use lest it lose out to theworse. Once weaccept this understanding perhaps some of our imperfections will not occasion the cynicism and self flagellation of our society that exists today.

With this in mind let us assume that the FBI and CIA did, on occasion exceed their authority. Let us not in our efforts to correct the problem think that we can, by a stroke of legislation eliminate any need for covert intelligence operations. For we can rest assured that neither the Russians nor the Chinese will join us in this quest for a Utopian and nobler less secretive international or domestic community. Any hasty, unilateral acts of so-called purification on our part will not insure freedom in the U.S. or stability abroad.

In closing, while you and I do not currently see eye to eye on this issue, we can, by confining our thoughts and statements to the basic issues, as contrasted to denouncing personalities, have a better chance of securing an ultimate meeting of the minds in an effort to solve this complex and often seeming insurmountable enigma.

very sincerely yours,

William H. Lawrence



"I THINK IT'S TIME WE FOUND ANOTHER LINE OF WORK, PHILBRICK...."

Retired Agent Questions Morgan's FBI Position

ge 4 - Editorial Page "Asheville Citizen" Asheville NC January 30, 1976

was appalled to read the ry. on page 14 of your Jan. 1976, edition, captioned: en. Morgan Calls F.B.I. ost Dangerous Threat.'"

This story reported comnts made by U.S. Senator bert Morgan (D., N.C.) to the eville Area Chamber of nmerce on Jan. 15. Mr. rgan was quoted as saying he considered the FBI to be nation's most dangerous eat, adding, "It's just rotten he core." He elaborated that FBI has lied, openned mail d wiretaps illegally and ducted organized campaigns discredit individuals.

He said that the FBI had recordings critical of rtin Luther King Jr., made be played for audiences that g would be addressing.

I am a retired FBI agent, h 27 years service prior to my 1970 retirement. Twenty-five of these years were spent in domestic and foreign inspired intelligence type operations.

My response is that the charges made by Senator Morgan were not only grossly exaggerated but taken out of context, resulting in his distinguished audience receiving distorted and misleading information.

The abuses alluded to by the Senator must, on reflection, be viewed in context to the times that prompted them; times of bombings, massive riots, destructive confrontations, killings, maimings and peripheral atrocities, many of which were initiated by and led by revolutionary extremists. Nor should we forget the numerous riots, burning and looting of our major cities.

In balance, the nation's need for internal Security scrutiny protection intensified. FBI employes recognized the danger, felt that they had a responsibility to respond and, in good faith, initiated actions designed to neutralize, deter and contain violent activities as well as those threatening impending violence.

The central question for all of us should be: Has the FBI, with the help of countless dedicated local police agencies and concerned citizens, provided necessary and sufficient protection for the public and country in the domestic intelligence field, in context with a recognition that in any free society there is and should be a prejudice favoring all but the most violent attacks on society?

Remember: The framers of our Constitution were not so sure of the invulnerability of our form of government. Otherwise the preamble thereof would not have provided that our government is to take measures to insure its domestic tranquility and provide for its common defense. This mandate is an endless and often awesome responsibility.

Why is it so necessary for Senator Morgan to castigate and Cavil the current FBI under the enlightened and able leadership of Clarence Kelley? I know Mr. Kelley and was privileged to work under his immediate supervision in 1961, immediately prior to his retirement following which he served as Chief of Police at Kansas City, Missouri. It was only two years ago that he returned to the FBI, this time as its director.

I can certify Mr. Kelley as an honest, extrem competent, dedicated and fearing man.

This is not to assum sacrosanct and pious posi for no organization is per as is no individual. Our pective judgments as to correct methods of meeting solving problems may always be in accord.

It is one thing to try correct actual shortcomings tactical errors of our telligence agencies, includ the FBI: but, it is quite anot to wreck and demoralize agency, so vital to this count by publicly labelling it "rotten to the core" and as " nation's most dangero threat."

William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Dri
Spruce Pine

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

62-111-395 -

Robert Morgan
North Carolina

COPY

UNITED STATES SENATE
Washington, D.C.20510

February 3, 1976

Mr. William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Drive
Spruce Pine, North Carolina 28777

Dear Mr. Lawrence:

Thank you for taking time to write me and for your expression of your feelings about the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I admire your loyalty to the organization you served.

We have finished many long hours of hearing testimony regarding the activities of the FBI. Let me say that as a citizen and as Attorney General of North Carolina, I always supported the FBI and defended it when I heard it criticized.

It gives me no pleasure now to hold it in less high esteem than I did before, but after hearing testimony about its activities, especially under Mr. Hoover, I could reach no other conclusion but that the due process clause and the civil liberties of individuals were violated time after time. What may be worse, I got the feeling from the testimony of present FBI officials that they didn't plan to change things much, if at all.

I know that many fine people such as you served the Bureau and thir country well, but I cannot disregard the unchallenged testimony I heard during the past several months.

Thank you again for writing and with best wishes.

Sincerely yours,

Robert Morgan

RM/gpb

Reply To:Post Office Drawer 2719,Raleigh, North Carolina276
Federal Building-Cantury Post Office

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-

EXTENSION OF REMARKS OF CONGESSMAN ROY. A. TAYLOR

JANUARY 22,1976

Mr.Speaker, I would like to call my colleagues' attention to the editorial appearing in the U.S. News &World Report of January 26,1976,titled "Is America Going Mad?". In line with the editorial are not segments of the press, television commentators, and many spokesmen of the Congress going too far in emphasizing the negative and ignoring the positive0-in dwelling on the mistakes of the past rather than the problems of the present and the hopes of the future Are they not going too far in destroying the confidence of the American people and of people abroad in our American institutions--the FBI, the CIA, the Defense Department, the Congress----and in destroying the confidence in public officials both those serving today and many whose honorable servise has ended with death----J.Edgar Hoover, John F.Kennedy, Franklin Roosevelt.

Are they not tearing our nation to pieces in the eyes of the world and weakening fundamental institutions whose effective services are needed today and will be needed tomorrow. Why dwell so long on the negative and lose sight of the positive accomplishments, thereby giving people a defeatist attitude and placing doubt and mistrust between the people and their government.

This is serious because without public confidence our Democracy cannot operate and it cannot win and maintain respect abroad. I,too, want to know the truth and help right the wrongs established, but once the truth has been revealed I am content to let the facts take their place in history and agree with the editorial that no useful purpose is served by constantly repeating the mistakes of the past.

The future belongs to the people,communities and nations who have faith in themselves and in what they stand for and in what they are doing. My choice of a motto for the Bicentennial year is "Take pride in America's past and take part in its future."

The editorial follows:

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/ETHL

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-

COPY

ROY A.TAYLOR
11th District
North Carolina

CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

January 29,1976

Mr. William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Drive
Spruce Pine, North Carolina 28777

Dear Mr. Lawrence:

Thank you for your recent letter, the copy of your letter to Senator Morgan and the newspaper clippings.

I am not among those Members of Congress who have been criticizing the FBI and CIA. In my judgement both agencies are vitally essential. Tt is coincidental that you included the editorial,"Is America Going Mad" from U.S. News and World Report. This editorial made such sense to me that last week I placed a copy of it inthe Congrssional Record along with my own comments of agreement. Enclosed is a copy of my remarks for the Record along with a copy of a news release which I mailed to all news media in the Eleventh Congressional District.

I know that Senator Morgan will read your letter very carefully and will welcome the opportunity it affords him to respond to you directly.

Sincerely

Roy A. Taylor
Member of Congress

RAT:ao

Enclosure

MDR 16

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2ALM/EHC

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-

C O P Y

JESSE HELMS
North Carolina

UNITED STATES SENATE
Washington, D.C. 20510

January 30,1976

Mr. William H. Lawrence
314 Swiss Pine Lake Drive
Spruce Pine, North Carolina 28777

Dear Mr. Lawrence:

Thank you for your letter of January 26 regarding the unfair treatment being received by the F.B.I.. Rest assured, this is one Senator who has not been fooled by all this nonsense. We have had experience enough with so-called ad hoc committees which tend toward sensationalizing of their subject matter, and cater to a press hungry for leaks of sensitive information.

Of course, I'm sure the F,B,I, has made mistakes--who hasn't? What is important is that these mistakes have been few and far between, and the F.B.I. was and is the most honest and efficient law enforcement agency in the world.

When the country is faced with critical problems of inflation, people out of work, and the price of energy going out of sight, Congress does not need to be distracted from these important problems by a sideshow run by left-wing columnists and commentators.

Thanks again for writing. Please continues to share your thoughts with me.

Sincerely

Jesse Helms

JESSE HELMS: Jn

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE
62-116395-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. P. L. Mack
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 1/27/76

1 - Mr. D. W. Moore
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. T. W. Leavitt
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. F. A. Tansey

FROM : T. W. Leavitt

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY '75

At 6:10 p.m., 1/27/76, at the request of Executive Assistant to Deputy Associate Director (Investigative) Paul L. Mack, Deputy Assistant Director Thomas W. Leavitt requested that we determine facts surrounding a United Press International (UPI) news release 1/27/76 indicating the Senate Select Committee (SSC) was conducting an investigation in San Diego concerning the alleged FBI promoted warfare against blacks. Facts set forth indicating additional SSC members are currently in San Diego and according to news reports are to interview SAC, San Diego, Ronald L. Maley.

Intelligence Division Night Supervisor F. Anthony Tansey subsequently contacted SA Paul V. Daly, Office of Legal Counsel; SA Seymor F. Phillips, Senstudy project; and, IS-1 Section Chief Joseph G. Deegan. It was determined that two SSC investigators, Michael Madigan and Lester Seidel, were both in San Diego last week investigating information concerning the FBI and Secret Army Organization (SAO) involvement in specific activities in the San Diego area. Previous FBIHQ clearance had been obtained and "waiver of confidentiality agreement" authorizations were approved for those two Committee members to speak to two current Agents and two former Agents in the San Diego area concerning SAO investigations. No one was aware of any current Committee investigators being in the San Diego area in connection with any other investigation involving the FBI.

At 7:21 p.m., SAC Maley was telephonically contacted by Night Supervisor Tansey and was apprised of the UPI dispatch dated 1/27/76 at San Diego. Maley stated this was a new situation (pertaining to the Black Panther Party and the US Organization), different from the matter regarding the SAO wherein two SSC investigators interviewed two current and two former FBI Agents last week. Maley stated the first he learned of this was an article in Monday night's newspaper followed by a clarification in the San Diego "Union" newspaper on Tuesday, 1/27/76.

REC-100 62-116375 1366

Enclosure

ENCLOSURE

MDR 16

FAT:dsh
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP3 ALM/EHL

CONTINUED - OVER

8-5

84 FEB 25 1976

Maley stated the article goes into some length that Michael Madigan and Lester Seidel, both members of the investigating staff of the SSC, were in San Diego conducting investigation relative to the FBI and SAO in the past. The article further states that another investigator from the SSC, named Arthur Jefferson, is scheduled to arrive in San Diego today (1/27/76) to begin a probe of FBI attempts to encourage warfare in 1969 between rival black nationalist factions in San Diego and Los Angeles. The article continues that the FBI already has turned over to the Senate panel a "1200-page document confirming that the FBI attempted to foster strife among blacks throughout the nation." An afternoon meeting was scheduled 1/27/76 between Arthur Jefferson and Leon Williams, San Diego's first black City Councilman.

Maley stated the article in the "Union" newspaper did not indicate he, Maley, was to be interviewed. He did locate the Monday night article in the San Diego "Evening Tribune" which indicated that Maley would be interviewed.

Maley stated that under no circumstances would he submit to interview by SSC investigators without first contacting Office of Legal Counsel and securing a waiver of his confidentiality agreement. Maley further stated he had earlier in the day forwarded a clipping to Inspector-Deputy Assistant Director Homer A. Boynton, Jr., External Affairs Division, concerning a press release which had been made by Madigan and Seidel when they were in the San Diego area. Maley expressed considerable concern that the investigators for the SSC seem to spend a great deal of their time making press releases (mostly unfavorable to the FBI) and very little of their time interviewing or investigating the facts. Maley stated that two articles, in Monday night's paper and in Tuesday's paper, were indicative of the type of press releases being made. He stated nobody has contacted him about interviews but he has read their intentions in the paper.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENSTUDY '75

Maley was advised to submit pertinent information to FBIHQ by teletype and he reiterated he would not talk to any investigators without first securing specific approval of Office of Legal Counsel.

ACTION:

For information. Copy of the UPI dispatch 1/27/76 attached. When San Diego teletype is received, it will be analyzed and any appropriate action taken.

SAN DIEGO (UPI) -- THE SENATE INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE IS INVESTIGATING CHARGES THE FBI PROMOTED GUERRILLA-STYLE WARFARE AGAINST BLACKS AND POLTICAL DISSIDENTS IN SAN DIEGO DURING THE LATE 1960S AND EARLY 1970S, IT WAS REPORTED YESTERDAY.

THE SAN DIEGO EVENING TRIBUNE SAID TWO COMMITTEE INVESTIGATORS HAD BEEN SENT TO SAN DIEGO TO TALK WITH SAN DIEGO POLICE, THE FBI AND AT LEAST ONE ELECTED OFFICIAL.

AMONG THOSE TO BE INTERVIEWED WERE RONALD HALEY, AGENT IN CHARGE OF THE FBI'S SAN DIEGO OFFICE, RICHARD HUFFMAN OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, FORMER POLICE CHIEF RAY HOOBLER AND CITY COUNCILMAN LEON WILLIAMS, THE NEWSPAPER SAID.9

UPI 01-27 08:55 AES

MDR 16
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/7/00 BY SP2 ALM/EHL

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-1366

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

Bulky 1120

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88321 Date: 2025

62- HQ-116395

Serial 1120 PT 1

BULKY

62-HQ-116395-E1120 PT 1

FBI - CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER

HQ - HEADQUARTERS BOX 3582

Class / Case #	Sub	Vol.	Serial #	
0062 116395		1	1120	ONLY

2/13/88848

RRP004Z72R

Excised
copy
for Senate

274-10125

WOMEN'S BAIL FUND

274-10125

FD-35 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/14/72

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172487)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS-NEW LEFT
(00:NY)

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of one LHM re the Women's Bail Fund.

Individuals mentioned in attached LHM are not characterized due to insufficient information in the files of the NYO to identify or characterize them.

NYO files contain no information re PATRICIA REINER with exception that she is subject of Minneapolis file 157-1288 captioned, "PATRICIA REINER, EM-BPP."

Information Identifies
Informant.

2-Bureau (Encs. 10) (RM)
2-Minneapolis (157-1288) (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Albany (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-) (PAM ENGLE)
1-New York (100-) (SHIRLEY TAYLOR)
1-New York (100-) (GERRY TOSCA)
1-New York (100-) (AMY LOWENSTEIN)
1-New York (100-172487) (MARY PINOTTI) (42)
1-New York

AJO:ihr
(13)

ST. 103

REC-13

19

AGENCY: ARMY, OSI, ONI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA

RAD (ISD, CI/J, CD) ID/S
DATE FORW: 3/21/72
HOW FORW:

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Information Identifies Informant

Sources utilized in this LHM are as follows:

1st source
2nd source
3rd source
6th source

} Informants Symbol #

SAS of the FBI observing demonstrations are as follows:

5/14/71	CARLOS R. DURAN PATRICK ARNALL ARTHUR F. PITTENGER
7/26/71	LOUIS E. BROWN ARTHUR F. PITTENGER

LEADS:

MINNEAPOLIS

AT MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA. Will conduct indices check re Women's Bail Fund and advise NYO re PATRICIA REINER's affiliation with the Fund.

ALBANY

AT ALBANY, NEW YORK. Inasmuch as the Fund has stated donations are tax exempt, Albany will determine if the Fund has filed to solicit charitable funds and/or filed articles of incorporation.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will determine if account #046-514716 at Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. is account of Women's Bail Fund.

NY 100-172487

NON-SYMBOL INFORMANT ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

4th source

5th source

7th source

Sources

CAUTION: NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED TO RESIDENT AGENTS, DETACH.

LEADS (CONT'D)

2. Will submit under separate communication NYO recommendation to interview Informant former PSI of NYO.

3. Will follow activities of the Women's Bail Fund.

CLASSIFICATION:

Enclosed LHM is classified, "Confidential" because it contains information from sources of continuing value, disclosure of which might reveal their identity and thus be prejudicial to the national defense interests of the US.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
March 14 , 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. NYfile (100-172487)

Women's Bail Fund

Unless otherwise stated, all sources in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On March 30, 1971, a first confidential source furnished literature, concerning the Women's Bail Fund, which was picked up at the Upper Westside Womens Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, New York (NY) on March 27, 1971. The literature captioned, "Women's Bail Fund" argued that the Women's House of Detention, in New York City (NYC), should not exist and that "the Women's House of Detention, along with the prisons and jails across the country, is a weapon used by the power structure here in America to oppress and exploit the people of poor communities." It further relates that "Women have come together in New York from many different organizations to form a Women's Bail Fund for all the sisters inside the House of Detention. The Bail Fund is also working to prepare simple pamphlets on law because of the total lack of any legal resources in the House of Detention and secure legal assistance where needed." The address is listed as the Women's Bail Fund, P.O. Box 637, Cooper Station, NY, NY 10003.

On August 26, 1971, the first source furnished literature on the Women's Bail Fund which stated, "The Women's Bail Fund is a coalition of Third World and white women who are:

".....raising bail to release women prisoners from Rikers Island.

"...establishing communication with women inside.

"....assisting women who are bailed out in meeting their needs.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

19

"....providing legal information for prisoners.

"....making public the torture these women undergo.

"....supporting prison struggles everywhere."

On April 12, 1971, a second confidential source made available a flyer on the Women's Bail Fund which was distributed at the National Womens March on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. The flyer, captioned, "Victory to the NLF and All Oppressed Peoples" states "Women in Vietnam and in the United States are fighting for the right to live: for the very right to exist.....the U.S. is now dotted with concentration camps for the poor and non-white: the jails.....But imprisonment doesnt' break the spirit of the sisters in jail. They resist! When denied their dignity, they organize and fight back. When one sister is beaten they organiz_ and resist. In the coldest part of winter when the boilers had broken down, the women worked in freezing temperatures in cold water to do the laundry-not 'because the pigs made us do it - but for our own beautiful sisters.' .....We Vietnamese, Black, Latin, White and Asian-american women are united in our struggle - we share common goals and face a common enemy. We express our complete solidarity with the NLF and shall work to bring the victory there."

On May 14, 1971, Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed a demonstration in front of the NYC Women's House of Detention sponsored by the Women's Bail Fund and Youth Against War and Fascism (YAWF). The demonstrators chanted slogans calling for release of their "sisters" from jail and expressed opposition to a proposed move of the inmates of the Women's House of Detention from its downtown site to the Rikers Island Prison Facility. The demonstrators called this proposed move an attempt to isolate the "sisters from their supporters."

By means of a loudspeaker, the demonstrators called to several inmates of the House of Detention who appeared in the upper storey windows, obtained their names and place of arrest. This information allegedly was to be used to obtain bail for the prisoners in question. Thereafter, several speakers denounced the jails as concentration camps and called for the release of the "political prisoners." in the House of Detention. Among the speakers was Shirley Taylor of the Women's Bail Fund and a former inmate of the Women's House of Detention.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

Women's Bail Fund

YAWF

YAWF is the youth group of the Workers World Party (WWP).

NY

WWP

The WWP was founded in 1959 by individuals who disagreed with policies of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The WWP dissidents advocated unconditional support of the Soviet Union and the building of a revolutionary party geared to the overthrow of capitalism. More recently the WWP has called for peaceful solutions to Sino-Soviet disputes, however, the WWP generally supports the People's Republic of China in its ideological differences with the Soviet Union.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A third confidential source advised on May 18, 1971, the Women's Bail Fund has called for victory for the Vietcong and is setting up a "phone chain" to be able to call for "action against the transfer of women from the House of Detention to Rikers Island."

On June 6, 1971, the third source advised the Women's Bail Fund will have a "major bail out of women" from the Women's House of Detention from June 10 to June 13, 1971 at the Washington Square Methodist Church. It will include four days of "discussions, films, counseling and information services" for inmates and their families. The coordinator for the Bail Fund was identified as Pam Engle, telephone number 989-6717.

On July 26, 1971, SAS of the FBI observed a picket-type demonstration at 51st Street and Avenue of the Americas protesting the existence of all jails. Among the groups represented was the Women's Bail Fund.

On August 4, 1971, a fourth confidential source advised the following checks were among those drawn from the bank account of Lubell, Lubell, Fine and Schaap, Attorneys-at-Law, 103 Park Avenue, NY, NY.

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's Bail Fund

Date	Payee	Bank of Deposit and/or Endorser
June 25, 1971	Women's Bail Fund for $2,000.00	Chemical #046-514716
June 25, 1971	Women's Bail Fund for $3,500.00	Patricia Reiner 4th N.W. National Minneapolis, Minnesota

This information is not to be made public except in a usual proceeding following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. Frank V. Scuderi, Assistant Secretary, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 253-15 Union Turnpike, Floral Park, NY.

The source no longer has custody of the basic documents from which the check information was obtained.

The fourth source advised on January 5, 1971 that Jonathan W. Lubell, William H. Schaap, Stephen L. Fine, Neal L. Gantcher and David G. Lubell are all members of Lubell, Lubell, Fine and Schaap Law Firm.

A fifth confidential source advised on February 25, 1970, that as of July, 1968, William Schaap, an attorney for Lubell, Lubell, Fine and Schaap, was a member of the Board of Directors of the National Lawyers Guild (NLG).

D.C.

The fifth source advised on February 25, 1970, William Schaap, Neal Gantcher and Stephen Fine had reservations to attend the NLG, 31st National Convention, February 20-23, 1970 in Washington, D.C.

On April 17, 1969, a sixth confidential source advised that as of May, 1969, Jonathan Lubell was President of the New York City Chapter of the NLG.

Jonathan [illegible] Lubell

NLG

NLG is a communist front organization of lawyers and law students dedicated to Communist Party, USA and New Left ideals for radical change of the social, economic and judicial systems in the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's Bail Fund

On January 6, 1972, the first source made available a one page leaflet distributed through the mails by the Women's Bail Fund and dated December, 1971. The leaflet is a request for funds for the Bail Fund with the notation that donations are tax exempt. The leaflet, in part says, "The Women's Bail Fund is one arm of the growing nationwide prison solidarity movement. During the past year we raised bail to release over 120 women who have been imprisoned while awaiting trial....."

On January 23, 1972, a seventh confidential source advised that Post Office Box 637, Cooper Station, NY, NY, is subscribed to by the Women's House of Detention Bail Fund and rented by Mary C. Pinotti, 86 East 3rd Street, NY, NY (Telephone 777-5823.)

The third source advised on February 10, 1972 the Women's Bail Fund is trying to obtain a grant from the NY People's Life Fund (PLF), however, they have been advised by the PLF that they may receive a loan rather than an outright grant. The source advised the Fund participated in a demonstration a month ago at the New York City Correctional Institution at Riker's Island, NY, however, said its activities seem to be limited. The source advised that two principal activists of the Women's Bail Fund are Amy Lowenstein and Gerry Tosca.

[illegible]

The NY PLF is a fund set up by the War Tax Resistance (WTR) to grant loans or funds to local groups in the NY area.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The WTR is a national organization which encourages the non-payment of federal taxes as a protest to the war in Indochina.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/28/72

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (100-22702) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS-NEW LEFT

(OO: NEW YORK)

Re New York airtel to the Bureau dated 3/14/72.

On 4/19/72, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that no certificate of incorporation located in either the active file or the file records regarding any bail fund.

On 4/19/72, a second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that captioned organization has not filed with the State of New York to solicit charitable funds.

The second confidential source further advised that the captioned organization may fall within those certain persons who are exempted under New York State Law, Article 10-A, Solicitation and Collection of Funds for Charitable Purposes, Section 482-A. The second confidential source stated that in most instances charitable organizations are exempted under the exemption provision not requiring filing with the State of New York to solicit charitable funds whenever gross contributions during a fiscal year are not in excess of $1,000.

Z

(2)-Bureau (RM)
2-New York (100-172487) (RM)
1-Albany
GLS:mmq
(5)

REC-71
EX-112

-2

7 MAY 3 1972

NEW LEFT

3

55 JUN 2 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/28/72

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172487)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS - REVACT
(OO:NY)

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM regarding the Women's Bail Fund.

LHM is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as information received from sources of continuing value, if disclosed could impair their future effectiveness and therefore be prejudicial to the national defense interests. Indices of the NYO are negative concerning individuals mentioned in the LHM as being members of the Women's Bail Fund with the exception of AMY LOBENSTINE.

New York Office files reflect AMY LOBENSTINE is a member of the Women's Liberation Movement and, in 1969, was a member of the "People Against Racism", an umbrella-type organization financed by church groups working exclusively in White communities in opposition to the supremacy of White culture. LOBENSTINE is the wife of FARNSWORTH ELLIOT LOBENSTINE, subject of case captioned, "FARNSWORTH ELLIOT LOBENSTINE; SM - REVACT (VB); (New York file 100-165762, Bureau file 100-459419).

2 - Bureau (Encls.10) (RM)
1 - New York (105-108560) (AMY LOBENSTINE)
1 - New York
AJO:lab
(5)

ST-106
REC 16

100-4[illegible]-3

10 AUG 30 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

70 SEP 21 1972

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

August [illegible]

NY 100-172487

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Sources utilized in this LHM are as follows:

First source
INFORMANT

Second Source
SOURCE

Third source

SOURCE

Fourth source
INFORMANT

Fifth source
INFORMANT

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Inasmuch as the Women's Bail Fund has had several contacts with Weatherman subjects, New York will continue efforts to determine activities and structure of the Fund.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

August 28, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Women's Bail Fund

A first confidential source advised that Beverly Sterner, Channel 13 News, 304 West 58th Street, New York, New York, is affiliated with the Women's Bail Fund (WBF).

An article appeared in the March, 1972 issue of the "Liberated Guardian", captioned "Women's Bail Fund; Organizing Our Anger", written by five unidentified members of the Women's Bail Fund Collective.

The article relates "The Women's Bail Fund is a group of about 35 women in New York City that bails women out of jail (150 so far). They have been organized for over a year and a half and did their first bailout on December 20, 1970. They have been active in supporting other groups involved in the prison struggle. They do legal follow-up for bailed-out sisters who want it and have been talking with people about the prison struggle, why jails exist, who the real enemies are, etcetera."

The article is introduced by the following statement:

"For this article we wanted to talk about ourselves. So five of us volunteered to collect different thoughts from as many women as possible in our group and then pooled these reflections in this article, using the words from their raps."

The article, being reflections of the various members of the group, is a series of quotes by unidentified members concerning the WBF.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

3

Women's Bail Fund

The following are reflections of some WBF members carried under the subcaption "Our Roots - Why We Started - Why We Joined".

"There was a woman in my consciousness-raising group who was in the bail fund when it was first getting started and she talked with others about it. To some of us it was a very exciting idea. To others it was frightening - connecting to political activity as women. Ultimately it ended in a split of my small group on whether we should carry our newly raised consciousness to any sort of feminist political action or not.

"In the past, I was politically frustrated because I was only involved in one-shot actions. I saw what was happening in terms of how this system functions to oppress black people and that resulted in a lot of pain for me. I felt I had to reflect my stands in a day-to-day struggle. I had the sense that the women in the WBF were also aware of that need.

"When sisters want us to, we go to court with them. When I go to court I find that it can do bad things to my head. I make judgements like this jude is better than another one, but it's all shit. All judges are pigs. Or like feeling good that a sister got six months instead of five years when she shouldn't have gotten anything at all.

"I was in the House of Detention when there was the bail fund demonstration on December 20, 1970. The whole tier was so excited. When someone saw the first people she let out a scream and everyone rushed to the windows. As the chanting increased outside we started to sing and chant. They locked us in our cells so each person would be isolated and intimidated about chanting. But all the women kept it up. Everyone inside said the feeling about this demonstration was different than other demonstrations. There had been more contact. The women saw Afeni and Joan and another woman that they had known inside outside in the demonstration. That was real important.

"A lot of it was the bail fund. The bail fund banner with the address made it real that people were serious about supporting people inside. It wasn't going to be a one-shot deal.

Women's Bail Fund

The following are reflections carried under the sub-caption "Questions We Are Facing Right Now".

"There's a real dialectic between reform and revolution. So much of what we do is short-term support stuff that can be seen as reformist. When prisoners raise these demands it's understood to be revolutionary; when people on the outside raise them, they are felt to be reformist. I have done a whole lot of courtroom work, both in the bail fund and before too. In fact, the whole social work thing is what I come out of, which is why it is so hard for me to deal with all this ('cause I obviously reflect a lot of that work). Social work when it started back in the late 1800's and early 1900's came out of real radical circles, the radicals and feminists and such. And when you read MAO, he talks about service to the people as a revolutionary thing. But for us it feels weird because it has been co-opted. I think that the movement now, trying to recoup the revolutionary aspects, that original sense of service to the people, trying to help people survive.

"One of the ways to really keep ourselves out of the rut of being social workers is to engage in more political education among ourselves and to ask other groups how they've dealt with this question. Also we should be more involved in educating other people.

"We should be doing more for women inside. We need to really work on facilitating communications between the sisters inside the jail. Women prisoners have been slower to get organized but I'm sure this is because there is so much isolation in the women's jail. Concretely, we need to write more letters to find out what is going on, send literature, but also tell the women about each other, about what other women are thinking and feeling. This would stop the sense of isolation and increase the sense of solidarity.

"I think much of the movement is guilty of ultra-leftism. In China the Communists worked on a lot of things that were a lot less than what they ultimately wanted. We're too afraid of being contaminated by being involved in reform movements. We too often define our enemies too broadly and our allies too narrowly.

Women's Bail Fund

"I've been real impressed with what women in the group are willing to commit themselves to do and that they fulfill those commitments. And that atmosphere of responsibility affects new members too. This is real important. It helps me through the rough times and all the ideological hassles and struggles we go through. You really have a sense that everyone really wants to work things through, search for solutions, wants to hold together because we feel responsible for the work. Even the way people ask for leaves of absence when they are sick or too busy, that they feel they want to explain why they have to stop doing work for a while, shows people's commitment and responsibility."

> The "Liberated Guardian" was created in April, 1970, through active and violent dissent against the politics and policies of the "Guardian". Its major aims were to produce a "more revolutionary" paper, to operate collectively within it and to maintain by design a loose political position.
>
> The "Guardian" is self-described as an "independent radical newsweekly" which takes a strong left position but is not identified with any organized group. It is considered to be the largest radical weekly in America.

A second confidential source advised an account for the WBF was opened on July 6, 1971, for $3,500. The account was closed ten days later on July 16, 1971. This account was opened by Patricia Reiner of 2451 Aldrich Avenue South, Minneapolis. Reiner, on August 30, 1971, submitted a forwarding address of 855 South Cedar Lane, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383.

A third confidential source advised the WBF set aside money for Constance Trimble at the First National Bank, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The source advised two accounts were opened for the WBF on behalf of Trimble. One account was a savings account in the amount of $2,000; the other was a checking account in the amount of $2,800. The trustees for these accounts were listed as Neil B. Dietrich or Catherine Collins.

Constance Trimble was tried and found not guilty on a charge of first degree murder for making a telephone call which lured a St. Paul, Minnesota police officer to an ambush slaying which occurred in 1970.

On April 5, 1972, and April 8, 1972, a fourth confidential source advised Jennifer Dohrn and Judith Clark were in contact with various members of the WBF on these two days.

Judith Ann Clark is a member of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) - Weatherman faction and was underground in 1970 prior to her arrest on December 17, 1970 by Special Agents (SAS) of the FBI New York City, as a result of an outstanding arrest wanted for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution - mob action. Clark was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury at Chicago, Illinois in April, 1970, prior to her arrest. She was sentenced to three years, for which she spent nine months in the Cook County Jail, Chicago, Illinois, and was released in July, 1971, to serve the remaining time on probation in New York City.

Jennifer Ellen Dohrn is the sister of FBI Top Ten Fugitive Bernadine Rae Dohrn. Both sisters are alleged members of the SDS - Weatherman faction.

SDS was founded during June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan, and in the 1960's functioned as the leading New Left campus-based student organization in the United States. From a stance of "participatory democracy," the SDS moved to a radical-revolutionary position. It maintained a national office at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, until February, 1970. Internal factionalism during 1969 produced three main factions: Weatherman, Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), and Worker Student Alliance (WSA). The Weatherman and RYM no longer consider themselves associated with the SDS. The WSA faction continues to use the name SDS.

On April 14, 1972, a fifth confidential source advised that Judith Clark was in touch on April 3, 1972, with a Beth Last Name Unknown (LNU), at 466 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York, concerning the WBF.

The source advised that Clark, on November 5, 1972, was in touch with an unknown female and discussed the Wednesday night meeting of the WBF. Clark discussed the fact that Jeannie LNU, Estelle LNU and Laurie LNU would be at the meeting at 5:30 PM, that evening at Clark's residence. The source related that Sara LNU and Naomi LNU, both from the Defense Bail Fund, were also expected at the meeting. Clark discussed the fact that the WBF has no common politics and no common political direction at this point and the WBF could become a defense committee, not because it would be desireable, but because of a lack of any other direction.

The source advised that on the same day, Clark was in touch with Amy Lobenstine from the WBF at telephone number 663-1136, and both agreed to attend an education meeting of the Fund.

The fifth confidential source further related that Clark was in contact, on April 8, 1972, with a Marilyn Dalismer, 254-4498, and a Shelley Lawrence, 663-1136. Both were identified by the source as being associated with the WBF.

On April 21, 1972, the fifth confidential source advised Clark and Dohrn went to the residence of Marilyn Dalsimer, 110 Bleecker Street, Apartment 7D, New York City, telephone number 254-4498 on that day. Dalsimer was identified as a member of the WBF.

11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

August 28, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title Women's Bail Fund

Character Internal Security - Revolutionary Activities

Reference is made to New York memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 11/30/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-172487) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS - REVACT
(OO:NY)

Re New York airtel and LHM, 8/28/72, and captioned as above.

On 11/28/72, INFORMANT advised the Women's Bail Fund (WBF) is not a leading element and lacks any influence in the movement in New York City.

A review of the subject file discloses there is no structure to the WBF and that it is a coalition of women who belong to various groups in the New York City area, whose main purpose is to raise funds for selected women in jail.

It is noted that Weatherman subjects have contacted those involved in the bail fund. However, have decryed the lack of political direction of the WBF and would like to turn it into a defense committee because of a lack of any other direction. There is no indication that this has occurred, and the bail fund still remains a loose coalition of like-minded individuals from various groups seeking to raise funds for various purposes. Because of its lack of common political direction, it has had no influence and presently is ineffective in the movement.

In view of the above, the NYO is discontinuing investigation in this matter to be reopened upon receipt of pertinent information from sources that the bail fund is being redirected as a structured group for a common political and ideological purpose.

ST-113
REC-70

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

AJO:jss
(3)

23 DEC 4 1972

59 DEC 12 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Excised copy for Senate

274-10125

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Vol I

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/17/67

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. C[illegible]
Mr. C[illegible]
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. G[illegible]
Mr. Rosen
[illegible]
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-NEW)

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
SM-C

Attached are five (5) copies of an LHM relating to the captioned organization which plans a march on Washington, D.C., January 8, 1968.

Sources referred to in this LHM are as follows:

Source who furnished all details and copies of publications is SF 1773-S on 11/15/67;

Source used to document VIVIAN HALLINAN is SF 2470-S;

Source used to document TERENCE HALLINAN is SC 52-S;

Source used to document BETTY MEREDITH is SF 2082-S;

Source used to document VINCENT HALLINAN is CSNY 1057-S.

3 - Bureau (Encl. 5 - RM)
4 - San Francisco (1 - 100-NEW)
(1 - 134-44)
(1 - 100-7514) (WILPF)
(1 - 100-53769) (WILPF - MARIN CO.)

RML:cg
(7)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (SO), ~~GRD, CD~~
DATE FORW: 11-27-67
HOW FORW:
BY:

XEROX
FEB 2 1968

REC 67

100-448326

NOV 22 1967

INT. SEC.

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: 347
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 17, 1967

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

A source advised on November 15, 1967, that an organization captioned as above has been organized for the purpose of protesting the Vietnam War. The source stated that it is the objective of this organization to induce women by the thousands to travel to the White House, Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968 for a demonstration to end "this dishonorable war".

The source stated that the person who is acting as executive secretary for this organization in the San Francisco Bay Area is Vivian Hallinan and that she is being assisted by Elizabeth Meredith.

Re: Vivian Hallinan:

Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962 that his mother would be willing to join the Communist Party (CP) if her husband, Vincent Hallinan would also join.

The most recent CP activity on the part of Terence was on October 14, 1967, when he attended a meeting of the Northern California District CP Committee held at San Francisco.

Vivian Hallinan was arrested on a civil rights sit-in demonstration at Auto Row in San Francisco, in April, 1964. Sergeant William Davis, San Francisco County Jail Number 2, San Bruno, California, advised on August 22, 1966, that Vivian Hallinan served a month in the County Jail from July 5, 1966 to August 2, 1966 having been found guilty on a sit-in charge.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100 448326 — 1

ENCLOSURE

XEROX

FEB 7 1968

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Re: Elizabeth Meredith,
also known as
Betty Meredith

A source advised in 1954 that Betty Meredith of 55 Woodside Way, Ross, California, was considered by the CP to be highly trusted in regard to CP activities.

Re: Vincent Hallinan

Vincent Hallinan was candidate for President of the United States on the Independent Progressive Party ticket in 1952. This party was formed in California in 1948 and ceased to exist in 1954, when it failed to poll sufficient votes to remain on a California ballot. The California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities in its 1955 report on page forty-six, states in part that the Independent Progressive Party in California was quickly captured by the communists and soon was being operated lock, stock and barrel by the Communist Party of California.

A source advised on April 20, 1966, that Vincent Hallinan was the Treasurer for American Institute For Marxist Studies (AIMS).

A characterization of AIMS is contained in the appendix.

According to the source, it is the aim and objective of Vivian Hallinan when she goes to Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the Rankin Brigade to get herself arrested as she believes that nothing can be accomplished unless the women are arrested and then do their talking from jail.

A source made available the following material which relate to the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. A paper entitled, (1) "You Cannot Have Wars Without Women"; (2) a reprint of an article from the "San Francisco Chronicle" dated Saturday, May 20, 1967, entitled, "Jeannette Rankin Speaks Up". This article contains biographical sketch of Jeannette Rankin. (3) A letter signed by "E. Meredith", P.O. Box 993, Ross, California, under the date of October 26,

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

1967, setting forth objectives of the Rankin Brigade. Copies of these three publications are as follows:

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

YOU CANNOT HAVE WARS WITHOUT WOMEN

Women must use their minds, their voices, and their bodies to stop the killing in Vietnam; to do less is to ignore our special responsibilities to the human race.

"10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin made the above statement in May of this year. Fifty years ago, as the first woman elected to Congress, she voted against World War I. She has consistently maintained her struggle for peace, and at 86 she is as courageous and vigorous as ever--an inspiration to all women.

The presence of the United States forces in the internal struggle of Vietnam is immoral and illegal. There can be no possible justification for our inte ference in the domestic affairs of this tiny distant land.

This 86-year-old woman has stated that she is wil ing to stay in jail until the bombing is stopped. N all women are free to join her, but we can assure her that thousands of women will march peacefull beside her. Some will picket, others will go to ja with Miss Rankin. Every woman's participation i equally valuable. We are confident each one will the maximum of which she is capable.

On January 8th, women from all over the land wil converge on Washington to demand the end of this dishonorable war. We shall come as individuals, or as organizations, but we shall join together as concerned women under the aegis of Jeannette Ra

Chairman:
Jeannette Rankin

Executive Secretary:
Vivian Hallinan

For more information, write to:

Jeannette Rankin Brigade
c/o Vivian Hallinan
61 Peninsula Road
Belvedere, California

WILL YOU JOIN US TO SAVE THE MEN YOU LOVE

Jeannette Rankin Speaks Up

War's Unremitting Foe

Atlanta, Ga.

Jeannette Rankin, the only member of Congress to oppose this country's entry into both World Wars, says the nation's women should band together to halt the war in Vietnam.

"If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary, that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women," she says.

Miss Rankin, the first woman ever to serve in the House of Representatives, said in an interview: "We've had 10,000 women sit back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. To me, that is worse than the old Hebrew sacrifices."

At 86, she is still battling her old enemy — war.

"It isn't a question of war against Germany, Japan or Vietnam. It's just that the whole system is very stupid.

"War is nothing more than a method of settling a dispute, but it has nothing to do with the dispute. In fact, you never have the same issues at the end of war that were present at the beginning."

AP Wirephoto

JEANNETTE RANKIN
No time to be polite

SUFFRAGETTE

Miss Rankin, an outspoken leader in the struggle which eventually allowed women to vote under the 19th Amendment, suggests that women today — as they did on the suffrage issue — band together to "do everything possible" to end the war.

"We — women — should picket everything," she says. "This is no time to be polite. The Army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says, 'come on and fight.'

"But they don't take the politicians and decision-makers to fight."

Miss Rankin is still active, with a gracious charm and a sharp sense of humor. She does not make many public speeches now although she did address an Atlantans for Peace meeting Thursday night.

ROLL CALL

Miss Rankin was Congressman-at-large from Montana from 1917 to 1919. In 1940 she was elected to the House for one term.

Now living at Watkinsville, Ga., she recalls vividly the dramatic night in 1917 when the House debated the war resolution against Germany.

She had taken office only three days before, and she had sat quietly throughout most of that long evening. Finally, shortly after 2 a.m., the time came for the fateful roll call.

The scene was tense. Monotonously, the clerk called the name of each member.

When her name was reached, Miss Rankin remained silent. Following the House custom, the roll was called a second time. With all eyes upon her, Miss Rankin rose unsteadily and, with voice quivering, said:

"I want to stand by my country, but I cannot vote for war."

In 1941, after being elected to a second term on the slogan, "Prepare to limit the defense; keep our men out of Europe," she cast another opposing vote — this time in an effort to prevent the U.S. from entering World War II.

"I'm opposed to all wars," she declares. "The war method must be abolished if we are to continue as a civilization."

Associated Press

Ohio Woman Loses Third Son to War

Hamilton, Ohio

Birdie Allen a widow, received word Thursday that her soldier son, Sergeant Samuel R. Allen, 32, was killed in action in Vietnam.

He was the third of her six sons to died in battle. Jim Allen was killed in Holland on September 20, 1944, three days after he parachuted into that country. Charlie D. Allen was killed April 14, 1945, after his army unit crossed the Rhine river.

Mrs. Allen's other three sons are ministers.

United Press

Care Here for 'Viet Kids' War Burns

A national committee organized to treat severely burned and wounded Vietnamese children announced here yesterday that six children will be brought to the United States for specialized medical care.

A spokesman for the Committee of Responsibility told a news conference that the group had selected children who could not possibly survive given only the treatment afforded in Vietnamese hospitals.

The children will probably be brought to San Francisco for lengthy treatment including plastic surgery when Saigon grants permission, according to Dr. Henry Mayer of Redwood City.

The committee's medical team has just returned from Vietnam. They found that 10,000 children under the age of 12 will be admitted to hospitals there this year with war-related wounds.

Mayer said that doctors throughout the United States have volunteered their services and hospitals will make facilities available.

************* Jeannette Rankin Brigade********* P.O. Box 993
Ross, Calif.
Oct. 26, 1967

Here it is, the long-awaited first call upon women to join the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. I'm enclosing ______ copies --hope you can find means to duplicate these for your community.

Much has happened since I talked to you --exciting things, much response, and some firm dates. A great deal of time was spent with Miss Rankin in order to do this in the way that she felt was best. A there were other very important things already in the hopper, such as Women Strike for Peace in Washington on Sept. 20, and the tremendous Stop the Draft Week of Oct. 16 - 21, all taking the time and energies of the peace groups.

The next full-scale convergence of women throughout the land wil be the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. We will go to Washington on January We will endeavor to enter the U.S. Congress to present our demand for end to the war. These plans will be formally announced on November 1 Veterans Day (formerly Armistice Day), when Miss Rankin will issue th Call to the women of the nation.

Now is the time to organize those in your community, to find tho who can go to Washington and those who will support us by lending the names or helping in other ways. Now is the time to bring this up in churches, P.T.A.'s and women's organizations, including union auxiliaries.

We have been in touch with many men, important in their fields -- labor, retired generals, professors, etc.-- who have offerred to sponsor the Brigade. But it was decided to have only women as national sponsors. Among these at present are Dagmar Wilson, Coretta King, Ruth Krause, Esther Pike, and Jessica Mitford. Interested men are being invited to join a "Men's Auxiliary", to help with fund-raising, e More on this anon. Several clergymen in the Bay Area have agreed to preach sermons on the subject of women and their responsibility of working to oppose war.

Ideas for supportive action in local communities are needed and welcome. Please let me know what you are doing and planning.

Yours for peace,

P.S. Please forgive a mimeographed letter, but I have so many people to contact and the time is short!

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

The source further advised that the Marin Chapter of the Women's International League For Peace And Freedom (WILPF) is supporting the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in every way possible.

A characterization of the WILPF is contained in the appendix.

1

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR MARXIST STUDIES

A source advised on April 9, 1963, that on April 7, 1963, at a meeting of the District Committee of the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA), of New England, held in Boston, Massachusetts, HERBERT APTHEKER stated he was developing an organization called American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS), which would eventually legalize the CP. He stated AIMS would publish literature on History, Science, Physics, Archeology and other subjects which would be put out quarterly with various supplements.

A second source advised on June 30, 1966, that HERBERT APTHEKER was elected to the National Committee, CPUSA, at the 18th National Convention of the CPUSA, held June 22-26, 1966, in New York City.

A third source advised on June 7, 1963, that on June 3, 1963, HERBERT APTHEKER spoke at the CPUSA, New York District Board meeting concerning AIMS. APTHEKER stated that AIMS would unite and strengthen the CP although the CP would not be connected with it. He stated AIMS was being formed to operate within the scope of the McCarran and Smith Acts and would legally bring Marxist material and opinions to the attention of American scholars and the general public.

A fourth source reported on August 29, 1966, that AIMS issues a "Newsletter" every other month. This source also made available the information that AIMS issues publications and holds symposiums concerning Marxism.

A fifth source advised on May 9, 1967, that as of that date, AIMS was located on the fifth floor west of 20 West 30th Street, New York, New York.

APPENDIX

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM

In a leaflet dated January, 1962, WILPF described itself as follows:

"What is the WILPF?

"It is the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an international, interracial organization striving for peace and freedom by non-violent democratic methods. It was founded in 1915, during the first World War, and its first president was JANE ADDAMS, the first American woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

"How Does it Work?

"It keeps its membership informed on current problems through its legislative office in Washington. It issues its own pamphlets, study kits, fact sheets, and cooperates with like-minded organizations. WILPF has consultative status at the United Nations on a national and international level.

"What Does it Do?

"WILPF, through its local branches, sponsors public discussion on such topics as disarmament and world law, nuclear testing, civil defense, Berlin, civil rights, etc. Through its Peace Action Committee, WILPF initiates peace walks, vigils, and meetings, as an organization and with other peace groups. Peace education for children is a special concern of WILPF.

"How Is it Set Up?

"The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has its national headquarters at JANE ADDAMS House, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 3, Pa., where its monthly paper, FOUR LIGHTS, is published. Its legislative office is at 120 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington 2, D. C. International headquarters are in Geneva. The International meets every three years. It conducts summer schools, peace congresses and publishes its magazine, PAX."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 17, 1967
San Francisco, California

Title : JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Character :

Reference : San Francisco memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: November 27, 1967

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) (P)

SUBJECT: "CHANGED" (6)
JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Title marked "Changed" to add one more "N" in JEANNETTE as obtained from the Congressional Directory.

RE: Seattle teletype to the Bureau, dated 11/22/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten (10) copies and for WFO two (2) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. Copies were sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service and the USA, Seattle.

The Seattle Office has an active COMINFIL case on SWAP. A preliminary inquiry was conducted regarding MAD-FAD without developing evidence of CP domination or control. The AFSC is not under investigation, but a dead file is maintained so investigation can be instituted if sufficient CP infiltration develops, pursuant to Section 87E, M of I.

The LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL because information furnished by the sources used, if disclosed, might compromise these regular informants of continuing value. The first source is SE 691-S; the second is SE 648-S; and the third is SE 711-S.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

3 - Bureau (Enc.10) (REG)
2 - WFO (Enc.2) (REG)
4 - Seattle (1 - 100-29048)
RBC/cjw (1 - 100-28340) (MAD-FAD)
(9) ~~(1 - 134-547A)~~
(1 - 100-27547) (VIDEM)

FEC 27/ -

NOV 29 1967

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

DIV. SEC.

FEB 7

Approved: ________________ Sent ________________ M Per ________________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Seattle, Washington
November 27, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

B. APPROX. 1916

On November 27, 1967, a confidential source reported Mrs. DAGMAR WILSON, representing Women Strike for Peace (WSP), spoke at the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Hall, Seattle, Washington, during the evening of November 21, 1967, under the sponsorship of Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP). A summary of SWAP's activities distributed at the meeting indicated Mrs. WILSON is one of the founders of WSP and was a guest at a brunch that day given by ANCI KOPPEL, Chairman of SWAP, whereat SWAP's steering committee met informally with WILSON.

Mrs. WILSON announced plans are being made to organize a Jeannette Rankin Brigade for a peaceful invasion of Washington, D. C. on January 8, 1968, under the auspices of Mothers and Fathers Against the Draft (MAD-FAD) with the support of WSP. She said she hoped the assistance of draft resistance groups across the nation could be enlisted for the event. WILSON indicated JEANNETTE RANKIN is, or was, a member of the United States Congress.

> With regard to WSP, the "People's World", a West Coast communist newspaper, in its issue of October 20, 1962, quoted Doctor FRANCES HERRING, national leader of WSP, as stating the organization "was composed of autonomous local groups 'open to women of any race, religious creed or political ideology'".

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COPIES DESTROYED
3 43 MAY 11 1971

100-448326-5

ENCLOSURE

On May 3, 1965, a second source made available a leaflet distributed by SWAP which stated in part that Mrs. DONNA ALLEN, a national leader of WSP; Mrs. DAGMAR WILSON, founder and leader of WSP; and RUSS NIXON, General Manager of the "National Guardian" (see Appendix Section) were "found guilty of contempt in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia for refusing to testify at a closed meeting of HUAC (they had expressed a willingness to testify at an open hearing where their views would not be subject to possible distortion by HUAC, as has happened at other closed HUAC hearings)".

The AFSC is the social out-reach arm of the religious group known as the Society of Friends (Quakers).

SWAP and its chairman, ANCI KOPPEL, are characterized in the Appendix.

MAD-FAD at Seattle was described in October, 1967, by the first source as being a small group headed by JOSEPH and DORIS LEAVY, parents of a draft-age son. The LEAVYs have been active in Vietnam war protest matters in the past.

Leavy

With regard to JEANNETTE RANKIN, the Biographical Directory of the American Congress (1950 edition) contains the following information:

"RANKIN, JEANNETTE, a Representative from Montana; born near Missoula, Missoula County, Mont., June 11, 1880; attended the public schools, and was graduated from the University of Montana at Missoula in 1902; student at the School of Philanthropy, New York, N. Y., in 1908 and 1909; social worker in Seattle, Wash., in 1909; engaged in promoting the cause of woman suffrage in the State of Washington in 1910, in California in 1911, and in Montana 1912-1914;

> visited New Zealand in 1915 and worked as a seamstress in order to gain personal knowledge of social conditions; elected as a Republican to the Sixty-fifth Congress (March 4, 1917-March 3, 1919); was the first woman to be elected to the National House of Representatives; did not seek renomination in 1918, having become a candidate for the Republican nomination for Senator, but was unsuccessful; was also an unsuccessful candidate on an independent ticket for election to the United States Senate; engaged in social work; elected to the Seventy-seventh Congress (January 3, 1941-January 3, 1943); was not a candidate for renomination in 1942; resumed lecturing and ranching, and is a resident of Helena (Avalanch Ranch), Mont."

The first source said the chairman of the meeting at the AFSC Hall was TAIMI HALONEN who gave a biographical sketch of Mrs. WILSON's life, including the information she is an illustrator of children's books.

> A third source stated in October, 1967, TAIMI HALONEN was then Chairman of the Ballard-Greenwood Club of the Communist Party (CP), and a member of the North Central CP Section Committee.

In her talk, Mrs. WILSON reportedly stated the recent March on Washington (D. C.) held October 21, 1967, had been very exciting, and she had been among those arrested. She said the soldiers were more compassionate with the women than were the police and were slow in using force on women. She stated she recently visited Hanoi and found the people warm and gentle. Even when she was in an area which had been bombed, the people were sympathetic to her and seemed to regard her somewhat as a heroine. She related one Catholic church had been bombed five times. One Vietnamese official picked a bouquet of flowers and gave them to her as a symbol they want peace and not war. Some of the Vietnamese women told her and other delegates they did not want to kill American soldiers and hoped these soldiers could be dissuaded from going to war and getting killed.

Mrs. WILSON went on to relate the State Department would like to get her passport, but she is determined to go where she pleases. Following her talk, she answered questions. A collection from the crowd of some 175 people present netted about $146.00, according to an announcement.

On November 21, 1967, the "Seattle Times" published the results of an interview with Mrs. WILSON, which was conducted prior to the meeting at the AFSC Hall. A reproduction of the article is attached.

The "Seattle Times" is a daily newspaper published at Seattle, Washington.

Vietnam Issue Viewed As Peace, Not Politics

By PAUL HENDERSON

"It matters not [illegible] the virtue lies in Communism or democracy," said the pacifist-housewife, recently returned from Hanoi.

"What matters is that we learn to live with each other in peace."

Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, 51, of Washington, D. C., was interviewed yesterday at the Friends Meeting House, 4001 Ninth Ave. N. E.

She said her two-week visit to the North Vietnamese capitol was "as a mother, and not to seek a political solution to the war."

AMERICAN BOMBS have created an ugly picture in Hanoi, and military installations are not the only targets, she asserted. She said she was sown bomb damage in residential areas "far removed from any strategic targets."

Schools and hospitals have been destroyed, and she herself "escaped by 20 minutes a bomb that destroyed a church," she reported.

Mrs. Wilson traveled with two other members of the Women's Strike for Peace, an organization she founded in 1961. Upon arrival at Hanoi, she said, they were presented flowers and steel helmets.

Mrs. Wilson said she talked with American prisoners, including a pilot who was repentant for his part in the war and "sorry he had not known the facts."

MRS. DAGMAR WILSON

MRS. WILSON said she is opposed to the war because "it is illegal and we shouldn't be there."

But certainly there has been a logical explanation for American involvement in Vietnam, a reporter said.

Mrs. Wilson dropped her frequent smile and reprimanded reporters "for not doing your homework."

United States involvement in Southeast Asia is for economic reasons, "prompted by the greedy capitalism that is destroying our ideals," she declared.

Mrs. Wilson said nations should have the right to determine their own destiny. And Communism in "that little country of Vietnam" is hardly a threat to democracy in the United States, she said.

Mrs. Wilson, an illustrator of children's books, said she has ignored a State Department demand for her passport.

"It's in my left-hand desk drawer, where it will stay," she said. "They aren't going to tell me where I can't go."

Page 33
"Seattle Times"
Seattle, Washington
November 21, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

"Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly, *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, "Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell", August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

APPENDIX

SEATTLE WOMEN ACT FOR PEACE (SWAP)

A source reported on May 17, 1962, a meeting of the Ballard-Greenwood CP Club was held in Seattle, April 25, 1962, at which TAIMI HALONEN was nominated to be the new Chairman of this Club. Along with other business of the evening, HALONEN said she expected to devote a good portion of her time to SWAP, an organization of peace forces that met recently with seven members. She said four of the seven were from the "left" but did not go into detail. She said the group had problems of an organizational nature because it was new, and she thought she could help.

On April 5, 1963, a second source stated a meeting of the University CP Club was held at Seattle on April 2, 1963. KEN ROSE, a member of the Club, reported the most influential peace organization in Seattle was SWAP.

On July 31, 1964, a meeting of the North Central CP Section Committee was held at Seattle. WILL PARRY, Section Chairman, said attention should be placed on three political questions - peace, civil rights, and labor. Under peace, he said CP clubs should inject the Women Act for Peace campaign into the election campaign. At another Section meeting, February 5, 1966, TAIMI HALONEN was praised for effective peace work and for her help in developing unity among the peace forces. Section-wide concentration was urged in assisting SWAP to visit 1,000 workers on the Vietnam issue.

A third source advised on February 24, 1966, a Northwest District CP Committee meeting was held at Seattle February 12, 1966. After lunch, the entire group participated in passing out leaflets pertaining to racial matters and the Vietnam war which carried the name of SWAP, 5411 Ravenna Avenue Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98105, which address has been used consistently by SWAP and is that of ANCI KOPPEL, also known as Mrs. CHARLES KOPPEL. KOPPEL has been and continues to be the coordinator and apparent prime motivating force of SWAP as of May, 1967.

A fourth source reported in 1945 ANCI KOPPEL was a member of the Professional Group of the Communist Political Association (CPA), also known as the Rogers CP Club at Seattle, Washington.

The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

8-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Seattle, Washington

November 27, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-29048

Title	JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Communication dated and captioned as above, at Seattle, Washington.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/30/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-new)

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN
BRIGADE ON JANUARY 8, 1967 IN
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING -
INTERNAL SECURITY
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOteletypes dated 11/28/67 and 11/29/67.

Transmitted herewith are 10 copies of an LHM for the Bureau describing possible anti-Vietnam war protest activity in Washington, D.C. Two copies are enclosed for the New York Office.

LHM is being disseminated locally to Secret Service, USA and military intelligence agencies.

Source used in LHM is WF 1777-S

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information reported by the source could lead to the identification of that source and compromise future effectiveness.

WFO continuing to follow and will report further pertinent details.

④ - Bureau (Enc. 10)
(1-105-138315)(VIDEM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)(RM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

GTT:dgp
(8)

AIRTEL

ENCLOSURE

REC 7 100-[illegible]

NOV 30 1967

FEB 8 1968

C. C. - Bishop

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, ED)
DATE FORW: 12-4-67
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN 100-[illegible]

F-59

Approved: ______________ Sent ________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535

November 30, 1967

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE ON JANUARY 8, 1967 IN WASHINGTON, D. C.

Inspector Thomas I. Herlihy, Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., advised on November 28, 1967, that he had received information from an official of the Pennsylvania Railroad to the effect that two Pennsylvania Railroad trains had been reserved for travel from New York City to Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968. Inspector Herlihy advised that these trains had been reserved by the "Jeannette Rankin Brigade" in New York City, but no further details were available concerning the possible use of the trains.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on November 28, 1967, that a Jeannette Rankin Brigade is being formed in various cities of the United States by members of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization. The source stated further that this Brigade is intended to be a "one shot" organization to hold demonstrations "all over" the United States on January 8, 1968, protesting the war in Vietnam and attempting to "bring the war machine to a halt."

The source stated that the Brigade has been founded in response to a statement made by former

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COPIES DESTROYED
343 MAY 11 1971

100-448326-4

DEMONSTRATION BY
JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
ON JANUARY 8, 1968
IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin to the effect that if large numbers of women protested the war and were arrested, it would bring the war machine to a halt in this country. The source stated that there is much dissension within the New York and Washington, D.C. groups of Women Strike for Peace concerning this organization as many of the women are opposed to the formation of another "peace organization." The source stated that a committee is being established within the Women Strike for Peace to organize civil disobedience during the demonstrations on January 8, 1968.

The source further stated that there will apparently be many organizations represented in the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in addition to the Women Strike for Peace. The source stated that there is no information at the present time as to exactly what cities will be the scene of these demonstrations.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
12/5/67
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. WC Sullivan
1 - Mr. CD Brennan
1 - Mr. RH Horner

REC-52 100-448475-1
~~105-138315-8295~~

airtel

EX-103

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The San Francisco Office has advised the Bureau of the receipt of information that an organization known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade has sent out a call for a demonstration to be held at the White House, Washington, D. C., on 1/8/68 in protest of the war in Vietnam.

For your information, Jeannette Rankin, the Chairman of the Brigade, is an 86-year-old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia, who served in the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919 and who was elected to that office for one term in 1940.

Rankin has repeatedly opposed U.S. involvement in foreign wars and has voted against declarations of war by the U.S. during both World Wars I and II. With respect to the Vietnam war, she has stated, "Ten thousand women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women." She has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing in Vietnam is stopped.

2 - All Field Offices

RHH:jes
(68)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

MAILED 7
DEC 5 1967
COMM-FBI

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

XEROX
7 1967

UNREC COPY FILED IN 100-448336

The Secretary of the Brigade has been identified as Vivian Hallinan, the wife of Vincent Hallinan who in 1966 was identified as the Treasurer for the American Institute of Marxist Studies, a communist front organization.

One source has described the Brigade as a "one-shot" organization formed by women in various cities to hold demonstrations "all over" the U.S. on 1/8/68.

In its call for the above demonstration, Brigade literature urges participants to enter the U.S. Congress to present demands for an end to the war.

All offices immediately alert sources concerning this demonstration. All information developed is to be immediately reported to the Bureau and Washington Field by teletype followed by memorandum, original and ten copies, under the above caption for dissemination to all interested agencies. Teletypes must contain sufficient identifying data to enable the Bureau to characterize organizations and individuals supporting the demonstration without resorting to file reviews. Such statements as "a Security Index subject" or "subject of a Bureau investigation" should not be used. The Bureau is not to be referred to its files for identifying information.

It is essential that all individuals with subversive backgrounds and subversive organizations participating in this demonstration be identified.

Informant coverage of groups that plan to support the Brigade and to participate in the demonstration is to be arranged. It is imperative that the Bureau be able to pinpoint subversive organizations and individuals participating in the demonstration.

Each office is to make particular effort to develop information regarding the financial backing of individuals and groups that may participate in the demonstration.

Copies of any printed material distributed in regard to the demonstration should be obtained and copies promptly forwarded to the Bureau as enclosures to letterhead memoranda. Where possible, the name and identifying data concerning individuals distributing literature and the name of the organization that issues it should be obtained.

Any information developed indicating a particular group or individual will attempt to force his way into Congress should be submitted expeditiously in order that appropriate dissemination may be made.

Washington Field, as office of origin, should alert all sources concerning the proposed demonstration, assure that appropriate and effective coverage of the demonstration is coordinated with other offices, and that all appropriate local authorities and Government agencies are apprised of developments.

Authorization for informants to participate in the demonstration is to be obtained from the Bureau. In order that the Bureau may keep the President and other appropriate Government agencies currently advised of developments, prompt attention and reporting by recipient offices is imperative.

The Atlanta and San Francisco Offices should be particularly alert to the development of information regarding the Jeannette Rankin Brigade's sponsorship of this demonstration. Additionally, these offices promptly institute an investigation under the caption "Jeannette Rankin Brigade." This investigation is to be conducted in accordance with instructions set forth in Section 87E, Manual of Instructions.

NOTE:

See memo C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan, dated 12/1/67, captioned as above, prepared by RHH:jes.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan 15
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO Mr. W. C. Sullivan 15

DATE: 12/1/67

FROM C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

C.D. Brennan

The San Francisco Office has reported that an organization known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade has sent out a call for women from throughout the Nation to demonstrate at the White House on 1/8/68. This call also urges participants to "enter the U.S. Congress" to present demands for an end to the war.

Jeannette Rankin, who is the Chairman of the Brigade, is an 86-year-old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia. She was a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919 and served one term in 1940. She voted against U.S. involvement in World Wars I and II. Rankin has publicly protested the war in Vietnam and has asserted her willingness to go to jail in protest of the bombing.

The Secretary of the Brigade has been identified as Vivian Hallinan, the wife of Vincent Hallinan who was identified in 1966 as the Treasurer for the American Institute of Marxist Studies, a communist front organization.

The above information has been furnished to the White House, the Department of State, the Attorney General and military intelligence.

In view of the Bureau's responsibility to identify subversive elements which may participate in the demonstration sponsored by this group and to keep the White House and other agencies advised of developments, it is felt that the field should be notified of the proposed demonstration and furnished with instructions for handling information concerning it, including the need for informant coverage of participating groups.

MCT ~~[illegible]~~

Enclosure

12-4-67

REC-52 100-447[illegible]-1

15 DEC 1967

RHH:jes
(8)

XEROX
DEC 7 1967

CONTINUED - OVER

UNREC COPY FILED IN 100-44[illegible]

Memo to Mr. Sullivan
RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

There is attached an airtel to all offices advising of this demonstration and furnishing instructions for its coverage and instructing our Atlanta and San Francisco Offices to institute investigations to further develop information concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached airtel to all offices be approved and transmitted.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/29/67

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE DEFERRED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-new)

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE ON JANUARY EIGHT NEXT. INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY.

REWFOTEL DATED NOVEMBER TWENTYEIGHT PAST CAPTIONED AS ABOVE. WF ONE SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN - S ADVISED THIS DATE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE IS A "ONE SHOT" ORGANIZATION FORMED BY WOMEN IN VARIOUS CITIES TO HOLD DEMONSTRATIONS "ALL OVER" THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY EIGHT NEXT. BRIGADE FOUNDED IN RESPONSE TO STATEMENT BY FORMER CONGRESSWOMAN JEANNETTE RANKIN TO EFFECT THAT IF LARGE NUMBERS OF WOMEN WERE ARRESTED FOR PROTESTING WAR IT WOULD "BRING THE WAR MACHINE TO A HALT." ABOVE SOURCE STATES MUCH BICKERING BETWEEN NEW YORK AND WDC GROUPS OF WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE CONCERNING THIS ORGANIZATION. SOURCE STATES CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE BEING PLANNED FOR THE AEEAIR. SOURCE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS. LHM FOLLOWS.

100-445475-X1

~~[illegible]~~

2 - Bureau
2 - Teletype Unit
2 - WFO

REC 39

EX 101

14 DEC 1 1967

GTT:dgp
(6)

TELETYPE

Xerox - 1

cc - [illegible]

54 DEC 7 1967

Approved: __________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

FEB 15 1968

D-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/28/67

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE DEFERRED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-new)

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE ON JANUARY EIGHT 1968 NEXT. INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY.

INSPECTOR THOMAS I. HERLIHY, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, ADVISED THIS DATE AN OFFICIAL OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD ADVISED HIM THAT TWO PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD TRAINS HAD BEEN RESERVED BY THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE IN NEW YORK CITY FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D. C., ON JANUARY EIGHT NEXT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO INSPECTOR HERLIHY.

NEW YORK REQUESTED TO ASCERTAIN DETAILS CONCERNING ABOVE.

100-445475-X

REC 39

14 DEC 1 1967

101

2 - Bureau
2 - Teletype Unit
2 - WFO

~~54 DEC 7 1967~~

GTT:dgp
(6)

cc - Kleinkauf

TELETYPE
Approved: _______ Sent _______M Per _______
Special Agent in Charge

FEB 15 1968

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

VIA TELETYPE
DEC 7 1967
ENCIPHERED

FBI WASH D C ---4---

244PM DEFERRED 12-7-67 SMS

TO DIRECTOR & WFO

WFO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY EIGHT 1968 NEXT INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY) ~~99:~~ 00 WFO

REBUAIRTEL DECEMBER FIVE LAST CAPTIONED AS ABOVE REGARDING PROPOSED JENNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE (JRB) SPONSORSHIP OF INSTANT DEMONSTRATION.

RELIABLE SOURCE INDICATES THAT DECEMBER SIXTY-SEVEN ISSUE OF "LA WISP", MONTHLY NEWSLET~~DS~~TER OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COUNCIL OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP), WHICH IS BEING MAILED TODAY (DECEMBER SEVEN) TO ENTIRE MAILING LIST CONTAINS ON PAGE ONE "A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN" TO PARTICIPATE IN ABOVE DESCRIBED BRIGADE JANUARY EIGHT NEXT.

WSP IS ALSO CIRCULATING COPIES OF REPRINT FROM SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE DATED MAY TWENTY LAST CONCERNING MISS RANKIN'S OPPOSITION TO WARS, AND IS COORDINATING LOCAL ACTIVITY TO FORM

END PAGE ONE

REC [illegible] 447 -2

8 DEC 11 1967

TWO COPIES TO WFO

Xerox Mr. Dugan
Mr Enlow

cc - Kleindienst

3 XEROX

DEC 1967

2-

THERN CALIFORNIA JRB CONTINGENT FROM OFFICE SPACE AND TELEPHONES AT WSP HEADQUARTERS, FIVE EIGHT NINE NINE WEST PICO BOULEVARD, LOS ANGELES.

MARY CLARKE, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP IS MEMBER OF NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE FOR JRB, AS WELL AS LOCAL COMMITTEE. ~~3XXX~~ EVA KORN AND CLARKE ARE SPEARHEADING LOCAL COMMITTEE, BOTH ARE ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP.

SOURCE TWO ADVISED IN JULY FIFTY FIVE THAT CLARKE WAS DROPPED FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY COMMUNIST PARTY (LACCP) IN SPRING FIFTY FIVE FOR PERSONAL REASONS AND NOT FOR ANY POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WITH LACCP.

SOURCE THREE REPORTED DURING NOVEMBER FORTY SEVEN KORN WAS MEMBER OF LACCP DURING YEARS FORTY SIX AND FORTY SEVEN.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP IS AFFILIATE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SAME TITLE HEADQUARTERED WASHINGTON, D. C., HAS SPONSORED DEMONSTRATIONS LOCALLY PROTESTING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM.

COVERAGE CONTINUING. LHM FOLLOWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE ONE IS ~~LA FOUR FOUR NINE ZERO S~~. SOURCE TWO IS LA ~~THREE EIGHT TWO FOUR~~ S. SOURCE THREE IS LA ~~THREE ZERO SIX ONE~~ S.

BUREAU HAS APPROVED THUMBNAIL CHARACTERIZATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP.

AIRMAIL COPIES BEING FURNISHED AT AND SF.

END

RM FBI WASH DC

R RELAY

Mr. Dugan
Mr Enlow

v. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/11/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReBuairtel dated 12/5/67, captioned as above.

Enclosed herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau setting forth activities for demonstration on 1/8/68.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Local law enforcement agencies cognizant.

Source used in LHM is WF 1777-S.

WFO will continue to follow and report pertinent details.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~GRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

ENCLOSURE

REC 8

(4) - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

14 DEC 11 1967

GTT:dgp
(6)

ENTERED

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

C. C. Bishop

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535

December 11, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on December 11, 1967, furnished a copy of the November, 1967, issue of "Memo." The "Memo" is self-described as the National Bulletin of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization. Page six of this publication sets forth plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade scheduled for Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968. A copy of page six is attached.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 17 1971

ATTACHMENT

ENC [illegible]

4

6

BRIGADE FORMED TO CONFRONT CONGRESS

Helena, Montana
November 27, 1967

To all American Women:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings - for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

Jeannette Rankin

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 8

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country. AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American. This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States! Come to Washington on January 8 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

*Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
*Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
*Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 8, American women will:

*PETITION the United States Congress
*CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America - programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

For further information about the Brigade, contact your nearest WSP group or write to the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 133 W. 72 St., N.Y. 10023

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/12/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (REGISTERED)
(Priority)

NCS/jkt

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (P)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: Washington Field

Re Bureau airtel dated 12/5/67, and Los Angeles airtel dated 12/7/67, captioned as above.

For the information of the Bureau, there are attached eight (8) copies of an LHM, with two copies each for the Washington Field, Atlanta, New York and San Francisco Divisions. Instant LHM contains data currently available in this office regarding the formation and plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

A classification of "Confidential" has been placed on this LHM to protect the symbol numbered informants utilized herein, who are identified as follows:

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW: 12-21-67
HOW FORW:
BY:

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encls. 8)(RM)(AM)
2 - Atlanta (Info)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
2 - New York (Info)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
2 - San Francisco (Info)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
3 - Los Angeles
  (1 - 100-61745)(WSP)
  (1 - 134-2199A)(~~EA 4490-S~~)

REC- 59 100-447115-9

20 DEC 16 1967

GGB/rem
(14)

G. C. Bishop

57 JAN 3 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

Source One LA 4490-S

Source Two NELL BORDEN, Screen Actors Guild, Hollywood (request) Member Steering Comm. [illegible]

Calif Source Three LA 3061-S CP member [illegible] Calif.

Source Four LA 3854-S

For the Bureau's information a sub-committee has been formed within the Southern California Council of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) to handle present activities to publicize the JRB. This committee consists of MARY CLARKE and EVA KORN, who are mentioned in the details of instant LHM. It also includes ~~LA 4490-S~~ and GERALDINE SHAPIRO (also known as GERRY SHAPIRO). The latter, is a relatively new member of the WSP having attended some six meetings between 2/7/67 and 10/10/67, and has not been the subject of active investigation by this office. To further protect ~~LA 4490-S~~, her name and the name of GERALDINE SHAPIRO are not being included in details of instant LHM, as it is hoped that suspicion may be directed toward SHAPIRO at a later date to indicate she might be an informant for some investigating body.

Calif

There has been no attempt to characterize the listed individuals in the "partial list of sponsors" set out in the "La Wisp" issue of December 1967, a xerox copy of which is attached, with the exception of LESLIE PARRISH and MARY CLARKE (the only local Southern California women). PARRISH has not been the subject of active investigation by the Los Angeles Division as she has been reported in attendance at less than five WSP activities.

Calif NELL BORDEN has advised that actress VIVECA LINDFORS, who formerly appeared in some Hollywood film productions, is a current member in good standing of the Screen Actors Guild. She was born 12/29/20 in Sweden, entered the United States at New York City on 4/8/46, and holds Alien Registration Number 626-49-64. Her last known address was 172 East 95th Street, New York City; and she is represented professionally by the William Morris Agency, New York City. LINDFORS name

44

appears as one of the JRB sponsors in the December 1967 issue of "La Wisp".

One copy each is being furnished the local offices of Secret Service; United States Attorney; Region II, United States Army; NISO, San Diego; and OSI, as it is felt each of these services would have an interest.

Coverage is continuing and with [redacted] in her present capacity, this office should be in a position to keep on top of this matter locally. The Bureau and interested offices will be promptly advised of any subsequent developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 12, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

The following information has been made available by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past:

Source One reported on December 7, 1967, that copies of "La Wisp", monthly newsletter of the Southern California Council of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP - see appendix) being mailed to the WSP mailing list on that date contained a "Call" from the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) "To all American women", announcing a proposed march on Washington, D. C., on January 8, 1968, when the United States Congress opens in joint session. This march would be to demand that Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops. (A xerox duplication of the first page of the above-mentioned December 1967 issue of "La Wisp", containing this "Call", is appended to this memorandum.)

The partial list of JRB sponsors included in this issue of the "La Wisp", contained the names of only two women presently active in the Southern California area, Mary Clarke (see characterization of her in the appendix page on WSP), and motion picture actress Leslie Parrish.

Source One has advised that Parrish has only recently become interested in activities of WSP and has attended less than five WSP activities. Source Two reported

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

9

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968

that Leslie Parrish is the professional name of Marjorie Hellen, who was reportedly born March 18, 1935, in Massachusetts, who holds Social Security number 174-28-2505. Her residence, as furnished by this source, is 8810 Dorrington, Los Angeles, California (90048); telephone CRestview 1-7936; with message service through telephone number 652-3380 (the Calder Agency, 8749 Sunset Boulevard, Hollywood, Los Angeles). She has formerly been a member of the American Federation of Radio and Television Artists, and is currently a member in good standing with the Screen Actors Guild, Hollywood, her dues being paid through May 1, 1968.

According to Source One, the Southern California Council of WSP is presently coordinating local activity to form a contingent of the JRB from Southern California. They are making office space and telephones in their Los Angeles headquarters, 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles available for this purpose. Spearheading the local committee are Mary Clarke and Eva Korn, both of whom are active in WSP. Mary Clarke is currently a member of the JRB's National Steering Committee.

> Source Three reported during November 1947, that Eva Korn was a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party (ASCCP) during the years 1946 and 1947.

To give publicity to the proposed activity of the JRB, the local WSP office is circulating a reprint from the "San Francisco Chronicle", issue of Saturday, May 20, 1967, page nine, which contained a feature article regarding the opposition to wars by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, for whom the JRB has been named. (A xerox copy of the reprint from the above-mentioned San Francisco, California, daily newspaper is appended to this memorandum).

[illegible]

June Sunderland, WSP activist from Santa Barbara, has indicated to the local WSPers, according to Source One, that Mrs. Vincent (Vivian) Hallinan of the San Francisco Bay area of California, is trying to get additional sponsors for this project. Sunderland also has told local WSPers that the

Rankin Brigade should be made up of only those women who volunteer to participate with the prior understanding that they should be ready to spend at least two months in jail for the commission of civil disobedience while in Washington, D. C.

Sunderland also suggested that a good way to recruit women to join the Brigade would be to make a pitch for recruits when Mary Clarke, Dagmar Wilson and Ruth Krause are making their respective speaking engagements across the United States since their return from a trip to North Vietnam, which they visited as representatives of WSP during the fall of 1967.

> Source Four advised during the summer of 1965 that June Sunderland, 3730 Hollister Avenue, Santa Barbara, California, had attended a 1967 "peace conference" in Helsinki, Finland, at the invitation of the Communist Party (CP), and that funds to cover her expenses were raised in part by the CP; and that following her attendance at the Helsinki affair she went on to Russia for ten days at the invitation and expense of the Soviet Government.

Source One learned that a communication was received from eastern sponsors of the JRB on December 7, 1967, indicating that the JRB march on Washington might not be held on January 8, 1968, but possibly would be set back until either the 15th or 22nd of January 1968, depending upon the date that the United States Congress would reconvene. The communication indicated that since the entire purpose of the Brigade would be to confront the opening joint session of Congress that it would be futile to schedule the march prior to the date Congress would reconvene. The suggestion was made that recruitment of local women to participate in the JRB be held in abeyance until a confirmation had been obtained indicating the date on which Congress would reconvene.

Source One, had indicated that although the "Call", as reproduced in "La Wisp", states, "There will be local actions across the country at the same time as the action in Washington, D. C., " that there are no current plans for

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968

any such simultaneous actions in Southern California.

The December 7, 1967, issue of the "Federal Register", notes that Congress is scheduled to reconvene on January 15, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DEC. 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

to all american women

"...I hope all women will respond to the following CALL and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress." Jeannette Rankin (first woman elected to Congress)

call (partial)

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN, who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home,

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 8th

as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American Troops

Congress use its power to heal the sick society at home

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. PETITION the United States Congress.

YOU DON'T HAVE TO GO TO WASHINGTON, D.C. TO PARTICIPATE. MANY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ARE ALREADY PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE. THERE WILL BE LOCAL ACTIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ACTION IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS: Mrs. Martin Luther King, Dagmar Wilson, Mary Clarke, Mary McCarthy, Jessica Mitford, Susan Sontag, Mrs. John C. Bennett, Mrs. Esther Pike, Kay Cole, Nikki Bridges, Mia Auerbakken Adjali, Jane Buckenholz, Judith Morse [illegible], Rosa Parks, Mrs. Jack Gilford, Mrs. Burton Lane, Leslie Parrish, Mrs. Benjamin S. Collins, Louise Peck, Mrs. John Burton, Vivian Hallinan, Viveca Lindfors

MAY 11 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

(send to WSP, 5899 W. Pico Blvd., Los Angeles 90019)

___I wish to join the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. ___Please send me more information.

NAME________________________________PHONE____________

ADDRESS_____________________________ZIP______________

CONFIDENTIAL

San Francisco Chronicle, Saturday, May 20, 1967, Page 9.

Jeannette Rankin Speaks Up

War's Unremitting Foe

Atlanta, Ga.

Jeannette Rankin, the only member of Congress to oppose this country's entry into both World Wars, says the nation's women should band together to halt the war in Vietnam.

"If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary, that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women," she says.

Miss Rankin, the first woman ever to serve in the House of Representatives, said in an interview: "We've had 10,000 women sit back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. To me, that is worse than the old Hebrew sacrifices."

Now 86, she is still battling her old enemy — war.

"Isn't a question of war against Germany, Japan or Vietnam. It's just that the whole system is very stupid.

"War is nothing more than a method of settling a dispute, but it has nothing to do with the dispute. In fact, you never have the same issues at the end of war that were present at the beginning."

SUFFRAGETTE

Miss Rankin, an outspoken leader in the struggle which eventually allowed women to vote under the 19th Amendment, suggests that women today — as they did on the suffrage issue — band together to "do everything possible" to end the war.

"We — women — should picket everything," she says. "This is no time to be polite. The Army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says, 'come on and fight.'

"But they don't take the politicians and decision-makers to fight."

Miss Rankin is still active, with a gracious charm and a sharp sense of humor. She does not make many public speeches now although she did address an Atlantans for Peace meeting Thursday night.

ROLL CALL

Miss Rankin was Congressman-at-large from Montana from 1917 to 1919. In 1940 she was elected to the House for one term.

Now living at Watkinsville, Ga., she recalls vividly the dramatic night in 1917 when the House debated the war resolution against Germany.

She had taken office only three days before, and she had sat quietly throughout most of that long evening. Finally, shortly after 2 a.m., the time came for the fateful roll call.

The scene was tense. Monotonously, the clerk called the name of each member.

When her name was reached, Miss Rankin remained silent. Following the House custom, the roll was called a second time. With all eyes upon her, Miss Rankin rose unsteadily and, with voice quivering, said:

"I want to stand by my country, but I cannot vote for war."

In 1941, after being elected to a second term on the slogan, "Prepare to limit the defense; keep our men out of Europe," she cast another opposing vote — this time in an effort to prevent the U.S. from entering World War II.

"I'm opposed to all wars," she declares. "The war method must be abolished if we are to continue as a civilization."

Associated Press

Watkinsville Ga.

AP Wirephoto

JEANNETTE RANKIN
No time to be polite

Ohio Woman Loses Third Son to War

Hamilton, Ohio

Birdie Allen a widow, received word Thursday that her soldier son, Sergeant Samuel R. Allen, 32, was killed in action in Vietnam.

He was the third of her six sons to died in battle. Jim Allen was killed in Holland on September 20, 1944, three days after he parachuted into that country. Charlie D. Allen was killed April 14, 1945, after his army unit crossed the Rhine river.

Mrs. Allen's other three sons are ministers.

United Press

Care Here for Viet Kids' War Burns

A national committee organized to treat severely burned and wounded Vietnamese children announced here yesterday that six children will be brought to the United States for specialized medical care.

A spokesman for the Committee of Responsibility told a news conference that the group had selected children who could not possibly survive given only the treatment afforded in Vietnamese hospitals.

The children will probably be brought to San Francisco for lengthy treatment including plastic surgery when Saigon grants permission, according to Dr. Henry Mayer of Redwood City.

The committee's medical team has just returned from Vietnam. They found that 10,000 children under the age of 12 will be admitted to hospitals there this year with war-related wounds.

Mayer said that doctors throughout the United States have volunteered their services and hospitals will make facilities available.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE, Also Known As Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/13/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

"CHANGED"
DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO:WFO)

C.D. Brennan

Title is marked "Changed" to indicate new date for the above demonstration which was originally carried as "DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968."

ReBuairtel to all offices dated 12/5/67, sent under caption indicated in first paragraph.

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau and 2 copies each for LA, NY, SF and SE indicating the change in plans for the date of the above demonstration as well as details of the protest activities.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Information

ENCLOSURE

④ - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Seattle (Enc. 2) (RM)
4 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)
(1-100-46369) (WMC)
(1-100-47147)
~~GTT:dgp~~
(16)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~GRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

REC-15

C. C. - Bishop

9 DEC 21 1967

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

contained in the LHM has been telephonically furnished to Secret Service, U.S. Capitol Police and other local law enforcement agencies. WFO has alerted all sources to be alert for information concerning the above demonstration.

Sources used in LHM are as follows: First source is WF-1777-S and second source is BA-975-S.

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information furnished by first source could lead to the identification of that source of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness.

WFO continuing to follow and will report any pertinent details developed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 13, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on December 13, 1967, that the Coordinating Committee of the Washington Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (WMC) met on the night of December 12, 1967, at the local headquarters at 4402 Georgia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Helen Gurewitz acted as Chairman of the meeting which consisted of reports on the antidraft week, plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade demonstration and plans for political action in the anti-Vietnam war movement.

> A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in June, 1964, that Helen Gurewitz was then a member of the Communist Party.

According to the first source, Matthew Clark gave a report on the antidraft week in Washington, D.C. Clark stated that the activities were not very successful due to a complete lack of adult support as well as a lack of funds. He described the week long protest activity as very disappointing.

According to the first source, Sue Orrin of the WMC then gave a report on plans for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade demonstration. Orrin reported that she had talked to "New York" on that date and stated that the only major change in the Brigade's plans was a change of date due to

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

5

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

the fact that the organization had learned that Congress will not reconvene until January 15, 1968. According to Orrin, two trains from New York City, two airplanes from California and one bus load from Seattle, Washington, have already been reserved for participants to the above activity. Orrin reported that the Brigade wants to have Senator Mansfield and Speaker of the House McCormick meet the delegation on the steps to the United States Capitol. Orrin reported that the "officials in New York" do not expect these two Congressmen but do think that Senators Morse and Gruening will meet them and accept their anti-war statement and have this statement recorded in the Federal Register.

According to the first source, Orrin further indicated that the present plans for the Brigade call for other unspecified activity in Washington, D.C., but that they will not negotiate with local police for permits ahead of time. Orrin reported that there is a split within the Brigade between certain groups of women who wish to have only legal protest activity in Washington, D.C., and another group which is strongly in favor of illegal activity or civil disobedience. Following the protest activities on January 15, 1968, the Brigade plans to go to Georgetown University where they will hold a conference. The details for this conference will be handled by Donna Allen of Washington, D.C.

According to the first source, the remainder of the above meeting consisted of a discussion of future political plans in the anti-war movement concerned primarily with registration for upcoming primaries in the local areas.

Harold Clayton, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad, Washington, D.C., advised on December 12, 1967, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in New York had previously reserved two trains to travel to Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968. Mr. Clayton stated that this reservation has now been changed to the date of January 15, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

F . -3: (Rev. 5-22-64)

[illegible]
...ach
Mr. Mohr
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 12/14/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReBUairtel to Albany and all offices dated 12/5/67 captioned as above; Seattle teletype to Bureau dated 12/13/67, and Seattle airtel and LHM to Bureau dated 11/27/67 titled JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE, INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS).

Enclosed are 11 copies of an LHM concerning captioned demonstration for the Bureau and two copies each for Atlanta, San Francisco and Washington Field Office. Copies were sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service and the USA, Seattle.

The source used in the LHM is ~~SE-691-S~~. The LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL because information furnished by this source, if disclosed, might compromise this informant of continuing value.

REC 8

SWAP is the subject of a COMINFIL investigation at Seattle. SWAP appears to be doing the promotion work for the Brigade in the State of Washington.

ENCLOSURE

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

DEC 22 1967

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (REG)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (REG)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (REG)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (REG)
5 - Seattle
  (1 - 100-29048)
  (1 - 100-26068) (SWAP)
  (1 - 100-27547) (VIDEM)
  (1 - 100-18017) (KOPPEL)
  (1 - 134-547A)

RBC:ser
(14)

C. C. - Bishop

53 JAN

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington 98104

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 14, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to a previous memorandum dated November 27, 1967, concerning captioned demonstration which was titled Jeannette Rankin's Brigade, Information Concerning.

On December 13, 1967, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, made available a leaflet received from ANCI KOPPEL, leader of Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP), which indicates SWAP is attempting to help mobilize a "Nationwide Congress of Women" to be held in Washington, D. C., January 8, 1968, on the opening day of Congress. The leaflet suggests participants "represent ourselves in Congress" and "test our WOMAN POWER." A reproduction of the leaflet is attached.

JEANNETE RANKIN, the Chairman of the Brigade, is an 86-year-old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia, who served in the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919 and who was elected to that office for one term in 1940. She has repeatedly opposed U. S. involvement in foreign wars and voted against declarations of war by the U. S. in both World Wars I and II.

ANCI KOPPEL and SWAP are characterized in the appendix.

On December 14, 1967, DALE JENSEN, Charter Service Department, Greyhound Bus Lines, Seattle, advised ANCI KOPPEL has previously made arrangements for charter buses for various activities of her organization but thus far has not requested space for a trip to Washington, D. C. in January, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

ERICAN WOMEN REPRESENT 51% OF THE VOTING POPULATION IN THE USA

We could be the determining factor in any election

Nevertheless, once elected, many Congressmen and certainly the President, refuse to listen to our call for an end to war, for decent homes, a future for our children, and a brighter tomorrow for all families everywhere.

Year, after year, more and more of our sons are sacrificed for wars that never cease. Our lives become more and more dominated by the military-industrial complex. We face the horror of bringing up our families in a crisis-ridden society in which:
Children starve-- --Young men are slaughtered in battle
Youth are jobless or drafted--
Children are provided mediocre education in antiquated buildings--
families lack adequate medical care--
Violence permeates our culture --
Where racism erodes all of our hard-won victories, and millions have been subjected to the worse kinds of indignities, simply because some of us are black.

IT IS UTTER MADNESS TO SPEND 2½ BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH TO KILL AND BE KILLED IN VIETNAM WHEN THERE IS A CRYING NEED FOR FUNDS TO ELIMINATE HUNGER, AND POVERTY AT HOME.

IF YOU OR I WERE A CONGRESSWOMAN we would.........do what?

Jeanette Rankin, the first woman to be elected to Congress has called for a Nationwide Congress of Women to be held in Washington DC, January 8th (opening day of Congress)

IF YOU AGREE: We've been silent much too long!
THEN -- Join the Jeanette Rankin Congress of Women in D.C.

Jo

Violence permeates our culture --
Where racism erodes all of our hard-won victories, and millions have been subjected [illegible] the worse kinds of indig[illegible]ties, simply because some of us are black.

IT IS UTTER MADNESS TO SPEND 2½ BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH TO KILL AND BE KILLED IN VIETNAM WHEN THERE IS A CRYING NEED FOR FUNDS TO ELIMINATE HUNGER, AND POVERTY AT HOME.

IF YOU OR I WERE A CONGRESSWOMAN we would..........do what?

Jeanette Rankin, the first woman to be elected to Congress has called for a Nationwide Congress of Women to be held in Washington DC, January 8th (opening day of Congress)

IF YOU AGREE: We've been silent much too long!
THEN -- Join the Jeanette Rankin Congress of Women in D.C.
and / or
Join others in our state to sponsor a Washington State GRASSROOTS ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN.
At which we can Tell it as it is
We can draft legislation that will alleviate the immediate problems--
We can project a long-ranged program for a happier tomorrow in clear, simple language everyone can understand..

IF you are a mother, and ADC recipient, a victim of discrimination, a student, a social worker, teacher, professional-- a PTA member, a housewife or a worker--

You are needed at one or another of the Jeanette Rankin Assembly of Women

We agree with Stewart Meachem (AFSC): "We'll find a way out of the war once we DECIDE TO GET OUT."
FOR ONE DAY - Let's represent ourselves in Congress.
FOR ONE DAY Les us test our WOMAN POWER

1968 is an election year. Want to or no, candidates will listen if we speak out in one united, clear voice: END THE WAR NOW
END RACISM & POVERTY NOW!

I want to go to D.C. ☐ I will donate to send someone else ☐

I want to help organize a Washington State GRASSROOTS ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN ☐

I Belong to:, ______________________________
Church groups, women's clubs, unions, other organizations

Name________________ Address______________________________

Phone________________ City____________________ Zip________

Seattle Women Act For Peace - 5411 Ravenna Ave. NE -Seattle 98105
Phone -- AT 2 0591

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

SEATTLE WOMEN ACT FOR PEACE (SWAP)

A source reported on May 17, 1962, a meeting of the Ballard-Greenwood CP Club was held in Seattle, April 25, 1962, at which TAIMI HALONEN was nominated to be the new Chairman of this Club. Along with other business of the evening, HALONEN said she expected to devote a good portion of her time to SWAP, an organization of peace forces that met recently with seven members. She said four of the seven were from the "left" but did not go into detail. She said the group had problems of an organizational nature because it was new, and she thought she could help.

On April 5, 1963, a second source stated a meeting of the University CP Club was held at Seattle on April 2, 1963. KEN ROSE, a member of the Club, reported the most influential peace organization in Seattle was SWAP.

On July 31, 1964, a meeting of the North Central CP Section Committee was held at Seattle. WILL PARRY, Section Chairman, said attention should be placed on three political questions - peace, civil rights, and labor. Under peace, he said CP clubs should inject the Women Act for Peace campaign into the election campaign. At another Section meeting, February 5, 1966, TAIMI HALONEN was praised for effective peace work and for her help in developing unity among the peace forces. Section-wide concentration was urged in assisting SWAP to visit 1,000 workers on the Vietnam issue.

A third source advised on February 24, 1966, a Northwest District CP Committee meeting was held at Seattle February 12, 1966. After lunch, the entire group participated in passing out leaflets pertaining to racial matters and the Vietnam war which carried the name of SWAP, 5411 Ravenna Avenue Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98105, which address has been used consistently by SWAP and is that of ANCI KOPPEL, also known as Mrs. CHARLES KOPPEL. KOPPEL has been and continues to be the coordinator and apparent prime motivating force of SWAP as of May, 1967.

> A fourth source reported in 1945 ANCI KOPPEL was a member of the Professional Group of the Communist Political Association (CPA), also known as the Rogers CP Club at Seattle, Washington.
>
> The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/19/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

SUBJECT: Demonstration Protesting U.S.
Policy in Vietnam;
1/8/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Bureau airtel 12/5/67 and Los Angeles airtel with LHM 12/12/67 captioned as above.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of an LHM and two copies each for the Washington Field Office, Atlanta Office, Los Angeles Office and New York Office.

Instant LHM concerns the most up-to-date information in possession of the San Francisco Office regarding the activities of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

ENCLOSURE

EX 106
REC 39

3 - Bureau (Encls. 8) (AM-RM)
2 - New York (Info.) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (Info.) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (100-70701) (Info.) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
3 - San Francisco
(2 - 100-59802)
(1 - WFP) (100-48035)
GOW:bja
(14)

C. C. - Bishop

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER
RAO (ISD, CRD, ED)
DATE FORW: 1/2/68
HOW FORW:
BY:

100-448175-9x

DEC 22 1967

~~66 JAN 8 1968~~

295

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

FEB 15 1968

Instant LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect the identities of sources of continuing value.

First source mentioned in instant LHM is ~~THOMAS FITZPATRICK, Director of Special Services of the San Francisco Police Department.~~

SF T-2 is SF 2903-S.
SF T-3 is SF 2470-S.

SF T-4 is SF 2578-S.

SF T-5 is SF 2988-S.

SF T-6 is former SF 2256-S.

SF T-7 is LA 3200-S.

SF T-8 is LA 2954-S.

SF T-9 is MISO, San Francisco.

SF T-10 is SF 2595-S.

SF T-11 is SF 1933-S.

SF T-12 is SF 671-S*

San Francisco will continue to report any pertinent information received concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Copies of instant LHM are being furnished locally to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Service, San Francisco, and the United States Attorney, San Francisco.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 19, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM;
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum dated November 17, 1967 captioned "Jeannette Rankin Brigade."

Where available, characterizations are set forth on individuals mentioned as sponsors of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade who reside in the Northern California area.

The following information has been made available by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past.

A source made available a copy of a newsletter from the Jeannette Rankin Brigade dated November 29, 1967, signed by Eda Hallinan. (A xeroxed duplication of the first two pages of this newsletter is appended to this memorandum.)
SF T-1, 12/4/67.

The following are characterizations of individuals listed as sponsors of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade who reside in the Northern California area:

EDA HALLINAN

Eda Hallinan is a current member of the Communist Party (CP).
SF T-2, 5/2/67.

VIVIAN HALLINAN

Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the CP if her husband, Vincent

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-445175-9X

ENCLOSURE 2552

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

Hallinan would also join.

SF T-3, 10/31/62

Vivian Hallinan was arrested on a civil rights sit-in demonstration at Auto Row in San Francisco in April, 1964. Sergeant William Davis, San Francisco County Jail Number 2, San Bruno, California, advised on August 22, 1966, that Vivian Hallinan served a month in the County Jail from July 5, 1966 to August 2, 1966, having been found guilty on a sit-in charge.

MRS. JOHN BURTON

In November, 1963, Mrs. John Burton was a member of the San Francisco W. E. B. DuBois Club.

SF T-4, 11/7/63

See appendix pages for characterization of W. E. B. DuBois Club.

JUDY COLLINS

A Judy Collins attended a meeting of the Spring Mobilization Committee (SMC) at San Francisco, California, on April 4, 1967.

SF T-5, 4/14/67

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

The SMC called for a massive demonstration against the war in Vietnam held in New York and San Francisco in April, 1967.

JESSICA MITFORD

Jessica Treuhaft is a widely read author who writes under the name Jessica Mitford. Jessica Treuhaft was identified as a member of the CP in the San Francisco Bay Area in March, 1958.

SF T-6, March, 1958

MALVINA REYNOLDS

Sources advised that Malvina Reynolds was a CP member from 1931-1948 and continued active in the CP until 1950.

SF T-7, 1946,
SF T-8, 1950

A source advised on December 4, 1967, that in the November newsletter of the East Bay Women for Peace (WFP), Madeline Duckles was listed as the West Coast coordinator of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

SF T-9, 12/4/67.

See Appendix pages for characterization of WFP.

MADELINE DUCKLES

A source advised on February 3, 1966 that Madeline Duckles was one of the leaders and more militant member of the WFP. She talked at meetings in favor of creating disturbances and was involved in a march at a United

States Army base in Oakland, California on November 20, 1965 to protest current U.S. policy in Vietnam.

SF T-10, 2/3/66.

A source advised on December 19, 1967, that Sonia Kaross, a member of the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the WFP, was planning on going to Washington, D.C. to attend the proposed demonstration in that city on January 15, 1968.

SF T-11, 12/19/67

It is noted that Sonia Kaross is also known as Sonia Baltrun.

Records of the Alameda County Voters Registration reflect that Sonia Baltrun in May, 1934, gave her political preference as Communist.

On April 9, 1943, a source advised that Sonia Baltrun openly bragged about her membership in the CP and the fact that she attended the first party convention. This source also advised that Sonia Baltrun was not a chartered member of the CP, but was the holder of a very low book number.

SF T-12, 4/9/43.

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

"You can't have wars without women."

November 29, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Friends:

> "10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women."

Sponsors:

- Jeannette Rankin
- Vivian Hallinan
- Mia Auerbakken Adjali
- Mrs. John C. Bennett
- Mrs. Harry Bridges
- Jane Buckenholz
- Mrs. John Burton
- Mary Clark
- Judy Collins
- Mrs. Cyrus Eaton
- Mrs. Jack Gilford
- Mrs. Martin Luther King
- Vivica Lindfors
- Jessica Mitford
- Rosa Parks
- Louise Peck
- Mrs. Ester Pike
- Malvina Reynolds
- Mrs. Robert Scheer
- Susan Sontag
- Mrs. Benjamin Spock
- Emyline Stokes
- Helen B. Turnbull

Jeannette Rankin, first woman elected to Congress in the United States, made this statement in May of this year.

We are planning to have 10,000 women come to Washington on January 8th, in the name of the newly formed Jeannette Rankin Brigade, to express our opposition to the illegal, immoral war in Vietnam.

We would like your support in this work. Would you make time on the agenda of your next meeting, for a speaker from the Bay Area Brigade, to come before your organization? If you can reply quickly, we could even have a short program of pertinent entertainment to help make our point. Malvina Reynolds has offered to speak for us, and sing a couple of her popular topical songs wherever she goes--she is the song-writer performer who has had many recent hits, including "What Have They Done to the Rain?", "Little Boxes", and "Morningtown Ride".

Please come to our initial planning meeting involving the entire Bay Area on Monday, December 4, 1967, 8:00 PM, at the Parish House, Church of the Incarnation, 29th Avenue and Noriega, San Francisco. Come as an individual or as a representative of your organization. Tell your friends about it. Everyone interested is welcome. We need your ideas.

Yours sincerely,

Eda Hallinan

Eda Hallinan

CONFIDENTIAL

RANKIN BRIGADE

CONFIDENTIAL

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

Sponsors:

Jeannette Rankin
Vivian Hallinan
Mia Auerbakken
Adjali
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Mrs. Harry Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Mrs. John Burton
Mary Clark
Judy Collins
Mrs. Cyrus Eaton
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Mrs. Martin Luther King
Vivica Lindfors
Jessica Mitford
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Mrs. Ester Pike
Malvina Reynolds
Mrs. Robert Scheer
Susan Sontag
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Emyline Stokes
Helen B. Turnbull

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 8.

WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country. WOMEN have power to acclaim peace and a decent life for every American. This is "womanpower"! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States. Come to Washington on January 8 as Congress opens its 91st session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she heads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

--Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for withdrawal of all American troops.
--Congress use its power to heal the sick society at hom
--Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged lands we leave behind in Vietnam.
--Congress listen to what a people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex which controls the ruling interests of America.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited.
On January 8, 1968, American women will:

--PETITION the U.S. Congress.
--CONVENE a congregation of American women to develop programs to meet the crises in America--programs which will express our political powers, reason and consciences.
--Let us declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restorin our country to the community of nations.

For more
information
call or write
Eda Hallinan
5490 Kales Ave.
Oakland, Calif.
653-1204

CONFIDENTIAL

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist -oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B.DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966 that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, had indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

APPENDIX

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source has advised that as of April, 1966, the records of the DCA reflect that the following Du Bois Clubs and/or Chapters in Northern California are affiliated with the parent organization, the DCA:

1. Berkeley Du Bois Club (BDBC), (Chartered)
2. Fillmore Du Bois Club (FDBC), (Chartered)
3. San Francisco Du Bois Club (SFDBC), (Chartered)
4. San Francisco State College Du Bois Club (SFSCDBC), (Chartered)
5. San Jose Du Bois Club (SJDBC), (Chartered)
6. San Jose State College Du Bois Club (SJSCDBC), (Non-chartered)
7. Stanford University Du Bois Club (SUDBC), (Non-chartered)

A second source has advised in April, 1967, that for all intent and purpose, the DCA is defunct in the general San Francisco Bay Area, although certain elements in the Northern California District Communist Party are attempting to revive interest in the DCA.

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR PEACE aka
Women Strike for Peace

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette," a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Berkeley, California, contained an article in the November 19, 1965, evening edition reflecting that in November, 1961, when concern mounted over radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, a group of women in Washington, D. C. started Women Strike for Peace. The idea spread rapidly throughout the country and now embraces 900 groups, including Women For Peace groups in the San Francisco Bay area.

These groups support programs to achieve goals such as:

(1) Continued disarmament negotiations.

(2) A strong and flexible United Nations.

(3) Planning now at state and national levels for conversion to peace-time economy and positive efforts to ease world tensions.

The women act as individuals and as a group, with specific actions suggested by individuals and groups from all over the world. Decision to participate jointly on any given suggestion is democratly arrived at by members of the Coordinating Committee. Effective cooperation with other peace groups is encouraged. Monthly Coordinating Committee meetings and general meetings, as warranted, are open to all and announced in mailings to members. There are no dues or membership forms nor conditions for membership.

To stir an awareness of the need for peace, Women For Peace encourage public education in peace objectives at local schools and sponsor peace-oriented demonstrations and public meetings, newspaper ads, billboards, and candidates for public office. On the national level the group attempts to influence government officials by letters and conferences.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. Rozamus

12/21/67

1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

airtel

To: SACs, Philadelphia (100-49497)
WFO

From: Director, FBI (100-448475)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

RePHtel 12/19/67.

For your information the date of the captioned demonstration has been changed from 1/8/68 to 1/15/68 to coincide with the reconvening of Congress.

Authority is granted for PH 475-S to attend this demonstration. The source should be instructed to maintain contact with the Washington Field Office during the period of the demonstration for the purpose of promptly furnishing any pertinent data that may be developed.

Je

Upon return to your area, the informant should be promptly debriefed and a communication suitable for dissemination submitted to the Bureau and interested offices.

REC 31

6

Washington Field Office should immediately advise the Philadelphia Office of the name of the Agent and the telephone number which the informant should use in contacting that office during the course of the demonstration. Philadelphia Office advise Washington Field Office the code name PH 475-S will use in contacting that office.

RHH:jes
(7)

MAILED 8
DEC 20 1967
FBI

NOTE: PH 475-S is a 42-year-old colored female who is a member of the CPUSA. She has been an informant since May, 1956. PH by retel advised the informant was in contact with the sponsoring committee of the captioned demonstration and requested authorization for source to make the trip.

19 DEC 21 1967

54 DEC 28 1967

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (~~Rev.~~ 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/22/67

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

REC-34

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Philadelphia teletype to Director, Newark and WFO dated 12/21/67.

Enclosed are ~~12~~ 11 copies for the Bureau, one copy for Atlanta, two copies for Newark, one copy for San Francisco, and two copies for WFO of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

Information copies are being supplied to Atlanta and San Francisco since the Bureau by airtel dated 12/5/67 instructed that those offices open investigations of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade.

For the information of the offices not receiving a copy of referenced Philadelphia teletype, it contained a precis of enclosed LHM.

ENCLOSURE

(3) - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
    1 - 100- (RUTH KRAUSE)
1 - San Francisco (Info)(Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
8 - Philadelphia
    1 - 100-49497
    1 - 134-1314 SUB A
    1 - 100-40351 (RUTH KRAUSE)
    1 - 100-45773 (KATHERINE LBYCAMP)
    1 - 100-45581 (ETHEL TAYLOR)
    1 - 100-46020 (USP)
    1 - 100-9882 (WILPF)
    1 - 100-43842 (COMINFIL MASS ORGS.)
KKS:PSM
(17)

REC-34

100-448475-10

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW: 12/29/67
HOW FORW:

12 DEC 27 1967

XEROX
JAN 2 1968

INT. SEC.

Bishop

53 JAN 8 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being disseminated locally to NISO, OSI, MI, and Secret Service.

Sources utilized in the LHM are:

1. PH 761-S
2. PH 61-S
3. SF 2955-S

The "Application for Sales and Use Tax License" of the USP was made available by JOSEPH S. MULLIN, Supervisor of Field Investigations, Department of Revenue, Sales and Use Tax, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1400 West Spring Garden, Philadelphia, Pa., on 6/8/67 to SA ELMER E. SUSSMAN.

The LHM is marked confidential since it contains data from sources one through three, the unauthorized disclosure of which might reasonably result in the identification thereof, and compromise the future effectiveness of sources of continuing value.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

December 22, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

On December 21, 1967, a source made available "A Call To American Women." A Xerox copy of this "Call" is attached to this memorandum.

The source obtained the call at a meeting of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC) held on December 15, 1967.

A characterization of the PSSFC is attached to this memorandum.

Source advised that at the PSSFC meeting of December 15, 1967, a film about Vietnam was shown. After the film, RUTH KRAUSE, a housewife from Cherry Hill, N.J., who have been to Vietnam, spoke.

A second source advised on December 18, 1967, that RUTH KRAUSE was a member of the Communist Party of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD) at that time.

On the "Call," listed under "Partial List of Sponsors" were the following names with no further identifying data:

CATHERINE L. CAMP
RUTH KRAUSE
ETHEL TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

100-148475-10

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1967

The following information is supplied concerning one KATHERINE L. CAMP and one ETHEL TAYLOR, who may or may not be identical to the individuals listed under "Partial List of Sponsors:"

A third source advised on June 27, 1967, that KATHERINE L. CAMP attended the annual meeting of the United States Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) held from June 19-24, 1967, at Asilomar, Calif. At this meeting CAMP was elected the new president of the U.S. Section, WILPF.

The records of the Voters Registration Commission, Norristown, Pa., reflect that KATHERINE L. CAMP, born July 10, 1918, is a housewife who resides at 200 Hughes Road, King of Prussia, Pa. She is the wife of Dr. WILLIAM P. CAMP, Superintendent of the Norristown State Hospital, Norristown, Pa.

On the "Application for Sales and Use Tax License" submitted to the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue on May 25, 1967, by the Women Strike for Peace, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pa., ETHEL TAYLOR, 1505 Ashford Way, Overbrook Hills, Philadelphia, Pa., was listed as "Coordinator."

Call to American Women

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who a[illegible]outraged by the ruthless slaug[illegible]er in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 8

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States!

Come to Washington on January 8 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

> Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
>
> Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.
>
> Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 8, American women will:

> PETITION the United States Congress
>
> CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

---

clip here and return to:

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
133 West 72nd Street
New York City 10023
(212)799-6520

I will

.... be a sponsor
.... go to Washington on Monday, January 8th, 1968.
.... contribute $...............
I can drive to Washington and have room for ..... passengers.
Please send me........train tickets (roundtrip NY/Washington) at $7.50 each. (Train leaves Pa. station 7:30 am; returns NY 11 pm)
I cannot come but will help organize supportive action in my home community.......

NAME...

CONFIDENTIAL

ADDRESS.......................... . TELEPHONE NUMBER..................

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK WHEREVER THEY ARE ON JANUARY 8.

Partial List of Sponsors

Muriel Adams ✓
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp ✓
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin
Sylvia E. Crane
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Elizabeth Lee Haselden
Dorothy Hassler
Anna Arnold Hedgeman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogel
Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florynce Kennedy
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause ✓
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Mrs. Burton Lane
Marilyn Langner
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Helen Merrell Lynd
Olive Mayer
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Nan S. Pendergrast
Eleanor Perry
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Marcus Raskin
Malvina Reynolds
Carmen Ristorucci
Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
Ruth Rosenwald
Muriel Rukeyser
Marie Runyon
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Marjorie Schell
Juanita J. Saddler
Elaine Slater
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Elizabeth Sutherland
Amy Swerdlow
Mary Adams Sykes
Ethel Taylor ✓
Maza Tilghman
Helen B. Turnbull
Barbara Webster
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson
Winnifred Wygal

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

(1)

APPENDIX

Characterizations of Organizations

PHILADELPHIA SOCIAL SCIENCE FORUM COMMITTEE

A source advised on November 14 and 17, 1958 that a meeting of the District Education Commission, Communist Party of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD), was held November 13, 1958 at 3425 Powelton Avenue, Philadelphia. At this meeting, DANIEL RUBIN, the District Education Director, presented a proposal for a series of forums under the nominal sponsorship of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC). The source stated that PSSFC was merely a paper organization and this series of forums was organized by the District Education Commission and had to be approved by the District Committee (CPEPD) before being put into effect.

This source stated on June 12, 1959, November 5, 1959, and October 21, 1960 that the PSSFC remained under the control of the District Education Commission, CPEPD.

A second source reported on October 9, 1961, that the District Executive Committee (DEC), CPEPD, met on October 2, 1961, and approved plans to hold and to support a new series of forums of PSSFC beginning November 10, 1961, and ending in May, 1962.

The second source on May 8, 1964, advised that the main purpose of the PSSFC is to bring to Philadelphia well known speakers who have a pro-Communist point of view. Included among the speakers each year are national leaders of the Communist Party, USA.

The second source added on May 15, 1967 that the PSSFC continued to meet during 1962 through 1967 and that it remains under the control of the CPEPD.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

,-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 22, 1967

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1967

Character

Reference Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Philadelphia.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI

Date: 12/22/67

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Philadelphia teletype to Bureau and WFO dated 12/19/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 12 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and San Francisco 2 copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above.

Source utilized is ~~RH-475-S.~~

Bureau authority was requested in referenced Philadelphia teletype for this source to accompany Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS to the demonstration on 1/8/67, at Washington, D. C. The request is reiterated here to insure informant coverage of Philadelphia participants.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 12) ENCLOSURE
  1 - 100-358751
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
  1 - 100- (VIVIAN HALLINAN)
2 - Philadelphia
  1 - 100-49497
  1 - 134-537-Sub A

REC- 71

ST-106

12 DEC 27 1967

INT. SEC.

KKS:LMH
(10)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., State
RAD (CD, CI, CD)
DATE FORW: 12/29/67
HOW FORW: RS
BY: KH

C. C. - Bishop

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

57 JAN

STERE. COPY AND COPY OF ENCL. LEFT IN

PH 475-S advised on 12/19/67, that VIVIAN HALLINAN, Apartment Houses, 61 Peninsula Road, Belvedere, Calif., wrote to Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS by letter dated October, 1967, which was not delivered at Philadelphia until November, 1967, while WILLIAMS was in California regarding the court martial of her son, RONALD LOCKMAN.

HALLINAN originally had wanted WILLIAMS to be at the launching of the Brigade at a press conference to be held in Washington, D. C., on Veterans Day, 11/11/67, along with mothers, sisters, and widows of men killed in Vietnam. HALLINAN desired WILLIAMS to furnish her with the names of mothers and wives of men killed in Vietnam who felt their loved ones should not have been there at all.

Since Mrs. WILLIAMS did not return until after 11/11/67, she did not know of the event, and therefore, did not participate. Additionally, she did not get around to reading all her mail until much after she returned to Philadelphia.

This was the reason the source did not learn of this Brigade until December.

The LHM was marked Confidential to protect PH 475-S, a source of continuing value.

Copies of the attached LHM are being disseminated locally to Secret Service, NISO, MI, all Philadelphia, and OSI, Olmsted Air Force Base.

> "10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail, if necessary, we could stop the war. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin made the above statement in May of this year, when the country was told that 10,000 American boys had died in Vietnam. Fifty years ago as the first woman elected to Congress in the United States she said, "I want to stand by my country but I cannot vote for war."

Miss Rankin was a militant fighter for women's suffrage, and has been a vehement and consistent voice against war. Still a strong feminist, Miss Rankins is now building a self supporting women's cooperative homestead in Georgia. At 86 she is as courageous and vigorous as ever, holding staunchly to her beliefs that war is immoral. This May, after her statement against the war in Vietnam, Miss Rankin was deluged with letters from women across the nation who applauded her position. Miss Rankin was enthusiastic when asked to transform her words into a demonstrative effort, and thus the Jeannette Rankin Brigade was born. We are seeking the sponsorship of women of stature and prestige who represent the many facets of our national life. This accomplished we feel sure that thousands of women who have never been moved to action will find their place with the Brigade. This will be a single effort, and will be joined by women individually, and through organizational affiliations, We are trying to provide the framework in which every concerned woman will feel comfortable.

Miss Rankin places the Brigade in an historical context as a continuation of the efforts of the Abolitionists, and the Suffragettes, representing the best of American traditions.

What are you willing to do to save your son, your brother, your husband from killing and being killed in Vietnam? What are you willing to do to put an end to the senseless waste of American and Vietnamese lives?

We have written letters to our President and Congressmen; we have taken full page advertisements pleading for a halt to this war; we have marched; we have wept; we have been ignored.

Thousands of women are willing to go to Washington to demand that our President end this war now. In 1954 he said, "I am against sending American G.I.'s into the mud and muck of Indo-China on a bloodletting spree to perpetuate colonialism and white man's exploitation in Asia." In 1964 he was elected to the presidency on the promise that his administration would bring peace in Vietnam. We gave him our vote. We are giving him our men -- No More! As citizens we have the right to have our grievances heard. We will be heard if it means a massive act of peaceful civil disobedience to achieve it.

Will you join us to save the men you love from death, and the country you love from shame?

WITHOUT WOMEN

Women must use their minds, their voices, and their bodies to stop the killing in Vietnam; to do less is to ignore our special responsibilities to the human race.

"10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin made the above statement in May of this year. Fifty years ago, as the first woman elected to Congress, she voted against World War I. She has consistently maintained her struggle for peace, and at 86 she is as courageous and vigorous as ever -- an inspiration to all women.

The presence of the United States forces in the internal struggle of Vietnam is immoral and illegal. There can be no possible justification for our interference in the domestic affairs of this tiny distant land.

This 86-year-old woman has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing is stopped. Not all women are free to join her, but we can assure her that thousands of women will march peacefully beside her. Some will picket, others will go to jail until bail is arranged, and others will stay in jail with Miss Rankin. Every woman's participation is equally valuable. We are confident each one will do the maximum of which she is capable.

On January 8th, women from all over the land will converge on Washington to demand the end of this dishonorable war. We shall come as individuals, or as organizations, but we shall join together as concerned women under the aegis of Jeannette Rankin.

Will you join us to save the men you love from death, and the country you love from shame?

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL 4

FBI

Date: [illegible]

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Portland (100-10983) (P)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

CINAL

The title is marked Changed to show the date of demonstration as 1/15/68. Date was formerly carried in title as 1/8/68.

[illegible] to All Offices, dated 12/5/67.

5 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (AM) (RM)
(1 - 100-) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
(1 - 105-138315) ([illegible])
(1 - 100-) (JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)
(1 - 100-) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
(1 - 100-) (JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)
5 - Portland
(2 - 100-10983) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
(1 - 100-10326) ([illegible])
(1 - 100-9218) (CINAL)
(1 - 100-3952-SUB 9) (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

100-448326

JEL:dlf
(15)

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
100 JAN 8 1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN

53 [illegible] 2 1968

Approved: ____________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

PD 100-10983

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve copies, for San Francisco two copies and [illegible] copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) suitable for dissemination concerning proposed anti-war demonstration [illegible] 3/15/68, Portland, Oregon, in support of Demonstration [illegible] U.S. Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C. 1/15/58. Sources utilized in this LHM, who have furnished reliable information in the past, are as follows:

First Source	PD 395-S
Second Source	[illegible] 2081-S
Third Source	PD 395-S

The LHM is classified "confidential" because data reported from informants could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Copies of LHM disseminated to USA, Secret Service, MI, OSI, and VIC, all Portland.

Summary of information contained in LHM was not submitted to the Bureau by teletype inasmuch as a lengthy advance notice was received concerning the demonstration.

Portland will continue to follow this matter pursuant to Bureau instructions.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Portland, Oregon
December 27, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On December 27, 1967, a source made available a one-page letter of Portland Women For Peace, a local pacifist organization, and a one-page sheet printed on both sides, first side captioned "A Call to All American Women" and the second side captioned "Jeannette Rankin Helena, Montana", which are as follows:

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-448326

ENCLOSURE

PORTLAND WOMEN FOR PEACE
P. O. BOX 13061
PORTLAND, OREGON [illegible]3

CONFIDENTIAL

December 18, 1967

Dear Friend:

We are sending this letter to you and others from whom we have not heard much recently, in the hope of re-enlisting your efforts in the Women for Peace movement. It has been too long since we last heard directly from many of you, and our meetings with those of you whom we have seen recently have been brief.

Of course, we know the paralyzing sense of frustration we all feel occasionally, as we learn of the mounting horrors in Victnam. But this feeling is only temporary, and quickly gives way to activity. As women, we bear the major responsibility for the preservation of life, and thus a major responsibility in the peace movement,

Enclosed you will find an announcement of the latest national women's effort for peace. Several peace groups in Portland are cooperating in raising funds to send representatives to Washington. We hope that you will also support this effort, to insure representation from Portland Women for Peace. The coupon on the enclosed notice is for your use in this effort.

> In addition, we will have a supportive peaceful demonstration in Portland at
>
> NOON, Monday, JANUARY 15th
> Pioneer Post Office
> 5th and Morrison
>
> We are asking participants to wear black, and to bring a black (or dark colored) umbrella. We shall carry the umbrellas opened, rain or shine. Placards (to wear) and leaflets (to distribute), expressing support for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, will be available. We shall march around the Post Office block for one hour, from noon to 1 p.m., leafleting as we walk.

We hope, if you cannot go to Washington, yourself, that you will contribute to help someone else to go, and that you will also join with us at the Pioneer Post Office at noon Monday, January 15th.

In addition, please let us hear from you on your ideas of what more we might do locally. We have some ideas too, which we hope to share with you, and on which we shall need much help.

Please get in touch with one of us soon. Your help, ideas, and efforts are urgently needed.

Yours for Peace,

Phoebe Friedman - phone 281-6288
Rose Leopold - phone 232-1605
Gloria Shaich - phone 246-5249

CONFIDENTIAL

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by t[illegible] ruthless slaughter in Vietnam [illegible] the persistent neglect of human needs at home

CONFIDENTIAL

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 15

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States! Come to Washington on January 15 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

> Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
>
> Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

> PETITION the United States Congress.
>
> CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America - programs which will express our political power, reason, and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations.

- -

Clip here and return to

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
Portland Supporters
P. O. Box 13061
Portland, Oregon 97213

I would like to go to Washington on January 15 ____________

I would like to help plan for supportive action in Portland on Jan. 15 ____________

Enclosed is my contribution of $ ____________

Name ____________________

CONFIDENTIAL

Address ____________________

Phone ____________________

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK ON JANUARY 15th - WHEREVER THEY ARE

JEANNETTE RANKIN
Helena, Montana

November 27, 1967

To all American Women:

CONFIDENTIAL

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

Jeannette Rankin

Initial Sponsors

Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Anne M. Bennett
(Mrs. John C. Bennett)
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clark
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Judith Eaton
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Ruth Goodelman

Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Dorothy Hassler
Ann Arnold Hedgman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogle
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florence Kennedy
Coretta King
(Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr)
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Mrs. Burton Lane
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Mary McCarthy
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton

Grace Mora Newman
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Carmen Ristorucci
Juanita J. Saddler
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Emlen Stokes
Mary Adams Sykes
Helen B. Turnbull
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Dagmar Wilson
Winifred Wygal

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

CONFIDENTIAL

-16-63)

CONFIDENTIAL

The Jeanette Rankin Brigade

Mass women's peace action

SAN FRANCISCO — When Congress reconvenes in January, the opening session will be met with the demand that its first order of business must be ending the Vietnam war and the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

This demand will be presented by woman power, organized into the Jeanette Rankin Brigade.

The women plan to convene a Congress of American Women to develop programs "dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations."

Besides demanding that the legislators act to end the war, the women will demand that Congress:

- Use its power to heal a sick society at home;
- Use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam;
- Listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

This movement was inspired by an [illegible] by Jeanette Rankin, 86, the nation's first woman in Congress, elected in 1917. "If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary," she said in May, "that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women."

Miss Rankin, a militant leader of the suffragette movement that eventually gained women the right to vote under the 19th Amendment, voted in 1917 against U.S. involvement in World War I and also opposed American military commitment in World War II.

"This is no time to be polite," Miss Rankin said. "The army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says 'come and fight'. But they don't take the politicians and decision makers to fight."

Miss Rankin's militant opposition to the Vietnam war was

nationwide convening of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade in Washington.

Women for Peace and the Women's Intl. League for Peace and Freedom have rallied to support of the action and a drive is now underway to get the largest possible number of women to Washington for the joint opening session of Congress.

Supportive action by women who cannot go to Washington will be planned in various localities.

One facet of the Congress of American Women will be discussion of electoral action, says Nikki Bridges, San Francisco chairman of the brigade.

"Many of us feel we should support peace candidates where they exist and go into politics ourselves in other places, because that way you get a forum you don't otherwise have," she says.

At present efforts are being made to get support from as many peace and women's



JEANNETTE RANKIN
'No time to be polite'

groups as possible. "We also want the support of groups like political organizations that have the type of program in which peace is just one facet," Mrs. Bridges says. "We don't want men, but do want their money and support."

Among the initial sponsors are women from many walks of life bound together by a common concern about the war — Mrs. Benjamin Spock; Mrs. Rosa Parks (of the Montgomery Alabama bus boycott): author Jessica Mitford; Grace Mora Newman (sister of Dennis Mora of the Fort Hood Three); Mrs. Ann Eaton, author Kay Boyle, Mrs. Harry Belafonte; Mrs. Esther Pike, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

National executive secretary of the group is Mrs. Vivian Hallinan.

Detailed plans are still in formation, Mrs. Bridges says, but organizations and individuals are invited to join in any way they can. The San Francisco Bay Area office telephone number is 474-4453.

—M. P.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

9 "People's World"
San Francisco,
California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/16/67
Edition: Vol. 30 No. 50
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:
☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Jeanette Rankin Brigade sets January 15 for capitol action

SAN FRANCISCO — When American women petition the joint session of Congress on its opening day (Jan. 15) to end the war in Vietnam, it will be "the most important coalition of women ever formed," Mrs. Vivian Hallinan, executive secretary of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade, told a press conference here last week.

"There will be women representing the clergy, scientists, professionals, and leaders of the civil rights movement," she said. "The black clad women will be led by Jeanette Rankin, the country's first congresswoman, who is now 86 years old."

The people's leaders hope enough women from the Bay Area will join the brigade to make a plane charter feasible. Inquiries about the chartered plane can be addressed to the local office of the Brigade at [illegible] Golden Gate avenue, S.F. Telephone 47[illegible]-4106.

The Brigade is now contacting congressional leaders, asking them to meet the women at the capitol steps to receive their petition to put ending of the war in Vietnam as the first order of business for the new session of the Congress.

Program for the event, as finalized, calls for presentation to Congress of the Brigade's demands (see PW Dec. 16) and then holding of a women's congress that afternoon to plan political action on a local scale.

Unless Congress acts on their petition, the women will use Jan. 16 to see their representatives and pressure them to support their demands.

"We are not going to do anything unconstitutional," Mrs. Hallinan said. "We are going to petition Congress for redress of grievances. There was agreement at a meeting of the national steering committee to give Congress three more months to act. After that we will take to the streets — there was agreement on this by all those concerned."

Among the national sponsors of the event are prominent members of virtually every major national church and women's organization, for example Elsie Thomas Culver (World Council of Churches); Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Southern Christian Leadership Conf.); Jane Buchenholz (Americans for Democratic Action); Ellen Aurbakken (United Church Women).

Also Mrs. Emlen Stokes (American Friends Service Committee); Mrs. John C. Bennett (Methodist, wife of John Bennett, dean of Union Theological Seminary); author Susan Sontag; actress Ruby Dee; Judith Morse Eaton and Grace Luchs Elliot (Natl. Council of the Young Women's Christian Assn.).

Support for the event was also expected from authors Mary McCarthy and Betty Friedan.

Local supportive events for those who cannot go to Washington are being planned throughout the nation.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

5 "People's World"
San Francisco, California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/23/67
Edition: Vol.30 No.51
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The "People's World" (PW) is a west coast communist weekly newspaper published in San Francisco, California.

Gloria Shaich was mentioned in April, 1956, by a Communist Party (CP) functionary as a member of the City Committee of the Albany, New York CP. Gloria Shaich attended an Albany CP conference in May, 1958, which was open to those "in or near to" the CP.

Second Source, April 17, 1956
June, 1958

Rose Leopold long has been a close associate of Oregon CP leaders and with her husband, Bernard Leopold, has frequently attended CP sponsored functions. Rose Leopold last attended an Oregon CP state convention on January 24, 1959.

Third Source, January 30, 1959
November 30, 1967

Phoebe Friedman, Rose Leopold, and Gloria Shaich, during 1965, 1966, and 1967, have been active participants in various demonstrations protesting U.S. policy in Vietnam which were held in Portland, Oregon.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The following persons at Portland, Oregon, on December 27, 1967, were advised of the above proposed demonstration:

United States Attorney Sidney I. Lezak at 9:50 a.m.

United States Marshal Eugene G. Hulett at 9:30 a.m.

Postal Inspector Nolan Brown at 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Darrell L. Hoyt, Buildings Manager, General Services Administration, at 9:55 a.m.

Mr. John E. Wells, Special Agent, United States Secret Service, at 9:40 a.m.

Mr. T. R. Toomey, Special Agent in Charge, 115th Military Intelligence Group at 8:25 a.m.

Mr. Charles G. Moseby, Clerk, Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force at 8:32 a.m.

Mr. L.A. Hancock, Special Agent, Naval Intelligence Command, at 8:30 a.m.

Officer Charley F. Trimble, Intelligence Unit, Portland Police Department at 8:35 a.m.

Deputy Marvin V. Woidyla, Intelligence Unit, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office at 8:35 a.m.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Corporal Lyle E. Mitchell, Intelligence Section, Oregon State Police, Milwaukie Station, at 10:00 a.m.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

VIA TELETYPE
DEC 27 1967
ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

WA -2- 3:08 PM EH

URGENT 12-27-67 EH

TO DIRECTOR AND WASHINGTON FIELD

WASHINGTON FIELD VIA WASHINGTON -ENCODED-

FROM CHICAGO (100-44707) 4P

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY EIGHTH, SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

VIDEM, BUFILE 105-138315

ANZELM A. CZARNOWSKI, SEVEN FIVE ONE THREE W. SIXTYTHIRD STREET, ARGO, ILLINOIS, MEMBER OF CP OF ILLINOIS, OCTOBER, FORT~~H~~YTHREE - JANUARY, FIFTYFIVE, FURNISHED TODAY COPY OF PAMPHLET CAPTIONED, "A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN", ISSUED BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE, FIVE TWO ZERO N. MICHIGAN AVENUE, CHICAGO. PAMPHLET DESCRIBES BRIGADE AS BROAD COALITION OF WOMEN FROM MANY AREAS OF AMERICAN LIFE WHO WILL MEET IN WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, ~~ZIYHY~~ S XT -EIGHT FOR OPENING ~~DS~~ OF CONGRESS TO DEMAND FOLLOWING:

ONE. CONGRESS, AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, RESOLVE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IMMEDIATELY ARRANGE FOR THE WITH- DRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS.

END PAGE ONE

WCS

C.D. Brennan

5 - K. Nettleland

B. W. Bo

R

REC- 57

8 1968

12

CC - EX-106

10 COPIES TO WFO

XEROX
DEC 1967

~~MR. DELOACH FOR THE DIRECTOR~~

57 JAN 10 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

PAGE TWO

TWO. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO HEAL A SICK SOCIETY AT HOME.

THREE. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RAVAGED LAND WE LEAVE BEHIND IN VIETNAM.

FOUR. CONGRESS LISTEN TO WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SAYING AND REFUSE THE INSATIABLE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY - INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

AFTER PETITIONING OF CONGRESS, GROUP WILL HOLD OWN CONGRESS TO ARTICULATE POSITION ON ACHIEVING PEACE, THEN RETURN TO OWN COMMUNITIES AND MOBILIZE WOMEN DEDICATED TO RESHAPING AMERICAN SOCIETY AND RESTORING AMERICA TO POSITION OF HONOR IN COMMUNITY OF NA~~TIONAL~~TIONS. GROUP WILL MEET JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT AT UNION DEPOT, WASHINGTON, D.C., ELEVEN THIRTY A.M. AND WALK TO CONGRESS AND PRESENT PETITION. MANY WILL STAY IN WASHINGTON TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMANDS BY PRESENTING THEM TO CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS, JANUARY SIXTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT. PLANS CALL FOR TRAVEL FROM CHICAGO BY BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY, LEAVING FOUR THIRTY, P.M., JANUARY FOURTEEN,

END PAGE TWO

SIXTYEIGHT, WITH PLANE AND BUS ARRANGEMENTS ALSO POSSIBLE IF SUFFICIENT RESPONSE. PARTICIPANTS ADVISED TO CONTACT HOSPITALITY OFFICE, TWO ONE FOUR ZERO PEACE STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONE (TWO ZERO TWO) TWO NINE THREE - TWO ZERO TWO ZERO IF ACCOMMODATIONS HELP NEEDED. LEAFLET CONTAINS PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS INCLUDING NINETYEIGHT INDIVIDUALS AS NATIONAL SPONSORS AND FIFTYSEVEN INDIVIDUALS AS CHICAGO SPONSORS. CHICAGO SPONSORS INCLUDE BERNICE DISKIN, ROSALIND DURHAM, MARJORIE KINSELLA, SYLVIA KUSHNER.

AS OF MAY, SIXTYSEVEN, BERNICE DISKIN WAS CURRENT MEMBER OF CP OF ILLINOIS, ACCORDING TO A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST (MAY EIGHT, SIXTYSEVEN).
R
FOSALIND DURHAM CURRENT MEMBER OF THE CP OF ILLINOIS, ACCORDING TO SECOND SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST (DECEMBER EIGHTEEN, SIXTYSEVEN). THIRD SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED NOVEMBER TWENTYTWO, SIXTYSEVEN MARJORIE KINSELLA WAS THEN CURRENT CP OF ILLINOIS MEMBER. FOURTH

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST REPORTED JULY FOURTEEN, SIXTYFIVE THAT SYLVIA KUSHNER THEN MEMBER OF CP OF ILLINOIS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE BUREAU AIRTEL TO ALL OFFICES, DE~~V~~CEMBER FIVE, SIXTYSEVEN.

THE SOURCES ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST SOURCE - CG FIVE NINE ZERO EIGHT - S

SECOND SOURCE - CG SIX THREE FOUR FOUR - S

THIRD SOURCE - CG SEVEN ZERO ONE FIVE - S

FOURTH SOURCE - CG FIVE SEVEN SEVEN EIGHT - S

SECRET SERVICE, USA, MILITARY AT CHICAGO ADVISED.

CHICAGO FOLLOWING CLOSELY TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL DETAILS AND IDENTIFY PARTICIPATING SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS.

LHM WITH COPIES OF ABOVE LITERATURE FOLLOWS.

END~~BPE~~

RM R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

R. Horner advised
8 10/pm 12/22/67/rn

CC: MR. SULLIVAN

FBI

Date: 12/27/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI

REC- 43

FROM: SAC, Portland (100-10983) (P)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

CINAL

The title is marked changed to show the date of demonstration [illegible]. Date was formerly carried in title as 1/8/68.

Re Bureau airtel to all Offices, dated 12/5/67.

Bureau (Enc. 12) (RM)
- 1 - 100-)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
- 1 - 105-138315)(WSPW)
- (1 - 100-)(JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)

2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)
- (1 - 100-)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
- (1 - 100-)(JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)

2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)

5 - Portland
- (2 - 100-10983)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
- (1 - 100-10626)(WSPW)
- 1 - 100-9248)(CINAL)
- 1 - [illegible]-SUB 0)(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

REC- 43

DEC 30 1967

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRB, GD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-9-68
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]

INT. SEC.

5 JAN 12 1968

Approved: __________ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

JAN 8 1968

SEARCH SATELLITE

PD 100-10983

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve copies, for San Francisco two copies and WFO two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) suitable for dissemination concerning proposed anti-war demonstration Monday, 1/15/68, Portland, Oregon, in support of Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C. 1/15/68. Sources utilized in this LHM, who have furnished reliable information in the past, are as follows:

First Source	PD 395-S
Second Source	AL 2882-S
Third Source	PD 305-S

The LHM is classified "confidential" because data reported from informants could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Copies of LHM disseminated to USA, Secret Service, MI, OSI, and NIC, all Portland.

Summary of information contained in LHM was not submitted to the Bureau by teletype inasmuch as a lengthy advance notice was received concerning the demonstration.

Portland will continue to follow this matter pursuant to Bureau instructions.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- CONFIDENTIAL -

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon
December 27, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On December 27, 1967, a source made available a one-page letter of Portland Women For Peace, a local pacifist organization, and a one-page sheet printed on both sides, first side captioned "A Call to All American Women" and the second side captioned "Jeannette Rankin Helena, Montana", which are as follows:

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

15

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]RTLAND WOMEN FOR PEACE
P. O. BOX 13061
PORTLAND, OREGON 97213

December 18, 1967

Dear Friend:

We are sending this letter to you and others from whom we have not heard much recently, in the hope of re-enlisting your efforts in the Women for Peace movement. It has been too long since we last heard directly from many of you, and our meetings with those of you whom we have seen recently have been brief.

Of course, we know the paralyzing sense of frustration we all feel occasionally, as we learn of the mounting horrors in Vietnam. But this feeling is only temporary, and quickly gives way to activity. As women, we bear the major responsibility for the preservation of life, and thus a major responsibility in the peace movement.

Enclosed you will find an announcement of the latest national women's effort for peace. Several peace groups in Portland are cooperating in raising funds to send representatives to Washington. We hope that you will also support this effort, to insure representation from Portland Women for Peace. The coupon on the enclosed notice is for your use in this effort.

In addition, we will have a supportive peaceful demonstration in Portland at

NOON, Monday, JANUARY 15th
Pioneer Post Office
5th and Morrison

We are asking participants to wear black, and to bring a black (or dark colored) umbrella. We shall carry the umbrellas opened, rain or shine. Placards (to wear) and leaflets (to distribute), expressing support for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, will be available. We shall march around the Post Office block for one hour, from noon to 1 p.m., leafleting as we walk.

We hope, if you cannot go to Washington, yourself, that you will contribute to help someone else to go, and that you will also join with us at the Pioneer Post Office at noon Monday, January 15th.

In addition, please let us hear from you on your ideas of what more we might do locally. We have some ideas too, which we hope to share with you, and on which we shall need much help.

Please get in touch with one of us soon. Your help, ideas, and efforts are urgently needed.

Yours for Peace,

Phoebe Friedman - phone 281-6288
Rose Leopold - phone 232-1605
Gloria Shaich - phone 246-5249

CONFIDENTIAL

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

CONFIDENTIAL

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 15

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States! Come to Washington on January 15 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

> Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
>
> Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

> PETITION the United States Congress.
>
> CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America - programs which will express our political power, reason, and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations.

- -

Clip here and return to

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
Portland Supporters
P. O. Box 13061
Portland, Oregon 97213

I would like to go to Washington on January 15 ________

I would like to help plan for supportive action in Portland on Jan. 15 ________

Enclosed is my contribution of $ __________

Name ____________________

CONFIDENTIAL

Address ____________________

Phone ____________________

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK ON JANUARY 15th - WHEREVER THEY ARE.

JEANNETTE RANKIN
Helena, Montana

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1967

To all American Women:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

Jeannette Rankin

Initial Sponsors

Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Anne ~~M.~~ Bennett
(Mrs. John ~~C.~~ Bennett)
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buckenholz
Catherine E. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clark
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Judith Eaton Judith [illegible]
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Ruth Goodelman

Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Dorothy Hassler
Ann Arnold Hedgman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogle
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florence Kennedy
Coretta King
(Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr)
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Mrs. Burton Lane
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Mary McCarthy
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton

Grace Mora Newman
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Carmen Ristorucci
Juanita J. Saddler
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Emlen Stokes
Mary Adams Sykes
Helen B. Turnbull
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Dagmar Wilson
Winifred Wygal

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

[illegible] OF

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Jeanette Rankin Brigade

Mass women's peace action

SAN FRANCISCO — When Congress reconvenes in January, the opening session will be met with the demand that its first order of business must be ending the Vietnam war and the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

This demand will be presented by woman power, organized into the Jeanette Rankin Brigade.

The women plan to convene a Congress of American Women to develop programs "dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations."

Besides demanding that the legislators act to end the war, the women will demand that Congress:

- Use its power to heal a sick society at home;
- Use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam;
- Listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

This movement was inspired by an appeal by Jeanette Rankin, 86, the nation's first woman in Congress, elected in 1917. "If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary," she said in May, "that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women."

Miss Rankin, a militant leader of the suffragette movement that eventually gained women the right to vote under the 19th Amendment, voted in 1917 against U.S involvement in World War I and also opposed American military commitment in World War II.

"This is no time to be polite," Miss Rankin said. "The army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says 'come and fight'. But they don't take the politicians and decision makers to fight."

Miss Rankin's militant opposition to the Vietnam war was taken up by about 75 prominent women throughout the country who issued a call for the nationwide convening of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade in Washington.

Women for Peace and the Women's Intl. League for Peace and Freedom have rallied to support of the action and a drive is now underway to get the largest possible number of women to Washington for the joint opening session of Congress.

Supportive action by women who cannot go to Washington will be planned in various localities.

One facet of the Congress of American Women will be discussion of electoral action, says Nikki Bridges, San Francisco chairman of the brigade.

"Many of us feel we should support peace candidates where they exist and go into politics ourselves in other places, because that way you get a forum you don't otherwise have," she says.

At present efforts are being made to get support from as many peace and women's groups as possible. "We also want the support of groups like churches and labor unions, and political organizations that have the type of program in which peace is just one facet," Mrs. Bridges says. "We don't want men, but do want their money and support."



JEANNETTE RANKIN
'No time to be polite'

CONFIDENTIAL

Among the initial sponsors are women from many walks of life bound together by a common concern about the war — Mrs. Benjamin Spock; Mrs. Rosa Parks (of the Montgomery Alabama bus boycott); author Jessica Mitford; Grace Mora Newman (sister of Dennis Mora of the Fort Hood Three); Mrs. Ann Eaton, author Kay Boyle, Mrs. Harry Belafonte; Mrs. Esther Pike, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

National executive secretary of the group is Mrs. Vivian Hallinan.

Detailed plans are still in formation, Mrs. Bridges says, but organizations and individuals are invited to join in any way they can. The San Francisco Bay Area office telephone number is 474-4456.

—M. P.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

9 "People's World"
San Francisco, California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/16/67
Edition: Vol. 30 No. 50
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Jeanette Rankin Brigade sets January 15 for capitol action

SAN FRANCISCO — When American women petition the joint session of Congress on its opening day (Jan. 15) to end the war in Vietnam, it will be "the most important coalition of women ever formed," Mrs. Vivian Hallinan, executive secretary of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade, told a press conference here last week.

"There will be women representing the clergy, scientists, professionals, and leaders of the civil rights movement," she said. "The black clad women will be led by Jeanette Rankin, the country's first congresswoman, who is now 86 years old."

The people's leaders hope enough women from the Bay Area will join the brigade to make a plane charter feasible. Inquiries about the chartered plane can be addressed to the local office of the Brigade at 150 Golden Gate avenue, S.F. Telephone 474-4456.

The Brigade is now contacting congressional leaders, asking them to meet the women at the capitol steps to receive their petition to put ending of the war in Vietnam as the first order of business for the new session of the Congress.

Program for the event, as finalized, calls for presentation to Congress of the Brigade's demands (see PW Dec. 16) and then holding of a women's congress that afternoon to plan political action on a local scale.

Unless Congress acts on their petition, the women will use Jan. 16 to see their representatives and pressure them to support their demands.

"We are not going to do anything unconstitutional," Mrs. Hallinan said. "We are going to petition Congress for redress of grievances. There was agreement at a meeting of the national steering committee to give Congress three more months to act. After that we will take to the streets — there was agreement on this by all those concerned."

Among the national sponsors of the event are prominent members of virtually every major national church and women's organization, for example Elsie Thomas Culver (World Council of Churches); Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Southern Christian Leadership Conf.); Jane Buchenholz (Americans for Democratic Action); Ellen Aurlakken (United Church Women).

Also Mrs. Emlen Stokes (American Friends Service Committee); Mrs. John C. Bennett (Methodist, wife of John Bennett, dean of Union Theological Seminary); author Susan Sontag; actress Ruby Dee; Judith Morse Eaton and Grace Luchs Elliot (Natl. Council of the Young Women's Christian Assn.).

Support for the event was also expected from authors Mary McCarthy and Betty Friedan.

Local supportive events for those who cannot go to Washington are being plannod throughout the nation.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

5 "People's World"
San Francisco, California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/23/67
Edition: Vol.30 No.51
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The "People's World" (PW) is a west coast communist weekly newspaper published in San Francisco, California.

Member

Gloria Shaich was mentioned in April, 1956, by a Communist Party (CP) functionary as a member of the City Committee of the Albany, New York CP. Gloria Shaich attended an Albany CP conference in May, 1958, which was open to those "in or near to" the CP. N.Y

Second Source, April 17, 1956
June, 1958

(NEE)

Rose Leopold Long has been a close associate of Oregon CP leaders and with her husband, Bernard Leopold, has frequently attended CP sponsored functions. Rose Leopold last attended an Oregon CP state convention on January 24, ~~1959.~~

Member

Third Source, January 30, 1959
November 30, 1967

Phoebe Friedman, Rose Leopold, and Gloria Shaich, during 1965, 1966, and 1967, have been active participants in various demonstrations protesting U.S. policy in Vietnam which were held in Portland, Oregon.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The following persons at Portland, Oregon, on December 27, 1967, were advised of the above proposed demonstration:

United States Attorney Sidney I. Lezak at 9:50 a.m.

United States Marshal Eugene G. Hulett at 9:30 a.m.

Postal Inspector Nolan Brown at 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Darrell L. Hoyt, Buildings Manager, General Services Administration, at 9:55 a.m.

Mr. John E. Wells, Special Agent, United States Secret Service, at 9:40 a.m.

Mr. [illegible] R. Toomey, Special Agent in Charge, 115th Military Intelligence Group at 8:25 a.m.

Mr. Charles G. Moseby, Clerk, Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force at 8:32 a.m.

Mr. L.A. Hancock, Special Agent, Naval Intelligence Command, at 8:30 a.m.

Officer Charley F. Trimble, Intelligence Unit, Portland Police Department at 8:35 a.m.

Deputy Marvin V. Woidyla, Intelligence Unit, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office at 8:35 a.m.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Corporal Lyle E. Mitchael, Intelligence Section, Oregon State Police, Milwaukie Station, at 10:00 a.m.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 12/28/67

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

WCS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9843) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Miami teletype to Director dated 12/27/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM concerning the captioned demonstration. Two copies are being furnished Philadelphia, the office of origin of the WILPF. Two copies are being furnished Atlanta and San Francisco who have current investigations concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. One copy is being furnished all other offices for their information.

The title has not been changed to record the new set date since this information has not been corroborated in the Miami Division.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (RM)
(1 - 100-9882) (WILPF)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)

1 - ____________ (Enc. 1) (RM) (Info)
2 - Miami (1 - 105-9843)
(1 - 100-11990)
JJM:sl
(66)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~) State
DATE FORW: 1-4-68
HOW FORW: RS
BY: RHH:RBK

REC 8

13 JAN 8 1968

C. C. - Bishop

cc - Horner with encl.

59 JAN 12 1968

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

Copies are being disseminated locally to NISO, 6 ND, Charleston, South Carolina; OSI, Robins AFB, Georgia; 111th MI Group, Orlando, Florida; and Secret Service, Miami.

The source concealed is PEARL CRAIGO (request), 343 West 46th Street, Hialeah, Florida, who furnished information to SA JOHN J. MATTIMORE.

LEADS

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will corroborate new set date of January 15, 1968.

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will ascertain if individuals from this area plan to participate.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
105-9843

Miami, Florida
December 28, 1967

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

A source, on December 27, 1967, advised that members of the Miami Chapter of the Women's International League For Peace & Freedom had received the following communication:

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE & FREEDOM
2006 Walnut Street - Philadelphia 3, Pa.

WIL-O-GRAM

Phila., Pa. Dec. 15 URGENT IMMEDIATE ACTION

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE CALLS THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN WOMEN TO COME TO WASHINGTON. DATE CHANGED TO JANUARY 15. JOIN AMERICAN WOMEN FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE TO PETITION THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND HEAL SICK SOCIETY AT HOME. WEAR BLACK. MEET AT UNION STATION WASHINGTON, D. C. AT 11 A.M. WALK TO CAPITOL. WOMEN'S CONGRESS TO CONVENE IN AFTERNOON AT GEORGETOWN U. SOME WILL STAY NEXT DAY TO SEE CONGRESSMEN.

* * * * * *

WATCH FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR PROGRAM.

Contributions to this mailing gratefully accepted.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1*

COPIES DESTROYED
842 APR 8 1971

105 — 13[illegible] - 8621

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
December 28, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-9843

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI ATLANTA

600 PM URGENT 12/28/67 MRB

TO DIRECTOR, WFO AND SAN FRANCISCO

FROM ATLANTA 100-7300

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
COMMUNICATION SECTION
DEC 28 1967
TELETYPE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON DC, JANUARY EIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

WCS/M

REBUAIRTEL TO ALBANY, DEC. FIVE, SIXTYSEVEN.

5 - K

KINLEY JONES, REPORTER, WSB TELEVISION STATION, ATLANTA, GA., ADVISED ON DEC. TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYSEVEN, THAT DURING INTERVIEW WITH JEANNETTE RANKIN AT WATKINSVILLE, GA., ON DEC. TWENTYSIX, SIXTYSEVEN, SHE STATED SHE INTENDED TO LEAD THE PROPOSED MARCH OF WOMEN IN WASHINTON DC, ON JAN. FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT, AT WHICH TIME THEY WOULD MARCH TO THE CAPITOL BUILDING AND PRESENT PETITITON FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES TO JOHN MCCORMACK, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RANKIN STATED SHE HAD RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM MCCORMACK INFORMING HER HE WOULD BE GLAD TO GREET THEM.

RANKIN EXPLAINED THAT MRS. VIVIAN HALLINAN OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., INFORMED HER SOMETIME AGO THAT A GROUP OF WOMEN HAD FORMED AN ORGANIZATION CALLED THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE AND ASKED HER IF SHE WOULD BE THE HONORARY PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION, AT WHICH TIME SHE INFORMED THEM SHE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SERVE.

RANKIN STATED SHE WAS ASKING WOMEN TO EXPRESS IDEAS AGAINST THE INSTITUTION OF WAR AND THAT SHE WAS OPPOSED TO THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTE.

18 JAN 4 1968

13

EX 70 75

ATLANTA CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON DETAILS FOLLOWS. P.

54 JAN 8 1968

1 cc - R. Horner

END

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/30/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (P)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., January 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO:Washington Field

ReBuairtel to all offices dated 12/5/67, sent under caption "DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., January 8, 1968" and Los Angeles teletype to Bureau and Washington Field captioned same.

For the information of the Bureau, there are attached eleven (11) copies of an LHM, with two copies each for the Washington Field and San Francisco Division. Instant LHM contains data currently available in the Los Angeles Division regarding the formation and plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

A classification of "Confidential" has been placed on this LHM to protect the symbol numbered informants utilized herein, who are identified as follows:

Source One	LA 4490-S
Source Two	LA 3063-S
Source Three	LA 3824-S

3 - Bureau (Encls.11) (RMAM)
2 - San Francisco (Info) (Encls.2)(RMAM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Encls.2)(RMAM)
3 - Los Angeles
(1 - 100-61745)(WSP)
(1 - 134-2199A) (~~LA 4490-S~~)

BDH/sdb
(10)

ENCLOSURE

REC 67

26

JAN 3 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
~~HOW FORW:~~
BY:

C.C. - Bishop

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

There has been no attempt to characterize the listed organizations comprising the Jeannette Rankin Brigade on a national level inasmuch as these are national organizations.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
December 30, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to prior Los Angeles memoranda dated December 12, 1967, relating to a proposed march on Washington, D. C., when Congress reconvenes in January, 1968, by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

Source one advised on December 28, 1967, that a meeting of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade of Southern California was held on the night of December 27, 1967 at 1226 South Curson Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Source one advised the JRB in the Los Angeles area is comprised of the following organizations:

Women for Legislative Action (WLA)(See Appendix)

Women Strike for Peace (WSP)(See Appendix)

Black Congress

Santa Ana Peace Center

Long Beach Peace Center

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles (See Appendix - Communist Infiltration of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles)

Individuals Against the Crime of Silence

Los Angeles Times
a daily newspaper published
in Los Angeles, page 11,
August 12, 1967

The August 12, 1967, morning edition of the Los Angeles Times on page 11, described the Black Congress as a coalition of South Central Los Angeles groups, many of them advocating Negro militancy.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

[illegible] 26

ENCLOSURE

Source one described the Black Congress as an amalgamation of civil rights organizations who are advocating the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and the money being utilized to carry on the war in Vietnam be used to fight poverty in the United States, provide better jobs in the ghetto, and provide more welfare benefits for the under-privileged in the United States.

Source three advised on March 3, 1966 that the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is a peace-oriented womens' organization which is 'Anti-War', per se. In addition, they work superficially in regards to civil rights issues. The participants are primarily active church-goers with a few former Communist Party members. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's activities have included demonstrations and distribution of literature opposing the Vietnam war.

Source one described the Santa Ana Peace Center, Long Beach Peace Center, and Individuals Against the Crime of Silence as peace-oriented organizations in the Los Angeles area who advocate the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam.

Source one advised the JRB on the national level now consists of persons from all walks of life representing in part the following organizations.

National Council of Churches

World Council of Churches

United Church Women

United Church of Christ

American Friends Service Committee

Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Americans for Democratic Action

Fellowship of Reconcilitation

National Council of Jewish Women

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee

Congress on Racial Equality

W. E. B. Du Bois Clubs of America (See appendix)

National New Politics

Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy

Source one reported that at the meeting of the JRB on December 27, 1967, it was reported the following women would attend the demonstration protesting United States policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968:

Joyce Angus
Leslie Parrish
Sheila Sloane
Mary Clarke
Mary Pearson

Two or more women representing the black community would also go depending upon the amount of money raised by the JRB to finance their trip to Washington, D.C.

Source one advised that all the above named individuals are members of Women Strike for Peace (WSP)(See Appendix).

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Source one advised that Joyce Angus is on the Executive Committee of WSP.

Source three advised in July, 1955, that Mary Clarke was dropped from Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955 for personal reasons and not for any political differences with LACCP.

Source one further reported that Glory Roberts of Pacoima, California, who is editor of the "Social Action Communicator", a monthly publication located in Pacoima, California, recording secretary of the Peace Action Council (PAC) (See Appendix), and representative to the PAC from the Black Congress and vice versa, was selected as Chairwoman of a JRB committee to reach into the black community to get participants from the Black ghetto involved in the demonstration in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968. Source one advised that in order to do this, all the organizations comprising the JRB will have to pledge money to get the women to Washington, D.C. and back to Los Angeles, California.

Source one stated that three committees have been established within the JRB. One of these committees has been established to draw up a list of redress of grievances. Each branch of the JRB throughout the nation will, when gathered in Washington, D.C. as a main committee, decide the major grievances and the redress of grievances will be incorporated into a petition to be presented to Congress. The second committee will be to involve the people in the black community in the demonstration. The third committee is to act as a coordinating committee.

Source one further advised it was reported that the women from Southern California will leave by plane on Sunday, January 14, 1968 at approximately 10:00 A.M., arriving Washington, D.C. at approximately 6:00 P.M. on the same date. No definite information was available yet regarding the airlines on which the women would be flying. The cost per person will be $216. This amount will be paid by money received from pledges, some individuals will pay part of their expenses with the remainder coming from the pledges, and other women making the trip will pay all their own expenses. No expenses are contemplated while the women are in Washington, D.C. inasmuch as arrangements have been made for the women to stay with other WSP members in the Washington, D.C. area. Source one advised that it is contemplated all the women will stay in Washington, D.C. until Tuesday, January 16, 1967.

Source one advised it was reported the women from across the nation would gather at the Union Depot, Washington, D.C. at 11:30 A.M. on January 15, 1968. Source one further reported it is hoped ten thousand women will participate in the demonstration. After the gathering at Union Depot, the women will march in solemn procession, all wearing black, to the steps of the capitol building where the petition containing the redress of grievances will be presented to the Congress. Source one further advised it had been reported that Representative Mc Cormick and Senator Mansfield had agreed to receive the petition. Representative Mc Cormick, according to source one, had agreed to accept fifteen women in his office at which time he would receive the petition, but source one advised the JRB now wants Representative Mc Cormick and Senator Mansfield to accept the petition on the steps of the capitol building in order that they might get news coverage. After the petition has been presented, the JRB wants the redress of grievances read into the Congressional Record.

Further activities of the JRB while in Washington, D.C. are to include a three hour "Women's Congress", possibly on the grounds of Georgetown University.

Mary Clarke pointed out that although the original intention had been to have only those women participate in the JRB who were willing to risk arrest for civil disobedience, she stated at the above meeting that no civil disobedience is anticipated in view of the large number of organizations participating who are opposed to such civil disobedience. However, she further stated that individuals are not going to be discouraged who might elect to create civil disobedience.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Tentative agreement was reached at this meeting for those women who are unable to fly to Washington, D.C. to participate in local action in Los Angeles, California on January 15, 1968, as follows:

9:30 A.M.	Assemble at California State Building in the downtown civic center, march with picket signs pointing out that the reported thirty billion dollars being spent in the Vietnam war should be spent in the state and the city.
10:30 A.M.	March to the Los Angeles City Hall.
11:30 A.M.	March to Los Angeles City Board of Education, 450 North Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

At the present time no local civil disobedience is planned. The JRB subcommittee to involve members of the black community in the demonstration will attempt to obtain a speaker from the ghetto to appear at the above locations; however, such a speaker has not yet been agreed upon.

Source one advised on December 29, 1967, that CLARA AUERBACH of San Francisco, California, has contacted local coordinators of the JRB to advise then that approximately 20 women from the San Francisco area will be traveling to Washington, D.C., via Los Angeles, leaving San Francisco on January 13, 1968. Source advised that Mrs. Auerbach was active in both the WSP and the WLA in Los Angeles prior to moving to San Francisco about three years ago.

The Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office are cognizant. Duty Agent Jenkins, Region II, United States Army, Pasadena, California, was furnished a summary of the above information on December 29, 1967. An information copy of this memorandum is being furnished that agency, and one each to the United States Attorney, Los Angeles; Secret Service, Los Angeles; Office of Special Investigations, Norton Air Force Base; and Naval Investigative Service Office, San Diego, California.

FIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES

A source advised on May 22, 1967, that the premises of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, 2936 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, California, have been utilized for meetings by Communist Party members and sympathizers over a period of years. Speakers and lecturers at the church frequently espouse Communist causes or follow the Communist Party line. Communist front group literature is distributed at the church. The church is used by some Communist Party members for "mass concentration" work.

This same infiltration extends to adjuncts of the church such as the Unitarian Public Forum and the Fellowship for Social Justice, formerly known as the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice.

STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN has been minister of the church since 1948.

Reverend STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN is described in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities Committee in California, 1948, page 115, as a very active "Communist fronter" and connected with numerous "Communist front organizations and activities."

Membership in the First Unitarian Church does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE, Also Known As Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that Mike Zagarell, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that Daniel Rubin, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countires and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that Jarvis Tyner was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that Jarvis Tyner is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A source advised on May 1, 1963, that the Women for Legislative Action was formed in 1952, claiming to be an independent organization dedicated to non-partisan participation in legislative and civic activities. Its position in favoring or opposing legislation usually parallels the position of the Communist Party and related groups. It also supports legislation to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Membership in the Women for Legislative Action does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

Another source advised on May 11, 1967, that the Women for Legislative Action continues to be active in the Los Angeles area.

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California

December 30, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

Character INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference Los Angeles memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/3/68

CDB

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

ReBuairtel to Albany, 12/5/67, and Atlanta teletype to Director, WFO and San Francisco, 12/28/67.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM captioned as above, prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, on 1/2/68, and suitable for dissemination.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Fort McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

The source utilized in the enclosed LHM is SF 2470-S.

Enclosed LHM is being classified confidential since unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the informant reflected therein could reasonably result in the identifying of this source of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta
CTH:met
(9)

ENCLOSURE

REC-31

22 JAN 4 1968

34

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, [redacted] CD)
DATE FORW: 1-9-68
HOW FORW:
BY:

ORIG COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

XEROX
JAN 9 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

58 JAN 1969

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
January 2, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Kinley Jones, Reporter for WSB Television Station, Atlanta, Georgia, advised on December 28, 1967, that during an interview with Jeannette Rankin at Watkinsville, Georgia, on December 26, 1967, she stated she intended to lead the proposed march of women in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, at which time they would march to the capitol building and present a petitition for redress of grievances to John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Rankin stated she had received a telegram from Mr. McCormack informing her he would be glad to greet them. Rankin explained that Mrs. Vivian Hallinan of San Francisco, California, informed her sometime ago that a group of women had formed an organization called the "Jeannette Rankin Brigade", and asked her if she would be the honorary president of the organization, at which time she informed them she would be delighted to serve. Rankin stated she was asking women to express ideas against the institution of war and that she was opposed to the use of violence to settle any dispute.

VIVIAN HALLINAN

A source advised on October 31, 1962, that Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the CP if her husband, Vincent Hallinan, would also join.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ENCLOSURE

34

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968

Vivian Hallinan was arrested on a civil rights sit-in demonstration at Auto Row in San Francisco, California, in April, 1964.

Sergeant William Davis, San Francisco County Jail Number 2, San Bruno, California, advised on August 22, 1966, that Vivian Hallinan served a month in the County Jail from July 5, 1966, to August 2, 1966, having been found guilty on a sit-in charge.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

VIA TELETYPE
JAN 4 19
ENCIPHERED

WA ----10----

NK ----4-----

PH ----2-----

FBI NEW YORK

7:25 PM URGENT 1-4-68 AWS

TO DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON FIELD 100-47173, NEWARK AND PHILADELPHIA

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WFO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM NEW YORK 100-161601

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, DC, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT; INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY); OO: WFO.

ON JANUARY THIRD LAST, ~~NEW YORK TWO SEVEN ZERO FIVE - S~~, RELIABLE- CONCEAL, ADVISED AT NEW YORK COUNTY COMMUNIST PARTY COMMITTEE MEETING DECEMBER TWENTY EIGHTH, SIXTY SEVEN, THOSE PRESENT WERE URGED TO ATTEND JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON, SPONSORED BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE (JRB).

ON JANUARY THIRD LAST ADVERTISEMENT APPEARED IN "NEW YORK TIMES", PAGE FIFTY SEVEN, CAPTIONED "DAGMAR WILSON SAYS JOIN ME IN WASHINGTON JANUARY FIFTEENTH". AD INCLUDED COMMENT "THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN WOMEN, LED BY JEANNETTE RANKIN, FIRST U.S. CONGRESSWOMAN, WILL DEMAND THAT CONGRESS END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND OUR SOCIAL CRISIS AT HOME."

REC 8

8622

JAN 8 1968

END PAGE ONE

cc - Thompson

5

55 JAN 12 1968

TWO COPIES TO WFO

~~MR. DELOACH FOR THE DIRECTOR~~

PAGE TWO

~~CSNY SIX THOUSAND-S~~, RELIABLE-CONCEAL, ADVISED PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT GOTHAM HOTEL, NYC, JANUARY THIRD LAST, ANNOUNCED JRB SPONSORING JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON, DC, WITH ASSISTANCE OF WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP). PARITCIPANTS WILL INCLUDE FLORYNCE KENNEDY, RUBY DEE, JUDY MORSE EATON, THE DAUGHTER OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, AND MRS. BENJAMIN SPOCK. AT THE CONFERENCE IT WAS STATED SOME NEGRO WOMEN WOULD PARTICIPATE, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE.

DC

KENNEDY IS A NEW YORK ATTORNEY WHO HAS REPRESENTED H. RAP BROWN OF SNCC.

~~NEW YORK SIX NINE FOUR-S ASTERISK~~, RELIABLE-CONCEAL, ADVISED IN NOVEMBER, NINETEEN SIXTY FIVE, RUBY DEE WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

END PAGE TWO

ON JANUARY FOUR[illegible] INSTANT, FIVE SEPARATE AD[illegible] APPEARED IN "THE VILLAGE VOICE", A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER IN NYC. RUBY DEE, LINDA MORSE, MRS. BENJAMIN SPOCK AND SUSAN SONTAG APPEARED BY NAME AND PHOTO SEPARATELY IN FOUR OF THE ADS REQUESTING "JOIN ME IN WASHINGTON JANUARY FIFTEENTH," AND INCLUDED IDENTICAL COMMENTS REFERRED TO IN "NEW YORK TIMES" AD OF JANUARY THIRD LAST.

THE FIFTH AD STATED "WE WANT TEN THOUSAND WOMEN IN WASHINGTON JANUARY FIFTEENTH" AND INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

" THE BROADEST COALITION OF AMERICAN WOMEN IN HISTORY-WOMEN YOUNG AND OLD, FROM CHURCH, POLITICAL, PEACE AND MINORITY GROUPS, FROM THE ARTS, POFESSIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS-WILL SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE THE DAY CONGRESS OPENS. WE WOMEN, REPRESENTING FIFTY ONE PERCENT OF THE VOTING POPULATION, WILL DEMAND THAT AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, CONGRESS WITHDRAW US TROOPS AND ACT TO MAKE A DECENT LIFE FOR OUR TWENTY THREE MILLION BLACK PEOPLE AND ALL CITIZENS.

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

"WE WILL CONVENE OUR OWN CONGRESS OF AMERICAN WOMEN, FOLLOWING OUR PETITION AT THE CAPITOL. WE WILL DECLARE OUR INTENTION TO MOBILIZE ON ALL LEVELS IN OUR COMMUNITIES TO RESHAPE OUR SOCIETY. START THE NEW YEAR WITH A DAY OFF FROM HOME OR JOB TO WORK FOR PEACE WITH THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

SUSAN SONTAG IS AN AUTHOR AND WRITER.

ON JUNE SIXTEENTH, SIXTY SEVEN, ~~CHICAGO SEVEN ZERO-ONE NINE~~-S, RELIABLE-CONCEAL, ADVISED THAT AT A MEETING OF NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION, CPUSA, ON JUNE FOURTEENTH, SIXTY SEVEN, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, LINDA MORSE, AKA LINDA DANNENBERG, WAS THEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE CPUSA.

ALL ABOVE ADS LISTED NEW YORK ADDRESS OF JRB AS ONE THREE THREE WEST SEVENTY SECOND STREET, NYC.

ON JANUARY FOURTH INSTANT, BSS, NYCPD, ADVISED THAT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING JRB IS KNOWN EXCEPT THAT THEY CONTINUE TO HAVE TWO TRAINS RESERVED FROM NYC TO WASHINGTON, DC, ON JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT AND

END PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

ARE BEING ASSISTED BY WSP.

JOHN MARTIN, PASSENGER REPRESENTATIVE, PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, NYC, ADVISED JANUARY FOURTH INSTANT, THAT ORIGINAL REQUEST BY JRB FOR TWO TRAINS COULD NOT BE FURNISHED BY RAILROAD BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT. ONE TRAIN OF EIGHTEEN CARS BEING RESERVED. TRAIN WILL POSSIBLY INCREASE TO TWENTY CARS. MARTIN ESTIMATED TOTAL OF FOURTEEN HUNDRED PASSENGES WOULD BE TRANSPORTED. TRAIN TO DEPART NYC SEVEN TWENTY AM, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT, ARRIVE NEWARK SEVEN THIRTY SIX TO PICK UP ADDITIONAL PASSENGERS, ARRIVE WASHINGTON, DC ELEVEN TEN AM. NO OTHER STOPS BETWEEN NEWARK AND WASHINGTON. TRAIN WILL DEPART WASHINGTON SEVEN TEN PM, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT, ARRIVE NEWARK TEN FORTY FIVE PM, ARRIVE NEW YORK CITY ELEVEN PM.

MARTIN STATED A GROUP FROM PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ORGANIZED BY ONE ETHEL TAYLOR, TELEPHONE NUMBER L O FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN ZERO, HAS RESERVED THREE COACHES ON REGULAR TRAIN DEPARTING PHILADELPHIA EIGHT TEN AM, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT, ARRIVING WASHINGTON, DC TEN TWENTY AM.

END PAGE FIVE

~~CORR L9 WS ARRIVE~~

-- SULLIVAN

PAGE SIX

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED.

NYO INVESTIGATION CONTINUING. LHM WILL FOLLOW.

END

WA...

RNK R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

RWF FTB FBI WASH DC FOR #10/ rnk

R. Horner advised 10 25 11/6/63 to be included in letter.

CC- MR. SULLIVAN

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. F[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓ WCS
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
(OO:WFO)

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau with 2 each for New York and Philadelphia describing above demonstration.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Local law enforcement agencies cognizant.

Sources used in LHM are: first source is WF 1777-S; second source is CARTER BARBER, 2633 Adams Mill Road, WDC; thir source is NY 694-S*.

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information reported from first source could lead to the identity of a source of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness.

REC 5 20

COPY OF ENCL

WFO continuing to follow and will report pertinent details.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

8 JAN 9 1968

11 ENCLOSURE

4 - Bureau
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - New York (RM) ~~(Enc. 2)~~
2 - Philadelphia (100-49497) (RM) (Enc. 2)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061)

GTT:dgp
(10)

AIRTEL

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

66 JAN 10 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

January 4, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 4, 1968, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) with headquarters at 133 West 72nd Street, New York City, originally scheduled a demonstration in Washington, D.C. on January 8, 1968, to coincide with the opening of Congress. In view of the fact that the reconvening of Congress was delayed until January 15, 1968, the organization rescheduled the demonstration for that date. The source stated that the JRB is composed mostly of members of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization and is using the name of the JRB only for this one affair.

The above source stated that individuals are to meet at Union Station in Washington, D.C., at approximately 11:30 a.m. on January 15, 1968, and then walk in a "silent procession" to the United States Capitol. Literature sent out by the local office of Women Strike for Peace indicate that the women will assemble at Union Station at the above time and "in solemn procession and wearing black, we will walk to the Capitol steps behind our delegation who will present our '"Women's Petition to the Congress"' demanding redress of grievances."

According to the source, the group wanted to have Speaker of the House McCormick and Senator Mansfield meet them on the Capitol steps and accept the above mentioned petition. Thereafter, the women would visit both the Senate and the United States House of Representatives and confer

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

/ 1-1761

20

COPIES DESTROYED
27_ MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

with individual Congressmen in their offices. These women were to attempt to persuade Congressmen to lend their support to end the war in Vietnam. The source indicated that the organization had written to Speaker McCormick and Senator Mansfield asking to be met on the Capitol steps but Speaker McCormick had answered by stating that he could not meet them on the steps but he would be willing to receive a delegation of ten to fifteen women in his office on that date. The source stated that Senator Mansfield had not replied to their request.

The source stated that some of the women in the JRB want to commit acts of civil disobedience so that they may be arrested but most of the individuals involved do not think it advisable to commit acts of civil disobedience. The source stated that at no time have any specific details been mentioned as to the acts of civil disobedience which might be committed. The source stated that following the visit to Congress, the women would like to hold a meeting sometime between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. at some logical site in Washington, D.C. Source stated that negotiations are under way to rent the D.C. Armory for that time and they have the money available for such rental but some of the leaders object to a clause in the contract which would allow the Armory to cancel the reservation at any time. The source stated that negotiations are also underway to rent a ballroom at the Shoreham Hotel.

According to the source, 3,000 women are expected to participate in the above demonstration with most of them coming by train from New York City. The source stated that Sylvia Lichtenstein has been appointed coordinator of the demonstration.

A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 10, 1951, that Sylvia Lichtenstein was a member of the Newspaper Club of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia from 1947 to 1950.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Captain Robert Krahling, United States Capitol Police, advised on January 3, 1968, that a delegation from the JRB and their attorney, Joseph Forer, met with officials of the United States Capitol Police on January 2, 1968, concerning details of the proposed demonstration. These individuals were advised by the United States Capitol Police that they cannot demonstrate on the Capitol grounds in a group or carry placards, as such activity is prohibited by rules of Congress. Forer, as attorney for the group, advised the officials that these women will be coming to the Capitol as individuals and although they will be walking together they can only be kept out of the Capitol building if the police exclude all visitors from the United States Capitol. Forer argued that such a demonstration on the Capitol grounds is not a violation of the law by the participants but a violation of the United States Government in refusing to allow its citizens to present their grievances to Congress.

Captain Krahling advised that in addition to Joseph Forer, the members of the above delegation included the following individuals:

Dagmar Wilson
Sylvia Lichtenstein
Donna Allen
Billie Hetzel

A third source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in September, 1959, that a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, had recently referred to Joseph Forer as "one of the most important communist in Washington, D.C."

Inspector Thomas I. Herlihy, Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department, advised on January 3, 1968,

CONFIDENTIAL

that the Regional Office of the JRB is located at 3306 Ross Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., which is the residence of Donna Allen. He stated that the area representative of the JRB is Wilhelmina Hetzel, 3625 Yuma Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Inspector Herlihy stated that Mrs. Hetzel had recently advised him that twenty coach loads of individuals from New York City will leave New York City via Pennsylvania Railroad at 7:20 a.m. January 15, 1968, and arrive in Washington, D.C., at 11:10 a.m. From Union Station, they will march to the United States Capitol where they will visit Congress and the offices of various Congressmen. Between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. they expect to hold a "Congress of American Women" possibly at the D.C. Armory. According to Inspector Herlihy, the New York group will leave Union Station at 7:10 p.m. to return to New York City.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
~~Miss Gandy~~

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (1~~00-[illegible]22~~6)

REC 25

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING US POLICY
IN VIETNAM
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: WFO

1 xerox copy NSA
2/18/70 - WJM/kab
Dorothy

Re San Francisco teletype to Bureau, 1/3/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM concerning captioned demonstration and 2 copies each for Atlanta, Los Angeles, and WFO. Copies of instant LHM have been furnished locally to the Army, Navy Air Force, Secret Service, San Francisco and USA, San Francisco.

The sources mentioned in the LHM are as follows:

Source 1 is SF 2114-S;
Source 2 is WF 1777-S;
Source 3 is SF 1870-S;
Source 4 is CSLA 3200-S;
Source 5 is LA 2954-S;
Source 6 is SF 2470-S;
Source 7 is CSSF 2357-S;
Source 8 is Mrs. GRIFFIN SHURBET (BY REQUEST)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
DATE FORW: 1-[illegible]
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encls. 11) (AM-RM)
2 - New York (Info)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (Info)(Encls. 2)(100-7300)(AM-RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (Info)(Encls. 2)(100-70701)(AM-RM)
3 - San Francisco
(2 - 100-59802)
(1 - 100-48035 - Women Strike for Peace)
COW:jal
(14)

REC 25 - 27

JAN 10 1968

C. C. - Bishop

XEROX
JAN 11 1968

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION.

59 JAN

100-59802
GOW:jal

Source 9 is FBI Post Office Box 416 under
name JUNE LASKA;
Source 10 is CG 6183-S;
Source 11 is SF 2518-S.

Instant LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect the identities of sources of continuing value.

San Francisco will continue to follow and report any pertinent information received concerning this matter.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

San Francisco, California

January 4, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum, dated December 19, 1967.

The following information has been made available by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past.

A source advised on January 3, 1968, that the following individuals from the Northern California area were planning to fly to Washington, D.C., to attend a demonstration in that city on January 15, 1968, sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. The source stated that these individuals intend to depart from San Francisco on January 13, 1968, and will reside at the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) near the White House. Tentative plans of the group to charter a plane have been cancelled as the group was unable to obtain enough individuals for charter flight:

Clara Auerbach
Zena Druckman
Catherine Cole
Malvina Reynolds
Hazel Grossman
Vivian Hallinan
Ethel Ledel

A second source advised on September 21, 1967, Ck that Clara Auerbach attended the 6th National Conference of Women Strike for Peace (WSP) held Septmeber 20 through 23, 1967, in Washington, D.C. On September 21, 1967, a steering committee of seven individuals for the National Conference appointed by the

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1-- 449115 97

ENCLOSURE

chairman included Clara Auerbach.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN FOR PEACE aka Women Strike for Peace

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette," a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Berkeley, California, contained an article in the November 19, 1965, evening edition reflecting that in November, 1961, when concern mounted over radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, a group of women in Washington, D. C. started Women Strike for Peace. The idea spread rapidly throughout the country and now embraces 900 groups, including Women For Peace groups in the San Francisco Bay area.

These groups support programs to achieve goals such as:

(1) Continued disarmament negotiations.

(2) A strong and flexible United Nations.

(3) Planning now at state and national levels for conversion to peace-time economy and positive efforts to ease world tensions.

The women act as individuals and as a group, with specific actions suggested by individuals and groups from all over the world. Decision to participate jointly on any given suggestion is democratly arrived at by members of the Coordinating Committee. Effective cooperation with other peace groups is encouraged. Monthly Coordinating Committee meetings and general meetings, as warranted, are open to all and announced in mailings to members. There are no dues or membership forms nor conditions for membership.

To stir an awareness of the need for peace, Women For Peace encourage public education in peace objectives at local schools and sponsor peace-oriented demonstrations and public meetings, newspaper ads, billboards, and candidates for public office. On the national level the group attempts to influence government officials by letters and conferences.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968

A third source advised in January, 1968, Zena Druckman is a current member of the San Francisco County Communist Party (CP).

CAL.

Catherine Cole, formerly Kay McTernan, according to a fourth source, in May, 1947, was transferred from the Wilshire-Fairfax Club to the 13th CD Club of the Los Angeles County CP during 1947.

CAL.

Source four in 1946 and a fifth source in 1950 have advised that Malvina Reynolds was a CP member from 1931 to 1948 and continued active in the CP until 1950.

CAL

DC

Source three on January 4, 1967, also advised that at a meeting of the Fillmore Club of the San Francisco County CP on December 14, 1966, in San Francisco, a discussion took place among the members present about members who carry books, but do not attend meetings. It was suggested that Hazel Grossman be dropped from the club because of her inactivity and absence from the meetings.

A sixth source advised on October 31, 1962, that Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the CP if her husband, Vincent Hallinan would also join.

A seventh source advised on October 8, 1965, that in August, 1965, Ethel R. Ledel was a "People's World" (PW) subscriber.

CAL

The PW is a West Coast communist newspaper.

Source one has also advised that attorneys Arthur Kinoy and William Kunstler from the East Coast are expected to draw up a petition to end the war in Vietnam to be presented to Congres The demonstrators are then going to ask the Speaker of the House to present the petition as the first order of business. If he does not they will send him a telegram.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

On January 3, 1968, an eighth source advised that it was possible that Thelma Shumake would travel to Washington for the demonstration on January 15, 1968.

Special Agents of the FBI interviewed Thelma Shumake on August 18, 1953, at which time she stated that she had attended 15 or 20 meetings of the CP. She declined to furnish any information as to whether or not she had made application at any time for CP membership or was a member of the CP. If a crisis occurred in the United States between the forces of Democracy and Communism, she commented that she would not know which group she would support adding that it would depend upon whom the communist leaders were at that time.

OK
D.C.

An article appearing in the December 12, 1967, edition of the "Independent Journal", a daily San Rafael, California newspaper, stated that a Mrs. Jean Schellenberg of Tiburon, California, was attempting to organize support for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade march in Washington in January, 1968. The article stated that 15 Marin women have agreed to travel to Washington in January.

D.C.

On January 3, 1968, a ninth source furnished a copy of a leaflet captioned "Bay Area Action" printed by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California. Xeroxed duplication of this leaflet is appended to this memorandum.

On January 4, 1968, the first source advised that Clara Auerbach recently stated that approximately 30 women from the San Francisco bay area currently intend to travel to Washington, D.C. for the January 15 demonstration in that city. This source also advised that the following individuals had also indicated that they will attend the demonstration in Washington:

Eleanor ~~Salkind~~,
Marie Schooley.

OK
D.C.

During January, 1960, a tenth source advised Isadore Salkind had indicated that his wife

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

Eleanor Franklin Salkind was a member of the CP.

On March 24, 1967, an eleventh source advised that Marie Marstelle Schooley was a member of the San Francisco area Women for Peace.

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States!

Come to Washington on January 15 as Congress opens. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

PETITION the United States Congress

CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman t vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings--for the of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to this CALL, and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin



JEANNETTE
RANKIN
BRIGADE
150 Golden Gate Ave., Rm. 302
San Francisco, Calif. 94102

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 16 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

BAY AREA ACTION

CONFIDENTIAL

Join Us

At noon January 15 on the Polk street steps of the San Francisco City Hall ten thousand women in black who cannot go to Washington will protest the war in Vietnam. In cities from New York to Los Angeles women will gather to express their Christmas prayers for peace.

Will you join us?

We will give to Mayor Joseph Alioto a copy of the Washington petition and ask for his support. To so petition our government is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment. We will telephone our Congressmen from their offices in the Federal Building to let them know women will be calling on them in Washington and that we join them in urging a quick end to the Vietnam war.

Because we are for peace we will do these things peacefully with respect for our fellowmen.

Join Us

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS

U.S.A.

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbach [illegible]
Mrs. K[illegible] [illegible]oler
Dona [illegible]n
Ca[illegible]erson
Ellen [illegible]en
Hele[illegible]
Norma [illegible]
Mrs. H[illegible] [illegible]
Mrs. John [illegible]ancett
Louise [illegible]
Rebecca [illegible]man
Peggy [illegible]ngs
Mrs. Algernon Black
Joan [illegible]
K[illegible]
Ni[illegible]ges
Con[illegible]n
Ja[illegible]enholz
Dr. Su[illegible]ckingham
Mrs. John [illegible]
Catherine [illegible]
Ly[illegible]ert
Ma[illegible]
Eve[illegible] Coffin
Ruth G[illegible] Colby
Judy [illegible]
Sylvi[illegible]e
Florence [illegible]
Elsie [illegible] Culver
Polly [illegible]bertson
Ruby [illegible]
Mavis Dick
Mrs. E[illegible] Durnam
Mrs. [illegible]
Jud[illegible] [illegible]on
Grace Loucks [illegible]
Mrs. Berg[illegible] Evans
Betty [illegible]
Ann[illegible]
Eleanor [illegible]ch
Betty Friedan
Mrs. Ma[illegible] [illegible]edlaender
Mrs. Horace [illegible]ss
Frances Friedman
Margaret [illegible]

U.S.A.

Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Mrs. [illegible]rdon
Barb[illegible]
[illegible]an
Mrs. E[illegible] [illegible]burg
Mrs. Sidney [illegible]arris
Elizabeth [illegible]spiden
Dorothy Hess[illegible]
Anna Arnold Hedgeman
France[illegible]ing
Carme[illegible]ton
Lois Cr[illegible]ogle
Donna [illegible]
Mrs. W[illegible] Huntington
Mrs. R[illegible]
Mrs. Chris[illegible]anus
R. Elizab[illegible]
Mrs. [illegible]hson
Floryn[illegible]
Mrs. [illegible] Jr.
Susan [illegible]oy
R[illegible]nzler
Ru[illegible]
Mrs. Hen[illegible] Kress
Marg[illegible]
Hele[illegible]
Mrs. B[illegible]
Anna [illegible]ford
Mac[illegible]er
Viveca Lind[illegible]
Mrs. I. Lo[illegible]
Mary E[illegible]
Helen M[illegible] Lynd
Er[illegible]
Olive [illegible]yer
Bet[illegible]th
Jes[illegible]ord
Lind[illegible]
Nell[illegible]
Grace [illegible]wman
Doro[illegible]
Mrs. Jose[illegible] Papp
Ro[illegible]
Les[illegible]ish
Hele[illegible]
[illegible]

U.S.A.

Nan[illegible]
Anne [illegible]
Elean[illegible]
Lou[illegible]ols
Esth[illegible]
Alice [illegible]itzer
Mrs. [illegible]
Mercedes [illegible]andall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Ma[illegible]
Malvina [illegible]
Libby [illegible] Reynolds
Carm[illegible]
Mrs. [illegible] Rosenberg
He[illegible]son
Ru[illegible]wald
Mu[illegible]keyser
Mar[illegible]
Mrs. Ro[illegible] Ryan
Marjorie [illegible]ell
Juanita [illegible]ler
Toshi-A[illegible]eeger
Elai[illegible]
Helen [illegible]ith
Mrs. Benj[illegible]ck
Susa[illegible]
Mrs. S. E[illegible]es
Eliz[illegible]land
A[illegible]
[illegible]es
Ethe[illegible]lor
Ida [illegible]
Ma[illegible]man
Helen B[illegible]
Dor[illegible]
Lucy [illegible]chiel
Barbara [illegible]ster
[illegible]
Co[illegible]ss
Rosal[illegible]lls
Ann[illegible]cke
Pearl [illegible]
Dagm[illegible]n
Mrs. [illegible]
Winnifred [illegible]
Mrs. [illegible]

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
is a coalition of individuals and existing organizations.

Jeannette Rankin - Chairwoman
Vivian Hallinan - Executive Secretary

- -

Clip and mail to: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
150 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, Ca. 941[illegible]

____I am interested in going to Washington on January 15.
____I will plan to spend an additional day to lobby my Congr
____I will work to develop local supportive action.
____I enclose $____ as my contribution.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in _______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15-16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

ReBuairtel to Albany, 12/5/67, and Atlanta teletypes to Director, WFO and San Francisco, 12/28/67 and 1/3/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM captioned as above, prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, on 1/4/68, and suitable for dissemination.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Fort McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
12- Atlanta (2 - 100-7300)
(1 - 100-6730) (VIDEM)
(1 - 100-7274 (BUSINESS EXECUTIVES MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE)
(1 - 25-18472) (J. BRITTAIN PENDERGRAST, JR.)
(1 - 100-7122) (ATLANTANS FOR PEACE)
(1 - 100-3128) (AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE)
(1 - 100-7253) (NANCY COLLINSON)
(1 - 100-5720) (ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY)
(1 - 100-6351) (CORETTA KING)
(1 - 100-New Dead) (NAN S. PENDERGRAST)
~~(1 - 100-6857) (SOUTHERN COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO~~
END THE WAR IN VIETNAM)

CTH:met
(19)

C. C. - Bishop

REC-35

33

1 JAN 5 1968
INT. SEC.

XEROX
JAN 9 1968

AGENCY: G-2, CNI, OSI, ~~SEC SER~~, —
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: _______
HOW FORW: _______
BY: _______

COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: _______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent _______________ M Per _______________

AT 100-7300

The source utilized in the enclosed LHM to characterize ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY is SF 1917-S.

Enclosed LHM is being classified confidential since unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the informant reflected therein could reasonably result in the identifying of this source of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
January 4, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

On January 3, 1968, Mrs. Nancy S. Pendergrast, also known as Mrs. John Brittain Pendergrast, Jr., Atlanta Coordinator for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, furnished the following information:

Women from all over the United States will meet at the Union Depot, Washington, D.C., at 11:30 a.m., on January 15, 1968, dressed in black, and will march silently to the Capitol steps to present to Speaker of the House John McCormack and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield a petition to Congress demanding redress of grievances to end the war in Vietnam. The group will hold a workshop on the evening of January 15, 1968, and make plans for the next day's activities, such as lobbying of Congressmen on January 16, 1968, and convening of a Congress of women. No civil disobedience is anticipated.

Individuals from the Atlanta, Georgia, area who are planning to join Jeannette Rankin in Washington are Mrs. Coretta King, wife of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and Mrs. Noyes Collinson of the American Friends Service Committee, Atlanta Office.

An article appearing in the evening edition of "The Atlanta Journal", a newspaper published daily at Atlanta, Georgia, on January 2, 1968, stated Jeannette Rankin will

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

10 [illegible] 3.3

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

address a group of Atlanta women interested in peace activities at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, on the evening of January 4, 1968, and Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., National Sponsor of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, would also speak at the meeting. The article stated further that Mrs. King would join Miss Rankin in the fifty-woman national delegation on the opening day of Congress. According to the article, Isobel Cerney, Founder of the Southern Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, would be on the program at Ebenezer Baptist Church.

ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY

A source on August 25, 1961, advised that a meeting of the Palo Alto Communist Club, Palo Alto, California, was held on August 23, 1961, and that $36.00 was turned over in this meeting as an up-to-date payment of Communist Party dues for Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney.

The source also advised on September 18, 1961, that a close friend was trying to have Isobel Cerney kicked out of the Communist Party because of her present religion "jag" and because she did not attend Communist Party meetings regularly when visiting Palo Alto during the Summers.

The source further advised on August 28, 1962, that Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney were then out of the Communist Party, although the $25.00 received for their current dues was to be retained by the Party.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
January 4, 1968

FD-323
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Character: INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference: Memorandum prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, dated and captioned as above.

All sources whose identities have been concealed in the referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations not conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
~~Miss Gandy~~

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

VIDEM
(BUFILE 105-138315)

Re Chicago teletype dated 12/27/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies and for WFO are two copies of an LHM captioned as above.

The date of the demonstration in the title of these communications has been changed from 1/8/68 to 1/15-16/68 to conform with information contained in the attached pamphlet of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

The sources are identified as follows:

T-1 CG 6066-S
T-2 CG 6543-S
T-3 CG 5851-S

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

-37

ENC.

3 - Bureau (Enc.11)
2 - WFO (Enc.2)
3 - Chicago (100-44707)
(1 - 100-42717)
(1 - 100-44775)

REC 5

EX 103

5

JWT:ELK
(8)

C.C. - Bishop
XEROX
JAN 11 1968

13

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge Sent ______ M Per ______

CG 100-44707
100-42717
100-44775

T-4	CG 5890-S
T-5	CG 5908-S
T-6	CG 6386-S
T-7	Undercover detective, Special Squad Number 1, New York Police Department.
T-8	CG 7015-S
T-9	Anonymous source
T-10	Anonymous source
T-11	Anonymous source
T-12	Former CG 5676-S
T-13	Former CG 5857-S

One copy each of the LHM is being furnished to the 113th MI Group, United States Secret Service, and USA locally.

The LHM is classified confidential in order to protect sources utilized which are of continuing value.

This matter is being followed closely at Chicago. The Bureau and interested offices will be kept advised of additional information developed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
100-44707
100-42717
100-44775

Chicago, Illinois
January 4, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

On December 27, 1967, Anzelm A. Czarnowski, 7513 West 63rd Street, Argo, Illinois, a former member of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois, October, 1943 - January, 1955, furnished the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation a copy of a pamphlet captioned, "A Call to American Women" issued by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 520 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

A copy of the above pamphlet is attached hereto.

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade is described therein as a broad coalition of women from among many areas of American life who will meet in Washington, D.C. January 15, 1968, for the opening of Congress to make the following demands:

1. Congress as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

2. Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.

3. Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

-3

1 0 4

4. Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex.

It is further stated that following the petitioning of Congress the group will hold its own Congress to articulate their position on achieving peace and then return to their own communities and mobilize women dedicated to reshaping American society, and restoring the country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

According to the pamphlet the group will meet January 15, 1968, at the Union Depot, Washington, D.C., at 11:30 a.m. and walk to Congress and present the petition. Many plan to stay in Washington to begin implementation of their demands by presenting them to Congressmen and Senators on January 16, 1968.

Attached to the pamphlet is an application for rail tickets to travel to Washington by Baltimore and Ohio Railway, leaving Chicago January 14, 1968, at 4:30 p.m. It is also indicated that plane and bus transportation may also be arranged for if enough people are interested. Anyone needing assistance in securing accommodations is advised to contact the Hospitality Office, 2140 Peace Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., telephone number (202) 293-2020.

The pamphlet contains a partial list of persons who are National sponsors and Chicago sponsors. Included among sponsors listed were the following:

Sylvia Bloom

As of October, 1967, Sylvia Bloom was a member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-1, October 5, 1967)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

Margaret Burroughs

Margaret Burroughs is known to have been a member of the CP of Illinois in 1955 - 1957.

(CG T-2, November, 1961)

During 1964, Margaret Burroughs met with CP members at Chicago to discuss establishment of a teachers group of the CP.

(CG T-1, November, 1964)

Margaret Burroughs attended a meeting at Chicago, Illinois, May 15, 1967, for the purpose of reorganizing and reactivating the Chicago Council of American Soviet Relations (CCASR). This meeting was held at the direction of the National Committee, CP, USA.

(CG T-3, May, 1967)

A characterization of the CCASR is attached.

Florence Criley

As of February, 1959, Florence Criley was a member of a CP club at Chicago, Illinois, and on July 30, 1961, attended a reception sponsored by the CP of Illinois at Chicago.

(CG T-4, February 11, 1959,
September 1, 1961)

Florence Criley is not currently known as a CP member but was a member in the late 1940's and attended some CP affairs during 1960.

(CG T-5, January - May, 1960,
December 28, 1967)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

In October, 1963, Florence Criley attended a banquet sponsored by the CP of Illinois at Chicago.

(CG T-6, November 21, 1963)

Bernice Diskin

Diskin is a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-5, December 28, 1967)

Rosalind Durham

Rosalind Durham is a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-5, December 28, 1967)

Frieda Engel

N.

In 1944, Frieda Engel was a member of the Communist Political Association Club in the Manhattan Section of New York City, New York.

(CG T-7, June, 1944)

According to the Secretary of State of New York at Albany, New York, April 16, 1947, the name Frieda Engel appeared on a 1946 CP nominating petition in New York State.

Virginia Hardin, a self-admitted former CP member, advised February 17, 1961, that she knew Frieda Engel to be a member of the Heights CP club of Cleveland, Ohio, as of April, 1960.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

Marjorie Kinsella

As of November, 1967, Marjorie Kinsella was a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-8, November 22, 1967)

Sylvia Kushner

Sylvia Kushner is a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-5, December 28, 1967)

Anna Riggs Langford

According to a news letter of the Chicago Chapter, National Lawyers Guild (NLG) concerning events in June, 1964, ~~it was stated that~~ Anna Riggs Langford of the firm Robinson and Langford, 7107 South South Park Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was a new member of the NLG.

A characterization of the NLG is attached.

Mrs. Marvin Mandel

CG T-9 advised May 22, 1945, that Mandel was a CP member at Chicago in 1944.

CG T-10 advised March 1, 1946, that Mandel was a CP member at Chicago as of December, 1945, and had been a CP member for four years.

CG T-11 stated on May 3, 1946, that Mandel was then a CP member.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

CG T-12 advised in November and December, 1948, that Mandel was chairman of the Women's Committee of the School Administrative Staff at Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, in 1943.

The Abraham Lincoln School has been cited pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Ida Terkel

As of October, 1952, Ida Terkel was reported active in a CP club in Chicago.

(CG T-13, October 6, 1952)

On December 27, 1967, the above information was telephonically furnished to George Jakuboski, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois, Maurice Martineau, United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois, and Marian Herzog, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, Formerly known as Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship

EDWIN GORDON FOX, 7147 Jeffrey Avenue, Chicago, Illinois,(now deceased) made available in January, 1954, the "First Annual Report CCASF," an undated publication which stated that the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship (CCASF) was incorporated in July, 1943. This document stated, "The Council's affiliation with the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF) was validated August 11, (1943). The present name was adopted to conform to standard national practice. It should be noted, however, that the Chicago Council is entirely autonomous; the government of its affairs rests exclusively in the hands of its Chicago Executive Board."

On April 8, 1965, a source furnished information to the effect that as of March 11, 1965, this organization would be known as the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Relations (CCASR). MANDEL TERMAN continued to be listed as Chairman of the new organization.

During April, 1965, a second source advised that MANDEL TERMAN had arbitrarily dissolved the Board of Directors, assumed all financial and other functions of the organization, and was maintaining existing records of the organization at his residence, 660 West Irving Park Road, Chicago, Illinois. The aims and purposes of this organization continued to be to work for peaceful coexistence and friendship with the USSR. While it claimed to be an autonomous organization, its program followed the NCASF and it was in frequent contact with the NCASF.

On November 5, 1958, a third source advised that in the early 1940s, MANDEL TERMAN was a member-at-large of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois. TERMAN was in Russia in November, 1958, where he had gone to discuss the treatment of Jews and to discuss Jewish culture in the USSR with the leadership of the Soviet Union.

2

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

In January, 1966, a fourth source advised that the CCASR went out of existence in the Spring of 1965 due to the health condition of MANDEL A. TERMAN. The offices of the CCASR, formerly located at 32 West Randolph Street, Chicago, were for a short time carried at MANDEL TERMAN's home residence, 660 West Irving Park Road, Chicago. During the Fall of 1965 due to the defunctness of the CCASR, the CP of Illinois found it necessary to sponsor a rally honoring the 48th anniversary of the Russian Revolution under a temporary committee called "The Chicago Committee for American-Soviet Friendship Rally." This rally was held on November 7, 1965, and once the rally was held this temporary committee went out of existence.

The fourth source advised that as of the present time the CCASR is defunct in the Chicago area and any future rally to be held on the American-Soviet friendship theme will have to be organized by the CP of Illinois on a temporary basis.

The NCASF has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD CHICAGO CHAPTER

A source advised on May 9, 1967, that it was his understanding that the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) was formed around 1936 in New York City, and that the Chicago Chapter of the NLG (CCNLG), which is affiliated with the national group in New York, was formed shortly thereafter, possibly in 1937 by a group of liberal progressive lawyers in protest against activities of the American Bar Association which they claimed was a non-liberal, non-progressive organization. The CCNLG has no established headquarters but occasionally uses the return address of its officials in literature.

1 APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" revised and published December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., states as follows on page 121 concerning the National Lawyers Guild:

"1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149.)

"2. Cited as a Communist front which 'is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations, and controlled unions' and which 'since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents.'

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally related September 17, 1950.)

"3. 'To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the * * * National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection.'

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91.)"

9-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Chicago, Illinois
January 4, 1968

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

Character INTERNAL SECURITY

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CG T-7 is a representative of another agency which collects security type information in the New York, New York area.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

A Call to American Women

100-11 ENCLOSURE -37



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15 & 16

AMERICAN WOMEN constitute 51% of the voting population, yet a high percentage of us don't vote. It is time for women to break out of their societal molds and take their place as effective, vocal citizens. WOMEN CAN ELECT the President they want; Women can determine the political, social and economic direction of the nation. WE HAVE WOMEN POWER. Let's use it to demonstrate our opposition to this war to the Congress of the United States.

We are a broad coalition of women from many areas of American life. We shall meet in Washington on January 15 for the opening of Congress to demand the following:

1. CONGRESS, AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, RESOLVE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IMMEDIATELY ARRANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS.
2. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO HEAL A SICK SOCIETY AT HOME.
3. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RAVAGED LAND WE LEAVE BEHIND IN VIETNAM.
4. CONGRESS LISTEN TO WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SAYING AND REFUSE THE INSATIABLE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

After we petition the United States Congress, we will hold our own congress to articulate our position on the basic problem of achieving peace. We declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women to dedicate ourselves to reshaping American society, and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

On January 15, we will meet at the Union Depot in Washington, D.C., at 11:30 A.M., and walk behind our delegation which will present our petition to the U.S. Congress.

On January 16, many of us will stay in Washington to begin implementation of these demands by presenting them to our Congressmen and Senators. We hope you can stay.

---

lip here and return to:

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
c/o Georgina Gronner
520 North Michigan
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 787-1628

I WILL –

____be a sponsor

____contribute $____________

____go to Washington on Monday, Jan. 15, 1968

____stay for the activities on Jan. 16, 1968

Please send me ______ train tickets (B & O, leaving from Grand Central Station, Wells & Harrison, January 14 at 4:30 P.M. Return train leaves Washington 11:15 P.M., January 15 & 16. Round trip Chicago/Washington – $42.00 for coach) Enclosed is the appropriate amount of money.

I am interested in a plane flight at approximately $65.00______ (check if so).

I am interested in a round trip bus fare at approximately $30.00______

We will only be able to have the plane and the bus arrangements if we have enough people. If you or your group needs help in securing accommodations, contact the Hospitality Office, 2140 Peace Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Telephone Number – (202) 293-2020

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
520 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

CHICAGO ILL.
DEC 22 PM 1967

PARTIAL LIST OF NATIONAL SPONSORS

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Connie Brown
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin
Ruth Gage Colby
Judy Collins
Sylvia E. Crane
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Elizabeth Lee Haselden
Dorothy Hassler
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogel
Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florynce Kennedy
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Mrs. Burton Lane
Marilyn Langner
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Helen Merrell Lynd
Olive Mayer
Jessica Mitford
Lucy Montgomery
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Nan S. Pendergrast
Eleanor Perry
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Marcus Raskin
Malvina Reynolds
Carmen Ristorucci
Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
Ruth Rosenwald
Muriel Rukeyser
Marie Runyon
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Marjorie Schell
Juanita J. Saddler
Elaine Slater
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Elizabeth Sutherland
Amy Swerdlow
Mary Adams Sykes
Ethel Taylor
Maza Tilghman
Helen B. Turnbull
Barbara Webster
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson
Winnifred Wygal

PARTIAL LIST OF CHICAGO SPONSORS

Ruth Adams
Mrs. Samuel J. Baskin
Mrs. Donald Boyer
Sylvia Bloom
Margaret Burroughs
Joan Brown
Mrs. Eugene Cotton
Mrs. Henry Cress
Karen Culberg
Mavis Dick
Mrs. Earl Dickerson
Bernice Diskin
Sister Terese Avila Duffy
Rosalind Durham
Mrs. Edward Druzinski
Mrs. Jack Ellison
Frieda H. Engel
Mrs. Robert L. Farwell
Florence Field
Helen Feldman
Muriel Flanders
Beatrice Fredman
Sister Ignatia Griffin
Mrs. Ogden Hannaford
Mimi Harris
Mrs. Sidney J. Harris
Pearl Hirshfield
Donna Holabird
Mrs. Bergen Evans
Georgina Gronner
Mrs. Christopher Janus
Mrs. Robert Katzman
Marjorie Kinsella
Sylvia Kushner
Anna R. Langford
Doreen Lapin
Mrs. Lawrence Knobel
Shirley Lens
Mrs. Marvin Mandel
Francelle W. Marcus
Mrs. Albert R. Martin
Mrs. William C. Matney
Joyce Miller
Patti Miller
Mrs. Phillip W. Moore, Jr.
Sister Prudence Moylan
Mrs. John McNee
Mrs. Albert H. Newman
Cecilia F. O'Riley
Mona Podore
Mrs. Al Raby
Mrs. A. A. Rayner, Jr.
Mrs. Leo Roberg
Marian Roberts
Mrs. Erwin A. Salk
Ruth Shriman
Mrs. Edgar Siskin
Mrs. Farwell Smith
Nancy Stableford
Mrs. Nathan Stein
Ida Terkel
Carole Travis
Sister Mary Peter Traxler
Mrs. C. T. Vivian
Mrs. Arnold Wolf
Mrs. James Zacharias
Mrs. Carlton Zucker

Excised
copy for

Senate

274-10125

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Vol II

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/5/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

~~REC 11~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-138315)

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (100-36173)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
PROPOSED WOMEN'S MARCH,
1/15/68, PROVIDENCE, R.I., -
DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S.
INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

Title is being changed from the date 1/8/68 to 1/15/68 to reflect the actual date of the proposed women's march at Providence, R.I.

Re Boston airtel and LHM to Bureau dated 1/3/68, captioned Proposed Women's March, 1/8/68, Providence, R.I. - DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM.

Enclosed herewith are the original and ten copies of a self-explanatory LHM.

The following agencies were advised of the contents of this LHM and copies of same have been provided to these agencies:

EDWARD P. GALLOGLY, USA,
Providence, R.I.

WILLIAM SHIELDS, Agent in Charge
U.S. Secret Service
Providence, R.I.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - Boston
CAR:lz
(5)

REC 11

23

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

JAN 8 1968

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

LEON ENTRAS, Special Agent
NISO, Newport, R.I.

Captain ROGER J. BROCK
Providence Field Office, Region III,
108th MI Group
Providence, R.I.

JOHN M. ROMAN, Special Agent
OSI, Naval Construction Battalion Center
Davisville, Rhode Island

The confidential source mentioned in the LHM is Captain LEO TRAMBUKIS, Planning Office, Providence, R.I. Police.

LEAD

BOSTON

AT PROVIDENCE, R.I.

Will report results of proposed march.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Boston, Massachusetts
January 5, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Proposed Women's March, January 15, 1968, Providence, Rhode Island - Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information on January 5, 1968:

On January 2, 1968, Miss Dorothy Donnelly, 244 Bowen Street, Providence, Rhode Island, applied for and was granted a permit to hold a women's peace march parade commencing at 2:00 PM, January 15, 1968. The source advised that Miss Donnelly stated the parade is to be conducted in conjunction with former United States Representative Jeannette Rankin's brigade, which will have a group of women marching on this same date at Washington, D.C. Miss Donnelly further told the source she anticipates approximately fifteen women in the Rhode Island area will march in this parade; that the parade will commence at the Cranston Street Armory, Cranston Street, Providence, Rhode Island; that they will march via various streets around the State House at Providence, Rhode Island, and proceed to the steps of the Providence City Hall, where they will have about a half hour speaking program. Miss Donnelly would not divulge the identity of individuals who would speak at this program but did say that the women would be from out of town but were not nationally known or prominently known.

Miss Donnelly also told the source she is a member of the Rhode Island Committee for Peace in Vietnam, but this organization is not sponsoring this march. She said that she is spearheading this march to support Jeannette Rankin's march at Washington, D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

23

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

F- 36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Tele. Room

Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/5/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~100-448326~~)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO - Washington Field

Re San Francisco teletype 1/5/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven (11) copies of LHM concerning captioned demonstrations. Two (2) copies each are enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington Field.

Sources utilized in LHM are:

First Source	SF 1773-S
Second Source	Former SF 1433-S
Third Source	Former SF 2253-S

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11)(AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (100-7300)(Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (100-70701)(Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
4 - San Francisco (2 - 100-59802)
(1 - 100-48035)
(1 - 80-461)

GOW/jr
(15)

100-449475-32

XEROX
JAN 11 1968

AGENCY: G-2, CNI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
FAO (ISD, ~~CRD,~~ CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

70 JAN 1 1968

Fourth Source	SF 2955-S
Fifth Source	SF 2585-S
Sixth Source	CSSF 2960-S

LHM is classified confidential inasmuch as it contains data which could reasonably result in the identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

San Francisco will continue to follow and report any pertinent information received concerning this matter.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
January 5, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum dated January 4, 1968.

Copies of this memorandum have been furnished locally to the U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Service, and U. S. Attorney.

A source advised on January 5, 1968, that the following individuals from the Northern California area are planning to depart San Francisco January 13, 1968, via plane for Washington, D. C. to support the demonstration on January 15, 1968. Source indicated that all of these women, excluding NIKKI BRIDGES, participate in activities of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Marin County, California.

FRANCES STEADMAN
BETTY MEREDITH
MARIE INGERMAN
DOROTHEA HEGERTY
NIKKI BRIDGES, aka Mrs. Harry Bridges.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-449475-52

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (WILPF)

In a leaflet dated January, 1962, WILPF described itself as follows:

> "What is the WILPF?
>
> "It is the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an international, interracial organization striving for peace and freedom by non-violent democratic methods. It was founded in 1915, during the first World War, and its first president was JANE ADDAMS, the first American woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize.
>
> "How Does it Work?
>
> "It keeps its membership informed on current problems through its legislative office in Washington. It issues its own pamphlets, study kits, fact sheets, and cooperates with like-minded organizations. WILPF has consultative status at the United Nations on a national and international level.
>
> "What Does it Do?
>
> "WILPF, through its local branches, sponsors public discussion on such topics as disarmament and world law, nuclear testing, civil defense, Berlin, civil rights, etc. Through its Peace Action Committee, WILPF initiates peace walks, vigils, and meetings, as an organization and with other peace groups. Peace education for children is a special concern of WILPF.
>
> "How Is it Set Up?
>
> "The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has its national headquarters at JANE ADDAMS House, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 3, Pa., where its monthly paper, FOUR LIGHTS, is published. Its legislative office is at 120 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington 2, D. C. International headquarters are in Geneva. The International meets every three years. It conducts summer schools, peace congresses and publishes its magazine, PAX."

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

A second source advised in April, 1945, that the records of the San Francisco County Communist Party (CP) indicated that FRANCES STEADMAN transferred from the Westlake Branch of the Los Angeles County CP to San Francisco in 1945 and that her dues were paid to and including December, 1944. Cal.

A third source advised on March 20, 1957, that according to BETTY MEREDITH, she attended the California CP State Convention held in San Francisco, March 16-17, 1957. Cal.

A fourth source advised during 1967 that MARIE ZINGERMAN attended six meetings of the WILPF in Marin County, California, during the period January-October, 1967.

D.C.

A fifth source advised on January 4, 1968, that DOROTHEA HEGERTY is a current active member of the Marin County CP. Cal

A sixth source advised on March 2, 1967, that Mrs. H. BRIDGES, 35 Kronquest Court, San Francisco, California, is listed as the recipient of a new yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW), expiration date March 4, 1968.

Nikki Bridges

The PW is a West Coast communist newspaper published weekly in San Francisco.

Mrs Harry Bridges

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Records of the U. S. District Court, San Francisco, show that on May 25, 1949, HARRY BRIDGES was indicted for criminal actions of perjury and conspiracy committed to conceal CP membership, thereby fraudulently obtaining U. S. citizenship. BRIDGES was convicted of these charges on April 4, 1950. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. Based on the Statute of Limitations having run, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction on May 15, 1953.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
January 5, 1968

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference San Francisco memorandum dated as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/8/68

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

WCS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701)(P)

C. Brennan

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

3

OO: WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

Re Los Angeles airtel and letterhead memoranda (LHM) dated 12/12/67 and 12/30/67, captioned as above.

For the information of the Bureau there are attached eleven copies of an LHM, with one copy each for the information of the Washington Field and San Francisco Divisions. Instant LHM contains all data currently available in the Los Angeles Division regarding the formation and plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

Instant LHM has been classified "Confidential - Group I," to protect Source One (~~LA 4490-S~~) a currently active symbol numbered informant of continuing value.

Because of her political position, no attempt has been made to characterize ~~California Assemblywoman YVONNE BRATHWAITE~~ in the details of instant LHM; however, for the Bureau's own information, it is pointed out that

ENCLOSURE

REC 3

83

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11)(RM)(AM)
1 - San Francisco (100-59802)(Enc. 1)(RM)(AM)
1 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Enc. 1)(RM)(AM)
1 - Los Angeles

20 JAN 13 1968

GGB/lhk
(6)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI [illegible]
RAO ISD, CD, DFU
DATE FORW: 1-17-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: [illegible]

C. C. Bishop

INDEXED

Approved: ________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ________ M Per ________

932 9th + E

~~LA 4490-S~~ has revealed in the past that members of both the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and the Women for Legislative Action (WLA) were very active in the political campaigning for her which resulted in her election.

The LAPD and the LACSO are cognizant of changes in time schedule for local JRB action. Information copies of this LHM are being furnished the U. S. Attorney and Secret Service, Los Angeles; Region II, U. S. Army, Pasadena; Office of Special Investigations, Norton Air Force Base; Naval Investigative Service Office, San Diego, California. Coverage is continuing.

Exact dates and locations of the subcommittee meetings of the JRB have not been detailed in instant LHM to further protect Source One, as some of these meetings were attended by small numbers of persons which could aid in pinpointing this valuable Security Informant.

The Bureau and Washington Field will be advised promptly if the identities of any additional persons from the Southern California area traveling to Washington, D. C., become known.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
January 8, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to prior Los Angeles memoranda dated December 12 and 30, 1967, relating to a proposed march on Washington, D. C., by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB), when the United States Congress reconvenes in January 1968.

Source One advised that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP - see appendix) and the Women for Legislative Action (WLA - see appendix) are the two major organizations in Southern California working for the success of the January 15, 1968, activities of the JRB both locally and in Washington, D. C. Subcommittees of the JRB have been meeting in the headquarters of WSP at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, and WLA at 5889 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. During the most recent of these subcommittee meetings, held during the first week in January 1968, at the latter location, much of the discussion was related to proposed action in Southern California by women who would be unable to travel to Washington, D. C., for the January 15th confrontation with Congress.

Minor changes in the previously announced schedule of local activities for January 15, 1968, were agreed upon at this meeting, as follows:

9:30 AM	Assemble on the front steps of the Old California State Building, First and Broadway, Los Angeles, where the JRB's list of grievances will be read over a public address system and then presented to California

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

100-[illegible]-83

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

Assemblywoman Yvonne Brathwaite. According to the reports at this JRB meeting, Mrs. Brathwaite, who was not present, had agreed to either meet personally with the JRB women at the State Building, or to send her personal representative if her schedule would not permit her to be present at that time.

Following a brief rally at the State Building, the JR Brigaders will enter the State Building with leaflets; opening the doors of the various offices, and handing leaflets to any women in the building, located at 217 West First Street.

11:30 AM Women of the JRB will more to the steps of the Los Angeles City Hall, where they will attempt to influence as many persons as possible, who will be entering and leaving the City Hall during the luncheon hour. The list of grievances will again be read at the City Hall, which is located at 200 North Spring Street.

1:00 PM March to the Los Angeles City Board of Education, 450 North Grand Avenue, to confront the members of the School Board, and attempt to influence as many women employees of the Board as possible.

Margaret Wright, militant black nationalist oriented Negro woman who has been active in recent demonstrations against the Los Angeles City Board of Education at Manual Arts High School, will act as the JRB's spokeswoman at this latter location. It is the present intention of the JRB women to go inside the administrative buildings at the Board of Education and leaflet women employees there.

At the most recent JRB subcommittee meeting, Margaret Wright expressed her disappointment that no organized civil disobedience was being planned for the local action of the JRB. However, she added, "That's O.K., the police will force disobedience anyway!"

The main slogan adopted by the local JRB is, "The Hand that Rocks the Cradle is Going to Rock the Boat, With Our Vote." Picket signs that have been approved to be carried in the local JRB demonstrations include:

"You Can't Have War Without Women"

"Woman Power is Peace Power"

"Women Control the Vote"

It was announced that three different versions of the local JRB "Call" would be distributed within the next week. The three will be geered to Caucasians, Negroes, and Mexican-Americans respectively. The monthly news bulletin of the WSP, called, "La Wisp," for January 1968, has an appeal to the WSP membership tojoin the local action if they are unable to make the trip to Washington. It was also announced that a $50.00 advertisement would be placed in the "Herald-Dispatch," Los Angeles Negro newspaper, calling for the support of members of the black community. Three JRB activists were to appear on local radio shows to plug the JRB prior to January 15th.

Xerox copies of two documents being circulated throughout Southern California during early January 1968, to publicize the local and the national actions of the JRB are appended to this memorandum. Leslie Parrish, who is mentioned in one of these documents, according to Source One, is a screen actress who has very recently become interested and active in the anti-Viet Nam war movement

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

and has become affiliated with the Southern California Council of WSP. It is noted that she is presently scheduled to give a report back to the San Fernando Valley Chapter of WSP on January 19, 1968, following her return from the action in Washington, D. C.

The Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office are cognizant of the time changes in the schedule for the local action of the JRB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE, Also Known As Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A source advised on May 1, 1963, that the Women for Legislative Action was formed in 1952, claiming to be an independent organization dedicated to non-partisan participation in legislative and civic activities. Its position in favoring or opposing legislation usually parallels the position of the Communist Party and related groups. It also supports legislation to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Membership in the Women for Legislative Action does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

Another source advised on May 11, 1967, that the Women for Legislative Action continues to be active in the Los Angeles area.

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Friend:

A number of our California women will join thousands of others throughout the country in Washington D. C. on the opening day of Congress. They are going to Congress to: demand an end to the war, to help our sick society at home and end the demands of the military.

This idea came about when an 86 year old former Congresswoman, Jeanette Rankin, said: "If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary, that would end it. You cannot have wars without women."

We would like to raise enough money to send all who wish to go. If you cannot join the group going to Washington, would you make a contribution so that those who can go will not be handicapped by lack of funds.

Then, save a date on your new calendar. On Friday, January 12th we will have a report on Washington given by Leslie Parrish who will be one of the leaders of the So. Calif. delegation. You will receive definite information and confirmation by mail.

If you are able to go to Washington, please call 761-1783 for further information.

Yours for Peace,

Valley Women Strike for Peace

P. S. Please make your checks payable to Women Strike for Peace and send it in the enclosed envelope. Thanks

CONFIDENTIAL

not have wars without women.

CONFIDENTIA

D UP! THE [illegible]ORITY OF AMERICAN VOTERS ARE [illegible]EN... BUT WE ARE AN UNREPRE-D MAJORITY! We find our government responding to its military-industrial advisors while it turns a deaf ear to us. Oh yes, we have heard and read the stirring speeches against the Vietnam war, made on the floor of Congress. But most of these great orators (men who were put into office with the help of women) proceed to vote for the billion dollar appropriations that make this war possible, while millions of Americans are robbed of their rights to decent housing, health services, education and employment.

WE HAVE VESTED INTERESTS TOO!...OUR HOMES AND OUR FAMILIES. They are being destroyed by these strawmen who do nothing to end this insane war, and do nothing to take care of the neglect of human needs at home..

WE ARE TIRED OF TALKING TO STRAWMEN! In Los Angeles on January 15th, we will speak to WOMEN - because WOMEN CARE and WOMEN WILL LISTEN!

The JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE will be descending on Washington, D.C. on January 15th to demand that Congress listen to what American women are saying.

THE HAND THAT ROCKS THE CRADLE IS GOING TO ROCK THE BOAT!! WITH OUR VOTE! In cities and towns across this nation, women will be mobilizing in local supportive actions. This is the launching of the FIRST broad coalition of women for political power in 1968. This is our opportunity to work together to put into office only those candidates who truly represent us and to TURN OUT THE STRAWMEN.

join with us here in los angeles

the time: the place:

9:30 AM - Old State Building, 217 West 1st St., LA

11:30 AM - City Hall, 200 North Spring

1:00 PM - Board of Education, 450 North Grand

BE ON TIME! WE WILL MARCH FROM PLACE TO PLACE LEAFLETING WOMEN. PLACCARDS WILL BE PROVIDED.

all women are urged to wear black

• •

I will:

____ go to Washington, D.C. on Jan. 15th. (Plane fare round trip $216.00).

____ help work in the local action in Southern California.

____ contribute $______ for local action, or $_____ to send a woman to Wash. D.C.

Name: Phone No:

CONFIDENTIAL

Address: City: Zip:

(Please tear off and mail to WSP at address above)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
January 8, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title · DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICE IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

Character INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1 - Mr. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

1/8/68

CODE ~~PLAINTEXT~~

TELETYPE DEFERRED

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

TO SAC SEATTLE REC 13 ST 115

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (100-448475) — 91

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT.

REURTEL JANUARY FIVE LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR ~~SE-SEVEN-SIX NINE~~ -- S TO ATTEND CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. UP TO ONE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS MAY BE PAID SOURCE FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN MAKING TRIP.

INSTRUCT SOURCE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH WFO AND PROMPTLY FURNISH PERTINENT DATA DEVELOPED. SEATTLE ADVISE WFO CODE NAME USED BY INFORMANT. WFO ADVISE SEATTLE NAME OF AGENT TO CONTACT AND PHONE NUMBER TO BE USED.

PROMPTLY DEBRIEF SOURCE ON RETURN YOUR AREA AND SUBMIT LHM.

COPY MAILED WFO.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

1 - WFO
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

RHH:df
(6)

VIA TELETYPE
12 [illegible] 1968

100-40820

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

NOTE:

~~SE-769-S is a 37-year-old white female who is the wife of an airline employee.~~ She has been an informant since April, 1963, and is an inactive member of the Communist Party (CP) of the State of Washington. Informant is currently paid up to $100 per month for services and up to $100 per month for expenses. The

XEROX
JAN 22 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

Horner-988 0 F

Teletype to SAC, Seattle
RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
100-448475

NOTE CONTINUED:

Seattle Office has been attempting to reactivate the informant in CP work. She has been invited to attend the demonstration by one of the CP members of the area and her attendance will enhance her status with the Party and facilitate her reactivation. As her husband is an airline employee, the cost of the transportation will be minimal.

Teletype is being used to afford informant opportunity to make arrangements for the trip.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☒ RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

R-48

DEFERRED 1-5-68

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE

5-T Rosen C. D. Brennan

VIDEM; WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY). OO: WFO.

REBUAIRTEL, DECEMBER 5 LAST.

SEATTLE 769S HAS BEEN ASKED TO ACCOMPANY A DELEGATION TO SUBJECT VIDEM FROM SEATTLE AREA BY TAIMI HALONEN, CP MEMBER. INFORMANT'S HUSBAND EMPLOYED BY UNITED AIRLINES AND TRANSPORTATION COSTS FOR TRIP TO WASHINGTON FOR HER WOULD BE MINIMAL, AND SHE IS WILLING TO GO IF FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS CAN BE WORKED OUT.

EFFORT HAS BEEN MADE TO WORK INFORMANT BACK INTO CP ACTIVITY IN SEATTLE, AND GOING WITH ABOVE DELEGATION WOULD CONSIDERABLY ENHANCE HER POSSIBLE SUCCESS IN THIS CONNECTION IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING COVERAGE. INFORMANT IN PAST WAS CP MEMBER IN EVERETT, SNOHOMISH COUNTY, WASHINGTON.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC 13 [illegible] - 91

ST 115

JAN 19 1968

C D Brennan

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☒ RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

PAGE TWO FROM SEATTLE

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR INFORMANT TO GO TO WASHINGTON AS ABOVE IN EVENT SHE CAN MAKE APPROPRIATE FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS, AND FOR PAYMENT OF UP TO $150 IN EXPENSES, SAME TO BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR BY INFORMANT AND ONLY THAT PORTION ESSENTIAL BEING EXPENDED FOR SUBSISTENCE AND TRANSPORTATION.

RECEIVED: 6:42PM RM

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/9/68

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY (100-20033) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Attached herewith for Bureau, is the original and 10 copies, and for WFO 2 copies, of an LHM regarding captioned subject. Also attached for the Bureau is one post card regarding captioned subject.

Source in attached LHM is ~~AL 2972-S~~. Source characterizing Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is ~~PH 210-S~~.

Albany sources alerted for identification of individuals and organizations participating in captioned protest and for determination of financial backing.

③-Bureau (Enc. 12)(RM)
2-WFO (Enc. 2)(RM) ENCLOSURE
2-Albany
TCK:gab
(7)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

REC 3

100-[illegible]-84

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, [illegible]
RAO ISD, OD [illegible]
DATE FOR: 1-17-68
HOW F: R/S
BY: [illegible]

JAN 12 1968

Approved: ________________ Special Agent in Charge Sent __________ M Per __________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Albany, New York

January 9, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past stated that the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom had circulated post cards in the Syracuse, New York area, announcing captioned demonstration, which would be under the sponsorship of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Source noted that according to the post card, the date of the march had been changed to January 15, 1968. Source advised that the card instructed participants to meet at Union Station, Washington, D.C., at 11 AM, January 15, 1968, and then walk to the Capitol. Source stated that no known organizations or individuals were planning to attend from the Syracuse, New York area, at this time.

A source who had furnished reliable information in the past advised that the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is a movement which has its national headquarters at the Jane Addams House, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; its legislative office at 120 Maryland Avenue, North East, in Washington, D.C.; and its international headquarters in Geneva. It is an international, inter-racial organization striving for peace and freedom by non-violent, democratic methods. It was founded in 1915 and its first President, JANE ADDAMS, was the first American woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize. It keeps its membership informed on current problems through its legislative office in Washington and issues its own pamphlets, study kits and fact sheets. It sponsors public discussions on such topics as disarmament, nuclear testing and civil defense, through its local branches, and initiates peace walks, vigils and meetings.

100-111175-84

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade has as its Chairman, JEANNETTE RANKIN, who is an 86 year old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia, and who served in the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919, and who was elected to that office for one term in 1940. RANKIN has repeatedly opposed United States involvement in foreign wars and has voted against declaration of war by the United States during both World Wars I and II. With respect to the Vietnam war, she has stated, "Ten thousand women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women." She has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing in Vietnam is stopped.

The Secretary of the Brigade has been identified as VIVIAN HALLINAN, the wife of VINCENT HALLINAN, who in 1966 was identified as the Treasurer for the American Institute of Marxist Studies, a communist front organization.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

56 (Rev. 5-22-

FBI

Date: 1/10/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

REC 30

Thompson

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-49837)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO:WFO)

Re NK tel 1/9/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM dated and captioned as above.

Copies of the LHM are being furnished to Military Intelligence Agencies and to Secret Service and USA at Newark.

Files of the Newark Office contain insufficient information on Mrs. DARNELL to prepare a characterization.

3 - Bureau (Enc.11) (RM)
3 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Enc.3) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc.1) (Info.) (RM)
2 - Newark

REC 30

GEJ:cg
(9)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY: [illegible]

JAN 11 1968

DW SEC.

C.C. - Bishop

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

57 JAN 13 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Newark, New Jersey
January 10, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

On January 9, 1968, A.T. Nardone, General Traffic Agent, Public Service Coordinated Transport, Newark, New Jersey, advised that one Mrs. Darnell, 204 Eastbourne Terrace, Moorestown, New Jersey, has made a reservation for one Public Service Bus, capacity fifty persons, to leave Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Shopping Center Mall at 8:00 AM, on January 15, 1968, to arrive at Union Station, Washington, D.C., the same date. The company has been advised that the group plans to participate in a demonstration in Washington, D.C.

The bus is to return to Cherry Hill, New Jersey, the same day, leaving from somewhere in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C., at about 6:00 PM.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-442175-44

ENCLOSURE

FBI

Date: 1/10/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

REC 16

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReWFOairtel and LHM dated 1/4/68, captioned as above.

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau and two for New York describing further plans for above demonstration.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Local law enforcement agencies cognizant of information contained in LHM.

Sources used in LHM are ~~WF-1777-S~~ and second source is ~~CARTER BARBER, 2633 Adams Mill Road, N.W., Washington, D.C.~~

LHM classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information furnished by the first source could lead to the identification of that source and compromise future effectiveness.

WFO continuing to follow and will report any further pertinent details developed.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

GTT:dgp
(8)

C. C. Bishop

AIRTEL

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~ORD~~, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:

REC 16

EX 109

JAN 1

Approved: ______________ Sent __________M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 10, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 9, 1968, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) planned on a demonstration in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968, the day the United States Congress reconvenes. According to the source, officials of the JRB want to assemble on the steps of the United States Capitol and present a petition to officials of the United States Congress but the United States Capitol Police has refused to grant them permission for such an assembly. The source further stated that attorneys for the JRB have petitioned the United States District Court to grant an injunction prohibiting the enforcement by the United States Capitol Police of a Congressional ruling prohibiting demonstrations on the United States Capitol grounds.

The above source stated that plans for the demonstration still consist of assembling at Union Station at 12:30 p.m. January 15, 1968, marching to the Capitol where they will present a petition to Congressional officials and also confer with various Congressmen and will hold a meeting probably at the Shoreham Hotel between 2 and 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

27 MAY 12 1971

77

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Harry Bliss, Banquet Manager, Shoreham Hotel, Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., advised on January 9, 1968, that the JRB has reserved the Regency Room from 2 to 6 p.m. on January 15, 1968. Mr. Bliss indicated that this room will accomodate 2,500 to 3,000 individuals and that representatives of the JRB stated they intended to have approximately 2,000 persons using the room on that date.

Bliss stated that the Washington, D.C. representative of the JRB was Sylvia Lichtenstein and that she had given him a one thousand dollar check as a deposit for the banquet room. Bliss stated that this check was drawn on the Sterling National Bank and Trust Company, Queen's New York, on the account of the JRB, 13 West 72nd ~~Street~~, New York City, and was signed by one Sandra Wolf.

NY

> A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in July, 1951, that Sylvia Lichtenstein was a member of the Newspaper Club of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia from 1947 to 1950.

W.E. Beard, Charter Manager, D.C. Transit, New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., advised on January 9, 1968, that the JRB had reserved thirty-three buses to pick up individuals in the vicinity of the United States Capitol beginning at 2 p.m. on January 15, 1968, to be bused to the Shoreham Hotel. He stated that at 6 p.m. these same individuals will be bused to Union Station. Mr. Bliss indicated that the Pennsylvania Railroad is handling the finances for the above buses and that all arrangements are being made through the New York Office of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Beard stated that the location of the pickup in the vicinity of the United

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

States Capitol has not yet been determined but he is negotiating with local law enforcement officials to ascertain a convenient place for the pickup.

Captain Robert Krahling, United States Capitol Police, Washington, D.C., advised on January 9, 1968, that the attorneys for the JRB had filed for an injunction in the United States District Court in an attempt to prevent the United States Capitol Police from enforcing a Congressional regulation prohibiting demonstrations on the United States Capitol grounds. Captain Krahling stated that after a hearing in the United States District Court on this date, the judge dismissed the above proceedings and the attorneys for the JRB stated that they were appealing the matter to the United States Court of Appeals.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/10/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

Re BU airtel to all offices, 12/5/67.

The first paragraph of the attached LHM, of which there are 11 copies for the Bureau, two (2) for Atlanta, and two (2) for WFO, indicates a change in date of the demonstration from January 8 to 15, 1968, which is set out for the benefit of local agencies which did not have the information set out in WFO airtel, December 13, 1967, when the title was changed to show the new date. Copies of instant LHM are being sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service, and the USA, Seattle.

Sources used in the LHM are: First-~~SE 691-S~~; Second-~~SE 769-S~~; and Third-former ~~SE CX-62x* (policy)~~. The LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL because information from two of these sources, if disclosed, might compromise regular security informants of continuing value.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (REG)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (REG)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (REG)
4 - Seattle
    (1 - 100-29048)
    (1 - 100-28189) (SUB A) (CP INF.)
    (1 - 100-13305) (HALONEN)
    (1 - 100-22171) (J. WARE)
RBC:bgv
(11)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

SE 115

REC-35

90

14 JAN 19 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ________M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

5 JAN 23

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington
January 10, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING

On January 9, 1968, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, stated the Jeannette Rankin Brigade demonstration originally scheduled for January 8, 1968, at Washington, D.C., had been postponed until January 15, 1968, when Congress reconvenes. The source made available a leaflet concerning the event. A reproduction is attached.

On January 9, 1968, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, reported TAIMI HALONEN and possibly others planned to go to Washington, D.C., for the demonstration and would probably travel via United Air Lines.

TAIMI HALONEN was reported by the first source in December, 1967, as being a member of the Communist Party (CP) at that time.

On January 9, 1968, WENDELL C. WOODARD, Reservations manager, United Air Lines, Seattle, made available information indicating TAIMI HALONEN and Mrs. J. WARE had reservations on United Flight 42 departing 9:15 a.m., January 13, 1968, and will fly nonstop to Friendship Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, arriving at 4:35 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. They are scheduled to return to Seattle on United Flight 41 leaving Friendship Airport at 6:00 p.m. and arriving at Seattle-Tacoma Airport, Seattle, at 8:25 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, January 18, 1968.

JERLINE WARE, nee ABAIR, aka Mrs. JOHNNY WARE, was reported in August, 1952, by a third source who has furnished reliable information in the past as being under transfer from the Communist Party of California to Seattle, Washington, as of that time.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ENCLOSURE

- 90

On January 10, 1968, the first source reported LINDA CORR, a Negro, and THORUN ROBEL, white, are also planning to go to Washington, D.C., but their mode of travel is as yet unknown. The source said both are CP members at Seattle. In addition, four women from Tacoma, Washington, are preparing to go, but their identities have not been learned.



3

JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15

(OPENING DAY OF CONGRESS)

to join former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin and thousands of women from all areas of our nation in demanding that Congress, as it's first order of business

RESOLVE: ►to END THE WAR in Vietnam, and arrange for the orderly withdrawal of all American troops:

►to use its power and the billions now wasted on war, to solve some of the problems of our crisis-ridden society by seriously working for better and low-cost housing, more day-care centers, more jobs and job-training, eliminating poverty and discrimination, and conducting a massive campaign against racism and bigotry in our schools, governmental agencies, or wherever it appears.

COME TO WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15th

to represent the Pacific Northwest at the
JEANNETTE RANKIN
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN
at which we can discuss our many problems and suggest solutions.

Women constitute 51% of the American electorate. 1968 is an election year. If we devote ourselves wholeheartedly to it, we can force the administration to End the War, and to change our foreign policies; to restore our nation to a position of honor in the community of nations; to reshape American society to meet the needs of the people, and plan for a better tomorrow for all Americans.

Those who cannot come to Washington are urged to attend a

Washington State "GRASS ROOTS" Assembly of Women

SATURDAY, JANUARY 20th . . . 9:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
at the
Mount Zion Baptist Church Auditorium
1624 - 19th Avenue. . . . Seattle, Washington
(Parking on 20th)

Registration Fee $1.50 includes Lunch

Clip and mail to: JEANNETTE RANKIN CONGRESS OF WOMEN
537 - 31st Avenue East
Seattle, Washington 98102

I want to go to Washington D. C. on January 15th ☐
I will need financial assistance ☐
I will contribute________to help send someone else.
I will attend the Grassroots ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN ☐
I need housing for ☐__________ Registration Fee $1.50 enclosed ☐

NAME____________________ ____________________
ADDRESS____________________ __________PHONE NO.__________

CONFIDENTIAL

Partial List of Sponsors

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin
Sylvia E. Crane
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Elizabeth Lee Haselden
Dorothy Hassler
Anna Arnold Hedgeman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogel
Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florynce Kennedy
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Mrs. Burton Lane
Marilyn Langner
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Helen Merrell Lynd
Olive Mayer
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Nan S. Pendergrast
Eleanor Perry
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Marcus Raskin
Malvina Reynolds
Carmen Ristorucci
Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
Ruth Rosenwald
Muriel Rukeyser
Marie Runyon
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Marjorie Schell
Juanita J. Saddler
Elaine Slater
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Elizabeth Sutherland
Amy Swerdlow
Mary Adams Sykes
Ethel Taylor
Maza Tilghman
Helen B. Turnbull
Barbara Webster
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson
Winnifred Wygal

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

24979

1 - R. H. Horner
1 - M. J. Rozamus

1/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 134

TO SAC NEW YORK (100-161601)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT

INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY

REURTEL JANUARY ELEVEN.

AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR NEW YORK THREE ONE SIX FOUR - S TO ACCOMPANY DEMONSTRATORS FROM NEW YORK CITY FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. ADVISE INFORMANT TO PROMPTLY CONTACT WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE, EXTENTIONS THREE NINE ONE OR FOUR SIX ZERO PROMPTLY UPON RECEIPT OF IMPORTANT DATA.

REC-68

100-44811-35

PROMPTLY DEBRIEF SOURCE ON RETURN YOUR AREA AND SUBMIT COMMUNICATION SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION.

1 - 134-9703

RHH:jal (5)

VIA TELETYPE
JAN 11 1968
727 pm
ENCIPHERED

NOTE: ~~NY 3164-S is a 41-year-old white male resident of NYC who is employed as a photographer-reporter on a Latin-American~~ newspaper. He has been an informant since February, 1961, and is currently paid up to $300 for services and up to $80 for expenses incurred. Source has furnished information on the Progressive Labor Movement, Casa de Las Americas, the Cuban Mission to the UN and the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba. Demonstration in Washington on January 15 is sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade with the support of various women's pacifist groups. The demonstrators expect to petition Congress when they reconvene on January 15.

JAN 12 1968

62 JAN 18 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

1/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE 100-448475-67 URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

EX-109

1 - Mr. W. G. Deegans
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

TO SAC ATLANTA

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT.

REURTEL JANUARY TEN LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR ~~CYNTHIA YVONNE MITCHELL, PRI~~, TO ATTEND CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. INSTRUCT SOURCE TO PROMPTLY APPRISE WFO OF ANY PERTINENT DATA DEVELOPED DURING TRIP TO WASHINGTON. SPECIAL AGENT GARNETT TUNSTALL, PHONE NUMBER EXECUTIVE THREE-SEVEN ONE ZERO ZERO, EXTENSIONS THREE NINE ONE OR FOUR SIX ZERO, SHOULD BE CONTACTED FOR THIS PURPOSE. ATLANTA ADVISE WFO CODE NAME USED BY THIS SOURCE. COPY MAILED WFO.

64 APR 3 1968

ENCLOSED

RHH

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

WFO
1 - 170- (Cynthia Yvonne Mitchell)
RHH:cst cst
(6)

NOTE: ~~Mitchell is a 20-year-old colored female who is employed as a bank clerk in Atlanta.~~ She was approved as a probationary racial informant in November, 1967, as she was familiar with some of the racial issues and close to dissident racial groups in Atlanta. She is paid under SAC authority. Atlanta, by retel, advised that they were sending informant, UACB, to participate in demonstration as a method of acquainting her with persons active in Vietnam and racial activities. Teletype being used in order to instruct Atlanta in the method source should contact WFO while in Washington area.

olson
eLoach
ohr
Bishop
asper
allahan
onrad
elt
Gale
Rosen
ullivan
avel
rotter
ele. Room
olmes
ndy

JAN 1968 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

RHH

(-28-67)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

BHM

7:50PM URGENT 1-10-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR AND WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM ATLANTA

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16 NEXT; IS; OO: WFO.

~~CYNTHIA YVONNE MITCHELL, PRI (GHETTO)~~ BEING DESIGNATED BY ATLANTA TO ACCOMPANY GROUP LEAVING ATLANTA BY CHARTERED GREYHOUND BUS AT 7 AM, JANUARY 15 NEXT ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON TO PARTICIPATE IN PRESENTING ANTI-UNITED STATES PROTEST TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. GROUP WILL RETURN TO ATLANTA VIA GREYHOUND ARRIVING 8 AM, JANUARY 16 NEXT. ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY INFORMANT THROUGH MRS. NANCY COLLINSON, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. INFORMANT WILL BE COMPENSATED UP TO $100 FOR TRANSPORTATION AND EXPENSES ON SAC AUTHORITY. INFORMANT BEING USED IN THIS INSTANCE AS MEANS OF ACQUAINTING HERSELF WITH PERSONS ACTIVE IN VIETNAM ACTIVITIES AND RACIAL ACTIVITIES AND FOR PURPOSE OF REPORTING PERTINENT INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF THIS GROUP IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

1-11-68

1-WFO

RHH/cst

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 1/10 —

REC 48

100-448115-67

EX-103

8 JAN 16 1968

2 CC WASHINGTON FIELD.

XEROX
JAN 16 1968

CC —

TWO COPIES WFO

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

DECODED COPY

☐ **AIRGRAM** ☐ **CABLEGRAM** ☐ **RADIO** ☒ **TELETYPE**

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

PAGE TWO FROM ATLANTA

ATLANTA MAKING ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH INFORMANT UACB BY 5 PM EST JANUARY 11 NEXT. P.

RECEIVED: 8:06 PM RM.

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Rev. 5-22-64

FBI

Date: 1/11/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
OO:WFO

ReNYteletypes 1/4/68, 1/9/68, 1/10/68.

Enclosed herewith for Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM concerning captioned demonstration. Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia is one information copy of the LHM.

Copies of this LHM have been disseminated to interested local intelligence agencies and USA's, SDNY and EDNY.

3 - Bureau (ENCLS. 11) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (ENCLS. 2) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (ENCLS. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (ENCLS. 1) (RM)
1 - Newark (ENCLS. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (ENCLS.1) (RM)
1 - New York

HPB:mhm
(11)

ST-110

REC 13

JAN 12 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, Sec Serv, State
RAO FSD, OD, IDIA
DATE FORW. 1-17-68
HOW FORW. R/S
WNP:dlh
cc + encl 932 9th + D

Approved: ____________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

56 JAN 24 1968

NY 100-161601

BSS, NYCPD have been advised of pertinent travel plans from NYC of JRB.

Sources used in LHM:

1. NY-694-S*
2. CG-7019-S
3. NY-2705-S
4. CSNY-6000-S
5. WILLIAM R. ENNIS, Security Supervisor,
   NY Telephone Company (by request)
6. NY 5894-S*
7. NY 1587-S

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information from sources 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 who are of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of the information would tend to identify these informants and therefore affect the national security interest.

NYO will cover departure and advise Bureau and Washington Field by telephone followed by teletype.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
January 11, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam, Washington,
D.C., January 15, 1968

On January 3, 1968, an advertisement appeared in the "New York Times", page 57, captioned "Dagmar Wilson Says Join Me In Washington January 15". The ad included the comment "Thousands of American Women, Led By Jeannette Rankin, First United States Congresswoman, Will Demand That Congress End The War In Vietnam and Our Social Crisis At Home". The ad listed the name and address for transportation and contributions as Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB), 133 West 72nd Street, New York City, 10023, telephone number (212) 799-6520.

On January 4, 1968, five separate advertisements for JRB at the above address appeared in "The Village Voice", a weekly newspaper in New York City. Ruby Dee, Linda Morse, Mrs. Benjamin Spock and Susan Sontag appeared by name and photo separately in four of the ads requesting the reader to "Join Me in Washington January 15". These four ads included substantially the same comments which appeared in the above "New York Times" ad of January 3, 1968. The fifth ad in "The Village Voice" was headed by the comment "We Want 10,000 Women In Washington Jan. 15". The ad included comments about the activities and purpose for the demonstration. A xerox copy of this ad is attached hereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

15

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968

Ruby Dee

A confidential source advised on November 19, 1965, Ruby Dee was a member of the Communist Party (CP) as of November, 1965.

Linda Morse, Also Known As
Linda Dannenberg

A second confidential source advised on June 16, 1967, that at a meeting of the National Youth Commission, CP, United States of America (USA), on June 14, 1967, in Brooklyn, New York, it was stated Linda Dannenberg was then under the influence of the CP, USA.

Susan Sontag

Susan Sontag is an author, writer and critic.

On January 3, 1968, a third confidential source advised that at a New York County CP Committee meeting, December 28, 1967, those present were urged to attend the January 15, 1968 Demonstration in Washington, D.C., sponsored by JRB.

On January 4, 1968, a fourth confidential source advised that a Press Conference was held at the Gotham Hotel, 5th Avenue and 55th Street, New York City, which announced that JRB would sponsor the January 15, 1968 Demonstration in Washington, D.C., and would be assisted by Women Strike For Peace (WSP). Participants were to include Florynce Kennedy, Ruby Dee, Judy Morse Eaton, who is the daughter of Senator Wayne Morse, and Mrs. Benjamin Spock, the wife of Dr. Benjamin Spock. At the conference, it was stated some Negro women would participate in the demonstration. The fact that Negroes would participate was described at the conference as an "unprecedented move".

Demonstration Protesting United States Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968

Florynce Kennedy has been publically identified as an attorney for H. Rap Brown, National Chairman, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

On January 4, 1968, Mr. John Martin, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad, Pennsylvania Station, 8th Avenue and 33rd Street, New York City, advised that the original request from JRB for two special trains to Washington, D.C., from New York City, could not be furnished by the railroad because of insufficient equipment. One train of eighteen cars is being reserved for JRB. This train might be increased to 20 cars. Martin estimated that 1400 passengers would be the capacity of the reserved train. It will depart Penn Station 7:20 am on January 15, 1968. It will arrive Penn Station, Newark, New Jersey, at 7:36 am to pick up additional passengers. It will arrive Washington, D.C., at 11:10 am. There are no stops between Newark and Washington. The train will depart Washington, D.C., at 7:10 pm January 15, 1968, arrive Newark 10:45 pm, arrive New York City, 11:00 pm.

Martin stated a group from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, organized by an Ethel Taylor, has reserved three coaches on the regular Pennsylvania Railroad to Washington, D.C., which departs Philadelphia 8:10 am January 15, 1968, arriving Washington, D.C., 10:20 am.

On January 5, 1968, a fifth confidential source advised that in obtaining the New York Telephone number 799-6520 for JRB, 133 West 72nd Street, New York City the references listed were Mrs. Peter C. Thompson, 10230 67th Avenue, Forest Hills, Queens, New York, and Mrs. Peter M. Wolf, 312 West 71st Street, Manhattan, New York. No bank references were listed.

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam, Washington,
D.C., January 15, 1968

On January 9, 1968, Mrs. John Martin, Pennsylvania Raidroad, advised JRB informed him that more tickets had been sold for the January 15, 1968, special train than there were seats on the train. JRB had again requested more railroad cars. Martin informed them additional cars or an additional train was not available. JRB indicated they would consider chartered buses for the extra women from New York. Martin further stated that a $5000.00 check had been received from JRB drawn on the account of JRB at Sterling National Bank and Trust Company, Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, New York. The checked was signed by Mrs. Miriam Thompson. Martin indicated that most of the train negotiations have been conducted with Mrs. Thompson.

Mr. Martin stated he had arranged with the D.C. Transit Company, Washington, D.C., to provide approximately 33 buses from the capitol to the Hotel Shoreham, Washington, D.C.,at 2:00 pm, January 15, 1968. The buses will depart the hotel at 6:00 pm for Union Station and will depart Washington, D.C., 7:10 pm.

On January 10, 1968, a sixth confidential source advised that Frances Bordofsky and Sylvia Thompson were going to the demonstration in Washington, D.C., sponsored by JRB.

Frances Bordofsky

A seventh confidential source advised June 27, 1967, that Frances Bordofsky, a representative of Bronx County CP, is a member of the New York District CP Committee.

Sylvia Thompson

The third confidential source advised on February 27, 1967, that Sylvia Thompson is a member of the New York County CP Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL

We Want 10,000 Women In WASHINGTON JAN. 15

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade, Led By The 1st US Congresswoman, Demands That Congress

1. Bring the Boys Back From Vietnam

2. Act On Neglected Human Needs At Home

The broadest coalition of American women in history—women young and old, from church, political, peace and minority groups, from the arts, professions and public affairs—will speak with a single voice the day Congress opens. We women, representing 51% of the voting population, will demand that as its first order of business, Congress withdraw US troops and act to make a decent life for our 23 million black people and all citizens.

We will convene our own Congress of American Women, following our Petition at the Capitol. We will declare our intention to mobilize on all levels in our communities to reshape our society. Start the New Year with a day off from home or job to work for peace with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Make Womanpower Political Power

Jeannette Rankin Brigade 133 W. 72 St. NYC 10023
Tel: 212 (799-6520)

I will contribute $..

I will be at Union St'n Washington 11:30 am ....

Send me ....train tix (round trip NY/Wash.) @$7.50 each. Lv. Pa. St'n Monday Jan. 15 7:30 am; ret. NY 11 pm. Bring lunch bus fare Capitol to Women's Congress. Wear black or somber dress.

Name ....

Adress .... Tel. ....

The above advertisement appeared in "The Village Voice", on January 4, 1968, page 21.

CONFIDENTIAL

5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/11/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
1/15/68, WASHINGTON, D.C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Los Angeles airtel and LHM, 12/30/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM setting forth information concerning a demonstration ~~to~~ be held in Santa Ana, California, on 1/15/67, in support of captioned demonstration.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being disseminated locally to 115th, MIG, Region II, Pasadena; USA, Los Angeles; Secret Service, Los Angeles; OSI, Norton AFB; and NIS, San Diego. LHM also enclosed for Washington Field.

The source used to characterize the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is LA 3324-S. The source used to characterize ELSE STUHR is an anonymous source of the Chicago Office.

ENCLOSURE

(5) - Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173)(Encls. 2)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

REC 16 100-447172

[redacted]

LJM/pjc
(6)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, ~~CD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-18-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY:

16 JAN 16 1968

[redacted]

INT. SEC.

C. C. - Bishop

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

LA 100-70701

The enclosed LHM is classified confidential because it contains information from LA 3824-S which could reasonably result in source's identification.

would be [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

January 11, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICE IN VIETNAM WASHINGTON, D. C.

On January 11, 1968, Lieutenant Robert Palmer, Santa Ana Police Department, advised that he had received an application for permission to use public property in the City of Santa Ana, California, which was submitted by Else Sturm, 30802 South Coast Highway, Laguna Beach, California.

According to this application, Sturm indicated she represented the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and was requesting authority for a "procession of approximately 160 persons dressed in black to support the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, protesting the government's position on the Vietnam War in conjunction with a massive demonstration to be held in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968." Sturm indicated the procession would be held between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on January 15, 1968, and would proceed from 6th Street to Sycamore Street, to 8th Street, to Broadway, and downtown Santa Ana, California.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that WILPF is a peace oriented women's organization which is "Anti-War" perse. In addition, this organization works specifically in reference to civil rights issues. Participants in the organization are primarily active church-goers with a few former Communist Party members. WILPF's activities have included demonstration and distribution of literature opposing the Vietnam War.

Another source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that Else Sturm was a member of the Communist Party in Chicago, Illinois, in December, 1946.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

DATE: 1/12/68

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

We have prepared a summary of activities scheduled by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in their demonstration to be held at the Capitol on January 15, 1968. A copy of this memorandum is attached for ready reference.

It has been previously reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, a nationwide group of women opposed to the war in Vietnam, will sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

Current plans of the Brigade call for the demonstration to assemble at Union Station, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p.m. and march to the Capitol via Louisiana Avenue. The Brigade has been unable to obtain a permit to assemble at the Capitol as previously planned.

Their request to meet with Speaker of the House, John W. McCormack and Senator Michael J. Mansfield on the steps of the Capitol for the purpose of presenting their petition before the entire demonstration has been thwarted. Speaker McCormack agreed to meet with a delegation of 10 to 15 women in his office. Following the presentation of the petition and until 2 p.m., participants will confer with various Congressmen. At 2 p.m., they will be taken by bus to the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., for a conference from 2 to 6 p.m. At 6 p.m., those returning to the New York-Philadelphia area will be transported by bus to Union Station to entrain.

Some of the Brigade's demonstrators are expected to remain in Washington, D. C., until January 16 at which time they will attempt to confer with their Congressmen concerning the war in Vietnam. Communist Party members from New York,

Enclosure sent 1-12-68

REC 7

100-448475

RHH:jav (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

14 JAN 17 1968

XEROX

EX-109

JAN 19 1968

Illinois and the State of Washington have been identified as participants. Among these are Frances Bordofsky of the New York District Party Committee and Sylvia Thompson, a member of the Party's New York County Committee.

Busses have been chartered by groups from Cleveland, Newark, New York, and Philadelphia.

Supporting demonstrations will also be held by the Brigade's groups in Chicago, Illinois and Clayton, Missouri.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed memorandum to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; United States Secret Service; and the Attorney General.

ADDENDUM:

All information concerning the march has not only been furnished to the above, but has been furnished to Park and Capitol police, Metropolitan police and the military intelligence agencies.

✓

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

January 12, 1968

1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

3

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

It was previously reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, a nationwide group of women who are opposed to the war in Vietnam, will sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

Sources who have furnished reliable information in the past have advised that current plans call for the Brigade to assemble at Union Station, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p.m., January 15, 1968. The demonstrators will march to the Capitol via Louisiana Avenue. The Brigade's plans originally called for the demonstrators to assemble at the Capitol; however, legal restrictions have arisen to prevent the demonstrators from assembling at this site.

The Brigade further had hoped to present their petition to Speaker of the House John W. McCormack and Senator Michael J. Mansfield on the steps of the Capitol. Speaker McCormack has answered their request by stating that he could not meet them on the steps, but would be willing to receive a delegation of ten to fifteen women in his office on that date. Following this, some participants will confer with various Congressmen.

At 2 p.m. on January 15, 1968, the demonstrators plan to be taken in busses to the Shoreham Hotel, Calvert Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., where the Brigade has reserved a banquet room from 2 to 6 p.m. At 6 p.m., those attending the meeting at the Shoreham Hotel will again be transported by bus to Union Station where those who arrived by train will depart to the New York-Philadelphia area by special train departing at 7:10 p.m.

Some of the Brigade's demonstrators are expected to remain in Washington, D. C., until January 16, 1968, at which time they will attempt to confer with their Congressmen concerning the war in Vietnam.

100-448475
RHH:jav
(27)

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

100-448226-8

REC 7

XEROX

JAN 19 1968

66 JAN 24 1968

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Memorandum CONFIDENTIAL

- DeLoach
- Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

DATE 1/12/68

TO

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

FROM C.

SUBJECT:

Participants in the demonstration will include Frances Bordofsky, a member of the New York District Committee, Communist Party, USA; Sylvia Thompson, a member of the Communist Party's New York County Committee; Rosalind Durham, Communist Party member in the State of Illinois; and Linda Corr, Taimi Halonen, and Thorun Robel, Communist Party members in the State of Washington.

Sources have reported that busses have been chartered to transport demonstrators from Cleveland, Ohio; Newark, New Jersey; New York, New York; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These busses are in addition to a special train of approximately 20 cars which is to transport participants from New York to Washington, D. C. Three coaches will also be added to a regularly scheduled train at Philadelphia.

Demonstrations in support of the Brigade's demonstration in Washington, D. C., are being planned for Chicago and St. Louis. In Chicago, the Women for Peace, a pacifist group, will hold a demonstration January 15, 1968, from 12 noon to 1 p.m. at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois. This demonstration will urge Congress to stop the war in Vietnam and to work on human needs in the United States. The participating women have been asked to wear black clothing. Mourning veils will be furnished them at the demonstration.

A silent vigil of women dressed in black is scheduled to be held on the steps of the St. Louis County Courthouse, Clayton, Missouri, on January 15, 1968, from 12 noon to 1 p.m.

NOTE:

Classified "Confidential" as some of the information included in this summary comes from sensitive sources, the compromise of which would be detrimental to the U. S.

Xerox copies being sent to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; the Vice President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; United States Secret Service; the Attorney General; the Deputy Attorney General; and Assistant Attorneys General J. Walter Yeagley, Stephen J. Pollak and Fred M. Vinson, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

See memorandum C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated 1/12/68 captioned as above as prepared by RHH:jav.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL   REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

WCS
TYD

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

C. D. Brennan

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
(OO: WFO)

ReNYtel, 1/11/68.

Enclosed herewith for Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM concerning captioned demonstration. Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia is one copy of the LHM. Copies of this LHM have been designated to interested local intelligence agencies, and USAs, SDNY and EDNY.

BSS, NYCPD, has been advised of bus travel plans from NYC.

NYO will cover departure of buses, as well as trains, from NYC.

ENCLOSURE

REC 10

-41

3-Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
1-Atlanta (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Los Angeles (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Newark (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Philadelphia (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-New York (100-161601)

20 JAN 13 1968

HPB:mfw (42)
(11)

called R.W. Horner
6 PM, 1/13/67

C. C. - B.S.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
M Per
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________________ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
January 12, 1968

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D. C.
January 15, 1968

On January 11, 1968, Mr. John Martin, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad, Pennsylvania Station, New York City, stated he had been informed by the New York office of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) that the overflow of women traveling to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, by train would be handled by buses furnished through the All State Bus Corporation, Brooklyn, New York. These buses would depart from the vicinity of Pennsylvania Station, New York City.

On January 11, 1968, Mr. Robert Stimell, Sales Representative, All State Bus Corporation, 3163 Coney Island Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, advised that his company had contracted with JRB to furnish five buses to depart from 31st Street and Eighth Avenue (vicinity Pennsylvania Station), New York City, at 7 A.M., January 15, 1968. These buses have a total seating capacity of 245. The All State Bus Corporation has received a deposit of $250 on January 11, 1968, from Miriam Thompson of JRB. Stimell advised that the All State Bus Corporation was acting as the bus broker with JRB, and it was anticipated that the actual buses used would come from the New York and Keansburg Line, a New Jersey-based company.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

41

ENCLOSURE /

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING - ~~IS.~~ Internal Security

INSPECTOR A.D. BEYE, U.S. PARK POLICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., ADVISED THIS DATE PERMIT IS BEING GRANTED FOR JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE (JRB) TO USE SPACE AT FOOT OF CAPITOL HILL IN THE VICINITY OF THE GRANT MONUMENT FOR ASSEMBLY ON MONDAY, JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT. INSPECTOR BEYE ADVISED REPRESENTATIVE OF JRB REQUESTED PERMISSION FOR USE OF THIS AREA FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR BEGINNING ELEVEN THIRTY AM, JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT, AND PERMIT WILL ALLOW SPEAKERS DURING THAT PERIOD.

REC-34 100-448475-65

22 JAN 17 1968

(2) - Bureau
2 - WFO

GTT:fet
(4)

cc 11C-DA
1010

C.D.

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge Sent ______ M Per ______

CODE 1/12/68

TELETYPE SENT BY CODED TELETYPE URGENT 1 - Mr. R.H. Horner
EX-113

TO SAC ST LOUIS (100-20923)
FROM DIRECTOR FBI (100-448475)-66
REC 48

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

5

REURTEL JANUARY ELEVEN, LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PAY ~~SE ONE ZERO ONE NINE - -~~S UP TO ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN PARTICIPATING IN CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION JANUARY FIFTEEN, NEXT, AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

INSTRUCT SOURCE TO PROMPTLY FURNISH ANY PERTINENT DATA DEVELOPED TO SA GARNETT, TUNSTALL, PHONE NUMBER EXECUTIVE THREE SEVEN ONE ZERO ZERO, EXTENTION THREE NINE ONE OR FOUR SIX ZERO.

FOR INFORMATION OF WFO, SOURCE USES CODE NAME A - ONE FIVE ZERO.

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY DEBRIEF SOURCE UPON RETURN TO YOUR AREA AND SUBMIT LHM.

MAIL COPY TO WFO.

1 - WFO
1 - M.F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 100-375206
RHH:jav (6)

VIA TELETYPE
735P DF
ENCIPHERED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

olson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
sen
llivan
avel
rotter
ele. Room
olmes
andy

66 JAN 23 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

Teletype to SAC, St. Louis
RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
100-448475

NOTE:

SL-1019-S is a 43-year-old Negro female who is employed as a housewife. She has been an informant since 7/53. Informant is a member of the Missouri State Committee, CP, USA; member of the Financial Committee; and Organizational Secretary of the CP of Missouri. She is currently authorized payments of up tO $235 per month for services and up to $20 per month for expenses. Source would be able to furnish valuable information concerning Party efforts during this demonstration. The demonstration in Washington, D. C., on 1/15/68 is sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade composed of women from various peace organizations. Teletype being used in view of necessity for infomant to make travel arrangements.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (P)

I. MO

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING [illegible] STATES
~~U.S.~~ POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15- 16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

Ch

Re Buairtel to Albany, 12/5/67, and Atlanta teletype, 1/12/68, to Bureau.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM captioned as above, prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, on 1/12/68, and suitable for dissemination.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Ft. McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)(RM)
6 - Atlanta (2 - 100-7300)
(1 - 100-6730)
(1 - 100-3128)
(1 - 100-7253)
(1 - 100-New Dead) (RICHARD PARR)

REC-69 [illegible] 13

JAN 15 1968

CTH:met
(13)

INT. SEC.

E. C. Bishop AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI Sec Ser
RNO [illegible] State
DATE [illegible]
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ________ M Per ____________

55 JAN 22 1968

UNIT[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia
January 12, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Mrs. Nancy Collinson of the American Friends Service Committee Office in Atlanta, Georgia, advised on January 12, 1968, that a Greyhound bus had been chartered by individuals from Atlanta who were due to take part in the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, and she would accompany this group.

W. Earl Perry, Charter Manager, Southeastern Greyhound Lines, advised on January 12, 1968, that a 38-passenger bus had been chartered by Mrs. Nancy Collinson, and the bus is scheduled to leave the Atlanta Greyhound Bus Depot at 7:30 p.m. on January 14, 1968, and due to arrive at the Union Station in Washington, D.C., at 10:00 a.m. on January 15, 1968. On the return trip from Washington to Atlanta, the passengers are to be picked up at 6:00 p.m. on January 15, 1968, at the Shorham Hotel, and the bus is due to arrive in Atlanta at 8:00 a.m. on January 16, 1968.

The following individuals were advised of the above on January 12, 1968:

Lieutenant Robert Shattles, Atlanta Police Department;

Special Agent Phillip Perry, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Atlanta, Georgia;

Hoyt West, Special Agent, 111th Military Intelligence Group, Region V, Fort McPherson, Georgia;

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1974

100-448[illegible]-73

ENCLOSU[illegible]

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Mr. A.B. Wentz, Special Agent in Charge, United States Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia;

Mr. Charles L. Goodson, United States Attorney, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________
(Priority)

Encl. X

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-444?75)

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49?97) -P-

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

Re Philadelphia teletype, dated 1/11/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM captioned as above. Two copies each of the LHM are being designated for WFO and Newark. One information copy each of the LHM is being designated for Atlanta ~~and~~ San Francisco since they have cases on the "JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

PA - [illegible] - NY

Source utilized is [redacted]

The information from [illegible] FISHER was furnished by SA KENNETH K. SMYTHE.

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally to Secret Service, OSI, NISO, and [illegible], 109th MI Group.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (100-444?75) (Encs. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Newark (Encs. 2) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47073) (Encs. 2) (RM)
3 - Philadelphia
1 - 100-49?97
1 - 100-45??? ([illegible])
1 - 100-45561 ([illegible])
1 - 134-16-Sub [illegible]

KKS:mes
(13)

REC- 69

EX 109

100-444 - 74

8 JAN 15 1968

INT. SEC.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, OD)
DATE FORW: 1-16-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: [illegible]

C. C. - Bishop

57 JAN 23 1968

Sent ________ M Per ________

NW 88321 DocId:32989544 Page 272

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

January [illegible], 1968

[illegible]
[illegible] L. [illegible],
[illegible]
JANUARY 15, 19[illegible]

On January 11, 1968, [illegible], Pennsylvania Railroad Police, 30th Street Station, Philadelphia, Pa., furnished the following information:

PA - DC - NJ

[illegible] (WIL) has reserved three coaches, [illegible] train number 1[illegible] to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968. Fifty persons will board the train at Trenton, N. J., at 7:3[illegible] a.m. on January 15, 1968, prior to its arriving at Philadelphia. The other 150 persons will board the train at 30th Street Station, Philadelphia. The train will leave Philadelphia at 8:10 a.m. and arrive at Washington, D. C., at 10:30 a.m., January 15, 1968.

[illegible]

On January 11, 1968, [illegible], who has furnished reliable information in the past, made available a copy of a mimeographed letter from the [illegible]. A Xerox copy of the letter is attached to this memorandum.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; [illegible]

1

100-448475-74

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

WOMEN strike for PEACE
20 S. 12th Street - Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 - Telephone: LO 3-4310

Dear WSPER:

Women Strike for Peace nationally is supporting the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. Planeloads, trainloads and carloads of women will be coming into Washington on Monday, January 15th, from all over the country.

We are particularly pleased with this action because it represents for the first time a real coalition of women's peace groups, church groups, theatre personalities, and community leaders.

The Day is envisioned as a solemn, dignified confrontation of those who should be representing the ever growing opposition to the war. We ask that you write your Congressmen urging that they support the four points listed in the enclosed Call as Congress reconvenes. Later in the afternoon at our Women's Congress we want to be able to report on Congressional responses.

We will all meet at Union Station in Washington at 11:30 AM and slowly walk to the Capitol. We ask the women to wear black. We will be led by Jeannette Rankin who will proceed to the top of the Capitol steps with a representative delegation of 50 women to present our petition to the two men who represent the whole of Congress, Senator Mike Mansfield and Speaker of the House McCormack. The delegation will read the demands before the assembled women and the two Congressmen. Leaving the Hill, the women will enter buses for a motorcade to a Congress of American Women (place to be announced). Women will present an analysis of the current crisis on the war front and the domestic front, leading to suggestions for program and actions to be taken back to our communities for implementation.

Women may choose to remain in Washington the next day to meet with their Congressmen. If you wish to stay and wish help in securing accommodations, contact the Hospitality Com-ittee, 2140 P. St. N.W . Washington, DC (293-2020). We regret that in order to get the owest train fare we had to guarantee return the same day; therefore you would have to inance your own trip back on the 16th.

Our hope is that 10,000 women will converge upon Washington. We urge you to participate.

Yours for Peace,

Ethel Taylor

S-MEET A T 30th STREET STATION INFORMATION DESK AT 7:45 TO ALLOW TIME FOR PRESS AND TV OVERAGE. LIMIT OF 200 SEATS ON TRAIN -- RESERVE EARLY.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via airtel airmail
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (100-20923) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/8/68 - JEANNETTE RANKEN BRIGADE INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

C. D. Brennan

ReBuairtel to AL, 12/5/67, and SL teletypes to Bureau, 1/9 and 1/11/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, and for WFO 2 copies.

Local dissemination has been made to USA, Secret Service, St. Louis Police Department, Clayton Police Department, and Navy, Army and Air Force Intelligence.

St. Louis County Police Department has been orally advised but has not been furnished a copy of the LHM.

Source one is ~~SL 1093-S.~~

Source two is ~~SL 1019-S.~~

The LHM has been classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect identity of these sources of continuing value.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW: 1/16
HOW FORW:
BY:

REC 48

85

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (Enc. 2) (RM)
5 - St. Louis (1 - 100-20923)
(1 - 134-161A ~~SL 1019-S)~~
(1 - 134-214A ~~SL 1093-S)~~
(1 - 100-20884 PEACE CENTER)
(1 - 100-19842 VIDEM)

9 JAN 16 1968

ENCLOSURE

C.D. Bishop

SJP:paw
(10)

XEROX
JAN 17 1968

Approved: ________________ Sent ________________M Per ________________
Special Agent in Charge

51 FEB 7 1968

St. Louis has not attempted to characterize any of the names listed on printed flyer that is a part of the LHM. The names written in after St. Louis delegation are not known to have subversive connections, although they are associated with peace and anti-Vietnam activities.

St. Louis is continuing its efforts to identify individuals who will travel to Washington, D. C., and it will follow demonstration to be held at Clayton, Missouri, 1/15/68.

Bureau will be kept advised by airtel.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri

January 12, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968 - JEANNETTE RANKEN BRIGADE

Information was developed that in late fall of 1967 an organization known as the Jeannette Ranken Brigade had sent out a call for a demonstration to be held at the White House in Washington, D. C., on January 8, 1968, in protest of the War in Vietnam. Jeannette Ranken, the Chairman of this Brigade, is 86 years old and is a former member of Congress from the State of Montana. She first went to Congress in 1917.

The December 14, 1967 issue of the "St. Louis Post-Dispatch", a daily St. Louis newspaper, in an article on Page 10C, stated that Jeannette Ranken was planning a massive Vietnam peace project by women who would converge on Congress in January, 1968. She is elsewhere quoted to have said, "Ten thousand women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had ten thousand women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women." She has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing in Vietnam is stopped.

Source One advised on January 6, 1968, that the St. Louis Peace Information Center, at 6217 Delmar, has been active in organizing interest in the Jeannette Ranken demonstration. It was announced that the date for the demonstration at Washington, D. C., had been changed from January 8, to January 15, 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This communication and its contents are loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside of the agency to which loaned.

85

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

Source said that in addition to sending a delegation to Washington, D. C., the St. Louis group is formulating plans for a demonstration to take place in St. Louis, Missouri, on January 15, 1968. The Peace Center has distributed a leaflet. A copy of this leaflet is as follows:

CONFIDENTIAL



who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

1968

TO COME TO WASHINGTON

JANUARY 15

as Congress opens. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

PROGRAM

Llve. St. Louis Sat. PM, Jan. 13

2. Attend Planning Sessions Sun.

3. Hospitality in homes 3 nights

~~4. Silent walk to Capitol 11:30 AM Mon.~~

5 Visit Congress-men Tues.

6. Return Tues. night

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

PETITION the United States Congress

CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

PARTIAL LIST OF National SPONSORS

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Dagmar Wilson
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culve
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliot

The Brigade is composed of women from all walks of life, churches, arts, professions (Not sponsored by organizations)

St. Louis Delegation - Partial list

Yvonne Logan, Lois Bock
Rachel Fatlaman, Vivian Schatz,
Charlotte Peskind, Bernice
Wehrmeyer, Eldora Spiegelberg

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elect to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones w must be concerned with the needs and development of the

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

Congre[illegible]se its power to heal a sick society at [illegible]e.

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

PROGRAM
1. Lve. St. Louis Sat. PM, Jan. 13
2. Attend Planning Sessions Sun.
3. Hospitality in homes 3 nights
4. Silent walk to Capitol 11:30 AM Mon.
5 Visit Congressmen Tues.
6. Return Tues. night

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

PETITION the United States Congress

CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

PARTIAL LIST OF National SPONSORS

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett

Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Jessica Milford
Nello Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks

Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sonlag

Dagmar Wilson

Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culve
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott

The Brigade is composed of women from all walks of life, churches, arts, professions (Not sponsored by organizations)

St. Louis Delegation - Partial list

Yvonne Logan, Lois Beck
Rachel Fathman, Vivian Schatz,
Charlotte Peskind, Bernice
Wehrmeyer, Eldora Spiegelberg

Needed!
Women to go as delegates
Women to contribute funds
Women to care for children
Women to staff Peace Information Center for 3 days
Women to vigil in St. Louis
Call: Eldora Spiegelberg PA1-4918
[illegible] CiVO [illegible] ([illegible])

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 15 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin

JEANNETTE RANKIN

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK WHEREVER THEY ARE ON JANUARY 15

CONFIDENTIA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

With regard to the local demonstration, Source advised that final plans would be made at a meeting scheduled at the Peace Center on January 14, 1968. It has been proposed that the demonstration would take place at the St. Louis County, Missouri Courthouse at Clayton, Missouri. It will consist of women dressed in black, standing in silence for one hour between 12 Noon and 1 PM. An article on Page 8A of the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat", a St. Louis daily newspaper, Friday, January 12, 1968 states that vigil for peace will be held at Clayton. This article says that an hour-long vigil for peace by women wearing black is planned for January 15, 1968, for one hour at noon at the St. Louis County Courthouse. The vigil is being carried out by the St. Louis Chapter of the Women Strike for Peace. Miss Nolan Peskin is described as the founder of the St. Louis Chapter. She is further referred to as the wife of the Clayton, Missouri, businessman who is a member of the Veterans for Peace. According to the article, plans will be finalized at a meeting to be held at the Peace Information Center on January 13, 1968.

Source Two advised on January 10, 1968, that women from St. Louis who intend to take part in the January 15, 1968, demonstration at Washington, D. C., are being told that the St. Louis group will travel together via Trans World Airlines. They will depart St. Louis at 6:25 PM on Sunday, January 14, 1968, and will arrive in Washington at 9:03 PM. Each woman is being told that she should make her own airline reservation and that each is to pay her own travel expenses. Housing in Washington, D. C., will be provided for, however, food will have to be purchased by the individual. It is possible that some money may be contributed by individuals who cannot make the trip but who want to help others who can go but who are lacking the funds. On January 15, 1968, the women will attempt to call on members of the Congress and present to them their opposition to the Vietnam War. On January 16, 1968, a "Women's Congress" will be held in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of issuing instructions to the delegates concerning future activities that they are to carry on upon returning to their homes. The location where this meeting will be held is not known.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

The St. Louis group will endeavor to obtain reservations on Trans World Airlines flight leaving Washington, D. C., January 16, 1968, at 5:05 PM.

An article appearing in the September 20, 1967 issue of "The St. Louis Post-Dispatch" on Page 3C read as follows:

> "A Peace Information Center will be opened at 6217 Delmar Boulevard with ceremonies at 8:00 p.m. today. The Center will contain literature on foreign affairs, economics and social problems. Information concerning alternatives under the Selective Service Act and individual counseling for young men will be provided by appointment."

All sources in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

[redacted]

COB

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

To: Director, FBI (100-448475)

From: SAC, Philadelphia (100-49497) (P)

[redacted]

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68; INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

Enclosed for the Bureau are an original and ten copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Two copies each of the LHM are being designated for Newark and WFO. One information copy each is being designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have cases on the "Jeannette Rankin Brigade."

Re Philadelphia teletype to the Director dated 1/5/68.

The information from the Philadelphia Police Department was received by SA JOHN [illegible].

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 3) (RM)
3 - Philadelphia
  1 - 100-46020 (WSP)
  1 - 100-42539 (CAROLYN [illegible])

EX 106

REC-31

86

(11)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., ~~/Dll~~
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD), State
DATE FORW: 1-18-68
HOW FORW: RS
BY:

22 JAN 16 1968

C. C. - Bishop

54 JAN 24 1968

INT. SEC.

The pretext was conducted by Clerk MARY T. PENTITIS. The pretext utilized was that of a woman interested in making the trip to Washington, D. C.

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally to Secret Service, NISO, OSI, and 109th MI Group.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 12, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

On January 5, 1968, Officer JAMES MC GOVERN, Civil Disobedience Unit, Philadelphia Police Department, made available two flyers pertaining to the scheduled January 15, 1968, Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) demonstration in Washington, D. C. The first carried the heading "Join the Jeannette Rankin Brigade" and listed the address and phone number for the JRB as 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. (LO 4-5570). The second was a message "To All American Women" from JEANNETTE RANKIN and listed a partial list of sponsors. Copies of these flyers are attached to this memorandum.

The information service of the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania reflected that the listing for LO 4-5570 was Women Strike for Peace, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

On January 5, 1968, [illegible] of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) Office was contacted under suitable pretext. She stated that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade was an ad hoc committee formed of various peace groups and church women. It was being coordinated in Philadelphia out of the WSP office only for this one occasion and for the group of women going to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968. A march to the Capitol to petition Congress was planned. The rest of the activities would then be held indoors at Georgetown University which had provided facilities for the convening

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

100-44[illegible]-86

of the Congress of American Women. [illegible] stated that all the information she had available concerning the JRB was contained in the flyer (mentioned above - attached) issued by the JRB.

JOIN THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15

SUPPORT JEANNETTE RANKIN AS SHE LEADS US TO THE CAPITOL

TO DEMAND THAT --

1. CONGRESS AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS RESOLVE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IMMEDIATELY ARRANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS.
2. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO HEAL A SICK SOCIETY AT HOME.
3. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RAVAGED LAND WE LEAVE BEHIND IN VIETNAM.
4. CONGRESS LISTEN TO WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SAYING AND REFUSE THE INSATIABLE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

WOMEN OF AMERICA!

OUR POWER IS UNLIMITED!

ON JANUARY 15th WE WILL

PETITION THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

CONVENE A CONGRESS OF AMERICAN WOMEN THAT AFTERNOON TO DEVELOP PROGRAMS TO MEET THE CRISIS IN AMERICA -- PROGRAMS WHICH WILL EXPRESS OUR POLITICAL POWER, REASON AND CONSCIENCE.

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
20 S. 12th St.
Phila., Pa. 19107 - LO 4-5570

Enclosed is $____ for ___ train tickets - $8.50 round trip from 30th St. Station -- $10.50 round trip from Trenton.

I cannot go - am enclosing $___ for someone else to go.

Be at 30th St. Station 7:45 A.M. (train leaves 8:10 A.M.). Train leaves 7:32 A.M. from Trenton. (Train leaves Washington 6:00 P.M. sharp.)

Name_______________________________ ____________
Address_____________________________Phone__________

'Make checks payable to Jeannette Rankin Brigade. For further information about the DAY contact the office.)

All women are urged to wear black on January 15th.

-4-

JEANNETTE RANKIN
Helena, Montana

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against the war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings - for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

JEANNETTE RANKIN

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS J. [illegible]

Mrs. Harry Bellefonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Kay Boyle
Katherine L. Camp
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Eleanor French
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Dorothy Hassler
Dr. Frances Herring
Mrs. Martin Luther King
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Krause
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Viveca Lindfors
Jessica Mitford
Grace Mora Newman
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Nan S. Pendergrast
Esther Pike
Malvina Reynolds
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Ethel Taylor
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson



"HE LEARNED HIS FIRST WORD TODAY—KILL"

"This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible] (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1-12-68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

REC-32

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, RICHMOND (100-10593) -P-

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
INTERNAL SECURITY

00: WFO

ReBureau airtel to all offices, 12-5-67, and Richmond teletype dated 1-11-68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of LHM concerning captioned demonstration and two copies for WFO.

One copy each of the LHM is being transmitted to the following:

109th MIG, Richmond, Va., via FD-342
U.S. Secret Service, Richmond, Va., via FD-342

The first confidential source referred to in the enclosed LHM is PH 27-S.

The second confidential source referred to is PH 61-S.

LEAD:

REC-32

RICHMOND: Will follow this matter and keep the Bureau and WFO advised of pertinent developments.

ENCLOSURE

JAN 17 1968

③ - Bureau (Encs. 10) (RM)
2 - WFO (Encs. 2) (RM)
2 - Richmond (1 - 100-10593) (1 - 66-2521A)
DWH:jll
(7)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~GRD, OD~~)
DATE FORW: ______
HOW FORW: ______
BY: ______

INT. SEC.

C. G. Bishop

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

60 JAN 2 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Richmond, Virginia

January 12, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

Detective C. F. SMITH, Intelligence Squad, Richmond, Virginia, Police Department, advised that he had received information that ICHIRO HASEGAWA, who is known to be active in peace movement groups in the Richmond, Virginia, area was planning to attend the demonstration sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade originally scheduled for January 8th but now planned for January 15, 1968.

SMITH stated that his information indicated that HASEGAWA planned to travel to Washington, D. C., to participate in that demonstration with other unknown individuals. He stated that he has no information concerning HASEGAWA's mode of transportation to Washington nor her participation in the demonstration. SMITH also has no information concerning the number of individuals planning to attend the demonstration with her.

A confidential source advised on September 8, 1965, that the publication "Four Lights," described as the official publication of the Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in a supplement to its July 1965 issue, listed the nominees for the National Board of the WILPF. Included in this listing was the following name - MARII HASEGAWA, also known as ICHIRO HASEGAWA. Within the framework of the WILPF, her activities were listed as follows:

President - New Jersey State Branch - 1956 - 1960
National Membership Chairman - 1960 - 1965
Member of the National Board and Vice President - 1962 - 1965
President Burlington County, New Jersey, Branch - 1961 - 1965

A second confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 15, 1962, that THOMAS NABRIED and FRANCIS GABOW, Communist Party of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD) Leaders, have both

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

96

ENCLOSURE

indicated that the Communist Party (CP) was interested in influencing peace groups, specifically WILPF and there have been instructions for sometime for CP members to join this organization.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It s the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UN[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]TICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Richmond, Virginia

January 12, 1968

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968

Character INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY

Reference Richmond memorandum dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It s the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen WC
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI CINCINTI

4:26 PM URGENT 1/13/68 PAR

TO DIRECTOR AND WFO

FROM CINCINNATI (100-17137) 2P

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY EIGHT SIXTY EIGHT INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

ON JANUARY TWELVE LAST, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO IS IN A POSITION TO FURNISH RELIABLE INFORMATION ADVISED THAT ANN PERRY, YELLOW SPRINGS OHIO, HAS ORGANIZED APPROXIMATELY FORTY WOMEN TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION NOW SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT. THESE WOMEN WHO WILL BE FROM DAYTON, YELLOW SPRINGS, AND SURROUNDING AREAS IN OHIO WILL DEPART FROM THE ANTIOCH COLLEGE UNION, YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, SEVEN FIFTEEN PM, JANUAPY FOURTEEN NEXT AND ANTICIPATE ARRIVING WASHINGTON, D.C. APPROXIMATELY SEVEN AM JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT WHERE THEY WILL UNLOAD AT THE UNION STATION. DRESSED IN BLACK, THEY WILL MEET WITH DEMONSTRATORS FROM OTHER AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROCEED IN SILENCE TO THE CAPITOL.

REC 30 -15

EX 101

16 JAN 16 1968

SOURCE STATED THIS GROUP WILL MEET AT SEVEN THIRTY PM, JANUARY

END PAGE ONE

~~XEROX~~

JAN 1 1968

ccs AG-DAG 1010

6:30 P.M. 1/13/68 called SA R. H. Horner

TWO COPIES WFO

PAGE TWO

FIFTEEN NEXT AT THE SHOREHAM HOTEL, TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED CALVERT ST., NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR THE RETURN TRIP TO YELLOW SPRINGS.

RELIABLE SOURCES ADVISE ANN PERRY, YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, HAS BEEN A LEADER IN ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS AND ALSO IN THE PAST SHE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE.

INSTANT DATE RELIABLE SOURCES ADVISED THEY COULD FURNISH NO ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT SET OUT ABOVE. SOURCES STATED YELLOW SPRINGS GROUP STRICTLY PEACE MAKERS AND NO VIOLENCE ANTICIPATED

ADMINISTRATIVE;

REBUAIRTEL TO ALL SAC7S, DECEMBER FIVE LAST, AND MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, DECEMBER TWENTY EIGHT LAST.

SOURCE IS WANDA FITZPATRICK, MANAGER, DAYTON AND SOUTHEASTERN BUS LINES, INC., JAMESTOWN, OHIO.

END

HOLD

LLD

FBI WASH DC

TWO COPIES WFO

FE[illegible]

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JAN 14 1968

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. M[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. C[illegible]
Mr. C[illegible]
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Rosen
Mr. [illegible] ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC*

FBI CINCINTI

11:26 PM URGENT 1-14-68 DHV

TO DIRECTOR AND WFO

FROM CINCINNATI (100-17137)

5-

C.A.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15 ~~EIGHT~~, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING. (IS).

INSTANT DATE A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT APPROXIMATELY FORTY WOMEN DEPARTED YELLOWSPRINGS, OHIO BY BUS, NINE PM THIS DATE FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT. THE BUS WHICH RESEMBLES A GR~~A~~EYHOUND TYPE BUS WAS CHARTERED FROM THE SOUTHEASTERN BUS LINES, INC., JAMESTOWN, OHIO.

Ch

SOURCE ADVISED THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS SNOWING AND ROAD CONDITIONS HA~~Z~~ZARDOUS THE WOMEN WERE DETERMINED TO REACH WASHINGTON, D. C. FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RECITEL JANUARY THIRTEEN, LAST.

SOURCE IS CHIEF JAMES A MCKEE, POLICE DEPARTMENT YELLOWSPRINGS, OHIO.

END

LLD

FBI WASH DC*

1 XEROX JAN 1968

Thompson

cc AG date 1-17

REC 11

EX 106

JAN 16 1968

5 JAN [illegible] COPIES WFO

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-138315) 1/15/68

SAC, HONOLULU (100-6372) (C)

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES
INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Remyrad 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve (12) copies of LHM captioned above.

Honolulu T-1 was ~~CS SF-33X~~ used to identify LAURENTY.

Investigation was conducted by SA LEO S. BRENNEISEN.

Copy of letter and LHM furnished Washington Field Office, office of origin, in the case entitled, "DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/8/68; INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

LHM has been made available locally to military intelligence agencies and Secret Service.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW: [illegible]
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]

3 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (RAM)
(1) - 100-DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/8/68)
1 - Washington Field (Enc. 1) (RAM)
(100-DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/8/68)
1 - Honolulu
LSB:lfj
(5)

[illegible] JAN 19 1968

ENCLOSURE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Honolulu, Hawaii
January 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

On January 15, 1968, Edward Higgins, Commission on Subversive Activities, Legislature, State of Hawaii, at Honolulu, advised as follows:

A short time after noon that date, some fifteen women gathered on the lawn in front of the Main United States Post Office Building in Honolulu and passed out a leaflet, "Hawaii Women Support the Jeannette Rankin Brigade," a photostat of which is appended hereto. The women's group which included Ada Laurenty, Aiko Reinecke, Jean King, and Bette Johnson, were interviewed by local press and television representatives.

The January 15, 1968, edition of the Honolulu Advertiser, a daily newspaper of Honolulu, reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade plans a march today in Washington, D.C., to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

On January 4, 1963, Honolulu T-1 identified Ada Laurenty as a Communist Party (CP) member in San Diego in 1934 and as being active in the CP in the San Francisco, California, area in 1943.

On November 30, 1953, Robert McBurney Kempa, a former member of the CP in Honolulu from 1947 to 1952, identified Aiko Reinecke as a CP member in 1952.

On October 8, 1953, Kempa identified Jean King as a CP member from 1950 to 1952.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

Today, January 15, Congress reconvenes in Washington. Women from all over the United States have gathered there to petition the Congress in the name of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade. Jeannette Rankin, the first woman to serve in Congress and the only person to vote against U.S. entry into both World Wars, leads the women there, along with such other sponsors as Mrs. M.L.King, Mrs. Harry Belafonte, Mrs. John C. Bennett, Mrs. Benjamin Spock, Mrs Judith Morse Eaton. The Brigade is a national coalition of women's antiwar groups mobilized against the war in Veitham. As the cost of the war in lives and money mounts daily, the women of this country call upon congress to take action against it. To support the senators and Congressmen who oppose the war, to encourage those who are troubled but silent, to speak out, and to make our position known to those who still support this immoral war, we, as women of Hawaii, are gathered here. Our message to Reps. Mink and Matsunaga, to Sens. Fong and Inouye, is that

women will no longer give their sons and loved ones to a government waging a genocidal war...
women will no longer accept a government which represents a military and industrial machine rather than its people...
women will no longer consent to raise their children in the blight and neglect of a society geared to profit and war...
women grieve for suffering people all over the world and will no longer remain silent while the gap widens between the rich and the poor...

We ask our government to design and carry out a domestic program commensurate with the needs of the American people; to follow a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries; to pursue our official committment to disarmament, and to respect international law.

American women who, as women everywhere, are the bearers and conservers of life, will not stand idly by as life is destroyed in our name.

About two hundred Oahu women have signed the following petition to Congress:

As Congress reconvenes, we urge that its first order of business be to put an end to the war in Vietnam and arrange for the withdrawal of American troops; and that the Congress turn its attention to ameliorating the crisis in America.

We urge the Congress to heal a sick society at home, to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam and to refuse to listen to the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

- -

I want to be kept informed about women's peace activities.

Name______________________________ Return to:
Jeannette Rankin Brigade Comm.
Address____________________________ 2115 Armstrong,
Honolulu, 96822

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Honolulu, Hawaii
January 15, 1968

Title: Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam

Character:

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated at Honolulu, Hawaii, January 15, 1968, and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/15/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: [illegible], SEC SER
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
DATE FORW: 1-16-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RHH / dlc
cc + encl 132 9th FS.

B.D.|B.|

ReWFOairtel and LHM dated 1/10/68, captioned as above.

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau and two each for offices indicated in the copy count.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Law enforcement agencies cognizant of information contained in LHM.

Sources used in LHM are first source WF 1777-S; second source NY 2017-S* and third source NY 3164-S.

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information reported by the first and third sources could lead to the identification of those sources and compromise future effectiveness.

REC 25 100-44?1- 82

SAs mentioned in LHM are as follows: CLAUDE W. BOGLEY, FORREST F. BURGESS, R. C. CLACK and RICHARD C. COFFMAN, and JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR.

④ - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - Los Angeles (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM)
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

IOT

2 JAN [illegible] 1968

52 JAN 25 1968

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

AIRTEL

WFO continuing to follow and will report further pertinent details.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in December, 1967, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) had been formed primarily by members of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization. Members of Women Strike for Peace had formed the organization following a statement made by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin of Montana, in which she stated that if 10,000 American housewives were willing to be arrested, they could stop the war in Vietnam. According to the source, the JRB was formed as a "one shot organization" to sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D.C., when Congress reconvenes in 1968.

The same source advised that January 15, 1968, had been established as the date of the above demonstration in view of the fact that Congress was reconvening on that date. The source stated that the headquarters of the JRB was located in New York City and that officials there and in other large United States cities including Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., were formulating the plans for a "march on the United States Capitol" where the women would present to the United States Congress a petition demanding that the Congressmen end the war in Vietnam. The source stated that a small minority in the above organization were in favor of commiting acts of civil disobedience and being arrested but the vast majority of the organization wanted a peaceful demonstration to again focus the Congressional attention upon the war in Vietnam.

The same source advised in January, 1968, that representatives of the JRB met with officials of the United States Capitol Police on several occasions and attempted to gain permission to assemble on the steps of the United States Capitol and present a petition to Congressional

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

ENCLOSURE

100-447415-82

leaders. Officials refused to allow the women to assemble as it is in violation of a United States law prohibiting demonstrations on the United States Capitol grounds. The source advised on January 12, 1968, that a final meeting with the United States Capitol Police officials had been held and it had been decided by the representatives of the JRB that the women would assemble at Union Station at approximately 11:30 a.m. and march to Union Square located at the foot of Capitol Hill off the Capitol grounds. Officials of the JRB obtained a permit from the United States Park Police granting them permission to use an area in the vicinity of Union Square for assembling and hearing the reading of the petition which was to be presented to the United States Congress by a small delegation of that organization.

The source advised on January 12, 1968, that the JRB had rented the Regency Ballroom of the Shoreham Hotel, Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., from 2 to 6 p.m. on January 15, 1968. After meeting on Union Square, the group will travel by bus to the Shoreham Hotel where they will hold a Congress of American Women. After 6 p.m. they will be bused to Union Station where they will depart Washington, D.C.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 15, 1968, at approximately 11:30 a.m. observed several hundred people assembled in Union Station apparently waiting to participate in the JRB demonstration at that time. At approximately 11:40 a.m. a train bound from New York City to Washington, D.C., arrived at Union Station with approximately 1,500 individuals, mostly women, aboard. These individuals began marching at twelve noon away from Union Station, South on Louisiana Avenue. Now numbering approximately 2,600, they marched six abreast on the West sidewalk of Louisiana Avenue to the vicinity of Union Square where they began arriving at approximately 12:35 p.m.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

The following individuals were preceded by several individuals carrying a large banner which read: "End the War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." Prior to leaving Union Station, many small placards were observed, some of which read: "End the War" and "LBJ Eats Imperial Margarine." These placards were removed from the demonstration when the participants were advised they would only be allowed to carry a large banner in front and a large banner in the rear of the marchers. The banner bringing up the rear of the marchers read as follows: "U.S. Women Unite End the War in Vietnam." Before the participants began marching, one Amy Swerdlow of New York City, acting as spokesman for the group, stated that a delegation of fifteen women were going by car to present their petition to the United States Congress while the rest of them would walk to Union Square where the petition will be read to them by Viveca Lindfors. After the reading of this petition, the participants were instructed to board buses which were located near Union Square and they would be transported to the Shoreham Hotel.

All of the participants had arrived at Union Square by approximately 1 p.m. and it was estimated by police officials that approximately 2,600 individuals had taken part in the march. Small placards had been observed in Union Station which showed representatives there from the following locations:

Washington, D.C.
California
Kentucky
Cleveland, Ohio
Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Maryland
Kansas
New York
Illinois

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Most of the participants in the above march were female and dressed in black with some wearing black wreaths. The monitors and spokesmen for the group instructed them not to talk to each other but to march in a silent, solemn procession.

> A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 30, 1966, that Amy Swerdlow, also known as Mrs. Stanley Swerdlow, was listed as a "non-party visitor" at the 18th Nation Convention CP, USA, held in 1966 in New York City.

Captain Robert Krahling, United States Capitol Police, Washington, D.C., advised on January 15, 1968, that Jeannette Rankin and approximately fifteen members of the JRB visited the office of Speaker of the United States House of Representatives John McCormick at approximately 1 p.m. this date. He stated they presented him with a copy of a petition which was entitled "A Petition to the 90th Congress" and which stated the following:

> "We Women of the United States, who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home, have come to Washington to petition the Congress of the United States for the redress of intolerable grievance and demand that:
>
> 1. Congress shall, as the first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately withdraw all American troops.
>
> 2. Congress shall use its power to heal a sick society at home
>
> 3. Congress shall use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam

> 4. Congress shall listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex
>
> We herewith declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity and to exercise their political power to reshape American society and restore our country to a position of honor in the Community of Nations
>
> The Jeannette Rankin Brigade
> January 15, 1968"

A third source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on January 15, 1968, advised that she had arrived in Washington, D.C., on the train from New York City at approximately 11:40 a.m. She stated that included in her group were six members of the Socialist Workers Party and one member of the Young Socialist Alliance.

> The Socialist Workers Party has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
>
> Young Socialist Alliance is described in the appendix.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed the participants in the above march enter buses in the vicinity of Union Square and travel to the Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where they arrived at approximately 2:20 p.m. They then assembled in the Regency Room and the Ambassador Room of that hotel where a program began at approximately 2:30 p.m.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Just prior to the opening of the above program, a group entitled "Radical Women's Group from New York" put on a skit which included the bringing in of a stretcher indicating that it was the body of a dead soldier. On the stretcher was a telegram of regrets and it was stated that there would later be a mock burial of the above "corpse."

The program of the Congress of American Women began with Pearl Willen of New York acting as the presiding officer. She made announcements to the effect that there was much literature on the tables and that workshops would be held both tonight and the following day. She welcomed representatives from forty states to the gathering and stated that they now need to go from the great society to the just society. Mrs. Willen introduced the two Co-Chairmen of the Congress as Mrs. Coretta King of Georgia and Mrs. Mary Clark of Los Angeles, California, who were both present and acknowledged the introduction.

The first speaker on the program was Mrs. Vivian Hallinan of San Francisco, California, who described the development of the coalition of women which had developed into the JRB. She said the JRB had been conceived in California last year after the statement by Mrs. Rankin concerning what the women could do to stop the war. Hallinan described the JRB's goal as "world without war" and "life with dignity and opportunities to develop our maximum capacity."

The next speaker on the program was Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was initially introduced as Coretta King. Mrs. King stated that she was greatly encouraged by the growth of the peace movement and that she was totally opposed to the brutal slaughter in Vietnam. She stated that the women must use all of their power to stop that war.

She stated that the men had gotten us into this war and had made a complete mess of it. She stated that there is a need to end the war so that we may tend to the needs of people in urban ghetto areas. Injustice in our society must be taken care of and she described the present challenges as "militarism, racism and wantonism." She stated there can be no justice at home until there is no war in the world. She concluded by reading a poem entitled "Life Ain't Been No Crystal Stair."

Jeannette Rankin was the next speaker and she welcomed everyone expressing great joy that so many women had gathered together for peace. She stated that our forefathers wrote the constitution in such a way so that the military could not take over control of this Government. She was apparently implying that the military system is running the United States. She stated that the women must see that the military system is destroyed. She demanded that women have a secret ballot inthe election as well as a choice in selecting candidates. She concluded by recommending that women everywhere become candidates for political offices.

The next speaker was Katherine Camp from Pennsylvania described as the President of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Mrs. Camp described the activities of the fifteen women delegation that went to Congress on this date. She stated that they presented a petition to Speaker of the House McCormick and that he had assured them that it would be acted on as any other petition presented to Congress. Camp stated that the Speaker left then as he was called by a bell to the floor of the Congress. Camp stated that following this, Mrs. Rankin, her sister Edna McKinon, and niece Mrs. Dorothy Brown, visited Senator Mike Mansfield and presented him with a petition.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Harriet Van Tassel of New York City next reported on the suit instituted by the JRB to restrain authorities from enforcing a rule against demonstrating on the United States Capitol grounds.

Cora Weiss of New York next took over the meeting and permitted a Mrs. Mitchell Goodman to make a statement. It is to be noted that Mrs. Mitchell Goodman is probably the wife of Mitchell Goodman recently indicted by the Federal Grand Jury in connection with counseling of evasion of Selective Service laws. Mrs. Goodman stated that all the women there should encourage their sons to refuse the draft.

DC Mary Clarke next called a role of states in which individuals were asked to stand when their home state was called.

D.C

Ruby Dee then read a poem writtenby W.E.B. DuBois. Mrs. Vel Phillips of Wisconsin next described political action that was necessary in 1966 in order to elect a peace candidate.

Charlotte Bunch Weeks next spoke on the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and stated that it was necessary to protest in order to stop this war in Vietnam. She further stated that the United States has been put in a bad light as far as the rest of the world is concerned because the United States has sided with a dictatorship.

Ella Baker of New York stated that this country is faced with a sick society because we have avoided dealing with human needs at home. She stated that there are more poor people among the whites than among the Negroes and that more Indian children die than American have died in Vietnam. She urged all women to study civil liberties and to learn what can be done at protest activities.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Cynthia Wedel of New York next acted as Chairman of a group of individuals who spoke concerning "We declare our Intentions." These individuals were Vivian Rothstein of Illinois, Judith Morse Eaton of Connecticut and Mrs. Dagmar Wilson of Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Wilson spoke concerning political action necessary in order to change the United States policy in Vietnam. She stressed the need for education along these lines and stated that this is the beginning of a revolution. She made many references to her recent visit to North Vietnam and based her opinions upon what she saw in North Vietnam.

The first source advised on January 15, 1968, that while the main meeting was being held in the Ambassador Room of the Shoreham Hotel, a group called the Radical Women's Group met in the adjoining room but after much discussion, were unable to agree on any acts of civil disobedience and therefore nothing was accomplished by them.

The above source stated that although workshops were announced and spaces have been reserved for such workshops, the source does not believe they will be held as the vast majority of the individuals are leaving Washington, D.C. between 6 and 7 p.m. this date. The source stated that the above program was concluded at approximately 5:40 p.m. and all of the participants left the Shoreham Hotel via bus with the majority of them going to Union Station to catch the scheduled train for New York City.

There were no incidents or arrests during the above activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication US.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognized the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the YS have come into basic poltiicial solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

On March 10, 1967, a source advised that the YSA was formed during 1957, by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The source further advised that the YSA has recently become more open about admitting that it is the youth group of the SWP and that an SWP representative has publicily stated that the YSA is the SWP's youth group.

The headquarters of the YSA are located in Rooms 532-536, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/15/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-49837) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)

Re New York teletype dated 1/4/68, Newark airtel dated 1/10/68, Philadelphia teletype dated 1/11/68, and Newark teletype dated 1/15/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM dated and captioned as above.

Copies of LHM are being furnished to Military Intelligence Agencies and to Secret Service and USA at Newark.

Special Agents DENIS D. O'SULLIVAN and GEORGE EDWIN JONES observed departure of train at Newark.

SA J. A. MOSELEY observed departure of train at Trenton.

SA RAYMOND S. BYRNE observed departure of bus at Moorestown, New Jersey.

ENCLOSURE

REC 13

JAN 17 1968

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
3 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Enc. 3) (RM)
1 - New York (100-161601) (Enc. 1) (info) (RM)
2 - Newark
GEJ/ksh
(9)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI [illegible]
RAO [illegible]
DATE FORW: [illegible]
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY Sent [illegible] Per ______

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

54 JAN 29 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Newark, New Jersey
January 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed seventy-five women board special Pennsylvania Railroad Train at Pennsylvania Station, Newark, New Jersey, on January 15, 1968. The train departed Newark at 7:50 a.m. for Washington, D.C.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed forty-one women board Pennsylvania Train Number 1231 which departed from Pennsylvania Station, Trenton, New Jersey, at 7:30 a.m. on January 15, 1968.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed thirty-six women depart from Moorestown, New Jersey, on Public Service Coordinated Transport Bus at 8:20 a.m. on January 15, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

44977- 89

CONFIDENTIAL

- Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

January 16, 1968

1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

100-448475-76

REC-28

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

It was previously reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, a nationwide group of women who are opposed to the war in Vietnam, would sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

At 11:40 a.m., January 15, 1968, a group, predominantly women numbering approximately 2,600, assembled at Union Station, Washington, D. C., and marched six abreast on the west sidewalk of Louisiana Avenue to Union Square at the foot of Capitol Hill.

The marchers were preceded by several individuals carrying a large banner which read, "End the War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." Several women followed the marchers carrying another banner which read, "United States Women Unite, End the War in Vietnam." Prior to leaving Union Station, participants carried several other small placards some of which read, "End the War" and "LBJ Eats Imperial Margarine." At the request of authorities, the demonstrators discarded these placards.

SEE [illegible] NOTATION ON MEMORANDUM

Before the demonstrators left Union Station, a delegation of 15 women, including Jeannette Rankin, drove to the Capitol where they presented a petition to Representative John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to Senator Michael J. Mansfield. This petition was entitled "A Petition to the 90th Congress" and stated the following:

> "We Women of the United States, who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home, have come to Washington to petition the Congress of the United States for the redress of intolerable grievance and demand that:

100-448475

CONFIDENTIAL

RHH:jav
(27)

Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading ad declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

55 JAN 2? 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

> "1. Congress shall, as the first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately withdraw all American troops.
>
> "2. Congress shall use its power to heal a sick society at home.
>
> "3. Congress shall use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> "4. Congress shall listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.
>
> "We herewith declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity and to exercise their political power to reshape American society and restore our country to a position of honor in the Community of Nations.
>
> "The Jeannette Rankin Brigade
> January 15, 1968."

While the delegation was making the presentation to the Congressmen, the main contingent, which had assembled at Union Square, was presented with the petition which was read to them by Viveca Lindfors, ~~the Swedish actress and~~ one of the sponsors of the Brigade.

Following a reading of the petition to the demonstrators, the participants were taken by bus to the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. At the Shoreham Hotel, the group convened a Congress of American Women at 2:30 p.m.

Following the welcome, the first speaker on the program was Mrs. Vivian Hallinan, the Executive Secretary of the Brigade from San Francisco, California. Hallinan described the Brigade's goal as "world without war" and "life with dignity and opportunities to develop our maximum capacity."

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, who is a member of the Communist Party, USA, Northern District of California, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the Communist Party if her husband would also join.

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke to the assembly stating that she was totally opposed to the brutal slaughter in Vietnam and that women must use all their power to stop that war. She described present challenges as "militarism, racism and wantonism."

Jeannette Rankin spoke and welcomed those attending. She stated that their forefathers had written the Constitution in such a way that the military could not take over control of the Government. She stated that the women must see that the military system is destroyed. She demanded that women have a secret ballot in the election as well as a choice in selecting candidates. She concluded her talk by recommending that women everywhere become candidates for political offices.

Katherine Camp, the President of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an international women's pacifist organization, described to the assembly the activities of the delegation which had presented the petition to Speaker McCormack at the Capitol earlier that day.

One of the speakers, Mrs. Mitchell Goodman, whose husband was recently indicted by Federal Grand Jury in connection with counseling of evasion of the Selective Service laws, stated that all the women present should encourage their sons to refuse the draft.

Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, National Chairman of Women Strike for Peace, a national women's pacifist group, told the assembly that political action was necessary in order to change the United States policy in Vietnam. She stressed the need for education along these lines and stated that this meeting would be the beginning of a revolution.

et

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

During the time that the main group of demonstrators was meeting in the Ambassador Room of the Hotel, a small group, who called themselves the Radical Women's Group and composed mainly of younger women, met in the adjoining Regency Room of the Hotel. This meeting was highly disorganized, without apparent purpose or objective and developed no conclusions.

Although workshops were announced to be held following the assembly, the vast majority of those present at the meeting left the Hotel following the 5:40 p.m. conclusion of the meeting and returned to Union Station for the trip home.

In addition to the demonstration in Washington, D.C., sympathy demonstrations were held by contingents of the Brigade in various cities throughout the country.

In Miami, Florida, 70 women assembled at the Torch of Friendship, Bay Front Park, and participated in a silent vigil.

Approximately 150 to 200 demonstrators gathered on the front steps of the San Francisco City Hall in support of the demonstration in Washington, D. C. At this demonstration, Nikki Bridges, San Francisco Chairman of the Brigade, announced that since it was not possible for the demonstrators to personally contact their Congressmen who were out of town, that following the presentation of a petition to Mayor Joseph Alioto, they would proceed to a near-by Western Union office in order that wires could be sent to their Congressmen protesting United States policy in Vietnam. Mayor Alioto appeared on the steps of City Hall, received the petition, and announced that he would transmit it to Congress. Nikki Bridges is the wife of Harry Bridges who was indicted for perjury and conspiracy committed to conceal Communist Party membership in obtaining United States citizenship in 1949.

Approximately 250 women assembled at the Old State Building, Los Angeles, California, at 9:30 a.m., to hear speeches from various women condemning the war in

Vietnam. Following this, the group marched to the west steps of the Los Angeles City Hall where a delegation entered and made an attempt to address the City Council. The City Council on vote refused to grant this permission.

Demonstrations by representatives of the Brigade were also held in Providence, Rhode Island; Seattle, Washington; Clayton, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; and Atlanta, Georgia.

NOTE:

Classified "Confidential" as some of the information included in this summary comes from sensitive sources, the compromise of which would be detrimental to the U. S.

Xerox copies sent to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State and Defense; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the Attorney General; the Deputy Attorney General; and Assistant Attorneys General J. Walter Yeagley, Stephen J. Pollak, Fred M. Vinson, Jr., and the Inter-Division Information Unit of the Department.

See memorandum C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated 1/16/68 captioned as above as prepared by RHH:skr.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T.E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/16/68

FROM : C.D. Brennan

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

L.C.

Information has previously been disseminated to the White House and other interested agencies concerning the plans of captioned organization, a nationwide group of women who are opposed to the war in Vietnam, to stage a demonstration in Washington, D.C. on 1/15/68 and present a petition to Congress demanding an end to the Vietnam war. This demonstration was held as scheduled on 1/15/68.

The demonstrators marched from Union Station to Union Square at the foot of Capitol Hill by way of Louisiana Avenue. The group was preceded by several individuals carrying a banner which read "End the War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." Several women followed the marchers carrying another banner which read "United States Women Unite, End the War in Vietnam." Initially, the group carried other placards which read "End the War" and "LBJ Eats Imperial Margarine." However, at the request of authorities, these placards were discarded.

Before the demonstrators left Union Station, a delegation of 15 women, including Jeannette Rankin, drove to the Capitol where they presented a petition to Representative John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to Senator Michael J. Mansfield. The petition entitled "A Petition to the 90th Congress" pointed out the opposition of women of the United States to the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistant neglect to human needs at home and demanded Congress as the first order of business resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately withdraw all American troops. It called for Congress to use its power to help a sick society at home, to make reparations for destruction in Vietnam and to listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex.

Enclosure sent 1-16-68
RHH:skr
(7)

445775-76

REC-28 JAN 17 1968

CONTINUED - OVER

INT. SEC.

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan
RE: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

This petition was read to the demonstrators assembled at Union Square by Swedish film actress, Viveca Lindfors.

Following the assembly at Union Square, the marchers were bussed to the Shoreham Hotel where they convened a congress of American women from approximately 2:30 p.m. to 5:40 p.m.

During this time, speeches were made by Vivian Hallinan, who has been described by her son, Terrence Hallinan, as being willing to join the Communist Party if her husband would join. Hallinan described the Brigade's goal as "world without war" and "life with dignity and opportunities to develop our maximum capacity."

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., stated that women must use all of their power to stop the war in Vietnam. She described present challenges as "militarism, racialism and wantonism.

Jeannette Rankin welcomed the participants and stated women must see that the military system is destroyed. She recommended that women everywhere become candidates for political offices. Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, Chairman of the Women Strike for Peace, a national pacifist group, spoke concerning United States policy in Vietnam. She stressed the need for education in order to change United States policy and stated that their demonstration was the beginning of a revolution.

While this assembly was taking place a small group calling themselves Radical Womens Group met in a room across the hall. This group was very disorganized and was held without apparent objective.

Sympathy demonstration were held in Miami, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; St. Louis, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; Atlanta, Georgia; San Francisco and Los Angeles, California. In San Francisco the Brigade's contingent presented a petition to the Mayor who agreed to transmit it to Washington. In Los Angeles, the contingent attempted to speak before the City Council, but their request was denied.

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan
RE: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

All pertinent information developed was promptley furnished to the Inner-Division Information Unit of the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Metropolitan Police Department, Park Police, U.S. Capitol Police, General Services Administration, and military intelligence agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed memorandum to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; Vice President; Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Secret Service; the Attorney General and other interested officials of the Department of Justice be approved.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

CB/WH7

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
(OO:WFO)

ReNYairtel to Bureau, 1/12/68.

Enclosed herewith for Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM regarding departure from NYC of women participating in captioned demonstration. Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, New Haven, and Philadelphia is one information copy of the LHM.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Newark (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - New Haven (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - New York

HPB:smv
(12)

EX 109
REC-21

JAN 17 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRB, OD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

54 JAN 25 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
January 16, 1968

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C.
January 15, 1968

On January 15, 1968, Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed the following:

A special train of the Pennsylvania Railroad, consisting of eighteen cars bound for Washington, D.C., departed Pennsylvania Station, 8th Avenue at 31st Street, New York, New York, at 7:29 AM. The train's capacity was approximately 1,400 seats. Approximately 1,200 women and five males boarded this train which had been designated by loud speaker announcements and signs as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) special train.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968

Mr. John Martin, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad advised that the special train would arrive Washington, D.C. at Union Station approximately 11:15 AM. Martin stated the first two cars of the special train were empty to accommodate additional women to be picked up in Newark, New Jersey. Martin indicated a group of women had come from New Haven, Connecticut via two buses and had boarded the JRB train.

SAS of the FBI observed a bus from the Academy Charter Service of New Jersey containing approximately 50 women identified as participating with JRB depart from 31st Street between 8th and 9th Avenue, New York City, at 7:30 AM. Two other chartered buses were available at this location, but were not used.

After 7:30 AM announcements were made within Pennsylvania Station that women participating with JRB, who had missed the special train, should board the regular Pennsylvania Railroad Train "The President" bound for Washington, D.C. SAS of the FBI observed approximately 200 women, who had congregated in vicinity of the special JRB ticket table, board "The President" which departed at 8:00 AM. This train was scheduled to arrive at Union Station, Washington, D.C. at 11:50 AM.

D

SAS of the FBI observed women wearing buttons bearing "Women's Vote For Peace", "Jeannette Rankin Brigade", and buttons supporting Senator Eugene Mc Carthy. Norma Spector was observed selling tickets at the special JRB table. Lorraine Gordon was observed being interviewed by members of the Press in connection with JRB activities.

DC
NY

CONFIDENTIAL

Norma Spector

A confidential source advised on August 18, 1966, that Norma Spector was elected to serve on the District Committee, New York Communist Party (CP) at the June 12, 1966, session of the New York District CP Convention, held in New York City.

Lorraine Gordon

On September 14, 1964, a second confidential source advised that Lorraine Gordon was a listed speaker at the Fifth National Convention of the Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF) held in New York City from September 18, 1964 to September 24, 1964.

A characterization of ELF is attached hereto.

1. APPENDIX

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS

"The Jewish Fraternalist" dated October, 1947, self-identified as the official publication of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order (JPFO) of the International Workers Order (IWO), Page 6, contained an article which reflected that the Emma Lazarus Division (ELD) of the JPFO was to hold its first national convention in New York City on November 15 and 16, 1947, after having been first established at a National Women's Conference called three years previously by the JPFO.

"The Morning Freiheit" (MF) on January 25, 1951, contained a report of the National Convention of the ELD of the JPFO which took place in New York City on January 20 and 21, 1951. At this convention, it was noted that the ELD changed its name to Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF) and adopted a new constitution.

On May 4, 1966, a source advised that the ELF was recognized by the Communist Party (CP) United States of America (USA) as an important national organization of women whose leadership was primarily made up of Communists. The source stated the ELF was dedicated to peace, in protecting the rights of foreign born, and against bomb testing, Negro discrimination and the rearmament of West Germany.

The source also stated the ELF renders support to and receives support from the MF and other Jewish progressive organizations.

The ELF National Office was moved and is now located at 150 Fifth Avenue, Room 632, New York, New York.

The IWO and JPFO have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" revised and published as of December 1, 1961, to supersede Guide published on January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "Morning Freiheit":

CONFIDENTIAL

2. APPENDIX

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION
OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS (CONTINUED)

"1\. A 'Communist Yiddish daily'. (Attorney General FRANCIS BIDDLE Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686.)

"2\. 'The Freiheit has been one of the rankest organs of Communist propaganda in this country for almost a quarter of a century.' (Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 75.)"

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Enclosed for the Bureau are an original and ten copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Two copies are enclosed for WFO as Office of Origin. Two information copies each are designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have investigation pending on the "JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

Re Philadelphia teletype to Director, dated 1/15/68.

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally to MI, OSI, NISO, and Secret Service.

SA KENNETH K. SMYTHE advised SA DARWIN STEELMAN, Region II, 109th MI Group, Philadelphia, Pa., of the information in the enclosed LHM at 9:20 a.m. on 1/15/68.

SA SMYTHE was the Agent who observed the departure of the group from 30th Street Pennsylvania Railroad Station, Philadelphia, on 1/15/68.

3 - Bureau (100-448475) (Encs.-11) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Encs.-2) (Info) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Encs.-2) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Encs.-2) (RM)
3 - Philadelphia
  1 - 100-49497
  1 - 100-46020 (WSP)
  1 - 100-48477 (VETS & RESERVISTS FOR PEACE)

KKS:hof
(12)

ENCLOSURE

95

REC-32

JAN 18 1968

INT. SEC.

C. C. - Bishop

3 XEROX

JAN 23 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD-OD~~)
DATE FORW.: 1-18-68
HOW FORW.:
BY:

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

At 7:45 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, on January 15, 1968, a group of women began gathering at the information counter in the 30th Street Station of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia, Pa. One sign carried by two women bearing the legend, "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE," was displayed. A few of the women wore WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP) buttons and a few wore blue overseas caps with VETERANS AND RESERVISTS FOR PEACE in white lettering on them. Nearly all the women wore some article of Black Clothing.

The group was composed predominantly of white, middle-aged women. The group, numbering approximately 125, was well behaved and orderly.

At 8:10 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, the group boarded cars numbered 1582, 1535, and 1509 of Pennsylvania Railroad Train #131, The Congressional, bound for Washington, D.C. The train left 30th Street Station at 8:20 a.m. There were no incidents.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

XEROX
JAN 23 1968

ENCLOSURE

05

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Sullivan
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, KANSAS CITY (100-12409) RUC

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1/8/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

REC 11

Re Kansas City tel 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven copies of letterhead memo concerning captioned demonstration.

Two copies are furnished Philadelphia, office of origin of WILPF and two copies furnished to WFO.

Indices of the Kansas City Division contain no references for the names appearing in letterhead memo.

~~3~~ - Bureau (Encs. 11)(RM)
2 - WFO (Encs. 2)(RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Encs. 2)(1-100-9882)(RM)
1 - Kansas City
GAA:pe
(8)

C. C. Bishop

REC 11

92

JAN 22 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~ORD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-17-68
HOW FORW:
BY:

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Kansas City, Missouri

January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

The "Kansas City Star" newspaper, Kansas City, Missouri, edition of January 14, 1968, contained an article stating that Kansas City women were responding to a "woman power" appeal issued by Miss Jeanette Rankin, former member of Congress, to end the war in Vietnam. According to the article, a small delegation of Kansas City women plan to go to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, to participate in the march by the "Jeanette Rankin Brigade" to petition Congress for a United States withdrawal from Vietnam. The others in the group would remain in Kansas City and present copies of the petition to the offices of U. S. Representatives Richard Bolling, Kansas City, Missouri, and Larry Winn, Kansas City, Kansas, at 1:00 p.m., on January 15, 1968.

The "Kansas City Star" evening edition of January 15, 1968, carried an article stating that on the afternoon of January 15, 1968, 20 women appeared at the offices of Representatives Bolling and Winn. They carried no signs and the demonstration was orderly. The women, all from the greater Kansas City area, merely presented a petition asking Congress to end the war in Vietnam and withdraw American troops, to make reparations for the "ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam", and to listen to the American people and refuse "the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex". The article stated that the Kansas City branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom had been planning to send representatives to the Washington march, but it was not until Wednesday that they decided to present the petitions to Congressmen Winn and Bolling.

According to the article, Mrs. John M. Swomley, Jr., Program Chairman of the organization, stated the Kansas City group hoped to identify with the women in Washington and their objective to bring and end to the war in Vietnam.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, ETC.

The article identified the following Kansas City area women as participating in the march in Washington on January 15, 1968:

Mrs. Theodore Wallace
Mrs. Frederick Fender
Mrs. Alan Boley
Mrs. Karl Lientz
Mrs. Fred Batson
Mrs. June Dornell
Miss Lanita Jackson

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-~~448326~~)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: Washington Field

Re San Francisco teletype to Bureau and Washington Field, 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven (11) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. Two (2) copies each are enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York and Washington Field.

Sources utilized in LHM are:

First source CSSF 2960-S

Second source SF 2466-S

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC SER.,
RAO (ISD, GRD, ~~CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

Instant LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL inasmuch as it contains data which could reasonably result in the identification of confidential informants of continuing value and

3 - Bureau (Encls. 11)(AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (100-7300)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (100-70701)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - New York (Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
5 - San Francisco (100-59802)
(1 - 100-54559)
(1 - 100-48035)
(1 - 80-461)
GOW:jal
(16)

ENCLOSURE

REC-32

JAN 18 1968

INT. SEC.

Approved: C. C. Bishop
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Special Agents who observed the demonstration at San Francisco are:

ZAVEN JARDARIAN
RICHARD E. RODERMUND
GARRY OWEN WATT
DIRCK A. MERRILL

The Special Agent who observed Elaine Yoneda was SA CHESTER L. JACOBY.

The Special Agent who observed the dmonstration at Monterey, California, is BURNEY THREADGILL, JR.

San Francisco indices negative re AILEEN HERNANDEZ.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 16, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum, dated January 5, 1968.

Copies of this memorandum have been furnished locally to the US Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Service, San Francisco, and the United States Attorney, San Francisco.

At 12:00 noon, January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the FBI observed approximately 150-200 demonstrators (primarily women) gather on the front steps of the City Hall in San Francisco, to support a companion demonstration being held in Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968, sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Many of the demonstrators were noted to be carrying placards, on which were noted to be the following statements:

"Heal the Sick Society at Home - Join The Jeannette Rankin Brigade"
"First Step To Peace - Stop The Bombing Now"
"Outlaw War"
"Ratify UN Human Rights Conventions"
"Stop The Draft"
"Negotiate Now"
"Outlaw Napalm"
"Rescind The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution"
"Stop US Empire Building in Asia."

At approximately 12:05 p.m. Nikki Bridges, San Francisco

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 97

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 15, 1968

Chairman of the Brigade, announced to the demonstrators that this local demonstration was principally gathered to support women from around the United States who were gathered in Washington, D.C. today, as part of a nation-wide demonstration sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, to petition Congress to resolve the conflict in Vietnam. Bridges stated that inasmuch as it was not possible for the demonstrators to personally contact their congressmen, most of whom were out of town; that following the presentation of a petition to Mayor Joseph Alioto, the demonstrators would then proceed to the Western Union Office on 10th and Market Streets in San Francisco, so that the women protestors could send wires to their congressmen, protesting United States policies in Vietnam. Bridges indicated that the petitioners would request Mayor Alioto to convey to Congress their petition, which among other things urged Congress, as its first order of business, to resolve to end the War in Vietnam and immediately arrange for withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam; for Congress to use its power to heal the sick society at home and to make reparations for the ravaged lands left behind in Vietnam.

> A source advised March 2, 1967, that Mrs. H. Bridges, also known as Nikki Bridges, 35 Kronquest Court, San Francisco, California, was listed as a recipient of a new yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW), expiration date March 4, 1968.
>
> The PW is a west coast communist newspaper, published weekly in San Francisco.

The next speaker was identified as Aileen Hernandez. She spoke for approximately five minutes and briefly explained to the demonstrators who Jeannette Rankin is and what the purposes of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade are. She stated that the group has no principal spokesman and it is principally a group of women who are involved and committed in a fight for peace.

Several of the demonstrators, led by Nikki Bridges, then proceeded to the Office of Mayor Joseph Alioto to present their petition.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 15, 1968

Approximately ten minutes later the Mayor of San Francisco appeared on the steps of the City Hall and announced to the demonstrators that he would gladly transmit their petition to Congress. Mayor Alioto stated that he fully believed in the constitutional right of peaceful assembly. He indicated, however, that because he had consented to transmit the demonstrators' petition to Washington, he did not necessarily agree with it. The Mayor then stated that it was his personal opinion that the United States Government and the Johnson Administration had done all in its power to attempt to come to a peaceful and honorable solution in the Vietnamese War. He related that he felt that it was now up to the other side to make the same attempts to arrive at a peaceful solution in the Vietnamese conflict.

At approximately 12:45 p.m., the demonstrators proceeded to the Western Union Office located at 10th and Market Streets in San Francisco, so that wires could be sent to their congressmen in Washington.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed one Elaine Yoneda participating in the above demonstration and following the demonstration Yoneda was observed to return to her employment at the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) - Pacific Maritime Association, Pension Fund, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco.

A second source advised on December 4, 1967, that Elaine Yoneda is a current and active member of the Communist Party (CP).

On January 15, 1968, a Special Agent of the FBI observed a silent protest by a group of women on the lawn of Colton Hall, Monterey, California, between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. These women were ostensibly gathered to support the demonstration being held in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. There were no speeches given; the demonstrators merely conducted a silent vigil.

A one page leaflet captioned "Women To Take First Step to End The War" printed by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, was handed out at the above demonstration. A Xeroxed duplication of this leaflet is appended to this memorandum.

Women to take first step to End The War



are you

TIRED... of paying all your taxes for bullets and bombs??
FED UP... with fighting senseless wars??
SHOCKED... at the burning of innocent women and children???

women are

EMOTIONAL...	yes, because we're still human. We care about our loved ones and are outraged at the killing!
PRACTICAL...	yes, because we're used to making ends meet, putting our shoulders to the wheel and getting things done!
POWERFUL...	yes, because we have 51% of the vote. We control the "purse strings", why not the "political strings".

Join us to start the PEACE WHEEL rolling, January 15 at noon on the Polk Street steps of City Hall, in support of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade going to Washington to petition Congress to (1) end the war, (2) heal the sick society at home and (3) repair the damages done in Vietnam. We will give a copy of the petition to Mayor Alioto. We will telephone our Congressmen from the Federal Building to let them know women will be calling on them.


PEACE
CONGRESS to ACT NOW
To heal a sick society at home
To repair damages in Vietnam

Information: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
150 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, 94102
Phone: 474-4456

CONFIDENTIAL

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Chairman: Jeannette Rankin
Executive Secretary: Vivian Hallinan

Partial List of Sponsors

- Muriel Adams
- Mia Aurbakken Adjali
  - *Methodist U.N. Representative*
- Donna Allen
  - *WILPF, Women Strike for Peace*
- Carol Anderson
  - *National Council of Churches*
- Ellen Aubakken
  - *Methodist Board*
- Helen Baker
  - *United Church Women, Editor of Publications*
- Leona Bayer, M.D.
- Norma Becker
- Mrs. Harry Belafonte
- Mrs. John C. Bennett
  - *Church Women United, wife of Dean of Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University*
- Rebecca Berman
  - *Teachers' Committee to End War*
- Peggy Billings
  - *Methodist Church, Director of Social Action*
- Mrs. Algernon Black
  - *American Ethical Union*
- Kay Boyle
  - *Author*
- Nikki Bridges
  - *Wife of ILWU President Harry Bridges*
- Connie Brown
  - *Newark Welfare Board*
- Jane Buchenholz
  - *Americans for Democratic Action*
- Mrs. John Burton
  - *Wife of Legislator*
- Catherine L. Camp
  - *National President, WILPF*
- Twila Lytton Cavert
  - *YWCA, World Council of Churches*
- Mary Clarke
  - *Women Strike for Peace, California Democratic Council*
- Eva Rubenstein Coffin
  - *Wife of Chaplain of Yale University*
- Ruth Gage Colby
  - *International Representative, Women Strike for Peace*
- Judy Collins
  - *Singer*
- Sylvia E. Crane
  - *Anti-HUAC Committee Lobbyist*
- Florence Criley
  - *International Representative, United Electrical Workers' Union*
- Elsie Thomas Culver
- Polly Cuthberton
  - *American Friends Service Committee*
- Ruby Dee
  - *Actress*
- Ann Eaton
- Judith Morse Eaton
  - *Daughter of Senator Wayne Morse*
- Grace Loucks Elliott
  - *National Council YWCA*
- Anne Florant
- Eleanor French
  - *United Church Women, YWCA*
- Betty Friedan
  - *Author*
- Mrs. Marc Friedlander
- Mrs. Horace L. Friess
  - *American Ethical Union*
- Frances Fritchman
  - *Wife of Unitarian Minister*
- Margaret Gage
- Mrs. Jack Gilford
- Dr. Carolyn Goodman
- Mrs. Max Gordon
  - *Women Strike for Peace*
- Vivian Hallinan
- Fannie Lou Hamer
  - *Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party*
- Mrs. E.Y. Harburg
- Elizabeth Lee Haselden
  - *Church Women United, wife of editor of Christian Century*
- Dorothy Hassler
  - *Fellowship of Reconciliation*
- Anna Arnold Hedgeman
  - *National Council of Churches*
- Aileen Hernandez
  - *Vice President, National Organization of Women*
- Dr. Frances Herring
- Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
  - *YWCA, National Council of Churches*
- Lois Crozier Hogle
  - *YWCA*
- R. Elizabeth Johns
  - *United Church of Christ, Church Women United*
- Florynce Kennedy
  - *Attorney*
- Mrs. Rosemary Kilch
  - *Past President, National Council of Catholic Women*
- Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
- Susan K. Kinoy
  - *Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party*
- Ruth Kinzler
- Ruth Krause
  - *New Jersey Peace Center*
- Margaret Kuhn
  - *Presbyterian Church Center*
- Helen B. Lamb
  - *Author, Wife of Corliss Lamont*
- Mrs. Buton Lane
- Dr. Mary Lane
  - *President, Northern California Association for Nursery Education*
- Marilyn Langer
  - *SANE*
- Mrs. I. Lee Levy
- Viveca Lindfors
  - *Actress*
- Mary Ely Lyman
  - *Union Theological Seminary*
- Helen Merrell Lynd
  - *Author, Sociolcgist*
- Olive Mayer
  - *Scientist*
- Betty Meredith
  - *Nursery School Teacher*
- Lucy Montgomery
- Nelle Morton
  - *Professor of Theology, Drew University*
- Jessica Mitford
  - *Author*
- Grace Mora Newman
  - *Fort Hood Three*
- Dorothy Nyland
  - *Fellowship of Reconciliation*
- Emmy Lou Packard
  - *Artist*
- Mrs. Joseph Papp
  - *Theatre*
- Rosa Parks
  - *Alabama bus rider*
- Leslie Parrish
  - *TV Actress*
- Louise Peck
  - *Cleveland Peace Mobilization*
- Nan S. Pendergrast
- Eleanor Perry
  - *Screen Writer, Producer of "David and*
- Laura Phauls
  - *Union Theological Seminary*
- Esther Pike
- Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
  - *American Ethical Union*
- Mrs. Sidney Poitier
- Mercedes M. Randall
  - *Author*
- Jeannette Rankin
- Mrs. Marcus Raskin
- Malvina Reynolds
  - *Songwriter*
- Carmen Ristorucci
  - *Dubois Clubs*
- Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
  - *Reform Democrats*
- Ruth Rosenwald
  - *Chicago Rosenwald Foundation*
- Muriel Ruykeyser
  - *Poet*
- Marie Runyon
  - *National Conference for New Politics*
- Mrs. Robert Ryan
- Marjorie Schell
  - *SANE*
- Juanita J. Saddler
  - *YWCA*
- Elaine Slater
  - *CORE*
- Helen Huntington Smith
  - *United Church of Christ*
- Mrs. Benjamin Spock
- Susan Sontag
  - *Author*
- Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
  - *American Friends Service Committee*
- Elizabeth Sutherland
  - *Student Nonviolent Coordinating Comi*
- Amy Swerdlow
  - *Women Strike for Peace*
- Mary Adams Sykes
  - *American Friends Service Committee*
- Ethel Taylor
  - *Women Strike for Peace*
- Maza Tilghman
  - *United Church Women*
- Helen B. Turnbull
  - *United Church Women, World Council Churches, Episcopal Church*
- Barbara Webster
  - *Liberation, CNVA*
- Cynthia Wedel
  - *Executive Secretary, National Council of Churches*
- Cora Weiss
  - *Women Strike for Peace*
- Anne Werneke
  - *Youth, National Council of Churches*
- Pearl Willen
  - *Past President, National and Internation cil of Jewish Women*
- Dagmar Wilson
  - *Founder of Women Strike for Peace*
- Winnifred Wygal
- Elaine Yoneda
  - *President, ILWU Auxiliary No. 16*

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
100-59802

January 16, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	
Reference	San Francisco memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9843) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Miami teletypes to the Bureau dated 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven copies of an LHM concerning the captioned demonstration. Two copies are being furnished WFO which is origin. Two copies are being furnished Atlanta and San Francisco who have current investigations concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. Two copies are being furnished Philadelphia, office of origin in the WILPF investigation.

Copies are being disseminated locally to NISO, 6th ND, Charleston, S. C., OSI Robins AFB, Ga., 111th M. I. Group, Orlando, Florida, and U. S Secret Service, Miami, Florida.

The following were advised of the proposed demonstration on 1/15/68:

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM) ENCLOSURE
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM) REC- 62 100-[illegible]
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (100-9882) (WILPF) (RM) 13 JAN 20 1968
2 - Miami
(1 - 100-11990)
JJM:vc
(13)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., ~~RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)~~ State INT. SEC.
DATE FORW: 1-22-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY:

JAN 2 1968

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______

Special Agent DOUGLAS CHALFONTE
U. S Secret Service
Miami, Florida, 9:50 a.m.

Major ROBERT STACHEL
Agent in Charge
111th M. I. Group
Miami, Florida, 10:00 a.m.

Sgt. JOHN CURTAIN
Criminal Intelligence Section
Dade County Department of Public Safety
Miami, Florida, 10:10 a.m.

Sgt. JOHN MC CRACKEN
Intelligence Unit
Miami Police Department, 10:15 a m.

The first source concealed is PEARL CRAIGO, (request) 343 West 46th Street, Hialeah, Florida.

The second source concealed is former MM 578-S.

The demonstration was observed by SA JOHN J. MATTIMORE.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-9843

Miami, Florida
January 16, 1968

Re: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to a memorandum, captioned as above, dated December 28, 1967, at Miami, Florida. The memorandum concerned a call issued by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade for American Women to travel to Washington, D. C. on January 15, 1968, to petition the United States Congress to end the war in Viet Nam.

A source, on January 15, 1968, advised that the Miami Chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) had scheduled a demonstration to take place January 15, 1968, at Miami, Florida. The demonstration would be a support activity for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade that would be in Washington, D. C. on that date to petition Congress to end the war in Viet Nam.

The January 16, 1968, issue of the "Miami Herald," a local Miami, Florida newspaper, contained an article entitled "Five Thousand Women Join Viet War Protest." The article identified Jeannette Rankin as an 87 year old woman pacifist and former member of Congress who voted in Congress against the American entry into both world wars.

A Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on January 15, 1968, observed an anti-war demonstration take place in Miami, Florida. Approximately 70 participants, mostly elderly women, assembled at the Torch of Friendship, Bayfront Park, downtown Miami, at 2:00 p.m. They stood in silent vigil, some wearing black

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

75-99

arm bands holding placards aloft bearing the following slogans:

"Peace Throughout the Earth"

"We Demand An End To The War In Viet Nam Immediately"

"Peace On Earth. Good Will To All Men"

"Join Our Silent Vigil For Peace In Viet Nam"

"Vietnamese Are Our Brothers Whom We Kill"

"For A World Without War"

"We Pause To Remember Our Brothers Who Gave Their Lives In Viet Nam"

Literature distributed identified the sponsor of the demonstration as the "Women's International League for Peace and Freedom" (see attached xerox copy).

The participants, following the vigil, continued their demonstration by walking in single file with the anti-war signs through the downtown city streets to the Federal Building where they dispersed at 3:15 p.m. No incidents were observed to occur.

Source also advised that at least six people from greater Miami had considered traveling to Washington, D. C. to participate in the demonstration in that city being sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade although no firm plans had been made. Among these individuals was Greta Lynch.

A second source in April, 1951, advised that Greta Lynch that year stated she had been expelled from the Communist Party in 1944.

Re: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-9843

Miami, Florida
January 16, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SPONSORED BY

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM



TORCH OF FRIENDSHIP [illegible] BOULEVARD

Monday, January 15, 1967 from 2 P.M. to 4 P.M.

WEAR BLACK IF POSSIBLE

THOUSANDS of American women will see to it that PEACE in Vietnam will be the first order of business when Congress convenes.

Speaker of the House John McCormick and Senator Mike Mansfield will receive a delegation of 50 women led by Jeanette Rankin. The women will present a petition to these two Congressmen who represent the whole Congress.

- * PETITION the United States Congress to
  - * use its power to heal a sick society at home.
  - * use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam
  - * listen to what American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all

THOUSANDS of American women will see to it that PEACE in Vietnam will be the first order of business when Congress convenes.

Speaker of the House John McCormick and Senator Mike Mansfield will receive a delegation of 50 women led by Jeanette Rankin. The women will present a petition to these two Congressmen who represent the whole Congress.

* PETITION the United States Congress to
  * use its power to heal a sick society at home.
  * use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam
  * listen to what American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

FOR WOMEN ONLY
W.I.L.P.F.

374-3773

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1-16-68

Transmit the following in ____ *(Type in plaintext or code)*

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

Via ____ *(Priority)*

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (100-20923)

FD-217

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re St. Louis tel, 1-15-68, and airtel and LHM, 1-11-68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM suitable for distribution.

Two copies have been designated for WFO.

Local dissemination has been made to Secret Service, USA, SLPD, OSI, ONI, Clayton PD, and 113th MI-3.

Source 1 is AL PENHORWOOD, Reservations Supervisor, TWA AIRLINES, SLMO (by request).

Source 2 is SL 1019-S.

Names furnished by TWA were: BLINN, BOCK, CORNELL, FATHMAN, FREEMAN (cancelled), HOLLANDER, PESKIN, SCALES (cancelled), SCHATZ, SPIEGELBERG and WEHRMEYER. These names were not set out in the LHM because first names were not available. It is not possible to definitely say they are the same individuals as ones on whom first names are available.

REC 49

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encl. 11) RM 2 - WFO (Encl. 2) RM
3 - St. Louis
(1 - 100-20923)
(1 - 134-161A
(1 - 100-19842 Videm)
SJP:wma
(8)

REC-4 100 - 44 [illegible] - 190

EX 106

12 JAN 19 1968

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, STATE
RAO [illegible] SS

Bishop

DATE FORWARD: 1-23-68
HOW FORWARD: 125
BY: [illegible]

INT. SEC.

Approved: ____ Special Agent in Charge

Sent JAN 23 1968 M Per ____

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri 63177

January 16, 1968

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference is made to St. Louis memorandum of January 11, 1968.

Source Two advised on January 13, 1968, that BERNICE WEHRMEYER of the St. Louis Peace Information Center, 6217 Delmar Boulevard, said that the St. Louis Delegation going to Washington, D. C. to take part in the Jeannette Rankin demonstration would number about twelve women. They would travel by Trans-World Airline. They had reservations on the 6:25 P. M. flight departing St. Louis on January 13, 1968. They planned to demonstrate and try to see members of Congress on January 15, 1968. On January 16, 1968, they would attend a Women's Congress and return to St. Louis, Tuesday evening, January 16, 1968. They had reserved three hotel rooms in Washington, D. C., near the White House.

Source One advised January 15, 1968, that there had been eleven reservations made by women leaving St. Louis on the 6:25 P. M. TWA flight for Washington, D. C., and returning on January 15, 1968. Only nine reservations, however, were used. It was apparent that all of the reservations were related to each other.

On January 15, 1968, Sergeant Keith McConnell of the Clayton, Missouri, Police Department, advised that about 12:00 Noon, on that date, a number of individuals commenced gathering in front of th St. Louis County, Missouri, Court House. By 12:15 P. M. they commenced

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-44[illegible]-10

ENCLOSURE

to march in a wide circle. In all there were twenty women and one man. One woman had two small children that walked with her. They were all of the white race. They continued to walk until 1:00 P. M. when they broke up and all left the area. They carried one sign that read: "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE - STOP THE WAR IN VIETNAM." At one time two negro males observed the marchers and joined them. After about five or ten minutes they apparently learned what the demonstration was about and left.

Sergeant McConnell did not know any of the demonstrators. They were orderly and quiet. There were no incidents and no threats were made.

An article appearing in the September 20, 1967, issue of "THE ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH" on page 3 C read as follows:

> "A Peace Information Center will be opened at 6217 Delmar Boulevard with ceremonies at 8:00 P. M. today. The Center will contain literature on foreign affairs, economics and social problems. Information concerning alternatives under the Selective Service Act and individual counseling for young men will be provided by appointment."

"THE ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH" is a daily St. Louis newspaper.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri 63177

January 16, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at St. Louis, Missouri.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Portland (100-10983)(P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

CINAL

Re Portland teletype to Bureau, 1/15/68 and Portland airtel and Letterhead Memorandu, dated 12/27/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve copies and for WFO two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) suitable for dissemination concerning anti-war demonstration Monday, 1/15/68, Portland, Oregon, in support of Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., 1/15/68.

6 - Bureau (Enc. 12)(AM)(RM)
    (4 - 100-   )(DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 105-138315)(VIDEM)
    (1 - 100-   )(JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2)(AM)(RM)
5 - Portland
    (2 - 100-10983)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 100-10626)(VIDEM)
    (1 - 100-9248)(CINAL)
    (1 - 100-3952-SUB 9)(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

LBA:dlf
(13)

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, STATE 100-447735-102
RAO [illegible]
DATE FORWARD: 1-24-68 [illegible]
HOW FORWARD: [illegible]
BY: [illegible]

JAN 19 1968

REC-68

EX 106

C. C. - Bishop

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Sources utilized in this LHM, who have furnished reliable information in the past, are as follows:

First Source	PD 477-S
Second Source	PD 426-S
Third Source	Former PD 407-S
Fourth Source	PD 395-S

The LHM is classified "confidential" because data reported from informants could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Copies of LHM disseminated to USA, Secret Service, MI, OSI, and NIC, all Portland.

SA LEO B. APP, JR., SA WILLIAM S. BROWN, and SA JOHN V.HANLON observed the demonstration in Portland on 1/15/68.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- CONFIDENTIAL -

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon
January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On Monday, January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Portland Office observed approximately forty women conducting a peaceful silent picketing demonstration on the sidewalk counter clockwise around the block encompassing the Pioneer Branch, U.S. Post Office (USPO), 520 S.W. Morrison Street, Portland, Oregon, from noon to 1:00 p.m. The majority of women were middle aged, wore black clothing, carried black umbrellas and some carried signs with wording, "No More War" and "The Women's Vote is a Vote for Peace". A small number of the black umbrellas contained white block letters on top with wording, "Peace is our Shelter".

The majority of participants were the same as in previous demonstrations against U.S. policy in Vietnam and among those participating were Susan Elizabeth Hamerquist, Martina Gangle Curl, Julia Eaton Ruuttila, Barbara Davis Crowley, and Mary Jane Brewster.

The demonstration was orderly and no arrests were made.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-448475-102

ENCLOSURE

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY
15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY
15, 1968

The demonstrators were largely ignored by the passers by and a large number of pedestrians refused to accept leaflets being handed out.

A number of the demonstrators passed out the following three-page leaflet (back was blank) made from a single folded pink piece of paper, which was as follows:

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY
15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY
15, 1968



THE
WOMEN'S
VOTE
IS THE
PEACE
VOTE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

WE MARCH

to support the thousands of American women assembled today in Washington, D.C.

Led by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, they are petitioning Congress:

- to end the war in Vietnam NOW
- to arrange for complete withdrawal of American troops

WE WEAR BLACK

- to protest the destruction of life - American and Vietnamese
- to protest the devastation of Vietnamese country and culture
- to protest the atmosphere of violence in which our children are being raised

WE PLEDGE

the strength of our collective political power to nominate and elect candidates who will work for peace in 1968.

Notify your present Congressional Representatives and Senators of your agreement with these aims by signing this page and mailing to them in Washington, D.C.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

AMERICAN WOMEN

-represent 51% of the voting population of this country

-have the power to achieve peace -

THE WOMEN'S VOTE CAN BE THE PEACE VOTE!

WE INVITE

you to join with us to work for peace in 1968. Please mail the coupon below to:

Portland Women for Peace
P.O. Box 13061, Portland, Ore. 97213

or to:

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
P.O. Box 1186, Portland, Ore. 97207

I wish to help in the Women's Vote Campaign to End the War in '68. Please place my name on your mailing list.

Enclosed is contribution of $______.

Name ____________________ Phone ______

Address ____________________________

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Susan Elizabeth Hamerquist, wife of Donald Lee Hamerquist, is publicly known as a Communist Party (CP) member in Portland, Oregon. Susan Elizabeth Hamerquist is a member of the Oregon CP state board.

First Source, January 11, 1968

Donald Lee Hamerquist is publicly known as organizational secretary, Oregon District, CP, USA, and a member of the CP, USA, National Committee.

Martina Gangle Curl is a member of the Labor Club of the CP.

Second Source, January 11, 1968

During 1948, Barbara Davis (now Mrs. Barbara Davis Crowley) was a member of the CP in Portland, Oregon.

Mr. Marshall Kolin
Self-admitted former CP member
September 29, 1953 to October 14, 1953

Mary Jane Brewster is a self-admitted former CP member.

Julia Eaton Ruuttila was an active CP member during 1949.

Third Source, October 8, 1959

Portland Women for Peace is a local pacifist organization.

Fourth Source, January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

A leaflet of the Portland chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) dated December 5, 1967, identified WILPF as follows: "The WILPF was founded by Jane Addams in 1915. Since this time, it has been steadfastly opposed to militarism and war. It is an international organization believing that peace must be based upon economic and social justice."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/17/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

REC 11

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
(OO:WFO)

ReNYairtel to Bureau, 1/16/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM regarding captioned demonstration attended by NYO informant. Enclosed for Washington Field are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Albany, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Newark, New Haven and Philadelphia, is one information copy of the LHM.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Albany (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Milwaukee (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Newark (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - New Haven (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Encl. 1) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (134-5638) (INV) (312)
1 - New York

REC 11

-93

13 JAN 18 1968

HPB:car
(15)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, SD~~)

ENCLOSURE

DATE FORW: 1-19-68
HOW FORW:
BY:

INT. SEC.

66 JAN 26 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

NY 100-161601

Copies of this LHM have been disseminated to interested local intelligence agencies and USA's, SDNY and EDNY.

Sources used in the LHM are:

1. NY 3164-S
2. NY 4253-S
3. Mr. ENRICO CARUSO
   Assistant Vice-President
   Sterling National Bank
   355 Lexington Avenue
   New York City
   (By request)
4. MI 236- PSI (Former)

This LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information from the first and second source who are of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of the information could identify these informants, and, therefore, affect the national security interest.

MIRIAM THOMPSON and SANDRA WOLF are not identifiable in indices of the NYO.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
January 17, 1968

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.,
January 15, 1968

The following information was obtained from a confidential source on January 16, 1968, who had accompanied Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) on their demonstration in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968:

The special JRB train departed Pennsylvania Station, New York City, at approximately 7:30 AM. The train appeared to be nearly full. It arrived at Union Station, Washington, D.C., shortly after twelve noon. The large group of women proceeded to Grant Park which is in the vicinity of the United States Capitol. At Grant Park there was a total of approximately 4,000 women and they remained at the park from 12:45 PM to 1:30 PM. They were instructed by those in charge that they should carry no signs, engage in any group singing or be disorderly in any manner. A folk singer by the name of Judy Collins entertained the group at the park. A sound truck arrived and Vivica Lindfors, the actress, read an anti-Vietnam war petition which Jeannette Rankin was to present to the leaders of Congress. Jeannette Rankin then took this petition and with a small group of women, went into the United States Capitol.

After she returned at approximately 1:30 PM, most of the demonstrators went by bus to the Shoreham Hotel, arriving at approximately 2:00 PM. They held a

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
228 MAY 13 1971

93

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.,
January 15, 1968

D-1

"Women's Congress" meeting. Speakers at the hotel included Mrs. Martin Luther King, who gave an anti-war speech and spoke of the needs of the Negroes at home. Jeannette Rankin gave an anti-war speech, as did Dagmar Wilson. A city council woman from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, also gave a speech opposing the war in Vietnam. Mrs. Mitchell Goodman, described as the wife of Mitchell Goodman who had been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for his anti-draft counseling, gave a speech in which she also encouraged resistance to the draft. All of the speeches were completed by approximately 6:00 PM and at 6:30 PM, busses departed for Union Station. There was a delay at Union Station because of train difficulties and the group did not arrive back in New York City until after twelve midnight.

C-3

Observed participating in the demonstration were Hedda Garza, Berta Green and Judy White.

Hedda Garza, Berta Green
and Judy White

D-2

A second confidential source on November 20, 1967, advised that as of that time, Hedda Garza, Berta Green and Judy White were members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A third confidential source advised on January 11, 1968, that JRB had an account at the Park Hills Branch, Sterling National Bank, 101-25 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, New York, which was opened on November 28, 1967.

CONFIDENTIAL

The address for the account was listed as 133 West 72nd Street, New York City. The officers were listed as:

Cora Weiss, President
Sandra Wolf, Treasurer
Miriam Thompson, Secretary

It was noted that Miriam Thompson has a personal special checking account at the bank in which she is listed as a housewife.

The information furnished above by the third confidential source is not to be made public except in the usual proceedings following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The officer to be subpoenaed is Mr. John Driscoll, Assistant Vice-President, Sterling National Bank, 101-25 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, Queens, New York.

Cora Rubin Weiss

In March, 1956, a fourth confidential source advised that on March 26, 1956, Cora Rubin, while attending the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, was present at a meeting sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Chapter of Labor Youth League (LYL).

LYL has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

All the above confidential sources have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/17/68

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (100-44707) C

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/15-16/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(IS)

VIDEM

Re Chicago airtel and LHM 1/4/68; and Chicago teletypes 1/10, 11, 12, and 15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies and for WFO 2 copies of an LHM captioned as above.

The sources are identified as follows:

T-1	CG 6314-S
T-2	Former CG 6266-S
T-3	CG 5908-S
T-4	CG 7015-S

One copy each of the LHM is being furnished locally to the 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois, and OSI, and Secret Service, Chicago.

The LHM is classified confidential in order to protect T-1, T-3, and T-4, sources which are of continuing value.

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, STATE
RAO
DATE FORWARD: 1-23-68
HOW FORWARD: RS
BY:

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
3 - Chicago
  1 - 100-42717
  1 - 100-44775

100-

REC-21

JAN 19 1968

XEROX

JAN 24 1968

JWT:mr
(8)

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNREC COPY FILED IN

The activity on 1/14/68 was observed by SAs PHILIP R. WANERUS, WILLIAM F. CRONIN, DALE D. CONROY and GENE E. ARNOLD.

The activity on 1/15/68, was observed by SAs EMIL L. SCHROEDER and PAUL L. TIMMERBERG.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
January 17, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-44707

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

On January 10, 1968, CG T-1 advised that the coordinating committee concerned with captioned activity consisted of Mrs. Lucille Montgomery, Marjorie Kinsella, Carol Travis, Rosalind Durham, and Sylvia Kushner. Montgomery, Travis, and Durham were to depart Chicago for Washington, D.C., by air, January 11, 1968, to help with the preparations. According to this source, there would also be a demonstration at the Federal Building in Chicago on January 15, 1968, in support of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

In the January 13, 1968, edition of the "Chicago Daily News," a general circulation daily newspaper in Chicago, it was reported that also in Washington, D.C., from Chicago to help complete plans for the demonstration were Anna Riggs Langford and Sylvia Cotton.

Robert Hensley, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O RR) official, Chicago, advised on January 12, 1968, that Sylvia Kushner, in the name of the Chicago Jeannette Rankin Brigade, made reservations for 34 persons to travel from Chicago to Washington, D.C., via B&O RR Train Number 6, departing Chicago

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automa
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-448475-101

at 4 p.m., January 14, 1968, and arriving in Washington, D.C., at 9 a.m., January 15, 1968. Thirteen of those persons were to return to Chicago via B&O RR, leaving Washington, D.C., at 4:30 p.m, January 15, 1968, and 16 of the group to leave Washington, D.C., at 4:30 p.m., January 16, 1968, to return to Chicago.

On January 12, 1968, Loyal Hibbs, Loyal Travel Service, 10 Riverside Plaza, Chicago, a charter agency for the Greyhound Bus Lines at Chicago, advised that Sylvia Kushner, in the name of Jeannette Rankin Brigade, chartered one Greyhound Bus with the capacity of 38 passengers. This bus was to leave the Greyhound station at Chicago at 6 p.m., January 14, 1968, and deliver the passengers to the Union Station, Washington, D.C., arriving at 9 a.m., January 15, 1968. The bus was scheduled to depart from Washington, D.C. from the Shoreham Hotel at 9 p.m., January 15, 1968, and return to Chicago. It was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 14, 1968, that 66 women boarded B&O RR Train Number 6 at Grand Central Station, Chicago, and departed for Washington, D.C., at 4 p.m. It was observed on the same day by Special Agents of the FBI that approximately 20 women boarded a Greyhound Bus at the Chicago Greyhound Terminal which had been chartered by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. The bus departed the Chicago terminal at 6 p.m., January 14, 1968, enroute to Washington, D.C.

On January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the FBI observed that from 12 noon to 1 p.m., approximately 75 persons, mostly women, conducted a silent vigil at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois, in support of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Concerning persons mentioned above, the following is set forth:

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON,
D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Sylvia Cotton

CG T-2 advised in 1953 that Sylvia Cotton was a member of the Communist Party (CP), 1952-53.

Rosalind Durham

CG T-3 advised December 28, 1967, that Rosalind Durham is a current member, CP of Illinois.

Sylvia Kushner

CG T-3 advised December 28, 1967, that Sylvia Kushner is a current member, CP of Illinois.

Marjorie Kinsella

CG T-4 advised November 22, 1967, that Marjorie Kinsella was a current member, CP of Illinois.

Anna Riggs Langford

According to a news letter of the Chicago Chapter, National Lawyers Guild (NLG) concerning events in June, 1964, it was stated that Anna Riggs Langford, 7107 South South Park Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was a new member of the NLG.

A characterization of the NLG is attached.

Lucille Montgomery

CG T-1 advised in September, 1967, that Lucille Montgomery was chairman of a Host Committee of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) held at Chicago over the 1967 Labor Day weekend.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Carol Travis

CG T-1 advised in September, 1967, that Carol Travis was secretary of a Steering Committee of the above NCNP.

The above information was furnished January 12, 1968, and January 15, 1968, to the following:

Clinton R. Vanzant and
Thomas Murray
Region I, 113th MI Group
Evanston, Illinois

Kathleen Mc Kay
Office of the United States Attorney,
Chicago, Illinois

Jay Sachs and Joseph Noonan
United States Secret Service
Chicago, Illinois

William Richter
Chicago Police Department.

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications revised and published December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., states as follows on page 121 concerning the National Lawyers Guild:

"1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149.)

"2. Cited as a Communist front which 'is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations, and controlled unions' and which 'since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents.'

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally related September 17, 1950.)

"3. 'To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the * * * National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection.'

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91.)"

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD CHICAGO CHAPTER

A source advised on May 9, 1967, that it was his understanding that the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) was formed around 1936 in New York City, and that the Chicago Chapter of the NLG (CCNLG), which is affiliated with the national group in New York, was formed shortly thereafter, possibly in 1937 by a group of liberal progressive lawyers in protest against activities of the American Bar Association which they claimed was a non-liberal, non-progressive organization. The CCNLG has no established headquarters but occasionally uses the return address of its officials in literature.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
January 17, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-44707

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
Reference	Chicago memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/17/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

REC 16

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (RUC)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Reference is made to prior Los Angeles Airtels and letterhead memoranda (LHM) dated December 12 and 30, 1967 and January 11, 1968; Los Angeles teletypes of January 12 and 15, 1968, captioned as above.

For the information of the Bureau there are enclosed eleven (11) copies of an LHM concerning the final local planning meeting of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) and the subsequent demonstrations held by this group in Los Angeles and Santa Ana, California on January 15, 1968.

An information copy of the LHM is being furnished to San Francisco as it contains data regarding VIVIAN HALLINAN, a resident of the San Francisco area; and to WFO the Office of Origin. No attempt has been made to document Mrs. HALLINAN in instant LHM since she is not a Los Angeles subject.

The Los Angeles Division has no Bureau approved characterization for the Women's International League for

EX 104 REC 16

3 - Bureau (Encls. 11) (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - San Francisco (100-59802)(Encls. 1) (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - WFO (100-47173)(Encls. 1) (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - Los Angeles (100-70701)
GGB/ajs
(6)

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, CSI, STATE
RAO
DATE FORWARD: 1-24-68
HOW FORWARD: RS
BY:

JAN [illegible] 1968

151

54 FEB 2 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Peace and Freedom; so no attempt has been made to document it herein other than as a "peace-oriented" group.

Instant LHM has been classified confidential to protect the symbol number informants utilized therein. Sources utilized are:

Source One	LA 4490-S
Source Two	LA 3184-S
Source Three	NY 588-S
Source Four	Anonymous source of Chicago Division
Source Five	LA 3200-S*

One copy each is being furnished the local offices of Secret Service; United States Attorney; Region II, U. S. Army; OSI and NISO, as each of these services have received copies of prior LHMs.

SAs GILBERT G. BENJAMIN and JAMES R. PACE made the observations in Los Angeles. SA LEON J. MEYER made the observations in Santa Ana.

As the local aspects of this demonstration have been completed this matter is considered RUC.

UNITED STATES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
January 17, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to prior memoranda captioned as above, including those dated December 12 and 30, 1967 and January 11, 1968, from Los Angeles, California.

Former C.P member in [illegible]

Source One reported that the final local planning meeting of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) Committee in Southern California, was held on January 11, 1968, in the offices of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) (see appendix), 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. A communication was received from Mary Clarke (see characterization in appendix page on WSP) indicating that she and Vivian Hallinan of San Francisco, California, were already in Washington, D. C., making final arrangements for the JRB action to be held in that city on January 15, 1968. Clarke indicated that she and Mrs. Hallinan had already received numerous queries from representatives of the Washington news media regarding proposed action to be taken by the JRB. She also noted that it might be necessary to re-route the proposed JRB march on the Capitol, in view of some "1882 Law" relating to demonstrations in the vicinity of the Capitol building.

According to Source One the women from Southern California, travelling to participate in the Washington JRB action, were to leave Los Angeles Saturday night, January 13, 1968, via American Airlines Flight 78. Most of them were to return to Los Angeles, from Dulles International Airport, on Tuesday, January 16, 1968, via American Airlines Flight 75.

As of January 12, 1968, the following women affiliated with WSP were scheduled to travel from Southern California to Washington for the JRB demonstration: Eva Korn, Mary Lewis, Bea Glass, Florence Temkin, Mildred Holland, Ada Wasserman, Joyce Miller Angus, Leslie Parrish, Pat Lavit, Geraldine Shapiro, Beverly Bruce and Florence White; according to Source One.

CONFIDENTIAL

100-448475-103

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

ENCLOSURE

Three women representing the black community were also scheduled to fly to Washington from the Southern California JRB Committee. They were Bobbie Hodges, Althea Alexander, and Glory Roberts. Two women affiliated with the peace-oriented Pasadena Chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Cathy Hofer and Marian Beardsley, were also to join the above women for the flight to Washington, according to Source One.

On January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the Los Angeles Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed a group of women assemble in front of the Old State Building, 217 West First Street (First and Broadway, in the downtown Civic Center), Los Angeles, California, at approximately 9:30 AM. The women were carrying placards indicating they were the local representation of the JRB. They also had two leaflets for distribution (Xerox copies of which are appended to this memorandum) which called for women to participate and which indicated that a voting block of American women had the power to put an end to the war in Vietnam. These leaflets bore the address of the JRB as 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles, California (90019), which is the address of the headquarters of the WSP in Southern California.

Starting shortly after 10:00 AM, the women proceeded to hold a rally on the south steps of the Old State Building, with the speakers utilizing an electronic amplification system, which was held by actress Leslie Parrish.

Source One indicated that Parrish had originally been scheduled to fly to Washington, D. C., to participate in the JRB action at the Capitol, but changed her plans at the last minute in order to remain in Los Angeles.

The rally was headed by Tima Tomash, who acted as the local JRB organizer and answered some of the questions regarding the JRB from members of the news media on the scene. Veronica Sissons acted as mistress of ceremonies. Speakers included Mary Henry, Negro civil rights and poverty worker; Margaret Wright (who has been identified by Sources One and Two as a militant black nationalist, who has been extremely active in recent months in disturbances at Manual Arts High School, Los Angeles, which resulted in a court injunction to prohibit her entering those school grounds); and television actress Ellen McRae. The speakers all called for a coalition of women to form a strong voting block which could produce legislation to end the war in Vietnam, end poverty and "legislated injustice".

At 10:50 AM, the women marched to the steps on the First Street side of the Los Angeles City Hall for a second rally. A count made as the demonstrators marched between the Old State Building and the City Hall revealed that 250 adult Caucasians (majority of whom were women dressed in black), and eight non-Caucasian adults were involved, plus some youngsters and infants. The mother of one of the children had a cardboard sign, depicting a bomb and the caption, "I'm Glad I'm Not Vietnamese", strapped to the back of her son who appeared to be less than four years of age.

With Veronica Sissons again acting as mistress of ceremonies, the rally was addressed by Charlotte Sherman, Margaret Wright, Tima Tomash, and Jill Schary. The latter was introduced as a radio commentator employed by Los Angeles Radio Station KLAC. She joined the others in calling for a coalition of women to influence legislation and bring an end to the war in Vietnam. She also called for support of other "liberal radio broadcasters on our side", one of whom she named as William Winter. (The "Daily People's World", west coast communist newspaper, in its edition of June 11, 1946, described William Winter as chairman of a local citizens' committee to safeguard the Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee, which organization has been cited pursuant to Executive Order 10450).

Charlotte Sherman was introduced as the wife of Laurence Sherman, it being pointed out that he was an unsuccessful candidate for public office, on a peace slate, during 1967, but that both he and his wife were continuing the fight for an end to the war in Vietnam. She said, "It is time for us to re-examine our role as women. Women are a vehicle for giving life. We will not be a vehicle for perpetuation of wars". She then read some anti-war quotes from Henry David Thoreau, indicating they were as timely today, as when he wrote them.

Margaret Wright stated that whereas the majority of women in the demonstration were wearing black to denote mourning, that she and her non-Caucasian associates who feel, "Black is beautiful" were dressed in white to indicate their attitude of mourning. She called for the elimination of ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) from local high schools and junior colleges, adding, "They have got to get live bullets out of the schools, and get some live teachers in." She repeated these same statements during the afternoon when the JRB moved to the Los Angeles City Board of Education.

As the rally was breaking up, Wright grabbed the public address system and said that it had been learned that the City Council was in session inside the City Hall Building.

She urged the women not to disperse, but to join her and others in invading the City Council Chambers with a demand that the JRB be allowed to speak to the Council even though they had not made previous arrangements for a place on the agenda that day. Some of the women were already out of range of the public address system and did not hear this announcement by Wright, having already been dismissed by Sissons and told to reconvene at the Board of Education following luncheon.

Approximately 200 of the demonstrators did enter the Council Chambers. They got word to the councilmen, through one of the staff members, that they wished to be heard. A motion to allow a JRB representative to address them was put before the Council, and defeated by a vote of six to five. Immediately following this vote, there was a unanimous vote that the Council adjourn. As the councilmen filed out of the room, Tima Tomash rushed to the front shouting demands that they return, while other of the women hissed and booed the city legislators.

During the noon hour some of the women distributed leaflets in the City Hall and on the surrounding streets in the downtown Civic Center.

At 1:00 PM, the women, whose numbers had by that time been reduced to 125, massed in the patio of the Los Angeles City Board of Education, 450 North Grand Avenue, Los Angeles. Sissons, Wright and Tomash addressed the assembled demonstrators, pointing out that money spent in Vietnam could be better spent in education. Wright claimed that many of the so-called student "drop-outs" are in reality "push-outs", claiming that she herself was one of the latter. She said, "We need books, not bombs. We know this is a racist war and we blacks are not going to fight a racist war". She indicated that rather than fight overseas, the black people would remain at home and fight the racists. She also said, "Just because I'm pro-black doesn't necessarily mean I'm anti-white."

Wright said, "I'm not political, but I am honest. I can't honestly get up and say the pledge of allegiance to the American flag, because I really don't have liberty and justice; so I just get up and stand and won't repeat the pledge." Later, when she observed a photograph of President Johnson hanging from a wall in the Administration Building at the Los Angeles City Board of Education, she told the JRB women with her, "We shouldn't have to look at such pornographic pictures."

CONFIDENTIAL

Wright said that her arrest at the hands of Los Angeles City School Security Officers, during the recent Manual Arts High School disturbance, had at least one bright result. She said that at the time of her arrest it had been necessary for the arresting officers to drag her down the hall as she was too heavy for them to carry. Then she added that the next time she is arrested the officers will not have that excuse as she has lost thirty pounds in the meantime.

The speeches in the patio ended at 1:30 PM and many of the women left immediately. Seventy-eight women remained and attempted to enter a special committee meeting being attended by some of the School Board members. They were informed by a member of the administrative staff that the public meeting of the School Board would not be held until 4:00 PM, the regularly scheduled meeting time. The women milled around in the hallway outside the meeting room, until finally a staff member came out and told them that two members of the School Board, Reverend James E. Jones and Dr. Julian Nava, had agreed to grant them an audience. The women were then ushered into the public board room of the School Board where they waited until 2:00 PM at which time the above-named Board members granted the demonstrators a short audience and answered some questions put to them by the women. One question, as to how much longer the members of the School Board were going to permit recruiters from the armed forces to interview students at local high schools and junior colleges remained unanswered, but Dr. Nava pointed out to the women that he had seen nothing wrong in entering the armed forces to fight for this country himself when he was 17 years of age; and he could see nothing wrong in other young men who wanted to do the same today. The demonstration was concluded by 3:00 PM. There were no incidents and no arrests.

Placards carried during this demonstration in Los Angeles bore the following captions:

"Eat Texas Beef, Not L.B.J. Baloney"

"Woman Power is Vote Power is Peace Power"

"Draft Beer Not Students"

"Where Have All the Men Gone-To Graveyards"

"Jeannette Rankin Brigade-Women's Votes Count, End the War"

"Women's Power is Peace Power."

A Special Agent of the FBI observed a separate group of 32 adult Caucasian females assemble at 10:05 AM, in the vicinity of the Orange County Courthouse, in downtown Santa Ana, California, January 15, 1968. About half of these women were dressed in black and they were carrying signs indicating they represented the JRB. Other signs being carried during the ensuing demonstration read, "Support Dr. Spock." They marched around the courthouse until 11:00 AM, when the demonstration was concluded with no incidents or arrests. Else Sturm identified herself to members of the press, as being in charge of the demonstration.

> Source One has identified Leslie Parrish, Tima Tomash, Veronica Sissions and Charlotte Sherman as having been affiliated with the WSP Southern California Council.
>
> Source Three identified Tima Tomash as a member of the Communist Party (CP) from at least 1940 to 1950, and as a member of the New York State CP School Commission during a portion of that period.
>
> Source Four identified Else Sturm as a member of the CP in Chicago, Illinois, in December, 1946.

Source One reported during June, 1967, that Florence Temkin, was an official in the Women for Legislative Action (WLA - see appendix), as well as being active in the Council of the WSP.

Source Five reported in 1947, that Eva Korn was at that time a member of the CP and had been such for approximately fifteen years.

An information copy of this memorandum is being furnished to each of the following agencies: United States Attorney, Los Angeles; Secret Service, Los Angeles; Office of Special Investigations, Norton Air Force Base; Region II, United States Army, Pasadena; and Naval Investigative Service Office, San Diego, California.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE, Also Known As Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A source advised on May 1, 1963, that the Women for Legislative Action was formed in 1952, claiming to be an independent organization dedicated to non-partisan participation in legislative and civic activities. Its position in favoring or opposing legislation usually parallels the position of the Communist Party and related groups. It also supports legislation to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Membership in the Women for Legislative Action does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

Another source advised on May 11, 1967, that the Women for Legislative Action continues to be active in the Los Angeles area.

Will Rock the ~~Boat~~ Vote

On January 15 American women will assemble in Washington, D. C. With Jeannette Rankin* leading the Brigade, they will converge on Congress as it reconvenes. They will petition for a redress of their grievances and will demand that Congress end the war in Vietnam and turn its power to healing our "sick society".

This is "Woman Power" !

In support of these women and their demands, Southern California women will assemble for appropriate ceremonies, marching and leafleting in Los Angeles on Monday, January 15, 1968:

9:30 A.M., on the steps of the Old State Bldg., 217 West 1st St.
11:30 A.M., City Hall, 200 North Spring St.
1:00 P.M., Board of Education, 450 North Grand

(please, wear black if possible)

"Turn Woman Power to Peace Power"

---

* Jeannette Rankin, Montana, U.S.A., is the first woman elected to Congress. A consistent, dedicated voice for a world without war, she says, "...Women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race." Her Brigade is your chance to demonstrate your concern!

Respond! Join! Participate!

Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 5899 W. Pico Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90019 - 937-0236

DO YOU KNOW . . .

YOU have the majority of the nation's vote!

YOU have 51% of the vote!

YOUR VOTE CAN STOP KILLING YOUR CHILDREN!!

BECAUSE IT'S AN OBSCENE WASTE TO BEAR AND RAISE OUR CHILDREN TO BE SLAUGHTERED IN WAR!

YOUR VOTE CAN DECIDE WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUR MEN!

BECAUSE NOW HE HAS TO DIE WITHOUT A CHOICE!!

YOUR VOTE IS THE POWER TO SPEND 3 BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH ON THE NEEDS HERE AT HOME - INSTEAD OF ON THE WAR IN VIET-NAM!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE FROM OFFICE THE MEN WHO WILL NOT LISTEN! WILL NOT RESPOND TO YOUR NEEDS - WHO DO NOT REPRESENT YOU!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO ELECT THOSE WHO WILL:

END THE WAR!
END POVERTY!
END LEGISLATED INJUSTICE!

A WOMEN'S VOTING BLOCK WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALL AMERICANS TO ENJOY THEIR FREEDOMS!

WOMEN WHO BELIEVE IN LIFE PARTICIPATE!

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Please Clip Here And Return To: JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
5899 West Pico Blvd.

YOUR VOTE CAN STOP KILLING YOUR CHILDREN!!

BECAUSE IT'S AN OBSCENE WASTE TO BEAR AND RAISE OUR CHILDREN TO BE SLAUGHTERED IN WAR!!

YOUR VOTE CAN DECIDE WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUR MEN!

BECAUSE NOW HE HAS TO DIE WITHOUT A CHOICE!!

YOUR VOTE IS THE POWER TO SPEND 3 BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH ON THE NEEDS HERE AT HOME - INSTEAD OF ON THE WAR IN VIET-NAM!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE FROM OFFICE THE MEN WHO WILL NOT LISTEN! WILL NOT RESPOND TO YOUR NEEDS - WHO DO NOT REPRESENT YOU!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO ELECT THOSE WHO WILL:

END THE WAR!
END POVERTY!
END LEGISLATED INJUSTICE!

A WOMEN'S VOTING BLOCK WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALL AMERICANS TO ENJOY THEIR FREEDOMS!

WOMEN WHO BELIEVE IN LIFE PARTICIPATE!

Please Clip Here And Return To:

JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
5899 West Pico Blvd.
Los Angeles, Calif.
90019 - - Tel. 937-0256

Name: ______________________

Address: ______________________ Tel. No. ____________

WOMEN'S POWER IS PEACE POWER

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/18/68

Transmit the following in ______________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

C. Bishop

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOUISVILLE (100-4998) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Bureau airtel dated 12/5/67 and Miami airtel to Bureau dated 12/28/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 14 copies and for WFO three (3) copies of a letterhead memorandum captioned as above except that the date has been changed to 1/15/68.

Referenced Bureau airtel reflects the Secretary of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade is VIVIAN HALLINAN, the wife of VINCENT HALLINAN. Louisville files reflect a

ENCLOSURE

REC 55

EX-112

25 JAN 20 1968

7 - Bureau (Enc. 14) (RM)
  (1 - 100-10355) (Info)
  (1 - 105-164714) (Info)
  (1 - 100-445949) (Info)
3 - WFO (Enc. 3) (RM)
  (1 - 100-17107) (Info)
6 - Louisville (1 - 100-197)
  (1 - 100-4599) (Julia F. Allen)
  (1 - 105-890)
  (1 - 100-4661)

GWA/plh (16)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD,~~ CD) Stat INT. SEC.

DATE FORW: Sent
HOW FORW: R/
BY: RHH: alk

53 JAN 29 1968

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge ______ M Per ______ report of SA LEON F. SCHWARTZ dated 5/29/52 at New York entitled "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, IS - C," (Bureau file 100-357934 and Louisville file 100-3284-249) which reflects one Vincent Hallinan, California attorney, was the 1952 Progressive Party candidate for President of the United States.

LS T-1 in the LHM is ~~PHYLLIS SCHNURR~~, Vice President, Bank of Louisville, Louisville, Kentucky; the original information from this source is located in Louisville file 100 197-1A and 1B (17).

LS T-2 is JOE RYAN, Assistant Auditor, First National-Lincoln Bank, Louisville, Kentucky; the original information is located in Louisville file 100-197-1A and 1B (17).

It is noted the newspaper article mentioned in the LHM contains identifying data regarding the persons mentioned only as detailed in the LHM.

Louisville file 157-417-9, memo of SA HUGH M. BYRD, dated July 7, 1967, entitled "POSSIBLE RACIAL VIOLENCE, MAJOR URBAN AREAS, RM", describes one SARAH BURNSIDE as a Negro female residing on Race Street, Richmond, Kentucky, who is employed by the Appalachia Volunteers (AV). This organization is described in the LHM as a Federally financed anti-poverty agency. There is no subversive information in Louisville files regarding SARAH BURNSIDE.

Dean JULIA F. ALLEN, Berea College, Berea, Kentucky, at least in her 60's, is the subject of a closed case in Louisville file entitled "JULIA F. ALLEN, SM - C," (no Bureau file known, Louisville file 100-4599).

The KAREN MULLOY mentioned in LHM is possibly the wife of JOSEPH T. MULLOY who is one of the subjects of the case entitled "ALAN MC SURELY; MARGARET MC SURELY, Aka; JOSEPH T. MULLOY; CARL BRADEN ANNE BRADEN; INFORMATION CONCERNING (SM - C)" (Bureau file 105-164714 and Louisville file 105-890).

The information in the LHM from the masthead of "The Southern Patriot" is found in a report of SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON dated 11/22/67 at Louisville entitled "SCEF, IS - C, ISA - 1950", (Bureau file 100-10355 and Louisville file 100-197).

There is no information in Louisville files regarding other Kentucky residents mentioned in the LHM.

Since several participants in the March have apparent SCEF connections, information copy is being designated to that file.

The Louisville Peace Council is the subject of Bureau file 100-445959 and Louisville file 100 4661. This matter is not currently under investigation. This organization utilizes the address 1135 South Brook, Louisville, Kentucky, and apparently has connections with the Grace Hope Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Community Center, both Louisville, Kentucky.

Any further information regarding this matter will be promptly furnished.

UN[illegible]D STATES DEPARTMENT OF [illegible]ICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Louisville, Kentucky
January 18, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The January 16, 1968, edition of the "Courier-Journal", a Louisville, Kentucky, newspaper of general circulation, reflected an article that reported that Jeannette Rankin and some 5,000 other women marched near the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968. The article further reflected the group was known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade and that the purpose of the march was to protest the Vietnam war.

It was indicated therein that the marchers were "met by a seemingly disinterested Washington and a reconvening 90th Congress that, not unexpectedly, paid them little heed."

Miss Jeannette Rankin, described in the article as the march leader and first woman member of congress, and thirteen others presented a petition to two congressional leaders. One Sarah Burnside, Richmond, Kentucky, is depicted as a member of this group and a delegate from Appalachia.

The demonstration, described as peaceful, included Mrs. Ernest Gruening, "wife of the Alaska Senator"; Mrs. Martin

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible] 8752

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
342 APR 30 1971

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, DC.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Luther King, Mrs. Benjamin Spock, and Judy Collins, "a Washington singer ~~of protest~~ group", as "prominent participants."

The aforementioned article mentions that Mrs. Gwen Griffin, a member of the Steering Committee that helped organize the Jeannette Rankin Brigade march, is an employee of the Council of the Southern Mountains and a resident of Berea, Kentucky.

Other Kentucky marchers from Madison County, Kentucky, were Miss Julia Allen, former Dean of Women at Berea College, Berea, Kentucky; Mrs. Don ~~Johnson, and Mrs.~~ Kennedy Brooks.

Also listed as partici~~pating in~~ the march were the following Louisville, Kentucky, residents: Mrs. Karen Mulloy, Mrs. Ann Braden, Karla Block, Cathie Grove, Suzanne Crowell, Teresa Bridges, and Nessa Goatley. It is noted the aforementioned newspaper article contains no further identifying data regarding these persons. The women from Louisville, Kentucky, allegedly came with the partial financial backing of the Louisville Peace Council.

With regard to the aforementioned persons from Kentucky, it is noted that the files of the Louisville Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reflect Dean Julia F. Allen, Berea College, Berea, Kentucky, has been connected with the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF) and its predecessor organization, the Southern Conference of Human Welfare, since 1938.

A characterization of the SCEF is attached hereto as an appendix.

It is further noted that one Karen Mulloy is the wife of Joseph T. Mulloy. Mulloy and Mr. and Mrs. Alan McSurely, the McSurelys being field workers of the SCEF, were arrested in August, 1967, by Pike County, Kentucky, officials under a Kentucky sedition law later ruled unconstitutional by a Federal Court. Mulloy at the time was employed by the

Appalachia Volunteers, a Federally financed anti-poverty agency, but has since been discharged.

Also, it is noted that the masthead of the October, 1967, "The Southern Patriot", Volume 29, No. 9, self-identified as the organ of the SCEF, lists one Anne Braden as Associate Executive Director, and Suzanne Crowell and Catherine Grove are listed as Field Staff members of SCEF.

Information furnished by Louisville T-1 regarding SCEF salary payments and information furnished by Louisville T-2 regarding SCEF employee expenses and other pertinent SCEF expenditures reflect that one Theresa Bridges, one Suzanne Crowell, one Nessa Goatley, and one Anne Braden each received a cash allowance from SCEF sometime in 1967.

SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. (SCEF)

The Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) was cited as a Communist front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947. In the same house report, "The Southern Patriot" was cited as an "organ" of the SCHW.

An amendment to the charter of the SCHW dated April 26, 1946, changed its name to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Incorporated (SCEF) and stated its purpose to be to improve the educational and cultural standards of the Southern people in accordance with the highest American democratic institutions, traditions and ideals.

The masthead of the April, 1967, issue of "The Southern Patriot" indicates that it is the publication of SCEF, editorial and business offices of which are located at 3210 West Broadway, Louisville, Kentucky, Eastern office of which is located at Suite 412, 799 Broadway, New York City, New York. "The Southern Patriot" is published once each month, except July. SCEF is stated to be dedicated to ending discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, national origin or economic condition.

Carl Braden is identified as Executive Director of SCEF and Anne Braden as editor of "The Southern Patriot."

Mrs. Alberta Ahearn, 2311 Payne Street, Louisville, Kentucky, a self-admitted former member of the Communist Party (CP), Louisville, Kentucky, testified on December 11, and 13, 1954, in Jefferson County, Kentucky Criminal Court in a State sedition prosecution against Carl James Braden. She identified Carl Braden and his wife, Anne McCarty Braden, as having been known to her as members of the CP from January, 1951 to December, 1954.

The SCEF is self-described as having deep roots in the South where it began as the educational wing of the SCHW, organized in 1938 to work for economic and political reform. When the SCHW disbanded in the late 1940's, SCEF

SCEF (Continued)

continued as an independent organization, rallying support for integration and democracy and helping to stimulate and nurture new movements of the early 1960's. The SCEF maintained headquarters in Louisiana for twenty years, but in 1966 moved its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.

A source advised on March 2, 1961, that Claude Lightfoot, a Communist Party functionary, stated at a meeting of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 25, 1961, that the Communist Party is not connected with any progressive movement but indirectly they do have some influence in the SCEF.

A second source, who is familiar with some phases of Communist Party activity in the New Orleans area, advised on June 3, 1966, that during the time that the SCHW was in existence, members of the Communist Party were members of and worked actively in the SCHW; however, since the formation of the SCEF, Communist Party members have not been encouraged to work in the SCEF. The source stated that the SCEF is a progressive, liberal organization, which he considers a Communist Party front organization because it has gone along with the Communist Party on certain issues, particularly on the racial issue.

A third source advised on May 25, 1965, that George Meyers, a Communist Party functionary, expressed great admiration for Carl and Anne Braden and the SCEF, with which they are affiliated, and expressed the view that the SCEF is the best organization in the South as far as doing effective work is concerned and that they have a better idea of what they are doing, where they are heading, and influence other organizations for the better.

The second source also advised on June 3, 1966, that many people who are officials and supporters of the SCEF, while liberal in their views, are by no means Communists.

1-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Louisville, Kentucky
January 18, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
Reference	Letterhead memorandum dated January 18, 1968.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/18/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CINCINNATI (100-17137) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., RAO (UND, CRD, CI)
DATE FORW: 2-2-68
HOW FORW: r/s
BY: [illegible]

ReBuairtel to all SAC's, 12/5/67; Miami airtel to Bureau, 12/28/67; mytels to Bureau, 1/13 and 14/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and ten copies of an LHM; two copies each for Atlanta, Cleveland, San Francisco and WFO.

First source mentioned in LHM is WANDA FITZPATRICK, Manager, Dayton and Southeastern Bus Lines, Incorporated, Jamestown, Ohio, who furnished this information to SA GEORGE P. ULLRICH on 1/12/68.

The second source mentioned in LHM is Chief JAMES MC KEE, PD, Yellow Springs, Ohio, who furnished this information to SA GEORGE P. ULLRICH on 1/14/68.

Sources used to characterize ANN PEERY are as follows:

REC-51

Third source is CG 6474-S;

Fourth source is NY 3229-S;

13 JAN 20 1968

ENCLOSURE

Fifth source is CI 529-S;

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Cleveland (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
3 - Cincinnati (1-100-17137)
~~(1-100-14702) (1-100-14859)~~

[illegible]/mjb (14)

5 1 JAN [illegible] 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Sixth source is CS NY 4204-S.

The LHM is classified confidential because sources are utilized who are of continuing value and disclosure of their identities would adversely effect the internal security of the United States. Examples are CI 529-S and CS NY 4204-S.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 17, 1968

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    (c) ☐ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ______________________________

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) (1)
U. S. Secret Service, Cincinnati

Enclosure(s)

(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Cincinnati, Ohio
January 18, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

A confidential source furnished the following information on January 12, 1968:

Ann Peery, Yellow Springs, Ohio, has organized approximately forty women to travel to Washington, D. C. for captioned demonstration now scheduled for January 15, 1968. These women who will be from Dayton, Yellow Springs and surrounding areas in Ohio will depart from the Antioch College Union, Yellow Springs, Ohio, approximately 7:15 p.m. on January 14, 1968. They anticipate arriving in Washington, D. C. approximately 7:00 a.m. on January 15, 1968, where they will unload at the Union Station. The women, dressed in black, will meet with demonstrators from other areas of the United States and proceed in silence to the capital.

Source stated this group will meet at 7:30 a.m., January 15, 1968, at the Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., for the return trip to Yellow Springs.

On January 14, 1968, a second confidential source advised that approximately forty women departed Yellow Springs, Ohio, by bus at 9:00 p.m. on January 14, 1968, for demonstration in Washington, D. C. The bus was chartered from the Southeastern Bus Lines, Incorporated, Jamestown, Ohio.

Source advised that although it was snowing and road conditions hazardous, the women were determined to reach

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification.

100-448475-78
ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

Washington, D. C. for the demonstration.

The "Dayton Daily News", a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Dayton, Ohio, area, carried an article titled "Area Women Joining Peace March in Capital" on page 5A of the January 14, 1968, edition.

According to the article the women had a variety of personal reasons for taking part in Monday's peace effort.

According to the article Janice Bulley, 1376 Harvard Boulevard, in Dayton, Ohio, stated that, "It seems so hard to find anything to do that gets any kind of real response. Perhaps this will. As mothers, we have a special stake in this war. Perhaps our effort Monday will somehow be translated into a direct action to stop it."

According to the article, Lois Schrag, Springfield, Ohio, stated that while peace demonstrations were often most effective on a local level, sometimes a mass outpouring of feeling like this is helpful.

According to the article June Gibbon, Bowling Green, Ohio, stated, "As we become more involved in this war, and more human lives are lost, I feel more and more strongly that unless I oppose the war actively, I am in a way responsible for those deaths."

According to the article, Marjory Dickinson, Yellow Springs, Ohio, stated, "I personally feel that mature women expressing themselves on the war in a serious manner is an important thing."

The "Dayton Daily News", supra, carried an article titled "Six Local Women in D. C. Protest", on page one of the January 15, 1968, edition. This article is set out in its entirety as follows:

"Six Daytonians were among thousands of women who gathered near the capital this morning to protest the Vietnam war.

"Calling themselves the 'Jeanette Rankin Brigade,' they assembled at Union station near the Capitol and planned to march to Union square just east of the Capitol itself.

"A brigade spokesman estimated some 10,000 women from across the nation turned out for the demonstration. Delegates came from as far away as the West Coast.

"Daytonians included Mrs. Mildred Harvey, one of this year's Ten Top Women in Dayton; Mrs. Bobbie Bernstein of 1426 Catalpa Dr.; Mrs. Nancy Piediscalzi of 427 Alameda Pl,; Mrs. J. Edward Hersberger of 1232 Brooklands Rd. Mrs. Julian [illegible] of 1376 Harvard Blvd., and Mrs. Mary Thomson, wife of Matt Thomson, director of American Friends in Dayton and surrounding states.

"Leading the march was the 87-year-old Miss Rankin, dowager queen of the peaconicks, who while in Congress voted against entry into both world wars.

"The Ohio delegation, composed predominately of Clevelanders, also counted a number of women from Yellow Springs including Mrs. Gay Houston.

"Capitol Police said they would not permit the women to demonstrate on Capitol grounds. However, it was expected that 15 of the brigade would be able to present a peace petition to House Speaker John McCormick (d-Mass.) shortly after Congress reconvened at noon today to begin its second session.

"A heavy snowfall greeted the women as they arrived by plane, train, bus and private car this morning.

"But it did not cool the ardor of the women who pledged their demonstration would be a powerful one.

"Mrs. Hersberger said her son, Second Lt. Eric Ulrikson, did not share her feelings about Vietnam. The lieutenant, she said, doesn't feel we can do without the armed services at this time in the world's development.

"Mrs. Marie Tuck of Cleveland called her appearance a "family affair."

B. APPROX 174

Tuck

OHIO

"She said her son David, 26, testified at the Bertrum Russell meeting near Copenhagen that the Johnson administration was committing atrocities in Vietnam. That meeting resulted in a condemnation of the U. S. as the aggressor in the Southeast Asian conflict.

"Mrs. Tuck said her son had not seen combat but was a battalion mail clerk.

Tuck

"She said she has another son, T[illegible], who is station at Ft. Knox, Ky.

"He's a good soldier from 9 to 5," Mrs. Tuck said, adding that her son preaches resistance to the war after those hours.

"She said that some 150 men of her son's battalion were recently sent to Vietnam but her son was kept in the U.S. because of his activities.

ANN PEERY

On September 7, 1961, a third source advised that a list of members had been received by the Chicago Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) from the national office of FPCC for use by the Chicago Chapter in securing renewals of memberships and/or a subscribers fee. Included on the list is the name "Miss Ann Perry, Rd 1, Box 229P, Yellow Springs, Ohio, B62."

In connection with the above list, a fourth source advised that the letters, "B62" indicate a member has membership coming up for renewal in the second quarter of 1962.

A fifth source advised on May 16, 1966, that on May 15, 1966, Ann Peery stated her maiden name was Ann Perry but her married name is Ann Peery.

A sixth source advised on April 18, 1967, and

and on April 22, 1967, that the name "Ann Peery, c/o Peace and Freedom Center, 221 Xenia Avenue, Yellow Springs, Ohio" appeared on the current mailing list of "The Worker" and the Weekend edition of "The Worker".

"The Worker" is an east coast communist newspaper.

A characterization of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee is attached in the appendix hereto.

THIS IS LOANED TO YOU BY THE FBI, AND NEITHER IT NOR ITS CONTENTS ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE AGENCY TO WHICH LOANED.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. Charles A. Santos-Buch identified himself and Robert Taber as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and Taber obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party(SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that Vincent "Ted" Lee, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that Lee believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. Lee did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se.

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator Dodd was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC.

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA COMMITTEE (CONT'D)

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World legram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-Castro FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-Castro street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-Castro American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by Castro's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected presidential assassin Lee H. Oswald.

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. Lee had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization.

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Cincinnati, Ohio
January 18, 1967

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY
Reference	Cincinnati airtel and LHM dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/19/68

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Thompson

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The Washington Field Office has advised that approximately 20-25 women began picketing in front of the White House at 1 p.m. today in support of Ertha Kitt's views expressed during a White House luncheon 1/18/68 in opposition to the war in Vietnam. Included among the demonstrators are representatives of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist group which is opposed to the war in Vietnam. All pertinent information developed has been furnished to Secret Service, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Park police and the military intelligence agencies by the Washington Field Office.

ACTION:

For information. You will be advised of additional developments.

CWT:jav
(7)

REC- 57 100-4[illegible] 94

JAN [illegible]

ADDENDUM BY D. E. MOORE (1/19/68)DEM:hmm: The Washington Field Office advised at 2:15 p.m. that the above-mentioned demonstration broke up at 1:45 p.m., after a speech was made by comedian Dick Gregory. No arrests or incidents occurred.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

C/H/S

FBI

Date: 1/19/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, NEW HAVEN (100-19472) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
OO:WFO

Re: New Haven teletype, 1/15/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM concerning captioned demonstration, and for WFO 2 copies of same LHM. The confidential sources mentioned therein are Miss HELEN GAFFNEY (Protect by request), Charter Clerk, The Connecticut Company, New Haven, Conn., and former CSNY 426-S.

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in identification of the sources and thereby effect the national security interest.

Copies of this LHM are being disseminated locally to 108th MIG, Secret Service and USA, New Haven, all of whom are cognizant of this matter.

REC-69 100-448475-107

ENCLOSURE

AGENCY: G-2, CNI, OSI, SEC. SER., State
RAO ([illegible]) [illegible]
DATE FORW: 1-29-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RHH:dlk

JAN 23 1968

3 Bureau (Enc.11) (RM)
2 WFO (Enc.2)(RM)
2 New Haven (1-100-19497)
RRM/mmf
(7)

C. C. - Bishop [illegible] CC + encl 932 9th [illegible]

54 JAN 31 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New Haven, Connecticut
January 19, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised on January 15, 1968, that two buses departed from the Connecticut Company, New Haven, Connecticut, and Mrs. JAMES FINCH, 85 West Shepard Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut, and Mrs. MONNIE CALLAN, 1646 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut, representatives of the Connecticut Jeannette Rankin Group, at 4:30 a.m., January 15, 1968. According to the source, the busses containing sixty-two women, were destined to Penn Station, New York City, to connect with a special train for Washington, D.C. The buses were due to return to Penn Station at 11:00 p.m. on January 15, 1968, to pick up and return the Connecticut group.

A second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that MONNIE CALLAN, as a representative of the Lower Harlem Youth Section, attended what appeared to be a youth meeting of the Communist Party held September 9, 1949.

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

1*

100-448475-107

ENCLOSURE

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: January 23, 1968

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via Airtel Air Mail - Registered Mail
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MILWAUKEE (100-15436) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-26-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: [illegible] c.c. [illegible]

Re Bureau Airtel to Albany dated 12/5/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the original and eleven copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter which, as will be noted, actually transpired 1/15/68. Two copies each are also furnished to recipient offices of this communication inasmuch as Atlanta and San Francisco are currently conducting additional investigation concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. WFO was principal office involved in connection with the demonstration 1/15/68.

Milwaukee indices are negative concerning Mrs. BERTHA RUBIN, Mrs. LEON (EDITH) GILMAN, Mrs. ROBERT FRANZ, PEGGY MUELVER and ROBIN MUELVER.

3-Bureau (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 12)
2-Atlanta (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 2)
2-San Francisco (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 2)
2-WFO (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 2)
3-Milwaukee (100-15436)
- (1-100-12791 - LEA BETTY ZELDIN)

GJV/els
(12)

100-446475-[illegible]

REC 16

JAN 25 1968

C. G. - Bishop

F48

Approved: ______________ Sent __________M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

Milwaukee files do reflect additional information concerning LEA BETTY ZELDIN, Security Index subject. This information concerned data from a confidential source abroad (Italian Armed Forces Intelligence Service) to the effect that ZELDIN, while in Bologna, Italy in 1966, attended meetings and participated in rallies of the Italian Communist Party. This information has not been included in the enclosed LHM inasmuch as it is classified "Secret" and would therefore necessitate classification of LHM as "Secret". It is felt that ZELDIN is adequately described through public sources as set forth in LHM as an anti-Vietnam demonstrator.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
January 23, 1968

Demonstration Protesting United States
Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.
January 8, 1968

The "Capital Times", local daily newspaper published at Madison, Wisconsin in its issue of January 15, 1968 carried an article which reflected that Mrs. Lee Zeldin, 5705 Forsythia Place, Madison, Wisconsin and Mrs. Robert Franz, Oregon, Wisconsin were in Washington, D.C. that day participating with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade March on Congress. This article states that Mrs. Zeldin has been in peace demonstrations in Madison, Wisconsin and was a registered peace lobbyist in the State of Wisconsin.

The article also discloses that Mrs. Franz is an observer and delegate from the Madison Womens' International League for Peace and Freedom.

The "Milwaukee Sentinel", local daily morning publication, Milwaukee, Wisconsin in its issue of January 16, 1968 disclosed that Milwaukee Alderman and Milwaukee Common Council Member, Mrs. Vel R. Phillips; Mrs. Bertha Rubin, 3948 North Murray Avenue, Shorewood, Wisconsin and Mrs. Leon Gilman, 3822 North 67th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin had participated in the Jeannette Rankin Brigade March on Congress in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968.

The "Milwaukee Journal", local daily evening publication, Milwaukee, Wisconsin in its issue January 16, 1968 also identified the aforementioned three individuals from the greater Milwaukee area as having attended the demonstration in Washington on January 15, 1968. In addition, its article on the matter identified Robin and Peggy Muelver, sisters, 2506 South 29th Street, Milwaukee as two additional Milwaukee participants.

"This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency."

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

Demonstration Protesting United States
Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.
January 8, 1968

Phillips

The aforementioned Vel Phillips, according to public source information, in addition to being Alderman and Milwaukee Common Council Member, is a member of the Milwaukee Youth Council (MYC), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The MYC has been active in daily marches and demonstrations in Milwaukee, Wisconsin since August 28, 1967 in an effort to obtain open housing legislation in Milwaukee.

The "Wisconsin State Journal", local daily newspaper, Madison, Wisconsin, in its November 17, 1967 issue described Mrs. Lee Zeldin, age 38, 5705 Forsythia Place as a "Vietnam Protestor". The "Capital Times", in an article contained in its issue October 19, 1967 identified Lee Zeldin as a registered lobbyist for the Committee for Direct Action, described as an anti-Vietnam War group. Lee Zeldin is also said in this article to have been active in distributions of anti-War pamphlets.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/26/68

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH (100-15846) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968,
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Bureau airtel to Albany dated 12/5/67, and Miami airtel to Bureau dated 12/28/67, with an enclosed LHM indicating that captioned demonstration might occur on 1/15/68, instead of 1/8/68.

Pittsburgh reliable sources who were alerted to the possibility of captioned demonstration have advised that this demonstration was not discussed at meetings of the Communist Party of Western Pennsylvania (CPWP) or meetings of the Pittsburgh Anti-Vietnam Peace Organization. Informants furnished no information indicating that individuals from the Pittsburgh, Pa., area participated in captioned demonstration.

The identities and dates of contact of Pittsburgh informants are maintained in captioned file.

1D 2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM)
1 - Pittsburgh
DFW:lgh
(5)

EX-109

100-448475-108

REC 6

JAN 30 1968

INT. SEC.

54 FEB 2 1968

137

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/26/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) (C)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM;
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: WFO

REC-1

Re Bureau airtel to all offices, 12/5/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve (12) copies and two (2) copies each for Boston, Cleveland, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, WFO, and Philadelphia of an LHM concerning captioned matter. The copies are furnished the auxiliary offices because persons mentioned in the LHM are from territories of these offices. Copies were sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service, and USA, Seattle.

Sources used in the LHM are as follows:

First source is SE 769-S
Second source is SE 691-S
Third source is SE 648-S
Fourth source is IP 3002-S
Fifth source is SE 490-S

C. O. Bishop

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encl. 12) (REG)
(1 - 100-408204)
2 - Boston (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - Cleveland (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - Los Angeles (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - San Francisco (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - New York (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - WFO (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - Philadelphia (Encl. 2) (REG)
1 - Seattle
RBC:cmh
(18)

REC-1 100-448175 110

EX 104

4 JAN 31 1968

INT. SEC.

XEROX
FEB 6 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SERV. State
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, OD)
DATE FORW: 2-1-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RH

ORIGINAL COPY FILED IN

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

SE 100-29048

The LHM is classified confidential because information from the above source, if disclosed, might compromise regular security informants of continuing value.

A copy of the LHM is designated for BUfile 100-408204 on the source who covered this demonstration at Washington, D.C. for the Seattle Office.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington
January 26, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM; WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING

On January 24, 1968, a confidential source reported five members of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade delegation from Washington State went to Washington, D.C., on United Airlines Flight 42, leaving Seattle shortly after 9 a.m., January 13, 1968. The group consisted of the following:

LONNIE HEALY C. P. MEMBER
TAIMI HALONEN C. P. MEMBER
THORUN ROBEL C. P. MEMBER
HELEN FRENCH
ELAINE HORSLEY

A second source advised in January, 1968, LONNIE HEALY, TAIMI HALONEN and THORUN ROBEL are members of the Communist Party (CP) at Seattle.

The first source went on to state the Seattle delegation was met at Baltimore Friendship Airport by THOMAS BLACKBURN who resides at 9406 Sayebrook, Silver Springs, Maryland. BLACKBURN carried a sign reading "6 Seattle Ladies - J.R. Brigade," which apparently had been made up with the anticipation of there being one more woman in the group. BLACKBURN questioned each person as to her organizational affiliations, with emphasis on church and peace groups. HEALY, HALONEN, and ROBEL all indicated they are with Women Strike for Peace. FRENCH said she did not represent any particular group, and HORSLEY said she was active in her church and interested generally in peace. BLACKBURN said he and his wife are with the American Friends and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. BLACKBURN took the Seattle group to his home. On Sunday morning BLACKBURN invited the women to attend church but only FRENCH accepted. The others said they were going sightseeing in Washington, D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

XEROX
FEB 6 1968

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE. 110

With regard to Women Strike for Peace (WSP), the "People's World", west coast communist newspaper, in its issue of October 20, 1962, quoted Dr. FRANCES HERRING, national leader of WSP, as stating the organization "was composed of autonomous local groups 'open to women of any race, religious creed or political ideology.'"

On May 3, 1965, a third source made available a leaflet distributed by Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP) (see appendix), local affiliate of WSP which stated in part, that Mrs. DONNA ALLEN, a national leader of WSP; Mrs. DAGMAR WILSON, founder and leader of WSP; and RUSS NIXON, General Manager of the "National Guardian" (see appendix) were "found guilty of contempt in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia for refusing to testify at a closed meeting of HUAC (they had expressed a willingness to testify at an open hearing where their views would not be subject to possible distortion by HUAC, as has happened at other closed HUAC hearings)."

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is the social outreach arm of the religious group known as the Society of Friends (Quakers).

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, according to a fourth source in July, 1961, held its annual meeting at St. Paul, Minnesota, from June 26 - 30, 1961. Resolutions passed at the conference included the following proposals: support the repeal of the recent Supreme Court decision which sustained the constitutionality of the registration provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the membership provisions of the Smith Act; favor social and cultural exchange, non-intervention in Cuba, abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and ban further nuclear testing.

The first source went on to state the Seattle delegation went to Room 132-A, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., early Sunday evening, January 14, 1968, where a Steering Committee for the demonstration the following day was meeting. Among those present were MARY CLARKE, Los Angeles, California; JUDITH MORSE EATON of Connecticut; and ELEANOR FRENCH of New York who did not give any sign of being related to HELEN FRENCH of the Seattle group. LONNIE HEALY inquired several times about other Seattle people who might have arrived separately. She also questioned the absence of Negroes on the committee and sought to have a resolution adopted on American Indians. In connection with the Indian matter she distributed a leaflet, a reproduction of which is set out at the end of this memorandum.

C. P. MEMBER C. P. MEMBER C. P. MEMBER

Later MARJORIE RADER, EMELIA CASSIDY, LINDA CORR (Negro) and ZEFRA (STUDAMIRE) (Negro) arrived at the Shoreham Hotel. The source did not know ZEFRA's last name, but it is given later in this memorandum by another source. These four indicated they were being housed at DONNA ALLEN's home in Washington, D.C. RADER joined HEALY in questioning the lack of representation on the Steering Committee of representatives from minority groups. [illegible]

D- 1952

MARJORIE RADER and EMELIA CASSIDY were reported by a fifth source in January, 1968, as being CP members at Tacoma, Washington, and ZEFRA STUDAMIRE was described as a 16-year old Negro girl who has been active in the Young Political Explorers League (YPEL) (see appendix) at Tacoma.

LINDA CORR was reported by the second source as being a CP member at Seattle as of January, 1968.

Following the Steering Committee meeting the group went to dinner. The Seattle delegates met a Mrs. DUNLAP from Pasadena, California, and a MARY BEARDSLEY from Encino, California. DUNLAP said she had been working on a signature campaign for the Peace and Freedom Party of California which was not further described. BEARDSLEY said she works in an office which coordinates the activities of peace organizations. BETTY MEREDITH of Marin County, California, and formerly of Seattle, stopped at the Seattle table and reminisced with HALONEN and ROBEL "about the old days in Seattle." ERICA NIEDER, formerly of Tacoma, Washington, and now of Cleveland, Ohio, inquired of RADER about some people in South Tacoma. From the reaction, it was assumed by the source NIEDER is not closely associated with anyone in whom RADER has an interest.

Following dinner, the Washington State delegation went to Shoreham Suite A-409 occupied by VIVIAN HALLINAN of California. Several California women were there to hear instructions for Monday. Rumors were rampant. One person said police would plant two hundred "agent provocateurs" in the line of march to create scenes which would result in arrests. It was also stated police had prepared for five hundred arrests; that all telephones into the demonstration headquarters were being monitored; and that permission to march was still being withheld. After the California group had been briefed, the following instructions were read to the Washington delegates by MALVINA REYNOLDS of California:

(1) Maintain silence throughout the march.

(2) Maintain strict discipline; walk to the right on the sidewalk.

(3) Follow the instructions of monitors in blue armbands who will be under orders from white arm-banded marshals.

(4) Surround and isolate any trouble makers.

(5) Carry at least $10.00 on your person, preferably $25.00.

(6) Remove all items from your purse that might be considered a weapon; i.e. nail files, hat pins, etc. Remove all addresses except home and emergency addresses from purse.

(7) Don't wear dangling earrings for if one should fall they might cause injury if someone reached out to assist you and caught hold of the earring.

The telephone number of the Brigade headquarters was given for use in case of arrest.

TAIMI HALONEN and THORUN ROBEL were mildly self-critical about not working for the programs the younger women were promoting. TAIMI said she was tired after working long hours on the Seattle conference to be held Saturday, January 20th at Mt. Zion Baptist Church in Seattle at which the Seattle delegation would report. HALONEN made the observation, however, that the women working on the program were all very experienced leaders and she trusted they would formulate a satisfactory program.

On Monday, January 15, 1968, the delegates including the group from Washington State, met at the Union Station in Washington, D C. It was learned here that the instructions which had been given the day before at the Shoreham Hotel were evidently for the California group only, because many California people had been badly beaten in previous demonstrations and they were very cautious and somewhat apprehensive. The official pattern was different. Mimeographed sheets headed "Jeannette Rankin Brigade - Information and Instructions" were passed out and these appeared to be the official instructions. A reproduction is attached.

The Washington State delegation was enlarged when a Mrs. BACKUP from Tacoma arrived. RADER said some of the money usually received from wealthy contributors had been collected by Mrs. BACKUP. Reverend HAROLD BASS of Tacoma collected $120.00, and wanted someone else to go instead of ZEFRA (STUDAMIRE). RADER defended herself when TAIMI HALONEN criticized her for bringing ZEFRA along since ZEFRA is at least six months pregnant.

After the demonstration, HEALY and RADER spent much of the time urging the speakers to include in their talks something about the status of the American Indian. ELLA BAKER from New York did include a paragraph from the paper the Washington State delegation submitted to Congress. This was entitled, "American Indians and the Struggle for Peace". It had been prepared by LONNIE HEALY although at its bottom it carried the notation "(Prepared by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade Delegation from Washington State)."

RADER, HEALY, and CORR became indignant because the audience did not give a standing ovation to Mrs. MARTIN L. KING, Jr. or any of the Negro speakers.

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM; WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

HEALY expressed great dissatisfaction with the basic organization of the gathering. She wanted an organizational meeting instead of a rally type meeting which occurred. HALONEN and ROBEL agreed somewhat. HEALY implied the whole thing was a waste of her time.

In the workshop section of the meeting, HALONEN worked in the legislative action section; HELEN FRENCH and ELAINE HORSLEY in the electoral campaigns; and HEALY and CORR in racism. Here, too, the younger women were very critical. HEALY, particularly, resented having men as "resource people" for the group. She said she thought this was a women's congress. TAIMI said she found herself in a situation that was quite different in that she was working with a very broad spectrum of politically and economically oriented individuals and it was a real learning experience.. ELAINE HORSLEY was anxious to get back home and work for peace while the spirit of JEANNETTE RANKIN was still fresh. She and HELEN FRENCH expressed the view the congress met the needs of American women in giving a concrete program on which to work.

Tuesday, January 16, 1968, was for lobbying. The Seattle and Tacoma people were told to meet at the Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue. HALONEN, ROBEL, HEALY, HORSLEY, and HELEN FRENCH arrived before the appointed time. After about an hour, EMELIA CASSIDY arrived stating RADER had an eye problem and would be unable to attend. Mrs. BACKUP joined the group. LINDA CORR and ZEFRA were too tired to get up so early. The group called on Washington State's Senators JACKSON and MAGNUSON, but they were not in their offices. After leaving a copy of the women's petition and a questionnaire prepared by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (see attachment) they called on Washington State's Congressmen FLOYD HICKS and BROCK ADAMS. Mr. HICKS was out of town. Mrs. HORSLEY knew the Congressman personally and her son knew two of the office personnel. She asked that they relate to him that she was vitally interested in peace and social justice.

Congressman BROCK ADAMS was in his office and spent about twenty minutes talking with the group concerning his political views and some of the political machinations of his party. The group then began to disintegrate. ELAINE HORSLEY left to get a 2:30 flight to Boston where she would visit her son who is attending Harvard University.

CONFIDENTIAL

After some sightseeing in the afternoon, HALONEN, ROBEL, and Mrs. BACKUP checked into the Plaza Hotel since they were going to stay a day or two longer for some workshops. RADER stayed also. The rest of the group, HEALY, CORR, ZEFRA (STUDAMIRE), CASSIDY, and FRENCH went to Friendship Airport and boarded UAL Flight 41 for Seattle.

While in Washington, HEALY kept trying to call a CARL BLOICE who the source thought used to be either in Seattle or San Francisco, but she never reached him.

The workshops held on January 15th after the march were:

(1) Legislative Action

(2) Electoral Campaign

(3) Press

(4) New Women in New World

(5) War at Home

(6) Resistance
  (a) Action
  (b) Draft
  (c) Direct Action

(7) Church

(8) Schools

Reproductions of other documents received by the first source at Washington, D.C. are set out at the end of this memorandum.

On January 23, 1968, the fifth source advised a meeting of the Trade Union CP Club was held at Tacoma, Washington, on January 18, 1968, at which EMELIA CASSIDY, also known as MILLIE CASSIDY, a member of that club, reported on her trip to Washington, D.C. She stated she stayed at DONNA ALLEN's home there. She said MARJORIE RADER got an eye infection which kept her from going to the march. RADER remained at ALLEN's residence. She added ZEFRA STUDAMIRE shouldn't have gone because she was uncooperative and would not attend anything. She was rude, said her bed was too low and complained about the food. Some or all of these

CONFIDENTIAL

troubles might be attributed to the fact STUDAMIRE is expecting a baby in April. CASSIDY stated there were too many rules to follow.

The delegates weren't premitted to carry a nail file, wear peace buttons, or exhibit RANKIN buttons. They had to walk six abreast and were not allowed to march around the White House. She said a suit will be brought in court for this denial of their rights. She went on to state each person had or was given $10.00 to carry on his person so he could not be arrested for vagrancy.

CASSIDY said a nurse, Mrs. HELEN M. COOK, had been very helpful to the group. COOK told CASSIDY she could be reached at 719 Beechwood Road, Media, Pennsylvania, if more information is desired concerning Veterans for Peace, which was not further described.

GUY RADER, a CP member at this meeting, tried to stop CASSIDY when the latter complained ZEFRA STUDAMIRE was too immature to have been sent to the conference, but CASSIDY wasn't easy to stop. She was incensed over the fact money had been used for STUDAMIRE's trip and the latter refused to cooperate. RADER and STUDAMIRE remained in Washington, D.C. after the conference to handle some business with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) according to CASSIDY.

SNCC is an organization which has concerned itself with racial matters in the United States.

C. P. MEMBER C. P. MEMBER

On January 24, 1968, the second source reported a Jeannette Rankin Women's Conference was held at the Mt. Zion Baptist Church, Seattle, Washington, on January 20, 1968, which was attended by about 150 women, including the following members of the CP: LINDA CORR, HALLIE DONALDSON, RUTH EMERSON, VIVIAN GEORGE, VIVIAN GABOURY, TAIMI HALONEN, ALICE HAWKINS, HILDUR JOSEPHINE HUGHES, LONNIE HEALY, IRENE HULL, THORUN ROBEL, MARGE RABBITT, BABA JEAN MANGACANG, and IRENE URQUHART. Of the five persons taking tickets at the door, three were CP members, HEALY, HULL, and ROBEL. DONALDSON, another CP member, had a book display with selections from the Co-op Bookstore, 710 Stewart Street, Seattle.

CONFIDENTIAL

The Washington Cultural Cooperative, which operates the Co-op Bookstore, is characterized in the appendix.

The source went on to say CP member CORR, a Negro, had a display of Negro dolls which she was selling to raise funds to send to the South "to help fight the battle there."

Opening remarks at the meeting were along socialistic lines, according to the source. The principal speaker said capitalism is a rich-man's democracy, while socialism has democracy for the working man

The group then separated into workshops on such topics as welfare, schools, law, young people, working women, and draft resistance. When these smaller groups reassembled, after lunch, some of the delegates to the Jeannette Rankin Brigade affair at Washington, D.C. gave short talks. The speakers included HALONEN, HEALY, CORR, ROBEL, and CASSIDY (from Tacoma), all of whom have been characterized before as CP members. Most of the five spoke as mothers who did not want their sons to go away to fight a rich man's war. They stated wars had not proved anything in the past and had been run by men; Now the women should come to the front and tell the men they are not raising their sons for cannon fodder. The group attending the welfare workshop presented a resolution in support of a black women's lobby to Olympia (the capital of Washington State). A heated debate arose between some of the white women present and three Negroes. The latter contended the white women did not know what the black women had been through. One white woman then stated this was wrong and that the Negro women were trying to isolate themselves from other women who had fought equally as hard as the Negroes. CP members HULL, HEALY, and MANGAOANG cautioned all present to be united, remembering these differences had been built up over hundreds of years and that one meeting would not solve all the difficulties but could be a start in solving them. They indicated it was a healthy sign when they could argue openly and not behind each others backs.

Reproductions of two leaflets distributed at the meeting are set out following the Brigade literature.

AM[illegible] INDIANS AND THE STRUGGLE F[illegible]E

Today, in Battle Creek, Michigan, the city's seal, adopted in 1591, is racist and violent because it pictures a white man hitting an unarmed Indian with a rifle butt. Some Indian youth view the television program "Custer" as indicative of racist America. The National Congress of American Indians opposes this distortion of history. Beatings and murder of Indians in Maine go unchallenged. Congress voted in 195 to open up Indian land reservations to state jurisdiction. In actuality, this rides established tribal courts and federal jurisdiction. It gives local bigoted authorities more opportunity to harrass and open the way to termination of our treaties and in several places resulted in actual loss of land.

It is as deadly to be an Indian in America as it is to be a soldier in Viet Nam. In the three years before 1967, more Indian children below the age of 18 had died in this country than the 6,628 U. S. combat casualties of the entire Viet Nam War (as of the end of 1966). Most of these were children below the age of six.

The price we pay is the built-in racism our children are taught in school, over television, in cartoons; the Indian has become a joke to white Americans. We pay because we don't know our own history.

The thread of struggle for self-determination runs through the history of Indian-Americans. When a few Indian youth speak of Red Power, the roots go deep into their history in finding nourishment for this demand. Just as some Negro leaders today speak of W.E.B. DuBois as having raised the same issue of identity long before the level of struggle, which is Black Power, arrived. This struggle has gone on for 400 years.

The Indian people have been sending spokesmen to bring their grievances and their positions before the power structure of this country for two hundred years. They have fought in the courts since at least 1830 when the case of the Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia tested the ability and the willingness of the United States to protect an Indian Tribe in its efforts at self-determination.

The Vietnamese war is a continuation of the whole racist war we have waged against the Indian People. Understanding this is a part of understanding the Viet Nam war. We respond to what is happening to Vietnamese children, yet the Indian people have suffered from the same policy of extermination and destruction of their identity.

We must unite with the strivings of those who have had to deal with United States' genocide for 200 years!

We can help to push the United States to ratify the United Nations Resolution, "Treaty Against Genocide", that the United States should correct the history and policy of genicide against the Indian people. Today this refers to the destruction of their identity as a people and linke with the struggles of people for their identity all over the world. To stop the policy of genocide, of racism, to develop compensatory steps to undo the effects of the crimes against the Indian people, to remove the oppression of the Indian people!

All the forces in this country cannot win democratic power without making this correction of what was done to the American Indian people.

(Prepared by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade Delegation from Washington State)

Welcome to Washington! Each one of us represents the spirit and message of this call to Americ[illegible] Women. Together, in wide an[illegible]onderful coalition, we are the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE!

We are walking and assembling off Capitol Grounds because we have been denied our First Amendment right to petition Congress on Capitol Grounds. We are challenging this denial in the Federal Courts, not only for ourselves, but for all Americans! Our aim and tactic today is to carry through a silent procession and a peaceful, disciplined protest.

1. Emergency needs, problems or questions of any nature should be reported to Monitors. MONITORS ARE WEARING BLUE ARMBANDS. MONITOR CAPTAINS ARE WEARING WHITE ARMBANDS.

2. Due to Police Department edict, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNS OR BANNERS CARRIED, OTHER THAN THE ONE LEAD-OFF JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. We will, of course, all adhere to this.

3. Press Aides will be beside the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER.

4. Please, NO LITTER! Do not discard this or any other papers on the streets.

5. The address of the Shoreham Hotel (where the Congress is to be held) is 2500 Calvert Street, N. W. We will convene in the Regency and Ambassador Ballrooms.

6. Our route is from Union Station down Louisiana Avenue to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square). WE MUST ALL REMAIN ON THE WEST SIDEWALK, FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF OUR JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. Capitol Police will direct traffic.

7. The JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE OFFICE phone number is 362-9219. The phone number for Housing is 234-0700. Ask for the Regency Ballroom Hospitality Table.

8. As we have agreed, (prior to arriving in Washington) this is to be a quiet, peaceful vigil. We will have no conversation with one another, or with onlookers as we proceed in orderly fashion from Union Station to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square).

9. While we are quietly assembled at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), Viveca Lindfors will read to us the petition being presented by our delegation to Congress.

10. The buses taking us from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel, will be located on Madison Drive and on Washington Drive, from Third Street to Seventh Street. Monitors will guide us to our buses.

11. All of those who have not paid their bus fare from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel are asked to pay 50¢ at the Women's Congress at the Shoreham.

12. PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ANY MATERIALS during the March, or at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square). Free literature may be placed on tables at the Shoreham Hotel. NO literature may be sold or hand-distributed. The only item to be sold is the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BUTTON.

BANNERS CARRIED, OTHER THAN THE ONE LEAD-OFF JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. We will, of course, all adhere to this.

3. Press Aides will be beside the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER.

4. Please, NO LITTER! Do not discard this or any other papers on the streets.

5. The address of the Shoreham Hotel (where the Congress is to be held) is 2500 Calvert Street, N. W. We will convene in the Regency and Ambassador Ballrooms.

6. Our route is from Union Station down Louisiana Avenue to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square). WE MUST ALL REMAIN ON THE WEST SIDEWALK, FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF OUR JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. Capitol Police will direct traffic.

7. The JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE OFFICE phone number is 362-9219. The phone number for Housing is 234-0700. Ask for the Regency Ballroom Hospitality Table.

8. As we have agreed, (prior to arriving in Washington) this is to be a quiet, peaceful vigil. We will have no conversation with one another, or with onlookers as we proceed in orderly fashion from Union Station to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square).

9. While we are quietly assembled at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), Viveca Lindfors will read to us the petition being presented by our delegation to Congress.

10. The buses taking us from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel, will be located on Madison Drive and on Washington Drive, from Third Street to Seventh Street. Monitors will guide us to our buses.

11. All of those who have not paid their bus fare from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel are asked to pay 50¢ at the Women's Congress at the Shoreham.

12. PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ANY MATERIALS during the March; or at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square). Free literature may be placed on tables at the Shoreham Hotel. NO literature may be sold or hand-distributed. The only item to be sold is the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BUTTON.

13. All of thise instructions, as well as all of the decisions regarding the day's activities, have been made by a National Steering Committee representing the entire coalition.

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

QUESTIONS FOR CONGRESSMEN

Prepared by The Legislative Office
Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, Washington, D.C.
January 10, 1968

1. Q: Will you do everything in your power to help work for an early end of the war?
   (a) Will you support the plea of U Thant and the Pope for an end (or halt) to the bombing in North Vietnam and arrangements for a cease-fire?
   (b) Will you support negotiations with the National Liberation Front which is doing the major fighting in South Vietnam?
   (c) Will you support a Geneva-type Conference, or UN efforts to end the war?

   A: ______________________________

2. Q: Will you support increased appropriations for anti-poverty measures and full funding for rent supplements, Model Cities programs and OEO programs?

   A: ______________________________

3. Q: Will you vote for the Federal open housing law (Title V of the Civil Rights bill) and for the Civil Rights Protection bill which will strengthen criminal laws against the intimidation or injuring of civil rights workers?

   A: ______________________________

4. Q: Will you actively oppose either a planned or executed land invasion of North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, by American or any other troops?

   A: ______________________________

5. Q: Will you work for revision of the punitive and reactionary welfare measures which were included in the Social Security Act passed in the first session of the 90th Congress?

A: ______________________________

____

6. Q: Will you support the establishment of a National Commission on Guaranteed Incomes and legislation funding such a program of income maintenance?

A: ______________________________

____

7. Q: Will you demonstrate your opposition to the war by refusing to vote funds for its continuation? There were 18 Representatives and 3 Senators who refused to vote for the $12 billion dollar supplemental appropriation (for Fiscal Year 1968) in January, 1967. Will you be among them in January or February when the 1969 supplemental comes up?

A: ______________________________

____

____

8. Q: Will you read into the Congressional Record a request that Dean Rusk appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open hearings? (Secretary Rusk has not appeared in public testimony on the subject of Vietnam since January 28, 1966.)

A: ______________________________

____

____

9. Q: Will you support a "sense of Congress" Resolution calling for opposition to continued American involvement in Vietnam? Will you co-sponsor such a resolution?

A: ______________________________

____

____

RIDERS' INSTRUCTIONS

7:20 am: Train departs from Pennsylvania Station, New York. Coffee and snacks will available on the train; please eat your lunches *before* the train arrives in Washington. Sandwiches available for purchase on return train from Washingt

There will be a Marshall, identifiable by her blue arm-band, on each car of the special train, to answer questions, etc. She will collect $1.00 from each woman for bus fare in Washington, which includes the ride from the Capitol to the Shoreham Hotel, and from the hotel to Union Station in time to catch the train back to Newark and New York.

11:30 am: Assemble at Union Station Depot and proceed IN SILENCE to Capitol behind state-name signs which will be available at the station in Washington.

AT THE CAPITOL, we have requested that a delegation of 50 present our petition to Hou Speaker McCormack and Senate Majority Leader Mansfield. We are still negotiating for that plan. We will be orderly, peaceable, law-abiding in our demonstration.

AFTER THIS DEMONSTRATION, proceed to chartered buses at Supreme Court Parking Area. will take us to Hotel Shoreham, 2500 Calvert Street, N.W. (about a half-ho ride).

3:00 - 6:00 pm: WOMEN'S CONGRESS at the Hotel Shoreham. The program includes speake from all parts of the Coalition of Individuals, who will analyze women's in ending the war and ending our domestic neglect. The Congress will be launching ground for community action proposals.

5:15 pm: *Philadelphia woman only leave the Shoreham by bus for their train, which leaves from Union Station at 6:00 pm.*

6:00 pm: For people returning to Union Station only, buses leave Hotel Shoreham. for New York and Newark leaves Union Station at 7:10 pm.

8:30 pm: Workshops at Hotel Shoreham for those staying over.

Tuesday, January 16: Plans will be detailed Monday night for Tuesday's activities around lobbying Congress.

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade
January 15, 1968

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Washington, D.C. January 15, 1968

Congress of American Women

Chairmen:
Pearl Willen, New York
Coretta King, Georgia
Mary Clarke, California

CALL TO ORDER ....
Pearl Willen, New York

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COALITION...
Vivian Hallinan, California
Coretta King, Georgia

MESSAGE....
Jeannette Rankin, Montana

READINGS....
Ruby Dee, New York

REPORT FROM THE DELEGATION TO THE CAPITOL
Katherine Camp, Pennsylvania

REPORT ON OUR SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT IN WASHINGTON....
Harriet Van Tassel, New York

MESSAGES...
Mary Clarke, California

POLITICAL ACTION IN 1968....
Val Phillips, Wisconsin

"WE ARE OUTRAGED....

"BY THE RUTHELESS SLAUGHTER IN VIETNAM"
Charlotte Bunch ~~Weeks~~, Washington, D.C.

"BY THE PERSISTENT NEGLECT OF HUMAN NEEDS AT HOME."
Ella Baker, New York

JEANNETTE
RANKIN
BRIGADE

"WE DECLARE OUR INTENTIONS.....
Chairman: Cynthia Wedel, New York

Vivian Rothstein, Illinois
Judith Morse Eaton, Connecticut
Doris Turner, New York
Dagmar Wilson, Washington, D.C.
Fannie Lou Hamer, Mississippi

CLOSING...

"Let us declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations."

NOTE: It is requested that each participant contribute one dollar, or more, to defray the expenses of the Women's Congress.

and unconstitutional infringement of their First Amendment rights to assembly, free speech and the right to petition their government for a redress of grievances.

Upon informing the Capitol Police of their planned march to the Capitol building to present their petition, the women were threatened with arrest under 40 U.S.C. 193 (a) et. seq. which, after defining the area considered Capitol Grounds, states:

> "It is forbidden to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in said United States Capitol Grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement......"

The statute further provides that exceptions from these prescriptive provisions will be made in the discretion of certain Congressional leaders and/or Capitol Police. The exceptions are allowed on "ocassions of national interest becoming the congnizance and entertainment of Congress."

The petition of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade apparently does not become "the entertainment of Congress" and arrests were threatened. Therefore the suit which was files prays for the convening of a three-judge Federal District Court which is requested to enjoin the operation and enforcement of the statute and to declare it unconstitutional. We have asked the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to grant us this relief on an emergency basis prior to January 15th. Our request was denied. The same request was made to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and was likewise denied. As it was then impossible to obtain relief prior to January 15th the Brigade's attorneys are continuing the appeal on a non-emergency basis in the Court of Appeals and have every confidence of ultimate victory.

This is far from the last time that these women or any other Americans intend to appear in their nation's Capitol to petition their government. Hopefully this will be the last time that they find it so difficult to do so.

Jeannette Rankin Brigade
Jeannette Rankin, Montana
Donna Allen, Washington,DC
Mia Aurbakken-Adjali, NY
Ellen Aurbakken, NJ
Ella J. Baker, NY ELLA [illegible]
Helen Baker, NY
Anna M. Bennett, NY
Ada Black, NY
Elinor G. Black, NY
Mercedes M. Randell, NY
Kay Boyle, Calif
Mrs. Harry Bridges, Calif
Katherine L Camp, Pa KATHERINE CAMP
Mary Clarke, Calif, D.C
Mary Moss Cuthbertson, Pa
Ruby Dee, NY
Eleanor French, NY
Ruth A. Friess, NY
Sister Margeurite Hafner, Ill.
Vivian Halinan, Calif
Elizabeth Curry Hyslop, NY
Hon. Mrs. J. Preston Irwin, Ohio

Mrs. I. Lee Levy, NY
Olive Mayer, Calif
Jessica Mitford, Calif
Mrs. Kenneth Montgomery, Ill
Nelle Morton, NJ
Dorothy Nyland, Ohio
Mildred Scott Olmsted, Pa
Grace Paley, NY
Louise Peck, Ohio
Nan Pendergrast, Ga
Malvina Reynolds, Calif
Muriel Rukeyser, NY
Juanita J. Saddler, NY
Dr. Winifred Shannon, N.M.
Edna Sinclair, Mass.
Helen Huntington Smith, NY
Mrs. Jane C. Spock, NY
Margaret Stein, Calif.
Lydia Stokes, NJ
Amy Swerdlow, NY
Ethel Taylor, Pa
Mariam Thompson, NY
Helen B Turnbull, NY
Louise Wallace, Kan.

The statute further provides that exceptions from these will be made in the discretion of certain Congressional leaders and/or Capitol Police. The exceptions are allowed on "ocassions of national interest becoming the congnizance and entertainment of Congress."

The petition of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade apparently does not become "the entertainment of Congress" and arrests were threatened. Therefore the suit which was files prays for the convening of a three-judge Federal District Court which is requested to enjoin the operation and enforcement of the statute and to declare it unconstitutional. We have asked the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to grant us this relief on an emergency basis prior to January 15th. Our request was denied. The same request was made to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and was likewise denied. As it was then impossible to obtain relief prior to January 15th the Brigade's attorneys are continuing the appeal on a non-emergency basis in the Court of Appeals and have every confidence of ultimate victory.

This is far from the last time that these women or any other Americans intend to appear in their nation's Capitol to petition their government. Hopefully this will be the last time that they find it so difficult to do so.

Jeannette Rankin Brigade
Jeannette Rankin, Montana
Donna Allen, Washington, DC
Mia Aurbakken-Adjali, NY
Ellen Aurbakken, NJ
Ella J. Baker, NY ELLA BAKER
Helen Baker, NY
Anna M. Bennett, NY
Ada Black, NY
Elinor G. Black, NY
Mercedes M. Randell, NY
Kaye Boyle, Calif
Mrs. Harry Bridges, Calif
Katherine L Camp, Pa
Mary Clarke, Calif
Mary Moss Cuthbertson, Pa
Ruby Dee, NY
Eleanor French, NY
Ruth A. Friess, NY
Sister Margeurite Hafner, Ill.
Vivian Halinan, Calif
Elizabeth Curry Hyslop, NY
Hon. Mrs. J. Preston Irwin, Ohio
Ethel Jensen, Pa
Helen Kearns, NY
Grace Killens, NY
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ga
Ruth R. Krause, NJ
Margaret Kuhn, Pa
Denise Levertov, NY

Mrs. I. Lee Levy, NY
Olive Mayer, Calif
Jessica Mitford, Calif
Mrs. Kenneth Montgomery, Ill
Nelle Morton, NJ
Dorothy Nyland, Ohio
Mildred Scott Olmsted, Pa
Grace Paley, NY
Louise Peck, Ohio
Nan Pendergrast, Ga
Malvina Reynolds, Calif
Muriel Rukeyser, NY
Juanita J. Saddler, NY
Dr. Winifred Shannon, N.M.
Edna Sinclair, Mass.
Helen Huntington Smith, NY
Mrs. Jane C. Spock, NY
Margaret Stein, Calif.
Lydia Stokes, NJ
Amy Swerdlow, NY
Ethel Taylor, Pa
Mariam Thompson, NY
Helen B. Turnbull, NY
Louise Wallace, Kan.
Cynthia C Wedel, NY
Cora Weiss, NY
Pearl Willen, NY
Dagmar Wilson, Washington, DC
Winnifred Wygal, NY

[illegible]st ry of Modern Welfar[illegible]rams

Modern welfare programs in the United States began with passage of the Social Security Act---in 1935, authorizing federal grants to states for public assistance and child welfare programs. In 1937, the Washington Legislature repealed the Paupers Law of 1854 and enacted a State Social Security Law. "Welfare" has been a bone of contention ever since.

Greenleigh Report

In 1963, the Washington Legislature appropriated $20,000 for a study of the state's public assistance programs. The study was made by Greenleigh Associates, and the Greenleigh Report was presented in December, 1964.

> This report stated that public assistance grants in Washington, with standards based on 1959 prices and 12% ratable reductions, were 40% below the minimum standards for health and decency. Speaking of child welfare needs, the report said: "There is an excessive and increasing rate of referral of children to the Juvenile Courts, both for dependency and delinquency. There is an excessive and increasing trend for children to be removed from their natural families and cared for elsewhere."

WHAT ABOUT RATABLE REDUCTIONS?

The 1965 Legislature removed the ratable reductions. The 1967 Legislature ordered the Dept. of Public Assistance to bring it's pricing standard's up to 1967 levels.

New standards were put into effect July first. Increased allowances for rent vary from county to county. Other allowances were increased an average of 10-3/4%. In King County the total increase was 16%. Thus, King County grants have been increased by 28% since 1964, but the cost of living has increased by at least 5%. Grants are stil 17% less than acceptable levels.

> The maximum grant for a Seattle family consisting of two adults, a boy 13, and a girl 8, is $285.80 a month--$3,429 a year. But recent changes in the Federal Social Security Law cast a shadow on even this figure. The local welfare officials will not offer any guess as to what may happen next. NEW RATABLE REDUCTIONS ARE ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY.

There is much talk of getting people off welfare by putting them to work. Yet who will take care of the children? Child care costs from $60 to $80 per child per month in Seattle.

Some examples of women's wages:

Nurses Aid - $1.40 per hour -- $2912.00 per year
House Cleaners - $1.65 per Hr Dept. Store Clerk - $1.76¼ per hr
hotel maids 1.69 " "
Laundry Workers 1.93 " "
garment " 1.60 " " Minimum
Journey women clerk - 2.01½ per hr -- $4186.00 per year

PREPARED FOR: Washington State Grassroots Assembly of Women
January 20, 1968

bleak indeed. The Boeing Company in Seattle
garnishments brought against its workers every month by creditors who force the Company and the Courts to become little better than collection agencies. The following information is supplied by the Seattle Legal Services Center.]

HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM
WAGE GARNISHMENTS

1. GET A LAWYER IMMEDIATELY if your wages are garnished. The Seattle Legal Services Center provides lawyers for people with low incomes who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer. A similar service for low income workers is provided by the Tacoma Legal Assistance Office, 1501 South "M" Street, Tacoma.

2. DO NOT GO TO COURT ALONE and do not call the creditor without legal advice, or they may help you to confess judgment against yourself, and you can lose your wages and your case without any evidence or trial or opportunity to testify. Do not sign a confession of judgment without your lawyer's advice.

3. DO NOT IGNORE THE ACTION or a default judgment may be entered against you without your knowledge. Your lawyer can prevent this if you notify him promptly of the action.

4. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION of $25.00 per week, plus $10.00 for the first dependent, plus $5.00 for each additional dependent, up to a maximum of $50.00 per week. Be sure you claim an exemption for each week's wages caught by the garnishment. You don't have to state whether you owe the debt to claim an exemption.

5. YOU MAY HAVE A DEFENSE to all or part of the claim if it includes a "collection fee" or "attorney's fee", if it is an old debt, if it was incurred by fraud or deception, if you did not get what you bargained for or if you have been through bankruptcy. Your lawyer may advise you of other defenses to the garnishment.

6. JURY TRIAL AND NIGHT COURT may be available to you, in certain cases, by requesting them. Jury trials cost $6.00 and night court costs $1.00 in Justice Court.

7. IF YOU ARE FIRED because of a garnishment, report it to your union and you may be able to file a grievance or have it arbitrated.

8. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. Many Courts say that garnishment is not "misconduct" on the job. If you are refused unemployment compensation for this reason, you have only 10 days to file Notice of Appeal with the Employment Security Department.

9. WELFARE, VETERANS AND SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS and certain other kinds of government benefits cannot be garnished.

10. BANKRUPTCY OR A WAGE EARNER PLAN may be a way to protect yourself from repeated garnishments.

* *

SEATTLE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER

Furnished by Washington State Labor Council, AFL-CIO.

low incomes who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer. A si[illegible]vice for low income workers is provided by the Tacoma Legal Assistance Office, 150[illegible] South "M" Street, Tacoma.

2. DO NOT GO TO COURT ALONE and do not call the creditor without legal advice, or they may help you to confess judgment against yourself, and you can lose your wages and your case without any evidence or trial or opportunity to testify. Do not sign a confession of judgment without your lawyer's advice.

3. DO NOT IGNORE THE ACTION or a default judgment may be entered against you without your knowledge. Your lawyer can prevent this if you notify him promptly of the action.

4. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION of $25.00 per week, plus $10.00 for the first dependent, plus $5.00 for each additional dependent, up to a maximum of $50.00 per week. Be sure you claim an exemption for each week's wages caught by the garnishment. You don't have to state whether you owe the debt to claim an exemption.

5. YOU MAY HAVE A DEFENSE to all or part of the claim if it includes a "collection fee" or "attorney's fee", if it is an old debt, if it was incurred by fraud or deception, if you did not get what you bargained for or if you have been through bankruptcy. Your lawyer may advise you of other defenses to the garnishment.

6. JURY TRIAL AND NIGHT COURT may be available to you, in certain cases, by requesting them. Jury trials cost $6.00 and night court costs $1.00 in Justice Court.

7. IF YOU ARE FIRED because of a garnishment, report it to your union and you may be able to file a grievance or have it arbitrated.

8. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. Many courts say that garnishment is not "misconduct" on the job. If you are refused unemployment compensation for this reason, you have only 10 days to file Notice of Appeal with the Employment Security Department.

9. WELFARE, VETERANS AND SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS and certain other kinds of government benefits cannot be garnished.

10. BANKRUPTCY OR A WAGE EARNER PLAN may be a way to protect yourself from repeated garnishments.

Washington State AFL-CIO
Furnished by Labor Council

* *

SEATTLE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER

Main Office	West Seattle	Pioneer Square	Central Area
1700 E. Cherry	6528 32nd S. W.	104 1/2 Cherry	23rd & Union
EAst 9-2450	WEst 7-8330	MAin 3-5455	EAst 9-3200

opeiu#8

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

"Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly, *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, "Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell", August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

APPENDIX

SEATTLE WOMEN ACT FOR PEACE (SWAP)

A source reported on May 17, 1962, a meeting of the Ballard-Greenwood CP Club was held in Seattle, April 25, 1962, at which TAIMI HALONEN was nominated to be the new Chairman of this Club. Along with other business of the evening, HALONEN said she expected to devote a good portion of her time to SWAP, an organization of peace forces that met recently with seven members. She said four of the seven were from the "left" but did not go into detail. She said the group had problems of an organizational nature because it was new, and she thought she could help.

On April 5, 1963, a second source stated a meeting of the University CP Club was held at Seattle on April 2, 1963. KEN ROSE, a member of the Club, reported the most influential peace organization in Seattle was SWAP.

On July 31, 1964, a meeting of the North Central CP Section Committee was held at Seattle. WILL PARRY, Section Chairman, said attention should be placed on three political questions - peace, civil rights, and labor. Under peace, he said CP clubs should inject the Women Act for Peace campaign into the election campaign. At another Section meeting, February 5, 1966, TAIMI HALONEN was praised for effective peace work and for her help in developing unity among the peace forces. Section-wide concentration was urged in assisting SWAP to visit 1,000 workers on the Vietnam issue.

A third source advised on February 24, 1966, a Northwest District CP Committee meeting was held at Seattle February 12, 1966. After lunch, the entire group participated in passing out leaflets pertaining to racial matters and the Vietnam war which carried the name of SWAP, 5411 Ravenna Avenue Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98105, which address has been used consistently by SWAP and is that of ANCI KOPPEL, also known as Mrs. CHARLES KOPPEL. KOPPEL has been and continues to be the coordinator and apparent prime motivating force of SWAP as of May, 1967.

A fourth source reported in 1945 ANCI KOPPEL was a member of the Professional Group of the Communist Political Association (CPA), also known as the Rogers CP Club at Seattle, Washington.

The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPE[illegible]

WASHINGT[illegible] COOPERATIVE (WCC), aka Washington Cultural [illegible] Association

On February 23, 1960, a source reported the Communist Party (CP), Northwest District Committee, at a meeting in January, 1960, decided to prepare for opening a cooperative bookstore and directed the CP State Board to set up a Party committee for this purpose.

The above source also reported that at a state-wide CP conference held on August 27, 1960, CP District Chairman BURT NELSON reported on the WCC. NELSON announced the committee was determined to have the bookstore opened by the earliest possible date, probably October 15, (1960). He urged support of the WCC.

A second source in February and March, 1960, advised a committee of CP members during those months commenced organization of the WCC with authorized capital of $2,000 which was to sell shares and make other plans for operation of a bookstore selling "progressive" literature at Seattle. In May and June, 1960, this source reported BURT NELSON, on May 18, 1960, stated the CP District Literature Commission would concern itself with the bookstore and other types of literature to be sold. On May 31, 1960, BURT NELSON suggested October 1, 1960, as the tentative opening date of the bookstore.

A second source advised on November 2, 1960, the principal aim of the WCC is to establish a bookstore in the Seattle area inasmuch as this need has long been recognized by the Washington State CP due to difficulties encountered in maintaining a Party literature apparatus, and it is desired to have available public facilities to attract supporters and sympathizers. This source stated the WCC has obtained a location for its bookstore at 710 Stewart Street, Seattle, and operations commenced at that location on November 5, 1960.

A third source advised on May 1, 1967, that the WCC held its annual meeting of shareholders at the Roosevelt Hotel, Seattle, on April 30, 1967. As a part of the business at this meeting, a report was made on the financial status of "Co-op Books", 710 Stewart Street, Seattle, for the preceding year.

APPENDIX

YOUNG POLITICAL EXPLORERS LEAGUE (YPEL)

A source stated REE ANN HALONEN, daughter of OIVA HALONEN, who was then the Chairman of the Communist Party's Industrial Section at Seattle, had said on July 29, 1957, that the youth group in Seattle was considering adoption of the name Young Political Explorers.

A second source advised a meeting of the Communist Party (CP) Downtown Club in Seattle was held on October 30, 1958. WANDA HUBBARD, CP member, stated she was the youth director of the Young Political Explorers. She stated there were two groups in Washington, and the Seattle group had fifteen active members. The age limits were from twelve to twenty years of age. The purpose of the group was to examine all political ideas, including socialism.

A third source also reported on the CP Downtown Club meeting on October 30, 1958. WANDA HUBBARD stated the youths had chosen the names of Young Political Explorers, which is a statewide CP organization and was formerly known as the Labor Youth League. HUBBARD stated it is directly supported and directed by the CP.

> The Labor Youth League has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A fourth source advised MARY SUTHERLAND, Youth Director of the Northwest District of the CP, stated on May 17, 1961, that she was handling two youth groups, one of which was the teenage youth group.

The fourth source advised on February 10, 1967, the Young Political Explorers League continues in existence in the Seattle area and is under the guidance and leadership of MARY SUTHERLAND.

-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington

January 26, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM; WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Communication dated and captioned as above at Seattle, Washington.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: FEB 5 1968

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
1/15/68;
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO:WFO)

Re Philadelphia airtel to the Director, 1/16/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Two copies are designated for WFO as Office of Origin. Two information copies each are designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have an investigation pending on the "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally th 109th MI Group, NISO, OSI, and Secret Service.

The first source is PH 475-S, and the second source is former PH 286-S.

The LHM was classified Confidential since it contained information from Source one and Source two, the unauthorized disclosure of which might reasonably result in the identification thereof, and compromise the future effectiveness of sources of

3-Bureau (100-448475) (Enc.-11) (RM)
1-Atlanta (Enc.-2) Info (RM)
1-San Francisco (Enc.-2) Info (RM)
2-WFO (100-47178) (Enc.-2) (RM)
5-Philadelphia
  1-100-49497
  1-100-35008 (PEARL CHERTOV)
  1-100-45773 (KATHERINE CAMP)
  ~~1-100-40771 (VIVIAN WILLIAMS)~~
  1-134-537 Sub A (PH 475-S)

KKS;bjt
(12)

100-448475-111

REC-28 FEB 6 1968

INT. SEC.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., State
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~) IPU

DATE FORW: 2/7/68
HOW FORW: [illegible]

FEB 13 1968

continuing value.

PH 475-S advised that Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS was to have been in the small, select group that presented the petition to Congress. However, she became separated from this group in the crowd and was not among those who called on Congress.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

FEB 5 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968

On January 19, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information:

On January 15, 1968, a group of approximately 175 women gathered at the Pennsylvania Railroad 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, Pa. They boarded three special coaches on the 8:10 a.m. train for Washington, D.C. The group was the Philadelphia Contingent of the Jeannette Rankin PA, DC Brigade which was going to petition the Congress of the United States against the War in Vietnam.

The train arrived at Washington, D.C., at about 10:45 a.m. The group remained at Union Station, Washington, D.C., for about an hour waiting for women arriving at the station from other points, so that the march could begin.

When all were assembled, the group marched in orderly fashion to Union Square near the Capitol. Prior to the march it was announced that a small group of women would present their petition to Congress, while VIVECA LINDFORS D.C. would read the petition to the assembled group of women at Union Square.

At Union Square, a girl folk singer entertained and there was a brief period of silence for those killed in Vietnam. There appeared to be about 5,000 women assembled

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

1

ENCLOSURE

at the Square. Most of the women wore some article of black clothing.

After the assembly at Union Square, the women boarded buses that took them to the Shoreham Hotel, where a Congress of American Women was convened. This began about 3:00 p.m.

D.C.

Among the speakers were CORETTA KING, JEANETTE RANKIN, D.C. and KATHERINE CAMP. D.C. - PA.

The Philadelphia delegation left the Shoreham at 5:00 p.m., for the return trip home. They left Union Station, Washington, D.C., on the 6:10 p.m., train for Philadelphia.

Among those who were in the Philadelphia delegation were KATHERINE CAMP of the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom, PEARL CHERTOV, and Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS.

PA. - D.C.

The source stated that Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS is the mother of Army Private RONALD LOCKMAN, who had been court-martialed for refusing an order to board transport for duty in Vietnam.

The source stated that WILLIAMS, while at the Women's Congress at the Shoreham, was observed being interviewed by newspaper reporters about her son.

A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 26, 1968, that PEARL CHERTOV was the organizer for the Philadelphia Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (PBSWP). PA - D.C.

A characterization of PBSWP is attached to this memorandum.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 2/27/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)
BUfile 100-448475
WFO file 100-47173
AT file 100-7300

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., State
RAO (ISD, CRD, ~~CD~~)
DATE FORW: 2/1/68
HOW FORW: ______
BY: RHH:dlw

11 + encl. 9/22, 9th + 10.

Re Buairtel to Albany, 12/5/67; Atlanta teletypes to Director, 12/28/67 and 1/30/68; Atlanta airtels to Director, 1/4/68, 1/12/68 and 1/16/68, all with first caption.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM prepared at Atlanta on 2/27/67, captioned "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)", and suitable for dissemination.

ENCLOSURE
REC-69
EX-110
100-448475-114
FEB 28 1968

④ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (100-58302) (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta
CTH:met
(10)

2 encls destroyed

INT. SEC.

NW 88321 DocId:32989544 Page 452

Sent ______ M Per ______

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Ft. McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

The source utilized in the enclosed LHM to characterize ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY is SF 1917-S.

Enclosed LHM is being classified CONFIDENTIAL since unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the informant reflected therein could reasonably result in the identifying of this source of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

Referenced Bureau airtel to Albany, 12/5/67, instructed San Francisco and Atlanta to institute investigation under the caption "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE." The only individual with any known subversive background determined to have had any connection with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in the Atlanta Division is ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY, who was last known to have paid CP dues in California in 1961, and apparently subsequently was "kicked out of the Communist Party because of her present religious jag" in 1961.

The only activity of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade with which ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY was known to have been connected was on one occasion when she participated in a public meeting at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta on 1/4/68, where discussions were held regarding plans for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade trip to Washington.

In view of the absence of any known subversive affiliation of any individuals in prominent positions with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, the above-mentioned information regarding ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY's connection with the organization is being set forth in the enclosed LHM, under the caption of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, and no further investigation is being conducted under the Jeannette Rankin Brigade caption at the present time, UACB.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
February 27, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The January 2, 1968, issue of "The Atlanta Journal", a daily newspaper published in Atlanta, Georgia, carried an article captioned "Miss Rankin Plans Peace Talk Here" which stated that Jeannette Rankin would address a group of Atlanta women interested in peace activities at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 4, 1968, and Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., a national sponsor of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, would also speak at this meeting. The article stated further that Isobel Cerney, founder of the Southern Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, would be on the program at the Ebenezer Baptist Church.

ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY

A source on August 25, 1961, advised that a meeting of the Palo Alto Communist Club, Palo Alto, California, was held on August 23, 1961, and that $36.00 was turned over in this meeting as an up-to-date payment of Communist Party dues for Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney.

The source also advised on September 18, 1961, that a close friend was trying to have Isobel Cerney kicked out of the

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPIES DESTROYED
KZ MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

Communist Party because of her present religion "jag" and because she did not attend Communist Party meetings regularly when visiting Palo Alto during the Summers.

The source further advised on August 28, 1962, that Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney were then out of the Communist Party, although the $25.00 received for their current dues was to be retained by the Party.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
February 27, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Character: INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference: Memorandum prepared at Atlanta,
Georgia, on February 27, 1968,
captioned as above.

All sources whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

D-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/14/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (RUC)

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(IS)
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are nine copies and for Washington Field and Oklahoma City, two copies each of an LHM with results of an anti-Vietnam war rally held in NYC on 3/7/68. An information copy of this LHM has been furnished 108th MI Group, NYC.

The first source used in the LHM is NY 6001-R; the second source used is NY 3527-S.

R

The attached LHM is classified "Confidential" because of information furnished by the above two sources who are of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of the information furnished could identify these sources and therefore affect the national security interests.

1-982dsh

ENCLOSURE 1-932dsh

-110
REC-34

3 - Bureau (Encl. 9) (RM)
2 - Oklahoma City (Encl. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO (Encl. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (100-154786) (VIDEM) (42)
1 - New York

100-44[illegible]10

HPB:ecs
(10)

10 MAR 15 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE

RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD) IDIU~~
DATE FORW: 3-20-68
HOW FORW: RS
BY: Ghm/pac

C. C. - Bishop

F14

INT. SEC.

MAR 20 1968

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

March 14, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NYfile 100-161601

Jeannette Rankin Brigade

On March 2, 1968, "The Guardian," formerly known as the "National Guardian," page 15, had an advertisement for a rally sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade with the theme of "End War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." The rally was to be held at the Community Church, 45 East 35th Street, New York City, on March 7, 1968, at 8:00 PM.

A characterization of the "National Guardian" is attached hereto.

On March 8, 1968, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the above rally was held at the Community Church in New York City, on March 7, 1968, from 8:00 PM to 10:30 PM. Approximately one-hundred individuals attended. The main speaker was Diedra Stapp who spoke in opposition to the war in Vietnam. She called for an immediate cessation of the bombing and for immediate negotiations. She stated that the South Vietnamese soldiers should be doing the fighting. Stapp also stated that her husband was currently a member of the United States Army and that he was having difficulties with the Army and that she expected him to be discharged in the near future and that he would not receive an honorable discharge.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

100-448326-10

ENCLOSURE

Another speaker was Florynce Kennedy who spoke primarily on racial matters. She stated that blacks and whites must live together or there will be frequent riots. She also indicated that she believed the government was attempting to get rid of some of the black leaders by prosecuting them. She called for the election of Dr. Benjamin Spock as President and also called for a hunger strike until the war in Vietnam was settled. Reverend Thomas Hayes gave an anti-Vietnam war speech in which he made reference to a book he had written about the Vietnam war. He also read a recent article in the "Wall Street Journal" concerning the war in Vietnam.

A film was shown of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade activities in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, in which they demonstrated against the war in Vietnam in the vicinity of the United States Capitol and also held anti-war meetings on that date. Additionally, entertainment was provided by some individuals playing bongo drums and a female dancer.

Dierdra Griswold Stapp

Dierdra Stapp

A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Dierdra Griswold is a member of the National Committee of the Workers World Party (WWP) as of November 1, 1967.

N.Y.

A characterization of WWP is attached hereto.

Florynce Kennedy

Florynce Kennedy has been publicly identified as an attorney for H. Rap Brown, National Chairman, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

APPENDIX

1.

"NATIONAL GUARDIAN"

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "NATIONAL GUARDIAN
>
> "1. 'established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly * * *. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.' (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the ROSENBERGs and MORTON SOBELL, August 25, 1956, p. 12.)"

APPENDIX

1.

WORKERS WORLD PARTY

On April 17, 1959, a confidential source advised that on February 12, 1959, a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) minority group under the leadership of National Committee member SAM BALLAN, split from the SWP.

The source stated that this minority group, referred to as the Marcyites, after many years of program and policy differences on varied issues concerning tactics and interpretation of political events, split from the SWP on the grounds that the Party was liquidating itself by departing from the Marxist precepts of LEON TROTSKY and retreating from the fight for the world socialist revolution. The final issue which ultimately forced the split was the minority's opposition to the SWP regroupment policy which involved cooperation with the Communist Party (CP) periphery-individuals characterized by the minority as petty-bourgeois.

The minority program, according to the source, advocated unconditional defense of the Soviet Union and has as its goal the building of a revolutionary party with a complete proletarian orientation for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism in the United States and throughout the world.

On May 12, 1960, source advised that this minority group had chosen the name Workers World Party.

On May 1, 1967, a second confidential source advised that the Workers World Party, which maintains headquarters at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York, supports the People's Republic of China in its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.

The SWP and CP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475) DATE: 3/19/68

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)(RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WASHINGTON FIELD

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re San Francisco airtel and letterhead memorandum to the Bureau, dated 1/16/68.

This matter was opened by the San Francisco Office on November 17, 1967, on receipt of information from SF 1773-S that an organization known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade had sent out a call for a demonstration to be held at the White House, Washington, D. C., on January 8, 1968, in protest of the war in Vietnam. As noted in referenced San Francisco communication, the above efforts culminated in a demonstration at San Francisco, California, on January 15, 1968, and a companion demonstration held in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968.

A review of the San Francisco files in the above matter reflects that NIKKI BRIDGES, San Francisco Chairman of the Brigade, was on March 2, 1967, listed as a recipient of a new yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW), expiration date March 4, 1968. There is no known Communist Party (CP) membership on the part of BRIDGES. VIVIAN HALLINAN, Executive Secretary of the Brigade, is the only other individual noted as an officer of the Brigade according to San Francisco files. San Francisco files do not reflect any known CP membership on the part of HALLINAN.

REC-71 100-44 115

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Atlanta (INFO)(100-7300)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(RM)
1 - San Francisco
GOW/sms #9
(6)

MAR 21 1968

SEC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

MAR 28 1968

On January 31, 1968, at a meeting of the Marin County Chapter of the Women's International League For Peace and Freedom (WILPF), SF 2955-S advised that during a general discussion concerning the Brigade, it was felt that the group did not want the Brigade to become another formalized group, but rather keep the Brigade as a loose organization, and as an umbrella group for the WILPF.

San Francisco files in addition reflect that there has not been at any time a known group of members of the Brigade; rather the organization has been sponsored by women on both a local and national level, many of whom are members of varied women's peace groups.

In view of the above information, indicating a lack of specific membership and future activity, no further investigation is being conducted by the San Francisco Office under the Jeannette Rankin Brigade caption at the present time, UACB.

This matter will be closely followed and should any future information received by the San Francisco Office appear to warrant additional investigation, this matter will be reopened.

PA
51

4-572 (Rev. 7-18-63)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director

DATE: 1-19-68

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam

Pages S145-S146. Senator Thurmond, (R) South Carolina, spoke concerning the demonstration on January 15 by a group of anti-war protestors called the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. He stated "Upon close inspection, one sees that the list of organizers and sponsors of this group is pretty much the same list of tired campaigners for far-left causes. ---- In short, the brigade was a typical united front operation--the tried and tested Communist tactic by which many well-intentioned people are deluded into supporting a cause organized, financed, and directed by professional militants." Mr. Thurmond set forth information on Mrs. Vivian Hallinan described by the press as the leader and organizer of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. He also included information on her family which included the following: "Michael and Terence Hallinan, sons of Vincent and Vivian Hallinan, were among the principal organizers of the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs, which have been described by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as a Communist-spawned youth organization. The Hallinans, wife and husband and sons, were deeply involved in the protests at the University of California at Berkeley, both in the so-called free speech movement, and in the sit-ins at San Francisco."

Original filed in: 66-1731-

100-448475-

NOT RECORDED
128 MAR 13 1968

354

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 1-18-68 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

51 MAR 27 1968

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
3010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

No Send

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/26/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44775) (C)

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
IS-C

Remyairtels and LHMs 1/4/68 and 1/17/68 captioned "DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968; INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)."

Mrs. Robert Gronner

As detailed in recommunications, the January demonstration was a function of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, self-described in its literature as a broad coalition of women from many areas of American life. Chicago headquarters of the Brigade was given as c/o GEORGINA GRONNER, 520 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago. In developing information regarding the January activity, it was determined that the Chicago coordinating committee was composed of LUCILLE MONTGOMERY, MARJORIE KINSELLA, CAROL TRAVIS and ROSALIND DURHAM, with travel arrangements being made by SYLVIA KUSHNER.

LUCILLE MONTGOMERY was chairman of the host committee of the convention of the National Conference for New Politics(NCNP in September, 1967.

CAROL TRAVIS, who was secretary of a steering committee which arranged for the NCNP convention, attended a meeting of a Communist Party (CP) of Illinois Club held in Chicago February 14, 1968, according to CG 6344-S. Investigation concerning TRAVIS is pending.

KINSELLA, DURHAM and KUSHNER are known CP members. No subversive information concerning MONTGOMERY is identifiable in Chicago indices.

Captioned case was initiated to determine the extent of activity and degree of communist influence in the organization in the Chicago area.

On January 12, 1968, Sergeant BURTON LOVELY Intelligence Division, Chicago PD, identified GEORGINA GRONNER as the wife of Dr. ROBERT GRONNER, MD. 3162 North Pine Grove Avenue, with offices at 670 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago.

116

2-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago
JWT:meb
(3)

REC-12

APR 29 1968

JUL 24 1968 XEROX

INT./SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CG 100-44775

Mrs. ROBERT GRONNER was shown as a member of a seventh anniversary dinner committee of the Chicago Area Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy held at Chicago October 15, 1964, on an invitation furnished by CG 6508-S, September 23, 1964. No other information in Chicago files. ROBERT GRONNER appears to be identical with Chicago file 140-2299 as attending physician (1957) Veterans Administration Research Laboratory, VA, Chicago, Illinois, SGE, on basis that he spoke at a 1952 meeting sponsored by the Chicago Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions.

On February 1, 1968, Detective ROBERT BOCK, Intelligence Division, Chicago PD, advised that LUCILLE MONTGOMERY was the motivating force and almost solely responsible for organizing for the Brigade in Chicago. She was assisted as needed by the individuals listed above in arranging for participation in the January activity and held several meetings at her apartment in that regard.

On April 18, 1968, Sergeant LOVELY and Detective BOCK advised that all information which had been developed by that agency regarding the Brigade was concerned directly with the January march on Washington and the supporting local demonstration in Chicago January 15, 1968. They had no knowledge that any meetings or other activities have been held subsequent to that time and were of the opinion that the organization as a continuing affair did not "get off the ground" in Chicago.

Information concerning the January demonstrations was received at that time from numerous Chicago informants. These and others in a position to learn of any subsequent activity were alerted through frequent contacts and have advised they have no knowledge of continuance of the Brigade as an active organization. These informants, along with the dates of most recent contact in this regard, are identified as follows:

CG 5792-S	4/22/68	CG 6344-S	4/23/68
CG 6269-S	4/22/68	CG 7015-S	4/18/68
CG 6221-S	4/19/68	CG 6142-S	4/18/68
CG 5825-S	4/15/68	CG 6240-S	4/23/68
CG 5778-S	4/23/68	CG 6386-S	4/23/68
CG 6265-S	4/18/68		

CG 100-44112

Because of a lack of indications that the Brigade has, to date, developed into a functioning organization, it is not believed additional investigation is warranted at this time and this case is being closed. Chicago will maintain contact with knowledgeable sources and remain alert to any future activity on the part of this organization which would dictate that the investigation should be reinstituted.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES G(1ENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448326) DATE: 6/3/68

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-47173) (C)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

BC

Re Burouting slip, 5/16/68.

All pertinent information in captioned matter has been disseminated and no further action is necessary.

No further action is being taken by WFO.

W

REC 102

100-448475-117

~~[illegible]-16~~

(2)-Bureau
1-WFO

JRP:mam
(3)

1cc Rm 924 9 [illegible]

22 JUN 4 1968

INT. SEC.

XEROX
JUN 21 1968

[illegible] 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-448326

Excised

copy for

Senate

274-10125

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/16/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

WOMEN'S [illegible]

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies and 2 copies for WFO of LHM concerning captioned activity.

Source used in attached LHM is **INFORMANT**.

This LHM is being classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by NY 6474-S could reveal the identity thereof and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

The NYO will furnish any additional information re this matter to the Bureau and WFO.

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-172435) (THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE)
1-New York (100-164665) (WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT) (WLM) (42)
1-New York (134-15562A) (31)
1-New York (100-171548) (WOMEN'S CONFERENCE IN CANADA, 3/24-4/7/71) (42)
1-New York
JRN:ihr
(10)

REC-103

130

ENCLOSURE

1-OSI
1-Army
1-S.S.
1-NAr
1-RAO-[illegible]

3/19/71

MAR 17 1971

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
March 16, 1971

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on March 10, 1971 made available a four page folder captioned, "Women's National March On The Pentagon April 10," sub-captioned, "defend the right to live."

This folder reflected women's disagreement with the Nixon administration's policy in regards to Indochina, and states, in part, as follows:

"Our sisters in Vietnam have stretched forth a hand to us. They are our example. We answer them with our strength together. Women are marching against the Pentagon on April 10. With dignity and rage we march against the American Medical Association and its health system that cares nothing about the health of the people. We march against the partnership between police and organized crime, which makes heroin a big business-----silently endorsed by those who 'govern us'. We march against politicians, hustlers and kickback men, whose corruption and crimes are paid for by the people. We march against the injust court system, and for the freeing of all political prisoners."

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-4537-[illegible]-130

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

The folder indicated that contributions for the march should be sent to:

"April 10 Women's Committee
c/o Upper Westside Women's Center
627 Amsterdam Avenue, NYC (212) 847-6696," and information regarding transportation and child care could be obtained from the "New York Office."

"Grant's Tomb", a community newspaper, upper west side, New York City (NYC), March, 1971, Number 2 Issue, page 10, contained an article captioned, "Women March on Washington". This article reflected, in part, as follows:

"Out of the outrage against the war that was the unifying force of the Ann Arbor conference, the women's caucus decided to channel our frustration into a public statement calling for a women's march on Washington, D.C. on April 10. We all felt the urgency to show how we as women feel oppressed by the same U.S. system that needs the dominance of men over women, white over black, brown and, yellow, heterosexual over homosexual, and over poor to support the aggressive war policy that is killing our Vietnamese sisters and brothers.------

"We are making this march one step in showing the world our solidarity as women with all our sisters in Vietnam who are fighting for their lives. The Committee to Defend the Right to Live, a South Vietnamese women's organization, has called for our support."

The confidential source mentioned above on March 15, 1971, furnished information that on March 11, 1971, a "women's meeting" was held at Washington Square Methodist Church, 135 West 4th Street, New York, New York (NY). Approximately 70 people were present. It appears to the source that the Pentagon action April 10th is being led by the same women, in the "Women's Union", who are planning the trip to Toronto, Canada in late March, 1971. The only decision arrived at during the meeting, according to the source, was that on the scheduled date, April 10th, there will be a march on the Pentagon.

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Nothing was decided as to mode of travel to Washington and no other firm plans were made regarding any other action in Washington, D.C.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/26/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

ReNYat and LHM to the Bureau dated 3/16/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM concerning captioned activity. Two copies each of LHM are enclosed for designated offices.

Source one in LHM is **INFORMANT** source two is **INFORMANT**.

Enclosed LHM is classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above sources could reveal the identity of these sources, and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

For the information of WFO, **INFORMANT** advised on 3/25/71 that she learned that one ABBY is in WDC working on

REC 98

3 MAR 27 1971

~~NEW LEFT~~

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
2-Albany (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Baltimore (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Boston (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Cleveland (100-30116) (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Indianapolis (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-164665) (WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT) (42)
1-New York

1-ARMY 3/31/71
1-NAVY RLP/
1-AF
1-SS
1-RRO-ISD

WHB:ihr
(19)

Approved: FM/KPB, 42 ______ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

plans for the march, and that this individual is probably ABBY ROCKEFELLER, daughter of DAVID ROCKEFELLER, President of Chase Manhattan Bank, NYC.

LEADS:

ALBANY, BALTIMORE, BOSTON, CLEVELAND AND INDIANAPOLIS

Will furnish any information regarding this matter to the Bureau, Alexandria and WFO.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

March 26, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.
NYfile (100-172646)

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Reference is made to New York memorandum dated March 16, 1971.

On March 24, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on March 22, 1971, a "Committee for April 10" held a meeting at the Law Commune Office, 640 Broadway, New York City (NYC), which was attended by 30 to 40 females. It was learned that a woman from the New York (NY) group was already in Washington, D.C. working with others there to arrange permits, speakers, et cetera, for the women's march on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. It was stated that it was easier to obtain a permit for a march from the Justice Department to the Pentagon, than from the Pentagon to the Justice Department, but that no permit had been obtained as yet. It was pointed out that a march from the Pentagon to the Justice Department was preferred as there would be less chance of losing marchers en route to the Justice Department than from marching from the Justice Department to the Pentagon. It was stated that no buses had been chartered at NY, but it was hoped that 15 buses would be needed.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

131

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Law Commune

On September 16, 1969, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Law Commune is not an organization in the usual sense of the word. It is rather a law firm comprised of a group of lawyers interested and sympathetic to the New Left and Black Power organizations, and who counsel and defend individuals in these groups as the occasion arises. They likewise permit their premises to be used on occasion as a meeting place for these organizations and distribute some of their literature.

On March 25, 1971, the second advised that as of now there is much confusion over the mechanical aspects of the Women's National March on April 10, 1971, and that the people in Washington, D.C. will make the ultimate decision regarding the route of the march. The source stated that in NY, information concerning buses for Washington, D.C. will be available at the Upper West Side Women's Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue, NYC, telephone number 874-6696.

On March 24, 1971, the second source made available a piece of literature sent out by the "April 10 Women's Committee" concerning the national women's march on the Pentagon on April 10. This literature contained in part as follows:

"We are going to the Pentagon on April 10 to serve notice on our enemies that women are moving against them. Our urgency and our fury at the expansion of the Indochinese war and our rage at the repression of our black and brown sisters and brothers needs expression right now. We are joining with other women to struggle for the everyday things we need and against whatever and whoever prevents us from getting them.

"We need and want our sisters around the country to build for this action in their own ways, and to communicate with other sisters their ideas, suggestions and criticisms. This is a temporary contact list which came out of the Ann Arbor Conference:

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

"Baltimore...301-685-6575 (women on Outcry)

Boston...617-666-1243 (Kathy)

Vermont...802-454-8311 (Women's Center, King Basement, Goddard)

Ohio (Kent)...216-673-3708 (Nancy)

Indianapolis...317-472-9061 (Susan)

New York...212-874-6696 (West Side Women's Center, 627 Amsterdam Ave., New York City.)"

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan ✓
[illegible]
[illegible] ✓
Mr. Brennan CD ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR006 WF PLAIN

7:48PM NITEL 3-31-71 FMK

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

NEW YORK (100-172435)

ALEXANDRIA

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-53558) 4P

Women's Liberation movement

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE; INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMATION CONCERNING.

ON MARCH THIRTY FIRST, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC) MADE AVAILABLE A COPY OF AN APPLICATION OF A PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION IN PARK AREA(S) UNDER ADMINISTRATION BY NATIONAL CAPITAL PARKS, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR DATED, MARCH TWENTY FOUR NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE. THE APPLICATION WAS EXECUTED BY ONE ABIGAIL KAPLAN, FOUR ZERO ZERO NINE EAST WEST HIGHWAY, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, WHICH STIPULATED THE SPONSORING

END PAGE ONE

D.C.

REC-57 [illegible] -136

APR 18 1971

5-R

EX-103

“cc to IDIU [illegible]”

61 APR 23 1971

PAGE TWO

ORGANIZATION IS KNOWN AS "APRIL TEN WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, SIX TWO SEVEN AMSTERDAM AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK"; THAT KAPLAN IS A REPRESENTATIVE OF ORGANIZATION AND THAT SYLVIA WARREN, THREE SEVEN FIVE RIVERSIDE DRIVE, THIRTEEN E, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, WAS NEW YORK REPRESENTATIVE. APPLICATION FURTHER REFLECTS THE DEMONSTRATION WILL TAKE PLACE ON APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE, WITH A FIVE THOUSAND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS. WOMEN PARTICIPANTS IN DEMONSTRATION WILL ASSEMBLE ON GRASSY AREA BETWEEN SEVENTH AND NINTH STREETS AND CONSTITUTION AND MADISON DRIVE, SOUTHWEST, WDC, FROM ELEVEN AM TO TWELVE NOON, DURING WHICH ONE UNNAMED PERSON WILL SPEAK. GROUP THE, FROM NOON TO THREE PM WILL MARCH WEST ALONG CONSITUTION AVENUE TO TWENTY THIRD STREET, SOUTH ON TWENTY THIRD TO LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND ACROSS MEMORIAL BRIDGE THEN USING

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

THE MOST DIRECT ROUTE TO PENTAGON, FROM THREE PM TO FIVE PM, GROUP WILL RALLY AT PENTAGON WITH SPEAKERS AND POSSIBLY MUSIC THEN DISPERSE IN SMALL GROUPS ON FOOT. GROUP WILL HAVE PORTABLE SOUND TRUCK, BULL HORNS, POSSIBLY SMALL PLATFORM AT PENTAGON, FOUR HUNDRED BANNERS, PLACARDS. DANA BIEBERMAN, FIVE TWO ONE WEST ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, AND SYLVIA WARREN WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MARSHALS BEING PROVIDED. IT WAS INDICATED IN APPLICATION NO DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY WAS CONTEMPLATED. PURPOSE OF PORPOSED DEMONSTRATION WAS SHOWN AS "TO PROTEST THE VIETNAM WAR".

SECRET SERVICE, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

END PAGE THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE

LIEUTENANT DEELY IS THE PARK POLICE REPRESENTATIVE.

NEW YORK DETERMINE FROM SOURCES POSSIBLE SIZE OF DEMONSTRATION AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO WDC. FURNISH ANY OTHER INFORMATION DEEMED PERTINENT IN ORDER FOR WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE TO ALERT RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES. REFER TO NEW YORK AIRTEL MARCH SIXTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE.

ALEXANDRIA ARRANGE TO COVER DEMONSTRATION VIRGINIA SIDE OF MEMORIAL BRIDGE AND AT PENTAGON.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE WILL HANDLE WDC ACTIVITY.P.

END

KPT FBI WASH

CLR

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/31/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646) (P)

Women's Liberation Movement

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

ReNYat and LHM to Bu, 3/26/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM concerning captioned activity and another unrelated march on 4/10/71 from the Washington Monument to the Japanese Embassy in WDC. Two copies each of LHM are enclosed for AX and WFO.

Source utilized in LHM is INFORMANT.

LHM is classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above source could reveal the identity of this source of continuing value and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

AGENCY ACSI/ONI/OSI/SS
RAG/ISD/DIU CRD
4-7-71 SCym
R/S
BAU/[illegible]

B EX-112

REC 70

16-4[illegible] 146

ENCLOSURE

ICC 724 9FD

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM) (4 Xeroxes made)
2-Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York

WHB:lhr
(8)

62 APR 29 1971

[illegible] SECTION

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ______________

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
March 31, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. NYfile (100-172646)

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Reference is made to New York (NY) memorandum dated March 26, 1971.

On March 30, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on March 26, 1971, a "Committee for April 10" held a meeting at the McIntosh Student Union, Barnard College, New York City (NYC), to plan and organize for the Women's March on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. The meeting was attended by 30 individuals and had no chairman.

The source stated that at the above meeting, two representatives, man and wife, from an "Action Committee" on certain islands near Okinawa, planned a march on April 10, 1971 in Washington, D.C. to protest giving over to Japan what they feel to be Chinese islands. This march is to begin at 1:00 p.m. at the Washington Monument, up Massachusetts Avenue to the State Department, and possibly on to the Japanese Embassy. Support of the women's group was requested; however, after the two left the meeting, the "Committee for April 10" decided not to support the Chinese march on the grounds that they were too "liberal."

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 100-455[illegible]-146

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

The source advised that at the above meeting, it was stated that no permit had been obtained as yet for the Women's March on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. It was stated that the march will proceed from a "grassy spot" at the Justice Department at noon, past the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, Department of Labor and on to the Pentagon. An hour at each end of the march would be allowed for speakers, though the group doubted they would use it. Guerrilla theatre activity by participating groups in front of the various government buildings was discussed and encouraged, though specifics were not mentioned.

The source stated that at the above meeting, copies of a letter to Madame Binh, head of the Vietcong delegation to the Paris peace talks and the North Vietnamese in Paris, were passed out, describing the purpose of the April 10 march. This letter is set forth as follows:

"March 25, 1971

"Dear Mme. Binh,

"On April 10, many of us American women will be marching on the Pentagon. You know already of the other actions being planned here against the war. As women, we are coming out from separate cities and roles, trying to create reality out of what we once held looked up in our imaginations. In marching on the Pentagon, we are joining with all people inside and outside of Amerika, who fight against Amerika's attempt to control us.

"We've been conditioned so long to accept Amerika's definition of us as weak, passive, and powerless, and to deny all our feelings of love and strength, that it has been a struggle for us to turn towards each other and fight for our freedom.

"Your own long struggle in Indochina, and the struggle of Third World people here at home, awakened us to the destruction that Amerikan power represents all over the world. Your many victories against that power have been an inspiration to us. But it wasn't until we joined together to examine and share our own experiences as women in Amerika that we saw ourselves not only as your supporters, but as sisters in a revolutionary struggle for the liberation of all people.

"We are becoming women of the revolution, working in our own way to stop the bombs from dropping in your land, at the same time that we work to build day care centers, health clinics, and a whole culture that will come from and respond to the needs of all the people, not just the rich and the powerful. The enormous anger and energy of sisters together is a force that confuses and terrifies the rulers of Amerika.

"It's so incredibly hard for us to write what we're feeling, to express to you and our Vietnamese sisters and brothers the depth and strength of our love and solidarity.

"Tidings of revolutionary joy from sisters inside Amerika,

"In love and respect,
"April 10th Women's Committee"

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 4/5/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, 4/10/71
IS-MISC

Womens Liberation Movement

SDS 6/11/70 W/F

INFORMANT who has been attending meetings of captioned group, has expressed an interest in accompanying group on bus to WDC, 4/10/71.

UACB, source will travel to WDC, 4/10/71, to participate~~d~~ in the march and reimbursed for expenses upon her return by the NYO.

EX-103 REC 17 100-[illegible]-132

16 APR 6 1971

NEW LEFT

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Washington Field (RM)
1-New York (134-17468)
1-New York (

JWR:ihr
(7)

62 APR 15 1971

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

HGT2/-2/?&2/?&,/6

NR12 NY CODE

10:35PM NITEL 4-5-71 AJN

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK 100-172646

Wells

R. Cotter

WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE; IS- MISC.

WOMENS LIBERATION [illegible]

B

ON APRIL FIVE, INSTANT, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT CONCERNING CAPTIONED MARCH, FOURTEEN BUSES WILL DEPART NYC FOR WDC AT ABOUT SIX AM ON APRIL TEN, NEXT, WITH ABOUT SIX HUNDRED THIRTY PASSENGERS FOR THE MARCH. THE BUSES CHARTERED ARE CROWN COACH, COAST CITIES CRUISERS, INC., COMMUNI~~C~~TY COACH LINES AND GARDEN STATE~~D~~ TRANSIT LINES. THE BUSES WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPT., WDC, WHERE THEY WILL UNLOAD. THE EMPTY BUSES WILL THEN DRIVE TO THE PENTAGON WHERE THEY WILL WAIT FOR THE END OF THE MARCH. ALL WILL RETURN TO NEW YORK WITH THEIR PASSENGERS ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL TEN, NEXT.

END PAGE ONE

ST-109 REC- 66

-134

6 APR 13 1971

5

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data

55 APR 30 1971

cc Wells

PAGE TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE

RENYAT AND LHM, MARCH THIRTY ONE, LAST, AND WFOTEL, MARCH THIRTY ONE, LAST.

SOURCE CONCEALED IS INFORMANT

LHM FOLLOWS WITH ADDITIONAL INFO RELATING TO MARCH.

END

Nil

To White House, AG, Secret Service,
CIA, State, OSI, ONI, DIA, Vice
President by tel. CC's of White
House tel to DAG; AAG's: IS, CRD,
CRIM, IDIU; ~~NIS~~ 4-6-71

(Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 4/5/71

Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646) (P)

Women's Liberation Movement

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, 4/10/71
IS-MISC

ReNYat and LHM to Bu, 3/31/71; WFOtel, 3/31/71 and NYtel, 4/5/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM re captioned activity. Two copies each are enclosed for AX, PH & WFO.

Source utilized in LHM is INFORMANT.

LHM is classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above source could reveal the identity of this source of continuing value and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

NY files contain no information identifiable with ABBEY KAPLAN, who was also refered to in reWFOtel, as well as this LHM.

EX-112 REC-74

ReWFOtel stated that SYLVIA WARREN & DANA BIEBERMAN are responsible for marshals being provided for the 4/10/71

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM) ENCLOSURE
2-Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Philadelphia (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-170605) (WEATHERMAN) (47)
1-New York (100-164665) (WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT) (48)
1-New York

WHB:the
(12)

147

7 APR 6 1971

1971

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

march on the Pentagon. For the information of AX & WFO, these individuals are identified as follows:

DANA BIBERMAN

On 2/3/70, —INFORMANT— advised that DANA BIBERMAN was then connected with the Weatherman faction of SDS. (NYfile 100-165434; Bufile 100-457986)

SYLVIA WARREN

On 10/14/69, INFORMANT advised that SYLVIA WARREN was the mistress of BRIAN FLANAGAN, a member of the Weatherman Faction of SDS, at the time he was arrested on 10/11/69 by the Chicago, Ill. PD on charges of attempted murder, following a battle between SDS group and the police in which RICHARD ELROD, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago, was seriously injured. (NYfile 100-167933; Bufile 100-456940)

LEAD:

Phiadelphia will furnish information regarding this matter to the Bureau, AX & WFO.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

April 5, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. NYfile (100-172646)

Women's National March On The Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Reference is made to New York (NY) memorandum dated March 31, 1971.

On March 30, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished a leaflet distributed on March 27, 1971, entitled, "April 10 Women's March On The Pentagon," which contained the sentence "Fresh Wind Blows Against the Empire" in the form of a rainbow. The leaflet, described by the source as a Weatherman leaflet, is quoted in part as follows:

"...the rainbow is a sign of that which is in all things.

"It is a sign of the union of all the peoples like one big family.

"Seek the vision. Become a warrior of the rainbow!

"Let it grow! Let it grow!

"We are creating reality out of what we once held locked up in our imaginations. We are coming out from separate cities and roles, channeling our life force into a revolution which will free not only women, but all people. We can't be free until everybody is free. In marching on the Pentagon, we are pointing out the source of our oppression

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 100-4-[illegible]-147

and joining with all people in and out of Amerika who fight the Pentagon.

"For information call: West Side Women's Center (212) 874-6696.

"Buses will leave from Union Square & the Bronx at 6 a.m. on April 10 returning same day..."

A characterization of the Weatherman is attached hereto.

West Side Women's Center

The "Rat", an underground type newspaper published in New York City (NYC) bi-weekly, in its issue of November 17-December 6, 1970, page 13, contained an article captioned: "News From: Women's Center in N.Y." This article reflects that a West Side Women's Center is located at 626 Amsterdam Avenue, NY, NY, where it is forming an "Abortion Program" for those living on the Mid to Upper West Side (of NYC.)

"The Village Voice," a weekly NYC newspaper, issue of December 10, 1970, page 16, reflects an article captioned, "Women's Center." This article states in part that "The West Side Women's Liberation Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue (near 90th Street), has started a free abortion counseling and referral project to serve women of the Upper West Side. Women who need this service can come in or call the center at TR 4-6696 from 11:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Mondays and Thursdays, and from 6:00 to 9:00 on Tuesdays and Wednesdays."

On April 2, 1971, the source advised that on March 29, 1971, approximately 40 women attended a meeting of the "April 10 Committee" which was held at New York University Loeb Student Center, NYC, to organize for the women's march on the Pentagon. Abbey Kaplan (not further identified) was Chairwoman. Kaplan stated she was negotiating the permit and other arrangements in Washington, D.C. A list of over 25 schools in the area was read by Kaplan to determine if contacts had been made to leaflet, et cetera. It appeared that the majority of schools had been reached, but there were still several yet to be organized.

A representative from the committee was sent to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where contact was made the women's center and the "Kensington Collective," concerning the April 10 march on Washington.

The source stated that several women at the meeting complained that the Weatherman leaflet (previously referred to) was ineffective as it was directed only toward young hippie women. One woman argued in favor of this leaflet, but later stated "we'll do another one."

The source stated that a committee was established to work on advertising of the march and that Barbara Reilly, among others, volunteered for this work. A second committee was formed to plan the rallies in Washington, D.C. It was stated there would be a brief rally at the Justice Department and a major rally at the Pentagon. In addition, they would arrange for the receipt of telegrams from the Toronto conference, and Madame Binh, head of the Vietcong delegation to the Paris peace talks and the North Vietnamese in Paris. It was also stated that there would be guerrilla theaters and a leaflet pointing out "targets" along Constitution Avenue.

Barbara Reilly

On October 21, 1970, the above source advised that Barbara Reilly as of that date was a member of the Weatherman faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

A characterization of SDS is attached hereto.

On April 5, 1971, the above source advised that concerning the Women's National March on the Pentagon, that six buses will depart the Uptown Women's Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue, NYC, that six additional buses will depart the north side of Union Square, NYC, and that two more will depart from 109 East 184th Street, Bronx, NY (across the street from the

Bronx Community College,) all to depart for Washington, D.C. at approximately 6:00 a.m. on April 10, 1971. The buses chartered for captioned march are:

Crown Coach
Coast Cities Cruisers, Incorporated
Community Coach Lines and
Garden State Transit Lines

The buses will proceed directly to the Justice Department, Washington, D.C., where they will unload. The empty buses will then drive to the Pentagon where they will wait for the end of the march. All will return to NY with their passengers on the night of April 10, 1971. The source said that each bus will carry 38 to 49 passengers and it is expected that approximately 630 persons will travel to Washington, D.C. from NYC by bus for the march.

1. APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Students for a Democratic Society, commonly known as SDS, came into existence at a founding convention held during June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan. From an initial posture of "participatory democracy," Marxist-Leninist ideology of various shadings became predominant during 1968-1969 with debate centering on how best to create a revolutionary youth movement. SDS moved from involvement in the civil rights struggle to an anti-Vietnam war position to advocacy of a militant anti-imperialist line linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. All major factions within SDS embrace Marxism-Lenism and identify internationally with China, Cuba and North Vietnam as countries leading the worldwide struggles against the United States. However, the Soviet Union was regarded as imperialist and with the Communist Party, United States of America, "revisionist" in nature.

SDS operated under a national constitution which called for an annual National Convention (NC) and quarterly National Council meetings wherein programs were initiated and debated. Three national officers were elected annually with a National Interim Committee to run the organization. Regional offices and college chapters elected delegates to the national meetings but each functioned independently on local matters. Its official publication "Fire" (formerly "New Left Notes") last appeared in December, 1969.

Internal factionalism of serious proportions developed during 1968 - 1969 and the following three factions evolved as a result of a split at the June, 1969, NC: Weatherman, Worker Student Alliance (WSA), and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM). The effect of the split on SDS chapters throughout the country was divisive. Some aligned with one or the other of the three major factions. Others, unable to identify with any faction, disassociated with SDS completely and changed names.

The SDS national office in recent years was located at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. It was closed in February, 1970.

2. APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (cont'd)

The Weatherman and RYM groups no longer consider themselves associated with SDS, and the WSA group refers to itself as the true SDS.

Characterizations of Weatherman, WSA and RYM are set out separately.

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

1. APPENDIX

WEATHERMAN

Initially called the "Action Faction," Weatherman came into being immediately before the June, 1969, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) National Convention (NC). At this NC Weatherman won all three national officer positions and a majority of the National Interim Committee as well. Subsequently, they took over the SDS National Office (NO) in Chicago, and controlled its funds, paper and national records. Although internal struggle existed until late 1969, Weatherman for all major purposes controlled SDS nationally from June, 1969, until its NO closed in February, 1970. At this time it no longer considered itself part of SDS.

The term Weatherman emerged from an ideological paper prepared by its leaders entitled "You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows" ("New Left Notes" June 18, 1969). This statement outlined the basic stance of Weatherman: Marxist-Leninist in content but with strong advocacy that action not theory would bring about revolution in the United States. This posture was complemented with an international identification to the Cuban revolution and CASTRO's statement that the duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution.

During October, 1969, Weatherman riots in Chicago resulted in more than 260 arrests for mob action and related charges. A program of armed struggle was finalized during a December, 1969, "War Council" wherein terrorist tactics and political assassination were contemplated. The basic strength of Weatherman was then revealed to be some 300 - 350 nationally and geographically apportioned to the Midwest, New York, and some Northwest.

As its rhetoric of violence escalated, Weatherman leaders increasingly discussed the necessity of an underground operation wherein more than 90 percent of the organization would be submerged; "affinity groups" of three - five members would function independently. In February, 1970, Weatherman leaders announced a program of "strategic sabotage" with police and military installations as primary targets.

In February, 1970, Weatherman abandoned the SDS NO, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and throughout the country entered an underground status.

A characterization of the SDS
is set out separately.

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

1.

APPENDIX

WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE/ PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

A source advised during August, 1969, that at the National Convention (NC) of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held in Chicago, Illinois, during June, 1969, a split arose between the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) and the National Office (NO), the NO becoming known as the Weatherman faction. The PLP faction drew the largest support among those in attendance at the NC.

Source further advised that during late Summer, 1969, the PLP faction of SDS established its National Headquarters (NH) on the second floor of a loft-type building at 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts. The campaign on which the PLP faction centered was to build a worker student alliance or a campus worker student alliance. Thus, they adopted the names of Worker Student Alliance (WSA) or Campus Worker Student Alliance.

Source stated that the "New Left Notes," printed in New York City, is the official publication of the WSA faction.

A second source advised during January, 1970, that within the SDS, the WSA is a caucus of which the PLP constitutes the leadership.

A third source advised during July, 1970, that during demonstrations staged in the Boston area during the Spring and Summer of 1970 by the NH, the main theme of previous demonstrations staged by the NH shifted from protestations of the Vietnam War and other United States foreign policy matters to attacking domestic issues such as racism and unemployment and demonstrating support of the "workers' struggle."

Characterizations of the SDS
and PLP are set out separately.

1.

APPENDIX

REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH MOVEMENT

A source advised that the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYMII) faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held a national conference at Atlanta, Georgia, from November 26 to 30, 1969. At this conference it was decided to form a new organization to be known as Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), characterized as a mass anti-imperialist youth organization, said organization being proposed as separate and distinct in form and content from SDS. The "Principles of Unity" adopted by the conference included a struggle against white supremacy and male supremacy; fights against imperialism, anticommunism, fascism and oppression of youth; and support of the right of self-determination of all "oppressed nations," also support of the right of all "oppressed and exploited" peoples "to armed self-defense." It was agreed that RYM would not be a Marxist-Leninist organization; however, source said this was decided in order to indicate an organization broad enough in form to be acceptable to everyone. A temporary National Steering Committee (NSC) made up of eight females and two males was elected to govern RYM until national officers could be elected during the Spring of 1970.

RYM publications have listed the RYM National Office (NO) at Post Office Box 5421 and Post Office Box 77012 C, both Atlanta, Georgia, and a second source has advised that the NO has no office space but would probably be considered as located at Apartment 27, 1067 Alta Avenue, Northeast, Atlanta.

Second source advised that women dominated the founding conference and have continued to dominate NSC meetings to the point that "women's liberation" has apparently become the RYM's principal issue - also that RYM's poor financial condition has resulted in its failure to publish a paper. During early 1970, RYM has decided to cater to the working class rather than youth, since the potential for social revolution lies in workers.

A third source has stated that it was decided at the March, 1970, NSC meeting that RYM women had decided the organization will be molded into a "working class, Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary, anti-imperialist, problack nationalist, people's women's liberation organization."

A characterization of the SDS is set out separately.

1. APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The "New York Times" city edition Tuesday, April 20, 1965, Page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by MILTON ROSEN and MORTIMER SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City, May 31, to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention, MILTON ROSEN was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and LEVI LAUB, FRED JEROME, JARED ISRAEL, WILLIAM EPTON, JACOB ROSEN, JEFFREY GORDON and WALTER LINDER were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine, and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

Source advised on May 25, 1970, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

1971

TELETYPE

NR 037 NY CODE

5-30 PM URGENT 4-8-71 MJW

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA

BOSTON 91-4218

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK 100-172646

Miss Gandy

WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, SEVENTYONE, IS - MISC, GILROB, (BUREAU FILE NINE EIGHT - FOUR SIX SIX ONE ONE).

Internal Security
Miscellaneous

ON APRIL SEVEN, LAST, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT CONCERNING CAPTIONED MARCH, A MEETING OF THE "APRIL TEN COMMITTEE" WAS HELD IN NYC ON APRIL TWO, LAST, WHERE IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS SECURED ST. STEPHENS CHURCH, SIXTEENTH STREET, AND NEWTON STREET, NORTHWESTERN WDC, FOR HOUSING ACCOMODATIONS ON APRIL NINE, NEXT. THE CHURCH AND PRIVATE HOMES WILL BE USED.

ABOVE SOURCE STATED THE PHONE AT THE WDC WOMEN'S CENTER IS TWO ZERO TWO - TWO THREE TWO - FIVE ONE FOUR FIVE. WOMEN WERE URGED TO PHONE THREE FOUR SEVEN - SEVEN FIVE ONE EIGHT IN WASHINGTON FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE IF NEEDED.

REC 8 151

SUGGESTED SPEAKERS WERE MARJORIE MELVILLE (INDICTED MAY TWENTY TWO, SIXTY EIGHT AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND BY FEDERAL GRAND JURY ~~FGJ~~ IN CONNECTION WITH DESTRUCTION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE RECORDS AT

END PAGE ONE

6 APR 20 1971

1 APR 26 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

CATONSVILLE, MARYLAND) AND A SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOMAN WHO HAS BEEN SPEAKING AT VARIOUS LEFT ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

ON APRIL EIGHT, INSTANT, A SECOND SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED A MEETING OF THE "APRIL TEN COMMITTEE" WAS HELD APRIL FIVE, LAST, AT THE LOEB STUDENT CENTER, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NYC, WHERE A DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON HOW MILITANT THE MARCH SHOULD BE. "TRASHING" WAS PUT DOWN THOUGH SOME WOMEN EMPHASIZED A NEED TO FIGHT AND DEFEND OTHER PARTICIPANTS. ACTS SUCH AS SPRAY PAINTING STATUTES AND WALLS OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS EN ROUTE ON MARCH WERE RECOMMENDED. ALSO SUGGESTED WAS THE TAKING DOWN OF AMERICAN FLAGS AND REPLACING THEM WITH VIET CONG FLAGS. IT WAS DECIDED "NOT TO LEAVE THE PENTAGON THE WAY WE FOUND IT" AND "TO LEAVE BANNERS AND FLAGS FLYING IN THE AREA AROUND THE NORTH PARKING LOT WHERE THE MARCH WOULD END. ALSO SPRAY PAINTING OF CONCRETE IN PARKING LOT WAS RECOMMENDED.

ON APRIL EIGHT, INSTANT, THE SECOND SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT ON TUESDAY, APRIL SIX, LAST, GIRLS WORKING ON GUERILLA THEATER AT THE APRIL TEN WOMENS CENTER AT SIX TWO

END PAGE TWO

SEVEN AMSTERDAM AVE., NYC, FOUND A SEALED ENVELOPE LYING ON THE FLOOR ADDRESSED TO THE "APRIL TEN COMMITTEE." THE ENVELOPE BORE NO POSTMARK AND HAD APPARENTLY BEEN HAND DELIVERED. THE LETTER SET FORTH SUPPORT FOR THE APRIL TEN WOMENS MARCH ON THE PENTAGON AND WAS SIGNED CATHERINE POWER AND SUSAN SAXE. THE SOURCE ADVISED SHE WAS TOLD THE LETTER HAD BEEN COPIED AND THE ORIGINAL DESTROYED BY THE APRIL TEN COMMITTEE. THE LETTER WILL BE READ AT THE MARCH IN WASHINGTON AND WILL ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE UNDERGORUND PRESS FOR PUBLICATION. (POWER AND SAXE ARE FUGITIVES - WANTED FOR INTERSTATE FLIGHT- MURDER; THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; BANK ROBBERY. BOTH ARE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.)

ADMINISTRATIVE.

RENYTEL, APRIL FIVE, LAST, NYAT AND LHM, APRIL FIVE,
memo
LAST.

SOURCE ONE IS INFORMANT.

SOURCE TWO IS INFORMANT WHO HAS BEEN ADVISED TO BE DOUBLY ALERT FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING POWER AND SAXE.

END

DRL FBI WASH DC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: April 7, 1971

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON PENTAGON
Saturday, 4/10/71

According to information received from the Washington Field Office and Domestic Intelligence Division, the "April Tenth Women's Committee" of New York City, a recently formed group of women's protest organizations, plans a "March on the Pentagon" on Saturday, 4/10/71, as an anti-war protest. Plans call for the protesters, who may number as many as 5,000, to assemble at L'Enfant Square, Constitution Avenue, between Seventh and Ninth Streets, Northwest, between 11:00 a.m. and noon, and thereafter march to the Pentagon via Constitution Avenue and Memorial Bridge. The demonstration is scheduled to end around 5:00 p.m. The Committee has reportedly chartered 14 busses capable of carrying 630 passengers from New York City to Washington. The busses are scheduled to unload at the Justice Building, where it is reported the women will demonstrate. It is noted that L'Enfant Square, the assembly point for the demonstrators, is within one block of the Justice Building. The protesters are then scheduled to march to the Pentagon, where they will hold another demonstration and will be picked up by the busses at the Pentagon.

General Services Administration (GSA) and Department security officials are cognizant and plan to reinforce the guard force at the Tenth Street Auto Entrance, which is the only Justice Building entrance open on Saturday. Since we do not conduct tours on Saturday, no adjustment in our tours is necessary.

EX-103 REC 8 100-[illegible] -133

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

18 APR 14 1971

4/7

FDH:bll (23)
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Beaver
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Mr. Stapleton
1 - Mr. Creedon
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. McMichael
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

56 APR 19 1971

THREE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. B
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Walters
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR023 BA PLAIN

629 PPM NITEL 4-7-71 PWM

TO DIRECTOR

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM BALTIMORE (100-28415)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, SEVENTY ONE, IS-MISC. WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

INSTANT DATE, SERGEANT HARWOOD BURRITT, INSPECTIONAL SERVICES DIVISON, BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, ADVISED ON APRIL NINTH NEXT AT EIGHT PM INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BALTIMORE WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT, A PUBLICLY DESCRIBED WOMEN'S RIGHT ORGANIZATION, PLAN TO HOLD A MEETING AT THREE ZERO TWO EIGHT GREENMOUNT AVENUE, BALTIMORE. PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING IS TO DISCUSS POSSIBLITY OF INDIVIDUALS FROM BALTIMORE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON, DC, ON APRIL TENTH NEXT TO TAKE PART IN WOMEN'S MARCH ON PENTAGON. SGT. BURRITT ADVISED TO DATE, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF INDIVIDUALS FROM BALTIMORE WILL ACTUALLY TAKE PART IN THE MARCH, AND IF SO, THE NUMBER INVOLVED OR MODE OF TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, DC.

REC-7 [illegible]-45

138

APR [illegible] 1971

END PAGE ONE

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

61 APR 23 1971

PAGE TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM, MARCH TWENTY SIX, SEVENTYONE.

BALTIMORE SOURCES NEGATIVE RE INVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS FROM BALTIMORE ATTENDING MARCH, APRIL TENTH NEXT.

BALTIMORE WILL ATTEMPT TO COVER MEETING APRIL NINTH NEXT AND BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES WILL BE ADVISED OF RESULTS OF MEETING.

END

cc. Wells

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 8 1971
TELETYPE

NR014 WF PLAIN

832PM NITEL 4-8-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR, (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
NEW YORK (100-172435)
ALEXANDRIA

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-53558)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NINETEEN SEVENTYONE; INTERNAL SECURITY - INFORMATON CONCERNING.

Women's Liberation Movement

ON APRIL EIGHT INSTANT, AT TWELVE FORTYFIVE PM, SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OBSERVED ABOUT TWELVE WHITE FEMALE INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR EARLY TWENTIES ASSEMBLE AND HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE NEAR THE FRONT OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BUILDING, TENTH AND PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, ENTRANCE. TWO OF THE FEMALES UNFOLDED AND HELD A LARGE BANNER INSCRIBED, QUOTE WOMEN'S MARCH, APRIL TEN DASH A FRESH WIND BLOWS AGAINST THE EMPIRE UNQUOTE. TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SOPKE. THE FIRST ONE STATED THEMARCH ON APRIL TEN TO THE PENTAGON WAS NOT UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF ANY SINGLE GROUP; THAT THE MARCH WAS CALLED TO HAVE WOME FROM ALL GROUPS JOIN IN TO PROTEST THE WAS IN VIETNAM. THE SECOND SPEAKER IDENTIFIED AS LAURIE

END PAGE ONE.

REC-40 100-45[illegible]-123

1971

5-D

XEROX
APR 16 1971

51 APR 26 1971

"cc to [illegible]
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

(LNU) READ A PRESS RELEASE WHICH IN PART STATED THE WOMEN WERE MARCHING QUOTE TO SAY NO MORE TO AMERIK'A WAR AGAINST OUR SISTERS AND BROTHERS IN INDOCHINA, NO MORE TO A COURT SYSTEM WHICH DISPENSES JUSTICE ACCORDING TO ONE'S COLOR, SEX, OR BANK ACCOUNT, NO MORE TO DEHUMANIZING JOBS, CRUMBLING HOUSING AND A HEALTH SYSTEM WHICH CARES MORE ABOUT PROFITS THEN THE PEOPLE IT IS SUPPOSED TO SERVE. UNQUOTE. THE AFFAIR TERMINATED AT ONE PM, WITHOUT INCIDENT.

SECRET SERVICE, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE: THE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO OBSERVED THE ACTIVITY WERE PHILIP E. MOSTROM, WILLIAM T. BROOKS, AND JOSEPH E. KELLER. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.
memo

END

EBM FBI WA CLR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
[illegible]
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: 4/8/71

FROM : J. P. Dunphy

SUBJECT: APRIL TENTH WOMEN'S COMMITTEE
"MARCH ON THE PENTAGON"
SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1971

I. MARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

This event is scheduled to take place between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 10, 1971, with listed activities reported planned as follows:

A. Participants (possibly as many as 5,000) assemble in L'Enfant Square, Constitution Avenue, between 7th and 9th Streets, between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon. NOTE: As many as 630 persons arriving by chartered buses reportedly will unload at the Justice Building and demonstrate there.

B. After assembly and related activities the participants will march to the Pentagon by way of Constitution Avenue and Memorial Bridge.

C. Upon arrival at the Pentagon, the main demonstration is scheduled to take place, concluding about 5:00 p.m. The charter buses are to pick up participants at the Pentagon.

II. COMMENTS

A. No traffic restrictions have been issued and Washington Field Office (WFO) indicates no streets will be closed unless crowd size makes this necessary.

REC-74

148

B. Heavy seasonal tourist traffic added to the marchers may well cause some delays along Constitution Avenue between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.

ENCLOSURE

6 APR 16 1971

Enclosure
1 - Mr. Tolson (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Mohr (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Sullivan (Enc.)
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan (Enc.)

1 - Mr. Tavel (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Beaver (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Hereford (Enc.)
1 - Miss Gandy (Enc.)
2 - Miss Holmes (Enc. 2)

THREE

GLC:ko (12)

CONTINUED - OVER

C. In view of the above, WFO recommends that Constitution Avenue be avoided during the afternoon. No problems other than seasonal tourist traffic are anticipated north of Constitution Avenue.

D. It is suggested that entrance to or exit from the Justice Building may be made with minimum delay at any time during the day by using streets north of Constitution Avenue.

Pertinent information is shown on the enclosed map.

For information.

WBS

"APRIL TENTH WOMEN'S COMMITTEE" MARCH ON PENTAGON - SATURDAY APRIL 10, 1971


WASHINGTON CIRCLE
PENNSYLVANIA AVE.
NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE.
CONNECTICUT AVE.
VERMONT AVE.
MASSACHUSETTS AVE.
NEW YORK AVE.
NEW JERSEY AVE.
WHITE HOUSE
ELLIPSE RD.
VIRGINIA AVE.
N. Y. AVE.
INDIANA AVE.
LOUISIANA AVE.
DELAWARE AVE.
FBI
UNION STATION
CONSTITUTION AVE.
MADISON DR.
WASHINGTON DR.
ADAMS DR.
JEFFERSON DR.
INDEPENDENCE AVE.
MARYLAND AVE.
THE CAPITOL
WASHINGTON MONUMENT
LINCOLN MEMORIAL
REFLECTING POOL
TIDAL BASIN
OHIO DRIVE
POTOMAC RIVER
SOUTHWEST FREEWAY
N. C. AVE.
MD. AVE.
CANAL ST. PKWY.
RAILROAD
NORTH CAPITOL
SOUTH CAPITOL
PIERCE
FENTON PL
MYRTLE ST
G PLACE
DUNNINGTON PL.

TO PENTAGON VIA MEMORIAL BRIDGE

▬ Bus unloading area - Demonstration reportedly planned at Justice Building.

▨ Assembly area

⋯ Indicated route of march - Destination is the Pentagon where main demonstration, ending at about 5:00 P. M., is scheduled

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR001 PH CODE

AM NITEL 4-9-71 JEW

TO DIRECTOR

NEW YORK (100-172646)

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-52802)

[illegible]

WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NEXT. IS-MISC.

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM TO DIRECTOR, APRIL TEN NEXT. IS-MISC.

SOURCE AND INFORMANTS AT PHILADELPHIA UNABLE TO FURNISH ANY INFORMATION ON ALLEGED WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL TEN NEXT. ESTABLISHED SOURCE AT BUS COMPANIES, PHILADELPHIA, ADVISED NO BUSES LEASED FOR THAT DATE FOR WOMENS TRIP. PHILADELPHIA HAS ALERTED INFORMANTS AND WILL FURNISH ANY INFORMATION RECEIVED TO BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES.

END

REC 12 100-453[illegible]-137

[illegible]-104

12 APR 14 1971

5-R

56APR19 1971

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE

NR 019 B S CODE

9:54 PM URGENT 4-9-71 WFY

TO DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON FIELD

ALEXANDRIA

FROM BOSTON (100-42759) 2 P

WOMEN'S Liberation NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NEXT, IS - MISC.

ON APRIL NINE, SEVENTYONE, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT FORTY FIVE PEOPLE WILL LEAVE ON A BUS AT TEN PM TONIGHT, APRIL NINE, INSTANT, ENROUTE WASHINGTON D.C. THEY WILL DEPART ABOARD A BRUSH HILL BUS FROM SIXTY EIGHT ST. STEPHEN ST., BOSTON, DESTINED FOR THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AT WASHINGTON D.C. AND WILL BE IN THAT CITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WOMEN'S MARCH ON THE PENTAGON.

ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE SOURCE, THIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON, D.C. IS BEING SPONSORED BY THE STUDENT ACTIVITIES UNIT

END PAGE ONE

REC-41 100-[illegible]-139

EX-103

8 APR 15 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

60 APR

PAGE TWO

AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE-----

REFERENCE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM, MARCH TWENTY SIX, LAST.

SOURCE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS SOURCE [redacted].

BOSTON WILL FOLLOW AND REPORT ANY ADDITIONAL DATA DEVELOPED.

END

cc - Welle

TELETYPE

Mr. Brennan C.D.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 002 AX PLAIN

7:38PM NITEL 4-10-71 CSW

TO: DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
BOSTON (100-42759)
NEW YORK (100-172646)
WFO (100-53558)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (100-669)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, IS-MISC.
INTERNAL SECURITY _ MISCELLANEOUS

Womens Liberation Movement

AT TWO THIRTYTWO PM, INSTANT DATE, A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY MARCHERS CROSSED MEMORIAL BRIDGE FROM WASHINGTON, D.C., INTO ARLINGTON, VA., AND PROCEEDED TO THE MALL ENTRANCE AT THE PENTAGON VIA WASHINGTON BLVD. MARCHERS SPRAY PAINTED THE WALLS OF AN OVERPASS OVER GEORGE WASHINGTON PARKWAY WITH WRITINGS "BITCHES UNITE", "OFF THE PENTAGON", "FREE ERIKA". MARCHERS ARRIVED AT PENTAGON AT THREE O'CLOCK PM. NUMEROUS SPEECHES WERE GIVEN BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS ADVOCATING THE FREEING OF ANGELIA DAVIS AND BOBBY SEAL; STOPPING THE WAR AGAINST BLACK AMERICA; AND DEMANDING PRESIDENT NIXON AND WAR WAGGERS IN THE PENTAGON TO END THE WAR. THEY DISPLAYED SIGNS "FREE ERIKA AND BOBBY-STOP WAR AGAINST BLACK AMERICA," "NO JUSTICE IN AMERIKKKA", "SUPPORT SISTERS IN STRUGGLE-ASIA, AFRICA AND

END PAGE ONE

REC-30 100-[illegible]-150

APR 20 1971

62 MAY 10 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

LATIN AMERICA," "MADAME BINH", AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FLAGS. ONE SPEAKER SAID THAT THE FBI WOULD NOT APPREHEND BERNADINE DOHRN UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE AND THAT IT WOULDN'T DO ANY GOOD. THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE FLAGS WERE SET ALOFT BY MEANS OF ATTACHED HELIUM BALLOONS. MARCHERS DEPARTED FOUR FIFTY PM, INSTANT DATE, NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS OCCURRED. IT WAS NOTED THAT AFTER ALL THE MARCHERS HAD LEFT, PAINTED ON THE CEMENT AT THE MALL ENTRANCE WAS "VC" AND A STAR.

ADMINISTRATIVE: RE NEW YORK TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR APRIL TEN, INSTANT.

NO ~~LHM~~ MEMO BEING SUBMITTED.

END

RSPPXX FBI WASH DC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE

NR 005 WF PLAIN

7:11PM NITEL 4-10-71 GEA

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

NEW YORK

ALEXANDRIA

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-53558) 3P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE; INTERNAL SECURITY - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

Women's Liberation Movement

ON APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, AT TEN FORTY A.M. SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OBSERVED ABOUT TWO HUNDRED WHITE FEMALE INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR EARLY TWENTYIES BEGIN TO ASSEMBLE ON THE GRASSY AREA, AT SOUTHEAST CORNOR OF NINTH AND CONSTITUTION AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC). THE GROUP THEN WAITED AROUND WITH THE SIZE OF THE GROUP INCREASING STEADILY. MANY OF THE FEMALES HAD WOMEN LIBERATION EMBLEMS PAINTED ON THEIR FACES. OTHERS HAD QUOTE FREEDOM UNQUOTE PRINTED ALONG WITH EMBLEMS. ON THEIR CLOTHING SOME HAD QUOTE NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE UNQUOTE. ENTERTAINMENT WAS PROVIDED BY THE PARTICIPANTS WHICH CONSISTED OF SINGING AND SKITS RENERED IN FRONT OF AN OPEN TRUCK WITH AN AMPLIFIER. AT TWELVE NOON METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD) ESTIMATED THE SIZE OF

END PAGE ONE

REC 100-453233 142

APR 15 1971

"cc to [illegible]
Adm. data [illegible]

THE CROWD TO ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED. AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE THAT THE MARCH TO THE PENTAGON WOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS BUSES ARRIVED FROM THE NEW YORK AREA. AT TWELVE THIRTY P.M. THREE BUSES OF THE COAST CITIES CRUISER INCORPORATED, NEW JERSEY, ARRIVED. MPD STATED THE CROWD NOW NUMBERED ABOUT SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY. AT ONE TWENTYFIVE P.M. THE MARCH TO THE PENTAGON BEGAN WITH THE GROUP PROCEEDING PAST THE JUSTICE BUILDING ON THE SIDEWALK IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE BUILDING. MPD STATIONED POLICEMEN BETWEEN THE JUSTICE BUILDING AND THE SIDEWALK. NO ATTEMPT TO DEFACE THE BUILDING WAS MADE. THE MARCHERS, SIX ABREAST, CONTINUED ON THE SIDEWALK OF CONSTITUTION AVENUE TO LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND THEN ACROSS MEMORIAL BRIDGE TO THE PENTAGON ARRIVING THERE ABOUT THREE P.M. ENROUTE THEY SHOUTED AND CHANTED OBSCENTIES SUCH AS, QUOTE ONE TWO THREE FOUR WE DON'T WANT YOUR F---G WAR. UNQUOTE. BANNERS AND PLACARDS CARRIED BY THE MARCHERS WERE INSCRIBED, QUOTE FREE ERICKA AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS; GIVE WOMEN AND MEN A FREE CHOICE FOR

END PAGE TWO

THEIR LIVES - LEGALIZE ABORTIONS - END THE WAR; FEMINISTS LIVE; DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE - WOMEM OF ITHACA, NEW YORK; WOMEN RISING UP ANGRY; MADAME BINH - LIVE LIKE HER; FREE BOBBY - FREE ERICKA - STOP THE WAR AGAINST BLACK AMERICA - YAWF; SUPPORT SISTERS STRUGGLE - ASIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA - YAWF WOMEN; THERE IS NO JUSTICE IN AMERICA - WOMEN'S BAIL FUND INCORPORATED. MPD ADVISED THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS ENROUTE TO PEGTAGON ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MARCHERS PLACED PAINTED WOMEN'S LIBERATION MONOGRAMS ON STATUES IN THE VICINITY OF LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND ON MEMORIAL BRIDGE. SECRET SERVICE AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE

WFO SAS WHO OBSERVED THE ACTIVITY WERE RICHARD C. COFFMAN, JOSEPH E. KELLER, MELVIN S. GOLDBERG AND FRANK J. BASHAW, JR.

THE MPD WHO ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE CROUWD WAS DEPUTY CHIEF DIALS.

AX HANDLING DEMONSTRATION VICINITY OF PENTAGON.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

~~CORR THE NEXT TO THE LAST WRD ON PAGEON SHOULD READ "SIZE"~~

END

RSP FBI WASH DC

To White House, AG, Secret Service,
CIA, State, ACSI, OSI, DIA, Vice
President by tel. CC's of White
House tel to DAG; AAG's: IS, CRD,
TRIM, IDIU; ~~NIS~~ 4-12-71

CC-MR. BRENNAN

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

APR 10 1971

TELETYPE

NR009 NY CODE

920AM URGENT 4-10-71 JAA

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD 100-53558

CHICAGO

FROM NEW YORK 100-172646

Liberation Movement.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971. IS-MISC

RE NEW YORK TELEPHONE CALL TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE INSTANT DATE.

ON INSTANT DATE AT SEVEN THIRTY AM, SA'S OBSERVED THREE BUSES COAST CITIES CRUISER NUMBER FIVE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN, COMMUNITY COACH LINES NUMBER FIVE HUNDRED AND SIX AND FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY SIX DEPART FROM UNION SQUARE,. NEW YORK CITY FOR WASHINGTON, DMC. WITH APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIVE GIRLS UNDER TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF AGE, NINETY FIVE PERCENT WHITE.

END PAGE ONE

REC 8 100-455233-145

18 APR 15 1971

EX 101

5-RW

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

61 APR 23 1971

Wells

PAGE TWO

FIVE BUSES RETURNED EMPTY TO GARAGE FOR LACK OF PASSENGERS.

OBSERVED AMONG GROUP WAS LINDA SUE EVANS, WEATHERMAN, N.Y D.C WEARING SHORT LEATHER JACKET DARK BROWN, MULTI COLORED DRESS

OVER BLUE DUNGAREES WITH RED SLASH AT BOTTOM. EVANS HAS SHORT BLOND HAIR AND WEARING LARGE EARRINGS.

ON INSTANT DATE AT SEVENTY TWENTY FIVE AM SAS OBSERVED SIX BUSES DEPARTING NINETYTH STREET AND AMSTERDAM AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY WITH APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY PASSENGERS, MAJORITY BEING WHITE UNDER AGE OF TWNETY FIVE. BUSES INCLUDED THOSE NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY SIX, SIXHUNDRED AND SEVENTY SIX AND SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE OF COACH CITIES CRIUSERS INC. AND NUMBER SEVENTY FOUR OF TRANSIT CHARTER SERVICE AMD NUMBER FORTY THREE AND NUMBER EIGHTY TWO OF GARDEN STATE TRANSIT LINES, ALL NEW JERSEY CHARTER BUSES.

ALL WEATHERMAN ARE TO BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE NEW YORK TELEPHONE CALL TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE INSTANT DATE.

RE NEW YORK TELETYPE DATED 4-8-71 AND NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM DATED 4-5-71.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED OF ABOVE.

INFORMANT— ADVISED 4-8-71 THAT NO BUSES WOULD DEPART FROM BRONX, NEW YORK FOR CAPTIONED MARCH.

SAS OBSERVING DEPARTURE OF BUSES WERE ALBERT E. FALLER RENO F. WALKER, ALAN J. OUIMET AND WILLIAM H. BATTS.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

AJP FBI WASH DC

HOLD

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: APRIL 13, 1971

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (100-28415) - RUC -

SUBJECT: ~~WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON~~
THE PENTAGON
APRIL 10, 1971
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

Gray

RE: New York airtel and LHM to the Bureau, dated March 26, 1971; Baltimore teletype to the Bureau, dated April 7, 1971.

Referenced Baltimore teletype contains information indicating a meeting was planned in Baltimore, Maryland on April 9, 1971, by members of the Baltimore Women's Liberation Movement, to discuss the possibility of individuals from Baltimore traveling to Washington, D. C. for captioned march.

On April 9, 1971, Sergeant HARWOOD BURRITT, Inspectional Services Division, Baltimore City Police Department, advised the planned meeting for the night of April 9, 1971, was not held. No information has come to the attention of his department indicating any groups of individuals or organizations plan to travel to Washington, D. C. to take part in the march on the Pentagon.

REC 8 100-45 144

5-B

Referenced New York LHM contained Baltimore telephone number 301-685-6575 as a contact telephone number for the Baltimore area. For the information of the Bureau, this telephone number is listed to DAVID GREEN, 637 Washington Boulevard, Baltimore. GREEN is a Security Index subject, Priority III, of the Baltimore Division, Baltimore File 100-25946, Bureau file 100-453010.

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - WFO (INFO) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Alexandria (INFO) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore
JRF:bjp

6 APR 14 1971

APR 26 1971

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

Contact with sources of the Baltimore Division, familiar with New Left and Communist activities in the Baltimore, Maryland area, failed to reveal any information indicating individuals or organizations from the Baltimore, Maryland area, participating in the captioned march.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 4/14/71

FROM : SAC, INDIANAPOLIS (100-22551) (~~RC~~ P C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON
THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS - MISC.

Re. New York airtel to the Bureau, 3/26/71.

——SOURCE—————— Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Indianapolis, Indiana (protect) advised on 4/1/71 that Telephone Number 317-472-9061 is an outdoor pay phone at the Missisinewa Reservoir, Peru, Indiana.

Attempts to make pretext calls to above number on 4/1/71, 4/5/71 and 4/6/71 met with negative results re any SUSAN (LNU).

For additional information, a short note regarding captioned march was indicated in a local Indianapolis underground type newspaper with the notation to call NANCY, 926-9770 at Indianapolis, Indiana for information.

On 4/1/71, ——INFORMANT—————— called this number regarding a People's Peace Treaty Conference to be held that weekend. NANCY has been determined to be a NANCY PITTMAN who attended People's Peace Treaty Conference at New Castle, Indiana, 4/3-4/71. Indianapolis is currently conducting investigation regarding PITTMAN in connection with this conference.

On 4/9/71, INFORMANT———————(PSI under development) who has been contacted insufficient number of times to determine reliability advised that she had no knowledge of individuals going to Washington, D.C. regarding captioned matter from the Indianapolis area.

1-706 REC- 66 10?- -149

EX-112

②- Bureau (RM)
2 - Alexandria (RM)
2 - Washington Field Office (RM)
2 - Indianapolis (1 - 100-NANCY PITTMAN)
JHB/slr
(8)

APR 29 1971

NEW LEFT

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

REC-38

F B I

Date: 5/18/71

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

ENCL

Via AIRTEL ________________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-31570) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON
4/10/71
IS - MISC

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM concerning captioned activity. One copy each of LHM is enclosed for designated offices for informational purposes.

Source CV T-1 and CV T-3 used in LHM are **INFORMANT** Source CV T-2 is **INFORMANT**.

Due to the fact that most of the information contained in enclosed LHM was supplied by **INFORMANT** it has been assigned two symbols.

Enclosed LHM is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above sources could reveal their identity and be injurious to the national security of the US.

ENCLOSURE

③ - Bureau (Enc. 10) (RM)
(1 - 105-138315)
1 - Albany (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Alexandria (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Boston (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Cincinnati (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Detroit (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (100-172646) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - WFO (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Cleveland
(1 - 100-27247 VIDEM)

REC-38

159

3MP:mab

MAY 21 1971

57 JUN 14 1971

Sent ________ M Per ________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-31570

Cleveland, Ohio
May 18, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL 10, 1971

On March 30, 1971, CV T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that in Kent, Ohio, NANCY KURSHAN and one other female are the organizers of the Women's National March on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971, in Washington, D.C. (Women's March).

> CV T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on September 9, 1970, that as of September, 1970, NANCY KURSHAN was one of five "non-leaders" of the Youth International Party (YIP) in New York City who actually run the organization.

Source stated that KURSHAN has printed approximately 1,000 leaflets concerning the Women's March. It was learned that the women from Ann Arbor did not care for the idea of a Women's March on the Pentagon but the New York Women overruled the objection since they appealed to the May Day Coalition to do all the work such as obtain housing for the people.

On March 31, 1971, CV T-1 advised that there would be a meeting Thursday night, (April 1, 1971) in Kent, Ohio, concerning the Women's March. This source stated that a leaflet regarding the Women's March was discussed in Kent, Ohio on March 31, 1971. Source also stated that it was learned that the Women's group in Boston is planning to travel by bus to Washington, D.C. on Friday (April 9, 1971), arriving Saturday (April 10, 1971), and returning to Boston Saturday night (April 10, 1971).

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

159

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL 10, 1971

On March 31, 1971, CV T 3, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Women's March will begin between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, April 10, 1971, in Washington, D.C., across from the Department of Justice on Constitution Avenue, and will then proceed down Constitution Avenue to the Pentagon. Source said that some 3 to 10,000 persons are expected to participate in the Women's March with at least 650 of them being from New York.

On April 5, 1971, CV T-1 stated that it had been learned that approximately 12 buses will make the travel from New York City to Washington, D.C. for the Women's March although it was not known if the buses would be full, and a number of other buses would go from up-state New York. Source further stated that part of the Women's March in Washington, D.C., would consist of reading poems, singing, and going from building to building playing instruments.

On April 6, 1971, CV T-3 advised that the Women's group at the University of Ohio, Athens, Ohio, was having trouble obtaining transportation to the Women's March in Washington, D.C. since they did not have enough people to fill a bus.

On April 9, 1971, CV T-1 stated that at 12:00 noon, April 9, 1971, there would be a meeting in Washington, D.C. concerning the Women's March and further there would be a "party" that night, April 9, 1971, at St. Stevens Church, 16 and Newton, NW, Washington. This source also advised that she had learned that NANCY KURSHAN and seven other women from Kent, Ohio, were planning to attend the Women's March in Washington, D.C., April 10, 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

.UMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH
ON THE PENTAGON
APRIL 10, 1971

On April 10, 1971, CV T-3 advised that NANCY KURSHAN arrived in Washington, D.C. at 3:00 a.m., April 10, 1971. Source stated that as a matter of interest, NANCY KURSHAN and two other women, while enroute to Washington, D.C., were involved in a one car accident near Breezewood, Pennsylvania. This source further stated that no one was injured in the accident but the vehicle was a total loss.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/28/71

FROM : SAC, INDIANAPOLIS (100-22551) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH
ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

Re IP let, 4/14/71.

Contact with sources, Indianapolis Division, failed to reflect any additional information re captioned march.

B

1Q

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Alexandria (RM)
2 - Washington Field Office (RM)
1 - Indianapolis

JHB/dlc
(7)

EX 101 REC- 36

156

62 JUN 4 1971

56 JUN 7 1971

67

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/28/71

FROM : SAC, ALEXANDRIA (100-669)(RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON PENTAGON, 4/10/71
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

ReAXteletype to Bureau, 4/10/71.

On 5/7/71, and 5/19/71, [redacted] IDENTIFIES SOURCE advised that a JEANETTE ANN WARNER, a Lieutenant in the U. S. Navy Nurses Corps on active duty, spoke at the Pentagon during the demonstration there on 4/10/71. He advised that her date and place of birth is 6/1/46, at Crestion, Iowa. Her Social Security Number is 482-54-1520 and her Navy service number is 726633W. She resides with a Doctor SIDNEY N. WOLFE, employed by U. S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Maryland, and his wife at 2506 Cliffbourn Place, N. W., Washington, D. C. He advised that her permanent residence is 310 East Terry Street, Centerville, Iowa, and that she is currently stationed at the Bethesda Naval Hospital. He further advised that she attends classes at the George Washington University, Washington, D. C., and that she is active in the "Women's Lib."

Alexandria indices negative.

No further investigation remains outstanding and this case is considered RUC.

ST-105

REC 12

157

2 - Bureau (By Courier)
1 - WFO (100-53558)(Info)(By Courier)
1 - Alexandria
AAA/krl
(4)

JUN 4 1971

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/8/71

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-42759) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

ReBstel to Bureau, 4/9/71, and Cleveland airtel and LHM, 5/18/71.

In New York LHM of 3/26/71, it was mentioned that a number to be called in Boston concerning the captioned matter was "617-666-1243 (KATHY)". On 4/1/71, personnel, New England Telephone Company, Boston, advised that 666-1243 was assigned to HENRY NORR, 59 Pearson Ave., Somerville, Mass. He was scheduled to move on 4/2/71 to 91 Glen Street, Somerville. HENRY NORR is a Priority II SI subject of the Boston Office.

On 7/6/71, SOURCE (mail carrier), Winter Hill Branch, Somerville Post Office, Somerville, Mass., advised that HENRY NORR had lived at 59 Pearson Ave., Somerville, but recently moved to 91 Glen Street, Somerville. A girl by the name of KATHY MC FEE had also resided in the same apartment as did NORR at 59 Pearson Ave. When she moved, however, she left no forwarding address and her current location was unknown.

The following informants have advised they had no information concerning the Women's National March or KATHY MC FEE:

INFORMANT on 4/2/71, 5/28/71, and 6/29/71
" on 4/2/71 and 6/29/71
" on 4/2/71, 5/25/71, and 6/28/71
SYMBOL #

Boston had developed no additional pertinent information concerning this matter and is closing its file on this communication.

REC

163

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Alexandria (100-[illegible]) (RM)
1 - New York (100-172846) (Info.) (RM)
1 - WFO (100-53558) (Info.) (RM)
1 - Boston
KPW/pc
(7)

20 JUL 1971

NEW LEFT

Excised
Copy for
Senate

274-10125

THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE

✓

F[illegible]L BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 5 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan C.D.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

Wells
Cotter

NR005 SE PLAIN

6:30 PM NITEL 3-5-71 DCA

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM SEATTLE (100-NEW) 2 P

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE, INTERNATIONAL WOMENS DAY MARCH, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, MARCH EIGHT, NINETEEN SEVENTY-ONE. IS - MISCELLANEOUS, VIDEM. OO: SEATTLE.

ON INSTANT DATE, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, REPORTED TWO UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS WENT TO A MEETING OF THE FREEDOM SOCIALIST PARTY, A SCHISMATIC GROUP OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY WHICH HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U. S. PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO, HELD IN SEATTLE, DURING THE EVENING OF MARCH FOUR LAST AND DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS ADVERTISING AN INTERNATIONAL WOMENS DAY MARCH BEGINNING FOUR THIRTY PM AT THE WOMENS JAIL, FOURTH AND CHERRY, SEATTLE. THE AFFAIR IS UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF A NEW GROUP, THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE.

EX-104 REC-63 100-463[illegible]-2

THE PURPOSE OF THE MARCH WILL BE TO PROTEST THE INVASION OF LAOS, THE BROADENING OF AGGRESSION IN INDO CHINA AND ESCALATION TOWARDS A THIRD WORLD WAR. THE GROUP ADVOCATES IMMEDIATE WITH-

END PAGE ONE

MAR 9 1971

60MAR 17 1971

5

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

DRAWAL OF ALL U. S. MILITARY FORCES FROM INDO CHINA.

THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE NATURE OF THE SPONSORING COMMITTEE OTHER THAN TO STATE THAT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE A GROUP OF WOMEN ORIENTED TOWARD ANARCHISTIC BELIEFS WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC AFFILIATION WITH A TRADITIONAL BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED TO SECRET SERVICE, U. S. ATTORNEY, SEATTLE POLICE, U. S. MARSHAL AND THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

///// ADMINISTRATIVE /////

SOURCE IS INFORMANT. NO LHM.

TELETYPE FOLLOWS EVENT. - P -

E N D

BOLD

CC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 9 1971

TELETYPE

NR001 SE PLAIN

11:42AM URGENT 3/9/71 VAB

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM SEATTLE (100-30902) 2P

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY MARCH, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, MARCH EIGHT, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE. IS-MISCELLANEOUS. VIDEM. OO: SE.

ON MARCH NINE, INSTANT, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORTED APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERSONS ASSEMBLED AT THE BUILDING HOUSING THE WOMEN'S JAIL, FOURTH AND CHERRY, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, BEGINNING ABOUT FOUR P.M. MARCH EIGHT LAST AND MARCHED THROUGH DOWNTOWN AREA FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES BEGINNING AT FIVE P.M. AFFAIR WAS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF A NEW GROUP CALLING THEMSELVES THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE, BUT THE CORE OF THE PARTICIPANTS APPEARED TO BE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SEATTLE LIBERATION FRONT WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR A VIOLENT ATTACK ON THE FEDERAL COURT HOUSE IN SEATTLE IN FEB-

END PAGE ONE

REC-22 100-462981-3

EX-104

15 MAR 12 1971

XEROX
MAR 1 71

5/12

61 MAR 25 1971

RUARY, NINETEEN SEVENTY, AND WHICH GROUP WAS DOMINATED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE WEATHERMAN FACTION OF THE ANARCHISTIC STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS MADE BRIEF REMARKS PROTESTING UNITED STATES ACTION IN INDOCHINA. AFFAIR WAS PEACEFUL AND NO KNOWN PROPERTY DAMAGE REPORTED.

INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, SECRET SERVICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

ADMINISTRATIVE: SOURCE WAS JAMES TAGGART, PD INTELLIGENCE. SLF AND ITS PRINCIPAL MEMBERS ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION. NO DATA RECEIVED TO DATE TO INDICATE THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE IS AN ESTABLISHED ORGANIZATION BUT IF IT DEVELOPS INTO ONE THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED. NO LHM. -C-

END

MSE

FBI WASH DC

cc- MR. WELLS
ROOM 712-A 9&D

1 - Mr. R.L. Pence

SAC, Seattle 3/9/71

Director, FBI

3

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE
RIGHT TO LIVE
IS - ANARCHIST
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReSEtel dated 3/5/71 captioned "Committee to Defend the Right to Live, International Womens Day March, Seattle, Washington, March 8, 1971, IS - Miscellaneous, VIDEM."

Promptly initiate investigation in accordance with provisions of Manual of Instructions, Section 87B, to identify leaders and activists of captioned. Determine aims, objectives and activities of group. SuLHM positive information developed along with recommendations for further action.

RLP:bkr
(4)

NOTE:

Seattle furnished information captioned is new group sponsoring International Womens Day March, 3/8/71, at Womens Jail, Seattle. Purpose of march is to protest invasion of Laos, broadening of aggression in IndoChina and escalation toward Third World War. Information indicates group is made up of women with anarchistic beliefs without any specific affiliation with existing basic revolutionary organizations. Captioned should be investigated under the provisions of MOI, 87B.

463984

EX-117

MAILED 12
-R-9 1971
FBI

REC-4

0 MAR 16 1971

o!son
l!ivan
ohr
ishop
rennan, C.D.
allahan
asper
onrad
albey
elt
ale
osen
avel
alters
yars
ele. Room
olmes
andy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 4/30/71

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-30912) (C)

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE
IS - ANARCHIST
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Bureau letter, 3/9/71.

Contact has been maintained with all Seattle informants concerning this matter since early in March, 1971, and no information has been developed to indicate that captioned name is other than a temporary name used on a "one-shot" basis for one demonstration observing international women's day. Backers of the demonstration were factional Trotskyist elements who are few in number and poorly organized.

There is no indication captioned group is a separate entity, organized for on-going action.

UACB, this case is being closed, subject to being reopened in the event information is received to indicate the organization is viable.

K

EX-103 REC 18

2 - Bureau (REG)
1 - Seattle
RBC:cmf
(3)

11 MAY 3 1971

70 MAY 10 1971

Buy U.S. Savi s Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1120
-116395-~~1120~~ | ENC: 7 | 5 * | IED:bs 11/5/75

AG Attorney General
JUSTICE DEPT.

U.S. SENATE SELECT COM-
MITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Re SSC let 10/15/75, requesting: 1) delivery of FBI documents available to SSC for review of SSC request of 8/26/75, Part II, I; & 2) access to materials pertaining to FBI activity. Enclosed for your approval & forwarding to SSC is original of memo. Also enclosed is copy of memo for your records.

I

Excised
copy
for
Senate

274-10125

FURIES

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 5/31/72

FD217WFO
8/17/72
jw

FROM :SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Womens Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOlet to Atlanta 2/15/72; WFOlet to Jacksonville 3/14/72; WFOlet to Cincinnati 3/22/72; Jacksonville let to Tampa 3/31/72; Tampa let to WFO 4/7/72; Denver airtel to WFO 4/13/72; and Springfield let to WFO 4/18/72.

For information of the Bureau and all receiving offices of instant publication, which is described in its subscription advertisement as "a new lesbian-feminist newspaper for 'every woman who has ever been raped, physically, economically, or psychologically. We take the name FURIES, Goddesses of Vengeance and protectors of women as we want to build a movement in this country and in the world which can effectively stop the violent, sick, oppressive acts of male supremacy.'"

2- Bureau
2- Atlanta
2- Cincinnati
2- Denver (100-10985)
2- Jacksonville (100-2062)
2- Springfield (100-13456)
2- Tampa
15-WFO
    (1-100-55290) (FURIES)
    (1-100-50659) (SUSAN BAKER)
    (1-100-53703) (GINNY BERSON)
    (1-100-55495) (JOAN BERSON)
    (1-100-55499) (RITA MAE BROWN)
    (1-105-93016) (CHARLOTTE BUNCH)
    (1-100-55501) (SHARON DEEVY)
    (1-100-55494) (HELAINE HARRIS)
    (1-100-48805) (SUSAN HATHAWAY)
    (1-100-55500) (NANCY MYRON)
    (1-100-51967) (TASHA PETERSON)
    (1-100-55497) (COLETTA REID)
    (1-100-55498) (LEE SCHWING)
    (1-100-55509) (ANN SILVER)
    (1-100-55493) (JENNIFER WOOLUL)

REC 43

100-472144-X
~~177~~

16 JUN 1 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

JUN 14 1972
(29)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

"The paper includes letters, articles, fiction, poetry, news, and graphics, as well as information about various literatures for women."

WFO is currently conducting investigation of captioned publication, located at 219 11th St., S.E., WDC, in an effort to develop information pertaining to the following:

1. General nature of the publication
2. Location of publishing and printing facilities
3. Circulation
4. Sources of funds
5. Identities of leading activists
6. Connection with any revolutionary activity oriented organization
7. Propensity for violence of individuals who associate with this group
8. Whether individuals reside in a communal type existence
9. Extent of any foreign or domestic subversion.

To date, there have been 3 issues of "The Furies" published. The initial issue of captioned publication indicated that "this paper is printed by the Sojourner Truth Press Collective, in Altanta, Georgia." This issue also indicated that the mailing address for the publication is P.O. Box 8843, S.E. Station, WDC 20003. It is to be noted that this S.E. Station handles the address 219 11th St., S.E., WDC.

On 1/4/72, INFORMANT advised that captioned publication espouses the cause of radical lesbianism and aligns itself politically with the views of the New Left.

On 3/20/72 INFORMANT advised that the "Furies" is a gay newspaper for women in which the political line is the fight against racism and repression. Source advised that the members of the "Furies" believe that if you do not follow these general programs you are not a feminist.

A review of the initial issue of captioned publication indicates the following staff members.

SUSAN BAKER
GINNY BERSON
JOAN BYRON

RITA MAE BROWN
CHARLOTTE BUNCH
SHARON DEEVY
HELAINE HARRIS
SUSAN HATHAWAY
NANCY MYRON
TASHA PETERSON
COLETTA REID
LEE SCHWING
ANN SILVER
JENNIFER WOOLUL

WFO is conducting individual investigations regarding the staff members to determine if their activities would warrant their inclusion on the ADEX.

For information of the Bureau, **INFORMANT** who is in a position to furnish limited information regarding the residents of 219 11th St., S.E., has furnished information on numerous occasions regarding vehicles which have been parked in front of or near the "Furies" residence. Source has observed occupants of these vehicles enter the residence at 219 11th St., S.E.. Leads have been set out in referenced communications regarding these vehicles for identification.

On 4/10/72, **INFORMANT** advised that several months ago, when several girls moved into the residence at 219 11th St., S.E., WDC, they were observed carrying what appeared to be a printing press into the basement of the apartment.

Source advises that several females frequent the house and one of the girls has a baby. The same source advised that most of the girls who frequent the address have extremely short hair and always wear slacks.

For information of the Bureau a review of the three existing issues of the newspaper indicates that most of the articles concern the problems that lesbians face, where they can go socially, and how to be strong and independent as a lesbian. The newspaper contains very few advertisements, but all of the ads refer to lesbians.

WFO is in receipt of only one copy each of the three issues; however, through established sources, WFO will obtain a copy of the next publication for the Bureau's perusal.

A review of WFO files indicates that SUSAN HATHAWAY and NATASHA BYRD, staff members of the above captioned publication, have known and associated with a few of the Weathermen fugitives. SUSAN HATHAWAY was on the defense for the Chicago Seven.

LEADS

All receiving offices are requested to review office indices re all staff members of captioned publication.

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will continue investigation in an effort to answer above listed questions and make a recommendation for further investigation.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES G[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 6/22/72

FROM : SAC, CINCINNATI (100-20519) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Womens Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO: WFO)

Re WFO letter to Cincinnati dated 3/22/72, and WFO letter to the Bureau dated 5/31/72.

For information, referenced WFO letter to Cincinnati dated 3/22/72, requested registration check on three 1971 Ohio license plates and it should be noted that in the last paragraph the license plate number is listed as J3862 and that the lead reads JE862.

The following investigation was conducted by SC W. JAMES GRETZ at Columbus, Ohio:

Bureau of Motor Vehicles

On 4/4/72, Mrs. JEAN SMEDLEY, Record Clerk, License Plate Index, advised the following information with regard to the listed 71 plates:

1971 Ohio license plate W5487 was issued to JANET L. BUCHANAN, 2254 Lucile Drive, Lancaster, Ohio, on a 1965 Volkswagen bearing VIN 115144097.

1971 Ohio license plate T4612 is registered to HOWARD D. MC ARTOR, Rural Route 2, Granville, Ohio, on a 1967 VW bearing VIN 117288826.

2-Bureau (RM)
2-WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1-Cincinnati

RMM:cm
(5)

MCT-37

REC-36 100-472144-4

14 JUN 28 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

JUL 10 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

1971 Ohio license plate J3862 is registered to the Colonial Stores, Incorporated, 1033 Brentnell Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, on a 1969 Chevrolet Station Wagon bearing VIN 131359K376355.

1971 Ohio license plate JE862 is registered to JAMES LLOYD WEEKS, 1751 Bryn Mawr Road, East Cleveland, Ohio, on a 1963 American Motors Sedan bearing VIN B563937.

The following investigation was conducted by SA ROBERT M. MC DANIEL at Cincinnati, Ohio:

A review of Cincinnati indices reveal negative information in regard to JANET L. BUCHANAN, 2254 Lucile Drive, Lancaster, Ohio, and HOWARD D. MC ARTOR, Rural Route 2, Granville, Ohio. Cincinnati indices reveal that JAMES LLOYD WEEKS was referenced in Cincinnati file 100-19515, which file indicated that on 1/8/71, a white Rambler American bearing current Ohio license EH2853 was observed at a commune located at 2900 18th Street, Northwest, Washington. It was a commune known as Women's Liberation Commune and considered to be frequented by Weatherwomen. Cincinnati file 100-19515 reveal that a copy of Cincinnati letter was forwarded to WFO file 100-52724 which contains a letter giving background information regarding JAMES LLOYD WEEKS.

LEADS:

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will review WFO file 100-52724 in an effort to develop further background information regarding JAMES LLOYD WEEKS.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/6/72

FROM : SAC, SPRINGFIELD (100-13456) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Women's Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
OO: WFO

Re WFO letter 5/31/72, a copy of which is enclosed for Chicago.

Springfield indices disclosed a main case file for one SUSAN HATHAWAY, date of birth 9/13/41. Chicago was office of origin, Chicago file 100-47141. Springfield reviewed Motor Vehicle files in attempt to locate HATHAWAY for Chicago.

The other names listed in referenced letter were not identifiable in Springfield indices.

Chicago should advise WFO as to any information in file pertaining to HATHAWAY.

EX-114

REC-15

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
2 - Chicago (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Springfield (100-13456)

RCR/lsb
(7)

JUL 10 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

58 JUL [illegible] 1972

Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/31/72

FROM : SAC, TAMPA (100-3125)(RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Womens Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO:WFO)

WFO letter to the Bureau, 5/31/72.

Tampa indices negative re all names, except that of SUSAN H. THAWAN, which name was indexed on page 20 of WFO LHM dated 3/17/71, captioned "DEMONSTRATIONS SPONSORED BY PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE AT WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY, 1971."

13

4

REC-49

10 AUG 3 1972

10

2 - Bureau
2 - WFO (100-55290)
1 - Tampa

RJH/rjh
(5)

54 AUG 14 1972

Rel's Act Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 6/20/72

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE (100-2062)(RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Women's Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO: WFO)

Re WFO let to Acting Director, 5/31/72.

For the information of the Bureau and WFO, Jacksonville indices are negative regarding staff members mentioned in referenced letter.

EX-113 REC.

31

2 - Bureau
2 - WFO (100-55290)
1 - Jacksonville
AJW:jcb
(5)

REC-30

JUN 23 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

54 JUL 13 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/25/72

FROM : SAC, DENVER (100-10985) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - RA
OO: WFO

Reference Washington Field Office letter to the Bureau 5/31/72.

A review of the Denver indices revealed the following individuals had files pertaining to them:

RITA MAE BROWN
LEE SCHWING

The following information was furnished to Denver (31-4480) from the Sacramento Police Department in a letter dated 10/26/70:

RITA MAE BROWN, Born 9/24/47, at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, 5' tall, 100 pounds, dark brown hair, brown eyes, listed to be Sioux Indian and part Negro, was arrested in Sacramento, California, by the Sacramento PD on 6/19/70, at 1910 5th Street, Apartment 9, engaged in an act of prostitution for which she received $10.00. She was fined $125.00 or ten days in the County Jail. Jail sentence suspended for three years. BROWN's former address is listed as 940 Hays Street, San Francisco, California.

FBI Identification Number 379078F reflects BROWN was arrested by the Denver PD, Denver, Colorado, on 9/2/65, 9/28/65, and 10/12/66, for investigation of prostitution. FBI Identification Record further indicates that BROWN was also arrested on 9/28/68, Denver, Colorado, for investigation of prostitution and on 6/27/70, by the Sacramento, California, PD for investigation of prostitution. 100-472144-5

REC-53 100-4[illegible]-20

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM) (100-55290)
1 - Denver
FEP:cjg
(5)

12 JUL 28 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

AUG 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

DN 100-10985

In a letter from Denver to Sacramento dated 12/7/70, status RUC, indicated local sources within the Denver Division have been contacted and advised that to their knowledge, BROWN was not currently working in the Denver area nor do they know for whom BROWN was working for in 1966.

Indices check regarding LEE SCHWING, (DN 100-10967), reflects in a letter to WFO file 100-55498 (C), dated 4/3/72, that SCHWING's driver's license and photograph on license was supplied to WFO on the above date. No further information contained in Denver file regarding SCHWING.

Denver indices negative regarding remainder of staff members of captioned publication.

Denver Division considers this case RUC.

Colo.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/31/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO:WFO)

Re WFOletter to the Bureau, 5/31/72; Jacksonville letter to the Bureau, 6/20/72; Springfield letter to the Bureau, 7/6/72; and Atlanta letter to WFO, 7/20/72.

For information of all receiving offices, a review of WFO files indicate that two of the staff members of captioned publication, SUSAN HATHAWAY and NATASHA BYRD have known and associated with a few of the Weatherman fugitives. Also, the subscriber to the telephone at the "Furies" address, 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. (WDC), is NANCY MYRON. MYRON is employed by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a self-described "New Left Think Tank."

(INFO)

W/IPS

~~205~~

REC-03

100-472144-5X2

AUG 1 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

2 - Bureau
2 - Albuquerque (Enc. 1)
2 - Atlanta (100-9284)(Enc. 1)
2 - Baltimore (Enc. 1)
2 - Boston (Enc. 1)
2 - Charlotte (Enc. 1)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 1)
2 - Houston (Enc. 1)
2 - Miami (Enc. 1)
2 - Newark(Enc. 1)
2 - New Haven (Enc. 1)
2 - New York (Enc. 1)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 1)
5 - WFO
(1 -1[illegible]65) (Info)
(1 -100-55500)(MYRON)
(1 -100-55497)(REID)
(1 -100-55498)(SCHWING)

54 AUG 14 1972

DPH:tah

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

For these reasons, the toll records for the "Furies" telephone 202-544-7613, were obtained from the last five month period.

On 7/13/72, [redacted] that three women, SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING and COLETTA REID originally rented the house. She stated she has no background information on any of the women and is not aware of anyone else residing at the residence. She has received no complaints about the residents from the neighbors. Miss JOHNSON added she would help the FBI in any way possible.

Information identifies source who requested prot

Atlanta advised as follows in referenced letter:

The 5/29/72, issue of "The Great Speckled Bird", an underground newspaper with general distributions in the Atlanta, Ga., area, carried the following notice:

> "On application of Sally Cabb, Marianne Kaufman and Nancy Jones, all of 432 Moreland Ave., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia, articles of incorporation have been granted the Sojourner Truth Press, Inc. by the Honorable Jeptha Tanksley, Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Georgia Business Corporation Code. The registered of the corporation is located at 432 Moreland Ave., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia and it's registered agent is Sally Gabb. The purpose of the corporation is printing and dissemination of information. The minimum capital with which the corporation shall commence business is $500.00."

On 5/18/72, a source in the position to know, advised that the following individuals were connected with the Sojourner Truth Press:

SALLY GABB
1190 Mansfield Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

NANCY JONES
348 Mell Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

JENNIEXHAMILTON
193 Elizabeth Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

ALEXANDERXJOYCE
348 Mell Ave., N.E
Atlanta Ga

Informant Symbol #

On 7/7/72, [redacted] advised that the Sojourner Truth Press was a printing press for hire, which prints mostly New Left material for New Left organizations, yet espouses no opinions of its own. As long as their fee is met, they print what is desired (papers, pamphlets, flyers, etc.)

All those individuals mentioned above are, individually, subjects of security investigations in Atlanta.

Enclosed for each receiving office except the Bureau are the toll records from this residence for the last five months. Receiving offices are requested to review the tolls, identify subscribers to the phone numbers within their respective division and conduct criminal checks, source checks, and indices checks regarding each subscriber.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/6/72

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-44951) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
(OO: WFO)

per 5x2

ReWFOlet to Bureau dated 7/31/72.

On 8/14/72, personnel of the Secretary's Office, New England Telephone Co., 185 Franklin St., Boston, Mass., provided the following information concerning the below-listed telephone numbers:

617-734-2337 - EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER, 360 Longwood Ave., Roxbury, Mass.;

APPROX.

617-665-2847 - CHARLES WELCH, 45 Tappan St., Melrose, Mass.;

617-666-2847 - WENDY SOBEL, 18 Belmont St., Somerville, Mass.

A search of the indices of the Boston office failed to disclose any information identifiable with CHARLES WELCH or WENDY SOBEL.

Boston indices reflected the following information concerning EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER, the son of DAVID DELLINGER:

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
2 - Boston
1 - (100-38735)
PPG/dab
(6)

ST-111

REC 43

6

12 SEP 11 1972

OCT 16 1972

Rev. Act. S

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Boston file 100-38735 entitled "EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER, aka PATCH DELLINGER; SM - ANARCHIST (BUFILE 100-450988)" reflected that DELLINGER was subject of Boston investigation based on his participation in a "Teach-In" and Rededication Service on 1/29/68 at the Arlington St. Church, Boston. During the above activity, DELLINGER made a statement in support of the "Resistance Group" and turned in what was reported to be Selective Service cards.

The primary function of the Resistance Group was to aid, abet, and counsel young men faced with the draft.

EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER graduated from Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa., on 6/6/66 majoring in economics. He was arrested at Chester, Pa. on 4/1/64 and was charged with disorderly conduct.

The 1968-69 Harvard University Directory of Officers and Students reflected that DELLINGER was enrolled in the School of Medicine, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

It had been reported that PATCH DELLINGER was present at a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Street Meeting in New York City on 7/21/64.

The file further disclosed that inasmuch as the Boston office had no current information associating DELLINGER with the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance and that his activities on behalf of the New England Resistance were pacifist in nature, it was felt that DELLINGER did not warrant inclusion on the Security or Agitator Indexes maintained at that time; and thus, the case was placed in a closed status.

A review of Boston file 25-25585 (Bufile 25-569484) reflected that DELLINGER was also subject of investigation based on his participation in the previously mentioned Rededication Services at the Arlington St. Church in Boston on 1/29/68 at which 23 individuals turned in either a Notice of Classification and/or a Registration Certificate. Two other individuals turned in some other type of document. It was determined that DELLINGER had turned in a Selective Service Registration Certificate and two Notices of Classification issued by LB #28, Flemington, New Jersey. Also, a two-page statement signed PATCHEN DELLINGER supporting the Resistance movement was turned in.

In April, 1972, AUSA, Boston declined any prosecution concerning DELLINGER.

On 8/21/72, personnel of the Office of the Mass. Commissioner of Probation, Suffolk County Courthouse, Boston, a central repository for all traffic and criminal conviction records within the Commonwealth of Mass., advised that their files contain no record identifiable with CHARLES WELCH, WENDY SOBEL, or EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER.

A review of the 1972 Police Listings for the cities of Melrose and Boston revealed the following information:

Name	Address	Occupation	Age
CHARLES A. WELCH	45 Tappan St., Melrose	Retired	66
EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER	360 Longwood Ave., Roxbury	Physician	28

The 1971 Police Listing for the city of Somerville failed to reflect any information concerning WENDY SOBEL as residing at 18 Belmont St. in Somerville.

BS (100-44951)

Sources familiar with Communist Party and Revolutionary Activities in the Boston area were contacted during August and Sept., 1972 and knew of no activity on the part of any of the aforementioned telephone subscribers. Sources are as follows:

Date	Source	Contacting Agent
8/31/72	[redacted]	LEO E. BRUNNICK
8/31/72	[redacted]	LEO E. BRUNNICK
9/1/72	[redacted]	LAWRENCE GILLIGAN
8/18/72	[redacted]	LAWRENCE GILLIGAN
9/1/72	[redacted]	ROBERT J. MC CAFFERY
8/31/72	[redacted]	RALPH D. GAULT
8/31/72	[redacted]	ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN

Informant Symbol #

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/22/72

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-54463)(P)

Sc

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMAN'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
00:WFO

4

aw5X

Re WFO letter to Bureau dated 7/31/72.

On 9/6/72, -SOURCE [redacted] advised that phone number 215-691-0132 was installed 5/10/71 and is subscribed to by EDWARD G. FERTALTAL, III, 730 Center Street, Bethlehem, Pa.

The above information is confidential and should not be made public without the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. DONALD V. POWELL, 12th Floor, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 1 Parkway, Philadelphia, Pa.

Philadelphia indices are negative re EDWARD G. FERTALTAL, III.

LEAD

PHILADELPHIA
AT BETHLEHEM, PA.

Will conduct credit and criminal checks re EDWARD G. FERTALTAL, III, 730 Center St., Bethlehem, Pa.

7

REC-65

EX-116

SEP 1972

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290)(RM)
2 - Philadelphia (100-54463)

EAB:kpb
(6)

5 E OCT 20 1972

Rev. Act Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/21/72

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-52994) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
OO: WFO

Re Springfield letter to Bureau dated 7/6/72 and WFO letter to Bureau dated 7/31/72.

Springfield by letter dated 7/6/72 requested that Chicago furnish to Washington Field pertinent information concerning SUSAN HATHAWAY as it appears in Chicago files.

Pertinent information concerning HATHAWAY was furnished to Washington Field by letters dated 1/18/71 and 1/24/72 captioned "SUSAN HATHAWAY, SM-NEW LEFT (EXTREMIST)" WFO file 100-48808.

By letter dated 7/31/72 Washington Field furnished the toll call records for the "Furies" telephone 202 544-7613. The following numbers within the Chicago Division appeared in these toll records:

312 528-2475

Public records of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company (IBTC) disclose this number is listed to JUDSON H. MINER, 632 West Oakdale, Chicago. Another listing is shown for JUDSON H. MINER, lawyer, 22 East Huron, Chicago, telephone #751-1170. This latter number apparently is MINER's business office.

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Wahington Field (100-[illegible]5290)(RM)
2- Chicago

EX-101 REC-63

100-472144-7X
21 AUG 23 1972

PLT:meb
(6)

Rev. Act. Sect.

SEP 7 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The "Chicago Sun Times," a daily newspaper in its issue of 11/11/71, described JUDSON H. MINER as president of the Chicago Council of Lawyers (CCL), "a reform-oriented group of 1,300 attorneys."

The "Chicago Sun Times" of 10/23/70 stated that most members of the CCL are youthful lawyers and the CCL was organized in June, 1969, to work for reform of the legal profession and the general community. This article described JUDSON H. MINER as a Legal Aid Bureau attorney and head of the CCL.

The files of the Chicago Office contain no information of a subversive nature concerning MINER.

On 8/11/72 SC JEROME J. COX reviewed the records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago PD, and located no record for JUDSON H. MINER.

312 566-4622

On 8/11/72 SC RICHARD HAHN determined through records of the IBTC that 312 566-4622, an unpublished number, is listed to OLIE LYALL RYAN, 2001 North Midlothian, Mundelein, Illinois.

A review of Chicago indices on 8/17/72 disclosed no references to OLIE LYALL RYAN.

LEADS

AT CHICAGO AND MUNDELEIN, ILLINOIS. Will check local police department files concerning OLIE LYALL RYAN, 2001 North Midlothian, Mundelein, Illinois.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/25/72

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE (100-11664) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER,
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

(OO: WFO)

Re WFO letter to Bureau dated 7/31/72. rev5 X

On 9/1/72, a well placed source advised that Blowing Rock, N. C., telephone number 295-3321, had been discontinued effective 5/23/72. This source stated the number was formerly listed to JAMES W. HATHAWAY, Laurel Lane, Blowing Rock, N. C. Also HATHAWAY was a teacher at Appalachian State University, Boone, N. C.

On 9/5/72, DOUGLAS TOWNSEND, Chief of Police, Blowing Rock, N. C., advised that JAMES HATHAWAY who resided on Laural Lane in Blowing Rock was associated with Appalachian State University in Boone as a College Professor and his wife was a former movie actress. Chief TOWNSEND stated that the HATHAWAYS have some sort of "connection" or relatives in Italy and that they had left Blowing Rock some months ago, but just recently returned and are planning on opening a restaurant in the Blowing Rock area in the future.

Chief TOWNSEND stated that he had no record of the HATHAWAYS as having been arrested for any crime in the Blowing Rock area.

On 9/14/72, a check of the Charlotte Office indices revealed no record for JAMES W. HATHAWAY, mentioned above or SUSAN HATHAWAY mentioned in referenced WFO letter.

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
2 - Charlotte

REC-34

8

BDC:mwb
(6)

10 SEP 28 1972

58 OCT 25 1972

Rev. Ac / Sect

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CE 100-11664

LEAD:

CHARLOTTE:

AT BLOWING ROCK, N. C.

Will determine if JAMES W. HATHAWAY's wife is SUSAN HATHAWAY, and if so, attempt to determine if identical with SUSAN HATHAWAY mentioned in referenced WFO letter.

CE 100-11664

NON SYMBOL SOURCE

The well placed source referred to is Mr. C. P. HUGHES, Office Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Boone, North Carolina.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/29/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER,
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - RA
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO letter to Bureau, 7/31/72; Denver letter to Bureau, 7/25/72; Tampa letter to Bureau, 7/31/72; Chicago letter to Bureau, 8/21/72; Boston letter to Bureau, 9/6/72; Albuquerque letter to WFO, 9/11/72, and Newark letter to Bureau, 9/15/72. 100-453233-207

see 5x2

On 7/13/72, INFORMATION IDENITIFIES INFORMANT [redacted] was contacted by SA DENNIS PHILLIP HYTEN. Source advised that several young white girls continue to reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC. They appear friendly, but keep very much to themselves. On 8/23/72, this source advised SA HYTEN that apparently four or five young white girls now live at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC. Source has seen numerous different girls frequenting the residence, but is unsure exactly how many reside there.

One girl, name unknown, who resides at the residence has stated to source that she is a music teacher. Source has seen several girls on different occasions carrying what

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (100-9284)
2-Baltimore
2-Charlotte
2-Chicago (100-52994)
2-Houston
2-Miami
3-Newark (100-55147)
2-New Haven
2-New York
2-Philadelphia
4-WFO
(1-100-48808) (HATHAWAY)
(1-100-55497) (REID)
(1-100-55496) (SCHWING)
JMG:lmc
(26)

REC-7

ST-106

17 SEP 29 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

appeared to be newspapers. Source states that all the girls are generally quiet and stay to themselves.

The folloiwng investigation was conducted by SA PHILLIP K. CRUMM at Carlsbad, New Mexico.

On 8/14/72, a check of the City Directory covering Carlsbad, New Mexico, revealed that telephone number 505-885-9609 is currently subscribed to RICHARD I. WOODUL, 1214 Cedar, Carlsbad, New Mexico.

On 8/14/72, criminal checks with the Carlsbad Police Department and Eddy County Sheriff's Office revealed no record in the name of RICHARD I. WOODUL.

On 8/14/72, Detective LEO ARMSTRONG, Carlsbad Police Department, advised that RICHARD I. WOODUL is a long-time resident of Carlsbad and is a local businessman there. He further advised that one of WOODUL's daughters, JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL, date of birth 11/24/48, was now a resident of Washington, D. C. (WDC).

A name check in Albuquerque indices revealed no record in the name of RICHARD I. WOODUL; however, a check of the name JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL revealed that she is the subject of a previous investigation, file 100-4154. JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL is also the subject of WFO file 100-55493.

Apparently JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL is still a resident of WDC, and is a friend of NANCY MYRON. Apparently JENNIFER WOODUL has placed telephone calls from the home of NANCY MYRON to the home of her father, RICHARD I. WOODUL, in Carlsbad, New Mexico, and he also apparently is no way involved in any of his daughter's activities in WDC.

On 9/13/72, SOURCE [redacted] advised that SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING and COLETTA REID still rent and apparently reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC.

SOURCE [redacted] stated that these three girls pay their rent each month by check, which is drawn on an account at the American Security and Trust Company, WDC. She said that HATHAWAY, SCHWING and REID take turns each month signing the check for the rent.

SOURCE related that she recalled that when she rented the dwelling to these three girls, they made a remark that they were employed by a "research organization", name unknown, and did most of their research at the Library of Congress.

SOURCE stated that she has not been in the dwelling at 219 11th Street, S.E., since it was rented to these three girls. She has received no complaints concerning any of their activities and she would have no personal knowledge of their activities.

She advised that she does plan to inspect the property in the near future, as this is her custom as the owner.

On 9/14/72, SOURCE furnished the August, 1972, copy of "The Furies" newspaper.

A subsequent review of this issue, as well as all previous issues, does not reflect any radical revolutionary or anti-Government theme. All issues have been devoted to articles pertaining to lesbian/feminist interests.

Investigation is continuing in an endeavor to develop further background information regarding the "Furies" newspaper and the individuals involved with this publication.

All receiving field offices are requested to complete necessary investigation and expeditiously furnish results to Bureau and WFO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10-11-72

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-54463) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMAN'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
OO: WFO

Re Philadelphia letter to the Bureau, ser. 9 9-22-72.

On 10-2-72, Mrs. LAVERNE KLINGER, Identification Division, Bethlehem Police Department, Bethlehem, Pa., advised that a review of her files failed to reflect any record for EDWARD G. FERTAL or FERTALTAL, III.

On the same date, — SOURCE —, Bethlehem Credit Bureau, Bethlehem, Pa., advised that her records indicate a file for EDWARD G. FERTAL and wife, CAROL, who reside at 730 Center Street, Bethlehem, Pa. The file has been open since 5-14-67 and indicates the couple were moved on 5-17-69 and have a previous address of 720 East 9th Street, Bethlehem, Pa. CAROL FERTAL's employment was listed as a 2nd Grade School Teacher at St. Simon and Jude School, Bethlehem, Pa., and that EDWARD G. FERTAL attended Pennsylvania State University and was in the U.S. Army assigned at Fort Bliss, Texas.

Philadelphia indices are negative regarding EDWARD G. FERTAL and CAROL FERTAL.

10

2-Bureau (RM)
2-WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1-Philadelphia (100-54463)
VJC: ams
(5)

ST-111

OCT 18 1972

4 OCT 27 1972

S Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI   DATE: 10/11/72

FROM : SAC, HOUSTON (100-12843) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
OO: WFO

rev 5x2

ReWFOlet to Bu, 7/31/72.

9

The following investigation was conducted by SA RICHARD L. SCHUHLER at Houston, Texas:

On 8/4/72, a review of Cole's 1972 City Directory for Houston, Texas revealed that telephone number 713-643-5584 is presently subscribed to DANIEL R. HARRIS, 8315 Meadville, Houston, Texas.

REC 25

11

On 8/4/72, a check was made of Houston indices and it revealed that a 62-0 information concerning entry for DANIEL R. HARRIS exists consisting of the following information:

On 8/4/70, Mr. and Mrs. DANIEL R. HARRIS, 8315 Meadville, Houston, Texas, visited the Houston Office of the FBI requesting assistance because their daughter, HELAINE HARRIS, had run away from home on 5/12/70. On this occasion, Mr. HARRIS advised that for the previous six or eight months his daughter had become very interested in the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the Young Womens Liberation Front, which was active at the University of Houston. He stated that his daughter became interested in the Women's Liberation movement when she attended some courses at the University of Houston and at the University of Thought which was active on the University of Houston campus. HELAINE HARRIS attended the Southern Female Liberation meeting at Edwards, Mississippi from May 8-10, 1970 and upon her return from this meeting she left home after her parents had demanded she stop participating in this type of activity. Mr. HARRIS further advised that their daughter telephonically contacted him from Albuquerque, N. M. on 7/30/70 at which time she stated

16 OCT 16 1972

(2) - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)   1cc 904 (0)
1 - Houston
RLS/sac
(5)

XEROX
NOV 3 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

she wanted to come home but could not inasmuch as she could not get along with her parents.

On 8/6/70, Mr. HARRIS telephonically contacted the Houston Office of the FBI and advised that he had received a call on the previous evening from his daughter in Berkeley, California. She stated this was where the action is and that she was a part of it. Mr. HARRIS additionally stated that his daughter had made statements prior to her departure from home that Houston was behind in riots and that she was going to go where the action is so that she could be a part of it.

Mr. HARRIS had filled out a missing persons report with the local authorities in Houston in May, 1970 and the following information is taken from a copy of that report:

Name	HELAINE HARRIS
Race	White
Sex	Female APPROX
Age	16 years old (In May, 1970)
Address	8315 Meadville, Houston, Texas
Height	5'7"
Weight	140 lbs.
Hair	Brown naturally curly, shoulder length, usually parted in center and pulled behind ears into ponytails
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Olive
Wears gold rimmed,	round glasses, cannot see without them.
SSAN	459-98-6262

On 9/11/72, the records of the Houston PD were caused to be checked and no information could be found identifiable with DANIEL R. HARRIS (father), HELEN HARRIS (mother), or HELAINE HARRIS.

On 9/29/72, INFORMANTS [redacted] advised that they have never heard of a DANIEL R. HARRIS or HELAINE HARRIS.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/24/72

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-52994) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA

4

OO: WFO

per 7X

Re Chicago letter dated 8/21/72

On September 6, 1972, Lieutenant PHIL CANCELLI, Mundelein, Illinois Police Department, advised that his records are negative regarding OLIE LYALL RYAN.

On September 15, 1972, Sergeant BERNARD LEONARD, Lake County Sheriff's Office, Waukegan, Illinois, advised his records are negative regarding RYAN.

On August 21, 1972, SC G. PACH reviewed the records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago Police Department and found no record for RYAN.

REC 43

-12

ST-103

14 OCT 26 1972

[illegible] 40

(2)-Bureau (RM)
2-WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1-Chicago

PLT:smg
(5)

57 N[illegible] 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 11/7/72

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE (100-11664) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER,
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - REVACT

(OO: WFO)

Re Charlotte letter to Bureau, 9/25/72. per 8

On 10/5/72, SOURCE — Credit Bureau, Boone, N. C., advised that their records reveal JAMES HATHAWAY is a Professor at Appalachian State University in Boone and that his wife's name is MARY and they reside in care of General Delivery, Blowing Rock, N. C.

On 10/26/72, DOUGLAS TOWNSEND, Chief of Police, Blowing Rock, N. C., advised that both JAMES HATHAWAY and his wife are residing in Blowing Rock, N. C., and that they intend to open a restaurant in Blowing Rock sometime in the future.

REC-5

13

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1 - Charlotte

27 NOV 10 1972

BDC:dlt
(5)

54 NOV 16 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 11/21/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-176760) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
(OO:WFO)

4

C.E.

ReNYlet to WFO, dated 9/28/72.

NYO indices, negative regarding Liberation Publication, 339 Lafayette, NYC, PHOEBE FISHER, 5 Doyer Street, New York, NY, and THOMAS J. MYRON, 12 Livingston Street, Rhinebeck, NY.

On 9/29/72, SOURCE [redacted], Credit Bureau of Greater New York, NYC, advised SC ROBERT J. LIBERATORE that there was no record in her files identifiable with a Mr. PHOEBE FISHER, 5 Doyer Street, New York, NY. SOURCE also advised on the same date that there was no record in her files identifiable with THOMAS J. MYRON, 12 Livingston Street, Rhinebeck, NY.

On 10/5/72, SC ROBERT D. SHEA caused a search to be made of the records of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York, NYC, regarding Liberation Publication, 339 Lafayette, New York, NY. There was no record identifiable with this organization.

It should be noted that no criminal checks can be conducted on an individual at the New York City Police Department without that individual's date of birth.

ST-115 REC-88

The following sources at New York, NY, were contacted with negative results regarding PHOEBE FISHER, THOMAS J. MYRON and Liberation Publication:

[redacted] Informants [redacted]

NOV 27 1972

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York

283

PWG:dab
(3)

DEC 5 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will continue attempts to determine subscriber to telephone numbers 914-462-0604 and 212-732-2944.

FD-272 (Rev. 3-3-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office WASHINGTON FIELD	Office of Origin WASHINGTON FIELD	Date 12/13/72	Investigative Period 1/4/72 - 12/1/72	
Title of Case 0 "FURIES" NEWSPAPER WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.		Report made by JERRY M. GRAVES		Typed by: neh
		Character of Case INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES		

SUMMARY

REFERENCES: WFO letters to Bureau, 5/31, 7/31 and 9/29/72. Atlanta letters to WFO, 7/20 and 9/19/72. Newark letter to Bureau, 9/15/72 100-453233-207 New York airtel to WFO, 9/28/72.

2

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

INFORMANTS

Source Identification	Location
WF T-1 is [redacted]	100-55290-1
WF T-2 is [redacted]	100-55290-20
WF T-3 is [redacted]	134-9613 Sub A-286
WF T-4 is [redacted]	100-55290-34

INFORMANTS

Approved | Special Agent in Charge | Do not write in spaces below

Copies made:
5-Bureau 100-472144
1-USSS
2-Baltimore
3-Newark 100-55147
2-New Haven
2-New York 100-176760
2-WFO 100-55290

REC 68

ST-105

Notations:

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE ATTACHED

1cc 9Ch (F)

2cc FAO (ISD) "0"

A

1972

WFO 100-55290

WF T-5-[redacted]

WF T-6 is[redacted] 100-55290-46A

WF T-7-See [redacted]

WF T-8 is[redacted] 100-55290-57

WF T-9 is [redacted] 134-10361 Sub A

Informants

Investigation of persons mentioned in this report as being staff members of the "Furies" Newspaper is being conducted and reported through individual cases.

Extensive physical surveillance of the "Furies" location at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., as well as individuals who frequented this address, has been conducted by WFO, particularly during period August-November, 1972.

This surveillance, as well as resulting follow-up investigation, did not reflect any activities of a revolutionary or subversive nature by any member of the "Furies."

As set out in details of this report, a thorough review of all issues of the "Furies" Newspaper did not reflect a radical revolutionary or anti-government theme.

It was noted that the August, 1972 issue of the "Furies" was the last issue published.

LEADS:

BALTIMORE, NEWARK, NEW HAVEN AND NEW YORK

Are requested to submit results of outstanding investigation so that this case can be appropriately resolved.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
100-55290

November 13, 1972

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

RE: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual or organization believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Threats or actions against persons protected by Secret Service.
2. ☐ Attempts or threats to redress grievances.
3. ☐ Threatening or abusive statement about U. S. or foreign official.
4. ☐ Participation in civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or hostile incidents against foreign diplomatic establishments.
5. ☐ Illegal bombing, bomb-making or other terrorist activity.
6. ☐ Defector from U. S. or indicates desire to defect.
7. ☒ Potentially dangerous because of background, emotional instability or activity in groups engaged in activities inimical to U. S.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available.

Very truly yours,

L. Patrick Gray III

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s))
U. S. Secret Service

Enclosure(s)

Copy to: 1-United States Secret Service

Report of: JERRY M. GRAVES

Office: Washington, D.C.

Date: 12/13/72

Field Office File #: 100-55290

Bureau File #: 100-472144

Title: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Synopsis:

"Furies" Newspaper, self described as a lesbian/feminist publication, was published by a group of individuals located at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC. Reported purpose of newspaper was to espouse the cause of radical lesbianism and to align itself politically with the views of the "New Left." Paper published from January-August, 1972, and did not espouse any radical revolutionary or anti-government themes. Background and activities set out.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

I. PREDICATION AND BACKGROUND

Investigation to determine extent of activities was initiated regarding the "Furies" Newspaper in January, 1972, after the following information was received:

On January 4, 1972, WF T-1 advised that a new publication known as the "Furies" Newspaper was being formed in Washington, D.C. to espouse the cause of radical lesbianism and to align itself politically with the views of the "New Left." Source advised that a trial issue was scheduled to be published and distributed during January, 1972, no specific date given.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

Nor duplicated within your agency.

On January 13, 1972, WF T-2 provided a copy of the January, 1972 issue of the "Furies" Newspaper.

A review of this issue revealed the following self description:

"The Furies is a new lesbian-feminist newspaper for every woman who has ever been raped, physically, economically or psychologically. We take the name FURIES, Now Goddesses of Vengeance and protectors of woman, as we want to build a movement in this country, and in the world which can effectively stop the violent, sick, oppressive acts of male supremacy.

The paper includes letters, articles, fiction, poetry, news, and graphics, as well as information about various literature for women."

The initial issue of the "Furies" Newspaper indicated that "this paper is printed by the Sojourner Truth Press collective in Atlanta, Georgia."

It was noted that the "Furies" is located at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., and a further review of the initial issue reflected the following staff members:

SUSAN BAKER
JOAN BIREN
CHARLOTTE BUNCH
HELAINE HARRIS
NANCY MYRON
COLETTA REID
ANN SILVER

GINNY BERSON
RITA MAE BROWN
SHARON DEEVY
SUSAN HATHAWAY
TASH PETERSON
LEE SCHWING
JENNIFER WOODUF

II. ACTIVITIES

On March 20, 1972, WF T-3 advised that the "Furies" is a gay newspaper for women in which the political line is the fight against racism and repression by men. Source advised that the members of the "Furies" believe that if you do not follow these general programs you are not a feminist.

Source knew of no radical revolutionary tendencies or activities being planned or contemplated by any of the "Furies" members.

On April 10, 1972, WF T-4 advised that several months ago, when several girls moved into the residence at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., they were observed carrying what appeared to be a printing press into the basement of the apartment.

Source advised that several females frequented the house and one of the girls has a baby. Source advised that most of the girls who frequented the address have extremely short hair and always wear slacks.

On July 13, 1972, WF T-5 advised that three women, SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING, and COLETTA REID originally rented the house located at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. Source had no background information on any of these women and was not aware of anyone else residing at the residence. Source has received no complaints about the residence from the neighbors.

On July 7, 1972, WF T-6 advised that the Sojourner Truth Press in Atlanta, Georgia, was a printing press for hire, which prints mostly "New Left" material for "New Left" organizations, yet it espouses no opinions of its own. As long as their fee is met, they will print what is desired, i.e. papers, pamphlets, flyers, etc.

On September 11, 1972, WF T-7 advised that the Sojourner Truth Press had gone out of business on August 15, 1972, due to a lack of funds. Source also advised that the individuals connected with the Sojourner Truth Press were planning on leaving Atlanta.

On September 13, 1972, a telephone call was made to telephone number 688-6222, the telephone number for the Sojourner Truth Press, Atlanta, Georgia, and a recorded voice advised that service for that telephone number had been discontinued.

On July 13, 1972, WF T-4 advised that several young white girls continued to reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. They appear friendly, but keep very much to themselves.

On August 23, 1972, this source advised that apparently four or five young white girls now live at 219 11th Street, S.E. Source has seen numerous different girls frequenting the residence, but is unsure exactly how many reside there at the present time.

One girl, name unknown, who resides at the residence, has stated to source she is a music teacher. Source has seen several girls on different occasions carrying what appeared to be newspapers. Source states that all the girls are generally quiet and keep to themselves.

On September 13, 1972, WF T-5 advised that SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING and COLETTA REID still rent and apparently reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.

Source stated that these three girls continue to pay their monthly rent promptly and she said that each of the girls takes turns paying the rent each month.

Source related that when the dwelling was rented to these three girls, they made a remark that they were employed by a "research organization", name unknown, and did most of their research at the Library of Congress.

Source stated that she has not been in the dwelling at 219 11th Street, S.E., since it was rented to these three girls, but she has received no complaints concerning any of their activities.

On September 14, 1972, WF T-8 furnished the August, 1972 copy of the "Furies" Newspaper.

A subsequent review of this issue, as well as all previous issues, did not reflect any radical revolutionary or anti-government theme. All issues have been devoted to articles pertaining to lesbian/feminist interests.

On October 12, 1972, WF T-9 advised that an internal conflict has developed within the "Furies" collective and they are breaking up into different factions, based on ideological differents.

Whether or not the paper will continue is unknown at this time.

On December 1, 1972, WF T-9 advised that the "Furies" stopped publishing their newspaper sometime in the Fall of 1972.

Source was unable to locate a subsequent issue after the August, 1972 issue.

FD-323 (Rev. 8-1-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535

November 13, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-55290

Title "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Reference Report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 12/26/72

cw/oss

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN (100-21771) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS' LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
OO: WFO

Rev 5X2 Rev 9

RE: WFO letters to the Bureau, 7/31/72 and 9/29/72.

On 9/7/72, INFORMANT advised that Hartford, Conn., telephone number 232-7678 has been listed since prior to 3/29/72, to HYMAN BERSON, 5 King Edward Rd., West Hartford, Conn.

—SOURCE— West Hartford PD, Records Division, advised on 10/24/72, that there is no record for this individual in their files. Miss JOANN CURRAN, Conn. State Police Bureau of Identification, advised there is no record for one HYMAN BERSON.

The 1971 City Directory for West Hartford lists HYMAN (SYLVIA A.) BERSON as employed as a buyer for Youth Center Stores, Hartford, and residing at 5 King Edward Rd., West Hartford.

SOURCE ————, GID, Hartford, Conn., PD, advised on 10/24/72, that there is no record for BERSON and that the name of HYMAN BERSON and his wife, SYLVIA, are unknown to the Intelligence Division.

On 11/9/72, INFORMANT advised that HYMAN and SYLVIA BERSON are unknown to source.

On 11/20/72, INFORMANT advised that HYMAN and SYLVIA BERSON are unknown to source. INFORMANT was contacted on 12/13/72, also with negative results.

REC-88 16

NHO indices are negative re both HYMAN and SYLVIA BERSON.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-WFO (RM)
1-New Haven
WBG/jhk
(4)

ST-114

15 DEC 30 1972

F473

Rev

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-472144) DATE: 1/30/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-176760) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
(OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)

Reference Washington Field report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES, dated 12/13/72.

On 12/13/72, SOURCE [redacted] New York Telephone Company, 140 West Street, New York, New York, advised SA FRANK J. MEYERS that telephone number 914-462-0604, is subscribed to by LESTER H. PARKER, 8 Pine Tree Drive, Poughkeepsie, New York. This telephone was connected 2/14/69, and no further background information was available regarding this individual.

Subscriber to telephone number 212-732-2944 has already been furnished Washington Field in New York letter to Washington Field dated, 9/28/72.

NYO indices negative re LESTER H.PARKER.

During the months of December, 1972, and January, 1973, the following sources, familiar with New Left activities at New York, New York were contacted regarding LESTER H. PARKER, with negative results.

INFORMANTS (4) [redacted]

New York is considering the status of this matter as RUC.

ST-116

C-70

18

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Washington Field (100-55290) (RM)
1- New York

7 FEB 2 1973

PMG:epl
(5)

FEB 7 1973

Rec. Act. Sect.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-472144) DATE: 1/31/73

FROM :SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT:"FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES, dated 12/13/72. Dec 15

On 12/27/72, INFORMANT advised that some of the internal conflicts within the "Furies" Organization had been settled, but there are no plans to reinstitute publication of the paper. Source stated that most remaining members are writing articles for other lesbian orientated publications and periodicals.

Mrs. JEWEL JOHNSON, 1117 Anacostia Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. (WDC), (protect identity) owner of property at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC, advised on 1/16/73 that apparently this dwelling is being occupied by the same group of women who rented it, since the rent continues to be paid.

She added however, that about 6 weeks ago, she attempted to inspect the premises and found no one present at that time.

She has driven by the residence several times at night since then, and has not noted any lights on in the house, nor has several attempted phone calls been answered.

Baltimore and New York furnish results of previously requested investigation.

WFO will continue to follow activities of "Furies" members.

ST-100 REC-88

17

2-Bureau
2-Baltimore
2-New York (100-176760)
1-WFO

Rev. Acc. Sect.

JMG:neh
(7)

FEB 14 1973

cc

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-472144) DATE: 3/29/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-55290) (C)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION;
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES, 12/13/72, and WFO letter to Bureau, 1/31/73.

On 3/6/73, INFORMANT advised that for all intents and purposes the "Furies" organization and collective have ceased to function. There are no plans to publish another newspaper, and most of the members have left to pursue their own interests.

As reported in re WFO report, investigation of this case did not reflect any activities on the part of the "Furies" that would be considered revolutionary or subversive.

The "Furies" newspaper ceased publication in August, 1972, and did not espouse a radical revolutionary line.

In view of the above, this case is being closed. WFO will remain alert for information regarding any possible future activity on the part of the "Furies", and will report same at that time.

EX-117

REC-36

19

10

2-Bureau
1-WFO

APR 2 1973

JMG:mjs
(3)

51 APR 18 1973

File #:

62-HQ-116395

Serial Scope:

Bulky 1120

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88321 Date: 2025

this has
been abstracted,
other items
with request
10/15/75

file copy

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Vol I

SSC

10/15/75 [illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Callahan
(Mr. Hereford)
1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Mr. Miller
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Smith
1 - Mr. Horner

Tolson
Felt
Rosen
Mohr
Bishop
Miller, E.S.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

FROM : T. J. Smith TJS

DATE: 11/17/71

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 20, 1971, SPONSORED BY THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

This memorandum advises of demonstrations being scheduled in Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, California, on 11/20/71 to build public support for the repeal of antiabortion laws.

The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition was formed at a conference held at Columbia University, New York City, in July, 1971, which was attended by approximately 1,000 women from 29 states. The conference voted to make a woman's right to abortion a national and political issue. Subsequent to its formation, the coalition called for demonstrations in San Francisco and Washington on 11/20/71 to build public support for the repeal of all antiabortion laws, to protest forced sterilization, and to call for an end to restrictive contraceptive laws. A source of the Washington Field Office has advised that the march in Washington is supported by the Young Socialist Alliance, the youth group of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Carol Lipman, who is a member of the SWP, is Project Director of the Washington march.

O.C.

Coalition leaders in requesting permit for the demonstration have estimated that participation in the Washington march will range between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The Washington Field Office has developed information that 46 buses have been chartered to bring participants to the demonstration. Participants will represent some 80 cities. The Metropolitan Police Department anticipates participation will be in the vicinity of 5,000 persons

EX-101 REC-23

Demonstrators are scheduled to assemble at the Ellipse between 10 a.m. and 12 noon and will march via 17th Street to H Street, down H Street to 15th Street, down 15th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue, and then east on Pennsylvania Avenue to the west steps of the Capitol. A rally will be held at the latter site between 2 and 6 p.m.

5 - Horner

RHH:ekn
(11)

369

CONTINUED - OVER

51 NOV 29 1971

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 20, 1971, SPONSORED
BY THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

N.Y.

Speakers will include Billy Jean King, a professional tennis player, Dr. Barbara Roberts, a doctor at the National Institute of Health and a national director of the Coalition, and Linda Jenness, the 1972 SWP Presidential candidate. Though not confirmed, Congresswomen Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm are reported to be invited as speakers.

D.C.

NY Member - Socialist Workers Party

NY [illegible] S.

We have included all pertinent information concerning this march in our summary teletype to The White House, the Vice President, Secret Service, the Attorney General, and military intelligence agencies.

There have been no traffic restrictions placed in effect by the Metropolitan Police Department to date. However, this would be a later consideration as the date of the march approaches.

It appears that the route of march will definitely affect traffic on Saturday morning.

SD/GCM

ACTION:

None. For information.

EM

DJD

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
[illegible]
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

NR 001 SA CODE

2:47AM NITEL 11-18-71 DET

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON FIELD (100-54927)

FROM SAN ANTONIO (100-12995) 3P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER TWENTY, SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D. C. IS - NEW LEFT. OO: WAYINGTON FIELD.

6

RE WASHINGTON FIELD NITEL, NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN, LAST, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE, AND SAN ANTONIO TEL, NOVEMBER FIFTEEN, LAST, CAPTIONED "DAILY DEATH TOLL PROJECT, WASHINGTON, D. C., COMMENCING NOVEMBER EIGHT, SEVENTYONE, SPONSORED BY WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, AND CLERGY AND

END PAGE ONE

EX-1
REC-18 100-467406

NOV 22 1971

190 ~~"Code 1970~~
~~Auto data deleted"~~

57 NOV 26 1971

LAYMEN CONCERNED ABOUT VIETNAM, IS - NEW LEFT: VIDEM."

RE SAN ANTONIO TEL CONTAINS INFORMATION FROM SOURCES THAT NO ONE FROM AUSTIN, TEXAS, WILL GO TO WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR DAILY DEATH TOLL PROJECT AND THAT ONLY TEXAS ACTION WAS IN AUSTIN ON NOVEMBER FIFTEEN, LAST, ALL DUE TO LACK OF INTEREST.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, KEVIN MC GREEVEY, TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES, INC., AUSTIN, TEXAS, ADVISED NO BUSES HAVE BEEN RENTED AND NONE WILL BE RENTED FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D. C., AND RETURN SINCE NO BUSES AVAILABLE.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, SA EIGHT FOUR ONE - S ADVISED SOURCE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANYONE GOING TO WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, LIEUTENANT BOLTON GREGORY, INTELLIGNECE, PD, AUSTIN, ADVISED AUSTIN WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COMMITTEE UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO GET SUPPORT FOR

END PAGE TWO

CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. LIEUTENANT GREGORY BELIEVES AS MANY AS THREE OR FOUR MAY GO TO WASHINGTON, IDENTITIES UNKNOWN.

NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED.

RUC

END

WJM FBI WA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson____
Mr. Felt____
Mr. Rosen____
Mr. Mohr____
[illegible]
[illegible], ES. ✓
Mr. Callahan____
Mr. Casper____
Mr. Conrad____
Mr. Dalbey____
Mr. Cleveland____
Mr. Ponder____
Mr. Bates____
Mr. Tavel____
Mr. Walters____
[illegible]
Tele. Room____
Miss Holmes____
Miss Gandy____

NR 002 HO CODE

10:40 AM URGENT 11-19-71 IRV

TO DIRECTOR, ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

WFO 100-54927

FROM HOUSTON 100-12404

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT.

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN, LAST, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN PERSONS FROM HOUSTON YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA) GROUP IN HOUSTON PLAN TO JOIN CHARTERED BUS FROM AUSTIN, TEXAS, AND PROCEED TO DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER TWENTY, NEXT PERTAINING TO ABORTION. SOURCE ADVISED IN ADDITION TO PERSONS RIDING CHARTERED BUS, THREE MEMBERS OF HOUSTON YSA WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON IN THEIR PERSONAL CARS.

REC-59

THE HOUSTON CONTINGENT IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO

END PAGE ONE 190

57 NOV 26 1971

HO 100-12404

PAGE TWO

HOUSTON UPON COMPLETION OF DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITIES IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

ADMINISTRATIVE: SOURCE MENTIONED ABOVE IS HO ONE THREE FOUR NINE-S.

RE HOUSTON AIRTEL, NOVEMBER NINE, LAST. P

END

MRF FBI WA DC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR006 PH CODE

150AM NITEL 11-19-71 JJR

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: DOMINTEL

WFO (100-54927)

FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-53818) (P) [illegible]

Smith
Shackelford
~~Griffith~~

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WOMAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT (OO: WFO)

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN LAST A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFO IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT NO CHARTER HAS BEEN PLACED WITH GREYHOUND LINES BY THE WOMEN UNITED FOR ABORTION RIGHTS" (WUFAR) OR RELATED GROUPS.

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN LAST A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT A REQUEST FOR TEN BUSES WAS MADE WITH THE PUBLIC SERVICE COORDINATED TRANSPORTATION BY "WUFAR", BUT THE COMPANY COULD NOT PROVIDE THE SESIRED NUMBER OF BUSES SO THE ORDER WAS NOT TAKEN.

REC-18 100-468406-14

NOV 22 1971

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN LAST, A THIRD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFO IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE "WUFAR" PLACED A DEPOSIT WITH THE TRENTON PHILADELPHIA COACH

END PAGE ONE

60 NOV 26 1971

190

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

COMPANY, A SEPTA SUBSIDIARY, FOR THE CHARTER OF NINE BUSES TO LEAVE FROM PHILADELPHIA AT SEVEN A.M., NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT

MEMBER of Women United for Abortion Right

FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. THE BALANCE OF THE BILL WAS TO BE PAID ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN SEVENTYONE BY SHEILA OSTROW OF THE WUFAR AT ONE ONE ONE FIVE WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA. ~~Pa~~ D.C.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN SEVENTYONE THIS SOURCE ADVISED THE WUFAR CANCELLED THE CHARTER OF THE NINE BUSES WITH NO INDICATION THAT ANOTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION WAS BEING UTILIZED.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN SEVENTYONE, BY MEANS OF A SUITABLE PRETEXT AT THE OFFICE OF THE WUFAR, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AS OF THIS DATE THE WUFAR WAS STILL OFFERING BUS SERVICE TO WASHINGTON, D.C. THE BUSES ARE DUE TO DEPART PHILADELPHIA AT SEVEN A.M., NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT AND RETURN TO PHILADEPHIA LEAVING WASHINGTON, D.C., AT SIX P.M., NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT.

ADMINISTRATIVE: RE WFO AIRTEL TO BUREAU DATED NOVEMBER FIVE LAST.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

FIRST CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS CHARLES H. GARNER, JR., CHARTER AGENT, GREYHOUND LINES, PHILADELPHIA.

SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS FRANCES PAULSGRAF, CHARTER AGENT, PUBLIC SERVICE COORDINATED TRANSPORTATION OF NEW JERSEY.

THIRD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS PH ONE TWO NINE SEVEN - CS.

PHILADELPHIA INDICES CONTAIN NO LISTING FOR SHEILA OSTROW UNDER THAT SPELLING.

PHILADELPHIA WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING THE PROPOSED BUS SERVICE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.

END

WA...

WA PLS ACK FOR TEL

DCW

FBI WASDH DC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 20 1971
TELETYPE

NR 004 WF CODE

850 PM NITEL 11-20-71 ALM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BOSTON

CHICAGO

CLEVELAND

NEW HAVEN

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-54927) 5P

T. Griffith

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS - NEW LEFT.

11-1

ON INSTANT DATE SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING:

AT APPROXIMATELY TEN A.M. WOMEN REPRESENTING VARIOUS WOMEN'S GROUPS FROM BOSTON, NEW HAVEN, NEW YORK, CLEVELAND, CHICAGO, AND OTHER CITIES BEGAN GATHERING ON THE ELLIPSE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC). THE ASSEMBLED GROUP DEPARTED THE ELLIPSE AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE TEN P.M., AT WHICH TIME THE GROUP NUMBERED ABOUT FIFTEEN HUNDRED.

REC-21 100-[illegible]406-3

2 NOV 24 1971

FROM THE ELLIPSE THE GROUP PROCEEDED NORTH ON SEVENTEENTH STREET, NORTHWEST, EAST ON H STREET, SOUTH ON FIFTEENTH STREET

END PAGE ONE

WFO 100-54927

PAGE TWO

TO PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, AND EAST ON PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TO THE WEST FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) CAPITOL.

DURING THE MARCH FROM THE ELLIPSE TO THE CAPITOL THE GROUP WALKED APPROXIMATELY TWENTY ABREAST, DISPLAYING SIGNS SUCH AS QUOTE RHODE ISLAND WOMEN FOR ABORTION REFORM END QUOTE, QUOTE MY BODY NOT THE STATES END QUOTE, QUOTE EVERY CHILD A WANTED CHILD END QUOTE, QUOTE FREE ABORTION ON DEMAND END QUOTE, QUOTE DEFEND SHIRLEY WHEELER END QUOTE, QUOTE KEEP THE STATE OUT OF MY VIRGINIA (sic) END QUOTE, QUOTE SEVEN GAY WOMEN END QUOTE, QUOTE BOSTON, REPEAL ALL ABORTION LAWS END QUOTE QUOTE DO NOT LABOR UNDER RESTRICTIONS END QUOTE, AND QUOTE WILSON HIGH SCHOOL END QUOTE.

DURING THE GATHERING ON THE ELLIPSE THERE WERE TWO TABLES OF SOCIALIST PARTY (SWP) LITERATURE SET UP CONTAINING PAMPHLETS READING, QUOTE VOTE FOR SWP FOR SEVENTY TWO END QUOTE, AND OTHER LEAFLETS ADVOCATING LINDA JENESS FOR PRESIDENT AND ANDREW PULLEY FOR VICE PRESIDENT. FOUR SWP LITERATURE TABLES WERE ALSO SET UP AT RALLY SITE AT WEST FRONT ON THE CAPITOL.

END PAGE TWO

SHORTLY AFTER THE GROUP LEFT THE ELLIPSE A SMALL AIRCRAFT FLEW OVER MARCH ROUTE TRAILING A SIGN READING, QUOTE ABORTION KILLS ~~LEFT~~ LIFE END QUOTE.

SHORTLY AFTER ONE THIRTY P.M., THE MARCHERS ASSEMBLED AT WEST FRONT OF CAPITOL WHERE THEY LISTENED TO MUSIC PROVIDED BY THE NEW HAVEN WOMEN'S LIBERATION ROCK BAND. ABOUT TWO P.M., THE FOLLOWING SPEAKERS WERE HEARD IN THIS ORDER:

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

DOCTOR BARBARA ROBERTS, WONAAC PROJECT DIRECTOR:; MARCIA COLEMAN, BLACK TASK FORCE: BEULAH SANDERS, NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION; SHIRLEY WHEELER, CONVICTED ABORTION LAW VIOLATOR, STATE OF FLORIDA: LANA CLARKE DAVIS, WHO STATED SHE HAD AN ABORTION THIRTY YEARS AGO IN FLORIDA: LINDA JENNESS, SWP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, NINETEEN SEVENTY TWO; MARGE SLOAN, A BLACK FEMALE; JOYCE BROWN, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED: DOCTOR ANN CLAY, FLORIDA ABORTION GROUP; CAROL HENDERSON EVANS, BOSTON WOMEN'S LIBERATION; LINDA DINEEN, FROM CANADA, WHO AVERRED THAT CANADIAN ABORTION LAWS ARE REPRESSIVE; STEPHANIE COONTZ, NATIONAL PEACE ACTION COALITION; AND NANCY STEARN, LAWYER FOR SHIRLEY WHEELER. THE ABOVE LISTED SPEAKERS IN GENERAL ADVANCED THE THEME THAT ALL

END PAGE THREE

3

ANTI-ABORTION LAWS SHOULD BE REPEALED, THAT A WOMAN'S BODY IS NOT PUBLIC PROPERTY, AND THAT WOMEN MUST UNITE POLITICALLY TO STRIKE DOWN PRESENT ABORTION LAWS.

THE RALLY CONCLUDED AT APPROXIMATELY FOUR P.M., AT WHICH TIME THE CROWD HAD DIMINISHED TO ABOUT THREE HUNDRED.

A SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THERE WERE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEW YORK SPARTACIST LEAGUE, THE PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY, AND KALAMAZOO WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN ATTENDANCE AT THE RALLY. SOURCE ADDED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT FROM SPEAKERS PLATFORM PROCLAIMED WONAAC WAS FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS IN DEBT AND ASKED FOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

SHORTLY AFTER ONE THIRTY P.M. AN ANTI ABORTION GROUP OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TO TWO HUNDRED PERSONS ARRIVED AT THE EAST SIDE OF U.S. CAPITOL CARRYING PLACARDS READING, QUOTE THE RIGHT TO HAPPINESS FOR UNBORN BABIES END QUOTE, QUOTE LOVE LIFE, SAVE BABIES END QUOTE AND QUOTE TO HELL WITH BELLA END QUOTE. THIS GROUP OPPOSING CAPTIONED RALLY DEMONSTRATED PEACEFULLY AND DEPARTED AREA AT ABOUT TWO TEN P.M.

END PAGE FOUR

WFO 100-54927

PAGE FIVE

CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION WAS PEACEFUL THROUGHOUT MARCH AND RALLY AND CONCLUDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE, PARK POLICE, SECRET SERVICE, AND METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, WDC, COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

AGENTS OBSERVING DEMONSTRATION WERE WILLIAM C. ARMS, WILLIAM T. BROOKS, RICHARD C. COFFMAN, NORMAN H. HIERONYMI, MASON B. NOAH, JR., AND WILLIAM T. TUCKER.

SOURCE IS WF TWO TWO THREE SIX DASH PSI. NO LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM FOLLOWS.

AIR MAIL COPIES TO ATLANTA, BALTIMORE, CINCINNATI, DETROIT, INDIANAPOLIS, KANSAS CITY, PITTSBURGH, AND PHILADELPHIA.

END

JTJ FBI WASH DC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 20 1971

TELETYPE

NR 004 SF PLAIN

4/46PM 11-20-71 URGENT MXG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (100-71464) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC); DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, INSTANT, SAN FRANCISCO, IS -NEW LEFT.

RALLY AT CIVIC CENTER ENDED BY THREE FOURTY-FIVE PM. OFFICAL POLICE ESTIMATE OF CROWD WAS APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HUNDRED. SEVERAL HUNDRED YOUNG PEOPLE ATTENDING A SKI SHOW NEARBY WERE MERELY ON-LOOKERS AND NOT PART OF DEMONSTRATION. NO INCIDENTS OR ARREST.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RE SF TEL ELEVEN TWENTY, SEVENTYONE.

REC-32 100-468406-30

SAS OBSERVING WERE EDWARD O'FLYNN AND JAY GRODIN. JERRY WRIGHT, ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH MIG, ADVISED. TOM DICKSON, INTELLIGENCE DETAIL, SOURCE OF OFFICIAL CROWD ESTIMATE.

LHM FOLLOWS.

END

MKA FBI WASH DC

NOV 23 1971

NOV 21 11 22 PM '71

57 DEC 10 1971

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 20 1971

TELETYPE

NR 002 SF PLAIN

1:57 PM URGENT 11/20/71 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (100-71464) (P) 1P

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY INSTANT, SAN FRANCISCO, IS - NEW LEFT.

APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS, EIGHTY PER CENT OF WHOM WERE YOUNG WOMEN IN THEIR TEENS AND EARLY TWENTIES, GATHERED AT THE EMBARCADERO, SAN FRANCISCO, THIS DATE AND BEGAN MARCHING AT ELEVEN TEN AM FROM EMBARCADERO TO CIVIC CENTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CARRYING SIGNS SUCH AS "FREE OUR WOMEN" AND "SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE". THE MARCHERS HAVE ARRIVED AT CIVIC CENTER AND A FEMALE ROCK BAND IS PLAYING. CROWD HAS REACHED APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS AT THIS TIME, RALLY IS SCHEDULED FROM TWO TO FOUR PM. NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS.

97

-37

REC- 32

AMINISTRATIVE

RE SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL NOVEMBER TWELVE LAST.

SAS OBSERVING ARE EDWARD O'FLYNN AND JAY GRODIN. JERRY WRIGHT, ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH MIG ADVISED. LIAISON BEING MAINTAINED WITH TOM DICKSON, INTELLIGENCE DETAIL, SAN FRANCISCO PD.

END

JTJ FBI WASH DC

90

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 17 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR014 BS CODE

7:54 PM NITEL 11-17-71 DAD

TO: DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMINTEL)

51 WFO

FROM: BOSTON 100-43809

Griffith

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER TWENTY, SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS DASH NEW LEFT, (OO: WFO).

A SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ON NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST, ADVISED THAT MATILDE ZIMMERMAN, PHONE NUMBER FIVE FOUR SEVEN DASH ONE EIGHT ONE EIGHT OF BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION, FIVE FIVE TWO MASS. AVE., CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ROOM NINE, HAD ORDERED FIVE BUSES WITH A FORTYFIVE PERSON CAPACITY EACH FROM THE BRUSH HILL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DORCHESTER, BOSTON, MASS. FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D.C. NOVEMBER NINETEEN NEXT. A FIFTEEN HUNDRED DOLLAR CASH DEPOSIT AGAINST A TOTAL COST OF THIRTYFIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS WAS MADE NOVEMBER FIFTEEN LAST. THE BUSES ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. APPROXIMATELY NINE PM, NOVEMBER

END PAGE ONE

REC-35 [illegible]

16 NOV 22 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

NINETEEN NEXT FROM A PARKING LOT OF THE PURITY SUPREME MARKET, GREEN STREET, CAMBRIDGE. COST OF ROUND TRIP TICKET IS EIGHTEEN DOLLARS.

A SECOND SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ON INSTANT DATE, ADVISED THAT THE BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION WAS FORMED OUT OF THE LOCAL FEMALE LIBERATION GROUP AND WHILE THIS COALITION IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY MADE UP OF SOCIALIST WORKER PARTY, (SWP) BOSTON AND YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE OF BOSTON (YSA-B) FEMALE MEMBERS, IT IS CONTROLLED BY MEMBERS OF THOSE GROUPS.

ACCORDING TO THE LATTER SOURCE, MATILDE MILES, NEE ZIMMERMAN WAS THE SWP BOSTON MEMBER HEADING UP LOCAL SWP DASH YSA WORK IN THE COALITION AND SHE AND EVELYN CLARK ANOTHER SWP BOSTON MEMBER HAD LEFT OR WERE PLANNING TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. TO HELP IN THE ORGANIZING OF THE NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION DEMONSTRATION AT WASHINGTON, D.C. BOTH PLANNED

END PAGE TWO

TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THROUGH THE DEMONSTRATION. THIS LATTER SOURCE FURTHER ADVISED THAT AT A MEETING OF THE SWP, BOSTON HELD NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE LOCAL WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION WAS HOPING TO FILL FOUR BUSES WITH PARTICIPANTS FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR THE NOVEMBER TWENTY DEMONSTRATION BUT THAT A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ACTUAL PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT KNOWN.

THE NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE LISTING SERVICE, ADVISED THAT PHONE NUMBER FOUR NINE ONE DASH ONE ZERO SEVEN ONE, IS LISTED TO FEMALE LIBERATION FIVE FIVE TWO MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, CAMBRIDG, AND THAT NUMBER FIVE FOUR SEVEN DASH ONE EIGHT ONE EIGHT IS LISTED TO THE BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION AT THAT SAME ADDRESS.

THE BOSTON SWP IS THE LOCAL AFFILIATE AND FOLLOWS THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE NATIONAL SWP. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

THE YSA-B IS THE BOSTON AFFILIATE OF THE YSA, THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP).

END PAGE THREE

AGENT MARK BROWN, SECRET SERVICE BOSTON, WAS ADVISED OF THE ABOVE ON INSTANT DATE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE WFO AIRTEL NOVEMBER FIVE SEVENTYONE.

THE FIRST SOURCE IS CAPT. JOSEPH AHERN, SUBVERSIVE UNIT, MASS. STATE POLICE.

THE SECOND SOURCE IS BS EIGHT ZERO EIGHT DASH S.

BOSTON FOLLOWING AND WILL PROVIDE BUREAU AND WFO ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS.

ONE COPY EACH OF PHOTOGRAPH OF MILES AND CLARK BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO WFO VIA AIRTEL. MILES IS FORMER SUBJECT WFO FILE ONE ZERO ZERO DASH FOUR SEVEN FIVE FOUR SIX.

END.

LRS FBI WASHDC CLR

cc — Korner

F B I

Date: 11/15/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-43509) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, 11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
IS - NEW LEFT

S/pen

I/S.

Re Boston letter to Philadelphia, 9/30/71 (IO), captioned "JUDITH KLEINBERG, SM - SWP" and San Francisco airtel and LHM, 11/12/71 (no copy Philadelphia).

sw 26

Enclosed for San Francisco is a copy of Boston summary report concerning former Boston subject JUDITH KLEINBERG who it is believed is identical with the JUDY KLEINBERG mentioned in re airtel and LHM.

91

④ - Bureau (RM)
(2 - 100-468540) (JUDITH KLEINBERG)
2 - Philadelphia (RM)
(JUDITH KLEINBERG)
4 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (RM)
(2 - 100-71464)
(2 - JUDY KLEINBERG)
4 - Boston (2 - 100-43509)
(2 - 100-43175) (JUDITH KLEINBERG)
AVS:mej
(14)

REC-61 100-468466-65

EX-100

2 NOV 22 1971

NEW LEFT

58NOV 2? 1971

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

For the information of Philadelphia, re San Francisco LHM related to a scheduled demonstration of captioned group 11/20/71 in the San Francisco area and noted that a JUDY KLEINBERG who has been in the San Francisco area since 10/30/71 and is formerly from Massachusetts was publicity coordinator for captioned group in San Francisco.

Philadelphia is requested to forward to San Francisco a copy of photograph enclosed to Philadelphia in re letter to enable San Francisco to establish whether the JUDY KLEINBERG mentioned in re San Francisco communication is identical with Boston subject JUDITH KLEINBERG.

Philadelphia should also establish through postal or other sources whether JUDITH KLEINBERG has furnished any indication of a change of address from 6606 North 11th St., Philadelphia, which address she had listed as a change effective 9/23/71 when she moved from the Boston area.

If the above identification is established by San Francisco, that office is requested to determine KLEINBERG's residence and employment status and advise Boston and Philadelphia in order that Boston may submit FD-128.

FEDERAL BUREAU C VESTIC
COMMUNICATIONS SEC

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 017 BA CODED

11:32 PM NITEL 11-19-71 HJS

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMINTEL)

WFO (100-54927)

FROM BALTIMORE (100-29231) RUC

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS-NEW LEFT (OO: WFO)

ON NOVEMBER NINETEEN, SEVENTYONE, A SOURCE RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND THREE ZERO TWO EIGHT GREENMOUNT AVE., BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, HAD HOPED TO CHARTER A BUS TO TRANSPORT PARTICIPANTS TO CAPTIONED RALLY, BUT LACK OF INTEREST MAKES USE OF A BUS DOUBTFUL.

A SECOND SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, STATED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION HAD ATTEMPTED TO SOLICIT SUPPORT FOR CAPTIONED RALLY AMONG CITY COLLECTIVES WITH LITTLE SUCCESS.

A THIRD SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE ENTHUSIAM FOR CAPTIONED RALLY AMONG BALTIMORE AREA RESIDENTS AND FEW PARTICIPANTS WERE EXPECTED TO ATTEND FROM BALTIMORE AREA.

ADMINISTRATIVE: FIRST SOURCE IS BA ONE TWO THREE FIVE DASH S. SECOND SOURCE IS BA TWO ZERO THREE SIX DASH PSI. THIRD SOURCE IS CS BA ONE EIGHT TWO ZERO DASH S. NO LHM FOLLOWS.

RE WFO AIRTEL TO DIRECTOR, NOVEMBER FIVE, SEVENTYONE.

END

EX-104 REC-36 100-468706-

NOV 23 1971

190

54 DEC 1 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

020 CG CODE

1020PM NITEL 11-19-71 EOM

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DID)

WFO (100-54927)

FROM CHICAGO (100-52028)

Horner

T. J. Smith

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS - NEW LEFT.

RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN LAST, THAT ILLINOIS WOMENS ABORTION COALITION (IWAC) HAS SOLD APPROXIMATELY TWENTY SEATS ON CHARTERED TRAILWAYS BUS WHICH WILL DEPART CG LATE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER NINETEEN INSTANT, FOR CAPTIONED MATTER AT WASHINGTON, D.C. IWAC HOPES TO FILL ONE BUS AND POSSIBLY ANOTHER BUT NEED FOR SECOND BUS AT THIS TIME IS DOUBTFUL. TENTATIVE PLANS ARE FOR BUS TO RETURN TO CG LATE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT.

ADMINISTRATIVE

EX-100 REC- 36 100-468406-32

NOV 23 1971

RE WASHINGTON FIELD AIRTEL NOVEMBER FIVE LAST.

CHICAGO SOURCE IS CG SEVEN SEVEN ZERO SEVEN - S.

END

c.c.: Horner

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

FBI

Date: 11-[illegible]-71

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-32010)(P)

RE: PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C. AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
11-20-71 FOR ABORTION LAW
REPEAL SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S
NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC)
SM - NEW LEFT

Enclosed for the Bureau are 8 copies of LHM concerning captioned matter.

Copies of instant LHM are being directed to Detroit, New York, San Francisco and Washington Field in view of their interest in the individuals listed therein, the WONAAC or the planned demonstrations by that group in Washington, D. C. and San Francisco on 11-20-71.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations mentioned in enclosed LHM are set forth where available.

Sources utilized in LHM are as follows:

Enc. 724-940

ENCLOSURE

EX-113

(2) - Bureau (enc. 8)(RM)
2 - Detroit (enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
(1 - 100- BARBARA ROSE)
1 - New York (enc. 1)(Info)(RM)
2 - San Francisco (enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
(1 - 100- CAROL LIPMAN)
6 - Cleveland
(1 - 100-29936 LAURIE PERKUS)
(1 - 100-30100 CAROL LIPMAN)
(1 - 100-28243 [illegible])
(1 - 100-23654 SWP MEMBERSHIP)

REC 16

AGENCY ACSI [illegible]
REQ. REC'D [illegible]
DATE FORW. [illegible]
HOW FORW. [illegible]
BY [illegible]

6 NOV 10 1971

NEW LEFT

CEJ:smk

57 DEC 13 1971

Sent ______ M Per ______

CV T-1 is a confidential source, who is in a position to have information of this type

CV T-2 is CV 694-S

CV T-3 is CV 1098-PSI

CV T-4 is NY 4253-S

Cleveland will continue to follow and report developments.

LHM classified **CONFIDENTIAL** as data reported from **CV T-1** thru CV T-4 could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise effectiveness thereof.

NONSYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

CV T-1 is PHYLLIS MOLER, Charter Sales,
Greyhound Bus Lines, Cleveland,
Ohio

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Cleveland, Ohio

November 3, 1971

PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C. AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971, FOR
ABORTION LAW REPEAL SPONSORED
BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

B. APPROX. 1950

On October 18, 1971, CV T-1, a reliable source, advised that LAURIE PERKUS, 11220 Bellflower, Cleveland Heights, Ohio, telephone number 368-2248, had made arrangements to charter four 43 passenger coaches from Greyhound Bus Lines for a trip to Washington, D. C. on November 19, 1971, and return on November 20, 1971. PERKUS had made the above arrangements in the name of the Abortion Project Coalition, not further identified, and had stated that a need for four additional coaches may arise prior to planned departure. The Cleveland group is scheduled to depart Cleveland at 11:30 p.m., November 19, 1971, and arrive in Washington, D. C. at 8:30 a.m., November 20, 1971, with planned destination noted merely as "Pennsylvania Avenue". Only one day in Washington, D. C. is planned inasmuch as the group is scheduled to depart Washington, D. C. at 6:00 p.m., November 20, 1971, and arrive Cleveland, Ohio, at 3:00 a.m., November 21, 1971.

On October 27, 1971, CV T-2, a reliable source, advised that LAURIE PERKUS is a current active member of the Cleveland Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The Cleveland Branch of the SWP is affiliated with the National SWP and follows its directives. The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On September 14, 1970, an article entitled "Students Map Anti-War Activities Here" appeared in the "Plain Dealer",

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-468406-43

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Cleveland, Ohio, area, and related that the Cleveland Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) had held its first meeting on September 13, 1970, since summer recess to plan statewide anti-war activities for the fall. The above article reported that LAURIE PERKUS, age 21, had been appointed a full time committee staff member of the Cleveland SMC.

STUDENT MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, Young Socialist Alliance. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On October 19, 1971, an article entitled "Women Strive For Abortion Reform" appeared in "The Caldron", a student newspaper circulated on the Cleveland State University (CSU) campus, Cleveland, Ohio, related that a Women's Educational Conference on Abortion Law Repeal was scheduled for October 23, 1971, at Case Western Reserve University (CWRU), Cleveland, Ohio, and that speakers included BARBARA ROBB, the attorney for the Michigan Women's Abortion Youth and a National coordinator of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC). The above article characterized both the WONAAC and the Cleveland Abortion Project Coalition as follows:

> "One way that women are engaged in a coordinated National campaign is through the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) with which the Cleveland Abortion Project Coalition is affiliated. WONAAC was formed at a National Women's Conference in New York City in mid-July which was attended by over 1000 women from 29 states. It was at this conference that the National Abortion Law Repeal Campaign was launched. The women endorsed the aforementioned demands and a coordinated campaign

of legislative action, court action, and a massive march on Washington D. C. and San Francisco on November 20."

On October 24, 1971, CV T-3, a reliable source, advised that LAURIE PERKUS had been recruiting women to travel to Washington, D. C. on November 19 - 21, 1971, to take part in a massive demonstration planned to protest abortion laws. PERKUS had stated that the Abortion Project Coalition of Cleveland would utilize four busses and round-trip fare for one person would be $17.

On October 29, 1971, CV T-1, advised that during October, 1971, LAURIE PERKUS had made two reservations for air transportation for individuals to travel to Cleveland, Ohio, on October 23, 1971. The first reservation was made for BARBARA ROBB, 2761 East Jefferson, Detroit, Michigan, telephone number 513/567-0450, and was to cover a flight from Detroit to Cleveland on October 23, 1971 for ROBB; however, ROBB did not utilize her reservation. The second reservation was made for CAROL LIPMAN, whose home address was given as 917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., telephone number 202/347-0946, and was to cover a flight on October 23, 1971, from Washington, D. C. to Cleveland, Ohio, and return same date via United Airlines flight 423 to Cleveland and United Airlines flight 666Y return to Washington, D. C. The reservation for LIPMAN was utlized on October 23, 1971, as planned.

On April 28, 1970, CV T-4, a reliable source, advised that CAROL LIPMAN is a member of the SWP.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters ✓
Mr. Soyars
~~Tele. Room~~
Miss Holmes

FBI

Date: 11/12/71

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927)

WOMAN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO airtel to Bureau 11/5/71 and airtel and LHM 11/2/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of an LHM including two copies designated for the Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section. Also enclosed for the Identification Division is original letter to U.S. Capitol Police in container marked evidence.

Source utilized in LHM is WF 2188-S.

This LHM is being classified confidential to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information which could be prejudicial of the defense interest of the nation.

It is noted that in the past the YSA/SWP organizers of captioned demonstration have eschewed violence to achieve their ends. This letter is being submitted due to the possible connection with captioned demonstration.

U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Division and MPD Intelligence Division have been telephonically advised.

4503
11-17-71

REC-2

NOV 29 1971

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 10)
(1-Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section (Enc. 3))
1 - WFO
RCC:jmg
(4)

Approved: ____________________
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

WFO 100-54927 November [illegible]

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

The Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section is requested to process enclosed letter and envebpe for identifiable prints and furnish results together with letter and envelope to WFO.

[illegible]

clipped fr[illegible] and/or magazines. The message [illegible]

[illegible]

at 2:00 p.m., to [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

On October [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 12, 1971

WOMAN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Alliance

On November 10, 1971, Inspector Robert E. Krahling, United States Capitol Police, advised that a letter had been received by his office, which contained the following message composed of words of assorted size clipped from newspapers and/or magazines. The message read:

> WOMAN'S ABORTION [illegible]
> bomb
> Nov 20
> 3 27

At the bottom of the letter was affixed a label from a can of Bumble Bee Brand Fancy White Meat Tuna Fish.

Subject [illegible] coalition

It is noted that November 20, 1971, is the date of a publicly announced march and rally by the Woman's National Abortion Action Coalition culminating in a rally at 2:00 p.m., on the west steps of the United States Capitol. In a Washington Post Daily Newspaper article of October 15, 1971, Dr. Barbara Roberts, National Project Director of the coalition stated that the march would attack abortion laws which degraded, mutilated and murdered women. She stated the coalition was comprised of about 30 women's groups which would demonstrate against the forced sterilization and restrictive contraception laws and also plan to hold national abortion hearings in Washington, D.C., before the march. Roberts estimated between 10,000 and 20,000 women would engage in this march and rally.

On October 15, 1971, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that the November 20, 1971, WONAC March is largely the creator of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and as such has not received the endorsement of more radical.

100-46[illegible]-40

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

woman's groups who consider YSA/SWP to be "non feminist."

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party, (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as " a Multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

ABORTION

CONFIDENTIAL

bomb

NOV 20

3- 217

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

BUMBLE BEE BRAND SOLID ... TUNA
NET WT. 3½ OZ.
WRITE FOR Free RECIPE BOOKLET
BUMBLE BEE Fancy SOLID WHITE TUNA
NET WT. 3½ OZ.
BUMBLE BEE SEAFOODS
CASTLE & COOKE

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-70)

FBI

Date: 11/20/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

To: Director, FBI ATTENTION:

174-0

From: SAC, WFO ([redacted])

☐ CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION
GENERAL INVEST. DIV.

Subject: UNSUB; Threat to Bomb United States Capitol Washington, D.C. 11/20/71

☒ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIV.

Re WFO airtel and LHM, 11/12/71, captioned "Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAC) Sponsored Demonstration, 11/20/71, Washington, D.C., IS-New Left" (WFOfile 100-54927)

☐ CR ☐ EL ☐ DIH ☐ CRA-64
☐ PA ☐ PE ☐ PF ☐ E
☐ EID ☒ Bomb Threats ☐ Extremist Matters
☐ White Hate ☐ Black

Summary of Complaint:

Enclosed are original and 6 copies of LHM dated and captioned as above and original and one copy of FD-376.

LHM is being furnished to local agencies by WFO.

Telephone call received at WFO by SA JAMES P. WOOTEN.

Information re receipt of bomb threat and results of search was telephonically furnished to Bureau.

At 12:20 p.m., 11/20/71, an unidentified individual, possibly a white female, called Communications Dispatch Service, MPD, and told Officer HORN: "Members of the B Tribe and the Woman's Liberation March, while posing as tourists going through the Capitol, are going to plant a bomb between 1500 hours and 1530 hours. This will be done during the tour."

ACTION: UACB: 1906D

☒ No further action being taken and
☒ LHM enclosed ☐ Copy furnished to USA Washington, D.C.
☒ FD-376 (enclosure to LHM)
☐ LHM being submitted
☐ Report being submitted
☐ Preliminary investigation instituted
☐ Limited investigation instituted

2-Bureau (Enc. 9)
3-WFO
(1-[illegible])
(1-[illegible])
(5)

100-468406-

1-CD + ID 694-C
11-24-71
JTS-RK
1-SS
1-EID

ORIGINAL FILED IN 174-

NOT RECORDED
44 DEC 2 1971

ENCLOSURE

NOV 1971

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

WFO 174-0

The attention of the Bureau is directed to re WFO airtel and LHM, 11/12/71, captioned "Woman's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAC) Sponsored Demonstration, 11/20/71, Washington, D.C.; IS-New Left". (WFO 100-5492) which may pertain to the same threat. The message read:

"Woman's Abortion
bomb
Nov. 20
3 27."

The message suggest the bomb would detonate at 3:27 on November 20, which is within the 1500 - 1530 hours on 11/20/71.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D.C. 20535

November 20, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNKNWON SUBJECT
THREAT TO BOMB UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
BOMB THREAT

At 12:45 p.m. Mike De Sanctis, Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., telephonically advised a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that at 12:20 hours (12:20 p.m.) November 20, 1971, a call was received by Officer Horn of the Communications Dispatch Service, Metropolitan Police Department from an unidentified individual, possibly a white female, who stated: "Members of the B Tribe and the Women's Liberation March, while posing as tourist going through the Capitol, are going to plant a bomb between 1500 hours and 1530 hours. This will be done during the tour today." De Sanctis stated Lieutenant Abernathy of the Capitol Police had been notified.

12:50	Lieutenant Abernathy United States Capitol Police (Confirmed)
12:55	Special Agent Larry Boondog United States Secret Service
1:05	Mr. Toliver General Services Administration

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-468406 -

ENCLOSURE

Mr. Tolson ____
Mr. Felt ____
Mr. Rosen ____
Mr. Mohr ____
Mr. Bishop ____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Callahan ____
Mr. Casper ____
Mr. Conrad ____
Mr. Dalbey ____
Mr. Cleveland ____
Mr. Ponder ____
Mr. Bates ____
Mr. Walkart ____
Mr. Walters ____
Mr. Soyars ____
Tele. Room ____
Miss Holmes ____
Miss Gandy ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 13 1972
TELETYPE

EW

NR011 NY CODE

1205PM URGENT 1-13-72 GMD

TO DIRECTOR

ATT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON FIELD 100-49940

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 1P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC); OO: WFO

IS- NEW LEFT

ON JANUARY THIRTEENTH SEVENTY TWO, DETECTIVE HENRY SUAREZ, SIS, NYCPD ADVISED WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) AND OTHER UNKNOWN GROUPS OF WOMEN ARE TO CONDUCT MARCH AT FOUR THIRTY P.M. THURSDAY, JANUARY THIRTEENTH SEVENTY TWO. THIS MARCH IS TO BEGIN AT FORTY SECOND STREET AND TIMES SQUARE AND GO TO HERALD SQUARE (THIRTY FOURTH STREET AND SIXTH AVENUE), NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME, CONCERNING PURPOSE OF MARCH OR NUMBER EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

REC- 32 100-462401

ADMINISTRATIVE:

JAN 18 1972

SIS, NYCPD COGNIZANT. NEW YORK WILL COVER AND SUTEL.

END

54 JAN 20 1972

GXC FBI WASHDC

FBI

Date: 11/17/71

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

Je

Helgeson

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (157-0)(P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION COALITION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
EM
OO: Washington Field Office

SF 3215-E, a highly confidential source, furnished the following information 11/15/71.

A female individual by the name of BILLY NOBLE (phonetic) of the Women's National Abortion Coalition in Washington, D.C. was in contact with BPP National Headquarters Oakland, California speaking with ERICKA HUGGINS.

NOBLE wanted to know whether or not HUGGINS would be able to come to Washington on 11/20/71, to participate in a demonstration by the captioned group. HUGGINS informed NOBLE that she had not heard as yet from the people she must contact in order to get permission to make such a trip, but she promised to notify NOBLE as soon as she receives some word.

2 - Bureau (RM)
4 - Washington Field Office (RM)
5 - San Francisco
  (1 - 157-4356)(ERICKA HUGGINS)
  (1 - 100-53950)(BOBBY SEALE)
  (1 - 157-2874)(Public Appearances)
  (1 - 157-4726)(LESLIE JOHNSON)
JAC:sl
(11)

CARBON COPY

157-23791-1

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

Special Agent in Charge

Source stated that later on 11/15/71, an individual by the name of HANNAH (LNU) also contacted ERICKA HUGGINS at BPP National Headquarters regarding this same matter and also wanted to know if the BPP had decided to endorse the 11/20/71 demonstration by the Women's National Abortion Coalition. HUGGINS said she did not know what position the Party would take in this regard.

Source also advised that subsequently HUGGINS was in contact with LESLIE JOHNSON, secretary to BPP Chairman BOBBY SEALE, wanted to know if JOHNSON had as yet been able to talk to Chairman about her possible appearance in Washington. JOHNSON told HUGGINS that she has been unable to do so inasmuch as SEALE was on a speaking tour in North Carolina, but she promised to discuss the matter with SEALE when she next hears from him.

No additional information has been received from source with respect to this matter to indicate a positive committment for an appearance by HUGGINS as indicated.

Washington Field identify the captioned group and contact sources regarding the noted demonstration scheduled for Washington and furnish appropriate information to the Bureau and logical law enforcement agencies.

San Francisco will advise of any information developed indicating possible travel to Washington by ERICKA HUGGINS or any other BPP personality for this demonstration.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/17/71

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ AIR MAIL (Priority)

017(136) to SF
conv/Bu
6/6/72 KHS
SE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (157-0)(P)

AKA: Women's National Abortion Action Coalition

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION COALITION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
EM
OO: Washington Field Office

SF 3215-E a highly confidential source, furnished the following information 11/15/71.

A female individual by the name of BILLY NOBLE (phonetic) of the Women's National Abortion Coalition in Washington, D.C. was in contact with BPP National Headquarters Oakland, California speaking with ERICKA HUGGINS.

NOBLE wanted to know whether or not HUGGINS would be able to come to Washington on 11/20/71, to participate in a demonstration by the captioned group. HUGGINS informed NOBLE that she had not heard as yet from the people she must contact in order to get permission to make such a trip, but she promised to notify NOBLE as soon as she receives some word.

100-468406-46X

EX-100

REC 13 ~~157-23909~~

2 - Bureau (RM)
4 - Washington Field Office (RM)
5 - San Francisco
(1 - 157-4356)(ERICKA HUGGINS)
(1 - 100-53950)(BOBBY SEALE)
(1- 157-2874)(Public Appearances)
(1 - 157-4726)(LESLIE JOHNSON)

MCT-30

NOV 19 1971

JAC:sl
(11)

EXT. INT. SEC.

58 NOV 30 1971

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______

SF 157-0
JAC:sl

Source advised that later on 11/15/71, an individual by the name of [illegible] (LNU) also contacted ERICKA HUGGINS at BPP National Headquarters regarding this same matter and also wanted to know if the BPP had decided to endorse the 11/20/71 demonstration by the Women's National Abortion Coalition. HUGGINS said she did not know what position the Party would take in this regard.

Source also advised that subsequently HUGGINS was in contact with LESLIE JOHNSON, secretary to BPP Chairman BOBBY SEALE, wanted to know if JOHNSON had as yet been able to talk to Chairman about her possible appearance in Washington. JOHNSON told HUGGINS that she has been unable to do so inasmuch as SEALE was on a speaking tour in North Carolina, but she promised to discuss the matter with SEALE when she next hears from him.

No additional information has been received from source with respect to this matter to indicate a positive committment for an appearance by HUGGINS as indicated.

Washington Field identify the captioned group and contact sources regarding the noted demonstration scheduled for Washington and furnish appropriate information to the Bureau and logical law enforcement agencies.

San Francisco will advise of any information developed indicating possible travel to Washington by ERICKA HUGGINS or any other BPP personality for this demonstration.

FBI

Date: 11/15/71

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (REGISTERED) (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-79014)(P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
11/20/71
Washington, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT
OO: Washington Field Office

Re Washington Field airtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) to the Bureau dated 11/2/71 nov 3

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies and for San Francisco and Washington Field two (2) copies each of a LHM containing information regarding captioned demonstration.

Source one in the LHM is LA 5271-S and source two in the LHM is LA 4179-S.

Information furnished by sources contained in the enclosed LHM is classified confidential because the unauthorized disclosure of either the information or the identities of sources would be detrimental to the national defense.

REC-18 100-468[illegible]-46

The suitable pretext referred to in the enclosed LHM consisted of a 11/10/71, telephone conversation by ELEANOR VILLANO, Clerk in the Los Angeles Office, with an unidentified female individual at the Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee, 2936 West Eighth Street, Los Angeles, under the guise of attempting to obtain information regarding the planned 11/20/71, demonstration at San Francisco, California.

NOV [illegible] 1971

2 - Bureau (AM)(RM)(Enc. 8)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)(AM)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (Enc. 2)(AM)(RM)
2 - Los Angeles
RJR/vdb
(8)

NEW LEFT

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

No information has been developed at Los Angeles indicating that any Los Angeles area individuals plan to attend captioned demonstration in Washington, D. C.

Los Angeles will remain alert for any additional information regarding captioned demonstration.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Los Angeles, California
November 15, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION November 20, 1971 Washington, D. C.

The WONAAC is self-described in its literature as being formed by the national conference of more than 1,000 women held in New York City, New York, in July 1971. At that conference, women from 29 states and 253 organizations came together to unite their efforts in the national fight for the repeal of all abortion laws and for the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and repeal of contraception laws. The conference called for a massive show of force for these goals in a march on Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, California, November 20, 1971. WONAAC is based on a program of legislative, judicial, and mass demonstration activities on a local and national level, and seeks to unite all women in the fight for the right of abortion.

The September 22, 1971, issue of the "Los Angeles Times", a newspaper of general circulation published daily in Los Angeles, California, contains an article on page 6, part IV, datelined Washington, D. C., entitled "Abortion March Mobilizing", which article states in part as follows:

> "Women from 253 organizations across the country are mobilizing for mass demonstrations here (Washington, D. C.) and in San Francisco in November to support the complete repeal of all abortion laws.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALTION (WONAAC)

> "These groups, which joined in July (1971) to form the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), are organizing a march Nov. 20 (1971) in Washington planned to take them past the White House, the Supreme Court and the Capitol--institutions which they feel can effect significant changes in existing abortion laws. They are expecting what they call a conservative estimate of between 10,000-20,000 persons, but are hoping for thousands more."

On November 10, 1971, source one made available the following leaflet issued by the Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee (LAWAAC), an affiliate of the WONAAC, and annoucing a demonstration to be held November 20, 1971, at San Francisco, California, to protest abortion laws and forced sterilization and restrictive contraception laws.

ASSEMBLE 10:30 A.M. AT EMBARCADERO PLAZA ACROSS FROM FERRY BUILDING AT END OF MARKET STREET

CONFIDENTIAL



JOIN US ON NOVEMBER 20!

Abortion is a woman's right to choose

Join the first national women's march on

San Francisco

November 20

Repeal anti abortion laws
Against forced sterilizaton and restrictive contraception laws

EVERY STATE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS LAWS ON THE BOOKS WHICH RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF WOMEN TO OBTAIN ABORTIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL SUCH LAWS DENY US ONE OF OUR MOST BASIC RIGHTS -- THE RIGHT TO CONTROL OUR OWN BODIES; THE RIGHT TO CONTROL OUR OWN LIVES. RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS PROVIDE THE BASIS OF LEGALIZED MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF WOMEN, INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATIONS AND THE PRICE POOR WOMEN ARE OFTEN FORCED TO PAY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SAFE, LEGAL ABORTIONS.

NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL WOMEN TO COME TOGETHER IN A NATIONALLY–COORDINATED EFFORT TO WIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHT OF WOMEN TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHETHER OR NOT THEY WANT TO BEAR CHILDREN, AND TO CONTROL THEIR OWN LIVES.

*SINCE WOMEN WON THE RIGHT TO VOTE.

Please clip and mail to: ✂

Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee / 2936 W. 8th Street (3rd floor)
Los Angeles, California 90005 / (213) 487-7696

- ☐ I endorse the Campaign and the March on Nov. 20
- ☐ I want/can provide transportion to San Francisco
- ☐ I just want to help; put me on the mailing list
- ☐ Enclosed find donation of ________ *Funds Urgently Needed!!*

☐ FIND ENCLOSED $14.00 FOR ROUND TRIP BUS TICKET

CONFIDENTIA

Name: ________ Phone ________ Address ________ City / Zip ________

Organization ________ School ________ 3 ________ Occupation ________

VOLUNTEERS NEEDED! ALL WOMEN WELCOME! JOIN US! Office open 7 days a week - meetings, 8:00 p.m. Wednesdays

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

It was ascertained by means of a suitable pretext by a representative of the FBI on November 10, 1971, that the LAWAAC plans to charter a bus from Los Angeles to San Francisco for Los Angeles individuals interested in participating in the above November 20, 1971, demonstration in San Francisco. The bus is scheduled to depart Los Angeles at 10:00 p.m., on November 19, 1971, and to depart San Francisco after the demonstration at 10:00 p.m., November 20, 1971. The cost of a round trip ticket on a bus will be $14.00.

The November 11, 1971, issue of the "UCLA Daily Bruin", the official campus newspaper of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, contained an article on page 2 entitled "Symposium Presents Views on Women's Roles in Society", which article indicated that Dr. Barbara Roberts was one of a number of speakers at a "teach-in" symposium on women held at UCLA. According to the article, Dr. Roberts talks about her work as a volunteer doctor in an abortion clinic in Washington, D. C. The article indicated that WONAAC would sponsor simultaneous demonstrations in San Francisco and Washington, D. C., on November 20, 1971, to protest abortion laws.

The November 12, 1971, issue of "The Militant" contained an article on page 5 entitled "Building for Nov. 20" which article describes Dr. Barbara Roberts as the National Project Director of WONAAC.

"The Militant" is the weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The above November 11, 1971, issue of the "UCLA Daily Bruin" further indicated that another speaker at the "teach-in" symposium of women at UCLA was Olga Rodriguez, described by the article as a member of WONAAC. According to the article, RODRIGUEZ "spoke out against laws which harm

4 MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION
[illegible] Socialist Workers party

women and children and laws which make some Black and nonwhite women turn to sterilization as an answer to birth control.

On November 11, 1971, source two advised that Olga Rodriguez is a currently active member of the Los Angeles Local - Socialist Workers Party (LAL - SWP) and the Los Angeles Branch - Young Socialist Alliance (LAB - YSA).

The LAL - SWP has been in existence since the 1930's. The LAL - SWP is a local branch of the SWP.

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in the Los Angeles area (LAB - YSA) is actually the youth organization of the SWP and follows the SWP aims and purposes to the letter.

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

According to the masthead of "The Young Socialist Organizer" it is described as "A bi-weekly action publication of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

11-29-61)

NITED STATES DEPARTMENT O JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
November 15, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-79914

Title	WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION November 20, 1971 Washington, D. C.
Character	
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 12/9/71

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-79014)(RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
11/20/71
Washington, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
OO: Washington Field Office

Re Los Angeles airtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) to the Bureau dated 11/15/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies, and for San Francisco and Washington Field Office two (2) copies of a LHM containing information regarding captioned demonstration.

The sources utilized in the enclosed LHM are as follows:

Source one	CSLA 4703-S
Source two	LA 5271-S

Information furnished by sources contained in the LHM is classified confidential because the unauthorized disclosure of either the information or identities of sources would be detrimental to the national defense.

No information has been developed at Los Angeles indicating that any Los Angeles, California, area individuals participated in the 11/20/71, demonstration at Washington, D. C.

100-734-2D ENCLOSURE

REC-41

ST 107

DEC 13 1971

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)(RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-54927)(Enc. 2)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

RJR/vdb
(7)

JAN 10 1972

AGENCY
DATE 12-22-71
BY

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California
December 9, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
November 20, 1971
Washington, D. C.

The WONAAC is self-described in its literature as being formed by the national conference of more than 1,000 women held in New York City, New York, in July 1971. At that conference, women from 29 states and 253 organizations came together to unite their efforts in the national fight for the repeal of all abortion laws and for the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and repeal of contraception laws. The conference called for a massive show of force for these goals in a march on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, California, November 20, 1971. WONAAC is based on a program of legislative, judicial, and mass demonstration activities on a local and national level, and seeks to unite all women in the fight for the right of abortion.

On November 28, 1971, source one advised that on November 19, 1971, a bus chartered by the Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee (LAWAAC) transported approximately fifty Los Angeles, California, area individuals from Los Angeles to San Francisco to participate in a demonstration held in that city on November 20, 1971, and sponsored by WONAAC to protest abortion laws, forced sterilization, and restrictive contraception laws. This bus left Los Angeles at approximately 10:00 p.m., on November 19, 1971, and returned to the Los Angeles area during the evening of November 20, 1971.

100-466[illegible]-45

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Source one further advised that among those who traveled to San Francisco with this group were Dave Chamberlin, Richard Geyer, Carole Newcomb, Dave Gooler, Olga Rodriguez, Rachele Fruit, Peter Cooper, and Jack Barrett, all of whom are members of the Los Angeles Local - Socialist Workers Party (LAL - SWP), and Jane Gooler, a member of the Los Angeles Branch - Young Socialist Alliance (LAB - YSA). According to source, Geyer, Newcomb, Dave Gooler, Rodriguez, and Fruit are also members of the LAB - YSA.

> The LAL - SWP has been in existence since the 1930's. The LAL - SWP is a local branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).
>
> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
>
> The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in the Los Angeles area (LAB - YSA) is actually the youth organization of the SWP and follows the SWP aims and purposes to the letter.
>
> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."
>
> According to the masthead of "The Young Socialist Organizer" it is described as "A bi-weekly action publication of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

On November 28, 1971, and November 29, 1971, sources one and two advised that LAWAAC, an affiliate of WONAAC, is dominated and concontrolled by members of the LAL - SWP and the LAB - YSA.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Los Angeles, California

December 9, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-79014

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, November 20, 1971, Washington, D. C.

Character

Reference Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 12/8/71

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-71464) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
11/20/71, WASHINGTON D. C.,
AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
IS - NEW LEFT

Re San Francisco airtel, 11/12/71; per. 26 and San Francisco teletypes, 11/20/71, per. 38

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. One copy is enclosed for Washington Field for information.

SA EDWARD J. O'FLYNN and SA JAY H. GRODIN observed on 11/20/71.

It is notd that Bureau file 157-23909 also pertains to captioned matter.

TOM DICKSON, Intelligence Detail, San Francisco Police Department, was source of official crowd estimate.

Source utilized in LHM is LA 4179-S.

LHM is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" because unauthorized disclosure of information contained therein could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States.

1 cc enc. 734 gvd

ENCLOSURE

EX-100
REC-11

100-468406-44

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Info) (Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - San Francisco
(1 - 100-55904) (HELEN MEYERS)
ZJ:mba
(5)

3 DEC 13 1971

AGENCY SS
~~REQ. REC'D~~ RAU/2005 ISD
DATE FORW. 12-16-71
HOW FORW. RS
BY RH-66

NEW LEFT

5 DEC 20 1971

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

San Francisco, California

December 8, 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D.C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Copies of this memo are being disseminated to local intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The WONAAC is self-described in its literature as being formed by the national conference of more than 1,000 women held in New York City, New York, in July, 1971. At that conference, women from twenty-nine states and two hundred fifty-three organizations came together to unite their efforts in the national fight for the repeal of all abortion laws and for the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and repeal of contraception laws. The conference called for a massive show of force for these goals in a march on Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, California, November 20, 1971. WONAAC

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 100-468406-44

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON D.C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

is based on a program of legislative, judicial, and mass demonstration activities on a local and national level, and seeks to unite all women in the fight for the right of abortion.

On November 20, 1971, Special Agents of the San Francisco Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed that approximately five hundred individuals, primarily young women in their teens and early twenties, gathered at the Embarcadero, San Francisco, California, and began marching at 11:10 a.m. from the Embarcadero, en route to the Civic Center, San Francisco. They carried signs such as "free our women" and "separate church and state". By 12:30 p.m., the marchers had arrived at the Civic Center where a female rock band was performing. A rally was held at the Civic Center from approximately 1:45 p.m. to 3:30 p.m., addressed by individuals supporting repeal of abortion laws.

There were no incidents or arrests with regard to the march and rally, according to San Francisco Police Department records, and the official police estimate of the crowd attending the rally was approximately eight hundred individuals.

The Sunday, November 21, 1971, edition of the "San Francisco Examiner", a San Francisco, California, daily newspaper, in an article entitled "Pro and Anti-Abortion Forces Hold Rallies", described HELEN MEYERS, one of the speakers at the Civic Center rally, as Regional Coordinator for WONAAC.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN's NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON D.C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

On September 22, 1971, a source advised that HELEN MEYERS, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) organizer in Los Angeles, California, transferred to the SWP in Berkeley, California, effective August 31, 1971.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
December 8, 1971

Title	WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Character	
Reference	San Francisco letterhead memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 2/3/72

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Boston, Mass.

ReWFOteletype, dated 11/20/71 captioned, "WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, 11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT" and BSairtel and LHM, dated 1/18/72, captioned as above.

On 1/26/72, NY 7010-S provided a flyer on the WONAAC conference to be held on 2/11, 2/12, 2/13/72 at Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. It is to be noted that flyer indicated a mass rally is scheduled for 2/11/72 from 7:00 PM to 10:00 PM, and that strategy sessions, limited to women only, are scheduled for 2/12, 2/13/72.

In view of the above, all female informants of the NYO operating in the New Left area have been canvassed and at this time, none are in a position to attend.

On 2/2/72, NY 4253-S advised that from 600 to 800 individuals were expected to attend the above conference, including people from Canada and other countries. The identities of these individuals or the speakers are not known at the present time, and the NYO has no additional information other than that set forth is referenced airtel.

ST 101 REC-54 100-467116-51

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Boston (100-43809) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (100-54927) (RM)
1 - New York
JMW:jlr
(6)

FEB 5 1972

NEW LEFT

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

New York will continue to make efforts to locate a source suitable for assignment and Boston and the Bureau will be advised if such an informant is located.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/19/72

Transmit the following in ____________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-32010)(C)

RE: "CHANGED"
ABORTION PROJECT COALITION
CLEVELAND, OHIO
IS - NEW LEFT

1-1
11-1

Title carried in previous communications as "PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C. AND SAN FRANCISCO, 11/20/71 AND ABORTION LAW REPEAL SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), SM - NEW LEFT".

100-468406-43

Re Cleveland airtel and LHM dated November 3, 1971 captioned "PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C. AND SAN FRANCISCO, 11/20/71 AND ABORTION LAW REPEAL SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), SM - NEW LEFT", and WFO nitel to the Bureau, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New Haven and New York dated 11/20/71 captioned "WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WNAAC) - SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, 11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT".

100-468406-39

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations mentioned in enclosed LHM are set forth where available.

Sources utilized in LHM are as follows:

REC-102 100-468406-5

ENCLOSURE

② - Bureau (Enc. 8)(RM)
4 - Cleveland
(1 - 100-29936)(PERKUS)
(1 - 100-31449)(SCHEER)
(1 - 100-28669)(TRYON)
GBI:cmv
(6)

1 to DIA, SS, OSI(ISD) By R/S
SSC/vmw
2/2/72

3 destroyed 932D
1 retained

11 JAN 24 1972

NEW LEFT

54 FEB 9 1972

Approved: ____________ Special Agent in Charge Sent ____________ M Per ____________

GPO : 1970 O - 402-735

First source utilized is CV 1098-S.

Second source utilized is CV 739-S.

Third source utilized is CV 1540-PSI.

LHM is classified "Confidential" as data reported from CV 1098-S, CV 1540-PSI and CV 739-S could reasonably result in the identification of sources of continuing value and compromise effectiveness thereof.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Information derived through investigation and use of established sources has failed to indicate that captioned organization is involved directly in any activity other than the pursuit of abortion law reform and women's liberation. Cleveland is continuing coverage of the activities of individuals connected with the Abortion Project Coalition under individual main case files; consequently, no further investigation is being conducted at Cleveland regarding captioned organization.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Cleveland, Ohio

January 19, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION CLEVELAND, OHIO

Reference is made to Cleveland letterhead memorandum dated November 3, 1971 and captioned "Proposed Demonstrations, Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, 11/20/71 and Abortion Law Repeal Sponsored by Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), SM - New Left".

Information was received at Cleveland, Ohio that an organization called the Abortion Project Coalition (APC) had formed in Cleveland and was planning to attend a demonstration in Washington,D.C. on November 20, 1971 sponsored by the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC). Subsequent investigation and information supplied by reliable sources revealed that the APC had been formed to campaign for abortion law reform.

On October 29, 1971 a reliable source advised that the APC had established a headquarters at 11220 Bellflower, Cleveland Heights, Ohio, telephone 368-2248, which is located in Flora Mather Hall, Case Western Reserve University (CRWU). Source further advised that Laurie Perkus, Robbie Scheer and Sue Tryon were the leaders of the APC all of whom were associated individually with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) CLEVELAND, OHIO BRANCH

The Cleveland Branch of the SWP is affiliated with the National SWP and follows its directives. The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE 100-46845-50

RE: ABORTION PROJECT COALITION
CLEVELAND, OHIO

On December 3, 1971 a second source, reliable, advised that during a meeting of the Cleveland Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) on November 21, 1971 Robbie Scheer stated that about 5,000 women attended the Women's Liberation March in Washington, D.C. on November 20, 1971, including a bus of approximately 40 women from Cleveland. The Cleveland YSA according to source, considered 40 a good number for the first women's liberation march.

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA)
CLEVELAND, OHIO

The Cleveland branch of the YSA is the youth group of the SWP in Cleveland.

On December 22, 1971 above source advised that on December 21, 1971 Robbie Scheer had stated that there were some intersession classes being held at CWRU, Cleveland, Ohio, by the APC. These are three classes in Women's Liberation: one on Abortion, one on Women's Literature, and one in Psychological Aspects of the Women's Liberation Movement.

On December 22, 1971 a reliable source advised that about 2,000 - 2,500 persons attended the march and rally for abortion law reform on November 20, 1971 at Washington, D.C. of which approximately 80% were female and 20% were male. Source stated that the march was fairly orderly and source noted only one minor incident which occurred at a theater along the route that was showing the movie "The Sex Machine". There was no destruction and no arrests were made.

On January 10, 1972 Tony Zemac, University Circle Police Department, Cleveland, Ohio, advised that his office had received numerous leaflets and references to the Abortion Project Coalition, which is located at CWRU, but that his office did not consider the APC a subversive organization in its own right. He further advised that to the best of his knowledge, the APC is organized and is operated solely for the

RE: ABORTION PROJECT COALITION
CLEVELAND, OHIO

support of a campaign for abortion law reform.

This documement contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES C ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI DATE: 1/24/72

FROM : SAC, Indianapolis (100-24006) (C)

SUBJECT: BLOOMINGTON ABORTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

100-468406-12

ReIPtel 11/18/71 captioned "WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION 11/20/71 WASHINGTON, D. C., IS - NEW LEFT. OO: WFO".

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of LHM re captioned Bloomington Abortion Coalition (BAC).

First confidential source is IP 3274-S;
second confidential source is IP 3828-PSI.

For the information of the Bureau, captioned organization was formed primarily for the purpose of getting people to travel to Washington, D. C., for the demonstration on 11/20/71 sponsored by the Women's National Abortion Coalition (WONAAC). The main organization for the BAC was on the part of two female YSA members at Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. The organization does not meet regularly and is not presently a continuing organization and has not met since the demonstration in Washington, D. C. In view of the fact that the organization is not a continuing organization, no further investigation is being conducted by the Indianapolis Division into this matter and it is being placed in a closed status.

Retained 932D
1 destroyed

2 - Bureau (Enc. - 6) (RM)
~~1~~ - Indianapolis
LLG:css
(3)

REC- 45 100-4[illegible]-4

JAN 27 1972

1-DIA, SS, RAO-ISD
By R/S 2/3/72
SSC/vms
30

54FEB 7 1972

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

eply, Please Refer to
ile No.

Indianapolis, Indiana

January 24, 1972

BLOOMINGTON ABORTION COALITION

On November 4, 1971, Segeant John Tomlinson, U. S. Park Police, Washington, D. C., furnished a permit application for a demonstration to be held November 20, 1971, at Washington, D. C. The sponsoring organization was given as Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, 917 15th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. In addition to the main sponsoring organization, other sponsors were also listed and included in those listed was the Bloomington Abortion Coalition, 702 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana, 47401.

On November 10, 1971, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that a meeting of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) was held at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, on November 2, 1971. At the meeting, a discussion concerning the Washington, D. C., demonstration of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was held at which time Paula Savich, head of the women's faction of the YSA and Chairwoman for the Bloomington Abortion Coalition (BAC), gave a report. Savich stated that bus tickets for the November 20, 1971, demonstration to be held in Washington, D. C., would be sold in Bloomington on November 8, 1971. Savich stated that the local chapter, which is the BAC, would be asked to assume fund-raising quotas and help to pay debts incurred by the national organization. Savich encouraged all YSA members, both male and female, to travel to Washington, D. C., for the demonstration. It was also discussed that male members of the YSA would be expected to assume part of the transportation costs by YSA women who participated in the November 20, 1971, demonstration at Washington, D. C. According to this source, the BAC is backed primarily by the YSA at Indiana University and the Chairwoman, Paula Savich, is a member of the YSA at Indiana University. The organization was formed by the women's faction of the YSA principally for attendance at the Washington, D. C., demonstration.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-468406-49

OOMINGTON ABORTION COALITION

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On November 18, 1971, the confidential source listed above and a second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised approximately 15 individuals would be attending the demonstration in Washington, D. C., from Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. The individuals traveling were to represent the BAC headed by Paula Savich, Chairwoman and YSA member. Included in those scheduled to travel were approximately five or six members of the YSA from Indiana University and plans were for individuals to travel in two Ford Econoline vans rented from U-Haul, Bloomington, Indiana. Original plans had called for a bus to be chartered; however, the lack of individuals signing up to attend the demonstration resulted in the cancellation of the bus.

On November 16, 1971, an article entitled "Abortion Repeal March Plans Set" appeared on page 12 of the "Indiana Daily Student", a local campus daily newspaper. The article indicated approximately 40 students were to travel to Washington, D. C., and that Student Body President Mary Scifres had been invited by the WONAAC to speak at a rally on the Capitol steps in Washington, D. C. According to the article, Scifres had not decided whether or not to accept the invitation. Paula Savich, Chairwoman for the local committee, according to the article, stated, "It is important that this march be really big". She indicated that they were taking reservations for the bus trip to Washington.

On November 24, 1971, the first confidential source mentioned above advised that the BAC in Washington, D. C., participated in the demonstrations as scheduled. Source indicated that no problems arose from the demonstration. According to the source, Indiana University Student Body President Mary Scifres did not attend the demonstration but did send a statement which was to be read at the demonstration; however, due to difficulties, this statement was never read. According to source, between 15 and 20 persons actually attended the demonstration who were from Indiana University.

On November 30, 1971, an article appeared on page 9 of the "Indiana Daily Student", supra, captioned "Women March for Abortion Reform". The article stated that less than the forty students who had been expected to attend the demonstration actually attended. The article indicated that the large number of persons expected to attend the Washington, D. C., demonstration from all over the country did not materialize. The article also stated that Student Body President Mary Scifres, who had had to decline an invitation by the demonstration sponsors to speak at the march because of obligations at Indiana University, prepared a statement to be read. Her statement and several other statements, however, were not read because of the lack of time due to frequent breakdown of sound equipment delaying speeches. According to the article, Paula Savich had expected a better turnout from Indiana University.

On January 17, 1972, the second confidential source mentioned above advised that the BAC was not currently active and that it was not expected to be active in the near future unless other demonstrations such as the demonstration held in Washington, D. C., on November 20, 1971, called for support from Indiana University. According to this source, the BAC had been formed principally by members of the YSA, namely Paula Savich, who was Chairwoman for the BAC and who currently heads the women's faction of the YSA at Indiana University.

FBI

Date: 1/18/72

Transmit the following in ________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL (Priority)

2-1

REC-37

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (100-43809) (P)

SUBJECT: BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re Bureau O-1 dated 12/30/71 captioned as above; and Bureau O-1 dated 1/6/72 captioned "Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Sponsored Demonstration, 11/20/71, Washington, D. C., IS - NEW LEFT"; and WFO teletype dated 11/30/71 bearing the latter caption.

NR

100-468456-139

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies and for New York and WFO two copies each of an LHM concerning captioned group, which is the local affiliate of the WONAAC, it being noted that Boston handles information concerning both out of the same Boston file 100-43809.

Sources are identified as follows:

First source is [redacted]

3 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM)
(1 - WONAAC Sponsored Demonstration, 11/20/71, Washington, D. C.)
2 - New York (100-WONAAC) (Enc. 2) (RM)
3 - WFO (100-[illegible]) (Enc. 2) (RM)
11 - Boston (2 - 100-43809)
(1 - 100-40411) (E. CLARK)
(1 - 100-[illegible]120) (H. MILES)
(1 - 100-[illegible]42) (SWP)
(1 - 100-[illegible]) (YSA)
(1 - 100-40255) (Women's Liberation)
(2 - 100-) (JANE ROLAND)
(2 - 100-) ([illegible])

AVB:mcr
(15)

REC-37

100-468456-148X

JAN 21 1972

AGENCY: ARMY, OSI, ONI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA

DIA; Dec 932D

RAD (ISD, CRO, CD) IDIU

MAR 7 1972

DATE FORW: 1/27/72

HOW FORW: RS

Approved: ________ Sent ________ M Per ________

Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition

Second source is BS 808-S.

Third source is Officer DONALD RYAN, Boston University Security Police.

Agents observing the Washington, D. C., demonstration were WILLIAM ARMS, WILLIAM BROOKS, RICHARD COFFMAN, NORMAN [illegible], MASON NOAH, and WILLIAM TUCKER.

MATHLEN ITEES is an ADEX subject in the Boston Division; and appropriate security investigations are or will be conducted concerning EVELYN CLARK, JANE ROLAND, and PAT PUTNAM.

Boston as of this time contemplates coverage of the scheduled conference through BS 1781-PSI and BS 1414-E (Prob) as well as the Campus Police Force at Boston University.

New York and WFO are requested to advise of any additional pertinent information they possess concerning the scheduled conference and whether sources from those divisions will be in attendance.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "Confidential" as the unauthorized disclosure of information provided by the sources could reasonably result in identification of these sources of continuing value, compromise their future effectiveness, and thus adversely affect the defense interests of the United States.

Boston following, and Bureau will be advised of pertinent developments.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Boston, Massachusetts

January 18, 1972

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

A source who has provided reliable information in the past, on November 16, 1971, advised as follows:

Matilde Zimmerman, telephone number 547-1818, of "Boston Women's Abortion Action," 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, had ordered five buses with a forty-five person capacity each from the Brush Hill Transportation Company, Dorchester (Boston), Massachusetts, for travel to Washington, D. C., on November 19, 1971; and a $1,500 cash deposit against a total cost of $3,500 was made on November 15, 1971. The buses were scheduled to depart for Washington, D. C., at approximately 9 p.m. on November 19, 1971, from a parking lot at the Purity Supreme Market, Green Street, Cambridge; and the cost of the round-trip ticket was $18.

DC

A second source who has provided reliable information in the past, on November 17, 1971, provided the following information:

The Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed out of the local Female Liberation (FL) group; and while BOWAAC is not exclusively made up of Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston, and Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) female members, it is controlled by members of those groups.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19

MAR 7 1972

470215 - 1

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Matilde Miles, nee Zimmerman, was the SWP, Boston, member heading up local SWP/YSA work in the Coalition; and she and Evelyn Clark, another SWP, Boston, member, had left or were planning to leave for Washington, D. C., to help in organizing the November 20, 1971, WONAAC scheduled demonstration at Washington, D. C., and both planned to remain in that area through the demonstration.

At a meeting of the SWP, Boston, held November 16, 1971, it was reported that the local BOWAAC was hoping to fill four buses with participants for travel to Washington, D. C., for the November 20, 1971, demonstration but that a specific number of actual participants from this area was not then known.

The New England Telephone Listing Service personnel on November 17, 1971, advised that telephone number 547-1818 is listed to BOWAAC, 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, and that telephone number 491-1071 is listed to FL located at that same address.

At approximately 10 a.m., November 20, 1971, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed women who represented various women's groups from cities in the United States, including Boston, gathering on the Ellipse in Washington, D. C. At approximately 12:10 p.m., the group, then numbering about 1,500, was observed to march from the Ellipse to the West Front of the Capitol; and during the march to the Capitol, signs carried by some of the marchers were observed to read "Rhode Island Women for Abortion Reform" and "Boston Repeal All Abortion Laws."

The Special Agents also observed that two tables of SWP literature were set up during the gathering at the Ellipse and four at the rally site at the Capitol. The rally ended about 4 p.m. without incident.

The second source, on December 3, 1971, advised that the organizer of the SWP, Boston, had recently reported that between eighty to one hundred individuals had traveled from Boston to Washington, D. C., to participate in the WONAAC November 20, 1971, demonstration.

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

"The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP, in its November 14, 1971, edition carried the following announcement: "Abortion Conference - The Second National Conference of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition will be held February 11-13, 1972, at Boston University. For further information, contact WONAAC, 150 Fifth Avenue, Suite 843, New York, New York 10011. Phone (212) 741-0450."

On January 12, 1972, the second source advised that SWP, Boston, and YSA-B members active in BOWAAC were distributing a "Housing Fact Sheet" to locate housing accommodations for individuals visiting the Boston area to attend the above-scheduled conference at Boston University February 11-13, 1972. This Fact Sheet listed the BOWAAC office at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, telephone number 547-1818.

This second source further advised as follows on January 12, 1972:

BOWAAC was originally a subcommittee of the FL group locally but has now grown into a separate group whose specific interest is in abortion reform. Both BOWAAC and FL in the general Boston area are located at the same address, 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, but have separate offices at that address.

Individuals active in BOWAAC are also active in other FL work; however, all individuals active in FL work are not active in BOWAAC.

The SWP and YSA in the Boston area have approximately fifteen of their FL members active in FL work with approximately six to eight of this number in and the controlling forces of BOWAAC. Jane Roland, who joined the SWP, Boston, in late 1971, is now heading up the Party's faction work in FL and BOWAAC; and Matilde Miles and Evelyn Clark continue on a leave of absence from the SWP, Boston, and to work at the National Headquarters of WONAAC.

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

A third source who has provided reliable information in the past, on January 17, 1972, advised that Patricia F. Putnam, President of Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts FL, residence 162 Hampshire Street, Cambridge, telephone number 547-8557, under the sponsorship of Boston University FL has reserved Hayden Hall, Boston University, and fifty classrooms located in the College of Business Administration, College of Liberal Arts, Boston University, also the location of Hayden Hall, for the period February 11-13, 1972, for a "conference open to the public." According to the third source, it was requested that five of the fifty classrooms have a seating capacity of seventy-five or over.

This third source further advised that Patricia Putnam, Social Security Number 024-36-7397, as of the 1970-1971 school year was listed as a senior in the College of Liberal Arts (CLA), Boston University, with a residence at 35 Glencoe Street, Brighton (Boston), Massachusetts.

The third source advised that the 1971-1972 Boston University Listing of Students shows Putnam as still a CLA senior with residence as of the September, 1971, registration at 90 Lake Street, Newton, Massachusetts.

1/30/72

The Boston SWP is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The YSA-B is the Boston affiliate of the YSA, the youth organization of the SWP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 13 1972
TELETYPE

NR60 NY CODE

1120 PM NITEL 1-13-72 FPN

TO DIRECTOR

ATT DID

WASHINGTON FIELD

4P:m NEW YORK

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), OOWF IS-NEW LEFT

RENYTEL THIS DATE. ser 47

ON THIS DATE SAS OF THE FBI OBSERVED A DEMONSTRATION AND MARCH SPONSORED BY WONAAC WHICH COMMENCED AT FOUR THIRTY PM AT FOUR TWO ST. AND TIMES SQUARE, NYC. APPROXIMATELY FIFTY INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATED IN THE DEMONSTRATION WHICH MARCHED TO PROTEST ALL ABORTION LAWS.

AT FIVE THIRTY PM DEMONSTRATION PROCEEDED SOUTH ON SIXTH AVE. TO HERALD SQUARE (THREE FOUR ST. AND SIX AVE) NYC ARRIVING APPROXIMATELY SIX PM. DEMONSTRATORS OBSERVED CARRYING POSTERS READING "ABORTION IS A WOMAN'S RIGHT, WONAAC". WHILE MARCHING, DEMONSTRATORS CHANTED A SLOGAN "NOT THE CHURCH, NOT THE STATE, WOMEN MUST DECIDE OUR FATE". MAJORITY OF DEMONSTRATORS WERE WOMEN AGED APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN TO TWO FIVE YEARS. DEMONSTRATORS ENDED SIX PM NO INCIDENTS OBSERVED.

100-469406-

END PG ONE

60 JAN 21 1972

PG TWO

WONAAC IS CONTROLLED BY THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP). WONAAC'S OBJECTIVE IS REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION LAWS AND NO FORCED STERILIZATION OF WOMEN. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

ADMINISTRATIVE

DEMONSTRATION OBSERVED BY SAS JAMES J. WOLF AND JAMES F. REILLY. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 10 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 017 IP CODE

3:19 AM NITEL 2/9/72, SENT 2/10/72 CXM

TO DIRECTOR
BOSTON

FROM INDIANAPOLIS (100-24006) 2P

Shackelford

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION IS - NL

THIS DATE A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WNAAC) WAS TO BE HELD AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, NEXT. DISCUSSION AT YSA MEETING HELD FEBRUARY EIGHT, LAST AT BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA, DETERMINED APPROXIMATELY TEN FEMALES FROM BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA, PLANNED TO ATTEND THIS CONFERENCE. FIVE OF THESE PERSONS ARE YSA MEMBERS AND ARE BELIEVED TO INCLUDE PAULA SAVICH, CYNTHIA KRALY, PRISCILLA HEILERS, DEBBIE PORTER, AND ELLEN OSTROFSKY. INDICATIONS ARE THAT YSA PLANS TO DOMINATE CAPTIONED CONFERENCE.

REC-18 100-462406-57

PAULA SAVICH, YSA MEMBER, ADVISED BLOOMINGTON CONTINGENT MAY TRAVEL TO CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AND POSSIBLY RIDE ON CHARTERED BUS BY A GROUP OF ACTIVISTS TRAVELING FROM CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. PLANS FOR TRAVEL ARE NOT DEFINITE.

FEB 23 1972

END PAGE ONE

61 FEB 29 1972

INDIANAPOLIS WILL HAVE NO SOURCES COVERING CONFERENCE AND INVIEW OF POSSIBLE YSA AND NL DOMINATION OF CONFERENCE, BOSTON MAY CONSIDER COVERAGE, IF NOT ALREADY DONE.

ADMINISTRATIVE: THE ABOVE SOURCE IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT IP THREE TWO SEVEN FOUR-S.

END

RECD P 015 017

DCW FBI WAH DC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 13 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 001 BS CODE

1255 AM NITEL 2-13-72 TJT

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMINTEL)

NEW YORK (100-774481)

WFO (100-55420)

FROM BOSTON (100-43809) 2P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY ELEVEN DASH THIRTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, BOSTON, MASS. IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

A SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO THAT THE TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO SESSION OF THE WONAAC CONVENTION AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MASS., BEGAN AT TEN AM WITH SERVICES AND A GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT MARSH CHAPEL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY WHICH RAN UNTIL ELEVEN AM.

EX-103 REC-35 100-468406-5

THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY CONSISTED OF WORKSHOPS HELD IN VARIOUS BOSTON UNIVERSITY CLASS ROOMS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN HAYDEN HALL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY DURING THE LATER EVENING HOURS.

8 FEB 15 1972

THE DAYS EVENTS WERE WITHOUT INCIDENT. AN ESTIMATED EIGHT HUNDRED TO ONE THOUSAND INDIVIDUALS WERE IN ATTENDANCE DURING THE DAYS PROCEEDINGS. THE CONVENTION IS SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE AM TWO THIRTEEN SEVENTYTWO AND TO RUN THROUGH LATE EVENING THAT DATE.

END PAGE ONE

A SECOND SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ON TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO IDENTIFIED OVER THIRTY MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP), BOSTON AND CAROL LIPMAN A LEADER IN THE SWP AND WONAAC, FORMERLY OF THE SWP, BOSTON, AND NOW BELIEVED LOCATED IN NYC, AS HAVING BEEN IN ATTENDANCE AT THE OPENING RALLY OF THE TWO ELEVEN DASH THIRTEEN SEVENTYTWO WONAAC CONVENTION AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY WHICH RALLY WAS HELD IN HAYDEN HALL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY THE EVENING OF TWO ELEVEN LAST.

THE BOSTON SWP IS THE LOCAL AFFILIATE AND FOLLOWED THE AIMS AND PURPOSE OF THE NATIONAL SWP. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE BOSTON TEL TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO.

SOURCES ARE JAMES CUNNINGHAM, BOSTON UNIVERSITY CAMPUS POLICE AND BS EIGHT ZERO EIGHT DASH S.

OTHER SOURCES SCHEDULED TO ATTEND ABOVE CONVENTION HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT THIS DATE WITH BOSTON OFFICE PROBABLY DUE TO SECURITY REASONS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT COGNIZANT OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED. BOSTM FOLLOWING.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: FEBRUARY 8, 1972

THE FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (100-29231) - RUC -

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
(TROTSKYIST)

Encl
1

RE: Bureau O-1, dated January 14, 1971.

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of a Letterhead Memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

Sources mentioned in this Letterhead Memorandum (LHM), are as follows:

Source one is
BA 1235-PSI

Second source is
CS BA 1820-S

In view of the fact captioned organization is now defunct, no further investigation is being conducted by Baltimore.

38

1-932D
1 destroyed

ENCLOSURE

REC-51

2 - Bureau (Enc.6) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore
TJB:bjp
(3)

100-468406 54

14
18 FEB ~~10~~ 1972

1-DIA, SS, RAD-ISD
By R/S
FEB 18 1972 2/11/72
JSC/vms

NEW LEFT

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-108

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

FEBRUARY 8, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-29231

RE: WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
(TROTSKYIST)

On November 13, 1971, a source advised that the Women's National Abortion Coalition (WONAAC) planned to hold demonstrations at Washington, D. C. and San Francisco, California on November 20, 1971. The purpose of the demonstrations were to call for the repeal of all abortion, contraception and forced sterilization laws. The Women's Right to Choose of Maryland, the Baltimore, Maryland affiliate of WONAAC was to organize busing and housing arrangements for out-of-state women.

On November 22, 1971, a source advised that the Women's Right to Choose of Maryland, working from 3028 Greenmout Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, were unsuccessful in attempts to generate enthusiasm for the WONNAC demonstration among Baltimore area women. Therefore, the plan to charter a bus for the purpose of transporting demonstrators to the Washington, D. C. rally was cancelled.

On November 30, 1971, a second source advised that the Women's Right to Choose of Maryland had been formed as an "ad hoc" group for the specific purpose of supporting the November 20, 1971 Washington, D. C. demonstration. The source further stated that the Women's Right to Choose of Maryland ceased to exist, following this demonstration, and is now defunct.

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY."

100-468406 54

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

FEBRUARY 8, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-29231

Title	WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	MEMORANDUM DATED AND CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVE TION
C TION

CODE TELETYPE FEB 8 1972 URGENT

TO SACS WFO (100-55420) Sent TELETYPE 2/8/72
BOSTON REC-52 EX-112 1 - Mr. S. S. Czarnecki

FROM DIRECTOR FBI 100-468406-53

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY-TWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REWFOTEL FEBRUARY SEVEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY-TWO.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PAY WF TWO ONE EIGHT EIGHT - S AMOUNT UP TO ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX DOLLARS FOR ACTUAL EXPENSES INCURRED, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION, TO COVER CAPTIONED. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES.

INSTRUCT INFORMANT MAINTAIN CONTACT BOSTON REGARDING SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS DURING CAPTIONED. WFO DEBRIEF INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT LHM WITHIN FIVE DAYS POSITIVE INFORMATION DEVELOPED TO BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES.

BOSTON ADVISE WFO TELEPHONE NUMBER TO BE USED BY INFORMANT IN BOSTON. COPY MAILED NEW YORK.

1 - NEW YORK (BY MAIL)
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 100-20608 (WF 2188-S)
SSC:jlm
(G)

NOTE:

WONAAC is sponsoring national convention in Boston, Massachusetts, 2/11-13/72. Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presently dominating and controlling many WONAAC chapters throughout the country. Imperative that we have appropriate coverage at this convention in view of the large number of YSA and SWP members who are expected to attend. This is the first informant authorized to attend this convention.

Urgent teletype being utilized in view of the time factor order for WFO to properly prepare informant for travel to

r. Tolson
r. Felt
r. Rosen
r. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
r. Casper
r. Conrad
r. Dalbey
r. Cleveland
r. Ponder
. Bates
. Walkart
. Walters
Soyars
le. Room

6 1 FEB 22 1972

EM

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 7 1972

TELETYPE

NR 010 WF CODED

5:49 PM NITEL 2-7-72 ASW

TO DIRECTOR

BOSTON

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), CONVENTION FEBRUARY ELEVEN THROUGH THIRTEEN, SEVENTYTWO AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, INTERNAL SECURITY DASH NEW LEFT.

WF TWO ONE EIGHT EIGHT DASH S MEMBER OF WASHINGTON, DC LOCAL OF YSA AND WONAAC HAS BEEN SELECTED BY WASHINGTON, DC, YSA LEADERSHIP TO ACCOMPANY WASHINGTON, DC, WONAAC DELEGATION TO BOSTON CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY ELEVEN THROUGH THIRTEEN, SEVENTYTOW.

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO SEND SOURCE TO CAPTIONED AND BUREAU AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED TO ADVANCE TO SOURCE THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THIRTYSIX DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES TO BE ACTUALLY INCURRED INCLUDING SEVENTYSIX DOLLARS ROUND TRIP AIR COACH FARE FROM WASHINGTON, DC, TO BOSTON AND TWENTY DOLLARS PER DAY FOR THREE DAYS FOR FOOD, LODGING, CONTRIBUTIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSED INCLUDING GROUND TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM AIRPORTS.

EX-112 REC-52 100-461405-53

11

100-32608-

3 FEB 10 1972

FOR INFORMATION OF BOSTON, SOURCE'S CODE NAME IS ARISA.

END

5-8

MRF FBI WA DC

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 8 1972
TELETYPE

2/8/72

TO SACS DETROIT
BOSTON (100-43309)

EX-112 REC-52 100-466-52

1 - Mr. S. S. Czarnecki

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REDETEL FEBRUARY EIGHT, INSTANT.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO SEND DE TWO TWO SEVEN EIGHT - PSI TO COVER CAPTIONED. SINCE RETEL SPECIFICALLY COMMENTS NO REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS BEING MADE AT THIS TIME PURSUANT TO EXISTING BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, IT IS ASSUMED ANY SUCH EXPENSES WILL BE HANDLED UNDER EXISTING SAC AUTHORITY. INSURE EXACT ACCOUNTING OF ALL EXPENSES IS OBTAINED.

INSTRUCT INFORMANT MAINTAIN CONTACT BOSTON REGARDING SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS DURING CAPTIONED. DETROIT DEBRIEF INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT LHM WITHIN FIVE DAYS POSITIVE INFORMATION DEVELOPED TO BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES.

BOSTON ADVISE DETROIT TELEPHONE NUMBER TO BE USED BY INFORMANT IN BOSTON. COPY MAILED NEW YORK.

1 - NEW YORK (BY MAIL)
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 134- (DE 2278-PSI)

SSC:jlm
(6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

FEB 18 1972

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

TELETYPE TO DETROIT, ET AL
RE: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
CONVENTION, 2/11-13/72,
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

NOTE:

WONAAC is sponsoring national convention in Boston, Massachusetts. Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presently dominating and controlling many WONAAC chapters throughout the country. Imperative that we have appropriate coverage at this convention in view of the large number of YSA and SWP members who are expected to attend This is the second informant authorized to attend this convention. The informant is a female active in SWP and Women's Liberation activities in Detroit. She was specifically requested to attend this convention by party leaders. Although Detroit does not indicate estimated expenditures, it is to be noted informant will be traveling by automobile with four other females from the Detroit area. Her expenditures for expenses would obviously be minimal.

THE DETROIT [illegible] SPECIFICALLY
REQUESTED TO ATTEND BY PARTY LEADERS. SOURCE WILL BE
TRAVELING TO BOSTON BY POA IN ACCOMPANIMENT OF FOUR OTHER
FEMALE MEMBERS OF THE [illegible].

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

UPON RETURN TO DETROIT, SOURCE WILL BE [illegible]
[illegible] SOURCE'S [illegible]
OF CAPTIONED WILL BE SUBMITTED TO BOSTON FOR INCLUSION IN
[illegible].

END.

[illegible] FBI WASH DC

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 9 1972

TELETYPE

9

Em/s

Mr. [illegible]	
Mr. Miller, ES	✓
Mr. Callahan	
Mr. Casper	
Mr. Conrad	
Mr. Dalbey	
Mr. Cleveland	
Mr. Ponder	
Mr. Bates	
Mr. Waikart	
Mr. Walters	
Mr. Soyars	
Tele. Room	
Miss Holmes	
Miss Gandy	

NR 004 DE CODE

1:10 PM URGENT 2-8-72 NMG

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DID)

BOSTON (100-43809)

FROM DETROIT (100-NEW) 1P

National Abortion Action Coalition

NATIONAL ~~WOMEN'S~~ ABORTION ACTION COALITION CONVENTION AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, FEBRUARY TWELVE - THIRTEEN, SEVENTY TWO. IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO SEND DE TWO TWO SEVEN EIGHT - PSI TO CAPTIONED CONVENTION AS SOURCE, A MEMBER OF THE DETROIT BRANCH SWP (DBSWP), HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO ATTEND BY PARTY LEADERS. SOURCE WILL BE TRAVELING TO BOSTON BY POA IN ACCOMPANIMENT OF FOUR OTHER FEMALE MEMBERS OF THE DBSWP.

REC-52 100-468406-58

NO REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS BEING MADE AT THIS TIME.

SOURCE WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE BOSTON OFFICE AND WILL FURNISH PERTINENT INFO TO BOSTON AS INDICATED.

UPON RETURN TO DETROIT, SOURCE WILL BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AND FD - THREE ZERO SIX REFLECTING SOURCE'S REPORT OF CAPTIONED WILL BE SUBMITTED TO BOSTON FOR INCLUSION IN THEIR LHM.

6 FEB 10 1972

END

MKA FBI WASH DC

58

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

F B I

Date: 2/18/72

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REC LHM (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-55420) (P)

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
February 11-13, 1972, at
Boston, Massachusetts
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ReButel to WFO and BS, dated 2/8/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies, for Boston and New York 2 copies, and one copy for Baltimore of an LHM dated as above and captioned, "Second Womens National Abortion Action Conference, February 11 through 13, 1972, at Boston, Massachusetts."

The confidential source referred to in the LHM is WF 2188-S.

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because the defense interests of the nation can be adversely affected if this source was compromised.

Information copy of the LHM is designated for Baltimore inasmuch as JULIE CARLSON is a member of the College Park local of YSA at the University of Maryland, and that Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS is a WONAAC representative from Maryland.

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
1 - Baltimore (Enc. 1) (Info)
2 - Boston (Enc. 2)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)
3 - WFO
(1 - 100-55430)
(1 - 134-9613 Sub A)

JAM:dco
(10)

ACTION: ARMY, OSI, CIA, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA.

DIA; 2CC932D
RAD (ISD, CRD, CD) IDIU
DATE FORW: 2/23/72
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: SSC/mem

ST 104

REC-12 100-467406

18 MAR 6 1972

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535
February 18, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

SECOND WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION CONFERENCE
FEBRUARY 11 THROUGH 13, 1972
AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Second Womens National Abortion Action Conference, sponsored by the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), commenced on Friday evening, February 11, 1972, at Hayden Hall on the campus of Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.

> WONAAC has been publicly described as an organization of groups whose aim is to effect the overthrow of existing abortion laws and to establish "free abortion on demand."

The source advised that the opening session of the conference was in the nature of a rally with approximately 600 individuals in attendance. The rally was addressed by a number of speakers, including Matilde Zimmerman, representing Mass. WONAAC and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and Dr. Barbara Roberts of WONAAC, stressing the need for the repeal of abortion laws on the theme that abortion is a woman's right to choose.

> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

105-468406-64

ENCLOSURE

The confidential source advised that during this rally, approximately 50 individuals representing the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) attempted to disrupt the proceedings, but were contained by the Conference Marshals. The source stated that PLP was protesting the dominance of influence by SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in WONAAC.

The PLP was founded in 1962 by individuals expelled from the Communist party, USA, for following the Chinese communist line. Its objective is the establishment of a militant working-class movement based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought.

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer" as "a multi-national revolutionary socialist youth organization."

Source advised that the February 12 session of the conference began at approximately 10:30 a.m. at Marsh Chapel on the campus of Boston University with approximately 500 women in attendance. The chairwoman for this general assembly was Delphine Welch, a national staff member of WONAAC and the National Womens Liberation Director of the YSA from New York City. MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The following agenda for the conference was approved by the assembly:

Saturday, February 12, 1972

11:00 to 1:30 p.m. General Workshops
1:30 to 2:30 p.m. Lunch
2:30 to 5:00 p.m. Project and Constituency Workshops

SECOND WOMENS NATIONAL
ABORTION ACTION CONFERENCE

CONFIDENTIAL

5:00 to 7:00 p.m.	Dinner
7:00 to 10:00 p.m.	General Assembly, Discuss and Vote on Strategy Proposals

Sunday, February 13, 1972

9:00 to 11:00 a.m.	Organizational Workshops
11:00 to 3:00 p.m.	General Assembly - Workshop and Implementational Proposals

The source advised that the following women are members of SWP-YSA, and were appointed to the presiding committee for the purpose of chairing various sessions: Carol Lipman, Nancy Rosenstock, Delphine Welch and Matilde Zimmerman.

NO

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The source advised that a general workshop was chaired by Matilde Zimmerman from 11:00 to 11:30 a.m., which proposals were discussed that would be submitted to the conference for adoption by WONAAC. The source advised that the afternoon session between 2:30 and 5:00 p.m. consisted of small groups meeting in various classrooms at Boston University, including the following workshops:

National Legislation for Abortion
State Legislation for Abortion
Campus and High School Actions
Court Actions
Forced Sterilization
Clinics, Referrals
Anti-abortion Attacks
Gay Women
Working Women
Black, Chicano and Asian-American Women
The Abortion Movement and Racism
Contraception
Population Control Versus A Woman's Right to Choose

The source stated that a general assembly plenum was held at 7:00 p.m. in Hayden Hall attended by approximately 1,000 women, and that this assembly was chaired by Delphine Welch.

Dr. Barbara Roberts presented the credentials report in which she stated that 922 women had registered for the conference and that an additional 300 women attended the Friday evening rally, composing a total attendance figure of 1300. Dr. Roberts advised geographic representation included 350 women from the New England and New York area, and that there were representatives from Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., in addition to 74 women from California, 12 from Texas, 8 from Florida, 2 from England and 3 women from New Zealand. She stated that attendance was further broken down as follows: 92 college campuses represented, 14 high schools represented, 314 college women, 51 high school women and 178 working women.

The source advised that the February 13 session began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and it consisted of a group made up of approximately 50 women, each meeting in various classrooms conducting organizational workshops. The afternoon session consisted of a general assembly following which the conference adjourned.

The source advised that the conference once again re-established and reiterated WONAAC's call for free abortion on demand. The source also advised that the main action proposal passed by the conference calls for an abortion action week from May 1 to 6, 1972. The source stated that this week would consist of educational programs, legislative support, judicial action and culminating in local or regional demonstrations on May 6, 1972, around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion laws and restrictive contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

The source advised that the following women, who are members of the combined Washington, D.C., locals of SWP-YSA and WONAAC, attended the conference:

Sharon Naiman
Pam Burchette
Jeannie Reynolds
Lyn Forney
Eloise Chase
Alice Woznack
Dida Constantinidis
Julie Carlson
Mary Anne Lunn
Barbara Chis

The source advised that in addition the following women from Washington, D.C., who are members of WONAAC, but not affiliated with SWP or YSA were in attendance:

Dee Mosbacker
Nancy Williams
Vicki Martin

The source advised that the SWP-YSA members of WONAAC felt that the conference was a success and that the influence of SWP-YSA members continues to dominate. The source advised that the SWP-YSA women felt that they overcame opposition put forth by PLP and a group calling itself Revolutionary Women, which attacked WONAAC as a group led by SWP-YSA who are nothing more that bourgeois rebels.

> Revolutionary Women is self-described as an organization that is addressed to the special oppression of women and has a program that ranks this struggle to the class struggle.

The source stated that opposition proposals submitted in workshops were turned down in favor of those proposals backed by the SWP-YSA women.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GO_ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : **DIRECTOR, FBI** DATE: 2/9/72

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-16058) (C)

Women's National Abortion Action Coalition

SUBJECT: MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION aka Minneapolis Abortion Action Coalition; MINNESOTA ABORTION ACTION COALITION IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Minneapolis, Minn

134-2237-...

instant report, to

OO: MINNEAPOLIS, CLIFFORD MILLER, furnished 1/26/72

Re Bureau O-1 Form captioned "MINNEAPOLIS ABORTION ACTION COALITION, aka Minnesota Abortion Action Coalition; IS - C (TROTSKYIST)," received at Minneapolis on 1/10/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the original and five copies of a letterhead memorandum prepared under the title "MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION."

Oral information, instant

The enclosed LHM is classified confidential because it contains information from MP T-1 through MP T-4, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably result in compromising the sources' identities and impair the national defense interests of the United States.

Individuals named in the enclosed LHM are either on the ADEX or are informants or sources of the Minneapolis Office. An investigative summary report has been submitted regarding REBECCA ANN FINCH with the recommendation she be placed on the ADEX. Investigation is currently being conducted concerning JANE VAN DEUSEN, looking toward the submission of a summary report with the recommendation that she be placed on ADEX.

1cc Ext 932-b EX-115 REC-5 100-468406-63

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
3 - Minneapolis
1 - 100-16058
1 - 100-15950
1 - 100-1246 (SWP)
DEW:pl
(5)

ENCLOSURE

3-7 1972

Copy to SS, DIA, (Prom-ISD) 2cc
by routing slip for DIA
☒ info ☐ action
date 3/6/72
by SSC/dlh

3/6/72 MP for action SSC:dlh

In Reply, Please Refer to
MP 100-16058

Minneapolis, Minnesota

Sources utilized are identified as follows:

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source		File Where Located
MP T-1 is ~~MP-2794-PSI~~	Oral information, instant report, to SA H. CLIFFORD MILLER, furnished 1/26/72	134-2237-S1-6-46
MP T-2 is ~~MP-2277-S~~	Used to cite REBECCA ANN FINCH Used to cite JANE VAN DEUSEN Used to cite MARY HILLERY	134-43-S1-706
	Oral information, instant report, to SA RALPH S. RUSSELL, furnished 2/4/72	1972
MP T-3 is ~~MP-2851-PSI~~	Oral information, instant report, to SA DONALD E. WALLER, furnished 2/8/72	134-2268-S1 100-16058-1A
MP T-4 is ~~MP-2775-S~~		134-2163-S1-37

Minneapolis Office recommends no further investigation be conducted concerning MWAAC. The interest and activities of the SWP in this group will be reported by Minneapolis as a part of activities in the semi-annual submission of reports on the organization TCB-SWP.

WS 100-16028

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-16058

Minneapolis, Minnesota

February 9, 1972

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

ORIGIN

The Minnesota Women's Abortion Action Coalition (MWAAC) had its origin following a July, 1971, National Abortion Conference held at Columbia University, New York City, New York. The MWAAC is a part of the women's liberation movement, which has had extensive growth in the past several years.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

The MWAAC is described as a part of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) which had its beginning at a New York City, New York, conference, in July, 1971, attended by more than 1,000 women.

Volume 1, Number 1,
November, 1971, edition of
"Gold Flower," self-described
as a Twin Cities newspaper
for women published monthly
at Minneapolis, Minnesota

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

100-468406-43

100-16028

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

STATUS OF INCORPORATION

The records of the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Minnesota, reveal there has been no incorporation either as a non-profit organization or other type organization filed with this office for the MWAAC.

Arthur Anderson
Office of the Secretary
of State
State Office Building
St. Paul, Minnesota, on
February 7, 1972

AIMS AND PURPOSE

The primary aims and purpose of the MWAAC are identical with the demands of WONAAC; that is, repeal of all anti-abortion laws, no forced sterilization, and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

MP T-3 on
December 14, 1971

LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS

The present headquarters of the MWAAC is located in Room 203, Coffman Student Union, on the campus of the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, the office of University Women's Liberation.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

ACTION COALITION
MINNESOTA WOMEN

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The Young Socialist Alliance - Twin Cities Group is th

In November and December, 1971, the MWAAC utilized as headquarters office, space at 100 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

(SWP).

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. described in the masthead of its

MP T-3 on
January 12, 1972

~~OFFICERS~~ MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

Mary Hillery, Coordinator of women's liberation activities, formerly acted as coordinator for MWAAC. Jane Van Deusen, as of February, 1972, has assumed the position of coordinator, MWAAC. Jane Van Deusen and Mary Hillery are current members of the Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MINN

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

The Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed in 1955 by the merger of the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, branches of the SWP. The Twin Cities Branch - SWP is an affiliate of the SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

MINN

Mary Hillery, a member of the Young Socialist Alliance, Twin Cities Group (YSA - TCG), has been the coordinator of the MWAAC since its inception. This activity is in conjunction with Hillery's activities in the women's liberation movement.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

In the spring of 1971, members of the YSA-TCG were urged to make telephone calls to local radio stations in order to build public sympathy for a march on the state c

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

CONFIDENTIAL

The Young Socialist Alliance - Twin Cities Group is the Youth Branch of the Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), an affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The MWAAC is not an organization as such which would have a staff of officers, elected or appointed.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

MP T-3 on
February 8, 1972

MEMBERSHIP

The MWAAC is a non-membership feminist movement of individuals interested in promoting the repeal of all abortion laws and other aims which have to do with principles of women's liberation.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

GENERAL ACTIVITIES

In the spring of 1971, members of the YSA-TCG were urged to make telephone calls to local radio stations in order to build public sympathy for a march on the state capitol to

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

be held on April 3, 1971, to end all abortion laws in the state of Minnesota.

of some 54 persons departed from M... utilizing two Voit Bus Company vehicles on the ea... November 19, 1971.

MP T-1 on
March 28, 1971

On April 3, 1971, an anti-abortion law march was held at St. Paul, Minnesota, from the residence of the Governor to the steps of the State Capitol Building. A large crowd, predominantly women, participated in this peaceful march.

MP T-4 on
April 15, 1971

At a meeting of the TCB-SWP held in April, 1971, Mary Hillery reported that there were approximately 600 participants in the anti-abortion law march held on April 3, 1971.

Rebecca Ann Finch in November, 1971, was an active member of the YSA - TCG.

MP T-2 on
May 7, 1971

On November 16, 1971, at a meeting of the YSA-TCG held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, discussion centered around a mass action demonstration to be held on November 20, 1971, in Washington, D. C., sponsored by WONAAC. It was announced that the MWAAC had conducted a telephone fund drive campaign in order to raise money to send two busloads of individuals from this area to participate in the Washington, D. C., demonstration. It was announced that buses would depart from Minneapolis, Minnesota, 9 a.m. on November 19, 1971; and among those individuals planning to participate were approximately ten persons active in the YSA-TCG or the TCB-SWP.

February 9, 1972

MP T-1 on
November 17, 1971

The MWAAC is not a committee of the TC... it a part of the YSA-TCG. Wom-5-s liberation is

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The MWAAC chartered two 39-passenger buses for travel to Washington, D. C., to depart Minneapolis, Minnesota, at 9:00 a.m., Friday, November 19, 1971. The Minneapolis group of some 54 persons departed from Minneapolis utilizing two Voit Bus Company vehicles on the early morning of November 19, 1971.

John Thomsen, Dispatcher
Dickinson Lines, Inc.
Anoka, Minnesota
November 18, and 19, 1971

On November 23, 1971, at a meeting of the YSA-TCG held in November, 1971, Rebecca Ann Finch presented a report on women's activities, during which she announced that the WONAAC demonstration on Washington, D. C., on November 20, 1971, drew only half the number of persons expected and as a result, there was a large debt incurred by the national organization. Rebecca Ann Finch in November, 1971, was an active member of the YSA-TCG.

MP T-1 on
December 1, 1971

Rebecca Ann Finch is a current member of the TCB-SWP.

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

The MWAAC group has not been active in the Twin Cities area subsequent to the November 20, 1971, march on Washington, D. C.

MP T-3 on
February 8, 1972

SWP INFLUENCE

The MWAAC is not a committee of the TCB-SWP nor is it a part of the YSA-TCG. Women's liberation is a topic of general interest and concern to the membership of the TCB-SWP; and the anti-abortion stand taken by MWAAC is one aspect of the women's liberation movement of interest.

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

Members of the YSA-TCG have expressed an interest in women's liberation as a matter of policy. The anti-abortion movement is one aspect of women's liberation of concern to female members of the YSA-TCG. The vast majority of women in the state of Minnesota support either the repeal or changes in present state laws on abortion. Members and sponsors of MWAAC include professional women, medical doctors, lawyers, municipal court judges, and others from all walks of life.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

Individuals active in the women's liberation movement in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, of responsible leadership positions within the community, have recognized the sympathies of individuals such as Mary Hillery and consider her to be a representative of the radical left. As a result, Mary Hillery is considered to have little or no influence in the women's liberation movement in this area.

MP T-3 on
February 8, 1972

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF
THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF
THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY.
IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE
DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Minneapolis, Minnesota

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-16058

February 9, 1972

Title	MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Minneapolis

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 2/29/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:WFO)

per 58 P. Chamberlain Info

Re Washington Field airtel, dated 2/9/72, with captioned title.

On 2/18/72, Mr. MARVIN GLICKMAN, rental agent, 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York, advised that the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) rented room number 843 at this address on 12/14/71. GLICKMAN stated that a JOANNA MISNIK, Treasurer, WONACC, signed the rental agreement. The rent was $5,700.00 per year or $475.00 per month. The phone at WONAAC headquarters is 212-741-0450.

LEADS

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Determine the officers of WONAAC. In addition, determine the bank in which they have their account.

ST-100 REC 25

100-468406-61

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Washington Field (100-55420)
1- New York (100-1611547) (JOANNA MISNIK)
1- New York

5 MAR 6 1972

JJS:mej
(6)

NEW LEFT

5 MAR 21 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/1/72

FROM : SAC, DETROIT (100-40622)(P)(C)

SUBJECT: Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Convention
February 11 - 13, 1972
Boston, Massachusetts
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ser 52 ser 59

Re Detroit teletypes dated 2/8 and 2/16/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. No handouts are being furnished the Bureau as it is anticipated Boston will provide all miscellaneous paraphernalia Botsn deems necessary for effective coverage.

Enclosed for Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New York are two (2) copies each of captioned LHM as persons identified in LHM reside within each respective division.

This LHM is being classified confidential in order to protect the source who is of continuing value, the disclosure of which might be prejudicial to the national defense interests of the nation.

The source is DE 2278-PSI, location is this LHM.

Each receiving office is requested to make additional copies of this LHM as needed to disseminate to individual case files.

2 - Bureau (RM) (Enc. 8)
2 - Boston (100-43809) (RM) (Enc. 2)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Cleveland (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Detroit
ZTL:rck
(14)

100-46[illegible]-60

REC-41

18 MAR 6 1972

AGENCY: ARMY, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA
Rec 932D; DIA; 3cc destroyed
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD) IDIU
DATE FORW: 3/9/72
HOW FORW: 1972/5

NEW LEFT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

CONFIDENTIAL

Detroit, Michigan
March 1, 1972

Re: Women's National Abortion Action
Coalition (WONAAC) Convention,
February 11 - 13, 1972
Boston, Massachusetts

On February 18, 1972, source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information:

A Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Convention was held on the Boston University campus, Boston, Massachusetts, during the period of February 11 - 13, 1972.

Approximately 1,000 persons were in attendance at this convention which was held to determine future action of WONAAC and to allow diverse factions within the Women's Abortion Movement to join ranks under one issue.

Female members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) from all over the county were requested by the national office of the SWP and YSA to attend this convention in order to insure the effective control of the SWP.

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

-66

ENCLOSURE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

The SWP specifically wished the convention to adopt a one-issue position, that being the complete control of the female body by the individual female. This specific issue, "women control their bodies" was adopted by the women's organization and all other proposals were rejected.

Workshops were organized for each of the many separate racial and ethnic groups represented at the conference. Workshops were based on appeal to the specific group intended and all were supposedly controlled by the SWP.

A Black, Raza, Asian-American women's workshop was held on February 12, 1972, with 35 persons attending. Among the issues discussed at the workshop were the attempts of democratic and republican presidential candidates to capitalize on minority group attitudes in regard to the abortion movement and the fact that minority groups all to often find themselves without a voice when real issues are involved.

Of particular importance to the group was the La Raza Unida Party, a legitimate political party in Texas which serves to unite Mexican Americans. Of equal importance was the Gay Liberation Movement, which the group felt expresses the plight of gay females who do not want children and are forced to live with men because of the mores of American society.

Attendees agreed that the one issue of abortion law repeal will serve to unite women under one banner and more effectively serve the Women's Movement.

The convention adjourned after an agreement that an "Abortion Action Week" would be held May 1 - 6, 1972. This action would serve to keep public attention focused on the need to legalize abortion and to seek effective support from the many thousands of women who want to right to choose.

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

The following persons were identified by the source as being in attendance at the captioned convention:

Sheila Mahency
1268 Amsterdam Avenue
New York, New York

MASS.

Io Aurelia Duncan
58 Queenberry #20
Boston, Massachusetts

Gracie E. Adams
Post Office Box 4588
Chicago, Illinois

MASS.

Anna Bush
901 Mass. Avenue #7
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Ruby Scott
700 Commonwealth
Boston, Massachusetts

Nan Bailey
Box 291 Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island

MASS.

Janet Griffith
Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, New York

Lee Blake
47 Spruce Street
New Bedford, Massachusetts

Evelyn Greer
437 Laurel Street
Reading, Pennsylvania

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

Doris Abdurrahiy
1516 Widener Place
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Marsha Coleman
Barnad College,
Hewitt Hall 733,
Box 424
New York, New York

Yoshie Izqiuerdo
20201 Lindsay
Detroit, Michigan

P. Morgan Hamilton
1724 Wymore #6
East Cleveland, Ohio

Joyce Shatteen
13359 Euclid #12
East Cleveland, Ohio

Hattie L. Mc Citdeon
2349 Cumberland Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Doris A Long
237 East Twelfth Street
New York, New York

Derita Johnson
7621 South Saginaw
Chicago, Illinois

Maria Robinson
1367 Joliet Place
Detroit, Michigan

Maxine Williams
16315 130th, #12-B
Jamaica, New York

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

Pattie Iiyama
14 West 85th Street
#4-B
New York, New York

Margaret Sloan
7621 Saginaw
Chicago, Illinois
telephone 312-678-7575 NR-S.

Claytee Artz
120 Seward #406
Detroit, Michigan

Claire King
109 Zeigler Street
Roxbury, Massachusetts

Dee Anna Searcy NR
East Cleveland, Ohio

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO SAC DETROIT (100-40622) 2/17/72

FROM DIRECTOR FBI 100-4[illegible]-159

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (
1 - Mr. R. L. Pence

ST-100 REC-15

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REDETEL FEBRUARY SIXTEEN, LAST. att

AUTHORITY GRANTED PAY DE TWO TWO SEVEN EIGHT - PSI EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN COVERING CAPTIONED.

NO ACTION BEING TAKEN AT THIS TIME REGARDING YOUR REQUEST TO PAY INFORMANT ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR SERVICES. AS YOU ARE AWARE, PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES MADE ON STRICT C.O.D. BASIS AND NO INFORMATION CONTAINED RETEL ON WHICH BUREAU CAN BASE WORTH OF INFORMATION FURNISHED BY INFORMANT. WHEN DETAILED LHM SUBMITTED, RESUBMIT REQUEST FOR PAYMENT TO INFORMANT FOR SERVICES.

1 - Mr. E. F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 134-22730 (~~[illegible]~~)
PLP:[illegible]
(6)

NOTE:

By Bureau teletype, 2/8/72, we authorized attendance of DE 2278-PSI at captioned. At that time DE made no request for payment to informant. Informant has returned to Detroit and furnished exact accounting of expenses amounting to $85.55 and Detroit has requested Bureau to reimburse informant for these expenses. Detroit has also requested Bureau to authorize payment of $100 for services rendered, but Detroit furnished no details whatsoever of information furnished. Payment for expenses is warranted and is being authorized; however, no payment for services will be authorized until Bureau furnished results of information obtained by informant during captioned.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

55 MAR 2 1972

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT ☑

RLS

RCS

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
[illegible]
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
[illegible]
Mr. Dalbey
[illegible]
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
FEB 16 1972

NR 005 DE CODE

6:07 PM URGENT 2-16-72 ETA

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DID)

FROM DETROIT (100-40622)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ~~TIOL ALION WAAC~~ ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) ~~CONVTION~~ CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, SEVENTYTWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REBUTELS, FEBRUARY EIGHT, LAST, AND MYTEL, FEBRUARY EIGHT, LAST.

BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO PAY SOURCE EIGHTYFIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTYFIVE CENTS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED DURING ATTENDANCE AT CAPTIONED. EXACT ACCOUNTING OF EXPENSES AS FOLLOWS: REGISTRATION TWO DOLLARS; BUS TRANSPORTATION SIXTY SIX DOLLARS AND FIFTEEN CENTS; FOOD SEVENTEEN DOLLARS AND FORTY CENTS.

ST-100 REC-15

BUREAU AUTHORITY ALSO REQUESTED TO PAY SOURCE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR SERVICES RENDERED DURING COVERAGE OF CAPTIONED.

SOURCE DEBRIEFED THIS DATE AND FURNISHED WRITTEN REPORT.

DETROIT PREPARING LHM BASED ON INFO PROVIDED BY SOURCE.

END

FEB 28 1972

ACK FOR NR005 AND 006

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 2/9/72

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAG, WFO (100-55420)(P)

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re Boston airtel and LHM dated 1/18/72 captioned, "BOSTON WOMENS ABORTION ACTION COALITION, IS - C (TROTSKYIST)", and New York airtel (IO) dated 12/15/71 captioned, "WONAAC, IS - NEW LEFT."

As the Boston Division is aware, WF 2188-S will be present at the WONAAC Convention, 2/11/72 through 2/13/72, Boston, Massachusetts.

On 2/3/72 WF 2188-S advised that a number of YSA/SWP female members of the Washington, D. C., Local will expect to attend the above convention as representatives of the D. C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (DCWAAC).

Source also advised that WONAAC had moved its Headquarters from Washington, D. C., to 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York.

REC 22

100-468106-58

2 - Bureau
2 - Boston (100-43809) (BOWAAC)
2 - New York (100-174481) (WONAAC)
1 - WFO

AAM:dlm
(7)

FEB 9 1972

NEW

Approved: ______________________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1E

Re Boston LHM dated 1/18/72 reflected that "The Militant," the 'SWP Weekly Newspaper,' in the 11/14/71 edition, listed WONAAC as located at 150 5th Avenue, Suite 845, New York, New York, telephone 741-0450.

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Verify change of WONAAC Headquarters to 150 5th Avenue.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 13 1972
DCW
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 056 NY CODE

838 PM NITEL 4-13-72 BGW

TO DIRECTOR (100-468406)

ATTN: DID

FROM NEW YORK (100-174481) 2P

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), IS-C (TROTSKYIST).

APRIL ONE THREE, SEVENTY TWO, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN PAST ADVISED WONAAC WOULD CONDUCT DEMONSTRATION GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER'S OFFICE NEW YORK CITY TO PROTEST BAN MEDICAID PAYMENTS FOR ABORTIONS.

APRIL ONE THREE, INSTANT, SPECIAL AGENTS OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OBSERVED FOUR WOMEN ENTER OFFICE NEW YORK GOVERNOR WHEREIN THEY PRESENTED GOVERNOR'S AID PETITION RELATIVE TO ABOVE MENTIONED BAN. NO DEMONSTRATION OCCURRED, WOMEN DEPARTED GOVERNOR'S OFFICE WITHOUT INCIDENT.

REC-3
ST-112

ABOVE MENTIONED SOURCE ON APRIL SIXTEEN, NEXT, WONAAC WILL CONDUCT COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION TO ACTION BY KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS DEMANDING REPEAL ABORTION LAWS IN NEW YORK STATE. DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULED FOR ONE THREE ZERO PM, VICINITY FIFTH AVENUE AND

APR 17 1972

END PAGE ONE

60 APR 24 1972

2" cc to ISO

Adm. data deleted

5-

PAGE TWO

EIGHT SIX STREET, NEW YORK CITY.

WONAAC HAS BEEN PUBLICLY DESCRIBED AS AN ORGANIZATION OF GROUPS WHOSE AIM IS TO EFFECT THE OVERTHROW OF EXISTING ABORTION LAWS AND TO ESTABLISH "FREE ABORTION ON DEMAND".

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE MENTIONED HEREIN IS NY ONE ZERO THREE EIGHT NINE P.S.I. SPECIAL AGENTS OBSERVING DEMONSTRATION, JOHN J. SYRON, JOSEPH DERTINGER, JR. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED REGARDING APRIL ONE THREE, ONE NINE SEVEN TWO DEMONSTRATION.

NEW YORK OFFICE WILL FOLLOW SCHEDULED APRIL ONE SIX NEXT DEMONSTRATION.

BIS, NYCPD ADVISED OF DEMONSTRATION TO BE HELD APRIL ONE SIX, NEXT.

END

FD 263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
WASHINGTON FIELD	NEW YORK	3/21/72	2/1/72 - 3/20/72

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)	ARLAND A. MOSEL	rms
	CHARACTER OF CASE IS-C (TROTSKYIST)	

REFERENCE: WFO airtel and LHM dated 2/18/72 captioned "WONAAC Convention, 2/11-13/72, at Boston, Massachusetts, IS-C (TROTSKYIST)" and NYlet to Bureau dated 2/29/72.

-P*-

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as identification of sources WF T-1 - WF T-6 could prove prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					☐ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED R.D.K. / Jam SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

(6) - Bureau
2 - WFO (100-55420)

(COPY COUNT CONTINUED ON COVER PAGE B)

100-447446-11

REC-34

2 MAR 24 1972

ST 104

NEW LEFT

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	SS	DIA	2CC RAC (ISD)	1CC 932D
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.	4/3/72	M&S		
By	SSC			

Notations

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE ATTACHED

-A-

COVER PAGE

GPO : 1971 440-579

Copy Count Continued:

2 - Albany
2 - Atlanta
2 - Boston
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Milwaukee
2 - New Haven
2 - New York
2 - Newark
2 - Norfolk
2 - Philadelphia
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Richmond
2 - San Antonio
2 - San Francisco
2 - Seattle
2 - St. Louis

INFORMANTS	LOCATION
WF T-1 is WF 2188-S	100-55420-26 134-9613 Sub A 182-221 instant report
WF T-2 is Non-Symbol Source	NY 100-174481
WF T-3 is AT 1406-S	Report of SA THOMAS J. WILSON dated 1/26/72 at Atlanta, Georgia.
WF T-4 is BS 808-S	BS 100-43809

WFO 100-55420

WF T-5 is CG 5926-S CG 100-52028

WF T-6 is CG 7707-S CG 100-52028

Physical observation, 1/13/72 WONAAC sponsored demonstration, conducted by SAs JAMES J. WOLF and JAMES F. REILLY.

WFO is currently conducting active investigation on DEE MOSBACHER, STAR BOWIE, and ANNA SEAGRAVES. SHARON NAIMAN and HOLLY RUSSELL are ADEX subjects of WFO.

Inasmuch as the New York Division has verified change of WONAAC Headquarters to 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York, that Division is considered the new office of origin.

WFO is placing this case in a pending inactive status for six months at which time a report will be submitted under caption D. C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (D. C. WAAC).

All receiving offices should note that the New York Division is the new office of origin in this matter and any pertinent activity in their respective divisions should hereafter be furnished to New York by appropriate communication.

-C*-
COVER PAGE

WFO 100-55420

ADMINISTRATIVE - NON-SYMBOL SOURCE
WFO report 3/21/72.

WF T-2 is MARVIN GLICKMAN, Rental Agent, 150 5th Avenue, New York City, New York.

THIS PAGE IS TO BE MAINTAINED IN HEADQUARTERS CITY AT ALL TIMES.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

Report of: ARLAND A. MOSEL **Office:** Washington, D. C.
Date: 3/21/72

Field Office File #: 100-55420 **Bureau File #:**

Title: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - C (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis:

Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was founded as a result of a conference held in New York City, New York during July, 1971, for the purpose of forming a national movement of groups scattered throughout the United States, who favored and had worked to legalize abortion. The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in activities of WONAAC. During founding conference, WONAAC's goals were defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization." WONAAC opened National Office, 917-15th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. (WDC), during September, 1971, which was transferred to 150-5th Avenue, New York City, effective 12/20/71. WONAAC does not maintain formal membership and funds are obtained through contributions. WONAAC has affiliates and/or support groups located throughout U. S. WONAAC sponsored demonstrations held 11/20/71 in San Francisco, California and WDC, around theme of "Repeal of All Abortion Laws." Second WONAAC conference held Boston, Massachusetts, 2/11-13/72, which strongly endorsed "Abortion Rights Act of 1972," and called for a week of local abortion activities, 5/1-6/72. Other secondary proposals adopted set forth.

-P*-

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

This investigation is predicated upon information that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in activities of the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC).

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. Origin and Scope

During July 16-18, 1971, a conference was held in New York City, New York, in order to form a national movement of groups scattered throughout the United States, who favored and had worked to legalize abortion. In excess of 1,000 women attended this conference and as a result, founded WONAAC.

(WF T-1, 7/21/71)

B. Aims and Purposes

During its founding conference, WONAAC's goals were defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

It was decided that a national march on Washington, D. C. (WDC), with a simultaneous march on San Francisco, California, on November 20, 1971, in a public show of support for abortion law repeal, would be the first step in launching their campaign on a national scale.

(WF T-1, 7/21/71)

C. Headquarters

WONAAC opened a National Office at 917 15th Street, N.W., WDC, during September, 1971, which was transferred to 150 5th Avenue, New York City, New York, on December 20, 1971.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

S.I.

JOANNA MISNIK, Treasurer, WONAAC, leased Room 843, 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York, on December 14, 1971, at an annual rental of $5,700.

(WF T-2, 2/18/72)

D. Officers

The following individuals are considered staff members of WONAAC, and are members of YSA, SWP, or are independent therefrom as indicated:

Staff Member	Other Organization Affiliation	
CAROL LIPMAN — S.I.	SWP	MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION
MATILDE ZIMMERMAN	SWP	
DELPHINE WELCH	YSA/SWP	
SHERRY SMITH	SWP	
KIPP DAWSON	SWP	
MARSHA COLEMAN	SWP	
NANCY ROSENSTOCK	YSA/SWP	
JOAN GOMBOS	INDEPENDENT	
ELLEN SHAPIRO	INDEPENDENT	

	MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION
DORIS LONG	INDEPENDENT
NANCY ROLF	INDEPENDENT
VIVIAN OSKIEWSKI	INDEPENDENT

(WF T-1, 3/10/72)

E. Membership and Finances

WONAAC does not maintain a formal membership as such.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

WONAAC is a non-profit organization which obtains its funds through contributions and uses any funds collected in off-setting expenses incurred in the furtherance of its activities. WONAAC receives a certain amount of support, financially and otherwise, from independent organizations who identify with WONAAC's main central demand of "Repeal All Abortion Laws."

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

F. WONAAC Affiliates

1. Georgia Women's Abortion Action Coalition (GWAAC), located at 128 Pine Street, Atlanta, Georgia. Leadership of GWAAC is vested in VAUGHN BOCHMAN, who is also an active member of YSA, Atlanta.

(WF T-3, 1/12/72)

2. Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), located at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. While BOWAAC is not exclusively made up of Boston area YSA and SWP members, it is controlled by members of those groups.

(WF T-4, 11/17/71)

3. Illinois Women's Abortion Coalition (IWAC), located at 343 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, Room 343. IWAC is a non-membership organization with no officers and minimal activity. Those individuals who function in IWAC are predominantly YSA-SWP members.

(WF T-5 and WF T-6, 1/17/72 and 1/14/72)

4. D. C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (D. C. WAAC), located at 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., WDC, Room 303. Staff members of D. C. WAAC are DEE MOSBACHER, SHARON NAIMAN and STAR BOWIE. Also HOLLY RUSSELL and ANNA SEAGRAVES, who are high school "women." All of these individuals are members of the WDC Local of the YSA.

(WF T-1, 3/10/72)

5. In addition to the abvoe, WONAAC affiliates and/or support groups are reportedly located in the following areas:

Los Angeles, California
San Francisco, California
NH Hartford, Connecticut
New Haven, Connecticut
Jacks Gainesville, Florida
Chicago, Illinois
BS Maine
Detroit, Michigan
Newark, New Jersey no
AL Binghamton, New York
Cincinnati, Ohio
PH Harrisburg, Pennsylvania no
Cleveland, Ohio
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania no
St. Louis, Missouri no
BS Rhode Island
SA Austin, Texas no

Houston, Texas
Norfolk, Virginia
RH Roanoke, Virginia
William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Virginia
Seattle, Washington
MILW Madison, Wisconsin

(WF T-1, 3/20/72)

II. ACTIVITIES

A. Conferences and Demonstrations

1. WONAAC Founding Conference was held in New York City, New York, July 16-18, 1971. This conference called for national demonstrations to be held on November 20, 1971, in WDC and San Francisco, California, around the theme of "Repeal of All Abortion Laws."

(WF T-1, 7/21/71)

a. On November 20, 1971, approximately 1,500 women, representing womens liberation groups from the East Coast and Mid-West, gathered on the Ellipse in WDC, in response to the call by WONAAC to march on the United States Capitol to demand the repeal of all abortion laws. This group departed the Ellipse at approximately 10:30 a.m. on that date and marched along Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., to the west side of the Capitol Building. There the marchers assembled for a rally which concluded at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same date. There were no incidents of violence and the march and rally were peaceful throughout.

(WF T-1, 11/23/71)

b. On January 13, 1972, a WONAAC sponsored demonstration was held from 4:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. in the vicinity of 42nd Street and Times Square, New York City, New York protesting all abortion laws. Approximately 50 individuals participated and the demonstration ended without incident.

(Physical observation, Special Agents, FBI, 1/13/72)

2. Second WONAAC Conference was held in Boston, Massachusetts, February 11-13, 1972. Approximately 1,300 women attended the conference, which once again re-established and reiterated WONAAC's call for abortion on demand. It was noted during the conference that WONAAC had been unable to create anything like a national campaign and that local meetings across the country had been disappointingly small. It was pointed out that WONAAC had failed to attract the large numbers of working women, housewives, and students concerned with the abortion issue, including the majority of women's liberationists and abortion reform activists. It was felt that the movement could not succeed without the support of the working women.

At the close of the conference, WONAAC strongly endorsed the "Abortion Rights Act of 1972," which is to be introduced in the U. S. Congress by Congresswoman BELLA ABZUG from New York. This bill would override all laws which impose sanctions upon those who choose to exercise their individual right to an abortion.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

a. Proposed Actions

It was moved and adopted during the above conference that WONAAC sponsor a week of local abortion activities, May 1-6, 1972, consisting of educational programs, legislative support, judicial action, and culminating in local or regional demonstrations on May 6, 1972, around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion laws and restrictive contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

In addition, the following secondary proposals were adopted during the conference:

1. That a telegram be sent to the New York State Court of Appeals and New York Governor NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, condemning the court's February 10, 1972, decision denying women on Medicaid the right to abortions on demand.

2. That the coalition continue to organize black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, native American and Asian American participation in their activities.

3. That members of local coalitions confront candidates for office and force them to take a stand on abortion, and that they publicize those who oppose abortion so that the voters can see where these politicians stand.

4. That the coalition make a special effort to reach out to and involve "gay" women in their activities.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

YSA and SWP members of WONAAC felt the conference to be a success in that opposition proposals submitted were turned down in favor of those proposals backed by the YSA-SWP women.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

MAR 21 1972

Title WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - C (TROTSKYIST)

Reference Report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 20 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR019 WF CODED

6:37PM NITEL 4-20-72 ALM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420) 2P

PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE TO THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC), SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), MAY THREE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO; INTERNAL SECURITY - C (TROTSKYIST).

Communist

ON APRIL NINETEEN, LAST, A SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT TROTSKYIST MEMBERS OF WONAAC HAVE PROPOSED TO DEMONSTRATE ON MAY THREE, NEXT, AT THE QUOTE VATICAN EMBASSY UNQUOTE IN WDC, PRESUMABLY IN REFERENCE TO THE RESIDENCE OF THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE TO THE UNITED STATES, THREE THREE THREE NINE MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NORTHWEST, WDC. TIME OF THE DEMONSTRATION AND NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT OBTAINED.

EX-112 REC-33 100- 406

8 MAY 2 1972

SOURCE STATED THE QUOTE TROTSKYISTS UNQUOTE REFERRED TO ARE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKER'S PARTY (WSP).

END PAGE ONE

1 cc to ISD

[illegible] data deleted

PAGE TWO

THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

WONAAC WAS FOUNDED DURING JULY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A NATIONAL MOVEMENT OF GROUPS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES WHO FAVORED AND WORKED TO LEGALIZE ABORTION. DURING THE FOUNDING CONFERENCE, WONAAC'S GOALS WERE DEFINED AS QUOTE WORKING ON A NATIONAL SCALE TO MAKE ABORTION LEGAL, TO END RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTION LAWS, AND TO END FORCED STERILIZATION UNQUOTE. WONAAC IS HEADQUARTERED IN NEW YORK CITY.

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; SECURITY OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN ADVISED.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS WF TWO ZERO THREE FOUR DASH S.

NEW YORK ALERT APPROPRIATE SOURCES AND SUTEL ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE AND BUREAU.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE FOLLOWING.

END

2

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)
(ATTN: DID)

DATE: APR 2 7 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C
(TROTSKYIST)

ReWFO nitel to Director, dated 4/20/72. per 71

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM, concerning captioned title.

Enclosed for Boston and Philadelphia is one copy each of an LHM, concerning captioned title which is provided for information only.

This LHM is classified "Confidential" in that it contains information from sources one and two, which, if disclosed, could impair the effectiveness of these sources and could possibly have an adverse effect on the national defense.

The sources used in this LHM are:

Identity of Source	File Where Located
CS - 1 [redacted]	Instant LHM
CS - 2 [redacted]	WF 100-55420

ENCLOSURE

2) - Bureau (Encls. 6) (RM)
1 - Boston (Encl. 1) (100-43809)
1 - Philadelphia (Encl. 1)
2 - New York
(1 - 100-4013) (SWP NATIONAL) (45)

JJS:nl
(7)

AGENCY: ARMY, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA
DIA; lcg 932D
2cc
DATE FORW: 5.3.72
HOW FORW: R|S
BY: SSC|wam

52 MAY 1 1972

Not ~~INT. SEC.~~ RM
REVOL. ACT.

1972 *Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC)

On April 18, 1972, confidential source one, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the leadership of the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), is dominated by the Socialist Workers Party. In addition, source stated that WONAAC) has scheduled an "Abortion Action Week", May 1-6, consisting of informational programs and educational activities. This week is to culminate with a march from 1st Avenue and 27th Street to Union Square, Broadway and 17th Street, New York City. The purpose of the march, according to WONAAC literature, is to "defend our right to abortion".

Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) is a Socialist Workers Party dominated, non-membership organization, which is promoting a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign.

Socialist Workers Party (SWP), has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This same source advised that WONAAC has affiliates at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts and 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

On April 19, 1972, confidential source two, who has provided reliable information in the past, advised that Trotskyist members of WONAAC have proposed to demonstrate on May 3, 1972, at the Vatican Embassy in Washington, D. C., probably referring to the Residence of the Apostolic Delegate to the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-468406-16

ENCLOSURE

FBI

Date: 2/[illegible]/72

REC-7 - 134 4, LHM

Transmit the following in [illegible]
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (100-[illegible]) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
IS - C
(TROTSKYIST)

Re Boston airtel and LHM, 1/18/72 entitled Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition, IS-C (Trotskyist) and Boston teletype 2/[illegible]/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies and for New York and WFO are two copies of an LHM reflecting information concerning the WONAAC Convention at Boston. An information copy is also being provided for Detroit as one of Detroit sources was scheduled to have attended the convention. Copies are also being furnished to designated offices inasmuch as individuals from such territories were reported in attendance.

5 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM)
2 - New York (100-[illegible]) (Enc. 2)(RM)
2 - WFO (100-[illegible]) (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - Detroit (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Houston (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Miami (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Jacksonville (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc. 1) (RM)
3 - Boston
(1-100-[illegible]) ([illegible])
AVS/ls
(17)

EX-109 REC-7 100-468406-69

15 FEB 25 1972

NEW LEFT
INT. SEC.

AGENCY: ARMY, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA
DIA, 100932D
RAD (ISD, CRD, CI, IDIU)
DATE FORW: 2/29/72
HOW FORW: RS
BY: SSC

ENCLOSURE

Approved: [illegible] Sent [illegible] M Per [illegible]

Sources are:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted]
5. [redacted]

BS 1362-PSI had been unable to attend the Saturday Session of the convention due to a sudden illness.

Further, BS 1414 E, whom it was originally felt would also attend, was unable to do so as informant was recuperating from an appendectomy.

During the convention period, Boston was not in contact with either WF 2188-S or DE 2278-PSI who were also scheduled to attend the convention, apparently due to security reasons it being noted that both of these informants were to have travelled to the Boston area in the company of other individuals.

All individuals identified as members of the SWP, Boston are either sources of the Boston Division or are currently on the ADEX or under current investigation for consideration for same.

The LHM has been classified "confidential" as the unauthorized disclosure of the information provided by source 1, 2 or 4 could reasonably result in identification of the sources of continuing value, jeopardize their future effectiveness, and thus adversely affect the defense interests of the United States.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ase Refer to

Boston, Massachusetts

February 18, 1972

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

A source on February 11, 1972, advised as follows:

The opening session of the WONAAC Convention held at Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, February 11-13, 1972, began at approximately 8:00 p.m. the evening of February 11, 1972, and was in the nature of a rally held in Hayden Hall, Boston University with approximately 600 individuals present. Of this number, approximately 50 were males; but it is noted that this was the only convention session to which males were invited.

The general theme of the rally was "How To Win Abortion Law Repeal." Matilde Miles nee Zimmerman who in December 1971, transferred from the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston to the SWP, New York and is now also a WONAAC national staff member, was one of the two rally moderators.

> The SWP, Boston is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The source advised that the rally speakers, all of whom stressed the legalization of abortion, included the following:

> Judy Syfers Coordinator of WONAAC West, Feminist Author

100-468406-69

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

Doctor Barbara Roberts, a founder and national project director of WONAAC.

Shirley Wheeler, first woman convicted and sentenced for having an abortion.

Sarah Weddington, an attorney who argued for the elimination of the Texas Abortion Law before the United States Supreme Court in the fall of 1971.

Florence Luscomb, long-time Feminist.

Elma Barrera, organizer of the 1971 Houston, Texas Chicana Conference.

Judith Keith, head of the Abortion Repeal Committee, Day County, Florida.

Frances Howard Gordon, Feminist from Nottingham, England, not further identified.

Sudie Judson, Chairwoman, Brooklyn, New York Welfare Action Council.

Brenda Brdac, female liberation, Berkeley, California.

"The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP in its November 5, 1971, edition described Shirley Wheeler as a 23-year-old Florida woman who was convicted of manslaughter for having an abortion and sentenced October 15, 1971, by a Daytona Beach, Florida judge to two years probation with the condition she must either get married or move to North Carolina and live with her family.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON
MASSACHUSETTS

A second source on June 28, 1962, advised that the Tass News Agency, the Official Soviet Government news gathering agency had been advised that Florence Luscomb, described as a 72 year old Communist Party (CP) member who organized the white collar workers in New England, would attend the world congress for general disarmament and peace scheduled to be held in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The "Daily World" an East-Coast Communist Newspaper, in its May 2, 1970. edition named Florence Luscomb as one of two co-chairman of the twentieth birthday party to honor Otis A. Hood, State Chairman of the CP of New England.

The first source further advised that at the outset the rally was delayed due to a small group protesting against abortion who sat in front of the doors to Hayden Hall blocking the entrance to the hall. This group was eventually peacefully removed by the police.

A third source on February 11, 1972, advised that at approximately 7:30 p.m. officers of the Boston University Campus Police arrested 15 individuals who had been conducting a peaceful sit-in blocking the doors to Hayden Hall, Boston University, where a WONAAC rally was being held. According to the third source the 15, who had been conducting their peaceful sit-in since shortly before 7 p.m. that evening, were arrested on charges of disturbing the peace and trespassing on Boston University property when they refused to leave on their own volition. The arrests were orderly, without incident and the 15, two of whom were Roman Catholic Priests and the remainder Seminarians from St. Johns Seminary, Boston, were turned over to the Boston, Massachusetts Police Department. All of those arrested were released on bail for court appearance on February 12, 1972, and no other serious incidents occurred during the rally.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

The first source on February 12, 1972, identified the following members of the SWP, Boston as having been present at the February 11, 1972, rally:

~~GEORGE BASLEY~~

~~TRACY BLISS~~

ANN MARIE CAPUZZI

BRUCE CLARK

EVELYN CLARK

GARY COHEN

~~ALBA (DAWN) DE LOLLIS~~

DAVID EDWARDS

PAMELA EDWARDS

ALLAN EINHORN

TOBY EMMERICH

JOHN FINNAN

ROBERT GAHTAN

PATRICIA GALLIGAN

~~ROBERT GEBERT~~

DONALD GUREWITZ

VIRGINIA HILDEBRAND

CARLA HOGG

~~DAVID JEROME~~

~~KAREN KOPPERUD~~

MARY LIPMAN

KAY LYDON

TED NAULT

KATHY PAGE

PHILIP PASSEN

JANE ROLAND

PHYLLIS SAWYER

STEPHEN SCHMUGER

TOBA SINGER

AUGUSTA TRAINOR

MARY (SUDI) TRIPPET

STEPHEN WATSON

CHARLES WILLIAMSON

The first source further advised on February 12, 1972, that Carol Lipman, a leader in the SWP and WONAAC

CONFIDENTIAL

who was formerly a member of the SWP, Boston and now believed to be in New York, was also present at the February 11, 1972, rally.

This first source also advised that the Saturday and Sunday, February 12-13, 1972, sessions, which would be open to women only, were scheduled to include workshops on such topics as national and local legislative projects, court actions, forced sterilization, abortion referral and clinics, campus and high school work and the building of the Abortion Law Repeal Movememt.

The third source advised on February 12, 1972, that the February 12, 1972, session of the WONAAC Convention began at 10:00 a.m. with services and a general assembly at Marsh Chapel, Boston University, which ran until 11:00 a.m. The remainder of the day consisted of workshops held in various Boston University classrooms followed by another general assembly in Hayden Hall during the later evening hours. This third source advised that the day's events were without incident and that an estimated 800 to 1000 individuals were in attendance during the days' proceedings. He advised that the convention was scheduled to reconvene on the morning of February 13, 1972, and to run through the late evening that date.

The "Boston Globe," a daily newspaper published in Boston, in its February 13, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Abortion Strategy Discussed" which in part reported that more than 800 women from across the country had gathered for a conference at Boston University the weekend of February 11-13, 1972, to plan a strategy to win repeal of all laws that restrict abortion. According to the article it was expected that the conference would endorse the latest Federal bill to nulify all state laws restricting abortion-- the "Abortion Rights Act of 1972" to be introduced by United States Congresswoman Bella Abzug from New York.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

The article reported that discussion at the convention had centered around whether or not to adopt the slogan "Free Abortion on Demand; No Forced Sterilization" or to focus on a single issue--repeal of the abortion laws. It further reported that a proposal was presented for an Abortion Action Week, May 1-6, 1972, to include educational programs, legislative support, judicial action and local or regional demonstrations centering around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion and anti-contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

Jane Roland, identified in the article as coordinator of the Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition said that whatever the conference does nationally, her organization would be acting at the local level.

A fourth source on February 13, 1972, advised as follows:

The February 13, 1972, session of the WONAAC Convention at Boston University began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and the day's program was in the form of workshops held in about 8 classrooms in the College of Liberal Arts, Boston University. There were approximately 50 females in attendance at each workshop; and the maximum number of persons, all female, present at any one time during the day would be estimated at between 400 and 500. The workshops primarily related to the building of WONAAC throughout the United States fund raising and regional work with ideas being exchanged between individuals attending from such areas of the United States as: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, New York and Boston. The major theme appeared to be how to strengthen an awareness of WONAAC, which reportedly was in need of financial support. It was also stated that there was a need for regional travelers with cars who would be able to travel full time, and funds would be needed in this regard. It was felt that more effort should be placed in obtaining paid

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS

speaking engagements in colleges throughout the United States as such action would not only bring in needed funds but also help to spread an awareness of WONAAC and its objectives among college students. The workshops were peaceful and no incidents arose.

Tables identified with such groups as Female Liberation, Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) were set up in a hallway of the College of Liberal Arts for sale of literature or posters.

> SDS was founded during June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan, and in the 1960's functioned as the leading New Left campus-based student organization in the United States. From a stance of "participatory democracy," the SDS moved to a radical-revolutionary position. It maintained a national office at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, until February, 1970. Internal factionalism during 1969 produced three main factions: Weatherman, Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), and Worker Student Alliance (WSA). The Weatherman and RYM no longer consider themselves associated with the SDS. The WSA faction continues to use the name SDS.

> The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

> As the youth organization of the SWP the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

On February 13, 1972, a fifth source advised that Boston University authorities had been notified by representatives of WONAAC at 4:30 p.m. that date that the WONAAC Convention was coming to a close. According to that source by 5:30 p.m. all of the convention participants had dispersed and the Boston University facilities utilized for the various convention proceedings had been locked. This source further advised that the February 13, 1972, convention session was without incident.

The "Boston Globe" in its February 14, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Women's group backs abortion bill" which reported that the "Abortion Rights Act of 1972," mentioned above, received strong endorsement from WONAAC at the close of its second national conference on February 13, 1972. The article further reported that to implement the endorsement, coalition chapters intended to publicize the text of the bill, which proposes to repeal all abortion laws, and have speakers on the legislation at forums, teach-ins, rallies and other educational activities.

According to the article the following proposals were adopted:

That the coalition sponsor an Abortion Action week, May 1-6.

That a telegram be sent to the New York Court of Appeals and New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller condemning the court's February 10, 1972, decision denying women on Medicaid the right to abortions on demand.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

That the coalition continue to organize black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, native American and Asian-American participation in their activities.

That members of local coalitions confront candidates for office and force them to take a stand on abortion, and that they publicize those who oppose abortion so that the voters can see where these politicians stand.

That the coalition make a special effort to reach out to and involve gay women in their activities.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Boston, Massachusetts

Refer to

February 18, 1972

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972 BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Reference Memorandum of Federal Bureau of Investigation dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 17 1972
TELETYPE

Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR001 NEW YORK CODE
2:25AM NITEL 4-17-72 NFM
TO DIRECTOR (100-468406)
ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
FROM NEW YORK (100-171481)

Shackelford

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

AT TWO P.M., APRIL SIXTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY-TWO, APPROXIMATELY SIXTY INDIVIDUALS COUNTER DEMONSTRATED AGAINST THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS PARADE, VICINITY OF FIFTH AVENUE AND EIGHTY SIXTH STREET NYC. THIS COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION WAS SPONSORED BY WONAAC ADVOCATING REMOVAL OF ALL RESTRICTIVE ANTI-ABORTION LAWS. COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION CONCLUDED FOUR P.M., NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS.

REC-59

10 APR 18 1972

CHARACTERIZATION

WONAAC HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS AN ORGANIZATION OF GROUPS WHOSE AIM IS TO EFFECT THE CHANGE IN ABORTION LAWS

END PAGE ONE

15

70 APR 24 1972

PAGE TWO

NEW YORK (100-171481)

AND ESTABLISHE "ABORTION ON DEMAND."

ADMINISTRATIVE

ser 67

RE NEW YORK NITEL TO BUREAU FOUR-THIRTEEN-SEVENTYTWO. SPECIAL AGENTS WHO OBSERVED DEMONSTRATION ARE JOHN J. SYRON, AND JOSEPH E.F. URRER. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

EJF FBI WASH DC

cc Homer Shackelford

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES 'VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 6/8/72

FROM SAC, PITTSBURGH (100-17517) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ser 81

Rerep of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72 at Washington Field.

During April and May, 1972, confidential informants and sources who are familiar with the Communist Party, Trotskyist New Left and Extremist activies in Pittsburgh Division, were unable to furnish any information concerning the above captioned organization or any activities within the Pittsburgh Division.

In view of the above, no further investigation is being conducted at Pittsburgh at this time.

2-Bureau
2-New York
1-Pittsburgh

PBC:djr
(5)

REC-59 100-[illegible]-4-8

EX-112

4 JUN 12 1972

Rev. Ac/Sec

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-463406) DATE: JUN 0 6 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C
(TROTSKYIST)

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM concerning captioned title.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This LHM is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as identification of sources NY T-1 and NY T-2 could prove prejudicial to the defense interests of the US and possibly compromise sources of continuing value.

The files of the NYO disclosed that the following WONAAC staff members are also members of the NY Branch of the SWP:

MATILDE ZIMMERMAN	NY 100-164365	Bufile 100-449333
JUDY KLEINBERG	NY 100-175437	Bufile
DEBBIE NOTKIN	NY 100-171819	Bufile
EVELYNN KIRSCH	NY 100-174520	Bufile 100-442975
JOANNA MISNIK	NY 100-161547	Bufile 100-447829

Although several of the leaders of the WONAAC are SWP members, their activities as pertaining to WONAAC have been directed toward the legal repeal of all restrictive abortion laws. Investigation to date has not disclosed any indication that captioned organization is engaged in any subversive or violence prone activity.

cc + Encl (93; D

(2)- Bureau (Encls. 6) (RM)
1 - New York (100-164365) (MATILDE ZIMMERMAN)
1 - New York (100-175437) (JUDY KLEINBERG)
1 - New York (100-171819) (DEBBIE NOTKIN)
1 - New York (100-174520) (EVELYNN KIRSCH)
1 - New York (100-161547) (JOANNA MISNIK)
1 - New York

JJS:kcb
(8)

AGENCY: [illegible], SEC. SER., STATE, [illegible]
2 - RID (RC),
DATE FORW: 7/5/72
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: GJL: dlk

REC- 119

80

12 JUN 9 1972

Rev. Act Sect.

60 JUL 13 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

NY 100-174481

It is felt that the activities of these SWP-WONAAC members can best be followed through their individual case files rather than under a WONAAC caption. This case is being closed by the NYO.

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Location
NY T-1 is ~~NY 10389-PSI~~	NY 134-19305A-12
NY T-2 is ~~NF 2034-S~~	NY 100-174481-81

The SAs who observed the women entering NY Governor ROCKERFELLER's office on 4/13/72 were SAs JOHN J. SYRON and JOSEPH DERTINGER, JR.

The SAs who observed the demonstration on 4/16/72, were SAs JOHN J. SYRON and JOSEPH E. FURRER.

The SAs who observed the march on 5/6/72, were SAs JOHN J. SYRON and JAMES F. REILLY.

"Repeal of Anti-Abortion Laws" at Governor Rockerfeller's Office in New York City.

As the youth organization of

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFID[illegible]TIAL

( )

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

JUN 08 1972

Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition (WONAAC)

On February 2, 1972, NY T-1 advised that on February 2, 1972, Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) sponsored an "abortion debate" at the Community Church, 40 East 35th Street, New York City. The debate was between speakers representing a "Womens Right to Choose" and the "Celebrate Life" group.

> WONAAC is a non-membership organization which is promoting a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign.

> The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450

On March 12, 1972, NY T-1 advised that it was announced at a meeting of the Upper West Side Branch, Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) on March 12, 1972, that a demonstration sponsored by WONAAC would be held on March 16, 1972, for "Repeal of Anti-Abortion Laws" at Governor Rockerfeller's Office in New York City.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer" as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-468406-80

Womens National Abortion
Action Coalition (WONAAC)

On March 23, 1972, NY T-1 advised that on March 19, 1972, it was announced at a meeting of the Upper West Side Branch of YSA, New York City, that a meeting was being held at the WONAAC Office, to discuss the plans for the May 1-6, abortion action week rally.

On April 13, 1972, Agents of the FBI observed four women, representing WONAAC, enter the office of New York Governor Rockerfeller where they presented an aide with a petition demanding that Medic-aid payments be permitted to be used for abortions.

On April 16, 1972, Agents of the FBI observed approximately sixty individuals representing WONAAC, counter-demonstrate in the vicinity of 86th Street and Fifth Avenue against a parade sponsored by the Knights of Columbus who were marching in support of the repeal of all abortion laws.

On April 19, 1972, NY T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that SWP members representing WONAAC proposed to demonstrate at the Vatican Embassy, Apostalic Delegate to the United States, in Washington, D.C.

On April 21, 1972, NY T-1 advised that on March 22, 1972, a WONAAC meeting was held at the office of WONAAC, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City. There were approximately 21 individuals at this meeting. The meeting consisted of a discussion of the route to be utilized on the May 6, 1972 march and of the various ways money could be raised; namely, sale of literature, buttons, contributions.

On page 4 of the April 26, 1972 issue of the "Guardian" there was an article which indicated that WONAAC was sponsoring an abortion action week May 1-6. The demands are:

1. Repeal of all anti-abortion laws.
2. No forced sterilization.
3. Birth control available to all.

Womens National Abortion
Action Coalition (WONAAC)

> The "Guardian" is self-described as an "independent radical newsweekly" which takes a strong left position but is not identified with any organized group. It is considered to be the largest radical weekly in America.

On May 6, 1972, a march and rally sponsored by WONAAC was observed by Agents of the FBI. There were approximately two thousand participants who were in support of the repeal of all anti-abortion laws.

-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

JUN 0 6 1972

Title	WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
Character	IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	Memorandum dated 6/6/72 and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/30/72

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE (100-2049) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ReWFOrep of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL, 3/21/72.

For the information of the Bureau and New York, JK 372-S (former) and JK 337-CS advise that there is a Women's Liberation group at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, which recently sponsored an Abortion Action Week rally, however, none of the individuals associated with this Women's Lib group are connected with any subversive organizations such as Young Socialist Alliance or Socialist Workers Party. They are merely Women's Liberationists, who support the repeal of all abortion laws.

In view of the above, no active investigation is being conducted by the Jacksonville Division of the Women's Liberation group at the University of Florida, as there is no present indication they are connected and/or interested in subversive activities.

REC-115

100-462406-78

5 JUN 1 1972

2 - Bureau
1 - New York (Info)
1 - Jacksonville

AJW:ahc
(4)

Rev. Act. Sect.

55 JUN 9 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
[illegible]
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR001 NY CODE

947AM URGENT 5-7-72 EAD

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

ATT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 2P

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), IS DASH NEW LEFT.

AT TWELVE THIRTY PM, FIVE SIX SEVENTY TWO, A MARCH SPONSORED BY THE WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), COMMENCED AT FIRST AVENUE AND TWENTY SEVENTH STREET, NYC, ENROUTE HERALD SQUARE AND UNION SQUARE, NYC, WHERE A RALLY WITH APPROXIMATELY TWO THOUSAND PARTICIPANTS BEGAN. THE CENTRAL THEME OF THE SPEAKERS WAS THE REPEAL OF ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS.

REC-21

EX-115

WONAAC IS A SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY DOMINATED ORGANIZATION WHICH IS PROMOTING A NATIONALLY COORDINATED ABORTION LAW REPEAL CAMPAIGN.

18 MAY 15 1972

NEW LEFT

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO SPEAKING AT THE RALLY WERE JOANNA MISNICK, MATILDA

END PAGE ONE

60 MAY 16 1972

"cc to [illegible] D

Adm. data deleted

cc: Homer

ZIMMERMAN AND CAROL LIPMAN, ALL KNOWN SWP MEMBERS. IN ADDITION, BELLA ABZUG, CONGRESSWOMAN, NYC; SHIRLEY CHISHOLM, CONGRESSMAN NYC, AND MARY LINDSEY, WIFE OF NYC MAYOR JOHN LINDSEY. A JEAN FAUST (PHONETIC) READ A STATEMENT IN BEHALF OF NEW YORK CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM FITTS RYAN. BELLA ABZUG STATED..." EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO USE ABORTION LAWS AS MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL..."

SHIRLEY CHISHOLM ASKED..." IS HE (NIXON) QUALIFIED TO TALK ABOUT THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE, WHILE HE CONTINUES TO BOMB VILLAGES..." ..." CHILDREN MUST NOT BE MADE TO SUFFER THE FATE OF BEING BORN UNWANTED, ABORTION MUST BE MADE THE RIGHT OF EVERY WOMAN..."

SHIRLEY CHISHOLM STATED THAT SHE WAS GOING TO BRING THE ISSUE OF ABORTION TO THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION.

THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS AND THE RALLY CONCLUDED AT FOUR FORTY FIVE PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE

THE FBI AGENTS OBSERVING THE RALLY AND MARCH WERE SAS JOHN J. SYRON AND JAMES REILLY.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

BJM FBI WASHDC

CLR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 6 1972

TELETYPE

ESM/WDF

NR034 WF CODE

11:19PM NITEL 5-6-72 GIA

TO ACTING DIRECTOR
NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55966) (C) 3P

CANDLELIGHT MARCH TO UNITED STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SPONSORED BY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC), MAY SIX, SEVENTY TWO. INTERNAL SECURITY DASH COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST).

RE WFO TELETYPE DATED APRIL TWENTYEIGHT, LAST. per 74

ON MAY SIX, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC) HELD A FORUM MEETING AT ST. MARK'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THIRD AND A STREETS, SOUTHEAST, WASHINGTON, D.C. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS AND LASTED [illegible] SEVEN THIRTY P TO NINE THIRTY PM ON MAY SIX INSTANT. THE SOURCE STATED THAT ~~THE~~ FOLLOWING THE MEETING, THE GROUP LEFT THE CHURCH AND PROCEEDED IN A CANDLELIGHT PROCESSION TO THE EAST STEPS OF THE CAPITOL BUILDING.

END PAGE ONE

REC-110

100-468486-76

6 MAY 12 1972

51 MAY 19 1972

Included in summary to White House and Attorney General. Date 5/8/72

THE PURPOSE OF THE MARCH WAS TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION AND TO PROTEST EXISTING ABORTION LAWS.

THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT LEADERS OF THE MARCH INCLUDED ELOISE CHASE, SHARON NAIMON AND BARBARA CHIS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE WASHINGTON, D.C. BRANCH OF THE SOCIALIST WORKER'S PARTY (SWP).

SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

WONAAC IS INFLUENCED BY SWP AND YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA) MEMBERS. YSA IS THE YOUTH AFFILIATE OF SWP.

ON MAY SIX INSTANT, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY FIFTY TO SEVENTYFIVE INDIVIDUALS, MOSTLY FEMALES PROCEED TO THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL IN A CANDLELIGHT PROCISSION. THE PROCESSION LASTED FROM APPROXIMATELY NINE THIRTYFIVE PM (BEGINNING AND ENDING AT THE CHURCH) TO TEN FIFTEEN PM AND WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE PLACING OF A CARDBOARD COFFIN ON THE STEPS OF THE EAST SIDE OF THE CAPITOL BUILDING TO SYMBOLIZE THE DEATH OF TEN THOUSAND WOMEN FROM ILLEGAL ABORTIONS PREFORMED IN THE UNITED STATES DURING NINETEEN SEVENTY.

END PAGE TWO

C 100-55966

PAGE THREE

NO INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE IS WF TWO ONE EIGHT EIGHT DASH S.

COPY FURNISHED TO NEW YORK AS OFFICE OF ORIGIN ON WONAAC.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WITH SPECIAL AGENTS EDWARD KENNEY, JOSEPH A. MAHONEY, SECOND, AND NORMAN H. HIERONYMI.

NO LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM FOLLOWS.

END.

JTJ FBI WASH DC

cc to Norman

NR 003 CV CODE

8:05 PM URGENT -6-72 SLO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 6 1972

TELETYPE

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM CLEVELAND 100-32715

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

MARCH AND RALLY TO REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, MAY SIX, 5 6 IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY.

Womens National Abortion [illegible]

ON INSTANT DATE A SPECIAL AGENT OF THE FBI OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED TWENTYFIVE INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE APC, ASSEMBLE AT ELEVEN FORTYFIVE AM AT THE NEW FEDERAL BUILDING EAST NINTH ST., AND LAKESIDE, CLEVELAND, OHIO. OF THIS GROUP APPROXIMATELY SEVENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE FEMALES AND THE REMAINING TWENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE MALES. THIS GROUP FORMED A CIRCLE AND MARCHED IN FRONT OF THE FEDERAL BUILDING FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF HOUR. MOST OF THE PARTICIPANTS CARRIED BANNERS WHICH READ "REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS." FOLLOWING THIS ASSEMBLY AND MARCH, WHICH WAS AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE FIFTEEN PM THE ENTIRE GROUP THEN PROCEEDED SOUTH ON EAST NINTH ST., TO

END PAGE ONE

EX-115
REC-21 Sap

100-468406-75

20 MAY 12 1972

"cc to ISD
Adm. data 1 deleted"

60 MAY

Included in summary to White House and Attorney General. Date 5/8/72

EUCLID AVE., WEST ON EUCLID AVE., TO PUBLIC SQUARE AND THEN TO THE OLD FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING AT THE CORNER OF SUPERIOR AVE., AND PUBLIC SQUARE. THIS GROUP ARRIVED AND ASSEMBLED AT THIS POINT AT APPROXIMATELY

Ohio

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

TWELVE FORTYFIVE PM WHERE THEY HEARD SPEAKERS DELIVER SPEECHES PRINCIPALLY ON REPEALING ALL EXISTING ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, ELIMINATING FORCED STERILIZATION AND REPEALING ALL CONTRACEPTIVE LAWS. SPEAKERS OBSERVED WERE: [redacted], A MEMBER OF THE APC AS WELL AS A MEMBER OF BOTH THE CLEVELAND BRANCH OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (CESWP) AND THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA); AND [redacted], A MEMBER OF APC AS WELL AS THE CESWP.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

SOME OF THE STATEMENTS SHOUTED BY THE ASSEMBLY WERE "ABORTION SHOULD BE A WOMAN'S DECISION," "ABORTION IS NOT MURDER," AND -"A WOMAN SHULD HAVE CONTROL OVER HER OWN BODY." THE RALLY TERMINATED AT APPROXIMATELY ONE FORTYFIVE PM CLEVELAND, OHIO, PD ADVISED NO ARRESTS, INJURIES OR INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE OCCURRED DURING THE RALLY. US SECRET SERVICE, CLEVELAND, COGNIZANT.

SOCIALIST WORKERS APARTY CLEVELAND, OHIO, BRANCH.

END PAGE TWO

[illegible]-32715

PAGE THREE

THE CLEVELAND BRANCH OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) IS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SWP AND FOLLOWS ITS DIRECTIVES. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO

YSA -------- AS THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF SWP, THE YSA SERVES AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF RECRUITMENT INTO THAT ORGANIZATION. THE YSA IS DESCRIBED IN THE MASTHEAD OF ITS OFFICIAL PAPER "THE YOUNG SOCUIALST ORGANIZER," AS "A MULTINATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION."

APC--------- THIS IS A SELF-DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, DEDICATED TO REPEALING ALL ABORTION LAWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CJHILDREN. IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTION LAWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

aw 3

RE CLEVELAND TEL MAY ONE, LAST.

SA WHO OBSERVED MARCH AND RALLY WAS PETER J. TAMA. IN VIEW OF PEACEFUL NATURE OF MARCH AND RALLY, NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED, UACB, AND THIS MATTER IS BEING CONSIDERED CLOSED.

END

JTG FBI WASH DC

Mr.
Mr.
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 28 1972

TELETYPE

NR002 WF CODED

500 PM NITEL 4-28-72 SKA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420)

PROPOSED CANDLELIGHT MARCH TO UNITED STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SPONSORED BY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, (WONAAC), MAY SIX, SEVENTYTWO. INTERNAL SECURITY- COMMUNIST(TROTSKYIST).

5-6-72

WASHINGTON, D.C.

ON APRIL TWENTYSEVEN LAST, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION HAS PROPOSED A CANDLELIGHT MARCH FROM ST. MARKS EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THIRD AND A STREETS, S.E., WASHINGTON, D.C., TO THE EAST STEPS OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION. THE MARCH IS EXPECTED TO START AT NINE THIRTY PM AND END APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN PM ON THE NIGHT OF MAY SIX NEXT AND APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL

END PAGE ONE

REC-35 100-464406-74

EX-109

MAY 5 1972

2 cc to 150

MAY 11 1972

PAGE TWO

ABORTION ACTION COALITION IS LOCATED AT ONE THREE FOUR SIX CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C., AND IS INFLUENCED BY MEMBERS OF THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE AND THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED LOCALLY OF PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION INCLUDING UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE.

ADMINISTRATIVE SOURCE IS WF TWO ZERO THREE FOUR-S.

WFO FOLLOWING.

END

JEM FBI WASH DC

CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 1 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Felt
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss [illegible]

NR 010 CV CODE

9:35 PM URGENT 5/1/72 RJB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CLEVELAND (100-NEW) 2P

Womens National Abortion Action Coalition

MARCH AND RALLY TO REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, MAY SIXTH, NEXT. INTERNAL SECURITY - NEW LEFT.

ON INSTANT DATE, RELIABLE SOURCE FURNISHED LEAFLET ANNOUNCING CAPTIONED MARCH AND RALLY. ACCORDING TO LEAFLET, SUPPORTERS OF APC ARE TO ASSEMBLE AT TWELVE NOON AT THE NEW FEDERAL BUILDING, EAST NINTH STREET AND LAKESIDE. THE MARCHERS WILL THEN PROCEED SOUTH ON EAST NINTH STREET TO EUCLID AVENUE, WEST ON EUCLID AVENUE TO PUBLIC SQUARE, AND THEN TO THE OLD FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING AT CORNER OF SUPERIOR AVENUE, AND PUBLIC SQUARE WHERE RALLY WILL BE HELD. NO INDICATION MARCH AND RALLY WILL BE OTHER THAN PEACEFUL.

CLEVELAND, OHIO PD, LOCAL SECRET SERVICE, AND GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION BUILDING MANAGEMENT ADVISED.

END PAGE ONE

REC-21

EX-116

MCT-7

6 MAY 4 1972

Included in letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 5/2/72

54 MAY 10 1972

"Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

CV 100-NEW

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION

THIS IS A SELF-DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, DEDICATED TO REPEALING ALL ABORTION LAWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN. IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTION LAWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS CV SEVEN THREE NINE - S.

CLEVELAND FOLLOWING THIS MATTER AND WILL SUTEL AFTER CAPTIONED EVENT.

END

cc - Horner

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

DATE: 4/27/72

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-79014)(C)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C

LOS ANGELES WOMENS
ABORTION ACTION COMMITTEE
IS - NEW LEFT

100-468406-45

Re Los Angeles letter and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 12/9/71, and Los Angeles report of SA RICHARD J. KAYSA dated 12/23/71, and captioned "Womens Liberation Movement."

For information of the Bureau and New York, referenced communications report activities sponsored by the Los Angeles Womens Abortion Action Committee (LAWAAC), a Los Angeles based affiliate of WONAAC which is headquartered in New York City.

Although LAWAAC continues to exist in name, this group has not been active in sponsoring activities since its participation in the 11/20/71 WONAAC sponsored demonstration at San Francisco, California.

It is anticipated that LAWAAC will sponsor or participate in future demonstrations, and Los Angeles will report any future activity by this group.

REC-21

18 MAY 1 1972

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (100-174481)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

RJR/rjr
(5)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. W. Gray (Grigalus)

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. G. J. Lex

[illegible]

7/11/72

TO SACS, NEW YORK (100-174481)
WFO (100-55420)

REC- 22

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) 83

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK; IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REWFO TEL JULY SEVEN, LAST, AND NYTEL JULY TEN, LAST, BOTH CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADVANCE WF TWO ONE EIGHT EIGHT - S ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION, TO ATTEND CAPTIONED CONFERENCE. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES FROM INFORMANT.

PRIOR TO SOURCE TRAVELING TO CONFERENCE, WFO AND NEW YORK COORDINATE IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANT CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NEW YORK OFFICE. WFO INSTRUCT INFORMANT CONTACT NEW YORK OFFICE TO REPORT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 134-20608

1 - 134-20608

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

GJL:tlc
(7) tlc

Felt ____
Bates ____
Bishop ____
Callahan ____
Campbell ____
Cleveland ____
Conrad ____
Dalbey ____
Jenkins ____
Marshall ____
Miller, E.S. ____
Ponder ____
Soyars ____
Walters ____
Tele. Room ____
Mr. Kinley ____
Ms. Armstrong ____
Mr. Gandy ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 11 1972

628 P 2NY

TELETYPE

RLS cwt GL

tsm/ZTC

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

Mr. Conrad

TELETYPE TO NEW YORK AND WFO
RE: WOMEN'NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN,
SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK,
NEW YORK
100-468406

WFO CONTACT INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT DETAILED FD - THREE ZERO SIX TO NEW YORK WITHIN FIVE DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER SEVENTY-TWO DASH THREE (C) RE REPORTING OF RESULTS OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES.

NOTE:

WONAAC was founded in New York City 7/71 for purpose of forming a national movement of groups throughout U. S. who favor legalized abortion. This organization is dominated by Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). WONAAC scheduled to hold conference at Hunter College, New York, New York, 7/14-16/72. WFO source, WF 2188-S advised that anti-Trotskyist women in WONAAC will attempt to negate influence of YSA control of organization at captioned conference. In teletype dated 7/7/72 WFO requested authorization to advance WF 2188-S $113 for expenses in connection with attendance at this conference. Expenses involve $38 for round trip by Metro Coach from WDC to New York City and for three days' food and lodging at rate of $25 per day. WFO furnished code name to New York for use by source. Source currently authorized $250 per month for services and $45 per month for expenses. Based on fact that source selected by WDC YSA leadership to be member of delegation to attend this conference, WFO being authorized to advance source $113. WFO and New York instructed to coordinate re source maintaining contact with New York and to insure that FD-306 submitted within five days after conclusion of conference.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 7 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR 016 WF CODED

5:38PM NITEL 7-7-72 ASW

TO ACTING DIRECOTR

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD TWO PAGES

~~A~~ Bradford Griffith

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, SEVENTYTWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK. INTERNAL SECURITY DASH C (TROTSKYIST).

WF TWO ONE EIGHT EIGHT DASH S, MEMBER OF WASHINGTON, DC LOCAL OF YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA) AND WONAAC, HAS BEEN SELECTED BY WASHINGTON, DC YSA LEADERSHIP AS PART OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WONAAC DELEGATION TO NEW YORK CONFERENCE JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, NEXT. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THIS CONFERENCE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THE YSA BECAUSE IT IS FELT THAT ANTI TROTSKYIST WOMEN IN WONAAC WILL ATTEMPT TO NEGATE INFLUENCE OF TROTSKYIST WOMEN IN WONAAC AT CAPTIONED CONFERENCE.

REC-22 100-408166-85

EX

6 JUL 12 1972

TEL to NY and WFO GJL:tlc 7/11/72

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO SEND SOURCE TO CAPTIONED, AND BUREAU AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED TO ADVANCE TO SOURCE

END PAGE ONE

5-454

PAGE TWO

THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES TO BE ACTUALLY INCURRED, INCLUDING THIRTYEIGHT DOLLARS ROUND TRIP METRO COACH FARE FROM WASHINGTON, DC TO NEW YORK, AND TWENTYFIVE DOLLARS PER DAY FOR THREE DAYS FOR FOOD, LODGING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.

FOR INFORMATION OF NEW YORK, SOURCE'S CODE NAME IS MARISA.

IF APPROVED BY BUREAU, NEW YORK PROVIDE WFO WITH NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF CONTACTING AGENT.

END

DSS FBI WA DC FOR THREE   HOLD FOR THREE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/22/72

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (100-22881) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re report of ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72 at Washington Field.

The State University of New York at Binghamton is part of the University system of the State of New York, and the University at Binghamton has an enrollment of approximately 7,500 students. The student newspaper published at the University twice weekly during the school year in its issue of 10/15/71 carried a brief ad in the classified section as follows:

"Women who have had abortions needed to relate their experiences to other women, educate all women about abortion at abortion speak out October 21. Contact Linda L., extention 4130."

The 11/12/71, issue of the "Pipedream", student newspaper published at the State University of New York at Binghamton, carries an announcement that the Binghamton Womens Abortion Coalition was selling bus tickets for the Womens March on Washington for repeal of all abortion laws, repeal of all contraception laws and no force sterilization for 11/20/71. Women and men were invited to attend and tickets were on sale at the student center. Cars and volunteers were needed and they were to contact LINDA LOEW at extention 4129.

~~Former AL 3487-PST~~, who is familiar with New Left activities on the campus of the State University of New York at Binghamton was contacted regularly during the school year of 1971-72 and he stated that he did see some signs on bulletin boards in the Fall of 1971 about abortion organizations, but never knew them to be of much success on campus. He stated that he did not see any

100-465926-83

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (RM)
1 - Albany
CFH/mhv
(5)

REC-19

15 JUN 26 1972

54 JUL 5 1972

X-109

Rev. Act. Sect.

S Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

activity or signs on any bulletin boards from the period of approximately January, 1972 until school closed in May, 1972. This source was contacted 5/16/72. He stated also at that time that LINDA LOEW has been a close associate of BETTY SACHS who is the leader of the Young Socialist Alliance Chapter on campus at the University. Informant stated that there was no organization formed to his knowledge of a Womens Abortion Action Coalition in the Binghamton area.

Other sources familiar with New Left activities on the campus of the State University of New York at Binghamton, were contacted during May, 1972, and two sources advised that they knew of no organization of Womens Abortion Action Coalition on the campus or in the Binghamton vicinity during the past year.

Albany Division has had an investigation pending on LINDA LOEW and a report is being written with appropriate recommendation for administrative action on LINDA LOEW. In view of the lack of activity of an Abortion Coalition organization in the Binghamton area, no further investigation is being conducted by Albany.

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE

Sources contacted at SUNY, Binghamton were JOSEPH FERALDO, Director of Security, and DUANE FOOTE, Security Officer, SUNY, Binghamton, on 5/18/72.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. W. Gray (Grigalus)

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. R. L. Pence
6/19/72

TO SAC, DETROIT (134-3030)

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (134-22865)

DE TWO EIGHT THREE ONE DASH S; SM - DWAAC.

REDETEL JUNE FIFTEEN, LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED ADVANCE INFORMANT AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION, TO COVER MEETING OF WOMENS POLITICAL CAUCUS (WPC), WASHINGTON, D. C., JUNE TWENTY-FOUR TO TWENTY-FIVE, NEXT. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING OF EXPENSES FROM INFORMANT.

WFO AND DETROIT COORDINATE CODE NAME OF INFORMANT AND IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANT CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WHILE IN WASHINGTON, D. C. DETROIT INSTRUCT INFORMANT TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH WFO IN EVENT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DEVELOPED WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE. DETROIT INSTRUCT INFORMANT BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR EXTENT OF SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) INFLUENCE OR CONTROL OVER MEETING AND IDENTITIES OF SWP MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE.

DETROIT CONTACT INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT DETAILED LHM WITH AIRTEL COVER.

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 100-16 (SWP)
1 - 100-468406 (WONAAC)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

100-468406-

NOT RECORDED
42 JUN 23 1972

[illegible]

RLP:tlp
(8)

70 JUL 14 1972

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Teletype to Detroit
Re: DE 2831-S
134-22865

NOTE:

Approximately 75 to 100 individuals expected to attend policy meeting of Womens Political Caucus (WPC), WDC, 6/24-25/72, with specific discussion to center around organizing booklet drafted by WPC instructing new women's groups to seek support from other organizations, including communist Socialist Workers Party (SWP). SWP moving quickly and vigorously to infiltrate and dominate women's liberation movement and has formed numerous chapters of front group named Womens Abortion Action Coalition (WAAC). DE 2831-S is member of Detroit WAAC and has furnished coverage on SWP influence in her chapter and has been successful through her own efforts in thwarting complete SWP takeover. Informant is in position to discuss with persons in leadership capacity at WPC meeting threat of SWP infiltration and will also be in position to report on existing SWP influences. Informant is currently paid on authority of Special Agent in Charge. Informant's presence at meeting is desirable and requested expenses of $135 considered reasonable. Nitel being utilized to allow informant necessary preparation time.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
BOSTON	NEW YORK	6/23/72	6/1-12/72	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION		ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.		cmd
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		IS - C (TROTSKYIST)		

REFERENCE: Boston airtel and LHM dated 1/18/72 ✓ captioned "Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition, IS-C (TROTSKYIST)". Boston airtel and LHM dated 2/18/72. ser 69
WFO report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72.
ser 81

-P*-

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					☒ NONE	ACQUITTALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED James L. Handley SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

REC 68

EX-112

7

2 JUN 28 1972

COPIES MADE:

6 - Bureau (100-468406) (RM)

2 - New York (100-774481) (RM)

2 - Boston (100-43809)

2CC - 932-D

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	Sec. Sev., 2-OBO M-ISD			
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	7/5/72			
How Fwd.	7/5	6 1972		
By	CGL: dlk			

Notations

Rev. Act. Sect.

-A-

LEADS

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASS.

Will continue to follow and report pertinent activities of the local abortion group within the Boston Division.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	Location
BS T-1 is (BS 808-S)	BS 134-729A-762-787
BS T-2 is identified on the Non-Symbol Source Administrative Page	
BS T-3 is (BS 1362-PSI)	BS 100-43809-36

ADMINISTRATIVE

With respect to individuals mentioned in the details of this report, MATILDE MILES is a former Security Index subject of the Boston Division who transferred to New York; EVELYN CLARK and JANE ROLAND are subjects of current investigations and TOBA SINGER is an ADEX subject of the Boston Division.

Agents observing the activity at Washington, D.C. were WILLIAM ARMS, WILLIAM BROOKS, RICHARD COFFMAN, NORMAN HIERONYMI, MASON NOAH AND WILLIAM TUCKER.

This report has been classified "Confidential" as the unauthorized disclosure of information provided by BS T-1 and BS T-3 could reasonably result in the identification of these informants of continuing value, compromise their future effectiveness and thus adversely affect the defense interests of the United States.

BS 100-43809

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

BS T-2 is JOSEPH AHERN BS 100-43809-6
Captain,
Mass. State Police
(By request)

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

(Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

Report of: ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR. Office: Boston
Date: 6/23/72

Field Office File #: 100-43809 Bureau File #: 100-468406

Title: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: Informants advised the Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed during the late summer, 1971, out of the local Female Liberation (FL) group. Its headquarters is located at 552 Mass. Avenue, Cambridge. BOWAAC is not a formal membership group but there are approximately a total of 20-25 females regularly involved in the group's work. The Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston faction within BOWAAC, which comprises about half of the activists, were the controlling force. However, recent reports indicate this faction has apparently alienated itself from other activists and does not now believe BOWAAC can be built into a successful supporter group for the YSA and SWP locally.

-P*-

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to
not to be distributed outside your agency.

BS 100-43809

Details:

I. ORGANIZATION

A. Origin and Objectives

The Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed during late summer, 1971, out of the local Female Liberation (FL) group.

BS T-1
November 17, 1971

BOWAAC was originally a subcommittee of FL in the Greater Boston Area but as of January, 1972, had grown into a separate group whose specific interest was in abortion reform. Individuals active in BOWAAC are also active in other FL work; however, all individuals active in FL work are not active in BOWAAC, with BOWAAC being the smaller of the two groups.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

> WONAAC has been publicly described as an organization of groups whose aim is to effect the overthrow of existing abortion laws and to establish free abortion on demand.

B. Headquarters

A permit for a WONAAC sponsored demonstration at Washington, D.C., scheduled for November 20, 1971, listed BOWAAC at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Room 9, telephone number (617) 547-1818 or 491-1071, as among supporting groups.

Sergeant JOHN TOMLINSON
United States Park Police
Washington, D.C.
November 4, 1971

Telephone number 547-1818 is listed to BOWAAC at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge and telephone number 491-1071 is listed to Female Liberation at that same address.

New England Telephone
and Telegraph Company
Listing Service
November 17, 1971
June 12, 1972

BOWAAC and FL, in the Boston area, are located at the same address, 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, but have separate offices at that address.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

C. Membership

BOWAAC is not a formal membership type group. There are, however, approximately a total of 20-25 females regularly involved in office maintenance or correspondence and telephone contact work to develop outside support for scheduled public activities and demonstrations.

BS T-1
June 11, 1972

D. Leadership and Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance Infiltration

The Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) is the Boston affiliate of the YSA, the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The Boston SWP is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.

While BOWAAC was not exclusively made up of Boston SWP and YSA-B female members, as of November, 1971, it was controlled by members of those groups.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MATILDE MILES, nee ZIMMERMAN, was the Boston SWP member heading up local SWP/YSA work in BOWAAC but she and EVELYN CLARK, another Boston SWP member active in BOWAAC, were then in the process of leaving Boston for Washington, D.C., to help in organizing a scheduled November 20, 1971, WONAAC demonstration at Washington, D.C.

BS T-1
November 17, 1971

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The YSA and SWP in the Boston area have approximately 15 of their female members active in FL work with approximately six to eight in and the controlling forces of BOWAAC. As of January, 1972, JANE ROLAND, who joined the Boston SWP in late 1971, was heading up SWP/YSA work in FL and BOWAAC as MATILDE MILES had not returned to Boston, but rather transferred to New York.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

In late January, 1972, TOBA SINGER and JANE ROLAND, leaders of the local SWP/YSA FL faction, reported that there was continuing trouble within FL with respect to the control of that group by the SWP and YSA forces and also the direction of FL into any kind of abortion work.

BS T-1
February 10, 1972

During early March, 1972, TOBA SINGER reported that at an increasing rate abortion work was becoming a more important area of work than FL and that a number of SWP and YSA female members were being transferred into the abortion work.

BS T-1
March 26, 1972

The stress of the SWP/YSA female members in the general Boston area who are active in female matters continues to be away from FL and into BOWAAC with only two or three remaining on the fringes to follow FL activities.

BS T-1
May 10, 1972

Recent reports concerning SWP/YSA faction work within BOWAAC disclose that, as previously occured with the Party's work within FL, those in the Party faction have apparently alienated themselves from the other females active in BOWAAC and for the most part have lost any support from others not in the Party faction. Any suggestions now offered by those of the Party faction in BOWWAC, which comprises approximately half of the activists in the group, are no longer accepted, cause considerable argument and there is evidence of "red baiting". As a result, the Party faction does not now believe that they can build BOWAAC into any successful supporter type organization as had resulted through Party work in the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC).

BS T-1
June 11, 1972

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, Young Socialist Alliance. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

II. OTHER ACTIVITIES

MATILDE ZIMMERMAN, telephone number 547-1818 of "Boston Women's Abortion Action", 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, in November, 1971, chartered five busses with a 45 person capacity each for travel to Washington, D.C. on November 19, 1971. A $1,500 cash deposit was made against a total cost of $3,500 on November 15, 1971. The busses were scheduled to depart for Washington, D.C. at approximately 9:00 P.M., on November 19, 1971, from Cambridge with a round trip cost of $18.

BS T-2
November 16, 1972

At a meeting of the Boston SWP held November 16, 1971, it was reported that BOWAAC was hoping to fill four busses with participants for travel to Washington, D.C., for the scheduled November 20, 1971, WONAAC demonstration.

BS T-1
November 17, 1971

At approximately 10:00 A.M., November 20, 1971, various women's groups from cities within the United States, including Boston, were observed gathering on the Ellipse in Washington, D.C., and at approximately 12:10 P.M. the group, then numbering about 1500, was observed to march from the Ellipse to the West front of the Capitol building. One of the signs carried by the marchers read "Boston Repeal All Abortion Laws". Two tables of SWP literature were set up during the gathering at the Ellipse and four at the rally site at the Capitol.

Special Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
November 20, 1971

The organizer of the Boston SWP in late November, 1971, reported that between 80-100 individuals had traveled from Boston to Washington, D.C. to participate in the above-mentioned November 20 demonstration.

BS T-1
December 3, 1971

"The Militant", a weekly newspaper of the SWP, in its November 14, 1971, edition carried the following announcement: "Abortion Conference - The Second National Conference of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition will be held February 11-13, 1972 at Boston University. For further information contact WONAAC, 150 Fifth Avenue, Suite 153, New York, New York 10011."

Boston SWP and YSA-B members active in BOWAAC were distributing in January, 1972, a "Housing Fact Sheet" in an effort to locate housing accommodations for individuals visiting the Boston area to attend the above scheduled conference at Boston University.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

The opening session of the WONAAC Conference, held at Boston University, February 11-13, 1972, began on the evening of February 11 and was in the nature of a rally in Hayden Hall with approximately 600 individuals present. Of this number approximately 50 were males but it is noted that this was the only conference session to which males were invited.

The general theme of the rally was "How to Win Abortion Law Repeal" and MATILDE MILES, mentioned previously, was one of the two rally moderators.

Approximately 30 members of the YSA-B and/or the SWP, Boston, were in attendance at the rally.

The Saturday and Sunday, February 12-13, 1972 sessions, open to women only, were scheduled to include workshops on such topics as national and local legislative projects, court action, forced sterilization, abortion referral and clinics, campus and high school work and the building of the Abortion Law Repeal Movement.

BS T-1
February 13, 1972

The "Boston Globe", a daily newspaper published in Boston, in its February 13, 1972 edition, carried an article entitled "Abortion Strategy Discussed" which in part reported that more than 800 women from across the country had gathered for a conference at Boston University the weekend of February 11-13, 1972 to plan a strategy to win repeal of all laws that prohibit abortion. According to the article, it was expected that the conference would endorse the latest Federal bill to nullify all state laws restricting abortion - "The Abortion Rights Act of 1972", to be introduced by United States Congresswoman BELLA ABZUG from New York. The article reported that discussion at the conference had centered around whether or not to adopt the slogan "Free Abortion on Demand; No Forced Sterilization" or to focus on a single issue - repeal of the abortion laws. It further reported that a proposal was presented for an Abortion Action Week, May 1 to 6, 1972, to include educational programs, legislative support, judicial action and local or regional demonstrations centering around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion and anti-contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

JANE ROLAND, identified in the article as coordinator of BOWAAC, was reported to have stated that whatever the conference does nationally her organization would be acting at the local level.

The February 13, 1972, session of the WONAAC Conference at Boston University was in the form of workshops held in approximately eight classrooms with about 50 females in attendance at each workshop. The maximum number of persons present at any one time during the day would be estimated at between 400 to 500. The workshops primarily related to the building of WONAAC throughout the United States, fund raising and regional work, with ideas being exchanged between individuals attending from various areas of the country, including Boston. The major theme appeared to be how to strengthen awareness of WONAAC, which was reportedly in need of financial support. Literature tables were set up on the periphery of the workshops and among organizations identified with the tables was the YSA.

BS T-3
February 13, 1972

The "Boston Globe" in its February 14, 1972 edition carried an article entitled "Women's Group Backs Abortion Bill" which reported that the abovementioned "Abortion Rights Act of 1972" had received strong endorsement from WONAAC at the close of its second national conference. The article reported that to implement the endorsement, coalition chapters intended to publicize the text of the bill, which proposed to repeal all abortion laws, and to have speakers on legislation at forums, teach-ins, rallies, and other educational activities. The article further reported that the proposals adopted at the convention were: that the coalition sponsor an Abortion Action Week, May 1 - 6, 1972; that a telegram be sent to the New York Court of Appeals and Governor NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER condemning the Court's February 10, 1972 decision denying women on

Medicaid the right to abortions on demand; that the coalition continue to organize Black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, Native American and Asian American participation in their activities; that members of local coalitions confront candidates for office and force them to take a stand on abortion or to publicize those who oppose abortion; that the coalition make a special effort to reach out to and involve gay women in their activities.

(1-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Boston, Massachusetts

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

June 23, 1972

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
(TROTSKYIST)

Reference

Report of SA ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.,
dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Vol I

10/15/75

SSC

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. T[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. G[illegible]
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/17/67

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-NEW)

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
SM-C

organization

Attached are five (5) copies of an LHM relating to the captioned organization which plans a march on Washington, D.C., January 8, 1968.

Sources referred to in this LHM are as follows:

Source who furnished all details and copies of publications is [redacted] on 11/15/67;

Informant

Source used to document VIVIAN HALLINAN is [redacted];

Source used to document TERENCE HALLINAN is [redacted]

Source used to document BETTY MEREDITH is [redacted]

Source used to document VINCENT HALLINAN is [redacted]

Informant

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encl. 5 - RM)
4 - San Francisco (1 - 100-NEW)
[redacted] Informant
(1 - 100-7514) (WILPF)
(1 - 100-53769) (WILPF - MARIN CO.)
RML:cg
(7)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAC (ISD), ~~CRD, CD)~~
DATE FORW: 11-27-67
HOW FORW: RCS
BY:

XEROX
FEB [illegible] 1968

OCT 27
REC 67
100-448326
NOV 22 1967
INT. SEC.

AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: 347 Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

November 17, 1967

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

A source advised on November 15, 1967, that an organization captioned as above has been organized for the purpose of protesting the Vietnam War. The source stated that it is the objective of this organization to induce women by the thousands to travel to the White House, Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968 for a demonstration to end "this dishonorable war".

[illegible]

The source stated that the person who is acting as executive secretary for this organization in the San Francisco Bay Area is Vivian Hallinan and that she is being assisted by Elizabeth Meredith.

Re: Vivian Hallinan:

Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962 that his mother would be willing to join the Communist Party (CP) if her husband, Vincent Hallinan would also join.

The most recent CP activity on the part of Terence was on October 14, 1967, when he attended a meeting of the Northern California District CP Committee held at San Francisco.

[illegible]

Vivian Hallinan was arrested on a civil rights sit-in demonstration at Auto Row in San Francisco, in April, 1964. Sergeant William Davis, San Francisco County Jail Number 2, San Bruno, California, advised on August 22, 1966, that Vivian Hallinan served a month in the County Jail from July 5, 1966 to August 2, 1966 having been found guilty on a sit-in charge.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100- 448326 - 1

ENCLOSURE

XEROX
FEB 7 1968

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Re: Elizabeth Meredith,
also known as
Betty Meredith

A source advised in 1954 that Betty Meredith of 55 Woodside Way, Ross, California, was considered by the CP to be highly trusted in regard to CP activities.

Re: Vincent Hallinan

Vincent Hallinan was candidate for President of the United States on the Independent Progressive Party ticket in 1952. This party was formed in California in 1948 and ceased to exist in 1954, when it failed to poll sufficient votes to remain on a California ballot. The California Senate Fact-Finding Committee on Un-American Activities in its 1955 report on page forty-six, states in part that the Independent Progressive Party in California was quickly captured by the communists and soon was being operated lock, stock and barrel by the Communist Party of California.

A source advised on April 20, 1966, that Vincent Hallinan was the Treasurer for American Institute For Marxist Studies (AIMS).

A characterization of AIMS
is contained in the appendix.

According to the source, it is the aim and objective of Vivian Hallinan when she goes to Washington, D.C., in conjunction with the Rankin Brigade to get herself arrested as she believes that nothing can be accomplished unless the women are arrested and then do their talking from jail.

A source made available the following material which relate to the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. A paper entitled, (1) "You Cannot Have Wars Without Women"; (2) a reprint of an article from the "San Francisco Chronicle" dated Saturday, May 20, 1967, entitled, "Jeannette Rankin Speaks Up". This article contains biographical sketch of Jeannette Rankin. (3) A letter signed by "E. Meredith", P.O. Box 993, Ross, California, under the date of October 26,

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

1967, setting forth objectives of the Rankin Brigade. Copies of these three publications are as follows:

YOU CANNOT HAVE WARS WITHOUT WOMEN

Chairman:
Jeannette Rankin

Executive Secretary:
Vivian Hallinan

Women must use their minds, their voices, and their bodies to stop the killing in Vietnam; to do less is to ignore our special responsibilities to the human race.

"10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin made the above statement in May of this year. Fifty years ago, as the first woman elected to Congress, she voted against World War I. She has consistently maintained her struggle for peace, and at 86 she is as courageous and vigorous as ever--an inspiration to all women.

The presence of the United States forces in the in ernal struggle of Vietnam is immoral and illegal. There can be no possible justification for our inte ference in the domestic affairs of this tiny distant land.

This 86-year-old woman has stated that she is wi ing to stay in jail until the bombing is stopped. N all women are free to join her, but we can assure her that thousands of women will march peacefull beside her. Some will picket, others will go to ja with Miss Rankin. Every woman's participation i equally valuable. We are confident each one will the maximum of which she is capable.

On January 8th, women from all over the land wil converge on Washington to demand the end of this dishonorable war. We shall come as individuals, or as organizations, but we shall join together as concerned women under the aegis of Jeannette Ra

For more information, write to:
Jeannette Rankin Brigade
c/o Vivian Hallinan
61 Peninsula Road
Belvedere, California

WILL YOU JOIN US TO SAVE THE MEN YOU LOVE

Jeannette Rankin Speaks Up

War's Unremitting Foe

Atlanta, Ga.

Jeannette Rankin, the only member of Congress to oppose this country's entry into both World Wars, says the nation's women should band together to halt the war in Vietnam.

"If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary, that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women," she says.

Miss Rankin, the first woman ever to serve in the House of Representatives, said in an interview: "We've [illegible] 10,000 women sit back [illegible] let their sons be killed in [illegible]nam. To me, that is [illegible] than the old Hebrew [illegible]fices."

[illegible] 86, she is still battling [illegible] enemy — war.

"[illegible] isn't a question of war against Germany, Japan or Vietnam. It's just that the whole system is very stupid.

"War is nothing more than a method of settling a dispute, but it has nothing to do with the dispute. In fact, you never have the same issues at the end of war that were present at the beginning."

SUFFRAGETTE

Miss Rankin, an outspoken leader in the struggle which eventually allowed women to vote under the 19th Amendment, suggests that women today — as they did on the suffrage issue — band together to "do everything possible" to end the war.

AP Wirephoto

JEANNETTE RANKIN

No time to be polite

"We — women — should picket everything," she says. "This is no time to be polite. The Army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says, 'come on and fight.'

"But they don't take the politicians and decision-makers to fight."

Miss Rankin is still active, with a gracious charm and a sharp sense of humor. She does not make many public speeches now although she did address an Atlantans for Peace meeting Thursday night.

ROLL CALL

Miss Rankin was Congressman-at-large from Montana from 1917 to 1919. In 1940 she was elected to the House for one term.

Now living at Watkinsville, Ga., she recalls vividly the dramatic night in 1917 when the House debated the war resolution against Germany.

She had taken office only three days before, and she had sat quietly throughout most of that long evening. Finally, shortly after 2 a.m., the time came for the fateful roll call.

The scene was tense. Monotonously, the clerk called the name of each member.

When her name was reached, Miss Rankin remained silent. Following the House custom, the roll was called a second time. With all eyes upon her, Miss Rankin rose unsteadily and, with voice quivering, said:

"I want to stand by my country, but I cannot vote for war."

In 1941, after being elected to a second term on the slogan, "Prepare to limit the defense; keep our men out of Europe," she cast another opposing vote — this time in an effort to prevent the U.S. from entering World War II.

"I'm opposed to all wars," she declares. "The war method must be abolished if we are to continue as a civilization."

Associated Press

Ohio Woman Loses Third Son to War

Hamilton, Ohio

Birdie Allen a widow, received word Thursday that her soldier son, Sergeant Samuel R. Allen, 32, was killed in action in Vietnam.

He was the third of her six sons to died in battle. Jim Allen was killed in Holland on September 20, 1944, three days after he parachuted into that country. Charlie D. Allen was killed April 14, 1945, after his army unit crossed the Rhine river.

Mrs. Allen's other three sons are ministers.

United Press

Care Here for 'Viet Kids' War Burns

A national committee organized to treat severely burned and wounded Vietnamese children announced here yesterday that six children will be brought to the United States for specialized medical care.

A spokesman for the Committee of Responsibility told a news conference that the group had selected children who could not possibly survive given only the treatment afforded in Vietnamese hospitals.

The children will probably be brought to San Francisco for lengthy treatment including plastic surgery when Saigon grants permission, according to Dr. Henry Mayer of Redwood City.

The committee's medical team has just returned from Vietnam. They found that 10,000 children under the age of 12 will be admitted to hospitals there this year with war-related wounds.

Mayer said that doctors throughout the United States have volunteered their services and hospitals will make facilities available.

************* Jeannette Rankin Brigade********* P.O. Box 993
Ross, Calif.
Oct. 26, 1967

Here it is, the long-awaited first call upon women to join the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. I'm enclosing copies --hope you can find means to duplicate these for your community.

Much has happened since I talked to you --exciting things, much response, and some firm dates. A great deal of time was spent with Miss Rankin in order to do this in the way that she felt was best. A there were other very important things already in the hopper, such as Women Strike for Peace in Washington on Sept. 20, and the tremendous Stop the Draft Week of Oct. 16 - 21, all taking the time and energies of the peace groups.

The next full-scale convergence of women throughout the land wil be the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. We will go to Washington on January We will endeavor to enter the U.S. Congress to present our demand for end to the war. These plans will be formally announced on November 1 Veterans Day (formerly Armistice Day), when Miss Rankin will issue th Call to the women of the nation.

Now is the time to organize those in your community, to find tho who can go to Washington and those who will support us by lending the names or helping in other ways. Now is the time to bring this up in churches, P.T.A.'s and women's organizations, including union auxiliaries.

We have been in touch with many men, important in their fields -- labor, retired generals, professors, etc.-- who have offerred to sponsor the Brigade. But it was decided to have only women as national sponsors. Among these at present are Dagmar Wilson, Coretta King, Ruth Krause, Esther Pike, and Jessica Mitford. Interested men are being invited to join a "Men's Auxiliary", to help with fund-raising, e More on this anon. Several clergymen in the Bay Area have agreed to preach sermons on the subject of women and their responsibility of working to oppose war.

Ideas for supportive action in local communities are needed and welcome. Please let me know what you are doing and planning.

Yours for peace,

P.S. Please forgive a mimeographed letter, but I have so many people to contact and the time is short!

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

The source further advised that the Marin Chapter of the Women's International League For Peace And Freedom (WILPF) is supporting the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in every way possible.

A characterization of the WILPF is contained in the appendix.

1

AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR MARXIST STUDIES

A source advised on April 9, 1963, that on April 7, 1963, at a meeting of the District Committee of the Communist Party, United States of America (CPUSA), of New England, held in Boston, Massachusetts, HERBERT APTHEKER stated he was developing an organization called American Institute for Marxist Studies (AIMS), which would eventually legalize the CP. He stated AIMS would publish literature on History, Science, Physics, Archeology and other subjects which would be put out quarterly with various supplements.

A second source advised on June 30, 1966, that HERBERT APTHEKER was elected to the National Committee, CPUSA, at the 18th National Convention of the CPUSA, held June 22-26, 1966, in New York City.

A third source advised on June 7, 1963, that on June 3, 1963, HERBERT APTHEKER spoke at the CPUSA, New York District Board meeting concerning AIMS. APTHEKER stated that AIMS would unite and strengthen the CP although the CP would not be connected with it. He stated AIMS was being formed to operate within the scope of the McCarran and Smith Acts and would legally bring Marxist material and opinions to the attention of American scholars and the general public.

A fourth source reported on August 29, 1966, that AIMS issues a "Newsletter" every other month. This source also made available the information that AIMS issues publications and holds symposiums concerning Marxism.

A fifth source advised on May 9, 1967, that as of that date, AIMS was located on the fifth floor west of 20 West 30th Street, New York, New York.

APPENDIX

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (WI

In a leaflet dated January, 1962, WILPF described itself as follows:

"What is the WILPF?

"It is the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an international, interracial organization striving for peace and freedom by non-violent democratic methods. It was founded in 1915, during the first World War, and its first president was JANE ADDAMS, the first American woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize.

"How Does it Work?

"It keeps its membership informed on current problems through its legislative office in Washington. It issues its own pamphlets, study kits, fact sheets, and cooperates with like-minded organizations. WILPF has consultative status at the United Nations on a national and international level.

"What Does it Do?

"WILPF, through its local branches, sponsors public discussion on such topics as disarmament and world law, nuclear testing, civil defense, Berlin, civil rights, etc. Through its Peace Action Committee, WILPF initiates peace walks, vigils, and meetings, as an organization and with other peace groups. Peace education for children is a special concern of WILPF.

"How Is it Set Up?

"The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has its national headquarters at JANE ADDAMS House, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 3, Pa., where its monthly paper, FOUR LIGHTS, is published. Its legislative office is at 120 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington 2, D. C. International headquarters are in Geneva. The International meets every three years. It conducts summer schools, peace congresses and publishes its magazine, PAX."

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 17, 1967
San Francisco, California

Title : JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Character :

Reference : San Francisco memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: November 27, 1967

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) (P)

SUBJECT: "CHANGED" (C)
JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Title marked "Changed" to add one more "N" in JEANNETTE as obtained from the Congressional Directory.

RE: Seattle teletype to the Bureau, dated 11/22/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten (10) copies and for WFO two (2) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. Copies were sent locally to MIG, NIS, OSI, Secret Service and the USA, Seattle.

The Seattle Office has an active COMINFIL case on SWAP. A preliminary inquiry was conducted regarding MAD-FAD without developing evidence of CP domination or control. The AFSC is not under investigation, but a dead file is maintained so investigation can be instituted if sufficient CP infiltration develops, pursuant to Section 87E, M of I.

REC 27

The LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL because information furnished by the sources used, if disclosed, might compromise these regular informants of continuing value. The first source is [redacted]; the second is [redacted]; and the third is [redacted]
Informant Informants

NOV 29 1967

3 - Bureau (Enc.10) (REG)
2 - WFO (Enc.2) (REG)
4 - Seattle (1 - 100-29048)
RBC/cjw (1 - 100-28040) (MAD-FAD)
(9) (1 - [redacted]) Informant
(1 - 100-27547) (VIDEM)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
DATE FORW.
HOW FORW.:
BY:

COPY AND COPY OF ENCL. FILED IN

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Seattle, Washington
November 27, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING

B. APPROX. 1916

On November 27, 1967, a confidential source reported Mrs. DAGMAR WILSON, representing Women Strike for Peace (WSP), spoke at the American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) Hall, Seattle, Washington, during the evening of November 21, 1967, under the sponsorship of Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP). A summary of SWAP's activities distributed at the meeting indicated Mrs. WILSON is one of the founders of WSP and was a guest at a brunch that day given by ANCI KOPPEL, Chairman of SWAP, whereat SWAP's steering committee met informally with WILSON.

Mrs. WILSON announced plans are being made to organize a Jeannette Rankin Brigade for a peaceful invasion of Washington, D. C. on January 8, 1968, under the auspices of Mothers and Fathers Against the Draft (MAD-FAD) with the support of WSP. She said she hoped the assistance of draft resistance groups across the nation could be enlisted for the event. WILSON indicated JEANNETTE RANKIN is, or was, a member of the United States Congress.

> With regard to WSP, the "People's World", a West Coast communist newspaper, in its issue of October 20, 1962, quoted Doctor FRANCES HERRING, national leader of WSP, as stating the organization "was composed of autonomous local groups 'open to women of any race, religious creed or political ideology'".

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

COPIES DESTROYED
3 43 MAY 11 1971

100-448326-5

ENCLOSURE

On May 3, 1965, a second source made available a leaflet distributed by SWAP which stated in part that Mrs. DONNA ALLEN, a national leader of WSP; Mrs. DAGMAR WILSON, founder and leader of WSP; and RUSS NIXON, General Manager of the "National Guardian" (see Appendix Section) were "found guilty of contempt in the United States District Court of the District of Columbia for refusing to testify at a closed meeting of HUAC (they had expressed a willingness to testify at an open hearing where their views would not be subject to possible distortion by HUAC, as has happened at other closed HUAC hearings)".

The AFSC is the social out-reach arm of the religious group known as the Society of Friends (Quakers).

SWAP and its chairman, ANCI KOPPEL, are characterized in the Appendix.

MAD-FAD at Seattle was described in October, 1967, by the first source as being a small group headed by JOSEPH and DORIS LEAVY, parents of a draft-age son. The LEAVYs have been active in Vietnam war protest matters in the past.

LEAVY

With regard to JEANNETTE RANKIN, the Biographical Directory of the American Congress (1950 edition) contains the following information:

"RANKIN, JEANNETTE, a Representative from Montana; born near Missoula, Missoula County, Mont., June 11, 1880; attended the public schools, and was graduated from the University of Montana at Missoula in 1902; student at the School of Philanthropy, New York, N. Y., in 1908 and 1909; social worker in Seattle, Wash., in 1909; engaged in promoting the cause of woman suffrage in the State of Washington in 1910, in California in 1911, and in Montana 1912-1914;

> visited New Zealand in 1915 and worked as a seamstress in order to gain personal knowledge of social conditions; elected as a Republican to the Sixty-fifth Congress (March 4, 1917-March 3, 1919); was the first woman to be elected to the National House of Representatives; did not seek renomination in 1918, having become a candidate for the Republican nomination for Senator, but was unsuccessful; was also an unsuccessful candidate on an independent ticket for election to the United States Senate; engaged in social work; elected to the Seventy-seventh Congress (January 3, 1941-January 3, 1943); was not a candidate for renomination in 1942; resumed lecturing and ranching, and is a resident of Helena (Avalanch Ranch), Mont."

The first source said the chairman of the meeting at the AFSC Hall was TAIMI HALONEN who gave a biographical sketch of Mrs. WILSON's life, including the information she is an illustrator of children's books.

> A third source stated in October, 1957, TAIMI HALONEN was then Chairman of the Ballard-Greenwood Club of the Communist Party (CP), and a member of the North Central CP Section Committee.

In her talk, Mrs. WILSON reportedly stated the recent March on Washington (D. C.) held October 21, 1967, had been very exciting, and she had been among those arrested. She said the soldiers were more compassionate with the women than were the police and were slow in using force on women. She stated she recently visited Hanoi and found the people warm and gentle. Even when she was in an area which had been bombed, the people were sympathetic to her and seemed to regard her somewhat as a heroine. She related one Catholic church had been bombed five times. One Vietnamese official picked a bouquet of flowers and gave them to her as a symbol they want peace and not war. Some of the Vietnamese women told her and other delegates they did not want to kill American soldiers and hoped these soldiers could be dissuaded from going to war and getting killed.

Mrs. WILSON went on to relate the State Department would like to get her passport, but she is determined to go where she pleases. Following her talk, she answered questions. A collection from the crowd of some 175 people present netted about $146.00, according to an announcement.

On November 21, 1967, the "Seattle Times" published the results of an interview with Mrs. WILSON, which was conducted prior to the meeting at the AFSC Hall. A reproduction of the article is attached.

The "Seattle Times" is a daily newspaper published at Seattle, Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

Vietnam Issue Viewed As Peace, Not Politics

By PAUL HENDERSON

"It matters not [illegible] the virtue lies in communism or democracy," said the pacifist-housewife, recently returned from Hanoi.

"What matters is that we learn to live with each other in peace."

Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, 51, of Washington, D. C., was interviewed yesterday at the Friends Meeting House, 4001 Ninth Ave. N. E.

She said her two-week visit to the North Vietnamese capitol was "as a mother, and not to seek a political solution to the war."

AMERICAN BOMBS have created an ugly picture in Hanoi, and military installations are not the only targets, she asserted. She said she was sown bomb damage in residential areas "far removed from any strategic targets."

Schools and hospitals have been destroyed, and she herself "escaped by 20 minutes a bomb that destroyed a church," she reported.

Mrs. Wilson traveled with two other members of the Women's Strike for Peace, an organization she founded in 1961. Upon arrival at Hanoi, she said, they were presented flowers and steel helmets.

Mrs. Wilson said she talked with American prisoners, including a pilot who was repentant for his part in the war and "sorry he had not known the facts."

MRS. DAGMAR WILSON

MRS. WILSON said she is opposed to the war because "it is illegal and we shouldn't be there."

But certainly there has been a logical explanation for American involvement in Vietnam, a reporter said.

Mrs. Wilson dropped her frequent smile and reprimanded reporters "for not doing your homework."

United States involvement in Southeast Asia is for economic reasons, "prompted by the greedy capitalism that is destroying our ideals," she declared.

Mrs. Wilson said nations should have the right to determine their own destiny. And Communism in "that little country of Vietnam" is hardly a threat to democracy in the United States, she said.

Mrs. Wilson, an illustrator of children's books, said she has ignored a State Department demand for her passport.

"It's in my left-hand desk drawer, where it will stay," she said. "They aren't going to tell me where I can't go."

Page 33
"Seattle Times"
Seattle, Washington
November 21, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

1 APPENDIX

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

"Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly, *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, "Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell", August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

1

APPENDIX

SEATTLE WOMEN ACT FOR PEACE (SWAP)

A source reported on May 17, 1962, a meeting of the Ballard-Greenwood CP Club was held in Seattle, April 25, 1962, at which TAIMI HALONEN was nominated to be the new Chairman of this Club. Along with other business of the evening, HALONEN said she expected to devote a good portion of her time to SWAP, an organization of peace forces that met recently with seven members. She said four of the seven were from the "left" but did not go into detail. She said the group had problems of an organizational nature because it was new, and she thought she could help.

On April 5, 1963, a second source stated a meeting of the University CP Club was held at Seattle on April 2, 1963. KEN ROSE, a member of the Club, reported the most influential peace organization in Seattle was SWAP.

On July 31, 1964, a meeting of the North Central CP Section Committee was held at Seattle. WILL PARRY, Section Chairman, said attention should be placed on three political questions - peace, civil rights, and labor. Under peace, he said CP clubs should inject the Women Act for Peace campaign into the election campaign. At another Section meeting, February 5, 1966, TAIMI HALONEN was praised for effective peace work and for her help in developing unity among the peace forces. Section-wide concentration was urged in assisting SWAP to visit 1,000 workers on the Vietnam issue.

A third source advised on February 24, 1966, a Northwest District CP Committee meeting was held at Seattle February 12, 1966. After lunch, the entire group participated in passing out leaflets pertaining to racial matters and the Vietnam war which carried the name of SWAP, 5411 Ravenna Avenue Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98105, which address has been used consistently by SWAP and is that of ANCI KOPPEL, also known as Mrs. CHARLES KOPPEL. KOPPEL has been and continues to be the coordinator and apparent prime motivating force of SWAP as of May, 1967.

> A fourth source reported in 1945 ANCI KOPPEL was a member of the Professional Group of the Communist Political Association (CPA), also known as the Rogers CP Club at Seattle, Washington.
>
> The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

28-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-23018

Seattle, Washington
November 27, 1967

Title	JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Communication dated and captioned as above, at Seattle, Washington.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 11/30/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-new)

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN
BRIGADE ON JANUARY 8, 1967 IN
WASHINGTON, D. C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING -
INTERNAL SECURITY
(OO:WFO)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, CRI: ED)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

ReWFOteletypes dated 11/28/67 and 11/29/67.

Transmitted herewith are 10 copies of an LHM for the Bureau describing possible anti-Vietnam war protest activity in Washington, D.C. Two copies are enclosed for the New York Office.

LHM is being disseminated locally to Secret Service, USA and military intelligence agencies.

Source used in LHM is [redacted] Informant

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information reported by the source could lead to the identification of that source and compromise future effectiveness.

WFO continuing to follow and will report further pertinent details.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 10)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

GTT:dgp
(8)

ENCLOSURE

C. C. - BISHOP

NOV 30 1967

FEB 3 1969

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

AIRTEL

Approved: ____________ Sent ________ M Per ________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

November 30, 1967

DEMONSTRATION BY
JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
ON JANUARY 8, 1967
IN
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Inspector Thomas I. Herlihy, Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., advised on November 28, 1967, that he had received information from an official of the Pennsylvania Railroad to the effect that two Pennsylvania Railroad trains had been reserved for travel from New York City to Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968. Inspector Herlihy advised that these trains had been reserved by the "Jeannette Rankin Brigade" in New York City, but no further details were available concerning the possible use of the trains.

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on November 28, 1967, that a Jeannette Rankin Brigade is being formed in various cities of the United States by members of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization. The source stated further that this Brigade is intended to be a "one shot" organization to hold demonstrations "all over" the United States on January 8, 1968, protesting the war in Vietnam and attempting to "bring the war machine to a halt."

The source stated that the Brigade has been founded in response to a statement made by former

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

COPIES DESTROYED
343 MAY 11 1971

100-448326-4

DEMONSTRATION BY
JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
ON JANUARY 8, 1968
IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin to the effect that if large numbers of women protested the war and were arrested, it would bring the war machine to a halt in this country. The source stated that there is much dissension within the New York and Washington, D.C. groups of Women Strike for Peace concerning this organization as many of the women are opposed to the formation of another "peace organization." The source stated that a committee is being established within the Women Strike for Peace to organize civil disobedience during the demonstrations on January 8, 1968.

The source further stated that there will apparently be many organizations represented in the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in addition to the Women Strike for Peace. The source stated that there is no information at the present time as to exactly what cities will be the scene of these demonstrations.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
12/5/67
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. WC Sullivan
1 - Mr. CD Brennan
1 - Mr. RH Horner

REC-52 100-448475-1
~~105-137215-8295~~

airtel

EX-103

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The San Francisco Office has advised the Bureau of the receipt of information that an organization known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade has sent out a call for a demonstration to be held at the White House, Washington, D. C., on 1/8/68 in protest of the war in Vietnam.

For your information, Jeannette Rankin, the Chairman of the Brigade, is an 86-year-old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia, who served in the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919 and who was elected to that office for one term in 1940.

Rankin has repeatedly opposed U.S. involvement in foreign wars and has voted against declarations of war by the U.S. during both World Wars I and II. With respect to the Vietnam war, she has stated, "Ten thousand women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women." She has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing in Vietnam is stopped.

2 - All Field Offices

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes

RHH:jes
(68)

MAILED 2
DEC 5 1967
COMM-FBI

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

UNREC COPY FILED IN

XEROX
DEC 7 1967

67 DEC 27 1967

The Secretary of the Brigade has been identified as Vivian Hallinan, the wife of Vincent Hallinan who in 1966 was identified as the Treasurer for the American Institute of Marxist Studies, a communist front organization.

One source has described the Brigade as a "one-shot" organization formed by women in various cities to hold demonstrations "all over" the U.S. on 1/8/68.

In its call for the above demonstration, Brigade literature urges participants to enter the U.S. Congress to present demands for an end to the war.

All offices immediately alert sources concerning this demonstration. All information developed is to be immediately reported to the Bureau and Washington Field by teletype followed by memorandum, original and ten copies, under the above caption for dissemination to all interested agencies. Teletypes must contain sufficient identifying data to enable the Bureau to characterize organizations and individuals supporting the demonstration without resorting to file reviews. Such statements as "a Security Index subject" or "subject of a Bureau investigation" should not be used. The Bureau is not to be referred to its files for identifying information.

It is essential that all individuals with subversive backgrounds and subversive organizations participating in this demonstration be identified.

Informant coverage of groups that plan to support the Brigade and to participate in the demonstration is to be arranged. It is imperative that the Bureau be able to pinpoint subversive organizations and individuals participating in the demonstration.

Each office is to make particular effort to develop information regarding the financial backing of individuals and groups that may participate in the demonstration.

Copies of any printed material distributed in regard to the demonstration should be obtained and copies promptly forwarded to the Bureau as enclosures to letterhead memoranda. Where possible, the name and identifying data concerning individuals distributing literature and the name of the organization that issues it should be obtained.

Any information developed indicating a particular group or individual will attempt to force his way into Congress should be submitted expeditiously in order that appropriate dissemination may be made.

Washington Field, as office of origin, should alert all sources concerning the proposed demonstration, assure that appropriate and effective coverage of the demonstration is coordinated with other offices, and that all appropriate local authorities and Government agencies are apprised of developments.

Authorization for informants to participate in the demonstration is to be obtained from the Bureau. In order that the Bureau may keep the President and other appropriate Government agencies currently advised of developments, prompt attention and reporting by recipient offices is imperative.

The Atlanta and San Francisco Offices should be particularly alert to the development of information regarding the Jeannette Rankin Brigade's sponsorship of this demonstration. Additionally, these offices promptly institute an investigation under the caption "Jeannette Rankin Brigade." This investigation is to be conducted in accordance with instructions set forth in Section 87E, Manual of Instructions.

NOTE:

See memo C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan, dated 12/1/67, captioned as above, prepared by RHH:jes.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 12/1/67

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The San Francisco Office has reported that an organization known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade has sent out a call for women from throughout the Nation to demonstrate at the White House on 1/8/68. This call also urges participants to "enter the U.S. Congress" to present demands for an end to the war.

Jeannette Rankin, who is the Chairman of the Brigade, is an 86-year-old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia. She was a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919 and served one term in 1940. She voted against U.S. involvement in World Wars I and II. Rankin has publicly protested the war in Vietnam and has asserted her willingness to go to jail in protest of the bombing.

The Secretary of the Brigade has been identified as Vivian Hallinan, the wife of Vincent Hallinan who was identified in 1966 as the Treasurer for the American Institute of Marxist Studies, a communist front organization.

The above information has been furnished to the White House, the Department of State, the Attorney General and military intelligence.

In view of the Bureau's responsibility to identify subversive elements which may participate in the demonstration sponsored by this group and to keep the White House and other agencies advised of developments, it is felt that the field should be notified of the proposed demonstration and furnished with instructions for handling information concerning it, including the need for informant coverage of participating groups.

MCT ~~[illegible] - 8215~~

Enclosure

12-4-67

REC-52 100-[illegible]-1

15 DEC 1967

RHH:jes
(8)

XEROX
DEC 7 1967

CONTINUED - OVER

UNREC COPY FILED IN
100-[illegible]

Memo to Mr. Sullivan
RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

There is attached an airtel to all offices advising of this demonstration and furnishing instructions for its coverage and instructing our Atlanta and San Francisco Offices to institute investigations to further develop information concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that the attached airtel to all offices be approved and transmitted.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
~~Miss Gandy~~

FBI

Date: 11/29/67

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE DEFERRED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-new)

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE ON JANUARY EIGHT NEXT. INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY.

REWFOTEL DATED NOVEMBER TWENTYEIGHT PAST CAPTIONED AS ABOVE. WF ONE SEVEN SEVEN SEVEN - S ADVISED THIS DATE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE IS A "ONE SHOT" ORGANIZATION FORMED BY WOMEN IN VARIOUS CITIES TO HOLD DEMONSTRATIONS "ALL OVER" THE UNITED STATES ON JANUARY EIGHT NEXT. BRIGADE FOUNDED IN RESPONSE TO STATEMENT BY FORMER CONGRESSWOMAN JEANNETTE RANKIN TO EFFECT THAT IF LARGE NUMBERS OF WOMEN WERE ARRESTED FOR PROTESTING WAR IT WOULD "BRING THE WAR MACHINE TO A HALT." ABOVE SOURCE STATES MUCH BICKERING BETWEEN NEW YORK AND WDC GROUPS OF WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE CONCERNING THIS ORGANIZATION. SOURCE STATES CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE BEING PLANNED FOR THE AEEAIR. SOURCE ATTEMPTING TO OBTAIN FURTHER DETAILS. LHM FOLLOWS.

100-445475-X1

REC 39 ~~100-445551-2~~

EX 101

14 DEC 1 1967

2 - Bureau
2 - Teletype Unit
2 - WFO

GTT:dgp
(6)

TELETYPE Xerox-1

cc-Klunkauf

54 DEC 7 1967

Approved: Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

FEB 15 1968

D-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/28/67

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE DEFERRED
(Priority)

[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓ WCS
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

c.o.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
SAC, NEW YORK

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-new)

DEMONSTRATION BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE ON JANUARY EIGHT 1968 NEXT. INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY.

INSPECTOR THOMAS I. HERLIHY, INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, ADVISED THIS DATE AN OFFICIAL OF THE PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD ADVISED HIM THAT TWO PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD TRAINS HAD BEEN RESERVED BY THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE IN NEW YORK CITY FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D. C., ON JANUARY EIGHT NEXT. NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO INSPECTOR HERLIHY.

NEW YORK REQUESTED TO ASCERTAIN DETAILS CONCERNING ABOVE.

100-448475-X

REC 39

14 DEC 1 1967

101

2 - Bureau
2 - Teletype Unit
2 - WFO
~~54 DEC 7 1967~~
GTT:dgp
(6)

cc - Kleinkauf

TELETYPE

Approved: ______ Sent ______M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

FEB 15 1968

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

VIA TELETYPE
DEC 7 1967
ENCIPHERED

FBI WASH D C ---4---

244PM DEFERRED 12-7-67 SMS

TO DIRECTOR & WFO

WFO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY EIGHT 1968 NEXT INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY) ~~99~~ 00: WFO

REBUAIRTEL DECEMBER FIVE LAST CAPTIONED AS ABOVE REGARDING PROPOSED JENNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE (JRB) SPONSORSHIP OF INSTANT DEMONSTRATION.

RELIABLE SOURCE INDICATES THAT DECEMBER SIXTY-SEVEN ISSUE OF "LA WISP", MONTHLY NEWSLET~~DE~~TER OF THE SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA COUNCIL OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP), WHICH IS BEING MAILED TODAY (DECEMBER SEVEN) TO ENTIRE MAILING LIST CONTAINS ON PAGE ONE "A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN" TO PARTICIPATE IN ABOVE DESCRIBED BRIGADE JANUARY EIGHT NEXT.

WSP IS ALSO CIRCULATING COPIES OF REPRINT FROM SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE DATED MAY TWENTY LAST CONCERNING MISS RANKIN'S OPPOSITION TO WARS, AND IS COORDINATING LOCAL ACTIVITY TO FORM

REC- [illegible] -47 -2

8 DEC 11 1967

END PAGE ONE

TWO COPIES TO WFO

Xerox Mr. Dugan
Mr Enlow
CC - Kleindienst

3 XEROX

DEC 1967

UTHERN CALIFORNIA JRB CONTINGENT FROM OFFICE SPACE AND TELEPHONES AT WSP HEADQUARTERS, FIVE EIGHT NINE NINE WEST PICO BOULEVARD, LOS ANGELES.

MARY CLARKE, EXECUTIVE BOARD MEMBER OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP IS MEMBER OF NATIONAL STEERING COMMITTEE FOR JRB, AS WELL AS LOCAL COMMITTEE. ~~3XXX~~ EVA KORN AND CLARKE ARE SPEARHEADING LOCAL COMMITTEE, BOTH ARE ACTIVE IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP.

SOURCE TWO ADVISED IN JULY FIFTY FIVE THAT CLARKE WAS DROPPED FROM LOS ANGELES COUNTY COMMUNIST PARTY (LACCP) IN SPRING FIFTY FIVE FOR PERSONAL REASONS AND NOT FOR ANY POLITICAL DIFFERENCES WITH LACCP.

SOURCE THREE REPORTED DURING NOVEMBER FORTY SEVEN KORN WAS MEMBER OF LACCP DURING YEARS FORTY SIX AND FORTY SEVEN.

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP IS AFFILIATE OF NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF SAME TITLE HEADQUARTERED WASHINGTON, D. C., HAS SPONSORED DEMONSTRATIONS LOCALLY PROTESTING AMERICAN INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM.

COVERAGE CONTINUING. LHM FOLLOWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE ONE IS INFORMANT SOURCE TWO IS INFORMANT SOURCE THREE IS INFORMANT.

BUREAU HAS APPROVED THUMBNAIL CHARACTERIZATION OF SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WSP.

AIRMAIL COPIES BEING FURNISHED AT AND SF.

END

RM FBI WASH DC

R RELAY

Mr. Dugan

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/11/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

3

ReBuairtel dated 12/5/67, captioned as above.

Enclosed herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau setting forth activities for demonstration on 1/8/68.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Local law enforcement agencies cognizant.

Source used in LHM is **INFORMANT.**

WFO will continue to follow and report pertinent details.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 12-11-67
HOW FORW:
BY:

ENCLOSURE

REC 8

DEC 11 1967

④ - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

GTT:dgp
(6)

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

December 11, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on December 11, 1967, furnished a copy of the November, 1967, issue of "Memo." The "Memo" is self-described as the National Bulletin of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization. Page six of this publication sets forth plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade scheduled for Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968. A copy of page six is attached.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED

27 MAY 17 1971

[illegible]

ATTACHMENT

[illegible] - 4

6

BRIGADE FORMED TO CONFRONT CONGRESS

Helena, Montana
November 27, 1967

To all American Women:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings - for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

Jeannette Rankin

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 8

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country. AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American. This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States! Come to Washington on January 8 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

*Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
*Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
*Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 8, American women will:

*PETITION the United States Congress
*CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America - programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

For further information about the Brigade, contact your nearest WSP group or write to the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 133 W. 72 St., N.Y. 10023

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/12/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (REGISTERED)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (P)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: Washington Field

Re Bureau airtel dated 12/5/67, and Los Angeles airtel dated 12/7/67, captioned as above.

For the information of the Bureau, there are attached eight (8) copies of an LHM, with two copies each for the Washington Field, Atlanta, New York and San Francisco Divisions. Instant LHM contains data currently available in this office regarding the formation and plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

A classification of "Confidential" has been placed on this LHM to protect the symbol numbered informants utilized herein, who are identified as follows:

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encls. 8)(RM)(AM)
2 - Atlanta (Info)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
2 - New York (Info)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
2 - San Francisco (Info)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Encls. 2)(RM)(AM)
3 - Los Angeles
(1 - 100-61745 WSP)
(1 - 134-2199A) INFORMANT

REC- 59

GGB/rem
(14)

20 DEC 16 1967

C. C. - Bishop

Approved: ______________ Sent ________M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

Source One INFORMANT

Source Two SOURCE

Calif Source Three [illegible] } INFORMANTS [illegible] Calif

Source Four

For the Bureau's information a sub-committee has been formed within the Southern California Council of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) to handle present activities to publicize the JRB. This committee consists of MARY CLARKE and EVA KORN, who are mentioned in the details of instant LHM. It also includes INFORMANT nd GERALDINE SHAPIRO (also known as GERRY SHAPIRO). The latter, is a relatively new member of the WSP having attended some six meetings between 2/7/67 and 10/10/67, and has not been the subject of active investigation by this office. To further protect INFORMANT her name and the name of GERALDINE SHAPIRO are not being included in details of instant LHM, as it is hoped that suspicion may be directed toward SHAPIRO at a later date to indicate she might be an informant for some investigating body.

Calif

There has been no attempt to characterize the listed individuals in the "partial list of sponsors" set out in the "La Wisp" issue of December 1967, a xerox copy of which is attached, with the exception of LESLIE PARRISH and MARY CLARKE (the only local Southern California women). PARRISH has not been the subject of active investigation by the Los Angeles Division as she has been reported in attendance at less than five WSP activities.

Calif NELL BORDEN has advised that actress VIVECA LINDFORS, who formerly appeared in some Hollywood film productions, is a current member in good standing of the Screen Actors Guild. She was born 12/29/20 in Sweden, entered the United States at New York City on 4/8/46, and holds Alien Registration Number 626-49-64. Her last known address was 172 East 95th Street, New York City; and she is represented professionally by the William Morris Agency, New York City. LINDFORS name

hg

appears as one of the JRB sponsors in the December 1967 issue of "La Wisp".

One copy each is being furnished the local offices of Secret Service; United States Attorney; Region II, United States Army; NISO, San Diego; and OSI, as it is felt each of these services would have an interest.

Coverage is continuing and with INFORMANT in her present capacity, this office should be in a position to keep on top of this matter locally. The Bureau and interested offices will be promptly advised of any subsequent developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
December 12, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

The following information has been made available by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past:

Source One reported on December 7, 1967, that copies of "La Wisp", monthly newsletter of the Southern California Council of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP - see appendix) being mailed to the WSP mailing list on that date contained a "Call" from the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) "To all American women", announcing a proposed march on Washington, D. C., on January 8, 1968, when the United States Congress opens in joint session. This march would be to demand that Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops. (A xerox duplication of the first page of the above-mentioned December 1967 issue of "La Wisp", containing this "Call", is appended to this memorandum.)

The partial list of JRB sponsors included in this issue of the "La Wisp", contained the names of only two women presently active in the Southern California area, Mary Clarke (see characterization of her in the appendix page on WSP), and motion picture actress Leslie Parrish.

Source One has advised that Parrish has only recently become interested in activities of WSP and has attended less than five WSP activities. Source Two reported

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

9

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968

that Leslie Parrish is the professional name of Marjorie Hellen, who was reportedly born March 18, 1935, in Massachusetts, who holds Social Security number 174-28-2505. Her residence, as furnished by this source, is 8810 Dorrington, Los Angeles, California (90048); telephone CRestview 1-7936; with message service through telephone number 652-3380 (the Calder Agency, 8749 Sunset Boulevard, Hollywood, Los Angeles). She has formerly been a member of the American Federation of Radio and Television Artists, and is currently a member in good standing with the Screen Actors Guild, Hollywood, her dues being paid through May 1, 1968.

According to Source One, the Southern California Council of WSP is presently coordinating local activity to form a contingent of the JRB from Southern California. They are making office space and telephones in their Los Angeles headquarters, 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles available for this purpose. Spearheading the local committee are Mary Clarke and Eva Korn, both of whom are active in WSP. Mary Clarke is currently a member of the JRB's National Steering Committee.

> Source Three reported during November 1947, that Eva Korn was a member of the Los Angeles County Communist Party (ASCCP) during the years 1946 and 1947.

To give publicity to the proposed activity of the JRB, the local WSP office is circulating a reprint from the "San Francisco Chronicle", issue of Saturday, May 20, 1967, page nine, which contained a feature article regarding the opposition to wars by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, for whom the JRB has been named. (A xerox copy of the reprint from the above-mentioned San Francisco, California, daily newspaper is appended to this memorandum).

[illegible]

June Sunderland, WSP activist from Santa Barbara, has indicated to the local WSPers, according to Source One, that Mrs. Vincent (Vivian) Hallinan of the San Francisco Bay area of California, is trying to get additional sponsors for this project. Sunderland also has told local WSPers that the

Rankin Brigade should be made up of only those women who volunteer to participate with the prior understanding that they should be ready to spend at least two months in jail for the commission of civil disobedience while in Washington, D. C.

Sunderland also suggested that a good way to recruit women to join the Brigade would be, to make a pitch for recruits when Mary Clarke, Dagmar Wilson and Ruth Krause are making their respective speaking engagements across the United States since their return from a trip to North Vietnam, which they visited as representatives of WSP during the fall of 1967.

> Source Four advised during the summer of 1965 that June Sunderland, 3730 Hollister Avenue, Santa Barbara, California, had attended a 1967 "peace conference" in Helsinki, Finland, at the invitation of the Communist Party (CP), and that funds to cover her expenses were raised in part by the CP; and that following her attendance at the Helsinki affair she went on to Russia for ten days at the invitation and expense of the Soviet Government.

Source One learned that a communication was received from eastern sponsors of the JRB on December 7, 1967, indicating that the JRB march on Washington might not be held on January 8, 1968, but possibly would be set back until either the 15th or 22nd of January 1968, depending upon the date that the United States Congress would reconvene. The communication indicated that since the entire purpose of the Brigade would be to confront the opening joint session of Congress that it would be futile to schedule the march prior to the date Congress would reconvene. The suggestion was made that recruitment of local women to participate in the JRB be held in abeyance until a confirmation had been obtained indicating the date on which Congress would reconvene.

Source One,had indicated that although the "Call", as reproduced in "La Wisp", states, "There will be local actions across the country at the same time as the action in Washington, D. C., " that there are no current plans for any such simultaneous actions in Southern California.

The December 7, 1967, issue of the "Federal Register", notes that Congress is scheduled to reconvene on January 15, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DEC. 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

to all american women

"...I hope all women will respond to the following CALL and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress." Jeannette Rankin (first woman elected to Congress)

call (partial)

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN, who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home,

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 8th

as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American Troops

Congress use its power to heal the sick society at home

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. PETITION the United States Congress.

YOU DON'T HAVE TO GO TO WASHINGTON, D.C. TO PARTICIPATE. MANY ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS ARE ALREADY PLANNING TO PARTICIPATE. THERE WILL BE LOCAL ACTIONS ACROSS THE COUNTRY AT THE SAME TIME AS THE ACTION IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS: Mrs. Martin Luther King, Dagmar Wilson, Mary Clarke, Mary McCarthy, Jessica Mitford, Susan Sontag, Mrs. John C. Bennett, Mrs. Esther Pike, Kay Cole, Nikki Bridges, Mia Auerbakken Adjali, Jane Buckenholz, Judith Morse [illegible], Rosa Parks, Mrs. Jack Gilford, Mrs. Burton Lane, Leslie Parrish, Mrs. Benjamin S[illegible] Collins, Louise Peck, Mrs. John Burton, Vivian Hallinan, Viveca Lindfors

76

MAY 11 1972

XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

__________(send to WSP, 5399 W. Pico Blvd., Los Angeles 90019)__________

___I wish to join the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. ___Please send me more information.

NAME________________________________PHONE____________

ADDRESS_____________________________ZIP______________

CONFIDENTIAL

San Francisco Chronicle, Saturday, May 20, 1967, Page 9.

Jeannette Rankin Speaks Up

War's Unremitting Foe

Atlanta, Ga.

Jeannette Rankin, the only member of Congress to oppose this country's entry into both World Wars, says the nation's women should band together to halt the war in Vietnam.

"If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary, that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women," she says.

Miss Rankin, the first woman ever to serve in the House of Representatives, said in an interview: "We've had 10,000 women sit back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. To me, that is worse than the old Hebrew sacrifices."

Now 86, she is still battling her old enemy — war.

"Isn't a question of war against Germany, Japan or Vietnam. It's just that the whole system is very stupid.

"War is nothing more than a method of settling a dispute, but it has nothing to do with the dispute. In fact, you never have the same issues at the end of war that were present at the beginning."

SUFFRAGETTE

Miss Rankin, an outspoken leader in the struggle which eventually allowed women to vote under the 19th Amendment, suggests that women today — as they did on the suffrage issue — band together to "do everything possible" to end the war.

Watkinsville Ga.

[illegible] 1881

AP Wirephoto

JEANNETTE RANKIN

No time to be polite

"We — women — should picket everything," she says. "This is no time to be polite. The Army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says, 'come on and fight.'

"But they don't take the politicians and decision-makers to fight."

Miss Rankin is still active, with a gracious charm and a sharp sense of humor. She does not make many public speeches now although she did address an Atlantans for Peace meeting Thursday night.

ROLL CALL

Miss Rankin was Congressman-at-large from Montana from 1917 to 1919. In 1940 she was elected to the House for one term.

Now living at Watkinsville, Ga., she recalls vividly the dramatic night in 1917 when the House debated the war resolution against Germany.

She had taken office only three days before, and she had sat quietly throughout most of that long evening. Finally, shortly after 2 a.m., the time came for the fateful roll call.

The scene was tense. Monotonously, the clerk called the name of each member.

When her name was reached, Miss Rankin remained silent. Following the House custom, the roll was called a second time. With all eyes upon her, Miss Rankin rose unsteadily and, with voice quivering, said:

"I want to stand by my country, but I cannot vote for war."

In 1941, after being elected to a second term on the slogan, "Prepare to limit the defense; keep our men out of Europe," she cast another opposing vote — this time in an effort to prevent the U.S. from entering World War II.

"I'm opposed to all wars," she declares. "The war method must be abolished if we are to continue as a civilization."

Associated Press

Ohio Woman Loses Third Son to War

Hamilton, Ohio

Birdie Allen a widow, received word Thursday that her soldier son, Sergeant Samuel R. Allen, 32, was killed in action in Vietnam.

He was the third of her six sons to died in battle. Jim Allen was killed in Holland on September 20, 1944, three days after he parachuted into that country. Charlie D. Allen was killed April 14, 1945, after his army unit crossed the Rhine river.

Mrs. Allen's other three sons are ministers.

United Press

Care Here for Viet Kids' War Burns

A national committee organized to treat severely burned and wounded Vietnamese children announced here yesterday that six children will be brought to the United States for specialized medical care.

A spokesman for the Committee of Responsibility told a news conference that the group had selected children who could not possibly survive given only the treatment afforded in Vietnamese hospitals.

The children will probably be brought to San Francisco for lengthy treatment including plastic surgery when Saigon grants permission, according to Dr. Henry Mayer of Redwood City.

The committee's medical team has just returned from Vietnam. They found that 10,000 children under the age of 12 will be admitted to hospitals there this year with war-related wounds.

Mayer said that doctors throughout the United States have volunteered their services and hospitals will make facilities available.

CONFIDENTIAL

- 9 -

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE,
Also Known As
Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/13/67

Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Mr.
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

WCS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

C.D. Brennan

"CHANGED"
DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO:WFO)

Title is marked "Changed" to indicate new date for the above demonstration which was originally carried as "DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968."

ReBuairtel to all offices dated 12/5/67, sent under caption indicated in first paragraph.

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau and 2 copies each for LA, NY, SF and SE indicating the change in plans for the date of the above demonstration as well as details of the protest activities.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies.

ENCLOSURE

4 - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Los Angeles (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Seattle (Enc. 2) (RM)
4 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)
(1-100-46369) (WMC)
(1-100-47147)
GTT:dgp
(16)

AIRTEL

Information
AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~GRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

REC-15

C. C. - Bishop

DEC 21 1967

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]

WFO 100-47173

contained in the LHM has been telephonically furnished to Secret Service, U.S. Capitol Police and other local law enforcement agencies. WFO has alerted all sources to be alert for information concerning the above demonstration.

Sources used in LHM are as follows: First source is **INFORMANT** and second source is **INFORMANT**.

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information furnished by first source could lead to the identification of that source of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness.

WFO continuing to follow and will report any pertinent details developed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 13, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on December 13, 1967, that the Coordinating Committee of the Washington Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (WMC) met on the night of December 12, 1967, at the local headquarters at 4402 Georgia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Helen Gurewitz acted as Chairman of the meeting which consisted of reports on the antidraft week, plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade demonstration and plans for political action in the anti-Vietnam war movement.

> A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in June, 1964, that Helen Gurewitz was then a member of the Communist Party.

According to the first source, Matthew Clark gave a report on the antidraft week in Washington, D.C. Clark stated that the activities were not very successful due to a complete lack of adult support as well as a lack of funds. He described the week long protest activity as very disappointing.

According to the first source, Sue Orrin of the WMC then gave a report on plans for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade demonstration. Orrin reported that she had talked to "New York" on that date and stated that the only major change in the Brigade's plans was a change of date due to

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

5

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968

the fact that the organization had learned that Congress will not reconvene until January 15, 1968. According to Orrin, two trains from New York City, two airplanes from California and one bus load from Seattle, Washington, have already been reserved for participants to the above activity. Orrin reported that the Brigade wants to have Senator Mansfield and Speaker of the House McCormick meet the delegation on the steps to the United States Capitol. Orrin reported that the "officials in New York" do not expect these two Congressmen but do think that Senators Morse and Gruening will meet them and accept their anti-war statement and have this statement recorded in the Federal Register.

According to the first source, Orrin further indicated that the present plans for the Brigade call for other unspecified activity in Washington, D.C., but that they will not negotiate with local police for permits ahead of time. Orrin reported that there is a split within the Brigade between certain groups of women who wish to have only legal protest activity in Washington, D.C., and another group which is strongly in favor of illegal activity or civil disobedience. Following the protest activities on January 15, 1968, the Brigade plans to go to Georgetown University where they will hold a conference. The details for this conference will be handled by Donna Allen of Washington, D.C.

According to the first source, the remainder of the above meeting consisted of a discussion of future political plans in the anti-war movement concerned primarily with registration for upcoming primaries in the local areas.

Harold Clayton, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad, Washington, D.C., advised on December 12, 1967, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in New York had previously reserved two trains to travel to Washington, D.C., on January 8, 1968. Mr. Clayton stated that this reservation has now been changed to the date of January 15, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 12/14/67

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) -P-

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReBUairtel to Albany and all offices dated 12/5/67 captioned as above; Seattle teletype to Bureau dated 12/13/67, and Seattle airtel and LHM to Bureau dated 11/27/67 titled JEANNETTE RANKIN'S BRIGADE, INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS).

Enclosed are 11 copies of an LHM concerning captioned demonstration for the Bureau and two copies each for Atlanta, San Francisco and Washington Field Office. Copies were sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service and the USA, Seattle.

The source used in the LHM is INFORMANT. The LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL because information furnished by this source, if disclosed, might compromise this informant of continuing value.

REC 8

SWAP is the subject of a COMINFIL investigation at Seattle. SWAP appears to be doing the promotion work for the Brigade in the State of Washington.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (REG)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (REG)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (REG)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (REG)
5 - Seattle
  (1 - 100-29048)
  (1 - 100-26068) (SWAP)
  (1 - 100-27547) (VIDEM)
  (1 - 100-18017) (KOPPEL)
  (1 - 134-547A)
RBC:ser
(14)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

DEC 22 1967

C. C. - Bishop

53 JAN

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington 98104

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

December 14, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to a previous memorandum dated November 27, 1967, concerning captioned demonstration which was titled Jeannette Rankin's Brigade, Information Concerning.

On December 13, 1967, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, made available a leaflet received from ANCI KOPPEL, leader of Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP), which indicates SWAP is attempting to help mobilize a "Nationwide Congress of Women" to be held in Washington, D. C., January 8, 1968, on the opening day of Congress. The leaflet suggests participants "represent ourselves in Congress" and "test our WOMAN POWER." A reproduction of the leaflet is attached.

JEANNETE RANKIN, the Chairman of the Brigade, is an 86-year-old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia, who served in the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919 and who was elected to that office for one term in 1940. She has repeatedly opposed U. S. involvement in foreign wars and voted against declarations of war by the U. S. in both World Wars I and II.

ANCI KOPPEL and SWAP are characterized in the appendix.

On December 14, 1967, DALE JENSEN, Charter Service Department, Greyhound Bus Lines, Seattle, advised ANCI KOPPEL has previously made arrangements for charter buses for various activities of her organization but thus far has not requested space for a trip to Washington, D. C. in January, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

8

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

ERICAN WOMEN REPRESENT 51% OF THE VOTING POPULATION IN THE USA

We could be the determining factor in any election

Nevertheless, once elected, many Congressmen and certainly the President, refuse to listen to our call for an end to war, for decent homes, a future for our children, and a brighter tomorrow for all families everywhere.

Year, after year, more and more of our sons are sacrificed for wars that never cease. Our lives become more and more dominated by the military-industrial complex. We face the horror of bringing up our families in a crisis-ridden society in which:
Children starve-- --Young men are slaughtered in battle
Youth are jobless or drafted--
Children are provided mediocre education in antiquated buildings--
families lack adequate medical care--
Violence permeates our culture --
Where racism erodes all of our hard-won victories, and millions have been subjected to the worse kinds of indignities, simply because some of us are black.

> IT IS UTTER MADNESS TO SPEND 2½ BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH TO KILL AND BE KILLED IN VIETNAM WHEN THERE IS A CRYING NEED FOR FUNDS TO ELIMINATE HUNGER, AND POVERTY AT HOME.

IF YOU OR I WERE A CONGRESSWOMAN we would..........do what?

Jeanette Rankin, the first woman to be elected to Congress has called for a Nationwide Congress of Women to be held in Washington DC, January 8th (opening day of Congress)

IF YOU AGREE: We've been silent much too long!
THEN -- Join the Jeanette Rankin Congress of Women in D.C.

Jo
C

Violence permeates our culture --
Where racism erodes all of our hard-won victories, and millions have been subjected to the worse kinds of indignities, simply because some of us are black.

IT IS UTTER MADNESS TO SPEND 2½ BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH TO KILL AND BE KILLED IN VIETNAM WHEN THERE IS A CRYING NEED FOR FUNDS TO ELIMINATE HUNGER, AND POVERTY AT HOME.

IF YOU OR I WERE A CONGRESSWOMAN we would..........do what?

Jeanette Rankin, the first woman to be elected to Congress has called for a Nationwide Congress of Women to be held in Washington DC, January 8th (opening day of Congress)

IF YOU AGREE: We've been silent much too long!
THEN -- Join the Jeanette Rankin Congress of Women in D.C.
and / or
Join others in our state to sponsor a Washington State GRASSROOTS ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN.
At which we can Tell it as it is
We can draft legislation that will alleviate the immediate problems--
We can project a long-ranged program for a happier tomorrow in clear, simple language everyone can understand..

IF you are a mother, and ADC recipient, a victim of discrimination, a student, a social worker, teacher, professional-- a PTA member, a housewife or a worker--

You are needed at one or another of the Jeanette Rankin Assembly of Women

We agree with Stewart Meachem (AFSC): "We'll find a way out of the war once we DECIDE TO GET OUT."
FOR ONE DAY - Let's represent ourselves in Congress.
FOR ONE DAY Les us test our WOMAN POWER

1968 is an election year. Want to or no, candidates will listen if we speak out in one united, clear voice: END THE WAR NOW
END RACISM & POVERTY NOW!

I want to go to D.C. ☐ I will donate to send someone else ☐

I want to help organize a Washington State GRASSROOTS ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN ☐

I Belong to:, ____________________
Church groups, women's clubs, unions, other organizations

Name ____________ Address ____________

Phone ____________ City ____________ Zip ____________

Seattle Women Act For Peace - 5411 Ravenna Ave. NE -Seattle 98105
Phone -- AT 2 0591

1

APPENDIX

SEATTLE WOMEN ACT FOR PEACE (SWAP)

A source reported on May 17, 1962, a meeting of the Ballard-Greenwood CP Club was held in Seattle, April 25, 1962, at which TAIMI HALONEN was nominated to be the new Chairman of this Club. Along with other business of the evening, HALONEN said she expected to devote a good portion of her time to SWAP, an organization of peace forces that met recently with seven members. She said four of the seven were from the "left" but did not go into detail. She said the group had problems of an organizational nature because it was new, and she thought she could help.

On April 5, 1963, a second source stated a meeting of the University CP Club was held at Seattle on April 2, 1963. KEN ROSE, a member of the Club, reported the most influential peace organization in Seattle was SWAP.

On July 31, 1964, a meeting of the North Central CP Section Committee was held at Seattle. WILL PARRY, Section Chairman, said attention should be placed on three political questions - peace, civil rights, and labor. Under peace, he said CP clubs should inject the Women Act for Peace campaign into the election campaign. At another Section meeting, February 5, 1966, TAIMI HALONEN was praised for effective peace work and for her help in developing unity among the peace forces. Section-wide concentration was urged in assisting SWAP to visit 1,000 workers on the Vietnam issue.

A third source advised on February 24, 1966, a Northwest District CP Committee meeting was held at Seattle February 12, 1966. After lunch, the entire group participated in passing out leaflets pertaining to racial matters and the Vietnam war which carried the name of SWAP, 5411 Ravenna Avenue Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98105, which address has been used consistently by SWAP and is that of ANCI KOPPEL, also known as Mrs. CHARLES KOPPEL. KOPPEL has been and continues to be the coordinator and apparent prime motivating force of SWAP as of May, 1967.

A fourth source reported in 1945 ANCI KOPPEL was a member of the Professional Group of the Communist Political Association (CPA), also known as the Rogers CP Club at Seattle, Washington.

The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/19/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

SUBJECT: Demonstration Protesting U.S.
Policy in Vietnam;
1/8/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Bureau airtel 12/5/67 and Los Angeles airtel with LHM 12/12/67 captioned as above.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of an LHM and two copies each for the Washington Field Office, Atlanta Office, Los Angeles Office and New York Office.

Instant LHM concerns the most up-to-date information in possession of the San Francisco Office regarding the activities of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Ch

ENCLOSURE

EX 106
REC 39

3 - Bureau (Encls. 8) (AM-RM)
2 - New York (Info.) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (Info.) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (100-70701) (Info.) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Encls. 2) (AM-RM)
3 - San Francisco
(2 - 100-59802)
(1 - WFP) (100-48035)
GOW:bja
(14)

C. C. Bishop

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 12/23/67
HOW FORW:
BY:

100-445475-9x

DEC 22 1967

395

66 JAN 9 1968

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge Sent ________ M Per ________

FEB 15 1968

SF 100-59802
GOW:bja

Instant LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect the identities of sources of continuing value.

First source mentioned in instant LHM is SOURCE.

SF T-2 is
SF T-3 is
SF T-4 is
SF T-5 is Informants
SF T-6 is
SF T-7 is
SF T-8 is
SF T-9 is THIRD AGENCY
SF T-10 is
SF T-11 is Informants
SF T-12 is TECHNICAL SURVEILLANCE

San Francisco will continue to report any pertinent information received concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Copies of instant LHM are being furnished locally to the Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Service, San Francisco, and the United States Attorney, San Francisco.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

San Francisco, California

December 19, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM;
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum dated November 17, 1967 captioned "Jeannette Rankin Brigade."

Where available, characterizations are set forth on individuals mentioned as sponsors of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade who reside in the Northern California area.

The following information has been made available by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past.

A source made available a copy of a newsletter from the Jeannette Rankin Brigade dated November 29, 1967, signed by Eda Hallinan. (A xeroxed duplication of the first two pages of this newsletter is appended to this memorandum.)
SF T-1, 12/4/67.

The following are characterizations of individuals listed as sponsors of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade who reside in the Northern California area:

EDA HALLINAN

Eda Hallinan is a current member of the Communist Party (CP).
SF T-2, 5/2/67.

VIVIAN HALLINAN

Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the CP if her husband, Vincent

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-445175-9X

ENCLOSURE

Hallinan would also join.

SF T-3, 10/31/62

Vivian Hallinan was arrested on a civil rights sit-in demonstration at Auto Row in San Francisco in April, 1964. Sergeant William Davis, San Francisco County Jail Number 2, San Bruno, California, advised on August 22, 1966, that Vivian Hallinan served a month in the County Jail from July 5, 1966 to August 2, 1966, having been found guilty on a sit-in charge.

MRS. JOHN BURTON

In November, 1963, Mrs. John Burton was a member of the San Francisco W. E. B. DuBois Club.

SF T-4, 11/7/63

See appendix pages for characterization of W. E. B. DuBois Club.

JUDY COLLINS

A Judy Collins attended a meeting of the Spring Mobilization Committee (SMC) at San Francisco, California, on April 4, 1967.

SF T-5, 4/14/67

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM

The SMC called for a massive demonstration against the war in Vietnam held in New York and San Francisco in April, 1967.

JESSICA MITFORD

Jessica Treuhaft is a widely read author who writes under the name Jessica Mitford. Jessica Treuhaft was identified as a member of the CP in the San Francisco Bay Area in March, 1958.

SF T-6, March, 1958

MALVINA REYNOLDS

Sources advised that Malvina Reynolds was a CP member from 1931-1948 and continued active in the CP until 1950.

SF T-7, 1946,
SF T-8, 1950

A source advised on December 4, 1967, that in the November newsletter of the East Bay Women for Peace (WFP), Madeline Duckles was listed as the West Coast coordinator of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

SF T-9, 12/4/67.

See Appendix pages for characterization of WFP.

MADELINE DUCKLES

A source advised on February 3, 1966 that Madeline Duckles was one of the leaders and more militant member of the WFP. She talked at meetings in favor of creating disturbances and was involved in a march at a United

CONFIDENTIAL

States Army base in Oakland, California on November 20, 1965 to protest current U.S. policy in Vietnam.

SF T-10, 2/3/66.

A source advised on December 19, 1967, that Sonia Kaross, a member of the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the WFP, was planning on going to Washington, D.C. to attend the proposed demonstration in that city on January 15, 1968.

SF T-11, 12/19/67

It is noted that Sonia Kaross is also known as Sonia Baltrun.

Records of the Alameda County Voters Registration reflect that Sonia Baltrun in May, 1934, gave her political preference as Communist.

On April 9, 1943, a source advised that Sonia Baltrun openly bragged about her membership in the CP and the fact that she attended the first party convention. This source also advised that Sonia Baltrun was not a chartered member of the CP, but was the holder of a very low book number.

SF T-12, 4/9/43.

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

"You cannot have
wars without women."

Sponsors:
Jeannette Rankin
Vivian Hallinan
Mia Auerbakken Adjali
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Mrs. Harry Bridges
Jane Buckenholz
Mrs. John Burton
Mary Clark
Judy Collins
Mrs. Cyrus Eaton
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Mrs. Martin Luther King
Vivica Lindfors
Jessica Mitford
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Mrs. Ester Pike
Malvina Reynolds
Mrs. Robert Scheer
Susan Sontag
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Emyline Stokes
Helen B. Turnbull

November 29, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Friends:

> "10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin, first woman elected to Congress in the United States, made this statement in May of this year.

We are planning to have 10,000 women come to Washington on January 8th, in the name of the newly formed Jeannette Rankin Brigade, to express our opposition to the illegal, immoral war in Vietnam.

We would like your support in this work. Would you make time on the agenda of your next meeting, for a speaker from the Bay Area Brigade, to come before your organization? If you can reply quickly, we could even have a short program of pertinent entertainment to help make our point. Malvina Reynolds has offered to speak for us, and sing a couple of her popular topical songs wherever she goes--she is the song-writer performer who has had many recent hits, including "What Have They Done to the Rain?", "Little Boxes", and "Morningtown Ride".

Please come to our initial planning meeting involving the entire Bay Area on Monday, December 4, 1967, 8:00 PM, at the Parish House, Church of the Incarnation, 29th Avenue and Noriega, San Francisco. Come as an individual or as a representative of your organization. Tell your friends about it. Everyone interested is welcome: We need your ideas.

Yours sincerely,
Eda Hallinan
Eda Hallinan

CONFIDENTIAL

RANKIN BRIGADE

CONFIDENTIAL

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 8.

WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country. WOMEN have power to acclaim peace and a decent life for every American. This is "womanpower"! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States. Come to Washington on January 8 as Congress opens its 91st session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she heads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

- --Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for withdrawal of all American troops.
- --Congress use its power to heal the sick society at hom
- --Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged lands we leave behind in Vietnam.
- --Congress listen to what a people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex which controls the ruling interests of America.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited.
On January 8, 1968, American women will:

- --PETITION the U.S. Congress.
- --CONVENE a congregation of American women to develop programs to meet the crises in America--programs which will express our political powers, reason and consciences.
- --Let us declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restorin our country to the community of nations.

Sponsors:

Jeannette Rankin
Vivian Hallinan
Mia Auerbakken
Adjali
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Mrs. Harry Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Mrs. John Burton
Mary Clark
Judy Collins
Mrs. Cyrus Eaton
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Mrs. Martin Luther King
Vivica Lindfors
Jessica Mitford
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Mrs. Ester Pike
Malvina Reynolds
Mrs. Robert Scheer
Susan Sontag
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Emyline Stokes
Helen B. Turnbull

For more
information
call or write
Eda Hallinan
5490 Kales Ave.
Oakland, Calif.
653-1204

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist -oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B.DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that MIKE ZAGARELL, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966 that DANIEL RUBIN, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countries and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised GUS HALL, CPUSA General Secretary, had indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that JARVIS TYNER is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL 7

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA) SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source has advised that as of April, 1966, the records of the DCA reflect that the following Du Bois Clubs and/or Chapters in Northern California are affiliated with the parent organization, the DCA:

1. Berkeley Du Bois Club (BDBC), (Chartered)
2. Fillmore Du Bois Club (FDBC), (Chartered)
3. San Francisco Du Bois Club (SFDBC), (Chartered)
4. San Francisco State College Du Bois Club (SFSCDBC), (Chartered)
5. San Jose Du Bois Club (SJDBC), (Chartered)
6. San Jose State College Du Bois Club (SJSCDBC), (Non-chartered)
7. Stanford University Du Bois Club (SUDBC), (Non-chartered)

A second source has advised in April, 1967, that for all intent and purpose, the DCA is defunct in the general San Francisco Bay Area, although certain elements in the Northern California District Communist Party are attempting to revive interest in the DCA.

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR PEACE aka
Women Strike for Peace

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette," a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Berkeley, California, contained an article in the November 19, 1965, evening edition reflecting that in November, 1961, when concern mounted over radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, a group of women in Washington, D. C. started Women Strike for Peace. The idea spread rapidly throughout the country and now embraces 900 groups, including Women For Peace groups in the San Francisco Bay area.

These groups support programs to achieve goals such as:

(1) Continued disarmament negotiations.

(2) A strong and flexible United Nations.

(3) Planning now at state and national levels for conversion to peace-time economy and positive efforts to ease world tensions.

The women act as individuals and as a group, with specific actions suggested by individuals and groups from all over the world. Decision to participate jointly on any given suggestion is democratly arrived at by members of the Coordinating Committee. Effective cooperation with other peace groups is encouraged. Monthly Coordinating Committee meetings and general meetings, as warranted, are open to all and announced in mailings to members. There are no dues or membership forms nor conditions for membership.

To stir an awareness of the need for peace, Women For Peace encourage public education in peace objectives at local schools and sponsor peace-oriented demonstrations and public meetings, newspaper ads, billboards, and candidates for public office. On the national level the group attempts to influence government officials by letters and conferences.

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. Rozamus

12/21/67

1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

airtel

To: SACs, Philadelphia (100-49497)
WFO

From: Director, FBI (100-448475)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

RePHtel 12/19/67.

For your information the date of the captioned demonstration has been changed from 1/8/68 to 1/15/68 to coincide with the reconvening of Congress.

Authority is granted for INFORMANT to attend this demonstration. The source should be instructed to maintain contact with the Washington Field Office during the period of the demonstration for the purpose of promptly furnishing any pertinent data that may be developed.

Upon return to your area, the informant should be promptly debriefed and a communication suitable for dissemination submitted to the Bureau and interested offices.

DEC 31 1 C

6

Washington Field Office should immediately advise the Philadelphia Office of the name of the Agent and the telephone number which the informant should use in contacting that office during the course of the demonstration. Philadelphia Office advise Washington Field Office the code name PH 475-S will use in contacting that office.

RHH:jes
(7)

MAILED 8
DEC 20 1967

NOTE:

INFORMANT has been an informant since May, 1956. PH by retel advised the informant was in contact with the sponsoring committee of the captioned demonstration and requested authorization for source to make the trip.

DEC 21 1967

54 DEC 28 1967

131

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/22/67

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

REC-34

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Philadelphia teletype to Director, Newark and WFO dated 12/21/67.

Enclosed are ~~12~~ 11 copies for the Bureau, one copy for Atlanta, two copies for Newark, one copy for San Francisco, and two copies for WFO of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

Information copies are being supplied to Atlanta and San Francisco since the Bureau by airtel dated 12/5/67 instructed that those offices open investigations of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade.

For the information of the offices not receiving a copy of referenced Philadelphia teletype, it contained a precis of enclosed LHM.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
    1 - 100- (RUTH KRAUSE)
1 - San Francisco (Info)(Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
8 - Philadelphia
    1 - 100-49497
    1 - 134-1314 SUB A
    1 - 100-40351 (RUTH KRAUSE)
    1 - 100-45773 (KATHERINE LBYCAMP)
    1 - 100-45581 (ETHEL TAYLOR)
    1 - 100-46020 (USP)
    1 - 100-9882 (WILPF)
    1 - 100-43842 (COMINFIL MASS ORGS.)
KKS:PSM
(17)

REC-34

REC-34

10

Bishop

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:

2 DEC 27 1967

XEROX

JAN 2 1968

INT. SEC.

53 JAN 5 1968

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge Sent ______ M Per ______

0-49497

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being disseminated locally to NISO, OSI, MI, and Secret Service.

Sources utilized in the LHM are:

1.
2. Informants
3.

The "Application for Sales and Use Tax License" of the USP was made available by JOSEPH S. MULLIN, Supervisor of Field Investigations, Department of Revenue, Sales and Use Tax, Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 1400 West Spring Garden, Philadelphia, Pa., on 6/8/67 to SA ELMER E. SUSSMAN.

The LHM is marked confidential since it contains data from sources one through three, the unauthorized disclosure of which might reasonably result in the identification thereof, and compromise the future effectiveness of sources of continuing value.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

December 22, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

On December 21, 1967, a source made available "A Call To American Women." A Xerox copy of this "Call" is attached to this memorandum.

The source obtained the call at a meeting of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC) held on December 15, 1967.

A characterization of the PSSFC is attached to this memorandum.

Source advised that at the PSSFC meeting of December 15, 1967, a film about Vietnam was shown. After the film, RUTH KRAUSE, a housewife from Cherry Hill, N.J., who have been to Vietnam, spoke.

A second source advised on December 18, 1967, that RUTH KRAUSE was a member of the Communist Party of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD) at that time.

On the "Call," listed under "Partial List of Sponsors" were the following names with no further identifying data:

CATHERINE L. CAMP
RUTH KRAUSE
ETHEL TAYLOR

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

100-449[illegible]-10

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1967

The following information is supplied concerning one KATHERINE L. CAMP and one ETHEL TAYLOR, who may or may not be identical to the individuals listed under "Partial List of Sponsors:"

A third source advised on June 27, 1967, that KATHERINE L. CAMP attended the annual meeting of the United States Section of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) held from June 19-24, 1967, at Asilomar, Calif. At this meeting CAMP was elected the new president of the U.S. Section, WILPF.

The records of the Voters Registration Commission, Norristown, Pa., reflect that KATHERINE L. CAMP, born July 10, 1918, is a housewife who resides at 200 Hughes Road, King of Prussia, Pa. She is the wife of Dr. WILLIAM P. CAMP, Superintendent of the Norristown State Hospital, Norristown, Pa.

On the "Application for Sales and Use Tax License" submitted to the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue on May 25, 1967, by the Women Strike for Peace, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pa., ETHEL TAYLOR, 1505 Ashford Way, Overbrook Hills, Philadelphia, Pa., was listed as "Coordinator."


all to American Women



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin

JEANNETTE RANKIN

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 8

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States!

Come to Washington on January 8 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

> Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
>
> Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.
>
> Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 8, American women will:

> PETITION the United States Congress
>
> CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

---

clip here and return to:

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
133 West 72nd Street
New York City 10023
(212)799-6520

I will

.... be a sponsor
.... go to Washington on Monday, January 8th, 1968.
.... contribute $...............
I can drive to Washington and have room for ..... passengers.
Please send me....... train tickets (roundtrip NY/Washington) at $7.50 each. (Train leaves Pa. station 7:30 am; returns NY 11 pm)
I cannot come but will help organize supportive action in my home community.......

NAME........................ CONFIDENTIAL ....
ADDRESS........................ . TELEPHONE NUMBER..................

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK WHEREVER THEY ARE ON JANUARY 8.

CONFIDENTIAL

Partial List of Sponsors

Muriel Adams ✓
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp ✓
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin
Sylvia E. Crane
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Elizabeth Lee Haselden
Dorothy Hassler
Anna Arnold Hedgeman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogel
Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florynce Kennedy
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause ✓
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Mrs. Burton Lane
Marilyn Langner
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Helen Merrell Lynd
Olive Mayer
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Nan S. Pendergrast
Eleanor Perry
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Marcus Raskin
Malvina Reynolds
Carmen Ristorucci
Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
Ruth Rosenwald
Muriel Rukeyser
Marie Runyon
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Marjorie Schell
Juanita J. Saddler
Elaine Slater
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Elizabeth Sutherland
Amy Swerdlow
Mary Adams Sykes
Ethel Taylor ✓
Maza Tilghman
Helen B. Turnbull
Barbara Webster
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson
Winnifred Wygal

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

Characterizations of Organizations

PHILADELPHIA SOCIAL SCIENCE FORUM COMMITTEE

A source advised on November 14 and 17, 1958 that a meeting of the District Education Commission, Communist Party of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD), was held November 13, 1958 at 3425 Powelton Avenue, Philadelphia. At this meeting, DANIEL RUBIN, the District Education Director, presented a proposal for a series of forums under the nominal sponsorship of the Philadelphia Social Science Forum Committee (PSSFC). The source stated that PSSFC was merely a paper organization and this series of forums was organized by the District Education Commission and had to be approved by the District Committee (CPEPD) before being put into effect.

This source stated on June 12, 1959, November 5, 1959, and October 21, 1960 that the PSSFC remained under the control of the District Education Commission, CPEPD.

A second source reported on October 9, 1961, that the District Executive Committee (DEC), CPEPD, met on October 2, 1961, and approved plans to hold and to support a new series of forums of PSSFC beginning November 10, 1961, and ending in May, 1962.

The second source on May 8, 1964, advised that the main purpose of the PSSFC is to bring to Philadelphia well known speakers who have a pro-Communist point of view. Included among the speakers each year are national leaders of the Communist Party, USA.

The second source added on May 15, 1967 that the PSSFC continued to meet during 1962 through 1967 and that it remains under the control of the CPEPD.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

December 22, 1967

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1967

Character

Reference Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Philadelphia.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/22/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Philadelphia teletype to Bureau and WFO dated 12/19/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 12 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and San Francisco 2 copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above.

Source utilized is INFORMANT.

Bureau authority was requested in referenced Philadelphia teletype for this source to accompany Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS to the demonstration on 1/8/67, at Washington, D. C. The request is reiterated here to insure informant coverage of Philadelphia participants.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (RM)
  1 - 100-358751
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
  1 - 100- (VIVIAN HALLINAN)
2 - Philadelphia
  1 - 100-49497
  1 - 134-537-Sub A

REC- 71

KKS:LMH
(10)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.

DEC 27 1967

BASIC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

INFORMANT advised on 12/19/67, that VIVIAN HALLINAN, Apartment Houses, 61 Peninsula Road, Belvedere, Calif., wrote to Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS by letter dated October, 1967, which was not delivered at Philadelphia until November, 1967, while WILLIAMS was in California regarding the court martial of her son, RONALD LOCKMAN.

HALLINAN originally had wanted WILLIAMS to be at the launching of the Brigade at a press conference to be held in Washington, D. C., on Veterans Day, 11/11/67, along with mothers, sisters, and widows of men killed in Vietnam. HALLINAN desired WILLIAMS to furnish her with the names of mothers and wives of men killed in Vietnam who felt their loved ones should not have been there at all.

Since Mrs. WILLIAMS did not return until after 11/11/67, she did not know of the event, and therefore, did not participate. Additionally, she did not get around to reading all her mail until much after she returned to Philadelphia.

This was the reason the source did not learn of this Brigade until December.

The LHM was marked Confidential to protect INFORMANT a source of continuing value.

Copies of the attached LHM are being disseminated locally to Secret Service, NISO, MI, all Philadelphia, and OSI, Olmsted Air Force Base.

> "10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail, if necessary, we could stop the war. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin made the above statement in May of this year, when the country was told that 10,000 American boys had died in Vietnam. Fifty years ago as the first woman elected to Congress in the United States she said, "I want to stand by my country but I cannot vote for war."

Miss Rankin was a militant fighter for women's suffrage, and has been a vehement and consistent voice against war. Still a strong feminist, Miss Rankins is now building a self supporting women's cooperative homestead in Georgia. At 86 she is as courageous and vigorous as ever, holding staunchly to her beliefs that war is immoral. This May, after her statement against the war in Vietnam, Miss Rankin was deluged with letters from women across the nation who applauded her position. Miss Rankin was enthusiastic when asked to transform her words into a demonstrative effort, and thus the Jeannette Rankin Brigade was born. We are seeking the sponsorship of women of stature and prestige who represent the many facets of our national life. This accomplished we feel sure that thousands of women who have never been moved to action will find their place with the Brigade. This will be a single effort, and will be joined by women individually, and through organizational affiliations, We are trying to provide the framework in which every concerned woman will feel comfortable.

Miss Rankin places the Brigade in an historical context as a continuation of the efforts of the Abolitionists, and the Suffragettes, representing the best of American traditions.

What are you willing to do to save your son, your brother, your husband from killing and being killed in Vietnam? What are you willing to do to put an end to the senseless waste of American and Vietnamese lives?

We have written letters to our President and Congressmen; we have taken full page advertisements pleading for a halt to this war; we have marched; we have wept; we have been ignored.

Thousands of women are willing to go to Washington to demand that our President end this war now. In 1954 he said, "I am against sending American G.I.'s into the mud and muck of Indo-China on a bloodletting spree to perpetuate colonialism and white man's exploitation in Asia." In 1964 he was elected to the presidency on the promise that his administration would bring peace in Vietnam. We gave him our vote. We are giving him our men -- No More! As citizens we have the right to have our grievances heard. We will be heard if it means a massive act of peaceful civil disobedience to achieve it.

Will you join us to save the men you love from death, and the country you love from shame?

WITHOUT WOMEN

Women must use their minds, their voices, and their bodies to stop the killing in Vietnam; to do less is to ignore our special responsibilities to the human race.

"10,000 women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women."

Jeannette Rankin made the above statement in May of this year. Fifty years ago, as the first woman elected to Congress, she voted against World War I. She has consistently maintained her struggle for peace, and at 86 she is as courageous and vigorous as ever -- an inspiration to all women.

The presence of the United States forces in the internal struggle of Vietnam is immoral and illegal. There can be no possible justification for our interference in the domestic affairs of this tiny distant land.

This 86-year-old woman has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing is stopped. Not all women are free to join her, but we can assure her that thousands of women will march peacefully beside her. Some will picket, others will go to jail until bail is arranged, and others will stay in jail with Miss Rankin. Every woman's participation is equally valuable. We are confident each one will do the maximum of which she is capable.

On January 8th, women from all over the land will converge on Washington to demand the end of this dishonorable war. We shall come as individuals, or as organizations, but we shall join together as concerned women under the aegis of Jeannette Rankin.

Will you join us to save the men you love from death, and the country you love from shame?

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

FBI

Date: 12/27/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Portland (100-10983)(P)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

CINAL

The title is marked Changed to show the date of demonstration as 1/15/68. Date was formerly carried in title as 1/8/68.

Re Bureau airtel to All Offices, dated 12/5/67.

6 - Bureau (Enc. 12)(AM)(RM)
    (4 - 100-)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 105-138315)(VIDEM)
    (1 - 100-)(JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (AM)(RM)
    (1 - 100-)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 100-)(JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (AM)(RM)
5 - Portland
    (2 - 100-10983)(DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 100-10626)(VIDEM)
    (1 - 100-9248)(CINAL)
    (1 - 100-3952-SUB 9)(INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

100-448326

LEA:dlf
(15)

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
100 JAN 8 1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN

53 JAN 22 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve copies, for San Francisco two copies and PD two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) suitable for dissemination concerning proposed anti-war demonstration Monday, 1/15/68, Portland, Oregon, in support of Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C. 1/15/68. Sources utilized in this LHM, who have furnished reliable information in the past, are as follows:

First Source [redacted]
Second Source [redacted]
Third Source [redacted]

Informants

The LHM is classified "confidential" because data reported from informants could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Copies of LHM disseminated to USA, Secret Service, MI, OSI, and NIC, all Portland.

Summary of information reported in LHM was not submitted to the Bureau by teletype inasmuch as a lengthy advance notice was received concerning the demonstration.

Portland will continue to follow this matter pursuant to Bureau instructions.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- CONFIDENTIAL -

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Portland, Oregon
December 27, 1967

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY
15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY
15, 1968

Sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On December 27, 1967, a source made available a one-page letter of Portland Women For Peace, a local pacifist organization, and a one-page sheet printed on both sides, first side captioned "A Call to All American Women" and the second side captioned "Jeannette Rankin Helena, Montana", which are as follows:

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-448326

ENCLOSURE

PORTLAND WOMEN FOR PEACE
P. O. BOX 13061
PORTLAND, OREGON 97213

CONFIDENTIAL

December 18, 1967

Dear Friend:

We are sending this letter to you and others from whom we have not heard much recently, in the hope of re-enlisting your efforts in the Women for Peace movement. It has been too long since we last heard directly from many of you, and our meetings with those of you whom we have seen recently have been brief.

Of course, we know the paralyzing sense of frustration we all feel occasionally, as we learn of the mounting horrors in Vietnam. But this feeling is only temporary, and quickly gives way to activity. As women, we bear the major responsibility for the preservation of life, and thus a major responsibility in the peace movement.

Enclosed you will find an announcement of the latest national women's effort for peace. Several peace groups in Portland are cooperating in raising funds to send representatives to Washington. We hope that you will also support this effort, to insure representation from Portland Women for Peace. The coupon on the enclosed notice is for your use in this effort.

In addition, we will have a supportive peaceful demonstration in Portland at

NOON, Monday, JANUARY 15th
Pioneer Post Office
5th and Morrison

We are asking participants to wear black, and to bring a black (or dark colored) umbrella. We shall carry the umbrellas opened, rain or shine. Placards (to wear) and leaflets (to distribute), expressing support for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, will be available. We shall march around the Post Office block for one hour, from noon to 1 p.m., leafleting as we walk.

We hope, if you cannot go to Washington, yourself, that you will contribute to help someone else to go, and that you will also join with us at the Pioneer Post Office at noon Monday, January 15th.

In addition, please let us hear from you on your ideas of what more we might do locally. We have some ideas too, which we hope to share with you, and on which we shall need much help.

Please get in touch with one of us soon. Your help, ideas, and efforts are urgently needed.

Yours for Peace,

Phoebe Friedman - phone 281-6288
Rose Leopold - phone 232-1605
Gloria Shaich - phone 246-5249

CONFIDENTIAL

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by [illegible] ruthless slaughter in Vietnam [illegible] the persistent neglect of human needs at home

CONFIDENTIAL

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 15

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States! Come to Washington on January 15 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

> Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
>
> Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

> PETITION the United States Congress.
>
> CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America - programs which will express our political power, reason, and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations.

- -

Clip here and return to

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
Portland Supporters
P. O. Box 13061
Portland, Oregon 97213

I would like to go to Washington on January 15 ________

I would like to help plan for supportive action in Portland on Jan. 15 ________

Enclosed is my contribution of $ ________

Name ________________

CONFIDENTIAL

Address ________________

Phone ________________

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK ON JANUARY 15th - WHEREVER THEY ARE.

JEANNETTE RANKIN
Helena, Montana

November 27, 1967

To all American Women:

CONFIDENTIAL

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

Jeannette Rankin

Initial Sponsors

Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Anne M. Bennett
(Mrs. John C. Bennett)
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clark
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Judith Eaton
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Ruth Goodelman

Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Dorothy Hassler
Ann Arnold Hedgman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogle
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florence Kennedy
Coretta King
(Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr)
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Mrs. Burton Lane
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Mary McCarthy
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton

Grace Mora Newman
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Carmen Ristorucci
Juanita J. Saddler
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Emlen Stokes
Mary Adams Sykes
Helen B. Turnbull
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Dagmar Wilson
Winifred Wygal

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

CONFIDENTIAL

7-16-63)

CONFIDENTIAL

The Jeanette Rankin Brigade

Mass women's peace action

SAN FRANCISCO — When Congress reconvenes in January, the opening session will be met with the demand that its first order of business must be ending the Vietnam war and the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

This demand will be presented by woman power, organized into the Jeanette Rankin Brigade.

The women plan to convene a Congress of American Women to develop programs "dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations."

Besides demanding that the legislators act to end the war, the women will demand that Congress:

- Use its power to heal a sick society at home;
- Use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam;
- Listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

This movement was inspired by an appeal by Jeanette Rankin, 86, the nation's first woman in Congress, elected in 1917: "If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary," she said in May, "that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women."

Miss Rankin, a militant leader of the suffragette movement that eventually gained women the right to vote under the 19th Amendment, voted in 1917 against U.S. involvement in World War I and also opposed American military commitment in World War II.

"This is no time to be polite," Miss Rankin said. "The army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says 'come and fight'. But they don't take the politicians and decision makers to fight."

Miss Rankin's militant opposition to the Vietnam war was taken up by about [illegible] prominent

nationwide convening of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade in Washington.

Women for Peace and the Women's Intl. League for Peace and Freedom have rallied to support of the action and a drive is now underway to get the largest possible number of women to Washington for the joint opening session of Congress.

Supportive action by women who cannot go to Washington will be planned in various localities.

One facet of the Congress of American Women will be discussion of electoral action, says Nikki Bridges, San Francisco chairman of the brigade.

"Many of us feel we should support peace candidates where they exist and go into politics ourselves in other places, because that way you get a forum you don't otherwise have," she says.

At present efforts are being made to get support from as many peace and women's groups as possible. "We also want the support of groups like political organizations that have the type of program in which peace is just one facet," Mrs. Bridges says. "We don't want men, but do want their money and support."

JEANNETTE RANKIN
'No time to be polite'

Among the initial sponsors are women from many walks of life bound together by a common concern about the war — Mrs. Benjamin Spock; Mrs. Rosa Parks (of the Montgomery Alabama bus boycott): author Jessica Mitford; Grace Mora Newman (sister of Dennis Mora of the Fort Hood Three); Mrs. Ann Eaton, author Kay Boyle, Mrs. Harry Belafonte; Mrs. Esther Pike, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

National executive secretary of the group is Mrs. Vivian Hallinan.

Detailed plans are still in formation, Mrs. Bridges says, but organizations and individuals are invited to join in any way they can. The San Francisco Bay Area office telephone number is 474-4456.

—M. P.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

9 "People's World"
San Francisco,
California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/16/67
Edition: Vol.30 No. 50
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

-10-63)

CONFIDENTIAL

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Jeanette Rankin Brigade sets January 15 for capitol action

SAN FRANCISCO — When American women petition the joint session of Congress on its opening day (Jan. 15) to end the war in Vietnam, it will be "the most important coalition of women ever formed," Mrs. Vivian Hallinan, executive secretary of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade, told a press conference here last week.

"There will be women representing the clergy, scientists, professionals, and leaders of the civil rights movement," she said. "The black clad women will be led by Jeanette Rankin, the country's first congresswoman, who is now 86 years old."

The people's leaders hope enough women from the Bay Area will join the brigade to make a plane charter feasible. Inquiries about the chartered plane can be addressed to the local office of the Brigade at 150 Golden Gate avenue, S.F. Telephone 474-4456.

The Brigade is now contacting congressional leaders, asking them to meet the women at the capitol steps to receive their petition to put ending of the war in Vietnam as the first order of business for the new session of the Congress.

Program for the event, as finalized, calls for presentation to Congress of the Brigade's demands (see PW Dec. 16) and then holding of a women's congress that afternoon to plan political action on a local scale.

Unless Congress acts on their petition, the women will use Jan. 16 to see their representatives and pressure them to support their demands.

"We are not going to do anything unconstitutional," Mrs. Hallinan said. "We are going to petition Congress for redress of grievances. There was agreement at a meeting of the national steering committee to give Congress three more months to act. After that we will take to the streets — there was agreement on this by all those concerned."

Among the national sponsors of the event are prominent members of virtually every major national church and women's organization, for example Elsie Thomas Culver (World Council of Churches); Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Southern Christian Leadership Conf.); Jane Euchenholz (Americans for Democratic Action); Ellen Aurbakken (United Church Women).

Also Mrs. Emlen Stokes (American Friends Service Committee); Mrs. John C. Bennett (Methodist, wife of John Bennett, dean of Union Theological Seminary); author Susan Sontag; actress Ruby Dee; Judith Morse Eaton and Grace Luchs Elliot (Natl. Council of the Young Women's Christian Assn.).

Support for the event was also expected from authors Mary McCarthy and Betty Friedan.

Local supportive events for those who cannot go to Washington are being planned throughout the nation.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

5 "People's World"
San Francisco,
California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/23/67
Edition: Vol.30 No.51
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The "People's World" (PW) is a west coast communist weekly newspaper published in San Francisco, California.

Gloria Shaich was mentioned in April, 1956, by a Communist Party (CP) functionary as a member of the City Committee of the Albany, New York CP. Gloria Shaich attended an Albany CP conference in May, 1958, which was open to those "in or near to" the CP.

Second Source, April 17, 1956
June, 1958

Rose Leopold long has been a close associate of Oregon CP leaders and with her husband, Bernard Leopold, has frequently attended CP sponsored functions. Rose Leopold last attended an Oregon CP state convention on January 24, 1959.

Third Source, January 30, 1959
November 30, 1967

Phoebe Friedman, Rose Leopold, and Gloria Shaich, during 1965, 1966, and 1967, have been active participants in various demonstrations protesting U.S. policy in Vietnam which were held in Portland, Oregon.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The following persons at Portland, Oregon, on December 27, 1967, were advised of the above proposed demonstration:

United States Attorney Sidney I. Lezak at 9:50 a.m.

United States Marshal Eugene G. Hulett at 9:30 a.m.

Postal Inspector Nolan Brown at 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Darrell L. Hoyt, Buildings Manager, General Services Administration, at 9:55 a.m.

Mr. John E. Wells, Special Agent, United States Secret Service, at 9:40 a.m.

Mr. T. R. Toomey, Special Agent in Charge, 115th Military Intelligence Group at 8:25 a.m.

Mr. Charles G. Moseby, Clerk, Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force at 8:32 a.m.

Mr. L.A. Hancock, Special Agent, Naval Intelligence Command, at 8:30 a.m.

Officer Charley F. Trimble, Intelligence Unit, Portland Police Department at 8:35 a.m.

Deputy Marvin V. Woidyla, Intelligence Unit, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office at 8:35 a.m.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Corporal Lyle E. Mitchael, Intelligence Section, Oregon State Police, Milwaukie Station, at 10:00 a.m.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

VIA TELETYPE
DEC 27 1967 BJM
ENCIPHERED

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. F
Mr. G
Mr. R on
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

WCS

WA -2- 3:08 PM EH

URGENT 12-27-67 EH

TO DIRECTOR AND WASHINGTON FIELD

WASHINGTON FIELD VIA WASHINGTON -ENCODED-

FROM CHICAGO (100-44707) 4P

C.D.

5- Kathleen

B. W

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY EIGHTH, SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

VIDEM, BUFILE 105-138315

ANZELM A. CZARNOWSKI, SEVEN FIVE ONE THREE W. SIXTYTHIRD STREET, ARGO, ILLINOIS, MEMBER OF CP OF ILLINOIS, OCTOBER, FORTYTHREE - JANUARY, FIFTYFIVE, FURNISHED TODAY COPY OF PAMPHLET CAPTIONED, "A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN", ISSUED BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE, FIVE TWO ZERO N. MICHIGAN AVENUE, CHICAGO. PAMPHLET DESCRIBES BRIGADE AS BROAD COALITION OF WOMEN FROM MANY AREAS OF AMERICAN LIFE WHO WILL MEET IN WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, SXT ~~ZIYHY~~- EIGHT FOR OPENING OF ~~D$~~ CONGRESS TO DEMAND FOLLOWING:

ONE. CONGRESS, AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, RESOLVE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IMMEDIATELY ARRANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS.

END PAGE ONE

R

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC- 57

12

CC - HCX 106

10 COPIES TO WFO

67 JAN 10 1968

XEROX

DEC 1967

PAGE TWO

TWO. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO HEAL A SICK SOCIETY AT HOME.

THREE. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RAVAGED LAND WE LEAVE BEHIND IN VIETNAM.

FOUR. CONGRESS LISTEN TO WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SAYING AND REFUSE THE INSATIABLE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY - INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

AFTER PETITIONING OF CONGRESS, GROUP WILL HOLD OWN CONGRESS TO ARTICULATE POSITION ON ACHIEVING PEACE, THEN RETURN TO OWN COMMUNITIES AND MOBILIZE WOMEN DEDICATED TO RESHAPING AMERICAN SOCIETY AND RESTORING AMERICA TO POSITION OF HONOR IN COMMUNITY OF NA~~NJOA,~~TIONS. GROUP WILL MEET JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT AT UNION DEPOT, WASHINGTON, D.C., ELEVEN THIRTY A.M. AND WALK TO CONGRESS AND PRESENT PETITION. MANY WILL STAY IN WASHINGTON TO BEGIN IMPLEMENTATION OF DEMANDS BY PRESENTING THEM TO CONGRESSMEN AND SENATORS, JANUARY SIXTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT. PLANS CALL FOR TRAVEL FROM CHICAGO BY BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILWAY, LEAVING FOUR THIRTY, P.M., JANUARY FOURTEEN,

END PAGE TWO

SIXTYEIGHT, WITH PLANE AND BUS ARRANGEMENTS ALSO POSSIBLE IF SUFFICIENT RESPONSE. PARTICIPANTS ADVISED TO CONTACT HOSPITALITY OFFICE, TWO ONE FOUR ZERO PEACE STREET, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C., TELEPHONE (TWO ZERO TWO) TWO NINE THREE - TWO ZERO TWO ZERO IF ACCOMMODATIONS HELP NEEDED. LEAFLET CONTAINS PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS INCLUDING NINETYEIGHT INDIVIDUALS AS NATIONAL SPONSORS AND FIFTYSEVEN INDIVIDUALS AS CHICAGO SPONSORS. CHICAGO SPONSORS INCLUDE BERNICE DISKIN, ROSALIND DURHAM, MARJORIE KINSELLA, SYLVIA KUSHNER.

AS OF MAY, SIXTYSEVEN, BERNICE DISKIN WAS CURRENT MEMBER OF CP OF ILLINOIS, ACCORDING TO A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST (MAY EIGHT, SIXTYSEVEN).
R
FOSALIND DURHAM CURRENT MEMBER OF THE CP OF ILLINOIS, ACCORDING TO SECOND SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST (DECEMBER EIGHTEEN, SIXTYSEVEN). THIRD SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED NOVEMBER TWENTYTWO, SIXTYSEVEN MARJORIE KINSELLA WAS THEN CURRENT CP OF ILLINOIS MEMBER. FOURTH

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST REPORTED JULY FOURTEEN, SIXTYFIVE THAT SYLVIA KUSHNER THEN MEMBER OF CP OF ILLINOIS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE BUREAU AIRTEL TO ALL OFFICES, DEVEMBER FIVE, SIXTYSEVEN.

C

THE SOURCES ARE IDENTIFIED AS FOLLOWS:

FIRST SOURCE - [redacted]

SECOND SOURCE - [redacted]

THIRD SOURCE - [redacted]

FOURTH SOURCE [redacted]

Informants

SECRET SERVICE, USA, MILITARY AT CHICAGO ADVISED.

CHICAGO FOLLOWING CLOSELY TO DEVELOP ADDITIONAL DETAILS AND IDENTIFY PARTICIPATING SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS.

LHM WITH COPIES OF ABOVE LITERATURE FOLLOWS.

ENDBPE

RM R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

[illegible]

[illegible] SULLIVAN

FBI

Date: 12/27/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

100-43
105-138315
100-447

TO: Director, FBI

REC- 43

FROM: SAC, Portland (100-10983) (P)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

CINAL

Encl.

Keep

The title is marked Changed to show the date of demonstration as 1/15/68. Date was formerly carried in title as 1/8/68.

Re Bureau airtel to All Offices, dated 12/5/67.

6 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (AM) (RM)
    (1 - 100-) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 105-138315) (VIDEM)
    (1 - 100-) (JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)
    (1 - 100-) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 100-) (JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)
5 - Portland
    (2 - 100-10983) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
    (1 - 100-10626) (VIDEM)
    (1 - 100-9248) (CINAL)
    (1 - 100-3952-SUB 9) (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

REC- 43 100-447

15

EX 106

DEC 30 1967

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-4-68
HOW FORW:
BY:

[illegible]:dff

ENCLOSURE

12

JAN 12 1968

Sent ______ M Per ______

Special Agent in Charge

JAN 8 1968

LIAISON SEC.

PRECEDENCE SATELLITE

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve copies, for San Francisco two copies and WFO two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) suitable for dissemination concerning proposed anti-war demonstration Monday, 1/15/68, Portland, Oregon, in support of Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C. 1/15/68. Sources utilized in this LHM, who have furnished reliable information in the past, are as follows:

First Source
Second Source
Third Source

Informants

The LHM is classified "confidential" because data reported from informants could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Copies of LHM disseminated to USA, Secret Service, MI, OSI, and NIC, all Portland.

Summary of information contained in LHM was not submitted to the Bureau by teletype inasmuch as a lengthy advance notice was received concerning the demonstration.

Portland will continue to follow this matter pursuant to Bureau instructions.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Portland, Oregon
December 27, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 13, 1968

Sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On December 27, 1967, a source made available a one-page letter of Portland Women For Peace, a local pacifist organization, and a one-page sheet printed on both sides, first side captioned "A Call to All American Women" and the second side captioned "Jeannette Rankin Helena, Montana", which are as follows:

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

15

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible]RTLAND WOMEN FOR PEACE
P. O. BOX 13061
PORTLAND, OREGON 97213

December 18, 1967

Dear Friend:

We are sending this letter to you and others from whom we have not heard much recently, in the hope of re-enlisting your efforts in the Women for Peace movement. It has been too long since we last heard directly from many of you, and our meetings with those of you whom we have seen recently have been brief.

Of course, we know the paralyzing sense of frustration we all feel occasionally, as we learn of the mounting horrors in Vietnam. But this feeling is only temporary, and quickly gives way to activity. As women, we bear the major responsibility for the preservqtion of life, and thus a major responsibility in the peace movement.

Enclosed you will find an announcement of the latest national women's effort for peace. Several peace groups in Portland are cooperating in raising funds to send representatives to Washington. We hope that you will also support this effort, to insure representation from Portland Women for Peace. The coupon on the enclosed notice is for your use in this effort.

In addition, we will have a supportive peaceful demonstration in Portland at

NOON, Monday, JANUARY 15th
Pioneer Post Office
5th and Morrison

We are asking participants to wear black, and to bring a black (or dark colored) umbrella. We shall carry the umbrellas opened, rain or shine. Placards (to wear) and leaflets (to distribute), expressing support for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, will be available. We shall march around the Post Office block for one hour, from noon to 1 p.m., leafleting as we walk.

We hope, if you cannot go to Washington,yourself, that you will contribute to help someone else to go, and that you will also join with us at the Pioneer Post Office at noon Monday, January 15th.

In addition, please let us hear from you on your ideas of what more we might do locally. We have some ideas too, which we hope to share with you, and on which we shall need much help.

Please get in touch with one of us soon. Your help, ideas, and efforts are urgently needed.

Yours for Peace,

Phoebe Friedman - phone 281-6288
Rose Leopold - phone 232-1605
Gloria Shaich - phone 246-5249

CONFIDENTIAL

A CALL TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN

We are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

CONFIDENTIAL

TO COME TO WASHINGTON ON JANUARY 15

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States! Come to Washington on January 15 as Congress opens in joint session. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

> Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.
>
> Congress use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.
>
> Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

> PETITION the United States Congress.
>
> CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America - programs which will express our political power, reason, and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations.

- -

Clip here and return to

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
Portland Supporters
P. O. Box 13061
Portland, Oregon 97213

I would like to go to Washington on January 15 ______

I would like to help plan for supportive action in Portland on Jan. 15______

Enclosed is my contribution of $ ________

Name ____________________

CONFIDENTIAL

Address ____________________

Phone ____________________

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK ON JANUARY 15th - WHEREVER THEY ARE.

JEANNETTE RANKIN
Helena, Montana

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1967

To all American Women:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January [illegible], 1968, the opening day of Congress.

Jeannette Rankin

Initial Sponsors

Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Anne ~~M.~~ Bennett
(Mrs. John ~~C.~~ Bennett)
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine E. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clark
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Judith Eaton [illegible]
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Ruth Goodelman

Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Dorothy Hassler
Ann Arnold Hedgman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogle
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florence Kennedy
Coretta King
(Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr)
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Mrs. Burton Lane
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Mary McCarthy
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton

Grace Mora Newman
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Carmen Ristorucci
Juanita J. Saddler
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Emlen Stokes
Mary Adams Sykes
Helen B. Turnbull
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Dagmar Wilson
Winifred Wygal

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

The Jeanette Rankin Brigade

Mass women's peace action

SAN FRANCISCO — When Congress reconvenes in January, the opening session will be met with the demand that its first order of business must be ending the Vietnam war and the withdrawal of American troops from Southeast Asia.

This demand will be presented by woman power, organized into the Jeanette Rankin Brigade.

The women plan to convene a Congress of American Women to develop programs "dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to the community of nations."

Besides demanding that the legislators act to end the war, the women will demand that Congress:

- Use its power to heal a sick society at home;
- Use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam;
- Listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

This movement was inspired by an appeal by Jeanette Rankin, 8[illegible], the nation's first woman in Congress, elected in 1917. "If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary," she said in May, "that would end it. You cannot have wars without the women."

Miss Rankin, a militant leader of the suffragette movement that eventually gained women the right to vote under the 19th Amendment, voted in 1917 against U.S. involvement in World War I and also opposed American military commitment in World War II.

"This is no time to be polite," Miss Rankin said. "The army isn't polite when it selects a young man and says 'come and fight'. But they don't take the politicians and decision makers to fight."

Miss Rankin's militant opposition to the Vietnam war was taken up by about 75 prominent women throughout the country who issued a call for the nationwide convening of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade in Washington.

Women for Peace and the Women's Intl. League for Peace and Freedom have rallied to support of the action and a drive is now underway to get the largest possible number of women to Washington for the joint opening session of Congress.

Supportive action by women who cannot go to Washington will be planned in various localities.

One facet of the Congress of American Women will be discussion of electoral action, says Nikki Bridges, San Francisco chairman of the brigade.

"Many of us feel we should support peace candidates where they exist and go into politics ourselves in other places, because that way you get a forum you don't otherwise have," she says.

At present efforts are being made to get support from as many peace and women's groups as possible. "We also want the support of groups like churches and labor unions, and political organizations that have the type of program in which peace is just one facet," Mrs. Bridges says. "We don't want men, but do want their money and support."



JEANNETTE RANKIN
'No time to be polite'

CONFIDENTIAL

Among the initial sponsors are women from many walks of life bound together by a common concern about the war — Mrs. Benjamin Spock; Mrs. Rosa Parks (of the Montgomery Alabama bus boycott); author Jessica Mitford; Grace Mora Newman (sister of Dennis Mora of the Fort Hood Three); Mrs. Ann Eaton, author Kay Boyle, Mrs. Harry Belafonte; Mrs. Esther Pike, Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

National executive secretary of the group is Mrs. Vivian Halliman.

Detailed plans are still in formation, Mrs. Bridges says, but organizations and individuals are invited to join in any way they can. The San Francisco Bay Area office telephone number is 474-4456.

—M. P.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

9 "People's World"
San Francisco,
California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/16/67
Edition: Vol.30 No. 50
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

(Mount Clipping In Space Below)

Jeanette Rankin Brigade sets January 15 for capitol action

SAN FRANCISCO — When American women petition the joint session of Congress on its opening day (Jan. 15) to end the war in Vietnam, it will be "the most important coalition of women ever formed," Mrs. Vivian Hallinan, executive secretary of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade, told a press conference here last week.

"There will be women representing the clergy, scientists, professionals, and leaders of the civil rights movement," she said. "The black clad women will be led by Jeanette Rankin, the country's first congresswoman, who is now 86 years old."

The people's leaders hope enough women from the Bay Area will join the brigade to make a plane charter feasible. Inquiries about the chartered plane can be addressed to the local office of the Brigade at 150 Golden Gate avenue, S.F. Telephone 474-4456.

The Brigade is now contacting congressional leaders, asking them to meet the women at the capitol steps to receive their petition to put ending of the war in Vietnam as the first order of business for the new session of the Congress.

Program for the event, as finalized, calls for presentation to Congress of the Brigade's demands (see PW Dec. 16) and then holding of a women's congress that afternoon to plan political action on a local scale.

Unless Congress acts on their petition, the women will use Jan. 16 to see their representatives and pressure them to support their demands.

"We are not going to do anything unconstitutional," Mrs. Hallinan said. "We are going to petition Congress for redress of grievances. There was agreement at a meeting of the national steering committee to give Congress three more months to act. After that we will take to the streets — there was agreement on this by all those concerned."

Among the national sponsors of the event are prominent members of virtually every major national church and women's organization, for example Elsie Thomas Culver (World Council of Churches); Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. (Southern Christian Leadership Conf.); Jane Buchenholz (Americans for Democratic Action); Ellen Aurbakken (United Church Women).

Also Mrs. Emlen Stokes (American Friends Service Committee); Mrs. John C. Bennett (Methodist, wife of John Bennett, dean of Union Theological Seminary); author Susan Sontag; actress Ruby Dee; Judith Morse Eaton and Grace Luchs Elliot (Natl. Council of the Young Women's Christian Assn.).

Support for the event was also expected from authors Mary McCarthy and Betty Friedan.

Local supportive events for those who cannot go to Washington are being planned throughout the nation.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

5 "People's World"
San Francisco, California

Northwest Final

Date: 12/23/67
Edition: Vol.30 No.51
Author:
Editor: AL RICHMOND
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office:

☐ Being Investigated

CONFIDENTIAL

- 6 -

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The "People's World" (PW) is a west coast communist weekly newspaper published in San Francisco, California.

member

Gloria Shaich was mentioned in April, 1956, by a Communist Party (CP) functionary as a member of the City Committee of the Albany, New York CP. Gloria Shaich attended an Albany CP conference in May, 1958, which was open to those "in or near to" the CP.

Second Source, April 17, 1956
June, 1958

Rose Leopold (nee) Long has been a close associate of Oregon CP leaders and with her husband, Bernard Leopold, has frequently attended CP sponsored functions. Rose Leopold last attended an Oregon CP state convention on January 24, ~~1959.~~

Third Source, January 30, 1959
November 30, 1967

Phoebe Friedman, Rose Leopold, and Gloria Shaich, during 1965, 1966, and 1967, have been active participants in various demonstrations protesting U.S. policy in Vietnam which were held in Portland, Oregon.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The following persons at Portland, Oregon, on December 27, 1967, were advised of the above proposed demonstration:

United States Attorney Sidney I. Lezak at 9:50 a.m.

United States Marshal Eugene G. Hulett at 9:30 a.m.

Postal Inspector Nolan Brown at 11:30 a.m.

Mr. Darrell L. Hoyt, Buildings Manager, General Services Administration, at 9:55 a.m.

Mr. John E. Wells, Special Agent, United States Secret Service, at 9:40 a.m.

Mr. [illegible] H. Toomey, Special Agent in Charge, 115th Military Intelligence Group at 8:25 a.m.

Mr. Charles G. Moseby, Clerk, Office of Special Investigations, United States Air Force at 8:32 a.m.

Mr. L.A. Hancock, Special Agent, Naval Intelligence Command, at 8:30 a.m.

Officer Charley F. Trimble, Intelligence Unit, Portland Police Department at 8:35 a.m.

Deputy Marvin V. Woidyla, Intelligence Unit, Multnomah County Sheriff's Office at 8:35 a.m.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Corporal Lyle E. Mitchael, Intelligence Section, Oregon
State Police, Milwaukie Station, at 10:00 a.m.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 12/28/67

Transmit the following in ______
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9843) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Miami teletype to Director dated 12/27/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM concerning the captioned demonstration. Two copies are being furnished Philadelphia, the office of origin of the WILPF. Two copies are being furnished Atlanta and San Francisco who have current investigations concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. One copy is being furnished all other offices for their information.

The title has not been changed to record the new set date since this information has not been corroborated in the Miami Division.

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (RM)
(1 - 100-9882) (WILPF)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)

1 - ______ (Enc. 1) (RM) (Info)
2 - Miami (1 - 105-9843)
(1 - 100-11990)
JJM:sl
(66)

C. C. - Bishop

cc - Horner with encl.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~) Clete
DATE FORW: 1-4-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RHH:RAK

REC 8

13 JAN 8 1968

59 JAN 12 1968

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

Copies are being disseminated locally to NISO, 6 ND, Charleston, South Carolina; OSI, Robins AFB, Georgia; 111th MI Group, Orlando, Florida; and Secret Service, Miami.

The source concealed is PEARL CRAIGO (request), 343 West 46th Street, Hialeah, Florida, who furnished information to SA JOHN J. MATTIMORE.

LEADS

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will corroborate new set date of January 15, 1968.

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will ascertain if individuals from this area plan to participate.

UNIT[illegible]TATES DEPARTMENT OF JU[illegible]E

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
105-9843

Miami, Florida
December 28, 1967

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

A source, on December 27, 1967, advised that members of the Miami Chapter of the Women's International League For Peace & Freedom had received the following communication:

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE & FREEDOM
2006 Walnut Street - Philadelphia 3, Pa.

WIL-O-GRAM

Phila., Pa. Dec. 15 URGENT IMMEDIATE ACTION

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE CALLS THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN WOMEN TO COME TO WASHINGTON. DATE CHANGED TO JANUARY 15. JOIN AMERICAN WOMEN FROM ALL WALKS OF LIFE TO PETITION THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND HEAL SICK SOCIETY AT HOME. WEAR BLACK. MEET AT UNION STATION WASHINGTON, D. C. AT 11 A.M. WALK TO CAPITOL. WOMEN'S CONGRESS TO CONVENE IN AFTERNOON AT GEORGETOWN U. SOME WILL STAY NEXT DAY TO SEE CONGRESSMEN.

* * * * * *

WATCH FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS YEAR PROGRAM.

Contributions to this mailing gratefully accepted.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1*

105 — 1[illegible] — [illegible] -8621

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
842 APR 8 1971

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Miami, Florida
December 28, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-9843

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at Miami, Florida

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI ATLANTA

600 P.M. URGENT 12/28/[illegible] MRB

TO DIRECTOR, WFO AND SAN FRANCISCO

FROM ATLANTA 100-7300

TELETYPE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON DC, JANUARY EIGHT, SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

WCS/M

REBUAIRTEL TO ALBANY, DEC. FIVE, SIXTYSEVEN.

5 -

KINLEY JONES, REPORTER, WSB TELEVISION STATION, ATLANTA, GA., ADVISED ON DEC. TWENTYEIGHT, SIXTYSEVEN, THAT DURING INTERVIEW WITH JEANNETTE RANKIN AT WATKINSVILLE, GA., ON DEC. TWENTYSIX, SIXTYSEVEN, SHE STATED SHE INTENDED TO LEAD THE PROPOSED MARCH OF WOMEN IN WASHINTON DC, ON JAN. FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT, AT WHICH TIME THEY WOULD MARCH TO THE CAPITOL BUILDING AND PRESENT PETITITON FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES TO JOHN MCCORMACK, SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. RANKIN STATED SHE HAD RECEIVED A TELEGRAM FROM MCCORMACK INFORMING HER HE WOULD BE GLAD TO GREET THEM.

RANKIN EXPLAINED THAT MRS. VIVIAN HALLINAN OF SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF., INFORMED HER SOMETIME AGO THAT A GROUP OF WOMEN HAD FORMED AN ORGANIZATION CALLED THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE AND ASKED HER IF SHE WOULD BE THE HONORARY PRESIDENT OF THE ORGANIZATION, AT WHICH TIME SHE INFORMED THEM SHE WOULD BE DELIGHTED TO SERVE.

RANKIN STATED SHE WAS ASKING WOMEN TO EXPRESS IDEAS AGAINST THE INSTITUTION OF WAR AND THAT SHE WAS OPPOSED TO THE USE OF VIOLENCE TO SETTLE ANY DISPUTE.

16 JAN 4 1968

13

75

ATLANTA CONTINUING ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN ADDITIONAL DETAILS ON PLANS. AIRTEL FOLLOWS. P.

54 JAN 8 1968

1

CC - R. Horn

END

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 12/30/67

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (P)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
January 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO:Washington Field

ReBuairtel to all offices dated 12/5/67, sent under caption "DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., January 8, 1968" and Los Angeles teletype to Bureau and Washington Field captioned same.

For the information of the Bureau, there are attached eleven (11) copies of an LHM, with two copies each for the Washington Field and San Francisco Division. Instant LHM contains data currently available in the Los Angeles Division regarding the formation and plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

A classification of "Confidential" has been placed on this LHM to protect the symbol numbered informants utilized herein, who are identified as follows:

Source One
Source Two
Source Three
} Informants

3 - Bureau (Encls.11) (RMAM)
2 - San Francisco (Info) (Encls.2)(RMAM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Encls.2)(RMAM)
3 - Los Angeles
(1 - 100-61745)(WSP)
(1 - 134-2199A) INFORMANT
BDH/sdb
(10)

ENCLOSURE

REC 67

3 JAN 3 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
~~HOW FORW:~~
BY:

Bishop

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

There has been no attempt to characterize the listed organizations comprising the Jeannette Rankin Brigade on a national level inasmuch as these are national organizations.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California

December 30, 1967

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to prior Los Angeles memoranda dated December 12, 1967, relating to a proposed march on Washington, D. C., when Congress reconvenes in January, 1968, by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

Source one advised on December 28, 1967, that a meeting of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade of Southern California was held on the night of December 27, 1967 at 1226 South Curson Avenue, Los Angeles, California. Source one advised the JRB in the Los Angeles area is comprised of the following organizations:

Women for Legislative Action (WLA)(See Appendix)

Women Strike for Peace (WSP)(See Appendix)

Black Congress

Santa Ana Peace Center

Long Beach Peace Center

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles (See Appendix - Communist Infiltration of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles)

Individuals Against the Crime of Silence

Los Angeles Times
a daily newspaper published
in Los Angeles, page 11,
August 12, 1967

The August 12, 1967, morning edition of the Los Angeles Times on page 11, described the Black Congress as a coalition of South Central Los Angeles groups, many of them advocating Negro militancy.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

26

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Source one described the Black Congress as an amalgamation of civil rights organizations who are advocating the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and the money being utilized to carry on the war in Vietnam be used to fight poverty in the United States, provide better jobs in the ghetto, and provide more welfare benefits for the under-privileged in the United States.

Source three advised on March 3, 1966 that the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is a peace-oriented womens' organization which is 'Anti-War', per se. In addition, they work superficially in regards to civil rights issues. The participants are primarily active church-goers with a few former Communist Party members. Women's International League for Peace and Freedom's activities have included demonstrations and distribution of literature opposing the Vietnam war.

Source one described the Santa Ana Peace Center, Long Beach Peace Center, and Individuals Against the Crime of Silence as peace-oriented organizations in the Los Angeles area who advocate the withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam.

Source one advised the JRB on the national level now consists of persons from all walks of life representing in part the following organizations.

National Council of Churches

World Council of Churches

United Church Women

United Church of Christ

American Friends Service Committee

Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom

Americans for Democratic Action

Fellowship of Reconcilitation

National Council of Jewish Women

Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee

Congress on Racial Equality

W. E. B. Du Bois Clubs of America (See appendix)

National New Politics

Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy

Source one reported that at the meeting of the JRB on December 27, 1967, it was reported the following women would attend the demonstration protesting United States policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968:

Joyce Angus
Leslie Parrish
Sheila Sloane
Mary Clarke
Mary Pearson

Two or more women representing the black community would also go depending upon the amount of money raised by the JRB to finance their trip to Washington, D.C.

Source one advised that all the above named individuals are members of Women Strike for Peace (WSP)(See Appendix).

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Source one advised that Joyce Angus is on the Executive Committee of WSP.

Source three advised in July, 1955, that Mary Clarke was dropped from Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955 for personal reasons and not for any political differences with LACCP.

Source one further reported that Glory Roberts of Pacoima, California, who is editor of the "Social Action Communicator", a monthly publication located in Pacoima, California, recording secretary of the Peace Action Council (PAC) (See Appendix), and representative to the PAC from the Black Congress and vice versa, was selected as Chairwoman of a JRB committee to reach into the black community to get participants from the Black ghetto involved in the demonstration in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968. Source one advised that in order to do this, all the organizations comprising the JRB will have to pledge money to get the women to Washington, D.C. and back to Los Angeles, California.

Source one stated that three committees have been established within the JRB. One of these committees has been established to draw up a list of redress of grievances. Each branch of the JRB throughout the nation will, when gathered in Washington, D.C. as a main committee, decide the major grievances and the redress of grievances will be incorporated into a petition to be presented to Congress. The second committee will be to involve the people in the black community in the demonstration. The third committee is to act as a coordinating committee.

Source one further advised it was reported that the women from Southern California will leave by plane on Sunday, January 14, 1968 at approximately 10:00 A.M., arriving Washington, D.C. at approximately 6:00 P.M. on the same date. No definite information was available yet regarding the airlines on which the women would be flying. The cost per person will be $216. This amount will be paid by money received from pledges, some individuals will pay part of their expenses with the remainder coming from the pledges, and other women making the trip will pay all their own expenses. No expenses are contemplated while the women are in Washington, D.C. inasmuch as arrangements have been made for the women to stay with other WSP members in the Washington, D.C. area. Source one advised that it is contemplated all the women will stay in Washington, D.C. until Tuesday, January 16, 1967.

Source one advised it was reported the women from across the nation would gather at the Union Depot, Washington, D.C. at 11:30 A.M. on January 15, 1968. Source one further reported it is hoped ten thousand women will participate in the demonstration. After the gathering at Union Depot, the women will march in solemn procession, all wearing black, to the steps of the capitol building where the petition containing the redress of grievances will be presented to the Congress. Source one further advised it had been reported that Representative Mc Cormick and Senator Mansfield had agreed to receive the petition. Representative Mc Cormick, according to source one, had agreed to accept fifteen women in his office at which time he would receive the petition, but source one advised the JRB now wants Representative Mc Cormick and Senator Mansfield to accept the petition on the steps of the capitol building in order that they might get news coverage. After the petition has been presented, the JRB wants the redress of grievances read into the Congressional Record.

Further activities of the JRB while in Washington, D.C. are to include a three hour "Women's Congress", possibly on the grounds of Georgetown University.

Mary Clarke pointed out that although the original intention had been to have only those women participate in the JRB who were willing to risk arrest for civil disobedience, she stated at the above meeting that no civil disobedience is anticipated in view of the large number of organizations participating who are opposed to such civil disobedience. However, she further stated that individuals are not going to be discouraged who might elect to create civil disobedience.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Tentative agreement was reached at this meeting for those women who are unable to fly to Washington, D.C. to participate in local action in Los Angeles, California on January 15, 1968, as follows:

9:30 A.M.	Assemble at California State Building in the downtown civic center, march with picket signs pointing out that the reported thirty billion dollars being spent in the Vietnam war should be spent in the state and the city.
10:30 A.M.	March to the Los Angeles City Hall.
11:30 A.M.	March to Los Angeles City Board of Education, 450 North Grand Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

At the present time no local civil disobedience is planned. The JRB subcommittee to involve members of the black community in the demonstration will attempt to obtain a speaker from the ghetto to appear at the above locations; however, such a speaker has not yet been agreed upon.

Source one advised on December 29, 1967, that CLARA AUERBACH of San Francisco, California, has contacted local coordinators of the JRB to advise then that approximately 20 women from the San Francisco area will be traveling to Washington, D.C., via Los Angeles, leaving San Francisco on January 13, 1968. Source advised that Mrs. Auerbach was active in both the WSP and the WLA in Los Angeles prior to moving to San Francisco about three years ago.

The Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office are cognizant. Duty Agent Jenkins, Region II, United States Army, Pasadena, California, was furnished a summary of the above information on December 29, 1967. An information copy of this memorandum is being furnished that agency, and one each to the United States Attorney, Los Angeles; Secret Service, Los Angeles; Office of Special Investigations, Norton Air Force Base; and Naval Investigative Service Office, San Diego, California.

FIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE FIRST UNITARIAN CHURCH OF LOS ANGELES

A source advised on May 22, 1967, that the premises of the First Unitarian Church of Los Angeles, 2936 West 8th Street, Los Angeles, California, have been utilized for meetings by Communist Party members and sympathizers over a period of years. Speakers and lecturers at the church frequently espouse Communist causes or follow the Communist Party line. Communist front group literature is distributed at the church. The church is used by some Communist Party members for "mass concentration" work.

This same infiltration extends to adjuncts of the church such as the Unitarian Public Forum and the Fellowship for Social Justice, formerly known as the Unitarian-Universalist Fellowship for Social Justice.

STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN has been minister of the church since 1948.

Reverend STEPHEN H. FRITCHMAN is described in the Fourth Report, Un-American Activities Committee in California, 1948, page 115, as a very active "Communist fronter" and connected with numerous "Communist front organizations and activities."

Membership in the First Unitarian Church does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE, Also Known As Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates were told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention.

The second source advised in September, 1966, that Mike Zagarell, CPUSA Youth Director, stated that in Negro communities the Party still supported the plan to build "left" socialist centers and to solidify the Party base through the DCA. This source also advised in September, 1966, that Daniel Rubin, CPUSA National Organizational Secretary, stated the Party believes the DCA should have a working-class outlook and be a mass organization favorable to socialism, socialist countires and Marxism, and in April, 1967, advised that Gus Hall, CPUSA General Secretary, indicated the DCA primary emphasis should be on developing mass resistance to the draft.

A third source advised in September, 1967, that Jarvis Tyner was elected chairman of the DCA on September 10, 1967, at the Third National Convention of the DCA held in New York, New York, from September 8-10, 1967.

A fourth source advised during August, 1967, that Jarvis Tyner is a member of the National Committee of the CPUSA.

A fifth source advised on September 21, 1967, that the headquarters of the DCA is located at 34 West 17th Street, New York, New York.

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A source advised on May 1, 1963, that the Women for Legislative Action was formed in 1952, claiming to be an independent organization dedicated to non-partisan participation in legislative and civic activities. Its position in favoring or opposing legislation usually parallels the position of the Communist Party and related groups. It also supports legislation to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Membership in the Women for Legislative Action does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

Another source advised on May 11, 1967, that the Women for Legislative Action continues to be active in the Los Angeles area.

APPENDIX

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
December 30, 1967

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

Character INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference Los Angeles memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/3/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

CDB/JJ

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

ReBuairtel to Albany, 12/5/67, and Atlanta teletype to Director, WFO and San Francisco, 12/28/67.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM captioned as above, prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, on 1/2/68, and suitable for dissemination.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Fort McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

The source utilized in the enclosed LHM is INFORMANT

Enclosed LHM is being classified confidential since unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the informant reflected therein could reasonably result in the identifying of this source of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) ENCLOSURE
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta
CTH:met
(9)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, [illegible] CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY

REC 31

34

22 JAN 4 1968

XEROX
JAN 9 1968

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________________ M Per ____________________
Special Agent in Charge

55 JAN 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Atlanta, Georgia
January 2, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Kinley Jones, Reporter for WSB Television Station, Atlanta, Georgia, advised on December 28, 1967, that during an interview with Jeannette Rankin at Watkinsville, Georgia, on December 26, 1967, she stated she intended to lead the proposed march of women in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, at which time they would march to the capitol building and present a petitition for redress of grievances to John McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives. Rankin stated she had received a telegram from Mr. McCormack informing her he would be glad to greet them. Rankin explained that Mrs. Vivian Hallinan of San Francisco, California, informed her sometime ago that a group of women had formed an organization called the "Jeannette Rankin Brigade", and asked her if she would be the honorary president of the organization, at which time she informed them she would be delighted to serve. Rankin stated she was asking women to express ideas against the institution of war and that she was opposed to the use of violence to settle any dispute.

VIVIAN HALLINAN

A source advised on October 31, 1962, that Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the CP if her husband, Vincent Hallinan, would also join.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

ENCLOSURE

34

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 8, 1968

Vivian Hallinan was arrested on a civil rights sit-in demonstration at Auto Row in San Francisco, California, in April, 1964.

Sergeant William Davis, San Francisco County Jail Number 2, San Bruno, California, advised on August 22, 1966, that Vivian Hallinan served a month in the County Jail from July 5, 1966, to August 2, 1966, having been found guilty on a sit-in charge.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

VIA TELETYPE
JAN 4 1968
ENCIPHERED

WA ----10----

NK ----4-----

PH ----2-----
FBI NEW YORK

7:25 PM URGENT 1-4-68 AWS

TO DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON FIELD 100-47173, NEWARK AND PHILADELPHIA

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WFO VIA WASHINGTON

FROM NEW YORK 100-161601

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, DC, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT; INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY); OO: WFO.

ON JANUARY THIRD LAST, **INFORMANT**

RELIABLE- CONCEAL, ADVISED AT NEW YORK COUNTY COMMUNIST PARTY COMMITTEE MEETING DECEMBER TWENTY EIGHTH, SIXTY SEVEN, THOSE PRESENT WERE URGED TO ATTEND JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON, SPONSORED BY JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE (JRB).

ON JANUARY THIRD LAST ADVERTISEMENT APPEARED IN "NEW YORK TIMES", PAGE FIFTY SEVEN, CAPTIONED "DAGMAR WILSON SAYS JOIN ME IN WASHINGTON JANUARY FIFTEENTH". AD INCLUDED COMMENT "THOUSANDS OF AMERICAN WOMEN, LED BY JEANNETTE RANKIN, FIRST U.S. CONGRESSWOMAN, WILL DEMAND THAT CONGRESS END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND OUR SOCIAL CRISIS AT HOME."

REC 8

JAN 8 1968

END PAGE ONE

cc - Thompson

5 JAN 12 1968

TWO COPIES TO WFO

~~MR. DELOACH FOR THE DIRECTOR~~

PAGE TWO

SOURCE , RELIABLE-CONCEAL, ADVISED PRESS CONFERENCE HELD AT GOTHAM HOTEL, NYC, JANUARY THIRD LAST, ANNOUNCED JRB SPONSORING JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON, DC, WITH ASSISTANCE OF WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP). PARITCIPANTS WILL INCLUDE FLORYNCE KENNEDY, RUBY DEE, JUDY MORSE EATON, THE DAUGHTER OF SENATOR WAYNE MORSE, AND MRS. BENJAMIN SPOCK. AT THE CONFERENCE IT WAS STATED SOME NEGRO WOMEN WOULD PARTICIPATE, WHICH WAS DESCRIBED AS AN UNPRECEDENTED MOVE.

DC

KENNEDY IS A NEW YORK ATTORNEY WHO HAS REPRESENTED H. RAP BROWN OF SNCC.

INFORMANT ASTERISK, RELIABLE-CONCEAL, ADVISED IN NOVEMBER, NINETEEN SIXTY FIVE, RUBY DEE WAS A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY.

END PAGE TWO

ON JANUARY FOUR[illegible] INSTANT, FIVE SEPARATE AD[illegible] APPEARED IN "THE VILLAGE VOICE", A WEEKLY NEWSPAPER IN NYC. RUBY DEE, LINDA MORSE, MRS. BENJAMIN SPOCK AND SUSAN SONTAG APPEARED BY NAME AND PHOTO SEPARATELY IN FOUR OF THE ADS REQUESTING "JOIN ME IN WASHINGTON JANUARY FIFTEENTH," AND INCLUDED IDENTICAL COMMENTS REFERRED TO IN "NEW YORK TIMES" AD OF JANUARY THIRD LAST.

THE FIFTH AD STATED "WE WANT TEN THOUSAND WOMEN IN WASHINGTON JANUARY FIFTEENTH" AND INCLUDED THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS:

" THE BROADEST COALITION OF AMERICAN WOMEN IN HISTORY-WOMEN YOUNG AND OLD, FROM CHURCH, POLITICAL, PEACE AND MINORITY GROUPS, FROM THE ARTS, POFESSIONS AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS-WILL SPEAK WITH A SINGLE VOICE THE DAY CONGRESS OPENS. WE WOMEN, REPRESENTING FIFTY ONE PERCENT OF THE VOTING POPULATION, WILL DEMAND THAT AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, CONGRESS WITHDRAW US TROOPS AND ACT TO MAKE A DECENT LIFE FOR OUR TWENTY THREE MILLION BLACK PEOPLE AND ALL CITIZENS.

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

"WE WILL CONVENE OUR OWN CONGRESS OF AMERICAN WOMEN, FOLLOWING OUR PETITION AT THE CAPITOL. WE WILL DECLARE OUR INTENTION TO MOBILIZE ON ALL LEVELS IN OUR COMMUNITIES TO RESHAPE OUR SOCIETY. START THE NEW YEAR WITH A DAY OFF FROM HOME OR JOB TO WORK FOR PEACE WITH THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

SUSAN SONTAG IS AN AUTHOR AND WRITER.

ON JUNE SIXTEENTH, SIXTY SEVEN, INFORMANT [redacted] RELIABLE-CONCEAL, ADVISED THAT AT A MEETING OF NATIONAL YOUTH COMMISSION, CPUSA, ON JUNE FOURTEENTH, SIXTY SEVEN, BROOKLYN, NEW YORK, LINDA MORSE, AKA LINDA DANNENBERG, WAS THEN UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF THE CPUSA.

ALL ABOVE ADS LISTED NEW YORK ADDRESS OF JRB AS ONE THREE THREE WEST SEVENTY SECOND STREET, NYC.

ON JANUARY FOURTH INSTANT, BSS, NYCPD, ADVISED THAT NO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING JRB IS KNOWN EXCEPT THAT THEY CONTINUE TO HAVE TWO TRAINS RESERVED FROM NYC TO WASHINGTON, DC, ON JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT AND

END PAGE FOUR

PAGE FIVE

ARE BEING ASSISTED BY WSP.

JOHN MARTIN, PASSENGER REPRESENTATIVE, PENNSYLVANIA RAILROAD, NYC, ADVISED JANUARY FOURTH INSTANT, THAT ORIGINAL REQUEST BY JRB FOR TWO TRAINS COULD NOT BE FURNISHED BY RAILROAD BECAUSE OF INSUFFICIENT EQUIPMENT. ONE TRAIN OF EIGHTEEN CARS BEING RESERVED. TRAIN WILL POSSIBLY INCREASE TO TWENTY CARS. MARTIN ESTIMATED TOTAL OF FOURTEEN HUNDRED PASSENGES WOULD BE TRANSPORTED. TRAIN TO DEPART NYC SEVEN TWENTY AM, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT, ARRIVE NEWARK SEVEN THIRTY SIX TO PICK UP ADDITIONAL PASSENGERS, ARRIVE WASHINGTON, DC ELEVEN TEN AM. NO OTHER STOPS BETWEEN NEWARK AND WASHINGTON. TRAIN WILL DEPART WASHINGTON SEVEN TEN PM, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT, ARRIVE NEWARK TEN FORTY FIVE PM, ARRIVE NEW YORK CITY ELEVEN PM.

MARTIN STATED A GROUP FROM PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA, ORGANIZED BY ONE ETHEL TAYLOR, TELEPHONE NUMBER L O FOUR FIVE FIVE SEVEN ZERO, HAS RESERVED THREE COACHES ON REGULAR TRAIN DEPARTING PHILADELPHIA EIGHT TEN AM, JANUARY FIFTEENTH NEXT, ARRIVING WASHINGTON, DC TEN TWENTY AM.

END PAGE FIVE

~~CORR L9 WS ARRIVE~~

SULLIVAN

PAGE SIX

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED.

NYO INVESTIGATION CONTINUING. LHM WILL FOLLOW.

END

WA...

RNK R RELAY

FBI WASH DC

RWF FTB FBI WASH DC FOR #10/RNK

R. Horner
advised 10:25 11/4/63
to be included in [illegible]

CC: MR. SULLIVAN

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
(OO:WFO)

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau with 2 each for New York and Philadelphia describing above demonstration.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Local law enforcement agencies cognizant.

Sources used in LHM are: first source is INFORMANT second source is SOURCE thir source is INFORMANT

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information reported from first source could lead to the identity of a source of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness.

REC 5 20

WFO continuing to follow and will report pertinent details.

AGENCY: [illegible] SEC. SER.,
[illegible] (ISD, ~~[illegible]~~, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

JAN 9 1968

11 ENCLOSURE

4 - Bureau
(1-105-138315) (VPDEM)
2 - New York (RM) (Enc. 2)
2 - Philadelphia (100-49497) (RM) (Enc. 2)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061)

GTT:dgp
(10)

AIRTEL

Approved: ______________ Sent ________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535

January 4, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 4, 1968, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) with headquarters at 133 West 72nd Street, New York City, originally scheduled a demonstration in Washington, D.C. on January 8, 1968, to coincide with the opening of Congress. In view of the fact that the reconvening of Congress was delayed until January 15, 1968, the organization rescheduled the demonstration for that date. The source stated that the JRB is composed mostly of members of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization and is using the name of the JRB only for this one affair.

The above source stated that individuals are to meet at Union Station in Washington, D.C., at approximately 11:30 a.m. on January 15, 1968, and then walk in a "silent procession" to the United States Capitol. Literature sent out by the local office of Women Strike for Peace indicate that the women will assemble at Union Station at the above time and "in solemn procession and wearing black, we will walk to the Capitol steps behind our delegation who will present our '"Women's Petition to the Congress"' demanding redress of grievances."

According to the source, the group wanted to have Speaker of the House McCormick and Senator Mansfield meet them on the Capitol steps and accept the above mentioned petition. Thereafter, the women would visit both the Senate and the United States House of Representatives and confer

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

/ 1 - [illegible]

20

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

with individual Congressmen in their offices. These women were to attempt to persuade Congressmen to lend their support to end the war in Vietnam. The source indicated that the organization had written to Speaker McCormick and Senator Mansfield asking to be met on the Capitol steps but Speaker McCormick had answered by stating that he could not meet them on the steps but he would be willing to receive a delegation of ten to fifteen women in his office on that date. The source stated that Senator Mansfield had not replied to their request.

The source stated that some of the women in the JRB want to commit acts of civil disobedience so that they may be arrested but most of the individuals involved do not think it advisable to commit acts of civil disobedience. The source stated that at no time have any specific details been mentioned as to the acts of civil disobedience which might be committed. The source stated that following the visit to Congress, the women would like to hold a meeting sometime between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. at some logical site in Washington, D.C. Source stated that negotiations are under way to rent the D.C. Armory for that time and they have the money available for such rental but some of the leaders object to a clause in the contract which would allow the Armory to cancel the reservation at any time. The source stated that negotiations are also underway to rent a ballroom at the Shoreham Hotel.

According to the source, 3,000 women are expected to participate in the above demonstration with most of them coming by train from New York City. The source stated that Sylvia Lichtenstein has been appointed coordinator of the demonstration.

A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 10, 1951, that Sylvia Lichtenstein was a member of the Newspaper Club of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia from 1947 to 1950.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Captain Robert Krahling, United States Capitol Police, advised on January 3, 1968, that a delegation from the JRB and their attorney, Joseph Forer, met with officials of the United States Capitol Police on January 2, 1968, concerning details of the proposed demonstration. These individuals were advised by the United States Capitol Police that they cannot demonstrate on the Capitol grounds in a group or carry placards, as such activity is prohibited by rules of Congress. Forer, as attorney for the group, advised the officials that these women will be coming to the Capitol as individuals and although they will be walking together they can only be kept out of the Capitol building if the police exclude all visitors from the United States Capitol. Forer argued that such a demonstration on the Capitol grounds is not a violation of the law by the participants but a violation of the United States Government in refusing to allow its citizens to present their grievances to Congress.

Captain Krahling advised that in addition to Joseph Forer, the members of the above delegation included the following individuals:

Dagmar Wilson
Sylvia Lichtenstein
Donna Allen
Billie Hetzel

A third source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in September, 1959, that a member of the National Committee of the Communist Party, USA, had recently referred to Joseph Forer as "one of the most important communist in Washington, D.C."

Inspector Thomas I. Herlihy, Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department, advised on January 3, 1968,

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

that the Regional Office of the JRB is located at 3306 Ross Place, N.W., Washington, D.C., which is the residence of Donna Allen. He stated that the area representative of the JRB is Wilhelmina Hetzel, 3625 Yuma Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Inspector Herlihy stated that Mrs. Hetzel had recently advised him that twenty coach loads of individuals from New York City will leave New York City via Pennsylvania Railroad at 7:20 a.m. January 15, 1968, and arrive in Washington, D.C., at 11:10 a.m. From Union Station, they will march to the United States Capitol where they will visit Congress and the offices of various Congressmen. Between 2 p.m. and 6 p.m. they expect to hold a "Congress of American Women" possibly at the D.C. Armory. According to Inspector Herlihy, the New York group will leave Union Station at 7:10 p.m. to return to New York City.

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
~~Miss Gandy~~

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~100-44232~~6)

REC 26

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING US POLICY
IN VIETNAM
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: WFO

1 xerox copy to SA
2/18/70 - WJM/kub
Mr. Dorothy

Re San Francisco teletype to Bureau, 1/3/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM concerning captioned demonstration and 2 copies each for Atlanta, Los Angeles, and WFO. Copies of instant LHM have been furnished locally to the Army, Navy Air Force, Secret Service, San Francisco and USA, San Francisco.

The sources mentioned in the LHM are as follows:

CY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.

FORW:
FORW:

Source 1 is
Source 2 is
Source 3 is
Source 4 is
Source 5 is
Source 6 is
Source 7 is
INFORMANTS
Source 8 is SOURCE

3 - Bureau (Encls. 11) (AM-RM)
2 - New York (Info)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (Info)(Encls. 2)(100-7300)(AM-RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Info)(Encls. 2)(100-70701)(AM-RM)
3 - San Francisco
(2 - 100-59802)
(1 - 100-48035 - Women Strike for Peace)
CDW:jal
(14)

JAN 10 1968

XEROX
JAN 11 1968

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION.

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M ____________
Special Agent in Charge

100-59802
GOW:jal

Source 9 SOURCE

Source 10 } INFORMANTS
Source 11

Instant LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect the identities of sources of continuing value.

San Francisco will continue to follow and report any pertinent information received concerning this matter.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

San Francisco, California

January 4, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum, dated December 19, 1967.

The following information has been made available by sources who have furnished reliable information in the past.

A source advised on January 3, 1968, that the following individuals from the Northern California area were planning to fly to Washington, D.C., to attend a demonstration in that city on January 15, 1968, sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. The source stated that these individuals intend to depart from San Francisco on January 13, 1968, and will reside at the Young Women's Christian Association (YWCA) near the White House. Tentative plans of the group to charter a plane have been cancelled as the group was unable to obtain enough individuals for charter flight:

Clara Auerbach
Zena Druckman
Catherine Cole
Malvina Reynolds
Hazel Grossman
Vivian Hallinan
Ethel Ledel

A second source advised on September 21, 1967, cal that Clara Auerbach attended the 6th National Conference of Women Strike for Peace (WSP) held Septmeber 20 through 23, 1967, in Washington, D.C. On September 21, 1967, a steering committee of seven individuals for the National Conference appointed by the

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-449115-37

ENCLOSURE

chairman included Clara Auerbach.

WOMEN FOR PEACE aka
Women Strike for Peace

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette," a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Berkeley, California, contained an article in the November 19, 1965, evening edition reflecting that in November, 1961, when concern mounted over radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, a group of women in Washington, D. C. started Women Strike for Peace. The idea spread rapidly throughout the country and now embraces 900 groups, including Women For Peace groups in the San Francisco Bay area.

These groups support programs to achieve goals such as:

(1) Continued disarmament negotiations.

(2) A strong and flexible United Nations.

(3) Planning now at state and national levels for conversion to peace-time economy and positive efforts to ease world tensions.

The women act as individuals and as a group, with specific actions suggested by individuals and groups from all over the world. Decision to participate jointly on any given suggestion is democratly arrived at by members of the Coordinating Committee. Effective cooperation with other peace groups is encouraged. Monthly Coordinating Committee meetings and general meetings, as warranted, are open to all and announced in mailings to members. There are no dues or membership forms nor conditions for membership.

To stir an awareness of the need for peace, Women For Peace encourage public education in peace objectives at local schools and sponsor peace-oriented demonstrations and public meetings, newspaper ads, billboards, and candidates for public office. On the national level the group attempts to influence government officials by letters and conferences.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968

A third source advised in January, 1968, Zena Druckman is a current member of the San Francisco County Communist Party (CP). CAL.

Catherine Cole, formerly Kay McTernan, according to a fourth source, in May, 1947, was transferred from the Wilshire-Fairfax Club to the 13th CD Club of the Los Angeles County CP during 1947. Cal.

Source four in 1946 and a fifth source in 1950 have advised that Malvina Reynolds was a CP member from 1931 to 1948 and continued active in the CP until 1950. CAL

DV

Source three on January 4, 1967, also advised that at a meeting of the Fillmore Club of the San Francisco County CP on December 14, 1966, in San Francisco, a discussion took place among the members present about members who carry books, but do not attend meetings. It was suggested that Hazel Grossman be dropped from the club because of her inactivity and absence from the meetings.

A sixth source advised on October 31, 1962, that Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the CP if her husband, Vincent Hallinan would also join.

A seventh source advised on October 8, 1965, that in August, 1965, Ethel R. Ledel was a "People's World" (PW) subscriber. Cal

The PW is a West Coast communist newspaper.

Source one has also advised that attorneys Arthur Kinoy and William Kunstler from the East Coast are expected to draw up a petition to end the war in Vietnam to be presented to Congres The demonstrators are then going to ask the Speaker of the House to present the petition as the first order of business. If he does not they will send him a telegram.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

On January 3, 1968, an eighth source advised that it was possible that Thelma Shumake would travel to Washington for the demonstration on January 15, 1968.

> Special Agents of the FBI interviewed Thelma Shumake on August 18, 1953, at which time she stated that she had attended 15 or 20 meetings of the CP. She declined to furnish ~~any information~~ as to whether or not she had made application at any time for CP membership or was a member of the CP. If a crisis occurred in the United States between the forces of Democracy and Communism, she commented that she would not know which group she would support adding that it would depend upon whom the communist leaders were at that time.

D.C.

An article appearing in the December 12, 1967, edition of the "Independent Journal", a daily San Rafael, California newspaper, stated that a Mrs. Jean Schellenberg of Tiburon, California, was attempting to organize support for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade march in Washington in January, 1968. The article stated that 15 Marin women have agreed to travel to Washington in January.

D.C.

On January 3, 1968, a ninth source furnished a copy of a leaflet captioned "Bay Area Action" printed by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California Xeroxed duplication of this leaflet is appended to this memorandum.

On January 4, 1968, the first source advised that Clara Auerbach recently stated that approximately 30 women from the San Francisco bay area currently intend to travel to Washington, D.C. for the January 15 demonstration in that city. This source also advised that the following individuals had also indicated that they will attend the demonstration in Washington:

> Eleanor ~~Salkind~~,
> Marie Schooley.

D.C.

> During January, 1960, a tenth source advised Isadore Salkind had indicated that his wife

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY
15, 1968

Eleanor Franklin Salkind was a member of the CP.

On March 24, 1967, an eleventh source advised that Marie Marstelle Schooley was a member of the San Francisco area Women for Peace.

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15

AMERICAN WOMEN represent 51% of the voting population of our country.

AMERICAN WOMEN have the power to achieve peace and a decent life for every American.

This is woman power! Demonstrate it to the Congress of the United States!

Come to Washington on January 15 as Congress opens. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

PETITION the United States Congress

CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

CONFIDENTIAL

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman t vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings--for the of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to this CALL, and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin



JEANNETTE
RANKIN
BRIGADE
150 Golden Gate Ave., Rm. 202
San Francisco, Calif. 94102

7

CONFIDENTIAL

MAY 16 1972
XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

CONFIDENTIAL

BAY AREA ACTION

Join Us

At noon January 15 on the Polk street steps of the San Francisco City Hall ten thousand women in black who cannot go to Washington will protest the war in Vietnam. In cities from New York to Los Angeles women will gather to express their Christmas prayers for peace.

Will you join us?

We will give to Mayor Joseph Alioto a copy of the Washington petition and ask for his support. To so petition our government is a right guaranteed by the First Amendment. We will telephone our Congressmen from their offices in the Federal Building to let them know women will be calling on them in Washington and that we join them in urging a quick end to the Vietnam war.

Because we are for peace we will do these things peacefully with respect for our fellowmen.

Join Us

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS

U.S.A.

[redacted]

U.S.A.

[redacted]

GA

U.S.A.

[redacted]

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
is a coalition of individuals and existing organizations.

Jeannette Rankin - Chairwoman
Vivian Hallinan - Executive Secretary

Clip and mail to: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
150 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, Ca. 941

___I am interested in going to Washington on January 15.
___I will plan to spend an additional day to lobby my Congr
___I will work to develop local supportive action.
___I enclose $___ (or) ___ as my contribution.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15-16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

ReBuairtel to Albany, 12/5/67, and Atlanta teletypes to Director, WFO and San Francisco, 12/28/67 and 1/3/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM captioned as above, prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, on 1/4/68, and suitable for dissemination.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Fort McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, ~~SEC SER~~,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: ____
HOW FORW: ____
BY: ____

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
12- Atlanta (2 - 100-7300)
(1 - 100-6730) (VIDEM)
(1 - 100-7274 (BUSINESS EXECUTIVES MOVE FOR VIETNAM PEACE)
(1 - 25-18472) (J. BRITTAIN PENDERGRAST, JR.)
(1 - 100-7122) (ATLANTANS FOR PEACE)
(1 - 100-3128)(AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE)
(1 - 100-7253) (NANCY COLLINSON)
(1 - 100-5720) (ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY)
(1 - 100-6351) (CORETTA KING)
(1 - 100-New Dead) (NAN S. PENDERGRAST)
(1 - 100-6857) (SOUTHERN COORDINATING COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM)

33

REC-35

1 JAN 5 1968
INT. SEC.

ENCL FILED IN

XEROX
JAN 9 1968

CTH:met
(19)

C. C. - Bishop

Approved: ____________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

AT 100-7300

The source utilized in the enclosed LHM to characterize ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY is INFORMANT.

Enclosed LHM is being classified confidential since unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the informant reflected therein could reasonably result in the identifying of this source of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia

January 4, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

On January 3, 1968, Mrs. Nancy S. Pendergrast, also known as Mrs. John Brittain Pendergrast, Jr., Atlanta Coordinator for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, furnished the following information:

Women from all over the United States will meet at the Union Depot, Washington, D.C., at 11:30 a.m., on January 15, 1968, dressed in black, and will march silently to the Capitol steps to present to Speaker of the House John McCormack and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield a petition to Congress demanding redress of grievances to end the war in Vietnam. The group will hold a workshop on the evening of January 15, 1968, and make plans for the next day's activities, such as lobbying of Congressmen on January 16, 1968, and convening of a Congress of women. No civil disobedience is anticipated.

Individuals from the Atlanta, Georgia, area who are planning to join Jeannette Rankin in Washington are Mrs. Coretta King, wife of Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., President of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference, and Mrs. Noyes Collinson of the American Friends Service Committee, Atlanta Office.

An article appearing in the evening edition of "The Atlanta Journal", a newspaper published daily at Atlanta, Georgia, on January 2, 1968, stated Jeannette Rankin will

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

100- [illegible] 33

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAR 12 1971

address a group of Atlanta women interested in peace activities at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, on the evening of January 4, 1968, and Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., National Sponsor of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, would also speak at the meeting. The article stated further that Mrs. King would join Miss Rankin in the fifty-woman national delegation on the opening day of Congress. According to the article, Isobel Cerney, Founder of the Southern Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, would be on the program at Ebenezer Baptist Church.

ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY

A source on August 25, 1961, advised that a meeting of the Palo Alto Communist Club, Palo Alto, California, was held on August 23, 1961, and that $36.00 was turned over in this meeting as an up-to-date payment of Communist Party dues for Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney.

The source also advised on September 18, 1961, that a close friend was trying to have Isobel Cerney kicked out of the Communist Party because of her present religion "jag" and because she did not attend Communist Party meetings regularly when visiting Palo Alto during the Summers.

The source further advised on August 28, 1962, that Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney were then out of the Communist Party, although the $25.00 received for their current dues was to be retained by the Party.

UNITED STATES DEPAR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
January 4, 1968

FD-323
In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Title: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Character: INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference: Memorandum prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, dated and captioned as above.

All sources whose identities have been concealed in the referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations not conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/4/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968,
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(IS)

VIDEM
(BUFILE 105-138315)

Re Chicago teletype dated 12/27/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies and for WFO are two copies of an LHM captioned as above.

The date of the demonstration in the title of these communications has been changed from 1/8/68 to 1/15-16/68 to conform with information contained in the attached pamphlet of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

The sources are identified as follows:

T-1
T-2 Informants
T-3

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, C.O. SD)
DATE FORW: ______
HOW FORW: ______
BY:

3 - Bureau (Enc.11)
2 - WFO (Enc.2)
3 - Chicago (100-44707)
(1 - 100-42717)
(1 - 100-44775)

JET:SLK
(8)

C. C. BISHOP
XEROX
JAN 11 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

CG 100-44707
100-42717
100-44775

T-4
T-5
T-6
T-7

T-8
T-9
T-10
T-11
T-12
T-13

INFORMANTS

One copy each of the LHM is being furnished to the 113th MI Group, United States Secret Service, and USA locally.

The LHM is classified confidential in order to protect sources utilized which are of continuing value.

This matter is being followed closely at Chicago. The Bureau and interested offices will be kept advised of additional information developed.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.
100-44707
100-42717
100-44775

Chicago, Illinois
January 4, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968,
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

On December 27, 1967, Anzelm A. Czarnowski, 7513 West 63rd Street, Argo, Illinois, a former member of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois, October, 1943 - January, 1955, furnished the Chicago Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation a copy of a pamphlet captioned, "A Call to American Women" issued by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, 520 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

A copy of the above pamphlet is attached hereto.

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade is described therein as a broad coalition of women from among many areas of American life who will meet in Washington, D.C. January 15, 1968, for the opening of Congress to make the following demands:

1. Congress as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

2. Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.

3. Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
-37
Group I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1 3 [illegible] 4

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

4. Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex.

It is further stated that following the petitioning of Congress the group will hold its own Congress to articulate their position on achieving peace and then return to their own communities and mobilize women dedicated to reshaping American society, and restoring the country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

According to the pamphlet the group will meet January 15, 1968, at the Union Depot, Washington, D.C., at 11:30 a.m. and walk to Congress and present the petition. Many plan to stay in Washington to begin implementation of their demands by presenting them to Congressmen and Senators on January 16, 1968.

Attached to the pamphlet is an application for rail tickets to travel to Washington by Baltimore and Ohio Railway, leaving Chicago January 14, 1968, at 4:30 p.m. It is also indicated that plane and bus transportation may also be arranged for if enough people are interested. Anyone needing assistance in securing accommodations is advised to contact the Hospitality Office, 2140 Peace Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., telephone number (202) 293-2020.

The pamphlet contains a partial list of persons who are National sponsors and Chicago sponsors. Included among sponsors listed were the following:

Sylvia Bloom

As of October, 1967, Sylvia Bloom was a member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-1, October 5, 1967)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

Margaret Burroughs

Margaret Burroughs is known to have been a member of the CP of Illinois in 1955 - 1957.

(CG T-2, November, 1961)

During 1964, Margaret Burroughs met with CP members at Chicago to discuss establishment of a teachers group of the CP.

(CG T-1, November, 1964)

Margaret Burroughs attended a meeting at Chicago, Illinois, May 15, 1967, for the purpose of reorganizing and reactivating the Chicago Council of American Soviet Relations (CCASR). This meeting was held at the direction of the National Committee, CP, USA.

(CG T-3, May, 1967)

A characterization of the CCASR is attached.

Florence Criley

As of February, 1959, Florence Criley was a member of a CP club at Chicago, Illinois, and on July 30, 1961, attended a reception sponsored by the CP of Illinois at Chicago.

(CG T-4, February 11, 1959,
September 1, 1961)

Florence Criley is not currently known as a CP member but was a member in the late 1940's and attended some CP affairs during 1960.

(CG T-5, January - May, 1960,
December 28, 1967)

In October, 1963, Florence Criley attended a banquet sponsored by the CP of Illinois at Chicago.

(CG T-6, November 21, 1963)

Bernice Diskin

Diskin is a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-5, December 28, 1967)

Rosalind Durham

Rosalind Durham is a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-5, December 28, 1967)

Frieda Engel

In 1944, Frieda Engel was a member of the Communist Political Association Club in the Manhattan Section of New York City, New York.

(CG T-7, June, 1944)

According to the Secretary of State of New York at Albany, New York, April 16, 1947, the name Frieda Engel appeared on a 1946 CP nominating petition in New York State.

Virginia Hardin, a self-admitted former CP member, advised February 17, 1961, that she knew Frieda Engel to be a member of the Heights CP club of Cleveland, Ohio, as of April, 1960.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

Marjorie Kinsella

As of November, 1967, Marjorie Kinsella was a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-8, November 22, 1967)

Sylvia Kushner

Sylvia Kushner is a current member of the CP of Illinois.

(CG T-5, December 28, 1967)

Anna Riggs Langford

According to a news letter of the Chicago Chapter, National Lawyers Guild (NLG) concerning events in June, 1964, ~~it was~~ stated that Anna Riggs Langford of the firm Robinson and Langford, 7107 South South Park Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was a new member of the NLG.

A characterization of the NLG is attached.

Mrs. Marvin Mandel

CG T-9 advised May 22, 1945, that Mandel was a CP member at Chicago in 1944.

CG T-10 advised March 1, 1946, that Mandel was a CP member at Chicago as of December, 1945, and had been a CP member for four years.

CG T-11 stated on May 3, 1946, that Mandel was then a CP member.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

CG T-12 advised in November and December, 1948, that Mandel was chairman of the Women's Committee of the School Administrative Staff at Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, in 1943.

The Abraham Lincoln School has been cited pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Ida Terkel

As of October, 1952, Ida Terkel was reported active in a CP club in Chicago.

(CG T-13, October 6, 1952)

On December 27, 1967, the above information was telephonically furnished to George Jakuboski, 113th Military Intelligence Group, Evanston, Illinois, Maurice Martineau, United States Secret Service, Chicago, Illinois, and Marian Herzog, Office of the United States Attorney, Chicago, Illinois.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS, Formerly known as Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship

EDWIN GORDON FOX, 7147 Jeffrey Avenue, Chicago, Illinois,(now deceased) made available in January, 1954, the "First Annual Report CCASF," an undated publication which stated that the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Friendship (CCASF) was incorporated in July, 1943. This document stated, "The Council's affiliation with the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship (NCASF) was validated August 11, (1943). The present name was adopted to conform to standard national practice. It should be noted, however, that the Chicago Council is entirely autonomous; the government of its affairs rests exclusively in the hands of its Chicago Executive Board."

On April 8, 1965, a source furnished information to the effect that as of March 11, 1965, this organization would be known as the Chicago Council of American-Soviet Relations (CCASR). MANDEL TERMAN continued to be listed as Chairman of the new organization.

During April, 1965, a second source advised that MANDEL TERMAN had arbitrarily dissolved the Board of Directors, assumed all financial and other functions of the organization, and was maintaining existing records of the organization at his residence, 660 West Irving Park Road, Chicago, Illinois. The aims and purposes of this organization continued to be to work for peaceful coexistence and friendship with the USSR. While it claimed to be an autonomous organization, its program followed the NCASF and it was in frequent contact with the NCASF.

On November 5, 1958, a third source advised that in the early 1940s, MANDEL TERMAN was a member-at-large of the Communist Party (CP) of Illinois. TERMAN was in Russia in November, 1958, where he had gone to discuss the treatment of Jews and to discuss Jewish culture in the USSR with the leadership of the Soviet Union.

2

CHICAGO COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS

In January, 1966, a fourth source advised that the CCASR went out of existence in the Spring of 1965 due to the health condition of MANDEL A. TERMAN. The offices of the CCASR, formerly located at 32 West Randolph Street, Chicago, were for a short time carried at MANDEL TERMAN's home residence, 660 West Irving Park Road, Chicago. During the Fall of 1965 due to the defunctness of the CCASR, the CP of Illinois found it necessary to sponsor a rally honoring the 48th anniversary of the Russian Revolution under a temporary committee called "The Chicago Committee for American-Soviet Friendship Rally." This rally was held on November 7, 1965, and once the rally was held this temporary committee went out of existence.

The fourth source advised that as of the present time the CCASR is defunct in the Chicago area and any future rally to be held on the American-Soviet friendship theme will have to be organized by the CP of Illinois on a temporary basis.

The NCASF has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

1 APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD CHICAGO CHAPTER

A source advised on May 9, 1967, that it was his understanding that the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) was formed around 1936 in New York City, and that the Chicago Chapter of the NLG (CCNLG), which is affiliated with the national group in New York, was formed shortly thereafter, possibly in 1937 by a group of liberal progressive lawyers in protest against activities of the American Bar Association which they claimed was a non-liberal, non-progressive organization. The CCNLG has no established headquarters but occasionally uses the return address of its officials in literature.

1 APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" revised and published December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., states as follows on page 121 concerning the National Lawyers Guild:

"1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149.)

"2. Cited as a Communist front which 'is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations, and controlled unions' and which 'since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents.'

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally related September 17, 1950.)

"3. 'To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the * * * National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection.'

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91.)"

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Chicago, Illinois
January 4, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

CG T-7 is a representative of another agency which collects security type information in the New York, New York area.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

A Call to American Women



[illegible] -37



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15 & 16

AMERICAN WOMEN constitute 51% of the voting population, yet a high percentage of us don't vote. It is time for women to break out of their societal molds and take their place as effective, vocal citizens. WOMEN CAN ELECT the President they want; Women can determine the political, social and economic direction of the nation. WE HAVE WOMEN POWER. Let's use it to demonstrate our opposition to this war to the Congress of the United States.

We are a broad coalition of women from many areas of American life. We shall meet in Washington on January 15 for the opening of Congress to demand the following:

1. CONGRESS, AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS, RESOLVE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IMMEDIATELY ARRANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS.
2. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO HEAL A SICK SOCIETY AT HOME.
3. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RAVAGED LAND WE LEAVE BEHIND IN VIETNAM.
4. CONGRESS LISTEN TO WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SAYING AND REFUSE THE INSATIABLE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY–INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

After we petition the United States Congress, we will hold our own congress to articulate our position on the basic problem of achieving peace. We declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women to dedicate ourselves to reshaping American society, and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

On January 15, we will meet at the Union Depot in Washington, D.C., at 11:30 A.M., and walk behind our delegation which will present our petition to the U.S. Congress.

On January 16, many of us will stay in Washington to begin implementation of these demands by presenting them to our Congressmen and Senators. We hope you can stay.

---

lip here and return to:

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
c/o Georgina Gronner
520 North Michigan
Chicago, Illinois 60611
(312) 787-1628

I WILL –

____be a sponsor

____contribute $__________

____go to Washington on Monday, Jan. 15, 1968

____stay for the activities on Jan. 16, 1968

Please send me ______ train tickets (B & O, leaving from Grand Central Station, Wells & Harrison, January 14 at 4:30 P.M. Return train leaves Washington 11:15 P.M., January 15 & 16. Round trip Chicago/Washington – $42.00 for coach) Enclosed is the appropriate amount of money.

I am interested in a plane flight at approximately $65.00______ (check if so).

I am interested in a round trip bus fare at approximately $30.00______

We will only be able to have the plane and the bus arrangements if we have enough people. If you or your group needs help in securing accommodations, contact the Hospitality Office, 2140 Peace Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Telephone Number – (202) 293-2020

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
520 North Michigan Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60611

CHICAGO
DEC 22
PM
1967
ILL.

UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON

PARTIAL LIST OF NATIONAL SPONSORS

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Connie Brown
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin
Ruth Gage Colby
Judy Collins
Sylvia E. Crane
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Elizabeth Lee Haselden
Dorothy Hassler
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogel
Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florynce Kennedy
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Mrs. Burton Lane
Marilyn Langner
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Helen Merrell Lynd
Olive Mayer
Jessica Mitford
Lucy Montgomery
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Nan S. Pendergrast
Eleanor Perry
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Marcus Raskin
Malvina Reynolds
Carmen Ristorucci
Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
Ruth Rosenwald
Muriel Rukeyser
Marie Runyon
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Marjorie Schell
Juanita J. Saddler
Elaine Slater
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Elizabeth Sutherland
Amy Swerdlow
Mary Adams Sykes
Ethel Taylor
Maza Tilghman
Helen B. Turnbull
Barbara Webster
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson
Winnifred Wygal

PARTIAL LIST OF CHICAGO SPONSORS

Ruth Adams
Mrs. Samuel J. Baskin
Mrs. Donald Boyer
Sylvia Bloom
Margaret Burroughs
Joan Brown
Mrs. Eugene Cotton
Mrs. Henry Cress
Karen Culberg
Mavis Dick
Mrs. Earl Dickerson
Bernice Diskin
Sister Terese Avila Duffy
Rosalind Durham
Mrs. Edward Druzinski
Mrs. Jack Ellison
Frieda H. Engel
Mrs. Robert L. Farwell
Florence Field
Helen Feldman
Muriel Flanders
Beatrice Fredman
Sister Ignatia Griffin
~~Mrs. Ogden Hannaford~~
Mimi Harris
Mrs. Sidney J. Harris
Pearl Hirshfield
Donna Holabird
Mrs. Bergen Evans
Georgina Gronner
Mrs. Christopher Janus
Mrs. Robert Katzman
Marjorie Kinsella
Sylvia Kushner
Anna R. Langford
Doreen Lapin
Mrs. Lawrence Knobel
Shirley Lens
Mrs. Marvin Mandel
Francelle W. Marcus
Mrs. Albert R. Martin
Mrs. William C. Matney
Joyce Miller
Patti Miller
Mrs. Phillip W. Moore, Jr.
Sister Prudence Moylan
Mrs. John McNee
Mrs. Albert H. Newman
Cecilia F. O'Riley
Mona Podore
Mrs. Al Raby
Mrs. A. A. Rayner, Jr.
Mrs. Leo Roberg
Marian Roberts
Mrs. Erwin A. Salk
Ruth Shriman
Mrs. Edgar Siskin
Mrs. Farwell Smith
Nancy Stableford
Mrs. Nathan Stein
Ida Terkel
Carole Travis
Sister Mary Peter Traxler
Mrs. C. T. Vivian
Mrs. Arnold Wolf
Mrs. James Zacharias
Mrs. Carlton Zucker

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Vol II

10/15/75 ~~HSC~~ SSC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 7/30/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C (TROTSKYIST)
OO:NY

For the information of receiving offices, the Bureau has authorized discontinuance of active investigation of captioned organization.

Receiving offices are, nevertheless, requested to remain alert for any pertinent activity on the part of this organization which would be of interest to this Bureau.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Albany (100-22881) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (100-9058) (RM)
2 - Boston (100-43809) (RM)
2 - Chicago (100-52028) (RM)
2 - Cleveland (100-32010) (RM)
2 - Detroit (100-40426) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (100-53818) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-55420) (RM)
1 - New York

WRC:trr
(19)

REC-63

AUG 1 1973

EIVE

Y-349

AUG 6 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI(100-468406) DATE: 3/30/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(OO: NY)

Re New York letter to the Bureau, 6/6/72; Bureau O-7 to New York, 7/12/72; and Philadelphia letter to the Bureau, 2/28/73.

As outlined in referenced New York letter, the New York Office noted, as far back as June, 1972, it recognized that, although several leaders of WONAAC were known to be SWP members, their activities, as pertaining to WONAAC, had been directed toward the legal repeal of all restrictive abortion laws, and investigation had disclosed no indication that WONAAC, as an organization, had engaged in any subversive or violence prone activity.

Referenced Bureau O-7, referencing the aforementioned communication, nevertheless instructed that the New York Office, as office of origin, had overall responsibility for captioned organization, and directed the New York Office to reopen its case and submit semi-annual reports.

A review of the results of the continuing investigation of WONAAC, together with all indices and references pertaining thereto, since June 1972, reflects no apparent change in the activities or the organization or its membership from that outlined above.

The New York Office is in accord with the view of the Philadelphia Division, as set forth in its referenced letter, that WONAAC represents basically a social change vehicle which, despite disparate political views of its leaders and membership, deals with the single issue of abortion rights.

24

REC-69 1(-46 117

11
23 APR 4, 1973

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York
WRC:rcc
(3)

FIVE

54 APR 17 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

In view of instructions set forth in Bureau memorandum 10-73, dated 3/6/73, paragraph G, wherein the Bureau reiterated its policy that the FBI has no interest in individuals and organizations involved in legitimate dissent and the recent United States Supreme Court decision upholding the right to abortion, it appears continued investigation of WONAAC as such is not justified.

The New York Office further concurs with the Philadelphia view that continued investigation of the SWP and/or YSA would produce the desired coverage and information concerning its members who are associated or active in WONAAC.

UACB, the New York Office is closing the investigation of this organization.

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
BOSTON	NEW YORK	3/21/73	3/2 - 3/16/73	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION		ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.		mej
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		IS - C (TROTSKYIST)		

REFERENCE: Boston report of SA ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR., dated 6/23/72.

- P* -

LEADS:

BOSTON DIVISION

AT BOSTON, MASS.

Will continue to follow and report pertinent activities of the local abortion group within the Boston Division.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED				☐ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

⑥ - Bureau (100-468406) (RM)
2 - New York (100-174481) (RM)
2 - Boston (100-43809)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

116

REC-3

~~REC-3~~

7 MAR 26 1973

EX-1

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Request Recd.	[illegible]		[illegible]	
Date Fwd.	4/2/73			
How Fwd.	RS	57 APR 3	1973	
By	[illegible]			

Notations

EIVE

COVER PAGE

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Location
BS T-1 is BS 808-S	134-729A - 803-808

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Investigation has previously been conducted concerning JANE ROLAND and ANN MARIE CAPUZZI, identified as Socialist Workers Party, Boston, members in this report; and the Bureau was advised that neither was felt to meet with current criteria for inclusion on the ADEX.

FEDERAL BUREAU

Copy to:

Report of: ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.
Office: Boston, Massachusetts
Date: March 21, 1973

Field Office File #: 100-43809
Bureau File #: 100-468405

Title: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: Informant advised: Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), moved its headquarters in late summer, 1972, from 552 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass., to 419 Boylston Street, Room 323, Boston. BOWAAC not a formal membership-type group but there are currently a limited number of activists, a maximum of fifteen, a majority of whom are local Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and/or Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) members, involved in BOWAAC work. A number of formerly active independents in BOWAAC have dropped out of BOWAAC work in view of U. S. Supreme Court decision liberalizing abortion laws; and as a result, SWP/YSA plans locally with respect to BOWAAC are indefinite. Activities set forth.

- P* -

DETAILS:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

I. ORGANIZATION OF BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION (BOWAAC)

BOWAAC, the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed out of the local Female Liberation group; and while BOWAAC is not exclusively made up of Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston, and Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) female members, it is controlled by members of those groups.

WONAAC has been publicly described as an organization of groups whose aim is to effect the overthrow of existing abortion laws and to demand free abortion on demand.

The SWP, Boston, is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The YSA-B is the Boston affiliate of the YSA, the youth organization of the SWP.

A. Headquarters

In late summer, 1972, BOWAAC moved its headquarters from 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass., to 419 Boylston Street, Room 323, Boston, Massachusetts, telephone 266-3574.

BS T-1
September 28, 1972

BOWAAC headquarters continues to be located at 419 Boylston Street, Boston, Room 323.

BS T-1
March 2, 1973

The New England Telephone 1973 Directory for the Boston area lists BOWAAC at 419 Boylston Street, Boston, with telephone numbers 266-3574 and 266-1679.

B. Membership and SWP and YSA Infiltration

BOWAAC is not a formal membership-type group. There are, however, currently a limited number of activists, a maximum of fifteen, the majority of whom are members of the SWP and/or YSA in the Boston area, involved in BOWAAC work. The number of activists is currently limited as a number of the formerly active independents in the group have recently dropped out of BOWAAC work feeling that the United States Supreme Court decision relaxing legal restraints on the practice of abortion has resolved the abortion problems.

Member of Subject Organization

BS T-1
March 2, 1973

JANE ROLAND, the SWP, Boston, member then in charge of SWP/YSA work in BOWAAC, in early 1972, reported that work in BOWAAC was going quite slowly in the Boston area and that there continued to be opposition to the SWP/YSA control by independents active in BOWAAC.

Member of Subject Organization

BS T-1
September 28, 1972

ANN MARIE CAPUZZI, the SWP, Boston, member currently in charge of SWP/YSA work in BOWAAC, recently reported that, in view of the above-mentioned United States Supreme Court decision concerning abortion laws and the dropping out of BOWAAC work by a number of the independents, future plans of the SWP/YSA locally with respect to BOWAAC are indefinite.

BS T-1
March 2, 1973

C. Activities

"The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP, in its September 22, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Petition Filed for Vote on Abortion," which reported that representatives of an Abortion Referendum Committee had announced on September 7, 1972, the filing of a petition to allow Massachusetts citizens to vote on whether abortion should be legalized. According to the article, representatives of BOWAAC were among supporters of this Abortion Referendum Committee.

A leaflet entitled "Speak Outrage - A Woman's Right to Choose a Public Hearing" was distributed to the public in the general Boston area during October, 1972, to advertise a meeting at the Boston University, Boston, Law Auditorium under the joint sponsorship of BOWAAC and Female Liberation on October 28, 1972. According to the leaflet, women would testify at this gathering against persons or institutions which had victimized them with legal or illegal abortions or had denied them contraception, voluntary sterilization or good pre-natal care, or had sterilized them without their knowledge or consent.

Among the listed speakers was JANE ROLAND, identified as a member of BOWAAC, who was to speak on the topic, "Summary and Indictments."

"The Militant" in its November 10, 1972, edition carried an article which reported that on October 28, 1972, 300 women had gathered at the Law Auditorium of Boston University to hear testimony on "Crimes Against Women." The article reported that the program, entitled "Speak Outrage," was built by "Speak Outrage Project," a committee of individuals from several groups in the Boston area, one of which was identified as BOWAAC.

The article reported that topics covered in the testimony ranged from abortion to forced sterilization to poor pre-natal care and that presentations were given by women of diverse ages and economic and religious groups.

The "Observer," a campus newspaper of Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, in its November 3, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Groups Debate Abortions," which reported that representatives from the "Value of Life Committee" and BOWAAC had met head on November 1, 1972, at Tufts University to debate the issue of legalized abortion. The article reported that JANE ROLAND, identified as the former coordinator of BOWAAC, spoke in favor of repealing all abortion laws.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Boston, Massachusetts

March 21, 1973

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

Reference Report of Special Agent ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR., dated and captioned as above at Boston, Massachusetts.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/6/72

FROM : SAC, DETROIT (100-40426) P

SUBJECT: NATIONAL WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAUCUS (NWPC)
POLICY COUNCIL MEETING
6/24 - 25/72
WASHINGTON, D.C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYITE)
DEfile 100-40426

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM captioned, "National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), Policy Council Meeting", dated as above.

Also enclosed for the Bureau are three samples of literature distributed at captioned meeting.

One copy each of captioned LHM is being furnished New York, San Francisco, and WFO for their information.

Source is DE 2831-S, location: this LHM.

ENCLOSURE

10

2 - Bureau (Enc. - 11) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. - 1) (Info.) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. - 1) (Info.) (RM)
1 - WFO (Enc. - 1) (Info.) (RM)
4 - Detroit
    1 - 134-3030
    1 - 100-1334 (SWP)
ZTL:PMR
(9)

REC-23

AGENCY: [illegible] DIA, SEC. SER., STATE, [illegible]
DIA; 2cc 9320; 1cc destroyed
2cc RAO [illegible]
DATE FORW: 7/19/72
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: GJL/mem

8 JUL 25 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Detroit, Michigan

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

July 6, 1972

Re: National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC)
Policy Council Meeting

Source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, provided the following information on July 3, 1972:

A Policy Council Meeting of the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) was held in Washington, D.C. during the period June 24, 1972 - June 25, 1972.

> The NWPC is a legitimate, loosely-knit, open organization of politically motivated women seeking equal recognition in the American community.

During the Policy Council Meeting there were no overt attempts by any organized group to influence the policy meeting and there were no individuals present who identified themselves as members of any organization which might be construed as subversive and/or supporting any cause except legitimate change.

Of significance, however, was the fact that literature of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was present in brochures and pamphlets located throughout the meeting area. All of the WONAAC material was geared to the abortion movement and specifically the WONAAC conference scheduled for Hunter College, New York, July 15 - 16, 1972.

> WONAAC was founded in July, 1971. for the purpose of forming a national movement of groups scattered throughout the United States who favor and now work to legalize abortion. The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in WONAAC.

> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

9

ENCLOSURE

Re: NWPC Policy Council Meeting

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

During the council meeting on June 24, 1972, Mary Clarke, who is associated with the Southern California WPC, an affiliate of the NWPC, advised a group of policy council members that WONAAC had been using the Southern California WPC name as an endorser of WONAAC. Clarke also stated that WONAAC had passed out propaganda at a caucus rally in California and were very effective at taking control of small gatherings.

The Chairwoman from Nassau County in New York, whose name was not recalled, defended WONAAC stating that "they were a good group". This woman's position was not supported and, in general, WONAAC literature was not accepted by those persons present. Jill Ruckelshaus, a new member of the Policy Council, is reportedly concerned about the SWP's attempts to align itself with the abortion movement and will be using her newly gained position to fight SWP attempts at control of local WPC groups.

The NWPC organizing brochure published by the NWPC has been written to assist individual WPC groups in organizing. The brochure lists political parties and para-political organizations to be contacted by caucus organizers when forming the nucleus of a WPC. Among those listed was the SWP. After discussions at the caucus it was determined that the SWP should be removed from the list. The new edition of the WPC organizing brochure will not list the SWP; it has been replaced by National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC).

The NPAC was founded in 1970 by members of the SWP. Its basic objective is to unite masses of people including labor unions, GIs, and the black community in the struggle to end United States intervention in Southeast Asia through orderly and peaceful tactics.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR001 NY PLAIN

115AM NITEL 07-17-72 JPM

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM NEW YORK (100-174481)

Shackelford

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
CONFERENCE SEVEN FIFTHTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH SEVEN TWO HUNTER COLLEGE
NYC IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

RENYTEL SEVEN FIFTEEN SEVENTY TWO.

A CONFIDENTAL SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT LATE SECOND SESSION OF THIRD WNAAC CONVINED NINE AM AT HUNTER COLLEGE NYC. SOURCE STATED MORNING SESSION NINE ELEVEN AM INCLUDED ORGANIZATIONAL WORKSHOPS NOT COVERED AT SEVEN FIFTEEN SESSION SUCH AS I "PRESS WORK", "FUND RAISING", AND "STRINGTHINING OF LOCAL COALITIONS". AGENDA FROM ELEVEN AM TO THREE PM TERMINATION OF CONFERENCE WAS SCHEDULED AS A PLENARY SESSION WHEREBY ALL WORK PERFORMED AT THE TWO DAY CONFERENCE WAS EXPECTED TO CULMINATE IN A UNIFIED NATIONAL WOMENS CAMPAIGN SET OF PROPASLA FAVORABLE TO WNAAC. SOURCE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT A SPLID DEVELOPED IN THE RANKS OF WNAAC BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) FACTION WHICH HAD PREDOMENATED IN CONTROLING THE CONFERENCE AND INDEPENDENCE" DASH ALL OTHERS REPRESENTING THE NON SWP FACTION. SOURCETATED OF THE

END PAGE ONE

EX-109 REC-71

78

56 JUL 21 1972

PAGE TWO

SEVEN TO EIGHTMEMBERS ATTENDING EACH DAY SESSION, APPROXIMATELY FIVE TO ONE HUMDRED DELIGATES WERE VOCAL IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SWP FACTION. AT THE FINAL PLENIARY SESSION FIVE MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF WNAAC REPRESENTING THE INDEPENDENT FACTION RESIGNED. SOURCE STATED INDEPENDENCE (NUMBER UNKNOWN) HAVE RESOLVED TO LEAVE WNAAC, RETURN TO HOME STATES, AND WORK THRU LOCAL PRO - ABORTION ORGANIZATONS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS DE TWO FIVE ONE THREE ONE-S.

NYO WILL SUBMIT LHM.

END

EJF FBI WASH DC

CLR

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR 01 NY CODE

4:00AM NITEL 7-16-72 RDS

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481

WOMANS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONFERENCE, JULY 15-16, 1972 AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK. IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

RE WFO NIGHT TEL TO BUREAU SEVEN SEVEN SEVENTY TWO, BUREAU NIGHT TEL TO NEW YORK SEVEN ELEVEN SEVENTY TWO, NEW YORK TELS TO BUREAU SEVEN TEN SEVENTY TWO AND WFO SEVEN TWELVE SEVENTY TWO AND DETROIT NIGHT TEL TO BUREAU SEVEN FOURTEEN SEVENTY TWO.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT DATE A TWO DAY CONFERENCE OF THIRD WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) COMMENCED NINE AM INSTANT DATE AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, N.Y., PRINCIPAL ANNOUNCED PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO MAP OUT A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO DEFEND AND EXTEND RIGHT TO ABORTION IN NEW YORK AND HELP WIN REPEAL OF ALL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST ABORTION IN STATES OF THE U.S.

EX-104

REC-6

87

JUL 17 1972

SOURCE ADVISED THAT FOLLOWING NINE AM REGISTRATION, CONFERENCE ENVOLVED INTO PLENARY SESSIONS AND VARIOUS WORK SHOPS LASTING

END PAGE ONE

53 JUL 19 1972

[illegible]

[illegible] CODE

PAGE TWO

UNTIL TEN PM.

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ALL OBSERVABLE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN ORDERLY NON-VIOLENT AND PEACEFUL FASHION, AND THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT REPORTABLE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS PRESENT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY OR YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE.

ADDITIONAL WORKSHOPS SCHEDULED FOR SESSION TO BE HELD SEVEN SIXTEEN SEVENTY TWO WHICH IS EXPECTED TO RUN FROM EIGHT AM TO THREE PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS NY ONE ZERO THREE EIGHT NINE DASH S. SUMMARY TELETYPE CONCERNING ACTIVITIES ON JULY SIXTEEN WILL BE SUBMITTED BY THE NYO.

-P-

END

EJF FBI WASH DC

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓ Miller
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

[illegible]

NR005 NY CODE

359PM URGENT 7-10-72 PAC

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATT DID

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 2P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONFERENCE, JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, NEXT, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, INTERNAL SECURITY DASH C, (TROTSKYIST).

RE WFO NITEL TO BUREAU, JULY SEVEN, LAST.

NY ONE ZERO THREE EIGHT NINE DASH S ADVISED, INSTANT DATE, ABOVE CAPTIONED CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, JULY FIFTEEN AND SIXTEEN, NEXT, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, COMMENCING NINE AM ON EACH DATE. SOURCE PLANS TO ATTEND CONFERENCE BOTH DATES AND AFFORD COVERAGE OF EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE. PENDING.

REC-22

20 JUL 18 1972

END

SSSSSSSS

RMS FBI WA DC CLR

186

5-466

57 JUL 19 1972

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE:

~~FROM~~ : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) P

SUBJECT: THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

ReNYteletype to Bureau, 7/10/72, Bunitel to NY, 7/11/72, NYteletype to WFO, 7/13/72, Buteletype to Detroit, 7/14/72, Detroit teletype to Bu, 7/14/72, NYnitel to the Bureau, 7/17/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of an LHM reflecting details of WONAAC conference held in NYC, on 7/15 and 16/72.

The LHM has been stamped "Confidential" inasmuch as it contains information furnished by the confidential sources identified below, all known sources of continuing value, the disclosure of which information to unauthorized persons could compromise these sources to the detriment of the national defense interest of the US.

INFORMANTS

Confidential source number one is NY 10389-S.
Confidential source number two is DE 2831-S.
Confidential source number three is WF 2188-S.

MC

94

REC-9

6 AUG 24 1972

ENCLOSURE

2-Bureau (Encls. 10) (RM)
1-New York (100-4013) (SWP) (45)
1-New York (100-133479) (YSA) (45)
1- New York

WMC:mg
(5)

Rev. Act. Sect.

62 SEP 8 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. Bufile 100-468406
NYfile 100-174481

The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition

Confidential sources one, two and three, all of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 18, 19, and 20, 1972, respectively, that a Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Conference was held at Hunter College, Park Avenue and 69th Street, on July 15 and 16, 1972.

Confidential source number one advised that New York City was picked for the site of this convention because this city is considered to be the center of the most powerful anti-abortinn effort so far.

The WONAAC Conference was open to all women who supported the Abortion Law Repeal Movement. Registration was $3.00 per person. Housing and child care facilities were available. There were approximately 800 women in attendance at this conference.

Discussions held at this conference centered on plans for (one) future activity in the campaign to repeal all anti-abortion and contraception laws and (two) to end forced sterilization.

A discussion was held concerning the attacks being made by the Catholic Church Hierarchy and other anti-abortion groups against women's rights to their own bodies.

WONAAC is aware of the fact that progress for these matters will not come easy, that it will be fought by various groups step by step all the way, therefore, this conference was called to discuss all the different approaches and to decide on the major direction for WONAAC to take.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Exc[illegible] automatic
[illegible]
[illegible]

94

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

The Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition

The following was the Agenda for the conference as originally prepared by the June 27 Working Committee:

Saturday, July 15

9:00-10:00	Registration
10:00-11:30	Plenary Session: Greetings and organization of conference
11:30-1:30	Workshops I: General discussion of major action proposals
1:30-2:30	Lunch
2:30-4:00	Workshops II (Project Workshops): anti-abortion attacks and the Catholic Church, petition campaigns and the Abortion Rights Act, court actions, tribunal, referenda, defense cases, legislative action, forced sterilization, research and education, elections, referral and clinics, August 26, workshops on states facing similar abortion situations
4:00-5:30	Workshops III (Constituency Workshops): campus, Black, Raza, high school, gay, Catholic women
5:30-7:30	Dinner, with provision for statewide or regional meetings over dinner
7:30-10:00	Plenary Session

Sunday, July 16

9:00-11:00	Workshops IV (Organizational Workshops): press, fundraising, building and strengthening local coalitions
11:00-3:00	Plenary Session: further discussion and vote on major action proposals

During the Saturday session a proposal was made that WONAAC organize a "National Tribunal" on abortion, contraception and forced sterilization to be held in NYC this Fall.

The Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition

The Agenda for the conference followed the proposed agenda set forth by the Working Committee, mentioned above, with the exception of a change in the lunch hour and some of the workshop schedules.

Prior to the Saturday conference, a Socialist Workers Party - Young Socialist Alliance (SWP-YSA) Fraction meeting was held at the Belmont Plaza Hotel on 49th Street and Lexington Avenue at [illegible] AM. Those in attendance at this Faction meeting were SWP-YSA comrades from NYC and from out of town. The discussion at this Faction meeting centered on the procedure to be followed at the conference by the YSA-SWP members in terms of voting on various workshops and what stand to take which would be more beneficial for the YSA-SWP. This Faction meeting was concluded at approximately 9:30 PM.

FORMER MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The WONAAC Conference procedure continued uninterrupted with votes on various floor discussions until an interruption was made by Rose Weber, a WONAAC coordinator. She addressed all YSA-SWP members at the conference, asking them what was their real reason for being in attendance at the WONAAC Conference. She accused the YSA-SWP of not being sincerely interested in abortion rights, but rather being interested in what was best for the SWP-YSA. She stated that because of the YSA-SWP influence being enforced on the conference, she was resigning as a WONAAC coordinator and staff member. She stated that she detested the intervention of the YSA-SWP in this conference; that the SWP-YSA has caused conflict among the WONAAC staff and therefore, they cannot work out constructive solutions to their problems. She also suggested that the "Zero Population" and planned parenthood have no voice in discussions at this conference. Finalizing her accusations, she stated the YSA-SWP members had no mind of their own nor did they have any freedom of expression of their own. She stated that they only followed the instructions set forth for them at the SWP-YSA faction meeting held before this conference. Five additional resignations followed Rose Weber from WONAAC. They all stressed the fact that they would continue their work in the abortion fight outside of this organization. member Young Socialist Alliance

In defense of the SWP-YSA position at the conference, Linda Jenness, the SWP Presidential candidate, N.Y. spoke in behalf of the YSA-SWP. In answer to Rose Weber's accusation, Jenness stated that all members of the YSA-SWP were independent individuals with their own personal ideas and viewpoints.

On July 15, 1972, a proposal was passed by the Election Workshop which stated in part as follows:

"WONAAC welcomes women from all political affiliations and views. We are united in action to win our demands guaranteeing women the right to control our own reproduction functions.

"By uniting women of all political views we maximize our strength. Any attempt to impose one political view on everyone in WONAAC would only destroy our ability to fight together on the abortion question. Therefore WONAAC, as an organization takes no position on any candidates or political parties...."

"The political rallies which will no doubt take place with increasing frequency around the country as November approaches offer us a forum for getting our ideas across to great numbers of women. Besides allowing us an opportunity to force the candidates to take a public stand on abortion, these gatherings give us a chance to publicize both WONAAC and the repeal campaign."

A National WONAAC structure proposal was presented, which stated in part as follows:

"All women are welcome in WONAAC: Black, Latina, Chicana, Native American and Asian women, gay women, high school, college, and working women, women from political organizations, trade unions, the military, and communities across the country. We are united in uncompromising struggle for our common goal: the right of all women to control fully their own reproductive lives..."

"The National Conference shall be the highest decision-making body of WONAAC, and shall operate on the basis of one woman, one vote.

"There shall be a National Coordinating Committee (NCC) composed of one woman from each national organization, area coalition, and group supporting and building WONAAC..."

Within the [illegible]

"There shall also be a Working Committee (WC), which is a sub-committee of the NCC and which is composed of the project directors or coordinators, the elected national staff, and one woman from each coalition, committee, group and national organization supporting and building WONAAC in the locale of the national office..."

In addition to the above, a proposal "that the National Office of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition establish an emergency cash fund, from which to contribute significant amounts of money to organizations and individuals who are working to achieve goals compatible with those of WONAAC..."

"That the National Office of WONAAC, as its first act of financial support, pledge $2,000 to the Kennedy-Schulder suit against the tax-exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church, since the Church has violated restrictions on its political activity by lobbying for anti-abortion legislation.

"That the National Office of WONAAC pledged $1,500 to the defense of the seven women arrested in Chicago because of their alleged activity in abortion counselling, referral, and prodedure..."

"That the WONAAC National Office maintain, at all times, a fund-raising staff efficient enough to meet the needs of the emergency fund at the same time it raises sufficient capital to maintain the daily expenses of the National Office and staff..."

Confidential source number two related that the evening plenary session of WONAAC occurred on July 15, 1972, and it was immediately apparent that the Socialist Workers Party - Young Socialist Alliance (SWP-YSA) group dominated the meeting. Independent women who wanted to make statements during this session were voted down by SWP floor leaders and these same persons continued to vote as a bloc on all issues.

The group of independent women from various geographic areas, that is those women who were not associated with the SWP or YSA, went together after the plenary session was adjourned and considered the problem of how to handle the SWP leaders. While these women were not political realists in their goals, they did believe in working throughout the existing system rather than functioning with the SWP in their eventual goal of revolution.

It was decided that the independent feminists would no longer continue hassling within WONAAC. They did not want to have decisions for them being structured by a male dominated group. They also decided that money being collected by WONAAC in the name of abortion law change was not being used for that purpose, but rather to sustain members of the SWP-YSA.

The Sunday morning session, July 16, 1972, was labeled "Meeting to Discuss Internal Hassles." About 35 independents attended and a few number of SWP-YSA members and sympathizers were present. Independents there were from New Haven, Boston, Detroit, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

The Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition

The independents did not waiver in their firm opposition to SWP-YSA control of WONAAC. Six national coordinators of WONAAC were independents and decided to resign publicly at the afternoon plenary session. They also decided to combat SWP control of the feminist movement through the various publications.

FORMER MEMBERS OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

CALIF. CA

The six national coordinators who resigned were Judy Siphers, San Francisco; Ann C. Davidson, PA Philadelphia; Rose Weber, New York; Vicki Eslinger, Columbia, South Carolina; Nancy Rolf, New York; and Ellen Shapiro, New York.

N.Y.

There were approximately 700-800 women in attendance at the afternoon session. According to one of the SWP leaders, these women were from 31 states and three countries- Canada, Italy and Sweden. The states that had more representation than others were Ohio, Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts.

Most of the problems and differences between the independents and the SWP centered around approaches to abortion law reform. The SWP was charged with always having demonstrations and rallies and never doing any work through the legislative process.

The independents stated that they were tired of this hassle and that they believed there were more effective ways to change abortion laws than carrying placards in the streets.

After the independent women publicly resigned in front of the plenary session, two other coordinators announced they were staying on. One was Barbara Roberts, the other's name is unknown.

Linda Jenness made a final plea for the independent women to reconsider. The removal of the independents from WONAAC has debilitated the organization and most independent representatives will be going back to their own cities to work for abortion law change in organizations which have no connection with the SWP.

The concern still exists, however, that WONAAC will be able to collect monies in the name of abortion reform and there is also the concern that women new to the movement will join in a mistaken notion that they will be furthering abortion law reform.

Independents vowed before leaving New York that they would try to publicize activities from the SWP in an effort to prevent this.

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (FS)
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex, Jr.

SAC, Philadelphia (100-53818) 8/11/72

Acting Director, FBI (100-468406)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Reurlet and LHM dated 7/27/72.

Referenced letter stated that activities of captioned organization in Philadelphia did not appear to be within the Bureau's investigative interest and, therefore, no additional investigation would be conducted.

As you are aware, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) play a major role in Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) throughout the United States. Although a source of your office claimed he was not aware of any information indicating WONAAC in Philadelphia is substantially controlled by SWP, four individuals whose photographs appeared in a Philadelphia paper, were identified as members of the SWP as well as WONAAC. Based on this as well as the established fact that WONAAC is, for the most part, totally controlled by SWP/YSA, it is basic that the activities of this organization be followed by your office.

You are, therefore, to reopen the case concerning captioned matter and follow the activities of this organization for the purpose of determining the extent of influence and control by individuals who are members of SWP/YSA and who are acting on behalf of these organizations. A copy of your communications should be furnished to the New York Office, office of origin in this matter, for information.

1 - New York (100-174481)

REC 43 100-468406-92

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

3 AUG 11 1972

GJL:tlc
(6)

Felt
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Campbell
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

70 AUG 16 1972
MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to Philadelphia
Re: Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition
100-468406

NOTE:

Philadelphia submitted letter and LHM dated 7/27/72 concerning WONAAC. Philadelphia stated that UACB no additional investigation would be conducted concerning this organization since it did not seem to be in the Bureau's investigative interest. Based on control of WONAAC by SWP/YSA throughout the country, Philadelphia being instructed to reopen and follow activities.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: JUL 27 1972

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-53818) (C)

SUBJECT: PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), AKA, WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, WOMEN UNITED FOR ABORTION RIGHTS
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of an LHM concerning captioned organization. Enclosed for New York are two copies of the same LHM.

Sources in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows:

PH T-1	PH 2114-S
PH T-2	PH 55-S
PH T-3	CG 7561-S

The enclosed LHM is being classified confidential in view of the fact that it contains information from PH T-1, PH T-2, and PH T-3 whose identities need to be protected in order not to compromise their future effectiveness and thereby be injurious to the national defense.

Copies of this communication are being furnished to the New York Office which is office of origin in this matter.

No additional investigation will be conducted in this matter UACB inasmuch as a continuing investigation of the abortion action coalition does not appear to be within the Bureau's investigative interest.

EX-117 REC-28 100-468406-91

The individuals mentioned in the enclosed LHM as being affiliated with the Socialist Workers Party are either on the ADEX or under investigation with the objective of inclusion on the ADEX.

ENCLOSURE

② - Bureau (100-468406) (Enc. 6) (RM)
2- New York (100-174481) (Enc. 2) (RM)
1- Philadelphia (100-53818)

JCH:sdc
(5)

5 JUL 28 1972

8/7/72

70 AUG 16 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-109-01

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

July 26, 1972

PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

PH T-1 advised on May 25, 1972, that Women United for Abortion Rights (WUAR), 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., telephone WA-2-0381, is the local affiliate of Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) and that about two weeks ago WUAR decided to change their name from WUAR to Philadelphia Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (Philadelphia WONAAC) and that they intended to utilize the same office space at 1115 Walnut Street and the same telephone number. PH T-1 added that this change was made inasmuch as the name WUAR was found to be unwieldy and awkward and that it did not convey the group's affiliation with WONAAC as well as the new name Philadelphia WONAAC.

An article in "The Sunday Bulletin," Section 2, pages 6 and 7, issue of October 31, 1971, listed the various candidates for political office in the City of Philadelphia in connection with the forthcoming elections. Photographs of the following individuals appeared and background information contained under each individual photograph indicated that all were members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and that they were also affiliated with the WUAR and/or WONAAC:

JEAN SAVAGE
CAROL LISKER
ROSE OGDEN
NANCY STREBE

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

100-467421-91

CONFIDENTIAL

PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

PH T-2 made available information on January 27, 1972 which reflected that as of that time the Coordinator of WUAR was SAMARA JAROSH.

SUBJECT

ORGANIZATION

PH T-3 advised on January 14, 1972 that ~~as of that~~ time SAMARA JAROSH was a member of the SWP.

PH T-1 advised on May 25, 1972 that it is difficult to determine the actual degree of SWP participation in the affairs of WONAAC in the Philadelphia area and that he was not aware of any information which would reflect that Philadelphia WONAAC was substantially controlled by the SWP. Source explained that the abortion rights issue had frequently been discussed at many of the recent public forum type meetings sponsored by the Philadelphia SWP and held at the Philadelphia SWP Headquarters at 1004 Filbert Street in Philadelphia. The discussions held on the abortion rights issue indicated that the SWP felt that the capitalistic system had used the dual issues of abortion and women's liberation to keep women in a position of inferiority, whereas the socialistic system being promoted by the SWP would be in favor of abortion and women's liberation, and WONAAC would therefore naturally attract members of the SWP to their organization.

CONFIDENTIAL

1-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 26, 1972

Title	PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, AKA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, WOMEN UNITED FOR ABORTION RIGHTS
Character	
Reference	Philadelphia letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. W. Gray (Grigalus)

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

1 - Mr. G. J. Lex, Jr.
7/14/72

TO SACS, DETROIT (100-40426)
NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK; IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REDETEL JULY THIRTEEN, LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADVANCE DE TWO EIGHT THREE ONE - S ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION TO NEW YORK, TO ATTEND CAPTIONED CONFERENCE. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES FROM INFORMANT.

PRIOR TO SOURCE TRAVELING TO CONFERENCE, DETROIT AND NEW YORK COORDINATE IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANT CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NEW YORK OFFICE. DETROIT INSTRUCT INFORMANT CONTACT NEW YORK OFFICE TO REPORT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

REC-28 100-468406-90

DETROIT CONTACT INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT DETAILED FD - THREE ZERO SIX TO NEW YORK WITHIN FIVE DAYS AND

1 - 134-22865
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

6 JUL 19 1972

GJL:tlc
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Felt
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Campbell
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

1:39 P

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

TELETYPE TO DETROIT AND NEW YORK
RE: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN,
SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
100-468406

NEW YORK SUBMIT SUCCINCT LHM SETTING FORTH RESULTS OF CONFERENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER SEVENTY-TWO DASH THREE (C) RE REPORTING RESULTS OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES.

NOTE:

WONAAC was founded in New York City 7/71 for purpose of forming a national movement of groups throughout U. S. who favor legalized abortion. This organization is dominated by Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). WONAAC scheduled to hold conference at Hunter College, New York, New York, 7/14-16/72. Detroit in teletype 7/13/72 requested authorization for DE 2831-S a valuable source who has been paid under SAC authority, to attend national conference in New York City. Detroit advised delay in submitting request was due to lack of information as to whether source would be able to attend conference. DE 2831-S is member of Detroit Women's Abortion Action Coalition (WAAC) and has furnished coverage on SWP influence in her chapter, and she has been successful in thwarting complete SWP takeover. Based on informant's position to discuss with persons in leadership capacity matters concerning SWP infiltration of WONAAC, it appears highly desirable for source to attend WONAAC conference in New York City. Detroit being authorized to advance source $135 in connection with travel to this conference. Detroit and New York also instructed to coordinate re source maintaining contact with New York and to insure FD-306 submitted and LHM submitted setting forth results of conference in accordance with SAC Letter 72-3 (C) re reporting results of subversive conferences. Source is second out-of-town informant to attend this conference.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: SEP 21 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMEN"S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:NY)

ReAL letter to New York, dated 8/30/72, wherein Albany asked to be advised of any active investigation being conducted re WONAAC, or if any active investigation is warranted by Albany, FBI.

For the information of the Albany Division, the New York Office is the office of origin, concerning captioned organization. The Bureau has advised that as the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance play a major roll in WONAAC throughout the United States, and inasmuch as information has been provided that WONAAC is, for the most part, totally controlled by Socialist Workers Party/ Young Socialist Alliance, the activities of this organization should be followed, for the purpose of determining the extent of influence and control by individuals who are members of Socialist Workers Party/ Young Socialist Alliance, and who are acting on behalf of these organizations.

Based upon Bureau instructions, in light of information set forth in referenced Albany letter, concerning DIANE PARRY, an Socialist Workers Party organizer in the Utica, New York area, and her reported communication with national headquarters of WONAAC in New York City. It would appear advisable for the Albany Division to institute such investigation, as it deems appropriate to ascertain the extent of Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance activity in its division in connection with WONAAC.

REC-72

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Albany (RM)
1 - New York

WRC:nl
(5)

17 SEP 25 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

57 SEP 28 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

For the information of the Albany Division, the New York Division has been instructed to prepare a national organizational report on WONAAC, to be submitted by December, 1972.

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Miss [illegible]

NR 003 CV CODE

115 PM URGENT 8-24-72 CLP

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM CLEVELAND (100-NEW)3P

RALLY TO REPEAL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, AT FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, CLEVELAND, OHIO, OR PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, AUGUST TWENTY-FIVE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, IS - RA.

19 72

5-T[illegible]

ON AUGUST TWENTYFOUR NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED SUPPORTERS OF APC WILL HOLD A DEMONSTRATION AT NOON ON AUGUST TWENTYFIVE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, TO CALL FOR REPEAL OF ANTI-ABORTION LAWS. DEMONSTRATION WILL BE HELD AT FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, EAST NINTH STREET AND LAKESIDE AVENUE, OR AT PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO.

Griffith

A SECOND RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED ON AUGUST TWENTYFOUR NINETEEN SEVENTWO, THAT AT A SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) MEETING ON AUGUST TWENTYONE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, CLEVELAND, OHIO, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT AN ABORTION RALLY WILL BE HELD AT

END PAGE ONE

REC-23

95

ST-117

2 "cc to ISD
Adm. data deleted"

MCT-35 AUG 30 1972

Included in summary to White House and Attorney General. Date 8/25/72

AGENCY
HOW FORW.
DATE FORW.
BY

61 SEP 6 1972

THE FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, EAST NINTH STREET AND LAKESIDE AVENUE, OR AT PUBLIC SQUARE ON AUGUST WENTYFIVE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, AT NOON. MEMBERS WERE ADVISED THAT ANYONE WHOSE LUNCH PERIOD COINCIDES WITH THE TIME OF THE RALLY SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ATTEND.

CLEVELAND, OHIO POLICE DEPARTMENT, LOCAL SECRET SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION BUILDING MANAGEMENT AND LOCAL UNITED STATES MARSHAL'S OFFICE WERE ADVISED.

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC)

THIS IS A SELF-DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO DEDICATED TO REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION ALWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN, IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTIVES LAW.

SOCIALIST WOERKS PARTY (SWP), CLEVELAND, OHIO BRANCH

THE CLEVELAND BRANCH OF THE SWP IS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SWP AND FOLLOWS ITS DIRECTIVES.

THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE

FIRST SOURCE IS CV ONE ZERO NINE EIGHT - PSI.

SECOND SOURCES IS CV SIX NINE FOUR - S.

CLEVELAND FOLLOWING THIS MATTER AND WILL SUTEL AFTER CAPTIONED EVENT.

END

FBI VDM WASH DC

CLR

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 10/4/72

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:NY)

On 10/3/72, NY 4253-S provided a flyer, captioned "Attention, All Women! Demonstrate to Demand the Supreme Court Rule in Favor of a Women's Right to Choose!", published by the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), 150 5th Avenue, New York City 10011.

The flyer encouraged all women to appear on Wednesday, 10/11/72, at 12:00 noon in front of the White House in Washington, D.C. to present demands for a right to the abortion law. The flyer indicated that on that date, United States Supreme Court will re-hear the suits challenging the constitutionality of the restrictive Texas and Georgia abortion laws.

The flyer stated that since it is presently illegal to demonstrate in front of the Supreme Court, WONAAC intended to hold a picket line and demonstrate

ST-102

② - Bureau (RM)
1 - Washington Field (100-55420) (INFO) (RM)
1 - New York (134-9382)
1 - New York

REC-73

11 OCT 6 1972

WRC:nl
(5)

Tel. Sent [illegible] WH Sit Room, AG, DAG, CSI

58 OCT 13 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

*U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574 in front of the White House at the afore mentioned time to present its demands.

The flyer revealed that WONAAC also scheduled a bus to leave WONAAC Office at 150 5th Avenue, New York City at 6:30 AM, 10/11/72. Interested participants were requested to enclose $10.00 for a round trip ticket to be paid to WONAAC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/21/72

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-16058) (P)

SUBJECT: MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION, aka
Minneapolis Abortion
Action Coalition;
MINNESOTA ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

OO: MINNEAPOLIS

Re Minneapolis letter and letterhead memorandum dated February 9, 1972.

Encl. 2

The Bureau, by routing slip dated March 6, 1972, advised that because of Socialist Workers Party (SWP) leadership and interest in the above organization, this case was to be kept in a pending status and its activities followed.

In accordance with the above instructions, the Bureau is being furnished the original and five (5) copies of a letterhead memorandum prepared under the title, "Minnesota Women's Abortion Action Coalition."

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified confidential because it contains information from MP T-1 through MP T-4, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably result in compromising the identity of the source and, therefore, impair the national defense interests of the United States.

Information concerning individuals named in the enclosed letterhead memorandum has previously been submitted to the Bureau and these individuals have been placed on ADEX in the past.

2 - Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
3 - Minneapolis
(1 - 100-1246)
DEW:dlb
(5)

ENCLOSURE

OCT 26

REC-70

ST-117

14 SEP 25 1972

98

Rev. Act. Sect.

57 OCT 13 1972

10/3/72.

R/S

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source		File Where Located
MP T-1 is ~~MP 2794-S~~	Orally to SA H. CLIFFORD MILLER, 8/9/72, pages 1, 2, and 6, instant LHM	134-2237-S1-58 thru 70
MP T-2 is ~~MP 2851-PSI~~	Orally to SA DONALD E. WALLER, 8/17/72, page 1, 5, instant LHM	100-16058-32, 28
MP T-3 is MP 2277-S	Used to cite JANE VAN DEUSEN	134-43-S1-741 thru 751
	Orally to SA RALPH S. RUSSELL, 8/23/72, page 5, instant LHM	
MP T-4 is MP 2303-S		134-75-S1-829 thru 836

LEAD

MINNEAPOLIS

AT MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Will continue to follow the activities of this group in accordance with current instructions.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

September 21, 1972

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

AIMS AND PURPOSE

The Minnesota Women's Abortion Action Coalition (MWAAC) is described as a part of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), which had its beginning at a conference held in New York City, New York in July, 1971.

Volume 1, Number 1,
November, 1971, edition of
"Gold Flower," self-described
as a Twin Cities newspaper
for women published monthly
at Minneapolis, Minnesota

The primary aims and purpose of the MWAAC are identical with the demands of WONAAC; that is, repeal of all anti-abortion laws, no forced sterilization, and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

LOCATION OR HEADQUARTERS

The present headquarters of the MWAAC is located at 100 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

MP T-2 on
August 17, 1972

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

100-46;11[illegible]-98

ENCLOSURE

OFFICERS

Jane Van Deusen in July, 1972, was identified as the coordinator of MWAAC. There are no other officers since this is not an organization, as such, which would have as a staff a group of officers, elected or appointed.

[illegible]

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

Jane Van Deusen in August, 1972, was identified as a then current member of the Twin Cities Branch-Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MP T-3 on
August 23, 1972

[illegible]

The Twin Cities Branch-Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed in 1955 by the merger of the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, branches of the SWP. The Twin Cities Branch-SWP is an affiliate of the SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

MEMBERSHIP

The MWAAC is a non-membership feminist movement of individuals interested in promoting the repeal of all abortion laws, and other aims having to do with principles of women's liberation on a national scale.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

GENERAL ACTIVITIES

At four closed meetings of the TCB-SWP held on various dates between January 26, 1972, and April 3, 1972, the women's liberation movement and some of the activities of the abortion action group were discussed. Included among these discussions were proposed attendance by local representatives at a WONAAC conference scheduled to be held at Boston, Massachusetts, February 11-13, 1972. At a meeting held April 3, 1972, discussions centered around a report presented concerning an abortion action week scheduled to be held in May, 1972, culminating in a May 6 rally at the State Capitol Building in St. Paul, Minnesota.

MP T-3 on
January 30, 1972, through
June 13, 1972

The MWAAC activities were discussed at four closed meetings of the TCB-SWP held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, between the dates of February 23, 1972, and March 22, 1972. Items included during these discussions were an MWAAC action conference scheduled to be held at the University of Minnesota campus, Minneapolis, Minnesota, on April 8, 1972, and the abortion action week scheduled to be held during the period May 1 through May 6, 1972, ending with a rally on the steps of the State Capitol Building in St. Paul, Minnesota.

MP T-4 on
February 28, 1972, through
March 29, 1972

Jane Van Deusen presented a report on women's activities to a closed meeting of the Young Socialist Alliance-Twin Cities Group (YSA-TCG) held February 20, 1972. Van Deusen, a member of the YSA-TCG, reported on the WONAAC conference held in Boston, Massachusetts, earlier in the month of February, 1972.

MP T-1 on
February 23, 1972

The Young Socialist Alliance-Twin Cities Group is the Youth Branch of the Twin Cities Branch-Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), an affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The MWAAC rally held May 6, 1972, began at the residence of the governor of the State of Minnesota, 1006 Summit Avenue, St. Paul, Minnesota, at approximately 3:30P.M. and proceeded to the State Capitol Building where the rally calling for the repeal of all abortion laws and emphasizing the demand for the right to legal abortions was held. The rally was held without incident and speakers identified included representatives from the YSA-TCG and the TCB-SWP. Jane Van Deusen was the principle speaker for the MWAAC at this rally which ended at approximately 5:30 P.M.

MP T-1 on
May 9, 1972

The principle speaker in favor of legal abortion in the State of Minnesota at the rally held in St. Paul, Minnesota, on May 6, 1972, was Jane Van Deusen from Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MP T-2 on
May 12, 1972

The MWAAC held a meeting July 25, 1972, at 100 University Avenue, Minneapolis, Minnesota. A report was presented concerning a national WONAAC conference held in New York City, New York, during July, 1972, where it was decided that an International Tribunal was planned for October 21, 1972. The International Tribunal would be held in New York City, New York, and it was hoped that plans could be made for a local tribunal scheduled to be held October 13, 1972, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, after which individuals would be designated to attend the international meeting scheduled for New York City. This July, 1972, meeting was the first activity on the part of the MWAAC as a non-organized effort following the May 6, 1972, rally.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

Individuals known to be involved in the women's liberation movement in the Twin Cities area of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, have, during the past six months, shown little or no interest in the organization known as the MWAAC. Former leaders in the women's liberation movement have become aware of the SWP influence among the leaders of the group, and have adopted a hands off policy from active participation in the affairs of this group. While the May 6, 1972, rally in St. Paul, Minnesota, was attended by some 200 individuals, their attendance was considered to be due to individual interest in the abortion issue.

MP T-2 on
August 17, 1972

SWP INFLUENCE

The MWAAC is not a committee of the TCB-SWP, nor is it a part of the YSA-TCG. Women's liberation is a topic of general interest and concern to the membership of the TCB-SWP, and the anti-abortion standard taken by MWAAC is one aspect of the women's liberation movement of continued interest.

MP T-3 on
August 23, 1972

Members of the YSA-TCG have in the past, expressed interest in the support of women's liberation as a matter of policy. The anti-abortion, or so called legal abortion movement, is one aspect of this women's liberation movement which continues to be of concern to members of the YSA-TCG, both male and female. While the vast majority of women in the State of Minnesota support either the repeal or changes in present state laws on abortion, supporters of this repeal or change also include professional women, medical doctors, lawyers, municipal court judges, and individuals from all walks of life.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Minneapolis, Minnesota

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

September 21, 1972

Title MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character

Reference Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Minneapolis

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 25 1972
TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Bates
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR 011 CV CODE

9:20 PM URGENT 8-25-72 SLO

TO ACTING DIRECTOR ATTN: DID

FROM CLEVELAND 100-33156 (P)

RALLY TO REPEAL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, AT FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, CLEVELAND, OHIO, OR PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, AUG. TWENTYFIVE SEVENTYTWO. IS - RA.

ON AUG. TWENTYFIVE, INSTANT, SAS OF THE FBI OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY FIFTY INDIVIDUALS ASSEMBLE AT NOON IN PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO. OF THIS GROUP, APPROXIMATELY SEVENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE FEMALES AND THE REMAINING TWENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE MALES. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS CARRIED PLACARDS WITH SLOGANS, "RATIFY THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT," ABOLISH LAWS THAT MURDER WOMEN - REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS." THE ASSEMBLED GROUP, SOME OF WHOM WERE CURIOSITY SEEKERS AND UNAFFILIATED PEOPLE ON THEIR LUNCH HOUR, HEARD SPEAKERS DELIVER SPEECHES, PRINCIPALLY ON REPEALING ALL EXISTING ANTI-ABORTION LAWS AND WOMEN'S

END PAGE ONE

REC-51

EX-116

96

5 -

70 SEP 15 1972

CV 100-33156

PAGE TWO

LIBERATION. SPEAKERS OBSERVED WERE CARYL LOEB, A MEMBER OF APC AS WELL AS THE CLEVELAND BRANCH, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, AND MARY WALSH, WHO SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION.

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC) THIS IS A SELF DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, DEDICATED TO REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION LAWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN. IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTIVES LAW.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP). CLEVELAND, OHIO BRANCH OF THE SWP IS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SWP AND FOLLOWS ITS DIRECTIVES. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

THE RALLY TERMINATED AT APPROXIMATELY ONE: FIFTEEN PM. THE RALLY APPEARED ORDERLY AND NO ARRESTS OR INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE WERE OBSERVED. A SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED RALLY CONSIDERED MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL. THE SOURCE STATED THE RALLY WENT OFF PEACEFULLY.

CLEVELAND PD, LOCAL US SECRET SERVICE AND LOCAL US MARSHAL'S

END PAGE TWO

ICE COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RE CLEVELAND TEL, AUG. TWENTYFOUR, SEVENTYTWO.

OBSERVING THE RALLY WERE SECURITY SQUAD SUPERVISOR THOMAS A. CORBETT, SA'S STEPHEN J. KASHIRSKY, E. MICHAEL KAHOE AND WILLIAM C. BELLINGER.

SOURCE IS CV ONE ZERO NINE EIGHT - PSI.

IN VIEW OF PEACEFUL NATURE OF RALLY, NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED, UACB.

P

END

JDJ FBI WASH DC CLR

cc - Kahoe

Mr. Felt
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Tele. Room
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR004 CODE

551 PM NITEL 10-11-72 GJH

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420) FOUR PAGES

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC).

INTERNAL SECURITY DASH COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST).

RE WFO TELETYPE DATED OCTOBER TEN, LAST.

ON OCTOBER ELEVEN, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY NINE AM THIS DATE, A WONAAC SPONSORED PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HELD IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), BY FIVE WOMEN REPRESENTATIVES OF WONAAC, INCLUDING DOCTOR BARBARA ROBERTS, WONAAC NATIONAL COORDINATOR WHO ACTED AS SPOKESWOMAN FOR WONAAC. THE PRESS CONFERENCE LASTED APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES, AND CONCERNED THE HEARINGS BEING HELD AT THE COURT REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN TEXAS AND GEORGIA. DOCTOR ROBERTS STATED THAT WONAAC HOPES THESE LAWS WOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

REC-36

105

END PAGE ONE

14 OCT 31 1972

57NOV2 1972

2 cc.
Adm. data deleted

PAGE TWO

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, FOLLOWING THE PRESS CONFERENCE, DOCTOR ROBERTS DEPARTED AND THE OTHER FOUR WOMEN PROCEEDED INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING WHERE THEY ATTENDED THE HEARINGS FROM NINE TWENTY AM TO ELEVEN FORTYFIVE AM.

THIS SOURCE ADVISED THAT A WONAAC SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, WDC, FROM APPROXIMATELY TWELVE NOON UNTIL ONE THIRTY PM, WITH APPROXIMATELY TWENTYFIVE TO THIRTY WOMEN PARTICIPATING IN THE DEMONSTRATION, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO EXPRESS SENTIMENT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, PARTICIPANTS CHANTED QUOTE SISTERS UNITE, STAND UP AND FIGHT, ABORTION IS OUR RIGHT UNQUOTE, AND CARRIED VARIOUS SIGNS, SOME OF WHICH READ, QUOTE ABORTION IS MY RIGHT UNQUOTE, QUOTE MY BODY, MY LIFE, MY RIGHT TO DECIDE UNQUOTE, QUOTE WOMEN MUST DECIDE OUR FATE, NOT CHURCH OR STATE UNQUOTE.

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE OR DURING THE DEMONSTRATION

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, DURING THE ABOVE DEMONSTRATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE, A FLYER WAS DISTRIBUTED WHICH STATED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS WERE IN WDC TODAY ON BEHALF OF THE MAJORITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN WHO AGREE THAT ABORTION IS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND THAT THE PICKET LINE WAS PART OF A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZED BY W~~O~~ONAAC TO FIGHT FOR THE REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION LAWS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION, THE FLYER ANNOUNCED A QUOTE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION AND FORCED STERILIZATION UNQUOTE, TO BE HELD IN NEW YORK CITY, MARCH NINE, TEN, ELEVEN, SEVENTYTHREE, WHERE WOMEN FROM ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WILL GATHER IN OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY AND FOR THE EVENT OF THE TRIBUNAL. THE FLYER CONTINUED THAT THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF WOMEN FROM ALL BACKGROUNDS AND EXPERIENCES, AND THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF LEGAL AND MEDICAL EXPERTS, THEY WILL DRAW TOGETHER THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

INDICT THE GOVERNMENT, THE ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, AND ALL THOSE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DENYING WOMEN CONTROL OVER THEIR BODIES. A DEMONSTRATION WILL ALSO BE HELD DURING THE TRIBUNAL TO PRESENT THEIR INDICTMENTS AND DEMANDS DIRECTLY TO THOSE WHO ARE FOUND GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

THE SOURCE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS WF THREE FIVE SIX NINE DASH CS.

END

FBI VDM WASH DC

ACK FRO THREE TELS

CLR

T'S MILLER
WANNALL
T.J. Smith
CREGAR
HORNER
ISD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
OCT 1972
TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Bender
Mr. Bayers
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR235 NY CODE

901PM URGENT 10-6-72 CJR

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATT DID

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 2P

DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE, OCTOBER ELEVEN NEXT, SPONSORED BY WOMENS ABORTION ACTION COALITION, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

ON OCTOBER THREE LAST, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, MADE AVAILABLE A FLYER CAPTIONED "ATTENTION, ALL WOMEN. DEMONSTRATE TO DEMAND THE SUPREME COURT RULE IN FAVOR OF A WOMENS RIGHT TO CHOOSE.", PUBLISHED BY WOMANS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), ONE FIVE ZERO FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY.

FLYER ENCOURAGED ALL WOMEN TO APPEAR OCTOBER ELEVEN NEXT, AT TWELVE NOON, IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON DC, TO PRESENT DEMANDS FOR THE RIGHT TO THE ABORTION LAW. [illegible]ER INDICATES THAT ON THAT DATE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WILL RE-HEAR SUITS CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIVE TEXAS AND GEORGIA ABORTION LAWS. FLYER STATES IT IS PRESENTLY ILLEGAL TO DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF SUPREME COURT AND WONAAC

END PAGE ONE

ST-113

REC-18

104

OCT 31 1972

5-

2 cc. ISD
Adm. data deleted

70 NOV 3 1972

PAGE TWO

INTENDS TO HAVE PICKET LINE AND DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE AS INDICATED ABOVE. FLYER INDICATES WONAAC HAS SCHEDULED BUS TO LEAVE WONAAC OFFICE, NEW YORK CITY, SIX THIRTY AM, OCTOBER ELEVEN NEXT. PARTICIPANTS REQUESTED TO ENCLOSE TEN DOLLARS FOR TICKET TO BE PAID TO WONAAC.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS NY FOUR TWO FIVE THREE DASH S.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE ADVISED CONTENTS OF ABOVE BY AIRTEL.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

PLS HOLD

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 10 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. EMW ✓
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR004 WF CODE

322 PM IMMEDIATE 10-10-72 SAT

TO ACTING DIRECTOR (100-468406)

NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420) 2 PAGES

T. Smith

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), INTERNAL SECURITY DASH COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST).

RE NEW YORK ARTEL DATED OCTOBER FOUR, LAST, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

ON OCTOBER FOUR, LAST, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DIVISION OF SPECIAL EVENTS, NATIONAL CAPITAL PARKS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, D.C., ADVISED THAT A NOTICE OF PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION WAS FILED WITH THAT DIVISION ON SEPTEMBER TWENTYONE, LAST, BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WONAAC WASHINGTON, D.C. CHAPTER, ONE THREE FOUR SIX CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST.

ST-114

REC 99 100-468406-103

OCT 25 1972

ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE NOTICE, THE DEMONSTRATION IS SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER ELEVEN, NEXT, AT LAFAYETTER SQUARE, WASHINGTON, D.C., FROM TWELVE NOON UNTIL SEVEN P.M., FOR THE

END PAGE ONE

70 OCT 31 1972

91

PAGE TWO

PURPOSE TO QUOTE EXPRESS SENTIMENT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION UNQUOTE, AND A MAXIMUM OF ONE HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE DEMONSTRATION WAS LISTED AS CAROL LIPMAN OF THE NATIONAL WONAAC OFFICE, ONE FIVE ZERO FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE ADVISED.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

NO LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM BEING SUBMITTED UNLESS DISRUPTION OCCURS DURING DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH CASE BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED.

SPOKESMAN FOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR IS PATRICIA KOMARINSKI.

END

KJB FBI WA D

CLR

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	NOV 30 1972	11/8/72-11/27/72	
TITLE OF CASE WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)		REPORT MADE BY WILLIAM R. CLOUGH		TYPED BY mes
		CHARACTER OF CASE IS-C (TROTSKYIST)		

REFERENCE:

Bureau O-7 to New York, 7/12/72.

-P*-

ADMINISTRATIVE:

With regard to the pretext to CAROL EATON, mentioned in the report, this pretext was conducted by SA WILLIAM R. CLOUGH and was in the nature of an anonymous newspaper reporter seeking information about WONAAC for a planned series of articles on ~~same~~ womens groups.

With regard to the names mentioned in the details of this report, the following is noted:

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED				☐ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

10 4 7

REC- 96

14 DEC 6 1972

COPIES MADE:

(6)-Bureau (100-468406) (RM)
1-New York (100-403 (SWP) (#45)
1-New York (100-133479) (YSA) (#45)
1-New York (100-174481)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	CIA	SS	STATE	2cc RDW (15D)
Request Recd.	kc 932D			
Date Fwd.	12/15/72			
Fwd.	R/5	221		
	DEC 20 1972			

Notations

Rev. Act. Sect.

COVER PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE (Continued:)

EVELYN KIRSCH, NY file 100-174520, Bu file 100-442975 is included in ADEX.

SUSAN LAMONT, NY file 100-160133, Bu file 100-448377 is the subject of a closed investigation, her activities not deemed warranted for inclusion in ADEX.

SUSAN CHRISTIE, NY file 100-167462, Bu file 100-458121 is the subject of Atlanta investigation, Atlanta being office of origin.

BARBARA MUTNICK is a Boston SWP member, Boston being office of origin.

With regard to the other names mentioned in the report, the NYO has no information contained in its files of a derogatory nature justifying their investigation.

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	File Where Located
NY T-1 BONNIE MERRILL 200 Main St. North Hampton, Mass. (By request)	NY 100-133479 Volume 184
NY T-2 WF 2188-S	WF 134-9613 Sub A 182-221
NY T-3 NY 711-S	NY 100-174481-18
NY T-4 NY 6467-S	NY 134-15562A- Scope- 948

INFORMANTS (Continued:)

Identity of Source	File Where Located
NY T-5 ~~NY 4253-S~~	NY 100-174481- 17, 90
NY T-6 ~~NY 7611-S~~	NY 134-17617A- 145
NY T-7 ~~NY 10389-S~~	NY 134-19305A- 14 through 75
NY T-8 ~~BS 808-S~~	BS 134-729A- 762-787
NY T-9 ~~WF 2188-S~~	WF 134-9613 Sub A 182-221
NY T-10 ~~BS 808-S~~	BS 134-729A- 762-787
NY T-11 ~~DE 2831-S~~	100-174481- 155

LEAD:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will follow and report activities of instant organization.

C*
COVER PAGE

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: WILLIAM R. CLOUGH
Office: New York, New York
Date: NOV 30 1972

Field Office File #: 100-174481
Bureau File #: 100-468406

Title: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY-C (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: WONAAC founded as result of conference held in NYC, NY, during July, 1971, for purpose of forming National Movement of Independent Groups throughout the US who favored legalized abortions and to end restrictive contraception laws and forced sterilization. National and NY State staff offices located 150 5th Avenue, NYC, NY. WONAAC does not maintain formal membership, and funds obtained through contributions. YSA and SWP influence and control over WONAAC reported since founding conference. Source advised February, 1972, that as result of de-escalation, Vietnam War, YSA-NYL plans to concentrate in area of Women's Liberation Movement through influence in WONAAC. Activities of WONAAC dutifully reported at regular membership meetings YSA-NYL during period March, 1972, through October, 1972. CAROL EATON, National Staff Member, advised under pretext in November, 1972, SWP/YSA influence not now significant, and WONAAC has always accepted help from whatever source offered. WONAAC International Tribunal scheduled to be held in NYC in March, 1972.

-P*-

DETAILS:

Investigation in this case is predicated upon receipt of information in July, 1971, from NY T-1, alleging the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) had taken over and were influencing the First National Womens Abortion Conference, held during that month

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. nor duplicated within your agency.

in New York City (NYC), details of which will be set out more fully hereinafter.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a Multi-National Revolutionary Socialist Youth Organization".
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. Origin and Scope

NY T-2 on July 21, 1971, and NY T-3 on October 1, 1971, furnished information that over 1,000 women met in conference at Columbia University, NYC, NY, on July 16, 1971, through July 18, 1971, to form a National Movement of independent groups scattered throughout the United States (US) who favored and had worked to legalize abortion. As a result of this conference, WONAAC was founded.

B. Aims and Purposes

In the WONAAC national newsletter, dated September 16, 1971, WONAAC was self-described as a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign including legislation, legal action, and nationally coordinated mass demonstrations in Washington, DC, and San Francisco, on November 20, 1971, for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws and corollary demands of no forced sterilization, and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws. WONAAC claims to reach all women, black; Chinaca; Latina; Asian; Puerto Rican; native American women; campus women; gay women; high school women; housewives; professional, welfare, and working women; young women; women from churches, political organizations, trade unions, the military, and communities across the country.

C. Headquarters

On November 22, 1972, a Special Agent (SA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), utilizing a pretext, contacted an individual self-identified as CAROL EATON at telephone number 675-9150, located at 150 5th Avenue, NYC, NY. EATON, who stated she is currently a National Staff member of WONAAC, advised that the National and NY Staffs of WONAAC are headquartered at this address.

D. When Meetings Held

According to CAROL EATON, regular NY Coalition meetings of WONAAC are held every other Wednesday evening at Religious Center at New York University, 2 Washington Square North, NYC, NY. EATON stated that most NY State staff members are present at these meetings and at least one or more National Staff members also try to be in attendance. Other than this, state and national staffs meet periodically, as business demands.

E. Officers

EATON identified the following individuals as current officers of WONAAC:

National Staff	SUSAN LAMONT	
National Coordinator ~~[illegible] ORGANIZATION~~	MARILYN MARKUS CAROL EATON	NY
NY State Staff [illegible] ~~[illegible]~~	BARBARA MUTNICK	
Coordinator	ANN GLICK JUDITH LAMBERT	NY

EATON further stated there are two recognized full time fund raisers for WONAAC. She identified these individuals as:

EVELYN KIRSCH
SUSAN CHRISTIE

F. Membership and Finances

According to EATON, WONAAC does not maintain a formal membership, as such, and financially exists only through voluntary contributions. She stated that all staff members, National and NY State, serve on a voluntary basis, receive no salary, and get only a small "subsistance allowance" which the staff has found necessary to supplement with their own personal funds in order to get by.

G. WONAAC Affiliates

CAROL EATON stated there are presently 36 WONAAC affiliates, also called "coalitions" throughout the US, and that most states of the union are represented by an affiliate or coalition.

II. YSA-SWP INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER WONAAC

NY T-1 provided information on July 22, 1971, that the First National Womens Abortion Conference was held at Columbia University, NYC, NY, from July 16, 1971, to July 18, 1971, which resulted in the founding of WONAAC. NY T-1 stated that it was immediately apparent that this conference was taken over and influenced by YSA-SWP members who infiltrated the various conference committees and workshops which were established to help formulate the main direction the Coalition would follow in the future. NY T-1 stated that it seemed certain the YSA-SWP would, in the future, dictate policy for this organization and would be able to control the utilization of WONAAC funds.

On August 5, 1971, NY T-4 provided a leaflet captioned, "What Every Woman Should Know". This leaflet, which was published by Feminist Organization for Communication, Action and Service (F.O.C.A.S.), related the following:

"The Womens National Abortion Coalition has been called and organized by the SWP and its affiliate, the YSA, including women supposedly representing Women's Liberation groups, who in truth represent, first, the

SWP and YSA. These women attach more importance to their political movement than to the Women's Liberation Movement. And when 77% of the women in this country are for reform of abortion laws, there is fertile soil for a political party to build itself on. The SWP/YSA realizes this and is taking advantage of it."

> On August 5, 1971, a leaflet captioned "F.O.C.A.S." revealed in part as follows:
>
> "A nucleus of about eight feminists have formed FOCAS, Feminist Organization for Communication, Action and Service. FOCAS evolved from the Women's Strike Coalition (WSC), which the Socialist Workers Party abruptly abandoned on May 25th in order to form the committee for WONAAC. Since that time a nucleus of women from WSC together with like-minded feminists preserved the WSC in order to maintain and expand a multi-issue action-oriented Women's Liberation coalition in the NYC area. Assisted by loans from supporting feminists, the new WSC paid back nearly a thousand of the three thousand dollars of debts incurred by the SWP women who had controlled the old WSC.

The "Militant" issue of August 6, 1971, page five, in an article entitled, "Abortion Campaign Counters Red-Baiting", revealed in part, with respect to the founding WONAAC conference in July, 1971:

> "The Militant" is a weekly newspaper of the SWP.

"There were many members of the SWP and YSA at the conference, and SWPers and YSAers are among those who have worked most consistently for abortion repeal and to build the abortion conference...."

NY T-5 advised on November 12, 1971, that a NY Planning Meeting of WONAAC was held at LOEB Student Center, NY University, NY, on November 11, 1971, to lay plans for a scheduled November 20, 1971 demonstration in Washington, DC. According to this source, this meeting was completely dominated and controlled by members of the SWP.

NY T-6 related on November 16, 1971, that the Upper West Side Branch of the YSA planned to send a contingent of its members to Washington, DC, on November 20, 1971, in order to participate in the planned demonstration there on that date.

NY T-6 stated that practically all the members of the uptown branch of the YSA, NY, were expected to participate in this activity.

NY T-5 related on January 20, 1972, that the scheduled November 20, 1971 march in Washington was "crucial" to all SWP and YSA branches in that it afforded an opportunity for selling of "The Militant" and other SWP/YSA literature, and also afforded an opportunity for "intervening " in the action via distribution of SWP Election Campaign literature.

NY T-8 on February 11, 1972, and NY T-9 and NY T-10 on February 14, 1972, provided information that a WONAAC convention was held February 11, 1972, to February 13, 1972, at Hayden Hall, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. The general theme of this convention was "How to Win Abortion Law Repeal". NY T-8 stated that approximately 30 members of the YSA or SWP Boston Chapters were observed in attendance at this convention.

NY T-7 related on February 14, 1972, that because of the de-escalation of the Vietnam War by the NIXON Administration, the YSA-New York Local (NYL), while continuing on with anti-war work through the NY Student Mobilization

Committee (SMC) and NY National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), both of which organizations they dominate, would also concentrate in the area of the Women's Liberation Movement through their influence in WONAAC.

> The SMC is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.
>
> NPAC was founded in 1970 by members of the SWP. Its objective is the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all US forces and material in Southeast Asia.

NY T-7 advised on various dates, March 23, 1972, through October 17, 1972, that activities of WONAAC were dutifully reported and included on the agenda at regular meetings of the Upper West Side Branch, YSA-New York Local (NYL) during that period.

NY T-5 advised on April 18, 1972, that the leadership of WONAAC was then dominated by the SWP.

NY T-7 related on July 7, 1972, that at a WONAAC meeting held June 27, 1972, at 706 Broadway, NYC, NY, starting at 6:40 PM, it was announced that even though WONAAC previously had accused various female activists working along with them in the Women's Liberation struggle of red baiting because of the stand they had taken against the SWP-Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), at present they are forced to work with these individuals to help strengthen the WONAAC cause.

At this meeting, certain WONAAC staff members walked out and voiced their disapproval of the meeting being taken over by a majority of SWP-YSA members. They indicated that the SWP-YSA has no right to be in a policy-making position in WONAAC.

NY T-7 on July 18, 1972, and NY T-11 on July 19, 1972, provided information that a WONAAC conference was held at Hunter College, Park Avenue and 69th Street on July 15, 1972 and July 16, 1972.

NY T-7 stated that NYC was picked as the site of this convention because this city is considered to be the center of the most powerful anti-abortion effort so far.

Discussions held at this conference centered on plans for (one)-future activity in the campaign to repeal all anti-abortion and contraception laws and (two)-to end forced sterilization.

A discussion was held concerning the attacks being made by the Catholic Church Hierarchy and other anti-abortion groups against women's rights to their own bodies.

NY T-11 related that the evening plenary session of WONAAC occurred on July 15, 1972, and it was immediately apparent that the SWP-YSA groups dominated the meeting. Independent women who wanted to make statements during this session were voted down by SWP floor leaders and these same persons continued to vote as a block on all issues.

The group of independent women from various geographic areas, that is, those women who were not associated with the SWP or YSA, went together after the plenary session was adjourned and considered the problem of how to handle the SWP leaders. While these women were not political realists in their goals, they did believe in working throughout the existing system rather than functioning with the SWP in their eventual goal of revolution.

It was decided that the independent feminists would no longer continue hassling within WONAAC. They did not want to have decisions for them being structured by a male dominated group. They also decided that money being collected by WONAAC in the name of abortion law change was not being used for that purpose, but rather to sustain members of the SWP-YSA.

The Sunday morning session, July 16, 1972, was labeled "Meeting to Discuss Internal Hassles." About 35 independents attended and a few number of SWP-YSA members and sympathizers were present. Independents there were from New Haven, Boston, Detroit, New York (NY), Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

The independents did not waiver in their firm opposition to SWP-YSA control of WONAAC. Six national coordinators of WONAAC were independents and decided to resign publicly at the afternoon plenary session. They also decided to combat SWP control of the feminist movement through the various publications.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

PA

The six national coordinators who resigned were JUDY SIPHERS, San Francisco; ANN C. DAVIDSON, Philadelphia; ROSE WEBER, NY; VICKI ESLINGER, Columbia, South Carolina; NANCY ROLF, NY; and ELLEN SHAPIRO, NY.

There were approximately 700-800 women in attendance at the afternoon session. According to one of the SWP leaders, these women were from 31 states and three countries-Canada, Italy and Sweden. The states that had more representation than others were Ohio, Illinois, New York and Massachusetts.

Most of the problems and differences between the independents and the SWP centered around approaches to abortion law reform. The SWP was charged with always having demonstrations and rallies and never doing any work through the legislative process.

The independents stated that they were tired of this hassle and that they believed there were more effective ways to change abortion laws than carrying placards in the streets.

After the independent women publicly resigned in front of the plenary session, two other coordinators announced they were staying on. One was BARBARA ROBERTS, the other's name is unknown.

DER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

LINDA JENNESS made a final plea for the independent women to reconsider. The removal of the independents from WONAAC has debilitated the organization and most independent representatives will be going back to their own cities to work for abortion law change in organizations which have no connection with the SWP.

The concern still exists, however, that WONAAC will be able to collect monies in the name of abortion reform and there is also the concern that women new to the movement will join in a mistaken notion that they will be furthering abortion law reform.

Independents vowed before leaving NY that they would try to publicize activities from the SWP in an effort to prevent this.

III. OBSERVATION OF CURRENT NATIONAL STAFF MEMBER REGARDING YSA/SWP INFLUENCE

When contacted under pretext on November 24, 1972, CAROL EATON, self-identified as a current National Staff member, and previously mentioned in this report, related that she has been active in WONAAC since its inception. EATON, while averring she is definitely not a YSA, SWP, or member of any "radical group", acknowledged there always have been SWP, YSA and "radical" elements in WONAAC. She went on to state, however, that WONAAC has never allied itself politically with any organization or individual, including any of the political candidates in the recent political election and, despite its diverse makeup as too ideaological beliefs of its membership, WONAAC is basically an organization which strives only to the objectives for which it was originally founded. To this end, she went on, WONAAC would accept help from whatever source offered.

EATON admitted there were some problems in the past with regard to friction within WONAAC about SWP and YSA influence. She stated, however, this matter, to her observation, never seemed a serious one, and is quite minimal today. With regard to the "walk out" of six national coordinators at the July, 1972 conference in NYC, she stated the walk out did not occur, in fact, because of the SWP/YSA influence question, but rather because those who walked out believed WONAAC should be a "referral agency", while those who stayed felt it should not. By referral agency, EATON stated she means an agency which would refer callers to a specific location or place where abortions could be obtained.

IV. PLANNED PROJECTS

CAROL EATON advised that WONAAC plans an international Tribunal march to be held in NYC, NY, from March 9, 1972, to March 11, 1972. She stated plans have not yet been finalized, including the exact location or site this event will take place. However, she noted that SIMONE BEAUVOIR, a Parisian, well known in the Women's Liberation Movement, would be honorary chairwoman.

FRENCH
[illegible]

FD-323 (Rev. 8-1-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

November 30, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. Bufile 100-468406
NYfile 100-174481

Title Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC)

Character Internal Security-C (Trotskyist)

Reference is made to New York report of Special Agent (SA) William R. Clough, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency., nor duplicated within your agency.

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

3/6/73

TO SACS, NEW YORK (100-174481)
WFO (100-55420) REC 43
FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) EX-101

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. E. P. Grigalus
1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION; IS - C (TROTSKYIST). REWFOAIRTEL DATED MARCH TWO LAST.

WITH REGARD TO YOUR REQUEST TO SEND TWO INFORMANTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION AND FORCED STERILIZATION SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN NYC ON MARCH NINE DASH ELEVEN, NEXT, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO ADVANCE (WF TWO ZERO THREE FOUR DASH S) EIGHTY-EIGHT DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION TO ATTEND THAT CONFERENCE. AUTHORITY ALSO GRANTED TO ADVANCE (WF TWO ONE EIGHT EIGHT DASH S) EIGHTY-EIGHT DOLLARS FOR SIMILAR EXPENSES TO ATTEND THAT CONFERENCE. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES FROM EACH INFORMANT.

PRIOR TO SOURCES TRAVELING TO CONFERENCE, WFO AND NYO COORDINATE IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANTS CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NYO. WFO INSTRUCT INFORMANTS TO CONTACT NYO TO REPORT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

WFO CONTACT INFORMANTS IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT

GJL:rsm (6)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Thompson
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

1:50 PM
WGC
RLS
WHF

58 MAR 13 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

TELETYPE TO SACS, NEW YORK AND WFO
RE: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
100-468406

DETAILED FD DASH THREE ZERO SIX TO NY WITHIN FIVE DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER SEVENTY-TWO DASH THREE (C) RE REPORTING OF RESULTS OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES.

NOTE:

WONAAC was founded in NYC 7/71, for purpose of forming a national movement of groups throughout U.S. who favor legalized abortions. Organization dominated by Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). WONAAC scheduled to hold International Conference at NYC 3/9-11/73. WF 2034-S, a member of the YSA and SWP, and WF 2128-S, a member of the YSA, have both been selected by SWP leadership to attend the conference in New York and to remain over for political activity at the YSA-SWP National Office on 3/11/73. Expenses involve $38 each for round-trip by Metro Coach from D.C., to NYC and $50 each for food, lodging, contributions and miscellaneous expenses for two days. Outlay would be $88 for each informant making a total of $176. Based on fact that sources were selected by [illegible].WDC., YSA/SWP leadership to be member of delegation to attend the International Tribunal, WFO is being authorized to advance each source $88.

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

FBI

Date: 3/2/73

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-55420) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re WFO report dated 12/15/72, captioned "WDC CHAPTER OF WONAAC, IS-C (TROTSKYIST)," setting forth information concerning an "International Tribunal on Abortion, contraception and forced sterilization" scheduled to be held in New York City, 3/9-11/73.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies and three (3) for New York of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

The source referred to in attached LHM is WF 2034-S.

REC 43

WF 2034-S, a member of the YSA and SWP Locals, WDC and WF 2188-S, a member of the YSA Local, WDC, have both been selected by WDC YSA/SWP leadership to attend the "International Woman's Day Soliditary Meeting" in New York City on 3/10/73 and to remain over for political activity at the YSA/SWP national office on 3/11/73.

7 MAR 7 1973

Bureau authority is requested to send both of the above sources to New York City for participation in the Woman's Day Soliditary Meeting and political activity at YSA/SWP national office, and to advance to each source the amount of $88 for expenses to be actually incurred, including $38 round trip metro coach fare from WDC to New York and $25 each per day for two days for food, lodging, contributions and miscellaneous expenses.

ENCLOSURE

5-LHM

2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
3 - New York (100-174481) (Enc. 3)
    (1 - 100-133479) (YSA)
4 - WFO (1 - 100-55420)
    (1 - 100-35189) (YSA)
    (1 - 134-9834 SUB A)
    (1 - 134-9613 SUB A)

[illegible]
3/5/73

AAM:jab
(9)

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

For the information of New York the code name of WF 2034-S is STUKA and the code name for WF 2188-S is MARISA. If approved by the Bureau, New York is requested to provide WFO with the name and telephone number of contacting agent.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

March 2, 1973

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

During the latter part of February, 1973, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Washington, D.C. (WDC) Chapter of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (D.C. WONAAC) is scheduled to participate in an "International Woman's Day Solidarity Meeting" scheduled to be held in New York City, New York on Saturday, March 10, 1973, place to be announced.

> The national office of WONAAC is located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, New York. WONAAC goals are self-defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

According to the above source, a flyer distributed by D.C. WONAAC disclosed that among those individuals scheduled to speak at the meeting are; GISELE HALIMI, described as a leader of "Choisir," a French abortion rights organization; MICHELE CHEVALIER, described as a defendent in a French abortion trial; and CLAUDE SERVAN SCHREIBER, described as a feminist journalist and as a leader of "Choisir".

According to the above source, members of the WDC Locals of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) have been urged to participate in the International Womans Day Solidarity Meeting.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

105-[illegible]-114

ENCLOSURE

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The above source advised that in addition to attendance at the Solidarity Meeting, some YSA/SWP members will remain in New York City overnight to conduct political activity at the National Office of the YSA/SWP in New York City, on March 11, 1973.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (FS)
1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex, Jr.

SAC, New York (100-174481) EX-111 REC-127 4/4/73

Acting Director, FBI (100-468406) - 113

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
OO: NEW YORK

RePHlet 2/28/73.

The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) has been the subject of a separate investigation by the Bureau in numerous offices. In referenced letter, Philadelphia pointed out that WONAAC represents a basic social change dealing with abortion rights and that in view of the fact the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of abortion, the continued investigation of WONAAC at this time does not appear to be desirable and should be discontinued. Philadelphia also suggested that continued investigation of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), should determine pertinent activities of WONAAC.

After careful consideration of this matter, the Bureau agrees with the observations of the Philadelphia Office that the investigation of WONAAC should be discontinued. However, in view of the fact that WONAAC is dominated and controlled by the SWP, a Trotskyist communist organization cited by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, it is the responsibility of the Bureau to investigate and report pertinent information relating to the extent of SWP domination and control of captioned organization.

Therefore, recipients should close separate investigations concerning WONAAC. In the future, report above-described information regarding WONAAC under appropriate subheading in the SWP semiannual organizational reports.

2 - Albany (100-22831)
2 - Boston (100-43809)
2 - Detroit (100-40426)
2 - Jacksonville (100-2049)
2 - Minneapolis (100-16058)
2 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

2 - Pittsburgh (100-17517)
2 - Richmond (100-11665)
2 - Sacramento
2 - San Antonio (100-12935)
2 - St. Louis (100-22704)
2 - WFO (100-55420)

MAILED 21
APR - 4 1973
FBI

GJL:rsm (30) WGC

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

rsm

WRW/RLS

Mr. Felt ____
Mr. Baker ____
Mr. Callahan ____
Mr. Cleveland ____
Mr. Conrad ____
Mr. Gebhardt ____
Mr. Jenkins ____
Mr. Marshall ____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ____
Mr. Soyars ____
Mr. Thompson ____
Mr. Walters ____
Tele. Room ____
Mr. Kinley ____
Mr. Armstrong ____
Mr. Bowers ____
Mr. Herington ____
Ms. Herwig ____
Mr. Mintz ____
Mrs. Neenan ____

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to SAC, New York et al
Re: Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC)
100-468406

NOTE:

WONAAC has been subject of separate investigation by numerous offices. In relet 2/28/73, Philaddphia stated that WONAAC represents basic social change dealing with abortion issue and considering recent U.S. Supreme Court upholding right of abortion, investigation of WONAAC should be discontinued, but activities followed through investigation of SWP and YSA. New York, office of origin in this matter, as well as other offices handling WONAAC investigations, including Philadelphia, being advised that Bureau agrees with observations of Philadelphia considering controversial abortion issue and in the future report activities of WONAAC in subheading of SWP semiannual organizational reports.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 2/28/73

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-53818)(RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:New York)

Re Philadelphia letter to Bureau dated 1/31/73 and Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 2/12/73.

For the information of New York, referenced Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 2/12/73 authorized a continued investigation of WONAAC utilizing only established sources. The Bureau further advised that the investigation was to be conducted in a most discreet manner and that no action was to be taken which could in any way be construed as infringement by the FBI on academic freedom at the University of Pennsylvania.

The case file of captioned organization has been reviewed as well as all indices references to captioned organization and it has been determined that while some of the individuals associated with WONAAC in the Philadelphia area are also known to be affiliated with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and for the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the majority of WONAAC supporters appear to be individuals interested in social change rather than revolutionary political change.

SP 105

113

REC-5

In view of the fact that WONAAC represents basically a social change vehicle dealing with the single issue of abortion rights and the fact that a recent U. S. Supreme Court decision upheld the right to abortion, thereby reducing the political value of this issue, it would appear that a continued investigation of WONAAC at this time is not desirable.

12

2 - Bureau (100-468406) (RM)
1 - New York (100-174481) (RM) (Info)
1 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

21 MAR 5 1973

JCH:klh
(4)

FIVE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be discontinued. In this regard, it is noted that continued investigation of the SWP and/or the YSA should produce the desired data regarding their activities without taking the risk of embarrassment inherent in a continued investigation of WONAAC,

UACB, Philadelphia is RUC'ing this matter.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 2/22/73

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-16058) (C)

SUBJECT: MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION, aka
Minneapolis Abortion
Action Coalition;
MINNESOTA ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

OO: MINNEAPOLIS

Re Minneapolis letter and letterhead memorandum dated 9/21/72.

The Minnesota Supreme Court on 2/2/73 declared the state's abortion law unconstitutional in its entirety based on the 1/22/73 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court wherein it was ruled that the states cannot prohibit abortions during the first six months of pregnancy.

The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court has resulted in several Twin Cities area hospitals in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, offering facilities and providing necessary procedures for staff members to perform abortions under these court rulings. 1B

MP 2851-PSI who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that the object of the captioned group was to remove anti-abortion laws from the books in the state of Minnesota, as well as in the United States.

On 2/16/73 this source further related that the Women's Liberation Movement supporters in the Twin Cities area have generally reacted favorably to the court decisions relating to abortion laws and now that the principal object of the Minnesota Abortion Action Coalition has been achieved, the influence of its spokesmen is expected to decline.

18

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Minneapolis
DEW:cjp
(3)

REC-28
EX-103

FEB 26 1973

10

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Minneapolis sources (MP 2277-S) and (MP 2794-S,) who have in the past furnished reliable information concerning the activities of the Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance - Twin Cities Group, advised on 2/15/73 that in view of the recent court decisions concerning the abortion issue, the past interest, influence and limited activity on the part of members of these respective organizations in the abortion issue is expected to become non-existent.

This case is being placed in a closed status based on the above information and no LHM is being submitted.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (FS)
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex

SAC, Philadelphia (100-53818) 2/12/73

Acting Director, FBI (100-468406) - 111

REC-139

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST) EX-103

Reurlet 1/31/73.

Referenced letter stated that a flier was passed out at an antiwar rally in Philadelphia on 10/26/72 revealing that the WONAAC had moved to offices located on the third floor at Houston Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and that the telephone service for this office was subscribed to by the University of Pennsylvania.

In regard to your request to continue attempts to develop information regarding WONAAC, an organization dominated and controlled by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), considering it now utilizes offices at the University of Pennsylvania, you are authorized to continue your investigation. You should, however, restrict your investigation to determining the degree of infiltration and domination of this organization by SWP or its youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). This investigation must be conducted in a most discreet manner and limited to established sources. No action is to be taken by you which could in any way be construed as infringement by the FBI on academic freedom at the University of Pennsylvania.

It is noted by the Bureau that the above information was received by your office on 10/26/72, however, your request was not submitted to the Bureau until 1/31/73, a period in excess of 90 days. Although it is recognized there may be other matters requiring more immediate attention, the delay in this instance appears unreasonable. In the future, insure that these matters are handled on a more timely basis.

GJL:mjg mjg
(5)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

MAILED 5
FEB 12 1973

57 FEB 20 1973

WGC

EM/WPW

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to Philadelphia
Re: Women's National Abortion Action
Coalition (WONAAC)
100-468406

NOTE:

In letter dated 1/31/73 Philadelphia advised that information had been received on 10/26/72 that WONAAC, which is dominated and controlled by Socialist Workers Party (SWP), had moved to the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia requested authority to continue investigation. Philadelphia being authorized to continue investigation in a most discreet manner and to avoid conducting investigation which could be construed as infringement on academic freedom. Philadelphia also being advised to furnish such information on a more timely basis in the future.

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 1/31/73

WAS Gen

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (100-53818) (P)

SUBJECT: PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), aka IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re Philadelphia letter to the Bureau dated 7/27/72, and Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 8/11/72.

PH 210-S who has furnished reliable information in the past, made available information on 9/1/72, which reflected that the various women's liberation groups in the Philadelphia area were planning a women's rights rally to be held on 8/26/72, at Rittenhouse Square, Philadelphia, Pa. The information furnished by the source further reflected that the coalition of women's rights groups which planned the rally for 8/26/72, held a meeting on 8/16/72, and at that time they voted to exclude the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance people from participation in the rally on the grounds that they were representatives of political organizations.

The records of the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania as furnished on 12/15/72, by DONALD V. POWELL (PROTECT SOURCE), reflected that telephone service for the Women United For Abortion Rights, 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., consisted of telephone number WA 2-0381, which was installed on 6/25/71, and which was disconnected on 7/31/72, for non-payment of bill.

2 - Bureau (100-468406)(RM)
1 - New York (100-174481)(RM)
1 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

JCH:cmk
(4)

REC-49

ST-111

14 FEB 6 1973

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PH 100-53818

A flyer was passed out to the public at an anti-war rally held in Philadelphia on 10/26/72, which reflected that Philadelphia Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) had moved to the third floor, Houston Hall, 3417 Spruce Street, University of Pennsylvania, telephone number 594-5267. The records of the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania as furnished by DONALD V. POWELL, (PROTECT SOURCE) reflected that telephone service for number 594-5267 is subscribed to by the University of Pennsylvania, 34th and Spruce Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.

Sources of the Philadelphia Office have not furnished any information regarding WONAAC activities since referenced Philadelphia letter was submitted.

Request of Bureau

In view of the fact that WONAAC left 1115 Walnut Street in late July 1972, and is presently maintaining an office at the University of Pennnsylvania Houston Hall, Bureau authority is requested to continue to attempt to develop information regarding captioned organization, and to attempt to determine the extent of TROTSKYIST influence or direction of WONAAC.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/31/73

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

JWB

Sper
Griffith

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

FROM: SAC, ALBANY (100-22881) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

(OO: NEW YORK)

Re New York letter to the Bureau 1/10/73.

On this date, Lieutenant JOHN NABORS, New York State Capital Police, Albany, New York, stated that demonstration mentioned in referenced communication failed to take place on 1/30/73, and no demonstrators were in evidence at the Capital Building.

Appropriate local officials were advised on 1/22/73 of proposed demonstration.

10

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (RM) (100-174481)
2 - Albany
JTD:kms
(6)

REC-73 100-

110

11 FEB 2 1973

ST-116

Rev. Act. Sect.

51 FEB 8 1973

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 1/10/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C

ReALlet to NY, dated 10/31/72.

Attached for the information of the Albany Division is a copy of a flyer obtained by the New York Office, published by the National Office of WONAAC and calling attention and urging the attendance of recipients to legislative hearings on abortion, scheduled to be held in the state capital building in Albany, New York, on January 30, 1973. The flyer indicated that testimony would be heard from medical and legal experts on abortion along with reports from women who have had legal as well as illegal abortions. Those attending were urged to visit their legislators in the morning and attend the hearing in the afternoon.

On 1/9/73, SA WILLIAM R. CLOUGH, utilizing a pretext of an anonymous newspaper reporter, ascertained from an unknown female at National Office of WONAAC, located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, New York (telephone 212-675-9150), that several hundred women were expected to attend the aforementioned hearings and that several buses accommodating most of these individuals were scheduled to leave from Union Square West, New York, New York, at 7 and 8 a.m. on 1/30/73.

This unknown individual stated she had reason to believe that those attending the hearings under the auspices of WONAAC would not conduct themselves in other than a peaceful manner.

Albany will, through logical informants or established sources, furnish any pertinent information developed re this matter.

10
2-Bureau (RM)
2-Alberty (100-22881) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-New York

WRC:jal
(5)

REC-80

EX-101

109

10 JAN 15 1973

Not Rec'd

Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
WASHINGTON FIELD	NEW YORK	12/15/72	9/21/72-12/6/72

TITLE OF CASE WASHINGTON, D.C., CHAPTER WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC)	REPORT MADE BY ARLAND A. MOSEL	TYPED BY pmw
	CHARACTER OF CASE IS-C (TROTSKYIST)	

REFERENCE: Report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72 at Washington, D.C., captioned, "Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), IS-C (TROTSKYIST).

- P* -

ADMINISTRATIVE

INFORMANTS	LOCATION
WF T-1 is WF 2188-S WF T-2 is WF 3569-CS WF T-3 is WF 2034-S	134-9613 Sub A - 182 through 365. Also instant report. 100-55420-78 134-9834 Sub A - 719.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE					ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED — SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

6-Bureau (100-468406)
2-New York (100-174481)(WONAAC)
2-WFO (100-55420)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

[illegible] 108

REC-73

20 DEC 22 1972

ST-115

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	SS	2cc Rom (ISD)	1cc 932D	
Request Recd.	1cc dest.			
Date Fwd.	1/5/73			
How Fwd.	R/S			
By	JAN 10 1973			

Notations

L

Rev. Act. Secd.

COVER PAGE

These individuals considered to be key people in D.C. WONAAC all have or are the subjects of WFO investigations due to their YSA and/or SWP membership. None are ADEX subjects at this time.

WFO is placing this case in a pending inactive status for six months.

B*
COVER PAGE

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:	ARLAND A. MOSEL	Office:	Washington, D.C.
Date:	12/15/72		
Field Office File #:	100-55420	Bureau File #:	100-468406

Title: WASHINGTON, D.C., CHAPTER
WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY-C (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: D.C. WONAAC affiliate of Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), which was founded July, 1971. WONAAC national headquarters originally located Washington, D.C., (WDC), but moved to New York, New York, December, 1971. D.C. WONAAC located 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., WDC, and key people involved all members of WDC locals of Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and/or Socialist Workers Party (SWP). D.C. WONAAC does not maintain formal membership and funds obtained through contributions. Does not hold regular meetings and most activities in conjunction with those planned by national office. Goals synonymous with those of national office which have been defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

- P* -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. nor duplicated within your agency.

This investigation is predicated upon information that the Washington, D.C., (WDC), locals of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in activities of the WDC chapter of the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (D.C. WONAAC).

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. Origin and Scope

D.C. WONAAC is an affiliate of Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), which was founded at a conference held in New York, New York, July 16-18, 1971. WONAAC's national headquarters was originally located in WDC, but was moved to New York, New York, during December, 1971. The WDC chapter was originally referred to as D.C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (D.C. WAAC), but was subsequently changed to D.C. WONAAC in order to be identified completely in name with national.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

B. Aims and Purposes

D.C. WONAAC's goals are synonymous with those of WONAAC, which have been defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

(WF-1, 7/21/71 and 12/6/72)

C. Location

D.C. WONAAC is located at 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., WDC, Suite 318.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

D. Headquarters

National WONAAC is located at 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

YSA/SWP members are a minority force on the National WONAAC staff and the independent staff members favor elimination of YSA/SWP women from WONAAC.

(WF T-1, 7/5/72)

E. Officers

Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS, National Coordinator of WONAAC, resides at 4528 Van Ness Street, N.W., WDC.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

The following individuals, who are all members of the WDC locals of the YSA and/or SWP, are considered to be the key people involved in D.C. WONAAC:

BARBARA SANDSTROM
STARR BOWIE T
PAT PUTNAM T
TOBA SINGER (w/APEX)
KATHY KERSEY
SARA SMITH

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

F. Membership and Finances

D.C. WONAAC does not maintain a formal membership as such.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

D.C. WONAAC is a non-profit chapter of WONAAC which obtains its funds through contributions and uses any funds collected in offsetting expenses incurred in the furtherance of its activities. It receives a certain amount of support, financially and otherwise, from independent organizations who identify with WONAAC's main central demand of "Repeal All Abortion Laws."

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

At a regular business meeting of the WDC local YSA, held on August 1, 1972, it was mentioned during the Womens Liberation report that WONAAC was in debt and that a local fund raising cookout was scheduled for August 6, 1972.

(WF T-1, 8/1/72)

II. ACTIVITIES

A. Meetings

D.C. WONAAC does not hold regularly scheduled meetings. Other activities, such as demonstrations or other actions, are generally in conjunction with those planned by the national office.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

B. WONAAC Related Activity

A D.C. WONAAC sponsored "Women's Commission on Abortion and Forced Sterilization" was held on May 6, 1972, at St. Marks Church, 3rd and A Streets, S.E., WDC, as part of a nationwide campaign sponsored by WONAAC. Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS, WONAAC National Coordinator, and SHARON NAIMAN, WDC local YSA member, were among the conveners of the Commission.

(WF T-1, 5/6/72)

D.C. WONAAC was represented at the third national WONAAC conference held at Hunter College, New York, New York, July 14-16, 1972.

(WF T-1, 7/19/72)

D.C. WONAAC participated in a WONAAC sponsored press conference and demonstration held in WDC on October 11, 1972, to express sentiment for legalized abortion. Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS acted as spokeswoman for WONAAC. A flyer distributed during the demonstration announced an "International Tribunal on Abortion, contraception and forced sterilization" to be held in New York, New York, March 9-11, 1973, where women from all over the United States and other parts of the world will gather in observance of International Women's Day and the event of the Tribunal.

(WF T-2, 10/11/72)

At a regular business meeting of the WDC local at the YSA, held on November 13, 1972, it was stated, during the women's liberation report, that WONAAC is seeking endorsements by prominent women and women's organizations. In addition, it was stated that WONAAC and YSA plan to become more active in participation with other women's organizations then in the past.

(WF T-3, 11/13/72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C. 20535

December 15, 1972

Title	WASHINGTON, D.C. CHAPTER WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC)
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY-C (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	Report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/15/71

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

per 2 ReWFOairtel and LHM, 11/2/71 per 3 and WFOairtel to Bu, 11/5/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 8 and for other receiving offices two copies of LHM.

Sources referred to in LHM is WF 3569-CS.

Sources used to characterize CAROL LIPMAN in LHM are WF 2188-S and NY 4253-S.

Source used to characterize [redacted] WF ~~2188-S~~.

100-468[illegible]-13

LEADS

ATLANTA EX-101

REC NOV 22 1971

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA. Contact logical sources in Women's Liberation Movement to determine approximate numbers and leading personalities planning to attend captioned demonstration.

8 ENCLOSURE

2-Bureau (Enc. 8)
2-Atlanta (Enc. 2)
2-Boston (Enc. 2)
2-Chicago (Enc. 2)
2-Cleveland (Enc. 2)
2-New York (Enc. 2)
2-Philadelphia (Enc. 2)
2-WFO
(1-100-49208) (WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT)
BCC:cac
(16)

AGENCY SS
REQ. REC'D 150
DATE FWD. 11-16-71
HOW FWD.
BY BJC

~~Copy to~~ 14cc 432D
~~by routing slip for~~ 11cc mail 9+D
☑ Info ☐ Action
date Sent 11/18/71
by SSC

Approved: ______________ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

5 DEC 2 1971

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

WFO 100-54927
In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CHICAGO

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. Contact sources within Women's Liberation Movement, especially those knowledgeable in SWP/YSA to determine numbers and personalities coming to Washington, D. C. (WDC), for captioned demonstration.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. Contact logical sources to determine leading personalities and approximate numbers planning to participate in captioned demonstration.

Furnish characterizations of EVELYN CLARK and MILTILDE MILES.

CLEVELAND

AT CLEVELAND, OHIO. Contact logical sources within the Women's Liberation Movement to determine leading personalities and numbers to participate in captioned demontration.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK. Contact logical sources to determine leading figures and numbers of participants in demonstration.

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. Contact logical sources to determine leading personalities and approximate numbers planning to attend captioned demonstration.

Receiving offices will contact appropriate bus companies to obtain information regarding number of buses coming from their areas to WDC for captioned demonstration.

WFO will continue to follow locally.

LHM is classifed "Confidential," to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information which could be prejudicial to the defense interest of the nation.

CONFIDENTIAL

Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-448791-12

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535 CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 15, 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.

On November 4, 1971, Sergeant JOHN TOMLINSON, U.S. Park Police, furnished a permit application for captioned demonstration which contained the following information:

Sponsoring organization Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, 917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. (WDC), 20005, phone 202-347-0946. Individual sponsor and WONAAC National Project Director, Carol Lipman, 116 Sunnyside Road, Silver Spring, Maryland, telephone numbers 202-347-0946 and 202-535-2610. D.C. Other principal officers were Barbara Roberts, M.D., 7547 Springlake Drive, Apartment B-1, Bethesda, Maryland, 365-0353 and Joan M. Gombos, 1701 16th Street, N.W., WDC, 20005. D.C.

Washington, D.C.

Carol Lipman is described as a member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). As of June, 1970, Lipman was the National Executive Secretary of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC).

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The SMC is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

The following sponsoring organizations were listed:

Women V. Connecticut, Women and The Law Office,
Box 69, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-468406-13

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

AT **Georgia Women's Abortion Action Coalition**
P.O. Box 7122, Atlanta, Ga. 30309 (404) 874-8365

BS Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
552 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9, Cambridge, Mass. 02139
(617) 547-1818; 491-1071

PH **Women United for Abortion Rights**
1115 Walnut Street, 3rd floor, Philadelphia, Pa. (215) Wa 2-0381

C Illinois Women's Abortion Coalition
343 So. Dearborn Ave., Room 305, Chicago, Ill. 60605 (312) 922-0745

W Women for Abortion Action
917 - 15th St. N.W., Suite 502, Washington, D. C. (202) 347-0947

NY WONAAC - New York
P.O. Box 685, Old Chelsea Station, New York, N.Y. 10011
(212) 924-0894

CV **Abortion Project Coalition - Cleveland**
11220 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44106 (216) 368-2248

Rhode Island Coalition to Repeal Abortion Laws
64 Preston Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02906 (401) 331-3370

Detroit Women's Abortion Action Coalition
2230 Withrell, Detroit, Michigan (313) 962-8022

BA Women's Right to Choose of Maryland
3028 Greenmount Ave., Baltimore, Maryland (301) 323-9485

I Bloomington Abortion Coalition
702 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana 47401

Women V. Connecticut, Women and the Law Office
Box 89, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
(203) 436-0364

MP

Minneapolis Abortion Action Coalition
100 University Ave., S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55814
(612) 332-5773

HO

Houston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
Box 192, Campus Activities, University of Houston, Houston,
Texas 77004 (713) 748-6600 Ext 1266

There are affiliates in many western states but they are coordinating for the San Francisco counterpart of the November 20 demonstration. WONAAC West has already obtained the necessary permits for the demonstration in San Francisco.

An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 participants will march peacefully and orderly to build public support for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws against forced sterilization and an end to restrictive contraceptive laws. The marchers will assemble 10:00 a.m. to noon at the Ellipse; march west from the Ellipse on E Street to 17th Street; N. on 17th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue; E. on Pennsylvania Avenue to 15th; South on 15th Street to Pennsylvania; Southeast on Pennsylvania to the Capitol and Rally; The West Steps of the Capitol.

The following activities during the demonstration were listed:

Demonstrators will assemble in contingents at the Ellipse and march above route to the Capitol to participate in a rally. Marchers will be carrying signs and placards concerning the aims of the demonstration; many will be brought from around the country. Speakers are not yet firmed up. Musical entertainment will be part of the rally. Demonstrators will disperse and either return home in D. C. area or go to cars and busses and return to cities.

There will be one marshal for every 20 demonstrators, Chief Marshal listed as [illegible], D.C.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C. CONFIDENTIAL

Members of Socialist Workers Party D.C.

Delphine Welch is described as a member of SWP.

On November 12, 1971, a source that has provided reliable information in the past, advised that preparations to transport demonstrators for the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition Rally, November 20, 1971, in WDC, have been made in the following cities:

Atlanta Two Trailways Buses
Chicago Eight Trailways Buses
Cleveland Four Greyhound Buses, seating capacity, 43 per bus.
New York City 15 buses, seating capacity 40 - 50, confirmed with more likely to be chartered.
Philadelphia 9 buses chartered from the S.E.P.T.A. Line, seating 51 passengers each.

In addition, Philadelphia has dispatched Sheila Ostrow, 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia to WDC to help organize the rally. PA

Source further advised that the Boston Local of the SWP has sent Evelyn Clark and Matilde Miles to WDC for the specific purpose of organizing the November 20 Demonstration. Mass. Mass

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 18 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss [illegible]
Miss Gandy

NR 005 IP PLAIN

719 PM NITEL 11/18/71 SRM

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIV.)

WFO (100-54927)

FROM INDIANAPOLIS (100-23792)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOV. TWENTY, NEXT, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS - NEW LEFT. OO: WFO.

A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIBLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED NOV. EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN INDIVIDUALS WILL BE ATTENDING CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION FROM INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON, IND. INDIVUDUALS WILL REPRESENT BLOOMINGTON ABORTION ACTION COMMITTEE. INCLUDED IN THOSE TRAVELING WILL BE APPROXMATELY FIVE MEMBERS OF THE YOUND SOCIALIST ALLIANCE FROM INDIANA UNIVERSITY WHO ARE SUPPORTING DEMONSTRATION. INDIVIDUALS

END PAGE ONE

REC-59

EX-100

100-468106-12

1971

NOV 1971

Adm. data deleted

PAGE TWO

WILL BE TRAVELING IN TWO FORD ECONOLINE VANS RENTED FROM U-HAUL.

ADMIN:

nov. 2

RE WFO AIRTEL NOV. FIVE LAST.

END

LRS FBI WASHDC CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NR 010 WF CODED

NOV 17 1971

5:07 PM NITEL 11-17-71 ASW

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TO DIRECTOR (ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGNECE)

CLEVELAND (100-27031)

NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-54927)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT.

CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK AND ADVISED TO HAVE INFORMANTS ATTENDING CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION REPORT INFORMATION TO WFO BE CALLING SIX TWO EIGHT DASH TWO EIGHT THREE SEVEN OR SIX TWO EIGHT DASH TWO EIGHT TWO SIX AND SPEAK WITH PERSON ANSWERING.

CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK WILL ADVISE WFO OF CODE NAMES TO BE USED BY RESPECTIVE INFORMANTS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

REC-59

RE NEW YORK TEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN, LAST AND BUREAU AIRTEL TO CLEVELAND NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST CAPTIONED STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS), IS - NEW LEFT.

NOV 18 1971

END

MRF FBI WA DC

100

57 NOV 26 1971

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 18 1971

[illegible]TYPE

NR 007 SF CODE

11:02PM NITEL 11/17/71 JAK

TO DIRECTOR
ATLANTA
NEW YORK
WASH FIELD OFFICE

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (157-0) 2P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION COALITION, WASHIGNTON, D.C. EM.

INCO

RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED THAT ERICKA HUGGINS HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO APPEAR AT A RALLY AND DEMONSTRATION SPONSORED BY CAPTIONED ORGANIZATION TO BE HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. NOV. TWENTY NEXT.

ON NOV. SIXTEEN LAST, HUGGINS DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH BPP CHAIRMAN BOBBY SEALE IN NEW YORK INFORMING HIM OF THE REQUEST AND THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS BEING RUN BY ALL BLACK WOMEN AND ALL OF THE SPEAKERS TO APPEAR WERE TO BE BLACK. REPORTEDLY THE ROUND TRIP FARE FOR TWO WOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE EVENT HUGGINS CAN APPEAR.

END PAGE ONE

REC- 36 100-465406-1

"cc to IDIU [illegible]

NOV 19 [illegible]

HUGGINS TOLD SEALE THAT JULIAN BOND, NEGRO GEORGIA STATE LEGISLATOR, WAS AMONG THE LIST OF SPEAKERS. OTHERS WERE NOT IDENTIFIED.

SEALE MADE NO DECISION AT THIS TIME AS TO THE POSSIBLE APPEARANCE OF HUGGINS.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

SOURCE IS SF THREE TWO ONE FIVE - E.

WFO ADVISE LOGICAL AUTHORITIES OF SCHEDULED RALLY AND DEMONSTRATION.

ATLANTA INFORM WFO IF DATA AVAILABLE INDICATING ATTENDANCE OF JULIAN BOND.

FOR INFO OF NEW YORK, SEALE WAS REACHED IN NEW YORK AT TELEPHONE NUMBER TWO ONE TWO - JU SIX - SEVEN ZERO ZERO ZERO, EXTENSION THREE FOUR THREE FOUR, BELIEVED TO BE OFFICE OR RESIDENCE OF MARTIN KENNER.

SAN FRANCISCO WILL ADVISE WFO IF INFO RECEIVED INDICATING TRAVEL BY HUGGINS TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS MATTER.

END...

HOLD

MR. TRAINOR
[illegible] 710 A 9&D

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/12/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DID)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOairtel, dated 11/5/71.

NY 4253-S, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on 11/12/71 that a NY planning meeting of captioned group was held at the Loeb Student Center, New York University, New York, NY, on 11/11/71.

For the information of the Bureau and WFO, plans formulated during this meeting called for the renting of 20 buses which can transport approximately 1,000 individuals. The cost for a round-trip ticket from New York, NY to Washington, D. C. (WDC) will be $10.00. The buses are scheduled to depart Union Square, New York, NY, at 6:00 AM on 11/20/71, and return the same day.

NY 4253-S advised that above meeting was completely dominated and controlled by members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

-724-D

EX-104 REC 20

NOV 15 1971

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-49940)(RM)
1 - New York

JMW:sln
(6)

~~Copy to~~ 2cc 932D
by routing slip for
☑ Info ☐ Action
date 11/18/71
by SSC/mm

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

It was announced that the demonstration was planned to be completely non-violent and that the scheduled speakers at WDC are BILLY JEAN KING, women's tennis champion; and SHIRLEY WHEELER, who was convicted in the State of Florida on a charge of having an illegal abortion.

NYO will follow locally and furnish more specific information when it becomes available.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
NOV 17 1971
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR012 NY CODE

340 AM NITEL 11-17-71 JMC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON FIELD 100-54927

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALTION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE. WASHINGTON, D.C. IS-NEW LEFT. 00-WFO.

ON NOVEMBER SIXTEEN INSTANT, NY SEVEN SIX ONE ONE DASH S, RELIABLE, ADVISED HE, AS A MEMBER OF THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA), HAS BEEN INVITED TO ACCOMPANY NEW YORK CONTINGENT LEAVING NEW YORK CITY EARLY AM OF NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT, TO PARTICIPATE IN CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. NO UNUSUAL EXPENSES ARE ANTICIPATED BEING INCURRED BY SOURCE FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT. UACB, SOURCE WILL PARTICIPATE IN CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION WITH NEW YORK CONTINGENT.

END

FBI WA RDR

REC-35 100-464466 -5

EX-100

Gray

5 NOV 18 1971

5-CM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11-9-71

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, HOUSTON (100-12404)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT

RE WFO airtels 11-2-71 and 11-5-71.

On 11-9-71, HO 1349-S and HO 1342-S advised that at a regular weekly meeting of the Houston Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Chapter, discussion was had regarding the forthcoming Women's Abortion demonstration to be held in Washington, D.C. November 20, 1971.

A show of hands was requested as to who was planning to attend this demonstration activity and approximately ten persons raised their hands, indicating they planned to attend. Of the individuals who indicated that they planned to attend, none could be considered well-known personalities and they are merely regular SWP members and their boyfriends.

No informants of the Houston Division plan to attend the demonstration activity and the method of travel of the Houston contingent at the present time is unknown.

Additional details, when obtained, will be furnished the Bureau and WFO.

EX-100

REC-11 100-468406-4

~~3~~ 10 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-54927)(RM)
3 - Houston (1 - 100-12404)
(1 - 134-326A)
(1 - 134-344A)

DCS:bl
(8)

NOV 12 1971

57 NOV 22 1971

Approved: ______________ Sent __________M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

GPO : 1970 O - 402-735

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

~~Mr. Tolson~~
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
~~Mr. Soyars~~
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: NOV 2 1971

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927) (P)

REC 10

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

2, 3, 4

Re New York airtel and LHM 10/5/71 captioned, March on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco on 11/20/71 for Repeal of Aboration Laws Sponsored by Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, IS - New Left and Kansas City letter and LHM dated 10/27/71.

1 - 124-D

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encs. 8)
2 - Atlanta (Encs. 2)
2 - Detroit (Encs. 2)
2 - Houston (Encs. 2)
2 - Kansas City (Encs. 2)
2 - Los Angeles (Encs. 2)
2 - New York (Encs. 2)
2 - San Francisco (Encs. 2)
2 - Seattle (Encs. 2)
2 - WFO
(1 - 100-49208)

RCC:dlm
(21)

Copy to 932D
by routing slip for
☒ ~~Info~~ ☒ ~~Action~~
date 11/10/71
by SSC/[illegible]

EX-101

AGENCY 55
[redacted]
DATE FORW.
HOW FORW.
BY

100-465[illegible]-3

REC-10

5 NOV 12 1971

Approved: RCK
Special Agent in Charge

Sent _______ M Per _______

WFO 100-54927

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies and for other receiving offices two copies of LHM on captioned demonstration.

LHM is classified "Confidential", to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information which could be prejudicial to the defense interest of the nation.

First source in LHM is WF 2188-S. Second source in LHM identified on separate administrative page.

LEADS

All receiving offices are requested to contact knowledgeable sources within Women's Liberation Movement to determine demonstration plans, identity of leading personalities and numbers planning to attend captioned demonstration from their respective areas.

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN: In view of the National Coordinating Committee meeting held 10/2/71 in Detroit, will consult sources to determine results of this meeting regarding captioned demonstration.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Will search indices on WONAAC staffers:

KIPP DAWSON
CAROL LIPMAN
SHERRY SMITH
JOAN GOMBOS
MARSHA COLEMAN
NANCY ROSENSTOCK

to furnish available identifying data on each.

WFO will continue to give this matter close attention to ascertain all details of this proposed demonstration.

[illegible] FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WFO 100-54927 Washington, D. C. [illegible] CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Second source referred to in LHM is ROBERT J. DAVIDS, 917 15th Street, N. W. [illegible]

On September [illegible], a source, who has furnished reliable information [illegible] a letter to its supporters, which stated the following:

"To: Women and women's organizations throughout the world

"Dear Sisters,

"Throughout history [illegible] things have been done [illegible] through which women won the right to vote.

"Today, in [illegible] corner of the earth, laws deny women the right to [illegible] or [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] are unhappy in this [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NOV 2 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 20, 1971 WASHINGTON, D. C.

On September 29, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that WONAAC sent a letter to its supporters, which stated the following:

"To: Women and women's organizations throughout the world

"Dear Sisters,

"Throughout history few things have been more universal or known fewer national boundaries than the suffering of women from the denial of our right to control our own lives, our own bodies. Decades ago the suffragists of the United States took inspiration from their British sisters and went on to build part of the international movement through which women won the right to vote.

"Today, in every corner of the earth, laws deny women the right to abortion, the right to decide whether or not to have children. Now a new generation of women has begun to stand up for our rights. The struggle for the right to abortion is rapidly crossing boundaries of nations and continents, of language and background. We have inspired one another and learned from one another.

"In the United States women from many backgrounds are uniting in this fight. On November 20, we will march in massive numbers on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, to demand the repeal of all anti-abortion laws, with no forced sterilization and the repeal of all restrictive

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

100 — 468406 — 3

contraceptive laws. We call on our sisters around the world to unite with us on that day, to bring out power together, to let the world hear in one united voice and many languages our slogan 'ABORTION -- A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE.'

"When we join together throughout the world, no force can stop us.
to facilitate all aspects of organizing the Fall Abortion
"In sisterhood,
"Delegates to the first Women's National Abortion Conference Held in New York City, July 16-18, 1971."

On October 12, 1971, second source, who is in a position to furnish such information, provided a copy of the WONAAC National Newsletter dated September 16, 1971, which contained the following self-description:

"WONAAC is based on a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign including legislation, legal action and nationally coordinated mass demonstrations in Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, on November 20, for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws and the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws...

"We were formed at a national conference held at Columbia University July 19, 1971, attended by over 1,000 women from 23 states and 253 organizations. The call for this conference was initiated by women organizing Women Vs Connecticut, the class action suit in that state and women's liberation groups in New York City. This call was then endorsed by hundreds of women around the country who participated in the spirited and educational conference which formed WONAAC.

"WONAAC aims to reach all women ... Black, Chicana, Latina, Asian, Puerto Rican and Native American women, campus women, gay women, high school women, housewives, professional, welfare and working women, young women, women from churches, political organizations, trade unions, the military and communities across the country ... and to build the broadest possible movement for abortion law repeal."

The newsletter proclaimed that the WONAAC National Office would be moved from New York City, to Washington, D. C., to facilitate all aspects of organizing the Fall Abortion Law Repeal Campaign. The following women from the old New York staff were moved to Washington, D. C.:

Kipp Dawson
Carol Lipman
Sherry Smith
Joan Gombos
Marsha Coleman
Nancy Rosenstock

NY
DC

The National Coordinating Committee of WONAAC was scheduled to meet October 2, 1971, at 12:00 noon, 2230 Withrel Street, Detroit Michigan, to discuss among other points, the details for the November 20, 1971 march on Washington, D. C.

The newsletter also outlined the following speaking tour of Dr. Barbara Roberts to publicize the aims of WONAAC and to promote participation in the November 20, 1971, demonstration:

"September 23, 24	Seattle
October 5, 6	Atlanta
October 13, 14	Houston
November 7-13	Los Angeles"

The October 15, 1971, issue of the "Washington Post", a daily newspaper in Washington, D. C., carried the following notice regarding the WONAAC sponsored November 20, 1971, rally for Washington, D. C.:

ENTER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATIO

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

"...Coordinators of the event said they hope for a turnout of about 20,000 women who would stage the first national female march on the Capitol since women won the right to vote in 1920.

"Dr. Barbara Roberts, national project director of the coalitions, said the march, scheduled to go past the White House and down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol, would attack "abortion laws which degrade, mutilate and murder women."

"The coalition, which comprises about 30 women's groups, will also demonstrate against forced sterilization and restrictive contraception laws and plans to hold national abortion hearings in Washington before the march."

First source advised on October 15, 1971, that the November 20, 1971, rally has received mixed support from various Washington, D. C., women's liberation groups. Several radical women's groups refused to endorse the November 20, 1971, action because they view it as a Young Socialist Alliance (YSA)/Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Front which will use these rallies to further its own recruitment drive. Furthermore, they considered YSA/SWP to be "non-feminist". Main support for the November 20, 1971, demonstration will come from the WSA Women's Fraction Group.

Important endorsements thus far are coming from Betty Freidan, noted author in Women's Liberation Movement, New York Congress women, Bella Abzug and Dr. Milan M. Vuitch, a Washington, D. C., doctor involved in the abortion controversy. Lynda Jenness, the SWP presidential candidate is scheduled to be one of the speakers.

Young Socialist Alliance

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NOV 2 1971

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Character IS - NEW LEFT

Reference LHM of SA RICHARD C. CARTER dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/5/71

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via ______ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

5-Hoover

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(00:WFO)

ReWFOairtel and LHM, 11/2/71.

On 11/4/71 Sergeant JOHN TOMLINSON, U. S. Park Police, furnished a permit application for captioned demonstration which contained the following information:

103 EX-103 REC-7 REC-2 100-468406-2

Sponsoring organization Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, 917 15th Street, N.W., WDC, 20005, phone 202-347-0946. Individual sponsor and WONAAC National Project Director, CAROL LIPMAN, 116 Sunnyside Road, Silver Spring, Maryland, telephone numbers 202-347-0946 and 202-365-2010. Other principal officers were BARBARA ROBERTS, M.D., 7547 Springlake Drive, Apartment B-1, Bethesda, Maryland, 365-0853 and JOAN M. GOMBOS, 1701 16th Street, N.W., ~~WDC, 20005.~~ WFO files show CAROL LIPMAN to be a member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). As of June,

② - Bureau
2 - WFO
(1 - 100-49940)
RCC:rms
(30)

(COPY COUNT CONTINUED ON PAGE 2)

~~c-7~~ to WFO
by routing slip for
☐ Info ☒ Action
date 11/9/71
by SSC/mon

Approved: RGK/WCG Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

Copy Count Continued:

2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Chicago
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Minneapolis
2 - New Haven
2 - New York
2 - Philadelphia
2 - San Francisco

1970, LIPMAN was the National Executive Secretary of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC).

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The SMC is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

The following sponsoring organizations were listed:

Georgia Women's Abortion Action Coalition
P.O. Box 7122, Atlanta, Ga. 30309 (404) 874-8365

Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
552 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9, Cambridge, Mass. 02139
(617) 547-1818; 491-1071

Women United for Abortion Rights
1115 Walnut Street, 3rd floor, Philadelphia, Pa. (215) Wa 2-0381

Illinois Women's Abortion Coalition
343 So. Dearborn Ave., Room 305, Chicago, Ill. 60605 (312) 922-0745

Women for Abortion Action
917 - 15th St. N.W., Suite 502, Washington, D. C. (202) 347-0947

WONAAC - New York
P.O. Box 685, Old Chelsea Station, New York, N.Y. 10011
(212) 924-0894

Abortion Project Coalition - Cleveland
11220 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44106 (216) 368-2248

Rhode Island Coalition to Repeal Abortion Laws
64 Preston Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02906 (401) 331-3370

Detroit Women's Abortion Action Coalition
2230 Withrell, Detroit, Michigan (313) 962-8822

Women's Right to Choose of Maryland
3028 Greenmount Ave., Baltimore, Maryland (301) 323-9485

Bloomington Abortion Coalition
702 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana 47401

Women V. Connecticut, Women and the Law Office
Box 89, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
(203) 436-0364

Minneapolis Abortion Action Coalition
100 University Ave., S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55814
(612) 332-5773

Houston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
Box 192, Campus Activities, University of Houston, Houston,
Texas 77004 (713) 748-6600 Ext 1266

There are affiliates in many western states but they are coordinating for the San Francisco counterpart of the November 20 demonstration. WONAAC West has already obtained the necessary permits for the demonstration in San Francisco.

An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 participants will march peacefully and orderly to build public support for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws, against forced sterilization and an end to restrictive contraceptive laws. The marchers will assemble 10:00 a.m. to noon at the Ellipse; march west from the Ellipse on E Street to 17th Street; N.on 17th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue; E.on Pennsylvania Avenue to 15th; South on 15th Street to Pennsylvania; Southeast on Pennsylvania to the Capitol and Rally; The West Steps of the Capitol.

The following activities during the demonstration were listed:

Demonstrators will assemble in contingents at the Ellipse and march above route to the Capitol to participate in a rally. Marchers will be carrying signs and placards concerning the aims of the demonsrration; many will be brought from around the country. Speakers are not yet firmed up. Musical entertainment will be part of the rally. Demonstrators will disperse and either return home in D. C. area or go to cars and busses and return to cities.

There will be one marshal for every 20 demonstrators, Chief Marshal listed as DELPHINE WELCH, WDC.

WFO files show WELCH attended SWP National Convention, August, 1971.

Secret Service and AUSA have been notified. Other interested agencies also cognizant.

LEAD

Receiving offices are requested to conduct appropriate investigation to determine the numbers and composition of those groups from their area planning to attend captioned demonstration.

WFO will continue to follow locally.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: Domestic Intelligence Division

DATE: 10/27/71

FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY (100-new) P

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT
OO WFO

11

DF

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of self-explanatory letterhead memorandum. Enclosed for WFO are two (2) copies of above letterhead memorandum.

Kansas City Division has a pending case on SARAH SCHMIDTLEIN, nee COPOWYCZ, KC file 100-13611.

KC T-1 is KC 1291-PSI (location instant letterhead memorandum).

9

Kansas City Division will follow and report any additional information regarding captioned group.

Fd 217

REC- 45

468106

NOV-18

ENCLOSURE

18 OCT 29 1971

3-Bureau (Encs. 8)(RM)
2-WFO (Encs. 2)(RM)
2-Kansas City
VDC:jmm
(7)

AGENCY: ~~[illegible]~~ SEC. SER., ~~[illegible]~~
DIA, ~~I~~EC(WEUS) 1cc 932D, 1cc DESTROYED
RAO (ISD, ~~[illegible]~~) IDIU
DATE FORW: 11/4/71
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: SSC/WSM

NEW LEFT

54 NOV 8 1971

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Kansas City, Missouri

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

October 27, 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D.C.

On October 1[illegible], 1971, KC T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Sarah Schmidtlein, nee Copowycz, a Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) member and Kansas City Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) head, is attempting to stimulate interest in various women's groups to get together a Kansas City women's delegation to attend the WONAAC demonstration on November 20, 1971, at Washington, D.C. KC T-1 advised that the Washington demonstration is to demonstrate against the abortion law repeal alleged to be voted on in Congress at that time. KC T-1 said at the present time plans are to send one busload and more if tickets to be sold.

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100 - 468406 -

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Vol II

10/15/75
SSC

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/5/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

REC 11

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-138315)

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (100-36173)

SUBJECT: CHANGED
PROPOSED WOMEN'S MARCH,
1/15/68, PROVIDENCE, R.I., -
DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S.
INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM.

Title is being changed from the date 1/8/68 to 1/15/68 to reflect the actual date of the proposed women's march at Providence, R.I.

Re Boston airtel and LHM to Bureau dated 1/3/68, captioned Proposed Women's March, 1/8/68, Providence, R.I. - DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM.

Enclosed herewith are the original and ten copies of a self-explanatory LHM.

The following agencies were advised of the contents of this LHM and copies of same have been provided to these agencies:

EDWARD P. GALLOGLY, USA,
Providence, R.I.

WILLIAM SHIELDS, Agent in Charge
U.S. Secret Service
Providence, R.I.

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - Boston
CAR:lz
(5)

REC 11

23

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

58 JAN 8 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

LEON ENTRAS, Special Agent
NISO, Newport, R.I.

Captain ROGER J. BROCK
Providence Field Office, Region III,
108th MI Group
Providence, R.I.

JOHN M. ROMAN, Special Agent
OSI, Naval Construction Battalion Center
Davisville, Rhode Island

The confidential source mentioned in the LHM is Captain LEO TRAMBUKIS, Planning Office, Providence, R.I. Police.

LEAD

BOSTON

AT PROVIDENCE, R.I.

Will report results of proposed march.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Boston, Massachusetts
January 5, 1968

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Proposed Women's March, January 15, 1968, Providence, Rhode Island - Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information on January 5, 1968:

On January 2, 1968, Miss Dorothy Donnelly, 244 Bowen Street, Providence, Rhode Island, applied for and was granted a permit to hold a women's peace march parade commencing at 2:00 PM, January 15, 1968. The source advised that Miss Donnelly stated the parade is to be conducted in conjunction with former United States Representative Jeannette Rankin's brigade, which will have a group of women marching on this same date at Washington, D.C. Miss Donnelly further told the source she anticipates approximately fifteen women in the Rhode Island area will march in this parade; that the parade will commence at the Cranston Street Armory, Cranston Street, Providence, Rhode Island; that they will march via various streets around the State House at Providence, Rhode Island, and proceed to the steps of the Providence City Hall, where they will have about a half hour speaking program. Miss Donnelly would not divulge the identity of individuals who would speak at this program but did say that the women would be from out of town but were not nationally known or prominently known.

Miss Donnelly also told the source she is a member of the Rhode Island Committee for Peace in Vietnam, but this organization is not sponsoring this march. She said that she is spearheading this march to support Jeannette Rankin's march at Washington, D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

23

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/5/68

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (~~100-448326~~)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO - Washington Field

5 - [illegible]
C. D. Brennan

Re San Francisco teletype 1/5/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven (11) copies of LHM concerning captioned demonstrations. Two (2) copies each are enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York, and Washington Field.

Sources utilized in LHM are:

First Source

Second Source

Third Source

Informants

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11)(AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (100-7300)(Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (100-70701)(Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Enc. 2)(AM-RM)
4 - San Francisco (2 - 100-59802)
(1 - 100-48035)
(1 - 80-461)

100-447115-32

GOW/jr XEROX
(15) JAN 11 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAD (RS, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

SF 100-59802
GOW/jr

Fourth Source
Fifth Source
Sixth Source } Informants

LHM is classified confidential inasmuch as it contains data which could reasonably result in the identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

San Francisco will continue to follow and report any pertinent information received concerning this matter.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
January 5, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum dated January 4, 1968.

Copies of this memorandum have been furnished locally to the U. S. Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Service, and U. S. Attorney.

A source advised on January 5, 1968, that the following individuals from the Northern California area are planning to depart San Francisco January 13, 1968, via plane for Washington, D. C. to support the demonstration on January 15, 1968. Source indicated that all of these women, excluding NIKKI BRIDGES, participate in activities of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in Marin County, California.

FRANCES STEADMAN
BETTY MEREDITH
MARIE INGERMAN
DOROTHEA HEGERTY
NIKKI BRIDGES, aka Mrs. Harry Bridges.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-44947 52

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM (WILPF)

In a leaflet dated January, 1962, WILPF described itself as follows:

> "What is the WILPF?
>
> "It is the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an international, interracial organization striving for peace and freedom by non-violent democratic methods. It was founded in 1915, during the first World War, and its first president was JANE ADDAMS, the first American woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize.
>
> "How Does it Work?
>
> "It keeps its membership informed on current problems through its legislative office in Washington. It issues its own pamphlets, study kits, fact sheets, and cooperates with like-minded organizations. WILPF has consultative status at the United Nations on a national and international level.
>
> "What Does it Do?
>
> "WILPF, through its local branches, sponsors public discussion on such topics as disarmament and world law, nuclear testing, civil defense, Berlin, civil rights, etc. Through its Peace Action Committee, WILPF initiates peace walks, vigils, and meetings, as an organization and with other peace groups. Peace education for children is a special concern of WILPF.
>
> "How Is it Set Up?
>
> "The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom has its national headquarters at JANE ADDAMS House, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia 3, Pa., where its monthly paper, FOUR LIGHTS, is published. Its legislative office is at 120 Maryland Avenue, N.E., Washington 2, D. C. International headquarters are in Geneva. The International meets every three years. It conducts summer schools, peace congresses and publishes its magazine, PAX."

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

A second source advised in April, 1945, that the records of the San Francisco County Communist Party (CP) indicated that FRANCES STEADMAN transferred from the Westlake Branch of the Los Angeles County CP to San Francisco in 1945 and that her dues were paid to and including December, 1944. CAL.

A third source advised on March 20, 1957, that according to BETTY MEREDITH, she attended the California CP State Convention held in San Francisco, March 16-17, 1957. CAL.

A fourth source advised during 1967 that MARIE KINGERMAN attended six meetings of the WILPF in Marin County, California, during the period January-October, 1967.

D.C.

A fifth source advised on January 4, 1968, that DOROTHEA HEGERTY is a current active member of the Marin County CP. CAL.

A sixth source advised on March 2, 1967, that Mrs. H. BRIDGES, 35 Kronquest Court, San Francisco, California, is listed as the recipient of a new yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW), expiration date March 4, 1968.

Nikki [illegible]

The PW is a West Coast communist newspaper published weekly in San Francisco.

MRS HARRY BRIDGES

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Records of the U. S. District Court, San Francisco, show that on May 25, 1949, HARRY BRIDGES was indicted for criminal actions of perjury and conspiracy committed to conceal CP membership, thereby fraudulently obtaining U. S. citizenship. BRIDGES was convicted of these charges on April 4, 1950. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction. Based on the Statute of Limitations having run, the U. S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction on May 15, 1953.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
January 5, 1968

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference San Francisco memorandum dated as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/8/68

WCS

Transmit the following in ______________________

(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701)(P)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

C. BRENNAN

3

Re Los Angeles airtel and letterhead memoranda (LHM) dated 12/12/67 and 12/30/67, captioned as above.

For the information of the Bureau there are attached eleven copies of an LHM, with one copy each for the information of the Washington Field and San Francisco Divisions. Instant LHM contains all data currently available in the Los Angeles Division regarding the formation and plans of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB).

Instant LHM has been classified "Confidential - Group I," to protect Source One INFORMANT a currently active symbol numbered informant of continuing value.

Because of her political position, no attempt has been made to characterize ~~California Assemblywoman YVONNE BRATHWAITE~~ in the details of instant LHM; however, for the Bureau's own information, it is pointed out that

ENCLOSURE

REC 3

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11)(RM)(AM)
1 - San Francisco (100-59302)(Enc. 1)(RM)(AM)
1 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Enc. 1)(RM)(AM)
1 - Los Angeles

20 JAN 13 1968

GGB/lhk
(6)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI
RAO
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

C. C. BISHOP

Approved: ______________ Sent ______ M Per ______

Special Agent in Charge

INFORMANT has revealed in the past that members of both the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) and the Women for Legislative Action (WLA) were very active in the political campaigning for her which resulted in her election.

The LAPD and the LACSO are cognizant of changes in time schedule for local JRB action. Information copies of this LHM are being furnished the U. S. Attorney and Secret Service, Los Angeles; Region II, U. S. Army, Pasadena; Office of Special Investigations, Norton Air Force Base; Naval Investigative Service Office, San Diego, California. Coverage is continuing.

Exact dates and locations of the subcommittee meetings of the JRB have not been detailed in instant LHM to further protect Source One, as some of these meetings were attended by small numbers of persons which could aid in pinpointing this valuable Security Informant.

The Bureau and Washington Field will be advised promptly if the identities of any additional persons from the Southern California area traveling to Washington, D. C., become known.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Los Angeles, California
January 8, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference is made to prior Los Angeles memoranda dated December 12 and 30, 1967, relating to a proposed march on Washington, D. C., by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB), when the United States Congress reconvenes in January 1968.

Source One advised that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP - see appendix) and the Women for Legislative Action (WLA - see appendix) are the two major organizations in Southern California working for the success of the January 15, 1968, activities of the JRB both locally and in Washington, D. C. Subcommittees of the JRB have been meeting in the headquarters of WSP at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, and WLA at 5889 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. During the most recent of these subcommittee meetings, held during the first week in January 1968, at the latter location, much of the discussion was related to proposed action in Southern California by women who would be unable to travel to Washington, D. C., for the January 15th confrontation with Congress.

Minor changes in the previously announced schedule of local activities for January 15, 1968, were agreed upon at this meeting, as follows:

9:30 AM Assemble on the front steps of the Old California State Building, First and Broadway, Los Angeles, where the JRB's list of grievances will be read over a public address system and then presented to California

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

100 — [illegible] -83

ENCLOSURE

Assemblywoman Yvonne Brathwaite. According to the reports at this JRB meeting, Mrs. Brathwaite, who was not present, had agreed to either meet personally with the JRB women at the State Building, or to send her personal representative if her schedule would not permit her to be present at that time.

Following a brief rally at the State Building, the JR Brigaders will enter the State Building with leaflets; opening the doors of the various offices, and handing leaflets to any women in the building, located at 217 West First Street.

11:30 AM Women of the JRB will more to the steps of the Los Angeles City Hall, where they will attempt to influence as many persons as possible, who will be entering and leaving the City Hall during the luncheon hour. The list of grievances will again be read at the City Hall, which is located at 200 North Spring Street.

1:00 PM March to the Los Angeles City Board of Education, 450 North Grand Avenue, to confront the members of the School Board, and attempt to influence as many women employees of the Board as possible.

Margaret Wright, militant black nationalist oriented Negro woman who has been active in recent demonstrations against the Los Angeles City Board of Education at Manual Arts High School, will act as the JRB's spokeswoman at this latter location. It is the present intention of the JRB women to go inside the administrative buildings at the Board of Education and leaflet women employees there.

At the most recent JRB subcommittee meeting, Margaret Wright expressed her disappointment that no organized civil disobedience was being planned for the local action of the JRB. However, she added, "That's O.K., the police will force disobedience anyway!"

The main slogan adopted by the local JRB is, "The Hand that Rocks the Cradle is Going to Rock the Boat, With Our Vote." Picket signs that have been approved to be carried in the local JRB demonstrations include:

"You Can't Have War Without Women"

"Woman Power is Peace Power"

"Women Control the Vote"

It was announced that three different versions of the local JRB "Call" would be distributed within the next week. The three will be geered to Caucasians, Negroes, and Mexican-Americans respectively. The monthly news bulletin of the WSP, called, "La Wisp," for January 1968, has an appeal to the WSP membership tojoin the local action if they are unable to make the trip to Washington. It was also announced that a $50.00 advertisement would be placed in the "Herald-Dispatch," Los Angeles Negro newspaper, calling for the support of members of the black community. Three JRB activists were to appear on local radio shows to plug the JRB prior to January 15th. D.C.

Xerox copies of two documents being circulated throughout Southern California during early January 1968, to publicize the local and the national actions of the JRB are appended to this memorandum. Leslie Parrish, who is mentioned in one of these documents, according to Source One, is a screen actress who has very recently become interested and active in the anti-Viet Nam war movement

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY
IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

and has become affiliated with the Southern California Council of WSP. It is noted that she is presently scheduled to give a report back to the San Fernando Valley Chapter of WSP on January 19, 1968, following her return from the action in Washington, D. C.

The Los Angeles Police Department and the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office are cognizant of the time changes in the schedule for the local action of the JRB.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE,
Also Known As
Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A source advised on May 1, 1963, that the Women for Legislative Action was formed in 1952, claiming to be an independent organization dedicated to non-partisan participation in legislative and civic activities. Its position in favoring or opposing legislation usually parallels the position of the Communist Party and related groups. It also supports legislation to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Membership in the Women for Legislative Action does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

Another source advised on May 11, 1967, that the Women for Legislative Action continues to be active in the Los Angeles area.

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

Dear Friend:

A number of our California women will join thousands of others throughout the country in Washington D. C. on the opening day of Congress. They are going to Congress to: demand an end to the war, to help our sick society at home and end the demands of the military.

This idea came about when an 86 year old former Congresswoman, Jeanette Rankin, said: "If we had 10,000 women willing to go to prison if necessary, that would end it. You cannot have wars without women."

We would like to raise enough money to send all who wish to go. If you cannot join the group going to Washington, would you make a contribution so that those who can go will not be handicapped by lack of funds.

Then, save a date on your new calendar. On Friday, January 12th we will have a report on Washington given by Leslie Parrish who will be one of the leaders of the So. Calif. delegation. You will receive definite information and confirmation by mail.

If you are able to go to Washington, please call 761-1783 for further information.

Yours for Peace,

Valley Women Strike for Peace

P. S. Please make your checks payable to Women Strike for Peace and send it in the enclosed envelope. Thanks

CONFIDENTIAL

not have wars without women.

CONFIDENTIA

ED UP! THE [illegible]RITY OF AMERICAN VOTERS ARE [illegible]N... BUT WE ARE AN UNREPRE-ED MAJORITY! We find our government responding to its military-industrial advisors while it turns a deaf ear to us. Oh yes, we have heard and read the stirring speeches against the Vietnam war, made on the floor of Congress. But most of these great orators (men who were put into office with the help of women) proceed to vote for the billion dollar appropriations that make this war possible, while millions of Americans are robbed of their rights to decent housing, health services, education and employment.

WE HAVE VESTED INTERESTS TOO!...OUR HOMES AND OUR FAMILIES. They are being destroyed by these strawmen who do nothing to end this insane war, and do nothing to take care of the neglect of human needs at home.

WE ARE TIRED OF TALKING TO STRAWMEN! In Los Angeles on January 15th, we will speak to WOMEN - because WOMEN CARE and WOMEN WILL LISTEN!

The JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE will be descending on Washington, D.C. on January 15th to demand that Congress listen to what American women are saying.

THE HAND THAT ROCKS THE CRADLE IS GOING TO ROCK THE BOAT!! WITH OUR VOTE! In cities and towns across this nation, women will be mobilizing in local supportive actions. This is the launching of the FIRST broad coalition of women for political power in 1968. This is our opportunity to work together to put into office only those candidates who truly represent us and to TURN OUT THE STRAWMEN.

join with us here in los angeles

the time: the place:

9:30 AM - Old State Building, 217 West 1st St., LA

11:30 AM - City Hall, 200 North Spring

1:00 PM - Board of Education, 450 North Grand

BE ON TIME! WE WILL MARCH FROM PLACE TO PLACE LEAFLETING WOMEN. PLACCARDS WILL BE PROVIDED.

all women are urged to wear black

• •

I will:

___ go to Washington, D.C. on Jan. 15th. (Plane fare round trip $216.00).

___ help work in the local action in Southern California.

___ contribute $_____ for local action, or $_____ to send a woman to Wash. D.C.

Name: Phone No:

8*

CONFIDENTIAL

Address: City: Zip:

(Please tear off and mail to WSP at address above)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
January 8, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICE IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1 - Mr. Rozamus
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

1/8/68

CODE ~~[illegible]~~

TELETYPE DEFERRED

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

TO SAC SEATTLE REC 13 ST 115

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (100-448475) — 91

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT.

REURTEL JANUARY FIVE LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR INFORMANT, TO ATTEND CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. UP TO ONE HUNDRED FIFTY DOLLARS MAY BE PAID SOURCE FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN MAKING TRIP.

INSTRUCT SOURCE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH WFO AND PROMPTLY FURNISH PERTINENT DATA DEVELOPED. SEATTLE ADVISE WFO CODE NAME USED BY INFORMANT. WFO ADVISE SEATTLE NAME OF AGENT TO CONTACT AND PHONE NUMBER TO BE USED.

PROMPTLY DEBRIEF SOURCE ON RETURN YOUR AREA AND SUBMIT LHM.

COPY MAILED WFO.

VIA TELETYPE
12-[illegible]

1 - WFO
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

RHH:df
(6)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-[illegible]

NOTE:

INFORMANT has been an informant since April, 1963, and is an inactive member of the Communist Party (CP) of the State of Washington. Informant is currently paid up to $100 per month for services and up to $100 per month for expenses. The

XEROX
JAN 22 1968

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE 2

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Teletype to SAC, Seattle
RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
100-448475

NOTE CONTINUED:

Seattle Office has been attempting to reactivate the informant in CP work. She has been invited to attend the demonstration by one of the CP members of the area and her attendance will enhance her status with the Party and facilitate her reactivation. As her husband is an airline employee, the cost of the transportation will be minimal.

Teletype is being used to afford informant opportunity to make arrangements for the trip.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☒ RADIO ☐ TELETYPE

R-48

DEFERRED 1-5-68

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SEATTLE

Rosen C. D. Brennan

VIDEM; WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY). OO: WFO.

REBUAIRTEL, DECEMBER 5 LAST.

INFORMANT HAS BEEN ASKED TO ACCOMPANY A DELEGATION TO SUBJECT VIDEM FROM SEATTLE AREA BY TAIMI HALONEN, CP MEMBER.

Information
Identifies
Informants

Tel. To SE 1-8-68

100-402

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ST. 115

JAN 19 1968

C. D. Brennan

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

DECODED COPY

☐ **AIRGRAM** ☐ **CABLEGRAM** ☒ **RADIO** ☐ **TELETYPE**

PAGE TWO FROM SEATTLE

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED FOR INFORMANT TO GO TO WASHINGTON AS ABOVE IN EVENT SHE CAN MAKE APPROPRIATE FAMILY ARRANGEMENTS, AND FOR PAYMENT OF UP TO $150 IN EXPENSES, SAME TO BE FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR BY INFORMANT AND ONLY THAT PORTION ESSENTIAL BEING EXPENDED FOR SUBSISTENCE AND TRANSPORTATION.

RECEIVED: 6:42PM RM

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

FBI

Date: 1/9/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ALBANY (100-20033) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Attached herewith for Bureau, is the original and 10 copies, and for WFO 2 copies, of an LHM regarding captioned subject. Also attached for the Bureau is one post card regarding captioned subject.

Source in attached LHM is INFORMANT. Source characterizing Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is INFORMANT.

Albany sources alerted for identification of individuals and organizations participating in captioned protest and for determination of financial backing.

3-Bureau (Enc. 12)(RM)
2-WFO (Enc. 2)(RM)
2-Albany
TCK:gab
(7)

REC 3

100-

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI

DATE FOR

HOW F

BY:

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Albany, New York

January 9, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past stated that the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom had circulated post cards in the Syracuse, New York area, announcing captioned demonstration, which would be under the sponsorship of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Source noted that according to the post card, the date of the march had been changed to January 15, 1968. Source advised that the card instructed participants to meet at Union Station, Washington, D.C., at 11 AM, January 15, 1968, and then walk to the Capitol. Source stated that no known organizations or individuals were planning to attend from the Syracuse, New York area, at this time.

A source who had furnished reliable information in the past advised that the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is a movement which has its national headquarters at the Jane Addams House, 2006 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; its legislative office at 120 Maryland Avenue, North East, in Washington, D.C.; and its international headquarters in Geneva. It is an international, inter-racial organization striving for peace and freedom by non-violent, democratic methods. It was founded in 1915 and its first President, JANE ADDAMS, was the first American woman to win the Nobel Peace Prize. It keeps its membership informed on current problems through its legislative office in Washington and issues its own pamphlets, study kits and fact sheets. It sponsors public discussions on such topics as disarmament, nuclear testing and civil defense, through its local branches, and initiates peace walks, vigils and meetings.

100-11175-84

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

ENCLOSURE

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade has as its Chairman, JEANNETTE RANKIN, who is an 86 year old resident of Watkinsville, Georgia, and who served in the House of Representatives as a Congresswoman from Montana from 1917 to 1919, and who was elected to that office for one term in 1940. RANKIN has repeatedly opposed United States involvement in foreign wars and has voted against declaration of war by the United States during both World Wars I and II. With respect to the Vietnam war, she has stated, "Ten thousand women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had 10,000 women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women." She has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing in Vietnam is stopped.

The Secretary of the Brigade has been identified as VIVIAN HALLINAN, the wife of VINCENT HALLINAN, who in 1966 was identified as the Treasurer for the American Institute of Marxist Studies, a communist front organization.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Rev. 5-22-

FBI

Date: 1/10/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

REC 30

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-49837)

Thompson

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO:WFO)

Re NK tel 1/9/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM dated and captioned as above.

Copies of the LHM are being furnished to Military Intelligence Agencies and to Secret Service and USA at Newark.

Files of the Newark Office contain insufficient information on Mrs. DARNELL to prepare a characterization.

3 - Bureau (Enc.11) (RM)
3 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Enc.3) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc.1) (Info.) (RM)
2 - Newark

REC 30

GEJ:cg
(9)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

JAN 11 1968

C.C. - Bishop

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

57 JAN [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Newark, New Jersey
January 10, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

On January 9, 1968, A.T. Nardone, General Traffic Agent, Public Service Coordinated Transport, Newark, New Jersey, advised that one Mrs. Darnell, 204 Eastbourne Terrace, Moorestown, New Jersey, has made a reservation for one Public Service Bus, capacity fifty persons, to leave Cherry Hill, New Jersey, Shopping Center Mall at 8:00 AM, on January 15, 1968, to arrive at Union Station, Washington, D.C., the same date. The company has been advised that the group plans to participate in a demonstration in Washington, D.C.

The bus is to return to Cherry Hill, New Jersey, the same day, leaving from somewhere in the Georgetown area of Washington, D.C., at about 6:00 PM.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-44[illegible]-44

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/10/68

- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Bishop
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Gale
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in ________________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________________________
(Priority)

REC 16

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

C. D. Brennan

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReWFOairtel and LHM dated 1/4/68, captioned as above.

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau and two for New York describing further plans for above demonstration.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Local law enforcement agencies cognizant of information contained in LHM.

Sources used in LHM are **INFORMANT** and second source is **SOURCE**.

LHM classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information furnished by the first source could lead to the identification of that source and compromise future effectiveness.

WFO continuing to follow and will report any further pertinent details developed.

4 - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

ENCLOSURE

REC 16

EX 109

100-47

JAN 1? 1968

GTT:dgp
(S)
AIRTEL

C. C. - Bishop

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO /ISD, ORD CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:

105-138315

UNREC COPY [illegible] FILED IN

Approved: ________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D. C. 20535
January 10, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 9, 1968, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) planned on a demonstration in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968, the day the United States Congress reconvenes. According to the source, officials of the JRB want to assemble on the steps of the United States Capitol and present a petition to officials of the United States Congress but the United States Capitol Police has refused to grant them permission for such an assembly. The source further stated that attorneys for the JRB have petitioned the United States District Court to grant an injunction prohibiting the enforcement by the United States Capitol Police of a Congressional ruling prohibiting demonstrations on the United States Capitol grounds.

The above source stated that plans for the demonstration still consist of assembling at Union Station at 12:30 p.m. January 15, 1968, marching to the Capitol where they will present a petition to Congressional officials and also confer with various Congressmen and will hold a meeting probably at the Shoreham Hotel between 2 and 6 p.m.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification.

[illegible] DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

77

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Harry Bliss, Banquet Manager, Shoreham Hotel, Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., advised on January 9, 1968, that the JRB has reserved the Regency Room from 2 to 6 p.m. on January 15, 1968. Mr. Bliss indicated that this room will accomodate 2,500 to 3,000 individuals and that representatives of the JRB stated they intended to have approximately 2,000 persons using the room on that date.

Bliss stated that the Washington, D.C. representative of the JRB was Sylvia Lichtenstein and that she had given him a one thousand dollar check as a deposit for the banquet room. Bliss stated that this check was drawn on the Sterling National Bank and Trust Company, Queen's New York, on the account of the JRB, 13 West 72nd Street, New York City, and was signed by one Sandra Wolf.

> A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in July, 1951, that Sylvia Lichtenstein was a member of the Newspaper Club of the Communist Party in the District of Columbia from 1947 to 1950.

W.E. Beard, Charter Manager, D.C. Transit, New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., advised on January 9, 1968, that the JRB had reserved thirty-three buses to pick up individuals in the vicinity of the United States Capitol beginning at 2 p.m. on January 15, 1968, to be bused to the Shoreham Hotel. He stated that at 6 p.m. these same individuals will be bused to Union Station. Mr. Bliss indicated that the Pennsylvania Railroad is handling the finances for the above buses and that all arrangements are being made through the New York Office of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Beard stated that the location of the pickup in the vicinity of the United

CONFIDENTIAL

States Capitol has not yet been determined but he is negotiating with local law enforcement officials to ascertain a convenient place for the pickup.

Captain Robert Krahling, United States Capitol Police, Washington, D.C., advised on January 9, 1968, that the attorneys for the JRB had filed for an injunction in the United States District Court in an attempt to prevent the United States Capitol Police from enforcing a Congressional regulation prohibiting demonstrations on the United States Capitol grounds. Captain Krahling stated that after a hearing in the United States District Court on this date, the judge dismissed the above proceedings and the attorneys for the JRB stated that they were appealing the matter to the United States Court of Appeals.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓ WCS/ln
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

F B I

Date: 1/10/68

Transmit the following in ______________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

Re BU airtel to all offices, 12/5/67.

The first paragraph of the attached LHM, of which there are 11 copies for the Bureau, two (2) for Atlanta, and two (2) for WFO, indicates a change in date of the demonstration from January 8 to 15, 1968, which is set out for the benefit of local agencies which did not have the information set out in WFO airtel, December 13, 1967, when the title was changed to show the new date. Copies of instant LHM are being sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service, and the USA, Seattle.

Sources used in the LHM are: First-INFORMANT Second-INFORMANT and Third INFORMANT The LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL because information from two of these sources, if disclosed, might compromise regular security informants of continuing value.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (REG)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (REG)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (REG)
4 - Seattle
(1 - 100-29048)
(1 - 100-28189) (SUB A) (CP INF.)
(1 - 100-13305) (HALONEN)
(1 - 100-22171) (J. WARE)
RBC:bgv
(11)

REC-35

90

14 JAN 15 1968

Approved

Sent

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington
January 10, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

On January 9, 1968, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, stated the Jeannette Rankin Brigade demonstration originally scheduled for January 8, 1968, at Washington, D.C., had been postponed until January 15, 1968, when Congress reconvenes. The source made available a leaflet concerning the event. A reproduction is attached.

On January 9, 1968, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, reported TAIMI HALONEN and possibly others planned to go to Washington, D.C., for the demonstration and would probably travel via United Air Lines.

> TAIMI HALONEN was reported by the first source in December, 1967, as being a member of the Communist Party (CP) at that time.

On January 9, 1968, WENDELL C. WOODARD, Reservations Manager, United Air Lines, Seattle, made available information indicating TAIMI HALONEN and Mrs. J. WARE had reservations on United Flight 42 departing 9:15 a.m., January 13, 1968, and will fly nonstop to Friendship Airport, Baltimore, Maryland, arriving at 4:35 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. They are scheduled to return to Seattle on United Flight 41 leaving Friendship Airport at 6:00 p.m. and arriving at Seattle-Tacoma Airport, Seattle, at 8:25 p.m., Pacific Standard Time, January 18, 1968.

> JERLINE WARE, nee ABAIR, aka Mrs. JOHNNY WARE, was reported in August, 1952, by a third source who has furnished reliable information in the past as being under transfer from the Communist Party of California to Seattle, Washington, as of that time.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

90

On January 10, 1968, the first source reported LINDA CORR, a Negro, and THORUN ROBEL, white, are also planning to go to Washington, D.C., but their mode of travel is as yet unknown. The source said both are CP members at Seattle. In addition, four women from Tacoma, Washington, are preparing to go, but their identities have not been learned.

SE 100-29048



3



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 8, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

A CALL TO AMERICAN WOMEN

who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam
and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

TO COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15

(OPENING DAY OF CONGRESS)

to join former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin and thousands of women from all areas of our nation in demanding that Congress, as it's first order of business

RESOLVE: ► to END THE WAR in Vietnam, and arrange for the orderly withdrawal of all American troops:

► to use its power and the billions now wasted on war, to solve some of the problems of our crisis-ridden society by seriously working for better and low-cost housing, more day-care centers, more jobs and job-training, eliminating poverty and discrimination, and conducting a massive campaign against racism and bigotry in our schools, governmental agencies, or wherever it appears.

COME TO WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15th

to represent the Pacific Northwest at the
JEANNETTE RANKIN
NATIONAL CONGRESS OF WOMEN
at which we can discuss our many problems and suggest solutions.

Women constitute 51% of the American electorate. 1968 is an election year. If we devote ourselves wholeheartedly to it, we can force the administration to End the War, and to change our foreign policies; to restore our nation to a position of honor in the community of nations; to reshape American society to meet the needs of the people, and plan for a better tomorrow for all Americans.

Those who cannot come to Washington are urged to attend a

Washington State "GRASS ROOTS" Assembly of Women

SATURDAY, JANUARY 20th . . . 9:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.
at the
Mount Zion Baptist Church Auditorium
1624 - 19th Avenue. . . . Seattle, Washington
(Parking on 20th)

Registration Fee $1.50 includes Lunch

Clip and mail to: JEANNETTE RANKIN CONGRESS OF WOMEN
537 - 31st Avenue East
Seattle, Washington 98102

I want to go to Washington D. C. on January 15th ☐
I will need financial assistance ☐
I will contribute________to help send someone else.
I will attend the Grassroots ASSEMBLY OF WOMEN ☐
I need housing for ☐________ Registration Fee $1.50 enclosed ☐

NAME________________________ ________________________
ADDRESS______________________ __________PHONE NO.__________

CONFIDENTIAL

Partial List of Sponsors

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin
Sylvia E. Crane
Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culver
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott
Eleanor French
Mrs. Horace L. Friess
Frances Fritchman
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Elizabeth Lee Haselden
Dorothy Hassler
Anna Arnold Hedgeman
Dr. Frances Herring
Lois Crosier Hogel
Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
R. Elizabeth Johns
Florynce Kennedy
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Kinzler
Ruth Krause
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Mrs. Burton Lane
Marilyn Langner
Viveca Lindfors
Mary Ely Lyman
Helen Merrell Lynd
Olive Mayer
Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Louise Peck
Nan S. Pendergrast
Eleanor Perry
Laura Phauls
Esther Pike
Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
Mercedes M. Randall
Jeannette Rankin
Mrs. Marcus Raskin
Malvina Reynolds
Carmen Ristorucci
Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
Ruth Rosenwald
Muriel Rukeyser
Marie Runyon
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Marjorie Schell
Juanita J. Saddler
Elaine Slater
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Elizabeth Sutherland
Amy Swerdlow
Mary Adams Sykes
Ethel Taylor
Maza Tilghman
Helen B. Turnbull
Barbara Webster
Cynthia Wedel
Cora Weiss
Anne Werneke
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson
Winnifred Wygal

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE is a coalition of existing organizations and individuals.

1/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE 100-448115-67 URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

EX-109

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegans
1 - Mr. R. H. Horner

TO SAC ATLANTA

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, NINETEEN SIXTY-EIGHT.

REURTEL JANUARY TEN LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR INFORMANT TO ATTEND CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. INSTRUCT SOURCE TO PROMPTLY APPRISE WFO OF ANY PERTINENT DATA DEVELOPED DURING TRIP TO WASHINGTON. SPECIAL AGENT GARNETT TUNSTALL, PHONE NUMBER EXECUTIVE THREE-SEVEN ONE ZERO ZERO, EXTENSIONS THREE NINE ONE OR FOUR SIX ZERO, SHOULD BE CONTACTED FOR THIS PURPOSE. ATLANTA ADVISE WFO CODE NAME USED BY THIS SOURCE. COPY MAILED WFO.

1 - WFO

1 - 170- (Cynthia Yvonne Mitchell)

RHH:cst
(6)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NOTE: INFORMANT was approved as a probationary racial informant in November, 1967, as she was familiar with some of the racial issues and close to dissident racial groups in Atlanta. She is paid under SAC authority. Atlanta, by retel, advised that they were sending informant, UACB, to participate in demonstration as a method of acquainting her with persons active in Vietnam and racial activities. Teletype being used in order to instruct Atlanta in the method source should contact WFO while in Washington area.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ AIRGRAM ☐ CABLEGRAM ☐ RADIO ☒ TELETYPE

7:50PM URGENT 1-10-68 ARK

TO DIRECTOR AND WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM ATLANTA

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16 NEXT; IS; OO: WFO.

INFORMANT BEING DESIGNATED BY ATLANTA TO ACCOMPANY GROUP LEAVING ATLANTA BY CHARTERED GREYHOUND BUS AT 7 AM, JANUARY 15 NEXT ENROUTE TO WASHINGTON TO PARTICIPATE IN PRESENTING ANTI-UNITED STATES PROTEST TO MEMBERS OF CONGRESS. GROUP WILL RETURN TO ATLANTA VIA GREYHOUND ARRIVING 8 AM, JANUARY 16 NEXT. ARRANGEMENTS MADE BY INFORMANT THROUGH MRS. NANCY COLLINSON, ATLANTA, GEORGIA. INFORMANT WILL BE COMPENSATED UP TO $100 FOR TRANSPORTATION AND EXPENSES ON SAC AUTHORITY. INFORMANT BEING USED IN THIS INSTANCE AS MEANS OF ACQUAINTING HERSELF WITH PERSONS ACTIVE IN VIETNAM ACTIVITIES AND RACIAL ACTIVITIES AND FOR PURPOSE OF REPORTING PERTINENT INFORMATION REGARDING ACTIVITIES OF THIS GROUP IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

COPY FILED IN

REC 48

67

8 JAN 16 1968

2 CC WASHINGTON FIELD.

XEROX

JAN 16 1968

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

-28-67)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DECODED COPY

☐ **AIRGRAM** ☐ **CABLEGRAM** ☐ **RADIO** ☒ **TELETYPE**

PAGE TWO FROM ATLANTA

ATLANTA MAKING ABOVE ARRANGEMENTS WITH INFORMANT UACB BY 5 PM EST JANUARY 11 NEXT. P.

RECEIVED: 8:06 PM RM

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/11/68

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
OO:WFO

ReNYteletypes 1/4/68, 1/9/68, 1/10/68.

Enclosed herewith for Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM concerning captioned demonstration. Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia is one information copy of the LHM.

Copies of this LHM have been disseminated to interested local intelligence agencies and USA's, SDNY and EDNY.

③ - Bureau (ENCLS. 11) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (ENCLS. 2) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (ENCLS. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (ENCLS. 1) (RM)
1 - Newark (ENCLS. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (ENCLS.1) (RM)
1 - New York

HPB:mhm
(11)

ST-110 REC 13

JAN 12 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI Sec Serv, State
ISD, OD, IDIA
DATE FORW: 1-17-68
R/S
WNP:dch
cc + encl. 932 9th + D

Approved: ________________ Special Agent in Charge Sent ________________ M Per ________________

56 JAN 24 1968

NY 100-161601

BSS, NYCPD have been advised of pertinent travel plans from NYC of JRB.

Sources used in LHM:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

6.
7.

INFORMANTS

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information from sources 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 who are of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of the information would tend to identify these informants and therefore affect the national security interest.

NYO will cover departure and advise Bureau and Washington Field by telephone followed by teletype.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
January 11, 1968

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam, Washington,
D.C., January 15, 1968

On January 3, 1968, an advertisement appeared in the "New York Times", page 57, captioned "Dagmar Wilson Says Join Me In Washington January 15". The ad included the comment "Thousands of American Women, Led By Jeannette Rankin, First United States Congresswoman, Will Demand That Congress End The War In Vietnam and Our Social Crisis At Home". The ad listed the name and address for transportation and contributions as Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB), 133 West 72nd Street, New York City, 10023, telephone number (212) 799-6520.

On January 4, 1968, five separate advertisements for JRB at the above address appeared in "The Village Voice", a weekly newspaper in New York City. Ruby Dee, Linda Morse, Mrs. Benjamin Spock and Susan Sontag appeared by name and photo separately in four of the ads requesting the reader to "Join Me in Washington January 15". These four ads included substantially the same comments which appeared in the above "New York Times" ad of January 3, 1968. The fifth ad in "The Village Voice" was headed by the comment "We Want 10,000 Women In Washington Jan. 15". The ad included comments about the activities and purpose for the demonstration. A xerox copy of this ad is attached hereto.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968

Ruby Dee

A confidential source advised on November 19, 1965, Ruby Dee was a member of the Communist Party (CP) as of November, 1965.

Linda Morse, Also Known As Linda Dannenberg

A second confidential source advised on June 16, 1967, that at a meeting of the National Youth Commission, CP, United States of America (USA), on June 14, 1967, in Brooklyn, New York, it was stated Linda Dannenberg was then under the influence of the CP, USA.

Susan Sontag

Susan Sontag is an author, writer and critic.

On January 3, 1968, a third confidential source advised that at a New York County CP Committee meeting, December 28, 1967, those present were urged to attend the January 15, 1968 Demonstration in Washington, D.C., sponsored by JRB.

On January 4, 1968, a fourth confidential source advised that a Press Conference was held at the Gotham Hotel, 5th Avenue and 55th Street, New York City, which announced that JRB would sponsor the January 15, 1968 Demonstration in Washington, D.C., and would be assisted by Women Strike For Peace (WSP). Participants were to include Florynce Kennedy, Ruby Dee, Judy Morse Eaton, who is the daughter of Senator Wayne Morse, and Mrs. Benjamin Spock, the wife of Dr. Benjamin Spock. At the conference, it was stated some Negro women would participate in the demonstration. The fact that Negroes would participate was described at the conference as an "unprecedented move".

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam, Washington,
D.C., January 15, 1968

Florynce Kennedy has been publically identified as an attorney for H. Rap Brown, National Chairman, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC)

On January 4, 1968, Mr. John Martin, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad, Pennsylvania Station, 8th Avenue and 33rd Street, New York City, advised that the original request from JRB for two special trains to Washington, D.C., from New York City, could not be furnished by the railroad because of insufficient equipment. One train of eighteen cars is being reserved for JRB. This train might be increased to 20 cars. Martin estimated that 1400 passengers would be the capacity of the reserved train. It will depart Penn Station 7:20 am on January 15, 1968. It will arrive Penn Station, Newark, New Jersey, at 7:36 am to pick up additional passengers. It will arrive Washington, D.C., at 11:10 am. There are no stops between Newark and Washington. The train will depart Washington, D.C., at 7:10 pm January 15, 1968, arrive Newark 10:45 pm, arrive New York City, 11:00 pm.

Martin stated a group from Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, organized by an Ethel Taylor, has reserved three coaches on the regular Pennsylvania Railroad to Washington, D.C., which departs Philadelphia 8:10 am January 15, 1968, arriving Washington, D.C., 10:20 am.

On January 5, 1968, a fifth confidential source advised that in obtaining the New York Telephone number 799-6520 for JRB, 133 West 72nd Street, New York City the references listed were Mrs. Peter C. Thompson, 10230 67th Avenue, Forest Hills, Queens, New York, and Mrs. Peter M. Wolf, 312 West 71st Street, Manhattan, New York. No bank references were listed.

Demonstration Protesting United States Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968

On January 9, 1968, Mrs. John Martin, Pennsylvania Raidroad, advised JRB informed him that more tickets had been sold for the January 15, 1968, special train than there were seats on the train. JRB had again requested more railroad cars. Martin informed them additional cars or an additional train was not available. JRB indicated they would consider chartered buses for the extra women from New York. Martin further stated that a $5000.00 check had been received from JRB drawn on the account of JRB at Sterling National Bank and Trust Company, Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, New York. The checked was signed by Mrs. Miriam Thompson. Martin indicated that most of the train negotiations have been conducted with Mrs. Thompson.

Mr. Martin stated he had arranged with the D.C. Transit Company, Washington, D.C., to provide approximately 33 buses from the capitol to the Hotel Shoreham, Washington, D.C.,at 2:00 pm, January 15, 1968. The buses will depart the hotel at 6:00 pm for Union Station and will depart Washington, D.C., 7:10 pm.

On January 10, 1968, a sixth confidential source advised that Frances Bordofsky and Sylvia Thompson were going to the demonstration in Washington, D.C., sponsored by JRB.

Frances Bordofsky

A seventh confidential source advised June 27, 1967, that Frances Bordofsky, a representative of Bronx County CP, is a member of the New York District CP Committee.

Sylvia Thompson

The third confidential source advised on February 27, 1967, that Sylvia Thompson is a member of the New York County CP Committee.

CONFIDENTIAL



We Want 10,000 Women In WASHINGTON JAN. 15

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade, Led By The 1st US Congresswoman, Demands That Congress

1. **Bring the Boys Back From Vietnam**
2. **Act On Neglected Human Needs At Home**

The broadest coalition of American women in history—women young and old, from church, political, peace and minority groups, from the arts, professions and public affairs—will speak with a single voice the day Congress opens. We women, representing 51% of the voting population, will demand that as its first order of business, Congress withdraw US troops and act to make a decent life for our 23 million black people and all citizens.

We will convene our own Congress of American Women, following our Petition at the Capitol. We will declare our intention to mobilize on all levels in our communities to reshape our society. Start the New Year with a day off from home or job to work for peace with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Make Womanpower Political Power

Jeannette Rankin Brigade 133 W. 72 St. NYC 10023
Tel: 212 (799-6520)

I will contribute $..

I will be at Union St'n Washington 11:30 am ....

Send me ....train tix (round trip NY/Wash.) @$7.50 each. Lv. Pa. St'n Monday Jan. 15 7:30 am; ret. NY 11 pm. Bring lunch bus fare Capitol to Women's Congress. Wear black or somber dress.

Name ....

Adress .... Tel. ....

The above advertisement appeared in "The Village Voice", on January 4, 1968, page 21.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/11/68

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
1/15/68, WASHINGTON, D.C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

C. C. Bishop

Re Los Angeles airtel and LHM, 12/30/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM setting forth information concerning a demonstration to be held in Santa Ana, California, on 1/15/67, in support of captioned demonstration.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being disseminated locally to 115th, MIG, Region II, Pasadena; USA, Los Angeles; Secret Service, Los Angeles; OSI, Norton AFB; and NIS, San Diego. LHM also enclosed for Washington Field.

The source used to characterize the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom is [redacted]. The source used to characterize the [illegible] STUDENTS is [redacted] [redacted] of the Chicago Office.

Informant

ENCLOSURE

③ - Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173)(Encls. 2)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

REC 16

LJM/pjc
(6)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~ SD)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

16 JAN 16 1968

LA 100-70701

The enclosed LHM is classified confidential because it contains information from [redacted], which could reasonably result in source's identification.

Informant

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
January 11, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICE IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.

Individual oral obligation of confidentiality

On January 11, 1968, [redacted] Santa Ana Police Department, advised that he had received an application for permission to use public property in the City of Santa Ana, California, which was submitted by Else Sturm, 30802 South Coast Highway, Laguna Beach, California.

I.I.

According to this application, Sturm indicated she represented the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) and was requesting authority for a "procession of approximately 150 persons dressed in black to support the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, protesting the government's position on the Vietnam War in conjunction with a massive demonstration to be held in Washington, D. C, on January 15, 1968." Sturm indicated the procession would be held between 10:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon on January 15, 1968, and would proceed from 6th Street to Sycamore Street, to 8th Street, to Broadway, and downtown Santa Ana, California.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

COPIES DESTROYED

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C.

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that WILPF is a peace oriented women's organization which is "Anti-War" perse. In addition, this organization works specifically in reference to civil rights issues. Participants in the organization are primarily active church-goers with a few former Communist Party members. WILPF's activities have included demonstration and distribution of literature opposing the Vietnam War.

Another source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that Else Sturm was a member of the Communist Party in Chicago, Illinois, in December, 1946.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

24979

1 - R. H. Horner
1 - M. J. Rozamus

1/11/68

CODE

TELETYPE URGENT

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

TO SAC NEW YORK (100-161601)

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY

REURTEL JANUARY ELEVEN.

AUTHORITY GRANTED FOR INFORMANT TO ACCOMPANY DEMONSTRATORS FROM NEW YORK CITY FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. ADVISE INFORMANT TO PROMPTLY CONTACT WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE, EXTENSIONS THREE NINE ONE OR FOUR SIX ZERO PROMPTLY UPON RECEIPT OF IMPORTANT DATA.

REC-68

[illegible]-35

PROMPTLY [illegible] AND [illegible] COMMUNICATION SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION.

1 - 100-9703

RHH:jal (5)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

NOTE: Informant has been an informant since February, 1961, and is currently paid up to $300 for services and up to [illegible] for expenses incurred. Source has furnished information on the Progressive Labor Movement, Casa de las Americas, the Cuban Mission to the UN and the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba. Demonstration in Washington on January 15 is sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade with the support of various women's pacifist groups. The demonstrators expect to petition Congress when they reconvene on January 15.

JAN 12 1968

62 JAN 18 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

Tsb ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/12/68

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

We have prepared a summary of activities scheduled by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in their demonstration to be held at the Capitol on January 15, 1968. A copy of this memorandum is attached for ready reference.

It has been previously reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, a nationwide group of women opposed to the war in Vietnam, will sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

Current plans of the Brigade call for the demonstration to assemble at Union Station, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p.m. and march to the Capitol via Louisiana Avenue. The Brigade has been unable to obtain a permit to assemble at the Capitol as previously planned.

Their request to meet with Speaker of the House, John W. McCormack and Senator Michael J. Mansfield on the steps of the Capitol for the purpose of presenting their petition before the entire demonstration has been thwarted. Speaker McCormack agreed to meet with a delegation of 10 to 15 women in his office. Following the presentation of the petition and until 2 p.m., participants will confer with various Congressmen. At 2 p.m., they will be taken by bus to the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C., for a conference from 2 to 6 p.m. At 6 p.m., those returning to the New York-Philadelphia area will be transported by bus to Union Station to entrain.

Some of the Brigade's demonstrators are expected to remain in Washington, D. C., until January 16 at which time they will attempt to confer with their Congressmen concerning the war in Vietnam. Communist Party members from New York,

Enclosure sent 1-12-68 REC 7 100-441326-8
~~100-448475~~
RHH:jav (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

XEROX
JAN 19 1968

EX-109

14 JAN 17 1968

Illinois and the State of Washington have been identified as participants. Among these are Frances Bordofsky of the New York District Party Committee and Sylvia Thompson, a member of the Party's New York County Committee.

DC

Busses have been chartered by groups from Cleveland, Newark, New York, and Philadelphia.

Supporting demonstrations will also be held by the Brigade's groups in Chicago, Illinois and Clayton, Missouri.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed memorandum to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; United States Secret Service; and the Attorney General.

ADDENDUM:

All information concerning the march has not only been furnished to the above, but has been furnished to Park and Capitol police, Metropolitan police and the military intelligence agencies.

✓

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

January 12, 1968

1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

It was previously reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, a nationwide group of women who are opposed to the war in Vietnam, will sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

Sources who have furnished reliable information in the past have advised that current plans call for the Brigade to assemble at Union Station, Washington, D. C., at 12:30 p.m., January 15, 1968. The demonstrators will march to the Capitol via Louisiana Avenue. The Brigade's plans originally called for the demonstrators to assemble at the Capitol; however, legal restrictions have arisen to prevent the demonstrators from assembling at this site.

The Brigade further had hoped to present their petition to Speaker of the House, John W. McCormack, and Senator Michael J. Mansfield on the steps of the Capitol. Speaker McCormack has answered their request by stating that he could not meet them on the steps, but would be willing to receive a delegation of ten to fifteen women in his office on that date. Following this, some participants will confer with various Congressmen.

At 2 p.m. on January 15, 1968, the demonstrators plan to be taken in busses to the Shoreham Hotel, Calvert Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., where the Brigade has reserved a banquet room from 2 to 6 p.m. At 6 p.m., those attending the meeting at the Shoreham Hotel will again be transported by bus to Union Station where those who arrived by train will depart to the New York-Philadelphia area by special train departing at 7:10 p.m.

Some of the Brigade's demonstrators are expected to remain in Washington, D. C., until January 16, 1968, at which time they will attempt to confer with their Congressmen concerning the war in Vietnam.

SENT PER ...
ON 1/12/68

100-448326-8

100-448475
RHH:jav
(27)

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

REC 7

XEROX
JAN 19 1968

JAN 24 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Memorandum **CONFIDENTIAL** Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO **JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE** DATE: 1/12/68

FROM : C. D.

SUBJECT:

Participants in the demonstration will include Frances Bordofsky, a member of the New York District Committee, Communist Party, USA; Sylvia Thompson, a member of the Communist Party's New York County Committee; Rosalind Durham, Communist Party member in the State of Illinois; and Linda Corr, Taimi Halonen, and Thorun Robel, Communist Party members in the State of Washington.

Sources have reported that busses have been chartered to transport demonstrators from Cleveland, Ohio; Newark, New Jersey; New York, New York; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. These busses are in addition to a special train of approximately 20 cars which is to transport participants from New York to Washington, D. C. Three coaches will also be added to a regularly scheduled train at Philadelphia.

Demonstrations in support of the Brigade's demonstration in Washington, D. C., are being planned for Chicago and St. Louis. In Chicago, the Women for Peace, a pacifist group, will hold a demonstration January 15, 1968, from 12 noon to 1 p.m. at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois. This demonstration will urge Congress to stop the war in Vietnam and to work on human needs in the United States. The participating women have been asked to wear black clothing. Mourning veils will be furnished them at the demonstration.

A silent vigil of women dressed in black is scheduled to be held on the steps of the St. Louis County Courthouse, Clayton, Missouri, on January 15, 1968, from 12 noon to 1 p.m.

NOTE:

Classified "Confidential" as some of the information included in this summary comes from sensitive sources, the compromise of which would be detrimental to the U. S.

Xerox copies being sent to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; the Vice President; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; United States Secret Service; the Attorney General; the Deputy Attorney General; and Assistant Attorneys General J. Walter Yeagley, Stephen J. Pollak and Fred M. Vinson, Jr.

CONFIDENTIAL

See memorandum C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated 1/12/68 captioned as above as prepared by RHH:jav.

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via TELETYPE URGENT
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING - ~~IS.~~ Internal Security

INSPECTOR A.D. BEYE, U.S. PARK POLICE, WASHINGTON, D.C., ADVISED THIS DATE PERMIT IS BEING GRANTED FOR JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE (JRB) TO USE SPACE AT FOOT OF CAPITOL HILL IN THE VICINITY OF THE GRANT MONUMENT FOR ASSEMBLY ON MONDAY, JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT. INSPECTOR BEYE ADVISED REPRESENTATIVE OF JRB REQUESTED PERMISSION FOR USE OF THIS AREA FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR BEGINNING ELEVEN THIRTY AM, JANUARY FIFTEEN, SIXTYEIGHT, AND PERMIT WILL ALLOW SPEAKERS DURING THAT PERIOD.

REC-34 [illegible]475-65

JAN 17 1968

(2) - Bureau
2 - WFO

GTT:fet
(4)

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per

1/12/68

CODE

TELETYPE SENT BY CODED TELETYPE URGENT 1 - Mr. R.H. Horner
X-113

TO SAC ST LOUIS (100-20923)

REC 48

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (100-448475) - 66

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN, ONE NINE SIX EIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

5

REURTEL JANUARY ELEVEN, LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PAY INFORMANT UP TO ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN PARTICIPATING IN CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION JANUARY FIFTEEN, NEXT, AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

INSTRUCT SOURCE TO PROMPTLY FURNISH ANY PERTINENT DATA DEVELOPED TO SA GARNETT, TUNSTALL, PHONE NUMBER EXECUTIVE THREE SEVEN ONE ZERO ZERO, EXTENTION THREE NINE ONE OR FOUR SIX ZERO.

FOR INFORMATION OF WFO, SOURCE USES CODE NAME ( ).

ST. LOUIS PROMPTLY DEBRIEF SOURCE UPON RETURN TO YOUR AREA AND SUBMIT LHM.

MAIL COPY TO WFO.

1 - WFO
1 - M.F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 100-375206
RHH:jav (6)

VIA TELETYPE
735 PM
1-11-68
ENCIPHERED

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

JAN 22 1968

UNIT ☑

Teletype to SAC, St. Louis
RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
100-448475

SENT BY CODED TELETYPE

NOTE:

[redacted] has been an informant since 7/53. [redacted]. She is currently authorized payments of up tO $235 per month for services and up to $20 per month for expenses. Source would be able to furnish valuable information concerning Party efforts during this demonstration. The demonstration in Washington, D. C., on 1/15/68 is sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade composed of women from various peace organizations. Teletype being used in view of necessity for infomant to make travel arrangements.

Information
Identifies
Informant

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
~~U.S.~~ POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15- 16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)

Ch

Re Buairtel to Albany, 12/5/67, and Atlanta teletype, 1/12/68, to Bureau.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM captioned as above, prepared at Atlanta, Georgia, on 1/12/68, and suitable for dissemination.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Ft. McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

ENCLOSURE

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
6 - Atlanta (2 - 100-7300)
(1 - 100-6730)
(1 - 100-3128)
(1 - 100-7253)
(1 - 100-New Dead) (RICHARD PARRY)

REC-69 100-[illegible] 13

JAN 15 1968

CTH:met
(13)

INT. SEC.

E. C. Baker AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI Secret Service
RAO [illegible] State
DATE [illegible]
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: [illegible]

Approved: ______________________ Sent [illegible] 932M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

55 JAN 22 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Atlanta, Georgia
January 12, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

Mrs. Nancy Collinson of the American Friends Service Committee Office in Atlanta, Georgia, advised on January 12, 1968, that a Greyhound bus had been chartered by individuals from Atlanta who were due to take part in the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, and she would accompany this group.

W. Earl Perry, Charter Manager, Southeastern Greyhound Lines, advised on January 12, 1968, that a 38-passenger bus had been chartered by Mrs. Nancy Collinson, and the bus is scheduled to leave the Atlanta Greyhound Bus Depot at 7:30 p.m. on January 14, 1968, and due to arrive at the Union Station in Washington, D.C., at 10:00 a.m. on January 15, 1968. On the return trip from Washington to Atlanta, the passengers are to be picked up at 6:00 p.m. on January 15, 1968, at the Shorham Hotel, and the bus is due to arrive in Atlanta at 8:00 a.m. on January 16, 1968.

The following individuals were advised of the above on January 12, 1968:

Lieutenant Robert Shattles, Atlanta Police Department;

Special Agent Phillip Perry, Georgia Bureau of Investigation, Atlanta, Georgia;

Hoyt West, Special Agent, 111th Military Intelligence Group, Region V, Fort McPherson, Georgia;

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1974

100-4464[illegible] 73

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Mr. A.B. Wentz, Special Agent in Charge, United States Secret Service, Atlanta, Georgia;

Mr. Charles L. Goodson, United States Attorney, Northern District of Georgia, Atlanta, Georgia.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in [illegible]
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL [illegible]
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-44[illegible])

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-4949) -P-

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEO, SER, RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, OD)
DATE FORW: 1-16-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: [illegible]

Re Philadelphia teletype, dated 1/11/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM, dated and captioned as above. Two copies each of the LHM are being designated for WFO and Newark. One information copy each of the LHM is being designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have cases on the "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

Source utilized is INFORMANT.

The information from [illegible] was furnished to SA KENNETH K. [illegible].

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally to Secret Service, OSI, NISO, and [illegible], 109th MI Group.

ENCLOSURE

- Bureau (100-44[illegible]) (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (RM)
6 - Philadelphia
  1 - [illegible]-4949
  1 - [illegible] (LHM)
  1 - 100-45561 (EARLY [illegible])
  1 - 134-16-Sub [illegible]

KYS:[illegible]
(13)

REC- 69

EX 109

100-44[illegible]-74

8 JAN 15 1968

SEC.

C. C. Bishop

57 JAN 23 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE [redacted]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

January [illegible]

[illegible] [redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] [illegible], unidentified [illegible] [illegible] Philadelphia [illegible] information:

X, P.A. - D.C. - N.I.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] group [illegible] at [illegible] p.m. on January [illegible], [illegible] at Philadelphia. [illegible] [illegible] Broad [illegible] Philadelphia [illegible] will leave Philadelphia at [illegible] a.m. and arrive at Washington, D. C. at 10:30 a.m., January [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] January [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] information [illegible] a mimeographed letter from the [illegible]. A xerox copy of the letter is attached [illegible]

[illegible]

108-44[illegible]415-74

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED

27 MAY 12 1971

WOMEN strike for PEACE
20 S. 12th Street - Philadelphia, Pa. 19107 - Telephone: LO 3-4310

Dear WSPER:

Women Strike for Peace nationally is supporting the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. Planeloads, trainloads and carloads of women will be coming into Washington on Monday, January 15th, from all over the country.

We are particularly pleased with this action because it represents for the first time a real coalition of women's peace groups, church groups, theatre personalities, and community leaders.

The Day is envisioned as a solemn, dignified confrontation of those who should be representing the ever growing opposition to the war. We ask that you write your Congressmen urging that they support the four points listed in the enclosed Call as Congress reconvenes. Later in the afternoon at our Women's Congress we want to be able to report on Congressional responses.

We will all meet at Union Station in Washington at 11:30 AM and slowly walk to the Capitol. We ask the women to wear black. We will be led by Jeannette Rankin who will proceed to the top of the Capitol steps with a representative delegation of 50 women to present our petition to the two men who represent the whole of Congress, Senator Mike Mansfield and Speaker of the House McCormack. The delegation will read the demands before the assembled women and the two Congressmen. Leaving the Hill, the women will enter buses for a motorcade to a Congress of American Women (place to be announced). Women will present an analysis of the current crisis on the war front and the domestic front, leading to suggestions for program and actions to be taken back to our communities for implementation.

Women may choose to remain in Washington the next day to meet with their Congressmen. If you wish to stay and wish help in securing accommodations, contact the Hospitality Comittee, 2140 P. St. N.W . Washington, DC (293-2020). We regret that in order to get the owest train fare we had to guarantee return the same day; therefore you would have to inance your own trip back on the 16th.

Our hope is that 10,000 women will converge upon Washington. We urge you to partiipate.

Yours for Peace,

Ethel Taylor

3-MEET A T 30th STREET STATION INFORMATION DESK AT 7:45 TO ALLOW TIME FOR PRESS AND TV COVERAGE. LIMIT OF 200 SEATS ON TRAIN -- RESERVE EARLY.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via airtel airmail (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (100-20923) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/8/68 - JEANNETTE RANKEN BRIGADE INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

C. D. [illegible]

ReBuairtel to AL, 12/5/67, and SL teletypes to Bureau, 1/9 and 1/11/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum suitable for dissemination, and for WFO 2 copies.

Local dissemination has been made to USA, Secret Service, St. Louis Police Department, Clayton Police Department, and Navy, Army and Air Force Intelligence.

St. Louis County Police Department has been orally advised but has not been furnished a copy of the LHM.

Source one is INFORMANT

Source two is INFORMANT

The LHM has been classified CONFIDENTIAL to protect identity of these sources of continuing value.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW: 1/16
HOW FORW:
BY:

REC 48

85

JAN 16 1968

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (Enc. 2) (RM)
5 - St. Louis (1 - 100-20923)
(1 - 134-161A
(1 - 134-214A } INFORMANTS
(1 - 100-20884 PEACE CENTER)
(1 - 100-19842 VIDEM)

SJP:paw
(10)

XEROX
JAN 17 1968

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

St. Louis has not attempted to characterize any of the names listed on printed flyer that is a part of the LHM. The names written in after St. Louis delegation are not known to have subversive connections, although they are associated with peace and anti-Vietnam activities.

St. Louis is continuing its efforts to identify individuals who will travel to Washington, D. C., and it will follow demonstration to be held at Clayton, Missouri, 1/15/68.

Bureau will be kept advised by airtel.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri

January 12, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968 - JEANNETTE RANKEN BRIGADE

Information was developed that in late fall of 1967 an organization known as the Jeannette Ranken Brigade had sent out a call for a demonstration to be held at the White House in Washington, D. C., on January 8, 1968, in protest of the War in Vietnam. Jeannette Ranken, the Chairman of this Brigade, is 86 years old and is a former member of Congress from the State of Montana. She first went to Congress in 1917.

The December 14, 1967 issue of the "St. Louis Post-Dispatch", a daily St. Louis newspaper, in an article on Page 10C, stated that Jeannette Ranken was planning a massive Vietnam peace project by women who would converge on Congress in January, 1968. She is elsewhere quoted to have said, "Ten thousand women have sat back and let their sons be killed in Vietnam. If we had ten thousand women willing to go to jail if necessary we could stop the war in Vietnam. You cannot have wars without women." She has stated that she is willing to stay in jail until the bombing in Vietnam is stopped.

Source One advised on January 6, 1968, that the St. Louis Peace Information Center, at 6217 Delmar, has been active in organizing interest in the Jeannette Ranken demonstration. It was announced that the date for the demonstration at Washington, D. C., had been changed from January 8, to January 15, 1968.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This communication and its contents are loaned to you by the FBI, and neither it nor its contents are to be distributed outside of the agency to which loaned.

85

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

Source said that in addition to sending a delegation to Washington, D. C., the St. Louis group is formulating plans for a demonstration to take place in St. Louis, Missouri, on January 15, 1968. The Peace Center has distributed a leaflet. A copy of this leaflet is as follows:



who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home

[illegible]

TO COME TO WASHINGTON

JANUARY 15

as Congress opens. Support Jeannette Rankin as she leads a representative delegation of American women to the Capitol to demand that:

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

Congress use its power to heal a sick society at home.

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

PROGRAM
1. Lve. St. Louis Sat. PM, Jan. 13
2. Attend Planning Sessions Sun.
3. Hospitality in homes 3 nights
~~4. Silent walk~~ to Capitol 11:30 ~~AM Mon.~~
5 Visit Congressmen Tues.
6. Return Tues. night

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

PETITION the United States Congress

CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

PARTIAL LIST OF National SPONSORS

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin



Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Popp
Rosa Parks
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag

Dagmar Wilson

Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culve
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliot

The Brigade is composed of women from all walks of life, churches, arts, professions

St. Louis Delegation - Partial list

Yvonne Logan, Lois Bock, Rachel Fathman, Vivian Schatz, Charlotte Peskind, Bernice Wehrmeyer, Eldora Spiegelberg

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN, (Not sponsored by organizations)

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elect to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all

Congress, as its first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately arrange for the withdrawal of all American troops.

Congres[illegible]se its power to heal a sick society at [illegible]e.

Congress use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

Congress listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

PROGRAM
1. Lve. St. Louis Sat. PM, Jan. 13
2. Attend Planning Sessions Sun.
3. Hospitality in homes 3 nights
4. Silent walk to Capitol 11:30 AM Mon.
5 Visit Congress Tues.
6. Return Tues. night

WOMEN OF AMERICA, our power is unlimited. On January 15 American women will:

PETITION the United States Congress

CONVENE a Congress of American Women that afternoon to develop programs to meet the crisis in America—programs which will express our political power, reason and conscience.

LET US DECLARE our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations.

PARTIAL LIST OF National SPONSORS

Muriel Adams
Mia Aurbakken Adjali
Donna Allen
Carol Anderson
Ellen Aurbakken
Helen Baker
Norma Becker
Mrs. Harry Belafonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett

Rebecca Berman
Peggy Billings
Kay Boyle
Nikki Bridges
Jane Buchenholz
Catherine L. Camp
Twila Lytton Cavert
Mary Clarke
Eva Rubinstein Coffin

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.

Jessica Mitford
Nelle Morton
Grace Mora Newman
Dorothy Nyland
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks

Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag

Dagmar Wilson

Florence Criley
Elsie Thomas Culve
Polly Cuthbertson
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Grace Loucks Elliott

The Brigade is composed of women from all walks of life, churches, arts, professions (Not sponsored by organizations)

St. Louis Delegation - Partial list

Yvonne Logan, Lois Bock
Rachel Fatlman, Vivian Schatz,
Charlotte Poskind, Bernice
Wehrmeyer, Eldora Spiegelberg

Needed!
Women to go as delegates
Women to contribute funds
Women to care for children
Women to staff Peace Information Center for 3 days
Women to vigil in St. Louis
Call: Eldora Spiegelberg PA 1-4919
[illegible] VO 3-1750 ([illegible])

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings -- for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

JEANNETTE RANKIN

ALL WOMEN ARE URGED TO WEAR BLACK WHEREVER THEY ARE ON JANUARY 15

CONFIDENTIA

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

With regard to the local demonstration, Source advised that final plans would be made at a meeting scheduled at the Peace Center on January 14, 1968. It has been proposed that the demonstration would take place at the St. Louis County, Missouri Courthouse at Clayton, Missouri. It will consist of women dressed in black, standing in silence for one hour between 12 Noon and 1 PM. An article on Page 8A of the "St. Louis Globe-Democrat", a St. Louis daily newspaper, Friday, January 12, 1968 states that vigil for peace will be held at Clayton. This article says that an hour-long vigil for peace by women wearing black is planned for January 15, 1968, for one hour at noon at the St. Louis County Courthouse. The vigil is being carried out by the St. Louis Chapter of the Women Strike for Peace. Miss Nolan Peskin is described as the founder of the St. Louis Chapter. She is further referred to as the wife of the Clayton, Missouri, businessman who is a member of the Veterans for Peace. According to the article, plans will be finalized at a meeting to be held at the Peace Information Center on January 13, 1968.

Source Two advised on January 10, 1968, that women from St. Louis who intend to take part in the January 15, 1968 demonstration at Washington, D. C., are being told that the St. Louis group will travel together via Trans World Airlines They will depart St. Louis at 6:25 PM on Sunday, January 14, 1968, and will arrive in Washington at 9:03 PM. Each woman is being told that she should make her own airline reservations and that each is to pay her own travel expenses. Housing in Washington, D. C., will be provided for, however, food will have to be purchased by the individual. It is possible that some money may be contributed by individuals who cannot make the trip but who want to help others who can go but who are lacking the funds. On January 15, 1968, the women will attempt to call on members of the Congress and present to them their opposition to the Vietnam War. On January 16, 1968, a "Women's Congress" will be held in Washington, D. C., for the purpose of issuing instructions to the delegates concerning future activities that they are to carry out upon returning to their homes. The location where this meeting will be held is not known.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

The St. Louis group will endeavor to obtain reservations on Trans World Airlines flight leaving Washington, D. C., January 16, 1968, at 5:05 PM.

An article appearing in the September 20, 1967 issue of "The St. Louis Post-Dispatch" on Page 3C read as follows:

> "A Peace Information Center will be opened at 6217 Delmar Boulevard with ceremonies at 8:00 p.m. today. The Center will contain literature on foreign affairs, economics and social problems. Information concerning alternatives under the Selective Service Act and individual counseling for young men will be provided by appointment."

All sources in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

CDS

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

To: Director, FBI (100-448475)

From: SAC, Philadelphia (100-49497) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68; INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)

Enclosed for the Bureau are an original and ten copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Two copies each of the LHM are being designated for Newark and WFO. One information copy each is being designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have cases on the "Jeannette Rankin Brigade."

Re Philadelphia teletype to the Director dated 1/5/68.

The information from the Philadelphia Police Department was received by SA [illegible].

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (RM)
3 - Philadelphia
  1 - 100-45020 (NBP)
  1 - 100-42539 (CAROLYN [illegible])

REC-31 EX-106

86

[illegible]:cd
(11)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., 1014
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)

22 JAN 16 1968

DATE FORW: 1-18-68
HOW FORW: RS
BY: WAF-TC-BK

C. C. - Bishop

54 JAN 24 1968

INTL SEC.

The pretext was conducted by Clerk MARY T. PENITIS. The pretext utilized was that of a woman interested in making the trip to Washington, D. C.

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally to Secret Service, NISO, OSI, and 109th MI Group.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 12, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

On January 5, 1968, Officer JAMES MC GOWAN, Civil Disobedience Unit, Philadelphia Police Department, made available two flyers pertaining to the scheduled January 15, 1968, Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) demonstration in Washington, D. C. The first carried the heading "Join the Jeannette Rankin Brigade" and listed the address and phone number for the JRB as 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. (LO 4-5570). The second was a message "To all American Women" from JEANNETTE RANKIN and listed a partial list of sponsors. Copies of these flyers are attached to this memorandum.

The information service of the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania reflected that the listing for LO 4-5570 was Women Strike for Peace, 20 South 12th Street, Philadelphia, Pa.

On January 5, 1968, [illegible] [illegible]RGER of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) office was contacted under suitable pretext. She stated that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade was an ad hoc committee formed of various peace groups and church women. It was being coordinated in Philadelphia out of the WSP office only for this one occasion and for the group of women going to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968. A march to the Capitol to petition Congress was planned; the rest of the activities would then be held indoors at Georgetown University which had provided facilities for the convening

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

86

of the Congress of American Women. [illegible] stated that all the information she had available concerning the JRB was contained in the flyer (captioned above - attached) issued by the JRB.

JOIN THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

COME TO WASHINGTON JANUARY 15

SUPPORT JEANNETTE RANKIN AS SHE LEADS US TO THE CAPITOL

TO DEMAND THAT --

1. CONGRESS AS ITS FIRST ORDER OF BUSINESS RESOLVE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM AND IMMEDIATELY ARRANGE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL AMERICAN TROOPS.
2. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO HEAL A SICK SOCIETY AT HOME.
3. CONGRESS USE ITS POWER TO MAKE REPARATION FOR THE RAVAGED LAND WE LEAVE BEHIND IN VIETNAM.
4. CONGRESS LISTEN TO WHAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE ARE SAYING AND REFUSE THE INSATIABLE DEMANDS OF THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX.

WOMEN OF AMERICA!

OUR POWER IS UNLIMITED!

ON JANUARY 15th WE WILL

PETITION THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

CONVENE A CONGRESS OF AMERICAN WOMEN THAT AFTERNOON TO DEVELOP PROGRAMS TO MEET THE CRISIS IN AMERICA -- PROGRAMS WHICH WILL EXPRESS OUR POLITICAL POWER, REASON AND CONSCIENCE.

- -

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
20 S. 12th St.
Phila., Pa. 19107 - LO 4-5570

Enclosed is $____ for ___ train tickets - $8.50 round trip from 30th St. Station -- $10.50 round trip from Trenton.

I cannot go - am enclosing $___ for someone else to go.

Be at 30th St. Station 7:45 A.M. (train leaves 8:10 A.M.). Train leaves 7:32 A.M. from Trenton. (Train leaves Washington 6:00 P.M. sharp.)

Name________________________________ ______________
Address_____________________________ Phone__________

'Make checks payable to Jeannette Rankin Brigade. For further information about the DAY contact the office.)

All women are urged to wear black on January 15th.

JEANNETTE RANKIN
Helena, Montana

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN:

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against the war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote, because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then, as I do today, that women are the ones that must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings - for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live. I hope all women will respond to the following call and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

JEANNETTE RANKIN

PARTIAL LIST OF SPONSORS

Mrs. Harry Bellefonte
Mrs. John C. Bennett
Kay Boyle
Katherine L. Camp
Ruby Dee
Mrs. Ann Eaton
Judith Morse Eaton
Eleanor French
Mrs. Jack Gilford
Dr. Carolyn Goodman
Vivian Hallinan
Mrs. E. Y. Harburg
Dorothy Hassler
Dr. Frances Herring
Mrs. Martin Luther King
Susan K. Kinoy
Ruth Krause
Margaret Kuhn
Helen B. Lamb
Viveca Lindfors
Jessica Mitford
Grace Mora Newman
Mrs. Joseph Papp
Rosa Parks
Nan S. Pendergrast
Esther Pike
Malvina Reynolds
Mrs. Robert Ryan
Helen Huntington Smith
Mrs. Benjamin Spock
Susan Sontag
Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
Ethel Taylor
Pearl Willen
Dagmar Wilson



"HE LEARNED HIS FIRST WORD TODAY—KILL"

"This document cont[illegible] neither recommen[illegible] nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the [illegible] of the FBI and is loaned to your [illegible] and its contents are not to be distributed outside your [illegible]

-6-

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1-12-68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

REC-32

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, RICHMOND (100-10593) -P-

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
INTERNAL SECURITY

OO: WFO

ReBureau airtel to all offices, 12-5-67, and Richmond teletype dated 1-11-68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of LHM concerning captioned demonstration and two copies for WFO.

One copy each of the LHM is being transmitted to the following:

109th MIG, Richmond, Va., via FD-342
U.S. Secret Service, Richmond, Va., via FD-342

The first confidential source referred to in the enclosed LHM is **INFORMANT.**

The second confidential source referred to is **INFORMANT.**

LEAD:

REC-32

RICHMOND: Will follow this matter and keep the Bureau and WFO advised of pertinent developments.

(3) - Bureau (Encs. 10) (RM)
2 - WFO (Encs. 2) (RM)
2 - Richmond (1 - 100-10593) (1 - 66-2521A)
DWH:jll
(7)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, SD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

JAN 17 1968

INDEXED

C. C. Bishop

Approved: ____________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Richmond, Virginia

January 12, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

Detective C. F. SMITH, Intelligence Squad, Richmond, Virginia, Police Department, advised that he had received information that ICHIRO HASEGAWA, who is known to be active in peace movement groups in the Richmond, Virginia, area was planning to attend the demonstration sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade originally scheduled for January 8th but now planned for January 15, 1968.

SMITH stated that his information indicated that HASEGAWA planned to travel to Washington, D. C., to participate in that demonstration with other unknown individuals. He stated that he has no information concerning HASEGAWA's mode of transportation to Washington nor her participation in the demonstration. SMITH also has no information concerning the number of individuals planning to attend the demonstration with her.

A confidential source advised on September 8, 1965, that the publication "Four Lights," described as the official publication of the Woman's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) in a supplement to its July 1965 issue, listed the nominees for the National Board of the WILPF. Included in this listing was the following name - MARII HASEGAWA, also known as ICHIRO HASEGAWA. Within the framework of the WILPF, her activities were listed as follows:

President - New Jersey State Branch - 1956 - 1960
National Membership Chairman - 1960 - 1965
Member of the National Board and Vice President - 1962 - 1965
President Burlington County, New Jersey, Branch - 1961 - 1965

A second confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 15, 1962, that THOMAS NABRIED and FRANCIS GABOW, Communist Party of Eastern Pennsylvania and Delaware (CPEPD) Leaders, have both

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

96

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

indicated that the Communist Party (CP) was interested in influencing peace groups, specifically WILPF and there have been instructions for sometime for CP members to join this organization.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It s the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Richmond, Virginia

January 12, 1968

Title DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968

Character INFORMATION CONCERNING - INTERNAL SECURITY

Reference Richmond memorandum dated and captioned as above

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It s the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/12/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

WCS

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

C. D. Brennan

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
(00: WFO)

ReNYtel, 1/11/68.

Enclosed herewith for Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM concerning captioned demonstration. Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, Philadelphia is one copy of the LHM. Copies of this LHM have been designated to interested local intelligence agencies, and USAs, SDNY and EDNY.

BSS, NYCPD, has been advised of bus travel plans from NYC.

NYO will cover departure of buses, as well as trains, from NYC.

ENCLOSURE

REC 10

- 41

③-Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
1-Atlanta (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Los Angeles (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Newark (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-Philadelphia (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1-New York (100-161601)

20 JAN 13 1968

HPB:mfw (42)
(11)

called R.H. Horner 6 PM, 1/13/68

C. C. - Bishop

~~AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.~~
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)

Approved: ______________________ Sent __________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

DATE FORW: __________
HOW FORW: __________
BY: __________

F

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
January 12, 1968

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D. C.
January 15, 1968

On January 11, 1968, Mr. John Martin, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad, Pennsylvania Station, New York City, stated he had been informed by the New York office of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) that the overflow of women traveling to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, by train would be handled by buses furnished through the All State Bus Corporation, Brooklyn, New York. These buses would depart from the vicinity of Pennsylvania Station, New York City.

On January 11, 1968, Mr. Robert Stimell, Sales Representative, All State Bus Corporation, 3163 Coney Island Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, advised that his company had contracted with JRB to furnish five buses to depart from 31st Street and Eighth Avenue (vicinity Pennsylvania Station), New York City, at 7 A.M., January 15, 1968. These buses have a total seating capacity of 245. The All State Bus Corporation has received a deposit of $250 on January 11, 1968, from Miriam Thompson of JRB. Stimell advised that the All State Bus Corporation was acting as the bus broker with JRB, and it was anticipated that the actual buses used would come from the New York and Keansburg Line, a New Jersey-based company.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

41

ENCLOSURE

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen WC
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI WASH DC

FBI CINCINTI

4:26 PM URGENT 1/13/68 PAR

TO DIRECTOR AND WFO

FROM CINCINNATI (100-17137) 2P

C. D. Brennan

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY EIGHT SIXTY EIGHT INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

ON JANUARY TWELVE LAST, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO IS IN A POSITION TO FURNISH RELIABLE INFORMATION ADVISED THAT ANN PERRY, YELLOW SPRINGS OHIO, HAS ORGANIZED APPROXIMATELY FORTY WOMEN TO TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION NOW SCHEDULED FOR JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT. THESE WOMEN WHO WILL BE FROM DAYTON, YELLOW SPRINGS, AND SURROUNDING AREAS IN OHIO WILL DEPART FROM THE ANTIOCH COLLEGE UNION, YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, SEVEN FIFTEEN PM, JANUARY FOURTEEN NEXT AND ANTICIPATE ARRIVING WASHINGTON, D.C. APPROXIMATELY SEVEN AM JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT WHERE THEY WILL UNLOAD AT THE UNION STATION. DRESSED IN BLACK, THEY WILL MEET WITH DEMONSTRATORS FROM OTHER AREAS OF THE UNITED STATES AND PROCEED IN SILENCE TO THE CAPITOL.

REC 30

EX 101

16 JAN 16 1968

SOURCE STATED THIS GROUP WILL MEET AT SEVEN THIRTY PM, JANUARY

END PAGE ONE

cc: Thompson

ccs AG-DNE
1010

6:30 PM,
1/13/68
called SA R. H. Horne

JAN 1968

TWO COPIES WFO

FIFTEEN NEXT AT THE SHOREHAM HOTEL, TWENTY FIVE HUNDRED CALVERT ST., NORTHWEST, WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR THE RETURN TRIP TO YELLOW SPRINGS.

RELIABLE SOURCES ADVISE ANN PERRY, YELLOW SPRINGS, OHIO, HAS BEEN A LEADER IN ANTI-WAR DEMONSTRATIONS AND RELATED ACTIVITIES IN THE PAST FEW YEARS AND ALSO IN THE PAST SHE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE.

INSTANT DATE RELIABLE SOURCES ADVISED THEY COULD FURNISH NO ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFORMATION OTHER THAN THAT SET OUT ABOVE. SOURCES STATED YELLOW SPRINGS GROUP STRICTLY PEACE MAKERS AND NO VIOLENCE ANTICIPATED

ADMINISTRATIVE;

REBUAIRTEL TO ALL SACS, DECEMBER FIVE LAST, AND MIAMI AIRTEL TO BUREAU, DECEMBER TWENTY EIGHT LAST.

SOURCE IS SOURCE.

END

HOLD

LLD

FBI WASH DC

TWO COPIES WFO

FBI WASH DC*

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 15 1968
TELETYPE

FBI CINCINTI

11:26 PM URGENT 1-14-68 DHV

TO DIRECTOR AND WFO

FROM CINCINNATI (100-17137)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

5 - Thompson

cA. Bz

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY ~~EIGHT~~ 15, NINETEEN SIXTYEIGHT, INFORMATION CONCERNING. (IS).

INSTANT DATE A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT APPROXIMATELY FORTY WOMEN DEPARTED YELLOWSPRINGS, OHIO BY BUS, NINE PM THIS DATE FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY FIFTEEN NEXT. THE BUS WHICH RESEMBLES A GR~~A~~EYHOUND TYPE BUS WAS CHARTERED FROM THE SOUTHEASTERN BUS LINES, INC., JAMESTOWN, OHIO.

Ch

SOURCE ADVISED THAT ALTHOUGH IT WAS SNOWING AND ROAD CONDITIONS HA~~Z~~ZARDOUS THE WOMEN WERE DETERMINED TO REACH WASHINGTON, D. C. FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RECITEL JANUARY THIRTEEN, LAST.

SOURCE IS CHIEF JAMES A MCKEE, POLICE DEPARTMENT YELLOWSPRINGS, OHIO.

END

LLD

FBI WASH DC*

XEROX
JAN 1968

Mr. Thompson

cc AG DAG
1/17

REC-51 100-44545-41

EX 106

JAN 16 1968

JAN ... COPIES WFO

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/19/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, NEW HAVEN (100-19472) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D. C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
OO:WFO

Re: New Haven teletype, 1/15/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM concerning captioned demonstration, and for WFO 2 copies of same LHM. The confidential sources mentioned therein are [redacted] (Protect by request), [redacted], The Connecticut Company, New Haven, Conn., and [redacted].
Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information the unauthorized disclosure of which could result in identification of the sources and thereby effect the national security interest.

Copies of this LHM are being disseminated locally to 108th MIG, Secret Service and USA, New Haven, all of whom are cognizant of this matter.

REC-69 100-448475-141

ENCLOSURE

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
DATE FORW: 1-24-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RHH:dlk

JAN 23 1968

3-Bureau (Enc.11) (RM)
2 WFO (Enc.2)(RM)
2 New Haven (1-100-19497)
RHH/mmf
(7)

C.C. - Bishop

56 JAN 31 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New Haven, Connecticut
January 19, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised on January 15, 1968, that two buses departed from the Connecticut Company, New Haven, Connecticut, and Mrs. JAMES FINCH, 85 West Shepard Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut, and Mrs. MONNIE CALLAN, 1646 Whitney Avenue, Hamden, Connecticut, representatives of the Connecticut Jeannette Rankin Group, at 4:30 a.m., January 15, 1968. According to the source, the busses containing sixty-two women, were destined to Penn Station, New York City, to connect with a special train for Washington, D.C. The buses were due to return to Penn Station at 11:00 p.m. on January 15, 1968, to pick up and return the Connecticut group.

A second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that MONNIE CALLAN, as a representative of the Lower Harlem Youth Section, attended what appeared to be a youth meeting of the Communist Party held September 9, 1949.

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

100-448475-107

ENCLOSURE

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/15/68

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-47173) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, CNI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)
DATE FORW: 1-16-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RHH: dch

cc + encl 932 9th FA.

CD/B/

ReWFOairtel and LHM dated 1/10/68, captioned as above.

Transmitted herewith are 11 copies of an LHM for the Bureau and two each for offices indicated in the copy count.

LHM being disseminated locally to Secret Service, AUSA and military intelligence agencies. Law enforcement agencies cognizant of information contained in LHM.

Sources used in LHM are first source INFORMANT. second source (ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE) and third source INFORMANT.

LHM is classified "Confidential" in view of the fact that information reported by the first and third sources could lead to the identification of those sources and compromise future effectiveness.

REC 25 100-44-1 - 82

SAs mentioned in LHM are as follows: CLAUDE W. BOGLEY, FORREST F. BURGESS, R. C. CLACK and RICHARD C. COFFMAN, and JOSEPH A. CONNORS, JR.

④ - Bureau (Enc. 11)
(1-105-138315) (VIDEM)
2 - Los Angeles (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Newark (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO
(1-100-44061) (VIDEM)

JAN 25 1968

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

Approved: ________________ Special Agent in Charge Sent ________________ M Per ________________

WFO continuing to follow and will report further pertinent details.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

CONFIDENTIAL

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
January 15, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised in December, 1967, that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) had been formed primarily by members of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist organization. Members of Women Strike for Peace had formed the organization following a statement made by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin of Montana, in which she stated that if 10,000 American housewives were willing to be arrested, they could stop the war in Vietnam. According to the source, the JRB was formed as a "one shot organization" to sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D.C., when Congress reconvenes in 1968.

The same source advised that January 15, 1968, had been established as the date of the above demonstration in view of the fact that Congress was reconvening on that date. The source stated that the headquarters of the JRB was located in New York City and that officials there and in other large United States cities including Los Angeles, San Francisco and Washington, D.C., were formulating the plans for a "march on the United States Capitol" where the women would present to the United States Congress a petition demanding that the Congressmen end the war in Vietnam. The source stated that a small minority in the above organization were in favor of commiting acts of civil disobedience and being arrested but the vast majority of the organization wanted a peaceful demonstration to again focus the Congressional attention upon the war in Vietnam.

The same source advised in January, 1968, that representatives of the JRB met with officials of the United States Capitol Police on several occasions and attempted to gain permission to assemble on the steps of the United States Capitol and present a petition to Congressional

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification.

ENCLOSURE

100-11411- 82

leaders. Officials refused to allow the women to assemble as it is in violation of a United States law prohibiting demonstrations on the United States Capitol grounds. The source advised on January 12, 1968, that a final meeting with the United States Capitol Police officials had been held and it had been decided by the representatives of the JRB that the women would assemble at Union Station at approximately 11:30 a.m. and march to Union Square located at the foot of Capitol Hill off the Capitol grounds. Officials of the JRB obtained a permit from the United States Park Police granting them permission to use an area in the vicinity of Union Square for assembling and hearing the reading of the petition which was to be presented to the United States Congress by a small delegation of that organization.

The source advised on January 12, 1968, that the JRB had rented the Regency Ballroom of the Shoreham Hotel, Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., from 2 to 6 p.m. on January 15, 1968. After meeting on Union Square, the group will travel by bus to the Shoreham Hotel where they will hold a Congress of American Women. After 6 p.m. they will be bused to Union Station where they will depart Washington, D.C.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 15, 1968, at approximately 11:30 a.m. observed several hundred people assembled in Union Station apparently waiting to participate in the JRB demonstration at that time. At approximately 11:40 a.m. a train bound from New York City to Washington, D.C., arrived at Union Station with approximately 1,500 individuals, mostly women, aboard. These individuals began marching at twelve noon away from Union Station, South on Louisiana Avenue. Now numbering approximately 2,600, they marched six abreast on the West sidewalk of Louisiana Avenue to the vicinity of Union Square where they began arriving at approximately 12:35 p.m.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

The following individuals were preceded by several individuals carrying a large banner which read: "End the War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." Prior to leaving Union Station, many small placards were observed, some of which read: "End the War" and "LBJ Eats Imperial Margarine." These placards were removed from the demonstration when the participants were advised they would only be allowed to carry a large banner in front and a large banner in the rear of the marchers. The banner bringing up the rear of the marchers read as follows: "U.S. Women Unite End the War in Vietnam." Before the participants began marching, one Amy Swerdlow of New York City, acting as spokesman for the group, stated that a delegation of fifteen women were going by car to present their petition to the United States Congress while the rest of them would walk to Union Square where the petition will be read to them by Viveca Lindfors. After the reading of this petition, the participants were instructed to board buses which were located near Union Square and they would be transported to the Shoreham Hotel.

All of the participants had arrived at Union Square by approximately 1 p.m. and it was estimated by police officials that approximately 2,600 individuals had taken part in the march. Small placards had been observed in Union Station which showed representatives there from the following locations:

Washington, D.C.
California
Kentucky
Cleveland, Ohio
Michigan
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Connecticut
Maryland
Kansas
New York
Illinois

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Most of the participants in the above march were female and dressed in black with some wearing black wreaths. The monitors and spokesmen for the group instructed them not to talk to each other but to march in a silent, solemn procession.

A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on June 30, 1966, that Amy Swerdlow, also known as Mrs. Stanley Swerdlow, was listed as a "non-party visitor" at the 18th Nation Convention CP, USA, held in 1966 in New York City.

Captain Robert Krahling, United States Capitol Police, Washington, D.C., advised on January 15, 1968, that Jeannette Rankin and approximately fifteen members of the JRB visited the office of Speaker of the United States House of Representatives John McCormick at approximately 1 p.m. this date. He stated they presented him with a copy of a petition which was entitled "A Petition to the 90th Congress" and which stated the following:

> "We Women of the United States, who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home, have come to Washington to petition the Congress of the United States for the redress of intolerable grievance and demand that:
>
> 1. Congress shall, as the first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately withdraw all American troops.
>
> 2. Congress shall use its power to heal a sick society at home
>
> 3. Congress shall use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam

CONFIDENTIAL

4. Congress shall listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex

We herewith declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity and to exercise their political power to reshape American society and restore our country to a position of honor in the Community of Nations

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade
January 15, 1968"

A third source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on January 15, 1968, advised that she had arrived in Washington, D.C., on the train from New York City at approximately 11:40 a.m. She stated that included in her group were six members of the Socialist Workers Party and one member of the Young Socialist Alliance.

The Socialist Workers Party has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Young Socialist Alliance is described in the appendix.

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed the participants in the above march enter buses in the vicinity of Union Square and travel to the Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, N.W., Washington, D.C., where they arrived at approximately 2:20 p.m. They then assembled in the Regency Room and the Ambassador Room of that hotel where a program began at approximately 2:30 p.m.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Just prior to the opening of the above program, a group entitled "Radical Women's Group from New York" put on a skit which included the bringing in of a stretcher indicating that it was the body of a dead soldier. On the stretcher was a telegram of regrets and it was stated that there would later be a mock burial of the above "corpse."

The program of the Congress of American Women began with Pearl Willen of New York acting as the presiding officer. She made announcements to the effect that there was much literature on the tables and that workshops would be held both tonight and the following day. She welcomed representatives from forty states to the gathering and stated that they now need to go from the great society to the just society. Mrs. Willen introduced the two Co-Chairmen of the Congress as Mrs. Coretta King of Georgia and Mrs. Mary Clark of Los Angeles, California, who were both present and acknowledged the introduction.

The first speaker on the program was Mrs. Vivian Hallinan of San Francisco, California, who described the development of the coalition of women which had developed into the JRB. She said the JRB had been conceived in California last year after the statement by Mrs. Rankin concerning what the women could do to stop the war. Hallinan described the JRB's goal as "world without war" and "life with dignity and opportunities to develop our maximum capacity."

The next speaker on the program was Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., who was initially introduced as Coretta King. Mrs. King stated that she was greatly encouraged by the growth of the peace movement and that she was totally opposed to the brutal slaughter in Vietnam. She stated that the women must use all of their power to stop that war.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

She stated that the men had gotten us into this war and had made a complete mess of it. She stated that there is a need to end the war so that we may tend to the needs of people in urban ghetto areas. Injustice in our society must be taken care of and she described the present challenges as "militarism, racism and wantonism." She stated there can be no justice at home until there is no war in the world. She concluded by reading a poem entitled "Life Ain't Been No Crystal Stair."

Jeannette Rankin was the next speaker and she welcomed everyone expressing great joy that so many women had gathered together for peace. She stated that our forefathers wrote the constitution in such a way so that the military could not take over control of this Government. She was apparently implying that the military system is running the United States. She stated that the women must see that the military system is destroyed. She demanded that women have a secret ballot in the election as well as a choice in selecting candidates. She concluded by recommending that women everywhere become candidates for political offices.

The next speaker was Katherine Camp from Pennsylvania described as the President of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. Mrs. Camp described the activities of the fifteen women delegation that went to Congress on this date. She stated that they presented a petition to Speaker of the House McCormick and that he had assured them that it would be acted on as any other petition presented to Congress. Camp stated that the Speaker left then as he was called by a bell to the floor of the Congress. Camp stated that following this, Mrs. Rankin, her sister Edna McKinon, and niece Mrs. Dorothy Brown, visited Senator Mike Mansfield and presented him with a petition.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Harriet Van Tassel of New York City next reported on the suit instituted by the JRB to restrain authorities from enforcing a rule against demonstrating on the United States Capitol grounds.

Cora Weiss of New York next took over the meeting and permitted a Mrs. Mitchell Goodman to make a statement. It is to be noted that Mrs. Mitchell Goodman is probably the wife of Mitchell Goodman recently indicted by the Federal Grand Jury in connection with counseling of evasion of Selective Service laws. Mrs. Goodman stated that all the women there should encourage their sons to refuse the draft.

DC

Mary Clarke next called a role of states in which individuals were asked to stand when their home state was called.

DC

Ruby Dee then read a poem writtenby W.E.B. DuBois. Mrs. Vel Phillips of Wisconsin next described political action that was necessary in 1966 in order to elect a peace candidate.

Charlotte Bunch Weeks next spoke on the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and stated that it was necessary to protest in order to stop this war in Vietnam. She further stated that the United States has been put in a bad light as far as the rest of the world is concerned because the United States has sided with a dictatorship.

Ella Baker of New York stated ~~that~~ this country is faced with a sick society because we have avoided dealing with human needs at home. She stated that there are more poor people among the whites than among the Negroes and that more Indian children die than American have died in Vietnam. She urged all women to study civil liberties and to learn what can be done at protest activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968

Cynthia Wedel of New York next acted as Chairman of a group of individuals who spoke concerning "We declare our Intentions." These individuals were Vivian Rothstein of Illinois, Judith Morse Eaton of Connecticut and Mrs. Dagmar Wilson of Washington, D.C.

Mrs. Wilson spoke concerning political action necessary in order to change the United States policy in Vietnam. She stressed the need for education along these lines and stated that this is the beginning of a revolution. She made many references to her recent visit to North Vietnam and based her opinions upon what she saw in North Vietnam.

The first source advised on January 15, 1968, that while the main meeting was being held in the Ambassador Room of the Shoreham Hotel, a group called the Radical Women's Group met in the adjoining room but after much discussion, were unable to agree on any acts of civil disobedience and therefore nothing was accomplished by them.

The above source stated that although workshops were announced and spaces have been reserved for such workshops, the source does not believe they will be held as the vast majority of the individuals are leaving Washington, D.C. between 6 and 7 p.m. this date. The source stated that the above program was concluded at approximately 5:40 p.m. and all of the participants left the Shoreham Hotel via bus with the majority of them going to Union Station to catch the scheduled train for New York City.

There were no incidents or arrests during the above activity.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication US.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of the YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognized the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the YS have come into basic poltical solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

On March 10, 1967, a source advised that the YSA was formed during 1957, by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The source further advised that the YSA has recently become more open about admitting that it is the youth group of the SWP and that an SWP representative has publicily stated that the YSA is the SWP's youth group.

The headquarters of the YSA are located in Rooms 532-536, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/15/68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

CY/UA7

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, NEWARK (100-49837) (P)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
January 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)

Re New York teletype dated 1/4/68, Newark airtel dated 1/10/68, Philadelphia teletype dated 1/11/68, and Newark teletype dated 1/15/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of LHM dated and captioned as above.

Copies of LHM are being furnished to Military Intelligence Agencies and to Secret Service and USA at Newark.

Special Agents DENIS D. O'SULLIVAN and GEORGE EDWIN JONES observed departure of train at Newark.

SA J. A. MOSELEY observed departure of train at Trenton.

SA RAYMOND S. BYRNE observed departure of bus at Moorestown, New Jersey.

ENCLOSURE

REC 13

JAN 17 1968

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
3 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Enc. 3) (RM)
1 - New York (100-161601) (Enc. 1) (info) (RM)
2 - Newark
GEJ/ksh
(9)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI
DATE FORW: 1-22-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY Sent ____ M Per ____

INTR SEC

Approved: ____________________
Special Agent in Charge

54 JAN 29 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Newark, New Jersey
January 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed seventy-five women board special Pennsylvania Railroad Train at Pennsylvania Station, Newark, New Jersey, on January 15, 1968. The train departed Newark at 7:50 a.m. for Washington, D.C.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed forty-one women board Pennsylvania Train Number 1231 which departed from Pennsylvania Station, Trenton, New Jersey, at 7:30 a.m. on January 15, 1968.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed thirty-six women depart from Moorestown, New Jersey, on Public Service Coordinated Transport Bus at 8:20 a.m. on January 15, 1968.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

44917 - 89

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-138315) 1/15/68

SAC, HONOLULU (100-6372) (C)

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES
INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

8762

Remyrad 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve (12) copies of LHM captioned above.

Honolulu T-1 was SOURCE used to identify LAURENTY.

Investigation was conducted by SA LEO S. BRENNEISEN.

Copy of letter and LHM furnished Washington Field Office, office of origin, in the case entitled, "DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/8/68; INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY).

ORIGINAL FILED IN

LHM has been made available locally to military intelligence agencies and secret service.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)
DATE FORW: 1-4-68
HOW FORW: A/S
BY: LHP:dk

3 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (RAM)
  (1) - 100-DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING
  U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON,
  D.C., 1/8/68)
1 - Washington Field (Enc. 1) (RAM)
  (100-DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING U.S.
  POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/8/68)
1 - Honolulu
LSB:lfj
(5)

[illegible] 1968

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Honolulu, Hawaii
January 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM

On January 15, 1968, Edward Higgins, Commission on Subversive Activities, Legislature, State of Hawaii, at Honolulu, advised as follows:

A short time after noon that date, some fifteen women gathered on the lawn in front of the Main United States Post Office Building in Honolulu and passed out a leaflet, "Hawaii Women Support the Jeannette Rankin Brigade," a photostat of which is appended hereto. The women's group which included Ada Laurenty, Aiko Reinecke, Jean King, and Bette Johnson, were interviewed by local press and television representatives.

The January 15, 1968, edition of the Honolulu Advertiser, a daily newspaper of Honolulu, reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade plans a march today in Washington, D.C., to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

On January 4, 1963, Honolulu T-1 identified Ada Laurenty as a Communist Party (CP) member in San Diego in 1934 and as being active in the CP in the San Francisco, California, area in 1943.

On November 30, 1953, Robert McBurney Kempa, a former member of the CP in Honolulu from 1947 to 1952, identified Aiko Reinecke as a CP member in 1952.

On October 8, 1953, Kempa identified Jean King as a CP member from 1950 to 1952.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

Today, January 15, Congress reconvenes in Washington. Women from all over the United States have gathered there to petition the Congress in the name of the Jeanette Rankin Brigade. Jeannette Rankin, the first woman to serve in Congress and the only person to vote against U.S. entry into both World Wars, leads the women there, along with such other sponsors as Mrs. M.L.King, Mrs. Harry Belafonte, Mrs. John C. Bennett, Mrs. Benjamin Spock, Mrs Judith Morse Eaton. The Brigade is a national coalition of women's antiwar groups mobilized against the war in Veitham. As the cost of the war in lives and money mounts daily, the women of this country call upon congress to take action against it. To support the senators and Congressmen who oppose the war, to encourage those who are troubled but silent, to speak out, and to make our position known to those who still support this immoral war, we, as women of Hawaii, are gathered here. Our message to Reps. Mink and Matsunaga, to Sens. Fong and Inouye, is that

women will no longer give their sons and loved ones to a government waging a genocidal war...
women will no longer accept a government which represents a military and industrial machine rather than its people...
women will no longer consent to raise their children in the blight and neglect of a society geared to profit and war...
women grieve for suffering people all over the world and will no longer remain silent while the gap widens between the rich and the poor...

We ask our government to design and carry out a domestic program commensurate with the needs of the American people; to follow a policy of non-intervention in the affairs of other countries; to pursue our official committment to disarmament, and to respect international law.

American women who, as women everywhere, are the bearers and conservers of life, will not stand idly by as life is destroyed in our name.

About two hundred Oahu women have signed the following petition to Congress:

As Congress reconvenes, we urge that its first order of business be to put an end to the war in Vietnam and arrange for the withdrawal of American troops; and that the Congress turn its attention to ameliorating the crisis in America.

We urge the Congress to heal a sick society at home, to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam and to refuse to listen to the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

- -

I want to be kept informed about women's peace activities.

Name________________________________

Address______________________________

Return to:
Jeannette Rankin Brigade Comm.
2115 Armstrong,
Honolulu, 96822

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Honolulu, Hawaii
January 15, 1968

Title: Demonstrations Protesting United States Intervention in Vietnam

Character:

Reference: Letterhead memorandum dated at Honolulu, Hawaii, January 15, 1968, and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

- Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan

January 16, 1968

1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

445475 - 76

REC-28

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

It was previously reported that the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, a nationwide group of women who are opposed to the war in Vietnam, would sponsor a demonstration in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, to petition Congress to end the war in Vietnam.

At 11:40 a.m., January 15, 1968, a group, predominantly women numbering approximately 2,600, assembled at Union Station, Washington, D. C., and marched six abreast on the west sidewalk of Louisiana Avenue to Union Square at the foot of Capitol Hill.

The marchers were preceded by several individuals carrying a large banner which read, "End the War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." Several women followed the marchers carrying another banner which read, "United States Women Unite, End the War in Vietnam." Prior to leaving Union Station, participants carried several other small placards some of which read, "End the War" and "LBJ Eats Imperial Margarine." At the request of authorities, the demonstrators discarded these placards.

Before the demonstrators left Union Station, a delegation of 15 women, including Jeannette Rankin, drove to the Capitol where they presented a petition to Representative John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to Senator Michael J. Mansfield. This petition was entitled "A Petition to the 90th Congress" and stated the following:

> "We Women of the United States, who are outraged by the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistent neglect of human needs at home, have come to Washington to petition the Congress of the United States for the redress of intolerable grievance and demand that:

100-448475

CONFIDENTIAL

RHH:jav
(27)

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading ad
declassification

SEE NOTE PAGE 5

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

"1. Congress shall, as the first order of business, resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately withdraw all American troops.

"2. Congress shall use its power to heal a sick society at home.

"3. Congress shall use its power to make reparations for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam.

"4. Congress shall listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

"We herewith declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity and to exercise their political power to reshape American society and restore our country to a position of honor in the Community of Nations.

"The Jeannette Rankin Brigade
January 15, 1968."

While the delegation was making the presentation to the Congressmen, the main contingent, which had assembled at Union Square, was presented with the petition which was read to them by Viveca Lindfors, ~~the Swedish actress~~ and one of the sponsors of the Brigade.

Following a reading of the petition to the demonstrators, the participants were taken by bus to the Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D. C. At the Shoreham Hotel, the group convened a Congress of American Women at 2:30 p.m.

Following the welcome, the first speaker on the program was Mrs. Vivian Hallinan, the Executive Secretary of the Brigade from San Francisco, California. Hallinan described the Brigade's goal as "world without war" and "life with dignity and opportunities to develop our maximum capacity."

jsw

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

A source who has furnished reliable information in the past has advised that Terence Hallinan, the son of Vivian Hallinan, who is a member of the Communist Party, USA, Northern District of California, stated in October, 1962, that his mother would be willing to join the Communist Party if her husband would also join.

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., spoke to the assembly stating that she was totally opposed to the brutal slaughter in Vietnam and that women must use all their power to stop that war. She described present challenges as "militarism, racism and wantonism."

Jeannette Rankin spoke and welcomed those attending. She stated that their forefathers had written the Constitution in such a way that the military could not take over control of the Government. She stated that the women must see that the military system is destroyed. She demanded that women have a secret ballot in the election as well as a choice in selecting candidates. She concluded her talk by recommending that women everywhere become candidates for political offices.

Katherine Camp, the President of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, an international women's pacifist organization, described to the assembly the activities of the delegation which had presented the petition to Speaker McCormack at the Capitol earlier that day.

One of the speakers, Mrs. Mitchell Goodman, whose husband was recently indicted by Federal Grand Jury in connection with counseling of evasion of the Selective Service laws, stated that all the women present should encourage their sons to refuse the draft.

Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, National Chairman of Women Strike for Peace, a national women's pacifist group, told the assembly that political action was necessary in order to change the United States policy in Vietnam. She stressed the need for education along these lines and stated that this meeting would be the beginning of a revolution.

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

During the time that the main group of demonstrators was meeting in the Ambassador Room of the Hotel, a small group, who called themselves the Radical Women's Group and composed mainly of younger women, met in the adjoining Regency Room of the Hotel. This meeting was highly disorganized without apparent purpose or objective and developed no conclusions.

Although workshops were announced to be held following the assembly, the vast majority of those present at the meeting left the Hotel following the 5:40 p.m. conclusion of the meeting and returned to Union Station for the trip home.

In addition to the demonstration in Washington, D.C., sympathy demonstrations were held by contingents of the Brigade in various cities throughout the country.

In Miami, Florida, 70 women assembled at the Torch of Friendship, Bay Front Park, and participated in a silent vigil.

Approximately 150 to 200 demonstrators gathered on the front steps of the San Francisco City Hall in support of the demonstration in Washington, D. C. At this demonstration, Nikki Bridges, San Francisco Chairman of the Brigade, announced that since it was not possible for the demonstrators to personally contact their Congressmen who were out of town, that following the presentation of a petition to Mayor Joseph Alioto, they would proceed to a near-by Western Union office in order that wires could be sent to their Congressmen protesting United States policy in Vietnam. Mayor Alioto appeared on the steps of City Hall, received the petition, and announced that he would transmit it to Congress. Nikki Bridges is the wife of Harry Bridges who was indicted for perjury and conspiracy committed to conceal Communist Party membership in obtaining United States citizenship in 1949.

Approximately 250 women assembled at the Old State Building, Los Angeles, California, at 9:30 a.m., to hear speeches from various women condemning the war in

Vietnam. Following this, the group marched to the west steps of the Los Angeles City Hall where a delegation entered and made an attempt to address the City Council. The City Council on vote refused to grant this permission.

Demonstrations by representatives of the Brigade were also held in Providence, Rhode Island; Seattle, Washington; Clayton, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; and Atlanta, Georgia.

NOTE:

Classified "Confidential" as some of the information included in this summary comes from sensitive sources, the compromise of which would be detrimental to the U. S.

Xerox copies sent to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; the Vice President; the Secretaries of State and Defense; Director, Central Intelligence Agency; the Attorney General; the Deputy Attorney General; and Assistant Attorneys General J. Walter Yeagley, Stephen J. Pollak, Fred M. Vinson, Jr., and the Inter-Division Information Unit of the Department.

See memorandum C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan dated 1/16/68 captioned as above as prepared by RHH:skr.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Mr. C.D. DeLoach
1 - Mr. T.E. Bishop
1 - Mr. W.C. Sullivan

TO : Mr. W.C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/16/68

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R.H. Horner

FROM : C.D. Brennan

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Information has previously been disseminated to the White House and other interested agencies concerning the plans of captioned organization, a nationwide group of women who are opposed to the war in Vietnam, to stage a demonstration in Washington, D.C. on 1/15/68 and present a petition to Congress demanding an end to the Vietnam war. This demonstration was held as scheduled on 1/15/68.

The demonstrators marched from Union Station to Union Square at the foot of Capitol Hill by way of Louisiana Avenue. The group was preceded by several individuals carrying a banner which read "End the War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." Several women followed the marchers carrying another banner which read "United States Women Unite, End the War in Vietnam." Initially, the group carried other placards which read "End the War" and "LBJ Eats Imperial Margarine." However, at the request of authorities, these placards were discarded.

Before the demonstrators left Union Station, a delegation of 15 women, including Jeannette Rankin, drove to the Capitol where they presented a petition to Representative John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives, and to Senator Michael J. Mansfield. The petition entitled "A Petition to the 90th Congress" pointed out the opposition of women of the United States to the ruthless slaughter in Vietnam and the persistant neglect to human needs at home and demanded Congress as the first order of business resolve to end the war in Vietnam and immediately withdraw all American troops. It called for Congress to use its power to help a sick society at home, to make reparations for destruction in Vietnam and to listen to what the American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military industrial complex.

Enclosure sent 1-16-68
RHH:skr
(7)

REC-28 JAN 17 19[illegible]

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan
RE: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

This petition was read to the demonstrators assembled at Union Square by Swedish film actress, Viveca Lindfors.

Following the assembly at Union Square, the marchers were bussed to the Shoreham Hotel where they convened a congress of American women from approximately 2:30 p.m. to 5:40 p.m.

During this time, speeches were made by Vivian Hallinan, who has been described by her son, Ter~~r~~ence Hallinan, as being willing to join the Communist Party if her husband would join. Hallinan described the Brigade's goal as "world without war" and "life with dignity and opportunities to develop our maximum capacity."

Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., stated that women must use all of their power to stop the war in Vietnam. She described present challenges as "militarism, racialism and wantonism.

Jeannette Rankin welcomed the participants and stated women must see that the military system is destroyed. She recommended that women everywhere become candidates for political offices. Mrs. Dagmar Wilson, Chairman of the Women Strike for Peace, a national pacifist group, spoke concerning United States policy in Vietnam. She stressed the need for education in order to change United States policy and stated that their demonstration was the beginning of a revolution.

While this assembly was taking place a small group calling themselves Radical Womens Group met in a room across the hall. This group was very disorganized and was held without apparent objective.

Sympathy demonstration were held in Miami, Florida; Boston, Massachusetts; Seattle, Washington; St. Louis, Missouri; Portland, Oregon; Atlanta, Georgia; San Francisco and Los Angeles, California. In San Francisco the Brigade's contingent presented a petition to the Mayor who agreed to transmit it to Washington. In Los Angeles, the contingent attempted to speak before the City Council, but their request was denied.

Memorandum to Mr. W.C. Sullivan
RE: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

All pertinent information developed was promptly furnished to the Inner-Division Information Unit of the Department of Justice, Secret Service, Metropolitan Police Department, Park Police, U.S. Capitol Police, General Services Administration, and military intelligence agencies.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the enclosed memorandum to Mrs. Mildred Stegall, the White House; Vice President; Secretary of State; Secretary of Defense, Director, Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. Secret Service; the Attorney General and other interested officials of the Department of Justice be approved.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in PLAINTEXT
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

CB/WH7

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
(00:WFO)

ReNYairtel to Bureau, 1/12/68.

Enclosed herewith for Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM regarding departure from NYC of women participating in captioned demonstration. Enclosed for WFO are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, Newark, New Haven, and Philadelphia is one information copy of the LHM.

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Newark (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - New Haven (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - New York

EX 109

REC-21

HPB:smv
(12)

14 JAN 17 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, OD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

54 JAN 25 1968

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
January 16, 1968

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C.
January 15, 1968

On January 15, 1968, Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed the following:

A special train of the Pennsylvania Railroad, consisting of eighteen cars bound for Washington, D.C., departed Pennsylvania Station, 8th Avenue at 31st Street, New York, New York, at 7:29 AM. The train's capacity was approximately 1,400 seats. Approximately 1,200 women and five males boarded this train which had been designated by loud speaker announcements and signs as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) special train.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968

Mr. John Martin, Passenger Representative, Pennsylvania Railroad advised that the special train would arrive Washington, D.C. at Union Station approximately 11:15 AM. Martin stated the first two cars of the special train were empty to accommodate additional women to be picked up in Newark, New Jersey. Martin indicated a group of women had come from New Haven, Connecticut via two buses and had boarded the JRB train.

SAS of the FBI observed a bus from the Academy Charter Service of New Jersey containing approximately 50 women identified as participating with JRB depart from 31st Street between 8th and 9th Avenue, New York City, at 7:30 AM. Two other chartered buses were available at this location, but were not used.

After 7:30 AM announcements were made within Pennsylvania Station that women participating with JRB, who had missed the special train, should board the regular Pennsylvania Railroad Train "The President" bound for Washington, D.C. SAS of the FBI observed approximately 200 women, who had congregated in vicinity of the special JRB ticket table, board "The President" which departed at 8:00 AM. This train was scheduled to arrive at Union Station, Washington, D.C. at 11:50 AM. [illegible] NY

D

SAS of the FBI observed women wearing buttons bearing "Women's Vote For Peace", "Jeannette Rankin Brigade", and buttons supporting Senator Eugene Mc Carthy. Norma Spector was observed selling tickets at the special JRB table. Lorraine Gordon was observed being interviewed by members of the Press in connection with JRB activities.

D
NY

CONFIDENTIAL

Norma Spector

A confidential source advised on August 18, 1966, that Norma Spector was elected to serve on the District Committee, New York Communist Party (CP) at the June 12, 1966, session of the New York District CP Convention, held in New York City.

Lorraine Gordon

On September 14, 1964, a second confidential source advised that Lorraine Gordon was a listed speaker at the Fifth National Convention of the Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF) held in New York City from September 18, 1964 to September 24, 1964.

A characterization of ELF is attached hereto.

1.

APPENDIX

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION
OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS

"The Jewish Fraternalist" dated October, 1947, self-identified as the official publication of the Jewish People's Fraternal Order (JPFO) of the International Workers Order (IWO), Page 6, contained an article which reflected that the Emma Lazarus Division (ELD) of the JPFO was to hold its first national convention in New York City on November 15 and 16, 1947, after having been first established at a National Women's Conference called three years previously by the JPFO.

"The Morning Freiheit" (MF) on January 25, 1951, contained a report of the National Convention of the ELD of the JPFO which took place in New York City on January 20 and 21, 1951. At this convention, it was noted that the ELD changed its name to Emma Lazarus Federation of Jewish Women's Clubs (ELF) and adopted a new constitution.

On May 4, 1966, a source advised that the ELF was recognized by the Communist Party (CP) United States of America (USA) as an important national organization of women whose leadership was primarily made up of Communists. The source stated the ELF was dedicated to peace, in protecting the rights of foreign born, and against bomb testing, Negro discrimination and the rearmament of West Germany.

The source also stated the ELF renders support to and receives support from the MF and other Jewish progressive organizations.

The ELF National Office was moved and is now located at 150 Fifth Avenue, Room 632, New York, New York.

The IWO and JPFO have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" revised and published as of December 1, 1961, to supersede Guide published on January 2, 1957, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "Morning Freiheit":

CONFIDENTIAL

2.

APPENDIX

EMMA LAZARUS FEDERATION
OF JEWISH WOMEN'S CLUBS (CONTINUED)

"1. A 'Communist Yiddish daily'. (Attorney General FRANCIS BIDDLE Congressional Record, September 24, 1942, p. 7686.)

"2. 'The Freiheit has been one of the rankest organs of Communist propaganda in this country for almost a quarter of a century.' (Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 75.)"

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Enclosed for the Bureau are an original and ten copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Two copies are enclosed for WFO as Office of Origin. Two information copies each are designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have investigation pending on the "JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

Re Philadelphia teletype to Director, dated 1/15/68.

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally to MI, OSI, NISO, and Secret Service.

SA KENNETH K. SMYTHE advised SA DARWIN STEELMAN, Region II, 109th MI Group, Philadelphia, Pa., of the information in the enclosed LHM at 9:20 a.m. on 1/15/68.

SA SMYTHE was the Agent who observed the departure of the group from 30th Street Pennsylvania Railroad Station, Philadelphia, on 1/15/68.

3 - Bureau (100-448475) (Encs.-11) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Encs.-2) (Info) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Encs.-2) (Info) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Encs.-2) (RM)
3 - Philadelphia
  1 - 100-49497
  1 - 100-46020 (WSP)
  1 - 100-48477 (VETS & RESERVISTS FOR PEACE)

KKS:hcf
(12)

ENCLOSURE

REC-32 2 JAN 18 1968

95

INT. SEC.

C. C. Bishop

3 XEROX
JAN 23 1968

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD-OD~~)
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________M Per ______________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

At 7:45 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, on January 15, 1968, a group of women began gathering at the information counter in the 30th Street Station of the Pennsylvania Railroad, Philadelphia, Pa. One sign carried by two women bearing the legend, "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE," was displayed. A few of the women wore WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE (WSP) buttons and a few wore blue overseas caps with VETERANS AND RESERVISTS FOR PEACE in white lettering on them. Nearly all the women wore some article of Black Clothing.

The group was composed predominantly of white, middle-aged women. The group, numbering approximately 125, was well behaved and orderly.

At 8:10 a.m., Eastern Standard Time, the group boarded cars numbered 1582, 1535, and 1509 of Pennsylvania Railroad Train #131, The Congressional, bound for Washington, D.C. The train left 30th Street Station at 8:20 a.m. There were no incidents.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

XEROX
JAN 23 1968

ENCLOSURE

45

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, KANSAS CITY (100-12409) RUC

REC 11

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
1/8/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Kansas City tel 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven copies of letterhead memo concerning captioned demonstration.

Two copies are furnished Philadelphia, office of origin of WILPF and two copies furnished to WFO.

Indices of the Kansas City Division contain no references for the names appearing in letterhead memo.

~~3~~ - Bureau (Encs. 11)(RM)
2 - WFO (Encs. 2)(RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Encs. 2)(1-100-9882)(RM)
1 - Kansas City
GAA:pe
(8)

C. C. Bishop

REC 17

3 JAN 22 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~ORD, OD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-19-68
HOW FORW:
BY:

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Kansas City, Missouri

January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

The "Kansas City Star" newspaper, Kansas City, Missouri, edition of January 14, 1968, contained an article stating that Kansas City women were responding to a "woman power" appeal issued by Miss Jeanette Rankin, former member of Congress, to end the war in Vietnam. According to the article, a small delegation of Kansas City women plan to go to Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968, to participate in the march by the "Jeanette Rankin Brigade" to petition Congress for a United States withdrawal from Vietnam. The others in the group would remain in Kansas City and present copies of the petition to the offices of U. S. Representatives Richard Bolling, Kansas City, Missouri, and Larry Winn, Kansas City, Kansas, at 1:00 p.m., on January 15, 1968.

The "Kansas City Star" evening edition of January 15, 1968, carried an article stating that on the afternoon of January 15, 1968, 20 women appeared at the offices of Representatives Bolling and Winn. They carried no signs and the demonstration was orderly. The women, all from the greater Kansas City area, merely presented a petition asking Congress to end the war in Vietnam and withdraw American troops, to make reparations for the "ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam", and to listen to the American people and refuse "the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex". The article stated that the Kansas City branch of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom had been planning to send representatives to the Washington march, but it was not until Wednesday that they decided to present the petitions to Congressmen Winn and Bolling.

According to the article, Mrs. John M. Swomley, Jr., Program Chairman of the organization, stated the Kansas City group hoped to identify with the women in Washington and their objective to bring and end to the war in Vietnam.

[illegible] recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. [illegible] to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

92

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, ETC.

The article identified the following Kansas City area women as participating in the march in Washington on January 15, 1968:

- Mrs. Theodore Wallace
- Mrs. Frederick Fender
- Mrs. Alan Boley
- Mrs. Karl Lientz
- Mrs. Fred Batson
- Mrs. June Dornell
- Miss Lanita Jackson

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

REC 34

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-~~448326~~)

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: Washington Field

Re San Francisco teletype to Bureau and Washington Field, 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven (11) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. Two (2) copies each are enclosed for Atlanta, Los Angeles, New York and Washington Field.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC SE
RAO (ISD, CRD, OD)
FORW:
HOW FORW:

Sources utilized in LHM are:

First source SOURCE

Second source INFORMANT

Instant LHM is classified CONFIDENTIAL inasmuch as it contains data which could reasonably result in the identification of confidential informants of continuing value and

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encls. ~~11~~)(AM-RM)
2 - Atlanta (100-7300)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Los Angeles (100-70701)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - New York (Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(Encls. 2)(AM-RM)
5 - San Francisco (100-59802)
(1 - 100-54559)
(1 - 100-48035)
(1 - 80-461)

REC 32

JAN 19 1968

GOW:jal
(16)

Approved: C. C. Bishop Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Special Agents who observed the demonstration at San Francisco are:

ZAVEN JARDARIAN
RICHARD E. RODERMUND
GARRY OWEN WATT
DIRCK A. MERRILL

The Special Agent who observed Elaine Yoneda was SA CHESTER L. JACOBY.

The Special Agent who observed the dmonstration at Monterey, California, is BURNEY THREADGILL, JR.

San Francisco indices negative re AILEEN HERNANDEZ.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

January 16, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference is made to San Francisco memorandum, dated January 5, 1968.

Copies of this memorandum have been furnished locally to the US Army, Navy, Air Force, Secret Service, San Francisco, and the United States Attorney, San Francisco.

At 12:00 noon, January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the FBI observed approximately 150-200 demonstrators (primarily women) gather on the front steps of the City Hall in San Francisco, to support a companion demonstration being held in Washington, D.C., January 15, 1968, sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Many of the demonstrators were noted to be carrying placards, on which were noted to be the following statements:

"Heal the Sick Society at Home - Join The Jeannette Rankin Brigade"
"First Step To Peace - Stop The Bombing Now"
"Outlaw War"
"Ratify UN Human Rights Conventions"
"Stop The Draft"
"Negotiate Now"
"Outlaw Napalm"
"Rescind The Gulf of Tonkin Resolution"
"Stop US Empire Building in Asia."

At approximately 12:05 p.m. Nikki Bridges, San Francisco

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 15, 1968

Chairman of the Brigade, announced to the demonstrators that this local demonstration was principally gathered to support women from around the United States who were gathered in Washington, D.C. today, as part of a nation-wide demonstration sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, to petition Congress to resolve the conflict in Vietnam. Bridges stated that inasmuch as it was not possible for the demonstrators to personally contact their congressmen, most of whom were out of town; that following the presentation of a petition to Mayor Joseph Alioto, the demonstrators would then proceed to the Western Union Office on 10th and Market Streets in San Francisco, so that the women protestors could send wires to their congressmen, protesting United States policies in Vietnam. Bridges indicated that the petitioners would request Mayor Alioto to convey to Congress their petition, which among other things urged Congress, as its first order of business, to resolve to end the War in Vietnam and immediately arrange for withdrawal of all American troops from Vietnam; for Congress to use its power to heal the sick society at home and to make reparations for the ravaged lands left behind in Vietnam.

> A source advised March 2, 1967, that Mrs. H. Bridges, also known as Nikki Bridges, 35 Kronquest Court, San Francisco, California, was listed as a recipient of a new yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW), expiration date March 4, 1968.
>
> The PW is a west coast communist newspaper, published weekly in San Francisco.

The next speaker was identified as Aileen Hernandez. She spoke for approximately five minutes and briefly explained to the demonstrators who Jeannette Rankin is and what the purposes of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade are. She stated that the group has no principal spokesman and it is principally a group of women who are involved and committed in a fight for peace.

Several of the demonstrators, led by Nikki Bridges, then proceeded to the Office of Mayor Joseph Alioto to present their petition.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S.
POLICY IN VIETNAM
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
JANUARY 15, 1968

Approximately ten minutes later the Mayor of San Francisco appeared on the steps of the City Hall and announced to the demonstrators that he would gladly transmit their petition to Congress. Mayor Alioto stated that he fully believed in the constitutional right of peaceful assembly. He indicated, however, that because he had consented to transmit the demonstrators' petition to Washington, he did not necessarily agree with it. The Mayor then stated that it was his personal opinion that the United States Government and the Johnson Administration had done all in its power to attempt to come to a peaceful and honorable solution in the Vietnamese War. He related that he felt that it was now up to the other side to make the same attempts to arrive at a peaceful solution in the Vietnamese conflict.

At approximately 12:45 p.m., the demonstrators proceeded to the Western Union Office located at 10th and Market Streets in San Francisco, so that wires could be sent to their congressmen in Washington.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed one Elaine Yoneda participating in the above demonstration and following the demonstration Yoneda was observed to return to her employment at the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU) - Pacific Maritime Association, Pension Fund, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco.

A second source advised on December 4, 1967, that Elaine Yoneda is a current and active member of the Communist Party (CP).

On January 15, 1968, a Special Agent of the FBI observed a silent protest by a group of women on the lawn of Colton Hall, Monterey, California, between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. These women were ostensibly gathered to support the demonstration being held in Washington, D.C., sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. There were no speeches given; the demonstrators merely conducted a silent vigil.

A one page leaflet captioned "Women To Take First Step to End The War" printed by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, was handed out at the above demonstration. A Xeroxed duplication of this leaflet is appended to this memorandum.

Women to take first step to End The War



are you

TIRED... of paying all your taxes for bullets and bombs??

FED UP... with fighting senseless wars??

SHOCKED... at the burning of innocent women and children???

women are

EMOTIONAL...	yes, because we're still human. We care about our loved ones and are outraged at the killing!
PRACTICAL...	yes, because we're used to making ends meet, putting our shoulders to the wheel and getting things done!
POWERFUL...	yes, because we have 51% of the vote. We control the "purse strings", why not the "political strings".

Join us to start the PEACE WHEEL rolling, January 15 at noon on the Polk Street steps of City Hall, in support of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade going to Washington to petition Congress to (1) end the war, (2) heal the sick society at home and (3) repair the damages done in Vietnam. We will give a copy of the petition to Mayor Alioto. We will telephone our Congressmen from the Federal Building to let them know women will be calling on them.


PEACE
CONGRESS to ACT NOW
To heal a sick society at home
To repair damages in Vietnam

Information: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS
150 Golden Gate Ave., San Francisco, 94102
Phone: 474-4456

CONFIDENTIAL

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Chairman: Jeannette Rankin
Executive Secretary: Vivian Hallinan

Partial List of Sponsors

- Muriel Adams
- Mia Aurbakken Adjali
  Methodist U.N. Representative
- Donna Allen
  WILPF, Women Strike for Peace
- Carol Anderson
  National Council of Churches
- Ellen Aubakken
  Methodist Board
- Helen Baker
  United Church Women, Editor of Publications
- Leona Bayer, M.D.
- Norma Becker
- Mrs. Harry Belafonte
- Mrs. John C. Bennett
  Church Women United, wife of Dean of Union Theological Seminary, Columbia University
- Rebecca Berman
  Teachers' Committee to End War
- Peggy Billings
  Methodist Church, Director of Social Action
- Mrs. Algernon Black
  American Ethical Union
- Kay Boyle
  Author
- Nikki Bridges
  Wife of ILWU President Harry Bridges
- Connie Brown
  Newark Welfare Board
- Jane Buchenholz
  Americans for Democratic Action
- Mrs. John Burton
  Wife of Legislator
- Catherine L. Camp
  National President, WILPF
- Twila Lytton Cavert
  YWCA, World Council of Churches
- Mary Clarke
  Women Strike for Peace, California Democratic Council
- Eva Rubenstein Coffin
  Wife of Chaplain of Yale University
- Ruth Gage Colby
  International Representative, Women Strike for Peace
- Judy Collins
  Singer
- Sylvia E. Crane
  Anti-HUAC Committee Lobbyist
- Florence Criley
  International Representative, United Electrical Workers' Union
- Elsie Thomas Culver
- Polly Cuthberton
  American Friends Service Committee
- Ruby Dee
  Actress
- Ann Eaton
- Judith Morse Eaton
  Daughter of Senator Wayne Morse
- Grace Loucks Elliott
  National Council YWCA
- Anne Florant
- Eleanor French
  United Church Women, YWCA
- Betty Friedan
  Author
- Mrs. Marc Friedlander
- Mrs. Horace L. Friess
  American Ethical Union
- Frances Fritchman
  Wife of Unitarian Minister
- Margaret Gage
- Mrs. Jack Gilford
- Dr. Carolyn Goodman
- Mrs. Max Gordon
  Women Strike for Peace
- Vivian Hallinan
- Fannie Lou Hamer
  Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
- Mrs. E.Y. Harburg
- Elizabeth Lee Haselden
  Church Women United, wife of editor of Christian Century
- Dorothy Hassler
  Fellowship of Reconciliation
- Anna Arnold Hedgeman
  National Council of Churches
- Aileen Hernandez
  Vice President, National Organization of Women
- Dr. Frances Herring
- Mrs. Ralph D. Hyslop
  YWCA, National Council of Churches
- Lois Crozier Hogle
  YWCA
- R. Elizabeth Johns
  United Church of Christ, Church Women United
- Florynce Kennedy
  Attorney
- Mrs. Rosemary Kilch
  Past President, National Council of Catholic Women
- Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr.
- Susan K. Kinoy
  Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party
- Ruth Kinzler
- Ruth Krause
  New Jersey Peace Center
- Margaret Kuhn
  Presbyterian Church Center
- Helen B. Lamb
  Author, Wife of Corliss Lamont
- Mrs. Buton Lane
- Dr. Mary Lane
  President, Northern California Association for Nursery Education
- Marilyn Langer
  SANE
- Mrs. I. Lee Levy
- Viveca Lindfors
  Actress
- Mary Ely Lyman
  Union Theological Seminary
- Helen Merrell Lynd
  Author, Sociologist
- Olive Mayer
  Scientist
- Betty Meredith
  Nursery School Teacher
- Lucy Montgomery
- Nelle Morton
  Professor of Theology, Drew University
- Jessica Mitford
  Author
- Grace Mora Newman
  Fort Hood Three
- Dorothy Nyland
  Fellowship of Reconciliation
- Emmy Lou Packard
  Artist
- Mrs. Joseph Papp
  Theatre
- Rosa Parks
  Alabama bus rider
- Leslie Parrish
  TV Actress
- Louise Peck
  Cleveland Peace Mobilization
- Nan S. Pendergrast
- Eleanor Perry
  Screen Writer, Producer of "David and
- Laura Phauls
  Union Theological Seminary
- Esther Pike
- Mrs. Sigmund Pollitzer
  American Ethical Union
- Mrs. Sidney Poitier
- Mercedes M. Randall
  Author
- Jeannette Rankin
- Mrs. Marcus Raskin
- Malvina Reynolds
  Songwriter
- Carmen Ristorucci
  Dubois Clubs
- Mrs. Alex J. Rosenberg
  Reform Democrats
- Ruth Rosenwald
  Chicago Rosenwald Foundation
- Muriel Ruykeyser
  Poet
- Marie Runyon
  National Conference for New Politics
- Mrs. Robert Ryan
- Marjorie Schell
  SANE
- Juanita J. Saddler
  YWCA
- Elaine Slater
  CORE
- Helen Huntington Smith
  United Church of Christ
- Mrs. Benjamin Spock
- Susan Sontag
  Author
- Mrs. S. Emlen Stokes
  American Friends Service Committee
- Elizabeth Sutherland
  Student Nonviolent Coordinating Com
- Amy Swerdlow
  Women Strike for Peace
- Mary Adams Sykes
  American Friends Service Committee
- Ethel Taylor
  Women Strike for Peace
- Maza Tilghman
  United Church Women
- Helen B. Turnbull
  United Church Women, World Council
  Churches, Episcopal Church
- Barbara Webster
  Liberation, CNVA
- Cynthia Wedel
  Executive Secretary, National Council of Churches
- Cora Weiss
  Women Strike for Peace
- Anne Werneke
  Youth, National Council of Churches
- Pearl Willen
  Past President, National and Internation
  cil of Jewish Women
- Dagmar Wilson
  Founder of Women Strike for Peace
- Winnifred Wygal
- Elaine Yoneda
  President, ILWU Auxiliary No. 16

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
100-59802

January 16, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	
Reference	San Francisco memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI [illegible]

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9843) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Miami teletypes to the Bureau dated 1/15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eleven copies of an LHM concerning the captioned demonstration. Two copies are being furnished WFO which is origin. Two copies are being furnished Atlanta and San Francisco who have current investigations concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. Two copies are being furnished Philadelphia, office of origin in the WILPF investigation.

Copies are being disseminated locally to NISO, 6th ND, Charleston, S. C., OSI Robins AFB, Ga., 111th M. I. Group, Orlando, Florida, and U. S Secret Service, Miami, Florida.

The following were advised of the proposed demonstration on 1/15/68:

③ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM) ENCLOSURE
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM) REC- 62 100-[illegible]-44
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (100-9882) (WILPF) (RM) 13 JAN 20 1968
2 - Miami
(1 - 100-11990)
JJM:vc
(13)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., ~~RAO (ISD, CRD, CD)~~ State
DATE FORW: 1-22-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY:

INT. SEC.

JAN 25 1968

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________

Special Agent DOUGLAS CHALFONTE
U. S Secret Service
Miami, Florida, 9:50 a.m.

Major ROBERT STACHEL
Agent in Charge
111th M. I. Group
Miami, Florida, 10:00 a.m.

Sgt. JOHN CURTAIN
Criminal Intelligence Section
Dade County Department of Public Safety
Miami, Florida, 10:10 a.m.

Sgt. JOHN MC CRACKEN
Intelligence Unit
Miami Police Department, 10:15 a m.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

The first source concealed is [redacted]),

Informant

The second source concealed is [redacted].

The demonstration was observed by SA JOHN J. MATTIMORE.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-9843

Miami, Florida
January 16, 1968

Re: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference is made to a memorandum, captioned as above, dated December 28, 1967, at Miami, Florida. The memorandum concerned a call issued by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade for American Women to travel to Washington, D. C. on January 15, 1968, to petition the United States Congress to end the war in Viet Nam.

A source, on January 15, 1968, advised that the Miami Chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) had scheduled a demonstration to take place January 15, 1968, at Miami, Florida. The demonstration would be a support activity for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade that would be in Washington, D. C. on that date to petition Congress to end the war in Viet Nam.

The January 16, 1968, issue of the "Miami Herald," a local Miami, Florida newspaper, contained an article entitled "Five Thousand Women Join Viet War Protest." The article identified Jeannette Rankin as an 87 year old woman pacifist and former member of Congress who voted in Congress against the American entry into both world wars.

A Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on January 15, 1968, observed an anti-war demonstration take place in Miami, Florida. Approximately 70 participants, mostly elderly women, assembled at the Torch of Friendship, Bayfront Park, downtown Miami, at 2:00 p.m. They stood in silent vigil, some wearing black

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

100-445475-99

arm bands holding placards aloft bearing the following slogans:

"Peace Throughout the Earth"

"We Demand An End To The War In Viet Nam Immediately"

"Peace On Earth. Good Will To All Men"

"Join Our Silent Vigil For Peace In Viet Nam"

"Vietnamese Are Our Brothers Whom We Kill"

"For A World Without War"

"We Pause To Remember Our Brothers Who Gave Their Lives In Viet Nam"

Literature distributed identified the sponsor of the demonstration as the "Women's International League for Peace and Freedom" (see attached xerox copy).

The participants, following the vigil, continued their demonstration by walking in single file with the anti-war signs through the downtown city streets to the Federal Building where they dispersed at 3:15 p.m. No incidents were observed to occur.

Source also advised that at least six people from greater Miami had considered traveling to Washington, D. C. to participate in the demonstration in that city being sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade although no firm plans had been made. Among these individuals was Greta Lynch.

> A second source in April, 1951, advised that Greta Lynch that year stated she had been expelled from the Communist Party in 1944.

Re: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED
STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 105-9843

Miami, Florida
January 16, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Miami, Florida.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SPONSORED BY

WOMEN'S INTERNATIONAL LEAGUE FOR PEACE AND FREEDOM



TORCH OF FRIENDSHIP BISCAYNE BOULEVARD

Monday, January 15, 1967 from 2 P.M. to 4 P.M.

WEAR BLACK IF POSSIBLE

THOUSANDS of American women will see to it that PEACE in Vietnam will be the first order of business when Congress convenes.

Speaker of the House John McCormick and Senator Mike Mansfield will receive a delegation of 50 women led by Jeanette Rankin. The women will present a petition to these two Congressmen who represent the whole Congress.

* PETITION the United States Congress to
  * use its power to heal a sick society at home.
  * use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam
  * listen to what American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.



JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all



THOUSANDS of American women will see to it that PEACE in Vietnam will be the first order of business when Congress convenes.

Speaker of the House John McCormick and Senator Mike Mansfield will receive a delegation of 50 women led by Jeanette Rankin. The women will present a petition to these two Congressmen who represent the whole Congress.

- * PETITION the United States Congress to
  - * use its power to heal a sick society at home.
  - * use its power to make reparation for the ravaged land we leave behind in Vietnam
  - * listen to what American people are saying and refuse the insatiable demands of the military-industrial complex.

JEANNETTE RANKIN
HELENA, MONTANA

November 27, 1967

TO ALL AMERICAN WOMEN,

I am proud of the fact that my first vote cast in Congress was a vote against war. It was the first opportunity for a woman to vote because I was the first woman to be elected to Congress.

I believed then as I do today that women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race. I have always fought for the dignity of all human beings — for those of the present as well as those of future generations.

I will continue to struggle as long as I live.

I hope all women will respond to the following CALL, and join me in Washington on January 15, 1968, the opening day of Congress.

With highest hopes,

Jeannette Rankin
JEANNETTE RANKIN

FOR WOMEN ONLY
W.I.L.P.F.

374-3773

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1-16-68

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL AIRMAIL

Via ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, ST. LOUIS (100-20923)

FD-217

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U. S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 13, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re St. Louis tel, 1-15-68, and airtel and LHM, 1-11-68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of a LHM suitable for distribution.

Two copies have been designated for WFO.

Local dissemination has been made to Secret Service, USA, SLPD, OSI, ONI, Clayton PD, and 113th MI-3.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

Source 1 is [redacted] TWA AIRLINES, SLMO (by request).

Informant

Source 2 is [redacted].

Names furnished by TWA were: BLINK, [illegible], [illegible], [illegible], [illegible] (cancelled), [illegible], SCHATZ, STEGELBERG and [illegible]. These names were left out in the LHM because [illegible] it is not possible to definitely say they are the same individuals as ones on whom first names are available.

REC 49

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encl. 11) RM 2 - WFO (Encl. 2) RM
3 - St. Louis
(1 - 100-20923)
(1 - 134-161A
(1 - 100-19842 Videm)

REC-4 100-

EX 106

12 JAN 19 1968

SJP:wma
(S)

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, STATE

Bishop

DATE FORWARD: 1-23-68
HOW FORWARD: RS
BY: [illegible]

INT. SEC.

Sent __________ M Per __________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri 63177

January 16, 1968

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968

Reference is made to St. Louis memorandum of January 11, 1968.

Source Two advised on January 13, 1968, that BERNICE WEHRMEYER of the St. Louis Peace Information Center, 6217 Delmar Boulevard, said that the St. Louis Delegation going to Washington, D. C. to take part in the Jeannette Rankin demonstration would number about twelve women. They would travel by Trans-World Airline. They had reservations on the 6:25 P. M. flight departing St. Louis on January 13, 1968. They planned to demonstrate and try to see members of Congress on January 15, 1968. On January 16, 1968, they would attend a Women's Congress and return to St. Louis, Tuesday evening, January 16, 1968. They had reserved three hotel rooms in Washington, D. C., near the White House.

Source One advised January 15, 1968, that there had been eleven reservations made by women leaving St. Louis on the 6:25 P. M. TWA flight for Washington, D. C., and returning on January 16, 1968. Only nine reservations, however, were used. It was apparent that all of the reservations were related to each other.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

On January 15, 1968, [redacted] of the Clayton, Missouri, Police Department, advised that about 12:00 Noon, on that date, a number of individuals commenced gathering in front of t St. Louis County, Missouri, Court House. By 12:15 P. M. they commenced

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-43[illegible]-10[illegible]

ENCLOSURE

to march in a wide circle. In all there were twenty women and one man. One woman had two small children that walked with her. They were all of the white race. They continued to walk until 1:00 P. M. when they broke up and all left the area. They carried one sign that read: "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE - STOP THE WAR IN VIETNAM." At one time two negro males observed the marchers and joined them. After about five or ten minutes they apparently learned what the demonstration was about and left.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

[redacted] did not know any of the demonstrators. They were orderly and quiet. There were no incidents and no threats were made.

An article appearing in the September 20, 1967, issue of "THE ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH" on page 3 C read as follows:

> "A Peace Information Center will be opened at 6217 Delmar Boulevard with ceremonies at 8:00 P. M. today. The Center will contain literature on foreign affairs, economics and social problems. Information concerning alternatives under the Selective Service Act and individual counseling for young men will be provided by appointment."

"THE ST. LOUIS POST DISPATCH" is a daily St. Louis newspaper.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

St. Louis, Missouri 63177

January 16, 1968

Title	DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above, at St. Louis, Missouri.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/16/68

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL - REGISTERED
(Priority)

TO: Director, FBI

FROM: SAC, Portland (100-10983) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

CINAL

Re Portland teletype to Bureau, 1/15/68 and Portland airtel and Letterhead Memorandu, dated 12/27/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve copies and for WFO two copies of a Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) suitable for dissemination concerning anti-war demonstration Monday, 1/15/68, Portland, Oregon, in support of Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam, Washington, D.C., 1/15/68.

6 - Bureau (Enc. 12) (AM) (RM)
 (4 - 100-) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
 (1 - 105-138315) (VIDEM)
 (1 - 100-) (JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (AM) (RM)
5 - Portland
 (2 - 100-10983) (DEMO, 1/15/68)
 (1 - 100-10626) (VIDEM)
 (1 - 100-9248) (CINAL)
 (1 - 100-3952-SUB 9) (INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS)

LBA:dlf
(13)

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, STATE
RAO
DATE FORWARD: 1-24-68
HOW FORWARD:
BY:

JAN 19 1968

REC-68

EX 106

C. C. - Bishop

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Sources utilized in this LHM, who have furnished reliable information in the past, are as follows:

First Source	[redacted]
Second Source	[redacted]
Third Source	[redacted]
Fourth Source	[redacted]

#Informant I

The LHM is classified "confidential" because data reported from informants could reasonably result in identification of confidential informants of continuing value and compromise future effectiveness thereof.

Copies of LHM disseminated to USA, Secret Service, MI, OSI, and NIC, all Portland.

SA LEO B. APP, JR., SA WILLIAM S. BROWN, and SA JOHN V.HANLON observed the demonstration in Portland on 1/15/68.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Portland, Oregon
January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Sources utilized in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On Monday, January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Portland Office observed approximately forty women conducting a peaceful silent picketing demonstration on the sidewalk counter clockwise around the block encompassing the Pioneer Branch, U.S. Post Office (USPO), 520 S.W. Morrison Street, Portland, Oregon, from noon to 1:00 p.m. The majority of women were middle aged, wore black clothing, carried black umbrellas and some carried signs with wording, "No More War" and "The Women's Vote is a Vote for Peace". A small number of the black umbrellas contained white block letters on top with wording, "Peace is our Shelter".

The majority of participants were the same as in previous demonstrations against U.S. policy in Vietnam and among those participating were Susan Elizabeth Hamerquist, Martina Gangle Curl, Julia Eaton Ruuttila, Barbara Davis Crowley, and Mary Jane Brewster.

The demonstration was orderly and no arrests were made.

- CONFIDENTIAL -

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-448475.102

ENCLOSURE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

The demonstrators were largely ignored by the passers by and a large number of pedestrians refused to accept leaflets being handed out.

A number of the demonstrators passed out the following three-page leaflet (back was blank) made from a single folded pink piece of paper, which was as follows:

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968



THE
WOMEN'S
VOTE
IS THE
PEACE
VOTE

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968



WE MARCH

to support the thousands of American women assembled today in Washington, D.C.

Led by former Congresswoman Jeannette Rankin, they are petitioning Congress:

- to end the war in Vietnam NOW
- to arrange for complete withdrawal of American troops

WE WEAR BLACK

- to protest the destruction of life - American and Vietnamese
- to protest the devastation of Vietnamese country and culture
- to protest the atmosphere of violence in which our children are being raised

WE PLEDGE

the strength of our collective political power to nominate and elect candidates who will work for peace in 1968.

Notify your present Congressional Representatives and Senators of your agreement with these aims by signing this page and mailing to them in Washington, D.C.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY
15, 1968

AMERICAN WOMEN

-represent 51% of the voting population of this country

-have the power to achieve peace -

THE WOMEN'S VOTE CAN BE THE PEACE VOTE!

WE INVITE

you to join with us to work for peace in 1968.
Please mail the coupon below to:

Portland Women for Peace
P.O. Box 13061, Portland, Ore. 97213

or to:

Women's International League for Peace and Freedom
P.O. Box 1186, Portland, Ore. 97207

I wish to help in the Women's Vote Campaign to End the War in '68. Please place my name on your mailing list.

Enclosed is contribution of $______.

Name ____________________ Phone ________

Address ____________________

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

Susan Elizabeth Hamerquist, wife of Donald Lee Hamerquist, is publicly known as a Communist Party (CP) member in Portland, Oregon. Susan Elizabeth Hamerquist is a member of the Oregon CP state board.

First Source, January 11, 1968

Donald Lee Hamerquist is publicly known as organizational secretary, Oregon District, CP, USA, and a member of the CP, USA, National Committee.

Martina Gangle Curl is a member of the Labor Club of the CP.

Second Source, January 11, 1968

During 1948, Barbara Davis (now Mrs. Barbara Davis Crowley) was a member of the CP in Portland, Oregon.

Mr. Marshall Kolin
Self-admitted former CP member
September 29, 1953 to October 14, 1953

Mary Jane Brewster is a self-admitted former CP member.

Julia Eaton Ruuttila was an active CP member during 1949.

Third Source, October 8, 1959

Portland Women for Peace is a local pacifist organization.

Fourth Source, January 16, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, PORTLAND, OREGON, JANUARY 15, 1968

A leaflet of the Portland chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF) dated December 5, 1967, identified WILPF as follows: "The WILPF was founded by Jane Addams in 1915. Since this time, it has been steadfastly opposed to militarism and war. It is an international organization believing that peace must be based upon economic and social justice."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/17/68

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority)

REC 11

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)
(OO:WFO)

ReNYairtel to Bureau, 1/16/68.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM regarding captioned demonstration attended by NYO informant. Enclosed for Washington Field are two copies of the LHM. Enclosed for Atlanta, Albany, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Newark, New Haven and Philadelphia, is one information copy of the LHM.

③ - Bureau (Encls. 11) (RM)
1 - Atlanta (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Albany (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Milwaukee (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Newark (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - New Haven (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Encl. 1) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (Encls. 2) (RM)
1 - New York (134-5638) (INV) (312)
1 - New York

REC 11

-93

13 JAN 18 1968

HPB:car
(15)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-17-68
HOW FORW:
BY:

ENCLOSURE

INT. SEC.

66 JAN 26 1968

Approved: ________________ Sent ________________ M Per ________________
Special Agent in Charge

NY 100-161601

Copies of this LHM have been disseminated to interested local intelligence agencies and USA's, SDNY and EDNY.

Sources used in the LHM are:

1.
2.
3.
4.

Informants Symbol numbers

This LHM is classified "Confidential" because it contains information from the first and second source who are of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of the information could identify these informants, and, therefore, affect the national security interest.

MIRIAM THOMPSON and SANDRA WOLF are not identifiable in indices of the NYO.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
January 17, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.,
January 15, 1968

The following information was obtained from a confidential source on January 16, 1968, who had accompanied Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) on their demonstration in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968:

The special JRB train departed Pennsylvania Station, New York City, at approximately 7:30 AM. The train appeared to be nearly full. It arrived at Union Station, Washington, D.C., shortly after twelve noon. The large group of women proceeded to Grant Park which is in the vicinity of the United States Capitol. At Grant Park there was a total of approximately 4,000 women and they remained at the park from 12:45 PM to 1:30 PM. They were instructed by those in charge that they should carry no signs, engage in any group singing or be disorderly in any manner. A folk singer by the name of Judy Collins D. entertained the group at the park. A sound truck arrived and Vivica Lindfors, the actress, read an anti-Vietnam war petition which Jeannette Rankin was to present to the leaders of Congress. Jeannette Rankin then took this petition and with a small group of women, went into the United States Capitol.

After she returned at approximately 1:30 PM, most of the demonstrators went by bus to the Shoreham Hotel, arriving at approximately 2:00 PM. They held a

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions
of the FBI. It is the property
of the FBI and is loaned to your
agency; it and its contents are
not to be distributed outside
your agency.

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

93

Demonstration Protesting United
States Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.,
January 15, 1968

"Women's Congress" meeting. Speakers at the hotel included Mrs. Martin Luther King, who gave an anti-war speech and spoke of the needs of the Negroes at home. Jeannette Rankin gave an anti-war speech, as did Dagmar Wilson. A city council woman from Milwaukee, Wisconsin, also gave a speech opposing the war in Vietnam. Mrs. Mitchell Goodman, described as the wife of Mitchell Goodman who had been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for his anti-draft counseling, gave a speech in which she also encouraged resistance to the draft. All of the speeches were completed by approximately 6:00 PM and at 6:30 PM, busses departed for Union Station. There was a delay at Union Station because of train difficulties and the group did not arrive back in New York City until after twelve midnight.

Observed participating in the demonstration were Hedda Garza, Berta Green and Judy White.

Hedda Garza, Berta Green
and Judy White

D.a.

A second confidential source on November 20, 1967, advised that as of that time, Hedda Garza, Berta Green and Judy White were members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A third confidential source advised on January 11, 1968, that JRB had an account at the Park Hills Branch, Sterling National Bank, 101-25 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, New York, which was opened on November 28, 1967.

The address for the account was listed as 133 West 72nd Street, New York City. The officers were listed as:

Cora Weiss, President N.Y.
Sandra Wolf, Treasurer
Miriam Thompson, Secretary

It was noted that Miriam Thompson has a personal special checking account at the bank in which she is listed as a housewife.

The information furnished above by the third confidential source is not to be made public except in the usual proceedings following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. The officer to be subpoenaed is Mr. John Driscoll, Assistant Vice-President, Sterling National Bank, 101-25 Queens Boulevard, Forest Hills, Queens, New York.

Cora Rubin Weiss

In March, 1956, a fourth confidential source advised that on March 26, 1956, Cora Rubin, while attending the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, N.Y. was present at a meeting sponsored by the University of Wisconsin Chapter of Labor Youth League (LYL).

LYL has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

All the above confidential sources have furnished reliable information in the past.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/17/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (100-44707) C

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/15-16/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(IS)

VIDEM

Re Chicago airtel and LHM 1/4/68; and Chicago teletypes 1/10, 11, 12, and 15/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies and for WFO 2 copies of an LHM captioned as above.

The sources are identified as follows:

T-1
T-2
T-3
T-4

Informants [redacted]

One copy each of the LHM is being furnished locally to the 113th MI Group, Evanston, Illinois, and USA and Secret Service, Chicago.

The LHM is classified confidential in order to protect T-1, T-3, and T-4, sources which are of continuing value.

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, OSI, STATE
REQ. REC'D:
DATE FORW: 1-[illegible]-68
HOW FORW: RS
BY:

3 - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
3 - Chicago
1 - 100-42717
1 - 100-44775

JAN 19 1968

XEROX

JWT:mr
(8)

JAN 24 1968

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

The activity on 1/14/68 was observed by SAs PHILIP R. WANERUS, WILLIAM F. CRONIN, DALE D. CONROY and GENE E. ARNOLD.

The activity on 1/15/68, was observed by SAs EMIL L. SCHROEDER and PAUL L. TIMMERBERG.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
January 17, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-44707

CONFIDENTIAL

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968

On January 10, 1968, CG T-1 advised that the coordinating committee concerned with captioned activity consisted of Mrs. Lucille Montgomery, Marjorie Kinsella, Carol Travis, Rosalind Durham, and Sylvia Kushner. Montgomery, Travis, and Durham were to depart Chicago for Washington, D.C., by air, January 11, 1968, to help with the preparations. According to this source, there would also be a demonstration at the Federal Building in Chicago on January 15, 1968, in support of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

In the January 13, 1968, edition of the "Chicago Daily News," a general circulation daily newspaper in Chicago, it was reported that also in Washington, D.C., from Chicago to help complete plans for the demonstration were Anna Riggs Langford and Sylvia Cotton.

Robert Hensley, Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O RR) official, Chicago, advised on January 12, 1968, that Sylvia Kushner, in the name of the Chicago Jeannette Rankin Brigade, made reservations for 34 persons to travel from Chicago to Washington, D.C., via B&O RR Train Number 6, departing Chicago

CONFIDENTIAL
Group 1
Excluded from autom
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-44847-101

at 4 p.m., January 14, 1968, and arriving in Washington, D.C., at 9 a.m., January 15, 1968. Thirteen of those persons were to return to Chicago via B&O RR, leaving Washington, D.C., at 4:30 p.m, January 15, 1968, and 16 of the group to leave Washington, D.C., at 4:30 p.m., January 16, 1968, to return to Chicago.

On January 12, 1968, Loyal Hibbs, Loyal Travel Service, 10 Riverside Plaza, Chicago, a charter agency for the Greyhound Bus Lines at Chicago, advised that Sylvia Kushner, in the name of Jeannette Rankin Brigade, chartered one Greyhound Bus with the capacity of 38 passengers. This bus was to leave the Greyhound station at Chicago at 6 p.m., January 14, 1968, and deliver the passengers to the Union Station, Washington, D.C., arriving at 9 a.m., January 15, 1968. The bus was scheduled to depart from Washington, D.C. from the Shoreham Hotel at 9 p.m., January 15, 1968, and return to Chicago. It was observed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation on January 14, 1968, that 66 women boarded B&O RR Train Number 6 at Grand Central Station, Chicago, and departed for Washington, D.C., at 4 p.m. It was observed on the same day by Special Agents of the FBI that approximately 20 women boarded a Greyhound Bus at the Chicago Greyhound Terminal which had been chartered by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. The bus departed the Chicago terminal at 6 p.m., January 14, 1968, enroute to Washington, D.C.

On January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the FBI observed that from 12 noon to 1 p.m., approximately 75 persons, mostly women, conducted a silent vigil at the Federal Building, Chicago, Illinois, in support of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade.

Concerning persons mentioned above, the following is set forth:

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Sylvia Cotton

CG T-2 advised in 1953 that Sylvia Cotton was a member of the Communist Party (CP), 1952-53.

Rosalind Durham

CG T-3 advised December 28, 1967, that Rosalind Durham is a current member, CP of Illinois.

Sylvia Kushner

CG T-3 advised December 28, 1967, that Sylvia Kushner is a current member, CP of Illinois.

Marjorie Kinsella

CG T-4 advised November 22, 1967, that Marjorie Kinsella was a current member, CP of Illinois.

Anna Riggs Langford

According to a news letter of the Chicago Chapter, National Lawyers Guild (NLG) concerning events in June, 1964, it was stated that Anna Riggs Langford, 7107 South South Park Avenue, Chicago, Illinois, was a new member of the NLG.

A characterization of the NLG is attached.

Lucille Montgomery

CG T-1 advised in September, 1967, that Lucille Montgomery was chairman of a Host Committee of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) held at Chicago over the 1967 Labor Day weekend.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S.
POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON,
D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968

Carol Travis

CG T-1 advised in September, 1967, that Carol Travis was secretary of a Steering Committee of the above NCNP.

The above information was furnished January 12, 1968, and January 15, 1968, to the following:

Clinton R. Vanzant and
Thomas Murray
Region I, 113th MI Group
Evanston, Illinois

Kathleen Mc Kay
Office of the United States Attorney,
Chicago, Illinois

Jay Sachs and Joseph Noonan
United States Secret Service
Chicago, Illinois

William Richter
Chicago Police Department.

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications revised and published December 1, 1961, by the Committee on Un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., states as follows on page 121 concerning the National Lawyers Guild:

"1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149.)

"2. Cited as a Communist front which 'is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations, and controlled unions' and which 'since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents.'

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally related September 17, 1950.)

"3. 'To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the * * * National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection.'

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91.)"

1

APPENDIX

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD
CHICAGO CHAPTER

A source advised on May 9, 1967, that it was his understanding that the National Lawyers Guild (NLG) was formed around 1936 in New York City, and that the Chicago Chapter of the NLG (CCNLG), which is affiliated with the national group in New York, was formed shortly thereafter, possibly in 1937 by a group of liberal progressive lawyers in protest against activities of the American Bar Association which they claimed was a non-liberal, non-progressive organization. The CCNLG has no established headquarters but occasionally uses the return address of its officials in literature.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Chicago, Illinois
January 17, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-44707

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIET NAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
Reference	Chicago memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-7 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/17/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

REC 16

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-70701) (RUC)

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Reference is made to prior Los Angeles Airtels and letterhead memoranda (LHM) dated December 12 and 30, 1967 and January 11, 1968; Los Angeles teletypes of January 12 and 15, 1968, captioned as above.

For the information of the Bureau there are enclosed eleven (11) copies of an LHM concerning the final local planning meeting of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) and the subsequent demonstrations held by this group in Los Angeles and Santa Ana, California on January 15, 1968.

An information copy of the LHM is being furnished to San Francisco as it contains data regarding VIVIAN HALLINAN, a resident of the San Francisco area; and to WFO the Office of Origin. No attempt has been made to document Mrs. HALLINAN in instant LHM since she is not a Los Angeles subject.

The Los Angeles Division has no Bureau approved characterization for the Women's International League for

EX 104 REC 16

3 - Bureau (Encls. 11) (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - San Francisco (100-59802)(Encls. 1) (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - WFO (100-47173)(Encls. 1) (REGISTERED AIR MAIL)
1 - Los Angeles (100-70701)
GGB/ajs
(6)

AGENCY: ACSI, ONI, CSI, STATE
RAO [illegible]
DATE FORWARD: 1-24-68
HOW FORWARD: RS
BY: [illegible]

JAN [illegible]

[illegible] FEB 2 1968

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

LA 100-70701

Peace and Freedom; so no attempt has been made to document it herein other than as a "peace-oriented" group.

Instant LHM has been classified confidential to protect the symbol number informants utilized therein. Sources utilized are:

Source One [redacted]
Source Two [redacted]
Source Three [redacted]
Source Four [redacted]
Source Five [redacted]

Informants

One copy each is being furnished the local offices of Secret Service; United States Attorney; Region II, U. S. Army; OSI and NISO, as each of these services have received copies of prior LHMs.

SAs GILBERT G. BENJAMIN and JAMES R. PACE made the observations in Los Angeles. SA LEON J. MEYER made the observations in Santa Ana.

As the local aspects of this demonstration have been completed this matter is considered RUC.

UNITED STATES
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
January 17, 1968

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

**DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY
IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)**

Reference is made to prior memoranda captioned as above, including those dated December 12 and 30, 1967 and January 11, 1968, from Los Angeles, California.

Former CP member [illegible]

Source One reported that the final local planning meeting of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade (JRB) Committee in Southern California, was held on January 11, 1968, in the offices of the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) (see appendix), 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. A communication was received from Mary Clarke (see characterization in appendix page on WSP) indicating that she and Vivian Hallinan of San Francisco, California, were already in Washington, D. C., making final arrangements for the JRB action to be held in that city on January 15, 1968. Clarke indicated that she and Mrs. Hallinan had already received numerous queries from representatives of the Washington news media regarding proposed action to be taken by the JRB. She also noted that it might be necessary to re-route the proposed JRB march on the Capitol, in view of some "1882 Law" relating to demonstrations in the vicinity of the Capitol building.

According to Source One the women from Southern California, travelling to participate in the Washington JRB action, were to leave Los Angeles Saturday night, January 13, 1968, via American Airlines Flight 78. Most of them were to return to Los Angeles, from Dulles International Airport, on Tuesday, January 16, 1968, via American Airlines Flight 75.

As of January 12, 1968, the following women affiliated with WSP were scheduled to travel from Southern California to Washington for the JRB demonstration: Eva Korn, Mary Lewis, Bea Glass, Florence Temkin, Mildred Holland, Ada Wasserman, Joyce Miller Angus, Leslie Parrish, Pat Lavit, Geraldine Shapiro, Beverly Bruce and Florence White; according to Source One.

CONFIDENTIAL

100-448415-103

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1971

Three women representing the black community were also scheduled to fly to Washington from the Southern California JRB Committee. They were Bobbie Hodges, Althea Alexander, and Glory Roberts. Two women affiliated with the peace-oriented Pasadena Chapter of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom; Cathy Hofer and Marian Beardsley, were also to join the above women for the flight to Washington, according to Source One.

On January 15, 1968, Special Agents of the Los Angeles Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation observed a group of women assemble in front of the Old State Building, 217 West First Street (First and Broadway, in the downtown Civic Center), Los Angeles, California, at approximately 9:30 AM. The women were carrying placards indicating they were the local representation of the JRB. They also had two leaflets for distribution (Xerox copies of which are appended to this memorandum) which called for women to participate and which indicated that a voting block of American women had the power to put an end to the war in Vietnam. These leaflets bore the address of the JRB as 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles, California (90019), which is the address of the headquarters of the WSP in Southern California.

Starting shortly after 10:00 AM, the women proceeded to hold a rally on the south steps of the Old State Building, with the speakers utilizing an electronic amplification system, which was held by actress Leslie Parrish.

Source One indicated that Parrish had originally been scheduled to fly to Washington, D. C., to participate in the JRB action at the Capitol, but changed her plans at the last minute in order to remain in Los Angeles.

The rally was headed by Tima Tomash, who acted as the local JRB organizer and answered some of the questions regarding the JRB from members of the news media on the scene. Veronica Sissons acted as mistress of ceremonies. Speakers included Mary Henry, Negro civil rights and poverty worker; Margaret Wright (who has been identified by Sources One and Two as a militant black nationalist, who has been extremely active in recent months in disturbances at Manual Arts High School, Los Angeles, which resulted in a court injunction to prohibit her entering those school grounds); and television actress Ellen McRae. The speakers all called for a coalition of women to form a strong voting block which could produce legislation to end the war in Vietnam, end poverty and "legislated injustice".

At 10:50 AM, the women marched to the steps on the First Street side of the Los Angeles City Hall for a second rally. A count made as the demonstrators marched between the Old State Building and the City Hall revealed that 250 adult Caucasians (majority of whom were women dressed in black), and eight non-Caucasian adults were involved, plus some youngsters and infants. The mother of one of the children had a cardboard sign, depicting a bomb and the caption, "I'm Glad I'm Not Vietnamese", strapped to the back of her son who appeared to be less than four years of age.

With Veronica Sissons again acting as mistress of ceremonies, the rally was addressed by Charlotte Sherman, Margaret Wright, Tima Tomash, and Jill Schary. The latter was introduced as a radio commentator employed by Los Angeles Radio Station KLAC. She joined the others in calling for a coalition of women to influence legislation and bring an end to the war in Vietnam. She also called for support of other "liberal radio broadcasters on our side", one of whom she named as William Winter. (The "Daily People's World", west coast communist newspaper, in its edition of June 11, 1946, described William Winter as chairman of a local citizens' committee to safeguard the Joint Anti-Fascist Refuge Committee, which organization has been cited pursuant to Executive Order 10450).

Charlotte Sherman was introduced as the wife of Laurence Sherman, it being pointed out that he was an unsuccessful candidate for public office, on a peace slate, during 1967, but that both he and his wife were continuing the fight for an end to the war in Vietnam. She said, "It is time for us to re-examine our role as women. Women are a vehicle for giving life. We will not be a vehicle for perpetuation of wars". She then read some anti-war quotes from Henry David Thoreau, indicating they were as timely today, as when he wrote them.

Margaret Wright stated that whereas the majority of women in the demonstration were wearing black to denote mourning, that she and her non-Caucasian associates who feel, "Black is beautiful" were dressed in white to indicate their attitude of mourning. She called for the elimination of ROTC (Reserve Officers Training Corps) from local high schools and junior colleges, adding, "They have got to get live bullets out of the schools, and get some live teachers in." She repeated these same statements during the afternoon when the JRB moved to the Los Angeles City Board of Education.

As the rally was breaking up, Wright grabbed the public address system and said that it had been learned that the City Council was in session inside the City Hall Building.

She urged the women not to disperse, but to join her and others in invading the City Council Chambers with a demand that the JRB be allowed to speak to the Council even though they had not made previous arrangements for a place on the agenda that day. Some of the women were already out of range of the public address system and did not hear this announcement by Wright, having already been dismissed by Sissons and told to reconvene at the Board of Education following luncheon.

Approximately 200 of the demonstrators did enter the Council Chambers. They got word to the councilmen, through one of the staff members, that they wished to be heard. A motion to allow a JRB representative to address them was put before the Council, and defeated by a vote of six to five. Immediately following this vote, there was a unanimous vote that the Council adjourn. As the councilmen filed out of the room, Tima Tomash rushed to the front shouting demands that they return, while other of the women hissed and booed the city legislators.

During the noon hour some of the women distributed leaflets in the City Hall and on the surrounding streets in the downtown Civic Center.

At 1:00 PM, the women, whose numbers had by that time been reduced to 125, massed in the patio of the Los Angeles City Board of Education, 450 North Grand Avenue, Los Angeles. Sissons, Wright and Tomash addressed the assembled demonstrators, pointing out that money spent in Vietnam could be better spent in education. Wright claimed that many of the so-called student "drop-outs" are in reality "push-outs", claiming that she herself was one of the latter. She said, "We need books, not bombs. We know this is a racist war and we blacks are not going to fight a racist war". She indicated that rather than fight overseas, the black people would remain at home and fight the racists. She also said, "Just because I'm pro-black doesn't necessarily mean I'm anti-white."

Wright said, "I'm not political, but I am honest. I can't honestly get up and say the pledge of allegiance to the American flag, because I really don't have liberty and justice; so I just get up and stand and won't repeat the pledge." Later, when she observed a photograph of President Johnson hanging from a wall in the Administration Building at the Los Angeles City Board of Education, she told the JRB women with her, "We shouldn't have to look at such pornographic pictures."

Wright said that her arrest at the hands of Los Angeles City School Security Officers, during the recent Manual Arts High School disturbance, had at least one bright result. She said that at the time of her arrest it had been necessary for the arresting officers to drag her down the hall as she was too heavy for them to carry. Then she added that the next time she is arrested the officers will not have that excuse as she has lost thirty pounds in the meantime.

The speeches in the patio ended at 1:30 PM and many of the women left immediately. Seventy-eight women remained and attempted to enter a special committee meeting being attended by some of the School Board members. They were informed by a member of the administrative staff that the public meeting of the School Board would not be held until 4:00 PM, the regularly scheduled meeting time.. The women milled around in the hallway outside the meeting room, until finally a staff member came out and told them that two members of the School Board, Reverend James E. Jones and Dr. Julian Nava, had agreed to grant them an audience. The women were then ushered into the public board room of the School Board where they waited until 2:00 PM at which time the above-named Board members granted the demonstrators a short audience and answered some questions put to them by the women. One question, as to how much longer the members of the School Board were going to permit recruiters from the armed forces to interview students at local high schools and junior colleges remained unanswered, but Dr. Nava pointed out to the women that he had seen nothing wrong in entering the armed forces to fight for this country himself when he was 17 years of age, and he could see nothing wrong in other young men who wanted to do the same today. The demonstration was concluded by 3:00 PM. There were no incidents and no arrests.

Placards carried during this demonstration in Los Angeles bore the following captions:

"Eat Texas Beef, Not L.B.J. Baloney"

"Woman Power is Vote Power is Peace Power"

"Draft Beer Not Students"

"Where Have All the Men Gone-To Graveyards"

"Jeannette Rankin Brigade-Women's Votes Count, End the War"

"Women's Power is Peace Power."

A Special Agent of the FBI observed a separate group of 32 adult Caucasian females assemble at 10:05 AM, in the vicinity of the Orange County Courthouse, in downtown Santa Ana, California, January 15, 1968. About half of these women were dressed in black and they were carrying signs indicating they represented the JRB. Other signs being carried during the ensuing demonstration read, "Support Dr. Spock." They marched around the courthouse until 11:00 AM, when the demonstration was concluded with no incidents or arrests. Else Sturm identified herself to members of the press, as being in charge of the demonstration.

> Source One has identified Leslie Parrish, Tima Tomash, Veronica Sissions and Charlotte Sherman as having been affiliated with the WSP Southern California Council.
>
> Source Three identified Tima Tomash as a member of the Communist Party (CP) from at least 1940 to 1950, and as a member of the New York State CP School Commission during a portion of that period.
>
> Source Four identified Else Sturm as a member of the CP in Chicago, Illinois, in December, 1946.

Source One reported during June, 1967, that Florence Temkin, was an official in the Women for Legislative Action (WLA - see appendix), as well as being active in the Council of the WSP.

Source Five reported in 1947, that Eva Korn was at that time a member of the CP and had been such for approximately fifteen years.

An information copy of this memorandum is being furnished to each of the following agencies: United States Attorney, Los Angeles; Secret Service, Los Angeles; Office of Special Investigations, Norton Air Force Base; Region II, United States Army, Pasadena; and Naval Investigative Service Office, San Diego, California.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

APPENDIX

COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE WOMEN STRIKE FOR PEACE, Also Known As Women's International Strike for Peace

A source advised on May 14, 1967, that the Women Strike for Peace (WSP) in the Southern California area began its operations in the late fall of 1961, as an affiliate of the national organization formed in Washington, D.C. It is a peace oriented women's organization which is opposed to the present American foreign policy in Vietnam. It has also sought legislation which would bring about the abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA). In recent months the organization has sponsored demonstrations protesting the United States involvement in Vietnam and calling for the complete withdrawal of all United States troops from Vietnam. In the spring of 1966, it was instrumental in originating and putting into effect a campaign advocating support for "peace candidates" in the upcoming 1966 Congressional elections.

The same source stated that WSP is a non-membership organization and has no officers. The organization is open to women of all political opinions who are interested in world peace. It makes no effort to exclude from its activities members of, or persons sympathetic to, the Communist Party and related groups.

The guiding force behind the Southern California WSP groups is MARY CLARKE. A second source advised in July, 1955, that CLARKE was dropped from the Western Division, Los Angeles County Communist Party (LACCP) in the Spring of 1955, for personal reasons and not because of any political differences with the LACCP.

The first source advised that Southern California WSP maintains its office at 5899 West Pico Boulevard, Los Angeles. It receives mail through Post Office Box 19739, Los Angeles 19, California.

APPENDIX

APPENDIX

WOMEN FOR LEGISLATIVE ACTION

A source advised on May 1, 1963, that the Women for Legislative Action was formed in 1952, claiming to be an independent organization dedicated to non-partisan participation in legislative and civic activities. Its position in favoring or opposing legislation usually parallels the position of the Communist Party and related groups. It also supports legislation to abolish the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Membership in the Women for Legislative Action does not, of itself, connote membership in or sympathy with the Communist Party.

Another source advised on May 11, 1967, that the Women for Legislative Action continues to be active in the Los Angeles area.

CONFIDENTIAL

Will Rock the ~~Boat~~!
Vote

On January 15 American women will assemble in Washington, D. C. With Jeannette Rankin* leading the Brigade, they will converge on Congress as it reconvenes. They will petition for a redress of their grievances and will demand that Congress end the war in Vietnam and turn its power to healing our "sick society".

This is "Woman Power" !

In support of these women and their demands, Southern California women will assemble for appropriate ceremonies, marching and leafleting in Los Angeles on Monday, January 15, 1968:

9:30 A.M., on the steps of the Old State Bldg., 217 West 1st St.
11:30 A.M., City Hall, 200 North Spring St.
1:00 P.M., Board of Education, 450 North Grand

(please, wear black if possible)

"Turn Woman Power to Peace Power"

---

* Jeannette Rankin, Montana, U.S.A., is the first woman elected to Congress. A consistent, dedicated voice for a world without war, she says, "...Women are the ones who must be concerned with the needs and development of the human race." Her Brigade is your chance to demonstrate your concern!

Respond! Join! Participate!

5899 W. Pico Blvd., Los Angeles, Calif. 90019 - 937-0236

DO YOU KNOW . . .

YOU have the majority of the nation's vote!

YOU have 51% of the vote!

YOUR VOTE CAN STOP KILLING YOUR CHILDREN!!

BECAUSE IT'S AN OBSCENE WASTE TO BEAR AND RAISE OUR CHILDREN TO BE SLAUGHTERED IN WARS!

YOUR VOTE CAN DECIDE WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUR MEN!

BECAUSE NOW HE HAS TO DIE WITHOUT A CHOICE!!

YOUR VOTE IS THE POWER TO SPEND 3 BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH ON THE NEEDS HERE AT HOME - INSTEAD of ON THE WAR IN VIET-NAM!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE FROM OFFICE THE MEN WHO WILL NOT LISTEN! WILL NOT RESPOND TO YOUR NEEDS - WHO DO NOT REPRESENT YOU!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO ELECT THOSE WHO WILL:

END THE WAR!
END POVERTY!
END LEGISLATED INJUSTICE!

A WOMEN'S VOTING BLOCK WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALL AMERICANS TO ENJOY THEIR FREEDOMS!

WOMEN WHO BELIEVE IN LIFE PARTICIPATE!

Please Clip Here And Return To:

JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
5899 West Pico Blvd.

YOUR VOTE CAN STOP KILLING YOUR CHILDREN!

BECAUSE IT'S AN OBSCENE WASTE TO BEAR AND RAISE OUR CHILDREN TO BE SLAUGHTERED IN WARS!

YOUR VOTE CAN DECIDE WHAT HAPPENS TO YOUR MEN!

BECAUSE NOW HE HAS TO DIE WITHOUT A CHOICE!!

YOUR VOTE IS THE POWER TO SPEND 3 BILLION DOLLARS A MONTH ON THE NEEDS HERE AT HOME - INSTEAD OF ON THE WAR IN VIET-NAM!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO REMOVE FROM OFFICE THE MEN WHO WILL NOT LISTEN! WILL NOT RESPOND TO YOUR NEEDS - WHO DO NOT REPRESENT YOU!

YOUR VOTE HAS THE POWER TO ELECT THOSE WHO WILL

END THE WAR!
END POVERTY!
END LEGISLATED INJUSTICE!

A WOMEN'S VOTING BLOCK WILL MAKE IT POSSIBLE FOR ALL AMERICANS TO ENJOY THEIR FREEDOMS!

WOMEN WHO BELIEVE IN LIFE PARTICIPATE!

Please Clip Here And Return To:

JEANETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
5899 West Pico Blvd.
Los Angeles, Calif.
90019 - - Tel. 937-0236

Name: ____________________

Address: ____________________ Tel. No. __________

____

WOMEN'S POWER IS PEACE POWER

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/18/68

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (Priority)

C. Bill
Jm

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOUISVILLE (100-4998) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 8 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WFO

Re Bureau airtel dated 12/5/67 and Miami airtel to Bureau dated 12/28/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 14 copies and for WFO three (3) copies of a letterhead memorandum captioned as above except that the date has been changed to 1/15/68.

Referenced Bureau airtel reflects the Secretary of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade is VIVIAN HALLINAN, the wife of VINCENT HALLINAN. Louisville files reflect a

ENCLOSURE

REC 55

25 JAN 20 1968

7 - Bureau (Enc. 14) (RM)
    (1 - 100-10355) (Info)
    (1 - 105-164714) (Info)
    (1 - 100-445949) (Info)
3 - WFO (Enc. 3) (RM)
    (1 - 100-17107) (Info)
6 - Louisville (1 - 100-197)
    (1 - 100-4599) (Julia F. Allen)
    (1 - 105-890)
    (1 - 100-4661)

GWA/plh (16)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., INT. SEC.

RAO (ISD, ~~CRD~~, CD)

DATE FORW: Sent ____ M Per ____

HOW FORW:

BY:

53 JAN 29 1968

Approved: ____ Special Agent in Charge

report of SA LEON F. SCHWARTZ dated 5/29/52 at New York entitled "COMMUNIST INFILTRATION OF THE PROGRESSIVE PARTY, IS - C," (Bureau file 100-357934 and Louisville file 100-3284-249) which reflects one Vincent Hallinan, California attorney, was the 1952 Progressive Party candidate for President of the United States.

LS T-1 in the LHM is [redacted]

LS T-2 is [redacted]

SOURCES

It is noted the newspaper article mentioned in the LHM contains identifying data regarding the persons mentioned only as detailed in the LHM.

Louisville file 157-417-9, memo of SA HUGH M. BYRD, dated July 7, 1967, entitled "POSSIBLE RACIAL VIOLENCE, MAJOR URBAN AREAS, RM", describes one SARAH BURNSIDE as a Negro female residing on Race Street, Richmond, Kentucky, who is employed by the Appalachia Volunteers (AV). This organization is described in the LHM as a Federally financed anti-poverty agency. There is no subversive information in Louisville files regarding SARAH BURNSIDE.

Dean JULIA F. ALLEN, Berea College, Berea, Kentucky, at least in her 60's, is the subject of a closed case in Louisville file entitled "JULIA F. ALLEN, SM - C," (no Bureau file known, Louisville file 100-4599).

The KAREN MULLOY mentioned in LHM is possibly the wife of JOSEPH T. MULLOY who is one of the subjects of the case entitled "ALAN MC SURELY; MARGARET MC SURELY, Aka; JOSEPH T. MULLOY; CARL BRADEN ANNE BRADEN; INFORMATION CONCERNING (SM - C)" (Bureau file 105-164714 and Louisville file 105-890).

The information in the LHM from the masthead of "The Southern Patriot" is found in a report of SA GEORGE W. HUTCHISON dated 11/22/67 at Louisville entitled "SCEF, IS - C, ISA - 1950", (Bureau file 100-10355 and Louisville file 100-197).

There is no information in Louisville files regarding other Kentucky residents mentioned in the LHM.

Since several participants in the March have apparent SCEF connections, information copy is being designated to that file.

The Louisville Peace Council is the subject of Bureau file 100-445959 and Louisville file 100 4661. This matter is not currently under investigation. This organization utilizes the address 1135 South Brook, Louisville, Kentucky, and apparently has connections with the Grace Hope Presbyterian Church and the Presbyterian Community Center, both Louisville, Kentucky.

Any further information regarding this matter will be promptly furnished.

UNI[illegible] STATES DEPARTMENT OF JU[illegible]CE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Louisville, Kentucky
January 18, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The January 16, 1968, edition of the "Courier-Journal", a Louisville, Kentucky, newspaper of general circulation, reflected an article that reported that Jeannette Rankin and some 5,000 other women marched near the United States Capitol in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968. The article further reflected the group was known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade and that the purpose of the march was to protest the Vietnam war.

It was indicated therein that the marchers were "met by a seemingly disinterested Washington and a reconvening 90th Congress that, not unexpectedly, paid them little heed."

Miss Jeannette Rankin, described in the article as the march leader and first woman member of congress, and thirteen others presented a petition to two congressional leaders. One Sarah Burnside, Richmond, Kentucky, is depicted as a member of this group and a delegate from Appalachia.

The demonstration, described as peaceful, included Mrs. Ernest Gruening, "wife of the Alaska Senator"; Mrs. Martin

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[illegible] 8752

ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
342 APR 30 1971

Luther King, Mrs. Benjamin Spock, and Judy Collins, "a Washington singer of protest group", as "prominent participants."

The aforementioned article mentions that Mrs. Gwen Griffin, a member of the Steering Committee that helped organize the Jeannette Rankin Brigade march, is an employee of the Council of the Southern Mountains and a resident of Berea, Kentucky.

Other Kentucky marchers from Madison County, Kentucky, were Miss Julia Allen, former Dean of Women at Berea College, Berea, Kentucky; Mrs. Don Johnson, and Mrs. Kennedy Brooks.

Also listed as participating in the march were the following Louisville, Kentucky, residents: Mrs. Karen Mulloy, Mrs. Ann Braden, Karla Block, Cathie Grove, Suzanne Crowell, Teresa Bridges, and Nessa Goatley. It is noted the aforementioned newspaper article contains no further identifying data regarding these persons. The women from Louisville, Kentucky, allegedly came with the partial financial backing of the Louisville Peace Council.

With regard to the aforementioned persons from Kentucky, it is noted that the files of the Louisville Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation reflect Dean Julia F. Allen, Berea College, Berea, Kentucky, has been connected with the Southern Conference Educational Fund (SCEF) and its predecessor organization, the Southern Conference of Human Welfare, since 1938.

A characterization of the SCEF is attached hereto as an appendix.

It is further noted that one Karen Mulloy is the wife of Joseph T. Mulloy. Mulloy and Mr. and Mrs. Alan McSurely, the McSurelys being field workers of the SCEF, were arrested in August, 1967, by Pike County, Kentucky, officials under a Kentucky sedition law later ruled unconstitutional by a Federal Court. Mulloy at the time was employed by the

Appalachia Volunteers, a Federally financed anti-poverty agency, but has since been discharged.

Also, it is noted that the masthead of the October, 1967, "The Southern Patriot", Volume 29, No. 9, self-identified as the organ of the SCEF, lists one Anne Braden as Associate Executive Director, and Suzanne Crowell and Catherine Grove are listed as Field Staff members of SCEF.

Information furnished by Louisville T-1 regarding SCEF salary payments and information furnished by Louisville T-2 regarding SCEF employee expenses and other pertinent SCEF expenditures reflect that one Theresa Bridges, one Suzanne Crowell, one Nessa Goatley, and one Anne Braden each received a cash allowance from SCEF sometime in 1967.

SOUTHERN CONFERENCE EDUCATIONAL FUND, INC. (SCEF)

The Southern Conference for Human Welfare (SCHW) was cited as a Communist front by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 592, June 12, 1947. In the same house report, "The Southern Patriot" was cited as an "organ" of the SCHW.

An amendment to the charter of the SCHW dated April 26, 1946, changed its name to the Southern Conference Educational Fund, Incorporated (SCEF) and stated its purpose to be to improve the educational and cultural standards of the Southern people in accordance with the highest American democratic institutions, traditions and ideals.

The masthead of the April, 1967, issue of "The Southern Patriot" indicates that it is the publication of SCEF, editorial and business offices of which are located at 3210 West Broadway, Louisville, Kentucky, Eastern office of which is located at Suite 412, 799 Broadway, New York City, New York. "The Southern Patriot" is published once each month, except July. SCEF is stated to be dedicated to ending discrimination based on race, creed, color, sex, national origin or economic condition.

Carl Braden is identified as Executive Director of SCEF and Anne Braden as editor of "The Southern Patriot."

Mrs. Alberta Ahearn, 2311 Payne Street, Louisville, Kentucky, a self-admitted former member of the Communist Party (CP), Louisville, Kentucky, testified on December 11, and 13, 1954, in Jefferson County, Kentucky Criminal Court in a State sedition prosecution against Carl James Braden. She identified Carl Braden and his wife, Anne McCarty Braden, as having been known to her as members of the CP from January, 1951 to December, 1954.

The SCEF is self-described as having deep roots in the South where it began as the educational wing of the SCHW, organized in 1938 to work for economic and political reform. When the SCHW disbanded in the late 1940's, SCEF

SCEF (Continued)

continued as an independent organization, rallying support for integration and democracy and helping to stimulate and nurture new movements of the early 1960's. The SCEF maintained headquarters in Louisiana for twenty years, but in 1966 moved its headquarters to Louisville, Kentucky.

A source advised on March 2, 1961, that Claude Lightfoot, a Communist Party functionary, stated at a meeting of the Communist Party in Baltimore, Maryland, on February 25, 1961, that the Communist Party is not connected with any progressive movement but indirectly they do have some influence in the SCEF.

A second source, who is familiar with some phases of Communist Party activity in the New Orleans area, advised on June 3, 1966, that during the time that the SCHW was in existence, members of the Communist Party were members of and worked actively in the SCHW; however, since the formation of the SCEF, Communist Party members have not been encouraged to work in the SCEF. The source stated that the SCEF is a progressive, liberal organization, which he considers a Communist Party front organization because it has gone along with the Communist Party on certain issues, particularly on the racial issue.

A third source advised on May 25, 1965, that George Meyers, a Communist Party functionary, expressed great admiration for Carl and Anne Braden and the SCEF, with which they are affiliated, and expressed the view that the SCEF is the best organization in the South as far as doing effective work is concerned and that they have a better idea of what they are doing, where they are heading, and influence other organizations for the better.

The second source also advised on June 3, 1966, that many people who are officials and supporters of the SCEF, while liberal in their views, are by no means Communists.

1-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Louisville, Kentucky

January 18, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)
Reference	Letterhead memorandum dated January 18, 1968.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 1/18/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CINCINNATI (100-17137) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C., JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC
DATE FORW:
HOW FORW:
BY:

ReBuairtel to all SAC's, 12/5/67; Miami airtel to Bureau, 12/28/67; mytels to Bureau, 1/13 and 14/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are the original and ten copies of an LHM; two copies each for Atlanta, Cleveland, San Francisco and WFO.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

First source mentioned in LHM is [redacted], Dayton and Southeastern Bus Lines, Incorporated, Jamestown, Ohio, who furnished this information to SA GEORGE P. ULLRICH on 1/12/68.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

The second source mentioned in LHM is [redacted] PD, Yellow Springs, Ohio, who furnished this information to SA GEORGE P. ULLRICH on 1/14/68.

Sources used to characterize ANN PEERY are as follows:

REC 51

Third source is [redacted]

Fourth source is [redacted]

Fifth source is [redacted]

Informants

13 JAN 20 1968

ENCLOSURE

(3) - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Cleveland (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2) (RM)
3 - Cincinnati (1-100-17137)
~~(1-100-14704) (1-100-14859)~~

CI 100-17137

Informant

Sixth source is [redacted].

The LHM is classified confidential because sources are utilized who are of continuing value and disclosure of their identities would adversely effect the internal security of the United States. Examples are [redacted].

Informants

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535
January 17, 1968

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual who is believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning Presidential protection, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Has attempted or threatened bodily harm to any government official or employee, including foreign government officials residing in or planning an imminent visit to the U. S., because of his official status.
2. ☐ Has attempted or threatened to redress a grievance against any public official by other than legal means.
3. ☐ Because of background is potentially dangerous; or has been identified as member or participant in communist movement; or has been under active investigation as member of other group or organization inimical to U. S.
4. ☐ U. S. citizens or residents who defect from the U. S. to countries in the Soviet or Chinese Communist blocs and return.
5. ☒ Subversives, ultrarightists, racists and fascists who meet one or more of the following criteria:
    - (a) ☐ Evidence of emotional instability (including unstable residence and employment record) or irrational or suicidal behavior:
    - (b) ☐ Expressions of strong or violent anti-U. S. sentiment;
    - (c) ☐ Prior acts (including arrests or convictions) or conduct or statements indicating a propensity for violence and antipathy toward good order and government.
6. ☐ Individuals involved in illegal bombing or illegal bomb-making.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available
☐ may be available through ______________________________

____

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s) (1)
U. S. Secret Service, Cincinnati

Enclosure(s) *(Upon removal of classified enclosures, if any, this transmittal form becomes UNCLASSIFIED.)*

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Cincinnati, Ohio
January 18, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
JANUARY 8, 1968

A confidential source furnished the following information on January 12, 1968:

Ann Peery, Yellow Springs, Ohio, has organized approximately forty women to travel to Washington, D. C. for captioned demonstration now scheduled for January 15, 1968. These women who will be from Dayton, Yellow Springs and surrounding areas in Ohio will depart from the Antioch College Union, Yellow Springs, Ohio, approximately 7:15 p.m. on January 14, 1968. They anticipate arriving in Washington, D. C. approximately 7:00 a.m. on January 15, 1968, where they will unload at the Union Station. The women, dressed in black, will meet with demonstrators from other areas of the United States and proceed in silence to the capital.

Source stated this group will meet at 7:30 a.m., January 15, 1968, at the Shoreham Hotel, 2500 Calvert Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C., for the return trip to Yellow Springs.

On January 14, 1968, a second confidential source advised that approximately forty women departed Yellow Springs, Ohio, by bus at 9:00 p.m. on January 14, 1968, for demonstration in Washington, D. C. The bus was chartered from the Southeastern Bus Lines, Incorporated, Jamestown, Ohio.

Source advised that although it was snowing and road conditions hazardous, the women were determined to reach

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification.

100-448425-78
ENCLOSURE

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

Washington, D. C. for the demonstration.

The "Dayton Daily News", a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Dayton, Ohio, area, carried an article titled "Area Women Joining Peace March in Capital" on page 5A of the January 14, 1968, edition.

According to the article the women had a variety of personal reasons for taking part in Monday's peace effort.

According to the article Janice Bulley, 1376 Harvard Boulevard, in Dayton, Ohio, stated that, "It seems so hard to find anything to do that gets any kind of real response. Perhaps this will. As mothers, we have a special stake in this war. Perhaps our effort Monday will somehow be translated into a direct action to stop it."

D. S.

According to the article, Lois Schrag, Springfield, Ohio, stated that while peace demonstrations were often most effective on a local level, sometimes a mass outpouring of feeling like this is helpful.

According to the article June Gibbon, Bowling Green, Ohio, stated, "As we become more involved in this war, and more human lives are lost, I feel more and more strongly that unless I oppose the war actively, I am in a way responsible for those deaths."

According to the article, Marjory Dickinson, Yellow Springs, Ohio, stated, "I personally feel that mature women expressing themselves on the war in a serious manner is an important thing."

The "Dayton Daily News", supra, carried an article titled "Six Local Women in D. C. Protest", on page one of the January 15, 1968, edition, this article is set out in its entirety as follows:

"Six Daytonians were among thousands of women who gathered near the capital this morning to protest the Vietnam war.

"Calling themselves the 'Jeanette Rankin Brigade,' they assembled at Union station near the Capitol and planned to march to Union square just east of the Capitol itself.

"A brigade spokesman estimated some 10,000 women from across the nation turned out for the demonstration. Delegates came from as far away as the West Coast.

"Daytonians included Mrs. Mildred Harvey, one of this year's Ten Top Women in Dayton; Mrs. Bobbie Bernstein of 1428 Catalpa Dr.; Mrs. Nancy Plediscalzi of 427 Alameda Pl,; Mrs. J. Edward Hersberger of 1232 Brooklands Rd; Mrs. Julian Bull of 1376 Harvard Blvd., and Mrs. Mary Thomson, wife of Matt Thomson, director of American Friends in Dayton and surrounding states.

"Leading the march was the 87-year-old Miss Rankin, dowager queen of the peacenicks, who while in Congress voted against entry into both world wars.

"The Ohio delegation, composed predominately of Clevelanders, also counted a number of women from Yellow Springs including Mrs. Gay Houston.

"Capitol Police said they would not permit the women to demonstrate on Capitol grounds. However, it was expected that 15 of the brigade would be able to present a peace petition to House Speaker John McCormick (d-Mass.) shortly after Congress reconvened at noon today to begin its second session.

"A heavy snowfall greeted the women as they arrived by plane, train, bus and private car this morning.

"But it did not cool the ardor of the women who pledged their demonstration would be a peaceful one.

"Mrs. Hersberger said her son, Second Lt. Eric Ulrikson, did not share her feelings about Vietnam. The lieutenant, she said, doesn't feel we can do without the armed services at this time in the world's development.

"Mrs. Marie Tuck of Cleveland called her appearance a "family affair."

B. APPROX 1942

OHIO

"She said her son David, 26, testified at the Bertrum Russell meeting near Copenhagen that the Johnson administration was committing atrocities in Vietnam. That meeting resulted in a condemnation of the U. S. as the aggressor in the Southeast Asian conflict.

"Mrs. Tuck said her son had not seen combat but was a battalion mail clerk.

TUCK

"She said she has another son, T[illegible], who is station at Ft. Knox, Ky.

"He's a good soldier from 9 to 5," Mrs. Tuck said, adding that her son preaches resistance to the war after those hours.

"She said that some 150 men of her son's battalion were recently sent to Vietnam but her son was kept in the U.S. because of his activities.

ANN PEERY

On September 7, 1961, a third source advised that a list of members had been received by the Chicago Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) from the national office of FPCC for use by the Chicago Chapter in securing renewals of memberships and/or a subscribers fee. Included on the list is the name "Miss Ann Perry, Rt 1, Box 229P, Yellow Springs, Ohio, B62."

In connection with the above list, a fourth source advised that the letters, "B62" indicate a member has membership coming up for renewal in the second quarter of 1962.

A fifth source advised on May 16, 1966, that on May 15, 1966, Ann Peery stated her maiden name was Ann Perry but her married name is Ann Peery.

A sixth source advised on April 18, 1967, and

and on April 22, 1967, that the name "Ann Peery, c/o Peace and Freedom Center, 221 Xenia Avenue, Yellow Springs, Ohio" appeared on the current mailing list of "The Worker" and the Weekend edition of "The Worker".

"The Worker" is an east coast communist newspaper.

A characterization of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee is attached in the appendix hereto.

THIS IS LOANED TO YOU BY THE FBI,
AND NEITHER IT NOR ITS CONTENTS
ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE
THE AGENCY TO WHICH LOANED.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. Charles A. Santos-Buch identified himself and Robert Taber as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and Taber obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party(SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that Vincent "Ted" Lee, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that Lee believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. Lee did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se.

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator Thomas J. Dodd of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator Dodd was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC.

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World Telegram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-Castro FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-Castro street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-Castro American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by Castro's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected presidential assassin Lee H. Oswald.

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. Lee had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization.

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Cincinnati, Ohio
January 18, 1967

Title	DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C. JANUARY 8, 1968
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY
Reference	Cincinnati airtel and LHM dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Bishop ✓
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Mr. Sullivan

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/19/68

FROM : C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Thompson

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES
INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The Washington Field Office has advised that approximately 20-25 women began picketing in front of the White House at 1 p.m. today in support of Ertha Kitt's views expressed during a White House luncheon 1/18/68 in opposition to the war in Vietnam. Included among the demonstrators are representatives of Women Strike for Peace, a pacifist group which is opposed to the war in Vietnam. All pertinent information developed has been furnished to Secret Service, the Metropolitan Police Department, the Park police and the military intelligence agencies by the Washington Field Office.

ACTION:

For information. You will be advised of additional developments.

CWT:jav
(7) jav

REC- 57 100-41 94

JAN 26 196

ADDENDUM BY D. E. MOORE (1/19/68)DEM:hmm: The Washington Field Office advised at 2:15 p.m. that the above-mentioned demonstration broke up at 1:45 p.m., after a speech was made by comedian Dick Gregory. No arrests or incidents occurred.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: January 23, 1968

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via Airtel ______ Air Mail - Registered Mail
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MILWAUKEE (100-15436) (P)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C. JANUARY 8, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~)
DATE FORW: 1-26-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: R.H.H.

Re Bureau Airtel to Albany dated 12/5/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the original and eleven copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter which, as will be noted, actually transpired 1/15/68. Two copies each are also furnished to recipient offices of this communication inasmuch as Atlanta and San Francisco are currently conducting additional investigation concerning the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. WFO was principal office involved in connection with the demonstration 1/15/68.

Milwaukee indices are negative concerning Mrs. BERTHA RUBIN, Mrs. LEON (EDITH) GILMAN, Mrs. ROBERT FRANZ, PEGGY MUELVER and ROBIN MUELVER.

3-Bureau (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 12)
2-Atlanta (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 2)
2-San Francisco (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 2)
2-WFO (Air Mail - Registered Mail) (Encls 2)
3-Milwaukee (100-15436)
(1-100-12791 - LEA BETTY ZELDIN)
GJV/els
(12)

100-446475-[illegible]

REC 16

JAN 26 1968

F48

Approved: ______________ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______________ M   Per ______________

MI 100-15436

Milwaukee files do reflect additional information concerning LEA BETTY ZELDIN, Security Index subject. This information concerned data from a confidential source abroad [redacted] to the effect that ZELDIN, while in [redacted] in 1966, attended meetings and participated in rallies of the [redacted] Communist Party. This information has not been included in the enclosed LHM inasmuch as it is classified "Secret" and would therefore necessitate classification of LHM as "Secret". It is felt that ZELDIN is adequately described through public sources as set forth in LHM as an anti-Vietnam demonstrator.

Friendly Foreign intelligence Service

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
January 23, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

[illegible] 1929

Demonstration Protesting United States
Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.
January 8, 1968 Lea Betty Zeldin

The "Capital Times", local daily newspaper published at Madison, Wisconsin in its issue of January 15, 1968 carried an article which reflected that Mrs. Lee Zeldin, 5705 Forsythia Place, Madison, Wisconsin and Mrs. Robert Franz, Oregon, Wisconsin were in Washington, D.C. that day participating with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade March on Congress. This article states that Mrs. Zeldin has been in peace demonstrations in Madison, Wisconsin and was a registered peace lobbyist in the State of Wisconsin.

The article also discloses that Mrs. Franz is an observer and delegate from the Madison Womens' International League for Peace and Freedom.

The "Milwaukee Sentinel", local daily morning publication, Milwaukee, Wisconsin in its issue of January 16, 1968 disclosed that Milwaukee Alderman and Milwaukee Common Council Member, Mrs. Vel R. Phillips; Mrs. Bertha Rubin, 3948 North Murray Avenue, Shorewood, Wisconsin and Mrs. Leon Gilman, 3822 North 67th Street, Milwaukee, Wisconsin had participated in the Jeannette Rankin Brigade March on Congress in Washington, D.C. on January 15, 1968.

The "Milwaukee Journal", local daily evening publication, Milwaukee, Wisconsin in its issue January 16, 1968 also identified the aforementioned three individuals from the greater Milwaukee area as having attended the demonstration in Washington on January 15, 1968. In addition, its article on the matter identified Robin and Peggy Muelver, sisters, 2506 South 29th Street, Milwaukee as two additional Milwaukee participants.

"This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency."

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

Demonstration Protesting United States
Policy in Vietnam,
Washington, D.C.
January 8, 1968

The aforementioned Vel Phillips, according to public source information, in addition to being Alderman and Milwaukee Common Council Member, is a member of the Milwaukee Youth Council (MYC), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The MYC has been active in daily marches and demonstrations in Milwaukee, Wisconsin since August 28, 1967 in an effort to obtain open housing legislation in Milwaukee.

The "Wisconsin State Journal", local daily newspaper, Madison, Wisconsin, in its November 17, 1967 issue described Mrs. Lee Zeldin, age 38, 5705 Forsythia Place as a "Vietnam Protestor". The "Capital Times", in an article contained in its issue October 19, 1967 identified Lee Zeldin as a registered lobbyist for the Committee for Direct Action, described as an anti-Vietnam War group. Lee Zeldin is also said in this article to have been active in distributions of anti-War pamphlets.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/26/68

FROM : ~~SAC~~, PITTSBURGH (100-15846) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES
POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 8, 1968,
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Bureau airtel to Albany dated 12/5/67, and Miami airtel to Bureau dated 12/28/67, with an enclosed LHM indicating that captioned demonstration might occur on 1/15/68, instead of 1/8/68.

Pittsburgh reliable sources who were alerted to the possibility of captioned demonstration have advised that this demonstration was not discussed at meetings of the Communist Party of Western Pennsylvania (CPWP) or meetings of the Pittsburgh Anti-Vietnam Peace Organization. Informants furnished no information indicating that individuals from the Pittsburgh, Pa., area participated in captioned demonstration.

The identities and dates of contact of Pittsburgh informants are maintained in captioned file.

1D 2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM)
1 - Pittsburgh
DFW:lgh
(5)

EX-109

100-442475-108

REC 6

JAN 30 1968

INT. SEC.

54FEB2 1968

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/26/68

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL   AIRMAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SEATTLE (100-29048) (C)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM;
WASHINGTON, D.C.
JANUARY 15, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
OO: WFO

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM

REC-1

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC
RAO (ISD, CRD-OD)
DATE FORW: 2-1-68
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: RW

Re Bureau airtel to all offices, 12/5/67.

Enclosed for the Bureau are twelve (12) copies and two (2) copies each for Boston, Cleveland, Los Angeles, San Francisco, New York, WFO, and Philadelphia of an LHM concerning captioned matter. The copies are furnished the auxiliary offices because persons mentioned in the LHM are from territories of these offices. Copies were sent locally to MIG, NISO, OSI, Secret Service, and USA, Seattle.

Sources used in the LHM are as follows:

First source is [redacted]
Second source is [redacted]
C. C. - Bishop Third source is [redacted]
Fourth source is [redacted]
Fifth source is [redacted]

Informants

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Encl. 12) (REG)
(1 - 100-408204)
2 - Boston (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - Cleveland (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - Los Angeles (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - San Francisco (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - New York (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - WFO (Encl. 2) (REG)
2 - Philadelphia (Encl. 2) (REG)
1 - Seattle
RBC:emh
(18)

REC-1 100-447175

4 JAN 31 1968

XEROX
FEB 6 1968

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______

SE 100-29048

The LHM is classified confidential because information from the above sources, if disclosed, might compromise regular security informants of continuing value.

A copy of the LHM is designated for BUfile 100-408204 on the source who covered this demonstration at Washington, D.C. for the Seattle Office.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Seattle, Washington
January 26, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM; WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968 INFORMATION CONCERNING

On January 24, 1968, a confidential source reported five members of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade delegation from Washington State went to Washington, D.C., on United Airlines Flight 42, leaving Seattle shortly after 9 a.m., January 13, 1968. The group consisted of the following:

LONNIE HEALY C. P. MEMBER
TAIMI HALONEN C. P. MEMBER
THORUN ROBEL C. P. MEMBER
HELEN FRENCH
ELAINE HORSLEY

A second source advised in January, 1968, LONNIE HEALY, TAIMI HALONEN and THORUN ROBEL are members of the Communist Party (CP) at Seattle.

The first source went on to state the Seattle delegation was met at Baltimore Friendship Airport by THOMAS BLACKBURN who resides at 9406 Sayebrook, Silver Springs, Maryland. BLACKBURN carried a sign reading "6 Seattle Ladies - J.R. Brigade," which apparently had been made up with the anticipation of there being one more woman in the group. BLACKBURN questioned each person as to her organizational affiliations, with emphasis on church and peace groups. HEALY, HALONEN, and ROBEL all indicated they are with Women Strike for Peace. FRENCH said she did not represent any particular group, and HORSLEY said she was active in her church and interested generally in peace. BLACKBURN said he and his wife are with the American Friends and the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom. BLACKBURN took the Seattle group to his home. On Sunday morning BLACKBURN invited the women to attend church but only FRENCH accepted. The others said they were going sightseeing in Washington, D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
Group I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

XEROX
FEB 6 1968

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 12 1974

ENCLOSURE.

110

With regard to Women Strike for Peace (WSP), the "People's World", west coast communist newspaper, in its issue of October 20, 1962, quoted Dr. FRANCES HERRING, national leader of WSP, as stating the organization "was composed of autonomous local groups 'open to women of any race, religious creed or political ideology.'" U.S.A

On May 3, 1965, a third source made available a leaflet distributed by Seattle Women Act for Peace (SWAP) (see appendix), local affiliate of WSP which stated in part, that Mrs. DONNA ALLEN, a national leader of WSP; Mrs. DAGMAR WILSON, founder and leader of WSP; and RUSS NIXON, General Manager of the "National Guardian" (see appendix) were "found guilty of contempt in the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia for refusing to testify at a closed meeting of HUAC (they had expressed a willingness to testify at an open hearing where their views would not be subject to possible distortion by HUAC, as has happened at other closed HUAC hearings)."

The American Friends Service Committee (AFSC) is the social outreach arm of the religious group known as the Society of Friends (Quakers).

The Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, according to a fourth source in July, 1961, held its annual meeting at St. Paul, Minnesota, from June 26 - 30, 1961. Resolutions passed at the conference included the following proposals: support the repeal of the recent Supreme Court decision which sustained the constitutionality of the registration provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and the membership provisions of the Smith Act; favor social and cultural exchange, non-intervention in Cuba, abolition of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and ban further nuclear testing.

The first source went on to state the Seattle delegation went to Room 132-A, Shoreham Hotel, Washington, D.C., early Sunday evening, January 14, 1968, where a Steering Committee for the demonstration the following day was meeting. Among those present were MARY CLARKE, Los Angeles, California; JUDITH MORSE EATON of Connecticut; and ELEANOR FRENCH of New York who did not give any sign of being related to HELEN FRENCH of the Seattle group. LONNIE HEALY inquired several times about other Seattle people who might have arrived separately. She also questioned the absence of Negroes on the committee and sought to have a resolution adopted on American Indians. In connection with the Indian matter she distributed a leaflet, a reproduction of which is set out at the end of this memorandum.

C. P. MEMBER C. P. MEMBER C. P. MEMBER

Later MARJORIE RADER, EMELIA CASSIDY, LINDA CORR (Negro) and ZEFRA (STUDAMIRE) (Negro) arrived at the Shoreham Hotel. The source did not know ZEFRA's last name, but it DOB 1952 is given later in this memorandum by another source. These four indicated they were being housed at DONNA ALLEN's home in Washington, D.C. RADER joined HEALY in questioning the lack of representation on the Steering Committee of representatives from minority groups. [illegible]

MARJORIE RADER and EMELIA CASSIDY were reported by a fifth source in January, 1968, as being CP members at Tacoma, Washington, and ZEFRA STUDAMIRE was described as a 16-year old Negro girl who has been active in the Young Political Explorers League (YPEL) (see appendix) at Tacoma.

LINDA CORR was reported by the second source as being a CP member at Seattle as of January, 1968.

[illegible]

Following the Steering Committee meeting the group went to dinner. The Seattle delegates met a Mrs. DUNLAP from Pasadena, California, and a MARI BEARDSLEY from Encino, California. DUNLAP said she had been working on a signature campaign for the Peace and Freedom Party of California which was not further described. BEARDSLEY said she works in an office which coordinates the activities of peace organizations. BETTY MEREDITH of Marin County, California, and formerly of Seattle, stopped at the Seattle table and reminisced with HALONEN and ROBEL "about the old days in Seattle." ERICA NIEDER, formerly of Tacoma, Washington, and now of Cleveland, Ohio, inquired of RADER about some people in South Tacoma. From the reaction, it was assumed by the source NIEDER is not closely associated with anyone in whom RADER has an interest.

Following dinner, the Washington State delegation went to Shoreham Suite A-409 occupied by VIVIAN HALLINAN of California. Several California women were there to hear instructions for Monday. Rumors were rampant. One person said police would plant two hundred "agent provocateurs" in the line of march to create scenes which would result in arrests. It was also stated police had prepared for five hundred arrests; that all telephones into the demonstration headquarters were being monitored; and that permission to march was still being withheld. After the California group had been briefed, the following instructions were read to the Washington delegates by MALVINA REYNOLDS of California:

(1) Maintain silence throughout the march.

(2) Maintain strict discipline; walk to the right on the sidewalk.

(3) Follow the instructions of monitors in blue armbands who will be under orders from white arm-banded marshals.

(4) Surround and isolate any trouble makers.

(5) Carry at least $10.00 on your person, preferably $25.00.

(6) Remove all items from your purse that might be considered a weapon; i.e. nail files, hat pins, etc. Remove all addresses except home and emergency addresses from purse.

(7) Don't wear dangling earrings for if one should fall they might cause injury if someone reached out to assist you and caught hold of the earring.

The telephone number of the Brigade headquarters was given for use in case of arrest.

TAIMI HALONEN and THORUN ROBEL were mildly self-critical about not working for the programs the younger women were promoting. TAIMI said she was tired after working long hours on the Seattle conference to be held Saturday, January 20th at Mt. Zion Baptist Church in Seattle at which the Seattle delegation would report. HALONEN made the observation, however, that the women working on the program were all very experienced leaders and she trusted they would formulate a satisfactory program.

On Monday, January 15, 1968, the delegates including the group from Washington State, met at the Union Station in Washington, D.C. It was learned here that the instructions which had been given the day before at the Shoreham Hotel were evidently for the California group only, because many California people had been badly beaten in previous demonstrations and they were very cautious and somewhat apprehensive. The official pattern was different. Mimeographed sheets headed "Jeannette Rankin Brigade - Information and Instructions" were passed out and these appeared to be the official instructions. A reproduction is attached.

The Washington State delegation was enlarged when a Mrs. BACKUP from Tacoma arrived. RADER said some of the money usually received from wealthy contributors had been collected by Mrs. BACKUP. Reverend HAROLD BASS of Tacoma collected $120.00, and wanted someone else to go instead of ZEFRA (STUDAMIRE). RADER defended herself when TAIMI HALONEN criticized her for bringing ZEFRA along since ZEFRA is at least six months pregnant.

After the demonstration, HEALY and RADER spent much of the time urging the speakers to include in their talks something about the status of the American Indian. ELLA BAKER from New York did include a paragraph from the paper the Washington State delegation submitted to Congress. This was entitled, "American Indians and the Struggle for Peace". It had been prepared by LONNIE HEALY although at its bottom it carried the notation "(Prepared by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade Delegation from Washington State)."

RADER, HEALY, and CORR became indignant because the audience did not give a standing ovation to Mrs. MARTIN L. KING, Jr. or any of the Negro speakers.

HEALY expressed great dissatisfaction with the basic organization of the gathering. She wanted an organizational meeting instead of a rally type meeting which occurred. HALONEN and ROBEL agreed somewhat. HEALY implied the whole thing was a waste of her time.

In the workshop section of the meeting, HALONEN worked in the legislative action section; HELEN FRENCH and ELAINE HORSLEY in the electoral campaigns; and HEALY and CORR in racism. Here, too, the younger women were very critical. HEALY, particularly, resented having men as "resource people" for the group. She said she thought this was a women's congress. TAIMI said she found herself in a situation that was quite different in that she was working with a very broad spectrum of politically and economically oriented individuals and it was a real learning experience.. ELAINE HORSLEY was anxious to get back home and work for peace while the spirit of JEANNETTE RANKIN was still fresh. She and HELEN FRENCH expressed the view the congress met the needs of American women in giving a concrete program on which to work.

Tuesday, January 16, 1968, was for lobbying. The Seattle and Tacoma people were told to meet at the Methodist Building, 100 Maryland Avenue. HALONEN, ROBEL, HEALY, HORSLEY, and HELEN FRENCH arrived before the appointed time. After about an hour, EMELIA CASSIDY arrived stating RADER had an eye problem and would be unable to attend. Mrs. BACKUP joined the group. LINDA CORR and ZEFRA were too tired to get up so early. The group called on Washington State's Senators JACKSON and MAGNUSON, but they were not in their offices. After leaving a copy of the women's petition and a questionnaire prepared by the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (see attachment) they called on Washington State's Congressmen FLOYD HICKS and BROCK ADAMS. Mr. HICKS was out of town. Mrs. HORSLEY knew the Congressman personally and her son knew two of the office personnel. She asked that they relate to him that she was vitally interested in peace and social justice.

Congressman BROCK ADAMS was in his office and spent about twenty minutes talking with the group concerning his political views and some of the political machinations of his party. The group then began to disintegrate. ELAINE HORSLEY left to get a 2:30 flight to Boston where she would visit her son who is attending Harvard University.

After some sightseeing in the afternoon, HALONEN, ROBEL, and Mrs. BACKUP checked into the Plaza Hotel since they were going to stay a day or two longer for some workshops. RADER stayed also. The rest of the group, HEALY, CORR, ZEFRA (STUDAMIRE), CASSIDY, and FRENCH went to Friendship Airport and boarded UAL Flight 41 for Seattle.

While in Washington, HEALY kept trying to call a CARL BLOICE who the source thought used to be either in Seattle or San Francisco, but she never reached him.

The workshops held on January 15th after the march were:

(1) Legislative Action

(2) Electoral Campaign

(3) Press

(4) New Women in New World

(5) War at Home

(6) Resistance
    (a) Action
    (b) Draft
    (c) Direct Action

(7) Church

(8) Schools

Reproductions of other documents received by the first source at Washington, D.C. are set out at the end of this memorandum.

On January 23, 1968, the fifth source advised a meeting of the Trade Union CP Club was held at Tacoma, Washington, on January 18, 1968, at which EMELIA CASSIDY, also known as MILLIE CASSIDY, a member of that club, reported on her trip to Washington, D.C. She stated she stayed at DONNA ALLEN's home there. She said MARJORIE RADER got an eye infection which kept her from going to the march. RADER remained at ALLEN's residence. She added ZEFRA STUDAMIRE shouldn't have gone because she was uncooperative and would not attend anything. She was rude, said her bed was too low and complained about the food. Some or all of these troubles might be attributed to the fact STUDAMIRE is expecting a baby in April. CASSIDY stated there were too many rules to follow.

The delegates weren't premitted to carry a nail file, wear peace buttons, or exhibit RANKIN buttons. They had to walk six abreast and were not allowed to march around the White House. She said a suit will be brought in court for this denial of their rights. She went on to state each person had or was given $10.00 to carry on his person so he could not be arrested for vagrancy.

CASSIDY said a nurse, Mrs. HELEN M. COOK, had been very helpful to the group. COOK told CASSIDY she could be reached at 719 Beechwood Road, Media, Pennsylvania, if more information is desired concerning Veterans for Peace, which was not further described.

GUY RADER, a CP member at this meeting, tried to stop CASSIDY when the latter complained ZEFRA STUDAMIRE was too immature to have been sent to the conference, but CASSIDY wasn't easy to stop. She was incensed over the fact money had been used for STUDAMIRE's trip and the latter refused to cooperate. RADER and STUDAMIRE remained in Washington, D.C. after the conference to handle some business with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) according to CASSIDY.

> SNCC is an organization which has concerned itself with racial matters in the United States.

C. P. MEMBER C. P. MEMBER

On January 24, 1968, the second source reported a Jeannette Rankin Women's Conference was held at the Mt. Zion Baptist Church, Seattle, Washington, on January 20, 1968, which was attended by about 150 women, including the following members of the CP: LINDA CORR, HALLIE DONALDSON, RUTH EMERSON, VIVIAN GEORGE, VIVIAN GABOURY, TAIMI HALONEN, ALICE HAWKINS, HILDUR JOSEPHINE HUGHES, LONNIE HEALY, IRENE HULL, THORUN ROBEL, MARGE RABBITT, BABA JEAN MANGAOANG, and IRENE URQUHART. Of the five persons taking tickets at the door, three were CP members, HEALY, HULL, and ROBEL. DONALDSON, another CP member, had a book display with selections from the Co-op Bookstore, 710 Stewart Street, Seattle.

The Washington Cultural Cooperative, which operates the Co-op Bookstore, is characterized in the appendix.

The source went on to say CP member CORR, a Negro, had a display of Negro dolls which she was selling to raise funds to send to the South "to help fight the battle there."

Opening remarks at the meeting were along socialistic lines, according to the source. The principal speaker said capitalism is a rich-man's democracy, while socialism has democracy for the working man.

The group then separated into workshops on such topics as welfare, schools, law, young people, working women, and draft resistance. When these smaller groups reassembled, after lunch, some of the delegates to the Jeannette Rankin Brigade affair at Washington, D.C. gave short talks. The speakers included HALONEN, HEALY, CORR, ROBEL, and CASSIDY (from Tacoma), all of whom have been characterized before as CP members. Most of the five spoke as mothers who did not want their sons to go away to fight a rich man's war. They stated wars had not proved anything in the past and had been run by men. Now the women should come to the front and tell the men they are not raising their sons for cannon fodder. The group attending the welfare workshop presented a resolution in support of a black women's lobby to Olympia (the capital of Washington State). A heated debate arose between some of the white women present and three Negroes. The latter contended the white women did not know what the black women had been through. One white woman then stated this was wrong and that the Negro women were trying to isolate themselves from other women who had fought equally as hard as the Negroes. CP members HULL, HEALY, and MANGAWANG cautioned all present to be united, remembering these differences had been built up over hundreds of years and that one meeting would not solve all the difficulties but could be a start in solving them. They indicated it was a healthy sign when they could argue openly and not behind each others backs.

Reproductions of two leaflets distributed at the meeting are set out following the Brigade literature.

AMERI[illegible]NDIANS AND THE STRUGGLE FO[illegible]E

Today, in Battle Creek, Michigan, the city's seal, adopted in 1891, is racist and violent because it pictures a white man hitting an unarmed Indian with a rifle butt. Some Indian youth view the television program "Custer" as indicative of racist America. The National Congress of American Indians opposes this distortion of history. Beatings and murder of Indians in Maine go unchallenged. Congress voted in 195 to open up Indian land reservations to state jurisdiction. In actuality, this rides established tribal courts and federal jurisdiction. It gives local bigoted authorities more opportunity to harrass and open the way to termination of our treaties and in several places resulted in actual loss of land.

It is as deadly to be an Indian in America as it is to be a soldier in Viet Nam. In the three years before 1967, more Indian children below the age of 18 had died in this country than the 6,628 U. S. combat casualties of the entire Viet Nam War (as of the end of 1966). Most of these were children below the age of six.

The price we pay is the built-in racism our children are taught in school, over television, in cartoons; the Indian has become a joke to white Americans. We pay because we don't know our own history.

The thread of struggle for self-determination runs through the history of Indian-Americans. When a few Indian youth speak of Red Power, the roots go deep into their history in finding nourishment for this demand. Just as some Negro leaders today speak of W.E.B. DuBois as having raised the same issue of identity long before the level of struggle, which is Black Power, arrived. This struggle has gone on for 400 years.

The Indian people have been sending spokesmen to bring their grievances and their positions before the power structure of this country for two hundred years. They have fought in the courts since at least 1830 when the case of the Cherokee Nation vs. Georgia tested the ability and the willingness of the United States to protect an Indian Tribe in its efforts at self-determination.

The Vietnamese war is a continuation of the whole racist war we have waged against the Indian People. Understanding this is a part of understanding the Viet Nam war. We respond to what is happening to Vietnamese children, yet the Indian people have suffered from the same policy of extermination and destruction of their identity.

We must unite with the strivings of those who have had to deal with United States' genocide for 200 years!

We can help to push the United States to ratify the United Nations Resolution, "Treaty Against Genocide", that the United States should correct the history and policy of genicide against the Indian people. Today this refers to the destruction of their identity as a people and links with the struggles of people for their identity all over the world. To stop the policy of genocide, of racism, to develop compensatory steps to undo the effects of the crimes against the Indian people, to remove the oppression of the Indian people!

All the forces in this country cannot win democratic power without making this correction of what was done to the American Indian people.

(Prepared by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade Delegation from Washington State)

Welcome to Washington! Each one of us represents the spirit and message of this call to Americ[illegible] Women. Together, in wide an[illegible]nderful coalition, we are the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE!

We are walking and assembling off Capitol Grounds because we have been denied our First Amendment right to petition Congress on Capitol Grounds. We are challenging this denial in the Federal Courts, not only for ourselves, but for all Americans! Our aim and tactic today is to carry through a silent procession and a peaceful, disciplined protest.

1. Emergency needs, problems or questions of any nature should be reported to Monitors. MONITORS ARE WEARING BLUE ARMBANDS. MONITOR CAPTAINS ARE WEARING WHITE ARMBANDS.
2. Due to Police Department edict, THERE WILL BE NO SIGNS OR BANNERS CARRIED, OTHER THAN THE ONE LEAD-OFF JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. We will, of course, all adhere to this.
3. Press Aides will be beside the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER.
4. Please, NO LITTER! Do not discard this or any other papers on the streets.
5. The address of the Shoreham Hotel (where the Congress is to be held) is 2500 Calvert Street, N. W. We will convene in the Regency and Ambassador Ballrooms.
6. Our route is from Union Station down Louisiana Avenue to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square). WE MUST ALL REMAIN ON THE WEST SIDEWALK, FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF OUR JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. Capitol Police will direct traffic.
7. The JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE OFFICE phone number is 362-9219. The phone number for Housing is 234-0700. Ask for the Regency Ballroom Hospitality Table.
8. As we have agreed, (prior to arriving in Washington) this is to be a quiet, peaceful vigil. We will have no conversation with one another, or with onlookers as we proceed in orderly fashion from Union Station to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square).
9. While we are quietly assembled at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), Viveca Lindfors will read to us the petition being presented by our delegation to Congress.
10. The buses taking us from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel, will be located on Madison Drive and on Washington Drive, from Third Street to Seventh Street. Monitors will guide us to our buses.
11. All of those who have not paid their bus fare from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel are asked to pay 50¢ at the Women's Congress at the Shoreham.
12. PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ANY MATERIALS during the March, or at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square). Free literature may be placed on tables at the Shoreham Hotel. NO literature may be sold or hand-distributed. The only item to be sold is the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BUTTON.

BANNERS CARRIED, OTHER THAN THE ONE LEAD-OFF JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. We will, of course, all adhere to this.

3. Press Aides will be beside the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER.

4. Please, NO LITTER! Do not discard this or any other papers on the streets.

5. The address of the Shoreham Hotel (where the Congress is to be held) is 2500 Calvert Street, N. W. We will convene in the Regency and Ambassador Ballrooms.

6. Our route is from Union Station down Louisiana Avenue to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square). WE MUST ALL REMAIN ON THE WEST SIDEWALK, FOLLOWING THE LEAD OF OUR JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BANNER. Capitol Police will direct traffic.

7. The JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE OFFICE phone number is 362-9219. The phone number for Housing is 234-0700. Ask for the Regency Ballroom Hospitality Table.

8. As we have agreed, (prior to arriving in Washington) this is to be a quiet, peaceful vigil. We will have no conversation with one another, or with onlookers as we proceed in orderly fashion from Union Station to Union Square, (i.e. Grant Square).

9. While we are quietly assembled at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), Viveca Lindfors will read to us the petition being presented by our delegation to Congress.

10. The buses taking us from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel, will be located on Madison Drive and on Washington Drive, from Third Street to Seventh Street. Monitors will guide us to our buses.

11. All of those who have not paid their bus fare from Union Square (i.e. Grant Square), to the Shoreham Hotel are asked to pay 50¢ at the Women's Congress at the Shoreham.

12. PLEASE DO NOT DISTRIBUTE ANY MATERIALS during the March; or at Union Square (i.e. Grant Square). Free literature may be placed on tables at the Shoreham Hotel. NO literature may be sold or hand-distributed. The only item to be sold is the JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE BUTTON.

13. All of thise instructions, as well as all of the decisions regarding the day's activities, have been made by a National Steering Committee representing the entire coalition.

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

QUESTIONS FOR CONGRESSMEN

Prepared by The Legislative Office
Women's International League for
Peace and Freedom, Washington, D.C.
January 10, 1968

1. Q: Will you do everything in your power to help work for an early end of the war?
   (a) Will you support the plea of U Thant and the Pope for an end (or halt) to the bombing in North Vietnam and arrangements for a cease-fire?
   (b) Will you support negotiations with the National Liberation Front which is doing the major fighting in South Vietnam?
   (c) Will you support a Geneva-type Conference, or UN efforts to end the war?

   A: ____

   ____

   ____

2. Q: Will you support increased appropriations for anti-poverty measures and full funding for rent supplements, Model Cities programs and OEO programs?

   A: ____

   ____

   ____

3. Q: Will you vote for the Federal open housing law (Title V of the Civil Rights bill) and for the Civil Rights Protection bill which will strengthen criminal laws against the intimidation or injuring of civil rights workers?

   A: ____

   ____

   ____

4. Q: Will you actively oppose either a planned or executed land invasion of North Vietnam, Laos, or Cambodia, by American or any other troops?

   A: ____

   ____

   ____

5. Q: Will you work for revision of the punitive and reactionary welfare measures which were included in the Social Security Act passed in the first session of the 90th Congress?

A: ______

6. Q: Will you support the establishment of a National Commission on Guaranteed Incomes and legislation funding such a program of income maintenance?

A: ______

7. Q: Will you demonstrate your opposition to the war by refusing to vote funds for its continuation? There were 18 Representatives and 3 Senators who refused to vote for the $12 billion dollar supplemental appropriation (for Fiscal Year 1968) in January, 1967. Will you be among them in January or February when the 1969 supplemental comes up?

A: ______

8. Q: Will you read into the Congressional Record a request that Dean Rusk appear before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in open hearings? (Secretary Rusk has not appeared in public testimony on the subject of Vietnam since January 28, 1966.)

A: ______

9. Q: Will you support a "sense of Congress" Resolution calling for opposition to continued American involvement in Vietnam? Will you co-sponsor such a resolution?

A: ______

RIDERS' INSTRUCTIONS

:20 am: Train departs from Pennsylvania Station, New York. Coffee and snacks will available on the train; please eat your lunches *before* the train arrives in Washington. Sandwiches available for purchase on return train from Washingt

There will be a Marshall, identifiable by her blue arm-band, on each car of the special train, to answer questions, etc. She will collect $1.00 from each woman for bus fare in Washington, which includes the ride from the Capitol to the Shoreham Hotel, and from the hotel to Union Station in time to catch the train back to Newark and New York.

11:30 am: Assemble at Union Station Depot and proceed IN SILENCE to Capitol behind state-name signs which will be available at the station in Washington.

AT THE CAPITOL, we have requested that a delegation of 50 present our petition to Hous Speaker McCormack and Senate Majority Leader Mansfield. We are still negotiating for that plan. We will be orderly, peaceable, law-abiding in our demonstration.

AFTER THIS DEMONSTRATION, proceed to chartered buses at Supreme Court Parking Area. will take us to Hotel Shoreham, 2500 Calvert Street, N.W. (about a half-ho ride).

3:00 - 6:00 pm: WOMEN'S CONGRESS at the Hotel Shoreham. The program includes speake from all parts of the Coalition of Individuals, who will analyze women's r in ending the war and ending our domestic neglect. The Congress will be a launching ground for community action proposals.

5:15 pm: *Philadelphia woman only leave the Shoreham by bus for their train, which leaves from Union Station at 6:00 pm.*

6:00 pm: For people returning to Union Station only, buses leave Hotel Shoreham. for New York and Newark leaves Union Station at 7:10 pm.

8:30 pm: Workshops at Hotel Shoreham for those staying over.

Tuesday, January 16: Plans will be detailed Monday night for Tuesday's activities around lobbying Congress.

The Jeannette Rankin Brigade
January 15, 1968

THE JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Washington, D.C. January 15, 1968

Congress of American Women

Chairmen:	Pearl Willen, New York Coretta King, Georgia Mary Clarke, California

CALL TO ORDER ....
Pearl Willen, New York

DEVELOPMENT OF THE COALITION...
Vivian Hallinan, California
Coretta King, Georgia

MESSAGE....
Jeannette Rankin, Montana

READINGS....
Ruby Dee, New York

REPORT FROM THE DELEGATION TO THE CAPITOL
Katherine Camp, Pennsylvania

REPORT ON OUR SUIT IN FEDERAL COURT IN WASHINGTON....
Harriet Van Tassel, New York

MESSAGES...
Mary Clarke, California

POLITICAL ACTION IN 1968....
Val Phillips, Wisconsin

"WE ARE OUTRAGED....

"BY THE RUTHLESS SLAUGHTER IN VIETNAM"
Charlotte Bunch ~~Weeks~~, Washington, D.C.

"BY THE PERSISTENT NEGLECT OF HUMAN NEEDS AT HOME."
Ella Baker, New York

JEANNETTE
RANKIN
[illegible]

"WE DECLARE OUR INTENTIONS.....
Chairman: Cynthia Wedel, New York

Vivian Rothstein, Illinois
Judith Morse Eaton, Connecticut
Doris Turner, New York
Dagmar Wilson, Washington, D.C.
Fannie Lou Hamer, Mississippi

CLOSING...

"Let us declare our intention to return to our communities and mobilize women on all levels of activity, dedicated to reshaping American society and restoring our country to a position of honor in the community of nations."

NOTE: It is requested that each participant contribute one dollar, or more, to defray the expenses of the Women's Congress.

and unconstitutional infringement of their First Amendment rights to assembly, free speech and the right to petition their government for a redress of grievances.

Upon informing the Capitol Police of their planned march to the Capitol building to present their petition, the women were threatened with arrest under 40 U.S.C. 193 (a) et. seq. which, after defining the area considered Capitol Grounds, states:

> "It is forbidden to parade, stand, or move in processions or assemblages in said United States Capitol Grounds, or to display therein any flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement......"

The statute further provides that exceptions from these prescriptive provisions will be made in the discretion of certain Congressional leaders and/or Capitol Police. The exceptions are allowed on "ocassions of national interest becoming the congnizance and entertainment of Congress."

The petition of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade apparently does not become "the entertainment of Congress" and arrests were threatened. Therefore the suit which was files prays for the convening of a three-judge Federal District Court which is requested to enjoin the operation and enforcement of the statute and to declare it unconstitutional. We have asked the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to grant us this relief on an emergency basis prior to January 15th. Our request was denied. The same request was made to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and was likewise denied. As it was then impossible to obtain relief prior to January 15th the Brigade's attorneys are continuing the appeal on a non-emergency basis in the Court of Appeals and have every confidence of ultimate victory.

This is far from the last time that these women or any other Americans intend to appear in their nation's Capitol to petition their government. Hopefully this will be the last time that they find it so difficult to do so.

Jeannette Rankin Brigade
Jeannette Rankin, Montana
Donna Allen, Washington,DC
Mia Aurbakken-Adjali, NY
Ellen Aurbakken, NJ
Ella J. Baker, NY
Helen Baker, NY
Anna M. Bennett, NY
Ada Black, NY
Elinor G. Black, NY
Mercedes M. Randell, NY
Kay Boyle, Calif
Mrs. Harry Bridges, Calif
Katherine L Camp, Pa KATHERINE CAMP
Mary Clarke, Calif, D.C
Mary Moss Cuthbertson, Pa
Ruby Dee, NY
Eleanor French, NY
Ruth A. Friess, NY
Sister Marguerite Hafner, Ill.
Vivian Halinan, Calif
Elizabeth Curry Hyslop, NY
Hon. Mrs. J. Preston Irwin, Ohio

Mrs. I. Lee Levy, NY
Olive Mayer, Calif
Jessica Mitford, Calif
Mrs. Kenneth Montgomery, Ill
Nelle Morton, NJ
Dorothy Nyland, Ohio
Mildred Scott Olmsted, Pa
Grace Paley, NY
Louise Peck, Ohio
Nan Pendergrast, Ga
Malvina Reynolds, Calif
Muriel Rukeyser, NY
Juanita J. Saddler, NY
Dr. Winifred Shannon, N.M.
Edna Sinclair, Mass.
Helen Huntington Smith, NY
Mrs. Jane C. Spock, NY
Margaret Stein, Calif.
Lydia Stokes, NJ
Amy Swerdlow, NY
Ethel Taylor, Pa
Mariam Thompson, NY
Helen B Turnbull, NY
Louise Wallace, Kan.

The statute further provides [illegible] will be made in the discretion of certain Congressional leaders and/or Capitol Police. The exceptions are allowed on "ocassions of national interest becoming the congnizance and entertainment of Congress."

The petition of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade apparently does not become "the entertainment of Congress" and arrests were threatened. Therefore the suit which was files prays for the convening of a three-judge Federal District Court which is requested to enjoin the operation and enforcement of the statute and to declare it unconstitutional. We have asked the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia to grant us this relief on an emergency basis prior to January 15th. Our request was denied. The same request was made to the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and was likewise denied. As it was then impossible to obtain relief prior to January 15th the Brigade's attorneys are continuing the appeal on a non-emergency basis in the Court of Appeals and have every confidence of ultimate victory.

This is far from the last time that these women or any other Americans intend to appear in their nation's Capitol to petition their government. Hopefully this will be the last time that they find it so difficult to do so.

Jeannette Rankin Brigade
Jeannette Rankin, Montana
Donna Allen, Washington,DC
Mia Aurbakken-Adjali, NY
Ellen Aurbakken, NJ
Ella J. Baker, NY ELLA BAKER
Helen Baker, NY
Anna M. Bennett, NY
Ada Black, NY
Elinor G. Black, NY
Mercedes M. Randell, NY
Kaye Boyle, Calif
Mrs. Harry Bridges, Calif
Katherine L Camp, Pa KATHERINE CAMP
Mary Clarke, Calif D.C
Mary Moss Cuthbertson, Pa
Ruby Dee, NY
Eleanor French, NY
Ruth A. Friess, NY
Sister Margeurite Hafner, Ill.
Vivian Halinan, Calif
Elizabeth Curry Hyslop, NY
Hon. Mrs. J. Preston Irwin, Ohio
Ethel Jensen, Pa
Helen Kearns, NY
Grace Killens, NY
Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ga
Ruth R. Krause, NJ
Margaret Kuhn, Pa
Denise Levertov, NY

Mrs. I. Lee Levy, NY
Olive Mayer, Calif
Jessica Mitford, Calif
Mrs. Kenneth Montgomery, Ill
Nelle Morton, NJ
Dorothy Nyland, Ohio
Mildred Scott Olmsted, Pa
Grace Paley, NY
Louise Peck, Ohio
Nan Pendergrast, Ga
Malvina Reynolds, Calif
Muriel Rukeyser, NY
Juanita J. Saddler, NY
Dr. Winifred Shannon, N.M.
Edna Sinclair, Mass.
Helen Huntington Smith, NY
Mrs. Jane C. Spock, NY
Margaret Stein, Calif.
Lydia Stokes, NJ
Amy Swerdlow, NY
Ethel Taylor, Pa
Mariam Thompson, NY
Helen B Turnbull, NY
Louise Wallace, Kan.
Cynthia C Wedel, NY
Cora Weiss, NY
Pearl Willen, NY
Dagmar Wilson, Washington, DC
Winnifred Wygal, NY

WELFARE FACTS

story of Modern Welfa rams

ern welfare programs in the United States began with passage of the Social Security Act---in 1935, authorizing federal grants to states for public assistance and child welfare programs. In 1937, the Washington Legislature repealed the Paupers Law of 1854 and enacted a State Social Security Law. "Welfare" has been a bone of contention ever since.

Greenleigh Report

In 1963, the Washington Legislature appropriated $20,000 for a study of the state's public assistance programs. The study was made by Greenleigh Associates, and the Greenleigh Report was presented in December, 1964.

> This report stated that public assistance grants in Washington, with standards based on 1959 prices and 12% ratable reductions, were 40% below the minimum standards for health and decency. Speaking of child welfare needs, the report said: "There is an excessive and increasing rate of referral of children to the Juvenile Courts, both for dependency and delinquency. There is an excessive and increasing trend for children to be removed from their natural families and cared for elsewhere."

WHAT ABOUT RATABLE REDUCTIONS?

The 1965 Legislature removed the ratable reductions. The 1967 Legislature ordered the Dept. of Public Assistance to bring it's pricing standard's up to 1967 levels.

New standards were put into effect July first. Increased allowances for rent vary from county to county. Other allowances were increased an average of 10-3/4%. In King County the total increase was 16%. Thus, King County grants have been increased by 28% since 1964, but the cost of living has increased by at least 5%. Grants are still 17% less than acceptable levels.

> The maximum grant for a Seattle family consisting of two adults, a boy 13, and a girl 8, is $285.80 a month--$3,429 a year. But recent changes in the Federal Social Security Law cast a shadow on even this figure. The local welfare officials will not offer any guess as to what may happen next. NEW RATABLE REDUCTIONS ARE ALWAYS A POSSIBILITY.

There is much talk of getting people off welfare by putting them to work. Yet who will take care of the children? Child care costs from $60 to $80 per child per month in Seattle.

Some examples of women's wages:

Nurses Aid -	$1.40	per hour	-- $2912.00 per year
House Cleaners -	$1.65	per Hr	Dept. Store Clerk - $1.76¼ per hr
hotel maids	1.69	" "	
Laundry Workers	1.93	" "	
garment "	1.60	" "	Minimum
Journey women clerk -	2.01½	per hr	-- $4186.00 per year

PREPARED FOR: Washington State Grassroots Assembly of Women
January 20, 1968

Volunteer Labor

ear indeed. The Boeing Company garnishments brought against its workers every month by creditors who force the Company and the Courts to become little better than collection agencies. The following information is supplied by the Seattle Legal Services Center.)

HOW TO PROTECT YOURSELF FROM WAGE GARNISHMENTS

1. GET A LAWYER IMMEDIATELY if your wages are garnished. The Seattle Legal Services Center provides lawyers for people with low incomes who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer. A similar service for low income workers is provided by the Tacoma Legal Assistance Office, 1501 South "M" Street, Tacoma.

2. DO NOT GO TO COURT ALONE and do not call the creditor without legal advice, or they may help you to confess judgment against yourself, and you can lose your wages and your case without any evidence or trial or opportunity to testify. Do not sign a confession of judgment without your lawyer's advice.

3. DO NOT IGNORE THE ACTION or a default judgment may be entered against you without your knowledge. Your lawyer can prevent this if you notify him promptly of the action.

4. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION of $25.00 per week, plus $10.00 for the first dependent, plus $5.00 for each additional dependent, up to a maximum of $50.00 per week. Be sure you claim an exemption for each week's wages caught by the garnishment. You don't have to state whether you owe the debt to claim an exemption.

5. YOU MAY HAVE A DEFENSE to all or part of the claim if it includes a "collection fee" or "attorney's fee", if it is an old debt, if it was incurred by fraud or deception, if you did not get what you bargained for or if you have been through bankruptcy. Your lawyer may advise you of other defenses to the garnishment.

6. JURY TRIAL AND NIGHT COURT may be available to you, in certain cases, by requesting them. Jury trials cost $6.00 and night court costs $1.00 in Justice Court.

7. IF YOU ARE FIRED because of a garnishment, report it to your union and you may be able to file a grievance or have it arbitrated.

8. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. Many courts say that garnishment is not "misconduct" on the job. If you are refused unemployment compensation for this reason, you have only 10 days to file Notice of Appeal with the Employment Security Department.

9. WELFARE, VETERANS AND SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS and certain other kinds of government benefits cannot be garnished.

10. BANKRUPTCY OR A WAGE EARNER PLAN may be a way to protect yourself from repeated garnishments.

* *

SEATTLE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER

Furnished by
Washington State
AFL-CIO Labor Council.

low incomes who cannot afford to pay for a lawyer. A similar service for low income workers is provided by the Tacoma Legal Assistance Office, 150[illegible] South "M" Street, Tacoma.

2. DO NOT GO TO COURT ALONE and do not call the creditor without legal advice, or they may help you to confess judgment against yourself, and you can lose your wages and your case without any evidence or trial or opportunity to testify. Do not sign a confession of judgment without your lawyer's advice.

3. DO NOT IGNORE THE ACTION or a default judgment may be entered against you without your knowledge. Your lawyer can prevent this if you notify him promptly of the action.

4. YOU ARE ENTITLED TO AN EXEMPTION of $25.00 per week, plus $10.00 for the first dependent, plus $5.00 for each additional dependent, up to a maximum of $50.00 per week. Be sure you claim an exemption for each week's wages caught by the garnishment. You don't have to state whether you owe the debt to claim an exemption.

5. YOU MAY HAVE A DEFENSE to all or part of the claim if it includes a "collection fee" or "attorney's fee", if it is an old debt, if it was incurred by fraud or deception, if you did not get what you bargained for or if you have been through bankruptcy. Your lawyer may advise you of other defenses to the garnishment.

6. JURY TRIAL AND NIGHT COURT may be available to you, in certain cases, by requesting them. Jury trials cost $6.00 and night court costs $1.00 in Justice Court.

7. IF YOU ARE FIRED because of a garnishment, report it to your union and you may be able to file a grievance or have it arbitrated.

8. UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION. Many courts say that garnishment is not "misconduct" on the job. If you are refused unemployment compensation for this reason, you have only 10 days to file Notice of Appeal with the Employment Security Department.

9. WELFARE, VETERANS AND SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS and certain other kinds of government benefits cannot be garnished.

10. BANKRUPTCY OR A WAGE EARNER PLAN may be a way to protect yourself from repeated garnishments.

Furnished by
Washington State Labor Council
AFL-CIO

* *

SEATTLE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER

Main Office	West Seattle	Pioneer Square	Central Area
1700 E. Cherry	6528 32nd S. W.	104 1/2 Cherry	23rd & Union
EAst 9-2450	WEst 7-8330	MAin 3-5455	EAst 9-3200

opeiu#8

1 APPENDIX

NATIONAL GUARDIAN

"Established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly, *** Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, "Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell", August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

1

CONFIDENTIAL

APPENDIX

SEATTLE WOMEN ACT FOR PEACE (SWAP)

A source reported on May 17, 1962, a meeting of the Ballard-Greenwood CP Club was held in Seattle, April 25, 1962, at which TAIMI HALONEN was nominated to be the new Chairman of this Club. Along with other business of the evening, HALONEN said she expected to devote a good portion of her time to SWAP, an organization of peace forces that met recently with seven members. She said four of the seven were from the "left" but did not go into detail. She said the group had problems of an organizational nature because it was new, and she thought she could help.

On April 5, 1963, a second source stated a meeting of the University CP Club was held at Seattle on April 2, 1963. KEN ROSE, a member of the Club, reported the most influential peace organization in Seattle was SWAP.

On July 31, 1964, a meeting of the North Central CP Section Committee was held at Seattle. WILL PARRY, Section Chairman, said attention should be placed on three political questions - peace, civil rights, and labor. Under peace, he said CP clubs should inject the Women Act for Peace campaign into the election campaign. At another Section meeting, February 5, 1966, TAIMI HALONEN was praised for effective peace work and for her help in developing unity among the peace forces. Section-wide concentration was urged in assisting SWAP to visit 1,000 workers on the Vietnam issue.

A third source advised on February 24, 1966, a Northwest District CP Committee meeting was held at Seattle February 12, 1966. After lunch, the entire group participated in passing out leaflets pertaining to racial matters and the Vietnam war which carried the name of SWAP, 5411 Ravenna Avenue Northeast, Seattle, Washington 98105, which address has been used consistently by SWAP and is that of ANCI KOPPEL, also known as Mrs. CHARLES KOPPEL. KOPPEL has been and continues to be the coordinator and apparent prime motivating force of SWAP as of May, 1967.

A fourth source reported in 1945 ANCI KOPPEL was a member of the Professional Group of the Communist Political Association (CPA), also known as the Rogers CP Club at Seattle, Washington.

CONFIDENTIAL

The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

WASHINGTON CULTURAL COOPERATIVE (WCC), aka Washington Cultural Co-op Association

On February 23, 1960, a source reported the Communist Party (CP), Northwest District Committee, at a meeting in January, 1960, decided to prepare for opening a cooperative bookstore and directed the CP State Board to set up a Party committee for this purpose.

The above source also reported that at a state-wide CP conference held on August 27, 1960, CP District Chairman BURT NELSON reported on the WCC. NELSON announced the committee was determined to have the bookstore opened by the earliest possible date, probably October 15, (1960). He urged support of the WCC.

A second source in February and March, 1960, advised a committee of CP members during those months commenced organization of the WCC with authorized capital of $2,000 which was to sell shares and make other plans for operation of a bookstore selling "progressive" literature at Seattle. In May and June, 1960, this source reported BURT NELSON, on May 18, 1960, stated the CP District Literature Commission would concern itself with the bookstore and other types of literature to be sold. On May 31, 1960, BURT NELSON suggested October 1, 1960, as the tentative opening date of the bookstore.

A second source advised on November 2, 1960, the principal aim of the WCC is to establish a bookstore in the Seattle area inasmuch as this need has long been recognized by the Washington State CP due to difficulties encountered in maintaining a Party literature apparatus, and it is desired to have available public facilities to attract supporters and sympathizers. This source stated the WCC has obtained a location for its bookstore at 710 Stewart Street, Seattle, and operations commenced at that location on November 5, 1960.

A third source advised on May 1. 1967, that the WCC held its annual meeting of shareholders at the Roosevelt Hotel, Seattle, on April 30, 1967. As a part of the business at this meeting, a report was made on the financial status of "Co-op Books", 710 Stewart Street, Seattle, for the preceding year.

CONFIDENTIAL

1

APPENDIX

CONFIDENTIAL

YOUNG POLITICAL EXPLORERS LEAGUE (YPEL)

A source stated REE ANN HALONEN, daughter of OIVA HALONEN, who was then the Chairman of the Communist Party's Industrial Section at Seattle, had said on July 29, 1957, that the youth group in Seattle was considering adoption of the name Young Political Explorers.

A second source advised a meeting of the Communist Party (CP) Downtown Club in Seattle was held on October 30, 1958. WANDA HUBBARD, CP member, stated she was the youth director of the Young Political Explorers. She stated there were two groups in Washington, and the Seattle group had fifteen active members. The age limits were from twelve to twenty years of age. The purpose of the group was to examine all political ideas, including socialism.

A third source also reported on the CP Downtown Club meeting on October 30, 1958. WANDA HUBBARD stated the youths had chosen the names of Young Political Explorers, which is a statewide CP organization and was formerly known as the Labor Youth League. HUBBARD stated it is directly supported and directed by the CP.

> The Labor Youth League has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A fourth source advised MARY SUTHERLAND, Youth Director of the Northwest District of the CP, stated on May 17, 1961, that she was handling two youth groups, one of which was the teenage youth group.

The fourth source advised on February 10, 1967, the Young Political Explorers League continues in existence in the Seattle area and is under the guidance and leadership of MARY SUTHERLAND.

CONFIDENTIAL

-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Seattle, Washington

January 26, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	DEMONSTRATIONS PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM; WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968
Character	INFORMATION CONCERNING
Reference	Communication dated and captioned as above at Seattle, Washington.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: FEB 5 1968

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-49497) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., 1/15/68;
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO:WFO)

Re Philadelphia airtel to the Director, 1/16/68.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies of an LHM dated and captioned as above. Two copies are designated for WFO as Office of Origin. Two information copies each are designated for Atlanta and San Francisco since they have an investigation pending on the "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE."

Copies of the LHM are being disseminated locally th 109th MI Group, NISO, OSI, and Secret Service.

Informant

The first source is [redacted], and the second source is former [redacted] Informant

The LHM was classified Confidential since it contained information from Source one and Source two, the unauthorized disclosure of which might reasonably result in the identificatio thereof, and compromise the future effectiveness of sources of

3-Bureau (100-448475) (Enc.-11) (RM)
1-Atlanta (Enc.-2) Info (RM)
1-San Francisco (Enc.-2) Info (RM)
2-WFO (100-47178) (Enc.-2) (RM)
5-Philadelphia
  1-100-49497
  1-100-35008 (PEARL CHERTOV)
  1-100-45773 (KATHERINE CAMP)
  1-100-40771 (VIVIAN WILLIAMS)
  1-134-537 Sub A (PH 475-S)
KKS:bjt
(12)

REC-22 FEB 6 1968

INT. SEC.

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER.,
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD~~) IDIU
DATE FORW. 2/7/68

continuing value.

Informant

[redacted] advised that Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS was to have been in the small, select group that presented the petition to Congress. However, she became separated from this group in the crowd and was not among those who called on Congress.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

FEB 5 1968

DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING UNITED STATES POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15, 1968

On January 19, 1968, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information:

On January 15, 1968, a group of approximately 175 women gathered at the Pennsylvania Railroad 30th Street Station in Philadelphia, Pa. They boarded three special coaches on the 8:10 a.m. train for Washington, D.C. The group was the Philadelphia Contingent of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade which was going to petition the Congress of the United States against the War in Vietnam. PA, DC

The train arrived at Washington, D.C., at about 10:45 a.m. The group remained at Union Station, Washington, D.C., for about an hour waiting for women arriving at the station from other points, so that the march could begin.

When all were assembled, the group marched in orderly fashion to Union Square near the Capitol. Prior to the march it was announced that a small group of women would present their petition to Congress, while VIVECA LINDFORS would read the petition to the assembled group of women at Union Square. D.C.

At Union Square, a girl folk singer entertained and there was a brief period of silence for those killed in Vietnam. There appeared to be about 5,000 women assembled

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

CONFIDENTIAL

1

COPIES DESTROYED
27 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

at the Square. Most of the women wore some article of black clothing.

After the assembly at Union Square, the women boarded buses that took them to the Shoreham Hotel, where a Congress of American Women was convened. This began about 3:00 p.m.

DC.

Among the speakers were CORETTA KING, JEANETTE RANKIN, DC. and KATHERINE CAMP. DC.-PA.

The Philadelphia delegation left the Shoreham at 5:00 p.m., for the return trip home. They left Union Station, Washington, D.C., on the 6:10 p.m., train for Philadelphia.

Among those who were in the Philadelphia delegation were KATHERINE CAMP of the Womens International League for Peace and Freedom, PEARL CHERTOV, and Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS.

PA.-D.C.

> The source stated that Mrs. VIVIAN WILLIAMS is the mother of Army Private RONALD LOCKMAN, who had been court-martialed for refusing an order to board transport for duty in Vietnam.

The source stated that WILLIAMS, while at the Women's Congress at the Shoreham, was observed being interviewed by newspaper reporters about her son.

> A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on January 26, 1968, that PEARL CHERTOV was the organizer for the Philadelphia Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (PBSWP).

PA.-DC.

A characterization of PBSWP is attached to this memorandum.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 2/27/68

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL (Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475)

FROM: SAC, ATLANTA (100-7300) (RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D.C.,
JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)
(OO: WFO)
BUfile 100-448475
WFO file 100-47173
AT file 100-7300

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., State
RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, GD~~)
DATE FORW: 3/19/68
HOW FORW: [illegible]
BY: RHH:dll 10 + encl 9320 9/24/68

Re Buairtel to Albany, 12/5/67; Atlanta teletypes to Director, 12/28/67 and 1/30/68; Atlanta airtels to Director, 1/4/68, 1/12/68 and 1/16/68, all with first caption.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 11 copies, for WFO 2 copies, and for San Francisco 2 copies, of an LHM prepared at Atlanta on 2/27/67, captioned "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE, INFORMATION CONCERNING (INTERNAL SECURITY)", and suitable for dissemination.

ENCLOSURE REC-69 100-[illegible]-114

EX-110

FEB 28 1968

④ - Bureau (Enc. 11) (RM)
2 - WFO (100-47173) (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - San Francisco (100-53302) (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Atlanta
CTH:met
(10)

2 encls destroyed

INT. SEC.

Copies of the enclosed LHM are being furnished to 111th MIG, Region V, Ft. McPherson, Ga.; U.S. Secret Service, Atlanta, Ga.; NIS, Charleston, S.C.; OSI, Robins AFB, Ga.; and USA, Atlanta, for their information.

The source utilized in the enclosed LHM to characterize ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY is [redacted]. Informant

Enclosed LHM is being classified CONFIDENTIAL since unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the informant reflected therein could reasonably result in the identifying of this source of continuing value and jeopardize the future effectiveness thereof.

Referenced Bureau airtel to Albany, 12/5/67, instructed San Francisco and Atlanta to institute investigation under the caption "JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE." The only individual with any known subversive background determined to have had any connection with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade in the Atlanta Division is ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY, who was last known to have paid CP dues in California in 1961, and apparently subsequently was "kicked out of the Communist Party because of her present religious jag" in 1961.

The only activity of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade with which ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY was known to have been connected was on one occasion when she participated in a public meeting at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta on [illegible] where discussions were held regarding plans for the Jeannette Rankin Brigade trip to Washington.

In view of the absence of any known subversive affiliation of any individuals in prominent positions with the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, the above-mentioned information regarding ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY's connection with the organization is being set forth in the enclosed LHM, under the caption of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, and no further investigation is being conducted under the Jeannette Rankin Brigade caption at the present time, UACB.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
February 27, 1968

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

CONFIDENTIAL

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

The January 2, 1968, issue of "The Atlanta Journal", a daily newspaper published in Atlanta, Georgia, carried an article captioned "Miss Rankin Plans Peace Talk Here" which stated that Jeannette Rankin would address a group of Atlanta women interested in peace activities at the Ebenezer Baptist Church in Atlanta, Georgia, on January 4, 1968, and Mrs. Martin Luther King, Jr., a national sponsor of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, would also speak at this meeting. The article stated further that Isobel Cerney, founder of the Southern Coordinating Committee to End the War in Vietnam, would be on the program at the Ebenezer Baptist Church.

ISOBEL FORBES CERNEY

A source on August 25, 1961, advised that a meeting of the Palo Alto Communist Club, Palo Alto, California, was held on August 23, 1961, and that $36.00 was turned over in this meeting as an up-to-date payment of Communist Party dues for Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney.

The source also advised on September 18, 1961, that a close friend was trying to have Isobel Cerney kicked out of the

---

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

COPIES DESTROYED
83 MAY 13 1971

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Communist Party because of her present religion "jag" and because she did not attend Communist Party meetings regularly when visiting Palo Alto during the Summers.

The source further advised on August 28, 1962, that Isobel and Edwin H. Cerney were then out of the Communist Party, although the $25.00 received for their current dues was to be retained by the Party.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Atlanta, Georgia
February 27, 1968

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

Title: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE

Character: INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Reference: Memorandum prepared at Atlanta,
Georgia, on February 27, 1968,
captioned as above.

All sources whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/14/68

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-161601) (RUC)

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(IS)
(OO:WFO)

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are nine copies and for Washington Field and Oklahoma City, two copies each of an LHM with results of an anti-Vietnam war rally held in NYC on 3/7/68. An information copy of this LHM has been furnished 108th MI Group, NYC.

The first source used in the LHM is Informant [redacted] the second source used is [redacted]. Informant

The attached LHM is classified "Confidential" because of information furnished by the above two sources who are of continuing value and the unauthorized disclosure of the information furnished could identify these sources and therefore affect the national security interests.

1-982dsh. ENCLOSURE 1-932dsh

- 3 - Bureau (Encl. 9) (RM)
- 2 - Oklahoma City (Encl. 2) (RM)
- 2 - WFO (Encl. 2) (RM)
- 1 - New York (100-154786) (VIDEM) (42)
- 1 - New York

REC-34

[illegible]-10

HPB:ecs
(10)

10 MAR 15 1968

AGENCY: G-2, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE

RAO (ISD, ~~CRD, CD, IDIU~~)
DATE FORW: 3-20-68
HOW FORW: R15
BY: Ghm/pac

C. C. - Bishop

F14

MAR 20 1968

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

March 14, 1968

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

NYfile 100-161601

Jeannette Rankin Brigade

On March 2, 1968, "The Guardian," formerly known as the "National Guardian," page 15, had an advertisement for a rally sponsored by the Jeannette Rankin Brigade with the theme of "End War in Vietnam and Social Crisis at Home." The rally was to be held at the Community Church, 45 East 35th Street, New York City, on March 7, 1968, at 8:00 PM.

A characterization of the "National Guardian" is attached hereto.

On March 8, 1968, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the above rally was held at the Community Church in New York City, on March 7, 1968, from 8:00 PM to 10:30 PM. Approximately one-hundred individuals attended. The main speaker was Diedra Stapp who spoke in opposition to the war in Vietnam. She called for an immediate cessation of the bombing and for immediate negotiations. She stated that the South Vietnamese soldiers should be doing the fighting. Stapp also stated that her husband was currently a member of the United States Army and that he was having difficulties with the Army and that she expected him to be discharged in the near future and that he would not receive an honorable discharge.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

100-448326-10

Another speaker was Florynce Kennedy who spoke primarily on racial matters. She stated that blacks and whites must live together or there will be frequent riots. She also indicated that she believed the government was attempting to get rid of some of the black leaders by prosecuting them. She called for the election of Dr. Benjamin Spock as President and also called for a hunger strike until the war in Vietnam was settled. Reverend Thomas Hayes gave an anti-Vietnam war speech in which he made reference to a book he had written about the Vietnam war. He also read a recent article in the "Wall Street Journal" concerning the war in Vietnam.

A film was shown of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade activities in Washington, D.C., on January 15, 1968, in which they demonstrated against the war in Vietnam in the vicinity of the United States Capitol and also held anti-war meetings on that date. Additionally, entertainment was provided by some individuals playing bongo drums and a female dancer.

Dierdra Griswold Stapp   Dierdra Stapp

A second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Dierdra Griswold is a member of the National Committee of the Workers World Party (WWP) as of November 1, 1967.   n.t.

A characterization of WWP is attached hereto.

Florynce Kennedy

Florynce Kennedy has been publicly identified as an attorney for H. Rap Brown, National Chairman, Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee.

APPENDIX

1.

"NATIONAL GUARDIAN"

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications," revised and published as of December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., contains the following concerning the "National Guardian":

> "NATIONAL GUARDIAN
>
> "1. 'established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a "progressive" weekly * * *. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia.' (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the ROSENBERGs and MORTON SOBELL, August 25, 1956, p. 12.)"

CONFIDENTIAL

Jeannette Rankin Brigade

APPENDIX

1.

WORKERS WORLD PARTY

On April 17, 1959, a confidential source advised that on February 12, 1959, a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) minority group under the leadership of National Committee member SAM BALLAN, split from the SWP.

The source stated that this minority group, referred to as the Marcyites, after many years of program and policy differences on varied issues concerning tactics and interpretation of political events, split from the SWP on the grounds that the Party was liquidating itself by departing from the Marxist precepts of LEON TROTSKY and retreating from the fight for the world socialist revolution. The final issue which ultimately forced the split was the minority's opposition to the SWP regroupment policy which involved cooperation with the Communist Party (CP) periphery-individuals characterized by the minority as petty-bourgeois.

The minority program, according to the source, advocated unconditional defense of the Soviet Union and has as its goal the building of a revolutionary party with a complete proletarian orientation for the purpose of overthrowing capitalism in the United States and throughout the world.

On May 12, 1960, source advised that this minority group had chosen the name Workers World Party.

On May 1, 1967, a second confidential source advised that the Workers World Party, which maintains headquarters at 46 West 21st Street, New York, New York, supports the People's Republic of China in its ideological dispute with the Soviet Union.

The SWP and CP have been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-108-03

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448475) DATE: 3/19/68

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-59802)(RUC)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
U. S. POLICY IN VIETNAM,
WASHINGTON, D. C.,
JANUARY 15 - 16, 1968
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

OO: WASHINGTON FIELD

JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re San Francisco airtel and letterhead memorandum to the Bureau, dated 1/16/68.

Informants

This matter was opened by the San Francisco Office on November 17, 1967, on receipt of information from [redacted] that an organization known as the Jeannette Rankin Brigade had sent out a call for a demonstration to be held at the White House, Washington, D. C., on January 8, 1968, in protest of the war in Vietnam. As noted in referenced San Francisco communication, the above efforts culminated in a demonstration at San Francisco, California, on January 15, 1968, and a companion demonstration held in Washington, D. C., on January 15, 1968.

A review of the San Francisco files in the above matter reflects that NIKKI BRIDGES, San Francisco Chairman of the Brigade, was on March 2, 1967, listed as a recipient of a new yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW), expiration date March 4, 1968. There is no known Communist Party (CP) membership on the part of BRIDGES. VIVIAN HALLINAN, Executive Secretary of the Brigade, is the only other individual noted as an officer of the Brigade according to San Francisco files. San Francisco files do not reflect any known CP membership on the part of HALLINAN.

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Atlanta (INFO)(100-7300)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-47173)(RM)
1 - San Francisco
GOW/sms #9
(6)

REC-71

MAR 21 1968

ST/SEC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

MAR 28 1968

SF 100-59802
GOW/sms

Informant

On January 31, 1968, at a meeting of the Marin County Chapter of the Women's International League For Peace and Freedom (WILPF). [redacted] advised that during a general discussion concerning the Brigade, it was felt that the group did not want the Brigade to become another formalized group, but rather keep the Brigade as a loose organization, and as an umbrella group for the WILPF.

San Francisco files in addition reflect that there has not been at any time a known group of members of the Brigade; rather the organization has been sponsored by women on both a local and national level, many of whom are members of varied women's peace groups.

In view of the above information, indicating a lack of specific membership and future activity, no further investigation is being conducted by the San Francisco Office under the Jeannette Rankin Brigade caption at the present time, UACB.

This matter will be closely followed and should any future information received by the San Francisco Office appear to warrant additional investigation, this matter will be reopened.

51

4-572 (Rev. 7-18-63)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : The Director
DATE: 1-19-68

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: The Congressional Record

Demonstration Protesting U.S. Policy in Vietnam

Pages S145-S146. Senator Thurmond, (R) South Carolina, spoke concerning the demonstration on January 15 by a group of anti-war protestors called the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. He stated "Upon close inspection, one sees that the list of organizers and sponsors of this group is pretty much the same list of tired campaigners for far-left causes. ---- In short, the brigade was a typical united front operation--the tried and tested Communist tactic by which many well-intentioned people are deluded into supporting a cause organized, financed, and directed by professional militants." Mr. Thurmond set forth information on Mrs. Vivian Hallinan described by the press as the leader and organizer of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade. He also included information on her family which included the following: "Michael and Terence Hallinan, sons of Vincent and Vivian Hallinan, were among the principal organizers of the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs, which have been described by FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover as a Communist-spawned youth organization. The Hallinans, wife and husband and sons, were deeply involved in the protests at the University of California at Berkeley, both in the so-called free speech movement, and in the sit-ins at San Francisco."

Original filed in: 66-1731-3

100-448475-

384

NOT RECORDED
128 MAR 13 1968

In the original of a memorandum captioned and dated as above, the Congressional Record for 1-18-68 was reviewed and pertinent items were marked for the Director's attention. This form has been prepared in order that portions of a copy of the original memorandum may be clipped, mounted, and placed in appropriate Bureau case or subject matter files.

51 MAR 21 1968

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107-02

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 4/26/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-44775) (C)

SUBJECT: JEANNETTE RANKIN BRIGADE
IS-C

Remyairtels and LHMs 1/4/68 and 1/17/68 captioned "DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING U.S. POLICY IN VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D.C., JANUARY 15-16, 1968; INFORMATION CONCERNING (IS)."

Mrs. Robert Gronner

As detailed in recommunications, the January demonstration was a function of the Jeannette Rankin Brigade, self-described in its literature as a broad coalition of women from many areas of American life. Chicago headquarters of the Brigade was given as c/o GEORGINA GRONNER, 520 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago. In developing information regarding the January activity, it was determined that the Chicago coordinating committee was composed of LUCILLE MONTGOMERY, MARJORIE KINSELLA, CAROL TRAVIS and ROSALIND DURHAM, with travel arrangements being made by SYLVIA KUSHNER.

LUCILLE MONTGOMERY was chairman of the host committee of the convention of the National Conference for New Politics(NC

CAROL TRAVIS, who was secretary of a steering committe which arranged for the NCNP convention, attended a meeting of a Communist Party (CP) of Illinois Club held in Chicago February 14, 1968, according to [redacted]. Investigation concerning TRAVIS is pending.

Informant

KINSELLA, DURHAM and KUSHNER are known CP members. No subversive information concerning MONTGOMERY is identifiable in Chicago indices.

Captioned case was initiated to determine the extent of activity and degree of communist influence in the organization in the Chicago area.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

On January 12, 1968, [redacted], Intelligence Division, Chicago PD, identified GEORGINA GRONNER as the wife of Dr. ROBERT GRONNER, MD. 3162 North Pine Grove Avenue, with offices at 670 North Michigan Avenue, Chicago.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-Chicago
JWT:meb
(3)

REC-12

8 APR 29 1968

JUL 2

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Informant

Mrs. ROBERT GRONNER was shown as a member of a seventh anniversary dinner committee of the Chicago Area Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy held at Chicago October 15, 1964, on an invitation furnished by [redacted] September 23, 1964. No other information in Chicago files. ROBERT GRONNER appears to be identical with Chicago file 140-2299 as attending physician (1957) Veterans Administration Research Laboratory, VA, Chicago, Illinois, SGE, on basis that he spoke at a 1952 meeting sponsored by the Chicago Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

On February 1, 1968, [redacted] Intelligence Division, Chicago PD, advised that LUCILLE MONTGOMERY was the motivating force and almost solely responsible for organizing for the Brigade in Chicago. She was assisted as needed by the individuals listed above in arranging for participation in the January activity and held several meetings at her apartment in that regard.

Individual owed obligation of confidentiality

On April 18, 1968, [redacted] advised that all information which had been developed by that agency regarding the Brigade was concerned directly with the January march on Washington and the supporting local demonstration in Chicago January 15, 1968. They had no knowledge that any meetings or other activities have been held subsequent to that time andwere of the opinion that the organization as a continuing affair did not "get off the ground" in Chicago.

Information concerning the January demonstrations was received at that time from numerous Chicago informants and others in a position to learn of any subsequent activity. These were alerted through frequent contacts and have advised they have no knowledge of continuance of the Brigade as an active organization. These informants, along with the dates of most recent contact in this regard, are identified as follows:

[redacted]	4/22/68	[redacted]	4/23/68
[redacted]	4/22/68	[redacted]	4/18/68
[redacted]	4/19/68	[redacted]	4/18/68
[redacted]	4/15/68	[redacted]	4/23/68
[redacted]	4/23/68	[redacted]	4/23/68
[redacted]	4/18/68		

Informant

Informants

Because of a lack of indications that the Brigade has, to date, developed into a functioning organization, it is not believed additional investigation is warranted at this time and this case is being closed. Chicago will maintain contact with knowledgeable sources and remain alert to any future activity on the part of this organization which would dictate that the investigation should be reinstituted.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES G MENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-448326) DATE: 6/3/68

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-47173) (C)

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATION PROTESTING
UNITED STATES POLICY IN
VIETNAM, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
1/15/68
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

BC

Re Burouting slip, 5/16/68.

All pertinent information in captioned matter has been disseminated and no further action is necessary.

No further action is being taken by WFO.

W

REC 102

100-448475-117

~~100-1 - 16~~

2-Bureau
1-WFO

JRP:mam
(3)

1cc Rm 924 9 4 D

22 JUN 4 1968

INT. SEC.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-448326-

XEROX
JUN 21 1968

le #:

-HQ-116395

ial Scope:

Bulky 1120

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88321 Date: 2025

C

Excised
Copy for
Senate

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Vol I

✓

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: Domestic Intelligence Division

DATE: 10/27/71

FROM : SAC, KANSAS CITY (100-new) P

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT
OO WFO

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of self-explanatory letterhead memorandum. Enclosed for WFO are two (2) copies of above letterhead memorandum.

Kansas City Division has a pending case on SARAH SCHMIDTLEIN, nee CORONCE, KC file 100-13611.

KC T-1 is Informant [redacted] (location instant letterhead memorandum).

Kansas City Division will follow and report any additional information regarding captioned group.

Ed 21

REC- 45

468408

NOV 16

ENCLOSURE

18 OCT 29 1971

3-Bureau (Encs. 8)(RM)
2-WFO (Encs. 2)(RM)
2-Kansas City
VDC:jmm
(7)

AGENCY: SEC. SER., CIA
DIA, IEC (w/ENCS) lcc 932 D, lcc destroyed
HQ (ICD,) IDIU.
DATE FORW: 11/4/71
HOW FORW: R/S

NEW LEFT

54 NOV 8 1971

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Kansas City, Missouri

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

October 27, 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D.C.

On October 19, 1971, KC T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Sarah Schmidtlein, nee Copowycz, a Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) member and Kansas City Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) head, is attempting to stimulate interest in various women's groups to get together a Kansas City women's delegation to attend the WONAAC demonstration on November 20, 1971, at Washington, D.C. KC T-1 advised that the Washington demonstration is to demonstrate against the abortion law repeal alleged to be voted on in Congress at that time. KC T-1 said at the present time plans are to send one busload and more if tickets to be sold.

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

468406

100

1*

(Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: NOV 2 1971

- ~~Mr. Tolson~~
- [illegible]
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Bishop
- Mr. [illegible], E
- Mr. Callahan
- [illegible]
- [illegible]
- Mr. Dalbey
- Mr. Cleveland
- Mr. [illegible]
- Mr. Bates
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Walters
- ~~Mr. Soyars~~
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927) (P)

REC 10

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

1,3,4

Re New York airtel and LHM 10/5/71 captioned, March on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco on 11/20/71 for Repeal of Abortion Laws Sponsored by Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, IS - New Left and Kansas City letter and LHM dated 10/27/71.

3 - Bureau (Encs. 8)
2 - Atlanta (Encs. 2)
2 - Detroit (Encs. 2)
2 - Houston (Encs. 2)
2 - Kansas City (Encs. 2)
2 - Los Angeles (Encs. 2)
2 - New York (Encs. 2)
2 - San Francisco (Encs. 2)
2 - Seattle (Encs. 2)
2 - WFO
(1 - 100-49208)

EX-101

REC-10

Copy to 952D
by routing slip for
~~☐ Info~~ ☒ Action
date 11/10/71
by SSC/hcm

AGENCY SS
DATE FORW.
HOW FORW.
BY

5 NOV 12 1971

RCC:dlm
(21)

Approved: RCK Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies and for other receiving offices two copies of LHM on captioned demonstration.

LHM is classified "Confidential", to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information which could be prejudicial to the defense interest of the nation.

Informant

First source in LHM is [redacted] Second source in LHM identified on separate administrative page.

LEADS

All receiving offices are requested to contact knowledgeable sources within Women's Liberation Movement to determine demonstration plans, identity of leading personalities and numbers planning to attend captioned demonstration from their respective areas.

DETROIT

AT DETROIT, MICHIGAN: In view of the National Coordinating Committee meeting held 10/2/71 in Detroit, will consult sources to determine results of this meeting regarding captioned demonstration.

[illegible]

[illegible]

WONAAC STAFFERS:

KIPP DAWSON
CAROL LIPMAN
SALLY SMITH
JOAN GORDON
MARTHA COLEMAN
NANCY ROSENSTOCK

to furnish available identifying data on each.

WFO will continue to give this matter close attention to ascertain all details of this proposed demonstration.

WFO 100-54927 CONFIDENTIAL

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

Second source referred to in LHM is [redacted] Source [redacted] [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] letter to its supporters, which states the following:

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

NOV 2 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 20, 1971
WASHINGTON, D. C.

On September 29, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that WONAAC sent a letter to its supporters, which stated the following:

"To: Women and women's organizations throughout the world

"Dear Sisters,

"Throughout history few things have been more universal or known fewer national boundaries than the suffering of women from the denial of our right to control our own lives, our own bodies. Decades ago the suffragists of the United States took inspiration from their British sisters and went on to build part of the international movement through which women won the right to vote.

"Today, in every corner of the earth, laws deny women the right to abortion, the right to decide whether or not to have children. Now a new generation of women has begun to stand up for our rights. The struggle for the right to abortion is rapidly crossing boundaries of nations and continents, of language and background. We have inspired one another and learned from one another.

"In the United States women from many backgrounds are uniting in this fight. On November 20, we will march in massive numbers on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, to demand the repeal of all anti-abortion laws, with no forced sterilization and the repeal of all restrictive

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

100 — 468406 — 3

contraceptive laws. We call on our sisters around the world to unite with us on that day, to bring out power together, to let the world hear in one united voice and many languages our slogan 'ABORTION -- A WOMAN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE.'

"When we join together throughout the world, no force can stop us.

"In sisterhood,

"Delegates to the first Women's National Abortion Conference Held in New York City, July 16-18, 1971."

On October 12, 1971, second source, who is in a position to furnish such information, provided a copy of the WONAAC National Newsletter dated September 16, 1971, which contained the following self-description:

"WONAAC is based on a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign including legislation, legal action and nationally-coordinated mass demonstrations in Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, on November 20, for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws and the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws.

"We were formed at a national conference held at Columbia University July 19, 1971, attended by over 1,000 women from 23 states and 253 organizations. The call for this conference was initiated by women organizing Women Vs Connecticut, the class action suit in that state and women's liberation groups in New York City. This call was then endorsed by hundreds of women around the country who participated in the spirited and educational conference which formed WONAAC.

"WONAAC aims to reach all women ... Black, Chicana, Latina, Asian, Puerto Rican and Native American women, campus women, gay women, high school women,

CONFIDENTIAL

housewives, professional, welfare and working women, young women, women from churches, political organizations, trade unions, the military and communities across the country ... and to build the broadest possible movement for abortion law repeal."

The newsletter proclaimed that the WONAAC National Office would be moved from New York City, to Washington, D. C., to facilitate all aspects of organizing the Fall Abortion Law Repeal Campaign. The following women from the old New York staff were moved to Washington, D. C.:

Kipp Dawson
Carol Lipman
Sherry Smith
Joan Gombos
Marsha Coleman
Nancy Rosenstock

NY
DC

EMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATIO

The National Coordinating Committee of WONAAC was scheduled to meet October 2, 1971, at 12:00 noon, 2230 Withrel Street, Detroit Michigan, to discuss among other points, the details for the November 20, 1971 march on Washington, D. C.

DC

The newsletter also outlined the following speaking tour of Dr. Barbara Roberts to publicize the aims of WONAAC and to promote participation in the November 20, 1971, demonstration:

"September 23, 24	Seattle
October 5, 6	Atlanta
October 13, 14	Houston
November 7-13	Los Angeles"

The October 15, 1971, issue of the "Washington Post", a daily newspaper in Washington, D. C., carried the following notice regarding the WONAAC sponsored November 20, 1971, rally for Washington, D. C.:

"...Coordinators of the event said they hope for a turnout of about 20,000 women whowould stage the first national female march on the Capitol since women won the right to vote in 1920.

"Dr. Barbara Roberts, national project director of the coalitions, said the march, scheduled to go past the White House and down Pennsylvania Avenue to the Capitol, would attack "abortion laws which degrade, mutilate and murder women."

"The coalition, which comprises about 30 women's groups, will also demonstrate against forced sterilization and restrictive contraception laws and plans to hold national abortion hearings in Washington before the march."

First source advised on October 15, 1971, that the November 20, 1971, rally has received mixed support from various Washington, D. C., women's liberation groups. Several radical women's groups refused to endorse the November 20, 1971, action because they view it as a Young Socialist Alliance (YSA)/Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Front which will use these rallies to further its own recruitment drive. Furthermore, they considered YSA/SWP to be "non-feminist". Main support for the November 20, 1971, demonstration will come from the WSA Women's Fraction Group.

Important endorsements thus far are coming from Betty Freidan, noted author in Women's Liberation Movement, New York Congress woman, Bella Abzug and Dr. Milan M. Vuitch, a Washington, D. C., doctor involved in the abortion controversy. Lynda Jenness, the SWP presidential candidate is scheduled to be one of the speakers.

Young Socialist Alliance

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Character IS - NEW LEFT

[illegible]

(All [illegible] any listed below) whose identities [illegible]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions [illegible]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

NOV 2 1971

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

Character IS - NEW LEFT

Reference LHM of SA RICHARD C. CARTER dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan ✓
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 11/5/71

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
Via ______ (Priority)

TSS

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI
ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

5-Hoover

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED
DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(00:WFO)

ReWFOairtel and LHM, 11/2/71.
encl. 2

On 11/4/71 Sergeant JOHN TOMLINSON, U. S. Park Police, furnished a permit application for captioned demonstration which contained the following information:

103 EX-105 REC-7, REC-2 100-468446-2

Sponsoring organization Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, 917 15th Street, N.W., WDC, 20005, phone 202-347-0946. Individual sponsor and WONAAC National Project Director, CAROL LIPMAN, 116 Sunnyside Road, Silver Spring, Maryland, telephone numbers 202-347-0946 and 202-585-2616. Other principal officers were BARBARA ROBERTS, M.D., 7547 Springlake Drive, Apartment B-1, Bethesda, Maryland, 365-0853 and JOAN M. COMBOS, 1701 16th Street, N.W., ~~WDC, 20005.~~ WFO files show CAROL LIPMAN to be a member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). As of June,

②- Bureau
2 - WFO
(1 - 100-49940)
RCC:rms
(30)

(COPY COUNT CONTINUED ON PAGE 2)

C-7 to WFO
by routing slip for
☐ Info ☒ Action
date 11/9/71
by SSC/mm

Approved: RGK/WCG Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

Copy Count Continued:

2 - Atlanta
2 - Baltimore
2 - Boston
2 - Chicago
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Minneapolis
2 - New Haven
2 - New York
2 - Philadelphia
2 - San Francisco

1970, LIPMAN was the National Executive Secretary of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC).

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The SMC is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

The following sponsoring organizations were listed:

Georgia Women's Abortion Action Coalition
P.O. Box 7122, Atlanta, Ga. 30309 (404) 874-8365

Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
552 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9, Cambridge, Mass. 02139
(617) 547-1818; 491-1071

Women United for Abortion Rights
1115 Walnut Street, 3rd floor, Philadelphia, Pa. (215) Wa 2-0381

Illinois Women's Abortion Coalition
343 So. Dearborn Ave., Room 305, Chicago, Ill. 60605 (312) 922-0745

Women for Abortion Action
917 - 15th St. N.W., Suite 502, Washington, D. C. (202) 347-0947

WONAAC - New York
P.O. Box 685, Old Chelsea Station, New York, N.Y. 10011
(212) 924-0894

Abortion Project Coalition - Cleveland
11220 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44106 (216) 368-2248

Rhode Island Coalition to Repeal Abortion Laws
64 Preston Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02906 (401) 331-3370

Detroit Women's Abortion Action Coalition
2230 Withrell, Detroit, Michigan (313) 962-8822

Women's Right to Choose of Maryland
3028 Greenmount Ave., Baltimore, Maryland (301) 323-9485

Bloomington Abortion Coalition
702 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana 47401

Women V. Connecticut, Women and the Law Office
Box 89, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
(203) 436-0364

Minneapolis Abortion Action Coalition
100 University Ave., S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55814
(612) 332-5773

Houston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
Box 192, Campus Activities, University of Houston, Houston,
Texas 77004 (713) 748-6600 Ext 1266

There are affiliates in many western states but they are coordinating for the San Francisco counterpart of the November 20 demonstration. WONAAC West has already obtained the necessary permits for the demonstration in San Francisco.

An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 participants will march peacefully and orderly to build public support for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws, against forced sterilization and an end to restrictive contraceptive laws. The marchers will assemble 10:00 a.m. to noon at the Ellipse; march west from the Ellipse on E Street to 17th Street; N. on 17th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue; E. on Pennsylvania Avenue to 15th; South on 15th Street to Pennsylvania; Southeast on Pennsylvania to the Capitol and Rally; The West Steps of the Capitol.

The following activities during the demonstration were listed:

Demonstrators will assemble in contingents at the Ellipse and march above route to the Capitol to participate in a rally. Marchers will be carrying signs and placards concerning the aims of the demonsrration; many will be brought from around the country. Speakers are not yet firmed up. Musical entertainment will be part of the rally. Demonstrators will disperse and either return home in D. C. area or go to cars and busses and return to cities.

There will be one marshal for every 20 demonstrators, Chief Marshal listed as DELPHINE WELCH, WDC.

WFO files show WELCH attended SWP National Convention, August, 1971.

Secret Service and AUSA have been notified. Other interested agencies also cognizant.

LEAD

Receiving offices are requested to conduct appropriate investigation to determine the numbers and composition of those groups from their area planning to attend captioned demonstration.

WFO will continue to follow locally.

FBI

Date: 11-[illegible]-71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-[illegible]010)(P)

RE: PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C. AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
11-20-71 FOR ABORTION LAW
[illegible] WOMEN'S
NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC)
SM - NEW LEFT

Enclosed for the Bureau are 3 copies of LHM concerning captioned matter.

Copies of instant LHM are being directed to Detroit, New York, San Francisco and Washington Field in view of their interest in the individuals listed therein, the WONAAC or the planned demonstrations by that group in Washington, D. C. and San Francisco on 11-20-71.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations mentioned in enclosed LHM are set forth where available.

Sources utilized in LHM are as follows:

REC 124-[illegible]

3 - Bureau (Enc. 3)(RM)
2 - Detroit (Enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
  (1 - 100- [illegible])
1 - New York (Enc. 1)(Info)(RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (Enc. 2)(Info)(RM)
  (1 - 100- CAROL LIPMAN)
5 - Cleveland
  (1 - 100-29[illegible] [illegible])
  (1 - 100-30100 CAROL LIPMAN)
  (1 - 100-[illegible] [illegible])
  (1 - 100-2[illegible]54 [illegible])

CPI:ck

REC 18

BY [illegible]

6 NOV 10 1971

N.Y.-LEFT

57 DEC 13 1971

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

CV T-1 is a confidential source, who is in a position to have information of this type

CV T-2 is [redacted]

CV T-3 is [redacted]

CV T-4 is [redacted]

} Informants

Cleveland will continue to follow and report developments.

LHM classified CONFIDENTIAL as data reported from CV T-1 thru CV T-4 could reasonably result in identification of [illegible] effectiveness thereof.

CV 100-32010

NONSYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

SOURCE

CV T-1 is [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Cleveland, Ohio

November 3, 1971

PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS
WASHINGTON, D. C. AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971, FOR
ABORTION LAW REPEAL SPONSORED
BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

B. APPROX. 1950

On October 18, 1971, CV T-1, a reliable source, advised that LAURIE PERKUS, 11220 Bellflower, Cleveland Heights, Ohio, telephone number 368-2248, had made arrangements to charter four 43 passenger coaches from Greyhound Bus Lines for a trip to Washington, D. C. on November 19, 1971, and return on November 20, 1971. PERKUS had made the above arrangements in the name of the Abortion Project Coalition, not further identified, and had stated that a need for four additional coaches may arise prior to planned departure. The Cleveland group is scheduled to depart Cleveland at 11:30 p.m., November 19, 1971, and arrive in Washington, D. C. at 8:30 a.m., November 20, 1971, with planned destination noted merely as "Pennsylvania Avenue". Only one day in Washington, D. C. is planned inasmuch as the group is scheduled to depart Washington, D. C. at 6:00 p.m., November 20, 1971, and arrive Cleveland, Ohio, at 3:00 a.m., November 21, 1971.

On October 27, 1971, CV T-2, a reliable source, advised that LAURIE PERKUS is a current active member of the Cleveland Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The Cleveland Branch of the SWP is affiliated with the National SWP and follows its directives. The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On September 14, 1970, an article entitled "Students Map Anti-War Activities Here" appeared in the "Plain Dealer",

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

100-468406-43

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

a daily newspaper of general circulation in the Cleveland, Ohio, area, and related that the Cleveland Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) had held its first meeting on September 13, 1970, since summer recess to plan statewide anti-war activities for the fall. The above article reported that LAURIE PERKUS, age 21, had been appointed a full time committee staff member of the Cleveland SMC.

STUDENT MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, Young Socialist Alliance. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On October 19, 1971, an article entitled "Women Strive For Abortion Reform" appeared in "The Caldron", a student newspaper circulated on the Cleveland State University (CSU) campus, Cleveland, Ohio, related that a Women's Educational Conference on Abortion Law Repeal was scheduled for October 23, 1971, at Case Western Reserve University (CWRU), Cleveland, Ohio, and that speakers included BARBARA ROBB, the attorney for the Michigan Women's Abortion Youth and a National coordinator of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC). The above article characterized both the WONAAC and the Cleveland Abortion Project Coalition as follows:

> "One way that women are engaged in a coordinated National campaign is through the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) with which the Cleveland Abortion Project Coalition is affiliated. WONAAC was formed at a National Women's Conference in New York City in mid-July which was attended by over 1000 women from 29 states. It was at this conference that the National Abortion Law Repeal Campaign was launched. The women endorsed the aforementioned demands and a coordinated campaign

of legislative action, court action, and a massive march on Washington D. C. and San Francisco on November 20."

On October 24, 1971, CV T-3, a reliable source, advised that LAURIE PERKUS had been recruiting women to travel to Washington, D. C. on November 19 - 21, 1971, to take part in a massive demonstration planned to protest abortion laws. PERKUS had stated that the Abortion Project Coalition of Cleveland would utilize four busses and round-trip fare for one person would be $17.

On October 29, 1971, CV T-1, advised that during October, 1971, LAURIE PERKUS had made two reservations for air transportation for individuals to travel to Cleveland, Ohio, on October 23, 1971. The first reservation was made for BARBARA ROBB, 2761 East Jefferson, Detroit, Michigan, telephone number 513/567-0450, and was to cover a flight from Detroit to Cleveland on October 23, 1971 for ROBB; however, ROBB did not utilize her reservation. The second reservation was made for CAROL LIPMAN, whose home address was given as 917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., telephone number 202/347-0946, and was to cover a flight on October 23, 1971, from Washington, D. C. to Cleveland, Ohio, and return same date via United Airlines flight 423 to Cleveland and United Airlines flight 666Y return to Washington, D. C. The reservation for LIPMAN was utilized on October 23, 1971, as planned.

On April 28, 1970, CV T-4, a reliable source, advised that CAROL LIPMAN is a member of the SWP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FBI

Date: 11/12/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: [illegible])

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(00:WFO)

ReWFOairtel, dated 11/5/71.

Informant [redacted] who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised on 11/11/71 that a NY planning meeting of captioned group was held at the Loeb Student Center, New York University, New York, NY, on 11/11/71.

For the information of the Bureau and WFO, plans [illegible] which call [illegible] 1,000 individuals.

[illegible] Washington Square, New York, NY, at 6:00 AM on 11/20/71 and return the same day.

Informant [redacted] advised that above meeting was completely dominated and controlled by members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

(2) - Bureau (RM)
[illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible]:sln

S/pam
cw 2
5 - H

NOV 15 1971

~~Copy to~~ ZCC 9529
by routing slip for
☐ Info ☐ Action
date 11/16/71
by SSC

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

It was announced that the demonstration was planned to be completely non-violent and that the scheduled speakers at WDC are BILLY JEAN KING, women's tennis champion; and SHIRLEY WHEELER, who was convicted in the State of Florida, on a charge of having an illegal abortion.

NYO will follow locally and furnish more specific information when it becomes available.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters ✓
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes

FBI

Date: 11/12/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927)

WOMAN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

per 2

Re WFO airtel to Bureau 11/5/71 and airtel and LHM 11/2/71.

per 3

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of an LHM including two copies designated for the Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section. Also enclosed for the Identification Division is original letter to U.S. Capitol Police in container marked evidence.

Source utilized in LHM is [redacted] Informant.

This LHM is being classified confidential to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information which could be prejudicial of the defense interest of the nation.

It is noted that in the past the YSA/SWP organizers of captioned demonstration have eschewed violence to achieve their ends. This letter is being submitted due to the possible connection with captioned demonstration.

REC-3

U.S. Secret Service Intelligence Division and MPD Intelligence Division have been telephonically advised.

NOV 29 1971

ENCLOSURE

3 - Bureau (Enc. 10)
(1-Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section (Enc.
1 - WFO
RCC:jmg
(4)

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______ M Per ______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

WFO 100-54927

REQUEST OF THE BUREAU

The Identification Division, Latent Fingerprint Section is requested to process enclosed letter and envebpe for identifiable prints and furnish results together with letter and envelope to WFO.

clipped from newspapers and/or magazines. The message

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 12, 1971

WOMAN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

On November 10, 1971, Inspector Robert E. Krahling, United States Capitol Police, advised that a letter had been received by his office, which contained the following message composed of words of assorted size clipped from newspapers and/or magazines. The message read:

> WOMAN'S ABORTION
> bomb
> Nov 20
> 3 27

At the bottom of the letter was affixed a label from a can of Bumble Bee Brand Fancy White Meat Tuna Fish.

Subject organization

It is noted that November 20, 1971, is the date of a publicly announced march and rally by the Woman's National Abortion Action Coalition culminating in a rally at 2:00 p.m., on the west steps of the United States Capitol. In a Washington Post ~~Daily~~ Newspaper article of October 15, 1971, Dr. Barbara Roberts, National Project Director of the coalition stated that the march would attack abortion laws which degraded, mutilated and murdered women. She stated the coalition was comprised of about 30 women's groups which would demonstrate against the forced sterilization and restrictive contraception laws and also plan to hold national abortion hearings in Washington, D.C., before the march. Roberts estimated between 10,000 and 20,000 women would engage in this march and rally. D-1

On October 15, 1971, a source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that the November 20, 1971, WONAC March is largely the creator of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and as such has not received the endorsement of more radical

100-460466-40

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

woman's groups who consider YSA/SWP to be "non feminist."

> As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party, (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as " a Multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

bomb

NOV 20

3- 27

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

3

BUMBLE BEE BRAND
WRITE FOR Free RECIPE BOOKLET
BUMBLE BEE Fancy SOLID WHITE TUNA
BUMBLE BEE SEAFOODS
CASTLE & COOKE

(Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room

FBI

Date: 11/15/71

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-54927) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOairtel and LHM, 11/2/71 and WFOairtel to Bu, 11/3/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 8 and for other receiving offices two copies of LHM.

Sources referred to in LHM is [redacted]

Sources used to characterize CAROL LIPMAN in LHM are [redacted] and [redacted]

Source used to [illegible] [redacted]

Informant

LEADS

ATLANTA

AT ATLANTA, GEORGIA. Contact logical sources in Women's Liberation Movement to determine approximate numbers and leading personalities planning to attend captioned demonstration.

4-Bureau (Enc. 8)
2-Atlanta (Enc. 2)
2-Chicago (Enc. 2)
2-[illegible] (Enc. 2)
2-Philadelphia (Enc. 2)
2-WFO
(1-100-49[illegible]) (WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT)
RCC:eae
(16)

REC 55

NOV 22 1971

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge

☑ Info ☐ Action

Sent ______ M Per ______

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WFO 100-54927

CHICAGO

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. Contact sources within Women's Liberation Movement, especially those knowledgeable in SWP/YSA to determine numbers and personalities coming to Washington, D. C. (WDC), for captioned demonstration.

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS. Contact logical sources to determine leading personalities and approximate numbers planning to participate in captioned demonstration.

Furnish characterizations of EVELYN CLARK and MILTILDE MILES.

CLEVELAND

AT CLEVELAND, OHIO. Contact logical sources within the Women's Liberation Movement to determine leading personalities and numbers to participate in captioned demonstration.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK. Contact logical sources to determine leading figures and numbers of participants in demonstration.

PHILADELPHIA

AT PHILADELPHIA, PENNSYLVANIA. Contact logical sources to determine leading personalities and approximate numbers planning to attend captioned demonstration.

Receiving offices will contact appropriate bus companies to obtain information regarding number of buses coming from their areas to WDC for captioned demonstration.

WFO will continue to follow locally.

LHM is classifed "Confidential," to protect the unauthorized disclosure of information which could be prejudicial to the defense interest of the nation.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D. C. 20535
November 15, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

On November 4, 1971, Sergeant JOHN TOMLINSON, U.S. Park Police, furnished a permit application for captioned demonstration which contained the following information:

Sponsoring organization Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, 917 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. (WDC), 20005, phone 202-347-0943. Individual sponsor and WONAAC National Project Director, Carol Lipman, 113 Sunnyside Road, Silver Spring, Maryland, D.C. telephone numbers 202-347-0946 and 202-585-2610. Other principal officers were Barbara Roberts, M.D., 7547 Springlake Drive, Apartment B-1, Bethesda, Maryland, 365-0353 D.C. and Joan M. Gombos, 1701 16th Street, N.W., WDC, 20005. Washington, D.C.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

Carol Lipman is described as a member of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), As of June, 1970, Lipman was the National Executive Secretary of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC).

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The SMC is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

The following sponsoring organizations were listed:

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

100-468406-13

CONFIDENTIAL

MEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

AT **Georgia Women's Abortion Action Coalition**
P.O. Box 7122, Atlanta, Ga. 30309 (404) 874-8365

BS Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
552 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9, Cambridge, Mass. 02139
(617) 547-1818; 491-1071

PH **Women United for Abortion Rights**
1115 Walnut Street, 3rd floor, Philadelphia, Pa. (215) Wa 2-0381

CI **Illinois Women's Abortion Coalition**
343 So. Dearborn Ave., Room 305, Chicago, Ill. 60605 (312) 922-0745

WFO **Women for Abortion Action**
917 - 15th St. N.W., Suite 502, Washington, D. C. (202) 347-0947

NY WONAAC - New York
P.O. Box 685, Old Chelsea Station, New York, N.Y. 10011
(212) 924-0894

CV **Abortion Project Coalition - Cleveland**
11220 Bellflower Road, Cleveland, Ohio 44106 (216) 368-2248

ES Rhode Island Coalition to Repeal Abortion Laws
64 Preston Street, Providence, Rhode Island 02906 (401) 331-3370

[illegible] Detroit Women's Abortion Action Coalition
2230 Withrell, Detroit, Michigan (313) 962-8822

BA Women's Right to Choose of Maryland
3028 Greenmount Ave., Baltimore, Maryland (301) 323-9485

IP Bloomington Abortion Coalition
702 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana 47401

NH **Women V. Connecticut, Women and the Law Office**
Box 89, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut 06520
(203) 436-0364

NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
AAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

MP

Minneapolis Abortion Action Coalition
100 University Ave., S.E., Minneapolis, Minn. 55814
(612) 332-5773

KO

Houston Women's Abortion Action Coalition
Box 192, Campus Activities, University of Houston, Houston,
Texas 77004 (713) 748-6600 Ext 1266

There are affiliates in many western states but they are coordinating for the San Francisco counterpart of the November 20 demonstration. WONAAC West has already obtained the necessary permits for the demonstration in San Francisco.

An estimated 10,000 to 20,000 participants will march peacefully and orderly to build public support for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws against forced sterilization and an end to restrictive contraceptive laws. The marchers will assemble 10:00 a.m. to noon at the Ellipse; march west from the Ellipse on E Street to 17th Street; N.on 17th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue; E.on Pennsylvania Avenue to 15th; South on 15th Street to Pennsylvania; Southeast on Pennsylvania to the Capitol and Rally; The West Steps of the Capitol.

The following activities during the demonstration were listed:

Demonstrators will assemble in contingents at the Ellipse and march above route to the Capitol to participate in a rally. Marchers will be carrying signs and placards concerning the aims of the demonstration; many will be brought from around the country. Speakers are not yet firmed up. Musical entertainment will be part of the rally. Demonstrators will disperse and either return home in D. C. area or go to cars and busses and return to cities.

There will be one marshal for every 20 demonstrators, Chief Marshal listed as [illegible], NOC.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D. C.

CONFIDENTIAL

Delphine Welch is described as a member of SWP.

On November 12, 1971, a source that has provided reliable information in the past, advised that preparations to transport demonstrators for the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition Rally, November 20, 1971, in WDC, have been made in the following cities:

Atlanta Two Trailways Buses
Chicago Eight Trailways Buses
Cleveland Four Greyhound Buses, seating capacity, 43 per bus.
New York City 15 buses, seating capacity 40 - 50, confirmed with more likely to be chartered.
Philadelphia 9 buses chartered from the S.E.P.T.A. Line, seating 51 passengers each.

In addition, Philadelphia has dispatched Sheila Ostrow, 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia to WDC to help organize the rally. (Pa.

Source further advised that the Boston Local of the SWP has sent Evelyn Clark and Matilde Miles to WDC for the specific purpose of organizing the November 20 Demonstration. [illegible] [illegible]

Members of Socialist Workers Party D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 17 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR012 NY CODE

340 AM NITEL 11-17-71 JMC

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON FIELD 100-54927

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE. WASHINGTON, D.C. IS-NEW LEFT. OO-WFO.

ON NOVEMBER SIXTEEN INSTANT, [redacted] [redacted] RELIABLE, ADVISED HE, AS A MEMBER OF THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA), HAS BEEN INVITED TO ACCOMPANY NEW YORK CONTINGENT LEAVING NEW YORK CITY EARLY AM OF NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT, TO PARTICIPATE IN CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. NO UNUSUAL EXPENSES ARE ANTICIPATED BEING INCURRED BY SOURCE FOR THIS ASSIGNMENT. UACB, SOURCE WILL PARTICIPATE IN CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION WITH NEW YORK CONTINGENT.

END

FBI WA RDR

REC-35 100-46[illegible]

EX-100

Gray

Harner

5 NOV 18 1971

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11-9-71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM: SAC, HOUSTON (100-12404)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED
DEMONSTRATION
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT

RE WFO airtels 11-2-71 and 11-5-71.

On 11-9-71, [redacted] advised that at a regular weekly meeting of the Houston Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Chapter, discussion was had regarding the forthcoming Women's Abortion demonstration to be held in Washington, D.C. November 20, 1971.

A show of hands was requested as to who was planning to attend this demonstration activity and approximately ten persons raised their hands, indicating they planned to attend. Of the individuals who indicated that they planned to attend, none could be considered well-known personalities and they are merely regular SWP members and their boyfriends.

No informants of the Houston Division plan to attend the demonstration activity and the method of travel of the Houston contingent at the present time is unknown.

Additional details, when obtained, will be furnished the Bureau and WFO.

REC-11

3 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-54927)(RM)
3 - Houston (1 - 100-12404)
(1 - 134-326A)
(1 - 134-344A)

DCS:bl
(8)

NOV 12 1971

57 NOV 22 1971

Approved: Sent ______ M Per ______

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Bishop
1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Mr. Miller
1 - Mr. Callahan (Mr. Hereford)
1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Smith
1 - Mr. Horner

Tolson
Felt
Rosen
Mohr
Bishop
Miller, E.S.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. E. S. Miller

DATE: 11/17/71

FROM : T. J. Smith TJS

SUBJECT: DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 20, 1971, SPONSORED BY THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

This memorandum advises of demonstrations being scheduled in Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, California, on 11/20/71 to build public support for the repeal of antiabortion laws.

The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition was formed at a conference held at Columbia University, New York City, in July, 1971, which was attended by approximately 1,000 women from 29 states. The conference voted to make a woman's right to abortion a national and political issue. Subsequent to its formation, the coalition called for demonstrations in San Francisco and Washington on 11/20/71 to build public support for the repeal of all antiabortion laws, to protest forced sterilization, and to call for an end to restrictive contraceptive laws. A source of the Washington Field Office has advised that the march in Washington is supported by the Young Socialist Alliance, the youth group of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). Carol Lipman, who is a member of the SWP, is Project Director of the Washington march.

Coalition leaders in requesting permit for the demonstration have estimated that participation in the Washington march will range between 10,000 and 20,000 persons. The Washington Field Office has developed information that 46 buses have been chartered to bring participants to the demonstration. Participants will represent some 80 cities. The Metropolitan Police Department anticipates participation will be in the vicinity of 5,000 persons

REC-23

NOV 22 1971

Demonstrators are scheduled to assemble at the Ellipse between 10 a.m. and 12 noon and will march via 17th Street to H Street, down H Street to 15th Street, down 15th Street to Pennsylvania Avenue, ~~and then east on~~ Pennsylvania Avenue to the west steps of the Capitol. A rally will be held at the latter site between 2 and 6 p.m.

RHH:ekn
(11)

CONTINUED - OVER

5 1 NOV 29 1971

Memorandum to Mr. E. S. Miller
RE: DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D. C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA, NOVEMBER 20, 1971, SPONSORED
BY THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Speakers will include Billy Jean King, a professional tennis player, Dr. Barbara Roberts, a doctor at the National Institute of Health and a national director of the Coalition, and Linda Jenness, the 1972 SWP Presidential candidate. Though not confirmed, Congresswomen Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm are reported to be invited as speakers.

D.C.

NY BELLA S.

NY Member - Socialist Workers Party

We have included all pertinent information concerning this march in our summary teletype to The White House, the Vice President, Secret Service, the Attorney General, and military intelligence agencies.

There have been no traffic restrictions placed in effect by the Metropolitan Police Department to date. However, this would be a later consideration as the date of the march approaches.

It appears that the route of march will definitely affect traffic on Saturday morning.

SD/GCM

ACTION:

None. For information.

EM

DJD/glm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 17 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 010 WF CODED

5:07 PM NITEL 11-17-71 ASW

TO DIRECTOR (ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGNECE)

CLEVELAND (100-27031)

NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-54927)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT.

CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK AND ADVISED TO HAVE INFORMANTS ATTENDING CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION REPORT INFORMATION TO WFO BE CALLING SIX TWO EIGHT DASH TWO EIGHT THREE SEVEN OR SIX TWO EIGHT DASH TWO EIGHT TWO SIX AND SPEAK WITH PERSON ANSWERING.

CLEVELAND AND NEW YORK WILL ADVISE WFO OF CODE NAMES TO BE USED BY RESPECTIVE INFORMANTS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

REC-59

RE NEW YORK TEL TO BUREAU NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN, LAST AND BUREAU AIRTEL TO CLEVELAND NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST CAPTIONED STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS), IS - NEW LEFT.

NOV 19 1971

END

MRF FBI WA DC 190

57 NOV 26 1971

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 18 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 007 SF CODE

11:02PM NITEL 11/17/71 JAK

TO DIRECTOR
ATLANTA
NEW YORK
WASH FIELD OFFICE

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (157-0) 2P

INCORR

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION COALITION, WASHIGNTON, D.C. EM.

RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED THAT ERICKA HUGGINS HAS BEEN REQUESTED TO APPEAR AT A RALLY AND DEMONSTRATION SPONSORED BY CAPTIONED ORGANIZATION TO BE HELD IN WASHINGTON, D.C. NOV. TWENTY NEXT.

ON NOV. SIXTEEN LAST, HUGGINS DISCUSSED THIS MATTER WITH BPP CHAIRMAN BOBBY SEALE IN NEW YORK INFORMING HIM OF THE REQUEST AND THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS BEING RUN BY ALL BLACK WOMEN AND ALL OF THE SPEAKERS TO APPEAR WERE TO BE BLACK. REPORTEDLY THE ROUND TRIP FARE FOR TWO WOULD BE PROVIDED IN THE EVENT HUGGINS CAN APPEAR.

END PAGE ONE

EX 100 REC- 36 100-465405-

cc to IDIU Adm

NOV 19 1971

SF 157-0

HUGGINS TOLD SEALE THAT JULIAN BOND, NEGRO GEORGIA STATE LEGISLATOR, WAS AMONG THE LIST OF SPEAKERS. OTHERS WERE NOT IDENTIFIED.

SEALE MADE NO DECISION AT THIS TIME AS TO THE POSSIBLE APPEARANCE OF HUGGINS.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Informant

SOURCE IS [redacted]

WFO ADVISE LOGICAL AUTHORITIES OF SCHEDULED RALLY AND DEMONSTRATION.

ATLANTA INFORM WFO IF DATA AVAILABLE INDICATING ATTENDANCE OF JULIAN BOND.

FOR INFO OF NEW YORK, SEALE WAS REACHED IN NEW YORK AT TELEPHONE NUMBER TWO ONE TWO - [illegible] - [illegible] ZERO ZERO, EXTENSION THREE FOUR THREE FOUR, BELIEVED TO BE OFFICE OR RESIDENCE OF MARTIN KENNER.

SAN FRANCISCO WILL ADVISE WFO IF INFO RECEIVED INDICATING TRAVEL BY HUGGINS TO WASHINGTON FOR THIS MATTER.

END...

HOLD

MR. TRAINOR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 18 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
[illegible]
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss [illegible]
Miss Gandy

NR 005 IP PLAIN

719 PM NITEL 11/18/71 SRM

TO DIRECTOR, FBI (ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIV.)

WFO (100-54927)

FROM INDIANAPOLIS (100-23792)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOV. TWENTY, NEXT, WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT. OO: WFO.

A CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT, WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIBLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED NOV. EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN INDIVIDUALS WILL BE ATTENDING CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION FROM INDIANA UNIVERSITY BLOOMINGTON, IND. INDIVUDUALS WILL REPRESENT BLOOMINGTON ABORTION ACTION COMMITTEE. INCLUDED IN THOSE TRAVELING WILL BE APPROXIMATELY FIVE MEMBERS OF THE YOUND SOCIALIST ALLIANCE FROM INDIANA UNIVERSITY WHO ARE SUPPORTING DEMONSTRATION. INDIVIDUALS

END PAGE ONE

REC-59

EX-100

100-466106-12

1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

WILL BE TRAVELING IN TWO FORD ECONOLINE VANS RENTED FROM U-HAUL.

ADMIN:

rev. 7

RE WFO AIRTEL NOV. FIVE LAST.

END

LRS FBI WASHDC CLR

cc - Horner

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Toison
Mr. Felt
[illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
[illegible]
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 001 SA CODE

2:47AM NITEL 11-18-71 DET

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON FIELD (100-54927)

FROM SAN ANTONIO (100-12995) 3P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER TWENTY, SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D. C. IS - NEW LEFT. OO: WAYINGTON FIELD.

6

RE WASHINGTON FIELD ~~NITEL~~ per 11, NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN, LAST, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE, AND SAN ANTONIO TEL, NOVEMBER FIFTEEN, LAST, CAPTIONED "DAILY DEATH TOLL PROJECT, WASHINGTON, D. C., COMMENCING NOVEMBER EIGHT, SEVENTYONE, SPONSORED BY WAR RESISTERS LEAGUE, FELLOWSHIP OF RECONCILIATION, AND CLERGY AND

REC-18 -468406-1

EX NOV 22 1971

END PAGE ONE

190 "~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible] data [illegible]~~"

57 NOV 26 1971

SA 100-12995

PAGE TWO

LAYMEN CONCERNED ABOUT VIETNAM, IS - NEW LEFT: VIDEM."

RE SAN ANTONIO TEL CONTAINS INFORMATION FROM SOURCES THAT NO ONE FROM AUSTIN, TEXAS, WILL GO TO WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR DAILY DEATH TOLL PROJECT AND THAT ONLY TEXAS ACTION WAS IN AUSTIN ON NOVEMBER FIFTEEN, LAST, ALL DUE TO LACK OF INTEREST.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, KEVIN MC GREEVEY, TRANSPORTATION ENTERPRISES, INC., AUSTIN, TEXAS, ADVISED NO BUSES HAVE BEEN RENTED AND NONE WILL BE RENTED FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D. C., AND RETURN SINCE NO BUSES AVAILABLE.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, Informant [redacted] ADVISED SOURCE HAS NO KNOWLEDGE OF ANYONE GOING TO WASHINGTON, D. C., FOR CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN, INSTANT, LIEUTENANT BOLTON GREGORY, INTELLIGNECE, PD, AUSTIN, ADVISED AUSTIN WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COMMITTEE UNSUCCESSFULLY TRIED TO GET SUPPORT FOR

END PAGE TWO

CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION. LIEUTENANT GREGORY BELIEVES AS MANY AS THREE OR FOUR MAY GO TO WASHINGTON, IDENTITIES UNKNOWN.

NO FURTHER INVESTIGATION BEING CONDUCTED.

RUC

END

WJM FBI WA

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

[illegible]
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop ✓
[illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 002 HO CODE

10:40 AM URGENT 11-19-71 IRV

TO DIRECTOR, ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

WFO 100-54927

FROM HOUSTON 100-12404

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT.

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN, LAST, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN PERSONS FROM HOUSTON YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA) GROUP IN HOUSTON PLAN TO JOIN CHARTERED BUS FROM AUSTIN, TEXAS, AND PROCEED TO DEMONSTRATION IN WASHINGTON, D.C., SCHEDULED FOR NOVEMBER TWENTY, NEXT PERTAINING TO ABORTION. SOURCE ADVISED IN ADDITION TO PERSONS RIDING CHARTERED BUS, THREE MEMBERS OF HOUSTON YSA WILL BE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON IN THEIR PERSONAL CARS.

REC-59 15

THE HOUSTON CONTINGENT IS SCHEDULED TO RETURN TO

END PAGE ONE 190

57 NOV 26 1971

HO 100-12404

PAGE TWO

[illegible] UPON COMPLETION OF DEMONSTRATION ACTIVITIES IN WASHINGTON, D.C.

ADMINISTRATIVE: SOURCE MENTIONED ABOVE IS [redacted] Informant.

RE HOUSTON AIRTEL, NOVEMBER NINE, LAST. P

END

NR8 FBI WA DC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Bishop
- Mr. Miller, E.S.
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Dalbey
- Mr. Cleveland
- Mr. Ponder
- Mr. Bates
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Walters
- Mr. Soyars
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

NR006 PH CODE

150AM NITEL 11-19-71 JJR

TO DIRECTOR ATTN: DOMINTEL

WFO (100-54927)

FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-53818) (P)

Smith

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WOMAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT (OO: WFO)

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN LAST A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFO IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT NO CHARTER HAS BEEN PLACED WITH GREYHOUND LINES BY THE WOMEN UNITED FOR ABORTION RIGHTS" (WUFAR) OR RELATED GROUPS.

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN LAST A SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT A REQUEST FOR TEN BUSES WAS MADE WITH THE PUBLIC SERVICE COORDINATED TRANSPORTATION BY "WUFAR", BUT THE COMPANY COULD NOT PROVIDE THE SESIRED NUMBER OF BUSES SO THE ORDER WAS NOT TAKEN.

REC-18 100-468406-14

NOV 22 1971

ON NOVEMBER SEVENTEEN LAST, A THIRD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFO IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE "WUFAR" PLACED A DEPOSIT WITH THE TRENTON PHILADELPHIA COACH

END PAGE ONE

60 NOV 26 1971

190

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

COMPANY, A SEPTA SUBSIDIARY, FOR THE CHARTER OF NINE BUSES TO LEAVE FROM PHILADELPHIA AT SEVEN A.M., NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. THE BALANCE OF THE BILL WAS TO BE PAID ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN SEVENTYONE BY SHEILA OSTROW OF THE WUFAR AT ONE ONE ONE FIVE WALNUT STREET, PHILADELPHIA. ~~Pa~~ D.C.

MEMBER of Women United for Abortion Right

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN SEVENTYONE THIS SOURCE ADVISED THE WUFAR CANCELLED THE CHARTER OF THE NINE BUSES WITH NO INDICATION THAT ANOTHER MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION WAS BEING UTILIZED.

ON NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN SEVENTYONE, BY MEANS OF A SUITABLE PRETEXT AT THE OFFICE OF THE WUFAR, IT WAS DETERMINED THAT AS OF THIS DATE THE WUFAR WAS STILL OFFERING BUS SERVICE TO WASHINGTON, D.C. THE BUSES ARE DUE TO DEPART PHILADELPHIA AT SEVEN A.M., NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT AND RETURN TO PHILADEPHIA LEAVING WASHINGTON, D.C., AT SIX P.M., NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT.

ADMINISTRATIVE: RE WFO AIRTEL TO BUREAU DATED NOVEMBER FIVE LAST.

END PAGE TWO

FIRST CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS [redacted] CHARTER AGENT, GREYHOUND LINES, PHILADELPHIA.

SECOND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS [redacted], CHARTER AGENT, PUBLIC SERVICE COORDINATED TRANSPORTATION OF NEW JERSEY.

THIRD CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE IS [redacted]

Sources

PHILADELPHIA INDICES CONTAIN NO LISTING FOR SHEILA OSTROW UNDER THAT SPELLING.

PHILADELPHIA WILL CONTINUE TO FOLLOW THE ACTIVITIES CONCERNING THE PROPOSED BUS SERVICE TO WASHINGTON, D.C.

END

WA...

WA PLS ACK FOR TEL

DCW

FBI WASH DC

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 11/15/71

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-43809) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC),
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D. C.,
AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
IS - NEW LEFT

Re Boston letter to Philadelphia, 9/30/71 (IO), captioned "JUDITH KLEINBERG, SM - SWP" and San Francisco airtel and LHM, 11/12/71 (no copy Philadelphia).
sw 26

Enclosed for San Francisco is a copy of Boston summary report concerning former Boston subject JUDITH KLEINBERG who it is believed is identical with the JUDY KLEINBERG mentioned in re airtel and LHM.

91

4 - Bureau (RM)
  (2 - 100-468540) (JUDITH KLEINBERG)
2 - Philadelphia (RM)
  (JUDITH KLEINBERG)
4 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (RM)
  (2 - 100-71464)
  (2 - JUDY KLEINBERG)
4 - Boston (2 - 100-43809)
  (2 - 100-43175) (JUDITH KLEINBERG)
AVS:mej
(14)

35

2 NOV 22 1971

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

For the information of Philadelphia, re San Francisco LHM related to a scheduled demonstration of captioned group 11/20/71 in the San Francisco area and noted that a JUDY KLEINBERG who has been in the San Francisco area since 10/30/71 and is formerly from Massachusetts was publicity coordinator for captioned group in San Francisco.

Philadelphia is requested to forward to San Francisco a copy of photograph enclosed to Philadelphia in re letter to enable San Francisco to establish whether the JUDY KLEINBERG mentioned in re San Francisco communication is identical with Boston subject JUDITH KLEINBERG.

Philadelphia should also establish through postal or other sources whether JUDITH KLEINBERG has furnished any indication of a change of address from 6606 North 11th St., Philadelphia, which address she had listed as a change effective 9/23/71 when she moved from the Boston area.

If the above identification is established by San Francisco, that office is requested to determine KLEINBERG's residence and employment status and advise Boston and Philadelphia in order that Boston may submit FD-128.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 17 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR014 BS CODE

7:54 PM NITEL 11-17-71 DAD

TO: DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMINTEL)

WFO

FROM: BOSTON 100-43809

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER TWENTY, SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS DASH NEW LEFT, (OO: WFO).

A SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ON NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST, ADVISED THAT MATILDE ZIMMERMAN, PHONE NUMBER FIVE FOUR SEVEN DASH ONE EIGHT ONE EIGHT OF BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION, FIVE FIVE TWO MASS. AVE., CAMBRIDGE, MASS. ROOM NINE, HAD ORDERED FIVE BUSES WITH A FORTYFIVE PERSON CAPACITY EACH FROM THE BRUSH HILL TRANSPORTATION COMPANY, DORCHESTER, BOSTON, MASS. FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D.C. NOVEMBER NINETEEN NEXT. A FIFTEEN HUNDRED DOLLAR CASH DEPOSIT AGAINST A TOTAL COST OF THIRTYFIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS WAS MADE NOVEMBER FIFTEEN LAST. THE BUSES ARE SCHEDULED TO DEPART FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. APPROXIMATELY NINE PM, NOVEMBER

END PAGE ONE

REC-35 100-40[illegible]-36

16 NOV 23 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

NINETEEN NEXT FROM A PARKING LOT OF THE PURITY SUPREME MARKET, GREEN STREET, CAMBRIDGE. COST OF ROUND TRIP TICKET IS EIGHTEEN DOLLARS.

A SECOND SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ON INSTANT DATE, ADVISED THAT THE BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION WAS FORMED OUT OF THE LOCAL FEMALE LIBERATION GROUP AND WHILE THIS COALITION IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY MADE UP OF SOCIALIST WORKER PARTY, (SWP) BOSTON AND YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE OF BOSTON (YSA-B) FEMALE MEMBERS, IT IS CONTROLLED BY MEMBERS OF THOSE GROUPS.

ACCORDING TO THE LATTER SOURCE, MATILDE MILES, NEE ZIMMERMAN WAS THE SWP BOSTON MEMBER HEADING UP LOCAL SWP DASH YSA WORK IN THE COALITION AND SHE AND EVELYN CLARK ANOTHER SWP BOSTON MEMBER HAD LEFT OR WERE PLANNING TO LEAVE FOR WASHINGTON, D.C. TO HELP IN THE ORGANIZING OF THE NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION DEMONSTRATION AT WASHINGTON, D.C. BOTH PLANNED

END PAGE TWO

BS 100-43809

PAGE THREE

TO REMAIN IN WASHINGTON, D.C. THROUGH THE DEMONSTRATION. THIS LATTER SOURCE FURTHER ADVISED THAT AT A MEETING OF THE SWP, BOSTON HELD NOVEMBER SIXTEEN LAST, IT WAS REPORTED THAT THE LOCAL WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION WAS HOPING TO FILL FOUR BUSES WITH PARTICIPANTS FOR TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, D.C. FOR THE NOVEMBER TWENTY DEMONSTRATION BUT THAT A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF ACTUAL PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT KNOWN.

THE NEW ENGLAND TELEPHONE LISTING SERVICE, ADVISED THAT PHONE NUMBER FOUR NINE ONE DASH ONE ZERO SEVEN ONE, IS LISTED TO FEMALE LIBERATION FIVE FIVE TWO MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, CAMBRIDG, AND THAT NUMBER FIVE FOUR SEVEN DASH ONE EIGHT ONE EIGHT IS LISTED TO THE BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION AT THAT SAME ADDRESS.

THE BOSTON SWP IS THE LOCAL AFFILIATE AND FOLLOWS THE AIMS AND PURPOSES OF THE NATIONAL SWP. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

THE YSA-B IS THE BOSTON AFFILIATE OF THE YSA, THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP).

END PAGE THREE

BS 100-43809

PAGE FOUR

AGENT MARK BROWN, SECRET SERVICE BOSTON, WAS ADVISED OF THE ABOVE ON INSTANT DATE.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE WFO AIRTEL NOVEMBER FIVE SEVENTYONE.

THE FIRST SOURCE IS CAPT. JOSEPH AHERN, SUBVERSIVE UNIT, MASS. STATE POLICE.

THE SECOND SOURCE IS Informant [redacted]

BOSTON FOLLOWING AND WILL PROVIDE BUREAU AND WFO ANY PERTINENT DEVELOPMENTS.

ONE COPY EACH OF PHOTOGRAPH OF MILES AND CLARK BEING FORWARDED SEPARATELY TO WFO VIA AIRTEL. MILES IS FORMER SUBJECT WFO FILE ONE ZERO ZERO DASH FOUR SEVEN FIVE FOUR SIX.

END.

LRS FBI WASHDC CLR

cc — Korner

FE... BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room

NR 017 BA CODED

11:32 PM NITEL 11-19-71 HJS

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMINTEL)

WFO (100-54927)

FROM BALTIMORE (100-29231) RUC

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS - NEW LEFT (OO: WFO)

ON NOVEMBER NINETEEN, SEVENTYONE, A SOURCE RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND THREE ZERO TWO EIGHT GREENMOUNT AVE., BALTIMORE, MARYLAND, HAD HOPED TO CHARTER A BUS TO TRANSPORT PARTICIPANTS TO CAPTIONED RALLY, BUT LACK OF INTREST MAKES USE OF A BUD DOUBTFUL.

A SECOND SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, STATED THAT REPRESENTATIVES OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION HAD ATTEMPTED TO SOLICIT SUPPORT FOR CAPTIONED RALLY AMONG CITY COLLECTIVES WITH LITTLE SUCCESS.

A THIRD SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THERE WAS LITTLE [illegible] RALLY AMONG BALTIMORE AREA RESIDENTS AND FEW PARTICIPANTS WERE EXPECTED TO ATTEND FROM BALTIMORE AREA.

ADMINISTRATIVE: FIRST SOURCE IS [redacted] Informant. SECOND SOURCE IS [redacted] Informant. THIRD SOURCE IS [redacted] Source [redacted] NO LHM FOLLOWS. REC- 35

RE WFO AIRTEL TO DIRECTOR, NOVEMBER FIVE, SEVENTYONE.

END

14

54DEC 1 1971

cc to SDU

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 19 1971

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes

020 CG CODE

1020PM NITEL 11-19-71 EOM

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DID)

WFO (100-54927)

FROM CHICAGO (100-52028)

Hoker
T. Forsyth

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS - NEW LEFT.

RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED NOVEMBER EIGHTEEN LAST, THAT ILLINOIS WOMENS ABORTION COALITION (IWAC) HAS SOLD APPROXIMATELY TWENTY SEATS ON CHARTERED TRAILWAYS BUS WHICH WILL DEPART CG LATE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER NINETEEN INSTANT, FOR CAPTIONED MATTER AT WASHINGTON, D.C. IWAC HOPES TO FILL ONE BUS AND POSSIBLY ANOTHER BUT NEED FOR SECOND BUS AT THIS TIME IS DOUBTFUL. TENTATIVE PLANS ARE FOR BUS TO RETURN TO CG LATE AFTERNOON NOVEMBER TWENTY NEXT.

EX-100 REC- 36

ADMINISTRATIVE

NOV 23 1971

RE WASHINGTON FIELD AIRTEL NOVEMBER FIVE LAST.

CHICAGO SOURCE IS [redacted] Informant

END

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

FBI

Date: 11/20/71

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

To: Director, FBI

From: SAC, WFO ([redacted])

ATTENTION:

☐ CIVIL RIGHTS SECTION
GENERAL INVEST. DIV.
☒ DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIV.

Subject: UNSUB; Threat to Bomb
United States Capitol
Washington, D.C. 11/20/71

Re WFO airtel and LHM, 11/12/71, captioned "Woman's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAC) Sponsored Demonstration, 11/20/71, Washington, D.C., IS-New Left" (WFOfile 100-54927)

☐ CR ☐ EL ☐ DIH ☐ CRA-64
☐ PA ☐ PE ☐ PF ☐ E
☐ EID ☒ Bomb Threats ☐ Extremist Matters
☐ White Hate ☐ Black

Summary of Complaint:

Enclosed are original and 6 copies of LHM dated and captioned as above and original and one copy of FD-376.

LHM is being furnished to local agencies by WFO. Telephone call received at WFO by SA JAMES P. WOOTEN.

Information re receipt of bomb threat and results of search was telephonically furnished to Bureau.

At 12:20 p.m., 11/20/71, an unidentified individual, possibly a white female, called Communications Dispatch Service, MPD, and told Officer HORN: "Members of the D Tribe and the Woman's Liberation March, while posing as tourists going through the Capitol, are going to plant a bomb between 1500 hours and 1530 hours. This will be done during the tour."

ACTION: UACB:

☒ No further action being taken and
☒ LHM enclosed ☐ Copy furnished to USA Washington, D.C.
☒ FD-376 (enclosure to LHM)
☐ LHM being submitted
☐ Report being submitted
☐ Preliminary investigation instituted
☐ Limited investigation instituted

2 - Bureau (Enc. 7)
3 - WFO
(1 - [illegible])
(1 - [illegible])
Th[illegible]
(5)

1 - CD + ID 694-6
11-24-71
1-SS
1-EID

174-0

64 — 1906D

100-468406 —

3813

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ENCLOSURE

NOT RECORDED
4 DEC 2 1971

NOV [illegible] 1971

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

NW 88321 DocId:32989546 Page 64

The attention of the Bureau is directed to re WFO airtel and LHM, 11/12/71, captioned "Woman's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAC) Sponsored Demonstration, 11/20/71, Washington, D.C.; IS-New Left". (WFO 100-5492) which may pertain to the same threat. The message read:

"Woman's Abortion
bomb
Nov. 20
3 27."

The message suggest the bomb would detonate at 3:27 on November 20, which is within the 1500 - 1530 hours on 11/20/71.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

November 20, 1971

UNKNOWN SUBJECT
THREAT TO BOMB UNITED STATES CAPITOL
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOVEMBER 20, 1971
BOMB THREAT

At 12:45 p.m. Mike De Sanctis, Intelligence Division, Metropolitan Police Department, Washington, D.C., telephonically advised a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation that at 12:20 hours (12:20 p.m.) November 20, 1971, a call was received by Officer Horn of the Communications Dispatch Service, Metropolitan Police Department from an unidentified individual, possibly a white female, who stated: "Members of the B Tribe and the Women's Liberation March, while posing as tourist going through the Capitol, are going to plant a bomb between 1500 hours and 1530 hours. This will be done during the tour today." De Sanctis stated Lieutenant Abernathy of the Capitol Police had been notified.

12:50 Lieutenant Abernathy
United States Capitol Police (Confirmed)

12:55 Special Agent Larry Boondog
United States Secret Service

1:05 Mr. Toliver
General Services Administration

This document contains neither
recommendations nor conclusions of
the FBI. It is the property of
the FBI and is loaned to your agency;
it and its contents are not to be
distributed outside your agency.

100-468406-
ENCLOSURE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

[illegible] INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 20 1971

TELETYPE

NR 004 WF CODE

850 PM NITEL 11-20-71 ALM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BOSTON

CHICAGO

CLEVELAND

NEW HAVEN

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-54927) 5P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, WASHINGTON, D.C. IS - NEW LEFT.

11-1

ON INSTANT DATE SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OBSERVED THE FOLLOWING:

AT APPROXIMATELY TEN A.M. WOMEN REPRESENTING VARIOUS WOMEN'S GROUPS FROM BOSTON, NEW HAVEN, NEW YORK, CLEVELAND, CHICAGO, AND OTHER CITIES BEGAN GATHERING ON THE ELLIPSE IN WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC). THE ASSEMBLED GROUP DEPARTED THE ELLIPSE AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE TEN P.M., AT WHICH TIME THE GROUP NUMBERED ABOUT FIFTEEN HUNDRED.

REC-21 100-[illegible]-106-3

2 NOV 24 1971

FROM THE ELLIPSE THE GROUP PROCEEDED NORTH ON SEVENTEENTH STREET, NORTHWEST, EAST ON H STREET, SOUTH ON FIFTEENTH STREET

END PAGE ONE

[illegible]

[illegible] CODE

WFO 100-54927

PAGE TWO

TO PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, AND EAST ON PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE TO THE WEST FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES (U.S.) CAPITOL.

DURING THE MARCH FROM THE ELLIPSE TO THE CAPITOL THE GROUP WALKED APPROXIMATELY TWENTY ABREAST, DISPLAYING SIGNS SUCH AS QUOTE RHODE ISLAND WOMEN FOR ABORTION REFORM END QUOTE, QUOTE MY BODY NOT THE STATES END QUOTE, QUOTE EVERY CHILD A WANTED CHILD END QUOTE, QUOTE FREE ABORTION ON DEMAND END QUOTE, QUOTE DEFEND SHIRLEY WHEELER END QUOTE, QUOTE KEEP THE STATE OUT OF MY VIRGINIA (SIC) END QUOTE, QUOTE SEVEN GAY WOMEN END QUOTE, QUOTE BOSTON, REPEAL ALL ABORTION LAWS END QUOTE QUOTE DO NOT LABOR UNDER RESTRICTIONS END QUOTE, AND QUOTE WILSON HIGH SCHOOL END QUOTE.

DURING THE GATHERING ON THE ELLIPSE THERE WERE TWO TABLES OF SOCIALIST PARTY (SWP) LITERATURE SET UP CONTAINING PAMPHLETS READING, QUOTE VOTE FOR SWP FOR SEVENTY TWO END QUOTE, AND OTHER LEAFLETS ADVOCATING LINDA JENESS FOR PRESIDENT AND ANDREW PULLEY FOR VICE PRESIDENT. FOUR SWP LITERATURE TABLES WERE ALSO SET UP AT RALLY SITE AT WEST FRONT ON THE CAPITOL.

END PAGE TWO

2

SHORTLY AFTER THE GROUP LEFT THE ELLIPSE A SMALL AIRCRAFT FLEW OVER MARCH ROUTE TRAILING A SIGN READING, QUOTE ABORTION KILLS LIFE ~~LEFT~~ END QUOTE.

SHORTLY AFTER ONE THIRTY P.M., THE MARCHERS ASSEMBLED AT WEST FRONT OF CAPITOL WHERE THEY LISTENED TO MUSIC PROVIDED BY THE NEW HAVEN WOMEN'S LIBERATION ROCK BAND. ABOUT TWO P.M., THE FOLLOWING SPEAKERS WERE HEARD IN THIS ORDER:

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

DOCTOR BARABARA ROBERTS, WONAAC PROJECT DIRECTOR:; MARCIA COLEMAN, BLACK TASK FORCE; BEULAH SANDERS, NATIONAL WELFARE RIGHTS ORGANIZATION; SHIRLEY WHEELER, CONVICTED ABORTION LAW VIOLATOR, STATE OF FLORIDA; LANA CLARKE DAVIS, WHO STATED SHE HAD AN ABORTION THIRTY YEARS AGO IN FLORIDA; LINDA JENNESS, SWP PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE, NINETEEN SEVENTY TWO; MARGE SLOAN, A BLACK FEMALE; JOYCE BROWN, NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED; DOCTOR ANN CLAY, FLORIDA ABORTION GROUP; CAROL HENDERSON EVANS, BOSTON WOMEN'S LIBERATION; LINDA DINEEN, FROM CANADA, WHO AVERRED THAT CANADIAN ABORTION LAWS ARE REPRESSIVE; STEPHANIE COONTZ, NATIONAL PEACE ACTION COALITION; AND NANCY STEARN, LAWYER FOR SHIRLEY WHEELER. THE ABOVE LISTED SPEAKERS IN GENERAL ADVANCED THE THEME THAT ALL

END PAGE THREE

3

WFO 100-54927

PAGE FOUR

ANTI-ABORTION LAWS SHOULD BE REPEALED, THAT A WOMAN'S BODY IS NOT PUBLIC PROPERTY, AND THAT WOMEN MUST UNITE POLITICALLY TO STRIKE DOWN PRESENT ABORTION LAWS.

THE RALLY CONCLUDED AT APPPROXIMATELY FOUR P.M., AT WHICH TIME THE CROWD HAD DIMINISHED TO ABOUT THREE HUNDRED.

A SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THERE WERE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE NEW YORK SPARTACIST LEAGUE, THE PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY, AND KALAMAZOO WOMEN'S LIBERATION IN ATTENDANCE AT THE RALLY. SOURCE ADDED THAT ANNOUNCEMENT FROM SPEAKERS PLATFORM PROCLAIMED WONAAC WAS FIFTEEN THOUSAND DOLLARS IN DEBT AND ASKED FOR CONTRIBUTIONS.

SHORTLY AFTER ONE THIRTY P.M. AN ANTI ABORTION GROUP OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED FIFTY TO TWO HUNDRED PERSONS ARRIVED AT THE EAST SIDE OF U.S. CAPITOL CARRYING PLACARDS READING, QUOTE THE RIGHT TO HAPPINESS FOR UNBORN BABIES END QUOTE, QUOTE LOVE LIFE, SAVE BABIES END QUOTE AND QUOTE TO HELL WITH BELLA END QUOTE. THIS GROUP OPPOSING CAPTIONED RALLY DEMONSTRATED PEACEFULLY AND DEPARTED AREA AT ABOUT TWO TEN P.M.

END PAGE FOUR

WFO 100-54927

PAGE FIVE

CAPTIONED DEMONSTRATION WAS PEACEFUL THROUGHOUT MARCH AND RALLY AND CONCLUDED WITHOUT INCIDENT.

U.S. CAPITOL POLICE, PARK POLICE, SECRET SERVICE, AND METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, WDC, COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

AGENTS OBSERVING DEMONSTRATION WERE WILLIAM C. ARMS, WILLIAM T. BROOKS, RICHARD C. COFFMAN, NORMAN H. HIERONYMI, MASON B. NOAH, JR., AND WILLIAM T. TUCKER.

Informant

SOURCE IS [redacted]. NO LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM FOLLOWS.

AIR MAIL COPIES TO ATLANTA, BALTIMORE, CINCINNATI, DETROIT, INDIANAPOLIS, KANSAS CITY, PITTSBURGH, AND PHILADELPHIA.

END

JTJ FBI WASH DC

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
SECTION
NOV 20 1971

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

ES

NR 004 SF PLAIN

4/46PM 11-20-71 URGENT MXG

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: SAN FRANCISCO (100-71464) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC); DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY, INSTANT, SAN FRANCISCO, IS -NEW LEFT.

RALLY AT CIVIC CENTER ENDED BY THREE FOURTY-FIVE PM. OFFICAL POLICE ESTIMATE OF CROWD WAS APPROXIMATELY EIGHT HUNDRED. SEVERAL HUNDRED YOUNG PEOPLE ATTENDING A SKI SHOW NEARBY WERE MERELY ON-LOOKERS AND NOT PART OF DEMONSTRATION. NO INCIDENTS OR ARREST.

99

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RE SF TEL ELEVEN TWENTY, SEVENTYONE.

au 37 EX-112 REC-32 100-465406-38

SAS OBSERVING WERE EDWARD O'FLYNN AND JAY GRODIN. JERRY WRIGHT, ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH MIG, ADVISED. TOM DICKSON, INTELLIGENCE DETAIL, SOURCE OF OFFICIAL CROWD ESTIMATE.

LHM FOLLOWS.

NOV 23 1971

END

MKA FBI WASH DC

57 DEC 10 1971

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
ES
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

NOV 20 1971

TELETYPE

NR 002 SF PLAIN

1:57 PM ~~URGENT~~ 11/20/71 MCC

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAN FRANCISCO (100-71464) (P) 1P

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER TWENTY INSTANT, SAN FRANCISCO, IS - NEW LEFT.

APPROXIMATELY FIVE HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS, EIGHTY PER CENT OF WHOM WERE YOUNG WOMEN IN THEIR TEENS AND EARLY TWENTIES, GATHERED AT THE EMBARCADERO, SAN FRANCISCO, THIS DATE AND BEGAN MARCHING AT ELEVEN TEN AM FROM EMBARCADERO TO CIVIC CENTER, SAN FRANCISCO, CARRYING SIGNS SUCH AS "FREE OUR WOMEN" AND "SEPARATE CHURCH AND STATE". THE MARCHERS HAVE ARRIVED AT CIVIC CENTER AND A FEMALE ROCK BAND IS PLAYING. CROWD HAS REACHED APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS AT THIS TIME, RALLY IS SCHEDULED FROM TWO TO FOUR PM. NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS.

REC-32 -37

AMINISTRATIVE

DEC 26

RE SAN FRANCISCO AIRTEL NOVEMBER TWELVE LAST.

SAS OBSERVING ARE EDWARD O'FLYNN AND JAY GRODIN. JERRY WRIGHT, ONE HUNDRED FIFTEENTH MIG ADVISED. LIAISON BEING MAINTAINED WITH TOM DICKSON, INTELLIGENCE DETAIL, SAN FRANCISCO PD.

END

JTJ FBI WASH DC

90

1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 11/15/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL (REGISTERED)
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-79014)(P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
11/20/71
Washington, D.C.
IS - NEW LEFT
OO: Washington Field Office

Re Washington Field airtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) to the Bureau dated 11/2/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies and for San Francisco and Washington Field two (2) copies each of a LHM containing information regarding captioned demonstration.

Source [illegible] LHM is [redacted] Informant, and source two in the LHM is [redacted] Informant

Information furnished by sources [illegible] enclosed LHM is classified confidential because the unauthorized disclosure of either the information or the identities of sources would be detrimental to the national defense.

REC-13 46

The suitable pretext referred to in the enclosed LHM consisted of a 11/10/71, telephone conversation by ELEANOR VILLANO, Clerk in the Los Angeles Office, when an unidentified female individual at the Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee, [illegible], under the guise of attempting to obtain information [illegible] the planned 11/20/71, demonstration at San Francisco, California.

2 - Bureau (AM)(RM)(Enc. 8)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)(AM)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (Enc. 2)(AM)(RM)
2 - Los Angeles
RJR/vdb

Sent ______ M Per ______

No information has been developed at Los Angeles indicating that any Los Angeles area individuals plan to attend captioned demonstration in Washington, D. C.

Los Angeles will remain alert for any additional information regarding captioned demonstration.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
November 15, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
November 20, 1971
Washington, D. C.

The WONAAC is self-described in its literature as being formed by the national conference of more than 1,000 women held in New York City, New York, in July 1971. At that conference, women from 29 states and 253 organizations came together to unite their efforts in the national fight for the repeal of all abortion laws and for the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and repeal of contraception laws. The conference called for a massive show of force for these goals in a march on Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, California, November 20, 1971. WONAAC is based on a program of legislative, judicial, and mass demonstration activities on a local and national level, and seeks to unite all women in the fight for the right of abortion.

The September 22, 1971, issue of the "Los Angeles Times", a newspaper of general circulation published daily in Los Angeles, California, contains an article on page 6, part IV, datelined Washington, D. C., entitled "Abortion March Mobilizing", which article states in part as follows:

> "Women from 253 organizations across the country are mobilizing for mass demonstrations here (Washington, D. C.) and in San Francisco in November to support the complete repeal of all abortion laws.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALTION (WONAAC)

> "These groups, which joined in July (1971) to form the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), are organizing a march Nov. 20 (1971) in Washington planned to take them past the White House, the Supreme Court and the Capitol--institutions which they feel can effect significant changes in existing abortion laws. They are expecting what they call a conservative estimate of between 10,000-20,000 persons, but are hoping for thousands more."

On November 10, 1971, source one made available the following leaflet issued by the Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee (LAWAAC), an affiliate of the WONAAC, and annoucing a demonstration to be held November 20, 1971, at San Francisco, California, to protest abortion laws and forced sterilization and restrictive contraception laws.

ASSEMBLE 10:30 A.M. AT EMBARCADERO PLAZA ACROSS FROM FERRY BUILDING AT END OF MARKET STREET

CONFIDENTIAL



JOIN US ON NOVEMBER 20!

Abortion is a woman's right to choose

Join the first national women's* march on

San Francisco

November 20

Repeal anti abortion laws Against forced sterilizaton and restrictive contraception laws

EVERY STATE IN THE UNITED STATES HAS LAWS ON THE BOOKS WHICH RESTRICT THE RIGHT OF WOMEN TO OBTAIN ABORTIONS. WE BELIEVE THAT ALL SUCH LAWS DENY US ONE OF OUR MOST BASIC RIGHTS -- THE RIGHT TO CONTROL OUR OWN BODIES; THE RIGHT TO CONTROL OUR OWN LIVES. RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS PROVIDE THE BASIS OF LEGALIZED MURDER OF THOUSANDS OF WOMEN. INVOLUNTARY STERILIZATIONS ARE THE PRICE POOR WOMEN ARE OFTEN FORCED TO PAY IN ORDER TO OBTAIN SAFE, LEGAL ABORTIONS.

NOW IS THE TIME FOR ALL WOMEN TO COME TOGETHER IN A NATIONALLY-COORDINATED EFFORT TO WIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND DEMOCRATIC RIGHT OF WOMEN TO DECIDE FOR THEMSELVES WHETHER OR NOT THEY WANT TO BEAR CHILDREN, AND TO CONTROL THEIR OWN LIVES.

*SINCE WOMEN WON THE RIGHT TO VOTE.

Please clip and mail to: ✂

Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee / 2936 W. 8th Street (3rd floor)
Los Angeles, California 90005 / (213) 487-7696

☐ I endorse the Campaign and the March on Nov. 20
☐ I want/can provide transportion to San Francisco
☐ I just want to help; put me on the mailing list
☐ Enclosed find donation of __________ *Funds Urgently Needed!!*

☐ FIND ENCLOSED $14.00 FOR ROUND TRIP BUS TICKET

CONFIDENTIA

Name: __________ Phone __________ Address __________ City / Zip __________

Organization __________ School __________ Occupation __________

3

VOLUNTEERS NEEDED! ALL WOMEN WELCOME! JOIN US! Office open 7 days a week · meetings, 8:00 p.m. Wednesdays

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

It was ascertained by means of a suitable pretext by a representative of the FBI on November 10, 1971, that the LAWAAC plans to charter a bus from Los Angeles to San Francisco for Los Angeles individuals interested in participating in the above November 20, 1971, demonstration in San Francisco. The bus is scheduled to depart Los Angeles at 10:00 p.m., on November 19, 1971, and to depart San Francisco after the demonstration at 10:00 p.m., November 20, 1971. The cost of a round trip ticket on a bus will be $14.00.

The November 11, 1971, issue of the "UCLA Daily Bruin", the official campus newspaper of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA), 405 Hilgard Avenue, Los Angeles, contained an article on page 2 entitled "Symposium Presents Views on Women's Roles in Society", which article indicated that Dr. Barbara Roberts was one of a number of speakers at a "teach-in" symposium on women held at UCLA. According to the article, Dr. Roberts talks about her work as a volunteer doctor in an abortion clinic in Washington, D. C. The article indicated that WONAAC would sponsor simultaneous demonstrations in San Francisco and Washington, D. C., on November 20, 1971, to protest abortion laws.

The November 12, 1971, issue of "The Militant" contained an article on page 5 entitled "Building for Nov. 20" which article describes Dr. Barbara Roberts as the National Project Director of WONAAC.

"The Militant" is the weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The above November 11, 1971, issue of the "UCLA Daily Bruin" further indicated that another speaker at the "teach-in" symposium of women at UCLA was Olga Rodriguez, Calif described by the article as a member of WONAAC. According to the article, RODRIGUEZ "spoke out against laws which harm

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION
and socialist worker party

CONFIDENTIAL

women and children and laws which make some Black and nonwhite women turn to sterilization as an answer to birth control.

On November 11, 1971, source two advised that Olga Rodriguez is a currently active member of the Los Angeles Local - Socialist Workers Party (LAL - SWP) and the Los Angeles Branch - Young Socialist Alliance (LAB - YSA).

The LAL - SWP has been in existence since the 1930's. The LAL - SWP is a local branch of the SWP.

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in the Los Angeles area (LAB - YSA) is actually the youth organization of the SWP and follows the SWP aims and purposes to the letter.

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

According to the masthead of "The Young Socialist Organizer" it is described as "A bi-weekly action publication of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
November 15, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-79914

Title	WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION November 20, 1971 Washington, D. C.
Character	
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

FBI

Date: 11/17/71

Transmit the following in [illegible]
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

017(136) to SF
cons/BW
6/6/72

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (157-0)(P)

AKA: Women's [illegible]

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION COALITION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
EM
OO: Washington Field Office

Informant a highly confidential source, furnished the following information 11/15/71.

A female individual by the name of BILLY NOBLE (phonetic) of the Women's National Abortion Coalition in Washington, D.C. was in contact with BPP National Headquarters Oakland, California speaking with ERICKA HUGGINS.

[illegible] to know whether [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] informed [illegible]

[illegible] promised to [illegible] [illegible].

100 [illegible] - 46X

REC [illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible] (RM)
4 - Washington Field Office (RM)
[illegible] - San Francisco
(1 - 157-[illegible])(ERICKA HUGGINS)
(1 - 100-53950)(BOBBY SEALE)
(1 - 157-2974)([illegible])
(1 - 157-[illegible])([illegible])
JAC:sl
(11)

NOV 19 1971

EXT. INT. SEC.

58 NOV 30 1971

SF 157-0
JAC:sl

Source stated that later on 11/15/71, an individual by the name of HANNAH (LNU) also contacted ERICKA HUGGINS at BPP National Headquarters regarding this same matter and also wanted to know if the BPP had decided to endorse the 11/20/71 demonstration by the Women's National Abortion Coalition. HUGGINS said she did not know what position the Party would take in this regard.

Source also advised that subsequently HUGGINS was in contact with LESLIE JOHNSON, secretary to BPP Chairman BOBBY SEALE, wanted to know if JOHNSON had as yet been able to talk to Chairman about her possible appearance in Washington. JOHNSON told HUGGINS that she has been unable to do so inasmuch as SEALE was on a speaking tour in North Carolina, but she promised to discuss the matter with SEALE when she next hears from him.

No additional information has been received from source with respect to this matter to indicate a positive committment for an appearance by HUGGINS as indicated.

Washington Field identify the captioned group and contact sources regarding the noted demonstration scheduled for Washington and furnish appropriate information to the bureau and logical law enforcement agencies.

San Francisco will advise of any information developed indicating possible travel to Washington by ERICKA HUGGINS or any other BPP personality for this demonstration.

FBI

Date: 11/17/71

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (157-0)(P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION COALITION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
EM
OO: Washington Field Office

Informant a highly confidential source, furnished the following information 11/15/71.

A female individual by the name of BILLY NOBLE (phonetic) of the [illegible] in Washington, D.C. was in contact with [illegible] Oakland, California speaking with ERICKA HUGGINS.

NOBLE wanted to know whether or not HUGGINS would [illegible] 11/20/71, to participate in a [illegible]

[illegible] NOBLE [illegible] she receives [illegible]

2 - Bureau (RM)
4 - Washington Field Office (RM)
5 - San Francisco
(1 - 157-[illegible])(ERICKA HUGGINS)
(1 - 100-[illegible])([illegible])
(1 - 157-2874)(Public Appearances)
(1 - 157-4726)(LESLIE JOHNSON)
JRC:sl
(11)

157-

SF 157-0
JAC:sl

Source stated that later on 11/15/71, an individual by the name of HANNAH (LNU) also contacted ERICKA HUGGINS at BPP National Headquarters regarding this same matter and also wanted to know if the BPP had decided to endorse the 11/20/71 demonstration by the Women's National Abortion Coalition. HUGGINS said she did not know what position the Party would take in this regard.

Source also advised that subsequently HUGGINS was in contact with LESLIE JOHNSON, secretary to BPP Chairman BOBBY SEALE, wanted to know if JOHNSON had as yet been able to talk to Chairman about her possible appearance in Washington. JOHNSON told HUGGINS that she has been unable to do so inasmuch as SEALE was on a speaking tour in North Carolina, but she promised to discuss the matter with SEALE when she next hears from him.

No additional information has been received from source with respect to this matter to indicate a positive committment for an appearance by HUGGINS as indicated.

Washington Field identify the captioned group and contact sources regarding the noted demonstration scheduled for Washington and furnish appropriate information to the Bureau and logical law enforcement agencies.

San Francisco will advise of any information developed indicating possible travel to Washington by ERICKA HUGGINS or any other BPP personality for this demonstration.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
~~UNITED~~ STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 12/8/71

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-71464) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
11/20/71, WASHINGTON D. C.,
AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
IS - NEW LEFT

Re San Francisco airtel, 11/12/71; ser. 26 and San Francisco teletypes, 11/20/71, ser. 38

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter. One copy is enclosed for Washington Field for information.

SA EDWARD J. O'FLYNN and SA JAY H. GRODIN observed on 11/20/71.

It is notd that Bureau file 157-23909 also pertains to captioned matter.

TOM DICKSON, Intelligence Detail, San Francisco Police Department, was source of official crowd estimate.

Source utilized in LHM is [redacted] Informant.

LHM is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" because unauthorized disclosure of information contained therein could be prejudicial to the defense interests of the United States.

1 cc enc. 734 9 vd

REC-11 100-468406 - 44

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (Info) (Enc. 1) (RM)
2 - San Francisco
    (1 - 100-55904) (HELEN MEYERS)

ZJ:mba
(5)

DEC 10 1971

AGENCY 55
REQ. REC'D 11 H.O/2 cc's ISD
DATE FORW. 12-16-21
HOW FORW. RS
BY RH-66

DEC 20 1971

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

CONFIDENTIAL

San Francisco, California

December 8, 1971

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON, D.C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Copies of this memo are being disseminated to local intelligence agencies of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

The WONAAC is self-described in its literature as being formed by the national conference of more than 1,000 women held in New York City, New York, in July, 1971. At that conference, women from twenty-nine states and two hundred fifty-three organizations came together to unite their efforts in the national fight for the repeal of all abortion laws and for the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and repeal of contraception laws. The conference called for a massive show of force for these goals in a march on Washington, D.C., and San Francisco, California, November 20, 1971. WONAAC

CONFIDENTIAL

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 100-468406-40

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON D.C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

is based on a program of legislative, judicial, and mass demonstration activities on a local and national level, and seeks to unite all women in the fight for the right of abortion.

On November 20, 1971, Special Agents of the San Francisco Office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed that approximately five hundred individuals, primarily young women in their teens and early twenties, gathered at the Embarcadero, San Francisco, California, and began marching at 11:10 a.m. from the Embarcadero, en route to the Civic Center, San Francisco. They carried signs such as "free our women" and "separate church and state". By 12:30 p.m., the marchers had arrived at the Civic Center where a female rock band was performing. A rally was held at the Civic Center from approximately 1:45 p.m. to 3:30 p.m., addressed by individuals supporting repeal of abortion laws.

There were no incidents or arrests with regard to the march and rally, according to San Francisco Police Department records, and the official police estimate of the crowd attending the rally was approximately eight hundred individuals.

The Sunday, November 21, 1971, edition of the "San Francisco Examiner", a San Francisco, California, daily newspaper, in an article entitled "Pro and Anti-Abortion Forces Hold Rallies", described HELEN MEYERS, one of the speakers at the Civic Center rally, as Regional Coordinator for WONAAC.

WOMEN's NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION,
NOVEMBER 20, 1971,
WASHINGTON D.C., AND
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

On September 22, 1971, a source advised that HELEN MEYERS, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) organizer in Los Angeles, California, transferred to the SWP in Berkeley, California, effective August 31, 1971.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

6-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
December 8, 1971

Title	WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, NOVEMBER 20, 1971, WASHINGTON, D.C., AND SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Character	
Reference	San Francisco letterhead memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 12/9/71

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-79014)(RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
11/20/71
Washington, D. C.
IS - NEW LEFT
OO: Washington Field Office

Re Los Angeles airtel and letterhead memorandum (LHM) to the Bureau dated 11/15/71. 246

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies, and for San Francisco and Washington Field Office two (2) copies of a LHM containing information regarding captioned demonstration.

The sources utilized in the enclosed LHM are as follows:

Source one [redacted] SOURCE

Source two [redacted] Informant

Information furnished by sources contained in the LHM is classified confidential because the unauthorized disclosure of either the information or identities of sources would be detrimental to the national defense.

No information has been developed at Los Angeles indicating that any Los Angeles, California, area individuals participated in the 11/20/71, demonstration at Washington, D. C.

REC-41

100-7074-2/2D

ST 107

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)(RM)
2 - San Francisco (Enc. 2)(RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-54927)(Enc. 2)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

RJR/vdb
(7)

AGENCY: SS
12-29-71
BY RH

JAN 10 1972

Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
December 9, 1971

*In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.*

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION
November 20, 1971
Washington, D. C.

The WONAAC is self-described in its literature as being formed by the national conference of more than 1,000 women held in New York City, New York, in July 1971. At that conference, women from 29 states and 253 organizations came together to unite their efforts in the national fight for the repeal of all abortion laws and for the corollary demands of no forced sterilization and repeal of contraception laws. The conference called for a massive show of force for these goals in a march on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, California, November 20, 1971. WONAAC is based on a program of legislative, judicial, and mass demonstration activities on a local and national level, and seeks to unite all women in the fight for the right of abortion.

On November 28, 1971, source one advised that on November 19, 1971, a bus chartered by the Los Angeles Women's Abortion Action Committee (LAWAAC) transported approximately fifty Los Angeles, California, area individuals from Los Angeles to San Francisco to participate in a demonstration held in that city on November 20, 1971, and sponsored by WONAAC to protest abortion laws, forced sterilization, and restrictive contraception laws. This bus left Los Angeles at approximately 10:00 p.m., on November 19, 1971, and returned to the Los Angeles area during the evening of November 20, 1971.

100-46[illegible]-45

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Source one further advised that among those who traveled to San Francisco with this group were Dave Chamberlin, Richard Geyer, Carole Newcomb, Dave Gooler, Olga Rodriguez, Rachele Fruit, Peter Cooper, and Jack Barrett, all of whom are members of the Los Angeles Local - Socialist Workers Party (LAL - SWP), and Jane Gooler, a member of the Los Angeles Branch - Young Socialist Alliance (LAB - YSA). According to source, Geyer, Newcomb, Dave Gooler, Rodriguez, and Fruit are also members of the LAB - YSA.

> The LAL - SWP has been in existence since the 1930's. The LAL - SWP is a local branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).
>
> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
>
> The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in the Los Angeles area (LAB - YSA) is actually the youth organization of the SWP and follows the SWP aims and purposes to the letter.
>
> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."
>
> According to the masthead of "The Young Socialist Organizer" it is described as "A bi-weekly action publication of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

On November 28, 1971, and November 29, 1971, sources one and two advised that LAWAAC, an affiliate of WONAAC, is dominated and con-controlled by members of the LAL - SWP and the LAB - YSA.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Los Angeles, California
December 9, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-79014

Title	WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, November 20, 1971, Washington, D. C.
Character	
Reference	Memorandum dated and captioned as above at Los Angeles.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES. ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

[illegible] OF INVESTIGATION
[illegible] CTION
JAN 1[illegible] 1972

EML

NR011 NY CODE

1205PM URGENT 1-13-72 GMD

TO DIRECTOR

ATT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

WASHINGTON FIELD 100-49940

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 1P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC); OO: WFO

IS- NEW LEFT

ON JANUARY THIRTEENTH SEVENTY TWO, DETECTIVE HENRY SUAREZ, SIS, NYCPD ADVISED WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) AND OTHER UNKNOWN GROUPS OF WOMEN ARE TO CONDUCT MARCH AT FOUR THIRTY P.M. THURSDAY, JANUARY THIRTEENTH SEVENTY TWO. THIS MARCH IS TO BEGIN AT FORTY SECOND STREET AND TIMES SQUARE AND GO TO HERALD SQUARE (THIRTY FOURTH STREET AND SIXTH AVENUE), NEW YORK, NEW YORK.

NO FURTHER INFORMATION AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME, CONCERNING PURPOSE OF MARCH OR NUMBER EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

91

REC-34 / [illegible]

ADMINISTRATIVE:

EO JAN 18 1972

SIS, NYCPD COGNIZANT. NEW YORK WILL COVER AND SUTEL.

END

54 JAN 20 1972

190

GXC FBI WASHDC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JAN 13 1972

TELETYPE

NR60 NY CODE

1120 PM NITEL 1-13-72 FPN

TO DIRECTOR

ATT DID

WASHINGTON FIELD

4P.M. NEW YORK

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), OOWF IS-NEW LEFT

RENYTEL THIS DATE. ser 47

ON THIS DATE SAS OF THE FBI OBSERVED A DEMONSTRATION AND MARCH SPONSORED BY WONAAC WHICH COMMENCED AT FOUR THIRTY PM AT FOUR TWO ST. AND TIMES SQUARE, NYC. APPROXIMATELY FIFTY INDIVIDUALS PARTICIPATED IN THE DEMONSTRATION WHICH MARCHED TO PROTEST ALL ABORTION LAWS.

AT FIVE THIRTY PM DEMONSTRATION PROCEEDED SOUTH ON SIXTH AVE. TO HERALD SQUARE (THREE FOUR ST. AND SIX AVE) NYC ARRIVING APPROXIMATELY SIX PM. DEMONSTRATORS OBSERVED CARRYING POSTERS READING "ABORTION IS A WOMAN'S RIGHT, WONAAC". WHILE MARCHING, DEMONSTRATORS CHANTED A SLOGAN "NOT THE CHURCH, NOT THE STATE, WOMEN MUST DECIDE OUR FATE". MAJORITY OF DEMONSTRATORS WERE WOMEN AGED APPROXIMATELY FIFTEEN TO TWO FIVE YEARS. DEMONSTRATORS ENDED SIX PM NO INCIDENTS OBSERVED.

END PG ONE

15 [illegible] -48

16 JAN

in White House Summary

60 JAN 21 1972

PG TWO

WONAAC IS CONTROLLED BY THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP). WONAAC'S OBJECTIVE IS REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION LAWS AND NO FORCED STERILIZATION OF WOMEN. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

ADMINISTRATIVE

DEMONSTRATION OBSERVED BY SAS JAMES J. WOLF AND JAMES F. REILLY. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

FBI

Date: [illegible]/13/72

Transmit the following in [illegible]
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: [illegible] (100-43809) (P)

SUBJECT: BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION
[illegible]

Re Bureau C-1 dated 12/[illegible]/71 captioned as [illegible] Bureau C-1 dated 1/6/72 captioned "Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) [illegible] [illegible]; and WFO teletype dated [illegible] [illegible].

Enclosed for the Bureau are five copies and for New York and WFO are copies each of an LHM concerning captioned group, which is the local affiliate of the WONAAC, it being noted that Boston handles information concerning both out of the same Boston file 100-43809.

Sources are identified as follows:

Source [redacted]

[illegible]

[illegible]
2 - [illegible] (Enc. [illegible])
2 - WFO ([illegible]) (Enc. 2) (RM)
[illegible] - Boston [illegible]
(1 - [illegible])
(1 - 100-[illegible]) ([illegible] MILES)
(1 - [illegible])
(1 - [illegible])
(1 - 100-[illegible]) (Women's Liberation)
(1 - [illegible])

REC-3

MAR 7 1972

DATE FORW. 1/27/72

NW 88321 DocId:32989546 Page 99

BS 100-43609

Second source is [redacted] Informant

Third source is [redacted] Source

Agents observing the Washington, D. C., demonstration were WILLIAM [illegible], WILLIAM BROOKS, RICHARD COFFMAN, NORMAN [illegible], [illegible], and WILLIAM TUCKER.

[illegible] is an [illegible] subject in the Boston Division; and appropriate security investigations are or will be conducted concerning EVERETT [illegible], [illegible] ROLAND, and PAT PUTNAM.

Informants

Boston at this time contemplates coverage of the scheduled conference through [redacted], as well as the Campus Police Force at Boston University.

The [illegible] and [illegible] are requested to advise of any additional pertinent information they possess concerning the scheduled conference and whether sources from their divisions will be in attendance.

The enclosed LHM has been classified "Confidential" as the unauthorized disclosure of information provided by the sources could reasonably result in identification of these sources of continuing value and compromise their future effectiveness [illegible] interests of the United States.

Boston following, and Bureau will be advised of pertinent developments.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Boston, Massachusetts

January 18, 1972

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

A source who has provided reliable information in the past, on November 16, 1971, advised as follows:

nee Miles

Matilde Zimmerman, telephone number 547-1818, of "Boston Women's Abortion Action," 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Room 9, Cambridge, Massachusetts, had ordered five buses with a forty-five person capacity each from the Brush Hill Transportation Company, Dorchester (Boston), Massachusetts, for travel to Washington, D. C., on November 19, 1971; and a $1,500 cash deposit against a total cost of $3,500 was made on November 15, 1971. The buses were scheduled to depart for Washington, D. C., at approximately 9 p.m. on November 19, 1971, from a parking lot at the Purity Supreme Market, Green Street, Cambridge; and the cost of the round-trip ticket was $18.

A second source who has provided reliable information in the past, on November 17, 1971, provided the following information:

The Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed out of the local Female Liberation (FL) group; and while BOWAAC is not exclusively made up of Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston, and Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) female members, it is controlled by members of those groups.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

19

MAR 7 1972

470215

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Matilde Miles, nee Zimmerman, was the SWP, Boston, member heading up local SWP/YSA work in the Coalition; and she and Evelyn Clark, another SWP, Boston, member, had left or were planning to leave for Washington, D. C., to help in organizing the November 20, 1971, WONAAC scheduled demonstration at Washington, D. C., and both planned to remain in that area through the demonstration.

At a meeting of the SWP, Boston, held November 16, 1971, it was reported that the local BOWAAC was hoping to fill four buses with participants for travel to Washington, D. C., for the November 20, 1971, demonstration but that a specific number of actual participants from this area was not then known.

The New England Telephone Listing Service personnel on November 17, 1971, advised that telephone number 547-1818 is listed to BOWAAC, 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, and that telephone number 491-1071 is listed to FL located at that same address.

At approximately 10 a.m., November 20, 1971, Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed women who represented various women's groups from cities in the United States, including Boston, gathering on the Ellipse in Washington, D. C. At approximately 12:10 p.m., the group, then numbering about 1,500, was observed to march from the Ellipse to the West Front of the Capitol; and during the march to the Capitol, signs carried by some of the marchers were observed to read "Rhode Island Women for Abortion Reform" and "Boston Repeal All Abortion Laws."

The Special Agents also observed that two tables of SWP literature were set up during the gathering at the Ellipse and four at the rally site at the Capitol. The rally ended about 4 p.m. without incident.

The second source, on December 3, 1971, advised that the organizer of the SWP, Boston, had recently reported that between eighty to one hundred individuals had traveled from Boston to Washington, D. C., to participate in the WONAAC November 20, 1971, demonstration.

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

"The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP, in its November 14, 1971, edition carried the following announcement: "Abortion Conference - The Second National Conference of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition will be held February 11-13, 1972, at Boston University. For further information, contact WONAAC, 150 Fifth Avenue, Suite 843, New York, New York 10011. Phone (212) 741-0450."

On January 12, 1972, the second source advised that SWP, Boston, and YSA-B members active in BOWAAC were distributing a "Housing Fact Sheet" to locate housing accommodations for individuals visiting the Boston area to attend the above-scheduled conference at Boston University February 11-13, 1972. This Fact Sheet listed the BOWAAC office at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, telephone number 547-1818.

This second source further advised as follows on January 12, 1972:

BOWAAC was originally a subcommittee of the FL group locally but has now grown into a separate group whose specific interest is in abortion reform. Both BOWAAC and FL in the general Boston area are located at the same address, 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, but have separate offices at that address.

Individuals active in BOWAAC are also active in other FL work; however, all individuals active in FL work are not active in BOWAAC.

The SWP and YSA in the Boston area have approximately fifteen of their FL members active in FL work with approximately six to eight of this number in and the controlling forces of BOWAAC. Jane Roland, who joined the SWP, Boston, in late 1971, is now heading up the Party's faction work in FL and BOWAAC; and Matilde Miles and Evelyn Clark continue on a leave of absence from the SWP, Boston, and to work at the National Headquarters of WONAAC.

CONFIDENTIAL

BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

A third source who has provided reliable information in the past, on January 17, 1972, advised that Patricia F. Putnam, President of Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts FL, residence 162 Hampshire Street, Cambridge, telephone number 547-8557, under the sponsorship of Boston University FL has reserved Hayden Hall, Boston University, and fifty classrooms located in the College of Business Administration College of Liberal Arts, Boston University, also the location of Hayden Hall, for the period February 11-13, 1972, for a "conference open to the public." According to the third source, it was requested that five of the fifty classrooms have a seating capacity of seventy-five or over.

This third source further advised that Patricia Putnam, Social Security Number 024-36-7397, as of the 1970-1971 school year was listed as a senior in the College of Liberal Arts (CLA), Boston University, with a residence at 35 Glencoe Street, Brighton (Boston), Massachusetts.

The third source advised that the 1971-1972 Boston University Listing of Students shows Putnam as still a CLA senior with residence as of the September, 1971, registration at 90 Lake Street, Newton, Massachusetts.

150/3/47

> The Boston SWP is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.
>
> The YSA-B is the Boston affiliate of the YSA, the youth organization of the SWP.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/19/72

Transmit the following in ______________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-32010)(C)

RE: "CHANGED"
ABORTION PROJECT COALITION
CLEVELAND, OHIO
IS - NEW LEFT

1-1
11-1

Title carried in previous communications as "PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C. AND SAN FRANCISCO, 11/20/71 AND ABORTION LAW REPEAL SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), SM - NEW LEFT".

100-468406-43

Re Cleveland airtel and LHM dated November 3, 1971 captioned "PROPOSED DEMONSTRATIONS, WASHINGTON, D.C. AND SAN FRANCISCO, 11/20/71 AND ABORTION LAW REPEAL SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), SM - NEW LEFT", and WFO nitel to the Bureau, Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, New Haven and New York dated 11/20/71 captioned "WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WNAAC) - SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, 11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - NEW LEFT".

100-468406-39

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of an LHM concerning captioned matter.

Characterizations of individuals and organizations mentioned in enclosed LHM are set forth where available.

Sources utilized in IHM are as follows:

② - Bureau (Enc. 8)(RM) ENCLOSURE
4 - Cleveland
(1 - 100-29936)(PERKUS)
(1 - 100-31449)(SCHEER)
(1 - 100-28669)(TRYON)
GBI:cmv 3 destroyed 932D
(6) 1 retained

REC-102 SOP 100-468406-5

1 to DIA, SS, OSI(LD)
By R/S
SSC/vmr

JAN 24 1972

NEW LEFT

54 FEB 9 1972

Approved: JLB/am
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

GPO : 1970 O - 402-735

CV 100-32010

First source utilized is [redacted]

Second source utilized is [redacted]

Third source utilized is [redacted]

LHM is classified "Confidential" as data reported from [redacted], [redacted] [redacted] could reasonably result in the identification of sources of continuing value and compromise effectiveness thereof.

Informants

ADMINISTRATIVE

Information derived through investigation and use of established sources has failed to indicate that captioned organization is involved directly in any activity other than the pursuit of abortion law reform and women's liberation. Cleveland is continuing coverage of the activities of individuals connected with the Abortion Project Coalition under individual main case files; consequently, no further investigation is being conducted at Cleveland regarding captioned organization.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Cleveland, Ohio

January 19, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION CLEVELAND, OHIO

Reference is made to Cleveland letterhead memorandum dated November 3, 1971 and captioned "Proposed Demonstrations, Washington, D.C. and San Francisco, 11/20/71 and Abortion Law Repeal Sponsored by Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), SM - New Left".

Information was received at Cleveland, Ohio that an organization called the Abortion Project Coalition (APC) had formed in Cleveland and was planning to attend a demonstration in Washington,D.C. on November 20, 1971 sponsored by the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC). Subsequent investigation and information supplied by reliable sources revealed that the APC had been formed to campaign for abortion law reform.

On October 29, 1971 a reliable source advised that the APC had established a headquarters at 11220 Bellflower, Cleveland Heights, Ohio, telephone 368-2248, which is located in Flora Mather Hall, Case Western Reserve University (CRWU). Source further advised that Laurie Perkus, Robbie Scheer and Sue Tryon were the leaders of the APC all of whom were associated individually with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) CLEVELAND, OHIO BRANCH

The Cleveland Branch of the SWP is affiliated with the National SWP and follows its directives. The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

ENCLOSURE

[illegible]-468465-50

RE: ABORTION PROJECT COALITION
CLEVELAND, OHIO

On December 3, 1971 a second source, reliable, advised that during a meeting of the Cleveland Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) on November 21, 1971 Robbie Scheer stated that about 5,000 women attended the Women's Liberation March in Washington, D.C. on November 20, 1971, including a bus of approximately 40 women from Cleveland. The Cleveland YSA according to source, considered 40 a good number for the first women's liberation march.

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA)
CLEVELAND, OHIO

The Cleveland branch of the YSA is the youth group of the SWP in Cleveland.

On December 22, 1971 above source advised that on December 21, 1971 Robbie Scheer had stated that there were some intersession classes being held at CWRU, Cleveland, Ohio, by the APC. These are three classes in Women's Liberation: one on Abortion, one on Women's Literature, and one in Psychological Aspects of the Women's Liberation Movement.

On December 22, 1971 a reliable source advised that about 2,000 - 2,500 persons attended the march and rally for abortion law reform on November 20, 1971 at Washington, D.C. of which approximately 80% were female and 20% were male. Source stated that the march was fairly orderly and source noted only one minor incident which occurred at a theater along the route that was showing the movie "The Sex Machine". There was no destruction and no arrests were made.

On January 10, 1972 Tony Zemac, University Circle Police Department, Cleveland, Ohio, advised that his office had received numerous leaflets and references to the Abortion Project Coalition, which is located at CWRU, but that his office did not consider the APC a subversive organization in its own right. He further advised that to the best of his knowledge, the APC is organized and is operated solely for the

RE: ABORTION PROJECT COALITION
CLEVELAND, OHIO

support of a campaign for abortion law reform.

This documement contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES C ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI   DATE: 1/24/72

FROM : SAC, Indianapolis (100-24006) (C)

SUBJECT: BLOOMINGTON ABORTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

100-468406-12

ReIPtel 11/18/71 captioned "WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION 11/20/71 WASHINGTON, D. C., IS - NEW LEFT. OO: WFO".

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of LHM re captioned Boomington Abortion Coalition (BAC).

First confidential source is [redacted]
second confidential source is [redacted] } Informants

For the information of the Bureau, captioned organization was formed primarily for the purpose of getting people to travel to Washington, D. C., for the demonstration on 11/20/71 sponsored by the Women's National Abortion Coalition (WONAAC). The main organization for the BAC was on the part of two female YSA members at Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. The organization does not meet regularly and is not presently a continuing organization and has not met since the demonstration in Washington, D. C. In view of the fact that the organization is not a continuing organization, no further investigation is being conducted by the Indianapolis Division into this matter and it is being placed in a closed status.

[illegible] 1922
Investigated

2 - Bureau (Enc. - 6) (RM)
1 - Indianapolis
LLG:css
(3)

REC- 45

- 49

1-DIA, SS, RAC-ISD
By R/S 2/3/72
SSC/vmr

54 FEB 7 1972

ply, Please Refer to
File No.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Indianapolis, Indiana

January 24, 1972

BLOOMINGTON ABORTION COALITION

On November 4, 1971, Segeant John Tomlinson, U. S. Park Police, Washington, D. C., furnished a permit application for a demonstration to be held November 20, 1971, at Washington, D. C. The sponsoring organization was given as Women's National Abortion Action Coalition, 917 15th Street, Northwest, Washington, D. C. In addition to the main sponsoring organization, other sponsors were also listed and included in those listed was the Bloomington Abortion Coalition, 702 Atwater, Bloomington, Indiana, 47401.

On November 10, 1971, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised that a meeting of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) was held at Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana, on November 2, 1971. At the meeting, a discussion concerning the Washington, D. C., demonstration of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was held at which time Paula Savich, head of the women's faction of the YSA and Chairwoman for the Bloomington Abortion Coalition (BAC), gave a report. Savich stated that bus tickets for the November 20, 1971, demonstration to be held in Washington, D. C., would be sold in Bloomington on November 8, 1971. Savich stated that the local chapter, which is the BAC, would be asked to assume fund-raising quotas and help to pay debts incurred by the national organization. Savich encouraged all YSA members, both male and female, to travel to Washington, D. C., for the demonstration. It was also discussed that male members of the YSA would be expected to assume part of the transportation costs by YSA women who participated in the November 20, 1971, demonstration at Washington, D. C. According to this source, the BAC is backed primarily by the YSA at Indiana University and the Chairwoman, Paula Savich, is a member of the YSA at Indiana University. The organization was formed by the women's faction of the YSA principally for attendance at the Washington, D. C., demonstration.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-468406-419

LOOMINGTON ABORTION COALITION

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On November 18, 1971, the confidential source listed above and a second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past advised approximately 15 individuals would be attending the demonstration in Washington, D. C., from Indiana University, Bloomington, Indiana. The individuals traveling were to represent the BAC headed by Paula Savich, Chairwoman and YSA member. Included in those scheduled to travel were approximately five or six members of the YSA from Indiana University and plans were for individuals to travel in two Ford Econoline vans rented from U-Haul, Bloomington, Indiana. Original plans had called for a bus to be chartered; however, the lack of individuals signing up to attend the demonstration resulted in the cancellation of the bus.

On November 16, 1971, an article entitled "Abortion Repeal March Plans Set" appeared on page 12 of the "Indiana Daily Student", a local campus daily newspaper. The article indicated approximately 40 students were to travel to Washington, D. C., and that Student Body President Mary Scifres had been invited by the WONAAC to speak at a rally on the Capitol steps in Washington, D. C. According to the article, Scifres had not decided whether or not to accept the invitation. Paula Savich, Chairwoman for the local committee, according to the article, stated, "It is important that this march be really big". She indicated that they were taking reservations for the bus trip to Washington.

On November 24, 1971, the first confidential source mentioned above advised that the BAC in Washington, D. C., participated in the demonstrations as scheduled. Source indicated that no problems arose from the demonstration. According to the source, Indiana University Student Body President Mary Scifres did not attend the demonstration but did send a statement which was to be read at the demonstration; however, due to difficulties, this statement was never read. According to source, between 15 and 20 persons actually attended the demonstration who were from Indiana University.

On November 30, 1971, an article appeared on page 9 of the "Indiana Daily Student", supra, captioned "Women March for Abortion Reform". The article stated that less than the forty students who had been expected to attend the demonstration actually attended. The article indicated that the large number of persons expected to attend the Washington, D. C., demonstration from all over the country did not materialize. The article also stated that Student Body President Mary Scifres, who had had to decline an invitation by the demonstration sponsors to speak at the march because of obligations at Indiana University, prepared a statement to be read. Her statement and several other statements, however, were not read because of the lack of time due to frequent breakdown of sound equipment delaying speeches. According to the article, Paula Savich had expected a better turnout from Indiana University.

On January 17, 1972, the second confidential source mentioned above advised that the BAC was not currently active and that it was not expected to be active in the near future unless other demonstrations such as the demonstration held in Washington, D. C., on November 20, 1971, called for support from Indiana University. According to this source, the BAC had been formed principally by members of the YSA, namely Paula Savich, who was Chairwoman for the BAC and who currently heads the women's faction of the YSA at Indiana University.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 2/[illegible]/72

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via **AIRTEL** ________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

[illegible] Mass.

ReNYOteletype, dated 11/20/71 captioned, "WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION, 11/20/71, WASHINGTON, D.C., IS - [illegible]" and BSairtel and LHM, dated 1/18/72, captioned as above.

On 1/26/72, NY 7010-S provided a flyer on the WONAAC conference to be held on 2/11, 2/12, 2/13/72 at Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. It is to be noted that flyer indicated a mass rally is scheduled for 2/11/72 from 7:00 PM to 10:00 PM, and that strategy sessions, limited to women only, are scheduled for 2/12, 2/13/72.

In view of the above, all female informants of the NYO operating in the [illegible] area have been [illegible] and at this time, none are in a position to attend.

Informant

On 2/2/72, [redacted] advised that from 600 to 800 individuals were expected to attend the above conference, including people from Canada and other countries. The identities of these individuals or the speakers are not known at the present time, and the NYO has no additional information other than that set forth in referenced airtel.

ST 102 REC-54

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Boston (100-43609) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (100-5[illegible]227) (RM)
1 - New York
[illegible]:jlr
(6)

Approved: ________________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

New York will continue to make efforts to locate a source suitable for assignment and Boston and the Bureau will be advised if such an informant is located.

CODE [illegible] INVESTIGATION COMMUNICATIONS NITEL

FEB 8 1972

TO SACS DETROIT 2/8/72
BOSTON (100-43809)
REC-52
FROM DIRECTOR FBI 1 - Mr. S. S. Czarnecki

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REDETEL FEBRUARY ~~EIGHT~~ 6th, INSTANT.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO SEND [redacted] Informant TO COVER CAPTIONED. SINCE RETEL SPECIFICALLY COMMENTS NO REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS BEING MADE AT THIS TIME PURSUANT TO EXISTING BUREAU INSTRUCTIONS, IT IS ASSUMED ANY SUCH EXPENSES WILL BE HANDLED UNDER EXISTING SAC AUTHORITY. INSURE EXACT ACCOUNTING OF ALL EXPENSES IS OBTAINED.

INSTRUCT INFORMANT MAINTAIN CONTACT BOSTON REGARDING SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS DURING CAPTIONED. DETROIT DEBRIEF INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT LHM WITHIN FIVE [illegible] INTERESTED OFFICES.

BOSTON ADVISE DETROIT [illegible] EXCHANGE IN BOSTON. COPY MAILED NEW YORK.

1 - NEW YORK (BY MAIL)
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 134- [redacted] Informant

SSC:jlm
(3)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Mr. Felt
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mrs. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walkart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars

TELETYPE TO DETROIT, ET AL
RE: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
CONVENTION, 2/11-13/72,
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

NOTE:

WONAAC is sponsoring national convention in Boston, Massachusetts. Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presently dominating and controlling many WONAAC chapters throughout the country. Imperative that we have appropriate coverage at this convention in view of the large number of YSA and SWP members who are expected to attend This is the second informant authorized to attend this convention. The informant is a female active in SWP and Women's Liberation activities in Detroit. She was specifically requested to attend this convention by party leaders. Although Detroit does not indicate estimated expenditures, it is to be noted informant will be traveling by automobile with four other females from the Detroit area. Her expenditures for expenses would obviously be minimal.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 9 1972

TELETYPE

Elu/S

Mr. Miller, ES ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 004 DE CODE

1:10 PM URGENT 2-8-72 NMG

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DID)

BOSTON (100-43809)

FROM DETROIT (100-NEW) 1P

National Abortion Action Coalition

NATIONAL O ~~WOMEN'S~~ ABORTION ACTION COALITION CONVENTION AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, FEBRUARY TWELVE - THIRTEEN, SEVENTY TWO. IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO SEND informant [redacted] TO CAPTIONED CONVENTION AS SOURCE, A MEMBER OF THE DETROIT BRANCH SWP (DBSWP), HAS BEEN SPECIFICALLY REQUESTED TO ATTEND BY PARTY LEADERS. SOURCE WILL BE TRAVELING TO BOSTON BY POA IN ACCOMPANIMENT OF FOUR OTHER FEMALE MEMBERS OF THE DBSWP.

REC-52

NO REQUEST FOR ADVANCE OF FUNDS BEING MADE AT THIS TIME.

SOURCE WILL MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH THE BOSTON OFFICE AND WILL FURNISH PERTINENT INFO TO BOSTON AS INDICATED.

UPON RETURN TO DETROIT, SOURCE WILL BE THOROUGHLY DEBRIEFED AND FD - THREE ZERO SIX REFLECTING SOURCE'S REPORT OF CAPTIONED WILL BE SUBMITTED TO BOSTON FOR INCLUSION IN THEIR LHM.

END

MKA FBI WASH DC

FEDERAL [illegible] [illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CODE TELETYPE **URGENT**

TO SACS WFO (100-[illegible]) TELETYPE 2/8/72
BOSTON REC-52 FX-112
1 - Mr. S. S. Czarnecki

FROM DIRECTOR FBI 100-468406

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY-TWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REWFOTEL FEBRUARY SEVEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY-TWO.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO PAY [redacted] Informant AMOUNT UP TO ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-SIX DOLLARS FOR ACTUAL EXPENSES INCURRED, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION, TO COVER CAPTIONED. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES.

INSTRUCT INFORMANT MAINTAIN CONTACT BOSTON REGARDING SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS DURING CAPTIONED. WFO DEBRIEF INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT LHM WITHIN FIVE DAYS POSITIVE INFORMATION DEVELOPED TO BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES.

[illegible]

IN BOSTON. COPY MAILED NEW YORK.

1 - NEW YORK (BY MAIL)

1 - Mr. [illegible] ([illegible] ID)
1 - 100-20000 [redacted] Informant
SSC:jlm
(C)

NOTE:

WONAAC is sponsoring national convention in Boston, Massachusetts, 2/11-13/72. Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) presently dominating and controlling many WONAAC chapters throughout the country. Imperative that we have appropriate coverage at this convention in view of the large number of YSA and SWP members who are expected to attend. This is the first informant authorized to attend this convention.

Felt
Callahan
Cleveland
Ponder
Bates
Walters
Soyars
Holmes

61 FEB 22 1972

Urgent teletype being utilized in view of the time factor

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 7 1972

TELETYPE

NR 010 WF CODED

5:49 PM NITEL 2-7-72 ASW

TO DIRECTOR

BOSTON

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420)

Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), CONVENTION FEBRUARY ELEVEN THROUGH THIRTEEN, SEVENTYTWO AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, INTERNAL SECURITY DASH NEW LEFT.

Informant

[redacted] MEMBER OF WASHINGTON, DC LOCAL OF YSA AND WONAAC HAS BEEN SELECTED BY WASHINGTON, DC, YSA LEADERSHIP TO ACCOMPANY WASHINGTON, DC, WONAAC DELEGATION TO BOSTON CONFERENCE, FEBRUARY ELEVEN THROUGH THIRTEEN, SEVENTYTOW.

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO SEND SOURCE TO CAPTIONED [illegible] BUREAU AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED TO ADVANCE TO SOURCE THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THIRTYSIX DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES TO BE ACTUALLY INCURRED INCLUDING SEVENTYSIX DOLLARS ROUND TRIP AIR COACH FARE FROM WASHINGTON, DC, TO BOSTON AND TWENTY DOLLARS PER DAY FOR THREE DAYS FOR FOOD, LODGING, CONTRIBUTIONS AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES INCLUDING GROUND TRANSPORTATION TO AND FROM AIRPORTS.

FOR INFORMATION OF BOSTON, SOURCE'S CODE NAME IS [illegible]RISA.

END

8 FEB 1972

5-8

FBI WA DC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: FEBRUARY 8, 1972

FROM : SAC, BALTIMORE (100-29231) - RUC -

THF

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
(TROTSKYIST)

Encl

RE: Bureau O-1, dated January 14, 1971.

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of a Letterhead Memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

Sources mentioned in this Letterhead Memorandum (LHM), are as follows:

Source one is
[redacted] Informant

Second source is
[redacted] Source

In view of the fact captioned organization is now defunct, no further investigation is being conducted by Baltimore.

1-9320
1 destroyed

ENCLOSURE

REC-51

2 - Bureau (Enc.6) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore
TJB:bjp
(3)

1-DIA, SS, RAD-ISD
By R/S 2/11/72
FEB 1 0 1972

[illegible] - 46 8 4 3 6 54
14
18 FEB ~~10~~ 1972

NEW LEFT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-29231

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
FEBRUARY 8, 1972

RE: WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
(TROTSKYIST)

On November 13, 1971, a source advised that the Women's National Abortion Coalition (WONAAC) planned to hold demonstrations at Washington, D. C. and San Francisco, California on November 20, 1971. The purpose of the demonstrations were to call for the repeal of all abortion, contraception and forced sterilization laws. The Women's Right to Choose of Maryland, the Baltimore, Maryland affiliate of WONAAC was to organize busing and housing arrangements for out-of-state women.

On November 22, 1971, a source advised that the Women's Right to Choose of Maryland, working from 3028 Greenmout Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, were unsuccessful in attempts to generate enthusiasm for the WONNAC demonstration among Baltimore area women. Therefore, the plan to charter a bus for the purpose of transporting demonstrators to the Washington, D. C. rally was cancelled.

On November 30, 1971, a second source advised that the Women's Right to Choose of Maryland had been formed as an "ad hoc" group for the specific purpose of supporting the November 20, 1971 Washington, D. C. demonstration. The source further stated that the Women's Right to Choose of Maryland ceased to exist, following this demonstration, and is now defunct.

"THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY; IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY"

100-468406 54

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BALTIMORE, MARYLAND
FEBRUARY 8, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-29231

Title	WOMEN'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE OF MARYLAND
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	MEMORANDUM DATED AND CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 2/9/72

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-55420) (P)

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re Boston airtel and LHM dated 1/19/72 captioned, "BOSTON WOMENS ABORTION ACTION COALITION, IS - C (TROTSKYIST)", and New York airtel (IO) dated 12/15/71 captioned, "WONAAC, IS - NEW LEFT."

informant

As the Boston Division is aware, [redacted] will be present at the WONAAC Convention, 2/11/72 through 2/13/72, Boston, Massachusetts.

informant

On 2/3/72 [redacted] [illegible] rs of the [illegible] D. C., Lo[illegible] expect to attend the abo[illegible] [illegible]ention as representatives of the D. C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (DCWAAC).

[illegible] Washington, D. C., [illegible], New York, New York. [illegible]

- [illegible]
2 - Boston (100-[illegible]) ([illegible])
2 - New York (100-174[illegible]) ([illegible])
1 - WFO

[illegible]:dlm
(7)

-50

FEB 9 1972

NEW LEFT

Approved: ______ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

Re Boston LHM dated 1/18/72 reflected that "The Militant," the "SWP Weekly Newspaper, in the 11/14/71 edition, listed WONAAC as located at 150 5th Avenue, Suite 843, New York, New York, telephone 741-0450.

LEADS

NEW YORK DIVISION

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK: Verify change of WONAAC Headquarters to 150 5th Avenue.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

FEB 10 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 017 IP CODE

3:19 AM NITEL 2/9/72, SENT 2/10/72 CXM

TO DIRECTOR

BOSTON

FROM INDIANAPOLIS (100-24006) 2P

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION IS - NL

THIS DATE A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT A NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF THE WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WNAAC) WAS TO BE HELD AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, NEXT. DISCUSSION AT YSA MEETING HELD FEBRUARY EIGHT, LAST AT BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA, DETERMINED APPROXIMATELY TEN FEMALES FROM BLOOMINGTON, INDIANA, PLANNED TO ATTEND THIS CONFERENCE. FIVE OF THESE PERSONS ARE YSA MEMBERS AND ARE BELIEVED TO INCLUDE PAULA SAVICH, CYNTHIA KRALY, PRISCILLA HEILERS, DEBBIE PORTER, AND ELLEN OSTROFSKY. INDICATIONS ARE THAT YSA PLANS TO DOMINATE CAPTIONED CONFERENCE.

REC-18 100-464466-57

FEB 23 1972

PAULA SAVICH, YSA MEMBER, ADVISED BLOOMINGTON CONTINGENT MAY TRAVEL TO CHICAGO, ILLINOIS AND POSSIBLY RIDE ON CHARTERED BUS BY A GROUP OF ACTIVISTS TRAVELING FROM CHICAGO, ILLINOIS. PLANS FOR TRAVEL ARE NOT DEFINITE.

END PAGE ONE

57 FEB 29 1972

INDIANAPOLIS WILL HAVE NO SOURCES COVERING CONFERENCE AND INVIEW OF POSSIBLE YSA AND NL DOMINATION OF CONFERENCE, BOSTON MAY CONSIDER COVERAGE, IF NOT ALREADY DONE.

ADMINISTRATIVE: THE ABOVE SOURCE IS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT [redacted] Informant.

END

RECD P 015 017

DCW FBI WAH DC

NR 001 BS CODE

COMMUNICATIONS

1955 AM NITEL 2-13-72 TJT

FEB 13 1972

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMINTEL)

TELETYPE

NEW YORK (100-774481)

WFO (100-55420)

FROM BOSTON (100-43309) 2P

Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
[illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
[illegible]
Mr. Bates
[illegible]
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY ELEVEN DASH THIRTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, BOSTON, MASS. IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

A SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO THAT THE TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO SESSION OF THE WONAAC CONVENTION AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY, BOSTON, MASS., BEGAN AT TEN AM WITH SERVICES AND A GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT MARSH CHAPEL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY WHICH RAN UNTIL ELEVEN AM.

EX-103 REC-35

100-468406

THE REMAINDER OF THE DAY CONSISTED OF WORKSHOPS HELD IN VARIOUS BOSTON UNIVERSITY CLASS ROOMS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER GENERAL ASSEMBLY IN HAYDEN HALL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY DURING THE LATER EVENING HOURS.

3 FEB 15 1972

THE DAYS EVENTS WERE WITHOUT INCIDENT. AN ESTIMATED EIGHT HUNDRED TO ONE THOUSAND INDIVIDUALS WERE IN ATTENDANCE DURING THE DAYS PROCEEDINGS. THE CONVENTION IS SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE AM TWO THIRTEEN SEVENTYTWO AND TO RUN THROUGH LATE EVENING THAT DATE.

END PAGE ONE

A SECOND SOURCE WHO HAS PROVIDED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ON TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO IDENTIFIED OVER THIRTY MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP), BOSTON AND CAROL LIPMAN A LEADER IN THE SWP AND WONAAC, FORMERLY OF THE SWP, BOSTON, AND NOW BELIEVED LOCATED IN NYC, AS HAVING BEEN IN ATTENDANCE AT THE OPENING RALLY OF THE TWO ELEVEN DASH THIRTEEN SEVENTYTWO WONAAC CONVENTION AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY WHICH RALLY WAS HELD IN HAYDEN HALL, BOSTON UNIVERSITY THE EVENING OF TWO ELEVEN LAST.

THE BOSTON SWP IS THE LOCAL AFFILIATE AND FOLLOWED THE AIMS AND PURPOSE OF THE NATIONAL SWP. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE BOSTON TEL TWO TWELVE SEVENTYTWO.

Source

SOURCES ARE [redacted], BOSTON UNIVERSITY [illegible]

[illegible] [redacted] Informant.

OTHER SOURCES SCHEDULED TO ATTEND ABOVE CONVENTION HAVE NOT MADE CONTACT THIS DATE WITH BOSTON OFFICE PROBABLY DUE TO SECURITY REASONS.

BUREAU WILL BE KEPT COGNIZANT OF ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION DEVELOPED. BOSTON FOLLOWING.

END

NNK FBI WA

nhl

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

TO SAC DETROIT (100-40622) 2/17/72

FROM DIRECTOR FBI 100-4[illegible]-59

ST-100 REC-15

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. R. L. Pence

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REDETEL FEBRUARY SIXTEEN, LAST. att

AUTHORITY GRANTED PAY [redacted] Informants EIGHTY-FIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTY-FIVE CENTS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED IN COVERING CAPTIONED.

NO ACTION BEING TAKEN AT THIS TIME REGARDING YOUR REQUEST TO PAY INFORMANT ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR SERVICES. AS YOU ARE AWARE, PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES MADE ON STRICT C.O.D. BASIS AND NO INFORMATION CONTAINED RETEL ON WHICH BUREAU CAN BASE WORTH OF INFORMATION FURNISHED BY INFORMANT. WHEN DETAILED LHM SUBMITTED, RESUBMIT REQUEST FOR PAYMENT TO INFORMANT FOR SERVICES.

1 - [illegible] (100-[illegible])
1 - 134-[illegible] [redacted]

[illegible]
(6) Informants

NOTE:

[illegible] Bureau teletype, 2/16/72, [illegible] 1156 of [redacted] at captioned. At that time [illegible] for [illegible] to informant. Informant has returned to Detroit and furnished exact accounting [illegible] and Detroit has requested Bureau to reimburse informant for these expenses. Detroit has also requested Bureau to authorize payment of $100 for services [illegible], [illegible] to details whatsoever of information furnished. Payment for expenses is [illegible] and is being authorized; however, no payment for services will be authorized until Bureau furnished results of information obtained by informant during captioned.

Mr. T[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walkart

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Miller, ES
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Miss Holmes

FEB 16 1972

NR 006 DE CODE

6:07 PM URGENT 2-16-72 ETA

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DID)

FROM DETROIT (100-40622)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) ~~TION ALION WAAC~~

CONVENTION, ~~CONVTION~~, FEBRUARY ELEVEN - THIRTEEN, SEVENTYTWO, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS, IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REBUTELS, FEBRUARY EIGHT, LAST, AND MYTEL, FEBRUARY EIGHT, LAST.

BUREAU AUTHORITY REQUESTED TO PAY SOURCE EIGHTYFIVE DOLLARS AND FIFTYFIVE CENTS FOR EXPENSES INCURRED DURING ATTENDANCE AT CAPTIONED. EXACT ACCOUNTING OF EXPENSES AS FOLLOWS: REGISTRATION TWO DOLLARS; BUS TRANSPORTATION SIXTY SIX DOLLARS AND FIFTEEN CENTS; FOOD SEVENTEEN DOLLARS AND FORTY CENTS.

ST-100 REC-15

BUREAU AUTHORITY ALSO REQUESTED TO PAY SOURCE ONE HUNDRED DOLLARS FOR SERVICES RENDERED DURING COVERAGE OF CAPTIONED.

SOURCE DEBRIEFED THIS DATE AND FURNISHED WRITTEN REPORT.

DETROIT PREPARING LHM BASED ON INFO PROVIDED BY SOURCE.

END

FEB 18 1972

ACK FOR NR005 AND 006

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR)

UNITED STATES GO. .RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 2/9/72

FROM : RCH SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-16058) (C)

Women's National Abortion Action Coalition

SUBJECT: MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION aka
Minneapolis Abortion Action Coalition;
MINNESOTA ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Minneapolis, Minn

OO: MINNEAPOLIS

Re Bureau O-1 Form captioned "MINNEAPOLIS ABORTION ACTION COALITION, aka Minnesota Abortion Action Coalition; IS - C (TROTSKYIST)," received at Minneapolis on 1/10/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau is the original and five copies of a letterhead memorandum prepared under the title "MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION."

The enclosed LHM is classified confidential because it contains information from MP T-1 through MP T-4, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably result in compromising the sources' identities and impair the national defense interests of the United States.

Individuals named in the enclosed LHM are either on the ADEX or are informants or sources of the Minneapolis Office. An investigative summary report has been submitted regarding REBECCA ANN FINCH with the recommendation she be placed on the ADEX. Investigation is currently being conducted concerning JANE VAN DEUSEN, looking toward the submission of a summary report with the recommendation that she be placed on ADEX.

1cc & encl 932-D EX-115

REC-5 100-412496-63

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6) (RM)
3 - Minneapolis
1 - 100-16058
1 - 100-15950
1 - 100-1246 (SWP)
DEW:pl
(5)

11 2cc
Copy to SS, DIA, (FROM ISD)
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 3/6/72
by SSC/dlk

3-7 ~~[illegible]~~ 1972

0-7 MP for action 3/4/72 SSC:dlh

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. 100-16058

MP 100-16058

Minneapolis, Minnesota

February [illegible], 1972

Sources utilized are identified as follows:

INFORMANTS

Informants

Identity of Source		File Where Located
MP T-1 is [redacted]	Oral information, instant report, to SA H. CLIFFORD MILLER, furnished 1/26/72	134-2237-S1-6-46
MP T-2 is [redacted]	Used to cite REBECCA ANN FINCH Used to cite JANE VAN DEUSEN Used to cite MARY HILLERY	134-43-S1-706
	Oral information, instant report, to SA RALPH S. RUSSELL, furnished 2/4/72	1972
MP T-3 is [redacted]	Oral information, instant report, to SA DONALD F. WALLER, furnished 2/8/72	134-2238-S1 100-16058-1A
MP T-4 is [redacted]		134-2163-S1-37

Minneapolis Office recommends no further investigation be conducted concerning MWAAC. The interest and activities of the SWP in this group will be reported by Minneapolis as a part of activities in the semi-annual submission of reports on the organization TCB-SWP.

WS 100-16028

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-16058

Minneapolis, Minnesota

February 9, 1972

filed with this

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

ORIGIN

The Minnesota Women's Abortion Action Coalition (MWAAC) had its origin following a July, 1971, National Abortion Conference held at Columbia University, New York City, New York. The MWAAC is a part of the women's liberation movement, which has had extensive growth in the past several years.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

[illegible]

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

The MWAAC is described as a part of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) which had its beginning at a New York City, New York, conference, in July, 1971, attended by more than 1,000 women.

Volume 1, Number 1,
November, 1971, edition of
"Gold Flower," self-described
as a Twin Cities newspaper
for women published monthly
at Minneapolis, Minnesota

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

100-468406-43

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

CONFIDENTIAL

STATUS OF INCORPORATION

The records of the Office of the Secretary of State, State of Minnesota, reveal there has been no incorporation either as a non-profit organization or other type organization filed with this office for the MWAAC.

Arthur Anderson
Office of the Secretary of State
State Office Building
St. Paul, Minnesota, on
February 7, 1972

AIMS AND PURPOSE

The primary aims and purpose of the MWAAC are identical with the demands of WONAAC; that is, repeal of all anti-abortion laws, no forced sterilization, and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

MP T-3 on
December 14, 1971

LOCATION OF HEADQUARTERS

The present headquarters of the MWAAC is located in Room 203, Coffman Student Union, on the campus of the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, the office of University Women's Liberation.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

In November and December, 1971, the MWAAC utilized as headquarters office, space at 100 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota. (U)

MP T-3 on
January 12, 1972

OFFICERS

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

Mary Hillery, Coordinator of women's liberation activities, formerly acted as coordinator for MWAAC. Jane Van Deusen, as of February, 1972, has assumed the position of coordinator, MWAAC. Jane Van Deusen and Mary Hillery are current members of the Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), Minneapolis, Minnesota.

Minn

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

The Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed in 1955 by the merger of the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, branches of the SWP. The Twin Cities Branch - SWP is an affiliate of the SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Minn

Mary Hillery, a member of the Young Socialist Alliance, Twin Cities Group (YSA - TCG), has been the coordinator of the MWAAC since its inception. This activity is in conjunction with Hillery's activities in the women's liberation movement.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

CONFIDENTIAL

The Young Socialist Alliance - Twin Cities Group is the Youth Branch of the Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), an affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The MWAAC is not an organization as such which would have a staff of officers, elected or appointed.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

1971.

MP T-3 on
February 8, 1972

MEMBERSHIP

The MWAAC is a non-membership feminist movement of individuals interested in promoting the repeal of all abortion laws and other aims which have to do with principles of women's liberation.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

GENERAL ACTIVITIES

In the spring of 1971, members of the YSA-TCG were urged to make telephone calls to local radio stations in order to build public sympathy for a march on the state capitol to be held on April 3, 1971, to end all abortion laws in the state of Minnesota.

of some 51 [illegible]
Volt Bus Company vehicles on the [illegible] ber 19,

MP T-1 on
March 28, 1971

On April 3, 1971, an anti-abortion law march was held at St. Paul, Minnesota, from the residence of the Governor to the steps of the State Capitol Building. A large crowd, predominantly women, participated in this peaceful march.

MP T-4 on
April 15, 1971

At a meeting of the TCB-SWP held in April, 1971, Mary Hillery reported that there were approximately 600 participants in the anti-abortion law march held on April 3, 1971. Rebecca Ann Finch in November, 1971, was an active member of the YSA - TCG.

MP T-2 on
May 7, 1971

On November16, 1971, at a meeting of the YSA-TCG held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, discussion centered around a mass action demonstration to be held on November 20, 1971, in Washington, D. C., sponsored by WONAAC. It was announced that the MWAAC had conducted a telephone fund drive campaign in order to raise money to send two busloads of individuals from this area to participate in the Washington, D. C., demonstration. It was announced that buses would depart from Minneapolis, Minnesota, 9 a.m. on November 19, 1971; and among those individuals planning to participate were approximately ten persons active in the YSA-TCG or the TCB-SWP.

MP T-1 on
November 17, 1971

as a part of the YSA-TCG. [illegible] liberation [illegible]

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The MWAAC chartered two 39-passenger buses for travel to Washington, D. C., to depart Minneapolis, Minnesota, at 9:00 a.m., Friday, November 19, 1971. The Minneapolis group of some 54 persons departed from Minneapolis utilizing two Voit Bus Company vehicles on the early morning of November 19, 1971.

John Thomsen, Dispatcher
Dickinson Lines, Inc.
Anoka, Minnesota
November 18, and 19, 1971

On November 23, 1971, at a meeting of the YSA-TCG held in November, 1971, Rebecca Ann Finch presented a report on women's activities, during which she announced that the WONAAC demonstration on Washington, D. C., on November 20, 1971, drew only half the number of persons expected and as a result, there was a large debt incurred by the national organization. Rebecca Ann Finch in November, 1971, was an active member of the YSA - TCG.

MP T-1 on
December 1, 1971

Rebecca Ann Finch is a current member of the TCB-SWP.

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

The MWAAC group has not been active in the Twin Cities area subsequent to the November 20, 1971, march on Washington, D. C.

MP T-3 on
February 8, 1972

SWP INFLUENCE

The MWAAC is not a committee of the TCB-SWP nor is it a part of the YSA-TCG. Women's liberation is a topic of general interest and concern to the membership of the TCB-SWP; and the anti-abortion stand taken by MWAAC is one aspect of the women's liberation movement of interest.

MP T-2 on
February 4, 1972

Members of the YSA-TCG have expressed an interest in women's liberation as a matter of policy. The anti-abortion movement is one aspect of women's liberation of concern to female members of the YSA-TCG. The vast majority of women in the state of Minnesota support either the repeal or changes in present state laws on abortion. Members and sponsors of MWAAC include professional women, medical doctors, lawyers, municipal court judges, and others from all walks of life.

MP T-1 on
January 26, 1972

Individuals active in the women's liberation movement in the Twin Cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, of responsible leadership positions within the community, have recognized the sympathies of individuals such as Mary Hillery and consider her to be a representative of the radical left. As a result, Mary Hillery is considered to have little or no influence in the women's liberation movement in this area.

MP T-3 on
February 8, 1972

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF
THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF
THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY,
IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE
DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Minneapolis, Minnesota

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-16058

February 9, 1972

Title	MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Minneapolis

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Bishop
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

Date: 2/18/72

Transmit the following in ______ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______ (Priority)

REC 14

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-55420) (P)

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
February 11-13, 1972, at
Boston, Massachusetts
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ReButel to WFO and BS, dated 2/8/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies, for Boston and New York 2 copies, and one copy for Baltimore of an LHM dated as above and captioned, "Second Womens National Abortion Action Conference, February 11 through 13, 1972, at Boston, Massachusetts."

The confidential source referred to in the LHM is [redacted] Informant.

The LHM is classified "Confidential" because the defense interests of the nation can be adversely affected if this source was compromised.

Information copy of the LHM is designated for Baltimore inasmuch as JULIE CARLSON is a member of the College Park local of YSA at the University of Maryland, and that Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS is a WONAAC representative from Maryland.

2 - Bureau (Enc. 6)
1 - Baltimore (Enc. 1) (Info)
2 - Boston (Enc. 2)
2 - New York (Enc. 2)
3 - WFO
  (1 - 100-55430)
  (1 - 134-9613 Sub A)

JAM:dco
(10)

ST 104

AGENCY: ACSI, DIA, ONI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA.
DIA; 2009320
RAD (ISD, CRS, CI)
DATE FORW: 2/2/72
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: SSC [illegible]

REC-12 100 - 469400

18 MAR 6 1972

Approved: ______ Special Agent in Charge   Sent ______ M   Per ______

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535
February 18, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. [illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

SECOND WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION CONFERENCE FEBRUARY 11 THROUGH 13, 1972 AT BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Second Womens National Abortion Action Conference, sponsored by the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), commenced on Friday evening, February 11, 1972, at Hayden Hall on the campus of Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts.

> WONAAC has been publicly described as an organization of groups whose aim is to effect the overthrow of existing abortion laws and to establish "free abortion on demand."

The source advised that the opening session of the conference was in the nature of a rally with approximately 600 individuals in attendance. The rally was addressed by a number of speakers, including Matilde Zimmerman, representing Moss. WONAAC and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), and Dr. Barbara Roberts of WONAAC, stressing the need for the repeal of abortion laws on the theme that abortion is a woman's right to choose.

> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

105-468406-64

ENCLOSURE

The confidential source advised that during this rally, approximately 50 individuals representing the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) attempted to disrupt the proceedings, but were contained by the Conference Marshals. The source stated that PLP was protesting the dominance of influence by SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in WONAAC.

> The PLP was founded in 1962 by individuals expelled from the Communist party, USA, for following the Chinese communist line. Its objective is the establishment of a militant working-class movement based on Marxism-Leninism and Mao Tse-tung thought.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer" as "a multi-national revolutionary socialist youth organization."

Source advised that the February 12 session of the conference began at approximately 10:30 a.m. at Marsh Chapel on the campus of Boston University with approximately 500 women in attendance. The chairwoman for this general assembly was Delphine Welch, a national staff member of WONAAC and the National Womens Liberation Director of the YSA from New York City.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION Young Socialist Alliance

The following agenda for the conference was approved by the assembly:

Saturday, February 12, 1972

11:00 to 1:30 p.m. General Workshops
1:30 to 2:30 p.m. Lunch
2:30 to 5:00 p.m. Project and Constituency Workshops

5:00 to 7:00 p.m. Dinner
7:00 to 10:00 p.m. General Assembly, Discuss and Vote on Strategy Proposals

Sunday, February 13, 1972

9:00 to 11:00 a.m. Organizational Workshops
11:00 to 3:00 p.m. General Assembly - Workshop and Implementational Proposals

The source advised that the following women are members of SWP-YSA, and were appointed to the presiding committee for the purpose of chairing various sessions: Carol Lipman, Nancy Rosenstock, Delphine Welch and Matilde Zimmerman.

The source advised that a general workshop was chaired by Matilde Zimmerman from 11:00 to 11:30 a.m., in which proposals were discussed that would be submitted to the conference for adoption by WONAAC.

The source advised that the afternoon session between 2:30 and 5:00 p.m. consisted of small groups meeting in various classrooms at Boston University, including the following workshops:

National Legislation for Abortion
State Legislation for Abortion
Campus and High School Actions
Court Actions
Forced Sterilization
Clinics, Referrals
Anti-abortion Attacks
Gay Women
Working Women
Black, Chicano and Asian-American Women
The Abortion Movement and Racism
Contraception
Population Control Versus A Woman's Right to Choose

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The source stated that a general assembly plenum was held at 7:00 p.m. in Hayden Hall attended by approximately 1,000 women, and that this assembly was chaired by Delphine Welch.

Dr. Barbara Roberts presented the credentials report in which she stated that 922 women had registered for the conference and that an additional 300 women attended the Friday evening rally, composing a total attendance figure of 1300. Dr. Roberts advised geographic representation included 350 women from the New England and New York area, and that there were representatives from Pennsylvania, Washington, D.C., in addition to 74 women from California, 12 from Texas, 8 from Florida, 2 from England and 3 women from New Zealand. She stated that attendance was further broken down as follows: 92 college campuses represented, 14 high schools represented, 314 college women, 51 high school women and 178 working women.

The source advised that the February 13 session began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and it consisted of a group made up of approximately 50 women, each meeting in various classrooms conducting organizational workshops. The afternoon session consisted of a general assembly following which the conference adjourned.

The source advised that the conference once again re-established and reiterated WONAAC's call for free abortion on demand. The source also advised that the main action proposal passed by the conference calls for an abortion action week from May 1 to 6, 1972. The source stated that this week would consist of educational programs, legislative support, judicial action and culminating in local or regional demonstrations on May 6, 1972, around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion laws and restrictive contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

The source advised that the following women, who are members of the combined Washington, D.C., locals of SWP-YSA and WONAAC, attended the conference:

Sharon Naiman
Pam Burchette
Jeannie Reynolds
Lyn Forney
Eloise Chase
Alice Woznack
Dida Constantinidis
Julie Carlson
Mary Anne Lunn
Barbara Chis

The source advised that in addition the following women from Washington, D.C., who are members of WONAAC, but not affiliated with SWP or YSA were in attendance:

Dee Mosbacker
Nancy Williams
Vicki Martin

The source advised that the SWP-YSA members of WONAAC felt that the conference was a success and that the influence of SWP-YSA members continues to dominate. The source advised that the SWP-YSA women felt that they overcame opposition put forth by PLP and a group calling itself Revolutionary Women, which attacked WONAAC as a group led by SWP-YSA who are nothing more that bourgeois rebels.

> Revolutionary Women is self-described as an organization that is addressed to the special oppression of women and has a program that ranks this struggle to the class struggle.

The source stated that opposition proposals submitted in workshops were turned down in favor of those proposals backed by the SWP-YSA women.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/29/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:WFO)

per 58 P. Chamberlain Info

Re Washington Field airtel, dated 2/9/72, with captioned title.

On 2/18/72, Mr. MARVIN GLICKMAN, rental agent, 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York, advised that the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) rented room number 843 at this address on 12/14/71. GLICKMAN stated that a JOANNA MISNIK, Treasurer, WONACC, signed the rental agreement. The rent was $5,700.00 per year or $475.00 per month. The phone at WONAAC headquarters is 212-741-0450.

LEADS

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Determine the officers of WONAAC. In addition, determine the bank in which they have their account.

10

ST-100 REC 25

100-468406-61

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Washington Field (100-55420)
1- New York (100-1611547) (JOANNA MISNIK)
1- New York

5 MAR 6 1972

JJS:mej
(6)

NEW LEFT

5 MAR 21 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 3/1/72

FROM : SAC, DETROIT (100-49622)(P)(C)

SUBJECT: Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Convention
February 11 - 13, 1972
Boston, Massachusetts
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re Detroit teletypes dated ser52 2/8 and ser59 2/16/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight (8) copies of a letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above. No handouts are being furnished the Bureau as it is anticipated Boston will provide all miscellaneous paraphernalia Botsn deems necessary for effective coverage.

Enclosed for Boston, Chicago, Cleveland, Philadelphia, and New York are two (2) copies each of captioned LHM as persons identified in LHM reside within each respective division.

This LHM is being classified confidential in order to protect the source who is of continuing value, the disclosure of which might be prejudicial to the national defense interests of the nation.

The source is Informants [redacted] location is this LHM.

Each receiving office is requested to make additional copies of this LHM as needed to disseminate to individual case files.

2 - Bureau (RM) (Enc. 8)
2 - Boston (100-43809) (RM) (Enc. 2)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Cleveland (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - New York (Enc. 2) (RM)
2 - Detroit
ZTL:rck
(14)

-60

18 MAR 6 1972

AGENCY: ARMY, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE, DIA
Tec 932D; DIA; 3 ud destroyed
RAO (ISD, CFD, CD) IE/U
DATE FORW: 3/13/72

NEW LEFT

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

Detroit, Michigan
March 1, 1972

Re: Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Convention, February 11 - 13, 1972 Boston, Massachusetts

On February 18, 1972, source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished the following information:

A Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Convention was held on the Boston University campus, Boston, Massachusetts, during the period of February 11 - 13, 1972.

Approximately 1,000 persons were in attendance at this convention which was held to determine future action of WONAAC and to allow diverse factions within the Women's Abortion Movement to join ranks under one issue.

Female members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) from all over the county were requested by the national office of the SWP and YSA to attend this convention in order to insure the effective control of the convention by the SWP.

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

CONFIDENTIAL

[illegible] -60

ENCLOSURE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

The SWP specifically wished the convention to adopt a one-issue position, that being the complete control of the female body by the individual female. This specific issue, "women control their bodies" was adopted by the women's organization and all other proposals were rejected.

Workshops were organized for each of the many separate racial and ethnic groups represented at the conference. Workshops were based on appeal to the specific group intended and all were supposedly controlled by the SWP.

A Black, Raza, Asian-American women's workshop was held on February 12, 1972, with 35 persons attending. Among the issues discussed at the workshop were the attempts of democratic and republican presidential candidates to capitalize on minority group attitudes in regard to the abortion movement and the fact that minority groups all to often find themselves without a voice when real issues are involved.

Of particular importance to the group was the La Raza Unida Party, a legitimate political party in Texas which serves to unite Mexican Americans. Of equal importance was the Gay Liberation Movement, which the group felt expresses the plight of gay females who do not want children and are forced to live with men because of the mores of American society.

Attendees agreed that the one issue of abortion law repeal will serve to unite women under one banner and more effectively serve the Women's Movement.

The convention adjourned after an agreement that an "Abortion Action Week" would be held May 1 - 6, 1972. This action would serve to keep public attention focused on the need to legalize abortion and to seek effective support from the many thousands of women who want to right to choose.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

The following persons were identified by the source as being in attendance at the captioned convention:

Sheila Mahency
1268 Amsterdam Avenue
New York, New York

MASS.

Io Aurelia Duncan
58 Queenberry #20
Boston, Massachusetts

Gracie E. Adams
Post Office Box 4588
Chicago, Illinois

MASS.

Anna Rush
901 Mass. Avenue #7
Cambridge, Massachusetts

Ruby Scott
700 Commonwealth
Boston, Massachusetts

Nan Bailey
Box 291 Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island

MASS.

Janet Griffith
Vassar College
Poughkeepsie, New York

Lee Blake
47 Spruce Street
New Bedford, Massachusetts

Evelyn Greer
437 Laurel Street
Reading, Pennsylvania

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

Doris Abdurrahiy
1516 Widener Place
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Marsha Coleman
Barnad College,
Hewitt Hall 733,
Box 424
New York, New York

Yoshie Izqiuerdo
20201 Lindsay
Detroit, Michigan

R. Morgan Hamilton
1724 Wymore #6
East Cleveland, Ohio

Joyce Shatteen
13359 Euclid #12
East Cleveland, Ohio

Hattie L. Mc Citdeon
2349 Cumberland Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Doris A. Long
237 East Twelfth Street
New York, New York

Denita Johnson
7621 South Saginaw
Chicago, Illinois

Maria Robinson
1367 Joliet Place
Detroit, Michigan

Maxine Williams
16315 130th, #12-B
Jamaica, New York

CONFIDENTIAL

Re: WONAAC

Pattie Iiyama
14 West 85th Street
#4-B
New York, New York

Margaret Sloan
7621 Saginaw
Chicago, Illinois
telephone 312-678-7575

Claytee Artz
120 Seward #406
Detroit, Michigan

Claire King
109 Zeigler Street
Roxbury, Massachusetts

Dee Anna Searcy
East Cleveland, Ohio

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Vol II

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
WASHINGTON FIELD	NEW YORK	3/21/72	2/1/72 - 3/20/72

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)	ARLAND A. MOSEL	rms
	CHARACTER OF CASE IS-C (TROTSKYIST)	

REFERENCE: WFO airtel and LHM dated 2/18/72 captioned "WONAAC Convention, 2/11-13/72, at Boston, Massachusetts, IS-C (TROTSKYIST)" and NYlet to Bureau dated 2/29/72.

per64

per61

-P*-

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This report is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as identification of sources WF T-1 - WF T-6 could prove prejudicial to the defense interests of the nation.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE

CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES	ACQUIT-TALS

CASE HAS BEEN:

PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO

PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED RDK / [illegible] SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

REC-34

2 MAR 24 1972

ST 104

COPIES MADE:

6 - Bureau
2 - WFO (100-55420)

(COPY COUNT CONTINUED ON COVER PAGE B)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	SS	DIA	CC RAC (ISD) 100952D	
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.				
How Fwd.	4/3/72	MS		
By	SSE			

Notations

NON-SYMBOL [illegible] PAGE ATTACHED

-A-

COVER PAGE

GPO 1971 440-529

D Q

WFO 100-55420

Copy Count Continued:

2 - Albany
2 - Atlanta
2 - Boston
2 - Chicago
2 - Cincinnati
2 - Cleveland
2 - Detroit
2 - Houston
2 - Indianapolis
2 - Jacksonville
2 - Los Angeles
2 - Milwaukee
2 - New Haven
2 - New York
2 - Newark
2 - Norfolk
2 - Philadelphia
2 - Pittsburgh
2 - Richmond
2 - San Antonio
2 - San Francisco
2 - Seattle
2 - St. Louis

Informants

INFORMANTS	LOCATION
WF T-1 is [redacted]	100-55420-26 134-9613 Sub A 182-221 instant report
WF T-2 is Non-Symbol Source	NY 100-174481
WF T-3 is [redacted]	Report of SA THOMAS J. WILSON dated 1/26/72 at Atlanta, Georgia
WF T-4 is [redacted]	BS 100-43809

Informants

WF T-5 is [redacted] CG 100-52028

WF T-6 is [redacted] CG 100-52028

Physical observation, 1/13/72 WONAAC sponsored demonstration, conducted by SAs JAMES J. WOLF and JAMES F. REILL

WFO is currently conducting active investigation on DEE MOSBACHER, STAR BOWIE, and ANNA SEAGRAVES. SHARON NAIMAN and HOLLY RUSSELL are ADEX subjects of WFO.

Inasmuch as the New York Division has verified change of WONAAC Headquarters to 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York, that Division is considered the new office of origin.

WFO is placing this case in a pending inactive status for six months at which time a report will be submitted under caption D. C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (D. C. WAAC).

All receiving offices should note that the New York Division is the new office of origin in this matter and any pertinent activity in their respective divisions should hereafter be furnished to New York by appropriate communication.

D

WFO 100-55420

ADMINISTRATIVE - NON-SYMBOL SOURCE
WFO report 3/21/72.

Source

WF T-2 is [redacted] 150 5th Avenue, New York City, New York.

THIS PAGE IS TO BE MAINTAINED IN HEADQUARTERS CITY AT ALL TIMES.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

Report of: ARLAND A. MOSEL **Office:** Washington, D. C.
Date: 3/21/72

Field Office File #: 100-55420 **Bureau File #:**

Title: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - C (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis:

Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was founded as a result of a conference held in New York City, New York during July, 1971, for the purpose of forming a national movement of groups scattered throughout the United States, who favored and had worked to legalize abortion. The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in activities of WONAAC. During founding conference, WONAAC's goals were defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization." WONAAC opened National Office, 917-15th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. (WDC), during September, 1971, which was transferred to 150-5th Avenue, New York City, effective 12/20/71. WONAAC does not maintain formal membership and funds are obtained through contributions. WONAAC has affiliates and/or support groups located throughout U. S. WONAAC sponsored demonstrations held 11/20/71 in San Francisco, California and WDC, around theme of "Repeal of All Abortion Laws." Second WONAAC conference held Boston, Massachusetts, 2/11-13/72, which strongly endorsed "Abortion Rights Act of 1972," and called for a week of local abortion activities, 5/1-6/72. Other secondary proposals adopted set forth.

-P*-

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

This investigation is predicated upon information that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in activities of the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC).

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. Origin and Scope

During July 16-18, 1971, a conference was held in New York City, New York, in order to form a national movement of groups scattered throughout the United States, who favored and had worked to legalize abortion. In excess of 1,000 women attended this conference and as a result, founded WONAAC.

(WF T-1, 7/21/71)

B. Aims and Purposes

During its founding conference, WONAAC's goals were defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

It was decided that a national march on Washington, D. C. (WDC), with a simultaneous march on San Francisco, California, on November 20, 1971, in a public show of support for abortion law repeal, would be the first step in launching their campaign on a national scale.

(WF T-1, 7/21/71)

C. Headquarters

WONAAC opened a National Office at 917 15th Street, N.W., WDC, during September, 1971, which was transferred to 150 5th Avenue, New York City, New York, on December 20, 1971.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

S.I

JOANNA MISNIK, Treasurer, WONAAC, leased Room 843, 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York, on December 14, 1971, at an annual rental of $5,700.

(WF T-2, 2/18/72)

D. Officers

The following individuals are considered staff members of WONAAC, and are members of YSA, SWP, or are independent therefrom as indicated:

Staff Member	Other Organization Affiliation
CAROL LIPMAN — S.I.	SWP MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION
MATILDE ZIMMERMAN	SWP
DELPHINE WELCH	YSA/SWP
SHERRY SMITH	SWP
KIPP DAWSON	SWP
MARSHA COLEMAN	SWP
NANCY ROSENSTOCK	YSA/SWP
JOAN GOMBOS	INDEPENDENT
ELLEN SHAPIRO	INDEPENDENT

	MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION
DORIS LONG	INDEPENDENT
NANCY ROLF	INDEPENDENT
VIVIAN OSKIEWSKI	INDEPENDENT

(WF T-1, 3/10/72)

E. Membership and Finances

WONAAC does not maintain a formal membership as such.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

WONAAC is a non-profit organization which obtains its funds through contributions and uses any funds collected in off-setting expenses incurred in the furtherance of its activities. WONAAC receives a certain amount of support, financially and otherwise, from independent organizations who identify with WONAAC's main central demand of "Repeal All Abortion Laws."

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

F. WONAAC Affiliates

1. Georgia Women's Abortion Action Coalition (GWAAC), located at 128 Pine Street, Atlanta, Georgia. Leadership of GWAAC is vested in VAUGHN BOCHMAN, who is also an active member of YSA, Atlanta.

(WF T-3, 1/12/72)

2. Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), located at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts. While BOWAAC is not exclusively made up of Boston area YSA and SWP members, it is controlled by members of those groups.

(WF T-4, 11/17/71)

3. Illinois Women's Abortion Coalition (IWAC), located at 343 South Dearborn Street, Chicago, Illinois, Room 343. IWAC is a non-membership organization with no officers and minimal activity. Those individuals who function in IWAC are predominantly YSA-SWP members.

(WF T-5 and WF T-6, 1/17/72 and 1/14/72)

4. D. C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (D. C. WAAC), located at 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., WDC, Room 303. Staff members of D. C. WAAC are DEE MOSBACHER, SHARON NAIMAN and STAR BOWIE. Also HOLLY RUSSELL and ANNA SEAGRAVES, who are high school "women." All of these individuals are members of the WDC Local of the YSA.

(WF T-1, 3/10/72)

5. In addition to the abvoe, WONAAC affiliates and/or support groups are reportedly located in the following areas:

Los Angeles, California
San Francisco, California
NH Hartford, Connecticut
New Haven, Connecticut
Jacks Gainesville, Florida
Chicago, Illinois
BS Maine
Detroit, Michigan
Newark, New Jersey
AL Binghamton, New York
Cincinnati, Ohio
PH Harrisburg, Pennsylvania
Cleveland, Ohio
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania no
St. Louis, Missouri no
Rhode Island
SA Austin, Texas no

Houston, Texas
Norfolk, Virginia
RH Roanoke, Virginia
William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Virginia
Seattle, Washington
MILW Madison, Wisconsin

(WF T-1, 3/20/72)

II. ACTIVITIES

A. Conferences and Demonstrations

1. WONAAC Founding Conference was held in New York City, New York, July 16-18, 1971. This conference called for national demonstrations to be held on November 20, 1971, in WDC and San Francisco, California, around the theme of "Repeal of All Abortion Laws."

(WF T-1, 7/21/71)

a. On November 20, 1971, approximately 1,500 women, representing womens liberation groups from the East Coast and Mid-West, gathered on the Ellipse in WDC, in response to the call by WONAAC to march on the United States Capitol to demand the repeal of all abortion laws. This group departed the Ellipse at approximately 10:30 a.m. on that date and marched along Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W., to the west side of the Capitol Building. There the marchers assembled for a rally which concluded at approximately 4:00 p.m. on the same date. There were no incidents of violence and the march and rally were peaceful throughout.

(WF T-1, 11/23/71)

b. On January 13, 1972, a WONAAC sponsored demonstration was held from 4:30 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. in the vicinity of 42nd Street and Times Square, New York City, New York protesting all abortion laws. Approximately 50 individuals participated and the demonstration ended without incident.

(Physical observation, Special Agents, FBI, 1/13/72)

2. Second WONAAC Conference was held in Boston, Massachusetts, February 11-13, 1972. Approximately 1,300 women attended the conference, which once again re-established and reiterated WONAAC's call for abortion on demand. It was noted during the conference that WONAAC had been unable to create anything like a national campaign and that local meetings across the country had been disappointingly small. It was pointed out that WONAAC had failed to attract the large numbers of working women, housewives, and students concerned with the abortion issue, including the majority of women's liberationists and abortion reform activists. It was felt that the movement could not succeed without the support of the working women.

At the close of the conference, WONAAC strongly endorsed the "Abortion Rights Act of 1972," which is to be introduced in the U. S. Congress by Congresswoman BELLA ABZUG from New York. This bill would override all laws which impose sanctions upon those who choose to exercise their individual right to an abortion.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

a. Proposed Actions

It was moved and adopted during the above conference that WONAAC sponsor a week of local abortion activities, May 1-6, 1972, consisting of educational programs, legislative support, judicial action, and culminating in local or regional demonstrations on May 6, 1972, around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion laws and restrictive contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

In addition, the following secondary proposals were adopted during the conference:

1. That a telegram be sent to the New York State Court of Appeals and New York Governor NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, condemning the court's February 10, 1972, decision denying women on Medicaid the right to abortions on demand.

2. That the coalition continue to organize black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, native American and Asian American participation in their activities.

3. That members of local coalitions confront candidates for office and force them to take a stand on abortion, and that they publicize those who oppose abortion so that the voters can see where these politicians stand.

4. That the coalition make a special effort to reach out to and involve "gay" women in their activities.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

YSA and SWP members of WONAAC felt the conference to be a success in that opposition proposals submitted were turned down in favor of those proposals backed by the YSA-SWP women.

(WF T-1, 2/14/72)

9-61

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

MAR 21 1972

Title WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - C (TROTSKYIST)

Reference Report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

1*

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 17 1972
TELETYPE

NR001 NEW YORK CODE

2:25AM NITEL 4-17-72 NFM

TO DIRECTOR (100-468406)

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK (100-171481)

Shackelford

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

AT TWO P.M., APRIL SIXTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY-TWO, APPROXIMATELY SIXTY INDIVIDUALS COUNTER DEMONSTRATED AGAINST THE KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS PARADE, VICINITY OF FIFTH AVENUE AND EIGHTY SIXTH STREET NYC. THIS COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION WAS SPONSORED BY WONAAC ADVOCATING REMOVAL OF ALL RESTRICTIVE ANTI-ABORTION LAWS. COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION CONCLUDED FOUR P.M., NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS.

REC-59

10 APR 18 1972

CHARACTERIZATION

WONAAC HAS BEEN DESCRIBED AS AN ORGANIZATION OF GROUPS WHOSE AIM IS TO EFFECT THE CHANGE IN ABORTION LAWS

END PAGE ONE

15

70 APR 24 1972

PAGE TWO

NEW YORK (100-171481)

AND ESTABLISHE "ABORTION ON DEMAND."

ADMINISTRATIVE

ser 67

RE NEW YORK NITEL TO BUREAU FOUR-THIRTEEN-SEVENTYTWO. SPECIAL AGENTS WHO OBSERVED DEMONSTRATION ARE JOHN J. SYRON, AND JOSEPH E.F. URRER. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

EJF FBI WASH DC

cc Horner
[illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 13 1972
DCW
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 056 NY CODE

838 PM NITEL 4-13-72 BGW

TO DIRECTOR (100-468406)

ATTN: DID

FROM NEW YORK (100-174481) 2P

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), IS-C (TROTSKYIST).

APRIL ONE THREE, SEVENTY TWO, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN PAST ADVISED WONAAC WOULD CONDUCT DEMONSTRATION GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER'S OFFICE NEW YORK CITY TO PROTEST BAN MEDICAID PAYMENTS FOR ABORTIONS.

APRIL ONE THREE, INSTANT, SPECIAL AGENTS OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OBSERVED FOUR WOMEN ENTER OFFICE NEW YORK GOVERNOR WHEREIN THEY PRESENTED GOVERNOR'S AID PETITION RELATIVE TO ABOVE MENTIONED BAN. NO DEMONSTRATION OCCURRED, WOMEN DEPARTED GOVERNOR'S OFFICE WITHOUT INCIDENT.

REC-3
ST-112

ABOVE MENTIONED SOURCE ON APRIL SIXTEEN, NEXT, WONAAC WILL CONDUCT COUNTER-DEMONSTRATION TO ACTION BY KNIGHTS OF COLUMBUS DEMANDING REPEAL ABORTION LAWS IN NEW YORK STATE. DEMONSTRATION SCHEDULED FOR ONE THREE ZERO PM, VICINITY FIFTH AVENUE AND

APR 17 1972

END PAGE ONE

60 APR 24 1972

"cc to
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

EIGHT SIX STREET, NEW YORK CITY.

WONAAC HAS BEEN PUBLICLY DESCRIBED AS AN ORGANIZATION OF GROUPS WHOSE AIM IS TO EFFECT THE OVERTHROW OF EXISTING ABORTION LAWS AND TO ESTABLISH "FREE ABORTION ON DEMAND".

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE MENTIONED HEREIN IS Informant [redacted] [redacted] SPECIAL AGENTS OBSERVING DEMONSTRATION, JOHN J. SYRON, JOSEPH DERTINGER, JR. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED REGARDING APRIL ONE THREE, ONE NINE SEVEN TWO DEMONSTRATION.

NEW YORK OFFICE WILL FOLLOW SCHEDULED APRIL ONE SIX NEXT DEMONSTRATION.

[illegible] SIG, NYCPD ADVISED OF DEMONSTRATION TO BE HELD APRIL ONE SIX, NEXT.

END

REC-7

(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BOSTON (100-[illegible]) (P)

SUBJECT: [illegible]
([illegible]) CONVENTION, FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972
BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS
IS - C
(TROTSKYIST)

Re Boston airtel and LHM, [illegible] Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition, IS-C ([illegible]) and Boston teletype 2/11-13/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are [illegible] copies and [illegible] LHM [illegible] copies [illegible] reflecting information concerning the [illegible] convention at Boston. An information copy is also [illegible] for [illegible] scheduled to have attended the convention. Copies are also being furnished to designated offices inasmuch as individuals from such territories were reported in attendance.

2 - Bureau (Enc. 5) (RM)
[illegible] - New York ([illegible]) (RM)
2 - WFO ([illegible]) (RM)
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
1 - [illegible]
1 - Jacksonville (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Chicago (Enc. 1) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (Enc. 1) (RM)
3 - Boston
(1-100-[illegible]) ([illegible])
AVS/[illegible]
(27)

69

15 FEB 25 1972

AGENCY: ~~ARMY~~, ~~ONI~~, ~~OSI~~, SEC. SER., ~~STATE~~, ~~CIA~~

NEW LEFT
IN SEC.

ENCLOSURE

DIA, 100-9320
RAB (SS), C.[illegible]
DATE FORW: 2/29/72
HOW FORW: R/S
BY: SSC

Approved: ____ Sent ____ M Per ____
Special Agent in Charge

Sources are:

1. [redacted]
2. [redacted]
3. [redacted]
4. [redacted]
5. [redacted]

Informants

Sources

BS 1362-PSI had been unable to attend the Saturday Session of the convention due to a sudden illness.

Further, BS 1414 E, whom it was originally felt would also attend, was unable to do so as informant was recuperating from an appendectomy.

During the convention period, Boston was not in contact with either WF 2188-S or DE 2276-PSI who were also scheduled to attend the convention, apparently due to security reasons it being noted that both of these informants were to have travelled to the Boston area in the company of other individuals.

All individuals identified as members of the SWP, Boston are either sources of the Boston Division or are currently on the ADEX or under current investigation for consideration for same.

The LHM has been classified "confidential" as the unauthorized disclosure of the information provided by source 1, 2 or 4 could reasonably result in identification of the sources of continuing value, jeopardize their future effectiveness, and thus adversely affect the defense interests of the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ase Refer to

Boston, Massachusetts

February 18, 1972

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

A source on February 11, 1972, advised as follows:

The opening session of the WONAAC Convention held at Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts, February 11-13. 1972, began at approximately 8:00 p.m. the evening of February 11, 1972, and was in the nature of a rally held in Hayden Hall, Boston University with approximately 600 individuals present. Of this number, approximately 50 were males; but it is noted that this was the only convention session to which males were invited.

The general theme of the rally was "How To Win Abortion Law Repeal." Matilde Miles nee Zimmerman who in December 1971, transferred from the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston to the SWP, New York and is now also a WONAAC national staff member, was one of the two rally moderators.

> The SWP, Boston is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The source advised that the rally speakers, all of whom stressed the legalization of abortion, included the following:

Judy Syfers Coordinator of WONAAC West, Feminist Author

100-468406-69

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

Doctor Barbara Roberts, a founder and national project director of WONAAC.

Shirley Wheeler, first woman convicted and sentenced for having an abortion.

Sarah Weddington, an attorney who argued for the elimination of the Texas Abortion Law before the United States Supreme Court in the fall of 1971.

Florence Luscomb, long-time Feminist.

Elma Barrera, organizer of the 1971 Houston, Texas Chicana Conference.

Judith Keith, head of the Abortion Repeal Committee, Day County, Florida.

Frances Howard Gordon, Feminist from Nottingham, England, not further identified.

SudieJudson, Chairwoman, Brooklyn, New York Welfare Action Council.

Brenda Brdac, female liberation, Berkeley, California.

"The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP in its November 5, 1971, edition described Shirley Wheeler as a 23-year-old Florida woman who was convicted of manslaughter for having an abortion and sentenced October 15, 1971, by a Daytona Beach, Florida judge to two years probation with the condition she must either get married or move to North Carolina and live with her family.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON
MASSACHUSETTS

A second source on June 28, 1962, advised that the Tass News Agency, the Official Soviet Government news gathering agency had been advised that Florence Luscomb, described as a 72 year old Communist Party (CP) member who organized the white collar workers in New England, would attend the world congress for general disarmament and peace scheduled to be held in Moscow, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR).

The "Daily World" an East-Coast Communist Newspaper, in its May 2, 1970. edition named Florence Luscomb as one of two co-chairman of the twentieth birthday party to honor Otis A. Hood, State Chairman of the CP of New England.

The first source further advised that at the outset the rally was delayed due to a small group protesting against abortion who sat in front of the doors to Hayden Hall blocking the entrance to the hall. This group was eventually peacefully removed by the police.

A third source on February 11, 1972, advised that at approximately 7:30 p.m. officers of the Boston University Campus Police arrested 15 individuals who had been conducting a peaceful sit-in blocking the doors to Hayden Hall, Boston University, where a WONAAC rally was being held. According to the third source the 15, who had been conducting their peaceful sit-in since shortly before 7 p.m. that evening, were arrested on charges of disturbing the peace and trespassing on Boston University property when they refused to leave on their own volition. The arrests were orderly, without incident and the 15, two of whom were Roman Catholic Priests and the remainder, Seminarians from St. Johns Seminary, Boston, were turned over to the Boston, Massachusetts Police Department. All of those arrested were released on bail for court appearance on February 12, 1972, and no other serious incidents occurred during the rally.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

The first source on February 12, 1972, identified the following members of the SWP, Boston as having been present at the February 11, 1972, rally:

GEORGE BASLEY

TRACY BLISS

ANN MARIE CAPUZZI

BRUCE CLARK

EVELYN CLARK

GARY COHEN

ALBA (DAWN) DE LOLLIS

DAVID EDWARDS

PAMELA EDWARDS

ALLAN EINHORN

TOBY EMMERICH

JOHN FINNAN

ROBERT GAHTAN

PATRICIA GALLIGAN

ROBERT GEBERT

DONALD GUREWITZ

VIRGINIA HILDEBRAND

CARLA HOGG

DAVID JEROME

KAREN KOPPERUD

MARY LIPMAN

KAY LYDON

TED NAULT

KATHY PAGE

PHILIP PASSEN

JANE ROLAND

PHYLLIS SAWYER

STEPHEN SCHMUGER

TOBA SINGER

AUGUSTA TRAINOR

MARY (SUDI) TRIPPET

STEPHEN WATSON

CHARLES WILLIAMSON

The first source further advised on February 12, 1972, that Carol Lipman, a leader in the SWP and WONAAC

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS

who was formerly a member of the SWP, Boston and now believed to be in New York, was also present at the February 11, 1972, rally.

This first source also advised that the Saturday and Sunday, February 12-13, 1972, sessions, which would be open to women only, were scheduled to include workshops on such topics as national and local legislative projects, court actions, forced sterilization, abortion referral and clinics, campus and high school work and the building of the Abortion Law Repeal Movememt.

The third source advised on February 12, 1972, that the February 12, 1972, session of the WONAAC Convention began at 10:00 a.m. with services and a general assembly at Marsh Chapel, Boston University, which ran until 11:00 a.m. The remainder of the day consisted of workshops held in various Boston University classrooms followed by another general assembly in Hayden Hall during the later evening hours. This third source advised that the day's events were without incident and that an estimated 800 to 1000 individuals were in attendance during the days' proceedings. He advised that the convention was scheduled to reconvene on the morning of February 13, 1972, and to run through the late evening that date.

The "Boston Globe," a daily newspaper published in Boston, in its February 13, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Abortion Strategy Discussed" which in part reported that more than 800 women from across the country had gathered for a conference at Boston University the weekend of February 11-13, 1972, to plan a strategy to win repeal of all laws that restrict abortion. According to the article it was expected that the conference would endorse the latest Federal bill to nulify all state laws restricting abortion-- the "Abortion Rights Act of 1972" to be introduced by United States Congresswoman Bella Abzug from New York.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION
FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON,
MASSACHUSETTS

The article reported that discussion at the convention had centered around whether or not to adopt the slogan "Free Abortion on Demand; No Forced Sterilization" or to focus on a single issue--repeal of the abortion laws. It further reported that a proposal was presented for an Abortion Action Week, May 1-6, 1972, to include educational programs, legislative support, judicial action and local or regional demonstrations centering around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion and anti-contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

Jane Roland, identified in the article as coordinator of the Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition said that whatever the conference does nationally, her organization would be acting at the local level.

A fourth source on February 13, 1972, advised as follows:

The February 13, 1972, session of the WONAAC Convention at Boston University began at approximately 9:00 a.m. and the day's program was in the form of workshops held in about 8 classrooms in the College of Liberal Arts, Boston University. There were approximately 50 females in attendance at each workshop; and the maximum number of persons, all female, present at any one time during the day would be estimated at between 400 and 500. The workshops primarily related to the building of WONAAC throughout the United States fund raising and regional work with ideas being exchanged between individuals attending from such areas of the United States as: San Francisco, Los Angeles, Detroit, Chicago, Philadelphia, New York and Boston. The major theme appeared to be how to strengthen an awareness of WONAAC, which reportedly was in need of financial support. It was also stated that there was a need for regional travelers with cars who would be able to travel full time, and funds would be needed in this regard. It was felt that more effort should be placed in obtaining paid speaking engagements in colleges throughout the United States as such action would not only bring in needed funds but also help to spread an awareness of WONAAC and its objectives among college students. The workshops were peaceful and no incidents arose.

Tables identified with such groups as Female Liberation, Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) were set up in a hallway of the College of Liberal Arts for sale of literature or posters.

SDS was founded during June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan, and in the 1960's functioned as the leading New Left campus-based student organization in the United States. From a stance of "participatory democracy," the SDS moved to a radical-revolutionary position. It maintained a national office at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, until February, 1970. Internal factionalism during 1969 produced three main factions: Weatherman, Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), and Worker Student Alliance (WSA). The Weatherman and RYM no longer consider themselves associated with the SDS. The WSA faction continues to use the name SDS.

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

> As the youth organization of the SWP the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

On February 13, 1972, a fifth source advised that Boston University authorities had been notified by representatives of WONAAC at 4:30 p.m. that date that the WONAAC Convention was coming to a close. According to that source by 5:30 p.m. all of the convention participants had dispersed and the Boston University facilities utilized for the various convention proceedings had been locked. This source further advised that the February 13, 1972, convention session was without incident.

The "Boston Globe" in its February 14, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Women's group backs abortion bill" which reported that the "Abortion Rights Act of 1972," mentioned above, received strong endorsement from WONAAC at the close of its second national conference on February 13, 1972. The article further reported that to implement the endorsement, coalition chapters intended to publicize the text of the bill, which proposes to repeal all abortion laws, and have speakers on the legislation at forums, teach-ins, rallies and other educational activities.

According to the article the following proposals were adopted;

That the coalition sponsor an Abortion Action week, May 1-6.

That a telegram be sent to the New York Court of Appeals and New York Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller condemning the court's February 10, 1972, decision denying women on Medicaid the right to abortions on demand.

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972, BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

That the coalition continue to organize black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, native American and Asian-American participation in their activities.

That members of local coalitions confront candidates for office and force them to take a stand on abortion, and that they publicize those who oppose abortion so that the voters can see where these politicians stand.

That the coalition make a special effort to reach out to and involve gay women in their activities.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Boston, Massachusetts

Refer to

February 18, 1972

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION FEBRUARY 11-13, 1972 BOSTON, MASSACHUSETTS

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST

Reference Memorandum of Federal Bureau of Investigation dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)
(ATTN: DID)

DATE: APR 27 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C
(TROTSKYIST)

ReWFO nitel to Director, dated 4/20/72. per 71

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM, concerning captioned title.

Enclosed for Boston and Philadelphia is one copy each of an LHM, concerning captioned title which is provided for information only.

This LHM is classified "Confidential" in that it contains information from sources one and two, which, if disclosed, could impair the effectiveness of these sources and could possibly have an adverse effect on the national defense.

The sources used in this LHM are:

Identity of Source	File Where Located
CS - 1 [redacted]	Instant LHM
CS - 2 [redacted]	WF 100-55420

} Informants

2D
2 - Bureau (Encls. 6) (RM)
1 - Boston (Encl. 1) (100-43809)
1 - Philadelphia (Encl. 1)
2 - New York
(1 - 100-4013) (SWP NATIONAL) (45)

MAY 1 1972

JJS:nl
(7)

AGENCY: ARMY, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER, STATE, CIA
DIA: 100932D
DATE FORW: 5.8.72
HOW FORW: RS

INT-SEC. PM

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC)

On April 18, 1972, confidential source one, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the leadership of the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), is dominated by the Socialist Workers Party. In addition, source stated that WONAAC) has scheduled an "Abortion Action Week", May 1-6, consisting of informational programs and educational activities. This week is to culminate with a march from 1st Avenue and 27th Street to Union Square, Broadway and 17th Street, New York City. The purpose of the march, according to WONAAC literature, is to "defend our right to abortion".

> Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) is a Socialist Workers Party dominated, non-membership organization, which is promoting a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign.
>
> Socialist Workers Party (SWP), has been designated by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This same source advised that WONAAC has affiliates at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts and 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

On April 19, 1972, confidential source two, who has provided reliable information in the past, advised that Trotskyist members of WONAAC have proposed to demonstrate on May 3, 1972, at the Vatican Embassy in Washington, D. C., probably referring to the Residence of the Apostolic Delegate to the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-46846-10

ENCLOSURE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 20 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. M
Mr. B
Mr. Miller, ES.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR019 WF CODED

6:37PM NITEL 4-20-72 ALM

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420) 2P

PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION AT THE RESIDENCE OF THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE TO THE UNITED STATES, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC), SPONSORED BY WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), MAY THREE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO; INTERNAL SECURITY - C (TROTSKYIST).

Communist

ON APRIL NINETEEN, LAST, A SOURCE, RELIABLE IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT TROTSKYIST MEMBERS OF WONAAC HAVE PROPOSED TO DEMONSTRATE ON MAY THREE, NEXT, AT THE QUOTE VATICAN EMBASSY UNQUOTE IN WDC, PRESUMABLY IN REFERENCE TO THE RESIDENCE OF THE APOSTOLIC DELEGATE TO THE UNITED STATES, THREE THREE THREE NINE MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE, NORTHWEST, WDC. TIME OF THE DEMONSTRATION AND NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS WAS NOT OBTAINED.

EX-112 REC-33 100-[illegible]-406-71

8 MAY 2 1972

SOURCE STATED THE QUOTE TROTSKYISTS UNQUOTE REFERRED TO ARE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKER'S PARTY (WSP).

END PAGE ONE

cc to ISD

PAGE TWO

THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

WONAAC WAS FOUNDED DURING JULY, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE FOR THE PURPOSE OF FORMING A NATIONAL MOVEMENT OF GROUPS SCATTERED THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES WHO FAVORED AND WORKED TO LEGALIZE ABORTION. DURING THE FOUNDING CONFERENCE, WONAAC'S GOALS WERE DEFINED AS QUOTE WORKING ON A NATIONAL SCALE TO MAKE ABORTION LEGAL, TO END RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTION LAWS, AND TO END FORCED STERILIZATION UNQUOTE. WONAAC IS HEADQUARTERED IN NEW YORK CITY.

UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE; SECURITY OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, AND INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT HAVE BEEN ADVISED.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Informant

SOURCE IS [redacted]

NEW YORK ALERT APPROPRIATE SOURCES AND FURNISH ANY PERTINENT INFORMATION TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE AND BUREAU.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE FOLLOWING.

END

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

DATE: 4/27/72

FROM : SAC, LOS ANGELES (100-79014)(C)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C

LOS ANGELES WOMENS
ABORTION ACTION COMMITTEE
IS - NEW LEFT

100-468406-45

Re Los Angeles letter and letterhead memorandum (LHM) dated 12/9/71, and Los Angeles report of SA RICHARD J. RAYSA dated 12/23/71, and captioned "Womens Liberation Movement."

For information of the Bureau and New York, referenced communications report activities sponsored by the Los Angeles Womens Abortion Action Committee (LAWAAC), a Los Angeles based affiliate of WONAAC which is headquartered in New York City.

Although LAWAAC continues to exist in name, this group has not been active in sponsoring activities since its participation in the 11/20/71 WONAAC sponsored demonstration at San Francisco, California.

It is anticipated that LAWAAC will sponsor or participate in future demonstrations, and Los Angeles will report any future activity by this group.

EX-115

REC-21 100-468406-72

18 MAY 1 1972

NEW LEFT

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (100-174481)(RM)
1 - Los Angeles

RJR/rjr
(5)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 1 1972

TELETYPE

NR 010 CV CODE

9:35 PM URGENT 5/1/72 RJB

TO DIRECTOR

FROM CLEVELAND (100-NEW) 2P

"Womens National Abortion Action Coalit

MARCH AND RALLY TO REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, MAY SIXTH, NEXT. INTERNAL SECURITY - NEW LEFT.

Shackelford

ON INSTANT DATE, RELIABLE SOURCE FURNISHED LEAFLET ANNOUNCING CAPTIONED MARCH AND RALLY. ACCORDING TO LEAFLET, SUPPORTERS OF APC ARE TO ASSEMBLE AT TWELVE NOON AT THE NEW FEDERAL BUILDING, EAST NINTH STREET AND LAKESIDE. THE MARCHERS WILL THEN PROCEED SOUTH ON EAST NINTH STREET TO EUCLID AVENUE, WEST ON EUCLID AVENUE TO PUBLIC SQUARE, AND THEN TO THE OLD FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING AT CORNER OF SUPERIOR AVENUE, AND PUBLIC SQUARE WHERE RALLY WILL BE HELD. NO INDICATION MARCH AND RALLY WILL BE OTHER THAN PEACEFUL.

SOP
REC-21
EX-116
46840-73

CLEVELAND, OHIO PD, LOCAL SECRET SERVICE, AND GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION BUILDING MANAGEMENT ADVISED.

MCT-7

6 MAY 4 1972

END PAGE ONE

54 MAY 10 1972

Included in letter to White House and Attorney General. Date 5/2/72

Adm. data deleted

PAGE TWO

CV 100-NEW

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION

THIS IS A SELF-DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, DEDICATED TO REPEALING ALL ABORTION LAWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN. IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTION LAWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS Informant [redacted].

CLEVELAND FOLLOWING THIS MATTER AND WILL SUTEL AFTER CAPTIONED EVENT.

END

cc - [illegible]

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 28 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walkart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR002 WF CODED

500 PM NITEL 4-28-72 SKA

TO DIRECTOR

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420)

PROPOSED CANDLELIGHT MARCH TO UNITED STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SPONSORED BY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, (WONAAC), MAY SIX, SEVENTYTWO. INTERNAL SECURITY- COMMUNIST(TROTSKYIST)

ON APRIL TWENTYSEVEN LAST, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION HAS PROPOSED A CANDLELIGHT MARCH FROM ST. MARKS EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THIRD AND A STREETS, S.E., WASHINGTON, D.C., TO THE EAST STEPS OF THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION. THE MARCH IS EXPECTED TO START AT NINE THIRTY PM AND END APPROXIMATELY ELEVEN PM ON THE NIGHT OF MAY SIX NEXT AND APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL

END PAGE ONE

REC-35

EX-109

MAY 5 1972

2 cc to 1 SD

MAY 1 1 1972

PAGE TWO

ABORTION ACTION COALITION IS LOCATED AT ONE THREE FOUR SIX CONNECTICUT AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C., AND IS INFLUENCED BY MEMBERS OF THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE AND THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY.

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES ADVISED LOCALLY OF PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION INCLUDING UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE.

[illegible]

WFO FOLLOWING.

END

J[illegible] FBI WASH DC

CLR

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Walkart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 003 CV CODE

8:35 PM URGENT 5-6-72 SLO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 6 1972

TELETYPE

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM CLEVELAND 100-32715

MARCH AND RALLY TO REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, MAY SIX, 1972. IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY.

"Women's National Abortion Action Task..."

ON INSTANT DATE A SPECIAL AGENT OF THE FBI OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED TWENTYFIVE INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE APC, ASSEMBLE AT ELEVEN FORTYFIVE AM AT THE NEW FEDERAL BUILDING EAST NINTH ST., AND LAKESIDE, CLEVELAND, OHIO. OF THIS GROUP APPROXIMATELY SEVENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE FEMALES AND THE REMAINING TWENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE MALES. THIS GROUP FORMED A CIRCLE AND MARCHED IN FRONT OF THE FEDERAL BUILDING FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HALF HOUR. MOST OF THE PARTICIPANTS CARRIED BANNERS WHICH READ "REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS." FOLLOWING THIS ASSEMBLY AND MARCH, WHICH WAS AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE FIFTEEN PM THE ENTIRE GROUP THEN PROCEEDED SOUTH ON EAST NINTH ST., TO

END PAGE ONE

EX-115
REC-21 Sap

100-468406-75

20 MAY 12 1972

3 "cc to ISD
Adm data deleted"

60 MAY 1

Included in summary to White House
and Attorney General. Date 5/8/72

EUCLID AVE., WEST ON EUCLID AVE., TO PUBLIC SQUARE AND THEN TO THE OLD FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING AT THE CORNER OF SUPERIOR AVE., AND PUBLIC SQUARE. THIS GROUP ARRIVED AND ASSEMBLED AT THIS POINT AT APPROXIMATELY TWELVE FORTYFIVE PM WHERE THEY HEARD SPEAKERS DELIVER SPEECHES PRINCIPALLY ON REPEALING ALL EXISTING ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, ELIMINATING FORCED STERILIZATION AND REPEALING ALL CONTRACEPTIVE LAWS. SPEAKERS OBSERVED WERE: GA[redacted]GOLD, A MEMBER OF THE APC AS WELL AS A MEMBER OF BOTH THE CLEVELAND BRANCH OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (CBSWP) AND THE YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA); AND CA[redacted] LOEB, A MEMBER OF APC AS WELL AS THE CBSWP.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

SOME OF THE STATEMENTS SHOUTED BY THE ASSEMBLY WERE "ABORTION SHOULD BE A WOMAN'S DECISION," "ABORTION IS NOT MURDER," AND -"A WOMAN SHULD HAVE CONTROL OVER HER OWN BODY." THE RALLY TERMINATED AT APPROXIMATELY ONE FORTYFIVE PM CLEVELAND, OHIO, PD ADVISED NO ARRESTS, INJURIES OR INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE OCCURRED DURING THE RALLY. US SECRET SERVICE, CLEVELAND, COGNIZANT.

SOCIALIST WORKERS APARTY CLEVELAND, OHIO, BRANCH.

END PAGE TWO

[illegible]-32715

PAGE THREE

THE CLEVELAND BRANCH OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) IS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SWP AND FOLLOWS ITS DIRECTIVES. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO

YSA -------- AS THE YOUTH ORGANIZATION OF SWP, THE YSA SERVES AS THE MAIN SOURCE OF RECRUITMENT INTO THAT ORGANIZATION. THE YSA IS DESCRIBED IN THE MASTHEAD OF ITS OFFICIAL PAPER "THE YOUNG SOCUIALST ORGANIZER," AS "A MULTINATIONAL REVOLUTIONARY SOCIALIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION."

APC--------- THIS IS A SELF-DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, DEDICATED TO REPEALING ALL ABORTION LAWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CJHILDREN. IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTION LAWS.

ADMINISTRATIVE: 13

RE CLEVELAND TEL MAY aw ONE, LAST.

SA WHO OBSERVED MARCH AND RALLY WAS PETER J. TAMA. IN VIEW OF PEACEFUL NATURE OF MARCH AND RALLY, NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED, UACB, AND THIS MATTER IS BEING CONSIDERED CLOSED.

END

JTG FBI WASH DC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. [illegible]kart
Mr. Walters
Mr. S[illegible]
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAY 6 1972

TELETYPE

ESM/WDF

NR 024 WF CODE

11:19PM NITEL 5-6-72 GEA

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55966) (C) 3P

CANDLELIGHT MARCH TO UNITED STATES CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D.C., SPONSORED BY DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CHAPTER OF WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC), MAY SIX, SEVENTY TWO. INTERNAL SECURITY DASH COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST).

RE WFO TELETYPE DATED APRIL TWENTYEIGHT, LAST. per 74

ON MAY SIX, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC) HELD A FORUM MEETING AT ST. MARK'S EPISCOPAL CHURCH, THIRD AND A STREETS, SOUTHEAST, WASHINGTON, D.C. THIS MEETING WAS ATTENDED BY APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS AND LASTED FROM SEVEN THIRTY P TO NINE THIRTY PM ON MAY SIX INSTANT. THE SOURCE STATED THAT ~~AND~~ FOLLOWING THE MEETING, THE GROUP LEFT THE CHURCH AND PROCEEDED IN A CANDLELIGHT PROCESSION TO THE EAST STEPS OF THE CAPITOL BUILDING.

END PAGE ONE

100-468406-76

REC-110

6 MAY 12 1972

Included in summary to White House and Attorney General. Date 5/8/72

51 MAY 19 1972

100-55986

PAGE TWO

THE PURPOSE OF THE MARCH WAS TO GAIN SUPPORT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION AND TO PROTEST EXISTING ABORTION LAWS.

THE SOURCE ADVISED THAT LEADERS OF THE MARCH INCLUDED ELOISE CHASE, SHARON NAIMON AND BARBARA CHIS, ALL MEMBERS OF THE WASHINGTON, D.C. BRANCH OF THE SOCIALIST WORKER'S PARTY (SWP).

SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

WONAAC IS INFLUENCED BY SWP AND YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA) MEMBERS. YSA IS THE YOUTH AFFILIATE OF SWP.

ON MAY SIX INSTANT, REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY FIFTY TO SEVENTYFIVE INDIVIDUALS, MOSTLY FEMALES PROCEED TO THE UNITED STATES CAPITOL IN A CANDLELIGHT PROCESSION. THE PROCESSION LASTED FROM APPROXIMATELY NINE THIRTYFIVE PM (BEGINNING AND ENDING AT THE CHURCH) TO TEN FIFTEEN PM AND WAS HIGHLIGHTED BY THE PLACING OF A CARDBOARD COFFIN ON THE STEPS OF THE EAST SIDE OF THE CAPITOL BUILDING TO SYMBOLIZE THE DEATH OF TEN THOUSAND WOMEN FROM ILLEGAL ABORTIONS PREFORMED IN THE UNITED STATES DURING NINETEEN SEVENTY.

END PAGE TWO

107-55956

PAGE THREE

NO INCIDENTS WERE REPORTED.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Informant

SOURCE IS [redacted]

COPY FURNISHED TO NEW YORK AS OFFICE OF ORIGIN ON WOMAAC.

REPRESENTATIVES OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WERE SPECIAL AGENTS EDWARD KENNEY, JOSEPH A. MAHONEY, SECOND, AND NORMAN H. MITROWSKI.

NO LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM FOLLOWS.

END

JTJ FBI WASH DC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/30/72

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE (100-2049) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ReWFOrep of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL, 3/21/72.

For the information of the Bureau and New York, Informants advise that there is a Women's Liberation group at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Florida, which recently sponsored an Abortion Action Week rally, however, none of the individuals associated with this Women's Lib group are connected with any subversive organizations such as Young Socialist Alliance or Socialist Workers Party. They are merely Women's Liberationists, who support the repeal of all abortion laws.

In view of the above, no active investigation is being conducted by the Jacksonville Division of the Women's Liberation group at the University of Florida, as there is no present indication they are connected and/or interested in subversive activities.

REC-115

100-46446-78

5 JUN 1 1972

2 - Bureau
1 - New York (Info)
1 - Jacksonville

AJW:ahc
(4)

Rev. Act. Sect.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAY [illegible]
[illegible]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Felt
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Mohr
[illegible]
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Bates
Mr. Waikart
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR001 NY CODE

947AM URGENT 5-7-72 EAD

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

ATT DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 2P

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), IS DASH NEW LEFT.

AT TWELVE THIRTY PM, FIVE SIX SEVENTY TWO, A MARCH SPONSORED BY THE WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), COMMENCED AT FIRST AVENUE AND TWENTY SEVENTH STREET, NYC, ENROUTE HERALD SQUARE AND UNION SQUARE, NYC, WHERE A RALLY WITH APPROXIMATELY TWO THOUSAND PARTICIPANTS BEGAN. THE CENTRAL THEME OF THE SPEAKERS WAS THE REPEAL OF ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS.

REC-21

WONAAC IS A SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY DOMINATED ORGANIZATION WHICH IS PROMOTING A NATIONALLY COORDINATED ABORTION LAW REPEAL CAMPAIGN.

18 MAY 15 1972

NEW LEFT

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO SPEAKING AT THE RALLY WERE JOANNA MISNICK, MATILDA

END PAGE ONE

60 MAY 16 1972

"cc to [illegible]D

Adm. data deleted"

cc: Homer

ZIMMERMAN AND CAROL LIPMAN, ALL KNOWN SWP MEMBERS. IN ADDITION, BELLA ABZUG, CONGRESSWOMAN, NYC; SHIRLEY CHISHOLM, CONGRESSMAN NYC, AND MARY LINDSEY, WIFE OF NYC MAYOR JOHN LINDSEY. A JEAN FAUST (PHONETIC) READ A STATEMENT IN BEHALF OF NEW YORK CONGRESSMAN WILLIAM FITTS RYAN. BELLA ABZUG STATED..." EFFORTS ARE BEING MADE TO USE ABORTION LAWS AS MEANS OF SOCIAL CONTROL..."

SHIRLEY CHISHOLM ASKED..." IS HE (NIXON) QUALIFIED TO TALK ABOUT THE SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE, WHILE HE CONTINUES TO BOMB VILLAGES..." ..." CHILDREN MUST NOT BE MADE TO SUFFER THE FATE OF BEING BORN UNWANTED, ABORTION MUST BE MADE THE RIGHT OF EVERY WOMAN..."

SHIRLEY CHISHOLM STATED THAT SHE WAS GOING TO BRING THE ISSUE OF ABORTION TO THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION.

THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS AND THE RALLY CONCLUDED AT FOUR FORTY FIVE PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE

THE FBI AGENTS OBSERVING THE RALLY AND MARCH WERE SAS JOHN J. SYRON AND JAMES REILLY.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

BJM FBI WASHDC

CLR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: JUN 06 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C
(TROTSKYIST)

Enclosed for the Bureau are six (6) copies of an LHM concerning captioned title.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

This LHM is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as identification of sources NY T-1 and NY T-2 could prove prejudicial to the defense interests of the US and possibly compromise sources of continuing value.

The files of the NYO disclosed that the following WONAAC staff members are also members of the NY Branch of the SWP:

MATILDE ZIMMERMAN	NY 100-164365	Bufile 100-449333
JUDY KLEINBERG	NY 100-175437	Bufile
DEBBIE NOTKIN	NY 100-171819	Bufile
EVELYNN KIRSCH	NY 100-174520	Bufile 100-442975
JOANNA MISNIK	NY 100-161547	Bufile 100-447829

Although several of the leaders of the WONAAC are SWP members, their activities as pertaining to WONAAC have been directed toward the legal repeal of all restrictive abortion laws. Investigation to date has not disclosed any indication that captioned organization is engaged in any subversive or violence prone activity.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 6) (RM)
1 - New York (100-164365) (MATILDE ZIMMERMAN)
1 - New York (100-175437) (JUDY KLEINBERG)
1 - New York (100-171819) (DEBBIE NOTKIN)
1 - New York (100-174520) (EVELYNN KIRSCH)
1 - New York (100-161547) (JOANNA MISNIK)
1 - New York

JJS:kcb
(8)

AGENCY: SEC. SER., STATE
2 - RUC (RJ),
DATE FORW: 7/5/72
HOW FORW: C/S
BY: GJL: dlk

REC- 119

80

12 JUN 9 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

60 JUL 13 1972

NY 100-174481

It is felt that the activities of these SWP-WONAAC members can best be followed through their individual case files rather than under a WONAAC caption. This case is being closed by the NYO.

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Location
NY T-1 is Informant	NY 134-19305A-12
NY T-2 is Informant	NY 100-174481-81

The SAs who observed the women entering NY Governor ROCKERFELLER's office on 4/13/72 were SAs JOHN J. SYRON and JOSEPH DERTINGER, JR.

The SAs who observed the demonstration on 4/16/72, were SAs JOHN J. SYRON and JOSEPH E. FURRER.

The SAs who observed the march on 5/6/72, were SAs JOHN J. SYRON and JAMES F. REILLY.

"Repeal of Anti-Abortion Laws" at Governor Rockerfeller's Office in New York City.

CONFID[illegible]TIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

JUN 0 6 1972

Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition (WONAAC)

On February 2, 1972, NY T-1 advised that on February 2, 1972, Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) sponsored an "abortion debate" at the Community Church, 40 East 35th Street, New York City. The debate was between speakers representing a "Womens Right to Choose" and the "Celebrate Life" group.

> WONAAC is a non-membership organization which is promoting a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign.

> The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450

On March 12, 1972, NY T-1 advised that it was announced at a meeting of the Upper West Side Branch, Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) on March 12, 1972, that a demonstration sponsored by WONAAC would be held on March 16, 1972, for "Repeal of Anti-Abortion Laws" at Governor Rockerfeller's Office in New York City.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer" as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-468406 - 80

Womens National Abortion
Action Coalition (WONAAC)

On March 23, 1972, NY T-1 advised that on March 19, 1972, it was announced at a meeting of the Upper West Side Branch of YSA, New York City, that a meeting was being held at the WONAAC Office, to discuss the plans for the May 1-6, abortion action week rally.

On April 13, 1972, Agents of the FBI observed four women, representing WONAAC, enter the office of New York Governor Rockerfeller where they presented an aide with a petition demanding that Medic-aid payments be permitted to be used for abortions.

On April 16, 1972, Agents of the FBI observed approximately sixty individuals representing WONAAC, counter-demonstrate in the vicinity of 86th Street and Fifth Avenue against a parade sponsored by the Knights of Columbus who were marching in support of the repeal of all abortion laws.

On April 19, 1972, NY T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that SWP members representing WONAAC proposed to demonstrate at the Vatican Embassy, Apostalic Delegate to the United States, in Washington, D.C.

On April 21, 1972, NY T-1 advised that on March 22, 1972, a WONAAC meeting was held at the office of WONAAC, 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City. There were approximately 21 individuals at this meeting. The meeting consisted of a discussion of the route to be utilized on the May 6, 1972 march and of the various ways money could be raised; namely, sale of literature, buttons, contributions.

On page 4 of the April 26, 1972 issue of the "Guardian" there was an article which indicated that WONAAC was sponsoring an abortion action week May 1-6. The demands are:

1. Repeal of all anti-abortion laws.
2. No forced sterilization.
3. Birth control available to all.

Womens National Abortion
Action Coalition (WONAAC)

The "Guardian" is self-described as an "independent radical newsweekly" which takes a strong left position but is not identified with any organized group. It is considered to be the largest radical weekly in America.

On May 6, 1972, a march and rally sponsored by WONAAC was observed by Agents of the FBI. There were approximately two thousand participants who were in support of the repeal of all anti-abortion laws.

-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

JUN 06 1972

Title WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Reference Memorandum dated 6/6/72 and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES 'VERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/8/72

FROM : SAC, PITTSBURGH (100-17517) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

ser 81

Rerep of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72 at Washington Field.

During April and May, 1972, confidential informants and sources who are familiar with the Communist Party, Trotskyist New Left and Extremist activies in Pittsburgh Division, were unable to furnish any information concerning the above captioned organization or any activities within the Pittsburgh Division.

In view of the above, no further investigation is being conducted at Pittsburgh at this time.

2-Bureau
2-New York
1-Pittsburgh

PEC:djr
(5)

EC-59

81

EX-112

4 JUN 12 1972

Rev. Act/Sect.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. W. Gray (Grigalus)

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. G. J. Lex

[illegible] TO NEW YORK AND WFO
[illegible] ABORTION ACTION COALITION

7/11/72

TO SACS, NEW YORK (100-174481)
WFO (100-55420)

REC-22

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) — 85

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK; IS - C (TROTSKYIST), [illegible]

REWFO TEL JULY SEVEN, LAST, AND NYTEL JULY TEN, LAST, BOTH CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADVANCE INFORMANT ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION, TO ATTEND CAPTIONED CONFERENCE. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES FROM INFORMANT.

PRIOR TO SOURCE TRAVELING TO CONFERENCE, WFO AND NEW YORK COORDINATE IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANT CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NEW YORK OFFICE. WFO INSTRUCT INFORMANT CONTACT NEW YORK OFFICE TO REPORT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

1 - 134-20608

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

GJL:tlc
(7)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 134-20608

Felt
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Campbell
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 11 1972

628 PM

TELETYPE

RLS

TELETYPE TO NEW YORK AND WFO
RE: WOMEN'NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN,
SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK,
NEW YORK
100-468406

WFO CONTACT INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT DETAILED FD - THREE ZERO SIX TO NEW YORK WITHIN FIVE DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER SEVENTY-TWO DASH THREE (C) RE REPORTING OF RESULTS OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES.

NOTE:

WONAAC was founded in New York City 7/71 for purpose of forming a national movement of groups throughout U. S. who favor legalized abortion. This organization is dominated by Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). WONAAC scheduled to hold conference at Hunter College, New York, New York, 7/14-16/72. WFO source, Informant, advised that anti-Trotskyist women in WONAAC will attempt to negate influence of YSA control of organization at captioned conference. In teletype dated 7/7/72 WFO requested authorization to advance Informant $113 for expenses in connection with attendance at this conference. Expenses involve $38 for round trip by Metro Coach from WFO to New York City and for three days' food and lodging at rate of $25 per day. WFO furnished code name to New York for use by source. Source currently authorized $250 per month for services and $45 per month for expenses. Based on fact that source selected by WDC YSA leadership to be member of delegation to attend this conference, WFO being authorized to advance source $113. WFO and New York instructed to coordinate re source maintaining contact with New York and to insure that FD-306 submitted within five days after conclusion of conference.

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

JUL 7 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR 016 WF CODED

5:38PM NITEL 7-7-72 ASW

TO ACTING DIRECOTR

NEW YORK

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD TWO PAGES

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, SEVENTYTWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK. INTERNAL SECURITY DASH C (TROTSKYIST).

[redacted] INFORMANT [redacted] MEMBER OF WASHINGTON, DC LOCAL OF YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (YSA) AND WONAAC, HAS BEEN SELECTED BY WASHINGTON, DC YSA LEADERSHIP AS PART OF DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA WONAAC DELEGATION TO NEW YORK CONFERENCE JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, NEXT. SOURCE ADVISED THAT THIS CONFERENCE IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT TO THE YSA BECAUSE IT IS FELT THAT ANTI TROTSKYIST WOMEN IN WONAAC WILL ATTEMPT TO NEGATE INFLUENCE OF TROTSKYIST WOMEN IN WONAAC AT CAPTIONED CONFERENCE.

BUREAU AUTHORITY IS REQUESTED TO SEND SOURCE TO CAPTIONED, AND BUREAU AUTHORITY IS FURTHER REQUESTED TO ADVANCE TO SOURCE

END PAGE ONE

REC-22 — 86

6 JUL 12 1972

TL to NY and [illegible] 7/11/72

6 C

PAGE TWO

THE AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED THIRTEEN DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES TO BE ACTUALLY INCURRED, INCLUDING THIRTYEIGHT DOLLARS ROUND TRIP METRO COACH FARE FROM WASHINGTON, DC TO NEW YORK, AND TWENTYFIVE DOLLARS PER DAY FOR THREE DAYS FOR FOOD, LODGING, CONTRIBUTIONS, AND MISCELLANEOUS EXPENSES.

FOR INFORMATION OF NEW YORK, SOURCE'S CODE NAME IS(*)

IF APPROVED BY BUREAU, NEW YORK PROVIDE WFO WITH NAME AND TELEPHONE NUMBER OF CONTACTING AGENT.

END

DSS FBI WA DC FOR THREE HOLD FOR THREE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 6/22/72

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (100-22881) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re report of ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72 at Washington Field.

aer81

The State University of New York at Binghamton is part of the University system of the State of New York, and the University at Binghamton has an enrollment of approximately 7,500 students. The student newspaper published at the University twice weekly during the school year in its issue of 10/15/71 carried a brief ad in the classified section as follows:

"Women who have had abortions needed to relate their experiences to other women, educate all women about abortion at abortion speak out October 21. Contact Linda L., extention 4130."

The 11/12/71, issue of the "Pipedream", student newspaper published at the State University of New York at Binghamton, carries an announcement that the Binghamton Womens Abortion Coalition was selling bus tickets for the Womens March on Washington for repeal of all abortion laws, repeal of all contraception laws and no force sterilization for 11/20/71. Women and men were invited to attend and tickets were on sale at the student center. Cars and volunteers were needed and they were to contact LINDA LOEW at extention 4129.

INFORMANT who is familiar with New Left activities on the campus of the State University of New York at Binghamton was contacted regularly during the school year of 1971-72 and he stated that he did see some signs on bulletin boards in the Fall of 1971 about abortion organizations, but never knew them to be of much success on campus. He stated that he did not see any

100-11584-83

REC-19

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (RM)
1 - Albany
CFH/mhv
(5)

15 JUN 26 1972

54 JUL 5 1972

X-109

Rev. Act. Sect.

activity or signs on any bulletin boards from the period of approximately January, 1972 until school closed in May, 1972. This source was contacted 5/16/72. He stated also at that time that LINDA LOEW has been a close associate of BETTY SACHS who is the leader of the Young Socialist Alliance Chapter on campus at the University. Informant stated that there was no organization formed to his knowledge of a Womens Abortion Action Coalition in the Binghamton area.

Other sources familiar with New Left activities on the campus of the State University of New York at Binghamton, were contacted during May, 1972, and two sources advised that they knew of no organization of Womens Abortion Action Coalition on the campus or in the Binghamton vicinity during the past year.

Albany Division has had an investigation pending on LINDA LOEW and a report is being written with appropriate recommendation for administrative action on LINDA LOEW. In view of the lack of activity of an Abortion Coalition organization in the Binghamton area, no further investigation is being conducted by Albany.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 Mr. A. W. Gray [illegible]

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Mr. R. L. Pence
6/19/72

TO SAC, DETROIT (134-3030)

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (134-22865)

INFORMANT SYMBOL # SM - DWAAC.

RELETEL JUNE FIFTEEN, LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED ADVANCE INFORMANT AMOUNT NOT TO EXCEED ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION, TO COVER MEETING OF WOMENS POLITICAL CAUCUS (WPC), WASHINGTON, D. C., JUNE TWENTY-FOUR TO TWENTY-FIVE, NEXT. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING OF EXPENSES FROM INFORMANT.

WFO AND DETROIT COORDINATE CODE NAME OF INFORMANT AND IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANT CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WHILE IN WASHINGTON, D. C. DETROIT INSTRUCT INFORMANT TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH WFO IN EVENT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION DEVELOPED WHICH SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE. DETROIT INSTRUCT INFORMANT BE PARTICULARLY ALERT FOR EXTENT OF SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) EFFORT AT OR CONTROL OVER MEETING AND IDENTITIES OF SWP MEMBERS IN ATTENDANCE.

DETROIT CONTACT INFORMANT [illegible] AND SUBMIT DETAILED LHM WITH AIRTEL COVER.

1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)
1 - 100-16 (SWP)
1 - 100-463403 (WONAAC)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

NOT RECORDED
12 JUN 23 1972

RLP:tlp
(8)

70 JUL 14 1972

Teletype to Detroit
Re: DE 2831-S
134-22865

NOTE:

Approximately 75 to 100 individuals expected to attend policy meeting of Womens Political Caucus (WPC), WDC, 6/24-25/72, with specific discussion to center around organizing booklet drafted by WPC instructing new women's groups to seek support from other organizations, including communist Socialist Workers Party (SWP). SWP moving quickly and vigorously to infiltrate and dominate women's liberation movement and has formed numerous chapters of front group named Womens Abortion Action Coalition (WAAC). Informant is member of Detroit WAAC and has furnished coverage on SWP influence in her chapter and has been successful through her own efforts in thwarting complete SWP takeover. Informant is in position to discuss with persons in leadership capacity at WPC meeting threat of SWP infiltration and will also be in position to report on existing SWP influence. Informant is currently paid on authority of Special Agent in Charge. Informant's presence at meeting is desirable and requested expenses of $135 considered reasonable. Nitel being utilized to allow informant necessary preparation time.

FD-263 (Rev. 12-19-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
BOSTON	NEW YORK	6/23/72	6/1-12/72	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION		ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.		cmd
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		IS - C (TROTSKYIST)		

REFERENCE: Boston airtel and LHM dated 1/18/72 ✓ captioned "Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition, IS-C (TROTSKYIST)". Boston airtel and LHM dated 2/18/72. ser 69
WFO report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72.
ser 81

-P*-

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED					☒ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED James L. Handley, Jr. SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

6 - Bureau (100-468406) (RM)

2 - New York (100-774481) (RM)

2 - Boston (100-43809)

2CC - 932-D

81

REC 69

EX-112

2 JUL 28 1972

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	Sec. Svc., 2-ORO m-ISD			
Request Recd.				
Date Fwd.	7/5/72			
How Fwd.	R/S 6 1972			
By	CGL:dlk			

Notations

Rev. Act. Sect.

-A-

BS 100-43809

LEADS

BOSTON

AT BOSTON, MASS.

Will continue to follow and report pertinent activities of the local abortion group within the Boston Division.

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source	Location
BS T-1 is Informant	BS 134-729A-762-787
BS T-2 is identified on the Non-Symbol Source Administrative Page	
BS T-3 is Informant	BS 100-43809-36

ADMINISTRATIVE

With respect to individuals mentioned in the details of this report, MATILDE MILES is a former Security Index subject of the Boston Division who transferred to New York; EVELYN CLARK and JANE ROLAND are subjects of current investigations and TOBA SINGER is an ADEX subject of the Boston Division.

Agents observing the activity at Washington, D.C. were WILLIAM ARMS, WILLIAM BROOKS, RICHARD COFFMAN, NORMAN HIERONYMI, MASON NOAH AND WILLIAM TUCKER.

This report has been classified "Confidential" as the unauthorized disclosure of information provided by BS T-1 and BS T-3 could reasonably result in the identification of these informants of continuing value, compromise their future effectiveness and thus adversely affect the defense interests of the United States.

-C*-
COVER PAGE

BS 100-43809

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

BS T-2 is [redacted] BS 100-43809-6

SOURCE

(Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy to:

Report of: ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.
Office: Boston
Date: 6/23/72

Field Office File #: 100-43809
Bureau File #: 100-468406

Title: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: Informants advised the Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed during the late summer, 1971, out of the local Female Liberation (FL) group. Its headquarters is located at 552 Mass. Avenue, Cambridge. BOWAAC is not a formal membership group but there are approximately a total of 20-25 females regularly involved in the group's work. The Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston faction within BOWAAC, which comprises about half of the activists, were the controlling force. However, recent reports indicate this faction has apparently alienated itself from other activists and does not now believe BOWAAC can be built into a successful supporter group for the YSA and SWP locally.

-P*-

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to [illegible] are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Details:

I. ORGANIZATION

A. Origin and Objectives

The Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed during late summer, 1971, out of the local Female Liberation (FL) group.

BS T-1
November 17, 1971

BOWAAC was originally a subcommittee of FL in the Greater Boston Area but as of January, 1972, had grown into a separate group whose specific interest was in abortion reform. Individuals active in BOWAAC are also active in other FL work; however, all individuals active in FL work are not active in BOWAAC, with BOWAAC being the smaller of the two groups.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

WONAAC has been publicly described as an organization of groups whose aim is to effect the overthrow of existing abortion laws and to establish free abortion on demand.

B. Headquarters

A permit for a WONAAC sponsored demonstration at Washington, D.C., scheduled for November 20, 1971, listed BOWAAC at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Massachusetts, Room 9, telephone number (617) 547-1818 or 491-1071, as among supporting groups.

Sergeant JOHN TOMLINSON
United States Park Police
Washington, D.C.
November 4, 1971

Telephone number 547-1818 is listed to BOWAAC at 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge and telephone number 491-1071 is listed to Female Liberation at that same address.

New England Telephone
and Telegraph Company
Listing Service
November 17, 1971
June 12, 1972

BOWAAC and FL, in the Boston area, are located at the same address, 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, but have separate offices at that address.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

C. Membership

BOWAAC is not a formal membership type group. There are, however, approximately a total of 20-25 females regularly involved in office maintenance or correspondence and telephone contact work to develop outside support for scheduled public activities and demonstrations.

BS T-1
June 11, 1972

D. Leadership and Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance Infiltration

The Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) is the Boston affiliate of the YSA, the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The Boston SWP is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.

While BOWAAC was not exclusively made up of Boston SWP and YSA-B female members, as of November, 1971, it was controlled by members of those groups.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

MATILDE MILES, nee ZIMMERMAN, was the Boston SWP member heading up local SWP/YSA work in BOWAAC but she and EVELYN CLARK, another Boston SWP member active in BOWAAC, were then in the process of leaving Boston for Washington, D.C., to help in organizing a scheduled November 20, 1971, WONAAC demonstration at Washington, D.C.

BS T-1
November 17, 1971

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The YSA and SWP in the Boston area have approximately 15 of their female members active in FL work with approximately six to eight in and the controlling forces of BOWAAC. As of January, 1972, JANE ROLAND, who joined the Boston SWP in late 1971, was heading up SWP/YSA work in FL and BOWAAC as MATILDE MILES had not returned to Boston, but rather transferred to New York.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

In late January, 1972, TOBA SINGER and JANE ROLAND, leaders of the local SWP/YSA FL faction, reported that there was continuing trouble within FL with respect to the control of that group by the SWP and YSA forces and also the direction of FL into any kind of abortion work.

BS T-1
February 10, 1972

During early March, 1972, TOBA SINGER reported that at an increasing rate abortion work was becoming a more important area of work than FL and that a number of SWP and YSA female members were being transferred into the abortion work.

BS T-1
March 26, 1972

The stress of the SWP/YSA female members in the general Boston area who are active in female matters continues to be away from FL and into BOWAAC with only two or three remaining on the fringes to follow FL activities.

BS T-1
May 10, 1972

Recent reports concerning SWP/YSA faction work within BOWAAC disclose that, as previously occured with the Party's work within FL, those in the Party faction have apparently alienated themselves from the other females active in BOWAAC and for the most part have lost any support from others not in the Party faction. Any suggestions now offered by those of the Party faction in BOWWAC, which comprises approximately half of the activists in the group, are no longer accepted, cause considerable argument and there is evidence of "red baiting". As a result, the Party faction does not now believe that they can build BOWAAC into any successful supporter type organization as had resulted through Party work in the Student Mobilization Committee (SMC).

BS T-1
June 11, 1972

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth affiliate, Young Socialist Alliance. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.

II. OTHER ACTIVITIES

MATILDE ZIMMERMAN, telephone number 547-1818 of "Boston Women's Abortion Action", 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, in November, 1971, chartered five busses with a 45 person capacity each for travel to Washington, D.C. on November 19, 1971. A $1,500 cash deposit was made against a total cost of $3,500 on November 15, 1971. The busses were scheduled to depart for Washington, D.C. at approximately 9:00 P.M., on November 19, 1971, from Cambridge with a round trip cost of $18.

BS T-2
November 16, 1972

At a meeting of the Boston SWP held November 16, 1971, it was reported that BOWAAC was hoping to fill four busses with participants for travel to Washington, D.C., for the scheduled November 20, 1971, WONAAC demonstration.

BS T-1
November 17, 1971

At approximately 10:00 A.M., November 20, 1971, various women's groups from cities within the United States, including Boston, were observed gathering on the Ellipse in Washington, D.C., and at approximately 12:10 P.M. the group, then numbering about 1500, was observed to march from the Ellipse to the West front of the Capitol building. One of the signs carried by the marchers read "Boston Repeal All Abortion Laws". Two tables of SWP literature were set up during the gathering at the Ellipse and four at the rally site at the Capitol.

Special Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
November 20, 1971

The organizer of the Boston SWP in late November, 1971, reported that between 80-100 individuals had traveled from Boston to Washington, D.C. to participate in the above-mentioned November 20 demonstration.

BS T-1
December 3, 1971

"The Militant", a weekly newspaper of the SWP, in its November 14, 1971, edition carried the following announcement: "Abortion Conference - The Second National Conference of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition will be held February 11-13, 1972 at Boston University. For further information contact WONAAC, 150 Fifth Avenue, Suite 153, New York, New York 10011."

Boston SWP and YSA-B members active in BOWAAC were distributing in January, 1972, a "Housing Fact Sheet" in an effort to locate housing accommodations for individuals visiting the Boston area to attend the above scheduled conference at Boston University.

BS T-1
January 12, 1972

The opening session of the WONAAC Conference, held at Boston University, February 11-13, 1972, began on the evening of February 11 and was in the nature of a rally in Hayden Hall with approximately 600 individuals present. Of this number approximately 50 were males but it is noted that this was the only conference session to which males were invited.

The general theme of the rally was "How to Win Abortion Law Repeal" and MATILDE MILES, mentioned previously, was one of the two rally moderators.

Approximately 30 members of the YSA-B and/or the SWP, Boston, were in attendance at the rally.

The Saturday and Sunday, February 12-13, 1972 sessions, open to women only, were scheduled to include workshops on such topics as national and local legislative projects, court action, forced sterilization, abortion referral and clinics, campus and high school work and the building of the Abortion Law Repeal Movement.

BS T-1
February 13, 1972

The "Boston Globe", a daily newspaper published in Boston, in its February 13, 1972 edition, carried an article entitled "Abortion Strategy Discussed" which in part reported that more than 800 women from across the country had gathered for a conference at Boston University the weekend of February 11-13, 1972 to plan a strategy to win repeal of all laws that prohibit abortion. According to the article, it was expected that the conference would endorse the latest Federal bill to nullify all state laws restricting abortion - "The Abortion Rights Act of 1972", to be introduced by United States Congresswoman BELLA ABZUG from New York. The article reported that discussion at the conference had centered around whether or not to adopt the slogan "Free Abortion on Demand; No Forced Sterilization" or to focus on a single issue - repeal of the abortion laws. It further reported that a proposal was presented for an Abortion Action Week, May 1 to 6, 1972, to include educational programs, legislative support, judicial action and local or regional demonstrations centering around the demand for repeal of all anti-abortion and anti-contraception laws and an end to forced sterilization.

JANE ROLAND, identified in the article as coordinator of BOWAAC, was reported to have stated that whatever the conference does nationally her organization would be acting at the local level.

The February 13, 1972, session of the WONAAC Conference at Boston University was in the form of workshops held in approximately eight classrooms with about 50 females in attendance at each workshop. The maximum number of persons present at any one time during the day would be estimated at between 400 to 500. The workshops primarily related to the building of WONAAC throughout the United States, fund raising and regional work, with ideas being exchanged between individuals attending from various areas of the country, including Boston. The major theme appeared to be how to strengthen awareness of WONAAC, which was reportedly in need of financial support. Literature tables were set up on the periphery of the workshops and among organizations identified with the tables was the YSA.

BS T-3
February 13, 1972

The "Boston Globe" in its February 14, 1972 edition carried an article entitled "Women's Group Backs Abortion Bill" which reported that the abovementioned "Abortion Rights Act of 1972" had received strong endorsement from WONAAC at the close of its second national conference. The article reported that to implement the endorsement, coalition chapters intended to publicize the text of the bill, which proposed to repeal all abortion laws, and to have speakers on legislation at forums, teach-ins, rallies, and other educational activities. The article further reported that the proposals adopted at the convention were: that the coalition sponsor an Abortion Action Week, May 1 - 6, 1972; that a telegram be sent to the New York Court of Appeals and Governor NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER condemning the Court's February 10, 1972 decision denying women on

CONFIDENTIAL

Medicaid the right to abortions on demand; that the coalition continue to organize Black, Puerto Rican, Chicano, Native American and Asian American participation in their activities; that members of local coalitions confront candidates for office and force them to take a stand on abortion or to publicize those who oppose abortion; that the coalition make a special effort to reach out to and involve gay women in their activities.

CONFIDENTIAL

(1-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Boston, Massachusetts

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

June 23, 1972

Title	WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	Report of SA ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR., dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUL 10 1972
TELETYPE

NR005 NY CODE

355PM URGENT 7-10-72 PAC

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-458406

ATT DID

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 2P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONFERENCE, JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, NEXT, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, INTERNAL SECURITY DASH C, (TROTSKYIST).

RE WFO NITEL TO BUREAU, JULY SEVEN, LAST.

INFORMANT [redacted] ADVISED, INSTANT DATE, ABOVE CAPTIONED CONFERENCE WILL BE HELD SATURDAY AND SUNDAY, JULY FIFTEEN AND SIXTEEN, NEXT, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, COMMENCING NINE AM ON EACH DATE. SOURCE PLANS TO ATTEND CONFERENCE BOTH DATES AND AFFORD COVERAGE OF EVENTS THAT TAKE PLACE. PENDING.

REC-23

20 JUL 18 1972

END

SSSSSSSS

RMS FBI WA DC CLR

186

5-[illegible]

57 JUL 1972

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR 01 NY CODE

4:00AM NITEL 7-16-72 RDS

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481

WOMANS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONFERENCE, JULY 15-16, 1972 AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK. IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

RE WFO NIGHT TEL TO BUREAU SEVEN SEVEN SEVENTY TWO, BUREAU NIGHT TEL TO NEW YORK SEVEN ELEVEN SEVENTY TWO, NEW YORK TELS TO BUREAU SEVEN TEN SEVENTY TWO AND WFO SEVEN TWELVE SEVENTY TWO AND DETROIT NIGHT TEL TO BUREAU SEVEN FOURTEEN SEVENTY TWO.

A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT DATE A TWO DAY CONFERENCE OF THIRD WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) COMMENCED NINE AM INSTANT DATE AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, N.Y., PRINCIPAL ANNOUNCED PURPOSE OF WHICH IS TO MAP OUT A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN TO DEFEND AND EXTEND RIGHT TO ABORTION IN NEW YORK AND HELP WIN REPEAL OF ALL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST ABORTION IN STATES OF THE U.S.

EX-104

REC-6

87

JUL 17 1972

SOURCE ADVISED THAT FOLLOWING NINE AM REGISTRATION, CONFERENCE ENVOLVED INTO PLENARY SESSIONS AND VARIOUS WORK SHOPS LASTING

END PAGE ONE

53 JUL 19 1972

PAGE TWO

UNTIL TEN PM.

ACCORDING TO SOURCE, ALL OBSERVABLE ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED IN ORDERLY NON-VIOLENT AND PEACEFUL FASHION, AND THERE WAS NO SIGNIFICANT REPORTABLE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS PRESENT KNOWN OR SUSPECTED TO BE MEMBERS OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY OR YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE.

ADDITIONAL WORKSHOPS SCHEDULED FOR SESSION TO BE HELD SEVEN SIXTEEN SEVENTY TWO WHICH IS EXPECTED TO RUN FROM EIGHT AM TO THREE PM.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS INFORMANT [redacted] SUMMARY TELETYPE CONCERNING ACTIVITIES ON JULY SIXTEEN WILL BE SUBMITTED BY THE NYO.

-P-

END

EJF FBI WASH DC

Mr. Felt
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Campbell
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR001 NY PLAIN
115AM NITEL 07-17-72 JPM
TO ACTING DIRECTOR
FROM NEW YORK (100-174481)

Shackelford

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
CONFERENCE SEVEN FIFTHTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH SEVEN TWO HUNTER COLLEGE
NYC IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

RENYTEL SEVEN FIFTEEN SEVENTY TWO.

A CONFIDENTAL SOURCE ADVISED INSTANT LATE SECOND SESSION OF THIRD WNAAC CONVINED NINE AM AT HUNTER COLLEGE NYC. SOURCE STATED MORNING SESSION NINE ELEVEN AM INCLUDED ORGANIZATIONAL WORKSHOPS NOT COVERED AT SEVEN FIFTEEN SESSION SUCH AS I "PRESS WORK", "FUND RAISING", AND "STRINGTHINING OF LOCAL COALITIONS". AGENDA FROM ELEVEN AM TO THREE PM TERMINATION OF CONFERENCE WAS SCHEDULED AS A PLENARY SESSION WHEREBY ALL WORK PERFORMED AT THE TWO DAY CONFERENCE WAS EXPECTED TO CULMINATE IN A UNIFIED NATIONAL WOMENS CAMPAIGN SET OF PROPASLAS FAVORABLE TO WNAAC. SOURCE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT A SPLID DEVELOPED IN THE RANKS OF WNAAC BETWEEN THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) FACTION WHICH HAD PREDOMENATED IN CONTROLING THE CONFERENCE AND INDEPENDENCE" DASH ALL OTHERS REPRESENTING THE NON SWP FACTION. SOURCETATED OF THE

END PAGE ONE

EX 102 REC-71

88

56 JUL 21 1972

PAGE TWO

SEVEN TO EIGHTMEMBERS ATTENDING EACH DAY SESSION, APPROXIMATELY FIVE TO ONE HUMDRED DELIGATES WERE VOCAL IN THEIR OPPOSITION TO THE SWP FACTION. AT THE FINAL PLENIARY SESSION FIVE MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE OF WNAAC REPRESENTING THE INDEPENDENT FACTION RESIGNED. SOURCE STATED INDEPENDENCE (NUMBER UNKNOWN) HAVE RESOLVED TO LEAVE WNAAC, RETURN TO HOME STATES, AND WORK THRU LOCAL PRO - ABORTION ORGANIZATONS.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS INFORMANT

NYO WILL SUBMIT LHM.

END

EJF FBI WASH DC

CLR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/6/72

FROM : SAC, DETROIT (100-40426)

SUBJECT: NATIONAL WOMEN'S POLITICAL CAUCUS (NWPC)
POLICY COUNCIL MEETING
6/24 - 25/72
WASHINGTON, D.C.
INFORMATION CONCERNING

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYITE)
DEfile 100-40426

EX-103

Enclosed for the Bureau are eight copies of an LHM captioned, "National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC), Policy Council Meeting", dated as above.

Also enclosed for the Bureau are three samples of literature distributed at captioned meeting.

One copy each of captioned LHM is being furnished New York, San Francisco, and WFO for their information.

Source is INFORMANT location: this LHM.

10

2 - Bureau (Enc. - 11) (RM)
1 - New York (Enc. - 1) (Info.) (RM)
1 - San Francisco (Enc. - 1) (Info.) (RM)
1 - WFO (Enc. - 1) (Info.) (RM)
4 - Detroit
1 - 134-3030
1 - 100-1334 (SWP)
ZTL:PMR
(9)

89

REC-23

AGENCY [illegible] REQ. REC'D [illegible]
DIA; 2cc 932 0; 1cc destroyed
2cc
DATE FWD. 7/19/72
HOW FWD. RS
BY GJL/rwa

U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Detroit, Michigan
July 6, 1972

Re: National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC)
Policy Council Meeting

Source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, provided the following information on July 3, 1972:

A Policy Council Meeting of the National Women's Political Caucus (NWPC) was held in Washington, D.C. during the period June 24, 1972 - June 25, 1972.

> The NWPC is a legitimate, loosely-knit, open organization of politically motivated women seeking equal recognition in the American community.

During the Policy Council Meeting there were no overt attempts by any organized group to influence the policy meeting and there were no individuals present who identified themselves as members of any organization which might be construed as subversive and/or supporting any cause except legitimate change.

Of significance, however, was the fact that literature of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) was present in brochures and pamphlets located throughout the meeting area. All of the WONAAC material was geared to the abortion movement and specifically the WONAAC conference scheduled for Hunter College, New York, July 15 - 16, 1972.

> WONAAC was founded in July, 1971. for the purpose of forming a national movement of groups scattered throughout the United States who favor and now work to legalize abortion. The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in WONAAC.
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

9

ENCLOSURE

As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "a multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

During the council meeting on June 24, 1972, Mary Clarke, who is associated with the Southern California WPC, an affiliate of the NWPC, advised a group of policy council members that WONAAC had been using the Southern California WPC name as an endorser of WONAAC. Clarke also stated that WONAAC had passed out propaganda at a caucus rally in California and were very effective at taking control of small gatherings.

The Chairwoman from Nassau County in New York, whose name was not recalled, defended WONAAC stating that "they were a good group". This woman's position was not supported and, in general, WONAAC literature was not accepted by those persons present. Jill Ruckelshaus, a new member of the Policy Council, is reportedly concerned about the SWP's attempts to align itself with the abortion movement and will be using her newly gained position to fight SWP attempts at control of local WPC groups.

The NWPC organizing brochure published by the NWPC has been written to assist individual WPC groups in organizing. The brochure lists political parties and para-political organizations to be contacted by caucus organizers when forming the nucleus of a WPC. Among those listed was the SWP. After discussions at the caucus it was determined that the SWP should be removed from the list. The new edition of the WPC organizing brochure will not list the SWP; it has been replaced by National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC).

The NPAC was founded in 1970 by members of the SWP. Its basic objective is to unite masses of people including labor unions, GIs, and the black community in the struggle to end United States intervention in Southeast Asia through orderly and peaceful tactics.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

9K

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. A. W. Gray (Grigalus)

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

1 - Mr. G. J. Lex, Jr.
7/14/72

TO SACS, DETROIT (100-40426)
NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN, SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK; IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REDETEL JULY THIRTEEN, LAST.

AUTHORITY GRANTED TO ADVANCE INFORMANT ——— ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION TO NEW YORK, TO ATTEND CAPTIONED CONFERENCE. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES FROM INFORMANT.

PRIOR TO SOURCE TRAVELING TO CONFERENCE, DETROIT AND NEW YORK COORDINATE IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANT CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NEW YORK OFFICE. DETROIT INSTRUCT INFORMANT CONTACT NEW YORK OFFICE TO REPORT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

REC-22 90

DETROIT CONTACT INFORMANT IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT DETAILED FD - THREE ZERO SIX TO NEW YORK WITHIN FIVE DAYS AND

1 - 134-22865
1 - Mr. M. F. Row (6221 IB)

6 JUL 19 1972

GJL:tlc
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Felt
Bates
[illegible]
Callahan
Campbell
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong

1:39P

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT ☑

TELETYPE TO DETROIT AND NEW YORK
RE: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
CONVENTION JULY FOURTEEN THROUGH SIXTEEN,
SEVENTY-TWO, AT HUNTER COLLEGE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK
100-468406

NEW YORK SUBMIT SUCCINCT LHM SETTING FORTH RESULTS OF CONFERENCE IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER SEVENTY-TWO DASH THREE (C) RE REPORTING RESULTS OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES.

NOTE:

WONAAC was founded in New York City 7/71 for purpose of forming a national movement of groups throughout U. S. who favor legalized abortion. This organization is dominated by Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). WONAAC scheduled to hold conference at Hunter College, New York, New York, 7/14-16/72. Detroit in teletype 7/13/72 requested authorization for INFORMANT, a valuable source who has been paid under SAC authority, to attend national conference in New York City. Detroit advised delay in submitting request was due to lack of information as to whether source would be able to attend conference. INFORMANT is member of Detroit Women's Abortion Action Coalition (WAAC) and has furnished coverage on SWP influence in her chapter, and she has been successful in thwarting complete SWP takeover. Based on informant's position to discuss with persons in leadership capacity matters concerning SWP infiltration of WONAAC, it appears highly desirable for source to attend WONAAC conference in New York City. Detroit being authorized to advance source $135 in connection with travel to this conference. Detroit and New York also instructed to coordinate re source maintaining contact with New York and to insure FD-306 submitted and LHM submitted setting forth results of conference in accordance with SAC Letter 72-3 (C) re reporting results of subversive conferences. Source is second out-of-town informant to attend this conference.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)   DATE: JUL 27 1972

Joy
FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-53818) (C)

SUBJECT: PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), AKA, WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, WOMEN UNITED FOR ABORTION RIGHTS
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Encl.

Enclosed for the Bureau are six copies of an LHM concerning captioned organization. Enclosed for New York are two copies of the same LHM.

Sources in the enclosed LHM are identified as follows:

PH T-1 [redacted]
PH T-2 [redacted]
PH T-3 [redacted]
INFORMANTS

The enclosed LHM is being classified confidential in view of the fact that it contains information from PH T-1, PH T-2, and PH T-3 whose identities need to be protected in order not to compromise their future effectiveness and thereby be injurious to the national defense.

Copies of this communication are being furnished to the New York Office which is office of origin in this matter.

No additional investigation will be conducted in this matter UACB inasmuch as a continuing investigation of the abortion action coalition does not appear to be within the Bureau's investigative interest.

EX-117 REC-28

The individuals mentioned in the enclosed LHM as being affiliated with the Socialist Workers Party are either on the ADEX or under investigation with the objective of inclusion on the ADEX.

ENCLOSURE

② - Bureau (100-468406) (Enc. 6) (RM)
2 - New York (100-174481) (Enc. 2) (RM)
1 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

JCH:sdc
(5)

5 JUL 28 1972

8/7/72

Rec./Sect. Secd.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 26, 1972

PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

PH T-1 advised on May 25, 1972, that Women United for Abortion Rights (WUAR), 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., telephone WA-2-0381, is the local affiliate of Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) and that about two weeks ago WUAR decided to change their name from WUAR to Philadelphia Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (Philadelphia WONAAC) and that they intended to utilize the same office space at 1115 Walnut Street and the same telephone number. PH T-1 added that this change was made inasmuch as the name WUAR was found to be unwieldy and awkward and that it did not convey the group's affiliation with WONAAC as well as the new name Philadelphia WONAAC.

An article in "The Sunday Bulletin," Section 2, pages 6 and 7, issue of October 31, 1971, listed the various candidates for political office in the City of Philadelphia in connection with the forthcoming elections. Photographs of the following individuals appeared and background information contained under each individual photograph indicated that all were members of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and that they were also affiliated with the WUAR and/or WONAAC:

JEAN SAVAGE
CAROL LISKER
ROSE OGDEN
NANCY STREBE

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I

Excluded from automatic
Downgrading and Declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency: it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

100-467424-91

PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

PH T-2 made available information on January 27, 1972 which reflected that as of that time the Coordinator of WUAR was SAMARA JAROSH.

Sue T T [illegible]

PH T-3 advised on January 14, 1972 that as of that time SAMARA JAROSH was a member of the SWP.

PH T-1 advised on May 25, 1972 that it is difficult to determine the actual degree of SWP participation in the affairs of WONAAC in the Philadelphia area and that he was not aware of any information which would reflect that Philadelphia WONAAC was substantially controlled by the SWP. Source explained that the abortion rights issue had frequently been discussed at many of the recent public forum type meetings sponsored by the Philadelphia SWP and held at the Philadelphia SWP Headquarters at 1004 Filbert Street in Philadelphia. The discussions held on the abortion rights issue indicated that the SWP felt that the capitalistic system had used the dual issues of abortion and women's liberation to keep women in a position of inferiority, whereas the socialistic system being promoted by the SWP would be in favor of abortion and women's liberation, and WONAAC would therefore naturally attract members of the SWP to their organization.

[illegible]-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

July 26, 1972

Title	PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, AKA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION, WOMEN UNITED FOR ABORTION RIGHTS
Character	
Reference	Philadelphia letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (FS)
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex, Jr.

SAC, Philadelphia (100-53818) 8/11/72

Acting Director, FBI (100-468406)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Reurlet and LHM dated 7/27/72.

Referenced letter stated that activities of captioned organization in Philadelphia did not appear to be within the Bureau's investigative interest and, therefore, no additional investigation would be conducted.

As you are aware, the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) play a major role in Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) throughout the United States. Although a source of your office claimed he was not aware of any information indicating WONAAC in Philadelphia is substantially controlled by SWP, four individuals whose photographs appeared in a Philadelphia paper, were identified as members of the SWP as well as WONAAC. Based on this as well as the established fact that WONAAC is, for the most part, totally controlled by SWP/YSA, it is basic that the activities of this organization be followed by your office.

You are, therefore, to reopen the case concerning captioned matter and follow the activities of this organization for the purpose of determining the extent of influence and control by individuals who are members of SWP/YSA and who are acting on behalf of these organizations. A copy of your communications should be furnished to the New York Office, office of origin in this matter, for information.

1 - New York (100-174481)

REC 4 100-468406-92

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

3 AUG 11 1972

GJL:tlc
(6)

Felt
Bates
Bishop
Callahan
Campbell
Cleveland
Conrad
Dalbey
Jenkins
Marshall
Miller, E.S.
Ponder
Soyars
Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

70 AUG 16 1972
MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to Philadelphia
Re: Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition
100-468406

NOTE:

Philadelphia submitted letter and LHM dated 7/27/72 concerning WONAAC. Philadelphia stated that UACB no additional investigation would be conducted concerning this organization since it did not seem to be in the Bureau's investigative interest. Based on control of WONAAC by SWP/YSA throughout the country, Philadelphia being instructed to reopen and follow activities.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: AUG [illegible]

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) P

SUBJECT: THE WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

ReNYteletype to Bureau, 7/10/72, Bunitel to NY, 7/11/72; NYteletype to WFO, 7/13/72, Buteletype to Detroit, 7/14/72, Detroit teletype to Bu, 7/14/72, NYnitel to the Bureau, 7/17/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of an LHM reflecting details of WONAAC conference held in NYC, on 7/15 and 16/72.

The LHM has been stamped "Confidential" inasmuch as it contains information furnished by the confidential sources identified below, all known sources of continuing value, the disclosure of which information to unauthorized persons could compromise these sources to the detriment of the national defense interest of the US.

INFORMANTS

Confidential source number one is
Confidential source number two is } INFORMANTS
Confidential source number three is

NC

94

REC-9

NC

ENCLOSURE

6 AUG 24 1972

[illegible]

2-Bureau (Encls. 10) (RM)
[illegible]-New York (100-4013) (SWP) (45)
1-New York (100-133479) (YSA) (45)
1- New York

WRG:mg
(5)

2

Rev. Act. Sect.

62 SEP [illegible] 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. Bufile 100-468406
NYfile 100-174481

The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition

Confidential sources one, two and three, all of whom have furnished reliable information in the past, advised on July 18, 19, and 20, 1972, respectively, that a Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) Conference was held at Hunter College, Park Avenue and 69th Street, on July 15 and 16, 1972.

Confidential source number one advised that New York City was picked for the site of this convention because this city is considered to be the center of the most powerful anti-abortion effort so far.

The WONAAC Conference was open to all women who supported the Abortion Law Repeal Movement. Registration was $3.00 per person. Housing and child care facilities were available. There were approximately 800 women in attendance at this conference.

Discussions held at this conference centered on plans for (one) future activity in the campaign to repeal all anti-abortion and contraception laws and (two) to end forced sterilization.

A discussion was held concerning the attacks being made by the Catholic Church Hierarchy and other anti-abortion groups against women's rights to their own bodies.

WONAAC is aware of the fact that progress for these matters will not come easy, that it will be fought by various groups step by step all the way, therefore, this conference was called to discuss all the different approaches and to decide on the major direction for WONAAC to take.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP 1
[illegible] automatic
[illegible]

-94

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

The Women's National Abortion
Action Coalition

The following was the Agenda for the conference as originally prepared by the June 27 Working Committee:

Saturday, July 15

9:00-10:00	Registration
10:00-11:30	Plenary Session: Greetings and organization of conference
11:30-1:30	Workshops I: General discussion of major action proposals
1:30-2:30	Lunch
2:30-4:00	Workshops II (Project Workshops): anti-abortion attacks and the Catholic Church, petition campaigns and the Abortion Rights Act, court actions, tribunal, referenda, defense cases, legislative action, forced sterilization, research and education, elections, referral and clinics, August 26, workshops on states facing similar abortion situations
4:00-5:30	Workshops III (Constituency Workshops): campus, Black, Raza, high school, gay, Catholic women
5:30-7:30	Dinner, with provision for statewide or regional meetings over dinner
7:30-10:00	Plenary Session

Sunday, July 16

9:00-11:00	Workshops IV (Organizational Workshops): press, fundraising, building and strengthening local coalitions
11:00-3:00	Plenary Session: further discussion and vote on major action proposals

During the Saturday session a proposal was made that WONAAC organize a "National Tribunal" on abortion, contraception and forced sterilization to be held in NYC this Fall.

The Agenda for the conference followed the proposed agenda set forth by the Working Committee, mentioned above, with the exception of a change in the lunch hour and some of the workshop schedules.

Prior to the Saturday conference, a Socialist Workers Party - Young Socialist Alliance (SWP-YSA) Fraction meeting was held at the Belmont Plaza Hotel on 49th Street and Lexington Avenue at [illegible] AM. Those in attendance at this Faction meeting were SWP-YSA comrades from NYC and from out of town. The discussion at this Faction meeting centered on the procedure to be followed at the conference by the YSA-SWP members in terms of voting on various workshops and what stand to take which would be more beneficial for the YSA-SWP. This Faction meeting was concluded at approximately 9:30 PM.

FORMER MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The WONAAC Conference procedure continued uninterrupted with votes on various floor discussions until an interruption was made by Rose Weber, a WONAAC coordinator. She addressed all YSA-SWP members at the conference, asking them what was their real reason for being in attendance at the WONAAC Conference. She accused the YSA-SWP of not being sincerely interested in abortion rights, but rather being interested in what was best for the SWP-YSA. She stated that because of the YSA-SWP influence being enforced on the conference, she was resigning as a WONAAC coordinator and staff member. She stated that she detested the intervention of the YSA-SWP in this conference; that the SWP-YSA has caused conflict among the WONAAC staff and therefore, they cannot work out constructive solutions to their problems. She also suggested that the "Zero Population" and planned parenthood have no voice in discussions at this conference. Finalizing her accusations, she stated the YSA-SWP members had no mind of their own nor did they have any freedom of expression of their own. She stated that they only followed the instructions set forth for them at the SWP-YSA - Faction meeting held before this conference. Five additional resignations followed Rose Weber from WONAAC. They all stressed the fact that they would continue their work in the abortion fight outside of this organization. member Young Socialist Alliance

N.Y.

In defense of the SWP-YSA position at the conference, Linda Jenness, the SWP Presidential candidate, spoke in behalf of the YSA-SWP. In answer to Rose Weber's accusation, Jenness stated that all members of the YSA-SWP were independent individuals with their own personal ideas and viewpoints.

On July 15, 1972, a proposal was passed by the Election Workshop which stated in part as follows:

"WONAAC welcomes women from all political affiliations and views. We are united in action to win our demands guaranteeing women the right to control our own reproduction functions.

"By uniting women of all political views we maximize our strength. Any attempt to impose one political view on everyone in WONAAC would only destroy our ability to fight together on the abortion question. Therefore WONAAC, as an organization takes no position on any candidates or political parties...."

"The political rallies which will no doubt take place with increasing frequency around the country as November approaches offer us a forum for getting our ideas across to great numbers of women. Besides allowing us an opportunity to force the candidates to take a public stand on abortion, these gatherings give us a chance to publicize both WONAAC and the repeal campaign."

A National WONAAC structure proposal was presented, which stated in part as follows:

"All women are welcome in WONAAC: Black, Latina, Chicana, Native American and Asian women, gay women, high school, college, and working women, women from political organizations, trade unions, the military, and communities across the country. We are united in uncompromising struggle for our common goal: the right of all women to control fully their own reproductive lives..."

"The National Conference shall be the highest decision-making body of WONAAC, and shall operate on the basis of one woman, one vote.

"There shall be a National Coordinating Committee (NCC) composed of one woman from each national organization, area coalition, and group supporting and building WONAAC..."
Within the [illegible]

"There shall also be a Working Committee (WC), which is a sub-committee of the NCC and which is composed of the project directors or coordinators, the elected national staff, and one woman from each coalition, committee, group and national organization supporting and building WONAAC in the locale of the national office..."

In addition to the above, a proposal "that the National Office of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition establish an emergency cash fund, from which to contribute significant amounts of money to organizations and individuals who are working to achieve goals compatible with those of WONAAC..."

"That the National Office of WONAAC, as its first act of financial support, pledge $2,000 to the Kennedy-Schulder suit against the tax-exempt status of the Roman Catholic Church, since the Church has violated restrictions on its political activity by lobbying for anti-abortion legislation.

"That the National Office of WONAAC pledged $1,500 to the defense of the seven women arrested in Chicago because of their alleged activity in abortion counselling, referral, and procedure..."

"That the WONAAC National Office maintain, at all times, a fund-raising staff efficient enough to meet the needs of the emergency fund at the same time it raises sufficient capital to maintain the daily expenses of the National Office and staff..."

Confidential source number two related that the evening plenary session of WONAAC occurred on July 15, 1972, and it was immediately apparent that the Socialist Workers Party - Young Socialist Alliance (SWP-YSA) group dominated the meeting. Independent women who wanted to make statements during this session were voted down by SWP floor leaders and these same persons continued to vote as a bloc on all issues.

The group of independent women from various geographic areas, that is those women who were not associated with the SWP or YSA, went together after the plenary session was adjourned and considered the problem of how to handle the SWP leaders. While these women were not political realists in their goals, they did believe in working throughout the existing system rather than functioning with the SWP in their eventual goal of revolution.

It was decided that the independent feminists would no longer continue hassling within WONAAC. They did not want to have decisions for them being structured by a male dominated group. They also decided that money being collected by WONAAC in the name of abortion law change was not being used for that purpose, but rather to sustain members of the SWP-YSA.

The Sunday morning session, July 16, 1972, was labeled "Meeting to Discuss Internal Hassles." About 35 independents attended and a few number of SWP-YSA members and sympathizers were present. Independents there were from New Haven, Boston, Detroit, New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

The independents did not waiver in their firm opposition to SWP-YSA control of WONAAC. Six national coordinators of WONAAC were independents and decided to resign publicly at the afternoon plenary session. They also decided to combat SWP control of the feminist movement through the various publications.

FORMER MEMBERS OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

CALIF. CA The six national coordinators who resigned were Judy Siphers, San Francisco; Ann C. Davidson, Pa. Philadelphia; Rose Weber, New York; Vicki Eslinger, Columbia, South Carolina; Nancy Rolf, New York; and Ellen Shapiro, New York. N.Y.

There were approximately 700-800 women in attendance at the afternoon session. According to one of the SWP leaders, these women were from 31 states and three countries-Canada, Italy and Sweden. The states that had more representation than others were Ohio, Illinois, New York, and Massachusetts.

Most of the problems and differences between the independents and the SWP centered around approaches to abortion law reform. The SWP was charged with always having demonstrations and rallies and never doing any work through the legislative process.

The independents stated that they were tired of this hassle and that they believed there were more effective ways to change abortion laws than carrying placards in the streets.

After the independent women publicly resigned in front of the plenary session, two other coordinators announced they were staying on. One was Barbara Roberts, the other's name is unknown.

Linda Jenness made a final plea for the independent women to reconsider. The removal of the independents from WONAAC has debilitated the organization and most independent representatives will be going back to their own cities to work for abortion law change in organizations which have no connection with the SWP.

The concern still exists, however, that WONAAC will be able to collect monies in the name of abortion reform and there is also the concern that women new to the movement will join in a mistaken notion that they will be furthering abortion law reform.

Independents vowed before leaving New York that they would try to publicize activities from the SWP in an effort to prevent this.

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

NR 003 CV CODE

115 PM URGENT 8-24-72 CLP

TO ACTING DIRECTOR

FROM CLEVELAND (100-NEW)3P

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Hogan

RALLY TO REPEAL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, AT FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, CLEVELAND, OHIO, OR PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, AUGUST TWENTY-FIVE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, IS - RA.

5-Taylor

ON AUGUST TWENTYFOUR NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED SUPPORTERS OF APC WILL HOLD A DEMONSTRATION AT NOON ON AUGUST TWENTYFIVE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, TO CALL FOR REPEAL OF ANTI-ABORTION LAWS. DEMONSTRATION WILL BE HELD AT FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, EAST NINTH STREET AND LAKESIDE AVENUE, OR AT PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO.

A SECOND RELIABLE SOURCE ADVISED ON AUGUST TWENTYFOUR NINETEEN SEVENTWO, THAT AT A SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP) MEETING ON AUGUST TWENTYONE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, CLEVELAND, OHIO, IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT AN ABORTION RALLY WILL BE HELD AT

END PAGE ONE

REC-23

95

ST-117

2 "cc to ISD
"Adm. data deleted"

MCT-36 AUG 30 1972

Included in summary to White House and Attorney General. Date

AGENCY
HOW FORW.
DATE FORW.
BY

61 SEP 6 1972

THE FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, EAST NINTH STREET AND LAKESIDE AVENUE, OR AT PUBLIC SQUARE ON AUGUST WENTYFIVE, NINETEEN SEVENTYTWO, AT NOON. MEMBERS WERE ADVISED THAT ANYONE WHOSE LUNCH PERIOD COINCIDES WITH THE TIME OF THE RALLY SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO ATTEND.

CLEVELAND, OHIO POLICE DEPARTMENT, LOCAL SECRET SERVICE, GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION BUILDING MANAGEMENT AND LOCAL UNITED STATES MARSHAL'S OFFICE WERE ADVISED.

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC)

THIS IS A SELF-DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO DEDICATED TO REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION ALWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN, IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTIVES LAW.

SOCIALIST WOERKS PARTY (SWP), CLEVELAND, OHIO BRANCH

THE CLEVELAND BRANCH OF THE SWP IS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SWP AND FOLLOWS ITS DIRECTIVES.

THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE

FIRST SOURCE IS [redacted]

SECOND SOURCES IS [redacted]

INFORMANTS

CLEVELAND FOLLOWING THIS MATTER AND WILL SUTEL AFTER CAPTIONED EVENT.

END

FBI VDM WASH DC

CLR

Mr Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Bates
Mr. Bishop
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

[illegible] COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
AUG 25 1972

NR 011 CV CODE

9:20 PM URGENT 8-25-72 SLO

TO ACTING DIRECTOR ATTN: DID

FROM CLEVELAND 100-33156 (P)

RALLY TO REPEAL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, AT FEDERAL OFFICE BUILDING, CLEVELAND, OHIO, OR PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO, SPONSORED BY ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC), CLEVELAND, OHIO, AUG. TWENTYFIVE SEVENTYTWO. IS - RA.

ON AUG. TWENTYFIVE, INSTANT, SAS OF THE FBI OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY FIFTY INDIVIDUALS ASSEMBLE AT NOON IN PUBLIC SQUARE, CLEVELAND, OHIO. OF THIS GROUP, APPROXIMATELY SEVENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE FEMALES AND THE REMAINING TWENTYFIVE PERCENT WERE MALES. SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS CARRIED PLACARDS WITH SLOGANS, "RATIFY THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT," ABOLISH LAWS THAT MURDER WOMEN - REPEAL ALL ANTI-ABORTION LAWS." THE ASSEMBLED GROUP, SOME OF WHOM WERE CURIOSITY SEEKERS AND UNAFFILIATED PEOPLE ON THEIR LUNCH HOUR, HEARD SPEAKERS DELIVER SPEECHES, PRINCIPALLY ON REPEALING ALL EXISTING ANTI-ABORTION LAWS AND WOMEN'S

END PAGE ONE

REC-51

EX-116

96

5 -

70 SEP 15 1972

CV 100-33156

PAGE TWO

LIBERATION. SPEAKERS OBSERVED WERE CARYL LOEB, A MEMBER OF APC AS WELL AS THE CLEVELAND BRANCH, SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY, AND MARY WALSH, WHO SPOKE ON BEHALF OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION.

ABORTION PROJECT COALITION (APC) THIS IS A SELF DESCRIBED GROUP OF WOMEN IN CLEVELAND, OHIO, DEDICATED TO REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION LAWS SO THAT WOMEN HAVE THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE WHETHER OR NOT TO BEAR CHILDREN. IT IS ALSO ACTIVELY WORKING FOR NO FORCED STERILIZATION AND NO RESTRICTIVE CONTRACEPTIVES LAW.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY (SWP). CLEVELAND, OHIO BRANCH OF THE SWP IS AFFILIATED WITH THE NATIONAL SWP AND FOLLOWS ITS DIRECTIVES. THE SWP HAS BEEN DESIGNATED PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO.

THE RALLY TERMINATED AT APPROXIMATELY ONE: FIFTEEN PM. THE RALLY APPEARED ORDERLY AND NO ARRESTS OR INCIDENTS OF VIOLENCE WERE OBSERVED. A SOURCE, RELIABLE, ADVISED RALLY CONSIDERED MODERATELY SUCCESSFUL. THE SOURCE STATED THE RALLY WENT OFF PEACEFULLY.

CLEVELAND PD, LOCAL US SECRET SERVICE AND LOCAL US MARSHAL'S

END PAGE TWO

HREE

ICE COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

RE CLEVELAND TEL, AUG. TWENTYFOUR, SEVENTYTWO.

OBSERVING THE RALLY WERE SECURITY SQUAD SUPERVISOR THOMAS A. CORBETT, SA'S STEPHEN J. KASHIRSKY, E. MICHAEL KAHOE AND WILLIAM C. BELLINGER.

SOURCE IS INFORMANT [redacted].

IN VIEW OF PEACEFUL NATURE OF RALLY, NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED, UACB.

P

END

JDJ FBI WASH DC CLR

cc - Horner

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: SEP 21 1972

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMEN"S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:NY)

ReAL letter to New York, dated 8/30/72, wherein Albany asked to be advised of any active investigation being conducted re WONAAC, or if any active investigation is warranted by Albany, FBI.

For the information of the Albany Division, the New York Office is the office of origin, concerning captioned organization. The Bureau has advised that as the Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance play a major roll in WONAAC throughout the United States, and inasmuch as information has been provided that WONAAC is, for the most part, totally controlled by Socialist Workers Party/ Young Socialist Alliance, the activities of this organization should be followed, for the purpose of determining the extent of influence and control by individuals who are members of Socialist Workers Party/ Young Socialist Alliance, and who are acting on behalf of these organizations.

Based upon Bureau instructions, in light of information set forth in referenced Albany letter, concerning DIANE PARRY, an Socialist Workers Party organizer in the Utica, New York area, and her reported communication with national headquarters of WONAAC in New York City. It would appear advisable for the Albany Division to institute such investigation, as it deems appropriate to ascertain the extent of Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance activity in its division in connection with WONAAC.

REC-72

- 97

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Albany (RM)
1 - New York

17 SEP 25 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

WRC:nl
(5)

57 SEP 28 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

For the information of the Albany Division, the New York Division has been instructed to prepare a national organizational report on WONAAC, to be submitted by December, 1972.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/21/72

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-16058) (P)

SUBJECT: MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION, aka
Minneapolis Abortion
Action Coalition;
MINNESOTA ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

OO: MINNEAPOLIS

Re Minneapolis letter and letterhead memorandum dated February 9, 1972.

The Bureau, by routing slip dated March 6, 1972, advised that because of Socialist Workers Party (SWP) leadership and interest in the above organization, this case was to be kept in a pending status and its activities followed.

In accordance with the above instructions, the Bureau is being furnished the original and five (5) copies of a letterhead memorandum prepared under the title, "Minnesota Women's Abortion Action Coalition."

The enclosed letterhead memorandum is classified confidential because it contains information from MP T-1 through MP T-4, the unauthorized disclosure of which could reasonably result in compromising the identity of the source and, therefore, impair the national defense interests of the United States.

Information concerning individuals named in the enclosed letterhead memorandum has previously been submitted to the Bureau and these individuals have been placed on ADEX in the past.

2 - Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
3 - Minneapolis
(1 - 100-1246)
DEW:dlb
(5)

ENCLOSURE

OCT 26

REC-70

ST-117

14 SEP 25 1972

Rev. Act. Sec.

57 OCT 3 1972

10/3/72

98

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

MP 100-16058

INFORMANTS

Identity of Source		File Where Located
MP T-1 is *	Orally to SA H. CLIFFORD MILLER, 8/9/72, pages 1, 2, and 6, instant LHM	134-2237-S1-58 thru 70
MP T-2 is *	Orally to SA DONALD E. WALLER, 8/17/72, page 1, 5, instant LHM	100-16058-32, 28
MP T-3 is *	Used to cite JANE VAN DEUSEN Orally to SA RALPH S. RUSSELL, 8/23/72, page 5, instant LHM	134-43-S1-741 thru 751
MP T-4 is *		134-75-S1-829 thru 836

LEAD

MINNEAPOLIS

AT MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA

Will continue to follow the activities of this group in accordance with current instructions.

* DENOTES INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBER.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

CONFIDENTIAL

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

September 21, 1972

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

AIMS AND PURPOSE

The Minnesota Women's Abortion Action Coalition (MWAAC) is described as a part of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), which had its beginning at a conference held in New York City, New York in July, 1971.

Volume 1, Number 1,
November, 1971, edition of
"Gold Flower," self-described
as a Twin Cities newspaper
for women published monthly
at Minneapolis, Minnesota

The primary aims and purpose of the MWAAC are identical with the demands of WONAAC; that is, repeal of all anti-abortion laws, no forced sterilization, and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

LOCATION OR HEADQUARTERS

The present headquarters of the MWAAC is located at 100 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

MP T-2 on
August 17, 1972

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

100-1145 11 98

ENCLOSURE

OFFICERS

[illegible]

Jane Van Deusen in July, 1972, was identified as the coordinator of MWAAC. There are no other officers since this is not an organization, as such, which would have as a staff a group of officers, elected or appointed.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

Jane Van Deusen in August, 1972, was identified as a then current member of the Twin Cities Branch-Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MP T-3 on
August 23, 1972

The Twin Cities Branch-Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed in 1955 by the merger of the Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, branches of the SWP. The Twin Cities Branch-SWP is an affiliate of the SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

MEMBERSHIP

The MWAAC is a non-membership feminist movement of individuals interested in promoting the repeal of all abortion laws, and other aims having to do with principles of women's liberation on a national scale.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

GENERAL ACTIVITIES

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

CONFIDENTIAL

At four closed meetings of the TCB-SWP held on various dates between January 26, 1972, and April 3, 1972, the women's liberation movement and some of the activities of the abortion action group were discussed. Included among these discussions were proposed attendance by local representatives at a WONAAC conference scheduled to be held at Boston, Massachusetts, February 11-13, 1972. At a meeting held April 3, 1972, discussions centered around a report presented concerning an abortion action week scheduled to be held in May, 1972, culminating in a May 6 rally at the State Capitol Building in St. Paul, Minnesota.

MP T-3 on
January 30, 1972, through
June 13, 1972

The MWAAC activities were discussed at four closed meetings of the TCB-SWP held in Minneapolis, Minnesota, between the dates of February 23, 1972, and March 22, 1972. Items included during these discussions were an MWAAC action conference scheduled to be held at the University of Minnesota campus, Minneapolis, Minnesota, on April 8, 1972, and the abortion action week scheduled to be held during the period May 1 through May 6, 1972, ending with a rally on the steps of the State Capitol Building in St. Paul, Minnesota.

MP T-4 on
February 28, 1972, through
March 29, 1972

Jane Van Deusen presented a report on women's activities to a closed meeting of the Young Socialist Alliance-Twin Cities Group (YSA-TCG) held February 20, 1972. Van Deusen, a member of the YSA-TCG, reported on the WONAAC conference held in Boston, Massachusetts, earlier in the month of February, 1972.

MP T-1 on
February 23, 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

The Young Socialist Alliance-Twin Cities Group is the Youth Branch of the Twin Cities Branch-Socialist Workers Party (TCB-SWP), an affiliate of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

As the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."

The MWAAC rally held May 6, 1972, began at the residence of the governor of the State of Minnesota, 1006 Summit Avenue, St. Paul, Minnesota, at approximately 3:30P.M. and proceeded to the State Capitol Building where the rally calling for the repeal of all abortion laws and emphasizing the demand for the right to legal abortions was held. The rally was held without incident and speakers identified included representatives from the YSA-TCG and the TCB-SWP. Jane Van Deusen was the principle speaker for the MWAAC at this rally which ended at approximately 5:30 P.M.

MP T-1 on
May 9, 1972

The principle speaker in favor of legal abortion in the State of Minnesota at the rally held in St. Paul, Minnesota, on May 6, 1972, was Jane Van Deusen from Minneapolis, Minnesota.

MP T-2 on
May 12, 1972

The MWAAC held a meeting July 25, 1972, at 100 University Avenue, Minneapolis, Minnesota. A report was presented concerning a national WONAAC conference held in New York City, New York, during July, 1972, where it was decided that an International Tribunal was planned for October 21, 1972. The International Tribunal would be held in New York City, New York, and it was hoped that plans could be made for a local tribunal scheduled to be held October 13, 1972, in Minneapolis, Minnesota, after which individuals would be designated to attend the international meeting scheduled for New York City. This July, 1972, meeting was the first activity on the part of the MWAAC as a new-organized effort following the May 6, 1972, rally.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

Individuals known to be involved in the women's liberation movement in the Twin Cities area of Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, have, during the past six months, shown little or no interest in the organization known as the MWAAC. Former leaders in the women's liberation movement have become aware of the SWP influence among the leaders of the group, and have adopted a hands off policy from active participation in the affairs of this group. While the May 6, 1972, rally in St. Paul, Minnesota, was attended by some 200 individuals, their attendance was considered to be due to individual interest in the abortion issue.

MP T-2 on
August 17, 1972

SWP INFLUENCE

The MWAAC is not a committee of the TCB-SWP, nor is it a part of the YSA-TCG. Women's liberation is a topic of general interest and concern to the membership of the TCB-SWP, and the anti-abortion standard taken by MWAAC is one aspect of the women's liberation movement of continued interest.

MP T-3 on
August 23, 1972

MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

CONFIDENTIAL

Members of the YSA-TCG have in the past, expressed interest in the support of women's liberation as a matter of policy. The anti-abortion, or so called legal abortion movement, is one aspect of this women's liberation movement which continues to be of concern to members of the YSA-TCG, both male and female. While the vast majority of women in the State of Minnesota support either the repeal or changes in present state laws on abortion, supporters of this repeal or change also include professional women, medical doctors, lawyers, municipal court judges, and individuals from all walks of life.

MP T-1 on
August 9, 1972

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Minneapolis, Minnesota

September 21, 1972

Title MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character

Reference Letterhead memorandum dated and captioned as above at Minneapolis

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 10/4/72

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:NY)

On 10/3/72, **INFORMANT** provided a flyer, captioned "Attention, All Women! Demonstrate to Demand the Supreme Court Rule in Favor of a Women's Right to Choose!", published by the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), 150 5th Avenue, New York City 10011.

The flyer encouraged all women to appear on Wednesday, 10/11/72, at 12:00 noon in front of the White House in Washington, D.C. to present demands for a right to the abortion law. The flyer indicated that on that date, United States Supreme Court will re-hear the suits challenging the constitutionality of the restrictive Texas and Georgia abortion laws.

The flyer stated that since it is presently illegal to demonstrate in front of the Supreme Court, WONAAC intended to hold a picket line and demonstrate

ST-102

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Washington Field (100-55420) (INFO) (RM)
1 - New York (134-9382)
1 - New York

94

11 OCT 6 1972

WRC:nl
(6)

WH SS, AG, DAG

58 OCT 13 1972

Rev. Act.

Sent ________ M Per ________

in front of the White House at the afore mentioned time to present its demands.

The flyer revealed that WONAAC also scheduled a bus to leave WONAAC Office at 150 5th Avenue, New York City at 6:30 AM, 10/11/72. Interested participants were requested to enclose $10.00 for a round trip ticket to be paid to WONAAC.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 10 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S. ✓
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

NR004 WF CODE

322 PM IMMEDIATE 10-10-72 SAT

TO ACTING DIRECTOR (100-468406)

NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420) 2 PAGES

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC),
INTERNAL SECURITY DASH COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST).

RE NEW YORK ARTEL DATED OCTOBER FOUR, LAST, CAPTIONED AS ABOVE.

ON OCTOBER FOUR, LAST, A SPOKESMAN FOR THE DIVISION OF SPECIAL EVENTS, NATIONAL CAPITAL PARKS, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR, WASHINGTON, D.C., ADVISED THAT A NOTICE OF PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION WAS FILED WITH THAT DIVISION ON SEPTEMBER TWENTYONE, LAST, BY A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WONAAC WASHINGTON, D.C. CHAPTER, ONE THREE FOUR SIX CONNECTICUT AVENUE, NORTHWEST.

ST-114

REC 99 [illegible] -103

OCT 25 1972

ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE NOTICE, THE DEMONSTRATION IS SCHEDULED FOR OCTOBER ELEVEN, NEXT, AT LAFAYETTER SQUARE, WASHINGTON, D.C., FROM TWELVE NOON UNTIL SEVEN P.M., FOR THE

END PAGE ONE

70 OCT 31 1972

PAGE TWO

PURPOSE TO QUOTE EXPRESS SENTIMENT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION UNQUOTE, AND A MAXIMUM OF ONE HUNDRED INDIVIDUALS ARE EXPECTED TO PARTICIPATE.

THE PERSON IN CHARGE OF THE DEMONSTRATION WAS LISTED AS CAROL LIPMAN OF THE NATIONAL WONAAC OFFICE, ONE FIVE ZERO FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY.

METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, UNITED STATES SECRET SERVICE ADVISED.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

NO LETTERHEAD MEMORANDUM BEING SUBMITTED UNLESS DISRUPTION OCCURS DURING DEMONSTRATION, IN WHICH CASE BUREAU WILL BE IMMEDIATELY ADVISED.

SPOKESMAN FOR UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR IS PATRICIA KOMARINSKI.

END

KJB FBI WA D

CLR

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

OCT 1972

TELETYPE

Mr. Felt
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. [illegible] E.S.
Mr. Ponder
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Ms. Herwig
Mrs. Neenan

EM/W

NR335 NY CODE

931 PM URGENT 10-6-72 CJP

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATT DID

FROM NEW YORK 100-174481 2P

DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE, OCTOBER ELEVEN NEXT, SPONSORED BY WOMENS ABORTION ACTION COALITION, IS-C (TROTSKYIST).

ON OCTOBER THREE LAST, CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, MADE AVAILABLE A FLYER CAPTIONED "ATTENTION, ALL WOMEN. DEMONSTRATE TO DEMAND THE SUPREME COURT RULE IN FAVOR OF A WOMENS RIGHT TO CHOOSE." PUBLISHED BY WOMANS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), ONE FIVE ZERO FIFTH AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY.

FLYER ENCOURAGED ALL WOMEN TO APPEAR OCTOBER ELEVEN NEXT, AT TWELVE NOON, IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE, WASHINGTON DC, TO PRESENT DEMANDS FOR THE RIGHT TO THE ABORTION LAW. FLYER INDICATES THAT ON THAT DATE, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT WILL RE-HEAR SUITS CHALLENGING CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIVE TEXAS AND GEORGIA ABORTION LAWS. FLYER STATES IT IS PRESENTLY ILLEGAL TO DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF SUPREME COURT AND WONAAC

END PAGE ONE

T. Feagle

A. G. DC

ST-113

REC-18

-104

OCT 31 1972

5-

F17?

2 cc. ISD
Adm. data deleted

70 NOV 3 1972

PAGE TWO

INTENDS TO HAVE PICKET LINE AND DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF WHITE HOUSE AS INDICATED ABOVE. FLYER INDICATES WONAAC HAS SCHEDULED BUS TO LEAVE WONAAC OFFICE, NEW YORK CITY, SIX THIRTY AM, OCTOBER ELEVEN NEXT. PARTICIPANTS REQUESTED TO ENCLOSE TEN DOLLARS FOR TICKET TO BE PAID TO WONAAC.

ADMINISTRATIVE

SOURCE IS **INFORMANT**

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE ADVISED CONTENTS OF ABOVE BY AIRTEL.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

PLS HOLD

Mr. Felt
Mr. [illegible]
[illegible]
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
[illegible]
Tele. Room
Mr. [illegible]
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. [illegible]
Mrs. Neenan

NR004 CODE

551 PM NITEL 10-11-72 GJH

TO ACTING DIRECTOR 100-468406

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

NEW YORK (100-174481)

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-55420) FOUR PAGES

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC).

INTERNAL SECURITY DASH COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST).

RE WFO TELETYPE DATED OCTOBER TEN, LAST.

ON OCTOBER ELEVEN, INSTANT, A CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT AT APPROXIMATELY NINE AM THIS DATE, A WONAAC SPONSORED PRESS CONFERENCE WAS HELD IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, WASHINGTON, D. C. (WDC), BY FIVE WOMEN REPRESENTATIVES OF WONAAC, INCLUDING DOCTOR BARBARA ROBERTS, WONAAC NATIONAL COORDINATOR WHO ACTED AS SPOKESWOMAN FOR WONAAC. THE PRESS CONFERENCE LASTED APPROXIMATELY TWENTY MINUTES, AND CONCERNED THE HEARINGS BEING HELD AT THE COURT REGARDING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE RESTRICTIVE ABORTION LAWS IN TEXAS AND GEORGIA. DOCTOR ROBERTS STATED THAT WONAAC HOPES THESE LAWS WOULD BE DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

105

REC-56

END PAGE ONE

14 OCT 31 1972

57 NOV 2 1972

2 cc. [illegible]
Adm. data deleted

PAGE TWO

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, FOLLOWING THE PRESS CONFERENCE, DOCTOR ROBERTS DEPARTED AND THE OTHER FOUR WOMEN PROCEEDED INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT BUILDING WHERE THEY ATTENDED THE HEARINGS FROM NINE TWENTY AM TO ELEVEN FORTYFIVE AM.

THIS SOURCE ADVISED THAT A WONAAC SPONSORED DEMONSTRATION WAS HELD IN FRONT OF THE WHITE HOUSE, WDC, FROM APPROXIMATELY TWELVE NOON UNTIL ONE THIRTY PM, WITH APPROXIMATELY TWENTYFIVE TO THIRTY WOMEN PARTICIPATING IN THE DEMONSTRATION, THE PURPOSE OF WHICH WAS TO EXPRESS SENTIMENT FOR LEGALIZED ABORTION. DURING THE COURSE OF THE DEMONSTRATION, PARTICIPANTS CHANTED QUOTE SISTERS UNITE, STAND UP AND FIGHT, ABORTION IS OUR RIGHT UNQUOTE, AND CARRIED VARIOUS SIGNS, SOME OF WHICH READ, QUOTE ABORTION IS MY RIGHT UNQUOTE, QUOTE MY BODY, MY LIFE, MY RIGHT TO DECIDE UNQUOTE, QUOTE WOMEN MUST DECIDE OUR FATE, NOT CHURCH OR STATE UNQUOTE.

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS DURING THE PRESS CONFERENCE OR DURING THE DEMONSTRATION

END PAGE TWO

AT THE WHITE HOUSE.

ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE, DURING THE ABOVE DEMONSTRATION AT THE WHITE HOUSE, A FLYER WAS DISTRIBUTED WHICH STATED THAT THE PARTICIPANTS WERE IN WDC TODAY ON BEHALF OF THE MAJORITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN WHO AGREE THAT ABORTION IS THEIR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT AND THAT THE PICKET LINE WAS PART OF A NATIONAL CAMPAIGN ORGANIZED BY WONAAC TO FIGHT FOR THE REPEAL OF ALL ABORTION LAWS THROUGHOUT THE UNITED STATES. IN ADDITION, THE FLYER ANNOUNCED A QUOTE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION AND FORCED STERILIZATION UNQUOTE, TO BE HELD IN NEW YORK CITY, MARCH NINE, TEN, ELEVEN, SEVENTYTHREE, WHERE WOMEN FROM ALL OVER THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD WILL GATHER IN OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY AND FOR THE EVENT OF THE TRIBUNAL. THE FLYER CONTINUED THAT THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF WOMEN FROM ALL BACKGROUNDS AND EXPERIENCES, AND THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF LEGAL AND MEDICAL EXPERTS, THEY WILL DRAW TOGETHER THE EVIDENCE NECESSARY TO

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

INDICT THE GOVERNMENT, THE ANTI-ABORTION LAWS, AND ALL THOSE INSTITUTIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR DENYING WOMEN CONTROL OVER THEIR BODIES. A DEMONSTRATION WILL ALSO BE HELD DURING THE TRIBUNAL TO PRESENT THEIR INDICTMENTS AND DEMANDS DIRECTLY TO THOSE WHO ARE FOUND GUILTY OF CRIMES AGAINST WOMEN.

ADMINISTRATIVE.

THE SOURCE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS INFORMANT.

END

FBI VDM WASH DC

ACK FRO THREE TELS

CLR

T'S MILLER
WANNALL
T.J. Smith
CREGAR
HORNER
ISD

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE NEW YORK	OFFICE OF ORIGIN NEW YORK	DATE NOV 30 1972	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD 11/8/72-11/27/72

TITLE OF CASE
WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

REPORT MADE BY
WILLIAM R. CLOUGH

TYPED BY
mes

CHARACTER OF CASE
IS-C (TROTSKYIST)

REFERENCE:

Bureau O-7 to New York, 7/12/72.

-P*-

3
4
10
11.

ADMINISTRATIVE:

With regard to the pretext to CAROL EATON, mentioned in the report, this pretext was conducted by SA WILLIAM R. CLOUGH and was in the nature of an anonymous newspaper reporter seeking information about WONAAC for a planned series of articles on ~~same groups~~ womens groups.

With regard to the names mentioned in the details of this report, the following is noted:

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE					ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED

SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

10	4	107	REC-96

74 DEC 6 1972

COPIES MADE:

6-Bureau (100-468406) (RM)
1-New York (100-403 (SWP) (#45)
1-New York (100-133479) (YSA) (#45)
1-New York (100-174481)

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	CIA	SS	STATE	2cc RDW (ISD)
Request Recd.	cc 932D			
Date Fwd.	12/15/72			
How Fwd.	R/S	221		
By	DEC 20 1972			

Notations

Rev. Act. Sect.

COVER PAGE

ADMINISTRATIVE (Continued:)

EVELYN KIRSCH, NY file 100-174520, Bu file 100-442975 is included in ADEX.

SUSAN LAMONT, NY file 100-160133, Bu file 100-448377 is the subject of a closed investigation, her activities not deemed warranted for inclusion in ADEX.

SUSAN CHRISTIE, NY file 100-167462, Bu file 100-458121 is the subject of Atlanta investigation, Atlanta being office of origin.

BARBARA MUTNICK is a Boston SWP member, Boston being office of origin.

With regard to the other names mentioned in the report, the NYO has no information contained in its files of a derogatory nature justifying their investigation.

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	File Where Located
NY T-1 *	NY 100-133479 Volume 184
NY T-2 *	NY 134-9613 Sub A 182-221
NY T-3 *	NY 100-174481-18
NY T-4 *	NY 134-15562A- Scope- 948

* INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBER

INFORMANTS (Continued:)

Identity of Source	File Where Located
NY T-5 * [redacted]	NY 100-174481- 17, 90
NY T-6 * [redacted]	NY 134-17617A- 145
NY T-7 * [redacted]	NY 134-19305A- 14 through 75
NY T-8 * [redacted]	BS 134-729A- 762-787
NY T-9 *	WF 134-9613 Sub A 182-221
NY T-10 * [redacted]	BS 134-729A- 762-787
NY T-11 * [redacted]	100-174481- 155

LEAD:

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will follow and report activities of instant organization.

* DENOTES INFORMANT SYMBOL NUMBER.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: WILLIAM R. CLOUGH
Office: New York, New York
Date: NOV 3 0 1972

Field Office File #: 100-174481
Bureau File #: 100-468406

Title: WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY-C (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: WONAAC founded as result of conference held in NYC, NY, during July, 1971, for purpose of forming National Movement of Independent Groups throughout the US who favored legalized abortions and to end restrictive contraception laws and forced sterilization. National and NY State staff offices located 150 5th Avenue, NYC, NY. WONAAC does not maintain formal membership, and funds obtained through contributions. YSA and SWP influence and control over WONAAC reported since founding conference. Source advised February, 1972, that as result of de-escalation, Vietnam War, YSA-NYL plans to concentrate in area of Women's Liberation Movement through influence in WONAAC. Activities of WONAAC dutifully reported at regular membership meetings YSA-NYL during period March, 1972, through October, 1972. CAROL EATON, National Staff Member, advised under pretext in November, 1972, SWP/YSA influence not now significant, and WONAAC has always accepted help from whatever source offered. WONAAC International Tribunal scheduled to be held in NYC in March, 1972.

-p*-

DETAILS:

Investigation in this case is predicated upon receipt of information in July, 1971, from NY T-1, alleging the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) had taken over and were influencing the First National Womens Abortion Conference, held during that month

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

in New York City (NYC), details of which will be set out more fully hereinafter.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication, "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "a Multi-National Revolutionary Socialist Youth Organization".
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. Origin and Scope

NY T-2 on July 21, 1971, and NY T-3 on October 1, 1971, furnished information that over 1,000 women met in conference at Columbia University, NYC, NY, on July 16, 1971, through July 18, 1971, to form a National Movement of independent groups scattered throughout the United States (US) who favored and had worked to legalize abortion. As a result of this conference, WONAAC was founded.

B. Aims and Purposes

In the WONAAC national newsletter, dated September 16, 1971, WONAAC was self-described as a nationally coordinated abortion law repeal campaign including legislation, legal action, and nationally coordinated mass demonstrations in Washington, DC, and San Francisco, on November 20, 1971, for the repeal of all anti-abortion laws and corollary demands of no forced sterilization, and the repeal of all restrictive contraception laws. WONAAC claims to reach all women, black; Chinaca; Latina; Asian; Puerto Rican; native American women; campus women; gay women; high school women; housewives; professional, welfare, and working women; young women; women from churches, political organizations, trade unions, the military, and communities across the country.

C. Headquarters

On November 22, 1972, a Special Agent (SA) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), utilizing a pretext, contacted an individual self-identified as CAROL EATON at telephone number 675-9150, located at 150 5th Avenue, NYC, NY. EATON, who stated she is currently a National Staff member of WONAAC, advised that the National and NY Staffs of WONAAC are headquartered at this address.

D. When Meetings Held

According to CAROL EATON, regular NY Coalition meetings of WONAAC are held every other Wednesday evening at Religious Center at New York University, 2 Washington Square North, NYC, NY. EATON stated that most NY State staff members are present at these meetings and at least one or more National Staff members also try to be in attendance. Other than this, state and national staffs meet periodically, as business demands.

E. Officers

EATON identified the following individuals as current officers of WONAAC:

National Staff	SUSAN LAMONT	
National Coordinator ~~[illegible] ORGANIZATION~~	MARILYN MARKUS CAROL EATON	NY
NY State Staff	BARBARA MUTNICK	
Coordinator	ANN GLICK JUDITH LAMBERT	NY

EATON further stated there are two recognized full time fund raisers for WONAAC. She identified these individuals as:

EVELYN KIRSCH
SUSAN CHRISTIE

F. Membership and Finances

According to EATON, WONAAC does not maintain a formal membership, as such, and financially exists only through voluntary contributions. She stated that all staff members, National and NY State, serve on a voluntary basis, receive no salary, and get only a small "subsistance allowance" which the staff has found necessary to supplement with their own personal funds in order to get by.

G. WONAAC Affiliates

CAROL EATON stated there are presently 36 WONAAC affiliates, also called "coalitions" throughout the US, and that most states of the union are represented by an affiliate or coalition.

II. YSA-SWP INFLUENCE AND CONTROL OVER WONAAC

NY T-1 provided information on July 22, 1971, that the First National Womens Abortion Conference was held at Columbia University, NYC, NY, from July 16, 1971, to July 18, 1971, which resulted in the founding of WONAAC. NY T-1 stated that it was immediately apparent that this conference was taken over and influenced by YSA-SWP members who infiltrated the various conference committees and workshops which were established to help formulate the main direction the Coalition would follow in the future. NY T-1 stated that it seemed certain the YSA-SWP would, in the future, dictate policy for this organization and would be able to control the utilization of WONAAC funds.

On August 5, 1971, NY T-4 provided a leaflet captioned, "What Every Woman Should Know". This leaflet, which was published by Feminist Organization for Communication, Action and Service (F.O.C.A.S.), related the following:

"The Womens National Abortion Coalition has been called and organized by the SWP and its affiliate, the YSA, including women supposedly representing Women's Liberation groups, who in truth represent, first, the

SWP and YSA. These women attach more importance to their political movement than to the Women's Liberation Movement. And when 77% of the women in this country are for reform of abortion laws, there is fertile soil for a political party to build itself on. The SWP/YSA realizes this and is taking advantage of it."

On August 5, 1971, a leaflet captioned "F.O.C.A.S." revealed in part as follows:

"A nucleus of about eight feminists have formed FOCAS, Feminist Organization for Communication, Action and Service. FOCAS evolved from the Women's Strike Coalition (WSC), which the Socialist Workers Party abruptly abandoned on May 25th in order to form the committee for WONAAC. Since that time a nucleus of women from WSC together with like-minded feminists preserved the WSC in order to maintain and expand a multi-issue action-oriented Women's Liberation coalition in the NYC area. Assisted by loans from supporting feminists, the new WSC paid back nearly a thousand of the three thousand dollars of debts incurred by the SWP women who had controlled the old WSC.

The "Militant" issue of August 6, 1971, page five, in an article entitled, "Abortion Campaign Counters Red-Baiting", revealed in part, with respect to the founding WONAAC conference in July, 1971:

"The Militant" is a weekly newspaper of the SWP.

"There were many members of the SWP and YSA at the conference, and SWPers and YSAers are among those who have worked most consistently for abortion repeal and to build the abortion conference...."

NY T-5 advised on November 12, 1971, that a NY Planning Meeting of WONAAC was held at LOEB Student Center, NY University, NY, on November 11, 1971, to lay plans for a scheduled November 20, 1971 demonstration in Washington, DC. According to this source, this meeting was completely dominated and controlled by members of the SWP.

NY T-6 related on November 16, 1971, that the Upper West Side Branch of the YSA planned to send a contingent of its members to Washington, DC, on November 20, 1971, in order to participate in the planned demonstration there on that date.

NY T-6 stated that practically all the members of the uptown branch of the YSA, NY, were expected to participate in this activity.

NY T-5 related on January 20, 1972, that the scheduled November 20, 1971 march in Washington was "crucial" to all SWP and YSA branches in that it afforded an opportunity for selling of "The Militant" and other SWP/YSA literature, and also afforded an opportunity for "intervening " in the action via distribution of SWP Election Campaign literature.

NY T-8 on February 11, 1972, and NY T-9 and NY T-10 on February 14, 1972, provided information that a WONAAC convention was held February 11, 1972, to February 13, 1972, at Hayden Hall, Boston University, Boston, Massachusetts. The general theme of this convention was "How to Win Abortion Law Repeal". NY T-8 stated that approximately 30 members of the YSA or SWP Boston Chapters were observed in attendance at this convention.

NY T-7 related on February 14, 1972, that because of the de-escalation of the Vietnam War by the NIXON Administration, the YSA-New York Local (NYL), while continuing on with anti-war work through the NY Student Mobilization

Committee (SMC) and NY National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC), both of which organizations they dominate, would also concentrate in the area of the Women's Liberation Movement through their influence in WONAAC.

> The SMC is controlled by the SWP and its youth affiliate, YSA. SMC initiates and supports public demonstrations against the war in Southeast Asia.
>
> NPAC was founded in 1970 by members of the SWP. Its objective is the immediate, total and unconditional withdrawal of all US forces and material in Southeast Asia.

NY T-7 advised on various dates, March 23, 1972, through October 17, 1972, that activities of WONAAC were dutifully reported and included on the agenda at regular meetings of the Upper West Side Branch, YSA-New York Local (NYL) during that period.

NY T-5 advised on April 18, 1972, that the leadership of WONAAC was then dominated by the SWP.

NY T-7 related on July 7, 1972, that at a WONAAC meeting held June 27, 1972, at 706 Broadway, NYC, NY, starting at 6:40 PM, it was announced that even though WONAAC previously had accused various female activists working along with them in the Women's Liberation struggle of red baiting because of the stand they had taken against the SWP-Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), at present they are forced to work with these individuals to help strengthen the WONAAC cause.

At this meeting, certain WONAAC staff members walked out and voiced their disapproval of the meeting being taken over by a majority of SWP-YSA members. They indicated that the SWP-YSA has no right to be in a policy-making position in WONAAC.

NY T-7 on July 18, 1972, and NY T-11 on July 19, 1972, provided information that a WONAAC conference was held at Hunter College, Park Avenue and 69th Street on July 15, 1972 and July 16, 1972.

NY T-7 stated that NYC was picked as the site of this convention because this city is considered to be the center of the most powerful anti-abortion effort so far.

Discussions held at this conference centered on plans for (one)-future activity in the campaign to repeal all anti-abortion and contraception laws and (two)-to end forced sterilization.

A discussion was held concerning the attacks being made by the Catholic Church Hierarchy and other anti-abortion groups against women's rights to their own bodies.

NY T-11 related that the evening plenary session of WONAAC occurred on July 15, 1972, and it was immediately apparent that the SWP-YSA groups dominated the meeting. Independent women who wanted to make statements during this session were voted down by SWP floor leaders and these same persons continued to vote as a block on all issues.

The group of independent women from various geographic areas, that is, those women who were not associated with the SWP or YSA, went together after the plenary session was adjourned and considered the problem of how to handle the SWP leaders. While these women were not political realists in their goals, they did believe in working throughout the existing system rather than functioning with the SWP in their eventual goal of revolution.

It was decided that the independent feminists would no longer continue hassling within WONAAC. They did not want to have decisions for them being structured by a male dominated group. They also decided that money being collected by WONAAC in the name of abortion law change was not being used for that purpose, but rather to sustain members of the SWP-YSA.

The Sunday morning session, July 16, 1972, was labeled "Meeting to Discuss Internal Hassles." About 35 independents attended and a few number of SWP-YSA members and sympathizers were present. Independents there were from New Haven, Boston, Detroit, New York (NY), Chicago, Philadelphia, and San Francisco.

The independents did not waiver in their firm opposition to SWP-YSA control of WONAAC. Six national coordinators of WONAAC were independents and decided to resign publicly at the afternoon plenary session. They also decided to combat SWP control of the feminist movement through the various publications.

The six national coordinators who resigned were JUDY SIPHERS, San Francisco; ANN C. DAVIDSON, Philadelphia; ROSE WEBER, NY; VICKI ESLINGER, Columbia, South Carolina; NANCY ROLF, NY; and ELLEN SHAPIRO, NY.

There were approximately 700-800 women in attendance at the afternoon session. According to one of the SWP leaders, these women were from 31 states and three countries-Canada, Italy and Sweden. The states that had more representation than others were Ohio, Illinois, New York and Massachusetts.

Most of the problems and differences between the independents and the SWP centered around approaches to abortion law reform. The SWP was charged with always having demonstrations and rallies and never doing any work through the legislative process.

The independents stated that they were tired of this hassle and that they believed there were more effective ways to change abortion laws than carrying placards in the streets.

After the independent women publicly resigned in front of the plenary session, two other coordinators announced they were staying on. One was BARBARA ROBERTS, the other's name is unknown.

BER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

LINDA JENNESS made a final plea for the independent women to reconsider. The removal of the independents from WONAAC has debilitated the organization and most independent representatives will be going back to their own cities to work for abortion law change in organizations which have no connection with the SWP.

The concern still exists, however, that WONAAC will be able to collect monies in the name of abortion reform and there is also the concern that women new to the movement will join in a mistaken notion that they will be furthering abortion law reform.

Independents vowed before leaving NY that they would try to publicize activities from the SWP in an effort to prevent this.

III. OBSERVATION OF CURRENT NATIONAL STAFF MEMBER REGARDING YSA/SWP INFLUENCE

When contacted under pretext on November 24, 1972, CAROL EATON, self-identified as a current National Staff member, and previously mentioned in this report, related that she has been active in WONAAC since its inception. EATON, while averring she is definitely not a YSA, SWP, or member of any "radical group", acknowledged there always have been SWP, YSA and "radical" elements in WONAAC. She went on to state, however, that WONAAC has never allied itself politically with any organization or individual, including any of the political candidates in the recent political election and, despite its diverse makeup as too ideaological beliefs of its membership, WONAAC is basically an organization which strives only to the objectives for which it was originally founded. To this end, she went on, WONAAC would accept help from whatever source offered.

EATON admitted there were some problems in the past with regard to friction within WONAAC about SWP and YSA influence. She stated, however, this matter, to her observation, never seemed a serious one, and is quite minimal today. With regard to the "walk out" of six national coordinators at the July, 1972 conference in NYC, she stated the walk out did not occur, in fact, because of the SWP/YSA influence question, but rather because those who walked out believed WONAAC should be a "referral agency", while those who stayed felt it should not. By referral agency, EATON stated she means an agency which would refer callers to a specific location or place where abortions could be obtained.

IV. PLANNED PROJECTS

CAROL EATON advised that WONAAC plans an international Tribunal march to be held in NYC, NY, from March 9, 1972, to March 11, 1972. She stated plans have not yet been finalized, including the exact location or site this event will take place. However, she noted that SIMONE BEAUVOIR, a Parisian, well known in the Women's Liberation Movement, would be honorary chairwoman.

[illegible]
NY

FD-323 (Rev. 8-1-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York
November 30, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. Bufile 100-468406
NYfile 100-174481

Title Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC)

Character Internal Security-C (Trotskyist)

Reference is made to New York report of Special Agent (SA) William R. Clough, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

, nor duplicated within your agency.

~~FD-263 (Rev. 1-1-72)~~

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
WASHINGTON FIELD	NEW YORK	12/15/72	9/21/72-12/6/72	

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
WASHINGTON, D.C., CHAPTER WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC)	ARLAND A. MOSEL	pmw
	CHARACTER OF CASE IS-C (TROTSKYIST)	

REFERENCE: Report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated 3/21/72 at Washington, D.C., captioned, "Womens National, Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), IS-C (TROTSKYIST).

- P* -

ADMINISTRATIVE

INFORMANTS	LOCATION
WF T-1 is [redacted] INFORMANTS	134-9613 Sub A - 182 through 365. Also instant report.
WF T-2 is	100-55420-78
WF T-3 is	134-9834 Sub A - 719.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED				☐ NONE	ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

COPIES MADE:

6-Bureau (100-468406)
2-New York (100-174481)(WONAAC)
2-WFO (100-55420)

108

REC-73

EO DEC 22 1972

ST-115

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	SS	2cc Rom (ISD)	1cc 932D	
Request Recd.	1cc dest.			
Date Fwd.	1/5/73			
How Fwd.	2/5			

Notations

Fed. Act. Secd.

These individuals considered to be key people in D.C. WONAAC all have or are the subjects of WFO investigations due to their YSA and/or SWP membership. None are ADEX subjects at this time.

WFO is placing this case in a pending inactive status for six months.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of:	ARLAND A. MOSEL	Office:	Washington, D.C.
Date:	12/15/72		
Field Office File #:	100-55420	Bureau File #:	100-468406

Title: WASHINGTON, D.C., CHAPTER
WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC)

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY-C (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: D.C. WONAAC affiliate of Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), which was founded July, 1971. WONAAC national headquarters originally located Washington, D.C., (WDC), but moved to New York, New York, December, 1971. D.C. WONAAC located 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., WDC, and key people involved all members of WDC locals of Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and/or Socialist Workers Party (SWP). D.C. WONAAC does not maintain formal membership and funds obtained through contributions. Does not hold regular meetings and most activities in conjunction with those planned by national office. Goals synonymous with those of national office which have been defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

- P* -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency. nor duplicated within your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970 O - 406-840

This investigation is predicated upon information that the Washington, D.C., (WDC), locals of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) are playing a major role in activities of the WDC chapter of the Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (D.C. WONAAC).

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication "The Young Socialist Organizer," as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

I. ORGANIZATIONAL DATA

A. Origin and Scope

D.C. WONAAC is an affiliate of Womens National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), which was founded at a conference held in New York, New York, July 16-18, 1971. WONAAC's national headquarters was originally located in WDC, but was moved to New York, New York, during December, 1971. The WDC chapter was originally referred to as D.C. Womens Abortion Action Coalition (D.C. WAAC), but was subsequently changed to D.C. WONAAC in order to be identified completely in name with national.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

B. Aims and Purposes

D.C. WONAAC's goals are synonymous with those of WONAAC, which have been defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

(WF-1, 7/21/71 and 12/6/72)

C. Location

D.C. WONAAC is located at 1346 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., WDC, Suite 318.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

D. Headquarters

National WONAAC is located at 150 5th Avenue, New York, New York.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

YSA/SWP members are a minority force on the National WONAAC staff and the independent staff members favor elimination of YSA/SWP women from WONAAC.

(WF T-1, 7/5/72)

E. Officers

Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS, National Coordinator of WONAAC, resides at 4528 Van Ness Street, N.W., WDC.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

The following individuals, who are all members of the WDC locals of the YSA and/or SWP, are considered to be the key people involved in D.C. WONAAC:

BARBARA SANDSTROM
STARR BOWIE T
PAT PUTNAM T
TOBA SINGER (was APEX)
KATHY KERSEY
SARA SMITH

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

F. Membership and Finances

D.C. WONAAC does not maintain a formal membership as such.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

D.C. WONAAC is a non-profit chapter of WONAAC which obtains its funds through contributions and uses any funds collected in offsetting expenses incurred in the furtherance of its activities. It receives a certain amount of support, financially and otherwise, from independent organizations who identify with WONAAC's main central demand of "Repeal All Abortion Laws."

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

At a regular business meeting of the WDC local YSA, held on August 1, 1972, it was mentioned during the Womens Liberation report that WONAAC was in debt and that a local fund raising cookout was scheduled for August 6, 1972.

(WF T-1, 8/1/72)

II. ACTIVITIES

A. Meetings

D.C. WONAAC does not hold regularly scheduled meetings. Other activities, such as demonstrations or other actions, are generally in conjunction with those planned by the national office.

(WF T-1, 12/6/72)

B. WONAAC Related Activity

A D.C. WONAAC sponsored "Women's Commission on Abortion and Forced Sterilization" was held on May 6, 1972, at St. Marks Church, 3rd and A Streets, S.E., WDC, as part of a nationwide campaign sponsored by WONAAC. Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS, WONAAC National Coordinator, and SHARON NAIMAN, WDC local YSA member, were among the conveners of the Commission.

(WF T-1, 5/6/72)

D.C. WONAAC was represented at the third national WONAAC conference held at Hunter College, New York, New York, July 14-16, 1972.

(WF T-1, 7/19/72)

D.C. WONAAC participated in a WONAAC sponsored press conference and demonstration held in WDC on October 11, 1972, to express sentiment for legalized abortion. Dr. BARBARA ROBERTS acted as spokeswoman for WONAAC. A flyer distributed during the demonstration announced an "International Tribunal on Abortion, contraception and forced sterilization" to be held in New York, New York, March 9-11, 1973, where women from all over the United States and other parts of the world will gather in observance of International Women's Day and the event of the Tribunal.

(WF T-2, 10/11/72)

At a regular business meeting of the WDC local at the YSA, held on November 13, 1972, it was stated, during the women's liberation report, that WONAAC is seeking endorsements by prominent women and women's organizations. In addition, it was stated that WONAAC and YSA plan to become more active in participation with other women's organizations then in the past.

(WF T-3, 11/13/72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Washington, D.C. 20535

December 15, 1972

Title	WASHINGTON, D.C. CHAPTER WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (D.C. WONAAC)
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY-C (TROTSKYIST)
Reference	Report of SA ARLAND A. MOSEL dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency nor duplicated within your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 1/10/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C

ReALlet to NY, dated 10/31/72.

Attached for the information of the Albany Division is a copy of a flyer obtained by the New York Office, published by the National Office of WONAAC and calling attention and urging the attendance of recipients to legislative hearings on abortion, scheduled to be held in the state capital building in Albany, New York, on January 30, 1973. The flyer indicated that testimony would be heard from medical and legal experts on abortion along with reports from women who have had legal as well as illegal abortions. Those attending were urged to visit their legislators in the morning and attend the hearing in the afternoon.

On 1/9/73, SA WILLIAM R. CLOUGH, utilizing a pretext of an anonymous newspaper reporter, ascertained from an unknown female at National Office of WONAAC, located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, New York (telephone 212-675-9150), that several hundred women were expected to attend the aforementioned hearings and that several buses accommodating most of these individuals were scheduled to leave from Union Square West, New York, New York, at 7 and 8 a.m. on 1/30/73.

This unknown individual stated she had reason to believe that those attending the hearings under the auspices of WONAAC would not conduct themselves in other than a peaceful manner.

Albany will, through logical informants or established sources, furnish any pertinent information developed re this matter.

10

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Albany (100-22881) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-New York

REC-86

EX-101

107

10 JAN 15 1973

WRC:jal
(5)

NOT.

...ings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 1/31/73

Transmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority)

JWB

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

FROM: SAC, ALBANY (100-22881) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC) IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

(OO: NEW YORK)

Re New York letter to the Bureau 1/10/73.

On this date, Lieutenant JOHN NABORS, New York State Capital Police, Albany, New York, stated that demonstration mentioned in referenced communication failed to take place on 1/30/73, and no demonstrators were in evidence at the Capital Building.

Appropriate local officials were advised on 1/22/73 of proposed demonstration.

10

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - New York (RM) (100-174481)
2 - Albany
JTD:kms
(6)

REC-73 100-46[illegible]-110

11 FEB 2 1973

ST-116

Rev. Act. Sect.

51 FEB 8 1973

Approved: ____________________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971-413-135

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (FS)
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex

SAC, Philadelphia (100-53818) 2/12/73

Acting Director, FBI (100-468406) - 111

REC-139

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
(WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST) EX-103

Reurlet 1/31/73.

Referenced letter stated that a flier was passed out at an antiwar rally in Philadelphia on 10/26/72 revealing that the WONAAC had moved to offices located on the third floor at Houston Hall, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, and that the telephone service for this office was subscribed to by the University of Pennsylvania.

In regard to your request to continue attempts to develop information regarding WONAAC, an organization dominated and controlled by the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), considering it now utilizes offices at the University of Pennsylvania, you are authorized to continue your investigation. You should, however, restrict your investigation to determining the degree of infiltration and domination of this organization by SWP or its youth arm, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). This investigation must be conducted in a most discreet manner and limited to established sources. No action is to be taken by you which could in any way be construed as infringement by the FBI on academic freedom at the University of Pennsylvania.

It is noted by the Bureau that the above information was received by your office on 10/26/72, however, your request was not submitted to the Bureau until 1/31/73, a period in excess of 90 days. Although it is recognized there may be other matters requiring more immediate attention, the delay in this instance appears unreasonable. In the future, insure that these matters are handled on a more timely basis.

GJL:mjg mjg
(5)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WGC

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Purvis
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

MAILED 5
FEB 12 1973

57 FEB 20 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to Philadelphia
Re: Women's National Abortion Action
Coalition (WONAAC)
100-468406

NOTE:

In letter dated 1/31/73 Philadelphia advised that information had been received on 10/26/72 that WONAAC, which is dominated and controlled by Socialist Workers Party (SWP), had moved to the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia requested authority to continue investigation. Philadelphia being authorized to continue investigation in a most discreet manner and to avoid conducting investigation which could be construed as infringement on academic freedom. Philadelphia also being advised to furnish such information on a more timely basis in the future.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Memorandum

TO : Acting Director, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 1/31/73

WAS

FROM : SAC, Philadelphia (100-53818) (P)

SUBJECT: PHILADELPHIA WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC), aka
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re Philadelphia letter to the Bureau dated 7/27/72, and Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 8/11/72.

INFORMANT, who has furnished reliable information in the past, made available information on 9/1/72, which reflected that the various women's liberation groups in the Philadelphia area were planning a women's rights rally to be held on 8/26/72, at Rittenhouse Square, Philadelphia, Pa. The information furnished by the source further reflected that the coalition of women's rights groups which planned the rally for 8/26/72, held a meeting on 8/16/72, and at that time they voted to exclude the Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance people from participation in the rally on the grounds that they were representatives of political organizations.

The records of the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania as furnished on 12/15/72, by SOURCE, reflected that telephone service for the Women United For Abortion Rights, 1115 Walnut Street, Philadelphia, Pa., consisted of telephone number WA 2-0381, which was installed on 6/25/71, and which was disconnected on 7/31/72, for non-payment of bill.

2 - Bureau (100-468406)(RM)
1 - New York (100-174481)(RM)
1 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

JCH:cmk
(4)

REC-49

ST-113

14 FEB 6 1973

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

PH 100-53818

A flyer was passed out to the public at an anti-war rally held in Philadelphia on 10/26/72, which reflected that Philadelphia Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) had moved to the third floor, Houston Hall, 3417 Spruce Street, University of Pennsylvania, telephone number 594-5267. The records of the Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania as furnished by SOURCE [redacted] reflected that telephone service for number 594-5267 is subscribed to by the University of Pennsylvania, 34th and Spruce Streets, Philadelphia, Pa.

Sources of the Philadelphia Office have not furnished any information regarding WONAAC activities since referenced Philadelphia letter was submitted.

Request of Bureau

In view of the fact that WONAAC left 1115 Walnut Street in late July 1972, and is presently maintaining an office at the University of Pennnsylvania Houston Hall, Bureau authority is requested to continue to attempt to develop information regarding captioned organization, and to attempt to determine the extent of TROTSKYIST influence on direction of WONAAC.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 2/22/73

FROM : SAC, MINNEAPOLIS (100-16058) (C)

SUBJECT: MINNESOTA WOMEN'S ABORTION
ACTION COALITION, aka
Minneapolis Abortion
Action Coalition;
MINNESOTA ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

OO: MINNEAPOLIS

Re Minneapolis letter and letterhead memorandum dated 9/21/72.

The Minnesota Supreme Court on 2/2/73 declared the state's abortion law unconstitutional in its entirety based on the 1/22/73 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court wherein it was ruled that the states cannot prohibit abortions during the first six months of pregnancy.

The decision of the Minnesota Supreme Court has resulted in several Twin Cities area hospitals in Minneapolis and St. Paul, Minnesota, offering facilities and providing necessary procedures for staff members to perform abortions under these court rulings.

INFORMANT, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that the object of the captioned group was to remove anti-abortion laws from the books in the state of Minnesota, as well as in the United States.

On 2/16/73 this source further related that the Women's Liberation Movement supporters in the Twin Cities area have generally reacted favorably to the court decisions relating to abortion laws and now that the principal object of the Minnesota Abortion Action Coalition has been achieved, the influence of its spokesmen is expected to decline.

(18)

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - Minneapolis
DEW:cjp
(3)

REC-28
EX-103

10

12 FEB 26 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Minneapolis sources INFORMANTS —— who have in the past furnished reliable information concerning the activities of the Twin Cities Branch - Socialist Workers Party and the Young Socialist Alliance - Twin Cities Group, advised on 2/15/73 that in view of the recent court decisions concerning the abortion issue, the past interest, influence and limited activity on the part of members of these respective organizations in the abortion issue is expected to become non-existent.

This case is being placed in a closed status based on the above information and no LHM is being submitted.

Mr. Felt
Mr. Baker
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Cleveland
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Gebhardt
Mr. Jenkins
Mr. Marshall
Mr. Miller, E.S.
Mr. Soyars
Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Mr. Kinley
Mr. Armstrong
Mr. Bowers
Mr. Herington
Ms. Herwig
Mr. Mintz
Mrs. Neenan

FBI

Date: 3/2/73

Transmit the following in ____________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________________ (Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406)

FROM: SAC, WFO (100-55420) (P)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)

Re WFO report dated 12/15/72, captioned "WDC CHAPTER OF WONAAC, IS-C (TROTSKYIST)," setting forth information concerning an "International Tribunal on Abortion, contraception and forced sterilization" scheduled to be held in New York City, 3/9-11/73.

Enclosed for the Bureau are five (5) copies and three (3) for New York of an LHM dated and captioned as above.

The source referred to in attached LHM is INFORMANT.

REC 43

INFORMANT a member of the YSA and SWP Locals, WDC and INFORMANT a member of the YSA Local, WDC, have both been selected by WDC YSA/SWP leadership to attend the "International Woman's Day Soliditary Meeting" in New York City on 3/10/73 and to remain over for political activity at the YSA/SWP national office on 3/11/73.

7 MAR 7 1973

Bureau authority is requested to send both of the above sources to New York City for participation in the Woman's Day Soliditary Meeting and political activity at YSA/SWP national office, and to advance to each source the amount of $88 for expenses to be actually incurred, including $38 round trip metro coach fare from WDC to New York and $25 each per day for two days for food, lodging, contributions and miscellaneous expenses.

5 - LHF

2 - Bureau (Enc. 5)
3 - New York (100-174481) (Enc. 3)
    (1 - 100-133479) (YSA)
4 - WFO (1 - 100-55420)
    (1 - 100-35189) (YSA)
    (1 - 134-9834 SUB A)
    (1 - 134-9613 SUB A)

AAM:jab
(9)

3/7/73

Approved: ____________________ Sent ____________ M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

WFO 100-55420 FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

For the information of New York the code name of INFORMANT ——— and the code name for INFORMANT ———. If approved by the Bureau, New York is requested to provide WFO with the name and telephone number of contacting agent.

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

WFO 100-22

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

March 2, 1973

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)

During the latter part of February, 1973, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Washington, D.C. (WDC) Chapter of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (D.C. WONAAC) is scheduled to participate in an "International Woman's Day Solidarity Meeting" scheduled to be held in New York City, New York on Saturday, March 10, 1973, place to be announced.

> The national office of WONAAC is located at 150 Fifth Avenue, New York City, New York. WONAAC goals are self-defined as "working on a national scale to make abortion legal, to end restrictive contraception laws, and to end forced sterilization."

According to the above source, a flyer distributed by D.C. WONAAC disclosed that among those individuals scheduled to speak at the meeting are; GISELE HALIMI, described as a leader of "Choisir," a French abortion rights organization; MICHELE CHEVALIER, described as a defendent in a French abortion trial; and CLAUDE SERVAN SCHREIBER, described as a feminist journalist and as a leader of "Choisir".

According to the above source, members of the WDC Locals of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) have been urged to participate in the International Womans Day Solidarity Meeting.

> As the youth organization of the SWP, the YSA serves as the main source of recruitment into that organization. The YSA is described in the masthead of its official publication "The Young Socialist Organizer", as "A multinational revolutionary socialist youth organization."
>
> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

100-[illegible]-114

ENCLOSURE

WOMENS NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

The above source advised that in addition to attendance at the Solidarity Meeting, some YSA/SWP members will remain in New York City overnight to conduct political activity at the National Office of the YSA/SWP in New York City, on March 11, 1973.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS NEITHER
RECOMMENDATIONS NOR CONCLUSIONS OF
THE FBI. IT IS THE PROPERTY OF
THE FBI AND IS LOANED TO YOUR AGENCY;
IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE
DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE YOUR AGENCY.

(1)

CODE TELETYPE URGENT

3/6/73

TO SACS, NEW YORK (100-174481)
WFO (100-55420) REC 43

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. E. P. Grigalus
1 - Mr. W. N. Floyd
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex

FROM ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) 161

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION; IS - C (TROTSKYIST).

REWFOAIRTEL DATED MARCH TWO LAST.

WITH REGARD TO YOUR REQUEST TO SEND TWO INFORMANTS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON ABORTION, CONTRACEPTION AND FORCED STERILIZATION SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN NYC ON MARCH NINE DASH ELEVEN, NEXT, AUTHORITY IS GRANTED TO ADVANCE INFORMANT [redacted] EIGHTY-EIGHT DOLLARS FOR EXPENSES, INCLUDING ROUND-TRIP TRANSPORTATION TO ATTEND THAT CONFERENCE. AUTHORITY ALSO GRANTED TO ADVANCE [redacted] INFORMANT [redacted] EIGHTY-EIGHT DOLLARS FOR SIMILAR EXPENSES TO ATTEND THAT CONFERENCE. OBTAIN EXACT ACCOUNTING EXPENSES FROM EACH INFORMANT.

PRIOR TO SOURCES TRAVELING TO CONFERENCE, WFO AND NYO COORDINATE IDENTITY OF SPECIAL AGENT AND CONTACT TELEPHONE NUMBER THROUGH WHICH INFORMANTS CAN MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH NYO. WFO INSTRUCT INFORMANTS TO CONTACT NYO TO REPORT SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS.

WFO CONTACT INFORMANTS IMMEDIATELY UPON RETURN AND SUBMIT

GJL:rsm (6) SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Mr. Felt ____
Mr. Baker ____
Mr. Callahan ____
Mr. Cleveland ____
Mr. Conrad ____
Mr. Gebhardt ____
Mr. Jenkins ____
Mr. Marshall ____
Mr. Miller, E.S. ____
Mr. Soyars ____
Mr. Thompson ____
Mr. Walters ____
Tele. Room ____
Mr. Kinley ____
Mr. Armstrong ____
Mr. Bowers ____
Mr. Herington ____
Ms. Herwig ____

1150/1 Dec

WGC

RLS

58 MAR 13 1973

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

TELETYPE TO SACS, NEW YORK AND WFO
RE: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION
100-468406

DETAILED FD DASH THREE ZERO SIX TO NY WITHIN FIVE DAYS IN ACCORDANCE WITH SAC LETTER SEVENTY-TWO DASH THREE (C) RE REPORTING OF RESULTS OF SUBVERSIVE CONFERENCES.

NOTE:

WONAAC was founded in NYC 7/71, for purpose of forming a national movement of groups throughout U.S. who favor legalized abortions. Organization dominated by Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA). WONAAC scheduled to hold International Conference at NYC 3/9-11/73. INFORMANT a member of the YSA and SWP, and INFORMANT a member of the YSA, have both been selected by SWP leadership to attend the conference in New York and to remain over for political activity at the YSA-SWP National Office on 3/11/73. Expenses involve $38 each for round-trip by Metro Coach from D.C., to NYC and $50 each for food, lodging, contributions and miscellaneous expenses for two days. Outlay would be $88 for each informant making a total of $176. Based on fact that sources were selected by [illegible]DC., YSA/SWP leadership to be member of delegation to attend the International Tribunal, WFO is being authorized to advance each source $88.

FD-263 (Rev. 1-7-72)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
BOSTON	NEW YORK	3/21/73	3/2 - 3/16/73	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION		ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.		mej
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		IS - C (TROTSKYIST)		

REFERENCE: Boston report of SA ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR., dated 6/23/72.

- P* -

LEADS:

BOSTON DIVISION

AT BOSTON, MASS.

Will continue to follow and report pertinent activities of the local abortion group within the Boston Division.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED ☐ NONE					ACQUIT-TALS	CASE HAS BEEN:
CONVIC.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES		PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

COPIES MADE:

6 - Bureau (100-468406) (RM)
2 - New York (100-174481) (RM)
2 - Boston (100-43809)

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

11	11	116	REC-3
7 MAR 26 1973			~~REC-3~~
			EX-1

Dissemination Record of Attached Report				
Agency	SS	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Request Recd.	[illegible]		[illegible]	
Date Fwd.	4/2/73			
How Fwd.	RS	5 APR 3	1973	
By	[illegible]			

Notations

COVER PAGE

BS 100-43809

INFORMANTS:

Identity of Source	Location
BS T-1 is INFORMANT	134-729A - 803-808

ADMINISTRATIVE:

Investigation has previously been conducted concerning JANE ROLAND and ANN MARIE CAPUZZI, identified as Socialist Workers Party, Boston, members in this report; and the Bureau was advised that neither was felt to meet with current criteria for inclusion on the ADEX.

FEDERAL BUREAU

Copy to:

Report of: ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN, JR.
Office: Boston, Massachusetts
Date: March 21, 1973

Field Office File #: 100-43809
Bureau File #: 100-468406

Title: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

Synopsis: Informant advised: Boston Women's Abortion Action Coalition (BOWAAC), the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), moved its headquarters in late summer, 1972, from 552 Massachusetts Ave., Cambridge, Mass., to 419 Boylston Street, Room 323, Boston. BOWAAC not a formal membership-type group but there are currently a limited number of activists, a maximum of fifteen, a majority of whom are local Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and/or Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) members, involved in BOWAAC work. A number of formerly active independents in BOWAAC have dropped out of BOWAAC work in view of U. S. Supreme Court decision liberalizing abortion laws; and as a result, SWP/YSA plans locally with respect to BOWAAC are indefinite. Activities set forth.

- P* -

DETAILS:

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

I. ORGANIZATION OF BOSTON WOMEN'S ABORTION ACTION COALITION (BOWAAC)

BOWAAC, the local affiliate of the Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC), was formed out of the local Female Liberation group; and while BOWAAC is not exclusively made up of Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Boston, and Young Socialist Alliance of Boston (YSA-B) female members, it is controlled by members of those groups.

WONAAC has been publicly described as an organization of groups whose aim is to effect the overthrow of existing abortion laws and to demand free abortion on demand.

The SWP, Boston, is the local affiliate and follows the aims and purposes of the national SWP.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The YSA-B is the Boston affiliate of the YSA, the youth organization of the SWP.

A. Headquarters

In late summer, 1972, BOWAAC moved its headquarters from 552 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge, Mass., to 419 Boylston Street, Room 323, Boston, Massachusetts, telephone 266-3574.

BS T-1
September 28, 1972

BOWAAC headquarters continues to be located at 419 Boylston Street, Boston, Room 323.

BS T-1
March 2, 1973

The New England Telephone 1973 Directory for the Boston area lists BOWAAC at 419 Boylston Street, Boston, with telephone numbers 266-3574 and 266-1679.

B. Membership and SWP and YSA Infiltration

BOWAAC is not a formal membership-type group. There are, however, currently a limited number of activists, a maximum of fifteen, the majority of whom are members of the SWP and/or YSA in the Boston area, involved in BOWAAC work. The number of activists is currently limited as a number of the formerly active independents in the group have recently dropped out of BOWAAC work feeling that the United States Supreme Court decision relaxing legal restraints on the practice of abortion has resolved the abortion problems.

Member of Subject Organization

BS T-1
March 2, 1973

JANE ROLAND, the SWP, Boston, member then in charge of SWP/YSA work in BOWAAC, in early 1972, reported that work in BOWAAC was going quite slowly in the Boston area and that there continued to be opposition to the SWP/YSA control by independents active in BOWAAC.

Member of Subject Organization

BS T-1
September 28, 1972

ANN MARIE CAPUZZI, the SWP, Boston, member currently in charge of SWP/YSA work in BOWAAC, recently reported that, in view of the above-mentioned United States Supreme Court decision concerning abortion laws and the dropping out of BOWAAC work by a number of the independents, future plans of the SWP/YSA locally with respect to BOWAAC are indefinite.

BS T-1
March 2, 1973

C. Activities

"The Militant," a weekly newspaper of the SWP, in its September 22, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Petition Filed for Vote on Abortion," which reported that representatives of an Abortion Referendum Committee had announced on September 7, 1972, the filing of a petition to allow Massachusetts citizens to vote on whether abortion should be legalized. According to the article, representatives of BOWAAC were among supporters of this Abortion Referendum Committee.

A leaflet entitled "Speak Outrage - A Woman's Right to Choose a Public Hearing" was distributed to the public in the general Boston area during October, 1972, to advertise a meeting at the Boston University, Boston, Law Auditorium under the joint sponsorship of BOWAAC and Female Liberation on October 28, 1972. According to the leaflet, women would testify at this gathering against persons or institutions which had victimized them with legal or illegal abortions or had denied them contraception, voluntary sterilization or good pre-natal care, or had sterilized them without their knowledge or consent.

Among the listed speakers was JANE ROLAND, identified as a member of BOWAAC, who was to speak on the topic, "Summary and Indictments."

"The Militant" in its November 10, 1972, edition carried an article which reported that on October 28, 1972, 300 women had gathered at the Law Auditorium of Boston University to hear testimony on "Crimes Against Women." The article reported that the program, entitled "Speak Outrage," was built by "Speak Outrage Project," a committee of individuals from several groups in the Boston area, one of which was identified as BOWAAC.

The article reported that topics covered in the testimony ranged from abortion to forced sterilization to poor pre-natal care and that presentations were given by women of diverse ages and economic and religious groups.

The "Observer," a campus newspaper of Tufts University, Medford, Massachusetts, in its November 3, 1972, edition carried an article entitled "Groups Debate Abortions," which reported that representatives from the "Value of Life Committee" and BOWAAC had met head on November 1, 1972, at Tufts University to debate the issue of legalized abortion. The article reported that JANE ROLAND, identified as the former coordinator of BOWAAC, spoke in favor of repealing all abortion laws.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Boston, Massachusetts

March 21, 1973

Title WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION
ACTION COALITION

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST
(TROTSKYIST)

Reference Report of Special Agent ARTHUR V.
SULLIVAN, JR., dated and captioned
as above at Boston, Massachusetts.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI(100-468406) DATE: 3/30/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(OO: NY)

Re New York letter to the Bureau, 6/6/72; Bureau O-7 to New York, 7/12/72; and Philadelphia letter to the Bureau, 2/28/73.

As outlined in referenced New York letter, the New York Office noted, as far back as June, 1972, it recognized that, although several leaders of WONAAC were known to be SWP members, their activities, as pertaining to WONAAC, had been directed toward the legal repeal of all restrictive abortion laws, and investigation had disclosed no indication that WONAAC, as an organization, had engaged in any subversive or violence prone activity.

Referenced Bureau O-7, referencing the aforementioned communication, nevertheless instructed that the New York Office, as office of origin, had overall responsibility for captioned organization, and directed the New York Office to reopen its case and submit semi-annual reports.

A review of the results of the continuing investigation of WONAAC, together with all indices and references pertaining thereto, since June 1972, reflects no apparent change in the activities or the organization or its membership from that outlined above.

The New York Office is in accord with the view of the Philadelphia Division, as set forth in its referenced letter, that WONAAC represents basically a social change vehicle which, despite disparate political views of its leaders and membership, deals with the single issue of abortion rights.

REC-99 117

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York
WRC:rcc
(3)

23 APR 4 1973
11

FIVE

54 APR 17 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

In view of instructions set forth in Bureau memorandum 10-73, dated 3/6/73, paragraph G, wherein the Bureau reiterated its policy that the FBI has no interest in individuals and organizations involved in legitimate dissent and the recent United States Supreme Court decision upholding the right to abortion, it appears continued investigation of WONAAC as such is not justified.

The New York Office further concurs with the Philadelphia view that continued investigation of the SWP and/or YSA would produce the desired coverage and information concerning its members who are associated or active in WONAAC.

UACB, the New York Office is closing the investigation of this organization.

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford (FS)
1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
1 - Mr. G. J. Lex, Jr.

SAC, New York (100-174481) EX-111 REC-127 4/4/73

Acting Director, FBI (100-468406) - 113

WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION
COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
OO: NEW YORK

RePHlet 2/28/73.

The Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC) has been the subject of a separate investigation by the Bureau in numerous offices. In referenced letter, Philadelphia pointed out that WONAAC represents a basic social change dealing with abortion rights and that in view of the fact the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the right of abortion, the continued investigation of WONAAC at this time does not appear to be desirable and should be discontinued. Philadelphia also suggested that continued investigation of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), should determine pertinent activities of WONAAC.

After careful consideration of this matter, the Bureau agrees with the observations of the Philadelphia Office that the investigation of WONAAC should be discontinued. However, in view of the fact that WONAAC is dominated and controlled by the SWP, a Trotskyist communist organization cited by the Attorney General pursuant to Executive Order 10450, it is the responsibility of the Bureau to investigate and report pertinent information relating to the extent of SWP domination and control of captioned organization.

Therefore, recipients should close separate investigations concerning WONAAC. In the future, report above-described information regarding WONAAC under appropriate subheading in the SWP semiannual organizational reports.

MAILED 21
APR - 4 1973
FBI

2 - Albany (100-22881)
2 - Boston (100-43809)
2 - Detroit (100-40426)
2 - Jacksonville (100-2049)
2 - Minneapolis (100-16058)
2 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

2 - Pittsburgh (100-17517)
2 - Richmond (100-11665)
2 - Sacramento
2 - San Antonio (100-12935)
2 - St. Louis (100-22704)
2 - WFO (100-55420)

GJL:rsm (30)

WGC

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

WRW/RLS

Mr. Felt ___
Mr. Baker ___
Mr. Callahan ___
Mr. Cleveland ___
Mr. Conrad ___
Mr. Gebhardt ___
Mr. Jenkins ___
Mr. Marshall ___
Mr. Miller, E.S. ___
Mr. Soyars ___
Mr. Thompson ___
Mr. Walters ___
Tele. Room ___
Mr. Kinley ___
Mr. Armstrong ___
Mr. Bowers ___
Mr. Herington ___
Ms. Herwig ___
Mr. Mintz ___
Mrs. Neenan ___

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Letter to SAC, New York et al
Re: Women's National Abortion Action Coalition (WONAAC)
100-468406

NOTE:

WONAAC has been subject of separate investigation by numerous offices. In relet 2/28/73, Philadelphia stated that WONAAC represents basic social change dealing with abortion issue and considering recent U.S. Supreme Court upholding right of abortion, investigation of WONAAC should be discontinued, but activities followed through investigation of SWP and YSA. New York, office of origin in this matter, as well as other offices handling WONAAC investigations, including Philadelphia, being advised that Bureau agrees with observations of Philadelphia considering controversial abortion issue and in the future report activities of WONAAC in subheading of SWP semiannual organizational reports.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 2/28/73

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-53818) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS - C (TROTSKYIST)
(OO:New York)

Re Philadelphia letter to Bureau dated 1/31/73 and Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 2/12/73.

For the information of New York, referenced Bureau letter to Philadelphia dated 2/12/73 authorized a continued investigation of WONAAC utilizing only established sources. The Bureau further advised that the investigation was to be conducted in a most discreet manner and that no action was to be taken which could in any way be construed as infringement by the FBI on academic freedom at the University of Pennsylvania.

The case file of captioned organization has been reviewed as well as all indices references to captioned organization and it has been determined that while some of the individuals associated with WONAAC in the Philadelphia area are also known to be affiliated with the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and for the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the majority of WONAAC supporters appear to be individuals interested in social change rather than revolutionary political change.

ST-105

REC-5

113

In view of the fact that WONAAC represents basically a social change vehicle dealing with the single issue of abortion rights and the fact that a recent U. S. Supreme Court decision upheld the right to abortion, thereby reducing the political value of this issue, it would appear that a continued investigation of WONAAC at this time is not desirable.

12

2 - Bureau (100-468406) (RM)
1 - New York (100-174481) (RM) (Info)
1 - Philadelphia (100-53818)

21 MAR 5 1973

JCH:klh
(4)

FIVE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Therefore, it is recommended that this investigation be discontinued. In this regard, it is noted that continued investigation of the SWP and/or the YSA should produce the desired data regarding their activities without taking the risk of embarrassment inherent in a continued investigation of WONAAC,

UACB, Philadelphia is RUC'ing this matter.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-468406) DATE: 7/30/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-174481) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL ABORTION ACTION COALITION (WONAAC)
IS-C (TROTSKYIST)
OO:NY

For the information of receiving offices, the Bureau has authorized discontinuance of active investigation of captioned organization.

Receiving offices are, nevertheless, requested to remain alert for any pertinent activity on the part of this organization which would be of interest to this Bureau.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Albany (100-22881) (RM)
2 - Atlanta (100-9058) (RM)
2 - Boston (100-43809) (RM)
2 - Chicago (100-52028) (RM)
2 - Cleveland (100-32010) (RM)
2 - Detroit (100-40426) (RM)
2 - Philadelphia (100-53818) (RM)
2 - Washington Field (100-55420) (RM)
1 - New York

WRC:trr
(19)

REC-63

18

AUG 1 1973

RECEIVED

1-348

AUG 6 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON

10/15/75 SSC

Also:
Committee to Defend the Right to Life
Women's Bail Fund
Furies

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/16/71

Transmit the following in ____________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ____________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

WOMENS [illegible]

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies and 2 copies for WFO of LHM concerning captioned activity.

Source used in attached LHM is ~~NY 6474-S~~.

This LHM is being classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by NY 6474-S could reveal the identity thereof and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

The NYO will furnish any additional information re this matter to the Bureau and WFO.

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-172435) (THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE)
1-New York (100-164665) (WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT) (WLM) (42)
1-New York (134-15562A) (31)
1-New York (100-171548) (WOMEN'S CONCERENCE IN CANADA, 3/24-4/7/71) (42)

1-New York
JRN:ihr
(10)

REC-103

130

ENCLOSURE

1-OSI
1-Army
1-SS
1-Navy
1-RAO-ISD

3/19/71

MAR 17 1971

INT SEC

Approved: ____________ Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____________ M Per ____________

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

C O N F I D E N T I A L

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
March 16, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

A confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, on March 10, 1971 made available a four page folder captioned, "Women's National March On The Pentagon April 10," sub-captioned, "defend the right to live."

This folder reflected women's disagreement with the Nixon administration's policy in regards to Indochina, and states, in part, as follows:

"Our sisters in Vietnam have stretched forth a hand to us. They are our example. We answer them with our strength together. Women are marching against the Pentagon on April 10. With dignity and rage we march against the American Medical Association and its health system that cares nothing about the health of the people. We march against the partnership between police and organized crime, which makes heroin a big business-----silently endorsed by those who 'govern us'. We march against politicians, hustlers and kickback men, whose corruption and crimes are paid for by the people. We march against the injust court system, and for the freeing of all political prisoners."

C O N F I D E N T I A L

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100-453[illegible]-130

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

The folder indicated that contributions for the march should be sent to:

NY "April 10 Women's Committee
c/o Upper Westside Women's Center
627 Amsterdam Avenue, NYC (212) 847-6696," and
information regarding transportation and child care could be obtained from the "New York Office."

"Grant's Tomb", a community newspaper, upper west side, New York City (NYC), March, 1971, Number 2 Issue, page 10, contained an article captioned, "Women March on Washington". This article reflected, in part, as follows:

"Out of the outrage against the war that was the unifying force of the Ann Arbor conference, the women's caucus decided to channel our frustration into a public statement calling for a women's march on Washington, D.C. on April 10. We all felt the urgency to show how we as women feel oppressed by the same U.S. system that needs the dominance of men over women, white over black, brown and,yellow,heterosexual over homosexual, and over poor to support the aggressive war policy that is killing our Vietnamese sisters and brothers.------

"We are making this march one step in showing the world our solidarity as women with all our sisters in Vietnam who are fighting for their lives. The Committee to Defend the Right to Live, a South Vietnamese women's organization, has called for our support."

The confidential source mentioned above on March 15, 1971, furnished information that on March 11, 1971, a "women's meeting" was held at Washington Square Methodist Church, 135 West 4th Street, New York, New York (NY). Approximately 70 people were present. It appears to the source that the Pentagon action April 10th is being led by the same women, in the "Women's Union", who are planning the trip to Toronto, Canada in late March, 1971. The only decision arrived at during the meeting, according to the source, was that on the scheduled date, April 10th, there will be a march on the Pentagon.

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Nothing was decided as to mode of travel to Washington and no other firm plans were made regarding any other action in Washington, D.C.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/26/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646) (P)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

ReNYat and LHM to the Bureau dated 3/16/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM concerning captioned activity. Two copies each of LHM are enclosed for designated offices.

Source one in LHM is ~~NY-7395-PSI~~; source two is ~~NY-6474-S~~.

Enclosed LHM is classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above sources could reveal the identity of these sources, and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

For the information of WFO, ~~NY-6474-S~~ advised on 3/25/71 that she learned that one ABBY is in WDC working on

[illegible] LHM D

- 2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM)
- 2-Albany (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2-Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2-Baltimore (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2-Boston (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2-Cleveland (100-30116) (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2-Indianapolis (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
- 1-New York (100-164665) (WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT) (42)
- 1-New York

1-ARMY 3/31/71
1-NAVY RLP/[illegible]
1-AF
1-SS
1-RAO-ISD

WHB:ihr
(19)

REC 98

131

MAR 27 1971

~~NEW LEFT~~

Approved: BFM/10PB,42
Special Agent in Charge

Sent ______________ M Per ______________

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

plans for the march, and that this individual is probably ABBY ROCKEFELLER, daughter of DAVID ROCKEFELLER, President of Chase Manhattan Bank, NYC.

LEADS:

ALBANY, BALTIMORE, BOSTON, CLEVELAND AND INDIANAPOLIS

Will furnish any information regarding this matter to the Bureau, Alexandria and WFO.

[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. NYfile (100-172646)

March 26, 1971

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Reference is made to New York memorandum dated March 16, 1971.

On March 24, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on March 22, 1971, a "Committee for April 10" held a meeting at the Law Commune Office, 640 Broadway, New York City (NYC), which was attended by 30 to 40 females. It was learned that a woman from the New York (NY) group was already in Washington, D.C. working with others there to arrange permits, speakers, et cetera, for the women's march on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. It was stated that it was easier to obtain a permit for a march from the Justice Department to the Pentagon, than from the Pentagon to the Justice Department, but that no permit had been obtained as yet. It was pointed out that a march from the Pentagon to the Justice Department was preferred as there would be less chance of losing marchers en route to the Justice Department than from marching from the Justice Department to the Pentagon. It was stated that no buses had been chartered at NY, but it was hoped that 15 buses would be needed.

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1 - 4 - 131

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Law Commune

On September 16, 1969, a second source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Law Commune is not an organization in the usual sense of the word. It is rather a law firm comprised of a group of lawyers interested and sympathetic to the New Left and Black Power organizations, and who counsel and defend individuals in these groups as the occasion arises. They likewise permit their premises to be used on occasion as a meeting place for these organizations and distribute some of their literature.

On March 25, 1971, the second advised that as of now there is much confusion over the mechanical aspects of the Women's National March on April 10, 1971, and that the people in Washington, D.C. will make the ultimate decision regarding the route of the march. The source stated that in NY, information concerning buses for Washington, D.C. will be available at the Upper West Side Women's Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue, NYC, telephone number 874-6696.

On March 24, 1971, the second source made available a piece of literature sent out by the "April 10 Women's Committee" concerning the national women's march on the Pentagon on April 10. This literature contained in part as follows:

"We are going to the Pentagon on April 10 to serve notice on our enemies that women are moving against them. Our urgency and our fury at the expansion of the Indochinese war and our rage at the repression of our black and brown sisters and brothers needs expression right now. We are joining with other women to struggle for the everyday things we need and against whatever and whoever prevents us from getting them.

"We need and want our sisters around the country to build for this action in their own ways, and to communicate with other sisters their ideas, suggestions and criticisms. This is a temporary contact list which came out of the Ann Arbor Conference:

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

"Baltimore...301-685-6575 (women on Outcry)

Boston...617-666-1243 (Kathy)

Vermont...802-454-8311 (Women's Center, King Basement, Goddard)

Ohio (Kent)...216-673-3708 (Nancy)

Indianapolis...317-472-9061 (Susan)

New York...212-874-6696 (West Side Women's Center, 627 Amsterdam Ave., New York City.)"

CONFIDENTIAL

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Mohr
[illegible] ✓
[illegible]man CD ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR006 WF PLAIN

7:48PM NITEL 3-31-71 FMK

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

NEW YORK (100-172435)

ALEXANDRIA

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-53558) 4P

Women's Liberation Movement.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE; INTERNAL SECURITY INFORMATION CONCERNING.

ON MARCH THIRTY FIRST, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE, A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED STATES PARK POLICE, WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC) MADE AVAILABLE A COPY OF AN APPLICATION OF A PROPOSED DEMONSTRATION IN PARK AREA(S) UNDER ADMINISTRATION BY NATIONAL CAPITAL PARKS, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR DATED, MARCH TWENTY FOUR NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE. THE APPLICATION WAS EXECUTED BY ONE ABIGAIL KAPLAN, FOUR ZERO ZERO NINE EAST WEST HIGHWAY, CHEVY CHASE, MARYLAND, WHICH STIPULATED THE SPONSORING

END PAGE ONE

D.C.

REC-57 [illegible]-3233-136

APR [illegible] 1971

EX-103

5-R

"cc to IDIU
[illegible] deleted"

61 APR 23 1971

PAGE TWO

ORGANIZATION IS KNOWN AS "APRIL TEN WOMEN'S COMMITTEE, SIX TWO SEVEN AMSTERDAM AVENUE, NEW YORK, NEW YORK"; THAT KAPLAN IS A REPRESENTATIVE OF ORGANIZATION AND THAT SYLVIA WARREN, THREE SEVEN FIVE RIVERSIDE DRIVE, THIRTEEN E, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, WAS NEW YORK REPRESENTATIVE. DC,

APPLICATION FURTHER REFLECTS THE DEMONSTRATION WILL TAKE PLACE ON APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE, WITH A FIVE THOUSAND MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PARTICIPANTS. WOMEN PARTICIPANTS IN DEMONSTRATION WILL ASSEMBLE ON GRASSY AREA BETWEEN SEVENTH AND NINTH STREETS AND CONSTITUTION AND MADISON DRIVE, SOUTHWEST, WDC, FROM ELEVEN AM TO TWELVE NOON, DURING WHICH ONE UNNAMED PERSON WILL SPEAK. GROUP THE, FROM NOON TO THREE PM WILL MARCH WEST ALONG CONSITUTION AVENUE TO TWENTY THIRD STREET, SOUTH ON TWENTY THIRD TO LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND ACROSS MEMORIAL BRIDGE THEN USING

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

THE MOST DIRECT ROUTE TO PENTAGON, FROM THREE PM TO FIVE PM, GROUP WILL RALLY AT PENTAGON WITH SPEAKERS AND POSSIBLY MUSIC THEN DISPERSE IN SMALL GROUPS ON FOOT. GROUP WILL HAVE PORTABLE SOUND TRUCK, BULL HORNS, POSSIBLY SMALL PLATFORM AT PENTAGON, FOUR HUNDRED BANNERS, PLACARDS. DANA BIEBERMAN, FIVE TWO ONE WEST ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH STREET, NEW YORK, NEW YORK, AND SYLVIA WARREN WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MARSHALS BEING PROVIDED. IT WAS INDICATED IN APPLICATION NO DISRUPTIVE ACTIVITY WAS CONTEMPLATED. PURPOSE OF PORPOSED DEMONSTRATION WAS SHOWN AS "TO PROTEST THE VIETNAM WAR".

DC.

N.Y.

SECRET SERVICE, ASSISTANT UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

END PAGE THREE

PAGE FOUR

ADMINISTRATIVE

LIEUTENANT DEELY IS THE PARK POLICE REPRESENTATIVE.

NEW YORK DETERMINE FROM SOURCES POSSIBLE SIZE OF DEMONSTRATION AND MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION TO WDC. FURNISH ANY OTHER INFORMATION DEEMED PERTINENT IN ORDER FOR WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE TO ALERT RESPONSIBLE AGENCIES. REFER TO NEW YORK AIRTEL MARCH SIXTEEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE.

ALEXANDRIA ARRANGE TO COVER DEMONSTRATION VIRGINIA SIDE OF MEMORIAL BRIDGE AND AT PENTAGON.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE WILL HANDLE WDC ACTIVITY.P.

END

KPT FBI WASH

CLR

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/31/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646) (P)

Women's Liberation Movement

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

ReNYat and LHM to Bu, 3/26/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM concerning captioned activity and another unrelated march on 4/10/71 from the Washington Monument to the Japanese Embassy in WDC. Two copies each of LHM are enclosed for AX and WFO.

Source utilized in LHM is NY 7395-PSI.

LHM is classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above source could reveal the identity of this source of continuing value and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

AGENCY ACSI/ONI/OSI/SS
RAO/ISD/DIU/CRD
4-7-71
R/S

EX-112

REC 70

100-453233 - 146

ENCLOSURE

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM) (4 Xeroxes made)
2-Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York

APR 2 1971

RESEARCH SECTION

WHB:lhr
(8)

62 APR 29 1971

INT. SEC.

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
March 31, 1971

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. NYfile (100-172646)

Women's National March
on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Reference is made to New York (NY) memorandum dated March 26, 1971.

On March 30, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on March 26, 1971, a "Committee for April 10" held a meeting at the McIntosh Student Union, Barnard College, New York City (NYC), to plan and organize for the Women's March on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. The meeting was attended by 30 individuals and had no chairman.

The source stated that at the above meeting, two representatives,man and wife, from an "Action Committee" on certain islands near Okinawa,planned a march on April 10, 1971 in Washington, D.C. to protest giving over to Japan what they feel to be Chinese islands. This march is to begin at 1:00 p.m. at the Washington Monument, up Massachusetts Avenue to the State Department, and possibly on to the Japanese Embassy. Support of the women's group was requested; however, after the two left the meeting, the "Committee for April 10" decided not to support the Chinese march on the grounds that they were too "liberal."

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 100-455 [illegible] -146

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

The source advised that at the above meeting, it was stated that no permit had been obtained as yet for the Women's March on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. It was stated that the march will proceed from a "grassy spot" at the Justice Department at noon, past the Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior, Department of Labor and on to the Pentagon. An hour at each end of the march would be allowed for speakers, though the group doubted they would use it. Guerrilla theatre activity by participating groups in front of the various government buildings was discussed and encouraged, though specifics were not mentioned.

The source stated that at the above meeting, copies of a letter to Madame Binh, head of the Vietcong delegation to the Paris peace talks and the North Vietnamese in Paris, were passed out, describing the purpose of the April 10 march. This letter is set forth as follows:

"March 25, 1971

"Dear Mme. Binh,

"On April 10, many of us American women will be marching on the Pentagon. You know already of the other actions being planned here against the war. As women, we are coming out from separate cities and roles, trying to create reality out of what we once held looked up in our imaginations. In marching on the Pentagon, we are joining with all people inside and outside of Amerika, who fight against Amerika's attempt to control us.

"We've been conditioned so long to accept Amerika's definition of us as weak, passive, and powerless, and to deny all our feelings of love and strength, that it has been a struggle for us to turn towards each other and fight for our freedom.

"Your own long struggle in Indochina, and the struggle of Third World people here at home, awakened us to the destruction that Amerikan power represents all over the world. Your many victories against that power have been an inspiration to us. But it wasn't until we joined together to examine and share our own experiences as women in Amerika that we saw ourselves not only as your supporters, but as sisters in a revolutionary struggle for the liberation of all people.

"We are becoming women of the revolution, working in our own way to stop the bombs from dropping in your land, at the same time that we work to build day care centers, health clinics, and a whole culture that will come from and respond to the needs of all the people, not just the rich and the powerful. The enormous anger and energy of sisters together is a force that confuses and terrifies the rulers of Amerika.

"It's so incredibly hard for us to write what we're feeling, to express to you and our Vietnamese sisters and brothers the depth and strength of our love and solidarity.

"Tidings of revolutionary joy from sisters inside Amerika,

"In love and respect,
"April 10th Women's Committee"

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 4/5/71

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646)

SUBJECT: WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, 4/10/71
IS-MISC

Gray

O Womens Liberation Movement

SDS 6/11/70 W/F Bush Bitter Protest Ne Lt SA walk

~~NY 7395-PSI~~, who has been attending meetings of captioned group, has expressed an interest in accompanying group on bus to WDC, 4/10/71.

UACB, source will travel to WDC, 4/10/71, to participate in the march and reimbursed for expenses upon her return by the NYO.

cc 724

EX-103 REC 17 100-[illegible]-132

16 APR 6 1971

NEW LEFT

2-Bureau (RM)
2-Washington Field (RM)
1-New York (134-17468)
1-New York (

JWR:ihr
(7)

5-R

62 APR 15 1971

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ____________
Special Agent in Charge

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

HGT2/-2/?&2/?&,/6

NR12 NY CODE

10:35PM NITEL 4-5-71 AJN

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK 100-172646

WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTY ONE; IS- MISC.

Womens Liberation Movement

B

ON APRIL FIVE, INSTANT, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT CONCERNING CAPTIONED MARCH, FOURTEEN BUSES WILL PART NYC FOR WDC AT ABOUT SIX AM ON APRIL TEN, NEXT, WITH ABOUT SIX HUNDRED THIRTY PASSENGERS FOR THE MARCH. THE BUSES CHARTERED ARE CROWN COACH, COAST CITIES CRUISERS, INC., COMMUNITY COACH LINES AND GARDEN STATED TRANSIT LINES. THE BUSES WILL PROCEED DIRECTLY TO THE JUSTICE DEPT., WDC, WHERE THEY WILL UNLOAD. THE EMPTY BUSES WILL THEN DRIVE TO THE PENTAGON WHERE THEY WILL WAIT FOR THE END OF THE MARCH. ALL WILL RETURN TO NEW YORK WITH THEIR PASSENGERS ON THE NIGHT OF APRIL TEN, NEXT.

ST-109 REC- 66 -134

6 APR 13 1971

END PAGE ONE

15

5

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data

55 APR 30 1971

cc Wells

PAGE TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE

RENYAT AND LHM, MARCH THIRTY ONE, LAST, AND WFOTEL, MARCH THIRTY ONE, LAST.

SOURCE CONCEALED IS ~~NEW YORK SIX FOUR SEVEN FOUR DASH S.~~

LHM FOLLOWS WITH ADDITIONAL INFO RELATING TO MARCH.

END

N//
To White House, AG, Secret Service,
CIA, State, ACSI, OSI, DIA, Vice
President by tel. CC's of White
House tel to DAG; AAG's: IS, CRD,
CRIM, IDIU; ~~NIS~~ 4-6-71

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 4/5/71

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172646) (P)

Women's Liberation Movement

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, 4/10/71
IS-MISC

ReNYat and LHM to Bu, 3/31/71; WFOtel, 3/31/71 and NYtel, 4/5/71.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM re captioned activity. Two copies each are enclosed for AX, PH & WFO.

Source utilized in LHM is ~~NY 6474-S~~.

LHM is classified, "Confidential" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above source could reveal the identity of this source of continuing value and could be injurious to the national security of the US.

NY files contain no information identifiable with ABBEY KAPLAN, who was also refered to in reWFOtel, as well as this LHM.

EX-112 REC-74 147

ReWFOtel stated that SYLVIA WARREN & DANA BIEBERMAN are responsible for marshals being provided for the 4/10/71

2-Bureau (Encs. 6) (RM) ENCLOSURE (4 Xeroxes)
2-Alexandria (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Philadelphia (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Washington Field (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-170605) (WEATHERMAN) (47)
1-New York (100-164665) (WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT) (48)
1-New York ~~300~~ C

7 APR 6 1971

WHB:mlh
(12)

APR 20 1971

AGENCY ACSI ONI OSI SS
~~RAM/ISD, ID/CRD~~ CRIM
DATE 4-8-71
HOW FWD. 5
BY Sent ______M Per ______

Approved: ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

march on the Pentagon. For the information of AX & WFO, these individuals are identified as follows:

DANA BIBERMAN

On 2/3/70, ~~MI-295-S (former NY-6476-S)~~ advised that DANA BIBERMAN was then connected with the Weatherman faction of SDS. (NYfile 100-165434; Bufile 100-457986)

SYLVIA WARREN

On 10/14/69, ~~NY 6909-S~~ advised that SYLVIA WARREN was the mistress of BRIAN FLANAGAN, a member of the Weatherman Faction of SDS, at the time he was arrested on 10/11/69 by the Chicago, Ill. PD on charges of attempted murder, following a battle between SDS group and the police in which RICHARD ELROD, Assistant Corporation Counsel for the City of Chicago, was seriously injured. (NYfile 100-167933; Bufile 100-456940)

LEAD:

Phiadelphia will furnish information regarding this matter to the Bureau, AX & WFO.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York

In Reply, Please Refer to File No. NYfile (100-172646)

April 5, 1971

Women's National March On
The Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Reference is made to New York (NY) memorandum dated March 31, 1971.

On March 30, 1971, a source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished a leaflet distributed on March 27, 1971, entitled, "April 10 Women's March On The Pentagon," which contained the sentence "Fresh Wind Blows Against the Empire" in the form of a rainbow. The leaflet, described by the source as a Weatherman leaflet, is quoted in part as follows:

"...the rainbow is a sign of that which is in all things.

"It is a sign of the union of all the peoples like one big family.

"Seek the vision. Become a warrior of the rainbow!

"Let it grow! Let it grow!

"We are creating reality out of what we once held locked up in our imaginations. We are coming out from separate cities and roles, channeling our life force into a revolution which will free not only women, but all people. We can't be free until everybody is free. In marching on the Pentagon, we are pointing out the source of our oppression

CONFIDENTIAL

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE 100-4[illegible]-147

and joining with all people in and out of Amerika who fight the Pentagon.

"For information call: West Side Women's Center (212) 874-6696.

"Buses will leave from Union Square & the Bronx at 6 a.m. on April 10 returning same day..."

A characterization of the Weatherman is attached hereto.

West Side Women's Center

The "Rat", an underground type newspaper published in New York City (NYC) bi-weekly, in its issue of November 17-December 6, 1970, page 13, contained an article captioned: "News From: Women's Center in N.Y." This article reflects that a West Side Women's Center is located at 626 Amsterdam Avenue, NY, NY, where it is forming an "Abortion Program" for those living on the Mid to Upper West Side (of NYC.)

"The Village Voice," a weekly NYC newspaper, issue of December 10, 1970, page 16, reflects an article captioned, "Women's Center." This article states in part that "The West Side Women's Liberation Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue (near 90th Street), has started a free abortion counseling and referral project to serve women of the Upper West Side. Women who need this service can come in or call the center at TR 4-6696 from 11:30 a.m. to 9:00 p.m. on Mondays and Thursdays, and from 6:00 to 9:00 on Tuesdays and Wednesdays."

On April 2, 1971, the source advised that on March 29, 1971, approximately 40 women attended a meeting of the "April 10 Committee" which was held at New York University Loeb Student Center, NYC, to organize for the women's march on the Pentagon. Abbey Kaplan (not further identified) was Chairwoman. Kaplan stated she was negotiating the permit and other arrangements in Washington, D.C. A list of over 25 schools in the area was read by Kaplan to determine if contacts had been made to leaflet, et cetera. It appeared that the majority of schools had been reached, but there were still several yet to be organized.

A representative from the committee was sent to Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, where contact was made the women's center and the "Kensington Collective," concerning the April 10 march on Washington.

The source stated that several women at the meeting complained that the Weatherman leaflet (previously referred to) was ineffective as it was directed only toward young hippie women. One woman argued in favor of this leaflet, but later stated "we'll do another one."

The source stated that a committee was established to work on advertising of the march and that Barbara Reilly, among others, volunteered for this work. A second committee was formed to plan the rallies in Washington, D.C. It was stated there would be a brief rally at the Justice Department and a major rally at the Pentagon. In addition, they would arrange for the receipt of telegrams from the Toronto conference, and Madame Binh, head of the Vietcong delegation to the Paris peace talks and the North Vietnamese in Paris. It was also stated that there would be guerrilla theaters and a leaflet pointing out "targets" along Constitution Avenue.

Barbara Reilly

On October 21, 1970, the above source advised that Barbara Reilly as of that date was a member of the Weatherman faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS).

A characterization of SDS is attached hereto.

On April 5, 1971, the above source advised that concerning the Women's National March on the Pentagon, that six buses will depart the Uptown Women's Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue, NYC, that six additional buses will depart the north side of Union Square, NYC, and that two more will depart from 109 East 184th Street, Bronx, NY (across the street from the

C O N F I D E N T I A L

Women's National March On
The Pentagon, April 10, 1971

Bronx Community College,) all to depart for Washington, D.C. at approximately 6:00 a.m. on April 10, 1971. The buses chartered for captioned march are:

Crown Coach
Coast Cities Cruisers, Incorporated
Community Coach Lines and
Garden State Transit Lines

The buses will proceed directly to the Justice Department, Washington, D.C., where they will unload. The empty buses will then drive to the Pentagon where they will wait for the end of the march. All will return to NY with their passengers on the night of April 10, 1971. The source said that each bus will carry 38 to 49 passengers and it is expected that approximately 630 persons will travel to Washington, D.C. from NYC by bus for the march.

C O N F I D E N T I A L

1. APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Students for a Democratic Society, commonly known as SDS, came into existence at a founding convention held during June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan. From an initial posture of "participatory democracy," Marxist-Leninist ideology of various shadings became predominant during 1968-1969 with debate centering on how best to create a revolutionary youth movement. SDS moved from involvement in the civil rights struggle to an anti-Vietnam war position to advocacy of a militant anti-imperialist line linking up the oppressed peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America with the black liberation movement in the United States. All major factions within SDS embrace Marxism-Lenism and identify internationally with China, Cuba and North Vietnam as countries leading the worldwide struggles against the United States. However, the Soviet Union was regarded as imperialist and with the Communist Party, United States of America, "revisionist" in nature.

SDS operated under a national constitution which called for an annual National Convention (NC) and quarterly National Council meetings wherein programs were initiated and debated. Three national officers were elected annually with a National Interim Committee to run the organization. Regional offices and college chapters elected delegates to the national meetings but each functioned independently on local matters. Its official publication "Fire" (formerly "New Left Notes") last appeared in December, 1969.

Internal factionalism of serious proportions developed during 1968 - 1969 and the following three factions evolved as a result of a split at the June, 1969, NC: Weatherman, Worker Student Alliance (WSA), and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM). The effect of the split on SDS chapters throughout the country was divisive. Some aligned with one or the other of the three major factions. Others, unable to identify with any faction, disassociated with SDS completely and changed names.

The SDS national office in recent years was located at 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois. It was closed in February, 1970.

2.

APPENDIX

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (cont'd)

The Weatherman and RYM groups no longer consider themselves associated with SDS, and the WSA group refers to itself as the true SDS.

Characterizations of Weatherman, WSA and RYM are set out separately.

1. APPENDIX

WEATHERMAN

Initially called the "Action Faction," Weatherman came into being immediately before the June, 1969, Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) National Convention (NC). At this NC Weatherman won all three national officer positions and a majority of the National Interim Committee as well. Subsequently, they took over the SDS National Office (NO) in Chicago, and controlled its funds, paper and national records. Although internal struggle existed until late 1969, Weatherman for all major purposes controlled SDS nationally from June, 1969, until its NO closed in February, 1970. At this time it no longer considered itself part of SDS.

The term Weatherman emerged from an ideological paper prepared by its leaders entitled "You Don't Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows" ("New Left Notes" June 18, 1969). This statement outlined the basic stance of Weatherman: Marxist-Leninist in content but with strong advocacy that action not theory would bring about revolution in the United States. This posture was complemented with an international identification to the Cuban revolution and CASTRO's statement that the duty of a revolutionary is to make revolution.

During October, 1969, Weatherman riots in Chicago resulted in more than 260 arrests for mob action and related charges. A program of armed struggle was finalized during a December, 1969, "War Council" wherein terrorist tactics and political assassination were contemplated. The basic strength of Weatherman was then revealed to be some 300 - 350 nationally and geographically apportioned to the Midwest, New York, and some Northwest.

As its rhetoric of violence escalated, Weatherman leaders increasingly discussed the necessity of an underground operation wherein more than 90 percent of the organization would be submerged; "affinity groups" of three - five members would function independently. In February, 1970, Weatherman leaders announced a program of "strategic sabotage" with police and military installations as primary targets.

In February, 1970, Weatherman abandoned the SDS NO, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois, and throughout the country entered an underground status.

A characterization of the SDS is set out separately.

1.

APPENDIX

WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE/ PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

A source advised during August, 1969, that at the National Convention (NC) of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held in Chicago, Illinois, during June, 1969, a split arose between the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) and the National Office (NO), the NO becoming known as the Weatherman faction. The PLP faction drew the largest support among those in attendance at the NC.

Source further advised that during late Summer, 1969, the PLP faction of SDS established its National Headquarters (NH) on the second floor of a loft-type building at 173A Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, Massachusetts. The campaign on which the PLP faction centered was to build a worker student alliance or a campus worker student alliance. Thus, they adopted the names of Worker Student Alliance (WSA) or Campus Worker Student Alliance.

Source stated that the "New Left Notes," printed in New York City, is the official publication of the WSA faction.

A second source advised during January, 1970, that within the SDS, the WSA is a caucus of which the PLP constitutes the leadership.

A third source advised during July, 1970, that during demonstrations staged in the Boston area during the Spring and Summer of 1970 by the NH, the main theme of previous demonstrations staged by the NH shifted from protestations of the Vietnam War and other United States foreign policy matters to attacking domestic issues such as racism and unemployment and demonstrating support of the "workers' struggle."

Characterizations of the SDS and PLP are set out separately.

1. APPENDIX

REVOLUTIONARY YOUTH MOVEMENT

A source advised that the Revolutionary Youth Movement II (RYMII) faction of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) held a national conference at Atlanta, Georgia, from November 26 to 30, 1969. At this conference it was decided to form a new organization to be known as Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), characterized as a mass anti-imperialist youth organization, said organization being proposed as separate and distinct in form and content from SDS. The "Principles of Unity" adopted by the conference included a struggle against white supremacy and male supremacy; fights against imperialism, anticommunism, fascism and oppression of youth; and support of the right of self-determination of all "oppressed nations," also support of the right of all "oppressed and exploited" peoples "to armed self-defense." It was agreed that RYM would not be a Marxist-Leninist organization; however, source said this was decided in order to indicate an organization broad enough in form to be acceptable to everyone. A temporary National Steering Committee (NSC) made up of eight females and two males was elected to govern RYM until national officers could be elected during the Spring of 1970.

RYM publications have listed the RYM National Office (NO) at Post Office Box 5421 and Post Office Box 77012 C, both Atlanta, Georgia, and a second source has advised that the NO has no office space but would probably be considered as located at Apartment 27, 1067 Alta Avenue, Northeast, Atlanta.

Second source advised that women dominated the founding conference and have continued to dominate NSC meetings to the point that "women's liberation" has apparently become the RYM's principal issue - also that RYM's poor financial condition has resulted in its failure to publish a paper. During early 1970, RYM has decided to cater to the working class rather than youth, since the potential for social revolution lies in workers.

A third source has stated that it was decided at the March, 1970, NSC meeting that RYM women had decided the organization will be molded into a "working class, Marxist-Leninist, revolutionary, anti-imperialist, problack nationalist, people's women's liberation organization."

A characterization of the SDS is set out separately.

Women's National March on
the Pentagon, April 10, 1971

1.

APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The "New York Times" city edition Tuesday, April 20, 1965, Page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), which had been known as the Progressive Labor Movement.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962, by MILTON ROSEN and MORTIMER SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

A source advised on June 3, 1968, that the PLP held its Second National Convention in New York City, May 31, to June 2, 1968, at which time the PLP reasserted its objective of the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism.

The source also advised that at the Second National Convention, MILTON ROSEN was unanimously re-elected National Chairman of the PLP and LEVI LAUB, FRED JEROME, JARED ISRAEL, WILLIAM EPTON, JACOB ROSEN, JEFFREY GORDON and WALTER LINDER were elected as the National Committee to lead the PLP until the next convention.

The PLP publishes "Progressive Labor," a bimonthly magazine, and "Challenge-Desafio," a monthly newspaper.

Source advised on May 25, 1970, that the PLP utilizes an address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn, New York, and also utilizes an office in Room 617, 1 Union Square West, New York, New York.

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 7 1971
DCW
TELETYPE

Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 037 NY CODE

5-30 PM URGENT 4-8-71 MJW

TO DIRECTOR

ATTN. DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA

BOSTON 91-4218

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM NEW YORK 100-172646

WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, SEVENTYONE, IS - MISC, ~~GILROB~~, (BUREAU FILE NINE EIGHT - FOUR SIX SIX ONE ONE).

Internal Security
Miscellaneous

ON APRIL SEVEN, LAST, A SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED THAT CONCERNING CAPTIONED MARCH, A MEETING OF THE "APRIL TEN COMMITTEE" WAS HELD IN NYC ON APRIL TWO, LAST, WHERE IT WAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE COMMITTEE HAS SECURED ST. STEPHENS CHURCH, SIXTEENTH STREET, AND NEWTON STREET, NORTHWESTERN WDC, FOR HOUSING ACCOMODATIONS ON APRIL NINE, NEXT. THE CHURCH AND PRIVATE HOMES WILL BE USED.

ABOVE SOURCE STATED THE PHONE AT THE WDC WOMEN'S CENTER IS TWO ZERO TWO - TWO THREE TWO - FIVE ONE FOUR FIVE. WOMEN WERE URGED TO PHONE THREE FOUR SEVEN - SEVEN FIVE ONE EIGHT IN WASHINGTON FOR LEGAL ASSISTANCE IF NEEDED.

REC 8 151

SUGGESTED SPEAKERS WERE MARJORIE MELVILLE (INDICTED MAY TWENTY TWO, SIXTY EIGHT AT BALTIMORE, MARYLAND BY ~~FGJ~~ FEDERAL GRAND JURY IN CONNECTION WITH DESTRUCTION OF SELECTIVE SERVICE RECORDS AT

END PAGE ONE

6 APR 20 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

1 APR 26 1971

CATONSVILLE, MARYLAND) AND A SOUTH VIETNAMESE WOMAN WHO HAS BEEN SPEAKING AT VARIOUS LEFT ASSEMBLIES IN THE UNITED STATES.

ON APRIL EIGHT, INSTANT, A SECOND SOURCE, WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, ADVISED A MEETING OF THE "APRIL TEN COMMITTEE" WAS HELD APRIL FIVE, LAST, AT THE LOEB STUDENT CENTER, NEW YORK UNIVERSITY, NYC, WHERE A DISCUSSION WAS HELD ON HOW MILITANT THE MARCH SHOULD BE. "TRASHING" WAS PUT DOWN THOUGH SOME WOMEN EMPHASIZED A NEED TO FIGHT AND DEFEND OTHER PARTICIPANTS. ACTS SUCH AS SPRAY PAINTING STATUTES AND WALLS OF GOVERNMENT BUILDINGS EN ROUTE ON MARCH WERE RECOMMENDED. ALSO SUGGESTED WAS THE TAKING DOWN OF AMERICAN FLAGS AND REPLACING THEM WITH VIET CONG FLAGS. IT WAS DECIDED "NOT TO LEAVE THE PENTAGON THE WAY WE FOUND IT" AND "TO LEAVE BANNERS AND FLAGS FLYING IN THE AREA AROUND THE NORTH PARKING LOT WHERE THE MARCH WOULD END. ALSO SPRAY PAINTING OF CONCRETE IN PARKING LOT WAS RECOMMENDED.

ON APRIL EIGHT, INSTANT, THE SECOND SOURCE ALSO ADVISED THAT ON TUESDAY, APRIL SIX, LAST, GIRLS WORKING ON GUERILLA THEATER AT THE APRIL TEN WOMENS CENTER AT SIX TWO

END PAGE TWO

SEVEN AMSTERDAM AVE., NYC, FOUND A SEALED ENVELOPE LYING ON THE FLOOR ADDRESSED TO THE "APRIL TEN COMMITTEE." THE ENVELOPE BORE NO POSTMARK AND HAD APPARENTLY BEEN HAND DELIVERED. THE LETTER SET FORTH SUPPORT FOR THE APRIL TEN WOMENS MARCH ON THE PENTAGON AND WAS SIGNED CATHERINE POWER AND SUSAN SAXE. THE SOURCE ADVISED SHE WAS TOLD THE LETTER HAD BEEN COPIED AND THE ORIGINAL DESTROYED BY THE APRIL TEN COMMITTEE. THE LETTER WILL BE READ AT THE MARCH IN WASHINGTON AND WILL ALSO BE GIVEN TO THE UNDERGORUND PRESS FOR PUBLICATION. (POWER AND SAXE ARE FUGITIVES - WANTED FOR INTERSTATE FLIGHT- MURDER; THEFT OF GOVERNMENT PROPERTY; BANK ROBBERY. BOTH ARE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.)

ADMINISTRATIVE.

RENYTEL, APRIL FIVE, LAST, NYAT AND LHM memo, APRIL FIVE, LAST.

SOURCE ONE IS NEW YORK SIX FOUR SEVEN FOUR DASH S.

SOURCE TWO IS NEW YORK SEVEN THREE NINE FIVE - PSI WHO HAS BEEN ADVISED TO BE DOUBLY ALERT FOR ANY ADDITIONAL INFORMATION CONCERNING POWER AND SAXE.

E N D

DRL FBI WASH DC

C: MR. GALE✓ CC-MR. ROSEN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: April 7, 1971

FROM : N. P. Callahan

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON PENTAGON
Saturday, 4/10/71

According to information received from the Washington Field Office and Domestic Intelligence Division, the "April Tenth Women's Committee" of New York City, a recently formed group of women's protest organizations, plans a "March on the Pentagon" on Saturday, 4/10/71, as an anti-war protest. Plans call for the protesters, who may number as many as 5,000, to assemble at L'Enfant Square, Constitution Avenue, between Seventh and Ninth Streets, Northwest, between 11:00 a.m. and noon, and thereafter march to the Pentagon via Constitution Avenue and Memorial Bridge. The demonstration is scheduled to end around 5:00 p.m. The Committee has reportedly chartered 14 busses capable of carrying 630 passengers from New York City to Washington. The busses are scheduled to unload at the Justice Building, where it is reported the women will demonstrate. It is noted that L'Enfant Square, the assembly point for the demonstrators, is within one block of the Justice Building. The protesters are then scheduled to march to the Pentagon, where they will hold another demonstration and will be picked up by the busses at the Pentagon.

General Services Administration (GSA) and Department security officials are cognizant and plan to reinforce the guard force at the Tenth Street Auto Entrance, which is the only Justice Building entrance open on Saturday. Since we do not conduct tours on Saturday, no adjustment in our tours is necessary.

EX-103 REC 8 100-4[illegible]-133

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

15 APR 12 1971

4/7

FDH:bll (23)
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Each Assistant Director
1 - Mr. Beaver
1 - Miss Holmes

1 - Miss Gandy
1 - Mr. Stapleton
1 - Mr. Creedon
1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. McMichael
1 - Mr. D. J. Brennan

56APR19 1971

THREE

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR [illegible]

TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. W.
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR023 BA PLAIN

629 PM NITEL 4-7-71 PWM

TO DIRECTOR

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM BALTIMORE (100-28415)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, SEVENTY ONE, IS-MISC. Women's Liberation Movement

INSTANT DATE, SERGEANT HARWOOD BURRITT, INSPECTIONAL SERVICES DIVISON, BALTIMORE CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT, ADVISED ON APRIL NINTH NEXT AT EIGHT PM INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BALTIMORE WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT, A PUBLICLY DESCRIBED WOMEN'S RIGHT ORGANIZATION, PLAN TO HOLD A MEETING AT THREE ZERO TWO EIGHT GREENMOUNT AVENUE, BALTIMORE. PURPOSE OF THIS MEETING IS TO DISCUSS POSSIBLITY OF INDIVIDUALS FROM BALTIMORE TRAVELING TO WASHINGTON, DC, ON APRIL TENTH NEXT TO TAKE PART IN WOMEN'S MARCH ON PENTAGON. SGT. BURRITT ADVISED TO DATE, IT IS NOT KNOWN IF INDIVIDUALS FROM BALTIMORE WILL ACTUALLY TAKE PART IN THE MARCH, AND IF SO, THE NUMBER INVOLVED OR MODE OF TRAVEL TO WASHINGTON, DC.

REC-7 100-45 138

APR [illegible]71

END PAGE ONE

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

61 APR 23 1971

PAGE TWO

ADMINISTRATIVE DATA

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM, MARCH TWENTY SIX, SEVENTYONE.

BALTIMORE SOURCES NEGATIVE RE INVIDUALS OR ORGANIZATIONS FROM BALTIMORE ATTENDING MARCH, APRIL TENTH NEXT.

BALTIMORE WILL ATTEMPT TO COVER MEETING APRIL NINTH NEXT AND BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES WILL BE ADVISED OF RESULTS OF MEETING.

END

cc. Wills

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 8 1971
TELETYPE

Mr. Walters
Tele. Room
Miss Gandy

NR014 WF PLAIN

832PM NITEL 4-8-71 DLE

TO DIRECTOR, (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
NEW YORK (100-172435)
ALEXANDRIA

FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-53558)

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NINETEEN SEVENTYONE; INTERNAL SECURITY - INFORMATON CONCERNING.

WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT

ON APRIL EIGHT INSTANT, AT TWELVE FORTYFIVE PM, SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OBSERVED ABOUT TWELVE WHITE FEMALE INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR EARLY TWENTIES ASSEMBLE AND HOLD A PRESS CONFERENCE NEAR THE FRONT OF THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT BUILDING, TENTH AND PENNSYLVANIA AVENUE, NW, ENTRANCE. TWO OF THE FEMALES UNFOLDED AND HELD A LARGE BANNER INSCRIBED, QUOTE WOMEN'S MARCH, APRIL TEN DASH A FRESH WIND BLOWS AGAINST THE EMPIRE UNQUOTE. TWO OTHER MEMBERS OF THE GROUP SOPKE. THE FIRST ONE STATED THE MARCH ON APRIL TEN TO THE PENTAGON WAS NOT UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF ANY SINGLE GROUP; THAT THE MARCH WAS CALLED TO HAVE WOMEN FROM ALL GROUPS JOIN IN TO PROTEST THE WAR IN VIETNAM. THE SECOND SPEAKER IDENTIFIED AS LAURIE

END PAGE ONE

REC-40 100-455[illegible]33-123

XEROX
APR 16 1971

"cc to ID"
Adm. data deleted"

51 APR 26 1971

(LNU) READ A PRESS RELEASE WHICH IN PART STATED THE WOMEN WERE MARCHING QUOTE TO SAY NO MORE TO AMERIK'A WAR AGAINST OUR SISTERS AND BROTHERS IN INDOCHINA, NO MORE TO A COURT SYSTEM WHICH DISPENSES JUSTICE ACCORDING TO ONE'S COLOR, SEX, OR BANK ACCOUNT, NO MORE TO DEHUMANIZING JOBS, CRUMBLING HOUSING AND A HEALTH SYSTEM WHICH CARES MORE ABOUT PROFITS THEN THE PEOPLE IT IS SUPPOSED TO SERVE. UNQUOTE. THE AFFAIR TERMINATED AT ONE PM, WITHOUT INCIDENT.

SECRET SERVICE, METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, AND MILITARY INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE: THE SPECIAL AGENTS WHO OBSERVED THE ACTIVITY WERE PHILIP E. MOSTROM, WILLIAM T. BROOKS, AND JOSEPH E. KELLER. NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.
memo

END

EBM FBI WA CLR

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Dalbey
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Callahan

DATE: 4/8/71

FROM : J. P. Dunphy

SUBJECT: APRIL TENTH WOMEN'S COMMITTEE "MARCH ON THE PENTAGON" SATURDAY, APRIL 10, 1971

I. MARCH AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

This event is scheduled to take place between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m. on Saturday, April 10, 1971, with listed activities reported planned as follows:

A. Participants (possibly as many as 5,000) assemble in L'Enfant Square, Constitution Avenue, between 7th and 9th Streets, between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon. NOTE: As many as 630 persons arriving by chartered buses reportedly will unload at the Justice Building and demonstrate there.

B. After assembly and related activities the participants will march to the Pentagon by way of Constitution Avenue and Memorial Bridge.

C. Upon arrival at the Pentagon, the main demonstration is scheduled to take place, concluding about 5:00 p.m. The charter buses are to pick up participants at the Pentagon.

II. COMMENTS

A. No traffic restrictions have been issued and Washington Field Office (WFO) indicates no streets will be closed unless crowd size makes this necessary.

REC-74

148

B. Heavy seasonal tourist traffic added to the marchers may well cause some delays along Constitution Avenue between 11:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m.

ENCLOSURE

Enclosure

1 - Mr. Tolson (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Mohr (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Sullivan (Enc.)
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan (Enc.)

1 - Mr. Tavel (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Beaver (Enc.)
1 - Mr. Hereford (Enc.)
1 - Miss Gandy (Enc.)
2 - Miss Holmes (Enc. 2)

6 APR 16 1971

THREE

GLC:ko (12)

CONTINUED - OVER

C. In view of the above, WFO recommends that Constitution Avenue be avoided during the afternoon. No problems other than seasonal tourist traffic are anticipated north of Constitution Avenue.

D. It is suggested that entrance to or exit from the Justice Building may be made with minimum delay at any time during the day by using streets north of Constitution Avenue.

Pertinent information is shown on the enclosed map.

For information.

WBS

"APRIL TENTH WOMEN'S COMMITTEE" MARCH ON PENTAGON - SATURDAY APRIL 10, 1971


WASHINGTON CIRCLE
PENNSYLVANIA
NEW HAMPSHIRE AVE.
CONNECTICUT
DE SALES ST.
VERMONT AVE.
MASSACHUSETTS
MT VERNON PL.
NEW JERSEY
PIERCE
FENTON PL
MYRTLE ST.
CAPITOL
NEW YORK
PENNSYLVANIA AVE.
WHITE HOUSE
W. EXECUTIVE
E. EXECUTIVE
STATE PL.
HAMILTON PL.
E. EXECUTIVE AVE.
ELLIPSE RD.
G PLACE
UNION STATION
VIRGINIA
N. Y. AVE.
INDIANA AVE.
LOUISIANA AVE.
DELAWARE
NORTH
FBI
CONSTITUTION AVE.
MADISON DR.
WASHINGTON DR.
ADAMS DR.
JEFFERSON DR.
WASHINGTON MONUMENT
LINCOLN MEMORIAL
REFLECTING POOL
THE CAPITOL
E. CAPITOL
MD. AVE.
INDEPENDENCE AVE.
MARYLAND
CARROLL ST.
CANAL ST. PKWY.
SCHOOL ST.
RAILROAD
SOUTHWEST FREEWAY
N. C. AVE.
DUNNINGTON PL.
TIDAL BASIN
OHIO DRIVE
POTOMAC RIVER
15TH ST.
14TH
17TH
23RD

TO PENTAGON VIA MEMORIAL BRIDGE

▨ Bus unloading area - Demonstration reportedly planned at Justice Building.

▨ Assembly area

- - - Indicated route of march - Destination is the Pentagon where main demonstration, ending at about 5:00 P. M., is scheduled

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL [illegible]
COMMUNICATIONS [illegible]

NR001 PH CODE

AM NITEL 4-9-71 JEW

TO DIRECTOR
NEW YORK (100-172646)
ALEXANDRIA
WASHINGTON FIELD

FROM PHILADELPHIA (100-52802)

Liberation Movement

WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN NEXT. IS-MISC.

RE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM TO DIRECTOR, APRIL TEN NEXT. IS-MISC.

SOURCE AND INFORMANTS AT PHILADELPHIA UNABLE TO FURNISH ANY INFORMATION ON ALLEGED WOMENS NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL TEN NEXT. ESTABLISHED SOURCE AT BUS COMPANIES, PHILADELPHIA, ADVISED NO BUSES LEASED FOR THAT DATE FOR WOMENS TRIP. PHILADELPHIA HAS ALERTED INFORMANTS AND WILL FURNISH ANY INFORMATION RECEIVED TO BUREAU AND INTERESTED OFFICES.

END

REC 12 100-453[illegible]-137

EX-104

12 APR 14 1971

56 APR 19 1971

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
APR 9 1971
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 019 B S CODE

9:54 PM URGENT 4-9-71 WFY

TO DIRECTOR

WASHINGTON FIELD

ALEXANDRIA

FROM BOSTON (100-42759) 2 P

WOMEN'S Liberation NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NEXT, IS - MISC.

ON APRIL NINE, SEVENTYONE, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST ADVISED THAT FORTY FIVE PEOPLE WILL LEAVE ON A BUS AT TEN PM TONIGHT, APRIL NINE, INSTANT, ENROUTE WASHINGTON D.C. THEY WILL DEPART ABOARD A BRUSH HILL BUS FROM SIXTY EIGHT ST. STEPHEN ST., BOSTON, DESTINED FOR THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, AT WASHINGTON D.C. AND WILL BE IN THAT CITY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE WOMEN'S MARCH ON THE PENTAGON.

ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE SOURCE, THIS TRIP TO WASHINGTON, D.C. IS BEING SPONSORED BY THE STUDENT ACTIVITIES UNIT

END PAGE ONE

EX-103

REC-41

100-4[illegible]-139

8 APR 15 1971

"cc to IDU 60 APR
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

AT BOSTON UNIVERSITY.

ADMINISTRATIVE-----

REFERENCE NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM, MARCH TWENTY SIX, LAST.

SOURCE REFERRED TO ABOVE IS ~~SERGEANT JAMES LYNCH~~, ~~INTELLIGENCE UNIT, BOSTON PD~~.

BOSTON WILL FOLLOW AND REPORT ANY ADDITIONAL DATA DEVELOPED.

END

cc - Welle

TELETYPE

Mr. Brenn
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR 002 AX PLAIN

7:38PM NITEL 4-10-71 CSW

TO: DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)
BOSTON (100-42759)
NEW YORK (100-172646)
WFO (100-53558)

FROM: ALEXANDRIA (100-669)

Wells

VA.

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, IS-MISC.
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Womens Liberation Movement

AT TWO THIRTYTWO PM, INSTANT DATE, A GROUP OF APPROXIMATELY SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY MARCHERS CROSSED MEMORIAL BRIDGE FROM WASHINGTON, D.C., INTO ARLINGTON, VA., AND PROCEEDED TO THE MALL ENTRANCE AT THE PENTAGON VIA WASHINGTON BLVD. MARCHERS SPRAY PAINTED THE WALLS OF AN OVERPASS OVER GEORGE WASHINGTON PARKWAY WITH WRITINGS "BITCHES UNITE", "OFF THE PENTAGON", "FREE ERIKA". MARCHERS ARRIVED AT PENTAGON AT THREE O'CLOCK PM. NUMEROUS SPEECHES WERE GIVEN BY UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS ADVOCATING THE FREEING OF ANGELIA DAVIS AND BOBBY SEAL; STOPPING THE WAR AGAINST BLACK AMERICA; AND DEMANDING PRESIDENT NIXON AND WAR WAGERS IN THE PENTAGON TO END THE WAR. THEY DISPLAYED SIGNS "FREE ERIKA AND BOBBY-STOP WAR AGAINST BLACK AMERICA," "NO JUSTICE IN AMERIKKKA", "SUPPORT SISTERS IN STRUGGLE-ASIA, AFRICA AND

END PAGE ONE

REC-30 100-455232-150

APR 20 1971

62 MAY 10 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

PAGE TWO

LATIN AMERICA," "MADAME BINH", AND NORTH VIETNAMESE FLAGS. ONE SPEAKER SAID THAT THE FBI WOULD NOT APPREHEND BERNADINE DOHRN UNTIL IT WAS TOO LATE AND THAT IT WOULDN'T DO ANY GOOD. THREE NORTH VIETNAMESE FLAGS WERE SET ALOFT BY MEANS OF ATTACHED HELIUM BALLOONS. MARCHERS DEPARTED FOUR FIFTY PM, INSTANT DATE, NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS OCCURRED. IT WAS NOTED THAT AFTER ALL THE MARCHERS HAD LEFT, PAINTED ON THE CEMENT AT THE MALL ENTRANCE WAS "VC" AND A STAR.

ADMINISTRATIVE: RE NEW YORK TELETYPE TO DIRECTOR APRIL TEN, INSTANT.

NO ~~LHM~~ MEMO BEING SUBMITTED.

END

RSPPXX FBI WASH DC

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

TELETYPE

NR 005 WF PLAIN
7:11PM NITEL 4-10-71 GEA
TO DIRECTOR
ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
NEW YORK
ALEXANDRIA
FROM WASHINGTON FIELD (100-53558) 3P

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE; INTERNAL SECURITY - INFORMATION CONCERNING.

Women's Liberation Movement

ON APRIL TEN, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE, AT TEN FORTY A.M. SPECIAL AGENTS OF THE FBI OBSERVED ABOUT TWO HUNDRED WHITE FEMALE INDIVIDUALS IN THEIR EARLY TWENTYIES BEGIN TO ASSEMBLE ON THE GRASSY AREA, AT SOUTHEAST CORNOR OF NINTH AND CONSTITUTION AVENUE, N.W., WASHINGTON, D.C. (WDC). THE GROUP THEN WAITED AROUND WITH THE SIZE OF THE GROUP INCREASING STEADILY. MANY OF THE FEMALES HAD WOMEN LIBERATION EMBLEMS PAINTED ON THEIR FACES. OTHERS HAD QUOTE FREEDOM UNQUOTE PRINTED ALONG WITH EMBLEMS. ON THEIR CLOTHING SOME HAD QUOTE NOTHING LEFT TO LOSE UNQUOTE. ENTERTAINMENT WAS PROVIDED BY THE PARTICIPANTS WHICH CONSISTED OF SINGING AND SKITS RENERED IN FRONT OF AN OPEN TRUCK WITH AN AMPLIFIER. AT TWELVE NOON METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT (MPD) ESTIMATED THE SIZE OF

END PAGE ONE

REC 100-453253 142

APR 15 1971

"cc to ...
Adm. data deleted"

WFO 100-53558

PAGE TWO

THE CROWD TO ABOUT FIVE HUNDRED. AN ANNOUNCEMENT WAS MADE THAT THE MARCH TO THE PENTAGON WOULD BEGIN AS SOON AS BUSES ARRIVED FROM THE NEW YORK AREA. AT TWELVE THIRTY P.M. THREE BUSES OF THE COAST CITIES CRUISER INCORPORATED, NEW JERSEY, ARRIVED. MPD STATED THE CROWD NOW NUMBERED ABOUT SEVEN HUNDRED AND FIFTY. AT ONE TWENTYFIVE P.M. THE MARCH TO THE PENTAGON BEGAN WITH THE GROUP PROCEEDING PAST THE JUSTICE BUILDING ON THE SIDEWALK IMMEDIATELY ADJACENT TO THE BUILDING. MPD STATIONED POLICEMEN BETWEEN THE JUSTICE BUILDING AND THE SIDEWALK. NO ATTEMPT TO DEFACE THE BUILDING WAS MADE. THE MARCHERS, SIX ABREAST, CONTINUED ON THE SIDEWALK OF CONSTITUTION AVENUE TO LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND THEN ACROSS MEMORIAL BRIDGE TO THE PENTAGON ARRIVING THERE ABOUT THREE P.M. ENROUTE THEY SHOUTED AND CHANTED OBSCENTIES SUCH AS, QUOTE ONE TWO THREE FOUR WE DON'T WANT YOUR F---G WAR. UNQUOTE. BANNERS AND PLACARDS CARRIED BY THE MARCHERS WERE INSCRIBED, QUOTE FREE ERICKA AND ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS; GIVE WOMEN AND MEN A FREE CHOICE FOR

END PAGE TWO

THEIR LIVES - LEGALIZE ABORTIONS - END THE WAR; FEMINISTS LIVE; DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE - WOMEM OF ITHACA, NEW YORK; WOMEN RISING UP ANGRY; MADAME BINH - LIVE LIKE HER; FREE BOBBY - FREE ERICKA - STOP THE WAR AGAINST BLACK AMERICA - YAWF; SUPPORT SISTERS STRUGGLE - ASIA, AFRICA, LATIN AMERICA - YAWF WOMEN; THERE IS NO JUSTICE IN AMERICA - WOMEN'S BAIL FUND INCORPORATED.

MPD ADVISED THERE WERE NO INCIDENTS OR ARRESTS ENROUTE TO PEGTAGON ALTHOUGH SOME OF THE MARCHERS PLACED PAINTED WOMEN'S LIBERATION MONOGRAMS ON STATUES IN THE VICINITY OF LINCOLN MEMORIAL AND ON MEMORIAL BRIDGE. SECRET SERVICE AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES COGNIZANT.

ADMINISTRATIVE

WFO SAS WHO OBSERVED THE ACTIVITY WERE RICHARD C. COFFMAN, JOSEPH E. KELLER, MELVIN S. GOLDBERG AND FRANK J. BASHAW, JR.

THE MPD WHO ESTIMATED SIZE OF THE CROUWD WAS DEPUTY CHIEF DIALS.

AX HANDLING DEMONSTRATION VICINITY OF PENTAGON.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

~~CORR THE NEXT TO THE LAST WRD ON PAGEON SHOULD READ "SIZE"~~

END

RSP FBI WASH DC

To White House, AG, Secret Service,
CIA, State, ACSI, OSI, DIA, Vice
President by tel. CC's of White
House tel to DAG; AAG's: IS, CRD,
CRIM, IDIU; ~~NIS~~ 4-12-71

CC-MR. BRENNAN

COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

APR 10 1971

TELETYPE

- Mr. Tolson
- Mr. Sullivan
- Mr. Mohr
- Mr. Bishop
- Mr. Brennan CD
- Mr. Callahan
- Mr. Casper
- Mr. Conrad
- Mr. Dalbey
- Mr. Felt
- Mr. Gale
- Mr. Rosen
- Mr. Tavel
- Mr. Walters
- Mr. Soyars
- Tele. Room
- Miss Holmes
- Miss Gandy

NR009 NY CODE

920AM URGENT 4-10-71 JAA

TO DIRECTOR

ATTENTION DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

ALEXANDRIA

WASHINGTON FIELD 100-53558

CHICAGO

FROM NEW YORK 100-172646

Liberation Movement

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971. IS-MISC

RE NEW YORK TELEPHONE CALL TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE INSTANT DATE.

ON INSTANT DATE AT SEVEN THIRTY AM, SA'S OBSERVED THREE BUSES COAST CITIES CRUISER NUMBER FIVE HUNDRED AND ELEVEN, COMMUNITY COACH LINES NUMBER FIVE HUNDRED AND SIX AND FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY SIX DEPART FROM UNION SQUARE,. NEW YORK CITY FOR WASHINGTON, DMC. WITH APPROXIMATELY ONE HUNDRED AND THIRTY FIVE GIRLS UNDER TWENTY FIVE YEARS OF AGE, NINETY FIVE PERCENT WHITE.

REC 8 100-453233-145

END PAGE ONE

16 APR 15 1971

EX 101

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

61 APR 23 1971

CN - Wells

PAGE TWO

FIVE BUSES RETURNED EMPTY TO GARAGE FOR LACK OF PASSENGERS.

OBSERVED AMONG GROUP WAS LINDA SUE EVANS, WEATHERMAN, N.Y D.C WEARING SHORT LEATHER JACKET DARK BROWN, MULTI COLORED DRESS OVER BLUE DUNGAREES WITH RED SLASH AT BOTTOM. EVANS HAS SHORT BLOND HAIR AND WEARING LARGE EARRINGS.

ON INSTANT DATE AT SEVENTY TWENTY FIVE AM SAS OBSERVED SIX BUSES DEPARTING NINETYTH STREET AND AMSTERDAM AVENUE, NEW YORK CITY WITH APPROXIMATELY TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY PASSENGERS, MAJORITY BEING WHITE UNDER AGE OF TWNETY FIVE. BUSES INCLUDED THOSE NUMBERED SIX HUNDRED AND SIXTY SIX, SIXHUNDRED AND SEVENTY SIX AND SIX HUNDRED AND SEVENTY FIVE OF COACH CITIES CRIUSERS INC. AND NUMBER SEVENTY FOUR OF TRANSIT CHARTER SERVICE AMD NUMBER FORTY THREE AND NUMBER EIGHTY TWO OF GARDEN STATE TRANSIT LINES, ALL NEW JERSEY CHARTER BUSES.

ALL WEATHERMAN ARE TO BE CONSIDERED ARMED AND DANGEROUS.

END PAGE TWO

PAGE THREE

ADMINISTRATIVE

RE NEW YORK TELEPHONE CALL TO WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE INSTANT DATE.

RE NEW YORK TELETYPE DATED 4-8-71 AND NEW YORK AIRTEL AND LHM DATED 4-5-71.

WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE TELEPHONICALLY ADVISED OF ABOVE. ~~NEW YORK 7395 - PSI~~ ADVISED 4-8-71 THAT NO BUSES WOULD DEPART FROM BRONX, NEW YORK FOR CAPTIONED MARCH.

SAS OBSERVING DEPARTURE OF BUSES WERE ALBERT E. FALLER RENO F. WALKER, ALAN J. OUIMET AND WILLIAM H. BATTS.

NO LHM BEING SUBMITTED.

END

AJP FBI WASH DC

HOLD

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: APRIL 13, 1971

Transmit the following in ________________ (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ________________ (Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, BALTIMORE (100-28415) - RUC -

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL 10, 1971 IS - MISCELLANEOUS

RE: New York airtel and LHM to the Bureau, dated March 26, 1971; Baltimore teletype to the Bureau, dated April 7, 1971.

Referenced Baltimore teletype contains information indicating a meeting was planned in Baltimore, Maryland on April 9, 1971, by members of the Baltimore Women's Liberation Movement, to discuss the possibility of individuals from Baltimore traveling to Washington, D. C. for captioned march.

On April 9, 1971, Sergeant HARWOOD BURRITT, Inspectional Services Division, Baltimore City Police Department, advised the planned meeting for the night of April 9, 1971, was not held. No information has come to the attention of his department indicating any groups of individuals or organizations plan to travel to Washington, D. C. to take part in the march on the Pentagon.

REC 8 100-45

144

Referenced New York LHM contained Baltimore telephone number 301-685-6575 as a contact telephone number for the Baltimore area. For the information of the Bureau, this telephone number is listed to DAVID GREEN, 637 Washington Boulevard, Baltimore. GREEN is a Security Index subject, Priority III, of the Baltimore Division, Baltimore File 100-25946, Bureau file 100-453010.

5-B

2 - Bureau (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - WFO (INFO) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Alexandria (INFO) (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - Baltimore
JRF:bjp

6 APR 1 1 1971

~~NEW LEFT~~

APR 26 1971

Approved: ________________ Sent ________________ M Per ________________
Special Agent in Charge

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969 O - 346-090 (11)

Contact with sources of the Baltimore Division, familiar with New Left and Communist activities in the Baltimore, Maryland area, failed to reveal any information indicating individuals or organizations from the Baltimore, Maryland area, participating in the captioned march.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

: DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/14/71

P
FROM : SAC, INDIANAPOLIS (100-22551) ([illegible]C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON
THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS - MISC.

Re New York airtel to the Bureau, 3/26/71.

LINDA PIRRARD, Secretary, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Indianapolis, Indiana (protect) advised on 4/1/71 that Telephone Number 317-472-9061 is an outdoor pay phone at the Missisinewa Reservoir, Peru, Indiana.

Attempts to make pretext calls to above number on 4/1/71, 4/5/71 and 4/6/71 met with negative results re any SUSAN (LNU).

For additional information, a short note regarding captioned march was indicated in a local Indianapolis underground type newspaper with the notation to call NANCY, 926-9770 at Indianapolis, Indiana for information.

On 4/1/71, PS IP 3436-S (reliable) called this number regarding a People's Peace Treaty Conference to be held that weekend. NANCY has been determined to be a NANCY PITTMAN who attended People's Peace Treaty Conference at New Castle, Indiana, 4/3-4/71. Indianapolis is currently conducting investigation regarding PITTMAN in connection with this conference.

On 4/9/71, JANYCE SUE ANDERSON (PSI under development) who has been contacted insufficient number of times to determine reliability advised that she had no knowledge of individuals going to Washington, D.C. regarding captioned matter from the Indianapolis area.

1-706

100- -149

REC- 66

EX-112

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - Alexandria (RM)
2 - Washington Field Office (RM)
2 - Indianapolis (1 - 100-NANCY PITTMAN)
JHB/slr
(8)

[illegible] 1971

NEW LEFT

APR 29 1971

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 5/18/71

REC-38

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Encl

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, CLEVELAND (100-31570) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON
4/10/71
IS - MISC

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM concerning captioned activity. One copy each of LHM is enclosed for designated offices for informational purposes.

Source CV T-1 and CV T-3 used in LHM are CV-1011-S. Source CV T-2 is NY 7351-S.

Due to the fact that most of the information contained in enclosed LHM was supplied by CV 1011-S it has been assigned two symbols.

Enclosed LHM is classified "CONFIDENTIAL" because the unauthorized disclosure of information furnished by the above sources could reveal their identity and be injurious to the national security of the US.

ENCLOSURE

③ - Bureau (Enc. 10) (RM)
(1 - 105-138315)
1 - Albany (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Alexandria (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Boston (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Cincinnati (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Detroit (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (100-172646) (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - WFO (Enc. 1) (Info) (RM)
2 - Cleveland
(1 - 100-27247 VIDEM)

REC-38

AGENCY ACSI OA USSS
REQ. REC'D CRD
DATE FORW. 6/4/71
HOW FORW.
BY

159

GMB:mab
(17)

MAY 21 1971

51 JUN 14 1971

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______ M Per ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

GPO : 1970 O - 402-735

UNIT STATES DEPARTMENT OF JU CE
DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

eply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-31570

Cleveland, Ohio

May 18, 1971

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL 10, 1971

On March 30, 1971, CV T-1, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that in Kent, Ohio, NANCY KURSHAN and one other female are the organizers of the Women's National March on the Pentagon, April 10, 1971, in Washington, D.C. (Women's March).

> CV T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that on September 9, 1970, that as of September, 1970, NANCY KURSHAN was one of five "non-leaders" of the Youth International Party (YIP) in New York City who actually run the organization.

Source stated that KURSHAN has printed approximately 1,000 leaflets concerning the Women's March. It was learned that the women from Ann Arbor did not care for the idea of a Women's March on the Pentagon but the New York Women overruled the objection since they appealed to the May Day Coalition to do all the work such as obtain housing for the people.

On March 31, 1971, CV T-1 advised that there would be a meeting Thursday night, (April 1, 1971) in Kent, Ohio, concerning the Women's March. This source stated that a leaflet regarding the Women's March was discussed in Kent, Ohio on March 31, 1971. Source also stated that it was learned that the Women's group in Boston is planning to travel by bus to Washington, D.C. on Friday (April 9, 1971), arriving Saturday (April 10, 1971), and returning to Boston Saturday night (April 10, 1971).

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

-159

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH
ON THE PENTAGON
APRIL 10, 1971

On March 31, 1971, CV T 3, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that the Women's March will begin between 11:00 a.m. and 12:00 noon, April 10, 1971, in Washington, D.C., across from the Department of Justice on Constitution Avenue, and will then proceed down Constitution Avenue to the Pentagon. Source said that some 3 to 10,000 persons are expected to participate in the Women's March with at least 650 of them being from New York.

On April 5, 1971, CV T-1 stated that it had been learned that approximately 12 buses will make the travel from New York City to Washington, D.C. for the Women's March although it was not known if the buses would be full, and a number of other buses would go from up-state New York. Source further stated that part of the Women's March in Washington, D.C., would consist of reading poems, singing, and going from building to building playing instruments.

On April 6, 1971, CV T-3 advised that the Women's group at the University of Ohio, Athens, Ohio, was having trouble obtaining transportation to the Women's March in Washington, D.C. since they did not have enough people to fill a bus.

On April 9, 1971, CV T-1 stated that at 12:00 noon, April 9, 1971, there would be a meeting in Washington, D.C. concerning the Women's March and further there would be a "party" that night, April 9, 1971, at St. Stevens Church, 16 and Newton, NW, Washington. This source also advised that she had learned that NANCY KURSHAN and seven other women from Kent, Ohio, were planning to attend the Women's March in Washington, D.C., April 10, 1971.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON APRIL 10, 1971

On April 10, 1971, CV T-3 advised that NANCY KURSHAN arrived in Washington, D.C. at 3:00 a.m., April 10, 1971. Source stated that as a matter of interest, NANCY KURSHAN and two other women, while enroute to Washington, D.C., were involved in a one car accident near Breezewood, Pennsylvania. This source further stated that no one was injured in the accident but the vehicle was a total loss.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/28/71

FROM : SAC, INDIANAPOLIS (100-22551) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH
ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

Re IP let, 4/14/71.

Contact with sources, Indianapolis Division, failed to reflect any additional information re captioned march.

B

1Q

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Alexandria (RM)
2 - Washington Field Office (RM)
1 - Indianapolis

JHB/dlc
(7)

EX 101 REC- 36

156

22 JUN 4 1971

[redacted]
Int Sec

56 JUN 7 1971

67

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/28/71

FROM : SAC, ALEXANDRIA (100-669)(RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON PENTAGON,
4/10/71
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

ReAXteletype to Bureau, 4/10/71.

On 5/7/71, and 5/19/71, GORDON W. CROSSMAN, Naval Investigative Service (NIS), telephone OX 3-3525, advised that a JEANETTE ANN WARNER, a Lieutenant in the U. S. Navy Nurses Corps on active duty, spoke at the Pentagon during the demonstration there on 4/10/71. He advised that her date and place of birth is 6/1/46, at Crestion, Iowa. Her Social Security Number is 482-54-1520 and her Navy service number is 726633W. She resides with a Doctor SIDNEY N. WOLFE, employed by U. S. Naval Hospital, Bethesda, Maryland, and his wife at 2506 Cliffbourn Place, N. W., Washington, D. C. He advised that her permanent residence is 310 East Terry Street, Centerville, Iowa, and that she is currently stationed at the Bethesda Naval Hospital. He further advised that she attends classes at the George Washington University, Washington, D. C., and that she is active in the 'Women's Lib."

Alexandria indices negative.

No further investigation remains outstanding and this case is considered RUC.

ST-105

REC 12

157

② Bureau (By Courier)
1-WFO (100-53558)(Info)(By Courier)
1-Alexandria
AAA/krl
(4)

JUN 4 1971

1 NH Sec

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/8/71

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-42759) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S NATIONAL MARCH ON THE PENTAGON, APRIL 10, 1971
IS-MISC

ReBstel to Bureau, 4/9/71, and Cleveland airtel and LHM, 5/18/71.

In New York LHM of 3/26/71, it was mentioned that a number to be called in Boston concerning the captioned matter was "617-666-1243 (KATHY)". On 4/1/71, personnel, New England Telephone Company, Boston, advised that 666-1243 was assigned to HENRY NORR, 59 Pearson Ave., Somerville, Mass. He was scheduled to move on 4/2/71 to 91 Glen Street, Somerville. HENRY NORR is a Priority II SI subject of the Boston Office.

On 7/6/71, FRANK CONNORS (mail carrier), Winter Hill Branch, Somerville Post Office, Somerville, Mass., advised that HENRY NORR had lived at 59 Pearson Ave., Somerville, but recently moved to 91 Glen Street, Somerville. A girl by the name of KATHY MC FEE had also resided in the same apartment as did NORR at 59 Pearson Ave. When she moved, however, she left no forwarding address and her current location was unknown.

The following informants have advised they had no information concerning the Women's National March or KATHY MC FEE:

BS 1307-PSI on 4/2/71, 5/28/71, and 6/29/71
BS 1293-PSI on 4/2/71 and 6/29/71
BS 1339-PSI on 4/2/71, 5/25/71, and 6/28/71

Boston had developed no additional pertinent information concerning this matter and is closing its file on this communication.

REC

10

163

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Alexandria (100-569) (RM)
1 - New York (100-172646) (Info.) (RM)
1 - WFO (100-53558) (Info.) (RM)
1 - Boston
KPW/pc
(7)

20 JUL 12 1971

NEW LEFT

71

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
MAR 5 1971
TELETYPE

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

NR005 SE PLAIN

6:30 PM NITEL 3-5-71 DCA

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM SEATTLE (100-NEW) 2 P

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE, INTERNATIONAL WOMENS DAY MARCH, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, MARCH EIGHT, NINETEEN SEVENTY-ONE. IS - MISCELLANEOUS, VIDEM. OO: SEATTLE.

ON INSTANT DATE, A SOURCE WHO HAS FURNISHED RELIABLE INFORMATION IN THE PAST, REPORTED TWO UNIDENTIFIED INDIVIDUALS WENT TO A MEETING OF THE FREEDOM SOCIALIST PARTY, A SCHISMATIC GROUP OF THE SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY WHICH HAS BEEN DESIGNATED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE U. S. PURSUANT TO EXECUTIVE ORDER ONE ZERO FOUR FIVE ZERO, HELD IN SEATTLE, DURING THE EVENING OF MARCH FOUR LAST AND DISTRIBUTED LEAFLETS ADVERTISING AN INTERNATIONAL WOMENS DAY MARCH BEGINNING FOUR THIRTY PM AT THE WOMENS JAIL, FOURTH AND CHERRY, SEATTLE. THE AFFAIR IS UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF A NEW GROUP, THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE.

EX-104 REC-63 100-46 [illegible] 1-2

THE PURPOSE OF THE MARCH WILL BE TO PROTEST THE INVASION OF LAOS, THE BROADENING OF AGGRESSION IN INDO CHINA AND ESCALATION TOWARDS A THIRD WORLD WAR. THE GROUP ADVOCATES IMMEDIATE WITH-

END PAGE ONE

MAR 9 1971

66 MAR 17 1971

MAR 10 1971

"cc to IDIU
Adm. data deleted"

5

PAGE TWO

SE 100-NEW

DRAWAL OF ALL U. S. MILITARY FORCES FROM INDO CHINA.

THE SOURCE DID NOT KNOW THE NATURE OF THE SPONSORING COMMITTEE OTHER THAN TO STATE THAT IT IS BELIEVED TO BE A GROUP OF WOMEN ORIENTED TOWARD ANARCHISTIC BELIEFS WITHOUT ANY SPECIFIC AFFILIATION WITH A TRADITIONAL BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION.

ABOVE BEING FURNISHED TO SECRET SERVICE, U. S. ATTORNEY, SEATTLE POLICE, U. S. MARSHAL AND THE INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF THE ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

///// ADMINISTRATIVE /////

SOURCE IS ~~SE SEVEN SIX THREE S.~~ NO LHM.

TELETYPE FOLLOWS EVENT. - P -

END

BOLD

CC [illegible]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Brennan CD ✓
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Casper
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Dalbey
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Walters
Mr. Soyars
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 9 1971

TELETYPE

NR001 SE PLAIN

11:42AM URGENT 3/9/71 VAB

TO DIRECTOR (ATTN DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

FROM SEATTLE (100-30902) 2P

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE, INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S DAY MARCH, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, MARCH EIGHT, NINETEEN SEVENTYONE. IS-MISCELLANEOUS. VIDEM. OO: SE.

ON MARCH NINE, INSTANT, SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT REPORTED APPROXIMATELY SIXTY PERSONS ASSEMBLED AT THE BUILDING HOUSING THE WOMEN'S JAIL, FOURTH AND CHERRY, SEATTLE, WASHINGTON, BEGINNING ABOUT FOUR P.M. MARCH EIGHT LAST AND MARCHED THROUGH DOWNTOWN AREA FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES BEGINNING AT FIVE P.M. AFFAIR WAS UNDER THE AUSPICES OF A NEW GROUP CALLING THEMSELVES THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE, BUT THE CORE OF THE PARTICIPANTS APPEARED TO BE FORMER MEMBERS OF THE SEATTLE LIBERATION FRONT WHICH WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR A VIOLENT ATTACK ON THE FEDERAL COURT HOUSE IN SEATTLE IN FEB-

END PAGE ONE

REC-22 100-462984-3

EX-104

15 MAR 12 1971

XEROX
MAR 1 71

5.10

61 MAR 25 1971

RUARY, NINETEEN SEVENTY, AND WHICH GROUP WAS DOMINATED BY FORMER MEMBERS OF THE WEATHERMAN FACTION OF THE ANARCHISTIC STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY.

SOME OF THE PARTICIPANTS MADE BRIEF REMARKS PROTESTING UNITED STATES ACTION IN INDOCHINA. AFFAIR WAS PEACEFUL AND NO KNOWN PROPERTY DAMAGE REPORTED.

INFORMATION WAS FURNISHED TO UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, SECRET SERVICE, AND INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES OF ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE.

ADMINISTRATIVE: SOURCE WAS JAMES TAGGART, PD INTELLIGENCE. SLF AND ITS PRINCIPAL MEMBERS ARE UNDER INVESTIGATION. NO DATA RECEIVED TO DATE TO INDICATE THE COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE IS AN ESTABLISHED ORGANIZATION BUT IF IT DEVELOPS INTO ONE THE BUREAU WILL BE ADVISED. NO LHM. -C-

END

MSE

FBI WASH DC

cc- MR. WELLS
ROOM 712-A 9&D

1 - Mr. R.L. Pence

SAC, Seattle 3/9/71

Director, FBI

3

COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE
IS - ANARCHIST
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

ReSEtel dated 3/5/71 captioned "Committee to Defend the Right to Live, International Womens Day March, Seattle, Washington, March 8, 1971, IS - Miscellaneous, VIDEM."

Promptly initiate investigation in accordance with provisions of Manual of Instructions, Section 87B, to identify leaders and activists of captioned. Determine aims, objectives and activities of group. SuLHM positive information developed along with recommendations for further action.

RLP:bkr
(4)

NOTE:

Seattle furnished information captioned is new group sponsoring International Womens Day March, 3/8/71, at Womens Jail, Seattle. Purpose of march is to protest invasion of Laos, broadening of aggression in IndoChina and escalation toward Third World War. Information indicates group is made up of women with anarchistic beliefs without any specific affiliation with existing basic revolutionary organizations. Captioned should be investigated under the provisions of MOI, 87B.

100 - 463984

EX-117

REC-4

MAILED 12
1971

MAR 16 1971

son
van
r
hop
nnan, C.D.
lahan
asper
enrad
albey
elt
ale
sen
vel
tters
ars
ele. Room
lmes
andy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 4/30/71

FROM : SAC, SEATTLE (100-30912) (C)

SUBJECT: COMMITTEE TO DEFEND THE RIGHT TO LIVE
IS - ANARCHIST
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Re Bureau letter, 3/9/71.

Contact has been maintained with all Seattle informants concerning this matter since early in March, 1971, and no information has been developed to indicate that captioned name is other than a temporary name used on a "one-shot" basis for one demonstration observing international women's day. Backers of the demonstration were factional Trotskyist elements who are few in number and poorly organized.

There is no indication captioned group is a separate entity, organized for on-going action.

UACB, this case is being closed, subject to being reopened in the event information is received to indicate the organization is viable.

K

EX-103 REC 18

2 - Bureau (REG)
1 - Seattle
RBC:cmf
(3)

MAY 3 1971

70 MAY 10 1971

Buy U.S. Sav... s Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

WOMEN'S BAIL FUND

FD-35 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 3/14/72

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL

Via ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172487)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS-NEW LEFT
(00:NY)

Enclosed for the Bureau are 10 copies of one LHM re the Women's Bail Fund.

Individuals mentioned in attached LHM are not characterized due to insufficient information in the files of the NYO to identify or characterize them.

NYO files contain no information re PATRICIA REINER with exception that she is subject of Minneapolis file 157-1288 captioned, "PATRICIA REINER, EM-BPP."

PAM ENGLE mentioned in LHM is identical to subject of NY 134-13129; Bufile 134-15598 captioned, "PAMELA SARA ENGLE, PSI-CI," opened on 10/5/66 and closed 2/7/67. Subject, while working at the Hudson Institute, Croton-on-Hudson, NY, cooperated with the FBI in passing on non-sensitive information to EVZEN VACEK, then an employee of the Czeckslovakian Mission to

ENCLOSURE

ST. 101

2-Bureau (Encs. 10) (RM)
2-Minneapolis (157-1288) (Encs. 2) (RM)
2-Albany (Encs. 2) (RM)
1-New York (100-) (PAM ENGLE)
1-New York (100-) (SHIRLEY TAYLOR)
1-New York (100-) (GERRY TOSCA)
1-New York (100-) (AMY LOWENSTEIN)
1-New York (100-172487) (MARY PINOTTI) (42)
1-New York

REC-13

REC-13

NACT-1

AJO:ihr
(13)

AGENCY: ARMY, ONI, OSI, SEC. SER., STATE, CIA

RAO (ISD, CRO, CD) IDIU

DATE FORW: 3/21/72

HOW FORW: Sent

BY: SSC

LEFT

Approved: ______________________ M Per ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1971—413—135

~~the UN. VACEK had originally~~ approached ENGLE for information, the latter turning to the FBI for assistance. ENGLE ceased cooperating with the Bureau due to anxieties stemming from her position as an informant. There are no further references re ENGLE in the files of the NYO.

Sources utilized in this LHM are as follows:

1st source	NY 6474-S
2nd source	WF 3491-PSI
3rd source	NY 7615-S
6th source	NY 5338-S

SAS of the FBI observing demonstrations are as follows:

5/14/71	CARLOS R. DURAN PATRICK ARNALL ARTHUR F. PITTENGER
7/26/71	LOUIS E. BROWN ARTHUR F. PITTENGER

LEADS:

MINNEAPOLIS

AT MINNEAPOLIS, MINNESOTA. Will conduct indices check re Women's Bail Fund and advise NYO re PATRICIA REINER's affiliation with the Fund.

ALBANY

AT ALBANY, NEW YORK. Inasmuch as the Fund has stated donations are tax exempt, Albany will determine if the Fund has filed to solicit charitable funds and/or filed articles of incorporation.

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will determine if account #046-514716 at Chemical Bank New York Trust Co. is account of Women's Bail Fund.

NY 100-172487

NON-SYMBOL INFORMANT ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE

4th source	ALAN CROAK, Assistant Secretary, Manufacturer's Hanover Trust Co., 40 Wall St., NY, NY
5th source	Confidential Mailbox
7th source	Mrs. PAT BUTLER, Postal Inspector's Office, General Post Office, NY, NY

CAUTION: NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED TO RESIDENT AGENTS, DETACH.

LEADS (CONT'D)

2. Will submit under separate communication NYO recommendation to interview PAM ENGLE, former PSI of NYO.

3. Will follow activities of the Women's Bail Fund.

CLASSIFICATION:

Enclosed LHM is classified, "Confidential" because it contains information from sources of continuing value, disclosure of which might reveal their identity and thus be prejudicial to the national defense interests of the US.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
March 14 , 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. NYfile (100-172487)

Women's Bail Fund

Unless otherwise stated, all sources in this memorandum have furnished reliable information in the past.

On March 30, 1971, a first confidential source furnished literature, concerning the Women's Bail Fund, which was picked up at the Upper Westside Womens Center, 627 Amsterdam Avenue, New York, New York (NY) on March 27, 1971. The literature captioned, "Women's Bail Fund" argued that the Women's House of Detention, in New York City (NYC), should not exist and that "the Women's House of Detention, along with the prisons and jails across the country, is a weapon used by the power structure here in America to oppress and exploit the people of poor communities." It further relates that "Women have come together in New York from many different organizations to form a Women's Bail Fund for all the sisters inside the House of Detention. The Bail Fund is also working to prepare simple pamphlets on law because of the total lack of any legal resources in the House of Detention and secure legal assistance where needed." The address is listed as the Women's Bail Fund, P.O. Box 637, Cooper Station, NY, NY 10003.

On August 26, 1971, the first source furnished literature on the Women's Bail Fund which stated, "The Women's Bail Fund is a coalition of Third World and white women who are:

".....raising bail to release women prisoners from Rikers Island.

"...establishing communication with women inside.

"....assisting women who are bailed out in meeting their needs.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's Bail Fund

"....providing legal information for prisoners.

"....making public the torture these women undergo.

"....supporting prison struggles everywhere."

On April 12, 1971, a second confidential source made available a flyer on the Women's Bail Fund which was distributed at the National Womens March on the Pentagon on April 10, 1971. The flyer, captioned, "Victory to the NLF and All Oppressed Peoples" states "Women in Vietnam and in the United States are fighting for the right to live: for the very right to exist.....the U.S. is now dotted with concentration camps for the poor and non-white: the jails.....But imprisonment doesnt' break the spirit of the sisters in jail. They resist! When denied their dignity, they organize and fight back. When one sister is beaten they organiz and resist. In the coldest part of winter when the boilers had broken down, the women worked in freezing temperatures in cold water to do the laundry-not 'because the pigs made us do it - but for our own beautiful sisters.' .....We Vietnamese, Black, Latin, White and Asian-american women are united in our struggle - we share common goals and face a common enemy. We express our complete solidarity with the NLF and shall work to bring the victory there."

On May 14, 1971, Special Agents (SAS) of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) observed a demonstration in front of the NYC Women's House of Detention sponsored by the Women's Bail Fund and Youth Against War and Fascism (YAWF). The demonstrators chanted slogans calling for release of their "sisters" from jail and expressed opposition to a proposed move of the inmates of the Women's House of Detention from its downtown site to the Rikers Island Prison Facility. The demonstrators called this proposed move an attempt to isolate the "sisters from their supporters."

By means of a loudspeaker, the demonstrators called to several inmates of the House of Detention who appeared in the upper storey windows, obtained their names and place of arrest. This information allegedly was to be used to obtain bail for the prisoners in question. Thereafter, several speakers denounced the jails as concentration camps and called for the release of the "political prisoners." in the House of Detention. Among the speakers was Shirley Taylor of the Women's Bail Fund and a former inmate of the Women's House of Detention.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

Women's Bail Fund

YAWF

YAWF is the youth group of the Workers World Party (WWP).

WWP

The WWP was founded in 1959 by individuals who disagreed with policies of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The WWP dissidents advocated unconditional support of the Soviet Union and the building of a revolutionary party geared to the overthrow of capitalism. More recently the WWP has called for peaceful solutions to Sino-Soviet disputes, however, the WWP generally supports the People's Republic of China in its ideological differences with the Soviet Union.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A third confidential source advised on May 18, 1971, the Women's Bail Fund has called for victory for the Vietcong and is setting up a "phone chain" to be able to call for "action against the transfer of women from the House of Detention to Rikers Island."

On June 6, 1971, the third source advised the Women's Bail Fund will have a "major bail out of women" from the Women's House of Detention from June 10 to June 13, 1971 at the Washington Square Methodist Church. It will include four days of "discussions, films, counseling and information services" for inmates and their families. The coordinator for the Bail Fund was identified as Pam Engle, telephone number 989-6717.

On July 26, 1971, SAS of the FBI observed a picket-type demonstration at 51st Street and Avenue of the Americas protesting the existence of all jails. Among the groups represented was the Women's Bail Fund.

On August 4, 1971, a fourth confidential source advised the following checks were among those drawn from the bank account of Lubell, Lubell, Fine and Schaap, Attorneys-at-Law, 103 Park Avenue, NY, NY.

Women's Bail Fund

Date	Payee	Bank of Deposit and/or Endorser
June 25, 1971	Women's Bail Fund for $2,000.00	Chemical #046-514716
June 25, 1971	Women's Bail Fund for $3,500.00	Patricia Reiner 4th N.W. National Minneapolis, Minnesota

This information is not to be made public except in a usual proceeding following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. Frank V. Scuderi, Assistant Secretary, Manufacturers Hanover Trust Company, 253-15 Union Turnpike, Floral Park, NY.

The source no longer has custody of the basic documents from which the check information was obtained.

The fourth source advised on January 5, 1971 that Jonathan W. Lubell, William H. Schaap, Stephen L. Fine, Neal L. Gantcher and David G. Lubell are all members of Lubell, Lubell, Fine and Schaap Law Firm.

A fifth confidential source advised on February 25, 1970, that as of July, 1968, William Schaap, an attorney for Lubell, Lubell, Fine and Schaap, was a member of the Board of Directors of the National Lawyers Guild (NLG).

DC

The fifth source advised on February 25, 1970, William Schaap, Neal Gantcher and Stephen Fine had reservations to attend the NLG, 31st National Convention, February 20-23, 1970 in Washington, D.C.

On April 17, 1969, a sixth confidential source advised that as of May, 1969, Jonathan Lubell was President of the New York City Chapter of the NLG.

NLG

NLG is a communist front organization of lawyers and law students dedicated to Communist Party, USA and New Left ideals for radical change of the social, economic and judicial systems in the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

Women's Bail Fund

On January 6, 1972, the first source made available a one page leaflet distributed through the mails by the Women's Bail Fund and dated December, 1971. The leaflet is a request for funds for the Bail Fund with the notation that donations are tax exempt. The leaflet, in part says, "The Women's Bail Fund is one arm of the growing nationwide prison solidarity movement. During the past year we raised bail to release over 120 women who have been imprisoned while awaiting trial....."

On January 23, 1972, a seventh confidential source advised that Post Office Box 637, Cooper Station, NY, NY, is subscribed to by the Women's House of Detention Bail Fund and rented by Mary C. Pinotti, 86 East 3rd Street, NY, NY (Telephone 777-5823.)

The third source advised on February 10, 1972 the Women's Bail Fund is trying to obtain a grant from the NY People's Life Fund (PLF), however, they have been advised by the PLF that they may receive a loan rather than an outright grant. The source advised the Fund participated in a demonstration a month ago at the New York City Correctional Institution at Riker's Island, NY, however, said its activities seem to be limited. The source advised that two principal activists of the Women's Bail Fund are Amy Lowenstein and Gerry Tosca.

[illegible]

The NY PLF is a fund set up by the War Tax Resistance (WTR) to grant loans or funds to local groups in the NY area.

MEMBER OF SUBJECT ORGANIZATION

The WTR is a national organization which encourages the non-payment of federal taxes as a protest to the war in Indochina.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI   DATE: 4/28/72

FROM : SAC, ALBANY (100-22702) (RUC)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS-NEW LEFT

(OO: NEW YORK)

Re New York airtel to the Bureau dated 3/14/72.

On 4/19/72, a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that no certificate of incorporation located in either the active file or the file records regarding any bail fund.

On 4/19/72, a second confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that captioned organization has not filed with the State of New York to solicit charitable funds.

The second confidential source further advised that the captioned organization may fall within those certain persons who are exempted under New York State Law, Article 10-A, Solicitation and Collection of Funds for Charitable Purposes, Section 482-A. The second confidential source stated that in most instances charitable organizations are exempted under the exemption provision not requiring filing with the State of New York to solicit charitable funds whenever gross contributions during a fiscal year are not in excess of $1,000.

Z

2-Bureau (RM)
2-New York (100-172487) (RM)
1-Albany
GLS:mmq
(5)

REC-71

EX-112

-2

7 MAY 3 1972

NEW LEFT

3

55 JUN 2 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

AL 100-22702

NONSYMBOL SOURCE

ADMINISTRATIVE PAGE.

First confidential source mentioned in letter is JOSEPH GLALI, New York State Department of State, Division of Corporation, Albany, New York.

Second confidential source mentioned in letter is ROBERT J. COZZENS, Accountant, State of New York Department of Social Services, Charter Registration Section, Albany, New York.

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 8/28/72

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, NEW YORK (100-172487)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS - REVACT
(OO:NY)

Enclosed for the Bureau are ten copies of an LHM regarding the Women's Bail Fund.

LHM is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as information received from sources of continuing value, if disclosed could impair their future effectiveness and therefore be prejudicial to the national defense interests. Indices of the NYO are negative concerning individuals mentioned in the LHM as being members of the Women's Bail Fund with the exception of AMY LOBENSTINE.

New York Office files reflect AMY LOBENSTINE is a member of the Women's Liberation Movement and, in 1969, was a member of the "People Against Racism", an umbrella-type organization financed by church groups working exclusively in White communities in opposition to the supremacy of White culture. LOBENSTINE is the wife of FARNSWORTH ELLIOT LOBENSTINE, subject of case captioned, "FARNSWORTH ELLIOT LOBENSTINE; SM - REVACT (VB)," (New York file 100-165762, Bureau file 100-459419).

2 - Bureau (Encls.10) (RM)
1 - New York (105-108560) (AMY LOBENSTINE)
1 - New York
AJO:lab
(5)

SI-106

DEC 16

100 - 4[illegible] - 3

10 AUG 30 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

70 SEP 21 1972

Approved: ______________________ Sent ________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

Sources utilized in this LHM are as follows:

First source
NY-11370-S

Second Source
Unknown to New York Office; contained in files
of Minneapolis

Third source
Vice-President MILTON L. SNYDER
Security Office
First National Bank
Minneapolis, Minnesota

Fourth source
NY 11558-S

Fifth source
NY 1107-S

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Inasmuch as the Women's Bail Fund has had several contacts with Weatherman subjects, New York will continue efforts to determine activities and structure of the Fund.

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
August 28, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Women's Bail Fund

A first confidential source advised that Beverly Sterner, Channel 13 News, 304 West 58th Street, New York, New York, is affiliated with the Women's Bail Fund (WBF).

An article appeared in the March, 1972 issue of the "Liberated Guardian", captioned "Women's Bail Fund; Organizing Our Anger", written by five unidentified members of the Women's Bail Fund Collective.

The article relates "The Women's Bail Fund is a group of about 35 women in New York City that bails women out of jail (150 so far). They have been organized for over a year and a half and did their first bailout on December 20, 1970. They have been active in supporting other groups involved in the prison struggle. They do legal follow-up for bailed-out sisters who want it and have been talking with people about the prison struggle, why jails exist, who the real enemies are, etcetera."

The article is introduced by the following statement:

"For this article we wanted to talk about ourselves. So five of us volunteered to collect different thoughts from as many women as possible in our group and then pooled these reflections in this article, using the words from their raps."

The article, being reflections of the various members of the group, is a series of quotes by unidentified members concerning the WBF.

CONFIDENTIAL
GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

100 - 4 [illegible] 3

Women's Bail Fund

The following are reflections of some WBF members carried under the subcaption "Our Roots - Why We Started - Why We Joined".

"There was a woman in my consciousness-raising group who was in the bail fund when it was first getting started and she talked with others about it. To some of us it was a very exciting idea. To others it was frightening - connecting to political activity as women. Ultimately it ended in a split of my small group on whether we should carry our newly raised consciousness to any sort of feminist political action or not.

"In the past, I was politically frustrated because I was only involved in one-shot actions. I saw what was happening in terms of how this system functions to oppress black people and that resulted in a lot of pain for me. I felt I had to reflect my stands in a day-to-day struggle. I had the sense that the women in the WBF were also aware of that need.

"When sisters want us to, we go to court with them. When I go to court I find that it can do bad things to my head. I make judgements like this jude is better than another one, but it's all shit. All judges are pigs. Or like feeling good that a sister got six months instead of five years when she shouldn't have gotten anything at all.

"I was in the House of Detention when there was the bail fund demonstration on December 20, 1970. The whole tier was so excited. When someone saw the first people she let out a scream and everyone rushed to the windows. As the chanting increased outside we started to sing and chant. They locked us in our cells so each person would be isolated and intimidated about chanting. But all the women kept it up. Everyone inside said the feeling about this demonstration was different than other demonstrations. There had been more contact. The women saw Afeni and Joan and another woman that they had known inside outside in the demonstration. That was real important.

"A lot of it was the bail fund. The bail fund banner with the address made it real that people were serious about supporting people inside. It wasn't going to be a one-shot deal.

Women's Bail Fund

The following are reflections carried under the sub-caption "Questions We Are Facing Right Now".

"There's a real dialectic between reform and revolution. So much of what we do is short-term support stuff that can be seen as reformist. When prisoners raise these demands it's understood to be revolutionary; when people on the outside raise them, they are felt to be reformist. I have done a whole lot of courtroom work, both in the bail fund and before too. In fact, the whole social work thing is what I come out of, which is why it is so hard for me to deal with all this ('cause I obviously reflect a lot of that work). Social work when it started back in the late 1800's and early 1900's came out of real radical circles, the radicals and feminists and such. And when you read MAO, he talks about service to the people as a revolutionary thing. But for us it feels weird because it has been co-opted. I think that the movement now, trying to recoup the revolutionary aspects, that original sense of service to the people, trying to help people survive.

"One of the ways to really keep ourselves out of the rut of being social workers is to engage in more political education among ourselves and to ask other groups how they've dealt with this question. Also we should be more involved in educating other people.

"We should be doing more for women inside. We need to really work on facilitating communications between the sisters inside the jail. Women prisoners have been slower to get organized but I'm sure this is because there is so much isolation in the women's jail. Concretely, we need to write more letters to find out what is going on, send literature, but also tell the women about each other, about what other women are thinking and feeling. This would stop the sense of isolation and increase the sense of solidarity.

"I think much of the movement is guilty of ultra-leftism. In China the Communists worked on a lot of things that were a lot less than what they ultimately wanted. We're too afraid of being contaminated by being involved in reform movements. We too often define our enemies too broadly and our allies too narrowly.

Women's Bail Fund

"I've been real impressed with what women in the group are willing to commit themselves to do and that they fulfill those commitments. And that atmosphere of responsibility affects new members too. This is real important. It helps me through the rough times and all the ideological hassles and struggles we go through. You really have a sense that everyone really wants to work things through, search for solutions, wants to hold together because we feel responsible for the work. Even the way people ask for leaves of absence when they are sick or too busy, that they feel they want to explain why they have to stop doing work for a while, shows people's commitment and responsibility."

> The "Liberated Guardian" was created in April, 1970, through active and violent dissent against the politics and policies of the "Guardian". Its major aims were to produce a "more revolutionary" paper, to operate collectively within it and to maintain by design a loose political position.
>
> The "Guardian" is self-described as an "independent radical newsweekly" which takes a strong left position but is not identified with any organized group. It is considered to be the largest radical weekly in America.

A second confidential source advised an account for the WBF was opened on July 6, 1971, for $3,500. The account was closed ten days later on July 16, 1971. This account was opened by Patricia Reiner of 2451 Aldrich Avenue South, Minneapolis. Reiner, on August 30, 1971, submitted a forwarding address of 855 South Cedar Lane, Valparaiso, Indiana 46383.

A third confidential source advised the WBF set aside money for Constance Trimble at the First National Bank, Minneapolis, Minnesota. The source advised two accounts were opened for the WBF on behalf of Trimble. One account was a savings account in the amount of $2,000; the other was a checking account in the amount of $2,800. The trustees for these accounts were listed as Neil B. Dietrich or Catherine Collins.

Women's Bail Fund

> Constance Trimble was tried and found not guilty on a charge of first degree murder for making a telephone call which lured a St. Paul, Minnesota police officer to an ambush slaying which occurred in 1970.

On April 5, 1972, and April 8, 1972, a fourth confidential source advised Jennifer Dohrn and Judith Clark were in contact with various members of the WBF on these two days.

> Judith Ann Clark is a member of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) - Weatherman faction and was underground in 1970 prior to her arrest on December 17, 1970 by Special Agents (SAS) of the FBI New York City, as a result of an outstanding arrest wanted for unlawful flight to avoid prosecution - mob action. Clark was indicted by a Federal Grand Jury at Chicago, Illinois in April, 1970, prior to her arrest. She was sentenced to three years, for which she spent nine months in the Cook County Jail, Chicago, Illinois, and was released in July, 1971, to serve the remaining time on probation in New York City.
>
> Jennifer Ellen Dohrn is the sister of FBI Top Ten Fugitive Bernadine Rae Dohrn. Both sisters are alleged members of the SDS - Weatherman faction.
>
> SDS was founded during June, 1962, at Port Huron, Michigan, and in the 1960's functioned as the leading New Left campus-based student organization in the United States. From a stance of "participatory democracy," the SDS moved to a radical-revolutionary position. It maintained a national office at 1608 West Madison Street,

Chicago, Illinois, until February, 1970. Internal factionalism during 1969 produced three main factions: Weatherman, Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), and Worker Student Alliance (WSA). The Weatherman and RYM no longer consider themselves associated with the SDS. The WSA faction continues to use the name SDS.

On April 14, 1972, a fifth confidential source advised that Judith Clark was in touch on April 3, 1972, with a Beth Last Name Unknown (LNU), at 466 East 48th Street, Brooklyn, New York, concerning the WBF.

The source advised that Clark, on November 5, 1972, was in touch with an unknown female and discussed the Wednesday night meeting of the WBF. Clark discussed the fact that Jeannie LNU, Estelle LNU and Laurie LNU would be at the meeting at 5:30 PM, that evening at Clark's residence. The source related that Sara LNU and Naomi LNU, both from the Defense Bail Fund, were also expected at the meeting. Clark discussed the fact that the WBF has no common politics and no common political direction at this point and the WBF could become a defense committee, not because it would be desireable, but because of a lack of any other direction.

The source advised that on the same day, Clark was in touch with Amy Lobenstine from the WBF at telephone number 663-1136, and both agreed to attend an education meeting of the Fund.

The fifth confidential source further related that Clark was in contact, on April 8, 1972, with a Marilyn Dalismer, 254-4498, and a Shelley Lawrence, 663-1136. Both were identified by the source as being associated with the WBF.

On April 21, 1972, the fifth confidential source advised Clark and Dohrn went to the residence of Marilyn Dalsimer, 110 Bleecker Street, Apartment 7D, New York City, telephone number 254-4498 on that day. Dalsimer was identified as a member of the WBF.

11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New York, New York
August 28, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title Women's Bail Fund

Character Internal Security - Revolutionary Activities

Reference is made to New York memorandum, dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 11/30/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-172487) (C)

SUBJECT: WOMEN'S BAIL FUND
IS - REVACT
(OO:NY)

Re New York airtel and LHM, 8/28/72, and captioned as above.

On 11/28/72, NY 7615-S advised the Women's Bail Fund (WBF) is not a leading element and lacks any influence in the movement in New York City.

A review of the subject file discloses there is no structure to the WBF and that it is a coalition of women who belong to various groups in the New York City area, whose main purpose is to raise funds for selected women in jail.

It is noted that Weatherman subjects have contacted those involved in the bail fund. However, have decryed the lack of political direction of the WBF and would like to turn it into a defense committee because of a lack of any other direction. There is no indication that this has occurred, and the bail fund still remains a loose coalition of like-minded individuals from various groups seeking to raise funds for various purposes. Because of its lack of common political direction, it has had no influence and presently is ineffective in the movement.

In view of the above, the NYO is discontinuing investigation in this matter to be reopened upon receipt of pertinent information from sources that the bail fund is being redirected as a structured group for a common political and ideological purpose.

ST-113
REC- 70

2 - Bureau (RM)
1 - New York

23 DEC 4 1972

AJO:jss
(3)

Rev. Acct. Sect.

59 DEC 12 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

FURIES

10/15/75 BSC

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 5/31/72

FD217WFO
8/17/72
jw

FROM :SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

(RED COPIES)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Womens Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO:WFO)

ReWFOlet to Atlanta 2/15/72; WFOlet to Jacksonville 3/14/72; WFOlet to Cincinnati 3/22/72; Jacksonville let to Tampa 3/31/72; Tampa let to WFO 4/7/72; Denver airtel to WFO 4/13/72; and Springfield let to WFO 4/18/72.

For information of the Bureau and all receiving offices of instant publication, which is described in its subscription advertisement as "a new lesbian-feminist newspaper for 'every woman who has ever been raped, physically, economically, or psychologically. We take the name FURIES, Goddesses of Vengeance and protectors of women as we want to build a movement in this country and in the world which can effectively stop the violent, sick, oppressive acts of male supremacy.'"

2- Bureau
2- Atlanta
2- Cincinnati
2- Denver (100-10985)
2- Jacksonville (100-2062)
2- Springfield (100-13456)
2- Tampa
15-WFO
    (1-100-55290) (FURIES)
    (1-100-50659) (SUSAN BAKER)
    (1-100-53703) (GINNY BERSON)
    (1-100-55495) (JOAN BERSON)
    (1-100-55499) (RITA MAE BROWN)
    (1-105-93016) (CHARLOTTE BUNCH)
    (1-100-55501) (SHARON DEEVY)
    (1-100-55494) (HELAINE HARRIS)
    (1-100-48805) (SUSAN HATHAWAY)
    (1-100-55500) (NANCY MYRON)
    (1-100-51967) (TASHA PETERSON)
    (1-100-55497) (COLETTA REID)
    (1-100-55498) (LEE SCHWING)
    (1-100-55509) (ANN SILVER)
    (1-100-55493) (JENNIFER WOOLUL)

REC 43

100 - 472144 - X
197

16 JUN 1 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

JUN 14 1972
(29)

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

"The paper includes letters, articles, fiction, poetry, news, and graphics, as well as information about various literatures for women."

WFO is currently conducting investigation of captioned publication, located at 219 11th St., S.E., WDC, in an effort to develop information pertaining to the following:

1. General nature of the publication
2. Location of publishing and printing facilities
3. Circulation
4. Sources of funds
5. Identities of leading activists
6. Connection with any revolutionary activity oriented organization
7. Propensity for violence of individuals who associate with this group
8. Whether individuals reside in a communal type existence
9. Extent of any foreign or domestic subversion.

To date, there have been 3 issues of "The Furies" published. The initial issue of captioned publication indicated that "this paper is printed by the Sojourner Truth Press Collective, in Altanta, Georgia." This issue also indicated that the mailing address for the publication is P.O. Box 8843, S.E. Station, WDC 20003. It is to be noted that this S.E. Station handles the address 219 11th St., S.E., WDC.

On 1/4/72, [redacted] advised that captioned publication espouses the cause of radical lesbianism and aligns itself politically with the views of the New Left.

On 3/20/72 [redacted] advised that the "Furies" is a gay newspaper for women in which the political line is the fight against racism and repression. Source advised that the members of the "Furies" believe that if you do not follow these general programs you are not a feminist.

A review of the initial issue of captioned publication indicates the following staff members.

SUSAN BAKER
GINNY BERSON
JOAN BYRON

WFO 100-55290

RITA MAE BROWN
CHARLOTTE BUNCH
SHARON DEEVY
HELAINE HARRIS
SUSAN HATHAWAY
NANCY MYRON
TASHA PETERSON
COLETTA REID
LEE SCHWING
ANN SILVER
JENNIFER WOOLUL

WFO is conducting individual investigations regarding the staff members to determine if their activities would warrant their inclusion on the ADEX.

For information of the Bureau, WF 4562-E (GHETTO), who is in a position to furnish limited information regarding the residents of 219 11th St., S.E., has furnished information on numerous occasions regarding vehicles which have been parked in front of or near the "Furies" residence. Source has observed occupants of these vehicles enter the residence at 219 11th St., S.E. Leads have been set out in referenced communications regarding these vehicles for identification.

On 4/10/72, WF 4562-E advised that several months ago, when several girls moved into the residence at 219 11th St., S.E., WDC, they were observed carrying what appeared to be a printing press into the basement of the apartment.

Source advises that several females frequent the house and one of the girls has a baby. The same source advised that most of the girls who frequent the address have extremely short hair and always wear slacks.

For information of the Bureau a review of the three existing issues of the newspaper indicates that most of the articles concern the problems that lesbians face, where they can go socially, and how to be strong and independent as a lesbian. The newspaper contains very few advertisements, but all of the ads refer to lesbians.

WFO is in receipt of only one copy each of the three issues; however, through established sources, WFO will obtain a copy of the next publication for the Bureau's perusal.

A review of WFO files indicates that SUSAN HATHAWAY and NATASHA BYRD, staff members of the above captioned publication, have known and associated with a few of the Weathermen fugitives. SUSAN HATHAWAY was on the defense for the Chicago Seven.

LEADS

All receiving offices are requested to review office indices re all staff members of captioned publication.

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

Will continue investigation in an effort to answer above listed questions and make a recommendation for further investigation.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 6/20/72

FROM : SAC, JACKSONVILLE (100-2062)(RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Women's Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(00: WFO)

Re WFO let to Acting Director, 5/31/72.

For the information of the Bureau and WFO, Jacksonville indices are negative regarding staff members mentioned in referenced letter.

97

EX. PROC.

31

2 - Bureau
2 - WFO (100-55290)
1 - Jacksonville
AJW:jcb
(5)

REC-30

JUN 23 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

54 JUL 13 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 6/22/72

FROM : SAC, CINCINNATI (100-20519) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Womens Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(00: WFO)

4

Re WFO letter to Cincinnati dated 3/22/72, and WFO letter to the Bureau dated 5/31/72.

For information, referenced WFO letter to Cincinnati dated 3/22/72, requested registration check on three 1971 Ohio license plates and it should be noted that in the last paragraph the license plate number is listed as J3862 and that the lead reads JE862.

The following investigation was conducted by SC W. JAMES GRETZ at Columbus, Ohio:

Bureau of Motor Vehicles

On 4/4/72, Mrs. JEAN SMEDLEY, Record Clerk, License Plate Index, advised the following information with regard to the listed 71 plates:

1971 Ohio license plate W5487 was issued to JANET L. BUCHANAN, 2254 Lucile Drive, Lancaster, Ohio, on a 1965 Volkswagen bearing VIN 115144097.

1971 Ohio license plate T4612 is registered to HOWARD D. MC ARTOR, Rural Route 2, Granville, Ohio, on a 1967 VW bearing VIN 117288826.

4

S

MCT-37

REC- 36

100-472144-1

(12)

2-Bureau (RM)
2-WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1-Cincinnati

RMM:cm
(5)

14 JUN 28 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

JUL 10 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-02

1971 Ohio license plate J3862 is registered to the Colonial Stores, Incorporated, 1033 Brentnell Avenue, Columbus, Ohio, on a 1969 Chevrolet Station Wagon bearing VIN 131359K376355.

1971 Ohio license plate JE862 is registered to JAMES LLOYD WEEKS, 1751 Bryn Mawr Road, East Cleveland, Ohio, on a 1963 American Motors Sedan bearing VIN B563937.

The following investigation was conducted by SA ROBERT M. MC DANIEL at Cincinnati, Ohio:

A review of Cincinnati indices reveal negative information in regard to JANET L. BUCHANAN, 2254 Lucile Drive, Lancaster, Ohio, and HOWARD D. MC ARTOR, Rural Route 2, Granville, Ohio. Cincinnati indices reveal that JAMES LLOYD WEEKS was referenced in Cincinnati file 100-19515, which file indicated that on 1/8/71, a white Rambler American bearing current Ohio license EH2853 was observed at a commune located at 2900 18th Street, Northwest, Washington. It was a commune known as Women's Liberation Commune and considered to be frequented by Weatherwomen. Cincinnati file 100-19515 reveal that a copy of Cincinnati letter was forwarded to WFO file 100-52724 which contains a letter giving background information regarding JAMES LLOYD WEEKS.

LEADS:

WFO

AT WASHINGTON, D. C.

Will review WFO file 100-52724 in an effort to develop further background information regarding JAMES LLOYD WEEKS.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/6/72

FROM : SAC, SPRINGFIELD (100-13456) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Women's Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
OO: WFO

Re WFO letter 5/31/72, a copy of which is enclosed for Chicago.

Springfield indices disclosed a main case file for one SUSAN HATHAWAY, date of birth 9/13/41. Chicago was office of origin, Chicago file 100-47141. Springfield reviewed Motor Vehicle files in attempt to locate HATHAWAY for Chicago.

The other names listed in referenced letter were not identifiable in Springfield indices.

Chicago should advise WFO as to any information in file pertaining to HATHAWAY.

EX-114

REC-15

-2

18

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
2 - Chicago (Encl. 1) (RM)
1 - Springfield (100-13456)

RCR/lsb
(7)

JUL 10 1972
Rev. Act. Sect.

58 JUL 10 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 7/25/72

FROM : SAC, DENVER (100-10985) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - RA
OO: WFO

Reference Washington Field Office letter to the Bureau 5/31/72.

A review of the Denver indices revealed the following individuals had files pertaining to them:

RITA MAE BROWN
LEE SCHWING

The following information was furnished to Denver (31-4480) from the Sacramento Police Department in a letter dated 10/26/70:

RITA MAE BROWN, Born 9/24/47, at Pine Ridge, South Dakota, 5' tall, 100 pounds, dark brown hair, brown eyes, listed to be Sioux Indian and part Negro, was arrested in Sacramento, California, by the Sacramento PD on 6/19/70, at 1910 5th Street, Apartment 9, engaged in an act of prostitution for which she received $10.00. She was fined $125.00 or ten days in the County Jail. Jail sentence suspended for three years. BROWN's former address is listed as 940 Hays Street, San Francisco, California.

Me

FBI Identification Number 379078F reflects BROWN was arrested by the Denver PD, Denver, Colorado, on 9/2/65, 9/28/65, and 10/12/66, for investigation of prostitution. FBI Identification Record further indicates that BROWN was also arrested on 9/28/68, Denver, Colorado, for investigation of prostitution and on 6/27/70, by the Sacramento, California, PD for investigation of prostitution. 100-472144-5

REC-53 ~~100-4[illegible]~~ -202

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Washington Field (RM) (100-55290)
1 - Denver
FEP:cjg
(5)

12 JUL 28 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

AUG 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

In a letter from Denver to Sacramento dated 12/7/70, status RUC, indicated local sources within the Denver Division have been contacted and advised that to their knowledge, BROWN was not currently working in the Denver area nor do they know for whom BROWN was working for in 1966./

Indices check regarding LEE SCHWING, (DN 100-10967), reflects in a letter to WFO file 100-55498 (C), dated 4/3/72, that SCHWING's driver's license and photograph on license was supplied to WFO on the above date. No further information contained in Denver file regarding SCHWING.

Denver indices negative regarding remainder of staff members of captioned publication.

Denver Division considers this case RUC.

Colo-

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/31/72

FROM : SAC, TAMPA (100-3125)(RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" Newspaper
Womens Liberation Movement Publication
Washington, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO:WFO)

WFO letter to the Bureau, 5/31/72.

Tampa indices negative re all names, except that of SUSAN HATHAWAY, which name was indexed on page 20 of WFO LHM dated 3/17/71, captioned "DEMONSTRATIONS SPONSORED BY PEOPLE'S COALITION FOR PEACE AND JUSTICE AT WASHINGTON, D.C., MAY, 1971."

13

EX-104

4

REC-49

10 AUG 3 1972

10

2 - Bureau
2 - WFO (100-55290)
1 - Tampa

RJH/rjh
(5)

Rec'd Act. Sect.

54 AUG 14 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 7/31/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
(OO:WFO)

Re WFOletter to the Bureau, 5/31/72; Jacksonville letter to the Bureau, 6/20/72; Springfield letter to the Bureau, 7/6/72; and Atlanta letter to WFO, 7/20/72.

For information of all receiving offices, a review of WFO files indicate that two of the staff members of captioned publication, SUSAN HATHAWAY and NATASHA BYRD have known and associated with a few of the Weatherman fugitives. Also, the subscriber to the telephone at the "Furies" address, 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.(WDC), is NANCY MYRON. MYRON is employed by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS), a self-described "New Left Think Tank."

2 - Bureau
2 - Albuquerque (Enc. 1)
2 - Atlanta (100-9284)(Enc. 1)
2 - Baltimore (Enc. 1)
2 - Boston (Enc. 1)
2 - Charlotte (Enc. 1)
2 - Chicago (Enc. 1)
2 - Houston (Enc. 1)
2 - Miami (Enc. 1)
2 - Newark(Enc. 1)
2 - New Haven (Enc. 1)
2 - New York (Enc. 1)
2 - Philadelphia (Enc. 1)
5 - WFO
(1 -[illegible]65) (Info)
(1 -100-55500)(MYRON)
(1 -100-55497)(REID)
(1 -100-55498)(SCHWING)
DPH:tab
(13)

54 AUG 14 1972

REC-63

100-472144-5X2

3 AUG 1 1972

~~205~~

Rev. Act. Sect.

IPS

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

For these reasons, the toll records for the "Furies" telephone 202-544-7613, were obtained from the last five month period.

On 7/13/72, ~~Miss JEWEL JOHNSON (Protect by Request)~~, 1117 Anacostia Road, S. E., WDC employed at Civil Aeronautics Board, 1825 Connecticut Avenue, N. W., WDC, advised SA DENNIS PHILLIP HYTEN that ~~she is the owner of the row house at 219 11th Street, S. E., WDC.~~ ~~She stated~~ that three women, SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSANXSCHWING and COLETTA REID originally rented the house. She stated she has no background information on any of the women and is not aware of anyone else residing at the residence. She has received no complaints about the residents from the neighbors. Miss JOHNSON added she would help the FBI in any way possible.

Atlanta advised as follows in referenced letter:

The 5/29/72, issue of "The Great Speckled Bird", an underground newspaper with general distributions in the Atlanta, Ga., area, carried the following notice:

> "On application of Sally Gabb, MariannaXKaufman and Nancy Jones, all of 432 Moreland Ave., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia, articles of incorporation have been granted the Sojourner Truth Press, Inc. by the Honorable Jeptha Tanksley, Judge of the Superior Court of Fulton County, in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Georgia Business Corporation Code. The registered of the corporation is located at 432 Moreland Ave., N.E., Atlanta, Georgia and it's registered agent is Sally Gabb. The purpose of the corporation is printing and dissemination of information. The minimum capital with which the corporation shall commence business is $500.00."

On 5/18/72, a source in the position to know, advised that the following individuals were connected with the Sojourner Truth Press:

SALLY GABB
1190 Mansfield Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

NANCY JONES
348 Mell Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

JENNIE HAMILTON
193 Elizabeth Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

ALEXANDER JOYCE
348 Mell Ave., N.E.
Atlanta Ga

On 7/7/72, JK 405-S advised that the Sojourner Truth Press was a printing press for hire, which prints mostly New Left material for New Left organizations, yet espouses no opinions of its own. As long as their fee is met, they print what is desired (papers, pamphlets, flyers, etc.)

All those individuals mentioned above are, individually, subjects of security investigations in Atlanta.

Enclosed for each receiving office except the Bureau are the toll records from this residence for the last five months. Receiving offices are requested to review the tolls, identify subscribers to the phone numbers within their respective division and conduct criminal checks, source checks, and indices checks regarding each subscriber.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/6/72

FROM : SAC, BOSTON (100-44951) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
(OO: WFO)

ReWFOlet to Bureau dated 7/31/72. per 5X2

On 8/14/72, personnel of the Secretary's Office, New England Telephone Co., 185 Franklin St., Boston, Mass., provided the following information concerning the below-listed telephone numbers:

617-734-2337 - EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER, 360 Longwood Ave., Roxbury, Mass.;

& APPROX.

617-665-2847 - CHARLES WELCH, 45 Tappan St., Melrose, Mass.;

617-665-2847 - WENDY SOBEL, 18 Belmont St., Somerville, Mass.

A search of the indices of the Boston office failed to disclose any information identifiable with CHARLES WELCH or WENDY SOBEL.

Boston indices reflected the following information concerning EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER, the son of DAVID DELLINGER:

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
2 - Boston
1 - (100-38735)
PPG/dab
(6)

ST-111

REC 43

6

12 SEP 11 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

C OCT 16 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Boston file 100-38735 entitled "EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER, aka PATCH DELLINGER; SM - ANARCHIST (BUFILE 100-450988)" reflected that DELLINGER was subject of Boston investigation based on his participation in a "Teach-In" and Rededication Service on 1/29/68 at the Arlington St. Church, Boston. During the above activity, DELLINGER made a statement in support of the "Resistance Group" and turned in what was reported to be Selective Service cards.

The primary function of the Resistance Group was to aid, abet, and counsel young men faced with the draft.

EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER graduated from Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pa., on 6/6/66 majoring in economics. He was arrested at Chester, Pa. on 4/1/64 and was charged with disorderly conduct.

The 1968-69 Harvard University Directory of Officers and Students reflected that DELLINGER was enrolled in the School of Medicine, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.

It had been reported that PATCH DELLINGER was present at a Socialist Workers Party (SWP) Street Meeting in New York City on 7/21/64.

The file further disclosed that inasmuch as the Boston office had no current information associating DELLINGER with the SWP or the Young Socialist Alliance and that his activities on behalf of the New England Resistance were pacifist in nature, it was felt that DELLINGER did not warrant inclusion on the Security or Agitator Indexes maintained at that time; and thus, the case was placed in a closed status.

A review of Boston file 25-25585 (Bufile 25-569484) reflected that DELLINGER was also subject of investigation based on his participation in the previously mentioned Rededication Services at the Arlington St. Church in Boston on 1/29/68 at which 23 individuals turned in either a Notice of Classification and/or a Registration Certificate. Two other individuals turned in some other type of document. It was determined that DELLINGER had turned in a Selective Service Registration Certificate and two Notices of Classification issued by LB #28, Flemington, New Jersey. Also, a two-page statement signed PATCHEN DELLINGER supporting the Resistance movement was turned in.

In April, 1972, AUSA, Boston declined any prosecution concerning DELLINGER.

On 8/21/72, personnel of the Office of the Mass. Commissioner of Probation, Suffolk County Courthouse, Boston, a central repository for all traffic and criminal conviction records within the Commonwealth of Mass., advised that their files contain no record identifiable with CHARLES WELCH, WENDY SOBEL, or EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER.

A review of the 1972 Police Listings for the cities of Melrose and Boston revealed the following information:

Name	Address	Occupation	Age
CHARLES A. WELCH	45 Tappan St., Melrose	Retired	66
EVAN PATCHEN DELLINGER	360 Longwood Ave., Roxbury	Physician	28

The 1971 Police Listing for the city of Somerville failed to reflect any information concerning WENDY SOBEL as residing at 18 Belmont St. in Somerville.

Sources familiar with Communist Party and Revolutionary Activities in the Boston area were contacted during August and Sept., 1972 and knew of no activity on the part of any of the aforementioned telephone subscribers. Sources are as follows:

Date	Source	Contacting Agent
8/31/72	1271-S	LEO E. BRUNNICK
8/31/72	1338-PSI	LEO E. BRUNNICK
9/1/72	1370-PSI	LAWRENCE GILLIGAN
8/18/72	1307-PSI	LAWRENCE GILLIGAN
9/1/72	1311-S	ROBERT J. MC CAFFERY
8/31/72	1877-S	RALPH D. GAULT
8/31/72	808-S	ARTHUR V. SULLIVAN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 9/22/72

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-54463)(P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMAN'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
OO:WFO

Re WFO letter to Bureau dated 7/31/72.

On 9/6/72, ~~Mr. DONALD V. POWELL~~ advised that phone number 215-691-0132 was installed 5/10/71 and is subscribed to by EDWARD G. FERTALTAL, III, 730 Center Street, Bethlehem, Pa.

The above information is confidential and should not be made public without the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to Mr. DONALD V. POWELL, 12th Floor, Bell Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, 1 Parkway, Philadelphia, Pa.

Philadelphia indices are negative re EDWARD G. FERTALTAL, III.

LEAD

PHILADELPHIA
AT BETHLEHEM, PA.

Will conduct credit and criminal checks re EDWARD G. FERTALTAL, III, 730 Center St., Bethlehem, Pa.

REC-65
EX-116

SEP 1972

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290)(RM)
2 - Philadelphia (100-54463)

EAB:kpb
(6)

56 OCT 20 1972
320

Rev Act Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 8/21/72

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-52994) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
OO: WFO

Re Springfield letter to Bureau dated 7/6/72 and WFO letter to Bureau dated 7/31/72.

Springfield by letter dated 7/6/72 requested that Chicago furnish to Washington Field pertinent information concerning SUSAN HATHAWAY as it appears in Chicago files.

Pertinent information concerning HATHAWAY was furnished to Washington Field by letters dated 1/18/71 and 1/24/72 captioned "SUSAN HATHAWAY, SM-NEW LEFT (EXTREMIST)" WFO file 100-48808.

By letter dated 7/31/72 Washington Field furnished the toll call records for the "Furies" telephone 202 544-7613. The following numbers within the Chicago Division appeared in these toll records:

312 528-2475

Public records of the Illinois Bell Telephone Company (IBTC) disclose this number is listed to JUDSON H. MINER, 632 West Oakdale, Chicago. Another listing is shown for JUDSON H. MINER, lawyer, 22 East Huron, Chicago, telephone #751-1170. This latter number apparently is MINER's business office.

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Wahington Field (100-55290)(RM)
2- Chicago

PLT:meb
(6)

EX-101

REC-63

100-472144-7X

21 AUG 23 1972

SEP 7 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

The "Chicago Sun Times," a daily newspaper in its issue of 11/11/71, described JUDSON H. MINER as president of the Chicago Council of Lawyers (CCL), "a reform-oriented group of 1,300 attorneys."

The "Chicago Sun Times" of 10/23/70 stated that most members of the CCL are youthful lawyers and the CCL was organized in June, 1969, to work for reform of the legal profession and the general community. This article described JUDSON H. MINER as a Legal Aid Bureau attorney and head of the CCL.

The files of the Chicago Office contain no information of a subversive nature concerning MINER.

On 8/11/72 SC JEROME J. COX reviewed the records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago PD, and located no record for JUDSON H. MINER.

312 566-4622

On 8/11/72 SC RICHARD HAHN determined through records of the IBTC that 312 566-4622, an unpublished number, is listed to OLIE LYALL/RYAN, 2001 North Midlothian, Mundelein, Illinois.

A review of Chicago indices on 8/17/72 disclosed no references to OLIE LYALL RYAN.

LEADS

AT CHICAGO AND MUNDELEIN, ILLINOIS. Will check local police department files concerning OLIE LYALL RYAN, 2001 North Midlothian, Mundelein, Illinois.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/25/72

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE (100-11664) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER,
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY

(OO: WFO)

Re WFO letter to Bureau dated 7/31/72.

On 9/1/72, a well placed source advised that Blowing Rock, N. C., telephone number 295-3321, had been discontinued effective 5/23/72. This source stated the number was formerly listed to JAMES W. HATHAWAY, Laurel Lane, Blowing Rock, N. C. Also HATHAWAY was a teacher at Appalachian State University, Boone, N. C.

On 9/5/72, DOUGLAS TOWNSEND, Chief of Police, Blowing Rock, N. C., advised that JAMES HATHAWAY who resided on Laural Lane in Blowing Rock was associated with Appalachian State University in Boone as a College Professor and his wife was a former movie actress. Chief TOWNSEND stated that the HATHAWAYS have some sort of "connection" or relatives in Italy and that they had left Blowing Rock some months ago, but just recently returned and are planning on opening a restaurant in the Blowing Rock area in the future.

Chief TOWNSEND stated that he had no record of the HATHAWAYS as having been arrested for any crime in the Blowing Rock area.

On 9/14/72, a check of the Charlotte Office indices revealed no record for JAMES W. HATHAWAY, mentioned above or SUSAN HATHAWAY mentioned in referenced WFO letter.

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
2 - Charlotte

REC-34

8

BDC:mwb
(6)

10 SEP 28 1972

58 OCT 25 1972

Rev. Ac / Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

LEAD:

CHARLOTTE:

AT BLOWING ROCK, N. C.

Will determine if JAMES W. HATHAWAY's wife is SUSAN HATHAWAY, and if so, attempt to determine if identical with SUSAN HATHAWAY mentioned in referenced WFO letter.

CE 100-11664

NON SYMBOL SOURCE

The well placed source referred to is Mr. C. P. HUGHES, Office Manager, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Boone, North Carolina.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 9/29/72

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER,
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - RA
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO letter to Bureau, 7/31/72; Denver letter to Bureau, 7/25/72; Tampa letter to Bureau, 7/31/72; Chicago letter to Bureau, 8/21/72; Boston letter to Bureau, 9/6/72; Albuquerque letter to WFO, 9/11/72, and Newark letter to Bureau, 9/15/72. 100-453233-207

On 7/13/72, WF 4562-E (GHETTO), who lives next door ~~to "Furies" collective at 221 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D. C. (WDC)~~, was contacted by SA DENNIS PHILLIP HYTEN. Source advised that several young white girls continue to reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC. They appear friendly, but keep very much to themselves. On 8/23/72, this source advised SA HYTEN that apparently four or five young white girls now live at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC. Source has seen numerous different girls frequenting the residence, but is unsure exactly how many reside there.

One girl, name unknown, who resides at the residence has stated to source that she is a music teacher. Source has seen several girls on different occasions carrying what

(18)

2-Bureau
2-Atlanta (100-9284)
2-Baltimore
2-Charlotte
2-Chicago (100-52994)
2-Houston
2-Miami
3-Newark (100-55147)
2-New Haven
2-New York
2-Philadelphia
4-WFO
  (1-100-48808) (HATHAWAY)
  (1-100-55497) (REID)
  (1-100-55498) (SCHWING)
JMG:lmc
(26)

REC-7

ST-106

17 SEP 29 1972

6 OCT 23 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

appeared to be newspapers. Source states that all the girls are generally quiet and stay to themselves.

The folloiwng investigation was conducted by SA PHILLIP K. CRUMM at Carlsbad, New Mexico.

On 8/14/72, a check of the City Directory covering Carlsbad, New Mexico, revealed that telephone number 505-885-9609 is currently subscribed to RICHARD I. WOODUL, 1214 Cedar, Carlsbad, New Mexico.

On 8/14/72, criminal checks with the Carlsbad Police Department and Eddy County Sheriff's Office revealed no record in the name of RICHARD I. WOODUL.

On 8/14/72, Detective LEO ARMSTRONG, Carlsbad Police Department, advised that RICHARD I. WOODUL is a long-time resident of Carlsbad and is a local businessman there. He further advised that one of WOODUL's daughters, JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL, date of birth 11/24/48, was now a resident of Washington, D. C. (WDC).

A name check in Albuquerque indices revealed no record in the name of RICHARD I. WOODUL; however, a check of the name JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL revealed that she is the subject of a previous investigation, file 100-4154. JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL is also the subject of WFO file 100-55493.

Apparently JENNIFER ANNE WOODUL is still a resident of WDC, and is a friend of NANCY MYRON. Apparently JENNIFER WOODUL has placed telephone calls from the home of NANCY MYRON to the home of her father, RICHARD I. WOODUL, in Carlsbad, New Mexico, and he also apparently is no way involved in any of his daughter's activities in WDC.

On 9/13/72, Mrs. JEWEL JOHNSON, 1117 Anacostia Road, S.E., WDC, (protect identity), advised that SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING and COLETTA REID still rent and apparently reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC.

Mrs. JOHNSON stated that these three girls pay their rent each month by check, which is drawn on an account at the American Security and Trust Company, WDC. She said that HATHAWAY, SCHWING and REID take turns each month signing the check for the rent.

WFO 100-55290

Mrs. JOHNSON related that she recalled that when she rented the dwelling to these three girls, they made a remark that they were employed by a "research organization", name unknown, and did most of their research at the Library of Congress.

Mrs. JOHNSON stated that she has not been in the dwelling at 219 11th Street, S.E., since it was rented to these three girls. She has received no complaints concerning any of their activities and she would have no personal knowledge of their activities.

She advised that she does plan to inspect the property in the near future, as this is her custom as the owner.

On 9/14/72, WF 4805-PSI furnished the August, 1972, copy of "The Furies" newspaper.

A subsequent review of this issue, as well as all previous issues, does not reflect any radical revolutionary or anti-Government theme. All issues have been devoted to articles pertaining to lesbian/feminist interests.

Investigation is continuing in an endeavor to develop further background information regarding the "Furies" newspaper and the individuals involved with this publication.

All receiving field offices are requested to complete necessary investigation and expeditiously furnish results to Bureau and WFO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10-11-72

FROM : SAC, PHILADELPHIA (100-54463) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMAN'S LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
OO: WFO

Re Philadelphia letter to the Bureau, ser. 9 9-22-72.

On 10-2-72, Mrs. LAVERNE KLINGER, Identification Division, Bethlehem Police Department, Bethlehem, Pa., advised that a review of her files failed to reflect any record for EDWARD G. FERTAL or FERTALTAL, III.

G. Fertal

On the same date, Miss RUTH CAWLEY, Bethlehem Credit Bureau, Bethlehem, Pa., advised that her records indicate a file for EDWARD G. FERTAL and wife, CAROL, who reside at 730 Center Street, Bethlehem, Pa. The file has been open since 5-14-67 and indicates the couple were moved on 5-17-69 and have a previous address of 720 East 9th Street, Bethlehem, Pa. CAROL FERTAL's employment was listed as a 2nd Grade School Teacher at St. Simon and Jude School, Bethlehem, Pa., and that EDWARD G. FERTAL attended Pennsylvania State University and was in the U.S. Army assigned at Fort Bliss, Texas.

Philadelphia indices are negative regarding EDWARD G. FERTAL and CAROL FERTAL.

~~2~~ 18 -Bureau (RM)
2-WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1-Philadelphia (100-54463)
VJC: ams
(5)

REC-63

ST-111

-10

12 OCT 13 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

54 OCT 24 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 10/11/72

FROM : SAC, HOUSTON (100-12843) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
OO: WFO

rev 5X2

ReWFOlet to Bu, 7/31/72.

The following investigation was conducted by SA RICHARD L. SCHUHLER at Houston, Texas:

On 8/4/72, a review of Cole's 1972 City Directory for Houston, Texas revealed that telephone number 713-643-5584 is presently subscribed to DANIEL R. HARRIS, 8315 Meadville, Houston, Texas.

REC 25

On 8/4/72, a check was made of Houston indices and it revealed that a 62-0 information concerning entry for DANIEL R. HARRIS exists consisting of the following information:

On 8/4/70, Mr. and Mrs. DANIEL R. HARRIS, 8315 Meadville, Houston, Texas, visited the Houston Office of the FBI requesting assistance because their daughter, HELAINE HARRIS, had run away from home on 5/12/70. On this occasion, Mr. HARRIS advised that for the previous six or eight months his daughter had become very interested in the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the Young Womens Liberation Front, which was active at the University of Houston. He stated that his daughter became interested in the Women's Liberation movement when she attended some courses at the University of Houston and at the University of Thought which was active on the University of Houston campus. HELAINE HARRIS attended the Southern Female Liberation meeting at Edwards, Mississippi from May 8-10, 1970 and upon her return from this meeting she left home after her parents had demanded she stop participating in this type of activity. Mr. HARRIS further advised that their daughter telephonically contacted him from Albuquerque, N. M. on 7/30/70 at which time she stated

16 OCT 16 1972

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1 - Houston
RLS/sec
(5)

1cc 904 (0)

XEROX
NOV 3 1972

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

she wanted to come home but could not inasmuch as she could not get along with her parents.

On 8/6/70, Mr. HARRIS telephonically contacted the Houston Office of the FBI and advised that he had received a call on the previous evening from his daughter in Berkeley, California. She stated this was where the action is and that she was a part of it. Mr. HARRIS additionally stated that his daughter had made statements prior to her departure from home that Houston was behind in riots and that she was going to go where the action is so that she could be a part of it.

Mr. HARRIS had filled out a missing persons report with the local authorities in Houston in May, 1970 and the following information is taken from a copy of that report:

Name	HELAINE HARRIS
Race	White
Sex	Female B APPROX 1954
Age	16 years old (In May, 1970)
Address	8315 Meadville, Houston, Texas
Height	5'7"
Weight	140 lbs.
Hair	Brown naturally curly, shoulder length, usually parted in center and pulled behind ears into ponytails
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Olive
Wears gold rimmed, round glasses, cannot see without them.	
SSAN	459-98-6262

On 9/11/72, the records of the Houston PD were caused to be checked and no information could be found identifiable with DANIEL R. HARRIS (father), HELEN HARRIS (mother), or HELAINE HARRIS.

On 9/29/72, HO 1037-S and HO 1439-S advised that they have never heard of a DANIEL R. HARRIS or HELAINE HARRIS.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI   DATE: 10/24/72

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-52994) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA

4

OO: WFO

per 7X

Re Chicago letter dated 8/21/72

On September 6, 1972, Lieutenant PHIL CANCELLI, Mundelein, Illinois Police Department, advised that his records are negative regarding OLIE LYALL RYAN.

On September 15, 1972, Sergeant BERNARD LEONARD, Lake County Sheriff's Office, Waukegan, Illinois, advised his records are negative regarding RYAN.

On August 21, 1972, SC G. PACH reviewed the records of the Bureau of Records and Communications, Chicago Police Department and found no record for RYAN.

REC 43

-12

ST-103

OCT 26 1972

(2)-Bureau (RM)
2-WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1-Chicago

PLT:smg
(5)

57N 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-01

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 11/7/72

FROM : SAC, CHARLOTTE (100-11664) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER,
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
IS - REVACT

(OO: WFO)

per 8

Re Charlotte letter to Bureau, 9/25/72.

On 10/5/72, ~~BARBARA RAGAN,~~ Credit Bureau, Boone, N. C., advised that their records reveal JAMES HATHAWAY is a Professor at Appalachian State University in Boone and that his wife's name is MARY and they reside in care of General Delivery, Blowing Rock, N. C.

On 10/26/72, DOUGLAS TOWNSEND, Chief of Police, Blowing Rock, N. C., advised that both JAMES HATHAWAY and his wife are residing in Blowing Rock, N. C., and that they intend to open a restaurant in Blowing Rock sometime in the future.

ST-103

REC-5 13

21 NOV 10 1972

② - Bureau (RM)
2 - WFO (100-55290) (RM)
1 - Charlotte

BDC:dlt
(5)

Rev Act Sect. 6(0)

54 NOV 16 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 11/21/72

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-176760) (P)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
(OO:WFO)

4
G E

ReNYlet to WFO, dated 9/28/72.

NYO indices, negative regarding Liberation Publication, 339 Lafayette, NYC, PHOEBE FISHER, 5 Doyer Street, New York, NY, and THOMAS J. MYRON, 12 Livingston Street, Rhinebeck, NY.

On 9/29/72, PAULINE DE FIORE, Credit Bureau of Greater New York, NYC, advised SC ROBERT J. LIBERATORE that there was no record in her files identifiable with a Mr. PHOEBE FISHER, 5 Doyer Street, New York, NY. ~~Mrs. DE FIORE~~ also advised on the same date that there was no record in her files identifiable with THOMAS J. MYRON, 12 Livingston Street, Rhinebeck, NY.

A

On 10/5/72, SC ROBERT D. SHEA caused a search to be made of the records of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York, NYC, regarding Liberation Publication, 339 Lafayette, New York, NY. There was no record identifiable with this organization.

It should be noted that no criminal checks can be conducted on an individual at the New York City Police Department without that individual's date of birth.

ST-115 REC-88

14

The following sources at New York, NY, were contacted with negative results regarding PHOEBE FISHER, THOMAS J. MYRON and Liberation Publication:

NY 711-S ~~NY 7351-S~~
NY 6909-S ~~NY 7495-S~~
NY 6474-S

22 NOV 27 1972

②-Bureau (RM)
1-New York

283

PWG:dab
(3)

LEK

Rec'd Act. Sect.

DEC 5 1972

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

LEAD

NEW YORK

AT NEW YORK, NEW YORK. Will continue attempts to determine subscriber to telephone numbers 914-462-0604 and 212-732-2944.

FD-272 (Rev. 3-3-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Reporting Office	Office of Origin	Date	Investigative Period	
WASHINGTON FIELD	WASHINGTON FIELD	12/13/72	1/4/72 - 12/1/72	

Title of Case	Report made by	Typed By:
"FURIES" NEWSPAPER WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.	JERRY M. GRAVES	neh
	Character of Case INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES	

SUMMARY

REFERENCES: WFO letters to Bureau, 5/31, 7/31 and 9/29/72. ser x ser 5k ser 9
Atlanta letters to WFO, 7/20 58 and 9/19/72. 50
Newark letter to Bureau, 9/15/72 100-453233-207
New York airtel to WFO, 9/28/72. 50

- P -

ADMINISTRATIVE

INFORMANTS

Source Identification	Location
WF T-1 is WF 2197-PSI	100-55290-1
WF T-2 is WF 4015-C	100-55290-20
WF T-3 is WF 2188-S	134-9613 Sub A-286
WF T-4 is WF 4562-E	100-55290-34

Approved	Special Agent in Charge	Do not write in spaces below
		10 [illegible] - 15 REC 68
		DEC [illegible] ST-105

Copies made:

- 5-Bureau 100-472144
- 1-USSS
- 2-Baltimore
- 3-Newark 100-55147
- 2-New Haven
- 2-New York 100-176760
- 2-WFO 100-55290

Notations:

NON-SYMBOL SOURCE PAGE ATTACHED

1cc 906 (D)

2cc RAO (ISD) "O"

1cc SS (FO-376)

A

57DEC29 1972

WFO 100-55290

WF T-5 - See Non-Symbol Source Page
WF T-6 is JK 405-S 100-55290-46A
WF T-7 - See Non-Symbol Source Page
WF T-8 is WF 4805-PSI 100-55290-57
WF T-9 is WF 4027-PSI 134-10361 Sub A

Investigation of persons mentioned in this report as being staff members of the "Furies" Newspaper is being conducted and reported through individual cases.

Extensive physical surveillance of the "Furies" location at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., as well as individuals who frequented this address, has been conducted by WFO, particularly during period August-November, 1972.

This surveillance, as well as resulting follow-up investigation, did not reflect any activities of a revolutionary or subversive nature by any member of the "Furies."

As set out in details of this report, a thorough review of all issues of the "Furies" Newspaper did not reflect a radical revolutionary or anti-government theme.

It was noted that the August, 1972 issue of the "Furies" was the last issue published.

LEADS:

BALTIMORE, NEWARK, NEW HAVEN AND NEW YORK

Are requested to submit results of outstanding investigation so that this case can be appropriately resolved.

WFO 100-55290

~~ADMINISTRATIVE - NON SYMBOL SOURCE~~
~~WFOreport 12/13/72~~

~~WF T-5 is Mrs. JEWEL JOHNSON, 1117 Anacostia Road, S.E., Washington, D.C., owner of property at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.~~

~~(By request).~~

~~WF T-7 is ROBERT HISKEY, Postal Carrier, Station E, Euclid Avenue, Atlanta, Georgia.~~

~~(Deemed advisable).~~

THIS PAGE IS TO BE RETAINED IN HEADQUARTERS CITY AT ALL TIMES

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
100-55290

November 13, 1972

Director
United States Secret Service
Department of the Treasury
Washington, D. C. 20220

RE: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Dear Sir:

The information furnished herewith concerns an individual or organization believed to be covered by the agreement between the FBI and Secret Service concerning protective responsibilities, and to fall within the category or categories checked.

1. ☐ Threats or actions against persons protected by Secret Service.
2. ☐ Attempts or threats to redress grievances.
3. ☐ Threatening or abusive statement about U. S. or foreign official.
4. ☐ Participation in civil disturbances, anti-U. S. demonstrations or hostile incidents against foreign diplomatic establishments.
5. ☐ Illegal bombing, bomb-making or other terrorist activity.
6. ☐ Defector from U. S. or indicates desire to defect.
7. ☒ Potentially dangerous because of background, emotional instability or activity in groups engaged in activities inimical to U. S.

Photograph ☐ has been furnished ☐ enclosed ☐ is not available.

Very truly yours,

L. Patrick Gray III

L. Patrick Gray, III
Acting Director

1 - Special Agent in Charge (Enclosure(s))
U. S. Secret Service

Enclosure(s)

Copy to:

1-United States Secret Service

Report of: JERRY M. GRAVES

Office: Washington, D.C.

Date: 12/13/72

Field Office File #: 100-55290

Bureau File #: 100-472144

Title:

"FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Character:

INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Synopsis:

"Furies" Newspaper, self described as a lesbian/feminist publication, was published by a group of individuals located at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC. Reported purpose of newspaper was to espouse the cause of radical lesbianism and to align itself politically with the views of the "New Left." Paper published from January-August, 1972, and did not espouse any radical revolutionary or anti-government themes. Background and activities set out.

- P -

DETAILS: AT WASHINGTON, D.C.

I. PREDICATION AND BACKGROUND

Investigation to determine extent of activities was initiated regarding the "Furies" Newspaper in January, 1972, after the following information was received:

On January 4, 1972, WF T-1 advised that a new publication known as the "Furies" Newspaper was being formed in Washington, D.C. to espouse the cause of radical lesbianism and to align itself politically with the views of the "New Left." Source advised that a trial issue was scheduled to be published and distributed during January, 1972, no specific date given.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1970 O - 406-840

Nor duplicated within your agency.

On January 13, 1972, WF T-2 provided a copy of the January, 1972 issue of the "Furies" Newspaper.

A review of this issue revealed the following self description:

"The Furies is a new lesbian-feminist newspaper for every woman who has ever been raped, physically, economically or psychologically. We take the name FURIES, Now Goddesses of Vengeance and protectors of woman, as we want to build a movement in this country, and in the world which can effectively stop the violent, sick, oppressive acts of male supremacy.

The paper includes letters, articles, fiction, poetry, news, and graphics, as well as information about various literature for women."

The initial issue of the "Furies" Newspaper indicated that "this paper is printed by the Sojourner Truth Press collective in Atlanta, Georgia."

It was noted that the "Furies" is located at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., and a further review of the initial issue reflected the following staff members:

SUSAN BAKER
JOAN BIREN
CHARLOTTE BUNCH
HELAINE HARRIS
NANCY MYRON
COLETTA REID
ANN SILVER

GINNY BERSON
RITA MAE BROWN
SHARON DEEVY
SUSAN HATHAWAY
TASH PETERSON
LEE SCHWING
JENNIFER WOODUF

II. ACTIVITIES

On March 20, 1972, WF T-3 advised that the "Furies" is a gay newspaper for women in which the political line is the fight against racism and repression by men. Source advised that the members of the "Furies" believe that if you do not follow these general programs you are not a feminist.

Source knew of no radical revolutionary tendencies or activities being planned or contemplated by any of the "Furies" members.

On April 10, 1972, WF T-4 advised that several months ago, when several girls moved into the residence at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C., they were observed carrying what appeared to be a printing press into the basement of the apartment.

Source advised that several females frequented the house and one of the girls has a baby. Source advised that most of the girls who frequented the address have extremely short hair and always wear slacks.

On July 13, 1972, WF T-5 advised that three women, SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING, and COLETTA REID originally rented the house located at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. Source had no background information on any of these women and was not aware of anyone else residing at the residence. Source has received no complaints about the residence from the neighbors.

On July 7, 1972, WF T-6 advised that the Sojourner Truth Press in Atlanta, Georgia, was a printing press for hire, which prints mostly "New Left" material for "New Left" organizations, yet it espouses no opinions of its own. As long as their fee is met, they will print what is desired, i.e. papers, pamphlets, flyers, etc.

On September 11, 1972, WF T-7 advised that the Sojourner Truth Press had gone out of business on August 15, 1972, due to a lack of funds. Source also advised that the individuals connected with the Sojourner Truth Press were planning on leaving Atlanta.

On September 13, 1972, a telephone call was made to telephone number 688-6222, the telephone number for the Sojourner Truth Press, Atlanta, Georgia, and a recorded voice advised that service for that telephone number had been discontinued.

On July 13, 1972, WF T-4 advised that several young white girls continued to reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. They appear friendly, but keep very much to themselves.

On August 23, 1972, this source advised that apparently four or five young white girls now live at 219 11th Street, S.E. Source has seen numerous different girls frequenting the residence, but is unsure exactly how many reside there at the present time.

One girl, name unknown, who resides at the residence, has stated to source she is a music teacher. Source has seen several girls on different occasions carrying what appeared to be newspapers. Source states that all the girls are generally quiet and keep to themselves.

On September 13, 1972, WF T-5 advised that SUSAN HATHAWAY, SUSAN SCHWING and COLETTA REID still rent and apparently reside at 219 11th Street, S.E., Washington, D.C.

Source stated that these three girls continue to pay their monthly rent promptly and she said that each of the girls takes turns paying the rent each month.

Source related that when the dwelling was rented to these three girls, they made a remark that they were employed by a "research organization", name unknown, and did most of their research at the Library of Congress.

Source stated that she has not been in the dwelling at 219 11th Street, S.E., since it was rented to these three girls, but she has received no complaints concerning any of their activities.

On September 14, 1972, WF T-8 furnished the August, 1972 copy of the "Furies" Newspaper.

A subsequent review of this issue, as well as all previous issues, did not reflect any radical revolutionary or anti-government theme. All issues have been devoted to articles pertaining to lesbian/feminist interests.

On October 12, 1972, WF T-9 advised that an internal conflict has developed within the "Furies" collective and they are breaking up into different factions, based on ideological differents.

Whether or not the paper will continue is unknown at this time.

On December 1, 1972, WF T-9 advised that the "Furies" stopped publishing their newspaper sometime in the Fall of 1972.

Source was unable to locate a subsequent issue after the August, 1972 issue.

FD-323 (Rev. 8-1-72)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Washington, D.C. 20535
November 13, 1972

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-55290

Title "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT
PUBLICATION, WASHINGTON, D.C.

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES

Reference Report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 12/26/72

FROM : SAC, NEW HAVEN (100-21771) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS' LIBERATION
MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES
OO: WFO

RE: WFO letters to the Bureau, 7/31/72 and 9/29/72.

On 9/7/72, ~~CS-NH-604-C~~ advised that Hartford, Conn., telephone number 232-7678 has been listed since prior to 3/29/72, to HYMAN BERSON, 5 King Edward Rd., West Hartford, Conn.

~~Mr. TED MUNSON~~, West Hartford PD, Records Division, advised on 10/24/72, that there is no record for this individual in their files. Miss JOANN CURRAN, Conn. State Police Bureau of Identification, advised there is no record for one HYMAN BERSON.

The 1971 City Directory for West Hartford lists HYMAN (SYLVIA A.) BERSON as employed as a buyer for Youth Center Stores, Hartford, and residing at 5 King Edward Rd., West Hartford.

~~Det. JOSEPH HAMMICK, CID,~~ Hartford, Conn., PD, advised on 10/24/72, that there is no record for BERSON and that the name of HYMAN BERSON and his wife, SYLVIA, are unknown to the Intelligence Division.

On 11/9/72, ~~NH 839-PSI~~ advised that HYMAN and SYLVIA BERSON are unknown to source.

On 11/20/72, ~~NH 648-PSI~~ advised that HYMAN and SYLVIA BERSON are unknown to source. ~~NH 839-PSI~~ was contacted on 12/13/72, also with negative results.

REC-88

NHO indices are negative re both HYMAN and SYLVIA BERSON.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-WFO (RM)
1-New Haven
WBG/jhk
(4)

ST-114

15 DEC 29 1972

F473

Rev. Sect.

JAN

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-472144) DATE: 1/30/73

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-176760) (RUC)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS-RA
(OO: WASHINGTON FIELD)

Reference Washington Field report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES, dated 12/13/72.

On 12/13/72, ~~RUDOLPH J. POSCH, Secuirty Supervisor,~~ New York Telephone Company, 140 West Street, New York, New York, advised SA FRANK J. MEYERS that telephone number 914-462-0604, is subscribed to by LESTER H. PARKER, 8 Pine Tree Drive, Poughkeepsie, New York. This telephone was connected 2/14/69, and no further background information was available regarding this individual.

Subscriber to telephone number 212-732-2944 has already been furnished Washington Field in New York letter to Washington Field dated, 9/28/72.

NYO indices negative re LESTER H.PARKER.

During the months of December, 1972, and January, 1973, the following sources, familiar with New Left activities at New York, New York were contacted regarding LESTER H. PARKER, with negative results.

~~NY-711-S NY-6909-S NY-7495-S NY-10053-S~~

New York is considering the status of this matter as RUC.

ST-116 REC-70

18

2- Bureau (RM)
2- Washington Field (100-55290) (RM)
1- New York

7 FEB 2 1973

PWG:epl
(5)

54 FEB 7 1973

Rev. Act. Sect.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan
5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO :ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-472144) DATE: 1/31/73

FROM :SAC, WFO (100-55290) (P)

SUBJECT:"FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMEN'S LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES, dated 12/13/72. Dec 15

On 12/27/72, ~~WF 4027-S~~ advised that some of the internal conflicts within the "Furies" Organization had been settled, but there are no plans to reinstitute publication of the paper. Source stated that most remaining members are writing articles for other lesbian orientated publications and periodicals.

Mrs. JEWEL JOHNSON, 1117 Anacostia Avenue, S.E., Washington, D.C. (WDC), (protect identity) owner of property at 219 11th Street, S.E., WDC, advised on 1/16/73 that apparently this dwelling is being occupied by the same group of women who rented it, since the rent continues to be paid.

She added however, that about 6 weeks ago, she attempted to inspect the premises and found no one present at that time.

She has driven by the residence several times at night since then, and has not noted any lights on in the house, nor has several attempted phone calls been answered.

Baltimore and New York furnish results of previously requested investigation.

WFO will continue to follow activities of "Furies" members.

ST-100

REC-88

17

② -Bureau
2-Baltimore
2-New York (100-176760)
1-WFO

5 FEB 1 1973

Rev. Act. Sect.

JMG:neh
(7)

57 FEB 7 1973 cc m 9LSD

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : ACTING DIRECTOR, FBI (100-472144)

DATE: 3/29/73

FROM : SAC, WFO (100-55290) (C)

SUBJECT: "FURIES" NEWSPAPER
WOMENS LIBERATION MOVEMENT PUBLICATION,
WASHINGTON, D.C.
IS - RA
(OO:WFO)

Re WFO report of SA JERRY M. GRAVES, 12/13/72, and WFO letter to Bureau, 1/31/73.

On 3/6/73, [redacted], advised that for all intents and purposes the "Furies" organization and collective have ceased to function. There are no plans to publish another newspaper, and most of the members have left to pursue their own interests.

As reported in re WFO report, investigation of this case did not reflect any activities on the part of the "Furies" that would be considered revolutionary or subversive.

The "Furies" newspaper ceased publication in August, 1972, and did not espouse a radical revolutionary line.

In view of the above, this case is being closed. WFO will remain alert for information regarding any possible future activity on the part of the "Furies", and will report same at that time.

EX-117

REC-36

19

10
2-Bureau
1-WFO

JMG:mjs
(3)

4 APR 2 1973

51 APR 12 1973

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

586- Bulky

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

62- HQ-1163~~59~~ 95

Serial 586

62-HQ-116359-E586

BULKY

#3565

FBI - CENTRAL RECORDS CENTER

HQ - HEADQUARTERS BOX 3565

Class / Case #	Sub	Vol.	Serial #	
0062 116395		1	586	ONLY

2/13/85777

RKP00474ID

INSPECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

AUGUST 17 - SEPTEMBER 9, 1971

RETAIN COPY

[illegible] INSPECTION
8/[illegible] - 9/10/71

Recommend entire document be classified "Secret," XGDS 1, 2, 3.

Portions recommended for excision from attached have been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin.

Generally, criteria for excision were:

1. Information which could identify sources or sensitive techniques
2. Names of individuals or organizations whose privacy requires protection
3. Information which would reveal our overall success or lack of success in a given investigative area
4. Information from "Third Agencies" or friendly foreign agencies
5. Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section Chief level

The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general, disclose the extent of our commitment in specific areas of counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee Administrative Division figures regarding total manpower involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, we have not given them a breakdown as to where these personnel are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to whether we want to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel" sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or how little manpower we have on specific types of investigations.

It is questionable whether the information regarding criminal cases in the San Francisco report is germane to the Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitute a page saying that "pages ____ to ____ relate to criminal investigations."

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS

- Ellsberg Case 1
- East Coast Conspiracy 23

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

- Internal Security Section 31
- Research Section 39
- New Left Section 43
- Espionage Section 57
- Extremist Intelligence Section 66
- Nationalities Intelligence Section 74

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

- Security Index Program (Basic Revolutionary Organizations) 89
- Counterintelligence - White Hate Groups 91
- Thumbnail Sketch Program 93
- Security Informant Program (Basic Revolutionary and New Left Organizations) 94
- Security Index Program 97

Page

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)

Emergency Detention Program 97

Technical and Microphone Surveillances 98

Survey Regarding Potential For Racial Violence 99

New Left Movement 101

Key Activist Program 105

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) 107

Worker Student Alliance (WSA) 107

The Venceremos Brigade 110

PROSAB 110

ALEM Program 114

BANPOP Program 115

CANIL Program 116

COKMA Program 117

DESECO Program 119

East - West Exchange Program 121

Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets 123

Black Extremist Matters 125

Black Nationalist Movement 127

Page

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)

Black Panther Party 132

Black Revolutionary Party 136

Congress of African Peoples (CAP) 137

International Black Workers Congress, aka Black Workers Congress 139

Junta of Militant Organizations 140

Nation of Islam 142

Republic of New Africa 144

Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) 146

Communist Influence of Black Extremist Groups 148

Key Black Extremist Program 151

Extremist Informants 152

Ghetto Informants 154

Counterintelligence Program - Black Extremists 156

Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas 158

Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border BOCOV 159

Security Index - Cuba 161

American Repatriate Program 164

Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries 165

Page

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs (Continued)

International Organizations - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc 167

Chinese Aliens Entering the U. S.; Chinese Entering the U. S. Claiming U. S. Citizenship 169

Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States (CHICOIN) 172

Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments 173

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES - FOREIGN LIAISON

Bern 178

Bonn 179

Buenos Aires 180

Hong Kong 180

London 181

Madrid 182

Mexico City 183

Ottawa 184

Paris 185

Rome 185

Tokyo 186

Beirut 187

Page

Legal Attache Offices - Foreign Liaison (Continued)

Caracas 188

Copenhagen 190

La Paz 191

Managua 192

Tel Aviv 193

Chinese Communist Activities 200

Subversive Activities Control Board 213

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Dividing Domestic Intelligence Division Into Two Divisions 215

Antiriot Laws and Bombing Matters 224

Computation of Case and Work Load in the Domestic Intelligence Division 239

Potential Double Agent Program 244

PERSONNEL MATTERS

Adequacy of Personnel - Agent 249

Adequacy of Personnel - Clerical 300

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

Payments to Security Informants and Confidential Sources 314

Page

Suggestion Memorandum (Continued)

Survey Concerning Computerization of Security Informant Indices 321

Supervision and Control of Security Informant Development and Coverage by Internal Security and New Left Sections 324

Utilization of Inserts in Reporting Investigative Results in Criminal Cases by Legal Attaches 325

Black Nationalist Photograph Album 327

Young Socialist Alliance Internal Security - Communist (Trotskyist) 329

Automation of Intelligence Data re New Left and Extremist Individuals 331

Preparation of Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations 334

Black Extremist Activities In Penal Institutions - Extremist Matters 340

ELLSBERG CASE 4-A-3

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: This case is currently being afforded preferred supervisory and investigative attention. You are requested to furnish the following information about the case:

1. Brief narrative of basic investigation involving Ellsberg and provide current status.

2. You have advised this case may be part of a greater conspiracy. Advise what part you feel this and other leaks may be. It is realized the broad aspects of this case may be yet unconfirmed conjecture; however, furnish narrative of conjecture.

3. Advise what progress we have made and anticipate making in projecting our investigation into areas described in number two.

4. Advise as best you can at this point how "big" this investigation may become from a supervisory standpoint and indicate what impact an overall successful investigation may have on Governmental processes in our system of Government.

5. In regard to the administration of this investigation handled by the Nationalities Intelligence Section and due to certain intricacies of supervision the following information is requested individually from both Division Head and Section Chief:

   a. At the outset of the investigation, what instructions were issued Section handling case?

   b. What subsequent instructions or suggestions have been issued?

   c. What have been the manpower requirements of the case thus far and how have you worked these out with this Section?

   d. Division Head and Section Chief requested to make any further comments considered appropriate at this time.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71

ELLSBERG CASE

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL wRW
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. Initial investigation by Bureau opened 1/20/70 based on information from step-mother of subject's former wife to the effect that subject, with his children, took papers from his office at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica, California, and copied them with intent that they be made available for Senators Fulbright and Goodell. This information had come to knowledge of Carol Ellsberg through the Ellsberg children. Initial investigation continued through 9/25/70 when basic facts were presented to Department of Justice with note that no further action would be taken in the absence of a specific request from the Department. No such request was received.

On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" commenced publishing a series of articles purporting to report on the history of the U. S. decision-making process concerning Vietnam policies for the period 1945-1967. "The New York Times" claimed the articles were based on a study later identified as a 47-volume history entitled "United States - Vietnam Relations During the Period 1945-1967," commonly known as the "McNamara Study." The "McNamara Study" was prepared beginning in 1967 and was classified "Top Secret."

On 6/15/71 the Attorney General requested FBI to conduct all necessary investigation into the matter relating to the publication of classified information by "The New York Times." Our 1970 investigation and initial reports from sources obtained in instant matter pinpointed Ellsberg as the prime suspect responsible for the leak of classified data to news media. Extensive investigation at Los Angeles pinned down the identities of individuals present in October, 1969, when Ellsberg duplicated classified documents available to him through his employment at Rand Corporation in Santa Monica. Also revealed were his own statements to his former wife that he, in fact, was converting the classified documents to his own use to furnish them to various Congressional figures. The Los Angeles investigation has resulted in Ellsberg's current indictment alleging violation of Section 793(e), Title 18, U. S. Code (unauthorized possession of documents involved and unlawful retention of same) and Section 641, Title 18 (conversion of the documents to his own use). The Los Angeles investigation was the sole basis for this indictment and served as the basis for current imprisonment on charge of contempt of court of Anthony J. Russo who was present on one occasion when Ellsberg allegedly duplicated material in his possession.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
WRW:ams
4-A-3

Investigation at Washington, D. C., has pinned down Ellsberg's access to the documents in question and has additionally revealed his early change from "hawk" to "dove." It has also revealed his contacts with individuals at high levels in Federal Government attempting to persuade them to put before American public details of decisions underlying the U. S. policy in Vietnam.

Investigation at Boston has uncovered activity by Neil and Susan Sheehan, employees of "The New York Times," in late March, 1971. This activity has included extensive details of sessions where duplication of portions of the "McNamara Study" were involved. Revealed have been details identifying the printing companies utilized by the Sheehans, considerable travel between these companies and apartments available to or utilized by Ellsberg. We have uncovered extensive detail of Ellsberg's contacts from his Cambridge, Massachusetts, residence with members of the news media. Also revealed has been contact by Ellsberg with factions of the New Left and anti-Vietnam peace groups.

We have recently expanded our investigation in attempt to uncover details of dissemination of the "McNamara Study" by Ellsberg to other newspapers in which articles appeared attributed to the "McNamara Study." This investigation has revealed at least three newsmen from the Washington, D. C., bureaus of the newspapers involved were in the Boston and/or Cambridge area during the week immediately prior to Ellsberg's surrender on 6/28/71. We have learned that at least one newspaper had been contacted by an unknown individual in Boston who had offered the "McNamara Study" instructing that if the newspaper involved wished to avail itself of the offer, the classified documents could be picked up in Boston after contacting a given telephone number in that area for more detailed instructions. We are pursuing this facet of the investigation vigorously to pin down exact activities of the newspaper personnel involved and when this is done, we contemplate interviewing them for additional details.

Extensive investigation has been afforded the possibility that Ellsberg benefited from considerable assistance from other individuals in his attempt to disseminate the "McNamara Study" to the news media. Along these lines we have detected early reports of Ellsberg's cooperation with elements of the War Resistors League and have identified individuals in that organization described by Ellsberg as the principal influences on his change to a militant opposition to the U. S. - Vietnam policies. Investigation is continuing along these lines to establish if any individuals in these dissident groups may have assisted Ellsberg in his alleged violations of the statutes noted.

A relative of Mr. Haldeman at the White House, France Raine, reported that while attending a football game in Los Angeles in October, 1970, he overheard a conversation between two men sitting near him whom he believed to be prominent

3

in the Business Executives Movement for Vietnam (BEM). This conversation involved the plan on the part of an unidentified individual to leak secret information to the press in the Spring of 1971, with the unidentified individual being mentioned as being an employee of Rand Corporation and having formerly served as an advisor to Dr. Kissinger at the White House. Also mentioned by the conversants was the plan on the part of two White House aides to resign their positions sometime during the Summer of 1971 and to make anti-Administration revelations at that time regarding U. S. - Vietnam policy. Ellsberg was known to have appeared on at least two occasions as a speaker for BEM functions in Los Angeles and Washington, D. C. A close associate of his in Los Angeles was a former leader of the BEM chapter in that city. We have intensified our investigation of BEM and conducted extensive investigation to pin down identities of persons seated near Raine during the game in question. We are continuing our investigation along these lines to pinpoint a possible conspiracy existing as early as October, 1970, with ramifications of anti-Administration activity and revelation of classified information.

We have recently received from Attorney General clarification of the areas in which we can conduct investigation in this matter and, as a result, are extending our interviews into news media circles where we feel we can uncover individuals who will cooperate with us in revealing details of the Ellsberg revelations and any conspiracy that may have existed involving him and others to expose to public scrutiny the classified information involved in this case.

2. At the outset of this investigation Assistant Director Brennan spoke at a Division Chiefs' Conference and also directly to the Section Chief, Nationalities Intelligence Section, regarding the possibility of a wide-scale conspiracy in which Ellsberg could be involved. His observations along these lines were recorded in a memorandum to all Division Chiefs dated 7/23/71 and captioned "Re: Organizational Survey (Priorities and Manpower)." In this memorandum he commented upon the fact that the Ellsberg case might be a landmark in historical significance in view of the long-range potential regarding Governmental operations and the FBI's role in relation thereto. He stated that the leak in this case represented a deliberate and determined effort on the part of certain individuals to seriously disrupt and destroy the Government's capacity to carry out effectively its foreign policy in various areas.

Mr. Brennan noted that the past 15 to 20 years had witnessed the evolution of a new breed of fanatics who were determined to disrupt and destroy Governmental operations and to alter this country's foreign policy. He further noted that the movement supported by these fanatics bordered on treason which must be dealt with if our current form of Government is to survive.

4

During the early stages of the investigation in this case it became quite evident that Ellsberg had received assistance in getting into the hands of various newspapers the "McNamara Study." He admitted as much on 6/28/71 in responding to questions raised by reporters when he surrendered himself at the Boston Courthouse following issuance of a complaint charging him with violating the Espionage Statute. Accordingly, the thrust of our investigation has been directed toward identifying any individual or individuals or organization that may have assisted or conspired with Ellsberg. It was noted that developments had indicated that at least part of the "McNamara Study" was reportedly in the possession of the Institute for Policy Studies and that while a page-by-page review of the Bureau's file on that Institute had not revealed any information concerning Ellsberg, we had developed material in the Ellsberg investigation showing connections between him and some of the Institute employees.

No excising

On 7/6/71 the Director prepared a memorandum for Messrs. Tolson, Sullivan, Brennan and Bishop to advise that the Honorable H. R. Haldeman, Assistant to the President, had called the Director about the Ellsberg case. The Director stated that Mr. Haldeman said the President wanted a report on the case immediately to bring him up to date and then to keep him filled in, and that the President was particularly interested in the complicity of individuals.

On 7/6/71 with the Director's approval a conference was held with Departmental attorneys during which Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian explained that information coming to his attention from Departments of Defense and State officials indicated that a group at each of these Departments may be involved in a ring to pass out classified information. He said that while this may or may not be related to the Ellsberg case he was most desirous of getting a complete rundown on Ellsberg's background to determine if any of his associates may have come under suspicion in connection with other leaks. He also said the President was vitally concerned not only with the Ellsberg case but with all aspects of leaks of classified information of the Executive Branch.

We have not developed any hard evidence confirming that a wide-spread organized conspiracy exists to leak Government information. We are aware, however, of one thread common to certain of these leaks. That is, individuals such as Ellsberg, who were either bitterly opposed to the U. S. - Vietnam policy or in disagreement with other major foreign policy issues, have set themselves up above the law, claiming the right to decide what should be released to the public regardless of Executive Branch classification assigned to information. Many of these individuals in common with Ellsberg have been affiliated with one or more of the so-called "think tanks," such as Rand Corporation, have served in a number of sensitive positions in the Executive Branch of the Government and to a large extent are acquainted with one another, at least on a professional basis. Communications to appropriate field offices dated 7/7 and 12/71 contained instructions regarding the necessity for exploring the various facets of this situation.

The conspiracy aspects of the Ellsberg case as revealed to date are set forth in Item 3 below.

3. Speculation that Daniel Ellsberg conspired with others in obtaining, reproducing and disclosing the "McNamara Study" has some basis in public remarks made by him on 6/28/71 indicating that "It is implicit ... that other individuals helped out in various ways," and that he and the press share the responsibility for the newspapers' obtaining the study. We have, however, pursued the possibility of conspiracy from every conceivable angle and while investigation has produced some circumstantial evidence to support this theory, we have not found grounds to indicate existence of an over-all plot or conspiracy, threading its way throughout Ellsberg's actions.

Count One of a two-count indictment returned by a Federal grand jury on 6/28/71 charges Ellsberg with unauthorized possession, access to, and control over copies of what, in effect, was the "McNamara Study," from about September, 1969, to approximately October, 1969, while Count Two of this indictment charges that during the same approximate time span Ellsberg willfully, knowingly and unlawfully converted to his own use copies of these documents. We have established Ellsberg legally had access to the Study in the course of his employment with Rand Corporation at Santa Monica, California, but that he also obtained and had in his possession 18 volumes of a preliminary draft of the Study for at least nine months without the knowledge of the Top Secret Control Officer at Rand in Santa Monica. Failure of Rand employees in Washington, D. C., and at Santa Monica to adhere to established, in-house security procedures accounts for the fact Ellsberg was able to conceal his possession of these 18 volumes, and while over-all possession by Ellsberg of the Study and its preliminary draft volumes continues to be closely examined, no evidence exists of conspiracy at this point of the case.

Count Two of the aforementioned indictment, relating to conversion of these documents, is founded on information that Ellsberg reproduced a large quantity of classified documents in October, 1969, at the office of one Lynda Sinay, in the Los Angeles area. Ellsberg's two children, present at this reproduction session, have identified individuals who assisted Ellsberg in this task, but

6

interviews of these persons have developed nothing to indicate they were aware of the nature of the items being reproduced or of what use Ellsberg intended to make of the copies reproduced. Anthony Russo, a fellow employee of Ellsberg's at Rand in Santa Monica, would have been in an excellent position to have been aware of the ultimate purpose of Ellsberg's actions but has refused to talk to the Federal grand jury in Los Angeles, and is currently in jail for contempt of court relating to this refusal.

Subsequent to the duplicating of documents in October, 1969, Ellsberg, by his own statements, claims to have made efforts to furnish copies of these documents to Senator J. William Fulbright and former Senator Charles E. Goodell, and Senator George S. McGovern may also have been approached by Ellsberg concerning making these documents public. Representative Paul N. McCloskey, Jr., is also known to be in possession of documents which he publicly admits were given to him by Ellsberg. Data available concerning this phase of Ellsberg's actions also fails to indicate he acted in concert with anyone.

On 6/13/71 "The New York Times" published the first of a series of articles purporting to have been based on the "McNamara Study," and a number of other newspapers in the U. S. subsequently printed similar articles. Investigation has placed Neil Sheehan, a reporter for "The New York Times," in Cambridge, Massachusetts, during March and April, 1971, under an assumed name, and we have determined Sheehan and his wife engaged in a number of frantic copying sessions of documents during the period 3/21-23/71. Four blurred Xerox copies discarded during this duplicating have been identified by the National Security Agency as being reproductions of pages appearing in the "McNamara Study." It is highly probable Sheehan and Ellsberg cooperated closely in actions which enabled "The New York Times" to obtain the documents utilized in articles published by this newspaper and we have recently uncovered evidence indicating representatives of at least three other newspapers which have published articles based on the "McNamara Study" were in the Boston area in June, 1971, for the apparent purpose of obtaining copies of these documents. A source closely connected with one of these newspapers has advised that his newspaper obtained the documents after receiving a telephone call from an unknown individual who instructed that a reporter from the newspaper go to Cambridge and make the necessary arrangements to obtain them by calling a certain, unidentified telephone number. Investigation subsequently placed this reporter in Cambridge, but we have, to date, been unsuccessful in determining who furnished him with the material in question. While the newspapermen thus involved may have cooperated with Ellsberg in various ways in order to obtain the desired documents, available evidence does not suggest they conspired with him in carrying out the disclosure of these documents, but rather took advantage of his offer to furnish them with the material.

7

We are, however, vigorously pursuing all leads relating to the possession by "The New York Times" and other newspapers of the "McNamara Study" and have proposed that the field be authorized to immediately initiate interviews with friendly newsmen concerning this matter. We believe this area of investigation offers excellent possibilities of effecting a major breakthrough in this case.

There remains the suggestion Ellsberg may have received the cooperation of or conspired with various New Left, anti-draft, anti-Vietnam war elements, and this possibility has received the most penetrating examination. We know Ellsberg to have been friendly with a number of individuals connected with the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS) in Washington, D. C., and evidence exists that the IPS has been in possession for some time of documents which may be identical with the "McNamara Study." We have also learned, in tracing the development of Ellsberg's thinking from "hawk" to "dove," that from August, 1969, he became increasingly associated with a number of the more prominent anti-war exponents in this country, many of whom occupy important posts at Harvard University and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. We are in the process of tying together all of this data, in an effort to surface, if possible, any possible connection between these elements and Ellsberg in the disclosure of the highly classified "McNamara Study," but information available to date does not, as yet, substantiate or corroborate existence of a conspiracy in this regard.

Leave in

4. With particular regard to the President's concern expressed by Mr. Haldeman to the Director, mentioned hereinbefore, with respect to the complicity of individuals, and the instructions of the Attorney General that the Bureau in each leak case identify the individuals responsible, it is quite clear that we must resolve all allegations, especially those pertaining to possible conspiracies, during the course of our inquiries. As noted in Item 1, our inquiries have expanded to include not only the leak to "The New York Times" but to encompass the eight other newspapers which carried portions of the "McNamara Study." Since its inception, the Ellsberg case has required expanding supervisory attention here at the SOG. Nine men are currently committed to the case. There are no indications at this time that less supervisory attention will be needed in the near future. In fact, all indications are that there may have to be more commitments in this regard, particularly if the Department refers additional leak matters to us for the intensive investigative attention which has been requested in the past.

A successful investigation followed by a successful prosecution would certainly have a very important impact on Governmental processes, particularly within the Executive Branch of our Government. When the Supreme Court refused to grant injunctions sought by the Executive Branch against newspapers publishing the "McNamara Study," this upheld the freedom of the press. The question has not yet been litigated with respect to the right of the Executive Branch to protect its secrets through its classification system.

Unless Ellsberg is prosecuted successfully, anyone within the Executive Branch would apparently have the right to decide on his own initiative what information he wishes to place in the public domain by turning the information over to the newspapers. Much of the sensitive negotiations of the Executive Branch with foreign countries is dependent upon the secrecy with which they are carried out. If through a classification system or some other means the Executive Branch is not able to preclude the unauthorized disclosure of its secrets it is felt the Branch will be weakened to the extent that it cannot effectively function on the international scene certainly, and probably on the domestic scene in some instances. Thus, the structure of the Executive Branch might well collapse.

An unsuccessful prosecution would buttress the considerable support, particularly from the news media, for Ellsberg's contention that his disclosure of the classified documents was basically motivated by conscience and by deep concern that the public should be informed. It is closely related to the viewpoint held by a small but growing minority that an individual is free to follow the dictates of his conscience and to be the final arbiter of the validity of our criminal and civil statutes. If this thesis were to be supported, then it could apply to murder and bombings of Government and private institutions where such acts are dictated by conscience. It could follow that the Legislative, Executive and Judicial functions of the Nation are exercises in futility. This would be a road to anarchy.

From the above, it would appear that the outcome of the Ellsberg case would have a direct bearing on the Executive Branch of our Government and could affect the entire Governmental structure.

5(a). At the outset of the investigation, Assistant Director Brennan instructed the Section Chief to afford special attention to this case and to let him know of any manpower needs. He emphasized the importance of the case in his mind and wanted it handled as a special.

Within a day or two Mr. Brennan introduced the Section Chief to Departmental attorney James McGrath, who is a special assistant to Assistant Attorney General Mardian. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that McGrath was the coordinator for Mardian of the various groups under Mardian engaged in consideration of phases of the Ellsberg case. For example, he explained that

9

one group headed by Departmental attorney John Martin analyzed all investigative results received by the Department in an effort to establish whether a case was being made. Mr. Brennan advised the Section Chief that Mr. McGrath would be in a position to furnish any information required by the Section Chief from the Internal Security Division and instructed that copies of daily teletypes received from our various offices be furnished through Mr. McGrath to the Internal Security Division as they came in.

5(b). Approximately two weeks after this case was instituted, the Section Chief asked Mr. Brennan if he would brief both the Section Chief and the Section Number One Man on his concept of the magnitude of this case and its various ramifications. This was done and Mr. Brennan again emphasized the need for following all facets on a special basis.

Following the conference with Departmental attorneys 7/6/71, mentioned hereinbefore, Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore and Section Chief Wannall to his office and instructed that a "book" be prepared on Ellsberg covering his activities and associates during a period of a couple of years. He explained what he wanted in this book and provided for an Agent from Research Section to be assigned full time on its compilation.

On 7/15/71 Mr. Brennan instructed that a copy of each teletype received at the SOG on this case be furnished to him.

On 7/28/71 Mr. Brennan summoned Inspector D. E. Moore, Section Chief, Section Number One Man, and all Agents working on this case to his office for a conference. In compliance with his request, he was briefed on investigative results to date. He asked if serious consideration had been given to the possibility that Ellsberg himself was not directly involved in turning over the "McNamara Study" to "The New York Times," and instructed that we look into this phase of the matter very carefully.

On 8/2/71 Mr. Brennan summoned to his office the Section Chief and Case Supervisor Wagoner for the purpose of introducing them to Mr. G. G. Liddey of the White House. He explained that Mr. Liddey was coordinating all White House interest in this matter. Mr. Liddey pointed out that the White House wanted this case handled as a "Bureau special" and that a letter from the White House to that effect would be forwarded.

10

5(c). At the present time there are nine Agent Supervisors assigned to this matter.

Investigation was instituted 6/15/71 and from then until 6/23/71 manpower assignments were handled within the Section.

On 6/23/71 two additional Agents were placed in the Section on a loan basis and they were assigned to operational desks, as Agents permanently assigned to those desks from within the Section were assigned to the McLek case.

On 6/28/71 an Agent was assigned on a loan basis from Extremist Intelligence Section and this loan Agent has been rotated on a weekly basis since. He has been utilized to cover an operational desk while one of the regularly assigned Agents in the Section (H. J. Morgan) has been assigned full time to this case.

On 7/8/71 an Agent from Research Section was assigned full time to prepare a "book" on Ellsberg and has worked on this exclusively with the exception of an annual leave period of 8/2-13/71. He has not participated in any other phase of the case on a day-to-day basis.

On 7/8/71 one man on weekly rotating basis was assigned temporarily from the Espionage Section and continues to the present time. This loan Supervisor has been utilized to cover an operational desk within the Section while the regularly assigned Supervisor on the desk (J. R. Hagy) has been utilized full time on instant case.

On 7/29/71 an Agent from within the Section (L. E. Belanger) was assigned part time to handle special aspects of the Ellsberg case, relating specifically to electronic surveillance checks on potential witnesses.

Memorandum Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson 8/4/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," recommended and the Director approved that the number of Agents assigned to handle leak cases, including Ellsberg case, be increased immediately from five to seven, these two additional Agents to be diverted from other assignments in Domestic Intelligence Division with at least one to be diverted from the CP, USA Unit. The Director approved this. At that time we had five men working full time on instant and related cases, including J. M. Sizoo, who was involved exclusively in preparation of a "book" on Ellsberg.

On 8/9/71 in the absence of additional manpower from outside the Section, the number of Agents committed to instant and related cases was increased

//

from five to seven by assigning full time from within the Section SA L. E. Belanger and on a rotating basis one Agent from the Middle and South American Unit (B. M. Perez). Perez was replaced by SA W. W. Hamilton on 8/16/71.

On 8/13/71 two additional Agents were provided from outside the Section, one on a full-time basis and one on a rotating weekly basis. The Agent assigned on a full-time basis (T. J. Seabaugh) was immediately assigned to the McLek case. The Agent assigned on the weekly rotating basis was assigned to assist on one of the regular operational desks within the Section and an Agent who had been continuously on loan with the exception of an annual leave period of 8/6-16/71 (J. P. Benedict) was assigned full time to instant matters.

In summary, manpower from outside the Section have been assigned on a temporary basis on 6/23/71 (two Agents); 6/28/71 (one Agent); 7/8/71 (two Agents); and 8/13/71 (two Agents). Three of these loan Agents are now working full time on McLek case while four are assisting in covering operational desks that exist within this Section. Six Agents from within this Section are assigned full time to McLek case.

5(d). From above discussion, it will be noted that this case is directed at developing evidence concerning violations of Federal statutes under which we have investigative jurisdiction and our principal efforts have been directed toward this responsibility. There are also far reaching aspects of the case which require investigative attention and because they are so diversified there is a necessity for directing efforts in the first instance along those channels which are of greatest importance. These channels relate especially to the possibility of a conspiracy, if in fact one exists, on the part of individuals to acquire and release without authorization classified material of the Executive Branch of the Government.

As noted above, evidence has been developed which would support those prosecutive aspects which to date have been considered by the Department and efforts are currently underway to resolve the potential conspiracy aspects.

The principal problems which have arisen with respect to supervision of this case have related to efforts on the part of Assistant Attorney General Mardian and attorneys within his Division to (1) conduct investigative activity on their own and (2) to direct our investigative activities frequently into areas tangential to the main thrust of the case. With respect to investigative efforts by Mardian, the following are cited as examples:

12

On 6/29/71 Mardian telephonically advised he was sending a Departmental attorney to see Senator Charles McC. Mathias, Jr., who had received from Ellsberg some copies of classified documents. He said the Departmental attorney would discuss with Mathias the possibility of Mathias' turning these documents over to him. Mardian asked if we wanted to have an Agent accompany the attorney. The Director concurred that no Agent accompany the attorney, stating, "Let Mardian's emissary accept them."

On 7/21/71 when Agents of Washington Field Office endeavored to interview Mr. Charles W. Cooke, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, they were advised by Cooke that he would not submit to interview in the absence of clearance granted by the Deputy Attorney General. This was in pursuance of a lead which had been referred to us by Mardian and when the Cooke interview was attempted it was learned for the first time that two attorneys from the Internal Security Division had been designated to conduct the interview with Cooke.

On 8/10/71 one of Mardian's attorneys telephoned to say that he was going to interview an informant the next day in connection with this case and asked if the Bureau would arrange a place where he could meet securely with the informant and whether the Bureau desired to have an Agent present during the interview. In concurring that Bureau should not accede to these requests, the Director noted, "If Mardian's outfit would refrain from what are basically investigative activities and leave it to the Bureau there would be less friction."

On 8/12/71 the Bureau received through misrouting a communication which Mardian had addressed to the Attorney General to summarize current information in what he described as "Our continuing investigation into the acquisition of the 'McNamara Study' by the 'New York Times.'" The Director inquired whether Mardian's outfit was conducting their own investigation in this matter, as indicated by the contents of the memorandum. As a matter of fact, material summarized by Mardian was nothing more than information extracted from Bureau teletypes showing FBI investigative results.

With respect to Mardian's efforts to direct our investigative activities, the following are the most recent examples:

By letters dated 8/12 and 8/23/71 we received from Mardian lengthy instructions for conducting of investigation in the Ellsberg matter. It is quite evident from a review of these communications that the requests contained therein are the results of disorganized review of the material furnished to Department by the Bureau.

13

For example, both letters contained requests to conduct investigation previously conducted and reported to the Department. Certain other requests contained therein would more logically fall within the province of the Special Task Force Committee established by the Department of Defense to analyze Rand Corporation security procedures. Other requested investigation had previously been initiated by the Bureau and other investigative requests were not on their face germane to the violations or potential violations of law. Certain of the requested investigation appeared to be based on unsupported assumptions and theories of the invdvement of other individuals in the leak of the "Pentagon Papers" but offered no basis or reasons for the requested investigation.

The most recent letter, 8/23/71, contained request for investigation of Ellsberg's travel. We have been developing this information since the inception of our investigation and it has been furnished to the Department on an almost daily basis. This letter also requested inquiries concerning certain telephone calls by Ellsberg, investigation concerning most of which had also been previously initiated. Mardian also stated Department files had no information on Leonard S. Rodberg, whose name has recently come up in this case as the possible source of the "McNamara Study" material which will be published by the Beacon Press in Boston. We have in this and other cases furnished information on Rodberg in approximately a dozen communications.

The analyses of these lengthy letters from Mardian requires the expenditure of a considerable amount of Agent time. They indicate that Mardian's group, apparently in efforts to direct our investigation, are propounding questions, some of which are relevant but many of which are not relevant to the main thrust of our investigation, some of which should be referred elsewhere, and others of which have been previously answered.

In accordance with instructions issued by the Assistant Director, we are furnishing to Mardian copies of the daily teletypes from our field offices. These teletypes contain "raw" investigative results not coordinated. The coordination of these results regularly appears in our investigative reports which are also furnished to Mardian. We feel that the reports resolve many of the questions which have been propounded by Mardian in the past and it would enhance our investigative efforts to eliminate dissemination of the daily teletypes in the future and give to the Department investigative results in report form, supplemented by a weekly summary letter which we regularly forward to him.

14

ELLSBERG CASE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

I generally concur with the comments of Mr. Wannall as to the progress and status of this case from an investigative standpoint. I have reminded Mr. Wannall that the development of direct evidence should not be obscured by the broadening of the scope of this case. He has been advised that his objective must consistently be the development of substantial admissible evidence necessary to establish a conviction as to Federal violations charged in the Los Angeles indictment of Ellsberg and others which may develop from other corollary investigations being conducted.

From the outset, as stated by Mr. Wannall, I expressed the importance of this case and instructed him to advise me of any manpower needs. The question of manpower is discussed under the caption "Adequacy of Personnel" found in 6E of this report and was the subject of my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 7/29/71 captioned "Proposed Adjustments of Work Assignments, DID," memorandum of W. R. Wannall to Mr. Felt 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, DID," and my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan 8/12/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, DID."

In reference to Mr. Wannall's concluding suggestion in his writeup, the procedure of furnishing daily teletypes to the Department in major cases is not unusual. The high level interest of the Department, which will eventually be responsible for the prosecution of this case, as well as the interest of the White House dictates that teletypes in this matter be disseminated consistent with the Director's instructions, copy attached. It appears we should clarify the Department's use of these "raw" investigative results as set forth in our teletypes and suggest their detailed reviews be conducted from Bureau investigative reports, which are the normal communication for such use. Mr. Wannall will be instructed to advise the Department by letter with regard to the foregoing pointing out that our weekly summary letters and investigative reports will resolve many of the questions they raise as to information in our teletypes.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
CDB:lml
4-A-3

TED STATES DEPARTMENT USTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 15, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. SULLIVAN
MR. BRENNAN
MR. ROSEN

I have tried to lay down intelligent guidelines as to what should be sent and what should not be sent to the Internal Security Division of the Department. In the last several days I have noted a number of memoranda addressed to the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General about matters about which the Internal Security Division should have been advised and I have had to send these back and request that memoranda be appropriately addressed to the Assistant Attorney General of the Internal Security Division. Apparently I have failed in pointing out the guidelines I desired, so henceforth, you should send everything, including the kitchen stove if it comes in, to the Internal Security Division. It is hopeless to get a considered understanding of my wishes in this matter, which I believe is largely due to some degree of stubbornness because of the recent disciplinary action I had to take when we failed to advise the Attorney General about the Media burglary.

Therefore, as I have indicated, henceforth you will send everything to the Internal Security Division that in any way relates directly or indirectly to the work and jurisdiction of that Division.

Very truly yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:EDM (7)

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(R. E. White:bhg, 9/7/71)

This case involves the publishing of parts of the "McNamara Study" in June, 1971, by "The New York Times." The evidence to date strongly indicates Daniel Ellsberg is responsible for furnishing the classified data to representatives of this newspaper, and he has been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury for the unauthorized possession and conversion of these documents. This is the case simply stated; however, this matter is far from being so simple. From its inception, this case has been complicated by the enormity of the work to be completed and problems inherent in this unusual investigation.

In regard to the amount of work involved, a survey was made to establish how many communications were dated during the period of a single week (Saturdays and Sundays included). As a result of this survey, the following represents the number of communications dated during the weeks noted below:

INCOMING

	Teletypes	Airtels	Reports	Letters
7/11-17/71	107	21	5	2
8/1-7/71	81	26	5	3
8/8-14/71	82	24	4	2

OUTGOING

	Teletypes	Airtels	Letters
7/11-17/71	8	4	8
8/1-7/71	14	0	8
8/8-14/71	19	3	10

INTRA - SOG

	Memo
7/11-17/71	15
8/1-7/71	7
8/8-14/71	15

The above-noted chart is believed to be representative of the high volume of communications received daily. Many of these communications were lengthy and/or complicated requiring close analysis by one or more supervisors assigned to this "Special." Also, a check of the work devoted to the preparation of daily summary memos and of weekly summaries disclosed a supervisor would arrive at the office at approximately 5:30 a.m. each morning, Monday through Friday, to have the daily memos dictated and typed by 8:15 a.m. the same day, and the Supervisor responsible for the weekly summary due each Monday would spend approximately 6 hours preparing this communication on the prior Sunday. Noteworthy, too, is the fact that many responses to the letters from the Attorney General's Office require extensive research.

With the approval by the Attorney General to interview newspapermen, it is anticipated that the work load will increase rather than decrease in the immediate future. Initially there will be at least 75 newspapermen to be interviewed and numerous additional leads will be developed from these interviews. This investigation involves numerous facets and requires extensive work and supervision.

Presently there are 9 Supervisors assigned to this case and their responsibilities are as follows:

E. R. Harrell, Unit Chief, reviews all outgoing correspondence, reviews incoming reports in Ellsberg case; supervises preparation of daily summary memorandum, weekly White House memorandum in Ellsberg case, SALT Lek case (leak of classified information concerning Strategic Arms Limitations Talks appearing in "The New York Times"), and the Toll Lek case (leak from State Department cables concerning alleged misconduct of Bert M. Tollefson, Jr.); assists in setting out leads from daily teletype correspondence from field.

J. R. Wagoner, as case Agent in McLek, responsible for review of all incoming reports as to adequacy of reporting and leads; maintains and supervises operation of lead box in Ellsberg case; responsible for follow-up communications on outstanding leads; has basic responsibility for preparation of weekly White House summary; assists in preparation of daily memorandum summarizing prior day's investigative activity in the field.

J. R. Hagy, as case Agent, has all supervisory responsibility for Toll Lek; conducts research on all New Left aspects of Ellsberg investigation and responsible for preparation of comprehensive analysis of New Left implication in the case; responsible for setting out leads relative to New Left associates and contacts by Ellsberg; responsible for following field investigation; corroborating attendance by Ellsberg at New Left functions; assists in leads obtained from daily teletypes in McLek and Toll Lek cases;

assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; and assists in preparation of weekly White House summary.

H. J. Morgan, as case Agent, has primary responsibility for supervision of SALT Lek case; reviews all incoming correspondence and sets out pertinent leads relative to SALT Lek; assists in preparation of daily memorandum summarizing investigation in all three major leak cases aforementioned; assists in review of daily teletype traffic in all three major leak cases; review of dissemination of weekly reports in SALT Lek; assists in preparation of White House summary.

L. E. Belanger handles all ELSUR checks; reviews, correlates and conducts necessary research relative to all material received from Department of Defense in Ellsberg investigation; responsible for backup file reviews in connection with New Left contacts by Ellsberg; assists in preparation of weekly White House memorandum; assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum.

T. J. Seabaugh assigned exclusively to a comprehensive study, charting and research into extensive travel performed by Daniel Ellsberg; responsible for setting out leads to insure complete coverage of all details of travel facets of investigation.

J. P. Benedict responsible for extensive file reviews regarding numerous news media personnel and personalities involved in Ellsberg investigation to ascertain their susceptibility to interview as cooperative sources; conducting extensive research and charting of the considerable telephone traffic involved in this matter, including traffic from Daniel Ellsberg, Anthony Russo, the Sheehans, "The New York Times," the Washington bureaus of all newspapers involved, traffic from various hotels utilized by Ellsberg and his contacts, and all other individuals whose telephone traffic has been subpoenaed as a result of Departmental action via Grand Jury subpoena.

W. W. Hamilton assists in preparation of daily summary memorandum; responsible for review and appropriate preparation of all summary teletypes for dissemination to Department of Justice; file reviews on the numerous news personalities being considered for interviews as potential cooperative sources in the Ellsberg investigation; handling of correspondence connected with leads obtained from daily teletypes; assists in preparation of White House summary.

J. M. Sizoo assigned exclusively to the research and preparation of an extensive biographical write-up on Ellsberg. In this regard, facts concerning Ellsberg's life, behavioral patterns, associates, education, political views, personality transformations, family, and influences will be studied and analyzed.

In addition to the above specific assignments, each member of the unit on a daily basis is required to participate in Section, Unit and/or Branch conferences for resolution of investigative facets of the Ellsberg, Toll Lek and SALT Lek investigations.

Some of the problems involved in this investigation are:

(1) Whether Ellsberg was alone responsible for this crime, or whether he was part of a small or large-scale conspiracy.

(2) Whether the purpose was for idealistic reasons (anti-Vietnam War beliefs), to discredit the Executive Branch of the Government, or to make available classified information to a foreign nation.

(3) Investigations have been conducted by agencies other than the FBI: State Department, Department of Defense, NSA and the Attorney General's Office, and it is the Bureau's responsibility to review and analyze these investigations.

(4) To determine what other persons and newspapers received these documents and from whom they received this data.

(5) Innumerable interviews involve newspapermen, Government officials, and persons having far left leanings, against U. S. policy in Vietnam and antagonistic toward the present Administration. These are all delicate interviews.

(6) To determine whether the New Left and/or any anti-Vietnam peace groups are involved in this case.

(7) All logical avenues of investigation to bring this case to a successful prosecution must be explored. An unsuccessful prosecution would open the door for anyone at whim to disclose classified information which could easily endanger the stability of the Executive Branch and impair our relations with other nations.

(8) The White House and the Attorney General's Office are closely following this matter and all other leak cases, and in this respect the Attorney General's Office has sent numerous communications requesting certain leads be covered by the FBI. These requests must be analyzed by DID and the appropriate communications answered, which is a time-consuming administrative procedure.

In regard to the last situation noted above, you are aware that the Department is reviewing for lead purposes the daily teletypes we furnish them. Thereafter, they send us a communication requesting us to conduct these leads. This must be stopped. Such a procedure is unproductive and time consuming, resulting in additional unnecessary communications to the Department. You are instructed to immediately advise the Department that the purpose of the daily teletypes is to make them cognizant of the developments in this case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation based on these communications.

With the importance of this case, the urgency of the problems to be resolved, the immediacy of the work to be performed, and the volume of communications received daily, there appears sufficient work at the present for nine Supervisors. However, you must constantly evaluate the work load to assure that the assigned manpower is fully justified. Also, much of the present work is exploratory, which involves researching and analyzing and thereafter assuring that the many facets are immediately and fully probed. Once these exploratory aspects are sufficiently investigated, this case will be directed toward more specific objectives which will narrow the investigative field. As this transition period is entered, immediate consideration should be given to reducing the manpower assigned to this matter. Also, it is incumbent upon you to make certain that all logical investigation is expeditiously and fully conducted in order that the Bureau will not be subjected to criticism by any person or agency.

A review of this matter indicates that you should continue affording it top priority supervision and direction.

Comments of Assistant Director and Section Chief Wannall requested.

ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL: The analysis and observations of the Inspector have been noted.
(WRW:ams 9/7/71) WRW

We will continue affording top priority supervision and direction to this case. In addition, we will immediately advise the Department that the purpose of daily dissemination of teletypes to the Internal Security Division is to make that Division cognizant of developments in the case and that the FBI fully intends to pursue all other logical investigation based on these communications.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above.
(CDB:mls 9/7/71)

22

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY 4-A-4

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: At the time of the last inspection this matter was being afforded urgent supervision and investigation for the purpose of identifying all of the conspirators and perfecting cases for prosecution against them.

You are requested to provide a brief narrative summary of this investigation and bring it up to date. Indicate in your response the number of subjects on whom we have developed prosecutive cases, the number yet to be developed and in each instance indicate what you feel are the possibilities of successful prosecution.

In this regard, identify any cases in which successful prosecution is in doubt and indicate what action is being taken to erase the doubt.

What is the current status of prosecution of these cases and when do you feel these cases will be adjudicated?

From a supervisory standpoint, advise how much manpower is being expended presently on the supervision of this (these) cases and indicate when you feel these men can be reassigned to other work.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: The investigation of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON) is concerned with plots in Washington, D. C., to blow up the tunnels housing the heating system servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official. Individuals connected with these plots are all associated with the Berrigan antiwar movement. An indictment was returned during

8/24/71
FBG/GHM:plm

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
4-A-4

Johnson

23

the last inspection (1/12/71) at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, which charged six individuals with complicity in these plots and two of these six were charged additionally with a violation of the contraband statute in that they caused unauthorized letters to be exchanged into and out of the Federal Penitentiary at Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. There were also seven individuals named in the indictment as unindicted co-conspirators.

Our investigation into this matter continued, and on 4/30/71, a superseding indictment was returned which expanded the charges and strengthened our case. Eight individuals were included in this indictment as defendants, and the number of unindicted co-conspirators was reduced to four. The superseding indictment includes those charges listed above and added the conspiracy aspects of the selected Selective Service break-in cases in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; Rochester, New York; Wilmington, Dover, and Georgetown, Delaware. Two additional counts added to the superseding indictment involve three individuals and charged them with the mailing of a threatening communication.

In addition to the substantive case, potential witnesses have been either cited for civil contempt of court or indicted for criminal contempt of court in connection with their refusal to answer questions before the Federal Grand Jury (FGJ) in Harrisburg after being granted immunity. Five individuals were cited for civil contempt, and four individuals were indicted for criminal contempt. Two of these cases are currently the subject of a petition by the Government to the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of certiorari, and the other cases are being held in abeyance until the Supreme Court renders its decision.

From the investigation conducted to date and the comments of the prosecutive staff of the Department, there does not appear to be any reason to believe that prosecution of this case will not be successful.

The substantive EASTCON case is currently in the pretrial stage with numerous motions of both the Government and the defense still pending before the court. At present, it appears that the court will be unable to set this matter for trial until January, 1972. Even though we are well on our way to trial, due to the complexities of charges in the indictment and the broad scope of the violations involved, there exists additional facets of investigation of a continuing nature which will possibly increase as the trial date approaches.

For example, in the Fall of 1970 we undertook to determine through an Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project whether EASTCON principals had established a long distance telephone communication network. The basis for this theory was information received from our informant, PH 1211-S, who advised that fictitious telephone credit card numbers were being utilized by members of the Berrigan antiwar movement to facilitate contacts. This project disclosed voluminous calls between EASTCON principals and between them and sympathizers from their own telephones and also corroborate the fraudulent use of fictitious telephone credit card numbers. This information was of value to the Department in the examination of witnesses before the FGJ since it placed witnesses in a position of either admitting contact between each other on specific dates, committing perjury, or claiming the Fifth Amendment. This project has more recently been extended and is now being utilized to identify individuals involved in the Washington, D. C., plots of the EASTCON case through "nonhit" telephone toll calls between EASTCON activists and persons not previously known to have been active in the movement. It is believed that recent information from this project, developed further by investigation, has identified a Capitol Hill elevator operator who was recruited for these plots. The project is a continuing one, and the investigation of pertinent developments hopefully will identify an engineer who was consulted on the tunnel plot, as well as other individuals involved in the Washington, D. C., action. The very technical nature of the raw material developed by the ADP project has resulted in individuals at the Bureau and certain offices such as Philadelphia, New York, Baltimore, and WFO having become well versed and particularly adroit in the interpretation of such complicated information.

The investigation of EASTCON includes the handling of two informants; the first, PH 1211-S, is the individual who will be responsible for the introduction of the most convincing evidence against all of the defendants - the letters between Philip Berrigan and Elizabeth McAlister which relate to every count in the indictment. Since the testimony of this informant before the FGJ, he has become theoretically the responsibility of the Department, as a Government witness, but of necessity, the Bureau has coordinated his activities, etc., because of his peculiar status until he testifies at trial. He is currently living many miles from Harrisburg under an assumed identity and is gainfully employed through the assistance of the Bureau. All of these problems have been coordinated through the Bureau to insure the security of this valuable source. As an example, the informant's father recently died and unfriendly members of the news media became aware of funeral arrangements. By instructions of the Bureau and through very competent handling by the field, the security of this informant was maintained in spite of the presence of unfriendly members of the press at the funeral. It will be necessary to continue to coordinate any other problems of this nature until his testimony is heard during trial. In this regard, as the trial date approaches, other problems develop requiring Bureau assistance such as arrangements for "in depth" conferences with the Department's prosecutive team under secure circumstances. This will be a very important conference since the informant has only been interviewed (briefly) by the Department on one occasion, and no opportunity has existed since his appearance before the FGJ to further explore his testimony.

We have also developed another informant, PH 1223-S, who is a close friend of Philip Berrigan and active sympathizers in the Berrigan antiwar movement. He is the only individual who has obtained any identification of possible MEDBURG suspects from John Peter Grady (arrested in the Camden Federal Building break-in 8/22/71). Grady indirectly claimed credit for that action and by inference named other people who are considered prime suspects. The informant has recently accepted a position of running a newspaper at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on behalf of The Defense Committee, the legal, bail bond, and public relations arm of the Berrigan antiwar movement. He is a unique and cunning individual who is now in a vital position to keep us informed of the on-the-scene and behind-the-scene activities in Harrisburg during the EASTCON trial. One extremely important example of the valuable information this informant has furnished resulted in our initiating (as a corollary investigation to EASTCON) an Espionage - X-type case based upon information he received from an ardent Berrigan supporter who has stated the intention to obtain classified documents from the Lyndon B. Johnson Library in Austin, Texas, to be publicized for the benefit of the antiwar movement in the same manner as those circulated by Daniel Ellsberg.

With respect to The Defense Committee, investigation is being coordinated as to the activities of this loose-knit group due to its direct relationship to the EASTCON case. There has evolved a national organization, and the activities of local groups, as they become organized, will be followed by the Bureau for intelligence information. As an indication of the potential of this body, recognizing that its real push for funds will reportedly not begin until the Fall of 1971, information has been received that they already have substantial funds in their coffers.

From information developed by PH 1223-S, it was determined that John Peter Grady was planning an "action" which from an analysis of the facts known at the Bureau appeared to centered in the New Jersey area. After observations in this regard were furnished to the field, investigation culminated in his being located in the Camden, New Jersey, area. The investigation which followed resulted in the arrest of 20 individuals on 8/22/71 in the act of destroying and stealing draft board records in the Camden Federal Building. The individuals arrested included Peter Fordi (an original member of the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives), Paul Couming, and John Swinglish, both indicted at Harrisburg for criminal contempt after refusing to testify before the EASTCON FGJ when granted immunity from prosecution. PH 1211-S determined Swinglish was the "recruiter" for the Washington, D. C., plots in the EASTCON case. It is to be expected that other individuals who are EASTCON activists will also be indicted at Camden. The evidence already obtained in that case discloses other EASTCON activists were responsible for the Selective Service draft board break-in at Trenton, New Jersey, 5/21/71. Likewise, the obviously coordinated Buffalo, New York, draft board break-in on the night of 8/21-22/71 involved sympathizers of the EASTCON movement.

Much of the foregoing represents the continuing intelligence coverage of the Berrigan antiwar movement, absolutely necessary to the Bureau's interests, aside from the important development of admissible evidence in the EASTCON prosecution. Further, many pretrial motions (by defense counsel) have been ruled on by the court, and many others are still outstanding. In anticipation of the court ruling on a motion for Discovery and Inspection as provided by the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Government, in order to expedite such matters, has previously allowed the inspection of certain evidence in this case. This has been done at various field offices under Departmental supervision. The lists of evidence made available, other arrangements and details with regard to such inspection, has been handled by guidance from the Bureau. Approximately one half of this evidence has thus far been inspected with hundreds of items of evidence still to be inspected in Washington, D. C., Philadelphia, and Baltimore. The court has ruled in favor of the defense broadly interpreting the right of Discovery and Inspection, particularly as to photographic evidence, Laboratory, and Identification Division reports. The Department has requested such material to be made available for inspection at the Department in the near future, and this project is being coordinated by the Bureau. There are estimated approximately 1,000 photographs submitted by 11 offices. The Laboratory (document examinations) and Identification Division reports will be voluminous since they include not only those prepared in connection with the EASTCON case itself, but also all of those prepared in connection with six Selective Service Act cases included as conspiracy charges in the EASTCON indictment. It is apparent that the evidence from the three offices covering these six Selective Service Act cases will be voluminous and require close coordination by the Bureau with the Department into the EASTCON case for a successful prosecution at trial.

At present, two supervisors are assigned full-time, and one supervisor spends approximately one half of his time in the supervision of this case. This investigation continues to generate a great deal of paper not only on the substantive case but also in connection with the other matters directly related thereto. It is anticipated the time of two and a half Agents will be the absolute minimum required to effectively handle this matter through the completion of the trial. Depending upon the volume of work generated by necessary requests of the Department in the pretrial and trial stages, additional manpower may be necessary at various times.

The Inspector has specifically inquired as to when these men can be reassigned to other work. It is to be noted that since the return of the superseding indictment on 4/30/71, two other full-time supervisors have been reassigned to other work within the Division.

It is not anticipated that the two supervisors assigned full-time to this case will be released prior to the conclusion of the trial in this matter.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I have read the attached and concur in the views expressed by Section Chief Shackelford.

(JAS:lrs) 8-24-71

28

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:wmj 8/26/71)

You should insure that every action is taken to insure successful prosecution in this matter.

Assistant Director please note.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(JAS:mls - 8/30/71)

The Inspector's comments have been noted. The Bureau may be assured that every possible action is being taken in the interests of successful prosecution.

29

ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Briefly set forth the noteworthy accomplishments of your Division, with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 1/26/71. This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplishments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program. This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertaining to the Bureau's progress, welfare, efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection.

A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to such matters should be in general terms.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: (JAS:mls 8/20/71) Attached are individual write-ups from each Section in the Division pertaining to the accomplishments of that particular Section.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/17/71
ESM:wmj

30

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - ARBOR W. GRAY

Attached are memoranda setting out noteworthy accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the last inspection.

This Section is responsible for supervision of investigations of the Communist Party, USA, its fronts, pro-Chinese communist groups, selected Trotskyist-communist groups, Klan and white hate groups, international organizations affiliated with the world communist movement and international New Left extremist movement, individuals affiliated with these organizations and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive organizations and individuals under various statutes relating to the internal security of the Nation and to gather intelligence of interest to Government officials and other agencies. The Section also supervises the development and administration of security informants in basic revolutionary organizations and other subversive and New Left groups. Where appropriate, the Section directs counterintelligence operations against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our supervision.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves from the case entitled, "Solo, IS - C." Due to the sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed with the Inspector.

In essence, this case involves sources developing intelligence information of the highest quality concerning the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the world communist movement. Since its inception, 38 successful missions to communist countries have been completed. Information developed by this operation from high-level contacts in the world communist movement is continually disseminated to the highest levels of our Government and, in many instances, is information not available from another source. Examples of this since early 1971 include the following: Soviets requested CPUSA to provide analysis of public opinion in U.S. regarding Nixon Administration and U.S.-Soviet relations to be used by General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), Leonid Brezhnev, in speech before 24th Congress of CPSU in March, 1971, and essence of analysis was provided; during the 24th Congress, it was learned Soviets doubted whether U.S. was serious on disarmament and they were concerned over U.S.-Chinese communist improved relations; Soviet countermeasures to counteract include planned vast propaganda campaign against U.S., initiation of a European Security Conference to isolate U.S., and improvement of Soviet relations with Japan; General Secretary, CPUSA, Gus Hall, planned visit to North Vietnam and Laos Spring of 1971, thereafter returning to U.S. to hold mass rallies to raise antiwar movement in U.S. to a new high; visit was set for 5/15-20/71; however, North Vietnamese canceled same, angering Hall who felt this resulted from Chinese communist pressure; information concerning possible split in CPUSA along racial lines; details concerning meeting of CPUSA leaders and Soviet Ambassador to U.S. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, at which time Dobrynin stated hope for world peace would be improved if President Nixon were re-elected in 1972.

All of this information was furnished the White House and other interested officials of our Government, usually by teletype. Central Intelligence Agency has expressed great interest in information developed by this operation and on July 24, 1970, requested permission to include pertinent data developed by our operation in a "Top Secret/No Foreign/Controlled Dissemination" classified document for senior U.S. Intelligence Board officials.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
PCM:sfw
4-F

32

The two principal informants in this operation have received the "Order of Lenin," with the title "Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the international communist movement."

Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. This number remains the same. In addition, we have another informant who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments. This latter source is also a member of the Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day basis as they occur.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
PCM:sfw
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT

A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts of foreign hostile governments, organizations, and individuals who influence, direct, or dominate the domestic subversive and extremist movements. There has been considerable evidence compiled over the years of this foreign influence. Since the last inspection, the following noteworthy achievements in our investigations relating to foreign influence have been accomplished:

1. In March, 1971, a coalition of leftist individuals including subversives and extremists under the sponsorship of the Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, American Friends Service Committee, and Fellowship of Reconciliation traveled to Paris where they were in contact with the North Vietnamese and other elements antagonistic to the U.S. We developed two informants to participate in this travel and as a result, identified all 170 people in attendance, their activities, contacts, and objectives. All information developed was afforded dissemination to appropriate Government agencies and we were commended by one intelligence agency for the excellent coverage.

2. The World Peace Council is the leading Soviet-dominated international effort to discredit and subvert U.S. domestic and foreign policy. Upon determining the World Peace Council would hold a General Session in Budapest, Hungary, in May, 1971, an effort was made to obtain informant coverage. An informant was developed for the travel and coverage resulted in the identification of all American participants including the Communist Party, USA, delegation and the activities of these individuals at the meeting. All pertinent documents relating to the Conference were obtained, as were the contacts and activities of American subversives at the Conference. Widespread dissemination of intelligence relating to this Conference was made and both the White House and Central Intelligence Agency favorably commented on its exceptional value.

3. During the past six months, the Unit has afforded specific coverage to the travel of U.S. citizens to three hostile communist countries: North Vietnam, North Korea, and Communist China. All individuals traveling to these countries during 1970 have been identified and, where pertinent, investigations have

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
DR:sfw
4-E

34

been opened. Careful records have been maintained regarding U.S. citizens who have visited these countries during the current year and arrangements have been made to receive quarterly reports from another intelligence agency which will enable us to double check our files and insure cases are opened on visitors to these hostile countries, when warranted. We feel this is a strong achievement because, as noted below, we have developed evidence that Americans are currently being recruited for intelligence assignments in these countries.

4. Early in 1971 it was determined an informant who had participated in Venceremos Brigade travel to Cuba had established a rapport with North Koreans in that country. Through careful direction of this informant, he was able to effect an invitation from the North Koreans to visit their country at their expense. He departed the U.S. with a group of three other Americans and traveled to Korea via Paris and Algiers. In Korea he was recruited by the North Koreans for an intelligence assignment, furnished funds, and a code. This is the first individual affiliated with the domestic subversive movement who, acting in a capacity for the U.S. Government, has been able to penetrate North Korea. We believe this informant will be able to furnish exceptionally valuable intelligence relating to foreign intelligence and political influence of the North Koreans in the domestic subversive movement.

5. Through cooperation with the British Security Service we have developed, during the past six months, direct connection between an individual who was associated with the Weatherman in the U.S. and bombing activities in England. British intelligence is extremely interested in this matter and we are carefully following it for developments.

Through intensified investigation of the Revolutionary Union (RU) and Venceremos Party (VP), we have been able to identify over 200 hard-core Marxist-Leninists who have all indicated violence-prone propensities. Of particular note is the fact that our closely supervised investigations in this area have developed an informant on the National Committee of the RU and have resulted in identification of an extremely militant RU group in Eugene, Oregon. The Department has expressed extreme interest in our RU investigation and has indicated a desire to explore prosecutions at the first opportunity.

In late 1970 Mark Lawrence Wefers, the student body president of the University of New Hampshire, traveled with a National Student Association group to North Vietnam. While there he made recorded speeches encouraging the servicemen in

South Vietnam to lay down their arms or turn their guns on the real "pigs." Wefers' incendiary comments were broadcast over Radio Hanoi. Intensive investigation has been and is continuing to be conducted and the Department has indicated an interest to prosecute Wefers under the sedition statutes at an early date. This will represent the first prosecution under the sedition statutes since the 1950's.

A suit was instituted against the Director and two Special Agents of the Memphis Office seeking preliminary injunction against the FBI and punitive and compensatory damages amounting to over $100,000 against the Director and the Agents. The suit was instituted by the Southern Conference Educational Fund claiming harassment and intimidation of war resisters. Former communists, extremists, and subversives were involved as plaintiffs. In July the plaintiffs dropped their plea for a preliminary injunction. Excellent information identifying the principal plaintiff, on whose statements the false allegations were based, as having a criminal record involving furnishing of false information and theft, has been furnished to the Department as well as the fact that he is the subject of a current outstanding State Bench Warrant. It is anticipated when this matter is argued before the court, the plea for punitive damages will be dropped, much to the embarrassment of the communist subversives and extremists involved.

The Unit endeavors to keep track of all efforts to discredit the U.S. military effort through organization of antiwar coffeehouses, oriented groups, and publications. Last January we intensified investigation on Peoples House, a coffeehouse operated by subversives in Clarksville, Tennessee. Excellent information has been developed, all the principal subversives participating have been identified, and details have been furnished to the Department and interested military intelligence agencies. The House Committee on Internal Security has taken an interest in this coffeehouse and it is expected to be the subject of a Congressional hearing which will publicly expose the involvement, tactics, and objectives of the extremist elements behind this subversive endeavor.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT 4-E

The FBI has continued its investigation of 18 Klan-type organizations including 255 klaverns (units) throughout the United States which had a slight increase in membership from 4,300 a year ago to approximately 4,500 at present. This increase in membership is primarily attributed to renewed interest in Klan-type organizations brought about by Federal directives regarding school busing in order to achieve racial balance in public schools.

In recent months the UKA and Shelton have undertaken a major campaign aimed at harassing the FBI. The initial step of the campaign was named by Shelton as "Operation Polly" in which he sought to obtain polygraph machines to help "weed out FBI pimps." We have taken steps to assure he is not successful by instructing our key informants to talk it down and, if necessary, to ultimately refuse to take such an exam. We have also discreetly contacted a potential supplier to be assured we are aware of any positive action taken by Shelton in this regard.

Further, as a result of our hard-hitting investigation and interviews of Klansmen, Shelton printed a series of articles in the monthly UKA publication "The Fiery Cross," entitled "Exposing the CIA and FBI," in which Shelton vehemently attacked the Bureau as a "Gestapo-like police force" and the Director as "a man who has sold out his country for his prided FBI." Picketing of the Norfolk and Richmond FBI Offices to protest interviews of Klansmen by FBI Agents as infringement of the individual rights of Klan members also took place recently and Klansmen were instructed to attempt to secure photographs and identities of our Agents in order that this information could be published in "The Fiery Cross" with the intent that the FBI be embarrassed and our Agents transferred. This information was furnished to appropriate field offices and to the Department. To date our Agents have avoided having their photographs taken by the Klan.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:co/bcw
4-E

37

Violence has been noticeably absent among Klan-type organizations during the past year. This is due in the main to our effective informant program. We have been able to direct our informants to positions of leadership throughout the country, and these informants have been extremely successful in forming nonviolent Klan policy. We have also been able to keep local authorities advised of potential Klan violence in time to thwart such action.

Since last inspection, information was also developed through Joan Gourley, former mistress of head of Minutemen, Robert DePugh, concerning murder of Walter Barnes, former Minutemen member who was allegedly murdered and buried by DePugh while in underground hide-out in New Mexico prior to his arrest by the FBI. Gourley traveled to New Mexico to locate gravesite in company of local authorities who granted her immunity. Gravesite disclosed only four small bones identified by coroner as coming from foot of human victim. Gourley furnished statement to New Mexico authorities and, in addition, stated DePugh had indicated in July, 1970, while imprisoned, that body had been removed from original gravesite, but she did not believe him at that time. Local District Attorney, while believing Gourley's story, felt prosecution not feasible without body. During July, 1971, SD 1155-R, a Minutemen informant of this Bureau furnished information and explosives reportedly to be utilized in the bombings of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division (ATFD) and Internal Revenue Service offices in the California area, resulting in the arrest of several individuals, including informant, by ATFD, thus preventing the bombings.

Subsequent to last inspection, dissemination has been made concerning weapons, possible violence and demonstrations of these groups which has resulted in the curtailment of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate group organizations in some areas. In several cases, confiscation of weapons has been made by ATFD of the Treasury Department based on our information. We have also made apprehensions of extremist subjects for illegal possession of firearms following conviction of a felony, a violation under our jurisdiction.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:co/bcw
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: There follows a summary of accomplishments of the Research Section since the last inspection:

Central Research Unit

This Unit performs a wide range of research and writing assignments and preparation of various documents and special reports. These include the following:

An extensive special assignment on new left research for the Director.

A special report which is kept up to date on FBI usage of electronic surveillances.

The "FBI Current Intelligence Analysis" issued approximately every week summarizes significant items of interest in subversive field.

"FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" issued weekly summarizes significant items relating to black extremists.

"The Extremist Speaks" is a monthly compilation showing extremist views taken from their publications.

A pamphlet entitled "The Black Panther" was prepared for public distribution.

A pamphlet entitled "1970: Year of the Urban Guerrilla" was prepared for distribution.

The monograph entitled "The CPUSA Annual Intelligence Digest" was issued in February.

A number of papers were prepared for the Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

A number of book reviews of interest were prepared.

Special reports are prepared on a continuing basis for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Special Committee.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
MSR:amt
4-E

The Unit coordinated the preparation of material for the Division's participation in the conference with police officials concerning attacks on police and prepared a special packet of material for distribution to those police officials in attendance.

This Unit also was responsible for coordination of preparation of damage assessments relating to Domestic Intelligence Division documents stolen in the burglary of the former Media, Pennsylvania, Resident Agency, and handling other aspects of the Medburg case as related to this Division.

In addition, the Unit also collected and prepared material for various articles, speeches, and surveys. Personnel of the Unit have handled lectures on subjects of communism, the new left, and racial extremism. These have consisted of classified lectures to Bureau's New Agents and In-Service classes, appearances before other intelligence agencies and National Academy classes and appearances before outside groups.

Special Records Unit

This Unit is primarily responsible for records keeping for emergency planning. Further details concerning programs handled by this Unit are set forth in Section 4-H.

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly called the Racial Reporting Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases of disturbances, violence and other developments where race is a factor as well as information bearing on the potential for violence throughout the country. Material being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is reviewed, coordinated and disseminated to interested officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other high officials. Statistical data on civil disorders, school disorders and attacks on police is extracted from communications received from the field and is maintained in this Unit for use in the preparation of special papers. Detailed statistical data is prepared for automatic data processing.

This Unit also prepares on demand certain studies and briefs concerning specific subject matters relating to racial extremists and racial situations. Examples of these are a detailed study on the extent of foreign influence on the black extremist movement completed in February of this year. A current document on this subject matter is presently

40

being prepared for early dissemination. In June, 1971, a comprehensive document on the potential for violence in the Nation during the Summer of 1971 was prepared for high-level dissemination.

In addition to the above, this Unit prepares a monthly "FBI Digest of Civil Disorders" briefly summarizing all disorders occurring in the previous month growing out of racial unrest. The incidents are listed geographically and chronologically so that the White House and other recipients can tell at a glance the general nature of incidents and problems and where they are.

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly known as the New Left Reporting Unit, coordinates coverage of activities relating to all New Left, student, and antiwar demonstrations, as well as other civil disturbances arising from issues other than racial in nature. A daily teletype summary on demonstrations and other disruptive activity is prepared for dissemination to the White House, the Attorney General and other interested Government officials.

Continuing and timely dissemination is made concerning major demonstrations in addition to the teletype summary and advance information concerning possible demonstrations is furnished Government officials (principally the President and Vice President) traveling throughout the country.

Since the last inspection, this Unit has covered the following major demonstrations:

Marches on Washington, D. C., and San Francisco, California, on 3/20/71 sponsored by the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) to protest unemployment.

A series of disruptive demonstrations held in Washington, D. C., during the period 4/1-5/71 sponsored by People's Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and May Day Collectives. During this series of demonstrations, some 12,000 arrests were made.

A series of demonstrations in Washington, D. C., sponsored by the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) during the period 4/18-23/71 to protest continued U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

41

A massive demonstration in Washington, D. C., on 4/24/71 sponsored by the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC). A similar demonstration was held in San Francisco. The Washington, D. C., demonstration attracted an estimated 400,000 persons.

A March for Victory demonstration sponsored by the Reverend Carl McIntire held in Washington, D. C., 5/8/71 to protest withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam.

A "smoke-in" sponsored by the May Day Collectives in Washington, D. C., 7/4/71.

Nationwide demonstrations during the period 8/6-9/71 sponsored by NPAC and PCPJ, as well as other peace groups to protest the war in Vietnam and to commemorate the atomic bombing of Japan.

This Unit also prepared studies and briefs when they are called upon to do so and regularly issues the monthly "FBI Intelligence Calendar of Major Events." Also statistics are maintained concerning the disorders for use as needed.

42

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD Attached are comments from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the New Left Section since the last Inspection. This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left movement, including terrorist groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this Section, as are sabotage investigations, and Protest and Trotskyist groups.

DID INSPECTION
8/18/71
DPW:jlm
4-E

43

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - WEST

The primary objective in this Unit has been and continues to be the goal of overcoming the threat to American institutions presented by violence prone extremists, such as those within the revolutionary Weatherman organization. This Unit and the Special Investigation Unit - East, supervise security investigations of the Weatherman group and its individual members. Through coordination with the General Investigative Division, which has handled certain criminal investigations involving Weatherman members, and with the Special Investigative Division, which has supervised the investigation of Weatherman fugitives, substantial accomplishments in the task of neutralizing these extremists have been achieved. A number of Weatherman leaders have been indicted on Federal charges involving violations of the Federal Anti-riot, gun control and bombing statutes. Many leaders and activists in the Weatherman organization have gone underground and the organization is currently composed of a few hundred adherents including those underground and above ground. Its underground existence and the fugitive status of its leaders have isolated Weatherman from the mass of American youth. Consequently, Weatherman has experienced a considerable reduction in strength, based on the number of its present adherents and its influence among young people.

Weatherman, though a small group, continues to be extremely dangerous in view of its violent and destructive tactics. It is noted that Weatherman has claimed credit for a number of bombings, including the bombing of the national Capitol building on 3/1/71.

Weatherman continues to receive intensive investigation. In recent months, a Weatherman bomb making factory has been discovered at 1038 A Pine Street, San Francisco, California, and subsequent investigation there has uncovered a number of persons, including attorneys, who are acting in a covert support role for Weatherman. The Department of Justice has now indicated in a letter to the Bureau that it will institute Federal Grand Jury proceedings concerning activities at this Pine Street address, with the prospect of further indictments and further discourage-

44

ment of Weatherman sympathizers. Approval has been obtained for this Unit to supervise this Pine Street case in view of its intimate connection with the overall Weatherman investigation. Approval has also been obtained for this Unit to supervise a New Left - Violence case in Tucson, Arizona, which involves Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms (UPRF) charges. This Tucson case concerns five New Left extremists, three of whom have now been indicted by a Federal Grand Jury. Two of these have been apprehended and the third is a fugitive. Another subject in this case has been sentenced to jail for contempt of court for refusing to testify before the Grand Jury.

An example of the salutary effect of vigorous investigation and prosecution of New Left extremists is seen in the Seattle area. There, a radical group called the Seattle Liberation Front (SLF), which was composed of former Weatherman members, had fomented continuing violence. Then SLF leaders were tried in Federal court on anti-riot charges. This trial ended in a mistrial but the SLF leaders were cited for contempt of court. Since that mistrial in December, 1970, SLF has been disbanded and most SLF members have left Seattle. There has been a noticeable reduction in New Left violence in Seattle.

In the several cases referred to above, it is noted that in each instance information crucial to the prosecution of New Left extremists was provided by New Left informants.

In recent months significant accomplishments were made in a case involving two extremists in Ohio through the use of a tesur installation. These two extremists were Nancy Kurshan and Howard Emmer, who were leaders of the Youth International Party (YIP). Between February and June, 1971, a tesur covered the activities of Kurshan, Emmer, and others with outstanding success. This source provided advance information concerning the plans of May Day leader Rennie Davis for the recent May Day national action. The source also provided extensive information on planned demonstrations and strikes at Kent State University on May 3 and 4, 1971, the anniversary of the killing of Kent State students by the National Guard in May 1970. This source furnished information concerning activities and movements of suspects in the Capbom case and other New Left extremists. This source also developed information on plans for the Women's March on Washington on April 10, 1971.

45

As a result of dissemination of advance information developed by this source, authorities were able to further control these demonstrations and reduce the violence arising out of such activity.

With reference to the complicated Weatherman investigation, much progress has been made recently in the development of information on the technical aspects of the actual operation of the Weatherman underground, particularly its use and methods of obtaining false identities, its courier system, its use of radical attorneys in covert support roles and in the movement of its support personnel. Effort is continually being made to develop new techniques and approaches to facilitate this investigation. A "stop index" program in NCIC, for Bureau use only, concerning extremists on Priority I of the Security Index was initiated in June, 1971. This program enables our field offices to receive prompt notice by teletype when police agencies make inquiries about these subjects. In addition, new procedures have recently been devised whereby the Identification Division can better disseminate to the field arrest information on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file. This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices to determine if fingerprints have been received since the last check.

46

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT-EAST

Incidents of sabotage currently being investigated by the Bureau.are, for the most part, the "home grown variety" occasioned by attacks against the military and related operations on the part of New Leftists, dissidents, and elements opposed to U.S. participation in the Vietnam War.

There are under investigation at the present time 9 sabotage initiated investigations with prosecution pending, involving 21 subjects who are charged with various violations including Attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government Property, Antiriot Law violations, Civil Rights violations, Violation of National Firearms Act, Possession of Destructive Device, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicle, Contempt of Court and Conspiracy.

Since last inspection and as a result of sabotage investigations, 10 individuals have either been tried in Federal court and found guilty or have entered guilty pleas. Three of these individuals have been sentenced to a total of 30 years while the remaining 7 are awaiting sentencing. Additionally, since last inspection and as a result of sabotage investigations, 6 additional individuals have been indicted but not yet brought to trial. Two of these 6 are currently in a fugitive status. It should be noted that as a direct result of this Bureau's sabotage investigations, 5 subjects are currently included in the Bureau's Most Wanted Fugitives List and Identification Orders are currently in effect concerning another 3 subjects.

TJM:cae
8/18/71
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
4-E

47

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST 4-E

The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic Society, Young Socialist Alliance, the militant Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party.

Four contingents have traveled to Cuba since November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216 young Americans who obtained their own transportation to Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that country. These young revolutionaries were returned to Canada on 2/12/70 at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship. The second contingent of 687 sympathetic American youths were loaded aboard this boat for its return trip to Cuba. This group, like the first contingent, worked in the sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of transportation on April 28, 1970. In August, 1970, the third contingent of the VB, made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and fertilizing citrus trees. This group returned to the U. S. mid-October, 1970. The fourth contingent of 233 young Americans traveled by air to Cuba during the last week of March, 1971, and were returned to Canada by Cuban ship on May 29, 1971.

Each group worked approximately 7½ hours a day, 5½ days a week, and in their free time were afforded the opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71

765 FBS:bjn
4-E

48

smash the U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the facade of the U. S. imperialist monster."

Each of the more than 1500 brigade members has been the subject of a security investigation which includes the identification and obtaining of background data as well as a personal interview with each brigade member. These investigations are being made to determine the immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the revolutionary movement in the U. S. Upon completion of the investigation and the interview of each of these individuals, the field must recommend either the inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index. In addition the field must continue to report every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts of each brigade member.

The intelligence responsibilities of the Bureau in regard to the VB have been handled through the placing of Bureau informants in the ranks of the various contingents. Accurate on-the-scene reports concerning the training and activities of these groups in Cuba have been furnished to the intelligence community and factual responses have been made to congressional and other legitimate inquiries regarding these young supporters of the Castro Regime. As a result of our investigations, more than 275 VB participants have been placed on the Security Index and it has been noted that about 25% of those individuals currently being intensively investigated as extremists in the New Left section, are ex-VB members.

Plans for a fifth contingent of the VB have been formulated. This new group is tentatively scheduled to depart for Cuba in early January, 1972, and is to be comprised of 225-250 individuals politically oriented to the socialist cause.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS - NEW LEFT UNIT

Among the primary responsibilities of this unit is the identification and investigation of individuals who, because of activities or affiliation with one or more violence-prone revolutionary groups, are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the nation. In most instances, this unit handles initial stages of the investigation and carries it through to completion. In some instances where individuals are determined to be of an extremist nature, those cases are referred to the units in this section handling extremist cases. At the conclusion of each investigation or at the phase of the investigation when it is determined that the individual therein could be considered a danger to the internal security of the country, an evaluation is made and, if appropriate, the individual's name is included on the Security Index.

The immense volume of cases handled in this unit is clearly exhibited by the fact that since the last inspection approximately 5000 cases have been handled in this unit. To be exact, 5418 cases have been opened and 4951 cases have been closed.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
WHF:rsm
4-E

50

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

This Unit is responsible for the investigation of antiwar protest groups and key activists connected therewith, as well as the Eastcon case. Accomplishments of the Unit worthy of note are as follows:

EASTCON

As a result of our investigation of the plots to blow up the underground tunnels housing the heating system servicing Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and to kidnap a high Government official, an indictment was returned at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, on 1-12-71 covering six individuals as defendants and seven unindicted co-conspirators. Our investigation into this matter continued, and on 4-30-71 a superseding indictment was returned at Harrisburg which added two additional defendants and reduced the number of unindicted co-conspirators to four. In addition, five individuals have been cited for civil contempt for refusal to testify before the Federal Grand Jury regarding this matter, and four individuals have been indicted for criminal contempt. By letter dated 2-25-71 to the Director, Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian advised of his appreciation for cooperation extended by the Bureau in this case and singled out the efforts of six members of the Domestic Intelligence Division, as well as two Agents of the Philadelphia Office.

Of paramount importance to the successful prosecution of this case is our principal witness, Boyd Frederick Douglas. He testified before the Grand Jury in January, 1971, and subsequently assumed a new identity and has been living under appropriate cover in Des Moines, Iowa. Inasmuch as he is a witness rather than an informant, the Department is primarily responsible for his welfare and his cover. We maintain liaison between the witness and the Department in order to insure that the Bureau's interests are properly looked after. The death of the informant's father in July, 1971, created a situation whereby the informant's identity and location could have been ascertained by irresponsible members of the press. Through the concerted efforts of the Omaha Office, the informant and his wife attended the funeral with no adverse effects. Assistant Attorney General Mardian, by letter dated 7-21-71, praised the high degree of proficiency of five Agents of the Omaha Office in protecting the identity of the witness.

The development of a highly placed informant, PH 1223-S, within the pro-Berrigan forces is also a significant accomplishment. This individual has gained the confidence of leaders in the Berrigan movement and is privy to information not available from any other source. The informant has furnished a wealth of information regarding fund raising and strategy and tactics planned by movement leaders to propagandize their position and to attempt to gain public support for the Berrigan cause. In the course of this coverage, the informant furnished information concerning plans of the group for action in the event parole was not granted to Philip and Daniel Berrigan on 7-28-71. He also furnished plans of the group to mount an attack on the Bureau of Prisons which culminated in a hunger-work strike at the Federal Correctional Institution, Danbury, Connecticut, on 8/6-7/71. This action resulted in the transfer of eleven inmates to the Medical Center for Federal Prisoners, Springfield, Missouri. We furnished plans of this proposed action to the Bureau of Prisons, and in a letter to the Attorney General dated 8-11-71, the Director of the Bureau of Prisons noted that the action of the inmates confirmed our intelligence reports received several weeks prior.

PH 1223-S also furnished information concerning the intention of the group to embarrass the administration by having Daniel Berrigan prepare the text for a Mass composed by musical conductor Leonard Bernstein. This Mass is to be part of the dedication ceremonies for the Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts in Washington, D. C., and is to be performed on 9-9-71. The words prepared by Daniel Berrigan were to have been in Latin and were to follow an antiwar theme. The group anticipated the President and high ranking administration officials would applaud the work and subsequent publicity would be to the effect that they had applauded antiadministration views. This information was furnished the White House and, according to the news media, the President has declined to attend the ceremonies on 9-9-71.

PH 1223-S has also furnished information showing the Berrigan supporters are interested in obtaining classified material such as that publicized by Daniel Ellsberg in an effort to embarrass the Government. The individual who is to attempt to get these papers is Linda Shaw Finlay, an ardent supporter of the Berrigan cause. Her target is the Lyndon B. Johnson Library at the University of Texas, Austin, which is the repository for former President Johnson's papers. We have a separate espionage investigation underway regarding this situation.

52

ANTIWAR MOVEMENT

This Unit is responsible for the investigation of dissident protest groups in order that their potential threat to the internal security of the country can be assessed. This includes development of informant coverage and the dissemination of timely intelligence information, as well as possible violations of Federal laws.

The organizations concerned are the communist Socialist Workers Party (SWP), its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), and the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) which is controlled by the SWP/YSA. All three of these groups utilize the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) as a vehicle to project their antiwar message. The Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ), continuation group of the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC), also exercises considerable influence in the antiwar movement and is a target for infiltration by the Communist Party, USA (CP). The May Day Collective (MDC), organized by Rennie Davis, is a militant group which split from the PCPJ following the May, 1971, demonstrations in Washington, D. C. Also of considerable interest is the Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW) which came into prominence during the Washington demonstrations. We have disseminated on a daily basis hundreds of reports and memoranda concerning the activities of these and other groups, as well as information regarding principal activists. This dissemination has been augmented by the preparation of several CINALs pertinent to specific demonstrations, conferences, or activities.

Of particular value has been our coverage of national conferences and conventions sponsored by various groups which are used to plan future antiwar activity and demonstrations. We have been able to cover these sessions most effectively and have furnished other interested Government agencies with advance information of their plans. Included in these conferences were the following:

2/19-21/71 --	National student antiwar conference, Washington, D. C., sponsored by SMC.
5/15/71 --	SMC National Steering Committee meeting.
6/25-27/71 --	PCPJ national conference, Milwaukee, Wisconsin.

53

7/2-4/71 -- NPAC national antiwar convention, New York City.

8/8-15/71 -- SWP national convention, Oberlin, Ohio, which also included Student Activist Educational Conference of the YSA.

8/13-17/71 -- MDC national conference, Atlanta, Georgia, preceded by regional conferences in Washington, D. C., and Fayetteville, Arkansas.

With regard to the MDC national conference, our informant coverage led to the apprehension of three leaders of the New York MDC contingent by the New York City Police Department for possession of firearms. Our informant determined the exact location in a specific vehicle where a shotgun, 22 caliber rifle, and 357 Smith and Wesson revolver, all loaded, were recovered. In addition, in excess of 500 rounds of ammunition for these weapons were seized.

Our investigation of the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam (COLIFAM) produced significant intelligence information with regard to the exchange of letters between prisoners of war in North Vietnam and their families within the U.S. By letter dated 8-9-71, the Directorate of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Force, advised that this information was of "considerable assistance" in an intelligence collection program concerned with prisoners of war.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

Included in the work of the New Left Groups Unit are the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of the Weatherman), other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports, New Left publications, and the maintenance of a library of research material on the New Left for use of Bureau officials in connection with approved speaking commitments.

In 1969, the Worker Student Alliance (WSA), Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions of SDS split into separate groups. Accomplishments concerning Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM faction of SDS is now practically defunct. Currently, the largest faction of SDS is the WSA faction, which is dominated by the pro-Chinese Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party (PLP).

Approximately twenty Bureau informants attended the SDS/WSA National Convention in Chicago, December 26-30, 1970. This convention was dominated by PLP controlled leadership; however, dissent was widespread, much of which was led by our informants. Since the last Inspection, this dissent has spread further and has resulted in additional factionalism within the SDS/WSA.

During the past winter, the SDS/WSA has continuously attempted to inject itself into labor disputes without success, due mainly to factionalism. The objective of the SDS/WSA is to build ties with workers inasmuch as in the old Marxist-Leninist tradition, they view the students-workers as the vanguard of the revolution. In this regard, the SDS/WSA set up a Summer Project with the twofold objective of a massive recruitment program and the fostering of a general strike, nationwide, through infiltration of industry and unions. We have been on top of this program from its inception and have kept all interested Government agencies advised of developments on a continuing basis. In addition, again largely due to factionalization, the SDS/WSA Summer Project program has not had significant success in any of its twenty-one target cities.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
DPW:jlm
4-E

55

New Left Movement reports submitted quarterly by each field office have enabled us to furnish interested agencies timely and informative documents on the activities of the New Left movement. This is a substantial contribution to the objective that responsible Government officials be alerted concerning the nature and extent of this aspect of subversive activities and the threat it presents to our democratic society.

By conducting an intensive review of many New Left publications which range from the pornographic to the clearly revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these publications; their subversive activities and whether or not they urge violence; and sources of funds. Since these publications are the voice of the New Left and are influencial in recruiting youth, pertinent factors concerning them are disseminated to interested officials and agencies. Since our review of these "underground" publications has revealed many of them frequently come into being and become defunct within a short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by perusing various underground news service lists as well as other documents and books which report new publications in this field.

A library of research material on the New Left is maintained for use of Bureau officials in connection with approved speaking engagements before Government officials and responsible citizens. In this manner, we have assisted these Government officials and responsible citizens to more fully understand the subversive and anarchist manifestations of the New Left movement.

Through the key activist program, we have focused investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left movement with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible. This program has proved successful in that we have been able to closely follow the activities of these individuals and furnish interested agencies and high Government officials with information concerning their subversive and agitational activities. Of particular note is the fact that more than half of the 73 individuals designated as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action.

56

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section

The primary mission of this Section involves counterintelligence operations against Soviet-Bloc Intelligence Services (SBIS). Counterintelligence, by definition and in practice, is a reaction to initiative displayed by a hostile intelligence service. This factor largely inhibits bold and aggressive initiatives on our part and the major part of our efforts is spent in routine, programmatic, nonremunerative work and patient, painstaking analysis of information developed. Positive counterintelligence achievement in the final analysis depends on the ability to detect and exploit in a timely fashion circumstances which arise naturally--contriving, to the extent this is feasible, to anticipate, encourage, or modify circumstances to our own advantage or the disadvantage of the SBIS.

In this perspective, the accomplishments listed below are most noteworthy. These are highlighted by the current operation of four defectors-in-place and the identification of three "illegal" agents since the last inspection. From both a quantitative and qualitative viewpoint, these successes represent an extremely high level of accomplishment in these two vital areas.

In keeping with the Inspector's instructions, brevity will be stressed in the examples portrayed. Security and the "need-to-know" principle also requires limitation of detailed information on many cases discussed. These matters, however, are identified sufficiently so that any additional data desired may be obtained from the individual file. Accomplishments cited are restricted to the most significant and/or representative.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr
4-E

I. Defectors-in-Place (DIP)

The most valuable asset which counterintelligence can acquire is the recruitment of a Soviet-bloc official who is an active intelligence officer or who otherwise has access to intelligence information. Such a source can produce information of incalculable value not obtainable from any other source. Highest priority and emphasis is assigned to cases which have such potential. Although we have had success in this area in the past, at the time of the last inspection we had no DIP. Currently we are operating four sources in this category, which are briefly described below.

IRONCLAD is a sensitive, highly placed DIP who furnishes, on a continuing basis, a large volume of high level information concerning operations of Soviet Intelligence Services (SIS). He has identified hundreds of SIS officers and furnished information concerning approximately 250 intelligence operations. Some of his information involves penetrations of other Government agencies as well as substantial information which has been of high interest to the White House. The value of information he has furnished and has a potential to furnish is beyond estimate.

WINGTIP is a DIP who is in a position to furnish information concerning Polish intelligence activities. He was recently recruited and his potential is still being exploited.

KIELBASA is a DIP who is a Polish intelligence officer whose recruitment was recently effected. He is under continuing development.

SPINNAKER is a DIP in the Yugoslav field who has furnished information on Yugoslav intelligence activities pertaining to identities of intelligence agents, their sources and targets. Dissemination of pertinent information furnished by him has been made to interested U. S. agencies.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr/eco
4-E

58

II. Double Agents

A double agent is an individual under Bureau control who has been recruited and given intelligence assignments by SBIS. Double agent development is given great emphasis since this is a primary method to obtain valuable information concerning hostile intelligence operations, targets, techniques and personnel. At the time of the last inspection, this Section listed 138 double agents, 296 potential double agents, and 49 inactive double agents. Figures for August 1, 1971, are 133, 291, and 47 for the respective categories. Apart from statistics, the most significant accomplishment lies in the quality of the double agent operations which has developed since the last inspection. A representative number of these situations are set forth below.

CHOWLINE is a double agent which began in 1958. Through the years this operation has grown steadily in significance and productivity. The source has been paid over $52,000 by the Soviets while passing carefully cleared material, some of which was deceptive in nature. A deception concept concerning nonexistent U. S. military capability has been accepted by the Soviets and their attempts to counteract this capability have reportedly caused them to commit $1.5 billion in their defense budget. Most significant developments were the identification of two Soviet illegal agents in the U. S. as a direct product of the CHOWLINE operation (see Palmetto and Ixora).

The SNOOD operation involves a Soviet agent who was uncovered through information received in 1962 from a DIP. We initiated interviews with this individual on a pretext of interest in the source of funds deposited by him which we knew to have originated with the Soviets. After extensive interviews source admitted his involvement as an agent for SIS and agreed to cooperate with the Bureau. During June, 1971, he met with a Soviet contact and through corroborative information from DIP, we know that Soviets still accept him as one of their most trusted and valuable U. S. agents.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr
4-E

BASELINE is a double agent operated against Hungarian Intelligence Services (HIS), who is reportedly considered to be the top Hungarian agent in the U. S. Although HIS has been most reluctant to have personal contact with this source in the U. S., we were able to induce such a meeting on January 28, 1971, in New York City and identified a Third Secretary of the Hungarian United Nations Mission. Informant has been told he will handle HIS agents in the U. S.

CANDY is a double agent operation directed against HIS on intermittent basis for 14 years. HIS interest was dormant from 1966 to 1970, when this operation was reactivated by HIS. HIS has attempted to have source meet with them abroad, but under our direction he has resisted this presure. We are still attempting to manipulate this operation to bring about intelligence meetings in the U. S.

In 1968 HIS, under cover of the East-West Exchange Program, dispatched a 29-year-old Hungarian national (LA5478-PSI) to the U. S. on an intelligence mission. This individual is now under our control. Under HIS instructions he was to seek permanent residence in this country to further his intelligence mission. This is being done under our control.

AQ 366-S is a double agent serving with U. S. Air Force in New Mexico. He has been operated against the GRU (Soviet Military Intelligence). He receives radio messages originating with GRU radio in Havana, Cuba. In June, 1971, he had a meet in Juarez, Mexico, and the Soviet principal was identified as an official from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Considerable information has been developed in this case concerning Soviet capabilities and communications systems.

In three double agent operations in the U. S. - Mexican border area we have identified four Soviet officials assigned to Mexico City as intelligence officers. In addition, we have uncovered a Soviet illegal agent. (EP 628-S; EP 656-S; SA 888-S).

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr
4-E

60

III. Soviet Illegal Operations

These operations are staffed by officers or agents of SIS who enter the U. S. and operate without any connection with the legal bases, i. e., the intelligence residencies staffed by intelligence personnel under cover of official position located at the Soviet Embassy and Mission to the United Nations. In view of the completely clandestine nature of these operations, they are the most difficult to detect. We have in the past achieved some success in detecting several illegal operations. Since the last inspection, three such agents have been identified in the cases outlined below.

PALMETTO is an investigation of an individual detected removing espionage material from a dead drop filled by the CHOWLINE source in March, 1971. This individual was successfully identified through intensive, discreet investigation as a Mexican national currently doing graduate work at a western university in the U. S. Intensive investigation is underway in this case to determine additional information concerning this individual's activities with a view to uncovering other Soviet agents in the U. S. whom he may be servicing.

In another outgrowth of the CHOWLINE case, we have identified the IXORA subject as a Soviet illegal agent. This individual is an Austrian national who entered the U. S. in 1968 as a permanent resident and resides and is employed in the New York City area. Identity of this person was furnished the CHOWLINE informant as an emergency contact to be made only in event a war is imminent. Intensive investigation is also underway in this case to determine the extent of this individual's activities and contacts.

In a double agent operation (referred to above), a Soviet illegal agent has been identified as a resident of Juarez, Mexico, who has been used in servicing Soviet agents in the U. S.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EWL:pdr
4-E

61

IV. Counterintelligence and Special Operations

In this category, on a highly selective basis we take initiative in actions which are designed to disrupt, deter or otherwise disadvantage the operations of SBIS. We employ our own resources and whenever feasible, those of other U. S. agencies. Brief examples of activity in this category since the last inspection are set forth.

A former Soviet exchange student in the U. S. reappeared as an official assigned to the Soviet United Nations Mission. During his previous visit in the U. S. he had recruited a fellow student, whom we had identified as a result of information furnished by a DIP. When the Soviet recontacted this American we were in a position to control the latter's actions. At our direction the double agent wrote a letter to the Soviet United Nations Ambassador complaining about the treatment he had received and the indiscretions committed by the Soviet. The Soviet has been reprimanded and there are indications that his assignment to the U. S. will be cut short.

A Soviet defector who formally operated as a KGB officer in the USSR was recently used by us to contact a Czech professor temporarily in the U. S. as an East-West exchange participant. The professor's wife is a Soviet national who was known to our defector source as an agent for the KGB in the Soviet Union. The Czech was suspected of being affiliated with Czech intelligence. An approach was made and although the Czech couple seriously considered the proposition for defection put to them, they finally decided against such action and returned to Czechoslovakia. During our contacts some information of low level intelligence significance was developed.

The Soviet Government is currently engaged in securing property in San Francisco to house the office and personnel of the Consulate General. Through conferences held with State Department we have been able to exert an

62

influence on the choice of properties made available to the Soviets. As a result of our action it appears almost certain that the Soviets are settling on a property considered by us to offer the best advantage for counterintelligence coverage.

In late January, 1971, we furnished information to State Department and White House concerning activities of a very aggressive KGB officer in Washington, D. C., who was attempting to obtain equipment involved in a classified communications system used by White House and other agencies. We suggested to State that subject be declared persona nongrata and State, after securing concurrence of White House, decided instead to personally admonish a representative of the Soviet Embassy concerning these activities. This action resulted in curtailing the Soviet's intelligence activities and probably resulted in his early recall.

A Soviet attached to the staff of the new Consulate General in San Francisco came to our attention as a KGB officer who had formerly been stationed in China. He had been declared persona nongrata and expelled from Peking with some publicity. This information was furnished by us to a cooperative newspaper source in San Francisco and resulted in a newspaper article which repeated the charges. Considerable embarrassment was caused and long range curtailment of this Soviet's intelligence activities is hoped for.

V. Prosecutive Action

One objective of counterintelligence investigations is prosecution. Since most intelligence officers have diplomatic immunity, this objective is rarely attained.

A Soviet intelligence officer operating under cover of employment at the United Nations Secretariat has requested classified information from a double agent regarding the F-14 aircraft being manufactured by Grumman. The facts have been presented to the Department of Justice and Department of State and both have approved prosecutive action. The Soviet was scheduled for arrest during May, 1971, but this action

63

was held in abeyance pending final approval of the White House, which had requested a temporary delay. Soviet has been on summer leave and recently returned to the U. S. We are currently seeking concurrence from the White House so that arrest may take place at the next meeting scheduled for 9/13/71.

VI. Dissemination of Significant Intelligence Data

One of the products of our counterintelligence operations is the development of intelligence data of interest to other U. S. agencies. The following are examples of significant data which has been disseminated on a high level since the last inspection.

1. Dissemination to National Security Agency regarding an unknown subject connected with that Agency who was reported to us as cooperating with the KGB.

2. Dissemination to Atomic Energy Commission concerning a high official of that Agency who was being cultivated by the Soviets for intelligence purposes.

3. Dissemination to State, CIA, and the White House of information we developed concerning the delivery to the Soviet Embassy on June 17, 1971, of a package containing a copy of the "Pentagon Papers."

4. Dissemination to White House, CIA, and State concerning an intelligence approach made by the Soviets to a member of the President's Science Advisory Committee.

5. Dissemination to the White House of information we developed concerning the receipt by Soviet intelligence of information concerning Dr. Kissinger's trip to China prior to the release of this information by the President. This information was obtained from an American agent of the KGB in Washington, D. C..

6. Dissemination on high level to White House and CIA concerning Soviet intelligence targets relating to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks then in progress.

64

7. Information in the CHOWLINE and PALMETTO cases has been disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney General. Dr. Kissinger has commended the Director and the FBI in this matter and specifically requested that he be kept informed of any additional developments

VII. Soviet Information Collation System (SICS)

SICS is the system in which we have utilized automatic data processing equipment to record data concerning Soviet officials in the U. S. Since the last inspection, a continuing expansion has been made in this system and we are looking to the inclusion of Satellite personnel in the near future. This is a time consuming project which holds a tremendous potential, already partially realized, for reducing administrative work and making our overall investigative operations more efficient and successful. Detailed write-up is included in Section 5-Q of the inspection report.

VIII. Recovery

$9,288.76 has been claimed as a recovery in the SNOOD case. This is the amount paid Internal Revenue Service as tax on income belatedly reported by subject due to action by the Bureau.

65

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

4-E

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The significant accomplishments of the Extremist Intelligence Section can be seen most clearly in the accomplishments through our investigative efforts as well as the accomplishments achieved through the extremist informants.

Since the last inspection we have supervised the "Newkill Special." This case involves unprovoked attack on two New York City (NYC) police officers, 5/21/71, by two Negro male assailants. Both officers were shot and killed. Prior to this shooting on 5/19/71 two NYC officers were machine gunned and seriously wounded as they attempted to stop a speeding car occupied by Negro males. Anonymous letters were received by news media in NYC claiming credit for these shootings.

The Director met with the President and the Attorney General regarding the killing of the two officers as this incident received nationwide publicity. The Director instructed an all-out effort be made to effect Bureau solution.

Intensive investigation has been conducted to identify assailants with investigation conducted abroad and in over 40 field offices. Over 2000 people have been interviewed. The Identification Division has compared the fingerprints of over 700 persons with latent evidence and the Laboratory Division has conducted about 400 separate examinations of ballistics and other type evidence in this case.

Since its inception, we have concentrated on members of the violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) as suspects. This has paid off since four persons were arrested in NYC on 6/5/71 while attempting an armed robbery. Two of the individuals

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
8/19/71
JGD:acs
4-E

arrested were Bureau fugitives. We had previously identified the two Bureau fugitives from fingerprints from material submitted by them to news media in May claiming credit for the murders. The two Bureau fugitives, Richard Moore and Edward Joseph, were BPP members who were reportedly in Algeria. A machine gun utilized in armed robbery and in possession of Moore was determined to be same weapon used in machine gunning of two NYC police officers on 5/19/71. Moore has been indicted by Queens County, New York, Grand Jury for attempted murder of the two officers. He and Joseph remain in custody of local officials.

Our intense investigation has in some respects decimated the BPP in NYC. We have kept them on the defensive and in hiding. Our investigation and interview program has resulted in developing a witness who is an associate of the prime suspects in this case.

Based upon her testimony of acts of violence, she identified seven Panthers who participated in killing a Negro BPP leader in NYC. Of the seven, three had previously been arrested in the above-mentioned armed robbery 6/5/71. The remaining four became Bureau fugitives for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution for murder.

On 8/7/71 a Panther informant of our Detroit Office under instructions to locate the four fugitives located Michael Dennis Hill, one of the four, who was accompanied by an associate. Based upon informant's report, Hill and Anthony Nicholas La Borde were arrested, both armed with firearms, and La Borde also had a live hand grenade in his possession. A Federal Grand Jury has indicted Hill and La Borde with possession of destructive device and La Borde also charged with harboring Hill.

Hill is reportedly the "trigger man" in shooting of two officers on 5/19/71 and our witness has stated Hill was extremely upset for his failure to actually kill the officers and is a likely suspect in killing the two officers two nights later on 5/21/71. Hill is described as the "hit man" of BPP and was the planner and "hit man" in armed robberies and acts of violence committed by BPP. La Borde was also indicted on armed robbery charges on 8/16/71 in NYC having been identified as the person who held up a bar during July, 1971.

Hill and La Borde are prime suspects in the killing on 5/21/71 and lineup is being arranged for our crime scene witnesses to view these two.

We have kept the White House and the Attorney General apprised of all pertinent developments in this case and on five occasions Mr. John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, the White House, has advised the Director by letter of his appreciation of being kept fully informed on this case.

Through the investigative efforts of the field and the various Bureau programs, we have been able to follow closely the development and activity of the BPP which revealed as of June, 1971, a total membership of 710 in 39 branches located in 37 cities.

The Bureau's Black Nationalist Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), which was in effect for several years, was discontinued 4/27/71. Prior to discontinuance, counterintelligence activity directed toward disruption of the BPP was carried out at an accelerated rate taking advantage of and exploiting any appropriate situation. Emphasis was placed on creating distrust between Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, and Eldridge Cleaver, BPP Minister of Information, a fugitive in Algeria. These efforts resulted in a break between Newton and Cleaver on 2/26/71 which soon grew into an irreconcilable split and a name-calling contest between the two of them. Through our mass media program, we disseminated publicity concerning the split within the party as well as the fact that Newton lived in a $650-a-month apartment while rank and file Panthers went hungry.

The publicity concerning the internal factionalism as well as Newton's high living definitely served to discredit the BPP and caused further factionalism. The financial supporters were disenchanted bringing to a halt the flow of donations into the organization. The resulting strain added to the paranoia of Newton causing him to create complete chaos within BPP national headquarters. Newton, in an effort to justify his position and to criticize Cleaver and his dissident followers, claimed that Cleaver and his appetite for violence were the root of all of the BPP problems in the recent past. Newton maintained the BPP was really nonviolent but was led astray by Cleaver and that he, Newton, will now return the organization to a position of nonviolence and community work.

In summation, our COINTELPRO efforts split the BPP, cut off their supplies of outside funds and created chaos within.

As a result of the ever increasing information being reported by our informants regarding the acquisition of weapons by black extremist groups, on 5/17/71 an airtel was sent to all SACs setting forth instructions regarding the handling of such information. This airtel sets out in detail the possible gun law violations under the National Firearms Act, State Firearms Control Act and the unlawful possession or receipt of firearms. The field was instructed that we have secondary investigative jurisdiction in such matters and that information developed by our informant coverage regarding possible gun law violations should be handled by us and vigorously pursued looking to the ultimate prosecution of the black extremists involved.

The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherstone, an articulate black extremist and an admitted communist who had in the past visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investigative techniques used, this dangerous extremist organization has been completely destroyed and is no longer a factor in the extremist activities in the Miami area. Our informant coverage developed information regarding the participation by BAMM leaders and members in fire bombings in the Miami area including a bombing at the University of Miami. Through this coverage and other investigations an excellent criminal case was developed regarding the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices by BAMM leaders. In December, 1970, Federal Grand Jury in Miami, Florida, rendered indictment charging Featherstone and two other BAMM leaders with violation of the new antiriot laws. All three subjects have been found guilty in Federal court Miami. Featherstone and Charles Riley, Jr., another BAMM leader, have been sentenced to the custody of the Attorney General for periods of four and two and a half years respectively. The third subject, after testifying for the Federal Government, was placed on probation.

Earlier this year, one of our informants being operated by the Richmond Office reported on a conspiracy by leaders of the Washington, D. C., Chapter of the BPP and leaders of the Richmond Information Center (RIC), an affiliate of the BPP, to steal and transport weapons from Richmond, Virginia, to Washington, D. C. This informant reported on the theft of such weapons in Richmond and their subsequent illegal transportation to Washington, D. C., by this group.

As a result of this information developed and other investigation, two of the BPP leaders in Washington and three RIC leaders in Richmond, Virginia, were subsequently indicted by a Federal Grand Jury.

Our informant testified in Federal court as the principal Government witness resulting in the conviction of the two Washington, D. C., leaders and two of the RIC leaders. The trial for the fifth individual involved is scheduled for 8/20/71 in Richmond. The sentencing of the convicted leaders is scheduled in the near future.

As a result of the conviction obtained based on the excellent information furnished by our informant, the RIC has been completely destroyed and conviction of the two Washington BPP leaders has been highly significant in curtailing the activity of the Washington, D. C., BPP Chapter.

The continued operation and development of extremist informants has resulted in a steady flow of valuable intelligence information, which information has brought about the apprehension of badly wanted extremist fugitives, confiscation of explosives and firearms in possession of extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives. In addition, these informants have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 630 individuals since the last inspection, 145 of these individuals were Bureau fugitives, as well as being responsible for the recovery of $327,760.53.

Concerning the development of information as to black extremist activities outside the United States effecting the United States, we have placed an informant in Canada under the direction of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This operation is commented on in detail in the extremist informant write-up.

Some of the concrete examples of our informant and investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:

Ghetto informants in June, 1971, developed information concerning the motive and circumstances leading up to an unsuccessful attempted fire bombing of a Jackson, Mississippi, police vehicle; identified a local subject involved in assault and theft of a revolver of a Cincinnati, Ohio, police officer, which information resulted in the arrest of the subject by the police department; furnished information which was instrumental in arranging for the surrender to FBI Special Agents of a 16-year-old male who was badly wanted by the Buffalo Police Department in connection with a shooting incident.

Omaha informants advised of the location of several weapons which were owned by members of the Black Revolutionary Party in Omaha and which were subsequently seized by the Omaha Police Department; Houston informants furnished information which was the basis of a raid by the Houston Police Department on the headquarters of the Peoples Party II, which resulted in the arrest of nine individuals, eight of whom were charged with burglary and firearms theft, and the recovery of numerous weapons.

Detroit extremist informants advised concerning a BPP member who was involved in a holdup killing in Detroit. He also advised that this individual was carrying the same pistol used in the killing, which enabled the Detroit police to arrest the BPP member, recover the pistol and determine that this weapon was used in the killing referred to above.

A Tampa informant furnished information concerning identity of two Negro males who placed a fire bomb in a garage in Tampa, Florida.

A Miami ghetto informant was instrumental in obtaining advance information concerning problems in a local high school. It is noted there was a walkout by students at this high school and as a result several Negro students were arrested. A Washington Field informant obtained information concerning Stokely Carmichael's trip to the United States from Africa and this information was verified by the New York Division.

Detroit informant provided information which saved two lives. This informant, who was a member of the BPP, was instrumental in saving the lives of two BPP members who were being disciplined by the BPP and his information when furnished to local police was responsible for arrest of seven BPP members who were charged with kidnaping and assault to do bodily harm less than murder.

A Memphis informant furnished information which prevented a shootout between members of the BPP chapter and the Memphis Police Department.

Extremist intelligence information gathered through our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated to the White House and other high-level Government agencies. This document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest of the extremist problem in the United States.

The quality of our informants can also be judged by the fact that since the last inspection 16 Special Agents have been recommended for either incentive awards or letters of commendation for their work in developing and handling these informants. In addition, 11 extremist informants were given bonus awards for valuable information furnished and services rendered.

In relating to the accomplishments of the Extremist Intelligence Section, comment must be made concerning the contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division during their analysis of extremist matters in the various field divisions. In addition to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section, the Inspection Staff, through their on-the-spot review of extremist matters in the field, are often able to detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening their operation.

The information furnished in the Inspection reports is used by this Section to do a comprehensive analysis of every field office operation and to furnish the results of the analysis to the field divisions by communications captioned "Administrative Review." These reviews have been most helpful in strengthening the various field office operations.

Since the last inspection, informant coverage has improved in the Boston, Charlotte, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Newark and New Haven field divisions and this improvement can be attributed in part to the Inspector's analysis of the above operations.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual units. Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
AJD:ams
4-E

SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT

FBI liaison Agents stationed abroad in 17 foreign posts have facilitated and encouraged the prompt handling by foreign agencies of FBI requests for investigation in the countries covered by those agencies. The productivity of this liaison during the first six months of 1971 was demonstrated by the location in those countries of 779 FBI fugitives, 35 fugitives wanted by other agencies, and 573 Selective Service delinquents for a total of 1,387 persons wanted in the U. S. Eighty-eight automobiles, stolen in the U. S., were recovered abroad during the same six months and the total estimated value of stolen property and funds recovered abroad was $596,442.

Requests for U. S. information and investigations within the U. S. are handled on a reciprocal basis for the foreign agencies with which we are in contact. This cooperation has played a large part in maintaining our dominant position in international police work and has encouraged a spirit of cooperation between the countries concerned. During the first seven months in 1971, we handled a total of 1,773 investigations under our Foreign Police Cooperation program. In one of these cases initiated as an FPC matter but transformed into an Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property case, New York City Agents were successful in locating the famous painting by El Greco "La Asuncion de la Virgen," which had been stolen in Spain in 1936 and brought into the U. S. in 1968 through Mexico. This painting, a Spanish national art treasure, is estimated as worth a minimum of one million dollars and its location has received exceptionally wide publicity in Spain and resulted in expressions of gratitude to our Legal Attache for FBI cooperation.

The expansion of our operations abroad was undertaken at the instruction of the President for the specific purpose of developing high-level political intelligence and each such item submitted is identified by the code word "HILEV." After a slow start in January, when the new offices were just getting underway, the production of HILEV items has increased to the point that during July, 1971, 73 such items were submitted of which 53 or 72.6% were actually disseminated to Dr. Kissinger and the Attorney General. Through August 17, 1971, a total of 245 items have been so disseminated. By letter March 3, 1971, Dr. Kissinger, referring to our work, stated "it is gratifying that efforts thus far have been so fruitful" and "your contributions in the foreign area are deeply appreciated." In June, 1971, the President informed the Director that he desired that we again expand our foreign liaison in view of the valuable information which had been procured by the Bureau in its operations abroad.

Agents of the Unit receive telephone calls from the other agencies in the Executive Branch who need information or have problems they wish to discuss with the FBI. Some of these are referred to the interested division but every effort is made to resolve them without unnecessarily involving Bureau officials. As an example, in May, 1971, we received an Army proposal for the checking of all fingerprints submitted by applicants for enlistment or induction into the Armed Forces. Special Agent Schwartz immediately discussed this proposal with the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Security Policy and a Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Army and was able to convince these officials that no change in the present procedures was necessary or desirable. As a result of the efforts of Special Agent Schwartz, the Bureau was saved a large volume of fingerprint classification and searching, and he was commended by the Director for his successful handling of this proposal.

CUBAN UNIT

This Unit has responsibility for neutralizing Cuban intelligence and subversive Puerto Rican independence activities against the United States. The Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN), New York City, is the focal point for Cuban spying operations, but Puerto Rican terroristic endeavors are carried out by several groups, some being strictly local San Juan operations and others, under Cuban direction, carrying out incendiary bombings and acts of sabotage in the New York City area, as well as in Puerto Rico.

Cuban Intelligence Matters

We currently have 11 active, 21 potential and one inactive double agents in the Cuban intelligence field. Through a concerted effort mounted against the CMUN in February, 1970, we had developed 24 DESECO-type sources at the time of the last inspection. Since that date, 19 other similar sources have been cultivated, and each is being used in some capacity on a continuing or intermittent basis in our efforts to establish blanket coverage of the known intelligence officials at the CMUN (9 out of a 15 man complement) and to develop a defector-in-place there.

Recently we have developed documentary proof that an Attache at the CMUN is illegally purchasing television cameras in violation of United States regulations, and State Department is considering persona non grata action based on this data. One of our sources has obtained the repair contract for CMUN automobiles which assures us continuing access to them.

In March, 1971, the Director's approval was obtained to carry out a concerted defection effort against a CMUN Second Secretary, using a Special Agent of the New York Office who has a Latin American background and who has gained the complete confidence of the Cuban intelligence official through his facility with the Spanish language and his finesse in posing as a Washington, D. C., businessman who is looking ahead to the time when United States will reestablish trade relations with Cuba. State Department is preparing back-up material for this operation. The White House has been offered this arrangement as a vehicle to feed disinformation to the Cuban Government, and it has responded with enthusiasm that serious consideration is being given to use of this communication channel.

In other positive moves we have arranged for a friendly newspaperman, who writes for Spanish-language newspapers in New York City, to prepare feature articles on Cuban defectors who have settled happily in the United States. In conjunction with State Department, we received concurrence of Secretary General U Thant of the United Nations to bar two strong-arm-type Cuban intelligence officials from United States territory even though neither had ever been in the United States or performed any known acts of violence against United States property or citizens. Mr. U Thant pointed out that this was a landmark action, as the United States had never before presented a case which warranted entry denials in the history of the United Nations.

Our around-the-clock coverage of Cuban intelligence activities has allowed us to identify, with a minimum of effort, the various extremist, New Left and subversive Puerto Rican independence leaders who maintain contact with the CMUN. Two valuable double agents in the Miami area have gained the complete confidence of a top Cuban collaborator based in New York City, and they are able to provide full details concerning Cuban Government military and civilian targets in the Miami area. One of these double agents is being groomed to make clandestine trips to New York City, and it is anticipated that we will receive valuable data concerning other Cuban Government targets when these trips materialize.

The field offices responsible for covering Cuban intelligence activities have consistently taken an imaginative approach to the problem, and supervisory personnel in the field and at the Seat of Government consistently strive to insure that all available tools are furnished the investigating Agents.

Subversive Puerto Rican Independence Matters

The terroristic Puerto Rican proindependence movement, responsible for over 230 incendiary bombings in Puerto Rico and over 40 in the New York City area since 1967, is a very real menace to major United States installations and to the security of Puerto Rico, as well as to the United States. While only a small minority of persons desiring independence for Puerto Rico is involved, we now have approximately 1,000 individuals marked for special handling in case of a national emergency, and a majority of these have been associated in some way with violent acts against public or private property.

The largest of the extremist Puerto Rican independence groups is the Puerto Rican Independence Movement (MPIPR), while others practicing violence are the Puerto Rican Socialist Workers

78

Party (PSO), Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA), Armed Commandos for Liberation (CAL), and the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico (NPPR), the oldest of the revolutionary groups. MIRA and CAL, in particular, are dominated by native Puerto Ricans who had many years of sabotage training in Cuba, returned surreptitiously to Puerto Rico and led the wave of major explosions which heavily damaged United States installations in metropolitan Puerto Rican areas. Property loss resulting from such acts of violence since 1967 has been estimated at over $15 million with an economic loss of over $100 million.

In addition to the previous apprehension of Filiberto Ojeda Rios, Cuban espionage agent and leader of several major bombing expeditions, the FBI was instrumental in the arrest by Police of Puerto Rico (POPR) of Narciso Rabell Martinez and Roberto Jose Todd Pagan, two other long-time espionage agents with extensive sabotage training in Cuba. Following the deaths of two police officials and an ROTC cadet during a riot in March, 1971, at the University of Puerto Rico, one of our informants was able to identify and bring about the arrest of a Federation of University Students for Independence (FUPI) leader involved in the killings. FUPI is a radical college student group which advocates violence in bringing about independence for Puerto Rico.

Our sources in the Puerto Rican independence field have given us information concerning subversives traveling between Puerto Rico and New York City to transport incendiary devices for use in acts of sabotage. Also a close rapport has been established between POPR and our San Juan Office in recent months. The resulting arrests and seizure of explosives, as well as intelligence material, have slowed down the acts of violence noticeably during the first seven months of 1971.

We are quite apprehensive that the National Conference of Governors has been scheduled for September 12-15, 1971, at San Juan. Realizing the volatile nature of the Puerto Rican independence movement, we have directed an airtel to all offices pointing up the powder keg situation and asking that every effort be made to obtain advance information concerning planned acts of violence to be carried out against participating officials. We are watching this situation closely and are prepared to give the POPR all logical assistance in helping to curtail any such plans.

MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT

This Unit is primarily responsible for the overall supervision and direction of the FBI's activities relating to countries in the Western Hemisphere commonly referred to as the Latin American nations. Such activities involve Espionage, Internal Security, Registration Act, Neutrality Matters and the collection and dissemination of foreign intelligence data. In addition, the Unit handles anti-Castro activities, pro-Castro organizations and individuals, Cuban Security Index matters and cases and Cuban travel, immigrant and refugee matters. The Unit is also responsible for the supervision of cases involving Spanish American and other ethnic groups.

The President and other policy makers have indicated a continuing interest in political intelligence information from areas in South and Central America and the Carribean. The critical need for such data from these areas, which are in constant political turmoil, prompted us to augument our office in Buenos Aires and to establish new offices in La Paz, Bolivia; Managua, Nicaragua; and Caracas, Venezuela. These offices coupled with our offices in Mexico and Buenos Aires give us representation in the areas from which political intelligence data is urgently needed. To further develop such information, we have established sensitive coverage in Panamanian and Chilean fields.

80

We have on a continuing basis been able to provide the President and other responsible officials with information of the type needed. With increasing frequency our Legal Attaches have been able to provide high level intelligence information which has been given exclusively to the White House and the Attorney General. One such item, for example, provided by the Legal Attache in La Paz on 5/20/71 and disseminated on the same date to the White House and the Attorney General dealt with plans of the Bolivian Government to request the withdrawal of the Peace Corps from that country. Subsequently on 5/22/71, the Bolivian Government did request the withdrawal of this group from the country. A representative of the National Security Council commented favorably concerning this data and the Legal Attache was commended by the Director for developing the source who was able to produce this type of information.

The Unit continues to be successful in thwarting the plans of militant anti-Castro groups which have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba. Successful development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities. Cuban exile activities are embarrassing to the U. S. Government and could lead to a major confrontation between the U. S. and the Soviet Union which has assumed the role of Cuba's protector. An example of our success in this area was the arrest by appropriate authorities of four members of Alpha 66, militant anti-Castro group, on 7/11/71 and the seizure of machine guns, ammunition, explosives, hand grenades, other weapons and a boat. Seizure of this material has hurt Alpha 66's capability to conduct raids on Cuba. Action taken in this instance was based on data furnished by FBI informant.

CHINESE UNIT 4-E

During February, 1971, we identified Robert Moling Teng (65-73910) as the individual reported by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) as having had clandestine contact with a Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence officer in Ottawa, Canada, on 2/2/71. Teng has outstanding credentials as a former Chinese Nationalist diplomat and a former United States Government employee. His background makes him an ideal type for covert use by the Chinese Communist Intelligence Service. Since February, 1971, Teng has attempted to gain employment on the White House staff, with State Department, with Department of Justice, and with a contractor handling work for National Aeronautics and Space Administration. We learned of these efforts through a sensitive source and were able to alert responsible officials concerning Teng.

In July, 1971, with Director's approval, a desk-level conference regarding Chicom matters was held at the Bureau with our RCMP counterparts. The conference was most rewarding and informative and the results were furnished to the Director, who instructed that a memorandum, based on results of the conference, be prepared for Dr. Kissinger at the White House. This memorandum was sent to Dr. Kissinger, who replied with a personal letter of thanks to the Director. Dr. Kissinger noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is most important, and he requested to be further advised of these developments as they occur.

An analysis of our existing method of handling cases on Chinese seaman deserters was made during February and March, 1971. This study resulted in a recommendation, approved, to streamline handling of these matters. Annual savings of $16,160 realized from this new procedure (see Bureau letter to Albany dated 3/22/71 captioned "Chinese Seamen Deserting in the U. S., IS - CH," 105-129735).

In view of the recent increase in the number of contact cases growing out of the establishment of a Chicom Embassy at Ottawa, Canada, it was recommended and approved that Legat, Ottawa, submit communications in unknown subject contact cases in a manner which would allow prompt relay to appropriate field offices inasmuch as identification of unknown subjects is of extreme importance at the outset.

EXO:dgo
8/19/71
4-E

In view of the increase in the number of contact cases mentioned above, Legat, Ottawa, has been requested to devise a form he can utilize in furnishing pertinent information to the Bureau. The present manner of submission of this data does cause some administrative problems here.

During August, 1971, one of our sources began a trip scheduled to last almost three weeks during which he will contact a number of pro-Chicom individuals in the United States and Canada and will culminate in an effort to establish contact with Chicom intelligence officers in Ottawa. Travel to Canada is with the concurrence of RCMP, and RCMP will provide coverage in order that we can evaluate the results of the source's efforts.

During the last three months, two other sources being directed against the Chicoms traveled to Hong Kong where they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts.

Another source, who is under Bureau direction and who is employed at the United Nations (UN), is now in Red China on home leave. This travel was made at no cost to the Bureau and when debriefed, it is expected that this source will be able to provide us with up-to-date information regarding conditions in Red China and possibly valuable political intelligence.

During July, 1971, Paul Lin, described by RCMP as the foremost Chicom agent of influence in Canada, visited Cambridge, Massachusetts, to consult with Harvard University officials. His schedule also called for a meeting with Senator Kennedy who has exhibited a keen interest in U. S. relations with Red China. One of our sources was able to maintain personal contact with Lin during this visit, and Lin has asked the source to carry tasks for him. It should be noted that RCMP has described Lin as the person most likely to be involved in any future discussions in the United States relating to Chicom efforts to ensure entry into the UN.

NATIONALITIES UNIT

Israeli and Middle East Investigations

Information from these investigations continues to be of extreme interest to the White House, the Secretary of State, and high-level officials within the intelligence community. We have continued to furnish information from our sensitive coverage in the Israeli field under a program of dissemination which has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE." "SCOPE" information is disseminated only to select individuals at the White House and Department of State and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the intelligence community. Data primarily relates to attempts by officials of the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction and support within United States Government circles for continued support of the Israeli Government politically and economically, as well as affording military equipment. The personalities involved in these dealings with Israeli officials have included prominent members of the United States Congress, as well as individuals in the Executive Branch. With regard to the information we have furnished, favorable comment has been received from Dr. Henry A. Kissinger at the White House, the Secretary of State and other dignitaries within the intelligence community relative to its timeliness and value in formulating United States Government policy and keeping abreast of the continuing tense situation in the Middle East.

This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation with the National Security Agency designed to penetrate diplomatic communications of foreign governments. We are currently conducting six such operations, all of which are most successful and responsive to high national priority requirements in the production of cryptanalytic and intelligence data. Two of the above-described operations were accomplished since January, 1971.

4 - E.

In view of the sensitivity of these particular operations, it is suggested that I or my Number One Man be consulted for details.

Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosure of Classified Information to "The New York Times: by Daniel Ellsberg

On June 15, 1971, the Attorney General requested the FBI conduct all necessary investigation into the publication of classified information by "The New York Times." Our continuing investigation on a "special" basis into this matter has, from its inception, identified Daniel Ellsberg, Senior Research Associate, Center of International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, as being the principal suspect in this matter. Investigation has revealed that Ellsberg had access to the material involved while employed at Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California; reproduced classified documents in Los Angeles, California, in October, 1969; and subsequently made copies of this material available to various members of Congress who failed to make the data public. Strong circumstantial evidence has been developed indicating that in March, 1971, he made copies of the information available to representatives of "The New York Times" for reproduction.

On June 28, 1971, a Federal Grand Jury at Los Angeles returned a two-count indictment charging Ellsberg with violation of Section 793 (E) of the Espionage Statute in that he unlawfully retained classified documents and failed to deliver them to appropriate Government officials. He was also charged with violation of Section 641 of the Theft of Government Property Statute in that he converted to his own use certain documents having a value of excess of $100.

Investigation revealed that Anthony Russo, former employee at Rand Corporation and associate of Ellsberg, assisted Ellsberg in the reproduction of documents in October, 1969. He was immunized from prosecution and

85

subsequently refused to testify before a Federal Grand Jury. As a result, he was held in contempt and was committed to jail on 8/16/71 until such time as he purges himself by testifying.

Considerable evidence has been developed indicating employees of "The New York Times" have also violated Section 793(E) of the Espionage Statute in regard to their unauthorized possession of classified information and refusal to deliver the information to appropriate officials of the United States Government upon demand.

The summary of facts in the Ellsberg matter, as stated above, derived from a mass of details uncovered by extensive investigation handled on a "special" basis in four of the Bureau's major offices and represents lesser degrees of investigative activity in virtually every Bureau continental office, as well as several Legal Attaches. The Unit has successfully coped with the supervisory responsibilities of this investigation to date and it's servicing of the numerous inquiries in this matter has contributed to the Bureau's stature in the eyes of the highest levels of the Executive Branch who have evidenced concern in the overall problem of the leak of classified information to unauthorized persons. Ramifications of the Ellsberg investigation could foreseeably touch every level of Government operation in view of the necessary revisions in the handling of classified data pointed up as being required because of shortcomings uncovered in this investigation. The need to uncover such shortcomings and to uncover any indication of a concentrated conspiracy to subvert the national security by violation of classification rules continues to be a matter of considerable concern in our investigation of Ellsberg and shares equally with the Unit's recognized responsibility for overseeing the investigation looking toward successful prosecution of Daniel Ellsberg and others involved in this matter.

86

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You are requested to furnish information regarding various surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This information should include identity of the project or program, background and date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.

Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you may wish to comment on:

1. Security Index Program.
2. Security Informants.
3. Extremist Matters. (Black extremist groups)
4. Extremist Informants.
5. White Extremist Groups.
6. Technical and Microphone Surveillances.
7. Counterintelligence.
8. Communist Infiltration of Extremist Groups.
9. New Left Movement.
10. Espionage.
11. Any other program deemed pertinent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached are individual write-ups from each of the Sections concerning the above.
(JAS:mls 8/20/71)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/17/71
ESM:wmj
4-H

87

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY: In connection with the Inspector's request under above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following handled by the Internal Security Section:

(1) Security Index Program

(2) Security Informant Program

(7) Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of White Hate Groups

(11) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent

(a) Thumbnail Sketch Program

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LLA:co
4-H

38

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS 4-H

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat to the national security began prior to World War II. The actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of a threat to the national security.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program is field-wide in scope. The goal of the Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals who because of their membership and activity and/or association with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program includes the collection of sufficient information relating to the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion. The SI is broken down into three Priority groupings, the cards being tabbed either Priority I, II or III in accordance with the relative factor of dangerousness. Most dangerous individuals are tabbed Priority I.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter of temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved a moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971. By memorandum October 29, 1970, from the Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was lifted. At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000 of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in

February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive, timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these individuals. Implementation was directed by airtel November 3, 1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period November 3, 1970, to June 30, 1971. This was considered essential in view of our approximation that it would be necessary to reopen about 7,000 of the Priority II and III types. Our experience in the nine months since moratorium was lifted has demonstrated the wisdom of the lifting of the moratorium as it was found that many of these subjects had changed residence and/or employment, thus necessitating substantial investigation to determine new whereabouts. There are presently pending a number of these cases for the precise purpose of determining whereabouts.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION

Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section. Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate supervisory personnel. I personally follow this matter closely to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

This is a major internal security program based upon Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION

The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated. The most recent justification is contained in memorandum from R. D. Cotter to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated January 12, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
SFP:rrd
4-H

90

BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program was initiated in September, 1964, for the purpose of counteracting and neutralizing white extremist organizations, leaders and adherents. During period January, February, and March of 1971, there were 17 field offices involved in this program and as specific situations arose, other divisions participated.

THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., (UKA)

Under the leadership of John Paul Rogers, Grand Dragon, Realm of Florida, the UKA in that area has become increasingly aggressive in recent months and has been afforded generally favorable coverage by the news media in Florida. In addition, Rogers has been infuriated by recent interviews of Klansmen by the FBI and has been increasingly vehement in his verbal attacks against FBI Agents. As a result, Rogers has been considered a primary subject for counterintelligence activity. Tampa has instructed its informants to discredit Rogers wherever possible without creating suspicion.

John Paul Rogers above has also recently devoted practically all of his energy to the UKA to the exclusion of his wife and job, having hired a retired barber to handle most of his business; yet he purchased a $19,000 home. Tampa is seeking ways to create suspicion of Rogers by other Klansmen.

Imperial Wizard, Robert M. Shelton of the UKA has for some time been attempting, without success, to purchase polygraph machines in order to "weed out FBI informants." Chicago, with Bureau authority, interviewed Walter Van De Werkin, past president of the American Society of Polygraph Examiners, in an effort to ascertain who we should logically contact in the polygraph field to prevent Shelton and the UKA from purchasing this machine. Interview, which was handled in a discreet manner and in complete confidence, revealed that we should not expand this endeavor further at this time due to the large number of individuals and companies involved. In the event we learn of a specific firm or individual the UKA desires to contact for this purpose, further consideration will be given to this matter.

During March, 1971, Washington Field Office was authorized to interview Robert J. Lee, admitted National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) official allegedly involved in raid on Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam to cast suspicion on Jesse Clayborn Stephens, self-styled east coast coordinator for Minutemen and to disrupt cooperative relationship between respective organizations and effect possible defection of Lee. Interview appeared to be successful in that rapport was established with Lee which may be beneficial in the future. Lee volunteered information concerning NSWPP matters not previously known to the Bureau and indicated he would be receptive for further contacts. It is felt this matter has long range potential.

CURRENT STATUS OF PROGRAM

While counterintelligence of Klan and white hate groups is an ongoing thing all counterintelligence programs as such which were operated by this division were discontinued by airtel to all field offices 4/27/71. In exceptional instances where counterintelligence action appears warranted, recommendations are now submitted to the Bureau under the individual case caption to which it pertains. These recommendations are then considered on an individual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
LLA:co
4-H

THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM 4-H

This program was initiated and authorized by SAC Letter 53-72 (J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure that the field is using current characterizations of subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing such organizations. Those characterizations deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr dated December 7, 1970.

The background and value of this program is the same as it was at the time of last inspection. Since June 1, 1971, we have been receiving and processing the annual submission of thumbnail sketches. To date thumbnail sketches on 387 separate organizations have been received and these are being processed by appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide interest, of which there are 70 at this time, will be furnished to the field by letter to all offices. Others are being returned to submitting field offices as they are approved. This program was last reviewed and analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970. Annual approval will again be requested when the current project is completed.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
4-H

93

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY AND NEW LEFT ORGANIZATIONS

At the time of the last inspection in January, 1971, the Internal Security Section handled informants only in the basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. There was no Security Informant Unit as such, informants being handled on subversive organization desks. On June 16, 1971, a Security Informant Unit was formed and this Unit now handles informants in the New Left field as well as in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups.

At last inspection there were 264 member informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA); at present there are 226, a decrease of 38. At last inspection there were 31 member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); at present there are 48, an increase of 17. As of July 31, 1971, date of latest monthly tabulation, the Security Informant Unit handled a total of 795 security informants and 671 potential security informants, a total of 1,466. This includes 630 informant cases transferred from the New Left Section to the Security Informant Unit in the Internal Security Section on June 16, 1971.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage. However, economy has increasingly become a primary factor. In line with the President's message on August 15, 1971, tightening economic controls and our continuing efforts to hold down expenditures, the field is being instructed by letter to all offices to cut down payments to security and extremist informants and sources by five percent. To assure uniformity and fairness in the application of this cutback throughout the field, each office was instructed to follow this formula: Total expenditures for all such informants and sources for the six month period ending July 31, 1971; reduce this total by five percent; divide the resulting figure by six (months). The resulting figure is to be the guideline for each office.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
4-H

This instruction is not a mandate to reduce payments across the board on all informants and sources. Offices are to evaluate expenditures within the determined guideline amount and adjust individual payments accordingly.

These instructions do not mean the Bureau will cease authorizing payments where new informants are developed and fully justified. It is incumbent on all offices to evaluate these matters within the guideline figure. There are to be no increases in payments to informants and sources for the next 90 days, in line with the Director's instructions.

Each office was instructed to advise the Bureau by return airtel of the guideline figure determined. By close of business September 30, 1971, the Bureau is to be advised by each office that these instructions have been complied with and that expenditures have been reduced by the five percent factor. On the basis of our expenditures during the past fiscal year, the five percent reduction will result in an annual saving of approximately $129,000.

Security informant development receives continuous supervision. It is not technically a program justified semiannually or annually but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative operations that requires and receives vigorous day to day attention.

The Security Informant Unit maintains an up-to-date index of Security Informants and potential security informants. It correlates personal and operating data (such as name, address, code, file and symbol number) concerning these informants, which it receives from the Division's investigative sections, and places such material on FD-348s, three by five cards that constitute the index. This index is maintained on discontinued as well as current informants.

95

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
HEM:cb 8/19/71

At the time of last inspection in January, 1971, a total of 1,159 security informants was being operated. As of July 31, 1971, the number had increased to 1,182, or an increase of 23. During the same period the number of potential security informants increased from 765 to 841, or an increase of 76.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HEM:cb
4-H

96

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

RDC/nw

Section Chief R. D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities of Research Section.

Security Index (SI) Program

Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated 1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.

As of 12/15/70 there were in the Index 3,450 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,614 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,064. Of these, 831 and 4,718, respectively, are communists--a total of 5,549 or 46 percent. As of 7/15/71 there were in the Index 4,013 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,680 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12, 693. Of these, 825 and 4,329, respectively, are communists--a total of 5,154 or 40.6 percent.

Emergency Detention Program

The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is field-wide, involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of a national emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950. The basic responsibility for the operation and implementation of the EDP rests with the Attorney General. Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney General's Portfolio," copies of which are in the Bureau's possession.

This program has been maintained in an up-to-date status. Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey." Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to of the Internal Security Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are maintained on a current basis. The Seat of Government and all field divisions maintain essential records for successful implementation of the EDP. Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.

This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit, Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the Department and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department. We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes. Periodic checks are made to insure that all records connected with the EDP, stored away from Headquarters city,* are current. Field division surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually of the status.

Legislation has been introduced in the 92nd Congress to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. In the event Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibility for protecting this Nation's internal security.

This program is under constant supervision and re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining may be made. A memorandum justifying the continuance of this program was last submitted on 1/12/71.

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

There has been no significant change regarding the utilization of these techniques in the internal security field since the last inspection. As of 8/16/71, we have 30 telephone surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases. We also have two tesurs in operation at the request of the State Department.

We are conducting four microphone surveillances (misurs) in internal security field, four misur installations are being operated at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA) and one at the request of Central Intelligence Agency. In addition, 62 teletype facilities are being covered at the written request of NSA.

---

*Only such records presently maintained away from SOG or field office headquarters are located at Quantico, Virginia.

Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence

This program was initiated in 1964 under the title "Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas." It requires each field office to conduct a continuing survey of localities having a potential for violence based on current racial conditions. Objective is twofold--to insure Bureau receives a current, realistic, and comprehensive picture of existing conditions which may lead to violence, and to obtain advance information of developments clearly pointing to the possibility of violence.

The field submits semiannual reports summarizing information received. Of course, pertinent information is submited on a timely basis depending upon the circumstances involved. The survey provides the basis for a cogent analysis of potential for violence and pertinent information is disseminated to the White House, Attorney General, and other Government agencies. In the spring of each year an analysis entitled "Potential for Violence in Major Cities in Summer" is prepared and disseminated on a high level in the Government.

99

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD: Attached are comments concerning surveys, projects and/or intensification programs in effect against the New Left Movement. This section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left Movement, including terrorist groups and individuals engaged in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. Investigations concerning New Left publications are also supervised in this section, as are sabotage investigations, and protest and Trotskyist groups.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
DPW:jlm
4-H

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

New Left Movement

Special Investigations Unit - West

The following surveys, projects and/or intensification programs are in effect against the New Left movement:

New Left Extremists

By letter to all field offices dated 2/13/70, the field was advised that the violence-prone Weatherman group planned to go underground and to direct "strategic sabotage" at military and police installations. The field was instructed to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group and to advise appropriate local police agencies of Weatherman plans. By airtel to all offices dated 3/19/70, the field was advised of Weatherman plans for extreme violence. The field was instructed to locate and identify Weatherman communes and activists. Intensive investigation of Weatherman leaders was ordered.

By airtel to Chicago dated 3/24/70, that office was instructed to initiate investigations and interview all individuals arrested in Chicago during a Weatherman rampage in October, 1969, where such investigations had not already been undertaken. More than 280 persons had been arrested, most of whom were either members of or closely associated with the Weatherman group. In connection with cases of bombing or arson which appeared to have New Left or black extremist connotations, SAC Letter 70-18 (C), dated 4/7/70, captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Bombing Matters" provided the field with guidance. In those cases where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or where the Department has advised that no investigation is warranted, the Bureau must be immediately advised concerning involvement of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident and recommendation made concerning additional investigation.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
HM:jta/bjn
4-H

101

By teletype to all offices dated 4/17/70, the field was advised of specific areas of investigations to be made against New Left terrorist groups and standards were set for investigations of communes. The field was also instructed to develop necessary informant coverage of these communes and groups so that advanced knowledge of planned violence could be obtained, preventive action initiated, and prosecution undertaken where possible.

By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/13/70, instructions were given concerning implementation of investigations of New Left terrorism which were begun with available manpower and further implementation was to be as rapid as possible. All adherents to the Weatherman ideology which advocated a Marxist-Leninist revolution and the use of terroristic tactics in furtherance of revolution are made subjects of these investigations. These subjects are to be considered for Priority I of the Security Index and when placed on Priority I, the Bureau must be advised every 45 days of their current residence and other pertinent information developed. Each office was instructed to submit a monthly airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities of communes or organizations; (2) number of cases opened during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of cases under investigation; (4) informant coverage utilized against these communes and organizations; and, (5) a brief summary of New Left violence in area during preceding month and action taken.

By Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70, the field was furnished a copy of a Departmental letter concerning specific areas of interest to the Department of Justice in campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action. The field was specifically instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and concerning agitational activities prior to and during violent campus disorders by subversive groups.

108

By airtel to all offices dated 7/16/70, the field was advised that New Left terrorism was continuing through bombings, arsons, and other violence and that each Special Agent in Charge must personally insure that sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these matters and to investigating New Left terrorists.

SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70, captioned "New Left Movement - Violence, Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman)" instructed the field to develop better informant coverage of Weatherman and other terrorist groups. By airtel to all offices dated 9/3/70, captioned "Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the field was instructed that in view of increased attacks on the police, it could be expected there will also be physical attacks against the FBI and that all Special Agent personnel should be fully cognizant of this possibility. To obtain complete intelligence data concerning any extremist influence in attacks on police, the field was instructed to institute appropriate investigation when information was received concerning an impending attack on police and informants directed to develop full facts concerning the attack.

SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70, captioned "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage" instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can infiltrate terrorist groups.

SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70, captioned "New Left Movement - Police Training Matters" advised the field that in view of recent violence by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests for SACs or ASACs to brief local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism and violence. These briefings would be at law enforcement meetings and conferences where attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law enforcement officials.

103

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised that a special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and other New Left terrorists has been initiated. The field was instructed to submit to the Bureau the identity of New Left terrorists whose fingerprints should be included in this special file.

By airtel to all offices dated 6/15/71 the field was advised that a new "stop index" program had been instituted in the National Crime Information Center (NCIC). This program is for Bureau use only and concerns extremists who are in Priority I of the Security Index and who are not already carried in the NCIC Wanted Persons file. Through this program, the field obtains prompt notice from NCIC by teletype whenever a police agency makes inquiry concerning one of these extremists, which enables the field to better follow the activities and movements of extremists.

By SAC Letter 71-37 (E) dated 8/10/71, captioned "Security Flash Notices Regarding Security Index Subjects" the field was advised of new procedures which will enable the Identification Division to better disseminate arrest information on Security Index subjects for whom no fingerprints are on file in the Identification Division. This is accomplished by periodic submission by the field of Security Flash Notices (FD-165) which determine if fingerprints of a Security Index subject have been received since the last check and if so, a stop is placed in the fingerprint record to assure that the field is advised of all subsequent fingerprint submissions. The Security Flash Notice is periodically submitted at different intervals depending on the priority of the subject's Security Index status.

Intensified investigation of New Left extremists has led to numerous prosecutions and indictments of extremist leaders. To provide further guidance for the field in these matters, SAC Letter 71-10 (E) dated 3/9/71 and captioned "Security Informants - Judicial Matters" advised the field of procedures to be followed in handling informants who are developing information on New Left groups and individuals who are in contact with these New Left activists or with their attorneys.

104

The Department of Justice has advised that informants may be utilized in furnishing information concerning the location of fugitives or the location of other New Left activists even though such utilization may result in the informant inadvertently learning of defense plans or strategy. The field has been instructed that when an informant is present in a conversation between an attorney and an individual under indictment he should, if possible, leave, or if this is not possible, he is not to report the substance of any such conversation to the FBI. Since radical attorneys are deeply involved with New Left extremists, not only in their legal defense but in their other activities, the above procedures are most helpful in extremist investigations.

Intensified investigation of New Left extremists has severely disrupted their operations and limited their influence. Numerous Weatherman leaders have been indicted and subsequently arrested or remain in fugitive status. The Weatherman organization has gone underground and is isolated from contact with the mass of American youth. The number of adherents to Weatherman is significantly less as a result of these prosecutions and investigations. The Weatherman group continues to be most dangerous in view of its adherence to violent tactics and continuous effort is being made to develop new approaches and techniques to facilitate this investigation.

Key Activists

By airtel to all offices dated 10/23/68, the Key Activist program was intensified and expanded. The field was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on individuals designated as key activists in the New Left movement. At the present time there are 73 key activists under investigation.

105

A Key Activist album containing photographs and biographical data on each key activist has been furnished to all offices. This album is maintained in a current status and has proved invaluable in following activities and travel of New Left key activists. By airtel dated 3/10/69 to all offices the field was instructed to submit reports each three months on key activists. The field was also instructed to prepare communications suitable for dissemination when these key activists filled a speaking engagement and whenever they made statements indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation. The purpose of this program is to secure testimony and evidence concerning violations of statutes particularly where these key activists are involved in campus disorders. The field has also been instructed to develop detailed information on sources of funds used by key activists and to closely follow their travel. Handwriting specimens of each key activist must be obtained and placed in the National Security File maintained by the laboratory.

The key activist program has been most successful. We have been enabled to closely follow the activities of these individuals and to provide other interested agencies with pertinent information. It is noted that more than half of the individuals designated as key activists are subjects of some type of prosecutive action.

106

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT
STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (SDS)
WORKER STUDENT ALLIANCE (WSA)

In Bureau airtels 5/24/71, 6/2/71 and 6/3/71, appropriate field offices were alerted to the SDS/WSA Summer Project and its twofold objective consisting of a massive recruitment program in 21 target cities and the fostering of a general strike, nationwide, through infiltration of industry and labor unions. Instructions were given to appropriate offices to take aggressive measures to expand their informant coverage during the SDS/WSA recruitment effort, and to develop and furnish information concerning the SDS/WSA Summer Projects in their territories. Numerous SDS/WSA members have been identified as having moved into cities other than those in which they usually operate, in connection with the SDS/WSA Summer Project....

New University Conference (NUC)

The NUC, composed of radical professors, graduate students and teachers, is committed to the growth of a revolutionary socialist movement in the U.S., with educational institutions and professional associations being their primary targets. In Bureau airtel 6/4/71, the attention of Chicago Division, office of origin, was directed to the fact that the NUC claimed 42 national chapters plus fifteen pre-chapter groupings, with 675 national members, and anticipated further expansion. Chicago Division was instructed to insure appropriate leads were set out to confirm the existence of all NUC chapters and to conduct appropriate investigations in accordance with Bureau instructions relating to investigations of organizations connected with institutions of learning. It was further instructed these investigations should include information concerning the leaders and leading activists, aims and objectives and the activities of these chapters.

New Left Movement Reports

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their

107

territories and to follow these reports with a report each quarter, similarly captioned, showing the status of the movement and its activity during the preceeding three-month period. These reports have enabled the Bureau and the submitting field offices to assess the potential dangerousness of the New Left movement, determine from one document the divisive or unifying issues within the movement and whether the activity is increasing, decreasing or continuing at the level indicated in the previous report. Since individual reports have not been required on the many small local New Left groups in each territory in lieu of adequate LHM, inclusion of pertinent data concerning these groups in the quarterly report alleviates the need for regularly submitted reports and puts the activities in a better perspective within each field division. Additionally, these reports have presented on a continuing basis a clear cut picture of the entire New Left movement which identifies its leaders, sources of funds, propaganda outlets, and shows the extent to which the New Left movement has been influenced by domestic and foreign subversive elements. This program has enabled the Bureau and the field to make a self analysis of all facets of our investigation of the New Left movement so we may expand and intensify our investigation of those phases indicating a need thereof. These reports have served as a valuable research tool at the Bureau and afford the individual field divisions an opportunity to evaluate the direction and success of their investigations in the New Left movement.

New Left Movement - Finances

No deletion

In February, 1970, Mr. Egil Krogh, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, requested, for the President, available information concerning income sources of various revolutionary groups. Since that time, information of this nature has been gathered and transmitted periodically by memoranda to the White House, Attorney General, Deputy Attorney General, and Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, after approval by the Director.

Key Activist Program

The Key Activist Program, described in detail in the Special Investigations Unit - West write-up, is coordinated by the New Left Groups Unit.

108

New Left Movement - Publications

By letter dated 11/5/68 to all offices under the caption of "New Left Movement, Publications, Internal Security - Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are described as "underground" newspapers. This survey has been particularly beneficial in view of the fact that the New Left, to a great extent, depends on the written word to spread its propaganda. The survey has disclosed that in excess of 200 papers are published on a regular basis with a central theme being criticism of the "establishment" in general and law enforcement, the draft and the Vietnam War in particular. Youth, particularly students, are the main target of these publications, which are effective vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they reach a large portion of the student population. Additionally, the survey has revealed the papers are in poor financial condition and often miss publication dates due to lack of funds. Funds are generally received from advertising, subscriptions, donations and benefits. Volunteer labor is used in most instances and many times the staff of the publication resides collectively in a commune.

A survey of underground publications is currently being conducted by the New Left Groups Unit, the purpose of which is to determine if trend information can be developed. Trend information is being developed during the course of this survey and information obtained will be incorporated into an educational-type document. Based on this survey, it appears the New Left movement is at a crossroads and is groping for a sense of unity and direction. This unity, if developed, will no doubt include future activity in political channels. These newspapers, which are often written in the foulest language, are a major influence on the youth in this country and are the strident propaganda voice of the New Left movement.

Informant Development - New Left Groups

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning informant development in New Left groups directed each SAC to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups, clearly setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to rectify these weaknesses. As a result, a clear-cut view of each division's informant coverage was obtained as well as an

109

analysis of where programs needed shoring up. Those offices found to be deficient in their coverage were directed to submit periodic communications detailing their coverage and setting out what steps are being taken to increase the coverage in terms of quantity and quality.

The Counterintelligence Program - New Left was discontinued by Bureau airtel to all offices dated 4/28/71 in view of the fact that sensitive intelligence techniques and disruptive activities were involved and absolute security was difficult to achieve.

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST

The Venceremos Brigade

The field was authorized by airtel to all offices, dated 5/11/70, to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members on SAC authority except in those instances where the subject is under 21, currently a student, professor, has some connection with an institution of learning or is a journalist. Bureau approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals.

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 5/15/70, instructed the field to immediately intensify investigations of all VB returnees from Cuba, ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recommendation. In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and non-Security Index returnees. In case of Priority I Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau every 45 days.

Prosab

Current Bureau instructions require development of adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsibilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields can be properly discharged. Semiannual reports are submitted by each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Base within its territory. A review of semiannual reports submitted by the field as of 7/1/71 disclosed that a total of 1,225 informants have been developed.

PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

May Day Collective (MDC)

Prior to May, 1971, MDC was the hard-core youth activist group of the Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice (PCPJ) and was the main force behind massive civil disobedience in Washington, D.C. There has been a definite split between the two groups over the question of violence which is favored by MDC. Following regional conferences in Fayetteville, Arkansas, and Washington, D.C., MDC held a national conference in Atlanta, Georgia, 8/13-17/71 to map its future course and to plan antiwar activity for the Fall of 1971. By airtel to all offices dated 7-26-71, the field was instructed to determine the existence of MDC organizations in the respective divisions and to furnish all available information to Bureau by 8-30-71 with comments regarding extent of coverage. Potential for violence by MDC was emphasized, and the field was alerted to possibility of violations of Federal laws.

Vietnam Veterans Against the War (VVAW)

Letter to all offices dated 8-3-71 instructed each office to initiate a survey to determine existence of VVAW. This action was necessary in the light of increasing indication that the VVAW may be a target for infiltration by subversive groups such as the Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party and their respective youth groups. VVAW has also been involved in aiding and financing U.S. deserters, including false identity papers and reportedly in one area has a cache of arms. VVAW has become increasingly active in the antiwar field and must be considered a prime target for infiltration.

East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (EASTCON)

This is an extremely important investigation requiring constant supervision and review at the Seat of Government. It involves plots to blow up the tunnels, housing, heating systems servicing Government buildings and to kidnap a high Government official. Conspiracy aspects of selected Selective Service break in cases are included in the indictment as well as violations involving the contraband and issuing threatening communications statutes. The Eastcon case is the subject of a write-up in Section 4-A-4.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
FBG:plm

///

SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS - NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/3/70, instructed the field to resume verification of residence and employment in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases and to resume periodic report writing in proportionate number in Priority II Security Index cases so that all such cases would be opened by 6/30/71.

As a result, annual reports in Priority II Security Index cases are being received pursuant to existing instructions and where verification of residence and employment shows a change, appropriate changes are being made on Security Index cards.

Bureau airtel to all offices, dated 11/4/70, instructed the field to initiate investigation of all SDS members as well as members of procommunist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence and that each individual investigated should be considered for the Security Index. Results of investigations in these cases are being received and supervised in this section. Activities in each instance are evaluated and where it is found the subject could be considered a danger to the internal security of this country in the event of a national emergency, the individual's name is included on the Security Index.

SAC Letter 71-35 (D), dated 7/27/71, instructed the field to discontinue use of Internal Security - Miscellaneous, Security Matter - Miscellaneous, and Security Matter - Anarchist as characters in security investigations. Instructions for using new characters were set out. This action was necessary in order to facilitate routine of mail at the Bureau and to more properly describe the characters of security investigations.

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section

The following programs discussed immediately hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the Espionage Section: Alem Program, Bureau file 65-69532; Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program, Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program, Bureau file 65-70719; DESECO Program, Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LW:bkr
4-H

113

ALEM PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-69532

4-H

1. ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S. under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American wives or 2. as male immigrants on first preference petitions because of certain professional and technical skills. The basis of this program is information furnished by the Fedora informant. This program was initiated in August, 1965. Individuals entering the U. S. under the above two categories have been determined through a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization Service Form G-188 punch cards. The Bureau has reimbursed the Immigration and Naturalization Service for expenses incurred in sorting these cards for immigrants entering the U. S. between the years 1960-1965.

2. Approximately 2100 cases have been opened under this program since its inception, of which 77 are now pending. We have not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent who entered the U. S. as an immigrant from Belgium (Buckboard case, Bufile 65-68188).

3. ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A. P. Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is placed with the Washington Field Office. The procedures followed in opening cases do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.

4. According to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the techniques set forth above in dispatching KGB "illegals" to the U. S. During 1960-1965, four KGB "illegals" reportedly arrived in the U. S. under category number one according to information the Fedora informant was able to obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis. It was last evaluated on December 24, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
APL:tdp
4-H

114

BANPOP PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70741

4-H

1. BANPOP is the code name for a program initiated in August, 1966, in an attempt to identify illegals in the U. S. who may be receiving funds through Swiss banks. The basis for the program was an analysis of four Soviet illegal cases between 1955 and 1966 in which the Banque Populaire Swisse of Switzerland was used by the Soviets to fund illegals. The transfers are screened with the following criteria: (1) the person or individual beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the transfer is between $300 and $5000 and (3) the last name of the person ordering and receiving the funds is the same or the money is directed to a specific bank account.

2. The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and Philadelphia Offices.

3. When one of the offices locates an individual who might be a possible suspect, the Bureau is advised by letter and a copy is sent to the appropriate field office requesting investigation to identify this person. The title includes the name of the subject and the code name of the program to insure that all mail is handled by the same Supervisor. At the present time, there are 7 pending cases. For the six-month period ending 4/1/71, Philadelphia reviewed 2950 transfers, has two pending cases and used two Agent hours per month. Chicago reviewed 1000 transactions, opened no cases and used six Agent hours per month. New York Office reviewed 6050 transactions, opened 8 cases and used 15 Agent hours per month.

4. This program is supervised by SA J.P. Lee of the Special Cases Unit, Espionage Section.

5. All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the program on a six-month basis. The program was last justified by memorandum of April 1, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JPL:tdp
8/19/71

4-H

115

CANIL PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70719

4-H

1. CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered the U. S. on immigrant visas obtained at one of the American consulates in Canada. This program is based on the Cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal husband and wife team who used this method of entry. Legat, Ottawa, effected arrangements with various American consulates in Canada to obtain the Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms filed by European immigrants prior to their destruction by the consulates. It is consulate practice to retain these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy them. Legat, Ottawa, forwards these forms to the New York Office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects, the New York Office uses criteria developed from analysis of the Cowslip case.

2. Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 35 cases were opened. There are 7 cases pending. No illegals have been uncovered to date. The procedures followed in this program do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the New York Office.

3. CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A.P. Litrento.

4. The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security field. It is felt this program still has a good potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical and has a sound basis. Past experience has shown that Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi continuously, if successful.

5. This program was evaluated in February, 1971. Legat, Ottawa, has suggested discontinuance of this program and New York's comments have been requested by Bulet 8/5/71.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
APL:tdp
4-H

COKMA PROGRAM

4-H

65-73750

1. Title is code word for physical surveillance coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelligence in the past several years. The New York Office instituted this program in July, 1970. This program receives close supervisory attention, is evaluated on a continuing basis and was subject of justification memorandum dated 8/16/71. In view of the success of this program by the New York Office, consideration has been given to its implementation by the Washington Field Office, however, the absence of subway transportation facilities used extensively by the Soviets in New York City precludes its adaption by the Washington Field Office.

2. The New York Office has catalogued known meeting areas as a result of past physical surveillances of Soviet intelligence officers, information received from defectors-in-place and double agents operating against Soviet intelligence officers. It is almost impossible to conduct a discreet physical surveillance of a trained intelligence officer and this program places our Agents in an area where there is a likelihood of a Soviet meet without surveillance hazards that could thwart meetings. Our objective is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under clandestine circumstances.

3. The New York Office utilized one four-man team initially in connection with this program. During the initial six months of this program, seven Soviet intelligence officers were observed in the area selected for coverage (Jamaica area of the Queens, New York,) on 22 occasions. Two individuals were observed in contact with Soviets and one individual contacted a Polish official. Based on the results obtained, coverage was expanded to the Flushing and Woodside section of the Queens, as well as the Rego Park section of the Queens, adding an additional four-man team. Since January known or suspected Soviet intelligence officers have been observed on 38 occasions accompanied by unknown individual or individuals on five occasions in the area covered by this program. We have determined through our Ironclad source the Soviets have placed the Jamaica section of the Queen off limits for meetings. While we are still affording this area some coverage

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
BFR:cgc
4-H

117

we are now concentrating on the other selected sites mentioned above. One of the most interesting developments of recent date has been the detection of a known Committee for State Security (KGB) officer who during his tour of duty in the United States has made approaches to Soviets who defected to this country, visiting a residence in the Jamaica area. The occupant of this residence is currently the subject of an investigation and it is anticipated he will be interviewed to determine the nature of his contacts with the Soviets.

4. This program is supervised by Special Agent F. J. Cassidy, Soviet Unit-New York, Espionage Section. Expense and time in handling this program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since program in field consist of surveillance activities there must be close supervision at field level.

5. This program is sound and has enabled us to uncover Soviet intelligence activities with minimum expenditure of manpower. It has also given us additional insight into Soviet modus operandi. Manpower limitations have restricted our full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets assigned to the New York area and must be experienced in surveillance procedures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
BFR:cgc

4-H

DESECO PROGRAM 4-H
Bufile 105-71688

1. The Deseco Program (program for development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) originated as result of conference between field and Bureau representatives in December, 1957. Purpose is to select and develop individuals to be placed in contact with Soviet-bloc intelligence officers as a means of (1) penetrating Soviet-bloc intelligence; (2) exerting control by keeping intelligence officers occupied with running our sources; and (3) assisting in possible defection of bloc intelligence officers.

2. Nineteen offices are engaged regularly in this program and other offices on occasion conduct investigations to develop background on selected sources. Greatest activity has been in New York, Washington Field, Chicago and San Francisco which cover Soviet-bloc establishments. The 19 offices are authorized to conduct "sounding-out" interviews of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority. Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are conducted on a UACB basis. New York and Washington Field submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the program. The other 17 offices submit summaries on a semi-annual basis.

3. Between the last inspection and July 15, 1971, approximately a 6-month period, 26 Deseco subjects were placed in contact with Soviet-bloc officials. Of these, four have developed to the status of security informants or double agents.

4. This program is correlated in the Espionage Section, Coordination Unit by Special Agent Lish Whitson. The program is handled in the field by Special Agents assigned to Soviet-bloc investigations who are familiar with the habits, weaknesses and intelligence targets of bloc personnel and are qualified to select and develop the type of individuals needed in this program. Unusual or sensitive cases in this program are routed to the Division front office for approval. All rules, policies and procedures regarding

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LW:bkr
4-H

119

interviews, developments and handling of Deseco sources are contained in Section 105 O, pages 42-44, Manual of Instructions.

5. This program is re-evaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by memorandum W. A. Branigan to C. D. Brennan, dated March 29, 1971. Limitations on other investigative techniques have underscored the value of this program demonstrated in the individuals developed as security informants or double agents. Selectees have enabled us to uncover and pin-point Soviet-bloc intelligence targets, identify Soviet-bloc intelligence officers and furnish information of value in considering defection approaches. During the month of March, 1971, a double agent, developed through the Deseco program, was instrumental in enabling the Bureau to identify a Soviet illegal operating in the guise of a graduate student in Salt Lake City. Direction of this program against Soviet-bloc intelligence officers will continue to be pressed to insure improvement in our coverage of Soviet-bloc intelligence operations.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
LW:bkr
4-H

120

EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM

Bufile: 105-42300 4-H

This program originated in 1955 in an attempt to provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards the visits of East-West Exchange Agreement participants as opportunities to promote intelligence activity.

As a result of the 1970 Inspection revisions were made in the investigative action taken in this field. The change was made as a result of other manpower commitments. SAC Letter 70-25 provided that no investigations will be conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East-West Exchange Program in the absence of any information indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles are checked on all Soviet participants and where information is developed showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and the field instructed to conduct necessary investigation.

During the period of January-June, 1971, 982 individuals were scheduled to enter the U. S. under the provisions of this exchange program and of this number, we had information indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 25 of these individuals.

With regard to Soviet exchange students there are currently 32 in the U. S. Based on information furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously in the U. S., we have determined that Soviet intelligence utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity, principally as spotters. In view of this, we afford these students active investigation. We have also found that a number of these students return to the U. S. for assignment at one of the Soviet establishments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in the U. S. as students are generally reactivated. The case of Yuriy Aleksandrovich Gostintsev is an example of an individual entering the U. S. under the East-West Exchange Program as a graduate student and engaging in intelligence activities. Ironclad, our sensitive defector in place, advised that Gostintsev who entered the U. S. 5/9/71 for a period of six months to do research at three American universities was working for Dr. Martin Summerfield at a laboratory at Princeton University. According to our source, Gostintsev, on 7/2/71, turned over a portfolio of 1,000 pages to a Soviet intelligence officer who

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
JPL:tdp

took the documents to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations, photographed them and returned them to Gostintsev. Similar operations took place on 7/16 and 7/23/71. Gostintsev originally entered the U. S. in 9/69 under the East-West Scientific Exchange Agreement for three months to work under Dr. Summerfield. He left the U. S. in 12/69 and returned again in 5/71.

RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

105-36365

1. Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have central repository for information developed in connection with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to radio and technical equipment purchased by them.

2. Washington Field and New York Offices furnish information developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis. Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, Bureau of International Commerce, United States Department of Commerce and where pertinent, to the National Security Agency (NSA). Material submitted includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description and cost of the items purchased. It involves maintenance of three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and New York Offices. Program established to achieve following objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory of certain technical equipment furnished to Soviets through overt or covert means which would permit its identification at some future time.

3. Since January, 1971, Program has disclosed continuing purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband portable radios. During 3/71 one KGB officer in Washington purchased 12 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband and wife illegal team previously in U. S. used one of these radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which contained their operating instructions. Program made it possible to secure serial numbers for possible future identification. Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed detailed information concerning two new antennae systems purchased by Soviets from company in Nebraska. It appears one of these will be used at new Consulate General in San Francisco when permanent location for that establishment secured. Details concerning such installations are of interest, not only to FBI Laboratory, but to State Department and NSA in connection with

its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities. Intelligence agencies of the military, such as Navy and Air Force, look to Bureau for details concerning purchases of this type made by Soviets since it enables reasonable estimate of their ability to monitor and intercept U. S. military communications. During 7/71, Program identified Soviet interest in purchase of sophisticated electronic apparatus in New York which can be utilized for radar or communications satellite tracking. They had not requested export license from Commerce Department for this article. It may be intended for clandestine use in U. S. for satellite tracking designed to improve accuracy of Soviet ICBM guidance systems. We have notified White House and interested Government agencies concerning this activity which is being conducted clandestinely from Soviet establishment in Washington, D. C.

4. Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C. Peterson, Soviet Unit - Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor and no weaknesses in program are apparent. Administrative tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Soviet Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.

5. Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination of material developed. Possession of some equipment on which discreet markings were previously placed by FBI Laboratory or item with serial number showing original acquisition by Soviets could serve to identify possessor with involvement in Soviet intelligence activity. Program is evaluated annually to determine justification for continuance.

6. Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971. Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.

SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

BLACK EXTREMIST MATTERS

Racial matters investigations were intensified through establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67.

By memorandum dated 7/14/71 it was recommended, and the Director approved, that the Racial Intelligence Section would, thereafter, be known as the Extremist Intelligence Section and the character of cases supervised would be changed from Racial Matters to Extremist Matters. This action was taken as the majority of extremist activity in U.S. is not based solely on racial hatred but based on a desire to overthrow U.S. Government by revolution.

This section handles extremist matters investigations involving black extremist organizations and individuals. Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal laws. The dangerousness to the U.S. of such individuals must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index. The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other domestic revolutionary groups among black extremists, especially black extremist organizations, is a prime objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources likewise have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled the Bureau to stay on top of the black extremist situation. These sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of alerting local authorities, and of keeping other Government

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WHA:cal
4-H

agencies dependent upon us for information informed of pertinent developments and advance intelligence, including data concerning potential violence.

Our informant coverage has made it possible for us to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House, the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an interest. Additional information pertaining to black extremist intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research Section.

Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government.

The activities of black extremists continue to place a heavy demand upon the Bureau's manpower and resources.

There are numerous black extremist groups throughout the nation, the majority of which are local in nature and relatively small in membership. These groups, however, either directly or indirectly, advocate defiance of the law, hostility toward constituted authority and, in some instances, advocate outright destruction of Government and establishment of a Marxist-Leninist form of Government. The activities of these groups constitute a constant threat to the internal security of the country through their propensity for violence, hatred of and outright opposition to our form of Government.

BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Bufile 157-8415

4-H

Black extremism is concentrated in organized activities of 64 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities throughout the U.S. The five major nationwide groups have chapters in 139 cities. Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals in excess of 8,300. This membership figure, however, disguises the real following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities and the extent of influence and leadership they exercise. This real support, especially from young blacks, is surfaced during confrontations with police and the Establishment. In fact, hostility toward the police by black extremist groups, as well as by black youths, continues unabated in many of our major cities.

Set out hereinafter are summaries concerning the key black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation.

Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF) was expanded on 2/26/71 to include telephone numbers of black, New Left and other ethnic extremists. As a result, black extremist groups, black extremist Security Index subjects and individuals included in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album have been entered into the CTNF. This has proven to be extremely valuable investigative tool and has saved the field considerable investigative time in ascertaining subscribers of telephone numbers since "hits" are made on 15.5 percent of numbers checked against the file.

The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was established on 3/8/69 to assist in identification of militant black extremists who travel extensively.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WHA:cal
4-H

127

The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist organizations, militant black nationalists who are known to travel and black extremists who are Bureau fugitives. Each office prepares a form on such individuals within its territory and the form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete album. In the event of travel by any of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel. Over 470 extremists are currently carried in this album. Information concerning fugitives was included to insure each office has a photograph and biographic sketch immediately available for its use in conducting investigation to locate or apprehend them.

To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants, especially extremist sources, we initiated the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives List in June, 1970. This list, which is prepared quarterly and sent each field office and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations are black extremists. For the months in which no quarterly list is prepared, all offices and selected Legats are advised of deletions and additions to this list. Currently there are 64 fugitives listed, 20 of whom are IO fugitives. This list has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents handling extremist matters and extremist informants and has been effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among extremist informants. Thirty-two of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was initiated.

Bureau airtel 11/12/70 advised the field of formation of Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File in Latent Fingerprint Section of the Identification Division. Field was instructed to insure all black extremists who have a propensity for violence or who would logically be considered suspects in serious crimes in which the Bureau may have an interest were included in the Black Extremist Section.

By airtel dated 3/19/71, captioned "Black Extremist Section of Single Fingerprint File, Identification Matters, Racial Matters," all offices were instructed to give greater emphasis to this program on a continuing basis due to increasing participation of black extremists in crimes of violence and continued reports from knowledgeable sources of plans of these extremists to participate in bombings, hijackings, kidnapings and other crimes of violence. As a result of this communication and aggressive supervision by Extremist Intelligence Section supervisors, the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File has doubled. The value of this valuable investigative tool was demonstrated in the special investigation being handled by this section known as Newkill. This case involves the murder of two New York City police officers on 5/21/71. Latents forwarded by our New York Office for comparison against this file resulted in the identification of two Black Panther Party (BPP) members and directly led to the solution of the machine gunning of two New York City police officers on 5/19/71. This information has also resulted in these individuals being developed as suspects in the Newkill murder. Supervisors are constantly alert to insure logical black extremists are included in this file.

In view of the high percentage of black extremists who have been reported to have weapons in their possession, the field by letter 3/18/71 captioned "Firearms Acts" and by airtel 5/17/71 captioned "National Firearms Act, State Firearms Control Assistance Act, Unlawful Possession or Receipt of Firearms, Racial Matters," emphasized that active investigation should be initiated concerning firearms violations stemming from Bureau investigations over matters within our primary jurisdiction, including racial (now extremist) matters investigations. Field was instructed to vigorously pursue possible violations arising out of extremist matters investigations. Such investigations will lead to statistical accomplishments and to the neutralization of black extremists. It was emphasized that all Agents assigned to extremist matters should thoroughly review all of the criminal statutes involving Federal gun law violations so that they would be in a position to recognize and vigorously pursue possible violations coming to their attention during extremist matters investigations.

Numerous investigations have been initiated by the field as a result of these instructions and recently four BPP leaders in Richmond or Washington, D. C., were convicted for Federal gun violations and one is awaiting trial. With the emphasis being placed on violations of Federal gun laws by black extremists, the number of convictions will increase and add to the Bureau's statistical accomplishments as well as neutralizing black extremists.

Investigation disclosed in Fall of 1970 that increased campus disorders involving black students posed a definite threat to the nation's stability and indicated the need for increase in both quality and quantity of intelligence concerning Black Student Unions (BSU) and similar groups which were targets for influence and control by violence-prone BPP and other extremists. On 10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on BSU and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigation. On 11/4/70 instructions were sent to the field to implement the program authorized by the Executive Conference.

The results of these discreet preliminary inquiries were analyzed and it was concluded that our responsibilities could adequately be handled by limiting our inquiries to black student groups on college campuses which have engaged in violent and lawless activities or are reported by knowledgeable sources to be moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. As a result, field offices were instructed by letter dated 7/26/71 that, thereafter, discreet preliminary inquiries on black student groups on college campuses should be limited to those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are moving in the direction of violence and lawlessness. Results of any preliminary inquiries conducted through established sources only in accordance with the above provisions must be reported to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination along with recommendations regarding whether an active investigation of the group and/or its leaders is warranted. The field was instructed that if established sources report a black student group is moving toward, or being influenced in the direction of, violence and lawlessness, although no such activity has occurred, the facts are to be furnished the Bureau with field office recommendations regarding active investigation. No active investigation of an organization connected with an institution of learning is conducted without prior Bureau authority.

The following pages set forth summaries concerning the key black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation.

BLACK PANTHER PARTY 4H

The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.

It expanded rapidly throughout the United States during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969. Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s, it expanded until there were approximately 48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many thousands of sympathizers as of December, 1970. Another gradual decline began in 1971; and as of June, 1971, the Party had 710 hard-core members in 39 branches representing 37 cities.

In February, 1971, the differences between Huey P. Newton, BPP Minister of Defense, and Eldridge Cleaver, then BPP Minister of Information, a fugitive in Algeria, rose to the surface; and Newton expelled Cleaver and his followers. About 100 BPP members in New York and New Jersey declared allegiance to Cleaver and became known as the BPP-Cleaver Faction.

The official goal of the BPP has always been the violent overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP has openly advocated urban guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the organization. Newton now claims the BPP was led astray by Cleaver in his quest for violence when actually the BPP is a nonviolent, community serving organization. In spite of Newton's peace loving front, the truth is that Newton and his BPP are just as much anarchists as ever. On 6-30-71 a Washington, D. C. BPP leader and follower of Newton stated "the ultimate goal of the BPP is the complete destruction of the United States Government and its replacement with Marxist-Leninist socialism."

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
RNB RNB:bad
4H

Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967 and since that time has expanded as the organization itself expanded.

By letter to all offices dated 2-27-70, approved by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions. Previously, offices were submitting quarterly reports on the BPP. The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to eliminate some paper work in the field.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968, and changed to a monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter to all offices dated 2-27-70. This change is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some paper work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments.

San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP. Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau airtel 1-21-70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental offices which is the current practice.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed by airtel 6-17-70 to submit a monthly summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch. This financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreign funding, expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations, and the steps being taken by each office to develop full financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis.

San Francisco was instructed 8-19-70 to submit monthly lists of nationwide bank accounts and expenses for BPP. This survey was devised by San Francisco; and since it is very helpful in establishing the "big picture" it is being required monthly.

The Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser and/or lessee of any property utilized by the BPP. The corporation and its activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York. By airtels 1-7 and 1-19-71 to San Francisco and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary of all pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the previous week plus a monthly review of SCPI bank accounts. These summaries keep the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables us to regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements.

It is noted that there are currently 25 field offices conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed information concerning its operations and activities including organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by headquarters and foreign support and internal factionalism.

All field offices having a BPP investigation were required by Bureau airtel 10-3-68 to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary data required by the Department, and they were also required by Bureau airtel 6-25-69 to maintain records of and to use permanent T symbol numbers to identify all concealed sources in BPP organization reports. Both of these requirements were based on Department requests. The Department advised that the need on which these requests were based no longer existed, and the field offices were instructed by Bureau airtel 5-17-71 to discontinue both programs.

By Bureau airtel 11-6-70, all continental offices were instructed to submit a biweekly airtel regarding underground BPP operations within each field office. This specific requirement was removed by Bureau airtel 4-29-71. However, all offices were admonished to keep the Bureau advised of any developments in this area.

"The Black Panther" newspaper, official organ of the BPP, had been printed in San Francisco since 1967 until recently when the printing was changed to New York City. The Bureau receives a sufficient quantity of the paper from New York to disseminate it to interested agencies and all Legal Attaches. New York also furnishes one copy of each weekly issue to all field offices. This newspaper in the past has been the best indication of current Party line; therefore, this program is essential to our intelligence gathering efforts.

Our ultimate objective is the prosecution of the BPP as an organization or by individual members for any violations of Federal or State laws. As in the past, we will continue to disseminate to local authorities any information we may receive concerning possible local violations. A secondary objective is to more completely develop information concerning the activities and objectives of the BPP for intelligence purposes.

In July, 1969, the Attorney General established a special task force for the specific purpose of developing a prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this purpose.

It is recommended that the intensive investigation of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as above be continued.

BLACK REVOLUTIONARY PARTY
157-15276

The Black Revolutionary Party is an all black revolutionary, political organization which was formed in April, 1971, at an internal meeting of the pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) (CP of C-ML). Among 16 people present were four Americans including well-known black extremist, Charles Knox, former Black Panther Party leader in Des Moines, Iowa.

The BRP was formed within the CP of C-ML to organize blacks in the United States and Canada operating from headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. The BRP follows the political line of communist Chinese leader MAO Tse-tung and publishes a newspaper which serves as its vehicle for disseminating its revolutionary dogma known as the "Black Revolutionary," the first issue of which appeared in May, 1971.

The BRP intends to maintain its existence secret until firmly established which is estimated at taking from one and one-half to two years. It intends to draw recruits from both sides of the current Black Panther Party factionalism and its proposed revolutionary program will reportedly be based on the issue of racial suppression. This is to be accomplished by the formation of armed self-defense units to "fight against the barbarous rule of the monopoly, capitalist class."

On July 12, 1971, Charles Knox and an additional Omaha black extremist were detained temporarily by United States Customs officials in Detroit while returning to the United States from Canada. Search of their vehicle by Customs officials determined Knox and his companion were in possession of numerous pamphlets and leaflets of a pro-communist nature.

Investigations of the BRP and its identified leaders and members are being aggressively pursued and, where necessary, closely coordinated with Royal Canadian Mounted Police via Legat, Ottawa.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
PEN:pag
4-H

/36

CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)
157-16554

CAP was formed as an international black separatist organization as the result of the convening of the fourth annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States and Atlanta, Georgia, during September, 1970. The organization, which is heavily infiltrated at the leadership level by black extremists, advocates the unity of blacks and the establishment of a black nation via the revolutionary ideology of Pan-Africanism as espoused by CAP supporter and well-known black revolutionary, Stokely Carmichael.

CAP is now active in 15 cities across the Nation and is vigorously pursuing its objectives in this country as well as establishing rapport and lines of communication with black groups and individuals abroad. Recent information indicates two United States CAP representatives plan a trip in the future to Tanzania for the purpose of establishing a CAP organization in that country.

CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRoi Jones, call for the extensive use of disruption and violence, if necessary, by blacks in order to create Independent Black Institutions as are necessary to accomplish CAP's revolutionary objectives by mass action programs utilizing "direction, dedication, and discipline."

CAP held a Western Regional Conference in San Diego, California, during June, 1971, during which it was recommended a national committee be established to consider the possibility of establishing a black paramilitary organization which would furnish support in the form of a united front action with all "liberation struggles" in the United States and internationally.

CAP is currently engaged in efforts at forming an all-black political party in the United States to nominate and elect black officials at local, state, and national levels who, it is felt, will support CAP's plans at establishing a separate black nation. The organization has planned an Eastern Regional Conference in Newark, New Jersey, for September, 1971, and has tentatively scheduled another international meeting in early 1972.

Investigations of the CAP, its black extremist leaders and members, are receiving most close supervision. Pertinent information developed in regard to their activities is being disseminated to the Department and interested Government agencies and officials.

INTERNATIONAL BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS, aka
BLACK WORKERS CONGRESS
Bufile 157-21532

The International Black Workers Congress (IBWC), which is in its formative stages, is dominated by James Forman, an official in the black revolutionary Student National Coordinating Committee. The IBWC makes its headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, at the same locale as that of League of Revolutionary Black Workers, a black extremist labor union in that city.

IBWC is involved in the organizing of black workers and students to further the revolutionary struggle in the United States and other parts of the world as well as for the purpose of building unity among all third world peoples. IBWC's stated objective in organizing black workers is to bring about a national work stoppage, thus severely damaging the United States economy. James Forman has repeatedly stressed the necessity for blacks to be organized to change the capitalistic system to that of a Marxist-Leninist society through seizure of state power.

The IBWC held a regional meeting in Gary, Indiana, in June, 1971, at which discussions centered around organizing black workers into a Marxist-Leninist society and preparations for a drive to organize blacks employed in the steel industry and in the "U. S. Post Office." It was indicated that IBWC would receive assistance from the pro-Chinese Communist Progressive Labor Party (PLP) in the form of advice concerning organizing activities.

An IBWC conference tentatively scheduled to be held in Detroit on August 21 - 22, 1971, has apparently been canceled. Indications are that the conference site has been shifted to Chicago, Illinois, where the conference will be scheduled within two weeks.

It is particularly significant to note IBWC leader James Forman, together with other United States black extremists, including affiliates of the League of Revolutionary Black Workers, recently undertook travel abroad which was to include visits to North Korea, North Vietnam, the Soviet Union, and Algeria.

R

139

JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS
BUFILE 157-9903 4-H

The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida. This group continues to be the leading organization of all black militant groups in the State of Florida. It was founded in St. Petersburg during May, 1968, with 85 ghetto youths as a nucleus who believed liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky, and other cities in Florida. They have attempted to organize on a national basis but have experienced little success except with the establishment of a chapter in Boston, Massachusetts.

The founder and leader of this organization is Joseph Waller, Jr., an articulate Negro who holds the position of "Chairman" and states that he intends to have all black militant groups in Florida designated as affiliates of JOMO.

The organization's voice and propaganda organ is "The Burning Spear" which is published on a monthly basis. This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white America. In this connection, JOMO members have participated in racial disturbances, fire bombings, and have been involved in attacks on police through the use of violence. Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and participated in a plot to break out two black "political prisoners" from a Florida prison. Members have also been arrested for the commission of murders and robberies.

The organization has accumulated a large cache of weapons, and its members are taught guerrilla warfare and receive firearms training.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
8/17/71
HAN:maz
4-H

140

Junta of Militant Organizations
Bufile 157-9903

Recently JOMO has been reincorporated under "The International Junta of Militant Organizations" and now appears to be attempting to make contact with organizations abroad and has embraced Stokely Carmichael's concept of Pan-Africanism.

JOMO has received contributions from all over the United States and recently was almost successful in receiving a large contribution from a church group in New York; however, this latter contribution was ultimately not received.

NATION OF ISLAM
Bufile 25-330971

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an independent semi-religious group consisting of an adult, hard-core, all black membership of 6,000 members. Muhammad's Temple Number 2 of the Holy Temples of Islam, Chicago, Illinois, is the national headquarters of this organization consisting of 108 groups in the U.S. and one in Bermuda. In seven U.S. cities it operates University of Islam schools for 200 to 600 children at each school. Local groups convene weekly, and once each year a national convention is held in Chicago which is attended by 5,000 to 6,000 individuals.

The NOI remains under leadership of Elijah Muhammed who is the self-proclaimed Messenger of Allah and "Supreme Ruler of the Universe." Leaders continue to stress creation of a separate black nation; complete segregation of the races; hatred of the white man; and development of a black economic community. The group opposes the war in Vietnam, teaches members to evade the draft, and strongly supports the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East.

Although for years the leaders of the NOI have taught members to refrain from carrying weapons and engaging in acts of violence and open attacks on the white man, as recently as July, 1971, the NOI Mosque, Tyler, Texas, planned the execution of radio disc jockey and his associate for having previously killed a fellow NOI member. Subsequently, seven members of this mosque were involved in killing one of these men. Local police recovered three pistols and a rifle from among members of this group. The highly inflammatory antiwhite ideology espoused by the NOI continues to make this group a highly volatile extremist organization.

The organization is reaching new heights in accumulating wealth. Three-fourths of a million dollars monthly flows in and out of bank accounts at a national level. Corporations have been formed to operate food processing plants, acquire land in the U.S. and in Bermuda, and acquire and maintain a fleet of jet airplanes.

This group continues the propagation of its beliefs through distributing 400,000 copies weekly of its newspaper, "Muhammad Speaks," and radio broadcasts throughout the country.

We have conducted a continuous security and/or extremist type investigation of this group since 1953 in accordance with Department directives. Each group is reported on semiannually, and the leaders, functionaries, and those involved in violence or extremist activities are subject to active investigation. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66 requested our investigation of this organization be continued.

REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA
Bufile 157-9079

The Republic of New Africa (RNA) was formed in Detroit, Michigan, in March, 1968, by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist. It has chapters in nine U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership of approximately 116 individuals.

RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard Henry, long-time extremists in the Detroit area. When first formed, RNA named as its President-in-exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence-prone black extremist then living in China. Williams, who has since returned to the U.S., has resigned his position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems and dissension existing within the organization.

RNA was established to create a black nation within the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations of $10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years of ancestral slave labor.

RNA's organizational structure is revolutionary in character and its leaders have proposed efforts be made for international recognition and financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black nations of the world. RNA, in September, 1970, made a formal agreement of mutual revolutionary and financial support with the leader of the Black Power Movement in Surinam.

RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion whose function was to protect the persons and property and to attack the enemies (police) of that nation. Training programs were instituted and uniforms complete with leopard skin epaulets were designed as the official dress for the Black Legionaires.

RNA maintains its national headquarters in Detroit, Michigan, despite the fact that since early 1970, two factions have arisen within the organization. One faction, led by Richard Henry, is attempting to establish a national headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana. This faction is the most active and militant of the two groups and has called for intensification of RNA activities throughout the U.S. The other group, under the leadership of Milton Henry in Detroit, has been relatively inactive for some time. The Milton Henry Faction, however, has scheduled a national RNA convention to be held in Dayton, Ohio, September 4 through 6, 1971, which activity could herald renewed revolutionary activity by this group.

The Richard Henry Faction has been extremely active in the past several months in attempting to obtain land and establish a black nation in Hinds County, Mississippi. During July, 1971, this faction held a "peoples court" to hear RNA's case against a black farmer and owner of the land claimed by RNA which was consecrated as the group's capitol in March 3, 1971. The black farmer has reneged on a former offer to sell his land to RNA. The RNA group found the farmer guilty and threatens to seize the land by force, if necessary.

The RNA's propensity for violent action is demonstrated by the fact that on August 18, 1971, local police officers in Jackson, Mississippi, accompanied by Bureau Agents raided an RNA site seeking four subjects for whom warrants were outstanding, one of whom was wanted for Unlawful Flight to Avoid Prosecution (UFAP) for murder in Detroit. A shoot-out occurred during which two police officers and a Bureau Agent were wounded. One police officer subsequently died of a head wound. Eleven RNA members, including Richard Henry, have been arrested by local authorities and the UFAP subject is still being sought. A subsequent search of the raided RNA headquarters determined it was a virtual arsenal of weapons of all types including homemade bombs and Molotov cocktails. The front door of this building had been booby-trapped and it had an escape tunnel leading from its rear which was accessible via a trap door in the building's interior and a trench-bunker similar to that utilized by the Viet Cong in the war in South Vietnam.

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)
100-439190

SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and black participation. Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a position which the organization maintains today.

H. Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word "nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.

Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence as a black extremist organization. The national leadership issued directives on the reorganization of the national office in New York City, as well as the local organizations and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC known as the Revolutionary Political Council.

As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970, to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt. Hunt also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary Political Council. Frances Beal is the National Political Education Officer. Hunt and Beal are the only two national officers of SNCC.

In July, 1971, a reorganizational meeting was held in Atlanta, Georgia. SNCC cadres gathered from several states and were directed by Hunt to study, understand, and then practice principles set forth in "Contradictions" by Mao Tse-tung and "Dialectical and Historical Materialism" by Joseph Stalin. SNCC members in San Antonio, Texas, are

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
RSY:ies
A. H.

146

already receiving extensive political education in communist ideology of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. The decision was made to establish a State Bureau of SNCC in every state and to move the national headquarters from New York City to Atlanta. SNCC will support various black revolutionary labor groups and will attempt to rally those under 25 years of age into a new Revolutionary Youth Organization. The cadres discussed establishment of a short-wave communication system utilizing code as a more secure alternative to telephone and mail systems.

Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates, and their activities continue to receive close supervision. Information of pertinence concerning the organization continues to be disseminated to the White House, the Department and other interested Government agencies and officials.

COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OF BLACK EXTREMIST GROUPS
100-442529

This intensification was initiated in August, 1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume and importance of this information made it necessary to follow this communist influence in a separate investigation. This investigation includes not only the influence of the Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups, splinter groups and others including the New Left.

The overall objective in this and related investigations is to protect the internal security of the United States by submitting information relating to possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop intelligence information and disseminate to interested Government agencies. Additionally, we take measures to neutralize the communist influence in the black extremist field whenever feasible.

Reports are submitted quarterly and the investigation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent information is disseminated to the White House and the Attorney General.

The year 1970 saw continued influence by communists and other subversives in extremist groups. In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist Party. This has not diminished in any way the Communist Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers whether they want it or not.

There are those in the Communist Party who oppose or are extremely reluctant to support the Black Panther Party especially those in the Black Panther Party who call for "revolutionary suicide." Charlene Mitchell, Secretary of the Black Liberation of the Communist Party, is reportedly attempting to split the Communist Party and form a Black Panther Communist Party which believes in violent and dramatic action. Her group is reportedly waiting for Angela Davis, admitted Communist Party member currently incarcerated in California awaiting trial in connection with the kidnapping and murder of a judge in California during an attempted escape by prisoners from the courtroom, to be released at which time Davis will become public leader of the new party. The Communist Party is girding itself to oppose the split.

In June, 1971, a group led by James Rufus Forman, Coordinator of International Affairs for the black extremist Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC), visited Hanoi ostensibly to establish rapport between the North Vietnamese and black people in the United States. The group's trip was also to include Algiers, Guinea, and Tanzania to reestablish old contacts for SNCC and initiate new ones.

"SNCC Monthly," the publication of SNCC, in its March, 1971, issue, contained an article about "Third World People," united by "common historical oppression." People in Cuba, Vietnam, Guinea, and the Palestinian guerrillas were mentioned as having cut off the tentacles of "the monster," imperialism. Another article in the same issue was printed to politicize the readers on the Arab-Israeli conflict and clarify the similarity between the Arab position and that of other "people of color" throughout the world.

Curtis Nelson Powell, Black Panther Party member involved in restructuring of Black Panther Party - Cleaver Faction, while in Stockholm, Sweden, in early August, 1971, inquired about the possibility of obtaining small arms on behalf of Eldridge Cleaver for the Black Panther Party. He specifically mentioned machine guns, pistols and bazookas and stated there would be no difficulty in getting these items into the United States. His request was rejected. Powell subsequently traveled to Algeria, headquarters of the Black Panther Party International Section, and then on to Tanzania. He met with the Tanzanian Minister for Economic Affairs and Development Planning and requested permission to open a Black Panther Party office in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Although the Tanzanian Minister was sympathetic, he doubted the Tanzanian Government would grant such permission at this time.

Write-ups concerning the Black Revolutionary Party and the International Black Workers Congress are incorporated in this survey. Such write-ups document the pro-Red China Communist Party of Canada (Marxist-Leninist) influence over the Black Revolutionary Party and the Marxist-Leninist doctrine of the International Black Workers Congress.

KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

4-H

Key Black Extremist (KBE) Program initiated 12/23/70 with Director's approval to intensify investigative coverage of selected black extremists throughout United States who are extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence. Ninety individuals are currently on the KBE list, including such persons as Stokely Carmichael, Huey Newton and David Hilliard.

Objective of program is to develop complete and detailed information on the day-to-day activities and future plans of KBE individuals. Investigative summary report is required followed by investigative report every 90 days.

All KBE individuals are included in Priority I of Security Index. Each is included in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album. All aspects of their finances are determined. Their handwriting specimens are placed in the National Security File in the Laboratory Division. Their fingerprints are included in the Black Extremist Section of the Single Fingerprint File in the Identification Division. Particular attention is paid to their travel. Possible criminal violations are vigorously pursued. Emphasis is placed on obtaining record of their inflammatory statements. High level of informant coverage on each individual is required.

Supervision of KBE investigations is handled on the individual desks and additions to and deletions from KBE list must be approved by Bureau. Inasmuch as KBE individuals are of the type whose investigation would ordinarily require close supervision by Bureau supervisors, the administration and supervision of this program entails only a minimum amount of time above that which would ordinarily be expended on the supervision of the cases of these persons.

Continuation of this program will be justified in December, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
HEH:acs
4-H

The prime purpose of development and utilization of extremist informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidenciary information concerning black and white extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning situations affecting civil unrest in all parts of the country.

Supervision of extremist informants at the Seat of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informants, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant coverage of the various extremist organizations, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremist groups' conventions, supervision of operations for the development of top-echelon BPP informants, and other special projects such as development of information concerning black extremist underground escape routes and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision with a minimum of paper work.

As of 7/31/71 we are operating a total of 7,477 extremist informants compared with a total of 7,184 at the time of the last Inspection. This is an increase of 293 informants. Concerning the above informants, 583 informants report on black extremist organizations and 353 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. We are operating 6,541 ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities as compared to 6,224 ghetto informants at the time of the last Inspection which represents an increase of 317 ghetto informants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

8/19/71
JGD:maz
4-H

152

In line with the fluctuating membership in the various black extremist organizations, we have constantly adjusted our informant coverage. This can be seen very clearly with the most violent of the black extremist groups, the Black Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection BPP membership was 1,000, and we afforded coverage of these 1,000 members with 173 informants which represents 17.3 percent of the membership. The present membership is 710, and we have 156 informants reporting on these individuals which represents 21.7 percent of the membership. This is a net increase of informant coverage to total membership of 4.4 since the last Inspection. This also indicates our aims and purposes of penetrating these organizations with the most qualified informants and keeping within the policy of operating the informant program in a very efficient manner.

At the time of the last Inspection we were operating 376 informants furnishing information concerning white extremist organizations, and as of 7/31/71 we are operating 353 informants. This is in keeping with the current membership of the Klan and white hate organizations.

By memorandum dated 2/19/71 from G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Penetration of Black Extremist Groups in Canada, Racial Matters" it was recommended and approved that this Bureau attempt to penetrate the black extremist activities in Canada due to the close working relationship being developed between the extremists in that country and the United States. We made available to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) a top source of the Baltimore Division. By letter dated 7/20/71 from Legat, Ottawa, it was set out that the RCMP advised they have been extremely pleased with the progress made by our source in that he has furnished information concerning future plans for acts of violence and the establishment of guerrilla warfare training by black extremist groups in the Toronto, Canada, area.

RCMP indicated that Halifax, Nova Scotia, is fast becoming a focal point of black extremist activity in Canada.

RCMP pointed out that the above area is visited frequently by black extremist figures from the United States and admitted that they have experienced considerable difficulty in the recruitment of suitable sources in the Halifax area. RCMP requested of the Bureau another source of the caliber of the one presently operating in Canada.

By memorandum dated 7/29/71 it was recommended and approved that we solicit of the field the identities of informants who may be able to travel to Canada. This project is presently being followed very closely.

By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan captioned "Racial Informant Development, Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters" it was recommended and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top-level informant in the BPP. By letter dated 8/17/71 San Francisco was instructed that captioned program is being discontinued. Review of this program showed that all avenues leading to the possible development of high-level BPP informants have been explored and the groundwork laid for the development of top-echelon leaders who might defect. Therefore, it was believed that it was no longer necessary to have two Special Agents assigned exclusively to this program. This will bring about a savings in manpower; however, San Francisco is under instructions to continue aggressive efforts to penetrate the top echelon of the BPP. This is being closely followed at the Seat of Government.

GHETTO INFORMANTS

The ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67 to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. A ghetto informant is an individual living or working in the ghetto area who is available to furnish information concerning conditions which may create civil unrest.

Since 1967 this program has been significantly modified in that this vast network of informants have been changed from listening posts to individuals who are actively seeking extremist information as well as information concerning violations of Federal and local statutes.

We have noted numerous incidents where ghetto informants are being converted by the field to regular extremist informants in that they have been graduated into positions where they can report on a regular basis concerning the activities of individual extremists and/or extremist organizations. As a valuable by-product we are also achieving criminal statistics through contacts with our ghetto informants. This program was justified by memorandum dated 7/4/71 from G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial Matters" and is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1972.

155

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - BLACK EXTREMISTS
Bufile 100-448006

Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70. This program was a supplement to our black extremist investigative activities and involved a variety of sensitive intelligence techniques which were afforded close supervision at the Seat of Government. No action could be instituted under this program without prior Bureau authorization.

To afford additional security to our sensitive techniques and operations, all counterintelligence programs, including this program, were discontinued and the field was so advised by airtel 4/28/71.

Although this program was discontinued, the field was advised if exceptional instances arose wherein it was considered counterintelligence action is warranted, that recommendations should be submitted to the Bureau under the specific case caption involved. These recommendations will then be considered on an individual basis. The field was also reminded that prior Bureau authority is required before initiating any activity of a counterintelligence nature.

Significant results since last inspection as a result of this program are set forth under "Accomplishments 4E" elsewhere in this report.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WHA:pjc
4-H

WH

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION: There are attached separate write-ups regarding the following programs supervised in the Nationalities Intelligence Section:

1. Name checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas
2. Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV)
3. Security Index-Cuba
4. American Repatriate Program
5. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
6. Chinese Aliens Entering the U. S.; Chinese Entering U. S. Claiming U. S. Citizenship
7. Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States
8. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
FXO:dgo
4-H

157

NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS

This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of foreign officials where their activity requires such action.

The basis for this program is found in the procedure by Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions to the field for active investigation.

Since the program was initiated, 794,570 Immigration and Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have undertaken 474 investigations based on results thereof.

The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program, the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures. The program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security threat to the United States.

The program is justified annually, with the last justification having been made February 18, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
ERH:bjp
4-H

158

PROGRAM
COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER
BOCOV
BUFILE: 100-356015

Substitute

I. Background and Date of Inception

BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948 to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25-mile zone south of the U. S. - Mexican border by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

II. Scope and Desired Objectives

Three border offices, El Paso, San Antonio, and San Diego, as well as the office of the Legal Attache, Mexico, participate in this program. Ten Agents and two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion of their time directing some 200 sources and informants. Population of the zone areas involved is approximately 1,700,000 persons of which some 2,400 have been identified as either members or sympathizers of major Mexican subversive groups.

III. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

Program has furnished valuable information relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives residing and or operating in the border area. Investigative results are furnished to all levels of interested U. S. Government intelligence community. Program continues to keep us advised of potential trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
BMP:emj
4 - H

159

IV. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Periodic reports on individuals and organizations as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed and correlated by SA Bernardo M. Perez. Involved is review of incoming letters, memoranda, reports and semiannual progress letters detailing informant coverage and subversive strength. Analysis of this material provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for counterintelligence moves.

V. Current Justification for Continuance

BOCOV continues to fill the above-described intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with other intelligence programs originating in the border area, in particular the SECOMEX program.

VI. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified January 8, 1971.

160

BOCOV

Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is no longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also in investigating criminal matters of an international nature. Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing abroad.

Substituted for pages 159x160
in copy to SSC

SECURITY INDEX - CUBA

Background and Date of Inception

This program was instituted in November, 1960. By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959, was a communist state posing a real and present threat to the internal security of the United States. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, an Agent Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for administering this program to assure the apprehension and special handling of the individuals included therein in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba.

Scope and Desired Objectives

As of July 15, 1971, there were 409 individuals included in the Security Index - Cuba Program, divided into two categories:

1. Individuals placed on the Security Index solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities (Cuban Special Section - 93 persons).
2. Persons already on the Security Index because of other subversive connections and activities who would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban" - 316 individuals).

161

Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date record of location and activities of individuals included therein, by means of established Security Index procedures and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of these persons become necessary.

Positive Results Achieved

Determination as to the validity of an individual's inclusion in this program is constantly under review. Since the program was last justified on April 7, 1971, the number of persons on the Cuban Section of the Index has been reduced from 95 to 93. These 93 persons are judged to be hard-core pro-Cubans, action against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory. Of these 93, 28 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending security investigations with Cuban ramifications is considered for inclusion in the Index.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The Agent Supervisor responsible for this program is required to review each investigative communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether the individual meets the criteria for inclusion in the Index, as outlined in the Manual of Instructions. He must make a decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the field's recommendations regarding these matters. He initiates procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division and Voucher Statistical Section of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of an individual on the Index, his removal and the assignment or change in apprehension priority.

If the individual involved is an alien, correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization Service. Action is also taken with the Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index.

Current Justification

The threat to the internal security of the United States from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years. A workable priority apprehension system which receives current and continuing attention is mandatory. This program, as presently organized and handled, is fully justified.

Frequencies of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation

This program is evaluated on a semiannual basis. The most recent review and evaluation was dated April 7, 1971.

163

AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM

The American Repatriate Program which was instituted in February, 1962, to specify procedure to be followed upon receipt of information that U.S. citizens residing in Cuba had been issued Swiss Protection Passports by Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba, for travel to U. S. was discontinued by memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated March 25, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
VHN:emj
4 - H

164

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES
(Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Scope and Objectives

Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations. Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962 and 1963, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.

The program has four principal phases as follows:

a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U. S. agencies regarding arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense.

b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of State Department and the Attorney General. We currently have special coverage on six diplomatic establishments of four non-Soviet bloc countries. Countries currently covered are Panama, Cuba, Israel and the United Arab Republic. Our cost in operating this phase of the program is related to translation of the intelligence product and salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the special coverage is justified. This justification is based on the value of the data developed.

c. This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet bloc countries as well as the development of individuals so closely connected with official establishments they are able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence information. We now have 39 actual and 14 potential live sources

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
ERH:bjp
4-H

at the establishments of 24 non-Soviet bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources.

d. This phase relates to our intensification of efforts by our legal attache offices abroad to develop and instantaneously report high-level intelligence information susceptible to immediate transmission to the White House for consideration by appropriate officials involved in determining national policy on critical international issues.

Since the last inspection we have instituted a program operating under the code word of "HILEV" which provides for specific channels of transmission and dissemination along the lines noted above. The expansion of our operations abroad, at the instruction of the President, has resulted in the development of considerable expertise on the part of our legal attaches in developing the type of information required in this area and the resulting product of their efforts has resulted in laudatory comments by Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and other high-level members of the Executive Branch.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to continue to produce a steady flow of substantive information of an intelligence nature for the White House and the highest level of the intelligence community. The program has been particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis, the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurring areas of tension created in South America by the frequent overthrow and/or establishment of regimes in that continent, some of which are strongly anti-American in political leaning. In other fringe nationality areas, the program has served as a basis for obtaining information which has served as a basis for advice to various high-level Government officials necessary for policy decisions within the international political arena. The majority of these data are not otherwise obtainable.

The daily flow of information from our sources in the various facets of this program to the highest levels of Government has succeeded in firmly establishing the FBI as a lucrative source of foreign intelligence.

166

This ability to produce such information has been recognized, as noted, by Dr. Kissinger at the White House and by various officials of the Central Intelligence Agency in frequent contact with the Bureau. Specific comments regarding the HILEV program and its productivity may be found in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments - Special Coordination Unit.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign political information of vital interest to the White House and members of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this program be continued.

5. Periodic Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by memorandum dated 5/5/71.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - DANGEROUS ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC

Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity.

The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act. The

167

program is similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program and the PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different type of individual.

The program is a control device only and involves no investigative activity. Twenty-three individuals (as of 8/18/71) are included on the list, with New York Office responsible for nineteen and Washington Field Office responsible for four.

Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify for elimination or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list.

Program continues to serve a useful purpose as a precautionary measure for U. S. security in time of emergency. It is justified annually, with last justification having been made 2/21/71.

CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE U. S.
(Bufile 105-135923)

CHINESE ENTERING THE U.S. CLAIMING U.S. CITIZENSHIP
(Bufile 105-12752)

Inasmuch as the criteria and objectives regarding the above two programs are similar, both are included in this write-up.

Investigations under the Chinese alien program were instituted 1/26/65 and investigations relating to Chinese entering the U. S. claiming U. S. citizenship were initiated 9/14/65.

Both of the above programs are designed to uncover, through investigation, ethnic Chinese who may enter the U. S. under the guise of a legitimate alien and/or U. S. citizen but who, in fact, may be covert intelligence agents of Communist China. Prior to inception of these programs, we were made aware of emphasis placed by Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence organizations on the need to introduce illegal agents into the U. S. Provided sufficient indoctrination and training are given, the legal alien channel is undoubtedly the easiest way to accomplish the desire of the Chicoms to plant their agents in this country.

Under existing immigration laws, up to 10,000 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U. S. for permanent residence annually. Under an additional program initiated in 1971, another 250 Chinese aliens may be admitted to the U. S. monthly as Conditional Entrants. All of these aliens have backgrounds closely connecting them with Communist China and some leave behind on the mainland immediate family members or very close relatives. Our experience in this field over the years indicates that alien entrants into the U. S. who may be selected for intelligence assignments would probably have resided in a communist country while in the 19 to 45-year age group and would probably have at least 8 years of formal education. Accordingly, our investigations of aliens are limited to those who fit the above criteria.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
FXO:dgo
4-H

169

The key to investigations of this type is the initial interview which is conducted after the field office covering the alien's residence has developed sufficient background information on the subject. These interviews are designed to have the subject personally verify information he may have furnished to U. S. authorities at some time in the past and in cases where significant discrepancies are disclosed through the interview, we will intensify the investigation, looking toward the possibility that the subject is now unable to recall a previous cover story. In the event the initial interview is satisfactory, the case is closed subject to being reopened after two years for a second interview. The second interview, which is conducted for the same purpose as the first interview, will determine whether or not additional action is to be taken. If the second interview is satisfactory, no subsequent action is taken with regard to the subject. Cases investigated under the citizenship program are handled in a similar manner.

Our investigations in both these areas produce intelligence information of various types which is valuable to other U. S. agencies having a primary interest in developments in mainland China. The two programs have produced tangible results in that a number of sources in the Chinese field have been developed through interviews.

Chinese alien cases originate with Legal Attache, Hong Kong, who views appropriate records and thereafter submits pertinent data to the Bureau regarding those aliens who fit the criteria for investigation or any others whose backgrounds are deemed to be so unusual that investigation may be justified even though they do not fit the criteria. Cases in the citizenship category are initiated by the Washington Field Office after review of passport records. Alien and citizenship cases are handled on the Desks of two Supervisors and constitute only a portion of the work on each Desk. Results of investigation are carefully reviewed and evaluated in line with our objective of determining if the subject is or may be of investigative interest.

It is felt that these two programs are fully justified for continuation since they cover areas which may be utilized by the Chicoms to introduce illegal agents into this country. No other U. S. investigative agency carries out investigative activity along this line. In addition, these programs provide us with sources and positive intelligence of

170

interest to other U. S. agencies. No additional manpower is necessary to carry out our responsibilities under these programs.

These programs are evaluated and justified annually. Both programs were considered justified based on Division inspection write-up 1/12/71.

171

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)

(Bufile 105-135614)

4-H

Captioned program was initiated in May, 1965, to combat Chinese communist (Chicom) efforts to initiate intelligence operations and develop intelligence data in the United States.

Analysis indicates that our current efforts relating to development of informants, particularly double agents, is an activity which we normally carry out in connection with our intelligence responsibilities. Since CHICOIN was previously defined as a means by which we were creating situations and placing our informants in contact with Chicoms abroad, with the aim of their being recruited by the Chicoms, it is felt we are accomplishing the same objective through source and double agent development in individual cases.

We are constantly aware of the need to employ counterintelligence methods designed toward penetration of Chicom intelligence, particularly since a Chicom official establishment has opened in Canada and with the knowledge that the Chicoms will probably enter the United Nations within the next 14 months. Along these lines, we are continuing, on an individual basis, development of sources who can be directed toward the penetration mentioned above.

Accordingly, it is felt that use of the term CHICOIN in connection with our basic efforts, is no longer necessary. CHICOIN, as a program, is therefore discontinued.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
EXO:dgo

172

VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

4-H

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.

This program was initiated in 8/65 in an effort to uncover Chinese communist (Chicom) activities in the United States. The identities of individuals, both citizens and noncitizens who are residents of this country, were furnished to us by United States intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services. These individuals either attempted to enter Communist China or contacted the diplomatic establishments of the People's Republic of China (PRC) throughout the world. Since 1965, the number of diplomatic establishments maintained by the PRC has increased many times, particularly during the past year when many countries recognized the PRC.

This program is field-wide and not directly connected with any other investigative program. The objectives include identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom establishments. It is essential that visitors to Communist China and PRC Embassies in foreign countries be identified to determine if they have access to classified material or could be utilized for an intelligence or espionage assignment upon their return to the United States. During recent months, the United States Government has lifted the ban on travel to Communist China. However, the PRC has been very selective in the issuance of travel documents to United States citizens and, up until now, has restricted the issuance of these documents to chiefly a few newspapermen, some scholars, known pro-Chicom sympathizers and a very limited number of ethnic Chinese. During the past month, the Department of State and the Justice Department have indicated that the travel restrictions will be lifted on permanent resident aliens in the United States who wish to visit Communist China, Outer Mongolia and Albania. Previously, the restrictions on United States citizens limited the number who actually entered China as well as the number of visitors to PRC diplomatic establishments. The lifting of the restrictions on United States citizens and the proposed amendment to the law concerning permanent resident aliens will greatly increase the number of investigations under this program. Many of the individuals traveling to China from the United States will be legitimate merchants, scholars and tourists. However, they will be subjected to possible approaches for intelligence purposes. In addition, we will possibly be able to utilize legitimate travelers as walk-ins. Therefore, it is essential that we fully identify all those who enter China or contact PRC diplomatic establishments abroad. The ethnic Chinese is of greatest interest to the Chicoms as a visitor, particularly if he has relatives residing on the Chinese mainland. Based upon the experiences of friendly foreign intelligence agencies, particularly RCMP, we have learned that the Chicoms primarily recruit as intelligence agents the ethnic Chinese.

2. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.

Investigations since the last inspection have greatly increased. Many of the investigations are in the initial stages of identifying the individuals. In February, 1971, the Chicoms established an Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. During that month, 14 United States residents contacted the Embassy. During June, 156 residents contacted the Embassy in addition to contacts with the Chicom propaganda news agency, New China News Agency. Included among these people are ethnic Chinese, national political figures in the United States, China scholars, journalists and merchants. The increase from February through June of over 1,000 percent indicates the acceleration of the problem facing the Bureau in this program. During July, there was a substantial increase over June. The Chicoms have taken on a new look and are encouraging visitors to the Embassy in Ottawa. Our common border, which is so easily crossed, offers no resistance, and it is through the excellent cooperation of the RCMP that we are able to obtain the names and addresses of individuals contacting the Embassy or the New China News Agency (NCNA). It is expected that in the future the number of contacts will increase both at Ottawa as well as at the China Travel Service in Hong Kong and the various Embassies of the PRC in foreign countries. The present policies of the President and the Department of State speaking for the United States Government

174

will continue to encourage visitors, any of which is a possible subject for recruitment by Chicom intelligence for hard espionage, intelligence activities or propagandizing the American people.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.

Portions of this program are handled by three Bureau supervisors. However, the visitors to China are correlated by one supervisor and the contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments are correlated by a second supervisor. This has become necessary because of the increased work load based upon information furnished by RCMP through Legat, Ottawa. Investigations are conducted to fully identify the individuals primarily through established sources, if possible, to determine their current residence and particularly their employment. Identification of employment is essential to determine if the individual has access to classified information or if he is in some field of endeavor which is of particular interest to the Chicoms. Each case is evaluated on its individual merits and cases are not opened on individuals on whom sufficient background information is available, such as nationally known journalists, scholars or political figures.

4. Current Justification for Continuation.

RCMP has advised as recently as July, 1971, that they feel that at least 50 percent of the Chinese communist intelligence effort in Canada will be directed against the United States. The wife of a Chicom intelligence officer of the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa has stated that the Embassy staff in Canada will be large because "we will be responsible for the United States as well as Canada." It is absolutely necessary that this program be continued to identify all contacts both in Canada as well as at other PRC diplomatic establishments throughout the world. In addition, Legat, Hong Kong, has submitted a form which has been approved to forward to the Bureau the identities of those individuals who are American citizens or permanent resident aliens who cross the border of Hong Kong into Communist China at Lo Wu.

175

In addition, identity of visitors will give us a fertile field for development of sources which we may utilize as walk-ins, particularly at the Embassy in Ottawa. RCMP has greatly encouraged this procedure.

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.

This program is evaluated annually and the last date of justification took place on 1/12/71.

176

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: In order that the overall foreign liaison can be fully and currently evaluated, you are requested to furnish your comments concerning each Legal Attache Office presently operating (17); former Legal Attache Offices which you have proposed to be reopened (3); and proposed new Legal Attache Offices (3).

In providing this information, you are requested to be specific as to: (1) productivity (including intelligence) of each existing office (provide examples); (2) comment as to adequacy of personnel assigned (fully document if additions, deletions or changes recommended); (3) make specific recommendations regarding continuing or discontinuing each of existing offices.

You are also requested to state your current recommendations regarding each former and new Legal Attache Office proposed above.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR: C. D. BRENNAN:
(CDB:mls 8/25/71)
I concur with the attached comprehensive analysis of Section Chief Wannall in regard to our Legal Attache operations abroad. The Inspector should particularly note Wannall's concluding observation that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by the White House, will require approval from State and Bureau of the Budget. As Mr. Wannall points out, we are not in a position to balance the value of the information expected against the costs, and I would suggest the Inspector insure that a copy of Mr. Wannall's overall analysis is furnished to the Administrative Division inasmuch as the Director on 8/23/71 approved the recommendation that the Administrative Division should coordinate and handle all requests for increased staffing, as well as the creation of new Legal Attache posts.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
4-H-1

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES
FOREIGN LIAISON

COMMENTS OF SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL: WRW In response to the Inspector's inquiry, comments follow concerning (1) the 11 foreign offices in operation prior to the expansion in December, 1970, (2) the 6 new offices opened in December, 1970, and (3) the 6 additional offices which we proposed be opened in response to the Director's inquiry in May, 1971. With respect to categories (1) and (2) it is noted that these 17 offices have just undergone inspection, most of them during the current month. As very few of the inspection reports are yet available, these comments are necessarily based upon those facets of the work which it is possible to observe from the Seat of Government.

(1) Offices in Operation Prior to Expansion

BERN

Our operations in Switzerland are most delicate because of the fierce independence of the Swiss, who would not permit the use of "Legal Attache" as it was considered too widely identified with the FBI. As a result, our representative is known in the Embassy and in Switzerland merely as an Attache. The office has become increasingly important in the criminal field very recently as a result of the large scale thefts of securities in the United States and their transportation to and attempted sale or hypothecation in Switzerland. In addition, it has long been the goal to obtain access to information concerning bank accounts opened in Switzerland by subjects of our investigations. Progress has been slow but we have been able to secure limited information and the cooperation received is the direct result of the personal liaison of our Legal Attache.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, the office located 7 fugitives and arranged 4 "informal deportations." Its pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 83 which is approximately average on a per agent basis in the foreign field. Through 8/23/71 Bern had submitted 7 HILEV items of which 5 were actually disseminated. This is the smallest number of submissions of any Legal Attache and the second smallest number of acceptable items.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
4-H-1
8/23/71
GAD:bsf

178

Personnel

Adequate. No increase envisioned.

Recommendation

Continue.

BONN

This is a very important European office covering Germany, Austria, and the Netherlands. There is a high volume of both criminal and security work. The large United State military presence in Germany is both an espionage target and a source of Bureau work. The military intercept program furnishes our office copies of correspondence passing through Germany to and from Iron Curtain countries and the volume of this is so great as to require extra clerical assistance. The Legal Attache has served in Germany since 1951 and is universely respected and given full cooperation.

Productivity

In fiscal 1971 20 persons wanted in the United States were located in the Bonn territory and 5 stolen cars were recovered. The Legal Attache is currently working a ring case which will result in location of an additional number. Through 8/23/71 he has submitted 18 HILEV items of which 7 have been disseminated. This is considerably below average and this matter was discussed with the Legal Attache during his visit to Washington on home leave recently. He has shown improvement as evidenced by the fact that he has submitted 4 items already during August of which 3 have been used. His pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 355 which is considerably above average on a per agent basis.

Personnel

A third agent was added to Bonn in December, 1970, at the time Austria was added to its territory. It is felt this is adequate.

Recommendation

Continue.

BUENOS AIRES

For several years this was a one-man office attempting to cover not only Argentina but also Brazil, some 1,200 miles away and larger than the United States. Although we had a very capable Legal Attache, he could barely touch the high spots in his territory and maintained a very low case load. Two additional agents were assigned in December, 1970, and Paraguay was added to the Legal Attache's responsibilities as was intelligence reporting on Chile. We believe the results have justified this move although one agent is still trying to cover Brazil on a road trip basis.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 38 persons wanted in the United States were located in the territory. The pending case load as of 6/30/71 was 294 and above average on a per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 47 HILEV items of which 21 have been used and 2 are still pending. This is well above the average.

Personnel

One agent and one clerk could be transferred from Buenos Aires if an office were to be opened in Rio de Janeiro. Under present circumstances, the personnel is adequate but three agents and three clerks would not be needed if Brazil was removed from their territory.

Recommendation

Continue. At present, this is our only point of coverage for an enormous area of South America.

HONG KONG

Originally opened to provide coverage of Chinese communist activities, Hong Kong fell heir to the entire Southwest Pacific area when our office in Manila was closed. We believe the area has a high potential both for cases pertaining to the Bureau's domestic jurisdiction and for items of high-level intelligence. The intermittent road trips, however, do not permit adequate development of contacts who can be relied upon to look out for our interests. In addition, the Legal Attache has required an abnormal amount

130

of supervision in regard to administrative matters. He experiences great difficulty in meeting deadlines and has been censured twice already this year for delays in reporting. He has an outstanding personality, speaks readily and fluently, and has a good background in Chinese matters. Nevertheless, very few of his HILEV submissions have been acceptable and he has evidenced a lack of understanding of what constitutes intelligence of interest to the White House. It was suggested that these matters be inquired into by the Inspector together with the Legal Attache's relationship with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) so far as the passage of information to and from British sources is concerned. The results of the inspection are not yet known.

Productivity

Fifty-four persons wanted in the United States were located by the office during fiscal 1971. Eight "informal deportations" were arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 178 which is approximately average on a per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the Legal Attache had submitted 27 items for HILEV dissemination of which 7 were considered acceptable.

Personnel

The present personnel complement is not considered adequate to discharge the Bureau's responsibilities, including HILEV in Southeast Asia. We have, however, recommended that three additional offices be opened in this area. If these offices are opened, the complement of two agents and two clerks should be able to handle the work in Hong Kong and, if necessary, provide relief to any one-man office opened in the area.

Recommendation

Continue. The resumption of relations with Communist China will make this office increasingly important.

LONDON

This is our most productive office in Western Europe and handles a heavy volume of criminal cases. Our office has developed a very close relationship with Scotland

Yard and its Special Branch with the result that we receive splendid cooperation in both criminal and security investigations in the London area. There are always a large number of Americans in England and Ireland and there will always be a need for our representation there.

Productivity

As of 6/30/71, London had 333 pending cases, the largest number per agent of any office except Ottawa. Ninety-one persons wanted in the United States were located by the office during fiscal 1971 and 4 "informal deportations" were arranged despite the British insistence upon formal legal procedures. As of 8/23/71, London had submitted 20 items for HILEV dissemination 11 of which were accepted. This is slightly below average.

Personnel

We have recommended that consideration be given to assigning an additional agent to London and if approved, this will still leave London with an above average number of cases per man. We believe that the Bureau gets high value for its investment in the London Office.

Recommendation

Continue.

MADRID

An increasing number of American travelers are visiting Spain and they have included fugitives and other United States criminals. The present Legal Attache has developed strong contacts in Spain, including Prince Juan Carlos, the heir apparent to General Franco. Although operating alone, the Legal Attache has done a particularly good job both in his contacts and the administration of his office.

Productivity

Twenty-four persons wanted in the United States were located by the Legal Attache during fiscal 1971. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 115 which is substantially above average on a per agent basis. To date, he has submitted 28 items for HILEV dissemination of which 17 have been accepted with 2 still pending. This is above average.

182

Personnel

We recently recommended that one agent and one clerk be added to Madrid in the event of a future expansion. While the present complement can handle the normal FBI cases, the emphasis on HILEV items can best be satisfied by an additional agent.

Recommendation

Continue.

MEXICO CITY

Our operation in Mexico is unique in that we are actively developing informants and working most closely with the cooperative Mexican officers who handle our cases there. This is our largest office both in terms of case load and personnel. Unlike Canada where practically all our work is handled by one agency, we are dealing with a number of different agencies in Mexico most of which lack the training and sophistication of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) hence the disparity in the personnel required to handle our work north and south of the border. In an effort to streamline our operations in Mexico, the Legal Attache has been instructed to reduce the number of informants he is operating and to cut back on his investigation in certain areas such as the American Communist Group in Mexico.

Productivity

Two hundred and eighteen persons wanted in the United States were located by the Mexico City Office during fiscal 1971. Thirty "informal deportations"were arranged and 53 stolen automobiles were recovered. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 627 which is below average on a per agent basis. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 37 HILEV items of which 28 were actually disseminated. This is substantially above average.

Personnel

We feel the present complement is adequate until the Legal Attache recommends additional "Resident Agencies." The large expanse of territory and the necessity of working

183

closely with Mexican police require our agents to be on the scene for anything but relatively routine investigations. The Legal Attache has for some time been considering possibility of opening one or more additional "Resident Agencies" to afford faster coverage and more thorough investigations in areas which now require extended road trips.

Recommendation

Continue.

OTTAWA

With Mexico City this is one of our two most important and productive offices. The establishment of a Chinese Communist Diplomatic Mission in Canada, the asylum afforded our deserters and Selective Service fugitives, and the relatively open border make Canada an area of intense FBI interest. We are fortunate in having RCMP with nation-wide security jurisdiction and nearly nation-wide police jurisdiction to handle our investigations. While we have a two-man office in Ottawa, RCMP has a three-man office in Washington because of the number of United States agencies with which they do business. Our relations with RCMP are outstanding and they are the closest counterpart of the FBI of any foreign investigative agency.

Productivity

The case load as of 6/30/71 was 548 which is by far the highest on a per agent basis. During fiscal 1971, the office located 994 FBI fugitives, 37 fugitives for other agencies, 755 Selective Service delinquents, and recovered 92 stolen automobiles. Ninety "informal deportations" were effected. As of 8/23/71, the office had submitted 22 HILEV items of which 10 were used. This is below average.

Personnel

The sheer volume of work makes the problem in Ottawa primarily clerical. As a streamlining measure, RCMP has printed routing slips with spaces for our titles and file numbers which the Legal Attache uses in forwarding RCMP work to the Bureau. An additional clerk has recently been furnished Ottawa and it is expected that the recent inspection will have noted the effect of this increase.

Recommendation

Continue.

184

PARIS

This is a major continental office to which an additional Agent was assigned at the time of the recent expansion in order to concentrate on development of high-level intelligence. Our Legat enjoys the confidence of the French investigative agencies and is able to secure cooperation which is denied to the Central Intelligence Agency as a result of the latter's involvement in a wire tapping incident during the 1960's. The departure of the American military from France has somewhat reduced the volume of criminal matters, but the establishment of NATO Headquarters in Brussels, also in Paris territory, has continued the flow of security matters. A substantial number of friends of the Bureau visit Paris each year and require time and attention from our Legat.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 23 persons wanted in the United States were located by Legat, Paris. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 244, which is average on a per Agent basis. As of 8/23/71, Paris has submitted 38 HILEV items, of which 21 have been used and one is pending. This is above average.

Personnel

No increase in personnel is envisaged for Paris. This office provides both clerical and Agent relief to Madrid.

Recommendation

Continue.

ROME

In addition to Italy, Rome covers Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus on a road trip basis. The office has not yet reached its full potential in the development of political intelligence, but a very satisfactory relationship exists with the Italian investigative agencies; and we are receiving coverage of organized crime figures and other criminals who have relocated in Italy. It is expected that the Legat

185

will expand his contacts in Italian cities other than Rome, such as Naples, Milan, Florence, and Venice, in order to widen his capabilities in the criminal field and improve his collection of HILEV intelligence items.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, 14 persons wanted in the United States were located by the office and one informal deportation was arranged. As of 6/30/71, there were 145 pending cases, slightly below average on a per Agent basis. As of 8/23/71, 13 HILEV items had been submitted, of which 9 were used. This is below average.

Personnel

We believe the personnel are adequate but not excessive.

Recommendation

Continue.

TOKYO

In addition to Japan, Tokyo covers South Korea and Formosa. The latter presents a particularly delicate situation as the United States moves toward recognition of Communist China. Our Nationalist Chinese contacts, however, have promised to continue their cooperation despite what they view as an unsympathetic move by the United States Government. Despite the language barrier in both South Korea and Formosa, our representatives have been consistently successful in getting the work of the Bureau handled in adequate fashion. As the United States military commitment in Japan is reduced and as the economic goals of the United States and Japan draw farther apart, it is increasingly important that we have a liaison capability in Tokyo.

Productivity

During fiscal 1971, Tokyo located 23 persons wanted in the United States and arranged three informal deportations. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 279,

186

substantially above average on a per Agent basis and the third highest of the foreign offices on that basis. Tokyo has submitted 40 items for HILEV dissemination, of which 17 have been used. This is slightly above average.

Personnel

We have recommended that one Agent and one clerk be added to Tokyo in the event of further expansion. This would permit more frequent visits to Taiwan and South Korea and would also permit widening of contacts within Japan itself, which is necessary if increased emphasis is to be placed upon HILEV production.

Recommendation

Continue.

(2) New Offices Opened in December, 1970

The following six offices were opened in December 1970, for the specific purpose of developing HILEV intelligence. Four of these offices were opened in entirely new territory while two were assigned areas previously handled by other Legats. In considering these six offices, it must be recognized that they were primarily intended as intelligence collectors and not as sources of normal Bureau cases. We have been pleased, however, to note that several of these offices are making a substantial contribution to the Bureau's domestic jurisdiction in addition to their HILEV work.

BEIRUT

This is a one-man post established in new territory where there had previously been little need for coverage. The Legat has developed several very productive sources of political intelligence and at the present time is the highest producer of HILEV items. He has been commended for this. Nevertheless, should there be any reduction in White House interest in HILEV items, we could not justify continuation of this office.

Productivity

One FBI fugitive and one Selective Service delinquent were located by this office between January and June,

187

1971. As of 6/30/71, there was a pending case load of 27, which is the smallest case load of any foreign office. Beirut has submitted 61 HILEV items, of which 31 have been used and three are still pending. This is the largest number of items used submitted by any office.

Personnel

Present complement is fully adequate and cannot be reduced. Vacation relief for the Legat should come from Rome and for the clerk from Tel Aviv (we cannot send Assistant Legat Rubenstein to relieve in Beirut because of the political situation).

Recommendation

In view of the high production of HILEV items, the office should be continued.

CARACAS

This office was opened to cover the large area of northern South America, together with the numerous territories and independent countries in the West Indies. It is essentially a road trip office and affords the Bureau coverage in an area where we have been totally dependent upon the Department of State and the Central Intelligence Agency for the handling of our leads. Our Legat, who started out with a semihostile Ambassador, has won the latter's respect and has made a gratifying start at development of the large and scattered area assigned to him. In addition to the Latin-American countries, he is covering French, British, and Dutch possessions; and the effectiveness of his liaison is demonstrated by his ability to devise channels of communication to his contacts throughout his area.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, Caracas located 11 FBI fugitives, one fugitive for another agency, and three Selective Service delinquents, while arranging one informal deportation. His case load 6/30/71 was 72, which is well below average on a per agent basis but is expected to increase with the further development of his territory. He has submitted 25 HILEV items, of which 12 have been used. This is slightly below average.

188

Personnel

In view of the road trip nature of this territory, two Agents will be necessary to insure continued coverage. While the present case load is low, this is a brand new office in completely new territory and we expect improvement.

Recommendation

This office should be continued without regard to the emphasis on HILEVS.

189

COPENHAGEN

This office was opened to exploit the potential of the Scandinavian countries handled on a road trip basis from London prior to the expansion in December, 1970. A large number of deserters, Selective Service subjects, and other fugitives have been granted asylum in Sweden and the liberality of the laws in Denmark has served as a magnet for youth from the United States. In addition, the entire area is attuned to moves from the Soviet Union and it was hoped that there would be a reasonable volume of regular Bureau work together with a steady flow of political intelligence. The potential of the office has not yet been reached. The unfortunate security breach which resulted in the change of Legal Attaches has put an experienced man in charge but he has been there less than two months and has not yet been able to bring the office into line. There has already been a marked improvement in the rate of HILEV submissions and we expect the office to be more successful under new management.

Productivity

Twenty-eight persons wanted in the United States were located by the Legal Attache during the first six months of 1971. One "informal deportation" was arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71 (prior to arrival of the new Legal Attache) was 43 representing the smallest per agent assignment of any Legal Attache. Through July, 1971, Copenhagen had submitted 8 HILEVs of which 2 were used. Already in August, 4 submissions have been received for a total of 12 and 3 have been used for a total of 5 with 1 still pending. This is the smallest HILEV production of any Legal Attache and Bulet 8/4/71 pointed this out and insisted upon improvement. Results thus far in August indicate that the Legal Attache is responding.

Personnel

While the present case load does not, on the surface, justify continuation of a two-man office, we believe the potential for far greater achievement exists in the Scandinavian countries and we feel that the new Legal Attache should be given an opportunity to exploit this potential.

190

Recommendation

We recommend that the office be continued in its present status for an additional six months at the end of which time consideration should be given as to its personnel complement.

LA PAZ

Coverage of Bolivia and Peru was initiated for the sole purpose of developing HILEV data and cannot be justified on any other grounds. The Legal Attache has done an outstanding job under very difficult circumstances. The government (until 8/22/71) was pro-communist and basically anti-United States. The Legal Attache is living inside a barbed wire fence with a full-time guard at his door. We have had to armor plate his car and furnish him a two-way radio to insure full-time communications with his Embassy. The altitude is such that persons with other than completely strong hearts and lungs should not be permitted to visit there. The office gives us coverage in an area we have not visited since the days of SIS but normal Bureau work there is minimal.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, the Legal Attache located 1 FBI fugitive and 3 Selective Service delinquents. His case load as of 6/30/71 was 45 which is well below average on a per agent basis. He has submitted 24 HILEV items of which 14 have been used which is about average. He has twice furnished advance information concerning important political developments including the current coup and he has received commendation from the Director for the material he has furnished.

Personnel

The work load certainly cannot justify any increase in personnel but it cannot be decreased without closing the office.

Recommendation

It is recommended that operations continue in La Paz for another six months at the end of which time a close hard look should be given to closing the office. It is possible that a more friendly regime in Bolivia will result in an increase in HILEV items but it will have no bearing on his over-all case load.

191

MANAGUA

This is an office opened in the right area but in the wrong place. There is Bureau business in Central America and we had long considered recommending an office there prior to the President's request in 1970. We did not want to open in Managua, however, but in San Jose, Costa Rica, where the living conditions are far superior. We were forced to settle for Managua when the Ambassador to Costa Rica objected to our opening there. As a result, we have two men living under difficult circumstances resulting in varied domestic problems including education of their children, and morale in our Managua Office is probably lower than in any other foreign post. It was expected that Central America would prove a fertile source of HILEV items because of the constantly changing political alignments in the various governments. This has not been the case and Bulet 6/4/71 informed the Legal Attache of our disappointment in his production. At the start of June he had only submitted 2 items, 1 of which had been used. He is showing improvement as indicated by the submission of three items in June, four in July, and five in August, as of 8/23/71. The Legal Attache has been placed on probation as a result of administrative deficiencies discovered by the Inspector and it is expected that this will have a salutary effect not only in his administration but also in the contribution of his office to the work of the Bureau.

Productivity

During the first six months of 1971, 14 persons wanted in the United States were located in Central America, 5 "informal deportations" were arranged, and 10 stolen automobiles were recovered. The Managua case load as of 6/30/71 was 65 which is far below average. A total of 14 HILEV items have been received of which 9 have been accepted. This total is below average but his current submission rate is well above average.

Personnel

The 7 Central American countries have enough substantive Bureau work to justify the present complement of this office, if the potential is fully exploited. We are watching this situation closely and expect marked improvement.

192

Recommendation

It is recommended that this office continue. It is possible that a change in leadership may be necessary as indicated by the Inspector's findings and recommendations concerning this will be made as soon as it can be determined whether or not there has been an improvement.

TEL AVIV

This office was opened solely as a source of HILEV material and it has proved fertile in this respect. There have been some unexpected fringe benefits in that an organized crime figure has taken refuge in Tel Aviv and the Legal Attache has been able to secure the cooperation of the Israeli police in affording coverage to the anti-Soviet Jewish Defense League, which has proven so troublesome in the New York City area. As the office has only been open during the current year, it is too early to assess accurately either its potential or its achievements.

Productivity

Eight persons wanted in the United States have been located in Israel and 3 "informal deportations" arranged. The case load as of 6/30/71 was 69, which is considerably below average on a per agent basis. Forty-four HILEV items have been submitted of which 27 have been used with 1 pending. This is substantially above average, and the Director recently noted the Legal Attache's excellent production and he has been recommended for commendation.

Personnel

It is too early to make an accurate assessment as to future personnel needs. One agent could handle the present case load but we do not feel that the full potential of the area has yet been reached and any reduction would result in two one-man offices at the end of the Mediterranean with accompanying problems of relief.

Recommendation

Continue for the time being.

(3) New Offices Recommended If Further Expansion Undertaken

In response to the Director's request, we recommended by memorandum 5/28/71 that six additional offices be opened for the specific purpose of increasing our production of high-level intelligence of interest to the White House. Three of these would be offices formerly operated but presently closed, while three would be completely new offices. The following are the three former Legat offices which we proposed be opened:

MANILA

We recommended that one Agent and one clerk be assigned to Manila to relieve Hong Kong of its present road trip coverage and to provide closer following of political developments in the Philippines, which area is apparently drawing farther away from its former close alignment with the United States. We have a number of applicant-type leads in the Philippines, and the handling of these could be expedited by a representative on the scene.

RIO DE JANEIRO

We proposed that two Agents and two clerks be assigned to reopen our office in this important population center of Brazil, a country larger than the United States. We are presently trying to cover this area from Buenos Aires, which is over 1,200 miles away, and we are passing up the opportunity to develop political intelligence items concerning developments in this huge country which, like most of Latin America, is in the throes of deciding between communism and capitalism.

SANTO DOMINGO

We proposed that one Agent and one clerk be assigned to reopen our office at the capital of the Dominican Republic. This would be entirely for the purpose of developing HILEV items, although there is a modicum of Bureau work in the area which is presently handled on a road trip basis from San Juan. We developed a number of

194

informants and sources during our period of operation there, and we feel that these could be reactivated to become a productive source of HILEV material.

The following are the three new offices which we proposed be opened, each to have a complement of 2 Agents and 2 clerks:

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

This office could cover Australia and New Zealand thereby relieving Hong Kong from its present futile efforts to cover the area by road trip and give on-scene coverage in this huge area where our work has been increasing. We presently are trying to cover 35 leads in the area which indicates there is a nucleus of essential Bureau business upon which an office can be predicated. Here again, however, the primary function of the new office would be production of HILEV items.

KUALA LUMPUR, MALAYSIA

This office would cover Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, presently handled out of Hong Kong, and would initiate coverage in Indonesia, where we have no coverage other than through State and the Central Intelligence Agency. There is now a nucleus of 20 Bureau cases pending, insufficient to justify the opening of an office, but the high interest in Southeast Asia would indicate that any production of political intelligence should include coverage in this area. Opening of the two foregoing offices, plus Manila, would relieve Hong Kong of all road trips and permit that office to concentrate on the important security matters involved in the new relationship between Communist China and the United States.

195

NEW DELHI, INDIA

This office would open completely new territory affording coverage of India, East and West Pakistan, and Nepal. The potential for political intelligence here is high, but there would be very little substantive Bureau work in the area.

Our recommendation for opening of the six foregoing offices was made strictly in response to the Director's request. We cannot justify opening of these offices on the basis of substantive Bureau business, but it is our judgment that these offer the most productive locations for the development of political intelligence. Any expansion abroad will be resisted by State and the Central Intelligence Agency; and unless specifically ordered by the White House, will require approval from Budget and State who maintain a personnel ceiling for each Department's representatives abroad. We are not in a position to balance the value of the information expected against the costs.

196

ADDENDUM OF THE INSPECTION DIVISION E.S. MILLER:wmj 8/26/71

You are requested to clarify and document your observations "that any future expansion abroad will be resisted by the Department of State and Central Intelligence Agency and unless specifically ordered by the White House will require approval from State and the Bureau of the Budget."

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

LEGAL ATTACHE OFFICES
FOREIGN LIAISON

4-H-1

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: The quoted observation concerning anticipated problems to be encountered in connection with any future expansion is based solely upon our experience during the December, 1970, expansion, together with regulations which have been promulgated applicable to United States personnel overseas. In December, 1970, we asked to open an office in San Jose, Costa Rica, but ended up in Managua, Nicaragua, a much less desirable location, because of what was termed the "objective of lower United States profile" in Costa Rica. We asked to open an office in Saigon, Vietnam, and were met with intolerable restrictions imposed by the Ambassador, with the result that we canceled our request. In connection with opening in Caracas, Venezuela, the Ambassador there demanded that we agree to coordinate any intelligence activities with the Central Intelligence Agency under the provisions of National Security Council Intelligence Directive 5 and that our representative measure up to a certain standard in his ability in Spanish. In fact, the Ambassador in Caracas said he would send our man back on the same plane if he did not possess the desired ability. Even before we had made a formal request, State indicated their desire that we not open an office in Helsinki, Finland, because of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) then in progress.
(GAD:hc 8/27/71)

Reference to approval by State and Budget is actually reference to the procedures established for any increase in overseas personnel. Such procedures are of long standing being known under the Johnson Administration as "BALPA" (Balance of Payments) and initially during the Nixon Administration as "OPRED" (Overseas Personnel Reduction). A "National Security Council Undersecretaries Committee," which includes representation from Budget and State, establishes fixed ceilings on all United States civilian employees abroad. Under the rules established by this committee any increase in these ceilings must be either (a) a result of "special studies" or at White House direction; or (b) by a request for a ceiling increase by proposal to the committee explaining the requirement and demonstrating its consistency with national policy and approved program plans. The present FBI ceiling is 88, and regular reports concerning our overseas positions are made to the committee through the Department by the Administrative Division.

The above has been set forth in some detail in response to the Inspector's request. The Director has stated that any expansion will be discussed with Dr. Kissinger at the White House before any action is taken. White House approval supersedes red tape developed by other agencies. We are confident that the President's desires can be rapidly and efficiently satisfied onces he gives the word.

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Since the last inspection there have been certain significant developments in the overall problems of meeting our responsibilities to this work. You are requested to furnish briefly such developments and also provide your appraisal of the situation as you presently see it. Obviously, there are strong indications that increases of investigative manpower in the field and imaginative supervision and direction here will be necessary. What has been accomplished since last inspection and what are your plans for the immediate future? Be specific in advising of programs currently being considered for recommended implementation.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: There is no doubt that our
DEM:mjt 8/23/71
work in the Chinese field will increase both at the SOG and in the field. Attached are comments by Section Chief Wannall with which I concur. Proposals for implementing programs discussed will be recommended by appropriate memoranda.

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

At the outset it should be noted that Western nations have been isolated from Communist China for more than twenty years. The Chinese communists (Chicoms) have established themselves officially in countries of the same or similar political persuasion and, therefore, we receive little or no data concerning the Chicoms which is relevant to our investigative responsibilities in the security field. We have been fortunate, however, to receive from Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) much data relating to their experience with the Chicoms who are now firmly officially established in Canada. The programs and methods we use or may implement in the future to deal with the Chicoms must, in some measure, be based on our prior experience in the security and intelligence fields and an analysis of the data we have received from the RCMP.

Recent Developments and Appraisals Thereof

Since last inspection (1/8-26/71), the following significant developments have occurred:

1. The Chicom Embassy in Canada has become operational. The Embassy staff numbers 26, of whom nine (33 percent) are known or suspected intelligence officers. The significance of the aforementioned figures is obvious when we recall the report of an RCMP source who quoted the wife of an Embassy official as stating "The (Chicom) staff will necessarily be large as it will be responsible for the United States as well as Canada." In addition, RCMP has advised, based on its intensified and expanded coverage of the Chicoms, that at least 50 percent of Chicom effort in the intelligence field having a Canadian base will be directed against the United States. RCMP has confidentially advised us that the Canadian External Affairs Office is willing to allow the Chicom official staff in Canada a maximum of 60 persons. This approximates the number of individuals staffing Soviet official establishments in Canada.

In appraising the above, we must heed the warning flags and prepare for a severe test of our resourcefulness. We cannot expect less than a substantial effort by the Chicoms to mount a variety of intelligence operations against this country from Canada. This situation will exist at least as long as no official Chicom establishment is located in this country.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
FXO:dgo
4-H-3

2. Restrictions on travel of U. S. citizens to Red China have been lifted entirely, and there is presently under study by Department of State and the Attorney General a recommendation that the prohibition on travel of permanent resident aliens to Red China also be lifted.

While the Chicoms have not allowed wholesale entry of Occidentals into their country, recent events suggest they are slowly but surely revising policy to permit more Westerners to visit the mainland. We are aware that the Chicoms have openly supported revolutionaries who operate in the U. S., and the desirability of personal contact with such types as well as with others who would work for the Chicoms is obvious. The new United States policy regarding travel of U. S. citizens to Red China will most assuredly prompt overt travel by individuals of Chicom persuasion as well as by persons who could well be subjected to an intelligence recruitment approach albeit unwittingly. While this area may not immediately present problems of the magnitude expected in other areas involving the Chicoms, we must realistically consider that U. S. citizens traveling to Red China deserve a careful look from an investigative standpoint, either as potential sources, one-time interviews for intelligence purposes, or as individuals who may have been recruited by the Chicoms during their visit to Red China.

With regard to the possibility that restrictions on travel of resident aliens to Red China will be lifted soon, there are in the United States many thousands of Chinese aliens having permanent resident status, most of whom have family members or close relatives residing on the mainland. If travel restrictions on these individuals are lifted, we are faced with an even greater danger of having Chicom-recruited individuals returning here. On its face, such a situation would pose an enormous investigative problem for the Bureau.

3. Within the last few weeks, Secretary of State Rogers announced U. S. policy as regards admission of Communist China to the United Nations (UN). Simply stated, Administration policy is to not oppose UN membership for the Chicoms while not agreeing to the ouster of Nationalist China (Taiwan) from the UN. There has been much talk of a "two China policy," but this is incidental to the real problem we face. With the removal of U. S. opposition, it is likely Red China

will be admitted to UN membership and that its representatives will appear in New York City between October, 1971, and September, 1972. When this almost certain development takes place, we will be faced with grave internal security/intelligence problems.

In appraising the above situation and noting that the Chicoms, should they gain UN membership, would be entitled to the largest delegation and largest percentage of UN Secretariat employees of any member nation, we would clearly require a substantial increase in the number of Agents handling Chinese work in the New York Office. Such an increase would include assignments to that office of as many Chinese-speaking Special Agent personnel as may be available and examination of the need to train additional Agents in the Chinese language. Dependent on the size of a Chicom UN delegation, it might be necessary to establish a Chinese Section in New York Office. Should a substantial increase in case load in the Chicom field come about as a result of Chicom entry into the UN, it would also suggest an increase in the number of Supervisors in this field at the Seat of Government.

With regard to the investigative aspect of Chicom entry into the UN, it is felt that the Chicoms, on arrival, will proceed cautiously at the outset in any program of covert or overt intelligence activity. That intelligence efforts will be undertaken, there is no doubt inasmuch as information in our files and sound logic demand the conclusion that the Chicoms will rely on a variety of methods by which to gather information to assist in the planning and execution of political moves as well as to combat or neutralize technical and scientific progress and military moves made by this and other countries. The Chicoms, with a base at the UN, might limit early intelligence efforts to political matters until they have their feet on the ground. Knowledge of their collection of such intelligence, however, could be of as much benefit to this country as would knowledge of Chicoms efforts to collect other types of intelligence.

The inevitability of the appearance of a Chicom delegation at the UN requires that we marshall all the assets we have in this field in order to be in a position to have broad quality coverage in the informant area and the ability to spring into quick and effective action from an investigative standpoint.

4. On 7/15/71, President Nixon announced his plan to visit Red China before May, 1972. The FBI may well be called

203

upon in months ahead to provide intelligence support in connection with the President's trip.

The step taken by President Nixon emphasizes the importance our Government places on the status of Red China as a world power. It is felt we should be in a position to provide the White House with as much intelligence as we can logically gather in the event such a request is levied upon us.

Accomplishments Since Last Inspection (1/8-26/71)

Our cooperative efforts with RCMP paid off during February, 1971, when we identified an unknown subject who made a clandestine contact with a Chicom intelligence officer in Ottawa. RCMP, through its coverage, recognized at the outset that preliminary contacts by the unknown subject were most unusual because of security precautions demanded by him. Within hours after our investigation was initiated, we identified the unknown subject as a Washington, D. C., resident holding impressive credentials in political circles. Our subsequent coverage in this case disclosed efforts made by the subject to gain employment on the White House staff as well as jobs with State and Justice Departments. We promptly alerted the White House and appropriate officials of other agencies.

In July, 1971, with the Director's approval, a desk-level conference was held at the Bureau with our RCMP counterparts. The results were most productive and, at the Director's instruction, we sent a memorandum to Dr. Kissinger setting out the highlights of the conference. Dr. Kissinger, in a personal letter to the Director, expressed his thanks for the information and noted that the Bureau's timely coverage of these matters is most important. He requested he be advised of significant developments as they occur.

Two of our sources who are being developed to fulfill double agent roles traveled from the U. S. to Hong Kong where they were scheduled to meet with their Chicom contacts. Another source, who is employed at the UN, is now in Communist China, and this trip was made at no cost to the Bureau. We expect to obtain valuable current intelligence information from this source upon her return to this country. Yet another source was directed to undertake a three-week period of travel during which he was to contact pro-Chicom individuals on the West Coasts of the U. S.

204

and Canada. These contacts were planned to serve as a basis for his contact with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa as the last phase of his trip.

Nine individuals are being considered for use along DESECO lines with the expectation that we will be able to target them against the Chicoms, either in Canada or in the U. S.

State Department approval has been obtained to interview and/or re-establish contact with 16 employees of the United Nations Secretariat who, it is felt, offer potential to assist us in the future or in an early effort connected with a joint operation with RCMP.

Two suggestions were submitted with a view toward streamlining administrative and investigative procedures in the Chicom field. Both were adopted and annual savings indicated to be $16,160.

Future Plans

In connection with foreseeable additional security and intelligence responsibility as regards Chicom activities, the following is set forth:

1. We have an Index of over 600 names of Chinese aliens who have been interviewed in the past and who are graduates of universities and/or graduate schools in Red China. We see this group as a reservoir from which we could develop a number of sources who could be directed against the Chicoms in the future or, if facts so indicate, could be utilized in connection with existing efforts to penetrate Chicom intelligence operations. This would involve opening cases on these individuals, providing instructions to the field offices involved, looking toward interviews for the purpose of determining informant potential and willingness to assist us.

2. Five field offices are currently involved in an effort relating to ethnic Chinese scientists having security clearances. Each office involved has been instructed to limit its efforts to ten such individuals, in the hope that we may find some who would be willing to initiate a contact with the

205

Chicoms for the purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment by Chicom Intelligence.

We have a list of approximately 3500 ethnic Chinese scientists and/or technicians who have security clearances. Because of manpower limitations, we have not included other offices in this program nor have we allowed more than 50 cases of this type to be opened. It would be desirable to expand this effort to include other offices and to increase the number of individuals involved in each office to perhaps 50. Again, our object is to develop a nucleus of sources who would be of present or future value in our counterintelligence operations against the Chicoms.

3. We would like to consider the use of ethnic Chinese Special Agents as well as nonethnic Chinese-speaking Special Agents who could, in an undercover capacity, be targeted against the Chicoms in Canada or against any Chicom establishment which may be located in this country in the future. Such an operation would require substantial indoctrination, direction, and development of cover employment and identity, and would be in essence a most appropriate and secure means by which to mount an operation designed to develop a defector in place.

4. Since the door to travel by U. S. citizens to Red China is wide open, we should expand our efforts in this area to fully identify each traveler (other than legislators and news media types) for the purpose of considering these individuals for interviews in order to gather positive intelligence or to identify any traveler who may have been subjected to a recruitment approach by the Chicoms.

5. We should consider instructing a limited number of field offices to begin efforts to develop sources who could be used in a "walk-in" program directed against the Chicoms in Canada as well as any Chicom establishment formed in this country. Here, we would not have to look toward ethnic Chinese but could selectively approach types who might be of interest to the Chicoms including military personnel because of their backgrounds in fields in which the Chicoms have expressed an interest.

6. In Chinese alien cases where a hostage situation exists, we should revamp current instructions to require a reinterview of such persons one year after the initial interview

(current practice calls for reinterview two years after initial interview). This is felt desirable since the alien who has immediate family and/or relatives residing in Red China is most susceptible to a recruitment approach and is more likely to be the type who has entered the United States on an intelligence mission.

7. We should consider issuing instructions to closely examine our UN sources to determine which may be logically directed to initiate contact with the Chicom Embassy in Canada. Contacts of this type, although they may indicate no immediate interest on the part of the Chicoms, may well serve as a basis for a later approach by the Chicoms, either before or after Chicom entry into the UN.

8. National Security Agency (NSA) representatives are of the opinion that the possibility exists that Chinese Intelligence Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the United States or in border countries (Canada, Mexico). Under Bureau instructions, our San Diego Office recently monitored broadcasts on the basis of predictions made by NSA. Broadcasts undoubtedly emanating from Red China were heard during this monitoring and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was excellent. Discussion with NSA led NSA representatives to observe that the broadcasts mentioned above might be connected with an illegal agent network, and they agreed to make a further study of this situation and provide us with additional sensitive material they have uncovered in order to determine if some tie-in could be developed. While this effort is a new one, and does not definitely establish that an illegal Chicom operation exists in this country, it is an indication that we should undertake action designed to uncover such a situation. In the absence of more specific data, we should consider at this time having field offices check warranty cards submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment, primarily radio receivers capable of tuning in on broadcasts such as those mentioned above. This would involve identification of the equipment, its manufacturer and subsequent instructions to the field to check warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards. Inquiry should include developing background information on the purchaser and, in cases where warranted, conducting interviews.

207

W

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 8/26/71)

You have advised that items one through nine in this write-up will be fully implemented by separate memorandum in each case consistent with the availability of manpower.

It would appear that present developments indicate that further delay in implementation of some of these programs may seriously retard our response to important investigative responsibilities.

You are requested to advise specifically when such programs will be implemented and what manpower requirements are necessary to do so.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief Wannall requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(CDB:mls 9/1/71)

I believe the five areas outlined by W. R. Wannall constitute a valid base from which to expand our coverage of anticipated Chicom intelligence and subversion which will be directed against this country when diplomatic relations are established and/or United Nations membership is established for the Chicoms. It is desirable to initiate these programs as soon as possible, prior to being faced with the Chicom activity.

My position concerning available manpower to accomplish this is covered under the write-up captioned "Adequacy of Personnel," 6E. As you are aware, the proposed work load adjustments contained in my memorandum dated 7/29/71 will make available some additional personnel, and further adjustments may well be made possible by close examination of case count figures under the new tightened procedures for counting pending cases. A mid-month case count was prepared for the Inspection Staff as of 8/20/71, and an end of the month case count is currently being prepared.

If these figures confirm a lower case load for Nationalities Intelligence (8/20/71 figure is 275 case load average and well below other Sections), I believe at least one

208

man from within that Section should be made available to implement this program.

If the Inspector feels two men should be made immediately available to this program from within the Domestic Intelligence Division complement and the nine men currently utilized by Wannall on the Ellsberg case are necessary and productive, a thorough review of case loads and other gauges of work load will be made, Section by Section, and another man added.

209

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

In connection with our objective of being prepared to counteract and/or neutralize the Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence and subversion effort we expect will be mounted against this country, it is proposed that the following action be recommended for implementation immediately. In each case, a separate memorandum containing appropriate recommendation will be submitted within the next ten days.

1. Initiate investigations on 300 of the over 600 individuals listed in our Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index. This effort would be aimed at developing quality sources we can direct against the Chicoms as well as developing intelligence from among a group of well-educated Chinese aliens. Based on our initial accomplishments in this area, additional cases on the balance of more than 300 names in the above Index would be opened for the purposes indicated above.

2. Initiate investigations on 500 ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances. This represents an expansion of our current effort which we have heretofore limited to five field offices representing a total of 50 individuals in the above category. The objective of this effort is to identify ethnic Chinese scientists who would, under Bureau direction, be willing to initiate contacts with Chicoms for the purpose of making themselves available for possible recruitment by Chicom intelligence.

We have a listing of over 3500 ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances, and opening 500 cases would be our initial attempt to expand source development in this area. Depending on the success of this effort, additional cases would be considered for opening for the purpose indicated above.

3. Expand our investigations relating to United States residents who visit Communist China to include development of background information on each visitor and, except in cases where the purpose of the visit appears legitimate on its face, to consider these individuals for interview. Such expansion is the obvious follow-up to the recent lifting of restrictions on travel by U. S. citizens to Red China. Experience in the

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
FXO:dgo
8/31/71

210

security field has shown that intelligence recruitment of individuals visiting communist countries is an established practice. These investigation and/or interviews would not include subjects of pending cases handled in other Sections in this Division. Examples of the latter would be travel to Red China by New Left types or black extremists who are subjects of continuing investigation.

4. Close examination of the situation as regards our sources in the Chinese field now employed at or having access to the United Nations who could be directed against the Chicoms immediately. This must be a critical examination closely supervised with the expectation that some of our existing sources and others who may be developed could be directed in early contacts with the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa, Canada. Our objective here is to develop within the United Nations itself sources who can supply us with quality information on the Chicoms, who will almost certainly enter the United Nations within the next year.

5. Initiate a survey of offices having ethnic Chinese-speaking Special Agents assigned to determine whether or not any of these Special Agents can be directed toward an operation against the Chicoms involving an undercover role. The purpose here is to establish an appropriate and secure means for utilizing one or more Special Agents for development of a defector in place among the Chicoms.

Implementation of the above will require a substantial amount of research for the purpose of issuing instructions to field offices. It is felt that in order to provide adequate supervision regarding the above numbered items, two Supervisors should be added to the existing complement (3) of the Chinese Unit.

Consideration has been given to all items (9) previously mentioned as being within the area of future plans for meeting our responsibilities in the Chicom field. It is felt that immediate implementation of the above 5 items should be accomplished while the remaining items herein before discussed will be considered for implementation in light of continuing developments in this field. We believe we have selected for immediate implementation those matters which will bring about the most substantial positive accomplishments in areas of current critical need.

211

9. Foreign intelligence agencies have concluded that one of the weakest links in Chicom intelligence operations is in the field of communications. We should, therefore, consider renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop programs, both of which were discontinued in 1965. Through these programs, we had a secure means to review communications between the United States and Red China and from them we acquired data on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians which was of security interest to us.

The matters discussed above are set forth in light of our current knowledge in the Chicom field. It is realized that continuing developments in this area may suggest new efforts which could be initiated or could suggest further expansion of our existing programs. Such recommendations would, of course, be made on a timely basis.

Items 1 through 9 above will be fully implemented by separate memorandum in each case consistent with the availability of manpower.

212

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES CONTROL BOARD 4-H-5

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: It is understood that additional work is anticipated as a result of Executive Order 11605 and subsequent Congressional action. You are requested to advise what action you have taken to brace for this additional work and how much volume you anticipate. Also advise as specifically as possible which Units will be affected the greatest, and to what extent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: The implementation of Executive Order 11605 will affect primarily the work of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section and Internal Security Section.

I have conferred with the Section Chiefs of the aforementioned Sections and instructed them to initiate a review of each of the cases which the Department has indicated it intends to proceed against to determine what additional investigation is required to develop the evidence necessary to present to the SACB. Administrative procedures for handling these cases have been worked out and since the cases are supervised in three different Sections, a Division Coordinator, who has had previous experience in preparing cases for presentation to the SACB, has been designated to insure that the cases are handled in a uniform manner in each of the three Sections.

So far, the Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings against the Black Panther Party, Progressive Labor Party, Young Socialist Alliance and Ku Klux Klan; however, we have not as yet had any specific requirements levied upon us by the Department in these cases. Based on past experience, it can be anticipated the services of one supervisor, full time, will be required to prepare each of these cases for presentation to the SACB.

CWT:djr 8/26/71

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
ESM:wmj
4-H-5

213

The language of Executive Order 11605 is very broad and generally coincides with the basis for our investigation of extremist groups. Conceivably, consistent with manpower available, proceedings could be initiated on most of the organizations we have under investigation although the Department has not indicated at this time that they will undertake any wholesale action.

For additional observations concerning the anticipated impact of Executive Order 11605 on the work of this Division, see the Adequacy of Personnel write-ups of the New Left Section, Extremist Intelligence Section and the Internal Security Section.

214

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTO TWO DIVISIONS

5-A-1a

INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER: Assistant to the Director Sullivan has suggested that Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) be divided into two separate divisions. In order that this matter can be analyzed during this inspection you are requested to furnish:

1. Complete table of organization for each of two new Divisions as you would organize them if suggestion were adopted. Do not use names of supervisors, Section Chiefs, Front Office administrators. Use only position designations, Section and Unit designations and number of Agents and clerks designated for each Unit and Section.

2. In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate new division.

3. Following each of the two tables of organization for the above new divisions, set out Section by Section and where appropriate, Unit by Unit, your reasoning for placement in division. In this regard, it will be necessary to take into account and balance both volume of work and nature of work being handled.

4. Indicate advantages in adoption of above suggestion.

5. Set out disadvantages you feel apparent in dividing DID. Also indicate how such can be overcome and resolved.

6. Since adoption of above would involve possible realignment of space in some instances, you are requested to advise what new space would be necessary and what other movement of personnel and equipment would be involved.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

see attached

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-1a

216

DIVIDING DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INTO TWO DIVISIONS

5-A-1a

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: 1. In accordance with the instructions of the Inspector there are set forth below two proposed tables of organization for the new Divisions which would be created by dividing the current Division into two Divisions. These Divisions would be named Domestic Intelligence Division and Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division respectively.

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Domestic Intelligence Division

Assistant Director
Inspector
2 secretaries
1 clerk-stenographer

4 p.m. to Midnight Supervisor (Agent)
10 clerks (Includes security patrol and Front Office mail room)

Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents
13 clerks

New Left Section

Front Office

2 Agents
2 clerks

New Left Groups Unit

4 Agents
4 clerks

Special Investigations Unit-East

6 Agents
5 Clerks

Subversive Individuals-New Left Unit

6 Agents
6 clerks

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
GCM:mlm
5-A-1a

Special Investigations Unit-West

5 Agents
5 clerks

Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit

4 Agents
5 clerks

Section Total: 27 Agents
28 clerks

Extremist Intelligence Section

Front Office

2 Agents
2 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-East

6 Agents
7 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-West

5 Agents
5 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate Unit-Central

4 Agents
3 clerks

Black Nationalist-White Hate-South and Extremist Informant Unit

5 Agents
7 clerks

Antiriot and Bombing Unit

4 Agents
3 clerks
(4 Agents & 2 clerks to be transferred from General Investigative Div.)

Section Total: 26 Agents
27 clerks

Internal Security Section

Front Office

2 Agents
2 clerks

Communist Party, USA Unit

2 Agents
3 clerks

International New Left and Sedition Unit

2 Agents
2 clerks

Subversive Individuals Unit

4 Agents
4 clerks

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit

2 Agents
4 clerks (2 clerks also handle Security Index)

Security Informant Unit

3 Agents
6 clerks

217

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit

2 Agents
2 Clerks

Steno Pool

14 clerks

Section Total: 17 Agents
37 clerks

DIVISON PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

73 Agents
105 clerks

PROPOSED TABLE OF ORGANIZATION

Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division

Assistant Director
Inspector
2 secretaries
1 clerk-stenographer

Midnight to 8 a.m. Supervisor (Agent)
9 clerks (Includes security patrol and Front Office mail room)

Division Front Office Total: 3 Agents
12 clerks

Espionage Section

Front Office

2 Agents
2 clerks

Coordination Unit

3 Agents
5 clerks

Soviet Unit - New York

4 Agents
5 clerks

Soviet Unit - Washington

3 Agents
4 clerks

218

Special Cases Unit

2 Agents
6 clerks

Satellite Unit

4 Agents
6 clerks

Section Total: 18 Agents
28 clerks

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Front Office

2 Agents
2 clerks

Middle and South American Unit (South & Central America, Caribbe countries and ethnic groups)

3 Agents
4 clerks

Special Coordination Unit

5 Agents
11 Clerks

Nationality Unit (All other non-communist countries

4 Agents
5 clerks

Cuban Unit

3 Agents
3 clerks

Chinese Unit

6 Agents
4 clerks

Section Total: 23 Agents
29clerks

Research Section

Front Office

2 Agents (Section Chief R. D.
2 clerks Cotter on loan to
Intelligence Evaluation
Committee)

Central Research Unit

5 Agents
8 clerks

Special Records Unit

1 Agent
3 clerks

Steno Pool

14 clerks

Section Total: 8Agents
27 clerks

DIVISION PERSONNEL RECAPITULATION

52 Agents
96 clerks

2. It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now assigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred to the new Division.

This is a most logical move and will afford tighter and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing violations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final prosecutive actions.

3. The line of reasoning utilized in the breakdowns as set forth above in the tables of organization was to separate the work into two categories as nearly as possible - domestic and foreign.

The proposed Domestic Intelligence Division is composed of New Left, Extremist Intelligence and Internal Security Sections. All work of these Sections is domestic oriented consisting of domestic subversive and extremist organizations such as Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, black extremists, New Left and anti-war groups as well as individuals affiliated therewith.

On the other hand, the proposed Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division is composed of the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections which supervise investigations which for the most part have definite foreign ramifications. The work of these Sections is foreign oriented consisting of such investigations as Soviet and satellite establishments and individuals as well as other foreign nationality groups and nationals, including Chinese communists. The Nationalities Intelligence Section will continue to supervise Legal Attaches and domestic Liaison through the Special

Coordination Unit. Other miscellaneous investigative matters involving extremist groups with foreign nationality ties such as Mexican-Americans, Spanish-Americans, and Puerto Ricans will continue to be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

The Research Section has been placed in the Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division in order to balance the workload as well as to provide for expansion for research-type work in espionage and foreign intelligence areas or for the manpower therein to be used as the Assistant Director sees most advantageous to carry out his responsibilities. It is recognized that this will cut DID short but it is felt DID will be able to handle any needed research at a Section level.

The New Left and Civil Disorder Reporting Units, currently in the Research Section, will be placed in Internal Security Section as data pertains solely to domestic groups. Likewise, administration of Security Index (SI) will be shifted from Research Section to the Internal Security Section as most of the cases on the SI are supervised in the DID.

In realigning work, we have provided for transfer of three Agents from Sections within the proposed Domestic Intelligence Division to the Nationalities Intelligence Section of other new Division. This has been accomplished by absorbing Klan and White Hate cases (2 men) into Extremist Intelligence Section and releasing one Agent from the current four-man Security Informant Unit of the Internal Security Section.

The proposed reorganization will result in the following Agent - clerical count:

Domestic Intelligence Division

73 Agents
105 clerks
This includes four Agents and two clerks to be transferred from General Investigative Division to handle antiriot and bombing matters.

Counterespionage - Foreign Intelligence Division

52 Agents
96 clerks
This includes raising the overall Agent complement of current Division personnel by one to provide for a new Assistant Director.

4. The advantage of the suggestion to form two separate Divisions out of the current Division is that it would provide for smaller Divisions thus allowing for tighter and more effective supervision.

5. The disadvantages in dividing the current Division far outweigh the advantages as can be seen from the following observations:

(a) The nature of the work of DID does not readily lend itself to division. The interrelationship of foreign influence in domestic subversion cases is well established and requires close coordination within the Division. If split, something would be lost in the process, as is now the case with antiriot and explosives and incendiary devices cases, predominantly involving extremists who are DID subjects being handled by General Investigative Division. Our goal should be to obtain maximum utilization of the knowledge and expertise of supervisory personnel, and division of DID would obviously result in diffusion of related talents and a less efficient use of available manpower.

(b) Budgetary considerations and administrative efficiency would be affected by imposing an additional Divisional superstructure (mail room, mail delivery clerks, Division Head and staff, with their equipment, odd-hour duty Agents, supply clerks, and steno pool, etc.) to handle the work presently being handled efficiently by existing DID. The creation of an additional high-level job (Division Head and staff) would be contrary to the President's economic freeze. Apparently the suggestion of Assistant to the Director W. C. Sullivan to divide the Division referred to by the Inspector is that set forth in memorandum from Mr. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson dated June 28, 1971. On that memorandum the Director stated, "I do not approve. We do not have any provision for another Assistant Director and all hearings before Budget Bureau and Congress have been concluded for Fiscal Year 1972." In light of the current national economic picture, the Director's comment is even more meaningful today.

These disadvantages, with the exception of the economy factor, can be overcome to a large extent by utilizing current space in 9th and D Street building with a minimum of carpentry work involved. The Executive office space can easily be arranged to handle another Assistant Director and staff. The Mail Room and Steno Pool would require alterations involving additions of partitions. Extra-duty shifts involving 4 p.m. to Midnight and Midnight to 8 a.m. can be arranged to service both Divisions from operational and security standpoints. On the other hand, the biggest disadvantage is that the split definitely will serve to lessen coordination of cases having foreign ramifications as so many of our domestic extremist cases do. This disadvantage likewise can be overcome to a large extent if we make up our minds to be extra careful to make certain that coordination between the new Division is such that Bureau is not embarrassed. This could cause a certain slow down in the handling of mail and result in duplicative handling in some instances.

6. It is felt current space is adequate to house the two Divisions with slight alterations as previously set out. Equipment for a new Assistant Director should not present any significant problem.

ANTI-RIOT LAWS AND BOMBING MATTERS 5-A-1 b

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: In discussions, you have advised that in your opinion there appears a great deal of logic in realigning supervision of above cases from General Investigative Division to Domestic Intelligence Division.

You are requested to advise in greater detail documentation of your reasoning and your recommendations in this regard.

For your information, on receipt of your response to this write-up it will be furnished to General Investigative Division for their observations and recommendations.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: By memorandum 8/30/68 from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, Inspection Division did an in-depth survey with respect to similar problem relative to transfer of substantive violations of Antiriot Laws and bombing cases involving subversive matters from GID to DID. Survey ascertained proposed transfer involved two categories supervised by GID which were so interrelated with gathering of intelligence in racial and security field that overlapping supervisory responsibilities constantly occurred. Accordingly, Inspection Division recommended transfer of these cases to DID to avoid duplication of supervisory review and to promote efficiency. Transfer not effected as Director stated he was opposed to transfer of these duties. A copy of Mr. Felt's 8/30/68 memorandum is attached together with a cover memorandum from Mr. Felt dated 9/4/68.

Developments since 9/4/68 dictate that we take another good look at this problem.

Activities of extremists and terrorists have definitely escalated to the point that the overall situation is a matter of increasing concern to the public and the

8/20/71
CWT:djr

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
ESM:wmj

5-A-1 b

administration. Since terrorist activities such as bombings, riots and the like are in violation of statutes under Bureau's investigative responsibility it behooves us to make certain that our supervision is as tight and effective as possible.

Inasmuch as DID is actively investigating the terrorists who are in violation of these laws, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and handle final prosecutive actions. Not only would duplicative supervisory action be avoided but the DID supervisor has at his fingertips a feel of the case, necessary background data and a full knowledge of sources who can develop needed evidence.

In 1968, criminal prosecutions of these violations were handled for most part by Department's Criminal Division but now the Department has moved to invest the Internal Security Division with the overall responsibility of prosecuting terrorist activities regarding above-mentioned matters. Similar reorganization on our part would certainly enhance more effective supervision. Of course, any transfer of cases to DID would require transfer of personnel from GID now handling these matters.

In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that supervisory responsibility for all violations of Antiriot Laws and substantive violations of Explosive and Incendiary Devices Act (Bombing Matters) involving extremist and political terrorists be transferred from GID to DID together with required Agent personnel.

225

September 4, 1968

Mr. Tolson:

We have carefully re-evaluated the proposal to shift subversive bombing cases and antiriot cases from Mr. Rosen's Division to Mr. Sullivan's Division but find ourselves coming back to the original conclusion.

Messrs. DeLoach, Rosen and Sullivan are strongly in favor. We recognize this does not resolve a wide variety of cases where supervisory responsibility could overlap, but these are the two areas where constant overlap occurs and where we have great need for continuity of supervision.

The memorandum clearly spells out that antiriot cases are handled in the Criminal Division of the Department, racial bombings in the Civil Rights Division and nationalist bombings in the Internal Security Division.

W. Mark Felt

9/4/68
ADDENDUM BY MR. TOLSON:

I am opposed to placing supervisory responsibility for these violations under the Domestic Intelligence Division.

CT:DSS

I am opposed to this proposed transfer of duties. H

107

226

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STAT GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

TO : MR. TOLSON

DATE: August 30, 1968

FROM : W. M. FELT

SUBJECT: PROPOSED TRANSFER OF SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITY FOR CERTAIN CASES FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SYNOPSIS

General Investigative Division (GID) and Domestic Intelligence Division (D propose that supervisory responsibility for substantive violations of the new Antir Laws and for bombing cases involving subversive matters should be transferred f GID to DID. Mr. DeLoach recommended and the Director approved that Inspectio Division examine matter to be certain that responsibilities are sharply and defini fixed.

In-depth Inspection survey reflects problem of overlapping supervisory responsibilities between divisions cannot be eliminated unless all investigative an intelligence functions are centered in a single division --- not feasible because of sheer volume. There are many investigative situations where occasional overla occurs, e.g. the close connection between criminal cases handled by GID and th Criminal Intelligence Program supervised by another division. However, propos transfer involves two categories now supervised by GID which are so inter-relate with the gathering of intelligence in the racial and security fields that overlap constantly occurs. Accordingly, these two categories (relatively small in case volume) should be transferred to DID, as proposed, to avoid duplication of supervisory review and to promote efficiency.

ANTIRIOT LAWS

These laws were enacted on 4/11/68 and prohibit incitement to riot and related violent acts connected with riots and civil disorders. Since enactment on 11 substantive cases have been opened; however, extensive intelligence gathering is continuously directed by DID relative to organizations and individuals likely to engage in riots such as Stokely Carmichael, H. Rap Brown and other agitators throughout the country. Individual acts arising from riots and constituting possi violations of Antiriot Laws are not practicably separable without causing duplic of supervisory review and loss of continuity in the development of cases.

Antiriot Laws are handled by the Criminal Division of the Department. DI now disseminates intelligence material to the Criminal Division and works with

Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Tavel

227

that Division on specific violations such as current sedition case against Stokely Carmichael and prior requests of Criminal Division concerning activities of H. Rap Brown. Since enactment, 11 specific cases have arisen, the most recent being in connection with allegations of police brutality during the Democratic Convention in Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers.

BOMBING MATTERS

The same principle of duplicate supervisory review is involved in those bombing cases that arise from the activities of subversive organizations and individuals which are supervised on a day-to-day basis by DID. Examples are fore nationalist groups, Ku Klux Klan, militant black nationalist groups and New Left groups. These cases should definitely be supervised by DID for maximum efficienc All other bombing cases will remain with GID.

The Internal Security Division of the Department now has responsibility ov these foreign nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organizations. Mr. Yeagley's Division is also charged with the development of criminal violations in the recent bombings by the so-called Cuban Power group. The Civil Rights Division of the Department usually has jurisdiction over other bombing case arising from white and black hate groups, but again DID has liaison with that Divisi on intelligence matters affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investigations to observe and photograph demonstrations at request of Civil Rights Divisio

Guidelines to delineate the proposed consolidation of supervision have bee drawn and are set forth in an appropriate SAC Letter to so inform the field (attache for approval).

EFFECT ON WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL

The changes proposed herein deal only in the two specific categories of A riot Laws and certain Bombing Matters cases. Special cases that arise in the civi rights field such as the murder of Martin Luther King and the murder of the three civil rights workers in Mississippi will not be affected by the proposed changes. Review of all pending cases that are affected by these changes discloses only one group (11 cases) that should now be transferred -- these are the recent bombings instituted by the Cuban Power group.

Analysis of all work load factors represented in the proposed switch of su visory responsibilities indicates that, if approved, it would be appropriate at the same time to reduce personnel complement of Civil Rights Section (GID) by one Ag supervisor and increase complement of Racial Intelligence Section (DID) by one Ag supervisor.

228

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
Re: Proposed Transfer of Supervisory Responsibility
For Certain Cases From General Investigative Division
to Domestic Intelligence Division

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That effective close of business 9/16/68 DID have supervisory responsibility over all violations of Antiriot Laws and over those Bombing Matters violatio within guidelines set forth herein.

2. That Supervisory responsibility for the specific pending cases (Cuban Power group of bombing cases) identified in this memorandum be transferred to DID effective 9/16/68.

3. That Agent personnel complement of GID be reduced by one and that of DID increased by one. If approved, to be handled by Mr. Mohr's office.

4. That attached SAC Letter be approved.

DETAILS CONTINUED - C

DETAILS

BACKGROUND

By memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach, 8/2/68, it was jointly proposed by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) and General Investigative Divisio (GID) that supervisory responsibility for the new Antiriot Laws investigations (classification 176) and certain types of bombing matter cases be transferred from GID to DID. With respect to the new FBI jurisdiction in Antiriot Laws, it was poi out in this memorandum that extremist organizations and individuals who will likel be engaged in riots and racial disturbances are the subject of continuing racial investigations supervised by DID. Similarly many of the bombing cases arise out of work handled in DID such as bombing of diplomatic establishments and bombings arising out of activities of groups in the racial field and internal security field. Following submission of this memorandum, Assistant to the Director DeLoach proposed and it was approved that Inspection Division thoroughly survey the entire question in order to draw appropriate guidelines and clearly define responsibilities to achieve orderly transition of the proposed reassignment of supervisory responsibility in these matters.

Thorough analysis has been made by Inspection Staff of all aspects of the proposal and means to accomplish it in the most practicable manner, including reviews of representative cases that have been handled under these categories and the overall volume and work load represented. The logic of the proposed reassignments appears unassailable. In both categories of cases the principle invo is the same, namely; that individual violations of applicable statutes arising from the activities of subversive organizations or groups should be supervised within th same division (DID) that has the basic and continuing responsibility for supervisio of the overall investigations of these organizations and groups as well as of the members thereof and the development of informants within the groups. The obviou benefit to be derived from the reassignment of these categories is the avoidance o duplication of supervisory reviews of these interrelated matters and the ready identification of individuals who may be involved in a specific violation with person already under investigation from an intelligence standpoint. Informants who may be utilized in specific violations or who are developed in the course of investigatio of such violations must of necessity be closely correlated with the supervision of these informant programs which now rests with DID. Furthermore, violations of the new Antiriot Laws may well be revealed in the course of general supervision of racial intelligence matters.

DETAILS
CONTINUED - OVER

230

ANTIRIOT LAWS

Contained in Public Law 90-284 enacted 4/11/68 (Civil Rights Act of 1968) were certain new additions to Title 18, representing criminal statutes for which investigative jurisdiction has been assigned FBI. Other provisions of this Act extended and enlarged existing civil rights legislation, the investigative jurisdiction for which primarily remains in the Civil Rights Section and is not involved in the subject matter herein discussed. The three pertinent statutes are as follows:

1. Section 245-b (3) of Chapter 13, Title 18, which makes it a violation for any person to use force or threat of force to wilfully injure, intimidate or interfere with any person engaged in a business affecting interstate commerce during or incident to a riot or civil disorder or attempting to perform any of these acts.

2. Section 2101, Chapter 102, Title 18, makes it a violation to travel interstate or to use the mail, telegraph, telephone, radio, television or other facility of interstate commerce to incite a riot or organize, promote, encourage, participate in or carry on a riot or commit any act of violence in furtherance of a riot or aid or abet any person in inciting or participating in a riot.

3. Section 231, Chapter 12, Title 18, makes it a violation to teach or demonstrate the use, application or making of a firearm or explosive or incendiary device or technique causing injury or death intending or having reason to know that same will be used in connection with a civil disorder which may interfere with commerce or with a federally protected function or the transportation in interstate commerce of such devices with similar intent or the commission of any act to interfere with any law enforcement officer or fireman engaged in official duties in connection with civil disorder or a federally protected function.

The foregoing three statutes have been designated by the Bureau as having the character of Antiriot Laws and are all included in the new classification 176. No other violations are included in this character or classification. Thus the

DETAILS
CONTINUED - OVER

231

reassignment of the entire classification to DID should present no problems with respect to any division of responsibility or routing of communications. Experience gained thus far under apparent violations which the Bureau has been requested by the Department to investigate supports the close correlation of such violations with racial intelligence matters now handled by DID. 11 specific cases have been opened thus far and are now pending. The most recent involves allegations of police brutal during Democratic Convention in Chicago involving injury to over 70 police officers. Review of these cases disclosed them to be noncomplex in nature and in view of the current status of supervision and investigation, it appears most practicable for GID to retain the specific supervision of these 11 cases to their conclusion. Thus supervisory responsibility under this classification will be fixed at a clear cut-off point after which all new cases arising will automatically be routed to and supervised by DID from inception. No further guidelines appear necessary in this classification.

BOMBING MATTERS

A variety of different types of cases arises under this category and it will hereafter represent a split classification with those cases applicable to the overall fields of supervision in DID being handled by that Division and the remainder continuing under supervision of GID. Accordingly, specific guidelines have been drawn to delineate this division of supervisory responsibility and encompassed in an SAC Letter in order that the field may make appropriate designation on communications to facilitate routing at the Seat of Government. Upon adoption of the guidelines and the dual character coincidental therewith proper routing will automatically be achieved of new matters arising (this coordinated with Files and Communications Division).

Inspection Staff analyzed the various types of bombing cases handled during Fiscal Year (FY) 1968 and reviewed representative sampling of specific pending files. There are two major areas herein which appear proper and logical to delegate future supervisory responsibility to DID. These are bombing matters arising from foreign nationalistic interests and those arising from racial intelligence interests. The reasons are the same as heretofore cited, namely the overall familiarity within DID of aims and activities of organizations and groups involved as well as the following of activities of individual members of such groups and the responsibility for the informant programs applicable to them. Other types of bombing cases not falling within the guidelines set forth hereinafter will remain with GID as in the past. Bombing matter violations (including threats) represent violations of Section 837, Chapter 39, Title 18. The violation is the interstate transportation of explosives with intent they be used for destruction of real or personal property which property is used for the objectives specified in the statute (educational,

DETAILS CONTINUED - OVER

232

business, civic, etc.). Threats or false reports also constitute violations within statute and the entire discussion within this memorandum includes threats or false reports under the use of the term bombing matters. Although the Department frequently resorts to other statutes for prosecutive considerations, this appears to have no significant bearing on the question of supervisory responsibility which is directed toward the full development of the investigation to establish identity of the perpetrators of the bombing violation and evidence to support prosecution.

In the vast majority of potential bombing violations that arise from the field, the Department is promptly advised and appropriate dissemination made without there being a substantial supervisory responsibility thereafter for the following of investigations because relatively few are opened by the Department for full investigation. For example, in FY 1968 there were approximately 15 bomb matter cases opened for full investigation at the Department's request whereas approximately 170 instances occurred of dissemination of initial information to the Department with no subsequent investigation requested. Of the 15 bombing matter cases opened for full investigation during FY 1968, nine were in the racial field (apparently Klan inspired), five in the foreign nationalist field and one unrelated to DID responsibility.

The following guidelines are proposed for determination of supervisory responsibility in bombing matter cases that hereafter will lie with DID (all others remaining with GID). Bombing matters (including threats) wherein:

1. The victim is a diplomatic or other establishment of a foreign government (such as embassy, consulate, official or quasi-official tourist agency, purchasing agency, etc.).

2. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing was instigated by a foreign nationalistic organization, group or coalition (such as recent series of bombings by so-called Cuban power groups), or member thereof.

3. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that the bombing was instigated by a subversive organization (such as Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, or Students for a Democratic Society), or member thereof.

4. It is apparent or circumstances strongly indicate that bombing was instigated by a white or black extremist group (such as Minutemen, Ku Klux Klan, Nation of Islam or Black Panthers Party), or member thereof.

Those cases which fall under the foregoing guidelines will hereafter bear a dual character in addition to Bombing Matters or Bombing Matters - Threats, nam the appropriate designation for the type of apparent instigator and/or victim in order to accomplish routing to the appropriate unit and section within DID such as Internal Security - R, Racial Matters - Klan, or Internal Security - Cuba. The foregoing guidelines have been incorporated in an appropriate SAC Letter together with instructions concerning use of dual character which is attached for approval.

The supervision of a particular case will remain the responsibility of the Division originally assuming it even though subsequent developments bring it within the purview of the type normally handled by the other Division, unless in the mutual judgment of the respective Assistant Directors, Bureau interests are better served by transferring the case.

In making the proposed transfer of the limited group of cases discussed herein, no problem appears to be presented insofar as liaison with appropriate Divis of the Department is concerned. The Criminal Division has responsibility for Antir Laws. DID now regularly disseminates intelligence material to that Division and wor closely with it on certain specific violations, such as the current sedition case agains Stokely Carmichael as well as previous requests to follow activities of H. Rap Brow. The Internal Security Division of the Department has responsibility over the foreig nationalist groups as well as the Klan and black nationalist organizations and has als been charged with the development of criminal violations in the recent bombings by th Cuban Power group. It is this Division headed by Mr. Yeagley with which DID consis deals on all subversive and espionage matters. The Civil Rights Division of the Dep ment usually has jurisdiction over other bombing cases arising from white and blac hate groups, but again DID has regular liaison with that Division on intelligence ma affecting these groups and has engaged in specific investigations to observe and photo-graph demonstrations at the request of the Civil Rights Division.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSITION AND SPECIFIC PENDING CASES

To achieve an orderly transition and to permit coordination of policy, instructions, etc., among the supervisors at the working level prior to the effective date of transfer it is proposed that such effective date be applicable to all matters arising after the close of business 9/16/68. From review by Inspection Staff of the current pending cases now within GID which would under the new guidelines hereafter fall within the supervisory responsibility of DID, it appears that none of these pending cases should be physically transferred for remaining supervision to conclusion except for one group of eleven cases. This group constitutes relatively recen cases arising from the series of bombings and attempted bombings in Florida, New York, Chicago, Newark and Los Angeles directed at diplomatic establishm and other offices of foreign governments who maintain relations with Cuba. Credi for many of the bombings has been claimed by "Cuban Power," a similar term to Black Power and several militant anti-Castro refugee organizations and individual

234

DETAILS CONTINUED - OVER

are suspects in these bombings. There has been extremely close coordination between GID and DID in these specific cases and DID is thoroughly conversant with the details of the individual investigations. Because of this and also in view of the likelihood of additional such bombings arising in the future by the same group or groups it appears feasible and practicable to transfer the eleven pending cases now to DID as well as any new ones by the same group arising in the days ahead. These eleven cases are Bureau files 174-688, 174-689, 174-749, 174-759, 174-760, 174-761, 174-762, 174-767, plus three new cases which have not been assigned Bureau file numbers, namely bombing of Mexican Airlines Office, Miami, 8/17/68; Bombing of West Side Liberal Club, New York, 8/19/68, and Bombing of Air France Airlines, Los Angeles, California, 7/19/68.

WORK LOAD AND PERSONNEL

The Bombing - Civil Rights Act of 1964 Unit of Civil Rights Section, GID, is composed of 6 Agent supervisors including Unit Chief and in addition to general bombing matters (those not falling under above guidelines) has supervisory responsibility over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Federal Train Wreck Statute, a Discrimination in Housing (Civil Rights Act of 1968). The latter violation which was established in the same Public Law as the Antiriot Laws has had only very recent experience and appears may well generate a substantial number of cases in the future. However, from analysis of total work load of the unit as well as of the entire Civil Rights Section, both from a standpoint of ratios of individual cases supervised for FY 1968 and percentage of manpower time expended, it appears that the transfer of supervisory responsibility for those cases as outlined in this memorandum will constitute the approximate full time of one Agent supervisor and accordingly it is being recommended that GID Agent complement be reduced by one.

Within DID the new Antiriot Laws and the majority of the bombing matter cases which will be transferred will increase supervisory responsibility in the Racial Intelligence Section. Other bombing matter cases will be spread among various units such as Special Investigations Unit of Internal Security Section, Cuban Special Cases Unit of Latin American Section, etc., and based upon past experience will not be of such volume as to require additional Agent supervisory personnel in those other individual units. Accordingly, it appears appropriate at this time to authorize increase of complement of DID by one Agent supervisor.

DO NOT FILE - RETURN TO RM 5736

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Bishop
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

August 15, 1968

MR. TOLSON:

RE: SUGGESTED TRANSFER OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR SUPERVISION OF CASES INVOLVING RIOT LAWS AND CERTAIN BOMBING MATTERS FROM GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION TO THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

I have for some time felt that a lack of clear cut responsibility existed in the handling of captioned matters.

To be brief, it would seem logical that the enforcement of anti-riot legislation would obviously belong to the same Division that is supervising the investigations and development of informants and intelligence regarding the Ku Klux Klan, hate groups and racial organizations. The question arises as to whether or not the transfer of certain bombing matter investigations should also be made to the Domestic Intelligence Division. Quite naturally, the General Investigative Division, because of the supervision of certain type cases in this category, should retain overall supervision in this field. However, consideration should be given to the Domestic Intelligence Division handling that category of cases wherein that Division's development of informants and intelligence would greatly aid in the continuance of supervision of this type case.

In view of the "gray area" involved in such supervision, I asked Messrs. Rosen and Sullivan to study this matter carefully so that appropriate recommendations could be made to you and the Director regarding a shift of responsibility. The findings of Rosen and Sullivan will be found attached to this memorandum. I am, however, not yet satisfied that responsibility is sharply and definitely fixed.

I would like to recommend that the Inspection Division make a survey of this entire matter and then present recommendations which will definitely tie down this matter once and for all. This survey should be expedited in view of the new legislation passed by Congress for which the FBI will obviously have heavy responsibilities in the future.

Respectfully,

C. D. DeLOACH

Enclosure
CDD:hmm
(3)
1 - DeLoach
1 - Felt

Memo to Tolson 8/29/68 [illegible]

[illegible] 8/29/68 [illegible]

236

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 8/23/71)

For the information of General Investigative Division, by separate write-up Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) was advised that Assistant to the Director Sullivan has suggested that DID be divided into two separate Divisions. In order that suggestion could be analyzed during current inspection, DID was requested to furnish certain observations regarding suggestion. Among these, Division was asked "In the event you feel work now being handled by another Division should be realigned in the event above suggestion adopted, so indicate under appropriate new Division."

DID responded, "It will be noted that supervision of antiriot and bombing cases currently in General Investigative Division has been included in table of organization of proposed Domestic Intelligence Division and specifically assigned to the Extremist Intelligence Section. Four Agents and two clerks are now assigned to this Unit in the General Investigative Division and should, of course, be transferred to the new Division.

"This is the most logical move and will afford tighter and more effective supervision of antiriot and bombing violations in view of fact that extremists and terrorists mostly involved are being actively investigated by Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). Accordingly, in addition to avoiding duplicative supervisory action, it follows that DID is better prepared to handle these criminal investigations and final prosecutive actions."

A separate white write-up captioned "Anti-Riot Laws and Bombing Matters" was prepared and DID asked specifically to comment regarding these matters. This addendum is part of that write-up.

You are requested to furnish your views of Mr. Sullivan's suggestion both as to the present structure of DID and as to the handling in the event DID is split. For your information, DID has proposed ARL and Bombing Matters be handled in the Extremist Intelligence Section.

Comments of Assistant Director Rosen requested. It would be appreicated if you would expedite this request.

ADDENDUM
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR ROSEN:
(AR:ige)

The following comments are equally applicable whether the Domestic Intelligence Division remains intact or is reorganized into two divisions.

Transferring these cases to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID) would eliminate much duplication of handling cases and would result in increased efficiency; however, this would require transferring to DID all bombing and antiriot cases as distinguished from transferring only those cases known to involve "extremists and political terrorists." As a practical matter substantially all antiriot laws investigations involve extremists and political terrorists. With regard to bombings, substantially all investigations deal at the outset with unknown subjects and it would be most impractical to attempt to delineate between bombings which do or do not involve terrorists. Since the act of bombing is in itself an act of terror it is logical to assume at the outset that terrorists are involved and the types of bombings delegated to the FBI by the Department's guidelines are limited to those targets most likely to be selected by political terrorists. (These targets pertain to Government property or functions, Federally funded projects, diplomatic establishments, colleges and universities, and those probably perpetrated by terrorists.)

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 8/25/71)

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested concerning Assistant Director Rosen's remarks.

ADDENDUM:
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:

I concur with Mr. Rosen's comments.

RLS:djr
8/27/71

COMPUTATION OF CASE AND WORK LOAD IN THE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

5-A-1 c

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: I have been advised that a new system of computing case and work load has been implemented within your Division. Describe and state reason for implementation.

It would appear that utilization of this system will result in a decrease in case load figures but not necessarily in the work load picture. You are requested to advise by Section and Unit basis the number of cases it is anticipated that the case load will decline in each instance. Use a "before" and "after" approach. Case load figures 7/31/71 will be satisfactory for use as known base (before). Be as specific as possible.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
ESM:wmj
5-A-1 c

ADDENDUM: 5-A-1c

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: In February, 1971, I issued (MSR:amt) instructions that each Section Chief submit monthly case load figures for his Section to the Branch Chiefs to be furnished to me with the Branch Chief's analysis as a basis for establishing a logical and current method of periodically assessing work loads and manpower needs within the Division. Inasmuch as it was intended these figures would serve as a guide for possible manpower changes to meet fluctuating and ever-changing problems, it was essential that figures presented be accurate and equally essential that like matters be tabulated uniformly.

On August 6, 1971, I instructed that a study be made to insure consistency not only in the counting of the cases but in the presentation of the monthly reports. As a result of this study, guidelines were firmly established concerning case counts within the various Sections. Changes from prior figures principally relate to cases involving (1) security informants (2) Security Index cases (3) certain organizations and other matters requiring only periodic reports.

Under the standardized procedures for case counts within the Division, informant cases, whether relating to security informants or PSIs, once initial approval by the Bureau for designation has been granted and where active day-to-day supervision is not necessary, are no longer retained in a pending status but are closed and placed on an administrative tickler to be reopened at the appropriate time to follow for the periodic justification letters required. Cases involving Security Index subjects as well as certain organizations and other matters requiring only the submission of periodic reports at no less than six month intervals, are now opened on a uniform basis 15 days after the due date of the periodic report in order that appropriate followup may be made to insure submission of report.

A format was devised for the Section Chiefs to submit the monthly data required and to account for each Agent in the Section and his current assignments as well as total and average case load figures by Unit and by Section.

Pursuant to your request, there follows a tabulation of the case load by Unit and by Section as of 7/31/71 and as of 8/20/71. Total case load for the Division decreased from 29,565 to 25,417--a decrease of 4,148 cases. Some small part of this decrease can be attributed to normal month by month fluctuation in case load; most of it is attributable to the changed procedures concerning case count as will be readily evident by the significant decreases in case loads in those Units handling principally informant cases, Klan cases, and organizational-type cases. This reduction in case load resulting from the changed case count procedures, of course, in no way decreases the work load on the individual desks. It is believed the current procedures for counting cases is more accurate and equitable and places the case load figures in perspective insofar as these figures are a factor in judging overall work load.

This in brief constitutes the basis for implementing the new system of computing case and work load in the Division. In the overall, it is directly related to our manpower problems and I have included a more detailed write-up bearing on this new system in its relationship to the Division's overall capacity and capability to fulfill its responsibilities in the "Adequacy of Personnel" write-up (6-E) which also bears on the matter.

	Caseload figures		
	7/31/71	8/20/71	Change
Espionage Section			
Special Cases Unit	751	735	
Soviet - Washington Unit	967	842	
Soviet - New York Unit	1223	973	
Coordination Unit	1226	1022	
Satellite Unit	1408	1261	
Section Total	5575	4833	-742
Nationalities Intelligence Section			
Special Coordination Unit	(No cases assigned)		
Cuban Unit	1074	776	
Chinese Unit	1125	1025	
Middle & South America Unit	920	598	
Nationality Unit	697	632	
Section Total	3816	3031	
(Handled by Clerk)	342	333	
	4158	3364	-794
Extremist Intelligence Section			
Black Nationalist - East Unit	1501	1423	
Black Nationalist - West Unit	924	845	
Black Nationalist - Central	1254	1332	
Racial Informant, Black - Nationalist - South	1749	1564	
Section Total	5428	5164	-264

	Caseload figures		
	7/31/71	8/20/71	Change
New Left Section			
Special Investigations - East	1719	1564	
Special Investigations - West	1495	1343	
New Left Groups	879	812	
Subversive Individuals - New Left	2492	2538	
Protest and Trotskyist Groups	574	588	
Section Total	7159	6845	-314
Internal Security Section			
Communist Party, USA	548	272**	
*International New Left and Sedition Unit	912	871**	
Klan and White Hate Groups Unit	1683	511	
Security Informant Unit	1466	869	
Subversive Individuals Unit	2636	2688	
Section Total	7245	5211	-2034
Research Section			
No cases assigned			
Division Total	29,565	25,417	-4148

*Unit now Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit

**1 Supervisor and 253 cases transfered from CPUSA Unit to Foreign Intelligence and Pro Chicom Unit 8/13/71

POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM 5-A-1-d
ESPIONAGE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: "Double Agent" (DA) is a commonly and frequently used term in the field of espionage and counterintelligence. In the Bureau's activities in these fields, DAs are a distinctive group of Security Informants (SIs) utilized against foreign intelligence operations in the United States. "Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a unique term used by DID to identify an individual under development as a DA; one who is in contact with a foreign intelligence officer but who has not yet been solicited by his foreign contact to perform clandestinely or covertly for the benefit of the foreign intelligence group.

During this inspection a representative number of files were reviewed to determine the extent of supervision afforded PDAs. A similar review was conducted last inspection. It is realized, however, that a comparison is not possible in view of recent DID instructions regarding the administrative handling of all SI and PSI files.

Subsequent to last inspection DID established procedure whereby those SI cases requiring day-to-day supervision or PSIs still under investigation should remain in active status; informant-type cases requiring only periodic review are closed and placed on administrative tickler, to be made pending 15 days after the six-month justification letter is due. DA and PDA files are included in these categories.

During the last inspection 237 files were reviewed. Included in that group were PSIs and DESECOs, and not limited to PDAs. All of the files were then in a pending status. During this inspection there were 65 files on PDAs in a pending status and 212 PDA files in a closed status. These were strictly PDA files and did not include other PSIs or DESECOs. It has been determined that at any given time there will probably be approximately 70 such cases in a pending status, if the number of such investigations in the field remains constant.

Of the 65 pending files, 58, or 89%, were reviewed. Of these, 22, or 38% contained specific instructions, directions or other guidance to the field

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
JON:wmj
5-A-1-d

244

since last inspection. At the time of last inspection of 237 files reviewed, less than 10, or 4%, contained such outgoing communications.

Also during this inspection 62 closed files on PDAs were reviewed at random. Of these, 12 or 19%, contained outgoing communications of the type described above since last inspection. It was observed that since last inspection a majority of the closed files contained only the six-month justification letter and were closed in accordance with Division instructions described above.

Due to current Division instructions, only those PDAs requiring day-to-day supervision or those on whom six-month justifications are due are considered pending at any given time. Hence, it is logical that a larger percentage of the closed PDA files will contain only the justification letters and no outgoing correspondence since last inspection.

It is well recognized that the field of DAs is a highly specialized one. Its success, both at the Seat of Government and in the field, requires skillful handling, patience, finesse and careful aggressiveness. In reviewing the PDA files, it was observed that many excellent candidates, with varying backgrounds, have reached various stages of development with excellent potential for use as actual DAs. Specifically, these cases are:

105-113525
105-141001
105-201286
105-207600
105-26896
134-11898
134-15414
134-18458
134-19684
134-19961
134-20321
134-20912

The quality of these PDAs would, in itself, suggest substantial potential and, in turn, need for greater supervision. The above-listed cases should be kept in a pending status, carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions furnished to the field. The field should be instructed to assume a more aggressive position in these cases and followed closely to insure proper attention is given to development of these persons as PDAs.

Review of PDA files shows evidence of closer supervision since last inspection. The percentage of files, including instructions and guidance to the field, rose from 4% to 38%. However, to realize greater accomplishments in this area of responsibility and to use our PDAs to the fullest extent, there is still need for improvement in supervision of these cases.

Comments of Section Chief W. A. Branigan, Inspector D. E. Moore, and Assistant Director Brennan requested.

245

Section Chief William A. Branigan
(CGS:EWL:pdr 8/30/71)

The comments of the Inspector regarding the marked improvement in supervision of our work is most gratifying. As was noted during the last inspection, evidence of supervision appearing in the PDA informant file is not always a completely accurate gauge of the supervisory attention being given each case. The informant file is designed, by provisions of the Manual of Instructions, to be a repository for information regarding the background and administrative handling of the source. Information reflecting operational activities and instructions more often appears in the active investigative file of the Soviet-bloc principal with whom the PDA is in contact.

In view of this significant factor, it is felt that the marked increase in supervision (from 4% to 38%) detected through review of informant files alone, is a most favorable trend and one which every effort will be made to sustain.

Twelve specific cases have been cited as quality PDAs which, by their very nature, suggested a need for greater supervision due to the substantial potential of each. The Inspector has instructed that these cases be kept in a pending status, carefully reviewed, with guidance and instructions furnished to the field to assume a more aggressive position in these cases. These instructions are appreciated and will be followed. As the Inspector has noted, the development of double agents is a highly specialized field requiring special faculties, not the least of which is careful aggressiveness. As these comments recognize, aggressiveness in the development of a double agent is inhibited by the practical necessity to restrict our manipulation of the sources to actions which appear naturally responsive to the initiatives displayed and opportunities offered by the Soviet-bloc representative with whom the source is in contact. Particularly is this true during the development phase before the source has been accepted as bona fide by his principal. Any unnatural or gratuitous action to hasten or strengthen the relationship is viewed with utmost skepticism and could result in compromise of our interest and rejection of the source. This is not to say we must eschew any initiatives; but that any such options must be pursued only after careful consideration of all the complex and variable factors peculiar to each individual case.

Section Chief William A. Branigan
(CGS:EWL:pdr 8/30/71)

Within this perspective the 12 cases referred by the Inspector will be kept open for intensive review to insure that all possible action not already taken to enhance and exploit the potential of each source has been considered and, where appropriate, additional instructions issued to the field.

It is noted that 10 of the 12 PDA cases referred to were in a closed status in accordance with recent DID instructions regarding the administrative handling of all SI and PSI files. Briefly under these procedures such cases are placed in a closed status and are reopened only at such time as a justification letter is due. These criteria will continue to be applied to PDA cases with exceptions, on a selective basis, in those situations which fall within the category defined by the Inspector.

Inspector D. E. Moore
(DEM:bsf 8/31/71)

The continual need for quality double agents is certainly recognized in our counterintelligence efforts against Soviet bloc intelligence and the cases referred to by the Inspector as excellent candidates will be given careful and aggressive handling.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
(DEM:bsf 8/31/71)

The comments of the Inspector have been noted and his instructions will be closely followed.

PERSONNEL MATTERS

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Please tabulate by Sections and Units the current Agent and clerical personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 8/17/71. Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be considered in the overall tabulation.

1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has been obtained to fill.

2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division as of 8/17/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation.)

3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of 8/17/71.

4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.

5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.

6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.

7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall Divisional write-up.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/17/71
ESM:wmj
6-E

248

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: 6 Attached find the Section
(CDB:amk) 8/30/71 write-ups concerning each category of information requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel. These comments are current as of August 17, 1971.

The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office consist of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors, two Special Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and twenty clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division teletype room and Mail Room and Messenger Service, and the Security Patrol force in addition to five Agents.

The overall authorized personnel complement of the Division at the beginning of Inspection was 120 Special Agents and 199 clerks, compared to an authorized complement of 116 Special Agents and 190 clerks at the time of the last Inspection.

As of August 17, 1971, we had 119 Special Agents assigned to the Domestic Intelligence Division (DID). This includes 2 Special Agents who are assigned on a temporary loan basis to the Intelligence Evaluation Committee in the Department of Justice (IEC). Since August 17, 1971, SA Dean N. Lloyd reported to the Research Section as a replacement for SA Bernard A. Wells who retired on 7/30/71. We are awaiting the replacement for SA Victor R. Schaefer who was transferred to Salt Lake City on 7/23/71 as Assistant Special Agent in Charge of that office. SA George M. Quinn has been designated as SA Schaefer's replacement but has not as yet reported to his assignment. With the reporting of SA Quinn, our assigned complement will be 121 in view of the fact that SA Garnett T. Tunstall (on loan to IEC from Extremist Intelligence Section) has been replaced and we include SA Tunstall in our total assigned complement.

As of August 17, 1971, we had 204 clerical employees assigned to DID. This is because recent replacements have reported to replace employees under transfer or resignation who have not left as yet. Since August 17, 1971, we had two additional clerks, GS-4, report to the Division. However, we have had two resignations submitted which will absorb them. We have one Section with an additional employee assigned which is dependent entirely upon the approval of a new position involving no increase in grade or salary.

This Division consists of six Sections. The attached write-ups of the Section Chiefs disclose adequate authorized Agent complement with exception of R. D. Cotter, Research; and W. R. Wannall, Nationalities Intelligence Sections. Authorized is underscored since Agent personnel are on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section because of the McLek Case as follows: Espionage (1), Extremist Intelligence (2), Internal Security (2), Research (1), and New Left (1).

Concerning comment in write-up of R. D. Cotter, Research, Item 6 refers to assignment of Cotter on a temporary basis to Department and need for complete staffing of that Front Office. Originally Cotter's assignment to the Department was not considered to be full time in that he was to be in the same building, readily available for consultation, and capable of handling special problems which might arise. However, the situation is not desirable for a long term arrangement and the term of that assignment is not known. Recognizing this, the adjustment of work assignments detailed in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 proposed elimination of one Section, making Section Chief Arbor Gray available to take over the Research Section. This would eliminate that problem with no additional personnel required. That proposal also makes No. 1 Man Callahan of Internal Security Section available for case assignment.

Concerning write-up of Section Chief W. R. Wannall, several points must be considered. Wannall's suggested build-up of the Chinese Unit to five men from present complement of three at this time to "handle the current work in the Unit and expand into areas which are considered necessary . . ." is reflective of a provincial outlook and a limited concept of the relative importance of proposed work in his area of responsibility in relation to the overall limitation of Bureau manpower and resources. Obviously some differentiation must be made to establish priorities. We must first cope with the immediate problems at hand before assigning manpower to projected problems.

Concerning Wannall's reference to needing a man for the Foreign Liaison Desk, my observations contained in my memorandum to Mr.Sullivan dated 8/16/71, which is attached to Wannall's write-up, still apply. I would add to that an observation that much of the material received from our Legats is actually handled on the related substantive intelligence desks responsible for the respective countries and not by the Foreign Liaison Desk. With the current special cases requiring extensive manpower commitments, I believe that desk can continue as is until the manpower situation is alleviated somewhat.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E

258

As to Wannall's comments concerning manpower on the Ellsberg case, under write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4A3, the personnel assigned to Ellsberg is certainly adequate and he does not at this point request additional personnel for that case.

There are two interrelated but separate problems to be dealt with here. The first, and broadest, is divisionwide adequacy of personnel and the Director has repeatedly stated the concept that major case specials must be handled with existing Division personnel. I agree with this wholeheartedly and have attempted to comply with that concept.

Also related here is the situation which uniquely affects the Domestic Intelligence Division in that our basic area of responsibility has been subjected to shifting patterns of work. Essentially, the rise of the black extremist was largely met with reduction in other work areas. The newer expanding threat of New Left terrorist activities is similarly being met by reduction of personnel committed to other areas of work of less urgent priorities.

Obviously, there are practical limits to the elasticity of manpower and our overall increase in caseload is indicative of considerable strain on our manpower capabilities. Facts concerning this increase are contained under "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1.

I believe, however, we can adequately cope with our responsibilities with existing personnel. In order to accomplish this, considerable study and review of existing administrative practices have been made at my direction since taking over this Division 8/1/70. In order to put available personnel where highest priorities existed, a major reorganization was effected 12/70 and our last inspection approved that action. The Director's letter dated 2/12/71 advising me of the Inspection Staff findings included the comment, "Continue to pay careful attention to imbalances in work load throughout the Division and take necessary action to correct these situations, as you did recently in your reorganization."

With this in mind, and drawing on facts developed during the reorganization and subsequent inspection, I directed a memorandum to Branch Chiefs J. A. Sizoo and D. E. Moore dated 2/19/71 pointing to (1) the need for case count to reflect active matters, (2) their responsibility to know what is going on in their respective Branches and (3) specifically instructing them to submit a monthly analysis of the work load of their Branches.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E

251

The need for uniformity in case count submitted by Sections was stressed to them, as was the need to establish a logical and current basis for a regular and periodic assessment of work loads and manpower needs within the Division.

Because of (1) a continued shift in manpower needs, and (2) a growing imbalance in caseloads between Sections and manpower demands of special cases, by memorandum to all Branch and Section Chiefs, I instructed Section Chiefs G. C. Moore and R. L. Shackelford to conduct a thorough survey of the Division and make suitable recommendations for manpower adjustments to cope with current needs of the Division. My memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71 detailed their findings and recommended they be approved.

Addendum of Inspection Division 7/30/71 approved this except for assignment of Special Coordination Unit to Research Section, recommending it be retained in Nationalities Intelligence Section. Mr. Felt's memorandum to Mr. Tolson dated 8/4/71 recommended proposed adjustment of work assignments in Domestic Intelligence Division be deferred pending his study and Director noted, "OK. Expedite." We are awaiting a decision.

Based on figures developed during the survey of G. C. Moore and R. L. Shackelford, it was obvious my previous instructions to the Branch Chiefs had not been effectively carried out, because case count figures still were not as meaningful or consistent between Sections as they should have been. To correct this situation and to establish what I intended in my original memorandum to the Branch Chiefs on this subject, I instructed two Supervisors, with Inspection Staff experience, to do a complete survey of case counting procedures and prepare tight recommendations to achieve the objectives previously sought.

This was done, and after discussion of their findings with Branch and Section Chiefs, these new procedures were adopted beginning 8/13/71. The results of this procedural change is detailed in "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, and I believe validates the recommended work adjustments contained in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 7/29/71.

It must be strongly pointed out here this procedural change does not bear on work load, but rather deals solely with tabulation of case count into a more accurate gauge of pending work and where the work is by desk, Unit, and Section. The work remains the same.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E

252

The proposed work adjustments contained in my memorandum of 7/29/71 essentially took manpower from work presently in the Internal Security Section (Klan and White Hate cases and Informant matters) and made them available to other more heavily loaded work areas. The Front Office staff of Internal Security Section will be available for other assignment as well. It also called for Nationalities Intelligence to absorb one of the five men on Ellsberg from that Section's complement because of relatively low caseload.

Details set forth in "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, disclose caseload decreased in Nationalities Intelligence and Internal Security Sections by 19% and 28% respectively, which is proportionately high compared to other Sections.

Espionage Section was proposed to receive a one-half man's time to compensate for the Ironclad case. This is consistent with that Section's 13% decrease in case count under the new procedure.

That write-up also discloses a case count under the new procedure of 275 cases per Agent for the Nationalities Intelligence Section compared as follows: Espionage - 303; Extremist Intelligence - 303; New Left - 334; Internal Security - 401. These figures are based on Supervisors assigned to case desks and do not include men on specials in any Section.

I do not believe the problems faced by Nationalities Intelligence Section far outweigh those of other Sections to justify that low figure and, therefore, believe my original recommendation that Nationalities Intelligence absorb one man from existing complement was justified. W. R. Wannall's comments in write-up captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, relative to manpower presently utilized on this case validate this further as he has now utilized manpower in his Section on this case. Obviously, tangential issues will arise from time-to-time in an investigation of this type and can and should be handled on an emergency basis within the Section handling the special. This has been the traditional practice and should be followed.

The second problem is essentially intra-divisional in nature and deals with a Division Head's responsibility and authority to effectively utilize resources available to him to cope with

253

the area of responsibility levied upon him. As detailed in Wannall's write-up captioned, Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, from the beginning of this case I made manpower available for the Ellsberg case as requested by him. As this investigation progressed, however, Wannall continued to levy demands for manpower which I believed unwarranted in view of (1) his failure to effectively adjust and use his existing manpower at a time when he had a proportionately low case load and (2) his granting extensive leave to personnel in his Section while continuing to levy manpower demands.

Wannall now claims to have nine men assigned to the Ellsberg case. I invite comparison of the handling of the Ellsberg Case to Eastcon. Eastcon at no time has had over 5 men assigned full time to it, even though the case is of the very highest priority and of a magnitude and complexity seldom matched in Bureau investigations. In addition to the basic and complex conspiracy itself, the case incorporates six separate substantive investigations (draft board entries) which had to be brought up to trial standard for prosecution of Eastcon. There are at least 85 volumes to the Eastcon file alone at this time. Eastcon was absorbed within the responsible Section until it was firmly established that Section's case load could not continue to absorb the impact of Eastcon. No requests for additional manpower were refused by me on Eastcon, and those requests made were fully supported by facts, justified and granted.

In my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/12/71, captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Leak Cases, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," I candidly stated my position and evaluation of Wannall's demands for manpower (copy attached). Attention is invited to page 2, paragraph 4, concerning the 5 highly qualified and experienced men available to Wannall, none of whom were being utilized by him on the Ellsberg case. Attention is also invited to page 2, paragraph 5, which details Wannall's claim to Mr. Felt of "enormous" problems and need for still 2 more men. Note that part of that "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one interview. Concerning the first reference your attention is directed to my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan dated 8/16/71 captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)," (copy attached) which attaches a memorandum from Wannall to me requesting an additional Supervisor for the Special Coordination Unit. Concerning the second reference above, and the tenor of the entire memorandum, your attention is invited to Wannall's write-up in this report captioned "Ellsberg Case," 4-A-3, page 10, paragraph 1, wherein he states 9 men are now assigned to that case.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/30/71
CDB:mls
6-E

254

These two references and Wannall's responses to them clearly draw the issues: (1) Whether he used good judgment and considered the Bureau and Division overall responsibilities in balance with his own desires for manpower in making his requests; (2) When weaknesses in his position were pointed out whether he attempted to cover them by making even more demands for manpower hoping this would somehow give them credence and (3) Whether he or the Division Head should judge the Division's resources and capabilities and determine their allocation and priority of need consistent with the Bureau's overall capabilities.

In summary, the work load of the Domestic Intelligence Division as exemplified by case loads set forth under "Pending Work and Delinquency," 4-D-1, are very high. Being mindful of the practical limits of Bureau resources, I believe the currently proposed adjustment of work assignments detailed in my above referred to memorandum of 7/29/71 will allow the Domestic Intelligence Division to function effectively with existing manpower. The new method of tabulating case count affords me a better administrative device to obtain maximum utilization of existing manpower and periodic adjustments within the Division will no doubt be warranted and made.

The observations of the Inspection Staff as to the validity of manpower committed to the Ellsberg case, as well as overall manpower needs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, are welcomed.

Extra

Mr. W. C. Sullivan August 12, 1971

C. D. Brennan

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
LEAK CASES
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

Rememo 8/4/71 from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson captioned as above, Mr. Felt recommended and the Director approved that the number of Agents handling leak cases in DID be increased immediately from 5 to 7 using DID manpower. Mr. Felt also recommended that the proposed adjustment of manpower in DID be deferred pending his study. The Director agreed and noted "Expedite." The following is offered for consideration:

This involves two problems:

(1) The proposed manpower adjustments recommended in memorandum from C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan on 7/29/71. The Inspection Division concurred with the proposed changes in that memorandum except for moving the Special Coordination Unit which coordinates Legal Attache matters out of the Nationalities Intelligence Section. The Director agreed, tentative to final approval of the organizational charts. The charts were submitted by memorandum C. D. Brennan to Sullivan 8/3/71 which led to Mr. Felt's memorandum of 8/4/71 recommending a further study.

(2) The second problem involves manpower needs for the Ellsberg and other leak cases which have arisen since 6/15/71. These are handled in the Nationalities Intelligence Section under Section Chief W. R. Wannall.

When the Attorney General requested we investigate the Ellsberg case on 6/25/71 I advised Wannall this was a matter of the highest priority and instructed him to use sufficient manpower to handle it. He advised me after his initial assessment that he would need the assistance of 3 additional supervisors. These were immediately temporarily reassigned to him from other sections. He subsequently said the problem was expanding and he would need 2 additional supervisors. These were also promptly temporarily reassigned to him from other sections.

This placed a heavy overall burden on all sections and led to my recommendations in my memorandum of 7/29/71 for manpower changes within DID to insure that manpower was being used on priority items.

Enclosure
CDB:lml (8)
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. N. P. Callahan
1 - Mr. Ponder
1 - Mr. D. E. Moore
1 - C. D. Brennan

(CONTINUED - OVER)

256

Mr. Felt's memorandum 8/4/71 indicates he discussed the manpower problem on the leak cases with Wannall who said his problems had now become so great he would need 2 more men for a total of 7.

In line with Mr. Felt's stated intention to initiate an overall study of the matter, I had Mr. Wannall submit to me an overall analysis of his manpower and work load as it relates to the leak cases in his section. Set forth are the case load figures for Mr. Wannall's section from March 1 - August 1, 1971:

March 1 - 324
April 1 - 323
May 1 - 313
June 1 - 291
July 1 - 292
August 1 - 294

When the Ellsberg case first broke, Wannall assured me he was using his existing manpower to the fullest extent possible and needed temporarily assistance from other sections to carry on the other heavy burdens of his section, but the case load figures now available for the six-week period from 6/15/71 to 8/1/71 show that all Wannall did was put his own men on the special (5 men) and borrow manpower (5 men) from other sections to keep his other problems in hand at the sacrifice of other sections with equally or even more burdensome problems.

This is shown by the fact that for June and July the case load average in Wannall's section while handling the Ellsberg case was 292 and 294 respectively as contrasted to a Division case load average for all sections during the same period of 339 and 335. This does not even take into consideration that he has 5 highly experienced and qualified supervisors in the Special Coordination Unit whom he does not include in his case load count. He could have drawn on at least one of these men for special assignment in an emergency but did not.

Actually, it is now clear that Wannall responded in the initial stage of his problem with a panicky, premature request for additional manpower as he subsequently did through his observation to Mr. Felt that he needed still 2 more men. In effect, Wannall put DID in the untenable position of giving Mr. Felt an off-the-cuff assessmentof what he considered to be an "enormous" problem and a need for still 2 more men unsupported by facts and oblivious to the problems of the Division as a whole. As a matter of fact, one of the leak cases which caused Wannall great alarm was referred to us by the Department on 8/2/71. By letter dated 8/9/71 Wannall advised the Department that we had conducted one interview which showed that prosecution could not be entertained and accordingly would conduct no further investigation in the absence of

(CONTINUED - OVER)

237

specific instructions. Therefore, one part of Wannall's "enormous" problem was resolved in one week with one interview and one letter to the Department.

Of equal concern to me is Wannall's handling of leave requests during the period of 6/15/71 to 8/5/71. When confronted with the Ellsberg case, he had discussed leave with me and had suggested that if it was necessary for him to cancel leave requests in his section he felt leave should be cancelled throughout the entire Division. I told him it would be ridiculous to cancel leave Division-wide because one section had a problem. I advised him leave throughout the Division would be approved on the basis of sound judgment in relation to overall Division work load and in accordance with the Director's instructions concerning individuals involved on major cases.

I have ascertained that since 6/15/71 Wannall has approved leave for 12 supervisors in his section totaling 763 hours. This is an average of nearly 8 days per man for each of those 12. He approved these extensive leave requests during the same period that he advised his problems were so "enormous" that he needed 7 additional men.

OBSERVATIONS:

Historically, the Bureau has learned to live with specials of various kinds. I agree with the concept that such specials are a test of the responsible official's ability to handle them within the framework of the Bureau's overall responsibilities and capabilities. In like manner, I expect no less from supervisory personnel under me and will not condone unwarranted attempts to grab manpower within the Division regardless of whether the attempts are based on an inability to think clearly, an incapacity to adjust to a stress situation, or oversight resulting from a provincial attitude and outlook.

DID has absorbed into its periphery of responsibilities many new problem areas involving racial and new left extremists in recent years. These problems have taxed our ingenuity and resulted in across-the-board heavy work load increases brought about by the need to flexibly realign manpower to meet new challenges. When other priorities of the Bureau have precluded additional manpower being added to DID, I have attempted to take the positive approach of making internal adjustments to fulfill our responsibilities with available resources.

In this vain, there is attached a copy of a memorandum I prepared for all Branch and Section Chiefs of DID dated 7/23/71 which resulted in my memorandum to Mr. Sullivan of 7/29/71 recommending DID manpower

(CONTINUED - OVER)

258

adjustments. I feel it will serve to show why the Inspection Division with a minor exception approved our proposed manpower adjustments. Perhaps it will serve also to facilitate the study Mr. Felt indicated he was initiating. I hope it will resolve any doubts the Director or others may have about what we are trying to do with our manpower resources in DID and why we are trying to do it.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) Pending the Director's final approval of the proposed manpower adjustments within DID, the 5 men temporarily assigned to the Ellsberg case remain as assigned.

(2) Any additional personnel to be assigned to the Ellsberg or other leak cases at this time should come from within the Nationalities Intelligence Section in view of the relatively lower case load in that section.

(3) That Inspector D. E. Moore personally assume overall direction of the Ellsberg and leak cases to insure Wannall's proper utilization of manpower in the direction of our objectives. This should include daily conferences with Wannall and his men on the Ellsberg and leak cases and a weekly progress report to me from Inspector Moore.

No. Since it has been stated (irresponsibly) that if Brennan was taken off Ellsberg case it would be lost Brennan is to remain until case is concluded. H

(4) That Mr. Felt as instructed by the Director expedite his study of recommended DID manpower adjustments so that desirable changes can be effected without further delay to enable us to put our manpower on our most important problems.

Mr. W. C. Sullivan August 16, 1971

C. D. Brennan

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

Re attached memorandum Wannall to Brennan 8/12/71 requesting one additional supervisor be approved from outside DID for the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) because of a heavy increase in work volume.

I agree expansion of our Legat offices has produced work increase which would justify additional supervisor on FLD. However, in regard to Wannall's recommendation concurred in by the Branch Chief, Inspector D. E. Moore, that it should come from outside DID, I am mindful of the Inspection Division's survey of work in DID during week of 7/19/71 following request for additional supervisor in Espionage Section. The Inspector concluded that the present supervisory capabilities of DID are adequate to handle existing work.

The Inspection Division's analysis of work in DID as of 7/1/71 compared with last inspection in January, 1971, revealed a stability of overall responsibilities from a case load standpoint shown by the fact average case load per supervisor in January was 322 and in July 330. Wannall's average case load in January per supervisor was 278 and in July 294--an average rise of only 8 cases in the Division and of only 16 cases in Wannall's section in six months.

Ordinarily, I would point out to both Inspector Moore and Wannall these factors mitigate against requesting additional supervisors from outside DID. Inspector Moore had access to these facts and should have explained to Wannall the need to follow traditional patterns in requesting an additional man, i. e., adjusting within the Division's overall manpower and work load framework of capabilities and responsibilities. The obvious answer is for Wannall to reassign a man from within his section to the FLD. This would (1) alleviate the work load there and, (2) bring his case load closer to the Division's supervisory average per man. At the end of 90 days he could then reassess his situation and consider any action the facts then warrant.

However, the significance placed on our recent Legat expansion may be an overriding factor to the Inspection Division or Mr. Felt who

Enclosure

CDB:lml (9)
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Ponder
1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - D. E. Moore

260

may feel the facts presented by Wannall are such to outweigh all other considerations. I feel it would be well for Mr. Felt to consider this request in conjunction with the manpower adjustment survey he is to initiate and I will be guided accordingly.

I have initiated some new guidelines for determining Division manpower assignments and case loads. I believe these will provide a still better basis for DID to insure its manpower is being most effectively used on priority matters. Mr. Felt may desire to use these guidelines immediately as a measure for his study.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Felt consider the request of Wannall for a supervisor from outside DID in conjuction with his study.

Any additional personnel
for Wannall's Section must
come from within the DID.
H

261

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY: As of close of business 8/17/71 the authorized personnel of the Internal Security Section was 17 Special Agents, 7 Secretaries, and 13 Clerks. A breakdown by Units follows:

FRONT OFFICE	AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS OF COB 8/17/71	
Section Chief	1	
Secretary	1	
Number One Man	1	
Secretary	1	
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT		
Supervisors	1	
Secretary	1	
Clerks	1	
FOREIGN INFLUENCE AND PRO-CHICOM UNIT		
Supervisors	3	(SA Benedict assigned temporarily Nationalities Intelligence)
Secretary	1	
Clerks	2	
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT		
Supervisors	2	
Secretary	1	
Clerks	2	
SECURITY INFORMANT UNIT		
Supervisors	4	(SA Seabaugh assigned temporarily Nationalities Intelligence)
Secretary	1	
Clerks	5	
SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT		
Supervisors	5	(SA WL Smith extended sick leave beginning 6/25/71)
Secretary	1	
Clerks	3	

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1. None

2. None

3. None

4. None

5. During the period since the last inspection manpower savings have been effected in that the following Supervisors for the periods indicated have been assigned elsewhere in the Division. Supervisor James P. Benedict has been assigned elsewhere in the Division for the entire period since the last inspection except for approximately 12 days that he was working in the Internal Security Section. Most of this period he was on temporary assignment in the New Left Section on the Special concerning the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives case. More recently he has been on temporary assignment to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the McLek Special. Since 8/13/71 Supervisor Tony J. Seabaugh has also been on temporary assignment in the Nationalities Intelligence Section on the McLek Special.

6. When Special Agent supervisory personnel currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections, are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle existing case load. There is, however, an area of pending work which could greatly increase the supervisory work load and require expeditious file reviews, analysis of cases, availability of witnesses, reviews of informant reports and preparation of correspondence. Funds were recently appropriated by Congress for the implementation of Executive Order 11605 which broadened the powers of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to enable the Board to hold hearings and designate violence-prone extremist organizations as subversive. The Department has indicated that it intends to initiate proceedings before the SACB as soon as possible and there are a number of organizations being handled in the Internal Security Section, such as the Revolutionary Union and Progressive Labor Party, which are likely to be selected for presentation. Based on past

experience, the preparation of a case for presentation to the SACB requires the services of one Supervisor on a full-time basis. Thus, it is anticipated that the Department's action pursuant to Executive Order 11605 will substantially increase the work load of the Internal Security Section.

7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:

case load
mail count
name checks
complexity of cases and supervision involved
deadline matters
special assignments
experienced supervisors

Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments handled.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
SFP:ebc
6-E

264

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: As of close of business 8/17/71, the complement of this Section was as follows: Special Agents 12, secretaries 6, and clerks 13, for a total of 31. This is broken down by unit as follows:

Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary (Stenography), 1 Secretary (Typing), 1 Clerk (Typing - GS-5). One Special Agent on permanent detached assignment to Department of Justice.

Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 3 Supervisory Clerks (technical publications writers), 1 Clerk (publications coordinator), 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Civil Disorder Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Current Intelligence Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 Secretary, 1 Supervisory Clerk (technical publications writer), 1 Clerk (omnibus).

Special Records Unit - 1 Special Agent, 1 Secretary, 4 Clerks.

The following responses are numbered to correspond with Inspector's specific questions:

1. Position of Section Chief is technically vacant, with no authority to fill. Section Chief R. D. Cotter, with approval of the Director, has been on permanent detached assignment with the Department of Justice since 6/1/71. Number One Man T. J. Smith has acted in capacity of Section Chief.

One Special Agent position in Current Intelligence Reporting Unit has been vacant since retirement of SA B. A. Wells, effective 7/30/71. Authority granted to fill position and SA D. N. Lloyd will report 8/18/71 as SA Wells' replacement.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/17/71
TJS:amt
6-E

2. SA Dean N. Lloyd is under transfer to the Division from the San Antonio Office. Transfer letter was dated 6/30/71. He has arrived in Washington and will report for assignment 8/18/71.

Mrs. Jacqueline Kelset Elliott, Clerk GS-4, assigned to Current Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/24/71. Letter acknowledging resignation was dated 8/3/71.

Miss Joyce Webb, Secretary, GS-5, assigned to Current Intelligence Reporting Unit, resigned effective 8/20/71. Letter acknowledging resignation was dated 7/28/71.

3. There is one GS-4 Clerk surplus to the Section complement. This is located in the Current Intelligence Reporting Unit and is due to fact that replacement for Mrs. Elliott (above) received prior to effective date of resignation, 8/24/71.

4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive to the needs of the Section.

5. There have been no manpower savings effected through streamlining procedures since date of last inspection. One Special Agent who had been on loan to Internal Security Section was transferred permanently to that Section effective 5/24/71, with no replacement to be provided. Overall Section complement was thereby reduced by one Special Agent and the work load occasioned by this reduction was absorbed by existing Agent complement with assistance from Supervisory Clerks (Technical Publications Writers).

6. Due to nature of permanent assignment of Section Chief R. D. Cotter to the Department of Justice, full burden and responsibility for running the Section and handling Section Front Office functions has fallen on the Number One Man, T. J. Smith. A replacement for Mr. Cotter is very definitely deemed necessary so that an acting Number One Man can be designated to relieve SA Smith in the Section Front Office. In the interest of continuity of responsibility and authority it is felt that designation of an acting Number One Man is a must. A replacement was approved by the Director for the other Agent named along with Mr. Cotter for detached permanent assignment to the Department. Personnel of the Section cannot be considered adequate so long as there is only one Special Agent handling Front Office responsibilities of the Section.

266

7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section includes a number of diverse factors. As pointed out in prior inspections, case load figures are not applicable, neither are there any other simple qualitative measurements of the Section's work. Research Section is essentially the service arm of the Division and handles a wide variety of assignments involving research, study and analysis. Of primary importance is production of a variety of documents aimed at providing the White House, Attorney General, other high level Government officials and Bureau officials current intelligence information relating to the broad spectrum of the Division's work. In addition to the writing of highly condensed intelligence summaries, digests, and analyses in pamphlet form for high level dissemination, the Section provides a daily teletype summary of racial disorders and developments and of antiwar, campus disorders and other disturbances growing out of various protest activity. The Section also handles all matters which involve the Division as a whole, where the matter crosses section lines. Director's specials involving such matters as wire taps, nonspecific topical subjects such as guidelines for internal security investigations, and similar matters are handled and/or coordinated in the Section.

The adequacy of personnel of the Section depends on the demands leveled by the White House or by Bureau officials for the specialized studies and other material which the Section is geared to produce on short notice. Demands for intelligence data were extremely heavy from the White House prior to and during the election campaign last year. It can reasonably be expected that even greater demands will be placed on the Bureau during the months ahead, and such demands will invariably involve the elements of extremism, terrorism, racial and new left agitation and other internal security problems. It is to be noted that this Section actually wrote one speech for Vice President Agnew and provided the material for inclusion in several others. We also provided Mr. Agnew with a special brief which was kept updated, for use in appearing before various groups.

267

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
NEW LEFT SECTION 6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: There is set forth below a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the New Left Section as of close of business, August 17, 1971.

	Authorized	Assigned
New Left Groups Unit	4 Agents	4 Agents
	4 Clerks	4 Clerks
Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit	3 Agents	3 Agents
	5 Clerks	5 Clerks
Special Investigations - East Unit	6 Agents	6 Agents
	5 Clerks	5 Clerks
Special Investigations - West Unit	5 Agents	5 Agents
	5 Clerks	5 Clerks
Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit	6 Agents	6 Agents
	6 Clerks	7 Clerks
Front Office	2 Agents	2 Agents
	2 Clerks	2 Clerks
Total	26 Agents	26 Agents
	27 Clerks	28 Clerks
	53 Employees	54 Employees

1. There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.

2. There are no transfers pending in or out of the Section, nor are there any letters of resignation in the Section pending as of August 17, 1971.

3. As of August 17, 1971, this Section is one secretary over the authorized complement. This secretary is temporarily assigned to the GS-6 secretary position in the Section Front Office, which was vacated by the reassignment of the incumbent to a proposed GS-6 clerical position in the Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. Upon approval of the proposed clerical position, the extra secretary will be utilized to fill the GS-6 secretary vacancy in the Front Office.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
RLS:cae
6-E

268

Adequacy of Personnel
New Left Section 6-E

4. At time of last inspection, this Section had a complement of 24 clerical personnel as compared to present assigned complement of 28 clerical personnel. This increase was occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit with accompanying personnel from Internal Security Section to the New Left Section.

Congress recently appropriated funds for implementation of Executive Order 11605 which broadened power of Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) to designate violence prone extremist organizations as subversive. The Department has indicated it intends to initiate these proceedings as soon as possible (See R. L. Shackelford memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan, August 16, 1971, captioned "Executive Order 11605"). This Section handles a number of organizations which will undoubtedly be selected by the Department for presentation before the SACB. Based on past experience, the preparation of cases for presentation to the SACB creates a considerable increase in work of a clerical nature. If the Department's intention in this regard is implemented, it will be necessary to obtain an additional clerk in the future, however, we are not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time.

5. The New Left Section, as of January, 1971, had an authorized complement of 22 Agents and 23 clerks. Current assigned complement is 26 Agents and 28 clerks. This increase in complement, as noted above, was occasioned by the transfer of the Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the Internal Security Section to the New Left Section.

6. The caseload being handled by the New Left Section (average 371 cases per Agent as of August 1, 1971) is considered excessive. We are, at the present time, making a conscientious effort to reduce this caseload to desirable level by weeding out and closing cases which do not require additional investigation. If, in spite of our efforts, the upward trend continues, it may be necessary to request additional Agent personnel to handle the excessive caseload in this Section.

As noted in number 4 above, it is anticipated that as a result of recent Congressional action, the Department intends to soon present violence prone extremist organizations before the SACB for designation as subversive. Such presentations will,

269

of necessity, include several organizations currently handled by this Section. Based on past experience, the preparation of a case for presentation before the SACB requires the services of one supervisor on a full-time basis. No request is being made at this time for additional Agent personnel. However, based on the above, it appears that a request for one additional Agent will be necessary when the above proceedings are instituted.

7. Adequacy of personnel in the New Left Section is constantly evaluated on basis of caseload and type of cases handled by each Unit, review of delinquency reports, number of requests received from Department and other agencies, and review of the overall objectives of the Section. When it is noted, because of special circumstances, that an excessive amount of work is temporarily assigned to one Unit, personnel from other Units are utilized to alleviate the situation.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION

(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section as of the close of business August 17, 1971, is as follows:

	AGENT	CLERK	SECRETARY	CLERK-STENO
Front Office	2	0	2	0
Soviet Unit - Washington	3	2	1	1
Soviet Unit - New York	4*	3	1	1
Special Cases Unit	2	5**	1	0
Coordination Unit	3	3***	1	1
Satellite Unit	4	5	1	0

*Special Agent George M. Quinn was designated to replace Special Agent Victor R. Schaefer. Special Agent Quinn is currently assigned to the Inspection Division; date of reporting to the Espionage Section is not known.

**Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

***Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

(2) By letter dated July 28, 1971, Special Agent George M. Quinn was ordered for assignment to the Domestic Intelligence Division.

By letter dated August 17, 1971, Dale P. Ramacciato submitted his resignation to be effective at close of business

271

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

August 20, 1971. Letter acknowledging resignation has not been received.

(3) As of August 17, 1971, there was a shortage of one Special Agent in the Soviet Unit - New York. As of August 17, 1971, there was no overage of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section.

(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate but not excessive at the present time.

(5) Since the last inspection the Special Agent complement of the Espionage Section has been reduced by two. At the time of the last inspection the Espionage Section had a total case load of 5,089 cases, of which 141 were handled by clerical personnel in lieu of Agent personnel. There was, therefore, an average of 275 pending investigations per Agent Supervisor. As of July 31, 1971, the Espionage Section had a total of 5,575 cases, of which 270 were handled by clerical personnel. This provided an average of 331 pending investigations for each Agent Supervisor.

(6) By memorandum June 4, 1971, a request was made to increase the Special Agent complement by one Special Agent. This was predicated on an increase in the volume and complexity of investigations handled. The request was denied. By memorandum July 14, 1971, I asked to increase the Special Agent complement by one in order that the Ironclad case could be assigned the full-time job of one Special Agent. Ironclad is a unique source of the Bureau and it is important that information from this source is given the analysis and consideration that it deserves. This request was denied, and the Special Agent complement of the Espionage Section was fixed at 18. In light of President Nixon's recent request to cut back, no request for additional Special Agent personnel is being made and the present complement is considered adequate.

(7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity of the cases, and the importance of the investigation.

In the Soviet Units - Washington and New York, we are currently handling 2,190 cases among an authorized complement of

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
WAB:hke
6-E

272

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

seven Special Agents. The greatest majority of our double agent cases are assigned in these Units and these are among the most complex investigations. The operation of a double agent requires minute supervision to insure that the objectives of the investigation are achieved. The Soviet Unit - Washington also supervises two illegal agent cases, and the Soviet Unit - New York has the overall supervision of the Ironclad source.

The Satellite Unit, which supervises the investigations in the Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav nationality fields, has a total of 1,408 investigations, including the informants and double agents that are being directed against the Soviet-bloc establishments and personnel. There is, therefore, an average of 352 investigations in this Unit.

The Coordination Unit is currently handling 1,226 investigations, of which 178 are assigned to a Clerk in lieu of an Agent. Considering that this Unit has the responsibility for a number of special subjects and special operations, including the adaptation of our records to automatic data processing equipment, the case load is considered very high.

In our Special Cases Unit there are currently 751 investigations, of which 92 are handled by a Clerk in lieu of an Agent. These investigations are divided among two Special Agents. The figure of 751 compares favorably with the total of 768 at the time of the last inspection, which number was divided among three Special Agents.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8-19-71
WAB:hke
6-E

273

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The current authorized personnel complement of the Extremist Intelligence Section as of the close of business August 18, 1971, is 22 Agents and 23 clerical personnel. This is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:

Front Office

Section Chief	- 1
Number One Man	- 1
Secretary to Section Chief	- 1
Secretary to Number One Man	- 1

Black Nationalist Unit - East

6 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
7 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - Central

4 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
3 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - West

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
6 clerical personnel

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
TDR:mlm
6-E

(1) There are no clerical or supervisory vacancies in the Section.

(2) No one is under transfer into or out of the Section.

(3) There is no shortage or overage of authorized personnel.

(4) The clerical personnel assigned to the Section is considered adequate at this time.

(5) The streamlining of our operations wherever possible to effect manpower savings is under continual evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since the last inspection include: (1) Abolishment of the Agitator Index on 4/21/71 as an analysis revealed that it was no longer the necessary administrative tool that it once was; (2) After consultation with the Department, discontinued submission of monthly evidentiary reports concerning the Black Panther Party on May 14, 1971. At the time this program was discontinued, 23 field offices were submitting monthly evidentiary reports averaging 37 pages in length; (3) Limited the scope of investigations of black student groups on college campuses to those groups which have engaged in violence and/or lawless activities or are moving toward violence or lawlessness by letter to all offices 7/26/71; (4) Assigned additional duties to clerical personnel in effort to reduce the workload of Special Agent Supervisors. Specifically, a clerk is now handling the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List, correlates the receipt and review of publications and newspapers dealing with the black nationalist movement, reviews and forwards to appropriate field offices information received from the military on black extremist in the Armed Forces, and handles certain correspondence with the National Security Agency concerning matters of mutual interest.

In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible

(6) The Special Agent complement is 22 including the Section Chief and Number One Man, an increase of one since the last inspection. The Division was reorganized December 17, 1970, on the basis of approximate case load per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the October 1, 1970, case load figures. As of January 1, 1971, the case load stood at 349 per Supervisor and a request for two additional Special Agent Supervisors was approved. The opening of cases on Black Student Union-type organizations and leaders thereof on college campuses across the Nation in December, 1970, showed up in our case load figures during the early months of 1971. These cases have been handled and closed by the end of the 1970-1971 school year. As of August 1, 1971, the case load stood at 5,428 or an average of 271 per Supervisor assigned. These cases represent hard-core extremist individuals and organizations and require extensive supervision.

Additional factors dealing with the adequacy of personnel is a special that was received in the Section on May 29, 1971, involving the killing of two police officers in New York City on May 21, 1971, which the President instructed the FBI to investigate and solve. The supervision of this investigation occupies the full time of one Supervisor. In addition, one Supervisor was placed on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on July 19, 1971, and a second Supervisor was placed on loan to that Section on August 13, 1971.

With the return of these two Supervisors to the Section, I consider the supervisory personnel as adequate.

There are several factors that would indicate that our work in the black extremist field will increase in the immediate future. With the reopening of school in the immediate future, we can foresee an influx of cases involving extremist Black Student UNion-type groups and leaders thereof.

Executive Order 11605 signed by the President on July 2, 1971, expanded the activities of the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB). The Department has advised

276

that a Section has been formed within the Internal Security Division of the Department to file petitions before the SACB pursuant to Executive Order 11605 and that the Department is interested in proceeding as quickly as possible against such parties as the Black Panther Party and the Ku Klux Klan among others. Such proceedings will materially increase the workload of the Section.

Under the proposed reorganization of the Division which is under consideration at this time, this Section, if such reorganization is approved, will handle all Klan and white-hate organizations, individuals and informants with the present supervisory complement. In this connection, the informant cases are adoptable to full assimilation into our present extremist informant setup and a great deal of the work in connection with the handling of these informants will be assigned the responsibility of two grade 6 clerical employees in the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. In order to absorb the Klan and white-hate organizations and individuals, they will be assigned in accordance with the geographic breakdown we are presently using within the four Units in the Section.

Black extremist activity in this country is developing more and more in international aspects. Residents of other countries including U. S. citizens and noncitizens are involved in clandestine and overt operational activity among racial extremists. We have targeted Central Intelligence Agency as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding foreign influence in the black extremist movement. We have levied requirements and are expanding on such requirements on the National Security Agency which has vast capabilities in developing the type of information needed.

(7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into consideration not only the case load which is compiled on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures in the black extremist movement such as Huey P. Newton, Eldridge Cleaver, James Forman, LeRoi Jones, and others require a considerable amount of supervisory attention.

Analysis of current developments in the racial field, preparation of special studies, requests from other Government agencies, and so forth all require considerable supervisory time and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of supervisory personnel.

278

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL wrw
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As of close of business 8/17/71 Section complement was:

	Authorized	Actual
Special Agents	20	20*
Secretaries (Steno)	8	8
Secretary (Typing)	1	1
Stenographer (Supervisory)	1	1
Clerical (Supervisory)	1	1
Stenographers	26	26**
Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)	20	21***
Totals	77	78

*Does not include 7 Agents on loan from other Sections for McLek Special.

**Includes one GS-5 Stenographer (Barbara J. Raney) out of assignment, working outside Bureau on loan to Intelligence Evaluation Committee.

***Includes one GS-4 Clerk (Kendall Wayne Shull) assigned temporarily to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes.

Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography) and one Secretary (Typing).

Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-5) and one Clerk (GS-4)

Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three Secretaries (Stenography), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and three Clerks (GS-4).

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/19/71
WRW:ams
6-E

279

Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Stenography), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor (Clerk), one Assistant Supervisor (Stenographic), one Clerk-Stenographer (GS-5), and 25 Clerk-Stenographers (GS-4).

While the foregoing represents the organizational structure of the Section as authorized, the actual structure has been affected by the McLek and related specials since 6/15/71. There are seven Agents assigned on a temporary, and in part rotating, basis to this Section from other sections within the Division. These men, together with the 20 Agents regularly assigned to the Section, are assigned as follows:

Section Front Office - two (no change).

Cuban Unit - three (two regular, one on temporary rotating assignment--David A. Brumble of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/13/71).

Nationality Unit - three (one regular and two on temporary assignment--James H. Kavanagh of New Left Section reported 7/19/71, and John L. Adams of Extremist Intelligence Section reported 8/9/71). This is one less than normal unit Agent complement.

Special Coordination Unit - five (no change).

Chinese Unit - two (regular). This is one less than normal unit Agent complement.

Middle and South American Unit - three (two regular and one on temporary rotating assignment--Wilfred R. Schlarman of Espionage Section reported 8/16/71).

McLek and Related Specials - nine (as follows):

Eugene R. Harrell (of this Section)
James R. Wagoner (of this Section)
Jesse R. Hagy (of this Section)
Herbert J. Morgan (of this Section)
Lionel E. Belanger (of this Section)

280

William W. Hamilton (of this Section)
Joseph M. Sizoo (of Research Section)
Tony J. Seabaugh (of Internal Security Section)
James P. Benedict (of Internal Security Section)

Harrell, Wagoner and Hamilton are regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit, Morgan to the Middle and South American Unit, Belanger to the Cuban Unit and Hagy to the Chinese Unit.

(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 8/17/71, although one transfer out was pending and one resignation was pending.

(2) By letter dated 8/16/71 Linda Marie Blum, Clerk-Stenographer, GS-4, was transferred to Phoenix Office. Carol A. Maslow has resigned effective close of business 8/27/71. Letter acknowledging this was dated 8/2/71.

(3) Kendall Wayne Shull, Clerk, GS-4, was assigned to Section 7/22/71 for training purposes pending clerical opening within Division to which he would be permanently assigned.

(4) The additional work involved in the handling of McLek and related specials has to date required the assignment of nine Agents. There has been additional clerical work involved which to date has been handled by clerks regularly assigned to the Nationality Unit plus the clerical assistance rendered by Kendall Wayne Shull from 7/22/71 to 8/17/71 and by Wayne T. Smith who, for training purposes, was assigned to this Section from 7/7 to 8/3/71. If reorganization results in setting up a special unit to handle McLek and related matters, we would require a GS-5 Secretary (Stenography) for the Unit Chief and a minimum of three clerical employees, one to handle lead cards, one to handle dissemination and the third to handle indices searches, file requests and related matters. We would endeavor to fill two of the three clerical positions from clerical complement presently in the Section by diverting one clerk from the present Nationality Unit and one clerk from the Middle and South American Unit. We would request that the clerical position which has existed since 7/7/71 for training purposes be made permanent by an increase in the clerical complement. This would result in adding to the over-all Section complement one Secretary (Stenography), GS-5, and one Clerk, GS-4.

(5) The principal manpower savings effected since last inspection was brought about through a voluntary reduction of over-all case load within the Section to preclude the necessity for requesting an additional Agent for assignment to the 13 operational desks within the Section (those existing in all units except the Front Office, the Special Coordination Unit, and the Division Stenographic Pool Unit). The case load reduction was effected by streamlining

281

procedures regarding the handling of cases relating to deserting Chinese seamen (a reduction of approximately 160 cases) and restricting the opening of investigations of the Jewish Defense League to high-level national leaders (which resulted in a reduction of approximately 70 cases). Memoranda captioned "Case Load Reduction, Nationalities Intelligence Section," dated 4/15 and 5/5/71 attached.

(6) Our regular Agent complement is 20 and we have seven men on loan from other sections. Of these 27 men, nine are presently assigned to McLek and related specials, six from the regular Agent complement from this Section and three of the loan Agents. The assignment of the manpower from this Section has resulted in the temporary reduction of the complements of the Nationality Unit and the Chinese Unit by one Agent each. While it is felt we can continue running these two units on a temporary basis in the immediate future with one less man assigned to each, we will not be able to expand efforts in the Chinese communist field which, at this time, is considered critical. To do this, the Chinese Unit should be built to an Agent complement of five. This would permit us to handle the current work in the unit and expand into areas which are considered necessary at this time and which are outlined in detail in the attached write-up dated 8/18/71 and captioned "Chinese Matters."

By memorandum dated 8/12/71 one additional Agent Supervisor was requested for assignment to the Foreign Liaison Desk. A copy of this memorandum is attached, together with a copy of a cover memorandum dated 8/16/71 from Assistant Director Brennan to Mr. Sullivan captioned "Adequacy of Personnel, Domestic Intelligence Division (DID)."

(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts, complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and intelligence requirements, personnel capabilities, and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.

April 15, 1971

CASE LOAD REDUCTION
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

We intend to reduce our current case load from 4197 to 3739, a reduction of 458 active cases and a reduction in the average case load for the 13 Agents handling case supervision from 322 to 287.

This reduction is in part contingent upon re-establishing the moratorium on SI cases and would be effected as follows:

Middle and South American Unit - By re-establishing the moratorium on SI cases, 30 pending cases would be closed. This Unit has a current case load of 976 active cases and reduction will result in a net case load of 946.

Chinese Unit - The recently approved streamlining procedures will result in approximately 30 days' time in the closing of 160 cases on deserting seamen. This Unit has 1028 current active cases and with reduction will have a net of 868 active cases.

Nationality Unit - We intend to restrict the investigation of the Jewish Defense League to the high-level national leaders which will result in reduction of 143 active cases. Unit has current case load of 917 active cases and with reduction referred to above will have an active case load of 774.

Cuban Unit - Upon re-establishment of moratorium on SI cases the case load in this Unit would be reduced by 125 pending active investigations. The current case load of 1276 will be reduced to 1151.

In addition, re-establishment of the moratorium will result in eliminating approximately 600 SI cases which are presently carried in an inactive status.

The reduction in the Chinese Unit will be accomplished within a 30-day period. The reduction of SI cases upon re-establishment of the moratorium and the remaining reduction will be effected upon your concurrence.

283

May 5, 1971

CASE LOAD REDUCTIONS

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

Pursuant to your request for observations concerning our comments in attached 4-15-71 informal memorandum, following is submitted:

We concur in the re-establishment of the moratorium on SI cases which will result in some 150 pending active investigations being discontinued.

We have previously noted that instructions have been outstanding for some time which will result in streamlining procedures in handling cases on deserting Chinese seamen. During April, (34) such cases have been closed, and it is anticipated during the month of May about (125) more such cases will be discontinued in the normal course of events.

The step which we have discussed in much detail relates to changing criteria for opening cases on individuals connected with the Jewish Defense League (JDL). The violent nature of many such individuals was the basis for our instructing several months ago that each member who has actively participated in and supported the demonstrations, acts of violence, etc. of the group be made subject of an individual investigation. This amounted to about 80 individual cases on some 8000 alleged members of the JDL at that time. The membership has increased tremendously during the interim and if we continue under this criteria, we estimate within the next year anywhere from 600 to 1000 additional cases would have to be opened.

Despite the fact we feel we will be taking a risk in not pinpointing someone who later turns out to be violence-prone activist, we suggest that at this time we revert to opening cases on (1) each JDL organization or subsidiary organization; (2) individuals serving in a leadership capacity of such organizations; and (3) other persons connected with the JDL who by past actions have shown propensity for violence or connection with activities involving violence or terrorism. This will result in our dropping from (70-80) cases in the immediate future.

August 18, 1971

CHINESE MATTERS

On the security and intelligence scene, Communist China has emerged as one of the most important countries handled in this Section. This fact was dramatically emphasized by President Nixon's July 15, 1971, announcement that he will visit Red China before May, 1972. Available information, including an announcement by Secretary of State Rogers, indicates that Red China's entry into the United Nations is imminent and will probably be an accomplished fact within the next 14 months. For the purpose of securing more and better intelligence on Red China and Red Chinese sympathizers; to develop more sources who can provide needed information; and to have a reservoir of sources we may utilize in intelligence operations against the Chinese communists (Chicoms), it is felt the following investigative areas should be activated and/or expanded:

1. Chinese Universities and Graduate Schools Index - The above Index consists of cards on more than 600 individuals who have been interviewed under our Chinese Alien Program and who have attended institutions of higher learning in Red China. It is felt that these individuals, because of their educational background, would be the types we should approach in order to determine their potential for use in operations against the Chicoms. This would require opening cases on each individual, reviewing Bureau file in each case, and thereafter setting out leads and instructions to the field in order to initiate the type of inquiry felt necessary in each case. The objective of this effort would be to identify those individuals whose activities we can direct against either the existing Chicom establishment in Canada or against Chicom establishments which are expected to be opened in this country in the near future.

2. Implementation of a program in which we would select four or more Special Agents for indoctrination and training, looking toward their utilization in an undercover capacity against the existing Chicom official establishment in Canada or against any Chicom establishment which may be located in the United States in the future.

285

3. Implementation of an effort in selected offices whereby individuals, present sources included, could be developed for the purpose of establishing a walk-in program directed against the Chicom Embassy in Ottawa. Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) representatives advised, during a July, 1971, conference, they would cooperate fully in an effort of this type.

4. Consideration should be given to renewing the Chiclet and Chiprop Programs, both of which were discontinued in 1965. These programs provided us with a secure means to obtain communications between the United States and Red China and, from these communications, we secured valuable intelligence and background information on both ethnic Chinese and Caucasians of security interest to us.

5. In connection with travel of U. S. citizens to Red China, it should be noted that all prior restrictions on such travel imposed by the U. S. Government have been lifted. The result of this action is that U. S. citizens who desire to travel to Red China no longer need to accomplish such travel clandestinely. The door is now open, and we may expect, in the near future, a substantial increase in such travel by U. S. citizens. It is felt we should fully identify each U. S. citizen traveling to Red China and in selected cases should conduct appropriate interviews, since our experience in the security field historically indicates that U. S. visitors to communist countries are frequently approached by the intelligence services of those countries for recruitment. This problem may be further magnified if and when permanent resident aliens are authorized to travel from the U. S. to Red China. Such a proposal is now under consideration by the Attorney General and the Department of State and favorable consideration could result in travel to Red China of many thousands of ethnic Chinese who have permanent resident status in the U. S. and who would desire to travel to Red China to visit families living there. In these cases, a clear hostage situation exists and such situations are often exploited by hostile intelligence services.

6. Immigration laws relating to Chinese aliens entering the U. S. have been broadened substantially and in early 1971, the Conditional Entry Program was begun. This program permits entry into the U. S. of up to 250 Chinese aliens per month, who were heretofore ineligible under our immigration laws. These aliens, in most cases, have families

286

residing on the China mainland, thereby creating a hostage situation which could be used as a lever by the Chicoms to gain cooperation.

It is felt desirable at this time to revamp our instructions regarding reinterviews of Chinese aliens in cases where a hostage situation exists. At the present time, our policy is to reinterview a Chinese alien two years after the initial interview. It is felt that these instructions should be modified to require that a second interview of a Chinese alien having members of his immediate family in Red China should occur one year after the initial interview.

7. We should expand our present source development program at the United Nations, looking toward development of individuals connected with the United Nations who would be willing, under Bureau direction, to initiate contact with Chicom official representatives in Canada. Based on information provided by RCMP, contacts of this type, even if no recruitment by the Chicoms is obvious, would serve to form a reservoir of individuals the Chicoms might well contact and/or operate upon their entry into the United Nations.

8. Our Chinese Scientists Program now involves five field offices, each of which is doing background inquiries on ten ethnic Chinese scientists who have security clearances. The purpose of this program is to select appropriate individuals from the above group of 50 to target against the Chicoms. We have a list of over 3500 ethnic Chinese who fit the criteria we are now using regarding the 50 individuals now under investigation. It is felt that continued development of good sources to direct against the Chicoms warrants expansion of this program, looking toward possible contact with almost all of the 3500 scientists on the above lists. The individuals on this list, being ethnic Chinese and being employed in the scientific and technical fields, would be most attractive to the Chicoms for intelligence purposes.

9. National Security Agency representatives are of the opinion that the possibility exists that Chinese Intelligence Service is beaming broadcasts to agents in the United States or in border countries (Canada or Mexico). Our San Diego Office recently monitored broadcasts felt by National Security Agency to have come from China, and the clarity of the signal on our West Coast was excellent. While this does not prove that an

illegal Chicom operation exists on our West Coast, it is an indication that we should undertake action designed to uncover such a possibility. In the absence of more specific data, we should consider at this time checking warranty cards submitted by purchasers of certain radio equipment, primarily radio receivers, which are capable of tuning in on broadcasts such as those mentioned above. This would involve identification of the equipment, its manufacturer, and subsequent instructions to appropriate field offices to check warranty cards on a regular basis for the purpose of determining names of ethnic Chinese who have submitted such cards. Subsequent inquiry should include developing background on the purchaser and, in cases where Bureau interests may be served, perhaps conducting interviews.

288

Mr. W. C. Sullivan August 10, 1971

C. D. Brennan

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)

Re attached memorandum Wannall to Brennan 8/12/71 requesting one additional supervisor be approved from outside DID for the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) because of a heavy increase in work volume.

I agree expansion of our Legat offices has produced work increase which would justify additional supervisor on FLD. However, in regard to Wannall's recommendation concurred in by the Branch Chief, Inspector D. E. Moore, that it should come from outside DID, I am mindful of the Inspection Division's survey of work in DID during week of 7/19/71 following request for additional supervisor in Espionage Section. The Inspector concluded that the present supervisory capabilities of DID are adequate to handle existing work.

The Inspection Division's analysis of work in DID as of 7/1/71 compared with last inspection in January, 1971, revealed a stability of overall responsibilities from a case load standpoint shown by the fact average case load per supervisor in January was 325 and in July 330. Wannall's average case load in January per supervisor was 278 and in July 294—an average rise of only 5 cases in the Division and of only 16 cases in Wannall's section in six months. (206 cases)

Ordinarily, I would point out to both Inspector Moore and Wannall these factors mitigate against requesting additional supervisors from outside DID. Inspector Moore had access to these facts and should have explained to Wannall the need to follow traditional patterns in requesting an additional man, i.e., adjusting within the Division's overall manpower and work load framework of capabilities and responsibilities. The obvious answer is for Wannall to reassign a man from within his section to the FLD. This would (1) alleviate the work load there and, (2) bring his case load closer to the Division's supervisory average per man. At the end of 90 days he could then reassess his situation and consider any action the facts then warrant.

However, the significance placed on our recent Legat expansion may be an overriding factor to the Inspection Division or Mr. Felt who

Enclosure
CDB:lml (9)
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. [illegible]
1 - C.D. Brennan

289

may feel the facts presented by Wannall are such to outweigh all other considerations. I feel it would be well for Mr. Felt to consider this request in conjunction with the manpower adjustment survey he is to initiate and I will be guided accordingly.

I have initiated some new guidelines for determining Division manpower assignments and case loads. I believe these will provide a still better basis for DID to insure its manpower is being most effectively used on priority matters. Mr. Felt may desire to use these guidelines immediately as a measure for his study.

RECOMMENDATION:

That Mr. Felt consider the request of Wannall for a supervisor from outside DID in conjunction with his study.

Any additional personnel
for Wannall's Section must
come from within the D.I.D.
H

296

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Ponder

Mr. C. D. Brennan

8/12/71

1 - Mr. Brennan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Day

W. R. Wannall

FOREIGN LIAISON DESK (FLD)
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION (DID)
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL

Fully mindful of the urgent matters requiring additional personnel in the DID (East Coast Conspiracy) and particularly the Nationalities Intelligence Section (Ellsberg and other leak cases), we must ask for help in the supervision of our foreign offices. While our Legat operations are not in the public eye, they do constitute an important area of our work which must not be overlooked in view of the evaluation being placed upon them by the White House.

In January, 1971, during the inspection of this Division, we pointed out that the expansion of our foreign liaison offices from 11 to 17 had come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors had been barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and analyze it in order to afford constructive supervision to the foreign offices. We noted the heavy demands made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who are valuable and cooperative contacts of our Legats and the 62% increase over the past ten years in the Foreign Police Cooperation cases being handled. We pointed out that the Supervisors should be preparing memoranda to keep the Director fully apprised of the work being done by our Agents abroad but just did not have time to do this. As a result of the inspection, memorandum 2/1/71 from Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson secured approval for addition of one man for assignment to the FLD. He reported 2/22/71. Contemporaneously, it became necessary to assign one Agent Supervisor on a rotating basis to the New Left Section on a temporary basis to assist in the East Coast Conspiracy case. An Agent from the FLD was selected for this temporary assignment, effective 4/26/71, which assignment was made permanent when all temporary assignments were converted to permanent assignments, effective 5/21/71. In effect, therefore, the additional man was available on the FLD only during the two months from 2/22 to 4/26/71.

GAD:dgo
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

291

In the meantime, between December, 1970, when the new foreign offices were opened and July, 1971, the latest month for which figures are available, there has been a nearly 60% increase in the amount of paper being produced by our foreign offices and requiring review on the FLD. We are most reluctant to ask for help at a time when the Bureau's resources are strained on so many fronts but we would be derelict in our duty if we did not point out that the situation which the Inspectors in January felt justified additional assistance has since become even worse. What we badly need is a man with a background of experience abroad plus a language ability who would be able to take hold immediately without extensive training. As an example, we can think of Special Agent John Morris, now in the domestic field, who was forced to ask to be returned to the U. S. due to his wife's condition following the death of their first-born child. There are undoubtedly others of equal capability and potential.

Many foreign officials who visit Washington do not speak English or are not fluent in it. We now have a Supervisor fluent in Spanish and the addition of a French or German capability would greatly reduce our need for interpreters from the Washington Field Office and elsewhere in the Bureau. The Division presently has one Supervisor with French and none with German. There are others with such languages as Spanish, Japanese, Chinese, Polish, and the like. If no one with experience in foreign liaison can be made available, one of these language trained men could be used provided a replacement from outside the Division is furnished. There is no way in which help can be provided within the Division without a replacement. We have eliminated and streamlined programs and we are now assigning Supervisors on a rotation basis to assist on the leak cases, leaving their permanent assignments sometimes for weeks at a time.

RECOMMENDATION:

That an additional Supervisor be approved for assignment to the FLD, to come from outside the Division, increasing the Division Agent complement by one.

292

① - Mr. Day

Retyped page 3 of memo W. R. Wannall to [illegible]. C. D. Brennan
dated 8/12/71 re: same subject

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan
RE: FOREIGN LIAISON DESK (FLD)
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL PERSONNEL

ADDENDUM: BY D. E. MOORE DEM:aeb 8/14/71

Pursuant to your request, this is to advise that there are two supervisors in the Domestic Intelligence Division with Legal Attache experience, Robert A. Bermingham, who is now assigned to the FLD, and Jessie R. Nagy. Nagy was assigned to this desk but is now assigned to the Ellsberg Special. Both Bermingham and Nagy speak Spanish.

There are 20 other supervisors in the division with language ability. None speak German and only one, John M. Ouellette, speaks French. The language ability of the others are in Russian, Japanese, Italian, Romanian, Polish, Bulgarian, Albanian, Portuguese, Hungarian, Yiddish and Chinese.

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 9/3/71)

During the course of instant inspection an in-depth survey was made relative to the adequacy of personnel, both Agent and clerical, within the DID. The primary purpose of this survey was to determine the best possible allocation of manpower bearing in mind the desirability to reallocate manpower to top priority assignments.

ADEQUACY OF AGENT PERSONNEL

Set forth below is a chart graphically illustrating where it is felt reductions can be made in Agent complement:

Internal Security and Research Branch

- Internal Security Section
  - Subversive Individuals Unit - 1
  - Security Informant Unit - 2
  - Klan and White Hate Groups Unit - 2

- Research Section - 1

- New Left Section
  - Subversive Individuals Unit - 1

Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch

- Extremist Intelligence Section - 2

- Nationalities Intelligence Section
  - Middle and South American Unit - 1
  - Nationality Unit - 1

TOTAL ---- 11

Comments and observations justifying the above-mentioned reductions in force can be found below under the individual Section and Unit captions.

294

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

Subversive Individuals Unit

This Unit has an Agent complement of 5. At the time of the last inspection it was a 3-man Unit; however, one was assigned on a special in another Unit, leaving actually two Agents to handle approximately 1300 cases, or 650 per man. Since the last inspection the case load has increased to approximately 2600. Consequently, it would appear that 4 men averaging 650 cases per man could handle the work of this Unit. This position is further strengthened as it can be anticipated that the case load will decrease since the deadline of lifting the moratorium expired 6/30/71 and the bulk of investigations have been brought up to date or will be brought up to date in the near future. By memorandum dated 8/26/71 it was recommended that SA John N. Ouellette be returned to the Internal Security Section due to the slackening of activity in the EASTCON case. Ouellette was formerly assigned to this Unit and the reduction could be accomplished by reassignment of him (or another Agent) to more pressing duties elsewhere.

Security Informant Unit

This Unit presently has 4 supervisors assigned; however, one has been on temporary assignment outside the Unit since June , 1971. The case load as of 8/71 for this Unit was 869 and would result in about 217 cases per Agent in a 4-man Unit, and 290 cases per Agent in a 3-man Unit. Further, you have indicated one of the factors affecting the productivity of the Unit is the necessity of obtaining authority by memorandum for the utilization of students and/or teachers as security informants. It was determined that 122 memos have been prepared since the last inspection requesting such approval. This is approximate 1 memo per workday, which does not appear to be an excessive work load. Since this Unit was formed it has functioned with 3 Special Agent Supervisors. This does not appear to have effected the efficiency of the operation and in view of the work and case load it is felt that the Unit could function quite satisfactorily with 2 Special Agent Supervisors.

Klan and White Hate Groups Unit

Under the reorganization of DID proposed by Assistant Director Brennan in his memorandum of 8/3/71 it was indicated this Unit's cases could be absorbed by the Extremist Intelligence Section. This would free two Special Agents for other assignment. It is felt this could be accomplished even if the proposed reorganization does not become an actuality.

RESEARCH SECTION

It is noted under the proposed reorganization of 8/3/71 a supervisor from this Section would be reallocated to another. It is felt this could be accomplished regardless of the reorganization. It is noted in this regard that this Section is presently operating efficiently with an Agent supervisor assigned to the Ellsberg case. Addressing ourselves to the lack of a Section Chief, it is felt your recommendations regarding filling Mr. Cotter's vacated position should be handled by separate memorandum. The replacement request for SA Marion S. Ramey's transferral to another Division is being handled separately.

NEW LEFT SECTION

Subversive Individuals Unit

This Unit has an authorized complement of 6 Agents but is presently adequately handling the work with 5, one being assigned full time to a special. Even though the case load is high, approximately 2500, leaving 500 cases per man, many of the matters are quite routine and can be handled with bare minimum of supervision. Because of this, Agents assigned to this Unit are able to handle a large number of cases and it is felt that the Agent presently assigned to the special should not be returned.

ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL BRANCH

Extremist Intelligence Section

During the last inspection you requested two more supervisors due to the fact that your case load had increased to a total of 6642, breaking down to 349 cases per supervisor. Your request was authorized. During May, 1971, one supervisor was permanently transferred from your Section leaving you a complement of 20 supervisors plus Section Chief and Number One Man (total 22). No replacement has been requested for this supervisor. Since 7/19/71 you have had one man on loan to the Nationalities Intelligence Section on a rotating basis and as of 8/9/71 a second man on loan. There has been a definite decrease in your case load since the last inspection. However, a slight increase would be anticipated due to the absorbing of the Klan and White Hate Groups matters. For the last 6 weeks you have been without the services of 1 supervisor on a rotating basis and for the last 3 weeks a second one. However, the Unit has still operated efficiently. As there is an imbalance as to cases and the number of men assigned it is felt that 2 supervisors could be transferred out of the Section leaving 20 (including Section Chief and Number One Man) to handle the necessary assignments (including Klan and White Hate).

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit

As of the close of business 8/20/71 the 3-man Cuban Unit had a case load of 776 and the Middle and South American Unit, also consisting of 3 men, had 598 cases. These two Units, the work of which is closely related and frequently overlaps, had a total case load of 1374 for 6 men for an average case load of 229. If the total case load of these two Units were handled by 5 men the average load would be 275, which appears more equitable in view of the overall commitments and work load of the Division. In view of the above, it is felt that the personnel of the Middle and South American Unit could be cut by one man. With 5 incumbents and with the inter-relation and natural overlapping of these two Units future fluctuation in the work load could be equitably handled between the two Units.

Nationality Unit

Under normal conditions it is believed that this 4-man Unit could be operated by 3 Supervisors. At present, there are 3 supervisors assigned this Unit's cases (exclusive of special) and the case load as of 8/20/71 was 632 cases which represents 158 cases per Agent for a 4-man Unit, or 211 per Agent for a 3-man Unit. Consequently it is felt that 3 supervisors could adequately handle the work of this Unit.

As can be seen, a pool of 11 men has been created. Treating those assigned on special to the Ellsberg case (9) as a separate entity, 2 men are available for general assignment. One man could be assigned to the Chinese Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section and the one supervisor from the Foreign Influence and Pro-CHICOM Unit of the Internal Security Section along with his cases (492). (Note this Agent is not included in the 11.) What is left of the Foreign Influence Unit could be consolidated with that of the CPUSA Unit. The other supervisor from the pool of 11 could be assigned to the Special Coordination Unit of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

This realignment would result in a considerable decline in personnel within the Internal Security Section. However, a balancing of work load could be accomplished through reassignment of the three-man Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit from the New Left Section to the Internal Security Section where it was in the recent past. Further, as you are aware, a proposal is presently being considered to reassign Antiriot Laws plus Explosives and Incendiary Devices cases from the General Investigative Division to the Domestic Intelligence

297

Division. While it is realized that logically these should be placed in the New Left or Extremist Intelligence Section, to balance work load, they could be considered for assignment to the Internal Security Section if proposal is approved. The Research and New Left Sections would each be decreased by one Special Agent Supervisor, the Extremist Intelligence Section by two. The Nationalities Intelligence Section, excluding the Front Office, would be increased by one Special Agent Supervisor.

OBSERVATIONS:

Considerable time has been devoted to this phase of the inspection to assess as accurately as possible manpower requirements of the various Units and Sections. In addition to ticklers and file reviews your outgoing mail was reviewed for one work week.

During the course of this mail survey covering a five-day work period, 715 pieces of mail or 143 pieces 1 day were generated and reviewed. Of this number, 268 pieces or 37% were directed to the Front Office for review and 497 pieces or 63% went directly to the field or other agencies without Front Office review. This indicates an average of 6 pieces of outgoing mail per Agent are being prepared per work week. 55.6% of the total pieces of mail were of a routine nature, setting forth a minimum degree of supervision and direction. 36.1% contained a moderate degree of supervision and 8.3% contained a considerable degree of supervisory instruction or direction.

Of the average of six pieces of mail per Agent 3.3 pieces were of a routine nature requiring minimal supervision ; 2.2 pieces moderate supervision and .5 pieces (1/2 letter, etc.) considerable supervisory instruction or direction per week.

Examples of minimum supervisory content would be communications permitting routine interview or informant payment (stamp). An example of moderate supervisory content would be a letter to the Attorney General with cover memo bringing AG up to date in a particular case. As example of supervisory content of considerable degree would be instructions to interview key witnesses on top priority cases setting out pertinent points to cover in the interview or would furnish supervisory direction of a substantive investigation.

It is realized the above survey reveals only a small part of the Division's production; however, it gives some insight into the amount of actual supervision and direction being afforded the field as an overall consideration. It is not felt or implied that a "letter writing" program for the sake of writing letters be instituted as obviously this does not relate to supervision. It may indicate, however, among other things, the amount of intensity of positive supervision being afforded, as an over view and is being furnished for your information as well as for mine.

The above analysis (manpower) reveals in your Division a need for 9 men on the McLek case, 2 for Chinese matters and one for Special Coordination Unit. On a priority basis, inspection surveys reveal the manpower is available as indicated. It is felt your Chinese program must "get going now" in view of impending developments.

In addition, our proposals will allow you to assign men permanently to McLek and make other necessary shifts in manpower to get away from the temporary assignment basis you now have and which is disruptive to all Sections involved. It is also acknowledged some of the realignment indicated has been proposed by your Division in studies made by you prior to this inspection.

299

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
CLERICAL

An analysis was also made of adequacy of clerical personnel within your Division and after careful study it was determined that a reduction of 11 clerical personnel is possible. This reduction could be made through attrition. The reductions possible are graphically set forth in the chart below:

Internal Security and Research Branch

Internal Security Section
- Klan and White Hate Groups - 3

New Left Section
- Special Investigations - East - 1
- Special Investigations - West - 1
- Subversive Individuals - New Left - 1

Espionage and Racial Intelligence Branch

Espionage Section
- Special Cases - 1
- Officials - New York - 1
- Officials - WFO - 1
- Satellite - 1

Nationalities Intelligence Section
- Middle and South American - 1

Our findings in most instances are based on a thorough review of the work of the individual units plus case load allocations. The justification for the above-mentioned reductions is set forth below under the individual Unit and Section designation:

INTERNAL SECURITY AND RESEARCH BRANCH

Internal Security Section

Klan and White Hate Groups

Pursuant to the above proposal that this Unit be absorbed by the Extremist Intelligence Section the two clerks and one secretary can be considered excess inasmuch as the work presently being performed by these persons can adequately be performed by the clerical personnel in the new Section.

300

New Left Section

Special Investigations Unit - East

The surplus clerk presently working in this Unit is not needed inasmuch as the four clerks permanently assigned to this Unit were adequately handling the work before he reported.

Special Investigations Unit - West

It is felt three clerks could handle the work in this Unit inasmuch as three clerks in Special Investigations Unit - East handle a comparative work load. The East Unit has four clerks; however, one clerk handles Sabotage cases and the West Unit does not handle these matters.

Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit

Although the case load in this Unit is high the work is routine and can be handled quickly. The Special Clerk (GS-6 Reviewer) handles much of the reviewing of communications thus saving clerical time. This Unit is operating with one less Agent who is on loan to the McLek case. Due to a comparison of the clerical work load of the Subversive Individuals Unit in the Internal Security Section it is felt this Unit could operate with one less clerk.

ESPIONAGE AND RACIAL INTELLIGENCE BRANCH

Espionage Section

Special Cases Unit

It is felt based upon the case load of this Unit being handled by clerks, that with the assistance of the stenographer, this Unit could adequately operate and function with one less clerical employee.

Officials - New York Unit

It is felt the clerk-stenographer assigned to this Unit could handle the IRONCLAD indices in addition to taking dictation from supervisors. This would leave the Unit with 2 stenographers for 3 supervisors and thereby release the clerk who is presently handling the IRONCLAD indices.

Officials - WFO Unit

Based on the case load of this Unit, it is felt the clerk-stenographer presently assigned could assist in clerical work, thereby releasing one of the clerks presently assigned to this Unit.

Satellite Unit

This Unit presently has three regular clerks and two Special Clerks. It is felt that one of the Special Clerks could assist in the regular clerical duties, thereby releasing one clerk from this Unit.

Nationalities Intelligence Section

Middle and South American Unit

Based on the case load of this Unit it is recommended that one clerk be released inasmuch as there does not appear to be sufficient work for three clerks.

Comments of Assistant Director regarding Agent and clerical adequacy requested.

ADDENDUM
ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN:
(CDB:djr 9/8/71)

I have thoroughly studied the Inspector's comments regarding adequacy of personnel, both Agent and clerical, and have the following observations to make:

I certainly recognize full well the need for reorganizing and reallocating personnel to provide manpower assistance to the Nationalities Intelligence Section which is handling the McLek case. In fact, the proposed reorganization of the Division as set forth in my memorandum of August 3, 1971, was based on the priority needs which arose from the McLek case and which continue to be critical. As set forth in that memorandum, manpower was to permanently be assigned to the Nationalities Intelligence Section in order to avoid disruption caused by handling this important case with temporary assignments.

In meeting the priority responsibilities in the McLek case as well as in other critical areas, I am also mindful that we do not have a surplus of manpower but are undoubtedly faced with the supervision of more complex cases in the security field with fewer Agents than at any other time in the Bureau's history. Crises brought about by terroristic acts of black extremists, Weathermen, antiwar activists, and other extremists are increasing in intensity and from all indications will continue to place heavy demands upon the Bureau. Likewise, the potential of Chinese Communist espionage activity in this country is readily apparent and the increased activity of Soviet Agents is a fact. These facts, coupled with special case commitments, have stretched available manpower to the limit of elasticity.

In making such manpower shifts, we must recognize that there will be a weakening of the supervision of the area from which the personnel are transferred and we must be prepared to accept this, at least on a temporary basis, because in the long run such weakening could be most harmful as well as embarrassing.

For example, the Inspector has indicated that two supervisors could be transferred out of the Extremist Intelligence Section and, in addition, that Section should absorb all Klan and white hate cases (now being handled by two men in another Section). Actually, this means absorption of the work of four men by the remaining men in the Section (18). Put another way, the work load has been increased by almost 25 per cent.

As will be noted in the table set out hereinafter, case loads are excessive in very sensitive areas of the Bureau's responsibilities, e.g., Soviet espionage and black and New Left extremists who are daily escalating their revolutionary activity in our streets.

The utilization of manpower on specials, such as the current nine men on McLek, will receive extremely close scrutiny and will be reallocated to these other pressing work areas as soon as possible as I do not believe the current case loads allow adequate supervision for any extended period of time.

No one realizes the potential threat which the Red Chinese pose to the security of this country better than I. We must recognize, however, that there has been considerable planning on the Bureau's part dating back to the 1950s when we had first indications that the United States might recognize Red China. But the fact is that we have more important priorities at this particular time evidenced by bombings, assassinations, arsons and other terroristic acts daily occurring by extremist elements within our investigative responsibilities. We are faced right now with a very serious internal security threat which demands immediate attention. This does not minimize the Red Chinese threat at all but we must recognize it is still a "potential" and until diplomatic channels are opened and active espionage activity begins again we must put "first things first." I believe affording one man to that work area is the limit of our available resources at this time.

With respect to the clerical reduction of 11 clerks, which is to occur by attrition, I feel that a reduction of this magnitude will definitely result in a hardship on the work of the Division. I have repeatedly stressed that wherever possible Agents should be relieved of as many duties as possible by competent clerical personnel, thus resulting in considerable savings of Agent manpower throughout the Division. A reduction of the number of clerks, as recommended by the Inspector, certainly will hamper our past streamlining efforts.

Set forth below, by Branch, are more specific observations with respect to the Inspector's comments and recommendations; however, in summary, I desire to point out that we cannot reassign manpower of the quantity involved for an extended period of time and eliminate entirely by attrition 11 clerks without such action having a deleterious effect in certain areas of our operations. I am strongly opposed to such lessening of our coverage in these areas but if such recommendations are approved and ordered, I will do my best to see that our responsibilities are fulfilled to the maximum degree possible under the circumstances.

The following comments are made concerning reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding the Internal Security and Research Branch. The Inspector recommends seven supervisors be reallocated from this Branch to other work areas. Based on day-to-day experience in these work areas and having available end of August case count figures, the following alternatives are recommended to make seven supervisors available.

Research Section: The present supervisor assigned to the Ellsberg case is a talented writer experienced in complicated research projects and preparation of research papers. He is utilized full time on the Ellsberg case in this capacity and on his own time continues to handle some speeches and research matters. Research Section will make a second supervisor available for the Ellsberg case and the original supervisor will return to Research Section as soon as his project is completed on Ellsberg. This is predicated on the assumption a replacement will be provided this Section for SA Ramey who was transferred to another Division.

Internal Security Section: Will make four supervisors available instead of five as recommended by the Inspector.

This is predicated on experience and present case load regarding the Subversive Individuals Unit primarily and also the Security Informant Unit. August 31, 1971, case count for the Subversive Individuals Unit is 2,663 cases, in addition, 523 cases were opened and 496 cases were closed during August in this Unit. This would be an average case load of 666 cases per Agent, not including the opening and closing mail flow.

305

The Security Informant Unit would be handling 904 cases, averaging 452 cases when reduced to two supervisors. Under the new case count system, these informant cases are largely cases with mail in hand requiring attention and close supervision because of funds being involved as well as the general sensitivity of these cases. In the event of sick or annual leave, one man could not possibly keep mail current and work loads in other units would, as a practical matter, preclude use of other personnel to carry out the work. The supervisor retained would reduce the case load in the Subversive Individuals Unit to a more reasonable and practical 533 case load average and also allow for a limited degree of flexibility in the informant matters from time to time as necessary. This provides the seven men from this Branch. (This includes one man from the New Left Section, as indicated.)

New Left Section: Will make one man available as recommended.

Regarding reallocation of Agent personnel to top priorities regarding the Espionage Branch, the following comments are made:

Extremist Intelligence Section will make two supervisors available and absorb the 559 Klan and White Hate cases with no Agent personnel. It must be borne in mind this, in effect, constitutes a net reduction of four supervisors to black extremist matters at a time when these activities are on a definite upswing. This can be lived with on a short term emergency basis and as manpower becomes available from the inevitable winddown of McLek, appropriate recommendations will be considered within the Division as to reallocation of that manpower with this in mind consistent with overall Division needs at that time.

Nationalities Intelligence Section will make two men available as recommended. With regard to the two Units being reduced, it is pointed out that the Middle and South American Unit is responsible for matters

306

relating to 32 countries. There are five Legal Attache (Legat) Offices located in countries handled by the Unit and each of these offices, except Mexico, covers more than one country. The Nationality Unit is responsible for matters relating to 101 countries. Eleven Legat Offices are locatedin the area of responsibility of this Unit and most of these Legat Offices cover more than one country.

There is a high volume of material which is received daily in these Units consisting of intelligence information from other agencies and news media material. All of this material must be reviewed in order that the supervisors will be in position not only to handle inquiries from any source relating to matters of Bureau responsibility in the nationalities intelligence field but also to process the high level intelligence (HILEV) items which are received from Legats. The latter is a very heavy responsibility since we recognize that if one high-level item goes to the President and he acts on it, and it proves to be incorrect, not only the Bureau but the White House itself might encounter serious problems. During month of August, of 106 HILEV items received from Legats, 51 were processed by the Nationality Unit and 34 by the Middle and South American Unit. Each of the two units disseminated 30 HILEV items. Dissemination of each HILEV item consumes approximately one hour of a supervisor's time.

With regard to the Nationality Unit, which has the lowest average case load per supervisor, other matters handled in the Unit not reflected by caseload are: providing for installation and maintenance of continued coverage in sensitive areas essential to the fulfillment of requests of the National Security Agency (Telex Coverage, 64 at present); establishing and maintaining highly sensitive coverage also for National Security Agency relating to electronic penetration of communications equipment; supervising and coordinating on a recurring basis coverage relating to the various United Nations General Assembly sessions (which includes close working relationship with Secret Service); maintenance of all Bureau liaison with National Security Agency.

It must be borne in mind the reduction of four case supervisors from the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence Branch and seven case supervisors from the Internal Security and

Research Branch are accepted to meet an emergency situation (McLek case) but these reductions are not considered consistent with adequate supervision nor offer necessary flexibility within Sections to meet emergencies and specials as they arise when viewed in terms of an extended period of time. It is expected the McLek case, as with all specials, will ultimately wind down. At that time and as personnel are available for reallocation, appropriate recommendations will be made and considered within the Division as to their commitment based on work loads at the time consistent with the overall needs of the Division.

Supervisory Case Load Averages

The following chart graphically displays caseloads per Section (excluding men on special or non-case assignment) as of August 31, 1971, and with the proposed shift of manpower contained herein which closely adheres to the Inspector's recommendations.

			Add or Delete	
	Present	Proposed	SAs	Cases
Nationalities Intelligence	286	315	-1	0
Extremist Intelligence	298	331	0	+559
Espionage	334	312	+1	0
Internal Security	444	477	-2	-559
New Left	333	333	0	0
Research	-	-	-2	0
Division	335	341	-1	

It must be borne in mind the "Add or Delete" column pertains only to supervisors now included in case count computations as being assigned to regular case load duties and does not portray total movement as recommended. Some of those included in the recommendations are already on special assignment (McLek, etc.). For example, Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections will merely make permanent the personnel on loan to McLek and, therefore, are listed as zero. Espionage will get a man back and is listed as +1.

Nationalities Intelligence Section is giving up two men from present assignment, one to the Chinese Unit and one to Special Coordination Unit. The latter is a non-case assignment and deletes one man from computation of average case load in the Section which brings that Section more in line with the present Division average of 335 cases per case supervisor under the new rules for case count. This also results in one less supervisor committed to case supervision and alters the Division average per case supervisor to 341 cases.

It is recognized the Internal Security Section has a high average case load per Agent, however, that Section has less organization cases and proportionately more individual matters requiring less supervisory attention than other Sections. This will be followed closely and depending on approval of transferring EID and ARL cases to this Division and/or resolution of Eastcon and appropriate recommendation will be made to adjust a block of work internally within the Division to create a better balance there.

As to the Espionage and Extremist Intelligence Branch clerical reduction recommendations, the following comments are made.

Nationalities Intelligence will reduce one clerk as recommended.

In the Espionage Section there are 16 substantive desk supervisors with 13 clerks actually performing the work for these supervisors, a ratio of .81 per supervisor. To reduce this number by four would result in the ratio .56 or roughly 1/2 clerk per supervisor.

The Clerk-Stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform clerical work only 20 per cent of her time. The use of a Clerk-Stenographer in the Special Cases, Officials - New York, and Officials - Washington Field Units thus would not absorb the extra work placed on the remaining clerks in these Units and such is not considered feasible. The use of a Special Clerk now handling cases in lieu of a Special Agent supervisor in the Satellite Unit to handle clerical functions for a Supervisor would defeat the purpose of establishing this position and would place an unfair burden of responsibility on that Special Clerk who should be free to concentrate on the supervision of her own cases.

In summary, it is felt that the present clerical assignment is the minimum number necessary to handle the voluminous work associated with 5,575 cases currently assigned to this Section.

The Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the case load of 559 cases but will need a minimum of one clerk to accompany these cases. This Section was not recommended by the Inspector to reduce clerical complement and it is not felt practical to absorb 559 cases and no clerical personnel. This is particularly true when it is considered no Agent personnel are being received with these cases.

I believe the above reductions, totalling three, are in good faith with the Inspection Staff's and my own desire to obtain maximum utilization of personnel and continue an efficient and practical operation. Further reduction would merely result in Agents performing clerical functions, and with the continued escalation in case loads and current special cases being handled, I do not believe further reductions can be made within the bounds of good personnel management and best utilization of clerical vs. Agent manpower.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
CLERICAL

The following comments are made concerning reduction of clerical personnel in the Internal Security and Research Branch.

Internal Security Section: In the past, it has been necessary on a frequent basis to afford considerable clerical assistance from the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to the Subversive Individuals Unit because of the extremely heavy clerical duties involved in the escalating case loads carried in this Unit, coupled with 523 cases opened and 496 cases closed during the past month, for example. It is necessary and warranted to retain two of the three clerical personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization in the Subversive Individuals Unit. If this is not done, it will result in an impractical clerical work load, with nowhere to draw upon clerical help and result in supervisors being additionally burdened with clerical functions, which they can ill afford to handle. This would also be consistent and in line with the assignment of Agent personnel in this Unit detailed previously and allow one clerk per Agent, which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work involved.

New Left Section: It is believed the Special Investigations - East and Special Investigations - West Units can function with one less clerk each as recommended by the Inspector. It is not believed good management, however, to reduce a clerk in the Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. With one supervisor reduced, the clerical work remains the same and retention of the clerk would allow one clerk per Agent, which is adequate but not excessive for the type of work involved. With the very heavy case loads in this Unit, coupled with 768 cases opened and 776 cases closed within the past month, for example, clerks are extremely busy. Reduction in clerical staff merely means Agents will have to perform clerical functions which is uneconomical and hardly practical with the work loads involved.

Bearing in mind Agent manpower reductions in the Internal Security and Research Branch, it is believed the Branch can operate with efficiency and in good faith with the Inspection Staff and Divisions desire to use manpower to its fullest and make the above three clerical reductions.

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:bhg, 9/9/71)

Your comments and proposals with respect to the reallocation of Agent personnel within the Division appear logical and are acceptable. However, exception must be made with respect to clerical employees.

You state it is necessary and warranted to retain 2 of the 3 clerical personnel in the disbanded Klan and White Hate Groups Unit for utilization in the Subversive Individuals Unit of the Internal Security Section. Based upon figures available the case load within the Subversive Individuals Unit approximates 2700 cases handled at present by three clerical employees giving an average case load per clerk of approximately 900 cases. Retaining one of the Klan clerks would result in an average case load per clerk of 675 cases which is not felt unreasonable or intolerable a burden. Further, it is not felt that less than 1 clerk per Agent is too great a load for the Unit.

Turning now to the Espionage Section based on our survey it was felt that 4 clerical positions could be voided through attrition, based primarily on greater utilization of clerk-stenographers on clerical duties. You state that, the clerk-stenographer position provides the incumbent to perform clerical work only 20% of her time. At present there are 10 secretaries and clerk-stenographers available for transcription of communications. A survey of communications conducted during this inspection revealed that the Espionage Section dispatched 121 pieces of correspondence during a 5-day period, which results in approximately 12 communications per secretary or slightly over 2 communications per day per employee. This does not indicate a great work load on the secretarial force and consequently it is felt that clerk-stenographers could be freed for clerical functions where necessary. In view of this it is felt that at least two clerical positions could be dissolved through attrition within this section.

With respect to the Extremist Intelligence Section, you indicate that the case load of 559 cases can be absorbed but a minimum of one clerk will be needed to handle these cases. Based upon case load figures available should this clerk not be made available the average case load per clerk within the Black Nationalist - East Unit would increase from approximately 470 to 660 cases. Black Nationalist - Central from approximately 715 to 940. Black Nationalist - South from approximately 780 to 1000, and the Black Nationalist - West from approximately 210 to 350 cases per clerk. Particular note should be made of the average case load per clerk increase

3/2

within the Black Nationalist - West Unit should the cases be absorbed there with no added clerical employees. In view of the above it is felt that the Racial Intelligence Section can absorb the additional cases without an added clerk.

Based on the above it can be seen that at least 7 clerical positions could be dissolved without an unreasonable burden being placed on the remaining.

SUGGESTION MEMORANDA

SUGGESTION
MEMORANDA

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: PAYMENTS TO SECURITY INFORMANTS
AND CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Present regulations allow for payments up to $400 with SAC authority on a COD basis to individuals being developed as informants on security matters. (Manual of Instructions, Section 107, page 14.) Once the individual is paid $400 and it appears he will furnish information on a regular basis, recommendation could be made to Bureau to pay him on "regular basis." Such authorization is through usage of FD-401. After the initial payments are approved, every 6 months an FD-401 is submitted requesting continuance, and, if approved, is stamped "approved" at the Bureau and returned. (Manual of Instructions, Section 107, page 15.)

In view of current Government-wide economy move and the Bureau's own economy program, it is imperative that the field exercise great care and scrutiny in payments to informants to assure that payments on a "regular basis" are fully justified and are not serving as an administrative crutch and expedient in lieu of payments under SAC authority.

A survey has been made of 80 files of informants who are presently being paid on a regular basis with respect to the date the informant was approved as a PSI, the date approval was given to pay him on a regular basis, and the amount paid the source under SAC authority before Bureau authority was sought to pay him on a regular basis.

In the following 34 informant files authority was granted to pay the source on a regular basis before the field used the full amount that could have been paid under SAC authority, representing 42.5% of the total cases reviewed:

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/3/71
JMM:bhg

3/4

134-6062*
134-6201*
134-4628*
134-10548*
134-20170
134-6316*
134-21561
134-20687
134-20051
134-19815*
134-19383
170-4295
134-20302
134-19115
134-19168
134-20038*
134-21173
134-13545*
134-20126
134-20310
134-20026
134-19732
134-18818
134-20998
134-20997
134-17812
134-19931
170-4092
134-18123*
134-21762
134-21218
170-4355
134-21305
134-21179

Those files marked with an asterisk indicate that only token amounts had been paid under SAC authority ranging from $25 to less than $100.

This analysis would indicate SACs are abdicating authority to approve paying sources the full amount allowed before seeking Bureau permission to pay on a regular basis.

In the following 17 instances the Bureau approved the field's communication seeking approval of an individual as a PSI in which the same communication also asked approval to pay the source on a regular basis:

134-10532
134-8857
134-13507
134-14523
105-188201
134-20302
134-20608
134-12826
170-4355
134-21179
134-20170
134-19228
134-21516
134-19815
134-19383
134-20175
170-4295

In the following 19 cases the Bureau approved sources being paid on a regular basis within 45 days of their being approved as a PSI:

134-6201
134-20445
134-19967
134-20089
170-768
134-17689
134-21762
134-20773
134-17337
134-21584
134-20833
134-20687
134-20051
134-19168
134-17762
134-16923
134-21622
134-18818
134-18059

These 36 cases (17 + 19) represent 45% of those files reviewed and indicate the field's undesirable practice of asking approval to pay sources on a regular basis upon obtaining approval to develop the source as a PSI. It does not appear that contacts with these individuals are over a sufficient period of time to conclude the source is furnishing data on a regular basis to justify paying him on a regular basis.

A representative number of informant files were checked where the full amount under SAC authority was not utilized and it was determined payments were over a 3.3 month period, for an average monthly payment of $73.00 for each source. Subsequent to receiving approval to pay the source on a regular basis each source received an average of $152 over the next 6-month period. It is concluded that if payments had continued for a longer period under SAC authority before paying on a regular basis, an average of approximately $80 less per month would have been expended in each case. On an annual basis this would be $960. Estimating that as few as 33% of the present number of Security Informants including New Left, Old Left (CPUSA), Extremists, Klan and other White Hate Groups have been developed in the past two years of the 1507 total number of Security Informants presently being paid on a regular basis, this could be projected into $240,000 less having been spent each year on these sources.

Consequently, it appears every effort should be expended to insure that payments to informants on a regular basis should be initiated only after the source has furnished data on a continuing basis for at least 6 months and after he has been paid the full amount under SAC authority on a COD basis for value received. There should be no objection to the field's obtaining Bureau authority to pay source up to another $400 SAC authority before paying on a regular basis. Certainly, the request to approve an individual as a PSI should not be coupled in the same communication with a request to pay that individual on a regular basis. (Of course, in exceptional and unusual cases facts could warrant conclusion that some sources could be paid on a regular basis in a shorter period of time.) This will also help to preclude informant's obvious conclusion that he is being paid on a salary basis because of the similar amounts paid to him each month.

In addition, all communications approving the initial payments on a regular basis to security informants should be routed through Mr. Tolson's Office for review and approval.

It is felt a wider usage of payments under SAC authority to security informants, will in the long run, serve to substantially reduce total payments to them and further implement efforts to curtail costs in accordance with the Director's and President's recent directives on economy.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

316

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan:
(JAS:ebc 9/8/71)

Security and extremist informants are essential to the Bureau's investigative responsibilities. They operate largely in controversial areas of old line and new left revolutionary organizations and individuals as well as in the volatile fields of black and white extremism and racial dissension. They are fraught with controversy and potential for embarrassment to the Bureau. Extended experience has taught us the absolute necessity for tight, effective, centralized control of these informants by SOG.

Fundamentally, whether an informant is paid under SAC authority or on a regular basis by SOG the same standards of justification are to be applied. The distinguishing element is the flexibility of on-the-scene, spot payment authority available to the SAC on a daily basis without the formality of time-consuming correspondence with Bureau headquarters. Money is paid in both situations on a c.o.d basis and full value must be received before payments are made. Initial payments to a developing informant under SAC authority, usually made on an expedient emergency basis, are not reviewed and evaluated at the SOG. The judgment of the SAC prevails. Generally the Bureau approves payments on a regular basis only when emergency and exceptional local conditions no longer prevail, when the informant is active, productive and gives promise of continuing to be so.

Should the currently authorized initial SAC-authorized $400 be expended rapidly--as is frequently the case--there is no objection to the field's obtaining Bureau authority to pay a second $400 to an informant under SAC authority. This does require justification through submission of full facts in the matter for SOG judgment, similar to the justification required each six months for informants paid on a regular basis.

Authorization for SAC authority to permit such payments up to six months before the field requests regular payments from the Bureau as suggested by the Inspector, could dilute both the central and consistent control of payments at the Bureau and could cause an increase in paper work required to implement the procedure. SAC authority currently has no fixed time limit for expenditures and in many cases this authorization could be

3/8

expended before the termination of a six-month development period thus requiring additional paper work in the field and resultant supervisory work at the Bureau.

It is extremely difficult to draw meaningful conclusions concerning any savings between payments under SAC authority and costs accrued under delayed SOG approval of payments on a regular basis. The informant while operating under SAC authority is in a developmental stage. It can be expected that at any given point in his development whether he continues on SAC authority or is approved for regular payments, expenditures to him will increase. It is the natural and practical order of informant development.

The sooner a developing security or extremist informant can be brought under SOG control the more effective and consistent becomes his supervision. The SAC remains accountable, of course, for the informant's handling, the validity of his expenditures, and the worth of his information. Additional supervision, based on broad field needs and applied with consistency to the over-all policies of the Bureau, necessarily is furnished by SOG supervisors and officials. This amounts to far more effective field-wide supervision of these sensitive matters.

Strict economy continues to be the rule in Bureau supervision of security and extremist informants. During the period 4/1/70 through 6/70 for example as a result of reviewing regular payments to informants $4392 was saved. During the period 1/1/71 through 3/1/71 $5156 was saved. More recently on 8/20/71 a letter to all offices instructed them to cut back five per cent in their total payments to security and extremist informants--a projected saving of $129,000.

It is respectfully submitted that, in view of the over-all sensitivity of security and extremist informants, current procedures allowing for initial payments under SAC authority with a shift to Bureau approval of payments on a regular basis as the informant progresses and develops productivity, provide the most effective and consistent field-wide supervision for the over-all needs of the Bureau.

317

While there is no objection to the Inspector's suggestion that all communications approving initial payments on a regular basis to these informants be routed through Mr. Tolson's office for review and approval it must be pointed out, of course, that this creates a substantial increase in the preparation and review of related correspondence, not previously required. In view of this forseeable increase in work load, it is respectfully suggested that we continue to handle initial payment correspondence under existing regulations.

319

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:bhg, 9/8/71)

Your comments have been noted and you will be advised as to any further action necessary.

Assistant Director please note.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan:
(JAS:sjr 9-8-71)

The above observations by the Inspector have been noted.

320

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SURVEY CONCERNING COMPUTERIZATION OF SECURITY INFORMANT INDICES

EM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: During this inspection, it was noted that the Security Informant Index is under the supervision of the Security Informant Unit, Internal Security Section. This Index contains certain data concerning security and potential security informants but does not include the extremist, probationary extremist, or extremist-ghetto informants. It must be maintained on a timely basis. As of 8/24/71, the Index had approximately 2026 informants. This Index is maintained by 2 GS-5 clerks, one GS-3 clerk, and 30% of the time of a GS-4 stenographer on a full time basis. This means that 3 1/3 employees are utilized to maintain this Index at an annual cost of approximately $20,000.

SAC Letter 71 21 (C) dated 5/18/71 instructs the field to give a symbol number designation to all individuals being developed as any type of a Bureau source of information. This required the field to submit secure teletypes to the Bureau concerning every source under development and has resulted in a backlog of work in the Index of approximately 45 to 60 days. In each instance, the clerical staff is required to pull and alter 2 cards (FD 348) on each existing source or make 2 cards on any new sources. Subsequent communications add or delete from the original information which requires the cards to be again pulled and appropriate changes recorded.

It would appear that this Index would benefit from being computerized which would result in a savings of clerical time and personnel. In addition to the informants now handled by the Index, other informant indexes could probably be computerized with a similar savings.

At the time of the last inspection, the Inspector suggested that record keeping operations throughout the Division should be considered for computerizing where feasible. It is suggested that immediate steps be taken through surveys and conferences to determine if it is plausible and/or practical to computerize and expand informant indexes similar to that already done to the Security and Agitator Indexes. Consideration should be

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/3/71
RHM:mea

321

given to the initial and continuing costs and redesigning the source information card (FD 348). The security of this information must be considered as data concerning informant matters is highly sensitive.

Comments of Unit Chief Grigalus; Section Chiefs Gray, Shackelford, G. C. Moore, Branigan, and Wannall; and Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

322

UNIT CHIEF GRIGALUS AND SECTION CHIEFS GRAY, SHACKELFORD, G. C. MOORE, BRANIGAN AND WANNALL: The Security Informant Index contains certain data concerning present and former informants and sources. This data basically consists of the identity of the informant with limited background information. The primary reason for such an index is to have a central repository containing the number and identities of informants. This information is readily accessible. Informal discussions have been held in the past concerning feasibility of computerizing the Security Informant Index as well as the Extremist Informant Index. During course of these discussions, there were two prime considerations; namely, the ready accessibility of information on the indexes as well as the saving of manpower and cost to the Bureau. Previous discussions did not result in a positive recommendation to computerizing the above indexes. It is noted that the present indexes are serving the Bureau's purpose. In order to insure that all avenues of savings are considered, the Inspector's suggestion will be carried out. Surveys and conferences with our expert personnel in the automatic data processing field will be conducted to determine if such an operation is feasible, practical and economical, keeping in mind the accessibility of the information and the security of informants. It is proposed, therefore, that this suggestion be immediately acted upon.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I agree that it would be desirable to carry out this suggestion.
(JAS:cb - 9/7/71)

I will follow this matter closely to determine if such an operation is feasible.

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY INTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: At the time of the last inspection a suggestion was submitted (pages 227 - 233) pointing out advantages in implementation of a program in this area of operation which would make our approach to both above types of informants and Extremist (Racial) informants uniform. You agreed to implement for one year; however, your subsequent efforts to initiate the program were lost in a "security of transmitting problem."

Your Extremist Intelligence Section solved the same problem by having the field send their informant reports to the Bureau by secure teletype and it is understood that method of handling is satisfactory. The overall Extremist Informant Program also appears productive.

It is recommended that you again favorably consider the prior suggestion and tailor implementation after its counterpart in the Extremist Section. Administration of such a program should be more efficiently handled now since you have reinstituted handling of these informants by a Security Informant Unit.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: This suggestion will be favorably considered. A careful analysis will be conducted to tailor the suggestion to the needs of the Sections affected, keeping uniformity in mind. This matter will be closely followed by me.
(JAS:cb - 8/27/71)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/26/71
ESM:wmj

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Foreign Operations Policy Manual, Section 10, page 1, provides that Legal Attaches should submit investigative results by cover letter or cover page, on FD-263, letterhead memorandum, or informant evaluation memorandum. The Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 21, provides that when reporting information in criminal and civil type cases received from the Bureau's Legal Attache, the information should be attributed to a confidential source abroad. In reports the source would be identified on the administrative page.

During the course of the recent inspection of our Legal Attache Offices, it was noted that generally Legal Attaches would furnish investigative results in criminal cases by airtel or letter where more expeditious means of communications was not necessary. In some instances, these communications would be rather lengthy. Upon receipt of these communications by the respective field office and if preparation of a report was desired, the information from the Legal Attache would have to be retyped, attributed to a confidential source abroad, and the identity of the source set out on the administrative page of the report. This rather burdensome task could be dispensed with if the Legal Attache would prepare an insert setting forth information and attributing it to a confidential source abroad. The insert would be transmitted by airtel or letter with the identity of the source set out.

The above is being brought to your attention for appropriate comment and if felt beneficial, the Foreign Operations Policy Manual should be amended to include inserts as the fourth means of reporting investigative results by the Legal Attaches.

Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JFH:bsf

325

UTILIZATION OF INSERTS IN REPORTING INVESTIGATIVE RESULTS IN CRIMINAL CASES BY LEGAL ATTACHES

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
Nationalities Intelligence Section
GAD:hc 8/20/71

The procedure proposed by the Inspector could be utilized by our foreign offices in those cases where they recognize that an investigative report must be prepared and where the information developed abroad is suitable for inclusion in such a report. We do not believe, however, that across-the-board instructions should be issued requiring this procedure in all instances, nor do we believe that such a requirement was visualized by the Inspector inasmuch as he suggests amendment of the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include inserts as one of four means of reporting investigative results by the Legal Attaches. In fact, Legal Attaches now prepare FD-302s in certain cases when specifically requested by the field. These are, of course, restricted to cases in which testimony or evidence from abroad is anticipated.

The minimal clerical staff abroad is insufficient to prepare inserts or FD-302s in more than a relatively few cases. The high volume handled by most of our Legal Attaches requires them to use every possible streamlining device to reduce the clerical burden. In Ottawa, for example, our Legal Attache utilizes a specially printed RCMP routing slip to forward RCMP prepared letterhead memoranda. Any requirement that Ottawa prepare inserts or FD-302s in any volume would be impractical. We propose, therefore, to amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include inserts as a fourth means of reporting without levying a requirement that it be utilized on a wholesale basis.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D.BRENNAN
DEM:mjt 8/23/71

The Inspector's suggestions and the comments of Section Chief Wannall have been noted and we will amend the Foreign Operations Policy Manual to include the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/20/71
GAD:hc

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
BLACK NATIONALIST PHOTOGRAPH ALBUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA) was approved and established in 1968 and at this time contains the photograph and biographical data of 472 black extremists who travel extensively in this country and abroad. Each field office plus Legal Attaches, Ottawa and Mexico City, maintain this Album to assist in coverage of movement of black extremist individuals in the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The Album appears to be an excellent investigative aid by making immediately available photograph and background data on individuals traveling from one Division to another or out of the country whose activities must be followed.

A review of files discloses at least 10 individuals who are included in the BNPA traveled to Paris in the recent past. It is noted a favorite route of Black Panthers traveling to Algeria is through Paris. In view of the increased activity on the part of the Cleaver Faction of the Black Panther Party, it can be assumed that travel of individuals affiliated with the Cleaver Faction to and from Cleaver's headquarters in Algeria will continue or increase. In view of these travels, the Legal Attache, Paris, could utilize the BNPA to facilitate expedite coverage of these extremists while in France.

A review of the BNPA itself reveals that some of the photographs attached to the FD-432 in this file do not have the names of the individuals photographed on the back of the photograph. These photographs should have the individual's name on the back in the event the photographs become detached from the FD-432.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That Legat, Paris, be provided with a copy of the BNPA.

2. If a further pattern of travel develops into an area covered by another Legal Attache, consideration should then be given to making available a copy of the BNPA to that Legal Attache.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/23/71
JTR:wmj/mkl

327

3. That a review be made of all FD-432's contained in the BNPA to insure that all photographs are identified with the name of the individual described on the specific form.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan and Section Chief George C. Moore requested.

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
EXTREMIST INTELLIGENCE SECTION: The BNPA has been reviewed and subject's name placed on the back of all photographs where not previously done. Legal Attache, Paris, will promptly be provided a copy of the BNPA. If in the future it appears that the BNPA will be of value to other Legal Attaches, consideration will be given then to making available the BNPA to that Legal Attache.

GCM:acs
8/26/71

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION: I concur with the above.

CDB:acs
8/26/71

328

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE
INTERNAL SECURITY - COMMUNIST (TROTSKYIST)

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: From a review of the matters being handled by the New Left Section, it is evident that the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the youth group of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), is the fastest growing subversive youth group in this country. In August, 1970, membership was estimated to be 1100. During the SWP convention which was held in August, 1971, it was determined that YSA membership had grown to 1500 members.

It is noted YSA played an important role in the activities of the National Peace Action Coalition during the April - May, 1971, antiwar demonstrations in Washington, D. C.

YSA has numerous chapters throughout the United States, primarily on campuses. In addition, the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) has chapters on many campuses. The SMC is nothing more than a front group for the YSA and is dominated and controlled by YSA.

YSA claims it had recruited 450 new members into its ranks during the Spring of 1971.

Its leaders have called for aggressive YSA recruiting among colleges this fall and have set a goal of at least doubling their present membership.

YSA leaders have called for student strikes on campuses this fall in order to close them down and attempt to organize them for antiwar work.

The SWP is attempting to place its candidates on ballots in 32 states and YSA is being called on to assist in a vigorous election campaign. SWP and YSA plan to use this campaign as a means of recruiting new members to their ranks. It is noted YSA is planning to hold its national convention in Houston, Texas, late this fall.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
TMJ:wmj

329

In view of the above and because of existing criteria which was approved by the Department that membership in YSA is sufficient to place an individual on the Security Index, the New Left Section should consider issuing instructions to the field that sufficient effort be expended on their investigations of YSA activities to insure that all YSA members are identified and investigated for possible inclusion in the Security Index.

Comments of Section Chief Shackelford and Assistant Director Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD I fully concur with the Inspector's observations concerning this matter. We are carefully analyzing the informant reports which are now being received concerning the results of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) National Convention and Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Educational Conference which was held 8/8-15/71. Considerable valuable information has been developed concerning YSA's future plans and activities, including its plans for an intensive recruiting campaign this fall. In addition, YSA is continuing to play an extremely important role in the activities of the National Peace Action Coalition (NPAC) and continues to dominate and control the nation-wide activities of the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC).

With appropriate approval, we will furnish all field offices with the latest known plans and activities of YSA and will instruct them to vigorously pursue their investigations of the YSA and to insure all YSA members are identified and, thereafter, to submit appropriate recommendations for placing their names in the Security Index pursuant to existing Bureau instructions.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN I concur. With appropriate approval, the field will be issued specific instructions.

330

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA
RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Espionage Section in close cooperation with the Voucher-Statistical Section - Administrative Division, has designed and implemented an automated system known as the Soviet Information Collation System. It is essentially a repository of pertinent data on Soviet officials assigned to the U. S. Through the fast and easy manipulation of this data by the computer, outputs arranged by important elements of information can be readily and reliably obtained for Bureau use or dissemination to outside agencies. The Espionage Section attests to the fact it has "streamlined our operations, promoted uniformity and assured the highest level of accuracy. At the same time, it has resulted in a substantial savings in time, money and manpower, both in the field and at SOG."

It would seem reasonable a similar repository of information could be collected regarding New Left and Extremist individuals. This would parallel the SICS operation.

Various reports could be selected from this data such as an alphabetical listing of Key Activist, New Left, and Extremist individuals. Other alternatives would include listings by phone number according to geographical areas, listings by addresses according to geographical areas, or listings by demonstrations in which certain individuals have participated. Summary reports or listings, if required for dissemination to the field offices or other interested agencies, could be efficiently prepared under such a system. There are numerous other alternatives that come to mind; however, any consideration for such a program must clearly take into account the need and benefit for such automation.

Comments of Section Chiefs Moore and Shackelford and Assistant Director Brennan requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/1/71
GNC:wmj

331

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

RE: AUTOMATION OF INTELLIGENCE DATA
RE NEW LEFT AND EXTREMIST INDIVIDUALS

ha SECTION CHIEFS MOORE and SHACKELFORD: As indicated elsewhere under Automatic Data Processing (ADP), 5-Q, automatic data banks are utilized extensively by the Extremist Intelligence and New Left Sections in connection with the Computerized Telephone Number File (CTNF). CTNF lists telephone numbers known to be utilized by black, New Left and other ethnic extremist groups and individuals. Telephone numbers included in CTNF are listed according to geographic areas. In addition, a special project utilizing ADP is being operated in connection with the EASTCON case. In this EASTCON project, ADP analyses of telephone calls between EASTCON subjects are made and also new subjects are identified through ADP analyses of EASTCON toll calls.

At present, over 12,700 individuals making up the Security Index (SI) have been incorporated into the Bureau's computerized data bank and this data is available to all offices through ADP. In connection with this ADP, SI project, identifying data concerning each subject, as well as his residence and business addresses, are included therein along with other pertinent items such as his organizational affiliation. Over 20 separate print-outs are prepared monthly for administrative and investigative use of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the field.

The facilities of NCIC have also been utilized to aid our investigations of New Left and extremist individuals. "Stop Index" programs for Bureau use only at NCIC have been devised which furnish notice of any police inquiry concerning missing Venceremos Brigade subjects and all Priority I, SI subjects who are extremists, unless they are already included in the NCIC Wanted Persons File.

As indicated, much effort has been made to avail ourselves of opportunities provided by ADP. The Inspector's suggestion that further effort be made to expand our use of ADP facilities, taking into consideration the need and benefit for such automation, appears to have merit; this will be studied and appropriate recommendations made as to its adaptability.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
HM:sad

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR BRENNAN: I concur with the above comments.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
9/2/71
HM:sad

333

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

PREPARATION OF INTERVIEW REPORTS (FD-302) IN SECURITY TYPE INVESTIGATIONS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: From a review of the FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations, and Manual of Instructions provisions in regard to security type investigations, more particularly espionage matters, Registration Act, security investigations, internal security - nationalistic tendencies matters, security informants, and racial matters, it was noted that no mention is made that information which may be the subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview report (FD-302).

In this connection the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 4a, makes reference to the preparation of interview reports in security type cases. Due to the discovery procedures existent in our judicial system, the preparation of these interview reports is most necessary particularly when dealing with information of a testimonial nature received from security informants. It is felt that quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents handling security matters to prepare FD-302's may be due to the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security investigations.

In view of the above, it is suggested that those provisions of the Manual and Handbook having to do with security type investigations be thoroughly reviewed and amended where necessary to set forth the fact that when information is received from security subjects, security informants, or other individuals which may become the subject of later testimony, an FD-302 should be prepared.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/18/71
JFH:bsf

334

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN, The following are my comments requested in Inspector's Suggestion Memorandum entitled "Preparation of Interview Reports (FD-302) in Security Type Investigations:"

Inspector notes at outset that from a review of the FBI Handbook, Manual of Rules and Regulations and Manual of Instructions in regard to the various types of security investigations, no mention is made that information which may be the subject of later testimony in judicial or administrative type hearings must be made a matter of record on an interview report (FD-302). Inspector does recognize that the Manual of Rules and Regulations, Part II, Section 4, page 4a, makes reference to the preparation of interview reports in security type cases.

In Section 4, Part II of the Manual of Rules and Regulations, which Section pertains to Communications, there is a subheading entitled "Reporting Information That May Become Testimony," which is covered on pages 4 and 4a. It is specifically stated on page 4, paragraphs 2b and c, that FD-302s should be used when information is obtained which may be the subject of testimony. At the very top of page 4a, a specific reference is made to security-type cases and the use of an FD-302 in these cases. The requirement for using an FD-302 is further reiterated in paragraph 6 on page 4a.

Part I of the Handbook has a section commencing on page 36, item 48, entitled "Reporting Information That May Become Testimony." This is the counterpart to the Manual of Rules and Regulations provisions cited immediately above. The requirement for the use of an FD-302 is enunciated in item number 48.

Of particular significance is the fact that both the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook provide in their respective Indices for the requirements discussed above. In the Manual, the material is indexed under "Reporting information that may become testimony" as well as under "Testimony--reporting information that may become." The Handbook index has the same two references. It is therefore obvious that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are logically and easily retrievable by reference to either or both the Manual and Handbook.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/24/71
SFP:rrd

335

A cursory spot check of some criminal violations in the Manual of Instructions notes that there is no specific mention made for some violations and it is quite likely that the specific requirement for use of an FD-302 is not spelled out for each of the many, many criminal violations covered in the various sections of the Manual of Instructions. The requirement is covered in the Manual of Rules and Regulations and the Handbook as are many other requirements which pertain to the Bureau's work generally. A primary function of the Manual of Rules and Regulations is to have in one place general requirements that are applicable across the board in our work. The Section relating to Communications referred to above is a good example.

It was observed by the Inspector that "quite possibly the seeming reluctance on the part of investigative agents handling security matters to prepare FD-302's may be due to the lack of mention of this in the Manual and Handbook provisions dealing with security investigations." It is respectfully observed that we have not noted any "seeming reluctance" on the part of investigative Agents handling work in the security field. We have found that the requirements for the use of an FD-302 are being generally complied with and when any shortcomings might be noted they are dealt with on an individual case basis. In short, we have had no problems in this area of our operations. It may be that the Inspector's observations are based on noting rather few FD-302s in security reports as compared with reports in the criminal field. If this be the case, it is observed that by and large our obtaining of information in the security field is of an intelligence nature with prosecutable situations being generally the exception. In other words, situations where information might become testimony are rather limited.

A further aspect of the Inspector's Suggestion Memorandum relates to the preparation of FD-302s when obtaining information from security informants. In this respect it is observed that a great many of our security informants prepare written reports which are firsthand accounts and thus preferable to FD-302s which are secondhand accounts. Thus, the informants' reports are even more valuable than FD-302s and are available for the same purpose as are the FD-302s. When an informant furnishes information orally which is not backed up by a written report from the informant and the information may become a matter of testimony, the Agent is under the same requirement to execute an FD-302. We have not observed any failings to speak of in this regard.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/24/71
SFP:rrd

In conclusion, it is my studied judgement that there is no necessity for augmenting the requirement concerning FD-302s in the various Manuals presently being utilized in the FBI.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/24/71
SFP:rrd

337

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(J. F. Hanlon:wmj 8/27/71)

The primary intent of this suggestion was to point up a possible problem developing as a result of the increased number of criminal violations being encountered by Special Agents handling security work. An excellent illustration of this can be found in case captioned "Peoples Coalition for Peace and Justice; IS-Miscellaneous," Bufile 100-459771. In WFO report of SA James F. Whalen dated 5/7/71, serial 423, page 5, is found a narrative of events at a demonstration on November 21, 1970, at New York. This information was not placed on an FD-302 and became an issue at a preliminary hearing. As the contents of this report were not on FD-302s it was necessary to excise pertinent portions of the report and considerable issue of this was made at the preliminary hearing. A further indication of this most necessary indoctrination of security Agents in the use of FD-302s can be found in the EASTCON case. Your attention is invited to an airtel under that caption dated 8/25/71 calling for an in-depth interview of a key witness. In this airtel the supervisor felt it necessary to instruct that the results of this interview be placed on an FD-302.

In light of the above, it is felt you should take whatever action deemed necessary to bring to the attention of Special Agents working security matters the necessity of placing information which could be testimony on FD-302s. It is felt the matter should definitely be highlighted and then followed in the individual cases.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Domestic Intelligence Division is appreciative of the observations and suggestions set forth in the Inspector's Addendum. Accordingly, I am instructing all Section Chiefs to stress this matter with all supervisory personnel in the Division. Further, all of our supervisors who regularly lecture to In Service classes and New Agents classes will stress this matter. We will of course follow the field in the individual cases where it is obvious or even appears that the required action is not being taken in the preparation of necessary FD-302s.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/27/71
SFP:rrd

339

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

BLACK EXTREMIST ACTIVITIES IN PENAL INSTITUTIONS
EXTREMIST MATTERS

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: By airtel to all continental offices 8/26/71 under the above-mentioned caption, all offices were requested to determine the extent of activity and/or influence attributable to black extremists within penal institutions. This was undoubtedly a result of the attempted prison break at San Quentin Prison in California in which black extremist George Lester Jackson was killed. Reports have indicated that Jackson had hidden a gun in his afro haircut. Further, press releases indicate that when the maximum security cell block was searched an afro hair-style wig was found.

Due to the numerous arrests made by our Agents, it is felt that the field should be alerted to the secreting of weapons in this manner.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

I concur with the suggestion of the Inspector. The Extremist Intelligence Section is preparing an airtel to all offices alerting them to the possibility of secreting weapons as noted above.

CDB:bad
8-26-71

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
8/26/71
OFL:wmj

340

INSPECTION

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

JANUARY 8-26, 1971

Page 5 - Why not leave in Haldeman and Mardian as they are acting in an official capacity?

OK

Page 7 ¶2. Congressmen's names deleted here but not on page 2 ¶1. why?

OK

Page 8 - #4. Haldeman - include?

OK

Page 9 - Last ¶ - include names?

Page 10 ¶1 ditto

Last ¶ - Liddy - include?

Page 12 Mardian (last ¶)?

Page 13 Mardian?

Page 14 Mardian?

Pages 23-27 Why not leave in Berrigan?

Page 26 Leave in Ellsberg?

Page 52 Berrigan? Ellsberg?

Page 54 delete only info after quote ends?

OK

Page 68 ¶3 Ehrlichman? ✓

Page 5[illegible] Shouldnt "Israeli" in
YES, BUT ↓ 1st line be deleted?
In a separate paper, SSC has asked what SCOPE is, & we are planning to tell them it's Israeli. However, I think we should excise here.

Page 52 ¶2 line 4. Shouldnt
"... diplomatic communications"
OK be deleted?

Page 109 Per Ryan We should discuss the
Bocov programs with
Wannall - re inclusion.
BOCOV not included in programs write-up.

Page 139 Ditto re Cointelpro

DID. INSPECTION
1/8-26/71

RETAIN COPY

Recommend entire document be classified "Secret," XGDS 1, 2, 3.

Portions recommended for excision from attached have been underlined in red or bracketed in red in left margin.

Generally, criteria for excision were:

1. Information which could identify sources or sensitive techniques
2. Names of individuals or organizations whose privacy requires protection
3. Information which would reveal our overall success or lack of success in a given investigative area
4. Information from "Third Agencies" or friendly foreign agencies
5. Identities of Bureau personnel below the Section Chief level

The adequacy of Personnel Sections, in general, disclose the extent of our commitment in specific areas of counterintelligence activity. We have given the Committee Administrative Division figures regarding total manpower involved in security investigations but, to my knowledge, we have not given them a breakdown as to where these personnel are assigned. A policy decision is necessary as to whether we want to pinpoint, through release of "Adequacy of Personnel" sections of these inspection reports, precisely how much or how little manpower we have on specific types of investigations.

~~It is questionable whether the information regarding criminal cases in the San Francisco report is germane to the Committee's inquiry. It would not seem improper to me to delete all references to criminal matters and merely substitute a page saying that "pages ___ to ___ relate to criminal investigations."~~

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS

- Substantive Errors 1
- East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives 2
- Accomplishments 9
  - Internal Security Section 10
  - Research Section 20
  - New Left Section 24
  - Espionage Section 33
  - Racial Intelligence Section 43
  - Nationalities Intelligence Section 50

Surveys, Projects and/or Intensification Programs

- Security Index Program 64
  - (Basic Revolutionary Organizations) 64
- Security Informant Program 66
  - (Basic Revolutionary Organizations)
- Counterintelligence Program 67
- Disruption of White Hate Groups 67
- Thumbnail Sketch Program 70
- New Left Movement 71
- Potential for Racial Violence 79
- Security Index Program 80
- Emergency Detention Program 81
- Security Informants 82
- Technical and Microphone Surveillances 82
- ALEM Program 84
- CANIL Program 85
- DESECO Program 86
- East-West Exchange Program 88
- COKMA Program 90
- Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by Soviets . . . 92
- BANPOP Program 95
- Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by U.S. Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments 96
- Chinese Aliens Entering U.S. and Chinese Entering U.S. Claiming U.S. Citizenship . . 99
- Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries International Organizations . . 102

Table of Contents (Continued) Page

Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside Soviet-Bloc .104
CHICOIN 105
BOCOV 107
Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas 109
Security Index - Cuba 111
American Repatriate Program 114
Cuban Refugee Program 116
Racial Matters 117
Black Nationalist Movement 119
Black Panther Party 122
Congress of African Peoples 126
Republic of New Africa 128
SNCC 130
Junta of Militant Organizations 132
Nation of Islam 134
Communist Influence of Racial Groups 135
Counterintelligence Program - Black Extremists 138
Key Black Extremist Program 144
Black Student Groups on College Campuses . . .145
Racial Informants 146

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

Administrative Write-Ups

Potential Double Agent Program [illegible]
Espionage Section
Domestic Intelligence Division 149

Coverage of Known Meet Areas (COKMA) Program 161

PERSONNEL MATTERS

Personnel Interviewed 167
Adequacy of Personnel 168

SUGGESTION MEMORANDA

Addition of Suitable Designation
Racial Informants For Seat of Government Routing 205

Articles Concerning Activities of Racial Extremists
Research Section 208

Eqbal Ahmad 211

Table of Contents (Continued)

Page

Chinese Matters 216

Defector Program 218
Maximum Utilization of Ghetto Informants 220
Revision of Racial Informant Status Report - Form FD-405 222
Supervision and Control of Security Informant Development and Coverage by Internal Security and New Left Sections 227

Venceremos Brigade 234

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UPS

Robert P. Bokinsky
PSI-PO (134-19651) 241
Jan Adam Klasa
IS-PO (105-186986)

Eric Nelson, PSI
IS-R (134-19669)
Vladimir G. Azaryan
IS-R (ATC-KGB) 247

1/8-26/71

SPECIFIC DIVISION OPERATIONS

SUBSTANTIVE ERRORS

4-B

INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER: During the course of the inspection, two substantive errors were detected in files reviewed. Both of these errors involved inadequacies in the supervision of Espionage related cases.

You should consider a further review and evaluation of these matters in this area of your operation.

Assistant Director Brennan note.

Noted - CS

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
BDW:sfw
1/26/71
4-B

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

4-A-1-a

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You are requested to furnish a very brief narrative background of this case from its beginning until the present time. In addition, you should specifically outline the case developed on each subject showing probable cause established as of this time. You are also requested to advise when these cases will be presented to the Federal Grand Jury and indicate the prospects in each instance for a return of a true bill.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
4-A-1-a

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR
C. D. BRENNAN

The East Coast Conspiracy is a loosely knit movement composed primarily of Catholic priests and nuns, teachers, students and former students and others who have manifested opposition to the Vietnam war by acts of violence against Government agencies and private corporations identified as defense contractors. The main thrust of their efforts has been vandalism of draft boards.

The Philadelphia Office developed an informant in Lewisburg Penitentiary who was a confidant of Philip Berrigan, a Catholic priest serving time for destruction of Selective Service records. Investigation by prison authorities determined this informant had been transmitting messages in and out of prison in a clandestine manner between Berrigan and Sister Elizabeth McAlister, a nun associated with the Religious Order of the Sacred Heart of Mary, Tarrytown, New York. In addition to transmitting letters to and from Berrigan, the informant met on several occasions with followers of Berrigan such as Neil McLaughlin and Joseph Wenderoth, unassigned Catholic priests in Baltimore, Maryland. Through these individuals he met others associated with the movement.

Information contained in the letters and obtained as a result of personal contacts of the informant produced information showing this group intended to call attention to their anti-Vietnam war position by blowing up the underground heating and electrical systems servicing Government buildings in Washington, D. C., and to kidnap a high Government official. Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, was mentioned as a possible victim. The proposed target date for these actions was February 22, 1971.

Following the arrest on September 6, 1970, of several individuals associated with this movement for the destruction of draft board records in Rochester, New York, which action included extensive vandalism to the office of the U.S. Attorney as well as our Rochester Resident Agency, the informant learned that the leading activists in the movement intended to expand their activities to include attacks against FBI offices. Informant also learned from McAlister that the group intended to undertake some sabotage-type action at Picatinny Arsenal, Dover, New Jersey, on an undisclosed date.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-11-71
FBG:plm
4-A-1-a

East Coast Conspiracy

Because of the basic responsibility of this Division for investigations involving subversive antiwar groups, overall responsibility for this investigation was assumed by memorandum dated September 10, 1970. This, of course, did not include individual Selective Service violations existing in various stages of prosecution or subsequent substantive violations in which affiliates of this group were suspected of being involved.

This investigation has been specifically targeted to two areas of prosecutive potential. First, to develop sufficient evidence to prosecute leadership of this broad conspiracy to impede the Government's functioning and conduct of the Vietnam war. In this vein, a comprehensive review of pertinent material discloses 16 related incidents from October 27, 1967, at Baltimore, Maryland, to Rochester, New York, on September 6, 1970. Of 97 individuals involved in 16 incidents during this period, 25 persons have been established as being involved in three or more of these incidents. This particular phase of the investigation is most detailed and complex; however, in terms of far-reaching damage to the movement, it is most significant. For example, we have set up an extensive Automatic Data Processing (ADP) project which resulted in a print-out showing over 300 telephone calls of interest between telephone numbers utilized by these conspirators and which corroborate information from the informant regarding calls he received from principal conspirators.

Second, we are developing sufficient evidence to prosecute the perpetrators of the plots to kidnap Presidential advisor Henry A. Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels which contain steam and electrical conduits between Government buildings in Washington, D.C.

Because of publicity given the plots to kidnap Kissinger and to blow up the tunnels in Washington, D. C., it is imperative this phase of the investigation be vigorously pressed toward prosecutive action. Consistent with this objective the Federal Grand Jury has been hearing evidence in this matter since December 18, 1970, and according to Departmental attorney Guy L. Goodwin will return indictments concerning the above-mentioned plots on January 12, 1971. Goodwin states the Federal grand jury will continue to hear evidence regarding other facets of this complex matter and probably will return additional indictments at a later date. According to Goodwin, the Grand Jury will return indictments against six conspirators named below and seven individuals, including Daniel Berrigan, will be named as unindicted co-conspirators at this time. Those to be indicted are Philip Berrigan, Elizabeth McAlister, Joseph Wenderoth, Neil McLaughlin, Eqbal Ahmad, and Anthony Scoblick.

Philip Berrigan:

Laboratory examination determined he authored letters regarding plots to kidnap a high Government official and to blow up tunnel system which were clandestinely transmitted out of Lewisburg Penitentiary.

Elizabeth McAlister:

Laboratory determined she wrote letters to Philip Berrigan regarding above plots. Investigation, including ADP project, has also established her contacts with other conspirators. Considered a leading activist in the movement.

Joseph Reese Wenderoth:

Leading activist of the movement and reported coordinator of plot to blow up tunnel system, with responsibility for recruiting necessary personnel. Met and discussed plan with informant. Automobile registered to Wenderoth and Neil McLaughlin observed at farm in Northern Maryland reported by informant as training site used by conspirators.

Neil Raymond McLaughlin:

Leading activist in the movement involved with bombing plot. Met with informant to discuss plot.

5

East Coast Conspiracy

Eqbal Ahmad:

Ahmad is Pakistani citizen and permanent resident alien. He is a principal figure in the kidnaping plot. ADP project has linked him with Wenderoth and McLaughlin.

Anthony Scoblick:

Involved in the bombing plot. He has met with informant and discussed plot and ADP project produced calls between informant and Scoblick's telephone.

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: This case was formally received by the
1/18/71 Domestic Intelligence Division on
JAA/EFF:maz 9/10/70 and responsibility for same
assumed by memorandum of R. L. Shackelford to C. D. Brennan dated 9/10/70. It is presently supervised by Supervisor James F. McGuire and overall supervision afforded by Unit Supervisor Fred B. Griffith.

It is acknowledged that it was necessary to issue instructions to the field cautioning them about conducting extensive background investigations on members close to this conspiracy prior to the presentation of facts of this case to the Grand Jury to preclude the possibility of compromising an informant. However, the following suggested investigative action is being set forth for your consideration inasmuch as it is of paramount importance that you continue to press this matter vigorously. These suggestions are not to be considered as all inclusive, but are being set forth for your consideration and appropriate action:

1. You should insure that the field aggressively intensifies its investigation of this conspiracy including detailed comprehensive background investigations on all subjects both directly and indirectly associated with the ECCSL. It should be emphasized, however, that utmost discretion and good judgment should be exercised in the conduct of investigations of the principal conspirators so that unfounded charges of harrassment cannot be leveled against the Bureau.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
JAA/EFF:maz

During the conduct of these background investigations the field should be particularly alert to every potential opportunity for developing member informants in not only the ECCSL but also in other sympathetic and splinter groups which develop or spin off from the vortex of this group.

It is noted that you have pointed out elsewhere in this report that 97 individuals have been involved in 16 separate and distinct organized incidents and attacks on Government agencies and private corporations. Twenty-five persons were involved in three or more such incidents.

2. The field should be appropriately instructed to keep the Bureau fully advised of all demonstrations, vigils, harrassment tactics, etc., conducted by sympathetic groups and followers of the ECCSL. Such vigils and demonstrations should be afforded sufficient appropriate coverage to develop identities and background of leading activists and sponsors of such sympathetic activities.

During these background investigations, particular emphasis should be placed on developing sources of funds and financing of the principal conspirators. A review of this file noted that the subjects appear to travel frequently, make numerous long-distance phone calls, rent cars, etc., yet outwardly, appear to have limited sources of income.

3. The field should be alerted to the distinct possibility that other groups similar to the ECCSL are formed as a result of the indictments returned in this matter. Field offices should also be alerted to other retaliatory actions by sympathetic groups attempting to capitalize on the "persecution" theory thereby exploiting the recent indictments as a sympathetic rallying point for more conspiratorial activities.

Assistant Director note.

EAST COAST CONSPIRACY 4-A-1-a

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR - C. D. BRENNAN: The suggestions and comments of the Inspector in this matter are pertinent, appreciated, and are being complied with. Because this case is of national significance and has received nation-wide publicity, you may be assured it will continue to receive expeditious handling, close supervision, and my personal attention.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
CDB:jlm
4-A-1-a

ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Briefly set forth the noteworthy accomplishments of your Division, with a section breakdown, since the last inspection, which ended on 4/17/70. This request deals with specific accomplishments other than statistical accomplishments. Specifically where you have devised a program for a definite purpose furnish also where possible specific tangible accomplishments on this program. This will give you an opportunity to set forth any Division achievements pertaining to the Bureau's progress, welfare, efficiency or any other items not covered elsewhere in this inspection.

A short paragraph on each phase should be sufficient. Do not include identifying data concerning highly confidential matters and any references to such matters should be in general terms.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached are individual write-ups from each Section in the Division pertaining to the accomplishments of that particular Section.
(JAS:mls 1/14/71)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
4-E

9

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

4-E

SECTION CHIEF - ARBOR W. GRAY

Attached are memoranda setting out the noteworthy accomplishments of the Internal Security Section since the last inspection.

This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), its fronts; pro-Chinese communist groups; Trotskyist groups; Klan and white hate groups; protest groups; international organizations affiliated with the world communist movement, the world Trotskyist movement and international New Left movement, individuals affiliated with these organizations and movements, as well as sedition cases. Our purpose is to gather evidence to support prosecutions of these subversive organizations and individuals under various statutes relating to the internal security of the nation. This Section also supervises development of security informants in basic revolutionary organizations and, where appropriate, directs counterintelligence operations against subversive groups and individuals in cases under our supervision.

DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP:mkl
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT

The major accomplishment of this Unit evolves from the case entitled, "Solo, IS - C." Due to the sensitive nature of this case, it will be orally discussed with the Inspector.

In essence, this case involves sources developing intelligence information of the highest quality concerning the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), the Soviet Union and its satellites, and the world communist movement. Since its inception, 37 successful missions to communist countries have been completed. Information developed by this operation from high-level contacts in the world communist movement is continually disseminated to the highest levels of our Government and, in many instances, is information not available from another source. Examples include the following: the current struggle among the leadership of the Soviet Union as of Spring, 1970, and early Winter, 1970, particularly in view of the struggle for power during the upcoming 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU); a message sent the Government of North Vietnam by the CPUSA, giving suggestions on how North Vietnam could aid antiwar protest groups in the United States; the Soviet reaction to the treaty signed by West Germany with the Soviets, along with secret portions of this treaty which have not yet been made public; the initiation of a worldwide propaganda campaign by the Soviets to counteract and weaken the United States position in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks; and details on the reorganization which is supposedto take place within the CPSU and the Soviet Government after the 24th Congress of the CPSU to be held in March, 1971.

All of this information was furnished the White House and other interested officials of our Government, usually by teletype. Central Intelligence Agency has expressed great interest in information developed by this operation and on July 24, 1970, requested permission to include pertinent data developed by our operation in a "Top Secret/No Foreign/Controlled Dissemination" classified document for senior U. S. Intelligence Board officials.

DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP:mkl
4-E

The two principal informants in this operation have received the "Order of Lenin," with the title "Hero of Soviet Labor" from the Soviets. This is the highest award given civilians by the Soviet Union and was given our sources for their "invaluable contribution to the international communist movement."

Continued high-level penetration of the CPUSA represents a sustained major accomplishment. At the time of the last inspection, we had 11 informants who were officially members of the CPUSA National Committee. At the present time, this overall number remains the same, but we have exchanged two informants to give us a better geographical breakdown. In addition, we have another informant who is an ex officio member of the National Committee because of the sensitive nature of his Party assignments. This latter source is also a member of the Political Committee which, in effect, runs the Party. This top-level coverage is responsible for furnishing information regarding policy-making matters on a day-to-day basis as they occur.

DID Inspection
1/12/71
RCP:mkl
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT

This unit was formerly known as the Protest Groups and International New Left Unit. As of December 16, 1970, a separate International New Left Unit was organized which took over investigations pertaining to this particular work. Since the last inspection, the intensified investigation of cases has continued to produce positive results.

Selective supervision has enabled us to have advance knowledge of New Left leaders, conferences, and demonstrations. Through this advance knowledge, we have been able to furnish the White House and other interested Government agencies information on a daily basis regarding pertinent activities of individuals and groups of interest to us. We have disseminated voluminous letterhead memoranda, reports, and teletypes concerning plans of leaders of these groups which were most timely, particularly where violence was a possibility. On the basis of material furnished by this unit, two Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL) were published pertaining to the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) and the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC).

These investigations furnished complete coverage of the major antiwar demonstrations in May and October, 1970, as well as sectional and national meetings at which plans for these demonstrations were formulated. This coverage afforded detailed knowledge of the major shift in the antiwar movement, and the view of its leadership pertaining to the degree and amount of militant tactics to be employed. We were able to follow closely the emergence of the National Coalition Against War, Racism, and Repression (NCAWRR) out of the once powerful NMC and the attempts of the Trotskyist groups to exercise greater influence within the antiwar movement through the formation of the National Peace Action Council (NPAC). The NCAWRR has proposed a national action for May, 1971, whereby efforts will be made to close down Washington, D. C., by the use of militant tactics. The NPAC plans national demonstrations in April, 1971, which may very well undermine the impact of the NCAWRR action.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JJS:plm
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT

(Prior to 12/16/70, part of Protest Groups and International New Left Unit.)

A prime responsibility of the Bureau and the intelligence community is to develop intelligence relating to efforts of foreign governments, organizations, and individuals to influence, direct, or dominate the New Left movement in the U.S. In this regard, over the years, there have been a number of international-type conferences often sponsored by international front-type groups frequently under the direction or control of the Soviet Union.

Late last summer this Bureau received information that the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam (SCV), an organization established in 1967 which is controlled by the Soviet dominated World Council for Peace, intended to hold a World Conference on Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia in Stockholm, Sweden, 11/28-30/70. As the SCV, since its inception, has been a major sounding board for anti-U.S. propaganda, particularly that of the North Vietnamese, we dispatched WF 1777-S to attend the World Conference. The informant's attendance proved of exceptional value. She not only attended preparatory meetings and post-conference meetings, but also participated in all sessions of the World Conference, identifying the entire American delegation, other international organizations involved, and foreign delegations including those representing the Cambodian Government in exile, the Provisional Revolutionary (communist) Government of South Vietnam, the North Vietnamese, and communists from Laos. Informant was able to develop the activity of the American delegation which was led by David Dellinger, a notorious New Left militant, and the obviously directed plans of the Conference to discredit the U.S. at the Paris peace talks. Informant also developed the nature of the international propaganda attack to be directed at the U.S., worldwide action planned in support of the communist position in Vietnam, and plans to "expose" the "criminal" position and actions of the U.S. as relate to Vietnam.

Our coverage of this Conference was of value to officials of other Government agencies and undoubtedly assisted in the formulation of positive U.S. policies relative to the U.S. position in Vietnam. The excellent coverage also resulted in our being able to directly pinpoint the foreign influence of the domestic subversive movement and resulted in a number of important investigations.

DID INSPECTION
1/12/71
DR:sfw
4-E

4

ACCOMPLISHMENTS
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUP UNIT 4-E

Membership in Klan-type organizations and other white hate groups has experienced a continuous decline for the past four years. The Klan reached a post-World War II membership high of approximately 14,000 in 1966. From that point on, there has been a continuing decline in membership. At the present time, we have 18 Klan organizations made up of 225 Klaverns (units). There are, of course, in addition to the membership, many thousands of sympathizers. Investigation in the white extremist field for organizations other than the Klan is centered around the Minutemen, the National States Rights Party (NSRP), and the National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP). There are numerous other small groups which likewise fall within this category. This reduction in Klan and other white hate group membership is attributable to the continuous attention given these investigations by the Seat of Government and the field, with specific attention given to hard-hitting investigations, counterintelligence programs directed at them, and penetration of these groups at all levels by our racial informants.

The year 1970 showed a continuing decline in the membership and effectiveness of the various Klan and white hate groups throughout the U.S. As of January, 1970, Klan membership totaled approximately 5,300. Our present figures indicate that Klan membership now totals approximately 4,300. The largest Klan group is the United Klans of America, Inc., Knights of the Ku Klux Klan (UKA) under the direction of Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton. The membership of this group in January, 1970, was approximately 4,100 whereas it now numbers 3,500 members, or approximately 80% of the membership of all Klan organizations. These recent figures represent an approximate decrease in overall Klan membership of 17% and 15% decrease in UKA membership. Membership in white hate organizations other than the Klan which has always been relatively smaller membership-wise has likewise experienced a relatively similar decline.

With the arrest of Robert DePugh, National Coordinator of the Minutemen, in July, 1969, and his subsequent conviction for Federal Firearms Act violation and incarceration, this group

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-12-71
JVW:ljw
4-E

15

has virtually fallen apart and there is practically no organized activity. Membership is approximately 180, but individuals remain violence prone.

The National States Rights Party under the direction of J. B. Stoner is likewise experiencing difficulty in increasing either membership or activity and consequently is planning to move its headquarters from Savannah, Georgia, to Atlanta, Georgia. In the meantime this organization continues to grind out anti-Negro and anti-Jewish propaganda in crude fashion in their publications and speeches. Membership is approximately 150.

The National Socialist White People's Party (NSWPP) (formerly the American Nazi Party) has its headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, which is the center for its activities. There is moderate activity in Los Angeles and Chicago. Recently a serious split in the leadership has occurred as a result of counterintelligence action taken on the part of the Bureau through use of racial informants. Here again membership continues to decline. They appear to be content with publishing a variety of anti-Negro, anti-Jewish publications and preparing their "White Power" telephone messages. Membership is approximately 125.

The above is set forth to show the general accomplishments made by this Unit in the Klan and white hate field during the past year. Some specific examples of accomplishments are hereafter set forth:

In February, 1970, we furnished information to the White House, the Army, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit, which we received from racial informants of our Tampa Division who advised that the United Florida KKK had printed 15,000 protest letters which were being made available to the public for mailing to President Nixon in connection with school desegregation. We also furnished a copy of the actual protest letter for the benefit of the White House and other agencies.

On February 20, 1970, Robert DePugh, National Coordinator of the Minutemen, mentioned above, was sentenced to four years imprisonment following conviction for bond default. It is noted DePugh was previously convicted and released on bond for Federal Firearms Act violation.

16

In March, 1970, we again advised the White House, the Attorney General, the Army, Secret Service, Internal Revenue Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Division of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit, of information learned from racial informants of our Mobile Division relative to another letter which was made available to the public by the UKA for mailing to President Nixon as a protest in connection with school desegregation in Alabama. This was similar to the information previously furnished relative to the other letter which was made available to the public by the United Florida KKK. A copy of this letter was also furnished to the White House, the Attorney General, Secret Service, the Internal Security and Civil Rights Divisions of the Department and the Inter-Division Information Unit.

In July, 1970, as a result of our investigation, two individuals associated with a paramilitary right wing group called "The Raiders," Ferri Loyd Hayes and Kenneth Ray McMaster, were arrested by Bureau Agents in connection with the bombing of 36 school busses at Longview, Texas, on July 4, 1970. A Federal court had ordered bussing in connection with school integration. A special Federal Grand Jury at Tyler, Texas, on July 23, 1970, returned a true bill of indictment charging the two individuals on two counts; count one, violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 241 (Civil Rights Act, 1964), and count two, violation of Title 18, U.S. Code, S. 1509 (Obstruction of Court Order). These two individuals had also been found to have placed "flashlight bombs" in two Negro residential areas. Both these individuals were held in lieu of $125,000 bond each; later reduced to $25,000 each. They are still awaiting trial.

In July, 1970, as a result of a counterintelligence technique utilized in connection with the counterintelligence program directed at the Klan, Exalted Cyclops Thomas Stipes, of Mascot Klavern 778, Mascot, Tennessee, was eliminated from this top position and subsequently banished from the UKA. As a result of this counterintelligence action, membership in this Klavern has fallen off appreciably.

On 9-25-70 Robert DePugh was found guilty in U.S. District Court, Albuquerque, New Mexico, under Federal Firearms Act for possession of various destructive devices at the time of his arrest in New Mexico. He received a ten-year sentence on 10-9-70 on these charges. He is presently serving his sentence at the U.S. Penitentiary, Leavenworth, Kansas.

17

In September, 1970, as a result of counterintelligence action taken, two of our racial informants in the Little Rock Division were instrumental in successfully causing the defeat of a Klansman who was running for Sheriff in Jefferson County, Arkansas. This unsuccessful candidate was Victor Calvert, Exalted Cyclops, Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of Arkansas Klans. During his campaign Calvert attempted to hide his Klan affiliation because he hoped to receive a good percentage of the Negro vote in his area. Our informants had discreetly spread the truth through the Negro community that Calvert was actually an active Klansman. As a result of this action Calvert was overwhelmingly defeated.

In September, 1970, we advised the President, the Vice President and the Attorney General of current information concerning Klan activity in the U.S.; the decline in Klan membership; techniques the Klan was instituting to attempt to increase its income and the fact that a black box, resembling a coffin, was being shipped to the President by a group called "United Parents of Duval County," Florida. This was being sent to the President in connection with a protest against school integration in Jacksonville, Florida. In furnishing this information, we advised that the individual who paid for the shipping was identified as a member of the U.S. Klans, Knights of the KKK, Inc.

In September, 1970, we advised the President, the Vice President and the Attorney General of the fact that Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA was going to request an appointment with the Attorney General to discuss the latest interpretations of civil rights laws. We further advised that Shelton was preparing copies of a "night letter" which he was going to make available to the news media in the Washington, D. C., area to publicize the fact he desired an appointment. This information was learned from a top level racial informant of our Birmingham Office who advised that Shelton was making this request allegedly because it, in Shelton's mind, concerned the welfare of people of Alabama in addition to those of other states. Our informant advised that Shelton would point out in his letter that appointments for black leaders had been granted and he was requesting equal opportunity, treatment and courtesy, on behalf of the white people of his community. Our informant also revealed that Shelton did not expect to receive an appointment with the Attorney General but was doing this merely to receive publicity as a result of this action. The appointment never came about.

18

In November, 1970, as a result of counterintelligence measures taken, we were successful in causing the resignation of W. Melvin Sexton, the Imperial Kligrapp (National Secretary, UKA). This was of particular importance in that he actually ran the UKA during the time Shelton was in prison.

The 1970 National Klonvokation of the UKA was held at the Ramada Inn, Tuscaloosa, Alabama, on November 28-29, 1970. At this Klonvokation, Robert M. Shelton was again elected Imperial Wizard to serve for three years. During a speech he made at the Klonvokation, Shelton stated (and has since reiterated his feelings to high-ranking members of the UKA who are racial informants of this Bureau) that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and possibly to utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officials and members in order to ferret out FBI informants. Shelton, in 1967, also had plans to utilize a polygraph machine and truth serum on Klan members in order to learn the identity of FBI informants. At that time, we used counterintelligence techniques in various forms including a press release in order to discourage Shelton in this regard. It is to be noted that many of our sensitive racial informants are in high-ranking positions within the UKA.

In order to again discourage Shelton in his desires in this regard, it was recommended on 1/5/71 that a press release be provided to reliable news sources through Assistant Director Bishop's office. Our desire is that we will discredit Shelton and frustrate his attempts by exposing his desires to the glare of publicity. The news release pointed out that Shelton is losing control of his subordinates and that Shelton is attempting to maintain control of the Klan by threats against anyone who criticizes him. The news release also pointed out that the Klan, which expresses patriotism and democratic ideals, must resort to gestapo-like tactics to hold its members in line.

The above are highlights of results of Bureau investigations into these matters. Many other disseminations made throughout 1970 have resulted in the curtailment of activity and disenchantment with the Klan and other white hate group organizations.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: Accomplishments of Research Section since last inspection follow.

Central Research Unit

This Unit has continued to perform a wide range of research and writing assignments, preparing various documents and special reports, most of which have been disseminated outside the Bureau as well as to our field offices. These have included the following:

An extensive special assignment on New Left research for the Director.

Statement by Director for use before President's Commission on Campus Unrest.

Issues (14) of Current Intelligence Analysis (CINAL), a periodic intelligence letter summarizing significant items of interest in the security field.

Issues (9) of The Extremist Speaks, a monthly compilation which shows the extremist views of right, left, and racially-oriented groups and individuals in the United States.

Monographs (7) setting out in-depth studies of significant factors in the security-intelligence field.

A comprehensive survey concerning the potential for racial violence, four (4) special reports for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and miscellaneous research assignments for the Division.

In addition, a number of special studies have been prepared in response to requests from the White House. These include:

A "Top Secret" study on domestic intelligence for the Inter-Agency Committee for Intelligence.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LJB:amt
4-E

An extensive brief, "Special Report, Nationwide Civil Disturbances," at the request of Vice President Agnew (revised periodically).

A study, "'Stop the Bombing' Campaign: A Communist Cause," at request of President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, concerning foreign influence in the 1964-68 campaign seeking a halt to U.S. bombing of North Vietnam.

"Top Secret" blind memoranda (3) for a special intelligence evaluation committee on extremist and terrorist groups in the U.S.

A "Secret" paper for the U.S. Intelligence Board analyzing "Racism, Radicalism, and Nationalism in the Caribbean."

This Unit has also collected and prepared material for various articles, speeches, and surveys, and has prepared special memoranda for the information of Bureau officials. Personnel of this Unit have handled lectures on the subjects of communism, the New Left movement, and racial extremism. These have consisted of classified lectures to Bureau's New Agents and In-Service classes, appearances before other intelligence agencies and National Academy classes, and a number of nonclassified lectures before civic, church, and law enforcement groups. Since last inspection, a total of 42 speeches have been handled involving outside groups.

Special Records Unit

Primarily responsible for records keeping, this Unit is also engaged in emergency planning. In addition, beginning in September, 1970, the Unit has prepared the Division's portion of the "Brief For Director's Use In Connection With Attorney General's Staff Conference," Thursdays, at 5 p.m.

Also beginning in September, 1970, this Unit has prepared the "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities," a weekly summary of racial extremist activities, which is disseminated to the White House, top Government officials, the intelligence community, and each field office. The White House has been highly commendatory of this paper, praising the content, format, and style. The Director approved an incentive award for the Agent who prepares the summary.

91

New Left Reporting Unit

This Unit, which coordinates covering of all New Left, student, and antiwar demonstrations throughout the country, has handled the reporting of the following major disruptions or demonstrations since the last inspection.

National demonstrations 4/14 –15/70 to protest the war and the payment of war taxes.

National Environmental Actions, which was held throughout the U.S. on 4/22/70.

Intensified and widespread student disruptions which occurred throughout the U.S. during the last part of April and during May, 1970.

A March on Washington on 5/9/70 to protest the invasion of Cambodia.

Nationwide demonstrations to protest the military, on 5/16/70.

A Yippies smoke-in at Washington, D. C., on 7/4/70. This also involved attempted disruption by the Yippies of the Honor America Day ceremonies.

The People's Army Jamboree, which was held at Portland, Oregon, 8/28-9/3/70, for the purpose of disrupting the National American Legion Convention.

The March for Victory, which was held at Washington, D. C., on 10/31/70 by Dr. Carl McIntire.

Demonstration against President Nixon, San Jose, California, 10/29/70.

Timely dissemination was made to the White House and the Attorney General, as well as other interested officials and agencies of the Executive Branch, concerning these demonstrations as well as nationwide agitation occurring on a daily basis throughout the country. Frequently, advance information was furnished to such officials and agencies pointing out likely trouble spots and predicting the possibility of violence.

In addition, a timely study concerning disruptive attacks on the courts was prepared and disseminated to high-level officials and interested agencies.

Racial Reporting Unit

This Unit, formerly called the Riot and Racial Disturbance Unit, has continued to coordinate all phases of racial disturbances and violence and other racial developments as well as information bearing on the potential for violence throughout the country. Voluminous material being reported on a daily basis by the field offices is reviewed, coordinated, and disseminated to interested officials and agencies and current teletype summaries are furnished to the White House, Attorney General, and other high-level officials. In the past year more than 5,500 memoranda and teletypes have been disseminated. Statistical data on racial disorders, school disorders, and attacks on police are maintained in this Unit for use in the preparation of special papers.

This Unit also prepares highly useful research studies concerning developments in the racial field. Since the last inspection, these have included special papers on the black action movement at racially harassed University of Michigan; a review of newly formed black extremist groups; numerous papers concerning provocative articles appearing in the Black Panther Party newspaper; a special paper for the Vice President concerning racial disturbances in Mississippi and Georgia; a study on racial disturbances in secondary schools in the 1969-70 school year; and a detailed account of advance information concerning the potential for violence in support of the Black Panther Party in New Haven, Connecticut, prepared for the Departmental Evaluation Committee. A detailed study on the extent of foreign influence in the black extremist movement, similar to that disseminated just after the last inspection, is presently being prepared for early dissemination.

In addition to the above, instructions in the Manual of Instructions and the FBI Handbook concerning the handling of general racial matters were completely revised and streamlined by this Unit since the last inspection.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E
NEW LEFT SECTION

SECTION CHIEF - R. L. SHACKELFORD: Attached are individual memoranda from each unit setting out the most noteworthy accomplishments of the New Left Section since the last inspection. This Section is responsible for the supervision of investigations of the New Left Movement including terrorist groups and individuals engaging in bombings, arson and assassinations, and other New Left groups and individuals both on college campuses and off campus. The development of New Left informants and investigations of New Left publications are also supervised in this Section as are sabotage investigations and counterintelligence operations against the New Left.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
HM:jlm
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

NEW LEFT GROUPS UNIT

The work of this unit concerns Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) factions (with the exception of Weatherman), other New Left campus groups, the Key Activist program, New Left Movement reports, New Left publications, New Left informants, and the maintenance of a library of "hand-out" material on the New Left for dissemination on a high level to Government officials and responsible citizens.

In 1969 Worker Student Alliance (WSA), Weatherman, and Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) factions of SDS split into separate groups. Accomplishments concerning Weatherman are reported elsewhere in this survey. The RYM faction of SDS is now practically defunct. Currently, the largest faction of SDS is WSA faction. WSA is dominated by the pro-Chinese, Marxist-Leninist Progressive Labor Party; and, while not as violent as Weatherman, is avowedly a revolutionary group.

Our efforts to achieve informant coverage in WSA showed results when WSA held its National Convention in Chicago in December, 1970. Approximately 20 Bureau informants attended this convention, and extensive information on activities at the convention was promptly reported and disseminated. Through informants, we have encouraged factionalism in WSA. At the convention, dissident groups led by one of our sources threatened a new split in SDS/WSA which may occur in the near future. Such dissension will reduce the possibility that SDS might once again become a massive student organization as it was before its division in 1969.

Through the Key Activist program, we have focused investigative attention on the leaders of the New Left movement with the aim of prosecuting these leaders under appropriate statutes, Federal or local, wherever possible.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
HM:maz
4-E

At the present time, we have designated 75 individuals as Key Activists. Of this number, 40 are currently the subject of prosecutive action. This has definitely severely disrupted the entire New Left movement as well as component New Left organizations.

Through the New Left Movement reports prepared quarterly by each field office, we have provided to interested agencies timely and informative documents on the activities of the New Left movement, thus making a substantial contribution to the objective that responsible officials be fully aware of the threat the New Left presents to our democratic society.

By closely following a myriad of New Left publications ranging from those merely pornographic to those clearly revolutionary, we have determined the leadership of these publications; their propensity for violence and subversive activities; sources of funds; and through dissemination have advised interested officials and agencies. Since these publications frequently appear and disappear within a short time, we are alert to the birth of new publications by following various underground news service lists as well as other documents and books which report new publications in this field.

We have recognized that in the past, informant coverage of New Left groups has not been adequate and accordingly have given great emphasis to this aspect of our responsibility. As a result, informant coverage in this area has been dramatically increased. At present, we have 900 informants and sources of all types providing coverage of the New Left. This number includes 178 security informants and 410 potential security informants.

Since the last inspection, New Left informants have provided information which has: led to the indictment of a number of New Left leaders on Federal and local charges; located fugitives including some Weatherman fugitives; provided advance information on numerous New Left demonstrations including plans for violence; and furnished detailed information on the organization, membership, and activities of a broad range of New Left groups.

The assistance of New Left informants has been invaluable, and we are continuing to emphasize the development of additional quality informants in this field.

Through the maintenance of a repository of "hand-out" materials and publications on the New Left for distribution to Government officials and responsible citizens, we have assisted these important individuals to more fully understand the subversive ramifications of the New Left movement.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - WEST

Since the Summer of 1969, New Left extremists have become increasingly identified as Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries, and have utilized extreme violence in effort to achieve their purpose. In the period since the last inspection, the prosecution of these revolutionaries has continued to be one of our primary objectives, to the end that individual terrorists are neutralized and their organizations are isolated; leaderless; and finally defunct. We have had significant accomplishments in this regard. On April 2, 1970, 12 leaders of Weatherman (the most violent faction of Students for a Democratic Society) were indicted in Chicago on Federal Antiriot Law (ARL) charges. Other Weatherman leaders were indicted on local charges and became Bureau fugitives. The Weatherman organization has gone underground and has taken extreme measures to avoid apprehension. Nevertheless, five of these Weatherman leaders have been located by the FBI as a result of investigations by Agents on New Left squads in the field and through the efforts of New Left informants.

On July 23, 1970, in Detroit, Michigan, indictments were obtained against 13 Weatherman leaders for violation of Federal bombing and gun control statutes. Five of these individuals have since been arrested or have surrendered.

Other Weatherman leaders remain in fugitive status and intensive efforts to locate them continue. Already these indictments and arrests have had a noticeable effect on the Weatherman organization. Bernardine Dohrn, a Weatherman leader who in May, 1970, had declared a state of war against the U. S. announced in December, 1970, that Weatherman had made a "military error" in tending to consider only "bombings and picking up the gun as revolutionary." Weatherman has learned, Dohrn said, that a group of "outlaws" who are isolated from the youth communities cannot grow to include large numbers of people.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
HM:maz/jlr
4-E

28

Weatherman and their ilk will doubtless try to organize wider support in the broad youth culture, most of which is not presently committed to violence. By the continuation of energetic efforts to prosecute the instigators of violence, we can increase the isolation of terrorist groups and reduce their influence on youth. This objective is being forcefully pursued wherever possible. In Seattle, a group of seven violence-prone individuals with Weatherman connections were tried in November and December, 1970, on Federal ARL; Conspiracy; and Destruction of Government Property charges. A mistrial in this case was declared December 10, 1970; however, due to the defendants' misconduct in court, all seven were cited for contempt. These Seattle indictments were made possible through New Left informant coverage.

The East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives, led by the notorious Berrigan brothers, has been the subject of intensive investigation since the last inspection. This group, which is masked as a religion-oriented peace group, has actually plotted kidnaping and violence. This matter has been presented to a Federal Grand Jury with the result that six individuals, including Philip Berrigan, were indicted on January 12, 1971. Seven other individuals, including Daniel Berrigan, were named by the Grand Jury as unindicted coconspirators.

Information set forth above referring to New Left extremists and the Weatherman organization also applies to work handled by the Special Investigations Unit - East.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS UNIT - EAST 4-E

The Venceremos Brigade (VB) came into being June, 1969, as a coalition of representatives from various New Left organizations including Students for a Democratic Society, Trotskyist Youth Socialist Alliance, the militant Black Panther Party and a supporting cast of Old Left organizations including the Communist Party, Progressive Labor Party and Socialist Workers Party.

Three contingents have traveled to Cuba since November, 1969. The first group was composed of 216 young Americans who obtained their own transportation to Cuba in defiance of the State Department ban on travel to that country. These young revolutionaries were returned to Canada at the expense of the Cuban Government which converted a cattle boat into a makeshift troop ship. This boat arrived in St. John, Canada, on February 12, 1970, and immediately loaded 687 sympathetic American youths aboard for its return trip to Cuba. This group, like the first contingent, worked in the sugar cane fields until its return by the same means of transportation on April 28, 1970. In August, 1970, the third contingent of the VB, made up of 407 persons, journeyed to the Isle of Youth where they participated in a Cuban agricultural experiment of planting and fertilizing citrus trees. This group returned to the U. S. mid-October, 1970.

Each group worked approximately $7\frac{1}{2}$ hours a day, $5\frac{1}{2}$ days a week, and in their free time were afforded the opportunity of absorbing communist propaganda offered by the Cubans, North Koreans and North Vietnamese. They were reminded by the Cuban camp director that they were here to show "solidarity with the socialist struggle, to smash the U. S. blockade, and to make a breach in the facade of the U. S. imperialist monster."

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71

FBS:amk
4-E

Each of the more than 1300 brigade members has been the subject of a security investigation which includes the identification and obtaining of background data as well as a personal interview with each brigade member. These investigations are being made to determine the immediate danger presented by these young revolutionaries and also to ascertain the long-range role they will take in the revolutionary movement in the U. S. Upon completion of the investigation and the interview of each of these individuals, the field must recommend either the inclusion or noninclusion of the subject in the Security Index. In addition the field must continue to report every 90 days for a period of one year on the activities and whereabouts of each brigade member.

Five approved Bureau informants accompanied the second VB, and the third VB also included in its ranks four Bureau approved informants. These sources have materially assisted the Bureau in discharging its intelligence responsibilities. While the security investigations of all brigade members are not completed, more than 100 VB participants have been placed in the Security Index and as we conclude these investigations it is anticipated numerous others will also be listed in this Index.

The fourth contingent of the VB is currently being organized and recruiting emphasis is being placed on "quality individuals" who have open outlooks and socialist backgrounds. This group is tentatively scheduled to depart for Cuba March 1, 1971, and is to be comprised of approximately 300 individuals. Information set forth above referring to the Venceremos Brigade also applies to work handled by the Special Investigations Unit - West.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SABOTAGE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS - EAST UNIT 4-E

Incidents of Sabotage have been on the rise since the mid-1960's, occasioned primarily by growing opposition throughout the country to the Selective Service System, the Armed Forces, and in particular to the war in Vietnam.

There are under investigation at the present time 7 Sabotage cases with prosecution pending involving 29 subjects who are charged with 43 separate violations including attempted Sabotage, Destruction of Government Property, Anti-Riot Law violation, Civil Rights violations, violation of the National Firearms Act, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Motor Vehicles, and Conspiracy. In connection with one of the above investigations, one subject in October, 1970, was found guilty and sentenced to five years, which sentence is being appealed, and another subject in November, 1970, pleaded guilty and is scheduled to be sentenced sometime in January, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
TJM:cae
4-E

ACCOMPLISHMENTS 4-E

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION

1. Persona Non Grata and other Removal Actions

Boris Mikhaylovich Orekhov was a correspondent in New York City for the Soviet newspaper "Pravda" from June, 1968, to July 7, 1970. Based on the results of FBI investigation, on the latter date he was expelled after the Department of State informed the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D. C., on June 24, 1970, that Orekhov had engaged in activities incompatible with his status as a journalist. His departure from the United States was requested. Orekhov departed July 7, 1970, depriving the Soviets of the presence in the U. S. of a very active intelligence officer.

In a similar case, also as a result of our investigations, on November 6, 1970, State informed the Soviets of the expulsion from the U. S. of Leonid Nikolayevich Zhegalov, a Washington, D. C., correspondent for the Soviet news agency "Tass." This action was in direct reciprocity for the expulsion from the USSR of a U. S. correspondent.

In an interesting and successful counterintelligence operation, the Soviets were forced to remove Yevgeniy Y. Yelshin, a KGB officer, from the United Nations Secretariat and send him home. Yelshin had been in contact with sources under our control in the aerospace field. In September, 1970, the "arrest" of one of our sources during a meet with Yelshin was staged. Subsequently, Yelshin was contacted by our Agents concerning his intelligence activities. Although Yelshin had not completed the term of his contract with the UN Secretariat, he returned home with his family, at Soviet expense, on 11/1/70.

In a pending case, our investigation has established violation of U. S. immigration laws by an individual known to be a KGB agent. He has denied affiliation with the Soviets, but has admitted immigration fraud. INS and State have initiated action to have him dismissed from the UN Secretariat and expelled from the U. S.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
4-E

Information we furnished to the Department of State apparently has prevented the return to the United States of two Polish commercial officials formerly assigned to New York City. We told State how the one, a Polish military intelligence officer, with the assistance of the other had since mid-1969 been very active in trying to purchase electronic equipment of defense significance and ship it to Poland in violation of export licensing requirements. On 3/27/70, State informed the Polish Ambassador to the U. S. that the activities of these two Poles must cease. Both left the country. We have subsequently learned through our sources that one, expected to return to U. S., has been reassigned and will not return. The other has not returned. Thus, the usefulness of two Polish agents in the U. S. was destroyed by our investigations.

2. Double Agents

One measure of our effectiveness in countering the activities of the intelligence personnel among the hundreds of communist bloc representatives in the U. S. is our ability to continue to develop and operate double agents against hostile agents. This is a matter of vital concern and continuous attention in the Espionage Section. Since the last inspection we have continued to improve our position in this regard, as the following chart shows:

Country	Active Double Agents			Potential Double Agents			Inactive Double Agents		
	4/1/70	12/1/70	Change	4/1	12/1	Chg	4/1	12/1	Chg
Soviet	67	74	+7	207	227	+20	34	33	-1
Albania	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Bulgaria	1	1	0	5	5	0	1	1	0
Czech	21	16	-5	13	14	+1	4	2	-2
East German	3	3	0	3	2	-1	3	3	0
Hungary	5	6	+1	5	3	-2	5	5	0
Poland	16	21	+5	25	25	0	2	3	+1
Romania	8	10	+2	7	10	+3	0	2	+2
Yugoslavia	2	2	0	12	10	-2	0	0	0
Totals	128	138	+10	277	296	+19	49	49	0

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld

4-F

It is obvious that despite the sophistication and security-consciousness of the Soviet Intelligence Services, our efforts to direct double agents against them continue to meet with conspicuous success. Examples of the productivity of our double agent operations appear elsewhere herein.

Some declines in the number of double agent operations against the intelligence services of countries other than the USSR handled by this section have occurred since the last inspection. In part, this may be a reflection of a change of emphasis in direction of our efforts, which has resulted in a reduction of the number of supervisors assigned to satellite, Albanian and Yugoslav matters. (In 4/70, nine full-time and one part-time supervisor were handling this work; at present there are four supervisors assigned to this work full time and three part time.) However, reference to the above chart shows that the bulk of the drop in the number of active and potential double agents has been in the Czech field. This is attributable primarily to two factors.

Following the occupation of Czechoslovakia (CSSR) by Soviet bloc armed forces in August, 1968, which resulted in the fall of the liberal Alexander Dubcek regime, the Communist Party of the CSSR began a critical analysis of all party members who had supported Dubcek. This analysis included individuals assigned to diplomatic posts in Washington and New York and resulted in the recall of about two-thirds of such personnel. A number were expelled or suspended from the Party. Of those recalled, several have not yet been replaced. The Chief Czech Intelligence Service (CIS) Resident in Washington was one of the latter. An extremely well placed source has reported that the purge, which began early in 1970, caused great anxiety among all the Czech personnel in Washington and New York and that morale dropped to rock bottom and, as consequence, little intelligence work was carried on during the current year. Naturally, with the CIS agents missing or dormant, our opportunities to target double agents against them diminished. This unsettled political situation, together with the overt defection of a CIS officer in Washington on 6/29/70, resulted in the CIS assuming a defensive posture and maintaining contact only with persons considered by them to be fully trustworthy. Indicative of the quality of our remaining double agents is the fact that CIS has held meets with two of our sources in the immediate past.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
4-E

The above chart, showing numbers of double agents at the time of the last inspection and at present tells only part of the story. It does not show that there is a continual process of review and analysis of double agent matters and close attention to field activity in this regard. We are constantly striving to weed out any "deadwood" and to introduce fresh blood into our counterespionage efforts. Presentation of precise figures on the turnover among double agents during the period since the last inspection is not feasible, because various offices have different reporting dates on which they inform the Bureau of additions and deletions of double agents in the various nationality fields. However, the following available figures clearly indicate desirable turnover. In the Soviet field, from March 1, 1970, to December 1, 1970, we added 41 active and potential double agents; a net increase of 30. In the other countries currently supervised in the Espionage Section, we added 28 active and potential double agents and dropped 17, a net gain of 11. Several of those dropped were used up in counterintelligence actions which terminated their active usefulness, and some left the country.

3. Counterintelligence and Other Significant Operations

In our eyes, counterintelligence activity is activity designed to disrupt and hamper the operations of an opposition intelligence service. Although it may involve harassment at times, it is for the most part much more serious and worthy of our efforts only when it inflicts actual damage on the effectiveness of the enemy. To this end, we employ our own capabilities and, whenever indicated and possible, those of other U. S. and other Government agencies. Following are some examples of this activity since the last inspection.

Upon instruction from us, one of our double agents told his Soviet handler, Vladimir Azaryan, an Amtorg Trading Corporation employee, that the FBI interviewed him and he admitted he had been contacting Azaryan and also his predecessor, Yuri Kitaev, a United Nations Secretariat employee. The double agent blamed Azaryan's ineptness for FBI interest. Azaryan obviously reported the matter to his superiors. Shortly thereafter, both Soviets left the United States, thus disrupting the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB).

As a result of Bureau counterintelligence action, an Aeroflot official who was a GRU officer was hurriedly removed from the U. S. under Soviet guard by the Soviets. In addition, an Intourist official, a suspected KGB officer, was also recalled from the U. S. because he was also blamed by the Soviets for the security breach involving the aforementioned Aeroflot official. Thus, one counterintelligence operation caused the removal from the U. S. of two Soviet Intelligence Service operatives.

In another operation a Soviet official assigned to Washington, a known KGB officer, was the principal in a Bureau double agent operation. With State Department clearance we confronted him during a meet with the double agent. He rejected our initial invitation to defect but analysis of information subsequently received indicated that he had not reported the approach. Again we contacted him and that time he acknowledged that he had personal problems and agreed to be contacted in the future. He has returned to the USSR on home leave and has agreed to meet with us again when he comes back to the U. S. There are indications that the delay in his return is due to his wife's illness. This operation continues to offer the possibility of his recruitment either here or abroad.

On the basis of information developed through one of our operations, two Argentinians were arrested in October, 1970, in Argentina as illegal Soviet agents. Our information is that they were targeted to ultimately operate in and against the U. S. Our effective handling of this matter stopped them before they even entered this country.

Based on information received from a well placed source, we recently identified a U. S. agent of the Soviets. In initial contact he has indicated a desire to cooperate with us and we plan to use him in a counterintelligence action against his Soviet principal. In another case, we developed sufficient information concerning the intelligence operations of Yuriy P. Vetrov that the U. S. Ambassador to the UN was able to inform his Soviet counterpart concerning Vetrov's activities. Vetrov was not the subject of persona non grata action because State did not want to give the Soviets the opportunity to expel one of our diplomats from Moscow and Vetrov was due to leave the U. S. However, the detailed information in our ambassador's possession must have caused considerable disruption of Soviet intelligence activities in the United Nations when our ambassador disclosed our knowledge of it.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
4-E

37

By letter to the Director 6/10/70, the U. S. Air Force expressed its appreciation for the invaluable contribution of Bureau personnel in supporting an OSI counterintelligence operation involving an East German Intelligence Service (EGIS) officer who came to the U. S. to service an Air Force double agent. We had been cooperating with Air Force in this case since 1965.

Information was obtained by one of our double agents against EGIS that EGIS has for some time been interested in penetrating State Department and is particularly interested in a State Department employee with whom our source is acquainted. We have furnished pertinent details to State and in December, 1970, State indicated that it was taking action to defensively brief the employee without pinpointing or jeopardizing our source. Such action should put us one step ahead in any attempt by EGIS or another bloc intelligence service to approach the employee.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:pld
4-E

On July 1, 1970, the State Department announced that Antonin Nenko, former Second Secretary, Czech Embassy, Washington, had defected and requested political asylum in the U. S. Nenko's action caused the termination of a highly successful and valuable operation we had been conducting against the CIS for some time. Nenko, a major in the Scientific and Technical Department of the CIS, had been working exclusively in the intelligence field since 1956, both in the United States and abroad. Prior to his overt defection, Nenko had been under our control furnishing detailed, highly significant information concerning Czech operations against the U. S. Although his overt defection is public knowledge, his activities as our defector-in-place have not been revealed, but the valuable information he furnished has been made available to interested Government agencies.

In 1969 a Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS) agent came to the U. S. as an immigrant. He has been under FBI control almost since his arrival. He was sent by HIS with instructions that he would ultimately take over the direction of HIS illegal agents in the United States. He has had several meetings with HIS handlers and the operation involving him includes the use of clandestine communications, meets in third countries, secret message drops and other sophisticated espionage techniques.

Not all of our responsibilities in the Espionage Section involve activity against hostile intelligence services. Among the immigrants from communist countries are many whose hostility to their former communist homelands is such, that given the opportunity, they would take violent action against representatives of their countries of origin. We have effected coverage of these nationality groups designed to permit us to alert responsible outside agencies to threats from such people. One example of our effectiveness in this regard occurred in connection with the visit of Yugoslav President Tito to Belgium in October, 1970. The Belgian Security Service (BSS) requested our cooperation in its efforts to protect Tito. In November, 1970, through Legat, Paris, we received a letter thanking the Bureau for its invaluable assistance in contributing to its successful handling, without serious incident, of the Tito visit. Because of our extensive coverage of anti-Tito Yugoslavs in the U. S., we had been able to furnish considerable information to the Belgians on possible troublemakers and to furnish prompt responses to specific inquiries.

Returning to our more usual counterespionage work, we developed and operated as a defector-in-place from July, 1969, until November, 1970, a Soviet official assigned to a Soviet establishment in New York City. This source, although not affiliated with Soviet intelligence, was able to furnish information of counterintelligence value and to identify members of the Soviet intelligence community. The source left the United States in November, 1970, but subsequently our New York Office received a communication from the source through a special channel. The communication indicated a possibility that the source may be able to cooperate with the U. S. Government in the future. This possibility is, of course, dependent upon the source's future Soviet assignments.

In October, 1970, the Internal Security Division of the Department informed us that the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security was concerned with the espionage and intelligence activities of Soviets employed at the United Nations Secretariat (UNSEC). We were requested to prepare a paper concerning such activities. The paper was furnished to the Department and to State during November, 1970. We have now been informed that based on our information U. S. Ambassador Phillips at the United Nations is considering placing certain restrictions in effect concerning the travel of Soviet nationals assigned to UNSEC. Should this take place, our efforts in this matter could definitely lead to more effective and efficient coverage of these Soviet intelligence personnel by the Bureau.

Coverage of a Soviet establishment, Washington, D.C., revealed Soviets had constructed a ten-foot-square opening in the roof, covered by a door on rollers. Monitoring detected a pattern of opening of the roof. Use of sophisticated laboratory technical equipment enabled the National Security Agency (NSA) to determine Soviets were using the opening in the roof in an operation to improve accuracy of guidance system of Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles targeted against the United States. NSA and the Defense Intelligence Agency have stated that this extremely valuable positive intelligence had not previously been developed any place in the world.

Another counterintelligence operation which has been conducted against the Soviets since 1966 took a novel turn since the last inspection. We had been using this operation to pass disinformation to the Soviets using material provided by the Air Force. In May, 1970, we arranged for a Bureau Agent to meet with a Soviet, in place of the former double agent. This May meeting was the product of prior arrangements engineered to have the new Soviet handler accept our Agent as his predecessor's former contact. The Soviet who appeared at the May meeting had not been previously known to be an intelligence officer. He gave the double agent instructions for future operations and we continued to pass Air Force material. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are interested and involved in supporting this operation. Since we substituted an FBI Agent for the original double agent, we have obtained sophisticated espionage paraphernalia not previously acquired in our other operations against the Soviets and we have received over $5,000 of Soviet funds.

In another sensitive double agent operation, conducted against the Soviets for almost 12 years, we have been passing disinformation supplied by the Joint Chief of Staff to the Soviets. Army analysis of the results of this operation indicates that it has caused the Soviets to commit one and a half billion dollars to an attempt to counteract the purported U. S. military capability described in the material we have passed. As recently as December, 1970, word has been received from the Soviets that they plan to continue this operation and may use an illegal agent to do so. We have also received from the Soviets in this operation over $42,000.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPT:as
4-E

4. Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA) and Other Prosecutive Action

On April 17, 1970, the Internal Security Division of the Department, based on our investigation, agreed to solicit the registration of Robert Charles Owens III under the FARA, as an agent of the USSR.

On October 21, 1970, the registration of Endre Kertesz under Title 50, U. S. Code, Sections 851-857, in which he described his assignment for the Hungarian Intelligence Service (HIS), was secured by the Department. This was the result of our investigation of Kertesz, a Hungarian immigrant who admitted he had been given an assignment by HIS to gather information concerning missile sites in the U. S.

In our exploitation of a defector from the Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS), we obtained information that the Yugoslavs had recruited a French military intelligence employee. Based on our information and follow-up investigation by French authorities, the French official, Eugene Rousseau, was convicted of espionage in April, 1970. In December, 1970, the Supreme Court in Paris, France, upheld his sentence of 15 years.

5. Recoveries

In many of our double agent operations the double agents receive payments from the foreign intelligence service well in excess of our expenses in conducting the operations. As such operations are concluded, we turn over the balance of monies received to the U. S. Treasury. Since the last inspection, we have turned over to the Treasury, as a result of these operations, over $16,000.

42

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The key to developing racial information on a regular and current basis is the operation and development of quality informants along with intensified investigation. In this regard we have increased the number of our racial informants since the last Inspection by 1,699 which brings our total number of informants to 7,184. In addition, we are continually intensifying our investigations and in line with our need for closer coverage of key black extremists, we instituted by airtel dated 12-23-70 the Key Black Extremist Program.

Racial informants have been furnishing a steady flow of valuable racial information which information has brought about the apprehension of badly wanted extremist fugitives, the confiscation of explosives and firearms in the possession of extremists, the prevention of violence and the saving of lives. In addition, these informants furnished valuable racial intelligence on a regular basis which intelligence included information concerning foreign influence, the Black Panther Party (BPP) underground as well as discussions by extremists as to South American style kidnapping of government officials and threats to kill the President.

It is significant to note that since the last Inspection racial informants have been responsible for bringing about the arrest of 510 individuals, 342 of which were local arrests and 168 Federal arrests as well as being responsible for the recovery of $330,179.03.

In order to improve our investigations and racial informant coverage in addition to our regular supervision furnished from the Seat of Government we held a two-day conference with racial supervisors from 39 field offices plus two legal attaches. The topics discussed at the conference covered the entire spectrum of the problems inherent in investigating and

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
1-12-71
JGD:bad
4-E

developing informants in the BPP as well as related extremist matters. These topics included detailed discussion concerning the need for full penetration of extremist groups to obtain information concerning terroristic activities which may be aimed against Government officials. In addition, the conference took note that maximum attention should be given to the extremist activities in Canada in connection with our investigations as well as intensifying our investigations having international ramifications.

The above items, along with other items affecting counterintelligence against extremists, the BPP underground activities and intensified investigations were fully discussed. Concrete suggestions were obtained from this conference and were subjects of individual memoranda which were approved thereby increasing the efficiency of our investigations and informant development.

Some of the above-approved suggestions are as follows:

1. Proposal to identify escape routes utilized by black extremists to flee the United States by utilizing a Bureau racial informant as a decoy.

2. Intensify BPP underground investigations including making available to select field offices copies of the film "The Battle of Algiers," which sets forth guerrilla warfare tactics used successfully by the National Liberation Front and which is now being studied and copied by the BPP.

3. Granting approval for Special Agents in Charge on their own initiative to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except where such appearances are at educational institutions.

4. Obtaining approval to reproduce an article by Victor Riesel, noted labor columnist, which article was highly critical of the BPP and set forth a proposal by a union member that unions affiliated with the freight handlers who handle the BPP newspaper shipments refuse to handle these papers.

5. Obtaining approval for a racial and New Left extremist activities In-Service classes.

6. Obtaining approval for the deletion of the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitive List from the Black Nationalist Movement in the United States Racial Calendar and transmitting this to the field by separate letter in order to give greater emphasis to these fugitive investigations.

7. Obtaining approval for revising the Agitator Index by deleting those individuals who are also included on the Security Index.

In addition to the above, there are other suggestions made by the attendees at the conference and approved by the Director which will assist in streamlining the overall investigative and informant development operation as well as making these operations more effective.

Some of the concrete examples of our informant and investigative accomplishments can be seen in the following:

Through our investigations, we have currently identified and closely scrutinized the activities of the 43 branches of the BPP which covers an area of 31 states and the District of Columbia. These investigations reveal that the BPP membership has increased to 1,000 hard-core members which is an increase of 250 in the last six months.

As a result of our investigations and informant penetration along with the cooperation with local authorities, 408 BPP members have been arrested on either Federal or local charges during 1970.

Racial informants in the Los Angeles and Chicago Divisions were successful in penetrating the BPP underground and now will be in a position to furnish information on BPP underground activities.

In connection with underground activities, a Dallas racial informant furnished the information which brought about the arrest of Elmer Gerard Pratt, a Los Angeles BPP leader and an alleged leader in the underground. Pratt's arrest along with the arrest of four other of his associates enabled us to obtain possession of documents apparently relating to the BPP underground and should give us knowledge concerning it and the possible identities of others involved in this underground operation.

In early June, 1970, efforts were made to establish a National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF) chapter, which is another name for a BPP chapter in Tampa, Florida. Through aggressive investigation, including thorough interrogation of all known members, the development of a top-level informant and effective use of information provided by this informant, Tampa Office was successful in decimating this group to the point where it is now floundering, nameless and without leadership and there is no indication of support for the BPP in that area.

The Black Afro Militant Movement (BAMM) was organized in the Miami Division in the early part of 1970. The leader of this group was Alfred Dwight Amos Featherston, an articulate black extremist and an admitted communist who has in the past, visited Fidel Castro in Cuba. Through the outstanding informant coverage developed by the Miami Office and the aggressive investigative techniques used, this organization for all intent and purposes, rendered inactive by the latter part of 1970. During 1970, BAMM engaged in an intensive recruiting program in the Miami area directed toward young blacks, formed an action group which participated in a number of fire bombings in the Miami area including one such bombing at the University of Miami. Through informant coverage and other investigative activities, the Miami Division developed an excellent case involving the teaching and demonstrating of explosive devices and in December the Departmental Attorneys presented this matter to a Federal Grand Jury in Miami resulting in Featherston, Charles Reiley and Jerome Trapp being indicted under the new antiriot laws dealing with the teaching and making of incendiary devices. This is the first such case brought under the new statute charging black extremists with this particular violation.

A Detroit racial informant furnished advanced information regarding planned ambush of Detroit police officers which, when furnished to Detroit Police Department, enabled them to take necessary action to prevent injury or death to the officers and resulted in the arrest of eight persons and the seizure of a cache of weapons. Informant also furnished information resulting in the location and confiscation by Bureau Agents of approximately 50 sticks of dynamite available to BPP and likely resulted in saving of lives and preventing possible property damage.

A Chicago racial informant furnished information which identified an individual who is a member of the BPP as the person who raped and shot a middle aged white housewife and then pistol whipped her husband in Chicago on 12-25-70. The same Chicago informant furnished information which resulted in the identification of an individual who was responsible for the murder of a police officer in Carbondale, Illinois.

A Springfield ghetto informant furnished information concerning an individual who was attempting to sell explosives for $2,000. This information enabled local authorities to apprehend the individual and confiscate 100 lbs. of explosives.

A Boston racial informant made a verbatim recording of a speech by a BPP member where he indicated the Panthers should utilize South American style kidnappings in order to effect the release of Panther political prisoners.

A Norfolk racial informant furnished daily information relating to a demonstration at Norfolk State College 5/8-18/70. During this demonstration she reported the Student Government President at the college threatened to kill President Nixon and observed another student burning the American flag. Based on this information, Secret Service is considering prosecution against the Student Government President and local police are prosecuting the student who burned the flag.

A New York informant furnished the identities of black extremists who were scheduled to depart the U.S. for Al Fatah camp in the Middle East for possible guerrilla training.

In discussing the accomplishments of the Racial Intelligence Section, it is felt that comment should be made concerning the contributions regularly being made by the Inspection Division during their analysis of the racial investigations in the various field divisions. In addition to acting upon information furnished to them by this Section, the Inspection Staff through their on-the-spot review of racial intelligence matters in the field are often able to detect weaknesses not apparent at the Seat of Government and offer constructive assistance to the office involved in strengthening their operations.

In reviewing the racial surveys prepared by the Inspection Division, we regularly note concrete guidance being afforded field offices. Examples can be found in recent instructions given during the inspection of the Mobile Office to direct two existing informants to seek membership in the Nation of Islam (NOI). These instructions were implemented and both informants currently report on NOI activities and have membership applications pending.

During a recent Cleveland inspection, the Inspectors gave instructions for the Cleveland Office to develop informants in a leadership position with the Cleveland National Committee to Combat Fascism (NCCF). As a result of these instructions, Cleveland has been successful in developing two informants within this organization both of whom are furnishing valuable information on the structural composition of the organization, staff members and proposed activities. One of these informants is a member of the security cadre of the Cleveland NCCF and as such has furnished valuable information concerning firearms in possession of members of this group.

Racial intelligence gathered through our informants and investigations makes up a major portion of the Bureau's sophisticated document which is disseminated to the White House and other high level Government agencies. This document captioned "FBI Summary of Extremist Activities" furnishes the White House and other agencies with a digest of the racial picture.

The quality of our racial informants can also be judged by the fact that since the last Inspection, 26 Special Agents in various field divisions were recommended for incentive awards for their work in developing informants and 15 racial informants were given bonus awards for valuable information they furnished and services performed.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

O'Connell

4-E

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

There is attached a summary of significant accomplishments of this Section set forth by individual Units. Specific tangible accomplishments resulting from programs supervised by this Section are outlined in write-ups separately submitted and will not be repeated herein.

Nationality Unit

Israeli and Middle East Investigations

Prior to the beginning of the 25th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, this Unit recognized the vulnerability of the large concentration of foreign diplomats attending the Session to acts of terrorism and demonstrations originating with groups dissenting with the incumbent regimes of the countries represented. We issued appropriate instructions to the field to alert sources and provide information immediately which would indicate a threat to the physical security or well being of these dignitaries who were coming to the United States for the Commemorative Session of the United Nations. Subsequent to this action, the White House similarly recognized the potential danger of embarrassment to the United States as host country for the United Nations if incidents occurred, and called on the Bureau to cooperate fully with United States Secret Service to uncover such incidents and provide full security for the chiefs of state and missions resident in New York City during the commemorative celebration. We established a system of liaison with United States Secret Service command post in New York City, as well as intensifying our liaison with New York City police and United States Mission to the United Nations. A flow of information from our sources was furnished to the interested agencies locally and to the intelligence community at a national level which resulted in laudatory comments by Secret Service liaison personnel who commented favorably on the Bureau's assistance in completing the Presidentially ordered mission of United States Secret Service in providing security for the officials mentioned.

During the same period of the 25th General Assembly of the United Nations, we furnished a continuing flow of information to the United States United Nations Mission regarding the the tense Middle East situation and developments related to peace talks instituted by the United States and carried out by United Nations officials. The data furnished to the United States United Nations Mission resulted in the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost, advising the Director by letter dated 11/13/70 of his desire to pay special tribute to Agents of this Bureau who had provided him with swift and accurate reports which he had found helpful and which provided him with privileged insight and perspective into the maneuverings during the 25th Session.

In the Israeli field we have continued to furnish information from our sensitive coverage under a program of dissemination which has been assigned the security designation of "SCOPE." "SCOPE" information is furnished only to select individuals at the White House and to a previously cleared chain of command within agencies of the intelligence community. These data relate to attempts by officials of the Israeli Government to obtain favorable reaction within United States Government circles for Israeli Government support including economic and military assistance. The personalities involved in these dealings have included prominent members of the United States Congress as well as individuals within the executive arm of our Government. Favorable comment has been forthcoming from Dr. Kissinger at the White House, from the Secretary of State and from other dignitaries within the intelligence community who have been privy to this "SCOPE" information relative to its timeliness and value to them in formulating policy decisions within our Government.

Miscellaneous Programs

This Unit has the supervisory responsibility for extremely sensitive operations undertaken in cooperation with the National Security Agency (NSA) designed to enhance our nation's capability to infiltrate the diplomatic communications of foreign governments. Our first significant breakthrough in this area occurred in 1968 and resulted in NSA estimate of $200,000 annually in evaluating the product of our coverage. We have realized continued success in this sensitive area with two additional successes since the last inspection for a total of four nationality areas being totally covered by the Bureau at this time. Dr. Louis W. Tordella, Acting Director, NSA, by letter dated 11/10/70, commented most favorably on the productivity of our program in this area, noting that our coverage provided information of priority concern to the NSA which would be otherwise unobtainable to the United States Government. In view of the extreme sensitivity of this information, it is suggested that either I or my Number One Man be consulted for further details.

In the miscellaneous espionage area a decided accomplishment was attained with close of investigation relating to Vernon Edward Thompson of Santa Barbara, California. In September and October, 1970, high officials of the intelligence and military communities, cabinet members, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger and Mr. Herbert J. Klein of the White House Staff and other highly placed United States Government officials began receiving cryptogram messages which, after decryption, disclosed implication of bombings of certain major cities on 11/29/70. Content of the messages revealed that the writer was privy to intelligence information and possibly had knowledge of United States nuclear weapon deployment. The receipt of these messages was the object of extreme concern by the recipients and resulted in our investigation.

Through outstandingly aggressive and imaginative investigation and with a dearth of investigative leads, the Los Angeles Office successfully identified the typewriter on which the messages were being prepared as being located in a library in the Santa Barbara area. Discreet and productive surveillance was conducted, which resulted in identification of Thompson and his neutralization as a point of anxiety and concern on the part of the highest level of officials in the executive branch and in the intelligence community. We are now awaiting a decision as to prosecution after review of the details of this matter by the Criminal Division of the Department.

The President has noted the paucity of positive intelligence information available to him for high-level policy decisions. We have recognized our responsibilities in this area through intensified coverage in the nationality fields supervised by this Unit as illustrated in the increase of establishments being afforded sensitive coverage and through the increase of our live informant coverage targeted against the nations involved. Three of the six new foreign liaison posts established recently by the Bureau involve countries within the area of responsibility of this Unit and information from those liaison posts should add to the production of our foreign intelligence information in response to President Nixon's requirements.

CUBAN UNIT

Our sustained pressure on Cuban Intelligence Service (CuIS) operations in the U.S. resulted in the recall to Cuba of three very experienced CuIS officers in April, 1970. They had been serving as officials of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN) and their withdrawal was in line with information provided by a CIA source to the effect that the Cuban Government planned to recall any personnel whom it believed were susceptible to persona non grata action by the U.S. State Department.

Based on FBI information, a leading Puerto Rican terrorist in New York City (Carlos Feliciano Vasquez) was apprehended by the New York City Police Department on May 16, 1970, while in the process of placing a bomb in an Armed Forces recruiting station.

After being confronted by us in early August, 1970, a very attractive and sexually permissive employee of the South African Embassy, Washington, D.C., admitted her deep involvement with the CuIS. She had furnished the Cubans data concerning American and foreign officials with whom she was in social contact. After becoming sexually involved with a State Department protocol officer in March, 1970, she was able to gain entree to diplomatic functions where she met ranking officials and employees of the U.S. and foreign governments. Our investigation indicated she was unable to establish contact with her principal to furnish information concerning the dignitaries she met following her involvement with the protocol officer and she voluntarily returned home to South Africa shortly after our interview of her. Her name is Jennifer Enid Miles.

A San Juan Office source was primarily responsible for developing information leading to the conviction on 8/26/70 of four Socialist Workers Party (PSO) leaders in Puerto Rico. The information developed by our source enabled the Police of Puerto Rico to arrest a total of nine PSO members. The PSO has been active in the wave of bombings taking place in Puerto Rico and the arrests were for violations of the Puerto Rican Explosives Law.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
1/12/71
RAM:dlw
4-E

During the Summer of 1970 a counterintelligence program aimed at creating dissension was instituted by our San Juan Office against the activist Puerto Rican Socialist League (LSP). On October 10, 1970, a high-placed Miami security informant reported the LSP was showing signs of grinding to a halt and that it recently experienced a severe split away from its youth group. Our counterintelligence move was directly responsible for the havoc occurring in the LSP.

As a result of disclosures made by Jennifer Enid Miles and other corroborative evidence developed by New York and Washington Field Office, we were able to have State Department declare persona non grata the two highest ranking CuIS officials in the U.S. on October 9, 1970. Counsellor Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez and First Secretary Orlando Prendes Gutierrez of the CMUN were the individuals involved and they made a total of seven against whom similar action has been taken by State Department since February, 1968, based on FBI investigations of CMUN personnel.

On October 10, 1970, Filiberto Ojeda Rios, a known Cuban espionage agent and a Bureau fugitive, was apprehended by FBI agents and the Police of Puerto Rico. Ojeda, leader of the Puerto Rican Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA), had been the prime mover behind the wave of violence and terrorist bombings which has occurred for many months in Puerto Rico. Documents found at his hideout definitely confirmed the close collaboration between the Cuban Government and Puerto Rican terrorist groups.

On October 19, 1970, an intensification program was instituted by our Miami Office based on instructions from the Bureau aimed at identifying CuIS agents in the Miami area who are believed to be tipping off Castro concerning infiltration efforts by anti-Castro refugees in the U.S. A coordinator had been made responsible for directing these efforts and progress has been made in eliminating certain suspects as well as developing valuable background regarding other logical suspects.

In December, 1970, an actual member of the clandestine MIRA organization, previously mentioned, was developed as an informant. This is the first informant to be in a position to get inside information regarding the group's plans and we previously had to depend on "fringe" sources to cover this very dangerous terrorist group.

Since our intensification program directed against the CMUN was begun in February, 1970, we have been able to institute some sensitive coverage for a period of six months, have installed equipment which can monitor handie-talkie radios used by CuIS personnel, have learned that CuIS personnel carry arms at all times, and have developed sources in a position to keep us advised as to the activities of such personnel on a 24-hour basis.

ACCOMPLISHMENTS

MIDDLE AND SOUTH AMERICAN UNIT

The President and other policy makers have a continuing interest in current political matters affecting Central and South America. We have provided officials in the Executive Branch of the Government on a continuing basis with information concerning the activities of political figures and leftist groups in a number of Latin American nations. Of particular significance was information concerning the activities of Arnulfo Arias Madrid, deposed Panamanian President residing in Miami, Florida, who is planning the overthrow of the current Panamanian Government. In an effort to provide the President and other policy makers with even more such information, we have recently expanded our coverage in the Chilean, Peruvian and Bolivian fields.

The unit continues to be successful in thwarting plans of militant anti-Castro groups which have sought to infiltrate Cuba and to attack ships and property of foreign nations engaged in trade with Cuba. Successful development of key informants who have infiltrated anti-Castro groups under Bureau direction has enabled the Bureau to keep abreast of their activities and often to have advance knowledge of the plans of these groups enabling us to take appropriate action to prevent such activities. An outstanding example of our success in this area was the thwarting of two militant anti-Castro attempts in July, 1970, to infiltrate Cuba and the seizure of boats, arms, ammunition and miscellaneous military equipment valued at $64,500 by U. S. authorities.

THE CHINESE UNIT 4-E

As a result of our close cooperation with RCMP, that agency, in 12/70, provided us with details of one of its double agent operations which clearly depicted intensification of Chinese communist (Chicom) intelligence efforts directed against the United States. We learned that the Chicoms have funded travel of the RCMP source to New York and Washington, D.C., where the source undertook to fulfill intelligence contacts and development of data for the Chicoms. As a result of getting this information, we learned that Chicoms desire to lay the foundation to get "our people" (Chicoms) into the United States under suitable cover, probably when the Chicom Embassy opens in Canada in the very near future. The Director's letter to the Commissioner, RCMP, expressed appreciation for RCMP information.

During August, 1970, three of our Chinese informants made contacts with Chicom intelligence representatives in Hong Kong and Canada, and it is believed they were affirmatively assessed for recruitment. Another source has made several trips to Vancouver, Canada, and San Francisco where he has made strides to penetrate Chicom groups which would be essential bases for future Chicom operations directed against the United States.

In August, 1970, National Security Agency (NSA) advised of increased interceptions of radio transmissions from Red China directed to illegal agents possibly in the United States. Immediate instructions were directed to appropriate field offices and efforts are under way to pinpoint areas of reception with the expectation that illegal agents will be uncovered.

Investigations have developed data indicating possible Chicom intelligence net formed in New York City utilizing Chinese seamen deserters as mail drops and/or couriers.

We identified a Chinese alien residing in New Jersey as an individual who provided an intelligence report to the New China News Agency (NCNA) representative in Canada. The NCNA representative has previously been identified as a Chicom Intelligence Service officer. The alien indicated he had a sub-agent working for him in New York City.

EXO:dgo
1/13/71
4-E

In view of the apparent upsurge in Chicom activity we furnished a detailed memorandum to Dr. Kissinger at the White House and to the Attorney General under date of 9/30/70. Our memorandum outlined the recent activities of Chicom in the intelligence field and pointed out increasing Chicom support for New Left and Black militant revolutionaries in this country.

We furnished information to State, Central Intelligence Agency and Secret Service which led to strengthening of guard and security around CHIANG Ching-Kuo, Deputy Prime Minister of Nationalist China and son of CHIANG Kai-shek, who was in the United States during April, 1970. As a result of this increased security, an attempt by two anti-Chinese nationalist individuals to assassinate CHIANG was thwarted.

Our investigations of the World United Formosans for Independence (WUFI) and Taiwan Independence Movement (TIM) developed information of growing Chicom interest in these groups indicating Chicoms might desire to cooperate with them to bring about the downfall of the Chinese Nationalist Government.

Positive information has been developed regarding the intelligence activities of pro-Chicom individuals assigned to the United Nations Secretariat. Our close coverage determined that the three most active of these individuals recently traveled to Europe, and coverage of their activities has been requested through contacts of Legat, Bern.

We have initiated an effort in four key field offices to develop sources among ethnic Chinese scientists having security clearance and who are logical Chicom targets. We were assisted in this effort by Defense Industrial Security Office.

We brought to attention of the White House and Secretary of State Rogers information regarding an anti-Chinese nationalist individual who had escaped house arrest in Taiwan, fled to Sweden and who later applied for U. S. visa. His presence in the United States could have adversely affected United States-Chinese Nationalist relations. Secretary of State Rogers took personal note of this information in a letter to the Director 10/28/70.

Other investigations indicated intensified Chicom interest in and support of radicals in the United States.

5-9

SPECIAL COORDINATION UNIT

During December, 1970, six new foreign offices were established. As a result of personnel moves, 19 Special Agents and 16 clerks were transferred to foreign offices each requiring passport, visa, and Department of State and Embassy notification. The numerous contacts with State and the outgoing letters (two for each person transferred) were handled in this Unit, together with the memoranda and notification to the White House regarding various phases of the operation. A special one-week indoctrination session was arranged and attended by most of the new Special Agent personnel. The Director's instructions that the expansion take place were issued 11-20-70. Each of the new offices was open and operating during December, 1970.

Through liaison with appropriate officials at the White House, the interest of those officials in proposed legislation which would provide increased retirement benefits for FBI personnel has been maintained. The advice of these officials concerning channels to be used in promoting this legislation was secured and has been followed.

Since the last inspection, SA Haynes has expedited and coordinated visits of the Director to the White House on approximately six occasions. This has included meeting the Director, taking him to the meeting site, introducing him to persons present if not known to him, and assuring his return to his car by the most direct route following the meeting.

Through carefully controlled contacts with the Commission on Campus Unrest, it was possible to secure a copy of their report in advance in order to insure that there were no unfavorable comments concerning the FBI. The left-wing staff of this Commission was very active in areas of direct interest to the Bureau, and SA Haynes was able to avoid any conflict and there were no derogatory references to our work made by this group.

Direct personal liaison was established during the period with Washington representatives of two additional countries: The Union of South Africa and Japan. The representative of the Bureau for State Security of the former and of the National Police Agency of the latter are now working directly with representatives of the Unit.

Swiss Police asked Bureau assistance in establishing the location of Yoseph Gargy, w.a., who had secured more than $400,000 in an armed robbery of a jewelry store in Zurich. The loot was recovered in Italy, and investigation under the Foreign Police Cooperation character resulted in the location of Gargy in the United States. We arranged for his arrest by other authorities so that he might be held for extradition.

During the calendar year 1970, Agents on the Foreign Liaison Desk handled 822 foreign visitors. These included not only special tours of Bureau facilities but also, in many instances, special conferences with Bureau officials, including the Director, and other courtesies for these contacts of our Legal Attache personnel.

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You are requested to furnish information regarding various surveys, projects and/or programs in effect in your Division. This information should include identity of the project or program, background and date of inception, scope and desired objectives, positive results achieved since last inspection, extent and nature of current supervision, current justification for continuance, and frequency of evaluation and date of last justification. Identify any surveys, projects or programs you have in operation that are not set forth in my request. In addition, identify any surveys, projects and programs completed or discontinued since the last inspection. Identify only investigative-type matters in this category.

Each of these projects or programs should be separately captioned and prepared in such manner that your comments regarding each topic are separate from comments on any other topic. Your comments are specifically requested on the following topics and any new programs instituted since the last inspection or other topics not included herein you may wish to comment on:

1. Security Index Program.
2. Security Informants.
3. Racial Matters.
4. Racial Informants.
5. Technical and Microphone Surveillances.
6. Counterintelligence.
7. Minutemen, Klan and other hate groups.
8. Nation of Islam.
9. Communist infiltration of racial groups.
10. New Left Movement.
11. Espionage.
12. Any other program deemed pertinent.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached are write-ups from each Section concerning the above.
(JAS:mls 1/15/71)

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

SECTION CHIEF ARBOR W. GRAY: In connection with the Inspector's request under above title, write-ups are attached relating to the following handled by the Internal Security Section:

- (1) Security Index Program
- (2) Security Informant Program
- (6) & (7) Counterintelligence Program - Disruption of White Hate Groups
- (12) Other Programs Deemed Pertinent
    - (a) Thumbnail Sketch Program

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
SFP:lmj
4-H

8

SECURITY INDEX PROGRAM 4-H
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION

Studies pertaining to the handling of individuals who in time of an emergency would represent a potential threat to the national security began prior to World War II. The actual program began in June, 1940, and dealt mainly with lists of individuals considered for detention in the event of a threat to the national security.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program is field-wide in scope. The goal of the Security Index (SI) Program is the identification of individuals who because of their membership and activity and/or association with subversive organizations are dangerous or potentially dangerous to the internal security of the country. The program includes the collection of sufficient information relating to the activities of such individuals to justify their apprehension and detention in the event of a national emergency. Another goal of the SI is to maintain it in a current status in the event immediate implementation is necessary to minimize possibilities of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED SINCE LAST INSPECTION

By way of background, in February, 1969, as a matter of temporary expediency, the Executives Conference approved a moratorium on certain Security Matter - Communist investigations and periodic report writing in Priority II and Priority III Security Index cases; moratorium later extended to January 1, 1971. By memorandum October 29, 1970, from the Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson, approved by the Director, the moratorium was lifted. At the time there were approximately 10,690 individuals on the SI who were of the Priority II and III types. Virtually no investigation had been conducted regarding approximately 7,000 of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
SFP:lmj
4-H

February, 1969. Many of these persons had changed residence and/or employment and their whereabouts were unknown. It can thus be seen that the lifting of the moratorium was an aggressive, timely and precise step toward fulfilling our current responsibilities, especially in knowing the whereabouts of these individuals. Implementation was directed by airtel November 3, 1970, to all offices, and in doing so we took a realistic step in permitting the field to stagger the reopening of these cases so that they would be spread out over the period November 3, 1970, to June 30, 1971. This was considered essential in view of our approximation that it would be necessary to reopen approximately 7,000 of the Priority II and III types.

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION

Responsibility for administrative handling of the SI rests with the Special Records Unit of the Research Section. Responsibility for individual cases rests with appropriate supervisory personnel. I personally follow this matter closely to insure it is current and that necessary changes are made where desirable. This program receives constant supervision.

JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

This is a major internal security program based upon Title II of the Internal Security Act of 1950 and is to be implemented in the event of a national emergency to minimize acts of espionage, sabotage and subversion.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION

The SI Program is constantly being re-evaluated. The most recent justification is contained in memorandum from Charles D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan dated January 8, 1970, and as of instant date (January 12, 1971) a current rejustification memorandum is in preparation.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
SFP:lmj
4-H

SECURITY INFORMANT PROGRAM
BASIC REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS

At the time of the last inspection in April, 1970, we had 279 member security informants in the Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), while at the present time we have 264 member informants in the CPUSA, a decrease of 15. In addition, there are 31 member informants in the Socialist Workers Party (SWP); the number of SWP informants at last inspection is not known.

On December 16, 1970, a reorganization of Sections within the Division resulted in a realignment of informant handling and record keeping, with the result that only informants in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups are now handled in the Internal Security Section. As of December 16, 1970, there were 578 informants in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. The number at last inspection is not known.

There has been continuing recognition of the fact that there must be no letdown in maintaining adequate informant coverage in basic revolutionary organizations. In this regard, SAC Letter 70-40 dated August 4, 1970, captioned "Racial and Security Informants," pointed out in-depth quality informants in these fields are more imperative than ever under present conditions in view of the upsurge in violence. SAC Letter 70-48 dated September 15, 1970, captioned "Security and Racial Informants," pointed out that never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage. This SAC Letter authorized development of informants between the ages of 18 and 21, thus presenting the field with a tremendous opportunity to expand informant coverage not only among violence-prone New Left and radical groups, but also in the basic revolutionary groups as well. There can be no doubt but that these instructions have stimulated development of informants.

Security informant development receives continuous supervision. It is not technically a program justified annually, but rather a fundamental procedure in our investigative operations that requires and receives vigorous day-to-day attention.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEM:mkl
4-H

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - DISRUPTION OF WHITE HATE GROUPS 4-H

BACKGROUND, DATE OF INCEPTION AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES

This program was initiated in September, 1964, for the purpose of exposing, disrupting and otherwise neutralizing activities of white extremist organizations, their leaders and adherents. There are currently 17 field offices regularly participating in this program and as specific situations arise other divisions also participate.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED

The following are highlights of accomplishments achieved through this program since last inspection: A racial informant of the Birmingham Division has been able to influence Robert Shelton, leader of the largest Klan group, United Klans of America, Inc., (UKA), to be more moderate in his speeches by opposing violence and stressing need for law and order as well as continuing his acts against communism. This has been effective in toning down Klan violence.

Midwest coordinator of National Socialist White People's Party, formerly known as American Nazi Party, was expelled from that organization after publicity furnished under this program disclosed he was of Jewish descent.

Through manipulation of informants, anonymous letters and utilization of friendly press services we were successful in creating a split in the UKA in North Carolina. This split was brought about when a rally of dissident Klansmen in September, 1969, showed their disaffection with the UKA leadership by burning their Klan membership cards. This split was highlighted in front-page news stories in North Carolina newspapers.

During 1970 National Klonvokation, Robert Shelton, who was again elected Imperial Wizard, made a speech indicating his feelings that high ranking members of the UKA may be disloyal and that he definitely plans to use a polygraph machine and

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LLA:lmj
4-H

possibly utilize sodium pentothal (truth serum) on all Klan officers and members to ferret out FBI informants. As a result, we recently furnished reliable news sources with information in belief that public exposure will deter considerably from any future enactment of these plans. It is too early to determine results of this move at this time.

As a result of counterintelligence action taken through racial informants in the Knoxville Division, we were successful in having the Exalted Cyclops of Mascot Klavern #778, Mascot, Tennessee, Thomas Stipes, eliminated from this top position and were able to have him subsequently banished from the Klan. This was brought about by having our racial informants create dissension within the ranks of this Klavern.

Through the use of two racial informants of our Little Rock Division, we were successful in causing the defeat of a Klansmen who was campaigning to be elected as sheriff of Jefferson County, Arkansas. This individual, Victor Calvert, Exalted Cyclops, Pine Bluff Klavern, Association of Arkansas Klans, in conducting his campaign attempted to hide his Klan affiliations because he hoped to receive a good percentage of the Negro vote in his area. Our informants were successful in discreetly letting out the word of his secret Klan membership.

As a result of counterintelligence action taken, W. Melvin Sexton, Imperial Kligrapp (National Secretary) of the UKA, the largest Klan organization in the country, resigned from his position. Both Sexton and his wife, in addition to being Klan members, were employed in the National Office of the United Klans of America. This is particularly significant in that for many years Sexton had been "number one man" to Imperial Wizard Robert M. Shelton of the UKA and actually ran the UKA while Shelton was in prison following his conviction for Contempt of Congress. This resignation was brought about by our informants planting the seeds of distrust regarding Sexton and exposing the fact that Sexton had a serious drinking problem.

CURRENT SUPERVISION AND JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE

The counterintelligence program requires little additional manpower since these extremists are under continuous investigation. All counterintelligence proposals are submitted to the Bureau for approval and positive results achieved from this program, when balanced against the relatively small expenditure of Agent and supervisory time, indicates that its continuance is justified. This program is re-evaluated annually and was last re-evaluated by memorandum G. C. Moore to W. C. Sullivan dated July 20, 1970.

THUMBNAIL SKETCH PROGRAM 4-H

This program was initiated and authorized by SAC Letter 53-72(J) dated October 27, 1953, to insure that the field is using current characterizations of subversive organizations and to provide uniformity in characterizing such organizations. Those characterizations deemed to be of field-wide interest are now to be furnished to the field by letter to all offices on an annual basis rather than by SAC Letter as was formerly the practice, in accordance with approval of suggestion in memorandum J. J. Casper to Mr. Mohr dated December 7, 1970.

The background and value of this program is the same as it was at the time of the write-ups for the 1970 inspection. Upon receipt of the annual letters from the field in June, 1970, 422 separate characterizations were received and reviewed by appropriate supervisory personnel at the Bureau. Those of field-wide interest were furnished to the field by SAC Letter 70-62 dated November 3, 1970. The remaining characterizations were returned to interested field offices following their approval by the Bureau. This program was last reviewed and analyzed and its continuance approved by memorandum R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated October 12, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEM:lmj
4-H

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

New Left Movement

Section Chief: R. L. Shackelford

The following surveys, projects and/or intensification programs are in effect against the New Left movement:

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices, dated 10/23/68, the field was instructed to expand its Key Activist programs and these programs were intensified. Each office was instructed to submit its recommendations on individuals considered as Key Activists. The field was instructed to maintain high-level informant coverage on these individuals. The purpose of this program is to render Key Activists ineffective and thereby drastically reduce their influence in the New Left movement. At the present time there are 75 Key Activists under intensive investigation. A Key Activist Album which contains photographs and biographical data on each Key Activist has been assembled and has been furnished to all offices. The Key Activist Album is maintained in a current status, 40 are subjects of prosecutive action. The Album has proven to be invaluable in following the activities and travels of New Left activists, both for the Seat of Government and for the field.

By airtel dated 3/10/69 to SAC, Albany, and all offices, the field was instructed to submit summary reports every three months on those individuals designated as Key Activists. The field was also instructed to prepare an appropriate communication suitable for dissemination in the event any of these individuals held a speaking engagement and whenever they made a statement indicating a propensity for violence or urging student agitation. The purpose of this program was to develop information in respect to the securing of testimony and evidence concerning violations of statutes within the Bureau's jurisdiction in connection with leaders involved with campus disorders.

By letter to all offices dated 5/5/69, the field was instructed that when it is ascertained that a Key Activist is scheduled to speak oncampus, in addition to the coverage of his appearance, they should determine through established sources the amount received by him and the source of the funds.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WNP:djr
4-H

The purpose of this is (1) to provide for a centralized reporting of New Left activity in this field; (2) to enable us to keep abreast of funds utilized to finance these inflammatory speeches; (3) to enable us to take advantage of situations which could embarrass the New Left or stifle future activity; (4) to facilitate the necessary evaluation and analysis by the Bureau and other interested agencies. By letter dated 12/23/69 to all field offices, information concerning financial aspects of the New Left were emphasized, and the field was instructed to develop solid information concerning the travelling of Key Activists.

By airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 10/28/68, a program was instituted to obtain a comprehensive study of the whole New Left movement. Offices were instructed to prepare summary reports on the New Left movement in their territories. The purpose of these reports was to obtain a comprehensive study of the movement in order to assess its potential dangerousness. Following the submission of the original summary reports, offices were instructed to submit such reports on a quarterly basis with an appropriate breakdown of the material in the report. These reports enable the Bureau to maintain recent and comprehensive information concerning various aspects of the New Left movement. These reports are disseminated to interested agencies to enable them to maintain a clear picture of New Left movement.

SAC Letter 70-11 (E) dated 3/3/70 instructed field to discontinue submission of quarterly letter listing identities of New Left movement groups under investigation, coverage afforded each group and programs of each office to develop necessary coverage. This information in order to streamline paper work is now to be set forth in cover pages of New Left quarterly report.

By airtel to all offices dated 12/9/70 instructions were reiterated to the field concerning the preparation and content of New Left movement quarterly reports. The organizations to be included in this report were noted as well as the subheadings to be utilized. A brief analysis of the current status of New Left activity in each Division is to be included in the cover pages of the report as well as the number of individual cases opened and closed concerning SDS members as well as members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence.

By letter dated 11/5/68, to SAC, Albany, and all offices, under the caption of "New Left Movement, Publications, Internal Security - Miscellaneous," the field was instructed to cover the principal propaganda mills of the New Left which are described as the "underground" newspapers. The field was instructed to conduct a detailed survey of these publications and to submit information concerning these obscene, seditious and inflammatory newspapers. At the present time, there are over 200 such publications being circulated. Cases on various of these newspapers which are deemed important to the New Left movement have been opened.

By airtel dated 3/16/70 to all offices, a survey was instituted to determine the amount of financial support given to New Left groups by tax-exempt charitable foundations, prominent or wealthy individuals, and politically oriented groups. The field was instructed to furnish results of this survey in form suitable for dissemination.

By letter to all Special Agents in Charge, dated 2/13/70, the field was advised that the militant and violence-prone Weatherman faction of the SDS planned to go underground and to direct "strategic sabotage" at military and police installations. The field was instructed to advise appropriate local police agencies of the aims of the Weatherman faction and of the necessity to vigorously investigate the Weatherman group.

By airtel to all field offices dated 3/19/70 the field was advised of the plans of the Weatherman faction of the SDS to form commando-type units to engage in bombing, arson and assassination. The field was instructed to make every effort to locate and identify Weatherman communes and their activists. A list of major Weatherman activists was furnished to the field which instructed intensive investigation to determine their whereabouts and to advise the Bureau and office of origin on a weekly basis. The field was instructed to utilize a caution statement that Weatherman activists should be considered dangerous for their known propensity for violence.

Bureau airtel to select offices handling bulk of Weatherman investigations dated 3/24/70 reiterated instructions in airtel to all offices 3/19/70 and specifically noted that New Left communes were to be located and participants identified to determine if they were violence prone. The offices were instructed to have Special Agents assigned to these investigations to be reminded of their prosecutive potential and to consider establishing a special squad to fully comply with Bureau instructions to intensify these investigations.

Bureau airtel to Chicago 3/24/70 instructed that office to promptly initiate investigations and interview all individuals who were arrested in Chicago during National Action week 10/8-11/69 if such investigations not already undertaken. Over 280 individuals were arrested, most of which were either members of or closely associated with Weatherman group. Chicago airtel to numerous offices 4/9/70 restated Bureau instructions.

SAC Letter 70-18 (C) dated 4/7/70 under caption "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Bombing Matters" set forth instructions to be followed in bombing and attempted bombing matters. In those instances of bombing or arson which appear to have New Left or black extremist connotations or motivation and where no Bureau substantive jurisdiction exists or the Department has advised no investigation is warranted, the Bureau is to be immediately advised setting forth pertinent data regarding involvement of subversive groups or individuals suspected in the incident as well as a recommendation for any additional investigation warranted.

Teletype to all SACs 4/17/70 set forth specific areas of investigations to be covered by field in its investigations against New Left terrorist groups and individuals and also set forth the definition of a commune for purposes of Bureau investigations and instructed field to conduct sufficient investigation of all members of the commune when they are members of a commune falling within Bureau standards for investigation. The field also was instructed to develop that informant coverage necessary of all communes and/or groups so that advance knowledge of any planned violence could be obtained to insure preventive action be initiated and prosecutive action brought to bear where possible.

By airtel to all offices 5/11/70 the field was authorized to interview all Venceremos Brigade (VB) members on SAC authority on completion of investigation except in those instances where the subject is under 21, currently a student, professor, has some connection with an institution of learning or is a journalist. Bureau approval is still needed concerning the latter individuals.

74

Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 instructed the field to begin implementation of investigations of New Left terrorism promptly with available manpower and scale of implementation should be as rapid as possible. All adherents to Weatherman ideology of advocating a Marxist-Leninist revolution now and use terroristic tactics in furtherance of revolution are to be subjects of these investigations. All of these subjects are to be considered for Priority I of the Security Index, interviewed and the Bureau advised every 45 days by letter of those placed in Priority I of their current residence and any other pertinent information developed. To facilitate handling at the Bureau, all reports and other communications within defined categories are to include word (Weatherman) in character. This airtel also instructed each office to submit monthly airtel beginning 6/1/70 setting forth (1) identities and locations of communes or organizations under investigation; (2) number of cases opened during month on individuals in these categories; (3) total number of individual cases under investigation; (4) informant coverage used against communes or organizations; and, (5) brief summary of New Left-oriented violence in area during preceding month and action taken.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 concerning the VB instructed all offices to immediately intensify investigations of all returnees from Cuba with this Brigade, ascertain their whereabouts, conduct prompt interviews and submit current reports with Security Index recommendation. In view of rebuttable presumption of at least sympathy to a violent Marxist-Leninist revolution and willingness to participate in that revolution by these VB members, the field was also instructed for one year to advise the Bureau every 90 days of whereabouts and activities of Priority II and III and non-Security Index returnees. In case of Priority I Security Index subjects, this information is to be furnished the Bureau every 45 days.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 5/15/70 forwarded the field a copy of a Departmental letter concerning the specific areas of interest to the Department in campus disorders looking toward possible prosecutive action. The field was specifically instructed to develop information concerning New Left involvement in campus violence and all agitational activities prior to and during violent campus disorders by subversive groups and such information must be fully determined and reported.

SAC Letter 70-30 (D) dated 6/2/70 reiterated prior instructions of moratorium on Security Matter - Communist investigations. Recent field inspections indicated some offices needed clarification of this moratorium. The SAC Letter noted instructions concerning moratorium only applied to routine communist investigations and not those individuals belonging to such groups as the Weatherman, Progressive Labor Party, Socialist Workers Party and Young Socialist Alliance.

Bureau airtel to all offices 7/16/70 noted that New Left terrorism is continuing through bombings, arsons and other forms of violence and each SAC must personally insure sufficient personnel are assigned to handle these matters as well as investigating individuals involved and those following Weatherman ideology of utilization of violent revolutionary tactics against our Government.

Bureau airtel to select offices dated 8/20/70 handling Key Activists were instructed to promptly submit to the Bureau sufficient handwriting specimens of each Key Activist and the specimen is to be placed in the National Security File maintained by the Laboratory. This was done in view of the propensity for violence of these individuals and the fact a number of them are currently Bureau fugitives.

SAC Letter 70-46 dated 9/1/70 captioned "New Left Movement - Violence, Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman)" refers to strategic sabotage plans of Weatherman against military and police installations and "Declaration of War" by Weatherman underground and instructs all security personnel to develop better informant coverage. This development should concern informants and sources who can furnish advance information regarding activities of Weatherman and other terrorist groups and was specifically stressed.

By airtel to all offices dated 9/3/70 captioned "Attacks on Police, Extremist Activity" the field was instructed, because of increased attacks on police, that it can be expected there will also be physical attacks against the FBI and it should be insured that all Special Agent personnel are fully cognizant of this possibility. If information is received targeting police, appropriate investigation must be immediately instituted and informants directed to develop full facts concerning the attack. The purpose of these investigations is to obtain complete intelligence data concerning any extremist influence.

SAC Letter 70-48 (B) dated 9/15/70 under caption "New Left and Black Extremist Terrorism - Informant Coverage" instructed the field to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their collectives, communes and staffs of their underground newspapers. Constructive plans to implement this program are to be included in Item 4 of the monthly airtel on "New Left Movement-Violence" which was outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70.

Bureau airtel to all offices 10/1/70 instructed the field to replace the word (Weatherman) as noted in Bureau airtel to all offices 5/13/70 with the word (Extremist). This was done to insure prompt and efficient routing at the Bureau as well as proper handling in the field. A new caution statement was also to be included in all correspondence in respect to those individuals involved in Weatherman and other New Left extremist activities.

SAC Letter 70-57 (C) dated 10/13/70 captioned "New Left Movement - Police Training Matters" advised the field that in view of recent developments concerning violence caused by New Left terrorists, the Bureau will consider requests from the field for SACs or ASACs to brief local law enforcement command and supervisory personnel regarding New Left extremism and violence at law enforcement meetings and conferences where attendance is restricted to full-time duly constituted law enforcement officials.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/3/70 advised the field that the moratorium of suspension of report writing in Priority II Security Index cases and suspension of verification of residence and employment in Priority II and Priority III cases is rescinded. Offices were instructed to reopen a proportionate number of cases each month and insure all were open by 6/30/71. Furthermore, residence and employment on all of these subjects is to be verified, annual reports submitted in Priority II cases and LHM submitted in Priority III cases where necessary.

77

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/4/70 instructed the field to initiate investigation of all members of SDS and members of pro-communist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence. Each individual under investigation should be considered for the Security Index.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70 concerning informant development in New Left groups noted that each SAC was to make this matter his personal concern in order that penetration of these groups by top quality informants will be accomplished in the immediate future. Each SAC was directed to submit to the Bureau by 11/13/70 a complete analysis of his informant coverage in New Left groups clearly setting forth the weaknesses and productive steps being taken to rectify these weaknesses.

Current Bureau instructions require development of adequate informant coverage of Strategic Air Command and Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Bases of the United States Air Force (PROSAB) to insure that our investigative responsibilities in the sabotage, espionage and internal security fields can be properly discharged. Semiannual reports are submitted by each office having a Strategic Air Command Base or an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Base within its territory. A review of semiannual reports submitted by the field as of 7/1/70 disclosed that a total of 1,281 informants have been developed.

Bureau airtel to all offices dated 9/9/70 advised field that special single fingerprint file on Weatherman fugitives and other New Left terrorists has been started. Field is instructed to immediately review files for identity of individuals who fit category of a New Left terrorist and whose fingerprints should be included in this special single fingerprint file. Names of these individuals were to be submitted to Bureau with sufficient identifying data and as new names come to attention of office promptly furnish the Bureau.

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

Section Chief R. D. Cotter: Following are applicable activities of Research Section.

Survey Regarding Potential for Racial Violence

This survey program was formerly under the title "Possible Racial Violence, Major Urban Areas." The program was initiated in 1964 in order that the Bureau would be aware of potential danger spots in the U. S. The present program requires each field division to conduct a continuing survey in their respective territories covering all localities having a potential for racial violence based on current racial conditions. The objective is to insure that the Bureau receives a realistic and comprehensive picture of existing racial conditions in these areas on a current basis and to obtain advance information of any impending racial developments which clearly point to the possibility of mob violence.

Quarterly reports submitted by field in line with this survey represent information obtained through contacts with local government and police officials, leaders of racial groups, and a cross section of informants and sources. The survey enables us to be thoroughly knowledgeable of racial developments and potential trouble spots and provides timely and pertinent information which is disseminated to the White House, Attorney General, and other Government agencies. Information developed is also used for an analysis of the potential for violence in the U. S., which is prepared in the spring of each year, just prior to the most active months, in this field, and which is disseminated on a high level.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
LJB:ekn
4-H

Security Index (SI) Program

Refer to white write-up prepared by Internal Security Section (4-H), which has investigative responsibility under this program. Research Section, Special Records Unit, maintains records applicable to the SI and is responsible for coordinating program. In line with this responsibility, Research Section prepared a memorandum to Assistant Director Brennan, dated 1/12/71, re-evaluating SI.

As of 4/15/70 there were in the Index 2,794 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,352 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 11,146. Of these, 848 and 4,770, respectively, are communists--a total of 5,618 or 50.4 percent. As of 12/15/70 there were in the Index 3,450 persons of leadership capacity (Priority I and II) and 8,614 rank-and-file subjects (Priority III) for a total of 12,064. Of these, 831 and 4,718, respectively, are communists--a total of 5,549 or 46 percent.

Emergency Detention Program

The Emergency Detention Program (EDP), which is field-wide, involves the planning for apprehension and detention of persons considered potentially dangerous to the national defense and public safety of the U. S. in time of a national emergency and for the search and seizure of contraband. The EDP is not a program as such but is based on Title II of the Internal Security Act (ISA) of 1950. The basic responsibility for the operation and implementation of the EDP rests with the Attorney General. Detailed plans regarding the EDP are drawn up and included in the "Attorney General's Portfolio," copies of which are in the Bureau's possession.

This program has been maintained in an up-to-date status. Administrative plans for the implementation of the program in each office are maintained in the form of a "Detpro Survey." Lists of individuals to be detained are furnished to the Internal Security Division of the Department each month and the listing of places to be searched under authority of the Master Search Warrant are maintained on a current basis. The Seat of Government and all field divisions, with the exception of Honolulu, maintain essential records at safe locations for successful implementation of the EDP. Each office also maintains instructions to be turned over to the U. S. Attorneys and U. S. Marshals upon implementation.

This program is coordinated by Special Records Unit, Research Section. Primary responsibility rests with the Department and changes can be made only upon approval of the Department. We merely recommend and/or suggest any desirable changes. Periodic checks are made to insure that all records connected with the EDP, stored away from Headquarters cities, are current. Field division surveys are kept up to date and the Bureau is advised semiannually of the status.

Legislation was previously introduced in Congress to repeal Title II of the ISA of 1950. When the 91st Congress ended, no affirmative action had been taken in this regard. In the event Title II should be repealed at a future date under new legislation, the Government's inherent right to protect itself internally will continue to be safeguarded by the Bureau under its basic responsibility for protecting this Nation's internal security.

This program is under constant supervision and re-evaluation so that any necessary changes and streamlining may be made. A memorandum justifying the continuance of this program was last submitted on 1/12/71.

81

Security Informants

Special Records Unit maintains an up-to-date index of Security Informants and Potential Security Informants. It correlates personal and operating data (such as name, address, code, file and symbol number) concerning these informants, which it receives from the Division's investigative sections, and places such material on FD-348s, three by five cards that constitute the index. This index is maintained on discontinued as well as current informants.

At the time of the inspection in April, 1970, a total of 1,141 Security Informants were being operated. As of 1/12/71 the number had increased to 1,159 for a total increase of 18. During the same period, the number of Potential Security Informants had increased from 616 to 765 for a total increase of 149.

Technical and Microphone Surveillances

There has been no significant change regarding the utilization of these techniques in the internal security field since the last inspection. As of 1/12/71, we have 40 telephone surveillances (tesurs) in Bureau's internal security cases and seven awaiting installation. We also have six tesurs in operation at the request of the State Department.

We are conducting six microphone surveillances (misurs) in internal security field, and four misur installations are being operated at the request of the National Security Agency (NSA). In addition, 64 teletype facilities are being covered at the written request of NSA.

82

Agent MacFarlane

4-H

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section

The following programs discussed immediately hereinafter are currently the responsibility of the Espionage Section: Alem Program, Bureau file 65-69532; Banpop Program, Bureau file 65-70741; Cokma Program, Bureau file 65-73750; Canil Program, Bureau file 65-70719; DESECO Program, Bureau file 105-71688; East-West Exchange Program, Bureau file 105-42300; and Radio and Technical Equipment Purchased by the Soviets, Bureau file 105-36365.

Following the inspection of April, 1970, the Counterintelligence Program was discontinued and a GS-14 Supervisor was made available for assignment elsewhere. No write-up has been submitted for the Rega Program since this is now being phased out.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-70
WAB:hke
4-H

ALEM PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-69532

4-H

1. ALEM is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet "illegal" agents who have entered the U. S. under assumed identities as 1. alien husbands of American wives or 2. as male immigrants on first preference petitions because of certain professional and technical skills. The basis of this program is information furnished by the Fedora informant. This program was initiated in August, 1965. Individuals entering the U. S. under the above two categories have been determined through a machine run of Immigration and Naturalization Service Form G-188 punch cards. The Bureau has reimbursed the Immigration and Naturalization Service for expenses incurred in sorting these cards for immigrants entering the U. S. between the years 1960-1965.

2. Approximately 1960 cases have been opened under this program since its inception, of which 106 are now pending. We have not uncovered any illegals to date although we have been able to identify through this program a valuable KGB agent who went to the U. S. as an immigrant from Belgium (Buckboard case, Bufile 65-68188).

3. ALEM is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A.P. Litrento. The responsibility of reviewing the pertinent G-188 cards and initiating investigations is placed with the Washington Field Office. The procedures followed in opening cases do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the Washington Field Office.

4. According to the Fedora informant, the KGB has used the techniques set forth above in dispatching KGB "illegals" to the U. S. During 1960-1965, four KGB "illegals" reportedly arrived in the U. S. under category number one according to information the Fedora informant was able to obtain from a KGB officer in the New York Residency.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
APL:tdp

4-H

CANIL PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70719 4-H

1. CANIL is the code name for the Bureau program to uncover Soviet illegals who may have arrived in Canada as European immigrants and thereafter entered the U. S. on immigrant visas obtained at one of the American consulates in Canada. This program is based on the Cowslip case which involved a Soviet illegal husband and wife team who used this method of entry. Legat, Ottawa, effected arrangements with various American consulates in Canada to obtain the Immigration Visa and Alien Registration (IVAR) forms filed by European immigrants prior to their destruction by the consulates. It is consulate practice to retain these forms for 16 to 18 months then to destroy them. Legat, Ottawa, forwards these forms to the New York Office where they are reviewed. To develop suspects, the New York Office uses criteria developed from analysis of the Cowslip case.

2. Since inception of this program in June, 1966, 27 cases were opened. There are no cases pending. No illegals have been uncovered to date. The procedures followed in this program do not require the use of much personnel or many man hours by the New York Office.

3. CANIL is supervised in the Espionage Section, Special Cases Unit, by SA A. P. Litrento.

4. The detection of Soviet illegals is one of the most difficult problems facing the Bureau in the security field. It is felt this program still has a good potential in uncovering illegals because it is logical and has a sound basis. Past experience has shown that Soviet intelligence will use the same modus operandi continuously, if successful.

5. This program is evaluated on an annual basis.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
APL:tdp

4-H

7

DESECO PROGRAM
Bufile 105-71688

The Deseco Program (program for development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) was conceived in an espionage conference in December, 1957. Its objective was to intensify the development of informants and double agents to penetrate Soviet-bloc intelligence and for use in sensitive defection approaches.

Between the last inspection and December 1, 1970, approximately an 8-month period, 37 Deseco subjects were placed in contact with Soviet-bloc officials and 8 of these have developed to the status of security informants or double agents.

The majority of work is concentrated in the New York, Washington, D. C., and Chicago areas where Soviet-bloc establishments are located. A Soviet Consulate General is scheduled to become operative in San Francisco during 1971, and a skeleton staff of four Soviet officials with five dependents is seeking appropriate buildings for this establishment.

San Francisco and other West Coast offices are currently developing a "pool" of Deseco sources for eventual use against Soviet intelligence officers who will operate out of the Soviet Consulate General. Due to the increased number of Soviet-bloc personnel in the United States and their relative freedom of travel, particularly to technical and scientific conventions, a total of 19 offices have been authorized to conduct "sounding-out" interviews of prospective sources without prior Bureau authority. Follow-up interviews with potential Deseco sources are conducted on a UACB basis. Unusual and highly sensitive cases are routed to the division front office for approval.

The New York, Washington Field and Chicago Offices submit monthly progress letters summarizing the results of the program. The other 16 offices submit summaries on a semi-annual basis. This program substantially assists us to penetrate and neutralize Soviet-bloc intelligence. The results achieved thus far warrant the program's continuance. It is the best means of penetration available considering the

DESECO PROGRAM

limitations on other sensitive investigative techniques. It affords us a pool of human resources available for use against Soviet-bloc intelligence personnel in political, economic and particularly scientific fields in which the intelligence services of the bloc have shown extreme interest. This program has been reevaluated on an annual basis. It was last justified by memorandum dated 10/22/69, but by the action of the Executive Conference approved by the Director on memorandum of 10/29/70, Washington and New York were instructed that every Special Agent in those offices handling investigations of Soviet personnel should immediately open on and develop two completely new Deseco subjects. These instructions were sent to the field by airtel of 11/2/70.

The program will next be justified by memorandum in March, 1971, when progress letters summarizing the results of the program will be due from all participating offices. This program is correlated in the Espionage Section Coordination Unit by Special Agent L. Whitson.

EAST-WEST EXCHANGE PROGRAM
Bufile: 105-42300

This Program originated in 1955 to provide internal security safeguards regarding the admission of Soviet and satellite nationals. Soviet intelligence regards visits of the East-West Exchange Agreement participants as opportunities to promote intelligence activity.

As a result of the last inspection SAC Letter 70-25 was prepared which set forth revisions of our investigative action in the field. This change was made as a result of other manpower commitments. The instructions in that SAC Letter provided that no investigations will be conducted of groups or individuals participating in the East-West Exchange Program in the absence of any information indicating affiliation with Soviet intelligence. Bufiles are checked on all Soviet participants and where information is developed showing intelligence affiliation, cases are then opened and the field is instructed to conduct the necessary investigation.

During the period of June-December, 1970, 525 individuals entered the United States under the provisions of this exchange agreement and of this number, we had information indicating Soviet intelligence affiliation on 28 of these individuals.

With regard to Soviet exchange students there are currently 31 in the United States. Based on information furnished by defector sources and investigations of Soviet students previously in the United States, we have determined that the Soviet Intelligence Services utilizes these students in an intelligence capacity, principally as "spotters." In view of this, we afford these students active investigation. We have also found that a number of these students return to the United States for assignment at one of the Soviet establishments and in most instances, contacts which they made while in the United States as students are generally reactivated. For example, Mikhail Fomichev, currently assigned to the Soviet Mission to the United Nations as a Third Secretary, was in the United States as an exchange student in 1966. Through a defector source we learned that he had recruited an American agent for the KGB and extensive investigation under the code word "Nikotine" (Bufile: 65-70250) has resulted in the identification of this agent in December, 1970. He has admitted his recruitment and

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
JPL:cgc

meetings with Fomichev since his return to the United States. One of the possibilities being considered by the KGB for this individual is to have him obtain employment as a Bureau Agent.

BANPOP PROGRAM
Bufile: 65-70741

1. BANPOP is the code name for a Bureau program through which an attempt is made to identify Soviet illegal agents who may be utilizing a Swiss bank to transfer funds to themselves. The program is based on an analysis of four Soviet illegal agent cases between 1955-1966 in which funds were furnished through the Banque Populaire Suisse in Switzerland. The transfers of funds are reviewed with the following criteria: (1) the person or individual beneficiary is named; (2) the amount of the transfer is between $300 and $5000 and (3) the last name of the person ordering and receiving the funds is the same or the money is directed to a specific bank account. The program was initiated by Bureau letter of August 26, 1966.

2. The program is now operated in the New York, Chicago and Philadelphia Offices. The Philadelphia Office originally had the program in effect from September, 1966, until May, 1968, when it was discontinued. However, it was renewed in that office in February, 1970.

3. When an office locates an individual who might be considered a subject, it writes a letter to the Bureau with a copy to the appropriate field office and requests that investigation be undertaken to identify this person. The title includes the name of the subject and the code name of the program in order that all cases will be handled by the same supervisor. At the present time, there are six pending cases. The New York Office utilized 12 Agent hours per month in handling 10,100 records for a six-month period ending August 31, 1970. The Philadelphia Office utilized four Agent hours per month and the Chicago Office utilized three Agent hours per month in handling its program.

4. This program is supervised by SA J. P. Lee of the Special Cases Unit, Espionage Section.

5. All offices keep the Bureau advised of the progress of the program on a six-month basis, submitting letters by March 1 and September 1 of each year.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JPL:tdp
1/12/71

4-H

COKMA PROGRAM

65-73750

1. Title is code word for physical surveillance coverage of known meeting areas utilized by Soviet intelligence in the past several years. The New York Office instituted this program in July, 1970.

2. New York Office has catalogued known meeting areas as a result of past physical surveillances of Soviet intelligence officers and information received from defectors-in-place and double agents operating against Soviet intelligence officers. Soviet intelligence officers are trained to detect surveillances and accordingly are extremely astute in detecting such coverage. It is almost impossible to conduct a discreet physical surveillance of them which will result in uncovering an intelligence operation. This program places our Special Agents in areas where there is likelihood of Soviet meet without hazard of prior surveillance which would thwart meeting. Almost all Soviet intelligence officers spend approximately one to three hours in "dry cleaning" themselves to insure they are not under surveillance when meeting an agent. When the Soviet arrives at the meeting area, he is confident that he is not under surveillance. Our objective in this program is to identify American agents meeting Soviet intelligence officers under clandestine circumstances.

3. New York, utilizing one team consisting of four Special Agents, afforded physical surveillance coverage to three consectutive subway stops in Queens, New York, which were known to have been frequented by Soviet intelligence officers in the past. From July through October, 1970, six Soviet intelligence officers were observed in these areas on 16 occasions. Two significant cases have been developed out of this coverage and New York has current authority to interview one of the subjects observed in clandestine contact with a known Soviet Committee for State Security officer. On 11/10/70, New York was authorized to further implement this program and advised that it intended to cover two other known meeting areas in Queens, New York, during early evening hours on weekdays and on Saturdays which is similar to the coverage previously afforded.

4. Program supervised by Special Agent George M. Quinn, Officials Unit - New York, Espionage Section. Expenses and time in handling program is negligible at Seat of Government. Since program in field consists of surveillance activities, there must be close supervision at field level.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

COKMA PROGRAM

5. Program offers excellent potential on basis of results achieved during short period it has been in operation. It must be noted that Soviets were not as active as usual during September - November, 1970, because of Twenty-Fifth United Nations Anniversary celebration and meeting of United Nations General Assembly. Soviet intelligence has in the past been extremely reluctant to engage in intelligence activities during such periods because detection at such time could be extremely embarrassing to Soviet Government. Manpower limitations have restricted our full utilization of this investigative technique. Special Agent personnel assigned to this program must be familiar with Soviets assigned to the New York area and must also be experienced in surveillance procedures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
GMQ:aeb

RADIO AND TECHNICAL EQUIPMENT PURCHASED BY THE SOVIETS

105-36365

1. Program commenced in March, 1955, in order to have central repository for information developed in connection with investigations of Soviets in this country pertaining to radio and technical equipment purchased by them.

2. Washington Field and New York Offices furnish information developed concerning these purchases on a monthly basis. Dissemination of the material is made to Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency, Army, Navy, Air Force, Atomic Energy Commission, and Bureau of International Commerce, United States Department of Commerce. Material submitted includes name of Soviet purchaser, date, quantity, description and cost of the items purchased. It involves maintenance of three control files; one each at Bureau, Washington Field and New York Offices. Program established to achieve following objectives: disseminate to interested Government agencies information concerning purchase of technical equipment in the United States by Soviet officials; determine whether Soviet intelligence is circumventing restrictions regarding material appearing on Department of Commerce restricted export control list; and to permit discreet markings by FBI Laboratory of certain technical equipment furnished to Soviets through overt or covert means which would permit its identification at some future time.

3. Since April, 1970, Program has disclosed continuing purchases by Soviet nationals of Grundig Satellite Multiband portable radios. During 9/70 one KGB officer in Washington purchased 30 of these radios at one time. Soviet husband and wife illegal team recently in U. S. used one of these radios to receive clandestine broadcasts from USSR which contained their operating instructions. Program made it possible to secure serial numbers for possible future identification. Analysis of purchases enables Laboratory to make reasonable estimate of internal communications used at Soviet establishments and security devices being operated. Program also disclosed type of transmitting equipment and antenna system purchased by Soviets, apparently for installation at Consulate General in San Francisco when that establishment becomes operational. This information is of interest not only to FBI Laboratory but to State Department and National Security Agency in connection with its worldwide coverage of Soviet communications capabilities.

4. Program supervised by Special Agent Eugene C. Peterson, Officials Unit - Washington, Espionage Section. Expense and time

utilized in handling program is negligible. Dissemination of material submitted by Washington Field and New York Offices requires minimum of time each month on part of Bureau Supervisor and no weaknesses in program are apparent. Administrative tickler for control maintained on Soviet Embassy Desk, Officials Unit - Washington, Espionage Section.

5. Program is of value not only to Domestic Intelligence Division and field offices but to agencies receiving dissemination of material developed. Possession of some equipment on which discreet markings were previously placed by FBI Laboratory could serve to identify possessor with involvement in Soviet intelligence activity. Program is evaluated annually to determine justification for continuance.

6. Program last evaluated and justified January 8, 1971. Tickler maintained for reevaluation by January 15, 1972, and each year thereafter, if still of continuing value.

SURVEYS, PROJECTS AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS 4-H

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION: There are attached separate write-ups regarding the following programs supervised in the Nationalities Intelligence Section:

1. Visitors to Communist China and Contacts by United States Residents of Chinese Diplomatic Establishments
2. Chinese Aliens Entering the United States and Chinese Entering the United States Claiming United States Citizenship
3. Intelligence Coverage of Friendly Foreign Countries
4. Counterintelligence Operations Against Chinese Communist Intelligence Activities in the United States (Chicoin)
5. Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV)
6. Name Checks of Aliens Holding Diplomatic and International Organization Visas
7. Security Index - Cuba
8. American Repatriate Program
9. International Organizations - Dangerous Aliens of Nations Outside the Soviet Bloc

PROGRAM

VISITORS TO COMMUNIST CHINA AND CONTACTS BY UNITED STATES RESIDENTS OF CHINESE DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS

4-H

(Bufile 105-144424)

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives.

Program was initiated in 8/65 in connection with efforts to cover Chinese Communist (Chicom) activities in the United States. Through cooperation of both United States intelligence agencies and friendly foreign intelligence services, the identities of United States residents are furnished to us who attempt to enter Communist China or contact People's Republic of China (PRC) diplomatic establishments in certain countries throughout the world.

This program is field-wide and not directly connected with any other investigative program. The objectives include identifying those individuals who enter the PRC and who may be engaged in Chicom activities in their contacts with Chicom establishments. The identity of these visitors is absolutely necessary in order to determine if they have access to classified material or if they could be utilized effectively by the Chicoms when they return to the United States. Some of these individuals have excellent potential for informant development. We have utilized contacts with Chicom diplomatic establishments in the development of selected sources who are attractive to the Chicoms and have been developed as double agents. By SAC Letter No. 70-26 dated 5/12/70, we restricted our investigations to cover actual visitors to China. This procedure was initiated to conserve manpower inasmuch as State Department had relaxed travel restrictions to China on 3/16/70 in order to allow travel to PRC for any "legitimate purpose." The President recently directed that a committee prepare recommendations for additional steps which may be taken to relax restrictions on travel to and promote further trade with the PRC. This highly confidential directive, if accepted, will permit many people to be eligible to travel to China if the Chinese will grant travel permits. Up to the present time, however, the Chicoms have only granted travel permits to pro-Chicom propagandists such as Edgar Snow.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JEM:cal
4-H

2. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection.

Investigations since the last Inspection have totaled 95. Many of these individuals were interviewed; however, it has been determined that none were allowed to enter Communist China. During the cultural revolution which ended during 1970, very few United States residents were allowed to enter Communist China including a number of United Nations employees who had previously made numerous trips to Communist China. There is every indication, however, that the Chicoms have taken on a "new look" internationally and are attempting to gain the friendship of the western world. This program has not reached its great potential due to the xenophobia which existed during the past three years. Communist China is expected to open an embassy at Ottawa, Canada, in 1/71 as result of Canadian recognition. This will make it far easier for United States residents to cross the border into Canada and either seek a travel permit to visit Communist China or make contact with Chicom intelligence representatives at the embassy in Ottawa.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision.

This program is handled by one Bureau supervisor who correlates information as received from either United States intelligence agencies or friendly foreign intelligence services and directs the office covering the individual's residence and employment to conduct necessary investigation according to the Manual of Instructions. Investigations are conducted to fully identify the individuals, determine current residence and employment and ascertain whether he has access to classified information. In absence of any unusual circumstances indicating need for further action, the case is closed. Each case is closely supervised and evaluated on its individual merits.

4. Current Justification for Continuation.

The potential of this program is far greater than what has been realized in the way of results to date. As mentioned above, the Canadian recognition of the PRC has given Communist China a foothold in North America. RCMP advises that they feel that 50 percent of the Chinese Communist intelligence effort will be directed toward the United States.

At the present time, the restrictions for crossing the border from the United States to Canada are practically nonexistent for a United States resident with proper documentation. Therefore, it is imperative that we continue such a program so that when RCMP reports individuals contacting the PRC Embassy in Ottawa we may fully identify these individuals.

5. How Often Evaluated and Date of Last Justification.

This program is evaluated annually and was last justified on 12/31/69. At that time, it was stated that the program would be evaluated and justified during 1/71; this is currently being undertaken.

CHINESE ALIENS ENTERING THE UNITED STATES 4-H
(Bufile 105-135923)

CHINESE ENTERING THE UNITED STATES CLAIMING UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP
(Bufile 105-12752)

These two programs have similar criteria for investigation and, therefore, are being handled under one write-up.

1. Background, Date of Inception, Scope and Desired Objectives

The alien program was instituted on 1/26/65 and the program concerning Chinese entering the United States claiming United States citizenship began on 9/14/65. Both programs were originated in an effort to identify Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence operatives who may be sent to the United States in deep cover. In 1955, Chicom intelligence emphasized the need to deploy deep cover illegal agents abroad and specifically in the United States. The number of cases currently investigated under the citizen program has been approximately 15 to 20 annually; only one, however, has been opened since last inspection. These individuals offer the Chicoms an ideal situation for placing an illegal into the United States who has assumed the identity of a Chinese whose father or grandfather was a United States citizen. These individuals, once they arrive in the United States, are never checked on by any agency. The Chinese aliens, a number of whom are students "temporarily," entering the United States to attend universities, have decreased in number during the past two years from approximately 2,000 per month to 600 per month. Recent relaxation of immigration regulations will now permit a great increase in the numbers allowed to enter the United States during 1971. Since the inception of both programs, we have simplified the criteria for investigating citizens and aliens keeping in mind the necessity for conserving manpower in our investigations, but also fulfilling our responsibilities. The scope and investigation of these two programs are identical. The prime objective of these two programs is the identification of intelligence agents; however, the two programs have been responsible for the development of positive intelligence information as well as a continuing increase in source coverage of Chinese matters, not only in our heavily populated Chinese localities, but also covering the lesser Chinese communities throughout the United States.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
JEM:sem

2. Positive Results Achieved Since the Last Inspection

Since the last inspection 151 cases have been opened on Chinese aliens and only one case on Chinese claiming United States citizenship. During this period 197 alien cases have been closed and eight cases involving citizens were closed. Information developed during these investigations has been disseminated to the intelligence community. To date, no Chicom intelligence agent has been uncovered by these two programs; however, we have steadily increased our source coverage and collected positive intelligence which has been disseminated to the intelligence community. This is a long-range program and it is expected it will pay dividends during the coming year with the establishment of a Chinese Communist embassy in Canada.

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The alien cases, most of which originate from our Legat in Hong Kong, are supervised by three supervisors according to the geographic location the alien is destined to in the United States. The citizen cases are also supervised by three supervisors according to geographic location and these cases are furnished to us as a result of Passport Records being checked by WFO. Cases in both programs are closely supervised to make certain that each subject falls within the criteria and that when the cases are reopened for investigation after two years the case is evaluated to determine if the subject may possibly be an intelligence agent.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

These two programs cover two vulnerable areas whereby the Chicoms could penetrate the United States by utilizing either aliens or individuals claiming United States citizenship who have been fully trained in Communist China and entered Hong Kong subsequent to 1/1/55. The screening process at United States Consulate General's office in Hong Kong is meager and current proposals for relaxation of rules will make it easier for the Chicoms to filter agents into the United States through the easiest route, that is, an alien or a citizen fully documented. These two programs also are one of the best sources for the development of informants and the gathering of positive intelligence information. These programs are fully justified for continuation and no additional manpower or expenditure requests are needed at this time for the continuation of these two programs.

5. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

These programs are evaluated annually. The alien program was last justified on 1/22/70 and the citizen program will be justified with the alien program on 1/22/71. On 9/18/70, a memorandum was submitted indicating that the citizen program would be coordinated with and justified with the alien program during January, 1971.

INTELLIGENCE COVERAGE OF FRIENDLY FOREIGN COUNTRIES (Bufile: 65-63113)

1. Background, Scope and Objectives

Program was inaugurated 1954 aimed at developing positive intelligence information, as well as data of value to FBI investigations. Expansion of the program took place in 1955 and 1959 and during 1962 and 1963, as well as in 1970, additional coverage was approved.

The program has three principal phases as follows:

a. Regular notification to the FBI by other U. S. agencies regarding arrival in U. S. of intelligence personnel from non-Soviet bloc countries. This phase consists chiefly of file reviews at Seat of Government at nominal expense.

b. Maintenance of special coverage on official establishments of selected non-Soviet bloc countries with the approval of State Department and the Attorney General. We currently have special coverage on eleven diplomatic establishments of seven non-Soviet bloc countries and three additional installations as recently approved by the Attorney General. Countries currently covered are Panama, Israel, Jordan, the United Arab Republic, Chile, Bolivia and Peru. Our cost in operating this phase of the program is related to translation of the intelligence product and salary of personnel who man special coverage equipment. Costs are analyzed on an individual basis each time the special coverage is justified. This justification is based on the value of the data developed.

c. This phase relates to the development of live sources within diplomatic establishments of non-Soviet bloc countries as well as the development of individuals so closely connected with official establishments they are able to provide accurate up-to-date intelligence information. We now have 47 actual and 22 potential live sources

at the establishments of 25 non-Soviet-bloc countries. The principal cost involved in this phase relates to Agent time devoted to investigations of sources and time spent in handling these sources.

2. Positive Results Achieved

This program has enabled us to provide the White House and the highest level of the intelligence community a continuing flow of valuable foreign political information affecting the national and international interests of the U.S. The program was particularly productive in our coverage of such critical areas of tension as the Middle East crisis, the continuing crisis in Panama, and the recurrent political crises created in South America through the unseating and establishment of regimes in the various countries covered. In the areas mentioned, as well as in other fringe nationality areas, this program has served as a basis for obtaining information which has provided U.S. Government with current data regarding the international political scene and has contributed otherwise unobtainable information for the benefit of those responsible for policy decisions at the highest level of our Government. An example of the importance of this information is illustrated in the comments of the U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Charles W. Yost, made by him in a letter dated 11/13/70 to the Director. Ambassador Yost noted that the support given to the U.S. United Nations Mission by the Bureau was deeply appreciated by him and had afforded him privileged insight and perspective.

Don't use

The quality of this program is further attested to by realization by the White House of the capabilities of the FBI to produce positive foreign political intelligence with resulting instructions to the Bureau to expand this capability abroad in select liaison positions. As a result of these instructions, our capability in furnishing foreign political information was expanded through the opening of six new liaison posts in Beirut, Lebanon; Caracas, Venezuela; La Paz, Bolivia; Copenhagen, Denmark; Managua, Nicaragua; and Tel Aviv, Israel. With this expansion, our overseas liaison Agents were increased from 28 to 42 with supporting clerical personnel being increased in number from 32 to 46. This move has increased the number of our foreign posts from 11 to 17. (More detailed comment regarding increase in liaison abroad is set forth in the work papers of this inspection under Section 4-E, Accomplishments - Special Coordination Unit.)

3. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The program as it relates to all friendly foreign countries (except West Germany) is coordinated by the Number One Man of the Nationalities Intelligence Section working through the separate supervisors assigned to the individual country's desk within the Section.

4. Current Justification for Continuation

This program continues to produce information of substantial value relative to Bureau investigations as well as substantive foreign political information of vital interest to the White House and members of the intelligence community. The information continues to illustrate the FBI's ability to produce valuable intelligence information relative to foreign political matters and to solidify the Bureau's position as a valuable source of foreign intelligence data. It is recommended that this program be continued.

5. Periodic Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified by memorandum dated 5/8/70.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS - DANGEROUS ALIENS OF NATIONS OUTSIDE THE SOVIET BLOC

Program was initiated in April, 1951, to create a centralized compilation of undesirable and potentially dangerous aliens with diplomatic immunity against whom State Department can, when wartime emergency arises, initiate steps for deportation or lifting of their diplomatic immunity.

The program applies only to aliens from countries outside the Soviet bloc employed in the United States in international organizations within provisions of International Organizations Immunities Act. The program is similar in intent to the Emergency Detention Program and the PRODIP Program; however, it involves an entirely different type of individual.

The program is a control device only and involves no investigative activity. Twenty-five individuals (as of 11/5/70) are included on the list with New York Office responsible for twenty and Washington Field Office responsible for five.

Current program requires only an annual letter with deletions or additions being made by separate letter as subjects involved qualify for elimination or inclusion. Substantive desk supervisors review field submissions to verify need for inclusion of individuals on list.

Program continues to serve a useful purpose as a precautionary measure for U. S. security in time of emergency. It is justified annually with last justification having been made 2/6/70.

PROGRAM 4-H

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS AGAINST CHINESE COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES (CHICOIN)

(Bufile 105-135614)

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

1. Background and Date of Inception

Chinese Communist (Chicom) intelligence service, lacking base from which to operate in United States, must rely on illegal and third-country operations to develop intelligence data in U. S. Chicoin was instituted in May, 1965, to combat these efforts.

2. Scope and Desired Objectives

To create situations and place our informants in contact with known Chicom agents in foreign countries, with ultimate aim being Chicom recruitment of our assets for illegal operation within U. S., resulting in penetration of Chicom intelligence activities inside our borders.

3. Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

In August, 1970, we directed Los Angeles informant, code name DINA, to travel to Canada to initiate contact with representatives of New China News Agency (NCNA) who are known Chicom intelligence agents. Source succeeded in making such contact and arousing interest of NCNA personnel. As bonus, source also encountered a double agent (code name ICED TEA) operated by Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) who has assignment from NCNA principal to recruit illegal agent in U. S., and who now intends to propose recruitment of DINA to Chicoms.

Seattle source, code name JUDD, has developed close association with key Chicom sympathizer in Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, and during period was invited to visit two Chicom ships in port at Vancouver. Source also made trip to

JRH:dgo
1/12/71
4-H

San Francisco for his Chicom friends, taking with him books and messages for individuals there from pro-Chicom individuals in Canada.

Two other sources, NY 5896-S and SF 2739-S, maintained personal contact with personnel of China Travel Service (CTS) in Hong Kong during period. CTS is Chicom agency specializing in arrangement trips to mainland China, and front for Chicom Intelligence.

4. Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Chicoin Program is handled by one Bureau Supervisor who correlates activities of field offices involved to insure proper direction of informants and control of specialized double agent operations. Close supervision of cases is maintained.

5. Current Justification for Continuance

Counterintelligence and penetration of Chicom intelligence operations is long-term process. Sources developed to date under this program present excellent potential for such penetration, especially in light of fact Chicoms expected to open Embassy in Ottawa, Canada, in next thirty to sixty days, with strong possibility Consulates will also be opened in border cities such as Vancouver. RCMP expects at least 50% of all future Chicom operations in Canada will be directed against United States and present sources loom large in penetration of such operations. Further, strong possibility exists Red China will finally gain admittance to United Nations during Fall, 1971, a move which makes development of quality sources in this field most imperative.

6. Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program justified annually, last justification being on 5/7/70.

PROGRAM
COMMUNIST COVERAGE ALONG THE MEXICAN BORDER
BOCOV
BUFILE: 100-356015

Background and Date of Inception

BOCOV was initiated by the Director in 1948 to fill a void in adequacy of coverage in the 25 mile border zone south of the U. S.-Mexican border by the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Scope and Desired Objectives

Three border offices, El Paso, San Antonio and San Diego, as well as the office of the Legal Attache, Mexico, participate. Ten Agents and two Assistant Legal Attaches devote a portion of their time, directing some 212 sources and informants. The population of the zone areas involved is approximately 1,700,000 individuals of which 2,371 are either members or sympathizers of major Mexican subversive groups.

Positive Results Achieved Since Last Inspection

Program has furnished valuable information relative to threat against U. S. by Mexican subversives residing in the border area. Investigative results are furnished to all levels of interested U. S. Government intelligence community. Program continues to keep us advised of potential trouble areas and allows for appropriate counter-measures.

Domestic Intelligence Division
1/12/71
JEG:emj
4-H

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

Periodic reports on individuals and organizations as well as informant coverage relating to BOCOV are analyzed and correlated by SA Joseph E. Gauzens, Jr. Involved is review of incoming letters, memoranda, reports and semi-annual progress letters detailing informant coverage and subversive strength. Analysis of this material provides a basis for detecting weaknesses and making arrangements for counter-intelligence moves.

Cutbacks initiated by the Bureau for the purpose of conserving manpower and streamlining operations have substantially reduced manpower and number of informants utilized. Agents and Legal Attaches participating were reduced from 16 to 12; informants and sources utilized from 312 to 212. These reductions resulted in annual savings of $19,934.65 and total manpower currently utilized on the program is 1.72 Agents. Effectiveness of BOCOV and our ability to re-expand the program should future circumstances warrant were not impaired by the cutbacks cited.

Current Justification for Continuance

BOCOV continues to fill the above-described intelligence void and, in addition, is coordinated with other intelligence programs originating in the border area, in particular the SECOMEX program.

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Justification

Program is evaluated annually and was last justified 10/2/70.

BOCOV

Bocov is a code word which concerns a highly sensitive intelligence operation of this Bureau which was in effect from 4/24/48 until 9/11/72. The purpose of this operation was to attempt to identify foreign subversive elements entering the U. S. Although this operation is no longer in existence, the disclosure of the fact that it was once carried on would undoubtedly severely impair the abilities of this Bureau to fulfill its domestic obligations, not only with regard to the internal security of the U. S., but also in investigating criminal matters of an international nature. Furthermore, unauthorized disclosure of details of this operation could jeopardize the lives of individuals who cooperated with this Bureau and who are currently residing abroad.

Substituted for pages 107+108
in copy to SSC

4-H

NAME CHECKS OF ALIENS HOLDING DIPLOMATIC AND INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION VISAS

This program was initiated in January, 1952, as a means of keeping the Attorney General advised of information of a subversive nature relating to the diplomats and officials of foreign countries entering the United States in official capacities. These data are required by the Attorney General to assist in discharging his responsibilities under the Immigration and Nationality Act for exclusion and/or deportation of foreign officials where their activity requires such action.

The basis for this program is found in the procedure by Immigration and Naturalization Service in its submission of a form advising of the arrival of the alien officials in this country, which form is sent to member agencies of the intelligence community. The separate agencies perform name checks on the data in these forms with the results being channelized to the FBI. We correlate this information with data from our files and furnish same to the Attorney General. In those instances where additional investigation appears warranted, we obtain clearance from Department of State and issue appropriate instructions to the field for active investigation.

Since the program was initiated, 617,290 Immigration and Naturalization Service forms have been processed and we have undertaken 452 investigations based on results thereof.

The program continues to supplement our overall coverage in the intelligence field with the majority of the work being handled by trained clerical personnel within the Nationalities Intelligence Section and some isolated instances of involved investigations being handled by substantive desk supervisors within the Division. Based on the limited number of active investigations opened since the inception of this program, the cost of the program consists mainly of name check expenditures. The program continues to serve a necessary purpose in our overall intelligence coverage, serving to alert us to the presence in this country of persons having a capability for intelligence activities or who may pose a security threat to the United States.

The program is justified annually, with the last justification having been made February 9, 1970.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
ERH:bjp
4-H

SECURITY INDEX - CUBA
(Bufile 100-358086-210)

Background and Date of Inception

This program was instituted in November, 1960. By that date it was obvious that Cuba, whose Government had been taken over by Fidel Castro in January, 1959, was a communist state posing a real and present threat to the internal security of the U. S. In 1962, at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, a Supervisor at the Bureau was assigned the specific responsibility for administering this program to assure the apprehension and special handling of the individuals included therein in the event of a limited emergency involving Cuba.

Scope and Desired Objectives

As of 12/15/70, there were 419 individuals included in the Security Index - Cuba Program, divided into two categories:

1. Individuals placed on the Security Index solely on account of their pro-Cuban activities. (Cuban Special Section - 96 persons).

2. Persons already on the Security Index because of other subversive connections and activity who would warrant special attention in the event of hostilities with Cuba (Security Index subjects tabbed "Pro-Cuban" - 323 individuals).

Program is designed to maintain an up-to-date record of location and activities of individuals included therein, by means of established Security Index procedures and reporting, in order that we are in a position to move swiftly should the apprehension or special handling of these persons become necessary.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
1/11/71
AHS:emj
4-H

Positive Results Achieved

Determination as to the validity of an individual's inclusion in this program is constantly under review. Since the last inspection, critical attention has been given this matter with the result that the number of persons on the Cuban Special Section of the Index has been reduced from 193 as of 3/16/70 to 96 as of 12/15/70. These 96 persons are judged to be the hard-core pro-Cubans, action against whom in a Cuban emergency would be mandatory. Of these 96, 27 are Cuban aliens. Each subject of pending security investigation with Cuban ramifications is considered for inclusion in the Index.

Extent and Nature of Current Supervision

The Supervisor responsible for this program is required to review each investigative communication in current cases of pro-Cuban individuals to determine whether the individual meets the criteria for inclusion in the Index, as outlined in the Manual of Instructions. He must make a decision as to the degree of dangerousness of the individual under the Priority Apprehension Program and rule on the field's recommendations regarding these matters. He initiates procedures with the Security Index Desk of the Domestic Intelligence Division and the Voucher Statistical Section of the Administrative Division regarding the placing of an individual on the Index, his removal, and assignment or change in Priority.

If the individual involved is an alien, correspondence with the Internal Security Division of the Department is required to assure the preparation of a pre-positioned arrest warrant by Immigration and Naturalization Service. Action is also taken with the Department to cancel the arrest warrant if the alien is removed from the Index.

On 10/29/70, the Director approved the lifting of the moratorium on report writing and certain investigative procedures in security cases on individuals. This will require the field to reopen by 6/30/71 and conduct investigation in cases on some 372 individuals involved in this program who have not received recent investigative attention. The Bureau will receive in the upcoming months summary reports, letterhead memoranda and other communications in virtually all of these cases. The moratorium, in effect since February, 1969, has limited investigative and reporting activity in this field. As of 1/11/71 there were 18 active and 78 inactive case in the Cuban Special Section of the Security Index (19% of the 96 case total) and at the time of the last inspection there were 25 active and 168 inactive cases (13% of the 193 case total).

Current Justification

The threat to the internal security of the U. S. from communist Cuba has not lessened in recent years. A workable priority apprehension system which receives current and continuing attention is mandatory. Instant program, as presently organized and handled, is fully justified.

Frequency of Evaluation and Date of Last Evaluation.

This program is evaluated on a semi-annual basis. The most recent semi-annual review and evaluation was dated 10/8/70.

AMERICAN REPATRIATE PROGRAM

BACKGROUND AND DATE OF INCEPTION - Program was instituted on February 28, 1962, to specify procedure to be followed upon receipt of information that U. S. citizen residing in Cuba had been issued a Swiss Protection Passport by Swiss Embassy in Havana, Cuba, for travel to U. S. Few Americans, however, received such passports prior to 1966 when the State Department estimated 800-900 U. S. citizens were still in Cuba and desired to return to the U. S. In February, 1967, when it appeared these U. S. citizens might be permitted to leave Cuba en mass, instructions were issued to field outlining investigation to be conducted relative to individual repatriates.

SCOPE AND DESIRED OBJECTIVES - Specific objectives of program are verification of repatriate's identity; ascertaining whether the individual has or had Cuban intelligence contact, training or assignment, or possesses intelligence information; and instructing individuals to alert us to any future intelligence contact. Program is field wide.

POSITIVE RESULTS ACHIEVED - From August, 1969, to July, 1970, eleven flights brought an average of 18 citizens out of Cuba per flight. These repatriates were accompanied by a total of 425 relatives and/or close friends, all of whom were Cuban aliens. Some 300 U. S. citizens remain in Cuba awaiting repatriation. There have been no repatriation flights since July 31, 1970.

Program has alerted us to return to this country of Security Index subjects, Castro sympathizers, individuals who traveled to Cuba without State Department authorization and individuals affiliated with Communist Party, USA. As a result of interviews conducted with repatriates, worthwhile data concerning conditions in Cuba has been obtained and disseminated to the U. S. Intelligence Community.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
VHN:emj
4-H

EXTENT AND NATURE OF CURRENT SUPERVISION - Program is supervised by one Seat of Government Agent who devotes a portion of his time. All cases are afforded careful supervision in an effort to detect presence of a repatriate who may have been recruited by the Cuban Intelligence Service for activity in this country. Thirty-two cases are pending.

CURRENT JUSTIFICATION FOR CONTINUANCE - Fidel Castro has consistently used the mass exodus of individuals from Cuba to infiltrate intelligence agents into the U. S. Program offers excellent potential for detecting such individuals who reenter this country under the protective coverage of their citizenship. We feel that the program is fully justified.

FREQUENCY OF EVALUATION AND DATE OF LAST JUSTIFICATION - An annual evaluation is made. The program was last justified on September 1, 1970.

CUBAN REFUGEE PROGRAM

The Cuban Refugee Program, which had as its objective the detection of Cuban intelligence agents possibly being infiltrated into the U. S. via refugee channels, was discontinued by SAC Letter 70-25, dated 5/5/70, paragraph C.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
VHN:emj
4-H

SURVEYS, PROJECTS, AND/OR INTENSIFICATION PROGRAMS

4-H

SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE/
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

RACIAL MATTERS

Racial matters investigations were intensified through establishment of the Racial Intelligence Section on 10/2/67. This Section handles racial matters investigations involving black extremist organizations and individuals. Objectives are to identify organizations and individuals that are involved in extremist activities, that advocate or had actually committed or have conspired to commit acts of violence, that advocate revolutionary or terrorist activities and that violate Federal laws. The dangerousness to the United States of such individuals must be assessed and a determination made as to whether they should be included in the Security Index or the Agitator Index. The extent of foreign influence or influence of the Communist Party or other domestic revolutionary groups among racial extremists, especially black extremist organizations, is a prime objective. To accomplish these objectives, sources have been developed who can furnish quality and timely information concerning individual extremists and extremist organizations. Such sources likewise have forewarned us of potential violence and enabled the Bureau to stay on top of the racial situation. These sources have assisted the Bureau in executing its responsibilities of alerting local authorities and to keep other Government agencies dependent upon us for information informed of pertinent developments including information concerning potential violence.

Our informant coverage has made it possible for us to keep a constant flow of information going to the White House, the Attorney General and other Government agencies having an interest. Additional information pertaining to racial intelligence matters and the survey regarding "Potential for Racial Violence" is set forth under data furnished by the Research Section.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WHA:sef

Reports submitted by the field are thoroughly reviewed at the Seat of Government to insure that essential information is being obtained on a timely basis and that it is being promptly disseminated in the field, as well as at the Seat of Government.

The Director on 11/27/70 in testimony before the Senate Appropriation Committee for the purpose of securing additional Special Agents emphasized again the violent and revolutionary nature of the Black Panther Party (BPP). He testified there has been an alarming increase in the number of black extremist attacks against law enforcement officers; BPP publications consistently advocate violence, including assassination and kidnapings, to achieve overthrow of the Establishment; BPP leaders have participated in crimes of violence; and Black Panthers have substantial connections with hostile foreign elements, notably the communist regime in North Korea and Arab terrorists in Algeria. Increasing ties between Arab terrorists and Black Panthers, according to the Director, raise the ominous possibility that militants may seek to ape Arab tactics, including airplane hijackings, to gain the release of jailed Panther members.

BLACK NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
Bufile 157-8415

Since 1/7/69 all offices have submitted semiannual reports presenting concisely a complete picture of black extremist activity in its area. This enabled us to identify groups and individuals involved in black extremist activities, to develope quality informants who report on such activities and to initiate intensified and penetrative investigations of such individuals and groups. Since the desired objectives for which these reports were originally designed had been realized, since field informs us on a timely basis in substantive cases of pertinent data concerning this movement and to insure manpower is utilized on priority matters, the Director on 7/6/70 authorized discontinuance of these reports.

On 3/8/69 the Black Nationalist Photographic Album (BNPA) was established to assist in identification of militant black extremists who travel extensively.

The BNPA is maintained in all offices. BNPA includes a photograph and biographical data on leaders of black extremist organizations and militant black nationalists who are known to travel. Each office prepares a form on such individuals within its territory and the form is then furnished to the Bureau and all offices where it is maintained in a complete album. In the event of travel by any of these individuals, the office covering the area being visited already has a photograph and biographical sketch of the individual immediately available. The album is also furnished to the Legats in Ottawa and Mexico City and to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and Central Intelligence Agency, in the event of foreign travel. Over 300 extremists are currently carried in this album.

In view of importance of an individual's fingerprint classification for identification purposes, the field by letter dated 5/8/70 was instructed to include such data in biographical sketch concerning each individual included in the BNPA and to amend those sketches then included in the Album to show such data.

The BNPA was also broadened to include black extremists who are Bureau fugitives. This insured each office having a photograph and biographical sketch immediately available for use in conducting investigation to locate such fugitives or in apprehending them.

By SAC Letter 70-65, item (D), dated 11/17/70, the field was advised that, henceforth, deletions of individuals from the BNPA would require Bureau authorization since Bureau did not agree with some deletions made by field which resulted in unwarranted action by all field offices.

To insure broad circulation among investigative personnel and to serve as an avenue for greater utilization of informants especially racial sources, we initiated the Black Extremist Bureau Fugitives list in June, 1970. This list, which is prepared monthly and sent each field office and selected Legats, identifies those Bureau fugitives who by reason of their activities or organizational affiliations are black extremists. Currently there are 45 fugitives carried on the list, 9 of whom are IO fugitives. Twenty of these fugitives are reportedly living outside the U.S. This list has given greater emphasis to the location of these fugitives, particularly among Special Agents handling racial matters and racial informants and has been effective in affording greater exposure of these fugitives among racial informants. Fifteen of these fugitives have been arrested since the list was initiated, with 5 being arrested in December, 1970. One of those arrested in December is the reported leader of the Black Panther Party (BPP) underground.

Racial Intelligence Section prepares monthly a Racial Calendar pertaining to the Black Nationalist Movement in this country. This Calendar identifies scheduled racial events throughout the country which are more than local in nature as well as all major scheduled events which could logically develop into a racial event. Purpose of the Calendar is to assist field in coverage of these events in view of widespread travel on the part of black nationalists in attendance at such affairs and to take part in demonstrations commemorating certain anniversaries of interest to blacks. A listing of recently published publications and articles concerning the black nationalist movement is also set forth in the Calendar. Publications included are public source and are identified to assist the field in keeping on top of writing by and about black nationalists and the black nationalist movement.

Black extremist activities are concentrated in organized activities of over 66 groups, some of which have chapters in major cities throughout this country. The violence-prone Black Panther Party, for example, has 48 branches throughout U.S. Hard-core membership in these black extremist groups totals about 9,600. This membership figure, however, disguises real following of extremist groups in black areas of our cities and extent of influence and leadership they exercise. These organizations, and particularly BPP, have substantial sympathetic support, especially from young blacks, which is frequently surfaced during confrontations with police.

Extent of black extremist strength is illustrated by Louis Harris Poll which was set forth in 4/6/70 issue of "Time." The Poll projects that nine per cent of all blacks, some two million Americans, call themselves "revolutionaries" and believe only a "readiness to use violence" will achieve equality. Twenty-five per cent have "a great deal" of respect for the BPP. Most alarming is that 40 per cent of those in the age group 14-21 years old believe violence is necessary to achieve equality.

The following pages set forth summaries concerning the key black extremist organizations that are presently under active and penetrative investigation.

The Black Panther Party (BPP), a black extremist organization, continues to be extremely active throughout the country. Formed during late 1966 in Oakland, California, for the obstensible purpose of patrolling the black community to prevent alleged police brutality, it was originally known as the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense.

It expanded rapidly throughout the United States during 1967-68, then suffered a gradual decline during 1969. Revitalized in December, 1969, and throughout the 1970s it has again currently expanded until today there are approximately 48 branches of the BPP with an estimated 1,000 hard-core members supported by many thousands of sympathizers. It also has an international office in Algiers, Algeria. The branches include 17 chapters and 31 affiliated groups that masquerade under the names of National Committee to Combat Fascism or Black Community Information Center.

The ultimate goal of the BPP is the violent overthrow of the United States Government and its replacement with a Marxist-Leninist system. The BPP openly advocates urban guerrilla warfare, assassination of Government leaders and other forms of violent terrorism. Since its inception, the BPP has aimed its most vicious invectives against law enforcement and particularly local police. "Off the pigs," BPP jargon for "kill the cop" is the battle cry of the organization. The weekly Panther newspaper, "The Black Panther," and its other publications and propaganda paraphernalia are abound with articles and cartoons encouraging lethal attacks against police and other forms of authority.

Our investigation of the BPP was instituted in 1967 and since that time has expanded as the organization itself expanded.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
ABF:drl
4H

By letter to all offices dated 2/27/70, approved by the Director, offices having BPP investigations were instructed to submit intelligence reports on the BPP every six months in compliance with instructions in the Manual of Instructions. Previously offices were submitting quarterly reports on the BPP. The changes made on the basis of a recommendation by a Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to eliminate some paper work in the field.

All field offices having a BPP investigation are also required to submit a monthly report containing evidentiary data required by the Department. Original instructions in this regard were issued by Bureau airtel 12/3/68 and the continued submission of this monthly report is necessary in view of possible prosecution of the BPP.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation are required to submit a monthly airtel summary of the status and activities of the BPP within its territory. This survey was commenced as a biweekly summary in November, 1968, and changed to a monthly summary on the approval of the Director by letter to all offices dated 2/27/70. This change is a result of a recommendation by the Racial Informants Conference of field supervisors to cut down paper work in the field. The monthly summary relieves the field of some paper work and at the same time keeps the Bureau and the field up to date on BPP developments.

San Francisco as office of origin in the BPP case continues to submit a biweekly summary and analysis of the BPP. Because of the excellence of this summary and the need for such an analysis by the field, San Francisco was instructed by Bureau airtel 1/21/70 to furnish copies of its summary to all continental offices which is the current practice.

All field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed by airtel 6/17/70 to submit a monthly summary on the financial activities of each BPP branch. This financial summary includes data on sources of income, foreign funding, expenses, the mechanics of local finance operations, and the steps being taken by each office to develop full financial data. This summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all financial developments regarding the BPP on a national and international basis.

By airtel to all continental offices 11/6/70 all field offices conducting an active BPP investigation were instructed to submit a biweekly airtel containing specific comments regarding underground BPP operations within the area of each field office. This includes progress in the identity and interviewing of expelled BPP members who, it has been determined, are the logical candidates for membership in the BPP underground. The underground operation of the BPP has an ultimate goal of terroristic guerrilla warfare. It is a recent development in the operation of the BPP which is the subject of an intensive investigation. The biweekly summary enables the Bureau to keep abreast of all developments in the underground and to intelligently coordinate the investigation thereof.

In recent months the Black Panther Party has formed a corporation known as Stronghold Consolidated Productions, Inc. (SCPI) to control all BPP funds and assets and to act as purchaser and/or lessee of any property utilized by the BPP. The corporation and its activities are under intensive investigation which has revealed that its activities are centered in San Francisco and New York. By airtel 1/7/71 to San Francisco and New York, these offices were instructed to submit a weekly summary in form suitable for dissemination of all pertinent developments concerning the corporation during the previous week. This summary keeps the Bureau aware of SCPI operations and also enables us to regularly fulfill our dissemination requirements.

It is noted that there are currently 32 field offices conducting active investigations of the BPP. Our intensive investigation has enabled us to identify its leaders, members and new branches. In addition, we have developed detailed information concerning its operations and activities including organization plans, funding programs, extent of control by headquarters and foreign support. In addition, evidentiary information that could support prosecution is regularly furnished to the Department.

Our ultimate objective is of course the prosecution of the BPP for violations of Federal criminal, civil rights and security statutes. A secondary objective is to more completely develop details of the BPP for intelligence purposes.

In July, 1969, the Attorney General established a special task force for the specific purpose of developing a prosecutive theory against the BPP. Attorneys of this task force, known as the Special Interdivisional Unit, have interviewed many of our informants in furtherance of this purpose and have instituted a continuing Federal Grand Jury in San Francisco. Ten of our informants have testified before this Federal Grand Jury and its is anticipated that others will be called.

It is recommended that the intensive investigation of the BPP including all surveys and procedures outlined as above be continued.

CONGRESS OF AFRICAN PEOPLES (CAP)
157-16554

The CAP was formed as an international revolutionary organization as the result of the convening of the fourth annual gathering of black power advocates in the United States in Atlanta, Georgia, September 3-7, 1970. This gathering was unique in that it was attended by approximately 2,500 blacks of so-called moderate and militant persuasion, as well as a large number of extremists. Representatives attended from 35 states and 21 different nations, including Canada, Australia, various independent nations of Africa, and the Caribbean area.

A number of the workshops at the CAP were dominated by extremist elements who urged the creation of massive cooperative programs and institutions designed to destroy any progress made toward integration of the races by complete rejection of white society, the formation of a separatist black nation, national African parties, and, ultimately, a World African Party.

These objectives are to be achieved through the unification, cooperation, and interdependence of blacks wherever they reside, regardless of their "imposed" nationalities, and under the revolutionary ideological banner of Pan-Africanism of the well-known black extremist Stokely Carmichael.

Specifically, CAP's domestic extremist element, headed by black revolutionaries Hayward Henry and LeRoi Jones from Newark, New Jersey, calls for extensive use of disruptive tactics against all segments of white-dominated institutions and organizations, including the police and the military.

Since its founding in Atlanta, CAP has held a number of regional meetings in various sections of the United States for the purpose of setting up its national organization and in furtherance of its revolutionary programs. As a result, CAP is currently activating in at least 17 different cities with its national headquarters and Chairman Hayward Henry located in Boston, Massachusetts. LeRoi Jones, however, appears to be the dominant figure in the organization.

Current CAP planning indicates the organization intends to move aggressively through deceptive programs

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
PEN:mkl
4-H

126

Congress of African Peoples (CAP)

to establish black political power through four basic activities which are:

(1) influencing of black political candidates;

(2) organization of the black community;

(3) formation of coalitions with all dissident and extremist groups whether white or black so long as CAP benefits from same; and

(4) the massive use of disruptive tactics.

CAP has emerged as yet another deadly threat to racial harmony and, as a result of its programs and ties with foreign extremist elements and well-known revolutionary Stokely Carmichael, must also be considered an imposing threat to the national security.

Investigations of the CAP, its leaders, and extremist affiliates are receiving most close supervision. Pertinent data developed in regard to their activities is being disseminated to the Department and to interested Government agencies and officials.

REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA 4-H
Bufile 157-9079

The Republic of New Africa (RNA), formed in Detroit, Michigan in March, 1968 by followers of Malcolm X, assassinated black extremist, has chapters in ten U.S. cities and a current hard-core membership of 100-130 individuals.

RNA was primarily formed by Milton and Richard Henry, black extremists of long standing in the Detroit, Michigan, area. When first formed, the RNA named as its President in exile Robert Franklin Williams, violence-prone black extremist then residing in China. Williams has since returned to the U.S. but has resigned from his position as head of the RNA due to his own legal problems and dissension existing within the organization.

RNA was established to create a black nation within the U.S. demanding from the U.S. Government the States of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi and South Carolina, in addition to individual reparations of $10,000 per black citizen as payment for 400 years of ancestral slave labor.

RNA's organizational structure was designed to be revolutionary in character and its founders proposed that efforts be made for international recognition and financial assistance from Cuba, Red China and the black nations of the world. RNA established a black army known as the Black Legion whose duty was to protect the persons and property and to attack the enemies (the police) of that nation. Training programs were instituted and uniforms complete with the leopard skin epaulets were disigned as the official dress for the Black Legionnaires.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
GTT:sef
4-H

High point in the RNA's activities occurred during a national convention in Detroit, Michigan, in March 1969, when members of the Black Legion engaged in armed confrontation with Detroit police resulting in the death of one policeman and the serious wounding of another. The RNA is currently split with dissension with two distinct factions. The Richard Henry Faction with headquarters in New Orleans, Louisiana, is the most active and militant of the two groups. The other faction is headed by Milton Henry with headquarters in Detroit, Michigan. Current plans of Richard Henry call for an intensification of RNA activities throughout the U.S.

129

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE (SNCC)
100-439190

SNCC was originally organized in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1960 under the name Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. Prior to the election of Stokely Carmichael as its Chairman in May, 1966, the organization operated as a nonmembership civil rights organization with both white and black participation. Carmichael, on assuming the Chairmanship of SNCC, immediately eliminated all whites from participation and changed the organization from a civil rights-oriented group to one whose aims were those of antiwhite revolutionary action and the overthrow of the United States Government, a position which the organization maintains today.

H. Rap Brown, Bureau fugitive and well-known black extremist who served as National Chairman for a time following Carmichael's vacating of that position in 1967, again assumed the National Chairmanship of SNCC in the Summer of 1969. At that time, it was announced SNCC was eliminating the word "nonviolent" from its title. The organization's headquarters were also moved from Atlanta, Georgia, to New York City.

Under Brown's direction, SNCC moved to restructure and revitalize itself in an attempt to regain its prominence as a black extremist organization. The national leadership issued directives on the reorganization of the national office in New York City, as well as the local organizations and the formation of councils to include a Revolutionary Economic Council, an Armed Guerrilla Tactics Council, a Research Council, and others which make up a body within SNCC known as the Revolutionary Political Council.

Included among new organizational procedures are plans for raising the number of active participants in local cadres, the obtaining and training in the use of weapons, the purchase of land for ostensible use in an Agrarian Reform Plan to aid black tenant farmers but which will also serve as a weapons training site. Training manuals on revolutionary activities, including guerrilla warfare and the medical care of wounded or injured persons, have been prepared and are to be disseminated to local SNCC chapters in furtherance of this reorganization.

As a result of H. Rap Brown's flight in May, 1970, to avoid prosecution in Howard County, Maryland, on local

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
PEN:mkl
4-H

charges of inciting to riot and arson, SNCC is presently under the titular leadership of William Edward Hunt. Hunt also serves as head of the organization's Revolutionary Political Council.

Hunt has successfully directed the opening of a "coffeehouse" known as the Third Eye Lounge in Augusta, Georgia. This facility, in line with SNCC's historical anti-Vietnam War posture, is to serve as a propaganda center from which to foment anti-Vietnam War sentiments among black military personnel at Fort Gordon, Georgia, as well as among the black civilian population in that area. In addition, Hunt has initiated publication and distribution of a revolutionary news organ known as "National SNCC." Aggressive programs are underway to obtain new SNCC activists, and in an effort to capture the support of black females, the organization recently formed The Third World Women's Alliance under the leadership of Fran Beal, a member of SNCC's Revolutionary Political Council.

Strong evidence of progress in connection with the organization's plans to initiate guerrilla warfare tactics is given by development of recent information indicating Hunt and other SNCC leaders are in the process of selecting a number of candidates to receive such training in North Korea. These individuals, on completion of training, will serve as instructors in various parts of the country, thus providing SNCC with a well-trained, hard-core cadre of personnel capable of initiating acts of terror against individuals and institutions of Government in furtherance of their revolutionary objectives.

Investigations of SNCC, its leaders, affiliates, and their activities continue to receive close supervision. Information of pertinence concerning the organization continues to be disseminated to the Department and other interested Government agencies and officials.

JUNTA OF MILITANT ORGANIZATIONS
BUFILE 157-9903

The Junta of Militant Organizations (JOMO) is a black extremist organization with headquarters in St. Petersburg, Florida. It is the leading organization for all black militant groups in Florida. JOMO was founded in St. Petersburg during May, 1968, with 85 ghetto youths, who believed liberation of black people will not come about through "normal channels." The organization has affiliated groups in Louisville, Kentucky and Gainesville, Florida. During December, 1970, leaders of JOMO decided to expand their operation throughout the nation. Attempts are currently being made to create chapters in Boston, Massachusetts and Miami, Florida. Joseph Waller, Jr., the articulate founder of JOMO, and present chairman of the organization intends to have all black militant groups in Florida designated as organization chapters.

The organization's voice and propaganda are carried out through the publication "The Burning Spear." This publication has urged blacks to buy arms and to be prepared to fight white America. In this connection, JOMO members have participated in racial demonstrations, used fire bombs and have been involved in attacks on police through use of violence. Members reportedly blew up a radio station in Tampa, Florida, and recently participated in a plot to break out two black political prisoners from a Florida prison. Eight members of the organization were arrested in 1970 for committing three murders and 15 armed robberies. One of the murders was committed to obtain money to pay a water bill for JOMO headquarters.

The organization is in the process of accumulating weapons and making plans for members to be taught guerrilla warfare and firearms training. In this connection leaders are interested in establishing contact with revolutionary African groups. Waller desires to create within the organization "Simba Warriors" who would act whenever violence might be necessary in order to "bring down the white man." During December, 1970, Waller reportedly had in his possession two Thompson sub-machine guns.

Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection
1/11/71
CAF:dlb

Junta of Militant Organizations
Bufile 157-9903

JOMO receives extensive contributions from all over the United States. It has association with the Black Panther Party and other black extremist groups as well as other New Left groups.

4-H

NATION OF ISLAM
Bufile 25-330971

The Nation of Islam (NOI) is an all-Negro, semireligious organization headed by Elijah Muhammad, self-proclaimed messenger of Allah. Under Muhammad's leadership, the NOI has grown up into a nationwide organization with a well-disciplined and devoted membership of almost 6,000 comprised of approximately 50 numbered mosques and approximately 50 unnumbered groups.

The NOI continues to teach antiwhite, anti-United States philosophy of hate aimed at a complete separation of the races. It opposes any form of integration and at the same time has remained aloof from other black extremist groups who favor violence. During racial disturbances, NOI members are given instructions to not get involved in the rioting. The NOI also opposes the war in Vietnam as a war against other non-whites and implies in its teachings that members should not serve in the United States Armed Forces as they can only serve one master, Elijah Muhammad. It also supports the Arabs in their conflict with Israel in the Middle East. The NOI also publishes a weekly newspaper known as "Muhammad Speaks," which contains vicious antiwhite propaganda. An average of 475,000 copies of this newspaper are distributed each week in the black communities and ghetto areas throughout the United States.

We have conducted a continuous security and/or racial-type investigation of this organization since 1953 in accordance with directives of the Department. Each active NOI group is reported on semiannually and the functionaries and leaders of the organization are those being investigated. The Department by letter dated 7/28/66 requested our investigation of this organization be continued.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
4-H
CEE:sef

ell

134

Communist Influence of Racial Groups
100-442529

This intensification was initiated in August, 1964. The subject matter was previously reported in a subsection of the Communist Party report, but the volume and importance of this information made it necessary to follow this communist influence in a separate investigation. This investigation includes not only the influence of the Communist Party but also that of the Trotskyite groups, splinter groups and others including the New Left.

The overall objective in this and related investigations is to protect the internal security of the United States by submitting information relating to possible Federal violations to the Attorney General for prosecution. We also have the responsibility to develop intelligence information and disseminate to interested Government agencies. Where feasible, certain counterintelligence measures are employed to neutralize the communist influence in the racial field.

Reports are submitted quarterly and the investigation is evaluated upon receipt of each report. Pertinent information is disseminated to the White House and the Attorney General.

The year 1970 saw continued influence by communists and other subversives in extremist groups. In fact, the communist attempts to influence the black extremist Black Panther Party were so insistent that the Panthers have become wary of the motives of the Communist Party. This has not diminished in any way the Communist Party's efforts to influence and support the Black Panther Party, the communist tactic being to support the Panthers whether they want it or not.

One illustration of the communist influence on the violence-prone Black Panther Party is the situation in which Huey Newton, Panther Supreme Commander, found himself

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
CEG:ekw
(4-H)

in connection with a film on Angela Davis, the communist and black revolutionary being held in California on murder charges. The Communist Party, USA, sponsored a motion picture on Davis and invited Newton to film the introduction to the film. Newton conferred with Eldridge Cleaver, exiled Information Minister of the Panthers, and told Cleaver he positively would not film the introduction because it appeared he would be required to follow the Communist Party line and, according to Newton, the Panthers did not follow anyone's line. Despite Newton's seemingly hard stand on this, the Communist Party found ways to make him relent, and three days later he agreed to the communist request, muttering that he would be "damned if he did and damned if he didn't." As violent as they are, the Panthers are no match for the sophistication of the experienced communist intrigue.

The communist hoodwinking is not confined to the Black Panther Party. The Communist Party's well-oiled propaganda machine has started to artfully transform Angela Davis, the accomplice in the brutal murder of a judge in California, into a national monument and into a growing source of funds. Not new at this sort of thing, the communists are well on their way to surpassing the monetary returns they have received from other racial and ethnic causes they have exploited, such as the Scottsboro boys, nine young blacks convicted twice in the 1930s in Alabama for raping two white girls on a freight train.

The communist influence in the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), the organization of the late Martin Luther King, Jr., has continued since King's death. Although Hunter Pitts O'Dell, a communist, amicably terminated his position as aide to the SCLC President in December, 1970, his influence continues as does that of Stanley Levison and Harry Wachtel who also have communist backgrounds. Levison handles the SCLC fund-raising. In the past Levison and Wachtel operated behind the scenes; today they are listed in SCLC literature as directors of the SCLC.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
CEG:ekw
4-H

136

In the past year, as anticipated, there has been a continued merging of racial activists and extremists with pro-Chinese communist groups, Trotskyites, the Students for a Democratic Society, and similar groups. In October, 1970, Elbert Howard, a Black Panther Party functionary, stated that the Black Panther Party is composed of Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries and no longer confines its interest to black power or black nationalism. He added that in the future the Panthers will encompass all revolutionaries regardless of race. We can expect this merger to continue.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/11/71
CEG:ekw
4-H

137

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM - BLACK EXTREMISTS
Bufile 100-448006

Counterintelligence in the black extremist field is a supplement to our investigative activities that cannot be identified as a function of this Bureau because of its clandestine nature. The goals of it are to prevent violence and other illegal activities by black extremists and black extremist organizations, to prevent the growth and/or unification of black extremist groups, to prevent such groups from gaining respectability and to preclude the rising of a leader who might unify and electrify various extremist factions and individuals.

To achieve these objectives, techniques are employed to neutralize organizations and individuals involved in extremist activities that are a threat to the internal security of this country. These techniques are aimed to embarrass, expose or otherwise neutralize these organizations and individuals.

Counterintelligence action regarding black extremists was initiated 8/25/67 and was last justified 5/14/70.

Counterintelligence operations are supervised on individual case desks as a logical adjunct of our investigative activities. In addition, one supervisor is designated coordinator to insure that operations initiated in different offices do not conflict. A quarterly letter is submitted for each participating division showing operations under consideration and results gained. All communications authorizing the institution of any counterintelligence operaions are routed through Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan; no operations are initiated by the field without Bureau approval.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WHA:sef

4-H

Counterintelligence operations and techniques were thoroughly discussed with field representatives attending the October 22 and 23, 1970, conference at the Bureau concerning the Black Panther Party (BPP). The conference concluded counterintelligence was an effective tool and there was a definite need for counterintelligence operations to neutralize black extremist activities.

The effect on black extremists of some authorized counterintelligence operations are difficult to assess, but a substantial number effected since last inspection have had measurable consequences and some of these included the following:

Four articles revealing extremist nature of BPP based on information furnished a news media source in Mississippi resulted in the closing of the BPP chapter in Cleveland, Mississippi. Agents of the Jackson Office were commended by the Director for this operation.

Following the arrests of BPP leadership in New Haven after torture-murder of BPP member in May, 1969, a Black Panther from Boston was sent to New Haven to rebuild that chapter. He proved to be an energetic organizer who built a closely knit and highly disciplined organization that effectively brought about mass demonstrations, attracted additional membership and which posed a serious threat to established Government. To neutralize this dynamic leader, New Haven was authorized to forward an anonymous letter to national BPP headquarters in California alleging he had embezzled BPP funds. Since then, numerous reports have been received indicating he had fallen into disfavor with BPP leaders and his motives were suspect. This resulted in his transfer to an insignificant BPP chapter in North Carolina.

In Rochester, New York, an anonymous letter sent to the Superintendent of Schools resulted in cancellation of subscriptions to the obscene, hate-filled, extremist newspaper of the BPP by a high school. These newspapers had been used in classrooms and costs of subscriptions had been charged to the school system.

Philadelphia division was authorized to send a letter to BPP national headquarters bearing an excellent facsimile of signature of a former BPP officer in Philadelphia who had been expelled a week previously due to problems with BPP leadership in Philadelphia. The letter accused Philadelphia BPP members of stealing clothing, food and drugs collected for poor children. All of these accusations, incidentally, were true. Since this letter was sent, Philadelphia BPP chapter has experienced severe problems with BPP headquarters, has been chastised repeatedly and prevented from participating in some BPP activities. Several members were disciplined by transfers. Subsequently, this situation was exploited by an authorized mailing of an anonymous letter to Huey P. Newton, Supreme Commander and co-founder of BPP, which criticized the meetings held under BPP auspices in Philadelphia September 5-7, 1970, concerning the planning for BPP-sponsored Revolutionary People's Constitutional Convention. These counterintelligence operations were primarily responsible for expulsion of head of the Philadelphia BPP and many of his followers from BPP on 10/16/70. These individuals have formed an independent local group in Philadelphia which contends with BPP for local support in that city. Thus, another result of this operation has been the splintering of Philadelphia BPP chapter.

To exploit a split in BPP leadership in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, Charlotte was authorized to prepare and send a leaflet to residents in vincinity of BPP headquarters. The leaflet insinuated the head of one BPP faction had pocketed donations secured for BPP Breakfast for Children Program. The leaflet caused consternation among BPP personnel and resulted in young Negro males poking fun at this BPP leader and accusing him of being a parasite. A decrease in financial donations to BPP followed the distribution of this leaflet.

Los Angeles set up a television expose of BPP in which George Putnam, newscaster KTTV-Los Angeles, California, noted that spread of Panther hoodlum-type revolutionary activity was a serious internal security threat, with law enforcement as its immediate target. He utilized the Director's comprehensive testimony on the BPP before the House Sub-Committee on Appropriations on 3/5/70 in bringing out the revolutionary and terroristic threat presented by BPP and its leaders. He concluded the program with the opinion that "we are subsidizing our own destruction if we allow this to continue."

To drive a wedge between BPP and many of its contributors, data concerning the anti-Zionist and anti-Semetic nature of BPP was furnished a news media source. As a result articles were published during June and July, 1970, in various newspapers throughout U.S., including "Long Island Press," Long Island, New York; "Daily News," Springfield, Massachusetts; and "Mobile Register," Mobile, Alabama. These articles discussed the close alliance developed between BPP and Al Fatah, an Arab terrorist organization waging guerrilla warfare against Israel. These articles emphasized that numerous pro-Arab and anti-Israeli articles have been published in the BPP newspaper and some of the latter articles called for the complete distruction of Israel.

The above articles as well as many other counterintelligence operations authorized since last inspection have contributed materially to drying up of contributions to BPP. Loss of revenue is one of the BPP's greatest problems and perhaps the best illustration is the drop in the size and circulation of the BPP newspaper, the Party's primary propaganda device. This paper has declined from 20 or more pages to 12 in its 1/2/71 issue and circulation at the end of the year was less than 100,000 after a high of 183,000 in October, 1970.

Counterintelligence action has also contributed or led to disruptions, dissension and factionalism in the BPP, the most important of the black extremist organizations. Sources have reported internal strife has developed among top BPP leaders and there is a growing distrust among them of one another. For example, Albert Howard, national leader who has been supervising BPP activities on East Coast, and Robert Bay, a BPP leader in New York, have been recalled to national BPP headquarters in California, where they were disciplined and severely criticized. In addition, SF 3421-R* on 12/26/70 reported a degree of dissension between Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information who is fugitive from justice and residing in Algeria, and Huey P. Newton. Informant learned Cleaver was extremely upset because BPP headquarters and particularly Newton are not keeping in touch with him and are not keeping him advised of key developments. This matter is being closely and aggressively followed for purpose of additional exploitation of these circumstances under this program.

Effective means of neutralizing black extremist groups is by drying up their sources of funds. We authorized the New York division to advise the Episcopal Church Center by anonymous letters that a $67,000 requested grant from the Episcopal Church Screening Board in New York, New York, to finance the Liberation School in Atlanta, Georgia, was in fact intended for use of Student National Coordinating Committee (SNCC) as the school was an operation of SNCC, a black extremist organization,and SNCC in seeking the grant had concealed its connection with the school. This operation resulted in the Church placing such low priority on this request that financial assistance for the school was precluded and the Liberation School was so advised. Since SNCC is in poor financial condition, this denial of funds was a blow to its endeavors to revitalize itself. The Director noted "excellent" on 9/3/70 memorandum which advised of this successful counterintelligence operation.

A highly successful counterintelligence operation exposed to college administrators the unethical and deceptive use made of college funds by Black Student Organization, Kalamazoo College, Kalamazoo, Michigan, to purchase literature concerning the creation of explosive devices and concerning guerrilla warfare. As a result of this operation, college confiscated such literature, admonished Black Student Organization leaders and tightened administrative procedures to preclude similar misuse of its funds.

The Jackson Office was authorized to furnish data concerning Republic of New Africa (RNA), a violence-prone black extremist separatist organization, to a cooperative newspaper source, resulting in the publication of an excellent article exposing the violent nature of this organization on the front page of the only state-wide evening newspaper in Mississippi. This publicity on the evening before the RNA regional conference was to begin, jolted RNA leaders. In addition, Negro participants from Jackson area were shocked to learn of the violent nature of this group and withdrew their support. The scheduled agenda was shelved and the conference was completely disrupted. Agents of the Jackson Office and Domestic Intelligence Division Supervisor were commended by the Director for this operation.

THE KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

On December 23, 1970, the Key Black Extremist Program was initiated, with the Director's approval, to intensify our coverage of certain black extremists who are extremely active and most vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence. As the program started about 90 were included. With Bureau approval others may be added by the field. This program is to provide intensified coverage of the day-to-day activities and future plans of these people and to assure that all possible violations of law on their parts are vigorously investigated when they are within our jurisdiction and are referred promptly to the appropriate agency when they are not.

An investigative summary report on all these people is due by February 15, 1971. Thereafter an investigative report is to be submitted every 90 days.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISON INSPECTION
1/12/71
CEG:ekw
(4-H)

BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

On October 29, 1970, the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on Black Student Unions and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigation. On November 4, 1970, instructions were sent to the field to implement this program. The number of campuses involved is about 500, representing approximately 750 black student groups. The officers will represent about 2,500 cases and the key activists another 250. The potential for new cases in this program will approximate 3,500 cases. This program includes junior colleges and two-year colleges as well as four-year colleges.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
CEG:ekw
(4-H)

RACIAL INFORMANTS

The prime purpose of development and utilization of racial informants and sources is to provide intelligence and evidentiary information concerning black and white racial extremist organizations and individuals. These sources are also called upon to furnish information concerning the general racial situation in all parts of the country.

Supervision of racial informants at Seat of Government includes review and approval of new informants and confidential sources, review of progress of informant every six months, review of payments being made to informants, analysis of informant coverage in each field office, analysis of nationwide informant coverage of an organization, coordination of informant coverage of specific functions such as the national convention of the Black Panther Party (BPP), and supervision of special projects such as development of top echelon BPP informant, using informant to develop information concerning a black extremist underground escape route and coordinating utilization of informants abroad with other agencies. All procedures are constantly evaluated in an effort to increase the efficiency of our operation and to provide the field with the necessary supervision and assistance with a minimum of paper work.

As of 1/12/71 we are operating a total of 7,184 racial informants, compared with a total of 5,485 at time of last inspection. This is an increase of 1,699 informants. 584 informants report on black extremist organizations. 376 informants report on white extremist organizations such as the Klan. (In line with recent reorganization of Domestic Intelligence Division, supervision of racial informants furnishing information on white extremists will shortly be transferred to the Internal Security Section.) We are operating 6,224 ghetto informants who provide general information within the black ghetto areas of our cities.

Informant coverage of black extremist groups has been increased since the last inspection with a significant increase being noted in our coverage of the BPP. At the time of the last inspection we operated 119 informants reporting on BPP as compared with 173 as of 1/12/71, which represents an increase of 54 informants.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
HEH:amk
4-H

Our ghetto informants have materially increased from 4,605 at the time of the last inspection to 6,224 as of 1/12/71, which represents an increase of 1,619.

At the time of the last inspection we were operating 438 informants furnishing information concerning white extremist organizations and as of 1/12/71 we are operating 376 such informants, which represents a decrease of 62. This is to be expected as a result of the continuing decline of Klan and other white extremist activities.

By memorandum dated 5/5/70 from G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, captioned "Racial Informant Development, Black Panther Party (BPP), Racial Matters," it was recommended and approved that two Special Agents of the San Francisco Division be assigned to work exclusively on developing a top-level informant in the BPP. It was also approved that $1,000 could be expended for the purpose of developing a top-level informant. As part of this program we have been in contact with a national BPP leader on several occasions, and while he has not agreed to cooperate with this Bureau he remains friendly to the contacting Agents and further efforts are contemplated to induce his cooperation. In addition we have been successful in obtaining the cooperation of another national BPP leader's wife, and through her cooperation we have made contact with this leader. Again the leader has not indicated a willingness to cooperate; however, additional contacts will be initiated with him. This operation was specifically designed to develop top-level informant in the top echelon of the BPP which is critically needed. We will continue to pursue the development of a top-level informant until it is accomplished.

GHETTO INFORMANTS

Ghetto informant program was instituted 10/11/67 to fulfill an urgent need to develop a network of "listening posts" in the ghetto areas of our cities. Ghetto informants were those persons living or working in the ghetto areas who furnished information concerning general racial conditions in their areas. As the field has gained experience in the handling of ghetto informants their value has steadily increased. Ghetto informants today are being utilized by field offices to attend public meetings held by extremists, to survey extremist bookstores, to verify residences and employments of Agitator and Security Index subjects living or working in ghetto areas and to identify individuals responsible for extremist activities tending to increase racial tensions in the ghetto areas. We are also noting numerous instances wherein ghetto informants are being converted by the field to regular racial informants furnishing information on black extremist organizations and individuals. As a valuable by-product we are also picking up criminal statistics through our contacts with ghetto informants. The ghetto informant program was last justified by memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan dated 7/17/70, captioned "Ghetto Informant Program, Racial Matters," and is scheduled to be rejustified in July, 1971.

TRAINING

A two-day conference of field supervisors handling racial matters investigations was held at Seat of Government 9/17-18/70. Representatives from 39 offices and two Legal Attaches attended. The conference dealt specifically with investigation of the BPP and informant development therein. A number of recommendations and suggestions resulted from this conference and were implemented. Suggestions approved as results of the conference are the subject of a separate write-up. Those in attendance were in agreement that the conference had been most beneficial to both field and Seat of Government personnel participating.

ADMINISTRATIVE OPERATIONS

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM

POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM
ESPIONAGE SECTION
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: This program is designed to develop double agents who can give us vital information from their knowledge of plans and illegal operations of our enemies within the United States. A potential double agent by your definition is one in contact with representatives of a foreign government under Bureau control but has not been requested to give information or given assignments.

During the course of this inspection, the Inspector asked for and received a list of 298 active potential double agents. A review of 237 files (80%) indicated the following:

a. These files deal primarily with PSIs and some SIs who have limited social, situational and business contacts with Soviet and Satellite nationals. Most of these nationals are allegedly intelligence agents, suspected intelligence agents or persons who are contacts of these nationals.

b. Generally the people selected for development as potential double agents are correspondents and journalists who come in contact with Tass news agency officials and employees; American businessmen who purchase Russian products or sell American products through Amtorg or other Russian companies operating in the United States; neighbors and building managers where nationals reside; naturalized American citizens of Slavic derivation who are contacted by suspected intelligence agents; naturalized American citizens who travel to Russia and satellite countries; leaders of Slavic-American societies, organizations and publications; American citizens taking educational and business tours in Russia and other Iron Curtain countries; and prominent members of technical and scientific societies who have an interest in similar scientific work and publications by Russian and satellite country professionals.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj

c. Generally a thorough background investigation is completed on each individual selected to be a potential double agent before the Bureau authorizes him to be interviewed to determine if he is receptive and willing to assist and cooperate with the Bureau. These investigations are not completed within a specified period. Several instances were noted wherein the national returned to his native country before the informant could develop suitable rapport. Review indicated several of these cases remain active although the national returned to his native country.

d. After the Bureau has authorized the field office to develop the potential double agent, the field office sends in progress reports each 6 months (FD-401). In most instances only a slight social acquaintanceship is established over an extensive period. Field and SOG supervision of these cases appears to be mechanical and perfunctory and lacks imaginative, aggressive and timely direction.

e. During the year 1970 there was an average of three communications per file received from the field. Most of these were semiannual reports. Communications from SOG to the field averaged less than one letter per file and in almost all instances this was a very short letter authorizing investigation and development of potential double agent. There were less than 10 cases noted where specific instructions, directions or other guidance was furnished to the field in developing these potential double agents.

f. 110 of the cases were reviewed at random for the specific purpose of determining generally how long they had been pending. 4 cases had been pending prior to 1960; 3 were open in 1961; 6 in 1962; 7 in 1963; 6 in 1964; 5 in 1965; 10 in 1966; 12 in 1967; 10 in 1968; 22 in 1969; and 25 in 1970. The average case has been opened 3 1/2 years and there has been an average of one piece of outgoing correspondence from the Bureau in each file.

Very little outgoing correspondence concerning instructions or directions were noted in these 110 files. For example, 5 of the files reviewed had no outgoing correspondence in them since 1967. One file was reviewed in which the last outgoing correspondence was in 1962. 65 of these 110 files did not have any outgoing correspondence in the last 12-month period (1970).

Review of this program as indicated by the above observations, reveals that virtually no direction is given the program. Separate write-ups have been prepared on two individual cases where supervision has been most inadequate.

150

As a general consideration, it is felt that you have 298 cases pending in what appears on the surface to be an important program but in reality are mere "numbers" from a supervision standpoint.

You are requested to explain why this condition exists, what is your justification for this type of handling, and what action you anticipate necessary to correct.

Comments of Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.

INSPECTOR DONALD E. MOORE
(1-24-71 CGS:EWL:DEM/djw:ekn)

The comments and observations of the Inspector dealing with a "POTENTIAL DOUBLE AGENT PROGRAM" have been carefully reviewed and the following comments are responsive to the questions raised:

For purposes of clarification it is important that the terminology and designations used be defined. The designation "Potential Double Agent" (PDA) is a descriptive term denoting an individual usually already approved by the Bureau as a Potential Security Informant (PSI) or as a Security Informant (SI). The approval of a PSI or SI is based on his current or potential capabilities to furnish information of intelligence or security interest. If individuals in either of these categories have an association with a Soviet-bloc official, for statistical purposes they are considered as PDA's. This labeling is incidental to their primary designation as a Bureau-approved PSI or SI, and their administrative handling at the Bureau conforms with overall Bureau policy and instructions relating to all Bureau approved sources, whether or not they are considered to be PDA's, and this designation does not alter the administrative handling of these cases.

Justifications for Bureau-approved PSI's and SI's are required on a six-month basis following definitely established form. The primary purpose of this justification is administrative in nature to insure the individual involved continues to meet Bureau standards. Substantive information which may have been furnished is reported in detail in the 134 file maintained by the Office of Origin as required by Bureau regulations. This information is then reported to the Bureau under appropriate substantive captions. Normally the only occasion when substantive data received from a source appears in the informant case file is in the semi-annual justification letter in extremely abbreviated form. See Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13, Manual of Instructions which states,

> "Correspondence in security informant and potential security informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption."

Regarding specific comments in paragraph c., as pointed out, the primary designation of an individual as a PSI or SI is his ability to furnish information of intelligence interest, which may or may not depend upon his association with one Soviet-bloc national. This association almost without exception becomes productive only when the Soviet-bloc official initiates action to exploit this relationship. The fact that the Soviet-bloc national departs ~~this~~ country, first, does not end their relationship, and secondly, does not end the potential that exists in the relationship. Very often there is a follow-up contact by another Communist-bloc official based on the apparently disrupted initial relationship. Characteristic of the patient, long-range planning and execution of Soviet-bloc intelligence, this reactivation may occur at some indeterminate future date. We must be alert to this concrete possibility in order to fully exploit the potential that exists in such cases. Therefore, contacts with the source, in cases of this type, must continue for a reasonable period.

Concerning paragraph d., in cases where the potential for development of an individual as a double agent is based exclusively on a social acquaintanceship with a specific Soviet-bloc official, the initiative for this development rests almost entirely with that Soviet-bloc official. Experience has taught us that attempts on our part to maniuplate our sources to hasten his development are most often recognized by the hostile intelligence officer as a provocation. When direction is necessary and practical, it must be developed in the overall context of the Soviet-bloc official's investigation, and such direction is apparent in the substantive case files. These factors will account for what appears to be "mechanical and perfunctory" supervision which "lacks imaginative, aggressive and timely direction," in the informant case file.

Paragraph e. refers to the lack of communications in the informant files reviewed. The nature and purpose of the informant file has been previously explained, and in this context it can be understood that operational instructions usually appear in the substantive files and not in the administrative file of the informant.

Paragraph f notes many instances of cases concerning "PDA's" have been opened for varying periods of time, and, again, the lack of extensive outgoing communications noted. It is again stressed that the designation of "PDA" is an arbitrary one, these files are evaluated and administered on an individual basis in accordance with Bureau requirements related to PSI's and SI's, and not solely on their double-agent potential. These requirements are met in these cases.

The Inspector has commented in his Survey that "virtually no direction is given the program." The foregoing comments have established 1.) the designation of PDA to a SI or PSI does not require administrative supervision or handling by SOG over and above that required for any SI or PSI, 2.) if direction and instruction is necessary and practical in a particular case, such is given in the overall supervision and handling of the substantive case file of the Soviet-bloc national involved, 3.) in accordance with current Bureau policy and instructions relating to the handling of these files, they contain a minimal amount of information relating to the productivity of the source, and 4.) the labeling and designation of a SI and PSI as a PDA is an administrative device adopted for the purpose of emphasizing the need for Double-Agents. There is no program as such, for the handling of these cases.

To the general consideration expressed that the 298 cases are mere numbers from a supervisory standpoint, the above comments clearly indicate such is not the case. These cases are not opened and maintained as a program. They are opened on individual merit and maintained in accordance with Bureau standards under the same requirements as all other PSI and SI cases at the SOG.

In summary, it appears that the criticisms leveled in this particular Survey are due to a misconception involving terminology. "PDA" is a label. It carries no requirement for administrative handling over and above supervision afforded the case as a PSI or SI. These cases are basic and vital investigative tools. Administration of such cases are guided by rigid Bureau standards; the comments made by Inspector do not indicate these standards have been breached. Thus, no corrective action is considered necessary and none is recommended. This does not mean that I will not continue to exert every effort to see that qualified informants will continue to be developed and that carefully considered and logical means will be employed to have these informants developed to the point they are accepted by Soviet-bloc officials and become operational Double-Agents. I am pleased we have increased the number of active Double-Agents since the last inspection and will closely follow our progress in this field.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
(DEM:ekn 1-24-71)

I have carefully noted the comments of the Inspector and also those of Mr. Moore. I certainly am aware that Double-Agents active against Soviet-bloc officials are a vital part of our counterespionage work. I share the views expressed by Mr. Moore and assure the Inspector I will closely follow the development of informants in this field and see that proper guidance is given the field to increase the number of active Double-Agents.

ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:mjt 1/25/71)

Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have in the Bureau today and during this inspection our review of your program was made with this attitude. I have reviewed with great interest the accomplishments and progress which you have made; however, there were certain aspects of your operation which have caused concern. Specifically, your handling of "Potential Double Agents" does not nearly result from a review standpoint with the feeling that this phase of work is compatible with the challenges presented. Elsewhere in this inspection we have discussed development of Double Agents in place as being highly desirable goals in our work, yet, we have lacked success in this as evidenced by an extended "dry" period of almost nine years.

I feel that perhaps foreign intelligence may not be that good and that by improving ourselves we may be able to accomplish our goals. In the above write-up it was my feeling that your Potential Double Agent program needs considerable attention from a critical self-analysis standpoint for the purpose of strengthening it consistent with its potential for providing valuable assistance both here and in the field.

Assistant Director note.

The comments of the Inspector are noted.

I most certainly share the Inspector's view that Soviet espionage is one of the greatest challenges we have in the Bureau today. I have and am continually stressing the development of good double agents. The Inspector referred to "Double Agents-in-place," and in view of the context of his remarks, I concluded he is referring to "Defectors-in-place," and I know of no higher goal in our work than developing them.

To my knowledge, the first Soviet Defector-in-place the Bureau ever developed was Kaarlo Tuomi, an illegal agent who was a Captain in the Soviet Army and who was developed in March, 1959. We operated him for approximately four and one-half years. Next, in 1961-1962, we developed Tophat, a Lieutenant Colonel in the Soviet Army who operated in this country until his return to the Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Soviet Union, he cooperated and furnished valuable information which was recovered by the CIA from deaddrops in Moscow. In 1966, Tophat was assigned to Burma and was contacted by the Bureau in that country. With the Director's approval, he was turned over to CIA and operated by them (and also for us since they serviced requirements for us) until 1969. Tophat has now returned to the Soviet Union, and to our knowledge, he is still a cooperative Defector-in-place and may come to the West again.

In October, 1961, we developed through investigation and interrogation the Gunson Defector-in-place, who was a member of the illegal apparatus for the Soviet Military Intelligence Service. In May, 1962, he returned to the Soviet Union, and if he can leave that country, we can expect that he will be in contact with us again.

In 1962, we began operations with the Fedora source, a Colonel in the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB). He furnished voluminous information on KGB operations, including the data which resulted in the arrest and conviction of Igor Ivanov and John William Butenko. In May, 1967, he returned to the Soviet Union but was again contacted by the Bureau in Canada in 1968, where he was visiting for a short period. In September, 1969, Fedora visited in New York and was again in touch with

Bureau Agents. To our knowledge, Fedora is still a viable source, and if he will not be reassigned in the United States, certainly we can anticipate contact with him at scientific symposiums elsewhere in the Western world.

In 1962, we developed the Nicknack Defector-in-place, who was a technical man connected with Soviet military intelligence. Nicknack returned to the Soviet Union in 1964, anticipating that his next overseas assignment would be with the Soviet Military Office in Washington, D. C.

In 1963, we compromised the Miter source, who was a co-opted agent of the KGB and who furnished political information which was disseminated at the highest level. He returned to the Soviet Union in October, 1964.

Contact was first made with the Shamrock source in January, 1967. At one time he was the Acting Resident of the KGB in New York. He furnished information concerning 102 KGB operations. Based upon information furnished by Shamrock, the identification of an illegal agent husband and wife team has been effected. They are presently located in Argentina.

During the summer of 1969, an Agent of the New York Office successfully developed the Harlo source, who acted as a Defector-in-place from July, 1969, to November, 1970. The Harlo source was in a position to furnish information of value and to identify members of the Soviet intelligence community. The source left the United States in November, 1970, under circumstances which may indicate a willingness to further cooperate if the opportunity presented itself.

While the above is a listing of Defectors-in-place achievements in the Soviet field, we have been equally successful with the Satellite intelligence services. Commencing in 1963, we developed the Prime source, who was a Polish code clerk at the Polish United Nations Mission. He furnished cipher pads and keys which enabled National Security Agency to break the Polish code. That Agency described his operation as the intelligence superhaul of the century.

In addition to two Defectors-in-place in the Polish field during the ensuing years, we now operate the Panther source, who is presently in-place in the United Nations Secretariat in New York.

We developed Gimme, a member of the Czechoslovakian Intelligence Service, in 1962 and operated him until he returned to Czechoslovakia in November, 1963. Thereafter, he was in continual clandestine contact with the CIA until his return to Washington in January, 1969, where he was again operated successfully until his overt defection in June, 1970.

WF 1373-S was a Yugoslav diplomat and intelligence officer who was successfully recruited and operated from July, 1962, until September, 1965. He was believed to be the first professional intelligence Yugoslav officer recruited anywhere in the world.

From early July, 1966, through the first week in November, 1966, we were in contact with an extremely sensitive Defector-in-place in the Washington, D. C., area. Knowledge of this Defector-in-place is and has been limited to very few Bureau personnel. Only four men in the Espionage Section are aware of his past cooperation. While in contact this Defector-in-place furnished extremely valuable counterintelligence and has the potential for reassignment to the United States. We are currently operating a double agent developed by this source in an effort to bring about his reassignment to this country. In addition, we have taken action against those Soviet intelligence officers in the same department as this source in an effort to force their recall, thus opening up the way for source to be reassigned to the U.S. as their replacement. Should we succeed his knowledge would give us an insight into the KGB legal apparatus in the U.S. that we have never previously had.

In addition, we have been in contact with numerous Soviet-bloc officials both through double agents who were carefully directed by us and by Bureau Agents. At the present time we are in contact with Henryk Cieslak, an employee of the Polish Embassy. Agents have talked to him several times and have an appointment to clandestinely meet with him this Saturday, January 29, 1971, at National Airport. He has indicated willingness to cooperate with us but has some reservations in view of his family situation. We expect to overcome this. In addition, in New York, Alexander Adam Messing-Mierzejewski, Chief of the Representation and Liaison Unit, Office of Interagency Affairs, United Nations Secretariat, (a Pole) has been contacted and expressed agreement to cooperate and we are continuing our contacts with him and hope to develop him fully.

These are just two of many contacts we have made during recent years in the Satellite field.

In the Soviet field we have been particularly anxious to develop Defectors-in-place and have made numerous contacts. During 1970 we had an Agent meet clandestinely on three occasions with Balentin P. Nizhelskiy, third Secretary at the Soviet Embassy, who is a known KGB officer and we had several brush meetings with him. He returned to the Soviet Union on normal home leave in late September, 1970, but prior to his departure arrangements were made for subsequent meetings with him when he returned. He has not returned and information recently received indicates this is due to serious illness of his wife in the USSR. While the reported illness of his wife may be only a cover by the KGB to keep us from knowing he reported his contacts, the illness of his wife may be very real and if so and he returns to this country subsequently we have excellent ground work already laid.

After a long period of working against Yuriy P. Lisnevskiy, a known GRU Agent and head of AEROFLOT Office in New York, we developed excellent information about him and established a close relationship with him. We secured very detailed personal information about Lisnevskiy and in October contacted him and while he was badly shaken because of the detailed operation we had run against him he did not commit himself to cooperate and after thinking about the matter for a period of time apparently decided to report to his superiors and was whisked back to the Soviet Union.

Lisnevskiy and Nizhelskiy are examples of efforts we have made and are continuing to make in this field. I am setting forth this very sensitive information so that the Inspector will be aware that we have been and most certainly will continue to do everything possible to accomplish our goals. I feel we have very dedicated and knowledgeable men working in this field and we are constantly analyzing the overall field in the light of changing world conditions to see that we take advantage of every opportunity. The Inspector may be assured we will continue to do so.

159

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM
COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS - (COKMA) PROGRAM

During the course of this inspection, a volume of material was reviewed, part of which were cases and investigations dealing with the above program in the New York Office. The program was instituted in July, 1970, by a team of Special Agents in the Jamaica-Queens area in an effort to observe clandestine activity there based on an analysis of previous activity in that area. SPIA letters dated 8/14/70 and 9/4/70 from New York reported the observation of numerous Soviet intelligence officers in the area during July and August, and three individuals were identified in contact with Soviet intelligence officers under suspicious circumstances.

It appears that the successes of the recent and current New York efforts in these matters still have not been brought to the attention of the Washington Field Office in the form of instructions or directions to analyze their situation for possible implementation of the program (if not already being done) in the Washington area.

For this reason, you are being requested to advise of supervisory procedures you have to insure the dissemination of new techniques and the "cross-fertilization" of ideas to appropriate offices.

It is realized that New York furnishes copies of communications to Washington Field Office. What provisions do you have at the Seat of Government to insure adequate, aggressive attention and supervision is provided to the field in matters such as this?

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan, Inspector Donald E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ESM:mkl
1/21/71

160

ADMINISTRATIVE MEMORANDUM
COVERAGE OF KNOWN MEET AREAS - (COKMA) PROGRAM

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
Espionage Section

The Inspector's comments regarding the success of captioned program in the New York Office have been noted and are valid. Bureau has furnished New York a communication offering suggestions and asking for its comments and recommendations regarding expansion of the program. No instructions or directions have been issued to WFO concerning possible implementation of this program in that office, although as the Inspector notes WFO has been made aware of the activity conducted by the New York Office, since the conditions on which the program is based are applicable only in the New York area by reason of conditions peculiar to that office alone; i.e., fact that analysis of activities by Soviet intelligence officers has disclosed they use areas in the vicinity of certain subway stops for meetings with agents either for the convenience of their sources or the security offered to both by the subway in traveling to or from meet areas. No subway exists in Washington, D. C. Travel in the Washington area is primarily by automobile, due to the lack of any appreciable rapid transit system, while in New York the primary means of transportation is the subway system. Since conditions peculiar to New York do not exist in Washington, D. C., it was not deemed necessary to issue instructions or directions to WFO concerning this particular program.

Another factor considered by Bureau was knowledge of prior use by WFO of programs directed against geographic and other known factors concerning Soviet intelligence operations peculiar to Washington as opposed to New York. Several years ago a program was used wherein all thoroughfares from the District, where Soviets resided almost exclusively at that time, were checked during hours we knew they conducted meets in the suburban areas and might be detected traveling to such areas via these routes for this purpose. This was discontinued due to lack of productivity. More recently, WFO used a "Sweeper Program" wherein all Special Agents assigned to Soviet investigations checked all shopping centers in the metropolitan area (District, Virginia and Maryland suburbs) after an analysis disclosed a preponderance of usage by Soviets of such locations for intelligence meets. This is the same concept on which the COKMA Program is based. It

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP:eco
1/22/71

operated from about 1967 to 1968 and was implemented on the basis of conditions detected as existing in WFO but which were not applicable in New York; therefore, instructions were not issued to New York for implementation of similar program but it was kept informed of developments in the same manner that New York is now informing WFO of developments occurring in instant matter. "Sweeper" was discontinued due to lack of positive accomplishments such as those which have been disclosed in the COKMA Program. From about 1968 to 1969, "Blitz Program" was used by WFO to check residences of the more active Soviet intelligence officers to determine the presence or absence of their automobiles with the expectation of disclosing patterns which might be afforded more intensive attention to ascertain nature of activity being conducted during these periods when their presence could not be accounted for. "Blitz" program was also discontinued during weekdays by WFO due to lack of positive accomplishments and, incidental thereto, manpower limitations or need to apply personnel to areas offering more firm possibilities for producing positive results; however, the principle is still utilized in connection with weekend physical surveillance scheduling.

Recognizing the value of accounting for all Soviets during as much of the day as possible, especially when they were away from our sophisticated coverage at the establishment where they are assigned, Bureau pointed out to both New York Office and WFO the valuable information disclosed through "Blitz" of their residences and instructed both offices to develop established neighborhood sources who could furnish information regarding arrivals and departures, use of automobile and odometer readings, as a means of insuring continued receipt of the information which would no longer be available following reevaluation and modification of the program. This instruction was also based on the fact that Soviets now reside throughout the periphery of suburban D. C. due to changing socio-economic conditions making it practically impossible to cover these widespread locations with any degree of sufficiency without some added technique.

During December, 1970, Espionage Section recommended distribution to all Bureau personnel at Seat of Government, WFO and the adjacent Resident Agencies of Baltimore and Alexandria of small card appropriately coded listing license numbers of vehicles used by the ten most active Soviet intelligence officers. This was approved by Director. Rationale here was to add several hundred pairs of eyes to cover individuals who are extremely conscious of and adept at detecting surveillances. Personnel observing these cars would not conduct any activity other than to report pertinent information concerning observation of the vehicle to WFO by routing slip for compilation and determination of suspicious patterns which should be resolved through concentrated surveillance coverage on the basis of available information (again the basic COKMA philosophy). This is being used on a trial basis in WFO to test its productivity and value. If found to be of assistance, consideration will be given to implementing in New York Office; however, in this instance again, the program is designed to exploit conditions prevelant in Washington, D. C., rather than New York where Bureau personnel do not reside in same general area as Soviets and therefore, might not be expected to produce positive results. Means of transportation available in both areas, previously mentioned, was also considered.

SPIA letters themselves are a vehicle for "cross-fertilization" of ideas between recipient and submitting offices. They contain monthly, detailed summaries of intelligence activities which have occurred in the submitting offices. They are routed to each Espionage Section Supervisor for review. If significant information is contained in submission from WFO which might be applicable to New York, or vice versa, Bureau Supervisor directs attention of appropriate office to the information by means of communication in the substantive file involved. Weekly Section Conferences allow for a more current discussion of significant or unusual developments as they occur in individual cases providing a more immediate vehicle for directing attention of one office to developments in another which might be applicable to a current or prior investigation.

Periodically, Espionage Section learns from other intelligence organizations, foreign and domestic, of new intelligence techniques or changes in MO by Soviets which should

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP:eco
1/22/71

163

be considered by offices having a Soviet establishment or particular investigative situation. This information is immediately furnished to interested offices by Supervisor having responsibility for coordination of the SPIA-SATPIA matters or by the substantive supervisor handling the particular investigation to which it pertains. Determination in this regard is made by Section Front Office which issues appropriate instructions and follows prompt compliance. Examples are notification from British and CIA regarding Soviet capability to use "dial-a-message" telephones (time, weather, prayer, AA etc.,) with sophisticated device on their telephone as means of clandestine communications. On another occasion British told us about Soviet use of compact broad-band scanning receiver by personnel supporting intelligence officer during meet as means of detecting radio transmissions in area which might indicate counterintelligence service interest in that particular activity. Both New York and WFO were alerted to these circumstances for consideration in their coverage of Soviet establishments and covering double agent meetings.

All matters pertaining to programs such as captioned are routed through Section Front Office to insure adequate and aggressive attention and supervision is provided to field, and make certain no possibility is overlooked to exploit such situations for maximum counterintelligence benefits on field-wide basis, consistent with feasibility or applicability.

Inspector D. E. Moore
DEM:lmb
1/23/71

I share Mr. Branigan's views that Cokma is not applicable to WFO in view of the different conditions existing in the two cities. Noting the other comments of the inspector and the information set forth by Mr. Branigan, I would like to advise that in communications I read, in contacts with personnal of New York and WFO and supervisors at the Seat of Government and in contacts with representatives of cooperative foreign intelligence agencies, I am most alert to situations and procedures that can be adopted by us. In conferences with Section Chiefs in the Branch, I stress the need to be alert for procedures that may have worked in one area of our operations and can be adopted to other areas.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
ECP:eco
1/22/71

164

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
DEM:lmb
1/23/71

I have carefully noted the inspector's comments and also the comments of Mr. Branigan and Mr. Moore. I am most alert to the development of new ideas and the need for "cross-fertilization" of ideas and stress this in my conferences with all Section Chiefs at the Division. I not only seek ideas about the operations of a Section Chief within the Section, but for ideas of operations anywhere within the Division and throughout the Bureau. I am constantly alert in my many contacts with representatives of other Government agencies, foreign liaison contacts and representatives of business for ideas which can be successfully utilized in our work and will continue this. In discussions with SACs, I constantly stress the challenging conditions the Bureau faces and the need for new ideas and new applications. I most certainly will continue to stress this.

ADDENDUM INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER
(ESM:sjr - 1/25/71)

It is my understanding that the COKMA concept is not "new" in the New York Office but, as indicated has had recent successes. It is realized COKMA deals with subway travel of our subjects; however, the concept was that to which I alluded in the above write-up. It was my feeling perhaps due to internal conditions in the Soviet Union and the Polish situation etc., that Soviet Intelligence may now be more active and consequently "pressing" for some reason thus making it possible for us to have significant success in New York in a relatively short period of time.

For this reason, it was my feeling that the matter should have been highlighted by SOG which has the responsibility for coordination and direction of field activities.

I do not agree with the concept that one field division is different from another when we are dealing with as important a topic as Soviet espionage.

Assistant Director Brennan and Inspector Moore note.

INSPECTOR D. E. MOORE
DEM:mjt
1/25/71

I certainly agree with the Inspector that one field division is no different than another in connection with the topic as important as Soviet Espionage. The point that Mr. Branigan and I were attempting to make is that we have to recognize the difference in methods of operation in Soviet intelligence officers in New York and WFO. The Inspector may be assured that I will follow the operations of Soviet-bloc intelligence officers in New York, WFO and also in San Francisco in view of the establishment of a consulate there. I will continue to be most alert to any successful procedures utilized in one office that may be productive in another and will certainly see that the procedures are applied where feasible.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
DEM:mjt
1/25/71

I concur with Inspector Moore.

166

PERSONNEL MATTERS

PERSONNEL INTERVIEWED

INSPECTOR E.S. MILLER: In addition to review of work performance, various personnel, by reason of supervisory position held, were interviewed during the course of this inspection by a member of the Inspection Staff. The interviews and review of work performance of these personnel have disclosed no substantial delinquencies of matters requiring recommendations for any specific action. The personnel are:

Employee	Category
Richard D. Cotter	Section Chief
George C. Moore	Section Chief
Robert L. Shackelford	Section Chief
W. Raymond Wannall	Section Chief
Conrad W. Thompson	Approved Bureau Speaker
Lambert L. Anderson	Approved Bureau Speaker
Frank B. Still, Jr.	Approved Bureau Speaker
Robert C. Putnam	Approved Bureau Speaker
David Ryan	Approved Bureau Speaker
Joseph M. Sizoo	Approved Bureau Speaker
Ervin L. Recer	Approved Bureau Speaker
Louis J. Brune, Jr.	Approved Bureau Speaker
C. Edwin Enright	Recommended for Advancement

Assistant Director Brennan please note.

Noted CB

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
JVB:sfw
6-A-4
1/21/71

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Please tabulate by Sections and Units the current Agent and clerical personnel complement of your Division as of the close of business 1/8/71. Show actual and authorized personnel in each Section or Unit, including the Division Front Office. Personnel on maternity leave or leave without pay should not be considered in the overall tabulation.

1. Include positions regarded as vacant but for which authority has been obtained to fill.

2. Identify all personnel under transfer into or out of the Division as of 1/8/71 as well as those who have submitted letters of resignation as of that date. (Show date of transfer letter or of acknowledgment of resignation.)

3. Tabulate by Section and Unit any shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of 1/8/71.

4. Indicate your assessment of adequacy of clerical personnel and if additional personnel is deemed necessary provide complete justification.

5. Provide specifics regarding manpower savings effected since the last inspection as a result of streamlining or any other means.

6. Comment on adequacy of your Agent personnel.

7. In the write-up on adequacy of personnel by Sections, describe criteria utilized in evaluation of personnel adequacy in each particular Section or Unit. Each Section write-up should constitute a separate part of the overall Divisional write-up.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/8/71
ESM:wmj
6-E

118

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Attached find the Section
ABK:jgr 1/15/71 write-ups concerning each category of information requested by the Inspector relative to adequacy of personnel. These comments are current as of 1/8/71:

The personnel assigned to the Division Front Office consists of one Assistant Director, two Inspectors, two Special Agent Supervisors, five stenographic employees and 19 clerical employees. This complement includes the personnel directly assigned to the Front Office, those in the Division teletype room, Mail Room and messenger service, the Security Patrol Force in addition to five Agents. I have not as yet requested a replacement for a GS-4 clerical position in the Front Office, which was created with the resignation of James A. Pettingill on 12/24/70. I am attempting to absorb the work of this position with the present personnel complement in the Front Office. This is on a trial basis and if it isn't satisfactory, I will recommend a replacement.

The overall authorized personnel complement of the Division at the beginning of the inspection was 116 Special Agents and 190 clerks compared to an authorized complement of 126 Agents and 186 clerks at the time of the last inspection. We now have assigned to the Division 116 Agents and 188 clerks. The clerical vacancies being the aforementioned GS-4 position in the Front Office and a vacancy in the Mail Room, which was created when a clerical position in the Internal Security Section was filled.

At the present time we have outstanding requests for two Agents to replace Special Agents George M. Quinn and C. Edwin Enright, who are under transfer to the Inspection Division. We also have requests for two GS-2 Mail Clerks for the Division Mail Room to replace the clerk who was transferred to the Internal Security Section and the second to replace the GS-3 clerk who will be reassigned or rotated when the replacement is made available to the Division. The Racial Intelligence Section has submitted a request for an additional clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. In addition, this Section is now making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors because of the heavy increase in the case load in the black extremist field. (Justification in Section write-up attached).

The request for a clerk by the Internal Security Section for a newly approved clerical position mentioned in its write-up has been filled. The Espionage Section may find it necessary to request an additional clerk to handle extra duties assigned to a clerk who is already heavily assigned, if the present system (now on a trial basis) proves unworkable. The New Left Section may find it necessary to request an additional Agent and clerk if the present trend of heavy increase in case load continues. We are watching this closely. As you will note in the write-up by the Nationalities Intelligence Section we are making a request for two additional Agent Supervisors at this time. This is necessary due to the recent increase in foreign legats from 11 to 17, increasing our legat personnel from 60 to 88.

To recapitulate, our requests for additional personnel are:

Front office	Two GS-2 clerks
Racial Intelligence	One GS-4 clerk One Agent Supervisor to replace Supervisor Enright. Two additional Agent Supervisors.
Espionage Section	One Agent Supervisor to replace Agent Quinn.
Nationalities Intelligence Section	Two additional Agent Supervisors.

I firmly believe that our limited requests for additional personnel at this time are fully justified. As you will note in the attached write-ups, we are not asking for additional personnel until, after on a trial basis, we have found it absolutely necessary and fully justified. The increase of terroristic tactics by the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society and militant organizations such as the Black Panther Party and the Jewish Defense League has made it absolutely imperative that intensive investigation be conducted to identify, locate all members of these militant organizations and secure evidence for prosecution, if we are to meet our grave responsibilities in the extremely vital field of internal security. This has increased the work load of the Racial Intelligence Section, the New Left Section, and the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Because of this increase in work and my interest in conserving manpower wherever possible, we recently reorganized the Division in order to make the most efficient use of our manpower. I conscientiously believe I have now trimmed my manpower to the bone. Under my direction, Branch and Section Chiefs continually evaluate personnel adequacy in order to assure we get the job done with a maximum amount of efficiency with the minimum amount of personnel. I conscientiously believe I have done this and I will continue to pursue this policy.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

SECTION CHIEF A. W. GRAY: As of 1/8/71 the authorized personnel of the Internal Security Section was 15 Special Agents, 7 Secretaries, and 9 Clerks. A breakdown by Units follows:

FRONT OFFICE	AUTHORIZED PERSONNEL AS OF 1/8/71	
Section Chief	1	
Secretary	1	
Number One Man	1	
Secretary	1	
COMMUNIST PARTY, USA, UNIT		
Supervisors	3	
Secretary	1	
Clerks	2	(1 new requested but not yet assigned)
SUBVERSIVE INDIVIDUALS UNIT		
Supervisors	3	
Secretary	1	
Clerks	2	
PROTEST AND TROTSKYIST GROUPS UNIT		
Supervisors	3	(1 - McGuire - temporarily assigned New Left Section)
Secretary	1	
Clerks	2	(1 - Hanning - temporarily assigned New Left Section)
INTERNATIONAL NEW LEFT AND SEDITION UNIT		
Supervisors	2	
Secretary	1	
Clerk	1	
KLAN AND WHITE HATE GROUPS UNIT		
Supervisors	2	
Secretary	1	
Clerks	2	

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
DFXC:bcw
6-E

172

SPECIFIC COMMENTS

1. In Protest and Trotskyist Groups Unit, one Special Agent Supervisor (McGuire) and one clerk (Hanning) temporarily assigned New Left Section. Supervisor in Charge of same Unit (Griffith) also spending majority of his time in New Left Section assisting on special. An additional Supervisor from International New Left Unit (Benedict) and one clerk from Klan and White Hate Groups Unit (Dean) are also working majority of their time on New Left Section special.

2. No pending transfers or resignations.

3. See number 1 above.

4. We have requested one additional clerical employee for the Communist Party, USA, Unit (request not yet filled) because of substantial need due to increase in Unit case load from 572 to 1076 as a result of reorganization. We are currently assessing need for another clerical employee in Klan and White Hate Groups Unit to handle large volume of mail involved in supervision of several hundred Klan and White Hate group informants.

5. Considering that Internal Security Section, as it is now constituted, was established December 16, 1970, approximately three weeks ago, no meaningful comments regarding manpower savings as related to this Section can be made. We are carrying a substantial case load, with increases in several areas. For example, the case load of the Communist Party, USA, Unit as a result of the reorganization increased from 572 to 1076 with no increase in personnel. Additionally, two Supervisors assigned to this Section (Griffith and McGuire) are on temporary loan to the New Left Section along with a clerical employee (Hanning). Additionally, a third Supervisor (Benedict) and a second clerical employee (Dean) are spending the majority of their working time on assignment to New Left Section special. For all practical purposes, the work of three Supervisors and two clerical employees is being absorbed on a daily basis within the present personnel complement which, of course, is a tangible manpower savings. In all Units we are constantly involved in attempting to eliminate or curtail the volume of paperwork being handled, reducing programs and projects to bare essentials and wherever possible, keeping the case load volume at a manageable figure.

Another example of manpower conservation exists in the Subversive Individuals - Basic Revolutionary Groups Unit which handles approximately 1,400 pending cases and is responsible for over 7,000 subjects on the Bureau's Special Indices. A moratorium on routine communist investigations in effect at the time of the last inspection, which curtailed the work of this Unit, has been removed and the case load increases daily. The removal of the moratorium warranted the expansion of this Unit from a two to three-man Unit at the time of reorganization but for all practical purposes, the Unit has functioned as a two-man Unit with the third man (Schwartz) on loan for the majority of the period to the Research Section for a special project.

6. When Special Agent supervisory personnel currently assigned, temporarily on loan to other Sections, are returned, we will have adequate personnel to handle existing case load.

7. In evaluating adequacy of both Special Agent and clerical personnel the following criteria were used:

case load
mail count
name checks
complexity of cases and supervision involved
deadline matters
special assignments
experienced supervisors

Administrative duties assigned Supervisors in Charge (reviewing mail, conferring with employees, organizing Unit) limit to some extent the volume of case assignments handled.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/13/71
DFXC:bcw
6-E

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL
NEW LEFT SECTION 6E

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: There is set forth below a tabulation of the actual and authorized personnel in the New Left Section as of close of business, January 8, 1971.

	Authorized	Assigned
New Left Groups Unit	6 Agents	6 Agents
	4 Clerks	4 Clerks
	1 Super Clerk	1 Super Clerk
	1 Secretary	1 Secretary
Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit	5 Agents	4 Agents
	4 Clerks	4 Clerks
	1 Secretary	1 Secretary
Special Investigations - West Unit	4 Agents	3 Agents
	4 Clerks	4 Clerks
	1 Secretary	1 Secretary
Special Investigations - East Unit	5 Agents	5 Agents
	4 Clerks	4 Clerks
	1 Secretary	1 Secretary
Special Assignment		1 Agent*
		1 Clerk*
Front Office	2 Agents	2 Agents
	2 Secretaries	2 Secretaries
Total	22 Agents	21 Agents
	16 Clerks	17 Clerks
	1 Super	1 Super Clerk
	6 Secretaries	6 Secretaries
	45 employees	45 employees

1. There are no vacant positions in the New Left Section.

2. Two Agents under transfer in: SA J. L. Hogan assigned to Special Investigations - West Unit and SA B. M. Perez assigned to Subversive Individuals - New Left Unit. No resignations.

*One Agent and one clerk on temporary assignment handling major case involving East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
RJS:jlm
6E

3. Special Investigations - West Unit has one Agent and one clerk on loan from the Internal Security Section.

4. Activities by New Left terrorists during the past year has been marked by an increase in acts of violence and conspiracies toward violence. The Weatherman group and other such groups have made it imperative that we institute continuing intensive investigations. By approved airtel to SAC, Albany, and all offices dated 11/4/70, the field was instructed to initiate investigation of all members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of procommunist militant New Left type campus organizations which follow SDS advocacy of violence and revolution. It is estimated that this will involve some 6,500 new investigations. If this trend continues, it will be necessary to obtain an additional clerk in the future; however, we are not requesting any additional clerical personnel at this time.

5. At the time of the last inspection, this Section had 22 Agents and 27 clerical employees authorized of which 22 Agents and 25 clerical employees were assigned. As a result of the realignment of the Division in December, 1970, this Section currently has 22 Agents and 23 clerical employees authorized.

6. As noted in number 4 above, the increase in terroristic activities by New Left militants has increased the burden of this Section. On the basis of the above, if this trend continues, it appears that it will be necessary to obtain one additional Agent in the future.

7. Personnel adequacy in the New Left Section is constantly evaluated on the basis of the productivity of each unit, requests received from the Department and other agencies and the overall objectives of the Section. The delinquent work in each unit is closely followed and in special situations where an excessive amount of work is assigned to one unit supervisory personnel from other units are utilized.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

6-E

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER: As of close of business 1/8/71, the complement of this Section was as follows: Special Agents 13, secretaries 5, and clerks 15, for a total of 33. This is broken down by unit as follows:

Section Front Office - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (Stenography), 1 secretary (typing)

Central Research Unit - 5 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 2 supervisory clerks (technical publications writers), 1 clerk (publications coordinator), 1 clerk (typing)

Racial Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 1 supervisory clerk (technical publications writer), 2 clerks

New Left Reporting Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary, 1 supervisory clerk (technical publications writer), 1 clerk

Special Records Unit - 2 Special Agents, 1 secretary (assigned but not authorized, see #3 below), 6 clerks

The following responses are numbered to correspond with Inspector's specific questions:

1. There are no vacant positions.

2. There are no personnel on transfer into or out of Section at this time and no pending resignations.

3. Only shortage or overage of authorized personnel is in Special Records Unit. Position of secretary in this unit has been approved by Director contingent upon final action by Position Classification Office which is now pending.

4. Current clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
RDC:mea
6-E

5. Since last inspection we have reduced one Agent from the complement of the Racial Reporting Unit as a result of various streamlining measures adopted relative to reporting requirements. This streamlining involved the elimination of a substantial number of letterhead memoranda and airtels previously required from each field office with regard to racial conditions and the elimination of daily cover memorandum to our outgoing racial teletype to the White House.

6. The authorized Agent complement for Section is considered adequate but not excessive at this time.

7. Criteria used in assessing personnel adequacy in this Section includes a number of diverse factors. Case load figures are not applicable to work of this Section nor are there any other simple, quantitative measurements of Section's work. Work of this Section involves primarily research and evaluation and the preparation of a variety of documents aimed at providing intelligence to the White House, the Attorney General, other interested agencies and Bureau officials. This Section seeks to summarize into comprehensive and meaningful "package" form information relating to current topics of intelligence interest and concern. The finished product is provided not only to other intelligence agencies and policy-making officials of the Government but, where appropriate, to our field offices for their information and guidance. The type of documents prepared varies from daily teletype summaries regarding racial disturbances and student agitation, to detailed monographs containing in-depth research into various facets of our work.

During the past year there has been a continuing demand for various intelligence summaries and this Section has been faced with a number of expedite projects on behalf of Bureau officials, including the Director, the White House, the Vice President's Office, and the Attorney General. Basis for this heavy work load has primarily been interest and concern in the explosive issues concerning racial and student disorders. The great majority of our projects have revolved around the preparation of material either for internal FBI use or for outside dissemination with respect to these issues.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF W. A. BRANIGAN
ESPIONAGE SECTION

(1) The authorized personnel of the Espionage Section as of January 8, 1971, is as follows:

	AGENT	CLERK	SECRETARY	CLERK-STENO
Front Office	2	0	2	0
Officials Unit - Washington	3	2*	1	1
Officials Unit - New York	5**	3	1	1
Special Cases Unit	3	4***	1	0
Coordination Unit	3	2****	1	1
Satellite Unit	4	5	1	0

*Two GS-4 Clerks (Barbara Ann Holland and Keith R. White) resigned closeof business January 8, 1971. J. Gail Whitson, GS-3, and Virginia A. Lensch, GS-4, reported for trial assignment on January 11, 1971.

**SA George M. Quinn, under transfer to Inspection Division, to depart close of business January 22, 1971. Replacement requested.

***Intelligence Analyst, GS-10, Mary E. Triplett, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

****Clerk, GS-7, A. Iris Kirby, performing work in lieu of Special Agent.

(2) By letter dated December 22, 1970, Special Agent George M. Quinn was transferred to the Inspection Division. He will depart by the close of business January 22, 1971.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-13-71
WAB:hke
6-E

179

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

Barbara Ann Holland and Keith R. White submitted resignations close of business January 8, 1971. Replacements were received as enumerated in item one above.

(3) As of January 8, 1971, there was a shortage of two GS-4 Clerk in the Officials Unit - Washington, but this was remedied on January 11, when replacements were received as indicated in item one above. A replacement has been requested for Special Agent George M. Quinn in the Officials Unit - New York, but none has been designated at this time. There is no overage of authorized personnel in the Espionage Section.

(4) Clerical personnel is considered adequate at the present time. With the reorganization of the Division, and combining Soviet and Soviet-bloc investigations in the Espionage Section, an extremely heavy burden has been placed on the clerical personnel handling the assignment cards for the Section (there are now 5,046 cases). This situation is being watched and it may be that it is unworkable to place the responsibility for maintaining the assignment cards in a GS-4 employee who is already heavily assigned. If this proves to be a fact, a recommendation will be made to add a Clerk at a GS-3 level who would exclusively handle the assignment cards.

(5) Following the 1970 inspection, personnel handling Soviet investigations was reduced by two Special Agents, GS-14. Following the inspection, personnel handling Soviet-bloc investigations were reduced by one Special Agent, GS-14, and one Clerk, GS-4. At the time of the reorganization of the Division in December, 1970, personnel handling Soviet-bloc investigations were reduced by four Special Agents (one GS-15; three GS-14) and five clerical personnel (one GS-5 and four GS-4).

(6) Special Agent personnel is considered adequate.

(7) Criteria utilized in determining the adequacy of personnel includes the volume of cases supervised, the complexity of the cases, and the importance of the investigations.

In the Officials Unit, both Washington and New York, we handle the greatest volume of complex investigations since

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

these cases include the bulk of our double agent operations. As of December 1, 1970, there were 74 active double agents in the Soviet field. This is the largest number of double agents we have ever achieved. At the time of the last inspection as of April 1, 1970, there were 67 active double agents. The current number of 74 is compared most favorably with the number of actual double agents three years ago (12/1/67), when there were 47 active double agents. At that time there were 18 case Agents handling Soviet matters. At the time of the last inspection, there were 16 case Agents in the Soviet field, and the current load is being carried by less than 14 case Agents. Three of the 14 are assigned part time to the handling of Soviet-bloc matters.

With the reorganization of the Division in December, 1970, the volume and work load for the Supervisors in the Espionage Section were materially increased. Four Agent Supervisors who were formerly assigned to the Sino-Satellite Section were transferred to the Espionage Section and brought with them in excess of 2,000 cases. The only possible way that this volume could be handled was by redistributing the work within the Coordination Unit and the Special Cases Unit. The volume of investigations in these Units is extremely heavy considering the number of special projects and special operations which are normally assigned in the Units.

In the Satellite Unit handling Polish, Romanian, Czechoslovakian, and Yugoslav investigative matters, we currently have 1,293 active cases divided among four Special Agents. In our Soviet-bloc counterintelligence work, we were as of December 1, 1970, operating 64 active double agents. This should be compared with the figure at the time of our last inspection, April 1, 1970, when there were 61 active double agents.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL 6-E

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE
RACIAL INTELLIGENCE SECTION

The current authorized personnel complement of the Racial Intelligence Section as of the close of business, January 8, 1971, is 21 Agents and 22 clerical personnel with a request pending for one additional clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit. This is broken down as follows according to Units within the Section:

Front Office

Section Chief - 1
Number One Man - 1
Secretary of Section Chief - 1
Secretary (Stenography) to Number One Man - 1

Black Nationalist Unit - East

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
7 clerical personnel

Black Nationalist Unit - Central

4 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge*
3 clerical personnel
*one Supervisor under transfer to Inspection Division

Black Nationalist Unit - West

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
TDR:bjr
6-E

Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit

5 Supervisors including Supervisor in Charge
5 clerical personnel

1) There are no clerical vacancies in the Section; however, as it was noted previously, a request has been submitted for an additional clerk for the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit which would increase our complement to 23 if approved.

2) Special Agent Supervisor C. Edwin Enright is under transfer to the Inspection Division, transfer letter dated January 8, 1971. A replacement is being requested.

3) With the transfer of Special Agent Enright there will exist a shortage of one Supervisor in the Black Nationalist Unit - Central.

4) The clerical personnel complement is inadequate and will be barely adequate if the request for one additional clerk is approved. The workload of the Section continues to increase and shows no signs of tapering off. We will continue to closely watch the clerical situation and make appropriate recommendations as required by any substantial change in the clerical workload.

5) The streamlining of our operations wherever possible to effect manpower savings is under continual evaluation. Examples of streamlining measures taken since the last Inspection include: 1) The discontinuance by each field division of semiannual reports concerning the black nationalist movement (Bureau file 157-8415). This was accomplished July 6, 1970. 2) On November 3, 1970, the Agitator Index was revised to delete those who were also included on the Security Index. 3) On November 5, 1970, existing instructions were modified concerning recordings of black

and New Left public appearances to allow the SAC to authorize use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or a proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except such appearances at educational institutions. Previously, prior Bureau approval was necessary.

In addition, we continue to utilize our teletype dissemination facilities to the maximum extent possible.

6) The Special Agent complement of 21 is the same as at the time of the last Inspection.

The Division was reorganized December 17, 1970, on the basis of approximate caseload per Supervisor of 279. This figure was based on the October 1, 1970, caseload figures. Since that time there has been a heavy increase in the caseload in the black extremist field where at present the average caseload as of January 1, 1971, stood at 349 per Supervisor. At the time of the last Inspection, the caseload of the Section stood at 5,946 including Klan and white hate-type cases. Under the reorganization this Section lost the Klan and white hate cases and as of January 1, 1971, the caseload encompassing black extremist individuals and organizations including racial informants in these organizations stood at 6,642, an increase of 696 cases since the date of the last Inspection.

There is a dire need for additional Special Agent supervisory personnel to handle our heavy responsibilities in the black extremist field, if we are to afford these cases the attention that they deserve. Based upon the Division reorganization figures, an additional four Supervisors would be required; however, we have tightened our belt and taken streamlining measures wherever possible and are requesting only two Special Agent Supervisors at the present time. We will attempt to accomplish our objectives with two additional Supervisors.

There are several factors that would indicate our work in the black extremist field will continue to increase. The increasing militancy of black extremists on college campuses caused us to require the field (by airtel 11/4/70) to open cases on all black student groups on college campuses as well as cases on the leaders thereof. There are numerous such groups throughout the United States. The Black Panther Party is growing and in September, 1970, opened up an international section in Algiers. In addition a grand jury is sitting in California with witnesses being heard in efforts to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther Party. The work in connection therewith and other aspects of the Black Panther Party investigation consumes almost the full time of one Supervisor.

Black extremist activity in this country is rapidly developing more and more in international aspects. Residents of other countries, including United States citizens and non-citizens, are involved in clandestine and overt operational and propaganda activity among racial extremists. We have targeted CIA as well as our Legal Attaches abroad for the development of data regarding foreign influences in the black extremist movement. The National Security Agency has vast capabilities in developing the type of information needed and we have alerted that Agency to our basic needs and have made arrangements for future assistance.

A prime factor in the rapid increase in our caseload has been our technical coverage of the Black Panther Party. At the time of the last Inspection we had six such technical surveillances in operation. We presently have 12 installed, one awaiting installation, and one awaiting approval. This special coverage provides on a daily basis a wealth of intelligence information and is most productive source for the opening of numerous new cases in the black extremist field. With the added coverage we can expect a continuing increase in the caseload.

In view of the above factors, there exists a dire need for two additional Special Agent Supervisors at this time.

7) In evaluating personnel adequacy, we take into consideration not only the caseload which is compiled on a monthly basis but also results of periodic mail counts taken on a quarterly basis. Many of our cases on key figures in the black extremist movement such as David Hilliard, Huey P. Newton, Elbert Howard, Le Roi Jones, Eldridge Cleaver, Emory Douglas, and others require a considerable amount of supervisory attention.

As previously noted, the Department is attempting to develop a prosecutive theory against the Black Panther Party and as a result it has been necessary to assign one Supervisor almost exclusively to handle investigation of this organization. The investigations of other organizations require a great deal of supervisory attention and direction. Analyses of current developments in the racial field, special requests from other Government agencies, preparation of special studies, and initiation of special projects all require the expenditure of considerable supervisory time and are taken into consideration in evaluating the adequacy of personnel.

ADEQUACY OF PERSONNEL

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION

As of close of business 1/8/71 Section complement was:

	Authorized	Actual
Special Agents	20	20
Secretaries (Steno)	8	8
Secretary (Typing)	1	1
Stenographer (Supervisory)	1	1
Clerical (Supervisory)	1	1
Stenographers	26	26
Clerks (GS-4, 5, 6, 7)	19	19
Totals	76	76

Section Front Office consists of two Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno) and one Secretary (Typing).

Cuban Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), one Clerk (GS-5) and one Clerk (GS-4).

Nationality Unit consists of four Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), one Clerk (GS-6) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Special Coordination Unit consists of five Special Agents, three Secretaries (Steno), one Clerk (GS-7), four Clerks (GS-5), and two Clerks (GS-4).

Chinese Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno) and three Clerks (GS-4).

Middle and South American Unit consists of three Special Agents, one Secretary (Steno), and three Clerks (GS-4).

Division Stenographic Pool consists of one Stenographic Supervisor (Steno), one Assistant Supervisor (Clerk) and 26 Clerk-Stenographers, GS-4.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/12/71
WRW:ams
6-E

(1) All positions were occupied as of close of business 1/8/71, although one resignation was pending (described in item 2 below).

(2) Miss Agnes M. Klima, Clerk-Stenographer, GS-4, assigned to Stenographic Pool, submitted her resignation effective 1/14/71 and acknowledgement of same was dated 1/6/71. This stenographic position was approved to be filled by assigning a GS-4 Clerk (Miss Barbara A. Hatcher) who had passed the stenographic test and request for replacement for Miss Hatcher dated 1/8/71 was submitted. Miss Hatcher actually was transferred to the stenographic position in the pool as of beginning of business 1/11/71 when her replacement, Miss Cheryl D. Carpenter, reported to this Section for assignment.

(3) There was no shortage or overage of authorized personnel as of close of business 1/8/71.

(4) Authorized clerical personnel complement is considered adequate but not excessive.

(5) As result of last inspection authorized Agent complement was reduced from 17 to 15. This manpower savings was effected by discontinuing two programs and streamlining a third one. Supporting memoranda in this regard have been submitted as attachments to yellow write-up 5-A-4on Section and Unit Analysis dated 1/12/71.

Memorandum to All Bureau Officials and Supervisors 70-13 dated 7/29/70 noted that the Liaison Section of Domestic Intelligence Division was being abolished effective immediately. This resulted in a cut-back of one Section Chief plus eight supervisory Special Agents who were engaged in domestic liaison functions. Calls from other U. S. agencies formerly handled by these nine men are now handled by Agent personnel throughout the Bureau who are principally concerned with the subject matter of the call. By far, the majority of such calls are handled by Agent personnel presently assigned to Nationalities Intelligence Section. In addition, representatives of other agencies who were contacted in their offices prior to discontinuance of Liaison Section frequently call at Domestic Intelligence Division for consultation. Arrangements were made for couriers representing certain other sensitive agencies, such as National Security Agency and Central Intelligence Agency, to call at Domestic Intelligence Division for the purpose of delivering or receiving mail requiring protective services of armed couriers.

Thus, many of the functions formerly performed by Special Agent personnel are handled by currently assigned personnel within the Division, resulting in the savings of the time of the nine Agents released.

As a result of the Division-wide reorganization effected 12/16/70 this Section absorbed without offsetting Special Agent personnel work relating to Chinese matters formerly assigned to three Special Agent Supervisors in the Sino-Satellite Section (now abolished). This resulted in an increased case load of over 25 percent.

(6) While there are 20 Agents assigned to the Section, two are assigned to the Section Front Office and five to the Special Coordination Unit, which handles remaining domestic liaison functions and all foreign liaison functions; thus, there are 13 Agents assigned to desks on which cases are handled. The case load per Agent since the last inspection has increased from 193 to 278, a 44 percent increase. This has been the result of cutting back two Agents as result of the last inspection and the assignment of Chinese work to the Section effective with the Division reorganization 12/16/70. There has been insufficient time since the latter date to establish whether the significant increase in case load per man will adversely affect the efficient operation of the Section. At this time, however, no additional Agent personnel is being requested for assignment to desks handling cases but the matter will be closely followed and if recommendations in this connection are considered appropriate in the future they will be submitted with justifying data.

At the present time there are five supervisory Special Agents assigned to the Special Coordination Unit and the heavy increase in work load on the Foreign Liaison Desk (FLD) in that Unit (to which two of the five Agents are assigned) has resulted in a situation warranting the assignment of two additional Special Agents to the desk. In connection with this, following is submitted:

In December, 1970, our foreign liaison offices were expanded from 11 to 17. It has come at a time when the two FLD Supervisors have been barely able to keep up with the flow of paper let alone actually examine and analyze it in order to afford active and constructive supervision to our foreign offices. This problem arises from two causes, (1) the heavy demands made on the time of these two Supervisors in welcoming and personally supervising the visits to the Bureau of the many foreign dignitaries who are valuable and cooperative contacts of our Legal Attaches--such visitors currently average 27 per month; and (2) the appreciable increase (62 percent) in the past ten years of the Foreign Police Cooperation cases we handle.

The Legal Attache expansion in December, 1970, increased Bureau personnel abroad from 60 to 88, of which latter number 42 are Special Agents. The latest case load figures available for the 11 Legal Attache offices then existing are for 10/31/70, at which time the 11 offices carried a total of 3,020 cases. In October, 1960, five Special Agent Supervisors were assigned to the FLD, one of whom devoted a portion of his time to Buplans matters, which matters have now been transferred to another Section. At that time the case load for all foreign offices was 1693.

In October, 1960, we had 166 Foreign Police Cooperation cases on the FLD. In October, 1970, there were 273. This large increase in Foreign Police Cooperation cases was absorbed as a result of the delegation to a clerical employee of supervisory responsibility for about 95 percent of the cases. This clerical employee, who is in Grade GS-7, is most efficient and quite capable but cannot be expected to have the experience of an Agent to recognize promptly potentially embarrassing situations arising.

As we now have six new Legal Attache offices, we can expect both the case load and the Foreign Police Cooperation requests to increase substantially.

The FLD Supervisors should be watching mail flow to determine the promptness with which Legal Attaches respond to requests; the thoroughness of handling such cases; and the adequacy of foreign agency contacts in a position to afford the Bureau the desired degree of cooperation. The FLD Supervisors should be preparing memoranda reflecting Legal Attache accomplishments in order to keep the Director fully apprised of the truly excellent work being done by our Agents abroad. As the situation now stands, the two present FLD Supervisors just do not have time to do this and we are incurring the risk of failing to afford direction and guidance in this very important area of the Bureau's operations.

To comply with Bureau requirements our 42 men abroad must seek cooperation of foreign agencies. In reciprocity they must accept requests for investigations in the U. S. regarding matters as simple as running down bad debtors to complex investigations involving the location of murder suspects. The two present FLD Supervisors at this time, because of the heavy demands on them, are unable to afford the necessary direction and assistance to the clerical employee handling Foreign Police Cooperation cases.

To afford the necessary and proper guidance to our foreign operations, particularly to the six new offices which have now been established and which will make heavy demands for immediate support, and to overcome the present heavy work load described above, two additional Agent Supervisors, preferably men having potential for foreign assignment, should be approved for the FLD at this time.

(7) Criteria utilized in evaluating personnel adequacy include continuing analysis of Agent and clerical work load, case load, mail counts, complexity of cases, relative importance of matters to national security and intelligence requirements, patterns of delinquency, personnel capabilities, and past experience in shifts of emphasis of work from one area to another.

191

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:wmj 1/22/71)

During the course of this inspection thorough analyses of work were performed which have given some insight in the supervision of work in your Division.

Taken into consideration was your recent reorganization of the Division which appears to have accomplished a better balance of work between branches.

In this write-up you have requested replacement Agents for SAs C. E. Enright and G. M. Quinn, both assigned in your Espionage and Racial Branch. In addition, you have requested two additional Agents for the Racial Intelligence Section and two Agents for the Special Coordination Unit.

Division case load was surveyed by categories from the field administrative reports for a 12-month period (January through December, 1970) to establish trends over this period. Basically, pertinent trends indicated increases of 70.2% in Internal Securityand New Left cases during the 12-month period; a 57.4% increase in racial matters; 34.9% in Security Informants; a decline of 33% in Espionage (65) and decline of 13.3% in Internal Security - Nationalistic Tendency (105) cases.

In addition, case loads by Section were reconstructed (in view of Division reorganization) and compared with case loads at the time of the last inspection as indicated in the following:

	Last Inspection	Current Inspection	
Espionage	5846	5038 (-808)	
Racial	4746	6642 (+1896)	
Nationalities Intelligence	2944	3620 (+676)	(Does not includ Spec. Coordination Unit)
Internal Security	3658	5318 (+1660)	
New Left	6551	6421 (-130)	
Research	No cases		

To further analyze case and work load the Research Section and Special Coordination Unit were excluded from computations and manpower was considered on the basis of 50 men in the Espionage Racial Intelligence Branch and 33 men in the Internal Security Branch(Section Chiefs and Number One Men also excluded).

Total case load in Espionage Branch currently is 15,300 and 11,739 in Internal Security;case load per supervisor in Espionage determined to be 14% lower than his counterpart in Internal Security (306 vs. 356). It is noted in this regard that the Racial Intelligence case load raises the Espionage Branch figures, since the Nationalities Intelligence Section has an average of only 278 and Espionage Section of only 280 cases per man. The average in Racial Intelligence Section is 350.

We next conducted surveys to determine whether the complexity of cases in Espionage and Nationalities work was appreciably more complex to justify the above-noted differences in case load.

All pending 65 classification cases (total 327) were reviewed and it was determined a total of 539 items of correspondence containing instructions or direction emanating from SOG were contained in these files or an average of 1.6 pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period. Over half of this was somewhat routine and very short.

We also reviewed the 100 most important (105s) cases and determined an average of 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at SOG in these files. 62% of this was considered somewhat routine.

We reviewed over 80% of your 298 Potential Double Agent cases and determined the average case was 3 1/2 years old and contained only 1 piece of correspondence in over 3 years (subject of separate write-up).

Other surveys revealed current active cases in these categories had an average of only 3+ pieces of correspondence in a 12-month period.

It is felt that degree of supervision and the amount of instruction and direction given our cases can be measured in one way by the frequency of correspondence necessitated by the individual cases.

Another survey of mail signed out at Section level revealed that approximately 57% of your outgoing mail emanates from the combined efforts of your New Left and Racial Sections. Espionage Section contributed about 8.7% and Nationalities Intelligence about 15%.

On the basis of the above studies and reviews of files, I conclude that, if anything, due to the intensity of the action that it requires more input to supervise Racial and New Left than it does cases assigned in the Espionage and Nationalities Sections.

For this reason, I feel you still have an imbalance in your Division which should be corrected. That is, you still have 5 men working Espionage and Nationalities work who should be shifted to other work to balance your assignments. I do not feel that you need two more men in the Special Coordination Unit at this time since increased work load considerations due to the additional Legats has not yet happened. When and if it does, you should make necessary intra-Branch transfers.

I agree with your recommended replacements for SAs Enright and Quinn; however, replacement for Quinn should be assigned to the Racial Section and not the Espionage Section. I am submitting separate recommendations regarding this.

Any further additions to the Racial Intelligence Section should be made from within the Espionage Branch from the pertinent Sections.

To recap, I feel as a result of this inspection that your present quota of 116 men is adequate. I feel the replacements requested are justified but I do not agree with your request for 4 additional Agents.

Comments of Assistant Director Brennan requested:

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: The Inspector has noted our recent reorganization to accomplish a better balance of work between branches.
(DEM:ekn - 1/23/71)

The reorganization was based on memorandum 10/9/70, Sizoo to Brennan, requesting 6 additional Agent Supervisors and memorandum 10/14/70, Mr. Felt to Mr. Tolson, denying this request. Mr. Felt's memorandum noted there were 18921 cases (excluding large volume of informants and Communist Party, USA, matters) and based on our set up at that time the average case load per Agent was 305 in the Internal Security Branch and 225 in the Espionage Branch.

Details of the approach utilized in our reorganization, 12/16/70, are set forth in the attachment. With 116 Division Agent complement and 83 desk agents (same figures utilized during current inspection) we distributed the Division caseload (22,857 as of 10/31/70, or an average of 275 per desk agent) as equitably as possible. This resulted in apportionment of caseload among the six present sections as follows:

194

Section	Desk Agents	Cases	Average Cases Per Agent
Internal Security	13	3627	279
Nationalities Intelligence	13	3692	284
Racial Intelligence	19	4948	260
New Left	20	5491	275
Espionage	18	5099	283
Research	0	0	0
Totals	83	22857	275

During the reorganization all work as well as cases formerly handled in three sections in the Espionage Branch was consolidated into two sections. All cases and work formerly handled in two operational sections in the Internal Security Branch were spread among three sections with the creation of the New Left Section as a separate entity. This resulted in additional Agents for New Left work.

Since 10/31/70 (caseload figures utilized for reorganization purposes) caseloads in each section have changed as follows:

Section	10/31/70	Current Inspection	Net Change
Espionage	5099	5038	-61
Racial Intelligence	4948	6642	+1694
Nationalities Intelligence	3692	3620	-28
Internal Security	3627	5318	+1691
New Left	5491	6421	+930
Research	0	0	0

The slight reductions in caseloads in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections have left the average cases per Agent at 280 and 278, respectively, both above the norm of 275 established for reorganizational purposes.

The Inspector has noted the number of outgoing pieces of correspondence in the 65 classification cases, the 100 most important 105 classification cases, and a review of 80 percent of 298 "potential double agent" cases. The vast majority of the cases handled in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections are 105 classification cases. Recognizing the Inspector reviewed the most important cases and determined that on an average 3.37 pieces of correspondence originated at the Seat of

Government in these files, I would estimate that a conservative minimum of over two pieces of correspondence originated at Seat of Government in each of the 105 classification group as a whole. With an average caseload of 280 per Supervisor, this would mean that 560 outgoing communications would be submitted each year. Minus weekends and holidays, there are 252 workdays in a year and I would estimate an average of 32 days per man would be accounted for by annual leave, sick leave, inspection assignments, tour assignments, firearms and physical examinations. This would leave 220 days for productive work per Supervisor. This would mean that each Supervisor would be required to review the necessary files and dictate approximately two and one-half communications per day. I feel this is perhaps a conservative estimate inasmuch as many of the cases involved relate to foreign diplomats and in each case, at the inception, we have to prepare a communication to Department of State setting forth basic facts about the individual and obtaining authority to investigate, and, thereafter, issue appropriate instructions to the field. Thus, in these cases, there are two outgoing communications prepared at the very inception.

In addition to measuring work on the basis of outgoing correspondence, I think note must be taken of the fact that the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections have a responsibility with regard to over 130 countries. The vast majority, of course, are of concern to the Nationalities Intelligence Section. Supervisors on the various desks have to be aware of conditions existing which affect the Bureau's responsibilities in the intelligence field and this encompasses the review of much intelligence material which shows up in the incoming mail count, all of which must be properly reviewed and coordinated.

During the inspection a mail count was kept for five days and the results, of course, are available to the Inspector. In this connection, during the five-day period, each Supervisor in the Espionage Section received an average of 255 pieces of regular incoming mail (such as, Seat of Government memoranda, letterhead memoranda, teletypes, airtels, cables, letters from field, and letters from outside agencies) for a total of 378 pages. Other incoming mail (such as intelligence reports and cables from other agencies, Bureau Source 6 and Bureau Source 200 items, publications, visa notifications and similar such items) averaged 40 items per Agent in the Espionage Section and the pages totaled 213. With regard to outgoing mail, there was an average per man of 11 items and 18 pages of dictated material and 79 items and 157 pages of outgoing nondictated, all of which involved preparation of material for dissemination to other agencies. In the Nationalities Intelligence Section, the comparable average figures per Supervisor were 213 items and 416 pages of incoming regular mail, 109 items and 440 pages of other incoming mail, 22 items and 40 pages of outgoing dictated mail, and 68 items and 169 pages of outgoing nondictated mail.

SUPERVISORY NON-INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL

Special Coordination Unit	5
New Left Report Unit Racial Report Unit	4
Special Records Unit	2
Central Research Unit	5
	16
Front Offices (Sections & Division) (Proposed 12-8 man) (4-12 shift)	17
TOTAL NON-INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL	33
TOTAL DIVISION COMPLEMENT	116
Less Total Non-Investigative Personnel	33
TOTAL AVAILABLE INVESTIGATIVE PERSONNEL	83

DIVISION CASE LOAD AVERAGE (10/31/70)

Total Division Case Count	22,857
Total Investigative Personnel	83
Division Average Case Load	275

INTERNAL SECURITY SECTION

	Cases	Men	Average
Front Office	0	2	0
Communist Party, USA Unit	382	2	191
Basic Revolutionary Individual Unit	1517	3	506
International New Left Unit	26** 644	3	223
Klan & White Hate Groups Unit	726	2	363
Security Informant Unit* Est.	332***	2	166
One additional man		1	
	3627	15	279

*SIC from Research Section
** Ad Hoc, etc.
*** Does not include 268 routine CP informant cases.

NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE

	Cases	Men	Average
Front Office	0	2	0
Cuban Unit	657	3	219
Middle & South American Unit	622	3	207
Nationalities Unit	926	4	232
Ethnic Groups Unit (Incl. CH.)	1487	3	496
Special Coordination Unit	0	5	0
	3692	20 13*	284

*Net Case Supervisors

RACIAL SECTION

	Cases	Men	Average
Front Office	0	2	0
Three Black Nationalist Units	4380	16	274
Racial Informant Unit	568	3	189
	4948	21	260

NEW LEFT SECTION

	Cases	Men	Average
Front Office	0	2	0
Security Informant Unit (Est.)	567*	3	189
New Left Individuals Unit	1464	4	488
New Left Groups Unit	952	4	238
Special Investigations Unit	2341	8	293
Sabotage	167	1	167
	5491	22	275

* 600 (Est) cases to Internal Security Section with those organizations transferred.

201

ESPIONAGE SECTION

	Cases	Men	Average
Front Office	0	2	0
Four Soviet & Two Satellite Units	5099	18	283
	5099	20	283

RESEARCH SECTION

	Cases	Men	Average
Front Office	0	2	0
Central Research Unit	0	5	0
Racial and New Left Reporting Unit*	0	4	0
Special Records Unit**	0	2	0
	0	13***	0

*Combining two units frees one SIC to handle informants in Internal Security Section.

**Will assume record keeping function for Security Informants.

***This low complement of Agent personnel should stand up when super clerks (4) are taken into account.

The fact that the work on a desk is measured by more than just caseload can best be illustrated by citing figures of incoming and outgoing mail for Special Coordination Unit, Nationalities Intelligence Section, for which no case load is reported. In that Unit there were 1173 items consisting of 1777 pages of regular incoming mail; 52 items consisting of 137 pages of other incoming mail; 117 items consisting of 233 pages of outgoing dictated mail; and 290 items consisting of 456 pages of outgoing nondictated mail.

As can be seen from the above, since the time of reorganization when equity in caseloads was established and manpower assignments made, there has been no decrease in the amount of work responsibilities in the Espionage and Nationalities Intelligence Sections. The December, 1970, reorganization resulted in the assignment of significant extra work to those two Sections. The substantial increases in caseloads in Racial Intelligence, Internal Security and New Left Sections have resulted from the opening of new investigations on members of basic revolutionary groups and the removal of the moratorium on Security Index reporting, approved by the Director, plus increased efforts in these areas by the field.

I feel a strong responsibility in our work in the Domestic Intelligence Division in connection with the national security of our country and am concerned with the ever increasing number of officials from communist countries assigned to the U. S. In addition, the President has recently expressed his urgent need for better high-level coverage which has resulted in expansion of our operations abroad and where possible in the U. S.

Foregoing was taken into consideration in connection with my request for additional personnel and you may be assured that whatever decision is reached I and the men in my Division will do our utmost to fulfill our responsibilities in all areas.

ADDENDUM
INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER:
(ESM:djr 1/25/71)

The information furnished by you will be taken into consideration in further evaluating your request for additional men and you will be advised of the Bureau's decision in this matter.

Assistant Director note.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/25/71
DEM:mjt

Noted.

SUGGESTION MEMORANDA

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM

ADDITION OF SUITABLE DESIGNATION
TO CAPTION OF COMMUNICATIONS PERTAINING TO CERTAIN RACIAL INFORMANTS TO INSURE PROPER ROUTING OF
SUCH CORRESPONDENCE AT SOG.

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Prior to the reorganization of the Domestic Intelligence Division on 12-16-70, all informants reporting on racial matters and white hate groups (including Ku Klux Klan) were supervised by the Racial Informant and White Hate Unit of the Racial Intelligence Section. All such informants are designated as Racial Informants. Subsequent to the reorganization of this Division, supervision of substantive matters pertaining to white hate groups and corresponding informants (396) is handled by the Klan and White Hate Groups Unit of the Internal Security Section. Supervision of black nationalist organizations and related informant cases (564) continues to be handled in the Racial Intelligence Section.

As a result of the above, the Racial Intelligence Section is receiving mail concerning racial informants who are reporting on white hate group activity. This mail should be reviewed and handled by the Internal Security Section. At the present time, it is not possible to determine to which section such mail should be routed without reviewing the content of the incoming correspondence since the caption of communications pertaining to all racial informants indicate only that a racial source is involved. The type of activity on which the informant reports -- black nationalist as opposed to white hate groups -- is not set forth in the caption.

In view of the fact that over 40% of the cases pertaining to racial sources involve white hate groups, it would appear desirable to identify such matters clearly in the caption of communications submitted to the Bureau by the field. This will permit such mail to be routed directly to the Internal Security Section and will save an appreciable amount of time in getting the mail to the section where it

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-22-71
HRH:ljw

will be handled. Such an addition to the caption will also preclude the necessity for the content of communications of this nature to be reviewed in the Racial Intelligence Section.

It is believed the desired routing could be effected by adding a characterization, such as White Hate Group (abbreviated WHG), to the caption of correspondence concerning informants who are reporting on the activities of such groups. Under existing procedure communications concerning racial informants reporting on white hate groups are submitted under a caption such as: CO 1234-R. Under the suggested procedure the communication would be captioned: CO 1234-R
(WHG).

Comments of Section Chiefs Gray and Moore and Assistant Director Brennan are requested.

206

SECTION CHIEF A.W. GRAY: Inspector's suggestion is a good one and should be adopted. However, in conformance with both existing "character" structure of Bureau case titles and a recommended change regarding security informant titles (memorandum A.W. Gray to C.D. Brennan, captioned "Security Informants; IS - Communist; New Left," dated 1/21/71), it is proposed that the character designation Racial Matters be included. Incoming communications concerning white hate group informants only would thus bear the title: CO 1234-R
RM - WHG

The Internal Security Section, if the Inspector concurs, will implement this change with appropriate instructions to the field.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
AWG:bcw

SECTION CHIEF G. C. MOORE: With respect to the Klan and white hate informants I concur with the above.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
AWG:dlb

107

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
ARTICLES CONCERNING ACTIVITIES OF RACIAL EXTREMISTS
RESEARCH SECTION

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Research Section prepares a number of timely monographs and other studies dealing with the activities of racial extremists. These papers, as well as the daily teletype summary and the weekly "Summary of Extremist Activities," serve to keep Bureau personnel, appropriate government officials, and the intelligence community advised on the up-to-date situation involving these matters.

Much information received is from public sources or otherwise of a non-confidential nature. The Bureau is in a unique position to collate and place in perspective the information concerning activities of these violence-prone extremists. This data could be used for preparation of articles for publication in magazines, journals, and newspapers which would serve to expose these individuals and organizations for what they are. Such articles would give the public an insight into the true nature of these extremists who would destroy our system of government and our society. This would serve to diminish public sympathy and support for their activities and would strengthen public support of law enforcement in general.

Although the Bureau has prepared and/or been instrumental in the publication of a number of articles concerning the campus revolutionaries of the New Left and of white hate groups, the only recent material we have made available to the public concerning racial extremist activities is that set forth in the Appropriations testimony. There is a definite need for good, timely articles for public consumption placing in perspective and showing the true nature of the activities of racial extremists. The Crime Records Division has sources available to facilitate publication of such material.

SUGGESTION

It is suggested that Research Section, with the assistance of and in coordination with the Crime Records Division, correlate the preparation and publication of articles dealing

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
MSR:mcm/mkz

MSR

208

with the activities of racial extremists. Care should be taken to use only material of a non-confidential nature which would not be detrimental to Bureau operations. Consideration should be given to a study of the Black Panther Party along the lines of the article entitled "A Study of Marxist Revolutionary Violence; SDS, 1962-1969" which effectively exposed the SDS. Other articles, perhaps shorter and more limited in scope, on specific activities and groups also should be considered at an early date.

Comments of Section Chief R. D. Cotter and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF R. D. COTTER:
(TJS/mea 1/21/71)

The Inspector's suggestion has merit. It is believed that Research Section would be able to gather together material which would be of value in educating the public to the real nature of extremists such as the Black Panther Party. Research Section will, consistent with current work assignments, begin preparation of material which, in coordination with Crime Records Division, can be made public.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
MSR:mcm/mkz

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: (TJS/mea 1/21/71) I think the Inspector's suggestion is very worthwhile. We believe that wherever possible the true nature of extremists should be publicized. Within the limits of available manpower, we will furnish Crime Records Division with as much unclassified material as possible for public consumption.

210

CASE SUGGESTION WRITE-UP

EQBAL AHMAD
SECURITY MATTER - MISCELLANEOUS
BUREAU FILE: 100-448675

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: This case was originally opened on 1/25/68 based upon Albany letter to the Director dated 1/19/68, requesting Bureau authority to institute an investigation of the subject based upon his antidraft and anti-Vietnam protest activities. At the time, subject was also considered to be a campus leader and agitator at Cornell University, Ithaca, New York, where he was employed as an assistant professor in the school of Industrial and Labor Relations.

Ahmad has subsequently become involved in the East Coast Conspiracy to Save Lives (ECCSL) and is presently under indictment as one of the coconspirators in this matter. (The ECCSL involves a conspiracy by a dissident group of priests, nuns, teachers, students and former students who have displayed opposition to the Vietnam War by committing acts of violence against Government agencies, including selective service boards and private corporations.) The leaders of the ECCSL, one of whom is Ahmad, planned to destroy underground electric and heating systems serving Government buildings in Washington, D. C. The group also has reportedly planned to kidnap a high Government official and Ahmad was a key figure in this phase.

Set forth below is a brief summary of background information taken from the subject's file:

Personal History

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) records at Buffalo, New York, indicate that Eqbal Ahmad was born December 30, 1930, at Irki, Bhiar, India, and is a citizen of Pakistan. His parents are listed as Ataur Rahman, father, and Khatooh Rahman, mother. Subject is described as male, 5'7½", 135 pounds, brown eyes, black hair, brown complexion, scar on left hand. In 1969 he was single and was assigned Alien Registration Number (ARN) A13183502. INS records disclose that on February 3, 1967, Ahmad's status was adjusted to that of a permanent resident alien.

Eqbal Ahmad

INS records further indicate that Ahmad first came to the United States in September, 1957, on a trip financed by a Fulbright Travel Grant and that Occidental College at Los Angeles, California, provided this fellowship. His sponsor was the Institute of International Education. In September, 1958, Ahmad transferred to Princeton University on a university fellowship and remained there until September, 1961, when he left the United States to take up residence in North Africa. INS records indicate that Ahmad last arrived in the United States at New York City on September 21, 1963, destined for Princeton University, Princeton, New Jersey, on a teaching fellowship. INS files also set forth prior residences at Lahore, Pakistan; Los Angeles, California; Tunis, Tunisia; Urbana, Illinois, and Ithaca, New York. Former employments include "lecturer in Modern History" at Forman Christian College and the Pakistan Military Academy in Pakistan as well as teaching assignments at Princeton University, University of Illinois and Cornell University.

He was registered in absentia during 1961 and 1962 and during this time was in Morocco and Tunisia. He was awarded a Ph.D. degree on June 13, 1967, by Princeton University.

On January 14, 1969, the Chicago Office determined that Ahmad was employed at the time by the Adlai E. Stevenson Institute of International Affairs (ASIIA), 5757 South Woodlawn Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Ahmad was listed as a recipient of funds for study in Vietnam for the period 1968-69.

In July, 1968, the Albany Division reported that information was developed indicating that the subject proposed to travel to North and South Vietnam. It is further noted that Ahmad was leaving Cornell University because of failure to have his contract renewed. He indicated in a published article of the "Cornell Daily Sun" that he would travel to North and South Vietnam during the 1968-69 academic year as a fellow of the Center for International Studies of the University of Chicago. The article further reported that Ahmad would carry press cards from a Pakistani newspaper and two Algerian newspapers. He was identified as a person active in the antiwar movement at Cornell University.

Eqbal Ahmad

On July 12, 1968, Ahmad's former landlord at Ithaca, New York, advised that the subject told him that he would travel to Vietnam in September, 1968, in order to study and report upon the war. Ahmad reportedly said that this study would be within his field of interest since he has been conducting research on guerrilla warfare and revolutions.

Language Ability

Subject reportedly speaks fluent English, Urdu, French, Arabic, Persian and Hindustani.

Revolutionary Background

On May 8, 1965, an issue of the "Daily Illini," a daily student newspaper published at the University of Illinois, Champaign-Urbana campus, Illinois, listed the participants in a local "teach-in" on the war in Vietnam to be held on Mary 15, 1965. One of the speakers was identified as Eqbal Ahmad, assistant professor of political science who was described as an expert on guerrilla and internal warfare who had worked with the anti-French FLN guerrillas during the Algerian independence struggle and who reportedly had studied guerrilla movements all over the world.

Ahmad's file cites numerous instances of Ahmad's involvement in antidraft and anti-Vietnam demonstrations and activities as well as numerous anti-American statements made by him. During his subsequent association with the ECCSL, Ahmad has been one of the prime movers in the plot to kidnap a high Government official and appears to have played an increasingly important role as a leader and advisor of the ECCSL.

In view of the foregoing information, the following suggestions are set forth for your consideration and appropriate action:

1. Eqbal Ahmad appears to have the potential qualities (background, intelligence, education, experience and linguistic ability) of a foreign intelligence agent.

Eqbal Ahmad

It is suggested that consideration be given to issuing instructions to the field to institute an intensive full field investigation of this subject particularly with respect to his national origin, travel and residences in foreign countries and involvement in foreign political activities.

If investigation abroad so justifies, it is suggested that consideration be given to intensifying our investigation of the subject to include the establishment of sources or informants close to him. Physical surveillance and the development of highly confidential sources should not be overlooked in effecting full coverage of Ahmad's current activities.

This background investigation should insure that emphasis is placed on developing information concerning Ahmad's income and financial affairs, verification of subject's travel to South and/or North Vietnam in 1968-69 and subject's activities in the Los Angeles, California, area during the period of his attendance at Occidental College at Los Angeles.

You should insure the field aggressively intensifies this background investigation, yet it should be emphasized that utmost discretion and good judgment should be exercised to avoid unfounded charges of "harassment" being directed against the Bureau.

The above suggestions are not to be considered as all-inclusive; however, you should insure that this matter receives close personal supervision.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

214

SUPERVISOR WILLIAM J. MC DONNELL: Suggestions of the Inspector have been noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be pursued and the field will be instructed to intensify its investigation in this matter, utilizing the utmost discretion in view of pending prosecution against the subject. For this reason, no effort will be made, pending prosecution, to institute sensitive coverage or other overt activity which might prejudice the prosecution, result in a charge of harassment or otherwise be a source of embarrassment to the Bureau. Following final prosecutive action of subject, all investigative measures and techniques will be considered in line with the Inspector's suggestions to determine the nationalistic orientation and activities of the subject.

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL: Suggestions of the Inspector have been noted and are well taken. Suggested avenues of approach will be pursued and the field instructed to intensify its investigation of subject, consistent with the fact that at this time prosecution is pending and therefore discretion must be exercised. This matter will be closely followed.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: Inspector's comments are noted and appreciated and prompt action will be taken to implement his suggestions along the lines set forth above by the Supervisor and Section Chief.

215

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
CHINESE MATTERS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The DESECO Program (development of selected contacts to be directed against Soviet-bloc officials) has been operated with considerable success since it was implemented as a result of an espionage conference in 1957. As a result of this program, a substantial number of security informants and double agents have been developed.

Simultaneous with the imminent opening of the Chinese Communist (Chicom) Embassy in Canada in early February, 1971, we can expect more intelligence operations by the Chicoms in the U.S. Information already furnished by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police indicates that possibly fifty per cent of the intelligence activity generated by the Chicoms in Canada will be directed at the U.S.

It is recognized that certain steps have previously been taken with a view toward developing double agents and informants among the Chicoms. These include contacts with certain Chinese scientists working in strategic technical fields in the U.S., as well as efforts to develop some ethnic Chinese sources who might be targeted against the Chicoms. It would appear that these programs should be expanded and intensified with a view toward developing an aggressive effort directed at the Chicoms and patterned after the DESECO program. This program should include persons who by the nature of their occupation, national origin, or otherwise might be logical targets of the Chicoms or would have occasion or opportunity to be in touch with the Chicoms. This program would include journalists, students, educators, politicians, librarians, travel agents and the like.

Comments of Section Chief Wannall and Assistant Director C. D. Brennan requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1-19-71
FDT:lrs

2/6

SECTION CHIEF W. R. WANNALL
NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE SECTION
1/20/71
FXO:dgo

The intelligence/espionage threat posed by the Chicoms, particularly in view of the opening of the Chicom Embassy in Canada during 2/71, is recognized.

In line with the Inspector's suggestion, we will intensify our current efforts aimed at penetration of Chicom intelligence through development of methods and techniques similar to those utilized in the DESECO Program. We will extend this operation on a highly selective basis and will strive to come up with sources who will be in a position to disrupt or neutralize Chicom intelligence efforts directed against the U. S.

In connection with possible operations in Canada, we will, of course, work closely with RCMP which has been most cooperative with us in the past.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/20/71
DEM:mjt

The Inspector's suggestion will certainly be followed. In addition, with the strong probability the Chicoms will be admitted to the United Nations in the near future, DESECO's in the Chinese field will be most useful to target against Chicom officials who will be assigned to the Chicom United Nations Mission and who will be employed in the Secretariat.

217

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
DEFECTOR PROGRAM

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The development of a Soviet intelligence officer as a defector-in-place who will advise us of hostile intelligence activities and plans is an urgent and paramount requirement of the Bureau.

We have failed to achieve this objective in almost ten years despite our programs and investigative activities. This suggests we take a fresh approach to the problem.

The present "Defector Program" operates as follows: "Defector committees" consisting of Espionage desk Supervisors in both the New York and Washington Field Offices select five Soviet intelligence officers (with Bureau approval) as defection targets. This selection is based on a variety of reasons which indicate the Soviets have defection potential. These Soviets are then marked for priority attention and "defection teams" consisting of four men in each office are exclusively assigned to assist the five case Agents in conducting physical surveillances and to apply increased investigative attention to these Soviet targets which will hopefully lead towards a successful defection approach.

It is unlikely that only four men and five case Agents would be able to obtain complete information relating to the daylight, evening and weekend activities, contacts and behavior of the five Soviet targets to present a true picture of their character and psychological makeup essential to a successful defection approach.

It is suggested that serious consideration be afforded to decreasing the number of selected Soviet targets to two or three and to increase the number of Special Agents on each "defection team." It is more likely that ten to fifteen/or more highly motivated Agents can be successful in a total all-out team effort to bring about the defection of the targeted Soviet. This effort would include physical surveillances; the placing of Deseco, social, and double agent informants close to the target; the development of a close friendship with the target by an Agent under appropriate cover; thorough psychological study; and whatever other imaginative and unorthodox procedures may be required to

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
HDC:mkl
1/20/71

218

create the best possible situation to enable the Soviet target to defect. This all-out effort on the part of each team should be highly professional and treated as a Bureau "special" with resolve and overriding determination to succeed.

It is fully realized that your manpower directed against Soviet intelligence has been decreased. It is also realized that it is an extremely difficult job to defect a trained Soviet intelligence officer. Extremely difficult jobs require extraordinary and sometimes unorthodox methods. You should afford this proposal serious consideration and survey the New York and Washington Field Offices for their ideas regarding this proposal.

Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

SECTION CHIEF WILLIAM A. BRANIGAN
1/21/71 (WAB:hke)

The suggestion of the Inspector is appreciated, and it is our feeling that it has merit. Steps will be taken to promptly initiate the survey of the New York and Washington Field Offices.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN
1/21/71
DEM:mjt

We are certainly cognizant of the importance of developing a defector-in-place in the Soviet field and will immediately initiate the survey suggested by the Inspector.

219

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
MAXIMUM UTILIZATION OF GHETTO INFORMANTS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Since the implementation of the Ghetto Informant Program in 1967, it has developed into a productive source of accomplishments for the Bureau. Experience has shown that in addition to being mere listening posts for black extremist action, these informants, when motivated by specific assignments, also furnish valuable criminal information. As a result of conferences held at the Seat of Government, the field was instructed in March, 1970, to give more positive assignments to ghetto informants. The Director noted, "This is most important."

The number of ghetto informants now stands at more than 6,200 and it is essential that we continually make certain we are achieving maximum results from this vast reservoir of information. It is believed one additional step toward this goal would be the giving of more specific assignments to these ghetto informants, especially concerning black extremists living in their locality, such as subjects on the Security Index and selected Agitator Index subjects with extremist tendencies. Such assignments would include the development of detailed information concerning black extremist targets such as data relating to their daily activities, sources of income, and information as to whether the black extremists are operating in violation of Federal or local statutes. Ghetto informants would be assigned to black extremist targets with whom they are acquainted or who reside or work in the same area. It is also probable that in many instances ghetto informants could also be targeted against similar subjects of interest to the New Left Program.

Based on our experience to date, there appears to be little doubt but what these additional specific assignments, if fully implemented throughout the field, would not only increase our intelligence coverage of black extremists, but could also be the vehicle for putting more of these militants in jail on criminal charges. The success of this approach would, of course, be commensurate with the enthusiasm of the individual Agents in the field and it is necessary that pressure be kept on it. A suggested means for checking on the Program's progress at the Seat of Government would be to amend Form FD-405 under the heading "Racial Informant Accomplishments" to require the field to specifically list major accomplishments attributable to ghetto informants during the previous month.

Comments of Section Chief G.C. Moore, Section Chief R.L. Shackelford, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennen requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION

ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
1/21/71

I agree that the suggestion made by the Inspector has merit and should further strengthen the productivity of our Ghetto Informant Program and increase our concrete accomplishments. Necessary instructions will be issued to the field to implement the suggestion as set forth by the Inspector.

SECTION CHIEF R. L. SHACKELFORD: I concur with the above suggestion.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above suggestion and as stated above the appropriate suggestion will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
JGD:dlb

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
REVISION OF RACIAL INFORMANT STATUS REPORT FORM FD-405

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Racial Intelligence Section currently utilizes Form FD-405 (copy attached), captioned "Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups (White-Black); Racial Matters." The form is submitted by the field quarterly, and it requires a detailed breakdown of militant black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates the specific informant coverage, including member informants, for each group and area, in addition to information required for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field as they occur during interim months.

The FD-405s are handled centrally by the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit and are furnished to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of informant development and coverage in each field office. This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses quickly and take appropriate corrective measures.

It is suggested that in order to provide tighter accountability for member informant development and coverage, FD-405 be revised to include an additional section to state as follows:

"Explain why you do not have member informants in those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.

"Indicate what specific action is being taken to develop member informants in those groups and advise when member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."

Comments of Section Chief George C. Moore and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
HDC:mkl

222

FD-405 (Rev. 4-23-70)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE:

FROM : SAC,

NOTE: Items 1 through 9 list total numbers; items 10 through 12 list dollar value; furnish details FD-405b

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT
RACIAL INFORMANTS
EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)
RACIAL MATTERS

Re: ______________________________

	All racial informants other than ghetto	Ghetto Informants
1. Informants		
a. Listed at beginning of month		
b. Added		
c. Deleted		
d. Listed at end of month		
2. Informants (Probationary)		
a. Listed at beginning of month		
b. Added		
c. Deleted		
d. Listed at end of month		

	White Extremist	Black Extremist
3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to the development of racial informants		

4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and individuals under SAC authority.

Services	Expenses	Total

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases ______________________________
6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5) ______________________________
7. Subjects Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6) ______________________________
8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies ______________________________
9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local ______________________________
10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases ______________________________
11. Merchandise Recovered, State and Local ______________________________
12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies ______________________________

223

FD-405a (Rev. 4-28-69)

Furnish complete listing quarterly - by the 10th of January, April, July, October; remaining months furnish only pertinent changes.

Name, location and number members of black extremist & white hate groups including identities of local chapters & groups on college campuses.	Identities of informants & sources providing coverage. Underline member informant.	Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning acts of racial violence.	Identities of informants and sources providing coverage of the individual or groups in preceding column.	Identify ghetto areas & estimate the population in each area.	Furnish the number of ghetto informants furnishing coverage of each area.

FD-405b (Rev. 4-23-70)

RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)

DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405

(Include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)

ADDENDUM
SECTION CHIEF GEORGE C. MOORE
1/20/71

The suggestion made by the Inspector will definitely enable the Racial Intelligence Section to afford closer supervision to the important task of developing quality racial informants especially member informants in extremist organizations.

Our present practice of reviewing the FD-405 and then communicating to the field when it is noted there is no member informant in extremist organizations will be streamlined by the suggestion made by the Inspector. In view of the above, appropriate instructions will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR CHARLES D. BRENNAN: I concur with the above views and as stated above the appropriate instructions will be issued to comply with the Inspector's suggestion.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/19/71
JGD:pdr

SUGGESTION MEMORANDUM
SUPERVISION AND CONTROL OF SECURITY INFORMANT DEVELOPMENT AND COVERAGE BY INTERNAL SECURITY AND NEW LEFT SECTIONS

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Each field office currently submits an annual report on all security informants and confidential sources, advising which informants are paid regularly. The report lists the subversive organizations currently under investigation by that office and includes the following basic information: address of organization, character of case, field file number, Bureau file number, approximate membership. The report also lists informant coverage of each organization as follows: officers - Rank and File - other.

In addition, quarterly reports on the"New Left Movement" are submitted by the field. These reports list informant coverage of New Left groups but do not specify which are member informants.

Additionally, Bureau airtel to all offices dated 11/5/70, captioned "Informant Development, Black Panther Party, New Left Groups," ordered a complete analysis of informant coverage in the Black Panther Party and New Left groups by each office in the field. This is not a regularly scheduled analysis.

It is noted that the Racial Intelligence Section currently utilizes FD-405,(copy attached), captioned "Status Report, Racial Informants, Extremist Groups (White-Black); Racial Matters." It is submitted by the field quarterly and requires a detailed breakdown of militant black extremist groups, ghetto area, and indicates the specific informant coverage, including member informants, for each group and area, in addition to information required for white extremist groups. A complete listing is furnished quarterly and only pertinent changes are furnished by the field as they occur during the interim months.

The FD-405s are handled centrally in the Black Nationalist - South and Racial Informant Unit and are routed to Bureau Supervisors handling the substantive case on each organization listed for timely evaluation of informant development and coverage in each field office. This enables the Bureau Supervisor to detect weaknesses and take timely corrective measures.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/18/71
HDC:mkl

227

The immediacy of the need for member informant coverage in all extremist organizations is obvious if the Bureau is to be forewarned of plans for bombings, kidnappings, demonstrations, and other acts of violence in this country.

It is suggested that the New Left and Internal Security Sections devise a form similar to the FD-405, designed to fit the unique requirements of those Sections, which will assist Supervisors to more accurately evaluate and control informant development and coverage in the field. The form should require specific information on member informant development and coverage in each revolutionary, New Left, extremist, and protest group under investigation in each field office. In devising the new form, the New Left and Internal Security Sections should bear in mind the suggestion which has been proposed separately for the Racial Intelligence Section to revise FD-405 by adding a section to read as follows:

"Explain why you do not have member informants in those groups listed in columns #1 and #3 on FD-405a.

"Indicate what specific action is being taken to develop member informants in those groups and advise when member informant coverage is anticipated for each group."

FD-405 also lists statistical accomplishments attributable to racial and ghetto informants. FD-374 is used for criminal informants. This information is tabulated by computer in the Voucher-Statistical Section and is available for immediate reference, including use by the Director in his Budget Testimony.

While not ordinarily engaged in criminal activity to the same extent as criminal, racial, or ghetto informants, it is nevertheless true that security informants, especially in the New Left field, are increasingly responsible for statistical accomplishments each year. These include location of Bureau fugitives, recovery of stolen merchandise, and other similar data. It can be reasonably anticipated that they will be responsible for additional statistical accomplishments in the future. There is no current procedure for compiling and recording this type of statistical data by the New Left or Internal Security Sections.

228

It is suggested that in order for the Bureau to receive full credit for statistical accomplishments attributable to all FBI informants, the new form devised by the New Left and Internal Security Sections should include statistical accomplishment data as currently required on FD-405.

Comments of Section Chiefs Arbor W. Gray, Robert J. Shackelford and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan are requested.

SECTION CHIEFS SHACKELFORD, WANNALL AND GRAY: The Inspector's suggestion appears to have merit. The New Left, Nationalities Intelligence and Internal Security Sections agree that FD-405 could be adapted to fit security informant evaluation in the New Left movement and in basic revolutionary organizations and related groups. It is proposed that representatives of each of these three sections implement the Inspector's suggestion by revising the form for security use and preparing the necessary instructions to the field requiring quarterly submission of this informant status report concerning organizations under investigation. Coordination, routing and statistical compilation of the incoming forms would be the responsibility of the Special Records Unit of the Research Section which maintains security informant records but the substantive sections involved would be responsible for evaluation and any necessary action on the basis of their content. It is believed further that should this procedure meet our needs for evaluation of member security informants, we should consider the elimination of the annual security informant report now submitted by each field office. It is proposed, therefore, that this suggestion be implemented for a six-month trial period (two submissions) to determine its feasibility and whether it does meet our needs for member informant evaluation. At the end of that trial period, the results will be analyzed and a commensurate recommendation submitted.

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: I agree that it would be desirable to carry out this suggestion at least on a trial basis to determine its feasibility. I will follow this matter and at the end of the trial period the procedure will be carefully analyzed to determine whether or not it should be continued.
(JAS:sjr - 1/21/71)

229

FD-405 (Rev. 4-23-70)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Director, FBI

DATE:

FROM : SAC,

NOTE: Items 1 through 9 list total numbers; items 10 through 12 list dollar value; furnish details FD-405b

SUBJECT: STATUS REPORT
RACIAL INFORMANTS
EXTREMIST GROUPS (WHITE-BLACK)
RACIAL MATTERS

Re: ______________________________

	All racial informants other than ghetto	Ghetto Informants
1. Informants		
a. Listed at beginning of month		
b. Added		
c. Deleted		
d. Listed at end of month		
2. Informants (Probationary)		
a. Listed at beginning of month		
b. Added		
c. Deleted		
d. Listed at end of month		

	White Extremist	Black Extremist
3. Number of Agents assigned exclusively to the development of racial informants		

4. Total amount of money paid to racial informants for information concerning black extremist organizations and individuals under SAC authority.

Services	Expenses	Total

STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS

5. Subjects Arrested, FBI Cases ______________
6. Bureau Fugitives (included in Item 5) ______________
7. Subjects Located, FBI Cases (not included in Items 5 or 6) ______________
8. Subjects Arrested, other Federal Agencies ______________
9. Subjects Arrested, State and Local ______________
10. Merchandise Recovered, FBI Cases ______________
11. Merchandise Recovered, State and Local ______________
12. Merchandise Recovered, other Federal Agencies ______________

230

([illegible] 4-25-69)

Furnish complete listing quarterly - by the 10th of January, April, July, October; remaining months furnish only pertinent changes.

Name, location and number members of black extremist & white hate groups including identities of local chapters & groups on college campuses.	Identities of informants & sources providing coverage. Underline member informant.	Identities of individuals or groups who have participated in or are active in planning acts of racial violence.	Identities of informants and sources providing coverage of the individual or groups in preceding column.	Identify ghetto areas & estimate the population in each area.	Furnish the number of ghetto informants furnishing coverage of each area.

231

FD-405b (Rev. 4-23-70)

RACIAL INFORMANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS

(Summarize Informant Accomplishments for Previous Month re Racial Intelligence Information.)

DETAILS FOR STATISTICAL ACCOMPLISHMENTS LISTED ON FD-405

(Include (1) Corresponding Item # from FD-405; (2) Identity of Case; (3) Field or Bufile #; (4) Type of Accomplishment.)

282

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: Your concurrence with this suggestion on a trial basis is considered forward-looking, particularly since you have used this type of handling with marked success in your Racial Intelligence Program.

It is felt, however, that a six months' period is not an adequate period to measure the effectiveness, considering the time required to reach full implementation of the program in the field. For this reason, it is strongly suggested you make your trial period at least one year.

Comments of Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN (JAS:sjr - 1/22/71) In line with the Inspector's suggestion, we will implement the program involved and evaluate it at the end of one year.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
HDC:mkl
1/22/71

233

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

INSPECTOR EDWARD S. MILLER: The Venceremos Brigade (VB) originated with a group of Americans who traveled to Cuba in January, 1969, to take part in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Cuban revolution. The national organization of the VB obtained support from a wide spectrum of leftist organizations including the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, and the Progressive Labor Party, as well as violent revolutionary groups such as the Black Panther Party, La Raza (a militant Mexican-American civil rights group), and the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society.

The idea of aiding Fidel Castro in meeting his proposed quota of harvesting ten million tons of cane sugar for 1970 quickly took the fancy of the young revolutionaries. Two hundred sixteen young Americans went to Cuba in November, 1969, to cut sugar cane and returned on February 11, 1970. The second contingent of 687 American youths left New Brunswick, Canada, on February 13, 1970, aboard a converted Cuban cattle boat and returned on April 28, 1970. The third contingent of 407 individuals sailed for Cuba aboard the Conrado Benitez on August 25, 1970. They returned to New Brunswick, Canada, on October 21, 1970. Presently a fourth group is being formed to leave on or about March 1, 1971, to stay in Cuba until approximately May 15, 1971.

While no evidence has been received that those persons who traveled to Cuba received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, they were constantly told that they were the vanguard of the revolution in the United States. They were told the only way to defeat the imperialistic Government of the United States, which must be overthrown, is through revolution.

Under the current instructions individual cases are opened to locate, interview, and recommend placement on the Security Index on each person who traveled to Cuba. The SAC may authorize the interview except where the person is under 21 years, is currently a student or professor, has some connection with an institute of learning, or is a journalist. In these instances Bureau authority must be obtained for the interview. Investigation of these persons, under the current instructions, is that the case remain open for one year with 90-day verifications of residence and employment after their interview. The purpose is to determine whether their inclusion on the Security Index after the interview is warranted.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/20/71
PJD:maz

Venceremos Brigade

To date, less than half of the VB members have been located and a large portion of those located have been uncooperative insofar as the interview is concerned. Over 100 of these persons have been placed on the Security Index, and it is anticipated that numerous others will be listed. Many have been arrested for engaging in acts of violence since their return, have participated in anti-Vietnam demonstrations, or demonstrated at trials involving members of the Black Panther Party or the persons involved in the October, 1969, "days of rage" indictments in Chicago, Illinois.

It is proposed that prior to closing any of the VB cases after the interview and a year of following the individual's activity on a 90-day reporting basis, he be interviewed a second time. For those who were initially cooperative, we should make every effort possible to convert these persons as informants. Those who were initially uncooperative should be considered for Priority II handling, and those who have met the requirements for Security Index inclusion in the initial stage should be re-evaluated to insure they still meet those requirements.

Since the members of the VB have made blatantly false statements in their passport applications by not disclosing their true destination, a technical violation of the law exists. In addition, many of the applications contained either false or out-of-date information including incorrect or old addresses and places of employment. These technical violations and items of incorrect information should be brought to the attention of Assistant Attorney General Robert C. Mardian who has recently been appointed in charge of the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice. He, together with Attorney General John N. Mitchell and James O. Eastland, United States Senator from Mississippi, has publicly indicated they were considering some antisubversion bills making it a crime to give aid and comfort to the enemy, particularly the North Vietnamese who had representatives in Cuba to meet the VB, and toughening the law against advocating the overthrow of the Government. The passport violations could certainly be reviewed and brought under their consideration for prosecution under current laws or for new legislative proposals.

Inasmuch as some of the VB members have indicated they were going underground and the fact that a majority have

235

not been located for interview, you should consider placing name stops in the Identification Division so that if these persons are arrested or an inquiry is made by local law enforcement authorities this fact will be immediately brought to the attention of the Bureau. In addition, a stop file is now being set up by the NCIC Unit for persons other than fugitives concerning whom the Bureau has an interest. This file will require, in addition to the name and birth date of the individual, as many other items of identification as possible such as his fingerprint classification, Social Security number, military service number, Selective Service number, and the like.

Every effort should be made to utilize stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit on these persons.

We should continue to impress upon the field the need for informants among the VB groups and insure that coverage of the fourth contingent is at least at the level of the second contingent (five informants) and the third contingent (four informants). Be sure that all efforts are made to have informants previously refused for passage with the prior contingents, as well as those nine informants who have previously traveled with the second and third contingents, be considered for the currently proposed trip. Also, sufficient other new informants should be proposed so that coverage of this latest contingent will be adequate for the Bureau's intelligence needs.

Comments of Assistant Director requested.

236

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C.D. BRENNAN: The Inspector's keen analysis and thoughtful suggestions in regard to the investigation of the Venceremos Brigade (VB) is sincerely appreciated. In connection with the above, the following observations by this Division are set forth:

1. As the Inspector is aware, security investigations are being conducted concerning each participant of the VB. These investigations require that background data including any prior subversive activities be ascertained, each individual participant be considered for interview, and that the field make a recommendation as to the inclusion of each VB subject on the Security Index (SI). Upon conclusion of the above, the field is to advise the Bureau each 90 days for a period of one year as to the whereabouts and activities of Priority II, Priority III, and any non-SI subjects who are VB returnees. Priority I VB subjects are regarded as extremists and this Bureau is notified each 45 days of their activities and whereabouts.

2. As to the difficulty in locating VB returnees, it is to be noted that the first and second contingents of the VB were comprised of approximately 900 individuals made up of young revolutionaries who were college dropouts leading nomadic and communal existences. This mode of living inherently makes the Bureau's job of locating these subjects for purpose of interview more difficult. In contrast, investigation to date of the third contingent, which was composed mostly of established college students, indicates that these individuals will be more easily located. Since the third contingent returned to the U.S. approximately 90 days ago, these investigations as to background data are now being completed and the initial interviews will be promptly conducted.

3. The suggestion that these subjects be reinterviewed upon the expiration of above-mentioned one year period, will be given serious consideration and instructions to this effect will be issued to the field upon approval of the Director. Efforts will be made to develop as informants those VB subjects who are cooperative and the need for further investigative attention regarding uncooperative individuals will be evaluated on the merits of each individual case.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
TJM:cae

4. Regarding foreign travel such as that in which the VB is engaged, it is recognized that the best interests of this country would undoubtedly be served by prohibition of such travel. The Internal Security Act of 1950 contained sanctions restricting travel on the part of Communist Party members. After extended litigation, the Supreme Court in June, 1958, ruled in the Kent and Briehl vs. Dulles passport case that the State Department could no longer deny passports to individuals with past history of subversive affiliations. In June, 1964, the Supreme Court in the Flynn - Aptheher passport case ruled that the right of U.S. citizens to travel abroad is protected by the due process clause of the 5th Amendment. In January, 1967, in the Laub decision specifically dealing with travel to Cuba, the Supreme Court ruled that the State Department could not confiscate an individuals passport simply because the individual traveled to Cuba without State Department sanction. In December, 1967, in the Lynd decision, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, ruled that anyone can travel to a restricted country if they did not use their passport to enter that country.

A number of bills have been introduced into Congress in recent years to remedy the above situation, most of which have never cleared committee. The Senate currently has a bill, the Eastland Bill, before the Senate to impose criminal penalties for violation of travel restrictions. A pending bill, H.R. 1493, was in December, 1969, introduced to restrict travel in violation of area restrictions. This bill has been sponsored by approximately 20 Congressmen. In view of the above, this Division has not considered it warranted to suggest additional legislation along these lines.

5. As to technical violations regarding false or erroneous statements made by members of the VB on passport applications, all information developed along these lines has been furnished both to the Department of Justice and the Department of State for whatever action they deem feasible. To date neither Department has requested that additional action be taken in this matter.

6. The Inspector's suggestion regarding the placing of name stops with the Identification Division and the NCIC Unit for information concerning hard-to-locate VB members, is well taken. This Division will coordinate this matter with NCIC to determine what information is necessary to place such stops and the manner in which this can best be effected. Instructions will be issued to the field regarding

implementation of this suggestion.

7. The VB is currently formulating plans for a fourth contingent to travel to Cuba approximately March 1, 1971. By airtel dated January 6, 1971, interested field divisions were instructed to immediately initiate an aggressive campaign to obtain informants to travel to Cuba as part of this contingent. These offices were instructed to advise the Bureau no later than 1/29/71 and weekly thereafter as to their progress in this matter. This Division is acutely aware of the importance of such informant coverage and will afford this program close attention.

ADDENDUM

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: You should bear in mind that the attitude and instructions expressed by the President, the Director, and many of the legislators in Congress have been to curtail the militant actions and the violent activities on the part of a significant group of young people in the United States today. The thinking of the Supreme Court of the United States with its several recent changes may be along the lines of suppressing the activities of those who so openly espouse the overthrow of all forms of democratic authority in the United States. In addition, the Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice has been specifically enlarged and strengthened to deal with these matters. It is recognized that individual violations of the passport laws have been brought to the attention of the Department of Justice in prior times. It might be well to consider presenting the matter in its entirety to the Department showing the number and frequency of violations for their consideration and study.

PJD:bah
1/22/71

We cannot overlook or minimize the fact that over 1,300 individuals have willingly and freely gone to Cuba, contrary to the State Department's specific instructions. These persons left in many instances with the impression that they would be trained in the use of revolutionary weapons including explosives and incendiary devices. They were subjected during their Cuban stay to all manner of propaganda. On their return to the United States many have gone underground and disappeared completely; others have become involved in crime, violence, and general disruptive activities; still more have refused to cooperate in any manner with the duly constituted authorities as they were so instructed by the leadership. We cannot afford to overlook these known 1,300 potential Cuban insurgents.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan please note.

ADDENDUM

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR C. D. BRENNAN: (JAS:sjr - 1/22/71) The Inspector's observation with reference to the VB cases has been noted and the Bureau may be assured that these matters are being pressed, and we will press the field to furnish these cases vigorous investigative attention.

240

SUBSTANTIVE WRITE-UPS

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP

ROBERT P. BOKINSKY
PSI - PO
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD
WFO FILE 134-9096
BUREAU FILE 134-19651

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 12/31/69 advised that the subject, a body shop mechanic employed by Amatucci Chevrolet Company, Wheaton, Maryland, was interviewed on 12/30/69, concerning his recent contact with Jan Adam Klasa, Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attache, Polish Embassy, Washington, D. C., who has been designated a known intelligence agent with defection potential. The subject appeared to be frank and cooperative during the interview and indicated his desire to assist the FBI. Accordingly, the Washington Field Office felt the subject had definite informant potential.

In the same communication the Washington Field Office furnished the Bureau with sufficient background data relative to subject and his wife and requested the Bureau to check indices.

The Bureau advised the Washington Field Office on 1/7/70 that Bureau files contained no record of the subject or his wife.

The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 3/17/70 furnished results of background investigation concerning the subject and requested authority to recontact the subject and attempt to develop him as an informant in the Polish field.

The Bureau by letter to the Washington Field Office dated 4/1/70 granted authority to recontact the subject in accordance with provisions of Section 107 of the Manual of Instructions. The Bureau further instructed the Washington Field Office to furnish results of recontact with the subject along with recommendations concerning future utilization of subject.

The Washington Field Office by letter to the Bureau dated 6/30/70 advised the Bureau that the subject had not been recontacted by Klasa of the Polish Embassy, but due to subject's continued cooperative attitude and willingness to assist the FBI, again requested the Bureau to grant authority to develop the subject as a

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj

241

PSI in the Polish field.

The Bureau by letter to Washington Field Office dated 7/7/70 designated the subject as a Bureau-approved PSI and again instructed that he be developed in accordance with instructions contained in Section 107, Manual of Instructions.

The above comprises a summary of all correspondence to date in 134-19651 file.

JAN ADAM KLASA
IS - PO
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - WASHINGTON FIELD
WFO FILE 105-92157
BUREAU FILE 105-186986

The U. S. Department of State advised the Bureau in October, 1968, that the subject was scheduled to be assigned to the Embassy of the Polish People's Republic, Washington, D. C., as Assistant Military, Naval and Air Attache. Subject subsequently arrived in Washington, D. C., on May 4, 1969.

By communication to WFO dated 6/20/69 the Bureau instructed that coverage of subject be intensified to determine the identities of any Agents he may be operating.

By communication dated 8/4/69 WFO advised Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles and Seattle Field Offices concerning identity and background of subject, furnished each office with a photograph of subject, and set forth additional investigative leads. The same WFO communication requested Bureau authority to conduct active investigation of subject including Fisurs when deemed appropriate, following clearance with U. S. Department of State.

On 9/2/69 the Bureau, with approval of U. S. Department of State, instructed WFO to proceed with the investigation.

Subsequent to 9/2/69 WFO and those offices listed above conducted active investigation of subject and promptly furnished results in a form suitable for dissemination to the Bureau.

In a progress memorandum to the Bureau dated 6/8/70, WFO advised that "PSI Bokinsky has agreed to attempt to contact Klasa on a social basis." This information is not substantiated in the PSI file (134-19651) nor was the proposal to use the PSI acknowledged in any communication from the Bureau.

Another progress letter from WFO dated 9/8/70 reveals that the PSI

Bokinsky, is now employed by Fenner Pontiac in Rockville, Maryland. It is noted that this information is not in the PSI file, the Baltimore Division was not advised, and no action was taken by the Bureau.

It is noted that the last Bureau communication to WFO in this matter is dated 9/2/69 granting authority to conduct Fisurs as may be necessary to determine if subject is engaged in intelligence activities.

It would appear that this entire investigation to date has lacked proper supervision at the Bureau level.

You are requested to advise the following:

1. Explain your overall supervisory policy in directing the development of Potential Double Agents directed against a known intelligence agent.

2. Why you failed to promptly and aggressively instruct the Washington Field Office to fully utilize PSI Bokinsky against Klasa, a known intelligence agent.

3. Why you failed to properly instruct the office of origin to disseminate to Baltimore Office and verify a change in employment by PSI Bokinsky.

Explanations Requested:

1. Unit Chief Howard H. Wallace, Jr., is requested to explain why in his overall supervision of these cases he failed to detect the above delinquencies.

2. Comments of Section Chief Arbor W. Gray, Inspector D. E. Moore, and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

243

UNIT CHIEF HOWARD H. WALLACE, JR.XX/d. The Inspector's comments
HHW:bcw 1/22/71 relate to the attempted development of a security informant, an automobile mechanic, for the purpose of providing better coverage of the activities of a Polish intelligence officer assigned to the Polish Embassy. This development is proceeding because the mechanic is in contact with the intelligence officer in connection with repair of the officer's automobile.

It is our policy to develop as many assets of all types as necessary to provide coverage of the activities of active Polish intelligence personnel. The Manual of Instructions, Section 107A, page 3, defines various types of sources (confidential sources, potential security informants, security informants, and double agents) developed for use in these types of investigations. The term "potential double agent" is not a status defined in the Manual. It is rather an administrative term used to distinguish a source being used against an intelligence officer when the source has not as yet been solicited to handle assignments for that officer but appears to have the potential for such functions if requested.

Bokinsky was designated a potential security informant by the Bureau on 7/7/70. The Manual of Instructions, Section 107K, 7, page 13, provides that correspondence in security informant and potential security informant cases should be strictly limited to the administrative handling of the informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under the substantive case caption. The six-month justification for the subject's status as a potential security informant (per SAC Letter 68-47, 8/20/68) is contained in WFO letter 1/19/71.

The relationship of Bokinsky to Klasa is developing in a normal pattern and at a pace consistent with avoiding suspicion that he is under our control. Bureau supervision has determined this through the case on Klasa, the Polish intelligence officer against whom the potential security informant is targeted. In that regard, a 90-day evaluation letter in the Klasa case was submitted by WFO on 9/8/70 which stated that attempts were continuing to have the potential security informant placed in contact with Klasa. The potential security informant was to contact Klasa and advise him of his new employment at Fenner Pontiac, Rockville, Maryland. Again, by 90-day evaluation letter dated 12/7/70 WFO advised the potential security informant had been in contact with Klasa concerning an automobile repair. As a result, Klasa had requested potential security informant to handle the repair of Polish Embassy's automobiles whenever necessary. It was stated that the potential security

244

informant would attempt to maintain contact with Klasa through the entre of automobile service. It is respectfully submitted that a review of both cases, the potential security informant and the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted, shows that these matters were afforded proper supervision at the Seat of Government.

2. The field has and must have the primary responsibility for development and direction of potential security informants against communist intelligence officers. The nature and intensity of the direction of such potential security informants must be commensurate with the apparent authenticity of the informant's relationship to and course of conduct with the intelligence officer against whom he is targeted. Over the years it has been firmly established from both investigative experience and information obtained from defectors that anyone who is aggressively cultivating an intelligence officer is automatically suspected as being under the control of opposition intelligence and, therefore, a provocateur. In instant case Bokinsky's logical entre to Klasa is Klasa's need for mechanical work on his and the Embassy's automobiles. Given time and cultivation as is being done according to 90-day letters being received in the Klasa case he may develop a rapport or relationship with Klasa that could result in his being upgraded to a security informant. Reviews of the Bokinsky file and the 90-day letters in the Klasa file show this matter is progressing normally and at a tempo in line with the facts of the relationship existing as well as normal experience in these matters. Therefore, it is believed there is no lack of proper supervision at the Seat of Gevernment.

3. It is respectfully submitted that there was no necessity for the Seat of Government to instruct the office of origin to disseminate to Baltimore information concerning Bokinsky and to obtain verification of his employment change as these items were covered in investigation. As a matter of long-standing policy WFO has the responsibility for developing and handling source coverage against communist intelligence officers assigned to diplomatic establishments in the Washington, D.C., area even though the source may live or work in suburban Maryland or Virginia. Review of the Bokinsky file shows that WFO by letter dated 3/17/70 to the Bureau stated that there was no record of information concerning Bokinsky available to the

245

Baltimore Office. This indicated to the Bureau Supervisor at the time that an interoffice communication had been sent to Baltimore by WFO. A check with WFO on 1/22/71 disclosed that by interoffice letter 11/6/69 it had advised Baltimore that Bokinsky was being considered for development as a potential security informant by WFO. His employment, residence and date of birth were set forth and indices check was requested. By interoffice letter 12/12/69 Baltimore advised WFO that its indices were negative. Subsequent verification of Bokinsky's change of employment was unnecessary when same was brought to the attention of the Bureau in 90-day evaluation letter submitted under the Klasa caption on 9/8/70, and again in 90-day evaluation letter of 12/7/70. No separate communication was required for the informant file regarding the change of employment because that information would be furnished in the normal six-month justification submitted by WFO and it does appear in the six-month justification dated 1/19/71.

SECTION CHIEF A.W. GRAY: I concur with the explanation of
AWG:bcw 1/22/71 SA Wallace. In accordance with existing instructions, normal procedures and at a pace consistent with security requirements and our experience in these matters, I respectfully submit that there was no lack of proper supervision at the Seat of Government.

Inspector D. E. Moore
1/23/71
DEM:lmb

I concur with the above comments of SA Wallace and Section Chief Gray. I feel that PSI Bokinsky must make any cultivation of Klasa appear entirely normal and WFO, by letter dated 12/7/70 in the Klasa caption, stated that Bokinsky will continue to contact Klasa concerning auto repairs and will attempt to establish a social relationship.

Assistant Director C.D. Brennan
1/23/71
DEM:lmb

I concur with the above comments.

246

SUBSTANTIVE ERROR WRITE-UP

ERIC NELSON, PSI
IS - R
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEWARK
NEWARK FILE - 134-3757
BUREAU FILE - 134-19669

INSPECTOR E. S. MILLER: Captioned investigation was instituted by the Newark Division based upon a communication to the Bureau dated 12/18/69 in the case entitled "Vladimir G. Azaryan; IS-R (ATC-KGB); Bureau file 105-184321; Newark file 105-25293." This communication seeks Bureau authority to interview subject to assess his potential as a security informant or double agent.

The subject, a naturalized American citizen, is employed as the chief chemist at Kaysam Corporation of America, Paterson, New Jersey, and reported to have had numerous contacts with Azaryan, who is chief engineer at Amtorg and a known KGB officer.

By communication to Newark, the Bureau on 1/6/70 instructed that office to interview subject "in accordance with existing instructions relating to interviews of security subjects" to evaluate his potential with regard to furnishing information regarding Azaryan. The Bureau further instructed Newark in the same communication to furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination.

Newark by communication to the Bureau dated 2/12/70 set forth background information relative to subject (in memorandum form, not suitable for dissemination as instructed by the Bureau) and stating information contained therein would be furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption.

On 3/31/70 the Newark Office advised under the Azaryan caption and not the case caption, that Nelson had been interviewed.

The above constitutes a summary of all correspondence contained in captioned file to date.

DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION INSPECTION
1/21/71
ESM:wmj

VLADIMIR G. AZARYAN
IS - R (ATC - KGB)
OFFICE OF ORIGIN - NEW YORK
NEW YORK OFFICE FILE - 105-97980
NEWARK OFFICE FILE - 105-25293
BUREAU FILE - 105-184321

The subject of this investigation first came to the attention of the Bureau in August, 1968, via a U. S. Department of State communication advising that the subject had been issued a visa to enter the U. S. as an employee of the Amtorg Trading Corporation, NYC, New York. At that time Bureau communication to NYO dated 8/14/68 instructed that office to be alert to subject's arrival and handle in accordance with Section 105 K, Manual of Instructions.

Subsequent to that time the NYO and auxiliary offices conducted extensive investigation including discreet Fisurs and kept the Bureau advised of their progress by letter dated 12/9/68. In this same communication, a request was made of the Bureau to contact U. S. Department of State for authority for intensified investigation of subject including surveillances when necessary. The Bureau by communication to U. S. Department of State dated 1/3/69 sought such authority which was subsequently granted by State 1/22/69. The subject has been under constant investigation by the NYO since that time with a free exchange of information between the NYO and the Bureau.

The Newark Office advised the Bureau by communication dated 3/31/70 that Nelson, the PSI, had been interviewed, the results of which were furnished the Bureau in LHM form dated 4/8/70. The results of the interview were furnished U. S. Department of State, CIA, Commerce and the U. S. Information Agency.

On 4/17/70 Newark Office again furnished results of contact by PSI Nelson with the subject in LHM form suitable for dissemination.

On 6/17/70 Newark reported another contact by PSI Nelson with the subject.

The NYO advised the Bureau by LHM dated 6/26/70 that on the evening of 6/14/70 the subject was observed boarding Aeroflot for a flight to Moscow.

Although a concentrated investigative effort was put forth by the New York and Newark Offices in the investigation, it is noted that no specific directions were given PSI Nelson by the New York or Newark Offices or the Bureau from January, 1970, to the time subject left for Moscow in June, 1970, in spite of the fact that Nelson and the subject had mutual professional backgrounds (chemists) and from a review of the files appeared to speak the same language.

248

It is noted that this case was originally opened as a PSI and potential double agent case. It is still in a pending status and is still being reported by you as a potential double agent case, when in fact the individual (Azaryan) against whom Nelson was directed departed the U.S. in June, 1970.

A review of the Nelson file fails to contain any instructions or directions regarding the development of Nelson as a double agent and in addition a review of the Azaryan file similarly contains no information or instructions from the Bureau in this regard. There appears to be a definite weakness in the overall administration and supervision of this "potential double agent" at the Seat of Government.

You are requested to advise the following:

1. What is your overall supervisory policy in connection with developing potential security informants directed against a double agent?

2. Why you continue to carry this case (Nelson) in a pending status when the subject whom he was directed against (Azaryan) left the U.S. for Russia in June, 1970.

3. Why you failed to instruct and aggressively direct the office of origin in the Nelson case against the double agent target Azaryan.

4. Why you have the Nelson case listed as a potential double agent when in effect he was being developed as a PSI.

Explanations Requested:

1. Case supervisor and Unit Chief Bowen F. Rose for failure to detect the above delinquencies in your overall supervision of the Nelson matter.

2. Comments of Section Chief William A. Branigan, Inspector D. E. Moore and Assistant Director Charles D. Brennan requested.

249

SA Bowen F. Rose
(1-22-71 BFR:as)

The case of Eric Nelson, PSI, IS-R, was assigned to me on 12/17/70, therefore, I was not responsible for instruction or direction of the office of origin in this matter prior to that date and it has not come up for review on tickler as yet. With regard to the case of Vladimir G. Azaryan, IS-R, this case is closed and has never been assigned to me.

With regard to questions raised by the Inspector, the following is set out.

It is presumed question one relates to our supervisory policy with regard to the development of informants to be targeted against Soviet officials and/or Soviet agents, not against our double agents. It is our policy to encourage informant development of as many individuals as possible against a Soviet target to provide the widest spectrum of information concerning his social, business and personal life in order to develop data essential for in depth defection analysis. In addition, we seek to identify those individuals whom the Soviets appear to be selecting for recruitment and to develop them to act in our behalf against the Soviets. Such highly controlled actions serve either to involve the Soviets in time consuming and costly operations in which they can only receive carefully selected and screened information or disinformation or may provide us the basis for effective counterintelligence actions against the Soviets, as is so well illustrated in the Azaryan case. Our supervision in the development of informants is accomplished through the close review and analysis of the periodic progress letters submitted on Soviet officials; the direction which we afford to contact cases and to the cases resulting from the DESECO Program.

As the result of an excellent counterintelligence effort formulated and carried out by the New York Office with Bureau guidance and direction, a defection approach was made to Azaryan by NY 5179-S on 6/4/70. This informant had previously been handled by Yuriy K. Kitaev, another experienced, aggressive KGB officer. As a result of this action, both Soviets departed the U. S. almost immediately. The loss of these two experienced operatives most certainly caused a serious disruption in the activities of the New York Residency of the KGB.

250

We have learned through defector sources that in instances such as described above, the entire activity of the KGB officers involved as well as the Residency as a whole are subjected to most careful scrutiny to determine if there has been a penetration; if the operation was mishandled and what, if anything, can be salvaged from other operations which were being run by the officers involved. Such a review may take many months. No doubt Azaryan's contacts with Nelson have been the subject of such careful study. Inasmuch as we did not involve Nelson in our approach to Azaryan, there is no reason to believe that the KGB does not still consider Nelson as a potential agent.

It would be logical for the Soviets to have Nelson's development continued by Azaryan's replacement, who would by now have been in the U. S. for a relatively short period of time. Historically, a newly arrived KGB operative takes some months to get acclimated to the environment in which he will work and, therefore, does not jump right in to take over a net of agents.

The Nelson case has been maintained in a pending status as it was felt he still possesses potential as a source against the Soviets. At this point the only ones who know if this is true are the KGB. If we were to attempt to initiate contact between Nelson and the Soviets, they would be convinced he is a plant and lose all interest in him. The only course of action we can pursue at this time is to wait for the Soviets to make a move.

Newark's most recent communication in this matter advised that Nelson is alert to our interests and they are maintaining contact with him. This is essential to insure we have full knowledge and control of any future Soviet initiatives. Experience has shown the Soviets will allow situations such as this to remain dormant for as long as eight years. It is not suggested that this matter will be kept pending for this length of time; however, for reasons indicated it is incumbent upon us to continue to follow this matter for a reasonable period of time.

A review of the Azaryan file will show aggressive supervision by Seat of Government supervisors, including specific instructions to the field. As a prime defection target, all facets of the investigation of his activities were carefully considered. NY 5179-S was selected as the vehicle to carry out our defection approach. Nelson, a contact of Azaryan, was interviewed and was cooperative. His operation as a source against Azaryan was proceeding in proper fashion, and having decided on the utilization of NY 5179-S to make the approach to Azaryan, there was no need to expedite Nelson's development. By not involving Nelson in this operation we have not unnecessarily revealed our interests in him and preserved a potential asset.

With regard to question four, the designations of an individual as a Potential Security Informant and as a potential double agent are not mutually exclusive. Potential Security Informant is the term defined in the Manual of Instructions for an individual in position to become active in intelligence activities and administrative supervision is in accord with provisions of the Manual of Instructions. On the other hand, potential double agent is merely an arbitrary designation we apply to an individual who is in contact with a Soviet-bloc official, but in which the relationship has not yet developed into one of a covert intelligence nature. Such a relationship is well illustrated in Azaryan's overt business contacts with Nelson on behalf of Amtorg, the Soviet trading company. That such a relationship may abruptly change in character to a covert intelligence operation is well documented in countless cases which have arisen out of "innocent" business oriented contacts. For this reason the arbitrary designation of potential double agent was given to Nelson.

In connection with the observation that the Bureau instructed the Newark Office to interview Nelson and furnish results in a form suitable for dissemination the Newark Office furnished background information and advised information would be furnished in LHM form under the Azaryan caption. The only occasion when substantive data received from a source appears in the informant case file is in the semiannual justification letter in abbreviated form. See Section 107K, paragraph 7, page 13, Manual of Instructions, which states:

> "Correspondence in security informant and potential informant matters should be strictly limited to administrative handling of informant and should not contain information more properly furnished under substantive case caption."

252

I have noted the Inspector's comments and I will continue to provide the type of direction and supervision to which those comments are directed.

Section Chief W. A. Branigan
(1/22/71 - WAB:hke)

I have noted the explanation of Unit Chief Bowen F. Rose together with his comments, and these comments are in keeping with long-established policies for following field investigations in individual counterintelligence investigations.

Inspector D. E. Moore
1/23/71
DEM:lmb

I have carefully noted Mr. Rose's comments and agree with them. Eric Nelson is a chemist who has been in contact with the Soviets and I feel he will be of continuing interest to them and that he presents potential for use against Soviet intelligence.

Assistant Director C. D. Brennan
1/23/71
DEM:lmb

I concur with the above comment and wish to assure the inspector I will closely follow our progress in developing informants to use against Soviet intelligence and the direction of their activities.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent H G 6/9/75
1-DIG - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Intelligence Coordination
Enc-2
ELHm
Senstudy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

MDR-16

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters ~~or~~ were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Sidell he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy-75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO [illegible] OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE [illegible]

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw KW
(14)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Rus 4569 JB

REC-102

HAND carried TO AG 6-11-75

62-116395-265

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/lk
ON 2-20-81
6076

62-116395

June 9, 1975

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. & ~~EXT.~~ BY SD165K/ga 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2 4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(13)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
aboratory ___
n. & Eval. ___
. Inv. ___
ing ___
Coun. ___
one Rm. ___
r Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA

62-116395-265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

'The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

'Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro"

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1963 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Lavis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 [illegible]

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Appendix C
Part I, #7

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 Alm/tmf
mdr-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ - my only concern [illegible] then with former Governor

62-116395-265

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MC
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ITEM II

Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered.

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say *there was no* connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would *deny* there was such connection.

I believe "yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

62-116395-264

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory RLM
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

REC- 102

62-116395-264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Delivered To Mr. ... Meeting ...

Dir. ___
AD Adm. ___
AD Inv. ___
Syst. ___
Affairs ___
& Com. ___

JUN 2 3 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:1hb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ...

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/4 Att

~~XC~~ 1

B. Prang

XC (1)/FC

Patch III

Assembly

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title: THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka- than this, in the opinion of se who have been trying to down the exact date of ha's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha is cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose ames began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an- vered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news- aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder house- vife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a linner party to which he was in- vited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur- lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat- dly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I don't. I still want name of [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

For information.

I shall await results.
H

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets Riha is a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in Washington to be by letter only. H

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed us that RIHA had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
[illegible]

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: [illegible]
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY ~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official ~~who said he~~ was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wpw 4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA AND HAD HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

②-Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsonic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 released
HSC Sen 94. (8/24/75 kg)
11/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/jmf
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

LFS

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N : SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC	J. T. Elliff
	HSC	

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EW
5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY~~ on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

P. V. Daly
4509 JB

Hand carried by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD

edm

REC-102

62-116395-262

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2001 BY SParm/lmf

MOR-16

WRW/fgl

62-116395-262

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐	DOCUMENT	☐	BRIEFING	☒	INTERVIEW	☐	TESTIMONY	☐	OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WDC
EWJ

5-

SFP:lhb (4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

The Attorney General

June 12, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

3

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmc
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP8NM/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

The United States of America
Transportation Request

A3,925,594

Void after ______ 19

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The National Airlines Company is requested
to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Miami, Florida + Return
for use of Lish Whitson ______ and ______ others with ______ accommodations
from ______ to ______ with authorization
to transport not over ______ lbs. of excess baggage from ______

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, 66
I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.
ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent
FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)
0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP[illegible]

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
Nov. [illegible] Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

PASSED
149/a
vo
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/14/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BILL TO

A 3,991,399

The Southern Railroad Company is requested
to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Atlanta Ga. & return via Southern # 13

for use of William C. Sullivan and others with accommodations

from to

Place of issue: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

48.95	25.60	74.55
		TOTAL

0500
21-60

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America
Transportation Request

FD-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard L. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:

Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWL
5-TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (7)

REC- 102

62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mlc
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair ongoing investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395-258

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

REC-102

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

5-Phillips

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

WRW

JBA
PLM

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

_______________, 1975

✓ Director
✓ Mr. Callahan
✓ Mr. Jenkins
✓ Mr. Adams
✓ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M _______________

Room _______________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Sensitively '75

Do we have any amplification of This instruction? Or, do we know of any admission responsive to This which illustrate interpretation K

Item #6 (tabbed) re

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities" Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

C- 102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tlc
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

5-Ew

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 ALM/CMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1.0

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
    Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]
MDR-14

84 JUN 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. W.R.W. ✓ HEM
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. Cregar
4123 JEH

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

REC-102

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102

62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC

MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
  Invasion of California State Legislature 6
  Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
  "Free Huey" Campaign 6
  Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
  International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. 7
  Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
  National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
  International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
  Target: Police. 15
  Attacks on Others. 15
  Weapons Caches 16
  "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
  Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
  Editorials 21
  Inflammatory Articles 24
  Provocative Slogans 29
  "Revolutionary Art" 30
  International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**



III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D. C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther*, June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLES FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

''Revolutionary Suicide''

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of ''historical'' importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.


WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community

WEEKS, EXPELLED

center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1971 PAGE 2

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in AmeriKKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother's body. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke with the brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only applies mercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Black youths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' C.M.I. *(communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable mini*mum. Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only one side* of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

COMMUNICATION

MOBILITY

INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military problem* facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED
D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and thumb firmly on the ham*mer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good.

Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revolutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in under estimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CANNOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what Revolutionary Artist and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people.

So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.G.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE
FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


Only the power of the people can free political prisoners
PIG


We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.
TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION , NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South VietNam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 197[illegible]).



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Lao. during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up [illegible] per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded [illegible] million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. [illegible] 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,[illegible] U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commanders [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. [illegible] Vietnam on February 2[illegible], 197[illegible] [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past. [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 197[illegible] affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] weekly [illegible] d. Hanna.

With [illegible], there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 19[illegible] U.S. Senator Mansfield [illegible] that Americans are fighting [illegible]. "The fact that some of them do not wear uniform does not [illegible] this one bit. The fact that [illegible] American combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting [illegible]

continued on next page

New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinesepeoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely and difficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW-NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. No specific

62-116395-253

REC-102

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MJC

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 24 1975

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee. WRW

PLM

[illegible]

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAM/R
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;

8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;

9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]/lmc
MDR-16

5 - TUNSTALL

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TM

We should carefully consider fact that
Hampton case is subject of pending litigation
and coordinate with Dept. instead of [illegible]
[illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620

18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.	HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.	BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.	CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.	RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.	

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2902

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2001 BY spa alm/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 SPN aim/JMC
MOR-16

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

---

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE **TELETYPE** **NITEL**

1 - Each Assistant Director

3 per SLP

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 11 1975
TELETYPE

320 A ESF

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2ALM/MAF
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

WRW/B

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy - 75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

THB:dm (7)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2ALM/JMT
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA - 5/27/75
VAS

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
    Central Intelligence Agency
    Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
    Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
    Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

JPL:jdp jdp
(4)

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 AIM/MF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 1
MDR-16

REC-75 62-116395-249

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
5:18 pm
JUN 18 1975
MEO
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

WRW
WOB

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

84 JUN 25 1975

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

SECRET

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

Mr. W. R. Wannall

6/4/75

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
48 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/mf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.
ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams   DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel JAM

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TJM

memo Mr Cregar [illegible]
6/17/75 TJM

62-116395-24
5

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 RUM/JMC
MOR-16

PLR

84 JUN 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17/75 by SA Daly. JAM

REC-104 62-116395-245

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAM
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/1/99 BY SP2 AM/MF

(8)

MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-284

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

COPY ... PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW/fal

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 alm/mf
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

General

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Bill

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request

Senstudy - 75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

17 JUN 19 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 Pum/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretary
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, CIA

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~2422~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-541

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entitie other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

REC- 102

62-116395-239

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

17 JUN 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 RM/lmf
mbe-16

84 JUN 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

① - 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(20)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel ~~to~~ of the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TVL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MOR-16

ORIGINAL FILED IN

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in __________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC- 102

- 116395 - 236X

14 ~~JUN 6~~ 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/bmf
MDR-16

Approved: __________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 avm/umf
MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0/19/2000 BY SP2 avm/lmt
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V Dellums

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated [illegible]/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 pvm/mf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC- 102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:lgp
(7)

WRW TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 Alm/lmf

MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

AUG 11 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 am/lmf

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

MOR-16

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

VFS

PLM WVC

JRS

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2016 BY SP2
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-2361

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395

Enclosure

AFW:dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPd AW/JMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

ALW

Addendum

WVC

RS

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

Jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, (OR EMPLOYEE) the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-14

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

62-116395-234

ENCLOSURE

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/1/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMS

MDR-16

17 JUN 18 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395-

4/9/75 memo to Mintz

memo Wannall to Adams 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] 4/1/75

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MJT

REC-100

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED — OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

Senate 6-75

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 1 8 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PVD JBH/PVD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, comm. rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 99. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~ of dec'n

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written doc~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent to H [illegible] 6/9/75
1 - [illegible] - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Spec. Coun. Intelligence Coordination

[illegible]-2
ELH:mj
Senstudy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf

MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior ~~to that time which~~ thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes.?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony.?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau, With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters ~~or~~ were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Sidell he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy - 75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR-Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(14)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC- 102

Hand carried to AG 6-10-75

62-116395-265

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/LR
ON 2-20-81
6074

62-116395

June 9, 1975

1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. ~~& EXT.~~ BY SD16SK/JKG 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2 4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
aboratory ____
an. & Eval. ____
Inv. ____
ing ____
Coun. ____
one Rm. ____
r Sec'y ____

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw (13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

JBA

62-116395-265

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

'The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

'Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

~~FIDENTIAL~~

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Q. Prior to 1963 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC
	HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
Fwg

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 [illegible]

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

Appendix C
Part I, #7

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/DMC
mdr-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ - my only concern 62-116395-265 then with former Governor

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mc
mdr-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ ITEM II

Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is when Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered.

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say _there_ _was_ _no_ connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would _deny_ there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___ RLM
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-264

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

7/11/75

Delivered To [illegible]

REC- 102

62-116395 - 264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Dir. ____
AD Adm. ____
AD Inv. ____
yst. ____
Affairs ____
& Com. ____

JUN 2 3 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

-16

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

[redacted] ~~XC~~ 3/Ah ~~XC~~ 1 R. Prong [redacted]

[redacted] ~~XC 1/FC~~ XC ① /FC

Patch III

↑

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka- e than this, in the opinion of se who have been trying to down the exact date of ha's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an- vered the telephone at his me at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news- aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder house- vife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a inner party to which he was in- ited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur- lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat- dly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha left Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title: THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I don't. I still want [illegible]

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

For information.

I shall await H's words.
H

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

[redacted] ~~SECRET~~ [redacted]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent as well as the source of the information.

~~SECRET~~

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets it was a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in future to be by letter only.
H

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed ~~us that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed:
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY ~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official who said he was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wpw 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

[illegible]

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA HAD AND HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G[illegible]ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ____________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ____________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RI~~J~~A
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

② Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 released
HSC Sen 94. (8/24/75 [illegible])
11/16/76.

REC-102

8
VFS
62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AIM/jmf
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ____
Inspection ___
Intell. ____
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ____
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

LFS

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

X	DOCUMENT		BRIEFING		INTERVIEW		TESTIMONY		OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

X	SSC	J. T. Elliff
	HSC	

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE on Intelligence Activities TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

✓ P. V. [illegible] 509 JB

Hand delivered by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD/[illegible]

62-116395-262

REC-102

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

PCM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2001 BY SPARM/LMF

MOR-16

WRW/TJL

62-116395-262

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE BY SSC

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC

☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

WDC

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

3

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 RM/LMF
MDR-16

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

Void after 19

BILL TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A3,925,564

The United States of America
Transportation Request
MEMORANDUM CARD COPY
DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

The National Airlines Company is requested
to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Miami, Florida & return (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY SUCH BETWEEN WHAT POINTS)
for use of Lish Whitson and others with accommodations (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.)
from to (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") with authorization
to transport not over lbs. of excess baggage from

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, 6
I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.
ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson
TITLE Special Agent
FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S., May 1, 1955, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a

Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
Nov. [illegible] Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

PASSED
VO 149/0
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-[illegible]

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATED 12/11/2000 BY SP2 evm/mef

MDR-16

62-116395-260

BILL TO	FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C.	A 3,991,309

The Southern Railroad ... Company is requested

to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC

to Atlanta Ga & return via Southern R R

for use of William C Sullivan and ... others with ... accommodations

PLACE OF ISSUE: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

William C Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

		TOTAL
42.95	35.60	74.55

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

0500

21-60

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America
Transportation Request

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MOR-16

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS
5-TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC- 102 62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

JAM:mfd (7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED.
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 alm/mlc
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 JUN 25 1975

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

WRW|lg

plm

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair on-going investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-258

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

JBA/PLM

WRW

Wannall had designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

________________, 1975

___ Director
___ ~~Mr. Callahan~~
___ Mr. Jenkins
___ Mr. Adams
___ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M ________________

Room __________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Senstudy '75

Do we have any amplification of This instruction; or, do we know of any submission responsive to This which illustrate interpretation

Item #6 (tabbed) re KY

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities"

Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

EC-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

84 JUN 26 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tsc
MDR-16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/CMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

5-Ew

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____ Wannall
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

1.0

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
    Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP 2 ALM/MAF
MAR-14

8 4 [illegible] 2 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. RW ✓ HEM
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

~~REC-102~~

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464~~)

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

Mr. Cregar
4123 JEH

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102 62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
    Invasion of California State Legislature 6
    Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
    "Free Huey" Campaign 6
    Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
    International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
    Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
    National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
    International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
    Target: Police 15
    Attacks on Others 15
    Weapons Caches 16
    "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
    Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
    Editorials 21
    Inflammatory Articles 24
    Provocative Slogans 29
    "Revolutionary Art" 30
    International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING



HUEY PERCY NEWTON

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**

III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice,* staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts,* and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice,* Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice.*

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther,* June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLES FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

"Revolutionary Suicide"

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of "historical" importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.


WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969



EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY-MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary , counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother's body. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke with the brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only applies mercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Black youths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blows away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or *killed. These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only one side* of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one military problem facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED
D.C.

COMMUNICATION

MOBILITY

INFORMATION

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS

UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.

PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3

COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 6, 1970 PAGE 5

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in underestimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CANNOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

''Revolutionary Art''

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as ''pigs'' and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what *Revolutionary Artist* and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people.

So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.G.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL



DEATH TO THE
FASCIST PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16





Only the
power
of the
people can
free
political
prisoners

THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4

We will not hesitate to kill or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
'O' WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Laos during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up 80 per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AFP, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 300 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vientiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things happened [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,5[illegible] U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose command [illegible] (Thailand). U.S. Senator [illegible] on February 27, 1970 said the number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam. In the past [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. combat troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" on April 6, 1970 affirmed that the CIA office in [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] weekly [illegible].

Without [illegible], there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, Senator Mansfield [illegible] that Americans are fighting [illegible]. "The fact that some of them do not wear uniforms does not change this one bit. The fact [illegible] American combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting in Laos."

continued on next page

New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-

Chinesepeoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely anddifficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW - NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
[redacted] 5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [redacted]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

4063

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. No specific

62-116395-253

REC-102

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: SENSTUDY 75
62-116395

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request. signed by Chairman of Committee WRW

PLM

N[illegible]

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;

8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;

9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMC
MDR-16

5-~~[illegible]~~ STALL

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TJM

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. [illegible] [illegible] to committee any specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620

18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPa nm/jmf
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805	
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY § 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)	
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON	Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)	

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JML
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPK aim/jmc

MOR-16

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

---

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

3 per SLP

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 11 1975
TELETYPE

4
329 A ESF

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

WRW/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2ALM/MAC
MDR-16 WRW/TCL

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975

46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 6th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

62-116395

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN 63-11652-46

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

THB:dm (7)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPaAlm/dmf
MDR-16

GPO 951-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA - 5/27/75

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [redacted] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 PM/JMF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
MDR-16

REC-75 62-116395-249

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

WRW
WOB

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 JUN 25 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
48 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/mf
MDR-16

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TWR

memo Mr Cregar to [illegible]
6/17/75 TJM

62-116395-247

REC-102

5

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 RLM/JMC
MOR-16

84 JUN 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original
which was hand carried
with enclosures to
O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17
by SA Daly. Jam

REC-104 62-116395-245

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SPO AWM/MAL
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

COPY ... PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

62-116395-244

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/4/99 BY SP2 ALM/MF

REC-102

(8)

MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 2 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/MF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney ~~General~~
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bill

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request Senstudy-75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102 62-116395-241

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 19 1975

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowat
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate
Deputy to the DCI for the
Intelligence Community, C

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242x~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 15 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-541

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. __
Laboratory __
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

REC-102

62-116395-239

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

17 JUN 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mc
mbe-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

(1) - 62-116305

TJM:mjc
(26)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395
NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Adams
DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Conner, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwar~~t~~z, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Conner telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel ~~of~~ to the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Conner it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwar~~t~~z agreed to this position.

O'Conner telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwar~~t~~z, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TVL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp ([illegible])

CONTINUED - OVER

INITIALS ON ORIGINAL

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

94-585-4-353

ORIGINAL FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

- Assoc. Dir. ____
- Dep. AD Adm. ____
- Dep. AD Inv. ____
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin. ____
  - Comp. Syst. ____
  - Ext. Affairs ____
  - Files & Com. ____
  - Gen. Inv. ____
  - Ident. ____
  - Inspection ____
  - Intell. ____
  - Laboratory ____
  - Plan. & Eval. ____
  - Spec. Inv. ____
  - Training ____
  - Legal Coun. ____
  - Telephone Rm. ____
  - Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC- 102

- 116395 - 236X

14 ~~JUN 6~~ 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/lmf
MDR-16

Approved: ____ Sent ____ M Per ____
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2 AVM/lmt
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2BM/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

WRW TJM

JDM:1gp
(7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 AUG 11 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 am/lmk

JUN 18 1975

27 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

MOR-16

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

HPS

PLM WVC QRS

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HPS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2006 BY SP2

MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116

Enclosure

AFW:dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPd AW/ymf
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

Jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant OR EMPLOYEE, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 pm/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, by the committee, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	✓
Laboratory	
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Legal Coun.	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams
DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

62-116395-234

ENCLOSURE

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 alm/lmb

MDR-16

17 JUN 18 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116464

memo Wannall to Mintz 4/11/75 AFW:dsh

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] [illegible] 4/1/75

REC-100

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland MOE-1 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED — OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

JAM

KY

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

Serialized 6-75

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so ~~that Nichols may~~ consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20

JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PVD JBH/PVD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ADM/MAF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind witness, agency rules or agreements, comm rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 '97. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~ [illegible]

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written doc~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarilv before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

SECRET

ADDENDUM: J. B. ADAMS 3/31/75 JBA:ams

On 3/28/75 Mr. Wannall and I met with Mr. Buchen and Mr. Hills at the White House. The purpose of the meeting was to review the role of The White House in coordinating the responses of the various intelligence agencies to the Senate Committee to insure that there was uniformity in complying with Committee requests in that any restrictions on the furnishing of information were uniform.

It was determined that there is a unanimity of opinion that access to raw files would not be granted Committee members or staff as a matter of practice, although it is not inconceivable that some particular horrendous event might arise which is of such significance that access to the files on that matter might be granted to the Committee Chairman or a select number of Senators.

We discussed items which we felt were particularly sensitive such as identities of informants, sources and cooperative citizens as well as information received from foreign sources. The sensitivity of specific details on confidential expenditures was pointed out although we had no objection to discussing or making available the gross figures.

JFK(1)(B)

(S) We discussed the various means of electronic exploitation in the foreign intelligence field including the Orkid program and similar programs, electronic wiretaps, microphones, Telex, and electronic penetration of communications equipment. We pointed out that there were varying degrees of sensitivity involved and each type of surveillance would have to be individually considered as to the degree of disclosure which could be made to the Committee. (S)

We briefly discussed activities which had previously taken place yet which might be subject of current interest because of newspaper publicity and allegations. We were reminded on more than one occasion that it was absolutely imperative that the White House not be surprised without being forewarned of any earthshaking incidents which might come to light. In this context, we mentioned the Anagram program, the various mail and pouch intercepts, the Karot and related cases, surreptitious entries in connection with CP, Klan and such investigations. (S)

(S) Cointelpro was mentioned as well as the [redacted] project which was a joint FBI-CIA microphone penetration of the [redacted]y in July, 1971. Mr. Buchen inquired about exploitation of unavailable Government records and we mentioned Bureau Source 4, Social Security records, as an example. STATE JFK(1)(C)

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET/[SCOPE] (S)

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 7/15/75

1 - Mr. F. S. Putman
1 - Mr. W. A. Branigan
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz
1 - Mr. M. R. L'Allier

J U N E

FROM : F. S. Putman SSM

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

Reference is made to memorandum W. O. Cregar to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 6/26/75, captioned "Senstudy 75." (S)

SYNOPSIS:

The purpose of this memorandum is to summarize information in FBI files concerning [Israeli intelligence collection capabilities] (S) in the United States. James J. Angleton, former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), [advised the FBI on 6/26/75 that he appeared before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) and in response to questions advised SSC he only had secondhand and fragmentary information concerning [Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collection] (S) in the United States, including [nuclear information.] (S) He advised the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly be directed to the FBI. [Sensitive technical source coverage by the FBI of the [redacted] between February, 1969, and October, 1972, developed information showing that Angleton, during this period in his official capacity at CIA, had frequent personal liaison contacts with the [redacted] Israeli Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives involving the exchange of extremely sensitive information. Currently the FBI has no pending investigation involving Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the United States. The most current information in FBI files concerning this matter involved the investigation based on CIA information dated 11/14/68 concerning the establishment at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., of an Israeli technical intelligence network. Also under investigation during this period at New York City was an IIS attempt to penetrate United Nations and official Arab establishments by the use of live sources. FBI files also reflect that IIS representatives periodically have operated in the United States since 1948.]

STATE JFK(1)(C)

1-8-01 [illegible] CLASSIFIED BY SP-2 ALM/LST/G
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395-395

1 - [65-58700 (IIS)] (S)

REC-88

CONTINUED - OVER (S)

3 JUL 22 1975

MRL:med
(9)

DETAILS - PAGE 2

SECRET/[SCOPE] (S)

Classified by 7005
Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

6 JUL 22 1975

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

SPEC. MAIL RM.

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

ACTION:

None. For information.

+HAG

WOG

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

DETAILS:

According to referenced memorandum, James Angleton, former Chief, Counterintelligence Operations, CIA, advised the FBI on 6/26/75 that he had recently testified under oath without counsel before three Senators and staff members of the Senate Select Committee (SSC). He was questioned concerning his knowledge of [Israeli capabilities to conduct intelligence collection] in the United States, including [nuclear information.] Angleton stated he avoided any direct answers, advising that any knowledge he might have would be secondhand and fragmentary. He informed the SSC that questions concerning this matter might more properly be directed to the FBI. (S) (S)

Sensitive technical source coverage by the FBI of the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., between February, 1969, and October, 1972, determined that Angleton, in his official capacity at CIA, had frequent personal liaison contacts with Israeli Intelligence Service (IIS) representatives at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., involving the exchange of extremely sensitive information. This special relationship was confirmed by Angleton and other CIA officials during a meeting with an FBI representative on 4/3/69. At this meeting CIA representatives stated that this liaison with IIS was known by the White House and the U. S. State Department. (S) JFK(1)(B)

STATE JFK(1)(4)

At the present time the FBI has no pending investigation involving Israeli intelligence collection capabilities in the United States. (S)

The most current information in FBI files concerning this matter involved the investigation based on CIA information dated 11/14/68 concerning the establishment at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C., of an Israeli technical intelligence network directed by Avraham Hermoni, Scientific Counselor. Hermoni, prior to his assignment as Scientific Counselor in Washington, D. C., was involved in the Israeli nuclear weapons program. The activities and contacts of Hermoni and colleagues at the Embassy were investigated through 1972. The investigations of these individuals were discontinued as no specific information was developed to indicate that they had acted unlawfully or outside the scope of their official duties. (S) JFK(1)(B)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Senstudy 75

During the period of these investigations it was determined that Embassy of Israel officials recruited U. S. scientists for employment in Israel, and extensive liaison was established with individuals within U. S. scientific, political, academic and industrial communities. As an example, Hermoni developed close contact with Dr. Zalman Mordecai Shapiro, Director of Nuclear Materials and Equipment Corporation, Apollo, Pennsylvania, a firm which processes uranium 235 for nuclear reactors. (S)

The basis of the discontinuation of the sensitive technical source coverage on the Israeli Embassy in 1972 was a U. S. State Department directive. (S)

STATE
JFK(1)(c)

During this period it was also determined that the IIS was attempting to penetrate the United Nations (UN) and Arab diplomatic establishments in New York City. An informant of the New York Office, who previously engaged in intelligence activities in the Middle East for the Israelis between 1955 and 1960 while working at the UN, was recontacted by Israeli intelligence in August, 1968, while visiting Israel. This informant had access at the UN to extremely sensitive information from the office of the Secretary General. Israeli intelligence had directed him to obtain and furnish, through a mail drop in Belgium, interoffice communications between the Secretary General of the UN and his undersecretaries, and information regarding the Middle East, particularly relating to Arab matters. (S)

In May, 1968, another informant of the New York Office, who previously resided in the Middle East and was active in the Egyptian intelligence service, addressed a personal letter to General Dayan of Israel in which he expressed his opinion the Israelis should force the Egyptians to surrender and sign a peace treaty. Informant was subsequently contacted in New York City by an Israeli intelligence agent who furnished his name as "Michael" who showed informant a copy of his letter to Dayan. "Michael" subsequently "recruited" informant and furnished him a mail drop in Italy. "Michael" instructed informant to obtain employment at an Arab diplomatic establishment in New York City in order to (S)

CONTINUED - OVER

furnish Israeli intelligence information on Arab moves in the Middle East crisis. During a meet in October, 1969, "Michael" was surveilled to the Israeli Consulate where he met Paul Korem, IIS representative. The informant subsequently received instructions that in the event of an emergency he should call a specific telephone number and ask for "Paul." This telephone number was identified as being a private line located at the Israeli Consulate. (S)

Neither of the above-described operations is currently active at New York. (S)

Korem, during his assignment at the Israeli Consulate in New York, initiated liaison contact with the New York Office of the FBI. (S)

FBIHQ currently has liaison with Menachem Navoth, IIS representative at the Embassy of Israel, Washington, D. C. During July, 1956, through December, 1956, while attending American University, Washington, D. C., and employed part time as a guard at the Embassy of Israel, Navoth was engaged in intelligence activities in the United States. Navoth met with an FBI double agent who was an employee of the U. S. State Department on several occasions and paid the double agent $250.00 for cooperating with the Israelis. (S)

New York currently has liaison with the Israeli Consulate. (S)

FBI files also reflect that IIS representatives have periodically conducted operations in the United States similar to those described herein since 1948. (S)

wrw

Jmr

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent to AG 6/9/75
1 - DAG - SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor, Spec. Intelligence Coordination
Enc-2 LHM Senstudy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmt

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

MDR-16

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever, apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto ~~to that time which~~ it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of whate~~ver~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

[redacted]

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau, With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ~~[illegible]~~ ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were ~~or~~ that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

Had such been furnished at an earlier date

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy-75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice, 11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw
(14)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Room 4509 JB

REC-102

62-116395-265

Hand carried to AG 6-11-75

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/lls
ON 2-20-81
6076

62-116395

June 9, 1975

1-Mr.W.O.Cregar
1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. ~~& EXT.~~ BY SP16SK/BG 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM ~~II, 1-2 4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
aboratory ____
an. & Eval. ____
Inv. ____
ing ____
Coun. ____
one Rm. ____
r Sec'y ____

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw (13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JBA
62-116395-265

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

'The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

'Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

CONFIDENTIAL

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

~~DENTIAL~~

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

~~NTIAL~~

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
Elw

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Appendix C
Part I, #7

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tmf
MOR-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ my only concern ~~that~~ then with former Governor

62-116395-2165

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE [illegible] BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

✓ITEM II Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered).

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

③

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say there was no connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would deny there was such connection.

I believe "Yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____ RLM
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

ENCLOSURE

62-116395 - 264

TJM

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

13

[illegible] 6/11/75 [illegible]

8/15 Delivered To Martha [illegible] [illegible] RPT

REC- 102

62-116395 - 264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.
yst.
Affairs
s & Com.

JUN 2 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

TREAT AS YELLOW

5-18

SFP:1hb
(4)

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

62-116395

6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/Ax ~~XC~~ 1 B. Prong

XC (T)/EC

Patch III

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I.

February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protests to CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commends SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM
Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer- y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka- than this, in the opinion of se who have been trying to down the exact date of ha's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter- ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili- es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an- vered the telephone at his me at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news- aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder housewife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a inner party to which he was invited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Saturlay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeatdly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or died as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S

DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I dont. I still want name of Agent which [illegible] H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
0-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan
DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

C

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

I shall await results.
H

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible]
[illegible]

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U. S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets CIA is a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in field to be by letter only. H

Attachments - a/s

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed ~~us that RIHA~~ had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

SECRET

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: [illegible]
JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY

~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official who said he was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM/wcw 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA AND HAD HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray AG

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

__ACTION:__

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL ______________________
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

② Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 released.
HSC Sen 94. (8/24/75 ky)
7/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AIM/JMF
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

LFS

8

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N[illegible]: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC **J. T. Elliff**
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-[illegible]

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~TO~~ on Intelligence Activities
~~STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY~~

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

P. V. [illegible] 509 JB

Hand delivered by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD

REC-102

62-116395-262

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

PCM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2001 BY SP2ARM/LMF

MOR-16

62-116395-262

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. 1
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED *(check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.)*

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED *(check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate)*

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION *(provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject)*

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO *(list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.)*

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION *(enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword)*

U

7. KEY WORDS *(enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis)*

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY *(see reverse side before completing this item)*

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

wdc

TREAT AS YELLOW

5

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC-102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975 MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

62-116395

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐ ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

Void after ___ 19

BILL TO **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION WASHINGTON, D.C.**

A3,925,504

The National Airlines Company is requested

to furnish coach (FIRST, COACH, MIXED, CHAIR, ETC.) class air (AIR, RAIL, BUS, ETC.) transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC

to Miami, Florida + Return (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") (SHOW CARRIERS AND JUNCTION POINTS AND WHERE MIXED CLASS SERVICE IS TO BE FURNISHED SPECIFY)

SUCH BETWEEN (CITIES, POINTS)

for use of Lish Whitson ___ and ___ others with ___ (LOWER BERTH, P.C. SEAT, ETC.) accommodations

from ___ to ___ (IF ROUND TRIP SERVICE REQUIRED WRITE "AND RETURN") with authorization

to transport not over ___ lbs. of excess baggage from ___

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, 196

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

The United States of America Transportation Request

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 01/19/2000 BY SP2alm/jmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
Gen'l Accounting Office Regulations No. 123.

PASSED
1491/a
VO
DEC 16 1964

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-16182

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATED 11/14/00 BY SP2 evm/lmf

62-116395-260

MDR-16

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

BILL TO

A 3,991,399

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

The Southern Railroad company is requested
to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC
to Atlanta, Ga. & return via Southern RR

for use of William C. Sullivan and others with accommodations

Place of issue: Washington DC 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

48.95	25.60	74.55
		TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

0500
21-60

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2 PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/[illegible]

MOR-16

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TO: Intelligence Community Staff ATTN: Central Index	FROM: **Federal Bureau of Investigation**

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWF
5-TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

REC- 102

62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/14/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mjc
MDR-16

JAM:mfd (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 [illegible] 2 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair ongoing investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

REC-102

62-116395-258

5-Phillips

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis
1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

JUN 25 1975

PVD:dkg (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 5 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

________________, 1975

___ Director
___ Mr. Callahan
___ Mr. Jenkins
___ Mr. Adams
___ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M ________________

Room __________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Sensitivity '75

Do we have any amplification of this instruction, or, do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrate interpretation K

Item #6 (tabbed) re K

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities"

Should create Congressional furor.

LM
Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

C-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAG
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY 5P2ALM/CNF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

5-EX

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
    Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/MAF
MDR-14

8 4 [illegible] 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. RW ✓ HEM.
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975

TELETYPE

REC-102

Mr Cregar
4123 JEH

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464)~~

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC-102 62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
  Invasion of California State Legislature 6
  Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
  "Free Huey" Campaign 6
  Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
  International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. 7
  Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
  National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
  International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
  Target: Police. 15
  Attacks on Others. 15
  Weapons Caches 16
  "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
  Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
  Editorials 21
  Inflammatory Articles 24
  Provocative Slogans 29
  "Revolutionary Art" 30
  International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING



HUEY PERCY NEWTON



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon , West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**



III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice*, staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts*, and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice*, Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



PAGE [illegible] THE BLACK PANTHER SEPTEMBER [illegible], [illegible]

1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D. C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther,* June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLES FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

"Revolutionary Suicide"

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of "historical" importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.


WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center

Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther,
June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying
Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY- MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, APRIL 3, 1971 PAGE 2

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother'sbody. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke withthe brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting “Get them niggers, get them niggers” They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only appliesmercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, “Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry’ .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Blackyouths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of ammunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party

SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG

FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY

STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY

THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH

ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The *principal of Juche (Self-Reliance)* clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

COMMUNICATION



MOBILITY



INFORMATION

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan,* execute AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or killed. *These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only* one side of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military problem* facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED
D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS



UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.



PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, *and* thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3



COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revlutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in underestimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CAN-NOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what Revolutionary Artist and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people. So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.C.F.,
Washington, D.C.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE
FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


Only the power of the people can free political prisoners
PIG

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any charge of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Laos during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140 million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up 80 per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded 300 million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 45,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vientiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. On June 7, 1970, J.A. Hann[illegible] acknowledged that Laos is the only place where such things [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,5[illegible] U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose command [illegible] (Thailand). U.S. Senator [illegible] on February 27, 197[illegible] [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military adviser [illegible] South Viet Nam in the past. [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. [illegible] troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khouang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 1970 [illegible] the CIA office in [illegible] [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] Laos was [illegible] d. Har[illegible].

With [illegible] there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible]. On March 6, 1970, Senator [illegible] Americans are fighting [illegible]. "The fact that [illegible] wear [illegible] uniforms does [illegible] this one bit. The fact is [illegible] Americans combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting [illegible]"

continued on next page



New textile factory at Sam-Neua

ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-Chinese peoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles of the people of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle of the American people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression on the international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to new heights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the American people as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely and difficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will find fault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW-NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall
DATE: 6/13/75

FROM : J. G. Deegan JGD

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. No specific

62-116395-253

REC-102

Enclosures - 2
62-116395
GTT:eks (10)

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/

JUN 24 1975

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 24 1975

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee wrc

PLM

[illegible]

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2ALM/tmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;

8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;

9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

[illegible] 6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

5-TUNSTALL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmc
MDR-16

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 JUN 27 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

PVD JBH|PVD

WRW|TWL

We should carefully consider fact that Hampton case is subject of pending litigation and coordinate with Dept. instead of being [illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPA/Am/jmf
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2202

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2001 BY SPA ALM/LMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPb alm/jmc

MOR-16

62-116395-
ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

3 per SLP

TO ALL SACS JUNE 11, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 4 1975
TELETYPE

320 A ESF

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

WRW/B

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

PCM

66-116395-

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Sen study - 75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116[illegible]

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

THB:dm (7)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAIM/DMF
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~T O P S E C R E T~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 [illegible]
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 [illegible]

MDR-16

REC-75 62-116395-249

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

8 4 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

SECRET

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/mf
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TJM

memo to Mr Cregar [illegible]
6/17/75 TJM

62-116395-247

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 RUM/MC
MOR-16

84 JUN 23 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

REC- 104 62-116395-245

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/9/2000 BY SP2 ALM/TAM
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)

DATE: 6/5/75

(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

COPY [illegible] PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

62-116395-244

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/9/00 BY SP2 Am/mf

REC-102

(8) MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

JUN 1975

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 23 1975

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/MF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

General

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

Bill

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request (Senstudy-75)

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 Encl

ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

17 JUN 19 1975

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395

84 JUN 1 9 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, CIA

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entiti other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces? M

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces. M

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force? M

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters. M

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O. [illegible]

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

REC- 102

62-116395-239

62-116464

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

17 JUN 19 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP3 RM/mf

84 JUN 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo to Mr. Adams from Legal Counsel
Re: SEANTE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

① - 62-116305

TJM:mjc
(20)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MDR-16

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 19 1975

84 JUN 19 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395

62-116395-237

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

CONTINUED - OVER

MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel to the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD WRW/TVL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. [illegible]dams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp ([illegible])

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF
MOR-16

ORIGINAL FILED IN

94-55-40-55

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ____
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC- 102

- 116395 - 236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/lmf
MDR-16

Approved: ____ Sent ____ M Per ____
Special Agent in Charge

U.S. Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 AVM/VMF

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767
201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370
DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0/19/2000 BY SP2 AVM/LMT
MDR-16

62-116395-231A

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated [illegible]/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2pwm/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:1gp
(7)

WRW TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 Alm/lmf

MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

84 AUG 11 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 Am/lmk

MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

PLM WVC

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2006 BY SP2
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10   5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

2

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz   DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395-

Enclosure

AFW:dsh dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

62-116395-235

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM 197 SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPQ AW/HMF
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant (OR EMPLOYEE), the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2alm/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-235

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

Wannall to Mintz memo 4/9/75 [illegible]

memo Wannall to Mintz to AFW:dsh 4/11/75

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

MOR-16

JUN 18 1975

84 JUN 19 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : MR. CALLAHAN
DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] [illegible] 4/1/75

REC-100

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MOF

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland 1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94-181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975

Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported without amendment

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2 alm/lsm/lmf
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

Senstudy -75

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so ~~that Nichols may~~ consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20

JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly

1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PUD JBH/PUD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ADM/MAF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, comm. rules.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 197. [illegible] comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~
of decision

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written doc~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

File #:

62-116395

Serial Scope:

231 THRU 235

236 THRU 1ST NR 237

1ST NR 238, 239

241, 242

244, 245

247

249, 1ST NR 249

252 THRU 254

255 THRU 260

262 THRU 265

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88614 Date: 03-18-2025

Alan G. Sentinella

May 21, 1975

The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood

Sent to H 6/9/75
SENSTUDY
Att: K. William O'Connor
Intelligence Coordination

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-265

to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were

assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

A. None.

Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted

to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

See attached pages ITEM II

Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison.

A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto ~~to that time which~~ it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

Q. Why would Harding know this information?

A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

A. Yes.

Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

A. I did not.

Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

A. Richard Hamilton.

Q. When did he assume these cases?

A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

A. Yes, he was.

Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

A. It did not develop any such information.

Q. How did you know of what~~ever~~ their CP affiliation may have been?

A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

A. I did not have the cases at that time.

Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

A. Yes.

Q. How?

A. From information in the appropriate file.

Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances,

airtels, letters, memoranda?

A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

Q. What was the ~~j~~gist of such communications?

A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

A. No.

Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign.

A. I have no such recollection.

Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned. ← SEE ITEM I. of attached pages

Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

Q. William Sullivan, who was formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

Q. Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Court Seal [JFK Law 10(a)1]

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q.

A.

Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

Q. Kitchen floor?

A. Yes.

Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy ~~had~~ changed it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation. See ITEM III of attached pages.

Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights ~~complications~~ Complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

See ITEM IV of attached pages

A. ~~Yes.~~ I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

Q. What about prior to 1965?

A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having KLAN ~~King~~ connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

A. Yes, I did not have any such contact.

Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were ~~or~~ that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category.

I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

A. That is correct.

Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

A. No.

Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

A. A number of different gentlemen, some of whom were periodically transferred.

Q. Who were some of those?

A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

A. Henry Rouse.

Q. Where is he now?

A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

Q. Recently testimony was given be one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

A. It is not my recollection that they did.

Q. What about a Klan organization?

A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceiably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

A. I do not know.

THIS WOULD READ BETTER IF MOVED TO PAGE 19

It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued.

Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted

such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Siedel he was not asking him to make any changes. He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened, Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

→ FROM P 18

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

June 9, 1975

The Attorney General

1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

Director, FBI

Senstudy-75

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACT

Reference is made to my letter dated May 22, 1975, forwarding a memorandum concerning an interview by a Staff Member of captioned Committee of retired FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella.

Enclosed is the original of a memorandum concerning testimony subsequently given by Mr. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the Committee. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures - 2

for info. only; Per J. Aldhizer's instructions, 5 copies of this interview sent to OPR - Dept of Justice.
11/22/76 - JCB

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-31-80 BY SP165K/JG

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw KW
(14)

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Rm. 4509 JB

REC- 102

Hand carried to AG 6-10-75

62-116395-265

TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DECLASSIFIED BY SP4JAM/lls
ON 2-20-81
6076

62-116395

June 9, 1975 1-Mr.W.O.Cregar

1-Mr.S.F.Phillips

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: TESTIMONY OF RETIRED FBI
SPECIAL AGENT (SA) BEFORE
SSC EXECUTIVE SESSION

Reference is made to the memorandum of this Bureau dated May 22, 1975, reporting a statement voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Alan G. Sentinella, a retired SA of the FBI. That statement concerned the interview of Sentinella by an SSC Staff Member on May 12, 1975.

Pursuant to a subpoena, Mr. Sentinella testified before an Executive Session of the SSC on May 21, 1975, after which he voluntarily furnished the FBI a statement concerning his testimony. Set out below is the verbatim text of that statement.

CLASS. & EXT. BY SD16SK/pa 10/31/80
REASON-FCIM II, ~~1-2 4.2~~ 3
DATE OF REVIEW 6-9-95

"Alan G. Sentinella"

"May 21, 1975

"The following represents the writer's recollection of testimony given this date before the Senate Select Committee (SSC) pursuant to subpoena. The session commenced at 10 a.m. 5/21/75 in Room 607, former Caroll Arms Hotel. Present was Senator Robert Morgan (North Carolina); Lester B. Seidel, Staff Member; Mr. Jack Smith, Staff Member; Mr. John Bailey, Assistant Minority Counsel, and a male reporter. Senator Morgan placed the writer under oath. Approximately four or five minutes later Senator Morgan excused himself with a general statement to the effect he had other pressing matters. The entire proceedings with only two exceptions were conducted by Lester B. Seidel.

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
aboratory ___
an. & Eval. ___
. Inv. ___
ing ___
Coun. ___
one Rm. ___
r Sec'y ___

1 - 67-432832 (Personnel File Former SA Alan G. Sentinella)
1 - 100-106670 (Martin Luther King, Jr.)
1 - 100-392452 (Stanley David Levison)

SFP:ekw ekw (13)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

JBA 62-116395-265

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Seidel explained the writer was entitled to counsel, had the privilege of invoking provisions of the Fifth Amendment, and would have the privilege of making an opening and closing statement. Seidel inquired whether the writer understood his rights and the Committee's rules and regulations, a copy of which he had made available.

'The writer acknowledged receipt of the Committee's rules and regulations as furnished by Seidel at 9:31 a.m. 5/21/75. He also acknowledged he had been informed of the right to counsel but inasmuch as this Committee was not understood to constitute a grand jury and in the absence of any charges or allegations of a violation of law on his part, he did not insist on the presence of counsel.

"Seidel was advised that as a former Special Agent the writer had contacted the Bureau's Legal Counsel Division and as of this date had been advised by Mr. Paul Daly thereof that he had been cleared by the Attorney General (AG) to testify to matters relating to investigation of Martin Luther King, Jr., Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and Stanley Levison.

'Seidel was advised that during his interview of the writer in Atlanta, Georgia, on 5/12/75 he had asked a question as to how long after the assassination of King did the telephone surveillance continue on the King residence. On 5/12/75 the writer responded it was his recollection this coverage continued until a short time subsequent to the assassination. Following that interview, the writer recalled that either shortly before or shortly after that case was assigned to the writer, the King family had moved from one residence to another and that continuation of the telephone surveillance from the former residence to the latter one was not authorized. Secondly, Seidel on 5/12/75 had asked when the King and SCLC cases were assigned to the writer, the writer recalled such assignment was in the early part of 1965; that it was now the writer's recollection this assignment was made in May, 1965.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

"Set forth below are questions asked by Seidel (unless otherwise indicated) and the writer's answers. These questions and answers are not set forth chronologically.

"Q. Why was continuance of the telephone surveillance not continued to the Kings' new residence?

"A. Continuance was not authorized by the AG.

"Q. What telephone surveillance was there conducted by Atlanta of Stanley Levison?

"A. There was no such coverage per se only such as afforded by contacts made of King or members of the SCLC staff by Levison.

"Q. Was there telephone surveillance of Levison in New York?

"A. Any contacts of King by Levison while in New York would have been covered.

"Q. Did the New York Office maintain telephone surveillance of Levison?

"A. I do not directly know.

"Q. During the Atlanta interview you indicated you had read New York reports concerning Levison. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. During Atlanta interview you indicated you presumed these reports set forth information concerning Levison from a telephone surveillance. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for your presumption?

CONFIDENTIAL

"A. The appropriate administrative portion of such report would have so indicated.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections did your investigation develop concerning Levison?

"A. None.

"Q. What information did you have establishing CP connection re Levison?

"A. Such information as was set forth in what was then referred to as a characterization of Levison. Such characterization was a part of each report submitted to the Bureau.

"Q. What was the nature of this characterization?

"A. I do not remember the precise language. It is my recollection the statement was brief and set forth information establishing past and/or present CP affiliation by Levison.

"Q. Where did you obtain this characterization?

"A. A characterization of an individual or organization at that time was prepared by the field office concerned, submitted to Bureau Headquarters for its approval, and such was made available to offices having a need-to-know this information.

"Q. What was the source of this information regarding Levison?

"A. I do not recall that I was ever apprised thereof. A characterization would not indicate the source of the information, unless public source information was utilized, otherwise the reliability or lack thereof of the source or sources would be indicated but not their identity.

"Q. What prompted you today to amend your answer on May the 12th '75 as to how long telephone surveillance continued on the King residence? Did you seek the advice or an answer from someone?

~~IDENTIAL~~

"A. Only to the extent that subsequent to May the 12th I conferred with a former Agent, Charles Harding. Prior thereto it had concerned me, that my initial answer to that question for some reason did not impress me as being completely correct. I mentioned this to Harding and he informed me that my answer was incorrect and mentioned the change in the King residence and the fact coverage had not been thereafter authorized. When he informed me of this I immediately recalled the change in residence which previously had escaped my memory.

"Q. Why would Harding know this information?

"A. For a period of time he was in a supervisory capacity.

"Q. Was he in a supervisory capacity when the change in residence was made?

"A. He was in a relief supervisory capacity at that time.

"Q. Why did you rely on Harding's recollection? Is his recollection better than yours?

"A. I am not suggesting his recollection is better or worse than mine. What he said to me merely served to jog my memory upon which I based my earlier statement today.

"Q. You recall when I interviewed you in Atlanta most of my questions were taken from prepared notes?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You recall that I told you that I would make notes during the interview in order that I might later refresh my recollection as to your testimony?

"A. Yes, and Mr. Seidel, you recall that I did not take any notes (to which he answered in the affirmative).

"Q. Did you make any recording of that interview at the time?

"A. I did not.

"Q. Did you make any subsequent written recording of the interview?

"A. Yes, I did so for my personal information.

"Q. Is such writing available to this Committee?

"A. I consider it a personal item for my personal use. I realize that you have the perogative of subpoenaing it. In the absence thereof, I prefer not to make it available.

"Q. How long after King's assassination did the telephone surveillance of SCLC continue?

"A. I cannot be certain. It continued for a period of time which may have been one, two, possibly three months. I simply do not remember.

"Q. Who handled SCLC and Levison case after you left the Bureau?

"A. Richard Hamilton.

"Q. When did he assume these cases?

"A. I cannot recall precisely. I am not even sure whether they had been administratively reassigned to him prior to my departure.

"Q. Who else besides Stanley Levison was in contact with King who you understood to have some type of CP connections?

"A. There was Hunter Pitts O'Dell, Bayard Rustin, and Harry Wachtel.

"Q. Hunter Pitts O'Dell, the same as Jack O'Dell?

"A. Yes, he was.

"Q. What evidence of CP connections or domination by Moscow of O'Dell, Rustin, Wachtel, did your investigation develop?

"A. It did not develop any such information.

"Q. How did you know of what their CP affiliation may have been?

"A. In the same manner as in regard to Levison.

"Q. What investigation did Atlanta conduct of O'Dell, Rustin, and Wachtel?

"A. There was no active ongoing investigation conducted of these individuals other than during such periods when they were in contact with King or members of SCLC.

"Q. Was Coretta King ever the target of an electronic surveillance?

"A. Not to my knowledge beyond such coverage as might have occurred from the telephone surveillance when it applied to the King residence or on such occasions when she might have been present in SCLC headquarters.

"Q. Do you know when the telephone surveillance of King and SCLC were initiated?

"A. I did not have the cases at that time.

"Q. Did you not learn of such information while you had these cases?

"A. Yes.

"Q. How?

"A. From information in the appropriate file.

"Q. What communication transpired between the Bureau and Atlanta relative to the initiation of these telephone surveillances, airtels, letters, memoranda?

"A. I am certain there were airtels, letters, possibly teletypes in the file.

"Q. What was the gist of such communications?

"A. Advisement that such installation had been authorized, instructions to initiate the coverage.

"Q. Who installed the surveillances, Al Miller; was he not a technician, a wireman?

"A. Your answer to that question is not entirely correct. Alden Miller was an Atlanta Agent who had certain technical ability. It is my recollection the surveillance was installed by an Agent who was not from the Atlanta Office. I do not remember his name.

"Q. Did you monitor any of these surveillances?

"A. No.

"Q. Did you monitor any such surveillance during this period of time?

"A. Yes. I recall on two occasions filling in for another employee in connection with telephone surveillance of the headquarters of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. I did not monitor the King or SCLC telephone surveillance.

"Q. What was the nature of the investigation of SNCC?

"A. To determine communist influence of that organization.

"Q. What is your recollection of the Bureau's efforts to influence any political campaign?

"A. I have no such recollection.

"Q. What about efforts to disrupt the political campaign of Senator Andrew Young?

"A. I do not know of any such efforts. It's my recollection that Andrew Young did not become actively involved in politics during the period of time with which we are concerned.

"Q. What about Julian Bond's campaign? Any effort to influence that?

"A. No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

"Q. What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

"A. None to my knowledge beyond such coverage as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

"Q. In same manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature. My answer was that my only concern had been with former Governor Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the Pickrick restaurant.

"Q. Did a former Bureau official William Sullivan visit Atlanta during this period?

"A. There were two Sullivans in an official capacity with the Bureau.

"Q. William Sullivan, whowas formerly connected with intelligence matters at the Bureau. Did you ever meet him?

"A. Yes. I met him on several occasions during the 1950s. I do not recall any contact with him during the period with which we are presently concerned.

"Q. After you received the King, SCLC, and Levison cases, what did Mr. Bob Nichols do?

"A. Shortly thereafter he was transferred as a Resident Agent to Valdosta, Georgia.

"Q. Was King given a nickname in the Atlanta Office?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was it?

"A. "Zorro."

"Q. How did that come about?

"A. I believe that began with Mr. Nichols and just passed on down.

"Q. Why was that name selected?

"A. I do not know precisely.

"Q. Don't you have any idea?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What was the basis for it?

"A. As I remember, "Zorro" was either a television or movie character who carried a sword and therefore could be referred to as a swordsman.

"Q. What connection had this with King?

"A. The Reverend King participated in a number of extra-marital relations and therefore it seemed fitting that in the vernacular the reference swordsman applied to him.

"Q. What extra-marital activities were there?

"A. There were several women involved.

"Q. How do you know this?

"A. It was indicated on occasions by conversations.

"Q. How?

"A. By reference to a previous escapade with an individual or to one pending.

"Q. Can you give an example of such reference?

"A. There is only one particular conversation that comes to mind at the moment and I have no recollection with whom the conversation was held; during which reference was made to a wonderful sermon they had preached together on somebody's kitchen floor.

"Q. Kitchen floor?

"A. Yes.

"Q. What surreptitious entry was made in respect to the King residence or SCLC headquarters?

"A. During the period I was concerned with these cases there was none.

"Q. Supposing an Agent wanted some item from either location to use against King or SCLC. Would he not have made a surreptitious entry to obtain it?

"A. No such entry was made at any time to my knowledge. I say this very firmly because the Bureau policy before the late 1950s concerning such a technique had changed.

"Q. (By Jack Smith) What do you mean by saying this policy had changed?

"A. During my period with the Bureau, from the beginning, such activity had to be approved by the Bureau. With reference to the period of time when the policy changed, it changed to the extent that obtaining authority therefore was virtually impossible.

"Q. Prior to 1965 in what way were you involved in any surreptitious entry?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I stated earlier I have been informed that I was released by the AG to testify before this Committee concerning King, SCLC, Stanley Levison, and matters related thereto.

"Q. Did you develop any information establishing CP connection on the part of King?

"A. Not beyond his affiliation with Levison and the other individuals previously mentioned.

"Q. What was the objective of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. To determine possible communist influence of King and SCLC.

"Q. If, as you state, you did not develop information that King was a communist, was not this investigation in vain?

"A. Not in my opinion. It is correct it did not establish that King was a CP member. It did establish that he was in contact with individuals then having past or present CP affiliation which was the objective of the investigation.

"I cannot be certain - I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

"Q. Do you remember during 1963 King alleged that Bureau Agents were not responsive to civil rights complaints in the vicinity of Albany, Georgia, and other South Georgia locations?

"A. Yes, I recall news media information concerning such allegations.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"Q. In response to these allegations by King, do you remember that Mr. Hoover became very concerned with King's allegations?

"A. Yes. I definitely remember the news media indicating that Mr. Hoover was extremely upset.

"Q. You have stated you were assigned to King and SCLC case in May, 1965, is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. You previously stated these cases were initiated 12 months or perhaps a little longer prior to your receiving them. Is that correct?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was there not then a connection between Director Hoover's concern with King's statements in 1963 regarding lack of attention to civil rights matters in South Georgia by the Bureau and the initiation of the investigation of King and SCLC?

"A. I did not discuss that matter with Mr. Hoover or with any Bureau official.

"Q. Do you deny there was any such connection?

"A. I cannot deny that there might have been such a connection. This was a situation in which I recall the news media on more than one occasion suggested such to be the case.

"Q. From 1965 until 1971 was there any electronic surveillance of any other individual or organization in addition to King, SCLC, and SNCC?

"A. To the best of my recollection there were none except as may have pertained to some strictly criminal investigations with which I had no connection.

"Q. What about prior to 1965?

"A. There was one concerning an individual or individuals having Klan connections believed to have been involved in an earlier church bombing, I believe in Birmingham, involving the death of several children.

"Q. During our interview in Atlanta you stated you did not have any contact with members of the news media or clergy regarding King or SCLC. Is that correct?

"A. Yes. I did not have any such contact.

"Q. What discussion was had with members of the Atlanta Police Department concerning King, SCLC, and Levison, and what was the extent of their electronic coverage regarding these matters?

"A. During the period of time I was concerned with King, SCLC, Levison, I had no discussion with any member of the Atlanta Police Department concerning these matters. Bureau instructions regarding these matters were that any discussion was on a strictly need-to-know basis and I have absolutely no recollection that members of the Atlanta Police Department fitted into this category. I do not have any knowledge as to what electronic surveillance may ever have been conducted by the Atlanta Police Department.

"Q. While in Atlanta you were assigned to what was referred to as the Security and Racial Squad, is that correct?

"A. That is correct.

"Q. Essentially this squad was concerned with security matters, racial matters, is that correct?

"A. Yes and it was also concerned with civil rights violations and election law violations.

"Q. In regard to civil rights and election law matters, did you ever develop any information pertinent to the CP?

"A. No.

"Q. What Agents do you remember were assigned to that squad? Charles Harding, Arthur Murtagh?

"A. Yes. Those two, Alden Miller, Richard Hamilton, Richard Davis, Donald Burgess, Randall McGough, Timothy Dorsch, Charles Haynes.

"Q. Who monitored the King and SCLC surveillance?

"A. A number of different gentlemen, some of them were periodically transferred.

"Q. Who were some of those?

"A. Donald Burgess, Richard Davis, Brian O'Shea, now deceased.

"Q. Who served in a supervisory capacity before Charles Harding?

"A. Henry Rouse.

"Q. Where is he now?

"A. I understand he retired, I do not know where he is located.

"Q. What was your involvement with the Bureau's program referred to as COINTELPRO?

"A. Mr. Seidel, as I endeavored to explain on May 12, your use of that particular terminology did not register with me at all.

"Q. Recently testimony was given by one or more Bureau officials indicating this program began during the late 1950s and continued to a fairly recent date. Did not your reports regarding King, SCLC, or Levison include in their caption COINTELPRO?

"A. It is not my recollection that they did.

"Q. What about a Klan organization?

"A. I did at various times handle investigations concerning individual Klan members. I did not handle the Klan as an organizational matter. It is my recollection that in reporting on the activities of an individual Klan member the character of the case would have been indicated as Ku Klux Klan - Racial Matter.

"I feel compelled to apologize if I appear particularly dense as to the utilization of this phrase COINTELPRO. If it was a program operating over a period of years the only explanation I can offer at this moment is that conceivably some field offices other than Atlanta were initially involved therein. If this was the case, Atlanta may well have been included therein subsequent to my departure.

"Q. (John Bailey) When the telephone surveillance was discontinued on the King residence and on SCLC who took care of that.

"A. I do not know.

"Following a few very general concluding comments by Seidel, the writer was given the opportunity to make a statement. At this point Seidel was advised it was the writer's understanding that the procedures of this Committee provided for a witness to subsequently have opportunity to review the transcript thereof, and that the writer would like to avail himself of this opportunity. Inquiry was made as to whether this could be accomplished via registered or certified mail to preclude unnecessary expense to the Government.

"Seidel responded at some length referring to (Section 6b?) of the Committee's rules and regulations which permitted such review in the Committee's office. Any expense thereof to be borne by the witness. He explained it was not his perogative to amend the Committee's rules and regulations.

"The writer apologized for asking the question and assured Mr. Seidel he was not asking him to make any changes.

CONFIDENTIAL

He submitted that had he been furnished a copy of the Committee's rules and regulations for a period of time no longer than 29 minutes before this Committee convened. Had such been furnished at an earlier date it would not have been necessary to have asked the question.

"The aforementioned session terminated shortly past 1 p.m.

"It should be noted the Committee took a five minute break approximately 12:05 to 12:10 p.m. after which questioning continued."

On June 4, 1975, Sentinella advised the FBI of the following additional information concerning this matter.

Sentinella received a telephone call that day from Seidel who advised him that the transcript of Sentinella's testimony was near completion and that Sentinella would receive a letter advising him it was ready for Sentinella's review, but only in SSC space.

Seidel sought from Sentinella and was furnished names of some FBI personnel who had monitored technical surveillance on King during the pertinent period. Seidel sought information concerning who supervised the King investigation at FBI Headquarters, to which Sentinella replied that he did not know any specifics. Seidel referred back to information from Sentinella both during the original interview and during Sentinella's testimony and Seidel asked why Sentinella had discussed the matter with former FBI Agent Harding. It was Sentinella's reply that he sought Harding's help in order to rectify what he thought was a wrong answer given to Seidel during the initial interview.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: Original and one copy to the AG, copy for forwarding to James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President. Information herein taken from Sentintella's verbatim statement which he voluntarily mailed to S. F. Phillips of the Senstudy 75 Project. The additional information Sentinella furnished 6/4/75 was telephoned by him to Phillips. On that occasion Sentinella also advised that Seidel had inquired of him that day as to whether he had discussed with Phillips the King case after arriving in Washington, D.C., and prior to testifying. Sentinella stated that he had not.

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

[illegible]E: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED

6/13/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC

☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Documents Pertaining to the Huston Plan, Cointelpro and other Practices and Programs

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/74, Appendix C, Part I, Item 7, 8.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"S"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

LIAISON

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

With CIA concurrence, SSC was furnished with copies of documents maintained by the Bureau relating to the disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, with the resultant temporary discontinuance of formal liaison between the FBI and the CIA.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
Fwg

TREAT AS YELLOW

5 - TJM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY [illegible]

MOR-16

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/13/75

Caption of Document: U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE. RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES AND PROGRAMS
HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMEN

Originating Office: FBI 37

Delivered by: Richard T. Taylor, Jr. Date: 8/5/75

Received by:

Title: Exec. Sec.

Appendix C
Part I, #7

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
mor-16

(Additional questions)

ITEM I.

Q: What about JULIAN BOND's Campaign? Any effort to influence that?

A: No. As I recall Bond was already a member of the Georgia legislature by 1964 or 1965.

Q: What electronic surveillance was conducted of Bond?

A: None to my knowledge beyond such coverage ~~of SNCC of which organization he~~ as may have resulted from coverage of SNCC with which Bond was affiliated.

Q: [In some manner a question was asked re other members of the Georgia legislature]. My answer was ~~that~~ - my only concern was then sitting former Governor

62-116395-265

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5/16/2000 BY SP2 PWM/JMC
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

Lester Maddox and my handling of the Civil Rights Act of 1964(?) case involving Maddox and his operation of the PICKRICK restaurant].

ITEM II

Re page 5, first Q. and A. set forth.

It seems this is where Seidel asked a question concerning other source (other than electronic) material re Levison. However, he went on talking and never actually posed a question as such; accordingly it was not answered].

OR

the above may have been related to the last Q. appearing at bottom of page 7.

ITEM III.

I cannot be certain — I may have briefly indicated here that it did not appear King was necessarily aware of the past or present CP connections of these persons.

ITEM IV.

Re page 14 and the answer you inquired about.

I'm sure my answer was as it now appears on page 14, i.e. corrected.

I did not say there was no connection. I'm sure I only introduced the negative when he asked if I would deny there was such connection.

I believe "yes" may have come in here in answering a question raised by your steno.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (SSC)
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Appendix C, Part I, Item number 7, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to the 1969 disappearance of Associate Professor Thomas Riha, University of Colorado, insofar as such memoranda and materials related to: (a) efforts of the FBI to ascertain the identity of confidential sources of the Central Intelligence Agency; and (b) inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, then President of the University of Colorado. Item number 8, requested all memoranda and other materials relating to actions by the Director or any other official of the FBI severing liaison (formal, informal, or other) or terminating contact (formal, informal, or other) between personnel of the FBI and personnel of the Central Intelligence Agency. Pursuant to these requests there are enclosed copies of 13 FBI communications.

In connection with your request for memoranda pertaining to inspections and administrative inquiries relating to the disclosure of information to Dr. Joseph R. Smiley, a search of the files of the FBI at Washington, D. C., and Denver, Colorado, does not indicate that any such inspections or administrative inquiries took place.

RLM:mam
(8)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO & THREE

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

ENCLOSURE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____ RLM
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-116395-264

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

With reference to the information furnished by Dr. Joseph R. Smiley contained in the communication from the Special Agent in Charge, El Paso, to the Director of the FBI, dated May 8, 1970, your specific attention is directed to the restrictions placed by Dr. Smiley on the information furnished by him. On June 4, 1975, Dr. Smiley was recontacted, at which time he advised that under no circumstances would he testify in public to the information which he originally furnished to the FBI on a confidential basis. He further advised that under no circumstances would he reveal the identity of his contact in the Central Intelligence Agency referred to in the May 8, 1970, communication. He agreed to the release of the information in the May 8, 1970, communication to the SSC on a strictly confidential basis, for its use only and not for any further dissemination. Dr. Smiley stated he has no information other than that in the May 8, 1970, communication.

Enclosures (13)

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

Concurrence to pass the 2/26/70 letter, with Secret enclosures, from Richard Helms, then Director of CIA, to J. Edgar Hoover, then Director of FBI, was obtained by Liaison Officer Leon F. Schwartz from Walter Elder, CIA on 6/10/75. The response to requests set forth in Appendix C, Part I, Item numbers 7 and 8 is being made in the same communication to avoid unnecessary duplication since the severing of liaison with CIA grew out of the RIHA matter.

NOTE CONTINUED PAGE THREE

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE HUSTON
PLAN, COINTELPRO, AND OTHER PRACTICES
AND PROGRAMS

HUSTON PLAN AND RELATED DEVELOPMENTS

NOTE CONTINUED:

A. W. Gray memorandum to W. C. Sullivan, 5/6/70, states "our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958." This information only appears on the cover page of the report of SA Daniel J. Griffin, dated, 8/31/60 at Boston. The information was furnished by Riha during interview on 8/11/60 and has never been given to us by CIA.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 13, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. L. Moore

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

By letter dated May 14, 1975, with attached appendices, the SSC requested certain information and documents from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are the original of a memorandum and enclosures which serve as a response to two of the SSC requests.

A copy of the memorandum with enclosures is being furnished for your records.

Enclosures (28)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RLM:mam
(9)

RLM

8/15 Delivered To [illegible] Meeting [illegible]

REC- 102

62-116395 - 264

17 JUN 25 1975

~~SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED~~

RLM

Dir.
AD Adm.
AD Inv.
Syst.
Affairs
& Com.

JUN 25 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

TE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☒ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/9/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

Provided to Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting testimony given by former FBI Special Agent Alan G. Sentinella before an Executive Session of the SSC.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Intelligence activities, domestic

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Testimony covered former FBI investigation of:

1) Martin Luther King, Jr.
2) Stanley David Levison
3) Southern Christian Leadership Conference

5-18

TREAT AS YELLOW

SFP:lhb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.
6-24-75 LFS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

~~XC~~ 3/Ar

~~XC~~

B. Prong

XC ① /FC

Patch III

Assembly

264

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVE[illegible]ENT

Memorandum

O : DIRECTOR, F.B.I. February 12, 1970

ROM : SAC, DENVER

UBJECT: THOMAS RIHA

On the late afternoon of February 10, 1970, I was called by MIKE TODOROVICH, who is in charge of the CIA office here in Denver. TODOROVICH stated he has instructions from his Washington Office to contact Denver District Attorney JAMES MC KEVITT and tell MC KEVITT that CIA Agent JOHN D. FRITZ who is stationed in Boulder, Colorado, had told Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, former President of the University of Colorado, that FRITZ had been told that THOMAS RIHA's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that RIHA was, in fact, all right. TODOROVICH then told me that FRITZ got this information from an FBI Agent in Boulder.

I told TODOROVICH to give me the name of the FBI Agent and he stated he would not do so. He then stated the FBI Agent told him, TODOROVICH the same thing. I again requested the name of the Agent. He again declined to give it to me. I very emphatically told TODOROVICH that until he gave me the name of the Agent who supposedly gave him and FRITZ this information, that I would not believe that either he or FRITZ had been given any information such as this by any Agent of this Bureau and this was based on the fact that no Agent would have any reason whatsoever to make such a statement since we had not conducted any investigation in this matter nor did we have any information concerning RIHA and, therefore, we would not be in a position to make such a statement as to whether or not RIHA was all right.

I then also pointed out to Mr. TODOROVICH that if he gave the information to Mr. MC KEVITT and advised Mr. MC KEVITT the information had come from an FBI Agent and if Mr. MC KEVITT contacted me I would certainly advise him that the information did not come from anyone in the FBI for the same reasons as set forth above.

I am enclosing, for the Bureau's information, an article which appeared in the February 11, 1970, issue of The Rocky Mountain News, a Denver newspaper. The article is captioned "Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha."

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Towards the end of the article it reports that MC KEVITT had received an official denial from "a Washington source" that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the RIHA case actually had any knowledge of where RIHA is now. The source, according to the article which MC KEVITT refused to identify, also said RIHA was not involved in espionage of any sort and that none of these agencies have ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver, or elsewhere that RIHA was alive and well.

The article points out the most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, CIA, Military Intelligence agencies and the U. S. INS.

Also enclosed is an article which appeared in the Rocky Mountain News for February 12, 1970. This article is captioned "Riha case investigators' theories might be altered."

For the information of the Bureau, we only have two resident agents in Boulder, Colorado, and I have personally contacted each of them and each has assured me both verbally and by memorandum that they have not made such statements as were attributed to them by TODOROVICH. Not only that, neither of the two has ever had any contact personally or otherwise with JOHN D. FRITZ, the CIA representative in Boulder.

This information is being forwarded to the Bureau only for information in view of CIA's actions in connection with this matter.

1. Protest to CIA re Todorovich's actions
2. Commend SAC re his handling of Todorovich.

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Riha case investigators' theories might be altered

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder woman's belief that she talked to Thomas Riha last March 17, as revealed Wednesday by the Rocky Mountain News, may have altered investigators' theories about what happened to the missing history professor and when it may have happened.

While avoiding specifics about their theories, Boulder police investigators expressed interest Wednesday in knowing more about the housewife's recollection that she telephoned Riha and carried on a 10-minute conversation with him shortly before noon that Monday, the day when he first failed to show up for his classes at the University of Colorado.

When told this by the News Wednesday, the woman said she would telephone the police department and volunteer her information.

Apparently, the woman's story proved startling to the two investigators who have been assigned fulltime to the Riha case, just as it did to many friends and neighbors of the professor, most of whom have said their last contacts with Riha were no later than the previous Thursday or Friday.

Phone survey

There has been speculation that whatever happened to him happened as early as that Friday night.

But the Boulder housewife, who was making a telephone survey at the time, told the News she is certain she talked to Riha on Monday, March 17.

She further insisted he seemed calm, relaxed and cheerful at the time.

If the woman is correct, police investigators conceded, it could well force them to revise their current theories about the case.

CIA agent

In another development, a Denver-based agent of the Central Intelligence Agency insisted the CIA has never been involved in any way with the case since Riha disappeared.

The agent, Michael M. Todorovich, insisted it hadn't been he who gave assurances to former CU president Joseph Smiley, Denver police chief George Seaton or other officials last spring that Riha was alive and well.

Such reported assurances, coupled with great reluctance on the part of these officials to elaborate on how they got them, have become the center of a major mystery in the strange case.

Todorovich further denied having discussed the matter with anyone, and stated emphatically that it "is entirely out of our jurisdiction."

Nevertheless, at least one official in the area is known reliably to have received his assurances from Todorovich himself.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

20 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-12-70
Edition: Home
Author: Alan Cunningham
Editor: Jack Foster
Title: THOMAS RIHA

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Boulder housewife sure she talked to Riha

By ALAN CUNNINGHAM

Rocky Mountain News Writer

A Boulder housewife is certain she talked to Thomas ha on the telephone last March 17, the day he first led to show up for his history classes at the Univer-y of Colorado.

What is even more remarka-e than this, in the opinion of ose who have been trying to down the exact date of ba's disappearance, is the man's insistence that Riha s cheerful, relaxed and inter-ted in chatting about a local litical issue.

The woman, who asks that she t be identified by name, has ld the News she was in the ocess of telephoning a list of ulder citizens last March, eking support for a proposed ection on whether the city ould take over its public utili-es.

While she had been involved the issue for several weeks, e is sure it was on Monday, arch 17, that she attempted to ach a dozen people whose mes began with the letters P" and "R." Among the three four whom she was able to ach that day, she insists, was homas Riha. She says he an-vered the telephone at his ome at 11:30 a.m.

The professor seemed calm, leasant and quite interested in e municipal issue, according the Boulder housewife. In ct, she explained, his name as on the list because he had arlier sent in a reader survey ballot" from a Boulder news-aper which related to the issue.

As a result, Riha struck her as more informed on it than most others she had talked to in her telephone inquiries, and she believes the conversation lasted about 10 minutes, making it the longest in which she took part that day.

The date, if the Boulder house-vife is correct, is significant, ince Riha reportedly missed a linner party to which he was in-vited the previous night, and ould not be reached on Satur-lay, March 15, by a friend who ried to telephone him repeat-dly.

Many people interested in the case have speculated that Riha eft Boulder, was kidnaped or lied as early as that Friday or Saturday. And the wife of a CU professor who was rumored to have seen Riha on Sunday, the 16th, vigorously dismissed this rumor as untrue when asked about it Tuesday.

But the Boulder housewife who made the series of telephone calls is equally adamant about the date when she talked to Riha. She says she didn't know the man, but recognized his name when a colleague of Riha's started discussing his disappearance at her home the following weekend. She checked, found his name on her calling list, and recalled details of their conversation.

While she didn't write down the date when she made her telephone calls, the woman says she has made detailed inquiries since then — some as recently as this week — to tie in the dates of related events with that of the crucial telephone call.

In Denver Tuesday, Dist. Atty. James D. "Mike" McKevitt told the News he had received an official denial from a Washington source that any of the official agencies which have been named in connection with the case actually had any knowledge of where Riha is now.

The source, which he declined to identify, insisted further that Riha never was involved in espionage of any sort, and that none of these agencies had ever told anyone in Boulder, Denver or elsewhere that Riha was alvie and well.

Most frequently mentioned agencies have been the FBI, the CIA, military intelligence agencies and the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service.

McKevitt also reported no reply yet from former CU President Joseph Smiley in his request that Smiley divulge to McKevitt the exact source of a report to him last spring that Riha was alive.

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

26 Rocky Mountain News
Denver, Colorado

Date: 2-11-70
Edition: Home
Author:
Editor: Jack Foster
Title:
THOMAS RIHA

Following is typewritten clarification of the handwritten comment of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

"I don't. I still want name of our agt which Todorovich gave to Dr. Smiley. H"

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES [illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan S DATE: 2-18-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On 2/10/70, SAC Werner, Denver, demanded that Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver, identify Bureau Agent who allegedly told a CIA officer that the subject's disappearance was merely a marital matter and that subject, in fact, was alright. Todorovich refused to do so. The Director instructed that we protest to CIA regarding Todorovich's actions.

On 2-17-70, Liaison Agent Papich vigorously protested Todorovich's actions to CIA, charging the Agency with impeding our inquiry. He pointed out that Todorovich's stubborn refusal to divulge the identity of the Bureau Agent involved was unacceptable because we had no information to support the statement attributed to our Agent. As a result of Papich's protest, a CIA official telephoned Todorovich and demanded that he divulge the identity of the Agent. Todorovich refused and stated that he considered this a matter of personal honor and that unless there was reason to believe Bureau operations were being adversely effected, he would not make the identification. CIA officials subsequently advised the Liaison Agent that they had reviewed the entire case and learned that District Attorney McKevitt publicly stated on 2-14-70 that the statement attributed to Dr. Smiley (which allegedly came to him via Todorovich from our Agent) was based on an "honest mistake" and that McKevitt felt this cleared the air and no further clarification was needed.

ACTION:

None. For information.

I don't. I still want [illegible] [illegible] Agent [illegible] [illegible]
H.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 2-20-70

FROM : D. J. Brennan

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to memorandum dated 2-18-70 from D. J. Brennan to Sullivan. The Director stated that he wants the name of the FBI Agent who had furnished certain information to Mike Todorovich, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) representative, Denver. The Liaison Agent met with Richard Helms, Director, CIA, on 2-20-70, repeating the background of this matter and reiterated the protest made earlier by the Bureau and asked that CIA obtain the identity of the FBI Agent.

Helms advised that he considered this a most serious development and fully recognizes the gravity of the situation since it has such a significant bearing on relations between the two agencies and the highly important work of both organizations. He stated that he does not have the identity of the FBI Agent and so far Todorovich has refused to disclose same. Helms advised that he is requesting Todorovich to proceed to Washington, D. C., immediately at which time he will be interviewed in detail by Helms. In the meantime, the CIA Director is requesting his subordinates to prepare for him a complete report covering all information in possession of CIA regarding the subject. He stated that he will communicate with the Bureau immediately after talking to Todorovich. He stated that it was absolutely necessary that he make certain that he has all the relevant facts so that he can accurately respond to the Director and take the proper and necessary administrative action within his own organization.

ACTION:

For information.

I shall await words
H

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-104

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: February 25, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

On February 24, 1970, James Angleton, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that Richard Helms had instructed him to transmit the following message to the Director.

Pursuant to instructions from Helms, Mike Todorovich, CIA representative in Denver, arrived in Washington, D. C., on February 24, 1970, and Helms initiated his interview. Helms expects to complete the interview including an examination of various CIA records within two days, upon the completion of which he will be transmitting a personal letter to the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "Werner acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. Papich has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. Michael Todorovich. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to Dr. Joseph Smiley, then President of Colorado University, Boulder, Colorado, now President of a university in El Paso, Texas, and to the District Attorney of Denver, Mr. James McKevitt. In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. Todorovich to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. Todorovich and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. Todorovich was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. Todorovich maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. Todorovich explained that the Riha/Galya Tannenbaum cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

The purpose of Mr. Todorovich's conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on Dr. Joseph Smiley. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. Todorovich affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI Special Agent in Charge, Mr. Scott Werner, and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. Werner to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Werner acted properly. H

Mr. Todorovich states that Mr. Werner refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. Werner engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. Todorovich. Subsequently, Mr. Todorovich conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding Dr. Smiley and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. Todorovich. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to Dr. Smiley and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. Todorovich, I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. Todorovich.

~~SECRET~~

I do not agree. Todorovich violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent [illegible] [illegible]

While the following is not pertinent to your request, my review of this case suggests the advisability of a re-examination of Riha's disappearance and past activities and, necessarily, the Tannenbaum case. Briefly, since 1958 we have communicated to your Bureau significant information which relates to Riha's involvement with Czech and Soviet intelligence services, when he was behind the Iron Curtain. I attach for your information and convenience copies of pertinent reports regarding this aspect of the case.

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Helms forgets Riha is a two way street. H

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachments - a/s

This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contacts with CIA in Washington to be handled strictly by letter. H

~~SECRET~~

ATTACHMENT

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. The January 1970 receipt of information from your Bureau that Mrs. Ruth Ann COOK, Thomas RIHA's mother, had mentioned rumors of her son's work for CIA in letters to the SAC, Denver, caused us to verify the fact RIHA has never been employed or used operationally by this Agency.

2. In 1958 and 1959 you were provided information that RIHA, when transitting Prague en route to Moscow, was contacted by Czech Intelligence and asked to remain in the CSR. Later in 1958 Czech Intelligence introduced RIHA to the KGB in Moscow and our source reported RIHA accepted certain privileges from the KGB while asserting he would not become a spy for the Soviets. Details reported by our source about RIHA's KGB contacts did not emerge during a 1960 FBI interview of RIHA.

3. This indication that RIHA may not have been truthful in 1960, when added to our current knowledge about KGB interest in recruiting American exchange students and RIHA's 1968 trip to the USSR, suggests the circumstances of RIHA's disappearance might be re-evaluated. This Agency is reopening its file on this case in view of the information disclosed in the attachments.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

COPY

27 October 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of Security
Department of State

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. The following report concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect the repatriation of Subject, a naturalized American East-West Exchange student, to his country of origin was recently submitted by a source of this office.

2. Source first became acquainted with Subject during the past year at The Russian Research Center, Harvard University. On 10 September 1958 he ran into Subject by chance at the SAS office in Vienna as the two boarded a SAS flight to Copenhagen via Duesseldorf. During the trip Subject disclosed the following to source which has been supplemented from information from our files.

3. RIHA, who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia 17 April 1929, is one of the twenty American students selected for the East-West Exchange Program and will be studying in the USSR for the 1958-59 academic year. Files in this Agency indicate that RIHA arrived in the U. S. on 15 July 1947 and became a citizen in 1952.

4. Our source informed us that RIHA had gone to Prague, June of this year, to see his father and other relatives. His father and mother are divorced and according to information in our files, his mother is listed as Mrs. Ruth A. COOK. address: 2023 Etna Street, Berkeley 4, California.

5. RIHA told our source that when he arrived in Prague he was put into a Government hotel for three days before he was allowed to stay with his relatives and friends. During this time, and perhaps later, RIHA was accompanied through the city by a guide whom he described as a "Government Official" name unknown, who attempted to effect Subject's repatriation to Czechoslovakia. RIHA told our source that this man has set up an appointment (date and address unknown) to meet him in Moscow to talk further.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

6. Subject told our source that this "Government Official" did not mention Czech Intelligence or Security Forces as such and that he (RIHA) is not too worried concerning this contact. RIHA apparently feels that it is the price he must pay in order to study in the Soviet Union and once he gets deeply into his studies in Moscow he feels that he can plead that he is too busy with his academic work to have contact with any officials. Our source also stated that RIHA is in some kind of correspondence with the Czech official. We have no description or name for the Czech official.

7. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office, and that our source be fully protected in the event that contact is made with RIHA.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

Signed: James Angleton

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/751,690

cc: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

~~SECRET~~

COPY

21 April 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT : RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CS CI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958 concerning an attempt by a member of Czech Intelligence to effect Subject's repatriation while the latter was in Prague in June of 1958 visiting relatives en route to study in Moscow during 1958-59 as an East-West Exchange Student. The following report describes further action taken by the KGB in Moscow to cultivate Subject, and was recently submitted by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. Sometime in December 1958, Subject again met the Czech Official who had tried to have Subject repatriate to the CSR in Prague last summer. According to our source, it was apparently an accidental meeting at a Moscow railroad station as the Czech was returning to Prague. The Czech was delighted to see Subject, and introduced him to a Soviet official. This Soviet identified himself only by a first name and a telephone number, both unknown to our source. The Soviet described his work as being in the American Section of the MVD.

3. This Soviet Official has been cultivating Subject (trying to see him as often as possible, sometimes twice a week) since their introduction in December, by offering such blandishments as trips in a chauffered private limousine into forbidden areas outside Moscow, tickets to any entertainment, access to material from previously inaccessible archives, the use of private country villas and all the "beautiful, interesting and intelligent girls" he might want. Subject has further been promised the opportunity of returning to the Soviet Union for as long as he wants at any future date. He would have to pay only his way over there; his expenses and return trip to the US would be paid by the Soviets.

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

~~SECRET~~

4. Subject has taken advantage of this offer to take several trips for sightseeing into forbidden areas around Moscow in a private car with the Soviet Official, and has also taken up a few offers for entertainment. Subject visited one of these villas, but refused the girls on the ground that he wants a woman to like him for himself, and not because she has been told to do so. The Soviet answered that "some of them will really learn to like you for yourself, as well as work for us," but Subject still declined to get involved. However, Subject has recently been taken up by a Soviet girl who had previously tried to seduce another American student and subsequently blurted out that she was put onto the latter American by the MVD, which she has also told Subject. Subject is reported to be responding warmly to her approaches although he has flatly told her he doesn't trust her nor any Russian completely. He claims he enjoys her company but will not have a serious affair with her, and suspects she may be tied up with the other women offered him by the Soviet Official.

5. In his relationship with the Soviet Official, Subject is reportedly aware that he is playing a risky game, and is only utilizing the situation for the comfort and convenience it brings him. He has told the Soviet frankly that he cannot be wom over ideologically. Subject says he feels that the Soviets' interest in him is to cultivate him as a scholar of possible future importance to insure that he will always be sympathetic to the Soviet Union. Subject has reportedly told several other American students of his relationship with the Soviet Official in order to cover himself "in case anything happened".

6. This Soviet Official has evinced an interest to Subject in many of the American Exchange students, with the explanation that some would undoubtedly be back in Moscow within two years as Diplomats and that since this is his area of responsibility, he wants to know as much as possible about them. The Soviet indicated that he was quite aware of the pattern of the American Exchange students' trips to the US Embassy and what they do in the university buildings, but is not so sure of their activities around the city. To demonstrate to Subject his knowledge about the American students, the Soviet Official mentioned an affair going on within the American group of which Subject had been unaware. The Soviet's information turned out to be true.

7. Subject was described by a reliable source, who knows him from group social gatherings at Harvard, as mature and socially vivacious with a warm personality. Subject is a clever and humorous conversationalist who likes to be surrounded by people, make new acquaintances, and develop friendships. Subject's patriotic motivation was not known to our source, but the latter felt that Subject was completely "Americanized" in manners and interests. Our source would guess that Subject has courage.

8. It is requested that no further dissemination be made of this information without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you either before or after his return to the United States.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS

JAMES ANGLETON

CS CI 3/754,303

COPY ~~SECRET~~

2 June 1959

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: RIHA, Thomas

1. Reference is made to our CSCI 3/751,690 of 27 October 1958, and our CSCI 3/754,303 of 14 April 1959 in which are reported the attempt by Czech Intelligence to induce Subject, a Czech-born naturalized American, to repatriate to Czechoslovakia, and the further cultivation of Subject by the KGB in Moscow where Subject is an Exchange Student during 1958-59. The following report describes further action by the KGB to recruit Subject, and his adamant refusal of any such offer. This latest information was recently received from RIHA by a sensitive and reliable source.

2. During April 1959, the Soviet Official ~~who said he~~ was from the American Section of the MVD (sic) and who had been cultivating Subject, allegedly asked the latter to make complete and regular reports on Michael Martin LUTHER, one of the other American Exchange Students at Moscow University. Subject was asked to spend as much time as possible with LUTHER, and to report where he goes, what he does and with whom he associates. If Subject were to do this reporting, the Soviet Official said he would make available certain material from Archives which Subject has been unable to get permission to use although research in this material is vital to his having a successful year academically in Moscow.

3. Subject alleges he flatly refused this "deal", saying that if he ever got mixed up in such a dirty business, it would be for his own side and not for the Communists. The Soviet Official then told Subject he should engage in such observation and reporting to the Soviets to lose some "naivete" about how the United States is exploiting the Cultural Exchange Program for intelligence purposes. To back up this assertion, the Soviet Official told Subject about a "spy nest where spies deposit things for one another" which he said had recently been uncovered near a university entrance frequented by still another American student, Walter CLEMENS, who, the Soviet implied, was not engaged in academic work only while studying at Moscow University.

~~SECRET~~

Group 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

Subject reportedly again adamantly refused to cooperate with the Soviet Official.

4. In paragraph 4 of CSCI 3/754,303, reference was made to a Soviet girl who had become interested in Subject, and whom Subject viewed with suspicion although continuing to see her for her companionship. Her name is Lida (Y)EGOROVA. Subject has now reportedly been alienated by her undependable personality and has pretty well broken up with her. This girl may have left, or soon be leaving, for Prague to join her husband.

5. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this office. It is further requested that such clearance be obtained if Subject is to be contacted by you.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR, PLANS:

[illegible]

James Angleton

CSCI 3/754,373

MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: March 2, 1970

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Reference is made to letter from Richard Helms, Director, CIA, dated February 26, 1970.

Pursuant to instructions the Liaison Agent advised Helms on February 27, 1970, that (1) the Bureau is discontinuing all contact with the CIA office in Denver and (2) that direct Liaison with CIA at headquarters is being terminated. Helms was further told that henceforth our communication with CIA will be by letter only.

ACTION:

Enclosed is a teletype to the Denver Office instructing that all contact with the local CIA office be discontinued.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CODE 3/2/70

TELETYPE

URGENT

TO SAC DENVER

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

THOMAS RIHA, INTERNAL SECURITY - CZECHOSLOVAKIA

IMMEDIATELY DISCONTINUE ALL CONTACT WITH THE LOCAL CIA OFFICE.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI .

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5-5-70

FROM : D. E. Moore DEM wcu 6-4-70

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

At 4:35 p.m., today I telephonically contacted ASAC Morley, Denver, and advised him that an article concerning the Riha case had appeared in the Sunday News (New York) 4-3-70. This article was a general rehashing of the Riha case.

I told him that the Bureau desired that SAC Werner contact the District Attorney to determine the developments of his investigation in this case and also determine what conclusions had been reached. Morley said this would be done.

Morley was asked if Denver had information concerning a professor who had gone to El Paso, Texas, or New Orleans, Louisiana, and he advised this probably referred to Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President at Colorado University who was there when Riha disappeared. He said that Smiley is now President of the University of Texas, at El Paso, Texas. He said Denver had no information that Dr. Smiley has any current information concerning this matter.

SAC Werner called at 5:30 p.m., today to advise that he had been unable to get in touch with the District Attorney but also was following up on this and would contact the District Attorney today and get in a teletype tonight.

ACTION:

For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

NR002 DN PLAIN

5:15 PM URGENT 5-5-70 DCM

TO: DIRECTOR

FROM: DENVER

THOMAS RIHA

REBUTELCAL TODAY.

PURSUANT TO REQUEST IN REBUTELCAL, THIS IS TO ADVISE THE PROFESSOR WHO ALLEGEDLY WENT TO EL PASO OR NEW ORLEANS CONCERNING THOMAS RIHA AND HAD HIS DFISAPPEARANCE IS UNDOUBTEDLY DR. JOSEPH SMILEY , FORMER PRESIDENT, COLORADO UNIVERSITY, BOULDER, COLO., WHO IS NOW PRESIDENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS IN EL PASO, TEXAS.

DR. SMILEY WAS ORIGINALLY CONTACTED BY CIA AND ADVISED BY CIA THAT RIHA WAS ALIVE AND WELL.

AS BUREAU HAS BEEN PREVIOUSLY ADVISED, CIA ATTEMPTED TO ATTRIBUTE THE ABOVE INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA TO THE FBI. HOWEVER, SINCE THERE WAS NO FEDERAL VIOLATION OVER WHICH THE BUREAU HAD INVESTIGATIVE INTEREST, NO FBI INVESTIGATION WAS

REC-35

END PAGE ONE

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

PAGE TWO

CONDUCTED.

DENVER FILES CONTAIN NO FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING RIHA OTHER THAT THAT PREVIOULSY SUBMITTED TO THE BUREAU.

DENVER DISTRICT ATTORNEY JAMES MC KEVITT, GENERALLY KNOWN AS MIKE MC KEVITT, ADVISED TODAY THAT THE INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE CONCERNING THE DISAPPEARANCE OF PROFESSOR RIHA IS AT A STANDSTILL SINCE ALL LEADS HAVE BEEN EXHAUSTED. MC KEVITT STATES THAT HE FEELS GALYA TANNENBAUM, FORMER CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF RIHA, MAY HAVE KILLED HIM IN VIEW OF FACT THAT MC KEVITT'S INVESTIGATION INDICATES THERE WAS A VERY BAD FEELING BETWEEN RIHA AND TANNENBAUM JUST PRIOR TO HIS DISAPPEARANCE DUE TO THE FACT THAT TANNENBAUM WAS FORGING CHECKS ON RIHA'S ACCOUNT.

FULL BACKGROUND CONCERNING TANNENBAUM PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED BUREAU UNDER CAPTION "GALYA TANNENBAUM, AKA, IMPERSONATION," BUFILE UNKNOWN, DENVER FILE FOUR SEVEN DASH THREE ONE NINE ZERO.

MC KEVITT SAID INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALED THAT TANNENBAUM

END PAGE TWO

WAS PROBABLY A NYMPHOMANIAC AND THAT SHE AND RIHA HAD HAD CONSTANT SEXUAL AFFAIRS AND THAT SHE HELD THIS AS A CLUB OVER HIS HEAD IN CONNECTION WITH THE FORGERY OF THESE CHECKS.

IN ANY EVENT MC KEVITT STATES IT IS HIS OPINION THAT RIHA IS DEAD SINCE HIS INVESTIGATION ALSO REVEALS RIHA WAS VERY ATTACHED TO HIS FRIENDS AND MC KEVITT FEELS THAT HE WOULD GET IN TOUCH WITH HIS FRIENDS IF HE WERE ALIVE. MC KEVITT ALSO ADVISES THAT INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE INDICATES RIHA WAS VERY ABNORMAL IN HIS SEXUAL DESIRES AND PURSUITS AND THAT THIS WAS HIS GREAT WEAKNESS; THAT HE COULD NOT LEAVE WOMEN ALONE AND THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT ONE OF THESE INVOLVEMENTS MAY HAVE RESULTED IN HIS DEATH.

IN VIEW OF THE DETAILS AND FACTS SET FORTH ABOVE, ANY INTERVIEW WITH DR. JOSEPH SMILEY IS BEING LEFT TO THE DISCRETION OF THE BUREAU.

END

WJM FBI WA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES G ERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: May 6, 1970

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Pursuant to Director's request Denver District Attorney James "Mike" McKevitt interviewed 5/5/70 as to investigation of Riha, Czechoslovak-born, naturalized, former professor of Russian history at Colorado University, who departed Denver area 3/69 without notifying friends, associates or estranged wife. His disappearance has been glamorized and spiced up in newspaper articles by references to Galya Tannenbaum, his paramour. McKevitt stated investigation at standstill, all leads being exhausted. He feels Tannenbaum may have killed subject since bad feeling developed between them prior to his disappearance due to her forging checks on his account. Further, Tannenbaum probably a nymphomaniac who had constant sexual affairs with Riha and used this as a club over his head to prevent disclosure of forgeries. In McKevitt's opinion Riha is dead since he was close to his friends and if alive would contact them. Investigation indicates Riha abnormal in his sexual desires and could not leave women alone. Possibility exists one of these involvements may have resulted in his death.

Dr. Joseph Smiley, former President, Colorado University, where subject employed, is now President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas. Smiley after subject's disappearance stated subject was alive and well. When challenged by McKevitt to disclose basis for statement he refused and appealed to CIA, his source, for help. Bureau vigorously refuted CIA's claim that Bureau Agent was original source for statement. As result McKevitt publicly announced statement was not true and resulted from "honest mistake." No indication Smiley has any facts to contribute concerning subject's current whereabouts or basis for his disappearance. Since Bureau has conducted no investigation into Riha's disappearance, interview of Smiley could result in impression Bureau entering case. However, if Director so desires, El Paso will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley. Bureau files show subject attended Moscow University 9/58-9/59. Our files show CIA gave Riha a short briefing prior to his entry into USSR in 1958. In 1958-59 CIA advised Czech intelligence attempted to persuade Riha to repatriate and later introduced Riha to Soviet intelligence which attempted his recruitment. After subject's return to US in 1959 no information was developed as to continued interest in him by Soviet intelligence.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
RE: THOMAS RIHA
105-78256

ACTION:

If the Director so desires, El Paso will be furnished background information regarding Riha and will be instructed to interview Dr. Smiley.

Yes.
H.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 5/7/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Rememo A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan, same caption, dated 5/6/70, by which the Director instructed we interview Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas, El Paso, Texas.

At 1:40 p.m., 5/7/70, I telephoned ASAC Jay Cochran, Jr., El Paso, and furnished him background of this matter. I instructed him to have Dr. Smiley contacted immediately, to make it clear that the FBI was not investigating the Riha matter and to inquire of Smiley if he has any new information regarding Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

ASAC Cochran was told to send the results of this interview of Dr. Smiley immediately by teletype to the Bureau. He was also told that in the event Dr. Smiley is out of town or otherwise unavailable for interview, a teletype should be sent immediately to the Bureau advising as to when the interview would be conducted.

ACTION:

None. For record purposes.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan DATE: 5/8/70

FROM : A. W. Gray

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIHA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING

Reference memorandum A. W. Gray to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/6/70, same caption, by which the Director instructed that Dr. Joseph Smiley, President, University of Texas at El Paso, Texas, be interviewed as to any knowledge he possessed concerning Riha's disappearance or current whereabouts.

Dr. Smiley was interviewed 5/7/70 and was most cooperative. Smiley stated since leaving the University of Colorado in 6/69 his knowledge of developments in this case has been derived from articles he has read in "The Denver Post." He speculated Riha may have been involved in intelligence work and based this comment on Riha's being a "loner" and having married a Czech girl. He said he had no evidence to support this speculation. He said that he was aware that one Mrs. Tannenbaum, a woman indicted in Colorado for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of Riha. He concluded that he had no further information concerning either Riha's disappearance or his whereabouts.

ACTION:

For information of the Director.

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

Date: 5/8/70

nsmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

AIRTEL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, EL PASO

SUBJECT: THOMAS RIJA
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
SINO-SATELLITE SECTION

ReButel call to EP, 5/7/70;
EP tel call to Bureau, 5/7/70.

In accordance with the request of the Director, SA FRANCIS J. PRASEK interviewed Dr. JOSEPH SMILEY, President of UTEP. Dr. SMILEY was advised that the FBI has no jurisdiction in this matter, nor is it conducting any active investigation regarding RIJA, and that we were simply desirous of being advised of any new information he may have received regarding RIJA's disappearance and/or present whereabouts.

Dr. SMILEY, who was most gracious and pleasant, stated that he left the University of Colorado, Boulder Colorado, in 6/69, and has since that time followed the investigation of RIJA and his disappearance which is being conducted by the newspaper "The Denver Post".

SMILEY, in 4/69, approximately three weeks after the disappearance of RIJA, contacted RIJA's attorney for the purpose of determining whether the attorney had any information regarding RIJA, since it was necessary for SMILEY to know whether RIJA was alive and whether he intended to return to the University for the fall semester of 1969 to resume teaching in the History Department. SMILEY, who cannot now recall the name of the attorney, was furnished an address for RIJA in Montreal, Canada, and a letter was directed to this address by the History Department seeking information regarding RIJA and his intentions.

② Bureau (RAM)
1-El Paso

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

After leaving Boulder, SMILEY was advised by Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, that a letter was received by the University purportedly written by RIJA in which he stated that he would not be returning to the University. BRIGGS advised SMILEY that in his opinion, the letter was a forgery, since the signature did not compare with that of RIJA.

After the disappearance, SMILEY began receiving a great many inquiries from the news media and he was pressed for a statement regarding his knowledge of RIJA and whether or not he was alive.

THE FOLLOWING WAS FURNISHED BY DR. SMILEY IN THE STRICTEST OF CONFIDENCE WITH THE UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WAS FOR THE INFORMATION OF THE FBI AND NOT FOR DISSEMINATION TO ANY OUTSIDE AGENCY SINCE HE WAS BREAKING A CONFIDENCE WITH AN ASSOCIATE IN THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY:

Being hounded by the press for a statement, he contacted a source in the CIA Office at Denver since he, SMILEY, was formerly a member of the Office of Naval Intelligence, thinking that perhaps that agency could assist him off the record with any information it might possess. SMILEY was aware that the CIA had interviewed RIJA following a trip by RIJA to the Soviet Union. The CIA source subsequently told Dr. SMILEY to merely advise the press that he had information to the effect that RIJA was "alive and well". This information was subsequently released by Dr. SMILEY to the student press at the University of Colorado, and it appeared in print.

When the Office of the District Attorney in Denver instituted investigation into the disappearance of RIJA, SMILEY was contacted by the DA's Office regarding the source of his statement. Dr. SMILEY again contacted the Denver CIA Office source and was advised that he was to state nothing and that he would be recontacted.

Some days later, the CIA source recontacted him and told him that he would be receiving an inquiry from the Office of the DA in the form of a statement, and that he should agree with the statement even though it "was not quite the truth". SMILEY did not question

these instructions, since he felt that CIA knew what should be done in this type of case. He received a telephone call from the DA's Office and a statement was read to him to the effect that the information which he had received and made public to the effect that RIJA was alive and well was in error. SMILEY told the caller that he agreed with the statement and nothing further came of this.

Dr. SMILEY does not know what part, if any, the CIA has in this case, but since he, SMILEY, is himself a former intelligence agent he did not feel that he had the right to question something which might be of vital importance to his country.

DR. SMILEY REQUESTED THAT NO HINT OR INFERENCE BE GIVEN TO THE CIA WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT HE HAS REVEALED TO THE FBI HIS CONTACTS REGARDING THIS MATTER WITH THE DENVER OFFICE OF THE CIA.

He stated that though he has no evidence to substantiate his belief, he cannot get it out of his mind that RIJA may have been a double agent for the Soviets or the Czechoslovaks. He is aware that one Mrs. TANNENBAUM, a woman indicted for a number of frauds and a suspect in two arsenic poisonings, is considered a suspect in the disappearance of RIJA. He never knew RIJA to be associated with any such woman, but stated that he was not acquainted with the personal life of RIJA who was somewhat of a "loner".

RIJA, when he joined the staff of the University of Colorado, was single but in 8/68, an individual came to visit RIJA ostensibly for the purpose of arranging a marriage between RIJA and the man's sister. The intended bride was a Czechoslovakian girl who was born in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and this "brother-in-law" was entertained by a member and colleague of RIJA in the History Department. This individual indicated to SMILEY that although the "brother-in-law" supposedly did not speak any English, and had RIJA translate every statement into Czech, it was apparent from the gestures and expressions of the "brother-in-law" that he understood more than he let on. Three weeks after the visit of this man, the woman who became Mrs. RIJA came to Boulder, Colorado, where she and RIJA were married. The marriage resulted in divorce a short time later and the girl reportedly returned to the East Coast from whence she came.

Dr. SMILEY indicated that he has no further information regarding this matter, but that Dean WILLIAM E. BRIGGS, College of Arts and Sciences, University of Colorado, Boulder, should be in possession of the letter purportedly written from Canada by RIJA, and may be in a position to assist in answering any question the Bureau might have regarding RIJA's association with the University of Colorado, since BRIGGS would have possession of these records. He stated BRIGGS is a trusted confidant of his and Dr. SMILEY's name should be used as an introduction should the Bureau desire any information of BRIGGS.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to this Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, which forwarded a memorandum of the same date for your approval and forwarding to the SSC in partial response to its request of April 30, 1975.

Attached for your approval and forwarding to the SSC is the original of an additional memorandum which completes the response to the Committee's request.

A copy of the memorandum for the SSC is being provided for your records.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395
1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination
LFS:mjg
(9)

Sect 102 [illegible]
HSC Ser 94. (8/24/75 [illegible])
11/16/76.

REC-102

62-116395-263

JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 JUN 25 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

RE: SECTIONS OF THE MANUAL OF
INSTRUCTIONS NOT PREVIOUSLY FURNISHED

Reference is made to the memorandum from captioned Committee dated April 30, 1975, and appendices thereto which contained requests for certain documents and other information from the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). This Bureau's memorandum of May 19, 1975, provided a partial response to this request and advised that it would be necessary to clear Section 102 of the Manual of Instructions with other interested agencies.

Section 102 has now been cleared with the other interested agencies and is available for review by Mr. Mark Gitenstein or other designated members of the Committee's staff at FBI Headquarters.

1 - The Attorney General

LFS:mjg mjs
(8)

NOTE:

Third agency considerations have been resolved by coordination with other appropriate agencies. Section 102 pertains to relations with other agencies.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

LFS

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

62-11[illegible]-263

GPO [illegible]

5-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/11/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee. Re: Sections of the Manual of Instructions not Previously Furnished
Section 102 of MOI

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Paul V Daly Date: 6-13-75

Received by: John T. Elliff

Title:

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

N : SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

For Review

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC J. T. Elliff
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Sections of the Manual of Instructions not previously furnished

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter dated 4/30/75, Part 2.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)
"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

OPERATING PROCEDURES

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

In response to above-cited SSC request, the SSC was advised that designated Sections, with one exception, of FBI Manual of Instructions were available for review at FBI Headquarters. By communication 6/11/75, SSC was advised excluded Section, which involved third agency considerations, is now available for review at FBI Headquarters.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75
6-24-75 LFS

TREAT AS YELLOW

WOC
EWS
5-TAM

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

3791 (6-75)

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

The Attorney General

June 11, 1975

Director, FBI

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ~~TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY~~ on Intelligence Activities

Enclosed for your information is the original of a memorandum concerning an interview by a staff member of captioned Committee of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, former Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. A copy of the memorandum is also enclosed for forwarding to Mr. James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President.

Enclosures (2)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb lhb
(12)

✓ P. V. [illegible] Rm 4509 JB

Hand carried by Paul V. Daly 6-12-75 PVD

edm

REC- 102

62-116395-262

JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000

MOR-16

PCM

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y

JUN 12 1975 MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(Mr. P. V. Daly)

62-116395

June 11, 1975

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE
DANIEL M. ARMSTRONG, III, BY SSC
STAFF MEMBER

Set out below is information voluntarily furnished to the FBI by Mr. Armstrong, who was formerly Special Assistant to Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III. Mr. Armstrong furnished the information following his interview by SSC Staff Member Mark Gitenstein. The interview took place in Washington, D. C., on June 6, 1975, between 10:00 a.m. and 12:15 p.m. Mr. Armstrong was not put under oath and was not advised of his rights including his right to personal counsel.

Mr. Armstrong advised that the interview covered the following areas:

1. The general activities of the FBI's Intelligence Division, particularly Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning research conducted in the Intelligence Division concerning the possibility of obtaining an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters;

2. The alleged existence of files in former Director Hoover's office;

3. Mr. Armstrong's knowledge concerning the increase in the number of FBI representatives assigned abroad as Legal Attaches.

1 - Personnel File of Daniel M. Armstrong, III

LFS:lhb
(11)

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. __
Ident. ____
Inspection __
Intell. ____
Laboratory __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. __
Training __
Legal Coun. __
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __
MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2001 BY SPARM/lmf

MOR-16

62-116395-262

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITY (SSC)

RE: INTERVIEW OF FORMER FBI EMPLOYEE BY SSC

With regard to the effort made to obtain an Executive Order establishing the FBI's authority in security matters, Mr. Armstrong advised the SSC representative that in May, 1972, one of the principal questions raised by Mr. Gray was concerning the jurisdictional authority of the FBI to conduct intelligence or security investigations. He commented that in May, 1972, a conference was held at Quantico, Virginia, involving a number of Bureau executives and that during this conference the question of jurisdictional authority was discussed. Following the conference, a special team was set up to discuss this subject, including Mr. Armstrong and former Special Agent Thomas Smith of the Intelligence Division. According to Mr. Armstrong, it was felt that it would be appropriate to develop a new set of guidelines and not to rely on prior statutes and Presidential orders. Armstrong recalled that after several meetings of this group, Thomas Smith prepared a document consisting of 43 pages which was completed approximately six weeks after the group was created. Armstrong recalled that the document was received in the Acting Director's office and was discussed at one of the regular afternoon staff conferences. At that time it was agreed that the document was good but that the timing was not thought to be appropriate. The thought was expressed that it would be held in abeyance until after the coming elections. It was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the matter might have been discussed between Attorney General Kleindienst and Mr. Gray, and it was decided not to push the matter until after the elections. Mr. Armstrong recalled advising Mr. Smith of the location of the document and the fact that it was being held in abeyance until after the elections.

The matter of the above document did not come up again until shortly before the confirmation hearings concerning Mr. Gray. At that time it was Mr. Armstrong's belief that the Bureau should not push for the Executive Order until after a

permanent Director of the Bureau had been confirmed. Mr. Armstrong advised that to the best of his knowledge the document was not given to the Department of Justice while Mr. Gray and his staff were in the Bureau.

Concerning files that were allegedly maintained in Mr. Hoover's office, Mr. Armstrong stated that shortly after Mr. Gray's arrival in the Bureau he made a statement to the effect that there were no secret files maintained by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Armstrong commented that he doubted the wisdom of making such a broad statement.

Shortly after Mr. Gray's statement was made, information came to Mr. Armstrong's attention which caused him to prepare a memorandum to Mr. Gray indicating the possibility of the existence of files in Mr. Hoover's office. Armstrong could not recall Mr. Gray's response to his memorandum but he believed that the original of the memorandum was returned to him and that he placed the original and the carbon in his desk along with other memoranda that he had prepared for Mr. Gray.

Mr. Armstrong stated that it was his theory that the files in Mr. Hoover's office were in two categories; the first being files containing information possibly detrimental to prominent persons in the Government and the other category being tidbits of information received in personal correspondence from various Special Agents in Charge concerning persons of possible interest to Mr. Hoover.

Mr. Armstrong advised further that at one of his daily conferences, Mr. Gray mentioned that he had talked to former Acting Associate Director Mark Felt concerning files which may have been maintained in Mr. Hoover's office and which he said were then in a safe in the custody of Mr. Felt.

Mr. Armstrong could not recall whether Mr. Gray and Mr. Felt were to go through the safe together or whether Mr. Felt was to do it alone and advise Mr. Gray of his findings.

With regard to the present location of such files, Mr. Armstrong had no specific knowledge but speculated that if they existed they might have been destroyed before Mr. Gray arrived in the office, they might have been retained in Mr. Felt's safe or they might have been removed to the custody of Mr. Clyde Tolson or Miss Helen Gandy at Mr. Hoover's house.

Mr. Armstrong advised that on April 27, 1973, prior to his departure from the Bureau, he destroyed all of the memoranda he had retained in his desk and he is certain that among them was his memorandum concerning files in Mr. Hoover's office.

With regard to the increase in the number of Legal Attaches, Armstrong advised that he recalled that shortly before Mr. Gray came to the Bureau there had been an expansion in the number of Legal Attaches. He understood that traditionally the role of the Legal Attache had been to function as a liaison representative to foreign police agencies but that with the expansion in the number of Legal Attaches they were given additional responsibilities in the field of foreign intelligence collection, exactly to what extent he did not recall. He recalled that the expansion was at the initiation of the White House and may have been because the White House was not satisfied with the intelligence collected by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Armstrong stated that he saw a potential for friction with CIA and speculated that this might have been a factor in the breach of liaison between the FBI and CIA. He recalled writing a memorandum for Mr. Gray expressing doubts as to whether the training of Special Agents of the FBI equipped them for the collection of foreign intelligence and some subsequent discussion that

perhaps the Legal Attaches should be brought home for such training, but that this idea was concluded to be impractical or unnecessary.

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM:
FBI

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☐ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☒ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/11/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☐ SSC
☐ HSC

To the Attorney General with copy for forwarding to the White House.

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Memorandum reporting interview of Daniel M. Armstrong, III, formerly Special Assistant to FBI Acting Director L. Patrick Gray, III, by SSC Staff Member.

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

NA

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

U

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

Authorities for FBI's security investigations

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

Interview included following topics: general activities of FBI's Intelligence Division, including FBI's authorities in security investigations; files maintained in former FBI Director Hoover's office, and increase in number of FBI representatives abroad as Legal Attaches.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SPaAum/lmf
MDR-16

TREAT AS YELLOW

WDC

SFP:1hb
(4)
62-116395

ORIGINAL VIA LIAISON TO CENTRAL COMMUNITY INDEX IN CONNECTION WITH SENSTUDY 75.

6-24-75 CFS

3791 (6-75)

276-10483

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.
- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.
- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.
- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.
- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

June 12, 1975

The Attorney General

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to the letter, and appendices thereto, from the SSC, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

Enclosed for your approval and forwarding to the Committee are an original of a memorandum and enclosures which are responsive to some of the requests.

A copy of the memorandum and enclosures are being furnished for your records.

Enclosures - 6

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

62-116395-260

RDS:lek|ek
(10)

REC- 102

17 JUN 25 1975

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

3

WRW

PLM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. A. J. Decker, Jr.
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar

62-116395

June 12, 1975

1 - Mr. R. D. Shea

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: REQUEST PERTAINING TO ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE

Reference is made to the SSC letter, with attached appendices, dated May 14, 1975, requesting certain documents and other information from the FBI.

In Appendix D, Item 10, the SSC requested all records, vouchers, travel authorizations, expense receipts, ticket stubs, governmental travel requests (GTRs), and any other documents which relate to travel by:

(a) Former Special Agent Lish Whitson from Washington, D. C., to Tampa or Miami, Florida, during 1964;

(b) Former Special Agents Cartha DeLoach, Hobson Adcock, Don Manning, Harold Linebaugh, and Elmer Todd from Washington, D. C., to Atlantic City, New Jersey, during August, 1964;

(c) Former Special Agent William C. Sullivan from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta, Georgia, during 1964.

In respect to 10a, on 12/9/64 a travel voucher was processed for payment to former Special Agent Lish Whitson in the sum of $19.40 for travel during the period 11/1-30/64. Accompanying the voucher was

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

RDS:lek lek
(9)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

ENCLOSURE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

a memorandum copy of a GTR issued 11/21/64 by Whitson to National Airlines in the sum of $107.40 for air travel from Washington, D. C., to Miami and return. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Whitson in connection with the aforementioned travel.

In respect to 10b, former Special Agents DeLoach, Adcock, Manning (correct name Donald Hanning), Linebaugh (correct name Harold Leinbaugh), and Special Agent Todd submitted travel vouchers for August, 1964. However, no GTRs were issued by them.

In regard to 10c, William C. Sullivan was the issuing officer of a GTR made out to Southern Railroad for travel from Washington, D. C., to Atlanta and return in the amount of $74.55. Enclosed find a copy of the GTR issued by Sullivan in connection with the aforementioned travel. Sullivan submitted a voucher for 11/28-30/64 in the amount of $37.10.

No other records are available concerning the travel and expenses of the individuals mentioned in 10a, 10b and 10c.

Enclosures - 2

1 - The Attorney General

NOTE:

The data regarding the GTRs and the travel of the individuals mentioned in the memorandum was obtained from the Voucher Unit, Data Processing Section, Computer Systems Division. In connection with 10a, 10b, and 10c, all expense vouchers of the individuals mentioned in these items have been destroyed under the Five-Year Retention Document Schedule Rule.

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

A 3,925,594

Void after ______ 19

BILL TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

The National Airlines Company is requested

to furnish coach class air transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC

to Miami, Florida + Return

for use of Lish Whitson and ______ others with ______ accommodations

from ______ to ______ with authorization

to transport not over ______ lbs. of excess baggage from ______

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE RECEIVED THE TRANSPORTATION SERVICE OR TICKETS REQUESTED EXCEPT AS STATED ON REVERSE SIDE

TRAVELER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

PLACE OF ISSUE Washington DC Nov 21, 6

I CERTIFY THAT THE TRANSPORTATION REQUESTED IS FOR OFFICIAL BUSINESS.

ISSUING OFFICER'S SIGNATURE Lish Whitson

TITLE Special Agent

FISCAL DATA (APPROPRIATION AUTHORIZATION ETC.)

0502
21-70

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

TRANSPORTATION AMT	ACCOMMODATION AMT	TOTAL
107.40		107.40

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

ENCLOSURE

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
May 1, 1935, in General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.)

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.
2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.
3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-10482

STANDARD FORM NO. 1169a
Form prescribed by Comptroller General U.S.,
Nov. [illegible] General Regulations No. 123.

(This space may be used to further identify services required.) ______

______

______

______

______

______

______

PASSED
VO 149/0
DEC 16 1964

INSTRUCTIONS TO TRAVELERS

1. This memorandum should be forwarded in accordance with administrative instructions.

2. Inasmuch as the memorandum card copy of the transportation request serves a very important administrative record, care must be exercised that such copy is legible and complete in all respects when forwarded.

3. Indicate above the actual services furnished where same varies from that requested. (See paragraph 1 of "CONDITIONS" on reverse of original request.)

276-[illegible]

BILL TO

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C.

A 3,991,399

The United States of America
Transportation Request

MEMORANDUM CARD COPY

DO NOT FOLD, SPINDLE OR MUTILATE

The Southern Railroad ... Company is requested to furnish first class rail transportation at lowest rate from Washington DC to Atlanta, Ga. & return via Southern R.R.

for use of William C. Sullivan and ... others with ... accommodations

from ... to ...

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

Place of issue: Washington, D.C. 11-25-64

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director FBI

0500
21-60

TRAVELER MUST ASCERTAIN COST OF TRANSPORTATION AND/OR ACCOMMODATIONS AND RECORD IN SPACES BELOW

42.95	31.60	74.55
		TOTAL

TICKET AGENT WILL NOT ACCEPT THIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 evm/mf

MDR-16

62-116395-260

-140 (Rev. 1-21-74) **FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION**
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

Addressee: Senate Select Committee

☐ LTR ☒ LHM ☐ Memo ☐ Report dated 6/12/75

Caption of Document: U.S. Senate Select Committee: Re: Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

Originating Office: FBI

Delivered by: Richard F. Taylor Jr. Date: 16 Jun 75 2PM

Received by: Sherry Powell

Title: Asst Off. Manager

Return this receipt to the Intelligence Division, FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF

MOR-16

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

NOTE: SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON REVERSE BEFORE COMPLETING.

TO: Intelligence Community Staff
ATTN: Central Index

FROM: Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Abstract of Information Provided to Select Committees

1. HOW PROVIDED (*check appropriate term. If a document was made available for review but not transmitted, so note.*)

☒ DOCUMENT ☐ BRIEFING ☐ INTERVIEW ☐ TESTIMONY ☐ OTHER

2. DATE PROVIDED
6/12/75

3. TO WHOM PROVIDED (*check appropriate term; add specific names if appropriate*)

☒ SSC
☐ HSC

4. IDENTIFICATION (*provide descriptive data for documents; give name or identification number of briefer, interviewee, testifier and subject*)

Request Pertaining to Electronic Surveillance

5. IN RESPONSE TO (*list date and item number if in response to formal request, otherwise state verbal request of (name), initiative, subpoena, etc.*)

SSC letter 5/14/75, Appendix D, Item 10.

6. CLASSIFICATION OF INFORMATION (*enter U, C, S, TS or Codeword*)

"U"

7. KEY WORDS (*enter the appropriate key words from the list provided separately; if key words not listed are used underline for emphasis*)

SURVEILLANCE

8. SUMMARY (*see reverse side before completing this item*)

SSC was furnished with information and documents relating to travel on the part of Bureau personnel in connection with SSC inquiry into this Bureau's use of electronic surveillances.

NOTE: Original via Liaison to Central Community Index in connection with Senstudy 75.
6-24-75 LFS

WOC
EWS
5-TJM

TREAT AS YELLOW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAT
MDR-16

TJM:lhb
(4)
62-116395

CLASSIFY AS APPROPRIATE

3791 (6-75)

INSTRUCTIONS

- Type or print clearly in ink.

- Indicate classification of the abstract top and bottom.

- Date the abstract and put on any internal control numbers required.

- "FROM" entry should clearly identify the organization providing the information.

- If additions (as when a copy of document sent to SSC is later sent to HSC) or changes to a previously submitted form are necessary, submit a copy of the original abstract, with the change indicated.

SPECIFIC ITEM NO. 8. SUMMARY - enter brief narrative statement describing substance of information and showing relationship to Intelligence Community matters if appropriate. Any feedback or evidence of investigatory interests should be noted. Commitments made to supply additional information should be noted. Additionally, certain administrative information may be entered here, e.g., restrictions on review of a document, if document was paraphrased, whether interviewee is current or former employee, etc. If actual document or transcript is provided, that fact should be noted and no summary is required. Additional pages may be attached if necessary.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached is a proposed memorandum to the Attorney General with a letterhead memorandum attached enclosing a copy of a memorandum J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson dated July 30, 1964, captioned "Investigation of Ku Klux Klan and other Hate Groups." It appears that we are proposing to give the copy of the Gale memorandum to the Senate Select Committee in response to their request by letter dated May 14, 1975, for a memorandum prepared by Gale relative to the subject matter of the 1964 memorandum.

My reading of the memorandum revealed that it is a purely deliberative document which quotes personal views of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Rosen, Mr. Belmont, and Mr. Gale. I am concerned that the release of such a memorandum containing not only the personal views of Bureau officials, but also identifying them by name could have an impact on individuals in the future who may be asked to furnish their opinions concerning policy matters in the FBI. As indicated by the Attorney General in his speech in New York, it is essential that the Executive Branch have a degree of privacy concerning policy discussions and expressions of personal views by officials in order for the Executive to function properly.

I do recognize that we may not be able to resist giving the Committee access to material documents that bear on particular issues under investigation, however, I do recommend that when we are required to produce deliberative documents, the names and other identifying data relating to individuals furnishing views be deleted.

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz

JAM:mfd (7)

REC- 102

62-116395-259

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/16/2000 BY SP2 ALM/mjc
MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

[redacted]

84 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. That the names of individuals described in the body of the memorandum of July 30, 1964, and other identifying data be deleted prior to furnishing the copy to the Committee.

2. In regard to future responses to requests for documents of a deliberative nature that our policy be that names and identifying data will be deleted prior to disclosure of the documents.

PLM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.	
Dep. AD Adm.	
Dep. AD Inv.	
Asst. Dir.:	
Admin.	
Comp. Syst.	
Ext. Affairs	
Files & Com.	
Gen. Inv.	
Ident.	
Inspection	
Intell.	
Laboratory	
Legal Coun.	✓
Plan. & Eval.	
Spec. Inv.	
Training	
Telephone Rm.	
Director Sec'y	

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 6-6-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

Former Special Agent Richard H. Davis of the Atlanta Office telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 6-4-75 at which time he explained that he had been contacted by Michael Epstein of captioned Committee at which time Epstein requested that Davis make himself available for interview in either Atlanta, Georgia, or travel to Washington, D. C. Davis informed Epstein that he would have to obtain Bureau approval prior to submitting to interview inasmuch as he had to obtain a release from his employment secrecy agreement.

Mr. Davis informed SA Daly that he was reluctant to agree to being interviewed by captioned Committee concerning his activities as an Agent. It was pointed out to Mr. Davis that the decision as to whether to agree to interview was his, but he was advised that captioned Committee has subpoena power and might attempt to force him to furnish information through the use of a subpoena. He was informed that the Bureau was cooperating with captioned Committee and their inquiry into FBI operations.

It was explained to Mr. Davis that if he desired to allow himself to be interviewed, the Bureau would make available an employee at his request to be available but not present during interview. He was also advised that this Agent would not represent him as private counsel. Mr. Davis was advised that the Bureau's concern was not of matters of historical fact but rather testimony might be required which could impair the Bureau's efforts to discharge its responsibilities. It was also explained that the Bureau representative would assist him in making determination whether his response to a particular question would identify confidential informants, impair on-going investigations, divulge information derived from other Government agencies or foreign sources or expose sensitive investigative techniques and, therefore, a response should not be given.

62-116395
1 - Mr. Wannall 1 - Mr. ~~W. O. Cregar~~
1 - Mr. Mintz 1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Personnel file, Richard H. Davis 1 - Mr. Daly
PVD:dkg (8)

REC-102

62-116395-258

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAC
MDR-16

JUN 25 1975

84 JUN 5 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Legal Counsel to Adams Memorandum
Re: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Davis indicated that he desired a Bureau representative be made available during his interview and would request the interview take place in Atlanta, Georgia. Additionally, he stated Epstein had indicated that the topic of discussion in the interview would be the Bureau's investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levison, and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. Mr. Davis stated he would recontact FBI Headquarters as soon as a date and place of interview had been determined. He indicated he would set the date for interview so that the Bureau would have ample opportunity to have an Agent available. We have separately requested Bureau approval for the release of Davis from his employment agreement for purposes of this interview.

granted per 5x8 note on 6/4/75 tel.

ACTION:

That the Intelligence Division make available an Agent for the interview of Mr. Davis when and if a date and place are agreed upon.

PVD JBH/pvg

JBA/PLM

Wannall has designated SA Phillips per R/S 6/9/75

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Office of Associate Director

__________, 1975

✓ Director
~~Mr. Callahan~~
___ Mr. Jenkins
✓ Mr. Adams
✓ Mr. Feeney
___ Mr. Ash
___ Mr. Bassett
___ Mr. Cleveland
___ Mr. Cochran
___ Mr. Decker
___ Mr. Gallagher
___ Mr. Gebhardt
___ Mr. McDermott
___ Mr. Mintz
___ Mr. Mooney
___ Mr. Moore
___ Mr. Walsh
___ Mr. Wannall

___ Mr. Mack
___ Mr. O'Connell

___ Miss Tietgen
___ Mrs. Mutter
___ Miss Downing
___ Miss Southers
___ Mrs. Haines

___ M __________

Room __________

___ Mrs. Metcalf
___ Telephone Room

___ Corres. Review
___ Mail Room
___ Teletype
___ Personnel Records
___ Mechanical Section

___ For Appropriate Action
___ For Your Approval
___ Initial and Return
___ Please Call Me
___ For Information
___ Per Conversation

Sensitivity '75

Do we have any amplification of This instruction; Or, do we know of any submission responsive to This which illustrate interpretation

K

Item #6 (tabbed) re

"items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities" Should create Congressional furor.

Paul L. Mack
Room 7004, Ext. 5606

C-102

62-116395-257

17 JUN 25 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/
MDR-16

84 JUN 26 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/18/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. Deakin
1 - Mr. T. E. Burns

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY

Reference is made to Bureau letter to The Attorney General 6/20/75 captioned "United States Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities (SSC)," forwarding letterhead memorandum for approval and forwarding to SSC.

The Director asked if we have any amplification of this instruction (to submit items with unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities for dissemination to the President under the INLET Program) or do we know of any submission responsive to this which illustrates interpretation?

There has been no amplification of this instruction, nor any submission under INLET of an item on prominent personalities that would show the interpretation of this point.

With respect to the observation that this matter should cause a congressional furor, it is noted that INLET has already been afforded considerable publicity, beginning in February, 1973, after an office memorandum on the subject reached the news media. This publicity is why the Senate Committee asked for documents on INLET. The White House and Senator Bob Packwood inquired about the Program. A detailed defense of INLET appeared in the Congressional Record.

By way of background, the INLET instruction that has received the most publicity--items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities--was recalled by the author of the INLET Program initiating letter as having been specifically dictated by then Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan.

TEB:lek
(8)

REC- 102

62-116395-256

CONTINUED - OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY 5022 ALM/CMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 24 1975

5-Ew

84 JUN 25 1975

While we cannot say exactly what former Assistant Director W. C. Sullivan had in mind when he added the instruction about items with an unusual twist, we can speculate with a hypothetical example.

If we learned that a trusted assistant to an important government official--an official who had taken a "hard line" with respect to dealings with the Soviet Union, for example--was under development by Soviet intelligence, this would be an unusual twist to an item of intelligence interest to the President involving a prominent person.

In such a hypothetical case, we would, of course, advise the government official involved, and The Attorney General and the President. We would have done this under INLET and we would still disseminate this type of data. INLET was only a vehicle for special dissemination.

ACTION:

For information.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. __
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-10-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

John Elliff of captioned Committee's task force on Domestic Intelligence Activities advised on 6-9-75, that the Committee is planning to have a Bureau representative testify concerning the FBI's authority to conduct investigations in the domestic and counterintelligence areas in late June or early July. Mr. Elliff stated that this testimony would be before the Senators and will be a general exploration of jurisdictional authority. Mr. Elliff also volunteered that he had told K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination of the Department, that the Committee wanted to be furnished a copy of the T. J. Smith Memorandum dated 7-31-72 concerning FBI's investigative jurisdiction in domestic and counterintelligence matters. Elliff stated that at this point, a summary of such documents would not be an acceptable substitute. Elliff desired such a document be made available to the Committee prior to the aforementioned testimony. With regards to testimony, Elliff indicated that it would not necessarily have to be the Director giving a testimony.

Elliff stated as he finalizes his plans concerning the testimony concerning FBI investigative jurisdiction, he would recontact SA Paul V. Daly of this Division and give more details concerning this matter.

62-116395

REC-59 62-116395-255

ST-101

5 JUN 12 1975

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Wannall
Attn: Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Kelly
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

PVD:eek
(8)

(CONTINUED - OVER)

LEGAL COUNSEL

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP

MDR-14

84 MAY 25 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

With regards to the request concerning the Smith document, we should await K. William O'Connor's request prior to taking any action concerning this matter, and with regards to testimony, we should await further details prior to engaging in the preparation of that testimony.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Adm. ____
Dep.-A.D.-Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 19 1975
TELETYPE

REC-102

NR 026 LA PLAIN

10:14PM NITEL 6-18-75 RLD

TO DIRECTOR (62-1~~16464~~)

FROM LOS ANGELES (66-1700-4124)

ATTN: INTD, WILLIAM O. CREGAR.

SENSTUDY 1975.

Mr Cregar
4123 JEH

RE BUTEL TO LOS ANGELES, JUNE 17, 1975.

THE LOS ANGELES OFFICE IS UNABLE TO IDENTIFY ANY INSTANCE THAT WAS ALLUDED TO IN CAPTIONED AIRTEL AND THERE ISNO RECORD OF ANY AGENTS BY THE NAME OF RON MASCAR OR WILLIAM MILLER ASSIGNED TO THE LOS ANGELES DIVISION SINCE 1956 TO PRESENT.

END

HOLD

REC- 102

62-116395-254

12 JUN 24 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/MJF

MDR-16

FIVE

84 JUN 24 1975

Black Panther Party



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
JOHN EDGAR HOOVER, DIRECTOR

MARCH 1971

"WE ARE FROM 25 TO 30 MILLION STRONG, AND WE ARE ARMED. AND WE ARE CONSCIOUS OF OUR SITUATION. AND WE ARE DETERMINED TO CHANGE IT. AND WE ARE UNAFRAID."



WARNING TO AMERICA

[illegible]

Table of Contents

I. FOUNDING 1
II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES 3
III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY 6
    Invasion of California State Legislature 6
    Police Officer Meets Panthers – and Death 6
    "Free Huey" Campaign 6
    Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver 7
    International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver 7
    Rise of the Black Panther Party 8
IV. LEADERSHIP 9
    National Committee to Combat Fascism 10
    International Section 10
V. FUNDS 12
VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS 13
VII. TACTICS 15
    Target: Police 15
    Attacks on Others 15
    Weapons Caches 16
    "Revolutionary Suicide" 16
    Panther "Justice" 18
VIII. PROPAGANDA 20
    Editorials 21
    Inflammatory Articles 24
    Provocative Slogans 29
    "Revolutionary Art" 30
    International News 35

THIS DOCUMENT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE FBI AS A BRIEF STUDY OF THE BACKGROUND, TACTICS, AND OBJECTIVES OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY. THE ORGANIZATION'S OWN PUBLICATIONS WERE THE SOURCE FOR MOST OF THE MATERIAL REPRODUCED.


LET US HOLD HIGH THE BANNER OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNALISM
AND THE INVINCIBLE THOUGHTS OF
HUEY P. NEWTON
MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY
AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE.

I. FOUNDING



HUEY PERCY NEWTON



BOBBY GEORGE SEALE

The Black Panther Party, with headquarters in Oakland, California, was founded in 1966 by two Oakland Negroes – Huey Percy Newton and Bobby George Seale – both at that time at Merritt College in Oakland. The name and symbol of the new party were taken from the Lowndes County Freedom Organization, an Alabama political party known informally in 1965 as the Black Panther Party.

From the writings of communists, revolutionaries, and black militants, Newton and Seale allegedly selected ideas around which they could build a revolutionary frame that suited the needs of their party. Influential writings included those of Mao Tse-tung, Chinese Communist leader; Frantz Fanon, West Indian psychiatrist who advocated violence for Algerian nationalists; Ernesto "Che" Guevara, one-time lieutenant of Cuba's Fidel Castro and a principal architect of 20th century guerrilla warfare; Malcolm X, American black nationalist who advocated violence to obtain Negro "freedom"; and W. E. B. DuBois, Negro educator who became a member of the Communist Party, USA, at the age of 93.

The organization was at first called the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense; however, the "Self-Defense" was removed in 1968 in an effort to project a more politically oriented image to prospective sympathizers and supporters.

As head of the new Black Panther Party, Newton assumed the title Minister of Defense, and Seale was named Chairman. When questioned about the membership of their organization, Newton and Seale gave the since oft-repeated reply: "Those who know don't say. Those who say don't know." The militancy of the group, however, had an immediate appeal to the discontented, restless youth of Oakland's ghettos.


HUEY NEWTON
BOBBY SEALE

Black Panther Party Chairman, Bobby Seale, and Minister of Defense, Huey Newton, selling Red Chinese magazine and "quotations from Chairman Mao Tse Tung."

3-2-67 San Francisco, Calif.

II. BLACK PANTHER OBJECTIVES

The Black Panther Party "Platform and Program" is repeated in each issue of the official Party publication, The Black Panther.

October 1966

Black Panther Party Platform and Program

What We Want What We Believe

1. We want freedom. We want power to determine the destiny of our Black Community.

We believe that black people will not be free until we are able to determine our destiny.

2. We want full employment for our people.

We believe that the federal government is responsible and obligated to give every man employment or a guaranteed income. We believe that if the white American businessmen will not give full employment, then the means of production should be taken from the businessmen and placed in the community so that the people of the community can organize and employ all of its people and give a high standard of living.

3. We want an end to the robbery by the CAPITALIST of our Black Community.

We believe that this racist government has robbed us and now we are demanding the overdue debt of forty acres and two mules. Forty acres and two mules was promised 100 years ago as restitution for slave labor and mass murder of black people. We will accept the payment in currency which will be distributed to our many communities. The Germans are now aiding the Jews in Israel for the genocide of the Jewish people. The Germans murdered six million Jews. The American racist has taken part in the slaughter of over fifty million black people; therefore, we feel that this is a modest demand that we make.

4. We want decent housing, fit for shelter of human beings.

We believe that if the white landlords will not give decent housing to our black community, then the housing and the land should be made into cooperatives so that our community, with government aid, can build and make decent housing for its people.

5. We want education for our people that exposes the true nature of this decadent American society. We want education that teaches us our true history and our role in the present-day society.

We believe in an educational system that will give to our people a knowledge of self. If a man does not have knowledge of himself and his position in society and the world, then he has little chance to relate to anything else.

6. We want all black men to be exempt from military service.

We believe that Black people should not be forced to fight in the military service to defend a racist government that does not protect us. We will not fight and kill other people of color in the world who, like black people, are being victimized by the white racist government of America. We will protect ourselves from the force and violence of the racist police and the racist military, by whatever means necessary.

7. We want an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of black people.

We believe we can end police brutality in our black community by organizing black self-defense groups that are dedicated to defending our black community from racist police oppression and brutality. The Second Amendment to the Constitution of the United States gives a right to bear arms. We therefore believe that all black people should arm themselves for self-defense.

8. We want freedom for all black men held in federal, state, county and city prisons and jails.

We believe that all black people should be released from the many jails and prisons because they have not received a fair and impartial trial.

9. We want all black people when brought to trial to be tried in court by a jury of their peer group or people from their black communities, as defined by the Constitution of the United States.

We believe that the courts should follow the United States Constitution so that black people will receive fair trials. The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution gives a man a right to be tried by his peer group. A peer is a person from a similar economic, social, religious, geographical, environmental, historical and racial background. To do this the court will be forced to select a jury from the black community from which the black defendant came. We have been, and are being tried by all-white juries that have no understanding of the "average reasoning man" of the black community.

10. We want land, bread, housing, education, clothing, justice and peace. And as our major political objective, a United Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony in which only black colonial subjects will be allowed to participate, for the purpose of determining the will of black people as to their national destiny.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of nature and nature's God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. **That, to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that, whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.** Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and, accordingly, all experience hath shown, that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. **But, when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security.**



III. RISE OF BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Proclaiming a legal right to bear arms, the Panthers by early 1967 had begun to appear in public wearing black leather jackets and black berets, openly carrying shotguns, rifles, or pistols, and shouldering bandoliers of ammunition.

Calling the police "pigs," the Panthers began a buildup in Negro areas of the idea that police departments, especially that in Oakland, were dedicated to the brutalization and harassment of minority groups, and, acting as an appendage of white government authority, were working toward the eventual annihilation (genocide) of the Negro race.

Invasion of California State Legislature

The first incident that brought national attention to this group occurred on May 2, 1967, as the California Legislature was in session in Sacramento. Approximately 40 members of the Black Panther Party, carrying loaded rifles, pistols, and shotguns, and some wearing bandoliers of ammunition about their waists or draped over their shoulders, burst into the Chamber. They were protesting a bill being introduced on that date outlawing the carrying of loaded weapons in public and were proclaiming their right to bear arms and criticize the police. Before they were arrested, they passed out mimeographed leaflets calling on all Negroes to end the "terrorist" oppression of colored races by white America and referring to the preparation of concentration camps in the United States as a beginning of genocide.

Police Officer Meets Panthers--and Death

The Panthers became more militant with the passing of time. At 5:00 a.m., October 28, 1967, two Oakland, California, patrol officers, John F. Frey and Herbert C. Heanes, made a routine traffic violation car stop. While the officers were awaiting the results of the car registration check by radio, the driver, Huey Newton, got out of the car. Suddenly, shooting broke out. Officer Frey was killed; Officer Heanes was wounded critically; and Newton received a stomach wound. He stopped a passing automobile and had the driver take him to a hospital where he was taken into custody and hospitalized. After a state trial, which began July 15, 1968, Newton was sentenced on September 27, 1968, to serve from 2 to 15 years on a charge of voluntary manslaughter.*

"Free Huey" Campaign

Two days after Patrolman Frey's death, the Huey Newton Defense Fund was established at a meeting of a section of the Negro community of Oakland.

The cry of "Free Huey" became a clarion call. The imprisoned Newton was built up in the public eye as "black and bold in defense of his people." Each

---

**It was ruled later that the presiding judge in this trial erred in instructions to the jury. Newton was released August 5, 1970, and scheduled for retrial.*

bringing its own axe to grind, such organizations as the anarchist New Left group named Students for a Democratic Society; the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party and its youth group, the Young Socialist Alliance; the Communist Chinese-oriented Progressive Labor Party; the Communist Party, USA, and its youth affiliate, the W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America; and militant campus groups, black and white, began to gather in support of the Panthers, who were willing not only to defy the establishment, but to destroy it.

LEROY ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

Enter Leroy Eldridge Cleaver

Early in 1967, the Panthers were joined by a recent parolee from the California prison system, author of a best-selling autobiography, *Soul On Ice*, staff writer for the magazine *Ramparts*, and admitted Marxist – Leroy Eldridge Cleaver.

In *Soul On Ice*, Cleaver wrote: "I sought out his (Marx's) books...It was like taking medicine for me to find that, indeed, American Capitalism deserved all the hatred and contempt that I felt for it in my heart...."

After Newton was jailed, although he remained the undisputed leader, it soon became apparent that Cleaver, designated Minister of Information, was projecting a major leadership image. The Party began to further widen its publicity, nationally and internationally, and enlarge its radical support and revolutionary intent.

As an example of this spreading influence of the Panther Party, the 1968 National Election ticket of the Peace and Freedom Party, a coalition of radical groups, included Cleaver as candidate for the Presidential nomination; Newton as candidate for the 7th Congressional District of Alameda County, California; Kathleen Cleaver, 18th Assembly District, California State Legislature; Bobby Seale, 17th Assembly District, California State Legislature. Cleaver received a national total of almost 200,000 votes. Only a small percentage of the California electorate cast their votes for Newton, Seale, and Kathleen Cleaver.

On the evening of April 6, 1968, Cleaver and several Panthers became involved in a shoot-out with Oakland police officers. The incident resulted in the death of a Panther, the wounding of two police officers, and the wounding and arrest of Cleaver. Cleaver's parole was revoked immediately and he was returned to prison. After much publicity, he was later released on bail by a Superior Court Judge who ruled that the jeopardy of his parole status stemmed "from his undue eloquence in pursuing political goals...offensive to many of his contemporaries." This decision was overruled by the District Court of Appeals and upheld by the California Court of Appeals. Cleaver was ordered to return to prison by November 27, 1968. Electing to become a Federal fugitive, he disappeared in late November, 1968, going first to Havana, Cuba, and later to Algiers, where he has established residence.

International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver

Soon after Cleaver's arrest in the spring of 1968, approximately 150 prominent individuals sponsored the establishment of an International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver. The committee intended to dispatch a team to Europe to gain

international support and arrange for a European edition of Cleaver's book, *Soul On Ice*.

Rise of the Black Panther Party

In May, 1968, the hard-core membership of the Black Panther Party was estimated at only 125, and Panther activity was confined largely to the San Francisco-Oakland, California, area. However, because of the dramatic shoot-outs, the "Free Huey" Campaign, the funds established for the defense of both Newton and Cleaver, the widespread publicity, and the support given readily by white radical groups and individual sympathizers, the Black Panther Party began to grow rapidly, not only in membership but in militancy and influence. Chapters began to appear in major cities throughout the country. By the end of 1968, the membership had reached nearly 2,000, with additional thousands of sympathizers and supporters.



1968: BALLOT OR THE BULLET

KATHLEEN CLEAVER,
COMMUNICATION SECT.,
BLACK PANTHER PARTY

18th ASSEMBLY DISTRICT
S.F. PEACE & FREEDOM PARTY

SHOOT YOUR SHOT

IV. LEADERSHIP

Organizationally, the Black Panther Party is set up to be under a Central Committee composed of the following positions:

- Minister of Defense and Supreme Commander, held by Huey Newton
- Chairman, held by Bobby George Seale
- Minister of Information, formerly held by Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
- Chief of Staff, held by David Hilliard
- Minister of Education, held by Raymond (Masai) Hewitt
- Communications Secretary, formerly held by Cleaver's wife, Kathleen
- Minister of Culture, held by Emory Douglas
- Field Marshal, formerly held by Donald Lee Cox

The position of Assistant Chief of Staff, not included among the Central Committee, is occupied by Roosevelt (June) Hilliard.

Under the Central Committee, the chain of command extends to leaders and officers of local chapters.

DAVID HILLIARD

RAYMOND (MASAI) HEWITT

KATHLEEN CLEAVER

EMORY DOUGLAS

DONALD LEE COX

National Committee to Combat Fascism

Set up to coexist with Black Panther Party branches in various cities in the United States are chapters of another organization called National Committee to Combat Fascism. In actuality, there is little difference between the two. This group, a Panther Party front, was set up as the result of a revolutionary conference, called National Conference for a United Front Against Fascism, held in Oakland, California, in July, 1969. The conference, sponsored by the Black Panther Party and assisted by the anarchist Students for a Democratic Society and the Communist Party, USA, was called to form a coalition of black and white radicals, described as "oppressed people."

The National Committee to Combat Fascism is considered by Party leaders to be the "political organizing bureau" of the Black Panther Party. Its specific task allegedly is to raise the political level of the people and educate them against the system.

International Section

On September 13, 1970, the International Section of the Black Panther Party officially opened in Algiers. Joining Cleaver on the staff were his wife, Kathleen, and Field Marshal Donald Lee Cox, a fugitive from justice. Cox faces charges of unlawful flight to avoid prosecution for conspiracy to commit murder, based on a warrant issued on April 20, 1970, at Baltimore, Maryland. He also failed to appear on May 14, 1970, in San Francisco, to answer Federal firearms charges.

This section, in its entirety, was expelled from the Black Panther Party by Huey Newton on February 27, 1971. The expulsion resulted from tensions and differences between Party hierarchy which led to disruptive factionalism.

D.C. greeting African brothers



Chinese 2nd Ambassador (R), Press Attaché (M) and Cultural Attaché (L) talking with Eldridge

Opening attended by cross section of Liberation Movements

Scenes from opening of International Section, The Black Panther, October 31, 1970

V. FUNDS

The money by which the Black Panther Party operates comes from a number of sources. There are substantial private contributions; fees for public appearances, such as campus speeches, radio, and television appearances; payments for magazine articles; collections for trials and bail funds in this country and abroad; subscriptions and individual sales of the Party's official organ, *The Black Panther;* fund-raising activities sponsored by sympathizers and supporters; sales of recordings of interviews and speeches; and financial aid from radicals and extremists.

According to the press, there is reason to believe that the Panthers, to obtain additional funds, are engaging in criminal activities, such as burglaries and robberies.

VI. "SOCIALISTIC" PROGRAMS

Panther Party leaders insist their primary aim is to serve the "people," meaning ghetto blacks. To establish good intent, Party officials have set up a series of community services aimed at recruiting members and sympathizers and building Party influence in ghetto areas. These programs, described by the Panthers as "socialistic" programs, are supposed to be carried out by all Party branches and include: "liberation schools" to give "our people a knowledge of self"; free health clinics, with money, medical supplies and professional services donated by laymen and professionals in the community; free clothing programs, with clothing donated by the community; Community Information Centers, to "answer the basic needs of the people"; and a monthly free shuttle bus service for families of blacks in prison. Few of these programs actually are carried out, and those that have been attempted have been mostly unsuccessful.

The program that has received the most publicity is the "breakfast program," devised as a further means of indoctrinating Negro youth in Panther teachings of racism and rebellion. As expressed in *The Black Panther*, June 14, 1969, "The youth we are feeding will surely feed the revolution." Breakfasts are held for ghetto children either at churches, housing projects, Panther Community Information Centers, or other space that can be obtained free of charge. Panthers usually ask local businessmen to donate food or money to this program, boycotting stores that refuse to participate. At these functions, children have been known to sing such chants as: "I am a revolutionary. I am a revolutionary. There's going to be some barbecue if Huey's not set free. Power to the people."

In 1969, Panther "Coloring Books" were printed and given out at these breakfasts. The books contained 22 pages of drawings teaching the children to distrust, hate, and kill police officers.


I am a Revolutionary
PEOPLE'S FREE SHOES PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE CLOTHING PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE FOOD PROGRAM
PEOPLE'S FREE BUSING PROGRAM
EMORY

SURVIVAL PENDING REVOLUTION

HUEY TOLD ME THAT THE PEOPLE ARE RESPONSIBLE FOR MAKING REVOLUTION. BUT WHILE IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING THE REVOLUTION, HUEY SAYS, "WE THE PEOPLE ARE THREATENED WITH GENOCIDE, BECAUSE RACISM AND FASCISM ARE RAMPANT, NOT ONLY IN OUR COUNTRY BUT THROUGHOUT THE WORLD." HE SAYS, "WE INTEND TO CHANGE ALL THAT. BUT IN ORDER TO CHANGE IT, THERE MUST BE TOTAL TRANSFORMATION. BUT UNTIL SUCH TIME THAT WE CAN ACHIEVE THAT TOTAL TRANSFORMATION, WE MUST EXIST. IN ORDER TO EXIST, WE MUST SURVIVE; SO THEREFORE WE NEED A SURVIVAL KIT." SO THAT WE CAN GROW UP HEALTHY WITH A MIND THAT CAN BE FUNCTIONAL AND CREATIVE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
YOUR COMRADE IN ARMS

VII. TACTICS

The Black Panther Party is a violent revolutionary group whose members provoke confrontations with law enforcement officers and whose leaders incite racial hatred and preach urban guerrilla warfare.

Target: Police

Panthers claim that black communities are occupied by the police in the same way and for the same purpose that foreign troops occupy conquered territory and that these forces, operating under "establishment" orders, are engaged in gradual annihilation of the black race. Blacks, according to the Panthers, must, through urban guerrilla warfare, use guns to liberate themselves from the ever-present repressive enemy. Children in Panther "schools" do their exercises to the rhythm of: "There is a pig upon the hill – if you don't kill him the Panthers will."

Numerous claims have been made that the Black Panther Party is an innocent victim of police persecution and genocide. This charge is rendered absurd by fact. During 1970, 6 police officers were killed and 22 wounded through acts of violence traced to the Panthers. One officer, in 1969, was killed by a Panther with a shotgun blast at point-blank range as the officer lay wounded and helpless on the ground.

Out of 20 members named by the Panther Party as "killed in cold blood" by the police, four were killed by members of a rival black extremist group on the west coast; one died of barbiturate intoxication; one was shot and killed by a store owner during a robbery attempt; one was killed by his wife over a love affair he was having with a female Black Panther; and another was allegedly tortured and killed by Panther Party members. Of the remaining twelve, two were found dead on the street, the victims of unknown assailants, and ten were involved in shoot-outs with police officers.

Attacks on Others

Panther attacks have not been limited to the police. While claiming their intent to protect the black community, Panthers have assaulted and threatened citizens who have tried to assist the police.

Neighborhood stores have been forced to "contribute" food supplies and money under fear of Panther violence. Many other persons have also been victimized, as shown by the fact that in 1969 alone 348 Panther members were arrested for serious crimes, including murder, armed robbery, rape, bank robbery, and burglary.

On April 21, 1969, 21 members of the Black Panther Party were charged in New York in a 30-count indictment with conspiring to bomb public places and murder policemen and with possessing dangerous weapons.

Weapons Caches

Stockpiles of machine guns, sawed-off shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, thousands of rounds of ammunition, Molotov cocktails, gunpowder, and accumulations of bayonets, swords, and machetes have been confiscated from Panther offices.

''Revolutionary Suicide''

On August 7, 1970, Superior Court Judge Harold Haley, the Deputy District Attorney, and three other persons were tied together with piano wire and dragged from a San Rafael, California, courtroom and taken as hostages by three armed Negro convicts, one of whom was standing trial for stabbing a San Quentin prison guard. The escapees were assisted by the defendant's 17-year-old brother who supplied them with weapons for the escapade. Judge Haley, who had a sawed-off shotgun taped to his neck, and the other hostages were forced into a waiting van. When the authorities tried to stop the kidnappers, the judge was brutally murdered; the Deputy District Attorney was injured seriously; and another hostage was slightly wounded. Three Negroes were slain and one was wounded.

Immediately thereafter, Huey Newton declared the killing of Judge Haley as being of ''historical'' importance to the Black Panther Party. This declaration was based on the Panther belief that all black prisoners, regardless of their crimes, are political prisoners and should be released.



OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA, POLICE DEPARTMENT CRUISER INVOLVED IN THE APRIL 6, 1968, GUNBATTLE WITH MEMBERS OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY.

CONFISCATED PANTHER WEAPONS

The perpetrators of the courtroom incident were lauded by the Panthers as setting another "revolutionary example for black people." In commenting further, *The Black Panther* of August 15, 1970, stated:

> *"The example that these brothers have set will be followed by many and many will rise to choose revolutionary suicide rather than reactionary suicide. Black people will unleash in great numbers the Black kamakazi..."*

In his eulogy at services for the slain Negroes, Newton said: "Our comrades have taught us all a revolutionary lesson. They have intensified the struggle and placed it on a higher level."

Panther "Justice"

Recalcitrant members of the Black Panther Party are sometimes victims of Panther "justice." As one example, Panther Chairman Bobby Seale was brought to trial in New Haven, Connecticut, for the torture-murder of Panther Alex Rackley. Rackley, a Panther suspected of being an informant, was scalded, murdered, and dumped in a swamp.

For a variety of reasons, many members have been purged from the Party. These incidents are usually written up in *The Black Panther* in special articles accompanied by photographs.


WASH ROOM
OLYMPICS
if you're not part of the solution... you're part of the problem.

PANTHER HEADQUARTERS, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS, JUNE 4, 1969

EXPELLED

So let this be heard throughout the black community, of Atlantic City, New Jersey. That Leonard Weeks is no longer a servant of the people. That he is no longer the breakfast coordinator for this community center, or for that matter no center ran by the Black Panther Party. He has become slip-shod in his duties as a servant to the people, many times he has been warned by his comrades, about his work, and about his duty to the people's children. He deserted the children of the black community, there were days he would not attend the breakfast program, because he said that he was tired or that he overslept. Well we cannot adhear to this because as revolutionaries we must prepare ourselves to be a match for a hundred. We must prepare to run ourselves to death if need be, so that the people shall be served, and to see to it that they truly have a right to the best. And we have no time for slip-shod niggers. We must hold ourselves responsible to the people. Every word, every act, and every policy must confirm to the people's interest, and if mistakes occur, they must be corrected, that is what being responsible to the people means.

WEEKS, EXPELLED

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

Black Panther Party N.C.C.F.
Community Center
Atlantic City,

FOOLS RUSH IN

Harold Wright, number one fool in Pittsburgh, rushed out of here and into Baltimore.

HAROLD WRIGHT, FOOL

The National Committee to Combat Fascism has no time for crazy dumb fools who run around pimping off the people's just struggle for freedom and self-determination This modern day mad man can't seem to find himself or anything else for that matter. He started out, helping to put this office together and after a long train of was put out. Harold didn't like this and started to hang around our office trying to give the community the impression that he was still a member of the revolutionary ranks of Babylon.

After a few days of the breakfast program, his wife Michelle decided that she loved Harold more than the people and went with him.

We say goodbye to the Wright family and other love birds (like the Johnson's) who can't deal for the people.

So let this be heard, Harold and Michelle Wright are not members of the National Committe to Combat Fascism nor will these fools ever be.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE

National
Committee to Combat Fascism
574 Brushton Ave.
Pittsburgh, Penn.
(412) 242-4728

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, p. 8.

VIII. PROPAGANDA

Although posters, pamphlets, recordings, and a singing group called "The Lumpen" are among propaganda vehicles used by the Black Panther Party, the main channel to the public is through their official organ, *The Black Panther*. Funds permitting, it is published weekly in Oakland, California. It includes editorials by Party leaders and spokesmen; provocative slogans; inflammatory articles; revolutionary art," comprising cartoons; and an international news section.

Excerpts from Article carrying Typed Signature of Eldridge Cleaver.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 22, 1970 PAGE 4

TO MY BLACK BROTHERS IN VIET NAM

I'm writing this on January 4, 1970. We are starting out a new year. On August 31, I'll be 35 years old. I'm married, and I have one child with another one on the way. I am in love with my wife and I would like to enjoy a happy life raising a family. But I am not free to live the type of life that I would like. Pigs--the racist fascist rulers of the United States--won't let me....

We appeal to you Brothers to come to the aid of your people. Either quit the army, now, or start destroying it from the inside. Anything else is a compromise and a form of treason against your own people. Stop killing the Vietnamese people. You need to start killing the racist pigs who are over there with you giving you orders. Kill General Abrahms and his staff, all his officers. Sabotage supplies and equipment, or turn them over to the Vietnamese people. Talk to the other Brothers and wake them up. You should start now weeding out the traitors amongst you. It is better to do it now than to allow them to return home to help the pigs wipe us out. Especially the Uncle Tom officers should be dealt with now, because the pigs will use them as effective tools against our people. When you can no longer take care of business inside the army, then turn yourself over to the Vietnamese people and tell them you want to join the Black Panther Party to fight for the freedom and liberation of your own people. If you do cross over, you don't have to worry about the Vietnamese people abusing you. They will be glad to see you drop out of the army because what they want most in life is to stop the fighting in their land. You have a duty to humanity as well as to your own people not to be used as murderous tools by racist pigs to oppress the people.



"IF YOU WANT PEACE YOU GOT TO FIGHT FOR IT"

There's too many American flags out here, and our Minister of Information, Eldridge Cleaver, says that the American flag and the American eagle are the true symbols of fascism. ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE. Black power to Black people, Brown power to Brown people, Red power to Red people, and Yellow power to Ho Chi Minh, and Comrade Kim Il Sung the courageous leader of the 40,000,000 Korean people....

We say down with the American fascist society. Later for Richard Millhouse Nixon, the Later for all the pigs of the power structure. Later for all the people out here that don't want to hear me curse because that's all that I know how to do. That's all that I'm going to do. I'm not going to ever stop cursing, not only are we going to curse, we're going to put into practice some of the that we talk about. Because Richard Nixon is an evil man. This is the that unleashed the counter-insurgent teams upon the BPP. This is the man that's responsible for all the attacks on the Black Panther Party nationally. This is the man that sends his vicious murderous dogs out into the Black community and invade upon our Black Panther Party Breakfast Programs. Destroy food that we have for hungry kids and expect us to accept like that idly. that man. ***We will kill Richard Nixon. We will kill any that stands in the way of our freedom.*** *We ain't here for no goddamned peace, because we know that we can't have no peace because this country was built on war. And if you want peace you got to fight for it.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

Photograph accompanying Article indicated these are the Words of Chief of Staff, David Hilliard.
THE BLACK PANTHER, November 22, 1969, p. 10.

Editorials

Through editorials, readers are advised of Party positions on national and international issues and are presented with the opinions of the hierarchy on inter-Party matters.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MARCH 13, 1971 PAGE 2

STATEMENT BY HUEY P. NEWTON, MINISTER OF DEFENSE OF THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY AND SUPREME SERVANT OF THE PEOPLE, ON THE OCCASION OF REVOLUTIONARY INTERCOMMUNAL DAY OF SOLIDARITY-

MARCH 5, 1971

Power to the People, Brothers and Sisters,

First of all I would like to thank all of you for my very presence here, because if it weren't for the Power of the People, I wouldn't be here tonight. I'm not here because of the Black Panther Party; I'm not here because of any group, I'm not here because of a group of kamakazis. I'm here because of the Power of the People.

We must remember that Revolution is a process. It's not a conclusion; because once we conclude, then we become counter-revolutionary. And that means even with the gun in our hands, because fascism also has a gun. And I would like to say tonight that the Black Panther Party stands against all forms of fascism, including sexual fascism. That we are against all kinds of chauvinism, including racial chauvinism; we're against sexual chauvinism, national chauvinism. We're intercommunalists. Before I went to prison, most of you know, you are aware, that I never made any speeches, you see, because I'm not a very eloquent man. I'm better known by the actions. And the Party was built upon the actions. And the action itself is a process. And we're not ever fixated. We haven't accepted any dogma. And we will not.

And I would like to say this, that from now on the Party itself will be better known by its contributions to the People, for the simple reason that some people around us seem to want to be known through the Media. But the Party can only judge itself through establishing certain survival programs, pending Revolution. Because remember, you make the Revolution. We can't free political prisoners, only the people can free political prisoners. And a people who are not free cannot free their prisoners, cannot free the prisoners that fascism makes. So I would like to say that we must work very hard in order to lift the consciousness of the people. We must free our Chairman Bobby Seale, Angela Davis, Ruchell Magee, the Soledad Brothers, the seven and the three, and all other political prisoners. Randy. We have to free all of them.

But we must remember that we must exhaust every possible tactic. And we must let it be known that never broadcast military tactics for military reasons. It's perfectly correct to broadcast military tactics for political reasons. That's what Uncle Ho said, and I agree with him. So we would like for the people to know that there are many things that we will not discuss in public. But what you can do is watch the fruits of our work. And we would like to say that our Party became an intercommunal Party upon its actions. And I think that's very good. So I'm asking you in order to free all political prisoners, free the people, free the woman and also the man, that we have to get together in unity by substituting verbal expressions for action. The final test of the pie is the action. We'll stand on the Black Panther Party. The Black Panther Party from 1966 when it was formed will stand on its record, will stand on the action. We won't claim to be ultra-leftists; we won't claim to be infantile leftists. What we'll do is act in accordance with the particular set of conditions and the particular problem that we have at a time. So please judge us upon our actions and we will develop like that. We will not develop with lip service coming from anyone. And sometimes I'm very thankful that I don't talk too well, because that's only one way of communication. We say that a picture is worth a thousand words, but action is supreme.

But what kind of action you take will depend upon the particular set of conditions. And I say all of this, because you know the Party and the world today is under turmoil. And this is very good. We always have welcomed all forms of contradictions. Because without the contradiction there is no transformation. So from the contradiction that has developed now in the world and in the Party, we hope to have a qualitative leap. If this leap eliminates some of us, then, of course, we'll weep for that. But we must not stop the Revolution. I will not stop the Revolution. You should not stop it. And, for all that it's worth, we know that words will never stop it. Words will not start the Revolution either. Only action. 'Sixty-six kicked off the armed manifestation of Revolution in this country, because it focused upon the need for the People not only to defend themselves, but also to develop a consciousness necessary to perform and to act to be able to fight in a protracted war. And that is why it is necessary for us to develop the correct ideology, which is a system of thinking. And we must not rely upon and conclude with the philosophy, which isn't necessarily a conclusion.

So we're ideologically revolutionists. We're in a constant state of change. And we fight with all people who want to change, because we know change will offer our hope. So after all of this, we must pay more attention to what is happening. The news media has attempted to discredit the Party by saying that it's over, because they don't see anyone. I think our programs are better than the Party. The communities are involved in forty-four cities. We must support these; we must expand them. Because I read an article, recently, a few months ago, where Che had some problems in Bolivia, because the peasants were so unconscious until he could not rally them even with the "focos". They did not understand why the military, the regular military was dropping. So what did he do. He attempted to form certain programs that he called survival programs. He attempted to form a free health program in order to get the peasants inside, to help them, and also to provide things for his focos. He also took to form a free breakfast program, a free shoe factory, and a sporting good store (for obvious reasons). So programs are good. Because an act that might be revolutionary might be counter-revolutionary, if the correct preparations are not made.

So to be a serious revolutionist, we must know that we are involved in a process, and not a set of principles or conclusions that are of face-value revolutionary. I do not know one thing that is revolutionary in itself. And all things might be revolutionary in context. In other words, capitalism was revolutionary when it kicked out feudalism. And now we have a situation where the capitalists have become the imperialists, and the people of the world, of the communities of the world will have to kick them out. So in order to free Angela, Bobby, Ruchell Magee and all other political prisoners, we must kick the fascists out. And we cannot do it with lip service.

POWER TO THE PEOPLE

BOBBY SEALE: "I AM THE CHAIRMAN OF ONLY ONE PARTY."

March, 1971

This is Brother Bobby Seale, from the New Haven Courthouse, back in jail, back here. And I just wanted to say to the people, the masses of people, to all the brothers and sisters, Women's Liberation Movement, Black brothers and sisters, Chicano brothers, the Puerto Rican brothers, the young revolutionary White youth in America, and especially, all the Black brothers and sisters in the Black community, that I've seen a lot of things happening; and I've took time to analyse what's happening. And I see presently that there're some divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions going on. Now the Party accepts constructive criticism. Constructive criticism! But the divisionary, counter-revolutionary actions and jive tactics of Eldridge Cleaver is doing nothing but aiding the pig power structure. Aiding the pig power structure in their attempt to put in gas chambers and jails over 130 political prisoners, who are presently, like myself and Ericka, caught up in these jails, and are being railroaded to the gas chamber, where we're fighting for our lives in these trials. And this is the only thing that Eldridge's actions are doing. This is the only thing that I can see that is going on. And my analysis shows this.

There is no split in the Black Panther Party, at all. But the main thing that we want to get across, I want to get across, to the people is that the Party is based on Survival Programs to serve the people, and these survival programs - from Breakfast for Children to the recent programs that I'm designing right here in jail, in my time that I'm not in court, which is a decent housing fit for shelter of human beings program - these are survival programs - and this program and all other programs that all other revolutionary organizations have are survival programs, that must sustain the people so the people can wage a revolutionary struggle.

And Eldridge Cleaver, who's denouncing these types of programs and carrying on with all those other divisionary jive tactics, is negating the real meaning of a People's revolutionary struggle. That's why the Black Panther Party belongs to the people, because the survival programs come forth, and we set up the survival programs to sustain the people's revolutionary struggle. Even the Vietnamese people, if one would check it out, have their survival programs; they have their cooperative, functional survival programs throughout their land, amongst their people. The people just don't have guns alone fighting their battle. The people over there have actual everyday, functional, constructive survival programs. In their countries, in their lands, and in their everyday operations in fighting the capitalist pigs who occupy their country, they have survival programs. And those survival programs sustain the revolutionary struggle there. Of course, our survival programs will be directly related to here in America. But I, myself, send solidarity and support to all the socialistic, revolutionary peoples of the world, and the socialistic countries and lands - and the different war zones, where the people, the masses in those lands, are fighting against the capitalistic, imperialistic ruling class circles.

And Eldridge Cleaver - who negates the very survival programs that the Party is trying to set forth, that the Central Committee is trying to set forth, and all the real dedicated, hard-working brothers in the Party are trying to set forth to educate the people and serve the people, these survival programs (that) sustain the people's

to the gas chambers. He's aiding the power structure and causing us to be in the prisons, because the political prisoners are the ones who really initiate and work hard to maintain the survival programs for the revolution, the people's revolutionary struggle.

Only the masses of the people can really free political prisoners. And the people must see the value and the validity of the survival programs. And getting on down to it, so the people can understand where it's at, so that the people, even the supporters that we have all over Europe, all the solidarity committees that are in Europe, that're in Sweden, that are in Denmark, and other countries over there, who support the freedom of political prisoners in this country, who support the survival programs of the poor oppressed people in this country, and the revolutionary movement (who are initiating these programs), I am trying myself to get people to understand, that we are beautifully behind them and we are glad and send greetings to them and praise the people who are in the solidarity committees in other countries, and in fact here in America, here in Ameri-KKK-a. I think that the people really have to understand who and what the Black Panther Party is, so that these reactionary, counter-revolutionary, divisionary tactics will not be misunderstood. The Party is not falling apart. It's just that Eldridge Cleaver has personally defected his own self from the Party. He defected from the Party.

And I, Bobby Seale, am the Chairman of only one Party. And that Party is the Party that Brother Huey P. Newton is the Minister of Defense of and one of the supreme, top servants of the people; that Brother David Hilliard is the Chief of Staff of; that Brother June Hilliard is the Assistant Chief of Staff of; that Bobby Hutton was a member of, before the pigs murdered him. I am the Chairman of only one Party, that Brother Fred Hampton, who loved the survival programs for the people, was Deputy Chairman of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, who Brothers Jonathan Jackson and George Jackson are members of. I'm the Chairman of only one Party, of the Central Committee of the Black Panther Party, with Huey, David, and the rest of the brothers and sisters on the Central Committee, where the Central Headquarters happens to be located on Peralta Street in Oakland, (California). So All Power to the People. Right On. And we're going to stick together. We ain't coming up with no jive. We have to free Brothers Ruchell Magee, George Jackson; we have to free Sister Angela Davis; we have to free these brothers and sisters. I am the Chairman of only one Party, the Party that Brother Huey is the Minister of Defense, with David Hilliard, June Hilliard, etc. And we're going to free political prisoners; and, we're going to keep these survival programs going; and, we're going to wage a People's revolutionary struggle, and not no jive, individualistic, defecting actions, by some individual who wants to play power games. I am the Chairman of the Party of which the San Quentin Cadre is apart and parcel of the same Party. The San Quentin Cadre of the Black Panther Party.

So all I have to say to the people is that you know where it's at. We're going to stick in solidarity. There're a bunch of jive renegades and jack-a-napes around. But later for that. Just later for that. Let that ride, cause we got survival to get on with, and a People's revolution to mobilize. And we got political prisoners to free all over this land.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!
RIGHT ON!

Inflammatory Articles

Many of the articles in *The Black Panther* are written by local Party members and concern regional incidents and issues. They are aimed at provoking national black sympathy and joint retaliation for magnified grievances against the authorities.



RACIST-MAD PIGS SIC K9 POLICE DOG ON BROTHER

On Friday night, March 27, 1970, 14 yr. old Brother John (Little Hot-Rod) Hargrove became the victim of a brutal attack inflicted by a K9 Police dog. This brother along with two other bloods were playfully chasing each other along the sidewalk in the area of Sixth and Snyder Streets. When the brothers approached the corner, one brother ran past brushing against a lady standing at the corner. When this happened the lady immediately grabbed the brother. The two other bloods kept running. Soon after the pig grabbed the brother, a light colored station wagon appeared. In the station wagon were two plain clothes pigs. These pigs immediately proceeded to hand-cuff the blood, beat him in the face, and unleash a vicious police dog that ripped the flesh off the brother's body. As the brother tried to escape the blows of the pig beating him in the face, the K9 proceeded to bite him all over his body. While the brother was being beaten by the pig, and attacked by the dog, the other pigs who came along proceeded to chase the other two bloods. The pigs fired a shot barely missing the fore-head of one of the brothers.

Little Hot-Rod, handcuffed, face badly beaten and suffering from dog bites all over his body, was taken to the local police station where he was booked on suspicion of pick-pocketing. He did not receive any medical attention until several hours later at the Philadelphia General Hospital; there they gave him one tetnus shot and put a bandage on each leg. The pig who created the vicious attack was later identified as one of Rizzo's faggot law and order boys of the GRANNY PATROL. The Granny Patrol is a special segment of piggery which employs pigs to dress up as women so that they can arrest suspected pick-pockets.

The party conducted an interview with the bloods who were fortunate enough to get away, we also spoke with the brother's parents, and were able to visit the brother, at the Youth Study Center. We also spoke with the people in the community who witnessed the horrid incident!

Following are excerpts from the tapes which describe the incident. We cannot use names here of the bloods because it has been passed down that the pigs are trying to round up the other brothers.

The racist pigs approached the brothers by shouting "Get them niggers, get them niggers" They chased the bloods with butcher knives, and what appeared to be an ax. One brother was hit with a pipe in the stomach.

People in the community responded to the arrest and attack angrily. When several people in the community demanded that the pigs call off the dog, they were met with racist remarks from the pigs.

The attack was so vicious, the dog ate the underwear on the brothers body. In addition to bites on the brothers hands, legs and waist the dog also bit the brother in the back and rectum. The brother suffered from severe beatings by the pigs, in the face.

When Little Hot-Rod was visited on Sunday at the Youth Study Center, his body was not healing properly. He related that the nurse only applies mercurochrome on the bites. He is suffering from soreness. He is sleeping on hard cots in the over-crowded center. The bites on his body are swollen and inflamed. The brother's first remarks to his family were, "Tell my probation officer to get me out of here, this place is like Byberry" .

Just less than two weeks ago, the brother was beaten in a cell Division. This pig beat him so bad that Methodist Hospital complained to the Police Department. His eyes were badly damaged. The pig's name who inflicted that beating was Juvenile Aid Officer, Charles Kora. Hot-Rod identified Kora as his assailant and since then, he has been harrassed in his neighborhood by every pig who comes through.

At 14, John Hargrove is a marked victim of Frank Rizzo's fascists, like so many other Black youths in this city. Pigs are on the loose to inflict more physical harm to our people. It is high time that we escalate our war on the pigs and drive them out of our communities.

Seize The Time people of Philadelphia, Rizzo and all of his racist paper tigers can be rightously blown away.

Rosemari Mealy
Philadelphia Branch
Black Panther Party

THE BLACK PANTHER, APRIL 18, 1970, P. 9.

NATIONAL GUARD ARMORY BOMBED, HEROES SUCCESSFULLY ESCAPE



Newburyport, Mass. is a small residental New England town basically composed of people from the White working class. Until last Saturday, September 19, Newburyport's only claim to fame was that it is one of the many small towns surrounding Boston which are strongholds for groups like the Minutemen and other right-wing fascist reactionaries. Last Saturday, however, at 6:00 a.m. in the morning a National Guard Armory was bombed, hundreds of rounds of amimunition ripped off, military personnel records taken and to top it off, they left the scene in a one ton army pick-up truck. They (the bombers) attempted to open the vault holding the weapons of the pig army, M-1 rifles, .45 caliber pistols and .30 caliber sniper carbines, but were not able to do so. The act was accomplished in one fast motion, and the heroes escaped capture and one week later, "law enforcement officials" are still scratching their heads in wonderment.

And although the weapons, themselves, tools of our liberation were not liberated from the oppressor, the success of this action cannot be denied.

As has been the case in liberation movements all over the world, the guns and arms made by and for the oppressor eventually ends up in the hands of the oppressed. More important, the unknown people who accomplished this act, obtained hundreds of rounds of desperately needed ammunition. Again, past experiences has shown that while the guns themselves can be obtained in ample supply, the ammunition, the bullets, that actually inflicts death upon our enemy, becomes very scarce. One of the necessities of our struggle is our ability to liberate, stockpile, and then accurately use the ammunition of our oppressor upon our oppressor.

As for the military personnel records, they can obviously be put to good use. Our oppressors must be harassed and intimidated day and night. They must not sleep, nor rest, these are the devils who plot the genocide of Black people. The National Guard Armory in the small town of Newburyport, like other small time towns surrounding the Black colony in Boston is designed to be used against us in the fascist genocidal plot devised by the treacherous minds of the Nixon-Agnew-Mitchell clique. It is to be carried out by those men whose names and addresses are now in the hands of the people. Unknown members of the fascist majority now appear before the people's tribunal and will be judged according to their actions.

This action is just one of many blows which will be dealt out to the oppressor. If this action was intended to help and serve the people, we welcome their help to our just liberation struggle against the Babylonian Empire.

ARM YOURSELF

Michael·Fultz
Boston Chapter
Black Panther Party


SISTER MURDERED IN COLD BLOOD BY RENT-A-PIG
FIVE SERVANTS OF THE PEOPLE RAILROADED BY TUCSON GRAND JURY
STORM TROOPERS INVADE COMMUNITY
THREE PIGS BEAT FIFTEEN YEAR OLD BLACK YOUTH
ENTIRE FAMILY BEATEN AND JAILED

Another regular feature in *The Black Panther* is a weekly article giving detailed instructions for the handling of firearms, or setting forth deportment for urban guerrilla warfare.

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 9, 1970 PAGE 16

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS HOW TO COMBAT C.M.I.

Part 5

The principal of Juche (Self-Reliance) clarified by Eldridge Cleaver, the Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, is "Use what you got to get what you need." To answer the question of how do you combat the pigs' *C.M.I. (communication, mobility* and information), we must first determine what we have going for ourselves. Checking out the practice of self-defense groups, we see that we have the power to determine what is to happen, when it is to happen and how it is supposed *to go down. What, When* and How (W.W.H.)- the element of surprise. The pigs have C.M.I. and self-defense groups have W. W. H.

To consider a self-defense operation successful is not to just *plan and execute but to plan, execute* AND escape. There have been too many instances where members of self-defense groups have planned and executed righteous blows against this racist system only to be captured, wounded or killed. *These are the consequences* for revolutionary activity, however we must keep casualties within an acceptable minimun. The *slogan must be Maximum Damage* to the Enemy, Minimun Damage to Us. Practice has shown that when planning W.W.H. if it is done with knowledge and an understanding of C.M.I. casualties will be kept within an acceptable minimum. *Too often, much attention* is given to a plan up to the point of execution without giving the same attention to evasion and escape, that phase of the operation that determines success. This is a subjective approach, a onesided *approach. W.W.H. is only one side* of the coin, C.M.I. is the other side. Because self-defense groups use W.W.H., the pigs' C.M.I. does not go into operation until a self-defense group commits itself by actually executing some type of *self-defense activity.*

COMMUNICATION



MOBILITY



INFORMATION

All of us should be aware that once C.M.I. is activated pigs start showing on the set from 30 seconds to 1 minute maximum in every *major city in Babylon, therefore* the success or failure of a defense operation is dependent upon the attention given to C.M.I. and the planning of evasion and escape. As I see it, learning to deal with the pigs' C.M.I. is the number one *military* problem facing revolutionary forces in Babylon today. It is time for all who have something to teach, by example, to step forward. And remember, to die honorably, one does not need company.

USE WHAT YOU GOT TO GET WHAT YOU NEED

D.C.

ORGANIZING SELF-DEFENSE GROUPS

Part 6 ON REVOLVERS

Parts 1, 2, 3, 4 and 5 have been in previous issues of the Black Community News Service. This article is on revolvers, it gives a basic run down on the use of revolvers. Check out all of the photographs and notes to help you understand better the functioning of a revolver.

SAFETY PRECAUTIONS:

1. Check to see if gun is loaded. You do this on a revolver by swinging out the cylinder. Pull back on the cylinder latch and gently push *out on the cylinder. (see unloading* a revolver photo #2)

2. Keep your finger off the trigger unless practicing trigger squeeze or firing.

3. Point your gun away from where someone may be shot-Point at the ceiling or to the floor, but wherever you point, make sure no one is in the way and can be harmed.

4. Never leave the hammer cocked on a revolver. (Explanation later on cocking a revolver.)

KINDS OF REVOLVERS:

.38 Snubnose - This gun has only a 2" barrel and shoots 38's. It is very easy to conceal.

.38 Special - Has a 4" barrel and shoots 38's.

.357 Magnum - This is the type of handgun the pig carries. The ammo for this is .357 magnum. Metal piercing bullets will pierce an engine block. This is the best type of revolver to have.

.41 and .44 Magnums - Have more knock down power than a .357 Magnum. The Highway Patrol carries these to shoot through car doors, but a .357 will go through a car door also and .357 ammunition is more plentiful.

PARTS OF A REVOLVER: PHOTO # 1

REVOLVER TERMS



UNLOADING:

Holding gun in left hand (pointed in safe direction) release cylinder latch with right hand. (#3). Push out cylinder with the fingers of left hand (#2). Now that you *have swung out the cylinder* and the bullets are visible you gently push down on the extractor and let bullets drop out into your right hand (#4).

LOADING:

To load, simply follow the same steps in unlatching the cylinder. Then drop bullets into the chambers of your cylinder. Gently push cylinder closed, and you are ready to fire. DO NOT SLAM CYLINDER CLOSED, this causes *extra wear on your gun.*

COCKING A REVOLVER:

Put the tip of your thumb on the hammer holding revolver steady in the palm of your hand. Do not put your finger in the trigger. Pull straight back steadily on your hammer spur until your hammer locks back. You gun is ready to *fire, do not put your finger in* the trigger until you are ready to fire. After cocking hammer, place your thumb directly on the frame beside the hammer, resting the tip of your thumb on the cylinder latch. (Photo #4) *Your forefinger should be placed* on the other side of the gun straight out just above the trigger guard until ready to fire. Everytime you cock the hammer before firing, this is called single action firing.



PHOTO # 2

UNCOCKING A REVOLVER (LOADED):

Keep your finger off the trigger! With gun already cocked, place your thumb on the hammer firmly. Now with the gun firmly in your hand, pointed in a safe direction, and thumb firmly on the hammer (still cocked) squeeze the trigger slowly until you can feel the hammer releasing. IMMEDIATE-

ALL POWER

TO

THE PEOPLE!

LOADING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 3



COCKING A REVOLVER PHOTO # 4

URBAN GUERILLAS

America's complexity will be her downfall, for complex power, communications and transportation networks are unprotected. These systems are the life lines of the industrial and military might of U.S.A. fascism. The source of America's strength is its vulnerable Achilles heel-therefore urban guerrillas, utilizing and relying on information divulged by sympathetic workers, can halt or severely cripple every industry in the nation, and bring fascism crashing to its knees. The dams, power stations, substations and power lines are vulnerable. Highly sophisticated communications networks are used by our enemies for carrying out routine business, and are an extremely important factor, in the fascist reaction to guerilla strikes. The neutralization of the fascist communications lie within the capabilities of urban guerillas.

The disruption of this system would hamper and cripple not only the fascist military but would also effect all industrial outputs. The fascist ruling clique realizes the vunerability of their transportation networks, yet all fascist military forces and industry utilize the railways, the state and interstate highway systems and the airports. Urban guerillas can cut and constantly harass these important links.

Urban guerilla teams highly motivated have already begun to put their theory into practice. Lists are being compiled and are constantly updated on fascist and all enemies of our people, because the location and identification of the enemy is an extremely vital task of urban guerillas. This basic intelligence is necessary for planning retaliatory strikes against our enemies. Where their killer groups, for the most, will be unable to locate guerillas, urban guerillas will, in every attack hit the fascist squarely on the chin. Urban guerillas, being one with the people, must attack like skilled brain surgeons--cutting out the diseased tissue while perserving the good. Their dual purpose is that of destroying all fascist forces and their lackeys, while protecting and serving our people. The fascist ruling clique fears this. They know the Party is preparing to fight until the last of our enemies bites the dust. The Party has dared to take the vanguard role in the struggle and will surely defeat U.S A. fascism no matter what the odds, no matter how great the sacrifice. The Party is aware that the fascists will never lay down their arms of their own accord. And also aware of the direction that U.S.A. fascism is taking in order to survive as long as possible.

In Brazil, the guerilla forces found through social practice that they could best achieve the goal of liberating their people from the strong-hold imposed by the fascist Brazilian oligarchy by waging urban guerilla warfare. Brazil's development as an industrial fascist nation and the economic and social backwardness of the indigenous peasants made the revolutionary forces adapt the strategy of urban guerrilla warfare. The urban guerrillas moved to mobilize the workers, and implement urban guerrilla warfare within the context of their historical experiences with the working class and the fascist ruling class oligarchy. The revolutionary forces have implemented this type of struggle which invariably catches the fascists with their pants down. The type of warfare which turns the asphalt concrete and steel of cities into jungles; into cemeteries for the fascist highly mechanized units and turns his weapons of mass slaughter into paper tigers; into urban jungles where the revolutionary forces can plunge the blade into the hilt in the vunerable life lines of even fascist U S.A In this country as well as in Brazil the fascists tremble with dread at the thought of nationwide attacks by urban guerrilla forces.

In the Pentagon and select centers scattered throughout the U S A., gigantic multimillion dollar computers are manned by hoards of the military. Technicians wrestle with fascism's nightmare-the problem of dealing with urban guerrillas. These machines can only reach an hypothesis drawn from information fed into them. In order for the fascists to test the solutions offered by the computer. they must first circumvent

the frail facade of the constitution and the bill of rights. The fascists realize that if these two pieces of paper were implemented they would be in their graves tonight because the constitution and the bill of rights contain the moral impetus necessary to bring this foul evil economic and social system to its doom.

U S.A. fascists have compiled and are still evaluating information received from South American satellite states who are being beset by courageous urban guerrillas waging relentless struggle with amazing(to fascists)and stunning success. Eldridge Cleaver, Minister of Information of the Black Panther Party, has said that we still have a little time left because the U.S.A fascist ruling clique hasn't programmed all of the people to accept the genocide of the Party and our people yet. For at least a year now, there have appeared in every major newspaper, seemingly innocent space fillers. Articles from UPI-API dealing with the deployment of fascist death squads against the revolutionary forces in South America.

These fillers had the sinister purpose of preparing America for the advent of death squads now in operation in every major urban center. These articles were to prepare the people to accept the first overt actions of the Chicago foul fascist gestapo killer unit. Their predawn kill all--destroy all mission was launched as a pilot, an experimental operation with a two fold objective. One was to put counter-revolutionary theory into practice in America --to bring into the streets the fascist ruling clique's solution to the Party--to test and evaluate the techniques of counter-insurgency urban warfare. The second important objective was to evaluate the response of the people to above ground counter-insurgency killer groups--to see if the people were conditioned to accept the outright fascist terror tactics directed officially by the fascist ruling clique.

Our Party has been and is still the main target of a national dehumanizing campaign. The fascist controlled news media has consistently maligned, viciously attacked and branded our Party as a racist band of blood-thirsty murderers out for their own personal gain. The fascist news media seeks to justify the fascist's program of destroying our people's first line of defense, the Party, and all other organizations which refuse to be either bought off with blood money or intimidated by the repressive fascist forces. The fascist attempts to isolate our Party from the people has been a dismal failure. The liquidation of Deputy Chairman Fred Hampton and Mark Clark had top priority on the fascist's pig list. However, neither the people nor our Party were cowed or intimidated by the bestial slaying of these two revolutionaries. The fascist ruling clique made a grave error in under estimating the will of the people and our Party. People from all walks of life and every progressive organization saw through the fascist attempts to isolate and destroy their Party. The people mobilized and rallied mass support for the Party and soundly condemned the actions of Chicago's fascist killer groups.

Make trouble, fail, make trouble, fail again until their doom. This is the logic of fascists the world over. In Chicago, they refused to acknowledge the bankruptcy of their counter-insurgency campaign. In December, in Los Angeles, Southern California, Chapter of our Party, came under attack by fascist killer groups. Although outnumbered and using inferior weapons, our Party repelled and held at bay the fascist shock troops and sounded the end of Chicago type operations in a fuselage of bullets. We learned valuable lessons paid for with the blood of our revolutionary comrades. The fascist ruling clique has seen the support, that their homicidal raids have generated for the Party. They now know that if conditions are favorable, they will receive tit for tat and then some. They now know that Black and all progressive people will not sit idly by and pacify the action of above ground killer groups Fascists have tried to rally the support of the American people to their avowed aims and failed.

Now begins the phase of underground, clandestine operation of fascist directed killer groups. This is all part of the nature of the fascist ruling clique. The fascists will no doubt expand the techniques of their South American lackeys who operate unrestricted, unswayed by either democratic institutions or public opinion. As the tempo of the struggle increases so will the fascist acts of reactionary terror and violence increase. The primary target of forming clandestine kill groups will be both our people and our Party. If we are to survive as a people, this next phase of attacks, and pave the way to victory, it is imperative that our people be armed with the ideology of the Party. For only then will our people be able to cope with, both, ideological and physical attacks initiated by the insane fascist ruling clique. Huey P. Newton, Minister of Defense, said that our Party must be a living shield that stands between our people and the fascist pigs and that our paper should serve to educate our people so that they will survive.

As the attacks against the Party escalate, so must the awareness of our people be channelled toward acceptance and even more, active participation in urban guerrilla warfare. Phase two of the fascist plans will surely and soundly be defeated. The fascists will awake to find themselves bogged down on that last front. They will be swallowed up in the morass of a people's war. Their graves will be dug by revolutionary urban guerrilla forces amidst the asphalt, concrete and steel of the cities.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEFEAT U S.A FASCISM ON EVERY FRONT

WE'LL ALL BE TOGETHER ON THE DAY OF VICTORY

Randy Williams,
Political Prisoner

REVOLUTIONARY HANDIWORK OF THE URBAN GUERILLA

Provocative Slogans

FREE ALL POLITICAL PRISONERS

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE!

SEIZE THE TIME, BEFORE TIME SEIZES YOU!

AN ATTACK AGAINST ONE IS AN ATTACK AGAINST ALL

BLOOD TO THE HORSES BROW AND WOE TO THOSE WHO CANNOT SWIM!

DARE TO STRUGGLE...DARE TO WIN!

DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS



FOR EVERY PORK CHOP THERE IS A FRYING PAN!

"Revolutionary Art"

The most prominent artist on *The Black Panther* staff is Minister of Culture Emory Douglas. Although he prepares a large number of cartoons, other Panther artists are also represented. These cartoons characterize the Government and local law enforcement as "pigs" and call for the overthrow of the Government and the killing of Government officials, as well as police officers.

The Black Panther; May 9, 1970; page 18



THE REVOLUTIONARY ARTIST

When the Black revolutionary artist starts a still life painting, he doesn't see a beautiful vase, or a dish of tasty fruit, against a soft velvet backdrop...he sees only a tattered curtain, rusty cans, a broken dish--empty.

As he seeks out a beautiful landscape to paint, he sees not fertile fields with dancing flowers, and lovely maidens bathing in the sun, but decaying houses, and streets covered with debris, and a Black woman in ragged clothes with tear-stained cheeks.

The Black revolutionary artist knows only oppression, and that his art must relate to his surroundings, and his people, and most of all, his art cannot be abstract and unrelated to his revolutionary people. So he seeks, and finds what our Minister of Defense Huey P. Newton calls "the spirit of the people." As he moves on that, he shows what *Revolutionary Artist* and Minister of Culture, Emory Douglas shows--"the oppressor *hanging by his heels.*"

The revolutionary artist gives his art to his oppressed people. So with his gun and his brush he shows the spirit of the people moving to crush the oppressor, and this is the essence of revolutionary art. His art then becomes part of the people's revolution.

He knows that only because of the urine covered walls and trash-littered alleys the people's desire for freedom will be replaced with *the BLOOD OF THE OPPRESSOR.*

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
Malik Barafu
N.C.G.F.,
Washington, D.C.

TO ALL REVOLUTIONARY ARTISTS

I would like to take this time to express on behalf of the Black Panther Party our warmest thanks to all revolutionary artists who have given their talents and thoughts to the people through revolutionary art. We would like to say that every artist's work that has appeared in the Black Panther Newspaper this past year has been a great contribution of visual interpretation of the ideology of the Black Panther Party and of the oppressed people of the world.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
DEATH TO THE FASCIST PIGS
Emory Douglas
Minister of Culture
Black Panther Party


1971 YEAR OF THE YOUTH
YOUTH MAKES THE REVOLUTION
DEATH
TO THE
FASCIST
PIGS
EMORY

EVERY DOOR THAT THE FASCISTS ATTEMPT TO KICK DOWN WILL PUT THEM DEEPER INTO THE PIT OF DEATH



SHOOT TO KILL


DEATH TO THE
FASCIST PIG
PIG

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 3, 1970, P. 9.

THE BLACK PANTHER
OCTOBER 17, 1970, P. 16



THE BLACK PANTHER
MARCH 20, 1971, P. 4


PIG
Only the power of the people can free political prisoners

We will not hesitate to kill
or die for our freedom.


TIER 3
"O" WING
RALPH

THE BLACK PANTHER
FEBRUARY 6, 1971, P. 5

THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, MAY 2, 1970 PAGE 13


OINK OINK OINK
OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK OINK
OINK
OINK
OINK
U.S. GOVT.
EMORY
OINK

International News

Panthers profess to believe that American Negroes comprise isolated "colonies" in the heart of the "mother" country, and are part of the Third World, defined as the nonwhite, undeveloped, and underdeveloped countries of the world. The 10-Point Program of the Black Panther Party includes, as a major political objective, a United-Nations-supervised plebiscite to be held throughout the black colony to determine the national destiny of American Negroes.

To internationalize their Party and enlarge their importance, Panther leaders have sought acceptance, support, and funds from sources abroad. They have made numerous trips to foreign countries, including Canada, Mexico, Cuba, Palestine, Germany, France, England, Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Soviet Union, North Korea, North Vietnam, and the Chinese Mainland.

Both at home and abroad, Panther leaders loudly proclaim anti-American sentiments and align themselves politically with the aims and tactics of enemy lands. The international contacts most important to the Panthers are made with revolutionary groups and communist countries, especially those that more closely follow Maoist thinking. The international news section of *The Black Panther* reflects attempts by the Black Panther Party to attract such attention, support, and aid.



THE BLACK PANTHER, SATURDAY, JUNE 27, 1970 PAGE 8

TELEGRAM TO COMRADE KIM IL SUNG

KIM IL SUNG
PREMIER OF THE CABINET
DEMOCRATIC PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF KOREA

June 25th marks the 20th anniversary of the U.S. imperialist aggressive invasion of the DPRK in 1950.

The Black Panther Party takes this occasion to salute the DPRK and the wise and brave leader of the 40 million Korean people, Comrade Kim Il Sung.

We recognize and respect the long history of resistance and victory that Comrade Kim Il Sung and the 40 million Korean people have contributed to the world wide struggle against imperialism and fascism; the shining examples of socialist construction while under severe conditions of U.S. provocation and aggression, the many brilliant ideological contributions you have made to the socialist camp and in particular the concept of "Juche".

Because of our historical experience in America; because we are faced with no alternatives but genocide or liberation we understand the criminal nature and gangster logic of the U.S. ruling class. Black people are increasingly the victims of overt military aggression and U.S. plots to subvert our struggle for national salvation. Under these conditions we have an increasing awareness that the expulsion of the U.S. imperialist burglars from Korean soil and the reunification of Korea will be a victory for the Korean people and a victory for oppressed people the world over.

We see clearly that the reunification of Korea is not seperate from the salvation of Black and other oppressed people in fascist America. As gang boss Nixon and his mob of criminals intensify their attempts to loot Asia they are intensifying their murderous repression of Black people in America. These attacks will be met with revolutionary solidarity manifested in action, both around the world and in the gangsters lair, and with one-beat-a-hundred fighters in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and North America; the U.S.A. will surely be brought to the peoples JUSTICE.

ALL POWER TO THE PEOPLE
CENTRAL COMMITTEE
BLACK PANTHER PARTY
U.S.A.

INTERCOMMUNAL NEWS

MEMORANDUM OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE LAO PATRIOTIC FRONT ON THE ESCALATION OF THE U.S. WAR OF AGGRESSION IN LAOS AND THE SETTLEMENT OF THE LAO PROBLEM

PART II

Application Of The Nixon Doctrine And Escalation Of The War Of Aggression In Laos By The Nixon Administration

UNDER PRESSURE FROM PUBLIC OPINION, NIXON ON MARCH 6, 1970 HAD TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MILITARY PERSONNEL, THE LOGISTIC AND AIR SUPPORT AND "OTHER ACTIVITIES" OF THE U.S. IN LAOS. He also admitted an increase in the U.S. military activities in Laos. But he tried to argue that those activities were "limited" and of a purely "defensive" character aimed at protecting American lives in South Viet Nam.

But public opinion in the United States and in the world immediately pointed out that that was the first time the highest executive in the United States made an open acknowledgement of the violation of the 1962 Geneva Agreements on Laos by the U.S. On March 7, Senator Albert Gore declared that Nixon in fact had conceded that "we (the U.S.) have violated the Geneva Agreements". Public opinion has condemned Nixon's allegations as "queer" and "selfcontradictory" (the Japanese paper "Asahi Shimbun" March 9. "Nixon's allegations were misleading. They mentioned only some facts and not everything and showed no sign of any change of policy." (Senators Scranton and Fulbright, March 6 and 9, 1970).

Obivously, Nixon cannot dupe public opinion which bases its judgement not merely on the words but also on the deeds of the Nixon administration during the recent past.

After Nixon came to power, the so-called "Nixon doctrine on Asia" saw the light which consists in providing more U.S. advisers, weapons and firepower to the Asians, while the latter contribute more mercenaries for the U.S. The formula of this doctrine is "native soldiers plus U.S. advisers and maximum logistic and air support" This is in fact a more elaborate and more refined form of U.S. neo-colonialism's wicked policy of making Asians fight Asians, and natives fight natives.

The active application of that doctrine in Laos finds a concrete expression in the steps of escalation taken by the Nixon administration in its aggressive war in Lao. during the past 18 months, escalation in the logistic supply, in the supply of U.S. military personnel and in the use of U.S. combat troops in the "special war".



The Resistance government formed in 1950 against the French Colonialists.

Under the Nixon administration, the amount of U.S. aid to Laos and military personnel introduced into this country have increased at almost the same rate. Compared with the 140million dollars in 1967, U.S. aid in 1969 rose to 250 million dollars of which only the economic and technical aid accounting for less than 60 million was announced, while the rest was almost exclusively used for military purposes. Thus, military aid - about 190 million dollars a year, - is more than treble the economic aid and makes up [illegible] per cent of the total aid. This figure is approximately the same as estimated by Senator A.J. Allender in a censured report on the scale of American involvement in the war in Laos (AF, Jan. 22 1970). It is necessary to note that what is described as "economic and technical" has also been used for secret activities of a military character. On June 7, 1970, J. A. Hanna, Director of the U.S. Agency for International Development, disclosed that the U.S. aid program also covers the CIA activities in Laos. At present, according to a statement of Senator M. Mansfield on September 21, 1969, U.S. aid in Laos had exceeded [illegible] million dollars a year and continued to increase.

Obviously, the Nixon administration is squandering in Laos more and more money of the American people, while serious social problems in the United States are yet unsettled, because enormous sums are being spent for unjust wars in Laos and in Indochina as a whole.

On March 6, 1970, Nixon said there were 643 advisers and military personnel out of the 1,040 Americans operating in Laos and denied the presence of any U.S. combat troops in Laos. That is not true. Compared with the 5,000 U.S. military personnel in Laos under the Johnson administration, the figure rose to 12,000 U.S. military personnel, with or without military uniform in the first period of the Nixon administration. Of them, there were at least 2,000 air force advisers, or 800 more than in 1967. The number of U.S. advisers assigned to the "special forces" training centres and regular units of the puppet army increased from 150 to 1,000 (according to a British source, the figure might be 2,000). The U.S. "special forces" operating in southern Laos are estimated at about 1,200 men. Thus there is one U.S. military adviser for every six Laos puppet soldiers (compared to the 70,000 men of the Vientiane army). In addition according to a statement of Senator R. Ottinger on April 24, 1970, at least half of the 48,000 U.S. air force personnel in Thailand (i.e. 24,000) are now directly participating in air activities in Laos. All told, the number of U.S. military men now taking part in military activities in Laos on the ground and in the air has run into tens of thousands at least equal to half of the total effectives of the Laos puppet army.

The running of the U.S. colossal war machine in Laos remains an affair of the U.S. embassy, Nixon's ambassador to Vietiane remains a military proconsul. The paper "France Soir", on March 3, 1970 said everything in Laos is controlled from the building of the U.S. embassy which houses the brain of the war machine. The number of army and air force military attaches of the U.S. embassy exceeds 200, an unusual figure for a foreign diplomatic mission in a country like Laos. The USAID agency in Laos is also operating within the framework of the U.S. diplomatic mission in Vientiane and is working for the CIA. [illegible] 1970, J.A. Hann[illegible] acknowledged that Laos is [illegible] place where such things [illegible] did not approve it.

Of late some 1,5[illegible] U.S. "green berets" were introduced into Laos, whose commanders [illegible] (Thailand), U.S. Senator [illegible] on February 2[illegible], 197[illegible] [illegible] number of U.S. "green berets" in Laos had exceeded that of U.S. military advisers in South Viet Nam in the past [illegible] 1969 and early 1970, U.S. [illegible] troops took part in ground attacks on the Plain of Jars area, Meng Khoang province. The U.S. magazine "Newsweek" of April 6, 197[illegible] [illegible] the CIA office in [illegible] GI's [illegible] Viet Nam [illegible] was [illegible] weekly [illegible] d. Har[illegible].

With [illegible] there have been more [illegible] participating in the fighting [illegible] On March 6, 1970, Senator Mansfield [illegible] Americans are fighting [illegible] "The fact that some [illegible] wear uniform does [illegible] this one bit. The fact that American combat troops [illegible] uniform have been fighting in Laos [illegible]"

continued on next page



New textile factory at Sam-Neua



ON CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG'S DECLARATION OF 20 MAY, 1970

In this declaration, Chairman Mao Tse Tung has set forth a brilliant and timely analysis of the qualitatively new situation that exists in the world as a result of the treacherous new acts of aggression launched by the fascist, imperialist Nixon-Chinesepeoples.

This declaration pulls together into clear focus the revolutionary struggles and the liberation struggles ofthepeople of the whole world, including the revolutionary struggle oftheAmerican people themselves.

Speaking specifically for the Black Panther Party, but reflecting the sentiments of millions of oppressed people inside the United States, it has become crystal clear to us that rampant imperialist aggression onthe international scale and vicious fascist repression on the domestic scale are the two faces of the criminal government of the United States and the calculated policy of the American ruling circles. For 400 years now, Black people inside the United States have been the long-suffering victims of fascist violence and repression. But under the Nixon-Pentagon clique, this reactionary violence and repression has been escalated to newheights of barbaric cruelty. At the same time, in order to put down the already gigantic and still growing mass movement among White Americans against the wreckless and sanguinary policies and imperialist adventures of the U.S. government, the cowardly Nixon-Pentagon clique has unleashed a bloodbath against the Americanpeople as a whole, creating for itself new enemies who have joined hands with those who were already determined to carry out a struggle to the bitter end against an economic, political, and social system that is dominated by the madmen in the Pentagon and that is responsible for the misery and bloodshed all over the world today.

Chairman Mao Tse Tung captures the truth of the situation when he points out the unprecedented isolation of the Nixon-Pentagon clique. Never before have these criminals been so exposed and isolated as they are today. And never before has it been so clear that this criminality can only be ended by the people rising up to seize their own destiny from the handfull of willful exploiters and murderers that now have the power in their hands.

Coupling a revolutionary call to arms with revolutionary optimism in the assurance of victory, Chairman Mao Tse Tung, the great leader of the Chinese Revolution, hero and teacher of the revolutionary people of the world, has performed an invaluable service to all mankind by stepping forward at this time to renew the people's indictment of the common enemy of us all--U.S. Fascism and Imperialist Aggression. These courageous words of Chairman Mao Tse Tung will give new heart to the peoples in their lonely anddifficult struggles to throw off the shackles and chains of oppression now being held in place by U.S. Fascism and Imperialism.

Lastly, we wish to point out that only the enemies of the people and those who shirk their revolutionary duties and who are afraid of their own shadows will findfault with Chairman Mao Tse Tung's declaration. For our part, we welcome it, because we have learned, by shedding our blood, that only through relentless struggle, by resorting to arms inside the very house of U.S. Fascism and Imperialism itself, can we gain our freedom and liberation. This is what our experience has taught us and this is the faith that will sustain us as we push forward our struggle..

LONG LIVE CHAIRMAN MAOTSETUNG!
LONG LIVE THE VICTORY OF THE PEOPLES' WAR!
DEATH TO THE U.S. FASCISM AND IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!
ALL POWER TO THEPEOPLE!
Eldridge Cleaver,
Minister of Information
Black Panther Party, U.S.A.

The Black Panther, June 20, 1970, page 16

THE TERROR, BRUTALITY AND MURDER OF MY BROTHERS AND SISTERS IS THE SUFFERING OF BLACK PEOPLE. THEREFORE, NOT TO LET SUCH EVENTS CONTINUE I MUST MERCILESSLY DO AWAY WITH THE LOW-NATURED BEAST THAT BITES THE HAND THAT FEEDS IT.



WE HAVE NO HANG UPS ABOUT REVOLUTIONARY VIOLENCE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

3 - Mr. J. A. [illegible]tz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
(1 - P. V. Daly)
1 - Mr. R. E. Gebhardt
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall

TO :Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/13/75

FROM :J. G. Deegan JGD

1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. G. Deegan
1 - Mr. D. Ryan
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall

SUBJECT:SENSTUDY 75

4063

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

This is to advise of a meeting with representatives of the Senate Select Committee (SSC) on 6/12/75 in my office in accordance with the request set out in Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams memorandum dated 6/4/75.

IS-1 Section Chief J. G. Deegan, Number One Man William H. Atkinson, Unit Chiefs Homer A. Newman, Jr., David Ryan, Garnett T. Tunstall, and Special Agent Paul Daly of the Legal Counsel Division met with Jack Smith and Lester B. Seidel of the SSC staff.

At the outset Mr. Seidel indicated that SSC would do case studies on various organizations against which the COINTELPRO was directed. Black Panther Party (BPP) had been chosen for the start because many BPP members had been involved in and convicted of criminal activity. He distributed copies of a document (a copy of which is attached) outlining the purpose of the meeting and setting out requests that will be made of the Bureau through appropriate channels in connection with this case study. Included in this document, along with requests for various Bureau documents regarding COINTELPRO as it pertains to the BPP, were requests for a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted, a list of all media persons contacted and a list of all FBI personnel connected with this program and their present locations.

The investigative responsibilities of the Bureau, as relates to the BPP, were described generally to Messrs. Seidel and Smith highlighting the origin of this violence-prone organization and the series of violent confrontations in which it participated in the late 1960s. Mr. Seidel stated that he was specifically interested in ascertaining the extent of COINTELPRO and how it related to the investigation of the BPP in San Francisco - Oakland and Los Angeles. COINTELPRO was stressed only as a procedure which could have been followed in the course of our investigation. ~~No specific~~

62-116395-353

REC- 102

Enclosures - 2

ENCLOSURE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ANM/

JUN 24 1975

62-116395

GTT:eks (10)

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

CONTINUED - OVER

instances of institution of counterintelligence activities were discussed, and it was indicated that these activities were minor as far as the overall BPP investigation was concerned.

In connection with COINTELPRO, the Bureau letter to SAC, San Francisco dated 5/11/70 captioned "Counterintelligence and Special Operations" was discussed. Basically, this letter suggests San Francisco consider a proposal that through the use of documents subtly incorporating false information, attempt to give the BPP the impression that the documents were stolen by a disgruntled police employee who is sympathetic to the Panthers. This document was presented to the House of Representatives Committee on Internal Security in 1974 and was included in their publication of hearings conducted by that Committee. Messrs. Seidel and Smith wanted to know if the activities outlined in this letter had been implemented by the San Francisco or Los Angeles Offices. He was advised that this letter was not implemented as it had requested comments and recommendations of the San Francisco Office, and that Office had recommended against the proposals contained therein.

Mr. Seidel asked the identity of the SAC who recommended against this proposal and was advised that the SAC there, at that time, would not necessarily have had personal knowledge of the matter. He then asked identity of supervisor who recommended against proposal and was advised this information was available in the field office. Concerning COINTELPRO in general, he inquired as to specific techniques used against the BPP and whether forgery and wiretaps had been a part of the program. He was advised that we were unable to furnish that information without extensive file review.

Mr. Seidel attempted to discuss Special Operations but he was advised that the matter was not within the purview of the current meeting.

Mr. Seidel explained that they would be traveling to San Francisco and intended to interrogate personnel in that Office as well as unspecified outsiders who may have been involved in COINTELPRO. Mr. Seidel stated that he had asked for the meeting with Bureau personnel to obtain background data to aid them in these

interrogations. Both Messrs. Seidel and Smith expressed appreciation for the assistance given them at this meeting and both additionally expressed their feeling that the Bureau had done a good and proper job in its investigation.

During the course of this meeting a monograph on the BPP prepared by the Bureau in March of 1971 was used for background data. Mr. Seidel expressed a desire to have a copy of this document. This document, which is prepared from public source data, was compiled for public distribution and, if you approve, a copy will be furnished to Mr. Seidel.

ACTION:

For your information and if you approve, one copy of attached document entitled "Black Panther Party"* will be sent to Mr. Seidel.

HEH/JGD

GTT

Get written request signed by Chairman of Committee. WRW

PLM

N[illegible]

*Per G.T. Tunstall, this document is not classified, made up of public source data, + until it became outdated, was furnished to the public. 6/19/75

Delivered to Sherry Towell of SSC 6/20/75 for delivery to Seidel

Black Panther Party: San Francisco-Oakland (Los Angeles)
Late 1960's through early 1970's

The Committee is examining the extent to which this COINTELPRO program relates to criminal investigation; the results obtained; the relationships between the FBI and local authorities (police and other governmental agencies); media and community leaders; the methods of targeting; techniques used to achieve program goals; legal authority; and authorization procedures and accountability.

To pursue this inquiry, the Committee requests the following documents in this initial stage:

1. 90-day status letters and reports;
2. letter and other documentary requests for particular COINTELPRO techniques and the responses thereto;
3. amendments and supplements to 1 and 2;
4. all previously requested related documents (e.g., field office inspection reports);
5. a list of all criminal investigations directly or indirectly related to this COINTELPRO, with explanation of the dispositions thereof;
6. a list of all local police departments and personnel contacted relative to this COINTELPRO;

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/11/2000 BY SP2 alm/tmk
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-253

7. a list of all media persons contacted in relation to this COINTELPRO and their media affiliation;

8. a list of all FBI personnel connected with this COINTELPRO, their specific connection, and their present location;

9. all other materials the FBI feels is necessary for the Committee to have a full understanding of this COINTELPRO.

The following persons will be interviewed by the Committee; the Committee requests information as to the whereabouts, and relation to the FBI should be indicated:

1. Robert E. Gebhardt
2. Harry Morgan
3. David E. Todd
4. Charles Bates
5. primary case agent(s) responsible for this COINTELPRO in the field
6. Bureau supervisor for this COINTELPRO.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. __
Dep. AD Inv. __
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. __
Ext. Affairs __
Files & Com. __
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Eval. __
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. __
Director Sec'y __

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that a representative of captioned Committee requested to be given a briefing concerning counterintelligence programs as applied to our investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco.

Lester Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee who is assigned the area of COINTELPROS, advised that the Committee is preparing what he termed case studies on COINTELPROS in four separate areas. He defined these areas as the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, White Knights of the Ku Klux Klan of Mississippi, the Professor Morris J. Starsky incident, and the Fred Hampton case (Black Panther Party leader in Chicago who was killed during a police raid in Chicago, Illinois).

Seidel previously had requested the Bureau arrange interviews of various Bureau personnel whom he considered familiar with the San Francisco Black Panther Party investigation, and at that time stated he intended to interview these individuals in two or three weeks. Mr. Seidel requested that prior to conducting interviews concerning this particular area, he desired to be briefed during the week of June 8 concerning the Bureau's general overall investigation of the Black Panther Party in San Francisco, along with the use of counterintelligence proposals against that organization. In this regard he desired that someone knowledgeable in this aspect be made available to brief him concerning this matter.

[illegible] 6/13/75 [illegible]

62-116395

REC- 102

62-116395-252

5-TUNSTALL

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

12 JUN 24 1975

PVD:kjs (7)

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL

84 [illegible] 27 1975 *Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan*

Legal Counsel to Mr. J. B. Adams Memo
RE: SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Seidel also stated that he was submitting a written request to the Bureau for certain Bureau documents pertaining to the COINTELPRO operations in the San Francisco Office and specifically mentioned requesting the quarterly status letters from that office on COINTELPRO.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) The Intelligence Division advise if a briefing can be arranged and the date and time of such a briefing.

2) Legal Counsel Division will advise Mr. Seidel of the Bureau's decision in this regard.

WRW/TM

PVD

JBH|PVD

We should carefully consider fact that
Hampton case is subject of pending litigation
and coordinate with Dept. [illegible]
[illegible] specific [illegible] provided.

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

Intelligence Community Staff

DCI/IC-75-0620
18 JUN 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

SUBJECT : Request for Documents by SSC

Attached is a request for documents received by CIA from the Senate Select Committee Staff on 10 June 1975. It is provided to you for information.

John M. Clarke
Acting Deputy to the DCI
for the Intelligence Community

Attachment: as stated

62-116395

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 23 1975

5

file 62-116395

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF
MDR-16

CLASSIFIED BY 006805
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)], (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

JUN 23 1975

~~SECRET~~

R223

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

DCI/IC 75-2902

~~SECRET~~

June 10, 1975

Mr. Walter Elder
Central Intelligence Agency
Headquarters
Langley, Virginia

Dear Mr. Elder:

Further to our conversation regarding formal requests for documents and records, I attach a list of supplemental document requests.

What I would propose is that you and I discuss this list to insure that we have properly identified the requested documents.

In addition to the attached list I would like to review studies in the historical series: (1)"Maritime Operations in Indonesian Operations -- 1957-1958;" "Overthrow of a Government, November 1952-1953;" and any studies prepared that trace the CIA's activities in relation to the overthrow of the government of Guatamala in 1954.

Sincerely,

William B. Bader

Attachment

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY sp2 alm/lmf
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE
62-116395

R223

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

To: Bill Bader

From: Elliot Maxwell

Date: June 9, 1975

Subj: Supplemental Document Requests

1. The General Counsel's memo on February 3, 1975 on proprietaries mentioned in the briefing paper prepared for the Rockefeller Commission.

2. The Inspector General's Survey of Propeietaries from 1967.

3. Inspector General's Survey of Domestic Operations Division done prior to May 26, 1966.

4. The opinion on covert action authority of the CIA prepared by the Justice Department under Attorney General Katzenbach.

5. List of those individuals who worked with John Richards.

6. List of the component surveys from 1960 to 1970. (Approximately 50 studies)

7. The subject heading list, the keyword list, and the name list, used for filing in the Office of General Counsel.

8. The Bureau of the Budget Confidential Report on Intelligence and Security Activities of the Government, dated September 20, 1945. (HS/HC-71, Item 1).

9. The Report by William H. Jackson, on the Coordination of Intelligence Functions and the Organization of Secret Intelligence in the British intelligence system. This is a report for the OSS dated August, 1945. (HS/HC-801, Item 9.)

10. A list of titles of the National Intelligence Estimates and Special National Intelligence Estimates from January 1, 1970 to the present.

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 SPR aim/jmc

MOR-16

62-116395-

ENCLOSURE

11. The Office of the General Counsel memo on the subject "Text and Explanation, Public Law 110," dated October 10, 1952.

12. The Interim Report to the National Security Council by Dulles, Correa, and Jackson, dated May 13, 1948 and entitled "Relations Between Secret Operations and Secret Intelligence."

13. The paper by the Office of General Counsel on the Origins of the CIA, which is mentioned in the memo of the General Counsel of September 1973.

14. The two pages of General Vandenberg's testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee outlining the clandestine collection function of the CIA, which were never published, a copy of which is now in the possession of Walter Pforzheimer.

15. An explanation of all the two-letter prefixes to the project names. (diographic)

16. The paper prepared by the Office of the Controller entitled "Historical Notes re: Budget and Finance Activities of CIA and Predecessor Organizations, 20 September 1945 through Janaury 1952." This is identified as HS/HC-36, Item 2.

17. The history of the development of NSCID-5 by Mrs. Margaret Ehrmantraut.

18. Study on Major Policy Authorizations for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948 through 1966.*

19. Draft bill written by Lawrence Houston in the Fall of 1946, entitled "A Bill for the Establishment of a Central Intelligence Agency," cited in the archives as HS/HC-805, Item

20. Detailed Budget Submissions and house notes prior to 1967.

21. (a) The transcript of the Senate Hearings on the CIA Act of 1949, cited Paragraph 7 OGC 73-2169, Memo for the Record, 20 November 1973, Subject: Payment to Richard Patrick Lippert;

    (b) Any documents relating to the inquiry by the Secretary of Defense in 1947 mentioned in Paragraph 8 of above memo.

22. Annex to the 1963 Inspector General's Report on Technical Services Division on Experiments with Drugs.

* Already on our priority list: for transmittal to Select Committee offic

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins

CODE TELETYPE NITEL

1 - Each Assistant Director

TO ALL SACS

JUNE 11, 1975 3 per SLP

FROM DIRECTOR FBI (62-116464)

PERSONAL ATTENTION
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. S. F. Phillips

HOUSTUDY 75.

REBUTELS MAY 2,20, 1975, "SENSTUDY 75."

BUFILE 62-116464 AND CODE NAME "HOUSTUDY 75" DESIGNATED FOR ALL MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND BUREAU'S HANDLING OF MATTERS PERTAINING THERETO. USE THIS FILE NUMBER AND CAPTION FOR MATTERS RELATING TO HOUSE COMMITTEE AS SEPARATE FROM SENSTUDY 75 FOR MATTERS RELATING TO SENATE COMMITTEE.

SFP:mjg
(19)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 1 1975
TELETYPE

NOTE:

Referenced teletypes advised field of our pledge of full cooperation with Senate Committee and issued instructions concerning handling contacts with Senate Committee Staff as well as handling of matters relating to interviews with present and former Bureau employees. Inasmuch as we have opened a separate file under Houstudy 75, it is believed this teletype would assist in prompting better management of correspondence between Bureau and field.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-9

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/15/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16 WRW/TAL

WRW/B

PCM

66-116395

NOT RECORDED
JUN 23 1975
46 JUN 23 1975

84 JUN 23 1975

May 23, 1975

1 - Mr. Wannall
(Attn: Mr. Schwartz)

Mr. Morton H. Halperin
122 Maryland Avenue, N. E.
Washington, D. C. 20002

Senstudy-75

Dear Mr. Halperin:

Reference is made to my letter to you dated April 8th, regarding your request for the "Delimination Agreement of 1948."

Coordination of this matter with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has disclosed three documents which are pertinent to your request. It is my understanding that two of the three documents have been released to you by that agency, and I am enclosing with this letter, the third document. You will find this letter dated October 2, 1948, from former FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover to Mr. Frank G. Wisner, then the Assistant Director for Policy Coordination, CIA, contains certain deletions. The material deleted refers to the same material excised in one of the two documents furnished to you by CIA, and concerning which CIA asserted exemption provisions found in Title 5, United States Code, Section 552 (b)(1) and (b)(3). These provisions relate to matters that warrant classification and those which are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. It is considered appropriate for the same exemption provisions to be cited by this Bureau in connection with the deleted portion.

You have thirty days from receipt of this letter to appeal to the Attorney General from any denial contained herein. Appeals should be directed in writing to the Attorney General (Attention: Freedom of Information Appeals Unit), Washington, D. C. 20530.

MAILED 6
MAY 23 1975
FBI

ORIGINAL FILED IN 63-1462-46

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 30 1975

THB:dm (7)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPAAIM/DMF
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 951-546

Mr. Morton H. Halperin

The envelope and the letter should be clearly marked "Freedom of Information Appeal" or "Information Appeal." Following the Attorney General's decision, judicial review is available in the district of your residence or principal place of business, or in the District of Columbia, where the records are situated.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Delivered to CIA 5/27/75 VAS

Enclosure

1 - Freedom of Information Act Coordinator - Enclosure
Central Intelligence Agency
Attention: Mr. Charles Saviage
Washington, D. C.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attn: Susan M. Hauser

NOTE: See copy of H. C. Flemister memo to Mr. W. R. Wannall, dated 5/7/75, captioned "Morton Halperin, FOIA Request," copy of which is attached. The material CIA requested to be excised has been deleted as described in this letter, and the Bureau file copy of the letter is not classified. Contact with CIA FOIA Section discloses the deletion of the material in the CIA letter dated 9/22/48 accomplishes the declassification of those documents. This has been coordinated with Intelligence Division. The original Bureau document is found in 65-48066-9.

~~SECRET~~

1 - [illegible] W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. J. P. Lee

CODE TELETYPE IMMEDIATE

TO SACS NEW YORK
BOSTON
DETROIT
LOS ANGELES
MIAMI
SAN FRANCISCO
SEATTLE
WFO

JUNE 18, 1975

FROM DIRECTOR FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

SENSTUDY 1975; BUDED: JUNE 24, 1975.

THE FOLLOWING REQUEST FOR INFORMATION HAS BEEN ADDRESSED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AND FROM THE ATTORNEY GENERAL TO FBIHQ FROM THE SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: " . . . THE FOLLOWING REQUESTS PERTAINING TO THE TECHNIQUE REFERRED TO AS 'MAIL SURVEILLANCE, INCLUDING MAIL COVERS AND OPENING MAIL' AND THE UTILIZATION OF THIS TECHNIQUE 'IN INTERNAL SECURITY, INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION, AND/OR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MATTERS, OPERATIONS, OR ACTIVITIES:' (1) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL OPENING OR MAIL INTERCEPT BY OR ON BEHALF OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT, THE TYPE OF MAIL OPENED OR INTERCEPTED,

JPL:jdp
(4)

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

CLASSIFIED BY SP2 AJM/JMF
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 X 1
MDR-16

REC-75 62-116395-249

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION
JUN 18 1975
5:18 pm
TELETYPE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

WRW
WOB

~~SECRET~~

JUN 20 1975

84 JUN 25 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☑

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

GPO : 1975 O - 569-920

AND THE PURPOSE OF THE OPENING OR INTERCEPT. (2) FOR ALL INCIDENTS OF MAIL COVERS THAT WERE PHYSICALLY CONDUCTED BY FBI EMPLOYEES, WHETHER ALONE OR IN COOPERATION WITH POSTAL SERVICE EMPLOYEES, FROM JANUARY 1, 1960, UNTIL THE PRESENT, PLEASE STATE THE PHYSICAL LOCATION WHERE THE COVER WAS CONDUCTED, THE NAMES OF THE INDIVIDUALS WHO PARTICIPATED IN THE COVER, THE TYPE OF MAIL COVERED, AND THE PURPOSE OF THE COVER. (3) PLEASE PROVIDE ALL DOCUMENTS AND MEMORANDA WHICH DISCUSS, REFER, OR RELATE TO THE ORIGINS, AUTHORIZATIONS, CONDUCT AND TERMINATION OF, AND POLICIES AND PROCEDURES FOR, THE MAIL OPENINGS, INTERCEPTS, AND COVERS IDENTIFIED ABOVE."

EACH OFFICE SHOULD IMMEDIATELY REVIEW ITS FILES FOR ALL INFORMATION REQUESTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE. NEW YORK, BOSTON, DETROIT, LOS ANGELES, SEATTLE, AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING SAM SURVEY. NEW YORK, DETROIT, AND SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING [GUS SURVEY.] (S) NEW YORK AND WFO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING Z COVERAGE. SAN FRANCISCO SHOULD FURNISH INFORMATION CONCERNING CHIPROP

~~SECRET~~

PAGE THREE ~~TOP SECRET~~

AND CHICLET. MIAMI SHOULD ADVISE IF THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM MM 890-S* RESULTED FROM INTERCEPT OF MAIL AND IF SO APPROPRIATE INFORMATION SHOULD BE FURNISHED. RESULTS SHOULD BE SUBMITTED BY TELETYPE, ATTENTION OF SA W. O. CREGAR, AND SHOULD REACH THE BUREAU BY JUNE 24, 1975.

~~CLASSIFIED BY 3676, XGDS 2 AND 3, INDEFINITE.~~

1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. G. T. Tunstall
6/4/75

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE (IEC)
INTERNAL SECURITY, MISCELLANEOUS

Senstudy -75

This is to receive approval for submission of copies of documents requested by the U. S. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. By letter dated 5/14/75 Senator Frank Church, Chairman of the above Committee, requested the Attorney General furnish documents including "all memoranda and other materials in the possession of the FBI pertaining to the activities of the IEC." (Appendix C, I, 14).

Mr. Kevin Maroney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, advised Supervisor Garnett T. Tunstall on 5/29/75 that the Department has made available to Senator Church's Committee all data contained in Departmental files on the IEC. Included in this material are work papers and final estimates prepared by IEC as well as communications between IEC and the Bureau. The only information remaining in Bureau files not already made available to the Committee consists of in-office memoranda. These memoranda fall into three general categories:
1. Those dealing with the origin and staffing of IEC,
2. Memoranda setting out requests from IEC for information from the Bureau and requests for approval to send such data to IEC and
3. Memoranda transmitting estimates and work papers of IEC which was the result of information furnished by the Bureau and other participating agencies.

These memoranda, without exception, show that the Bureau's participation in IEC was at the instruction of the Attorney General, its activities were legal and that the Bureau's contribution was substantial. It should be noted that the memorandum M. A. Jones to Mr. Bishop dated 11/25/70 captioned

1 - 62-116395 (SENSTUDY 75)
Enclosures
62-113887
GTT:eks (4)

62-116395 -
NOT RECORDED
18 JUN 25 1975

CONTINUED OVER

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 bm/lmf
MDR-16

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-113887-2

84 JUN 25 1975

"Robert C. Mardian, Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, Meeting with the Director, 11/25/70," has been excised to delete information not germane to IEC. Copy of original memorandum not excised attached.

ACTION:

If approved, copies of the above-described memoranda, which are attached, will be transmitted to the Department by LHM for referral to the Senate Select Committee.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 6/10/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE

On 6/9/75, Mr. K. William O'Connor telephonically advised me that the Committee is interested in information concerning certain electronic surveillance coverage instituted at the request of the White House concerning seventeen individuals. Mr. O'Connor said that he understands that a letter was addressed to the White House by the Bureau furnishing copies of documents that summarized the information available to the Bureau concerning the alleged seventeen wiretaps. Mr. O'Connor requested that he be briefed concerning this matter in order for him to discuss the Committee's requests.

It appears that Mr. O'Connor may be referring to a letter dated July 23, 1974, that was addressed to Mr. George P. Williams, Associate Counsel to the President, at the White House. A memorandum was addressed to the Attorney General also dated July 23, 1974, captioned "Electronic Coverage Placed At The Request of the White House," which advised the Department that pursuant to the authorization of the Deputy Attorney General certain documents had been furnished to Mr. Williams at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division identify the materials involved in Mr. O'Connor's request and provide him with an appropriate briefing.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mtm
(7)

WRW/TW

memo to Mr. Cregar [illegible]
6/11/75 [illegible]

62-116395-247

5

REC-102

17 JUN 23 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/23/2000 BY SP2 RLM/MC
MOR-16

84 2 3 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

2 - J. A. Mintz
(1 - J. B. Hotis)
1 - W. R. Wannall

The Attorney General

June 18, 1975

1 - W. O. Cregar
1 - A. B. Fulton
1 - D. Ryan

Director, FBI

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Attached herewith in 14 bound volumes are excised copies of Exhibits A through E of the Department report of FBI Counterintelligence Program (Cointelpro) activities, prepared by the committee chaired by former Assistant Attorney General Henry E. Petersen.

These exhibits are individual write-ups prepared by the FBI of each proposed action in the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, White Hate, Black Extremist, and New Left Cointelpros.

In my letter to you dated April 21, 1975, I recommended against release of these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee as they are internal work papers which were prepared as a part of the deliberative process for an in-house Department investigation. I strongly object to the release of these exhibits. In the event you deem it necessary to release these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee, I request the enclosed copies, which have been excised in an attempt to avoid intrusions upon individuals' right of privacy and compromise of sensitive investigative techniques and sources, be made available.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116009

Enclosures (14)

62-116395

1 - The Deputy Attorney General
Attention: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

1 - 62-116009

DR:pld
(11)

Director signed original which was hand carried with enclosures to O'Connor 5 15/P 6/17 by SA Daly. Jam

REC-104 62-116395-245

17 JUN 23 1975

See NOTE page 2.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/tml
MDR-16

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

84 JUN 23 1975

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

GPO 954-546

The Attorney General

NOTE:

On 6/11/75 Legal Counsel advised Mr. K. William O'Connor of the Department of our objection and our desire that excisions be made if we are overruled. Mr. O'Connor suggested the excised material be prepared on an expedite basis. It appears the Department will make available these exhibits to the Senate Select Committee but we feel we should be on record as relates to FBI recommendations and objections.

This letter and exhibits A through E, which will be made available to Legal Counsel, should be delivered to Mr. O'Connor at the Department by Legal Counsel Division.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. Daly)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

TO : Mr. W. R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

FROM : W. O. Cregar

SUBJECT: INTERVIEW OF MRS. DOROTHY SKILLMAN
6/4/75
SENSTUDY 75

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

On 6/4/75, Mrs. Dorothy Skillman, former Executive Assistant to Mr. Clyde Tolson, was interviewed by Mr. Mark H. Gittenstein and Miss Mary Deoreo of the Senate Select Committee Staff. Mrs. Skillman was escorted to the interview by former Assistant to the Director John P. Mohr who remained outside the interview room during the interview. Prior to the interview, Mrs. Skillman was met by SA L. F. Schwartz at which time she advised that she had been advised by Mr. John Hotis, Office of Legal Counsel, that the interview was to be concerning Mr. Hoover's Official and Confidential (OC) files and that if questions came up during the interview on other matters which might impinge on sensitive sources and methods, current Bureau investigations, etc., she was free to request an interruption of the interview to consult with Mr. Schwartz.

The interview of Mrs. Skillman commenced at 2:30 p.m., and it was terminated at approximately 4:30 p.m. On only one occasion toward the end of the interview, Mrs. Skillman asked to consult with Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz. She advised that the interviewers had asked her concerning her knowledge of what might have been in certain cartons which were reportedly stored in the recreation room area of the late Director's residence. Mrs. Skillman stated that she thought these cartons contained many of the gifts and mementos that had been collected by Mr. Hoover over a period of years. After consulting with Mr. Mohr, she realized that she knew this only from comments that had been made to her by Mr. Mohr and had no firsthand knowledge of the contents of the cartons. On Mr. Mohr's advice, she advised the interviewers that she had no firsthand knowledge of what was in the cartons but that she knew that Mr. Mohr was aware of what was in them because he was present when the appraisers of Mr. Tolson's estate inventoried the entire house including these cartons. At the conclusion of the interview, Mr. Gittenstein commented to Mr. Mohr that he might have further questions to ask him concerning the contents of the cartons but would probably handle that by a telephone call to Mr. Mohr.

COPY [illegible] PERSONNEL RECORDS UNIT

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MF
(8)
MDR-16

REC-102

62-116395-244

CONTINUED - OVER

PERS. REC. UNIT

84 JUN 23 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
Re: Interview of Mrs. Dorothy Skillman
6/4/75
Senstudy 75

After the completion of the interview, Mrs. Skillman advised Mr. Mohr and Mr. Schwartz that the interviewers had asked her a great number of questions concerning her knowledge of the OC files which she said was very limited, the layout of Mr. Hoover's house and the work that Mrs. Skillman and Miss Gandy had done at the residence subsequent to Mr. Hoover's death. She stated that the interviewers were quite courteous and in no way antagonistic. Mr. Mohr requested Mrs. Skillman to type up an informal memorandum concerning the interview and he indicated that when this was done, he would provide a copy to the Bureau.

ACTION:

For information.

WRW

4-312 (Rev. 12-11-73)

Date of Mail 6/13/75

Has been removed and placed in the Special File Room of Records Section.

See File 66-2554-7530 for authority.

Subject JUNE MAIL SENSTUDY 75

Removed By 79 JUN 24 1975

File Number 62-116395-242

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/24/2006 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

Permanent Serial Charge Out

DOJ/FBI

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

JUN 9 1975

TO: Kevin Maroney
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

John Mintz
Legal Counsel Division
Federal Bureau of Investigation

FROM: K. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence
Coordination

Bill

SUBJECT: IRS - SSC Request

Senstudy-75

Attached is a copy of the SSC document request served upon IRS which I received on June 3, 1975. Since some of the items may relate to DOJ/FBI functions, I thought you should be aware of the scope of the request, as a matter of information.

The Topical Task Forces may need to be alert to this request as a matter of prospective coordination.

cc: Deputy Attorney General

5 ENCLOSURE

"ENCLOSURE ATTACHED"

REC- 102

62-116395-241

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/00 BY SP2 ALM/LMF
MDR-16

17 JUN 19 1975

62-116395

84 JUN 19 1975

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

3 JUN 1975 DCI/IC 75-2033

Mr. William O'Connor
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination
Office of the Deputy Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. O'Connor:

Attached is a copy of a Senate Select Committee request to the Treasury Department dated 14 May 1975. Mr. Collins of Treasury has requested you be provided a copy of this request, but no other distribution will be made. It will, of course, become an entry in the Community Central Index.

Yours very truly,

Harriett D. Mowitt
Harriett D. Mowitt
Executive Secretary
USIB Ad Hoc Coordinating Group

Attachment: As stated

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-241

DCI/IC 75-2009

Department
of the Treasury
Office of Special
Assistant to Secretar
for National Security

to. Mr. John Clarke, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, C

room. ______ date. 5/29/75

Forwarded is a copy of the Senate Select Committee's first request to the Internal Revenue Service for documents and explanations. As I stated yesterday at the Ad Hoc Committee meeting there have been some discussions with the Committee staff since this letter was received and the staff has indicated that they plan to revise the questions considerably. In these circumstances you may wish to hold distribution of this document to other members of the Ad Hoc Committee until we receive the revised document. The one exception to this might be the Justice Department since some of the questions will involve matters of interest to them.

Foster

J. Foster Collins
room 4328
964-~~242xx~~ 2631

62-116395-341

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMA[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.

HOWARD H. BAKER, [illegible] TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, [illegible]IZ.
CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate

SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

May 14, 1975

COMMISSIONER
MAY 16 1975
INTERNAL REVENUE

Hon. Donald C. Alexander
Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service
Internal Revenue Building
1111 Constitution Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20224

Dear Commissioner Alexander:

The Committee appreciates your letter pledging the full cooperation and assistance of the Internal Revenue Service in the work of the Senate Select Committee on Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. We also appreciate your forwarding the draft resolution which would authorize the Committee to review any "tax-related information" which may fall within the purview of its responsibilities. Such a resolution is being put forward.

In an effort to expedite the Committee's inquiry into the intelligence functions of the Internal Revenue Service, the Committee asks your cooperation and assistance in furnishing the material and information sought in the enclosed "First Request for Documents from the Internal Revenue Service" and "First Interrogatories to the Internal Revenue Service". It is the Committee's desire that most of the material and information requested be provided by May 30 and the remainder very shortly thereafter. We also request that you provide the answers and documents as they are compiled rather than holding those which are initially compiled until May 30.

In the near future, the Committee's Chief Counsel will be in touch with your General Counsel to work out the mechanics of delivering the requested documents and interrogatory answers and to arrange for close liaison between the Committee's staff and the Internal Revenue Service personnel with whom the staff will wish to meet.

While we recognize that the enclosed requests are substantial, they reflect the broad mandate given to the Committee by the Senate. We believe that it is in the national interest that we perform our

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-541

work under that mandate both expeditiously and thoroughly. Of course, for us to proceed expeditiously, it is necessary to obtain prompt cooperation from the Executive agencies involved. We are hopeful that with your continued cooperation the end result of our joint efforts will meet the Committee's responsibilities to the Congress and to the American people.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church

Frank Church
Chairman

FIRST REQUEST TO INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FOR DOCUMENTS

The Committee wishes to identify all intelligence collection analysis and dissemination functions performed by the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to review the legal authority for such activities, the manner in which they are ordered and controlled, the coordination of such activities with other federal agencies, the exchange of intelligence information with other federal agencies and any other cooperation with such agencies relative to intelligence activity. In pursuit of this inquiry the Committee requests, that the IRS provide the Committee with the documents and information identified below.

The request is divided into two major parts. The first part seeks documents which relate generally to any intelligence functions which the IRS performs. The second part seeks documents relating to specific intelligence functions of the IRS of which the Committee is aware. Therefore, many of the documents encompassed by the second part of the request will also be encompassed by the first part of the request.

Wherever used herein, the following terms shall have the following meanings:

Documents	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, compute memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language and any other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
Intelligence	Information about persons or entitie other than purely financial information.
Relating to	Relating in whole or in part to.
Federal agencies	All such agencies, including the White House.

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

I. GENERAL REQUEST

With respect to each intelligence gathering or intelligence dissemination function of the IRS either now being performed or which has been performed within the last fifteen years, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart of the organizational unit performing the function indicating the total number of employees in each unit, the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, the chain of command to the organizational unit performing the function.

2. All rules, guidelines, regulations, manuals or other documents defining the function or providing guidance or control to those performing it.

3. All statutes, executive orders, departmental regulations, agency regulations, and any other documents or materials which constitute legal authority for the function.

4. The annual budget of the organizational unit performing the function for the last five years or, in the case of a unit which has ceased to exist, for the last five years of its existence.

5. All documents relating to any agreement or understanding with any other federal agency or the executive or any state or local government or agency regarding the function or the dissemination of any intelligence produced by the function.

6. All documents constituting or relating to reports or investigations of the function performed by the IRS or any other entity, and all documents relating to the establishment of the function.

7. All documents relating to electronic surveillance by IRS or other federal agencies.

II. SPECIFIC REQUESTS

A. Organization and Functions of Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions

With respect to the Intelligence and Internal Security Divisions of the IRS, please furnish the following:

1. An organizational chart indicating the total number of employees in each category or position, defining the assigned duties and responsibilities of each position, and delineating the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the Chief of each division.

2. A breakdown of the personnel in each of the two named divisions assigned to each district office, indicating the titles and functions associated with each position in each office.

3. Copies of all rules, guidelines and regulations defining the duties, functions, and responsibilities of each of the two divisions.

B. Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following specific categories of documents:

1. All documents relating to or constituting the recommendations of the study group convened in 1969 by William A. Kolar to study the feasibility of Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System, including all backup documents for such recommendations, and any documents reflecting dissenting views.

2. All documents passing from, to, or between William Kolar and the Commissioners of Revenue or their assistants relating to the plans for and progress made toward the implementation of IGRS.

3. All documents containing evaluations of the various methods of implementation of IGRS.

4. All documents constituting regulations, employee instructions and operating manuals regarding the IGRS, including guidelines, rules or regulations regarding the receipt and storage of information from other federal agencies.

5. All documents passing between the Chief of the Intelligence Division and the District Manager relating to the implementation of IGRS in each District.

6. All documents and guidelines relating to the implementation of IGRS in individual districts or in districts as a whole.

7. A breakdown by district of the IGRS files maintained in each district office, indicating the following:

(a) the number of such files on which some form of action constituting enforcement of the tax laws other than the maintenance of the file has actually been undertaken;

(b) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file is planned;

(c) the number of such files on which specific enforcement action other than the maintenance of the file has not been taken and is not planned.

? 8. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which no files are maintained.

9. An alphabetical list of the names of individuals, groups and organizations contained in IGRS on which files are maintained.

10. Any regulations or documents relating to criteria for determining the duration of a file in IGRS.

11. Any documents relating to rules or guidelines for analysis and dissemination of information held in IGRS.

12. Any documents relating to actual instances of dissemination to any person or organization, including other federal agencies, of information contained in IGRS.

13. Any documents relating to or constituting requests by anyone, including other federal agencies, for information contained in IGRS.

14. All documents which have been gathered or produced by the group formed in December 1974 to study the operation of IGRS, and all documents relating to or explaining the establishment of the study group.

C. Internal Revenue Strike Force Participation

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following information and documents relating to the participation by IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces:

All documents constituting or relating to agreements with other agencies regarding participation by the IRS in Organized Crime Strike Forces, including any documents relating to the desirability of participating on such strike forces.

D. Special Service Staff

In addition to the documents requested in Part I, please furnish the following documents relating to Special Service Staff (SSS):

1. any document which established the SSS;

2. a detailed organizational chart of the SSS indicating the number of employees in each unit of the SSS and the duties and responsibilities of the employees of each unit, as well as the chain of command from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to the head of SSS;

3. a document or documents indicating the names of all employees of SSS during its existence, and indicating the position occupied by each such employee;

4. all documents relating to the policies, operations and procedures of the SSS relating to the collection, analysis, storage and dissemination of information;

5. all documents relating to the transfer of any SSS files to IGRS.

E. Audit Division

In addition to any documents relating to the Audit Division which may be encompassed by Part I, please furnish:

1. the rules, regulations and guidelines, including employee manuals, for selection of taxpayers for audit and the legal authority for such rules, regulations and guidelines;

2. the rules, regulations and guidelines relating to the storage, use and dissemination of information gathered through audits;

3. all documents relating to any of the following occurring since 1950

(a) Politically motivated requests for an audit of any person or entity

(b) Requests by any person or state or federal agency whose official duties do not normally require the use of financial information on individual taxpayers for an audit of any person or entity

4. All documents constituting rules or guidelines for removal of taxpayers' names from the list of those to be audited.

F. General Requests For Information

To the extent they have not already been furnished in response to previous sections of this document request, please furnish:

1. All documents constituting requests to the IRS for information regarding any person or entity by anyone, including federal agencies, whose normal official functions do not require use of such information.

2. All documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to the requests referred to in 1. above.

3. All documents constituting or relating to requests by anyone, including other federal agencies:

(a) for electronic surveillance by IRS, or

(b) for information or investigation which led to electronic surveillance by IRS

and all documents relating to or constituting the response of the IRS to any such requests.

FIRST INTERROGATORIES TO THE

INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

Please provide full, explanatory answers to the questions set forth below. As used in these questions, the following terms shall have the meaning set forth below:

"Documents"	Memoranda, letters, notes, files, photographs, tape recordings or other electronic recordings, computer memories capable of being rendered readable, all papers containing printed language, and all other documents. Any document containing any writing which causes it to differ in any respect from any otherwise similar document shall be deemed a separate document.
"Relating to"	Relating in whole or in part to.
"Federal agency"	All federal agencies and the Executive Branch.

1. Regarding the February 7, 1975, official press release of the Internal Revenue Service and the answer of Commissioner Alexander to the first question posed by Senator Joseph Montoya in his letter of January 29, 1975, please answer the following:

   a. At whose direction did William A. Kolar convene a study group to study the feasibility of a formal, uniform Intelligence Gathering and Retrieval System (IGRS)?

   b. Who were the participants in the meeting of the study group?

   c. Please explain the relationship between each participant and the IRS.

   d. Please describe in detail the various alternative systems of implementation of IGRS tested in the

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-241

various districts, indicating which method was tested in which district, and list the dates each alternative system was tested in each district.

e. Please describe the procedure followed by District Directors in implementing IGRS in each district.

f. In how many district offices has IGRS been implemented?

2. How was intelligence data compiled, maintained, and stored by the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service prior to the inception of IGRS?

3. Did officials, representatives, or members of other federal government agencies participate in the establishment of IGRS or in any discussions regarding its establishment? If so, list each such agency and its representatives and explain the manner and extent of its involvement.

4. Did IGRS compile, maintain, and store information received from other federal agencies? If so, was that information compiled, maintained, and stored for the benefit and use of the Internal Revenue Service, the other federal agency, or both?

5. Is information received from other agencies of the federal government edited to delete non-tax-related material prior to its being entered in IGRS? If so, please explain the editing procedure and furnish all documents relating to such procedure.

6. Upon how many individuals and groups did IGRS maintain files as of November 1974?

7. Please identify all individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

8. Please state the total number of individuals and groups on whom IGRS maintained files as of November 1974.

9. Were all IGRS files maintained on a computerized or mechanized basis as of November 1974? How were the files indexed? In connection with the answer to this question, please identify all cross-referencing systems whereby categories of information could be retrieved from IGRS other than through identification of the name of an individual or group.

10. How many names were indexed in IGRS on which there were no files?

11. Please fully describe the procedure followed by the Intelligence Division of the IRS in establishing and entering a file on an individual, group, or organization in IGRS, stating whether:

    a. each file or name contained in IGRS is the result of an investigation by the Intelligence Division of IRS;

    b. the files or names stored and maintained by IGRS are periodically investigated by the Intelligence Division of IRS.

12. Upon how many IGRS files has some form of action constituting enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or the Justice Department?

13. How many names and files appear in IGRS upon which no action constituting the enforcement of tax laws, other than the establishment and maintenance of the file, has been undertaken by the Internal Revenue Service or Justice Department?

14. What criteria has been established by the Internal Revenue Service governing the duration of a file or name in IGRS?

15. What procedures are followed by the Internal Revenue Service in disseminating files, names, and other information contained in IGRS to other agencies of the federal government?

16. To what other agencies of the federal government has information contained in IGRS been distributed? Have there been any instances in which information contained in IGRS has been disseminated to other federal agencies without following the procedures described in Item 15 above?

a. If so, specify each such instance, listing the name of the individual, group, or organization whose file was disseminated and the agency at whose request the file was disseminated.

17. Has the Internal Revenue Service received requests for the dissemination of information contained in IGRS which (a) were politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please furnish the Committee with the following:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

18. Were any members of the IGRS study group convened by William Kolar in 1969 participants in the formation or operation of the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify them and describe in detail their relationship with both the Special Services Staff and IGRS.

a. Was IGRS, either in its formative or operative stages, used to maintain and store information collected by the Special Services Staff? If so, please identify the nature of the information so stored and the nature of the information not so stored.

b. Was it a policy of the Internal Revenue Service that documents and files maintained by the Special Services Staff not be stored in IGRS or its generic predecessors? If so, please furnish the Committee with evidence of such policy.

c. What was the relationship between the formal creation of IGRS on May 4, 1973, and the decision of the IRS to review and purge Special Services Staff files on or about June 28, 1973?

d. Have any Special Service Staff files ever been transferred to IGRS? If so, please specify the name of the individual, group, or organization upon which the file was maintained and the date it was transferred to IGRS.

19. With regard to the recent suspension of IGRS activities on January 22, 1975, pending an internal review of its operations, please answer the following:

a. To what specific duties have personnel assigned to IGRS been reassigned pending the present Internal Revenue Service review of IGRS? Please furnish the names of the personnel reassigned and the offices and units to which they have been reassigned.

b. Please furnish the name of the IRS official who is charged with the primary responsibility for conducting the study of IGRS.

c. In what manner are IRS intelligence files being compiled and maintained pending completion of the study?

20. What is the relationship between the Intelligence Division of the Internal Revenue Service and Organized Crime Strike Forces?

21. On how many strike forces do IRS agents participate? Please identify the strike forces.

22. How many agents participate on each such strike force?

23. Has the involvement of IRS intelligence personnel on such strike forces been confined to investigation of tax-related matters? If not, please indicate the manner and extent of IRS involvement in non-tax-related actions of the strike forces. In this regard, provide the Committee with detailed summaries of IRS participation on strike forces which did not involve or were unrelated to enforcement of tax-related matters.

24. What intelligence gathering, compiling, and storage systems has the Internal Revenue Service maintained in addition to IGRS?

25. In December 1974 the Internal Revenue Service suspended the operation of IGRS pending an internal review of the system. Was this review prompted by concern that non-tax-related materials were being gathered, compiled, and stored in IGRS? If so, please furnish the Committee with all files, names, and other information contained in IGRS files which is non-tax related.

26. Has the Internal Security Division of the Internal Revenue Service, or any other division of the Internal Revenue Service, ever investigated any aspects of the intelligence gathering, compilation, storage, and dissemination procedures of the Internal Revenue Service? If so, please identify and describe all such investigations and describe any subsequent action taken by the Internal Revenue Service as a result of the investigation.

27. Has the IRS received requests for the dissemination of information which were either (a) politically motivated, or (b) were made by individuals or entities whose normal official duties did not require the use of such information? If so, please state:

a. The name of the agency or individual making such request or requests and the name of the file or files sought by that agency or individual, or the nature of the information sought;

b. The date the request was received and the manner in which it was made; and

c. The action the Internal Revenue Service took on the request.

28. Has the IRS ever engaged in mail cover or other mail surveillance activities, including the recording of dispatch and receipt of mail (other than to or from the IRS) and the opening of mail (other than to the IRS)? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

29. Please set forth the rules, regulations, and procedures which govern removal of taxpayers' names from the list of returns to be audited.

30. Has the IRS ever engaged in wiretapping, electronic eavesdropping, or any other type of electronic surveillance? If so, please state:

a. The unit within the IRS which engaged in such activities;

b. When the activities occurred;

c. Whether they continue;

d. The names of all IRS personnel who ever either directly performed such activities or supervised or administered such activities;

e. The legal authority for such activities;

f. The reason for such activities;

g. Whether judicial approval was always obtained in advance for such activities.

31. If the answer to #30 is yes, as to each instance of such activity, state:

a. The dates during which the activity occurred;

b. The type of device used;

c. Whether judicial approval was obtained in advance and, if so, from which court;

d. The subject of the activity;

e. Why the activity occurred;

f. The use or disposition which was made of the information collected;

g. The names and current addresses of the individuals who (a) performed or (b) supervised the activity and whether they are IRS employees.

32. Has the IRS ever been directed, requested, or advised by any other federal agency to use electronic listening devices? If so, please state as to each such direction, request, or advice:

a. The date;

b. The federal agency making it;

c. The proposed subject;

d. The action IRS took;

e. If surveillance resulted, please identify the incident among those listed in answer to number 31;

f. The date and nature of all documents relating to the direction, request, or advice.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Legal Coun.
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. Adams

DATE: 6-13-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

W.O.

Prior memoranda have been submitted reporting that the Capitol Police Department would handle security checks of the space assigned to captioned Committees as well as the offices of the individual members.

Arrangements were made through the Sergeant at Arms of the Senate and House of Representatives to advise us of the Committee Members who have their private offices checked and the dates on which these checks were made.

On June 13, 1975, Captain Eugene Brannon of the Capitol Police Force advised Inspector Bowers that three members of the Senate Committee and two members of the House Committee have had their private offices checked to date. These are:

Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho) who had his office in room 245 Russell Senate Office Building and his Capitol office, room S-201 checked on 5-14-75.

Senator Gary Hart (D-Colorado) whose office in 6325 Dirkson Senate Office Building was checked on 5-22-75.

Senator Richard Schweiker (R-Penna.) whose office in 347 Russell Senate Office Building was checked on 6-5-75.

62-116464-

1-Mr. Adams
1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Bowers

REC- 102

62-116395-239

CONTINUED - OVER

17 JUN 19 1975

DWB:lgp
(7)

File 62-116395
62-116464

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/gmc
mbe-16

8 4 JUN 9 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Congressman Robert Giaimo (D-Conn.) whose office in 2265 Rayburn Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Congressman Robert Kasten (R-Wisc.) whose office in 1113 Longworth House Office Building was checked on 6-4-75.

Captian Brannon said they have no pending requests from other members of these Committees to make any checks of their offices.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. T. J. Jenkins
1 - All Assistant Directors
6/9/75
3 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(1 - Mr. J. B. Hotis)
(1 - Mr. P. V. Daly)
1 - All Sections Chiefs
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. T. J. McNiff

Mr. W. R. Wannall

W. O. Cregar

HOUSTUDY 75

By memorandum F. B. Griffith to Mr. Bassett captioned "Senstudy 75" dated 2/6/75, you were advised that "Senstudy 75" is the code word for the control file (62-116395) containing all communications relating to the Senate Select Committee's (SSC) investigation and study of Governmental operations with respect to intelligence activities.

In mid-February, 1975, the House of Representatives created a Select Committee on Intelligence Activities which will have virtually the same jurisdiction and responsibilities as the above SSC. To date, practically all our work has been related to the SSC and only very recently has the House Select Committee (HSC) made any efforts to commence staffing.

As it appears, we can expect in the near future requests from the HSC similar to that already received from the SSC and in order to facilitate the administrative handling and retrieval, where necessary, of HSC requests and this Bureau's response to same, the code word "Houstudy 75" is being assigned to the control file (62-116464) containing all communications pertaining to the HSC and related matters.

ORIGINAL FILED IN 62-116464-

ACTION:

None. Above submitted for information.

62-116464

① - 62-116395

TJM:mjc
(20)

62-116395

NOT RECORDED

46 JUN 19 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/LMF

MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. Adams DATE: 6-4-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY 75

The purpose of this memorandum is to advise that the Bureau has been requested to again make available Newark office secretaries, Mary Ann Massa and M. Ann Mierzejewski for interview by captioned Committee and that the Department and White House had instructed that they not be made available until such time as the Committee decides to allow Bureau representatives to be present during interview.

By way of background, you will recall that these employees were released from the Employment Agreement and were made available for interview on May 20, 1975, by captioned Committee. However, the Department in objection stated that they were desirous that a Bureau representative be present during the interview. The topic of the interview was to have been their duties and responsibilities during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention, Atlantic City, New Jersey. Ultimately, neither the Department nor the White House could reach agreement concerning the interviews and the employees did not submit to interview.

On June 3, 1975, Michael Epstein, staff member of captioned Committee again requested these employees be made available for interview on June 5, 1975, at 10:00 a.m. The scope of the interview would be the responsibilities and duties performed during the period of July to September, 1964, in connection with the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey.

REC-100

62-116395-237

62-116395

17 JUN 18 1975

1-Mr. Wannall
1-Mr. Cregar
1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Daly
1-67-538691 (Personnel File Mary Ann Massa)
1-67-581180 (Personnel File M. Ann Mierzewski)

PVD:lgp
(9)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 6/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf

MOR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Memo from Legal Counsel to Mr. Adams
SENSTUDY 75

Mr. Epstein classified the interview as an "abuse" type and agreed to allow agents to be available but not present during interview.

On June 3, 1975, K. William O'Connor, Special Counsel to the Deputy Attorney General for Intelligence Coordination, was advised of the request and of the fact that an agent could not be present during interview. He stated that the Department's position was that unless the Committee consented to allow Bureau personnel to be present, the interview would not go forth, and that he would advise Epstein and F. A. O. Schwarz, Chief Counsel of the Committee, of this decision.

Mr. O'Connor telephonically recontacted Special Agent Daly and advised that he discussed the matter with assistant to the Counsel to the President, James A. Wilderotter. Wilderotter told O'Connor it was the White House position that these girls should not be made available for interview unless the Committee allows Bureau personnel to be present. Wilderotter stated these two employees had been cited as examples wherein the White House felt interviews should not be conducted without representatives of the particular agency or Bureau being present as they are service personnel. According to Wilderotter, Schwarz agreed to this position.

O'Connor telephonically contacted Special Agent Daly on June 4, 1975, at which time he advised that he had discussed the interview with Schwarz, Epstein, and staff member Mark Gitenstein, and they would hold in abeyance the request to interview the employees pending a review of documents the Bureau is making available concerning 1964 Atlantic City Convention as stated in the Committee's request of ~~June~~ May 14, 1975.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PVD JBH/PVD

WRW/TVL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Adams
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. D.W. Moore

TO : Mr. W.R. Wannall

DATE: 6/5/75

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Kolombatovic
1 - Mr. Crescioli

FROM : V.V. Kolombatovic

SUBJECT: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ✓
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

This memorandum is to advise of the scheduled appearance, under oath, of former Chief Postal Inspector Henry B. Montague before the full Senate Select Committee (SSC) in Washington, D. C., on 6/12/75.

On 6/4/75 Mr. Ron L. Jackson, Assistant Chief Inspector, U. S. Postal Service, advised Liaison Agent L.A. Crescioli that he was contacted this date by Mr. Montague who informed Jackson that he, Montague, was scheduled to appear before the full SSC on Thursday, 6/12/75. According to Jackson, Mr. Montague appeared to be very concerned about his appearance before this Committee. In fact, Montague requested that Jackson alert FBI Director Kelley to the fact that Montague will appear before this Committee. Montague did not indicate any specifics to Jackson as to why he was so concerned over his scheduled testimony before the Committee.

In the way of background, Montague was the Chief Postal Inspector from 1961 to the Spring of 1969, on which latter date Mr. William J. Cotter assumed the position of Chief Postal Inspector. Prior to 1961 Montague was the Inspector-in-Charge of the New York Division of the Postal Service. In the opinion of Mr. Jackson, Montague is a man of the highest integrity and most certainly is not involved in any wrongdoing. Jackson confidentially advised the Liaison Agent that it is his belief that Montague is so concerned about his appearance before the Committee because he may have to reveal certain agreements that prevailed in the past between the Bureau and the Postal Service concerning mail covers that have not been made public to date.

LAC:tdp (9)

CONTINUED - OVER

94-58-4055

ORIGINAL FILED IN

62-116395-

NOT RECORDED
46 JUN 17 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MOR-16

84 JUN 18 1975

Memorandum to Mr. W.R. Wannall
RE: HENRY B. MONTAGUE
FORMER CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR,
U. S. POSTAL SERVICE
SCHEDULED APPEARANCE BEFORE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE 6/12/75

Jackson added that he personally has no knowledge of what agreements or understandings between the Bureau and the Postal Service that may be divulged by Montague. He emphasized that Montague did not divulge such data to him.

In conclusion, Jackson stated that Montague is in a retired status and has just returned from an extended vacation in the Mediterranean area. Montague did inform Jackson that the Committee has authorized Montague to be accompanied before the Committee by personal counsel; however, Montague has decided that he will testify alone and without personal counsel.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

WRW/tah

PLM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

- Assoc. Dir. ____
- Dep. AD Adm. ____
- Dep. AD Inv. ____
- Asst. Dir.:
  - Admin. ____
  - Comp. Syst. ____
  - Ext. Affairs ____
  - Files & Com. ____
  - Gen. Inv. ____
  - Ident. ____
  - Inspection ____
  - Intell. ____
  - Laboratory ____
  - Plan. & Eval. ____
  - Spec. Inv. ____
  - Training ____
  - Legal Coun. ____
  - Telephone Rm. ____
  - Director Sec'y ____

FBI

Date: 6/3/75

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/28/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

REC- 102

2 - 116395 - 236X

14 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 AM/lmf
MDR-16

Legal Coun

7-7

Approved: ________________ Sent __________ M Per __________
Special Agent in Charge

U.S.Government Printing Office: 1972 — 455-574

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

450 Golden Gate Avenue
Box 36015
San Francisco, California 94102

June 3, 1975

The Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
Congress of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums,

Mr. Don Jones, the Senior Resident Agent of the FBI Resident Agency in Berkeley, California, has referred to me your letter of May 28, 1975 asking certain information concerning the FBI's operation in Berkeley, California.

Your letter has been referred to FBI Headquarters in Washington, D.C. for appropriate action.

Sincerely,

Charles W. Bates
Special Agent in Charge

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2006 BY SP2 avm/umf

MDR-16

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives

RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8TH DISTRICT, CALIFORNIA

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COMMITTEE
CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EDUCATION
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE

WASHINGTON OFFICE:
1417 LONGWORTH BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-2661

DISTRICT OFFICES:
2490 CHANNING WAY, ROOM 202
BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA 94704
(415) 548-7767

201 13TH STREET, ROOM 105
OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA 94604
(415) 763-0370

DONALD R. HOPKINS
DISTRICT ADMINISTRATOR

May 28, 1975

Mr. Don Jones, Senior Resident Agent
Federal Bureau of Investigation
P. O. Box 1033
Berkeley, California 94704

Dear Mr. Jones:

As you are aware, I have been concerned for some time about the nature of the Bureau's involvement in local law enforcement affairs. This concern has been heightened by my appointment to the House Select Committee to Investigate the U. S. Intelligence Community. In this light, I am requesting answers to the following questions concerning FBI activity in Berkeley:

1. What is the size of the contingent of agents in the Berkeley field office?
2. What are the functional responsibilities in the field office, and what are the percentages of agents involved in each, i.e., political, drug abuse, criminal, etc.?
3. What are the titles of the agents, and how do these relate to their involvement in category two?
4. What is the ethnic and sexual breakdown of the staff and agents in the Berkeley field office?
5. What are the interactions and working relationships between the field office, the Berkeley Police Department, the University of California Police Department, private security agencies and informers? How many informers are utilized by the field office?
6. Recent disclosures have raised serious questions regarding the Bureau's involvement in political surveillance activities of organizations and individuals over the past several years. What actions has the local field office taken to correct the abuses of these actions, and what political surveillance is being undertaken?

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 0/19/2000 BY SP2 AVM/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-2318

7. I have read with interest of the Special Weapons and Tactics course given under Bureau auspices at the Santa Rita Rehabilitation Facility in Alameda County. I would appreciate your forwarding to me a description of the activities undertaken in this course, and the relationship of UCPD and BPD to the course. In addition, I would appreciate being provided any relevant information on SWAT that you have available.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter. I will look forward to your reply.

Sincerely,

Ronald V. Dellums

Ronald V. Dellums
Member of Congress

RVD/djc

6/3/75

AIRTEL AIR MAIL

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (62-116395)
ATTENTION: OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

FROM: SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (62-6887)

SUBJECT: SENSTUDY, 1975

Remytel call this date to Assistant to the Director JAMES B. ADAMS.

There is enclosed for the Bureau a letter dated 5/29/75 from Congressman RONALD V. DELLUMS, 8th District of California, to Mr. DON JONES, Senior Resident Agent, FBI, Berkeley, California. There is also enclosed a copy of my reply to Congressman DELLUMS.

San Francisco Office is obtaining pertinent information to Congressman DELLUM's request and this will be submitted to the Bureau in the immediate future.

2 - Bureau (Encls. 2)
1 - San Francisco
CWB/cmp
(3)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 pvm/lmf
MDR-16

1-Mr. Mintz
1-Mr. Hotis
1-Mr. Miller

REC-102 62-116395-236X

July 14, 1975

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums
House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Dellums:

This is in response to your letter dated May 28, 1975, sent to the Senior Resident Agent of the Berkeley, California, FBI Resident Agency.

To clarify your inquiries, it should be noted the Resident Agency at Berkeley, California, operates under the general supervision of the FBI's San Francisco Office.

There are currently nineteen Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley Resident Agency. All are white males. The function of a resident agency is to handle all FBI matters within its specific geographical territory. This includes criminal, security and applicant investigations. The FBI does not have primary jurisdiction regarding drug matters and does not conduct "political" investigations.

MAILED 7
JUL 15 1975
FBI

As a matter of policy, the FBI advises other governmental law enforcement agencies of matters coming to our attention which are within the investigative jurisdiction of those agencies. In some cases there is concurrent jurisdiction and a joint investigation may be conducted; however, local law enforcement agencies do not have access to FBI files. Representatives of private security agencies may be contacted from time to time in the course of discharging our official responsibilities just as any other citizens may be contacted. The FBI also utilizes the services of informants to develop information concerning matters within this Bureau's investigative jurisdiction; however, it would be inappropriate for me to discuss more specifically the number of such informants or the manner in which they are utilized.

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

JDM:lgp
(7)

WRW TJM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/19/2000 BY SP2 ALM/lmf
MDR-16

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

84 AUG 11 1975

GPO 954-546

Honorable Ronald V. Dellums

As I have already indicated, the FBI does not conduct "political" investigations, nor do we conduct "political surveillances." We do, of course, have a responsibility for conducting domestic intelligence investigations authorized under legislative enactments, Presidential Directives and instructions of the Attorney General. These matters relate to espionage, sabotage, treason, sedition, and other activities involving the internal security of the United States. The policies relating to such investigations are not made on an ad hoc basis by individual Agents or individual offices, but conform with broad policy applicable to all offices.

The FBI offers a variety of courses of instruction for law enforcement personnel throughout the United States, including such subjects as anti-sniper and survival training and special weapons and tactics, commonly known as "SWAT". The basic purpose of this training is to provide well prepared teams capable of resolving highly dangerous situations with a minimum of risk to innocent bystanders, the law enforcement personnel involved and the subjects of the investigation.

Enclosed is a newsclipping describing some of the training of our own personnel in this field. The article appeared on June 1, 1975, in the "Washington Star News."

Sincerely yours,

C. M. Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

Enclosure

NOTE: The information concerning the Special Agents assigned to the Berkeley, California, Resident Agency was furnished by ASAC Druken, San Francisco.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

TO : MR. W. R. WANNALL

DATE: June 3, 1975

2 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(J. B. Hotis)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. L. F. Schwartz

FROM : MR. W. O. CREGAR

SUBJECT: ~~SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES~~
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

Memorandum W. R. Wannall to Mr. J. A. Mintz 4/11/75 recommended that a draft of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for Staff Members of the captioned Committees be coordinated with Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other appropriate members of the intelligence community.

On 6/2/75 the draft Memorandum of Understanding was discussed by SA L. F. Schwartz with Mr. John M. Clarke, Associate Deputy, Intelligence Community Staff, and Mr. Donald E. Moore, Chairman, Security Committee, U. S. Intelligence Board, who advised that the draft had been reviewed by CIA and by the Security Committee on behalf of the intelligence community. They requested that the draft be revised in order to recognize the need for certain Staff Members to be cleared for access to compartmented information (a procedure already being followed by the Church Committee) and the desire of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) that it be made clear that the DCI will only offer his advice upon the request of the Committee Chairman and that in all cases the final determination as to clearance is the responsibility of the Committee Chairman.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Attached is a revised draft of the Memorandum of Understanding incorporating the changes proposed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore which changes are underscored. Both Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore were of the opinion that since Senator Church's Committee was already following the procedures outlined in the Memorandum of Understanding, and had completed the Committee Staff, it would be inappropriate to furnish a copy of the Memorandum of Understanding to Senator Church.

REC-100

62-116395
Enclosures

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-236

LES:ekw
(8)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMF

JUN 18 1975

17 JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

MOR-16

Memorandum to Mr. W. R. Wannall
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ACTIVITIES
62-116395

RECOMMENDATION:

If the attached revised draft is acceptable to the Bureau, it will be provided to the Attorney General for his approval and subsequent transmittal to Congressman Nedzi. In accordance with opinion expressed by Mr. Clarke and Mr. Moore, a copy will not be furnished to Senator Church.

HFS

PLM WVC

QRS

LET TO A.G.
ENCL. LHM FOR HSC
6/12/75 HFS: dmt

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned Committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information, in accordance with Executive Order 11652 and where necessary, for access to compartmented information in accordance with the standards set forth in Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1-14.

The FBI willffurnish a summary memorandum containing therresults of its investigation to the appropriate Committee Chairman.

In the case of an applicant, or employee, the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the person's suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2026 BY SP2
MOR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-256

by the respective Chairman to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman may wish to have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI, with a request for the DCI's advice. In all instances, the Committee Chairman will make the final determination.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. J. B. Adams
1 - Mr. W. V. Cleveland

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. WRW
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. A. Mintz

DATE: 4/11/75

FROM : W. R. Wannall WRW

1 - Mr. J. A. Mintz
(Mr. Farrington)
1 - Mr. W. R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W. O. Cregar
1 - Mr. A. F. Watters, Jr.

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Reference is made to Legal Counsel memorandum to Mr. J. B. Adams, 3/12/75, and my memorandum, 3/25/75, both captioned as above.

By referenced memorandum dated 3/12/75, Legal Counsel recommended that the Intelligence Division (INTD) discuss with representatives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other members of the intelligence community procedures for clearing staff members of captioned committees for access to classified information when questions as to the individual's trustworthiness have arisen in the course of the FBI's background investigation. Following such discussions, Legal Counsel recommended that a Memorandum of Understanding concerning these matters be prepared by the INTD which might be used by both Senate and House Committees.

By memorandum 3/25/75, the INTD submitted for approval a draft of a proposed Memorandum of Understanding concerning clearance procedures for staff members of captioned committees. Special Investigative Division disagreed with several features of our draft memorandum and has prepared a revised memorandum, which is attached for approval.

The INTD has coordinated this matter with the Special Investigative Division and interposes no objection to the text of the revised memorandum; however, it is suggested that consideration be given to adding the words "by the FBI" at the end of paragraph five on page one. Paragraph five, thus modified, would read: "Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI."

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 62-116395

Enclosure

AFW:dsh dsh
(7)

ENCLOSURE

REC-100

62-116395-235

JUN 18 1975

CONTINUED - OVER

LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION
ADDENDUM - SEE PAGE 3

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/6/2000 BY SPd AW/lmf
MDR-16

84 JUN 19 1975

Memorandum to Mr. J. A. Mintz
RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Discussions of this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community have been held in abeyance pending approval within the FBI as to the text of the proposed memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, that attached revised memorandum be coordinated by the INTD with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community prior to review by the Attorney General and transmittal to Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi by Legal Counsel Division.

Addendum

WVC

RS

ADDENDUM: LEGAL COUNSEL DIVISION PVD:dkg 4-15-75

Legal Counsel Division concurs with the general thrust of the memorandum of understanding, however, it is suggested the following wording be added where indicated:

Page 1, paragraph 3, insert after the word applicant, or employee. On line 2, change "applicant's" to read "person's".

Page 1, paragraph 4, after the word determined insert by the respective Chairman,.

Page 2, paragraph 1, after the word necessary insert by the Committee,.

Per

Jma

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Subject: Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information or Material on the Part of Employees of the Senate and House Select Committees on Intelligence Activities

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) will conduct background investigations at the request of the appropriate Committee Chairman of applicants and employees of the respective staffs of above-mentioned committees, so that a determination can be made as to their suitability for employment and as to their trustworthiness for access to classified information. ①

The FBI will furnish a summary memorandum containing ~~the results of its investigation to the appropriate Committee~~ Chairman.

In the case of an applicant (OR EMPLOYEE), the Committee Chairman will make a determination as to the ~~applicant's~~ PERSON'S suitability for employment.

No person shall be given access to any classified information or material unless such person has been determined BY THE RESPECTIVE CHAIRMAN to be trustworthy and unless access to such information or material is necessary in the performance of the person's duties.

Where there is a question of trustworthiness for access to classified information, the Committee Chairman will have the summary memorandum furnished to the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) by the FBI. ②

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 pm/lmf
MDR-16

62-116395-235

ENCLOSURE

The DCI will furnish his observations as to eligibility for access to classified information to the appropriate Committee Chairman for his consideration. The Committee Chairman will render the final determination after consultation, where it is deemed necessary, BY THE COMMITTEE, with the interested agencies.

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ___
Dep. AD Adm. ___
Dep. AD Inv. ___
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ___
Comp. Syst. ___
Ext. Affairs ___
Files & Com. ___
Gen. Inv. ___
Ident. ___
Inspection ___
Intell. ___
Laboratory ___
Plan. & Eval. ___
Spec. Inv. ___
Training ___
Legal Coun. ___
Telephone Rm. ___
Director Sec'y ___

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 3/12/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Mr. Adams memorandum to Mr. Callahan dated 3/7/75, captioned as above, copy attached, reported our conversation with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi.

As indicated in Mr. Adams' memorandum, Congressman Nedzi asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI, and the House Committee concerning investigative and clearance procedures for members of the Committee's staff. It appeared appropriate to us to coordinate a memorandum of understanding to be drafted for the House Committee with that to be drafted for the Senate Committee. Therefore, following our return from the meeting with Senator Church and Congressman Nedzi, I called Bill Miller and advised him of the request made by Congressman Nedzi for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding. I asked him whether it would be possible for us to coordinate the language of that memorandum with the understanding that it will be drafted for use by the CIA, other members of the intelligence community, and the Church Committee. Mr. Miller said that the proposal to coordinate the memorandum was completely acceptable to him and he requested that the draft memorandum being prepared for Congressman Nedzi be furnished him for review and possible adoption as the memorandum to be used by the Senate Committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the Intelligence Division discuss this matter with representatives of CIA and other appropriate members of the intelligence community and prepare a draft memorandum of understanding that may be used by both House and Senate committees.

Bufile 62-116395
Enc.
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Farrington
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (6)

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

JUN 18 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 1/11/2000 BY SP2 ALM/JMG

MDR-16

JUN 18 1975

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

62-116395-

84 JUN 19 1975

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm. ✓
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell. ✓
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval. ✓
Spec. Inv. ✓
Training
Legal Coun. ✓
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : MR. CALLAHAN

DATE: 3/7/75

FROM : J. B. ADAMS

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

On 3/7/75 Mr. Mintz and I called on Senator Church and his staff director, Bill Miller, to further discuss the procedures for investigating and clearing staff employees of the Committee, particularly where information might be developed raising a question as to the propriety of a clearance. It had previously been approved that the FBI would conduct the background investigations, furnishing the results to Senator Church, and after his determination that the individuals met the required criteria for access to classified information he would notify CIA of his determination and intent to employ the individual involved, at which time CIA would grant the necessary clearance based on the certification by Senator Church.

In discussions between CIA and FBI representatives, we raised the question as to whether CIA would review the results of the investigation prior to granting clearances and CIA representatives indicated they did not intend to and were reluctant to inquire of Senator Church as to whether they could be furnished the results of any investigations involving derogatory information.

In discussing this matter with Senator Church, I inquired whether he had any objection to our bringing to the attention of CIA any questionable cases in order that CIA representatives, who have the responsibility of granting the actual clearances, would be in a position to advise and counsel with Senator Church on those individual cases. He had absolutely no objection to this and, in fact, felt there should be an open communication between FBI, CIA and his Committee to insure that no one was appointed and cleared who did not measure up in every respect from a security standpoint.

I discussed with him the particular case of Stanley Rawson Sloan, the results of which I had brought for delivery to Senator Church. Sloan was

Wannall to [illegible] 4/1/75

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 11/16/2000 BY SP2 [illegible]

REC-100

ENCLOSURE

62-116395-234

SEE

17 JUN 18 1975

JBA:ams
(5)
1 - Mr. Cleveland
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Wannall

CONTINUED - OVER

formerly employed by CIA and resigned in December, 1974, after his clearance for sensitive compartmented information had been lifted as a result of his marrying an alien. This marriage would not preclude him from clearance for access to lesser degrees of sensitive material but only for the more sophisticated clearances. Mr. Miller advised that Sloan had not been appointed and was not going to be appointed because of other reasons unrelated to a security clearance.

Senator Church indicated that he felt it would be wise to prepare a memorandum outlining our security clearance procedures and his staff would be glad to prepare such a document.

Following the meeting with Senator Church, Mr. Mintz and I dropped by to see Congressman Nedzi, Chairman of the House Committee, and delivered to him Mr. Kelley's letter congratulating him and offering him our complete cooperation. Chairman Nedzi stated that he was very appreciative of this offer and would consider Mr. Kelley's request to confer with him as an open invitation and as soon as things had shaken down he would be in touch with us.

We discussed with him the investigative and clearance procedures we were following with the Senate Committee and Chairman Nedzi agreed the same procedures should be followed with his Committee, including our making available to CIA any derogatory information which might be pertinent to a clearance determination. At first, he suggested that we send the results of our investigations to CIA before coming to the Committee but then concluded that it would be more appropriate for them to come to him first since some of the applicants under consideration would probably not be appointed. He specifically asked that we prepare a memorandum of understanding to be approved by CIA, FBI and himself.

I asked Mr. Nedzi whether he felt the formulation of his Committee would serve to trim down the number of requests for information being received from various House committees and it was his opinion that it would help in some instances; however, in others committee chairmen would pursue their own inquiries. He personally did not feel he had the clout nor the desire to try to preempt this area entirely for his Committee. He also stated he felt that CIA's problems had in the main been fully exposed and would soon be

CONTINUED - OVER

of less concern, whereas the concern over domestic security policies of the FBI would undoubtedly be greater in the future. He expressed his appreciation for our cooperation and indicated he was striving for a responsible approach to the inquiry.

Following the meeting with Mr. Nedzi, Mr. Mintz and I agreed that it would be best for us to prepare a proposed memorandum of understanding concerning the investigative and clearance procedures for both Committees in order to try to insure uniformity, and Mr. Mintz will get in touch with Bill Miller to seek his concurrence in that regard. Our efforts will be coordinated with CIA and the proposed memorandum as drawn up will be submitted for the Director's approval.

ACTION:

Information only.

jma

KY

CONTINUED - OVER

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

By Mr. CHURCH

MAY 21, 1975
Referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration
JUNE 5, 1975
Reported without amendment
JUNE 6, 1975
Considered and agreed to

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2006 BY SP2ALM/lmf
MDR-16

REC-100

62-116395-233

NOT RECORDED
17 JUN 18 1975

94TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. RES. 165

[Report No. 94–181]

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

MAY 21, 1975

Mr. CHURCH submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules and Administration

JUNE 5, 1975

Reported by Mr. CANNON, without amendment

JUNE 6, 1975

Considered and agreed to

Searched 6-'75

RESOLUTION

Authorizing supplemental expenditures by the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Agencies for an inquiry and investigation relating to intelligence activities carried out by or on behalf of the Federal Government.

Resolved, That section 6 of Senate Resolution 21, Ninety-fourth Congress, agreed to January 27, 1975, is amended by striking out the amounts "$750,000" and "$100,000" and inserting in lieu thereof "$1,150,000" and "$300,000", respectively.

V

62-116395

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

2

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ✓
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Legal Coun. ✓
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director Sec'y ____

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams DATE: 5-28-75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

By memorandum dated 5-22-75 you were advised that former SA Robert Nichols had been contacted by Lester B. Seidel, staff member of captioned Committee, at which time Seidel attempted to arrange an interview of Nichols. Nichols was advised by Deputy Assistant Director Jack E. Herington of the provisions of Attorney General Order 501-73 pertaining to Departmental approval prior to furnishing information from Bureau files. He was also reminded that he had signed an employee agreement with the Bureau agreeing to maintain confidentiality of the information contained in Bureau files. He was advised if he requested, the Bureau would make available a representative to accompany him should he be interviewed by the Committee.

Former SA Nichols telephonically contacted SA Paul V. Daly of this Division on 5-28-75 and advised he had been recontacted by Mr. Seidel. Seidel requested and Nichols agreed to travel to Washington, D. C., on the morning of 5-30-75 for an interview at the Committee's offices. Nichols stated that Seidel indicated the scope of the interview would be concerning Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters. Nichols was unable to advise whether this was to be a staff interview or an appearance for testimony purposes before an executive session of the Committee. He stated he was not told by Seidel that his appearance would be pursuant to a subpoena. Nichols requested that the Bureau make available a representative so that Nichols may consult with him during the interview if need be.

62-116395-232

EX-105 REC-20 7 JUN 6 1975

Mr. Nichols was informed that the presence of a Bureau representative should not be interpreted by Nichols as being his private counsel but that the Agent would assist Nichols in making determination whether a specific question should be responded to or whether a response could properly be declined because an answer might compromise a source,

62-116395

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/LMC
MDR-16

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Mintz
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Personnel File 67-414885
(Former SA Robert Nichols)
1 - Mr. Hotis

PVD:kjs (8)

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

sensitive investigative technique, divulge information furnished the Bureau by other Government agencies and/or foreign intelligence sources or adversely affecting an ongoing investigation. It was pointed out to Mr. Nichols that if he so desires, he could, of course, obtain the services of private counsel. He indicated it was his intention to arrive in Washington Thursday night, 5-29-75. He was requested to appear in the Office of Legal Analysis, Room 4513, at approximately 8:15 a.m. on the morning of 5-30-75 so that arrangements might be made to brief him by the Office of Legal Analysis and subsequently by the Intelligence Division. Nichols stated he would do so.

The Office of Legal Analysis is attempting to obtain from Committee representatives further information as to the circumstances and exact time of interview of Nichols.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1) Intelligence Division representative be made available to accompany Nichols to his interview with captioned Committee.

2) That Nichols be released from his employment agreement to respond to questions concerning our investigation of Martin Luther King, Stanley David Levinson, and related matters.

PUD JBH/PUD

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Assoc. Dir.
Dep. AD Adm.
Dep. AD Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

TO : Mr. J. B. Adams

DATE: 5/28/75

FROM : Legal Counsel

SUBJECT: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Hotis

On May 27, 1975, James A. Wilderotter, Associate Counsel to the President, requested me and representatives of other agencies interested in the arrangements concerning interviews of witnesses by the Senate Select Committee to confer with him and Roderick Hills at 2:30 p.m. that date at the White House. Mr. K. William O'Connor, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Inspector John B. Hotis and I represented the Department and the FBI. Roderick Hills and James A. Wilderotter represented the President's counsel; Bob Andrews represented the Defense Department; John Warner, General Counsel, CIA; Roy Banner, General Counsel of NSA, and Mr. Hyland from State Department as well as John Clark, Deputy to the Director of CIA, attended.

The purpose of the meeting was to discuss the latest version of proposed procedures to be followed by the Committee staff investigators during interviews of former and current employees. Roderick Hills presented a document (copy attached) which he described as a counteroffer by Frederick Schwarz, Counsel to the Committee. He called for general discussion of the document after indicating that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Schwarz at lunch on May 27th and felt that it was a workable document. I pointed out to Mr. Hills that the document provides that there would be notice to the agencies of the identity of witnesses at reasonable time prior to interviews or taking of sworn testimony except where "the committee or its appropriate delegee" determines that prior notice should not be given. I told him that I was concerned that that provision would be used by the Committee staff to permit individual staff investigators to make that determination and I was confident they would do so.

EX-105

REC-20 62-116395-231

ENCLOSURE

Enc.
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Cregar
1 - Mr. Hotis
1 - Mr. Daly
1 - Mr. Mintz
JAM:mfd (7)

7 JUN 6 1975

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/18/2000 BY SP2 ALM/MAF
MDR-16

CONTINUED - OVER

84 JUN 18 1975

Mr. Hills was reluctant to seek a modification of the language indicating that he had an understanding with Mr. Schwarz that the authority would be limited to the senior counsel and to members of the Committee. I told Mr. Hills I would request that the language be modified in writing so that the authority would be conferred on specific representatives of the Committee to avoid having staff authority which I thought would be abused. Mr. Hills finally agreed that the language would be modified so that the authority would be available only to both Committee senior counsel and/or a combination of senior counsel and a Committee member. Further, the language would be modified to require that the determination that an agency would not be given prior notice of a pending witness interview would be recorded in writing for the Committee's records.

I asked Mr. Wilderotter and Mr. Hills whether this agreement was to be made between the staff and the agencies or whether it in fact would be accepted by the Committee. After some discussion, we were advised by Mr. Hills and Mr. Wilderotter that the document would be submitted to the full Committee for their approval and incorporated into the Committee's records.

I pointed out that I believed it was necessary for the understanding to be made between the Committee and the Executive in order for there to be some basis for restraining Committee staff investigators who may not be inclined to follow the rules.

Other proposed changes discussed would require the Committee representative to furnish to a witness a copy of the Committee's rules which includes advice concerning the right to counsel and a copy of the proposed guidelines for witness interviews.

I recommended that the guidelines be expanded to address the problem of existing secrecy agreements with former and present employees and the procedural problem involved in Attorney General Order 501-73 which requires prior Departmental approval in order for a witness to respond to a subpoena. As a result, Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28, 1975, that he would recommend the addition of a sentence in the opening paragraph that would indicate the guidelines would not be understood to impair the constitutional rights of individual witnesses, agency agreements with employees or former employees, existing Departmental orders or the Committee's own rules.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Adams
Re: Senate Select Committee, etc.

Other minor changes were considered and an effort will be made to correct the language so that the agencies will be obliged to make reasonable efforts to comply with all Committee requests instead of being required to furnish "all information" absolutely.

Mr. Wilderotter advised on the morning of May 28th that the comments described above will be discussed with Frederick Schwarz in an effort to finally resolve this matter.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information.

PLM

Source: Hills 5/27

OUTLINE FOR INQUIRY PROCEDURES

It is hoped that these voluntary guidelines will permit the Select Committee investigation to proceed without undue delay, but it is also recognized that these guidelines do not cover all points or anticipate all problems and that, therefore, either the Select Committee or some agency under investigation may have reason not to follow these suggested guidelines.

Also, it is recognized that this outline is without prejudice to the respective legal positions of the agencies and the Select Committee as to the production of specific information by way of documents or testimony. Not to impair Const. rights of ind. witness, agency rules or agreements, common law.

A. Classification of Interviews/Preliminary Testimony

The parties to this investigation by the Select Committee recognize that interviews/preliminary testimony to be conducted by the Committee staff will generally be of two separate and distinct natures.

(1) Those primarily seeking information concerning (A) the overall structure and functions of any agency or its relationship with other agencies or the Executive branch; (B) the substantive work being done by the agency, including the legal bases relied upon and the requisite approval levels for authorization; and (C) the capacities of each agency and the responsibilities to provide information for other governmental entities.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/12/2000 BY SP2 ALM/VMF
MDR-16

ENCLOSURE 62-116395-231

des 1 197. e comm

(2) Those primarily concerning specific allegations of agency or Executive branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred.

An agency representative will be present, as a general rule, at interviews/preliminary testimony in the first category for the purpose of assisting the Committee's investigation and facilitating the protection of information important to the national interest which is pertinent to the investigation. Similarly, as a general rule, agency representatives will not be present at interviews/preliminary testimony in the second category. The parties recognize, however, that for special reasons exceptions can be made in either case: i.e., when good reason exists, endorsed by the Select Committee, agency representatives may not be present for interviews/preliminary testimony falling under the first category, and for good and sufficient reason the agency may [seek to] have a representative present in the second category subject to the approval, of course, of the Select Committee.

B. Procedures to be Employed in Category (2).

When the Select Committee has identified a specific subject as a potential abuse or impropriety and has so notified the agency involved of its designation, that agency will, subject to the second sentence hereof, make [every effort] to provide the Select Committee

with all information and materials that it has on the subject. There will be a mutual effort by the Committee and the agencies to provide special handling techniques to convey or secure any particularly sensitive information or materials as appropriate.

In abuse or impropriety interviews/preliminary testimony, the following procedures will prevail.

(1) Witnesses will be identified to the agency a reasonable time prior to interviews or taking sworn testimony. This general rule includes current employees, former employees or others who have or have had a relationship with the agency.

Exceptions

~~Written record~~ [illegible]

A. Where the Committee or its appropriate delegee ~~by written doc~~ stet believes that prior identification of a witness could adversely affect the witness' willingness to be interviewed or to be forthcoming, or could otherwise hinder the investigation, such prior notice ~~by written authorization~~ will not be given, but in such cases the agency shall be given a general indication of the points or areas to be covered to the extent that is feasible without undercutting the reason for not providing prior notice in the first instance. Delegees shall consist of both Comm. senior counsel or a comb of senior counsel and committee member.

B. In certain cases, the Committee might notify the agency, if the agency agrees not to contact the witness before his appearance. The agency could identify for the Committee special security matters concerning prospective witnesses and provide information on how to locate a witness.

(2) When the Committee contacts a witness, it will explain the security and other arrangements between the Committee and the agency, as well as serve the witness a copy of these ground rules and a copy of the Committee rules. If the witness wishes to consult with the agency prior to his appearance, the Committee will not discourage or seek to interfere with that desire in any way and will help the witness contact the agency representative.

(3) Whenever they are not present at interviews or the taking of sworn statements, agency representatives will be available for consultations regarding the handling of special security matters.

(4) Whether or not an agency has notice of an interview or sworn statement, the Committee will inform the agency of the general substantive points covered as soon as possible thereafter, unless disclosure of the substance of a particular interview would make discernible the identity of a confidential source. In such cases, the Committee shall, to the extent feasible without undercutting that decision, notify the agency in general terms of the points or areas covered, and the fact that it has interviewed a witness on such matters.

(5) Whenever an agency receives prior notice of a particular interview or taking of a sworn statement, it will also be notified

of the general subject areas and periods of employment in which the Committee is primarily interested. The agency will then check the subject's personnel history file and advise the Committee of any exceptionally sensitive aspects of the subject's employment or activity which require special handling.

(6) If because of concern about security of sensitive information, a witness feels unable to give a responsive answer to a particular question, the witness shall so indicate to the interviewer. The questioner and witness may then consult with the agency representative with respect to an appropriate response which will facilitate the provision of pertinent information and its protection. These matters should be worked out forthwith and ordinarily before the close of the interview/testimony session.

(7) The Committee is responsible for providing special handling of interview notes and other working notes in a manner which will protect sensitive material. At the conclusion of the Committee's inquiry, the Committee will consult with the agencies concerned regarding the appropriate disposition of any such notes which have not been destroyed following the preparation of finished Committee documents. The agencies will indicate which of these notes it feels are too sensitive to be stored under the Archives

arrangement being established for the general disposition of the Committee's working papers and non-public reports.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10279-10018
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-221-1790

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/30/1967
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	EGD, ASSOC, ARRESTED, ROLE, ACAPULCO MURDERS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/30/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -41475

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT. NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS-314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 300659Z

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

Political Matters

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-95 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 28 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT: ARREST OF FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES FOR AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN GUERRERO

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (29 AUGUST 1967) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,295

SOURCE: [MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION] (C)

[DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.] (C) HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE SINCE EARLY 1966. (C)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT.
AS SANITIZED
~~GMB 3/11/98 (FF)~~
KP 1-14-98

MEXICO

REC 39 5-H

109-12-221-1790

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY FROM THE STATE OF VERACRUZ, CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES, IN THE CLASH BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE COPRA GROWERS' UNION IN ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, OVER THE WEEKEND OF 19-20 AUGUST 1967, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ABOUT THIRTY PERSONS AND THE WOUNDING OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED, HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, BUT FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY. HIS IMMUNITY, HOWEVER, EXPIRES

SEP 6 1967

Copy to Muf
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 9-1-67
by ERA
"Unrecorded" 406

279-1007

232

54 SEP 12 1967 C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

109-12-221

279-10018

AUG 31 11 45 AM '67
LIAISON SECTION, FBI

IN-41475

TDCS -314/13013-67

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH HIS TERM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

MEXICO

2. ON 28 AUGUST 1967, AGENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (GOBERNACION) ARRESTED FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOME OF ELENA GARRO DE PAZ, LEFTIST MEXICAN PLAYWRIGHT. HE IS BEING INTERROGATED ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE "ACAPULCO MURDERS."

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10279-10020
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-221-1792

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/30/1967
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	EGD, CLASH, RIVAL FACTIONS, COPRA GROWERS UNION, ACAPULCO
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/30/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Intelligence Information Cable

• ROUTINE

IN -41475

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC USIA NSA ONE OCR ORR SDO DCS AID CGS

FBI

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmisson or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE.

CITE TDCS-314/13013-67

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L 300659Z

REC 18

DIST 30 AUGUST 1967

Political Matters

Woodall

COUNTRY: MEXICO

DOI: 28 AUGUST 1967

SUBJECT: ARREST OF FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES FOR AGITATIONAL ACTIVITIES IN GUERRERO

Mexico

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT ~~EMB 3/4/96~~ AS SANITIZED (JFK)
KP 1-14-98

ACQ: MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (29 AUGUST 1967) FIELD REPORT NO. HMM-11,295

SOURCE: [MEXICAN SECURITY OFFICER WITH ACCESS TO INFORMATION] (C) [DERIVED FROM INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES.] HIS REPORTING HAS BEEN RELIABLE SINCE EARLY 1966. ~~(C)~~

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 9-18-95 BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)

1. (FIELD COMMENT: THE ROLE OF FEDERAL DEPUTY FROM THE STATE OF VERACRUZ, CESAR DEL ANGEL FUENTES, IN THE CLASH BETWEEN RIVAL FACTIONS OF THE COPRA GROWERS' UNION IN ACAPULCO, GUERRERO, OVER THE WEEKEND OF 19-20 AUGUST 1967, RESULTING IN THE DEATH OF ABOUT THIRTY PERSONS AND THE WOUNDING OF ABOUT ONE HUNDRED, HAS BEEN WIDELY PUBLICIZED IN THE MEXICAN PRESS. THERE HAS BEEN SPECULATION THAT HE WOULD BE ARRESTED, BUT FOR HIS CONGRESSIONAL IMMUNITY. HIS IMMUNITY, HOWEVER, EXPIRES

ST-125 REC 18 109-12-221-1792

18 SEP 6 1967

Copy to ___
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 9-1-67
by EHH

57 SEP 11 1967

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM 109-12-221

279-10020

AUG 31 11 45 AM '67

LIAISON SECTION FBI

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

WITH HIS TERM ON 1 SEPTEMBER.)

2. ON 28 AUGUST 1967, AGENTS OF THE MINISTRY OF GOVERNMENT (GOBERNACION) ARRESTED FEDERAL DEPUTY CESAR DEL ANGEL AS HE WAS LEAVING THE HOME OF ELENA GARRO DE PAZ, LEFTIST MEXICAN PLAYWRIGHT. HE IS BEING INTERROGATED ABOUT HIS ROLE IN THE "ACAPULCO MURDERS."

Mexico

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI CINCSO

REPORT CLASS: CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD NUMBER: 124-10279-10046
RECORD SERIES: HO
AGENCY FILE NUMBER: CR 105-7-210-7584

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: CIA
TO: USSS
TITLE:

DATE: 03/15/1976
PAGES: 2
SUBJECT: OBA, ASSOC, PEREZ, PALOMERA IGNAZIO, TRA, US, ATTEND, FATHER'S FUNERAL
DOCUMENT TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW DATE: 09/15/1998
UPDATE DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

NNNNVV EIA171 E[illegible]46[illegible]122

RR RUFBI

DE RUEAI[illegible] #0344 0752147

ZNY SSSSS

R 152017Z MAR 76

FM CIA

TO RUEISSQ/SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

INFO RUFBI/FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BT

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

MAR 15 1976

TELETYPE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT.
Except for the Brackets JM 6-25-97

(SLD/KSR
8-6-97 JFK)

Dep.-A.D.-Adm.
Dep.-A.D.-Inv.
Asst. Dir.:
Admin.
Comp. Syst.
Ext. Affairs
Files & Com.
Gen. Inv.
Ident.
Inspection
Intell.
Laboratory
Plan. & Eval.
Spec. Inv.
Training
Legal Coun.
Telephone Rm.
Director Sec'y

VISA APPLICANTS — Cuba

S E C R E T. CITE CIA 822742.

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS.

FBI ADM. only
ALL ~~INFORMATION~~ CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-30-94 BY SP8MAC/KSR

SUBJECT: PALOMERA PEREZ, IGNAZIO.

U.S.A.
C.R.
(JFK)

DPOB: 16 MARCH 1940, HAVANA, CUBA.

REF: SECRET SERVICE ADVANCE SAN JOSE 105, 21 FEBRUARY 1976.

Copy to MM
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 3-16-76
by SJO

7584

CIR-316/01060-76

REC-104

105-?-220

1. ACCORDING TO (S) [AN OFFICIAL NICARAGUAN SERVICE,] IGNAZIO PALOMERA PEREZ OBTAINED A NICARAGUAN EXIT PERMIT ON 5 MARCH 1976 FOR TRAVEL TO THE UNITED STATES. THE DATE OF HIS PROPOSED

MAR 17 1976

61 MAR 24 1976

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10107

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-180256-194

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 12/14/1973
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
MR, SERRANO, ORLANDO, TELCAL, USA, CUBAN EMBASSY, MEXICO CITY, CUBAN SPANISH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/05/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

DEC 14 1973

TELETYPE

Assoc. Dir. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Admin. ____
Comp. Syst. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Files & Com. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Inspection ____
Intell. ____
Laboratory ____
Plan. & Eval. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Legal Coun. ____
Telephone Rm. ____

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except BRACKETS

KP 7-6-98

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 8/23/94 BY SPBMBGLBH (JFK)

FTB003 4:01AM 12-14-73 JPS

ESC107

RR ESV

DE ESC #4304 3480730

ZNY SSSSS

R 132224Z DEC 73

FM CIA

TO FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BT

S E C R E T. CITE CIA 491076.

ATTN: INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

SUBJECT: [TELEPHONE TAPS ON CALLS INITIATED IN USA TO] (S) CUBAN INTELLIGENCE OFFICER MEXICO CITY, Mexico

1. ON 12 AND 15 NOVEMBER 1973 AN INDIVIDUAL WHO IDENTIFIED HIMSELF AS "ORLANDO SERRANO" NR D.C. [MADE TELEPHONE CALLS FROM THE USA TO] (S) THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY. HE [USED DOUBLE-TALK,] (S) SPOKE SPANISH WITH CUBAN VICE CONSUL JUAN ENSENAT CAMPS Cuba Mexico (AN IDENTIFIED CUIS OFFICER), AND REFERRED TO HIS (THE CALLER'S) RELATIONSHIP WITH MANUEL RODRIGUEZ SEOANE Mexico Cuba A Cuban Intelligence Service officer IN 1964 AND TO "MICKEY" WHOM HE HAD CONTACTED PREVIOUSLY, PRESUMABLY IN MEXICO. RODRIGUEZ IS A CUIS OFFICER AND "MICKEY" IS THE PSEUDONYM OF ENRIQUE CICARD LABRADA AKA Mickey Cuba Mexico WHO WAS STATIONED IN MEXICO CITY AS CONSUL FROM 1968 UNTIL TRANSFERED TO HAVANA 1971. -1971 in Mexico City, Mexico ACCORDING TO A DGI DEFECTOR IN 1971, CICARD WAS THEN EITHER HEAD OF THE DGI USA BUREAU OR THE SECTION IN CHARGE OF OPERATIONS AGAINST THE FBI AND

REC-81 105-180256-194

JAN 4 1974

airtel to SAC NY & WFO HLD/mlw 1/2/74

yellow

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

105-18025

SECRET

CIA.

SECRET

2. THERE ARE NO IDENTIFIABLE TRACES ON SERRANO. IN VIEW OF THE CALLER'S CITED CUIS CONNECTIONS, WE BELIEVE HE IS VERY POSSIBLY IDENTICAL WITH EMILIO ECHARTE PEDROSO, SUBJECT OF FBI NEW YORK REPORT DATED OCTOBER 27, 1970. THAT REPORT REFERRED TO ECHARTE'S RECRUITMENT IN CUBA BY RODRIGUEZ AND HIS DISPATCH TO THE USA ON A MISSION TO ASSASSINATE CUBAN EXILE LEADER MANOLO RAY. SAME REPORT ALSO ADVISED THAT ECHARTE CONTACTED DGI OFFICER CICARD IN MEXICO 1968 AND CICARD DIRECTED HIM TO CULTIVATE A CIA AGENT IN USA.

CUBA
USA

3. [THE 12 NOVEMBER CALL WAS MADE FROM AN UNIDENTIFIED LOCATION IN THE USA. THE 15 NOVEMBER CALL WAS MADE AT 1458 HOURS WASHINGTON, D.C. TIME FROM A PHONE BOOTH IN WASHINGTON TO THE CUBAN EMBASSY MEXICO CITY, TELEPHONE NUMBER 5530917. THE 12 AND 15 NOVEMBER CONVERSATIONS ARE SIMILAR IN CONTENT. OUR MEXICO CITY STATION RECEIVED A TAPE RECORDING OF THE 15 NOVEMBER TELEPHONE CONVERSATION FROM THE MEXICAN SERVICE WHICH] (S) WE ARE FORWARDING TO FBI HEADQUARTERS FOR REVIEW. [AN EXPERIENCED TRANSCRIBER EMPLOYED BY CIA STATES THAT THE CALLER] (S) USED DEFINITE CUBAN SPANISH. [THE TRANSCRIBER ALSO BELIEVES THE CALLER] (S) IS NOT WELL EDUCATED.

SECRET

2

4. ON 15 NOVEMBER [THE CALLER] (S) REFERRED TO HIS PREVIOUS RELATIONSHIP WITH RODRIGUEZ AND CICARD, AND SAID THAT THE MEETING HE [(THE CALLER)] (S) WAS INVOLVED WITH ["HERE"] (S) (PRESUMABLY IN THE USA) HAD BEEN SUSPENDED UNTIL "THE FIFTEENTH", THAT HE WANTED TO GO AND EXPLAIN WHAT IS TAKING PLACE, AND THAT ENSENAT SHOULD RELAY THE INFORMATION TO PINEIRO (PRESUMABLY MANUEL/PINEIRO/LOSADA, CHIEF OF THE CUBAN LIBERATION DIRECTORATE, WHO IS CURRENTLY BELIEVED TO BE IN HAVANA). ENSENAT SAID HE WOULD PASS THE MESSAGE TO THE FOREIGN MINISTRY. [THE CALLER SAID HE WOULD TELEPHONE ENSENAT AGAIN AT THE SAME TIME ON THE FIFTEENTH.] (S)

cuba

5. WE ARE UNABLE TO MAKE MUCH SENSE OUT OF [THE CALLS.] (S) ANY POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION YOUR ORGANIZATION CAN MAKE OF [THE CALLER] (S) AND HIS ACTIVITIES, BASED ONHIS CABLE AND YOUR REVIEW [OF THE 15 NOVEMBER TAPE,] (S) WILL BE APPRECIATED.

6. EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECALSSIFICATION SCHECULE OF E.O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY 5B2. AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE. ~~CLASSIFIED BY 054555~~..

BT

#4304

SECRET

NNNN

JDR JB

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/1/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10279-10209
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-67406-20

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	EDWARDS, SHEFFIELD
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/09/1963
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	PPJM, RECRUITMENT, AMERICAN CODE CLERK A/O DIPLOMAT IN MOSCOW, KGB
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/22/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

Subject advised that Nina and Ed Stevens do a lot of entertaining but he had never attended any of their parties. Subject stated that he would not trust Nina Stevens as far as he could throw an elephant. Subject stated that he had no proof but believed Nina to be a Soviet informant.

Fusia

Subject advised that Aline Mosby was a newspaperwoman in Schapiro's office. Mosby, during the past year, had been in the hospital on several occasions and one didn't see too much of her. Subject also advised that Mosby stuck mostly to the foreign circuit rather than the Embassy circuit. Subject stated that one of the reasons Mosby was in the hospital on one occasion was the fact that she had an abortion, according to gossip.

Subject stated that another newspaperwoman in Moscow was Priscilla Johnson. Subject advised that Johnson had the reputation of being a fairly good reporter and one whom the Soviets kept on a month to month visa basis. Subject indicated that it was highly possible the Soviets had attempted to recruit Johnson as she spent a lot of time with Soviet nationals.

Subject was queried as to whether he had ever made an unauthorized disclosure of classified information in the Soviet Union, to which he replied that he had not disclosed classified information as such. He stated that his cover, which he had used for the period in between [State Department] (S) assignments, was that he was a [consultant of the AEC, particularly to the Joint Atomic Energy Intelligence Committee, composed of AEC, CIA, State, NSA, Joint Chiefs, and the Armed Services.] (S) Subject stated that he had indicated to individuals, when questioned, that he had done economic research and analysis in the Soviet field and that he had done this ever since he had first become a [State Department] (S) employee. Subject stated that among others he had discussed this with [Ray Hutchins, his counterpart in the British Embassy.] (S)

Subject was asked for his itinerary on his return trip to the United States. Subject stated that he had long planned to come home via the Far East and it was a well publicized plan. He stated that when he left Moscow he stayed over in Delhi for a week to see if there were any objections from Headquarters as to his itinerary. He stated that when he received no instructions to the contrary, he returned to the United States via his previously announced plans and the differences in fares being borne by him.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10279-10258

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-221-417

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, MX
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 02/10/1960
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
NRO, INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY, MATEOS, LOPEZ, SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP, CARIBBEAN POLITICAL SITUATION, CUBAN EXILE ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

SECRET

~~8-10-94 05-~~ 2/13/78 JSG of Serial

~~Declassify on: OADR~~ HSCA re 12/22/77 Request re Rothman

#211326 Classified by SPLBJN/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 2/5/85

Date: 2/10/60

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Mexico (100-743G)

Subject: MONTHLY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY

SYNOPSIS

LOPEZ MATEOS' SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP (cont.)(page 2): Recent South American trip of Mexican President gave emphasis to need for coordinated effort in resolving economic problems of Latin America. Talks dealt with stimulation of commerce, but for present principal importance of trip seems to have been emotional rather than materialistic. DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS (page 3): While recently in Caracas, Venezuela, SIQUEIROS made statements critical of both Mexican President and Mexican Revolution. Mexican administration and public angered by remarks. CARIBBEAN POLITICAL SITUATION (page 3): Cuba. Meeting sponsored by Society of Friends of Cuba held at Mexico City, 1/17/60, to demonstrate support for Cuban Government. Nicaragua: Report received that Cuban Government still planning to support invasion of Nicaragua with pro-Communist elements. Haiti: Political situation reported to be deteriorating. [PARTIDO COMUNISTA [U] MEXICANO - PCM (COMMUNIST PARTY OF MEXICO)](page 6): XIII National Congress, scheduled for 2/22-26/60, again postponed to provide more time for holding of State Congresses and preparation of discussion material. POCM representatives to be invited to attend Congress. Federal District Committee to step up dues collections and general cell activity. JCM held plenum 1/11-14/60.[U] PARTIDO POPULAR - PP (POPULAR PARTY)(page 7): PP being reorganized and members being solicited to submit background and other data. PP held annual New Year's banquet on 2/6/60. PP inaugurated Pioneers, Boy Scout type organization, on 2/5/60. VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO (page 8): LOMBARDO was principal speaker at PP New Year's banquet and generally spoke favorably of government of LOPEZ MATEOS and his trip to South America. [SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES](S) (page 9): [VALENTIN VASILEVICH BAKULIN] identified as [new Soviet principal] of MEX-87.(S) Latter made trip to Los Angeles in [January,] 1960, and reported [S] to Soviets.](S)

8 - Bureau
1 - Mexico City
JNS/GFM/SWP/JTG:plb
(9)

1 - Ag, CP, Rd, SA
SD, Hoover & Rsi
(by the trip) 2-18-60
Ramsey

REC 74 13-221-417
1/20/94 it
EX-133 5668 SSP/dk
~~FEB 15 1960~~
REC.D (JFK)
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/dk
DECLASSIFY ON:
Lilke
NAT. AM. SEC.
pg 9

UNRECORDED COPY FILED

MC 100-743G

Cuban Exile Activities

On January 28, 1960, PSI MIGUEL ANDRES DE LEON ROJAS reported that responsible Cuban exile groups in Mexico City and the United States, who have supported Dr. EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, are convinced that General JOSE ELEUTERIO PEDRAZA CABRERA, who commands a group of Cuban military exiles in the Dominican Republic, would not be a wise selection as the military leader of the attempt to overthrow the CASTRO government. The PSI further advised that these Cuban exile groups believe that PEDRO LUIS DIAZ LANZ, former Chief of the Cuban Air Force, would be a much better military leader. (S)(S)(U)

The PSI also advised that information received from sources within Cuba reflected that FIDEL CASTRO had prepared a decree ordering the United States to vacate the Guantanamo Naval Base. According to this information, the decree was originally prepared in late November, 1959, but had not yet been signed for issuance. (S)(S)(U)

The PSI further reported that he had heard reports in Miami, Florida, of an invasion attempt which allegedly would be made by supporters of ROLANDO MASFERRER, a Cuban exile who resides in Miami. The PSI stated that MASFERRER, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, NORMAN ROTHMAN, and their associates form a group which is not regarded in a favorable light by responsible Cuban exiles or by responsible elements within Cuba. The PSI stated that from the information available to him in Miami he doubted very much that MASFERRER would be able to make an attempt at invading Cuba or, if an attempt were made, that it would be successful. (S)(U)

Nicaragua

PSI DE LEON also advised on January 28 that he had received information from within Cuba that ERNESTO "CHE" GUEVARA has not abandoned his project to utilize pro-Communist Nicaraguan exiles and Cuban "volunteers" in an attempt to invade Nicaragua. This source advised that approximately 400 guerrillas have been trained to make up the invasion force. The PSI stated he had received no information as to the timing of such an attempt, but expressed doubt that it would occur in the immediate future in view of the concern of the Cuban Government over a possible early invasion attempt by Cuban exiles. (S)(U)

528

age and is disposed to follow an international policy that will not only benefit Mexico but its sister Latin American countries who are bound together not only by historical ties but by the same economic and social conditions and identical perspectives. In apparent reference to DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS, leading PCM figure, he stated that some people, who are unable to understand national and international politics although they expound them daily, have been critical of President LOPEZ MATEOS' trip. During the course of the President's trip SIQUEIROS made a statement to the press wherein he criticized the President for not accepting a bid to visit Cuba and stated that President LOPEZ MATEOS was merely laying the ground work for a subsequent visit by President EISENHOWER. LOMBARDO was critical of President LOPEZ MATEOS in certain respects, particularly in connection with the imprisonment of the railroad strike agitators and PCM and POCM leaders.

ACTION TAKEN: None. Will be disseminated in the next report on the PP.

[SOVIET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES] (S)

[LAROB] (S)

Investigation conducted by this office to identify ["VALENTIN," the new Soviet principal] of MEX-[87] (S) pointed to [VALENTIN VASILEVICH BAKULIN, a Soviet Embassy] (S) employee who arrived in Mexico City with his family on [November 5] 1959 [S]. As soon as a photograph of [BAKULIN] became available, it was [S] shown to MEX-[87] (S) who immediately and positively identified him as [his principal "VALENTIN."] (S)

On [January 11] 1960, MEX-[87] returned to Mexico City [S] from a trip to Los Angeles. He thereafter kept a prearranged meeting with [BAKULIN] (S) on [January 18,] 1960, and (S) turned over to [S] him a [report of his activities in Los Angeles] (S) as well as a [map] (S) and newspaper clippings gathered by [LA 4199-S.] [BAKULIN] [S] instructed MEX-[87] to pick up a [Soviet message on January 21,] [S] 1960, from [the dead drop at Pilares and Pestalozzi] (S) Streets. The [message] was to contain questions regarding MEX-[87]'s [S] [report on his] trip to Los Angeles. [BAKULIN] also set up a [S] personal meeting for [February 15,] 1960. (S)

[MEX-[87 retrieved Soviet Message No. 22] on [January 21] (S)

1960. Contrary to the usual custom, this message was typed (S) instead of being on undeveloped 35 mm. film. The Soviets (S) inquired how and where LA 4199-S keeps the notes of his observations and the newspaper clippings, among what type of (S) people does the Los Angeles informant initiate his contacts, (S) what his expenses have been, the manner in which the data on (S) the displacement of a ship seen by the informants was obtained, (S) the intensity of traffic noted in the vicinity of the places (S) visited, the possibility of taking photographs, the security of the objectives, how LA 4199-S explains his trips to his (S) family, and the identity of the objectives on which data can be more easily secured. (S)

MEX-87 deposited his Message No. 22 in the established (S) dead drop on January 25, 1960, and generally answered the questions posed in the prior Soviet message. (S)

Soviet Message No. 23 was retrieved by MEX-87 on (S) February 8, 1960. It changed the personal meeting between (S) BAKULIN and MEX-87 from the third Monday of the month to the (S) last Monday of the month at the same time and place. (S)

ACTION TAKEN: None, pursuant to specific Bureau instructions.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10280-10030

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-77667-21

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 07/29/1964
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CC, SECADES, ROLANDO L. CUBELA, ASSOC, LIAISON WITH CIA, CONSPR, CUBA, CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

5010-108

Memorandum

SECRET

4

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-77667)

DATE: July 29, 1964

FROM : SAC, MIAMI (109-471) (C)

SUBJECT: ROLANDO L. CUBELA Y SECADES
IS - CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION ~~except for Brackets~~
IN THIS DOCUMENT. ~~GMB 4-4-94~~
EXCEPT FOR
BRACKETS
K 5-26-98

105-131629

Remylet 10/11/63.

It is noted that CUBELA is a Cuban Government official whose desire to defect was made known by MM 761-S in June, 1962. [Thereafter, CIA apparently made contact with CUBELA in Europe through [CARLOS TEPEDINO, 9819 64th Avenue, Rego Park, Queens, New York,] a Cuban exile and long-time friend of MM 761-S, who frequently travels in Europe.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

MM 761-S advised that on July 15, 1964, he was visited by [CARLOS TEPEDINO,] at which time he confided ~~(S)~~ (U) certain information concerning CUBELA. He cautioned the informant to say nothing concerning their conversation which would permit the information to reach CIA or any other source through which it might become public, inasmuch as to do so might result in the death of persons in Cuba, as well as [TEPEDINO himself.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

[TEPEDINO] thereupon confided that he has been ~~(S)~~ (U) acting as the contact man between CIA and CUBELA. CUBELA is also in contact with [the Cuban Ambassador in Paris named CARRILLO,] who reportedly is anti-CASTRO. [CARRILLO] (S) has been assisting both CUBELA and [TEPEDINO.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

According to [TEPEDINO,] CUBELA has been constantly ~~(S)~~ (U) complaining to him that CIA refuses to furnish him with certain necessary equipment with which he could take some

4/21-94 Classified by ~~5668 MAC/KSR~~ CADR (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR
5-27-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
ret to mm
VHM: gai 8/16/96

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-131629

2 - Bureau (RM)
2 - Miami
(1 - 109-471)
(1 - 134-379-Sub A)
THE/neb
(4)

REC 23

105-77667-21

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

JUL 30 1964

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED~~ #211,326
DATE 12/4/85 BY SP6 BJA/ECL

SECRET

NAT. ~~INT.~~ SEC.

SECRET

effective action in Cuba. According to [TEPEDINO,] CUBELA desires some sort of compact equipment with which he can possibly eliminate CASTRO; however, CIA keeps offering him only large, bulky, unserviceable material. (~~S~~)(u)

According to [TEPEDINO,] there is now under discussion some plan to kill FIDEL CASTRO, in which CUBELA will figure. CIA allegedly was formerly in favor of such a plan; however, inasmuch as Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY would have no part of it, it was shelved. Now the plan has allegedly been brought up again for consideration. President JOHNSON allegedly is aware of it, and has not ruled against it. If set in motion, it will be scheduled to occur sometime before the elections in November. (~~S~~)(u)

[TEPEDINO] told the informant he has not been able to learn much more concerning this plan, other than that CUBELA is supposed to participate, that it is to be accomplished by men in Cuba, and possibly someone from Europe. (~~S~~)(u)

The informant advised [TEPEDINO] did not specifically indicate how he had acquired this information; however, the informant presumed from his manner of speaking that he had obtained it from CUBELA. (~~S~~)(u)

The above is for the information of the Bureau, and is not being submitted in form suitable for dissemination since both [TEPEDINO] and CUBELA are apparently of operational interest to CIA. Dissemination would also lead to the disclosure of MM 761-S. Although questioned closely, MM 761-S was not able to furnish any further details. (~~S~~)(u)

SECRET

380-10036

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10280-10057
RECORD_SERIES: HO
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: CR 105-304390-236

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: FBI
FROM: LEG. BUE
TO: DIRECTOR. FBI
TITLE:

DATE: 03/03/1977
PAGES: 2
SUBJECT: OBA, CORU, ATTACK, ATTACHES, LIMA, PERU

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 07/14/1998
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS: Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

Consultation

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: REFERRED TO DIA

RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

Assoc. Dir. ____
Dep. AD Adm. ____
Dep. AD Inv. ____
Asst. Dir.:
Adm. Serv. ____
Ext. Affairs ____
Fin. & Pers. ____
Gen. Inv. ____
Ident. ____
Intell. ____
Legal Coun. ____
Plan. & Insp. ____
Rec. Mgt. ____
S. & T. Serv. ____
Spec. Inv. ____
Training ____
Telephone Rm. ____
Director's Sec'y ____

SECRET

R 031700Z MAR 77

FM [BUENOS AIRES (105-1348)] ~~(C)~~ (U)

TO DIRECTOR ROUTINE 052-03

[CARACAS ROUTINE 003-03
MADRID ROUTINE 003-03
MEXICO CITY ROUTINE 006-03] ~~(C)~~ (U)

BT

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~

(U) COORDINATION OF UNITED REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATIONS (CORU), NEUTRALITY MATTERS - CUBA - PERU.

REBUCAB FEBRUARY 26, 1977.

~~(C)~~ [AMERICAN EMBASSY, LIMA, PERU, CONFIRMS ATTACK AGAINST CUBAN EMBASSY ATTACHE'S HOUSE DID TAKE PLACE IN LIMA; HOWEVER, THE ATTACK WAS NOT PUBLICLY DISCLOSED OR WIDELY KNOWN IN LIMA. THE AMERICAN EMBASSY IN LIMA SUBMITTED NO REPORT ON THE INCIDENT.] HOWEVER, [THE CIA STATION IN LIMA AND] (S) THE DEFENSE ATTACHE'S OFFICE IN LIMA SUBMITTED DETAILED REPORTS TO THEIR RESPECTIVE HEADQUARTERS, I. E. [CIA] (S) HEADQUARTERS AND DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HEADQUARTERS IN WASHINGTON. IT IS SUGGESTED THE BUREAU CONTACT CIA AND DIA FOR DETAILS. ~~(U)~~ ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

~~BUREAU REQUESTED TO ADVISE MIAMI.~~

BT

Field offices only

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED ... AGENCIES
AND ... SERVICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF ~~Class~~ 7/19/85 jc
DATE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. except the Brackets below

KP 2-2-98 (JFK)
SLD/KSR 2-21-98

~~Classified by ... multiple sources~~
~~5/4/88~~
Declassify on: OADR

Foreign

105-304390-236

REC-39

EX-108

0-73 MAR 18 1977 JFG:jab 3/4/77
mm, ~~NY, NK, FSJ~~
State, ISS, GCS, SS, INS
[CIA] Customs, USCG, & DIA ~~(S)~~ (U)

State Dept's info is unclassified per their letter DTD 9-9-97

1 copies made
JCB CWC
avila
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 3-14 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290).

ACTION

CLASSIFIED BY: 5668 SLD/GCL
REASON: 1.5 (c)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)

5 5 MAR 28 1977

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/14/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10281-10028

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 62-80750-4563

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SHRODER, R. I.
TO : ROSEN

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/1967
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/11/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

---

v9.1

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10 5010-106
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

SECRET

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

9/25/95 Classified by 5668 SLD/mlc (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

TO : Mr. Rosen DATE: March 15, 1967

FROM : R. I. Shroder

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Shroder
1 - Mr. Thompson
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Trotter

SUBJECT: COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA (U)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA) (S)
INTERNAL SECURITY - VENEZUELA (U)
KIDNAPING (U)

(S) (X) (U) #211326
Classified by SPL BJA/GC
Declassify on: OADR 11/6/85

C. I. A. (S)(X)(U)

This relates to information received from CIA indicating the possibility that the Communist Party of Venezuela may attempt to kidnap the child of a CIA employee Thomas Keogh. No investigation is being conducted by us and appropriate dissemination has previously been made. (S)(X)

(S) At our suggestion, through liaison with CIA, fingerprints and photographs have been obtained and were furnished to SA W. O. Cregar by Mrs. Jane Roman of CIA on 3/10/67. This material is being made part of this file for possible use in the event of a kidnaping. Photographs and fingerprints are of the following individuals: Joseph Edward Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, Jr.; Christina Margarita Keogh; Elizabeth Teresa Keogh; Francis Xavier Keogh; Thomas Patrick Keogh, III, and Maria Rita Keogh. (S)(X)(S)

1934 B. 1958 B. 1957 1957 na

ACTION:

Thomas Patrick Keogh Jr. (S)

This matter has been coordinated with the Identification Division and it is recommended that this memo and attachment be sent directly to SA Carl Volker, Room 4125, IB, in order that the fingerprints may be promptly classified and filed.

Enclosure
ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
ST-114
REC 33
ENCLOSURE
FDT:emf
(7)

na

62-80750-4563

MAR 20 1967

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS JM 6-25-97

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

SLD/KSR 8-2-97 JFK

Fingerprints of following detached and filed in Ident Div.

MARIA RITA KEOGH
EDWARD JOSEPH KEOGH
CHRISTINA MARGARITA KEOGH
ELIZABETH TERESA KEOGH
FRANCIS XAVIER KEOGH
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH JR.
THOMAS PATRICK KEOGH III

(S)(S)

341

7 MAR 29 1967

64-200-22

U.S. / VENEZ

Agency and Request
NW 211326 5/14/92

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/28/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10284-10081
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-85440-28

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : DIRECTOR, FBI
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 08/11/1967
PAGES : 185
SUBJECTS :
MAB, ASSOC, CUBAN EXILES, MIL ACT, ACA
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE
COMMENTS : INC S/S, ADMIN PAGE

v9.1

PSI Elio Quintero (protect identity) (97-4313), 153 N.E. 44th Street, Miami, advised on 7/29/60 that he had been serving in a liaison capacity with the MRR and prospective defectee pilots of Cuban airlines. His operations were directed by Dr. Manuel Artime Buesa, an ex-Lieutenant of the Cuban Revolutionary Army who now was serving as Secretary General of the MRR. Quintero was in daily telephonic contact with Salvador Aldereguia and Antonio Bascaro, two members of the Cuban Revolutionary Army who were in exile in the Dutch West Indies, and through Artime was attempting to arrange for their admission into the US. ~~(C)~~ (U)

97-4313-3 p.3
(~~6,33~~)

Carlos Rodriguez, a Cuban national living in NYC as of August, 1960, reportedly said that he was affiliated with the "MRR - Camilo Cienfuegos", and claimed to be in close contact with the "real MRR" in Cuba. He said that Manuel Artime was not entirely sound, but that the movement in Cuba now was well organized and beginning to show signs of progress. (CIA, 9/1/60) ~~(S)~~ (U) ~~[BRACKETED INFO AND RECLASSIFIED PER AGENCYS LTR DTD 7/5/91] (S)(U)~~
~~9803 rld/gel #214326 4/30/98~~

105-91331-1 p.2
(~~41~~)

[In July, 1960 there was dissension in the MRR leadership which consisted of Ricardo Lorie, Higinio "Nino" Diaz, Antonio Michel Yabor and Manuel Artime Buesa. Artime, who represented the MRR on the FRD Executive Committee, reportedly was aligned with the political group of Manuel Antonio de Varona, Aurelio Sanchez Arango and Justo Carrillo. The dissident group, Lorie, Diaz and Yabor, who were not accepted by the FRD, aligned themselves with the Liberation Alliance which was formed in Miami on 8/7/60, and claimed they were the true MRR organization. A paid political announcement in the 8/2/60 issue of the "Diario Las Americas" stated that Jose Ignacio Rasco Bermudez, a secretary of the FRD Executive Committee, certified that the only MRR duly accredited representative of that organization to the FRD was Manuel Artime. The National Board of the MRR in Cuba, backed by the FRD, reportedly approved the reorganization of the MRR and Artime's expulsion of Lorie, Diaz and Yabor. On 8/16/60, CIA, Miami (protect identity), advised that Artime and ~~(S)~~ (U)

(continued)

SECRET

Rudolph Fernandez (protect identity), a cotton broker of Atlanta, Georgia who was closely associated with Francisco Gualberto Cajigas y Garcia Del Prado, Miami, Florida, civilian leader of the Cuban Unity of Liberation (UCL) (105-88041), furnished information to Miami Office Agents on 9/12/60. Cajigas had told Fernandez that Father Medina, Rector of Villanueva University, Havana, arrived in Miami from Havana, on 9/5/60, for the purpose of contacting Cajigas and offering him the help and resources of the Catholic Church in Cuba in his fight against Castro. Fernandez said that, according to Cajigas, Father Medina advised that the Catholic Church in Cuba was opposed to Manuel Antonio Varona of the FRD. Father Medina also disclosed to Cajigas that Manuel Artime, one of the five leaders of the FRD, had visited Medina and had confided that the FRD was divided and unhappy. U

105-88041-6 encl.p.5
(39)

Ramiro Loys (protect identity), a confidential source of information, advised on 9/6/60 that he had been told by Carlos Marquez Sterling that Antonio (Tony) Varona was coming to Washington, DC on 9/16/60, where he planned to confer with officials of the Department of State and CIA concerning the eventual unification of the various anti-Castro groups then in existence. At that time, Varona was to discuss what assistance this group might expect from the US and he also would provide the identity of various anti-Castro groups known to him. Among persons under consideration by Sterling, Varona, and others, for inclusion in this unified organization was Artime Buesa. According to Loys, Sterling had been a Cuban presidential aspirant during the election of 1958 and Varona was a former Cuban Senator now in exile in Miami, Florida. U

109-584-1916
(22)

Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas (2-1622), 1900 S.W. 21st Terrace, Miami, advised on 10/6/60 that through an intermediary (not further identified) he had been in contact with Manuel Artime Buesa, military leader and member of the FRD, and had offered to join the FRD provided the FRD would manifest certain stipulations. (Date

(continued)

SECRET

Fray Balbino de Ferral of the Capuchinos Convent Plaza de Jesus #2, Madrid, Spain, advised on 8/22/63 that he had been deported from Cuba in September, 1961. Fray Balbino stated that he was a member of the MRR, identified as a counterrevolutionary group which was headed by Manuel Artimes, who was one of the leaders of the 4/17/61 Bay of Pigs invasion (sic). Fray Balbino said that he acted in a sort of liaison capacity between the MRR and other counterrevolutionary groups. ~~(S)~~(u)

SECRET

105-111153-15
(73)

On 1/2/62, Philadelphia SOI Enrique Menocal (protect identity) advised that the 30th of November Movement (105-92196) was founded originally by Manuel Artime (date not indicated) and was composed largely of Catholic students in Cuba. Menocal said that November 30th was the date on which Huber Matos, former military commander of Cameguey Province in Cuba, was arrested by Fidel Castro and sentenced to prison for being a traitor to the Cuban Revolution. U

105-92196-28 p.3
(41)
SI 105-92196-17 encl.p.1
(41)

The MRR, an underground movement formed in Cuba in mid-1959, was composed primarily of three larger groups: (1) the ACU, under Manuel F. Artime Buesa; (2) a military group under Major Ricardo de la Lorie Valls; and (3) an air group, without planes, of 13 experienced pilots under Major Antonio Michel Yabor. The ACU was in existence prior to the Castro regime as the Cuban Catholic University (CACU) students organization. In November, 1959, under Artime's leadership, the majority of the CACU membership joined with the Rebel Army Officer group to become the MRR. In February, 1950, a coordinated movement of anti-Castro exiles outside Cuba was formed in Mexico and named the MRR. Artime and Lorie were joint heads of this newly formed group. About the middle of 1960, Artime, who was in the US, reportedly began to act without authority from the MRR Directorate, which resulted in formation of the MRR splinter group,

(continued)

(continued)

SECRET

Cuba since the ill-fated 4/17/61 Playa Giron invasion. [(MM 639-S).] (u)

On 12/29/62, President John F. Kennedy visited the Orange Bowl Stadium, Miami, where he reviewed the returned prisoners of Brigade 2506. He was accompanied by Jose Miro Cardona and Manuel Artime, both of whom were on the speakers' stand with President Kennedy. [(MM 639-S).] (u)

After Artime's return to the US, he used his influence with the US Government to obtain an interview with President Kennedy in Palm Beach, Florida. He was to continue as head of the MRR. Artime made a good appearance, spoke English, and had charmed US Government officials who were in charge of government policy between the US and Cuba. He was extremely ambitious and would like to be the head of the CRC and probably the future President of Cuba. (Higinio "Nino" Diaz, supra, 1/4/63). u

As a result of nationwide press, radio, and television coverage of President Kennedy's 12/29/62 activities at the Orange Bowl, which coverage prominently mentioned Artime's name, Artime now was better known and his position in the anti-Fidel Castro movement was greatly increased. Generally among Cuban exiles Artime was considered young, immature, and highly ambitious, and many felt that he would be the victim of his own publicity. u [(MM 639-S, 1/5/63).] (u)

97-4133-57 p.1,3-5
(29)

The 1/6/63 issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "Rift Develops in Invasion Brigade; 100 Boycotted JFK Here." This related to boycott by Cuban Brigade 2506 (105-117331) prisoners of President Kennedy's 12/29/62 appearance at the Orange Bowl to welcome the returned prisoners. The article stated that Enrique Llaca, Jr., recently released from Castro's prisons, singled out Manuel Artime and Dr. Jose Miro Cardona, head of the CRC, for criticism, declaring they were using the Brigade for their personal benefits. Both Artime and Miro Cardona denied this. The Brigade, under the leadership of Artime and a joint chiefs of staff, had set up headquarters in Miami. u

(continued)

SECRET

(continued) SECRET

The 1/6/63 issue of the "Miami News", in an article entitled "Brigade 2506 Meets Monday to Map Plans", set out the names of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the Brigade and quoted Artime as stating: "We have fought only one battle and we are certain the final battle is very near." U

On 1/9/63, [MM 492-S] 4(c)(U) advised that 24 hours after being received by President Kennedy at the Orange Bowl, the group headed by Enrique Llaca Orbiz appeared on Channel 10 Television, Miami. During their appearance they stated that they were opposed to the CRC and to Manuel Artime, chief of the Brigade. U

105-117331-1 encl.p.2,3,6,9
(50)

[In May, 1961 Fidel Castro offered to exchange a number of Cuban prisoners taken during the 4/17/61 invasion attempt, for US tractors and spare parts for same. Eliminated from the proposed tractor exchange deal were the three leaders of the invasion - Manuel Artime, Jose San Roman and Rafael Bolivar Fuentes. The Cuban Government proposed the exchange of Artime for Francisco "The Hook" Molina, a pro-Castro Cuban who had been convicted of second-degree murder in NYC. However, this proposed exchange failed to materialize and in late March - early April 1962, in Havana, Cuba, the prisoners were tried before a 5-man military tribunal and convicted. The verdict involved heavy ransoms with the ransom for Artime set at $500,000. Subsequently, the US carried out negotiations for release of the prisoners and on 12/23-24/62 they all were airlifted to Miami. Artime, the civil representative of the CRC, reportedly had emerged as a focal figure in the exile community. At a press conference on 12/25/62, he emphasized that all the returned prisoners regarded themselves as the "troops of the Revolutionary Council." Artime declined to discuss the military aspects of the abortive invasion. He said that he and the other ransomed prisoners were determined to return to Cuba.] ~~S~~(U) [As of 1/21/63, INS, Miami, was beginning to process the prisoners.] [U] [CIA, Miami, had contact with Brigade 2506 leaders Artime, Jose Perez San Roman and Eneido Oliva as sources of information to keep abreast of Brigade 2506 moods and desires, and not as "controlled agents"] (~~S~~)(U)

2nd set brackets (U), per INS LTR 11/6/92. 9803 rdd/gcl 311,326 1/6/93

(continued)

classified per agency ltr dtd 2/5/91 ~~X~~(U)
9803 rdd/gcl #241,326
4/30/92. See 1st and 3rd set of brackets

SECRET

(continued)

SECRET

REFERENCE		SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
105-99200-A	Washington Capital News Service, 12/24/62	(46)
-A	Washington Capital News Service, 12/26/62	(46)
-A	"The Miami Herald", 12/26/62 ("All-Out Effort Would Topple Castro -- Artime"; also, "Not a Turncoat Among Them.") (Photograph of Artime appeared in both articles).	(46)
105-107224-A	Washington Capital News Service, 12/25/62	(48)

7d (u)

[WF 1414-S] reported that a meeting of anti-Castro exiles scheduled for 8:30 P.M., 1/27/63, at St. Patrick's Academy, 924 G Street, N.W., Washington, DC, was to be addressed by Commandante Manuel Artime, Cuban exile military figure who participated in the ill-fated Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba in April, 1961. Artime, temporarily, was in Washington with associates, including Commandante Jose Perez San Roman, who likewise figured in the Bay of Pigs invasion. U

109-584-3405
(60)

Washington Capital News Service release, datelined Miami, 2/6/63, reported that the Cuban Brigade, which participated in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, was preparing militarily to try again to liberate Cuba, according to a statement made that day in Miami, by Manuel Artime, Brigade leader. Artime told UPI he was speaking as an individual and not as Secretary General of the MRR, or the Brigade. He called on Cubans to "unify for action" and on all free

(continued)

SECRET

SECRET

(continued)

publicize the movement on 4/11/63. He appeared to have the backing of Manuel Artime, who had been seen with Rivero quite frequently during the past week (place not indicated), and possibly that of Jose Miro Cardona, president of the CRC. Artime dealt with Miro through Carlos Pelaez Cossio, a former senator under Gomez and Batista (sic) and a personal confidant of both Miro and Artime (~~S~~) (U)

This reference indicated that foregoing information was acquired on 4/10/63 in the US (place not given). (~~S~~) (U)

[agency info at top and P1 classified per its 7/5/91 ltr] (~~S~~) (U)
9803 rdd/sel #211,326
4/30/92

105-117331-7 p.2
(51)

Miami Office report dated 4/30/63, set out information indicating that during January, 1963, some MRR (97-4133) functionaries participated in unity discussions with other Cuban revolutionary organizations. The MRR problem was complicated by the recent return to the US from imprisonment in Cuba, of Manuel Artime Buesa, MRR leader who had participated in the April, 1961 invasion attempt. In late January, 1963, Jose Miro Cardona, head of the CRC, tried to overthrow the MRR leadership of Artime. On 2/22/63, at a meeting held by the Enrique Oviedo Leon faction of the MRR (place not indicated), Artime was expelled and Oviedo was named MRR Secretary General. A document (quoted) entitled "Removal and Expulsion of Dr. Manuel Artime Buesa" was made available by [MM 492-S. (~~S~~)] On [4/23/63,] (~~S~~) [U] Manuel Villamanan (protect identity), Cuban exile in Miami, said that Artime still was undisputed head of the MRR; that about 75% of Brigade 2506 was sympathetic with the MRR; that Erneido Oliva of Brigade 2506 was very close to Artime and in agreement with Artime on both the military and political aspects of the fight against communism in Cuba; and that the MRR was not making clandestine trips to Cuba at that time. (Details set out). U

97-4133-60 p.1-3,5-8
(4/30)

The following references relate to an alleged aerial strike over Habana, Cuba, during the night of 4/25/63, in which action [Alexander Irwin Rorke, Jr. (97-4623)] (~~S~~) (U) reportedly was involved. [Frank Fiorini,] (~~S~~) (U)

(continued)

SECRET

(continued)

against Artime and considered him a demagogue. U

109-584-3822 p.1-6
(17,62)
SI 105-97873-18 encl.p.5
(Felipe Vidal Santiago,
12/17/63).
(44)

~~SECRET~~

It was reported on 1/22/64 that no further conversations between former Nicaraguan President Luis Somoza and former Cuban President Carlos Prio Socarras were known to have taken place concerning "Operacion Centroamericana"*. This project continued to be at a standstill and activities of Manuel Artime, MRR leader, apparently were not connected with it, although no open break with Prio had been made. Artime was slowly strengthening and training a group of exiles in Nicaragua. The MRP (105-92704) claimed that Artime was receiving aid from the Nicaraguan Government and from the US. (~~S~~)(U)

The Alliance of MRP - Alpha 66 - SFNE would consider joining forces with Artime when his organization had developed sufficient strength to make an attack on Cuba feasible. (~~S~~)(U)

(CIA, 3/9/64) (~~S~~)(U)
105-92704-92 (~~S~~)
(42)

*See CIA report, dated 11/1/63, appearing elsewhere in this summary. (~~S~~)(~~C~~)(U)
(105-123568-8) U

PSI Margot Pena (protect identity), a Cuban exile, advised on 1/24/64 that supporters of Manuel Antonio de Varona, head of the CRC (105-107224), and of Jose Miro Cardona, would oppose Manuel Artime, head of the MRR, should Artime return to Cuba as head of an anti-Castro force. Pena explained that Varona and Miro accused Artime of having betrayed them while he was in the training camp in Guatemala (~~S~~)(U)

(continued)

Miami report dated 3/19/64, set out activities of Manuel Artime Buesa as head of the MRR. This included Artime's travels between the US and Nicaragua and Costa Rica; his recruiting activities in behalf of his anti-Castro training program and including a number of Cuban exiles recruited out of the US Army for service with his group; the alleged grand style of living of Artime and his followers; and his operation of training camps in Nicaragua where he reportedly had more than five million dollars worth of military equipment. It was alleged that Artime was being officially sponsored and subsidized and that he made a living out of the revolution. In early 1964, when the Pro-Referendum Committee was polling the Cuban exiles for a Cuban referendum election to be held in May, Artime was reported to be against this referendum. Reference also set out information reported on 2/12/64 that Adelaida Padron Cruz, 881 N.E. 71st Street, Miami, continued to be Artime's mistress and that this residence was used by him for secret meetings.) U

SECRET

109-584-3884 p.1,7-10,13,18
(17,62)

Bernardo G. De Torres (105-124552), a Cuban exile, 1440 S.W. 4th Street, Miami, advised on 4/3/64 that he was one of the ransomed prisoners of the April, 1961 Cuban invasion and had returned to the US on 12/24/62. He stated that the support of the US to the Cuban invasion and its support to the movement of Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime in Central America, were two events which precluded prosecution of Cuban exiles for violation of neutrality. DeTorres said it was general information among Cuban exiles in Miami that Artime and members of his organization, the MRR, were receiving US assistance in some manner in connection with the establishment of training camps in Central America.) U

105-124552-3 encl.p.9
(52)

Bureau memo dated 4/9/64, advised that on 4/8/64, [Henry Hecksher] of CIA (62-80750) furnished information on a strictly (S) confidential basis, requesting that this information not be disseminated outside the Bureau. This pertained to the involvement in anti-Castro (X)

(continued)

[Last P, cont on pg 59, is classified per agency's 7/5/91 ltr.] ~~S~~ (U)
9803 rdd/gcl #211,326 4/30/92

SECRET

SECRET

As of 3/10/64, the MRR (97-4133) in the San Francisco, Calif. area, was conducting a recruitment program for a group to start military training within the next 2 months at an unknown location under the leadership of Manuel Artime. (Carolina Salazar - protect identity - MRR official and PSI under development) ~~(S)~~(U)

As of 4/20/64, the Northern California MRR membership had conducted a similar program. No further move was to be made until word was received from Artime, following which recruits probably would proceed to Miami for further instructions. It was the general feeling in MRR that the US Government was supporting Artime. (Jose Valdez - protect identity - MRR delegate). U

97-4133-103 encl.p.1,2
(31~~)~~

The Newark Office, on 4/16/64, reported that SOI Jose Manuel Macias (protect identity) advised on 4/1/64 that a couple of days previously, several members of Cuban Brigade 2506 who had visited Washington, DC and Miami, Florida, returned to the New York area. While in Miami they tried to see Manuel Artime but he was in Central America. Instead, they saw Antonio Iglesia Pons, who was in charge of military affairs for Artime. Artime did not have control of military activities but served as a figurehead and the go-between with the US Government. U

On 4/15/64, Macias stated that several members of the Brigade again would go to Miami on 4/20/64, and from there to Central America to the training camps set up by Artime. Artime was reported to have two bases in Central America, one in Nicaragua and the other in Costa Rica. U

109-584-3912
(62~~)~~

In connection with foregoing, Bureau memo dated 4/24/64, set out CIA's appraisal of this and other information furnished by the Newark Office and disseminated to CIA. According to CIA on 4/23/64, (U) ~~(S)~~

(continued)

[Last ¶ is classified per agency ltr dtd 7/5/91 (cont. on pg 62.)] ~~(S)~~(U)
9803 rdd/gcl #211,336
4/30/92

SECRET

SECRET

(continued)

Antonio Iglesia Pons was in charge of the Nicaraguan operations base as a camp commander, but was not in charge of military affairs for Artime. (~~S~~) (U)

This memo also set out information on CIA's relationship with Artime. (~~S~~) (U)

109-584-3911
(62)

TP 52-S advised that Rodrigo Calderon of Miami, Florida, a former high ranking officer in Cuba under former dictator Fulgencio Batista, came to Tampa on 4/25/64 and met secretly with other Batista followers. This group met for the purpose of formulating plans of their own in the event Fidel Castro was overthrown in the near future by anti-Castro forces that were not followers of Batista. It was felt that this group feared Manuel Artime and desired to formulate plans to be able to re-enter Cuba because it was common knowledge that some Batista supporters would be regarded as undesirables in Cuba when Castro was thrown out. It was believed that this meeting was held at the home of a woman doctor by the name of Dr. Miranda. Others present were Dr. Jose Mijares and a Dr. Santos, who worked for Hillsborough County in Tampa. (~~C~~) (U)

109-584-3914
(62)

In 1960, CIA initiated a program known under the code name "CLIP" (105-89923), the over-all objective of which was the establishment of an organization among Cuban exiles capable of replacing the Castro government. In May, 1960, CIA furnished the names of Cubans making up the nucleus of the organization which would move against Castro and which would publicly announce its existence under the name of Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD - Revolutionary Democratic Front) (105-87912). On 6/22/60, a manifesto was published in Mexico City, Mexico, announcing the formation of the FRD. Directors of this organization who signed the manifesto and were in Mexico City (~~S~~) (U)

(continued)

[P1, last P and portion at top unclassified per ~~agency~~ 7/5/91 ltr) (~~S~~) (U)
9803 rdd/gcl #211,326
4/30/92

SECRET

SECRET

Manuel Artime Buesa was in Nicaragua the week of 5/4/64 where he met with Teodoro Picado, Costa Rican pilot who returned to San Jose in April, 1964 after having been jailed in Cuba for seven months. (CIA) ~~(S)~~ (U) Classified per agency's 7/5/91 ltr. JK (U)

9803 RLL/SCL
#211326
4/30/92

109-584-3943
(17,62)

Press reports indicated that on 5/13/64, the MRR issued a communique advising of the capture of the Port of Pilon in Cuba and demolition of a sugar mill. Manuel Artime participated. The communique was signed by Manuel Artime Buesa, Secretary General, and Rafael Quintero, Military Coordinator of the MRR. The raid on the sugar refinery at Central Pilon, Oriente Province, was reported also by CSNY 2822-S and verified by Frank McCarthy, UPI, and Julio Lubo, former owner of Central Pilon. The following references on Artime relate to this activity: U

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4133-99 (Setting out press release as furnished by Dr. Cesar Baro Esteva, Vice-Secretary General, MRR)	(19,66)
-102* [(PSI Alfredo Borges, protect identity, and duplicate informant)] ∅(U)	(5,31)
-A "The NY Times" 5/14/64 p.1 ("Cuban Exiles Say They Seized Port").	(6,33)
-A Washington Capital News Service 5/13/64	(33)
105-114543-126	(50)

*Add. info.

SECRET

(U)(S) SECRET

On 5/11/64, MM 960-S advised that Manuel Artime Buesa continued as head of the MRR which maintained headquarters at 2212 N.E. 2nd Court, Miami. U

(S)(U)

Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez, Miami, former Comandos L action group leader, advised on 5/12/64, that as soon as repairs were completed on his boat, the "Silvia" he and about 10 others would leave on the boat for Central America to join Artime. U [U]

On 5/12/64, INS, Miami (protect identity) advised that Artime would leave Miami on 5/12 or 13/64 for Costa Rica, his Central American headquarters, and then go to Nicaragua where he reportedly had military training camps. Artime was expected to return to the US in about a week. (S) classified ~~[illegible]~~

Add. info. (U) per INS letter 11/6/92
9803 Add/gel
211,326 1/6/93
U

109-584-3976 p.8,9
(~~17,63~~)
SI as par. 2
105-117222-182 encl.p.3,4
(add. info.)
(~~12,50~~)

Alberto Oms Barreto, a former member of Brigade 2506 which participated in the April, 1961 invasion of Cuba, advised on 4/2/64, that he had made a trip to Washington, DC and Miami, Florida in mid-March, 1964, and had talked to representatives of Brigade 2506. Oms stated that leaders of Brigade 2506 in the Miami area were not contemplating doing anything at the present time in a military way to overthrow Fidel Castro. Most of them were not in sympathy with Manuel Artime Buesa who formerly was the civilian head of Brigade 2506. Oms stated that some former members of Brigade 2506 had gone with Artime and Artime was reported to have military camps in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Artime currently was the head of the MRR and was reported to be preparing for raids and guerrilla activity in Cuba in the immediate future. U

On 5/13/64, CSNY 2822-S advised that his niece (not further identified) recently had a letter from Joaquin Godoy of the MRP. Godoy (U)(S)

(continued)

SECRET

(continued 109-584-3949)

REFERENCE SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER

article entitled "Cuban Forays Indicate 2 Units Plan Strikes", from the 5/16/64 issue of the "Washington Evening Star")

SECRET

109-584-A Press Release for 5/22/64 column of Fulton Lewis, Jr. for King Features Syndicate, Inc. (65)

"The Washington Post and Times Herald", 5/30/64, p.B-7, in an article entitled "Cuba's Oil Refineries 'Off Limits'" in Jack Anderson's "Washington Merry-Go-Round" column, reported that these orders regarding the refineries were issued to Cuban Commandos by CIA. An aide to Cuban exile leader Manuel Artime had explained to this column: "We don't want to damage foreign property." A year before, Artime had complained to this column that CIA had cut the allowance for his freedom fighters down to a token $1000 a month. He hadn't complained recently.

97-4133-A, "The Washington Post and Times Herald" 5/30/64
(33)

CIA (protect identity) advised on 5/14/64 that the MRR was not a CIA operation. CIA at the direction of "Special Group" had been furnishing support to the MRR and its leader, Manuel Artime, and had been maintaining liaison with him on a regular basis. CIA disclaimed control over the MRR and Artime. ~~(S)~~ (U)

On 6/17/64, [Gordon (Rock) Rothwell] (protect identity), (S) Covert CIA Representative, Miami, Florida identified Angel Alfredo Fontanills Y Miguel (105-129278) as being connected with Manuel Artime and the MRR. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

105-129278-3 p.1,2;encl.p.3
(54)

[Last 2 ¶'s classified per agency ltr. dtd 7/5/91] ~~(S)~~ (U)
9803 rdd/gcl #241,326
4/30/92

SECRET

(continued)

Information from Mesa, developed through [his interpreter, James A. Kraker] (protect identity) of Crystal, Minnesota, indicated that as (S) of December, 1963, the MRR was reported to be sending a 5-man team into Cuba once a month for the purpose of assassination, with Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara as the principal targets. Communications between Cuba and the US allegedly were through clandestine short wave radio. Mesa returned to Minneapolis on 1/5/64, from a visit to Miami where he failed to see Artime who was in Puerto Rico. Mesa advised [Kraker] that Artime probably would spend more time in (S) Venezuela in 1964. According to [Kraker,] the MRR in the Twin Cities (S) area was disbanded in July, 1964, upon orders of Manuel Artime. ~~(S)~~

(per agency 7/5/94 ltr) (U)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4133-77	~~(4,30)~~
-82	~~(31,72)~~
-83	~~(5,31)~~
-84 encl.p.2	~~(72)~~
-92 encl.p.1,2	~~(31)~~
-134	~~(32)~~

Cuban exiles were saying that the US was providing a steady flow of aid to the MRR which was led by Manuel Artime Buesa. Some exiles claimed that the MRR attack on Puerto Pilon in May, 1964, was launched from the Dominican Republic. There was no evidence that Artime was receiving support from the Venezuelan Government. His failure to establish personal contact with the Venezuelan Administration during his 5/22-27/64 visit to Caracas, had provoked criticism in government circles. Some disillusionment with the MRR was said to be caused by Artime's failure to establish himself as the undisputed leader of the militant exile forces. (CIA, 7/16/64) ~~(S)~~ (U)

109-584-4034
~~(17,63)~~

VENEZUELA
(per agency 7/5/94 ltr) ~~(S)~~ (U)

During an interview on 10/22/64, John Ermil Freeman (105-109596), 2728 S.W. 24th Avenue, Coconut Grove, Miami, intimated

(continued)

SECRET

SECRET

(continued)

placing himself in absolute control without heeding the ideological postulates of the movement; and his failure to live up to the standards he had set up for the organization. ~~(S)~~ (U)

The "Miami News", Miami, Florida, 7/5/64, reported that on the previous day, Artime ordered all his men to report to South American training camps immediately. U

On 7/9/64, M.H. Redmon (protect identity), INS Investigator, Miami, advised that the MRR had closed its Miami headquarters and moved to Central America, but had established a secret underground office somewhere in Miami. On 8/4/64, Redmon stated that numerous MRR members went to Central America to join Artime during July, 1964 and that the MRR claimed it would move all of its records and equipment out of Miami by chartered airplane to Artime's headquarters in Central America. The MRR had a large ship that operated between Central America and New Orleans, Louisiana. The ship, name unknown, was operated by a cover company using letterhead stationery containing the following: "Maritima Bom, S.A., Coconut Grove Bank Building, Suite 309, Miami, Florida, Phone # 444-5781-82." This company also claimed to have Post Office boxes in Panama and Nicaragua. Sixto Mesa was listed as President [redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U) ~~Per INS letter dated 6/21/85~~ [Per INS letter dtd 4/6/92, 9803Ndd/gcl 211.326 1/6/93]

On 7/28/64, Carlos Zarraga Martinez (protect identity), PSI under development, advised that the rank and file MRR members continued to severely criticize Artime for maintaining his mistress, Adelaida Padron Cruz. She reportedly had great influence over Artime and some of his decisions concerning the MRR's operations had been influenced by her and objected to by the general membership ~~(C)~~ (U)

On 8/18/64, Miguel Dotres, 8418 N.W. 24th Avenue, Miami, advised that in late March or early April, 1964, Aldo Vera Serafin, head of an anti-Castro organization (not further identified), conferred with Artime and brought his organization into Artime's organization. Dotres furnished information indicating that Artime was against Baro's proposal that the MRR be headed by a 7-man board; also that the Cuban exile community doubted that Artime was a factor which eventually would figure in the overthrow of the present Cuban Government.

U.

97-4133-115 encl.p.1-8
~~(5,32)~~

SECRET

(continued)

SECRET

In early October 1964, the Alliance of the MRP - SFNE (105-112098) - Alpha 66 Cuban exile group was planning to initiate armed action in Cuba and its paramilitary organization had been moved from the US (place not indicated) to prepare for infiltration of Cuba. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, military leader of the Alliance, had issued strict instructions that there should be no collaboration at any level with the MRR or the JURE during the process of infiltration. Gutierrez had no faith in the ability or willingness of Manuel Artime or Manuel Ray to adhere to a joint infiltration program. Once in Cuba, however, limited tactical collaboration would be encouraged. (~~S~~)(U)

A delegation of the MRR, headed by Artime, was expected to arrive in Caracas in early October to seek support from the Venezuelan Government. (~~S~~)(U)

[(CIA, 12/3/64)] (~~S~~)(U) [Ps 1, 2 and brackets classified per agency ltr. dtd 7/5/91] (S)(U)
105-112098-540
(4~~9)~~
9803 rdd/gcl #211,326
4/30/92.

On 10/24/64, Firmin Joseph, representative of a group of Haitian exiles dedicated to the overthrow of Dictator Francois Duvalier, said that the schedule for an invasion of Haiti would be forthcoming after the US elections. Joseph said that a house in northwest Miami, which currently was being used to billet some of his men, was visited recently by a Cuban whom Joseph believed was from Manuel Artime Buesa's group, the MRR. (CIA) (~~S~~)(U)

2-1622-273 p.2
(~~1~~,2~~5)~~

(U)(~~S~~) [Carlos Zarraga Martinez (protect identity), Key Source - Cuba, 2954 S.W. 16th Terrace, Miami, Florida, who was attempting to form a unity group,] advised on 12/1/64 that the political activities of this group would be to offset the "right wing conservatism" of Manuel Artime Buesa. ~~S~~

As of mid-December 1964, Artime continued to head the MRR. Some exiles felt that recent scandals (not further identified)

(continued)

SECRET

(continued)

in Costa Rica involving Artime had discredited the anti-Castro movement, which might result in the withdrawal of support of Cuban exiles by the American people and the US Government. (No source given).

Add. info.

109-584-4114 p.3,4,8
(18,63)

Robert Dennis Arrington (105-96912) of Los Angeles, a US citizen who had entered Nicaragua on 12/8/64, was arrested by Nicaraguan officials on 12/17/64 for alleged possession of illegal arms and plotting the overthrow of the Nicaraguan Government. He had come to the attention of Nicaraguan authorities when he tried to make contact in Managua with anti-Castro Cubans in an attempt to interest them in buying the arms he was carrying. In Managua, at the Gran Hotel (date not indicated) Arrington met an unnamed Cuban who promised to take him to see Manuel Artime who was expected momentarily; however, this Cuban never came back to see Arrington.

Foregoing information on Artime is covered in the following references:

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4948-7 p.12	(34)
105-81431-12 p.12	(37)
105-96912-9 p.9	(44)

(U)

On [12/1/64, MM 639-S] advised that the MRR (97-4133) continued to be headed by Manuel Artime Buesa, a Cuban exile doctor who traveled continuously in the US, Central America and the Caribbean.

On 12/10/64, MM 639-S advised that different Cuban exile leaders continued to claim that Artime and the MRR were making a living

(U) ~~(C)~~

(continued)

(continued) SECRET

off the Cuban revolutionary activities; were engaged in smuggling instead of anticommunist warfare; and were misappropriating funds designed for commando and infiltration activity against the present government of Cuba. MM 639-S continued that it was claimed that Artime's men returned from Central America very disenchanted, or with large sums of money earned through illegal activity. ~~(S)~~(U)

According to reports from the Costa Rican newspaper "La Nacion", there was a training camp in Costa Rica, and in November 1964, Customs Authorities found Cubans smuggling large shipments of whiskey from Panama into Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Santiago Alvarez Rodriguez (protect identity), Miami, a Cuban exile and leading figure in the MRR, advised on 12/17/64, that after the November scandals concerning the alleged smuggling activities of the MRR, Artime reportedly visited with Costa Rican President Francisco J. Orlich (place not indicated). The MRR claimed that Orlich signed a declaration exonerating the MRR from all allegations concerning that organization's activities and smuggling. U

97-4133-123 encl.p.1,2,4
~~(5,32)~~

According to reported comments of Fulgencio Batista y Zaldivar (62-70441) as of mid-January 1965, he had not been in contact with Manuel Artime Buesa. (CIA). ~~(S)~~(U)[per agency's 7/5/91 ltr.] ~~(S)~~ (U)

62-70441-270 p.2
~~(2,26)~~

At the request of the Department of State the Bureau conducted an investigation of an attack on the Spanish vessel "Sierra Aranzazu" (2-1877) on 9/13/64, off the eastern tip of Cuba. It was alleged that this attack was carried out by representatives of a group receiving US backing, known as the MRR and headed by Manuel Artime. The Secret Organization of Continental Action (OSAC) initially claimed responsibility for the attack. Newspaper accounts indicated that Artime denied responsibility for the raid and in a statement from Panama suggested the Castro government was responsible in an attempt to discredit the MRR. On 10/5/64, Rolando Masferrer Rojas, 42-46

(continued)

TP 3 on this pg. AND 1st BRACKETS ON pg. 82 IS UNCLASSIFIED PER STATE DEPT.'s LETTER DTD 5-20-97

abp

SECRET

SECRET

On 2/23/65, the New York Office advised that on 1/8/65 and 1/26/65, NY 4533-S furnished information that the Soviet Intelligence Service in the US wanted to obtain any information available on the organizations: (1) Alfa 66; (2) Movimento Revolucionario Popular; (3) Movimento Renosadoz Revolucionario; and (4) Representacion Cubana En El Exilio. New York advised that the Movimiento Renosadoz Revolucionario might be identical with the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) headed by Manuel Artime Buesa. ~~(C)~~(U)

105-137715-2 encl.p.1
(14,55)

PSI Gerardo Soler, Tampa, Florida, advised that on 3/6/65, Pedro Jose Leal Flores (105-141019) and some of his friends went to Miami to try to see the military commander of RECE*, whose name was believed to be Oliva, and also to try to see Manuel Artime, leader of the MRR. The reason for this trip was not known, but Soler said he believed that Leal wanted to associate the Porfirio Ramirez Brigado Comando #1 with one of the larger anti-Castro organizations. ~~(C)~~(U)

This reference stated that Leal was leader of the anti-Castro organization known as the Porfirio Ramirez Brigado Comando #1, a group of young Cubans who had received Army training at Fort Jackson, South Carolina and who met weekly in Tampa at 1515-10th Avenue. ~~(C)~~(U)

[105-141019-1] ~~(C)~~(U)
(55)

*Representation of Cubans in Exile

U

~~(C)~~(U)

[On 3/1/65, MM 639-S] advised that Cuban exiles were discouraged and frustrated with the failures of exile leaders like Manuel Artime Buesa, who had been ineffective and would have to discontinue military operations in the near future. U

As of mid-March, 1965, Manuel Artime Buesa continued as head of the MRR and traveled extensively in the US, Latin America, and Europe. He was criticized severely by other anti-Castro leaders,

(continued)

SECRET

SECRET

On 5/20/65, Nilo Messer, 27 N.W. 47th Street, Miami, advised that he had been Manuel Artime Buesa's secretary and as such traveled thousands of miles with Artime in the US, South America and Europe. He said that he was planning to leave this secretarial position and had obtained another job. U

On 7/23/65, PSI Angel Yerga (protect identity), a Cuban exile who traveled frequently in Central America, advised that Artime continued as head of the MRR (97-4133). About two weeks previously both Yerga and Artime were in Nicaragua. However, the MRR then had no offices or operations in that country. Yerga heard from Cuban exiles in Nicaragua that the MRR reportedly had two unidentified airplanes available to them in Panama. However, there was no indication that the MRR planned any raids against Cuba either by using these planes or an operation by sea. (~~C~~)(U)

General Luis Somoza in Nicaragua told Yerga that Artime's operations there had been eliminated almost completely because of the US Government's attitude toward the MRR. (~~C~~) (U)

On 7/23/65, CIA, Miami (protect identity) advised that organization no longer had an operational interest in the MRR or its leader, Manuel Artime Buesa. (~~S~~) (per agency's 7/5/91 ltr.)(~~S~~) (U)

(U) 97-4133-143 p.1;encl.p.1,2
(6,32)
SI as par.1
97-4133-139
(32)
SI as par. 1 and 2
109-584-4272 p.1,6,7
(18,64)

On 7/23/65, PSI Angel Yerga advised that the MRR (97-4133) continued to receive money from CIA and that Manul Artime Buesa was reorganizing the MRR. (~~C~~)(U)

Add. info. U

97-4133-141
(69,77)

SECRET

(S)SECRET

On 7/29/65, WF [1683]-S advised that Concepcion Maria Fernandez Planas* (105-98201) had been married for a couple of months to a Cuban exile named Alfredo Cepero, a lawyer who was believed to be employed in Virginia. During the first days of the Castro regime, she had dated Jose Machado Ventura, who served as Castro's Minister of Public Health in Cuba. At one time (date not indicated) Fernandez also dated Manuel Artime of the famed Brigade 2506 which had invaded Cuba during April of 1961. WF [1683]-S was aware that Artime had [S] traveled to Washington, DC for the sole purpose of visiting Fernandez at her residence (address not given). WF [1683]-S stated that Cepero [S] was extremely jealous and he was almost certain that Fernandez had not revealed her past association with Machado and Artime to Cepero (C)

105-98201-13 encl.p.2
(45)

*Cuban national employed at the Pan American Union, Washington, DC. (see 105-98201-8). (C)(U)(C)(U)

Documents furnished by OACSI-Army included a G-2 USARSOUTHCOM report advising that an unnamed source who was Chief of the Presidential Guard, Republic of Panama (RP), indicated on 8/16/65, that source had been visited in his home, on both the preceding Friday and Saturday, by Cuban revolutionary Manuel Artimes. Source said that Artimes was a friend of General Somoza, Chief Director of the Nicaraguan National Guard, and of source's sister-in-law, Mrs. Yolanda de Corrales; also, that Artimes knew source's brother-in-law, Lt. Gumberto Corrales, Assistant to General Somoza. Artimes, who had been unable to contact President Robles, asked source to confidentially inform the President that a conspiracy was being planned for the purpose of assassinating the Presidents of Nicaragua, Costa Rica and the RP. Files of the 470th INTC Group, Fort Amador, Canal Zone, revealed background data on Manuel F. Artimes Buesa, born 1/29/32, Camaguey Province, Cuba. His father was shown as Manuel Artimes F. and his mother as Otilla B. de Artimes. It was suspected that Artimes wanted to meet President Robles to obtain from him a letter of introduction, for unknown reasons, to Jack Vaughan, former US Ambassador to RP and present US Assistant Secretary of State.

(continued)

ARMY INFO (LAST ¶) UNCLASSIFIED
PER LTR. DTD. 12/11/86
SPbBJA/GCL-10/30/90-#211,326
SEE 190-16449-288

SECRET

(continued)

operating from Paul's Barber Shop, Palms Plaza, 16772 South Dixie Highway, Perrine, Florida. This involved barbers Lestegas and Pablo Emilio Moncada Luna, subject of Bureau file # 105-136705, who were alleged to have mentioned tentative plans to assassinate Artime, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Pedro Diaz Lanz. (See 105-136704-1). (U)

SECRET

Luis Posada (protect identity), former member of JURE (105-114543), 750 N.W. 15th Street, Miami, advised on 9/23/65 that general opinion of the Cuban exiles strongly indicated that both Manuel Ray of JURE and Manuel Artime, MRR leader, no longer were regarded as important figures in the anti-Castro movement. (U)

105-114543-261 p.10
(50)

PSI Cira Olga Montano Lezcano (134-14424) was interviewed on 11/12/65, at Opa-locka Processing Center, Opa-locka, Florida. Montano indicated that she came to Miami from New York in about mid-1962. It was in Miami that she met her second husband, Ernesto Martinez Dominguez, where they both were active in the anti-Castro group of Manuel Artime Buesa who was a personal friend of hers. At the meetings of this group, she gave first aid classes for a period of two weeks in 1963. In October, 1965, Montano and her husband made a trip to Cuba in an effort to bring relatives out of Cuba. While there, she was approached by the Cuban Government to engage in intelligence activities in the US on behalf of Cubans. Included with information she was expected to report was any information concerning Artime and his activities. In Cuba, she was introduced to a man named "Orlando" whom she recognized as a man who was in Miami during 1962 and 1963, working with Artime's group. She and her husband departed Cuba for Miami on 11/8/65. Montano said her husband had told her the Cuban Government might have had reason to believe he was a CIA agent, because at one time he had worked for Artime. ~~(S)~~ (C) ~~(S)~~ (per agency's 7/5/91 ltr) ~~(S)~~ (U)

(U) ~~(C)~~ [134-14424-1] p.3,5,6 ~~(X)~~
(18,65)

SECRET

CIA communication dated 6/15/66, furnished a letter dated 3/18/66, from Gilberto Navarro R, a resident of San Pedro Sula, Honduras, Central America, to Manuel Artime, Director of the Cuban Revolutionary Front in Exile, Miami, Florida. This letter advised Artime to get in contact with the CIA to deport from Los Angeles, Calif. 3 sisters, Nora, Oneyda and Marina Amaya Cabrera, and to order the American Consul in San Pedro Sula to cancel the visa of another sister, Lila Amaya Cabrera V de Lopez, who planned to transfer her residency to Los Angeles. Navarro said these sisters were first cousins of the dangerous international communist, Eliceo Mejia Cabrera o Rovelo (105-129943) who was located in Havana, Cuba. ~~(S)~~ (U)

[per agency 7/15/91 ltr ~~(S)~~ (U)

(Copy of letter and of translation from Spanish attached)
105-129943-3
(~~14~~, ~~54~~)

[NY [4640-]S advised that on 3/28/66] ~~(S)~~ (C) he learned from the wife of Carlos Teperino that he had been put in charge by Manuel Artime of the contact and interview with Rolando Cubelas* in Paris. This woman stated that she saw Felipe Llaudy in company with Pepin Naranjo (reputed to be a great Fidelista) together with Cubelas in Paris (sic). (No further details). ~~(S)~~

This reference identified Felipe Llaudy as an official of the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations and a known intelligence agent. ~~(S)~~ (U)

109-12-210-5421 encl.p.2
(~~56~~)

*In early March, 1966, Rolando Cubela Secades was on trial in Cuba, charged with plotting to assassinate Fidel Castro. (See 109-12-210-5407). U

On 6/22/66, Felipe Rivero Diaz, head of the Cuban Nationalist Association, charged that if the US Government had its way, it would install propagandists Conte Aguero and Dr. Manuel Artime as the next rulers of Cuba. (Source not clear). U

109-584-4409 p.11
(~~64~~)

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~DESTROY~~ I 109-584-4075

~~DESTROY~~ I -4114 p.3

~~DESTROY~~ I -4179 p.4

~~DESTROY~~ SI -4272 p.6 97-4133-143 pars 1, 2 (6)(32)

~~DESTROY~~ I -4290 p.8

~~DESTROY~~ I 109-652-4

~~DESTROY~~ I 134-14424-1 p.3

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

DESTROY I 109-584-A Miami News 8/7/63

DESTROY I -A Miami Herald 9/8/63

DESTROY I -A Press Release - Fulton Lewis Jr. column ~~No newspaper or date given~~ 5/22/64
(Date on card: 5/28/64)
Conv 1/20/67

DESTROY I 109-636-3

DESTROY I 109-652-4

DESTROY DI 113-7-210-314

DESTROY I -429

DESTROY I 134-14424-1 p. 3

CONFIDENTIAL

65

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10284-10155
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-210-2088

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, PA
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/29/1960
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	EPE, BAYO, ALBERTO, POLIT, REVOLUTIONARY ACT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

THE FOREIGN SERVICE
OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
American Embassy
Paris 8, France

SECRET

8-1-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

SECRET

Date: July 29, 1960

To: Director, FBI

From: Legat, Paris (109-24)

Subject: CUBAN POLITICAL ACTIVITIES

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

5-15-95 Classified by 5668-SLD/mdc
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Re Paris letter 7/21/60.

During a visit to Bern, Switzerland, the captioned matter was discussed with [BURTON LIFSCHULTZ, Chief of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Switzerland.] (S) He advised that the Cuban Ambassador, SALAZAR-SANCHEZ, had been dismissed by the Cuban Government and his replacement has not yet arrived. [LIFSCHULTZ] advised that it has been rumored that (S) he will be replaced by one BAYO. He stated that this individual has not as yet been definitely identified and no background information is available regarding him. He stated, however, that he may be identical with the son of "General" ALBERTO BAYO who has previously been reported as a Spaniard who assisted in the CASTRO revolution and who has reportedly been active in revolutionary activities in Spain. (S)

This is furnished for the information of the Bureau. In the event further specific information is received, the Bureau will be advised.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except the brackets
JM 6-25-97

2 copies made
on 10/31/77
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA per req. 9/7/77
See Bufile 62-117290
DJC: mer

P
3 - Bureau (1 Havana)
1 - Madrid (sent direct)
1 - Paris
NWP:mas
(5)

Political Matters Cuba

REC'D
REC- 9 109-12-210 9088

9 AUG 5 1960

Copy to Havana
by routing slip for
☑ info ☐ action
date 8-10-60
by

EX 109

SECRET

NAT. INT. SEC.

50 AUG 11 1960

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10284-10171

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-83720-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BARRON, JOHN R.
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 12/31/1959
PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :
EPE, INTV, ARVIER, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL, AKA, EMP, RES, ASSOC, POLIT, INTEL ACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF INS, CIA

COMMENTS : REFERRED TO INS

FD-263 (Rev. 3-3-59)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
MIAMI	MIAMI	12/31/59	10/9 - 12/28/59	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, aka Maria Mendizabal, "Nene" Mendizabal		JOHN R. BARRON	31 8	ems
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA		

REFERENCES: Butel to Miami, October 9, 1959. 7-9452-13
Miami letter to Director, November 4, 1959. 7-9452-14
Miami report of SA JOHN R. BARRON, November 23, 1959, captioned: UNSUBS; MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ - VICTIM, KIDNAPPING - CONSPIRACY (Bufile 7-9452).

1/5/96
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

- P* -

2 copies made of Cover pg and pg 3
9/21/77 OJC/mer
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re reg 9/7/77
see Bufile 62-117290

LEADS

REQUEST OF BUREAU

The Bureau is requested to refer instant matter to the Department for decision regarding the subject's activities while employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ and regarding her admission that she furnished information to ALBERTO BAYO, JR., described in instant report, concerning information obtained during her employment. There exists a possible violation of the Registration Act, over which this Bureau has jurisdiction.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

7-9452-
109-283-
UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

APPROVED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW	
COPIES MADE:		7-83720-1	OCT - 2
		4 JAN 6 1960	REC- 26
		[redacted]	EX-117

COPIES MADE:
11 - Bureau (RM)
(1 - 7-9452)
(1 - 109-283)
3 - New York (RM)
(1 - 7-877 - info
1 - 62-11817
1 - INS, New York
No. A-11039008)
4 - Miami (2 - 97-300; 1 - 7-475;
1 - 109-39)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except P 5 pg. B AND pg. C (BRACKETS)
JM 6-25-97

SLD/KSR
8-1-97
(JFK)

COPIES DESTROYED
34 SEP 13 1974

Notations:

AGENCY State, CIA, G2, ONI, OSI
REQ. REC'D HAVANA (encl)
DATE FORW. 1/12/60 RB
HOW FORW.
BY Reg/SH

A.
COVER PAGE

NAT. INT. SEC.

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR ADD. DISSEMINATION

ltr AAG 1/13/60 FCL

SECRET

1-MM
1-NY

SECRET

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will report the decision rendered by the Department.

ADMINISTRATIVE

Information copies have been furnished the New York Office, inasmuch as the subject of this investigation was formerly employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, whom the New York Office is currently investigating.

This investigation is being placed in a pending inactive status, pending departmental decision concerning the subject's activities while she was employed as a secretary to ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ.

The Bureau is advised that investigation appearing in this report conducted prior to October 9, 1959, was made concerning the subject inasmuch as she was suspected of plotting against MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ to arrange his abduction, the details of which have been reported in reference Miami report dated November 23, 1959 (Bufile 7-9452).

MM T-2, utilized in the details of this report was interviewed by Special Agents JOHN R. BARRON and WILLIAM B. HOLLOMAN, [at which time she identified herself as] a CIA informant in Havana (S) [and stated that she was employed as a secretary to] (S) ALBERTO BAYO, JR. ~~(S)~~

The Bureau is advised that all informants familiar with Latin American activities were contacted, and no information was received indicating that the subject was active in Cuban intelligence activities.

SECRET

MM 97-300

SECRET

The interviews appearing in this report with MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, Dr. CARLOS SISO, and the subject, appear on SF 64s and FD 302s in original form in Miami case file 7-475, captioned: "UNSUBS; MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ - VICTIM; KIDNAPPING - CONSPIRACY (Bufile 7-9452).

INFORMANTS

IDENTITY	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is [CIA, Havana,] (~~X~~)(U) information contained in Butel to Miami dated October 9, 1959	7-475-9
MM T-2 is [ANA ROSA GUERRA](S) (S)[admitted] CIA informant in Havana, [who works in the office of ALBERTO BAYO, JR., Director, Air Fumigation, Havana](S) (X)	Instant report, page 7.
MM T-3 is JANET SUMMERS, District Manager's Clerk, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Miami Beach, Florida (nature of information)	Instant report, page 12.

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report, and they were concealed only in those instances where identities must be concealed.

C*

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

Copy to: 1 - INS, New York (RM)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR ~~[illegible]~~ BRACKETS
pg. 7 Jm 6-25-97

Report of: SA JOHN R. BARRON
Office: Miami
Date: December 31, 1959

Field Office File #: 97-300
Bureau File #: 7-9452 109-283

Title: MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER

SLD/KSR
8-1-97
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
REGISTRATION ACT - CUBA

Synopsis: Subject, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, born November 26, 1916 in Cuba; Immigration and Naturalization Service Alien Registration No. A-11039008. [While employed in Miami Beach, Florida as secretary to MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ, ex-Venezuelan president, reported by MM T-1 to be plant and furnishing information to ALBERTO BAYO, JR. regarding the activities of PEREZ JIMENEZ. MM T-1 described BAYO as being active in intelligence matters for the Cuban government.] Subject interviewed and admitted association with BAYO. ~~(S)~~ (U)

- P* -

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL 1/5/96
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

DETAILS:

This investigation is predicated on information furnished by MM T-1, a United States government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, which advised on October 9, 1959 that the subject, "Nene" MENDIZABAL, was in contact with ALBERTO BAYO, JR., described by MM T-1 as being engaged in intelligence activity for the Cuban government. ~~(S)~~ (U)

SUBJECT'S IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION STATUS

On October 9 and 30, 1959, the files of the District Office, Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), New York City, were caused to be reviewed by SA WILLIAM D. MEEHAN and reflected that on November 2, 1956, one MARIA MENDIZABAL, A11-039-008, date of birth November 26, 1916, in Havana, Cuba, filed an "Application for Immigration Visa and Alien Registration" at the

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

SECRET

American Embassy, Havana, Cuba.

In this application MARIA MENDIZABAL furnished her place of birth as Cieba del Agua, Havana, Cuba, and claimed that she was known by no other names. Her occupation was furnished as that of office clerk, and her last permanent address as "Avenue 19 Number 8203, e/84, Marianao, Havana, Cuba". Her destination and address in the United States were furnished care of the Latina Shipping Company, Limited, 111 Wall Street, New York City, but this was crossed through in ink, and the address 321 East 43rd Street, New York 17, New York, was marked in. She possessed Cuban Passport Number 21566, issued September 20, 1955, by the Cuban Ministry of State at Havana, Cuba, valid until September 20, 1957. She was described as follows:

Race	White (Cuban)
Sex	Female
Height	5 feet 5 inches
Weight	120 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Complexion	Fair
Marital Status	Divorced
Minor children	Sons - PEDRO FERNANDO FERNANDEZ Y MENDIZABAL; NELSON JOSE FERNANDEZ Y MENDIZABAL (ages not furnished)

B. APPROX. 1942 Cuba

Cuba

B. APPROX 1948

She claimed further in this application that she had previously applied for and was granted visas to enter the United States during 1952 and 1956, but the dates of her previous sojourns to the United States were not furnished.

MARIA MENDIZABAL submitted in support of this application a copy of her Certificate of Birth, Petition for Divorce, and a document attesting that she had no arrest record in Cuba, all of which were

SECRET

in the Spanish language.

Her file also contained an affidavit submitted by one EDUARDO M. GONZALEZ, 45 Fifth Avenue, New York City, an American citizen, who was born in Havana, Cuba. It was set out that GONZALEZ was the President and sole owner of the Latina Shipping Company, 111 Wall Street, New York City, and was desirous of bringing MENDIZABAL to the United States to work for the above company. The degree of relationship existing between GONZALEZ and MENDIZABAL was not set forth.

N.Y.

MARIA MENDIZABAL was granted an O-1 Visa, Number 5686, and arrived in the United States at Miami, Florida, on February 20, 1957. This was the only arrival or departure contained in the INS, New York records.

A search of the Alien Address Report Cards maintained at INS, New York, failed to reflect any record of MENDIZABAL for the years of 1958, and 1959.

RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION

MM T-1, on October 9, 1959, advised that MARIA MENDIZABAL, also known as "Nene" MENDIZABAL, employed as a secretary of ex-Venezuelan president MARCOS PEREZ JIMENEZ at Miami Beach, Florida, attempted to contact ALBERTO REVUELTA in Havana, at Havana telephone 29-5233, on October 9, 1959. MM T-1 advised that ALBERTO REVUELTA is identical with ALBERTO BAYO, JR., who, according to MM T-1, is engaged in intelligence activities for the Cuban government. MM T-1 believed that the subject was a plant and was furnishing information to BAYO, JR. regarding the activities of PEREZ JIMENEZ. (u)

SPAIN
APPROX. 1924

Prior to receipt of the above information as furnished by MM T-1 on October 9, 1959, the following

MM T-2, [on October 24, 1959,](S) advised that ALBERTO BAYO, JR., director of Air Fumigation, Marianao, Havana, Cuba, revealed [in early August, 1959] that "Nene"(S) MENDIZABAL, subsequently identified as MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, was sent on a delicate mission to Miami, and that in fifteen days, there would be an announcement in the press about PEREZ JIMENEZ. MM T-2 advised that he observed the subject [in the office of ALBERTO BAYO, JR. on three occasions](S)

The following information was obtained in connection with investigation concerning another matter:

On October 29, 1959, MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER was interviewed at Miami, Florida, by Special Agents CHARLES W. EDMISTON and JOHN R. BARRON.

MARIA JOSEFA MENDIZABAL ARVIER, 1951 Park Avenue, Apartment 11, Miami Beach, Florida, after being advised of her right to be represented by counsel, that anything she might say could be used against her in a court of law, stated that she was born on November 26, 1916, at Havana, Cuba.

MENDIZABAL stated that she arrived in the United States on August 15, 1959, aboard Cubana Airlines, which departed Havana, Cuba, at approximately 5:30 p.m. on August 15, 1959. She stated that upon her arrival at the Miami International Airport, she was met by Dr. CARLOS SISO and INES DAVILA, as well as a friend of Dr. SISO, introduced to her as CARLOS ~~PULIDO~~. FLA

MENDIZABAL advised that prior to her arrival in Miami, she had received a letter from INES DAVILA in the early part of August, 1959, wherein DAVILA advised her that PEREZ JIMENEZ, ex-Venezuelan President, was seeking the services of a reliable and competent secretary. She stated DAVILA in her letter to her asked if she would be interested in this position to which she subsequently replied that she would accept the position as secretary to PEREZ JIMENEZ, as she was heavily in debt in Cuba.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10284-10172
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-82352-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/27/1959
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	EPE, GONZALEZ, CARLOS HILARIO, SUSP, CONSPR, MURDER, VENTURA, ESTEBAN
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/03/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

(571)

FBI

~~SECRET~~

Date: 10/27/59

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS IN RED JM 6/25/97

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-)

CARLOS HILARIO GONZALEZ
IS - CUBA; RA - CUBA

8-1-97

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

Enclosed are 11 copies of a letterhead memorandum concerning an alleged plot by the subject to kill ESTEBAN VENTURA NOVO. The source of the information in enclosed memo is [ANA ROSA GUERRA, who contacted this office on 10/24/59 and advised she works for BERNARD L. BARKER, in an undercover capacity in Cuba, where she is employed as secretary to (S) ALBERTO BAYO COSGAYA, Chief of Air Fumigation-Technical, Cuban Air Force. BAYO has been described as a key figure in the Cuban Air Force and [was described by GUERRA] (S) as definitely a Communist. BARKER advised SA JOHN R. BARRON on 10/7/59 that he works for CIA in an undercover capacity in Cuba. This memorandum is classified confidential to protect the identity [of GUERRA] (S) who apparently is a CIA source. [GUERRA returned to Cuba on 10/26/59] (S)

CUBA

Information concerning the alleged plot against VENTURA has been furnished to the Miami Police Department and the Dade County Department of Public Safety. ESTEBAN VENTURA will be advised that there is possibly a plot to kill him but that no protection can be given him by this Bureau.

10/4/95
Classified by 5668 SD/GCL
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

2 copies made
9/27/77 DJC/mr
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re req 9/7/77
see bufile 62-117290

(3) - Bureau (AM)(Encl-11)(RM)
4 - Miami (2 - 105- CARLOS HILARIO GONZALEZ)
(1 - 105-1715, Cuban Retailiation Against Batista Adherents)
(1 - 105-1720, ESTEBAN VENTURA)

WBH:sll
(7)

1 cc RAB
AGENCY State, CIA, G-2, ONI (info)
REQ. REC'D OSI, INS, Havana (cc of airtel)
DATE FORW. 11-2-59
HOW FORW. RLS
BY VHN/SP

REC 7

105 - 82352 - 1

18 OCT 30 1959

ENCLOSURE

NAT. SEC.

Approved: ______________ Sent ______________ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

63 NOV 17 1959

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-75776

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10285-10254

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 03/23/1967
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC LHM, MEMO

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4/3/67

SECRET

airtel

1 - Mr. DeBuck

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

To: SAC, Miami [(134-1198)] (S)

REC 54

From: Director, FBI [(134-14264)] — 72](S)

[DOLPHIN
IS - CU] (S)

EX 106

Reurairtel and LHM both dated 3/23/67.

You are authorized to have [informant] [pass to his Cuban principal] (S) the information set forth in reLHM.

HLD:brr
(4)

NOTE: [Clearance for passage] (S) was obtained by Liaison Section 3/30/67.

~~#211,326~~
~~Classified by SP8BTJ/gcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84~~
~~(5668SLD/GCL 5/10/95-JFK)~~

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 2/4/98

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~ ~~DATE 6-05-98~~

MAILED 19
MAR 31 1967
COMM-FBI

SECRET

APR 7 1967

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

FBI

Date: March 23, 1967

Transmit the following in ________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)

(5668 SLD/GCL 2/4/98-JFK) (JFK)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (134-14264) (S)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (134-1198) (S) (P)

RE: DOLPHIN
IS - CUBA (S)

~~Classified by SPJBTS/GCL~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84~~
~~(SP...mc/GCL 4/26/84 JFK)~~

ReMiamilet 2/20/67.

In accordance with instructions concerning the handling of double agents, (S) there are attached hereto the original and 9 copies of a letterhead memorandum. The letterhead memorandum has been classified "SECRET," in order to protect the identity of a double agent of continuing value to the U.S. (S)

(S) As set forth in referenced letter, DOLPHIN's principal requested him to furnish information on a monthly basis concerning anti-CASTRO activities in the U.S. (S)

(S) In view of this, the Miami Office will have the informant prepare and the Miami Office will forward a letter containing the information set out in the attached letterhead memorandum. This information will be prepared in secret writing. (S)

REC 49 134-14264-72 (S)

The Bureau is requested to advise whether or not DOLPHIN (S) will be authorized (S) to make the information available to his Cuban principal on April 7, 1967. (S)

EX-113 (S)

Airtel to MM 4/3/67 HLD:...

3 - Bureau (Encl. - 10) (AM - RM)
1 - Miami
JEM:ems
(4)

ENCLOSURE

MAR 24 1967
4-3

LATIN AMERICAN

cc retained 62 D

61 APR 10 1967

SECRET

Approved: ________________ Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 23 1967

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

["FISHFACE"](S)

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)
(5668 SLD/ecc 5/4/98 - JFK)

~~Classified by SAS BTT/gel~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 4/30/84
~~(SPG MAC/ECL 9/26/94 JFK)~~

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. ~~(S)~~

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: ~~(S)~~ (U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. ~~(S)~~ (U)

At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information ~~(S)~~ (U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except brackets
KP 7-6-98
SLD/KSR 8-8-98 (JFK)

[Approved By USIB](S)
by Jack Corbett, CIA
Thomas J. O'Loughlin
3/30/67
WOB

~~SECRET~~

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

[134-14261 - 72](S)

CONFIDENTIAL ENCLOSURE

SECRET

[could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States.](S)

It is requested that [clearance be granted](S) for [the Cuban alien] to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.](S) (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CON~~FIDE~~NTIAL

MAR 23 1967

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)
(5668 SLO/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)

SECRET
["FISHFACE"] (S)

~~Classified by~~ SP8 BJJ/gcl
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 4/30/84
~~(SP8MAC/GCL 5/26/94 JFK)~~

The above [code name] (S) has been [assigned to a Cuban alien] (S) whose activities are being [directed] (S) against [a Cuban intelligence service] (S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal] (S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (~~S~~)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (~~S~~)(U)

> A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. (~~S~~)(U)
>
> At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. [If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information] (~~S~~)(U)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

CON~~FIDE~~NTIAL

[could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States] (S)/(U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted] (S) for [the Cuban alien] (S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.] (S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CON~~FIDEN~~TIAL

MAR 23 1967

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mf
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)
(5668 SLD/GCL 2/4/98 - JFK)

SECRET

["FISHFACE"](S)

~~Classified by~~ SP8 B~~[illegible]~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 4/3/84
~~SP8 MAC/GCL - 9/28/94 - JFK~~

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. ~~(S)~~

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: ~~(S)~~(U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. ~~(S)~~(U)

At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. *If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information* ~~(S)~~(U)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

CON~~FIDEN~~TIAL

[could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States.](~~S~~)(U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted](S) for [the Cuban alien](S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.](S)

This information should not be disseminated.

CONFIDENTIAL

MAR 23 1967

11/21/97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mik
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(5668SLD/GCL 2/4/98-JFK)

(JFK)

SECRET

~~Classified by SPB BTI/gd~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 4/30/84~~
~~(SPB MAC/GCL 9/26/94-JFK)~~

["FISHFACE"](S)

The above [code name](S) has been assigned to a [Cuban alien](S) whose activities are being [directed](S) against a [Cuban intelligence service](S) He was requested by [his Cuban principal](S) to obtain information relating to anti-Castro activities in the United States. (S)

Through his contacts with anti-Castro individuals in Miami, the following information was obtained: (S)(U)

A meeting of anti-Castro leaders was held recently at the home of Palayo Garcia. Manuel Fernandez, former Secretary of Labor in Cuba, acted as chairman, and the meeting was attended by former Castro officials, such as Manuel Urrutia, Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Danilo Mesa, Elena Mederos, and Efreu Gonzalez. (S)(U)

At the meeting, Fernandez suggested that a committee be formed and efforts made to have the committee travel to Cuba for a conference with Cuban officials, in order to discuss the release of political prisoners. It was believed that the discussion concerning political prisoners could be expanded to include a discussion of differences between Cuba and the United States. Those in attendance agreed that such a discussion would be timely, inasmuch as it appears that Fidel Castro is not completely satisfied with Cuba's relations with the Soviet Union. If the discussion of the relations between Cuba and the United States should prove productive, such information (S)(U)

SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

CONFIDENTIAL

could then be communicated by the committee to the United States Government, in a hope of bringing about a state of coexistence between Cuba and the United States. (~~S~~)/(U)

It is requested that [clearance be granted](S) for [the Cuban alien](S) to furnish this data to [his Cuban principal.](S)

This information should not be disseminated.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY:	FBI
RECORD_NUMBER:	124-10291-10023
RECORD_SERIES:	HO
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER:	CR 62-112738-1201

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR:	CIA
FROM:	CIA
TO:	DIRECTOR. FBI
TITLE:	
DATE:	03/03/1978
PAGES:	23
SUBJECT:	OBA, SITUATION RPT, VENEZUELA, TERRORISM, CUBAN EXILES, CARTER, JIMMY, VISIT
DOCUMENT_TYPE:	PAPER. TEXTUAL DOCUMENT

ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION:	Secret	NEW CLASSIFICATION:	
REVIEW_DATE:	07/08/1998	UPDATE_DATE:	
STATUS	Redact		

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS:

SECRET

1978 VISIT OF PRESIDENT JIMMY CARTER. ALTHOUGH THERE IS A TENDENCY TO BLAME THE UNITED STATES FOR VENEZUELA'S CURRENT FINANCIAL PROBLEMS, IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT DEMONSTRATIONS WHICH MIGHT TAKE PLACE WOULD BE AIMED AT PRESIDENT CARTER, BUT RATHER THEY WOULD BE STAGED DURING THE PRESIDENT'S VISIT TO EITHER EMBARRASS THE CURRENT VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT OR TO FURTHER DRAMATIZE THE CAUSE BEING ADVOCATED. (SOURCE : A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

3. THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES RECOGNIZE THIS SITUATION AND EXPECT THAT THERE WILL BE UNPLEASANT, ANTI-VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT INCIDENTS DURING PRESIDENT CARTER'S CARACAS VISIT. VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THESE INCIDENTS WILL DEAL WITH CHARGES OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND GOVERNMENT CORRUPTION. THE SECURITY FORCES WILL BE ABLE TO CONTROL ANY SITUATION THAT ARISES, THE AUTHORITIES BELIEVE. (SOURCE: [AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE.)] (S)

I. THE VENEZUELAN LEFTIST GROUPS

5

SECRET

POLISH DIPLOMATS. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY (S) RELIABLE.)

SECRET

5. VENEZUELAN EXTREME LEFTIST GROUPS INCLUDE THE BANDERA ROJA (BR); THE BANDERA ROJA-MARXIST/LENINIST (BR/MLLN ALSO KNOWN AS THE ANTONIO JOSE DE SCURE GUERRILLA FRONT: THE ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION (FALN),AND THE ORGANIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARIES (OR). THESE GROUPS HAVE BEEN OPERATING IN THE EASTERN VENEZUELAN STATES, PARTICULARLY MONAGAS, ANZOATEGUI, SUCRE AND BOLIVAR. THEY HAVE CARRIED OUT NUMEROUS RAIDS ON MILITARY POSTS, HAVE TAKEN OVER SMALL TOWNS FOR A LIMITED PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH THEY LECTURED THE TOWNS PEOPLE ON ANTI-GOVERNMENT POLITICAL THEMES, AND IN GENERAL HAVE HARRASSED AND EMBARRASSED THE GOVERNMENT FOR SEVERAL MONTHS. (SOURCE: [A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WITH ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS] AND]WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.) (S)

6. DESPITE A LARGE-SCALE VENEZUELAN MILITARY COMMITMENT IN THE EASTERN STATES, THE GUERRILLAS REMAIN

(8)

SECRET

SECRET

VIRTUALLY UNTOUCHED THEY MOVE ABOUT THE TOWNS AND CITIES OF THE AREA RELATIVELY FREELY AND GENERALLY ENJOY THE SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL CITIZENS. FOR THE MOST PART, THEY ARE NATIVES OF THE AREA, OR THROUGH THE YEARS HAVE SPENT A GOOD DEAL OF TIME THERE, HAVE MUCH IN COMMON WITH THE LOCAL PEOPLE, AND, IN SHORT, ARE MORE FRIENDLY AND THUS MORE WELCOME THAN THE GOVERNMENT SECURITY AND MILITARY PEOPLE. ESTIMATES OF THEIR STRENGTH RANGE FROM 50 TO 150 INDIVIDUALS. (SOURCE: [A VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE WITH ACCESS TO OFFICIAL REPORTS AND] WHOSE (S) REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

7. THE GOVERNMENT'S OWN HEAVY HANDED METHODS IN DEALING WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION, HAVE, IN TURN, HARMED THE GOVERNMENT'S IMAGE IN THE AREA FAR MORE THAN THE GUERRILLAS COULD HAVE HOPED TO DO WITH THEIR OPERATIONS. ALTHOUGH THE GOVERNMENT PUBLICLY CLAIMS TO HAVE CAPTURED SEVERAL GUERRILLA LEADERS RECENTLY, THE PRISONERS ARE ILLITERATE FARM WORKERS WHO CLEARLY ARE NOT TRAINED GUERRILLA FIGHTERS. THOSE WHO FEEL THAT THEY HAVE BEEN VICTIMIZED BY THE SECURITY FORCES, TURN AWAY FROM THE GOVERNMENT AND TOWARD THE GUERRILLAS. MANY OF THOSE WHO ARE NOT

(9)

SECRET

DIRECTLY AFFECTED ALSO LOSE RESPECT FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT WHICH, WHILE MISTREATING THE CITIZENRY, FAILS TO ERADICATE THE GUERRILLAS. INVESTIGATIONS INTO THE GOVERNMENT'S ANTI-GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES IN THE AREA ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN PROFESSIONAL MAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN [SECURITY AND JUDICIAL] (S) CIRCLES AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

SECRET

8. DURING THE PAST TWO TO THREE MONTHS THE GUERRILLAS HAVE BEEN RELATIVELY INACTIVE. VENEZUELAN AUTHORITIES HADBELIEVED THAT AFTER SPENDING AN ENJOYABLE HOLIDAY SEASON, THE GUERRILLAS WOULD RESUME THEIR CAMPAIGN IN FEBRUARY. THIS HAS NOT MATERIALIZED AND SECURITY OFFICIALS ARE NOW ATTEMPTING TO DISCOVER WHETHER THE GUERRILLAS HAVE TAKEN COVER AS A RESULT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S EFFORTS IN THE EASTERN STATES OR ARE REGROUPING AND PLANNING TO RENEW THEIR ACTIVITIES SOON. (SOURCE: [AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE.)] (S)

9. IN LATE FEBRUARY, HOWEVER, VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT BR LEADER GABRIEL PUERTA APONTE AND SEVERAL OTHER GUERRILLA LEADERS WERE IN CARACAS.

SECRET

SECRET

PUERTA AND THE OTHERS ARE BELIEVED TO BE IN CONTACT WITH UNSPECIFIED EXTREME LEFTIST ELEMENTS AND PLANS FOR THE SHIFTING OF THE GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN TO THE URBAN AREAS ARE BEING MADE. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.) (S)

10. THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT STILL BELIEVES THAT THE 26 FEBRUARY 1976 KIDNAPPING OF UNITED STATES BUSINESSMAN WILLIAM F. NIEHOUS WAS CARRIED OUT BY THE BR, FALN AND THE OR WORKING JOINTLY. WHILE THE GOVRNMENT HAS IMPRISONED SEVERAL INDIVIDUALS FOR THEIR SUPPOSED INVOLVEMENT IN THE KIDNAPPING, THE CASE REMAINS UNRESOLVED AND NIEHOUS' WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. (SOURCE: [AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE.] (S)

11. IN ADDITION TO THEIR RURAL MILITARY APPARATS, THE BR, OR AND FALN MAINTAIN QUASI- LEGAL FRONT GROUPS WHICH ARE ACTIVE IN THE URBAN AREAS. THE BR HAS NUMEROUS CIVIC

SECRET

AWARENESS GROUPS SUCH AS THE COMMITTEE AGAINST THE HIGH COST OF LIVING, THE STUDENT'S COMMITTEE FOR THE POPULAR STRUGGLE (CLEP), ETC. THE OR MAINTAINS A FRONT GROUP KNOWN AS THE SOCIALIST LEAGUE (LS, WHICH, IN TURN HAS ORGANIZED THE UNITED POPULAR STUDENT MOVMENT (MEUP). THE FALN'S LESS SUCCESSFUL FRONT IS RUPTURA . CLEP, MEUP AND RUPTURA HAVE WORKED TOGETHER TO ORGANIZE THE RECENT STUDENT DISTURBANCES WHICH BEGAN IN MID-FEBRUARY. FURTHERMORE, WHILE THERE IS NO PROOF, VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS BELIEVE THAT THE FRONT GROUPS ARE NOW RECEIVING SUPPORT AND DIRECTION FROM ABROAD. VENEZUELAN OFFICIALS EXPECT THESE DISTURBANCES TO CONTINUE AND INDEED INCREASE UNTIL AFTER THE DECEMBER ELECTION. (SOURCE: [AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE.)] (S)

SECRET

12. IN DISCUSSING THE STUDENT DISTURBANCES, RETIRED GENERAL RAUL GIMÉNEZ GAINZA, HEAD OF THE DIRECTORATE FOR THE SERVICES OF INTELLIGENCE AND PREVENTION (DISIP), SAID THAT HE FULLY EXPECTS THE DEMONSTRATIONS TO CONTINUE FOR SOMETIME. FURTHERMORE, HE OPINED THAT THE POLICE HAVE AS YET NOT REALLY BEEN CALLED OUT IN FORCE TO HANDLE THE

BT

#9329

12

SECRET

SECRET

HAVE NOT ENGAGED IN LOOTING. SHOULD THIS OCCUR, HE PREDICTED, THE NATIONAL GUARD WOULD QUICKLY BE CALLED OUT IN FORCE, SUCH A MOVE, HOWEVER, COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN SERIOUS INJURIES AND A DETERIORATION OF THE SITUATION. (SOURCE: A PROFESSIONAL MAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE (S) REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

II. CUBAN EXILES

13. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IS LARGE, WELL-ESTABLISHED AND INFLUENTIAL. FURTHERMORE, IT CURRENTLY FEELS BETRAYED AND REJECTED BY BOTH THE USG AND THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT. IN THE FORMER CASE, THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY IS CONCERNED BY THE USG'S EXPANDED FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. WITH REGARD TO THE GOV, THE EXILES HAVE COME TO DISTRUST THE PEREZ ADMINISTRATION WHICH THEY FEEL HAS UNJUSTLY HARRASSED THE COMMUNITY SINCE THE 6 OCOBER 1976 BOMBING OF A CUBANA AIRLINE, SUPPOSEDLY BY CUBAN EXILE EXTREMISTS. THE FAIRLY RECENT INSTANCE IN WHICH THE GOV REVOKED THE VENEZUELAN CITIZENSHIP OF A WELL-KNOWN CUBAN PHYSICIAN IN RETALIATION

(14)

SECRET

BOTH THE GOV AND THE EXILE COMMUNITY FEAR THAT, SHOULD HE DIE, EXILE EXTREMISTS WILL MOVE SWIFTLY AND STRONGLY AGAINST PRESIDENT PEREZ. BOSCH HIMSELF HAS SAID THAT PRESIDENT PEREZ WILL BE HELD PERSONALLY ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS DEATH. (SEE [HVC]7858, (S) TDFIRDB-315/02855-78.) (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN EXILES AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

CUBA-VENEZUELA

16. A RELATIVELY LARGE NUMBER OF FORMER CUBAN CITIZENS HOLD INFLUENTIAL POSITIONS WITHIN THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES. AMONG THESE ARE ORLANDO GARCIA, DISIP'S CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, AND RICARDO MORALES, A FORMER DISIP SECTION CHIEF AND A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF GARCIA. MORALES HAS IN THE PAST INDICATED HIS BELIEF THAT THE USG IS IN SOME MEASURE RESPONSIBLE FOR HIS CURRENT PROBLEMS AND ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS HAS MADE THREATENING REMARKS TOWARD USG PERSONNEL IN VENEZUELA. WHILE MORALES NO LONGER HOLDS AN OFFICIAL POSITION IN DISIP, HE DOES MAINTAIN SOME DISIP CONNECTIONS. MORALES TRAVELS ABROAD FREQUENTLY AND IS CURRENTLY BELIEVED TO BE OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY. (SOURCE:

SECRET

A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

(S)

17. THE CUBAN EXILE COMMUNITY HAS RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT MORALES RECENTLY THREATENED THE LIFE OF DIEGO ARRIA, VENEZUELAN MINISTER OF INFORMATION AND TOURISM, WHILE ARRIA WAS TRAVELLING ABROAD. THE COMMUNITY HAS IN THE PAST SUSPECTED MORALES TO BE AN AGENT OF THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT. SINCE THEY FEEL THAT ARRIA IS A RATHER UNLIKELY TARGET FOR CUBAN EXTREMISTS, THE COMMUNITY BELIEVES THAT MORALES' THREAT, IF INDEED MADE, IS POSSIBLY A CUBAN GOVERNMENT ATTEMPT TO FURTHER DISCREDIT THE EXILE COMMUNITY IN VENEZUELA. (SOURCE: A VENEZUELAN BUSINESSMAN WITH CONTACTS AMONG CUBAN EXILES AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

II. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

VENEZUELA

18. ILICH "CARLOS" RAMIREZ SANCHEZ, THE NOTORIOUS

(17)

SECRET

SECRET

INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST, IS A VENEZUELAN CITIZEN WHOSE FAMILY RESIDES IN SAN CRISTOBAL, TACHIRA STATE. THERE HAS BEEN PAST INFORMATION THAT RAMIREZ' ASSOCIATES OCCASIONALLY TRAVEL TO VENEZUELA. THERE IS NO CURRENT INFORMATION INDICATING THAT "CARLOS" HIMSELF OR ANY OF HIS CURRENT CLOSE ASSOCIATES ARE NOW IN VENEZUELA. (SOURCE: [AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE.)](S)

19. JOHNY KHOURI, LATIN AMERICAN HEAD OF THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE (PFLP), RESIDES IN THE PORT CITY OF LA GUAIRA IN THE CARACAS FEDERAL DISTRICT. THE GOV IS AWARE OF KHOURI'S PRESENCE IN VENEZUELA AND HAS AGREED TO ALLOW HIM TO REMAIN IN THE COUNTRY WITH HIS FAMILY AS LONG AS HE DOES NOT BECOME INVOLVED IN PFLP OR ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES IN VENEZUELA. IN AN EFFORT TO ENSURE KHOURI'S COMPLIANCE, THE GOV OCCASIONALLY MONITORS HIS ACTIVITIES. AS IN THE PAST, DISIP WILL UNDOUBTEDLY PLACE KHOURI UNDER "PREVENTIVE DETENTION" DURING PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT. (SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

20. IN ADDITION TO CUBAN EXILES, JEWISH AND ARAB GROUPS,

BT

#9330

18

SECRET

CARTER'S VISIT. (SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

SECRET

IV. THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES

21. THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES, ESPECIALLY DISIP, HAVE BEEN HARD HIT BY PERSONAL RIVALRIES AMONG THEIR TOP OFFICIALS. PART OF DISIP'S DIFFICULTIES ARISE FROM CHARGES OF MISCONDUCT IN THE HANDLING OF THE ANTI-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN IN THE EASTERN STATES. ANOTHER PART STEMS FROM MUTUAL DISTRUST AND BACKBITING AMONG ITS LEADERS. DISIP'S EFFICIENCY, WHICH UNDER NORMAL CONDITIONS IS NONE TOO GOOD, IS NOT UP TO ITS USUAL STANDARD. DISIP DIRECTOR GIMENEZ HAS VOICED HIS LACK OF FAITH IN THE YOUNGER GENERATION OF DISIP OFFICERS AND HAS EXPRESSED HIS DESIRE FOR A RETURN TO THE OLDER, MORE EXPERIENCED OFFICIALS. (SOURCE: [A VENEZUELAN PROFESSIONAL MAN] WITH CONTACTS (S) AMONG VENEZUELAN [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS (S) GENERALLY RELIABLE.)

22. SINCE THE BEGINNING OF THE YEAR BOTH DISIP AND THE TECHNICAL JUDICIAL POLICE (PTJ) HAVE EXPERIENCED FUNDING

SECRET

SECRET

PROBLEMS WHICH, ACCORDING TO DISIP DIRECTOR GIMENEZ, ARE DUE TO THE GOV'S CURRENT BUDGET PROBLEMS COUPLED WITH POOR ADMINISTRATION. DURING JANUARY AND FEBRUARY BOTH AGENCIES WERE FORCED TO BORROW FROM FEDERAL BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO MEET THEIR PAYROLLS. EVEN SO, PAYROLL DISBURSEMENTS HAVE BEEN MADE LATE. AS A RESULT, MORALE AMONG THE OFFICERS AND MEN OF THESE AGENCIES IS LOWER THAN USUAL. (SOURCE: [A PROFESSIONAL MAN] WITH CONTACTS AMONG (S) VENEZUELAN [SECURITY OFFICIALS] AND WHOSE REPORTING IS GENERALLY (S) RELIABLE.)

23. THE DIRECTORATE OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE (DIM) HAS NOT BEEN INVOLVED IN RECENT REORGANIZATION AND PERSONNEL PROBLEMS AND IS GENERALLY STAFFED WITH CAREER MILITARY OFFICERS ON ROTATIONAL TOURS. DIM'S OPERATIONS IN THE EASTERN STATES ARE CURRENTLY UNDER INVESTIGATION WHICH MAY, HOWEVER, CAUSE THIS SERVICE SOME PROBLEMS IN THE WEEKS AND MONTHS TO COME. (SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

24. VENEZUELAN SECURITY OFFICIALS HAVE NOT YET BEGUN TO DO ANY SUBSTANTIAL PLANNING FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S VISIT, BELIEVING

SECRET

SECRET

IT IS TOO EARLY TO DO SO. PRELIMINARY THOUGHT, HOWEVER, HAS BEEN GIVEN TO ESTABLISHING A JOINT SPECIAL SECURITY COMMAND TO COORDINATE MILITARY, POLICE AND SECURITY UNITS ASSIGNED TO SAFEGUARDING PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS PARTY. (SOURCE: [AN OFFICIAL VENEZUELAN SERVICE.)](S)

25. IN GENERAL, THE INTERNAL DIFFICULTIES OF THE SERVICES TEND TO MAKE BOTH DIM AND DISIP LESS FORTHCOMING WITH AND TRUSTFUL OF OUTSIDERS. FURTHERMORE, THEY ARE SUSPICIOUS OF EACH OTHER AND MUTUAL COOPERATION IS LIMITED. DESPITE THESE LIMITATIONS, THE VENEZUELAN SECURITY SERVICES ARE WELL DISPOSED TO AND CAN BE EXPECTED TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY PROTECTION FOR AND COOPERATION WITH PRESIDENT CARTER AND HIS PARTY. (SOURCE: A STAFF OFFICER OF THIS AGENCY.)

V. EMBASSY COMMENT

25. (EMBASSY COMMENT: THE CHARGE HAS SEEN THIS REPORT AND HAS NO COMMENT TO ADD.)

22

SECRET

SECRET

26. ACQ: VENEZUELA, CARACAS (2 MARCH 1978) FIELD NO. [HVC] 7860. (S)

27. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY, DEFATT, FBI, SECRET SERVICE CARACAS: SENT TO BRASILIA, RIO DE JANEIRO, LAGOS, MONROVIA, USCINCSO (J-2 ONLY).

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE-SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED-NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS-NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS.
CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1,2.

BT

#9331

23

SECRET

NNNN cc-INTD

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY: FBI
RECORD_NUMBER: 124-10291-10040
RECORD_SERIES: HO
AGENCY FILE_NUMBER: CR 109-12-207-3354

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR: CIA
FROM: CIA
TO:
TITLE:

DATE: 10/22/1976
PAGES: 5
SUBJECT: OBA, AKA, ARREST, TRA, FALSE PASSPORT, SUSP, ASSA, PLOT, POLIT, CHILE

DOCUMENT_TYPE: PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
ORIGINAL CLASSIFICATION: Secret
NEW CLASSIFICATION:
REVIEW_DATE: 07/07/1998
UPDATE_DATE:
STATUS Redact

RESTRICTIONS:

JFK Act 6 (1)(B)

COMMENTS: INC ADMIN PAGE

SECRET (When Filled In)

DIRECTORATE OF OPERATIONS

Intelligence Information Cable

● PRIORITY

IN 077749

PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

STATE/INR JCS/MC (DIA) CIA/NMCC SWS NSA TREAS NSC/S SDO NIO CRS
{SY/I/PIB} SS/ID FBI SECUR

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1) (2). Impossible to Determine Date of Automatic Declassification.

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except the brackets
JM 6-25-97 SLD/KSR 7-31-97
(JFK)

SECRET

CITE TDFIR DB-315/10576-76

DIST 22 OCTOBER 1976

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS [Political matters]

FBI Adm. markings only
DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 2-26-96
(JFK)

COUNTRY: CHILE

DOI : MID-APRIL TO MID-OCTOBER 1976

SUBJECT: CHILEAN GOVERNMENT INFORMATION ON CUBAN EXILE LEADERS ORLANDO BOSCH AND ROLANDO OTERO

ACQ : CHILE, SANTIAGO (21 OCTOBER 1976) FIELD NO. [HCS] 10,772 (S)

SOURCE : SEE BELOW.

1. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 3-4: [A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL WITH GOOD ACCESS TO OFFICIALS OF THE MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS.] HIS REPORTING IS FAIRLY RELIABLE. (S)

2. (FIELD COMMENT: SANTIAGO EMBASSY TELEGRAM 10107 OF 19 OCTOBER REPORTED THAT THE CHILEAN MINISTRY OF ~~FOREIGN~~ AFFAIRS HAD BEEN KEEPING AN EYE ON THE ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EXILE LEADER ORLANDO BOSCH, AND WAS NOW REVIEW~~ING ALL~~ ITS INFORMATION, PRESUMABLY IN LIGHT OF HIS RECENT ARREST IN VENEZUELA.)

Cuba
Chile

REC-52 ST-132 DE-16
[109-12-207-3354]

NOV 5 1976

3. ON 15 OCTOBER, FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS ASSEMBLED

S E C R E T

293

56 NOV 19 1976

5-RTC
6-

103

291-10040

IN 077749

TDFIRDB-315/10576-76

RECEIVED INTELLIGENCE DIV
OCT 26 4 44 PM '76

A FILE ON BOSCH AT THE REQUEST OF ADMIRAL PATRICIO Chile CARVAJAL, MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS. THE FILE CONSISTS MAINLY OF EXCHANGES OF CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN THE CHILEAN EMBASSY IN SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, AND THE FOREIGN MINISTRY CONCERNING BOSCH'S ARREST IN SAN JOSE IN MARCH 1976, AND THE FACT THAT HE HAD CHILEAN IDENTITY DOCUMENTS IN HIS POSSESSION.

4. THE DOCUMENTS INCLUDED A BIRTH CERTIFICATE, IDENTITY CARD, TAX IDENTIFICATION CARD AND PASSPORT, ALL IN THE NAME OF RICARDO RAMON DAVANZO CERUTI. THE PASSPORT WAS ISSUED IN CHILE IN 1966, AND HAD NEVER BEEN RENEWED. (SOURCE COMMENT: CHILEAN PASSPORTS NORMALLY REQUIRE RENEWAL EVERY TWO YEARS.) THE PASSPORT CONTAINED ONE CHILEAN EXIT STAMP, DATED 1966, AND NO INDICATION THAT IT HAD SUBSEQUENTLY BEEN USED TO ENTER OR EXIT CHILE. IT CONTAINED MANY EXIT AND ENTRY STAMPS INDICATING EXTENSIVE TRAVEL BY ITS BEARER IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND PANAMA, BETWEEN 1966 AND MARCH 1976. THE PASSPORT AND OTHER DOCUMENTATION WAS SHOWN TO CHILEAN EMBASSY OFFICIALS IN SAN JOSE BY COSTA RICAN OFFICIALS; HOWEVER, THE COSTA RICANS DID NOT GIVE THE DOCUMENTS TO THE EMBASSY OFFICIALS.

5. SOURCE OF PARAGRAPHS 6-7: AN OFFICIAL CHILEAN SERVICE. (S)

6. IN MID-APRIL 1976, THE DIRECTORATE OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE (DINA) RECEIVED INFORMATION THAT BOSCH HAD JUST ARRIVED IN CHILE WITH A CONTRACT TO ASSASSINATE A HIGH LEVEL CHILEAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (UNIDENTIFIED). ACCORDING TO DINA, BOSCH EVADED AN ARREST ACTION ON 10 APRIL, ESCAPING BY A MATTER OF MINUTES BUT LEAVING BEHIND ALL HIS CLOTHES AND TWO PASSPORTS.

7. ON 29 APRIL, DINA, HOWEVER, SUCCESSFULLY APPREHENDED ROLANDO OTERO HERNANDEZ, AN Chile ASSOCIATE OF BOSCH, WHO ALONG WITH THE LATTER WAS WANTED AS A FEDERAL FUGITIVE IN THE UNITED STATES. IN EARLY MAY, DINA INFORMED THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) OF OTERO'S ARREST, AND SUBSEQUENTLY TURNED OTERO OVER TO FBI AGENTS FOR RETURN AND PROCESSING IN THE UNITED STATES. (FIELD COMMENT: HVC-7328 (TDFIRDB-315/ (S) 01696-76) FROM AN UNTESTED SOURCE WITH ACCESS TO CUBAN EXILES REPORTED THAT OTERO WAS PLANNING TO ASSASSINATE CHILEAN MARXIST EXTREMIST ANDRES PASCAL ALLEANDE, Chile AND THAT HE WAS WORKING UNDER THE SPONSORSHIP OF THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT. DINA'S ARREST AND DEPORTATION TO THE U.S. OF

SECRET

291-10040

IN 077749

TDFIR DB-315/10576-76

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

SECRET

(classification)

FURTHER DISSEMINATION AND USE OF THIS INFORMATION SUBJECT TO CONTROLS STATED AT BEGINNING AND END OF REPORT.

OTERO RAISES QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ALLEGATION OF CHILEAN GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP OF OTERO AND HIS GROUP.)

8. FIELD DISSEM: EMBASSY AT SANTIAGO; SENT TO CARACAS.

REPORT CLASS SECRET--WARNING NOTICE--SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS--NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/ CONSULTANTS

CLASSIFIED BY RECORDED REPORTING OFFICER. XGDS-1, 2.

ADVANCE COPY TRANSMITTED TO STATE DIA ARMY NAVY AIR JCS SWS NSA SS/ID FBI TREAS CIA/OPSCEN.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/11/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10291-10123
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-72630-64, 65

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TO :	SAC, MM
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/31/1960
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	PDL, REL, TRA, VISA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/02/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF NSA, INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	INC A/T

FD-36 (Rev. 12-13-56)

FBI

Date: 4/4/60

Transmit the following in PLAIN TEXT
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL AIRMAIL
(Priority or Method of Mailing)

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-72630)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-1598)

PEDRO LUIS OSCAR DIAZ LANZ
IS - CUBA

Re Bureau airtel dated 3/31/60.

On 3/30/60, subject was contacted at his residence 120 S. W. 71st Ave., Miami, Fla., by SA WILLIAM A. WIGHTMAN, at which time DIAZ said that he had not traveled to Mexico, and that he understood that his brother, MARCOS, was still in Mexico City attempting to obtain a visa for entry into the U. S.

Report will be submitted in this case by 4/11/60.

REC- 74

105-72630-65

P.
3-Bureau (AM) (RM)
2-Miami
WAW:jlt
(5)

EX 107

JFK

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10/25/94 BY SC8mac/UB

APR 6 1960

NAT. INT. SEC.

52 APR 11 1960

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-80115

Approved: Special Agent in Charge Sent M Per

1

TOP SECRET

3/31/60

Airtel

PERSONAL ATTENTION

To: SAC, Miami (105-1598)

From: Director, FBI (105-72630)

PEDRO LUIS OSCAR DIAZ LANZ
IS - CUBA

Rerep SA William H. Wightman 2/26/60.

Bureau Source 6 in communication classified "Top [S] Secret" advised that on 3/18/60 the Cuban Embassy in Mexico [TS] reported to its headquarters that Diaz Lanz was possibly in Mexico trying to buy an airplane. According to Bureau Source [S] 6, he was trying to contact the pilot, Cesar Gomez, who was dusting crops. Under no circumstances should Bureau Source 6 [S] data be set forth in reports. (TS)

Miami will advise by return airtel whether Pedro Diaz Lanz is in Mexico and, if not, whether the Diaz Lanz mentioned above could be either his brother, Marcos Diaz Lanz, or any other member of his family.

In view of the likelihood that a Federal grand jury will be convened in the immediate future in the Rundquist-Shergalis matter and the possibility that the subject may be called as a witness, Bureau desires that a current report be submitted. This report must reach the Bureau by April 11, 1960.

VHN:sbs
(4)

4/7/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mdc
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
Per NSA letter 2/27/98 (JFK)

REC- 54 105-72630-64

15 APR 1 1960

MAILED 9
MAR 3 1 1960
COMM - FBI

10/25/94
CLASSIFIED BY: SP4mac lwc
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

F-139

51 APR 6 1960 MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

TOP SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10291-10236
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 97-4546-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 10/24/1961
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MR, MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO, ACA, INTERNAL RESISTANCE
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/11/1998
OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

RA

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-12-94 BY SP8 mac/ksr

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/490,978 (JFK)
SUBJECT	STATEMENTS OF MANOLA RAY, EXILE LEADER OF THE PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT	DATE DISTR.	24 OCTOBER 1961
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	OCTOBER 1961	REFERENCES	IN 11257
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	ENGLAND, LONDON (24 OCTOBER 1961)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	OEL-30,995

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 25 1961
CIA SJP

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE (5) [OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE] FROM "SOURCE WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG EXILES IN CARACAS".

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT (JFK) Brackets
KP 11-18-97
SLD/KSE 1-7-98

1. MANOLO RAY, EXILE LEADER OF MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO DEL PUEBLO (MRP - PEOPLE'S REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT) SAID IN EARLY OCTOBER THAT HE WAS FIRMLY OPPOSED TO ANY INVASION OF CUBA INSISTING THAT CASTRO'S OVERTHROW WAS TO BE ACHIEVED BY INTERNAL RESISTANCE AND THIS HAD ALREADY STARTED.

2. THE MRP WAS ORGANIZED THROUGHOUT THE ISLAND AND SUPPORTED BY ALL CLASSES OF THE POPULATION. IT HAD MEMBERS IN ALL 33 TRADE UNIONS, THE G-2, MILITIA AND THROUGHOUT THE ADMINISTRATION. RAY ESTIMATED 80 PERCENT OF POPULATION WERE OPPOSED TO CASTRO, THOUGH MAJORITY WERE NOT ACTIVELY SO. HE CONSIDERED THE MRP AT PRESENT ENJOYED MORE SUPPORT THAN THE ORIGINAL REVOLUTION HAD

REC- 46 97-4546-9

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

OCT 31 1961

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	~~ONE~~	~~OCR~~	~~ORR~~	OO	EXO	FBI

I&NS TREASURY REPC INCLANT

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

1 PC - Miami by 0-7 (inf.)
10-30-61

66 NOV 3 1961

97-4546

291-10236 78

REC'D
DOM INTELL DIV.

HAD AGAINST BATISTA.

3. THE MRP WAS PRESENTLY SHORT OF ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES BUT THE POSITION WAS IMPROVING (A MILITIA CAPTAIN WAS RECENTLY SENTENCED TO 30 YEARS IN PRISON FOR PASSING ARMS TO THE MRP). NO HELP WHATSOEVER HAD BEEN RECEIVED BY THE INTERNAL RESISTANCE FROM THE "SOURCES IN THE UNITED STATES, WHO PROVIDED SUPPORT FOR THE INVASION". THESE SOURCES WERE STILL THINKING INEFFECTUALLY IN TERMS OF A FURTHER INVASION.

4. THE GENERAL ATTITUDE OF THE RESISTANCE IN CUBA TOWARDS THE EXILES WAS ONE OF INDIFFERENCE MOUNTING TO CONTEMPT FOR SPECIFIC MOVES SUCH AS THE PROPOSED PROMOTION OF A CUBAN GOVT IN EXILE. WHAT THE RESISTANCE WANTED WAS FUNDS AND THE RETURN, BY INFILTRATION, OF TRAINED EXILES, PARTICULARLY COMMUNICATION EXPERTS.

5. ON THE TIMING OF CASTRO'S OVERTHROW, RAY SAID CASTRO WOULD NOT LAST ANOTHER YEAR. HE ADDED THAT THE SITUATION IN CUBA IMMEDIATELY AFTER CASTRO'S DOWNFALL WOULD BE DANGEROUS AND COULD DEVELOP INTO A CIVIL WAR.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE. CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/22/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10291-10319

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-117262-25, 24

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : LEG, PA
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 08/18/1965
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
SBE, REL, WINNER, MIRIAM FINKELMAN, AKA, PERSONAL HISTORY AND BKG

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/29/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC 2 MEMO, LHM

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 10/6/65

SECRET

FROM WBH SAC, CINCINNATI (105-3048)(C)

SUBJECT: MYRIAM FINKELMAN Y WINER
IS - CUBA
(00: Cincinnati)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT except Brackets MKH 2-6-98

Re Legat, Paris, letter to Bureau 8/18/65.

Enclosed for Bureau are nine copies of letterhead memorandum with accompanying evaluation memo concerning captioned matter. It is classified Confidential because of the source from which the information emanated.

The source is identified as Liaison Section of (S) [CIA] American Embassy, Madrid Spain (S)

Cincinnati is closing its case since subject is in Spain, has never been to the U. S., and there is no reason to believe she will come to this country within the near future.

2-Bureau (Enc. 9) (RM)
1-Cincinnati

RFM:blb
(3)

ENCLOSURE

Rc

Encl.

5-30-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
(JFK)

4/4/96
Classified by ~~3803 wmp/jw~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ JFK

EX-112

REC-43

105-117262-25

1 OCT 7 1965

SECRET

cc - Miami - info
4/26/66 grouped

OCT 7 1965

Copy to: CIA/STATE/RAO
ONI/OSI/ACSI
By routing slip for info.
Date 10/15/65 by

NAT. INT. SEC.

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

CONFIDENTIAL

RE: MYRIAM FINKELMAN Y WINER

SECRET

(u)
(X)

Sam Benton	1800 SOUTH TREASURE DRIVE MIAMI BEACH, FLA. - Brother - same as above
Francis Lyons	Sister - 14 Walton Street, Portland, Maine
Salomon Finkelman	Brother - 3105 SW 79th Avenue, Miami, Florida
Clara Delaster	Sister - Miami, Florida
Julie Abramson	Niece - 57 State Road, Portland, Maine

According to [Dr. Manuel Cortina, who was formerly acquainted with Winer in Santa Clara,] (S) she is currently Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. He has no information concerning her present address, however, he said she is believed to be living with an unidentified Cuban exile who was a professor in Las Villas. According to the knowledge of the source, they are not married. The source could not furnish any additional information concerning Winer's activities and stated there is no indication she will leave Spain and come to the United States. X(u)

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS IS LOANED TO YOU BY THE FBI, AND NEITHER IT NOR ITS CONTENTS ARE TO BE DISTRIBUTED OUTSIDE THE AGENCY TO WHICH LOANED.

SECRET

821-1031

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI DATE: 8/18/65

SECRET

FROM : LEGAT, PARIS (105-3551) (RUC)

NWP/ngp

SUBJECT: MIRIAM FINKELMAN WINNER
IS - CUBA
(OO - Cincinnati)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

FO-217

Encl

Re Cincinnati letter to Bureau 6/29/65.

There are enclosed for the Bureau and Cincinnati each one copy of a memorandum dated 8/9/65 prepared by the Liaison Section [(CIA)] (S) American Embassy, Madrid, Spain, containing background information regarding the captioned subject. [redacted]

It appears that the subject is presently residing in Madrid and is employed as the Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. (U)

The Consular Section has no record of an application for a United States visa from the subject. We have requested that they advise us in the event a visa application is received.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION except for brackets
IN THIS DOCUMENT. mKH 2-6-98

4 - Bureau (Encs. - 2) ENCLOSURE
(1 - Liaison Section)
(1 - Cincinnati, 105-3048)
1 - [Paris]
NWP:eim
(5)

5-30-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/lcs/c
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

~~Classified by~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~

REC- 54 105-117262-24

14 AUG 26 1965

SECRET

MCT-45

REC'D
DOM INTELL DIV.

AUG 23 3 38 PM '65

+ Encl.
Copy to Cincinnati
by routing slip for
☐ info ☒ action
date 8-25-65
by jw/ys

53 SEP 1 1965

NAT. INT. SEC.

5d1-1031d

C O N F I D E N T I A L

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief, Consular Section 9 August 1965

FROM: Liaison Section

SUBJECT: Miriam Finkleman WINNER (or WINER)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except Brackets MKH 2-6-98

SLD/IBR 5-30-98 (JFK)

According to usually reliable Cuban exile sources in Madrid, the Subject was born in Poland on 5 February 1922; she became a Cuban citizen in 1945. Subject arrived in Madrid, Spain, on 12 May 1963, bearing Cuban passport #34059 issued on 24 July 1956. Her last known address in Cuba was Ronda 17, Apt. 18, Habana.

JFK

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 1/14/95 BY sp2 wau/gp

The following is Subject's educational history:

1930 to 1936 - Primary school at Ludwipol, Poland
1938 to 1942 - High school-Instituto Marianao, Habana
1942 to 1947 - University of Habana (degree in Philosophy and Letters)
1958 - University of Columbia, New York (summer school studying German literature).

From 1956 to 1961, Subject was a professor of literature and languages at the Central University in Santa Clara, Las Villas. She held the same position from 1961 to 1962 at the University of Habana. She reportedly speaks English, German and Spanish fluently.

On arrival in Madrid in 1963, Subject listed the following members of her immediate family:

Ana Winner	- mother	- 1800 S. Treasure Drive, Miami Beach, Florida
Sam Benton	- brother	- same as above
Francis Lyons	- sister	- 14 Walton Street, Portland, Maine
Salomon Finkelman	- brother	- 3105 SW 79th Avenue, Miami, Florida
Clara Delaster	- sister	- Miami, Florida
Julie Abramson	- niece	- 57 State Road, Portland, Maine.

According to [Manuel Cortina, who was formerly acquainted with Subject in Santa Clara,] the Subject is currently the Director of English Language at the Mangold Institute in Madrid. He has no information concerning her present address, however, he said Subject is believed to be living with an unidentified Cuban exile who was a professor in Las Villas; to Source's knowledge, they are not married. Source has no additional information concerning Subject's current activities.

GROUP I
Excluded from
automatic downgrading
and declassification

105-117

ENCLOSURE

C O N F I D E N T I A L

5d1-1031d

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10296-10130

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 163-1504-7

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : DIRECTOR, FBI
TO : DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 03/23/1970
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
WHJ, ASSOC, RCK, IDENT, BKG, AKA, MIL SERV, EMP

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/18/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC MEMO

EX. - 106 REC-35
(RI) 163-1504 7

SECRET

1 - Mr. Michela

Date: March 23, 1970

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director for Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: GEORGE HOOVER PRATT
INTERNAL SECURITY - LAOS
RACIAL MATTERS

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS ON PG. 2
KP 10-10-97

1-17-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Reference is made to your request dated March 10, 1970, and to my letter dated November 21, 1969, concerning captioned individual, your file B-956.

There is enclosed one copy each of the fingerprint cards of captioned individual and James Warren Smedley, who may be identical with the James Warren Smedley mentioned in your request of March 10, 1970.

BY COURIER SVC.
9 8 MAR 23
COMM-FBI

It is noted that you were furnished two copies of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Identification Record concerning George Hoover Pratt, by my letter dated November 21, 1969. A review of the files of this Bureau disclosed no Identification Record identifiable with James Warren Smedley or William Herman Jackson, also known as Jack Karl Lawhorn, who were also mentioned in your request of March 10, 1970.

Tolson ____
DeLoach ____
Walters ____
Mohr ____
Bishop ____
Casper ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
Felt ____
Gale ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Soyars ____
Tele. Room ____
Holmes ____
Gandy ____

JCM:djw/ekw
(4)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

2
10/27/77 JTM/ma
HSCA re William H. Jackson
See Bufile 801-2
Req: 10/20/77

SECRET

E 268
60 APR 1 1970

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

While no Identification Record concerning James Warren Smedley was located, the enclosed fingerprint cards concerning Smedley and Pratt may be of assistance to you in making record checks through [official Thai] sources. (S) The enclosed fingerprint cards and the copies of the Identification Record which were furnished to you by my letter dated November 21, 1969, may be utilized by you in checking [official Thai] sources concerning the (S) individuals mentioned above. In making such checks, you must insure that the [Thai officials] clearly understand (S) that it is your Agency which is making the record checks and that such checks are not in any way being made for this Bureau.

Enclosures - 2

NOTE:

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) previously checked the names of Pratt, Jackson, and Smedley through Bureau files. CIA has advised that Pratt had reportedly attempted to get people out of Vietnam into Laos where these people could be trained and shipped to the United States to assist in the "Black Movement." By memorandum dated 3/10/70, CIA furnished additional identifying information concerning Jackson and Smedley and requested copies of fingerprint records. CIA requested to be advised if those records could be provided to [official Thai] sources in (S) order to facilitate checking certain [Thai] records which would otherwise be unavailable. (S)

SECRET

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

B-956 RO
10 MAR 1970

Read [illegible] 3-11-70

SUBJECT: George Hoover PRATT

Reference: A. Our memorandum of 11 February 1970, Subject as above.

B. Your letter dated 21 November 1969, Subject: George Hoover PRATT, Internal Security - Laos, Racial Matters.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except for Brackets
KP 10-10-97 SLD/KSR 1-17-98 (JFK)

1. [Our representative in Vientiane, Laos] (S) has provided the following additional information concerning Herman JACKSON and King SMEDLEY mentioned in paragraph 1A of reference A:

Vietnam

a. Herman JACKSON is believed to be identical with William Herman JACKSON, also known as Jack Karl IAWHORN, who was born on 24 November 1926 in Dothan, Alabama. JACKSON is a retired United States Army Master Sergeant who now owns Jack's American Star Bar in Bangkok, Thailand. He carries United States passport number 2539419.

b. King SMEDLEY is believed to be identical with James Warren SMEDLEY, negro male born on 3 October 1922 at Roanoke, Virginia. SMEDLEY served in the United States Air Force. He carries United States passport 2424089.

FOREIGN

2. Please provide us with copies of the fingerprint records of Subject and William Herman JACKSON. Please advise us if we may provide these records to (S) [official Thai sources] in order to facilitate checking certain Thai records that would otherwise not be available.

3-[illegible]-70

EX. - 106 REC-35

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH 163-1504-7

MAR 24 1970

Recd 3/18/70

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10300-10012
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-147458-52

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SAC, MM
TO :	DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/14/1967
PAGES :	8
SUBJECTS :	MR, LORIE, JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO, RES, POLIT ACT, TRA, ASSOC, POLIT PRISONERS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC LHM

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS ON PG. 2 JM 9-3-97

FBI

Date: 7-14-67

Transmit the following in (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL 5668 SLD/mD 12/16/97 (JFK) REGISTERED MAIL
(Priority)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL SLD/KSR 10-11-97 (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X(1)(6) (JFK) 11/18/97

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF 5/14/80 Class DATE

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

0-1 mm(2) 10/11/67 ~~Rept~~ 10/10/67

REC 82 ~~(JFK)~~ ~~SP8~~ 4-26-94
~~#24326~~
Classified by ~~SP8BTJ/gcl~~
Declassify on: OADR ~~3/84~~

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-147458)

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-9977) (P)

SUBJECT: COMITE PRO-LIBERACION DE LOS CIEN (CPLLC - COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ONE HUNDRED) IS - CUBA

ch

place cc in 105-162207 (u) C Roblejo

(S) ✱ 105-80787 (Cuban Intelligence activities)

Re Miami airtels 7-10-67, captioned "JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO LORIE, IS - CUBA" and "SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, aka - PSI, IS - CUBA".

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 14 copies of a LHM dated and captioned as above. Extra copies of this LHM are being furnished for transmittal to Legats, Ottawa (2) and Mexico City (1).

(page 3)

It is to be noted limited dissemination has been made concerning this matter and the enclosed LHM due to the sensitivity of the information concerning the

REC 82 105-147458-52

ST-103

11 JUL 19 1967

ENCLOSURE

⑤-Bureau (Enc. 14) (RM)
  (1-Legat, Mexico City 105-4967)
  (1-Legat, Ottawa 105-3083)
1-New York (info) (105-77103) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-San Juan (info) (105-9215) (Enc. 1) (RM)
1-Washington Field (info) (105-69372) (Enc. 1) (RM)
3-Miami
  (1-105-9977)
  (1-105-12062) (Roblejo)
  (1-134-1433-Sub-A)
JDH/al
(11)

1 copies made 3/9/78 for review at FBIHQ by JSG RE: M. Raf
(S) HSCA RE: 12/14/77 REQUEST

State/CIA/[redacted]/RAO/LINS
Army/Navy/Air Force/DIA/[redacted]
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, State
By R/S For Info
Date 7-20-67 By VHN/eh

cc airtel + 2cc encl. to Legat Ottawa (action); furnish cc to RCMP
airtel + encl. Sec. Legat Mexico (info)

386 C C-WICK 1967 XEROX

LATIN AMERICAN

105-162207
105-80787

UNREC COPY AND COPY OF ENCL FILED IN

62 AUG 4 1967

SECRET

possibility of ROBLEJO being involved in possible intelligence activities.

The FBI does not actually utilize Building T90 or T94 to conduct interviews of Cuban refugees. X However, CIA [under the guise of U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service interviewers] interrogate these arrivals [at this location] (S) A supply of the FBI "aviso" and the Director's message to newly arrived Cubans are distributed at this location.

It is to be recalled previous investigation has disclosed ROBLEJO has been in contact with [REINALDO ABREU, [S] Attache at the Cuban Embassy] in Mexico City and connected with [Cuban Intelligence] (S)

(S)

Also on June 29, 1967, MM [1115]-S reported LUIS RICARDO ALONSO, former Cuban Ambassador to London, who defected in 1965, has been in correspondence with [ABREU,] (S) having been introduced to him by RAUL ROA, Cuban Minister of Foreign Relations, in 1964. [ABREU] (S) reportedly is in charge of dealing with Cuban exile groups and Cuban guerrilla groups and more specifically, [has been in contact with ROBLEJO] (S)(U) since he, [ABREU] (S) is handling the matter of Cuban political prisoners. In addition, [ABREU,] since he is unable to travel [S] to Miami, has requested [ALONSO] to come to Mexico or to [S] converse with [NICOLAS RODRIGUEZ AZTARAEN,] attached to the [S] [Cuban Mission to the United Nations in] New York City in [S] connection with this matter X (U). X (S)

MM T-1 is SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO.

The enclosed LHM is classified SECRET to protect the identity of a potential informant of continuing value.

In the event the Bureau decides that the enclosed LHM may be disseminated, a copy of this LHM may be furnished [to the RCMP] inasmuch as it does not contain any information X (U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10300-10024

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-162207-3

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : SAC, MM
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

TITLE :

DATE : 07/10/1967
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Class
DATE 5/10/84 [illegible]

Mr. Tolson
Mr. DeLoach
Mr. Mohr
Mr. Wick
Mr. Casper
Mr. Callahan
Mr. Conrad
Mr. Felt
Mr. Gale
Mr. Rosen
Mr. Sullivan ✓
Mr. Tavel
Mr. Trotter
Tele. Room
Miss Holmes
Miss Gandy

FBI

SECRET

Date: 7/10/67

Transmit the following in
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 9-3-97
EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
ON PG. 2

REC 11

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI

FROM: SAC, MIAMI (105-12062) (P)

SUBJECT: JORGE RAUL ROBLEJO LORIE
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

OO: Miami

Re Miami airtel dated 6/21/67, captioned COMITE PRO-LIBERACION DE LOS CIEN (CPLLC) (COMMITTEE FOR THE LIBERATION OF THE ONE HUNDRED), IS - CUBA.

On 7/5/67, SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, 35 West 9th Street, Apartment 4, Hialeah, Florida, telephone 887-7218, voluntarily furnished the following information:

10-11-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/HSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)
HLD

8 - Bureau (RM)
  (1 - 105-147458)(CPLLC)
  (2 - Legat, Mexico)(Info.)
    (1 - 105-4947)(CPLLC)
  (2 - Legat, Ottawa)(Info.)
    (1 - 105-3083)(CPLLC)
2 - New York (Info.)(RM)
  (1 - 105-77103)(CPLLC)
2 - San Juan (Info.)(RM)
  (1 - 105-9215)(CPLLC)
3 - Miami
  (1 - 134-New)(Betancourt Collazo)
  (1 - 105-9977)(CPLLC)
JDH:jhk
(15)

2cc OTTAWA + 2cc MEXICO
7/17/67 mn

#211,326
Classified by ~~SP8 BJS/gel~~
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ 5/2/84

SP8 MAE/KSR
8-23-94
(JFK)

EX-103

REC 11

105-162207 - 3

Serial

JUL 20 1967

copies made
2/9/78 JSG
R M Rey
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 12/16/77 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

C. C. WICK

105-162207

memo cleared w/ Sullivan
Re CPLLC
mn 7/12/67

Airtel to mm 7/19/67
2-NY VHN:ekw
2-SJ
2-MEX

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Approved: FF / [illegible]
Special Agent in Charge

Sent M Per

BETANCOURT indicated that he had been the General Coordinator of the 30th of November anti-Castro organization in Cuba during 1959, 1960 and the first part of 1961. He arrived in the United States at Miami on June 29, 1961, via small boat. Upon his arrival in the United States, he assumed leadership of the 30th of November movement in Miami until approximately October, 1962, when he entered the U. S. Army under the Cuban recruitment program at Fort Jackson, S. C. Subsequent to this, he has been affiliated with the 30th of November movement in Chicago for approximately two years, 1963-1965, and in Miami, 1965 to date.

BETANCOURT is currently employed as a security guard for the National Patrol Detective Agency and the National Industrial Security Corporation (affiliates), 590 S. W. 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida. In connection with this employment, he is a guard at the Cuban Refugee Processing Center of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) three days a week. The Processing Center is located in Buildings T-90 and T-94 which are utilized by the U. S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) in processing, fingerprinting and photographing Cuban refugees upon their arrival in the United States. (CIA under the guise of INS interviewers interrogates (S) these arrivals at this location). (S)

BETANCOURT related he met ROBLEJO around the first of January, 1967, when ROBLEJO reportedly returned from Mexico City where he had been attempting to seek the release of Cuban political prisoners in Cuba. He met ROBLEJO through ANGEL ESTEVEZ, a coworker of BETANCOURT at the Hotel Fontainebleau where both were employed as waiters at that time. At the request of ESTEVEZ, BETANCOURT furnished ROBLEJO a table gratis at the Frank Sinatra show at the Fontainebleau Hotel, for which ROBLEJO was apparently grateful. As a result of this, ROBLEJO sought BETANCOURT's assistance in attempting to obtain the release of political prisoners and recently BETANCOURT was made a member of the Executive Committee of the CPLLC.

In this connection, BETANCOURT accompanied ROBLEJO to San Juan, Puerto Rico, the first week of June, 1967. BETANCOURT by this time had the impression ROBLEJO was actually anti-United States and he considered ROBLEJO a "leftist-socialist." While in Puerto Rico, they met with MANOLO RAY and RUFO LOPEZ FRESQUET. ROBLEJO discussed the possibility of RAY and LOPEZ FRESQUET becoming active in seeking the release of Cuban political prisoners. However, no definite agreement or conclusion was reached.

BETANCOURT stated that on or about June 15, 1967, he and ROBLEJO, while temporarily staying at 2930 Loiza, Santurce, Puerto Rico, were having a general conversation and ROBLEJO changed the topic to BETANCOURT's current work as a security guard at the Miami Airport where the Cuban refugees are processed. ROBLEJO asked detailed questions concerning the nature of the activities at this location, to which BETANCOURT explained that Cuban refugees upon their arrival in the United States are processed here, including having their photographs taken, being fingerprinted, and being interrogated. ROBLEJO asked BETANCOURT if the FBI was there, which BETANCOURT acknowledged in the affirmative, and ROBLEJO asked, "What do they do there?" BETANCOURT answered, "They investigate and clear all of the refugees arriving from Cuba in the United States." ROBLEJO was interested in knowing if BETANCOURT saw "those papers" and BETANCOURT stated he had seen them. (BETANCOURT indicated this was entirely fictitious, but since he did not trust ROBLEJO, he felt he might be in a position to be of possible assistance to the U. S. Government). ROBLEJO asked BETANCOURT if he could "photograph...take a picture of the documents or the people the FBI investigates." BETANCOURT asked ROBLEJO if he was "crazy," stating that if he did something like that, he could be put in the "electric chair." ROBLEJO indicated that with the use of a small camera, this could be accomplished very easily. Almost immediately, the topic was changed and BETANCOURT indicated to ROBLEJO he had to leave San Juan immediately because his child had just broken his collar bone. BETANCOURT also indicated to ROBLEJO that his, BETANCOURT's, wife had called and said she did not have any money in the house to buy food, etc. At this point, ROBLEJO gave BETANCOURT a check in the amount of $300.00, drawn on the First National Bank of Miami, on the account of the Committee of Relatives of the One Hundred. ROBLEJO made out this check in BETANCOURT's presence and requested $50.00 be given to ROBLEJO's mother. Immediately, BETANCOURT cashed the check and sent a money order to his wife, ERMITAS RAMON ARIAS.

BETANCOURT stated ROBLEJO had given him $50.00 in cash prior to their departure for Puerto Rico.

BETANCOURT advised he returned to Miami from Puerto Rico on June 18, 1967, and ROBLEJO remained in San Juan until June 28, 1967. He recalled ROBLEJO attempted to have him stay in Puerto Rico and was "mad" at BETANCOURT for leaving early.

On June 30, 1967, ROBLEJO telephonically contacted BETANCOURT, during which conversation ROBLEJO indicated he

SECRET

planned to go to Venezuela, Panama and Ottawa, Canada, and would see BETANCOURT upon his return. ROBLEJO is interested in obtaining a Mexican visa in order to go to Cuba to possibly converse with FIDEL CASTRO or other important leaders in the communist government of Cuba in connection with the possible release of Cuban political prisoners.

Local stops have been placed with INS in order to be notified of ROBLEJO's return to the United States.

Miami plans to locate and possibly monitor the bank account of the Committee of Relatives of the One Hundred and any other accounts where ROBLEJO is the authorized signature of an account.

The Bureau is being requested in a separate communication captioned "SERGIO OSWALDO BETANCOURT COLLAZO, aka "Ariel," PSI - CUBA," to grant authority to contact him in order to follow up in connection with ROBLEJO's request as mentioned above in the event ROBLEJO attempts to pursue this matter further.

The Bureau will be kept advised. **LHM incorporating pertinent data regarding subject's activities will be promptly furnished to the Bureau.**

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/14/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10311-10292
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-27799-513

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	LEG, BR
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	12/23/1964
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	USSS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/27/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106-03

UNITED STATES GOVER ENT

Memorandum

TO 4: Director, FBI DATE: 12/23/64

FROM : Legat, Bern (62-70) (RUC)

SECRET

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH SECRET SERVICE
THREATS AGAINST THE PRESIDENT

SECRET

ReBulet 11/19/64. 62-27799-507

Files of Legat, Bern, have been reviewed for individuals residing in Switzerland and Austria considered to be a possible threat to the President, and no one was found to fit this category.

In addition, discreet inquiry was made of the following sources, all of whom had no knowledge of individuals who might be considered threats:

Consular Section, the Embassy, Bern;
[Office of Special Assistant [(covert CIA),](S)
the Embassy, Bern;
American Consulate General, Vienna;
[Research Branch [(covert CIA)], the Embassy,](S)
Vienna; (S)
Security Officer, the Embassy, Vienna.

In this regard, however, Bureau attention is called to the case entitled PAUL GEORGE ANDERSON, aka, IS-X (Buf[illegible]e 100-415051). ANDERSON has been reported to be of interest to the Secret Service (Legat, Paris, letter dated 10/16/64). While he does not reside in territory covered by this office, he is in rather frequent transit en route to Hungary, where he is attempting to obtain a visa for his Hungarian wife to enter the U.S.

100-415051-
62-109060-

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

3-14-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
2 - Bern
(1 - 105-213)

REC-108 62-27799-513

HDG:mls
(5)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except Brackets
KP 5-18-98

14 DEC 28 1964

SECRET

LIAISON

JAN 5 1965

64 JAN 6 1965

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10320-10087

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 100-409763-79

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BR
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 05/13/1964
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
MARK LANE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

v9.1

5-126 (9-19-62)
OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVER

Memorandum

SECR

TO : Director, FBI (100-409763) DATE: 5/13/64

FROM : Legat, Bern (105-284) (RUC)

SUBJECT: MARK LANE
SM - C

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
K 5-6-98
SLD/KSR 5-27-98
(JFK)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 4/21/97

Re Bulet 4/20/64.

Security information furnished by referenced communication was disseminated to the indicated sources of this office on 5/4/64:

☒ [Abteilung II - Gruppe Staatspolizei, Bundesministerium Für Inneres (Austrian Security Police), Vienna, Austria.] (S)

☐ Security Branch, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

☐ U. S. Consulate General, Vienna, Austria.

☐ [Schweizerisches Bundespolizei (Swiss Federal Police), Bern, Switzerland.] (S)

☒ Other: [Research Branch [(covert CIA)] (S) American Embassy, Vienna.] (S)

Data furnished to the U. S. sources was classified Confidential. Material furnished to the foreign sources will be handled as Confidential under existing security agreements.

Appropriate notations are maintained in the files of the indicated sources to insure that this office will be notified in the event subject comes to their attention.

3 - Bureau
(1 - Liaison)
1 - Bern

HDG:mls
(4)

EX-115
100-409763-79
REC-49
6 MAY 18 1964

SUBV. FROM

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

68 MAY 22 1964
58

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10325-10318
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-80750-4166

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BRENNAN
TO :	SULLIVAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/11/1963
PAGES :	12
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON FILE
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/29/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC MEMO, SUMMARY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT as Sanitized 11/9/98

SECRET

Wash DC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

DIRECTOR'S MEETING WITH J. J. ~~MC~~ CONE

John A

Although Mr. McCone has indicated he will not be raising any problems or issues, the Director may find the following of assistance:

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

STATUS OF RELATIONS WITH CIA

To say that the two agencies work in complete harmony is not true. Conflicts of past years have had their influences. Fortunately we have been successful in establishing very effective working relations with several key figures in the agency who have been very cooperative and who are sincerely interested in getting the job done. Without this existing framework our relations with CIA could degenerate into a chaotic state.

With regard to differences with CIA, there were two situations during the past year which had a significant bearing on the relations between the two agencies. Approximately a year ago we learned that CIA had established contact with a Cuban exile who had come into the U.S. and who had confessed to the agency that he had been trained as a Cuban Intelligence Agent. CIA had this information for nearly a month before notifying the Bureau. We lodged very vigorous protest (re: Alwin Odio Tamayo). (S) The other event which led to a heated conflict arose from information which we disseminated to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board concerning Bureau's technical coverage of diplomatic establishments in this country. On May 15, 1963, McCone informed Mr. Belmont that a letter which the Bureau had sent to the aforementioned Board should be retracted because the communication included statements which incorrectly were attributed to him, the CIA Director. Mr. Belmont adamantly refused to retract the letter and after McCone asked for an apology, Mr. Belmont again made it clear that no apology was coming from him. The Bureau never retracted the letter because statements disseminated by us were predicated on information which had been given to us by two top CIA officials. The conflict was eventually resolved by McCone writing a letter to the Board and admitting that two of his subordinates had erroneously briefed the Bureau on a particular matter.

STATURE OF MC CONE IN THE PRESENT ADMINISTRATION

McCone obviously enjoys acquiring and using power. He considers himself not only the head of a particular government agency but also "the Director of Central Intelligence" and in

11/13/98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668-SLD/mde
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(JFK)

62-80750-4166

SECRET

ENCLOSURE

fiasco, we have not seen any evidence of high-grade intelligence being developed by CIA in Cuba since McCone became Director of the agency. To show impressive results, McCone must fall back on intelligence information developed through high-altitude photography and the use of other sophisticated technical equipment being used to photograph targets and to intercept communications. Much of this is, of course, being done in collaboration with other U. S. agencies such as the Air Force.

FBI COOPERATION WITH CIA

During the past year there have been numerous instances of excellent cooperation rendered by the Bureau to CIA. Set forth are some outstanding examples:

INFORMATION FROM SENSITIVE SOURCE SOLO

We have furnished CIA information from our sensitive Communist Party source who has traveled to Russia and has been in contact with Soviet leaders. This information has been most valuable to CIA in following developments particularly the differences between Red China and Russia.

TOPHAT

Our sensitive penetration of the Soviet Military Intelligence Service (GRU) has produced highly valuable information of use to CIA.

GIMME (S)

This is a highly sensitive penetration of the Czech Intelligence Service. His information [S] has significantly assisted CIA in obtaining a current picture of the Czech intelligence organization. [S]

BUREAU FURNISHES CIA A VALUABLE SOURCE

Our sensitive Czech source, Gimme, is [S] scheduled to return to Czechoslovakia. Arrangements [S] have been made to make him available to CIA.

FEDORA

Through this sensitive KGB penetration, we have furnished CIA leads pertaining to Soviet intelligence operations abroad. In addition, we have given the agency data pertaining to the organization and functions of KGB.

SOVIET MAIL DROPS OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES

Through our investigations in this country, we have identified Soviet mail drops in other areas and we have given this valuable information to CIA.

CIA APPROACHES OF THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE NATIONALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under agreed-to restrictions we have permitted CIA to contact Soviet and Satellite visitors in this country for the purpose of assessing their potential as sources when they return to their native countries.

CUBAN SOURCES

We have afforded CIA the opportunity to brief Bureau sources before such sources made trips to Cuba.

SENSITIVE CUBAN ESPIONAGE OPERATIONS

Both FBI and CIA have had access to intercepted radio communications being utilized by Cuban Intelligence. The Bureau has been far ahead of CIA in identifying agents mentioned in the communications and has furnished pertinent information to CIA.

TECHNICAL DATA TO CIA

The Bureau has been very successful in identifying Soviet and Cuban secret writing techniques. We have made this knowledge available to CIA.

CIA COOPERATION WITH BUREAU

TOPHAT

CIA did an excellent job of servicing drops in Moscow in this very sensitive case. This was done at considerable risk and was productive for us. [S]

SECRET

DOUBLE AGENTS FOR BUREAU

There have been a number of instances where CIA operated Soviet double agents outside of the U.S. and then made these individuals available to the Bureau for use in the U.S. In this connection it is also noted that in our development of the sensitive sources, Fedora (KGB penetration) and Gimme (penetration of Czech Intelligence Service) CIA furnished valuable assistance. [S]

VLADIMIR ROMASHKIN CASE

Several weeks ago, CIA advised us that one of its employees had been contacted by the Soviets. With CIA's cooperation, we conducted investigation which led to the ouster of a Soviet official and very favorable publicity for the Bureau.

COVERAGE IN MEXICO [S]

Through surveillances and surreptitious entry, CIA produced valuable information in our investigation of Franz Froehlich, a GRU Agent whom we since have doubled. [S]

AVAILABILITY OF DEFECTORS

CIA has been most cooperative in making defectors available to the Bureau for interviews.

COOPERATION WITH LABORATORY

From time to time CIA has made certain documents and equipment available to the Bureau's Laboratory. For example, a few weeks ago CIA made available to our Laboratory, at no cost, a portable unit designed for making radiographs (X-rays) of papers recording such characteristics as watermarks, printing, etc.

ASSISTANCE IN DEVELOPING A KEY CRIMINAL INFORMANT

Through assistance afforded by CIA, we gained access to an individual who subsequently became a valuable informant in the labor rackets field (NY 3936-C).

SECRET

FRENCH ACTIVITIES (S)

SECRET

Information provided by a sensitive CIA source has been very useful in following the activities of French agents in the U. S. (S)

POSSIBLE TOPICS WHICH MC CONE MAY REFER TO

JACK EDWARD DUNLAP

This is the National Security Agency employee who supplied information to the Soviets and who committed suicide in July of this year. We recently received information from our sensitive source Tophat in Moscow confirming that Dunlap worked for the Soviets. Tophat's information was furnished to McCone last week. McCone is particularly concerned about the possibility that Dunlap may have furnished the Soviets information which led to the compromise of Oleg Penkovsky, a sensitive CIA source in Russia.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

The Dunlap Case has been raising questions concerning the effectiveness of security within U.S. agencies. McCone anticipates that Congress eventually may initiate some inquiry and he already has been informed that the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is looking into the matter. Last week Mr. McCone asked Mr. Belmont for his views on personnel security. McCone, at that time, was briefed concerning our careful screening of applicants and our strong administrative controls including inspections. It was emphasized that the Bureau always resolved security problems in favor of the FBI rather than the individual involved. Mr. McCone was told that the key to the situation appeared to be tight screening and control procedures and the willingness to take prompt action.

COVERAGE OF NON-SOVIET BLOC DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENTS IN THE U. S.

In the Spring of this year, McCone brought up this matter before the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and he subsequently

SECRET

SECRET

had a discussion with Mr. Belmont. Essentially, McCone is most interested in technical coverage of individuals and installations of non-Soviet Bloc countries. He has left the impression that in his opinion such coverage could be expanded in the U.S. and thereby produce more intelligence and more sources. Our coverage in this field at the present time is quite extensive. With regard to CIA, we have the understanding that if the agency desires particular technical coverage, we will give each request the necessary consideration.

FRENCH ACTIVITIES (S)

In the early part of this year, we initiated extensive investigation of the alleged French (S) agents in this country on the basis of data furnished to us by a sensitive CIA source. This source has informed CIA that De Gaulle has (S) embarked on an extensive espionage program in the U.S. primarily designed to collect scientific data which will enable France to hasten its (S) development of a nuclear capability. We have disseminated the results of our investigation to CIA and we are continuing the handling of numerous leads. The information developed by us so far has failed to disclose any evidence that the French are stealing any classified (S) secrets in the U.S. The French appear to be (S) obtaining voluminous information available to the French through normal contacts between (S) French officials and their counterparts in the (S) U. S.

TOPHAT

A CIA agent recently obtained the message which our sensitive source Tophat secreted in a drop in Moscow. (S) The message included information concerning Soviet activities in France, Germany and Austria. We have given this data to CIA. In addition, McCone was told that Tophat identified Dunlap as a Soviet agent. We have told CIA that Tophat may have loaded the drop as early as June, 1963. The delay in obtaining the communication prevented us from getting into the Dunlap Case well before the subject committed suicide.

SECRET

CIA did not service the drop because our informant did not exhibit an agreed-to signal. He apparently did not use the signal in order to fully protect himself. On the other hand, CIA was unable to service the drop until August because State Department adamantly refused to give CIA clearance to conduct any activity in Moscow. This position was taken by State because it felt that any operational activity might jeopardize the test ban talks. (S)

ANATOLI GOLITZYN AKA ANATOLI KLIMOV

This is the Soviet KGB defector who came to the U. S. under CIA control, feuded with the agency, left for England under British Intelligence control and very recently returned to the U.S. Since his return, he has met with the Attorney General and with McCone. He has been extremely critical of the U.S. position toward Russia. Although a prima donna, Golitzyn has been the source of extremely valuable information for all U.S. agencies including the Bureau. Since his return, he has indicated to the Attorney General and CIA that he will contact appropriate agencies when he sees fit. In the past, Golitzyn has asked to meet with the Director. The Director has made it very clear that he will not see Golitzyn.

MICHAL GOLENIEWSKI

The subject is a former high-ranking official of the Polish Security Service who defected in January, 1961, and in recent weeks has been an embarrassing problem for CIA because of his many complaints. He has communicated with the President, the Attorney General and has been in contact with a Congressman. He is slated to testify before the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee in the near future. He has accused CIA of dishonesty and over-all failure to comply with his needs. We have had access to Goleniewski who has been a valuable source of information. However, we have been most careful not to become involved in the feud between him and CIA. We have cooperated to the extent of furnishing CIA any information received from Goleniewski which might be of assistance to the agency.

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

For your information, McCone has found this Board to be a constant irritant. This Board was established several years ago by the Eisenhower administration then continued by President Kennedy. It is designed to periodically review foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities. The present chairman of the committee is Clark Clifford and the staff director is J. Patrick Coyne. Apparently, McCone does not like a group such as this Board looking into his operations. There is some indication that his irritation arises from personal differences with Coyne.

WENNERSTROM CASE

Colonel Stig Wennerstrom, the Swedish Military Attache who, a few weeks ago, admitted to his government that he had been working for the Soviets. Wennerstrom was in the U. S. from 1952 until 1957 and was collaborating with the Russians while he was here. Recently, McCone indicated that a "damage report" should be prepared on this case and he expressed the opinion that this should be the responsibility of the Bureau. With regard to damage, he was referring to an evaluation of all information which Wennerstrom may have gained from the U. S. We have taken the position that we will not prepare such a damage report and if one is needed the work should be done by each interested agency.

UNKNOWN SUBJECT; KGB AGENT KNOWN AS "SASHA"

This is a Bureau investigation predicated on information furnished to us by Anatoli Golitzyn, the KGB defector who advised that CIA had been penetrated by KGB. We have been endeavoring to identify the unknown Soviet agent. We do have a suspect, [John S. [S] Barescu] who was born in Russia and who has been working for CIA for several years. McCone may not mention this matter but he is very much concerned about the situation. We have been keeping CIA advised of all pertinent developments.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10098

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : KEAY
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 06/10/1953
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT DATE: June 10, 1953

FROM : V. P. Keay VPK

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY-
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

AB

SYNOPSIS:

James Angleton, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) official, is in charge of [the Special Projects] unit located in the Foreign (S) Intelligence division of CIA. [During past year he has been very cooperative and has volunteered voluminous information of interest to Bureau. At the present time he more or less falls in category of Confidential Informant. In order to handle his material in a more efficient and secure manner, it is being recommended that a control file be created. Section Chiefs are also being alerted regarding the handling of information received from Angleton.] ~~(S)~~(U)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. It is recommended that the attached memorandum be disseminated to all Section Chiefs of the Domestic Intelligence Division, which sets forth instructions concerning the handling of information transmitted to the Bureau by Angleton.

7-26-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT BRACKETS
LEE 7-8-98

2. It is recommended that a separate control file be created which will contain a copy of each ["SP"] memorandum which Angleton furnishes the Bureau. ~~(S)~~(U) Such copies will be maintained in the file in numerical order and it will not be necessary to index the names. It is suggested that this file be entitled, "Central Intelligence Agency - James Angleton."

10/5/88
~~Classified by~~ SPYEXW/KFA
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ C.A.#88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

DETAILS:

James Angleton, a CIA official, is in charge of a section referred to as [Special Projects,] which is a part of CIA's Foreign ~~(S)~~(U)

RECORDED-108 62-99724
JUN 12 1953
24

SJP:lw
Attachment
1 - Mr. Medler
- Mr. Wannall

56 JUN 23 1953

SE 50

SECRET

Intelligence division. Angleton handles special cases of a various nature and he is usually given considerable freedom and leeway in directing the operations of his unit. In general, he is responsible only to the Director of CIA. [He has numerous foreign sources and channels for developing information. The primary source is the [Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) In addition to this, he is in contact with (S) [Jay Lovestone,] who periodically makes available to Angleton copies of reports which [Lovestone] has received from [American Federation of (S) Labor] representatives throughout the world. [These representatives (S) are associated with the Free Trade Union Committee, which is subsidized by the CIA. Angleton also has independent sources in the intelligence services of France, Italy, Greece, and Great Britain. On occasion he utilizes sources in the Vatican. Some of the men under his control are on various foreign assignments in Europe and are responsible only to him. Most of them are traveling under commercial cover.] ~~(S)~~

During the past several months Angleton has been very cooperative with the Bureau. He has volunteered voluminous information of interest to the Bureau and he has followed Bureau leads in an effective manner. Much of the information which Angleton has furnished appears in the raw form, that is, it consists of the actual reports received from Angleton's sources. This has been of advantage because the Bureau has been in a position to better evaluate the information instead of waiting for the delay and processing through normal channels in the CIA. In addition to information regarding security matters furnished by Angleton, he has also been of valuable assistance by keeping the Liaison Agent apprised of administrative changes and reorganization within the CIA. Angleton is thoroughly informed regarding the foreign intelligence activities of his agency and he frequently clarifies matters which the CIA sometimes camouflages with some of its cloak and dagger techniques. ~~(S)~~ (U)

For your information, Angleton was instructed by General Walter Bedell Smith, while he was still Director of the CIA, [to cooperate fully with the Liaison Agent and was told that he, Angleton, could disseminate any information he saw fit.] This policy has continued under Allen Dulles. (U) ~~(S)~~

Since the volume of information received from Angleton has increased the Liaison Agent has endeavored to encourage Angleton to establish some uniformity in the dissemination of information to (U) ~~(S)~~

the Bureau, particularly with regard to that information which he receives from [the Israeli Intelligence Service.](S) Angleton is now furnishing the Liaison Agent blank memoranda which are dated, captioned, and which carry a control number; for example, "SP-1." This number will serve as a ready reference when some question comes up within the Bureau or the CIA. The Liaison Agent will make an appropriate notation on each memorandum indicating that the documents emanate from Angleton. It is believed advisable to set up a control file containing a copy of each document furnished by Angleton. This can be done in a manner similar to the arrangement effected in handling reports received from [Stott.] (S)

In view of the above, Angleton more or less falls into the category of a Confidential Informant. He furnishes information of a sensitive nature and it is, therefore, believed that when disseminating his data, he should be protected as a source. Up to date Supervisors have been handling this information in a secure manner; however, since the volume of data received from Angleton has increased, it is believed desirable to alert all Section Chiefs regarding the handling of information received from Angleton. (~~S~~)(U)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10099

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-8

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : KEAY
TO : BELMONT

TITLE :

DATE : 03/09/1954
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

v9.1

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : MR. A. H. BELMONT

FROM : V. P. Keay

DATE: March 9, 1954

SUBJECT: JAMES ANGLETON
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Mohr
Trotter
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Miss Gandy

10/9/89 SPYCDWKFA
Classified by
Declassify on OADR 3.A. #88-1826
ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

As you know, the captioned individual has been providing the Bureau with considerable information, much of it being of a very sensitive nature. It has been noted that in transmitting communications to Angleton some memoranda have been sent to the Director of CIA, Attention: James Angleton, in care of [E. F. Hall.] (S) Other memoranda dealing with [Israeli Intelligence] matters have (S) been directed to James Angleton, in care of [E. F. Hall] (S)

In order that the Bureau would have a uniform procedure in transmitting mail to Angleton, the Liaison Agent discussed the matter with Angleton on March 5, 1954. Angleton requested that in the future mail being directed to him be transmitted to the Director of CIA, "Attention: James Angleton." Angleton stated that the above request was being made with the approval of Allen Dulles, the Director of CIA. He further indicated that he desired the above method of designation in connection with correspondence dealing with [Israeli Intelligence matters.] (S) With regard to Bureau (S) reports concerning [Israeli matters,] Angleton advised that such (S) material is being retained under his personal supervision and control.

7-26-98 SLD/KSR 1,5 (JFK)
5668

Angleton also asked when the Bureau found it necessary to disseminate information to him and other agencies, that his identity not be revealed to the other agencies. He explained that he is involved in several sensitive projects, such as [Israeli Intelligence,] (S) and if his identity were known to the other agencies, the security of CIA operations could be prejudiced.]

ACTION:

Attached hereto for your approval is a Memorandum to all Section Chiefs.

SJP:lw

Attachment

1 - Mr. Wannall
- Reading Room

CIA HAS NO [illegible]
[illegible] INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT BRACKETS
LEE 8-7-98

RECORDED - 36
EX. - 107

LIAISON

66 MAR 19 1954

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10326-10100
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-99724-9, 10

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BRANIGAN
TO :	BELMONT
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/30/1954
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/17/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

SECRET

TO : A. H. BELMONT

FROM : W. A. BRANIGAN

DATE: April 30, 1954

SUBJECT: JAMES ANGLETON
CIA

Tolson
Ladd
Nichols
Belmont
Clegg
Glavin
Harbo
Rosen
Tracy
Gearty
Mohr
Winterrowd
Tele. Room
Holloman
Sizoo
Miss Gandy

10/6/98 Classified by SP4ELW/KFA
Declassify on: OADR
CA #88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

As you are aware, James Angleton of CIA frequently turns over to the Bureau on a highly confidential basis information which has been developed through operations headed by Angleton. In many instances the information is given to the Bureau without clearing through regular CIA channels. In almost all instances it is given to us with the clear understanding that if included in a report or other communication prepared for dissemination outside the Bureau the information will be so set forth that it cannot be traced back to either Angleton or CIA. (S) In such instances where the information relates to [Israeli] matters, it has been the practice of [Israeli] (S) supervisors to clear with Angleton before disseminating information from him outside the Bureau. (S)

In taking up such a matter with Angleton last week it was determined that he objected to attributing information which he had furnished to "Confidential Informant T-2, an Agency of the Government which conducts personnel and intelligence investigations." He pointed out that by describing T-2 as an agency of the Government which conducts personnel and intelligence investigations the Bureau was revealing to outside agencies that the material did in fact come from another Government agency. (S) Since the material related to an individual who now resides in [Israel,] Angleton stated that, (S) in his opinion, recipient agencies could logically conclude that the information had originated with CIA since such an individual would be under CIA jurisdiction insofar as investigations abroad are concerned. Angleton requested that the information merely be attributed to Confidential Informant T-2, who, in this instance, could be described as being of known reliability.

It is suggested that it would materially assist in the handling of information received from Angleton in the future if the Liaison Section could work out a procedure whereby Angleton might be referred to as a Bureau informant. This would permit the Supervisors receiving the Angleton material firsthand to transmit it to the field and advise the field that the information in any report should be attributed to an informant with a temporary symbol number, which informant could be evaluated as having furnished information of a reliable nature in the past. On the informant page the temporary symbol number could be identified by the regular Bureau symbol assigned to Angleton. ~~(S)~~ (U)

S

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR 7-26-98
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6 (JFK)

WRW:mh

Memo to Belmont
Let to SAC 5-17-54

62-99724-9

RECORDED - 24

68 MAY 26 1954

EX-125

12 MAY 21 1954

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
~~DECLASSIFICATION~~ AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS
LEE 8-7-98

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10326-10103
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-99724-74

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BRENNAN
TO :	SULLIVAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/17/1965
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/17/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont ✓
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 3/17/65

FROM : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

7-24-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 ISD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1,6

(JFK) DJB

SUBJECT: [BUREAU INFORMANT 100] ~~(S)~~ (U)

In 1954, a procedure was approved whereby we could attribute certain information received from James Angleton, CIA, under the symbol "Bureau Informant 100." This information, for the most part, emanated from a liaison arrangement which CIA maintained with (S)[the Israeli Intelligence Service] and from other sources under the control of Angleton. Much of the information developed by Angleton was not disseminated within CIA but he felt that the data should be passed on to the Bureau. Allen Dulles gave him authorization to handle dissemination in this matter. We continue to receive information of value on a regular basis. ~~(S)~~

By SAC Letter 54-27 dated 5/25/54, we informed the field regarding Bureau Informant 100 and issued instructions that information from this source be described under an appropriate T symbol and characterization. Because of the passage of time and since some offices have had rare occasion to receive Bureau Informant 100 information, it is believed desirable to reiterate instructions to the field. This should be done since the Informant has been developing information in recent months regarding the travel of U. S. citizens (S)[to Russia via Israel.] Such travelers come from various parts of the U. S. ~~(S)~~

10/28/89
~~Classified by SP4GG/KGA~~
Declassify on: OADR
CA #88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

ACTION:

If approved, there is enclosed herewith a recommended SAC letter.

Enclosure

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
LEE 8-7-98

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. R. W. Smith
1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(10)

62-99724-75

REC 12

EX-112

10 MAR 24 1965

XEROX
MAR 24 1965

58 MAR 30 1965

F B I

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10104

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-78

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : BRENNAN
TO : SULLIVAN

TITLE :

DATE : 01/13/1967
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GO[illegible]RNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach ✓
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale ✓
Rosen
Sullivan ✓
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SECRET

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: 1/13/67

FROM : D. J. Brennan, Jr.

10/24/88
Classified by SP4EPW/KEA
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~
C.A.#88-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

SUBJECT: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)
INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM JAMES ANGLETON

In 1953 we created a separate control file (62-99724) under the caption, "CIA - James Angleton," for the purpose of retaining copies of certain types of memoranda disseminated to us by James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA. We believe that it is no longer necessary to maintain this control file.

In the way of background, the control file was created to give us the opportunity of closely monitoring our liaison with Angleton on a variety of matters which were not reported through normal CIA channels. CIA Directors permitted Angleton to run several intelligence projects, many of them with [the Israeli Intelligence Service.] (S) He was given authority by CIA to handle these projects and report only to the Director, CIA. He was given authority to disseminate to the FBI on all matters of interest to us. In 1953 we worked out an agreement where Angleton disseminated to us, and we attributed the information to Bureau Informant 100. The field was given appropriate instructions regarding the handling and reporting of the information. This procedure is still in existence and is operating satisfactorily. (S)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
LEE 8-7-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSE
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1.6
(JFK)
7-24-98

The information disseminated by Angleton is filed in the case file of an individual or an organization. The control file consists of copies of communications already recorded in separate case files. There has been little or no occasion to use the control file, and its usefullness at this point can be characterized as being obsolete.

62-99724-78

REC 32 6 JAN 18 1967

RECOMMENDATION:

It is recommended that it no longer be necessary to place copies of [Bureau Informant 100] material in the control file. (X)(U) The file will continue to be used for retention of mail of a policy nature.

Completed By Purge Unit.
29 Serials & Mail Destroyed.
1/23/67 DR

1-19-67 OK To Destroy Existing copy material other than policy matters
Mr Papich
L

62-99724

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

EX-115

61 JAN 24 1967

(7)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10105

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-99724-81

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/20/1970
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
BUREAU SOURCE 100 (ANGLETON)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/17/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC MEMO

SECRET

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Cassidy

REC-28 EX-115
62-99724-81

April 20, 1970

10/24/83
~~Classified by~~ SP4GLW/KEG
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
C.A. #83-1826

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Sent via courier 4/20/70

[SP LETTER SERIES] ~~(X)~~ (U)

Reference is made to your SP-9038 dated April 9, 1970. We feel that the method of addressing and forwarding SP material as utilized in this instance will enable us to handle such information in a discreet manner and request that you continue to forward this material in this manner. ~~(X)~~ (U)

With regard to [SCOPE] (S) items, your suggestion as set forth in paragraph two of reference will enable us to handle this highly sensitive material in the proper manner and request that you forward it as proposed. (X)

62-99724

ORIGINAL & 1 TO CIA

FJC:wmk/aga
(5)

7-24-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

NOTE:

In 1954 a procedure was approved whereby we could attribute certain information received from CIA under the symbol "Bureau Informant 100." CIA forwards this information utilizing an SP (Special Projects) number. They are asking our concurrence in a method of addressing and forwarding this material. They also suggested forwarding [SCOPE] material (S) (sensitive information concerning [Israeli intelligence activities] (S) in the same manner. They proposed to forward this material by courier in sealed envelopes to be delivered to Liaison Section Supervisor D. J. Brennan, Jr. It is felt this is the best way in which this highly sensitive material can be handled. (X)

SECRET
~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, except
JM 6-29-98 BRACKETS

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAY 1 1970

14

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Rec'd via Commn 4-15-70 RJ

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. Jm 6-29-98

SP-9038

9 April 1970

SUBJECT: SP Letter Series

James Angleton

1. In this same envelope we are forwarding other items which have interested you in the past and for which the SP series was originally set up. We would like you to confirm to us that this method of addressing and forwarding this material enables your office to handle it in the discreet manner as has been the case without exception in the past.

sent to exec files RJ

2. We have a few items in the [SCOPE] (S) area which we would also like to forward. We suggest that the [SCOPE] (S) material be forwarded in the same envelope with the regular SP letters, separately wrapped. We request your approval for handling the [SCOPE] (S) material in this way.

3. Please coordinate any correspondence on this subject with Mr. D. J. Brennan.

FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DEÇLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

REC-28
EX-115

62-99724-81

10 APR ~~22~~ 1970
27

KA sm to CIA
FBI comm 4/20/70

62-99724

5

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10326-10149
RECORD SERIES :	NY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-35253-991

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	NY
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/05/1962
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/09/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

---

v9.1

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT BRACKETS
MAC 2-27-98

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584)

APR 5 1962

SAC, NEW YORK (105-35253)

6-23-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS-CUBA

ReNYlet to Bureau dated 3/29/62.

MICHAEL J. P. MALONE, Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company, 106 Wall St., NYC, who is also employed by ROBERT KLEBERG of the King Ranch, Kingsville, Texas, advised on 3/30/62, that he had memoranda of his recent conversations in Washington, D.C., which he furnished the NYO. The memoranda of MALONE were written for ROBERT KLEBERG as a result of KLEBERG's meeting with Vice President LYNDON B. JOHNSON on 3/15/62.

In connection with MALONE's conversation with (U) ~~(S)~~ [Mr. HERBERT of the CIA,] who was described as an assistant to Colonel KING, ~~(S)~~ (U) MALONE wrote that [HERBERT] had informed ~~(S)~~ (U) him that [CIA] had separated the section in [CIA] which (U) deals solely with Cuban matters. MALONE wrote in his memorandum that [HERBERT] ~~(S)~~ (U) reported to him that he, [HERBERT,] ~~(S)~~ (U) did not agree with the general opinion of Vice President LYNDON JOHNSON relative to the lack ~~(S)~~ (U) of plans by President KENNEDY relative to Cuba. [HERBERT] told MALONE that he believed that President JOHN F. KENNEDY would act in the event of a crisis in Cuba and he believed that the opinion expressed by LYNDON B. JOHNSON with ROBERT KLEBERG on 3/15/62, was true as of many months ago.

(U) ~~(S)~~ MALONE wrote in his memorandum to KLEBERG that [HERBERT] was of the opinion that within the next two to three months, a favorable and appropriate climate will be created inside Cuba which would be favorable to some type of activity to overthrow the CASTRO Government.

MALONE in the same memorandum wrote that [HERBERT] ~~(S)~~ (U) expressed the opinion that the US Government should not loan Chile 385 million dollars as proposed by TEODORO MOSCOSO of the Alliance For Progress Program. [HERBERT] stated ~~(S)~~ (U) that he is very familiar with Chile and did not believe that they were in a position to intelligently utilize such a large sum of money and expressed an opinion that at the Foreign Ministers meeting at Punte del Este, Uruguay, in January, 1962, Chile was against the US's

2-Bureau (109-584) (RM)
1-New York (105-35253)

FJQ:kap
(3)

SECRET

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

105-35253-9

position. [HERBERT] (X)(U) expressed the opinion that the US should give more encouragement to Colombia and Argentina, who have already drawn up programs for social reform within the countries.

MALONE also wrote in his memorandum that [HERBERT] (X)(U) expressed the opinion that MALONE and his associates should attempt to discuss the Cuban question with Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY as he believes the Attorney General was a very strong minded individual and if he made a decision, would carry it out. (U) [HERBERT] also stated that he believed MALONE and his associates should also talk with Senators HUMPHREY and MC CARTHY, both members of the "New Frontier", who are also individuals who can make a tremendous impression on President KENNEDY. [HERBERT] (X)(U) stated that he would furnish MALONE some ideas relative to contacting Senator HUMPHREY.

MALONE, on 3/30/62, furnished a second memo which he had written to ROBERT KLEBERG relative to his conversation with a CIA contact, [CHARLES MAECHIN] (ph). (S) MALONE wrote that [MAECHIN] had informed him that the section within [CIA] handling Cuba has been separated from the rest of [CIA] and now functions as an individual unit and has its counterpart in the Departments of Defense and State.

MALONE wrote that he had discussed with [MAECHIN] (S) Vice President JOHNSON's opinion that President KENNEDY would not act in Cuba or commit US troops in Cuba, and (S) [MAECHIN] stated that he did not exactly agree with this opinion of Vice President JOHNSON's, but believed that if President KENNEDY was confronted with a situation, he would act with firmness despite possible repercussions in Berlin and Viet Nam.

(U)~~(S)~~ MALONE stated that [MAECHIN](S) indicated that there was a [CIA] plan in the formative stage relative to Cuba, and that he was hopeful that they would have something to work on soon which would give [CIA]~~(S)~~(U) more authority on which to operate. [MAECHIN](S) also indicated to MALONE that a military build-up can be expected in the Florida area, and that a minor one is already taking place at the present time at the US Naval Base at Guantanamo, Oriente Province, Cuba. (S)[MAECHIN] stressed that out of necessity future operations against Cuba would have to take place from an off-shore area because of security of the operation. MALONE also wrote in his memo that [MAECHIN](S) told him to tell ALBERTO FERNANDEZ of Key Biscayne, Florida, to be patient and that before long, [CIA] would fully utilize his abilities and equipment. ~~(S)~~(U)

MALONE also furnished on 3/30/62, a copy of his memo to ROBERT KLEBERG relative to MALONE's conversation on 3/15/62, with SERAFINO ROMUALDI of the Latin American Section of the AFL-CIO. In this memo to KLEBERG, MALONE wrote that ROMUALDI stated that President KENNEDY was still being pushed and pulled by the "Intelligentia," who were identified as ARTHUR SCHLESINGER and ADLAI STEVENSON, toward following a soft line relative to Cuba. ROMUALDI told MALONE that RICHARD N. GOODWIN of the US Department of State apparently was waking up to the fact that the future of President KENNEDY depends upon a strong, firm policy and the elinination of CASTRO and Communism in Cuba immediately. ROMUALDI told MALONE that his opinion of GOODWIN's present thinking was gathered from individuals who dealt directly with GOODWIN concerning Cuba.

MALONE wrote to KLEBERG that ROMUALDI also recommended that he, MALONE, and his associates attempt to get an appointment with Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY relative to Cuba as ROBERT KENNEDY is the strong influence on the President and has been pressuring the President to get rid of what he calls the "featherheads"

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10326-10191

RECORD SERIES : NY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-35253-987

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/29/1962
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
ANTI CASTRO ACTIVITIES IS-CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS :

DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584) SECRET MAR 29 1962

SAC, NEW YORK (105-35253)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKET
K 9-21-98

ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS - CUBA

Re NYlet to Director, dated 3/14/62.

MICHAEL J. P. MALONE, Vice-President, Czarnikow-Rionda Company, 106 Wall Street, NYC, who is also employed by the King Ranch of Kingsville, Texas, advised on 3/20/62, that he had accompanied ROBERT KLEBERG of the King Ranch to Washington, DC, on 3/15/62, for KLEBERG's meeting with Vice-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON at 4:00 p.m. on that date.

MALONE advised that he did not accompany KLEBERG to the meeting with Vice-President JOHNSON, but KLEBERG informed him that they discussed the Cuban problem and what course of action the US was going to follow in this matter. KLEBERG, according to MALONE, was advised by Vice-President JOHNSON, that President JOHN F. KENNEDY has no contemplated plans at the present time for any large scale movement against Cuba, and there are no plans for the use of US troops in Cuba.

MALONE advised that KLEBERG told him that Vice-President JOHNSON stated that President KENNEDY was much concerned about the world situation, and is devoting most of his time to the problems relative to Berlin, Laos and South Vietnam.

MALONE advised that KLEBERG stated that from his conversation with Vice-President JOHNSON, it was clear to him that the present administration has no intention of using US military force in the Cuban

2 - Bureau (109-584) (RM)
1 - Miami (105-1742) (Info.) (RM)
1 - Washington Field (105-29995) (Info.) (RM)
1 - New York (105-35253)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

6-25-98

FJO:gag
(6)

2/1/63

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

Searched
Serialized
Indexed
Filed

SECRET 105-35253-987

SECRET

problem, and that the Cuban problemhas taken 4th place in the order of importance as far as President KENNEDY is concerned.

MALONE further advised on March 20, 1962, that while in Washington, DC, he had made arrangements to contact [Mr. HERBERT, who was described as the assistant to Colonel KING of the CIA.] (~~S~~)(U) MALONE stated that in conversation with [HERBERT,] the question of United States (~~S~~)(U) action in Cuba was discussed, and [HERBERT] stated that (~~S~~)(U) he did not agree with the opinion expressed by Vice-President LYNDON B. JOHNSON. [HERBERT] told (~~S~~)(U) MALONE that he and his associates should get together with Senators in Washington who are close to perfect agreement with the "New Frontier" such as Senator HUBERT HUMPHREY of Minnesota, and bring pressure to bear on them since these Senators exert a certain degree of influence over the President.

MALONE stated on 3/20/62 that he also had a meeting on 3/15/62 with his CIA contact, [CHARLES MAECHIN.] (S) MALONE stated that [MAECHIN] gave him the definite (S) impression that he thought that President KENNEDY and the US would at some time make a move in Cuba. (S) [MAECHIN] stated that the CIA continues to operate but not with the complete authority with which they would like to carry out their plans. [MAECHIN] suggested (S) to MALONE that MALONE and his associates attempt to see Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY and see if some pressure could not be brought to bear on the Cuban matter from Attorney General KENNEDY.

MALONE advised that from his conversations with CIA on 3/15/62, and from the conversation of ROBERT KLEBERG with Vice-President JOHNSON, he definitely was confused as to whether or not the US had any definite plans for participation in an attempt to overthrow the present Cuban regime. MALONE stated that from conversations with other individuals in Washington, he got the impression that the Cuban Revolutionary Council was falling apart, and that Dr. JOSE MIRO CARDONA had very little influence over the Cuban exiles in the Miami area.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10332-10018

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 105-88025-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 08/04/1961
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS :

MM 105-2234

CONFIDENTIAL
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

In view of the relative inactivity of subject at this time insofar as Cuban revolutionary matters are concerned, no further investigation is being conducted, and this case is being closed. Should subject subsequently emerge as an active leader in anti-CASTRO activities, his case will be re-opened, and investigation conducted concerning his activities, and the Bureau will be advised.

On August 1, 1961, WILLIAM HERRINGTON, (C) CIA covert representative, Miami, Florida, informed that CIA had an operational interest in subject during the Cuban invasion in April, 1961. HERRINGTON (C) said that while there is no interest in subject at the present time, CIA still has an operational interest in subject's son, whom he identified as SANTIAGO ALVAREZ. (C) ~~(S)~~ (C)

(C) HERRINGTON indicated that CIA did have considerable operational interest in subject's yacht, the "Alisan", but that there is no interest at the present time. (C) HERRINGTON indicated he would advise the FBI at Miami if CIA develops any further interest in subject. (C) ~~(S)~~ (C)

Miami indices contained a communication from JUSTIN F. GLEICHAUF, CIA representative, under date of February 7, 1961, which, among other things, identified subject as a former Cuban senator who had collaborated on matters relating to the publication from time to time called "Esbirros". This information, according to CIA, came from a usually reliable source. Communication was classified "secret". (U) ~~(S)~~ (U)

CIA INFO (PS 2.3 AND BE. WRPW) CLASSIFIED AND DENIED IN ORDER IP4 DECLASSIFIED PER LTR. DTD 11/24/05. (SEE 190-16447-208)
SPBBSTA/ACCL - "1S/40 - 211.326

An investigation by the Miami Office of "Esbirros" disclosed it was a two or three-page mimeographed "scandal sheet" directed against the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), as well as all other groups and individuals both pro and anti-FIDEL CASTRO, according to MM 492-S. It was noted that many individuals, anti-CASTRO and anti-communist, had accused many other individuals of printing "Esbirros", which had resulted in the paper not being printed or published in January, 1961. This paper received very limited distribution, and it was not believed it had been printed in December, 1960. (U)

- COVER PAGE ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

MM 105-2234

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

This ~~report is classified~~ confidential since data reported from MM T-1, who is MM 726-S, could reasonably result in the identification of a confidential informant of continuing value and compromise the future effectiveness thereof. ~~C~~ (U)

INFORMANTS

IDENTITY	LOCATION OF ORIGINAL INFORMATION
MM T-1 is MM 726-S, contacted by SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	134-307-Sub A-98 Instant report, page 4,5
MM T-2 is MM 492-S, contacted by SA JAMES D. HAYES	Instant report, page 5
MM T-3 is MM 724-S, contacted by SA JAMES D. HAYES	Instant report, page 6

(U)

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report, and "T" symbols have been utilized only in those instances where identity must be concealed.

-C*-

- COVER PAGE -

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10332-10047
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 2-1622-178

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	MM
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/19/1962
PAGES :	19
SUBJECTS :	SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/22/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET ~~SECRET~~

MM 2-156

Copies Made:

9 - Bureau (2-1622)(RM)
1 - INS, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - U. S. Customs, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - U. S. Border Patrol, Miami, Florida (RM)
1 - Louisville (Info)(RM)
1 - Newark (Info)(RM)
1 - New Orleans (Info)(RM)
3 - New York (RM)
(2 - 105-52912)(1 - 105-38120)
3 - Miami
(2 - 2-156)(1 - 105-5003)

* * * * * * * * *

MIAMI:

AT FORT LAUDERDALE, FLORIDA

Cut Requested 186

Will attempt to locate and interview ORLANDO PIEDRA for any information concerning this matter, it being noted he has been reported to be vacationing in Florida at the present time.

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

1. Will maintain close contact with MM 639-S and other sources and informants for any additional pertinent information concerning subject's activities. X(u)

- B -

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET ~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET SECRET

MM 2-156

2. Will locate and interview BATISTA's son-in-law, ROBERTO FERNANDEZ MIRANDA, in an effort to obtain additional details concerning allegations as set forth in Bureau letter to Assistant Attorney General J. WALTER YEAGLEY dated July 31, 1962.

- ADMINISTRATIVE -

This report is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as data received from the Department of the Army on July 25, 1962, and furnished to Assistant Attorney General J. WALTER YEAGLEY was so classified.

Not classifiable
Army Letter
10/25/82
9143 [illegible]

- INFORMANTS -

Individuals contacted, as mentioned in this report, (who had no knowledge of any training groups in the Florida Keys) are identified as follows: X (S)

(S)

RENE A. RADOLE (NA)
CIA Covert Representative
Contacted August 7, 1962

X (S)

PSI (under development) FRANK HERNANDEZ
Contacted August 16, 1962

PSI (under development) MANOLO STINCER
Contacted August 30, 1962

X (X)

MM 674-C
Contacted September 5, 1962

- C -

- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET SECRET ~~SECRET~~

All of the above sources were contacted by SA RALPH L. JENSEN.

Identity	Location
MM T-1 is MM 639-S, contacted by SA ROBERT JAMES DWYER.	134-238 Sub A-630 and 631.
MM T-2 is FELIPE CATASUS PAZOS, former Vice Chief of Cuban Air Force under President BATISTA, contacted by SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR. (protect, by request).	Instant report page 3.
MM T-3 is MM 492-S, contacted by SAs JAMES D. HAYES and LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.	Instant report page 3.

C (X)(U)

C

- COVER PAGE -

~~SECRET~~

SECRET SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10365-10020

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68530-449

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : WMFO
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 09/20/1968
PAGES : 268

SUBJECTS :
NOSENKO BONA FIDES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/19/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO, INC MEMO, ANALYSIS

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Foreign 159

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 6-17-98

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) (~~S~~ U) ~~SECRET~~

DATE: 9/20/68

FROM : SAC, WFO (134-5437) (~~S~~ U)

CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 1259 SSP/CRD 11/4/79
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2+3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9/20/88

SUBJECT: "NORMAN" (~~S~~ U)
ESP - R

Re Bureau letter 2/29/68 captioned "SAMMY" which transmitted copy of CIA letter dated 2/19/68. The CIA letter had furnished to the Bureau copies of a 435 page Top Secret paper entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." A copy of this paper was also furnished to WFO. (~~S~~ U)

Enclosed are six copies of a paper dated 9/20/68 prepared by Agents of WFO which compares the contents and conclusions of the CIA paper with information obtained during the current (1967-68) interrogations of SAMMY. (An extra copy of this letter and of the WFO paper are enclosed for the Bureau in the event the Bureau desires to furnish a copy of each to New York.) (~~S~~ U)

The WFO paper is classified "Top Secret" because it contains excerpts of material from CIA so classified. (~~S~~ U)

It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set forth in the preface to the WFO paper. It is indicated therein that SAMMY is considered by CIA as a part of a large scale KGB deceptive operation. (~~S~~ U)

EX-106 REC-18 65-68530-449

In addition to those comments, it is noted that a paper prepared in December, 1964, by CIA as an agenda for a proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that SAMMY was dispatched by KGB in March, 1962, as one part of a broad provocation effort conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the latter part of 1961. It was stated, "We believe that the major figures in this provocation include at least three defectors, and at one time or another more than eight Soviet officials in-place as American Intelligence Service (AIS) agents. (~~S~~ U) They are supported

(~~S~~ U) 1 OCT 7 1968

3 - Bureau (Enc. 6) - 1 Section - 1 SE [illegible]
1 - WFO

ENCLOSURE

ETT:arw (~~S~~ U)
(4)

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR ON 7-26-98 (JFK)

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

Classified by 90-709-103K1
Declassify on: OADR

See addendum

ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP (S) OF
DATE

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. JM 6-17-98

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530) ~~(S)~~ (U) ~~SECRET~~

DATE: 9/20/68

FROM : SAC, WFO (134-5437) ~~(S)~~ (U)

SUBJECT: "NORMAN" ~~(S)~~ (U)
ESP - R

~~CLASSIFIED AND
EXTENDED BY 1259 SSO/CAD 1/4/79
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2+3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 9/20/88~~

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR ON 7-26-98 (JFK)

AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF 11/17/98
DATE

Re Bureau letter 2/29/68 captioned "SAMMY" which transmitted copy of CIA letter dated 2/19/68. The CIA letter had furnished to the Bureau copies of a 435 page Top Secret paper entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." A copy of this paper was also furnished to WFO. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Enclosed are six copies of a paper dated 9/20/68 prepared by Agents of WFO which compares the contents and conclusions of the CIA paper with information obtained during the current (1967-68) interrogations of SAMMY. (An extra copy of this letter and of the WFO paper are enclosed for the Bureau in the event the Bureau desires to furnish a copy of each to New York.) ~~(S)~~ (U)

The WFO paper is classified "Top Secret" because it contains excerpts of material from CIA so classified. ~~(S)~~ (U)

It is noted that a brief chronology of events is set forth in the preface to the WFO paper. It is indicated therein that SAMMY is considered by CIA as a part of a large scale KGB deceptive operation. ~~(S)~~ (U)

EX-106 REC-18 65-68530-449

In addition to those comments, it is noted that a paper prepared in December, 1964, by CIA as an agenda for a proposed CIA-FBI conference, concluded that SAMMY was dispatched by KGB in March, 1962, as one part of a broad provocation effort conceived as early as 1959 and set in motion in the latter part of 1961. It was stated, "We believe that the major figures in this provocation include at least three defectors, and at one time or another more than eight Soviet officials in-place as American Intelligence Service (AIS) agents. ~~(S)~~ (U) They are supported ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

See addendum
Classified by 90-209-103X1
Declassify on: OADR

cc rec encl 828-9-D

3 - Bureau (Enc. 6) ~~- 1 Section - 1-DS~~
1 - WFO

ENCLOSURE

ETT:arw ~~(S)~~ (U)
(4)

OCT 7 1968

~~SECRET~~

~~ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.~~

5010-108

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~TOP~~ SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. ~~JM 6-17-98~~
Except the
Brackets K 7/31/98

["NORMAN"] ~~S~~ (U)

Classified by See addendum 100-709-103X1
Declassify on: OADR

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

7-26-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

September 20, 1968

~~CLASSIFIED AND~~
~~EXTENDED BY 1259 / JJP/CAW 1/8/79~~
~~REASON FOR EXTENSION~~
~~FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2 2+3~~
~~DATE OF REVIEW FOR~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION 9/20/88~~ (U)
[all Top Secret information
is CIA info] ~~S~~

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES~~
~~AND FIELD OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP (S) OF 2455.4~~
~~DATE 1/11/79~~

~~TOP~~ SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

ia
ENCLOSURE 65-68530-449

III. DETAILS - COMPARISON OF PAPER AND CURRENT INTERVIEWS.. 20

A. Nosenko's Naval RU Service.......................... 20

B. Nosenko's Entry into KGB.......................... 23

1. Date of Entry.................................. 23
2. Role of General Kobulov.......................... 24
3. Komsomol and CP Membership.................... 28
4. Processing for Entry - KGB Building Pass...... 30
5. Designation of Directorates.................... 33
6. Location of Chief Directorate of Militia...... 35

C. Nosenko's Assignment to 1st Section, 1st Department, March, 1953 - June, 1955.......... 36

1. Nosenko Sought to Avoid Discussion............ 36
2. Assignment against Correspondents............. 37
3. Assignment against Army Attache Personnel..... 38
4. Agents "Volodina" and "Raketa"................ 40
5. Colonel Earl L. Mickelson (S)................ 41
6. Ira B. Richards (S)........................... 42
7. Howard L. Felchlin (S)........................ 43
8. Expulsion of Benson, Mule and Stroud (S)...... 45
9. George Van Laethem (S)........................ 47
10. Edward Ellis Smith............................ 48
11. "Andrey"...................................... 52
12. Service in 1st Section, March, 1953 - June, 1955...................... 53

D. Nosenko's Assignment to 7th Department, 1955-59... 57

1. Vladimir Muromtsev............................ 57
2. Nataliya Shulgina............................. 58
3. Tamara Kungarova.............................. 60
4. Yevgenia Danko................................ 63
5. Agents Volkov and Yefremov.................... 64
6. Martin Malia.................................. 69
7. Richard Burghi (S)............................ 71
8. Arsene Frippel................................ 72
9. Nosenko not a Counterintelligence officer.... 75
10. 1956-59 cases among Nosenko's Notes.......... 77
11. American Intelligence Use of Tourists........ 80

E. Nosenko's Assignment to 1st Section, 1st Department, January, 1960 - January, 1962..... 93

1. Nosenko's Position as Deputy Chief of Section. 95
2. Kovshuk's Acquaintance with Americans.........104
3. Golitzyn's Information Re Recruitments........104
4. James Storsberg - Military Code Clerk.........108
5. James Keyzers.................................115
6. Matthew Peter Zujus...........................118
7. Paul Jenner - John Garland...........(S).....120
8. Joseph Morone.................................123
9. Joseph Gaffey.................................127
10. John Abidian.................................128
11. KGB File on U. S. Embassy....................131
12. Audio Operations Against U. S. Embassy.......134
13. Cryptologic Attack Against U. S. Embassy.....141
14. Nosenko's Knowledge of CIA Personnel.........145
15. Robert Barrett (S)...........................147
16. Nosenko's Travel to Cuba.....................148
17. Nosenko's Travel to Bulgaria.................149
18. Transfer to 7th Department...................150
19. Nosenko's Knowledge of Morell (S) and Garland (S)...151

F. Nosenko's Assignment to 7th Department, January, 1962 - January, 1964.....................153

1. Nosenko's Substitute as Chief.................153
2. Nosenko's Contacts with Frippel (S)...........154
3. Volkov and William J. Zubon (S)...............154
4. Marina Rytova.................................155
5. W. E. Johnson.................................156
6. William Carroll Jones (S).....................157
7. KGB Officers in Soviet Delegation, Geneva.....159
8. Boris Belitskiy - V. L. Artemev...............161
9. Horst Brauns (S)..............................164
10. Pavel Fedorovich Shakhov.....................165
11. John Shubin (S)..............................169
12. Lee Harvey Oswald............................170
13. Nosenko's Temporary Duty Document...........171
14. Nosenko's Notes..............................175
15. Recall Telegram..............................178
16. KGB Knowledge of American Intelligence Tourist Operations...............................181

G. Miscellaneous Criticisms....184

1. Nosenko's Association with Gribanov....184
2. Nosenko's Komsomol and CP Status....186
3. Nosenko's Knowledge of KGB Forms....189
4. Nosenko's Knowledge of KGB Files and Checking Procedures....191
5. Nosenko's Sourcing of Information....194
6. Nosenko's KGB Ranks....196
7. KGB Officers Reportedly Known to Nosenko....197
8. KGB Dining Rooms....200
9. KGB Telephone Directories....201

H. Cases Not Directly Related to Claimed Positions in KGB....203

1. Actor /[Proctor](S)....204
2. [Robert Armstrong....206
3. Harold Berman....206
4. Robert Charles Christner....207
5. Norman Fisk....207
6. Preston Grover....208
7. Stephen F. Hoffman....208
8. *Melvin (Marvin) Kantor....209
9. Kazan - Komarek....210
10. Ralph Matlaw....210
11. Philip Nielsen....211
12. Bernard Pechter....211
13. Aron Pressman....(S)....212
14. Walter Rask....212
15. Spencer Roberts....213
16. Johanna Ross....213
17. John Rufe....214
18. Collette Schwarzenbach....214
19. Sofia Greta Shattauer....215
20. Howard Sochurek....215
21. William Taraska....216
22. Carmen Torrey....217
23. Vasiliy Volkov....217
24. William Wallace....218
25. Ralph and Evelyn Younger]....218

~~S~~

IV. NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION.........219

A. New Cases..219

1. [George Lubin, Will and Sipe Burtin,](S) (FNU) [Smith...]..........................219
2. (FNU) [Hoffman.](S)..........................223
3. [Domenico Canala....]..........................224
4. [Ery Whitaker Kehaya](S)..........................227
5. Unknown Subject; American Owner of Hotel or Restaurant..........................228
6. [Sam Sidney Hollander](S)..........................229

B. Significant Data on Cases Previously Reported.....230

1. John Discoe Smith (Zhari)......................230
2. The Brussels Case 233
3. Tatiana Fiaksel Sherich, Daniel Sherich.......234

C. Interesting New Data...............................236

1. Evgeniy Petrovich Granovsky...................236
2. Visit of High Ranking Officers... 237
3. Boris Aleksandrovich Komarov..................238
4. Nikolai Skvortsov..............................239

D. Significant Confirmatory Information..............239

1. Strukov and Uryvayev...........................239
2. [Richard Donald Shaffer..]......................240
3. [Ralph and Evelyn Younger](S)..................242
4. Trip of Nosenko's Mother.......................243
5. [Collette Schwarzenback.](S)...................243
6. [Gabriel Reiner](S) Vladimir Dmitryevich Chelnokov..............................244
7. [Virgil Kraft](S)..............................246
8. Consistency in Identifications and Information.......................................248

V. RESULTS OF POLYGRAPH EXAMINATION.........................250

I. PREFACE

A. Purpose of Paper

This paper has been prepared to compare the results of the 1967-68 interrogations of YURI NOSENKO with a CIA paper dated February, 1968, entitled "The Examination of the Bona Fides of a KGB Defector." This CIA paper was based on previous interrogations of NOSENKO and concluded that NOSENKO is not a bona fide defector. ~~(S)~~ (u)

According to the paper, in arriving at this conclusion the lengthy interrogations of NOSENKO, analysis of KGB operations which he related and comparison of his assertions with collateral information from other sources were considered. ~~(S)~~ (u)

B. Background

For convenience in assessing these papers, the following chronology of events is set forth: ~~(S)~~ (u)

NOSENKO first made contact with CIA in Geneva in June, 1962. After several meetings he returned to Russia and was not again in contact with CIA until his return to Geneva in January, 1964. On his return to Geneva he indicated ~~(S)~~ (u)

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

Significant inaccuracies were detected in the CIA paper regarding the [KEYZERS, MORONE] (S) and ABIDIAN cases. Contrary to statements in the paper, [KEYZERS] (S) was not interviewed about homosexual activities before he left Moscow; [MORONE] (S) did have contact with a girl at American House posing as a West German journalist; the Soviet maid TATYANA FEDOROVICH did have access to ABIDIAN's living quarters within six months after his arrival in Moscow. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: A number of previous CIA conclusions regarding this period were based on deficient interrogations of NOSENKO and inadequate collateral inquiries. These conclusions have been invalidated by current interrogation and collateral inquiries and there is no substantial basis for doubting NOSENKO's basic claims regarding this period. ~~TS~~ (U)

[F. 1962-64 Period] ~~TS~~ (U)

It is concluded in the CIA paper that NOSENKO's claims of being Chief of the American-British Commonwealth ~~S~~ (U) is alleged that NOSENKO did not indicate the sources from which he obtained the information regarding the cases. ~~(TS)~~ (u)

During current interrogation NOSENKO provided sources or logical explanation for his knowledge in sixteen of the nineteen cases referred to above. He also provided adequate clarification regarding three of the other five cases which were subjects of CIA criticism. In addition a current review of his notes by NOSENKO provided the translation "ECTOR", instead of "ACTOR" or ["PROCTOR"] (S) previously obtained, as the name of an agent. Collateral investigation has developed a logical suspect by this name. (Logical suspects named "ACTOR" or ["PROCTOR"] (S) were not previously identified.) ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: Previous interrogations of NOSENKO in which information was not obtained regarding the sources for these cases were obviously inadequate. Current interrogations have provided significant clarifying information. ~~(S)~~ (u)

I. New Cases and New Information

The current interrogations of NOSENKO have developed six new cases involving nine people which were previously not uncovered during his interrogations. Collateral investigation has identified six of these persons and one [(DOMENICO CANALA)] (S) has been interviewed and admitted the allegations. This case is considered significant corroboration of NOSENKO. ~~S~~

Additional significant data was developed on three cases previously mentioned by NOSENKO. Data in one case (the Brussels case) may assist in the identification of a KGB agent who supplied NATO codes. ~~S~~ (U)

Considerable interesting, new and confirmatory data was obtained during the current interrogations. Twelve examples are cited. ~~S~~ ~~S~~ (U)

COMMENT: The new cases, new information and confirmatory data obtained in the current interrogations and collateral inquiries also clearly establish that the previous interrogations were deficient and collateral inquiries inadequate. Failure to acknowledge significance of NOSENKO's personnel identifications and organizational data denotes lack of objectivity in CIA paper. ~~S~~ (U) appear reluctant in the past. One was his [extra-marital affair] (S) with a friend of INGA KARLAMOVA and the other was his arrest in 1954 when he used a KGB cover document to obtain [treatment for venereal disease.] (S) As a result he was removed as Komsomol Secretary. In addition the "Characteristic" which was prepared on him in early 1955 was critical of him and his mother had interceded with PETR FEDOTOV, Chief of SCD, who transferred NOSENKO to the 7th Department. This intercession possibly prevented his dismissal from KGB. ~~S~~ C

[2. Assignment Against Correspondents] ~~S~~ ~~C~~ (U)

Pages 76-80 relate to NOSENKO's assignment to operations against American correspondents. It was stated that although NOSENKO could give a breakdown of the network of agents used against correspondents in terms of number and type of agents, he had forgotten their true names and could not provide personality information on any of them. ~~S~~ ~~C~~ (U) necessary and they were suitable for use in a case.) NOSENKO had files on both of these agents which he turned over to PHILLIP VASILYEVICH KISLITSYN when NOSENKO began work on military attaches. He had no opportunity to use "RAKETA" in 1953. "RAKETA" was an agent for some officer of Section II, 1st Department in 1960 or 1961. ~~(S)~~(U)

5. [Colonel EARL L. MICKELSON] (S)

On page 88 it is stated that [Colonel EARL L. MICKELSON] (S) was involved in at least two incidents inside the Soviet Union which NOSENKO did not report. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: During interrogation of NOSENKO he could not recall specifically the arrest of [MICKELSON] (S) but stated that there were many "akts" against U. S. military attache personnel in which they were detained and written descriptions of their so-called "violations" were prepared. He indicated that the attache personnel, of course, in most instances refused to sign such documents, but nevertheless ~~(S)~~

they were prepared ~~(S)~~ (U)

6. [IRA B. RICHARDS] (S)

On pages 89 and 90 the paper indicates that NOSENKO correctly identified [IRA B. RICHARDS] (S) as an Assistant Army Attache and named his maid MARIYA NEVEROVA as an agent reporting on him. It was stated, however, that NOSENKO referred to LUDMILA GROMAKOVA in connection with another matter as a KGB agent during 1960-62 but did not relate her to [RICHARDS] (S) or to the 1953-55 period. GROMAKOVA gave [RICHARDS] (S) Russian language lessons. It was also stated that NOSENKO did not know of VOLODYA who was [RICHARDS'] (S) driver and therefore should have been NOSENKO's agent.

COMMENT: On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO, in response to a request, furnished a handwritten list of his agents. For the period 1953-54 he listed as an agent a teacher of the Russian language who was giving lessons to correspondent CLARK. He also listed for the period 1954-55 drivers of the military attache and his officers, indicated there were five or six and ~~(S)~~ (U) furnished the name of one as "SHNIREV." (NIKOLAY VASILYEVICH SHNYRYEV). NOSENKO was not specifically questioned concerning VOLODYA and GROMAKOVA's connections with [RICHARDS] (S)

7. [HOWARD I. FELCHLIN] (S)

Pages 90-93 of the paper relate to Assistant Army Attache [HOWARD I. FELCHLIN.] (S) It was indicated that NOSENKO correctly identified [FELCHLIN] (S) but knew nothing of his background, did not recall names of agents specifically targeted against him, did not recall a newspaper article in March, 1954, falsely accusing [FELCHLIN] (S) and his companion, did not recall any unusual circumstances involving the expulsion of [FELCHLIN] (S) and [MC KINNEY] (S) in 1954 and when told that the expulsion took place in that year stated this was not the correct date. It was also indicated NOSENKO did not recognize the name of [FELCHLIN's] (S) maid, FEDEROVA.

COMMENT: On April 18, 1968, (N-182), NOSENKO stated that he had a file on [FELCHLIN] (S) and utilized a chambermaid NEFEDOVA against him as well as drivers for the military attache's office. He described the chambermaid and furnished her code name as "SHEVEDOVA". When shown the name FEDEROVA he indicated that this was the name of [FELCHLIN's] (S) maid rather than NEFEDOVA. He also said that her first name was probably MARIYA but recognized DORA as the first name when it was mentioned to him. He stated that a driver for the military attache office was "SHNYREV" and accurately furnished his first name as NIKOLAY. He said there were several "akts" on [FELCHLIN] (S) during his travel in the USSR which [FELCHLIN] (S) refused to sign. He recalled that [FELCHLIN] (S) was arrested with another officer while NOSENKO and his wife were at Kubienka during the summer of 1954. He said that this occurred on the 8th or 9th of the month, probably July, and had appeared in the newspapers on those dates. He stated that he had been on vacation and his wife had given birth to a baby in August, 1954. (Actually the arrest took place on July 4, or July 5, 1954, and may well not have appeared in the Soviet newspapers until the 8th or 9th) ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO also pointed out that KGB obtained considerable information from microphones concerning operations and plans of the Military Attache personnel including their discussions before trips, their plans for visiting various cities and points of interest and their conversations after their trips. In addition KGB knew how much money they had each year for operations, the reactions of the officers to each other, etc. Excerpts of information were given to the Disinformation Department of KGB. ~~(S)~~ (U)

8. Expulsion of [BENSON, MULE] (S) and [STROUD] (S) ~~(S)~~

Pages 95 and 96 deal with the expulsion from the Soviet Union of Assistant U. S. Army Attaches [BENSON, MULE] (S) and [STROUD] (S) This expulsion resulted from seizure of equipment carried by these officers on May 5, 1955, and they were declared personae non gratae. It was stated that NOSENKO claimed that this incident had occurred after he was transferred to the 7th Department; however, when the May 7 date was given to him ~~(S)~~

he had turned the 1st Section files over to VALERIY BUDYLDIN who had worked for a short period but was later fired from KGB and the files were then transferred to VICTOR RASSADIN. (U)

? not very strong

It appears that NOSENKO's failure to recall details of this incident could be due to his hospitalization at the time it occurred. (U)

9. [GEORGE VAN LAETHEM] (S)

Pages 97 and 98 relate to [GEORGE VAN LAETHEM], (S) Assistant Army Attache, at the American Embassy from March, 1951, to March, 1953. NOSENKO had reported that ALLA LARIONOVA was placed on a train going from Berlin to Moscow with an assignment to strike up an acquaintance with [VAN LAETHEM.] (S) She succeeded in meeting him and gave him her address and telephone number; however, he did not call her. NOSENKO heard about this from PANKRATOV and knew of no other KGB interest in [VAN LAETHEM.] (S) It was pointed out that [VAN LAETHEM] (S) denied any meeting with LARIONOVA as alleged by NOSENKO and further [VAN LAETHEM] (S) was again in Moscow from March 19 to May 19, 1955, while NOSENKO was still the case officer responsible for Army Attaches. He was reported to the Russians as an Assistant Army Attache on permanent assignment although it was actually a temporary assignment.

COMMENT: As indicated above NOSENKO stated on April 16, 1968, (N-181), that he was in the hospital for 30 or 40 days just prior to transfer to the 7th Department and would have been in the hospital during April, 1955. When told that [VAN LAETHEM] (S) returned to the USSR on March 19, 1955, NOSENKO said that he did not remember it.

[10. EDWARD ELLIS SMITH] (U)

On page 99 the paper points out that NOSENKO claimed to have personally participated in the KGB operation against EDWARD ELLIS SMITH in 1954-55 but the incident described by NOSENKO in which SMITH was approached occurred in June, 1956, after NOSENKO had been transferred to the 7th Department for about a year. (U)

11. "ANDREY" (U)

On page 99 it is also indicated that if NOSENKO served in the Embassy Section (1st Section, 1st Department) during 1953-55, "It is difficult to perceive how he could have remained unaware of 'ANDREY'S' identity." NOSENKO claimed that "ANDREY" was spotted by ROY RHODES and was recruited prior to NOSENKO's connection with KGB in March, 1953. "ANDREY" was a crypto-repairman and the direct subordinate of the Army Attache cryptographic security officer, Captain WALTER MULE, (S) who was NOSENKO's target.

COMMENT: NOSENKO has consistently stated that "ANDREY" was being handled by KOVSHUK, assisted by BORODIN, and that he obtained information regarding "ANDREY" through conversations with KOVSHUK and BORODIN. Inasmuch as NOSENKO did not enter the KGB until 1953, it does not seem inconsistent for officers in his section not to reveal to him the identity of an important agent who was furnishing important information on a current (U) their duties and in addition noted that there were 2 FCD officers who were assigned to the Section "in practice" (for training purposes). He named one of these officers. On the same date he listed his special targets among the correspondents and military officers during this period and discussed the actions against them. He indicated that he had operated agents against officers of the Military Attache's office but was not responsible for the officers of the Navy and Air Force. In addition he said that the Sergeants of all of the services were the responsibility of another officer in the section. He stated that the main objectives against the Sergeants were to ascertain their weaknesses and place girls in contact with them. Normally KGB officers were not sent with foreign Attaches when they traveled in the USSR except to look for electronic gear. He described a search of the luggage of the Military Attache [FILLMORE K. MEARNS](S) in which he participated with

IONOV and KARETNIKOV of OTU whom he had known since 1953. (~~S~~) ~~C~~ (~~U~~)

When shown a list of Soviets employed by the U. S. Embassy in 1954 he selected the names of eleven as agents of the 1st Section. On February 8, 1968, (N-125), photographs of 18 Soviet employees of American House were displayed to him. He identified an old woman known as BABUSHKA as an agent who had worked at American House before 1953 and who had retired about 1960. In another group he recognized the photograph of TAMARA ANTUFEVA as an agent utilized in the [FREDERICK R. MC MAHON] (S) case who was sent to Berlin to contact him but was unsuccessful. He did not recognize the photograph of GALINA G. MOROZOVA and said he never saw her but Officer RAKOVSKIY, who worked against American House and the Sergeants, had an agent named MOROZOVA in 1953 or 1954. He recognized the photograph of RAISA TROFIMOVA and furnished her name as an agent of RAKOVSKIY. (~~S~~) ~~C~~

that CIA warned BELITSKIY against SHULGINA. The paper noted that CIA did not warn BELITSKIY against SHULGINA but BELITSKIY had reported to CIA that SHULGINA was a KGB agent. SHULGINA was for two years a Secretary-Correspondent of NBC Correspondent IRVING R. LEVINE and according to BELITSKIY was involved in the sexual entrapment and KGB recruitment of [British MP TOM DRIBERG.](S) It was stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of SHULGINA's involvement with LEVINE and other Americans belied his claim that she was his agent during the 1955-58 period. It was also noted that in 1964 he failed to recognize her photograph; when shown her name he identified her not as his former agent but as an SCD agent involved with BELITSKIY. ~~(S)~~(U)

COMMENT: On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO listed SHULGINA as one of his agents and indicated that in 1960 she left Intourist and worked in the Radio Committee. On January 24, 1968, (N-109), he stated that she was an agent of GEORGIY IVANOVICH RASTRUSIN before she was turned over to NOSENKO with whom she ~~(S)~~(U) or have been her case officer in the 1955-57 period. It was further noted that KUNGAROVA, who [had married an American tourist, PHILIP NIELSEN,](S) was interviewed by the FBI and denied collaboration with the KGB; that KUNGAROVA had died in 1965. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: On December 6, 1967, (N-57), the name VIKTOR KOPEYKIN was displayed to NOSENKO who identified him as a Lieutenant Colonel working as a Senior Case Officer in the 2nd Section of the 1st Department in 1960-62. He stated that KOPEYKIN "was keeping my former agent VERA" who [married PHILIP NIELSEN.](S) He stated that she had left Russia with [NIELSEN](S) but was coming back to Russia and KGB was also studying the question of whether [NIELSEN](S) was connected with American Intelligence. ~~S~~

On December 11, 1967, (N-64), NOSENKO listed TAMARA KUNGAROVA among his agents for the 1955-59 period. On January 11, 1968, (N-93), NOSENKO stated that she was "in close relations" ~~S~~(U) with a representative of the Belgian airlines and was trying to marry a foreigner to go abroad. X(U)

On January 30, 1968, (N-114), NOSENKO in writing about KGB operations against the British stated that in 1954-56 TAMARA KUNGAROVA and MARIANNA ZHETVINA were agents of the 2nd Department of SCD and were working in the British Embassy. Both knew the English language and were later turned over to NOSENKO by ALEKSEY SUNTSOV. NOSENKO understood that they had been "in close relations" with employees of the British Embassy. NOSENKO identified the photograph of MARIANNA ZHETVINA and on March 18, 1968, (N-165), identified the photograph of TAMARA KUNGAROVA. At that time he stated that she had worked for him two or three years but in 1959 he had discontinued working with her. She had been "in close relations" with Americans on her own initiative, some of which she did not report. He recognized the name of [JOHN MEANS THOMPSON] (S) as one of the Americans with whom she was in contact. She was also an interpreter for the [Forrestal](S) group.

On August 24, 1968, (n-217), NOSENKO stated that he had seen the name [PARSONS](S) which reminded him of a 2nd Department, SCD operation against a man by that name. He believed that TAMARA KUNGAROVA worked against this man. This happened prior to the time KUNGAROVA worked for him (NOSENKO) and probably while she was working against the British; however, NOSENKO was not sure that [PARSONS](S) was of British nationality.

4. YEVGENIYA DANKO

On page 109 the paper refers to YEVGENIYA DANKO who worked for [ARSENE FRIPPEL at the American Express Company](S) office in Moscow and later for [FRIPPEL's](S) successor, [MICHAEL JELISAVCIC.](S) It was indicated NOSENKO stated that he took DANKO over from another 7th Department case officer during the period 1955-57 and she was used to report on both [FRIPPEL](S) and [JELISAVCIC.](S) The paper noted that [FRIPPEL](S) left Moscow in 1961 by which time NOSENKO had transferred from the 7th Department.

COMMENT: On November 4, 1967, (N-11), while discussing [FRIPPEL,](S) NOSENKO stated that the true name of Agent "OKSANA" was EVGENIA VASILIEVNA DENKO. On December 11, 1967, (N-64), he listed among his agents EVGENIA DANKO who was a translator at the permanent exhibition of agriculture and industry in Moscow and from 1957 worked as a translator for [the American Express Company](S) representative in Moscow. On April 18, 1968, (N-182), NOSENKO stated that DANKO was a former Agent of IVAN ALEKSEYEVICH KONSTANTINOV and NOSENKO received her file in 1957 when KONSTANTINOV retired. At that time she was working at the permanent exhibition of agriculture as indicated above. Later, however, she was assigned to [FRIPPEL](S) when he inquired concerning an interpreter. After [FRIPPEL](S) left [in 1961](S) she continued working in the [American Express](S) office.

[5. VOLKOV and YEFREMOV] (U)

On pages 112 and 113 the paper refers to NOSENKO's Agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. It was noted that he was unfamiliar (U) with their background and could not say where they lived or how he got in touch with them when he required their service. It was noted that they were involved with one Dutch and five American visitors, including three CIA Agents, in the Soviet Union which was apparently unknown to NOSENKO. In addition they were involved with two other Americans in 1959 while he was their case officer but he learned about it only at the time he retired their files in 1962-63. ~~TS~~ (U)

COMMENT: On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO described in detail his relations with the agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV. He stated that as a result of the [MALIA](S) case the "Chiefs" of the 7th Department decided that a homosexual agent was needed. NOSENKO recruited the young fellow who was connected with [MALIA](S) and through him tried to get others. Then he visited the Moscow Investigation Department of the Militia (called Criminal Investigation Directorate of Moscow) for help. He was shown cards of Militia agents among which was the card for ANATOLIY VOLKOV, a former agent of the

Americans who were suspected by KGB of being CIA agents would likely be handled by KGB elements other than the 1st Section of the 7th Department where NOSENKO was assigned. (U)

6. MARTIN MALIA S

Pages 114 and 115 of the paper discuss the MARTIN MALIA (S) case. MALIA, (S) according to NOSENKO, was observed in contact with homosexuals in Moscow but was not approached by KGB for recruitment. It was noted that although MALIA (S) had not been interviewed in connection with NOSENKO's information, he had, in 1963, prior to receipt of NOSENKO's information, denied any involvement with homosexuals in the Soviet Union.

COMMENT: MALIA (S) has still not been interviewed concerning NOSENKO's allegations but it is noted that in September, 1963, SPENCER ROBERTS, (S) an admitted homosexual, advised that he observed MALIA (S) in Zurich, (S) Switzerland, (S) in July, 1963, and saw and overheard him proposition a young male for homosexual activities. On May 16, 1968, [ROBERTS] (S) changed his story but stated that he attended [Navy Language School] (S) with [MALIA] (S) in 1944-45 and suspected that he was a homosexual. In 1963 he saw him in [Cannes, France,] (S) in a group of homosexuals on a beach frequented almost exclusively by homosexuals.

In addition, information was reported to the American Embassy in Rome, Italy, in 1966 regarding a close association between [MALIA] (S) and a young German, [JORG B. MARUSCZCZYK] (S) who according to a physician appeared to be a homosexual.

The above information effectively supports NOSENKO's allegation that [MALIA] (S) was involved with homosexuals.

On November 7, 1967, February 6, March 8, and April 10, 1968, (N-14, 121, 125, 178), NOSENKO furnished detailed information regarding the [MALIA] (S) case which indicated he had a personal knowledge of that case. He said he had no doubt that [MALIA] (S) was connected with American Intelligence. This conclusion was based on

[MALIA's] (S) behavior, his manner of studying people and obtaining information from some of them. NOSENKO believed that [MALIA] (S) could have been recruited by KGB and said that PERFILEYEV later regretted that he did not permit an approach to [MALIA.] S

7. [RICHARD BURGHI] S

Pages 115-121 relate to the [RICHARD BURGHI] (S) case. On page 120 it is stated that NOSENKO is unfamiliar with the mechanics of KGB tracing procedures. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On January 26, 1968, (N-111), NOSENKO stated that the KGB has a rule that when the KGB Archives are checked for information on foreigners, both the FCD Archives and the Archives of the KGB must be checked. On this date he discussed in detail the handling of files pertaining to tourists and the transfer of the files to FCD when the tourists leave the Soviet ~~(S)~~ (U)

Union. Information furnished by NOSENKO on this date and on other dates indicates that he does have adequate knowledge of KGB tracing and filing procedures. (U)

8. [ARSENE FRIPPEL] (S)

Pages 137-143 relate to the recruitment and operation of [ARSENE FRIPPEL, American Express Company representative] (S) in Moscow. It is noted that the versions of NOSENKO and [FRIPPEL] (S) of the latter's recruitment and operation agree with some exceptions. It is stated that NOSENKO and [FRIPPEL] (S) agree that, with one exception, (when [FRIPPEL] (S) was queried regarding [BOWDEN] (U) and WINTERS), [FRIPPEL] (S) was not used to report on American Embassy employees. It is also stated that [FRIPPEL,] (S) while acknowledging that NOSENKO participated in all meetings with him, stated that CHELNOKOV was in charge of the entire operation. It is further stated that [FRIPPEL] (S) claims he saw NOSENKO on three occasions, twice in Odessa while visiting the USSR in 1962 and 1963 whereas NOSENKO insisted that he met [FRIPPEL] (S) but once in Odessa and once in Moscow in that period.

COMMENT: A review of the results of FBI interviews of [FRIPPEL] (S) during 1964 disclosed that [FRIPPEL] (S) described the initial recruiting contact of "NIKOLAEV" and "GRIBOV". He identified a photograph of NOSENKO as "NIKOLAEV" and stated that "NIKOLAEV" displayed photographs to him and carried out the interrogation. He stated that "NIKOLAEV" conducted almost all of the interrogations during their meetings; however, "Colonel GRIBOV" was in charge of the entire operation. (S)

This appears to agree with NOSENKO's account; he said that he was the case officer and was accompanied by Colonel V. D. CHELNOKOV, Deputy Chief of the 7th Department. When CHELNOKOV's photograph was displayed to [FRIPPEL] (S) he indicated that it resembled "GRIBOV" but would not make a definite identification. (S)

[FRIPPEL] (S) admitted having approximately six meetings through December, 1960, during which "NIKOLAEV" asked his observations of "various American Embassy officials." He specifically requested on one occasion information concerning [BOWDEN] (~~S~~)(U) and information regarding an economist at the Embassy whom [FRIPPEL] (S) presumed was GEORGE WINTERS. This also is consistent with NOSENKO's account who stated that he questioned [FRIPPEL] (S) about the Embassy and about Embassy officers [BOWDEN] (~~S~~)(U) and WINTERS. ~~(S)~~ ~~X~~

With regard to meetings in 1962 and 1963, [FRIPPEL] (S) said he visited the USSR in February, 1962, and went to Odessa for one day where he was met by "NIKOLAEV" and "GRIBOV." At that time they asked if any American Naval personnel were abroad the ["Olympia", Greek vessel] (S) on which he was traveling. Again in the summer of 1962 he accompanied a group of newspaper editors to the USSR at which time he was contacted by "NIKOLAEV" at [FRIPPEL's] (S) Moscow hotel room. He next visited the USSR in February, 1963, and again was approached by "NIKOLAEV" in Odessa. ~~(S)~~ ~~X~~

On November 4, 1967, (N-11), NOSENKO, in writing about the [FRIPPEL](S) case, stated that [FRIPPEL](S) returned to the USSR in the summer of 1962 with a group of correspondents and he saw him twice. In March, 1963, [FRIPPEL](S) was on [the "Olympia"](S) in Odessa "where I flew and have seen him." ~~(S)~~

There does not appear to be any substantial discrepancy between [FRIPPEL's](S) and NOSENKO's accounts and no basis to suspect that NOSENKO is lying. ~~(S)~~ (U)

[9. NOSENKO Not CI Officer] ~~(S)~~ (U)

On page 145, in discussing NOSENKO's operational activities during the 1955-60 period, it is stated that the evidence suggests that NOSENKO was an English speaking specialist in sexual entrapment and not a counterintelligence officer. Further that NOSENKO furnished no information which indicated that there was any material change in his duties and responsibilities after he was allegedly promoted to Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. ~~(TS)~~

COMMENT: The statement of [FRIPPEL] (S) that "NIKOLAEV" (NOSENKO) conducted almost all of the interrogations strongly suggests that NOSENKO was a counterintelligence officer rather than just an "English speaking specialist in sexual entrapment." A number of other cases, all summarized in the CIA paper, establishes this fact beyond reasonable doubt. [RICHARD BURGHI's] (S) (pages 115-120) description of his recruitment is one such case. He described his meeting with a Russian, "ANATOLI," [on June 18, 1956,] (S) who introduced him to "VIKTOR" and "YURI IVANOVICH" in a Moscow restaurant on [June 20, 1956.] (S) He identified the photograph of YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO as "YURI IVANOVICH" and said he left after about twenty minutes. On [June 23, 1956,] (S) [BURGHI] (S) traveled to [Kiev] (S) where he was met at the airport by "YURI IVANOVICH" and "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH" who took him to an apartment and introduced him to "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" (undoubtedly ANATOLI SERGEEVICH KOZLOV, Deputy Chief of the 7th Department who ~~TS~~

NOSENKO said accompanied him to [Kiev] (S) and participated in the approach to [BURGHI). (S) [Burghi] (S) said "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" was the ranking officer, referred to as Colonel, and he and "YURI IVANOVICH" had come from Moscow. "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH" was assigned [to Kiev.] (S) "ANATOLI SERGEEVICH" led the questioning and there was no doubt he was in charge. However, "YURI IVANOVICH" appeared to give orders to "VLADIMIR STEPANOVICH" and also appeared to be in charge during the brief encounter with "ANATOLI" and "VIKTOR" in the restaurant in Moscow before he went to [Kiev.] (S) ~~TS~~

It is submitted that a mere "English speaking specialist in sexual entrapment" would not be taken to [Kiev] (S) by the Deputy Chief of 7th Department after only a twenty-minute encounter with [BURGHI] (S) in Moscow. Further, such a "specialist" would not give orders to a KGB officer stationed in [Kiev.] (S) This is clearly the role of a case officer and [BURGHI's] (S) description confirms NOSENKO's account. (~~TS~~)

Four other cases cited in the CIA paper support NOSENKO's contention that he was a case officer. The subjects confirmed NOSENKO's accounts of their recruitments (~~S~~)(~~TS~~)(U)

[GIZELLA HARRIS] (S) (page 128) identified NOSENKO as one of the two men involved in her recruitment and said he "was definitely the man in charge" while the other "was merely present and listened." (~~TS~~)

[GEORGE DREW] (S) (pages 130-131) identified NOSENKO's photograph as his interrogator and said it was clear that he was the man in charge. (~~TS~~)

[DAVID TAYLOR] (S) (132-133) identified NOSENKO as the "Colonel SERGEYEV" who recruited him and said the mere sight of NOSENKO's photograph "sent shivers down his back." (~~TS~~)

[GERARD MERTENS] (S) stated the photograph of NOSENKO might be the "GEORGE PETERSON" who recruited him. (~~TS~~)

have had access to information concerning all of them while Deputy Chief of the Section in 1958-59. [FISK](S) was there in 1959; [GINSBERG](S) was there in 1956 but had subsequent trips; [KANTOR]~~(S)~~(U) is believed to have visited relatives (As indicated above, such cases would probably not have come to NOSENKO's attention); [KARLOV](S) was a [Swede](S) rather than American (NOSENKO's section may have had an interest if he was a part of the [Yale Chorus)](S); [PECHTER](S) was there in late 1959; (S)[PRESSMAN] was there in 1957 but did not go as a tourist; (S) (S)[SEVERN] probably did not visit the Soviet Union as a tourist; [SHATTAUR](S) had previously been recruited [in Poland](S) in 1946-47 and was re-recruited in 1962; [TARASKA](S) also visited relatives. References to all of these cases could, of course, have been in the 7th Department files reviewed by NOSENKO when he became Deputy Chief of the Department. Three of them [RUFE, SHATTAUR](S) and [KANTOR]~~(S)~~(U) were in notes prepared for the BOBKOV list referred to above. Therefore, it does not appear that his retention and delivery of notes regarding these cases should be given serious consideration as an indication he is not bona fide. His knowledge of the cases is consistent with his plausible explanations regarding his possession of the notes.

[11. American Intelligence Use of Tourists] (U)

Pages 146-150 relate to NOSENKO's awareness of what the KGB knew concerning the use of tourists by foreign intelligence services. It was noted that he claimed to have prepared a report for SCD Chief GRIBANOV in 1959, but could not remember the content, any examples included therein or the conclusions regarding American-British tourist intelligence operations. It is stated that he claimed no agents were definitely identified among American tourists and no tourists had been caught in the act of mailing letters, servicing dead drops, or contacting agents with one exception. This exception he named [as MC GUIRE who mailed a letter in Minsk in 1959.] (S) It was noted that this case as described by NOSENKO actually related to [EDWARD MC GOWAN, a CIA tourist agent who was detected by KGB mailing an operational letter in Minsk in August, 1958;] (S) however, [one ROBERT ALAN MC GUIRE] (S) visited the Soviet Union in April-May, 1959, and was the target of KGB provocations although he had no intelligence connections. It was stated that interrogation did not resolve how NOSENKO knew the name [MC GUIRE,] (S) but not the background of his case and knew the background of [MC GOWAN's] (S) case but not his name. ~~TS~~

The CIA paper also relates that the KGB agent GEORGE BLAKE furnished to KGB in 1959 a 19 page document covering a conference held in London between British and CIA representatives outlining British and American use of tourists for intelligence purposes. The KGB was therefore fully aware of the use of tourists and it was stated that the substance of this information, if not the document itself, would have been brought to the attention of the Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. ~~TS~~ (U) tourists for intelligence. The 1st Department of SCD wrote the final report about overall American Intelligence operations against the USSR, but NOSENKO's portion regarding use of tourists was considered good and was accepted as written. (U)

NOSENKO stated that there was an analysis each year regarding use of tourists for intelligence and even in 1955 there were some indications of tourist use by Americans including "little facts" - how the tourists acted, trying to get military information, trying to find drops, studying candidates for recruitment, etc. Each year they had good examples for the analysis including the use of other nationalities by the Americans. NOSENKO, however, could not remember any of the specific examples used in the analysis. (U)

On April 1, 1968, (N-175), when questioned concerning a case involving ["MC GUIRE] (S) or something like that", who was mentioned as mailing a letter, NOSENKO stated that this case, at the beginning, was a task for the 7th Department. ["MC GUIRE"](S) was an "aspirant" (student) "and he arrived in Russia having several tours and had about 30 or 40 days." He was young and alone and although there was no information on him in the Archives he was suspected because of his "legend" (stated reason for coming to the USSR). He, therefore, was the subject of coverage which detected his mailing of a letter in Minsk. This was reported to Moscow by KGB in Minsk, apparently directed to GRIBANOV, who turned the case over to the First (American) Department which thereafter handled the investigation. This happened in the late 1950's but NOSENKO could not recall the year. NOSENKO stated that the letter mailed by this ["MC GOWAN - MC GUIRE"](S) was going to a Russian. (The transfer of this case from the 7th to the 1st Department suggests that the Russian to whom the letter was mailed was being used in an operational game by the 2nd Section of the 1st Department.)

It should be noted that the [MC GOWAN] (S) case is mentioned in the KGB document acquired by CIA in 1961 which, as noted below, NOSENKO reviewed after the defection of ANATOLIY GOLITZYN. His knowledge of this case obviously could have been acquired at that time, although it might well have been acquired when KGB, Minsk, was covering him under 7th Department guidance. (~~S~~)(U)

On March 7, 1968, (N-159), in response to a question, NOSENKO said he saw very little information which emanated from the FCD regarding American use of tourists for intelligence; however, he had seen passages from a document which was in possession of SCD and which related to discussions in London between American, British, and Canadian representatives regarding use of tourists for intelligence. He could not specifically recall when the conference took place but believed it was in 1958. This document had come from FCD and he had (~~S~~)(U) (damage assessment). He said the document contained the names of foreigners against whom KGB was working or planned to work. The document was prepared in 1960-61. NOSENKO participated in discussions of the content of the document after GOLITZYN's defection and some cases mentioned therein were considered compromised and "x'd out." He did not believe the document contained the names of any persons who had been recruited but mostly related to suspects. He volunteered the name [BARTHELEMY](S) as the only name that he could recall in the document. However, on March 7, 1968, (N-159), he was shown a list of 26 names which were contained in the document and selected the names of three as names he recalled. ~~(S)~~ ~~C~~

It is considered significant that NOSENKO is aware of the document pertaining to tourists purloined by GOLITZYN. A review of this document indicates that most of the cases referred to therein as having occurred in 1958 and 1959, are such that ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO would not normally have come into possession of information regarding them while he was Deputy Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section. Of the 19 cases mentioned therein only seven occurred before 1960 and only one appears to have been the type of case which would have been handled by the American-British Commonwealth Section. [THOMAS BARTHELEMY] (S) went to Russia in 1959 as the representative of a tourist firm; [JUDITH GROUS] (S) was an exchange student in 1959-60; [MORRIS ETTENBERG] (S) apparently visited the USSR as a member of a group; [EDWARD MC GOWAN,] (S) discussed above, was brought to the attention of the American Department and was handled by that Department; [LIONEL SIMARD] (S) who visited in August, 1959, was introduced to a KGB agent employed at the American Embassy and may well have been handled by the 1st Department;

WILLIAM BESTOR (S) visited in 1959 with the Yale Chorus (S) and not as an individual tourist. WHITMORE GRAY (S) visited during November, 1959. He was an Assistant Professor at Michigan (S) University and a CIA Agent. (S) He was apprehended in Stalingrad November 13, 1959, (S) while attempting to photograph a factory. His is the only case among those in the document which logically should have come to the attention of NOSENKO while he was in the American-British Commonwealth Section prior to 1960. Thus his lack of knowledge does not appear to be suspect.

E. NOSENKO's Assignment to 1st Section, 1st Department, January, 1960 - January, 1962 (U)

Pages 151-261 of the CIA paper relate to the period January, 1960, to January, 1962, when NOSENKO claims to have been the Deputy Chief of the American Embassy Section (1st Section) of the American Department (1st Department). It is related that according to NOSENKO, he was supervisor of all (U) operations against code clerks and for some months against service attaches; case officer for the Embassy security officer, JOHN V. ABIDIAN; custodian of the Embassy Security file; and reviewer of all information obtained from microphones. It is stated that a comparison of his assertions with collateral information indicates that "he was none of these." ~~TS~~ (U)

It was also asserted that NOSENKO claimed complete knowledge of KGB recruitments and recruitment attempts against U. S. Embassy personnel, knowledge of CIA personnel on the Embassy Staff identified by KGB and status of the KGB cryptologic attack on Embassy communications. It is stated that his apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with [MORELLI] (S) and KOSOLAPOV's connection with [GARLAND] (S) refute his contention about knowledge of all recruitment attempts and, contrary to his claim, he does not know of CIA personnel on the Embassy staff identified by KGB. It is also stated that his information on the cryptologic attack on Embassy communications is superficial and in error. It was concluded that NOSENKO was neither Deputy ~~TS~~

included (1) The Agent net of the 1st Section,

(2) Knowledge that ROY RHODES furnished the original information on American use of electronic apparatus.

(3) Knowledge of attempts to obtain permission of the Chairman of KGB to put microphones in a wing of the American Embassy.

(4) Trips and aims of the trips of GRYAZNOV to Berlin in 1960, and KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in 1960 and Copenhagen in 1961.

(5) Knowledge of foreign agents obtained from conversations with leaders of other departments.

(6) Planning for technical counterintelligence from a building opposite American Embassy.

(7) Overdraft of operative money made by KOVSHUK.

(8) Facts about the 2nd Section's cases pertaining to BELITSKIY, BARRETT (S) and others and the trip of the Chief of 2nd Section, PETROV, to Frankfort in 1961.

2. KOVSHUK's Acquaintance with Americans ~~S~~ (U)

On page 158 it is stated that NOSENKO said KOVSHUK had personal contact with some American Embassy Officers but NOSENKO could identify only WINTERS. On page 159 it is indicated that NOSENKO did not know that WILLIAM N. MORELL (S) was identified formally by the American Embassy to the Soviet Government as a CIA employee; he was also not aware that KOVSHUK was in personal contact with MORELL. (S) ~~S~~

COMMENT: On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO stated that KOVSHUK had social meetings with LEWIS W. BOWDEN. ~~S~~ (U) On April 26, 1968, (N-186), NOSENKO stated that he believed KOVSHUK also knew JAMES ALEXANDER RAMSEY (S) and ROBERT OWEN (S) ~~S~~

3. GOLITZYN's Information Re Recruitments ~~S~~ (U)

On pages 162 and 163 information is set forth which was obtained from GOLITZYN pertaining to recruitments or possible recruitments of American personnel. It was reported that GOLITZYN visited the Embassy Section in the Spring of 1960 and learned ~~S~~ (U)

It is considered probable that the 1961 communication referred to by GOLITZYN is identical with, or related to, data furnished by SHAMROCK in (S) 1967 which indicated KGB was emphasizing operations against code clerks in 1961. The contents of the document made available by SHAMROCK undoubtedly (S) emanated from JOHN DISCOE SMITH, a former State Department code clerk and crypto technician who resigned in December, 1959, left the United States in May or June, 1960, and whose whereabouts thereafter were unknown until he was publicized as a defector by the Soviets in the Fall of 1967. ~~S~~ (U)

In this connection it is not clear how GRYAZNOV of the SCD would have knowledge of SMITH in the Spring of 1960. If SMITH was an agent prior to that time he would have been an agent of FCD. NOSENKO has reported, however, that another friend of GRYAZNOV's, NIKOLAY SKVORTSOV of FCD was handling "ZHARI" (believed to be the crytonym of SMITH) in 1961 and later "ZHARI" was being handled by ARTEMEV of the SCD. ~~S (S)~~ (U)

The possibility exists that GOLITZYN obtained information regarding the "real agent" from SKVORTSOV rather than GRYAZNOV. SMITH could have arrived in Moscow or otherwise have been in contact with SKVORTSOV during the period April - July, 1960, which GOLITZYN indicates in the period he talked to GRYAZNOV. At any rate, there is no certainty that an American code clerk assigned to Moscow in the Spring of 1960 had been recruited by KGB as alleged. ~~S~~ ~~C~~ (U)

~~4.~~ [JAMES STORSBERG - Military Code Clerk] (S)

Page 163 also sets forth information obtained from GOLITZYN who said that in the Spring of 1960 he was told by GRYAZNOV that the latter had developed an operation against an Embassy [military code clerk.] (S) KGB was 99 percent sure that [this code clerk] (S) would be recruited. ~~TS~~

In January, 1961, GOLITZYN learned from KOVSHUK that [JOHANNES PREISFREUND,] (S) then a KGB agent, had recently been used ~~TS~~

in the successful recruitment of an employee of the American Embassy. (It should be noted that when GOLITZYN was interviewed by FBI concerning this matter GOLITZYN related that he had inquired concerning his possible use of [PREISFREUND](S) but had been denied permission because he had been used in another operation. GOLITZYN could not be sure that the operation had been successful and presumed that it was against an employee of the American Embassy. From KOVSHUK's comments he assumed that the operation was successful.) ~~TS~~(U)

The comments of GRYAZNOV and KOVSHUK undoubtedly refer to KGB efforts to recruit [the military code clerk JAMES STORSBERG.](S) Information furnished by NOSENKO concerning this operation is set forth on pages 166-177 of CIA paper. It is noted therein that GOLITZYN's information concerning the use of [PREISFREUND](S) in the attempted recruitment of [STORSBERG](S) dates the incident at the end of [1960.](S) NOSENKO claimed that the approach took place about [June, 1961,](S) and [STORSBERG](S) claimed that it took place in October, 1961. It was concluded that GOLITZYN's timing was more plausible and therefore the operation against [STORSBERG](S) took place more than six months prior to the time claimed by NOSENKO and [STORSBERG.](S) ~~TS~~

It was stated that such an inaccuracy by NOSENKO concerning an event which took place less than a year before he described it to CIA in June, 1962, undermines his claim to the role he played and his claim to have been Deputy Chief of Section 1 and Supervisor of code clerk operations.

COMMENT: It is noted that [STORSBERG](S) when interviewed substantially confirmed NOSENKO's version of the approach except for the date. He also related that in the middle of [October, 1961,](S) on the evening of the KGB recruitment attempt against him, he saw "MICHAUD" (SKVORTSOV), [JOSEPH MORONE](S) and an unidentified female sitting together in the American House Club. (Note that [MORONE](S) actually left Moscow in [August, 1961.](S)

[MORONE](S) was interviewed by FBI Agents on May 22, 1968, and readily identified the photograph of SKVORTSOV as MARCEL MICHAUD whom he had seen on one occasion at American House. He related that he had visited American House Club one evening during the(S) middle of the week and observed several people sitting at a table. He probably recognized someone at the table (he cannot recall specifically) but approached the table and asked one of the two females at the table to dance. While dancing she said she was a "journalist" from West Germany, that she was with MICHAUD (who posed as a French businessman, a furrier) but he was bothering her and she did not want to stay with him. After dancing with this girl he met MICHAUD who praised the French female's ability to make love. [MORONE] (S) described the girl as age 24, attractive, dark hair, five feet two inches. He did not recall her name.

[MORONE] (S) stated that [STORSBERG] (S) could have been at the table but he could not recall specifically seeing [STORSBERG] (S) on this occasion. He was positive, however, that this was the only occasion that he had seen MICHAUD at American House.

Later in the evening the West German girl went to his room for a drink. He arranged to see her again (U) at which time he visited Red Square with her and recalls seeing a puppet show. Thereafter she returned (u) to his room and performed a perverted sex act on him.

[MORONE] (S) could not recall the date of this incident but believed that it occurred approximately the beginning of [February, 1961.] (S) He was certain that it did not occur before his vacation trip to [Helsinki] (S) the last week of [January, 1961.] (S) He was also certain that it occurred in cold weather because the female wore winter clothing when they visited Red Square and he recalled the wheather was very cold. He stated that the incident definitely occurred before the first week of [May, 1961] (S) because during that week he went to [Oslo and did not return until mid-July, 1961.] (S) At the time of his return there was a letter waiting for him from this West German girl. He left Moscow permanently in [August, 1961] S/

(S) [STORSBERG] was interviewed on August 15, 1968, by FBI Agents in an attempt to fix as accurately as possible the date on which KGB made the recruitment approach to him. (It is noted he stated on September 28, 1964, that on the evening he was approached, prior to leaving American House, he had seen [JOSEPH MORONE](S) dancing with a girl who accompanied MARCEL MICHAUD (SKVORTSOV) to American House. It is also noted that [MORONE](S) in interview on May 22, 1968, recalled seeing MICHAUD on one occasion only. He was certain this took place prior to the first week of [May, 1961,](S) when he left Moscow for [Oslo](S) returning [in mid-July, 1961.](S) ~~C~~

[STORSBERG](S) recalled seeing [MORONE](S) with MICHAUD on one occasion which he believed was either the evening of the recruitment approach to him or the date of the prior visit to MICHAUD's apartment about ten days earlier. He also recalled that the weather was very cold at the time of the approach. On the first visit to MICHAUD's hotel it was snowing and on the night of the approach it was very cold because he wore a heavy coat and a hat. ~~(S)~~ ~~C~~

[STORSBERG] (S) at first stated that the approach was about four months before he left Moscow and then stated it was about one and one-half months and not more than two months. He claimed that he did not have long to go until the end of his tour of duty. He is certain that his replacement [(ZUJUS)] (S) had not arrived at the time of the incident. [(ZUJUS] (S) arrived in Moscow in September, 1961.) He also stated the incident occurred after he saw the message which pertained to [KEYZER's] (S) homosexual activities. He believed the incident occurred quite sometime after the Ice Capades people were in Moscow because he had a good time when they were there and he did not have a good time after the approach. He stated that he did not believe he could have "sweated it out" for as long as six months; that regardless of how it may appear, his recollection is that the incident could not have happened more than two months before his departure.

Despite [STORSBERG's] (S) contentions, it is noted that both he and NOSENKO have indicated that MICHAUD did not visit the American House over an extended period of time; that [STORSBERG](S) recalls [MORONE](S) with MICHAUD just prior to his visit to MICHAUD's hotel; that [MORONE](S) dates the incident when he saw MICHAUD as prior to May, 1961; and that both [MORONE](S) and [STORSBERG](S) refer to the cold weather. [MORONE](S) left Moscow in [August, 1961,](S) and [ZUJUS](S) arrived in [September, 1961.](S) (Both probably before very cold weather.) These factors together with NOSENKO's assertion that [STORSBERG](S) was approached before [KEYZER's](S) departure on [June 16, 1961,](S) strongly indicate that [STORSBERG](S) was approached sometime before May, 1961, and that NOSENKO's version of the date of the approach is more accurate than GOLITZYN's version. ~~(S)~~

5. [JAMES KEYZERS] (S)

Pages 178-181 relate to the KGB attempt to defect [JAMES KEYZERS, a U. S. Army specialist](S) who served in Moscow from December, 1960, to June 16, 1961. The paper raises a number of questions concerning NOSENKO's version of this incident. ~~(S)~~

It is stated that no KGB officer directly connected with the case could regard [KEYZERS](S) as a replacement for [STORSBERG.](S) It was noted that [KEYZERS](S) did not identify the photograph of NOSENKO as the individual who approached him at the airport and his description of this person did not fit that of NOSENKO. It was stated that [KEYZERS,](S) prior to his departure from Moscow, acknowledged to his superiors that he had homosexual tendencies and admitted being involved in three homosexual incidents at American House. (It is noted that NOSENKO claimed that KGB knew from the microphone coverage that his homosexual activities were not discussed with [KEYZERS](S) prior to his departure and hoped to induce his defection by sending him a letter which would suggest he was in trouble because of these activities.)

The paper also concluded that KGB would have learned from microphone coverage, contrary to NOSENKO's assertion, that (S)[KEYZERS] did report the receipt of the KGB defection letter to his superiors.

COMMENT: The fact that [KEYZERS] (S) was trained for a period of time by [STORSBERG] (S) in the [military code room] (S) could well suggest to the KGB that he was to be the replacement for [STORSBERG] (S) The U. S. Army intelligence file was reviewed by FBI representatives on July 10, 1968, and contained no indication that [KEYZERS'] (S) homosexual activities were discussed with him before he left Moscow on June 16, 1961. On the contrary a memorandum prepared by his superior, [Colonel PETER L. URBAN,] (S) the U. S. Army Attache dated June 16, 1961, which summarized [KEYZERS'] (S) activities, mentioned derogatory comments which had been received about his relations with members of the American Ice Capades who were known or suspected homosexuals and noted that [KEYZERS] (S) had been informed of the reasons for his transfer from Moscow, "except that he was not informed of the allegations of homosexuality in order not to aggravate the possibility of a rash act by him while within the Soviet Union." ~~(S)~~

This memorandum clearly supports NOSENKO's version of this incident. (U)

With regard to KEYZERS (S) failure to identify NOSENKO it is pointed out that he saw the individual who approached him only momentarily, but it is recognized that his description of the individual is not close to that of NOSENKO.

6. MATTHEW PETER ZUJUS (S)

Pages 181-184 relate to the KGB operation against U. S. Army (S) Sergeant MATTHEW PETER ZUJUS (S) who arrived in Moscow in September, 1961, to assume the code clerk (S) duties of STORSBERG (S) and to remain there until January, 1963. On page 183 it was stated that ZUJUS (S) admitted to U. S. Army authorities in 1963 that in the summer of 1962 he had been intimate with an Austrian woman "LILLIAN" who had visited American House with someone from the United Arab Republic and returned alone a few days later. The American House manager interviewed her and learned that she claimed to be from Vienna and was traveling with her employer, a Czech. The Embassy security officer learned that she had no Austrian passport and asked her for her passport. She left and never returned to Americn House. It was stated that NOSENKO described this incident in connection with KGB attempts to entrap [JOSEPH MORONE](S) in [1960,](S) not [ZUJUS](S) in [1962;](S) that interrogation of NOSENKO never resolved how he knew of this incident. ~~S~~

Also with regard to the [ZUJUS](S) case, it is stated that NOSENKO identified ELLA UMANETS as a KGB agent employed at American House but never related her to [ZUJUS.] ~~S~~ (S)

COMMENT: On March 20, 1968, (N-167), NOSENKO related that in 1960 GRYAZNOV had gone to East Germany and brought to Moscow two girls who were to be targeted against American House. One of these girls, possibly known as "HANNAH", described by NOSENKO as a fat blonde in her mid thirties, posed as a correspondent from West Germany. This girl was introduced into American House with the help of [PREISFREUND] ~~S~~ (S)

NOSENKO stated that another woman had been documented as an Austrian but had not been successful ~~S~~ (U) as an agent against American House. He said this woman had some difficulty at American House regarding her passport. (U)

From information set forth above obtained from [MORONE] (S) it appears clear that NOSENKO did not confuse the use of a female agent in the [MORONE] (S) case with that in the [ZUJUS] (S) case. [MORONE] (S) confirmed that he had contact with a West German "journalist" at American House. The "LILLIAN" described by [ZUJUS] (S) could be the girl documented as an Austrian as related by NOSENKO or could be still a third female.

The discrepancy between NOSENKO's description of the "journalist" and that by [MORONE] (S) is not considered particularly significant although NOSENKO appears to be in error. He probably confused the "West German" with the "Austrian."

~~7.~~ [PAUL JENNER] (S) [JOHN GARLAND] (S)

Pages 185-192 relate to KOSOLAPOV's trips to Helsinki and the [PAUL JENNER] (S) and [JOHN GARLAND] (S) cases. It is stated therein that NOSENKO claimed KOSOLAPOV traveled to Helsinki in early 1960 for a double purpose (1) to probe for a new way to get in touch with American code clerks and (2) to make contact with PAUL JENNER (S) who was to come to Moscow via Helsinki. NOSENKO claimed to have read KOSOLAPOV's report indicating that he had made contact with JENNER (S) on the train trip from Helsinki to Moscow. It was noted that in fact JENNER's (S) name is listed on the train manifest for March 31, (S) 1960, and the alias used by KOSOLAPOV is listed on the manifest for April 2, (S) 1960. Thus KOSOLAPOV could not have contacted JENNER (S) on the train. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

It was concluded that the discrepancies indicated NOSENKO was neither KOSOLAPOV's supervisor nor supervisor over all KGB operations against code clerks. This conclusion was strengthened by the fact that NOSENKO could not recall a trip by KOSOLAPOV to Helsinki in November, (S) 1960, at which time he apparently returned to Moscow on the same train with JOHN GARLAND. (S) NOSENKO emphatically denied that KOSOLAPOV had traveled to Helsinki except in connection with the JENNER (S) case. It was concluded that (S) this denial is fatal to his claims that he was KOSOLAPOV's supervisor and supervised all operations against American code clerks. [illegible](X)

COMMENT: On November 6, 1967, (N-13), NOSENKO submitted comments concerning KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki similar to that information previously furnished by him. On June 1, 1968, (N-200), he insisted KOSOLAPOV made contact with [JENNER](S) on the train trip to Moscow and wrote a report to this effect when he returned. This discrepancy has not been clarified. (~~S~~)[illegible](U)

With regard to KOSOLAPOV's second trip to Helsinki it is noted that it took place at about the same time NOSENKO traveled to Cuba. It is also noted that [GARLAND](S) denied that he was contacted on the train by any Russian, despite the fact that KOSOLAPOV apparently rode the same train. Since there was no approach to [GARLAND](S) and nothing "important" happened on the train, it is not considered (X) inconceivable that NOSENKO just never was advised of KOSOLAPOV's trip. There appears to be nothing sinister about his denial of knowledge of this trip.(S)

~~8.~~ [JOSEPH MORONE] (~~C~~)(S)

Pages 193-199 relate to the KGB operation against [JOSEPH MORONE.](S) It is stated that NOSENKO is apparently unaware of [MORONE's](S) sexual involvement with friends of KGB agent SVETLANA IVANOVA at the apartment of SARWAT EL SHAZLY, his illicit currency dealing with PIETRO CECCHI and his relationship with ELLA UMANETS. It was also stated that NOSENKO erred in relating the East German female agent sent to the American House to [MORONE;](S) that this incident occurred later. It was concluded that this case indicates NOSENKO was not supervisor of all KGB operations against American code clerks.(~~S~~) [redacted]

COMMENT: As indicated above [MORONE](S) has furnished information regarding his relationship with a West German journalist who is undoubtedly one of the East German girls brought to Moscow by GRYAZNOV, one of whom posed as a West German correspondent as related by NOSENKO.(~~S~~)

On January 11, 1968, (N-92), NOSENKO gave a written summary of the [MORONE](S) case which was basically the same as his previous information but added that [MORONE](S) and a U. S. Marine in 1961 met out in the city of Moscow, a female agent who worked at American House, and her girl friend. They went to a restaurant and about one or two o'clock in the morning returned to the American Embassy (or American House) where the girls remained until morning. He also related that [MORONE](S) was not approached by KGB primarily because [STORSBERG](S) was considered more important and KGB did not want to prejudice that case. ~~C~~

On April 6, 1968, (N-177), NOSENKO stated that he believed that the Marine who went to the restaurant with [MORONE](S) was [BEGGS,](S) further that SARWAT EL SHAZLY also reported something about [MORONE](S) but he could not recall what it was. (~~S~~ ~~C~~

On May 7, 1968, (N-190), NOSENKO stated that girls working in the American House were reporting on [MORONE] (S) and he was particularly friendly with SVETLANA IVANOVA. He said PIETRO CECCHI also reported "pieces of information" about [MORONE] (S) but NOSENKO did not know of any black market dealings between CECCHI and [MORONE] (S) He stated that the photographs of [MORONE] (S) with the Polish girl were considered insufficient to compromise him and KGB wanted to create something more, possibly photographs with Russian girls. IVANOVA was considered as a prospect in this connection and she and her girl friend had met [MORONE] (S) and a Marine in a restaurant and thereafter spent the night in the "flat" of one of the Marines. At this time he stated that the Marine with [MORONE] (S) on this occasion was possibly [GARCIA] (S)

It is noted that when [MORONE] (S) was interviewed on October 16, 1962, he furnished information regarding his intimacy with the friend of SVETLANA IVANOVA in the apartment of [MORRIS ZWANG]. (S)

He stated that [GARCIA] (S) was also present and presumably was intimate with SVETLANA. He related that he and [ZWANG] (S) had also met three Russian girls in SARWAT's apartment but were not intimate with them. (This is inconsistent with data set forth on page 198 of the CIA paper.) ~~(S)~~ C

[MORONE] (S) admitted exchanging currency with PIETRO CECCHI but claimed that these exchanges did not exceed $200 or $300. ~~(S)~~ C

Thus, contrary to the CIA paper, NOSENKO is aware of [MORONE's] (S) sexual involvements and the East German girl was involved with [MORONE.] (S) NOSENKO's information seems adequate for a supervisor. ~~(S)~~ C

9. [JOSEPH GAFFEY](S)

Pages 203 and 204 relate to [JOSEPH GAFFEY, a military enlisted man](S) in Moscow who was a target of KGB. KGB attempted to lure him into downtown Moscow using SVETLANA IVANOVA. It was related that NOSENKO stated [GAFFEY](S) had refused her invitations and KGB had no derogatory information regarding him. It was also noted that during a State Department security interview [GAFFEY](S) admitted being intimate with IVANOVA at the American House and at her apartment; that she had told him that she was pregnant and asked for money for an abortion.

COMMENT: [GAFFEY](S) was discussed with NOSENKO on January 27, (N-113), and April 6, 1968, (N-177), but he could furnish no additional information. It is noted, however, that [GAFFEY](S) during State Department interview on July 27, 1962, stated that he was first intimate with IVANOVA in his room on December 27, 1961, and was intimate with her in her apartment on approximately three occasions thereafter.

She told him she was pregnant about May 1, 1962, and he was transferred from Moscow during that month. NOSENKO transferred from the American Embassy Section in early January, 1962, and thus would logically not have knowledge of [GAFFEY's](S) intimacy with IVANOVA.[~~S~~(U))

[10. JOHN ABIDIAN]~~(S)~~(U))

Pages 205-220 relate to the Security Officer JOHN ABIDIAN and the KGB operations against him. NOSENKO had furnished detailed information regarding this case which included data indicating that a female KGB agent TATYANA FEDOROVICH was used to place "metka" (an odorless substance) on ABIDIAN's clothing. Later this substance was found on letters mailed by ABIDIAN and traced to him. It is stated that ABIDIAN had no maid until 16 months after his arrival in Moscow and FEDOROVICH did not become employed by him until July, 1961. It was concluded therefore that FEDOROVICH could not have applied metka as claimed by NOSENKO which resulted in the interception of the letter mailed by ABIDIAN on April 1, (U) ~~(S)~~

1961, and probably she was not yet employed at the time of his mailing of a letter on July 2, 1961 ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (U)

The CIA paper also takes issue with NOSENKO's statements regarding ABIDIAN's visit to a dead drop site on December 30, 1961. NOSENKO claimed to have read the initial surveillance report covering this visit, to have visited the site himself and to have reviewed reports covering observation of the site for approximately three months. It was concluded that NOSENKO was not ABIDIAN's case officer. [redacted] (~~S~~(U)

COMMENT: NOSENKO was interviewed concerning ABIDIAN on May 1, 1968, (N-187), and stated that KGB knew that [MYRA KEMMER] (S) a female employee of the American Embassy, was ABIDIAN's mistress. TATYANA FEDOROVICH was [KEMMER's] (S) maid and was sent to ABIDIAN's apartment by [KEMMER] (S) to clean his apartment. This agent placed "metka" on his clothing as early as 1960. ~~(S)~~

ABIDIAN was subsequently interviewed by a representative of CIA and confirmed that this maid ~~(S)~~ (U) disclosed that the name following number 33 was [LUBIN,] (S) that following 34 was [SMITH,] (S) that following 35 was [WILL BURTIN] (S) and that following 36 was [CIPE] (S) [BURTIN.] (S) The other two names were of KGB case officers who NOSENKO stated were undoubtedly the case officers of [LUBIN] (S) and [SMITH.] (S) NOSENKO stated that these were four individuals of interest to PETROV and the 2nd Section was interested in placing microphones against them. (This is discussed later in this paper under New Information and as indicated therein, [LUBIN] (S) and the [BURTINS] (S) have been identified. They were in the USSR in 1961 [in connection with USIA exhibition] (S) and had been in contact with components of CIA.) ~~S~~ ~~S~~

The above information would appear to be a plausible explanation as to how NOSENKO came into possession of the list of microphones. ~~S~~ (U) the Embassy. He furnished information possibly pertinent to this matter on March 22, 1968, (N-168). He stated that in 1961 the First Department had initiated planning in connection with the establishment of an apartment across the street from the American Embassy which was to contain some special equipment. This equipment was to be provided by the Department of Defense which would supply experts to operate it. This operation was discussed with officers of OTU and reference was made to checking on waves or short waves. The planning resulted from coordination of the coverage of all western attaches under YEVGENIY NIKOLAYEVICH ALESHIN, Deputy Chief of the 1st Department who was supervising it. KOVSHUK, Chief of the 1st Section did not handle it. In the late 1950's or early 1960's the [1st Section] (S) of the 2nd Department had found out [that the [British] (S) were monitoring GRU radio transmissions.] (S) The monitoring was done from the [British Embassy] (S) and a cottage owned (S) by the [British.] (S) In 1961 discussions were held regarding checking of the [American cottage as well as the American Embassy.] ~~S~~(U)

NOSENKO also stated that the Ministry of Defense had a permanent post behind the American Embassy which was not related to the above matter. When NOSENKO went with VENYAMIN KOSLOV to visit surveillance posts of the 1st Department, 7th Directorate, located around the American Embassy, KOSLOV pointed out the building where the Ministry of Defense monitoring post was located. This post had been set up prior to 1961. ~~S~~ (U)

On March 26, 1968, (N-169), NOSENKO expressed the opinion that the new installation which was planned in 1961 was not related to either the [British] (S) monitoring or the permanent post of the Ministry of Defense, but was a different kind of technique. ~~S~~

[14. NOSENKO's Knowledge of CIA Personnel] ~~TS~~ (U)

Pages 240-248 relate to NOSENKO's knowledge of CIA personnel within the American Embassy. It was noted that NOSENKO claimed that he would necessarily know whom the KGB knew or suspected as CIA officers. NOSENKO had stated that [BORIS KLOSSON] (S) was considered to be the CIA resident. [(KLOSSON] (S) had no connection with CIA.) ABIDIAN was considered a CIA officer on the basis of his conduct. (He was a State Department officer who was utilized by CIA and was, in effect, the CIA resident.) [STEVE WASHENKO] (S) was correctly identified as being connected with CIA. [LEWIS BOWDEN,] (~~S~~)(U) who according to NOSENKO was suspected of being a CIA officer, had no affiliation with CIA. The same was true of RICHARD FUNKHAUSER. WILLIAM HORBALY was correctly identified by NOSENKO as being connected with CIA, as was GEORGE WINTERS. ~~TS~~

According to NOSENKO, STANLEY BROWN, [WILLIAM MORELL,] (S) [EUGENE MAHONEY] (S) and PAUL GARBLER were not suspected by KGB. (They were CIA employees.) The paper noted that both [MORELL] (S) and GARBLER were known to KGB as CIA officers although this was apparently unknown to NOSENKO. GARBLER was known as a CIA officer to GEORGE BLAKE. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: On January 27, 1968, (N-113), NOSENKO was shown a list of names including some American and Soviet employees of the American Embassy. He recognized the name of RICHARD FUNKHAUSER, stated he was suspected of connections with American intelligence and VYACHESLAV ALEKSANDROVICH KUSKOV was working against him. Concerning the name [STEVE WASHENKO] (S) he stated that [WASHENKO] (S) was an [Agriculture Attache] (S) in the American Embassy and "mailed letters" and was considered to be connected with American intelligence.

In connection with NOSENKO's statements regarding [KLOSSON,] (S) it is suggested that the fact he replaced [DAVID MARK] (S) who had been regarded by KGB as the CIA resident, would be sufficient for KGB to consider that [KLOSSON] (S) was connected with CIA despite the fact coverage of his activities disclosed no clandestine operations.

It is also noted that PAUL GARBLER did not arrive in Moscow until November 29, 1961. Information identifying him as an American intelligence officer would undoubtedly have been in possession of FCD but there is no assurance that it would have come to NOSENKO's attention prior to his departure from the 1st Section, 1st Department, SCD in January, 1962. It is suggested that FCD would have been very careful in disseminating information received from FCD agent GEORGE BLAKE prior to BLAKE's apprehension by the British. ~~(S)~~

15. [ROBERT BARRETT] (S)

On page 248 it is stated that NOSENKO did not know of [ROBERT BARRETT's] (S) contacts with homosexual agents VOLKOV and YEFREMOV in 1961 although NOSENKO claimed to have been their case officer at that time. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: Elsewhere in this paper NOSENKO's relations with these two agents is set forth in some detail. NOSENKO stated that he possibly did not know of all contacts these homosexuals made with Americans. On November 14, 1967, (N-22b), NOSENKO described in some detail the [BARRETT] (S) case indicating that these ~~(S)~~

two agents were used in [1959] (S) to get compromising photographs of [BARRETT] (S) The compromising materials were furnished to the 2nd Section of the 1st Department which recruited him when he returned to the USSR in [1960 or 1961.] (S) PETROV, Chief of the 2nd Section, told NOSENKO that [BARRETT] (S) had admitted connections with American Intelligence; that his task was to find Russians for future recruitment. The 2nd Section was preparing some individuals (to serve as double agents). The case officer was VADIM UDILOV ~~(S)~~

The fact that the 2nd Section was handling the case in 1961 may well explain why NOSENKO would not be aware of [BARRETT's 1961] (S) contacts with these two homosexual agents.

[16. NOSENKO's Travel to Cuba] (U)

On page 254 it is stated that NOSENKO's planned trip to the United States and his travel to Cuba damaged his claim that he was supervising operations against Embassy code clerks in 1960. It was indicated that with active operations going he (U)

COMMENT: On November 4, 1967, (N-10a), NOSENKO furnished basically the same information concerning the Bulgarian trip set forth in the CIA paper. The fact that there was no apparent necessity for the Bulgarian Minister of Interior to request a KGB officer for consultation is not a reasonable basis for judging this account to be untrue. ~~S~~ (U)

[18. Transfer to 7th Department] ~~S~~ (U)

On page 260 it is stated that NOSENKO dated his transfer to the 7th Department from the 1st Department as occurring before the defection of GOLITZYN which he dated as mid-January, 1962, despite being advised that the correct date was December 16, 1961. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COMMENT: NOSENKO during interview on March 6, 1968, (N-157), recalled that KGB had sent a cable to Helsinki after GOLITZYN's defection instructing that the residency make contact with [FREISFREUND](S) to warn him. NOSENKO and KOVSHUK contacted TARABRIN of FCD to arrange for the cable to be sent. KOVSHUK ~~S~~

and NOSENKO were Chief and Deputy Chief of 1st Section, 1st Department. It appears that his previous recollection of transfer before GOLITZYN's defection was in error. (U)

19. NOSENKO's Knowledge of [MORELL] and [GARLAND] (S)

On page 261 it is stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of KOVSHUK's relationship with [MORELL] (S) and KOSOLAPOV's connection with [GARLAND] (S) refute his contention that he would have known of all KGB recruitment attempts.

COMMENT: During the April 10, 1968, (N-178), interview, NOSENKO stated that KUSKOV had the file on [MORELL] (S) who was the [Economic] (S) Advisor at the Embassy. He advised he never heard anything particular about [MORELL]. (S)

With regard to [GARLAND,] (S) NOSENKO on April 6, 1968, (N-177), stated KOSOLAPOV had his file; however, NOSENKO insisted that he had no knowledge of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki in connection with [GARLAND] (S) and he would have known about it if anything important developed. It is noted that [GARLAND] (S) denies any recruitment approach.

On April 22, 1968, (N-184), NOSENKO stated that he could not make a flat statement that he would have known of any recruitments in the American Embassy during the 1955-59 period but believed he would have heard of them. He would have known of any such recruitments in 1960-61. He believed he would also have known of any recruitments in the 1962-63 period because he saw GRYAZNOV frequently and GRYAZNOV talked freely because NOSENKO helped him advance from Senior Case Officer in January, 1962, to Deputy Chief of Section 1, then Chief of Section 1, and then Deputy Chief of Department 1 about August or September, 1963. (~~S~~) *(U)

In view of NOSENKO's stated knowledge of [MORELL] (S) and [GARLAND] (S) and the officers who had their cases and since there is no evidence that either was the subject of a recruitment approach or other important development, it is submitted that his lack of knowledge (~~S~~

of KOVSHUK's relationship with [MOREIL] (S) and of KOSOLAPOV's trip to Helsinki does not refute his contention that he would have known of all important developments pertaining to the 1st Section, 1st Department in 1960-61. ~~(S)~~

[F. Assignment to the 7th Department January, 1962 - January, 1964] ~~(S)~~ (u)

Pages 263-333 pertain to NOSENKO's claims of assignment to the 7th Department during 1962-64, first as Section Chief of the American-British Commonwealth Section to July, 1962, and thereafter as Deputy Chief of the 7th Department until his defection. It was concluded his claims are not credible. ~~(S)~~ (u)

[1. NOSENKO's Substitute as Chief] ~~(S)~~ (u)

On page 265 it is stated that NOSENKO claimed he had no Deputy Section Chief and did not indicate who was assigned his duties in his absence. ~~(S)~~ (u)

COMMENT: On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO specifically stated that V. G. DERA was the officer whom he designated (u) ~~(S)~~

to act as Section Chief during his absence. He also utilized NOSKOV in this capacity on occasion~~(S)~~ (U) [redacted]

~~2~~. NOSENKO's Contacts with FRIPPEL (S)

On page 266 in discussing the ARSENE FRIPPEL (S) case it is stated that FRIPPEL (S) asserted he met NOSENKO in Odessa in February, 1962, which NOSENKO flatly denies. [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On November 4, 1967, (N-10b), NOSENKO wrote concerning the FRIPPEL (S) case that FRIPPEL (S) returned to the USSR in 1962 with a group of correspondents and "I have seen him twice. In March, 1963, 'Artur' (FRIPPEL) on the ship 'Olympia' was (S) in Odessa, where I flew and have seen him." Whether NOSENKO saw him in Odessa in February, 1962, has not been clarified (S ~~(S)~~

~~3~~. VOLKOV and WILLIAM J. ZUBON (S)

On page 267 it is stated that NOSENKO is apparently uninformed regarding the use of VOLKOV in a KGB entrapment operation against American tourist WILLIAM J. ZUBON (S) in July, 1962. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

COMMENT: This has not been clarified but as indicated above, NOSENKO stated that VOLKOV and YEFREMOV may have had contacts with Americans without advising him. On July 27, 1968, (N-212), [ZUBON's] (S) name was included in a list displayed to NOSENKO. He failed to recognize it. ~~(S)~~

[4. MARINA RYTOVA] ~~(S)~~ (U)

On page 268 it is stated that NOSENKO claims that he was officially registered as the case officer of MARINA RYTOVA until his defection in 1964 although she had obtained a job at the Communist Party Central Committee school and had ceased all agent work. ~~(S)~~ (U)

COMMENT: On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that although RYTOVA was no longer being used, her file had not been retired and he was still considered the case officer until his defection. ~~(S)~~ (U)

5. W. E. JOHNSON (S)

Pages 268-272 relate to the KGB entrapment of W. E. JOHNSON. (S) It is stated on page 272 that although JOHNSON (S) apparently confirmed NOSENKO's role, NOSENKO's version of the case is incompatible with what must have been the actual time frame. It was pointed out that according to his version, within five days of JOHNSON's (S) arrival KGB would have discovered he was a homosexual, concluded he was a threat, after intercepting his letters, and arranged his entrapment. The rapid pace of events suggests that his homosexuality was already known to KGB. Therefore, NOSENKO's participation contradicts his assertions about the timing of his transfer from the American Department. (S) [redacted]

COMMENT: On November 7, 1967, and March 6 and 7, 1968, (N-15, N-157, N-159), NOSENKO discussed the JOHNSON (S) case, furnishing basically the same information previously furnished. He added that DERA was the case officer for this case and DERA had posed as the Administrator of the hotel in which JOHNSON (S) was registered. (S) took the "akt" from him and then brought him to NOSENKO who obtained the agreement not to criticize the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that the homosexual agents YEFREMOV and VOLKOV spotted [JOHNSON] (S) soon after his arrival. At about the same time his letters were intercepted. KGB had no advance information concerning his homosexuality. ~~(S)~~

Considering NOSENKO's limited role in this matter and his claimed position as Chief of Section, it seems that his recall of this matter is adequate. With regard to the rapid pace of the operation, it is believed that KGB is certainly capable of moving rapidly when necessary. NOSENKO's account does not appear implausible. [redacted] ~~(S)~~ (U)

6. [WILLIAM CARROLL JONES] (S) [redacted]

On pages 272-273 the [WILLIAM CARROLL JONES] (S) case is discussed. It is stated that NOSENKO's ignorance of [JONES'] (S) Bible smuggling and the fact that his activities had been ~~(S)~~

publicized in the Soviet press indicates that he had no intimate connection with this case ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

COMMENT: On May 25, 1968, (N-198), NOSENKO related that when he returned to the 7th Department as Chief of Section 1 he was shown, at his request, materials on Section 1 cases which included the [JONES](S) case. [JONES](S) was suspected of intelligence connections; however, NOSENKO disagreed with this conclusion. Although [JONES](S) was involved with a girl he carefully turned off the lights during intimacies and was not successfully photographed; he drank with her in restaurants and gave gifts to Baptists; he had indicated he would return to the USSR and consideration was given to covering him again at that time. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO identified the photograph which was supplied by [JONES](S) of the girl with whom he was involved, LUDMILA BUGAEVA, and said he had seen her a couple of times. ~~(S)~~

Considering NOSENKO's position and connection with this case, his recall appears adequate. (~~S~~)(U)

[7. KGB Officers in Geneva] (~~S~~) (U)

Pages 279-280 discuss NOSENKO's comments regarding KGB officers within the Soviet delegation to Geneva in 1962. It was noted he identified only OLEG GRINEVSKIY as having a connection with KGB although he described A. K. KISLOV and V. G. FILATOV. It was stated that CIA tentatively identified all three of these Soviets as KGB officers. KISLOV was observed in KGB operational activity in Washington and Moscow; FILATOV served as an alternate contact in France with the KGB agent GEORGE PAQUES. [British intelligence] (S) reported that GRINEVSKIY handled a [British double agent.] (S) On page 280 it is noted that NOSENKO reported in 1964 for the first time that KISLOV had been a KGB operational contact in the U. S. and had been introduced to NOSENKO by a KGB officer in Moscow prior to their departure for Geneva in 1962. ~~S~~

65-68530-449

was a Section 2 case, but as a part of his duties in Geneva as a counterintelligence officer he was to direct BELITSKIY only if the Americans should make contact with him. It was stated that ARTEMEV, contrary to NOSENKO's claims, was not inexperienced and had been involved with a series of CIA American tourist agents in the Soviet Union of which NOSENKO was unaware although it occurred in 1958-59. It was also stated that NOSENKO had limited knowledge of the BELITSKIY case and it was concluded that he did not exercise any supervisory functions. ~~TS~~ (U)

COMMENT: One of the CIA tourist agents involved with ARTEMEV was [EDWARD MC GOWAN](S) who was in Russia in 1958. NOSENKO has advised that coverage of [MC GOWAN](S) was started by 7th Department but 1st Department took the case over after [MC GOWAN](S) was observed to mail a letter. Since NOSENKO was in 7th and ARTEMEV in the 1st, it is not unreasonable NOSENKO did not know of ARTEMEV's connection. ~~(S)~~ X

Another CIA tourist agent involved with ARTEMEV traveled on a diplomatic passport. It is X(U)

NOSENKO stated he was thankful at the time to the Americans for continuing the BELITSKIY operation although he had exposed it in 1962.~~(S)~~ ~~S~~ (u)

On August 1, 1968, (N-213), NOSENKO stated ARTEMEV was selected as Security Officer for the delegation because he knew English and French. The 2nd Section did not have anyone with language capabilities. This may explain why an officer of the 1st Section, would have been given the task of directing BELITSKIY in Geneva rather than an officer of the 2nd Section which handled the case. It is also noted that BELITSKIY was the subject of investigation. However, NOSENKO in the current interviews does not claim that ARTEMEV was inexperienced or that he (NOSENKO) exercised any supervisory functions of ARTEMEV's handling of BELITSKIY. ~~S~~ (u)

9. HORST BRAUNS (S)

On page 290 it is stated that NOSENKO was unaware that HORST BRAUNS (S) had corresponded with a girl friend in Leningrad and that she had spent a week with [BRAUNS] (S) in Moscow during which the recruitment attempt was made by KGB ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

COMMENT: On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that he did not know about the girl friend of [BRAUNS.] (S) He said this was probably known to KRUPNOV, his subordinate, who was the case officer. Considering NOSENKO's limited participation in the case, his lack of knowledge of the girl friend does not seem unusual. ~~(S)~~

[10. PAVEL FEDOROVICH SHAKHOV] ~~(S)~~ (U)

On page 291 it is concluded that NOSENKO did not direct the investigation of PAVEL FEDOROVICH SHAKHOV in Geneva in 1962. The SHAKHOV case is discussed on pages 276-278 and it is noted therein that NOSENKO claimed SHAKHOV was not and never had been a KGB officer. It was stated that RASTVOROV had identified him as a KGB officer, PETROV and DERYABIN reported that his photograph was familiar, BOURBON identified him as an "employee" of KGB, an FBI source said he was a pure diplomat and [SHAMROCK] (S) said he was still under suspicion. ~~S~~ (U)

(It is noted that [SHAMROCK] (S) described SHAKHOV as an agent rather than an officer of KGB.) ~~(S)~~(u)

COMMENT: NOSENKO was interviewed concerning SHAKHOV on February 24, 1968, (N-108), and related that he was a diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs from the 1930's and before that had worked for the Young Communist League in Leningrad. In the 1940's he had worked for the Soviet "Embassy" in the USA and was an FCD agent with the code name "RICHARD". In the 1950's KGB stopped work with him as an agent and put his file in the archives. He participated in many meetings and conferences relating to disarmament. In the late 1950's KGB started a "checking file" on him because he was suspected of connections with American Intelligence and there was a "signal" indicating a connection with the American diplomat [MARK.] (S) Because of these suspicions, in 1962 a plan was prepared to check him and NOSENKO was sent to Geneva as security ~~(S)~~

This suspicious behavior was somehow connected with [DAVID MARK] (S) who had worked in Moscow and who was known as an active intelligence officer. KGB decided SHAKHOV must be an agent or contact of [MARK] (S)

In addition, SHAKHOV was close to one (S) [EPSTEIN] (possibly [WILLIAM EPSTEIN, Canadian] (S) employed by the United Nations) who was suspected of connection with American, British, and Israeli Intelligence and was also at one time connected with Soviet Intelligence. Investigation of SHAKHOV had been initiated before 1962, possibly 1960 or 1961. After NOSENKO's 1962 report regarding coverage in Geneva, PETR IVANOVICH MASSYA was later sent to Geneva with a delegation and also checked SHAKHOV negatively. ~~S~~

NOSENKO commented that, although the file was closed, any KGB officer who would be present at any conference attended by SHAKHOV would be told to keep an eye on him. Also SHAKHOV would never be trusted. (~~S~~ (U) and would not be reinstated as an agent of KGB. ~~S~~(U)

With regard to the identification of SHAKHOV by the defectors mentioned above it is noted that only [SHAMROCK](S) and NOSENKO were in a position to have accurate knowledge of his connection with KGB and both identified him as a former agent rather than an officer. ~~S~~(U)

11. [JOHN SHUBIN](S)

On page 296-297 the [JOHN SHUBIN](S) case is discussed. NOSENKO claimed that [SHUBIN](S) visited the Soviet Union in 1958-59, was placed under KGB surveillance, was observed in a Ministry of Defense automobile and GRU later admitted to KGB he was of interest to GRU. Subsequently in 1962 while NOSENKO was reviewing a list of foreign visitors he noted [SHUBIN's](S) name and prohibited additional KGB investigation because of GRU's interest. The paper asserted that [SHUBIN](S) had no valid U. S. passport between 1940 and June, 1961, and if he visited the Soviet Union during that period it was not as an American tourist under his true name. Consequently he could not then have been the tourist target of the ~~(S)~~

7th Department as NOSENKO claimed. If NOSENKO was mistaken and was referring to [SHUBIN's] (S) 1961 visit he could not have noticed his name while reviewing tourist lists because NOSENKO was in the American Department at that time. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: This case has not been clarified but no ulterior motive is seen in NOSENKO's insistence that the first incident occurred in 1958-59, if it were not true. His insistence can only raise questions concerning the accuracy of his recollections. ~~TS~~ (U)

12. LEE HARVEY OSWALD u

On page 309 it is stated that NOSENKO's apparent ignorance of LEE HARVEY OSWALD's communications with the Soviet Embassy in Washington (in efforts to return to the USSR in 1963) discredits his claim to complete knowledge of all aspects of the KGB relationship with OSWALD. ~~TS~~ (U)

COMMENT: This matter has not been completely clarified although NOSENKO's lack of cognizance of this matter would not appear to seriously discredit him. OSWALD's ~~S~~ (U)

With further reference to the 1957-59 cases, NOSENKO stated on July 27, 1968, (N-212) that there was no time limitation put on BOBKOV's request. He wanted a list of recruitments and the list was prepared from available files, recollections of officers etc. without reference to year of recruitment. ~~S~~(u)

[15. Recall Telegram] ~~S~~(u)

Pages 324 and 325 relate to the recall telegram and it is noted that NOSENKO alleged that a telegram had been received by the KGB Residency in Geneva on February 4, 1964, ordering NOSENKO to return to Moscow. Eventually NOSENKO retracted this assertion and stated that there was no recall telegram; that he invented the telegram to hasten his defection. It is stated that [special intelligence](s) does not confirm the existence of the recall telegram but SCOTCH reported on February 20, 1964, that the KGB resident in New York had advised members of the Residency on February 18 or 19, 1964, concerning the content of telegrams received from KGB ~~TS~~

other officers of 7th Department examined the document to assess the effect its disclosure to the Americans by GOLITZYN would have on 7th Department cases.(~~S~~)(U)

NOSENKO described the document as ten or twelve pages in length and stated it contained the names of several foreigners against whom 7th Department was working or planned to work. He volunteered that the name [BARTHELEMY](S) was one of the names in the document and stated he did not think it contained the names of any recruited agents but only suspects or those 7th Department was interested in recruiting in the future. ~~S~~

It is clear from the above that NOSENKO not only had knowledge of data received from FCD regarding use of tourists by American Intelligence, but he also ~~S~~(U) document for [treatment of venereal disease.] (S) However, he continued as a member of the Komsomol until the year was up and kept the card for some period after his birthday. ~~S~~

NOSENKO described the Komsomol unit as very small, consisting of approximately 17 people. The Secretaries of most of the Departments were females. Dues were collected every month and there was some type of meeting every month. NOSENKO did not remember the name of the Secretary of the KGB Komsomol but stated that he dealt with MARAT SOKOLOV, a member of the Collegium of the Komsomol Bureau who was supervising the Komsomol organization in the SCD. (~~S~~) (U)

On April 22, 1968, (N-184), NOSENKO stated he was chosen as Secretary of the SCD Komsomol Unit at a meeting in September. ~~S~~ (U) previously failed to acknowledge that he knew some of these individuals. NOSENKO's current reactions to their names or photographs are set forth below(~~S~~)(U)

[A.A. LEBEDEV](S) [redacted]
Page 362

On December 2, 1967, (N-52), NOSENKO was shown a list of names which included [A.A. LEBEDEV.](S) He said he knew [LEV LEBEDEV](S) who was a Deputy to the Chief of the Special Section, SCD but he did not know [A.A. LEBEDEV.](S) [redacted]

[V.A. ZAYTSEV](~~S~~)(U)
Page 364 [redacted]

On February 15, 1968, (N-135), NOSENKO said he knew of some ZAYTESEVs but did not know this one whose photograph was shown.(~~S~~) (U)

[N.P. KULEBYAKIN](S)
Page 370 [redacted]

On April 26, 1968, (N-186), NOSENKO said [KULEBYAKIN](S) was well known but he did not know him personally. (~~S~~)

[(FIRST NAME UNKNOWN) KUROCHKIN](S)
Page 372 [redacted]

NOSENKO made no comment when this name was mentioned to him on November 14 (N-23), and December 2, 1967, (N-51)(~~S~~) (U)

O.D. KALUGIN
Page 373 ~~TS~~ (S)

NOSENKO made no comment regarding this name on October 31, (N-3), and November 20 (N-33). ~~(S)~~ (U)

VLADIMIR TULAYEV
Page 373 ~~(S)~~ (U)

On December 21, 1967, (N-77), NOSENKO did not recognize this name but leter recalled there was an Intourist translator by the name of TULAYEV. ~~(S)~~ (U)

YU. V. LYSOV (S)
Page 375

On February 14, 1968, (N-133), NOSENKO, when shown this photograph stated he had seen this person once or twice. He did not recall his name but said he was a young officer of FCD who took English examinations with NOSENKO. ~~S~~ ~~(S)~~ (U)

YU. N. PERFILEV
Page 379 ~~TS~~ (S)

On December 15, 1967, (N-73), NOSENKO did not recognize the photograph of this individual. He said he knew his father and knew there was a son but he had never seen him. (U) ~~(S)~~

ANATOLIY GOLITZYN
Page 383 ~~(S)~~ (U)

On November 6, 1967, (N-13), NOSENKO stated that he was not acquainted with GOLITZYN and did not talk to him. ~~(S)~~ (U)

GOLITZYN did talk to various other SCD officers. ~~S~~(u)

[V. D. AVDEYEV](S)
Page 389 X [redacted]

On July 20, 1968, (N-211), although he had not previously recognized [AVDEYEV's](S) photograph when displayed to him, NOSENKO stated he thought this photograph was familiar. It is considered possible that he recalled the photograph from it's previous showing to him. ~~S~~

[8. KGB Dining Rooms] ~~S~~ (u)

On page 375 (in Annex A) it is noted SCOTCH stated that NOSENKO knew many of the Chiefs and Deputies of KGB Directorates and Departments and would have knowledge of KGB hierarchy by reason of access to a dining room reserved for Chiefs and Deputies of Departments. The paper stated that NOSENKO never referred to the dining rooms until January - March, 1965, when he volunteered that he had eaten occasionally in the Chief's dining room. ~~TS~~(u)

COMMENT: On November 24, 1967, (N-39), while discussing VASILIY ROMANOVICH SITNIKOV whose (~~S~~)(u) current interrogations have clarified practically all of these cases. ~~(S)~~ [illegible] (U)

1. Actor [Proctor] S

Page 399 refers to a case involving ACTOR (or [PROCTOR]). (S) It indicates that NOSENKO said he was a valuable FCD agent who traveled overtly to Western Europe and thereafter clandestinely to the USSR. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: This case was referred to in notes brought out by NOSENKO in 1964. FBI translated the name in these notes as "EKTER." On December 8, 1967, (N-60), NOSENKO translated the name "ECTOR" but acknowledged it could be "ACTOR." He related that he had noted this name when a representative of the FCD had complained to the 7th Department, SCD, that this name had been included in a communication sent by Intourist through the open mails to various Soviet stations abroad. FCD was afraid its valuable agent would be compromised. This protest took place in 1963. ~~S~~ (U)

NOSENKO believed the agent had travelled to the USSR just prior to the protest. ~~S~~(U)

The translation of the name as "ECTOR" by NOSENKO has produced a more likely suspect than VERNON W. PROCTOR, (S) referred to in the CIA paper. This individual is JOSEPH FORTE ECTOR, JR. (S) born January 25, 1936, at Houston, (S) Texas. (S) He was a communications technician with the United States Air Force in Germany from April, 1957, to March, 1961. GABRIELLE HAMMERSTEIN (S) reported that a Soviet officer with whom she was in contact requested that she obtain biographic data concerning various individuals in West Berlin, one of whom was JOSEPH FORTE ECTOR, JR. (S) It appears that this request was made of HAMMERSTEIN (S) about February, 1961. Investigation disclosed that he is currently an employee of NSA but no record of travel since his return to the United States in March, 1961, has been located. ~~(S)~~

[2. [ROBERT ARMSTRONG] (S)

On page 402 it is indicated that NOSENKO provided no source for his information regarding [ROBERT ARMSTRONG] (S)

COMMENT: On November 14, 1967, (N-22c), NOSENKO stated he had heard from GRYAZNOV that the 1st Department suspected [ARMSTRONG] (S) was a homosexual and planned "active" work against him.

[3. [HAROLD BERMAN] (S)

On page 403 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [HAROLD BERMAN.] (S)

COMMENT: On August 1, 1968, (N-213), NOSENKO stated that [BERMAN] (S) was in the USSR several times. He was first of interest to the 7th Department in 1957 or 58 but later in 1960, when he came in connection with the Powers case, he was of interest to 1st Department.

It is noted that NOSENKO was in the 7th Department from 1955 to 1960 and in the 1st Department in 1960-61. (~~S~~)(U)

[~~4~~. [ROBERT CHARLES CHRISTNER] ~~X~~(S)

On page 407 it is stated NOSENKO did not indicate the source or date he acquired information on [ROBERT CHARLES CHRISTNER] (S)

COMMENT: On February 16, 1968, (N-141), NOSENKO stated that he remembered the name of [CHRISTNER] (S) as an auto tourist handled by the 6th Section, 7th Department, who was arrested in 1960 or 1961. He could recall nothing more.

[~~5~~. [NORMAN FISK] (S)

On page 409 it is stated that NOSENKO has not explained why he learned of the [NORMAN FISK] (S) case only in 1963 when he was reviewing the files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV although [FISK] (S) was in the USSR in 1959 when they were agents of NOSENKO. ~~TS~~

COMMENT: On February 27, 1968, (N-147), NOSENKO said he remembered the name of [FISK] (S) as a tourist, possibly a father and son but could recall nothing more. (It is noted that NOSENKO's notes in which the name [FISK] (S) was included have been destroyed.) ~~(S)~~

~~6~~. [PRESTON GROVER] (S)

On page 410 it is stated that NOSENKO indicated no source for his information on [PRESTON GROVER.] (S)

COMMENT: On March 18, 1965, (N-165), NOSENKO stated that he got this information from VLADIMIR KRIVOSHEI. ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~7~~. [STEPHEN F. HOFFMAN] (S)

On page 413 it is stated that NOSENKO claimed to be in the 7th Department at the time [STEPHEN F. HOFFMAN] (S) was a target of the 1st Section, 1st Department. [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On December 12, 1967, (N-66), NOSENKO stated that in June, 1963, GRYAZNOV of 1st ~~(S)~~

Section, 1st Department, had requested NOSENKO's (7th Department) assistance in obtaining a hotel room for a homosexual agent who was acquainted with HOFFMAN; (S) 1st Section desired to obtain photographs through the infrared process of the meeting between the agent and HOFFMAN (S) ~~(S)~~

~~X~~8. MELVIN (MARVIN) KANTOR ~~(S)~~ (U)

On page 416 it is stated that NOSENKO did not explain why the case on MARVIN (MELVIN) KANTOR ~~(S)~~ (U) was included among cases he noted as having occurred while he was in the Embassy Section in 1960-61. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: As indicated previously, NOSENKO related that in 1963 he was requested by a Deputy Chief of SCD to prepare a paper regarding agents of the 7th Department. NOSENKO in turn requested three of the Section Chiefs to give him information. Information regarding ~~(S)~~

KANTOR (~~S~~ U) was furnished by EVGENI NOSKOV, Senior Case Officer, Section 1, 7th Department, who was acting in absence of VATALI DERA, Chief of the Section. This listing of cases was not confined to the 1960-61 period but included recruitments in other years.

9. KAZAN - KOMAREK (S)

On page 417 it is stated that NOSENKO's sourcing of the lead pertaining to KAZAN-KOMAREK (S) has not been established.

COMMENT: On November 6, 1967, (N-12a), NOSENKO related that in 1961 or 1962 this individual had contacted Intourist with a proposal to send tourists to the USSR. This, of course, was within the responsibilities of 7th Department with which NOSENKO was affiliated in 1962.

10. RALPH MATLAW (S)

On page 417 it is noted that NOSENKO saw information pertaining to [RALPH MATLAW] (S) only when he was reviewing files of VOLKOV and YEFREMOV although he was their case officer when they were in touch with [MATLAW] (S) in 1959. [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: It is noted that NOSENKO's notes on [MATLAW] (S) have been destroyed. This case has not yet been discussed with NOSENKO for clarification. ~~S~~ [redacted]

11. [PHILIP NIELSEN] [redacted] (S)

On page 419 it is stated that NOSENKO claims personal knowledge of [PHILIP NIELSEN's] (S) meeting with agent [TAMARA KUNGAROVA's] (S) "father", although he was in the American Embassy Section at the time. [redacted] ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On September 2, 1968, (N-218), NOSENKO stated that he had heard of this meeting through another officer. The incident happened after NOSENKO had turned her over to another case officer. ~~S~~ (U)

12. [BERNARD PECHTER] [redacted] (S)

On page 420 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [BERNARD PECHTER]. [redacted] (S)

COMMENT: NOSENKO's notes which pertain to [PECHTER] (S) have been destroyed. On May 23, 1968, (N-197), NOSENKO stated that this case happened in 1959 before he went to the 1st Department in 1960. VLADIMIR IVANOV was working against [PECHTER] (S) and consideration was given to using GRUSHA, who had been publicly compromised in the United States in the operation. The idea was to photograph [PECHTER] (S) with GRUSHA as a means of exerting pressure on [PECHTER] (S) at a later time. This was a 7th Department case while NOSENKO was in the 7th Department. ~~S~~(U)

13. [ARON PRESSMAN] (S)

On page 421 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of information on [ARON PRESSMAN] (S) [redacted]

COMMENT: On December 5, 1967, (N-54), NOSENKO stated that the information was obtained from the special file of the 7th Department in 1963. (~~S~~(U))

14. [WALTER RASK] (S)

On page 422 it is stated that NOSENKO did not relate the [WALTER RASK] (S) case to his 1962-64 service in the 7th Department. [redacted] (X)

COMMENT: On November 28, (N-46), NOSENKO stated that this case was included among the notes furnished to him by EVGENI NOSKOV acting for Section Chief VITALI DERA in 1963 (as noted above). ~~(S)~~ (U)

15. [SPENCER ROBERTS] (S)

On page 422 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his original source of information on [SPENCER ROBERTS] (S)

COMMENT: On March 18, 1968, (N-165), NOSENKO stated that he did not recall how he learned about this case but it happened after he left the 1st Department in January, 1962. ~~(S)~~ (U)

16. [JOHANNA ROSS] (S)

On page 423 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [JOHANNA ROSS.] (S)

COMMENT: On November 10, 1967, (N-18d), NOSENKO stated that [ROSS] (S) was in the USSR as a tourist in 1959, and an agent of the 3rd Section, 7th ~~(S)~~

Department, had relations with her at the National Hotel which were photographed.

In 1962 or 1963 NOSENKO heard from GRYAZNOV that she was again in Moscow [as a tutor for the American Ambassador's children] (S) and was in "close relations" with a foreign Negro. 1st Department was planning to approach her and, if successful, to use her against American code clerks. ~~(S)~~ (U)

17. [JOHN RUFE] (S)

On page 424 it is stated that NOSENKO did not relate the [JOHN RUFE] (S) case to his 7th Department service and did not indicate the source of information ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: NOSENKO stated on November 28, 1967, (N-46), that this was one of the cases furnished by EVGENI NOSKOV in 1963 acting for VITALI DERA as indicated above. ~~S~~ (U)

18. [COLLETTE SCHWARZENBACH] (S)

On page 425 it is stated that NOSENKO did not recall ~~(S)~~

from whom he had heard about the [COLLETTE SCHWARZENBACH] (S) case. ~~(S)~~

COMMENT: On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO stated he saw the file on this case. The file was still in the 1st Section, 1st Department, in 1960. ~~(S)~~ (U)

19. [SOFIA GRETA SHATTAUER] (S)

On page 427 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [SHATTAUER.] ~~(S)~~ (S)

COMMENT: On November 28, 1967, (N-46), NOSENKO advised this was from NOSKOV as indicated above. ~~(S)~~ (U)

20. [HOWARD SOCHUREK] (S)

On page 428 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his source of information on [HOWARD SOCHUREK.] (S)

COMMENT: On January 10, 1968, (N-91), NOSENKO recalled this case while discussing cases where KGB or GRU officers came under suspicion. He stated that 7th Directorate surveillance ~~(S)~~

detected [SOCHUREK](S) in contact with a KGB officer. Such contact had not been previously approved. This was reported to the Chairman through regular channels and there was a scandal in SCD. GRIBANOV personally reprimanded the officers involved. ~~(S)~~

21. [WILLIAM TARASKA] ~~(S)~~(S)

On page 430 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his source of information on [WILLIAM TARASKA.](S)

COMMENT: It is noted that NOSENKO's notes pertaining to [TARASKA](S) have been destroyed; however, on November 16, 1967, (N-25), NOSENKO stated that this case occurred in 1959 when he was Deputy Chief of the 1st Section, 7th Department. The case officer for [TARASKA](S) was MICHAEL VINOGRADOV. On March 29, 1968, (N-174), NOSENKO stated that the Chief of 7th Department, DUBAS, had one or two meetings with him. He was considered to be recruited. ~~(S)~~

but NOSENKO did not know if he ever worked for KGB. (~~S~~)(U)

22. CARMEN TORREY S

On page 431 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate his source of information on CARMEN TORREY. (S)

COMMENT: On February 27, 1968, (N-147), NOSENKO stated that he remembered this name and that she was not an American. He said the 2nd Section of the 7th Department was working against her. (TORREY (S) was in the USSR January - February 1960). (~~S~~)

23. VASILIY VOLKOV (S)

On page 433 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on VASILIY VOLKOV. (S)

COMMENT: On November 28, 1967, (N-46), NOSENKO stated that this case was among the cases furnished to him in 1963 by EVGENI NOSKOV, acting for VITALI DERA as noted above. (~~S~~)(U)

X 24. [WILLIAM WALLACE] (S)

On page 434 it is stated NOSENKO has not indicated the source of his information on [WILLIAM WALLACE] (S) [redacted]

COMMENT: This was also one of the cases furnished NOSENKO by EVGENI NOSKOV as noted above. (~~S~~) (U)

X 25. [RALPH and EVELYN YOUNGER] (S)

On page 435 it is stated that NOSENKO did not indicate the source of his information on [RALPH and EVELYN YOUNGER] (S) [redacted]

COMMENT: On November 25, 1967, (N-41), NOSENKO stated that they were auto tourists who were caught by the 7th Department engaging in intelligence activities but the case was taken over by the 1st Department when they visited the USSR in 1961. NOSENKO was Deputy Chief of the 1st Section at that time. KOSOLAPOV, who worked closely with NOSENKO, was directly involved in the case. (~~S~~) [redacted] (U)

[IV. NEW CASES AND NEW OR CONFIRMATORY INFORMATION] [redacted] (U)

Information set forth above regarding the cases discussed in the CIA paper has clearly indicated that the current series of interrogations of NOSENKO in 1967 and 1968 have been much more thorough and have produced voluminous information clarifying data obtained from him in previous interviews. Of particular significance, however, in addition to that set forth above is information obtained during the current series of interviews which is completely new. Some of the information relates to new cases and some of it is new information on cases mentioned previously. Set forth below is a summary of the most significant data in these categories and additional new and confirmatory data obtained during the current interrogation. This material not only suggests that the previous interviews were inadequate but also appears significant in assessing the bona fides of NOSENKO. [redacted] (U)

[A. New Cases [redacted]

1. [GEORGE LUBIN,] (S) [redacted]
[WILL] (S) and [SIPE BURTIN,] (S) and [redacted]
[(FNU) SMITH] (S) [redacted]]

people of interest to PETROV of the 2nd Section. These names were ["LUBIN," "SMITH," "WILL BURTIN"] (S) and ["SIPE BURTIN."] (S) The name A. A. MIKHAILOV was listed beside the name of [LUBIN] (S) and Y. E. CHERNETSOV was listed beside the name [SMITH.] (S) NOSENKO stated that these were the case officers handling the cases of [LUBIN] (S) and [SMITH.] (S) Ditto marks under the name CHERNETSOV suggested that he also was handling the cases involving the [BURTINS.] (S) At the bottom of the sheet was a name and some numbers which NOSENKO said was the name "ZAITSEV" and a KGB telephone number. ~~TS~~

This is new information and so far as is known this material had not heretofore been observed or translated by CIA. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (u)

Investigation has disclosed that ["LUBIN"] (S) is probably identical with [GEORGE LUBIN] (S) who was in the USSR in connection with the "Plastics, USA Exhibit" in 1961, which was under the auspicies of USIA. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

[WILL] (S) and [SIPE BURTIN] (S) appear to be identical with a man and wife who in applications for passports in April, 1961, indicated they planned to depart about April 20, 1961, for a ~~(S)~~

business trip of four weeks to Italy, Germany, the Soviet Union and England. A subsequent passport application filed by [WILL BURTIN] (S) indicated that he was in Moscow from May 20-29, 1961, for "USIA." Inquiry at USIA disclosed that [WILL BURTIN] (S) was given a contract on April 13, 1961, to design, produce and install the exhibit, ["Medicine, USA"] (S) in the Soviet Union. He was instructed, however, on October 20, 1961, to stop work on the exhibit and travel expenses of $1600 submitted by him were disallowed ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

On July 19, 1968, the Director of Security, CIA, advised that in May, 1961, a component of CIA was in contact with [BURTIN] (S) to discuss problems in the [medical science] (S) field; however, it was not known whether his services were utilized. The Director of Security of CIA has also advised that [GEORGE LUBIN] (S) was of interest to a component of CIA in 1959 when he represented his company at a fair in the USSR and in 1960 when he was again scheduled to visit the Soviet Union. ~~(S)~~

[(FNU) SMITH] (S) has not been identified but may be identical with [WALTER BURGESS SMITH, II,] (S) who was in contact with ~~(S)~~

YURI V. ZAITSEV, Attache, Soviet Embassy in Washington in 1955; became employed by State Department in 1958; was detached to USIA in 1959 and assigned to the American National Exhibition in Moscow; and is currently a State Department employee. The connections of both [LUBIN](S) and [BURTIN](S) with USIA and the fact that they were both of interest to CIA are completely consistent with NOSENKO's comments regarding the type of cases handled by the 2nd Section and with PETROV's interest in establishing coverage. The same would apply to [WALTER BURGESS SMITH, II,](S) if he traveled to the USSR in 1961. However, it cannot be stated with certainty that these are the cases PETROV had in mind or, if so, whether they were the only cases in which he was interested at that time.~~(S)~~ [redacted]

2. [(FNU) HOFFMAN] (C)

On November 27, 1967 (N-43), when shown a list of American Embassy personnel which included the name [JEROME DAVID HOFFMAN,](S) NOSENKO stated there was a military officer who was in Russia for a short period in 1962 who was of interest to the 1st Section of the 1st Department which ~~(S)~~

initiated an operation against him. This man was born in Russia or his parents were born in Russia and KGB put a female agent "ELLADA" (KLARA GORBUNOVA) in contact with him and NOSENKO believes that photographs were taken of their relations. [HOFFMAN](S) told the agent that he would come again to Moscow. NOSENKO stated that he was told about this case by GRYAZNOV. Investigation to identify this individual has not been initiated but there is no reason to doubt the accuracy of NOSENKO's information.(~~S~~) [redacted]

~~X~~3. [DOMENICO CANALA](S) [redacted]

On January 13 and 30, April 10, and August 1, 1968, NOSENKO furnished information pertaining to this case. On January 13 (N-97), he stated that ALEKSANDR STEPANOVICH MALYUGIN was working with agent "AMICO" (PIETRO CECCHI), an Italian cook working in Spaso House. He said that MALYUGIN had another Italian agent who was working in the Argentine Embassy. On January 30 (N-114), NOSENKO stated that MALYUGIN recruited an Italian cook of the Argentine Embassy, a friend of PIETRO CECCHI, in the late 1950's. About 1960 or the beginning of 1961 this agent left Moscow for New York to work as a cook (~~S~~)(U) for the representative of Holland to the United Nations. This agent's file was transferred to the 1st Department of FCD which was planning to work with him in the U. S. ~~S~~ (U)

On April 10, 1968 (N-178), NOSENKO stated that this Italian agent may have been recruited on a homosexual basis and had gone to New York to work as a cook for either the Belgian or Dutch representative to the United Nations. BORIS IVANOV, KGB resident in New York, was in Moscow about this time and was very interested in this cook. NOSENKO believed that he might recognize the name of this agent. (~~S~~ U)

Investigation disclosed that the individual referred to by NOSENKO was most likely identical with [DOMENICO CANALA,] (S) Italian, born in 1920, who arrived in New York August 31, 1960, and thereafter served as an employee in the household of the [Belgian] (S) Ambassador to the United Nations, [WALTER LORIDAN.] (S) Subsequently, in 1961, he began employment as a cook in the (S) [Argentine] Embassy in Washington, D. C. (~~S~~)

On August 1, 1968 (N-213), NOSEKNO was shown the photographs and names of PIETRO CECCHI and [DOMENICO CANALA] (S) at which time he stated that he recognized [CANALA's] (S) name (~~S~~)

and he was the friend of CECCHI recruited by MALYUGIN. He said CANALA (S) had given "some hint" to MALYUGIN concerning another Italian working in another Embassy who was a homosexual. ~~(S)~~

CANALA (S) was interviewed by FBI Agents on August 14 and 16, 1968. He immediately recognized the photograph of MALYUGIN and related how he had been "set up" in Moscow for black market activities. An Indian had requested that he sell some watches. He sold one to a Russian chauffeur and was in contact with another Russian to sell two more. They were picked up by KGB and he agreed to additional meetings under threat of prosecution. MALYUGIN translated at the time of the arrest and subsequently was in contact with CANALA (S) about four or five times. Prior to his departure from Russia another Soviet was introduced to CANALA. (S) He selected the photograph of BORIS SEMONEVICH IVANOV as resembling this individual whom he saw for about fifteen minutes. Arrangements were made for subsequent contact in New York but CANALA (S) did not follow through. In 1961 or 1962 he was contacted by a Soviet in Washington. He selected the photograph of VLADIMIR PAVLOVICH ZAITSEV as the Soviet. CANALA (S) maintained that he refused to cooperate with ZAITSEV and has had no further contact. CANALA (S) also denied ~~(S)~~

that he had furnished information to the Soviets in Moscow but stated that he was afraid not to continue to meet with them. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

~~4.~~ [ERY WHITAKER KEHAYA] (S) [redacted]

On April 2, 1968 (N-176), NOSENKO stated that while looking at an encyclopedia he had seen the name of a flower which reminded him of a KGB agent with an unusual Jewish name FIAKSEL. This agent was married to an American furrier. He also recalled another furrier whose name was ["HOLLENDER"] (S) and another case involving a father and son who were in the tobacco business. This father and son were Americans who had traveled to the USSR and were of interest to MIKHAIL FEDOROVICH SHISHKIN of the 7th Department which had an operation against the son involving KLARA K. GORBACHEVA. (NOSENKO later corrected this name to KLARA KONSTANTINOVA GORBUNOVA.) ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

On April 4, 1968 (N-176), NOSENKO stated that SHISHKIN at one time was Chief of the 1st Section of the 7th Department but later was demoted and became a Senior Case Officer in the Section handling businessmen in the late 1950's. The case involving the American tobacco man and his son occurred in the ~~(S)~~

period 1957-59 and possibly in 1959. NOSENKO stated that possibly the name of the young man was ["ERIC."] (~~S~~)

On April 12, 1968 (N-179), a list of names including those of [ERYIK KEHAYA](S) and his son [ERY WHITAKER KEHAYA](S) was displayed to NOSENKO. He selected the name [KEHAYA](S) and stated he believed this was the name of the father and son previously mentioned by him. After seeing the name he recalled that he name of the young man was [ERY](S) rather than ["ERIC."](S) He did not know if a recruitment approach had been made to these individuals. ~~S~~

Investigation disclosed that the [KEHAYA's](S) have been in the tobacco business for many years and have traveled throughout the world including trips to the USSR. ~~S~~(U)

[5. Unknown Subject;] ~~S~~(U)

[American Owner of Hotel or Restaurant] ~~S~~(U)

On December 15, 1967, (N-73), NOSENKO stated that when Premier KHRUSHCHEV came to the United States he was accompanied by various individuals including a Deputy Chief of the 9th Directorate of KGB named SAHNO (or SAKHNO). This individual dealt with managers of hotels and restaurants in connection with KHRUSHCHEV's visit. In 1962 an American tourist, who was the owner of a hotel or restaurant, probably in New ~~S~~(U)

York, came to Moscow and requested through Intourist to see SAHNO. SAHNO told NOSENKO that he knew this man and asked NOSENKO to accompany him to a meeting with him. The meeting took place in the office of ANKUDINOV, Chief of Intourist and VLADIMIR BABKIN, Chief of an Intourist Department, was also present. The meeting was purely social and there was no recruitment attempt. On March 15, 1968 (N-164), NOSENKO in discussing this case, stated that this man was probably manager of a hotel and merely wanted to see SAHNO out of politeness. ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (U)

Investigation to date has not identified this individual. (Note: NOSENKO made reference to this incident while discussing the 9th Directorate on July 9 or 13, 1964 but a separate case was not initiated.) ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (U)

~~6.~~ [SAM SIDNEY HOLLANDER] [redacted] (S)

As indicated above NOSENKO mentioned a furrier by the name of ["HOLLENDER"] (S) on April 2, 1968. This case was discussed with him again on April 4 and 12, 1968 (N-176, 179). He stated that he did not know the first name but the man was a furrier who was in the USSR on several occasions. KGB was working against him in the early 1950's and possibly also in the late 1950's. His case was handled by the Section in the 7th Department which handled businessmen. NOSENKO did not know whether this man had been recruited. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

Investigation has disclosed that the individual referred to by NOSENKO is undoubtedly [SAM SIDNEY HOLLANDER,] (S) a fur broker in New York who has made a number of trips to the Soviet Union. [HOLLANDER] (S) has been interviewed and has advised that he lived with a Soviet woman during his stay in the USSR [from 1941-1945.] (S) This woman's name was [RAYA GRANICK.] (S) He also advised that he had met TATIANA FIAKSEL about 1946 in the Soviet Union. She later married a friend of his, DANIEL SHERICH also engaged in the fur business in New York. [HOLLANDER] (S) did not admit being contacted by Soviet Intelligence but stated he had always suspected that TATIANA F. SHERICH was working for Soviet Intelligence from the time that he had first met her. ~~S~~

B. Additional Significant Data u

[On Cases Previously Reported] ~~S~~ (u)

[1. JOHN DISCOE SMITH (ZHARI)] ~~S~~ (u)

This case illustrates the inadequacy of the processing of information obtained from NOSENKO during previous interviews. On June 25, 1964, NOSENKO furnished information concerning an American code clerk who had defected to the USSR and who was being handled by NIKOLAY SEMENOVICH ~~S~~ (u)

KGB as reported by [SHAMROCK] (S) during early 1967. NOSENKO's information relating to "ZHARI's" connection with India suggested that he was identical with SMITH who was stationed in India from 1955 to 1959 as a code clerk and communications technician. He transferred to Vienna, Austria, in late 1959 but resigned from State Department in December, 1959. SMITH's whereabouts was unknown from May or early June, 1960, until October, 1967, when the Soviets publicized his defection and reported he was in the USSR. ~~S~~ (u)

NOSENKO was reinterviewed concerning this matter on October 31, November 29, and December 6, 1967 (N-3, 47, 57), and furnished basically the same information as previously furnished. He was of the opinion that FCD had taken "ZHARI" from India and believed that he had first heard about him in 1961; however, ARTEMEV was connected with him in 1962. ~~S~~ (u)

There is little doubt that inquiries in 1964 regarding communications personnel stationed in India prior to 1961 would have discovered the JOHN DISCOE SMITH case three years before the case was reported by [SHAMROCK.] (S) ~~S~~ (u) for this agent was PAVEL FEDEROVICH PANKRATOV who introduced the agent to NOSENKO because NOSENKO was considering the possibility of using her against correspondent [KENNETH BRODNEY.] (S) He and PANKRATOV had a short meeting with her on the street and NOSENKO was introduced to her by PANKRATOV as his KGB colleague. She had been an agent for some time and used on a "neutral base," (occasionally when there was a need on a particular target). PANKRATOV told NOSENKO it would be easy for her to agree to have "close relations" (intimate relations) with a foreigner and NOSENKO said he did not use her against [BRODNEY] (S) but later saw her file when it was in possession of KOVSHUK. ~~S~~

NOSENKO said that he had met this agent with PANKRATOV in 1954 and it would have been before mid-1954 when PANKRATOV was transferred from the 1st Department. On April 16, 1968, (N-181), NOSENKO said that KOVSHUK had the file on FIAKSEL in 1960 or 1961 but he did not know why KOVSHUK was holding the file and did not know if KOVSHUK had taken the file over from PANKRATOV in mid-1954. At the time KOVSHUK had the file it was reported that she was coming back to Russia (from the U. S.). (~~S~~) ~~S~~ (U)

[4. NIKOLAI SKVORTSOV] [redacted] (~~S~~)(U)

On June 29, 1968, (N-206), a photograph containing the name of ALEKSANDR MIKHALYLOVICH CHECHEVITSYN was displayed to NOSENKO who identified the photograph as an old photograph of SKVORTSOV. It is noted that CHECHEVITSYN had accompanied ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH SOLOVYEV to Bangkok in 1960 were SOLOVYEV was in contact with a [State Department communications technician, ANTHONY LAPKA.] (S) This contact was the first step of an attempted recruitment of [LAPKA] (S) who went to Italy later in 1960. It is noted also that NOSENKO advised that SKVORTSOV during 1960-61 was trying to get a visa to go to Italy (~~S~~) [redacted]

Recruitment approaches were made to [LAPKA] (S) by the Soviets in Italy in 1960 and in France in 1962. He was prominently mentioned in information furnished by SHAMROCK which undoubtedly emanated from JOHN DISCOE SMITH, who was well known to [LAPKA.] (S)

D. Significant Confirmatory Information U

~~1.~~ [STRUKOV and URYVAYEV] (~~S~~)(U)

On June 29, 1968, (N-206), NOSENKO was shown a list of 165 Soviets who applied for visas to come to the United (~~S~~)(U)

States in 1963 and 1964 under the sponsorship of the Council on Student Travel of the YMCA East-West Committee. NOSENKO selected the photograph of VLADIMIR GRIGORYEVICH STRUKOV which he said was familiar and he thought he was a young officer who "practiced" in SCD in 1962-63 after studying at the higher school of KGB. He also recognized the photograph and name of YURIY VLADIMIROVICH URYVAYEV as a senior case officer in Section 4 of 7th Department. He then recalled that STRUKOV had been afraid to come to the United States. He and URYVAYEV had been selected as security officers for the group but URYVAYEV for some reason did not receive a visa. STRUKOV became an officer in 2nd Section, 7th Department in 1963. (~~S~~) (U)

After the interview of NOSENKO a recheck of FBI records disclosed that STRUKOV did come to the United States but URYVAYEV did not. While this is not of major importance, it is considered a significant indication that NOSENKO's knowledge of KGB was not derived from KGB briefing but from actual service as an officer. ~~S~~ (U)

2. [RICHARD DONALD SHAFFER] (S)

On March 5, 1968, (N-155), NOSENKO recognized the name [RICHARD DONALD SHAFFER] (S) on a list of American Embassy (~~S~~)

personnel. He described [SHAFFER] (S) as head of the Sergeants at American House who was spying on the Russian agents in American House and giving KGB trouble. The KGB, therefore, used some "medicine" against him to make him leave. This was done by placing the "medicine" in his bed. This caused an illness which the doctors did not diagnose. NOSENKO thought [SHAFFER] (S) left Moscow in 1960. The case officer working against him was VLADIMIR DEMKIN. ~~(S)~~

FBI files indicate that [SHAFFER's] (S) U. S. Army Attache and security files were reviewed on May 6, 1963. They disclosed that he arrived in Moscow May 8, 1958, and was assigned duties as manager of American House. He was scheduled to leave Moscow May 7, 1960, but got an extended tour for another year. However, he left April 10, 1961, before the year was up as he was suffering from erysipelas with severe skin rash, swelling about the face and a temperature. It was noted that [SHAFFER] (S) had excellent efficiency ratings and had been commended for his assistance to the exhibit manager of the American National Exhibition in Moscow. ~~(S)~~

This also is considered as significant indication that NOSENKO is furnishing information from personal knowledge and not from KGB briefing. ~~(S)~~ (U)

3. RALPH and EVELYN YOUNGER (S)

Page 435 of the CIA paper describes the KGB operation involving the captioned individuals who were arrested and recruited by KGB during 1961 while visiting the USSR. NOSENKO reported that his former subordinate, V. V. KOSOLAPOV, was directly involved in the case. After the YOUNGER's (S) departure from Moscow they reported their arrest to U. S. authorities and furnished descriptions of the individuals involved in their recruitment.

On June 22, 1968, (N-205), the descriptions furnished by the YOUNGERs (S) were discussed with NOSENKO. He suggested that "VIKTOR" described by them would be KOSOLAPOV; the "General" described by them was probably SERGEY MIKHAYLOVICH FEDOSEYEV, and "OLA" was probably BOGDANOVA, a female officer of 1st Section. When shown photographs of one NINA BOGDANOVA and one ELENA BOGDANOVA, NOSENKO believed that NINA BOGDANOVA was identical with the female officer of the 1st Section, 1st Department, who was involved in the YOUNGER (S) case. He also stated that VLADIMIR L'VOVICH ARTEMEV, an officer of the 1st Department, was involved.

Subsequently photographs of KOSOLAPOV, FEDOSEYEV, ARTEMEV, and the two BOGDANOVAs were displayed to the [YOUNGERs] (S) who made firm identifications of KOSOLAPOV, FEDOSEYEV, and NINA BOGDANOVA as being involved in their case. They were not certain that ARTEMEV was involved. ~~S~~

[4. Trip of NOSENKO's Mother] ~~S~~ [redacted] (U)

On May 15, 1968, (N-194), NOSENKO in conversation mentioned that his mother had accompanied Madam KOSYGINA on a trip to the Mediterranean and Western Europe in 1956, possibly on the "Poebeda." ~~S~~ [redacted] (U)

An Italian source reported to CIA concerning the visit of the "S. S. Pobeda" to Naples, Italy, on September 11-14, 1956. Included in the list of 400 passengers were KLAUDYA KOSYGINA born in 1908, passport number 123494, issued August 27, 1956, and TAMARA NOSENKO, born 1910, passport number 123495 issued August 27, 1956. ~~S~~ (U) [redacted]

~~5.~~ [COLLETTE SCHWARZENBACH] (S) [redacted]

Pages 424 and 425 of the CIA paper contain information concerning the captioned individual. NOSENKO reported that while she was working in Moscow she fell in love with a KGB agent and was the target of an unsuccessful KGB recruitment attempt. ~~S~~ (U)

It was noted that she reported this recruitment approach in January, 1959, and later furnished details of this attempt to a State Department security officer. [redacted] ~~S~~(u)

This case is undoubtedly identical with a case previously reported by ANATOLIY GOLITZYN concerning an American secretary who rebuffed a recruitment attempt. The two cases had not been tied together prior to the current series of interviews of NOSENKO. ~~(S)~~ (U)

6. GABRIEL REINER - (S)
VLADIMIR DMITRYEVICH CHELNOKOV ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

On November 18, 1967, (N-30), NOSENKO furnished a written memorandum in which he identified GABRIEL REINER (S) as head of "Cosmos" Travel Bureau (S) who dealt with Intourist and visited Russia several times. He worked with his son, SAM, (S) and both were suspected by KGB of having FBI connections. In 1960 CHELNOKOV, who was Chief of the 7th Department, became acquainted with REINER (S) under cover of Intourist. Thereafter he was in contact with REINER (S) when the latter was in Moscow. REINER (S) had CHELNOKOV's telephone number and CHELNOKOV received a telephone call from REINER (S) (who was abroad) on one occasion when NOSENKO was in CHELNOKOV's office. ~~(S)~~ [redacted]

On November 18, 1967, (N-31), NOSENKO stated that although [REINER] (S) would have considered CHELNOKOV to be an Intourist official, NOSENKO believed [REINER], (S) who was very sly, "suspected" CHELNOKOV and used him to settle questions which could not be settled through Intourist. He did not believe that [REINER] (S) would know CHELNOKOV's full name and said that CHELNOKOV had a "city number." NOSENKO had previously explained that KGB officers frequently gave their contacts a "city telephone number" rather than the telephone number of their KGB office although the telephone would be physically located in the office of the KGB officer. ~~(S)~~

On July 3, 1968, (N-207), NOSENKO stated he did not know whether [REINER] (S) knew CHELNOKOV under his true name. On June 10, 1968, a photograph of CHELNOKOV was displayed to [REINER] (S) who failed to recognize it. However, he stated that he knew two Soviets named CHELNOKOV; one worked in the section of Intourist that handled Intourist guides and appeared to hold the position of supervisor. The other was introduced to him in 1958 by an Intourist official SERGI M. GUSKOV, as "an important friend" who could help [REINER] (S) secure an appropriate X gift parcel license. The introduction took place in the Intourist office in Moscow and subsequent meetings occurred in this office or at [REINER's](S) hotel. [REINER](S) recalled having telephoned CHELNOKOV on several occasions from the U. S. concerning specific situations involving issuance of tourist visas and related matters.

7. [VIRGIL KRAFT](S)

Pages 129-130 of the CIA paper discuss the case reported by NOSENKO involving KGB approach to [VIRGIL KRAFT,](S) [a clergyman from the Chicago area.](S) NOSENKO had reported that [KRAFT](S) was compromised on the basis of intimacies with a Soviet woman which were photographed by the KGB. The recruitment approach to [KRAFT](S) was made by DUBAS, Chief of the 7th Department, who extracted an agreement from [KRAFT](S) not to criticize the Soviet Union. This approach was made in 1957 or 1958 and DUBAS again contacted [KRAFT](S) when he came to Moscow in 1963. Thereafter [KRAFT's](S) file was turned over to the FCD.

[KRAFT](S) was interviewed by FBI Agents in November, 1964, and confirmed that he had been approached and photographs of him and the Soviet female in compromising positions displayed to him;

however, he denied intimacies with the Soviet woman or agreement to collaborate with the KGB. ~~(S)~~

During the interview KRAFT (S) made available a photograph depicting him and the Soviet woman (NADEZHDA KOLESNIKOVA or KOLESHNIKOVA or KALESHNIKOVA). This photograph was displayed to NOSENKO on May 3, 1968, (N-188), who immediately recognized the photograph of KRAFT (S) and stated that he believed the woman was the Soviet woman with whom he had been compromised. However, he could not be absolutely sure because the hair style appeared to be different. ~~(S)~~

NOSENKO stated that although DUBAS (KONSTANTIN NIKITOVICH DUBAS) was Chief of the 6th Department in 1962 or 1963 when KRAFT (S) returned to the USSR, he was invited to contact KRAFT (S) because he had previously talked to him. NOSENKO believed that YURIY BELIKOV served as interpreter for DUBAS during the first interview (1957 or 1958), but DUBAS was probably accompanied by somebody from the 6th Department in the 1962 or 1963 interview. ~~(S)~~

On July 15, 1968, photographs of DUBAS and BELIKOV were displayed to KRAFT (S) by FBI Agents. He immediately identified the photograph of DUBAS as "the Chief" who had made the approach to him. He said the photograph of BELIKOV resembled ~~(S)~~

124-10369-10022

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-10369-10022

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 62-117290-ADMIN FOLDER-Y8

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : JONES
TO : WICK

TITLE :

DATE : 12/28/1966
PAGES : 322

SUBJECTS :
HSCA ADMINISTRATIVE FOLDER, LEE HARVEY OSWALD
VOLUME XII

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/23/1999

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : INC FOLDER, MEMO, A/T, TTY, LET, NOTES, LHM, PRESS RELEASES, TESTIMONY, NEWS ARTICLES, TRANSLATION

SECRET

1-Mr. Mohr
1-Mr. Sullivan
1-Mr. Callahan
1-Mr. Conrad

SAC, WFO [(100-18032)] (S)

11/22/66

Director, FBI [(100-357510)] (S)

1-Mr. Baker
1-Mr. Allen

[OFFICE OF THE SOVIET MILITARY ATTACHE
IS - R; CLOSED CIRCUIT TELEVISION] (S)

Classified by SP6BJA/GCL
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ 12/5/84
#21,326

ReBuairtel 10/25/66 reflecting installation authorization. ~~(S)~~ (U)

This letter is for information and record purposes. ~~(S)~~ (U)

In response to your request, a new closed-circuit television system was recently installed in connection with the captioned case. The system consists of a remotely controlled video camera, zoom lens and pan-tilt head mounted in a special disguise. A 17-inch monitor is located nearby and provides a view of the pertinent scene. Monitor personnel can remotely change the focal length, focus, aperture and field of view of the lens. Certain compensation for changing light conditions can also be made at the monitoring site. (S)

Attached is a technical addendum listing the equipment installed together with special circuit and cable data to assist WFO personnel in the maintenance of the equipment. Appropriate inventory changes should be made. ~~(S)~~ (U)

1 - [80-829] (S)

CTA:ev
(10)

ENCLOSURE

Enclosures (2)

REC- 47 (S)

53 DEC 9 1966

19 NOV 30 1966

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

DEC 5 1966

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

T oswald folder

SECRET

Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. 8/22/66

S. J. Papich

JOACHIM JOESTEN
INTERNAL SECURITY - RUSSIA

On 8/19/66, Cal Tenney, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised that the Swiss Federal Police received a letter from the subject, postmarked Milan, Italy, on 8/13/66, which read as follows:

"The final accounting with the Johnson gang is imminent. Each of you who continues to partake in the actions of the Johnson gang or their German officials, the Gehlen gang, or those who disrupt the plans of American patriots against the usurper regime, will shortly pay with their lives. Be it well understood, Greetings."

Tenney advised that this information has been disseminated by CIA to the White House and Secret Service.

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Soviet Section.

1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:rab
(4)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. JDA 2/22/99
AS SANITIZED

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/gcl
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK) 2/22/99

SECRET

3P2-100. 48

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10370-10012
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-117290-ADMIN FOLDER-M6

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	DOJ/CRIM
TITLE :	
DATE :	12/20/1977
PAGES :	244
SUBJECTS :	HSCA ADMINISTRATIVE FOLDER, ASSASSINATION MATTERS VOLUME XII
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/04/1999
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC FOLDER, LHM, MEMO, LET, MAILGRAM, NEWS ARTICLES, TTY, R/S, NEWS RELEASE, FD-302, SUMMARY, A/T, ENVELOPE

OCT 17 4 08 PM '77
RECEIVED
FEDERAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION
COMMUNICATIONS SECTION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. GMB 8/24/84
AS SANITIZED

[illegible]

RR RUFBI

DE RUEAIIA #4991 2901923

ZNY SSSSS

R 171607Z OCT 77

FM CIA

TO RUFBI/FEDERAL BUREAU OF IN//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

RUEHC/DEPT OF STATE//SY/I/PIP

RUEKJCS/DIA

RUEOIAA/DIRNSA

RUERSS/SECRET SERVICE//INTELLIGENCE DIVISION

BT

S E C R E T. CITE CIA 119969.

FIRCI-312/03383-77

S E C R E T--WARNING NOTICE - SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED--NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS - NOT RELEASABLE TO CONTRACTORS OR CONTRACTOR/CONSULTANTS--DISSEMINATION AND EXTRACTION OF INFORMATION CONTROLLED BY ORIGINATOR.

SUBJECT: ALLEGATIONS BY CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN JAMAICA CONCERNING THE ROLE OF CERTAIN CUBAN EXILES IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY

1. THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION WAS ACQUIRED BY CIA PURSUANT TO

62-109[illegible]-177 CARBON COPY DO NOT FILE

ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE THE U.S.

(S)

2. ACCORDING TO [OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN KINGSTON, JAMAICA], A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT ENRIQUE MONTERO LEZCANO, MINISTER-COUNSELOR OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN KINGSTON, MADE CERTAIN ALLEGATIONS ON 24 SEPTEMBER 1977 CONCERNING THE ROLE OF CUBAN EXILES IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY. MONTERO MADE THESE ALLEGATIONS DURING THE COURSE OF HIS ADDRESS TO THE REGULAR MONTHLY MEETING OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CUBA MEMBERS ASSIGNED TO JAMAICA. THE MEETING WAS HELD IN THE CUBAN EMBASSY. MONTERO SAID, AMONG OTHER THINGS, THAT CUBAN EXILES SUCH AS FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER DIAZ LAN (FNU) AND OTHERS HAD BEEN INVOLVED IN THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. MONTERO REFERRED TO THE ASSASSINATION IN THE CONTEXT OF A SECURITY LECTURE IN WHICH MONTERO CLAIMED THAT COUNTER-REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITIES BY CUBAN EXILES HAVE INCREASED IN RECENT MONTHS. MONTERO SAID RECENT INFORMATION HAD ARRIVED IMPLICATING DIAZ IN THE KENNEDY ASSASSINATION. MONTERO DID NOT MENTION ANY OTHER CUBAN EXILES BY NAME OR ANY FURTHER DETAILS. MONTERO DID NOT IDENTIFY THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION, ALTHOUGH OUR SOURCE HAD THE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/15/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-10371-10015
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	62-117290-ADMIN FOLDER-B

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	NIS
FROM :	NIS
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/18/1978
PAGES :	61
SUBJECTS :	HSCA ADMINISTRATIVE FOLDER, THIRD AGENCY CLEARANCE REQUESTS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/06/1999
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	INC FOLDER, INDEX, S/S, LET, ENV, REPORTS, RAP SHEET, LHM, MEMO, NOTES, DESPATCH, A/T, TELEGRAM, DATA REPORT, AIRGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

SECRET
SENSITIVE

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS
K 12-15-97
SCD/KSR
3/6/98 (JFK)

9 SEP 1974

N.W.

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation

ATTENTION : Intelligence Division

SUBJECT : Travel to Florida of an agent for the Soviets in Bogota to report on Cuban Exile Activities

place in
105-[illegible] (PRP)

1. Reference is made to our CIR-316/00990-74 dated 17 April 1974 and to your reply of 11 July 1974.

[illegible] (S)

2. [Carlos Miguel KASSEL (also known as GACEL) Castro] (S) was in Miami, Florida from 11 August to 29 August 1974.

3 (S) [KASSEL]'s natural cover for his stay in Miami and contacts with Cuban exiles was that of "Asistente Internacional" to the Union de Trabajadores de Colombia (UTC) and "Jefe de Redaccion" of "Justicia Social" published by the UTC in Bogota. Since the UTC is sympathetic to and supports some Cuban exile groups, (S) [KASSEL] feels his visit to and expenses in Miami can be fully justified within the context of his functions as a UTC official.

4. The following were (S) [KASSEL]'s main contacts in the Miami area:

A. Ignacio LEDON Iglesias, former Miami area committee Secretary for Propaganda of the Partido Revolucionario del Pueblo (PRP), left-winger, friend of Mario RIVADULLA (see below).

REC-89 105-9680-[illegible]

B. Mario RIVADULLA, PRP official and radio personality in Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic. RIVADULLA arrived in Miami from Santo Domingo on 14 August.

6 SEP ~~18~~ 1974

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

CIRA-0500-74
Classified by 061393. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of .EO. 11652 Exemption Category 5B(2). Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

Yellow cc to
WFO 2/27/75

SECRET -
SENSITIVE

XEROX
NOV 20 1974

105-89680-37

2.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

C. Ramiro de LA FE, brother of Ernesto de LA FE who had been recently released from jail in Cuba.

D. Rolando MASFERRER, Editor of "Libertad."

E. Alberto DIAZ Masvidal, Editor of "Miami Extra."

F. Max LESNIK, Editor of "Replica."

G. Vicente RUBIERA, leader of Telephone Workers Trade Union in Miami.

H. Santiago REY Pernas, former Cuban Minister of Interior.

I. Alberto del RIO Chaviano, former Brig. General in the Cuban Army.

5. Following are highlights of [KASSEL](S)s report for our representative who met him in Miami:

A. The Partido Revolucionario del Pueblo (PRP) has ceased to exist for all practical purposes. According to Ignacio LEDON, responsibility for the disintegration of the PRP falls on its leader Antonio SANTIAGO, whom [KASSEL](S) describes as a "farsante."

B. Mario RIVADULLA, a member of the PRP Executive Committee who now lives in Santo Domingo, told [KASSEL](S) that it is impossible to organize a political movement in exile which would be capable of influencing in any way the development of events in Cuba. RIVADULLA now believes that there is no alternative but to await a spontaneous change of events in Cuba and a possible overthrow or assassination of Castro by the military.

C. [KASSEL](S) attended a meeting of about 15 persons on 16 August presided over by Rolando MASFERRER, Director of the weekly "Libertad." MASFERRER told the participants that they should begin firing practice on a Florida farm to prepare themselves for action against Cuba before November, because he (MASFERRER) is sure that Castro will be overthrown by that time. MASFERRER pointed out that U.S. Security and

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

Intelligence Services are aware of his plans and that he has no difficulty in their implementation. Participants at the meeting were then asked to contribute funds for the purchase of weapons; the total cash raised exceeded $1,000.00. [KASSEL](S) commented that it is his impression that the funds raised were intended for MASFERRER's personal use rather than the purchase of weapons.

D. [KASSEL](S) discussed with Ramiro de LA FE the possibility of founding a conspiratorial and secret political movement to create a mechanism of penetrating Cuba for the purpose of contributing to conditions which would result in a military coup against Castro. The movement would be headed "in absentia" by Ernesto de LA FE, who had been released from prison in Cuba two months ago. The decision to launch this movement was made on 25 August in the apartment of Ramiro de LA FE. Present at that time, in addition to [KASSEL](S) and Ramiro de LA FE, were Armando MEDINA, Manuel CAVEDAS and Miguel A. ZERQUEIRA (Cubans) and Juan LÓPEZ (naturalized American). The new movement was named Movimiento Independente Radical de Cuba (MIRC) and Ramiro de LA FE was named its temporary leader until such time as Ernesto de LA FE can leave Cuba. The MIRC will seek contact with Cuban armed forces to launch a coup against Castro and it will also seek contact with anti-Communist groups in Brazil and with the government of Chile. Ramiro de LA FE claimed already to have contact with Patricia BERDUGO, a Chilean supposedly working for the Chilean Intelligence Service in Miami. During the meeting, Armando MEDINA said that he had once worked for CIA and that he participated in an attack on a Spanish merchant vessel which was mistaken for the Sierra Maestra of the Cuban Merchant Fleet. [KASSEL](S) was named [the Editor of the MIRC Manifesto](S) which will be published in the Latin American press on 10 October.

E. [KASSEL](S) met with Alberto DIAZ Masvidal, Editor-in-Chief of "Miami Extra," and offered his services as an unpaid contributor of articles from Bogota. The offer was accepted.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

6. [KASSEL's draft report to his Soviet contact in Bogota is a single-spaced nine-page paper entitled "Composicion Politica de la Emigracion Cubana en Miami, Florida." It covers those groups with which KASSEL has become most familiar: the PRP, the MIRC, Alfa 66, and several other minor groups. Following are highlights of that report.] (S)

A. [In response to a specific requirement from KASSEL's Soviet contact to determine if U.S. Government agencies, including specifically the CIA, support any of these groups, KASSEL makes emphatically clear in his report that none of the exile groups have the support of the U.S. Government, although some groups falsely claim to have such support. He points out that the U.S. Government not only ignores the political exiles, but places high priority on its relations with the USSR and is "disposed" to lift the blockade of Cuba and reestablish relations with Havana. In connection with the latter point, KASSEL reports on his interview with Dr. Alberto DIAZ Masvidal, Director of the Spanish edition of Miami Herald, who told KASSEL that reestablishment of U.S. - Cuban relations is now imminent.] (S)

B. Regarding on-island operations of Cuban exile groups, [KASSEL] concludes that none of them have any operational contacts in Cuba.

C. Regarding terrorism, [KASSEL] (S) reports that Dr. Orlando BOSCH, a fugitive from the U.S. who now lives in Venezuela under an assumed identity, and Antonio VECIANA, a founding member of the PRP who is now in prison, have a plan of attack against Cuban embassies and consulates and against Soviet Bloc missions in Latin America, to be put into effect when Venezuela, Costa Rica, and other unidentified countries reestablish relations with Cuba. He also singles out Jose de Jesus QINQAUMA, a Cuban political gangster who last year planned an attack against a Soviet family in Venezuela, and the Frente Unido de Liberacion, which was formed this month in Miami and which announced the launching of a terrorist campaign against Cuban and Soviet Bloc diplomatic installations in the entire Western Hemisphere.

WARNING NOTICE
SENSITIVE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS INVOLVED

7. If you wish, we will forward to you copies of (S) [KASSEL]'s reports to our representative (paragraph 5 above) [and to his Soviet contact in Bogota] (S) (paragraph 6 above).

8. We shall advise you if [KASSEL] (S) visits Miami again [on a mission for his Soviet contact in Bogota.] (S) If and when he does, we shall request that a Miami representative of the Bureau participate in our representative's meetings with [KASSEL] (S) as the subject matter of [KASSEL]'s (S) reporting is of direct interest to the Bureau.

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS:

[Herbert W. Natzke] (S)
fo David A. Phillips

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90037-10081
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	100-380792-26

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	BN
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/29/1959
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	MARTIN GREENDLINGER
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/07/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA, INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

SECRET

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

RA

cf 2/9

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI

DATE: 1/29/59

FROM : LEGAT, BONN (100-633)

SUBJECT: MARTIN GREENDLINGER, aka
SECURITY MATTER - C

Classified by SPGBJA/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 8/28/85
(SPS MAC/GCL - 4/15/94 - JFK)

4-1

Reference New York letterhead memorandum 11/17/58, furnished by Bureau routing slip 11/24/58.

The following agencies were furnished a summary of the New York information on the subject and were requested to provide any information which might come to their attention regarding the subject's travels or activities:

G-2, Headquarters, U.S. Army Europe;
Office of Special Investigations, U.S. Air Forces, Europe;
[Office of Coordinator and Special Advisor (confidential CIA),
American Embassy, Bonn, Germany;] (S)
[British Services Security Organization, British Forces in Germany;
Abteilung II (Security Police), Austrian Ministry of the Interior;
Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV - West German Federal Office
for the Protection of the Constitution)] and, [S]
Security Office, American Embassy, Vienna, Austria.

None of these agencies, [except the British] (S) have furnished any information to date. [The British Services Security Organization advised under date of 12/30/58, that it had no trace in its records on the subject, his [S] parents, Mr. and Mrs. DAVID GREENDLINGER, or his wife, ELENA IVANOVNA] Greendlinger
Mrs. Martin Greendlinger

RUC.

LOC.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 10-10-97

REC- 60

100 - 380792 - 26

3 - Bureau
1 - Bonn
(4) GAV:tlc

7 FEB 3 1959

EX-102

SUBV. CONTROL

AGENCY ICC - NH
REQ. REC'D
DATE FORW. 2-16-59
HOW FORW. R/S
BY IDH:mn

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

52 FEB 11 1959

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90041-10023
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 97-3856-13

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/26/1959
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	CRUZADA REVOLUCIONARIA ANTI COMUNISTA JOSE RASCO BERMUDA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/18/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	RPT

with his local supporters through three women who visit him periodically. He has been apprised of the activities of his followers in Miami and has requested that $20,000 be furnished to a 40-man group of his followers in Camaguey Province. The Camaguey group is the one he has charged with making a raid on La Cabaña prison and freeing him.

6. Under the orders of Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro, one PRUNA Blanco (fmu)[7] (S) has contacted one Narciso NAVARRO[8] (S), who has a group of followers in Pinar del Rio (S) and has arms, ammunition, and dynamite buried on his farm in that province. PRUNA Blanco (S) also has a group of followers in Pinar del Prio (S) province which is led by Jesus CABRERA (S) and former sergeant MARTINEZ (fmu). (S) The CABRERA (S) group is called Legión Democrática Cubana (LDC, Cuban Democratic Legion). (S) The buried arms and dynamite are to be used in sabotage and assassination attempts.

7. PRUNA Blanco (S) has also sent one Bernardo PARETS Gonzalez (S) to contact Manuel BLANCO Navarro in Miami. PRUNA Blanco (S) is attempting to set up an arms drop to the LDC (S) at a point 10 kilometers north of Los Palacios (22 36N, 83 16W). (S) LDC men will be waiting at this point and will signal the plane making the drop with four flashlights.[9]

8. Besides the two groups in Pinar del Rio province and the group in Camaguey, Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro also has two groups in Matanzas and Santa Clara provinces.[10]

9. On about 25 August 1959 Manuel BLANCO Navarro, in Miami, wrote a letter to one of his followers in Cuba. Enclosed with the letter were two messages which BLANCO asked be forwarded to Orlando VELAZCO, Distribuidora de Refrescos ARENAL Y (S) HNO SA, Avenida No. 515 y 517, Cardenas, Matanzas, telephone 632. (S) BLANCO also asked that CELAZCO (S) be informed that the letters were "from his sister Haydee" (S) (Sic). One of the messages reads as follows:

> Dear Brother:
>
> I am writing these lines to accompany a letter from my friend Dr. Rodriguez Couceiro , in whose house I am staying since I found out that they have arrested Leonel and that I cannot return there. As you will see in the letter, I am sending you a series of instructions to see if we can maintain the group that is presently without any leaders. Just as you have probably read in the newspapers, they have caught all the leaders in the roundup. This doesn't mean anything more than that we shall be delayed until we are reorganized again. Only about 100 were arrested, and the group numbered about 3,000.
>
> As he (my friend) informs you, I do not believe that you ought to visit Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro in La Cabaña prison. You should send someone in whom you have confidence. In the new contacts that you made do not use your own name. Use an alias so that, if anyone should talk, they will not be able to identify you. You should protect the place where you live. When you have meetings, hold them at prearranged places, never in your home. I know that you know how to do these things, but I want to warn you to be careful and use other persons to make your contacts. Don't do it personally. The principal objective is to be able to maintain yourself as the leader of the movement at least until you select chiefs if your work prevents you from leading in Habana.
>
> We have made contact here with a large group which was not caught and which is also organized from Autentico people. This group did not lose its leaders, since, as I say, it was not caught because it had joined us only a few days previously. This group is almost ready for action; so it is urgent that you reorganize our people rapidly in order

that Don Fidel may not last until the New Year. In the next letter we shall send more details and possibly give the main outlines of the business. As soon as you have anything to report, use a courier in whom you have confidence. Do not use the name of Carlos LOSADA (S) since that name is now "burned". Use the name Angel MARTINEZ, (S) and use the address which you already have for the time being. I think that we shall soon change residence, but I will send you the new address as soon as we do.

When you reply, use the name "little grandmother" (abuelita) since as you know, ~~my "name"~~ is also "burned". Many regards to all and an embrace from your sister

Haydee. (S)

10. The second message reads as follows:

Miami 21 August 1959

Orlando VELASCO (S)
Dear Friend:

As I suppose you already know, because of the treason of William Morgan [12] and Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo[12], the leaders of the Organization have been arrested, and it is most necessary that our people be reorganized so that the movement is not lost. The only person who is able to do so is you. I know that the responsibility is very great, but I also know your abilities, and we are sure that you will be able to do the job.

As a first objective, it is necessary to establish contact with Captain Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro. He is the chief of our organization and will continue to be. He is in prison in La Cabaña, according to our information, but is allowed to receive visitors. He knows you, since you met each other in his office. You can introduce yourself as the brother of Haydee. (S) He will give you names of persons and instructions to follow. However, it is very important that, while he remains a prisoner, you set up a courier so that you don't have to make subsequent visits. This would be dangerous in the extreme.

With respect to the rebels, be very careful in making your contacts, since one lesson is enough. There is one safe person whom you can trust, Dr. Fran MARSHALL. He is secretary of the Union Club.[13] (S) You can see him on our behalf and on that of the "Mejicano" (S)[11] So that he will not mistrust you, you can tell him that the last time we saw him was at a dinner on the terrace of the Union Club (S) Tell him that it rained a lot. Find out from him if Lt. PEÑA (S) can or cannot be trusted, since our information is contradictory. Be very careful with the rebels, and don't make the contacts with them directly. It is better that you designate another person for the purpose. Fran (S) is trustworthy but very easygoing.

Another group you can contact is that of Jorge GUTIERREZ Izaguirre (S) in the Rosita de Hornedo. Tell him that you were sent by Francisco GONZALEZ, who is in Montclair, New Jersey; that here we are united; and that he should join his group to our movement. I shall send you more information on this group.

You should also see Dr. Valentin ARENAS Amiga[14] (S). His office is at Aguiar No. 556, (S) Habana. Tell him that you come on my behalf and to recall the last visit of myself and the "Mejicano" (S) to his office, in which we were speaking of CASTRO. I recently wrote him a letter from New York. He leads a group of followers of Jose Ignacio RASCO (S) Artimes (S) etc.[15] (sic) of the Agrupacion.

You should also see Señor Agustín BATISTA, Jr., (S) in the Banco Trust Company.[16] (S) He knows Fran (S) and is a cousin of Enrique LLACA.[17] (S) So that he doesn't mistrust you, tell him that you are the messenger (enviado) and tell him to recall the interview we had in the lobby of the Savoy Hilton of New York. Up to recently he had a group.

For financial matters you can see Señor BELT[18] (S) a friend of (S) Haydee, and Señor Alin SUERO Falla.[19] (S) To contact the latter, see secretary Senor Jorge MACHADO (S) and tell him that you come on my behalf and that of the word Sugar (sic.) It is very important that you get together a good finance committee to handle the money problem there. Also talk to BLANCO (S) about persons you can see about money. Another person that you can see is Julio LOBO[20] (S) with Dr. BELT. (S)

You should also see Alejandro VERGARA (S) the chancellor of the Spanish Embassy (S) for me. He can help you a lot, above all with Valentin ARENAS (S) etc. The cousin of Rosarito (S) is Elena SOTO Martinez. (S) Her name is "Carolina" (S) and her telephone number is W-0746. (S) She lives at Galiano and Lagunas, (S) upstairs in the Tinaje (?) (S), Apartment (S) No. 7. She receives our letters and can help you. Introduce yourself as the brother of Haydee. (S) No one else should see her but you, and no one should know that you see her. You must be extremely careful to protect her.

Well, I believe that this is enough for now. Be extremely careful, and reorganize our rank and file, since the thing is soon.

(signature illegible)

Field Comments

1. Previously reported as a Cuban Rebel Army captain heading a counter-revolutionary group in Cuba. BLANCO was one of the chief conspirators arrested in August 1959, when the Cuban Government smashed a plot against it.

2. Brother and father respectively, of Reinaldo BLANCO Navarro.

3. Presidential candidate of the Cuban People's Party in the 1958 Cuban elections. He took asylum in the Venezuelan Embassy in July 1959 and was last reported in exile in Caracas on 26 July. At that time he reportedly said that he would soon leave for New York, where his family was.

4. In an open letter dated 6 June 1959 at Miami, one Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo (S) aka "El Mejicano", (S) a former Rebel Army captain, invited his former companions-in-arms to join CRAC.

5. The BLANCO group was reportedly without funds or arms as of 31 August 1959.

6. In a memorandum dated 16 September 1959 the U. S. Air Attache in Habana reported information from a wife of one of the prisoners in La Cabana that CRAC had gathered $1,000,000 to get Reinaldo BLANCO, Enrique OVARES, Gustavo de los REYES, Kuku BRINGUIER, and Dr. CAINAS Milanes out of prison. OVARES, REYES, and CAINAS are also high-level conspirators who were arrested in the roundup of August 1959.

7. According to a memorandum dated 26 August 1959, from the Protection Section of the American Embassy, Habana, an American citizen who had just been released from La Cabana prison after five months' imprisonment reported that a group of approximately 460 political prisoners and former prisoners are actively engaged in counter-revolutionary activities. Three hundred of the group were said to be at liberty in Habana, approximately 100 still held in prison, and about 70 in

open rebellion in Pinar del Rio under Luis LARA Crespo, (S) a former corporal of the BATISTA army. Among the leaders of the group was one Fernando PRUNA Blanco, (S) who was said to be held in the Castillo Prison at the time. PRUNA Blanco (S) (fnu) may be a relative of or identical with Fernando PRUNA Blanco. (S)

8. Identified by Source as the brother of Angel NAVARRO, (S) previously reported as co-ordinator of a group of counter-revolutionaries in Miami.

9. On 22 September 1959 source reported that this army drop had been scheduled between 8 and 10 p.m. on 25 September 1959.

10. Source did not know the size of any of the groups.

11. This probably refers to Dr. Francisco RODRIGUEZ Couceiro, (S) reported by a usually reliable source in July 1959 to be a leader, together with one Jose (S) Luis PUJOL, (S) of a Cuban counter-revolutionary movement. RODRIGUEZ Couceiro (S) was reported by the same source to be a first cousin of Francisco RODRIGUEZ Tamayo, aka "El Mejicano" (the Mexican). (S) The Habana telephone directory lists a Dr. Francisco RODRIGUEZ Couceiro, (S) a lawyer, at Pasco No. 652, (S) Habana.

12. Morgan and GUTIERREZ are two Cuban Rebel Army majors who penetrated the conspiracy that was smashed in August 1959.

13. The Habana telephone directory lists a Union Club (S) at San Lazaro No. 12, (S) Habana.

14. This is possibly a reference to Dr. Valentin ARENAS Arminan, (S) reported in July 1949 by a usually reliable source as the notary handling the purchase of the Banco Ultramar (S) for Spanish pro-Franco interests. The Banco Ultramar (S) was later absorbed by the Banco Continental Americano, (S) now known as the Banco Continental Cubano. (S)

15. The Habana telephone directory lists a Jose I. RASCO (S) at Avenida 31 No. 7406, Marianso. (S)

16. The Habana telephone directory lists a Banco Trust (S) Company of Cuba with main offices at Obispo No. 257, (S) Habana.

17. This is possibly a reference to Enrique LLACA Orbiz, (S) reported in the Habana press on 18 June 1959 as an executive (S) of the Julio LOBO (S) organization and former newspaper business manager who was released by Cuban Government authorities on 16 June. LLACA (S) and his son, Dr. Enrique LLACA, Jr. (S) had been held on charges of conspiracy. A United Press report dated 24 July 1959 at Santiago, Chile, said that Enrique LLACA Orbiz, (S) a lawyer and one-time economic editor of Diario de la Marina (S) had arrived in Chile as an exile.

18. This is possibly a reference to Guillermo BELT, former Cuban Ambassador to the United States under BATISTA. (S)

19. Wealthy Cuban businessman with large sugar interests.

20. Wealthy Cuban businessman with large sugar interests.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90060-10015
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	163-15064-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	PA
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/12/1966
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	LUCIEN CONEIN
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

Legat, Paris (163-1071) 7/12/66

125

EX-103

Director, FBI (163-15064) SECRET

2 - Orig & 1
1 - Yellow
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Flemister

LUCIEN CONEIN
FPC

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS 5-11-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK) 8-8-98

Reurlet 6/2/66.

Bufiles reveal that the name Lucien Emile Conein, born 11/29/19, appeared in a 1963 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) communication indicating Conein at that time was a staff employee of the Agency. The files of the Identification Division contain no arrest record for Lucien Conein. (U)

Through Liaison channels, Bureau determined that Conein is currently a covert employee of CIA, under the cover of a [State Department employee. (TS) He is presently in Saigon, South Vietnam, on an extremely sensitive assignment. CIA has requested that no information be furnished to the French regarding his affiliation with CIA or with regard to his present whereabouts.

For your information, Richmond determined (by a pretext telephone call) from the present occupant of 1111 Ingelside Avenue, McLean, Virginia, who is presently renting this residence from Conein, that the latter is a retired Lieutenant Colonel from the U. S. Army and is presently working and assigned to the U. S. Embassy in Saigon.

MAILED 6
JUL 13 1966
COMM-FBI

No arrest records were located for Conein in either Arlington County or Fairfax County, Virginia. Records of the Credit Bureau, Incorporated, of Washington, D. C., reveal a credit report dated 9/21/65, indicating that Lucien Conein, of 1111 Ingelside Avenue, McLean, Virginia, was then married to Ebjette and divorced from Carmen (last name not shown).

In view of CIA's request, under no circumstances should any information be furnished to the French concerning subject's present affiliation with CIA or his whereabouts. You may furnish the French the results of the credit and criminal checks as noted above. If the French raise the (U)

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Wick
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

2 - St. Louis (Enclosure)
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit (detached)
HCF:jkm
(8)

331
AUG 30 1966

SECRET

CONTINUED - OVER

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

10/21/94
Classified by ~~SP1~~
Declassify on: OADR

question of subject's whereabouts, you should inform them that inquiries to date reveal no information concerning his present whereabouts. You may advise the French that Conein's military service record is being reviewed for any pertinent information. ~~(S)~~ (U)

St. Louis should promptly locate and review Conein's military service record. According to Army sources in Washington, D. C., Conein's military service record was transferred to the U. S. Army Records Center, St. Louis, on 6/30/62. His military serial number was either 01320769 or 01322769. Furnish results in letterhead memorandum.

Enclosed for St. Louis is one copy of relet.

NOTE:

Subject was convicted by a French court in 12/47* to pay his wife (Monique Veber) a monthly sum of 8,000 francs (about $16) for the support of her and two children which resulted from the marriage. Subject has never followed the orders of the court and is currently the subject of an investigation at the request of the Investigative Magistrate in France. Information in the possession of the French indicated that Conein resided at the Ingelside address and they requested investigation by the Bureau to verify his residence and to determine his present situation with regard to employment and standard of living. Legat, Paris, requested Bureau check Bufiles, Ident files, and requested Bureau have Richmond check credit and criminal records and conduct discreet limited investigation to comply with the request of the French Police.

In view of CIA's request as indicated in this letter, it is felt that under no circumstances should we make any mention of our knowledge of subject's whereabouts. ~~(S)~~ (U)

* and was ordered

163-15064-1

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90065-10029

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-179869-31

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 10/18/1968
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
RICARDO MORALES NAVARETTE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/23/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

C. TRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 OCT 1968

REC 53

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Libertad ANTIGUA Arrencibia
Suspect Cuban Intelligence Agent

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except for the brackets
KP 2-2-98

1. Reference is made to Subject on whom considerable information has been disseminated to the Bureau, the last from this Agency being CSCI-316/03970-68 dated 9 October 1968.

2. Attached herewith is a copy of the 9 September 1968 debriefing of Libertad ANTIGUA Arrencibia which was provided by our Miami representative.

3. Information on the following individuals was compiled from the files of this office and from the files of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection:

EX-100 de Abelend REC 53 105-179869-31

a. Manuel ABELEND Martin was born in Havana, Cuba on 17 April 1911. He is married to Elena RODRIGUEZ Regulez, a Cuban citizen. His parents were Juan ABELEND, a former Cuban Consul in Lisbon, Portugal, and Concepcion MARTIN. Both parents are deceased. Manuel's brother, Gonzalo ABELEND Martin, is employed at the Brazilian Consulate in Miami, Florida. Manuel was contracted to work for the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, Cuba from 1 January 1933 through the first part of 1963. He served as Vice Consul up until his departure from Cuba in 1963. His wife was also employed in the same Embassy. Since 1963, ABELEND has been in Paris, France reportedly serving as Consul in the Brazilian Embassy. According to a reliable source, he has traveled widely throughout Europe and Latin America. He is well educated, skillful and has a great deal of experience in clandestine

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE 7/17/95 BY 5668 SLD/kcl (JFK)

ENCLOSURE

55 NOV 8-1968
105-179869

SECRET

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

OCT 24 1968

OCT 21 9 27 AM '63
LIAISON SECTION, FBI

1 COPIES MADE DATE 6/26/78 BY
CT RE HSCA
[illegible] DELIVERY
[illegible] Social 3
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

activities as a result of his working in the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. Source also reported that ABELEND has a past history of assisting personnel to escape prosecution by the CASTRO regime. According to available information, ABELEND has, in the past, provided asylum to anti-CASTRO Cubans. ABELEND is currently of interest to our Agency.

b. Ana Maria ABELEND. From an article published in the Cuban magazine Bohemia, 1 October 1965 edition, page 41, it appears that one Ana M. ABELEND is a singer. The article mentions that her song is an Argentine tango, "Sin Ti No Se Vivir".

c. Gonzalo ABELEND Martin, the brother to Manuel ABELEND Martin, is an Attache in the Brazilian Embassy in Miami, Florida. He was born in Havana, Cuba on 1 April 1924. Our files indicate that from 1961 through 1963 Gonzalo ABELEND may have been a [sub-source and also provided assistance to a former asset of this Agency through the use of his Diplomatic position.] (S) The above is sensitive and restricted information. Our files indicate that the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service may have additional information on ABELEND.

d. A search of our files failed to reveal any pertinent identifiable information concerning fnu JUVENAL and Mario lnu.

e. All available information concerning the other individuals mentioned in the attached debriefing was previously disseminated to the Bureau in CSCI-316/03651-68 dated 13 September 1968, and CSCI-316/03970-68 dated 9 October 1968, Subject as above.

4. This information has been made available to your representative in Miami, Florida.

CSCI-316/03988-68

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

18 OCT 1968

TO : Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM : Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: Libertad ANTIGUA Arrencibia
Suspect Cuban Intelligence Agent

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT FOR the brackets
KP 2-2-98

1. Reference is made to Subject on whom considerable information has been disseminated to the Bureau, the last from this Agency being CSCI-316/03970-68 dated 9 October 1968.

2. Attached herewith is a copy of the 9 September 1968 debriefing of Libertad ANTIGUA Arrencibia which was provided by our Miami representative.

3. Information on the following individuals was compiled from the files of this office and from the files of a group of Cuban emigres trained in the techniques of information collection:

a. Manuel ABELEND Martin was born in Havana, Cuba on 17 April 1911. He is married to Elena RODRIGUEZ Regulez, a Cuban citizen. His parents were Juan ABELEND, a former Cuban Consul in Lisbon, Portugal, and Concepcion MARTIN. Both parents are deceased. Manuel's brother, Gonzalo ABELEND Martin, is employed at the Brazilian Consulate in Miami, Florida. Manuel was contracted to work for the Brazilian Embassy in Havana, Cuba from 1 January 1933 through the first part of 1963. He served as Vice Consul up until his departure from Cuba in 1963. His wife was also employed in the same Embassy. Since 1963, ABELEND has been in Paris, France reportedly serving as Consul in the Brazilian Embassy. According to a reliable source, he has traveled widely throughout Europe and Latin America. He is well educated, skillful and has a great deal of experience in clandestine

SECRET

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 7/17/95 BY 5668SLD/GCL (JFK)

activities as a result of his working in the Brazilian Embassy in Havana. Source also reported that ABELEND has a past history of assisting personnel to escape prosecution by the CASTRO regime. According to available information, ABELEND has, in the past, provided asylum to anti-CASTRO Cubans. ABELEND is currently of interest to our Agency.

b. Ana Maria ABELEND. From an article published in the Cuban magazine Bohemia, 1 October 1965 edition, page 41, it appears that one Ana M. ABELEND is a singer. The article mentions that her song is an Argentine tango, "Sin Ti No Se Vivir".

c. Gonzalo ABELEND Martin, the brother to Manuel ABELEND Martin, is an Attache in the Brazilian Embassy in Miami, Florida. He was born in Havana, Cuba on 1 April 1924. Our files indicate that from 1961 through 1963 Gonzalo ABELEND may have been a [sub-source and also provided assistance to a former asset of this Agency through the use of his Diplomatic position.] (S) The above is sensitive and restricted information. Our files indicate that the Department of State and the Immigration and Naturalization Service may have additional information on ABELEND.

d. A search of our files failed to reveal any pertinent identifiable information concerning fnu JUVENAL and Mario lnu.

e. All available information concerning the other individuals mentioned in the attached debriefing was previously disseminated to the Bureau in CSCI-316/03651-68 dated 13 September 1968, and CSCI-316/03970-68 dated 9 October 1968, Subject as above.

4. This information has been made available to your representative in Miami, Florida.

CSCI-316/03988-68

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90073-10039
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	92-7599-21

Document Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	MM
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/21/1967
PAGES :	27
SUBJECTS :	DAVE YARAS DAVID YARAS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4; 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/24/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA, IRS
COMMENTS :	RPT

FD-263 (Rev. 3-8-67)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD	
MIAMI	MIAMI	11/21/67	7/20 - 11/20/67	
TITLE OF CASE		REPORT MADE BY		TYPED BY
DAVID aYARAS, aka		RALPH R. HILL, JR.		jgj
		CHARACTER OF CASE		
		AR		

~~SECRET~~

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES~~
~~AND FIELD OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP(S) OF~~ Classified
~~DATE~~ 11-12-85

6-23-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

~~SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION~~

REFERENCE: Report of SA RALPH R. HILL, JR., 7/21/67, at Miami.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS pg. C
KP 5-28-98

- P -

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

LEADS

CHICAGO

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

*1. Identify subscribers to telephone numbers set forth in this report (except those identified as noted), and thereafter conduct appropriate investigation to ascertain association with YARAS.

Remains classified per memo 8-12-98
SP8 MAG/KSR 10-30-85
9-3-94

Classified by ~~9145 [illegible]~~
Declassify on: OADR
2,6,9,597

ACCOMPLISHMENTS CLAIMED NONE						ACQUIT-TALS
CONVIC.	AUTO.	FUG.	FINES	SAVINGS	RECOVERIES	

CASE HAS BEEN:
PENDING OVER ONE YEAR ☐ YES ☐ NO
PENDING PROSECUTION OVER SIX MONTHS ☐ YES ☐ NO

APPROVED   SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE

DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW

92-7599-21

REC- 71

ST-106

8 NOV 28 1967

DEC 11

~~NINE~~

SECRET

COPIES MADE:
③ - Bureau (92-7599)
1 - USA, Miami
(ATTN: Departmental Attorney
WILLIAM EARLE)
3 - Chicago (92-1684)
(1 - USA, Chicago)
2 - Los Angeles (92-1303)
2 - Miami (92-1047)

1cc D+D 1537

Notations

STAT. SECT.

Dissemination Record of Attached Report	
Agency	
Request Recd.	CC. AAG, Criminal Division, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, Room 2726
Date Fwd.	
How Fwd.	12/6/67
By	

55 JAN 1 1968

SECRET

90073-10039

Chw 12-11

chw 12-12

[Source1-CIA] (U) ~~(S)~~

FOI/PA # [redacted]
APPEAL # ___
CIVIL ACT. # ___
E.O. # 12356
DATE 10-30-95 INITIALS

RECEIVED GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION DEC 8 5 04 PM '67 F.B.I. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION DEC 7 9 55 AM '67 F.B.I. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

RECEIVED GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION DEC 11 2 41 PM '67 F.B.I. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

FBI U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE DEC 1 11 19 AM '67

RECEIVED SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

REC'D - CIV RIGHTS FBI DEC 11 2 49 PM '67

RECEIVED GENERAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION DEC 8 1 25 PM '67 F.B.I. U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. DEC 12 12 17 PM '67

REC'D - SULLIVAN FBI - JUSTICE DEC 12 1 38 PM '67

SECRET

*2. Obtain Bureau authority for toll records of Chicago number BU 1-8513 (joint residence of LEONARD and DAVE YARAS).

SECRET

*3. Conduct investigation requested by Miami letter to Chicago dated May 4, 1967.

*4. Ascertain through IRS, Chicago, the extent of their investigation into the activities of YARAS and LEONARD PATRICK and determine if indictments are forthcoming relating to the investigation of possible extortion on the part of YARAS and PATRICK against HERMAN SALES, Inc. of Chicago.

*5. Attempt to establish coverage of YARAS's activities while in Chicago.

LOS ANGELES

AT LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

Refer to Los Angeles letter to Miami dated August 24, 1967, setting forth information relating to DELORES GOODMAN, et al, who reside at 1010 North Spaulding, Los Angeles. Los Angeles will afford interviews with JANET GOODMAN and others at Apartment 5 of that address to determine the extent of their knowledge of the activities of YARAS. Miami is interested primarily in determining if YARAS maintains a Los Angeles address in addition to those in Miami and Chicago.

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

Will continue to follow and report on the activities of YARAS.

SECRET

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 7-9-98 dal
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

SECRET

SECRET

ADMINISTRATIVE

SEC~~R~~ET

The extensive investigative period of this report is noted; however, Miami has been awaiting results of investigation being conducted in Chicago.

FLA

The following information relates to recent bombing activity in the Miami area perpetrated by Miami hoodlums, the principal suspect being FRANK "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL, alleged Lieutenant of YARAS. It is noted in this regard that Miami informants have reported that these bombings are part of an approved plan of the Chicago family, LCN, to organize certain bookmakers in the Miami area.

Information below relates to contacts with LUIS POSADA CARRILES in regard to his knowledge of the activities of captioned individual. At the time of original contact with CARRILES, he was an employee of CIA. During the latter stages of his contacts with SA WELSH his employment with CIA had been terminated. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

BOMBINGS - MIAMI AREA
JANUARY - JUNE, 1967

A. [CONTACTS WITH LUIS POSADA CARRILES, CIA INFORMANT] (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

1. On July 24, 1965, CIA provided in memo form information received from a reliable source. This source was later identified as [LUIS POSADA CARRILES] (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(~~U~~) (S)

POSADA advised that DIEGO BORGES was acting as an agent for three Americans who were seeking to buy pistols, explosives, blasting caps, hand grenades and silencers. The identity of the Americans was not known to POSADA although he believed they were members of the Ku Klux Klan or possibly the John Birch Society. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

SECRET

SEC~~R~~ET

SECRET

SECRET

POSADA provided the following background information concerning individuals involved with BORGES in the procurement of arms and munitions by the three Americans: ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

HERMINIO DIAZ, ~~732 N.W. 3rd Street, Miami,~~ Florida, sold sixty hand grenades (USMK II) to BORGES for delivery to Americans. DIAZ received from BORGES three hundred sixty dollars for grenades but delivered only forty. Subsequently, BORGES asked source to go to DIAZ and either pick up other twenty grenades or the one hundred twenty dollars in cash which they represented. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

RAMON ESCARDA, 620 S.W. 9th Street, MIAMI, FLA. who served in the U. S. Army, 1958-1959, was supposed to obtain one hundred pounds of pentolite for delivery to BORGES for $320-350. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

FRANK TAMAYO, 3213 S.W. 8th Street, Miami, FLA. active in anti-CASTRO activities, sold .622 caliber silencers to Americans for $1,000. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

Source gave descriptions of the three Americans and also recorded license plate of car utilized by group. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

On October 23, 1965, POSADA interviewed by Bureau Agents. POSADA readily admitted he had been in contact with three Americans who were seeking to purchase hand grenades, weapons, silencers and explosives. He had been placed in contact with these Americans by DIEGO BORGES. He confirmed DIAZ, ESCARDA and TAMAYO were also involved in this transaction. POSADA said shortly after he established contact with Americans, his CIA contact gave him several photos in attempt to identify Americans. POSADA said he identified one of the photos as that of FRANK ROSENTHAL. Immediately after he identified this photo, CIA instructed him to break off all contact with these three Americans and to have nothing further to do with them. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

FLA.

SECRET

SECRET

POSADA said that six silencers which had been manufactured at the home of TAMAYO had been given by BORGES to ROSENTHAL. He said ESCARDA was looking for pentolite but did not know whether material delivered to ROSENTHAL. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(u)

~~SECRET~~

On November 5, 1965, Bureau Agents exhibited photo of NORMAN ROTHMAN, FBI #152 585B, to POSADA. POSADA identified ROTHMAN as one of Americans with ROSENTHAL. He was of the impression that ROTHMAN was personally known to BORGES and had introduced ROSENTHAL to BORGES. It is noted ROTHMAN was arrested April 9, 1959, and was later convicted of violation of the National Stolen Property Act. He was sentenced to five years in prison and ten thousand dollar fine. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(u)

2. By similar communication, dated June 15, 1967, CIA advised the Miami Division that POSADA had been contacted by FRANK ROSENTHAL during the month of October, 1966. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(u)

ROSENTHAL told POSADA that all silencers he had purchased from POSADA were pieces of junk and he felt POSADA and BORGES were responsible for this and maybe his friends would kill POSADA and BORGES. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(u)

ROSENTHAL stated although he was out $5,000 from his previous purchases, he did not want money from POSADA. ROSENTHAL said he knew POSADA was working for CIA and he wanted some CIA equipment. POSADA allegedly refused to do this but POSADA made a number of fuse devices which he gave to ROSENTHAL. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(u)

This same memo reflects ROSENTHAL contacted POSADA in early June, 1967. ROSENTHAL stated the fuse devices were no good which were previously furnished and made a request for more CIA fuse devices and remote control unit for detonating explosive charges. (~~S1~~) (~~S~~)(u)

SECRET

SECRET (u)

On June 12, 1967, POSADA stated ROSENTHAL contacted him on June 11, 1967. ROSENTHAL asked for requested equipment and told source he would get him if he did not deliver. POSADA refused to do anything more for ROSENTHAL. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~

3. On June 22, 1967, SAs JAMES J. O'CONNOR and WARREN R. WELSH met with LUIS POSADA at Dinner Key, Coconut Grove, Florida. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

POSADA, at this time, reiterated his past dealings with FRANK ROSENTHAL from the time of the Spring of 1965, through June 12, 1967. POSADA made one additional remark concerning his involvement with ROSENTHAL during 1965. He stated that he did not directly furnish ROSENTHAL any of the explosives, et al, which he requested although he was introduced to ROSENTHAL as an expert in the field of explosives. For his expertise knowledge he was given $500 by ROSENTHAL sometime during the month of May, 1965. POSADA indicated that he gave this money to CIA, who in turn at a later date gave this money back to him. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

4. On June 23, 1967, SA JAMES J. O'CONNOR was telephonically contacted by POSADA. POSADA related that on June 22, 1967, he met with FRANK ROSENTHAL. Subject requested 250 pounds of C-4 explosives, a large quantity of pencil type devices and a remote control explosive apparatus. ROSENTHAL stated to source that money was no problem and he would pay twenty-five times the original cost if this was necessary. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

ROSENTHAL further related to POSADA that there would be at least twenty more bombings and additional corpses would be appearing in the Miami area. Subject stated that he would be out of town for several weeks although he requested a meeting with source on June 29, June 30, or July 1, 1967. ~~(S)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

5. On June 24, 1967, SA WARREN R. WELSH met with LUIS POSADA at the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

SECRET

On this date, POSADA was shown a photograph taken by the Dade County Public Safety Department, Miami, Florida, of an explosive device found at the apartment residence of MICKEY ZION, 7501 East Treasure Drive, North Bay Village, Miami, Florida. This device was intended to go off in the bedroom area of ZION's apartment on May 30, 1967. POSADA identified the explosive material as pentolite. He stated that he had provided ROSENTHAL with pencil type devices similar although not identical to the devices appearing in the photograph. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

6. On June 26, 1967, SA WARREN R. WELSH met with source at Dinner Key, Coconut Grove, Florida. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

POSADA advised that the cost of C-4 to ROSENTHAL would be $5-$7 a pound. The ingredients of C-4 are 92% RDX and 8% gelatin. The material is packaged in plastic type containers weighing approximately 2½ pounds each. He stated that the cost of the pencil type devices would vary between $10 and $15 per pencil. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

FLA

Source related that on June 24, 1967, he was contacted by DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA, son of now deceased Cuban gambling figure OSCAR ECHEMENDIA. ECHEMENDIA wanted source to meet with him concerning the obtainment of explosives for an unknown group of individuals. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

On June 25, 1967, source and ECHEMENDIA went to a location somewhere between S.W. 78th Court and 29th Terrace or 30th Street, in the southwest section of Miami. (This address is that of OLGA CHAVIANO, a Cuban dancer who is the girlfriend of NORMAN ROTHMAN. ROTHMAN is the subject of AR investigation by the Miami Division.) ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~(u)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

POSADA stated that he met with an unknown individual who was introduced to him as a Chilean. This individual spoke excellent Spanish and good English. Unknown individual was interested in obtaining pentolite pencil type devices, a .308 caliber silencer and any other delay type material which source could locate. At this meet source said that he could see NORMAN ROTHMAN several hundred yards away from the place of his meet with the Chilean. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

After the meet source stated that ECHEMENDIA told him that the Chilean he had just talked with was the man responsible for the recent bombings at MICKEY ZION's apartment, Rand's Cleaners and Alfie's Sundries. ECHEMENDIA said that this individual is working for NORMAN ROTHMAN, who is now a big man in Miami and a representative of the Mafia. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

7. On June 27, 1967, SA WARREN R. WELSH met with LUIS POSADA in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

Peru

FLA.

POSADA identified a photograph of ALBERTO LARRAIN/MAESTRE as the Chilean whom he had met with on June 25, 1967. (It is noted that MAESTRE is a Federal Bureau of Narcotics fugitive who is also a close associate of NORMAN ROTHMAN.) (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

8. On June 28, 1967, LUIS POSADA was contacted telephonically by SA WELSH, who was in Washington, D.C. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

Source advised that on June 28, 1967, ROSENTHAL had called his house, at which time his wife told ROSENTHAL that source would be out of town for several days. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

9. On June 28, 1967, LUIS POSADA telephonically contacted SA JAMES J. O'CONNOR. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Source indicated that during the morning of this date he met with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. At this meet he promised to furnish ECHEMENDIA with the various materials requested by ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE. Source quoted ECHEMENDIA a price of $10 a pound for C-4 and $150 per silencer without the pistol. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

Source further advised that ECHEMENDIA told him that he was to meet at midnight, June 29, 1967, with NORMAN ROTHMAN at the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida. The purpose of this meet, according to source, was to obtain an okay on the price of materials which were to be provided to the Chilean. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

10. On July 5, 1967, SA WELSH met with LUIS POSADA in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

Source stated that he was trying to analyze in his own mind the various meetings he has had with FRANK ROSENTHAL, NORMAN ROTHMAN, DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA and ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE. From all indications it appears that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE is performing the bombings for FRANK ROSENTHAL. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

NO LOCALITY

He reflected that the original contact between ECHEMENDIA, ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE and himself came about through a mutual friend by the name of LUCIO CABRERA. He described the latter individual as a former gunsmith in the 20506 Brigade. CABRERA was first contacted by DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA to obtain various explosives for a Chilean who was a close associate of NORMAN ROTHMAN. He stated that CABRERA contacted him as a potential source of these explosive devices since he had only had one previous contact with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

Source stated that he had obtained a remote control explosive device for ROSENTHAL although he could not at this time obtain all the C-4 or pencil type devices ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

requested by ROSENTHAL. He indicated that in order to obtain all the C-4 requested by ROSENTHAL he would have to contact LUIS MARTI, who resides in the State of New Jersey. He stated that MARTI is the source for Cubans who desire explosives. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

11. On July 7, 1967, SA WELSH met with LUIS POSADA in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

He related that during the evening of July 6, 1967, ROSENTHAL met him at their usual meeting place, behind Roger's Food Market, located on the corner of S.W. 27th Avenue and 25th Street. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

ROSENTHAL, in a very amiable mood, reflected that he would be leaving town either next Tuesday or Wednesday, and would need his explosive materials by that time. He further requested two grease guns with silencers and two M-2 carbines. ROSENTHAL said that he would make contact with source sometime during July 10, 1967, for the time of delivery. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

Source stated that the cost of the grease guns would be $175 per gun and the price of the carbines would be $120 per unit. He also indicated that during the above described meeting there was an unknown individual sitting in ROSENTHAL's car. (~~S-1~~) (~~S~~)(U)

Source also related that he had had a two hour talk with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA on July 6, 1967. ECHEMENDIA told him that the Chicago mob was contemplating the takeover of the gambling business in the Miami area. DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA stated that a representative of this group came to his house several nights ago and discussed the gambling situation. ECHEMENDIA stated that he was to receive an influential position with this group for the purpose of controlling the Cuban bolita operators. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(U)

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

ECHEMENDIA further stated that on the evening of his meet with NORMAN ROTHMAN at the Albion Hotel Lounge, Miami Beach, Florida, ROTHMAN had previously been in contact with MEYER LANSKY. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

U.S.A.

ECHEMENDIA also commented on a Cuban bolita operator by the name of EVARISTO GARCIA VIDAL. ECHEMENDIA stated that VIDAL was on the outs with the mob in view of his failure to pay the proper percentage of his earnings to the group. Because of this disfavor, the mob is allegedly out to kill VIDAL. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

12. On July 10, 1967, SA WELSH telephonically contacted LUIS POSADA. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA stated that he had talked with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA regarding the silencers he was to obtain for the Peruvian individual. ECHEMENDIA indicated that he was going to give one of the silencers to MARGOSA, a car salesman in the Miami area, who would test the equipment for the Peruvian. (SA FRANCIS J. DUFFIN obtained information that MARGOSA was formerly Sergeant of Police in Cuba and a Special Guard at the Tropicana Hotel in Havana. This hotel was operated by OSCAR ECHEMENDIA, now deceased.) (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

13. SA WELSH contacted LUIS POSADA in person at the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida, on July 11, 1967. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

In conversation with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA he ascertained that MARGOSA was well pleased with the silencers which he was testing for the Peruvian. POSADA stated that he was going to charge the Peruvian $150 per silencer, $15 per pencil and $10 a pound for C-4 explosive. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA was instructed at this time regarding the tenure of conversation he should have with ROSENTHAL at (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

SECRET

their next contact. He was requested to make up a story concerning a dummy customs raid at his residence and the fact that because of this raid he could not produce the requested explosive devices for ROSENTHAL. (S1) (~~S~~)(u)

~~SECRET~~

During the late evening hours of July 11, 1967, POSADA telephonically contacted SA WELSH and advised him that he had just been contacted by his CIA supervisor. He informed him that he was no longer in the employment of CIA due to an order emanating in Washington, D.C. He was told that this action by CIA headquarters in Washington had nothing to do with either his previous work record with CIA or his present contact with the FBI Office in Miami. (S1) (~~S~~) (u)

POSADA further stated at this time that ROSENTHAL had contacted his home at approximately 10:45 P.M. at which time his wife explained that her husband had been in trouble and that he would contact ROSENTHAL tomorrow. (S1) (~~S~~)(u)

14. SA WELSH contacted LUIS POSADA via telephone on July 12, 1967. (S1)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA stated that at approximately 10:30 A.M. on this date he contacted ROSENTHAL at his residence. ROSENTHAL would not talk on his home phone and requested POSADA to contact him at a pre-arranged number and time. (S1)(~~S~~)(u)

After making this telephonic contact, POSADA indicated that ROSENTHAL was extremely aggravated over the stalling tactics of POSADA. He gave POSADA an ultimatum to either produce the material in ten days or forget about everything. (S1)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA also related that on this date, DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA had contacted him and he informed ECHEMENDIA that the customs had raided his house the previous day. ECHEMENDIA stated that this raid meant nothing and he (S1)(~~S~~)(u)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

should not be worried about it. ECHEMENDIA stated that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE was not presently in the Miami area.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

~~SECRET~~

15. On July 13, 1967, SA WELSH contacted AUSTIN HORN, CIA, Miami.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

HORN stated that LUIS POSADA CARRILES was no longer an employee of CIA. He stated that the decision to release POSADA came from their Washington headquarters in view of the fact that POSADA had without authorization withdrawn himself from an anti-CASTRO group called Resa.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

HORN commented that POSADA was instructed to continue his cooperation with the FBI Office in Miami and that he would be paid through September, 1967, as long as he cooperated with this other Federal agency.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

16. On July 14, 1967, SA WELSH met with LUIS POSADA at Dinner Key, Coconut Grove, Florida.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA stated that he had conferred on this date with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA and ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE was not in town. ECHEMENDIA told POSADA that he was not going to place a specific order of explosives with POSADA until he found out exactly what MAESTRE and the Peruvian wanted, insofar as volume of explosive material.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA said that he had heard nothing more from ROSENTHAL.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

He further indicated that inasmuch as he is not presently employed in the Miami area he was contemplating a trip to Venezuela in order to secure a permanent type job.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

17. On July 15, 1967, LUIS POSADA was telephonically contacted by SA WELSH.(~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

SECRET

POSADA advised that DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA advised that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had returned to Miami on this date. He stated that ECHEMENDIA and MAESTRE were going to meet later on this date in the southwest section of Miami. According to POSADA, after this meeting ECHEMENDIA would contact him regarding the volume and type of explosives wanted by MAESTRE. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

SE~~C~~RET

18. On July 18, 1967, SA WELSH met in person with LUIS POSADA in the Dinner Key area, Coconut Grove, Florida. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA stated that he had just finished talking to DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. He ascertained that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had not participated in the bombing of a Miami police officer in the southwest section of Miami. MAESTRE had left with NORMAN ROTHMAN on either Sunday night or Monday morning for an unknown destination out of Florida. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

ECHEMENDIA related to POSADA that a policeman by the name of DOBSON or DAWSON was helping the "mob boys". ECHEMENDIA also related that he had heard that ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE and NORMAN ROTHMAN were responsible for the recent bombing at the Thunderbird Hotel in Las Vegas, Nevada. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

19. On July 24, 1967, LUIS POSADA was telephonically contacted by SA WELSH. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

POSADA stated that on July 20, 1967, FRANK ROSENTHAL had contacted him at his residence. POSADA at this time told ROSENTHAL that he was no longer interested in obtaining explosives for him and that he wished to have no further dealings with him. After hearing this, ROSENTHAL became very irate and gave back to POSADA a number of pencils that he had previously secured from him. (~~S-1~~)(~~S~~)(u)

SEC~~R~~ET SECRET

SECRET

SECRET ~~SECRET~~

POSADA stated that he became very upset over the conduct of ROSENTHAL and requested him to leave his residence in three seconds or he would shoot him in the head. After this threat by POSADA, ROSENTHAL told him "that someday when he was playing gin rummy POSADA would be killed". ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

20. On August 1, 1967, LUIS POSADA was contacted telephonically by SA WELSH. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

POSADA stated that on this date he had been in contact with DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA. ECHEMENDIA stated that NORMAN ROTHMAN had gone to the Hollywood, California area and ALBERTO LARRAIN-MAESTRE had departed for Peru. Source could not learn the duration of either of these two visits. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

He stated that he was no longer going to contact DOMINGO ECHEMENDIA and told this individual that he could no longer supply him with explosive material. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

21. On August 4, 1967, LUIS POSADA was contacted in person by SA WELSH at the corner of U. S. 1 and Bird Road. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

POSADA stated that several days after his last confrontation with ROSENTHAL he received a letter in the mail from an unknown individual. He stated that the contents of this letter consisted of eight pennies which were held together by Scotch tape and a .350 caliber bullet. POSADA did not know the significance of either of the items although he surmised that ROSENTHAL had sent these things to him. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

POSADA stated that he had heard nothing during the past week from FRANK ROSENTHAL and has told DOMINTO ECHEMENDIA not to contact him. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (u)

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

In conclusion, POSADA stated that he was contemplating a trip to Caracas, Venezuela, on Tuesday, August 8, 1967. ~~(S-1)~~ ~~(S)~~ (U)

~~SECRET~~

INFORMANTS

MM T-1	MM 1231-CTE
MM T-2	MM 998-C
MM T-3	PCI RAY WALDEN, Chicago Office

~~SECRET~~ SECRET

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - U. S. Attorney, Miami
(ATTN: Departmental Attorney WILLIAM EARLE)
1 - U. S. Attorney, Chicago

Report of: RALPH R. HILL, JR. **Office:** Miami, Florida
Date: 11/21/67

Field Office File #: 92-1047 **Bureau File #:** 92-7599

Title: DAVID YARAS

Character: ANTI-RACKETEERING

Synopsis:

FLA.

YARAS last observed in Miami early August, 1967, in company with ANTHONY RICCI and others. YARAS not known to be in Miami since August. Miami informant reports that YARAS maintains degree of control over activities of Miami and Miami Beach gamblers and bookmakers for the Chicago organization. YARAS last observed in Chicago, 10/24/67.

- P -

DETAILS:

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 10-30-95 BY 9145
260597

9-3-94 SP 8 MAC/KSR

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 8/4/67

1.

The following observations were made during a physical surveillance conducted in the vicinity of 4410 Adams, Miami Beach, Florida:

7:01 PM - DAVID YARAS and female depart his residence at 4410 Adams, enter his automobile and proceed, via the Julia Tuttle Causeway and the Airport Expressway, to the Miami Springs Villas, park in the vicinity of the Carriage Club there.

8:15 PM - YARAS and female companion observed dining with PETE SARNOFF, ANTHONY RICCI, two unknown males and several unknown females. All females appear to be wives of the men present.

On 8/3/67 at Miami Beach, Florida File # Miami 92-1047

by SAS RALPH R. HILL, JR., & WENDELL W. HALL, JR. Date dictated 8/4/67
RRH:mm

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

MM T-1 advised in August, 1967, that DAVID YARAS maintains a good deal of control over the activities of certain Miami and Miami Beach bookmakers and gamblers as part of the over-all plan to integrate the Miami area bookmakers into the Chicago organization. A certain amount of the action received by YARAS is turned over to PASQUALE ERRA, described by the informant as being the strongest La Cosa Nostra (LCN) figure in Miami. The informant states that YARAS' main interests, however, lie in Chicago, where he continues to maintain bookmaking, shylocking and "scam" businesses.

ALFRED MART, also known as ALFIE MART, resides at 1211 100th Street, Bay Harbor Island. He was interviewed at 1245 Michigan Avenue. MART volunteered the following information:

He stated that he first came to Miami Beach, Florida, in 1946 after his discharge from the U. S. Army. MART first started to work as a clerk in a horse room and shortly thereafter was given his own horse room. According to MART, all bookmaking and gambling was controlled by the S & G Syndicate. He reflected that before the influence of the mob, everyone connected with the syndicate was trustworthy and honest.

MART indicated that for a short period of time during 1964, he was associated as a part-owner in the Derby Sports Book located in Las Vegas, Nevada. One of his partners in this legal bookmaking operation was GEORGE ABDO who is now deceased. In order to financially back this book, MART stated that he mortgaged his home and also secured a personal loan in New York City. He said that during the first six months of 1964, he spent most of his time in Las Vegas in order to secure his interests at the business. In his opinion, he was swindled in the operation and financial backing of this bookmaking establishment and further contends that there are several falsehoods in the indictment presently pending against him in the district court in Las Vegas, Nevada.

MART stated that during the past several years, he has operated Alfie's Sundries which is located at 1664 Alton Road, Miami Beach, Florida. He also admits that during the past years he has conducted a small intrastate bookmaking operation. Most of the business is conducted by a paid clerk who has operated either at the sundries store or in another location. He reflected that due to his money interests, he does not manage the day to day operation of his bookmaking business although he is the financial backer of same.

MART stated that sometime during the spring of 1963, a line service came to the Miami area under the name of Multiple Sports News Service (MSNS). This outfit was headed by FRANK "LEFTY" ROSENTHAL. He was assisted in this venture by STANLEY GREEN, who acted as a clerk and pick-up man. He indicated that MSNS disseminated line information on collegiate and professional football, professional baseball and collegiate and professional basketball. In addition, they would supply player information and up-to-date scores. The latter was possible in view of a Western Union sports sticker which was installed in the offices of MSNS. MART stated that he was assigned a code number in which he or his clerk could use in obtaining line information. The cost of this service varied from sport to sport though he feels that $50 was probably the average price he paid per week.

MART said that in addition to the line service, MSNS also published a weekly sports journal. This journal was put out on a weekly basis and consisted of the schedule for the coming week of sports activity whether it be football, baseball or basketball. As a service to MSNS, Alfies Sundries would sell the sheets on their stand for 35 cents although they paid 23 cents a copy from the publisher. Normally they would get 70 to 100 sheets a week for local dissemination.

In MART's opinion, MSNS did have mob or syndicate backing at the time they started in 1963. He indicated that no force was used in obtaining subscribers to their service but the word was out among the bookmaking fraternity that it was the thing to do. He feels that during the past year MSNS has lost their affiliation with the syndicate and now is operating independent of any organized authority.

MART said that during the current 1967 major league baseball season, he paid $50 a week for the line service. Normally the $50 would be paid in cash by one of his employees working at Alfies Sundries to STANLEY GREEN. GREEN's normal pick-up day was either Monday or Tuesday.

MART said that the baseball line during the current season was normally disseminated the first time around 11:30 a.m. to noon. During the week of May 15, 1967, the line was coming out around 1 p.m. MART stated that he personally complained to GREEN about this late dissemination and GREEN told him that the delay was necessary in view of the fact that there were fewer customers taking the service. MART said that due to the late time of dissemination, he instructed his bookmaking clerk on May 19, 1967, not to call MSNS over the weekend for their line information.

On May 23 or May 24, 1967, STANLEY GREEN came to Alfies Sundries and demanded all the weekly sports journals that were in the rack. GREEN indicated that MSNS was going out of business as to both the dissemination of the line and the publication of their sports journals.

Several days after GREEN's visit to Alfies Sundries, FRANK ROSENTHAL came into the sundries and spoke personally with MART. In their conversation, MART told ROSENTHAL that he did not think it was right for MSNS to all of a sudden pull out their publications or in fact stop disseminating the line. MART also told ROSENTHAL that he was due a refund for services that had not been rendered. ROSENTHAL seemingly agreed and said he would consult STANLEY GREEN as to the amount of the refund.

MART stated that during the late evening hours of May 31, 1967, an explosion occurred at the back end of the American Epicure Market which is situated next door to Alfies Sundries. He stated that he was in the area at the time of the explosion and had seen no one in the area whom he considered a suspect. He did receive some information shortly after the explosion that one of the employees of the market considered himself to be an expert in the field of demolition. He was also aware of the fact that ED THAL, had fired on May 29, 1967, a Negro employee who was very irate at THAL for this action.

MART stated that his bookmaking operation continued after the first bombing at the American Epicure Market.

He further related that after MSNS had withdrawn their sheets from Alfies Sundries, he started to print his own schedules. The first sheet was a xeroxed copy of that put out by MSNS although he deleted the name of this service from the publication. He said that the first sheet was printed in a volume of 70 sheets. He stated that ROSENTHAL came into the store after his sheet came on the market, and he told him what he had done. MART said that he told ROSENTHAL that he was sure that his small publication of sheets would not in any way hinder the business of MSNS. MART stated the next two publications were similar in format to the sheet put out in Fort Worth, Texas. At the time of his first interest in publishing a sheet, he contacted ANGEL-KAPLAN for five of their sheets although his money was returned with a note indicating the impossibility of shipping sheets to the Miami, Florida area.

MART stated that on June 16, 1967, a severe explosion took place in Alfies Sundries. The main blast from the explosion occurred in the area of the telephone booths on the south side of the store. He indicated that he was not at the store at the time of the explosion although he appeared on the scene shortly after the occurrence.

MART said it was obvious at this time that the previous bombing at the American Epicure Market was a mistake and was really meant for Alfies Sundries.

MART stated that he considers the prime suspect in the two bombings to be FRANK ROSENTHAL. He characterized this individual as a man with an uncontrollable temper and further, an individual that was very unpredictable and at times, irrational in his behavior. He reflected that ROSENTHAL might have thought he was putting out either a line of his own or in fact disseminating to potential customers of MSNS the line that had been given him. According to MART, if the latter were true, MSNS would of course lose a sizeable amount of money per week. He emphatically denied that he was either putting out a line or giving the line put out by MSNS to other bookmakers whether it be in the Miami, Florida area or out of state.

MART readily admitted friendship with one MICKEY ZION and stated that it was common knowledge that ZION was a prominent bookmaking figure in the Miami, Florida area. He said that he was personally aware of the fact that ZION and FRANK ROSENTHAL have had many arguments over the operation of MSNS. These arguments would stem from accusations by ZION that ROSENTHAL was in fact putting out a false line and also to the fact that ZION was being charged too much money for the service rendered by MSNS. He said that during the fall and winter 1966-1967, ZION was paying $150 a week for service. A short time ago ZION was requested to pay $200 a week by ROSENTHAL for service. ZION refused to pay this amount of money. He further related that on one occasion ZION approached him to work out a deal for both of them obtaining line service from MSNS under one account number. MART refused to enter into such an agreement with ZION.

MART said that between the time of the first bombing and before the second bombing, ROSENTHAL called

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
Miami, Florida

November 21, 1967

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 92-1047

Title DAVID YARAS, aka

Character ANTI-RACKETEERING

Reference is made to report of Special Agent RALPH R. HILL, JR., dated and captioned as above, at Miami.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside

Alfies Sundries on several occasions late at night while he was in the store. He said ROSENTHAL attempted to disguise his voice although it was apparent to him that it was ROSENTHAL. ROSENTHAL on these occasions stated that he was desirous of obtaining certain baseball scores and was told by MICKEY ZION to call this number for results. MART politely told ROSENTHAL that he did not have the results desired but possibly he could call back in several hours for the information. It was MART's opinion that these calls were aimed at attempts to establish a working relationship between ZION and himself by ROSENTHAL.

In conclusion, MART stated that he was sure that if MIKE COPPOLA was alive there would have been no violence in the area. He related that COPPOLA had silent but firm control over gambling matters, and he did not believe in rough stuff. It was MART's opinion that a new young group of individuals are attempting a takeover in the area and are resorting to any means available to prove their position. He indicated that FRANK ROSENTHAL, DAVE YARAS and BENNY HUSICK would certainly fall under the category he had just mentioned.

The following information was given through observation and interview:

Name	ALFRED MART
Alias	ALFIE MART
Race	White
Sex	Male
Date of birth	August 8, 1916
Place of birth	New York City, New York
Height	5'8"
Weight	180 pounds
Hair	Grey
Eyes	Brown
Marital Status	Married

Wife	ADELAIDE
Children	Two sons
Local residence	1211 100th Street Bay Harbor Island Miami Beach, Florida

MM T-2 advised in September, 1967, that he had not seen YARAS in the Miami area for several months, and that when he is in town, YARAS and his wife eat regularly at the restaurant located in the Southgate Apartments, Miami Beach.

AT CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

MM T-3 advised on October 24, 1967, that DAVID YARAS was observed at 3600 Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, with his son, LEONARD YARAS, on October 20, 1967.

On October 24, 1967, Bureau Agents observed DAVID YARAS at the A-1 Laundry and Dry Cleaning building, Chicago and at 3600 Lake Shore Drive, Chicago.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90084-10077
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-209-727

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/06/1971
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC REGIONAL SEMINAR FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN C LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/14/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	CABLEGRAM

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

Intelligence Information Ca

● ROUTINE

IN 436533

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

STATE/INR DIA NMCC/MC (SECDEF JCS ARMY NAVY AIR) CIA/NMCC NIC NSA SDO ONE CRS ~~XXXXXXXXX~~ ~~XXXXXXXXX~~

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

(f) NO FOREIGN DISSEM

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT For the Brackets
KP 10-10-1997
SLD/KSR 11-7-97 (JFK)

CITE TDCS -314/10539-71

DIST 6 OCTOBER 1971

○ POLITICAL MATTERS

COUNTRY COSTA RICA/CENTRAL AMERICA

DOI 19-25 SEPTEMBER 1971

SUBJECT CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC REGIONAL SEMINAR FOR CENTRAL AMERICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC LEADERS

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 5-23-94 BY SPB MAC/EH JFK

ACQ EL SALVADOR, SAN SALVADOR (29 SEPTEMBER 1971) FIELD NO. [HSS-2550] (S)

SOURCE (S) [A DEPUTY OF] THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY. HE IS A USUALLY RELIABLE REPORTER. HE OBTAINED THE INFORMATION FROM A PERSON WHO ATTENDED THE SEMINAR.

ON

EX-112 REC-34 109-12-209-727

1. WHILE THE 19 TO 25 SEPTEMBER 1971 SEMINAR AT ALAJUELA, COSTA RICA, FOR SENIOR REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTIES AND MOVEMENTS OF CENTRAL AMERICA WAS ENTITLED "THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL POWER," THE TRUE PURPOSE OF THE SEMINAR WAS TO ACCOMPLISH A VERY DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, NICARAGUA, PANAMA, AND COSTA RICA. TO THIS END, THE TWENTY-FOUR PARTICIPANTS IN THE SEMINAR WERE PRESENTED AT THE OUTSET WITH A VERY DETAILED

8 OCT 14 1971

2D

cc Mga
10/14/71
vhw/emj

5W

54 OCT 22 1971

● SECRET /NO FOREIGN DISSEM
(classification) (dissem controls)

109-12-209

F312

OCT 13 11 29 AM 1971
REC'D
DOM INTELL

CR

QUESTIONNAIRE PREPARED BY THE INSTITUTE FOR CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC FORMATION (IFEDEC) CONCERNING THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN EACH OF THE SIX CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES. LAUREANO BATISTA, THE IFEDEC REPRESENTATIVE AT THE SEMINAR, REQUESTED THAT REPRESENTATIVES FROM EACH OF THE COUNTRIES PREPARE WRITTEN REPLIES TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE.

C.R.

2. COSTA RICAN AND NICARAGUAN REPRESENTATIVES, PARTICULARLY JORGE MONGE OF COSTA RICA, REACTED IN AN EXTREMELY NEGATIVE AND SUSPICIOUS FASHION TO THE IFEDEC QUESTIONNAIRE AND REFUSED TO PROVIDE WRITTEN ANSWERS. OTHER REPRESENTATIVES HAD LITTLE DESIRE TO PROVIDE WRITTEN ANSWERS TO THE QUESTIONNAIRE BUT GENERALLY DID NOT REACT AS STRONGLY AS DID THE COSTA RICANS AND NICARAGUANS. THOSE MOST OPPOSED TO BATISTA'S REQUEST EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT THE QUESTIONNAIRE WAS AN IFEDEC PLOY TO OBTAIN INFORMATION CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THEY DUBBED THE QUESTIONNAIRE EFFORT "OPERATION CAMELOT." BATISTA EXPLAINED THAT THE INFORMATION REQUESTED WAS REQUIRED BY THE LATIN AMERICAN CENTER FOR INFORMATION (CIDAL), AN ORGANIZATION RECENTLY FOUNDED IN CARACAS VEN BY THE AMERICAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC ORGANIZATION VEN (ODCA) AND HEADED BY BATISTA. THE SALVADORAN REPRESENTATIVES AT THE SEMINAR, AT LEAST, HAD NEVER BEFORE HEARD OF [illegible]DAL. IT WAS FINALLY DECI[illegible] THAT NO WRITTEN

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90092-10001
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-68227-927

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	NY
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/08/1965
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON WILLIAM K. HARVEY
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	RPT

FD-263 (Rev. 5-1-58)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SECRET

REPORTING OFFICE	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	DATE	INVESTIGATIVE PERIOD
NEW YORK	NEW YORK	10/8/65	3/15 - 9/23/65

TITLE OF CASE	REPORT MADE BY	TYPED BY
CHANGED ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON aka Samuel Katzman, James Olson, Bob Robertson, "Tommy"	ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN	dmk
	CHARACTER OF CASE ESP - R	

~~4-13-98~~ 5668 SLD/KSR

CLASS. & EXT. BY
REASON - FCIM II, 1-2.4.2
DATE OF REVIEW

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

CLASSIFIED BY
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
5/18/98 mdc (JFK)

The title of this report is marked "Changed" to add the name, BOB ROBERTSON, which THOMPSON indicated he had possibly used in the Fall of 1959 in a flight from Detroit to NYC, and the name, "TOMMY" by which name Mrs. HAROLD RETZLAFF, El Paso, Texas, knew THOMPSON.

Bureau has advised that the code name, "OXTANK", formerly used in communications other than reports and letterhead memoranda will no longer be used.

REFERENCES

NYreps of SA ROBERT F. LAUDWEIN, 3/15/65 and 5/28/65.

10/7/94 SP8MAC/GH (JFK)

Classified by
Declassify on: OADR 10/31/83

(U) $

Xerox to NSA 11/16/72 TMG/clld. Remarks, see NSA let to Bureau, same subject

ADMINISTRATIVE

Regarding the summary of THOMPSON's story in the "Saturday Evening Post" (SEP), the following information, obtained through interviews of THOMPSON and through other sources, is set forth to clarify the SEP story.

Per NSA letter 1/27/98

APPROVED	SPECIAL AGENT IN CHARGE	DO NOT WRITE IN SPACES BELOW
COPIES MADE:		65-68227-927 MCT-24

8 - Bureau (65-68227) (RM)
1 - USA, EDNY (RM)
1 - Butte (65-675) (Info) (AM/RM)
1 - Detroit (65-3540) (Info) (RM)

COPIES CONTINUED

2 - New York (65-22427)

REC-41

17 OCT 11 1965

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS ON PG. N KPG 1-22-98

SOVIET SECTION

Dissemination Record of Attached Report

Agency	State	CIA	OSI, ONI	ACSI
[redacted]	DIA	Hall (Justice)		
Date Fwd.	10/26/65			
How Fwd.				
By				

Notations

See other side

copies made
[(U) per CIA 07/8/91 letter]
re Wm. Harvey (this page & page N)
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 1/10/78 request. 2/10/78
(See Bufile 62-117290) DJC/mer

SECRET
983,322 ...
#211,326 6/15/92

(R.B.)

57 FEB 28 1966

53 FEB 7 1966

SECRET

Copies of Index pages 241 thru 256 to State, CIA, OSI, ONI, ACSI, DIA lice (Hall) by liaison 11-22-65. JNH/jcls. Pls attach this index to NY report in this e dated 10/8/65 which was disseminated to 10/26/65 by liaison

1 copy recd from NY by R/S 7-7-66 in response to Bureau R/S 6-30-66 (S) and sent to [Legat Ottawa] (S) for delivery to (S) [RCMP] by, by O-7- 7-13-66 (pp 1-256)

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. OCT 29 11 06 AM '65

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. 23 12 44 PM

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. OCT 11 3 47 PM '65

REC'D DOM INTELL DIV. OCT 13 6 31 PM '65

JAN 28 1966

FEB 1 1966

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF Class DATE 11/17/84

SECRET

92-1000

SECRET

[WILLIAM K. HARVEY] ~~(S)~~ (U) Foreign

THOMPSON stated that this individual's face was somewhat familiar, and that the name definitely was familiar to him. THOMPSON identified this individual as a Captain HARVEY, whose name appeared on communications directed to OSI from the [7983rd Army Unit.] (S) Specifically, THOMPSON remembered that Captain HARVEY's name had appeared on name check requests submitted to OSI, Berlin, from the [7983rd Army Unit.] (S) THOMPSON believed that the Soviets either showed THOMPSON a picture of HARVEY or asked THOMPSON about HARVEY. THOMPSON stated that he furnished whatever available information he had about HARVEY to the Soviets, but he could not now recall the nature of this information. ~~(S)~~

SECRET

Cover Page

-N-

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90092-10002

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68227-649

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/1965
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
OXTANK
WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

FD-302 (Rev. 10-11-63)

DERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGAT

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except for the brackets
p.D,F

Date

ROBERT GLENN THOMPSON
ESP - R 12/4/64

1. KP 1-22-98

SLD/KSR 4-14-98 (JFK)

ROBERT G. THOMPSON, 1693 North Gardiner Drive, Bay Shore, Long Island, New York, was interviewed on December 2, 1964. At the outset of the interview THOMPSON was advised by SA PAUL BOYCE TOMPKINS that he was not under arrest, that his meeting with the Special Agents was strictly voluntary, and that he could leave at any time he wished to do so. THOMPSON was also advised that he had a right to say nothing at all, and that anything he did say might be used in a court of law against him. He was also advised that if he did say anything about a crime he had a right at any time to talk to a lawyer of his own choice or anyone else with whom he might wish to speak before saying anything.

The interviewing agents advised THOMPSON that they had in their possession a list of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) male personnel who were assigned to the Berlin Base of that agency during the period that THOMPSON was assigned to OSI, Berlin. The names on this list were then read off to THOMPSON, at which time he was asked to comment on any names that he recognized. (~~S~~)(U)

THOMPSON made the following comments concerning the individuals listed below, whose surnames he recognized. (~~S~~)(U)

[ROBERT A. ACKERMANN] (S)

THOMPSON stated he recalled an individual named [ACKERMANN] (S) who had some connection with Army Intelligence or CIA in Berlin while THOMPSON was with OSI, Berlin. He could recall nothing further regarding this individual nor could he recall if he furnished any information about [ACKERMANN] (S) to STEVEN. (~~S~~)

~~$~~ Germany

On 12/2/64 at Bay Shore, LI, NY File # 65-22427

by SAS PAUL BOYCE TOMPKINS & GEORGE W. O'CONNOR:emv Date dictated 12/4/64

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

D — Cover Page

SECRET

3.

NY 65-22427

WILLIAM K. HARVEY ~~(S)~~(U)

THOMPSON stated that he recalled an individual by the name of HARVEY whom he believes was an officer with the 7983rd Army Unit (S) which THOMPSON stated was a covert CIA outfit, or was an officer with an Army Intelligence Unit in Berlin. THOMPSON believed that this individual had the rank of Captain or Major, and that he was an administrative or liaison officer. THOMPSON stated that STEVEN, his Soviet principal, asked him about this individual and THOMPSON told STEVEN whatever he knew about this individual. THOMPSON advised that he thinks he, THOMPSON, might have met this individual on one occasion. ~~(S)~~

Germany

CLARK JUNG (S)

~~S~~

THOMPSON advised that he recalled an individual having the last name JUNG (S) who was a civilian employee of the 7983rd Army Unit (S) THOMPSON recalled a great many details about this individual, including the fact that he was a civilian employee of CIA in Grade GS-9 or 10. THOMPSON believed that this individual was an "agent handler" and furthermore, that he had some connection with photography. THOMPSON stated that this individual may have been a "counterfeiter of documents" or he may have been a "bug" on photography ~~(S)~~

THOMPSON also recalled that this individual lived on Argentinische Allee or Onkel Toms Strasse in Berlin, Dahlem. ~~(S)~~(U)

THOMPSON also recalled that the individual whose last name he believes was JUNG (S) had some sort of an association with two German nationals, whose release from jail in Germany, United States Intelligence had obtained in order that their talents might be utilized by the 7983rd Army Unit (S) THOMPSON stated that one of these individuals was a counterfeiter and that the other individual was a safe-cracker. STEVEN told him this. ~~(S)~~

F

Cover Page

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90092-10016
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-67235-648

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	WMFO
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/05/1963
PAGES :	12
SUBJECTS :	WILLIAM K. HARVEY
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/15/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	RPT

WFO 65-8517 (S)(U)
AWN:ljp/jet/mfm

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

I. CIA EFFORTS TO PENETRATE USSR (S) 5

II. INTERVIEW OF [JOSEPH BURK,] (S) CHIEF, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS, TECHNICAL CAPABILITIES, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, CIA 13

III. INTERVIEW OF JAMES CRITCHFIELD, CHIEF, NEAR EAST-SUB ASIAN DIVISION, DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR PLANS, CIA (S)(1) 24

IV. INTERVIEW OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY, CIA 29

V. INTERVIEW OF [EARL ALLEN GOLD,] (S) CHEMIST, RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT, TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, CIA 33

VI. INTERVIEW OF SERGE PETER KARLOW, CIA (S)(1) 43 (U)

  (A) [Assignment to Technical Aids Detachment (TAD), [Frankfurt,] (S) Germany, [1950 - 1953] (S)(1)(S) (S)(1)(U) 78

    (1) [Travel in Europe During Tenure at TAD] (S)(1)(S)(U) 82

      (a) [Travel to Berlin] (S)(1)(S)(U)

  (B) [Tenure as Secretary of [Technical Requirements Board (TRB),] 1958 - [1959] (S)(1)(U) (S)(1)(S)(U) (S)(1)(U) 97

VII. INTERVIEW OF MRS. FERIDA KARLOW (U) 115

VIII. INTERVIEW OF MRS. PETER KARLOW (U) 118

IX. [INTERVIEW OF [ROLAND ERNEST DULIN,] (S) CIA] (S)(1)(S) 123

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

~~(X1)~~(S) [GOLD] knew of no relatives of the KARLOWs living abroad nor was he aware of any financial interests which either of the KARLOWs held in Germany. ~~(S-1)~~(U) In discussing KARLOW's associates, [GOLD] (S) furnished the following individuals as being KARLOW's overseas friends: ~~(X1)~~(S)

GORDON STEWART, Head of the CIA [Station at Frankfurt] (S)
WILLIAM K. HARVEY, CIA representative in Berlin
[PETER SICHEL, CIA representative at Berlin
WALTER JESSELL] CIA official in Germany. (S) GER ~~(X1)~~(S)

~~(X1)~~(S) [GOLD] characterized KARLOW as being primarily interested in associating with "front office personnel; that when KARLOW did mingle with the co-workers, it was more or less an act of condescendence." ~~(S)~~ (S-1)(U)

(S) [GOLD] advised that because of the wide area that TAD was servicing in behalf of CIA, it was necessary that a number of TAD personnel be constantly travelling. (S) [GOLD] remarked that he was travelling steadily and that KARLOW was a frequent traveler in behalf of TAD. (S) [GOLD] could recall no specific dates of trips by KARLOW during the period 1950 to 1953, but furnished the following in this regard: (~~X1~~)(S)

[Vienna] (~~X1~~)(~~S~~)(U)

(S) [GOLD] estimated that KARLOW probably made 12 to 15 trips to Vienna during this period for Agency purposes. He recalled that the Agency was servicing a number of requests from Vienna; that at one time, "We had a riotous operation going there and [ED FOSTER] (S) needed some help." (S) [GOLD] believed that [FOSTER] could furnish substantial information regarding KARLOW's activities in Vienna. (~~X1~~)(S)

AUSTRIA

(S) [GOLD] recalled that during this particular period there were no travel restrictions on American personnel in and around Vienna; that frequently one was not aware he was even in a Soviet zone. (S) [GOLD] could not recall how long KARLOW remained in Vienna on his trips there. (~~X1~~)(S)

[illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible]

SECRET

was not sure of the date. He mentioned HOUCK was still [Chief of Base at Berlin] (S) and said he saw HOUCK. KARLOW explained that military orders were necessary for any travel into Berlin, including flight by Pan American Airways, which also operated under military control. He stated the orders for travel by train were the most formal, since a check by the Soviets was involved. ~~(S-1)(S)~~

KARLOW related one of his men from TAD, [DANIEL C. NIESCHIUR] (S) was stationed in [Berlin] (S) under the name of DANIEL O'NEILL. He thought this was in 1951 or after 1951. He also stated that other men from TAD had temporary duty in [Berlin] (S) and recalled vaguely the photography men had set up some new equipment and dark room there, [JOHN KOPERA] (S) had visited Berlin in connection with some Polish matter, WESLEY PARCELLS on some German "things," and (S) [JOUBLANC] the chemist, in connection with some case. ~~(S-1)(S)~~

GER

KARLOW said he could not say whether he was in Berlin in August, 1951, but recalled he was there on at least one occasion in the summer because he clearly remembered how early the sun rose in the morning. ~~(S-1)(S)~~ (U) [HARRY H. ROSITZKE] ~~(S)~~

GER

KARLOW stated he rarely became involved in operations and was usually occupied in making arrangements and setting things up for use of the facilities of TAD. He recalled, however, he was involved in an operation with [JOHN PARKER] (S) and HARRY ROSITZKE of the SR (Soviet Russia) Division and flew to Berlin in 1952 in this connection. KARLOW explained the operation involved a planned attempt to steal the latest model MIG fighter plane and great preparation had been made but at the last minute the adventure was called off because of possible political and diplomatic repercussions. ~~(S-1)(S)~~ [JOHN WILLIAMS PARKER] ~~(S)~~ (S)

KARLOW first said he was unable to recall visiting Berlin in 1953 but later said he recalled seeing WILLIAM K. HARVEY, Chief of Station, (December, 1952, to August, 1959) on more than one occasion so he supposes he did make such visits. When informed that it was understood that KARLOW had been to Berlin ten to fifteen times in the period 1950 - 1953, KARLOW offered no objection and said it was possible that this was true. With reference to his later assignment in Munich from November, 1953, to the end of 1955, KARLOW stated he was fairly certain he had not visited Berlin during this period. ~~(S-1)(S)~~ (U)

SECRET

SECRET

KARLOW stated he had stayed with Agency associates on some visits to Berlin and on one or more occasions he stayed at the Harnach House, an Army guest house for the Berlin command. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW further advised that before his marriage he and his mother had visited Italy and Corsica, and also the Austrian spa town of Bad Gastein and thought that may have been during the Summer of 1951. He said on a second trip to those areas he was accompanied by his mother and his wife. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW also stated that after his marriage he and his wife had gone to Corsica on two occasions, and to Rome, and had spent New Years Eve 1952 - 1953 at a small town in Austria. These were purely personal trips. He said he did not recall having taken a trip to Berlin for purely personal purposes. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW stated that before their marriage "LIBBY" RAUSCH had gone to Berlin and stayed at the residence of WILLIAM K. HARVEY. KARLOW said he had not visited Berlin with "LIBBY" before marriage but recalled he had done so on one occasion after marriage and he recollected he had become ill on the train from some oysters he had eaten. (S-1)(S)(U)

KARLOW explained in early February, 1950, he proceeded to [Frankfurt] (S) and took over as Chief of TAD which was located in the [Frankfurt] (S) suburb of [Hoechst at Feldbergstrasse 44,] (S) and had mail address APO 709. KARLOW resided in an apartment located in an adjoining building. KARLOW advised when he assumed charge of TAD the unit consisted of only about nine persons. From recollection KARLOW identified TAD personnel as follows: (S-1)(S)

DG Major ROBERT HARRIS, the previous Chief of TAD and a former officer of National Security Agency, (NSA); (S-1)(S)(U)

Captain GUY DRENNAN, also formerly with NSA, and currently night Duty Officer with the Intelligence Branch of the Department of State; and (S-1)(S)(U)

(S) [EARL ALLEN GOLD,] a civilian scientist-chemist, who became deputy of KARLOW and had a small laboratory with several technicians and operated what KARLOW described as a postal censorship; and (S-1)(S)

ALL [illegible] PAGE IS CLASSIFIED [illegible] SHOWN OTHERWISE

(S)(U)

SECRET

WFO 65-8517
DEW:lpr

SECRET

2

today is closely similar to that of his appearance 15 years ago. He said he has never worn glasses and his weight has increased only ten pounds since he was in college and it has never varied more than that at any time. He said he has never worn a mustache. (X1)(S)(U)

Late in the interview, DULIN (S) said upon further recollection he remembers contacting a Professor HAROLD MOSELEY, who was Head of Soviet Studies at Columbia University in New York City, when DULIN (S) was recruiting employees. DULIN (S) said that upon thoughtful consideration of his activities at that time he recalled that there was a CIA interest in obtaining a well-qualified man for a position in Moscow. He said efforts were being made to find a man who was to have a cover in the Embassy in Moscow. (S) This person to be hired was supposed to have a fluent command of the Russian language and he had to be of Anglo-Saxon descent. He said CIA gave instructions that the man to be placed in the position in Moscow could not be of Slovak descent (S) DULIN said it is possible that HAROLD MOSELEY referred ROBERTS (S) to DULIN (S) as a prospective employee for the position in Moscow but at this time he has no recollection of either the name or the face of ROBERTS. (S) He said he could definitely state he had never taken any recruit to Admiral HILLENKOTTER to discuss employment. (S) DULIN said he does not know and does not believe he has ever known the identity of any CIA employee in Moscow, Russia. (X1)(S)

PAGE IS CLASSIFIED

DULIN (S) said he is unable to explain why ROBERTS (S) would have addressed any correspondence relating to his CIA employment to an individual using the name of DULIN. (S) He further said he cannot understand why correspondence would have been addressed to SPENCER ROBERTS (S) in New York City with an address on the bottom of the letter "c/o R. E. DULIN, (S) 2001 16th (S) Street, (S) N. W., Washington, D. C." (S) DULIN said he had never authorized HARRY ROSITZKE or WILLIAM HARVEY to use his name and address as a cover in correspondence relating to recruitment of employees. (X1)(S)

DULIN (S) said he is acquainted with HARRY A. ROSITZKE, who is also employed with CIA. (S) DULIN said his association with ROSITZKE is not now and has never been close. He said he is unable to recall exactly when he became acquainted with ROSITZKE but he associates their meeting with a period shortly following World War II. He is unable to state how they became acquainted because they have never been assigned to the same work. They have never lunched together and they (X1)(S)

SECRET

SECRET

(U)

SECRET

Page
HARVEY, WILLIAM K. 29, 40, 83, 84, 124
HARVEY, Mrs. WILLIAM K. 38
HECKSCHER, HENRY (S) 82
HEILMAN, GRANT (S) 58
HEILMAN, PETER (S) 109
HEINZ (S) 34, 85
HELMS, RICHARD 78, 97
HENINWAY, THOMAS (Deceased) (S) 56
HIGH, JOE BENTON (S) 35
HILLENKOTTER, Admiral 124, 125, 126
HOFFMAN, WALDO BUSHNELL (S) 72
HOLT, HARPER (S) 87, 106
HOUCK, LESTER C. 82
HOUSTON, LAWRENCE R. 102
IN-EXFILTRATION PANEL, TRB 14
JACOBSEN, "ELLIE" (Deceased) (S) 115
JACOBSEN, FANNY (S) 70, 115
JACOBSEN, HARRY (S) 70, 115
JACOBSEN, OTTO (S) 70,
JAMES, PATRICK J. (S) 113
JAMESON, DONALD 107
JESSELL, WALTER 40
JOHNSON, QUENTIN 98
JOUBLANC, JOSEPH CHARLES (JAY) (S) 35, 83, 87
KALNAY, FRANCIS (S) 72, 73
KALNAY, FRANK (S) 61
KARLOW, ELIZABETH (LIBBY) 28, 42, 88, 94, 118
KARLOW, FERIDA 27, 29, 39, 115
KARLOW, SERGE PETER 43
KARLOW, SONJA 46, 55
KATEK, CHARLES (S) 18, 24, 81
KATZ, MILTON (S) 79
KAUFFMAN, WALTER J. 102
KAUFMAN, JOHN HEIDEN (S) 67
KHOKHLOV, NIKOLAI 98, 104
KHRUSHCHEV, NIKITA 111
KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN B. 97
KISTNER, HARRY (S) 95
KLEBANSKI, BERTHA (S) 63
KLEBANSKI, ELIAS MEYER (S) 63
KLEBANSKI, SAMUEL (S) 63

ALL INFORMATION IN THIS
FILE IS CLASSIFIED
UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE

SECRET

133

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10070

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-6

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 04/10/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

SECRET

NOTE:

(S) Subject is a commercial representative from Yugoslavia. Information was received from CIA that an individual with the same last name was a member of Yugoslav Intelligence Service (YIS). However, another source of CIA advised subject was not a member of YIS. CIA has learned that an individual believed to be the subject is being recalled to Yugoslavia, but this individual wishes to remain in the U. S. CIA desires verification of this information because if it is true [CIA may wish to consider contacting subject in an effort to persuade him to return to Yugoslavia under control of CIA.] (S) Subject is supposed to return to Yugoslavia at end of April, 1963. Approach to subject by FBI is not recommended because New York informants said in March, 1963, subject is not engaged in intelligence activities and because State recently denied clearance for approach in similar case.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90110-10071
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-114623-6

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :	CIA
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/29/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	FRANC PECAR JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

29 MAR 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [Franc PECAR] (S) (U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-26-98
SLD/KSR
5-30-98
(JFK)

1. Reference is made to our memorandum number CSCI-3/773,057, subject as above, dated 10 October 1962.

2. Joseph MEROLA, 2018 North Bay Road, Miami Beach, Florida, has advised representatives of another office of this Agency that he learned from contacts in New York that (fnu) PECAR, a Yugoslav trade official in the U. S., is being recalled to Yugoslavia and wishes to remain in the U. S. According to MEROLA, PECAR will visit Miami from 12 to 19 April 1963.

3. While MEROLA has an unsavory background, the representative who spoke with him is inclined to believe that he was telling the truth in this instance. MEROLA claimed that he has also informed the U. S. District Attorney of the above development.

4. It seems probable that (fnu) PECAR is identical with the subject of referenced memorandum, who was assigned to New York in late 1962 as in INTERTRADE representative.

5. We would appreciate receiving any information available to your Bureau concerning PECAR's alleged desire to remain in the U. S.

6. If the above information is true, this Agency may wish to consider [the desirability of contacting PECAR in an effort to persuade him to return to Yugoslavia at our behest.] (S)

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

2/18/95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8 MAC/KFA
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

James L. Hunt

JAMES ANGLETON

CSCI-3/775,509

REC- 74 [105-114623-6] (U)

APR 5 1963

(FBI INFO)
DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR EX-II
ON 5/28/98
(JFK)

NAT. SEC.

Let to CIA
2- [illegible]
VEK: [illegible]
4-16-63

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90110-10072

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-114623-7

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/09/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
FRANC PECAR
JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

RECEIVED IN
APR 1 2 1963
LIAISON

9 APR 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE ~~OF CIA~~ INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-26-98

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT : [Franc PECAR] (~~S~~)(U)

1. Reference is made to our memoranda CSCI-3/775,509, dated 29 March 1963, CSCI-3/775,572, dated 2 April 1963, and CSCI-3/775,622, dated 4 April 1963, all with the subject as above.

2. Another office of this Agency has provided the following additional information from Joseph MEROLA concerning Subject.

a. Subject arrived in Miami, Florida, on 4 April and resided with Joseph MEROLA until 6 April 1963 when he was scheduled to return to New York. Subject planned to return to Miami for the period of 12-19 April following which he would go to Vienna for a short visit, returning to the United States about the end of April. Subject's family will remain in the United States.

b. According to MEROLA, Subject met Assistant Attorney General William Kenny in Miami, but MEROLA had no further details on their conversation except that PECAR appeared most eager to make arrangements to stay in the United States. Subject showed MEROLA and Kenny voluminous documentation.

3. [This office is considering contacting Subject during his visit to Vienna for the purpose of attempting recruitment to return to Yugoslavia.] (S) An early reply regarding information available to your Bureau concerning PECAR's activities in the United States would be appreciated.

6 page statement of Pecar furnished CIA by Bulet dated 4/18/63

Copy to N.Y. Miami
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 4-19-63
by HCF [illegible]

FOR THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR (PLANS):

J. Angleton
JAMES ANGLETON

(~~S~~)(U)

CSCI-3/775,718

2/18/95
FBI INFO
Classified by SP8 MAC/KSA
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

1 copies made
2-26-78 [illegible]
re: J. Merola
for review at FBIHQ by
HSCA re 2-26-78 request.
(See Bufile #62-117290)

1 Xerox copy made
4-18-63 HCF [illegible]

EX-1 REC-31 105-114623-7

APR 15 1963

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

56 APR 29 1963

SECRET

FBI INFO
DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 5-30-98 (JFK)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90110-10083
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-89923-184

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	MM
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/13/1961
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	CLIP JOSEPH RAYMOND MEROLA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/06/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	TT

5-4-41 (Rev. 1-25-61)

DECODED COPY

SECRET

- Tolson
- Parsons
- Mohr
- Belmont
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Tavel
- Trotter
- W.C. Sullivan
- Tele. Room
- Ingram
- Gandy

☐ **Radio** ☒ **Teletype**

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

REC- 92 CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except bracketed on pg. 2

DONAHOE

KP 5-26-98

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR

URGENT 4-13-61 4-17 PM SK

TO DIRECTOR

FROM SAC, MIAMI 131836

(U) (X) INTERNAL SECURITY-CUBA

[CLIP.] ~~IS CUBA~~. BUFILES 105-89923, 137-6257, 87-58729. ON APRIL 3 LAST MM 722 C FURNISHED FOLLOWING RE JOSEPH R. MEROLA, FORMER CI*, NOW SUSPECT IN "UNSUBS (TWO) ARMED ROBBERY OF APPROXIMATELY $117,200 IN JEWELRY AND CASH, RESIDENCE OF EDITH AND FRITZ DORIGO, HALLANDALE, FLORIDA, MARCH 20, 1961, ITSP**, MAJOR THEFT, OO MIAMI." MEROLA RECENTLY TOLD CI HE IS CONNECTED WITH CIA IN SOME CAPACITY IN WHICH HE CLAIMED TO HAVE ACCESS TO ALL FORMS EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION, BEING FURNISHED BY CIA TO SOME ANTI CASTRO GROUP. MEROLA CLAIMED CIA SENDS THIS EQUIPMENT TO MEROLAS HOME WHERE IT IS SUBSEQUENTLY PICKED UP BY BOAT FROM REAR MEROLA RESIDENCE. CLAIMED HE IS REQUIRED HAVE CUBANS WHO OBTAIN GUNS SIGN RECEIPT FOR SAME. OPERATION TAKES PLACE UNDER COVER DARKNESS. CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN FROM EQUIPMENT SEVERAL AUTOMATICS EQUIPPED WITH SILENCERS. INFORMANT CLAIMS MEROLA IS "ARMING THE OUTFIT" AND IS FURNISHING THESE WEAPONS TO VARIOUS HOODLUM ACQUAINTANCES FOR SUM $500 EACH. MEROLA EXHIBITED ONE SUCH AUTOMATIC TO CI AND DEMONSTRATED BY FIRING SHOT INTO AIR. CI "COULD NOT HEAR A THING." ON APRIL 5 JOHN NOBLE, COVERT CIA AGENT WORKING OPERATIONAL LEVEL, ADVISED DID NOT BELIEVE CIA HAD OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MEROLA BUT WOULD CHECK. ON APRIL 6 HE ADVISED CIA HAD NOT OPERATIONAL INTEREST IN MEROLA. ON APRIL 7 JUSTIN

Brazil
FZA.

137-6257-
87-58729-

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X

5-30-98

Tel to Miami (U) [CLIP] (X) (U) 4/14/61 md

EX-139 C.A. Liaison 4/18/61 md

REC- 92

REC- 105-89923-184

*CRIMINAL INFORMANT

**INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF STOLEN PROPERTY

XEROX APR 24 1961

26 APR ~~19~~ 1961

63 APR 26 1961

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

4-41 (Rev. 1-25-61)

DECODED COPY

Tolson ______
Parsons ______
Mohr ______
Belmont ______
Callahan ______
Conrad ______
DeLoach ______
Evans ______
Malone ______
Rosen ______
Tavel ______
Trotter ______
W.C. Sullivan ______
Tele. Room ______
Ingram ______
Gandy ______

☐ Radio ☒ Teletype

SECRET

PAGE TWO: FROM SAC, MIAMI 131836

GLEICHAUF, OVERT CIA REPRESENTATIVE, MIAMI, ADVISED ABOUT TWO MONTHS AGO HE WENT TO MEROLAS HOME AFTER MEROLA PESTERED HIM WITH PHONE CALLS OFFERING RENT PLANE OR HELICOPTER TO CIA FOR USE BY FRENTE REVOLUCIONARIO DEMOCRATICO, ANTI CASTRO ORGANIZATION UTILIZED BY CLIP. MEROLA SHOWED GLEICHAUF BOAT "TERRY KNAUT" DOCKED BEHIND HIS HOME AND IMPLIED THIS WAS HIS BOAT AND IT HAD ALREADY BEEN USED BY FRENTE. MEROLA SEEMED EAGER GET OUT OF U. S. AND SUGGESTED CIA USE HIM ON SOME MISSION TO BRAZIL WHERE MEROLA PLANNED WORK OUT DEAL TO SHIP WHISKEY TO BRAZIL DUTY FREE THROUGH BRAZILIAN POLITICIAN. GLEICHAUF TOLD MEROLA HE WAS NOT INTERESTED. AFTER FURTHER CHECK, GLEICHAUF ADVISED MIAMI THIS BOAT HAS BEEN USED ON ONE OR MORE OPERATIONS BY FRENTE, BUT NOT LIKELY BE USED AGAIN BECAUSE IN BAD SHAPE. BOAT 63 FEET, BEARS REGISTRATION NUMBER 270404. GLEICHAUF STATED MEROLA NOT WORKING FOR CIA OR FRENTE SO FAR AS CAN DETERMINE. ON APRIL 5 [DAVID GLASS,] (S) COVERT CIA AGENT, FURNISHED MIAMI LIST BOATS BEING USED IN VARIOUS OPERATIONS IN WHICH CIA HAS INTEREST. "TERRY KNOTT" ON THIS LIST. AFTER SEVERAL UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS TO CONTACT VARONA PERSONALLY, ON APRIL 13 JORGE MORAN, SECRETARY TO MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA LOREDO, GENERAL COORDINATOR OF FRENTE, CONFIDENTIALLY ADVISED MEROLA IS WORKING ON THE BOAT "TERRY KNOTT" OWNED BY MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION DE LA REVOLUCION, MRR, WHICH IS MEMBER ORGANIZATION OF FRENTE. MORAN STATED BOAT WAS OPERATED BY SANTIAGO BABUM APRIL 8 AND JOSE "PEPE" ARRIOLA WAS IN CHARGE OF "TERRY KNOTT"

No locality

SECRET

If the intelligence contained in the above message is to be disseminated outside the Bureau, it is suggested that it be suitably paraphrased in order to protect the Bureau's cryptographic systems.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/4/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90124-10055
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 97-3224-NR

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	MX
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/11/1962
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	MANUEL FUEGO MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/12/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

It is pointed out that CIA in both Managua, Nicaragua, and Guatemala City, Guatemala, is investigating this matter and the U.S. Army ~~(S)~~ (U) Attache, Guatemala City, has also done some investigation through his close contact with Lt. Colonel JOSE LUIS AGUILAR DE LEON, who is the confidential source abroad mentioned in the accompanying report. ~~(S)~~ (U) 2nd set of brackets declass per Army on 2-20-98

SCOTT HOLLOWAY (S) head of the CIA Station, American Embassy (S) Managua, Nicaragua, advised on 9-5-62 that NOEL PALLAIS, who is T-1 in the accompanying report, (S) runs the financial enterprises of General ANASTASIO SOMOZA of Nicaragua. HOLLOWAY (S) stated that PALLAIS has been in close contact with the CIA Office in regard to this case. (S) He was made available for contact by HOLLOWAY (S) and was subsequently interviewed at the CIA office (S) in Managua. HOLLOWAY (S) stated he personally has encouraged General SOMOZA (S) not to have anything to do with WERBELL, SMITH and associates. He stated he feels the offer to sell arms and ammunition and provide mercenaries which was made to the Guatemalan Government was only of secondary interest. ~~(S)~~

MICHAEL F. TAYLOR (S) of the CIA Station, (S) American Embassy, Guatemala City, advised on September 10, 1962, that it was ascertained that the woman who accompanied WERBELL to Managua is LUCY LUCHIEN, who owns the Duplex Building in Guatemala City. She returned to Guatemala City on September 1, 2 or 3, 1962. ~~(S)~~

(S) TAYLOR advised that when ARTHUR L. SMITH left Guatemala City on September 3, 1962, he left as a forwarding address 1025 Connecticut Avenue, Suite 405, Washington, D.C. According to TAYLOR (S) WERBELL told the manager of the Maya Excelsior Hotel that he had the clearance of CIA. ~~(S)~~

(S) TAYLOR stated that MIGUELITO YDIGORAS, son of the President of Guatemala, advised that neither WERBELL nor SMITH had made personal contact with him. At the request of MIGUELITO YDIGORAS, the Judicial ~~(S)~~

Police put a surveillance on WERBELL and SMITH, which apparently was rather obvious. The police also monitored their telephone conversations. Subsequently, [the Judicial Police] (S) advised CIA that SMITH had made one telephone call to MARIO GARCIA KOHLY in Washington, D.C., and another to a man by the name of DIGGS or BRIGGS in Washington, D.C. He also made a telephone call to Handy of Jones and Handy, Marine Architects, Miami, Florida. SMITH received a telephone call which was reported as having been from ARNOLD in Washington but (S) [TAYLOR] stated that CIA believes it was from FRANK AUSTIN, who he said is connected with MARIO GARCIA KOHLY in Washington. (~~S~~)

WERBELL tried to make telephonic contact with FRANK MARSHALL, Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica. (~~S~~) (U)

In telephone calls made just prior to 8-20-62 mention was made of meeting someone referred to only as "the general" at the Hotel El Salvador, San Salvador, El Salvador. According to [TAYLOR] (S) CIA does not believe the meeting took place in San Salvador as planned. (S) [TAYLOR] had previously mentioned on 8-13-62 that when WERBELL and SMITH first contacted MIGUELITO YDIGORAS during early August, 1962, they stated they were waiting for PINEIRO and seemed to think PINEIRO was someone YDIGORAS would know. They stated they would contact him as soon as PINEIRO arrived. [TAYLOR] (S) advised on 9-10-62 that it had been ascertained that Colonel JOSE PINEIRO PAEZ was apparently the one they were expecting. (~~S~~)

(S) [TAYLOR] stated that the telephone conversation between SMITH, WERBELL and the individuals they were talking to were apparently rather cryptic and [the Judicial Police] (S) obtained little more than the identities of the individuals making the calls. (~~S~~)

SECRET

SOURCES

The confidential source abroad is Lt. Colonel JOSE LUIZ AGUILAR LEON, Minister of Labor and Social Welfare, National Police, Guatemala City, Guatemala. (X) [S] T-1 is NOEL PALLAIS, first cousin of President LUIS SOMOZA, and General ANASTASIO SOMOZA of Nicaragua, who handles financial enterprises of General SOMOZA. X Located in instant report. Source concealed as he is a contact of CIA, (S) Managua, Nicaragua. (X)

CLASSIFICATION

Enclosed report is classified "Confidential" as it contains information from an official of a foreign government and from an individual who has close connections with a second foreign government. [S] Both (X) [S] requested the information be regarded as confidential.

STATUS

While this case and also the case on MANUEL FUEGO, RA - Central America, are being placed in an RUC status, they will be reopened if any pertinent information is received.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/4/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90124-10092
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	DOMR
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	07/16/1965
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/12/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	AT

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

FBI

Date: 7-16-65

SECRET

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via **Airtel**
(Priority)

Classified by SP8MPC/KSR 2-18-95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR 6-9-98 (JFK)

To: Director, FBI

From: SAC, Legat, Santo Domingo (134-31) (RUC)

Subject: ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO - PSI
IS - DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

REC-133

Reference Buairtel dated June 28, 1965. Reference also Santo Domingo teletype number 163, dated June 23, 1965, captioned, "MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WARBELL, III, PSI."

Information received from [the local office of] (S) CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) on May 30, 1965, revealed that subject, born in Havana, Cuba; 52 years; height 5'11"; weight 190 pounds; gray hair; brown eyes; married with no children; is employed by the Cia. Dominicana de Seguros, a subsidiary of AMADEO BARLETTA's Enterprises in Santo Domingo. The report indicated that RIVERO had worked in the General Motors set-up in Havana, Cuba, under BARLETTA. When CASTRO moved into Cuba, RIVERO exiled himself to Miami. BARLETTA then offered RIVERO a job in Santo Domingo and placed him in charge of the Division of Insurance of BARLETTA's General Motors set-up. RIVERO was described as a boisterious, gregarious type, who hits every bar in town and who is extremely loud mouthed. ~~(S)~~ (U)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 5-11-98 EXCEPT BRACKETS

Files of the Dominican Immigration Service checked on July 13, 1965, revealed that ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO has permanent Dominican Resident Visa 10349, issued to him for the year 1965. He has had permanent resident status in the Dominican Republic since 1962..

The file further indicated that he entered the Dominican Republic at Santo Domingo on February 2, 1962, from Miami, Florida. He was described as follows:

SECRET

4 - Bureau
1 - Liaison Section
1 - Santo Domingo

AAC:wlg (5)

REC-133

134-13856-2

copies made 5-28 736/9/14 of serial 2
Re: Mitchell L. Werbell
for review at FBIHQ by HSCA re 2-16-77 request of (See Bufile #62-117290)

JUL 20 1965

C.C. Wick

JUL 27 1965

Approved: ______________________ Sent ____________M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

Airtel to Director, FBI
RE: ANTONIO HECTOR RIVERO JUARRERO - PSI

DOB:	July 15, 1911
RACE:	White
COMPLEXION:	Light
WEIGHT:	175 lbs
HEIGHT:	5' 11"
EYES:	Brown
HAIR:	Gray
MARITAL STATUS:	Married
RESIDENCE:	Arzobispo Marino Number 30, Santo Domingo

JOHN CASSERLY (protect identity), correspondent for the American Broadcasting System who is known to this office, advised on July 11, 1965, that RIVERO is currently living with MITCHELL WARBELL. Dominican Republic

This source advised that RIVERO is notoriously known as a "wheeler dealer." He has a number of different businesses all concerned with automobiles and automobile insurance. He has associated with BARLETTA who had the General Motors franchise in Havana, Cuba, for many years.

Rivero Cuba

Source stated that RIVERO has a pleasant personality but described him as a heavy drinker and stated that RIVERO would do anything for money. He advised that RIVERO's wife is one EVANGELINA HERNANDEZ, a Cuban national. He further stated HERNANDEZ has relatives in Miami, Florida, and makes frequent trips to Miami. He advised RIVERO allegedly was mixed up in gambling enterprises but added that he had no proof of this.

Inasmuch as RIVERO is reported to be extremely loud mouthed and inasmuch as he is currently reported to be living with MITCHELL WARBELL, [who at one time was reported to be employed by CIA and who is currently characterized by CIA as a "wild man,"] ~~(S)~~(U) no further action is being taken with reference to developing this individual as a PSI.

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/10/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90130-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-88731-32

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : MM
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 07/09/1960
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
FRANCISCO RODRIGUEZ TAMAYO
PAN AMERICA CONFEDERATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/21/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : RPT

v9.1

MM 105-2643

1134-10

FD-302 reflecting identities of CYpress telephone numbers in Key West, Florida, was furnished by Mrs. POLLY ANDREW, District Manager's Clerk, Southern Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Coral Gables, Florida, who furnished same to SA LEMAN L. STAFFORD, JR.

INFORMANTS

Identity	Location of Original Information
MM T-1 is GILBERT BARRERAS, PSI, an American citizen, who has a wide acquaintanceship with Cubans in the Miami area.	134-409 Sub A
MM T-2 is RAY O'MERA, CIA, Miami (S)	Instant report, page 143

Careful consideration has been given to each source concealed in this report and "T" symbols were utilized only in those instances where identities must be concealed.

- D * -

COVER PAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/2/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90135-10074
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-82298-164

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/18/1963
PAGES :	28
SUBJECTS :	ELOY GUTIERREZ MENOYO
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/19/1999
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	SUMMARY

SECRET

CORRELATION SUMMARY

Main File No: 105-82298 Date: **January 18, 1963**

Subject: Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo (1)
Kiko Pernas*
One Gutierrez**
One Martinez***

Date Searched: 10/26/62

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

All logical variations of subject's name and aliases were searched and identical references found as:

Summary

Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guiterrez
Eloy Guitierrez
Eloy Guterrez
Eloy Gutierez
Eloy Gutierres
Ely Gutierres
Elog Gutierrez
Eloy Gutierrez
Eloy Menoyo Gutierrez
Eloyo Gutierrez
Ely Gutierrez
Gallego Gutierrez
Eloy Gutierrez Manoyo
Lazaro Martinez
Lazaro O. Martinez
Lazaro Cristobal Florian Martinez
Lazaro Cristobal Florian Martinez Mendez
Lazaro Martinez Mendez
Lazaro O. Martinez Mendez
Ely Gutierrez Menjoya
Eloy Gutierrez Menoy
Gutierrez Menoya

23

Eloy Gutierrez Menoya
One Menoyo
Eloy Menoyo
Elog Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guitierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guterrez Menoyo
Eloy Gutierez Menoyo
Eloy Gutierres Menoyo
Eloy Gutiirrez Menoyo
Eloy Gutterrez Menoyo
Eloyo Gutierrez Menoyo
Ely Gutierres Menoyo
Ely Gutierrez Menoyo
Gallego Gutierrez Menoyo
Guterriez Menoyo
Gutierre Menoyo
Gutierrez Menoyo
Eloy Guiterrez Menoyo
Eloy Monoya
Eloy Gutierrez Monoya
Floy Gutierrez Monoya
Eloy Gutierrez Monoyo

22

Also searched as One Gallego, see page 29 of summary.

(continued on next page)

7/25/94 05RMBGA
Classified by SP8 BLJ/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 2/13/89
(JFK

THIS SUMMARY HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR USE AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION.

105-82298-164

Analyst	Coordinator	Approved
James F. Kline	Mary H. Elgin	Norman F. Stultz

REC

ENC. BEHIND FILE

JFK:jeb

*Gutierrez was alleged to have used the nickname Kiko Pernas. See serials 72 and 95 of main file (105-82298). See also 105-98002-1.
** Not searched, see page 56 of search slip.
***Not completely searched, see page 56 of search slip.

62 JAN 29 1963

SECRET

organization rather than through file on GUTIERREZ MENOYO as an individual. Accordingly, Miami file 105-2102 (Bufile 105-82298) is being closed at this time and all leads regarding the II Front or GUTIERREZ MENOYO will be handled in 105-5948. For this reason a report was prepared at this time instead of the letterhead memorandum as requested in referenced Bureau letter.

- INFORMANTS -

Identity	Location
MM T-1 is MM 639-S	134-238 Sub A-479 and 134-238 Sub A-478 ~~S~~ (u)

- C* -
- COVER PAGE -

SECRET

SECRET

Hector Peter Ordetx, 1802 Lamar St., Tampa, Fla., furnished on 1/26/62, a quantity of miscellaneous papers, some of which bore the name of Roberto De Los Rios (100-431672) and appeared to be correspondence between him and members of his family in Cuba. One of these papers was a carbon copy of a typewritten letter in Spanish to "Dear Father", dated 4/7/59, at Tampa, with no signature. The writer said that Nelson had written him asking for declarations of the committee in regard to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and his insidious declarations. No further information.

100-431672-27 p.16,17
(3,36)

Correlator's Note: It was noted that Roberto De Los Rios had a brother named Nelson.

Rolando Arcadio Masferrer Rojas (100-344127) advised on 4/29/59, that he had heard that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and William Morgan, former leaders in Sierra del Escambray, Second Front, were dissatisfied with the situation in Cuba.

100-344127-18 p.19
(3)

CIA Information Report, dated 5/19/59, revealed that Temistocles Fuentes Rivera (105-62455) stated that when Ernesto "Che" Guevara arrived in Las Villas Province, Cuba, during the revolution, he was in the zone of the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray which was headed by Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. Gutierrez and an armed troop met Guevara with drawn guns, accused him of being a communist and demanded that he and his men leave their area of operations. (~~S~~)(u)

105-62455-10 p.1
(3,36)

MM-635-S, employed by the Cuban Air Force, advised that on 5/20/59, Major Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Major Pernas, and Major Armando Fleitas, all leaders of the Second Front of the Escambray, came to consult with Major Marcos Diaz Lanz, chief of the Revolutionary Air Force in Cuba. Gutierrez told Marcos Diaz that they had 400 men who were unemployed and whom they would like to put to work in order to keep them out of trouble. (X)(u)

*[109-599-6 Encl.p.1
(13,47)]*(~~S~~)(u)

SECRET

On 3/18/59, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, at a press conference, stated that his organization* supported the Castro Government "as long as it lives up to the principles for which we fought", and that if it should deviate "we will take whatever steps circumstances dictate". He further stated that his group was 100% anti-communist.

On 4/20/59, Gutierrez left Havana to visit Miami at the invitation of Miami's Mayor, (source not clear).

Paul Bethel, Press Officer, U.S. Embassy, Havana, Cuba (protect identity), advised that Tony Beacon was appointed Gutierrez's press secretary on the above mentioned trip and Beacon was paid by Nick Bartone, an American who was attempting to sell C-74's (Globemaster I) to Cuba.

"The Havana Post ",dated 5/27/59, carried an article to the effect that the Second National Front of the Escambray (105-78831) had issued a statement which endorsed the Agrarian Reform Program of the Cuban Government. The statement was signed by Gutierrez, National Chief, and Armando Fleitas, Secretary General of the organization.

Add. info. according to PSI Hugo Gonzalez Lajonchere (protect identity). (~~S~~)(U)

105-78831-1 p.1,2
(5,38)

A Foreign Service Dispatch from the Department of State, dated 5/28/59, revealed that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo had told the Embassy in Cuba that the Segundo Frente Nacional del Escambray (105-78831) was strongly anti-communist and would take action if necessary should the Government come under communist control or domination. (~~S~~) (U)

State also advised that a source, who had spent a month with the Segundo Frente under the command of Gutierrez, advised that the group was non-political and definitely not communist. Gutierrez felt that Fidel Castro had a number of communists among his advisors and he believed one of these was "Che" Guevara. Guevara had been joined by some of the members of the Segundo Frente, with Gutierrez's approval, but Guevara's followers had not been allowed to take arms with the Segundo Frente. (~~S~~)(U)

105-78831-3 p.2,3,4
(5,38)

PP's 6 + 7
IS NOW DECLASS
PER DEPT. OF
STATE LET. DTD
3-19-98
SLD/ICSR
5-13-98
(JFK)

---

* Second National Front of the Escambray.

Francisco Rodriguez Couceiro, 6424 S.W. 38th St., Miami, Fla., advised that the Crusade of Revolutionaries Against Communism (CRAC) had planned an invasion of the Isle of Pines, Cuba. In June, 1959, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and William Alexander Morgan, Commanders in the Cuban Army, were in contact with the Movimento Revolucionario Democrata in Havana, and this was known to the CRAC in Miami. Rodriguez had advised the group in Cuba and the anti-Castro movement in the Dominican Republic, not to trust either Morgan or Gutierrez because he considered them both to be loyal to Castro, and their cooperation with the group was for the purpose of entrapment.

Add. info. according to Rodriguez.

105-81502-7 p.20
(6, 38)

A teletype from San Juan, dated 6/5/59, concerning Nicaraguan revolutionary activities, set out the following: "Second Front Escambray Forces under Commandant Ely Gutierrez Menjoya requested immediate dissolution from Government. Message conjectures that this may mean a breakaway from policies of July 26 and could mean participation in other revolutions." Not further clarified. (X)(U)

[109-12-222-503
(26)] (X)(U)

[MM 685-S*] (S) advised on 6/26/59, that Paul Hughes, an American pilot, flew for Commander Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo during the Cuban Revolution. Hughes was suspected of taking guns that were stored at Miami International Airport and which belonged to the Cuban Government. Hughes had come to Miami from Cuba on a mission for Gutierrez. (X)

On 7/2/59, Sergio Diaz Brull, former advisor to the former Chief of the Cuban Air Force, advised that Gutierrez was sympathetic with the anti-Fidel Castro Movement and was waiting in the mountains of Cuba with approximately 2,000 men for instructions when to attack the forces of the Cuban Revolutionary Government.

105-79528-2 p.B, Encl.p.7
(5, 38)

Department of the Army advised that in an interview with Florencio Pernas Lorenzo (105-98002) on 2/14/61, Pernas advised that from January to March, 1959, all he did was attend social and official gatherings in Cuba. During this period he made a trip to Miami, Fla. with Comandante Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. In about July, 1959, he was requested by Gutierrez to participate in an action against Trujillo and Batista followers who were to attack Cuba. From 12/20-23/59, Pernas made a trip to Tampa, Fla., accompanied by Gutierrez to collect toys for needy children of the Escambray. (~~S~~)(U) PP's 1+2 IS NOW DECLASS PER ARMY LET. DTD. 4-16-98 SLD/KSR 5/13/98 (JFK)

Pernas entered the U.S. with Gutierrez* and planned to go to Miami and wait for orders of Gutierrez as to his future actions. (~~S~~)(U)

Add. info. according to Fernando Prio Hernandez, 1330 Southwest 12th Ave., Miami, Francisco Prio Socarras, 2200 Southwest 2nd Ave., Miami, Antonio Prio Socarras, 1001 Southwest 22nd St., Coral Gables, Fla., and duplicate informant.

105-98002-11 p.4-6,8-10
(8,41)
SI 105-98002-2 p.2,3
(8,41)
SI 105-98002-9 p.3,4,6-8
(8,41) Add. info.

*Entered U.S. January, 1961

CIA advised that a meeting composed of anti-Franco elements and communists took place on 2/4/61, at the camp of the Spanish Liberation Army (Ejercito de Liberacion de Espana-ELE) on the Isle of Pines near Havana. Abderraman Muley More and his aide, Manuel Perez, leaders of DRIL (Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation) who had taken charge of ELE since the departure in late January, 1961, of Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, were threatened with expulsion from Cuba for resisting communist efforts to take over ELE. (~~S~~)(U)

109-587-47
(13,47)

Miguel Antonio Sanchez Ramos, who was interviewed in Room 615, Roger Williams Hotel, 28 East 31st St., NYC (not further identified) (Protect identity), and who had furnished reliable information in the past, advised on 1/27/61, that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, who was involved in the "double cross" of the Dominican Republic's attempt to overthrow Fidel Castro in August, 1959, had a price of $100,000 on his head, put there by Trujillo of the Dominican Republic. (~~S~~)(U)

105-93789-39 Encl.p.7
(7,40)

SECRET

On 2/23/61, Cirita Lopez Cejas, residence, Miami, Fla., and a messenger for Manuel Ray and the underground, advised that Manuel Ray had helped Gutierrez Menoyo and the group who came with him, to escape from Cuba on 1/27/61. Lopez stated that she assisted in the arrangements for the defection and had hidden 5 or 6 of the revolutionaries in her home in Havana. She advised that Ray recognized that Gutierrez pulled a considerable amount of support and following as a former leader of the Escambray. He was considered a good campaigner and knew the Sierra Escambray Mountains extremely well.

[113-7-210-252 Encl.p.7,8 ~~(S)~~(U)
(51)

The 2/1/61, issue of the "Miami Herald" carried an article entitled "Economic Crises Won't Topple Castro-Prio" in which Carlos Prio Socarras (109-430) stated his views on Cuba and Castro. Prio also expressed concern that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, the rebel commandante who had sought asylum in Miami, was still being detained by U.S. authorities: Guiterrez was an anti-communist, according to Prio.

109-430-2390 Encl.p.3
(23)
SI 109-430-2395 p.10
(23)

CIA Information Report, dated 2/10/61, revealed that a source who belonged to a group which assisted defectors to escape from Cuba, had been trying to get Humberto Sori Marin (105-93839) out of Cuba. The source visited Miami to determine whether the means of escape from Cuba had been compromised by Gutierrez Menoyo and his companions. He also wanted to determine if Sori would be interned as was Gutierrez, and how Gutierrez had learned about this escape route and how he was able to highjack the boats. ~~(S)~~(U)

105-93839-2
(29)

CIA furnished on 3/6/61, a memorandum captioned "DRIL Plans For Action In the Iberian Peninsula" , which stated that the Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation (DRIL) planned to infiltrate a group from Portugal into the Sierra Morena mountain range. According to the secretary of DRIL leader Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, DRIL had a clandestine printing shop in Madrid. Field Comment: According to a 2/14/61 report from [an official Spanish service, Gutierrez's secretary] (C) in Havana, said that DRIL leader Abderraman Muley More had commented that his plan had been to charter a boat to be used for clandestine landing in Spain or Portugal. ~~(S)~~

109-587-48 p.3
(13,47)

On 6/30/61, Ralph Huguet, former officer in the Cuban Rebel Air Force, advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Max Edgardo Lesnick Menendez (105-64869) resided with him at the Blue Bay Motel, Normandy Isle, Miami Beach, Fla. Gutierrez desired to come to the Miami Office for an interview. Huguet advised that to his knowledge, neither Lesnick nor Gutierrez were involved in any acitvity or in any way connected with the current Cuban government. (S)(U)

105-64869-11
(4,36)
SI 105-64869-12 p.1-3
(4,36) Add. info.

MM 639-S advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, a recently defected military commander of the Cuban Revolutionary Army, and closely associated with the Frente Revolucionario Democratico, a leading anti-Castro organization, planned to attend, as an observer, military demonstrations with maneuvers that were to be held at an abandoned airport at Davie, Fla., on 7/1/61. These demonstrations were held by the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation (2-1683). (S)(U)

2-1683-3 Encl.p.2
(1,34)

MM 639-S advised on 7/2/61, that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, did not attend the demonstration held on 7/2/61, at Davie Airport, Davie, Fla., by the Revolutionary Junta of National Liberation (2-1683). (S)(U)

2-1683-7 Encl.p.2
(1,34)
SI 2-1693-31 p.11
(2,35) (Add. info according to
Gerald Patrick Hemming, 1936 Southwest
3rd St., Miami, Fla.)
SI 2-1499-78 p.11
(1,34)

Miami report, dated 10/4/61, revealed that MM-639-S advised that Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo's father and brother were both known communists in Cuba and Eloy himself fought on the side of the communists in Spain in the 1930's. Eloy was further accused of being responsible for over 200 innocent people being put in jail in Cuba and having participated in the William Alexander Morgan affair at Trinidad, Cuba, in August, 1959. He was not well considered by Cuban nationals in Miami, had a bad reputation and was not generally trusted. (~~S~~)(U)

Add. info.

2-1693-39 p.1,3-7,11
(2,35)

Roger Redondo Gonzalez, 730 W. 11th Ave., Miami, Fla., advised on 11/13/61, that a captain Antonico (LNU), who furnished the transportation for a group of Cuban exiles to infiltrate Cuba in August, 1961, was in charge of contacting the Cuban underground for Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. (~~S~~)(U)

Rafael Huguet Del Valle, Blue Bay Motel, 2070 Bay Drive, Miami Beach, Fla., advised on 11/13/61, that Antonico (LNU) was a fishing boat captain from Cayo Guillermo, Cuba, who was a member of the revolutionary movement of Gutierrez and who had contact with the underground section of this movement in Cuba. (~~S~~)(U)

Add. info. according to Huguet and duplicate informants. (~~S~~)(U)

2-1693-50 p.1-4,6
(2,35)

(S)
(NY 2965-S*) advised that on 12/22/61, Herbert Matthews ("NY Times" correspondent) contacted Mario Garcia Inchaustegui (105-99238), Cuban Ambassador to the UN. Garcia asked Matthews if there was any news of the "invasion of my country". Matthews replied that there was nothing new, only "the ravings of that 'jerk' Gutierrez (probably Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo) and Miro Cardona" (anti-Castro Cuban revolutionary leaders). (S)

[105-99238-26 p.1
(8,41)] (S)

Gerardo Gabriel Antonio Hernandez Perez (105-113456), residence, Miami, Fla., advised on 8/3/62, that he and many other Cubans had a poor opinion of Jose Miro Cardona, President of the Cuban Revolutionary Council, Manuel Ray Rivero, former member of the council, and Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, because they were once with the Castro regime and probably would have stayed if there had been sufficient opportunity for them to advance politically and financially. Ray was considered the most anti-American of any of the exiled leaders. (U)

105-113456-1 Encl.p.7
(9-42)

On 9/12/62, Rene Dechard, 1174 S.W. 12th St., Miami, Fla., advised that Max Garcia (97-4345) had made phone calls to his home at various times in the past in attempts to locate Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo.

97-4345-35 p.1,2
(3-36)

CIA Information Report, dated 9/18/62, revealed that General Generoso Campos Marquetti, President of the Alliance For the Liberty of Cuba (105-114160), stated that the Alliance sought a unification of all elements, except those of the Castroite bloc whose "hands are stained with blood". Campos was adamant in refusing to accept anyone of the ilk of Gutierrez Menoyo (FNU). (X)(U)

Headquarters Comment: This probably refers to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Commandant of the former anti-Batista Second National Front of the Escambray, who took exile in the U.S. in January, 1961.

105-114160-2 p.3,4
(9-42)

MM 639-S advised that on 9/28/62, Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, Tony Cuesta and about 4 others attended a meeting in Miami, Fla., which was considered a meeting of Operation Alpha 66 (105-112098). Cuesta had lived at 2753 N.W. 13th St., Miami, and had been in contact with Gutierrez and a number of American soldiers of fortune and mercenaries. Gutierrez was last known to reside at 1126 S.W. 12th Ave., Miami, and it was not known if he was a member of Operation Alpha 66. (X)(U)

105-112098-40 Encl.p.5
(9-42)

SECRET

REFERENCES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY

The following references on One Gallego, located in files maintained in the Special File Room of the Files and Communications Division, Records Branch, were not reviewed: (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
64-330-237-1545 (S)	(62) ✓ (X)
64-330-239-825	(62) ✓

The following reference on One Gallego was not available during the time this summary was being prepared: (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
X 64-1200-1063	(62) ✓ X (X)

See the search slip filed behind file for other references on this subject which contain the same information (SI) that is set out in the main file. Differences in source and additional nonpertinent information will be noted on the search slip.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10053
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-111855-1

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/15/1962
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL GEORGE SPELLMEYER
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF NSA, CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

- Tolson
- Belmont
- Mohr
- Callahan
- Conrad
- DeLoach
- Evans
- Malone
- Rosen
- Sullivan
- Tavel
- Trotter
- Tele. Room
- Holmes
- Gandy

TO : MR. D. J. BRENNAN DATE: June 15, 1962

TOP SECRET

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

SUBJECT: GEORGE SPELLMEYER;
FISHING BOAT,
"TERESA Y JULIA"
IS - CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS + IP1
KP 11-17-97

Wannall

10-1

On June 14, 1962, Colonel Rene Tallichet, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), made reference to National Security Agency (NSA) message 3/0/[CUD]/T536-62, [Havana to Washington,] dated June 7, 1962. This deals with a communication between [the Cuban Foreign Ministry and the Czech Embassy] concerning the granting of a Cuban visa to a U. S. citizen named George Spellmeyer, owner of the fishing boat "Teresa y Julia." ~~(TS)~~ [TS] [TS] Per NSA letter 2/27/98 - mde

(S) [Colonel Tallichet] advised that on June 14, 1962, CIA had received sensitive information covering communications within the Cuban Government. One of these intercepted communications has disclosed that the aforementioned fishing boat was leaving Havana for the Isle of Pines (location of Cuban prison). [Tallichet] pointed out that it appears most unusual that a fishing boat owned by a U. S. citizen would be involved in such activity. ~~(S)~~ (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP:ban ban
(5)

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Nasca
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

Let to Miami 6/30/62
2/14 N: gci 2 - Jacksonville
3-774 2 - Tampa

4/2/98 mde ~~12-11-97~~
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JLSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

2-17-94
~~Classified by 9813 ADDlet~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
2/13/26
(5668 SLD/gcl
4/6/95 - JFK)

REC-22

MCT 47

105 - 111855 - 1

JUN 21 1962

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

EX-115

TOP SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10067

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 105-30972-68

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : PAPICH
TO : LALLIER

TITLE :

DATE : 09/14/1960
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
PETROS MOUTSOS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GO NMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. L'Allier L

DATE: September 14, 1960

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: PETROS MOUTSOS
INTERNAL SECURITY - GREECE AND CUBA

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 11/17/97
JM 6-28-98

(X) The subject was [utilized by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an informant] in the communist-dominated Greek Maritime Organization, OENO.] (S) (X) His past activities have been the subject of correspondence between us and CIA. During the past year, [his usefulness to CIA had practically expired, primarily because of] (S) subject's desire to remove himself from the OENO atmosphere. (S)

On September 13, 1960, Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised that the subject is currently a crew member of the SS Radnor, which is scheduled to dock at New Orleans within the next two weeks. [CIA has had clandestine meetings with Moutos and] is (S) now endeavoring to work out an arrangement whereby he can travel to Cuba [and can serve as a source of information in that country.] (S) In order to arrange for such travel, it will be necessary for Moutos to jump ship at New Orleans. This will be done [with the approval] (S) (S) [of Immigration and Naturalization Service. CIA] will then hold conferences with Moutos and subject will thereupon proceed to Havana [under a cover being established for him.] (S)

Prior to leaving for Havana, Moutos will endeavor to have contact with his wife, Angela Boyer, who is well known to us and who has a communist background. His marriage to Boyer [was actually promoted in order to improve his position in OENO.] (S) He has been separated from his wife for a lengthy period although she has indicated that she desires to live with him again. [CIA hopes that] a resumption of relations between the two will help (S) Moutos [in establishing worthwhile contacts] in communist circles in Cuba. (S)

SJP:bas bas
(4)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

8/9/93
Classified by 9803 ADD/GCL
Declassify on: OADR 241,356
(5668 SLD/GCL-3/24/95-JFK)

(S) EX-105

REC. 5 105-30972-68

7 SEP 27 1960

12-10-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

LET: New Orleans
9/23/60
VHN: wmt: feac
1 - Baltimore 1 - NYO

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10230
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-30972-68

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	NO
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/23/1960
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL PETROS MOUTSOS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

1 - Mr. Nasca

SAC, New Orleans SECRET 9/23/60

REC- 5

Director, FBI (105-30972) -68

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except BRACKETS
~~KP 11-17-97~~
JM 6-23-98

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

EX- 105

PETROS MOUTSOS
MISCELLANEOUS-INFORMATION CONCERNING
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

The captioned individual was [utilized by CIA as an informant] in the communist-dominated Greek Maritime Organization, (S) OENO. During the past year [his usefulness to CIA has practically expired, primarily because of] the subject's desire to remove (S) himself from the OENO atmosphere. (S)

On September 13, 1960, CIA advised that the subject is currently a crew member of the SS "Radnor," which is scheduled to dock at New Orleans within the next two weeks. [CIA has had clandestine meetings with Moutsos and] is endeavoring to work out (S) an arrangement whereby he can travel to Cuba [and serve as a source of information.] (S) In order to arrange for such travel, it will be necessary for Moutsos to jump ship in New Orleans. This will be done [with the approval of INS. CIA] will then hold (S) conferences with Moutsos and the subject will thereupon proceed to Havana [under a cover being established for him.] (S)

Prior to leaving for Havana, Moutsos will endeavor to establish contact with his wife, Angela Boyer, who has a communist background. This marriage [was actually promoted in order to improve subject's position in the OENO.] The subject has been separated from (S) his wife for a lengthy period although she has indicated she desires to live with the subject again. [CIA hopes that] a resumption of (S) relations between the two will help Moutsos [in establishing worthwhile contacts] in communist circles in Cuba. (S) (S)

This is being furnished for your information and under no circumstances should any of this data be furnished to anyone outside the Bureau. Any pertinent information received concerning the subject should, of course, be promptly furnished to the Bureau.

1 - New York (105-15613)
1 - Baltimore (134-571)

12-10-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons 1 - 100-398547 (Angela Boyer)
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach VHN:wmt:kac
Malone (7)
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

58 SEP 29 1960

MAILED 25
SEP 23 1960
COMM-FBI

8/9/93
~~Classified by 9803 Add/gcl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 241,326
(5668 SLD/GCL-3/29/95-JFK)

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-398547

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10284
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-78890-27

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/05/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL LEVI LAUB
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: July 5, 1963

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: LEVI LAUB
UNAUTHORIZED TRAVEL TO CUBA

Blad

Reference is made to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) letter dated April 18, 1963, captioned "U. S. Nationals in Cuba." The Liaison Agent was instructed to obtain more specific information concerning subject's reported travel to Cuba. The following was furnished to the Liaison Agent on July 3, 1963, by A. P. Flynn, CIA: (U) ~~(S)~~

Information received by CIA indicated that the subject was in Cuba during the period February 22-March 11, 1963. CIA received this information from [the British Intelligence Service (MI-6). The British] (S) obtained the data from [Gavin Young, a British newspaperman] (S) who was in Cuba during the same period described above. [MI-6] (S) has advised CIA that [Young] (S) is currently traveling to San Francisco. [The British MI-6 representative in Washington, D. C.] (S) plans to contact [Young] (S) and work out arrangements whereby [Young] (S) can be made available to the Bureau for interview. ~~(S)~~

Calif Eng

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Subversive Control Section.

105-78890

1 - Mr. Bland
1 - Mr. Haack
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:gp (5)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
KP 3-19-98

Haack

REC- 69 105-78890-27

9 JUL 9 1963

FLOWER ROCK

4/14/98
~~Classified by 5668 SLD/GAT~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
(JFK)

EX-108

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6
(JFK)

62 JUL 15 1963

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10355
RECORD SERIES : HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA
TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 08/28/1961
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
[Restricted]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

Liaison Section
Mr. Donahoe
Mr. Little
1 - Mr. Meier

REC-9 105-24642-4 (S)

EX-112

COPIES MADE, DATE .... BY
.... RE ....
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED ....
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290) (U)

5668 SLD/GCL
4/18/95 (JFK)

Date: August 28, 1961

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

1-11-94
~~Classified by 9803RDD/cty~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
211326

Subject: EDUARDO ESPINOSA Y PRIETO
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - MEXICO (S)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Reference is made to your letter dated August 21, 1961, your reference CSCI-3/766,810 (U)

A review of this Bureau's file on subject fails to reveal that he wrote bank drafts to active communist workers with the possible exception of Alicia Morine Fuentes. (S) With regard to her, the only allegation that she was an active communist worker was made in February, 1941, by a person whose reliability was unknown to the United States Embassy in Mexico City, D. F. Our investigation failed to substantiate this allegation and you were so advised by letter under above caption dated September 24, 1959. Furthermore, at the time subject's bank draft to her was written (February 10, 1958), subject and Merino Fuentes were both connected with the Mexican (S) Mission to the United Nations, a fact which tends to reduce the (S) intelligence significance of this payment. (S)

Based on information in the files of this Bureau, it appears inadvisable to include in your summary to the Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz (BfV), Germany, that subject wrote bank (S) drafts to active communist workers or to suggest that he "was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities." (S)

ACM:bja
(7)

SEE NOTE PAGE 2

BY COURIER SVC.
46 AUG 29
COMM - FBI

SBD/kll

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
Mohr ____
Callahan ____
Conrad ____
DeLoach ____
Evans ____
Malone ____
Rosen ____
Sullivan ____
Tavel ____
Trotter ____
Tele. Room ____
Ingram ____
Gandy ____

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT Brackets
KP 5-18-98

5668 SLD/KSR
7-4-98

11/7/97

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mde (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

5 1961

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Director
Central Intelligence Agency ~~(S)~~ (U)

NOTE: This letter is classified "Secret" because it contains information so classified by CIA ~~(S)~~ (U)

CIA seeks to pass a summary of information concerning subject to the BfV in Germany and has requested permission to (S) include the following in this summary, stating it comes from our files: ~~(S)~~

"During his New York City tenure, he was known to write bank drafts to persons known to be active Communist workers. It was suggested that he was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities." ~~(S)~~ (U)

CIA stated above conclusion "was apparently based on numerous Bureau reports written during 1957 and 1958." CIA refers specifically to only one bank draft, it having been written by subject to Alicia Merino Fuentes and states that our (S) report dated 10/12/56 contained information that she was an active communist. This report was in the case on Merino Fuentes (S) and the only allegation that she was an active communist was the 1941 allegation made to the Embassy in Mexico. Bureau has developed no information indicating payees of other bank drafts written by subject had subversive associations or sympathies. ~~(S)~~ ~~(U)~~ (C)

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90137-10357

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : DOS

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 08/16/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
HENRYK IGNACY JANIKOWSKI

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for brackets
KP 5-18-98

16 AUG 1963

5-9-95
Classified by 5668 SLD/EH (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR
9BI Adm markings

TO: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Security
Department of State

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans

SUBJECT: JANIKOWSKI, Henryk Ignacy
DOB: 4 Sept. 1921
POB: Wiele, Bydogoszcz, Poland

105-7-250-28626

1. Reference is made to the name check request, dated 18 June 1963, subject as above, whose name you desired checked against the files of this office. The files contain the following information concerning Subject.

2. According to a report dated 23 March 1961 [from an official West German service,] (S) the Bremer Bank in Bremen, Germany, reported that they had received a check for one thousand dollars from one [Eduardo Espinosa y PRIETO] of the Mexican Embassy in Moscow, USSR, to be deposited to the account of one Erik SCHOTT, an architect residing at Ginsterweg 1, Bremen Munthe, West Germany.

3. On the basis of this information, SCHOTT was interrogated [by the West German service] (S) on 21 November 1961 for possible intelligence involvement. During the interrogation, SCHOTT provided the following information concerning Subject: SCHOTT first became acquainted with Subject in 1940 when he resided in Subject's home in Germany. Subject, who had moved to Poland, wrote to SCHOTT in 1957 and asked him to buy used cars and ship them to him. Subject transmitted to SCHOTT dollars and dollar checks for purchasing the cars via an unknown Polish sailor. Subject told SCHOTT that he had obtained the money on the black market and from exhibitors at the Poznan Fair. SCHOTT believed that Subject obtained the money from Poles who had relatives in the United States. During a visit to Belgium in 1957, Subject purchased several second-hand taxis and cars for shipment to Poland. Subject visited SCHOTT in late 1957 and purchased a Renault to take back with him to Poland. For the purpose of avoiding the customs duty on the car, SCHOTT gave Subject a statement to the effect that he was a relative.

105-24642 (S)

105-36649-2

ORIGINAL FILED IN LITTLE

7-4-98
FBI INFO
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (JFK)

NOT RECORDED
79 SEP 9 1963

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SEP 4 1963

In 1959 SCHOTT visited Subject in Gdansk, Poland. Subject told SCHOTT that he could obtain dollars from "an employee of an embassy" which he would send to SCHOTT for desposit in his account at the Bremer Bank. Subject obtained the dollars for zlotys at the black market exchange rate. SCHOTT's wife, who was also interrogated, stated that checks arrived by mail from an employee of the Mexican Embassy in Warsaw, Poland, which her husband deposited in Subject's account. Among documents obtained [officially] from the Bremer Bank was (S) a letter from [Mexican Ambassador in Warsaw, Eduardo ESPINOSA y PRIETO,] accompanying a check for one thousand dollars for (S) deposit to the account of Erich SCHOTT. Subject told SCHOTT that in 1950 his maid had reported to the Polish authorities that he had dollars in his house. As far as SCHOTT knew, Subject was investigated but was never sentenced. On 24 June 1961, Subject again visited SCHOTT and from Germany went to Zelzate, Belgium, to settle a debt from automobile buying operations in 1957. Subject visited his sister in Paris, France, and returned with her to Bremen in a new Peugot which he had bought in Holland in his sister's name. Subject then shipped the car to Poland.

4. According to [the West German service,] (S) no evidence was uncovered that would indicate SCHOTT was involved in intelligence activities.

CSCI-3/777,473

Encl. 1 name check

CC: Federal Bureau of Investigation

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

T-70358

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10467
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-89457-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	LALLIER
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/26/1961
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL JORGE BELIARD
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

ORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SEC~~RET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: June 26, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

(5668 SLD/GCL 4/18/95 - JFK)

SUBJECT: [JORGE BELIARD] (C)
[PSI] (C)
IS - CUBA

12/10/93
~~Classified by 9803RAD/8cl~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
241,326

Donahoe

The captioned individual is a [station manager of] (C) the Cubana Airlines, Idlewild International Airport, New York City. Recently Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) submitted a name check request concerning [Beliard.] Liaison was requested to determine the purpose of this request. (C)

On June 23, 1961, Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that a Cuban source had suggested to CIA that (C) [Beliard] possibly could be of some use to the Agency in connection with its operations in Cuba. Mrs. Roman stated that essentially CIA's interest would be to obtain assistance from (C) [Beliard] [in arranging courier routes between Cuba and the United States.] (C) CIA is of the opinion that [Beliard] (C) through his contacts in the Cuban Airlines and because of his possible association with individuals who travel regularly between the two countries, could arrange for CIA [to communicate with clandestine sources inside Cuba.] (C) The Liaison Agent requested CIA not to establish any contact with [Beliard] pending further word from the Bureau. ~~(S)~~ (C)

7-20-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSC
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT EXCEPT BRACKETS
IN 1P'S 2 + 3
KP 5-11-98

(U) (JFK) SLD/KSC 6-14-98

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section for appropriate review. We can either (1) inform CIA that no contact whatsoever should be made by CIA with [Beliard] in view of current Bureau operational (C) interest, or (2) we can permit CIA to maintain contact with [Beliard] (C) for exploration of its interests as described above, or (3) we can talk to [Beliard] (C) concerning the [potential for establishing courier routes] (C) and serve as the intermediary if [Beliard] is in a position (C) to be of assistance in this regard. Replies to CIA should be handled via Liaison.] ~~(S)~~

SJP:ban ban
(5)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

CONFIDENTIAL

REC- 85 [105-89457-9] ~~(S)~~ (U)

SEC~~RET~~

EX-112

10 JUL 5 1961

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY
JE RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28 N.Y.
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

9/30/61 FCJ: ej

HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10468
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 105-89457-9

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	NY
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/30/1961
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL JORGE BELIARD
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Confidential
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	AT

1 [redacted] pich
1 James

6-30-61

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

(5668 SLD/GCL 8/26/98 - JFK) 7-20-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

AIRTEL

12/10/93
~~Classified by 9803RDD/8CL~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~ 211,326
(5668 SLD/GCL 4/18/95 - JFK)

To: SAC, New York [(134-5609)] (C)

From: Director, FBI [(105-89457)] — ~~(S)~~ (U)

[NY 3186-PSI] (C)

REC- 85

CIA, by liaison, advised Bureau of desire to contact captioned [PSI] in connection with its Cuban operations. (C) CIA of opinion [PSI] is in position [to assist in the (C) establishment of courier routes between U.S. and its contacts in Cuba.] (C) Contact of [PSI] by CIA being held in (C) abeyance pending Bureau's approval. ~~(S)~~

Bureau's position in this matter flexible. We can refuse CIA authority to contact [PSI] or we can let (C) CIA operate [PSI] on its own. We can also serve as inter- (C) mediary between [the PSI] (C) and CIA. ~~(S)~~ (C)

Promptly contact [PSI] and discreetly ascertain if he is in position and willing [to assist in establishing courier routes.] (C) Do not advise [PSI] of CIA's connection at (C) this time. For information, CIA believes [PSI] able to (C) (C) [establish such a system] because of his employment with Cubana Airlines in New York City, and fact he is in contact with persons regularly traveling to Cuba. Furnish Bureau results of your contact with [PSI.] (C) In event [PSI] is in position (C) to [assist in the establishment of a courier system and] (C) willing to do so, you should furnish your observations concerning [PSI's] (C) proposed use in this matter. ~~(S)~~

KP 5/21/98

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS IN ¶'s 1, AND 3
SLD/KSR 6-14-98 (JFK)

MAILED 2
JUN 30 1961
COMM-FBI

FEJ:eg eg
(5)

NOTE: [PSI] (C) is [Station Manager of] (C) Cubana Airlines at Idlewild Airport in New York City. He has been [under development] by New York Office since November, 1960, (C) (C) and has [furnished data concerning operations] of Cubana Airlines and personnel employed by Cubana. In addition ~~(S)~~

CONTINUANCE OF NOTE ON PAGE TWO

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

50 JUL 11 1961

CONFIDENTIAL

MAIL ROOM ☒ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~SECRET~~

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

CONFIDENTIAL

CONTINUANCE OF NOTE:

(C) he has made available copies of incoming and outgoing manifests of Cubana flights between New York and Havana. New York has pointed out that PSI has not furnished data of unusual value; but because of his position, has a good potential. CIA advised Liaison Agent Papich it would not contact PSI until it had received authority to do so from Bureau. Before allowing CIA to make contact with PSI, it (C) is believed it would be best for our interests to determine if PSI can actually assist CIA. If he is in position to (C) assist that Agency, we will then consider what stand to take in this matter. (U)

CONFIDENTIAL

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90137-10488
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :	CIA
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	07/27/1961
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL [Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

L'

FBI INFO 7-10-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1, 6 (JFK)

27 JUL 1961

RECEIVED FROM
JUL 28 1961
CIA SJP

Dondelinger
Belmont

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director, Plans JAR

SUBJECT: [Eduardo Espinosa y Prieto, born 24 January 1909] (S) in Mexico City, Mexico

1-20-94 ~~Classified by 9803 RDD~~ ~~Declassify on: OADR~~ FBI adm. matters and info 241336

105-3-1
8-1

FBI INFO ~~Classified by 5668 SLD/GCL~~ ~~Declassify on: OADR~~ (JFK) 4/18/95

1. This Agency was queried recently [by the BfV (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz - Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) Germany] for information on Subject. A German citizen in Bremen, suspected (S) of Polish Intelligence Service activities, received a $1,000.00 deposit in his account from [Espinosa.] (S)

2. Your permission is requested to pass the following information, some of which was obtained from your files, to [the German authorities:] (S)

[Eduardo Espinosa] (S)
(S) [born 24 January 1909,] Mexico City, Mexico, appointed [Mexican Ambassador to Warsaw] during the summer of 1960. August 1957 to (S) summer 1960 [accredited to the United Nations Headquarters] in New (S) York City with the [rank of Ambassador as an Alternate Permanent Delegate.] (S) [During his New York City tenure, he was known to write (S) bank drafts to persons known to be active Communist workers. It was suggested that he was used as a means of financing Communist Party activities] ~~(S)~~ (U) He appears to be a Soviet contact, and that his wife, one

Possibly [Alicia Moreno Fuentes - 100-15511]

[Tamara Espinosa, nee Pechkurova, native Russian] (S)
was reported to have been an agent of the Soviet security services. She was admitted to Mexico in September 1947. When [Espinosa y Prieto] was in Mexico, he was in close touch with the (S) Soviet Embassy and expedited visas for Soviet delegations. The couple were particularly friendly with Soviet Ambassador Kapustin during 1953. [Mrs. Espinosa's] brother died in a Soviet prison in 1953, and (S) her mother still resides in the USSR.

N.Y.

Venezuela CHINA
Colombia

[(CIA)] ~~(S)~~ (U) S-3

These facts might indicate a Soviet hold over [Espinosa.] (S) Various opinions collected from persons who knew [Espinosa,] when he served in (S) [Shanghai, Bogota, Mexico, Caracas, Togoland, and the U.S.,] vary from (S) "basically friendly to the U.S" to the following: That he had been a penetration agent in the Axis group (in Shanghai) on behalf of the

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for brackets in pgs 1+2
KP 5-18-98 ~~(S)~~ (U)

REC- 52
EX- 129

[105-24642-45] (S)

22 AUG 3 1961

[Sect CIA] ~~(S)~~
Mailing 8/2/61

SECRET — [105-24642] (S)

5/H

FORM NO. 526
1 NOV 55

(23)

(U) (CIA) USSR, that he was 100% pro-Communist and most dangerous, that he has been an eagerly cooperative contact of the Soviets in Mexico for several years, and so on. The bulk of opinions are derogatory in nature. Petrov identified [Mrs. Espinosa] as an MVD agent. (S)

CSCI-3/766,521

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90138-10004
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-67173-20

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/15/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL ENRIQUE GARCIA ARMENTEROS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SECRET

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: 10/15/63

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: ENRIQUE GARCIA ARMENTEROS
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

Wannall

Mrs. Jane Roman, CIA, advised the Liaison Agent that her agency finally has been able [to place a man in Cuba] (S) who might be able to develop information in answer to the Bureau lead transmitted to CIA. She explained that the source's capability to be productive will depend upon his resourcefulness to get into the appropriate areas. (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(5) chs

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR THE BRACKETS
KP 3-19-98

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

REC- 20

65 - 67173 - 20

OCT 21 1963

4/9/95
Classified by 5668 ~~dld~~/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

EX-114

SECRET

68 OCT 28 1963

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90138-10007
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 65-63987-210-370

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	
DATE :	10/02/1963
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL INTELLIGENCE MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

Director
Central Intelligence Agency ~~(S)~~ (U) SECRET

12328

He is willing to write a letter to Vergara and instruct him to deliver the papers to a person who would be designated in his letter. He would make such a letter available to the FBI for delivery to Vergara. ~~(S)~~ (U)

Garcia advised that he has had no contact with Vergara since his departure from Cuba.

If feasible, it is requested that your Agency take the necessary steps, possibly through the Spanish Government (S) or through the Swiss Embassy in Havana, to obtain Garcia's (S) papers since they could conceivably contain intelligence and/or propaganda data of interest to the United States Government. If you desire, we would be glad to have Garcia write a personal letter to Vergara which would be made available to your Agency. If Garcia's papers are obtained, they will be reviewed by our Miami Office and pertinent data contained therein will be made available to interested agencies of the United States Government. ~~(S)~~

NOTE FOR SAC, MIAMI:

On 9/26/63 State Department advised that it preferred (S) that we handle this matter through CIA. Above for your information.

NOTE:

We previously directed a letter to State Department asking that they handle the above matter. Contact with State Department on 9/26/63 was made by SA O. H. Bartlett with Mr. John MacDonald of State.

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90138-10066
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 64-200-210-2325

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	FROHBOSE
TITLE :	
DATE :	12/02/1959
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	PAUL HICKMAN CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

STANDARD FORM NO. 64

Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : MR. F. A. FROHBOSE

DATE: 12-2-59

SECRET

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

CLASSIFIED BY
REASON:
(DCID) CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except Brackets
KP 1-23-98
(JFK)

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAIN

Tolson ____
Belmont ____
DeLoach ____
McGuire ____
Mohr ____
Parsons ____
Rosen ____
Tamm ____
Trotter ____
W.C. Sullivan ____
Tele. Room ____
Holloman ____
Gandy ____

SUBJECT: PAUL HICKMAN
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Communist Party - Cuba

The following information was furnished to the Liaison Agent on 12-1-59 by Mrs. Jane Roman, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). ~~(S)~~(U)

Swiss police recently located Hickman in Zurich, Switzerland. Information was developed by the Swiss indicating that subject allegedly was involved in business dealings relating to the sale of arms to the Castro Government. [With the collaboration of Swiss authorities, a CIA representative] (S) interviewed subject on 11-27 and 28-59. The subject has been characterized as a confidence operator and very unreliable. He claimed that he already had volunteered information concerning his knowledge of activities in Cuba to "friends of Senator Smathers." Hickman claimed that he had been in contact with a Soviet Embassy representative, Bern, Switzerland, in connection with a sale of Cuban sugar to Russia. Hickman claimed that the Soviet had given him considerable encouragement and indicated that the transaction would go through. The Soviet then suddenly told him that the deal was off. (S)

Mrs. Roman stated that CIA does not plan to cover subject's activities in the absence of a specific request from the Bureau. ~~(S)~~(U)

ACTION:

This information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP/nmn
(5)

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. James
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

See serials -
64-211-210-533
64-211-210-540
64-211-210-
64-211-210-543

CIA is sending confirming letter (S)(U)

~~8/3/93~~
~~Classified by 9803 [illegible]~~
~~Declassify on: OADR 211326~~

EX-135

64-200-210-2325

15 DEC 7 1959

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

(JFK)
5668 SLD/ISR
3-13-98

SECRET

12/4/59

5/15/96
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mak - JR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)
(JFK)

1 COPIES MADE DATE 6-6-78 BY
RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAIN

64-200-210

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/16/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90138-10073

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 64-211-210-830

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 11/21/1960
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
SOVIET EMBASSY HAVANA, CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : INDEFINITE

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

- 1 - Liaison
- 1 - Mullins

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-9-78 BY
SSS RE Soviet -Cuba
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE) BY LIAISON

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT ¶1 on pg. 2
KP 11-19-97
SLD/KSR 12-9-97 (JFK)

64-211-210 — 830

REC- 88

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/mlt
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1) (JFK)

(S) (U)

Date: November 21, 1960

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Mr. S. H. Horton
Acting Chief, Counterintelligence Staff (U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: SOVIET EMBASSY (U)
HAVANA, CUBA
INTERNAL SECURITY - R - CUBA

8/29/95 5668 SLD/GAT
8/17/93
Classified by 9803 rdl/sd
Declassify on: OADR 21.326 (JFK)

NOV 21 3 30 PM '60
READING ROOM

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

We have received information that a Soviet official in the United States has ordered ten safes from the (S) Mosler Safe Company for shipment to the Soviet Embassy, (S) Havana, Cuba. They are to be shipped by Export Order (S) Number E 12344, but the exact shipment date is unknown. (S)

The safes are identified as follows: (S)

Model Number (S)	Serial Number (S)	Combination (S)	Dial Key Number
2016CL	14387-11	5-70-40	H-669B
2016CL	14387-81	5-70-40	H-602B
2016CL	14387-55	5-70-40	H-794B
3016CL	14155-54	5-70-40	H-660B
3016CL	14155-19	5-70-40	H-667B
3016CL	14213-13	5-70-40	H-732B
3016CL	14213-60	5-70-40	H-784B (S)
4216CL	13905-39	5-70-40	H-749B
4216CL	13905-29	5-70-40	H-800B
4833CL	14483-21	31-75-26	H-679B

(S)

BY COURIER SVC.
59 NOV 23
COMM-FBI

NOV 18 3 21 PM '60

The model numbers designate the inside dimensions (S) of the safes. For example, Model Number 2016CL has inside (S) dimensions of twenty inches by sixteen inches. Each safe is (S)

Tolson
Mohr
Parsons
Belmont
Callahan
DeLoach
Malone
McGuire
Rosen
Tamm
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

RAM:jwh
(6)

ENCLOSURE

(SEE NOTE PAGE 2)

57 DEC 1 1960

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

----COPIES MADE, DATE..........BY
---------- RE --------------------
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED ----------
(SEE FBIHQ 62-117290)

Director
Central Intelligence Agency

(S) (X)

equipped with a key locking dial and each has two inside (S) compartments. (S)

Enclosed for the Central Intelligence Agency are a set of dial keys, appropriately labeled, and a set of (S) keys for the inside compartments of the safes. (S)

Information concerning the existence of this material should be handled on a need-to-know basis. It is requested that no further dissemination of this information be made without prior clearance from this Bureau.

Enclosures - 18

1 - Mr. John W. Hanes
Administrator
Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs
Department of State
Washington 25, D. C.

NOTE:

Classified "Secret" since nature of information requires that handling be limited and since disclosure could seriously jeopardize a most delicate source. X Information concerning a purchase of the safes was developed by Washington Field and (S) the keys and combinations were obtained by Cincinnati from an (S) established source at the company's factory. The set of keys (S) for the inside compartments consists of total of 8 keys and (S) they apparently are interchangeable to some extent. (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10002
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	10/10/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL [Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr. DATE: 10/10/63

FROM : Mr. S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: [MANUEL PINEIRO] (S)
IS - CUBA

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Wannall

We previously have been informed that the subject is a high-ranking official in the [Cuban G-2 organization] in Havana. (S) On 10/8/63, Mrs. Anita Potocki, a CIA analyst who has been working on [intercepted Cuban communications intelligence traffic] (S) advised the Liaison Agent that her Agency has come to the tentative conclusion that [Pineiro] (S) is identical with ["Petronio,"] (S) who has been mentioned in messages made available to the Bureau and CIA. We have noted that messages sent to the unidentified Cuban Agent in Panama referred to as ["Roberto"] (S) have been signed by ["Petronio."] (S)

Mrs. Potocki gave the following explanation which led to CIA's deduction. ~~(S)~~ (U)

[Messages emanating from Havana indicated that one of the recipients was probably located in a small town in Colombia near the Venezuelan Border. CIA developed a suspect and instituted coverage. Recently, this individual transmitted a letter to Havana which communication was intercepted by CIA. The person had apparently violated instructions by including some sensitive data in the communication. Havana then [transmitted a radio message] (S) castigating the Cuban Agent in Colombia. An examination of [the radio message and] (S) the intercepted communication sent by the Agent has led CIA to believe that ["Petronio"] (S) is identical with [Pineiro.] (S)] (S)

W

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. Except for the brackets KP 3-19-98

Bufile [105-78656] (S)

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Dunn
1 - [65-67843 ("Roberto")] (S)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich
SJP:chs
(6)

REC. 14

[105-78656-10] (S)

4/24/95
Classified by 5668 SLD/SAT
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

11 OCT 17 1963

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JLSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

EX-114

SECRET

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN [65-67843] (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10050
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR SEE TITLE

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	LALLIER
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	08/17/1961
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL [Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

TO : MR. L'ALLIER

DATE: August 17, 1961

FROM : S.J. PAPICH

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-11-98

SUBJECT: ISMAEL RODRIGUEZ
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA
(134-9775)

The captioned individual is the comptroller of Cubana Airlines, New York City, and has been utilized as a source of information by the Bureau. ~~(S)~~ On 8-16-61, David Hanlon, Office of Security, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent that on occasion his Agency has utilized Rodriguez [as a courier for transmitting material between the U.S. and Cuba.] This material has dealt with CIA operations in Cuba. ~~(S)~~ (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section.

SJP:jad (5)
jad
1-Donahoe
1-Nasca
1-Liaison
1-Papich

8-16-95
Classified by 5668 SLD/mk
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

2-16-94
~~Classified by 9813 RDD/ctj~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
211326

LET TO NY
VHN:dcr
8-22-61

134-9775-6

REC- 87
6-14-98

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR AUG 25 1961
DECLASSIFY ON: [illegible] (JFK)

EX-112

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

AUG 18 1961

...COPIES MADE, DATE 6-7-78 BY
... RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

SECRET

124-90139-10070

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90139-10070

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : HQ
TO : CIA

TITLE :

DATE : 12/11/1961
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
HERBERT LEVY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

SECRET

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Mullins

17619

REC-34 11 - 8 210 - 445

CIA HAS [illegible] IN THIS [illegible] EXCEPT FOR BRACKETS KP 5-11-98

12/1/98

~~800300~~/8CE

24326

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR 7-2-98
DECLASSIFY ON: [illegible] (JFK)

Date: December 11, 1961

To: [Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans] ~~(S)~~ (U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: HERBERT LEVY
MISCELLANEOUS - INFORMATION CONCERNING
(Nationalities Intelligence)

Enclosed is a copy of a memorandum dated November 28, 1961, at Salt Lake City, Utah, concerning Cuban economic matters. Copies of the memorandum have been furnished to the Bureau of International Programs, Department of Commerce, and to other interested agencies.

The source of the information contained in the memorandum is Mr. Herbert Levy, Director of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone HUnter 6-7171. He resides at 2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, and his home telephone number is HUnter 4-6424.

According to Mr. Levy, he resided at Houston, Texas, approximately five years ago and was contacted there on several occasions by [a representative of your Agency.] (S) Mr. Levy indicated he was then traveling abroad on occasions and was able to furnish (S) [your representative] information of interest concerning [India.] (S) He indicated he recently telephoned your headquarters in Washington, D. C., but was unable to obtain any information concerning the identity of your representative in his section of the United States. He said he had no objection to his identity being furnished to your Agency but does not desire that his identity be revealed to any other agency. He also requested that no action be taken which would reveal his identity to the business firm mentioned in the memorandum or to any other commercial firm.

We contemplate no further action in this matter.

Enclosure
DEC 15 1961

1 - Salt Lake City

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
[illegible]ge

~~SEE NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY PAGE TWO~~

18 DEC 13 1961

SEE NOTE ON YELLOW PAGE TWO

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

[Director
Central Intelligence Agency] (S)(u)

17620

NOTE FOR SAC, SALT LAKE CITY:

Reurlet 11/28/61 captioned "Large Quantities of Jute Bags and Hessian Cloth Sought by Cuban Government by Purchase or Barter Through International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City, New York, and Other Unknown Concerns November, 1961."

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Classified "Secret" since we refer to [CIA's use of Levy abroad.] He furnished information concerning possible violation of export regulations regarding shipments to Cuba by International Ore and Fertilizer Company, a large and reputable firm. Copies of memo have been furnished separately to Commerce, the military agencies and State Department. Separate letter also sent Salt Lake City concerning proper caption for reporting similar data. (S)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10071
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 110-6-210-445

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SU
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/28/1961
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL ECONOMIC MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104-02
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI SECRET DATE: 11/28/61

FROM : SAC, SALT LAKE CITY (62-0) -C-

Economic Matters
Cuba

SUBJECT: "LARGE QUANTITIES OF JUTE BAGS AND HESSIAN CLOTH SOUGHT BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT BY PURCHASE OR BARTER THROUGH INTERNATIONAL ORE AND FERTILIZER COMPANY, NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK, AND OTHER UNKNOWN CONCERNS NOVEMBER, 1961."
MISCELLANEOUS (DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION)

12/13/93
Classified by 980 SLE/8cl
Declassify on: OADR 311,326

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, EXCEPT BRACKETS
KP 5-11-98
K 8-20-98

Enclosed herewith to the Bureau are the original and three copies of a letterhead memorandum captioned as above. Also enclosed are photostats of two teletypes (total of four pages) purporting to be copies of teletypes from International Ore and Fertilizer Company, New York City, New York, to St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The photostats and information set forth in the letterhead memorandum were furnished to SA JOHN R. PHILIPS, Jr., by a man identifying himself as HERBERT LEVY, Director of Central Operations, St. Regis Paper Company, Bag Division, 2357 South Eighth West, Salt Lake City, Utah, telephone HUnter 6-7171. Mr. LEVY said he resides at 2884 Hyland Hills Road, Salt Lake City, Utah, residence telephone HUnter 4-6424. Mr. LEVY stated he resided at Houston, Texas, about five years ago, and at that time, he traveled abroad, mostly in [India,] (S) for his company, St. Regis Paper Company. While living in Houston, Texas, [a representative of Central Intelligence Agency,] name and telephone number (S) not now recalled, contacted LEVY on several occasions and requested him to obtain various types of information on his trips to [India.] (S) The type of information requested and obtained by LEVY was mainly of an [economic nature, or with respect to some company or individual in India.] (S)

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR (JFK)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1
7-2-98

EXP. PROC.

REC- 34 110-6-210-445

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (Enc. 8)
1 - Salt Lake City

Bit. State
051-ONI-6-2
DATE FORW. 12-7-61
HOW FORW. lw
BY Ramizez

13 DEC 1961

JRP:ps
(3)

Let - Salt Lake City
12-11-61
RAM:bw

(S)(U)
Let to [CIA] (encl)
12-11-61
Ram:bw

SECRET

NAT. SEC.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90139-10138
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-12-210-4315

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	05/10/1965
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE, APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

#4.

[redacted] [redacted] SECRET [redacted] 1 - Newpher

1 COPIES MADE DATE 4/26/78 BY
LJC RE PAPICH
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

May 10, 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT
KP 5-26-98 BRACKETS

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

A highly confidential informant who has furnished reliable information in the past recently advised that [on about February 20, 1963,] (S) Raul Roa, Cuban Foreign Minister, commented that the Sino - Indian conflict continually bothers Cuba and this conflict worked in the favor of the United States in the Fall of 1962.

Roa's evaluation of the situation in Cuba was highly pessimistic. Roa stated that the situation has deteriorated; that this was the only thing that could have happened because talks at the United Nations, New York, did not find an answer to the problem. Roa also observed that conditions as of February, 1963, were similar to those just before the crisis in the Fall of 1962, mentioning pirate boat activities, a campaign in the United States and a statement by President Kennedy which Roa described as meaningless.

Roa commented that the United States was the only nation which benefited from the crisis. The informant understood that it was Roa's contention that by excluding the Security Council of the United Nations from considering the Cuban situation and permitting the Organization of American States (OAS) to take up the matter freely, the United States is now enjoying a very favorable position in the OAS, the best it has enjoyed at any time in the Organization. In still referring to what the informant believed was the OAS, Roa said that the report of the Antisubversive Committee, now under study by the OAS, contains some definite proposals, such as a collective breakoff and a breakoff in relations with Cuba including postal contacts. Roa said it is known officially that Mexico will accept such resolutions with reservations; Bolivia, Chile and Uruguay will accept everything; and it is believed that only Brazil will oppose such resolutions. Cuba, according to Roa, believes that talks between President Kennedy and President Romulo Betancourt, Venezuela, will establish the action by the OAS.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Classified by 5665 SLD/gr
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)
4/26/95

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

[redacted] SECRET

EX-115

JON:rmc
(7)

109-12-210
1 - [101644 (PRIME)] (S)

50 MAY 16 1963

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

REC- 38

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

4315

17 MAY 13 1963

To CIA & State
by liaison 5/10/63

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
ullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
andy

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

FOREIGN POLITICAL MATTERS - CUBA

Roa also commented that it would have been much better if the Cuban situation had been handled by the United Nations Security Council. Among other things, this would have limited the ability of the OAS. When it was suggested that time was working in Cuba's favor, Roa agreed, saying it permitted internal consolidation, and economic and organizational endeavors. He also mentioned the differences within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the hope for settlement of differences in the Soviet Bloc and prospects for general relaxing of strained relations between all countries.

Although Roa did not mention the Soviet Union at any time, it appeared that he does not now agree with the Soviet Union's placing missiles in Cuba in 1962. Roa's comments during the entire conversation left one with the feeling that he was pessimistic, according to the informant.

NOTE:

Classified "~~Top~~ Secret" because unauthorized disclosure would reveal a high-level intelligence operation involving [PRIME,] our (S) extremely sensitive source at the [Polish UN Delegation.] (S)

PROPERTY OF THE FBI
This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90140-10004
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	HQ
TO :	CIA
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/13/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS CIA LIAISON MATERIAL
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-9-78 BY
PVH RE ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4/28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

SECRET

REC-140 (SC) 100-398547 - 60

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Floyd

Date: March 13, 1963

EX-112

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

(S)(U)

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
SECURITY MATTER - C

3-4-94
Classified by 9803 RDD/cly
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
2113226
(5668 SLD/ECL
3/31/95 - JFK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR,
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS IN ¶2
KB 10-17-97

Reference is made to prior communications concerning the captioned individual.

It would be appreciated [if you would advise this Bureau of any information which has come to your attention indicating continued residence by the captioned individual in Cuba. Any additional information which you may have received concerning her activities in that country would also be appreciated.] (S)(U)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

2 - New York (100-112920)(See note)

ATTENTION SAC, NEW YORK:

Reurlet 3/1/63.

12-15-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

You will be advised concerning the results of the above inquiry.

NOTE ON YELLOW:

Subject is in SI. She traveled to Cuba in December, 1960, to join her husband, Pedros Moutsos, [who, in the past, has acted as CIA informant.] (S) New York requested contact with CIA for information of subject's current residence in Cuba and her activities. (S)

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

1963

WHF:cad
(7)

BY COURIER SVC.
28 MAR 1 4
COMM - FBI

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90140-10005

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 100-398547-60

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : NY
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 03/01/1963
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS
CIA LIAISON MATERIAL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

NOT PSC 3/7

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-398547) DATE: MAR 1 - 1963

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (100-112920)(P)

SUBJECT: ANGELA PRINCE MOUTSOS aka
SM - C

(OO: NEW YORK)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT BRACKETS IN P1
KP 10-17-97

Rerep of SA JOHN H. SHEEHAN, dated 6/29/62, at NY.

Subject, who is on the SI of the NYO, departed from NY, 12/31/60, for Havana, Cuba. At that time she indicated she was to join her husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, in Cuba and remain there for two years. It is noted that the subject's husband, PEDROS MOUTSOS, (Bufile 105-30972), (S)[was a source utilized by the CIA] as of June, 1960 (S)

The Bureau is requested to [alert CIA sources for any information concerning subject's activities and residence in Cuba] ~~(S)~~ (U)

3-4-94
Classified by 9803RDD/etp
Declassify on: OADR
21324

(5668 SLD/gcl 3/31/98 JFK)

---COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY
------ RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

12-15-97
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REC- 52

100-398547-60

5 MAR 4 1963

EX-115

2-Bureau (100-398547)(RM)
1-New York (100-112920)

JJL:rtd
(3)

1d [2-CIA] ~~(S)~~ (U)
3/13/63
WHF:cal
2-NY

SUB CONTROL

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90140-10012
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 100-439769-302

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	BRENNAN
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/03/1963
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10

UNITED STATES GC T

Memoran

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : D. J. BRENNAN

DATE: September 3, 1963

FROM : S. J. PAPICH

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: PERMANENT STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA
IS - C

Baumgardner
Wannall

Austin Horn, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), advised the Liaison Agent on August 30, 1963, that a reliable CIA source in Madrid, Spain, had been in contact with [Mark Tischman,] (S) one of the American students who accompanied the group which recently visited Cuba. ~~(S)~~ This contact took place on August 27, 1963, at which time [Tischman] (S) volunteered the following information to the CIA source: ~~(S)~~

[Tischman] (S) identified the following students as "fellow travelers": Joseph Rex, Elena B. Fleming, John Milton, Don Ranmann, and Alberti Maher. ~~(S)~~ (U)

[Tischman] (S) referred to Levi Laub as a "communist in ideology" but not a Party member. He stated that Philip A. Luce is "a person of Marxist-Leninist tendencies"; that Michael Brown is a Trotskyite; that John W. Thomas is a decided partisan of the policy of Mao Tse Tung; that Eric D. Johnston is "of communist ideology though not a Party member"; that Clinton M. Jenks is "the son of the number three ranking communist in California"; and that the only student in the group who is actually a member of the Party is Allan Sheffield. ~~(S)~~ (U)

U.S.

Cuba U.S.

Sympathizer

C.P. Suspect

ACTION: Possible C.P. Member

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Internal Security and Nationalities Intelligence Sections.

4-1-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

1 - Mr. Baumgardner
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Simpson
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

REC 46 100-439769-302

5/15/95
Classified by ~~5668 CM~~/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SJP:gp (6)

11 SEP 5 1963

EX-104

Teletype SEP 10 1963
NY, SF, NK, HO
9-6-63
RDS

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for the brackets
KP 3-19-98

SECRET

JFK Assassination System Date: 4/17/201
Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90140-10071
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 97-4196-432

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	PAPICH
TO :	LALLIER
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/17/1961
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	CIA LIAISON MATERIAL FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/28/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA
COMMENTS :	MEMO

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Parsons
Mohr
Belmont
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Malone
Rosen
Tavel
Trotter
W.C. Sullivan
Tele. Room
Ingram
Gandy

~~SECRET~~

TO : Mr. L'Allier

DATE: March 17, 1961

FROM : S. J. Papich

4-10-95
Classified by 5668 SLD/GH
Declassify on: ~~OADR~~ JFK

SUBJECT: FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE (FPCC)
IS - CUBA

On March 16, 1961, Mrs. Jane Roman, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), furnished the Liaison Agent the enclosed draft of an article which CIA proposes to plant in a leading United States publication, possibly [the Saturday Evening Post.](S) The material essentially consists of an attack against the captioned organization and includes some material which has been disseminated by the Bureau to CIA. According to Mrs. Roman, this data will be furnished to some well-known writer not yet selected. (X)~~(S)~~

She inquired if the Bureau had any objection to the use of its material, which has been noted and bracketed in the enclosure. (X)~~(S)~~(U)

Mrs. Roman also advised that once arrangements are made to publish the article the Bureau will be given the opportunity to review the final draft before publication. (X)~~(S)~~(U)

ACTION:

The above information and enclosure are being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence Section. The reply to CIA should be transmitted via Liaison. (X)~~(S)~~(U)

4-8-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1
(JFK)

SJP:ban ban
(5)

Memo Donahoe to Belmont
3/24/61

1 - Mr. Donahoe
1 - Mr. Cotter
~~1 - Liaison~~
1 - Mr. Papich

Enclosure

5-RAC

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. except for the brackets
KP 3-19-98

REC-11 97-4196-432

9 MAR 28 1961

Photostat made of encl. orig. rec'd to Liaison (U) 4/11/61 SJPapich

ENCLOSURE

1 COPIES MADE, DATE 6-6-78 BY
RE Papich
FOR REVIEW AT FBIHQ AND/OR DELIVERY
TO HSCA RE REQUEST DATED 4-28
(SEE BUFILE 62-117290)

~~SECRET~~

58 APR 7 1961

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90146-10072
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-93072-169 THRU 182

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SEE TITLE
FROM :	[Restricted]
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	[Restricted]
DATE :	10/05/1967
PAGES :	80
SUBJECTS :	RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Not Assassination Related
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/08/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	INC 23 MEMO, ENVELOPE, 2 LET, 6 A/T, 2 LHM, RS, NEWS ARTIC, 2 LIST, SUMMARY

RECEIVED FR[illegible]
JUN 15 1972
CIA VIA COURIER

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 15 1972
CIA

O-146
15 JUN 1972

SUBJECT: SUGAR - Visit to the United States, June - July 1972 (SECRET)

REFERENCE: Our memorandum O-44, dated 29 October 1970, Subject: SUGAR, Activities During Visit to the United States, 24 September - 11 October 1970

1. SUGAR will return to the United States for a visit of several weeks beginning 21 June 1972. He will be in New York City for special training until mid-July and will then travel for about ten days on personal business and to renew old acquaintances.

2. We will appreciate receipt of any information on him affecting his security which may become available to your Bureau. As in the case of reference, we will provide you with any pertinent information obtained from him. We can also have him perform any appropriate tasks which your Bureau may desire to be done.

B

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

REC-22 105-93072-182
EX-116
17 JUN 22 1972

5-28

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

March 9, 1972

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REVOLUTIONARY UNION

A source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised during February, 1972, that Davida Fineman, a member of the pro-Chinese communist, Marxist-Leninist Revolutionary Union, advised during February, 1972, that she continues to be in occasional contact with the individual known to your Agency under the cryptonym "Sugar," and she refuses to believe that this individual is employed as an operative of your Agency. Fineman stated that she is also in contact with Rene Raindorf, pro-Chinese communist Marxist-Leninist of Belgium. (S)

Fineman indicated she was familiar with Roger Padgett (phonetic) who has served as a professor at Cornell University and at the University of Colorado at Boulder. The same source indicated that he too was acquainted with Padgett (phonetic) and that Padgett (phonetic) had admitted to the source he had worked for your Agency as an advisor to former President Sukarno of Indonesia for six years (S)

Fineman also volunteered that Gloria Steinem, prominent Women's Liberation advocate, was employed by your Agency. (S)

The above is for your information, and no further dissemination is being made by this Bureau.

1 - 105-93072 (Gibson)

105-184369

105-93072 -

170 MAR 10 1972

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
3/15/78

DR:dgo
(5)

2/19/98
Classified by SP8 MAC/GAT
Declassify on: OADR
(JFK)

31 MAR 5 1972

SECRET
~~Group 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE

YELLOW

Revolutionary Union

NOTE:

Source is CG 7262-S, it being noted Fineman stayed at informant's residence in Chicago during the period 2/11-14/72. "Sugar" is the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cryptonym for Richard Gibson, who is currently being operated in England by the Agency. (S)

Classified "Secret" because unauthorized disclosure could compromise CG 7262-S as well as a CIA source and thus cause severe damage to defense interests. (S)

Sent [to CIA] by form 0-14f dated 3/9/72. (S)

CONFIDENTIAL

DIRECTOR, FBI (105-186336) 2/11/72

LEGAT, PARIS (105-5616)(P)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

ARAB TERRORIST ACTIVITIES
IS - MIDDLE EAST

Re Paris letter dated 1/27/72.

Enclosed for the Bureau are 6 copies of an LHM setting forth information received from the Belgian Security Service (BSS), in captioned matter. LHm is classified "Confidential" inasmuch as information from the BSS is so classified. (C)

The BSS has requested any information available concerning (FNU) GIBSON, described in LHM as a Black American journalist who met with pro-Palestinian Belgian national ARON RAINDORF in London during December, 1971. (FNU) GIBSON is probably identifiable with RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON, a Black American journalist, born 5/13/31, at Los Angeles, California, who is the subject of Bufile 105-93072, and whose wife, JOY MARJORIE GIBSON, is a British citizen. (C)

Mrs Richard thomas Gibson

London is requested to contact official British services to determine any information concerning contacts between GIBSON and RAINDORF (C)

U.S.A.
England

4 - Bureau (Enc.- 6)
    (1 - Foreign Liaison Desk)
    (1 - Legat, Beirut)(Enc.- 1)
1 - Legat, London (Enc.- 1)(Sent Direct)
1 - Paris
MGZ/jmd
(6)

2/19/98
Classified by Sp8MAC/GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

ST-113

REC 20

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~
~~DATE~~

105-93072-181

FEB 28 1972

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 1~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
3/15/78

ENCLOSURE

CONFIDENTIAL

C

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-186336-460

53 MAR 1 1972

CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES~~
~~AND FIELD OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP(S) OF~~
~~DATE~~

February 11, 1972

Re: Arab Terrorist Activities

2/17/78
Classified by SP8MAC/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

The following information was furnished by a confidential source abroad on February 4, 1972:

According to the source, a pro-Palestinian organization called the Palestine Committee-Brussels was organized during 1970 within the Belgian National Palestine Committee for the purpose of supporting Palestinian revolutionary activities. The Brussels Committee was headed by Luc Dupire, a Belgian national born on April 9, 1942, at Haine St. Paul, and the National Palestine Committee by Aron Raindorf, a Belgian citizen born on December 22, 1919, at St. Gilles. (C)

Following a period during which the two groups worked in harmony, a schism took place in November, 1971, which resulted in a new group being formed by Dupire and Yvonne Sterck which was called The Responsible Group for the National Palestinian Committee and the Palestinian Committee-Brussels without other members of either group being consulted. Raindorf, according to the source, is currently attempting to regain control over divergent elements and to restore order to the groups involved. (C)

In this connection, Raindorf traveled to London where he remained from December 26 through December 28, 1971, and met with one Gibson, described only as an American Negro journalist and with an individual known as Manchanda, described as being of Pakistani origin. The source indicated Manchanda is probably identical to Albert Manchanda, a British citizen born on April 9, 1919, in India. Raindorf also traveled to Beirut, Lebanon, on January 20, 1972, and to Damascus, Syria, to meet with elements of the Fath and the O.L.P. which were not further described by the source. (C)

~~Classified by 1257~~
~~Exempt from GDS Category 1~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

ENCLOSURE

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and declassification~~

CONFIDENTIAL

105-93072-1*-181

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

SUPPLEMENTAL CORRELATION SUMMARY

(See Correlation Summaries dated 11/29/61 and 7/5/63, filed as 105-93072-40 and 100 respectively.)

Main File No: 105-93072

Date: 4/21/71

Subject: Richard Thomas Gibson
Gibson, One*

Date Searched: 1/6/71

All logical variations of subject's name and aliases were searched and identical references were found as:

Gibson, Richard Thomas Summary
Gibbson, Richard
Gibson, Chard
Gibson, D.
Gibson, Dick
Gibson, R.
Gibson, Richard
Gibson, Richard E.
Gibson, Richard T.
Gibson, Robert
Gibson, Sugar (S)
Gilson, Richard
Sugar, One (code name) (S)
Sweet, John R.

This is a summary of information obtained from a review of all "see" references to the subject in Bureau files under the names and aliases listed above. All references under the above names containing data identical with the subject have been included except any indicated at the end of this summary under the heading REFERENCES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY. References indicated in the block as SI contain the same information as the foregoing serial although the information may have been received from a different source.

THIS SUMMARY HAS BEEN PREPARED FOR USE AT THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT SUITABLE FOR DISSEMINATION. IT IS DESIGNED TO FURNISH A SYNOPSIS OF THE INFORMATION SET OUT IN EACH REFERENCE, AND IN MANY CASES THE ORIGINAL SERIAL WILL CONTAIN THE INFORMATION IN MORE DETAIL.

Analyst	Coordinator	Approved
Charles E. Rader	Josephine Telleri	Lawrence B. Brady

CER:sak

*Not searched. See page 21 of search slip.

RIATE AGENCIES
ELD OFFICES
SED BY ROUTING
(S) OF
ATE
BKK
REC 32

105-93072-180

MCT
BKK

17 APR 29 1971

2/17/95
Classified by SP8 MAC GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

ENCLOSURE

Behind File Search Slips Only

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 1,2,3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
3/15/78

SECRET

CONSOLIDATION

F466

53 JUN 17 1971

SECRET

ABBREVIATIONS

Add. info	Additional information appearing in this reference which pertains to Richard Thomas Gibson can be found in the main file or elsewhere in this summary. This information may have been received from a different source.
FPCC	Fair Play for Cuba Committee
PD	Police Department
WDC	Washington, D.C.

*****

(C) [NY 3164-S] advised on 2/27/61, that Richard Gibson, former Acting Executive Secretary, FPCC, was at that time in Algeria and was employed in an editorial capacity for "Revolution Africaine". Source believed that Gibson had recommended Daniel H. Watts (105-96316) as correspondent for the above publication at the UN.

105-96316-5 ep.2
(9)

The "New York Times" on 3/24/61, in an article entitled "US Asks Court Bar Questions On Castro Foes in Miami Area", by Peter Kihss, reported that an unidentified US agency had intervened in a murder trial in Miami asking that questions about activities by Cubans in that area seeking the overthrow of Premier Fidel Castro of Cuba be barred in the trial. The article stated that the above intervention became known while the FPCC called for a Congressional investigation of CIA. Richard Gibson, acting national secretary of the FPCC, said he based his call on an announcement of a "Revolutionary Council" set up by the two major anti-Castro groups in Miami. Gibson said there had been reports of CIA support of an anti-Castro enterprise and that forces had been using Florida as a training and staging point for attacks against Cuba. He said that reckless CIA action could lead the country into a major war.

105-89923-A "NY Times" 3/24/61
(9)

SECRET

SECRET

CV 489-S and CV 288-S advised that Anton Emil Kuerti (105-144287) was among those who attended a reception in Cleveland, Ohio, on 5/24/61, for Richard Gibson, Acting Secretary of the FPCC, which was sponsored by the Cleveland FPCC.

105-144287-7 p.3
(10)
SI 100-390323-14 p.11
(5)

Norman Driscoll, Chief Clerk, Chase Manhattan Bank, NYC (protect identity), advised that one J. Mitchell (105-120655), 4823 28th Ave., Kenosha, Wisc., had negotiated a personal money order dated 6/9/61, in the amount of $100.00 payable to Richard Gibson.

Add. info.

105-120655-2 p.1,3
(10)

On 6/13/61, Richard Gibson was the main speaker at a public lecture entitled "Lessons of Alabama and Cuba" which was held at 604 University Street, Seattle, Washington. The affair was sponsored by the Student Council, FPCC and the Adult Group, FPCC.

Gibson spoke again on 6/14/61, at a public forum sponsored by the above groups and held at 4753 18th Ave., N.W., Seattle. He spoke about the aims and purposes of FPCC and explained that the purpose of FPCC was to tell the truth about Cuba.

Michael Edward Lyons (140-33894) had been present at both affairs.

Former SE 736-S
140-33894-8 p.3
(11)
SI 140-29216-8 p.12
(11)

DN 215-S advised that on 6/18/61, Richard Gibson of NYC, had been featured at a meeting of the Denver, Colo., Chapter of the FPCC. Gibson told the group how they should conduct themselves if interviewed by FBI Agents or called before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

140-30768-8 p.9
(11)

SECRET

SECRET

CG 6474-S stated that in August, 1961, Richard Gibson, acting National Executive Secretary of the FPCC, advised that those names on the addressograph maintained at FPCC headquarters, NYC, which did not include a letter and a number after the state would be eligible for renewal of their membership and/or subscription fee beginning in January, 1962.

X (u)

100-443866-19 ep.15
(8)

CV 975-S* advised that during the FPCC National Advisory Committee conference, 10/14,15/61, Richard Gibson mentioned that the publication "Fair Play", official publication of the FPCC, was then published by the Libertarian Press, NY, owned by David Dellinger (100-384411). Gibson stated that the FPCC owed $300.00 to that concern and that ten thousand copies of the last issue had been printed.

Add. info.

100-384411-241 p.39,41,42
(5)

(c) [NY 3164-S] advised on 3/29/62, that Daniel Watts (105-96316) commented on plans for the FPCC to hold a film and social evening at the home of a known member of the CP. Watts felt that Richard Gibson (no locality) was "stupid to get tied up with the communist that way".

X

Add. info.

105-96316-10 p.4,5,9,14
(9)

This reference in the file captioned "World Fellowship, Inc." sets forth information pertaining to a series of lectures presented by Richard Gibson during the period 7/23/62 through 7/26/62, at the World Fellowship Camp, Conway, N.H. The lectures were given in celebration of the 7/26/53 attack by Fidel Castro's forces on Santiago De Cuba and were in support of Castro. (Details set out.)

61-9200-259 p.20,21
(2)

SECRET

(C) NY 3164-S advised on 8/23/62, that Richard Gibson had indicated that a split had developed in NYC between the pro-Castro Cubans and the Trotskyites, followers of the SWP, and that the split was especially apparent at the Casa Cuba Club, 691 Columbus Ave., NYC.

Add. info.

97-3874-26 p.4
(2,13)

CG 6474-S advised on 8/28/62, that John Alfred Rossen (61-10459) had read a letter from Richard Gibson of the FPCC national office in NYC at a meeting of the Chicago Chapter FPCC. The letter dealt with the distribution and handling of films and literature and financial problems of the national office. Material on speeches by Fidel Castro had been sent under separate cover. (u)

CG 6259-S advised that Rossen had volunteered to contact and attempt to get Gibson as a speaker for a FPCC city-wide rally on 9/28/62.

Add. info.

61-10459-162 p.6,7,11,15,16
(2)

The State Department advised that on 1/10/63, March Schleifer, an American Marxist and journalist, provided information pertaining to the formation of "Revolutionary Africa (RA)", a magazine which was an organ of the Politbureau in Algeria. The editor of the English language section was to be Richard Gibson. Schleifer had worked with Gibson in the FPCC movement but had lost some of his confidence in Gibson as a true revolutionary after the latter "jumped" at a bureaucratic position with the Politbureau. Schleifer had lived with Gibson in Algiers and regarded him as the same type of man that Djilas (not further identified) had denounced in "The New Class" (not further identified). Gibson's position with the Maspero (not further identified) group, and thus the FLN (not further identified), predated his involvement in Cuban affairs. Schleifer pointed out that long before the Cuban revolution, Gibson had been working in France with the French "neo-Marxist" left. He had considerable editorial ability and should have been an asset to "RA". (C)

105-101579-42
(9)
SI 105-101579-44 p.5
(9)

"The Harvard Crimson", Cambridge, Mass., on 3/27/63, contained an article entitled "Worthy Raps U.S. Travel Control". The article concerned comments made by William Worthy (105-20110) in which he criticized C.B.S. News executives stating that CBS had used a double standard when they fired Richard Gibson and Robert Tabor. According to Worthy the two staff members who had been released after forming the FPCC "would still be working if they were anti-Castro".

105-20110-A "The Harvard Crimson"
(8) 3/27/63

(c) [NY 3164-S] advised on 1/29/63, that Sarah Gibson was the wife of Richard Gibson.

NY 3246-S* advised that in February, 1963, Sarah Gibson of the English Bureau, "Revolution Africaine", 7 Laferriere Blvd., Algiers, Algeria, communicated with Esther Jackson, of "Freedomways" magazine, regarding an exchange of subscriptions of "Revolution Africaine" for a subscription to "Freedomways".

NY 3246-S* advised that in May, 1963, John Henrik Clarke of "Freedomways" magazine communicated with the editor of "African Revolution" and expressed his appreciation for a copy of that magazine and asked that his best regards be given to Richard Gibson and his family.

Add. info.

100-434819-90 p.45,46
(6)

John Stanley Peters, son of Hannah Ida Peters (105-121441) advised on 7/24/63, that his father, Edward Stanley Peters, had had some contact with the FPCC and on occasion had visited Richard Gibson, National Officer, at the NYC headquarters of the FPCC. On one occasion John accompanied his father. John stated that he was completely non-political, that he could not absorb the strange atmosphere in which Gibson traveled, and he very soon terminated the one contact with Gibson.

105-121441-8 p.5
(10)

SECRET

NY 3877-S* advised that on 7/30/63, an individual who identified himself as Taylor Adams, "an old publicity man retired from business for some years now" and a friend of Richard Gibson with whom he had done some work on the FPCC, had been in contact with Enrique Trujillo, Third Secretary, Cuban Mission to the UN, (62-77787-210) NYC. (S)

[62-77787-210-800 ep.1] (S)
(2)
SI 100-439769-197 p.5
(6)

Conf. Source Rene Pelleya Justiz (protect identity) advised on 11/8/63, that Richard Gibson, former FPCC official, who had been in contact with Raul Roa Garcia, Cuban Minister of Foreign Relations, in New York in November, 1961, was in Africa. In Africa Gibson was writing for a magazine "African Revolution", which according to source was completely communist. The magazine's main office was in Switzerland. (S)

[65-63987-210-422X ep.2] (S)
(2)

The following references in the file captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald" set forth information pertaining to the activities of Richard Thomas Gibson during the period March, 1960 through 12/9/63, in New York, Algeria, Cuba, France and Switzerland. Gibson, a journalist, had been head of the FPCC in the US and reportedly was a possible link between the FPCC and the Chinese communists. He worked as a journalist in Cuba and later in Algeria where he reportedly worked for the Algerian Government. From a reported conversation between Gibson and another individual in Switzerland there appeared a possible indication that Gibson had been acquainted with Oswald. Gibson was interviewed at the American Embassy, Paris, where he stated that he had no correspondence or knowledge of Oswald under the latter's full name. However, he had received a letter from one Lee Bowmont who had indicated an interest in organizing a FPCC in Ft. Worth, Texas, who possibly was Oswald. Oswald allegedly had been connected with the FPCC. The interviewer suspected that Oswald's pictures may have looked familiar to Gibson. X

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
105-82555-88	(14)
-157	(9)
-355	(14)
-1017 (Interview)	(9)
-3835 p.23	(9)

SECRET

SECRET

The following references in the file captioned "Robert Alexander Wood" set forth information pertaining to the activities of Richard Gibson during the period late 1959 through 2/3/64, in the United States, New York, Cuba, Europe, England, France, Switzerland and Algeria. Wood provided information pertaining to Gibson beginning with his first meeting in 1959 with Gibson when he offered his services to the FPCC. Wood, accompanied by Gibson's wife, left the US for Algeria where Gibson was editor of the publication "Revolution Africaine". Wood lived with Gibson in Algeria. According to Wood, after Gibson arrived in France he tried to get funds from the French CP without success and was embittered against the "comrades". Wood did not believe Gibson was a member of the CPUSA or any CP, but was an opportunist who rode high on which ever cause he could find. He believed Gibson could have been recruited for a good salary. Later Gibson was reportedly living in Switzerland where he was active among pro-Chinese communist elements. Further details set out.

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
100-353652-73 ep.2,6	(5)
-74 p.2,ep.4-9	(5)
-77 p.6,11	(14)

The following references in the file captioned "Fair Play for Cuba Committee" set forth information pertaining to the activities of Richard Gibson, a former FPCC official, during the period Spring, 1960 through 2/6/64, in New York, Ohio, Africa, Algeria, France and Switzerland. Gibson, a self-styled Black Nationalist, served as Acting National Executive Secretary of the FPCC and following the assassination of President John F. Kennedy there had been contemplation of prosecuting ex-officials of the FPCC under the Foreign Agents Registration Act because of a connection between the FPCC and the President's assassin. Gibson had been described as a former comrade of the CP, but was later said to have begun plotting against CP members. During a Congressional hearing, Gibson refused to answer questions of the Senate Internal Security Sub-Committee. Gibson traveled to Africa and Europe where he worked as a journalist. In France he reportedly worked for a left-wing newspaper.

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4196-899 ep.1	(3)
-900 p.1,ep.1,2	(3)
-902 p.32,33	(3)
-A "NY Journal American" 11/23/63	(3)
-A King Features Syndicate 11/27/63	(3)

(continued)

SECRET

(continued)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4196-26-60 p.2	(3)
97-4196-34-81 p.4,7,24	(3)
-83 p.2-4,10	(3)
-86 p.3,14	(4)
97-4196-50-26 p.23	(4)

Bundesamt Fuer Verfassungsschutz, (BFV- West German Federal Agency for the Protection of the Constitution) (protect identity) advised that on 5/12/64, John Henrik Clarke, Associate Editor of "Freedomways" communicated with a John Taylor at the Hotel Rigynes, 18, Rue Des Abbesses, Paris, France, and suggested that Taylor see Richard Gibson, Editor of the magazine "Revolution", 40 Rue Francais ler, Paris. Clarke said that Gibson had many contacts in Africa. (S)

Add. info.

100-434819-117 ep.2-4
(6)

This reference sets forth comments of Richard Gibson in early January, 1965, regarding the leftist publication "Revolution" and communist China's role in its operation. Gibson, former editor of the English edition of the publication, related his association and dispute with the editor of "Revolution", Jacques Verges, in Algeria and Switzerland and Verges' handling of the affairs of the publication.

109-12-278-194
(11)

The following references in the file captioned "Elizabeth 'Betita' Sutherland" set forth information pertaining to Richard Gibson during the period 9/15/61 through 5/30/65. Gibson, who had been in NYC during part of the above period, had been Acting National Executive Secretary, FPCC and a supporter of the Monroe Defense Committee. Gibson had been in contact with Sutherland and another individual regarding taking photographic equipment to Cuba and obtaining a visa for the person delivering the material. Gibson said Sutherland could send a telegram to Cuba using his name as an official of the FPCC if X

(continued)

(continued)

it would help in obtaining a visa. Sutherland and Gibson also discussed persons in Cuba who wanted to leave. Gibson mentioned having something published in the US rather than Cuba. Sutherland wrote a letter to Gibson dated 5/30/65 on the letterhead of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee regarding her activities and other matters.

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
105-21126-2 p.1,5-9	(8)
-19 (Letter enclosed)	(24)

The following references pertain to the investigations and/or hearings of Congressional Committees. Information regarding the activities of Richard Thomas Gibson was set out in testimonies of individuals and exhibits. Information set out covered the period 1950 through 6/11/65, in NY, Ohio, Cuba, France and Italy.

COMMITTEE	REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate	62-88217-2903 ep.28	(2)
	97-4057-29 ep.23,31,33	(3)
	97-4196-858 ep.160,169	(3)
	-859 ep.228,254,255	(3)
	-874 ep.339,342-346, 348,353,354,360,363	(3,20)
	105-80787-710 ep.341	(9)
Committee on Un-American Activities, House of Representatives	105-66204-46 ep.842	(9)

"The New York Times" on 6/13/65, contained an article entitled "Unit of Nationalists To Mark 5th Year; Asks Aid for Negro", which pertained to the fifth anniversary of a movement which had been started as the Liberation Committee for Africa (105-98055) by Daniel H. Watts, editor of Liberator, a publication of the Afro-American Research Institute, (AARI) Inc., and Richard Gibson. Gibson departed to concentrate on running the FPCC and was at that time a free-lance writer in Paris. In 1963 the organization became the AARI.

105-98055-A "NY Times" 6/13/65
(9)

SECRET

CIA furnished copies of letters dated 8/13 through 20/65, from Hodee W. Edwards (100-397465) to Sugar, who, because of operational considerations maintained contact with Edwards. The letters were of a political nature and contained an exchange of ideas between Edwards and Sugar. (S) (S)

Letters enclosed
100-397465-74
(24)

Correlator's Note: Numerous references in the above file contain information pertaining to correspondence between Edwards, a former CPUSA member living in Ghana, Africa, and Sugar. Letter to Chicago dated 10/7/65, indicated that Edwards had been in frequent contact with Richard Gibson who was residing in England. (S)

The following references in the file captioned "Revolution" aka "Africa, Latin America, Asia Revolution", set forth information pertaining to the activities of Richard Thomas Gibson, a member of the editorial board of the above magazine, during the period 1/8/63 through 10/22/65, in Algeria, Switzerland, France, Florida and New York. Gibson had been editor of "African Revolution", English language edition of "La Revolution Africaine", which had been created by the Algerian Front of National Liberation and reportedly was the official publication of the Algerian Government. Gibson had been former Acting Executive Secretary, FPCC, and was reportedly expected to supply "Revolution" and postage for its mailing to the FPCC. He allegedly sent money to set up a distribution office in NYC. Gibson asserted that no one party dictated the editorial line of "Revolution" even though the magazine agreed with the Chinese communist position in "Marxist disputes". Gibson was said to have been working in France long before the Cuban revolution with the "French Neo-Marxist Left".

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4803-2	(4)
-4 ep.1,2	(4)
-5 p.2,4-6,15,16	(4)
-6 ep.1	(4)
-8 ep.2,3	(4)
-15 p.2	(4)
-22	(20)
-29 p.1,2,6-8	(4)

(continued)

SECRET

SECRET

(continued)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
97-4803-31 ep.4,9	(13)
-36 p.2	(4)
-44 p.1	(4)
-51 ep.2	(4)
-66	(5)

CIA advised that from information dated January 1966, one of their sources stated that Robert Taber (97-4223), a journalist and a founder of FPCC, was the best of a group that included Richard Gibson (no locality). (S)

97-4223-142
(4)

CIA advised on 1/28/66, that "Sugar" had reported that Susan Heiligman Frank (100-339235) was not known to him and that he was not aware of her travel plans. He could not come up with any reason for Frank having had in her possession his name and address. (S)

Frank, who had been active in pro-Chinese communist activities in the US, and reportedly had been a contact of Chinese communist intelligence in England, prior to leaving NYC for London, had made inquiry concerning the address of Richard Gibson, former FPCC head, who was a CIA source in London, utilizing the code name "Sugar". (Letter to NY, 2/10/66.) (S)

100-339235-238
(5, 24)

This reference in the file captioned "Maxwell Curtis Stanford, Jr" sets forth information pertaining to Richard Gibson during the period 1950 through 3/2/66, in France, Algeria, America and North Carolina. Gibson, who had been in France in the 1950's, returned to America and became a foreign correspondent for CBS. Following his becoming assistant chairman of the FPCC, Gibson was fired by CBS. He and Robert Tatum, who had formed the FPCC, became representatives for Fidel Castro in America. They began working in the FPCC to restore Castro's image. Gibson arranged a trip to Cuba for several individuals and had been involved in an incident in Monroe, N.C., in which a white couple claimed to have been arrested. Allegedly because of the latter incident Gibson went to Algeria. (U)

105-132791-29 p.G,H.
(10)

SECRET

SECRET

Frank Mabry, Jr. (protect identity) advised on 9/29/66, that he had been told that Richard Gibson had been living in the Crystal Hotel, Paris, France, and had been working out of the La Royale Cafe, Paris. Mabry stated that he was attempting to obtain a letter of introduction to Gibson from Max Stanford, former secretary to Mabry, as he planned to travel to Paris, and also to convince Stanford that he could be a courier for the Revolutionary Action Movement (100-442684).

Add. info.

100-442684-34-99 p.2-5
(6)

CIA (protect identity), advised on 1/5/67 that the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee (62-88217) had allegedly been collecting information concerning Cuban subversive activity in the US and that one of the committee's investigators stationed in Miami, Fla., had been making inquiries concerning Richard Gibson. (S)

Gibson had been involved in the FPCC, a pro-Castro organization and then had allegedly changed his political views. He left the US and CIA began using him as a source of information. Gibson's CIA code name was "Sugar" (S) (Bureau memorandum, 1/6/67.) (C)

62-88217-3000
(2,24)

NY 3565-S furnished a list of individuals who participated in the Stockholm Conference on Vietnam which was held in Stockholm, Sweden, 7/6-9/67. The list included Richard Gibson (Stop It) (sic).

100-447368-22 p.26
(8)
SI 100-447368-26 ep.3,24
(8)
SI 105-170331-10 ep.24
(10)

CIA on 8/31/67, furnished a copy of a Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) (100-439190) questionnaire which had been sent to Sugar (no locality) by Courtland Cox of SNCC. According to CIA, Sugar filled in the form and returned it to Cox. Sugar had been unable to determine the purpose of the worldwide files SNCC seemed to have been trying to develop. Sugar had been receiving the SNCC Newsletter and had sent his newsletter to Cox (S)

Document enclosed
100-439190-1496
(24)

SECRET

This reference in the file captioned "Deserters" pertains to an article which appeared on 3/20/68 in "Tidsignal", a leftist newspaper in Sweden, entitled "This is How LBJ's Agents Operate in Sweden" by Bo Hammer (not further identified). The article concerned alleged activities of US agents in Sweden to persuade American deserters in Sweden to return to the Army. It alleged that Richard Gibson, who professed himself to be a journalist and pretended to belong to the Black Power movement had been instrumental in persuading Ray Jones, one of the first deserters from the US Army in Sweden, to return to Frankfurt. Gibson, who lived in London, Eng., was said to have visited Sweden no less than four times and on his last trip had claimed to represent American Negro leader Robert Williams who was in China. According to the article Gibson's main interest at that time seemed to have been Jones. Jones' relationship with Gibson and attempts by the deserters to unmask American agents in Sweden were set out including their contacting Gibson in London for that purpose. Details set out.

42-0-53999 ep.4-6
(2✓

In connection with a claim by the American Deserters Committee, Sweden, that agents for the CIA had tried to infiltrate the committee to break it up, it was determined at CIA that Richard Thomas Gibson, an informant of that Agency, had been maintaining some contact with US deserters. Gibson had been involved in at least one operation to influence a deserter to return to the US. Gibson also had been used by CIA throughout Europe as a penetration of Black Power and New Left groups and had been the source of considerable information from CIA. The impression had been received that Gibson had possibly been compromised and it could not be discounted that his involvement might become publicized including the allegation of a connection with CIA. (Brennan to Sullivan letter 3/22/68.) (S)

42-0-53895
(13✓

NY 6351-S on 8/2/68, furnished a list of "Guardian" (100-357044) contacts in England which were given to the participants of a "Guardian" sponsored tour of London, Eng. Included was Richard Gibson, 32 Hartswood Rd., Stamford Brook, London.

100-357044-832 ep.6
(5✓

SECRET

US Army Intelligence, Fort Holabird, Md., on 8/6/68, provided a list of personalities with whom Roy Ray Jones (105-172600) came in contact while in Denmark and Sweden which included Richard Gibson. In data given by Jones and his wife, Gibson was said to have resided in London, Eng., was allegedly a representative of International News and Features and was suspected by Jones to maintain a liaison with the Chinese Committee for Afro-Asian Solidarity, Peking, China. Gibson tried to induce Jones to undertake a speaking tour in Egypt. Charles Kurasia, a student from Southwest Africa, and who was believed to have been associated with an African underground movement in Sweden, introduced Jones to Gibson. Kurasia and Hans Goeran Franck, a Swedish lawyer who was believed to head the Swedish Chapter of Amnesty International, suspected Gibson of being a CIA agent. (C)

105-172600-16 encl.2 p.8
(10)
SI 105-172600-21 ep.8
(11)

This reference pertains to an interview on 10/18/68, with Daniel Henry Watts (105-96316). Watts advised that one of the better writers on the staff for his magazine the "Liberator" had been Richard Gibson who resided in Europe and covered Africa, Asia and Europe. Watts asked if interviewers were acquainted with Gibson to which they acknowledged that a Gibson appeared on the masthead of the "Liberator". Watts also advised that Gibson had been involved in the FPCC. No significance could be attached as to why Watts asked if interviewers were knowledgeable regarding Gibson; however [it was believed CIA had an interest in Gibson.] (S)

105-96316-33 p.3
(9)

The following references in the file captioned "Robert Franklin Williams" set forth information pertaining to the activities of Richard Gibson, [aka "Sugar",] during the period 19~~63 through 9/8/69, in Algeria~~ and England. Gibson, former FPCC Acting Secretary, reportedly had known Williams for ten years and had corresponded many times with him regarding publication of a book Williams had written and other matters. In 1963 Gibson went to Algeria and later to England where he eventually became overseas representative and correspondent for Negro Press International, Chicago, Ill. (S)

(continued)

SECRET

(continued)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
100-387728-142	(5)
-147	(5)
-174	(24)
-201	(5)
-298 p.1;ep.1	(5)
-A "NY Times" 9/9/69	(5)

This reference concerns questions that CIA was requested to pose to Richard Gibson regarding Howard Bruce Franklin (not further identified), while latter had been in France, Devida Fineman (not further identified), and any correspondence which Gibson maintained with the Revolutionary Union (105-184369) and its members. CIA advised on 10/28/69, that Gibson had not produced any information of value to those questions. Gibson had not been pressed for answers because CIA concluded that he would gain too much knowledge. CIA felt he should be operated on his own material and not on data received from other sources. CIA admitted that Gibson was "a handling problem" and questioned his reliability. (S)

105-184369-234
(11)

The following references in the file captioned "International Conference to Support the Palestinian Peoples Armed Struggle (ICSP)" set forth information pertaining to the activities of Richard Thomas Gibson in connection with the ICSP which was held in Algiers, Algeria, 12/26-28/69. Gibson, who had been residing in London, Eng., arrived in Paris and departed for Algiers on 12/26/69. Gibson's name appeared on the list of participants in the ICSP. (S)

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
105-200714-26 ep.2	(14)
-38 ep.1	(11)
-39 p.2	(14)
-40 p.2	(14)

(S)

SECRET

REFERENCES NOT INCLUDED IN THIS SUMMARY

The following reference on Richard Gibson was not available during the time this summary was being prepared.

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
100-442308-13	(6)

The following references on Richard Gibson and Robert Gibson located in files maintained in the Special File Room of the Records Branch, Files and Communications Division, were not reviewed, and it is not known whether they are identical with the subject of this summary:

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
64-330-210-858	(2)
-1633	(2)
65-68250-176	(17)
65-68530-469X ep.3907,3913	(17)

(S)

The following references on Richard Gibson have been reviewed and are identical with the subject, however, the information pertains to highly sensitive investigations and is not being included.

REFERENCE	SEARCH SLIP PAGE NUMBER
100-442715-874	(6,26)
-917	(24)
-977	(6)
-984 p.8,13-15	(6)
-1126	(6)
-1206	(7)
-1264	(7)
-1277 p.3	(7)
-1280	(7)
-1472 p.1,ep.1	(7)
-1490 p.1,ep.1	(7)
-1519	(7)
-1581 p.2	(7)
-1653	(7)
-2052 ep.2	(7)
-2212 ep.6	(7)
-2240 p.2,ep.3	(7)
-2253 p.4	(7)
-2325	(8,26)
-2498 ep.6	(8)

(S)

SECRET

(continued)

SECRET

See the search slip filed behind file for other references on this subject which contain the same information (SI) that is set out in the main file. Although the information is the same it may have been received from different sources.

SECRET

SECRET

5

November 12, 1970

BY COURIER

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Delivered to CIA by CIA Courier 11-13-70

SUGAR (R)

Reference is made to your informal memorandum dated October 29, 1970, (your reference O-44) enclosing 29 reports covering contacts of Sugar during his visit to the United States, September 24, 1970, to October 11, 1970. S

In accordance with your request, the following comments on and evaluations relating to the validity and usefulness of the information in the reports are set forth:

1. Sugar's recent presence in the United States was reported by two sources of this Bureau. These sources expressed no suspicions relating to his activity or cover. S

2. Based upon preliminary review, the information provided by Sugar appears accurate and generally conforms to information independently reported by our sources. Slight distortions noted were in accord with existing rumor or "talk" within domestic movement circles.

3. The information provided by Sugar is considered of good intelligence value, but not in itself of high or exceptional value. It confirms and supports information developed by Bureau sources and in several instances provides current assessments and useful investigative leads. S

4. Sugar's obvious close association with Richard Ward (indicated in reports S-52 and S-56) would appear to offer him an opportunity to establish a stringer relationship with the weekly New York City left-oriented "Guardian," in the event this is in accord with the projection of his cover. Ward, in spite of criticism of the "Guardian," continues to be included as a staff member in the publication's masthead and his articles continue to be published. Although the "Guardian" has a United Kingdom address (13 Wood Ride, Orpington, Kent), no London correspondent is listed in its masthead. Both S

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/10/73

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

105-93072
1 - 105-25320 (Ward)
Orig & 1 for CIA
DR:sfw sfw
(5)

SECRET

REC-86 105-93072-179

NOV 16 1970

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

EX-113

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 105-

55 NOV 19 1970

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

112

S

Ward and Wilfred Burchette (current "Guardian" Paris representative) have obvious close contacts with the Democratic Republic of North Vietnam representation in Paris and would appear to be in a position to provide an entree for Sugar to the North Vietnamese.

S

5. The detailed information furnished by Sugar relating to Ward (report S-56) suggests Ward as a likely candidate for approach. Our files indicate Sugar has been acquainted with Ward since 1967. We would very much appreciate receiving a current personality assessment of Ward by Sugar.

S

Your interest in referring the reports of Sugar to this Bureau is appreciated.

S

NOTE:

Sugar is CIA cryptonym for Richard Gibson who operates in behalf of CIA from London, furnishing coverage of European and Third World New Left and black extremists. The 29 reports furnished by the Agency on 10/29/70 covering Sugar's contacts while in the U.S. from 9/24-10/11/70 have been disseminated to appropriate field offices and Bureau files by Bulet 11/9/70, captioned "Richard Thomas Gibson, Information Concerning," Bufile 105-93072.

S

Richard Ward is included on the Security Index of the New York Office and he is a current staff member of the "Guardian." He was in contact with the North Vietnamese Diplomatic Mission in Paris in 5/70 and traveled thereafter to Hanoi and Laos for a five-week visit. According to the information made available by Sugar, Ward is critical of the "Guardian," the Soviets, and members of the New Left in this country. He is currently doing research on a book about American-Vietnamese relations and he claims this book will be scholarly, other than a propaganda piece. Based upon a current assessment of Ward by the Agency, we will consider interviewing him, looking towards his development as an informant.

S

Classified "Secret" because incoming so classified, and because it relates to sensitive CIA source compromise of whom could cause serious damage to defense interests.

S

SAC, Boston **SECRET** 11/9/70

REC-2

EX-113

Director, FBI (105-93072) 1148

1 - Mr. D. Ryan

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

CLASS. BY ~~SP2TAP/JAC~~

DATE OF REVIEW ~~[illegible]~~

Pages 1-3 are classified in their entirety per Agency (CIA) letter 5/12/86. SP-5 ci/smc 5/8/86

CLASS. & EXT. BY SP2TAP/5cm
REASON-FCIM II, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 11-9-90
4-29-80

ReBuairtel 9/17/70, copies not furnished Boston, Milwaukee, and New Orleans.

For the information of Boston, Milwaukee, and New Orleans, captioned individual, a Negro male who was formerly active in the U.S. as a member of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, currently serves as a CIA informant based in England. He is assigned the CIA cryptonym "Sugar" and he operates under the cover of "overseas representative and correspondent" for "Negro Press International," which is allegedly a Chicago-based firm. From his residence in London, Gibson furnishes coverage of European and Third World New Leftists and black nationalists. (S)

The identity of Gibson is afforded highly compartmentalized security within CIA and under no circumstances should any local CIA representatives be furnished any information (S)

MAILED 11
NOV - 6 1970
COMM-FBI

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

Enclosure 2/17/95 Classified by SP8MAC/SAT Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

2 - Chicago (105-10280) (Enclosures - 4)
2 - Detroit (Enclosures - 5)
2 - Los Angeles (Enclosure)
2 - Milwaukee (Enclosure)
2 - New Orleans (Enclosure)
2 - New York (Enclosures - 7)
2 - Philadelphia (Enclosure)
2 - San Francisco (100-47327) (Enclosures - 12)
2 - WFO (105-42103) (Enclosure)

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF~~ [illegible] DATE [illegible]

Classified by 1257
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/10/78 [illegible]

NOV 9 1970

1 - 100-147952 (Leibel Bergman)
1 - 100-29233 (Herbert Block) (S)
1 - 100-405600 (James Boggs)
1 - 105-168197 (H. Rap Brown)
1 - 100-446080 (Stokely Carmichael)
1 - 100-448517 (Albert Cleague)
1 - 100-447251 (Eldridge Cleaver)
1 - 100-439922 (Angela Davis)
1 - 157- (Edward Dawley)
1 - 100-432251 (William Epton)
1 - 100-446389 (Davida Fineman)
1 - 100-457417 (Mark Harris)
1 - 100-412654 (Milton Henry)

1 - 100-444362 (Richard Henry)
1 - 157-12301 (Elaine Klein)
1 - 157-12523 (LRBW)
1 - 105- (Gertrude Nayes)
1 - 100-442308 (Paul Richards)
1 - 105-106392 (Irving Rosenthal)
1 - 105-166181 (Danny Schechter)
1 - 105-106720 (Robert Scheer)
1 - 105-132791 (Max Stanford)
1 - 105-25320 (Richard Ward)
1 - 105-93616 (Dan Watts)
1 - 100-387728 (Robert Williams)
1 - 134-17534 (Don Wright) (S)

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes

51 NOV 17 1970

DR:sfw (48)

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

MAIL ROOM

SECRET SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

SECRET

regarding him or his activities. Information reported by Gibson should not be incorporated into any communication which will be afforded dissemination outside the Bureau. If necessary, the information he has furnished may be included on the administrative pages of an investigative report. (S)

On 10/29/70 CIA made available to the Bureau by cover letter of the same date 29 separate reports covering the activities and contacts of Sugar during his visit to this country during the period 9/24-10/11/70 when he traveled to Chicago, Detroit, New York, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. These reports have been reviewed at the Bureau and are being forwarded as enclosures to this communication for appropriate offices. Recipient offices should carefully review the reports, insure their channelization to appropriate field files and/or indexing, and take any appropriate action necessary on the information contained therein. (S)

The following reports are enclosed for the following field offices:

Boston:	Report S-52, Danny Schechter (BS 100-39117)
Chicago:	Copy of CIA cover letter (for reference purposes)
	Report S-31, Leibel Bergman
	Report S-32, Herbert Block (CG 134-1800)
	Report S-59, Don Wright (CG 134-2818)
Detroit:	Report S-33, James Boggs
	Report S-36, Albert Cleague
	Report S-44, Milton Henry
	Report S-47, League of Revolutionary Black Workers
	Report S-58, Robert Franklin Williams
Los Angeles:	Report S-38, Angela Davis
Milwaukee:	Report S-50, Paul Richards
New Orleans:	Report S-45, Richard Henry

(S)

Letter to SAC, Boston SECRET
RE: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
105-93072

(S)

New York:	Report S-34, H. Rap Brown
	Report S-41, William Epton
	Report S-51, Irving Rosenthal (NY 105-53021)
	Report S-54, Max Stanford (NY 88-10460)
	Report S-55, William Sutherland
	Report S-56, Richard Ward (NY 100-145420)
	Report S-57, Dan Watts
Philadelphia:	Report S-54, Max Stanford (PH 157-2889)
San Francisco:	Copy of CIA cover letter (for reference purposes)
	Report S-31, Leibel Bergman
	Report S-37, Eldridge Cleaver
	Report S-39, Edward Dawley
	Report S-40, FNU Edwards
	Report S-42, Davida Fineman
	Report S-43, Mark Harris
	Report S-46, Elaine Klein
	Report S-48, FNU LNU
	Report S-49, Gertrude Nayes
	Report S-51, Irving Rosenthal
	Report S-53, Robert Scheer
WFO:	Report S-35, Stokely Carmichael

S

NOTE:

The original CIA reports are being retained in the file of Richard Gibson. Xerox copies have been furnished the field, where appropriate, and additional Xerox copies are being furnished appropriate Bureau files as noted. The request set out in the Agency cover letter dated 10/29/70 for this Bureau's comments and evaluation of the validity and usefulness of the information appearing in Sugar's reports will be handled by separate communication.

S

(S)

SECRET

SECRET

361 SECRET

No Forei Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Contro d Dissem/For Background Use Only

0-44
29 OCT 1970

SUBJECT: ⓪ SUGAR, Activities during Visit to the United States, 24 September - 11 October 1970

1. Attached are 29 reports (S-31 through S-59) covering the results of Subject's visit to the United States in September and 11 October 1970. During his visit, Subject went to New York, Chicago, Detroit, and San Francisco with a brief stop in Philadelphia. Following a listing of reports on his activities and contacts during this period:

A. S-31, Leibel BERGMAN

B. S-32, Herb BLOCK

C. S-33, James BOGGS

D. S-34, H. Rap BROWN

E. S-35, Stokely CARMICHAEL

F. S-36, Albert CLEAGUE

G. S-37, Eldridge CLEAVER

H. S-38, Angela DAVIS

I. S-39, Ed DAWLEY

J. S-40, Fnu EDWARDS

K. S-41, William EPTON

L. S-42, Davida FINEMAN

M. S-43, Mark HARRIS

N. S-44, Milton HENRY

O. S-45, Richard HENRY

P. S-46, Elaine KLEIN

Q. S-47, League of Revolutionary Black Workers

R. S-48, Fnu LNU

S. S-49, Gertrude NAYES

ENC. BEHIND FILE

29-ENCLOSURE

Let to: BS (enc)
11/9/70 DR/ofw
2-CG (enc-4) 2-NY (enc-7)
2-DE (enc-5) 2-PH (enc)
2-LA (enc) 2-SF (enc 13)
2-Milwaukee (enc) 2-WFO (enc)
2-NO (enc)

105-93072
file 5-

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/17/95 BY Sp8MAC/GAT (JFK)

REC-2 105-93072-178

EX-113

NOV 9 1970

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

T. S-50, Paul RICHARDS

U. S-51, Irving ROSENTHAL

V. S-52, Danny SCHECHTER

W. S-53, Robert SCHEER

X. S-54, Max STANFORD

Y. S-55, Bill SUTHERLAND

Z. S-56, Richard WARD

AA. S-57, Dan WATTS

BB. S-58, Robert Franklin WILLIAMS

CC. S-59, Don WRIGHT

2. We would appreciate your office's comments on and evaluations of the validity and usefulness of the information in the attached reports.

Please transmit reply via CACTUS channel

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

11/17
c/f no T

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93072) DATE: 11/9/70

FROM : SAC, DETROIT (105-17055) (C)

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

ReBulet to Atlanta, 9/17/70.

No information has been reported to the Detroit Office concerning the proposed meeting between subject and ROBERT FRANKLIN WILLIAMS.

X(U)

1-712 9+8
2 - Bureau
1 - Detroit
TJR:PMR
(3)

EX-106

REC-1 105-93072-177

6 NOV 12 1970

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
~~3/10/78~~

file 5-DR

DECLASSIFIED BY Sp8MAC/GAT (JFK)
ON 2/17/95

~~INT. SEC.~~

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF classification DATE 3/10/78~~

60 NOV 20 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108-01

Mr. Tolson
Mr. Sullivan

Conrad ✓

F B I

SECRET

Date: 10/1/70

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Classified by SP8 Dy Bury
Declassify on: OADR
11/1/89 310,050

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE 5-14-80

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93072)

FROM: SAC, CHICAGO (105-10280)

CLASS. & EXT. BY SK
REASON - FCIM 11, 1-2.4.2 2
DATE OF REVIEW 10/1/90

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

Re Bureau airtel 9/17/70 in above caption.

BECAUSE THE SOURCES NAMED BELOW ARE AFFILIATED WITH A HIGHLY SENSITIVE BUREAU COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATION, ANY INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN MUST BE PARAPHRASED TO PROTECT THE IDENTITIES OF THE SOURCES. (C)

On 9/26/70 RICHARD GIBSON called CG 6547-S and his wife, CG 6548-S at the informants' home who suggested to him that they meet at a downtown restaurant for lunch. GIBSON readily agreed. Informants spent about an hour with him. He told them that he was in Chicago to attempt to get on the payroll of "Tuesday Magazine," a Black oriented weekly newspaper supplement, as an overseas correspondent. GIBSON indicated to the informants that he planned to travel to Detroit on 9/27/70 to meet with ROBERT WILLIAMS, and thereafter go to New York City. He did not mention that he would travel to San Francisco or any other US cities. (S) (C)

The informants and GIBSON discussed the civil war in Jordan. GIBSON commented that the move by King HUSSEIN against the Palestine Liberation Movement was the result of the policies (S)(C)

1-712 9+2

3 - Bureau (RM)
  1 - 100-442715 (Ad Hoc Committee) (Research Section) (C)
1 - Detroit (RM)
  1 - 100- (ROBERT WILLIAMS)
2 - San Francisco (RM)
  1 - 100-34639 (LEIBEL BERGMAN)
  1 - 100-61722 (DAVIDA FINEMAN)
5 - Chicago
  1 - 100-41353 (Ad Hoc Committee) (C)
  1 - A)134-1800 (CG 6547-S)
  1 - A)134-1844 (CG 6548-S) (C)
  1 - A)134-2818 (CG 7262-S)
HKS:mls
(15)

REC-57

105-93072-176

105-204933

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 3/20/78 190 SSR

OCT 8 1979

58 OCT 19 1970

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______________________ M Per ______________________
Special Agent in Charge

(-60) 339

SECRET

2 OCT 9 1970

Classified by 3359
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite 3/10/78

UNREC COPY FILED IN 100-442715-

SECRET

of peaceful co-existence. He also assessed the outcome of the Jordanian crisis as a defeat for the guerilla forces under YASSIR ARAFAT. (S) (C)

GIBSON mentioned to the informants that he had recently been in Amman, Jordan where he spoke with GEORGE HABASH, leader of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine. GIBSON indicated that HABASH was a strong leader; whereas, ARAFAT was weak and prone to compromise. (S) (C)

GIBSON mentioned that DAVIDA FINEMAN a leader of the Revolutionary Union stopped in Belgium (probably in January, 1970) enroute home from the Palestine Liberation Conference held in Algiers, Algeria in December, 1969 where she contacted SERGE (Possibly SERGE PAIROUX, a Belgium communist) in an effort to purchase some firearms. According to GIBSON, SERGE would not assist FINEMAN in obtaining the firearms because she mentioned the name of RENE RAINDORF, a Belgium communist who has been active in the cause of Palestine Liberation. GIBSON claimed that RAINDORF is known in left circles in Europe "as CIA." (C)

GIBSON asked the informants if he could meet with CG 7262-S whom he had met in Algiers last December. He was furnished the informant's phone number by CG 6547-S. (S)(C)

On the evening of 9/26/70 GIBSON met CG 7262-S at a Chicago bar where informant is employed part-time as a bartender. Due to the circumstances under which they met, it was difficult for the informant to carry on an extended conversation with GIBSON. However, GIBSON did tell the informant the same story concerning his reason for being in Chicago; his intention of traveling to Detroit to see ROBERT WILLIAMS; his visit to Amman, Jordan; and the fact that he met during the day with the other two informants. GIBSON did not indicate that he would visit with BERGMAN or FINEMAN; however, he told the informant that BERGMAN and FINEMAN visited him in England as they were returning to the United States from the Palestine Liberation Conference in Algiers. (S)(C)

mic

SECRET

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

~~SECRET~~ Date: 9/22/70

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

~~Via AIRTEL~~ CONFIDENTIAL
(Priority)

Classified by ~~259~~
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/19/78

Classified by SP88 Kluy ~~OADR~~ #310050
Declassify on: OADR 10/31/89

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI [(100-442715)] ~~(X)~~ u

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO [(100-41353)] (X) u

SUBJECT: [AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR A
MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY,
USA (AHC)
IS - CH
(RESEARCH SECTION)] (c)

NO MENTION OF AD HOC COMMITTEE SHOULD BE MADE IN REPORTS OR COMMUNICATIONS FOR DISSEMINATION TO OUTSIDE AGENCIES. IF DEEMED APPROPRIATE, THE AHC CAN BE MENTIONED IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE PAGES OF SUCH REPORTS OR COMMUNICATIONS. (c)

Re Buairtel to Chicago dated 9/17/70, re RICHARD GIBSON.

On 9/22/70, CG 6547-S made available the enclosed letter from RICHARD GIBSON advising that he will visit in Chicago and soliciting information about what the left in the U.S. is doing in regard to Palestine Liberation. Two xerox copies enclosed for Bureau. (c)

Chicago is preparing a communication of solidarity to be mailed to RENE RAINDORF concerning Palestine Liberation. (c)

Also enclosed for Bureau is a booklet entitled "Resistance Palestinienne" written in French possibly sent to Ad Hoc by RENE RAINDORF. CG 6547-S made this available on 9/22/70. If Bureau deems advisable, Chicago would appreciate a translation of the article. (C)

sent to translation unit 9/24/70

1-712 9+D

3 - Bureau (Encs. 3) (RM)
(1 - 105-~~97302)~~ 93072
2 - Chicago
(1 - 105-10280)

JWM/bak 232
(5)

B. Brophy

ORIGINAL FILED IN [100-442715-2439

Rec'd: Put copy of encl. w/ Gibson 105-93072

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF 12/17/70 B

ENCLOSURE

105-93072

NOT RECORDED
192 SEP 30 1970

RESEARCH SECTION

SEP 24 1970

Approved: OCT 6 1970

Special Agent in Charge ~~SECRET~~ Sent ______ M Per ______

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

The original of GIBSON's letter being retained by Chicago. LHM concerning RAINDORF's presence in Amman, Jordan to follow. (C)

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

Richard Gibson Reports
International news & features

CONFIDENTIAL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
~~SECRET~~

32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
London, W12 9NA

19 September 1970

Dear Herb and Comrades,

Just a hasty note to let you know that René and Gilbert have recently returned from Amman with news about the desperately critical situation there. Nevertheless, we believe the situation is excellent for the revolutionary forces, despite the seemingly crushing weight of the reactionary, imperialist forces.

Throughout Europe, initiatives are being made by comrades, especially in regard to Arab embassies, needling them or coaxing them to show solidarity with the Palestinians or demonstrating against the most reactionary (e.g. the Jordan Embassy here was occupied by students yesterday). Cables, letters and personal calls are being made to Arab governments and their diplomats throughout Europe, and the Iraqi and Syrians shamed for their inactivity, despite all their past verbal support of the Palestinian Revolution. It would be especially useful for you comrades in the States to inform René and me of any activity that you are engaged in on Palestine and please send us for republication texts of any statements, cables, etc.

Manu and Diane send you fraternal greetings. They are now married, by the way, and await reinforcement in the revolutionary ranks in December!

There is a possibility I might make it to the States sometime this fall. If so, I will try to come to Chicago to give you a first-hand report on the situation in these parts, as well as the Middle East.

Fraternally yours,

ALL INFORMATION ON THIS PAGE IS CLASSIFIED (C) UNLESS INDICATED OTHERWISE

Classified by Sp8
Declassify on: OADR 10/31/89

CONFIDENTIAL

~~SECRET~~
ENCLOSURE 105-93072-
~~SECRET~~
~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SECRET

SI-121

REC-84 105-93072-175

September 17, 1970
BY COURIER
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

Delivered to CIA by CIA courier 9-17-70 [illegible]

[SUGAR] (S)

Reference is made to your informal memorandum dated September 14, 1970, relating to Sugar's intended visit in the United States during the period September 20 - October 18, 1970. (S)

This Bureau desires to be advised of all pertinent contacts of possible investigative or intelligence interest to this Bureau that are made by Sugar during his travel in the United States. (S)

For ready reference purposes and for possible assistance in the direction of Sugar in this country and abroad, there is enclosed a list of individuals associated with the Weatherman faction of the Students for a Democratic Society who are presently in a fugitive status, and a list of black extremist fugitives. Any information Sugar may develop relating to the whereabouts of any of these individuals would be of value to this Bureau. (S)

Enclosures - 2

105-93072
Original and 1 for CIA
DR:sfw sfw
(4)

NOTE: "Sugar" is the CIA cryptonym for Richard Thomas Gibson, a former U.S. black militant who is currently operated by the Agency from London. Gibson has widespread contacts with leftists and black extremists in both Europe and the U.S. By separate communication we are alerting appropriate field offices to the expected presence of Gibson within their field office territories. Classified "Secret" because it relates to a sensitive CIA source, compromise of whom could cause serious damage to the national defense interest, and also because Agency incoming so classified. (S)

ENCLOSURE 2

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SECRET

GROUP 1
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

5 SEP 25 1970

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~ 3/10/78 DR

INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH WEATHERMAN FACTION OF SDS WANTED AS FUGITIVES BY THE FBI
SEPTEMBER, 1970

1. William Ayers
2 Judith Bissell
3. Silas Bissell
4. Kathie Boudin
5. Judith Clark
6. Bernardine Dohrn
7. Ronald Fliegelman
8. John Fuerst
9. Naomi Jaffe
10. Leonard Handelsman
11. John Jacobs
12. Jeffrey Carl Jones
13. Michael Justesen
14. David Klafter
15. Howard Machtinger
16. Celeste McCullough
17. Wendy Panken
18. Terry Robbins
19. Robert Roth
20. Mark Rudd
21. Michael Spiegel
22. Carolyn (Carlie) Tanner
23. Lawrence Weiss
24. Cathlyn Wilkerson

115-93072-175

ENCLOSURE

INDIVIDUALS ASSOCIATED WITH THE BLACK NATIONALIST OR EXTREMIST MOVEMENT IN THE U.S. WANTED AS FBI FUGITIVES
AUGUST 25, 1970

1. Linda Joyce Austin
   Violation: CAA - Piracy

2. Tyrone Elington Austin
   Violation: CAA - Piracy

3. Byron Vaughn Booth
   Known Affiliation: BPP
   Violation: CAA - Piracy, Kidnapping

4. Nathanial Jerome Burns
   Known Affiliation: BPP
   Violation: UFAP - Attempted Murder

5. Hubert Geroid Brown
   Known Affiliation: SNCC
   Violation: UFAP, Bond default

6. Leroy Eldridge Cleaver
   Known Affiliation: BPP
   Violation: UFAC, Bond default

7. Donald Lee Cox
   Known Affiliation: BPP
   Violation: UFAP - Conspiracy to Murder

8. Angelea Yvonne Davis
   Violation: UFAP - Murder, Kidnapping

9. Earl Andrew Ferrell
   Known Affiliation: BPP
   Violation: UFAC, Robbery

10. Merrill Dennis Harvey
    Known Affiliation: BPP
    Violation: Bond default

105-93072-173

ENCLOSURE

11. Ronald Boyd Hill
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: Escaped Federal prisoner

12. Claude Elvin Hubert
Known Affiliation: US
Violation: UFAP - Murder

13. Edwin Steve Jackson
Known Affiliation: Black Action Council for United Progress, Champaign, Illinois
Violation: UFAP - Murder

14. Raymond Johnson, Jr
Violation: CAA - Piracy

15. Vallejo Ryan Kennedy
Violation: SSA, Bond default

16. Larry Neil Mack
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: UFAP - Conspiracy to Commit Murder and Arson

17. Edward Meredith Martin
Violation: UFAP - Assault with intent to murder

18. Marion Ernest McMillan II
Known Affiliation: SNCC
Violation: SSA, Bond default

19. Henry Mitchel, Jr.
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: UFAP - Assault with intent to murder

20. John England Morris, Jr.
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: UFAP - Assault with intent to commit murder, Assault with deadly weapon

21. Richard Allen Napier
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: UFAP - Murder

22. Gwendolyn Joyce Patterson
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: CAA - Piracy, Kidnapping

23. James Joseph Patterson
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: CAA - Piracy, Kidnapping

24. Grady Love Breazeale
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: ITSMV - Bond default

25. Allan Sidberry
Violation: UFAP - Murder

26. Clinton Robert Smith, Jr
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: CAA - Piracy, Kidnapping

27. Maxwell Curtis Stanford, Jr.
Known Affiliation: RAM
Violation: UFAP - Assault, Bail jumping

28. Gail Melvina Truly, aka
Gail Melvina Robinson
Violation: Bond default, Federal Fugitive Process issued Los Angeles for Bank Robbery

29. Harry Okeon Truly
Known Affiliation: BSU
Violation: Bond default, Federal Fugitive Process issued Los Angeles for Bank Robbery

30. Donald Ray Williams
Known Affiliation: SNCC
Violation: UFAP - Possession of Marijuana

31. Wendell Woods
Known Affiliation: BPP
Violation: UFAP - Assault with intent to commit murder, Kidnapping, Robbery

SECRET
SENSITIVE

REC'D FROM

SEP 14 1970

CIA
VIA COURIER

14 SEP 1970

SUGAR's Visit to the United States

1. This is to advise you that SUGAR will be in the United States from about 20 September to 18 October 1970, for Agency consultation purposes. SUGAR will probably visit the following cities: New York, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, San Francisco and Philadelphia to meet with old friends and become re-acquainted with the scene in the United States.

2. We will provide you with any information that SUGAR receives during his "grass roots" trip that would be of interest to your agency.

3. We will advise you of any projected changes in his itinerary.

ST-121

REC-84 105-93072-175

10 SEP 18 1970

105-93072
file 5-DR

Airtel to SACs AT, CG, DE, LA, NY, PH, SF, WFO
9/11/70 DRK/bfw
LHM for CIA (enc-2)
9/11/70 DRK/bfw

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/12/96 BY SP8 MAC/GAT (JFK)

SENSITIVE
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

9/17/70

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Airtel

1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. Shackelford
1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. Ryan

To:	SACs, Atlanta	New York (105-42387)
	Chicago	Philadelphia
	Detroit	San Francisco (100-47327)
	Los Angeles	WFO (105-42103)

From: Director, FBI (105-93072)

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING
(RESEARCH SECTION)

~~Classified by 1259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
3/10/95

Captioned individual, a Negro male, who was formerly active in the U.S. as a leader of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, currently serves as a CIA informant based in England. He operates under the cover of "overseas representative and correspondent" for "Negro Press International," which is allegedly a Chicago-based firm. From his residence in London, Gibson furnishes coverage of European and Third World New Leftists and black nationalists. (S)

CIA has advised Gibson will be in the U.S. for consultations with the Agency during the period 9/20-10/18/70. During this period it is anticipated Gibson will visit New York City, Chicago, Detroit, Atlanta, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Philadelphia to visit old contacts and to "become reacquainted with the scene in the United States." (S)

EX-110 REC-32 105-93072-174

From past experience, Gibson may be expected to endeavor to contact Negro militant activists in all the above cities, and specifically he will probably be in contact with the pro-Chicom Revolutionary Union in San Francisco and Leibel Bergman and Davida Fineman who are associated with this organization. He very likely will endeavor to contact the Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party, USA, in Chicago and members of the Republic of New Africa in Detroit and Philadelphia. He has been closely associated with Robert Franklin Williams in the past and may be expected to endeavor to contact him in Detroit. (S)

DR:sfw
(21)

Classified by SP8 MAC/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

18 SEP 18 1970

MAILED 8
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Sullivan
Mohr
Bishop
Brennan, C.D.
Callahan
Casper
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Tavel
Walters
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

Airtel to SAC, Atlanta
RE: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON SECRET
105-93072

In the event the presence of Gibson comes to the attention of recipient offices, the Bureau should be promptly furnished all details, [but no specific inquiries or investigation should be conducted. The identity of Gibson is afforded highly compartmentalized security within CIA and under no circumstances should any local CIA representatives be furnished any information regarding Gibson or his activities.] (S)

NOTE: Gibson operates for CIA under the cryptonym "Sugar." He has traveled to the U.S. on similar missions in the past and, as in the past, we are instructing the Agency by separate communication we desire to be advised the results of any contacts he makes in the U.S (S) (X)

SECRET

1 - Mr. Cassidy
1 - Mr. Ryan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

May 5, 1970

Sent via 5-5-70 FB

RICHARD GIBSON

Reference is made to your memorandum dated April 20, 1970, your reference I-216, requesting the source of an article from the February, 1970, edition of the London publication, "Synic," relating to subject, which was forwarded to you by routing slip dated April 4, 1970.(S)

This article was obtained by our Legal Attache, London, presumably from a review of the public press.

It is noted in December, 1969, Leibel Bergman, the theoretical leader of the militant Maoist San Francisco-based Revolutionary Union, according to a source who has furnished reliable information in the past, indicated shortly after meeting Gibson he distrusted him because of Gibson's reputed affiliation with the Central Intelligence Agency. At this time, Davida Fineman, also a member of the Revolutionary Union (and the former paramour of Gibson), defended Gibson, repeatedly stating the charges against him were unfounded and the "same old stuff." Nevertheless, Bergman at the time persisted in his suspicion of Gibson.(S)

As a matter of additional interest, in February, 1970, Bergman commented that during his travel the previous month abroad, he had met with Gibson in London and stayed overnight at the Gibson residence. At this time, Bergman stated he found Gibson to be charming, likable, sophisticated, intelligent, but hung-up on a feeling of self-importance. Bergman described Gibson as doing "good work," but stated Gibson is not as important as he believes.(S)

(S)[Elaine Katz] contacted on 3/20/78 concerning the releasability of this document. WSB

MEA

From the above it would appear Bergman, who may be described as an astute tactical Marxist-Leninist, now accepts Richard Gibson. Any additional pertinent information believed to be of interest to you regarding the activities of Richard Gibson will be promptly made available(S)

REC-19

105-93072 -173

1 - 100-442715 (AHC)(S)

SECRET

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Original & 1 to CIA
DR:sfw
(6)

2/17/95 SP8MAC/GAT

Classified by [illegible]
Declassify on: OADR
F372

(JFK)

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF [illegible] DATE [illegible]

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2, 3
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/10/78 FBM

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Soyars
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

60 MAY 20 1970

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-442715 -(S)

RICHARD GIBSON

NOTE:

The above information was furnished by six Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) informants who have been in close contact with Leibel Bergman during the past several months. The AHC is an intelligence cover operated by this Bureau. Richard Gibson is a source of CIA operated under the Cryptonym "Sugar" who furnishes coverage of left-wing and black nationalist activities in Europe and Africa.(S)

Classified "Secret" because it relates to current active security informants, a cover intelligence operation, and a covert source of CIA, exposure of whom could cause serious damage to national defense interests. Incoming also classified "Secret/No Foreign Dissemination/ No Dissemination Abroad/ Controlled Dissemination/For Background Use Only."(S)

SECRET

SECRET

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only

2 0 APR 1970
I-216

C. D. Brennan
(re Gibson)
W. A. Sullivan

SUBJECT: Richard GIBSON NOT

Please advise if the attached clipping from SYNIC, dated late February 1970, a copy of which your Headquarters office sent this office on 10 April 1970, was obtained in this country or abroad, and if abroad, where.

R. D. Rother

Attachment: a/s

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON,

file 105-93072

D. R.

LHM for CIA
5/5/70
DR/sfw

B

1 ENCLOSURE

REC-64 5 105-93072 / 73

14 MAY 7 1970

No Foreign Dissem/No Dissem Abroad
Controlled Dissem/For Background Use Only
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification



DANGER - AMERICAN AGENT AT WORK......

Many people on the left tend to get a little paranoiac about the C.I.A., and to suspect absolutely everyone. There is, however, one person who moves around in the British left who should be avoided - it is just a little more than coincidental that so many people and organisations abroad seem to think that he is working for the Americans.

His name: RICHARD GIBSON. He is a Black American, and he works for NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL, itself not totally above suspicion. Gibson speaks in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology, and pretends to be no more than this. He produces a monthly bulletin, called 'RICHARD GIBSON reports', which carries a lot of information about those Southern African movements which are not fighting, like the PAC of South Africa, and ZANU of Rhodesia. He also carries, in this bulletin, smears about other movements, suggesting that they are lackeys of Israel, or terrorists or not revolutionary.

. Gibson is believed to be a CIA agent by most of the Southern African groups, by the Black Panthers, by the Palestinians, et. al. He used to work with a magazine in Algiers, but he was sacked, and the ,magazine printed an explanation saying he was CIA. Similarly, he lost his tie with 'Jeune Afrique' after they found him having contacts with US Embassy officials. Even Jordanian diplomats, who are not unknown for their US links, have been known to volunteer the information that Gibson is CIA.

He works from Britain : SYNIC suggests that he should be watched with care. And his associates here should not be forgotten either. SYNIC will be covering a couple of them in future issues.

……

DANGER - AMERICAN AGENT AT WORK is the first in a series of SYNIC PUBLIC SERVICE SECTIONs.



105-93072-173

ENCLOSURE

SYNIC No. 14. late Febuary 1970
Contributors: Phil Kelly, Peter Hellyer
Chris Bunyan, Guy Thornton,
Edited and Published by Dave Page and
Tony Carey.
Graphics: David Austin, Nicos
Papazaneteas.
Subscriptions (£1 per year), diary dates,
etc to : SYNIC, c/o Dave Page, 14, Hanley Rd
London, N.4
[illegible]

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-165706)

DATE: 3-9-70

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

FROM : LEGAT, PARIS (157-26)

SUBJECT: BLACK PANTHER PARTY
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
RM - BPP

The Service de Documentation Exterieure et de Contre-Espionnage (SDECE), French foreign intelligence and counterespionage service, advised on March 6, 1970, that DAVIDA FINEMAN, DONALD WRIGHT and RICHARD GIBSON, who attended the First International Congress of the Palestine Committees in Algiers December 26-28, 1969, were met on their arrival in Paris on January 6, 1970, by JULIA HERVE, nee WRIGHT, and her husband HENRI HERVE, Black Panther leaders. (S)

This information was previously reported to the Bureau from another French source in PARlet January 19, 1970, captioned "International Conference to Support Palestinian Peoples Armed Struggle, IS - Middle East; DAVIDA FINEMAN, SM - RU (Bufile 100-446389), RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON, IS - CU (Bufile 105-93072)." (S)

They requested information available to us regarding these individuals.

Background information from Paris Office files has been furnished regarding FINEMAN and GIBSON.

No information is available to Paris regarding DONALD WRIGHT except that which was furnished to the Bureau [in connection with his recent visit to Paris when he met LEIBEL BERGMAN and FINEMAN and proceeded to Algiers.] (S)

Request information available to Bureau regarding DONALD WRIGHT which can be disseminated to the SDECE. (S)

4 - Bureau
  (1 - Liaison Section)
  (1 - San Francisco)
5 - Paris (105-1270; 105-5778;
  100-2479; 105-4464)

NWP:jmw
(9)

105-93072

( ) Check of Bureau indices
( ) No pertinent data re
( ) No identifiable data re
(X) No additional data re Donald Wright based on available information.

105-165706-84-379

ORIGINAL FILED IN

RECORDED

50 APR 16 1970

9 ~~MAR 16~~ 1970

4x15

SECRET

2/17/96 Classified by SP8MAC GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

~~Classified by 259~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 1~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~
3/16/78

RACIAL INT. SECT.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

30 APR 29 1970

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

Routing Slip
FD-4 (Rev. 4-28-67)

To:
XX Director
Att.: IS-CU Desk

Date 3/20/70

FILE 105-93072

Title RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CU

☐ SAC
☐ ASAC
☐ Supv.
☐ Agent
☐ SE
☐ IC
☐ CC
☐ Steno
☐ Clerk

RE:

☐ Rotor #:

ACTION DESIRED

☐ Acknowledge
☐ Assign ____ Reassign ____
☐ Bring file
☐ Call me
☐ Correct
☐ Deadline
☐ Deadline passed
☐ Delinquent
☐ Discontinue
☐ Expedite
☐ File
☐ For information
☐ Handle
☐ Initial & return
☐ Leads need attention
☐ Return with explanation or notation as to action taken.

☐ Open Case
☐ Prepare lead cards
☐ Prepare tickler
☐ Return assignment card
☐ Return file
☐ Search and return
☐ See me
☐ Serial #
  ☐ Post ☐ Recharge ☐ Return
  ☐ Send to
☐ Submit new charge out
☐ Submit report by
☐ Type

Natl. Int. Sec.
File

D. Research Sec

Enclosed is copy of an article re subject furnished for information.

ENCLOSURE

Enc. 1

SAC J. T. Minnich
Office Legat, London

See reverse side

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/17/95 BY Sp8MAC/GAT (JFK)

REC-90

105-93072-173

NOT RECORDED
5 APR 8 1970

55 APR 24 1970



DANGER - AMERICAN AGENT AT WORK.......

Many people on the left tend to get a little paranoiac about the C.I.A., and to suspect absolutely everyone. There is, however, one person who moves around in the British left who should be avoided - it is just a little more than coincidental that so many people and organisations abroad seem to think that he is working for the Americans.

His name: RICHARD GIBSON. He is a black American, and he works for NEGRO PRESS INTERNATIONAL, itself not totally above suspicion. Gibson speaks in Marxist-Leninist-Maoist terminology, and pretends to be no more than this. He produces a monthly bulletin, called 'RICHARD GIBSON reports', which carries a lot of information about those Southern African movements which are not fighting, like the PAC of South Africa, and ZANU of Rhodesia. He also carries, in this bulletin, smears about other movements, suggesting that they are lackeys of Israel, or terrorists or not revolutionary.

Gibson is believed to be a CIA agent by most of the Southern African groups, by the Black Panthers, by the Palestinians, et. al. He used to work with a magazine in Algiers, but he was sacked, and the ,magazine printed an explanation saying he was CIA. Similarly, he lost his tie with 'Jeune Afrique' after they found him having contacts with US Embassy officials. Even Jordanian diplomats, who are not unknown for their US links, have been known to volunteer the information that Gibson is CIA.

He works from Britain : SYNIC suggests that he should be watched with care. And his associates here should not be forgotten either. SYNIC will be covering a couple of them in future issues.

....

DANGER - AMERICAN AGENT AT WORK is the first in a series of SYNIC PUBLIC SERVICE SECTIONs.

REC-90

file 5 - DR
105-93072

Xerox copy sent CIA by
0-14f, 4-7-70, DR


TRUST NO-ONE
EVEN HIM?
HE OVERPLAYED HIS HAND..
CIA
HES WHITE..

SYNIC
SYNIC No. 14. late Febuary 1970
Contributors: Phil Kelly, Peter Hellyer
Chris Bunyan, Guy Thornton,
Edited and Published by Dave Page and
Tony Carcy.
Graphics: David Austin, Nicos
Papazaneteas.
Subscriptions (£1 per year), diary dates,
etc to : SYNIC, c/o Dave Page, 14, Hanley Rd
London, N.4
Printed [illegible] Notting Hill P

Enq.
Enq.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2/17/95 BY Sp8MAC/GAT (JFK)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

BACKGROUND USE ONLY CONTROLLED DISSEM

B

SUBJECT : Leibel BERGMAN
Herb BLOCK

REFERENCE: Our memorandum of 6 February 1970, Subject: Davida FINEMAN and Leibel BERGMAN

1. A sensitive source has reported that Leibel BERGMAN and Herb BLOCK share a deep detestation of the Progressive Labor Party (PLP). BLOCK stated that he was convinced that the PLP was directly run by the CPUSA and that he (BLOCK) had learned that Fred JEROME's mother, Alice JEROME (a prominent member of the PLP) had secretly attended a Party school in the Soviet Union after being publicly associated with the PLP.

2. The main reason that BLOCK and his wife wanted to visit China was to continue denunciations of the PLP. BLOCK was convinced that his previous communications with the Chinese about PLP had had some effect and that the PLP would shortly be "derecognized" by the Chinese.

PLEASE TRANSMIT [illegible] MR. S. J. PAPICH

105-93072 (Gibson)
100-29233 (Block)
[ ](e)

MAR

100-147952-493

ORIGINAL FILED IN

file cc 100-
file cc 100-437041
100-147952
file 5

105-93072-
NOT RECORDED
47 MAR 6 1970

Copy to C G & S
by routing slip for
☑ info
date
by

[ ](S)

8/14/95
FBI INFO
Classified by 5668 SLD/SAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

BACKGROUND USE ONLY CONTROLLED DISSEM

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

SECRET

55 MAR 13 1970
F228

SECRET

SAC, Chicago (134-2818) 2/20/70

Director, FBI (134-17534) 1 - Mr. D. Ryan

DN 447-S
(RESEARCH SECTION)

Enclosed for information of Chicago and Denver is an informal CIA report dated 2/6/70, captioned "Donald Wright, Black Panther Party Member , Travel to Algiers." It is noted the subject of this report is known to both the Chicago and Denver offices. S

It is believed the CIA source mentioned in the enclosed report is identical to "Sugar," the identity of whom is known to the Chicago Office. It would appear the information in the enclosure is sparse and erroneous when compared to information furnished by DN 447-S and other sources. S

Enclosure

1 - Denver (170-169) (Enclosure)

1 - 100-442715 (AHC)
1 - 105-93072 (Gibson)

DR:sfw
(7)

NOTE:

DN 447-S is identical to the subject of Agency report dated 2/6/70, and "Sugar" is an Agency source known to the Bureau. We are carefully following information furnished by "Sugar" to determine its accuracy and also as a means to measure the accuracy and coverage of Bureau sources reporting in the same area. S

134-17534-23

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/10/78

DUPLICATE YELLOW

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classific
DATE 3/17/78

50 MAR 9 1970

SECRET

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD

[illegible]

06 FEB 1970

RL-344

SUBJECT: Donald WRIGHT, Black Panther Party Member
Travel to Algiers

og.

A confidential source has reported that Donald WRIGHT of Chicago, born on 9 March 1936, traveled to Algiers to attend the First International Congress of Support for the Palestinian People held on 27-29 December 1969. WRIGHT is a member of the Black Panther Party and the Chicago Ad Hoc Committee for a Marxist-Leninist Party. WRIGHT met with Eldridge CLEAVER in Algiers. WRIGHT remarked that CLEAVER had talked about visiting North Korea and did not appear eager to return to the U.S.

PLEASE TRANSMIT REPLY VIA LIAISON, MR. S. J. PAPICH

ORIGINAL FILED IN 134-17534-337(S)

8/7/95
FBI INFO
Classified by 5668 dld/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

105-93072
NOT RECORDED
46 MAR 2 1970

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECRET

DIRECTOR, FBI 1-19-70

LEGAT, PARIS

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO
SUPPORT PALESTINIAN PEOPLES
ARMED STRUGGLE (ICSP), ALGIERS 12/26-28/69 (S)
IS - MIDDLE EAST
PARfile 105-5778 (P)

DAVIDA FINEMAN
SM - RU
Bufile 100-~~446389~~
PARfile 100-2479 (RUC)

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CU
Bufile 105 93072
PARfile 105-1270 (RUC)

2/17/95
Classified by SP8MAC/BAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

200 714 - 14 (S)

RePARlet 1-19 70 captioned "International Conference to Support Palestinian Peoples Armed Struggle (ICSP), Algiers 12/26-28/69, IS - Middle East; LEISEL BERGMAN, IS - CH." (S)

On 1-15 70 the Renseignements Generaux (General Investigative Section), Police Nationale (RGPN), France advised that captioned individuals together with one DONALD WRIGHT, a Negro born 3-9 36 at Chicago, are presently in Paris. They reportedly arrived on 1-6-70 from Algiers where they participated on 12-26-69 in the International Conference to Support the Palestinian Peoples Armed Struggle. (S)

The RGPN stated that upon their arrival in Paris these three individuals were met by JULIA WRIGHT HERVE, who is known to the Bureau. They were lodged at the Centre International Protestant du Parc Montsouris (International Protestant Center of Parc Montsouris), 8 villa du Parc Montsouris, Paris 14. Paris files show that the office of "Afrique-Continent," which is headed by HENRY HERVE, the husband of JULIA WRIGHT HERVE, is located on the fourth floor of the Centre International Protestant du Parc Montsouris. (S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES AND FIELD OFFICES ADVISED BY ROUTING SLIP(S) OF DATE~~

- Bureau
(1 - Liaison Section)
4 - Paris
(1 - 105-4464, JULIA WRIGHT HERVE)
REP:jmw
(9)

SECRET

105-93072-
NOT RECORDED
191 JAN 23 1970

Classified by ~~1251~~
Exempt from GDS Category ~~1~~
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/19/78

59 FEB 9 1970

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Letter to Director, FBI
RE: INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO
SUPPORT PALESTINIAN PEOPLES
ARMED STRUGGLE (ICSP), ALGIERS 12/26-28/69 (S)

Our French source stated further that these individuals reportedly were about to depart for Communist China. We have alerted the RGPN to our interest in any additional information concerning such travel and they have agreed to advise us expeditiously. In this connection it should be noted that we have received similar comments from the Direction de la Surveillance du Territoire (DST), French domestic counterespionage service, but during a recent discussion with a representative of the DST, he advised that the statements relative to possible travel to Communist China were nothing more than speculation on the part of a DST employee. We will continue to keep the Bureau promptly advised of further developments. (S)

X

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

SECRET

SAC, Chicago (100-41353) (S)   1/26/70

Director, FBI (100-442715)

1 - Mr. G.C. Moore
1 - Mr. S.J. Papich
1 - Mr. D. Ryan

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR A
MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, USA (AHC) (S)
IS - CH
(RESEARCH SECTION)

ReCGairtel 1/14/70 enclosing the business card of Richard Gibson which was received from Gibson in Algiers by an AHC informant. This card indicates Gibson is an "Overseas Representative and Correspondent" for "Negro Press International" with head office in Chicago and home address of 35, Long Acre, London, W.C. 2, telephone 240-0480. His cable address is listed on the card as "NEPRIN," London, W.C. 2. (S)

Reference is also made to CGlet 1/14/70, AHC caption, enclosing an LHM of the same date captioned "Black Panther Party - Algerian Colony." Page 6 of this LHM sets forth that on 1/3/70 Black Panther Party leader "in exile," Eldridge Cleaver, in Algeria characterized Gibson as a well-known CIA agent. (S)

Chicago is requested to make inquiries to determine if Gibson, the Negro Press International, or "NEPRIN" are listed in local telephone directories or otherwise registered in the Chicago area. Advise the Bureau results of your inquiry. (S)

1 - 105-93072 (Gibson)

DR:sfw
(7)

NOTE: Gibson, a former leader of the Fair Play For Cuba Committee in the United States, has been operated for a number of years in Europe by CIA under the cryptonym "Sugar." The Agency has targeted him against Negro nationalist and pro-Chicom elements and, as a result, his path has frequently crossed the paths of our informants operating under the AHC cover. Chicago is aware of Gibson's CIA involvement. Purpose of this inquiry is to determine if Gibson has any actual ties in Chicago area which could conflict with AHC (S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF
DATE 3-17-

FEB 3 1970

2/17/95 SP8MAC/GAT

Classified by SP8
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

Classified by 12
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/10/78

DUPLICATE YELLOW
NOT RECORDED
185 JAN 27 1970

SECRET

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93072)

DATE: 1/3/70

FROM : SAC, WFO (105-42103) (RUC)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CU
(OO:Bureau)

For the current information of the Bureau and recipient office, the following, derived from review of subject's passport file by SA GERARD C. CARROLL at the Passport Office, U. S. Department of State on 1/2/70, is being set forth. Mrs. SHIRLEY ABBOUD, Foreign Operations Division of the Passport office, had notified SA KENNETH J. HASER that subject had recently obtained a new passport in London, England. (C)

Passport Z-1057628 (valid until 11/9/74) was issued to the subject at London, England, on 11/10/69. In an affidavit, also dated 11/10/69, to E. T. VANGAS, U. S. Consul in London, subject claimed that on 11/8/69, after passing the French exit immigration control at Orly Airport, he apparently dropped his passport Z-414374. British immigration authorities permitted him to land, upon production of his "home office certificate of registration G 662567". Subject added that Air France later reported that his passport was not found at Orly. In requesting a new passport, subject explained that he was scheduled to fly to Brussels on the morning of 11/12/69. (C)

MRS RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON

In his application for the above passport, subject listed his address as 32 Hartswood Road, London, ENGLAND indicating that his wife, JOY ~~M.~~ GIBSON, resided with him at this address. He advised that his travel plans were indefinite and that he intended to reside abroad for business reasons. (C)

EX-111 REC-95 105-93072-171

JAN 15

(2) - Bureau
1 - New York (105-42387) (Info) (RM)
1 - WFO

17 JAN 7 1970

GCC:pjg
(4)

cc to legat 1/19/70

Classified by SP8MAC/BAT 2/7/95
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

LATIN AMERICAN

SECRET

5 JAN 21 1970

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

Subject's passport file contained a communication from the American Embassy in Bern, Switzerland to the State Department, dated 1/23/68. It reported that subject, who was traveling by train from Milan to Geneva with his wife, was removed from the train by Swiss immigration authorities on 1/20/68 at Brig. Subject's wife contacted the American Embassy by phone from Brig requesting direct intervention with the Swiss. It was subsequently ascertained from a responsible Federal Foreigners Police (FFP) officer that the subject had been expelled from Switzerland on 9/12/63 for his political activity and association with the magazine, "La Revolution Africaine". On 12/16/63, the Bundesanwaltschaft (Federal Police and Justice Department) issued an order prohibiting subject's re-entry into Switzerland. However, since his whereabouts were unknown, notification of same could not be sent to the subject. The FFP officer stated that if the subject had applied for entry into Switzerland during the week instead of the weekend, he might have been authorized limited entry. According to this officer, the subject should write to the Bundesanwaltschaft in Bern concerning the incident at Brig and request that he be furnished a reason for it. He would then receive a copy of their order and would have opportunity to appeal the decision within 30 days. (S)

As stated in the above communication, subject's wife affirmed that the subject had made several trips to Switzerland subsequent to 1963 without any difficulties. She claimed she intended to protest to the International Press Institute concerning the Swiss authorities. (S)

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SECRET

Tolson
DeLoach
Walters
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: October 28, 1969

FROM : S. J. Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SUBJECT: STOKELY CARMICHAEL
ELDRIDGE CLEAVER
RACIAL MATTER

5 - No

Reference is made to memorandum dated 10/20/69, received from CIA setting forth information from a sensitive source to the effect that "Carmichael remained in Africa because he feared that President Nixon would try to arrest him for the assistance he had given Eldridge Cleaver in fleeing to Cuba." The Liaison Agent has been endeavoring to obtain an evaluation of this information. (S)

On 10/27/69, Richard Ober, CIA, advised that the source of the information was "SUGAR" (Richard Gibson). He stated "SUGAR" did not furnish any additional details. He further confided that because of past experiences, the reliability of the information could definitely be questioned. In the past, "SUGAR" has furnished information of a general or nonspecific nature. (S)

ACTION:

The above information is being directed to the attention of the Racial Intelligence Section.

1 - Mr. Moore (Nugent)
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

SJP:crk
(4)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 100-446080
unable to locate at time of Bureau 5.1.?

105-93072-
NOT RECORDED
NOV 5 1969

NOV 4 1969

8/7/95
Classified by 5668 Old/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

342

53 NOV

SECRET

TOP SECRET

16 0750Z Sep 69

Rcd [illegible] 9-17-69 wm

100-387728-295

ORIGINAL FILED IN *

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

RICHARD GIBSON IN LONDON CONTACTS DETROIT CONCERNING DEPARTURE OR ROBERT WILLIAMS FROM LONDON

FR: London: Richard GIBSON[a] 12 Sep 69

TO: Detroit: 1685 Murland, Brother IMARI[b]

Rob[c] and Milton[d] took off without incident at 0945 London time and should be arriving Detroit around noon your time. Yours in the struggle.

a. U.S. citizen who was an organizer for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and an editor for the English language section of Revolutionary Africa, Algiers, in 1963. He is a frequent contact of Robert WILLIAMS.

b. Richard HENRY, brother of Milton HENRY. Both HENRYs and WILLIAMS gave a press conference in Dar-es-Salaam, on 19 May 68, announcing the separatist Negro nation the "Republic of New Africa" of which WILLIAMS is the President.

105-93072-

NOT RECORDED

183 SEP 25 1969

c. Robert WILLIAMS, Negro militant who fled the U.S. to reside in Cuba. WILLIAMS and his lawyer, Milton HENRY, ~~arrived in Detroit~~ on 12 Sep 69 on a special flight from London.

d. Milton HENRY, a Pontiac, Michigan, lawyer. On 11 Sep 69, Tony SMYTHE (N/I) in London, informed Conrad LYNN (long-time associate of WILLIAMS and a militant civil rights lawyer) in New York that he (SMYTHE) wanted to know what was wrong with Milton HENRY's non-cooperation.

File-5

100-387728

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 8/1/95 BY 5668 SLD/JBAT (JFK)

F13

58 SEP 29 1969

TOP SECRET

FOR BACKGROUND USE ONLY

* unable to locate at time of review

FBI

Date: 6/13/69

SECRET

Transmit the following in ______________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL AIR MAIL
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-184369)

FROM : SAC, SAN FRANCISCO (100-61281) (P)

SUBJECT: REVOLUTIONARY UNION (RU)
IS - RU
(NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)

OO:SF

Re Bureau letter dated 12/11/68, "DAVIDA FINEMAN; SM-RU; (NATIONALITIES INTELLIGENCE)" and San Francisco letter dated 1/13/69 in the FINEMAN matter, requesting that Bureau have CIA interview "SUGAR" regarding DAVIDA FINEMAN.

Enclosed herewith are ten copies of an LHM captioned "RICHARD GIBSON; INFORMATION CONCERNING." Single copies of instant LHM furnished for the information of Chicago, Los Angeles and New York.

The source in the LHM is SF 3169-S, and the LHM has been classified "SECRET" in order to protect SF 3169-S, the CIA "SUGAR" operation, and the sensitive LEIBEL BERGMAN intelligence investigation.

(S)

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/10/78

5 - Bureau (Encls. 10) (RM)
  (1 - 100-446389; DAVIDA FINEMAN)
  (1 - 100-446765; HOWARD BRUCE FRANKLIN)
  (1 - 100- ; RICHARD GIBSON)
1 - Chicago (105-27305) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - Los Angeles (100-72077) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
1 - New York (105-100707) (Section 311) (Encl. 1) (Info) (RM)
5 - San Francisco
  (1 - 100-61722; DAVIDA FINEMAN)
  (1 - 100-56804; HOWARD BRUCE FRANKLIN)
  (1 - 100-47327; RICHARD GIBSON)
BW/cmp
(13)

105-93072-
NOT RECORDED
78 JUN 21 1969

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-184369-145

51 JUL 7 1969

CARBON COPY

Approved: ______________________ Sent ______ M Per ______
Special Agent in Charge

3/10/78

SECRET

In view of this latest development, it is most strongly urged that the Bureau, through liaison, have CIA interview "SUGAR" specifically concerning the following points:

(1) Any and all knowledge "SUGAR" has concerning activities and contacts of HOWARD BRUCE FRANKLIN while the latter was in France.

(2) Any and all knowledge of DAVIDA FINEMAN. In this connection, it is suggested that CIA be requested to encourage correspondence between "SUGAR" and FINEMAN. S

(3) "SUGAR" furnish CIA with all correspondence to and from the RU and that "SUGAR" be directed in a logical way to encourage such correspondence with the RU.

In view of LEIBEL BERGMAN's admitted difficulties over communications with Red China and lack of knowledge of current events in that country, it is believed that if "SUGAR" can favorably establish himself with the RU as a contact in Europe he will be able to furnish valuable information on any other contacts the RU may attempt to establish on the Continent and might even be utilized as a cutout by BERGMAN for the RU. S

In view of the delicate nature of the information contained in the LHM, the Bureau may wish to restrict dissemination to CIA only.

In referring the above requests to CIA, the Bureau should insure the bona fides of "SUGAR" as a CIA operative and his reliability lest SF 3169-S be compromised. S

San Francisco will continue to follow this matter with SF 3169-S.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California
June 13, 1969

SECRET

RICHARD GIBSON
INFORMATION CONCERNING

In June, 1969, a confidential source, who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that at an Executive Committee meeting of the Revolutionary Union (RU) held on June 8, 1969, DAVIDA FINEMAN read a letter which she had received from RICHARD GIBSON, whom she described as a Negro who resides in Europe and whom she knew while she was in France. This letter was a run-down on the Marxist-Leninist-Mao groups in various countries in Europe and described some of these groups as revisionists who support the new working class, e.g. technicians and other highly skilled labor, and support a broad united front which would include various members of the bourgeoise. C

According to this source, BRUCE FRANKLIN in no uncertain terms described GIBSON as a CIA agent who was exposed as such and had to flee France lest he be killed. FRANKLIN stated that he had proof of GIBSON's affiliation with CIA. LEIBEL BERGMAN, on the other hand, stated in no uncertain terms that BRUCE FRANKLIN's allegation was completely untrue and that GIBSON had been thoroughly checked out when BERGMAN, himself, was in Red China and had been found to be all right. BRUCE FRANKLIN continued the argument by stating that he could prove that GIBSON was a CIA agent because some friends of his in France had been exposed and arrested shortly after their introduction to GIBSON. S

At the Executive Committee meeting, it was decided that LEIBEL BERGMAN and the FRANKLINs were to iron out their differences about GIBSON amongst themselves and it was further decided that the RU may be in contact with GIBSON. S

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 3/17/78 gr/5.50

SECRET
~~Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification~~

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2 3
Date of Declassification ~~Indefinite~~
3/10/78

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

105-93072-
ENCLOSURE

RICHARD GIBSON

A characterization of the RU is contained in the appendix.

u

1

SECRET

REVOLUTIONARY UNION,
ALSO KNOWN AS
RED UNION, BAY AREA
REVOLUTIONARY UNION

In September, 1968, a source advised that the Revolutionary Union, commonly known to its membership as the Red Union (RU), was formed in early 1968 as a covert, revolutionary, Marxist-Leninist organization ideologically oriented toward Communist China, which it views as the model of the correct revolutionary Marxist-Leninist line as developed through MAO Tse-tung. The RU advocates the necessity of violent revolution and open guerrilla warfare to overthrow the existing political system in the United States and effect radical changes in this nation, and some members are collecting firearms, explosives, and other weapons and have engaged in guerrilla warfare and firearms training. In the San Francisco Bay Area, the RU consists of three locals, one each in San Francisco, the East Bay, and the Peninsula.

In April, 1969, a second source advised that the RU partially surfaced during that month through advertisements in select "New Left" periodicals, identifying three members of the Executive Committee as public spokesmen and offering for sale select writings of the RU, including a "Statement of Principles," in the form of "The Red Papers." With the exception of the three publicly identified spokesmen, the general membership of the RU will remain covert; however, individual members are free to reveal their RU membership to close political associates as the necessities of political effectiveness dictate.

The RU's published "Statement of Principles" calls for the smashing of the existing state apparatus by the United States working class and the establishment of communism and the dictatorship of the proletariat; recognizes the necessity of violent revolution and organized armed struggle to achieve those ends and calls for the creation of a revolutionary party based upon Marxism-Leninism as developed through MAO Tse-tung.

SECRET

SAC, Chicago (100-41353)   SECRET   11/22/66

Director, FBI (100-442715)

AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR A
MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, USA (S)
INTERNAL SECURITY - C

1 - Mr. Ryan

ReCGlet 11/7/66 relating to correspondence dated 10/25/66 received at the Ad Hoc Committee (AHC) post office box from Richard Gibson. (S)

For your confidential information, in the past the Central Intelligence Agency has prepared and widely disseminated bogus copies of "The Crusader," the publication of Robert F. Williams. For this reason, you should be most circumspect in citing Williams or his writings in connection with this intelligence operation. As previously authorized, Williams should be maintained on the AHC mailing list. (S)

The material relating to Williams, forwarded to the AHC by Gibson, is interesting from an intelligence viewpoint and your prompt attention in forwarding it to the Bureau is appreciated. (S)

Classified by 1259 ow 3-14-78
Exempt from GDS, Category 2,3
Date of Declassification Indefinite

ggP/vew

NOTE:

AHC is intelligence operation of this Bureau projected as a legitimate domestic pro-Chicom organization. Gibson, who resides in England, is an operational source of the Central Intelligence Agency active in the black nationalist and pro-Chicom field in Europe. Chicago is aware of Gibson's Central Intelligence Agency status. Gibson has corresponded with the AHC and is forwarding pro-Chicom material as well as the current letter authored by Williams critical of the Cubans. Williams is an American Negro black nationalist who fled the United States after indictment on a kidnapping charge. He currently resides in Peking where he is militantly pro-Chicom and anti-United States. (S)

A[illegible] OFFI[illegible] AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 3/16/78 JSD/mg

① - 105-93072 (Gibson)
1 - 100-387728 (Williams)

DR:lmm
(6)

105-93072-
NOT RECORDED
167 NOV 22 1966

DUPLICATE YELLOW

77 NOV 25 1966

F-497

SECRET

SECRET

11-15-68

1 - Mr. S. Papich
2 - Mr. D. Ryan

Airtel

Records, Place copies of attached and incoming in 105-93674 (Cohen) 100-442308 (Richards) 100-443869 (Fineman) 100-397465 (Edwards)

To: SACs, Chicago (100-41353)
San Francisco (100-54721)

From: Director, FBI (~~100-442715~~)

AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, USA
IS - C

105-93072 -

100-442715-1823

ReCGairtel 11-12-68 speculating that Davida Fineman, Hodee Edwards, and Paul Richards, all of whom have been associated with the CIA source known as "Sugar," are affiliated with the CIA in an operation in this country.

Through Bureau liaison on 11-15-68, it was determined from CIA that the Agency has had no contact or connection, either direct or indirect, with Fineman, Edwards, and Richards and that these individuals are not under the direction of the Agency.

In connection with this operation and the investigation of the Revolutionary Union, Chicago and San Francisco should bear in mind the likelihood that Fineman and Richards may very likely be in current contact with the CIA source known as "Sugar" although there is no indication they have knowledge of the Agency's relationship with "Sugar."

S

S

ORIGINAL FILED IN

DR:jth
(8)

MAILED 24
NOV 15 1968
COMM-FBI

NOTE:

Above information received by Bureau Liaison Representative Papich from CIA Liaison Officer Jane Roman.

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
8/9/78

59 DEC 4 - 1968

MAIL ROOM ☐ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

SECRET

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

F B I

Date: 11/12/68

CONFIDENTIAL

Transmit the following in ______________________________
(Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL ______________________________
(Priority)

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-442715)

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-41353)

Richard Gibson

SUBJECT: AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR A MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, USA IS-C

Re Chicago airtel to the Bureau dated 10/20/66 and Bureau airtel to Chicago dated 10/26/66, which contained allegations regarding RICHARD GIBSON.

Re New York letter to the Bureau dated 11/9/66 and Los Angeles letter to the Bureau dated 11/28/66, both which contain information concerning DAVIDA FINEMAN.

Re Bureau letter to Chicago dated 10/20/67, cc San Francisco, and San Francisco letter to Chicago dated 10/30/68, both which contain information concerning HODEE EDWARDS and PAUL RICHARDS.

Enclosed herewith for San Francisco are Xerox copies of the referenced communications concerning RICHARD GIBSON and DAVIDA FINEMAN.

According to SF 3169-S, one DAVIDA FINEMAN is currently active in the Revolutionary Union in San Francisco and source described her as a person who obviously has money inasmuch as her apartment is expensively furnished and she has some good quality paintings.

3 - Bureau (RM)
3 - San Francisco (Enc. 8) (RM)
(1 - 100-61281) (RED UNION)
(1 - 100-61508) (DAVIDA FINEMAN)
2 - Los Angeles (Info) (RM)
(1 - 100-68827) (DAVIDA FINEMAN)
1 - Chicago
RRG:gas
(9)

100-442715-1823

105-93072

NOT RECORDED
152 NOV 25 1968

NOV 15 1968

ORIGINAL FILED IN

Airtel to SACs CG, SF
11-15-68

Approved: ______________ Sent ______ M Per ______________
Special Agent in Charge

~~Classified by~~ 1259

CONFIDENTIAL

Exempt from GDS, Category 2

Date of Declassification Indefinite 3/9/78

Referenced communications concerning RICHARD GIBSON reflect that in 1966 former CG 5908-S, when in contact with pro-Chinese communists in Italy, was apprised of the suspicion of the Italians concerning RICHARD GIBSON, specifically that he was a CIA agent. In connection with their suspicions, the Italians requested the informant to check on one DAVIDA FINEMAN, who was ostensibly traveling with GIBSON as a translator. It was subsequently learned that FINEMAN was residing in Paris at that time but had been a resident of New York City. Referenced communications from New York and Los Angeles concerning FINEMAN identify her background. Chicago has no additional information concerning this person and does not, in fact; have sufficient knowledge to determine whether the person traveling with GIBSON in Europe in 1966 is identical with the DAVIDA FINEMAN who has emerged as part of the Revolutionary Union.

C

The Bureau and Los Angeles are requested to furnish to San Francisco any information which would assist in effecting an identification of this person, it being believed by Chicago that the definite possibility exists that the person traveling with GIBSON is in fact identical with the current member of the Revolutionary Union.

Chicago would desire to know when FINEMAN returned to the United States and if she has any recorded activities within left wing movements since returning. It would seem that her emergence in the Revolutionary Union is highly suspect in view of the probability of her former association with GIBSON. As GIBSON's identity is known to the Bureau and the interested office, it would seem that the implications of a CIA operation are clearly apparent.

C

In this connection, San Francisco letter of 10/30/68 reflects that HODEE EDWARDS has apparently returned to the United States from England and San Francisco is presently attempting to verify her residence. In connection with EDWARDS, it will be recalled that she had written to the Ad Hoc Committee while a house guest of RICHARD GIBSON in London concerning some theoretical aspects of pro-Chinese ideology and that GIBSON, while in contact with CG 6547-S in Chicago, had furnished the

C

CONFIDENTIAL

name of PAUL RICHARDS, son of EDWARDS, as a good person who had been active in the communist movement on the west coast. RICHARDS recently wrote to the Ad Hoc Committee expressing his favorable attitude toward the ideology as expressed by the Committee and the possibility exists, therefore, that he was prompted to do so on advice from his mother, HODEE EDWARDS.

c

The totality of these events suggest that CIA has effected operations in this country with the possible intent of attempting to arrange for travel to China, and Chicago strongly suspects not only FINEMAN but EDWARDS and RICHARDS as being part of these operations.

c

Chicago respectfully requests any information the Bureau may have in this matter.

CONFIDENTIAL

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (100-442715) DATE: 5/21/68

FROM : SAC, CHICAGO (100-41353)

SUBJECT: AD HOC COMMITTEE FOR A
MARXIST-LENINIST PARTY, USA
IS - CH

R. C. Harm
HC Boyd
Wannall
Baumgardner

Re Bulet dated 10/20/67 concerning PAUL RICHARDS and Bulet 4/26/68 concerning M. I. LASKI.

Attached to each copy of this communication is a xerox copy of a letter dated 4/23/68 from RICHARD GIBSON to the AHC. This letter was furnished to SA ROBERT R. GLENDON by CG 6547-S on 5/8/68.

For information Milwaukee, GIBSON is referring to PAUL RICHARDS in the third paragraph of this letter. As Milwaukee may desire to utilize this information in report form such must be paraphrased and the source to identify the characterization as RICHARDS is CG 6547-S who met with GIBSON last year in Chicago. Milwaukee is requested to review Bulet dated 10/20/67 for instructions regarding the AHC. Chicago would also suggest that GIBSON's name not be used in any report.

Em. Files

The Bureau's attention is invited to the comment in paragraph two regarding M. I. LASKI and in particular that which notes that LASKI alligned himself with MIKE BAKER in London who now professes an anti-MAO line. It would appear that LASKI in his headlong rush to gain international recognition has again created friends inimical to his own primary interests.

If the Bureau desires a fraternal letter to directed to GIBSON such will be promptly prepared.

C
C
C

100-442715-165

706 9 + 2
1 706 9 + 2

ENCLOSURE

2 - Bureau (RM) (encl. 2)
2 - Los Angeles (RM) (encl. 2) (1 100-67217) AHC)
(1-M. I. LASKI)
2 - Milwaukee (RM) (encl. 2)
(1-PAUL RICHARDS)
1 - San Francisco (RM) (encl. 1) (info) (100-54721)
1 - Chicago

RRG/tmw
(8)

REC-30
15 MAY 23 1968
ORIGINAL FILED IN

58 MAY 106

105-93072-
NOT RECORDED
178 JUN 11 1968

Classified by 1259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Declassification Indefinite

ENCLOSURE

9/9/78

NAT. INT. SEC.
RYAN

66JUN17 1968

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

CONFIDENTIAL

5010-108-02

AND ROUTING OFFICES

105-93072

32, Hartswood Road
Stamford Brook
London, W.12

CONFIDENTIAL

Encl

23 April 1968

Dear Herb,

Please forgive my slowness in answering your letter of February 12. Much has been happening here, not all of it for the best, as far as I can see, but I still believe that the sharpening racial and class contradictions in Britain -- and elsewhere in Europe -- in recent weeks will provide an excellent situation in which Marxist-Leninists can work more vigorously than in the past here. But there still remain many other internal contradictions, personality conflicts, distorted reflections of the Cultural Revolution, etc. that must be resolved. I wish I could write in greater detail, but I am certain you understand, with your experience, far more than I do.

Concerning "Comrade" Laski, nothing further has been heard of him since he left here for Paris. His great comrade here, Mike Baker, who published a huge interview with Laski in his publication, Red Front, also took to attacking what he now calls "Mao's ultra-Left clique." Whether Laski approves of Baker's new anti-Mao line, I cannot say, but birds of a feather do flock together...

C

The person living with me that you mentioned in your letter is a lady, mother of the young student at the University of Wisconsin that you met at my hotel in Chicago when I was last there. He is still very much in the revisionist party, although deeply disturbed by its general reformist, not to say capitulationist line, yet still greatly swayed by some of the CPUSA tame intellectuals, particularly Apteker. I do wish you comrades might help him to understand the correct line and find a way forward.

Give my regards to your wife, who I trust has now completely recovered from her bout of poor health.

Fraternally yours,

Richard

Richard Gibson

105-93072-
~~[illegible]~~
1653

CONFIDENTIAL
ENCLOSURE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
DeLoach
Mohr
Bishop
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

SECRET

TO : Mr. D. J. Brennan, Jr.

DATE: April 18, 1968

FROM : S. J. Papich

SUBJECT: SUGAR

4-1
10-1

SUGAR is a cryptonym for Richard Thomas Gibson, a U. S. Negro who has been utilized by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) as an informant in foreign countries. He has been a source of information relating to the New Left and Black Power activities. His background is well known to the Bureau, and we have always had some question concerning his reliability.

Recently, CIA reported that SUGAR had encountered some difficulty in Sweden as a result of his efforts to establish contact with American deserters in that country.

On April 17, 1968, Richard Ober confidentially advised that the Dutch internal security service had contacted CIA and was making an inquiry concerning SUGAR. At this point, CIA does not know why the Dutch are making the check, but the Agency is speculating that SUGAR's activities in Europe have come to the attention of the Dutch. It is Ober's opinion that CIA at some point will contact a top official in the Dutch internal security service concerning the Agency's interest in SUGAR.

Neth S.C

Ober stated that in the event the Bureau receives any inquiry from the Dutch concerning SUGAR, the Agency would like to be contacted before we respond to the Dutch. In this connection, he pointed out that Andries Kuipers of the Dutch internal security service is scheduled to visit the U. S. in the very near future and will be in contact with the Bureau. CIA is speculating concerning the possibility of Kuipers requesting information concerning SUGAR. Here again CIA asked that we check with agency before we would respond.

EX-110 REC 36 105-93072-170

ACTION: The above information is being directed to the attention of the Nationalities Intelligence, Racial Intelligence, Internal Security, and Foreign Liaison Sections.

SJP:clb (7)

1 - Mr. Cotter
1 - G. C. Moore
1 - C. D. Brennan
1 - Foreign Liaison
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Papich

APR 26 1968

70 MAY 3 1968

Classified by 2259
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

SECRET

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

5 Oct 67

TO: Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich

FROM: Deputy Director for Plans

SUBJECT: SUGAR
Activities of Russell Stetler and John Gerassi, US Citizens

1. The information below was acquired by SUGAR from a former employee of the London-based Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) who talked with Allan Krebs, an American leftist who is Director of the Free University in New York City and who is close to Russell Stetler and John Gerassi.

US-ENG

2. Stetler spends most of his time travelling between the US and London to consult with Ralph Schoenman, Director of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation (BRPF) regarding the Foundation's activities. There are now only three officials in the BRPF. Stetler is undecided about his political future and is considering the possibility of returning to graduate school. Schoenman does not have inexhaustible BRPF funds at his disposal and sometimes there are great financial crises. At times Stetler is very bitter about Schoenman's methods of operation and often feels that the latter "sells down the river those who work for him".

John

3. Gerassi, a member of the International War Crimes Tribunal's first investigating team to North Vietnam in December 1966 and January 1967, was in Cuba the week of 3 July 1967. He is no longer on friendly terms with Ralph Schoenman, and apparently went to Cuba for a different reason than that of Schoenman, who was there in late June 1967.[1]

EX 110 REC-69 105-93072-169

4. Gerassi told Krebs that he will publicly support the Tribunal, but that he is physically unable to work with Schoenman. It is due to the "fight" between the two individuals that Gerassi did not attend the First Session of the Tribunal in Stockholm ~~which was held in~~ early May 1967.[2]

APR 26 1968

5. It is requested that no action be taken on the basis of this information without prior coordination with this agency.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED

70 MAY 2 1968

316/01373-67

SECRET

Let to SAC New York 4/25/68

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET

1. Source Comment: While in London during the week of 17 July, Gerassi said he was en route to Havana where he was to be an observer at the Latin American Solidarity Organization (LASO) Conference. He believed the Cuban attitude has changed considerably in the past year and that the Moscow-leaning Communists are losing all their influence. The former repressive measures in Cuba against homosexuals, beatniks and other deviants have been dropped. Concerning the International War Crimes Tribunal, Gerassi appeared convinced that the Tribunal's Second Session will be held in Stockholm rather than in Copenhagen or some other city. He said that he will testify at the event in any case.

2. Field Comment: The First Session of the Tribunal was sponsored by the BRPF and was commonly referred to as the "Bertrand Russell War Crimes Tribunal". This designation however can no longer apply inasmuch as cumulative reporting, since the Stockholm meeting, indicates that the BRPF and the Tribunal are separate entities with independent motivation, direction and control. According to various sources, the Second Session of the Tribunal is scheduled to be held in Copenhagen, Denmark beginning 20 October 1967. It is not known whether or not the BRPF will support the Copenhagen event.

CSCI 316/04373-67

105-93072-169

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

5 OCT 67

Rec'd from R. Ober, CIA 4/22/68 PBD

[illegible] Director

[illegible] Deputy Director for Plans

[illegible] [illegible]
Activities of [illegible]

1. [illegible]

4-5

106-17341

Let to SAC, New York 4/25/68
RWN: [illegible]

XEROX
APR 26 1968

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

105-93072-169

NO FOREIGN DISSEM
SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/27/201

Agency Information

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88296 Date: 2025

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90146-10108
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	105-93072-128 THRU 131

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	NY
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/28/1965
PAGES :	21
SUBJECTS :	RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Not Assassination Related
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/09/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	INDEFINITE
COMMENTS :	INC 4 MEMO, LHM

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

_____________, 19___

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☑ Attention Nasca
☑ Return to Mullens 303RB
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☑ Main _________ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of _____________
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Diana Bornstein
Birthdate & Place
Address

Localities
R# _________ Date 11-26 Searcher Initials mb
Prod. _________

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	NRMf	
Main	105-93072-131	
	Diana Hermans (BU)	
	SI	
P	Hermans, Diana	
1 ✓	105-1-317-256	
	Hermans, Diane	
Not ✓	62-26225-35-A ny. World Tele. + Sun	5/27/59
Located	Bornstein, Robert Mrs	
	SI	

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Branch

______________, 19___

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☑ Attention Nasca
☑ Return to Mullens 303 R.B.
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☑ Main ______ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of ______
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Robert Bornstein
Birthdate & Place ______
Address ______

Localities ______
R# ______ Date 11-26 Searcher Initials mb
Prod. ______

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
	NCMt	
Np	28-714-4	
L7	105-93022-131	

4-22 (Rev. 1-22-60)

Federal Bureau of Investigation
Records Bra[illegible]

_______________, 19__

☐ Name Searching Unit - Room 6527
☐ Service Unit - Room 6524
☐ Forward to File Review
☑ Attention Nasca
☑ Return to Mullens 303RB
Supervisor Room Ext.

Type of References Requested:
☐ Regular Request (Analytical Search)
☐ All References (Subversive & Nonsubversive)
☐ Subversive References Only
☐ Nonsubversive References Only
☑ Main ________ References Only

Type of Search Requested:
☐ Restricted to Locality of ________
☐ Exact Name Only (On the Nose)
☐ Buildup ☐ Variations

Subject Daniel Watts
Birthdate & Place ________
Address ________

Localities ________
R# ________ Date 11-26 Searcher Initials mb
Prod. ________

	FILE NUMBER	SERIAL
MF ✓	105-96316	

1 - Mr. Mullins

SAC, New York (105-42387) 11-15-65

Director, FBI (105-93072) - 130

EX-107

REC-122

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CUBA

Reurlet 10-29-65. U

Prior to instituting action concerning subject's removal from Security Index, Bureau desires a report or memorandum be prepared for dissemination purposes to include any unreported subversive activities on subject's part. Submit promptly and you will be advised further concerning subject's Security Index status. U

RAM:bjs (4)

bjs

NOTE:

Subject was head of Fair Play for Cuba Committee at one time and is now living in London where he is connected with some communist publications. In 1962 subject offered to serve as informant for Bureau solely for financial reasons but we declined [and told CIA of his offer. In September, 1965, CIA advised it is now directing Gibson's activities.] (S) Prior to removing him from Index, it is felt a current report or memorandum should be submitted to interested agencies. ~~(X)~~

MAILED 7
NOV 12 1965
COMM-FBI

~~Classified by 2359~~
~~Exempt from GDS, Category 2~~
~~Date of Declassification Indefinite~~

3/8/98

3/10/78

12/30/94
Classified by SP8 MAC/SAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

F14

53 NOV 22 1965

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93072) DATE: 10/29/65

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-42387)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

SECRET

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CUBA

ReBulet, 10/22/65. U

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON is a SI subject of the NYO. [ReBulet indicates that CIA has advised in confidence that it is operating GIBSON and has assigned the code name SUGAR to GIBSON. (S)

N.Y

Although GIBSON's previous activities would warrant retention on the SI, it is felt that inasmuch as GIBSON has been debriefed by CIA and is presently being operated by CIA, GIBSON no longer warrants inclusion on the SI, and accordingly it is being recommended that the name of RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON be deleted from the SI. (S)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP(S) OF Classification
DATE 3-15-80 ACP/140

Bulet to SAC, NY
11-15-65
RAM:bjs

REC- 76

EX-101

105-93072-130

8 NOV 1 1965

NAT. INT. SEC.

2-Bureau (RM)
1-New York

JEH:mm
(3)

Classified by 2159
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

3/10/98

12/30/94
Classified by SP8MAC/GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

5010-108

1 - F tive Supervisor
1 - Mr. Mullins

SAC, New York (105-42387) 10-22-65

Director, FBI (105-93072) **PERSONAL ATTENTION**

TOP SECRET ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON ⑥
IS - CUBA

(U) According to Bureau Source 6, on 9-21-65 Richard Gibson in London contacted Robert Williams in Cuba and indicated he had received an unidentified message from Williams. Gibson assured Williams of his personal loyalty and solidarity in "the struggle." Gibson also said he was partially responsible for Williams' situation and was ready to make any effort which would help. (TS)

As you are aware, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has advised in confidence that it is operating Gibson and the message would indicate that CIA is attempting to have Gibson re-establish contact with Williams. Note that CIA has assigned the code name SUGAR to Gibson and data originating with him will be attributed to that code name. ~~(TS)~~ (S)

[CIA's operational interest (S) in Gibson must be maintained in strictest confidence.] [Bureau Source 6] data (S) is for lead purposes only and must not be included in communications prepared for dissemination. ~~(TS)~~

1 - London (100-2611) All information remains classified
1 - Foreign Liaison Unit
1 - 100-387728 (Robert Williams) (S)
RAM:bjs (8) [redacted]

Portions of Para 2 and 4 classified per CIA Letter DTD 01-14-86 #41-752

bjs

NOTE:

Williams is the Negro racist who fled to Cuba to avoid a kidnapping trial and is now a Bureau fugitive. Gibson was formerly head of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee but has claimed to be repentant. We were in touch with him in 1962 at which time he offered to serve as informant purely for financial reasons without showing any allegiance whatsoever to the U.S. [We advised CIA of his offer to cooperate and in May, 1965, CIA did make contact with Gibson in London where he now resides] ~~(TS)~~ (S)

[redacted]

MAILED 4
OCT 22 1965
COMM-FBI

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Felt
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

MAIL ROOM ☑ TELETYPE UNIT ☐

~~CLASSIFIED AND EXTENDED BY~~ SP4 JR mij (S)
~~REASON FOR EXTENSION~~
~~FCIM, II, 1-2.4.2~~ 3, 2
~~DATE OF REVIEW FOR DECLASSIFICATION~~ 10/22/85
7-15-80

TOP SECRET 213

Classified by SP8MAC FAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR 12/30/94

REC-50 105-93072-129

19 OCT 25 1965

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN 100-387728

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO : DIRECTOR, FBI (105-93072) DATE: JUN 28 1965

SECRET

FROM : SAC, NEW YORK (105-42387) (C)

SUBJECT: RICHARD THOMAS GIBSON
IS - CUBA

~~APPROPRIATE AGENCIES~~
~~AND FIELD OFFICES~~
~~ADVISED BY ROUTING~~
~~SLIP(S) OF~~ Classification
~~DATE~~ 3-15-78 HLP/KW

ReLegat, Londonlet, 4/26/65.

Enclosed herewith for the Bureau are 10 copies of a LHM dated and captioned as above. It is requested that one of the copies be furnished by the Bureau to Legat, London as requested in re Legat, London letter.

NY T-1 referred to in the memorandum (S) [is CIA] as contained in relet, 4/26/65.

NY T-2 is NY 4964-S*.

NY T-3 is [NY 3164-S] who is used to characterize RICHARD GIBSON.

Mrs. JAY SAPIENZA, Superintendent at 45 Carmine Street, NY, NY, was contacted by SA JOHN EDWARD HEGARTY on 6/3/65.

The records of BSS and BCI, NYCPD, were reviewed by SA AUGUST J. MICEK on 5/31/65.

The records of the Credit Bureau of Greater NY were reviewed by IC WILLIAM M. O'BRIEN on 5/19/65.

ENCLOSURE A

Classified by 1289
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite
3/8/78

2 - Bureau (Encls. 10) (RM)
1 - New York

REC- 62 105-93072-128

JEH:ctd
(3)

+1 LHM
Copy to London
by routing slip for
☒ info ☐ action
date 6/30/65
by EJK/jp

Classified by SP8MAC/SAT 12/30/94
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

16 JUN 30 1965

1CC retained by L.L. Anderson

Copy to: CIA/STATE/RAO
ONI/OSI/ACSI
By routing slip for info.
Date 6/30/65 by EJK/jp

NAT. INT. SEC.

50 JUL 22 1965

SECRET

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

SECRET

By letter dated 4/30/65, Legat, Mexico, advised that the Mexico City Station of CIA, by memorandum 2/18/65, captioned "American Communists' Contacts in Mexico City" which was classified "Secret" with instructions that the information not be disseminated outside the Bureau, furnished information indicating that a leading member of the National Liberation Movement, a pro-Cuba, anti-US Communist front, stated that LEO HUBERMAN and FRANCES KELLY, both of whom are editors of New York "Monthly Review" were in Mexico. According to the memorandum, HUBERMAN and KELLY were interested in discussing the possibility of publishing English translations of the writings of DAVID ALFARO SIQUEIROS, a well known Mexican artist and a member of the Central Committee of the Mexican CP. The memorandum also indicated that KELLY arrived in Mexico on 2/14/65, and both she and HUBERMAN were in contact with American Communists in Mexico. (S)

The enclosed LHM is being classified "Secret" as it contains information furnished by CIA which was classified "Secret". (S)

SECRET

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

New York, New York
June 28, 1965

Bureau 105-93072
New York 105-42387

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Richard Thomas Gibson
Internal Security - Cuba

b. approx 1930-1935

On April 20, 1965, NY T-1, another Government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, furnished information indicating that on April 2, 1965, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, London, England, had furnished Richard Gibson the telephone number of a girl who was going to stay in the United Kingdom and who wanted to see Gibson. NY T-1 noted that the girl is evidently Frances Kelley of the "Monthly Review" of New York. NY T-1 advised that Kelley had a letter of introduction to the above-mentioned employee of the Cuban Embassy, London, England, from Leo Huberman with whom she had worked in New York (S) Social Security # 043-51-2909

Frances Kelly

England

Mexico

A characterization of "Monthly Review" is contained in the appendix hereto. U

On March 1, 1965, NY T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished information indicating that Frances Kelly, who is originally from

SECRET

Classified by ~~1259~~
Exempt from GDS, Category
Date of Declassification Indefinite

~~GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification~~

12/30/94
Classified by SP8MAC/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

105-93072-128

ENCLOSURE

Richard Thomas Gibson

England and who recently returned to England, was employed by the publication "Monthly Review" in New York for several years. NY T-2 advised that while residing in New York, she resided at 45 Carmine Street, Apartment 25, New York, New York. NY T-2 advised that Frances Kelly is the sister of Pat Kelly, 19 Gunter Grove, London, Southwest 10, England. NY T-2 advised that her Social Security number is 043-51-2909. U

NY T-2 further advised that in June, 1964, Frances Kelly directed correspondence on behalf of "Monthly Review" to the Ghana Mission to the United Nations indicating that she had done some research work regarding a cumulative index for the party book shop in Accra, which had been requested by the Ghana Mission to the United Nations. ~~S~~(U)

The March, 1964 issue of "Monthly Review" on page 623, contains a book review by Frances Kelly in which she is identified as an assistant to the editors of "Monthly Review". U

On June 3, 1965, Mrs. Jay Sapienza, Superintendent, 45 Carmine Street, New York, New York, advised that Frances Kelly resided at 45 Carmine Street, for approximately two years until January, 1965, at which time she indicated that she was going to make a trip to Mexico and then return to England. Mrs. Sapienza stated that she believed that Frances Kelly originally came to the United States from England as she had an English accent. Mrs. Sapienza stated that Kelly is in her early 30's and was a journalist who worked for a magazine in New York, New York. Mrs. Sapienza stated that during her residence at 45 Carmine Street, Frances Kelly was an excellent tenant. U

Richard Thomas Gibson

The records of the Bureau of Special Services and the Bureau of Criminal Identification, New York City Police Department, were searched on May 31, 1965, and no record identifiable with Frances Kelly could be located. U

The files of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York were reviewed on May 19, 1965, and no record identifiable with Frances Kelly could be located. U

Concerning Richard Thomas Gibson, NY T-3, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that Gibson was the former Acting Executive Secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. In September, 1962, Gibson left the United States and went to Algeria where he remained until April, 1963. The March 19, 1963 issue of "Monthly Review" identifies Gibson as the English Language Editor of "Revolution Africaine", a new weekly created by the Political Bureau of the Algerian Government. U

A characterization of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee is contained in the appendix hereto. U

Richard Thomas Gibson

1.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press. U

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement. U

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible. U

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450. U

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that VINCENT "TED" LEE, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that LEE believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. LEE did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se. U

2.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator THOMAS J. DODD of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the CASTRO network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator DODD was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC. U

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World Telegram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-CASTRO FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-CASTRO street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-CASTRO American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by CASTRO's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected presidential assassin, LEE H. OSWALD. U

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. LEE had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization. U

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved. U

MONTHLY REVIEW

A source advised on March 24, 1953, that Monthly Review, Inc., was incorporated in the State of New York on October 19, 1951, and the corporation papers reflected it succeeded the individual business of LEO HUBERMAN at 66 Barrow Street, New York, New York, which operated since 1949 under the title, Monthly Review Press. u

The publication is "An Independent Socialist Magazine" with editorial and business offices at 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, New York, and mailing address at 66 Barrow Street, New York, New York, according to the March, 1961, issue of "Monthly Review." Its editors are listed as LEO HUBERMAN and PAUL M. SWEEZY. u

LOUIS F. BUDENZ, former editor of the "Daily Worker," an East Coast Communist newspaper which suspended publication on January 13, 1958, advised on June 23, 1950, that LEO HUBERMAN was a member of the CP in 1945. u

Another source advised on November 2, 1954, that PAUL M. SWEEZY was known as a Marxist, but not as a Communist Party (CP) member. The same source stated that the CP hard core had been critical of SWEEZY because of his independent application of Marxist theory. According to the source, SWEEZY was used to advantage in many CP front activities in the 1930's. u

The CP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450. u

U TED STATES DEPARTMENT O USTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

New York, New York
June 28, 1965

Bureau 105-93072
New York 105-42387

SECRET

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Richard Thomas Gibson
Internal Security - Cuba

On April 20, 1965, NY T-1, another Government agency which conducts intelligence investigations, furnished information indicating that on April 2, 1965, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, London, England, had furnished Richard Gibson the telephone number of a girl who was going to stay in the United Kingdom and who wanted to see Gibson. NY T-1 noted that the girl is evidently Frances Kelley of the "Monthly Review" of New York. NY T-1 advised that Kelley had a letter of introduction to the above-mentioned employee of the Cuban Embassy, London, England, from Leo Huberman with whom she had worked in New York. (S)

A characterization of "Monthly Review" is contained in the appendix hereto. U

On March 1, 1965, NY T-2, who has furnished reliable information in the past, furnished information indicating that Frances Kelly, who is originally from

SECRET

~~GROUP 1~~
~~Excluded from automatic~~
~~downgrading and~~
~~declassification~~

12/30/94
Classified by SP8MAC/GAT (JFK)
Declassify on: OADR

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

England and who recently returned to England, was employed by the publication "Monthly Review" in New York for several years. NY T-2 advised that while residing in New York, she resided at 45 Carmine Street, Apartment 25, New York, New York. NY T-2 advised that Frances Kelly is the sister of Pat Kelly, 19 Gunter Grove, London, Southwest 10, England. NY T-2 advised that her Social Security number is 043-51-2909. U

NY T-2 further advised that in June, 1964, Frances Kelly directed correspondence on behalf of "Monthly Review" to the Ghana Mission to the United Nations indicating that she had done some research work regarding a cumulative index for the party book shop in Accra, which had been requested by the Ghana Mission to the United Nations. X(u)

The March, 1964 issue of "Monthly Review" on page 623, contains a book review by Frances Kelly in which she is identified as an assistant to the editors of "Monthly Review". U

On June 3, 1965, Mrs. Jay Sapienza, Superintendent, 45 Carmine Street, New York, New York, advised that Frances Kelly resided at 45 Carmine Street, for approximately two years until January, 1965, at which time she indicated that she was going to make a trip to Mexico and then return to England. Mrs. Sapienza stated that she believed that Frances Kelly originally came to the United States from England as she had an English accent. Mrs. Sapienza stated that Kelly is in her early 30's and was a journalist who worked for a magazine in New York, New York. Mrs. Sapienza stated that during her residence at 45 Carmine Street, Frances Kelly was an excellent tenant. U

Richard Thomas Gibson

The records of the Bureau of Special Services and the Bureau of Criminal Identification, New York City Police Department, were searched on May 31, 1965, and no record identifiable with Frances Kelly could be located.

The files of the Credit Bureau of Greater New York were reviewed on May 19, 1965, and no record identifiable with Frances Kelly could be located.

Concerning Richard Thomas Gibson, NY T-3, who has furnished reliable information in the past, has advised that Gibson was the former Acting Executive Secretary of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. In September, 1962, Gibson left the United States and went to Algeria where he remained until April, 1963. The March 19, 1963 issue of "Monthly Review" identifies Gibson as the English Language Editor of "Revolution Africaine", a new weekly created by the Political Bureau of the Algerian Government.

4

A characterization of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee is contained in the appendix hereto.

1.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening In Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

> The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that VINCENT "TED" LEE, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that LEE believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. LEE did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se.

U

2. APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator THOMAS J. DODD of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the CASTRO network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator DODD was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC.

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World Telegram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-CASTRO FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-CASTRO street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-CASTRO American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by CASTRO's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected presidential assassin, LEE H. OSWALD.

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. LEE had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization.

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved.

y

MONTHLY REVIEW

A source advised on March 24, 1953, that Monthly Review, Inc., was incorporated in the State of New York on October 19, 1951, and the corporation papers reflected it succeeded the individual business of LEO HUBERMAN at 66 Barrow Street, New York, New York, which operated since 1949 under the title, Monthly Review Press.

The publication is "An Independent Socialist Magazine" with editorial and business offices at 333 Sixth Avenue, New York 14, New York, and mailing address at 66 Barrow Street, New York, New York, according to the March, 1961, issue of "Monthly Review." Its editors are listed as LEO HUBERMAN and PAUL M. SWEEZY.

LOUIS F. BUDENZ, former editor of the "Daily Worker," an East Coast Communist newspaper which suspended publication on January 13, 1958, advised on June 23, 1950, that LEO HUBERMAN was a member of the CP in 1945.

Another source advised on November 2, 1954, that PAUL M. SWEEZY was known as a Marxist, but not as a Communist Party (CP) member. The same source stated that the CP hard core had been critical of SWEEZY because of his independent application of Marxist theory. According to the source, SWEEZY was used to advantage in many CP front activities in the 1930's.

The CP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

SECRET

1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. Krupinsky
1 - Mr. Anderson

(NI) 105-140170

BY LIAISON

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

Date: July 23, 1965

To: Director
Central Intelligence Agency

Attention: Deputy Director, Plans

From: John Edgar Hoover, Director

Subject: UNKNOWN SUBJECTS;
Seventeen American Negroes
Training in Nanking, China
INTERNAL SECURITY - CHINA (S)

Classified by
Exempt from GDS
Date of Declassification

Information has been received from a confidential source abroad that according to a South African who was trained in guerrilla warfare at the Nanking Military School in China in 1963, there were seventeen American negroes also training at this school. The source further stated that this was not the first group of American negroes to receive such training there. (S)

No additional information has been developed corroborating the above allegation. However, a review of our files indicates that a source of your Agency, who utilizes the cryptonym "Sugar," evidently has a wide acquaintanceship in African nationalist movements and therefore may be in a position to furnish information concerning this matter. It is therefore requested that "Sugar" be contacted for any information he may be able to furnish in this regard. (S)

12/30/94
Classified by SP8MAC/GAT
Declassify on: OADR (JFK)

① - 105-93072 (Richard Thomas Gibson)

LLA:amf:lcr (7)

NOTE: Original information in this matter was furnished by MI-6. It is possible the negroes referred to are from South or Central America, if, in fact, they are Americans. Logical investigation to date has failed to develop any additional corroborating data. Sugar referred to above is Richard Thomas Gibson, formerly involved with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and well-known to the Bureau. He is presently on the Security Index. CIA has recently initiated contact with him in Europe and plans to operate him as a source. His initial debriefing by CIA indicates he should be contacted concerning captioned matter. This letter classified "Secret" since it repeats data from MI-6 memorandum so classified. 105-93072

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

(S)

ORIGINAL FILED IN 105-140170-11 (S)

NOT RECORDED
46 JUL 27 1965

DUPLICATE YELLOW
50 AUG 3 1965

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/9/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90155-10008

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 65-68530-116

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : WMFO
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 04/07/1964
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
NOSENKO 1964 REPORTINGS
YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : AT

FD-36 (Rev. 10-29-63)

FBI

Date: 4/7/64

SECRET

Transmit the following in ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
(Type in plain text or code)

Via AIRTEL
(Priority)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT the brackets
KP 5-26-98

CIA ADDRESSED ONLY pgs. 1, 2, 3 + 6 See addendum 180-709-103 KP

Classified by ...

Mr. Holmes
Miss Candy

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (65-68530)

FROM: SAC, [WFO] [(134-5437 Sub A)] ~~(S)~~ (U)

SUBJECT: YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
[ESP - R (KGB)
(OO:WFO)] ~~(S)~~ (U)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP
DATE

Class 158 5/12/82

ReWFOairtel 3/6/64. ~~(S)~~ (U)

NOSENKO was interviewed 4/2/64, by SAs DONALD E. WALTER, ALEKSO POPTANICH, and MAURICE A. TAYLOR. A number of cases which originated with source were discussed with him for additional data and photographs of Soviet Nationals were displayed to him. Topics covered included the following: ~~(S)~~ (U)

[VAN KRAKOV YUGOV] (S), POSSIBLY [YUGOV VAN KRAKOV] (S)

[HUGO JOSEPH VON KRAKAU,] (S) suspect for the above individual was discussed with source who was unable to furnish additional information or make any conclusion although he observed it was significant that [KRAKAU] is approximately the same age as subject described by him and has part German background. Source advised that the contacts with [LAWRENCE] (S) [ALOYAN] (S) in Russia were made by Armenian Officers of KGB and none of the officers of the Seventh Department (tourist) were in contact with [ALOYAN] (S)

[BERNARD FERGUSON MITCHELL
WILLIAM HAMILTON MARTIN] ~~(S)~~ (U)

APPROPRIATE AGENCIES
AND FIELD OFFICES
ADVISED BY ROUTING
SLIP (S) OF
DATE 2/11/78

not necessary since will be covered by WFO airtel for file

[3-Bureau
1-New York (RM)
1-WFO] ~~(S)~~ U

[MAT:mal
(5)] ~~(S)~~ (U)

[cc Lee] ~~(S)~~

C. C. Wick

memo Branigan to Sullivan 4-13

REC-
65-68530-176

2-11-98
5668 SLD/KSR

18 APR 16 1964

DECLASSIFY ON: 25X
(JFK)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AIRTEL

Approved: Thomas J. ... Sent ________ M Per ________
Special Agent in Charge

SECRET

EXTEND BY ... 6/4/98
REASON FOR EXTENSION
FCIM, II, 1-2.4.3
DATE OF REVIEW FOR
DECLASSIFICATION 2/11/84

[WFO [134-5437 Sub A] X (U)

SEC

[UNSUB; AMERICAN TOURIST TO RUSSIA FROM SOUTH OF SAN DIEGO OF INTEREST TO 13TH DEPARTMENT, KGB] X (U)

Source was questioned in this matter in effort to obtain identifying data. He was unable to recall any additional info of value and explained that his recollection was based on brief examination of a paper which came across his desk with many others. Source repeated there is a possibility that captioned case is identical with the case involving an American whose occupation ~~which~~ was repairing pipes, and stated his recollections concerning this was also very vague. Source could not recall the case officer from the Seventh Department who handled captioned case. X (U)

[UNSUB; CODE CLERK ALLEGEDLY RECRUITED BY KGB MOSCOW, SPRING, 1960] X (U)

Photograph of Sergeant [CHARLES BRYANT] (S) was displayed to source who advised the face was familiar especially the characteristic twisting of the mouth to one side, but advised he could not recall any circumstances which made his recollection of the picture possible. In view of the current status of NOSENKO he was not furnished with the facts in this case at this time. X

[AMERICAN PRIESTS IN MOSCOW - STUDIED BY KGB] X (U)

Source advised that prior his departure from Moscow GENNADIY GRYAZNOV, the KGB official, who was then Chief of Section, had told him that two American priests in Moscow were being studied and that one was under consideration for approach on the basis of blackmail. GRYAZNOV told source that a Russian girl who is employed at American House is on very friendly relations with this priest and KGB has knowledge that he has carressed and fondled her and anticipates they may succeed in catching him having intimate relations with this girl in which case a recruitment approach will be made. X (U)

[UNSUB; KGB AGENT ANDREY] X (U)

SEC

[WFO [134-5437 Sub A] X X(u)

Source advised that [REINER] (S) is the Head of [Cosmos Tours,] (S) New York City, and described him as a very shrewd and foxy individual. He said he was known to VLADIMIR D. CHELNOKOV, who was Deputy Chief, Seventh Department (tourist), however, subject was not recruited by the Seventh Department and no effort was made to recruit him. Source described [REINER] (S) as talkative and foxy and said he was suspected of being connected with American intelligence (FBI). Source stated [REINER] (S) knew many important people, but he believed work on him was wasted. He recalled [REINER's] (S) firm was the first to book a tour to Mongolia. He had negotiated with the Mongolian Republic for additional tours, but did not know whether he was successful. X

[SERGEANT JAMES MC MILLAN] X(u)

Source advised he was aware of the MC MILLAN case and stated although he did not know any details he understood MC MILLAN had assisted KGB and furnished everything he knew while at the American Embassy. He advised VADIM V. KOSOLAPOV visits him regularly and gives KGB funds in the sum of 500 rubles for a month. Source advised MC MILLAN is still married to the agent who assisted in his recruitment. Source identified this woman as VERA (LNU) and described her as a shy and decent girl. He said she had one son by MC MILLAN and also a child by a previous marriage. Source mentioned it was the task of the First Section (American Embassy), First Department (American), Second Directorate, to take care of defectors such as MC MILLAN. X(u)

X

[ANNABELLE BUCAR] X(u)

Source advised he also was somewhat familiar with the case of BUCAR who was recruited on the basis of ideology and a love affair with KONSTANTIN LAPSHEIN, an actor agent of the First Department, whom she subsequently married. Source stated BUCAR has not been happy in her private life since her husband is a heavy drinker and has weakness for girls, but she is satisfied otherwise with her life in Moscow where she works for the Radio Committee as an editor handling foreign broadcasts and also does translations receiving good money. X(u)

Photographs of members of the Bolshoi Ballet which visited the U.S. in 1962 were displayed to NOSENKO who identified three individuals, namely: X(u)

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : FBI
RECORD NUMBER : 124-90158-10062

RECORD SERIES : HQ

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CR 109-12-228-1924

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM : CIA
TO : HQ

TITLE :

DATE : 01/31/1973
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
POLITICAL MATTERS
LUIS POSADA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : APPROVAL OF CIA

COMMENTS : CABLE

(4)

Intelligence Information Report

Classified by Recorded Reporting Officer. Exempt from General Declassification Schedule of E.O. 11652 Exemption Category 5B (1), (2) Impossible to determine date of automatic declassification.

DIRECTORATE OF PLANS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE

SECRET

Political Matters

REPORT NO. CSCI-316/00339-73

DATE DISTR. 31 January 1973

COUNTRY Venezuela

DOI 8 December 1972

SUBJECT Reorganization of the Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 2-22-95 BY SP8MAC/EH JFK

all

ACQ Venezuela, Caracas (15 December 1972)

FIELD NO. [HVC]6525 (S)

SOURCE (S) [An experienced police investigator whose position gives him access to information on matters affecting the internal security of Venezuela. He reports without the knowledge of his superiors.] His information has been frequently confirmed by independent sources. [He provided a copy of the reorganization document.] (S)

KAG Research (HRS)

1. On 8 December 1972 the Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention (DISIP) was reorganized by its Director, Dr. Remberto Uzcategui Bruzual. (Source Comment: Uzcategui believes DISIP will be in line for criticism during the election year of 1973 and he wants to remove from positions of responsibility any of his controversial section heads.) The gist of the document issued by Uzcategui reorganizing DISIP follows.

2. The Director of DISIP sets the general policy based on instructions from the Ministry of the Interior and has ultimate control of the Services. The Deputy Director assists him in carrying out these responsibilities and substitutes for the Director during his absence. As its supervisory and fiscal units, DISIP has an Inspector General of Services who has the responsibility of disciplining personnel and investigating employees, and an internal comptroller who verifies the administration of the Services.

3. The following are the DISIP executive positions: (Directorate of the Service of Intelligence and Prevention)

a. Secretary General of Services, which has been assigned to Dr. Oswaldo Dominguez.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Berry (INV)

5-RTC

ND

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT for the brackets KP 2-9-98 SLD/KSR 4-15-98 (JFK)

(classification)			(dissem controls)					
STATE	DIA	XXXX	XXXX	XX	NSA	XX	CRS	(For Field Distribution see final paragraph)
	FBI							

Copy to Caracas 104-12-228
by routing slip for [illegible] 6220
date 2-13-73
by RTC/FSh

MAR 6 1973
LGH 7332
XEROXED ORIGINAL-RETAIN

70 MAR 1973 [illegible]

for review at FBIHQ by

HSCA req. of 12/22/77

90158-10062

all Venezuelan

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM
DOM INTELL UNIT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

FEB 16 12 44 PM '73

CSCI-316/00339-73

affairs - Directorate of the Services of Intelligence and Prevention

b. Chief of the General Information Division, which has been assigned to Lic. Joaquin Chaffardet.

REC-90 109-12-228-1924

c. Chief of the General Operations Division, which has been assigned to Commissioner Rodrigo Nieves Zarco.

16 FEB 1973

4. The Chiefs of the Zones and other branches in the interior are under the jurisdiction of the Secretary General of Services. They will handle administrative matters, intelligence and operations directly with the corresponding Divisions and will receive from them the general requirements to be fulfilled.

5. The General Operations Division has nationwide responsibility for all police and operational matters. It will be formed by as many operating divisions as there are specific activities to be fulfilled. The current operating divisions are:

a. First Division (Prevention), headed by Commissioner Adolfo Romero Gomez.

b. Second Division (Agent Control), headed by sub-commissioner Arpad Bango.

c. Third Division (Patrol), headed by Sub-Commissioner Julio Cesar Lanza.

d. Fourth Division (Explosives and Armaments), headed by Commissioner Luis Posada.

e. Fifth Division (Protection), headed by Commissioner Luis Martinez Guerra.

6. The General Information Division has nationwide responsibility for all intelligence and counter-intelligence matters, with the exception of subversion which is wholly the responsibility of the General Operations Division. The General Information Division will be formed by as many divisions as there are specific activities to be fulfilled. Currently these are:

a. Eleventh Division, headed by Commissioner Jose Vasquez Blanco.

b. Twelfth Division (Archives and Analysis), headed by Dr. Rafael Rivas Vasquez.

c. Thirteenth Division (USSR and Bloc Embassies), headed by sub-commissioner Alejandro Nystor.

7. The Secretary General of Services has responsibility for all administrative matters, including personnel and requests for services, equipment and finances. He also has responsibility for all matters not falling under the jurisdiction of the two general divisions, and in particular for those related to the Divisions of Personnel and Administration.

8. Field Dissem: Embassy at Caracas.

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	FBI
RECORD NUMBER :	124-90158-10069
RECORD SERIES :	HQ
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	CR 109-584-4735

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	SJ
TO :	HQ
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/05/1968
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	[Restricted]
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/08/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	APPROVAL OF CIA, DIA
COMMENTS :	AT; REFERRED TO DIA

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

SECRET

Date: 9/5/68

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. EXCEPT FOR the BRACKETS KP 2-9-98

Transmit the following in (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL (Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584)

FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN (109-44) (P)

SUBJECT: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS-CUBA

REC 87

(JFK)
SPT MAC/KSR 8-14-94

#211,326
Classified by MULTIPLE SOURCE
Declassify on: OADR BJA/bcl 12/28/94
SEE REFERRAL NOTE ON BACK PG 1

REFERENCES:

Bureau letter to San Juan, 7/26/68; Miami letter to Bureau, 8/2/68.

4-15-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X1 (JFK)

ENCLOSURES:

Enclosed are 10 copies for the Bureau and 4 copies for Miami of an LHM dated and captioned as above. The Bureau is requested to forward 1 information copy of LHM to Legat Santo Domingo.

Also enclosed for Bureau and Miami are one copy each of [Defense Intelligence Agency Information Report dated 7/7/68, and entitled "Storage of Supplies in Mona Island by a Cuban Exile Group" and classified CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION-SECRET.] (S-2)(S)

ADMINISTRATIVE:

EX-100 REC 82 109-584-4909

Enclosure to referenced Bureau letter was CIA Information Cable TDCS-314/11033-68 dated 7/12/68, reporting information regarding "plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela on 3 July, 1968." [CIA source was described in Information Cable as an experienced police investigator whose position gives him access to information on matters affecting the internal security of Venezuela.] (S) Source ~~furnished~~ information on 7/3/68, at Caracas, Venezuela. (S-1)(X)

1 SEP 9 1968

(12-ENCLOSURE)

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Information Report reported information that Detachment ~~8~~, USAFSO, Miami, [S-2][S] Florida, received on 7/7/68, from a [Cuban exile] source residing in the U. S. [which this source had received from LUIS POSADA] (S-2)(S)

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

CIA INFO IN P4 IS CLASSIFIED PER ITS 7/5/91 LTR. 9803 rld/gcl #211,326 4/29/92

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

State/CIA/~~Secret Service~~/RAO ISD
Army/Navy/Air Force/DIA/Customs/Coast Guard
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, State
By R/S For Info
Date 9-13-68 By

1 cy Airtel + Encl to Santo Domingo

4-Bureau (enc 11) (RM)
(1 - Legat, Santo Domingo) one
2-Miami (105-1742) (enc 5) (RM)
2-San Juan
VM:cab
(8)

LATIN-AMERICAN

Approved: D. C. Fisher Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____ M Per ____

HSCA req. of 12/22/77

SECRET

901.58-10069

SEP 12 1968

INTELL DIV.

SEP 9 1 13 PM '68

FOIA/PA # 211,326
APPEAL #
TITLE #
E.O. #12356
DATE 12/28/84 INITIALS GCL

1) 1S CIA

(5 3) 1S DIA

BRACKETED INFO ON PGS 1,2
REMAINS CLASSIFIED PER
DIA LTR DTD 5/5/86
SP6 BJA/GCL #211,326 9/27/90

State/CIA Secretariat
Army/Navy/Air Force/DIA/
Coordinating Group
RA 5-8 for info
Date

FD-36 (Rev. 5-22-64)

FBI

SECRET

Date: 9/5/68

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT, except for the brackets KP 2-9-98

Transmit the following in (Type in plaintext or code)

Via AIRTEL (Priority)

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE

TO: DIRECTOR, FBI (109-584)

FROM: SAC, SAN JUAN (109-44) (P)

SUBJECT: ANTI-FIDEL CASTRO ACTIVITIES
IS-CUBA

REC 87

(JFK) SP8 MAC/KSR 8-14-97

#211,326
Classified by MULTIPLE SOURCE
Declassify on: OADR BJR/bcl 12/18/96
SEE REFERRAL NOTE ON BACK PG 1

REFERENCES:

Bureau letter to San Juan, 7/26/68; Miami letter to Bureau, 8/2/68.

4-15-98
CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X 1 (JFK)

ENCLOSURES:

Enclosed are 10 copies for the Bureau and 4 copies for Miami of an LHM dated and captioned as above. The Bureau is requested to forward 1 information copy of LHM to Legat Santo Domingo.

Also enclosed for Bureau and Miami are one copy each of [Defense Intelligence Agency Information Report dated 7/7/68, and entitled "Storage of Supplies in Mona Island by a Cuban Exile Group" and classified CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION-NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION-SECRET.] (S-2)(S)

ADMINISTRATIVE: EX-100 REC 82 109-584-4955

Enclosure to referenced Bureau letter was CIA Information Cable TDCS-314/11033-68 dated 7/12/68, reporting information regarding "plan of Cuban exiles to ship arms from Venezuela on 3 July, 1968." [CIA source was described in Information Cable as an experienced police investigator whose position gives him access to information on matters affecting the internal security of Venezuela.] (S) Source ~~furnished~~ information on 7/3/68, at Caracas, Venezuela. (S)(X)

1 SEP 9 1968

12 ENCLOSURE
12 encl rec'd RFI [illegible]

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Information Report reported information that Detachment ~~8~~, USAFSO, Miami, [S-2](S) Florida, received on 7/7/68, from a [Cuban exile] source residing in the U. S. [which this source had received from LUIS POSADA] (S-2)(S)

④-Bureau (enc 11) (RM)
(1 - Legat, Santo Domingo) one pl.
2-Miami (105-1742) (enc 5) (RM)
2-San Juan
VM:cab
(8)

LATIN-AMERICAN
NARCA

Approved: E. C. Bishop, Special Agent in Charge

Sent ____ M Per ____

HSCA req. Ltr 12/22/77

SECRET

SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR CLASSIFICATION ACTION

CIA INFO IN P4 IS CLASSIFIED PER ITS 7/5/91 LTR. 9803 rdd/gcl #211,326 4/29/92

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN State/CIA/~~Secret Service~~/RAO ISD Army/Navy/Air Force/DIA/Customs/Coast Guard
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs, State
By R/S For Info
Date 9-[illegible]
By [illegible]

1 cc Airtel + Encl to Santo Domingo

160435

[described as a Cuban exile residing in Venezuela and a member of the Central Directorate of Police in Venezuela. [S-2][S] [[POSADA] is possibly CIA source in Caracas as his characterization by the DIA source and CIA are similar and information reported byDIA and CIA are similar.]] DIA information report indicates [~~S-1~~][S] that Cuban exile group known as the Ejercito De Liberacion Cubano (ELC) (Cuban Army of Liberation) plans to use Mona Island, off the coast of Puerto Rico, as a storage place and possibly as a training base. According to the source, this group has received assistance [from the Government of Venezuela](S-2)(S) in the form of weapons, amount and type not disclosed, and an "old" boat about 60 to 80' long. [POSADA] reported to the [S-2][S] [Cuban exile] source that the ELC has made at least one trip [S-2][S] to Mona Island [from Venezuela] for the purpose of carrying supplies. (S-2)(~~S~~)(U) (S-2)(S)

[[It should be noted that the boat described by [POSADA] is possibly identical with the launch Maria Constanza [S-2][S] described in CIA Information Cable as vessel being used to ship arms [from Venezuela]] (~~S-2~~) [S] (S-1)(S)(entire ¶)

A copy of the DIA Information Report was furnished locally to the San Juan Office by Detachment 2, USAFSO, San Juan. [DIA Information Report indicates that dissemination was made to CAS, Miami, Florida.](S-2)(S)

JORGE MARCANO, Agent, U. S. Customs, San Juan, had received a copy of CIA Information Cable and had instituted investigation. He stated that the search of Mona Island as described in enclosed LHM was a result of this investigation. He indicated that he has plans to return to Mona Island to revorartthMonaaIslandotos discovered there.

LHM being disseminated locally to U. S. Customs, San Juan and U. S. Coast Guard, San Juan. USCS

CIA INFO IN ¶2 AND PORTION OF ¶ AT TOP (DOUBLE BRACKETED) AND BRACKETS IN ¶3 CLASSIFIED PER ITS 7/5/91 LTR.
9803 rdd/gcl #211,326 4/29/97

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 11/24/97 dab
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

SECRET

SJ 109-44

REQUEST OF BUREAU:

In view of the possibility that CIA source is (S) [LUIS POSADA] who is reported to be furnishing information to a Cuban exile in the U. S. the Bureau should consider reporting this through liaison to CIA. ~~(S)(X)~~

P, CLASSIFIED PER CIA'S 7/5/91 LTR. 9803 rdr/scl #211,326 4/29/92

LEADS:

MIAMI

AT MIAMI, FLORIDA

1. Disseminate copies of enclosed LHM to appropriate agencies. Miami is requested to furnish San Juan with extra copies of any LHMs regarding this matter so that dissemination may be made locally to U. S. Customs and U. S. Coast Guard.

2. Alert Cuban sources particularly those reporting regarding ELC matters to the use of Mona Island as a storage or training base.

SAN JUAN

AT SAN JUAN, PUERTO RICO

1. Will alert extablished sources and attempt to develop information regarding the use of Mona Island by Cuban exile groups.

2. Maintain contact with U. S. Customs and U. S. Coast Guard regarding this matter.

SECRET

Date:09/02/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10237

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/29/75
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
HANDWRITTEN NOTES: TELEPHONE CALL WITH STURGIS ON 4-29-75.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/02/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
CONTAINED IN FILE ENTITLED, "STURGIS, FRANK" "O/R-I (OO)"
SANITIZED BY CIA.

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

5 681 8263 TCW Sturgis 4-29-75

Barker's Station Chief in early 1961 was [Jim Knowles]03, who was also in Havana Station, where he was Pro-Fidel. (So was [Jack Stewart]03 in Havana)

Barker, Martinez & ~~[illegible]~~ Sturgis were involved in domestic intell.
Bill Johnson — had Navy fighter plane

Hunt left Miami 1 wk b4 Bay of Pigs.

Sturgis says a "CIA Agent" is one who has a K w/ CIA & is pd by it." He never was a CIA agent.

He started getting involved w/ Cuban people in Miami in about 1945. Carlos Prio was 1st forced out of Cuba by Batista in about 1946. Sturgis' uncle was married to Cuban woman & was either in exile or was visiting in Fla.

Carlos Marcello, Mafia Don from New Orl., had trouble w/ Bobby Kennedy.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED en
16-8-94
(1)(A) KP 12 apr 99

2/pv

Marita Lorenz - mistress of Castro, Said recently to a reporter that when she 1st came to U.S. in 1960 or so, the first people she met was Sturgis & Howard Hunt. Sturgis denies this, says that the person who was with him was Alex Rorke or Sam Jenis — not Hunt.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER	135-10001-10238
RECORDS SERIES	
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	
FROM	
TO	
TITLE	
DATE	04/22/75
PAGES	2
SUBJECTS	
HANDWRITTEN NOTES:	TELEPHONE CALL WITH STURGIS ON 4-22-75.
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	U
RESTRICTIONS	OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS	O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	09/02/94
OPENING CRITERIA	

COMMENTS :
CONTAINED IN FILE ENTITLED, "STURGIS, FRANK" "O/R-I (OO)"
SANITIZED BY CIA.

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TCW Sturgis 4-22-75
Wants to correct something. Was Park Woolen - Santiago de Cuba - Counsel Genl but Sturg. didnt contact him.
It was Patterson, called him Bill. Was C/A agent there, left C/A later, after getting to be Chief of Station in Santiago. Sturg was in touch w/; not Woolen
(Jack Stewart,03.03 & Jim Knowles possibly met him) were in Havana.

Has info re Miami people, possibly incl. some Cuban Americans & poss. incl. some people of past C/A contact, are planning to go to Venezuela and to assass. Henry Kissinger & the Pres. of Venez. on Kissinger's forthcoming trip there.
Dr. de Cardenas - Latin Am. Anti Comm. League may be involved.

305-681-8263

2515 NW 122d St.
Miami, Fla. 22167

Called John Mintz, 324-3000 at FBI & gave him above info at abt 1:50 PM. Called him back again (talked to his secy - he on phone) at 1:58 P to give him Sturgis' address. Mintz asked that I delay calling Sturgis back until he gets things started at his end.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
Ap 12 apr 99
16-8-94
(1)(A)

"Mr. Nasca" of FBI called back at 2:17 PM, asked if OK w/ me if they have their Miami Ofc contact St.: OK w/ me. He OKd - ma

Called Sturgis back; told him FBI wd be contacting him this PM.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10239

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
HANDWRITTEN NOTES: LIST OF NAMES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/02/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
CONTAINED IN FILE ENTITLED, "STURGIS, FRANK" "O/R-I (OO)"
SANITIZED BY CIA.

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

C.I.A. personnel:

(Jack 03 Steward) - C.I.A. in Havana
1958-59

1968 - Merida, Mex

Rogelio Gonzalez Corso 1959
Havana - M.R.R. chief (military) code name (Francisco)
contact with me & Geraldine Shamma.

Rafael Hanscom. U.R.

Ray Sandstom - FT. Laud.
Lawyer for F. Sturgis.

Ricardo Lorie
&
Salvador Aller

Paul Bethel
Capt Antonio Montes Llano
Mia. Springs

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICAT AND/OR
RELEASE OF TH UMENT
AS SANITIZED
16-8-94
(1)(A) KP 12 apr 99

V/N

Date:09/02/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER	135-10001-10243
RECORDS SERIES	
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

8/20/98

KP 12 apr 99

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	ROCK
FROM	OLSEN, ROBERT
TO	FILE
TITLE	
DATE	03/06/75
PAGES	10

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

KP 12 apr 99

SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW OF MARCH 4, 1975, WITH E. HOWARD HUNT AND HIS DAUGHTER, LISA HUNT.

DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	S
RESTRICTIONS	OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS	O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	09/02/94
OPENING CRITERIA	

COMMENTS :
CONTAINED IN FILE ENTITLED, "HUNT, E. HOWARD - INTERVIEWED 3/4/75"
O/R-I (AA)"
SANITIZED BY CIA.

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

March 6, 1975

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM TO: File

FROM: Robert Olsen RO

SUBJECT: Interview of March 4, 1975, with E. Howard Hunt and his Daughter, Lisa Hunt

The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 PM and was conducted at 712 Jackson Place.

Mr. Hunt is presently residing at 1245 N.E. 85 8~~2~~th Street, Miami, Florida 33138. He has a silent telephone number of 305 758-6159.

Lisa Hunt resides at 3406 Nimitz Road, Apt. A-2, Kensington, Maryland 20795. She has an unlisted telephone number which she declined to give us. She was born on March 9, 1951.

The interview concerned allegations that Mr. Hunt was involved in the assassination of President John Kennedy and other public figures. He is aware of the public statements made by Dick Gregory and Ralph Schoenman in early February 1975 relative to his being involved in the assassination of President Kennedy. He states that most of the information that Mr. Gregory and Mr. Schoenman referred to is drawn from a book by Tad Szulc entitled, E. Howard Hunt, the Compulsive Spy. Hunt states that the book is saturated with errors. One of those errors is the claim that Hunt was Chief of Station in Mexico City in the fall of 1963.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(b)
12 Aug 94 em

The Bay of Pigs Background

Hunt states that in 1960 he was assigned to the job of organizing a "government in exile" for Cuba among Cuban exiles in Florida. The plan adopted by the National Security Council under President Eisenhower called for the formation and training of a brigade of Cuban exiles who would invade Cuba, establish a provisional government, receive recognition by the United States and overthrow the Castro government. The brigade had its own air force and was otherwise fully equipped by the United States Government. The operation, however, was not supposed to be one involving United States Government participation. The venture was to involve training and launching from outside the United States.

In connection with his political activity and the organization of the government in exile, Hunt went to Mexico in 1960. Shortly thereafter the Mexican government demanded that they leave and he returned to the United States. Richard Nixon, then Vice President, was working closely with the CIA on the project.

When President Kennedy was elected in November 1960, he was briefed on the project and confirmed the plans, including the plan to provide air cover to the invading Cuban force. In early 1961, however, the Kennedy administration decided that the political organization of the Cuban government in exile would have to be broadened so as to include all elements of the Cuban society. Even radical leftwingers were to be included. Hunt was assigned the job of convincing the leaders of the Cuban community to accept such a broadening of the political structure of the government in exile. Hunt found this to be an impossible job to accomplish because the Cubans recruited to make up the invasion force had been promised that the government in exile would be solidly anti-Castro and anti-communist. Hunt asked to be relieved of his assignment because he thought it was an impossible one to achieve and he returned to Washington to work on propaganda and similar non-political aspects of the forthcoming invasion.

Within twenty-four hours prior to the time that the Cuban brigade was to hit the beaches at the Bay of Pigs, President Kennedy made two critical decisions that affected the final outcome: he cancelled plans for an airstrike on Cuba which would have destroyed the six remaining combat planes that were available to Castro; second, the order that there be no air cover for the invading brigade. The result was that the invading force was chopped up while it was still in the water; the ships carrying the armored vehicles were sunk, as were the supply ships, and the troops were left abandoned on the shore. The remnant of the Cuban Air Force was entirely adequate to demolish the invasion fleet.

Hunt concedes that he was bitter about the decisions made by President Kennedy, but he primarily blames Arthur Schlesinger, Adlai Stevenson and Robert Kennedy for advising the President to follow the course he chose. He particularly feels that the Cubans had been recruited with certain promises and that those promises were withdrawn at the last minute. Hunt says, in fact, that the decision not to make the airstrike and not to provide air cover was made after the invasion fleet had arrived at the point of no return, i.e., when radio communication to the invasion fleet had already terminated for security reasons.

After the Bay of Pigs disaster, Hunt worked with Allen Dulles until early 1962 at which time Dulles was replaced as DCI. In January 1962, Hunt was assigned to the Domestic Operations Division of the Deputy Directorate for Plans. He was involved in handling proprietaries based in the United States, which have their impact abroad. His immediate superior was Stanley Gaines, who was either Chief of Operations or Executive Officer of the Domestic Operations Division and Tracy Barnes, who was Division Chief of DOD (Barnes is a cousin by marriage to Vice President Rockefeller.)

The proprietaries which Hunt was engaged in managing were [Continental Press] 24 which prepared news and radio 24 broadcasts for foreign use; 24 [Allied-Pacific] Publishing Company [of Bombay] which was engaged in publishing [textbooks for Indian schools]; the [Rome Daily American], 24 a cover 24 operation; and Fodor's Travel Guides, a proprietary which Hunt questions as to whether it had any use. (Fodor's had been set up in 1946 as a cover operation but served no apparent use during the years Hunt was with DOD.

The headquarters for the DOD was at 1717 H Street, N.W., in Washington, D. C., and then later it was on Pennsylvania Avenue.

Hunt's assignment with DOD lasted until the spring of 1965.

During the period from January 1962 until 1965, he states that he never traveled to Mexico or any other Latin American country. His first trip to Mexico after 1961 was in 1970, when he traveled there for the Mullen Company after his retirement from the CIA.

Hunt's Whereabouts on November 22, 1963

Hunt states that he had never been in Dallas until 1971, with a possible exception of a change of planes on his way to Mexico with his family in 1960. He does not recall whether that change of planes took place in Dallas or in Houston. In any event, he and his family never left the airport on that occasion.

He has never had any contact, directly or indirectly, with Lee Harvey Oswald, Jack Ruby or anyone else thought to have been associated with the assassination of the President.

He was never in New Orleans in 1963 and has never had anything whatever to do with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, which he identifies as a communist organization.

During the period from January 1962 to 1965, he traveled once or twice per year to India, two or three times per year to Paris, once or twice per year to London, and, during that period, he traveled two or three times to Rome. His only domestic travel in 1963 was between Washington and New York. All travel, whether domestic or international, was in his own name.

Hunt states that in 1961 he used the pseudonym of Edward J. Hamilton in connection with his work on the Cuban project in Florida. With the exception of that pseudonym and the pseudonym he used on the identification papers provided him for the Ellsberg break in, he has never used a pseudonym.

On November 22, 1963, he and his wife were driving on H Street at about 9th in Washington, D. C., when he turned the car radio on and learned that the President had been shot. He and Mrs. Hunt had been shopping in a Chinese grocery store in that immediate vicinity, immediately prior to their getting into the car. The Hunts lived at 5215 Balton Road, Sumner, Maryland. On their way home they drove to the Sidwell Friends school on upper Wisconsin Avenue and picked up their younger daughter, Kevan. Kevan told them that Robert and Courtenay Kennedy, children of Attorney General Robert Kennedy, were students in the same school and had been picked up by the Secret Service. The children in the school knew that the President had been shot.

Mr. Hunt states that the following persons are witnesses to the fact that he was here in Washington, D. C., at the time the President was shot in Dallas:

1. His son, Howard St. John Hunt, then ten years of age.
2. His daughter, Lisa, then twelve years of age.
3. His daughter, Kevan, then eleven years of age.
4. The family maid, Mary Trayner, now employed by a family living at 4806 DeRussey Parkway, Chevy Chase, Maryland, and whose phone number is 652-2930.

Mr. Hunt believes that he was either taking the day off from work as a part of annual leave on November 22, 1963, or he may have been recuperating from a hospitalization for ulcers. He had been hospitalized at about that period at Sibley Hospital in Washington, D. C.

Mr. Hunt states that he held the following oil company charge account and credit cards in 1963 and that such accounts may provide corroboration as to his presence in Washington, D. C., on November 22, 1963: Esso Oil, Gulf Oil, Texaco Oil, Cities Service Oil, Brooks Brothers (New York), Garfinkle's, Woodward and Lothrop, Sears Roebuck & Co., Hecht Co. He also states that telephone records might be checked with

Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co.; that the CIA might have travel voucher records showing his travel during that year and that CIA should also have records on the dates on which he took sick leave or annual leave.

Mr. Hunt categorically denies that he has been involved in any way whatsoever with the assassination of President Kennedy, Senator Robert Kennedy, Martin Luther King, or any other person either within or without the United States. He similarly denies any participation or involvement whatever in the attempted assassination of Governor Wallace, the disappearance of Congressman Hale Boggs or the shooting of Senator Stennis.

He states that in connection with the planning for the Cuban invasion in 1961, he did suggest that Fidel Castro should be assassinated either before or contemporaneously with that invasion, but his suggestion was not acted upon or otherwise approved.

Attached are copies of a press statement made by Mr. Hunt in early February 1975 in Florida, in which he denies the allegations made by Dick Gregory and others with respect to his involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy and a letter written to Mr. Hunt by the former family maid, Mary Traynor.

Lisa Hunt confirms her father's account that he was at home with the family in the afternoon and evening of November 22, 1963. She recalls that her father assembled the family in front of the television set. He wanted them all to watch the program because it was an important historical matter. They were all shocked about the assassination of the President.

cc: D. Belin
Senior Counsels

The allegations made by Dick Gregory and others connecting me to the murder of President John Kennedy are totally without foundati They constitute a false and vicious libel.

These charges are bizarre . products of sick minds. The Political Left has never been able or willing to accept the fact that Kennedy's assassin was a man of the Left; thus the Leftist preoccupation with finding an alternate assassin.

Dick Gregory's smear represents the ultimate in slander and innuendo customarily characterized as McCarthyism.

The Rockefeller and other investigative committees will probably examine Gregory's charges - as indeed they should. For my part I would welcome a thorough high-level investigation and a full airing of all relevant findings. Only if this takes place will I have any hope of clearing my name and living free from the threats against my life already made by neurotics.

I was not in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963; in fact I never visited Dallas until eight years later. I did not meet Frank Sturgis until 1972, nine years after we were allegedly together in Dallas. I was not in Mexico in 1963, and I did not meet Lee Harvey Oswald there or at any other place or time. Moreover, I shared the nation's grief over the murder of our President. These are the facts.

Until authoritative investigative bodies make known their judgment concerning my alleged involvement in the Kennedy murder I will continue to bring libel actions against any and all parties who repeat the libel. I must take this course because the libels are prejudicial to my position before the Court now considering my Appeal from the Watergate affair. And because the libels threaten my only means of livelihood, as a writer. But of even greater concern to me is that continued publicity given to these reckless charges could stimulate some yet-unpublicized maniac into violent action against me and my family.

FEB 5 1975

ADVICE AND WAIVER

Place 712 Jackson Pl
Date 1/31/75
Time 3:35 pm

Before you make any statement to, or answer any questions from, the Commission or its investigators, you should understand that you have the right to remain silent. If you choose to answer, anything you say can be used against you in court.

You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put, and may have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time; or you may defer your answer until you talk to a lawyer.

WAIVER

I have read and understand the foregoing advice. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions ~~[with]~~ [without] a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Signed

Witness:

Witness:

Time:

4806 De Russey Pkwy
Chevy Chase Md 20015
Feb 6 1875

Dear Mr Hunt

I am so glad you thought
writing to me. I remember the day President
ennedy was shot very well, and I certainly
emember you were there.

If you recall, Mrs Hunt's Aunt
nie, (I am sorry I can't remember her last name)
Chicago was staying with you for a few
ays, and on the Friday Mrs Hunt, her Aunt,
d the three children were going down town
a movie matinee, when Veronica Moffet
lled from the Spanish Embassy to tell Mrs Hunt
at the President had been shot. I remember
all stood around and stared at each other
en you put the television on, and the
st thing we heard was the Newsman saying
at it was now 45 minutes since the shot
d been fired, and that they still did
t know how badly he had been injured

I know that Mrs Hunts Aunt is now dead, but it is possible that when she went back to Chicago she may have mentioned that you were there when the news came through, to her daughter (Mrs Hunts cousin Phyllis) Although she might not remember it. She just may be able to corroborate your story too.

I can of course remember lots more details. It was the sort of day that stays in your mind

I hope you a still getting along well. Did you manage to sell the House on River Rd?

Let me know if there is anything I can do for you.

If you should run across Miss Stella remember me to her

Please give my regards to the children,

Sincerely

Mary

P.S. My Phone is 652-2930
I am always home in evenings.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10245

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/04/75
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HANDWRITTEN NOTES ON E. HOWARD HUNT.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled "Hunt, E. Howard - Interviewed 3/4/75"
"O/R-I (AA) (3)"

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Howard
E Hunt

E. Howard Hunt   Cf 3-4-75
Lisa Hunt, d/b March 9, 1957
3406 Nimitz Rd, Apt A 2
Kensington, Md. 20795

1245 NE 85th St
Miami Fla 33138
Ph. 305 758-6159 (Silent)

"E Howard Hunt, The Compulsive Spy"
By Tad Szulc
is primary source of Gregory-Schoenman. Errors:

— Hunt was Chief of Station in Mex City in fall of 1963.

Hunt — 1962 & 1963

Jan 1962 asgd to Domestic Oper. Div. of DDP, handling proprietaries based in U.S. (impact of which is abroad.) Immed. superior was Stanley Gaines was either Chief of Oper or Exec Off. of DOD & Tracy Barnes was Div Chief DOD. (Barnes is cousin by marriage to VP Rockef.)

— Continental Press, prepared news & radio bdcsts for foreign
— Allied-Pacific Pub. Co. of Bombay - publ text books for Indian schools.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(b)
11 Aug 84 en

– Rome Daily American – a cover operation

– Fodor's Travel Guides – Hunt questioned whether it had any use. Had been set up in 1946 as cover.

Hq. was here at ~~Langley~~ 1717 H St. NW & then later on Pa Ave.

This asgmt lasted until Spring '65

Never went to Mexico or other Latin Am. Country.

1st went to Mex after 1961 in 1970 for Mullin Co. after retirement fr CIA.

May have changed planes in Dallas in 1960 (w/o leav. airport) on way to Mexico City.

Oil Co. credit cards held in 1963
  Esso
  Gulf
  Texaco
  Cities Service
Charge accts in 1963
  Brooks Bros – NY
  Garfinkels
  Woodward & Lothrop
  Sears
  Hecht Co.
Chesapeake & Potomac Tel Co.
CIA should have travel voucher records:
annual leave

1961 Edward J. Hamilton pseudonym used by Hunt in re Cuban project in Fla.

Thinks he travelled to India 1 or 2 times per year, 2 or 3 times to Paris & 1-2 times per year in London, & 1 or less times per yr in Rome. Only domestic travel in 63 wd have been to NY. All travel done in his own name. [illegible]

On 22 Nov. '63, he & wife were driving on H St & 9th in Wash. D.C. when heard on car radio. Had been in Chinese grocery store. On way home to 5215 Bolton Rd, Sumner, Md. Drove home after stopping at Sidwell Friends School upper Wisconsin Ave & picked up younger daughter Kevan Hunt.

Kevan remembers that Robt Kennedy's / Robert & Courtney children, in same school, had been picked up from school by Secret Service & the children knew abt assass.

Witnesses to fact Hunt here in Wash.
Son - Howard St. John Hunt, then 10
Daughter - Lisa, then 12
Daughter - Kevan, then 11
Maid - Mary Trayner, now w/ family at
4806 DeRussey Pkwy
Chevy Chase Md.
Ph. 652-2930

Hunt thinks he was on leave (taking the day off) that day. Also may have been recuperating from hospitaliz. for ulcers. Sibley Hospital, Wash. D.C.

30(1)
8/27/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
8/20/98
K
KP 12 apr 99

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10246

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : CARGILL, MASON
TO : FILE

TITLE :

DATE : 04/22/75
PAGES : 27

SUBJECTS :
MCCONE PAPERS.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL Postponed
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

April 22, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94
(this page only)

A

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: MC CONE PAPERS

I have gone through most of the papers remaining at the Agency prepared by DCI McCone from November 29, 1961, through December 31, 1964. Attached are notes on portions of them dealing in any way with possible assassination attempts and contacts with the Warren Commission.

Enclosures

RMC:clb
(2)

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MATERIAL ATTACHED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94
(pp. 1-12 only)

MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS,
WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412 Committee plus Robert Kennedy.

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project - General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General - included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor operations apparently in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's are discovered in Cuba:

> "McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime."
> (emphasis added)

File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

(97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy: McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]
[According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following:

> "I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/ Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]

File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963

Nothing Relevant

File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group" [MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about Kennedy assassination [MISSING]

(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING]

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: "Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations.

File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassination attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations.

File: July 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press." [MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI "reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

File: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.

(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose. (Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action.
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss "Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same notation appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to "explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)

---

*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba. Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"
Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House.

BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassination of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "W" File

Nothing relevant.

BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined.

~~TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

April 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 8 Aug 94
(1)(c)
(2 pages only)

B

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: MONGOOSE MATERIALS RETAINED BY THE CIA

Joseph Selzer of the Inspector General staff made available to me all the materials he has been able to assemble from CIA sources concerning Project MONGOOSE. These consist of three file folders and one loose-leaf binder. I have examined them to determine if any reference is made to assassination, liquidation, or elimination of Castro.

The first document in this pile is a copy of the minutes of the August 10, 1962, meeting of the special group augmented, prepared by Tom Parrot. They were forwarded to Dr. Chamberlain, the CIA Inspector General, by Robroy Ratliff, a CIA employee detailed to the National Security Council. A cover memo of April 18, 1975, was attached, may be of some interest, and reads as follows:

> "FYI, We received a request from Belin of the Vice President's Commission to examine our files on MONGOOSE and other Cuban and D.R. files. While this request has not been resolved, the preliminary response is not to allow this access. Signed Robroy Ratliff."

The minutes of the August 10, 1962, meeting contained no mention, implicit or explicit, of assassination.

The first complete file examined was a long green cardboard file without a title on it. Inside, however, it is indicated to be a record of Special Group meetings and

Special Group (Augmented) meetings at which General Carter participated and discussions of Cuba and/or Cuban overflights during the period August 15 to November 14, 1962. This file contains a memorandum dated October 16, 1962, from General Carter to the Special Group Augmented, Subject: "Operation MONGOOSE Sabotage Proposals." Paragraph 1c of this memorandum contains a proposal that the CIA undertake 24(grenade) attack on 24(the Chinese Communist Embassy) in Havana, to be carried out by a recruited Cuban agent who has access to a roof overlooking the (embassy) 24 garden and who has volunteered for this mission."

The second file in this collection is entitled simply "MONGOOSE." This contains nothing relevant to the assassination inquiry.

Next in this collection in a large manila envelope on which is written in ink the following notation: "Separate cover attachment to ER75-5938." This envelope contains miscellaneous papers related to MONGOOSE. The documents in this envelope contain, among other things, a long list of potential sabotage targets within Cuba. I found no reference to assassination, either explicit or implicit.

The next file examined is marked "Cuba Special Subject." This file also contains miscellaneous papers relating to Project MONGOOSE, none of which contain any references to assassination.

The last item of this MONGOOSE package consists of a bulky loose-leaf binder of papers assembled for General Carter's reference of significant things that happened during the period of August to October, 1962. In this notebook, the Inspector General has already flagged entries which refer in any way to Operation MONGOOSE. I have examined all such entries.

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

April 30, 1975

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND QJWIN

On April 25, 1975, I was given three file folders containing material on the above subjects by Mr. Joseph Selzer of the Inspector General's staff. According to Mr. Selzer, his review of these files indicates that the basic purpose of ZRRIFLE and its asset QJWIN was the burglarization of premises outside the United States for the purpose of obtaining cryptologic materials. He assures me that there is nothing in these files which refer explicitly or implicitly to assassination or "executive action" in any form. His opinion is that clandestine operatives of the type who wrote the documents contained in these files would never commit to writing anything having to do with the subject of assassination.

C

The first file reviewed is entitled "ZRRIFLE/QJWIN/RYBAT OPERATIONAL." The following entries in this file seem to have some potential relevance:

12-10 1. Dispatch, dated November 1, 1960, to Chief of Station, Dakar, and Chief of Station, Luxembourg, from Chief, KUTUBE/D at headquarters. This three-page dispatch apparently deals with a mission on which a recruited agent, Jose Marie Andre Mankel, will be sent from Luxembourg, where he was recruited, to Dakar for the purpose of recruiting certain other agents from among criminal elements there, specifically Corsicans. The purpose for which these agents would ultimately be used is not clear from this dispatch. However, paragraph 2a reads as follows: "In view of the extreme sensitivity of the

KP 12 apr 99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
8 Aug 94
(1) (A)
(1) (B) (12 pages)

NW

objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do. Instead, he was told that we have evidence of Soviet operations among nationality groups in Africa, specifically, Corsicans, and that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use. (Comment: It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use MANKEL.) He agreed to go on the trip for us." It is not clear from this dispatch that Chiefs of Station in Luxembourg and Dakar were completely 12-10 witting of the purpose for which Mankel is being sent to Dakar. Paragraph 3 contains the following sentence: "Rabney gave Jouvenoy [Chief of Station, Luxembourg] the same briefing 12-10 concerning our purposes as he had given to the COS, Dakar." The remainder of the dispatch deals with details of the contacts with Americans which Mankel may make in Dakar if he requires further assistance, including instruction for bringing about a clandestine meeting.

15-20

2. Cable dated November 2, 1960, from Frankfurt to th Director with the notation: "Action: C/FI/D-4." This cab contains the following statement in paragraph 1: "Altman m Mankel 2 November. He accepted offer to procede Leopoldvil Precise mission not conveyed to him, he only informed that mission might involve large element of personal risk."

"Leopoldville may be released

JR

2-10

3. Cable, dated November 3, 1960, from Director to stations at Luxembourg and Dakar. This cable contains the first identification of Mankel with the code name QJWIN. The cable reads as follows: "AUDW 147 on QJWIN trip Dakar pouched both stations 3 November. 22 Confirm receipt by cable."

20-20 "Luxembourg: will advise when to brief him on Dakar mission after receipt further info from Altman per paragraph to FRAN 6959/(IN36814) on Leopoldville mission." This cable contains the following code word references: RYBAT, LAURICLE, ZRACORN.

4. Cable from Leopoldville to Director, with action to C/FI/D4, dated 5 November 1960. It contains the following paragraph:

61nJ

"Please inform Mankel he should proceed Leopoldville as soon as shots completed. Not necessary have Congo visa. Should go Paris and take Air France flight to Brazzaville and can obtain visa for Brazzaville in Paris."

Air FRANCE can be released

This cable contains a handwritten note in the margin as follows: "One copy given to Mr. Bissell by IS/Duty Off. Saturday. Action to be taken by DDP. - E.B."

5. Cable, dated November 9, 1960, to Luxembourg from Director. It contains the following statement: "Unless yo advised to contrary by Altman, brief QJWIN on Dakar mission, using notes left during Rabney visit...Please insure he thoroughly rehearsed all details since we anticipate he will go from Leopoldville to Dakar with no opportunity reviewing briefing..."

6. Cable, November 11, 1960, to Director, from Luxembourg. Paragraph 2 contains the following statement: "QJWIN recommended two French contacts who agree undertake unspecified job. Arrangement made for direct access without QJWIN if Altman interested..."

7. Cable, dated November 12, 1960, to Director, from Leopoldville. This cable requests the immediate departure of QJWIN for Leopoldville, and contains the following statement: "Local operational circumstances require immediate expediting of QJWIN travel to Leopoldville."

8. The file contains several documents apparently describing various Italians in the area of Trieste who have the capability to break and enter and crack safes. They appeared to be of questionable morality. Reports on the safecrackers were transmitted in a dispatch from the Chief of Station in (Rome) to the Chief, KUDOVE/D. The names of the 06 safecrackers in 15-9 question are (Sabatti) 06, (Cuccagna) 06, and (Bernardini).

9. Cable, dated December 8, 1960, from Leopoldville to the Director. It indicates that one purpose of QJWIN's presence in Leopoldville is to recruit a major in the "[Yugoslavian] air force, through framing him up in an illegal smuggling transaction.] This recruitment is apparently for the purpose of collecting information from within the (Yugoslavian) government."

6/PV

10. Cable, dated December 14, 1960, from headquarters to Leopoldville. The cable criticizes Leopoldville for using QJWIN for the purpose of recruiting the "(Yugoslav) major, since this was not his primary purpose in Leopoldville." Cable contains the following statement: "Would like restrict QJWIN to activity directly pertinent his mission Leopoldville or forthcoming mission Dakar and possibly elsewhere (e.g., Milan) for KUTUBE/D purposes. He our only asset of this type and we wish keep him clean of any operational involvement other than that originally planned for him." This is the first cable from headquarters on which the name of William K. Harvey appears.

11. Cable, dated December 17, 1960, from Leopoldville to Director. This cable concerned a new asset entering the picture for the first time, who arrived in Leopoldville on December 2. The cable states that WIROGUE was the asset with whom initial contact has been made in Leopoldville. WIROGUE is living in the same hotel as QJWIN with whom he conversed. QJWIN has reported: "WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to participate in intel net and be member execution squad. When QJWIN said he not interested, WIROGUE added there would be bonuses for special jobs. Under QJWIN questioning, WIROGUE later said he working for PBPRIME service."

12. Cable, dated January 19, 1961, from Director to Luxembourg. This cable apparently indicates that the Agency plans to use QJWIN in Leopoldville for more than one particular mission. It contained the following statement: "Inform QJWIN we planning use him Leopoldville indefinitely as discussed with him there."

13. There follows a series of cables reflecting the fact that QJWIN proceeds to Italy to recruit other assets. One cable admonishes field agents to tell QJWIN not to give reason to any of the candidates to be recruited in Italy to believe that ODYOKE or PBPRIME is involved. I get the impression that ODYOKE refers to the U.S. CIA, and PBPRIME refers to the intelligence service of some other nation. However, no document uncovered so far confirms this. Cables which follow seem to indicate that the people QJWIN was to recruit were intended to be professional burglars. There is no indication that they are intended to be assassins. There are many other indications that these recruits were intended for safecracking and breaking and entering. QJWIN told them he could offer a job for a large firm which wanted certain commercial documents stolen.

VpV

14. Subsequent cables and dispatches indicate other efforts on the part of QJWIN to recruit safecrackers in France and Italy.

15. Dispatch dated June 7, 1961, from headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D to the Chief of Station in Luxembourg. It contains a long discussion of the Agency's relationship with QJWIN and his main purpose as an agent. This dispatch makes it clear that the primary purpose of QJWIN's employment by the Agency is to recruit burglars and safecrackers for use by the CIA. This dispatch contains the first reference I have found to the code word ZRRIFLE. The one thing that seems rather unclear is why QJWIN was initially sent to Leopoldville, and apparently was contemplated to return to Leopoldville, when all of his recruiting of safecrackers and burglars takes place in Europe. The fact that his return to Leopoldville was contemplated may be easily seen from paragraph one of this cable. The releasing officer on this cable was Mr. William K. Harvey.

16. Correspondence and cables indicate that one James Rabney from CIA headquarters visited Europe in April and March of 1961 for the purpose of meeting with Mankel to discuss possible recruits for safecracking operations.

17. Dispatch dated December 15, 1961, from Chief of Station in Luxembourg to Headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D. It discusses the efforts of QJWIN to recruit two safecrackers in Switzerland. oC It indicates that two French citizens, named 06 Santelli and Garioni were asked to come to Switzerland under false pretenses by QJWIN for the purpose of being interviewed, The following passage in the dispatch indicates clearly these men were to be recruited for the purpose of the safecracking and surreptitious entry. "During the interview with Santelli, oC 06 Garioni observed that for a night job he would need an assistant to help him with carrying the equipment and to act as lookout. He said he would prefer to do the job during working hours; for this he would get three or four others to help him and force someone in the office to open the safe."

18. Dispatch dated February 2, 1962, from Chief of Station Luxembourg to Headquarters, Chief, KUTUBE/D. It discusses the efforts of the Luxembourg station to provide acceptable cover for Mankel in Germany, where the Agency has

4/JN

decided to locate him. The plan seems to be for Mankel to develop a business as an art dealer in some German town selling French paintings. It is contemplated that the Agency will supply the initial capital for the formation of his business. The final sentence in this dispatch asked headquarters for projected operational plans for QJWIN.

19. Cable, dated March 17, 1962, from Director to Luxembourg indicates that the Agency still contemplates some activity for Mankel in Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 of this cable reads as follows: "Tell him will at same time discuss Leopoldville assignment and have him sign contract." The cable directs Luxembourg to tell Mankel to meet James Rabney at certain locations in Germany on the 28th and 29th of March, 1961, telling him to be prepared to travel in Europe for about two weeks.

20. Cable dated April 18, 1962, from ol Headquarters to Luxembourg states that another agent QJBANNER-5 had informed the Agency that QJWIN is going on trial after Easter on charges of cobalt smuggling from 1957 or 1958 and could receive up to a six-year sentence. Paragraph 2 of the cable states, "Please contact QJWIN for all details including specific charges and name prosecutor. If 01 QJBANNER-5 info true we may wish attempt quash charges or arrange somehow salvage QJWIN for our purposes." Paragraph 3 states, "Still do not have basic decisions but fully anticipate we will need QJWIN."

21. Cable, dated April 26, 1962, from Luxembourg to Headquarters indicates that QJWIN's trial will be completed on April 29. He expects to be fined but not subject to a jail sentence. Some indication of the Agency's intents with respect to QJWIN may be discerned from paragraph 4 which reads as follows: "While we do not know present long-term plans for QJWIN, he has no lead to other candidates. His potential appears restricted activation to candidates OLLA 1426 or personal spot action. Suggest either could be done from Leopold base and question if not preferable move him to Leopold assignment now." There is a handwritten notation beside the first sentence of paragraph 4 which states, "Not the point." Beside the last sentence of this paragraph is the handwritten notation, "How?"

22. Cable dated May 24, 1962, to Luxembourg from Headquarters indicates that the Agency has changed its plans about assigning QJWIN any duties in Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 reads, "Decision made keep QJWIN Europe. Leopoldville assignment canceled." Cable also indicates that headquarters approves of Mankel's proposed move to Germany, probably Baden-Baden.

23. Memorandum dated July 3, 1962, WKH [presumably William K. Harvey] from AMS, re ZRRIFLE. This memo discusses possible future uses for QJWIN. It seems perfectly consistent with the use of QJWIN merely for the purpose of recruiting safecrackers and burglars. Paragraph 4 of this memo refers to some ZRRIFLE authorization paper: "I have already given you the ZRRIFLE authorization paper signed by Helms and Skip has been given QJWIN contract, including the extension to 1 March 1963." An attachment to this memorandum gives details on two possible candidates for burglary and safecracking. In this attachment there are two references, however, which may be somewhat disturbing: One candidate is stated to be "willing to use gun"; the second "wanted to know if he should be armed for job--ready to go to the end."

24. Immediately following a dispatch dated December 7, 1962, from Luxembourg to headquarters, there appears in the files two pages of penciled notes on yellow "buck-slip" type paper which are difficult to read but may be relevant. At the top of the first page appears the word QJWIN. On this page appears the following words, which are barely legible: "In 1961 by Bill H or Bissell used (Arnold C/ Estale) [or (Estate)] 03 direct action capability established in 03 B [illegible] QJWIN Luxembourg principal prelim capability for fourth country. QJWIN spotted three or four--moved to Italy..."

25. Dispatch from Luxembourg to Headquarters Chief, KUTUBE, dated February 14, 1964, indicates that QJWIN has been terminated. Paragraph 1 reads in part, "QJWIN has been terminated. "Rozeney told him on 21 April that the operation in which he was to play a role had been shelved and therefore his contract, which ran out on 29 February, was not renewed. He was reassured that this action did not result from anything he had done and his past cooperation was appreciated. It was mentioned as conceivable that the operation might have been off and running if he had been able to establish his cover last year."

2/17N

Another file examined was entitled "ZRRIFLE Administrative/Financial"; it is a long manila-type file. The following items of possible interest were noted in this file:

1. Memorandum dated January 11, 1961, to the Finance Division from William K. Harvey, Chief FI/D deals with the payments for Mankel's trip to Leopoldville. Paragraph 2 of this memo states, "In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it should be noted that QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed. Although future use of QJWIN is not precluded, it was not deemed fitting during this one use of him to enter into a continuing contractual relationship or to have him sign any memorandum of understanding."

2. Memorandum, dated January 31, 1961, for Chief, Accounts Branch, Finance Division, from Justin E. O'Donnell, Subject: Payments to QJWIN. Paragraph 1 of this memorandum reads as follows: "QJWIN was recruited in Frankfurt 1 November 1960 to undertake a one-shot mission to the Belgian Congo. Because the mission potentially involved great personal risk to him and he was obliged to separate himself from his business affairs, it was agreed orally by this writer with QJWIN that his compensation would be at the rate of $1,000 per month, plus his expenses, for a period of not less than one month and not more than two months." These two financial memoranda, numbers 1 and 2 here, seem to indicate a one-shot purpose for QJWIN in connection with a Congo operation, which seems inconsistent with many of the papers in the operational file reviewed above, which indicated an ongoing relationship with QJWIN for the purposes of recruiting safecrackers and burglars. These financial memoranda are certainly quite consistent with a plan to use QJWIN for a one-shot assassination attempt in the Belgian Congo. It is unclear that merely recruiting safecrackers and burglars or even performing safecracking and burglary missions, would have involved "potential great personal risk" to QJWIN.

3. Memorandum, dated March 24, 1961, for Cable Secretariat from William K. Harvey, Chief, FI/Division D, Subject: "Distribution of ZRRIFLE Traffic." Paragraph 1 of this memorandum reads, "Two copies of all cables bearing the ZRRIFLE indicator are to be delivered in a sealed envelope

directly to Chief, FI/Division D, 1502 L Building. No other distribution is to be made without the specific approval in each instance of the Chief, FI/D." Paragraph 2 reads, "The above has been personally approved by the Deputy Director (Plans)." I question whether such close handling of cable traffic is not unusual even in a case involving safecracking and burglary. Perhaps Harvey intended traffic of more sensitive issues to be passed through the ZRRIFLE channel.

4. In a large manila envelope filed immediately after a dispatch to Luxembourg from the Chief, KUTUBE, dated September 30, 1963, is a large manila envelope marked "Documents in Receipt Supporting ZRRIFLE Activities." Within this envelope are several smaller manila envelopes, one of which is entitled "ZRRIFLE, Receipts for Accounting Submitted by WK Harvey, Receipt for Operational Phone Calls May 15, 1963." Within this envelope are two sheets of yellow legal size paper which contain lists of operational expenses submitted by W.K. Harvey covering the period April 13-21, 1963, all of which are to be charged as operational expenses to QJWIN/ZRRIFLE. These expenses cover hotel expenses in Miami and Perine, Florida, long distance hotel calls for these locations, plus $75 for a boat chartered for operational purposes at Islamorada, Florida. A hotel receipt indicates Harvey paid the bill of a Mr. John A. Wallston of 56510 Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, for the nights of April 17, 18, and 19, and a Miami hotel, probably the Eden Roc. These documents are the first indication of any activities within the U.S. with respect to ZRRIFLE. Apparently they did not involve QJWIN but rather other activity, perhaps directed at Cuba because of his location in Miami. Perhaps Harvey should be confronted with this listing and asked to explain it.

A third file was examined, which was marked "ZRRIFLE-QJWIN Project/Contract. The following items of interest were found:

1. A long memorandum written in ink in longhand on sheets of yellow, legal size paper at the very back of this file entitled "Project ZRRIFLE." This is apparently justification material submitted for the project. The first portion of this memorandum seems to end abruptly at the end of the second page;

perhaps the subsequent pages are missing. These first two pages portray the objective of ZRRIFLE to be that of procurement of code and cipher materials by burglary and safecracking. However, subsequent pages, particularly the last four legal size pages in this file, contain what appears to be the outline of something which could be the establishment of an "executive action capability," although these words are not mentioned nor is the word "assassination." A copy of these pages should definitely be obtained. Paragraph 1 of these pages reads as follows, "Legal, ethical, moral, operational problems; political nonattributability." Paragraph 2 reads in part: "Our own experience (Bangkok) (and affect on DDP) and experiences with KGB...require most professional, proven operationally competent ruthless stable CE experience ops officers..."

Paragraph 3 of this memo is entitled "Maximum Security"; subparagraph 3b reads: "Within KUBARK one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" Paragraph 3c reads as follows: "Max. security cable COMMO for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one man overseas (Europe) control base with own (nonstation) COMMO. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips." Paragraph 3f reads as follows, "No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. government agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal." Paragraph 3i reads, "Pretext: KUTUBE/D search; this established (e.g., Rome)." Paragraph 3j reads, "No discussion in stations." Paragraph 3k reads, "No 'team' until ready to go, if at all." Paragraph 4 reads: "Blackmail: A. No American citizens or residents or people whoever obtained U.S. visas. B. No chain of connections: Strictly person to person; singleton ops. C. No meeting any candidate in home territory. D. Exclude organizations; e.g., Sicilians, criminals, those with record of arrest, those with instability of purpose as criminals. E. Staffers involved--selection." Paragraph 5 reads, "Cover: Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets or Czechs in case of blow." [This seems to indicate ZRRIFLE is not limited to burglary of embassies; how could you blame the Soviets or the Czechs for burglarizing their own embassies?] Paragraph 9 reads, "Should have phoney 201 in records to backstop this [referring to blaming the Soviets or the Czechs], all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file." Paragraph 11 reads, "Silverthorne."

On the following page of these papers, the paragraphs are numbered again from one. On this page a large ink X has been placed over the page; however, it is still legible. Paragraph 1 of this page reads, "Maximum security plus within KUBARK only (e.g., How much does Sivagusa[?] now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering and deciphering. Guise of LAURICLE objective." Paragraph 5 reads, "No chain of connections permitting blackmail."

2. Memorandum, dated February 19, 1962, from Richard Helms, Deputy Director (Plans), to William K. Harvey, Subject: "Authorization of ZRRIFLE Agent Activities." This memorandum authorizes Harvey to retain the services of agent QJWIN "and such other principal agents and subagents as may be required." Memorandum does not state the purpose of the ZRRIFLE project.

3. Filed immediately after a memorandum dated March 6, 1969, from Richard Helms to William K. Harvey, is a normal business size white envelope containing the following notation on the front in penciled handwriting, "Lloyd very personal from Bill H." Within this envelope is a small yellow piece of paper containing the following notation in penciled handwriting, "John Rosselli, alias John Ralston--Wm. Walker."

4. A memorandum dated June 27, 1963, for Chief, Foreign Intelligence, from William K. Harvey, Subject: QJWIN. This memo states that QJWIN is currently not being used for any operational purposes. It discusses whether or not he should be retained as an agent. Paragraph 2 seems to indicate that the executive action portion of QJWIN's project, if any, has been terminated. This paragraph reads: "As far as the ZRRIFLE aspects of this operation which has been covered under the QJWIN authorization for security reasons and with which Fletcher M. Knight is fully familiar as I orally advised you on June 26, 1963, except for one precautionary 'lifeline,' aspects of this case have been terminated and need no longer, except perhaps for minor accountings, be considered as a part of this project."

A last file of the ZRRIFLE series examined is entitled "ZRRIFLE Name Traces/Personality Sketches." Items of interest in this file are as follows:

1. Piece of thin white paper under tab C, the heading of which is "Secret-RYBAT." This document is a list of traits which desired recruits would have. This is similar to the list of traits deemed desirable in the handwritten memorandum contained in the far rear of the previous file reviewed. This set of characteristics, however, could refer to burglars and safecrackers as well as assassins. This is indicated by paragraph 8 which reads, "Commercial firms (unspecified)--industrial documents cover."

06

2. Included under tab M is a dossier of one Harold Meltzer, a resident of Los Angeles, with a long criminal record. This is the first instance in which I have noted a U.S. citizen under consideration for any recruitment with respect to the ZRRIFLE project.

06

3. Under tab T, information on Orlando Portale, an Italian citizen residing in Detroit, is included.

06

4. At tab Y is a page of information on one Hanna Yazbeck. The report states, "He often heads up a hatchet squad when disputes arise between the Moslem and Christian underworld factions in Beirut." The second paragraph of this page reads as follows: "During the period I was in Europe (1950-1958), his chief bodyguard was 06 a convicted murderer who owed his release from prison to Yazbeck's power. This bodyguard has since been murdered, but Yazbeck has an available pool of assassins."

06

5/DJ

3/17/
8/4/98 1393

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10253

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
KP 12 apr 99

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/03/75
PAGES : 22

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT OF DEPOSITION OF FRANK STURGIS BY ROBERT B. OLSEN AND JAMES N. ROETHE (PAGES 73 THROUGH 152 ONLY).

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN ~~IN~~ FULL Postponed
CURRENT STATUS : ~~O~~
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIGINA

~~TOP SECRET~~

Sturgis

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

1 of 2

KP 12 apr 99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

8 Aug 94
(pp 73-81, 84-85,
91, 143-152)

Thursday, April 3, 1975

Washington, D. C.

WARD & PAUL

Verba volant- scripta manent

Spoken words fly- written words endure

TM

WASHINGTON, D.C.
410 First Street, S.E., 20003
Phone
(202) 544-6000

FAIRFAX, VIRGIN
4055 Chain Bridge Rd., 2
Phone
(703) 273-2400

~~TOP SECRET~~

the attempted assassination on two occasions of Fidel Castro and all the top military commanders that used to come to the Air Force Base. And remember that I had another job at the Air Force Base training the military police. And I also was still Chief of Security.

MR. OLSEN: Let me ask you, are you telling us that you participated as a Cuban Air Force officer, and Chief of Training military police and security and intelligence operations in the Cuban Air Force, that participated in an attempt to assassinate Castro?

MR. STURGIS: Yes, on two occasions, plus other military officials.

MR. OLSEN: When did those attempts take place, during the early part of 1959?

MR. STURGIS: Yes sir. I would say the first attempt -- and I set it up as an exercise, that if I was to get the green light -- which I did not anticipate that I would, because there is such a thing as getting a green light -- and there is another thing of doing something without the green light, in other words, they do it but don't get caught -- but I did set it up as an exercise, and I did have men on several occasions, like I said, as a training exercise, stationed at the gate with me there, with men stationed on the rooftops of the homes, -- my excuse was for the protection of the entourage, Fidel and the military commanders that he had with him, he had a hometown bunch with him when they came to the Air Force, even with General Bayo. And I felt that if I would get the nod to assassinate them, I could do it within 30 seconds, high tail it and everything.

MR. OLSEN: Was there something that you had drawn up in the way of exercise as the result of the discussions with the other Air Force officials?

MR. STURGIS: The Air Force and Army officials. This information was given to the American Embassy. I again did these exercises to try to get a diversion that if I would get the nod to do the execution, that I would have some means of diversionary tactics to draw attention away from the people who did the execution, and that I was there with my people to prevent it because of the security.

MR. OLSEN: Did you discuss these plans in advance with Colonel Nichols?

MR. STURGIS: No sir. At the very -- I would say about six weeks of the revolution was over with there was a great deal of discontent among many of the top ranking military officers. I knew these people personally, I was in with them at those meetings and various places, and that they discussed, we all discussed the assassination then. And some said, well, there are some officers that will be with the group, Fidel and Raoul and Che, that were not really with them. So they were split on the idea of assassinating them. So they asked my opinion.

And I told them, well, in war innocent people do get killed. If you are going to assassinate the man, the best place to do it is at the front gate when he approaches, and to just, if there is seven or eight jeeps, just to give everyone in all of the seven or eight jeeps, whether they are pro or anti -- if you are going to go ahead and kill him, people are going to get hurt.

MR. OLSEN: I didn't understand whehter you answered my question as to whether or not you had discussed in advance with Colonel Nichols.

MR. STURGIS: No sir, after the meeting with the different military commanders, I reported to Nichols the type of discussions that were made at those meetings.

MR. OLSEN: And what was Colonel Nichol's response?

MR. STURGIS: Can we go off the record?

MR. OLSEN: If you want.

MR. STURGIS: Let's go off the record.

He told me to stand by, don't do anything, stand by, stall.

MR. OLSEN: And did you then stand by and stall?

MR. STURGIS: Yes sir, I not only stood by, but then I proceeded to do these exercises without asking Colonel Nichols, I did those on my own, to prepare a special group of men to set this up.

MR. OLSEN: You prepared the exercise. Did you ever get the green light from the people in Castro's Air Force and Army to go ahead with an attempt?

MR. STURGIS: Oh, they wanted to do it, sir. The only thing that held them back was me, I am the only one that held them back, because they wanted to kill him in a minute.

MR. OLSEN: And so they ere urging that this be done, but you were holding back on it?

MR. STURGIS: Right.

MR. OLSEN: And were you holding back on it at least in part because of the request made by Colonel Nichols that you would hold up on it, and not do anything?

MR. STURGIS: Right.

MR. OLSEN: Was any actual attempt made now to carry out an assassination on Premier Castro?

MR. STURGIS: The only attempt was what I was doing in these exercises.

MR. OLSEN: So that there was some planning, but no attempt?

MR. STURGIS: Well, let me say this. We are on a very thin piece of string there, because I was several times making those exercises, and I was really, because of my high position in the military. and because of the things that I knew -- and you must understand that I did break into the headquarters of the Cuban Army at Columbia Barracks, and did steal documents out of there. And I also at my own headquarters, in my files, I did photograph some things that were in my files from the past regime that was there, but also of other officers that were there that I could not trust, I wanted to see what kind of reports and things that were made. So I did photograph those. So I did make a breakin.

MR. OLSEN: What I am trying to do, Frank, is to draw a distinction, if I can, between some plans for, some setting up of exercises that would be preparatory to an attempt to assassinate Premier Castro, Che Guevara and Raoul Castro and others that might be with them. I am trying to distinguish that kind of planning and preparation for an actual attempt to carry it out.

MR. ROETHE: Were there any shots ever fired?

MR. STURGIS: No sir. As a matter of fact, in order to avoid that, because my people wanted to do it so badly, I had to take the ammunition away from them just to contain them.

MR..ROETHE: Was this an exercise that was going to be -- was this going to be a shooting?

MR. STURGIS: Oh, yes.

MR. ROETHE: So it was not a bombing or anything of this sort, strictly a shooting?

MR. STURGIS: A shooting.

MR. OLSEN: How soon before you left Cuba did this setting up of the exercises take place?

MR. STURGIS: It was within, I would say, four to six weeks.

MR. OLSEN: Before you left?

MR. STURGIS: No, four to six weeks after we took over the country, July 1, four to six weeks was the first attempt. That was in the last of January or the first week in February 1959, four or five weeks.

MR. OLSEN: Did this fever about assassinating Castro, Raoul Castro and Guevara, subside after a little while?

MR. STURGIS: Oh,no.

MR. OLSEN: Did it keep on going all the time while you were in Cuba?

MR. STURGIS: Yes sir. I did arrange to train the same men for another attempt at assassination of him in the headquarters of the Air Force on the second floor.

MR. ROETHE: Before you go on to that, why did you never make an attempt the first time, why did you hold back?

MR. STURGIS: I was waiting for a nod from Nichols.

MR. ROETHE: And you never received that nod?

MR. STURGIS: I never received that.

MR. ROETHE: What got you started into a second attempt to try a different type of assassination?

MR. STURGIS: Yes, it would be a different plan to assassinate him. This came, I would say the last part of February, if I am not mistaken. Things came to a fever pitch. Even the American Government, through other agents inside of Cuba, in the military and so forth, were getting a lot of information about the Communist activity. And Fidel was coming on his big thing, you know, about talking against the Americans. And this was creating a lot of dissension with some of the top military brass.

MR. OLSEN: That is, the military brass of the Cuban Government?

MR. STURGIS: Of the Cuban military, yes. And at the same time I am trying to recruit Commander Camelo Cienfugo.

MR. OLSEN: You had attempted to recruit him?

MR. STURGIS: I attempted to recruit Commander Camelo Cienfugo, and also Commander Almejera. He was the National Chief of Police.

MR. OLSEN: And who was the first one, Cienfugo?

MR. STURGIS: Commander Camelo Cienfugo was the Chief of the Army -- I think Raoul was the Chief of the Armed Forces.

MR. OLSEN: Did you succeed in recruiting them?

MR. STURGIS: I met them at the Capri Hotel, where the show as at. And I got them stoned out of their minds. And we discussed money, how they would be willing to do, and so forth. I didn't want to get into it too much, because I had Camelo Cienfugo lined up more, he was thinking more in line with what I was talking about. Commander Almejeira got stoned out of his mind. And he just put his head on the table and went to sleep. That was it. And so I had a hard time keeping Camelo Cienfugo awake.

MR. ROETHE: At hose request were you trying to recruit these gentlemen?

MR. STURGIS: Remember Embassy told me, please try to recruit agents for them.

MR. OLSEN: You were attempting to recruit people who would provide the information for the Embassy?

MR. STURGIS: To provide agents for the American Embassy.

MR. ROETHE: You were not recruiting them especially for assassination attempt?

MR. STURGIS: No. Now, Camelo gave me enough information that night where I brok into the Chief of the Army headquarters -- he was Chief of the Army. I broke into their files, and I did photograph and steal documents.

MR. OLSEN: What did you do with those documents?

MR. STURGIS: I turned them over to the others.

MR. OLSEN: To Colonel Nichols?

MR. STURGIS: Yes.

MR. ROETHE: Were you operating here now for Colonel Nichols, or do you know if you were operating for CIA? Who was the creator of this policy, if you know, Colonel Nichols as a diplomat? Was he a diplomat at that time?

MR. STURGIS: Colonel Nichols was the American Military Air Attache, which could be a cover for the CIA.

MR. OLSEN: You don't know if he was CIA or not?

MR. STURGIS: No. Again I say, nobody shows if they are CIA, unless you are working yourself as an employee.

MR. OLSEN: Let me turn here, Frank, to this area. Were you ever by Colonel Nichols requested to organize any activity other than recuriting people to act as agent for the American Embassy, were you ever asked to carry out any kind of activity in Cuba?

MR. STURGIS: No sir.

MR. OLSEN: You were never asked to carry out any assassination?

MR. STURGIS: No sir.

MR. OLSEN: Were you ever asked to carry out any attempt to overthrow the Castro Government?

MR. STURGIS: Well, let's not say overthrow the Castro Government. Colonel Nichols was very much, in his thinking, in the discussions with him, against the Castro Government. But then here you have a man that goes by the book.

MR. OLSEN: Let me ask you this. Were you ever asked to carry out any, action in Cuba on behalf of the American Embassy?

MR. STURGIS: No sir.

MR. OLSEN: Or Colonel Nichols?

MR. STURGIS: No sir.

MR. ROETHE: So your breaking in and obtaining those documents was something that you did on your own for information

MR. OLSEN: After you came back from Cuba at the end of June 1959 did you then settle in the Miami area?

MR. STURGIS: Yes sir.

MR. OLSEN: Did you take up employment in some normal job in Miami, or did you become involved right away?

MR. STURGIS: I was not employed, sir.

MR. OLSEN: Did you engage in any business for yourself at that point?

MR. STURGIS: Yes sir.

MR. OLSEN: Before we get to that, when you left Cuba, did you manage to take with you any substantial amount of money or wealth?

MR. STURGIS: No sir. I took some documents here that beloned to Commander Ricardo Lorie in his preparation to leave Cuba and come to exile. I helped to arrange for the escape of the Chief of the Air Force and his wife. As a matter of fact, I made contact with the American Embassy to see if they would accept him in the Embassy. And I was told by the Embassy people no. So I had to come here to make the arrangements for his escape with his brother Sergio Diaz Bruil, who in fact himself personnaly went to a yacht basin, Bertrand's Basin and rented a boat, I believe it was a sailboat. With the plans that both he and myself made, I proceeded to Cuba to pick up his brother, the Chief of the Air Force.

MR. ROETHE: Before we get back here in ths US, the of the mountains and in and out of the US.

MR. OLSEN: Frequently as a part of your revoluntionary activities?

MR. STURGIS: In order for me to get very close with Fidel personally, I went through a great risk in buying guns and equipment and smuggling guns and equipment to Cuba, both by air, by automobiles, and in Key West by the ferry. And I had an elaborate system made up.

MR. OLSEN: Let's go into that just a little bit. We are going back into the revoluntionary period, before the revolution succeeded, while you were working for Castro, while he was up in the hills. Who did you buy guns from in the US?

MR. STURGIS: I bought guns in Alexandria, Virginia.

MR. OLSEN: From whom?

MR. STURGIS: I believe the name of the company was ARMCO. And the owner was an ex-CIA agent.

MR. OLSEN: Named what?

MR. STURGIS: I forget.

MR. ROETHE: Was this ostensiby a private enterprise?

MR. STURGIS: At least I thought it was a private enterprise.

MR. OLSEN: He asked, was it ostnsibly a private enterprise. Was it actually a private enterprise?

MR. STURGIS: Let me say this here. Can I go back a little bit, Mr. Olsen?

And he did get the money.

MR. OLSEN: That is the kind of information that I have been seeking. I am trying to pin down what the money was for, who told it was CIA money, and what steps were taken that led to your getting the money.

Were there any other operations or expenditures that you had which you feel you are on strong, sound ground in saying were financed by the CIA?

MR. STURGIS: I was asked to do an assassination.

MR. OLSEN: By whom?

MR. STURGIS: Can I hold back on that?

MR. OLSEN: No, I would prefer that you tell us,if you will.

MR. STURGIS: It never was carried out.

MR. OLSEN: That is all right.

MR. STURGIS: I was contacted by this agent -- I am trying to go ahead and think of the date again, because again I will say, I had notes, and I keep them so far, and then I destroy them. And I did tell the Senate Watergate Committee that a friend of mine who was a CIA agent contacted me and asked me if I would do an assassination. And I told him, yes, I would. He said, good. Then, I will pass it on to my superior. And he made contact with me later, at a later date. I believe we had -- I am not sure -- I think we had either lunch or dinner at some ranch house.

MR. ROETHE: Is this in Miami?

MR. STURGIS: Yes.

MR. OLSEN: First of all, can you go back and tell me when you were approached by this friend of yours.

MR. STURGIS: This is why I say, I can't remember by the exact date, and maybe by talking --

MR. OLSEN: How about, if you give us the season of what year?

MR. STURGIS: The seasons in Miami are all along all the year around.

MR. ROETHE: How about just the year?

MR. STURGIS: I can't remember the year.

MR. ROETHE: Are we talking about after you -- this is after you got back from Cuba, obviously.

MR. STURGIS: Yes, it had to be -- let me see if I can narrow it down just about what year. Let's see. It had to be either before the Bay of Pigs, which is 1961, or after the Bay of Pigs, which again could be 1961. So I would say approximately it would be 1961.

MR.OLSEN: Then, where were you approached?

MR. STURGIS: In Miami.

MR. OLSEN: And is this somebody, Frank, for the moment, let's defer to your wishes, or your reservations, at least, by naming them. But is this somebody whom you knew to be employed by the CIA?

MR. STURGIS: No, sir.

MR. OLSEN: Is it somebody who you knew to be a contract agent of the CIA?

MR. STURGIS: No, sir. All I knew is that he was an agent, and at a later date, it was proven that he was an agent. So my contacts with this man throughout the years, how he worked, my close contact with him, in Miami, the way of operation, the way he handles himself, the people that he was in close contact with,that the top political and military people who were in exile that he was in touch with, the formation of the Bay of Pigs itself before the invasion,came through this particular man. He was part of the forming of this -- at least of the Revolutionary Council. And I was approached by him and I told Sam about it. I said, Sam, what do you think? The idiot -- I hope this never gets publicized.

MR. OLSEN: Trust us.

MR. STURGIS: I said, this idiot took me out, and we had some lunch, and he asked me if I wanted to do an assassination, or if I would do an assassination attempt for the outfit.

And I looked him square in the face and I told him, why did you come to me? And he says, well, Frank, like, who else? You are a man that the Chief knows your background, and I know your background, and I know you are capable. And you a capable man. And if anybody can do it, you can do it.

But the thing is, would you be interested?

And I said, yes, I would be.

MR.OLSEN: Did he talk to you about a sum of money?

MR. STURGIS: No, no money was -- the discussion of money was not involved in it, because I would not do anything for money. And he knows better than to ask me, unless it would be, Frank, what do you need for your expenses?

MR.OLSEN: Who was the target of this assassination? Was it Fidel Castro?

MR. STURGIS: No. I don't know. What happened was that I had another meeting with him, and he said he would contact his Chief, and he would -- and he told me to contact him later on, and I think he gave me a certain day to contact him, and I said OK. You must remember that,how I know this man as an agent, because he does the same things as I do, in his wife, he types away, or at least, he has a wife who types away, he makes all the reports, and stacks them in a file cabinet. Ihave heard him talk to his case officer on the telephone. And to me that was very stupid of him in doing that even to me who was his friend. That is a stupid way of doing things. Because he did not suspect that I was in touch with Sam, he cannot know. And the only time that he suspected that I had anything to do with CIA is when we were in prison, and the man on the television said, yes, he used to work for the

the CIA.

MR. OLSEN: When you say CIA, you were talking about the Watergate, not the other agent and me?

MR. STURGIS: I am talking about the agent and me, who was part of the Watergate group. And he was dumfounded and said, what, you work for CIA? And I said, yes, sir, you dumb bastard you, I was turning you in to my case officer.

MR. OLSEN: So neither one of you suspected --

MR. STURGIS: I knew he was an agent, but I didn't know that I was in contact -- I never used the word -- or at least I don't think I did, and I hope I haven't used it today -- thatI said I was an employee of CIA.

MR. OLSEN: No, I haven't even said that you were an agent of the CIA.

MR. STURGIS: Or that I was connected with the CIA.

MR. OLSEN: Now, who was the target of this conversation about assassination?

MR.STURGIS: I had a second meeting with him at the Ranchhouse, and he told me, he says, well, there is interest, Frank. He said, about this assassination, and I said, fine. I said.

And then he started to questioning, how would you do it? And I said, how do you mean how I would do it? There are several ways of trying to do assassination. The things have to know is who the person is, that is number 1, it is important, and where the person is at, which is important. And then, I will have to go ahead and go to the place where this man lives or what have you, after I know this information. And I said then, I can go ahead and tell you how I can do it. And he said, with a body, this and that, he will be discovered, you know we can't be connected with it. And I said, well, if you are worried about that, you do it. And he said, well, I can't do it. And I said, OK, beautiful. And I want --

I wanted to tell you something, I will do this, because you are a friend of mine, and because you asked me. But I will want more than that. And he said what is that? I said I want it from somebody higher than you, from somebody with authority. If you tell me -- and you are my friend, and I believe you -- but I want it more from somebody else that has some authority. You have a case officer.

I want your case officer to tell me to do an assassination plot, and I will do it. But coming from you, you are my friend, my buddy, but I have got to have more than that for my protection.

MR. OLSEN: Did he ever put you in contact with his case officer?

MR. STURGIS: I knew who his boss was.

MR. OLSEN: Who was his boss?

MR. STURGIS: Edwardo.

Wait just a minute. I am sorry. I could be wrong there. I said the wrong thing.

If I am going after the Bay of Pigs invasion, if this did happen, as far as the date is concerned, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, Edwardo did quit the operation and go on some other assignment or what have you. So that means he was no longer in the Miami area. So this part I had to get a new case officer.

MR. OLSEN: Edwardo left Miami before the Bay of Pigs, didn't he?

MR. STURGIS: He left after -- well, I don't know I am sorry. Because there is a possibility that he may have been either in Miami or he may have been in the Headquarters in Washington. But I can't pin it down because I don't know exactly where he was at.

MR. OLSEN: Did he ever make contacts with this man's case officer?

MR. STURGIS: No, sir, because it had to be one of two people, it either had to be Edwardo, whom I had never met, or it had to be possibly Jim Knowles 03 after Edwardo left.

MR. OLSEN: Did Jim Knowles 03 take his place, then?

MR. STURGIS: I believe so, I believe Jim Knowles 03 did take his place as this party's case officer.

MR. OLSEN: And then, you did not actually have any contact with his case officer?

3/18V

MR. STURGIS: When I told him that, I think I kind of stung him a little bit. And he said, well, OK, all right. Then, you will go through with it? And I said certainly, I will go through with it, I don't care who the hell it is. I said, you let me know. And hopefully, I was thinking of Fidel Castro, because I could have snuck into Cuba, I have done it so many times, and I would have taken a crack at killing Fidel.

MR. ROETHE: I missed something when I was out of the room. I take it you did not know the identity of the person whom you were being asked to assassinate?

MR. STURGIS: No, sir, I did not. I asked him -- you see, I didn't publish it, in other words, I was told no publicity. I was told, because Sam says, go ahead and work with him, and he said, let me know what is progressing.

MR. ROETHE: Is Sam what you would call your case officer?

MR. STURGIS: Sam is my contact, the man I was connected with.

MR. ROETHE: And you would always go to him before you would go ahead with some action like this?

MR. STURGIS: Oh, exactly. I wouldn't do anything unless I received an OK from somebody.

MR. ROETHE: Did you have any idea that this had anything to do with Cuba?

MR. STURGIS: It always had to do with Cuba.

MR. ROETHE: You were aware that this assassination had something to do with Cuba?

MR. STURGIS: I was thinking that it did, I could have been wrong. I was thinking that it could have something to do with Cuba.

MR.ROETHE: Did Sam seem to know anything about the subject -- about this, or did this seem to come as a surprise?

MR. STURGIS: It was a surprise. He was surprised that my friend approached me on something like this. And he said, don't say, no. I said, I will do it to anybody. I said, Sam, if it is all right, if this case officer -- Sam said, tell me who the case officer is, and if it is true, OK.

MR. ROETHE: What was your motivation for saying that you would do this?

MR. STURGIS: You know what a whore is?

MR. ROETHE: Do I know what a whore is?

MR. STURGIS: Yes.

MR. ROETHE: I guess I do.

MR. STURGIS: I don't mean to go ahead and question you. I am sorry. But in intelligence a whore is an agent that they would want that would do anything. But he has got to be motivated by patriotism. And that he would do anything for his country, regardless of what it was.

MR. ROETHE: Assuming that it was something that an official request made on behalf of the government?

MR. STURGIS: Well, you would think that if a case officer -- and you would be surprised how powerful a case officer -- what power a case officer has in his hands. He has got a lot of power.

MR. OLSEN: Thank you very much, Frank.

(Whereupon, at 6:00 o'clock p.m., the interview was concluded.)

- - -

4/17
8/4/98

Date:09/19/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10255

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : KNOCHE, E.H.
TO : BELIN, DAVID W.

TITLE :

DATE : 05/08/75
PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :
LETTER SENDING MATERIALS RELATING TO ALLEN DULLES AND WARREN COMMISSION.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : C
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/14/94

Postponed

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~Confidential~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

May 8, 1975

Mr. David W. Belin
Executive Director
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States

Dear Mr. Belin:

Per our conversation in your office this morning, I attach the only materials we have that relate to Allen Dulles and the Warren Commission.

There may be other papers in the hands of the Dulles family or at Princeton University.

Faithfully yours,

EHKnoche

E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

Logged
5-9-75

Classified by 014359
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

~~Confidential~~

KP 12 apr 95

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94
(this page)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Review of Personal Papers of Mr. Dulles

I reviewed the personal papers of Mr. Dulles covering the period after his departure from the Agency and while he was a member of the Warren Commission. I also reviewed Agency historical documents relating to Cuba. The review did not turn up anything of special significance or importance. For the most part, Mr. Dulles' papers included correspondence dealing with his book, personal contacts, and social activities. I have attached copies of all material in his papers that in any way dealt with the Kennedy assassination or the work of the Warren Commission. I have also attached relevant individual items culled from his daily diary.

Joseph Seltzer
Joseph Seltzer

KP 12 apr 99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94
(this page)

16 July 1964

Mr. Helms. Re call from Lee Rankin about wording to be used in report. Chief Justice assured Mr. McCone nothing would be included.

Sherman Hoar
Chappaquiddick Island
Edgartown, Mass.

File
Sherman Hoar
(?)

November 5, 1963

ear Mr. Dulles,

I was sorry not to have the pportunity to see you during my rief visit to Washington. I would ike to have paid my respects and o have offered to assist you in any way that I might during your service on the Commission of Investigation f the Presidents assassination.

The labors of this Commission will e most vital and can contribute o - must contribute to - the preservation the political and social fabric of e nation.

It was my feeling that perhaps I uld help you again as I used to in CB and Special Group matters as an ntelligent and informed leg man, a ordinator, a gatherer of information - in ense "a hewer of wood & carrier water." As you know I have handled ings before - The British & Chemists, been know my way around Washington in all branches of the government – the National War College.

Of most importance, I have a personal angle. Mr. Kennedy was a friend and classmate. I would like to contribute to a dignified assessment of the whys and to the positive conclusions which would lay a basis for favorable socio-political awakening:

The Commission, I presume & recommend, would work through existing agencies. It must however guide the reporting from those agencies and, at times, suggest further lines of investigation. In this area I could also be of help.

At present I am awaiting the start of the next school year when I shall resume my pre CIA career as a Professor of Economics so I am available if you should need my services.

However you do need my services or

ut I know that the investigation f this tragic event is in good ands. It is a most important esponsibility. Its results will have nanifold implications for the future. I wish you well.

Sincerely,

Sherman Hoar

Annex to Noven r 29, 1963, Diary:

About 5:30 on Friday, November 29, while I was sitting around the fire after a game of golf at Lloyd Neck, the telephone rang and I was advised that the President wanted to speak with me. I went to the phone and the White House operator said that the President wanted to speak with me, that he was on another line, and would I hold on for a minute. After a short wait the operator told me that someone had gone into the room and that she would call me back.

She called me back in five minutes. This gave me a brief chance to puzzle out what it was the President wanted to say to me. As it turned out, aided by some news items that the President was considering appointing a high-level commission to look into all the circumstances of the assassination of the President, I was led to put this as the first possibility. Soon the call came through. The President was on the line. I told him how much my thoughts had been with him in recent days. He thanked me. Then in a very kind expression of appreciation for what he thought I had done for the country over the years, he said he wished me to do a job for him. I asked him what it was. He said he was appointing a commission to look into all the circumstances surrounding the assassination and the later killing of the man believed responsible for the assassination. This commission would include the Chief Justice, members of the House and Senate from both parties, and two men outside of government, including myself, if I would serve.

I told the President without hesitation that I was prepared to serve if he felt I could be of service to him and the nation. I said that I assumed that he had considered my recent job and that he did not consider that this service was in any way an impediment. He said he had carefully considered it and he felt that, on the contrary, it would be helpful. I said I assumed that what he had told me was entirely confidential. He said it was until it was announced and he did not know the exact hour of that. I said I would, of course, maintain the confidence.

KP 12 am 99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94

Telephone Items from Diary of Mr. Dulles

22 November 1963 - 3 P.M.

Returned to Washington (from Williamsburg) - with John Warner after hearing of JFK's death.

6 December 1963

06

(Mr. Jose Colon), Madison Hotel. Reported that group of air force officers had planned to try to impeach President Kennedy before next re-election. AWD advised he reported to FBI. Only lead to identities is that one was former air attache in Czechoslovakia. (Colon) with North American Aviation Company.

06

6 December 1963

Mr. Ray Cline. Requested an assessment of reaction abroad to assassination, done by important areas -- Soviet, Satellite, Chinese. What line they are taking, etc?

27 January 1964

Mr. Angleton. Stated that it was all right to give the Rockwell Report to the Commission.

28 January 1964

Mr. Rocca. Mentioned article in Labor Monthly by Palme "After Kennedy"; thesis is that CIA killed the President.

7 February 1964

Mr. Angleton. They are getting a lot of reports published in Italy based on Chief Justice's statements that Oswald was a CIA agent and tying him to the FBI.

5 June 1964

Congressman Ford. Would like AWD to ask some questions for him on Monday at Commission hearings since he will be unable to attend.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 8 Aug 94

KP 12 apr 99

(3)

(two pages)

2/PV

December 6, 1963

Memorandum for Mr. James Angleton

06

Subject		Letter from Mr. Jose Colon

06

Please see enclosed letter from Jose Colon. Over the phone he told me that he had some information, rather vague, about some plot of air force officers to "impeach" President Kennedy, including an Air Force officer who had been attache in Czechoslovakia. I told him that such information should be brought to the attention of the FBI. He promised to do it but whether he will or not, I do not know.

I can only judge by telephone conversation in that he talked quite sanely but very vaguely.

AWD

Enclosure

awd:mk
1 - chr
1 - Commission file

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 8 Aug 94

(3)

2/RW

January 30, 1964

Memorandum for: The Honorable Lee Rankin

Attached are a few items of possible interest:

(1) a copy of an article in the January 1964 British "Labour Monthly" by, I believe, R. P. Dutt. I understand he is the editor of the "Labour Monthly" and a British Communist. I am seeking further data with regard to Dutt. I call your attention particularly to the section beginning on page 13, entitled "A C.I.A. Job?". I suggest that you might wish the CIA to send to you directly all important items of this general nature and also items bearing on the future Communist propaganda treatment of the assassination issue with their estimate, preferably coordinated with the State Department, showing the general trend of such propaganda, if there is one. It has been my experience that the Communist party of the Soviet Union exercises a good deal, but not complete, control over the propaganda activities of the various Communist parties in the free world and often uses these parties or selected ones to launch various trial balloons in the propaganda field.

(2) a letter I obtained from a source I will indicate to you orally written by George de Mohrenschildt, who you may recall appears in the Commission's records as one of the men who had contact with, and as I recall, some influence over Oswald. You will recall that the State Department had interrogated him briefly, I believe, at the insistence of the FBI. This letter might furnish a desirable basis for some further interrogation as I did not find the State Department interrogation wholly satisfactory.

(3) a letter from Robert C. McManus, who writes

KP 12apr 99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

8 Aug 74

(3 pp)

on stationery of the Senate Judiciary Committee and makes certain allegations bearing on the Commission's work. I do not know the writer and I have merely acknowledged the letter and stated I was referring it to the Commission. It may require no further answer.

Here are one or two additional thoughts I have.

(a) that we study the use made of post office boxes in connection with Oswald's activities and crimes and also ascertain the terms and conditions under which post office boxes can be rented, and whether there are uniform regulations or whether it is left more or less to the whim of local postmasters. Oswald's ability to hire a post office in a fictitious name and to use it for the receipt of firearms seems to have facilitated his criminal activities. Later the Commission might possibly wish to make some suggestions on this subject.

(b) I should be glad to see the conclusions of the recent report outlined a few days ago in The New York Times giving arguments for the shifting of the Narcotics Bureau from the Treasury Department.

(c) Do we have an adequate study by the State Department of their policy, of any legislation affecting it, with regard to the terms and conditions of the registration of undesirables? I assume that an American citizen who has not forfeited his rights as such has an undeniable right to return to the United States, but I am not clear whether this is under law or merely established practice.

(d) Do we have any recent study available as to the extent to which, under the Constitution, the rights of citizens (or residents?) to acquire and retain firearms - apart from the question of legislation with regard to the bearing of concealed arms?

Someone asserted to me the other day that tax collections in Texas applicable to the maintenance of its police force, etc., were unusually low as contrasted with other states. I doubt whether this was a correct judgment as I do not think that one can segregate in Texas or elsewhere the tax collections for police as against other public services.

Allen W. Dulles

Enclosures

awd:mk
1 - chr
1 - Commission official corres file

DUTT, Rajani Palme

Dutt was born in 1896 at Cambridge, England. His father, a doctor in Cambridge, belonged to a prominent Bengali family. His mother was Swedish. Was educated at Perse School in Cambridge, Balliol Oxford. He became a charter member of the British Communist party in 1920. Has been the British Communist party's leading theoretician since then.

He founded the "Labour Monthly" in 1921 and has been editor since then. Has taken an active interest in Indian Communist party affairs and was Secretary-Chairman of the British Communist party for a period in 1939. He also served for a time in the Communist party of Great Britain politburo. His standing with Moscow is excellent. In 1962 was afforded an honorary doctorate of history at Moscow University, where he lectured in April and May 1962. These lectures were published by Lawrence and Wishart in London 1963 under the title of "Problems of Contemporary History". One part of his lecture dealt with the cold war. The main theme of this section was to establish that the responsibility for the origins of the cold war rested with the West and that the West merely continued the policies of the Nazis and the Fascists.

Dutt's current position has been described as head of the international department of the Communist party of Great Britain, an office which he has held since at least 1956. He is also vice-chairman of the Communist party of Great Britain and again a member of the political and national executive committee.

February 26, 1964

Memorandum for The Honorable Lee Rankin

From

A. W. Dulles

I read with great interest the papers attached to the agenda for the Commission's meeting February 24, 1964. In J. Edgar Hoover's letter to you of February 10, 1964, on page 2, last paragraph, there is reference to Mr. Robert Storey's statement to Mr. Wade that when he, Storey, was with the War Crimes Commission in Germany after World War II, he ascertained that "the Central Intelligence Agency had informants that no one knew about, except the Central Intelligence Agency agent, and that the informant might have been an informant".

While this statement is not very clear, I would point out that the Central Intelligence Agency was not organized until late 1947 under the National Security Act of that year and that the Agency Mr. Storey is presumably referring to, if he did make the statement, must be the Office of Strategic Services, which was dissolved in late 1945. Of course, during the period of existence of the OSS, Lee Harvey Oswald was an infant.

With respect to J. Edgar Hoover's letters to you of February 11 and 13, 1964, I suggest that it may be desirable to try to clear up the confusion as to the existence of the "law enforcement officer in Dallas" who allegedly claimed that L. H. Oswald had been contacted by the FBI to become an informant. As I read the record available to me, there seems to be some conflict in the testimony of newsmen Hudkins and Golden. Very possibly this has arisen from the three contacts the FBI had with Oswald on June 26, and August 10 and 16, 1962. I do not find in the affidavits any indication of the purpose of either the June 26 or August 16 visits. The August 10 visit apparently related to the New Orleans Fair Play for Cuba incident. Have we memoranda on these visits to Lee Harvey Oswald?

/s/

AWD

KP 12apr99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

8 Aug 94

March 25, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RANKIN

FROM: A. W. Dulles

I have spoken to Mr. McCone and Mr. Helms about the general subject matter of your memorandum of March 17, 1964, regarding Lee H. Oswald and the charge that he was a paid informant of the FBI, CIA or another Federal agency.

Mr. McCone is away from Washington this week, but I have suggested to Mr. Helms that the first procedure suggested by you be followed; namely, an appropriate affidavit. I understand that this is now being prepared and will be submitted to Mr. McCone upon his return early next week.

awd:mk
1 - chr
1 - official Commission corres

Kp 12apr99

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94

June 5, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE LEE RANKIN

FROM A. W. DULLES

Last evening Attorney General Carr dined with Jack McCloy and me and had one or two suggestions:

1. that the Commission might wish to interview (a) Mr. and Mrs. Earl Cabell. They were in a strategic position in the automobile procession at the time of the assassination. We saw them briefly when we visited Dallas. (b) Lewis Nichols, former President of the Dallas Bar Association, who called on Oswald in connection with the question of his being legally represented. Carr seems to think that he has some interesting information that has not been obtained. (c) Elgin Crull, City Manager of Dallas, who, as such, was in direct over-all command of the police.

2. Carr also mentioned a black notebook belonging to Oswald which had two Washington telephone numbers: (a) the Russian Embassy and (b) a telephone number with no name but which was called by the Dallas police. The person answering was apparently a Negro pastor here.

AWD

awd:mk
1 - chr
1 - Commission official corres

12 apr 99 KP

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

8 Aug 94

July 27, 1964

Memorandum for Lee Rankin

From A. W. Dulles

As a result of my weekend reading which I have returned with comments, I have the following comments in addition to comments noted on the material returned.

1. Where have we dealt with the evidence as to Oswald's ability to handle a rifle?

2. Where do you plan to discuss Oswald's escape pattern or plans; did he have any - if so, why did he leave $170 at the Paines and start out with less than $20? If he killed the President to make a name, gain notoriety, etc., why did he try to escape at all and then deny the shooting when caught? I feel we must deal with these difficult issues. I have some speculations on the subject.

3. If Marina had admitted that she had once been a member of the Komsomol, would that have changed the decision regarding her visa? I believe this has been considered by the State Department. I feel we should look into this.

4. A great deal of the description of the motorcade and the shooting will be unclear unless we have a street map and, if possible, a photo taken from the sixth floor window. Is this possible?

KP 12 apr 99
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
8 Aug 94

5. Would it be possible and desirable to add to Chapter II a description, second by second - taken from the frames of Zaprudeis photos? This, if well done, would be a most dramatic method of describing the action. I don't think we have given enough use to these photos.

6. Has there been any follow-up on the letters to the Militant - mentioned to us by Isaac Don Levine - that possibly were written by Oswald?

7. Is there any section of the report which deals with the protection of the President and Vice President when abroad? Should we not deal with this briefly?

/s/

AWD

awd:mk
1 - chr
1 - Pres Com - official corres

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10276

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : KNOCHE, E. H.
TO : OLSEN, ROBERT B.

TITLE :

DATE : 04/29/75
PAGES : 30

SUBJECTS :
ATTACHING CIA COMMENTS ON CERTAIN QUESTIONS RAISED BY MR. PAUL HOCH.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/19/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "Hoch/Warren Commission Paper"
"O/R (V-F)"

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

29 April 1975

Mr. Robert B. Olsen
Senior Counsel
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States

Dear Mr. Olsen:

I am attaching, in answer to your request, CIA comments on certain questions raised by Mr. Paul Hoch.

I am advised that the references to HTLINGUAL (mail opening) material on pages 15 and 17 of our summary memo on the right side of the folder involved material which by our lights was innocuous, but which we made available to the FBI.

Let us know if there are any details you may wish to pursue. Our check, meanwhile, continues.

Faithfully yours,

EHKnoche

E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

Classified by 14359
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
~~AS SANITIZED~~
12-8-94
~~(1)(B)~~
(30 pages)

(8-12-94)

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Memorandum by Paul Hoch Concerning CIA Activities and the Warren Commission Investigation

Mr. Paul Hoch, a long-time critic of the Warren Commission report, has been associated with Ramparts magazine, NBC news, and US News and World Report in the past. He has been in touch with CIA on the Warren Commission investigation since at least 1971. Our files show that Mr. Hoch was one of 12 people who, in 1967 or earlier, received a copy of the original unexpurgated list of all Warren Commission material held by the National Archives before a new list without CIA titles was prepared by Archives at our request.

In the introduction to his copyrighted 24 March 1975 memorandum (Tab 1), Mr. Hoch notes that he "concentrates on the CIA, with emphasis on specific questions relevant to domestic CIA activities, possible CIA nondisclosure to the Warren Commission, and possible links between the assassination and CIA attempts to kill Fidel Castro." A review of the memorandum reveals that it contains a number of questions and allegations concerning CIA. However, it also contains questions and allegations concerning the FBI, the Department of State, and various military departments. It appears to be a general criticism of Warren Commission methods and findings with particular emphasis on CIA's alleged role in obfuscating what Mr. Hoch believes to be the true nature of its own activities leading up to and following the assassination.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 018186

We are not competent to comment on Mr. Hoch's questions or allegations concerning other Government agencies or the Commission. He has raised a number of points concerning CIA that we address below. Before doing so, however, a few words are in order concerning the set of mind with which Mr. Hoch seems to have approached this matter.

On page 11 of his memorandum, Mr. Hoch quotes Mr. James Angleton as having made the following remark to Mr. Seymour Hersh when asked by the latter about alleged CIA wrong-doing and domestic activities: "A mansion has many rooms and there were many things going on during the period of the [anti-war] bombings. I'm not privy to who struck John." Mr. Hoch then expresses puzzlement over this latter statement. He notes that "who struck John" may be a literary allusion or cliche unfamiliar to him and goes on to say:

> It may have been a reference to some other John-- e.g., Mitchell. Also, it is conceivable that "Who struck John" was some sort of code name for the CIA study of the Kennedy assassination. Angleton should be asked to explain that statement, and whether he is aware of any CIA investigations of Oswald or the assassination, particularly any which may have reached conclusions different from the Warren Commission's. Regardless of what Angleton now says he meant by his comment, an intended reference to John Kennedy seems as likely as any other explanation.

Mr. Hoch's willingness to attribute sinister implications to such a common phrase is both humorous and revealing. It belies the impression of reasonably objective scholarship he has sought to project in his memorandum.

The following questions are paraphrases of points concerning CIA raised by Mr. Hoch. They are keyed to the page on which the substance with which they deal appears in his memorandum.

QUESTIONS

P. 2

Did CIA intercept a letter and money order which Oswald's mother sent to him shortly after he defected to Russia?

Answer:

No. CIA did not intercept a letter and money order sent to Oswald by his mother shortly after his defection. Mr. Hoch's question probably refers to a matter taken up by Mrs. Marguerite Oswald with the FBI on 28 April 1960 and described in the 12 May 1960 report by the Dallas FBI office in Tab 2 .

P. 3

What dissemination in CIA was made of the FBI report "Fair Play for Cuba Committee--New Orleans Division" which dealt only with Oswald and "A. J. Hidell," Oswald's alias? Other than this report, were any CIA employees or informants aware of Oswald's activities in New Orleans?

Answer:

A copy of this report is attached at Tab 3. It was transmitted to CIA by the FBI under a cover note dated 8 November 1963. The date stamp on the reverse of the cover sheet indicates it was logged in to the Agency on 12 November 1963. The DDP Counterintelligence Staff liaison office received it on 15 November 1963. The report then went to the counterintelligence office of the DDP Special Activities Staff which was then concerned with Cuban matters (no date indicated). The registry for the Special Activities Staff counterintelligence office handled the report on 21 November 1963. On 22 November 1963, the report was received by the DDP Counterintelligence Staff special investigations office, presumably because it concerned a former defector to the Soviet Union. Apparently it was being processed by that office when President Kennedy was assassinated. Prior to the assassination, CIA had no information concerning Oswald's activities in New Orleans beyond this report.

P. 4

544 Camp Street: Is there a CIA connection with Guy Banister? With David Ferrie? With other associates of Banister?

Answer:

According to CIA records, during 1960 Guy Banister operated a private detective agency in New Orleans called Banister and Associates. CIA considered contacting him for use as a foreign intelligence source and for possible use of his firm for cover purposes. However, security investigation revealed derogatory information about his professional conduct, and he was not contacted. With regard to Mr. Ferrie, Agency files indicate that CIA never considered contacting him for any purpose at any time. Our record search to date has not revealed any contacts with other associates of Guy Banister.

P. 5 and footnote #12

Was Oswald ever a CIA informant? Was he debriefed by CIA in Moscow? on his return from the USSR? If not, any particular reason? Did CIA ever receive in whole or in part Oswald's manuscript about his life in Russia? Is #110669 an identifying number used by CIA in any way?

Answer:

Lee Harvey Oswald was never associated or connected, directly or indirectly, in any way whatsoever with CIA (see Tab 4 for testimony of John A. McCone and Richard Helms before Warren Commission and Affidavit of John A. McCone). As a former marine and as a returned defector, he was of primary interest to military authorities and to the FBI who were responsible for any debriefings of him upon his return from the USSR. CIA received copies of Oswald's manuscript from the FBI and the Warren Commission in the material disseminated by them after the assassination. The number 110669 is not a CIA identification number of Lee Harvey Oswald for any purpose including registration as a source. Within CIA records, the number 110669 identifies an individual of Austrian birth who was of intelligence interest in East Asia during the 1940's. 24 The Inter-Agency Source Register (ISR) (which is managed by CIA) lists by name and number military intelligence sources since 1957. We have searched the ISR for both Oswald's name and the number 110669. His name and that number are not registered in the ISR.

P. 7

Mexican photo

Answer:

We have had previous communications with Mr. Hoch concerning this matter (see Tab 5).

The Agency at no time in its dealings with the FBI in the Field or with the Warren Commission in Headquarters described or suggested that the unknown individual whose photograph was taken in Mexico City on 1 October was Lee Harvey OSWALD. Our total coverage of the unknown individual numbers twelve photographs taken on 1 October (USSR Embassy), 4 October (USSR Embassy) and 15 October (Cuban Embassy). OSWALD left Mexico City, it is known, at 0830 hours, 2 October. It is clear, therefore, that this individual could not be OSWALD. Mr. Helms, in a memorandum to the Warren Commission Chief Counsel, indicated very clearly that the photograph of this unknown individual had nothing to do with the OSWALD case. In the light of all of the facts in the file, we find no reason to modify this judgment.

P. 7

Mexican intercept operations: Did CIA have recordings of calls between Cuban and Soviet Embassies in which Oswald is discussed or in which Oswald participated? Did we have a recording of Oswald's conversation with a guard at the Soviet Embassy?

Answer:

CIA has transcripts of such calls, including a conversation between Oswald and a guard at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City, which were made on 27 and 28 September and 1 October 1963. These transcripts were reviewed in their entirety by the Warren Commission at CIA Headquarters and in Mexico City at the Station in April 1964. The recordings were erased routinely after the transcripts were made. Oswald identified himself only in the course of the 1 October conversation, and a summary of that conversation was the first indication of his presence in Mexico reported by the Station on 8 October 1963 and disseminated by CIA Headquarters on 10 October 1963.

P. 7

Who had substantial knowledge of matters pertaining to Oswald in the CIA Station in Mexico City at the time of Oswald's visit there? Was E. Howard Hunt the acting chief of station in Mexico City at or near that time?

Answer:

The operations which produced the transcripts of the calls connected with Oswald on 27 and 28 September and 1 October 1963 were quite closely held at the station. Few people beyond the chief and his deputy, one or two senior officers, and the monitor would have been privy to the material.

E. Howard Hunt served in Mexico City from December 1950 to June 1951. From November 1960 until his retirement in 1970, he was assigned to Headquarters. During the period in which Mr. Hunt was alleged by Mr. Hoch to have been acting chief of station in Mexico City--August-September 1963--Mr. Hunt was assigned to a DDP desk at Headquarters. See Tab 6 for documents covering Mr. Hunt's activities then. (Mr. Hunt made one extended trip to Europe during this period, from July 1965 to September 1966.)

P. 7-8

Did CIA personnel play any role in building up, disseminating, then denigrating a report that Oswald had received money to kill Kennedy from someone at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City? Was there a CIA connection with Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte, the source of the story?

Answer:

As stated in information provided to the Warren Commission by the Agency, CIA had no connection with activities or statements by Gilberto Alvarado Ugarte concerning allegations that Oswald received money to kill President Kennedy from someone at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. After Gilberto Alvarado came to the American Embassy in Mexico City on 26 November 1963 and made his allegations, his story was investigated by local CIA and FBI representatives in liaison with responsible Mexican law enforcement authorities. The Agency representatives informed the FBI that Alvarado was a well known Nicaraguan Communist underground member who was an informant of a Nicaraguan Security Service officer who was, in turn, a CIA source. On November 30, 1963, Alvarado admitted to Mexican security officials in writing that his whole story of having seen Lee Oswald receive money in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City to assassinate President Kennedy was false. On the same day, CIA reported to appropriate U. S. Government authorities that Alvarado stated his motive in telling his false story was to get the United

States to take action against Fidel Castro. He also said that he hated Castro and thought that his story about Oswald, if believed, would help cause the U. S. to take action against Castro.

P. 9

Is there any indication that CIA believed Oswald's defection and return might have been connected with a mission for another intelligence organization (e.g., military) and that this kept CIA away from his case?

Answer:

No. An Inter-Agency Source Registry is maintained [by 24 CIA] as a service of common concern. Such a registry was in existence throughout the 1960's. Its purpose is to preclude accidental contact or use of an intelligence source of one agency by another. Oswald's name never appeared in the registry.

VPN

P. 9

What was the purpose of a CIA-State study concerning defectors in general in 1960?

Answer:

There was no formal "study," but there was inter-agency preoccupation and exchange of information caused by the fact that there had been 13 U. S. defectors, including Oswald, between 1958 and 1960. Among the 13, there were five ascertained KGB agents: Davis, Dutkaniez, Martin, Mitchell, and Sloboda.

P. 9

Did Dr. Alexis Davison who served in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow when Oswald was there have any contact with Oswald of a non-medical nature? As Assistant Air Attache, did Davison coordinate intelligence activities with the CIA station? What was his connection with the Penkovsky case?

Answer:

A search of our files has revealed no CIA knowledge of the contact between Dr. Davison and Oswald during the latter's stay in the Soviet Union. At the time of Dr. Davison's assignment to Moscow, the CIA station chief was not charged with the function of coordinating the intelligence activities of the service attaches there. Dr. Davison's connection with the Penkovsky case and with CIA is described in Tab 7.

P. 10

Was J. Walton Moore connected with CIA? Was he connected with the Oswald case?

Answer:

Mr. J. Walton Moore was employed by CIA in the Contact Division office in Dallas during the early 1960's. His only contact with the Oswald case prior to the assassination is recorded in his 1 May 1964 memorandum to the Acting Chief, Contact Division, attached at Tab 8 (a typed version of the document is also attached because of the poor legibility of the original). He may have been involved in the Agency's effort to support the Warren Commission during the Commission's investigations. Mr. Moore has stated that he was never asked by Mr. de Mohrenschildt for advice concerning Oswald. We find no indication that there was ever any contact between Oswald and Mr. Moore.

P. 10

What actions did CIA take in Dallas or in Washington after Kennedy was shot or after Oswald was arrested?

Answer:

A special cable channel was established at headquarters to insure that all correspondence concerning Oswald would be controlled in a central repository. The resultant correspondence was subsequently incorporated into the Oswald file which was reviewed in full by the Warren Commission. Extensive investigative and analysis work was performed by the Agency in coordination with other Government agencies and with the Warren Commission.

Following the assassination of President Kennedy, DCI McCone instructed the Domestic Contact Service (DCS) to send an officer from its Dallas office to Parkland Hospital to contact and offer assistance to the FBI and Secret Service. Mr. Linwood Davis of that office went immediately to the hospital where he identified himself to the FBI and offered his services during the emergency. To date, our file review shows no indication that any particular use was made of Mr. Davis at that time.

P. 13

Does CIA have files with references to Oswald or his family other than CD692?

Answer:

CIA had only one general file on Oswald at the time of the assassination. That file had been opened as a result of Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union. At the time of the assassination the Warren Commission reviewed and received a copy of that file in its entirety. As the Agency continued to cooperate with the Commission, the Oswald file grew. It numbers 58 volumes now and contains all information in possession of the Agency on Oswald or his family.

The single exception to the above statement concerns one HTLINGUAL document dated 8 July 1961 but discovered only on review triggered by press publicity following the Oswalds' return to the U. S. in June 1962. The sensitivity of this intelligence precluded its inclusion in the Oswald file in general circulation. However, a copy of the document was forwarded to the FBI immediately upon discovery. (Also see question concerning Marina Oswald keyed to p. 14 of Mr. Hoch's memorandum.)

P. 14

Was there any FBI-CIA liaison concerning Oswald's intention to attend Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland? Was there any CIA intelligence interest in the school during that period?

Answer:

Information concerning Oswald's intention to attend Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland was passed to CIA by the FBI in the report of the FBI's interview with Mrs. Marguerite C. Oswald on 28 April 1960 (see pp 5-6 of that report in Tab 2). A search of CIA files has revealed no CIA knowledge of an Albert Schweitzer College in Switzerland.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

P. 14

Has CIA had any contact with Marina Oswald and are there any CIA records on her not previously turned over to the Warren Commission.

Answer:

CIA has had no contact with Marina Oswald. Our records show that a complete set of HTLINGUAL documents on Marina were turned over by hand to Mr. Sam Papich of the FBI on 23 November 1963 for use by the FBI in the course of their investigations. One other HTLINGUAL document received after that date was passed to the FBI in September 1964. To date, we have found no record indicating that CIA also passed these documents to the Warren Commission; nor do we have any record of how they were used by the FBI during the Warren Commission investigations.

P. 15

Who was the unidentified man at a meeting with Richard Helms on 12 March 1964 who would have known if Oswald had been a CIA informant?

Answer:

The unidentified man who accompanied Mr. Helms to the 12 March 1964 meeting was Mr. David E. Murphy, then Chief of the Soviet Russia Division, DDP. See paragraph 6 of the Tab 9 memorandum of record of this meeting for Mr. Helms' reported remark that he and Mr. Murphy were the two Clandestine Services officers who certainly would know whether or not Oswald had been an agent for CIA in the Soviet Union.

P. 16

Has CIA pursued independent investigations of the assassination and developed any new information not already provided to the Warren Commission, the Justice Department, or other responsible authority? For example, what use did the Agency make of the Zapruder film?

Answer:

As noted by Mr. Helms in the course of his testimony before the Warren Commission (see Tab 4, pp 123-124), the case of Lee Harvey Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy is not closed and "will never be closed" as far as the Agency is concerned. CIA has continued to be alert for new information abroad concerning this matter, and the Oswald file has grown over the years. The follow-up in Mexico City was particularly active during the 1960's. Throughout this period, no credible information has been developed which would substantially change the conclusions of the Warren Commission report. Any substantive information developed independently by the Agency has been shared with appropriate authorities, in particular the FBI.

A copy of the Zapruder film was acquired by CIA from Time, Inc., at the request of the Office of Training in February 1965. The agreement with Time, Inc., specified ". . .this film will not. . . be exhibited or published in any fasion except for internal training. . ." The Agency has adhered to these restrictions on the use of the film. From 1965 to 1969, the film was viewed by some officials in the Office of Training. Since April 1969, the film has been used by Special Operations Group, DDO, in courses designed to assist foreign government protective services in protecting their Chiefs of State and heads of government (see Tab 10).

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

P. 17

Has CIA engaged in any activities regarding critics of the Warren Report, including dissemination of information about them?

Answer:

Tab 11 contains a copy of Book Dispatch 5847 which transmitted guidance to certain CIA stations and bases concerning the countering of criticism of the Warren Report. This guidance for the field was prepared in response to a rash of books and articles criticizing the Commission's findings. It was sent out in April 1967. Our investigations to date have turned up no other guidance or activities undertaken in this connection.

P. 18

Did CIA have a connection with any member of the Odio family, including knowledge of an abortive plot to kill Castro which resulted in the imprisonment of Sylvia Odio's parents? Does CIA have any knowledge of the identities and activities of three men who reportedly visited Sylvia Odio two months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy, particularly the man introduced to her as Leon Oswald?

Answer:

The only relationship between CIA and the Odio family was the debriefing of Cesar Humberto Odio del Toro, Sylvia Odio's brother, during the early 1960's on a routine basis as part of a general program of eliciting positive intelligence from Cuban refugees in the United States. There is no connection or relationship between the Agency and the imprisonment of Sylvia Odio's parents for involvement in anti-Castro activities. According to our records, Sylvia Odio's parents were not imprisoned because of involvement in an assassination attempt against Castro. The following background information concerning the circumstances surrounding their imprisonment was provided by Cesar del Toro. The parents of Cesar and Sylvia were arrested by the Cuban Government in 1961 and sentenced to thirty years and nine years in prison respectively. They were imprisoned for participation in an organization named the Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo. Amador Odio Padron had been obtaining food and medical provisions for the care of Cubans in asylum at various foreign embassies in Havana. His wife had been helping him in that activity. Prior to his arrest Amador Odio Padron had been the owner of Cuba's largest inter-provincial trailer truck concern. (In fact, our records indicate that he had used his trucking concern to smuggle arms to anti-Battista forces during the 1954-56 period.) During the mid-1960's, Cesar Odio made several attempts to secure the release of his parents by offering to purchase large quantities of spare parts and transport them to Cuba.

The identities of the three men who reportedly visited Sylvia Odio two months prior to the assassination of President Kennedy were established in the course of the Warren Commission investigation. (See Report of The President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D. C., 1964, pp 321-325.)

Is there any CIA connection with an anti-Castro group which held meetings at 3126 Hollandale Street in Dallas or with a Cuban group which allegedly held meetings attended by Oswald at 3128 Harlendale Street in Dallas?

Answer:

Our file search to date has revealed no information concerning these two addresses. However, we are not satisfied that all possible CIA records have been consulted. A final report concerning this question will be forwarded to the Commission by 2 May 1975.

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

Hoch's Questions

1. Did the CIA intercept a letter & money order from Marguerite Oswald to Lee Harvey O. shortly after O. defected to Soviet U. ?

CIA says No.

Mail intercept program discussed in Rock. Comm. report

No [illegible] investig. made as to how FBI learned of the letter & M.Order because

- FBI functioning not w/in our Charter.
- Even if CIA had intercepted the ltr & reported it to FBI, it wd not be distinguishable from other mail interceptions or justify a separate investig.
- The mail intercept program of the CIA was not directed vs. Oswald individually.
- The Warren Commn received detailed evid. from the FBI with respect to the letter & money O.
- Certainly if Oswald was a CIA agent, as some have alleged, the CIA wd not have been reporting to the FBI on such mail recd by Oswald.

2. Angleton's "I'm not privy to who struck John."

- The whole Angleton quotation makes it clear that he was being asked about CIA activities occurring during the period of anti-war bombings in this country, and that he was responding to that question.

  The ~~only~~ reasonable meaning of his answer was: "There were a lot of things going on in the Agency during that period of anti-war bombings, and I wasn't aware of everything that was going on."

- The period of anti-war bombings didn't begin until 1967 or 1968, some 4 years or more after Pres K's death.

- The line "I'm not privy to who struck John," is drawn from the Bible (and its literary meaning is "I don't know.")

6/21/98

Date:09/19/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
8/20/98 KP12apr99

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10279

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/26/64
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
FITNESS REPORT OF E. HOWARD HUNT.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : ~~OPEN IN FULL~~ Postponed
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/19/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "Hoch/Warren Commission Paper"
"O/R (V-F)"

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

FITNESS REPORT

EMPLOYEE SERIAL NUMBER	013842

ECTION A — GENERAL

1. NAME *(Last)* *(First)* *(Middle)* HUNT, E. HOWARD	2. DATE OF BIRTH 10/09/18	3. SEX M	4. GRADE GS-15	5. SD D
6. OFFICIAL POSITION TITLE Ops Officer (Ch)	7. OFF/DIV/BR OF ASSIGNMENT DDP/DODS/R&P	8. CURRENT STATION Wash., D.C.		

9. CHECK (X) TYPE OF APPOINTMENT

X	CAREER		RESERVE		TEMPORARY
	CAREER-PROVISIONAL *(See instructions - Section C)*				
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:				

10. CHECK (X) TYPE OF REPORT

	INITIAL		REASSIGNMENT SUPERVISOR
X	ANNUAL		REASSIGNMENT EMPLOYEE
	SPECIAL *(Specify)*:		

11. DATE REPORT DUE IN O.P.
31 May 1964

12. REPORTING PERIOD *(From- to-)*
31 March 1963 - 31 March 1964

ECTION B — PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

W - Weak	Performance ranges from wholly inadequate to slightly less than satisfactory. A rating in this category requires positive remedial action. The nature of the action could range from counseling, to further training, to placing on probation, to reassignment or to separation. Describe action taken or proposed in Section C.
A - Adequate	Performance meets all requirements. It is entirely satisfactory and is characterized neither by deficiency nor excellence.
P - Proficient	Performance is more than satisfactory. Desired results are being produced in a proficient manner.
S - Strong	Performance is characterized by exceptional proficiency.
O - Outstanding	Performance is so exceptional in relation to requirements of the work and in comparison to the performance of others doing similar work as to warrant special recognition.

SPECIFIC DUTIES

ist up to six of the most important specific duties performed during the rating period. Insert rating letter which best describes the anner in which employee performs EACH specific duty. Consider ONLY effectiveness in performance of that duty. All employees ith supervisory responsibilities MUST be rated on their ability to supervise *(indicate number of employees supervised)*.

PECIFIC DUTY NO. 1 Supervises all Division propaganda operations.	RATING LETTER S
PECIFIC DUTY NO. 2 Project Officer WUHUSTLER, (WU) BONBON (with "oz" written above)	RATING LETTER S
PECIFIC DUTY NO. 3 Conducts liaison with USIA, Staffs and Area Divisions as required to coordinate DODS foreign & domestic propaganda operations.	RATING LETTER S
PECIFIC DUTY NO. 4	RATING LETTER
PECIFIC DUTY NO. 5	RATING LETTER
PECIFIC DUTY NO. 6	RATING LETTER

OVERALL PERFORMANCE IN CURRENT POSITION

Take into account everything about the employee which influences his effectiveness in his current position such as performance of specific duties, productivity, conduct on job, cooperativeness, pertinent personal traits or habits, and articular limitations or talents. Based on your knowledge of employee's overall performance during the rating period, lace the letter in the rating box corresponding to the statement which most accurately reflects his level of performance.	RATING LETTER S

26 MAY 1964

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

(8-12-94)

(When Filled In)

ECTION C. NARRATIVE COMMENTS

ndicate significant strengths or weaknes[illegible] demonstrated in current position keeping in [illegible]per perspective their relationship to overall performance. State suggestions made for improvement of work performance. Give recommendations for training. Comment on foreign language competence, if required for current position. Amplify or explain ratings given in Section B to provide best basis for determining future personnel action. Manner of performance of managerial or supervisory duties must be described, if applicable.

Subject has performed in a manner quite consistent with his long and broad experience in many aspects of the craft of intelligence, His senior grade, his special expertise in the field of propaganda and publication and his very high intellect have contributed to the division's operations in the public media field a sharp focus, an economical concentration of money and effort and a consequently heightened impact. In the WUHUSTLER project, Subject vindicated his faith in a moribund clandestine asset by demonstrating, after about a year and a half under his personal direction, that it is one of the most effective activities of its kind. Before Subject assumed direct responsibility for this project, it had suffered from visionary and diffuse direction and from poor case officer-agent rapport. Subject's personal handling of this operation is marked by excellent rapport and the project prospers on an entirely reoriented basis which the agent himself enthusiastically welcomes.

Subject's supervisory responsibility has extended over two secretaries, from one to two professional staffers under official cover and three professional career employees under unofficial cover. The fairness and precision of his management has patently won their respect and inspired their performance.

(Continued on additional sheet)

ECTION D CERTIFICATION AND COMMENTS

BY EMPLOYEE

I CERTIFY THAT I HAVE SEEN SECTIONS A, B, AND C OF THIS REPORT

ATE: 20 May 64

SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYEE: E. Howard Hunt

BY SUPERVISOR

ONTHS EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN NDER MY SUPERVISION: 24 months

IF THIS REPORT HAS NOT BEEN SHOWN TO EMPLOYEE, GIVE EXPLANATION:

ATE:) May 1964

OFFICIAL TITLE OF SUPERVISOR: DCOS

TYP[illegible] D SIGNATURE:

BY REVIEWING OFFICIAL

OMMENTS OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL

Concur

TE: 21 MAY 1964

OFFICIAL TITLE OF REVIEWING OFFICIAL: Chief, [illegible] ~~21 May 1964~~

TYPED OR PRINTED NAME AND SIGNATURE: C. T. James

~~SECRET~~

Attachment to Fitness Report of Howard Hunt 31 March 63 - 31 March 64

Section C (Continued)

Special mention should be made of Subject's objectivity and integrity in carrying out his responsibilities. These were best demonstrated when he promptly and swiftly terminated a large and effective radio broadcasting project, to establish which he and his subordinates had labored hard, immediately upon belated discovery that insuperable, practical obstacles precluded realization of the project's theoretical potential.

Subject's professional background has attuned his constant attention to FI operational opportunities arising in the course of his current CA activities, a practice consistent with his habit of seeking maximum benefit for every dollar spent in time, effort or cash.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10283

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT~~ 8/20/98

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : MURPHY, DAVID E.
TO : RECORD

TITLE :

DATE : 03/12/64
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD: "MEETING WITH THE WARREN COMMISSION ON 12 MARCH 1964." (WITH ROUTING SHEET ATTACHED)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT ~~AS SANITIZED~~

Kp 12 apr 99

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/19/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "Hoch/Warren Commission Paper"
"O/R (V-F)"

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

SUBJECT: (Optional)

~~SECRET~~

EYES ONLY

FROM: Chief, SR

EXTENSION:

NO.

DATE: 18 March 1964

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)	DATE RECEIVED	DATE FORWARDED	OFFICER'S INITIALS
1. DDP			
2.			
3.			
4. CSR			
5.			
6.			
7.			
8.			
9.			
10.			
11.			
12.			
13.			
14.			
15.			

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

To Dy [illegible]

Attached is the memorandum for record of our discussions with the Warren Commission Staff. The memorandum was reviewed in draft by Mr. Rocca.

DEM

154

Well done —

Thank you

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
~~AS SANITIZED~~
lcc
12-8-94
(1)(B)
(6 pages) (8-12-94)

610 USE PREVIOUS EDITIONS ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL ☐ INTERNAL USE ONLY ☐ UNCLASSIFIED

12 March 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the Warren Commission on 12 March 1964

1. On 12 March 1964, Mr. Helms, Mr. Murphy and Mr. Rocca met with Mr. Rankin, Chief Counsel for the Warren Commission, Mr. Willems, and other members of Mr. Rankin's staff. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the current status of the CIA contribution to the work of the Warren Commission.

2. The first topic raised by Mr. Rankin concerned information on Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in the Soviet Union as reported by the FBI, based on their interview of the defector, . This discussion is reported in a separate memorandum.

3. After disposing of the question of information on Oswald, Mr. Rankin's staff showed us a detailed memorandum they had prepared based on all of the information available to them, including our own contribution concerning Oswald's stay in the USSR. This material, together with some questions specifically related to the material we provided, will be forwarded to us by Mr. Rankin's staff. It was then suggested that a CIA officer most familiar with the material provided by CIA on the USSR aspects of the Oswald case visit the Commission in order to review on the spot the testimony given to the Commission by Marina Oswald. We agreed to send the appropriate officer to review this testimony but suggested that we wait until after receipt of the material just shown to us.

4. Members of Mr. Rankin's staff then spoke about having found a book in Oswald's possessions which had certain letters cut out giving the impression that this might have formed the base or key for a cipher system. They asked whether it would be useful in our opinion to send this book to NSA for review. We assured ~~them that~~ NSA was the appropriate Agency for this and Mr. Rocca commented that when this was done reference might also be made to the portion of Lee Oswald's notes which mentioned microdot. Another member of the Rankin staff

~~SECRET~~
EYES ONLY

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
~~AS SANITIZED~~

commented on the fact that Oswald had obtained employment in this country in a photographic firm through a Russian friend. He thought this might have a possible bearing on any clandestine communications systems he might have received from the Soviets.

5. Members of Mr. Rankin's staff then commented on the testimony of Mrs. Oswald to the effect that the letters from her son regarding his desire to return to the United States had the appearance of being dictated since they contained none of his usual grammatical errors and used legal language with which he would not have been familiar. In this connection, the fact that Lee Oswald wrote to the Embassy requesting help in arranging his return to the U.S. soon after receipt by the Embassy of a telegram from the Department reporting on correspondence with Oswald's mother seemed to indicate to members of Mr. Rankin's staff that the Soviets might have had access in some fashion to the contents of the telegram. They did not believe it was coincidental that Oswald's letter to the Embassy came immediately on the heels of the telegram from the Department. This led to a discussion of the appearance in the press of another telegram or report, from the Embassy in Moscow to the Department. Mr. Rankin said he would undertake to clarify this.

6. Mr. Willems noted that Mrs. Oswald had introduced a statement to the effect that she suspected her son to be a CIA agent. Mr. Willems asked whether in fact Oswald had been a CIA agent. Mr. Helms replied that he had not been. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any way of proving this. Mr. Helms first remarked that in him and Mr. Murphy the Commission had the two Clandestine Services officers who certainly would know whether or not Oswald had been an agent for CIA in the Soviet Union. He then said that the Commission would have to take his word for the fact that Oswald had not been an agent. Mr. Rankin interjected the view that the Commission had not adopted this procedure with other agencies and wondered whether there was not some way to clarify this point more effectively for the Commission. One suggestion he made was to have Mr. Dulles, who is familiar with CIA records procedures, review the material which would normally be held on agents and report to the Commission. Another suggestion was to follow the lead of the Director of the FBI who forwarded an affidavit to the Commission regarding the nature of FBI relations with Oswald.

7. A considerable part of the meeting from this point forward consisted of a review by Mr. Rankin and his staff of the gaps in their investigation to date. They noted that the most significant gap appeared in the Mexican phase. For example, they had no record of Oswald's

daily movements while in Mexico City nor could they confirm the date of his departure or his mode of travel. The original assumption that he had returned by bus could not be proven. Several possibilities were discussed whereby the Commission could fill in the gaps of its investigation of the Mexican phase. The suggestion was made that the most effective way of resolving the questions they had would be to have a member of the Commission visit Mexico City and discuss the issues on the spot with those American and Mexican officials directly concerned. Mr. Helms noted that it would be possible for a member of the Commission to visit our Chief of Station who would then be able to work out with the Warren Commission staff member the best way to handle interviews with Mexican police officials, particularly if it is desired that these interviews be informal in nature. Our Chief of Station would also be able to put the Warren Commission staff member in contact with the FBI officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers stationed in Mexico City. Mr. Helms cautioned that our Chief of Station(would be 32 under State Department cover)and that it would be proper to advise the Department of the planned visit and upon arrival to meet briefly with the Ambassador or Minister Counselor before proceeding to work out details with the CIA Chief of Station.

8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, members of Mr. Rankin's staff questioned Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca regarding the extent of the CIA file on Oswald for the period 8 October to 22 November 1963. They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown and wondered if there were not more. Mr. Rocca summarized the materials that had come to the attention of the Secret Service, or had been disseminated to the Secret Service, immediately after the assassination. Mr. Rocca said there was not additional substantive information and that the sanitized version seen by the Commission constituted the sum of our holdings. Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did not release actual copies of our messages because they contained codewords and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar with them. He added, however, that he would be happy to show the file with the original messages to any staff member of the Warren Commission who might come to visit him at Langley.

9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next discussed. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to

believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements. Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from telephone intercepts which were placed on both embassies. These intercepts were recorded on tape and reviewed by persons at our Station for any information affecting U. S. security. Such information is routinely passed to other agencies and entered in CIA files. Given the enormous bulk which is involved, the tapes are not kept on file but erased after a brief period of time. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that provided on other American citizens who might have made contacts of this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination. At the conclusion of his remarks on this subject, Mr. Helms specified that the information he had given Mr. Rankin was extremely sensitive and that the very existence of these telephone intercepts had to be very carefully protected.

10. The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in any information held by CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Commission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The Commission has received information from an unspecified source that Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story. Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assisting, to air manifest checks in Mexico. These would be carried out he said.

11. Mr. Helms was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Mr. Helms replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemination. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any liaison problems faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affecting internal security. Mr. Helms replied that there were always understandable human problems in conducting any liaison on any subject but

that by and large the procedures for dealing with internal security and counterespionage information which needed to be brought to the attention of other agencies were effective.

12. Mr. Willems then asked if CIA's intelligence collection system was automated. Mr. Helms replied that we did in fact have a machine records system for recovering file information which was unique in that it had been designed specifically with the requirements of the CIA Clandestine Services in mind. Thus, any information reposing in our files could be recovered by means of this machine system rapidly and efficiently. Mr. Helms invited Mr. Rankin and members of his staff to visit the Langley Headquarters and inspect the machine records system which he had described.

13. In speaking of the broader question of protection for the President, Mr. Rankin asked about our procedures for working with the Secret Service when the President travels abroad. Mr. Helms described how the system works and cited examples from the past to illustrate. He commented on some of the South American trips and on the visit to West Berlin to show the way in which the effectiveness and competence of the local police force plays a key role in efforts to insure the President's safety.

14. Mr. Willems asked if we could check on a memorandum sent to Mr. Karamessines on 12 February regarding one of the pictures identified by Mrs. Oswald as that of Jack Ruby. These pictures were from clandestine photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City which was provided by the FBI and then cropped to make a display to show to Mrs. Oswald soon after the President's assassination. The Commission has not been able to determine which of these pictures was shown Mrs. Oswald. Mr. Rocca will follow up on this.

David E. Murphy

David E. Murphy
Chief, SR Division

2/m
8/21/98

Curr Cl Ops

Date:09/20/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED~~
8/20/98

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10287

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : WEIDNER, JAMES B.
TO : FILE

TITLE :

DATE : 03/18/75
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW WITH JOHN STEIN.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/20/94

Postponed

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "John Stein" "B-W (VII-K)" "(3)"

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

March 18, 1975

~~SECRET - SENSITIVE~~

MEMORANDUM FOR: File

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Interview with John Stein

I interviewed Mr. Stein in his office at the CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia on March 18, 1975. The interview commenced at 11:10 a.m. and continued until approximately 1:20 p.m. No one else was present. At the outset of the interview, Mr. Stein signed an Advice and Waiver which is annexed hereto.

Mr. Stein, along with several other Deputies, were assigned to an Ad Hoc Committee to review various alleged domestic activities of the CIA. Stein's particular area was the counter-intelligence staff, except for the activities of that staff relating to the CI/SO project and to the mail intercept project.

Stein said that, after his review, he concluded that the job of the CI staff was essentially to "horse" the FBI into doing something. In fact, according to Stein, once you eliminate CI/SO and the mail intercept project from the CI staff, their activities were benign insofar as the scope of this Commission's scope of inquiry was concerned. He said that, unless you conclude that keeping records relating to Americans, per se, is improper, the CI staff files contained little of interest.

(a) Action-oriented Matters

I asked Stein whether he had found any evidence of domestic breaking and entering directed by the CI staff. Stein said that he had found no such activities, with one possible exception. Stein stated that, if such activities seemed appropriate, the CI staff would inform the Bureau

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED~~
16-8-94 lee

(1)(B)

which would accomplish the activities. This was because, if anything were discovered by virtue of the action which would lead to a prosecution, the action should be taken by the FBI, since the Department of Justice would have responsibility for the prosecution.

The only possible exception to the absence of any "breaking and entering" by the CI staff was the Tofti case. Tofti was a long term employee of the Agency, who put his house up for rent. Coincidently, another Agency employee went to look at the house for possible rental. In the course of so doing, the second employee found that there were quite a number of classified documents on the third floor of the house. The employee then reported what he found to the Agency, which sent personnel over to recover the documents. (The documents related to world-wide proprietaries of the Agency with which Tofti had been involved. Ultimately, Tofti explained that he intended to write a book about these matters and that was why the records were in his home.) The Agency undoubtedly did not have time to advise the Bureau much in advance (if at all) of the Agency's effort to recover the subject documents. Stein also noted that this incident did not, in fact, involve "breaking and entering" since the house was already opened to allow prospective renters to examine it.

Stein said that he had found no instances of physical surveillance done by the CI staff, although the staff would probably have been aware of surveillance accomplished by other agency components or by the Bureau. Stein cited as an example an instance where a female Agency employee was found to be living with a man who could well have been working for a foreign Government. The Office of Security, therefore, put a surveillance on her house for approximately three weeks. Discussions were also had with an informant within the Agency concerning this employee. (Files on this case would be maintained by the Office of Security).

Stein found no evidence of any electronic surveillance or telephone taps accomplished domestically by the CI staff. The staff had no personnel who could actually take any action. The staff, in this regard, would have had an advisory capacity, if it participated at all. The CI staff would simply advise the Bureau or other components of the Agency such as the Office of Security or the Office of Technical Services. In such instances the CI staff would not hold the file, except perhaps a memorandum relating to the particular case, but Stein found no such memoranda.

As a digression, Stein commented that, to the extent that CI staff may have gotten into "gray" areas, this may well have been as a result of an effort to restrict knowledge of a particular incident to the smallest possible number of people. Thus, rather than going to the Bureau, where control over the dissimilation of the subject information would not be possible, the staff might go to another Agency component such as the Office of Security. Similarly, where an investigation proved fruitless, continued maintenance of relevant files by the CI staff, rather than by the Agency or the Bureau generally, constituted part of an effort to avoid prejudicing the particular subject of the investigation.

Another general area mentioned by Stein was that involving the use by CI staff of people having an historical relationship with the staff. These persons would be used against clearly foreign targets in the United States. As an example, Stein said that such persons might be used to obtain access to codes or the like in this country.

Stein mentioned the allegations relating to the reported breaking and entering into the Chilian Embassy. I told him that we had already reviewed this instance, and, therefore, there was no need for him to review it any detail.

(b) Files on Americans.

The major source of files on Americans maintained by CI staff was the "American Targets Program" (ATP). This program involved information received by CI staff from Agency sources, from the State Department, and from the Military. Information might also be received from the FBI. The purpose of ATP was to collate all contacts between any American and any foreign intelligence officers, particularly those from the USSR. The concept of the program was that all such contacts would be reported to CI staff, which would index them for future reference.

Stein noted that, although the State Department actually had a formal regulation requiring that all contacts with Soviets be reported, it was extremely difficult to convince State officers so to report. Stein spent a substantial amount of time overseas under State cover. He said that, as a result of that experience, he knows that State officers are reluctant to report this kind of information. (A State officer probably will not achieve promotion by his contact with Soviet personnel.) As a result of this reluctance, the information obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department's Office of Security.

The ATP program for filing was simply that when a name was reported to CI staff, it was mechanically processed by personnel who exercised no judgment in recording the name. The names of both the Soviet and the American people involved in the contact would be recorded. As a result of this process, the ATP file index was able to develop a great deal of information on Soviet contacts with Americans. If, as a result of information obtained, CI staff had reason to believe that a aprticular person had been recruited by the Soviets, that information would be forwarded to the Office of Security for the Agency, if any Agency officer were involved, or to FBI, if an American outside the Agency was involved.

Stein explained that this program was conducted by CI staff instead of by the FBI or State, because the program might well contain information which would be relevant to CIA purposes, but not relevant to the purposes of the other Agencies. Thus, the files might well contain information concerning known KGB Agents. That information, in turn could have derived from a sensitive source, the identity of which CIA would not want to have revealed. Accordingly, the information was stored by the Agency rather than the other possible Governmental components. Information relevant to those components, however, was made available to them from the ATP project.

The information utilized by ATP could have been derived,as noted, from reports of other Governmental components or from information provided by any American. This would be information provided voluntarily, either by a person actually having a contact with a foreign intelligence officer or by persons with knowledge that someone else had had such a contact. The information could be particularly useful, not only to the CIA, but to other Governmental components. For example, the State Department's Office of Security might report that a State officer had had a contact over a long period with a Soviet. The CI staff could check all its information on that Soviet and confirm whether they had reason to believe that the Soviet was in fact an agent.

Another source of files on Americans held by CI staff might be the product [of code-breaking by NSA. Thus, in reading codes, names of Americans may appear.] Some of these may be innocuous, and some may be spies. In any event, all these names are also indexed, although the index is separate from ATP, because of the [sensitivity of the NSA program] as well as the information derived therefrom.

The information plugged into the indexing system will not become an actual file until there is some reason for opening a file on a particular person. At that point (for example, a file search requested by another Agency) all information relating to a particular person will be collated in one place. This, in turn will be developed into a separate file (a personality file). If the information on a particular person is requested by a CIA field office, the collation process would occur and the field would be told how the particular person had come to the attention of the Agency in the first instance and would also be told any derogatory information which the field station would want to know.

Other CI files derived from on-going cases. Part of these files emanate from information provided to the Agency by defectors. For example, one element of this information is designated "Soviet leads." This is because the CI staff learned from a defector that all Soviet women employed in the United States Embassy in the USSR during a certain period were Soviet agents. Some of these women, in turn, married Americans, and, as a result, now live in the United States. The FBI is advised of the identity of all these women. The CI staff, under official cover, occasionally goes out to interview these women, in an effort to convince them to reveal what they know about KGB operations. The effort was first to determine whether the women continue to be KGB agents, and, if not, to gather information from them. The general modus operandi would be to tell the women that we know that at one time they were KGB agents and, while we did not intend to take any action against them, to request them to reveal information that they may have learned at that time concerning KGB operations. Generally, the women would agree to do so. If they did not, the contract would, at least temporarily, be dropped. These women are, in short, used as "defectors who did not defect".

Other examples of going cases are: a journalist who had private contact with George Blake, a former KGB agent in England; an American who was tied into the Able case (in this instance, the actions are taken by the Bureau, but guidance is given by CI staff); and a journalist who the KGB, on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to recruit.*

Other files may relate to actions begun because of some kind of counterintelligence implication in a particular situation. In these instances CI would maintain the files because of the particular sensitivity of the matter, even though action may be taken by another Agency component.

---

*Stein noted that the decision as to whether to utilize someone as a double agent is made by the CIA. If the decision is affirmative, the double agent would be handled by the Agency (if he is abroad) or by the FBI (if he is in this country). The only exceptions to this pattern would be where the double Agent is in the United States for only a brief time or where he has a special relationship with a particular CIA officer.

Other files are maintained concerning the Soviet Embassy. CIA's position on this matter is that this is a State case which the Agency is running on behalf of State.

There is also a file on Vesco held by the CI Staff. The Agency became involved in this situation because John Dean of the White House called and stated that President Nixon's brother had obtained a job with IOS. He wanted to know what IOS was all about. CIA, in fact, had a file on IOS, because it was known that the Soviets had been attempting to penetrate that institution as a vehicle for getting agents into this country or at least allowing them to learn of economic matters relating to the United States. Stein said that, at one point, Vesco's lawyer called to say that he wanted to have an account of everything which had been said about Vesco over South American radio channels. The Agency refused this request, stating that it was beyond its charter.

(c) Defectors

There are four sorts of defectors handled by the CI Staff. The first group are those under low level cover which are being used to scan Soviet publications and to extract anything relating to Soviet intelligence which they, in light of their expertise, may recognize. The second group of defectors are those with "talents". This group are former KGB agents who, as a result, have special knowledge. They may be used from time to time to go and talk with (either in the United States or abroad) USSR citizens. Another sort of defector is one from Czechoslovakia. This particular person is highly knowledgable in Maxist-Leninist matters. Accordingly, he is used to write propaganda which is disseminated abroad. The last category of defectors are those who are no longer in regular contact with the agent. These particular persons are seen from time to time for some particular reason which could simply be an administrative matter concerning their pensions, etc.

The CI Staff also maintains a file on defectors from America to some other country (such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and others). These names are recorded because the persons involved may eventually end up in the United States once again or in some country other than the Soviet Bloc. This would not necessarily mean that that person is a spy, but it does mean that he would be of counter-intelligence interest, At approximately the time of the Kennedy assassination the Secret Service and the FBI became particularly interested in potential defectors from the United States. (Recall that Oswald had had connections with Russia). This was an operation which the CIA did not particularly want to undertake. Nonetheless the Agency did trace the names which the Bureau and Secret Service provided in this regard. The number of these names was perhaps 2,000 including crackpots who may have as an off hand comment, suggested that they intended to defect to, for example, Russia. The CIA attempted to turn the program over to the Secret Service for the Bureau, but they would not take it. The CIA ultimately stopped the project and cleared all the files out. This would have been approximately three years ago. Stein noted that although the files had been eliminated, it was possible that some of the names provided to the Agency had made it into the Central Agency files, and would not have been eliminated therefrom.

I briefly discussed the NOSENKO Case with Stein. Nosenko had defected to the United States and was admitted to this country as a "parolee". That is, the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau have a quota of persons which the Agency can bring into the country without regular immigration papers. These persons are the responsibility of the Agency. There was some initial doubt, as to whether, in fact, Nosenko had been sent to the United States by the KGB. Information obtained from another defector tended to confirm this suspicion. The question then was what to do with Nosenko. It was decided for a variety of reasons, that it would be unwise to attempt to deport him; as a result, he was kept in the United States in isolation. After several years it was determined that Nosenko was, in fact, not an attempted double agent. He was thereafter rehabilitated and now lives happily in the United States. Although the CI had an interest in this case, it was actually run by the Office of Security.

As one aspect of the Agency's duty to help in services of common concern to all Governmental agencies, the CIA recorded in computer form at the request of the FAA, all information relating to hijackers. Stein thinks that this was probably because the CIA had the only equipment which could handle the needed material in the proper fashion. The information so provided would, for example, include names of all those who were on board hijacked planes. Approximately two years ago the CIA tried to give this program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program, and, therefore it was terminated by CIA.

ADVICE AND WAIVER

Place [illegible]

Date ~~[illegible]~~ 7/15/74

Time 11:00 Am

Before you make any statement to, or answer any questions from, the Commission or its investigators, you should understand that you have the right to remain silent. If you choose to answer, anything you say can be used against you in court.

You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put, and you may have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time; or you may defer your answer until you talk to a lawyer.

WAIVER

I have read and understand the foregoing advice. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions ~~/ with /~~ JB / without / a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Signed____________________

Witness: R B [illegible]

Witness:____________________

Witness:____________________

Date:09/21/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER :	135-10001-10288
RECORDS SERIES :	
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	ROCK
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/04/75
PAGES :	55

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT: MEMORANDUM OF DEPOSITION FOR THE RECORD. PARTICIPANTS: FRANK STURGIS, WILFREDO NAVARRO, ROBERT B. OLSEN, JAMES N. ROETHE.

DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	T
RESTRICTIONS :	OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS :	O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	09/21/94
OPENING CRITERIA :	

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "President's Commission 4/4/75" "O/R-III (D)"

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~TOP SECRET~~

O/R - III (D)

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ON CIA ACTIVITIES

1 of 1

Friday, April 4, 1975

Washington, D. C.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
~~AS SANITIZED~~
16-8-94
(1)(4)

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

April 4, 1975

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM OF DEPOSITION FOR THE RECORD

DATE: Friday, April 4, 1975

PLACE: 712 Jackson Place, N.W.
Washington, D. C.

PARTICIPANTS:
Mr. Frank Sturgis - Witness
Mr. Wilfredo Navarro - Witness
Mr. Robert B. Olsen, Commission Staff
Mr. James N. Roethe, Commission Staff

OLSEN: Frank, continuing from our interview of yesterday which was being taken down by a court reporter, as you can see we don't have a court reporter present this morning, which is Friday, April 4, 1975, and we are beginning at 9:15 am. Do you understand, Frank and Wilfredo, that you are still under oath as you were yesterday and that this is a continuation of the deposition in effect that was being taken yesterday?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

NAVARRO: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: All right. We are going to have to stop from time to time to change belts, but we will try to speed it along as fast as we can. Yesterday we were talking about an approach which was made to you in Miami sometime after you had returned to the United States from Cuba in 1959, in which you were asked if you would be willing to undertake an assassination?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
~~AS SANITIZED~~ 16-8-94
(1)(A)

OLSEN: Would you tell us this morning who it was that approached you with that subject.

OLSEN: Mr. Sturgis has asked that we go off the record and we have had a conversation off the record, during the course of which Mr. Navarro was invited to leave the room and he is now absent from the room. The only parties present in the room at this time are Mr. Sturgis and myself. Now the question that I put to you, Frank, was: Can you identify for us at this time who it was that approached you with the question of whether you would participate in the performance of an assassation?

STURGIS: Bernard L. Barker.

OLSEN: And when was it, as best you now recall, Frank, that that approach was made?

STURGIS: I believe it was in approximately 1961, either before the Bay of Pigs or it was after the Bay of Pigs.

OLSEN: Was it very shortly before or shortly after?

STURGIS: I would be very honest with you, I don't remember.

OLSEN: Well, the Bay of Pigs operation actually took place in April of 1961, didn't it?

STURGIS: 1961, Yes, sir.

OLSEN: As I understand from your testimony yesterday, when you were approached about this, you indicated that you would be willing to do so.

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: But you thereafter checked with Sam Jenis about what he thought about it, and Sam Jenis indicated to you that he thought you should cooperate with Barker, but that you should make sure that it was going to be an authorized operation by insisting to Barker that the word come to you directly from someone who has identified himself as Barker's Case Officer. Is that a fair statement of what you have just told me?

STURGIS: Either his Case Officer, or his Station Chief.

OLSEN: Did you know at that time who Barker's Case Officer was?

STURGIS: I assumed at that time that it was possible that it was Eduardo, who he was the assistant under Eduardo.

OLSEN: But, am I correct in understanding now that you do not know whether Eduardo was still on the scene or whether he had been replaced?

STURGIS: No, sir, I do not know. Now let me say this. I did ask E. Howard Hunt do use the code name Eduardo while we were in Danbury, Connecticut, and present -

OLSEN: Now you are talking about 1972?

STURGIS: Now we are talking about 1972. I asked him if he gave any orders to Bernie, or Barker, or Maucho, whatever -- these names -- I called him by these names.

OLSEN: In other words, Barker was known as either Bernie or Maucho?

STURGIS: Right.

OLSEN: Okay.

STURGIS: I did ask Howard: Did you ever ask Maucho Barker to do an assassination, to approach me on an assassination. He says "Hell, no".

OLSEN: That was Mr. Hunt's answer to you in 1972?

STURGIS: Right.

OLSEN: All right then. Did you thereafter-- going back to the 1961-- did you have any further conversation with Bernard Barker about the subject?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I was advised to not to discuss the assassination attempt with him -- to let Bernie bring up the subject -- whenever I saw him. Bernie did bring up the subject --

OLSEN: Where did you talk to Bernie the next time about this subject?

STURGIS: It was either one or two places; it was either at his home in the --I believe the northwest section of town, or at a dinner that he invited me to at a steak house--and I believe it was a ranch house; this ranch house was located on 36th Street just before LeJuene Road.

OLSEN: And what happened when you next met with Barker about the subject?

STURGIS: He told me that this invitation was -- his Case Officer said "Take Frank out and have a dinner."

OLSEN: And what did he do? Did he explore further your willingness to undertake this?

STURGIS: Yes. Bernie asked me how I would go about it were the subject about the assassination, and he asked me how I would do it. And I told him, I says "Well, it would all depend. I don't want to know the man or the victim's name at this time, but it would depend on the man, his position, for me to determine how I would get rid of the man.

OLSEN: And also where?

STURGIS: Where--the location, right. Also, in the conversation I told him--he went into detail with me, and he said that there was a possibility that he would like to go on the thing with me. And I told him that "Well Bernie, I don't like anybody to come with me; I'll be very honest with you. I prefer to do it myself," because naturally I did not want to have a witness to something that I would do even if he is an agent or not, that I would do the thing. He said "Well, how could I know that it was done."

I says, "Well, there are several ways; No. 1, the person would eventually be reported missing; No. 2, I will cut off his ear or his finger and give it to you." I says, "because there won't be no body to recover." I told him -- he says how would you do it? I says "well, I could go the Everglades; I could dig a hole and put lye in it--the lye will eat up his body; I could take an airplane and fly over the gulfstream and I could dump him in the gulfstream weighted down -- I would have to cut his stomach and his intestines so that he wouldn't float. Even weighted down, a body will float unless you cut open the insides of his stomach and intestines." Or, I says, "I could go with a boat out into the gulfstream and use explosives in order to destroy the body completely."

OLSEN: Did you know at that time where this assassination attempt was to be undertaken in Florida?

STURGIS: No, sir; I again --knowing how agents work because I in turn have trained some people as far as intelligence was concerned; there is such a thing called compartmentation, and even though I was willing to go on this assassination,at that time I did not want to know who the person was in case if I did not do the assassination and someone else did the assassination, at least if it was uncovered that I would not be brought in as some one who knew of the conspiracy to assassinate someone here if it was in the United States or a foreign country.

OLSEN: Frank, did anything further transpire about this assassination? Other than this second conversation with Barker?

STURGIS: No, sir. Nothing came about because I nailed him to the wall, telling Barker that I would want someone much higher than he who would identify himself, his position with the company, and then I would do the operation.

OLSEN: Did anybody ever contact you then who was higher in the company?

STURGIS: No, sir. No one, but I still maintained my friendship with Barker throughout these years.

OLSEN: So that ended the matter with respect to assassinations?

STURGIS:Yes, sir.

(end of first tape)

OLSEN: All right, here we go back on record. And let the record show that Mr. Roethe has just recently re-entered the office and is now present for the rest of the conference. Jim, in order that your voice get picked up properly on this thing, would you move closer -- pick a chair that is a little closer to the mike.

Continuing then, Frank, did you ever have any further contact with anyone who you believed had any connection whatever with the Central Intelligence Agency about an assassination?

STURGIS: No, sir. Maucho Barker was the only one at that time. Now, Maucho asked me to help some other leaders who naturally were in touch with him. You must understand that because he asked me -- you can understand his position; his position was political under Eduardo; as I said before, E. Howard Hunt or Eduardo was a political officer with CIA with the planning of the Bay of Pigs invasion.

OLSEN: Well, what I'm getting at is: Did anybody ever contact you--that is, anybody who had any connection whatever with the CIA, contact you about an assassination after the one that you have just described to us?

STURGIS: In the United States, No, sir.

OLSEN: H w about outside the United States?

STURGIS: Well, there is a very thin line here. I have discussed assassinations of several top Cuban political and military leaders with the Havana Station.

OLSEN: When you say with the Havana Station, who in the Havana Station?

STURGIS: Well, with the United States Embassy, Colonel Nichols.

OLSEN: This was while you were still in Cuba? --

STURGIS: Yes, sir. --

OLSEN: Before leaving there in June 1959?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. That's in the first part of January and February of 1959.

OLSEN: Well, these were all discussed with us yesterday on the record when you described to us the discussions that took place among officials of the Cuban Air Force and Cuban Army about plans to assassinate Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Che Guevara?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: And people of their entourage.

STURGIS: Yes, sir..

OLSEN: And you described yesterday some exercises that were worked up, plans that were drawn up with respect to possible places to perform the assassinations?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: And then you described to us yesterday the fact that Colonel Nichols had on the occasions when you had discussed it with him --- Colonel Nichols had urged you to hold off on any such assassinations.

STURGIS: Right.

OLSEN: Now, in addition to those discussions that took place in Cuba early in 1959, when you were an officer of the Cuban Air Force, and the discussions that you had with Bernard Barker sometime in 1961 about a possible assassination of some unnamed person at an unnamed location, have you ever had any other discussions with anybody whatever associated with the United States Government about assassinations?

STURGIS: No, sir; not that I can remember at this time.

OLSEN: You mentioned to me when we talked over the telephone, Frank, that you had had some contact with or some relationship with a planned assassination of Premier Castro in New York. What was that that you were referring to?

STURGIS: There was a time--I don't remember the exact date--that Fidel was in New YOrk; there was a conspiracy or at least talk of a conspiracy to want to kill him. Now as far as CIA is concerned, I don't believe that they were involved or any agents were involved in that conspiracy.wanting to assassinate Fidel.

OLSEN: Was this then something that was discussed among elements of the Cuban exiles in Florida?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. New York and Florida.

OLSEN: Did you have any contact or know of any contact whatever in connection with such discussions of assassinating Premier Castro in New YOrk-- did you have any contact whatever with anybody in the Government of the United States?

STURGIS: That is very difficult to answer, Mr. Olsen, because of the dates.involved. I would think that I had contact with the Agency, but again I will state that whether they knew about or were involved in any conspiracy myself I do not know.

OLSEN: Well, when you say you had some contact with somebody from the Agency, did you have some contact with somebody from the Agency about such an assassination?

STURGIS: No, sir. No, I did not.

OLSEN: Was there any contact that you have had of any nature relating to any assassination any place with any official of the United States Government, other than the ones that you have already described to me?

[off the record]

OLSEN: All right, we are going back on the record again. Mr. Sturgis having said he was having difficulty thinking about exactly what answer he would give to the question that was posed because he didn't want to use up tape time while he was engaged in his thinking process. He has--while we have been off the record--explored the subject with us further and is now prepared to answer the question. Go ahead, Frank.

STURGIS: After that meeting with Barker, I, as far as I know, with the Cuban friends of mine who were working with the company or who was working under the company, there was a great deal of talk among the Cubans about wanting to assassinate Fidel Castro in New York, inside of Cuba, or in Latin America because Fidel did make several trips. There were talk, but as far as I know I don't know if CIA sponsored any of the Cubans in any attempt to kill Fidel or finance them in any attempt to kill him, nor supported any attempt by the Cubans to want to kill him, or whether these Cubans were simply patriots or were working for or associated with CIA.

OLSEN: You don't know then, Frank, whether any of this conversation about killing Fidel Castro was initiated or promoted or sponsored in any fashion by the Central Intelligence Agency?

STURGIS: I do not. No, sir.

OLSEN: Okay. Now, was there any other discussions about assassinations that you could tell us about that you participated in or knew of, other than what you have already described to us?

STURGIS: No, sir. At this point I cannot think of any. other attempt or discussion in any other assassination attempt on any one.

OLSEN: Did you ever have any conversation with anybody about assassinating President Kennedy?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Did you ever have any conversation with anyone about assassinating Attorney General, or later, Senator Robert Kennedy?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Did you ever have any conversation about assassinating Martin Luther King or any other legislative or executive or public figure in the United States?

STURGIS: No, sir.

[End of Tape #2]

OLSEN: All right, we are beginning belt No. 3 of this interview with Frank Sturgis on Friday, April 4, 1975. Frank, you have just told us that you have never had any conversations with anybody relating to the assassination of President Kennedy or any other political or other public figure in the United States. Is that correct?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Did you have any part whatever in planning or carrying out the assassination of President Kennedy or any other public figure of the United States?

STURGIS: I have not been involved in any of that, sir.

OLSEN: Were you in Dallas at any time in November 1963?

STURGIS: I don't recall, sir, but I do know one thing I was not in Dallas on November--I believe it was--November 22, 1963, when President Kennedy was asaassinated.

OLSEN: Where were you on that day?

STURGIS: I was at home in Miami.

OLSEN: Were you literally at home, or were you at work?

STURGIS: I remember, sir, that I saw the assassination of President Kennedy on television.

OLSEN: Now, of course, it had been taped on television; so you could have seen it anytime during that day or the succeeding days. It was replayed many times on television, wasn't it?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Where were you when you first heard that President Kennedy had been shot.

STURGIS: At my home.

OLSEN: Who was with you in your home at that time?

STURGIS: My wife, Mrs. Janet Sturgis; my mother-in-law, Mrs. Elizabeth Hunt; and I believe, my nephew, James Hunt.

OLSEN: And, is your mother-in-law alive today?

STURGIS: No, sir, she is dead.

OLSEN: When did she die?

STURGIS: You will have to call my wife. My mother-in-law lived with me for several years and offhand I forget the exact date that she died.

OLSEN: Now, the shooting of the President in Dallas on November 22, 1963, occurred at about 1:30 in the afternoon Miami time, can you tell us what you were doing at home on a Friday at 1:30, when the news first came that the

President had been shot?

STURGIS: No, sir, I couldn't. All I know is that I was home at that --

OLSEN: What kind of a job did you have at that time?

STURGIS: 1963 would be very difficult for me at the present time to just remember what I was doing in 1963 --

OLSEN: Were you selling used cars at that time?

STURGIS: I really don't know at this time. It is possible because I was involved through the years in selling used cars.

OLSEN: How did you first get the news that the President had been shot?

STURGIS: On television.

OLSEN: And did you remain at home the rest of the day?

STURGIS: Well I was at home for that day.

OLSEN: But I said, did you remain at home for the rest of the day after getting the news?

STURGIS: I'm sorry. Yes, sir, I did.

OLSEN: And were there anybody else who was aware of the fact that you were at home that day other than your wife, your mother-in-law, and your wife's nephew?

STURGIS: To the best that I can remember, sir, I believe they were the only ones -- I'm not too sure if anyone else stopped by the house or anything.

OLSEN: Do you recall calling anybody or talking to anybody that day by telephone or in person?

STURGIS: Well, not exactly, because everyone was upset in the house because of the assassination.

OLSEN: Were you ever taken into custody by any police in Dallas?

STURGIS: No, sir. Never.

OLSEN: Have you ever visited the scene of the assassination of President Kennedy in Dallas?

STURGIS: No, sir. Never have.

OLSEN: Have you turned over to us, Mr. Sturgis, a series of some 30 to 35 photographs taken of yourself in the late 1950's and early 1960's for purposes of identification of what you looked like in those days?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Do we have your permission to have those photographs copied and analyzed to determine whether there is any correspondence between your appearance at that time and the appearance of certain persons who were taken into custody in Dallas, Texas, on November 22, 1963?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. You have my permission.

ROETHE: Have those photographs been dated by you on the back of each photograph?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. These photographs have been dated to the best of my knowledge. They should be the correct date or approximately that date.

OLSEN: There are several instances, Frank, in which a date shows on the print itself, where you have separately identified the year in which the photograph was taken on the back of the photograph. Is that correct?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: And would those pictures where the date is shown on the front, wouldthe date shown on the front be reasonably close to the date on which the pictures were taken?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Would they be generally within six months or less of the date that the photographs were taken?

STURGIS: I would think so; yes, sir.

OLSEN: Frank, we have handed to you for your examination a series of five photographs which have been marked as "Groden Exhibits 9A, 9B, 9C, 9D and 9E" depicting certain persons who were being accompanied by police in Dallas, Texas, as they were walking along in the general vicinity of the Texas School Book Depository; can you tell us whether any of those photographs show you?

STURGIS: The people in the photograph that I have seen were not me.

OLSEN: Did you recognize any of the people in the photographs?

STURGIS: No, sir, I did not.

OLSEN: Can you tell us whether in your opinion any of those photographs show E. Howard Hunt?

STURGIS: Not that I know, sir, because at that time I did not know E. Howard Hunt.

[Off the record]

OLSEN: We have again bean off the record for a few moments while I have been thinking about the next line of inquiry or whether there is in fact anything else that we would like to talk to Frank Sturgis about. And we've concluded that we are about finished with the interview, but Mr. Sturgis has indicated that he would like to make a statement to us about his willingness to submit himself to a polygraph dealing with certain subjects that we have covered in this interview. Would you go ahead, Frank, and make whatever statement you want to make on that subject.

STURGIS: Yes, sir, Mr. Olsen, I am willing to take a polograph on the subject of either conspiracy on my part or the attempt on the attempt to assassination of President Kennedy, Martin Luther King, Robert Kennedy, or any official of the United States Government. Plus, I am willing to take a polygraph on what I have just told you about Bernie Barker asking me about an assassination attempt.

OLSEN: You're talking about these two conversations now that you had with Bernie Barker in which -- in about 1961 -- he approached you about your willingness to perform an assassination on some unknown person at some unknown place?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I'll take a polygraph on that too, if necessary.

OLSEN: Is there anything else, Frank, that you would like to reveal to the Commission, that you would like to talk to the Commission about, relating to the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency in any respect whatever?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I would like to make this statement. I think that there are elements in this country who are trying to destroy the Central Intelligence Agency. I believe in order for a country to have some defense or to protect our national security we do need an agency like Central Intelligence Agency. I do feel that there may be elements within Central Intelligence Agency who probably who have exceeded their orders and so forth, that may have went off on some things of their own that probably either their Station Chief or sometimes the Case Officer or anyone higher than whoever the people are that may have or would want to do certain illegal activities.

OLSEN: Okay. We are going to have to break again here because we are at the end of another belt on the dictating unit, but I do want to come back to one other question that I want to ask you on another case.

[end of Belt No. 3]

OLSEN: Frank, we are now beginning tape No. 4, or belt No. 4, here on this interview. And I would like to go into the subject a little bit further about any connections that you may have had with the assassination of President Kennedy.

First, let me ask you, have you ever in your life met Lee Harvey Oswald?

STURGIS: Not that I can remember, sir.

OLSEN: Do you know whether you had any contact with him in Florida?

STURGIS: Not that I can remember, sir.

OLSEN: Do you ever recall having had any contacts with somebody by the name of Jack Ruby--either in the United States, Cuba, or elsewhere?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Jack Ruby, I understand that his real name was Rubenstein; did you ever meet anybody in Cuba or in Florida by the name of Jack Rubenstein, or Jake Rubenstein?

STURGIS: Not that I can remember sir.

OLSEN: Have you ever in your life met Clay Shaw of New Orleans ?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Have you ever met a man by the name of David Ferry of New Orleans?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Or David Ferry or Clay Shaw from any place else?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Did you ever have any contacts with anybody at 544 Camp Street or that vicinity in New Orleans?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Did you ever visit anybody related to the Cuban Revolutionary Movement in New Orleans?

STURGIS: In New Orleans, No, sir.

OLSEN: Have you ever been to New Orleans?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I have. Several times.

OLSEN: And do you know whether you were in New Orleans at any time in 1962 or 1963?

STURGIS: I can't remember, sir. I don't recall the dates.

OLSEN: What was the occasion for your being in New Orleans?

STURGIS: I believe once or twice in leaving the country, one time I believe going to Panama, --

OLSEN: That is, you just flew to New Orleans in order to catch a flight to Panama?

STURGIS: To Panama. A direct flight to Panama. Also a direct flight to Guatamala when I went there to visit President Udios (?).

OLSEN: And, on either of those occasions did you go into the City of New Orleans or did you just stay at the airport between flights?

STURGIS: I stayed at a motel, which I believe was one of the largest motels in New Orleans. I did go into the French Quarter in New Orleans one time--the date I don't remember. But it was on one of these visits.

OLSEN: Was it just for an evening on the town, or what?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Just for social contact?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. Because New Orleans is a famous city in the French Quarter and I wanted to at least if I had the time at that time at the motel to visit the French Quarter.

OLSEN: Did you ever make contact with or confer with anybody relating to the Cuban Revolutionary Movement or any other Cuban anti-Castro groups in New Orleans?

STURGIS: No, sir. I didn't.

OLSEN: Did you ever have any contact with an organization known as the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee"?

STURGIS: No, sir. At least not that I can remember.

OLSEN: Did you have any connection at all with the prosecutions initiated in New Orleans by District Attorney Jim Garrett?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Were you ever called as a witness?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Were you ever interviewed or had your deposition taken in that matter?

STURGIS: By them; no, sir.

OLSEN: By anybody in cases involving charges brought against Clay Shaw?

STURGIS: Oh, no, sir. I was thinking about the FBI visting me several days after the assassination.

OLSEN: Were you contacted and visited by the FBI shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Who contacted you?

STURGIS: Two Special Agents from the Bureau, FBI. I believe one of the agents--if I'm not mistaken--his name was Bob Davis.

OLSEN: And do you know the name of the other one?

STURGIS: Offhand I forget, sir.

OLSEN: And do you know how long after the assassination that that interview took place?

STURGIS: No, sir. I don't; I really don't remember the exact date.

OLSEN: Did they tell you why they were interviewing you?

STURGIS: They wanted to know my whereabouts before, during and after the assassination of President Kennedy.

OLSEN: Did they say why they wanted to know your whereabouts?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. In the friendly(?) discussion that we had there-- I believe it lasted maybe two hours, to two and a half hours-- I asked why that they wanted to speak with me concerning this. And they said, "Well, Frank, we feel that you are one of several persons that is capable of doing this sort of thing."

OLSEN: Why did they think that you were capable of doing this kind of thing?

STURGIS: I really don't know, sir.

ROETHE: Was this interview in Miami?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. It was in Miami at my home. I believe--I'm not sure just where I was living at at that time, sir.

OLSEN: Do you recall having made any statements which were quoted in the Miami newspapers or any Miami newspaper about the assassination of the President?

STURGIS: I may have, sir.

OLSEN: Do you know whether you stated at that time that you knew any of the characters who were involved in the assassination?

STURGIS: I don't remember, sir.

OLSEN: Do you remember at that time stating whether you thought that there was a conspiracy or not a conspiracy in connection with the President's assassination?

STURGIS: I believe that to this day, that there is a possibility that there was a conspiracy to assassinate the President of the United States.

OLSEN: Well, what I'm asking you is do you remember stating at that time to the press or otherwise in Miami that you thought there was a conspiracy?

STURGIS: I would say yes, because I felt that way all along.

OLSEN: Frank, do you have any facts that you would be willing to give us -- or that you know of--that would indicate that there was in fact a conspiracy to assassinate the President?

STURGIS: Well, the only thing that I can add would --what makes me think that there was a conspiracy at that time in assassinating the President was the fact that knowing the political situation in Cuba before Castro and during Castro,with many of the Cubans who supported Batista that were involved and were connected with the crime syndicate, the Cuban crime syndicate, the American crime syndicate, with the Batista government at the same time supporting the Fidel Castro rebels, in order to safeguard not only their position in the crime syndicate --not only to get themselves better situated personally within the rebel groups; if they were successful, I believe that these same people would -- in my experience with them, what I have seen, from the people I was in contact with that came over to the United States into exile, now this is only a small group of people we are talking about--it probably would represent maybe several hundreds of people--many of these people were integrated in the revolutionary forces, the Frende (sp?), or the Revoluntionary Council, the brigade , or whatever you want to call it; this force which CIA supported. Now these same people came here; they got connections with the Central Intelligence Agency;

many of them got to be agents. And even to this present day, they are involved in some of the biggest international crime and drug smuggling that is going on in this country.

OLSEN: These elements of the Cuban crime syndicate associated with the Batista government who became exiles in this country --

STURGIS: --who then supported the Castro rebels, who then in turn, when Fidel took over the country, was with the new Cuban government; and then leaving for one reason or another: (1) Fidel wanted to clear out the crime situation there

[interruption-- end of Belt No. 4]

OLSEN: All right. Here we are back on belt No. 5, continuing the interview with Frank Sturgis on Friday the 4th of April. Go ahead Frank. You were just giving us your thoughts with respect to the possibility of a conspiracy to kill President Kennedy.

STURGIS: The same group of people whom I have just said that supported Batista, then the rebels, then Fidel who came into power after January the 1st, for one reason or another--especially Fidel telling me personally "If I'm in this office, I'm going to run all these gangsters, all these crime people out of Cuba" -- which he did; he gave me orders, and I did close up the gambling casinos for ten days in Cuba. These same people then had to turn against him that supported him and had positions as officers, military, and so forth, then had to leave Cuba and came to the United States as refugees.

OLSEN: And they were very hostile to Castro at that point?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. They were very hostile to him because he took away their livelihood.

OLSEN: And they then supported the anti-Castro movement in south Florida and they strongly supported the attempt to overthrow Castro that was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. Many of these men were integrated into CIA, which still maintained contact with the American crime syndicate, especially in Miami Beach.

OLSEN: You are talking about the fact that they--that the Cuban crime syndicate maintained relationships with the American crime syndicate?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: And the Cuban crime syndicate was involved as a part of the anti-Castro movement in south Florida?

STURGIS: Well you must understand that the Cuban crime syndicate was being busted up in Havana because of their close working, not only political but business-like deals that they had with the American syndicate. These people losing their businesses there--the Americans and the Cubans--came into the United States here, which still maintained contact with each other; many of these people because,you must understand, they had friends and contacts in Cuba, CIA needed them to work for them. Many of these people got to be agents for CIA.

OLSEN: You mean sources of information?

STURGIS: Led up to be agents for CIA; as agents because of their contacts inside of Cuba that they had that was part of the underground organization, part of the business life that they had there, which part of them was the Cuban crime syndicate.

OLSEN: Now let's move on to what the relationship is between the Cuban crime syndicate and its relation to the American crime syndicate, the anti-Castro movement in south Florida, and the assassination of the President. What is the connection? Do I understand from you, Frank, that after the Bay of Pigs operation that there was a great deal of hostility to President Kennedy and Senator Robert Kennedy on the part of the anti-Castro Cubans in south Florida.

STURGIS: Right. Yes, sir, there was.

OLSEN: And do I understand further that it is your thought that because this anti-Castro movement in south Florida also included a lot of the crime syndicate people from both the United States and Cuba --

STURGIS: Yes, sir. (interrupting)

OLSEN: -that therefore there was a capability as well as motivation for killing President Kennedy.

STURGIS: I believe from the information and discussions that I have had in the Cuban colony that the thing was more against Bobby Kennedy because he was the top law enforcement official in this country, that if --you know like "Hey, if you get rid of Bobby Kennedy, you still got his brother which is President Kennedy." So the thing was to -- the hostility was then put off against President Kennedy.

OLSEN: So assuming that there was both a strong enough motivation on the part of these elements, crime elements within the anti-Castro group, to kill the President and that there was the capability also to do it, do you have any evidence indicating that the killing of President Kennedy in Dallas was actually carried out by people who were involved in this anti-Castro movement in Florida?

STURGIS: Well, my thoughts were, and still is, the fact that there is a good possibility that Cuban and Americans who are part of this crime syndicate, using the Cubans and then setting up possibly a conspiracy--there is a lot of talk of, you know, of wanting to kill Fidel. So if you have to kill Fidel, why not Bobby Kennedy and why not the President of the United States.

OLSEN: But what I am asking you is: Do you know of any facts indicating that the killing of President Kennedy on November 22, 1963, was actually an outgrowth of any planning, conspiracy, or activity of the anti-Castro Cubans?

STURGIS: No, sir, I don't.

OLSEN: Or any other portion of the Cuban community?

STURGIS: No, sir, I don't have any facts on that.

OLSEN: It's just kind of your suspicion, like that -- or speculation?

STURGIS: Yes, sir; there is that possibility.

OLSEN: That because of the feeling, the anti-Kennedy feeling --

STURGIS: Yes, sir. (interrupting)

OLSEN: -- that they could have been involved?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. That they could have been involved because that --they need motive, motivation; and that was the motivation-- that would be the motivation.

OLSEN: Do you have any personal knowledge, or have you ever heard of any contacts between the anti-Castro Cuban element any place in the United States and Lee Harvey Oswald?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Have you ever heard that Lee Harvey Oswald made contact with, was friendly to, or attempted to penetrate any anti-Castro group?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: What is your information on that?

STURGIS: I'm not sure of the group; but there is a group called the "DR" -- the student directorate, which was being financed by CIA, and I believe one of the top officials of that group whom I was in touch with,both the president and lesser officials of/that group, supposedly-- they told me--that Oswald was in the Miami area, tried to penetrate their organization or some of the other Cuban organizations and possibly that he may have tried to make contact with me or spoke with me; to this day, I don't know if this is a fact or if it's not because I can't remember.

OLSEN: Who was the leader of this DR?

STURGIS: I don't recall offhand, sir, because the leaderhip did change-- I believe that it did change, the leadership ...

OLSEN: Who told you that there may have been such attempts by Oswald to penetrate or become involved in the DR?

STURGIS: One of the officials of the DR; I believe they had an office --a home that they used as an office--in the Coral Gables area I believe ..

OLSEN: Do you remember the name of this official?

STURGIS: No, sir, I don't at this time.

OLSEN: Do you know the name of any official of the DR?

STURGIS: Not at this time; no, sir. I was in touch with many Cubans at the time and unless I maintain a personal contact with people continuously, then I would naturally remember the names and so forth.

ROETHE: You mentioned this anti-Castro group, that you thought might have the capability to carry on an assassination, was presently still involved in certain drug smuggling activities and you also indicated that this group was in contact with CIA and was still on occasion doing some work for CIA . Is this right?

STURGIS: There was that possibility at that time. Because you must remember that I have picked up a lot of information by people talking with me and I have never followed through in investigating the type of information I was given by them.

ROETHE: The only implication that I wanted to have you direct your attention to was the implication that perhaps these people, in connection with CIA, were involved in some type of illegal activity, drug smuggling or some other activity of this nature.

STURGIS: Well, let me say this in reference to the CIA; a lot of these people were agents, whether or not in their illegal activities they were agents at that particular time or not, I have no proof of that.

OLSEN: Do you have any reason to believe that in running drug operations or other illegal activities, they were acting on behalf of the CIA?

STURGIS: No, sir.

[End of Tape #5]

OLSEN: All right, Frank, we are beginning Tape No. 6, and it is now about 11:00 am on Friday the 4th of April. Did you ever get interviewed within the last several years by a man by the name of St. George?

STURGIS: I wouldn't exactly call it an interview. But he has been in touch with me.

OLSEN: Did -- Where did you meet with him?

STURGIS: One time at the Holiday Inn --

OLSEN: Where?

STURGIS: This is LeJuene Road at 36th Street on top of the Holiday Inn, which was a restaurant -- if I'm not mistaken he was also checked in to that hotel.

OLSEN: Did you ever talk to him about his interest about writing a book about you?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

ROETHE: This is Miami?

STURGIS: In Miami; yes, sir.

OLSEN: Did you ever authorize him to write a book about you?

STURGIS: I gave him a little typed statement of the fact that I have authorized him to make contact with the different publishing companies, and so forth, to see if they would be interested, in giving me a contract in writing a book.

OLSEN: Did you ever authorize him then to write a book -- an authorized book about you?

STURGIS: No, sir, not for him. He would have to get with me to get the necessary information which it would take;to write a book of my life would take maybe, I would say eight months to a year with the research and information that I would have to supply him.

OLSEN: Did you ever tell him that you wanted to read over an outline or a transcript of his proposed book?

STURGIS: Well, sir, he mentioned that an outline would have to be made in order to present the outline to the publishing company to see if they would be interested in offering me a contract.

OLSEN: Did you ever have any conversation with him about your wanting to see an outline of the book before you authorized him to proceed?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I asked "Andrew, when are you going to make the outline";because he had to come sit down with me, take notes for an outline--which he never did.

OLSEN: Did he ever tell you that he had prepared an outline?

STURGIS: He told me that he knew enough about my anti-communist activites and about my Cuban activities that he would make an outline to present to the publishing company. I says "fine, but I would want to see the outline." I insisted upon it.

OLSEN: Did he ever tell you that he had made an outline?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. At that time he said that he was going to make an outline; then at later discussions with him by telephone he told me he had made an outline and that one of the companies was interested, that they were prepared to offer me $70,000 if he would come to Miami with a contract and further discussion on that matter.

OLSEN: Did he then come to Miami further to discuss it with you?

STURGIS: Yes, sir; he did.

OLSEN: And where did you meet with him then?

STURGIS: Oh, I forget. I think he came to my home--yes, as a matter of fact, he did come to my home. Then he invited me out to either one short dinner, which we did go, and he showed me the contract; and upon showing me the contract he wanted me to sign, he was very very pushy on the matter. And I told him No that I was not going to sign the contract. I wanted my lawyer, Henry Rothflat, to look over the contract -- plus I wanted to see a copy of the outline that he prepared and I wanted my attorney to look at the copy of the outline. I --

OLSEN: When was this, by the way? (interrupting)

STURGIS: '72, I believe.

OLSEN: Was this after the Watergate break-in?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. After the Watergate break-in. I told him that I had to be very very careful, that I could not speak anything about my Watergate affair because it was an order handed down by Judge Sirica.

OLSEN: Did he tell you that he had prepared an outline?

STURGIS: Yes. Oh, yes.

OLSEN: Did he tell you what had happened to it?

STURGIS: Well, he was -- this was before the outline being taken -- he was being forceful with me and I was getting very angry with him because he was trying to get me to sign the contract, and I told him: No, it had to go to Henry Rothflat; that I would not sign it; plus I want to see the outline; not only that, I want it stipulated in the contract that any information or --you know--the manuscript, that I would have to go over the manuscript, that I would want to at least say what was going to be in the manuscript or not be in the manuscript.

OLSEN: Did he ever tell you that the manuscript had been stolen?

STURGIS: At a later date. He left here; he was irate with me; he talked to me on the telephone from New York; he told me "Oh, my goodness, Frank; while certain things were coming out of the newspapers, this is what happened."

OLSEN: Is it about you?

STURGIS: Oh, yes.

OLSEN: What did he say to you?

STURGIS: I confronted him on that. I called Seymour Hersh up. I told Seymour Hersh "What the hell are you putting in the newspaper about me?" He says "Well, bu -bu St. George's." I don't give a fuck about Andrew St. George." He says "Well, in your outline you stated.." I says "I haven't stated these fucking lies that you are putting in the paper about me." I says "Andrew St. George is a fucking liar, and I told him that on the telephone." He says "Well, I believe you Frank, I believe you." I says "Well, stop that bullshit". Because he mentioned about the break-in of the Chilean Embassy--supposedly that I did the break-in of the Chilean Embassy --

ROETHE: Here in Washington?

STURGIS: In Washington, D. C. I denied it; I told him that I had nothing to do with that; I knew nothing about it; why are you dragging the CIA into this thing? It is absolutely ridiculous.

OLSEN: Did you have any conversation about other mistakes that were appearing in the press about you?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: What other mistakes, or erroneous information did you discuss with Seymour Hersh?

STURGIS: Well, I don't remember at the present time. But most of the stuff that I would think -- you see, I can't remember everything that came out in the article by Seymour Hersh.

OLSEN: What about the article that appeared in 1974 in TRUE Magazine about you, written by Andrew St. George. Have you read that article?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I have.

OLSEN: Is it an accurate article about you?

STURGIS: Most of the information in that magazine I did not give him. Most of it is lies. And I plan on bringing -- well, as a matter of fact, my lawyer in Miami, Mr. Ellis Rubin, has been instructed by me to bring a libel suit against TRUE MAGAZINE and Andrew St. George. I have written letters through my lawyer to TRUE MAGAZINE stating the utter lies of that article that came out, that had been in this article by Andrew St. George.

OLSEN: Was it stated in the TRUE MAGAZINE article that you told Andrew St. George that you had met Howard Hunt back in 1969.

STURGIS: I have never told Andrew St. George --

OLSEN: I am asking you whether that appeared in the TRUE MAGAZINE article?

STURGIS: I don't recall at this time.

OLSEN: If it appeared in the TRUE MAGAZINE article, was it true or false?

STURGIS: It was false, sir.

OLSEN: If it appeared in the TRUE MAGAZINE article that you had told Andrew St. George that you had discussed disposal and killings with Mr. Liddy, was that true or false?

STURGIS: That is false, sir.

OLSEN: IF it was stated in the TRUE MAGAZINE article that you had made a statement to the effect that Howard Hunt was a professional and that he had participated in several successful disposal operations, was that true or false?

STURGIS: False, sir. As a matter of fact, the day I received that magazine I took it to Wilfredo Navarro at Dodge Island in Miami, and I was very very hot about it. A newspaper reporter came over to me and took --

not a newspaper reporter--a T.V. reporter came over, and I categorically said on television that-- this was on Channel 4--(some one said 10 from the sideline, probably Navarro) Channel 10 and told them that this article was a lie and that I was going to bring a possible libel suit against the magazine and Andrew St. George.

OLSEN: Did you tell Andrew St. George that you were an old friend of E. Howard Hunt?

STURGIS: Never, sir. I may have told him that I was a friend of E. Howard Hunt at that particular time, which was in between trial.

OLSEN: Did you ever tell Andrew St. George that you had taken on the name of "Sturgis" from a character in the Hunt book written in 1949, called " Bimini Run" ?

STURGIS: No, sir. The first time I saw that book "Bimini Run" was two officers who arrested me in the Watergate. at Democratic Headquarters. They had the book. They did show it to me. I forget where and I was surprised. I did look it over. One of the chapters. And I was very very surprised that the character was Hank Sturgis, and I had a big laugh about it.

OLSEN: Was that purely a coincidence?

STURGIS: That was pure coincidence, and the first time I ever seen that book or heard about that book in my life.

OLSEN: I believe you testified to us previously that you had taken on the name of Sturgis as your legal name sometime in the 1960's after your mother had remarried a man by the name of Sturgis.

STURGIS: Ralph Sturgis. Yes, sir.

[end of Tape #6]

OLSEN: All right, we are beginning belt No. 7. Frank, did you state to Andrew St. George that if you had to do any killing that you would use your bare hands and a piece of wire.

STURGIS: That's hogwash. I never stated that. I may have stated in talking with Andrew about my activities in the Marine Corps and Edson's Raiders, which was the first raider battalion, that part of my training was for instance sneaking up on victims using the stiletto which we were equipped with to operate behind enemy lines, to go ashore in rubber boats, and so forth. I did receive that training to how to kill people with. Piano wire with this stiletto, sniper, telescopes, etc. -- that training I did receive in the South Pacific.

OLSEN: This was fairly common training received by people in the military services, or certain branches of the military services, during World War II?

STURGIS: I would say certain units in certain--for instance in the Marine Corps and the Army we had certain units that did this type of work; not everyone received this type of training.

OLSEN: All right, Frank. I think we are about near the end of this interview. But I did want to follow up on one other item. You said that you had had a telephone conversation, I believe, with Seymour Hersh about certain inaccuracies that were appearing in the press on articles he had written.

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Did he relate to you that he had received this information from Andrew St. George?

STURGIS: What happened, sir, as I remember calling him up late at night at the NEW YORK TIMES--this is after I spoke with Andrew St. George on the telephone and I called Andrew St. George every name in the book and Andrew told me "Well, Frank, I don't know how Seymour Hersh got this information "--because I accused Andrew St. George of making these lies that was supposedly part of his outline. I pinned him down good. "Did you put these lies in the outline; because if you did, that is not for me, and that is no good and I will not sign a contract with you; you are a son-of-a-bitch, you're a liar, and I have no confidence; it's the end of you with me in writing any type of book because you cannot be trusted. You are a liar." He says "Frank, look, I made an outline" this and that and "I did not give it to Seymour Hersh. What happened I gave it to one of the publishing companies and somehow Seymour Hersh did get this outline. He stole the outline. I am thinking right now whether or not I should sue the NEW YORK TIMES and Seymour Hersh. "That's what I should do, I --

ROETHE: You're quoting Andrew St. George?

STURGIS: Andrew St. George. For stealing. Well I says "If you don't sue him, I may go ahead and sue him for printing this shit that you have--and I may include you because I did not tell you all this bullshit. Where did you get this?"

OLSEN: What were the things in particular that you were angry about--the lies that were appearing in the paper about you? Do you remember which particular items aroused you the most?

STURGIS: I don't remember at this time because I was under so much pressure at that time because of the trial, because of all the publicity that was coming out, and because if my name was connected with anything especially--you know, I had to keep quiet, I could not counter of this publicity. I felt at that time--from what I know today, that the same people that we worked for were in turn trying to give us a bad reputation, trying to smear us in order to protect themselves from what I see what happened up to today from what I know. So, naturally I could not counter, and I was deadly afraid to talk with any newspaper people. And here Seymour Hersh came out with certain articles which I don't recall what they were today, making statements about at least one I can remember was the Chilean Embassy supposedly that CIA had something to do with the break-in and that I was the person who broke into the Chilean Embassy in Washin ton, D.C. And I confronted --I called Seymour Hersh after I spoke with Andrew St George late at night and told him "Who gave you this information? Why did you go ahead and print all these things? I don't know anything about what's in this outline that this man Andrew St. George wrote, and so forth. Who gave you this? Where did you get it at? He tells me you stole this outline. It is not my outline because it is not me telling Andrew St. George all this bullshit that's in there. How could you print these things? Why didn't you call me and talk with me personally to confirm or deny some of these things that supposedly is outlined. And you're saying directly that I said this."

OLSEN: Well, did Seymour Hersh then tell you where he got the information?

STURGIS: No, sir, because I was very hot at this and Seymour Hersh told me that it was in the outline--yes, he told me, I believe he told me, that it was in the outline that Andrew made up, supposedly that we both made together. And I told Seymour Hersh that I did not make no outline up with Andrew St. George. I don't know what's in it.

OLSEN: Do you know whether at any time while you were being interviewed by Andrew St. George he was making a recording of the conversation?

STURGIS: No, sir. I have never been to his room. He has never taken any notes or anything. I continually asked Andrew "When are you going to sit down with me to take notes for an outline?"

OLSEN: But you don't know for sure whether he was surreptitiously recording?

STURGIS: No, sir. Because I know many times--or at least this one time when I was talking with him, going back to my Castro days--and that's the only thing I have ever discussed with him, is my Castro days. Never anything about Watergate because ofthe order that Judge Sirica handed down not to discuss the case. But he did open up his briefcase; he had papers and so forth in his brief case.

OLSEN: Did you ever see any recording apparatus in his brief case?

STURGIS: No, sir. Not in his brief case.

OLSEN: Did he ever tell you that he was recording his conversation with you?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: Do you have anything else that you would like to offer to the Commission here relating to your connections with the Central Intelligence Agency?

STURGIS: Well, I do have some notes here when we get off the record to see if I got anything else I can add.

OLSEN: All right. Why don't we go off the record then, and you look through your notes and then you can tell us whether you have anything further you would like to add. Shall we do that?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

ROETHE: I would like to ask one more question. You indicated at the very beginning of our interview yesterday that you would tell us the truth, in whatever you answered and that there may be occasions when you might want to hold certain things back, and that you would tell us if you were doing that. I wonder if there has been any instance now where you held anything back from us, not by telling us a lie, but by simply not telling us everything that there is to tell.

STURGIS: Where it concerns the conspiracy or assassination attempts on the President of the United States, Martin Luther King, Bobby Kennedy or any American government official, I have told the truth; I have not held back anything whatsoever.

ROETHE: How about connections with CIA and their assassination attempts of foreign officials, such as the Cuban official?

STURGIS: To the best of my knowledge, I believe I have went over most of everything, and unless I, you know, go ahead and rack my brain, I may have forgot or in the --

OLSEN: Let me interrupt, Frank. Is there anything that you have intentionally withheld from us now about the whole subject matter that we have discussed with you in this interview?

STURGIS: No, sir. Let me think now --

OLSEN: Is it true now that what you are saying to us is that if you have omitted anything, it is because you just simply haven't remembered it?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Have you tried to be completely candid with us about the whole subject matter that we have covered with you in this interview?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I have been candid and honest with everything that we have discussed.

OLSEN: And there is nothing that you have intentionally withheld?

STURGIS: No, sir. Nothing at all.

[Off the record]

OLSEN: Now there was one subject a while ago that you wanted to discuss with us in private; and you have discussed it with us in private, have you not?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Okay.

STURGIS: And there are a few more things that I would like --

OLSEN: All right, let's go off the record while you have an opportunity to review your notes and records that you brought with you and then you will tell us whether there is something else that you would like to add.

STURGIS: Right.

[end of Belt #7]

OLSEN: Mr. Sturgis, we've had a period here during which I've been having a conversation with Mr. Navarro, who accompanied you here on this trip, and now you have had an opportunity to look over your notes. Do you have anything else that you would like to tell us about that bears directly upon activities of the CIA within the United States?

STURGIS: Yes,sir. Mr. Sam Jenis and myself discussed an operation that I participated in,in 1968.

OLSEN: And when did you discuss this with Mr. Jenis?

STURGIS: It was in 1967 that I discussed this with Sam.

OLSEN: And what was that discussion; would you tell us about it.

STURGIS: To do a commando-type operation into Cuba for the purpose of releasing political prisoners in some of the concentration camps in the south part of Cuba.

OLSEN: Did you conduct that kind of an operation?

STURGIS: Yes,sir. I prepared for that operation in 1967 by going with Geraldine Sharma (?sp), who at one time worked as an agent for the United States Government, went to Caracas, Venezuela, where both of us had meetings with President Leon of Venezuela.

OLSEN: And was this operation paid for by Jenis?

STURGIS: No, sir. Money was obtained through certain private sources, approximately $5,000, for this particular trip. While I was in Venezuela, I was in touch with the local Cuban colony there, one was the medical committee which the doctor was in charge of--at the present time I forget what his name is--also, the Venezuelan labor movement, I was in touch with there who was supposedly to support when the operation did in fact come off to support the operation.

OLSEN: Did you have any reason to believe that this was an activity sponsored by, directed by, organized by, the Central Intelligence Agency?

STURGIS: Yes,sir, with my close working association with Sam Jenis.

OLSEN: Do you know whether Sam Jenis had any interests or activities other than acting as an agent for the CIA?

STURGIS: No, sir; at that time, no sir. I did return back to the United States prepared for this operation; made advertisement in the local paper in Fort Lauderdale, I believe the newspaper was called the Sun Sentinel or possibly the Fort Lauderdale News. I received thousands -- not thousands, I would go ahead and safely say hundreds of letters. I gave --

OLSEN: What were you advertising for?

STURGIS: For men who would like to be involved in adventure, good pay, etc. I left an address in this advertisement to get in touch with attorney Ray Sanstrom .(?sp), who had his office in Fort Lauderdale; he is a practicing attorney then, is now, and also on the side he was a pilot. Mr. Ray Sanstrom, I believe the company that he was associated with was called the Southern Air Transport Company. I have an address here and I'm not sure whether it's Southern Air Transport Company or his office number, which is 429 South Andrews Avenue, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. Southern Air Transport supposedly is a CIA front company.

OLSEN: Well, did you arrange with this attorney to receive the calls that came in in response to that ad?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I made the arrangements prior that all calls or letters, preferably letters, of intent to be turned over to me for screening-- to screen these applicants for the coming operation.

OLSEN: Did you understand that this attorney was occupying offices at Southern Air Transport?

STURGIS: No, sir. I understand that possibly the address which I just gave you on Andrews Avenue may be his law firm's address, but Southern Air Transport is a CIA front.

OLSEN: But what does Southern Air Transport have to do with that ad?

STURGIS: Nothing with the ad, sir. What Southern Air Transport has to do with Ray Sanstrom is the fact that he was associated with Southern Air Transport.

OLSEN: In other words, he did legal work for them; or was he employed with them?

STURGIS: He was, I believe, employed by Southern Air Transport. If that is in fact the correct name, he was employed, I assume, with this particular ...

OLSEN: Was the operation then to free these prisoners in Cuba ever pulled off?

STURGIS: That is what I was supposed to tell the recruits-- the people that were to be accepted in this coming operation, that it was going to be a commando-type operation to release political prisoners in the concentration camps.

OLSEN: Was that ever done?

STURGIS: No, sir.

OLSEN: What was done with all these people who responded to the ad?

STURGIS: I screened the people; I spoke with them; and I picked twelve men out of this group, which one of them up to this day here I had working out of the country as an undercover agent for the United States Government.

OLSEN: Wait a minute here now -- wait a minute, you said you have had one of these people operating as an undercover agent for the United States Government ever since?

STURGIS: Up to this day, yes, sir.

OLSEN: Well,who's that?

STURGIS: Mr. Jerry Buchanan.

OLSEN: And where is he operating as an undercover agent for the United States Government?

STURGIS: He operated in Mexico and in the United States.

OLSEN: Did you turn him over to the United States Government in some way ?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I did.

OLSEN: Who did you turn him over to?

STURGIS: I turned this man over to -- well, I'll have to go back -- Jerry Buchanan was the person who came to me and told me about the IRA, the Irish Republic Agents, who in fact were looking for someone to do assassinations attempts in the United States because of informants that they had within their organization of the United STates giving information to Government agencies concerning guns being exported out of the United States.

OLSEN: I don't understand what the connection is between Buchanan being recruited as a result of that ad that you put in?

STURGIS: I knew Jerry for years. Jerry did see the ad and did make contact with me and naturally I accepted him as a recruit because then because of the ad.

OLSEN: How did it happen then that he got turned over to the United States Government?

STURGIS: At a later date I have used up to this time here -- since 1974, in the year 1974, after Watergate when I came out of prison, I promised Jerry with the information that he gave me concerning the IRA, the Irish Republican Army, concerning the North Korean agents that were in Mexico and also the drugs, I immediately tried to get in touch with the Central Intelligence Agency. On January 25, 1974, I was in touch with Mr. McVan, that is his CIA code name, of the Miami station and his telephone at that time was 445-3658. I called him at my bank at 95th Street, N.W. 7th Avenue in Miami, Florida, at approximately 10:35 A.M. He gave me a description of himself after I told him my name was Frank Sturgis. He named the Holiday Inn at LeJeune Road and 36th Street, where we were supposed to meet at 11:00 A.M. in the lobby of the hotel. Naturally I waited for an hour, and the bum never showed up.

OLSEN: Frank, I'm having a hellva time trying to understand what the hell this is all about? I thought you started telling me about the ad that you placed in the Fort Lauderdale paper in 1967 to recruit people ..

STURGIS: '68

OLSEN: --'68, to recruit some people to perform an operation to free political prisoners from a concentration camp in Cuba?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Now, did you recruit anybody at that time? Did you recruit 12 people?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I did recruit recruit ....

OLSEN: You got a lot of responses to the ad ?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: You picked 12 people out of it?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Was one of those people Buchanan?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Did you use him in any project with respect to Cuba?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. This was a 1968 project.

OLSEN: All right. Did you actually go ahead with the project to free people from Cuba?

STURGIS: I went with the project.

OLSEN: Did you successfully complete the project?

STURGIS: No, sir. We did not successfully complete the project.

OLSEN: Did you do anything other than engage in some planning ?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I did.

OLSEN: Did you actually attempt to go into Cuba to free these prisoners?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, I did. I made the attempt to go -- let me say, not into Cuba -- what happened, sir, is I sent the men into Mexico, into Guadalajara, Mexico, all twelve men. I then at one time did arrive in Guadalajara,Mexico.

(End of Tape #8)

OLSEN: All right, Frank, we're back on the record with the next belt here. You were talking about this effort in 1968 with respect to freeing political prisoners. I understand that the contact that led to this venture being undertaken was the contact that you had from Jenis?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: And that was the connection with the CIA?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: Did you receive any money from Jenis?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: How much money did you receive from Jenis in connection with that project?

STURGIS: $2,000.

OLSEN: Now you recruited some people, sent them to Mexico--to Guadalajara--you made a trip yourself down to -- where was it, Venezuela?

STURGIS: Well, that's before. That was 1967 in reference to this type of an operation.

OLSEN: All right. Anyway, did an actual attempt take place to go into Cuba to free any political prisoners?

STURGIS: Let me say this, sir, because you do not know the complete operation. I was instructed to tell the men that this was going to be a commando-type operation; when I left --before I left-- I was the last person to leave Miami -- to Mexico, Sam told me "Frank, you are to hijack-- or rather you are to meet another ship off the coast of Yucatan Peninsula, rendezvous with that ship; this ship will have information on the arrivals and the leaving of certain ships in the Western Hemisphere." I was supposed with the assistance of this ship -- was supposed to hijack a Russian vessel, and in hijacking this Russian vessel, I was supposed to go off the coast of Venezuela, receive assistance from the local Cuban colony there, plus the officials that I was in touch with of the Venezuelan LaborParty, to assist and use the hostages and the ship to approach the Cuban Government for the release of Cuban political prisoners. It was a known fact at that time that Fidel would not release the prisoners. That would be a propaganda victory, in one aspect to this operation. But the main overall idea was that when Fidel refused to release the prisoners, it was then going to be where we were going to ask for the release of the USS PUEBLO and the American crew that was captured and being held by the North Koreans. This was to create -- the capture of this Russian vessel was to create an international incident, possibly put world pressure on the Russians to release the American crew members and the USS PUEBLO.

OLSEN: Did that ever take place -- did you ever meet that ship off the Mexican coast?

STURGIS: No, sir. I went off the Mexican coast; I went into a small town called Progresso (?sp); at the time in 1968, (Mr. Jack Stuart) 03 was the Station Chief -- CIA Station Chief in Merida, Mexico. I did rent--lease--a boat in Progresso, Mexico; I went off the coast with this boat; I gave a written document to the captain of the boat that if this boat and the crew and myself and the members of the group were captured either by any foreign government, that he would have a document signed by me saying that we did in fact hijack him and the boat. The boat was leased for one week, ...

OLSEN: Was it paid for?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. It was paid in advance.

OLSEN: How big a boat was this?

STURGIS: I'm not sure how big the boat was at this time, but the records are -- the Government has about this operation and the boat and the people involved.

OLSEN: Was this your understanding that this was all a CIA venture?

STURGIS: Yes, sir, that was my understanding. I did get the boat; did put the guns and the equipment and the men aboard this boat. When I left Progresso I came at night offshore close to an encampment or an area where the men were waiting to come aboard. We did leave, went up to where Yucatan Peninsula was on the other side of an island called Cossamo (?sp) Island, south of Cossamo Island, or at least southeast of Cossamo Island was supposed to be the rendezvous spot. This boat I was supposed to rendezvous with did not show up. On the second day of not showing up, bad weather did come about in the area and in trying to get close to the shore, we did run aground on some coral reefs where the propeller, the rudder was bent, the ship was leaking badly, I had to throw some of the things overboard. We stayed all night on this coral reef ...

OLSEN: (interrupting) It was all ventured and scrapped?

STURGIS: Well, no sir. No, sir , the whole venture was not scrapped. Because of the damage to the boat, because the rendezvous was on the second day--was late in rendezvousing with the other boat which did not show up, I proceeded off the coast of Belize, which is the capital of British Honduras; I put the men ashore, and the guns and equipment ashore in a small atoll. I proceeded with a skeleton crew to go into Belize to fix the damages of the boat. While we were in Belize two hours, the authorities there came aboard and took us to their headquarters for questioning.

OLSEN: Was this Mexican authorities?

STURGIS: No, sir. This was British Honduras --

OLSEN: Honduras authorities?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. This was the British authorities. We were interrogated; at least, I was interrogated by the Chief of Intelligence there wanting to know what we were doing in the area, and so forth. We were immediately arrested; they somehow found out--not through me--but found out that the men and guns were put ashore on an atoll. They went out with airplanes and ships, got the men off the atoll, came in. We stayed there approximately 9, 10, 11 days -- I forget offhand -- went to trial, deported out of Belize to the Miami area. I was contacted by the American Consul there. He was very irate. There were a lot of newspaper articles that we came in from Guatemala to invade Belize. I assured the authorities in Belize--the Chief of Intelligence, that that was not the case. If you remember, or you may not remember, there was some talk of friction between Guatemala and the British Honduras because

Guatemala's claiming British Honduras as their territory. And they felt that we were sent over by CIA from Guatemala to stir up some kind of goings-on, and so forth. I did not tell them of the actual operation because the men did not know about the actual operation--only myself knew the actual operation. I told the men, at a later date, to tell the truth to the authorities of how they were recruited and for what reason they were recruited for.

OLSEN: Did the whole operation get started again, then?

STURGIS: No, sir. I believe the operation was aborted. That is one reason why after two hours in-port that we were picked up and charges put against us. The boat and the crew was sent back to Mexico. My men and myself were then deported after a trial under a judge there and sent back to Miami, and that was the end of the operation.

OLSEN: Is there anything else that you would like to tell us?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I was -- well I gave you the name of January 25, 1974, about my contact with CIA in Miami concerning national security business --

OLSEN: (interrupting) Where you attempted to contact them and where they wouldn't talk to you, and these CIA men did not even show up at the hotel?

STURGIS: That is true. I --

OLSEN: Is there anything else?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. I am going to give you a list of names here --

go over it briefly, of people I have been in contact with in the past who were, I believe, to be CIA agents. Many of these are my personal friends, and many of them have worked with me.

OLSEN: Would you leave that list for us in writing, and then just quickly run over the names right now without discussing them so that we can get them on the record, and then leave the paper with us?

STURGIS: All right, Sir. One is Jack Stewart 03 he was a CIA man in Havana.

OLSEN: (interrupting) Just give us the names.

STURGIS: Ragelio Gonzalez Corso in Havana; Rafael Hanscom, in Havana; Ray Sanstrom, Fort Lauderdale, Florida, lawyer; Ricordi Lorie; Salvador Aller; Paul Bethel in Havana and also Miami; Captain Antonio Montis Yunkles ? -- he is very close with General Wesson of the Dominican Republic and a very good close friend of mine; Colonel Gerard de Berly, his business office 800 Douglas Road, Coral Gables, phone number 448-7453, he was communications chief of CIA before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

OLSEN: Is there anything else that you would like to tell us?

STURGIS: Yes, sir.

OLSEN: We are going to have to put another belt on, Frank.

[end of Tape #9)

VR

OLSEN: All right, Frank, we are on a new tape now. Go ahead and wind up what additional information you want to give us relating to your activities associated with the CIA.

STURGIS: Here's another name, sir -- two names: Juan Mesa, he was in charge of communications in the brigade for CIA in the year 1960-61; there was also another friend called Monalitto (sp?) Treto, who was a skindiver and who worked closely with Juan Mesa. There is another fellow here, Alvaro Govea; his nickname is called "Kirk"; he was a sergeant in the Marine Corps in Havana at the American Embassy and he was attached with Nino Diaz' expedition, also in a camp in Louisiana which he participated in training;the camp was called the Algerian Naval Base, which is a training base. He was a CIA agent that worked closely with the Commander Nino Diaz during the invasion of the Bay of Pigs. Here is a couple more names and friends of mine: Mr. Sergio Abreu; he was in Bolivia for CIA; he was a friend of Sam Jenis. Also, Salvador Levi, CIA radio communications man that was working before and during the Bay of Pigs invasion. I gave you Yanos Montomara, Montes Yanos, Captain Montonio who I just told you about General Wesson Wesson, very close to him in the Dominican Republic, who has worked closely with me throughout many years. Let's see, my friend Sam Jenis naturally was working or based in South Florida a CIA agent in charge--one of the agents in charge in Guatemala was called Colonel Encente Leon during the Bay of Pigs with the brigade before the Bay of Pigs. I don't know whether you recall this, but on April 18, 1959, two Americans,Howard Anderson and Agnus McNair--both these people had contact with me, both in Havana, Anderson in Havana and McNair here in Miami. I sent Agnus McNair on a infiltration team to go into Havana to contact Howard Anderson; both these men were captured and were sentenced and executed in Penovalario(?).

OLSEN: What were they sent into Cuba for?

STURGIS: Mr. Olsen, the reason why --one of the reasons why I sent Angus McNair in was two-fold. One was to bring guns, ammunition, and radio equipment into Cuba for the underground; the other --

OLSEN: (interrupting) This was the anti-Castro underground?

STURGIS: Yes, sir. The other was to make contact with Howard Anderson and tellhim that Cuban intelligence was hot on him and if possible to return to -- with the boat that McNair went in to - Miami. I gave you the name of the Santianese (?) family early in the tapes; one naturally, was Sergio Roger San Jenis, or "sanhesise"(?) as we call it in Spanish. He at the present time is working atWilliam Leahman Mazda in Miami, Florida. The address there is 6310 S. Dixie Highway. The telephone number is 661-4261.

OLSEN: You have just indicated to us in a moment while we had the recorder stopped, that the first name of the Colonel Nichols at the American Embassy in Havana in 1959 was what?

STURGIS: Colonel Erickson Kicho -

OLSENL K -i - c -h ?

STURGIS: I'm sorry. I don't know where I get "K"; it is "Nichols".

OLSEN: Okay. You have also just shown to us a set of blank application blanks for employment with Central Intelligence Agency and instructions relating to the filling in of those blanks. When did you receive those blanks and from whom did you receive them?

STURGIS: I received these blanks in the early part of the 1960's by Sam Jenis, which he asked me if I wanted to fill out the applications and become an employee of Central Intelligence Agency. I told him I did not; he asked me why. I told him that I did not trust some of the agents that CIA had working for them per se as agents, because I felt that some of them were double-agents; I felt that many of the agents had too much power in their hands where a good possibility that their case officer or their station chief did not know totally what some of the agents were doing or orders that the agents were giving to underlings under them or people who were closely associated with them on a contract basis or whatever.

OLSEN: Frank, we've had a rather lengthy interview with you now; you've covered a great deal of information with us, and you've shown us records, photographs-- you've loaned to us some photographs which we are going to have copied and returned to you. Is there anything else at all that you would like to present to the Commission, or have the Commission know about relating to your contacts with the Central Intelligence Agency over the years, or your activities on behalf of the Agency?

STURGIS: I think I covered the area pretty good. I realize that it has been over many many years that I was trying to think about. As far as I know, I covered just about everything that I thought was important. If in the future that I would think of something or come across any documents or anything pertaining to any of my activities, I would gladly call you; and if it is necessary that you need copies of them, I will send them to you; or if it is not documents or anything that I can think up in my mind that I haven't covered with you, I could call you and give you that information.

OLSEN: Good. I want you to know that we appreciate very much your willingness to come up here to Washington from Florida and to spend the time that you have with us. I have given you a letter, I think already, the original of which was sent to your address in Miami, covering the matter of reimbursement of your travel expenses and per diem for the time that you have been with us. If there is nothing else on the subject now, let's conclude the interview at this point. And I want to assure you again that if you wish , you will have an opportunity to read the transcript of this interview and to make any corrections that you feel should be made, either because the thing has not been transcribed correctly or because you may have made a mistake in your recollection and you want to correct the record on that score. YOu will be given a chance to do that. We will not, however, be able to send the transcript to Miami to you because of the fact that much of the information that you have talked about is almost certain to be classifed. You will not be given a copy of the transcript. But as I say, you will be given an opportunity to read it and to make any corrections. Is there anything else that you would like to ask us, or that you would like to offer at this time?

STURGIS: Well, thank you. I believe we have covered a good period of my life and my association with the company; and I want to thank you for being so kind both to my friend and myself. And anything I can do now or in the future, I'm at your disposal.

OLSEN: Thank you very much, Frank. We appreciate it very much. And, Mr. Navarro, the same goes for you. We appreciate your coming and for all the help you've been to the Commission.

STURGIS: Thank you very much.

v.m.reed

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10297
RECORD SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

September 25, 1998
Status of Document: Postponed in Part
Number of Postponements: 8

The redactions in this document have been postponed under the provisions set forth in The John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992.

The number within the brackets is provided to represent the appropriate substitute language from the list below.

Board Review Completed: 08/25/98

2025 Release under the
John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992

---

01 Crypt
02 Digraph
03 CIA Employee
04 Asset
05 Source
06 Name of Person
07 Pseudonym
08 Identifying Information
09 Date
10 Location
11 Country
12 CIA Installation in Africa/ Near East*
13 CIA Installation in East Asia/ Pacific*
14 CIA Installation in Northern Europe*
15 CIA Installation in Western Europe*
16 CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere*
17 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Africa/ Near East*
18 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in East Asia/ Pacific*
19 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Northern Europe*
20 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Europe*
21 Cable Prefix for CIA Installation in Western Hemisphere*

* The number after the hyphen tracks of individual locations.

22 Dispatch Prefix
23 File Number
24 Operational Details
25 None
26 Scelso (The information is the true name of the individual whose pseudonym is John Scelso.)
27 CIA Job Title
28 CIA
29 Name of Organization
30 Social Security Number
31 Alias Documentation
32 Official Cover (Details of Official Cover)
98 Information not believed relevant to JFK assassination
99 See the special substitute language above.

8/rd
8/19/98

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Kp 12 apr 99

AGENCY : HPSCI
RECORD NUMBER : 135-10001-10297

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED~~ - 8/7/98
See pages 2370, 2373, 2376, 2377, 2385 + 2390

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/21/75
PAGES : 210

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT: VOL. 17. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES. 1 OF 2. TESTIMONY OF DEAN RUSK, GORDON GRAY, RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR., PAUL O'NEILL, ARNOLD E. DONOHUE.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : ~~OPEN IN FULL~~
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~09/28/94~~

~~Postponed~~

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Contained in file entitled, "April 21, 1995. 3."

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

September 12, 1994

Dear Mr. Sheehy:

This is in response to your request, pursuant to the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act, for NSC staff review of the transcript of testimony given April 21, 1975, to the President's Commission on CIA Activities by Dean Rusk, Gordon Gray, Richard Bissell, Paul O'Neill, and Arnold Donohue. The NSC staff has no objection to declassification and release of the document subject to the determinations of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State.

Sincerely,

David S. Van Tassel
Director
Access Management

Mike Sheehy
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
Room H405
The Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

The Department of State
has no objection to the
release or declassification
of this document from
page 2190 through page 2263.

Reviewed on August 11, 1994

IM/FPC/HR
Dept. of State

~~TOP SECRET~~

ORIGINAL

Vol. 17

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON

CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

1 OF 2

- - -

Washington, D. C.

Monday, April 21, 1975

WARD & PAUL

Verba volant- scripta manent

Spoken words fly- written words endure

TM

WASHINGTON, D.C.
410 First Street, S.E., 20003
Phone
(202) 544-6000

FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
4055 Chain Bridge Rd., 22030
Phone
(703) 273-2400

~~TOP SECRET~~

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF:	PAGE
Dean Rusk	2190
Gordon Gray	2263
(AFTERNOON SESSION - 2295)	
Richard M. Bissell Jr.,	2295
Paul O'Neill	2352
Arnold E. Donohue	2365

2268-[illegible]

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT,
the testimony of former
Secy of State Dean Rusk
before the Rockefeller
Commission, 21 APR 75
(pp 2190–2282)

12 Aug 94

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

VOLUME 17

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Washington, D.C.

Monday, April 21, 1975

The President's Commission met, pursuant to recess, at 10:07 o'clock a.m., in R oom 272, Old Executive Office Building, 17th and Pennsylvania Avenues, N.W., Washington, D.C. Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, Chairman of the Commission, presiding.

PRESENT:

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER, Chairman
JOHN T. CONNOR, Member
JOSEPH LANE KIRKLAND, Member
LYMAN L. LEMNITZER, Member
EDWIN N. GRISWOLD, Member
EDWARD H. SHANNON, JR., Member

STAFF:

DAVID W. BELIN, Executive Director
ROBERT WALLISON, Staff Member
MARVIN GRAY, Staff Member
SOL CORBIN, Special Assistant to the Vice President

- - -

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

P R O C E E D I N G S

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, if you would stand and raise your right hand and be sworn, this is Ruth Johnson who is a Notary Public for the District of Columbia.

MRS. JOHNSON: Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. RUSK: I do.

TESTIMONY OF DEAN RUSK

MR. BELIN: Could you please state your name for the record?

MR. RUSK: Dean Rusk.

MR. BELIN: And you served as Secretary of State, sir, in the Administrations of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, is that correct?

MR. RUSK: Yes.

Secretary Udall, Secretary Freeman and I were the only three who served throughout the terms of both Presidents.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, what is your present occupation?

MR. RUSK: I am Professor of International Law in the School of Law in the University of Georgia.

MR. BELIN: And prior to your service as Secretary of State with the Kennedy Administration, could you give us a little bit of a summary of your background?

MR. RUSK: Well, I was President of the Rockefeller

Foundation and General Education Board for about eight years during the 1950's. During the Truman Administration, with the exception of a few months when I was Special Assistant to the Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, I was in the State Department under Secretaries Marshall and Acheson, first in charge of United Nations Affairs, then Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs, and then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs.

Prior to that, I had over five years of active duty during World War II, and prior to that, teaching at Mills College in California while studying law at Berkeley.

And I can go back even further, if you wish.

MR. BELIN: During World War II, you were involved somewhat with intelligence, is that correct?

MR. RUSK: Yes, I was. I was in G-2 from October in 1941 until the summer of '43 when I went out to the China, Burma, India theatre. There I was Chief of War Plans, and had a relation with the operations of OSS of the China, Burma, India theatre.

MR. BELIN: Could you briefly give us an overview from your personal experience as to what kind of intelligence the United States government had during World War II?

MR. RUSK: Well, I think it is important for us to realize that in the background of CIA was a shocking ignorance of world affairs and situations in other parts of the world at

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the outbreak of World War II. As a Captain in the Army, I was called back to G-2 in October, 1941, two months before Pearl Harbor, to organize a new section of G-2 to cover everything from Afghanistan through the India Subcontinent, Burma, Ceylon, Malaya, Australia, New Zealand and the British Pacific Islands. They had no section in G-2 interested in that part of the world up to that point.

When I got there I asked to see what materials we had on hand as a start, and I was shown one file drawer by an old lady named Mrs. North. In that file drawer was one copy of Murphy's Tourist Handbook to India and Ceylon which had been stamped Confidential because it was the only copy in town, and they wanted to keep track of it; one 1925 military attache report from London on the British Army in India; and then a considerable number of clippings from the New York Times that this old lady, Mrs. North, had been clipping since World War I, and that was it.

Well, I passed my first test, because on the second day that I was there, a Colonel from the great War Plans Division of the General Staff called down and said, Rusk, I can't remember, is Indochina in South China or North China, and when I located Indochina for him he hung up in great satisfaction and feeling that he had great intelligence support from G-2.

Now, there is no way to describe how deficient we were and we had to scramble around and try to find a missionary here or a businessman there, or anybody who knew anything about some of these vast areas and, of course, we could get a good deal of information from the British, but you couldn't overload those lines all of the time, because we were starting from scratch.

We flew the hump with maps that were supposed to be on a scale of 1 to 1 million, but much of the material on those maps was purely honorary. I mean, I didn't even have maps that would show us the scale of 1 to 1 million the terrain in which we were operating. We tried to organize a Burmese language program in our Army and we looked around the United States for a native Burman. We asked the Census Bureau for a list of the people living here who had been born in Burma and they came up with about twelve names, but most of them were McDougall or McLanahan, the children of British soldiers who were born in Burma. We finally found one and we looked him up and he was in an insane asylum.

Well, we fished him out of the insane asylum and made a Burmese language instructor out of him.

The impact of this on the need for information after World War II cannot be exaggerated, because we just ran all the time, we were running into this factor of ignorance, and so I think it is important to bear that in mind. And I hope we will never get caught in that situation again.

MR. BELIN: Subsequent to World War II, with the build-up of the CIA and other intelligence agencies, of course, the information gathering facilities of the U.S. government became much greater. And I wonder if you have any opinion as to whether or not we might have at times gone to the other extreme so far as the storage of information?

MR. RUSK: I think partly because of this absence of information earlier that we tended to let intelligence become a thing in itself. I had the impression, for example, that in the intelligence community, and I don't point the finger at any particular agency, there developed a kind of a catalogue of desirable information, almost as a Sears, Roebuck catalogue, and it was the duty of the intelligence community to fill in all of the blanks. I hope the Commission will use discretion? disgression in what it does with some of the examples I might give here today, because I don't want to cause difficulty, but for example, Ambassador David Bruce in London told me that a member of the British Government had come to him and said, David, don't have your military attache planes flying over our factories at low level taking pictures. If you want pictures of our plants, we will give them to you, but all of this kind of business makes our workers nervous, and people don't know what's going on. All they were doing was filling in the blanks, and we tended to go at it without a direct relationship to what might be called policy needs. And I think this was one of the inherent senses of one's ignorance of pre-World War II times.

MR. BELIN: I think you also mentioned during our amt 7

interview last night that you thought the syndrome of avoiding another Pearl Harbor might have contributed to trying to collect a tremendous amount of information, and you gave as an example the attack on South Korea by North Korea.

MR. RUSK: Yes.

Our intelligence did not predict Pearl Harbor, but they certainly predicted the Roberts Commission. And I think that that experience has infected to some extent the intelligence community.

Now, I once wrote Mr. Schlesinger a little note about this and one or two other matters when he became Director of CIA. One of the nightmares of people in the intelligence community is to have something serious happen which they have not predicted, and so one of the results of that is that policy offices get a continual flow of possibilities, 90 or 95 percent of which never happen at all, and the policy officer has the problem then of trying to sort out which is for real and which is not. And that is, sometimes, very difficult.

In the case of Korea, after the North Korean attack was launched, people went back through thousands of bits of information. They came out with a handful, six or eight pieces on the basis of which some of them said oh, yes, you see, we knew this was coming. Well, no one picked up the phone and called me. I was Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs at that time, and no one picked up the phone and called me and said the North Koreans are going to attack. On that evening, I was having dinner with Judge Alsop and Mr. Pace and Justice Frankfurter, and I certainly would not have been out having dinner if I knew that an attack was imminent.

Indeed, Mr. John Foster Dulles, who was in Tokyo at the time, said it was not until the Tuesday after the Sunday of the attack that the MacArthur Headquarters accepted that it was anything more than a border incident, and so I think we tend to multiply alleged predictions, partly to cover your trail in case something happens, and I think this is something that policy officers have to get used to, and on which they have to make some discriminating judgments.

And it emphasizes the importance of multiple sources of information.

Now, when I was a Special Assistant to Judge Patterson, the Secretary of War, I personally supported his efforts to combine all of the intelligence agencies into a single agency and put them altogether in one organization. I since have changed my mind radically on that because I think it is very important that you have not competitive sources of information but diverse sources of information. One of the several reasons for the tragic mistake in the Bay of Pigs was that those who proposing the operation were the same people who were furnishing the information on which judgments were to be made. And I had a specific directive from the President not to consult my own

Bureau of Intelligence and Research in the Department of State to get their judgment on the situation inside Cuba.

So I think it is very important that we maintain diverse sources of information as a kind of check against each other, among other things, and also because that way you get some insights and some guesses that might not come through a single channel.

MR. BELIN: And so what you are saying is that some duplication, perhaps, so far as the sources on a particular problem, might not be adverse to the best interests of the country?

MR. RUSK: Well, I think there should be a very full exchange of information among the different elements of the intelligence community. But I think we ought to, that we ought to have diverse sources of judgment, of analysis, and matters of that sort.

MR. BELIN: Now, to go back to your previous comment concerning the Pearl Harbor syndrome and to cover all bases, is it a fair statement that perhaps the inundation of thousands of pieces of information to cover all possibilities does not necessarily lead to the best kinds of intelligence?

MR. RUSK: Well, we are faced, the intelligence community is faced, with an inherently difficult problem because of the blizzard of information that has fallen in on the world.

Now, a very large part of the CIA's information gathering has to do with getting materials that are in the public sector, publications from all over the world including the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, and the sheer management analysis of the information that is available in the public sector is a massive problem.

Now, the processes by which that mass is reduced to some estimates or judgments are very important. To some extent, policy officers are the prisoners of the information they have available to them, and policy officers should be in a pretty sceptical frame of mind about decisions. I mean about judgments of that sort.

Very often we try to get information that is not present in the real world, and we ought to, I think, be a little more candid in saying to ourselves that we don't know, but if you want our guess, here's our guess.

For example, on a certain Tuesday evenining in August, 1968, Russian forces went into Czechoslovakia. We thought later that we had learned that the Russians had made that decision on the preceeding Saturday night, three days earlier, Sunday, Monday, Tuesday.

Now, if we had asked our intelligence community before that Saturday night whether or not the Russians were going into Czechoslovakia, there is no way they could know, because the Russians didn't know. I mean, I used to smile occasionally at the enormous effort made by foreign people, foreign governments, to ascertain our intentions when I knew we didn't have any intentions, and so I think we ought to distinguish more clearly between information that is real and information or estimates that are rather speculative in character.

MR. BELIN: I am going to change the subject now to the statutes which were adopted by the Congress and which formed the charter of the CIA.

Last night, you had some comments concerning your observation of these statutes on the relationship to what has actually happened since the enactment of the statutes.

MR. RUSK: Well, I think one must bear in mind that these statutes are the public expressions of the will of the Congress, and there are some things that you don't say publicly. You don't lay out in the statute a capability, say, for political observations in a particular situation. You don't lay out in the statute, a public statute, the complete functions of the National Security Agency, for example.

Now, I don't think there was any doubt in the minds of the Congress over these past twenty-eight years that CIA had certain capabilities in the political action field as well as in the espionage, counter-espionage field, or any doubt about the real purposes and functions of the National Security Agency. And so although as a matter of law this may raise some curious questions, I don't think that one can honestly say that the Congress was in any way misled about what kind of an organization

CIA was, or what kind of an organization NSA is.

There was a kind of a common law of the matter behind the written word, or there was whatever you want to call it, I will leave that to the distinguished members of your Commission. But some of these things that have been criticized lately as a part of the attack on the CIA I do not think can be measured by reading the exact wording of the public aspects of the CIA charter.

MR. BELIN: Is it your understanding that at least the Oversight Committee leaders of Congress did basically know major areas of policy determination by the CIA?

MR. RUSK: Yes.

To what extent, I don't know. I do know that the Director of CIA consulted frequently with Senator Russell, for example. He was the one who had basically handled CIA's budget since he was chairman of the Armed Services Committee and practically chairman of the Appropriations Committee because of the chairman's age, and I know that there were pretty frequent discussions between the two of them.

I never sat in on any of those, so I can't testify directly as to what was said. But I had a good many discussions myself with Senator Russell on a good many foreign policy matters, and I never heard him complain about feeling that he needed to be better informed.

MR. BELIN: Now, we also discussed the practical fact of how CIA in your phrase was drawn into things that other agencies might not, or might have done if they had had the money available overtly, but they did not have, and the CIA was drawn in because CIA had the money.

Is that a fair summary of our discussion?

MR. RUSK: Yes.

A good many things that CIA has done over the years could have been done directly, and overtly by the Department of State if the Department of State could have gotten the appropriations.

For example, support to the National Student Association to send delegations to international conferences and things of that sort, activities similar to the activities of the British Council in Great Britain. But the chairman of our Appropriations Subcommittee in the House, Mr. John Rooney, didn't care very much about things cultural and scientific exchanges and U.S.I.D. and the Bureau of Cultural Affairs, and things of that sort, and now here was CIA who was able to come up with the money and so I think some activities sort of gravitated towards CIA because Dick Russell got their money which could have just as well or better been done overtly.

I don't know whether the situation can significantly change in that respect, but support of things like Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe could just as well have been done overtly by the Department of State as they were attempted on a covert basis by CIA. A good many things of that sort happened because they had the money.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, we also talked about internal executive oversight about CIA and the role of the Director of Central Intelligence, the DCI, as the head of the intelligence community.

Do you have any observations concerning the question of executive oversight of the Agency, or any suggestions in that area?

MR. RUSK: Well, as I look back on it, I do have one specific and potentially important suggestion. CIA by statute reports to the National Security Council. Of course, the President is the Chairman, and his decisions in the National Security Council are the decisions. There is no voting procedure there. But the statutory members of the National Security Council, in my recollection, never once sat down and looked at the major tables and the budget of the CIA. We were sort of in the intelligence and operational chain of command in a sense, but not in the administration chain of command.

I would assume that what happened was that the CIA would take their budget to maybe two or three members of the Bureau of the Budget, and then it would be discussed briefly with the President, and then it would be taken down and discussed with Senator Russell, and that was about the end of it.

In retrospect, I think it would have been helpful if the statutory members of the National Security Council had at least once a year taken a look at the organizational structure and the manning tables and the budget of CIA in order to have a little bit better feel of not only what was going on but what might be going on that they would not normally bump into.

So I think that that would be a step, that would be an improvement that would be desirable.

MR. BELIN: Now, I want to turn to the area of possible CIA involvement in coup d'etats abroad. Perhaps it is not within our charter specifically, but you made a comment last night concerning your eight years as Secretary of State.

MR. RUSK: Well, I have stated publicly, and I have been continuing to scratch my mind for exceptions, I have stated publicly that there was some 82 or so in the world somewhere during the eight years in which I was Secretary of State. That is unconstitutional changes of government.

There were substantially larger changes through elections and things of that sort. I don't remember a single one of those that was triggered by or caused by the CIA.

MR. BELIN: And by those, you mean coup d'etats?

MR. RUSK: Coup d'etat. The coup d'etat.

Now, I think one thing that requires a rather careful look, and some rather careful distinctions, the CIA people consider that one of their jobs is to keep in touch with different elements within a population, and they do have contacts with dissident groups here and there. Sometimes people in our embassies, mostly CIA people, but sometimes on the diplomatic side, get inquiries from dissident groups and various countries as to what the attitude towards the United States would be in the event of a coup d'etat.

I tried to get the word established that we would not respond to any such inquiries, partly as a practical matter, because I suspected that many of these were from provacateurs of the governments involved and they were trying to find out what our answer would be to such a question. But I had no doubts the CIA was in touch with dissident groups, and may have at times been buying information from them. But that does not translate in my mind to their calling the shots of it or becoming the boss or directing a coup d'etat.

MR. BELIN: In your experience as Secretary of State, were you aware of the practices of other governments and their intelligence, both in this country and abroad?

MR. RUSK: Yes. To a very considerable extent. Of course, you always suspect there are practices that you haven't caught up with, but there is a mean, dirty, unsavory, back alley struggle going on in the world in which a good many governments particpate, some of them close friends of ours, and most of them, including targets in the United States, because the position of the United States in world affairs is such that influencing American policy is a major effort on the part of almost every foreign office in the world. Wherever a dispute develops, the parties will each come in to try and get the United States to take their side, and so we are the target of a great deal of effort to find out what we are thinking, to influence our decisions and judgments, and a struggle to undermine some of the things that we are trying to accomplish in the world.

MR. BELIN: Were you ever aware, for instance, of forged documents being used to try and put the blame on the CIA for things?

MR. RUSK: Well, I think there were two or three instances that I recall. The exact timing and countries I don't recall at this point. It is somewhere in the records where forged documents were planted on African leaders to try to persuade them that CIA was trying to overthrow them. Fortunately, these forgeries were so crude that it was very easy to demonstrate that they were, in fact, forgeries, and I think we were able to satisfy the local chiefs of state that CIA was not trying to overthrow them.

But there were all sorts of things. If I could go off the record for a moment?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. RUSK: I must confess I am worried about a kind of euphoric and unilateral repeal of the Cold War in this country these days, because there are those who are out to bring the United States down, and they are working away at it, not only in this country, but in other parts of the world. Whether or not we ought to make that more public, that information public, I think is a major policy question that you gentlemen and those who are carrying present responsibility might want to think about, because there is no question about the fact that these people are conducting such operations, both here and abroad.

We did make a decision during the Vietnam affair not to make public what we knew about the activities of certain governments in this country because we knew that there were a lot of opponents to Vietnam, most of them who had no connection with outside governments, who were opposing it for perfectly reasonable, valid considerations, and we did not wish to start another wave of McCarthyism in this country.

But anyone who thinks that the Communists were not making every effort to influence American public opinion is just out of his head.

MR. GRAY: Sir, did you receive any specific information of such attempts to influence the young people that were demonstrating against the war, and so on?

MR. RUSK: There were bits and pieces occasionally, but at the moment I can't cite one of them in terms of chapter and verse.

MR. GRAY: Do you recall whether the CIA had an estimate as to the extent of any such involvement?

MR. RUSK: No.

Before we left office in 1969 there had been put together a world, a study of youth movements worldwide, and one of the interesting conclusions of the study was about the only thing these various youth movements had in common was technique, that their objectives varied widely.

For example, the young people in Eastern Europe appeared to be reaching out for what could be called the establishment values in the United States. But that study might throw some light on your question, if you can get ahold of it.

MR. BELIN: You also mentioned that you thought that attacking the CIA is a built-in process that certain groups including even the Russian intelligence agency might be involved in. Is that an accurate summary of your conversation last night?

MR. RUSK: Yes.

I think there is a substantial variety of motivations behind attacks on the CIA. I would say first that there have been some failures, and there have been some mistakes on the part of the CIA. Those things will happen among frail human beings. And I cite the Bay of Pigs as one notable and public example, and that has exposed the CIA to some criticism. I think there are interests who are hostile to the United States

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

that are at work in this field.

Anti-CIA propoganda is good propoganda in many parts of the world, and among sections of this country.

And then I think there are some personal motivations that I don't care much about, such things as desire to win a Pulitzer Prize or money or a sense of revenge. But I think more broadly, I think this is partly a reaction coming from a swing towards isolationism in this country, which I think is real, as I travel around this country in small and large cities, and again, this is sort of decisions on the part of a lot of people here that somehow the Cold War is over, despite the fact when you look through the world from Southeast Asia through Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Middle East, the Cold War is very much alive, at least from the point of view of the other side.

WARD & PAUL

1b

MR. BELIN: In this connection, do you have any specific recommendations as to whether or not this government should make available to the public more information about what other governments are doing, both in this country and abroad, to influence world affairs?

MR. RUSK: I think we probably ought to find some way to alert people to the fact that detente does not mean that a new Heaven and earth has been accomplished here on earth, and for example, I object to the use of the term domino theory, and I never used it myself, although President Kennedy seemed

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to embrace it on two or three occasions in Press conferences, and originally I believe it was President Eisenhower.

To me, the domino theory is a euphenism for something else. The theoretical basis for it is the Marxist doctrine of the world revolution, and we at least ought to talk about it in those terms. Is it there, what are they doing about it, is this still a real matter in the real world, and not obscure it by talking about a power game?

And I think that we could do more in that direction. We could be more frank and candid about the differences that still separate us even though it remains important that we try to find points of agreement between ourselves and those who might become our adversaries. I think the process of trying to find points of agreement like the Test Ban Treaty and the Nonproliferation Treaty, the Arms Limitation, the SALT talks and things of that sort, those are absolutely essential, but we ought not to be under an illusion about it, and I am afraid there has been so much illusion around what we are up against, and this is why I feel that the CIA and its capabilities are absolutely vital to the safety of the United States.

And I think one of our problems now is how to maintain some capabilities in the present atmosphere and discuss these, and in the face of the various investigations which we anticipate, and the investigative reporting and all of the rest that goes along with it.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, I want to turn to another area now concerning the allegations of assassination of foreign leaders.

Were you ever aware of any plans or proposals to assassinate any foreign leaders?

MR. RUSK: No proposal ever came to me seeking my approval for a plan to kill anybody. Now, those are not chosen words. I mean, no proposal ever came before me, period, involving the assassination of a foreign leader, period. Excuse me.

MR. BELIN: Go ahead.

MR. RUSK: On one occasion, the late great Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson, who was then, I believe our representative on the 303 Committee, I think it was named during that period, came in and more or less in a jocular frame of mind said that he had heard that somebody down the line, and he had not identified the person or the agency, was talking about the possible assassination effort, and I made it absolutely clear to him, and he fully agreed, that political assassination was contrary to the most elementary notions of American foreign policy, and that if we go down that trail, we are in the law of the jungle, and it would be out of control. That was my personal attitude throughout the period.

On one other occasion the matter came up in an indirect form which could be, I think, coverted by gossip into meaning something else. I had heard that Trujillo had been assassinated before the Dominicans had announced it. President Kennedy was then in Paris.

I called and got Pierre Salinger on the scene, and he tells about this in his book, by the way.

MR. BELIN: He was President Kennedy's Press Secretary?

MR. RUSK: He was President Kennedy's Press Secretary, and I told him Trujillo had been assassinated and to keep his mouth shut, because it had not been, it had not been announced.

Well, he stubbed his toe and announced it, or referred to it in one of those glancing remarks at a Press conference. My concern was that Trujillo's son was in Paris, that if Trujillo's son heard this announcement first from an American source that he would think that we had something to do with the assassination of Trujillo and might take it out on President Kennedy personally in Paris, and I was concerned about Kennedy's personal safety under those circumstances.

But those were the only two things that I remember in the assassination field.

MR. BELIN: When Mr. Thompson talk to you about it, did he indicate what potential foreign leader was involved?

MR. RUSK: If he did, I just don't remember it. I don't remember it.

MR. BELIN: With particular reference to the Trujillo assassination, do you know of any approval that was ever given by the State Department for American participation with any group that might be involved in overthrowing the government and assassinating Trujillo in the process?

MR. RUSK: Well, I knew that our intelligence people were in touch with a variety of Dominican groups, both in the Dominican Republic and abroad, and any one of them would have been glad, I think, to assassinate Trujillo. But I was not aware of any operational involvement of the United States government in his assassination.

MR. BELIN: If records were to show any cables going from the State Department under your name to any Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, would you state that those indicated personal knowledge on your part?

MR. RUSK: Well --

MR. BELIN: And I don't know, by the way, whether or not such cables existed. I am using it as a hypothetical example.

MR. RUSK: During my years, over 2,100,000 cables went out of the Department of State with my name signed to them, and I had seen only a tiny fraction of 1 percent of them before they went out. Now, I am responsible, I mean I cannot avoid the responsibility for what was done in a Department of which I was Chief.

In terms of my personal involvement, in the first place I don't recall such cables, but if you could get ahold of the green copies, the original greens of the outgoing cables, if I had seen and approved any of those, they would carry my initials. I always put my initials, small dr, on the cables that I personally approved, and it may be for cryptographic reasons that the State Department doesn't maintain the green copies, I just don't know. But if they have them then you can find out whether I was, in fact, aware of any of those cables.

MR. BELIN: Did you have any knowledge concerning the death of President Diem in Vietnam, or did you give any directions?

MR. RUSK: No, no directions at all. There was a cable that went out in August, 1963, sent out at a time when President Kennedy, Secretary McNamara, and I, all three, were out of town, and this cable was "cleared" with us on an open telephone. And when George Ball called me, he spoke in very guarded terms and told me that President Kennedy had already approved it.

Well, this was on an open telephone and with that kind of information I said use your own judgment, go ahead as far as I am concerned.

When the three of us got back to town, we looked at the cable in detail and felt that it went further than we wanted to go in the direction of Diem must go kind of thinking, and we pulled back on it. Now, we did make an effort in the months immediately following that, to try to persuade President Diem to get his brother Nhu, and Madame Nhu, out of the country. We told the President to send him as Ambassador to Washington, or Paris, or give him any kind of a job that would get him out of the country, because it was his brother, we felt, who was the principal motivator and executor of policies which were rapidly alienating the Buddhists, the military, and the students, and we felt that Brother Nhu was going to bring President Diem down.

I do recall very specifically that Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge had instructions that if a coup should develop, that he should do his best to insure President Diem's personal safety, and, indeed, I understand that on the morning of the day that it was clear that the military we moving, he called up Diem and suggested some arrangements to Diem that would insure his personal safety. Diem refused those suggestions and tried to get off into another part of the country where he thought he had some forces that might be loyal to him, and on the way was captured and killed.

MR. BELIN: Is it your testimony, then, that you don't know of any action by this government, or any agency of the government which contributed, directly contributed to the death of Diem?

MR. RUSK: It was not the policy of the United States

Government to see that President Diem was assassinated. We had put some pressure on him trying to bring about some changes in his policy, and to separate him from his brother, Nhu. For example, we had made some adjustments in our aid program. We cut back on our aid program. I think you will remember that, General Lemnitzer. And some of that was interpreted by the press, some of whom, by the way, were among the Diem must go group, by the press and by some of the people in South Vietnam, undoubtedly as being indeed, as it was pressure on President Diem, but maybe even they might have read it as a signal that we would be in favor of a coup.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, during your service with the Government, did you ever hear any discussion of the phrase known or called Executive Action Capability, which was defined as a built-in capability to be able to assassinate foreign leaders if it became a policy of this government to do so?

MR. RUSK: I don't recall it, no.

MR. BELIN: Is there any remembrance on your part of any plan or direction to have a plan to assassinate any Cuban leaders which might include, among others, Fidel Castro?

MR. RUSK: I assume that there were a good many Cubans who would have been glad to assassinate Castro, and I also am aware of the fact that the State Department and CIA both were in touch with various dissident Cuban groups. We had been since the Eisenhower administration. But, the specific point of the assassination of Castro, to my recollection, did not come to me for my attention. I cannot testify that down the line there might not have been some talk of this, but it never came to an action, a policy action judgment or a decision.

MR. BELIN: By that you mean the decision to go ahead with the plan?

MR. RUSK: That's right.

MR. BELIN: There are some documents which the Commission staff has seen which indicate that at a meeting at the State Department on August 10, 1962, which memoranda say that you were present, a meeting of a group known as the Special Operations Group, or the MONGOOSE group, that there was some discussion about the development of a possible plan to assassinate Castro.

Do you have any recollection of such a meeting or such discussion?

MR. RUSK: I don't, but that doesn't prove very much at this point. I do have an 11:00 o'clock telephone date with my appointment books at the LBJ library to determine whether, in fact, I was at that meeting, and I will report back to you as soon as I can find that out. It is entirely possible. You know, my own personal practice was to do a lot of listening in such groups, but not to get into the decision phase until the President and Secretary McNamara and I were ready to face a decision on the matter, because otherwise you would discourage the considerations of the widest range of possibilities or options that might be available.

Mr. Arthur Schlesinger in his book, Thousand Days, once referred to the fact that I used to sit there in the Cabinet room silent like an old Buddha. Well, that's right, quite right, because in most of those meetings with 30 or 40 people around the room, I did remain silent, and I would see the President either before the meeting or after the meeting and have my talk with him on the subject matter, because I had the feeling that if I sounded off and debated my President in front of these 30 or 35 people, that we would read about it in the New York Times or the Washington Post the next morning. So typically I would sit in a good many meetings without saying very much, but when we got to the point of decision, that was a different matter.

MR. BELIN: We also discussed the question of -- well, let me strike that and go back with one other question in this area. As I understand your statement, you have no specific recollection of any such discussions at any meetings. What you do say though is that they might have occurred so far as discussing the possibility, but they did not occur so far as an operational plan approval is concerned?

MR. RUSK: Yes. Yes. I am genuinely not trying in any way to be evasive. I do want to say that when I left the Department of State, I took no papers, files, records or memoranda of any sort. I took away my appointments books, which are available

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to anyone who wants to see them at the LBJ library, and copies of my income tax returns, and that's it. Everything else was left there. I have had many interviews and discussions with people writing articles, dissertations, books on things, in which I was involved, and I have long since learned, because of the mass of things that happened during those eight years, that my recollection on matters of detail simply isn't all that reliable. The record is there, and as far as I'm concerned, you are welcome to it now over in the State Department or wherever it might be.

But, it just means that I just cannot remember every detail of everything that happened. I averaged seeing 25 to 30 people for every day for eight years, and that is a good way to help you not to remember a lot of details that you are trying to recapture.

MR. BELIN: And I want to now turn to the area of possible oversight of the Agency. One of the concerns of this Commission is recommendations that it might make, and I would like to know whether or not you have any specific recommendations concerning the oversight of the Agency to make it a more responsive and a more effective agency?

MR. RUSK: Well, I think the National Security Council could give it more oversight along the lines that I have talked about. I'm not now talking about oversight of "operations," because I think that that on the whole worked pretty well through the 303 Committee, and the discussions that each of the principals had with his representative on the 303 Committee. I almost always had a talk, sometimes short, sometimes longer, with my representative on the 303 Committee before a meeting, to take a look at what was on the agenda and to express views on it. But I think that the statutory members of the NSC might take a little closer look at the total operations, the structure, the budget of the CIA, than they have done in the past.

MR. GRAY: Sir, for the record, could you state who the statutory members are that you are referring to?

MR. RUSK: Well, the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of the CIA, and then such other officials, such as Cabinet officers who might be called in ad hoc because of the subject matter being discussed. The Secretary of the Treasury was frequently there during my day, and the Attorney General was frequently there during my day.

MR. GRAY: During your tenure, how many people beyond the statutory members were normally at NSC meetings, approximately?

MR. RUSK: I would think at an NSC meeting there might be as many as 20 to 25 people in the Cabinet room.

MR. GRAY: Do you think it would be preferable to cut it down to something more closely approximating the statutory membership as a general matter?

MR. RUSK: Not necessarily, provided those 20 or 25 people in the room are people who know how to keep their mouth shut. Now, that is some doing in our kind of government, because I do think that there is danger in considering problems of this sort in too small a group. I mentioned one of the reasons for the mistake of the Bay of Pigs. Another reason was that it was held in such a small circle that the talents and resources of the government were not brought to bear upon the problem, and I am a little concerned about holding these things too closely.

For example, in the famous Tuesday luncheon sessions that President Johnson had on Vietnam, there were usually five or six people, the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Director of the CIA, a note-taker, plus the President. Occasionally there would be one or two others there.

Now, however, each one of us knew what the agenda was going to be, and I would take over with me notes and suggestions from my Department that had been worked on ahead of time for those Tuesday luncheon sessions, and there we did not close off other input. And the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs undoubtedly had talked to the Joint Chiefs, for example, about the items that were coming up, you see.

MR. BELIN: General Lemnitzer is nodding his head in agreement, I see, for the record.

With regard to this oversight, I think one of the things we talked about last night was the fact that because of the busy job that each of these members of the NSC had, and their own work, that the oversight should be done perhaps chiefly through deputies. Was that an accurate summary?

MR. RUSK: Well, I think a week by week oversight should be exercised by the kind of interdepartmental committee in which senior and trusted deputies would normally be those who would attend meetings, and in the State Department such people as Alexis Johnson and Llewellyn Thompson, people of that seniority and integrity, but I do think the statutory members themselves ought to take a periodic look at the total intelligence community situation, including CIA as well.

I am concerned about Congressional oversight. If this isn't handled carefully, it could destroy the CIA and its capabilities. Members of Congress operate under a Constitutional immunity provided by the First Amendment. What they say in Congress is not subject to question in any other place, so basically they are subject only to the possibility of being expelled by the necessary what is it, two thirds vote of their particular houses.

Now, that is a most unlikely sanction. There is a precedent in the Congress which I think has worked very well, if the Congress would agree that that is the way they should do it, and that is the Joint Atomic Energy Committee. That Committee is carefully selected, it has facilities and staff which are highly secure, and they do receive the most sensitive kind of information in the nuclear field. I think there are very few nuclear secrets which that Joint Committee has not had discussed with them. And I do not recall at the moment any significant leak that ever came out of that Committee.

Now, if the Congress itself would approach this matter of oversight of the CIA in that mood and spirit, and recognize that you cannot have a CIA involved in espionage and counter-espionage and an occasional political operation somewhere, and have it shouted from the rooftops, then I think some Congressional oversight could be useful.

I personally, but I am biased because I am an Executive Branch man, I personally would prefer ex post facto assessment rather than pre-consultation with regard to whether or not a particular thing should be done, because that could raise the question of who makes the decision. You might get, you might get a steady stream of alleged confrontations between a President and some group in the Congress that could cause great difficulty.

Could I go off the record just a second?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. RUSK: The Congress is the representative branch of the government only for those functions given to the Congress under the Constitution. The President is the representative branch of the government with respect to the duties assigned to the President, and so I see no particular reason why we have to say that the Congress has to participate in everything, nor is the Congress particularly willing to do it. For example, on

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

the question of amnesty, vitally affected one of the most important powers of the Congress, the power to raise armies, and in a period when the Congress was asserting its desire to re-establish its authority under the Constitution, did anyone in the Congress say that they ought to have participated in the amnesty decision? Not at all because it was a no win situation. Whatever the decision was, you were going to come out behind.

So I don't know whether the Congress -- on one occasion I invited a subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee to come down to the State Department on a very private basis to take a look at some of the technology of the espionage and counter-espionage, and we showed them a good many gadgets, and how various things operate, and it was pretty startling to them. And afterwards, at least two of them said to me, we appreciate your motivation in inviting us down here, but I'm sorry you did it because we don't want to know.

Now, how much of this kind of thing does the Congress really want to know when you start to peel the peeling off the banana? My guess is most of them would prefer not to know some of these things and have a chance to quarrel about it later if they want to.

MR. CONNOR: May I ask one question in this connection? Even though generally speaking you think that a joint Congressional committee with oversight functions with respect to the CIA should have only a post-audit responsibility, are there some situations,

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

such as the covert operations in the United States and elsewhere, that preceded the Bay of Pigs actions, where because of the magnitude and because of the foreign policy implications, and because of the possible direct war involvement, that there should be a preclearance?

MR. RUSK: Yes. I think there would be situations where prior consultation would be important. My guess is that had there been prior consultation on the Bay of Pigs, that that might have helped us avoid a very serious mistake. President Kennedy did talk to Senator Fulbright about it, and also talked to the Vice President Lyndon Johnson about it, both of whom were opposed to the Bay of Pigs. And so I think there are some, there would be some things where preconsultation would be very, very much in point. I was concerned about the notion that somehow you could not do anything without prior consultation and the consent of representatives of the Congress, because very often you just don't have time.

MR. GRAY: It's 11:00 o'clock, sir.

MR. RUSK: I wonder if we could pause for two minutes while I try to establish the point of where I was on August 10th.

(A brief recess was taken.)

MR. RUSK: I can confirm that there was a meeting in my conference room on the afternoon of August 10th, 1962, at which I was present. There were about a dozen people there, and my appointment book shows names of those who were there. I have asked them to photostat that page, and I will get it to you as quickly as possible. It does not show that General Lansdale was there, but he might have been. The list might have been incomplete.

MR. BELIN: Your appointment book will show the members present on that?

MR. RUSK: McNamara, McCone, George Ball, and there were about ten or twelve there.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, we were talking about oversight, and I would like to ask you to discuss with the Commission a summary of what we talked about last night concerning your observations of the kind of a person that should be the Director of Central Intelligence, with a particular reference to internal oversight.

MR. RUSK: Well, I do believe that any agency which is involved with what I would call raw power must be a highly disciplined agency and from the President on down. I think the quality and character of the persons who are directors of CIA and directors of FBI are very important indeed. However, I would not rely entirely on that. I would myself urge that they be put on terms of office of not more than say eight years, but, of course, subject to the pleasure of the President for periods shorter than that, because I think it is very important that there not be individuals who are in a position to develop power that somehow is not subject to the normal controls of the people

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

who are elected, the President and the Congress.

I don't want to speak unduly badly of the dead, but I think we allowed Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to develop just too much power, and we ought to rotate those offices, and that that would have a wholesome influence on the way they conduct their offices. I don't see any way in which one can through organizational structure or mechanics get complete protection against an occasional incident of pure indiscipline down the line. That is present in every large organization in our society, public and private, and so occasionally things like that will happen. But I think the quality is of great importance, and I think that during the period that I was there, I felt myself very fortunate in the men that were serving as Director of CIA.

t. 1b

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MR. BELIN: You mentioned that among the restrictions you would include, in addition to a maximum number of years that a person could serve in a position of this kind was the question of whether or not the DCI should be the brother of the Secretary of State, or for that matter, the Attorney General should be the brother of the President.

Do you have any observations along those lines?

MR. RUSK: Yes, I have, for what they are worth. I may be wrong, but I am clear. I think that the members of the National Security Council ought, in personal terms, to be at arms length with the Director of the CIA and the Director of the FBI. I don't think that it was a particularly good idea to have the Director of CIA and the Secretary of State as brothers. This is something George Marshall taught most of those who worked with him, to keep a kind of an arm's length from people above you and below you, because you don't want personal relationships to interfere with public duty. And he is very special on that particular point.

I am sorry I didn't --

MR. BELIN: The other aspect was with regard to the Department of Justice, the Attorney General and the President.

MR. RUSK: Oh, yes. You know, it is kind of traditional in this post-War period that the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Treasury remove themselves from party politics because the issues they

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

deal with are supposed to be and expected to be largely nonpartisan in character. I think our recent experience has indicated that it would be a good idea for the Attorney General to be added to that group, and that the Attorney General not be someone who is actively involved in party politics as the principal law officer of this government.

MR. CONNOR: Or a member of the family of the President, say?

MR. RUSK: I would think almost any other Cabinet job would be more appropriate for a member of the family of the President than the Attorney General or the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense.

MR. KIRKLAND: How do you feel, Mr. Secretary, about the question of whether the DCI should be a career intelligence officer, perhaps?

MR. RUSK: My feeling on that is a little bit like my attitude to what extent Ambassadors should be drawn from career members of the foreign service, that you ought to try and find the best man that you can. There may be times when that person would be a career man, there may be other times when he would come from the outside, and I would a little bit rather not try to generalize on that particular point, because you really ought to find the best man you can get for the job.

MR. KIRKLAND: If one of the problems confronting the Director is substantial White House pressure to do things that might not be prudent, do you think someone who had an independent reputation or means of livelihood might be in a better position to protect the Agency?

MR. RUSK: I doubt that it would turn on money. At one period -- I don't know whether they still do it -- but at the moment anyone enters the Dutch Cabinet, from that moment on they are guaranteed a full year's salary when they leave the Cabinet, and one of my Dutch friends referred to this as the Go to Hell fund, and one reason was to try to increase the sense of independence of the Cabinet members.

I doubt that would make all that much difference in the face of the Director of the CIA. I do believe that it is very important that we distinguish between the White House and the President. During my period, I tried to get my colleagues into the frame of mind so that if some staff person from the White House called over there and said that the White House would like for you to do this, then they were supposed to go back and say who at the White House. It is one thing if they were literally conveying a message from the President and quite another thing if they were not, because I was old-fashioned enough to believe that if it was not a President speaking on foreign policy that I was the spokesman for foreign policy.

And so I think we ought to be careful about people in the White House junior to the President asserting any kind of command role, or supervisory role, or directive role, with regard to either the CIA or the FBI.

Now, I do not think we should try to remove a President from that role, but my guess is that office has been immunized for at least another century against abuse of that command.

MR. CONNOR: Mr. Secretary, along those lines, do you think that it is wise for the same person to hold the position of Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for International or for National Security matters?

MR. RUSK: Well, that would not be my choice. I have taken the liberty of reminding Mr. Kissinger that he had learned while he was at the White House that a Secretary of State must not permit a Henry Kissinger to be in the White House, and I suspect that that has something to do with his present arrangements. We had a very good personal working relationship in that three-corned arrangement, the President, McGeorge Bundy and myself as far as foreign policy matters was concerned, and later with President Johnson and Walt Rostow.

Well, it is important. Dean Acheson once said in the relations with the President and the Secretary of State, that it was of the utmost importance that both of them understand at all times which one of them is President. If that adviser on National Security Affairs in the White House, and the

Secretary of State and the President, all three, have an adequate and an honorable working relationship on a basis of integrity in dealing with each other, there should not be any problems developing.

MR. CONNOR: Going back to a related question of the role of the Attorney General, was Attorney General Robert Kennedy present at that meeting in your office to which you referred?

MR. RUSK: I don't think he was. I don't recall him as being on the list, but I will have the list, and I will get it to the Commission.

MR. CONNOR: Was he personally involved in many of these policy questions having to do with the Cuban situation?

MR. RUSK: He would sit from time to time with the 303 Committee, and occasionally would make suggestions, some of them good, and some of them that I vetoed. But he was sort of interested in, you know, counterinsurgency and that kind of thing, and President Kennedy asked me to let him serve on the 303 Committee. But I always felt free to take up any problems if I needed to with President Kennedy himself.

MR. KIRKLAND: Are you aware of any independent contacts or relationships that he had with the CIA?

MR. RUSK: No, and it is very hard for me to dig into that particular point, because the three key people who would know about that are dead, President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy and

Allen Dulles. But I would be surprised and disappointed if President Kennedy, for example, had any kind of understanding with Mr. Dulles that very much affected our foreign policy without the knowledge of the Secretary of State. I can't swear that that was not so, obviously, because we are talking about a negative here. But I didn't get the impression that such a channel was operating.

MR. BELIN: Were there some meetings that Allen Dulles might have had with President Kennedy that you did not know about?

MR. RUSK: Oh, I am sure he dropped in on him occasionally for some additional briefings on different situations, and I am sure, I know that J. Edgar Hoover used to go into see the President, or the two Presidents that I served, occasionally on his own to report on various things. So the answer to that is yes.

MR. BELIN: To follow up with J. Edgar Hoover, one comment you made concerning a maximum term of service, I believe in our discussions last night you said that one of the major concerns you had was the possibility that if an agency like the FBI or CIA would be able to terrorize others, including possibly members of Congress.

MR. RUSK: Well, again I am not sure I am right on this, but I have developed over the years a strong aversion to monopoly of sources of information on important matters. And I am a little concerned to have all information in the Federal government on internal security matters come through one agency and one head of that agency. I am just a little worried about the need for a little more diversity. I don't quite know how to work this out, but I would be reluctant to have one man play a decisive role in making judgments about internal security problems in this country.

Now, one answer to that might be, and I defer to a member of your Commission, might be closer and more effective supervision by the Attorney General of the FBI and closer and more effective supervision by the CIA by the statutory members of the National Security Council.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, last night we talked about your concern that the intelligence community must be urged to have priorities in its job to reflect the regional trends of American foreign policy so that they don't always develop an insatiable appetite for information on everything that might not be relevant to American foreign policy.

MR. RUSK: Well, I am aware of the fact that there has been discussion of priorities from time to time, and we do, in fact, use the concept of priorities in terms of the expenditures of resources both in people and money. But I think we might, we might press that further and be somewhat more restrictive in the types of activities that are conducted in particular countries. I mean, it doesn't make much difference to the United States, for example, as to what happens in Burundi. I do not know how much effort they are putting into Burundi, but they shouldn't be doing it because it's there and we need a book full of information on Burundi. We ought to do it as a direct instrument of foreign policy rather than some momentum of the intelligence community working on its own.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. RUSK: I think there is a need for supervision of intelligence activities by policy officers who themselves ought to make some policy judgments about the kinds of intelligence that are useful rather than leave this question to the insatiability of an intelligence community for whom no amount of information is superfluous.

So I think every year or so there ought to be careful thought to priorities and directions, and maybe types of activities.

MR. BELIN: Now, Secretary Rusk, one comment you made last night concerned your observations about the very fact that in our country people write books about the CIA.

MR. RUSK: Well, I would not wish to be pressed to name individual countries, but I think one of the tributes to the constitutionality of our system is that people can work in these agencies and then go out and write books about them and survive. In most countries I know if that happened they would be struck down by a truck, run over in the countryside, and that would be the end of it.

But they do that here, they write best sellers. Well, it is a very troublesome thing when you get into this kind of kiss and tell writing in this particular field, and it is a danger to which the intelligence community, I suppose, is inevitably exposed to.

MR. BELIN: Do you feel there should be greater restrictions on the contractual enforcement of Agency contracts with employees not to divulge such information?

MR. RUSK: Well, I have suggested that you get ahold of the departure statement which I signed with the Department of State. It is very far-reaching in terms of my pledge with respect to the kinds of information that I in the first place would not take away with me, and secondly would not reveal, and it cites about twenty sections of the U.S. Code which purport to provide the statutory back-up for the requirements that they cited in that statement. Whether they still use it after the Freedom of Information Act, I just don't know. But I do thihk there is a very important problem here about whose information it is when people come in and work in sensitive jobs in government. There is still confusion, as I understand it, about whose it is. I mean, what about people who squirrel away in their attics classified material, take them off with them, and I gather now when they die those papers become the properties of their families. I think my own feeling is that if it is not clear, if it is clear in the statutes they ought to be forced, and if it is not clear, then it ought to be clarified by statute as to whose information it is when one is working in a government department, particularly in sensitive departments, and obtain such material. This is one of the messy fringes on our situation which I think we haven't straightened out carefully enough.

MR. BELIN: Another comment you had from an overall basis about the CIA was that because of its origin with the OSS, that might have affected the type of activities to which the Agency addressed itself in peacetime. Do you have any comments on that?

MR. RUSK: Well, this has a bearing, I think, not only on what people thought at the time that the National Security Act of 1947, as enacted, was, but also a good many of the personnel in CIA were brought over from OSS, and it may well be that some of the activities that they conducted during war time appeared to be entirely appropriate in a Cold War situation. But I think also that they were even more influenced by the events of the immediate post-War period.

We had reduced our armed forces to a point where the Joint Chiefs of Staff told me in 1946 that we did not have a division in our Army, not a group in our Air Force, that could be rated ready for combat. Our ships were being put in mothballs as fast as we could find berths for them, and those that remained afloat were manned by skeleton crews. Our Defense Budget in '47, '48 was coming down, came down to almost $11 billion, $11.3 billion, on its way down to a target of $10 billion. During that period, Joseph Stalin, looking out across the West, and not seeing any divisions, tried to keep the northwest province of Iran, demanded the two eastern provinces of Turkey, he ignored the peace treaty with the countries of Eastern Europe with respect to free elections and their political future, and he gave support to the guerrilas going to Greece, he pulled the coup d'etat in Czechoslovakia, he barricaded Berlin, and he gave the principal go ahead light for the North Koreans to go after South Koreans.

Now, that was the origin of the Cold War, but all of the revisions of historians are to the contrary, but that's another story. But in that kind of an atmosphere it is understandable that the United States government and the CIA consider that we were in a pretty embattled situation. It was not until about 1950 under the leadership of the Secretary of State, and against the opposition of the then-Secretary of Defense that we began to build up our armed forces again.

Now, this still is a pretty rough world situation and if there are ways in which we can do things by covert means that would hold off the time when we might have to consider whether you use major military means, I think we ought to maintain that capability. And I can never generalize against CIA-type activities, because I was a student in Germany and watched the storm troopers take the public platforms and the streets away from the democratic parties of Germany. And I would have been delighted in those days if there had been CIA's in Britain and France and the United States that could have come in there and found ways to help the democratic parties of Germany, and the failure to do so resulted in 50 million people being killed.

So I feel very strongly that although we ought to, that a President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of Defense must keep this sort of thing very much under control and take responsibility for it, that we must have this capability.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any observations concerning the effectiveness or any possible changes in the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board as an oversight vehicle or a related vehicle to CIA?

MR. RUSK: Well, I don't want to do a disservice to people who have rendered dedicated service. I have had the impression over the years the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board gets to be more gung-ho than anybody else, and that sometimes some of these things are urged by the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board which operationally may not make much sense. So I think that it is all right to have then advise, but they should not be permitted to make the decisions or to influence the decisions unduly.

MR. BELIN: In your opinion, are they an effective oversight agency at the present time?

MR. RUSK: Oh, I don't think they are effective, at least in my experience they have not been effective in the kind of oversight that is really needed. And I think the oversight should be given by those who are in positions established by our Constitution and statutes, the President, and the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, there have been recent allegations that the CIA was in some way involved with Lee Harvey Oswald. There have been also allegations that perhaps the State Department did not send over to the Warren Commission all of its files concerning Oswald and particularly about his trips abroad.

Do you have any comments concerning either of these allegations?

MR. RUSK: Well I never heard of Lee Harvey Oswald until the assassination, and we went through what I thought was a very intensive and thorough examination of the question as to whether any foreign government might have been involved with Lee Harvey Oswald, because that could have been an issue of war and peace.

Now, I personally was convinced that there was no indication that any foreign government was involved, and so testified to the Warren Commission, and my testimony is available to you.

I have never had any, the slightest reason to believe, that Lee Harvey Oswald was working for or pursuant to anything that came out of CIA whatever, and I must say, I really believe that anyone who charges that anyone in the United States government was involved in the assassination of Kennedy without hard proof is guilty of just sheer evil.

MR. BELIN: Did you ever come across any information in any manner whatsoever that indicated that Oswald was in any way connected with the FBI?

MR. RUSK: No.

Let me say that we did know of his travels and things of that sort. I am a little shocked to hear that there were materials in the State Department that were not turned over to the Warren Commission, because the order was to turn them all over.

MR. BELIN: When you say you were shocked to hear, you mean shocked that the allegation is that?

MR. RUSK: Shocked by the allegations, yes.

MR. BELIN: To your knowledge, was there any materials that were ever in the State Department files or any other government files that you know of that were not turned over?

MR. RUSK: Not to my knowledge, but sometimes when you are desperately looking for a piece of paper, it is often

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

very hard to find it, and it is entirely possible that whatever the instructions might have been that there might have been something lying around and somebody didn't transmit it. Whether this was simply through bureaucratic clumsiness or whether it was through indiscipline, I just can't say.

MR. GRAY: Mr. Secretary, one point that came up last night was the question of oversight of CIA collection efforts. Now, the covert action is supervised by what was then the 303 Committee, and you testified that some sensitive or potentially risky types of collections were presented to you and other members of the Administration.

What about the day to day overseas collection by clandestine techniques, is there any supervision outside of the CIA of that?

MR. RUSK: I don't believe that it is necessary for the President and Cabinet officers to get into the details of collection, unless they involve methods and techniques which could raise major issues of policy.

In other words, I don't think we need to know who are the agents and things of that sort. I do think that the Director of the CIA ought to be in charge of his own shop, and I ought to think that each one of our Ambassadors abroad ought to have complete access to whatever is being done in the country to which they are assigned by any representative of the United States government.

President Kennedy wrote a letter to all Ambassadors on that particular subject. Now, as I checked around among different Ambassadors, a good many of them exercised that right under that letter. There were others who simply didn't because they didn't think it was worthwhile or necessary, or things of that sort.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. GRAY: Now, when the CIA has agents or sources of information in this country, whether because they are, let us say foreign diplomats, or in situations such as you had in the Miami area with the Cuban emigre community, is there anyone in a position comparable to that of the Ambassador overseas who is outside of CIA and can monitor this day to day activity, to your knowledge?

MR. RUSK: I think not in detail.

MR. GRAY: Would you think that there should be?

MR. RUSK: No more than anyone outside of the Department monitored these thousands of cables a day that go out of the Department of State.

MR. GRAY: Would you think that there should be some need for supervision of that kind of activity?

MR. RUSK: Well, it would require -- one man couldn't do it. It would require substantial staff and, well, who is that staff? To whom is he going to report? I just don't think that is too much of a problem, actually.

MR. BELIN: With regards to the question of staff, do you think a Joint Committee of Congress might have too powerful a staff so far as the effective operation of the Agency is concerned if we were to adopt that approach of Congressional oversight?

MR. RUSK: Well, if they approach it on the same basis as they approached the Joint Atomic Energy Committee, I think that would not be all that much of a problem.

MR. BELIN: You mentioned the Miami area. To your knowledge, did Castro had any penetration of what went on in the Cuban exile community in Miami?

MR. RUSK: I forget the detailed evidence, but I always assumed that he did have them penetrated.

MR. BELIN: Are there any questions by any members of the Commission?

MR. GRISWOLD: One of the things that has come to us is the explanation for some of the things which the CIA did from 1966 to 1973 domestically which had caused concern with a result of pressures from the President.

Now, how can the CIA be guarded against pressures from the President? I recognize this is an extraordinarily difficult question.

MR. RUSK: It is a difficult question, and in trying to find the right answer to that question you don't want to create a situation where CIA is independent of the President.

MR. GRISWOLD: Right.

MR. RUSK: So you have to start with the kind of man you have as President. However, I think that --

MR. GRISWOLD: And I took the time period in to indicate both Presidents so that it is not a political question.

MR. RUSK: Right.

I would think that the key to that would be that such questions should be discussed by the statutory members of the National Security Council. It would be very difficult for a President to abuse his powers with people sitting there who have a sense of the tradition of their office and who can pull a President up by the coattails and say, now, wait a minute, now this is out of bounds, let's don't go down that trail.

MR. GRISWOLD: What about the Bay of Pigs operation?

MR. RUSK: Well, some of us did not serve President Kennedy did not serve President Kennedy very well on that, because of just that factor. For example -- well, we were all new in our relations with each other, but in retrospect I should have insisted that a crucial question be asked of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and that is, if you were going to do this operation with American forces, what would you consider your requirements to be? And that is, ask the Joint Chiefs to come up with a plan to do this same operation with American forces. And I can guarantee you that what they would say would have been necessary for the job would have been in such sharp contrast to the capabilities of this brigade that that itself might well have squashed the whole thing. Since this was a CIA operation, I think the Joint Chiefs were perhaps a little timid -- well, no, let's put it the other way. They were not asked for the kind of professional military judgment to which the President should have been exposed. They did comment on it but in a rather, I thought at the time a somewhat casual way, because it was not strictly their business, you see.

Now, I think we learn a lot of mistakes in a very hard way with the Bay of Pigs, and I think that some of those, some of the reasons for that mistake ought to be impressed upon people's minds just as the mistakes made under the general situation called Watergate.

MR. BELIN: Do you mean to imply that the military should have taken over the operation?

MR. RUSK: No, no. No, no. But a seasoned, professional military judgment on the point as to whether such a brigade had the chance of a snowflake in hell.

MR. KIRKLAND: Do you think there is a built-in tendency in the CIA, with the background of the way this was evolved, toward a degree of adventurism which needs fairly severe checking?

MR. RUSK: It is possible that at different periods there might have been those who were too much the eager beavers, but my concern now is that they have had the daylights scared out of them and they will crawl off under their shells and will be too timid.

MR. BELIN: Dr. Shannon, I believe you had a question?

DR. SHANNON: Yes.

I wondered, you said that this is on covert activities, and again, this is only partially a responsibility of this Committee, but it does affect our concerns, because the back-up for the covert activities very often has domestic implications. So I wonder, you say we should keep this capability, yet apparently originally it resided, right after the Second World War, in the State Department, and the suggestion has been made that perhaps a small, covert capability could be in the State Department, and that this would perhaps help the CIA if it were rid of covert business to concentrate on intelligence.

Do you have any views on this?

1b

MR. RUSK: Well, it is very hard for us to lose an organization in our governmental structure, to tuck it away where nobody hears about it and it doesn't come before parliamentary review and things of that sort. And maybe we should have tried that at the beginning, because so much of CIA's activities are for all practical purposes overt, and maybe we might have had something called a Central Information

Agency, and then tucked something away somewhere that would be as secret as some of those agencies in other governments that operate in this field. But I just don't know whether that would work in our particular, complicated, Constitutional system where the powers of Congress are always involved, and it is difficult for us to hide things away.

MR. SHANNON: I have a couple of more questions, if I may.

MR. BELIN: Go ahead, and then General Lemnitzer has some.

MR. SHANNON: Do you have any views as to the general, without going into specifics, the general aspect of domestic activities of the CIA? And clearly, one of the problems with this Commission is the clear and conflicting, well, clear, clear necessity of intelligence and secrecy on the one hand, but conflicting claims of constitutional rights and civil rights for individual citizens of the United States.

MR. RUSK: It seems to me, sir, that they are two different questions. One is the bureaucratic question as to whether one agency is intruding onto the proper responsibilities of another agency. To me, that is not all that much of a big deal, and that occurs all of the time all over government, and I am sure that the FBI has stepped outside of its assignment occasionally.

But the other question you have mentioned, the question of the Constitutional rights of American citizens, from whatever source, I think is very important. Last year I testified before Senator Muskie's Committee in which I expressed some doubt about subjecting all surveillance type activities of the unusual type to the supervision of the courts in this country on the ground that I was a little troubled about the idea of getting the judges into this kind of business, because it is a mean and dirty business.

Since then, I have rather changed my mind, and I am inclined to think that where the government feels that there must be the types of surveillance which could intrude on constitutional rights, that for whatever it might be, foreign policy, national security or otherwise for American citizens and resident aliens, that that should be done under the supervision of a court.

Now, it is going to be difficult to state that in such a way as to exclude the diplomatic community, and I do not think we want to extend constitutional rights to the diplomatic community, because they do not have the duties of citizenship to go along with it.

MR. SHANNON: One other quick one here. I don't want to pre-empt the General, who has something, but you mentioned the CIA sometimes, you believe, got into some activities that were questionable because they had the money. They are exempted, essentially, from a number of the accounting responsibilities of other Federal agencies.

Is this essential to their functions, or do you believe that some regular appropriation control over them similar to the State Department and other would be possible without destroying their role?

MR. RUSK: I am inclined to think that at least part of the CIA budget ought not to be on the public record. It may be that there is a part of it that can be, but I think there ought to be some covert money that is available to the CIA handled by people in the Congress who understand what is being done and the need for this for covert funds.

I personally would not like to see this handled in the normal budgetary processes of the government. And for example, we give away an enormous amount of information every year in these large budget presentations of the Department of Defense to the Congress, and I think certainly in the sensitive agencies we overdo public knowledge to some extent.

MR. LEMNITZER: We have had a suggestion that if the government continues to support covert operations that the covert operations should be removed from the CIA and put in a central intelligence group, which was the arrangement in the early days between the transition from OSS to CIA.

Do you think such an arrangement would solve any of the problems that are involved in carrying out effective covert operations?

MR. RUSK: I can imagine there could be some advantage to a reorganization that would change the names all around, because CIA has gotten to be a kind of a slogan for propoganda, both overseas and at home. And sometimes a fresh start might help in that regard.

But I don't believe that you would divert energetic and opposition Congressmen or investigative reporters or any people of that sort from trying to locate whatever it is we are talking about, and I am sure they would discover it. The simple fact is that we are a government that just doesn't know how to keep our mouths shut, and so I don't think you are going to succeed in hiding some such agency. But I can see that it might be desirable at some point to start over and change the names.

As you recall, in the foreign aid business we have changed the name about every four or five years, when it runs out of gas and needs a fresh start. And so I think we could do it again.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Connor, do you have any other question?

Do you have more, General?

MR. LEMNITZER: No.

MR. CONNOR: Mr. Secretary, we have received evidence about a feud that developed between the FBI and the CIA when J. Edgar Hoover was the FBI Director. And the testimony indicates that under his instructions there was a lack of effective cooperation between the FBI and the CIA, at least in certain respects during a period of time, and, therefore, there was pressure on the CIA to do some things in the domestic field that otherwise would have been done by the FBI or by joint action.

I wonder if in light of that experience, of which I am sure you are aware, you would have any recommendations for a clear delineation of responsibilities as between the FBI and the CIA, and particularly with respect to what is done in the United States?

MR. RUSK: Well, I can understand why some confusion might have arisen because the Director of Central Intelligence is also the Director of Central Intelligence for the community as a whole, and we used to get daily reports from the CIA which were all source reports. I mean, I could recognize a good many of these reports as coming out of State Department cables, for example, and I knew others probably came from the FBI.

Now, it may well be that that coordinating function of DCI led to some staff support in his own agency on some of these, what some people might call internal security questions. But I think a more important point is if you try to assign functions, it is very hard to do it in terms of geography, because espionage and counterespionage is a problem that exists in the United States as well as abroad. It is very hard to say that as soon as you hit the boundary of the United States you transfer the whole business from one operation to another, because I think you run into a good deal of trouble that way.

It is true that there was some lack of effective cooperation between the CIA and the FBI at times, and this is partly a matter of personality, and is one of the reasons that I feel that these people ought to be on terms not to exceed eight years. I testified to Senator Muskie's Subcommittee that talking to J. Edgar Hoover was about like talking to President DeGaulle, and, you know, there is only one DeGaulle and there is only one J. Edgar Hoover, so I anticipate this problem is not going to be repeated any time soon.

But, I do think that there ought to be a close working relationship.

Now bear in mind, gentlemen, that there is a very lively and active exchange of information between different elements of the intelligence community, and I have no doubt that other agencies have built up files which include a lot of raw data from the FBI, even though it was not in that agency's principal charter to have, or to collect, that kind of information. For example, in the State Department where 95 percent of our jobs, at least, are rated as sensitive, there is investigation of applicants, many of whom are not hired. There is investigation of officers on the job. That is renewed, I think, every five years to bring their security clearances up to date. Every time you move from one security clearance to another, you get another investigation. There must be tens of thousands of files on individuals in the State Department, but a lot of that material is from the FBI.

So I think, if we could -- I think we have an opportunity now to develop a more cooperative working relationship within the intelligence community, and make it clear that CIA is not responsible for what would normally be interpreted to be internal security, but I would not exclude CIA from a lively interest in the operations of foreign governments in this country, because you cannot separate those from their activities abroad.

MR. BELIN: Dean Griswold?

MR. GRISWOLD: Were you familiar with the fact that mail between the Soviet Union and the United States was being intercepted and opened during all of the time you were Secretary of State?

MR. RUSK: I think I was of the fact. I didn't know to what extent, and I think we did make some adjustments there to relax on a good many publications and things of that sort where there was no particular, seemed to be no particular, problem. I was curious the other day to read a manuscript that came the other day to the University of Georgia Press that at the beginning of the Republic there was a rigorous scrutiny of the mails for quite a long time before people began to move in to institute some privacy in the mails. I will try and get some citations on that for the staff to look at. But this is not new in our history.

MR. GRISWOLD: I was not thinking of publications, but of letters. Did copies of such letters ever come to you in intelligence reports?

MR. RUSK: No. It wouldn't come to me in that form, sir. Normally it would come to me as a piece of information, and it would normally have some introductory phrase, and this was for the purpose, I suppose, of protecting sources, some introductory phrase saying usually reliable sources, or somethin of that sort.

Then if I wanted to prick up my ears and ask about the source for a particular item, I could do so and I would be told. I don't recall any instance, any information that came out of this mail that ever caused me to ask for a source, and it turned out to be opening mail.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Kirkland, do you have any questions?

MR. KIRKLAND: I have a couple, Mr. Secretary.

Do you recall any constant, repeated concern by President Johnson to find out foreign sources of support for the domestic dissident groups, that this was an issue that he was continually concerned with?

MR. RUSK: Well, we were interested in that point. I think that we were inclined to assume that it was occurring, because it would be a perfectly normal and natural thing to occur under the circumstances of that period.

I didn't have any real doubt in my mind, although I don't have in my mind a list of citations I can give you for hard proof, but I am sure it occurred, and there were in terms of movement of money and movement of people and things of that sort.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. RUSK: There were black operations going on all of the time in this country.

MR. KIRKLAND: Do you see any apparent reason why the CIA should not properly attempt to try to find out what those sources were?

MR. RUSK: No, I think somebody has got to.

MR. KIRKLAND: Do you have any doubts about that being a proper operation of the CIA?

MR. RUSK: I don't think so. I think that in terms of action that it should not be CIA's action in the sense of breaking and entering and things of that sort. I think that the FBI ought to be the action responsive agency in this country, as I have said.

MR. KIRKLAND: Domestic in terms of working overseas?

MR. RUSK: Oh, overseas, I think it is essential for CIA to try to run down that kind of thing because we are the targets of a good many political systems.

MR. BELIN: Secretary Rusk, as a general overview, you might relate to the Commission the comment you had last night concerning the fact that there is no real substitute for the getting of people of character and quality on the job, and sometimes mistakes are made by the frailties of human nature.

MR. RUSK: Well, now that I am permanently a private citizen and think back on the years during and since World War II, I just don't believe that there is any way in which you can guarantee through organizational devices or arrangements that you escape the frailties of human nature. There are going to be mistakes, mistakes of judgment. Any of us who have served in government have had our share of them. I have had mine. And therefore, the greatest importance has to be assigned to the character of those who are carrying the responsibility as well as insistence upon adherence through all ranks of the policies established by the President and through his delegated deputies. I happen to believe that in the Executive Branch of the government that those in civilian clothes are as responsible to the President as are people in uniform, and that otherwise our system of democracy would break down, because nobody elected these people in civilian clothes to make policy or appeal to a higher law and defy the President.

They elected the President and the Congress to determine the policies of the government, and so I think we ought to look for people of the highest competence and the strongest characters to take these jobs of responsibility, and then we will have to rely upon them. I do not see any way in which you can guarantee that there would not be mistakes and failures and occasional stepping across the bounds.

MR. CONNOR: Mr. Secretary, would you comment on the obedience of a Cabinet official or highly placed Federal official who was ordered by the President to do something that violates the law clearly or is unconstitutional?

MR. RUSK: No, no. I was once instructed by President Kennedy to make an expenditure which my lawyers told me was unlawful, that the money was not for that kind of purpose, and I spoke to the Attorney General about it and said what do I do. And I think his reply was well, if you go to prison, your salary will continue while you are in prison.

Well, that was not very helpful. But anyhow, I refused to make the expenditure and told the President why, and he did not pursue it.

No, I think that there can come a time when if a President persisted then the Cabinet officer would have to resign, if that is what the President wanted to do.

MR. CONNOR: I agree with that interpretation.

MR. BELIN: I also think you commented that things sometimes don't go right anywhere else either, including the law as well as business and labor, and so we can't always expect

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to go right in government. Is that a fair summary?

MR. RUSK: Any institution is going to have its problems, because we are all people with feet of clay, and those feet of clay are going to show once in awhile.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any other comments you want to make to the Commission in closing?

MR. RUSK: I think my strongest concern, gentlemen, is that during this present period of nervousness and sensatinalism and investigation and reassessment that we not come out of this period with a serious crippling of our intelligence community and of our capability to engage in certain operations which are in lieu of war.

Now, at the present time there is a strong mood of withdrawal from world affairs among the American people. You can look at a lot of polls and investigations and get impressions around the country, and one gets the feeling at the present time that the American people would not support the use of American armed forces anywhere in the world unless there were a direct attack upon a territory of the United States itself.

Now, that could mean that there could be steady inroads on what we would think of was the Free World by those who were committed to impose something else on the Free World. And we can find ourselves in a situation where little by little a situation builds up where we are in such a desparate situation then that we have to face the agony of a nuclear decision, and then we are all dead.

And I would hope that we would maintain a capability of trying to deal with some of these situations at an early stage through careful and sophisticated political activity that would help us avoid the horrendous decisions that might lie at the end of the trail if the present trends continue too far into the future.

MR. BELIN: Are there any other questions by the members of the Commission?

MR. SCHWARZER: Dave, do you have a minute for a question?

MR. BELIN: Yes.

MR. SCHWARZER: I wanted to ask you, Secretary Rusk, whether you thought in line with your suggestion that we should attract the best possible men for the job of DCI, whether it would help to assign Cabinet level status to that position and whether that would perhaps make him a more effective person in the efforts to coordinate the activities of the intelligence community and how that would work?

MR. RUSK: I am not sure that that is very important, quite frankly, because the Cabinet is not that important as a corporate body. In our system, the Cabinet really is not a policymaking group. The chain of command goes from individual Cabinet officer to the President, and the Cabinet is usually an information exchanging body.

And secondly, I just don't believe we improve things very much by the continual inflation of titles. When I became Assistant Secretary of State, there were three. I think now there must be eighteen people in the State Department that either carry the title or have the equivalent rank.

I remember once one of our experienced former Ambassadors was cautioning on this and he said, bear in mind that the term Madam started as the address for a Queen. Now, so I really don't believe that changes in title make any difference, and I don't believe adding him to the Cabinet will. I think it is much more important that he be closely with and always present at the meetings of the National Security Council, because that is where the real decisions have to be made.

MR. KIRKLAND: Mr. Secretary, I have the impression that in the Foreign Service, the Office of the Inspector General is a fairly critical one and has a substantial amount of authority and an important role in the administration. Do you feel that a strengthening of that operation inside of the CIA would be desirable to help?

MR. RUSK: Of an Inspector General type operation inside of the CIA?

MR. KIRKLAND: Yes.

MR. RUSK: I think that would be very useful. I also think it might be well --

MR. KIRKLAND: It is true that it is a very important operation.

MR. RUSK: It is, and I tried to strengthen it in some respects when I was there. I think also the Inspector General of it or the Inspectors of the State Department ought to check when they make their visits to Embassies, check with the Ambassadors on the extent to which he is fully in charge of all activities by all officials of the American government, whatever their agency or department in his own Embassy in the country to which he is assigned, and that this letter of President Kennedy's, which is a matter of public record, should be emphasized so that if anything does go wrong, it is the Ambassador who is held responsible in the first instance.

MR. BELIN: That assumes the Ambassador will be tight-lipped on all occasions, I assume?

MR. RUSK: Would be what?

MR. BELIN: Tight-lipped at all times?

MR. RUSK: Yes, but I think on matters of this sort he is likely to be, because of the consequences of his not being, at least in the country where he is assigned.

MR. BELIN: Any other comments that you would like to make for the Commission, sir?

MR. RUSK: I don't think so.

MR. BELIN: Thank you very much for coming up here and bearing with us last night. Thank you, very much.

Now we have one more witness this morning.

If you would raise your right hand to be sworn, please, this is Mrs. Sammie Newman, a Notary Public for the District of Columbia.

MRS. NEWMAN: Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. GRAY: I do.

MR. BELIN: Thank you very much.

TESTIMONY OF GORDON GRAY

MR. BELIN: I wonder if you would state your name for the record, sir.

MR. GRAY: My name is Gordon Gray, no middle initial.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Gray, you have had quite extensive service with the government of this country, and I wonder if you could briefly summarize that for the Commission?

MR. GRAY: It would be easier, sir, if I use a few notes. I think we can do it more quickly.

Well, I served in the United States Army from 1942 to 1945, first as a private, being released as a Captain. This was near the close of the War.

I came back, I came to Washington, I served overseas I might say in General Bradley's Advanced Headquarters while I was overseas as a juniormost officer in his Advanced

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT, the testimony of former Special Asst. to the President, Gordon Gray, before the Rockefeller Commission, 21 APR 75
(pp 2262—2294)
16 Aug 94

Headquarters. I came back out of the Army in 1947 and became an Assistant Secretary of the Army in 1949, and became Under Secretary of the Army and then Secretary of the Army, which post I held until some time before the Korean War broke out.

I then became a Special Assistant for President Truman for the purpose of writing a report on foreign economic policy which was published in November, I guess, of that year. After the election, in 1951, I came back to Washington at President Truman's request to organize an organization which was somewhat abortive, known as the Psychological Strategy Board, but which put me in very close contact, in contact, with the intelligence matters, obviously.

MR. BELIN: Where physically did that Board meet?

MR. GRAY: That Board physically met in 712 Jackson Place. As a matter of fact, that is where it was organized and created.

MR. BELIN: Pardon me. Go ahead.

When you and I met this morning at 712 Jackson Place at our Headquarters, it was like going home to you in a sense, wasn't it?

MR. GRAY: It was, and that's not the end of it, as you will see in a moment.

In 1953 I was a member of the so-called Jackson Committee, and I think it was called the President's Committee on International Information Activities headed up by William

Harding Jackson, and C.D. Jackson was a member of the Committee, and one of the principal staff members was Wayne Jackson, and so it got to be known as the Jackson Committee, but it was a Committee set up to study the Cold War, and what we should do about it by President Eisenhower.

In 1955 -- well, in the meantime, in 1950, I had gone to the University of North Carolina to preside there. I came back here in 1955 as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. In 1956, I became a Director of the Office of Defense Mobilization. In 1958, I became Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

And I may say that when this was done, this was my office.

MR. BELIN: This was in 1956 as Director of ODM or 1958-59?

MR. GRAY: In 1958, my office, I had to go down to the corner of the building, and I have forgotten which floor, and I have been into this building so many times.

MR. BELIN: So the Vice President's Conference Room is where you once sat?

MR. GRAY: That's right.

And then in 1961 I became a member of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, appointed by President Kennedy and reappointed by successive Presidents, although I think it is fair to say that the present President has taken no action with respect to this Board.

MR. BELIN: Basically you have been a member of the PFIA since 1961, is that correct?

MR. GRAY: Yes, since May. I looked it up this morning and I thought it was earlier, but it turns out to have been May 6, 1961.

MR. BELIN: And you were a member of the National Security --

MR. GRAY: 16 May, excuse me.

MR. BELIN: And you were a member of the National Security Council until the 1949 amendments to the Act, I believe. Is that accurate?

end 4b

MR. GRAY: That is right, and the first act which created -- well, it was in the national military establishment, not the Defense Department and the Service Secretaries were all members of the National Security Council. And I briefly served when I became Secretary. Then in '49 the Act was changed, and the Defense Department was created, and various other changes were made, and the Service Secretaries were dropped, and I often say that Stuart Symington and I are the only two people who have ever been kicked off of the National Security Council and are still alive.

Later, of course, as Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, I was the backup to the Secretary of Defense, and attended the National Security Council meetings with him, briefed him on the meetings, and my next assignment, ODM, I was a member, statutory member of the Council, and then beginning in '58 until the end of the Administration, I helped the President run the Council.

MR. BELIN: Did you in your work, either on the National Security Council or as backup representative, did you ever feel the National Security Council undertook very much oversight of the CIA?

MR. GRAY: Well, I would know more clearly in the years from '58 to early '61, because I was really a part of the machinery of the Council. There was not much continuing oversight in the sense of the Council members examining what the various intelligence agencies were doing. There was an annual review of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, and of course, every meeting of the NSC began with a briefing by the DCI, which necessarily kept the members informed about certain or many aspects of intelligence. But I think it fair to say that the Council itself did not specifically spend much time reviewing intelligence activities. The Council did, of course, in a paper -- this is perhaps known to the members, and I don't want to cover a lot of ground which you have covered -- the Council had as the Chairman well remembers, adopted a paper called NSC 54/12, which really authorized the covert, the beginning of the covert activities of the Agency. That Committee, I think the Chairman of this Commission served as the President's representative on it for awhile, and of course, I did later when I was a special assistant.

But it underwent several changes in name. I changed it from 54/12 to the Special Committee, because the press by that time had gotten wind of it, and my own theory, and this is an aside, gentlemen, but in your recommendations, if you want to change some things that will get some things less visibility, one way to do it I believe is to change the name of things. It takes the press a little longer to catch on after you have given it a brand new name. Call it the Cavinaugh club or anything you like.

MR. BELIN: Now, you have served on the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 1961?

MR. GRAY: '61.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any opinion as to the viability of that board in general and also with specific reference to any oversight functions it might have performed with the CIA?

MR. GRAY: Yes, I do. My own strong feeling is that if the President does not have this board, he must have something like it. It is the only agency in government that I know of which on behalf of the President can oversee and interpret and understand the intelligence activities of all of the agencies of the government engaged in intelligence, which includes not only the CIA, but the DIA, and to some extent the AEC, to some extent the FBI, and other government agencies from time to time who find themselves involved purposefully or not in foreign intelligence activities. This board, I feel, should have the confidence of the President. He should be, feel comfortable with its membership. If any President inherits such a board and is not comfortable, then he ought to make his own board.

I am saying such a board is extremely important, especially if the recommendations of the Board get to the President, and there have been times in the past when they have not gotten to the President soon enough, and in some cases I am afraid not at all.

MR. BELIN: What particular types in the past are you referring to?

MR. GRAY: Well, I can speak very frankly. I think that it was more difficult at the beginning of the Nixon Administration than it had been in earlier days in having the reports, the written reports get to the Board, although I think it fair to say also that Mr. Nixon met fairly frequently with the Board.

MR. BELIN: Did Mr. Johnson meet fairly frequently with the Board?

MR. GRAY: Mr. Johnson, as I recall it, and I am going back some years now, and I have not checked the records, I think Mr. Johnson met twice with the Board, once for ceremonial purposes; that is, picture-taking, and once for substance. And General Eisenhower, for whom I was a liaison to the Board, met with the Board every three months for two or three hours. President Kennedy met almost every time the Board met, which was every other month. President Johnson practically not at all, and President Nixon quite a good deal. And we have had understandably only one with a President trying to get on top, a new President trying to get on top of his job. We did meet with him once or twice, I think, as Vice President.

Well, back to the Board. I think it is true, I think it is fair to say that either the Board or the members of the Board have been responsible for many of the innovations in the Intelligence field which have been vital to our national security. I have in mind the U-2, the reconnaissance satellite program, and at least the members of the Board had a good deal to do with that. The introduction of data processing in the intelligence community, for which the Board has fought for years with only I would say limited success so far, and the Board has very strong scientific expertise, and it has other expertise as we are now constituted, and as any board should have.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Economic activities, economic intelligence.

MR. GRAY: That's another thing. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice President.

Actually, when I say it has been innovative, the current activity in the United States Government, and interests in and reliance upon in the field of economic intelligence is larger than this board in the recommendations made to the President a couple of years ago, and I think the Board can be credited with that.

You asked me about oversight. We have tried to monitor the various agencies in the foreign intelligence field, the CIA, the DIA , and to some extent the others that I have mentioned, and I think we have been kept well informed. This Board has had all of the clearances that anybody in Government has. And I might say, Mr. Chairman, that to my knowledge in the years since 1956 when the first board was created, there has never been a leak from this board.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That's right.

MR. GRAY: And that is a record that is hard to match in this town I must say, either in the Executive agencies, and especially on the Hill. That is one reason I think that this is a reliable mechanism, because the members are loyal, it is a small and lean staff, and it undertakes studies in addition to its general monitoring responsibilities. It undertook studies on its own initiative, or some at the request of the President or a representative of the President, and some of these have been very important. Again, sometimes nothing seems to happen to them. The Board made a very important study about our naval forces, now quite some time ago, and it has gone nowhere.

The Board made a rather important study I think about human intelligence,the most comprehensive study that has ever been made in the government, and the first one that has been made at all in many years. I have to credit the atmosphere for the failure of that report to go very far, because obviously when you are talking about human intelligence, you raise questions which are involved in Watergate and this kind of phobia that people have.

On the other hand, the Presidents have by and large accepted the very many recommendations of the Board over the years which I believe have tended to strengthen the intelligence community, and without which it would not be as mature and sophisticated as it is today.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Gray, you mentioned that you were the advisor for National Security Affairs for President Eisenhower.

During the Eisenhower Administration did you ever hear any discussion of what was known as an Executive Action Capability which might be defined as a capability to assassinate foreign political leaders?

Have you ever heard that expression?

MR. GRAY: I don't remember ever hearing that expression until we talked this morning. I mean, I don't remember while I was in government hearing this expression.

MR. BELIN: You never heard the phrase until I asked you the first question in our interview this morning, is that correct?

MR. GRAY: That is correct.

MR. BELIN: While you were working with President Eisenhower, did you ever hear any discussion of any operational plan to try and assassinate any foreign leaders, and specifically Castro or Trujillo?

MR. GRAY: I would like if I may, Mr. Chairman, to not answer that yes or no because it is a complicated question. I would suppose if one were serving in government, and he would put the national security interests ahead of most everything else, he would not fail to think about assassination if this were a vital necessity to the national security. I think you would consider anything, and I have no doubt that at various times and at all levels, without the knowledge of any President, people have talked about assassination. But I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that ever came to President Eisenhower with respect to any assassinations, and specifically including those that you have mentioned.

Now, it is my impression that there was -- I would be surprised if there was any American discussion even of the question of the assassination of Trujillo. But you asked about Castro. I don't know how much detail I should go into, but I can say I am willing to go into detail if the members are interested. There is a memorandum covering every discussion President Eisenhower had with respect to Cuba, beginning in the winter of 1960, which ultimately culminated in the Bay of Pigs operation in 1961, he having approved a four point program, sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda, and the training of Cuban refugees.

I am reasonably sure that if Truman had ever -- I mean that if Castro had ever been a target of the President or the top people who were engaged in this program which he had authorized, certainly there would have been talk of assassination at that time, and I never heard it even hinted at. So specifically, I had a chance to see if the plans, or at least the training and other activities which would lead perhaps to a change in governments in other places, in another place, and I never heard the word assassination or anything of the equivalent mentioned once.

MR. BELIN: While you were serving on the President's

Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, did you ever hear that discussed?

MR. GRAY: Well, I never heard it discussed in the sense that the Board ever seriously discussed it. There was a member of the Board who is a well known individual. He is no longer on the Board, who practically every time the Agency people came before us and briefed us on Vietnam, he said have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North Vietnam, and the CIA would shrug, and then the next time they would come back a couple of months later, and he would say have you thought of trying to bump off some of the leaders in North Vietnam, and I heard that kind of discussion. But you never had any taker from the CIA. And, indeed, that has been my understanding beginning with Allen Dulles, and with all DCI's since, that Agency policy was against assassination on the ground that it didn't accomplish anything when you get right down to it.

But I might volunteer one other thing, Mr. Belin. When I was a special assistant to the President and presided over the planning board, which in those days, in the Eisenhower days, prepared all of the papers which went to the National Security Council, we were doing a paper on the Near and Middle East. This was within -- was at the time when Colonel Nasser was riding very high in the saddle, and the big issue in this paper was what were going to be the relationships of this government to

Colonel Nasser, and the opinions ranged everywhere from assassination on the one hand, suggested by somebody, to the other extreme, and that was that we get in bed with Nasser because he was considered to be the wave of the future.

Well, when the paper got written, there was no mention of assassination and no consideration even given to it. In fact, the paper came down about the middle of this thing, which was where it should have come. But I am saying that that is why I wanted to not say yes or no. I have heard the word assassination mentioned, but I know of no plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government.

MR. BELIN: You are saying you might have heard on occasion one person discuss it, but that was never in any way adopted as a policy, to the best of your knowledge, during the Eisenhower administration?

MR. GRAY: That is correct.

Now, how many other times it might have been discussed down in the bowels of some agency, I would have no way of knowing.

MR. BELIN: You mentioned to me early this morning that President Eisenhower talked to you about having the '54/12 Committee looking over activities of the Agency with regard to an oversight function.

Do you want to discuss that with the Commission?

MR. GRAY: Yes. Well, I really had forgotten what we discussed.

MR. BELIN: You talked about it particularly with reference to activities which might impinge upon governments.

MR. GRAY: Yes, indeed. When I became Special Assistant the President called me in with Allen Dulles, then DCI, and well, I think of Allen Dulles, but anyway, if it wasn't Allen Dulles, I then communicated this message to Allen Dulles. This I think was soon after the disclosure of the Berlin Tunnel, which some of you will remember as a very successful intelligence operation, and the President told me that he wanted the '54/12 group to pass upon all activities of this government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the people of some other nation. For example, the Berlin Tunnel, this was after the fact, would have been such, and overflights would have been such, and the '54/12 has always concerned itself in its successive incarnations with the overflight problem. President Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon the wisdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations. There were times when in the covert action field I would, in effect, appeal a decision of the 54/12 or the Special Group because I wondered whether it was in the national interest and when I took it back to the President from the Committee, I think at least on two occasions or on both occasions he overruled me in support of the Committee. But at least the matter got the attention of the President. There were not assassinations, I should say, but covert actions.

MR. BELIN: You also mentioned, though, that if there would have been discussion of assassinations with the President, that he was a staff man, and you feel that as a key person on the staff you would have been advised.

Is that a fair summary?

MR. GRAY: Let me say that in the time I served, Andrew Goodpasture, lately General Lemnitzer's eloquent successor as Commander of NATO, General Goodpasture was called Staff Secretary in the White House, and he was a good deal more than that. He was the President's right hand man for support matters in relationships with the Joint Chiefs, immediate relationships with all kinds of entities in Government, whereas my job was more in the long range field and the planning field.

Well, it is obvious that if we had not been men of good will and loyalty, this could have caused a lot of trouble, so we kept each other mutually informed. I told him about what was going on in the Special Group field, and he told me of all of the things that the President was asking him to do. And then when Eisenhower, General Eisenhower went out of office, these functions were sort of combined, first into McBundy, and then Walt Rostow, and what every other special assistant there had been. In other words, there was not Gray and Goodpasture, there was Bundy. This is clear? So now, in response to your question, I have recently been in communication with Andrew

Goodpasture, and I am able to say to you that neither of us, now back to assassination, remembers anything coming to the White House, and I cannot believe that anything could get to the President without going through one of us.

MR. BELIN: Is it a fair summary that he did believe strongly in staff?

MR. GRAY: He was the most staff minded -- well, that is a big statement. He was a very staff minded president.

MR. BELIN: We also talked this morning about the question of Congressional oversight, and some people have suggested the possibility of having a Joint Committee of Congress akin to the Atomic Energy Committee, perhaps, performing Congressional oversight in lieu of the present Congressional structure.

Do you have any comments on that?

MR. GRAY: I do, yes.. In the first place, I think the present situation where, if I understand it correctly, if the Agency seeks to undertake or does undertake a covert action, must not only be reported to the appropriate Congressional Committees, whatever they are, but approved by the President, and someone told me this means that about 80 people up on the Hill would know about this. I personally happen to think that there are many agents that have influence on Capitol Hill, and I think that there is a greater need for a tighter rein on security information going just like a shotgun to the Congress. I would worry then, about a Joint Committee such as you suggest, not because of the Committee itself, but because Joint Committees tend to generate large staffs, and are frequently, not always, the Committee becomes the captor of the staff. But I would worry most about leaks out of such a large staff, and there is not any question that much of this stuff that is appearing in the press, which in my judgment should not appear in the press, is coming right from Capitol Hill. So I would think that oversight Committees are appropriate in the Congress, and obviously the Congress should have the authority and the power to oversee what they want to oversee, and perhaps their oversight Committees have not been as active as they might have been, or as aggressive. That is easily corrected.

I can visualize some situations when a Congressman would not want to know some of the things that the Agency is doing.

MR. BELIN: We also discussed this morning your concern about leaks from people who have worked within the Agency and then have left the Agency.

Do you have any comments about that?

MR. GRAY: Yes, I do. I feel very strongly that the Congress should be encouraged to enact legislation which would give the Agency at least the same protection that the IRS has or the Agricultural Department has.

Now, it does not even have the protection of its information that the Internal Revenue Service has, and this to me is just nonsense. I believe in the right of privacy. I am for keeping the Internal Revenue records private. But I am not for telling the whole world about what is going on in the intelligence community. And right now there seems to be no way to stop this process, and it is not that one worries about so much having people know what the Agency is doing, but people's lives are being put in jeopardy, and people's lives are going to be lost as a result of some of these disclosures. The DCI is by statute charged with the protection of sources and methods of intelligence gathering. This absolutely destroys his statutory authority. He cannot protect sources and methods if anybody, any disgruntled former employee can write a book.

So without being specifically familiar, I think there is legislation pending, or I know Director Colby has proposed specific legislation to help alleviate this situation. I don't hope for, although I would welcome, an official Secrets Act such as we have in Britain, but then that is breaking down the old system, it's not working so well anymore, but I do believe that we ought to have some way to deter and punish those who deal lightly with the national security.

MR. BELIN: On the subject of the DCI, do you have any opinion of the problems that the DCI has as the Chief intelligence officer?

MR. GRAY: Yes. We have wrestled with this problem of leadership in the community. When I say we, I am speaking now not as a former Special Assistant, but if it is all right for me to speak as a member of the President's Board, how the community could be organized, and one of the problems has always been what I would describe as a constitutional problem. If X Agency has 60 percent of the dollars, and the head of Z Agency wants to or is told to give guidance and leadership, he simply cannot under our system give orders to a constitutional officer in another branch of government, specifically the Secretary of Defense. And at the same time, I feel there should be a chief intelligence officer of the Government. I think he must have the confidence of the President and a rapport with the President, and if he has that, his job is easier, and if he has to only persuade and request, but if your Committee is going to make recommendations about this, it seems to me that you might want to recommend that there be someone who is considered a chief intelligence officer, and that if you wish, it can be the DCI, or a new thought that we did not discuss this morning, there might be a special assistant to the President for intelligence affairs, and he could then represent the President across the board, and perhaps have greater success and leadership.

But I urge that you bear in mind the realities of the situation where one Agency simply cannot instruct another Agency under certain circumstances.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any opinion as to whether or not it is important to have an intelligence agency under civilian control?

MR. GRAY: Yes. I think it vitally important that it be under civilian control, and as a matter of fact, I would almost, I would almost think that would be axiomatic, although I think under the statute a military officer could be, and indeed, the first DCI I think, Hillenkoetter, Admiral Hillenkoetter, was indeed military. But I feel it should be under civilian control, and the issue we did not discuss this morning is one which I think this Commission must address itself to, and that is whether it is to be a careerist, or should it be an appointment of a citizen from private life.

Let me make the distinction clear. Richard Helms was a careerist, and John McCone was appointed from public life.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any opinion on that?

MR. GRAY: Yes. My own preference would be I think for a careerist, but if pressed now to name or give you some names of people in the Agency whom I would, and I think I know most of the top people, I would find it difficult to say to a President in good conscience, that I would recommend that you stick to a careerist. So that I have come down on a waffle there.

I have to say generally speaking I prefer a careerist, but in some cases I can see a very good intelligence officer who is not. I know, I happen to personally think that Allen Dulles was a fine intelligence officer. It was not his career, but he had been in it during the war, and successfully in it. He was more intelligence officer than administrator, but all in all, he served his country well in that post. But this is an issue which I don't really think there is any question about whether it be a civilian. The real question is whether you are going to have a policy or sort of play it by ear when the time comes to make a change.

MR. BELIN: Do you have an opinion concerning whether or not there should be amendments to the statutory charter of the Agency?

MR. GRAY: The statutory charter, as I understand it, and that was written before I came to Washington so I was not involved, but as I understand it, it was purposely written in somewhat vague terms to take care of situations that necessarily would be vague in and of themselves. I would see no objection to making it crystal clear, if people find it necessary, that the responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency are not in the domestic field, and do not involve domestic institutions or American citizens except insofar as the question of foreign intelligence activities becomes involved.

The trouble with trying to spell out the precise functions of the CIA and FBI, for example, this problem gets to be a very complicated one because there are a lot of grey areas, and to say that the CIA cannot have any personnel, and cannot be involved in this country, of course, is sort of silly. I am speaking now of not the intelligence analysis and publications, but I am talking about the acquisition of intelligence and counterintelligence and counterespionage. If you are too precise, then some matters are going to get lost between abroad and at home.

Now, there's got to be some way for the flow and transfer back and forth from the CIA and the FBI, so I would myself find it very difficult to see how the Congress could precisely define the functions of the Agency.

end 1a
begin 1b

But I would see no objection to making it clear that the American people need not fear that we are going to have a national police force under the name of the CIA, and this is what we are talking about, or the FBI, for that matter.

MR. BELIN: Did any members of the Commission have questions?

Yes, Mr. Connor.

MR. CONNOR: Mr. Gray, you were talking about the qualifications for the position of Director of Central Intelligence. Based on your experience, would you limit the term of the DCI to any fixed period of time?

MR. GRAY: I would not.

MR. CONNOR: You would leave it at the pleasure of the President who appoints the person and subsequent Presidents?

MR. GRAY: That's right.

MR. CONNOR: Going back to your earlier testimony about your experience as assistant to the President for security matters, do you think it is wise for the same person to occupy that position and Secretary of State?

MR. GRAY: No, sir.

MR. BELIN: Any particular reason why you feel that way?

MR. GRAY: Yes. I think that the Secretary of State, the responsibilities of the Secretary of State are very clear. I think the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense are very clear. I think the responsibilities of other executive agency heads are very clear. And I have a strong feeling that the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs should not be tied to any other agencies. I think he should be not a Secretary of Defense and a special assistant either. I think the special assistant should have his loyalty only to the President and not to any one department, and my own feeling is that the present situation creates some bottlenecks, administrative bottlenecks that should not exist.

MR. BELIN: Does that relate to your earlier testimony of actions by the Advisory Board perhaps not getting through to the President?

MR. GRAY: It relates in good measure to that. My own feeling is we have made recommendations to the President which have gone to the Special Assistant to the President, and then been bucked down to more junior people in the NSC staff, and which get to the President later or perhaps not at all. And my observation to you this morning, Mr. Belin, was that this Board is composed of big boys, and so if the President does not consider them big boys, he ought to get some big boys, and their studied conclusions should not be staffed out by junior people in the NSC staff.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: May I make a comment there?

The procedure which Gordon has just described is not limited to papers coming through NSC. This is a White House procedure established by President Nixon which involved all papers coming to the President, all of the staff work in this way, all of it was bucked down and staffed out so-called, in quotes, with the alternative recommendations, and it makes its way across the board so very little gets through to him without this staffing process.

So I think just to put it in perspective, this is a procedure which was developed by the Nixon Administration for staffing that involves all material.

MR. GRAY: I think it is fair to say, Mr. Vice President, that the fact remains that it does frustrate, I guess across the board, but it does frustrate.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That is right.

MR. GRAY: And we, the Board, or the staff on the Board, has had the unusual experience, at least on one occasion, of saying you sent this paper over to the President for his recommendations, and would you please write for us the response that the President ought to make to it. So it is somewhat discouraging.

Now, if I could volunteer a couple of things?

MR. BELIN: Please feel free to volunteer whatever you would like to for this Commission.

MR. GRAY: All right.

Let me say, Mr. Chairman, just a few observations. I wish we in this country, and I wish this Commission, perhaps, would worry more about the KGB and the GRU than the CIA. By God, I think that here they are operating in this country, we know they are operating freely here, and in New York there has been a recent incident when a Soviet agent was caught red-handed, and he was not declared personna non grata because of detente, and this worries the very -- this worries me very much. They are operating, and as far as they are concerned, the Cold War has not abated one bit, and the Cold War I describe is that war below the public, diplomatic talks.

Now, they have got hundreds of agents in this country, and I have indicated that my guess is that they have agents of influence, if not precise agents, up on Capitol Hill. I know this, almost know this to be the fact. They are operating freely in this country, and here our newspapers are trying to tear apart one basic, absolutely basic element of our national security and anything the Soviets do, it's fine. So that is from the heart.

I did want to say a couple of things, that I think if there is to be a Presidential Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, one of its principal functions has got to be for the President to seek to avoid subjective judgments in the intelligence community, and this is very difficult to do. I will give you three or four examples, if I may, or three examples. The Cuban missile crisis. You will recall that there was a Congressional election in progress. You will recall that we were getting all kinds of refugee reports. You will recall that Senator Keating was sounding, and was almost ridiculed by the Administration at the time, and then you will recall finally the U-2 flight which disclosed the existence of these missiles, and thereafter we had constant surveillance and knew about it.

Well, now, I have talked then, I have conducted a post mortem of that crisis, and in my judgment, the intelligence failure, or it almost was a failure, because another three or four days, and these missiles would have been camouflaged, and we might not have known about them, was the fact that nobody wanted to find those missiles there. They knew the President didn't want to find missiles. The last thing he wanted in this campaign -- this is no criticism of President Kennedy. No President would want to find Soviet Missiles in Cuba. So that the then DCI, the Director of Current Intelligence, whom later, he carried in his briefcase for three weeks a cable on an agent report from Cuba which turned out to be an accurate description of these missiles, and he was then personally briefing the President, and he said I was never sure enough. There were so many other reports, and we knew they were false, that the weight of my gut feeling fell on the side of new missiles. Well, this is a subjective judgment which was dictated in part by what people wanted to hear.

Now, the Chairman of this Commission will remember in recent years the Board had been able to get out of the national intelligence estimates of offensive military capabilities of the Soviet Union, language to the effect that by no stretch of the imagination, and I am paraphrasing, can the Soviet Union be a threat in this area for ten years, this type of statement. They used to have a statement that there is no way to conclude that the Soviets would ever take action against an American reconnaissance satellite. Well, we got that changed. These are subjective.

When the missiles, it was a question of MIRVing the missiles, the Agency was about the last place in the government to believe that the Soviets were MIRVing missiles, and for some reason they didn't want to find missiles being MIRVed. So somebody on behalf of the President has got to watch this business of subjective judgments, passed forward as unfinished intelligence.

I did want to say, and I am afraid I have not said it here, and if I have, I hope you will stop me, I talked twice this morning, and I can't remember about the innovative role that the PFIA has played in terms of its numbers or the board, and I guess I mentioned the U-2 reconnaissance and the satellites and etc., and the economic reports of the Government. That reminds me.

Now, finally, one thing that might be considered, and I have suggested this in the Board from time to time, but it has never gone very far, and I'm not sure about its wisdom myself, one solution, one action that might be taken in connection with the covert activities of the Agency would be to move them to a warehouse in Philadelphia, or a music store in Dallas or something and get them out of Washington so that they are not on the cocktail circuit, although in fairness, I think that the Agency personnel through the years have done very damn well in not leaking. But if there is to be a reorganization, one thing that might be considered would be to keep the completely overt activities, which comprise, as you know, the majority of the CIA functions, or involve a majority of their personnel, and move the covert stuff outside, and just get it out of the nation's capital. I would not eliminate it because I think it is necessary. But this is a consideration which perhaps may not have been presented.

MR. BELIN: Are there any other questions by members of the Commission?

MR. LEMNITZER: Under whose direction would this new function outside be?

MR. GRAY: I would leave it under the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Could I ask, Mr. Gray, whether when he analyzed some of the statements that the FIAB had corrected, that were misleading, that came from CIA to the President, whether he has ever given consideration of whether FIAB has ever investigated the possibility of double agents in CIA being responsible for misleading information?

MR. GRAY: You mean whether I feel that some of these things --

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Were intentionally done to mislead, or whether it was just caution?

MR. GRAY: I think the latter, Mr. Chairman. I think we would be very foolish to assume that the Agency has not been penetrated. I think it would be a foolish assumption. After all, they are the number one target for the Soviet Union. But my guess is that they have not penetrated at the top among the people who actually have been writing these estimates.

Are you asking for my opinion? That is my opinion. But I think you would be making a mistake to assume that the great preoccupation of Mr. Angleton, who left the Agency, about penetration of the Agency, his preoccupation I think was not misplaced. It is entirely possible that we are penetrated.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Gray.

MR. MARVIN GRAY: Mr. Gray, I have one or two questions on the Dominican Republic, and the U.S. relations there in 1960. I believe the government from during 1960, moved from a large degree a policy of non-intervention, to a more active role of trying to topple the Trujillo regime. And in May of 1960, Ambassador Farland returned to Washington for consultation and reported that among the dissidents with whom he had contacts, that they reportedly wanted support, and one of the things that they needed was high powered rifles with telescopic scopes. Subsequently he was given clearance, or subsequently, I'm sorry, the Director of Central Intelligence was authorized by the Assistant Secretary of State to provide that assistance.

Did you know anything about that, do you recall any discussions of providing rifles to internal dissidents?

MR. GRAY: Was this in '60 or '61?

MR. MARVIN GRAY: 1960, sir, May and June of 1960.

MR. GRAY: I recall there was concern in this government about developments in the Dominican Republic. To the best of my recollection, I did not know about the military equipment that you were speaking of.

MR. MARVIN GRAY: At the very end of the Eisenhower Administration, November 29th, January 12th, the matter of the Dominican Republic was taken up at the Special Group and discussions were had to work with the internal dissidents and exiles, and also to furnish arms to the internal dissidents?

Do you recall those meetings particularly?

MR. GRAY: I don't recall those meetings particularly, but if you say that the Special Group did indeed do this, I will not say it didn't. I just don't remember this specific instance.

MR. MARVIN GRAY: If you can recall, who would it have been, or if you can speculate any, would it have been your understanding that such arms which were furnished were for the purposes of an internal uprising and something of that nature and not specifically for doing away with the leadership?

MR. GRAY: Well, as far as I am concerned, I would be shocked to be reminded of anything that had to do with doing away with the leadership. No, I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assassination, or that kind of activity.

MR. MARVIN GRAY: Thank you.

MR. BELIN: Any other comments that you want to make to the Commission, sir?

MR. GRAY: No. You have been very patient, and I am afraid that I have been somewhat longwinded.

MR. BELIN: You were patient to wait, and we are sorry you had to wait so long.

Any other questions by the Commission?

Thank you, sir.

MR. GRAY: Right.

(Whereupon, at 1:12 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed to reconvene at 2:30 o'clock the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(3:50 p.m.)

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: If you will raise your right hand, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. BISSELL: I do.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: We appreciate your coming.

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.

MR. BISSELL: I am glad to be of any help I can.

MR. BELIN: Do you want to state your name before the Commission?

MR. BISSELL: Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

MR. BELIN: And Mr. Bissell, what is your educational background?

MR. BISSELL: Yale undergraduate education, and later a Yale Ph.D. in economics, and a year at the London School of Economics.

MR. BELIN: And you got your Ph.D. in 1939?

MR. BISSELL: I think it was '39, yes.

MR. BELIN: And then during World War II were you here in Washington?

MR. BISSELL: I was. I was in the War Shipping Administration, and later at the end of the war, in the Office of War Mobilization and reconversion.

MR. BELIN: And after World War II, then what did you

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT,

the testimony of Richard Bissell, former Deputy Director for Plans, CIA, before the Rockefeller Commission, 21 APR 75 (pp 2295-2351)

18 Aug 94

do?

MR. BISSELL: I returned to MIT where I was then a member of the faculty for about two years. Then I came to Washington as Chief of Staff of something called the Harriman Committee, which was one of the planning committees for the Marshall Plan, and I then was recruited by Paul Hoffman to serve in the ECA from almost the beginning of the Marshall Plan, and did serve for three years, and then became Deputy Director of the ECA, and finally Acting Director. After that, two years in the Ford Foundation organization, but I still had my office here, and then I think it was in 1954, but I am a little vague, a year plus or minus on dates, to the Central Intelligence Agency.

MR. BELIN: And who asked you to come to the Central Intelligence Agency?

MR. BISSELL: Allen Dulles.

MR. BELIN: When he asked you to come to the CIA, in what capacity did you come?

MR. BISSELL: I had the title of Assistant to the Director oh, for about five years, as a matter of fact.

MR. BELIN: And then what?

MR. BISSELL: Then I became the Deputy Director of Plans, in I think the fall of or toward the end of '58, or the very beginning of '59.

MR. BELIN: And how long did you stay with the Agency?

MR. BISSELL: Until February of 1962, if memory serves.

MR. BELIN: And after leaving the Agency, then what did you do?

MR. BISSELL: I joined the staff of United Aircraft Corporation in East Hartford, where I had a very unrevealing title of Director of Marketing and Economic Planning. It really was a corporate planning responsibility.

MR. BELIN: Wasn't that 1964?

MR. BISSELL: Yes.

MR. BELIN: Before that you worked for the Institute of --

MR. BISSELL: Yes. I'm sorry. I skipped over two years as President of the Institute for Defense Analysis. It is to that that I moved directly from the CIA.

MR. BELIN: And you retired from the United Aircraft in 1974?

MR. BISSELL: That's correct.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Bissell, during the time that you were with the Agency, did you ever have any discussions with anyone in the White House concerning the planning of what was called an Executive Action Capability, which was defined in substance as a capability of the Agency carrying out assassinations, if required?

MR. BISSELL: My recollection of this is far from clear. But I am satisfied that very early in the Kennedy Administration I did participate in such conversations.

MR. BELIN: And do you have any recollection of with whom you might have participated?

MR. BISSELL: I am almost certain it was either Walt Rostow or McGeorge Bundy, or probably the former, and possibly both.

MR. BELIN: Do you remember specifically what, if anything, was discussed in any of those conversations?

MR. BISSELL: My recollection, which isn't too specific, is that this was a discussion of the desirability of developing such a capability within the CIA that presumably would be a small, special unit, and highly compartmented from the rest of the organization.

MR. BELIN: Did you have any feeling as to whether or not this was done with or without the knowledge or consent of the President?

MR. BISSELL: I had no specific feeling on that point, but I had a great deal of confidence that the two gentlemen whose names I have mentioned, would not have discussed this, discussed with me or encouraged any course of action that they were not confident the President would approve.

MR. BELIN: Did you ever have any such discussions with any official in the Eisenhower Administration?

MR. BISSELL: Not to my recollection, and I think I am almost sure that I did not.

MR. BELIN: Now, apart from discussions of an executive action capability, did you ever or were you ever aware of any development of plans inside of the Agency with a specific plan or goal of the assassination of any particular foreign leader?

MR. BISSELL: Yes, I was aware of investigation and planning to that end.

MR. BELIN: Will you please enumerate before the Commission which foreign leader or leaders were involved?

MR. BISSELL: There were three cases I remember. One of them would have involved Sukarno, the second would have involved Lumumba, and the third did involve Castro. I am not giving that order chronologically, I don't remember what the chronology was, but those are the three cases I remember.

MR. BELIN: Could you please state for the Commission your entire knowledge with regard to the Sukarno matter?

MR. BISSELL: There was planning of such a possibility. I believe this was initiated in the Far Eastern Division of the CIA. The planning progressed as far as the identification of an asset whom it was felt might be recruited for this purpose. The plan was never reached, was never perfected to the point where it seemed feasible. The difficulty concerned the possibility of creating a situation in which the potential agent would have access to the target, and because the plan never reached that stage, it was never, so far as I am aware, discussed outside of the Agency with a view to obtaining approval or authorization.

MR. BELIN: So far as your concern with the Agency, this would have required such approval or authorization before they would have undertaken such a plan?

MR. BISSELL: They would.

MR. BELIN: Does that relate not just to Sukarno, but with any other target?

MR. BISSELL: That is correct.

MR. BELIN: Now, what about Lumumba?

MR. BISSELL: The Lumumba case planning began, was initiated within the Agency, and in that case, on my initiative, a case officer was directed to look into the possibilities. He reported back in a matter of weeks and convinced me that this was probably unfeasible, and probably an undesirable course of action, and he recommended instead that a quite different kind of operation, somewhat larger in scale, be attempted for the purpose of discrediting Lumumba and undermining his authority.

MR. BELIN: To the best of your knowledge, did the Agency in any manner whatsoever, have anything to do with the death of Sukarno?

MR. BISSELL: Absolutely nothing.

MR. BELIN: Did the Agency have anything whatsoever to do with the death of Lumumba?

MR. BISSELL: Nothing.

MR. BELIN: All right, now, you said there was a third.

MR. BISSELL: The Castro case.

MR. BELIN: All right.

Could you tell the Commission the background of the Castro case?

First, before you answer that, I will ask you the same question about Lumumba that I asked you with regard to Sukarno. Would there have been any operational plan put into effect without approval from the White House on that kind of a situation?

MR. BISSELL: No, there would not.

MR. BELIN: All right.

Now, let's turn to Castro.

Could you tell the Commission about the Castro situation?

MR. BISSELL: I became aware, and the timing of this I believe was the very beginning of 1961, of the possibility that an assassination attempt might be planned using Mafia resources, or syndicate resources. My very uncertain recollection is that I first heard of this possibility from Shef Edwards, who I think has testified here.

MR. BELIN: He has been interviewed by me.

MR. BISSELL: I see.

MR. BELIN: And for the record, he was the head of the Office of Security?

MR. BISSELL: That's correct.

MR. BELIN: During this period of time in the Agency, is that correct?

MR. BISSELL: That is correct. You should, the Commission should also understand that this would have been a very different kind of an operation than anything that the Agency normally undertook in that it would not have been carried out through DDP; that is, Agency operational channels, or through any case officer in the clandestine service. The possibility that seemed to exist was that through several intermediaries, the Office of Security or the Director of Security could be, and indeed, was in touch with individuals in Las Vegas, who claimed they could make such an attempt using their own personnel. This possibility was discussed by me, again I think probably with Walt Rostow. It may possibly have been discussed directly with McGeorge Bundy, but I suspect that it was through Rostow who was then Bundy's assistant and on his staff. My impression, but again I must emphasize that this is an uncertain impression, is that I was encouraged to go ahead with the investigation and planning of this operation, and by investigation I mean simply to find out what would be involved to make some assessment of the likelihood of success, and other aspects of the matter.

Under the circumstances, this had to be and was the responsibility of Shef Edwards.

end 3b

Tape 4
begin cb

MR. BELIN: Again, I will ask with regard to this aspect of your testimony the same question I asked you concerning the executive action capabilities. Did you have an opinion as to whether or not what you refer to as this encouragement had any authorization from the President or that the President in any manner knew about this?

MR. BISSELL: I had no direct reason to believe that he did, but I will make the same answer, that I had a high degree of confidence that the gentlemen I was talking to in the White House, whom I have identified, would not have given such encouragement unless they were confident that it would meet with the President's approval.

MR. BELIN: Did you ever have any discussions with anyone in the Eisenhower Administration concerning any possible plan to assassinate Castro?

MR. BISSELL: I have no clear recollection of such a discussion, but there could have been.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any recollection, if it could have been, with whom that discussion might have taken place?

MR. BISSELL: I would suppose that it would have been with Gordon Gray.

MR. BELIN: If it occurred?

MR. BISSELL: If it occurred, but the balance of my recollection is that it did not occur.

MR. BELIN: Do you know whether or not during the last few months of 1960, which would have been in the Eisenhower Administration, any plans were developed within the Technical Services Branch of the Agency to develop any kind of poison pills that might be used to assassinate Castro?

MR. BISSELL: I very much doubt if any such development was attempted with this or any other specific operation in view, but the Agency did have and does have an on-going R&D program, and I am quite certain that products of this sort were among those that it had available.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any other recollections concerning the Castro matter at this time?

MR. BISSELL: I am vague as to the final outcome of that attempt. I do not recollect, I have no recollection of a specific authorization that it should go forward. I believe, however, that we probably did move to be in a position to carry it out, or to authorize it if authorization were received. One of the reasons were, I believe that my own recollection of the final stages of that plan is vague is that, as I have already explained, what it contemplated was furnishing probably, furnishing probably some money and such items as pills or other devices through a number of cut-outs or intermediaries to a group which we ourselves, of course, did not in any direct sense control. This was not an operation of such a character that the communications would run through Agency channels, or that authorization on the spot would be by Agency personnel, or that the Agency could precisely and tightly control it.

MR. BELIN: Did you ever call Mr. William Harvey, who was a CIA man to eventually take over this operation within the latter part of '61 or early '62?

MR. BISSELL: Now, I did ask Mr. Harvey to take over a part of our reviving efforts against Castro and the Castro Administration. I probably urged him to look into this plan that was by that -- that had been active or that had been the subject of active attention nearly a year before. I have no recollection of authorizing him to revive it, except to look at it as a plan, or to proceed with any action along those lines.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any personal recollection as to whether or not the pills or pills of any kind, poison pills were ever delivered into Cuba?

MR. BISSELL: I do not have any recollection of that.

MR. BELIN: One way or the other?

MR. BISSELL: One way or the other.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any recollection on any other facts relating to this matter?

MR. BISSELL: I don't believe so.

MR. BELIN: Now, I want to turn to the question of Trujillo. Do you want to take over the questioning on Trujillo, Mr. Gray.

MR. GRAY: Yes, if it's all right.

MR. CONNOR: Well, will we be coming back to the Castro matter?

MR. BELIN: Before we go to Trujillo, let's stop with Castro right now and find out if the commissioners have any questions.

MR. CONNOR: Well, I would have a question. At the time you had these discussions with either Mr. Walt Rostow or McGeorge Bundy or both, as you recall them, to whom in the Agency did you report?

MR. BISSELL: Allen Dulles, and well, or Mr. Cabell his Deputy.

MR. BELIN: And did you ever have any discussions with them about this matter before you talked to the Director of Security?

MR. BISSELL: Well, as I have already testified my impression is that the first time I heard about this was in my first conversation at least with the Director of Security, so that would have preceded any conversation with the Director. And my own belief is that matters took that cause I believe the original approach was made to the Agency, that this was not a matter of the Agency seeking out the individuals with whom subsequently messages were exchanged.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: You mean approached by the White House?

MR. BISSELL: No, approached by the syndicate interests, that they had their own very strong motivations for carrying out this.

MR. KIRKLAND: What was their price if they would cooperate?

MR. BISSELL: Well, they had, as I say, very strong motivations on their own. You remember that Castro had fairly recently come to power. They had been powerful under Batista in Cuba, and they had a very lucrative set of interests for the syndicates, and they had been in effect been thrown out. There was still, of course, reasonably free travel, and so they had the strongest sort of reasons for anti-Castro sentiment on their own.

MR. KIRKLAND: But did they want any specific quid pro quo from the Agency?

MR. BISSELL: I'm sure they wanted some money as well as technical help, but I don't remember exactly what.

MR. CONNOR: Well, after you did learn about this from the CIA Director of Security, and then had some White House discussion, did you thereafter have any discussions about it with Mr. Dulles or his deputy?

MR. BISSELL: Yes, I am sure I did with Allen Dulles, simply that he should be aware that the planning was going forward. As a matter of fact, I believe the Director of Security had talked to Allen before I did on the matter.

MR. CONNOR: So that the subsequent activity and planning was with his, at least his tacet understanding?

MR. BISSELL: Correct.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Through previous testimony I got the impression that there were two attempts, one through this syndicate, and then another one directly through agents.

MR. BELIN: I think that the record basically is that in the first stage it was through the syndicate, and that in the second stage basically they used Cubian exiles but CIA agents, but the exiles who were being used were not necessarily CIA agents at the time so far as regular,full-time employees of the Agency.

MR. BISSELL: I don't have a recollection of that second one.

MR. GRAY: You left the Agency when, sir?

MR. BISSELL: In February of 1962.

MR. KIRKLAND: During this time that you were interested or this operation was under consideration, no one in a position of authority ever said flatly no, kill it?

MR. BISSELL: To the best of my knowledge, that is correct.

MR. CONNOR: Did you ever discuss with the Attorney General,Robert Kennedy?

MR. BISSELL: I have no recollection of discussing it with him.

MR. BELIN: But you do have a recollection of discussing it with Allen Dulles?

MR. BISSELL: Yes.

MR. BELIN: If the records were to show, or if Mr. Edwards were to say that rather than he contacting you that you contacted him concerning the Mafia, would you say that they are wrong, or would you say that perhaps your recollection is wrong?

BISSELL: Well, it is possible that my recollection is wrong, but I will -- I think I will stand on that as my recollection and it may be that Edwards and I simply have inconsistent recollections. But I seem to remember rather clearly that it was from him that I first learned of the possibility of this operation, and that he came to see me for this purpose rather than my sending for him. Now, could I just say that I had several conversations with Shef Edwards on this matter and it is very possible that I, that in a subsequent conversation I did take the initiative and send for and discuss it with him. But there may be an inconsistency here.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Was there ever any question raised as to whether this violated any of the domestic statutes limiting CIA's activities within the United States?

MR. BISSELL: That question was never raised to my knowledge.

MR. BELIN: Are there any other questions by members of the Commission?

Mr. CORBIN: May I ask a question? You said that you did not discuss it with Attorney General Kennedy. So far as you know, did you have any information or believe that he was ever aware of the proposed plans here?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember any conversations or incident that would have constituted evidence to me that he was aware, but I would not have been in the least surprised if he were. He could have been aware from Bundy or Rostow and conceivably in other ways. If the President knew of this, then I think it highly likely that the Attorney General did, because the President was in the habit of talking over matters of concern to him with the Attorney General.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Do you remember any letter from the Attorney General saying that all activities of this character relating assassination of Castro should stop?

MR. BISSELL: No, I do not remember that, Mr. Chairman.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That was alleged by some of his associates in the press?

MR. BISSELL: No.

MR. WALLISON: Mr. Bissell, after the assassination of President Kennedy in November of '63 you were no longer with the Agency I understand?

MR. BISSELL: That is correct.

MR. WALLISON: But knowing what you do about the events here concerning Castro, at least the planning, did you

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

relevant to the Warren Commission's inquiry?

MR. BISSELL: I really did not, no.

MR. WALLISON: And you had no discussions with anyone who is also involved in this matter about that?

MR. BISSELL: None.

MR. BELIN: Any other questions by members of the Commission concerning the Castro situation?

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Yes. Was there evidence to your knowledge that Castro was aware of this attempt or became aware of it?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember any evidence to that effect. I don't think that the actual attempt was ever made, although it is physically possible that the devices to be used, the poison pills did reach Cuba and it is perfectly possible that with some time lag Castro would have come on some evidence of this operation. But I don't remember ever seeing any report to that effect.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: The operation wasn't under your direct management?

MR. BISSELL: Not really, indirectly, but not directly. Within the Agency the key individual was Shef Edwards, yes.

MR. KIRKLAND: Were there efforts during the period following the Bay of Pigs to land agents on the island?

MR. BISSELL: Excuse me, sir?

MR. KIRKLAND: Were there efforts post-Bay of Pigs to land agents on the island?

MR. BISSELL: Well, there were none for a while, and I don't know, I would assume that such efforts have been made since then. But I think for a good many months after that it was not, would not have been easy to recruit agents, and also there was absolutely no internal underground or resistance that could give any infiltrated agent support. So my guess is that no such efforts were made for at least a year or more.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Bissell, you were in charge in a sense of the Bay of Pigs operation with the Agency, were you not?

MR. BISSELL: I was.

MR. BELIN: Could this have been part of an overall Bay of Pigs operation as opposed from in any way being a direction from the White House? In other words, could this have been something that the Agency just developed internally as its overall Bay of Pigs operation?

MR. BISSELL: I don't think this -- well, in fact I am quite clear that this was not developed in that, this plan was not developed in that way. I don't think it was even known to many if any of the individuals within the Agency that were concerned with the planning and preparation for the Bay of Pigs.

MR. KIRKLAND: Mr. Edwards was not involved in the Bay of Pigs?

MR. BISSELL: No, he was not.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

MR. CORBIN: I believe you testified that you discussed the establishment of the executive action capability with either Mr. Bundy or Mr. Rostow. Did I understand that correctly?

MR. BISSELL: Correct.

MR. CORBIN: Who was it that first raised this subject, as you recall it?

MR. BISSELL: I can't -- I have no recollection of who first raised it. My belief is that this would have come up as a subject very probably in conversations between myself and Mr. Rostow, and the reason I give that as my belief is that I had on a number of occasions discussed with Mr. Rostow the various kinds, various kinds of capabilities, and especially unconventional ones that the Agency should or might develop. At a somewhat later stage, for instance, he asked me and I asked for a small interdepartmental group to examine the ways of improving our military capabilities, and his thinking ran along the lines of developing these tools of action. And I think, therefore, that it is very probable that this came up in conversations with him, but which one of us would have coined the phrase, for instance, I don't know.

MR. CORBIN: So far as you recall it, were there any plans for such a capability being developed at the Agency when you had your first conversation with him?

MR. BISSELL: Oh, I'm reasonably certain the answer is negative to that.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

MR. KIRKLAND: There was no such capability in the Agency prior to that?

MR. BISSELL: There was no separated organization, identified capability of that sort.

MR. BELIN: Did you have any discussions with any people in the White House during either the Eisenhower Administration or the Kennedy Administration to the effect of why can't you do something about Castro?

MR. BISSELL: Well, it's possible. I don't remember a specific case, if there were any. When you asked earlier if there had been any discussions of this during the Eisenhower Administration, the reason I said that there could have been was just that sort of remark might easily have been made in a meeting. You know, couldn't you, is there any way that you could remove Castro and do something much simpler than the Bay of Pigs operation, that sort of remark could have been made in, for instance, a meeting of the Special Group. I don't happen to remember such remark having been made in the Eisenhower Administration.

MR. BELIN: Would President Eisenhower himself have made such a remark, or was he not a member of it?

MR. BISSELL: He did not attend the Special Groups.

MR. CONNOR: This small group that was formed by Mr. Edwards after your discussions, how many people were involved within the Agency?

MR. BISSELL: Well, I don't know that he formed a group. I think he conducted probably with the help of one other man in the Security Office such communications as there were.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Olsen I think has several additional questions in this area.

MR. OLSEN: Howard Hunt has stated in several of his writings that in connection with his work in preparation for the Bay of Pigs he recommended an assassination of Premier Castro be undertaken either to precede or to be contemporaneous with the Bay of Pigs operation. Now, Mr. Hunt was working under your direction?

MR. BISSELL: Right.

MR. OLSEN: At that time, was he not ?

MR. BISSELL: Yes, he was.

MR. OLSEN: Did such a recommendation from E. Howard Hunt ever come to your attention?

MR. BISSELL: I wouldn't be at all surprised. I don't have a specific recollection. It is the kind of thing he could have said in a meeting orally and I don't remember any written proposal to that effect originating from Headquarters.

MR. OLSEN: Is it your testimony that you have absolutely no recollection of an oral recommendation from Mr. Hunt to that effect?

MR. BISSELL: I don't have any specific recollection, but that doesn't mean that it couldn't have happened.

MR. OLSEN: Do you have a general impression that it happened?

MR. BISSELL: I would suspect that he is telling the truth when he said that he made this recommendation. Whether he would have made it in my presence or to me, or to Colonel King or others, I don't know.

MR. OLSEN: Mr. Bissell, there has also been testimony that has been taken by the staff of the Commission to the effect that a Bernard Barker, a contract agent of the CIA, or employee of the CIA, I believe it was at that time made contact with the person acting in the Cubian community down in the Miami area and asked him about this time whether he would be willing to undertake an assassination. Do you have any knowledge of that?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember that.

MR. OLSEN: Were you aware, Mr. Bissell, in the period 1961 early 1962 of there being a great deal of talk among Cuban exiles in this country of desire to kill Fidel Castro?

MR. BISSELL: Again, I have to say I have no specific recollection of reading newspaper stories to this effect, or hearing reports through CIA channels but it seems to me highly likely, given the nature of the situation, that there would have been talk of that sort.

MR. OLSEN: A great many of the Cuban exiles in Florida in particular and elsewhere in the southern part of the

United States at that time were being in effect utilized through front organizations that were being sponsored by the Agency, were they not?

MR. BISSELL: Uh-huh. I think that is true. Yes.

MR. KIRKLAND: Was there discussion of targets there confined to Fidel Castro, or would it include Guevara and others?

MR. BISSELL: Exclusively Castro.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Were not most of those Cuban organizations penetrated by Castro representatives?

MR. BISSELL: They were, indeed.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: So that it would be very easy for double agents to report back to Castro what was going on?

MR. BISSELL: That's right. Exactly. I think our judgment at the time, as a matter of intelligence, and I am now talking about after the Bay of Pigs operation in particular, but the same applies, by the way, to most of the preparation, I think our belief was that Castro was extremely well informed on what was going on. I don't think that he penetrated, so far as we knew, parts of that preparatory activity that were under the Agency's direct control, but all of the exile groups in Miami, including the political groups that we attempted to form and did form as front organizations, I'm quite sure he knew what was going on.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Did CIA know, have any information to the effect that Oswald was trying to penetrate some of those groups?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember that, Mr. Chairman.

MR. CONNOR: Did it ever come to your attention in any way that Oswald have any interest in the Cubian situation or was associated with it in any way?

MR. BISSELL: Never. I don't ever remember hearing any association, in anything that associated him with that.

MR. KIRKLAND: You mean prior to the assassination?

MR. BISSELL: Prior to the assassination.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Did Bill Pauli work for you during that period?

MR. BISSELL: Well, yes, in a sense. I mean, he served as a messenger, but for the most part that was in the final days of the Batista regime and he was used in an effort to persuade Batista to leave the country.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Olsen?

MR. OLSEN: After the assassination of President Kennedy, when it became well known that Lee Harvey Oswald had been active in attempting to penetrate anti-Castro groups, and had engaged in kind of a one-man operation for the Fair Plan For Cuba Committee, did it not occur to you, Mr. Bissell, that there might have been some relationship between the assassination of President Kennedy, in attitude, at least, that Oswald might have developed in connection with his Cuban contacts in New Orleans?

MR. BISSELL: Well, I think I can honestly say it didn't particularly occur to me at that time. I read the usual newspaper accounts of the assassination, but it wasn't until a good deal later that these facts about Oswald surfaced and I will honestly say that really didn't occur to me, that there was a connection.

MR. BELIN: Any other questions by the Commissioners on this particular area?

Now let's turn to the question of Trujillo, and I am going to ask Mr.Gray to interrogate you in that area.

MR. GRAY: Mr. Bissell, we have gone over the circumstances surrounding the death of Trujillo just before you testified, is that correct?

MR. BISSELL: Correct.

MR. GRAY: Incidentally, in the 13 years or so since you left the Agency, have you had occasion to review the documents dealing with that?

MR. BISSELL: I have not, no.

MR. GRAY: Now, in early 1960 the records I reviewed indicate that the government was maintaining a policy of non-intervention toward the Trujillo regime, and that in the early months of that year Ambassador Farland, who was then our Ambassador in the Dominican Republic, suggested that that policy be changed. Do you recall Ambassador Farland?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember whether I ever met him personally, but I do have some recollection of this recommendation of his.

MR. GRAY: And do you recall anything about his background?

MR. BISSELL: He had been I believe in the FBI at one time and he had an intense interest in intelligence matters and I think he had worked very closely with the CIA station, Chief of Station in the Dominican Republic.

MR. GRAY: Incidentally, was that station declared to the Dominican Government?

MR. BISSELL: I believe it was.

MR. GRAY: That would mean that the government, even though the people were under cover, would know who they were and what they were?

MR. BISSELL: At least who some of them were.

MR. GRAY: Now, the records reflect that when Mr. Farland returned to Washington for consultations in May of 1960 he stated that he had been in contact with some internal dissidents in the Dominican Republic, that they needed support from the United States, and in particular that they needed a number of high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes, and the Agency records reflect in conversations at the Agency he further went on to say that the Dominicans planned to remove Trujillo from the scene through use of some sort of explosive device. Do you recall conversations along these lines?

MR. BISSELL: My recollection is that on the occasion of this visit of his to Washingon he did urge that some military or equipment or guns or other devices be made available to the internal dissidents. I have a dim recollection that this was to include one or more rifles with telescopic sights. I wouldn't have remembered the number unless you had mentioned it from the records.

MR. GRAY: The records also reflect that at the end of June or the beginning of July you approved of the furnishing of such rifles to the Dominican dissidents on the basis of a memorandum from Colonel King, who was then Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, stating he had received authorization from Mr. Rubottom, who was then Assistant Secretary of State. Do you recall such approval?

MR. BISSELL: This is all consistent with my recollection.

MR. GRAY: Would you yourself be involved in any negotiations with the Department of State as a normal matter?

MR. BISSELL: As a normal matter I would not have been involved with meetings at the Assistant Secretary of State level. I would have been involved if and when this matter was discussed in the Special Group.

MR. GRAY: And do you recall, do you have any recollectio of whether or not you were involved in any discussions involving the furnishing of these rifles?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember that.

MR. GRAY: Now, the records pretty much petered out at this point. They don't show that either this plan was killed or that the rifles were actually sent. It could not be developed whether they were or not. Do you have any recollection why that change of course might have taken place?

MR. BISSELL: None whatsoever.

MR. GRAY: At the beginning of '60 and '61 you presented a proposal to the Special Group to work with the internal dissidents, and at the same time work with exile groups for paramilitary capability and things of that sort, am I correct?

MR. BISSELL: Correct.

MR. GRAY: At the January 12, 1961 meeting, at the instance of Department of State, the Special Group, which approved these covert operations, approved the provisions to the Dominican internal dissidents of limited supplies of small arms and some explosive devices, some explosives, I believe, do you have any recollection on that ?

MR. BISSELL: Such as it is, it would confirm what you state.

MR. GRAY: In your opinion, when they approved the provision of small arms, were they talking about assassination weapons, or were they talking about guerrilla supplies and things of that nature?

MR. BISSELL: I would have said definitely the latter. However, I think it was the understanding of everybody in Washington that if you provided weapons to internal dissidents, and especially in fairly small numbers, and were contemplating truly guerrilla-like activities as distinguished from something on the scale of the Bay of Pigs, that these might well include assassination attempts. But the concept that I seem to remember was that this was a plan for, in effect, the logistic support of the internal dissidents, and it did not contemplate that the Agency or the Station would be planning specific operations for them to carry out.

MR. GRAY: So, it would be their operations and the Agency furnishing of the equipment?

MR. BISSELL: Right.

MR. GRAY: And you draw a distinction there, do you?

MR. BISSELL: I do partly because in situations like that the Agency really has very little effective control over the group that is supported once the support has been granted.

MR. GRAY: And with respect to the explosives which were authorized, the Agency had been in contact with these internal dissidents and was aware that they did plan to use a bomb to kill Trujillo?

MR. BISSELL: I imagine that's the case, yes. I don't specifically remember.

MR. GRAY: And you then, if you don't recall of your own state of mind, do you have any recollection as to whether other members of the Special Group knew what the purpose of the explosives might be?

MR. BISSELL: I believe that they would have, yes.

MR. GRAY: You think they would have?

MR. BISSELL: I think they would have, yeah.

MR. GRAY: Now, the dissidents had difficulty coming up with a workable -- oh, very important, the Special Group attach the condition that these weapons and explosives be delivered to the representatives of the dissidents outside of the Dominican Republic, is that correct?

MR. BISSELL: Correct.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Did this get the approval of the White House?

MR. GRAY: The records that I have reviewed show it was approved by the Special Group. There was --

MR. BISSELL: There was also a White House Representative on the Speical Group.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: And you said earlier that any assassination or assassination attempt would have to have the highest approval?

MR. BISSELL: That's correct.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: From the President?

MR. BISSELL: That is correct.

MR. GRAY: Would include this sort of instance of furnishing material to people knowing what they are going to use it for, but where the Agency itself is not directing the operation?

MR. BISSELL: Well, let me answer that question this way: this clearly required and received the Special Group approval. The procedure always in the Special Group was that the White House Representative was presumed to inform the President of whatever was brought up in that Group that in his opinion should be brought to the President's attention. And furthermore, it was presumed to obtain presidential assent to action in those cases where he believed the presidential, personal assent of the President was called for.

MR.CONNOR: And who was the White House Representative sitting on the Special Group at that time?

MR. BISSELL: Gordon Gray. And frequently, given that procedure, it was frequently the case that a proposal would be made at one meeting of the Special Group, it would be discussed but no action taken until the next meeting, in part to provide this opportunity for the White House Representative to consult with the President to the extent he believed necessary.

MR. GRAY: Now, the dissidents were never able to develop a capability to receive these goods, nor did they ever provide any persons to be trained in the techniques of explosives and detonators and so forth?

MR. BISSELL: (Witness nodded in the affirmative.)

MR. GRAY: In March the station cabled the request of Mr. Dearborn, who was then Counsel General, that Trujillo's relations having been severed, cabled his request for three .38 police specials to be turned over to the dissidents as a show of good faith and materal support. Now, do you recall a discussion of the pistols and sending pistols by pouch and so forth?

MR. BISSELL: Yes. I think I do remember that discussion, and for that purpose you have identified.

MR. GRAY: The record also reflects that on the first couple of occasions such requests were made by the station the Agency refused them stating that it was inconsistent with the limitations imposed by the Special Group. The last request was not responded to for a period of some week, approximately a week, following which you approved it. It appears there was a meeting in the State Department between some State Department officials and Agency officials and the State Department memorandum of that meeting is not in their files. Based on that statement of documents, would you say whether or not you think there would have been State Department approval of pouching those pistols?

MR. BISSELL: I think there almost certainly would have been State Department approval, because there had been a specific prohibition imposed by the Special Group, and the Agency would not on its own authority have considered it possible to violate that prohibition unless and until there had been consultation with the State Department and concurrence by the State Department.

MR. GRAY: Would such consultation normally have been at your level or on Colonel Kings?

MR. BISSELL: I think probably Colonel Kings.

MR. GRAY: Assuming the State Department agreed to waive the Special Group restrictions,and the Agency felt this was appropriate, would you have felt it necessary to go back to the Special Group in any formal fashion?

MR. BISSELL: I think probably not, but I think the Special Group members would have been informed of this action at the next meeting.

MR. GRAY: As I stated, the record reflects that the pistols were sent to the Dominican Republic and were passed to the dissidents.

MR. BELIN: When, Mr. Gray, does the record reflect that?

MR. GRAY: I believe it was March 25th. I don't have my notes with me.

MR. BELIN: Of what year?

MR. GRAY: 1961.

MR. BELIN: When does the record reflect the rifles were shipped?

MR. GRAY: The Springfield rifles, the ones that

Ambassador Farland talked about?

MR. BELIN: The first rifles that went down.

MR. GRAY: As near as I can tell on the rifles that I spoke about earlier, they never went to the Dominican Republic.

MR. BELIN: In other words, the early rifles that were talked about never were shipped, is that correct, according to the records?

MR. GRAY: The records no longer discuss the matter once approval to ship them was given. There is no transmission, no further reference to receipt of them, nothing of that sort.

MR. BELIN: All right, go ahead.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: I would like to ask Mr. Bissell whether there was any question of violations of statutes by sending these weapons to a group through the use of the pouch, diplomatic pouch in relation to either a direct assassination attempt, or implied or possible?

MR. BISSELL: Well, I am not aware of any. In any case, I think that consideration did not arise at the time, and it obviously didn't arise in the minds of the State Department or the Special Group members or the Agency.

MR. GRAY: Now, following the shipment of the pistols, the station cabled back that they had discovered in the Consulate three Carbines that had been left behind by departing

Naval personnel and requested authority to pass those. Again, Headquarters delayed, and again there was a meeting with the State Department. There is a memorandum of this meeting and it doesn't reflect this subject came up, but the same day your Deputy, Mr. Barnes, approved the passage of the Carbines. Would you say that this would --

MR. BISSELL: I think almost certainly that the State Department would have been consulted.

MR. GRAY: Now, following this the station and the Consul requested,the Consul requested some more or relayed the request to the dissidents for some so-called grease guns, M-3 submachines, and three or four such weapons were pouched to the Dominican Republic. But with the Bay of Pigs and unsettled conditions in the Caribbean area they were never passed. Do you have any further recollection of the events preceding the death of Generalissimo Trujillo?

MR. BISSELL: I really have none, no.

MR. GRAY: Do you recall discussing these matters with anyone, let say of your superiors or anyone outside of the CIA?

MR. BISSELL: No special discussions, nothing other than those that would routinely occur in reviewing projects with Allen Dulles internally and any special reports to the Speical Group.

MR. BELIN: Did the Special Group give or reaffirm its position to pouch the weapons that were actually shipped in the spring of 1961?

MR. BISSELL: I don't know whether they did or not. As you have just heard, there is the indication that this was cleared with the State Department, and I have said that the normal procedure would be that everything [illegible] cleared with the State Department and the Special Group at least would have been informed of this at its next meeting, and presumably, therefore, it accepted that, or at any rate did not reverse the agreed upon position between the Agency and the State Department.

MR. BELIN: Who were the members of the Special Group, in summary, if you remember?

MR. BISSELL: I will have to have the date again.

MR. BELIN: Into the spring of '61.

MR. BISSELL: Well, by this time the Special Group would normally have included Bundy or Rostow, and at the beginning, at some date about mid-'61 I believe that General Maxwell Taylor, as the President's Military Adviser, sat in on most of the meetings. It would have included probably the Undersecretary of State, and the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Director of CIA.

MR. BELIN: And you mention the fact that in the fall of 1960 when this was first discussed, that at that time Mr. Gray was on the Special Group?

MR. BISSELL: Right. Correct.

MR. BELIN: And who was the Special Group at that time, who else?

MR. BISSELL: Well, it would have been, with the exception of the White House representation, it would have been the same individuals ex officio. It was suppose to be the Deputy Secretary of State, I mean the Undersecretary of State, the senior Undersecretary . Later, at certain stages in the organization of the Department it was the Undersecretary for Political Affairs in the State Department. The Deputy Secretary of Defense was a member, although there was sometimes a substitute for him. And the Director of Central Intelligence was the other person.

MR. KIRKLAND: Was that representative to the OAS involved in these discussions?

MR. BISSELL: I believe not, sir. I believe it is very unlikely.

MR. GRAY: Mr. Bissell, one other aspect of the cable traffic I should call to your attention is that shortly after the shipment of the pistols and the authorization to pass the Carbines, there is several cables between the station and the Agency Headquarters reflecting some concern whether Counsul Dearborn is going to mentioned these matters in his correspondence with the Department of State. Now, I suppose there could be two reasons for that, either nobody in the State Department knew it, or very few people in the State Department knew it. Would you have any opinion as to which of those situations existed?

MR. BISSELL: Yes. I am almost certain it would have been the latter. Operational information of this sort was suppose to be confined to the Assistant Secretary concerned and his Deputy. Quite often, for matters of somewhat lesser sensivity involve the station desk officer in the State Department, but it was suppose to be limited to two or three below the level of the Undersecretary and the Secretary.

MR. KIRKLAND: Was the Ambassador back in the country?

MR. BISSELL: I believe the Ambassador was back in the country, but in this particular case where Farland had been the Ambassador and was succeeded by Dearborn, they were both kept completely informed of what was going on at all times. The reason I say in this particular case is that these were two men who I mentioned earlier, were intensely interested in intelligence and covert activity or operations of this sort. It was Farland, as you have heard, who really initiated the policy of supporting the dissidents, and they were, to my recollection, very fully informed of what was done.

MR. BELIN: Again, you mentioned earlier that you felt that the Special Operations Group approved possibly a shipment of rifles in 1960 which evidently were not shipped. Do you have any specific recollection of that approval, or do you have any specific recollection that it was approved or not?

MR. BISSELL: I don't have a specific recollection, but I take it there is a record of that.

MR. BELIN: Are you assuming that if they were shipped they were approved, and if they were not shipped you don't know whether it was approved?

MR. BISSELL: I think that is what I am saying, yes, as you are stating, yes.

MR. BELIN: And if the record shows there were weapons shipped in the March or April of 1961. Then is it your specific recollection or just that you are assuming that the Special Operations Group approved that?

MR. BISSELL: No. I have some recollection of that one, the shipment involving the three revolvers, and I particularly remember the case that was made by Dearborn for doing it, which was to be able to give, to issue some weapons to the dissidents as evidence of our continued interest and good faith.

MR. BELIN: And would that approval of the Operations Group then have been in the spring of 1961 or the first part of 1961, or still going back?

MR. BISSELL: I'm quite certain it would have been the first part of 1961.

MR.KIRKLAND: Following the death of Trujillo, did the Agency give any help or aid to the surviving executioners?

MR. BISSELL: I don't remember that specifically. It was a confused period, of course, and the Agency was very active there in the next few months attempting to, in making contact with the various political groups and individuals that emerged, but I do not remember anything specific of the sort you speak of.

MR. BELIN: The records of the Agency show that Mr. McCone was not briefed about either the Castro plan or the so-called executive action capability until some period after he became DCI, which would have been in 1963 or so. Do you know any reason why he was not briefed about this?

MR. BISSELL: Well, I think by the time he took office which as I remember it it was late in 1961, I think it was about the first of December in 1961, any plan to develop an executive action capability internally was in abeyance. I don't know whether it ever was revived, certainly not while I was there, and I think that's the reason that he was not briefed on that. The possible plan of a possible Castro assassination had aborted and although an individual was designated by me just about that time to begin to look at the potential operations against the Castro regime, that designation would have occurred only a few weeks before I left, and I think, I don't think anything ever came of that. Bill Harvey, who was put into that position, was active in planning for a time, but I know that after a fairly short tour of duty he was removed, and so I am assuming the reason McCone was not briefed about these was that really nothing was happening that worth bringing to his attention.

MR. BELIN: Any other questions on the assassinations before we turn to one final area?

MR. GRAY: I do have one other question. Mr. Helms was your Deputy for a portion of this time?

MR. BISSELL: He was.

MR. GRAY: And ultimately your successor?

MR. BISSELL: Right.

MR. GRAY: Was he involved in any of these operations or planning that you have described?

MR. BISSELL: Well, he was generally informed about them because he saw copies of all of the cable traffic that came through, and sat in meetings with the Director and things of this kind. He was not actively involved in the Bay of Pigs preparations when that was going on. It was nearly a fulltime job for me, and I was handling much of the rest of the business of the CS. I believe that he would have been -- there's a chance that he would have been involved in the Dominican activities, but to just what extent I don't remember.

MR. KIRKLAND: I have one question. This group that carried out the assassination in the Dominican Republic were not initially sponsored by the CIA?

MR. BISSELL: That's correct, sir. They came into existence on their own, and as you have heard, it was Ambassador Farland's recommendation that they be supported, and I do want t emphasize, as I have said, that this was regarded by the Agency as a logistics support operation, in full knowledge that it was giving them the capability for violence. But nevertheless, there is quite a distinction, or at least there was in our minds between supporting an operation and either initiating it, organizing it, running it and controlling it.

MR. KIRKLAND: And this was not too long after the Trujillo assassination of a president of a friendly state?

MR. BISSELL: Exactly.

MR. GRISWOLD: Did anyone give consideration as to whether this was a wise thing to do or a legal thing to do?

MR. BISSELL: Well, I would presume, sir, that consideration was given in the State Department. And as you have heard, it was the Ambassador who first recommended that this support operation be undertaken. This was then approved by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State. He is the approver of record, but this must have also included Tom Mann, who was the Assistant Secretary of State. It was discussed in the Special Group where it was approved at the undersecretary level, and by a White House Representative, and the general presumption in the way the Agency's covert action operations were run was that the policy considerations of the wisdom of the action was a matter for the State Department, the White House and in a sense the National Security Council and the Pentagon wherever its interests were relevant, which was in many of these.

MR. GRISWOLD: But the CIA didn't regard itself as having any responsibility for either wisdom or legality?

MR. BISSELL: I wouldn't say that. I would not say that it had no responsibility for wisdom. The CIA obviously was represented both at the Special Group and on occasion with the ad hoc meetings when operations of this kind were discussed, and CIA representatives were quite often not backward in giving their views about wisdom. But this was not the part of the Agency's charter. I think that was recognized at the time, and it was one of the Allen Dulles' repeated exertation, that the CIA does not make policy. It is there as an agency in this capacity, it is there to carry out policy decisions.

Now, as to legality, I think there was a real effort in the years that I was in the Agency to restrict the Agency's operation within what was believed to be its charter. And in that sense, at least there was a concern for a legality. I am not -- I have to say that I am unclear myself as to how the concept of legality can be applied to many covert activities.

MR. CONNOR: Who was the Undersecretary of State in the Special Group at that time?

MR. BISSELL: Well, back in '60 it was Mr. Murphy, and in '61 it was Chester Bowles who was the Undersecretary. He did not represent the Department very often on the Special Group, and I don't remember whom he used for that purpose.

MR. GRAY: Mr. Merchant was there at that time.

MR. BISSELL: Yes, I think he was.

MR. SHANNON: Staying on this matter of approval as to the wisdom, you assumed the State Department had covered this, and that would mean you assumed the Secretary of State was informed?

MR. BISSELL: Yes, sir.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Was Goodwin involved in any of this stuff?

MR. BISSELL: Dick Goodwin became somewhat involved in the Bay of Pigs operation, but very late in the game. For the most part, only after it was over in the business of picking up the pieces. I suspect that he was involved a bit in the Dominican operation, and I believe that he would have been one of its supporters and very sympathetic to it.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: How about the Castro assassination attempt?

MR. BISSELL: No, I am almost certain that he knew nothing of that.

MR. BELIN: At least not during the time that you were with the Agency?

MR. BISSELL: That is correct, yes.

MR. KIRKLAND: Was John Hill, do you recall, was John Hill in the D.R. at the time ?

MR. BISSELL: I seem to remember him being there at some point, but I don't remember when it was. I think during

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the period we are talking about in the D.R. it was Farland followed by Dearborn.

MR. KIRKLAND: He was the charge d'affaires' I think afterwards?

MR. BISSELL: Yes.

MR. GRAY: Dearborn along with the members of the sation were removed very quickly after the death of Trujillo?

MR. BELIN: The final area of inquiry that I want to go into pertains to recommendations you might have concerning Agency operations or based upon your experience in the Agency and your experience both before in government and after in the business world. Do you have any specific recommendations as to how to improve the operations of the Agency?

MR. BISSELL: Well, as I have mentioned to you, Mr. Belin, I had a few that are rather scattered, and to which I do not attach any very great importance. I had occasion a few years ago to do a paper on this, and I am going to supply Mr. Belin a copy of this if it is of interest to him. The main thrust of that, I will put it this way, is that the Agency, most of the Agency's so-called failures, and especially its more massive ones have taken the form of a compromise of operations, or operations have been deemed to be failures largely because they were compromised. That is not true in all cases, by any manner of means, I mean the Bay of Pigs is a notable exception. But in general that is true, and that had lead me to argue, or really to remind any readers of this essay to which I have referred that the prime expertise the nation should seek in the clandestine service, in a foreign clandestine service is an ability to keep things secret, and to perform operations in secret and without compromise. And in part because of my own failings and shortcomings, by the late 60's the Agency already had I thought a rather lamentable record of not being able to do this.

Now, in reviewing the whole range of different kinds of covert operations, they involved progaganda operations, paramilitary operations, political action operations and the whole range. And with respect to each of these, the clandestine service is not the place where one would expect to, where one would look for professional competence, military competence. One would look to the Pentagon. Competence in political analysis and political science he would expect that the most competent people in the nation would be elsewhere, and he would not look there for competent economists as such. The professional competence that the clandestine service should have, is as I said, the ability to plan and organize and carryout operations, both intelligence collection and such covert action operations as are authorized with high security, and hopefully avoiding compromise.

Given that as its role, given its poor record, I suppose the thrust of this paper was that every effort should be made to improve this aspect of the Agency's operations. I made one organizational recommendation. It is just one way of doing it. It was to propose that there be a small internal staff in the Agency, in the clandestine service, but with the direct line to the DCI that should scrutinize every proposed new operation before it is initiated, and at least once a year should scrutinize every on-going operation from one standpoint soley that was the prospects of compromise, and their change from year to year. My feeling is that in the years that I was in the, it was the DDP in particular,that lacking this or any similar mechanism, a number of our mistakes occurred because there was not a strong enough voice raised internally in the councils of the Agency in favor or the precautions that would be required to maintain secrets.

smn
begin t.5a

MR. KIRKLAND: Would that not be a function of the Counterintelligence Division?

MR. BISSELL: Well, it could be, but actually the CI staff or Division did not function in that way and did not really attempt to perform that role. It was attempting really to protect the Agency and other parts of the Government from penetration, and I really had in mind not the compromise by classic penetration, but if you stop to think of it, it hasn't produced the great, dramatic revelations of recent years. It is the compromise from letting too many people become knowledgeable of an operation and still letting the operation go on, of having inadequate cutouts, and having inadequate compartmentation both within the Agency and elsewhere in the Government.

MR. BELIN: Now, you contrasted that with the Inspector General's review, which was a review of operations that had already been completed as opposed to current operations?

MR. BISSELL: That is correct. I am talking about before the fact review, and for this, the sole purpose really of what I have identified as security.

MR. BELIN: You also had a recommendation --

MR. CONNOR: Excuse me. You made an exception for the Bay of Pigs in that. Now, why would you say that that operation failed?

MR. BISSELL: Well, that operation not only was dramatically compromised, and indeed, it is questionable whether that could have been avoided under any circumstances, but it was also a military failure, and it seems to me perfectly clearcut that that is the case.

My reference to that was to contrast this with, for instance, the by now much publicized support to the Student Association and support to labor groups overseas. These operations, in my opinion, were tested by what they accomplished up to the point of compromise, and could perhaps still have accomplished, were brilliant ly successful, and what destroyed those operations was purely and simply compromise.

I also happen to think that they became, that they are examples, although perhaps I have not looked into them enough to be confident of this opinion, but I am afraid I think they became examples of very sloppy procedures. I think that anyone who had looked by the early '60s at that set of operations, coldly, and somewhat at arm's length from the standpoint of security would have said that they are absolutely doomed to compromise, and quite soon if major changes were not made.

After all, the very fact that, for instance, in the Student Organization you had new officers every year, and most of the officers were knowledgeable of the source of funding, well, it was absolutely inevitable that that would be brought up before long, and indeed, a state of mind had developed, I think, that it really would not do much harm if it were blown. I think that state of mind was perhaps perfectly proper with regard to the radios because they really had been blown before, but there are instances in my view of operations that did achieve notable results, and which eventually failed and had to be ended for the reason of compromise.

MR. BELIN: You have also had some recommendations concerning the type of personnel that the Agency ought to recruit.

MR. BISSELL: I will mention before touching on that, I had one other specific one which is really the subject of longstanding discussion inside of the clandestine service. I felt the Agency had come to rely much too heavily on official cover and was using its official cover again somewhat carelessly, and it is a very difficult job to build up unofficial cover, either governmental or nongovernmental. But I felt that far too little was being done about that. Mr. Belin refers to a quite unrelated recommendation of mind. I was fearful that the course the Agency was on was placing more and more reliance on staffing, on men and women brought in fairly young, in many cases right out of college, or soon after college, trained in the Agency and then spending or planning to make life careers there, somewhat in the fashion of the military services, and of the Foreign Service. I think that that is a perfectly appropriate pattern for those other services, but my own belief is that one of the great strengths of the Agency as a corps of individuals in say the mid-50s under Allen Dulles was that it attracted men from all walks of life, and because it was such a new organization at that time, most of its officers and all of its senior people had had some other kind of professional experienc and accomplishment before they came into the organization.

It had quite a scattering of men who had had military experience, it had some professionals like myself, it had lawyers, and Helms himself, before his OSS period, had been a journalist, and it had a wide range of skills. I do not mean those skills were important to be used. I never used economics in the Agency , and Helms I don't think ever used journalism, but my point is I think when it is engaging in the kind of business it is, it is better to have a variety of backgrounds, and not to have more than perhaps half of its personnel men who were in there for lifelong careers.

This relates to my remarks about official cover and its overuse. The pattern that I think was developing by the end of, by the beginning of the '60s in the clandestine service was that people more and more, its members thought of their careers as a little different in kind, and a little removed from Foreign Service careers. They expected to spend a life doing tours of duty in every case under official cover, and usually identified to the host government. And in short, to follow much the same career pattern as the Foreign Service.

I believe that this is not consistent really with the maintenance of the state of mind that ought to animate the clandestine service.

MR. BELIN: Any other questions by members of the Commission?

Thank you for coming.

MR. OLSEN: I have one that I would like tw get kind of on the record.

Mr. Bissell, there have been people responsible or irresponsible who have suggested that because you and Allen Dulles and General Cabell were all terminated from the Agency in effect by President Kennedy within a fair period of time after the failure of the Bay of Pigs, that the three of you and other people in the Agency would have had a motive to retaliate against President Kennedy.

Could you describe for us what you know of your relationship and that of General Cabell and Allen Dulles with President Kennedy after the termination of your respective periods of service with the Agency?

MR. BISSELL: I can't say very much about the other two gentlemen. I am sure that Allen on occasion saw the President, and I have every reason to believe that it was a friendly relationship. I rather doubt whether General Cabell had any direct contact with him after that.

I did have contact with him on perhaps two or three occasions. He asked me quite soon after I left the Agency to lend a helping hand to the then head of the rather new Alliance for Progress, and he also asked me to do a paper for him, that is, for the President, which I did do, on the question of what lessons from the Marshall Plan might have been applicable to the Alliance for Progress.

On another more lighthearted occasion, he got me to come over to the White House to give him some advice on cruising on the Maine coast. And the final time, I think, I suppose the final time I saw him, which couldn't have been but very shortly before his death, was the award of a medal. I think I can honestly say that the relationship was an extremely friendly one in my case, and as far as I could judge, mutually so. I had quite a number of contacts with him in the roughly eight months that I was still in the Agency after the Bay of Pigs, and I can say the same of that period.

And finally, for the record, I perhaps should say that shortly before I did finally leave the Agency, John McCone, with the President's knowledge and concurrence, and also that of the then Attorney General, asked me to stay on in the Agency, but in a somewhat different position than that of the DDP. I thought it was wiser for me to leave.

MR. LEMNITZER: I have a question. Don't you believe that in carrying on the covert operation of the magnitude of the Bay of Pigs, that compartmentation was one of the weaknesses, compartmentation in a clandestine operation to maintain cover and security was absolutely essential, but on the other hand, on an operation of that size with military aspects involved, it seemed to me that compartmentation was a weakness in the preparation of carrying out of the operation, not to mention the changing decisions that took place along the line as the operation unfolded?

MR. BISSELL: Well, I certainly agree with you, General Lemnitzer, in the change in decisions, and I agree with you, I probably would agree with you if you and I discuss specific examples of the compartmentation. I will say, however, that some of the compartmentation I think to this day was absolutely essential, and I will give you an example. We really could not allow the Cuban politicals in Miami, the exile members of the political parties, to visit the brigades in training in Guatemala, and the reason for that was that the brigade was shaping into a disciplined and unified force, and the politicians were totally insecure, and at odds with one another on almost everything. There was a great deal of intriguing in Miami, because if one politician could become identified in the eyes of the brigade, and if the operation was then successful, he would have been the leader.

So there is an example of where I think we were right to enforce compartmentation. But I don't think that is the kind of thing you have in mind, and I think I would agree with what you have in mind.

MR. LEMNITZER: Well, specifically I have in mind that within the Joint Chiefs of Staff at the time we could not find out what the diplomatic estimate of the situation was, that if this force did get ashore, and up in an accessible place, that the Cuban people would rally to it, and as a matter of fact, I have not found out yet what the diplomatic estimate of the situation was.

MR. BISSELL: Yes, I agree with you. That is an unfortunate example .

MR. GRISWOLD: Let me ask you, did the Bay of Pigs operation have anything to do with the gathering of intelligence?

MR. BISSELL: No, sir. It was somewhat dependent on it, but it didn't have anything to do with it.

MR. GRISWOLD: Then what business is it of the CIA to engage in operations which have nothing to do with the gathering of intelligence?

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Covert.

MR. BISSELL: Well, the category that came to be called covert action operations are justified under a much quoted clause in the CIA's charter which refers to such other activities as the National Security Council directs.

MR. GRISWOLD: Is there any evidence that the National Security Council directed this operation?

MR.BISSELL: Well, there is a question of definition of exactly what constituted the National Security Council at the time of that operation, but I will say that the plans for the operation were repeatedly reviewed by a group that included the President of the United States, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Assistant Secretary of State who was involved, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, or the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and then Army Colonel, now General I believe, who had been designated the Chairman of a group of three officers by the JCS to review plans and preparations.

So I would say that rarely has what started out as a clandestine operation been more intimately directed by a group, by those individuals who are, I believe, the members of the NSC.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Was that both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy?

MR. BISSELL: No, this was President Kennedy, and this began with the new administration.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: And did the brigades have reason to expect that if they were successful, they would get support from the U.S. military forces?

MR. BISSELL: No, it had no reason to believe that.

MR. LEMNITZER: Isn't a part of the answer to this question the comment made by President Kennedy after the operation failed that he was responsible, that it was at his direction that this operation was carried out?

MR. BISSELL: Yes, I think that's true, General Lemnitzer, but you remember I am sure just as I do, the degree to which the group I have identified was repeatedly involved in review of plans and whatnot.

MR. BELIN: Any other questions from the Commission?

Thank you very much, sir, for coming.

MR. BISSELL: You are welcome.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: We are very grateful to you, Mr. Bissell.

Do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. DONOHUE: I do.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Paul, do you swear to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

MR. O'NEILL: I do indeed.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Okay.

MR. BELIN: Mr. Donohue, we have generally had just one witness at a time in the room, so perhaps you had better leave the room while your boss testifies, and then we will call you back here.

MR. DONOHUE: Okay.

MR. CARGILL: Mr. Chairman, we thought we would begin the session on OMB with Mr. O'Neill giving a short background of OMB's role in Government, and then we will proceed to some more specific questions in dealing with the CIA with Mr. Donohue.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
the testimony of Paul
O'Neill, Director of
OMB, before the Rockefeller
Commission, 21 APR 75
(pp 2351-2385)
16 Aug 94

TESTIMONY OF PAUL O'NEILL

MR. O'NEILL: Very quickly, Mr. Vice President and members, I think it would be useful if I would try to give you some perspective about how OMB does its work with other agencies of government; that is to say, with agencies outside of the intelligence area, and specifically outside of the CIA area, so that as you come to the direct testimony from my staff member, Mr. Donohue, you will have a background in mind.

I know many of you have had lots of business dealings with the government, and you have some appreciation of how OMB works, so I will indeed be brief. I think I was just looking at some testimony that I am going to be giving in the next couple of days on OMB's budget, and I was looking at the historical members that show how many staff people are in OMB. And I think maybe that is a useful way to come to the subject.

In 1947 OMB had about 550 total staff people. Today we have 580 total staff people, including 380 professional staff people who examine the budgets and the programs and activities of everything in the Federal Government. And that means this year, as you know, over $350 billion worth of expenditures.

I think the budget function is a familiar one. We look at the amount of dollars that we are spending and compare it to what we have spent in the past. We look at equity considerations between groups that are served by Federal programs. We try to look at efficiencies, we try to look at geographic distribution questions and all of the other prospects that you might expect in a budget operation.

Now, in addition to that budget examination function, of course, we put together each year the President's budget for the approval of the Congress, and those same people who do the review and the analysis do that preparation function. That is not to say that we print it, but we do everything short of printing the President's budget.

In addition to those budget functions which are ongoing through the year, we also perform a legislative clearance function or a legislative review function for the President. Every piece of legislation that is introduced by the President goes through the Office of OMB so that it can be coordinated with the program of the President, and so that every department and agency of government that has any kind of an interest in that legislative proposal from the President has the advantage of a crosscutting analysis from any interested party within the Executive Branch. In addition to doing that kind of process with Presidential legislation, all legislation that is introduced in the Congress by either House, by a member of either House, comes to OMB when a member makes an appropriate request for that same kind of a review, and a report on the Administration's position on the provisions of that legislation just as though it were a piece of Presidential legislation.

There are two times during the year when the Director get deeply involved in the program activities and budget of all of the Departments and agencies of government, once in the spring and secondly in the fall as we are doing the final preparation of the President's budget, and the Director and Deputy sit down with examiners who have the responsibility, and their straw bosses and foremen, and go through with them their examination of the programs, the recommendations that are made by the Department and agency heads, the insights that our own staff have about how resources can best be distributed in preparation for a series of meetings that we have with the President to in turn discuss with him at somewhat higher levels of abstraction the alternatives that we see he has in making the judgments for the upcoming year.

In addition, we have, of course, some responsibility for efficiency as indicated earlier, and we do spend some time trying to ferret out programs that are not working well, proposing legislative changes, management changes, on occasion personnel changes to try to accomplish and accommodate better public performance.

I think maybe just by way of an example, to give you a more detailed feeling as to how the resources that are invested in the CIA area, or in the intelligence area, or the Defense area as compared to other areas, I might take an example in another area that we examine, and let me say Social Security as an example.

This year, Social Security spending will be $70 billion. We have one full time individual who examines the program of the Social Security Administration. Now, we do have on call some people who are not directly responsible for examining the budget in our management divisions to help out with examination of important management questions. We do call upon financial system experts in our budget review divisions to help support that one individual.

But what I am saying to you is we have one individual that examines on a full time basis the activities of the Social Security Administration. At the same time, we have one individual who examines the activities of the CIA, which in budgetary terms is a much, much smaller agency.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: One individual?

MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir. We have one full time examiner looking at the Central Intelligence Agency. He is backed up by a so-called branch chief who in turn reports to a division chief that is responsible for all of the international affairs programs of the government, who in turn reports to myself and Jim Lynn. So we are not performing an audit function for the programs and activities of the government, not by the furtherest stretch of the imagination are we performing an audit function. If you think back over what has happened with the explosion of government programs in the last 20 years, it is apparent on the face of it that as that explosion has taken place, OMB's role has changed in a fairly marked way. In looking at the historical files of OMB, it is interesting to note that back in the 1950s there were some 45 people examining the programs of the Veteran's Administration, and they were examining them then in a way that was more like an audit function, because it was possible to do that because we did not have the great number of programs we have now.

But that was all changed, and we are not examining programs in anything approaching an audit fashion in any activity of Government, not a single one.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Paul, would it be fair to ask, since you gave the figures on the comparison between '47 and '75, as to whether you are not grossly understaffed in relation to the responsibilities that were then carried out in terms of the size of the budget, or that is now carried out in terms of the size of the budget? It must be what, about ten times as big?

MR. O'NEILL: I think it is probably a lot more than ten times as big. It has really grown by leaps and bounds. I guess I do not think so, but it depends very much on one's philosophical view as to what can be done at the center when you have an explosion of governmental function.

My own feeling is that an audit function, and inspector general function that could hope to deliver real results would be so big that if it were in the Executive Office, that it would overwhelm the Executive office. That is what happened in the OMB as the character of what Federal Government is doing has changed, which is that we have moved away from 45 people looking at 170 VA hospitals and trying to know ourselves whether what they were doing in each of those hospitals was right or not. We have moved back into a position where we are really testing, we are testing the general concept of a Veterans health care program against the general concept of health insurance, or we are looking at what is going on in the private sector, and we are dealing at a much more abstract level than we were 25 or 30 years ago, by necessity.

Our office would have to be, I would say 2000, if we were to begin to approach a more detailed audit kind of an approach to our work.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: And is GAO moving into that vacuum?

MR. O'NEILL: Somewhat, yes, although the character of their operation from my point of view has changed quite a bit in the last ten or fifteen years. Ten or fifteen years ago they were very much of an accounting mind. They made sure that the numbers all added up, and that people had not defrauded the Federal Government. I do not think they ever told anybody very much interesting about what was going on, about whether it was useful or not, but over the last especially five years, I think they have changed their focus so that they have become

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

less accounting focused, and less, spending less of their time making sure that the numbers add up, and more of their time in trying to inform both the Executive branch and the government as to the value of those things that are being done with public monies.

So that they have changed their focus some also, in part by necessity.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Have we not got a former head of the Bureau of the Budget there?

MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir. They did, the former deputy director, as a matter of fact, two former deputy directors, Mr. Hughes and Mr. Staats.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: That is very interesting.

MR. GRAY: How big is GAO, how big a staff do they have?

MR. O'NEILL: I don't have a number in my head, but I could give it to you if you had a budget here. It is much larger than our operation, and my guess would be off the top of my head about 4000.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: GAO?

MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir.

MR. KIRKLAND: In these areas where there has been some episodes of misuse of funds, as in some of the poverty programs, and in the housing area, where do they get uncovered? Do they get uncovered in the internal audits of the agency, or at the OMB level, or how do these things come to light?

MR. O'NEILL: Let us take housing as an example. I think the uncovering of fraud problems in those programs has taken place at the local level, and it has taken place with GAO identifying a program, and the Inspector General of HUD has identified problems in those programs. And I think a similar finding on the OEO programs came out of those sorts of things.-- OMB's problem with the housing programs really recognized what had been found in the way of fraud, but our focus was more on the equity considerations, what was wrong with the program from an equity point of view. That is, the Federal Government was providing huge subsidies to a very small set of theoretically eligible population, and as we talked to the President as to what we saw wrong with those programs, that is the point we stressed, that there was no way in the world that we could ever equitably provide the same level of housing benefits to the set that was eligible under the current terms and conditions of the programs, and that combined with the cases of fraud that were identified by GAO and the HUD inspector general led us to a recommendation to the President that we stop those 235 and 236 subsidized housing programs.

MR. KIRKLAND: But the rural line of defense was actually in the control of the Agency, that is, your surveillance?

MR. O'NEILL: That is exactly right. Prevention of fraud really begins and ends, or almost ends, with the assigned responsible officials in those departments and agencies, and I guess my own feeling is that Government has gotten so big that if we can't depend on good surveillance and prevention of fraud by the Cabinet secretary and his officials, that we are going -- we have to depend on public oversight, and I guess I don't think that that works as well as it should. And therefore, indeed, we do have to depend on those cabinet and agency officials to see that we don't use the public's money in an unauthorized way.

MR. LEMNITZER: With the fiscal '76 budget being defended before the Congress, I presume you are now starting on the '77 year's budget.

MR. O'NEILL: Yes, sir, we are.

MR. LEMNITZER: Within your agency. How will CIA approach the problem and present it to you, to your office for 1977? Just what are the mechanics of it?

MR. O'NEILL: Well, they will receive the so-called budget calling, all of the departments and agencies in about June.

MR. LEMNITZER: Do they get any guidelines?

MR. O'NEILL: Yes, they will. Right now we are beginning to tune up for the '77 process, and over the month of May the Director and I will sit down with all of our examiners and our division heads and go through the prospects for fiscal year 1977 that our intelligence tells us will be coming in as requests to the President, and we will be looking at that against the backdrop of expected revenues based on anticipation of performance of the economy for fiscal year 1977. We will take all of that assessment of what the agencies are likely to be asking for, separating it out between those things that are new things, and those things that are driven by current authorizations and appropriations, and taking that whole package to the President along with his other economic advisors, Allen Greenspan, and Bill Siedman, and giving a judgment, getting a judgment from him as to how many dollars in broad blocks he wants to tell the Cabinet secretaries and the Agency heads they should use as a planning figure for their work over the next several months.

In June, those numbers from the President will go out as guidance to the Departments and agencies, and over the months, July, August, September, they will be within the limits provided by the President, deciding what kind of a specific program, detailed recommendation they want to make to him, and then in September these requests will begin to come in, and in September, October,and November, we will go through our regular budget process, evaluating what it is that is in the base that we must do, that we think it is desirable to keep doing, those things which we think should be taken out, evaluation of new things that are being proposed, and then through a series of sessions with the President, going through and getting his judgments on all of the numbers for fiscal year 1977.

MR. WALLISON: Do you in the course of your activities evaluate the activities of the various agencies in relation to their statutory charters or restrictions?

MR. O'NEILL: Well, yes, within the limitations of our staff reach.

MR. WALLISON: In the case we have here, assuming there were no Commission and there were no Congressional inquiries, would you consider it your responsibility to review what the Agency has done to determine whether it complied with the statutory charter?

MR. O'NEILL: Well, I don't think so, Peter. I guess because I think it is beyond our reach to assure ourselves or the President that everything that is done in the Federal Government is within the statutory authority provided by the Congress. It is just a human impossibility that 380 professional staff people could ensure that everything that is done by a public, government official, a Federal official, is within the limits of the statute.

MR. GRAY: I think Mr. Donohue, who was the CIA examiner for five years, can probably answer some of the detailed questions.

MR. O'NEILL: Right. Right.

MR. BELIN: Any more questions of this Witness?

MR. KIRKLAND: I take it from what you said earlier that say if it were possible and useful to put another ten people on to protect against any real misapplication of funds by an Agency like the CIA, that you feel that they would be more usefully put in the auditing section under the comptroller of the agency rather than the OMB?

MR. O'NEILL: Well, I think it would depend in part on whether or not you look at that kind of a change in OMB vis-a-vis CIA only, or whether there was a broad precedent for OMB's role and function. I suppose such a function could be lodged in the OMB, although I must say to you, with the number of people you are talking about, ten people, I would be highly skeptical that you can ensure that things you do not want to happen will not happen. Bureaucracy is so big, even in the case of CIA, that I am skeptical that ten good people can ensure that there would not be any examples or cases of operations outside of the law. I think that has to start at the top with a tone, and direction, and a sense of responsibility that the key officials bring to their job. So I guess I am not saying that you can cut off problems by having ten more people. You might make some difference because it would be a signal that somebody is going to pay closer attention than they have in the past.

MR. KIRKLAND: I just took the figure out of the air. You are saying that if that were commensurately multiplied through all of the oversight functions, it would create an agency the size of which you do not want in OMB to be useful.

MR. O'NEILL: I think that is right.

MR. KIRKLAND: An element of strengthening would be more in terms of pure misapplication of funds, it would be better done by strengthening the audit arrangements in the Agency?

MR. O'NEILL: Yes, and perhaps protecting that inspector general or auditing function from too close an association with the Agency that it is involved in so that it has a separate, clearly defined function, and a supporting relationship that makes it clear that it is expected to be independent of the agency that it is looking at .

MR. KIRKLAND: Do you and Jim Lynn, let us say, have a direct relationship with the Comptrollers of the different agencies independent of the director?

MR. O'NEILL: You mean with the inspectors general or with the comptrollers?

MR. KIRKLAND: Yes, whatever.

MR. O'NEILL: It is uneven. It depends on, I think, in both Jim's case and mine, on our previous association with individuals in the government. I am sure he knows the inspectors general.

MR. KIRKLAND: Well, where does an inspector general go beyond his boss if he has a problem?

MR. O'NEILL: I frankly cannot think of a case and time that I have been in OMB when an inspector general came to me and said here's a problem you should know about, no. But there have been occasions when a Secretary or a comptroller would come to me and say we think we have got a problem here that you should know about. I cannot think of fraud problems, but undesirable practices problems, for example, yes.

MR. BELIN: Any other questions of this witness before we go to Mr. Donohue?

Thank you very much, sir.

MR. O'NEILL: Okay.

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Thanks a lot, Paul.

TESTIMONY OF ARNOLD E. DONOHUE

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: Are you the one gentleman who is responsible for CIA in OMB?

MR. DONOHUE: No, Mr. Vice President. I head a staff of five professionals who review the budgets of the intelligence community, one of which --

CHAIRMAN ROCKEFELLER: The whole community?

MR. DONOHUE: Right, one of which individuals is assigned to the Central Intelligence Agency, and that has been practiced for I believe the last 13 years.

MR. GRISWOLD: Can you speak up, please?

MR. DONOHUE: Sure. Excuse me.

MR. BELIN: Could you please state your name for the record?

MR. DONOHUE: Arnold E. Donohue.

MR. BELIN: You are with OMB?

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED~~ 16-8-94

(1)(B)

the testimony of Arnold Donohue, OMB official in charge of the CIA budget, before the Rockefeller Commission, 21 APR 75

MR. DONOHUE: That's right, the international affairs division, the intelligence branch, I am the Chief thereof.

MR. BELIN: And what is your educational background?

MR. DONOHUE: I graduated from Georgetown University in 1960, and from Princeton, the Woodrow Wilson School, in 1962, and worked five years in the Central Intelligence Agency, primarily as an analyst, political, economic, and joined the Office of Management and Budget in 1967, and have been in the Intelligence Unit of the Office of Management and Budget since that time. I became chief of that branch in 1973.

MR. BELIN: Could you describe OMB's activities with the CIA in preparation of its program budget?

MR. DONOHUE: Let me give you a very broad answer to that because it probably is the primary work that the unit is involved in during the first nine months of any calendar year, generally from January through the October budget submission of the Agency. The examiner will be involved directly with the Agency, CIA or any other intelligence agency in preparation, looking forward to developing a budget recommendation for the director of the Office of Management and Budget, and ultimately to the President as far as the budget of those agencies goes.

So generally the first nine months would be a period where the examiner would undertake a work program looking at various aspects which for one reason or another would be important for making budgetary recommendations. This would be done

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

sometimes in conjunction with the Agency, attempting to have the Agency analyze a particular aspect of its program or activity, or done independently by the budget examiner as something he felt he had to take the lead in and develop an analysis of his own on, in which context he would then review the official budget submission coming in October 1st, coming in on October 1st.

That is a very important phase of the work because it really involves the nine month preparation whereby the examiner puts himself in line to review the rather detailed dollars and numbers, personnel data that will come in to him during the course of a budget examination beginning in October.

MR. BELIN: Do you have any more specific examples of the level of detail and the type of justification material?

MR. DONOHUE: Well, this preliminary phase would be something that would be interactive with the Agency. On October 1st, the Central Intelligence Agency, and that's the one I will illustrate with, will come in with a fairly detailed budget submission.

MR. BELIN: And you are holding --

MR. DONOHUE: And I am holding that in my hand right now for you to see the amount of material in it. It is a very detailed submission in traditional terms of the Office of Management and Budget.

MR. BELIN: About how many pages there?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

MR. DONOHUE: 250 approximately, 250 pages, with detai really on every office of the Central Intelligence Agency down to division levels, and the examiner would use this as a base of information.

MR. LEMNITZER: Would it include proposed covert operations specifically?

MR. DONOHUE: It would include in most cases a covert action operation that would be continuing during the coming fiscal year.

MR. LEMNITZER: New ones?

MR. DONOHUE: Generally it would not include new ones, because it would be nine months in advance at least of the beginning of the fiscal year, and it would be doubtful that new ones would be known that much in advance. In most cases the covert action projects would begin in a shorter time frame than that, and they would not be budgeted for in advance.

MR. CONNOR: Is that document classified?

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, that document is classified top secret, and I can give a brief rundown of the sort of informatio it contains.

MR. GRISWOLD: Does it include a category for prospective covert operations?

MR. DONOHUE: No, it does not. It would include funding of continuing covert action projects.

MR. GRISWOLD: I understand. But how is the Agency

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

going to carry out when it suddenly gets some situation where it seems to the Agency wise to move immediately into a covert operation?

MR. KIRKLAND: The contingency or discretionary funds?

MR. DONOHUE: Let's move into that area, and I think that probably will help.

MR. GRISWOLD: That's what I meant.

MR. DONOHUE: I will answer it. CIA does have a unique contingency reserve which is provided for the purposes of meeting basically extraordinary expenses that the Administration, that the Executive branch would not want to propose a supplemental to the Congress for. This contingency would then be used for purposes that came up during the course of the year, any supplemental purpose, whether that be covert action, whether it be the increased pay costs for employees, and it has been used for that in the past, or for emergency intelligence needs. Some new project would begin, and supplemental needs would be identified, and the contingency reserve would be used for that purpose.

MR. GRISWOLD: And there is a figure for that in the budget?

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, there is.

MR. GRISWOLD: How is that figure determined?

MR. DONOHUE: The figure is determined, as with any budget figure, with a recommendation or a request by the

Agency for a level of what it anticipates, or some level of funding that it would anticipate being available for the supplemental purposes during the coming fiscal year. It would be reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget, and it would be referred to the Congress through the Chairman of the Appropriations Committees, and they would be informed of the amount of that reserve that we anticipated would be available during the coming fiscal year, and that program and financing schedule, which is included in the budget, and they would have the opportunity to write back and to identify, if the Chairmen of the Committees, the Appropriations Committees, would have the opportunity to write back and indicate whether that was reasonable, basically through their appropriations action, and whether there was a reduction involved.

In some cases the Congress, for example, has made reductions in the amount of that contingency reserve, and in other cases they have not.

MR. KIRKLAND: Is it not maintained on a historical basis and just replenished up to a certain level?

MR. DONOHUE: It is generally replenished up to the level of approximately 24 $50 million a year. That has historically been, and I do not have the exact numbers in front of me, but historically it has been somewhere around 24 $50 million a year which has been judged adequate in recent years. There were occasions in the past when I think it was over that, and there are occasions when it has gone below that for any period of time.

MR. BELIN: Whose approval is necessary to allow the CIA to use this contingency fund?

MR. DONOHUE: As I stated, the basic function of the contingency fund is in lieu of supplemental appropriations requests identified for CIA because of the hidden nature of its budget. Therefore, depending upon the type of activity involved, the approval for the contingency has to come from the office, the use of the contingency funds comes from the Office of Management and Budget, but we would rely on a number of checks on that system. If it was pay supplement or something, that could be easily calculated based on past experience, and our office would take action by itself. If it was a supplemental request for some special intelligence project, we might review that, determine that, in fact, it was a priority need, meeting the needs that the Office of Management and Budget and the President has established for supplementals during that year, or particularly if it was a covert action project, we would attempt to determine, and usually have been successful in determining that 40 committee approval had been given for that project, and hopefully Presidential approval had been given for that project.

MR. KIRKLAND: You would not make an independent judgment on its merits, you would look to the authorization?

MR. DONOHUE: As far as the merits of the project itself, we would look in terms of covert action projects to the 40 Committee, with an indication of Presidential approval and since I have been head of the unit in 1973, I think we have had indications in every covert action project of Presidential approval of that covert action project. We would make an independent financial assessment as to whether the dollar amount requested by the Agency to carry out that covert action project was reasonable, and that would amount to a fair amount of detailed review of each request to use the contingency reserve for covert action projects. We would hold a hearing, based at the time of the request on the facts and information as to the financial cost of that particular project, and do that in a fair amount of detail.

That does not mean getting down to every last dollar or person involved, but it does amount to looking on an aggregate basis as to whether this is a reasonable amount, and can they provide, just can the Agency provide justification for that need?

MR. KIRKLAND: Well, in point of fact, since future contingency or future covert operations by their nature cannot be budgeted in advance, and usually must be initiated out of the contingency fund, in the OMB, you would get a look at each of these projects for all practical purposes at their inception, wouldn't you?

MR. DONOHUE: Yes, sir. We would.

MR. LEMNITZER: I had in mind particularly the recovery of the Russian submarine and the large expenditure that was involved. How was that handled, for example?

MR. DONOHUE: Do you want me to answer, David?

MR. BELIN: I will ask you this question because the Witness is concerned about secrecy agreements that he has signed pertaining to certain projects.

Is there any large project that involved an expenditure of more than $10 million by the Agency in any one year that was not audited or reviewed by OMB?

MR. DONOHUE: It would not be audited.

MR. BELIN: I used the word audit incorrectly because you do not audit. That was not carefully reviewed by the OMB?

MR. DONOHUE: I do not know of any large project of that magnitude that we would not be aware of. I will be glad to go off the record and answer the question.

MR. GRISWOLD: You couldn't get that out of a $50 24 million contingency fund.

MR. DONOHUE: That is correct.

MR. BELIN: Why don't we go off the record because of your concern with regard to the secrecy agreements that you yourself are signing, Mr. Donohue.

Can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. BELIN: Let me get back on the record here.

Can I return to the review aspects of your work at OMB?

MR. SHANNON: Before we get to that, could I just follow on right here where he was talking about approval by the 40 Committee? This is nothing to do with his immediately preceding comments, but just in general I take it if the 40 Committee, if you thought you had approval from the 40 Committee or from the President, then you would not look into the question of whether it was, whether it seemed to you to comply with statutory provisions or the Act as far as the Agency was concerned?

MR. DONOHUE: I am not sure of that. I have not found an instance where I would challenge it on a legal basis. I have found one project for example, a covert action project, that I would challenge on maybe a roles and missions, proper emphasis, priorities basis, and I would review that and send it up the chain of command in OMB to determine if in fact they feel strongly enough about it to reopen the issue with the President. I think we would do it in that context and have to inform my superiors that, in fact, the President had indicated approval or the 40 Committee had indicated approval, and if he wished to reopen it with the President, that would be his decision.

MR. SHANNON: I just thought that came in under where we were discussing more appropriately, and if you were starting a new line --

MR. BELIN: I am going now to the question of review by OMB.

Would you care to discuss that as to the number of examiners, the choice of portions of the budget that are reviewed, and any pertinent questions or hearings or recommendations?

MR. DONOHUE: Certainly. I have already explained the nine month preparatory. Here on October 1, and almost, usually always on that date, this column will come in and the examiner will usually, the examiner, and there is one examiner for CIA, will usually review this document in detail, going through, marking it up, seeing what areas he does not feel are adequately addressed, or in which he wants more information to address them in terms of a budget recommendation.

The things he would look for there are the criteria he would use, which would be for one thing incremental change from year to year, what it was in 1974 versus what they are proposing for 1976. He would look at the magnitude of resources involved here, and if it is a $50,000 project, he obviously would not have time to look over every $50,000 project, but if it is a $500 million project, he might very well look into it. He would look into critical areas, critical areas where we felt, or the Administration felt, or somebody had expressed a view that this was a critical area that needed to be addressed, and he might look at that area very closely. A new project coming along in the satellite field where the CIA had a responsibility, for example, might be looked at very closely, and he might look at something just to refamiliarize himself with the activities of a particular office.

He would, the present examiner at least, and there is no uniform guide here that an examiner would use, but the present examiner for example then prepared a list of written questions for the comptroller of the CIA for him to respond to based on his review of this document. In this case it was six pages worth of questions, 33 questions in all, asking specifically about a number of items, and I can give you some illustrations if you like of the type of detail that he would go into.

MR. GRAY: Why don't you read one or two and give us an idea?

MR. DONOHUE: All right.

Hearing to discuss the totality of 01 (KENNEN) related costs to the Agency covering as a minimum 1974, '75, and '76. The discussion should include by component the costs of R&D, computer and personnel distributions made by the Agency, and how this distribution is integrated into the United States overall classified photo interpretation effort. That may not mean much to you.

MR. BELIN: I wonder if we could include a copy of this as an exhibit to your testimony here?

Is there any particular reason that this cannot be included as an exhibit? This is all theoretically secret? Or do you feel you might not be able to?

MR. DONOHUE: Well, the code word I just mentioned, OI KENNEN, as a working paper, was not fully classified, so if I could check that out.

MR. BELIN: All right.

MR. DONOHUE: Let me give you one other example because it relates to one other aspect OMB has with respect to CIA, which is somewhat unique. Hearings with Office of Personnel to cover a justification of the 1976 request, and in general personnel management for the Agency supergrades and average grade requirements, and the status of the CIA retirement and disability system.

Prior to this meeting the examiner would like the following information: supergrade positions by name of position as of the end of FY '74 and anticipated for the end of FY '75. Lists should include whether occupied on June 30, 1974, and planned occupancy rate for the end of fiscal year '75. Overall accession, termination, trends and plans, 1970 through 1976, and average grade and average salary for these years. A paper indicating the Agency's long range plans for the financing of the CIA retirement and disability system fund in the light of the declining balance budget hearings in 1976.

Those are very detailed questions in terms of a budget examiner, and it is part of what I might say is a very intensive review on the part of OMB of the budget of CIA and in this particular case, fulfilling of a function somewhat beyond the scope of the normal budget examiner while looking at the personnel structure of the Agency, the rates of promotion, the average grade structure, the number of supergrades, the number of executive pay levels involved, the financing of the retirement system primarily here, because the Central Intelligence Agency system is not part of the Civil Service Commission and is now not reviewed by the Civil Service Commission as a government personnel system, so OMB does perform somewhat an additional role there.

Let me mention one other question here just to show you the amount of detail. Breakdown of personnel, full-time permanent, temporary part-time, and indigenous or local by station overseas for 1974 and 1975 and 1976.

MR. BELIN: What number of examiners or analysts do you have in connection with your review?

MR. DONOHUE: One examiner, full time, plus my own staff time that I would use in supervision of that exam.

MR. KIRKLAND: He works exclusively on CIA?

MR. DONOHUE: That's correct.

MR. BELIN: What choice of portions of the budget or offices is made for the closest scrutiny apart from the size?

MR. DONOHUE: Well, I gave you some criteria earlier for what his choice might be motivated by. He in this particular case I think looked at approximately 20 of the offices in some more detail out of approximately 50 offices, and that means that 30 were not looked at in closer detail other than what was in the written material. But he would give in to a fair amount of detail to a lot of the offices which would be relatively uncontroversial in terms of the resource requirements.

MR. BELIN: Are the hearings held on these areas, or are the written questions relied on exclusively?

MR. DONOHUE: No, the written questions would serve as a base for then holding a hearing, and I think in the case last year, the examiner indicated he spent approximately 75 to 80 hours in oral hearings, using the response he got in the written questions, plus the budget material, to elicit further information to serve as a basis for his recommendation to me, and ultimately to the Director on the level of resources that the CIA would require for 1976.

MR. SHANNON: Of the people participating in these hearings, they would be representatives from the administrative part of the CIA and perhaps the Deputy Director or one of the top level officials?

MR. DONOHUE: Particularly in the case of 1976, in fact, I accompanied the examiner for an initial session with three of the four major directorates in the CIA, and I think each of those sessions ran about two hours with Mr. Procter, Mr. Nelson, and Mr. Duckett. There was an additional session held wi

Mr. Blake, who is in charge of the administrative side, but these were really introductory to provide a total scope of each directorate's activities, followed by the 80 hours of hearings that he had, with usually representatives from the individual offices, whatever side they be in, operations side, or the intelligence production side or support side, and would request, or those people would be present for testimony, or not testimony, hearings on justifications for the budget.

end 5b

Tape 6
cbl

MR. [illegible]: Now, may the CIA appeal? Pardon me.

MR. SHANNON: I'm still not clear on to what extent the Director of the Agency participates in this kind of a review. Is he involved in this at all? He knows this is going on?

MR. DONOHUE: The Director of Central Intelligence?

MR. SHANNON: Yes.

MR. DONOHUE: The Director, of course, would have blessed this budget submission to OMB. His internal cycle calls for development of a program in the June-July timeframe. Prior to the October 1 submission, the time between June-July where he, as I understand it, would personally review it in the June-July timeframe would then be put into a budget document for October 1st, and generally we would be acquainted with what was going on, the magnitude of the resources, the major items that might influence the size of the budget in the June-July timeframe.

MR. SHANNON: But when you go back --

MR. DONOHUE: When we go back --

MR. SHANNON: To check on this, he is not sitting in on these things, you are doing it further down the line?

MR. DONOHUE: That's correct. It would be staff offices throughout CIA not the Director himself. If there was a need for a case to, in fact, have a session with the Director, if we felt it was important, I suppose we could request that, but in most cases the Agency attitude I think is very cooperative here, and if the information can be provided at whatever level, it is not a question of the individual director being present.

MR. GRAY: Mr. Donohue --

MR. DONOHUE: Appeals?

MR. GRAY: Appeals, that's right.

MR. DONOHUE: The process at that point would be CIA, the examiner of the CIA budget making a recommendation to me with my review to a division chief and the Office of Management and Budget, preparing a formal written preparation, submission on our recommendation, our staff recommendation to the Director of OMB in providing that in a session to the Associate Director, and the Director and the Deputy Director, a review of that budget with a recommendation as far as the total amounts to be involved, and the specific items that we would recommend for deletion. At that point the budget process provides for an appeal by the Agency head based on the Director of OMB's decision. He can appeal or he cannot. In the last five years he has appealed the last two years. He did not appeal the previous three years. He would appeal to the President and the decision would be made by the President.

MR. GRAY: In the last five years, how much are you cutting his request approximately? I don't need specific figures.

MR. DONOHUE: Are you talking in terms of the OBM staff recommendation, the staff of OMB's recommendations or the Director decision?

ch

MR. GRAY: Let's talk about the Director's decision.

MR. DONOHUE: It is three to five percent.

MR. BELIN: How was the CIA's budget submitted to Congress?

MR. DONOHUE: By the provisions of 50 USC-403 which is the basic CIA statute. The Director of OMB is authorized to transfer funds to the Agency from other accounts, and by tradition the method of identifying the accounts in which the CIA budget is carried to the Congress is by a letter from the Director of OMB to the Chairman of the Appropriations Committees in the House and the Senate identifying the appropriation amount, its location in the budget, and the financing schedule including the amount of contingents or reserve of which the Agency would have available during the coming year. Those letters would go in, in the last year to Mr. McClellan and Mr. Mahon, and they would be responded to at the completion of the appropriations process by Mr. Mahon and Mr. McClellan, Senator McClellan, and Congressman Mahon to the Director of OMB identifying the amount they had appropriated.

MR. BELIN: And that is in the Department of Defense budget generally, is that right?

MR. DONOHUE: Yes. It has been.

MR. BELIN: And after the appropriations bill is passed, how are the funds made available to the CIA?

MR. DONOHUE: Upon completion of the appropriations bill, well, they would be operating under a continuing resolution prior to the completion of the appropriations action, but they would be transferred first from the DOD account to a separate account in the Treasury, and secondly an apportionment of those funds to the CIA for actual expenditures. Those numbers might differ primarily on the basis of if funds were identified for contingency reserve the appropriation amount, that amount transferred, and apportioned, the amount appropriated would always be transferred into this special Treasury account, and the amount apportioned might vary depending upon the amount identified for holding within a contingency and subsequently released.

MR. BELIN: Is there any other way in which funds are made available to the Agency?

MR. DONOHUE: Yes. The major other additional way, of course, is transfers under the Economy Act provisions. Well, I am not an expert on the Economy Act, but it essentially provides the funds to be transferred to an agency where it can perform a service with economy to another government agency, and has a unique capability, or a unique ability or can provide common service to a number of government agencies, and those transfers would be made in this case to CIA. One of the largest as cited here would be those from the National Reconnaissa Office in charge of satellite development where CIA acts as a developer, and procurer of some of that equipment, and fairly large sums have annually been provided to the CIA through that mechanism. I would point out that those funds are reviewed by the intelligence unit of OMB in the context of the National Reconnissance Office and the total satellite programs.

MR. BELIN: What is the largest amount transferred in such manner?

MR. DONOHUE: I can't give you a detailed answer there, but I think the transfer by NRO has historically run in the last few years at about 24 $300 million a year.

MR. BELIN: Are most funds eventually transferred to the Agency under the Economy Act identified as such in the budget submissions of the transferring agencies?

MR. DONOHUE: No, I don't believe they would be identified as transfer items in the budget submissions by the agencies. Of course, in most cases large items here would be the satellite activities, and also the other problem we discussed earlier, the other area that we discussed earlier, those would not be identified, but would be known generally as those programs in which CIA had an interest, and had the responsibility for carrying out the research, development, procurement, engineering and the project.

MR. BELIN: Is OMB approval required for the CIA to shift funds from one program to another?

MR. DONOHUE: Internally within CIA, CIA does have a flexibility to reprogram within the total budget amount approved

(Jpw

by the President. Of course, that is something that would generally not be the wisest thing for an agency to do, especially if it was a program that had not been approved for some reason, or had been deleted in the previous budget submission, because it would entail, therefore, a further look at it by the OMB examiner, and an additional justification, but they technically could reprogram their funds within their total availability to cover their needs as they saw them. Obviously working nine months ahead of the fiscal year in terms of preparation of the budget there would be items that would increase, and they would have to cover these, and they would not require our approval for the reprogramming as such.

MR. GRISWOLD: What is NRO?

MR. DONOHUE: National Reconnaissance Office. That office which is responsible for the development, procurement, launch and operation of satellite reconnaissance vehicles.

MR. BELIN. Now, OMB does not have any responsibility for any audit or inspector general duties over at the CIA, does it?

MR. DONOHUE: No, it does not. Obviously our interest in prior year funding is primarily an interest in which to develop a base of information on historical expenditures for the purpose of evaluating future year requirements, the budgets, fiscal year budget year requirements that have been identified. It is not for purposes of going back to see that funds were

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

actually spent for the intended purpose, although it is conceivable that we might run across a question along that line. It is not a function that we would normally perform. The inspector general role, of course, is one that we also do not perform and CIA has their own inspector general function as part of the Agency.

I would like to comment additionally on that, that those two functions of auditor and inspector general would basically be in conflict with the primary, the basic budget function of OMB in terms of attempting to assess future year requirements. The honesty with which an agency would project his future year requirements based on an indepth audit approach to prior year funding would probably create more difficulties for us in terms of attempting to examine these future needs.

MR. BELIN: Would OBM generally detect an improper activity if it involved a small number of people and a small amount of money?

MR. DONOHUE: As a general rule, I think it would probably not have the capability to get down to small numbers of people engaged in improper activities or a small number of dollars improperly used. Obviously we cannot follow red wigs bought on an individual basis.

MR. BELIN: At what level --

MR. DONOHUE: We do not attempt to do that and have not succeeded in doing that.

MR. BELIN: At what level of either people or money would such an activity be detected if it were improper?

MR. DONOHUE: That is very hard to answer. It would depend on a lot of factors, some of which I enumerated earlier. But for example if there was express presidential interest in questions of illegal activities conducted by the Foreign Resources Division of CIA's Directorate of Operations, the budget examiner might look at that very intently during the coming year, and maybe the coming two or three years, and might notice some illegal activities at a fairly small size. But as a rule, I think we can say that unless you are approaching something on the order of $1 million or something on the order of 100 people involved, that the large number of CIA people that there are, we probably could not notice it.

MR. BELIN: Then did OMB become aware of a CIA transfer of $34,000 to the White House in 1970 to fund responses to letterson Nixson's Cambodia speech?

MR. DONOHUE: No, we were not aware and it was not requested, it was not transferred under the authority of the CIA Act of 1949.

MR. BELIN: Did the OMB become aware of Richard Ober's Special Operations Group which was monitoring American dissidents?

MR. DONOHUE: We did not.

MR. BELIN: Did OMB become aware of mail opening or main intercept programs of the CIA?

MR. DONOHUE: We were not familiar with any mail opening operation in the U.S.

MR. BELIN: Were you aware of any assistance to police departments given by the Office of Security of CIA?

MR. DONOHUE: I have checked the files on that particular question, and as of the moment I cannot locate any information indicating our knowledge. As I say, I was not the examiner on CIA during that period, but I found no information in the files indicating our knowledge thereof. My own recollection is that CIA did not attempt to hide, and it was known that they were involved in some training of police on a reimbursable basis from the departments. I do not think that was hidden, but I do not have any records to prove it, and it is a very vague recollection for me.

MR. BELIN: Were OMB people aware of investigations by the Office of Security of CIA which might have involved wire tapes and surreptitious entries?

MR. DONOHUE: Other than things that I have read in the newspaper, no, we were not familiar with any such activities in the United States.

MR. BELIN: Would you please describe for us cases in which the OBM has questioned the propriety of CIA activities?

MR. DONOHUE: Propriety is a difficult term to deal with. If the question becomes one of illegality, I think there probably are only two instances, if it is broadly interpreted in terms of whether the Agency should, in fact, do that for whatever reason. It would cover a large number of things. Obviously we make a number, a large number of specific recommendations in their budget each year. Let me touch on a couple of those. One was the liquidation by CIA of some airlines it was running as proprietary operations in which CIA originally proposed to its congressional committee that the proceeds from these liquidations be used to off-set their budget request for fiscal '74. As it turned out, they were, in fact, used partially with the approval of the Congress to off-set $\overset{24}{\$4}$ million of CIA budgetary requirements for fiscal year '74. In fiscal year '75, CIA did not make a proposal to include such liquidating assest as an off-set to its regular budget, and the Office of Management and Budget proposed that it do so and, in fact, reduced CIA's appropriations by $\overset{24}{\$20}$ million because of anticipated receipts from these, from the sale of these proprietaries during fiscal year '75.

Subsequently the CIA General Counsel, Mr. Warner, indicated that he felt there was some legal question involved in terms of the propriety of use of proprietary receipts here to off-set the obligation requirements of CIA. We reviewed it with him. Based on the legal opinion that he gave, which Mr. Colby concurred in, we reviewed it with our legal counsel, and our legal counsel indicated that this was probably a reasonable position on the part of the CIA, and so those funds are now not being used to off-set CIA appropriations. It was not one we originated. In fact, the CIA General Counsel originated it. It is probably a debatable legal question, as a matter of fact, but as it turned out we decided those funds would not be utilized to off-set regular appropriations.

MR. GRISWOLD: But they are recovered into the Treasury receipts?

MR. DONOHUE: At this point they will be used as regular receipts in the Treasury.

MR. GRISWOLD: They are not additional funds for the CIA to spend?

MR. DONOHUE: That is correct, and we were attempting to ensure that they were used to off-set regular CIA appropriations at the time of the appropriations and of the President's budget as opposed to the subsequent Congressional reduction, using the same funds.

A couple of other items which I would just like to cite in areas where OBM has been involved in the past where CIA activities might relevant is the Equal Employment Opportunity, which again because of CIA's unique statutory exemption, not unique, but exemption from the Civil Service Commission review, OMB has initiated action to insure that CIA made a conscientious effort to achieve equal employment opportunity goals. I have mentioned the covert action project previously which there was a question of roles and mission. I think there is one other episode like that where it is partly roles and missions, but it is certainly where I as the unit chief in OBM could use the guidance of this commission, and that is the use of some CIA equipment and some CIA involvement jointly with the FBI in conducting surveillance of foreign embassies, foreign residences, and which the commission, or which I think it is unclear at the present time the extent to which these operations are involved in positive foreign intelligence collection, which obviously is an appropriate mission for CIA versus counterintelligence activities more appropriately seems a mission for the FBI.

MR. BELIN: Basically what --

MR. DONOHUE: Can I add a couple of items to this?

MR. BELIN: Go right ahead.

MR. DONOHUE: I do recall very heavy involvement by our office in it, and again I was not personally involved in the implementation of the Katzenbach Report in '67 when it was decided that CIA involvement in private volunteer organizations seemed at that point to be inappropriate. And while I am not sure there was a distinct question of legality involved, it was decided that some of these activities should not be continued and OMB was instrumental in insuring that the Agency did not fund these activities which by presidential decision had been cited to be beyond the realm of CIA at that particular point.

MR. BELIN: What impact, if any, has OMB had on the management of the CIA?

MR. DONOHUE: You get into a much broader question there, and I would like to spend a few minutes just elaborating on the larger role that OMB has with respect to management, some of which I think may be Mr. O'Neill covered. But, there would be smaller instances of management activities that we would become involved in on an almost routine basis. I had mentioned personnel management as an area that we look into heavily, but there are other programmatic areas where we would feel that CIA's relationship with another agency of government might need to be straightened out, and we would initiate steps to try and straighten that out. I can think here of transferring of funding for certain third-party SIGINT operations to the National Security Agency where we were heavily involved. On a broader scale we were very intimately involved as a staff in OMB in support of Dr. Schlesinger in his 1971 re-organization study of the intelligence community, and that had very broad recommendations with respect to the organization of the Foreign Intelligence activities of the U.S., such as the President signed off I guess a 10 page directive in November '71 which provided for a greater role for the Director of Central Intelligence in the management and coordination of the overall U.S. Foreign Intelligence effort.

I could go into that in more detail, Mr. Belin, but this is up to you. This is a very long and exhaustive study amounting to about a year of staff time and essentially six members of the intelligence community.

MR. BELIN: Because of the time limitations, I am going to turn to another area, and that is whether or not since the CIA is not subject to the General Accounting Office, and it is not subject to thorough Congressional review, do you believe that OMB's oversight role should be expanded either in concept or in staff so that there might be a better opportunity to reduce any improper activity?

MR. DONOHUE: I think that the chance there of an enlarged OMB staff, in fact, discovering illegal or improper activities with an agency that is extremely adept at hiding things if it wishes would really be impossible. I don't think, with one examiner presently on the budget, and review of that agency that two, three, five would essentially make a difference, and it would essentially require a large number of people to, in fact, do the type of audit function that GAO does for the question of improper activities to really arise in order to get into that in such detail, at least as a guarantee, an expanded OMB staff could not provide that guarantee unless it essentially changed its function to one of audit, and even in that case it would be a post-audit function. It would be one that would discover illegal activities committed perhaps two or three years ago, and not activities currently under commission. I do not believe OMB could easily accept any additional responsibility in the area of audit. It is just beyond its charter. It is out of tune with its scope as an agency, and would basically be counterproductive in terms of our basic function.

MR. BELIN: Well, do you have any other recommendations involving OMB's relationship with the CIA?

MR. DONOHUE: In terms of OMB's role I see a number of things that probably we could do to, in fact, strengthen it in relatively minor ways. I offer them not in any hope of guaranteeing in any sense that improper or illegal activities would not occur, but certainly we could take a closer review of CIA's proprietary operations which now, when once established as an element, we would not require any continuing government funding, and would not generally be reviewed by OMB, except in so far as they required annual transfers to these proprietaries for maintenance. There probably could be some increase in OMB review of transfers to and from CIA under all provisions of the law. They probably have to be restricted to major transfers because there are a large number of minor transfers that reimburse personnel on detail that would be very difficult if not impossible to track.

OMB could undertake some stricter apportionment of CIA by project or by office, or by program which we do not now do. We essentially apportion to CIA as an agency, and they have the liberty to reprogram within those funds. We could tighten that to a certain extent.

We could probably not get down to each individual project or each individual office, but we could provide some limitations within four, five, possibly as many as ten categories where they would then have to seek our approval for reprogramming actions. That would help us in giving a closer review of CIA on its reprogramming actions at the same time.

These are things that could involve some additional paperwork. I don't think they have, would have much prospect for really providing a guarantee against illegal or improper activities.

MR. BELIN: Any questions by any members of the Commission?

MR. CONNOR: No.

MR. BELIN: Any other comments that you want to make, Mr. Donohue, for the record?

MR. DONOHUE: No. I think I've probably covered it as well as I can, in fact.

MR. BELIN: Well thank you very much for coming here.

MR. DONOHUE: Thank you.

(Whereupon, at 6:40 o'clock p.m. the Committee was recessed.)

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSA
RECORD NUMBER : 144-10001-10213

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSA
FROM : NEW YORK TIMES
TO :

TITLE :
OSWALD CALLS TO EMBASSIES REPORTED TAPED BY CIA

DATE : 09/21/75
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
ARTICLE IN NEW YORK TIMES RE TAPED CALLS TO SOVIET EMBASSY

DOCUMENT TYPE : NEWSPAPER
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/12/95

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

+5133 mary, 4025

ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP

Date 4 Jan 80

TO: (Name, office symbol, room number, building, Agency/Post)	Initials	Date
1. Betty Wyuat		
2. D4/AHA (Betty Wahat)		
3.		
4.		
5.		

☐	Action	☒	File	☐	Note and Return
☐	Approval	☐	For Clearance	☒	Per Conversation
☐	As Requested	☐	For Correction	☐	Prepare Reply
☐	Circulate	☐	For Your Information	☐	See Me
☐	Comment	☐	Investigate	☐	Signature
☐	Coordination	☐	Justify	☐	

REMARKS

Attached is the report we did on checking the Oswald Papers for the Warren Commission. I suspect its the only copy. The handwritten date (over)

DO NOT use this form as a RECORD of approvals, concurrences, disposals, clearances, and similar actions

FROM: (Name, org. symbol, Agency/Post) Jim Gengler

RAYMOND J. GENGLER

Room No.—Bldg.

Phone No.

5041-102

OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.206

☆ GPO : 1977 O - 241-530 (3450)

is the correct one.
I added it at the
time.

ing interests, had been

napped on Feb. 4, 1974, a few days short of a year before Mr. Scott went to the Harrisburg police.

Hearst, the Harrises

Yoshimura, a woman fleeing

Continued on Page 20, Column 3

Oswald Calls to Embassies Reported Taped by C.I.A.

By NICHOLAS M. HORROCK

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Sept. 20—The Central Intelligence Agency secretly tape-recorded two telephone conversations between Lee Harvey Oswald and the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City some eight weeks before President Kennedy was shot to death on Nov. 22, 1963, in Dallas, Government sources familiar with the events said today.

The call to the Soviet Embassy, according to the sources, alerted the C.I.A. to the presence of Oswald in Mexico City, and on Oct. 10 the agency warned the Federal Bureau of Investigation. There is no indication that the F.B.I., which was investigating Oswald for his pro-Castro activities, ever followed up on the information.

The call to the Cuban Embassy, the sources said, was not associated with Oswald until after the death of Mr. Kennedy. A Federal commission headed by Chief Justice Earl Warren found that Oswald, acting alone, had slain the President.

To Avoid Publicity

The calls were reportedly placed by Oswald on a trip to Mexico City in late September and early October, 1963. The events of this trip have never been fully made public and have been the subject of speculation for more than a decade.

The reports of the calls are the latest developments in the increasing speculation about the Warren Commission's conclusions. Evidence that the C.I.A. and the F.B.I. may have been less than candid with the commission has added to the questions surrounding the as-

Continued on Page 49, Column 1

Associated Press

Secretary of State Kissinger with Shimon Peres, Israeli Defense Minister, after their meeting in Washington.

of the

has been close to

the years, although

ly there has been

tween him and Pre

Mr. Khaddam is p

in Syria's efforts

the civil strife in

The Egyptian a

two men thus

weight beyond

issue.

Today, more

time a fair-size

mated at

the streets in

strate against

They marched

office shoutin

Yasir!" Demo

kind are usu

Continued on

Chilean Junta Resisting

By JONATHAN KANDELL

Special to The New York Times

SANTIAGO, Chile, Sept. 16—Two years after the bloody coup that toppled the Marxist coalition government of President Salvador Allende Gossens, the military junta that governs Chile has developed a siege mentality against critics of its harsh economic recovery program and of its continuing violations of human rights.

Unemployment is at its highest in at least four decades and industrial production has dropped sharply this year.

But the junta has vowed to continue an austerity program aimed almost exclusively at dampening the perennial rise in inflation and diminishing the state's role in the economy.

Arbitrary arrests and re-

ports of to

in recent

because of

fidence tha

version ha

hand, suc

tually be

and the s

remains

still abo

oners, ac

ment.

The j

knowled

than 1,0

tained

Lawyer

pect th

sing p

tention

ters.

G

The

has

Chile

larly

has

tiat

eig

I

Re

bil

co

vi

S

C

Today's Sections

Section	1 (2 Parts)	News
Section	2	Arts and Leisure
Section	3	Business and Finance
Section	4	The Week in Review
Section	5	Sports
Section	6	Magazine
(Part 2)		Report on Men's Wear
Section	7	Book Review
Section	8	*Real Estate
Section	9	*Employment Advertising
Section	10	Travel and Resorts

*Included in all copies distributed in New York City and the suburban area.

Index to Subjects

	Section	Page
Amusement News	1	52-53
Art	2	31-32
Bridge	2	42
Chess	2	43
Dance	2	10
Editorial/Op-Ed	4	16-17
Fashions/Home Fashions	6	60-63
Film	2	15
Food	6	64
Gardens/Home Repairs	2	38,42
Letters to the Editors	4	16
Music/Recordings	2	17-18
News Summary & Index	1	63
Obituaries	1	55
Photography	2	42
Puzzles	6	76
Ship Movements	1	63
Society	1	57-62
Stamps/Coins	2	36-37
Theater	2	5
TV/Radio	2	25
TV (Late Listings)	1	63

FOOT IS HERE! First Factual Account [illegible] Book Review Page 41

June Graduates Find More Jobs Than Expected

By SETH S. KING

Special to The New York Times

EVANSTON, Ill., Sept. 20—The graduating seniors in the class of '75, who in June were thought to have the poorest chances for employment since the Great Depression, are faring better than the forecasters had expected.

Few of them were courted by the employers this time. Most of them had to try longer and harder to find a job and had to settle for something less than they had hoped for.

The job offers came later in the summer than usual. And many of 1975's graduates are now working in places that they had not even considered living in before.

But many have been delighted to find that inflation has pushed starting salaries, especially for engineers and particularly for women engineers, far above last year's.

90% Find Jobs

Placement directors at universities and colleges in many parts of the country said this week that the majority of those seniors who made the effort were now employed in the fields they had trained for, or in something related to them.

"We've found that more than 90 per cent of Northwestern's June graduates who really sought jobs have now found them," said Victor R. Lindquist, director of placement at this large private university's Evanston campus.

"Of course, that's below the 95 per cent or higher rate we've had for the past three years," he said. "But when you consider how poor the prospects were this spring, it's not as bad as you'd expect."

The College Placement Council of Bethlehem, Pa., in a survey of 156 colleges and universities, found that by August job offers to the class of 1975 had dropped 27 per cent below last year. Of the 6,984 seniors

Continued on Page 45, Column 2

New York Times
Sunday 21 Sept 75
p 1

Continued From Page 1, Col. 2

sassination and has led to more calls for a reopening of the inquiry.

The Mexico City trip was given scant treatment in the Warren Commission report because publication of information about it might have exposed "sources and methods" of the C.I.A. and impaired national security, intelligence officers and commission staff sources have said.

In response to inquiries about the matter from The New York Times, the C.I.A. issued an unusual public statement on the matter. It would not confirm that there were any tape-recorded conversations but said:

"On October 9, 1963 Central Intelligence Agency headquarters received information that a person named Lee Oswald contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in late September or early October, 1963. In transmitting the information on 10 October 1963 Central Intelligence Agency headquarters said Lee Oswald was probably identical to Lee Henry (sic) Oswald, a former radar operator in the United States Marine Corps, born 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, who defected to the Soviet Union in 1959 and who, subsequently made arrangements to return to tho United States with a Russian wife.

From F.B.I. Reports

"This biographical data was based upon Federal Bureau of Investigation reports provided to Central Intelligence Agency following Oswld's defection to the Soviet Union.

"This information was also provided to the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Department of the Navy, the United States Ambassador and his staff in Mexico and to the Representative of the F.B.I. in Mexico.

"Following the assassination of President Kennedy, Central Intelligence Agency records revealed that a person believed to be Oswald was in contact with the Cuban Embassy on 27 September 1963 for the purpose of receiving a transit visa for use enroute to the U.S.S.R.

"In addition a number of photographs of individuals believed to be in contact with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico City were received from the Central Intelligence Agency station in Mexico and were compared with pictures of Lee Harvey Oswald by C.I.A. officers in Mexico City and C.I.A. headquarters and by United States authorities in Dallas, Texas.

United Press International

Lee Harvey Oswald

"It was determined that none of these photographs was the photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald. Their determinations, and the raw data upon which they were based, along with the reports of his visit to the Soviet Embassy, were made to the Warren and Rockefeller Commissions as were all other materials relevant to the investigation of President Kennedy's death."

Three staff members of the Warren Commission were assigned to investigate the Mexico City trip and other matters involving the C.I.A.—William T. Coleman, now Secretary of Transportation; Howard P. Willens, a formerJustice Department official now in private law practice, and W. David Slawson, a law professor in California.

Mr. Coleman said in a telephone interview that he was "disturbed" about the possibility that United State security might be harmed by recent disclosures of F.B.I. and C.I.A. activities. But he acknowledged that he and other staff members had received information from the C.I.A. on Oswald's activities in Mexico, and they did not run counter to the commission's conclusion that Oswald, acting alone, killed President Kennedy and a Dallas police officer, J. J. Tippitt.

Sure Others Learned

Mr. Coleman said he was sure that J. Lee Rankin, the Warren Commission's chief counsel, had been informed of the C.I.A., Mexico City data and that "at least two or three commission members" knew. He could not remember if the commission had ever discussed the matter in executive session. Mr. Willens and Mr. Slawson declined to make public comment.

Sources familiar with the contents of the tapes said that Oswald had been seeking a transit visa from Cuban officials and that he had been "rebuffed." One source said that the call to the Soviet Embassy had been an effort to get help in furthering his application at the Cuban Embassy.

These sources said there had been no "conspiratorial" tone to the conversations and one source called them "benign." Moreover, the sources said, the C.I.A. had information that the Cubans were suspicious of and unsympathetic to Oswald. One source said the Cubans regarded Oswald's behavior in returning to the United States from the Soviet Union and then asking to go back as "strange."

Asked if anything said might have "triggered" Oswald, a Castro supporter, to take "retaliation" against President Kennedy, one source said he thought not but said that he thought Oswald had been "frustrated" by the Cubans.

Known by F.B.I.

The F.B.I. acknowledged at the Warren Commission hearings that it had received information from the C.I.A. about Oswald's Mexican contact with the Soviet Embassy on Oct. 10, 1963. Former F.B.I. agents involved in the investigation said the bureau knew that Oswald had been trying to return to the Soviet Union.

Under bureau operating procedures at that time, the F.B.I. followed up on any unexplained visit by an American citizen to Communist embassies and consulates. It would have been particularly watchful in the case of Oswald, who had defected once.

The bureau jargon for such unexplained visits was "bogies" and agents were sent to interview the person on why he or she had been in contact with the Communists. The only reason this was not done in Oswald's case, these sources said, may have been because he was already under an F.B.I. security investigation in connection with pro-Castro activities.

The bureau's formal response to these questions was to refer to the Warren Commission report. In the report it was noted that James P. Hosty Jr., special agent of the Dallas field office, attempted to interview Oswald about his Cuban activities on Nov. 1.

---

was no promiscuous [illegible] of trash then. That happens a lot now, though."

Personnel Cuts

Sanitation personnel there have been cut from 1,450 to 935. They collect about 2,800 tons a day, compared with the 24,000 tons generated daily in New York City.

Mayor Beame's ultimatum to clean up the streets within 10 days expires tomorrow at midnight. Some progress has been reported.

Sanitation Commissioner Robert T. Groh, who resigned today amid mounting public criticism of his department's performance, attributed the unsightly dirty streets and overflowing rubbish barrels to manpower reductions. An average of 3,100 men is on duty daily now, compared with 4,000 in former years.

If more men are not hired, Mr. Groh said, "we'll just have to get accustomed to living like this; our standards will have to be lowered."

Solutions suggested in other cities included new laws and taxes governing packaging, use of an all-purpose returnable bottle and the painting of workers' names on sanitation trucks to enable citizens to hold them responsible for sloppy work.

But others believe a real solution rests only in changing people's behavior. City streets, said the Chicago columnist, Mike Royko, "are as clean as people in that neighborhood want them to be."

Mr. Powers of Keep America Beautiful professes optimism. The fiscal crises of the nation's cities, he said, are making more people aware that they can not rely on government to solve all their problems.

"This is a very, very slow process," he said. "I'm not suggesting there is a big movement across the country and we will have the situation cleaned up in five years. But there is a new attitude, and I am encouraged."



Soft, Subtle, and Sophisticated



It
SHI
Accessor
satchels
double-h
your sho
findings
Fall color



JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSA
RECORD NUMBER : 144-10001-10218

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : NSA
FROM : NSA/OFC OF POLICY
TO : MARK ALLEN

TITLE :
INFO ON JFK ASSASSINATION INVESTIGATION

DATE : 03/16/81
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
INVESTIGATION INTO JFK ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : LETTER
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : O
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/12/95

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Serial: N9022

[illegible]

Mr. Mark Allen
P. O. Box 9032
Washington, DC 20003

Dear Mr. Allen:

This responds to your letter of 12 January 1981 in which you request all correspondence or records of any communication between this Agency and the U. S. House Select Committee on Assassinations concerning the Committee's investigation into the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Your request has been processed under the provisions of 5 U.S.C. 552, the Freedom of Information Act. Information which is releasable is enclosed.

National Security Agency/Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) functions, activities, and internal organizational designators, as well as titles and names of NSA/CSS employees, have been deleted from the enclosures. These deletions have been made pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), in conjunction with 50 U.S.C. 402 note (Public Law 86-36). Section 6 of Public Law 86-36 provides that no law shall be construed to require the disclosure of the organization. or any function of the NSA, of any information with respect to the activities thereof, or of the names, titles, salaries, or number of persons employed by the Agency.

Other items have been deleted from the enclosures pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(6), as their disclosure would cause an unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the individuals concerned.

The remaining items have been deleted because they are classified and therefore exempt from access or release pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(1), which provides that the Freedom of Information Act does not apply to matters that are specifically authorized under criteria established by an Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of national defense or foreign policy and are in fact properly classified pursuant to such Executive order. The information is currently and properly classified in accordance with the criteria for classification in Section 1-3 of Executive Order 12065, and paragraph 2-202 of Department of Defense Regulation 5200.1-R. The information has been reviewed for possible declassification or downgrading according to the provisions of Sections 3-3, 3-4, and 3-6 of Executive Order 12065 and Chapter III of DoD Regulation 5200.1-R and found to be properly excluded from declassification or downgrading.

Kennedy [illegible]

Serial: N9022

In addition, this Agency is authorized by law to protect certain information concerning its activities. Title 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(3), exempts matters that are specifically exempted from disclosure by statute. The applicable statutes in this case are 18 U.S.C. 798, 50 U.S.C. 402 note (Public Law 86-36), and 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3). DoD Directive 5400.7, Sections III and VI.C.3, specifically recognizes this exemption.

As the deleted items constitute a partial denial of your request, you are hereby advised of this Agency's appeal procedures.

Any person denied access to records, or parts thereof, may, within 30 days after notification of the denial, file an appeal to the NSA/CSS Freedom of Information Act Appeal Authority. The appeal shall be in writing addressed to the NSA/CSS FOIA Appeal Authority, National Security Agency, Fort George G. Meade, MD 20755. The appeal shall reference the initial denial of access and shall contain, in sufficient detail and particularity, the grounds upon which the requester believes release of the information is required. The NSA/CSS Appeal Authority shall respond to the appeal within 20 working days after receipt.

Please be advised that records originated by the Congress of the United States are not subject to the Freedom of Information Act.

Sincerely,

ORIGINAL SIGNED BY

EUGENE F. YEATES
Chief, Office of Policy

Encls:
a/s

cc: L221 (less encls)
U " "
Q32 RF (less encls)
LAO

CONCUR: U _______________

M/R: Classified portions of the records were bracketed by M. Levin and P. Dinwoodie on 26 Feb 1981.

L. Figallo, Q324, 3085s, 9 March 1981, dd

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10001

RECORDS SERIES :
INDEX CARDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 491

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 133
Index Cards - June 1975 and July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 8-2-94 lu
(1)(4) 23-2-98 KP

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: ✓
Helms, Richard Leyland Bus Co.	1962	Castro ✓ Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no limitations were placed on the means. In fact, I never recall having been told by anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26) (The above statements refer to Mongoose.) Helms testified that "the pressure was very intense and I remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several "very nutty schemes." (26) Helms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pig and then lay dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. Afterwards interest tapered off, although Helms recalled efforts in 1963 involving "economic warfare" such as turning off oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries including an attempt to stop the sale [redacted] of buses to Cuba. (27)

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/28/75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(continuation)

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "lubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial [redacted] A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
~~2-2-94~~ 8-2-94 (2 cards)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE, [illegible] Y,

DATES:

Mar 13, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE
CUBA ✓

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Opa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued [redacted] help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, 13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 8-2-94
~~KP 2/2/98~~

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] LASH, A. M. [redacted] McCONE	McNAMARA SPECIAL GRP. (AUGMENTED)	August 10-11 1962	CASTRO ✓

OCCURRENCE:

CIA officer [redacted] and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with [redacted], in Copenhagen (85). [redacted] reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).

DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's suggestion that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 8-2-94

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] LASH, A. M.	August 14-23 1962	CASTRO ✓

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted] and [redacted] a Spanish speaking case officer [redacted] give A.M. LASH-1 S/W training and supplies.

On August 17, 1962 [redacted] cables CIA headquarters that "have no intention give /A.M. LASH/ physical elimination mission as requirement but recognized this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative." (85).

CIA headquarters replied to [redacted] by cable on 18 August: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given /A.M. LASH/." (85).
(emphasis added)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8-2-94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
Kp 23/2/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	KIRKPATRICK DDP Mr. Halpern CHEEVER	11/14/62 Nov. 21, 1962 10/30/62	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORID teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

STAFF: Paul Wallach

FILE:

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 8-2-94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT ~~Kp 23/2/98~~

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson Cheever	Oct 31, 1961	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

As for psychological operations, all CIA assets (including Lawrence Kieves) had been turned over to USIA for operational use.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00744)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
as sanitized
8-2-94 lee

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
Kp 23/2/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Edwards King Bannerman	[redacted] O'Connell	11/62	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not [redacted] or [redacted] knew (100)

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 8-2-94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
KP 23/2/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	KIRKPATRICK	~~DATES:~~ 11/14/62	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	DDP Mr. Halpern CHEEVER	Nov. ~~21, 1962~~ 10/30/62	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba ✓

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORID teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:

STAFF: Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 8-2-94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
KP 23/2/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
William Harvey
Gen. Lansdale
Walter Elder
DCI
KIRKPATRICK
DDP
Mr. Halpern
CHEEVER

DATES:
11/14/62
Nov. 21, 1962
10/30/62

CATEGORIES:
Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongoose
Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORID teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE:
Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:

STAFF:
Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10056

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : SCHLESINGER, ARTHUR JR
TO : THE PRESIDENT

TITLE :
CIA REORGANIZATION

DATE : 06/10/61
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
CIA
COVERT ACTION
PARAMILITARY WARFARE
CUBA
POLICY CONTROL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 244
Folder 7
Exhibit 5 to R. Goodwin testimony on 7/18/75

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort [redacted]

(1)(B)
(1)(C)
4 NOV 93

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operation. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to ____
☐ With concurrence of ____
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
~~EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a)~~ (1)(C)
FPC/HDR by ____ 12-16-1983
RK/AC

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

~~9. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. [CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover]~~

(1)(B)
4 NOV 93

~~Delete all of~~
Sec 3

JFK ACT

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to ______
☐ With concurrence of ______
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
~~EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a)~~ (1) (2)
FPC/HDR by ______ 12-6-93

8c
(1)(B)
4 NOV 93

(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." None-theless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

8c
(1)(B)
(1)(C)
4 NOV 93

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. [redacted] On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration [redacted] officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period [redacted]) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 123 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section [redacted]. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of [redacted] Embassy, a fact well known locally; and in

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Delete Sec 3 ☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to ____
☐ With concurrence of ____
JPIC Acct ☐ ~~Declassify~~ ~~☐ In~~ part and excise as shown (1)(C)
~~EO 12356, Sec. 1.3(a)(~~
FPC/HDR by ~~[illegible]~~ ~~12-6-93~~

SECRET

Delete Sec3

JFK Act

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☒ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to 9.
☐ With concurrence of
☐ Declassify ☐ In part and excise as shown
~~EO 12356~~, Sec. (1)(C)
FPC/HDR by 12 6 93

8c (1)(B) 4 NOV 93

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them: when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10087

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPTR

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-352

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF SAMUEL HALPERN

DATE : 06/18/75
PAGES : 89

SUBJECTS :
CUBA
ASSASSINATION
CASTRO
MAFIA
SPECIAL GROUP
BISSELL,
LANSDALE, EDWARD
HARVEY
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ZOGBEY
POISON
AMLASH
5412 COMMITTEE
ZRRIFLE
TASK FORCE W
MAHEU, ROBERT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

COMMENTS :

Box 245
Folder 9

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.

I would like to ask Mr. Schwarz if he would give us a brief synopsis of what we intend to question our witness about this morning.

Mr. Schwarz. The witness this morning will only be a single witness. He is Mr. Samuel Halpern. He was in the Far East, and I have now found out he was involved in [redacted] some alleged killing of an agent in Tailand, which are collateral matters that we may want to take up with him at the end.

But he came back here in the fall of 1961 and was instructed as assistant to get into the Cuban matter. And he will testify that he was told that they would proceed to overthrow the Castro government, and that there were no holds barred.

He will then describe the way in whch they worked with the Special Group.

The Chairman. What was Halpern's position?

Mr. Schwarz. Halpern's position was as Executive Assistant to Harvey. And Harvey, you will remember, was the man that was actually in charge of the Cuban position.

The Chairman. When are we going to get Harvey?

Mr. Schwarz. He is coming next Wednesday morning.

We are going to get some of this same conflict between the no-holds-barred testimony, which in his mind I guess he

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Who else was present at that meeting?

Mr. Halpern. A Mr. Ghose Zogbey. He was my branch chief.

Mr. Schwarz. Is he alive today, or is he dead?

Mr. Halpern. He died last year.

Mr. Schwarz. Approximately when in the fall of 1961 did that meeting take place?

Mr. Halpern. About the middle of October 1961.

Mr. Schwarz. What instructions were you given by Mr. Bissell at tht meeting?

Mr. Halpern. Mr. Bissell said he had recently -- and he didn't specificy the date or the time -- he had recently been chewed out in the Cabinet Room of the White House by borh the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both Mr. Zogbey and to me were to plan for an operation to accomplish that end.

Mr. Schwarz. Was any content put into the term "get rid of", or was that the term that was used, and only that term?

Mr. Halpern. To the best of my recollection, that was it. There was no limitation of any kind. Nothing was forbidden, and nothing was withheld. And the objective was to remove Castro and his regime.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you talk about tactics at all in that meeting, or was it just a general discussion about getting organized.

Mr. Halpern. Just a general discussion as to what we would do, how we would proceed, and what we would need. And at that point I had no idea how many people were left on the staff in the branch only having been on the job a day or a day and a half.

Mr. Schwarz. Shorly after that time did you get put in contact with a general?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir. General Lansdale.

Mr. Schwarz. And what was his function when you were introduced to him?

Mr. Halpern. Both Mr. Zogbey and I were introduced to him as the new chief of Operations for a government-wide effort to accomplish the removal of Castro and the Castro regime. This effort was to include not only CIA but the Department of State and the Department of Defense. And General Lansdale was to be the Chief of Operations for that outfit.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you brief him about Cuba or did he brief you about the operation, or what was the nature of that?

Mr. Halpern. No, we briefed him first in the old Situation Room, what used to called the Ibell Building, which

Mr. Halpern. It wasn't a matter of General Lansdale's being in charge, or the Attorney General being in charge, nobody objected to General Lansdale reporting to the Attorney General.

It was a matter of whether this would be done through the normal chain of command, or whether we would actually be under the General's direct command.

Mr. Schwarz. But it still is a chracterization, you were dealing with organization and bureaucracy?

Mr. Halpern. That is right. And drafting papers.

Mr. Schwarz. Drafting papers to do what?

Mr. Halpern. To try to get organized in terms of how we would accomplish the objective.

Mr. Schwarz.Did any of those papers that you drafted in those early stages include any reference to assassination as a device to accomplish the objective?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, did Mr. Helms enter the picture in the latter part of December 1961?

Mr. Halpern. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Describe how he came into the picture.

Mr. Halpern. To my knowledge, Mr. Zogbey described to me a meeting he had been at at the Director's morning staff meeting -- this is Mr. McCone's morning staff meeting -- in which Mr. McCone, almost in terms of a bombshell for the group at the meeting, stated that Mr. Helms would henceforth be -- the words were, his man on Cuba. This was something that nobody in the room apparently had any inkling of, and particularly Mr.Helms, nor Mr. Zogbey.

The Chairman. May I ask you to repeat that?

I am sorry, I just didn't catch it.

Mr. Halpern. At a meeting sometime in December 1961, which was the morning staff meeting that the Director held, and Mr. Zogbey was present --

Mr. Schwarz. But you were not?

Mr. Halprrn I was not, I got this from Mr. Zogby -- the Director, Mr. McCone, announced that Mr. Helms would be his man on Cuba, Mr. Helms would then be the Chief of Operations for the Deputy Director of Plans, and Mr. Bissell was in the room as the DDP.

Mr. Helms had no inkling of this before the meeting, and so stated to Mr. Zogbey, and even asked Mr. Zogby if he had had any inkling before the meeting.

Mr. Zogbey told me that he had none whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Helms then come and visit your new organization and tell you to make some changes?

Mr. Halpern. Yes. He came to Mr. Zogbey's office and looked at the list of officers, male and female, who were still working in the branch. Most of them were the remnants of the people from the old Bay of Pigs operation who had not yet been reassigned.

involved in this operation? That was the first reference I recall to a female operative.

Mr. Schwarz. There was no such previous evidence.

Mr. Halpern. We had a number of female officers, and still do, in our branches. And there were some in the Cuban branch and the Cuban task force.

Senator Huddleston. What types of activities did they participate in?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, recruting of agents, the handling of agents, disseminating reports, preparing propaganda guidances, preparing papers for a special group as appropriate, doing the work of any other officer.

Senator Huddleston. Can you name one or suggest one that was heavily involved in the assassination attempt?

Mr. Halpern. Oh, I don't know of any in the assassination attempt per se.

Senator Huddleston. You don't know of any?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Thank you.

The Chairman. Senator Mondale?

Senator Mondale. I am sorry I came in late, Mr. Halpern, and missed some of your testimony. As I came in you were saying that orders came from somewhere to get off your ass.

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir. Mr.Bissell told Mr. Zogbey cers whose objective would be to plan for the overthrow of the Castro regime.

Mr. Smothers. Was it your understanding that these plans were to extend to assassination?

Mr. Halpern. That word was not used, sir. But no holds were barred, and we had no limitation.

Mr. Smothers.Let me ask you it another way. What was your understanding of what Mr. Bissell had been told to do by the President and the Attorney General?

Mr. Halpern. To get rid of Castro and the Castro regime on the Island of Cuba.

Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. Bissell convey to you the idea that that included killing Castro?

Mr. Halpern. The subject never came up per se.

Mr. Smothers. What did you come away from that meeting expecting to do?

Mr. Halpern. We were very hard put to come upwwith any real ideas. We didn't know what to do, frankly. And we went back -- one thing we both agreed on, both Zogbey and I, is that we were not going to come up with a piece of paper which said this was going to be easy or could be done overnight, or could be done with mirrors.

The Chairman. Did you come away after your conversation with Mr. Bissell with the idea that he had instructed you to come up with a plan of some kind designed to overthrow, later.

The Chairman. I would like to take this and several other questions up with the committee, one of which deals with the question of the August recess. And I want to confer with you on that, too.

How many more questions do you have?

Mr. Schwarz. Instead of asking the other questions I will ask whether he knows anything about them, and we could bring him back later if he does.

Do you know anything about [redacted]?

Mr. Halpern. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. We will bring you back on that.

The Chairman. Can we get that done now?

Mr. Schwarz. Such [redacted] was made [redacted], was it?

Mr. Halpern. I don't know where it was made, sir, but I know it was made.

Mr. Schwarz. It was made in the U.S.?

Mr. Halpern. As far as I know it was.

Mr. Schwarz. And was that done under your direction?

Mr. Halpern. Well, it was done at the Far East Division request, and I was the one who did the negotiating with the Office of Security.

Mr. Schwarz. And was the plan that [redacted] a model who looked like Mr. Sukarno purporting to have sexual activity with some female, and that then the film would be released in Indonesia, and it would be attributed to the Russians in some fashion?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir, that was not the plan at all.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the plan?

Mr. Halpern. The plan was to have such a film from which we could make film which we could use in the propaganda activity against Sukarno in terms of him being close to the Russians, because the woman was supposed to be the Russian blonde woman that was assigned to Mr. Sukarno as escort officer when he visited the Soviet Union, and then went back and stayed with him for some time in Indonesia.

Mr. Schwarz. In short, it was a fake movie which was designed to put Mr. Sukarno in an undesirable light, by showing that he was having relations with some Russian female?

Mr. Halpern. And, therefore, in Russian control.

Senator Mondale. How was that film supposed to get to Indonesia?

Mr. Halpern. It wasn't a film. The original plan was to use clips from it in propaganda leaflets, and pamphlets, and things like that, just pictures from the film.

Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized that?

Mr. Halpern. Mr. Ulmer, who was then Division Chief.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know if any higher authority authorized it?

Mr. Halpern. Not offhand, no, sir, personally I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. And was it done, or was it turned off? I mean, the pictures were taken?

Mr. Halpern. The picture was taken, and that was the end of it.

Mr. Schwarz. And Mr. Maheu was used to accomplish it?

Mr. Halpern. I have no idea whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. And were the clips used in Indonesia?

Mr. Halpern. No, they were not.

Mr. Schwarz. Why not?

Mr. Halpern. We didn't have any proper outlets to get it done.

Mr. Schwarz. You had the film, but you had no way to distribute it in Indonesia?

Mr. Halpern. Not the film, but the clips.

Mr. Schwarz. What do you know about the killing of a person called Killum?

Mr. Halpern. The name is brand new to me, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know anything about the killing of a CIA employee or associate in Thailand in the 1950's?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know anything about the burial of such a person, in which you participated along with a man called Dennis Fleming and one called Peter Joast?

Mr. Halpern. That I participated? No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know anything about the killing of a CIA operative in Bangkok?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir. I was only in Bangkok, I think, once in my life.

Mr. Schwarz. That doesn't ring a bell at all?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know about any other killings?

Mr. Halpern. No, sir.

The Chairman. Any other questions?

Senator Schweiker. I just want to say, Mr.Chairman, that I would like to compliment the witness for some very clear and impartial answers, instead of the partial amnesia that we have run into lately.

And I think your kind of candor is very helpful to us in this committee to do the job. And I think it was very refreshing to hear some clear-cut specific recommendations of what did or did not happen. I just want to thank you.

The Chairman. I agree.

Thank you very much.

If there are no further questions,I think that completes the interrogation.

(The witness left the hearing room.)

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10105

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM HARVEY

DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : 62

SUBJECTS :
ZRRIFLE
CASTRO
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
OPERATION MONGOOSE
BISSELL, RICHARD
ASSASSINATION
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
THE PRESIDENT
QJWIN
MAFIA
SILVER, ARNOLD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 245
Folder 13

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

counterespionage for a brief period against the Japanese and the Italians and the Russians in '41. Then during most of the War, against the Germans, and then beginning in early '45 until the middle of '47 against the Soviet service again.

Mr. Schwarz. And then in 1947, did you join the CIA as head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch?

Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that also counterespionage?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it was.

Mr. Schwarz. And then between 1947 and 1952, you worked on Soviet counterespionage and certain special operations in the Department for Plans, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. Well, that is correct. It was a particular command and staff responsibility on communications intelligence and for a period of, I would think probably eight to ten months, I headed a planning staff, along with that.

Mr. Schwarz. In 1952, did you go to Berlin as Chief of Station for the CIA?

Mr. Harvey. I did.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you there until 1959?

Mr. Harvey. Until the end of 1959.

Mr. Schwarz. I understand, Mr. Harvey, that you had some rather substantial accomplishments there, such as the Berlin Tunnel.

Could you just very succinctly describe the Berlin Tunnel operation and then move on?

Mr. Harvey. Well, very briefly, that is an operation that (W) Frank Rollett and I conceived some time before I went to Berlin.

Senator Tower. You and who?

Mr. Harvey. Frank Rollett (W), who for many years was one of the, if not the most, knowledgeable senior officer in the cryptologic group.

And one of the reasons I went to Berlin was to attempt to mount this operation.

In substance, what it amounted to was setting up a fairly complex cover within a cover installation in West Berlin and driving a tunnel approximately 500 meters, well underground, across the sector boundary, and tapping into three main telephone, telegraph and teleprinter cables.

I think we had a total of around 900 circuits of these, which were, among other things, the main circuits between the command headquarters of the Soviet Group in Bunsdorf, and the outlying commands in Germany and the headquarters in Moscow.

Zossen-Wunsdorf

We also tapped into a number of Soviet Embassy circuits in ~~Unter den Frund~~ and Unter den Linden in East Berlin, including a number of intelligence circuits which unfortunately were not really readable.

Senator Tower. Were not what?

Mr. Harvey. Were not readable.

Mr. Schwarz. I have been told, Mr. Harvey -- is this not correct -- that you not only conceived the program but [redacted]

Mr. Harvey. I did.

Mr. Schwarz. In 1959, did you become Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division D?

Mr. Harvey. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Now is Division D a division of the CIA which is responsible for [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. That is also correct.

Mr. Schwarz. But part --

Mr. Harvey. But I would like to clarify it, if I may, Mr. Schwarz. It was the division of the clandestine services, which was the focal point and was responsible for primarily two things: [redacted].

We had nothing to do beyond that with the general sort of research and analysis use which was handled in [redacted] what I believe was the DDI, Deputy Director Intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Staff D include within its responsibilities [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, in two ways: complete control and coordination of any such efforts, approval and assessment of the security risk, and also in the direct procurement through operational means abroad, but not in this country.

Mr. Schwarz. And by operational, you mean [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. [redacted] that type of thing. [redacted] would be covered as well.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, did a man call [redacted] work for you in Staff D?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, he did.

Mr. Schwarz. At some point, did [redacted] recount to you a conversation concerning Patrice Lumumba?

He Plans in Fall 1960?

Mr. Harvey. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state what he said to you?

Mr. Harvey. Briefly, [redacted] came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell, who was then Deputy Director for Plans, to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr Bissell subsequently have a conversation with you in which he also recounted the fact that he had requested [redacted] to undertake such an operation?

of assassination is obviously a two-pronged subject, ours and theirs. We spent countless hours over the years trying to determine the parameters of how far the Soviet service was willing to go. This was partly a question of assessment, this was partly a question, to put it just as bluntly, of self-protection.

I will try to summarize what I think are fair conclusions. In the field of political assassination, although I cannot document this by evidence, I have no question but what the Soviet service has, does, and will continue to use the tool of assassination to accomplish political gains inside and outside of the USSR. In the intelligence field, I think you have to make a distinction, the distinction roughly -- and I'm over-simplifying this slightly -- but a distinction into perhaps three classes.

One, their own ethnics or nationals. Secondly, indigenous agents of third countries. And thirdly, the recognized official staff officers of other intelligence services.

During the seven years that I spent [redacted], which was the longest continuous period that I was exposed in depth to Soviet Executive Action, we lost a great many Russians, a great many Germans, a certain number of Czechs, Poles and other nationalities.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say you lost Russians, you mean Russians who were working with the United States?

Mr. Schwarz. Anyway, it exists, as a combination.

Mr. Harvey. In other words, if you want to put it in just these blunt terms, it would have been a lot easier for the KGB to assassinate me in West Berlin than it would have been for me to assassinate my opposite number in East Berlin, in the Soviet Embassy across the border.

Mr. Schwarz. In describing the Soviets, you distinguish between political assassination, direct agents of the United States, and finally the emigres and foreign nationals.

Mr. Harvey. And also -- well, not foreign nationals, but emigres and Soviet nationals.

Mr. Schwarz. That's what I meant. Soviet nationals.

Mr. Harvey. The most merciless, the field where they are the most merciless are their own defected agents, of course.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, to your knowledge, has the United States ever assassinated a defected agent or a third country?

Mr. Harvey. You mean an American agent who has defected or doubled?

Mr. Schwarz. Yes.

Mr. Harvey. To my personal knowledge, no.

Mr. Schwarz. What about persons who are third country enemies of the United States?

Mr. Harvey. No.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't know any instance of the United States assassinating any person who is in the non-political

Eyes Only basis, and the first part of this was the necessary documentation for the authority which was later signed off on by Dick Helms as Deputy Director.

Beginning on my page 4, your middle of page 3 --

Mr. Schwarz. Well, just a moment. Page 1 is a cover story, not the real story, the objectives --

Mr. Harvey. It is both.

Mr. Schwarz. But it does not recite as an objective, [illegible] assassination or assassination capability.

Mr. Harvey. No, it does not.

Mr. Schwarz. Instead, it cites the obtaining of code and cypher materials.

Mr. Harvey. Which, I would like to point out, was a perfectly legitimate objective and was not in a sense, a cover story except that if this project had gone so far as to the actual recruitment of any agent for assassination or the targeting of any target or the mounting of any operation, it would have been under this as a cover. But, those assets that were spotted by QJWINN, for instance, under ZRRIFLE were also honestly considered for possible clandestine procurement of communications intelligence outside the U.S.

So it's -- maybe I'm not making this clear, it's a cover in a sense, but it's not a phony cover, in other words.

Mr. Schwarz. Dual purpose.

Mr. Harvey. It was a dual purpose.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned QJWINN. Was QJWIN an agent who you did hold in reserve for possible use in connection with the Executive Action program?

Mr. Harvey. No, QJWIN is an agent that I considered for possible use and used for a limited period through Arnold Silver for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use, none of whom, as far as I personally know, were ever used.

Mr. Schwarz. But the multi-purpose use included as one purpose the possible use in assassination?

Mr. Harvey. Only in the sense that had we ever been saddled with a flat, if you will, command performance on assassination. I might have considered the people spotted by WIN as possibilities.

But, you see, before anybody that is ever spotted is approached for any operation and particularly -- and please, I don't mean to sound pedantic on this, ~~I don't mean to --~~ is actually approached, there should be ~~is a~~ long period of assessment, crosschecks, so on and so forth. This particular spotting mechanism never actually went that far, as far as I know.

I only know of one use made by QJWIN until we terminated him some months later, I don't remember the exact date. It was before I went to Rome. I know it was in connection with an operation in the Congo that was not an assassination operation.

Follow

and had, as far as I know, personally, at least, nothing to do with assassination.

I have checked pages 1 and 2 and 3 and my page 4.

Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 4 through 7, in your judgment, pages that were written by [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. As a guess, I'd say they appear to be in the same writing as these first three pages.

Mr. Schwarz. Are pages 8 and 9 pages that are written by you?

Mr. Harvey. Well, just a moment, let me get to those.

I would also like to point out that from page 4 that -- that is page 4, as long as it continues in the same handwriting was not a part of this so-called Project Outline, these I would guess were probably [redacted]'s notes and probably based, at least to an extent, on discussions he had with me, and certain sort of problems and questions and principles that I tossed out to be considered and cares to be exercised.

Mr. Schwarz. Then pages 8 and 9 are in your handwriting, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. Pages 8 and 9 are in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. And at the bottom of page 8, does that indicate that you had a conversation with [redacted] on January 26th?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it your judgment that that is January

26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it is.

Mr. Schwarz. And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?

Mr. Harvey. I think probably that might be -- well, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver.

Now, these two pieces of paper, well, I say two pieces of paper, what they are from -- they are in my handwriting. It's from a yellow pad, probably the duplicate of this that I used to keep on my desk and just make rough notes of conversations that I had, telephone and otherwise, with various people.

Once a week I would go through them and either destroy them, classified trash, dictate from them, or occasionally save them. There is no relationship between the material that appears after the line two-thirds of the way down the page, just before the 26/1-AS, , and the material which appears above it which is tabbed SID G, tab 21.

Mr. Schwarz. That would be Sid Gottlieb?

Mr. Harvey. Sid Gottlieb.

Mr. Schwarz. Doesn't the conversation with Sid Gottlieb on the 25th of January indicate you had discussion which included the word bankruptcy and you felt assassination was --

Mr. Harvey. There was a general philosophic discussion of assassination and assassination techniques. There was also a discussion on a number of other things that were of particular and specific interest to the communications intelligence field and the clandestine service's responsibilities aspects, if you will, and as best I can recall this conversation, this was a sort of an exchange of ideas and briefing session, probably held at the request of Sid Gottlieb in my office shortly after he either took over a new job in TSD or took over as actual Chief of TSD, which was the Technical Services Division of the clandestine services.

Mr. Schwarz. Now the reference in the middle of that conversation with Mr. Gottlieb to "Last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness." That's referring to assassination?

Mr. Harvey. That's obviously referring to assassination. That's probably what I told Sid Gottlieb my opinion on the use and propriety of assassination as a technique was.

of operational philosophy which I expressed to Gottlieb, that the question then came in pure theory as to -- as in such cases as, now assumptions, the example of 3 wrong, I am not really sure. But the closest that I can come is that the assumptions -- it might be desirable in a purely theoretical discussion and in my opinion we were wrong. Whether I said that to Gottlieb in the words that are here, I just don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. Who were the two besides Mr. Trujillo that make up the examples of 3?

Mr. Harvey. I presume -- I have no idea, but I presume that the logical candidates at that point would have been Lumumba and Castro. By logical candidates, I mean not that we were considering them in this discussion as logical targets for assassination, but that these were sort of the three people that would come to mind; if you are going to go into this, these are three to be considered.

tape 2b

But you will notice, if I may, Mr. Schwarz, "Framework of Sid's job. [redacted] - Memo." [redacted] is the name of ~~the~~ a staff officer who worked for me in Division D at that time.

This "translating machine" was an experimental device, done under -- hoped for development [redacted] that I was most interested in, because of the serious translation problem that we had [redacted].

So you see this was not a discussion strictly within the framework of either assassination as a specific, or assassination

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

as a general problem.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the material commencing on handwritten page 4 and commencing in the middle of page 3 of the Senator's notes, reflects in your judgment the conversation that you had with [redacted] and it is his notes about that conversation, is that right?

Mr. Harvey. That is my best guess.

It may also, however, include his own thinking and so forth. I doubt if it includes -- it certainly would not include any specific discussions, I don't think, with other officers, because [redacted] was under specific instructions not to discuss this as such with anybody else, at least without clearing it with me first.

Mr. Schwarz. And he starts, for example, by talking about "Legal, ethical, morale, operational problems" and so forth, and that reflects the conversation you had with [redacted]?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, it does.

Mr. Schwarz. Down toward the end of entry 3b -- and 3 has the heading "Maximum security" -- do you see that on page 4?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, I see it.

Mr. Schwarz. There is a sentence which reads as follows -- two sentences, which I should read into the record, three sentences.

"Within Kubark" -- now, is that the CIA?

crossed in this document.

Mr. Schwarz. One way or the other?

Mr. Harvey. That's right. One way or the other.

Mr. Schwarz. Your note has a report to the DCI, the January 26th reference, which reads in the first line AS. That is Arnold Silver, I take it?

Mr. Harvey. Yes, I'm sure that's Arnold Silver.

Mr. Schwarz. Then it appears to say f-a-n-f-o-r-n DCI matter. What does that mean?

Mr. Harvey. I am not sure. The closest I could come to that is a fairly illogical Fanfani, and Fanfani was never even dreamed of, as far as I know, in any such context. Fanforn -- Burton Wides raised that with me, and I just had to throw up my hands. I just don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't know what the reference to DCI in the notes means?

Mr. Harvey. No, I am sorry, I do not, at this point, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Mr. Harvey. Are you asking me to try to interpret the portion of this that is in my handwriting, or are you satisified at this point?

Mr. Schwarz. Well, the other items, it seems to me, are either not important or are understandable. Maybe some of the members have questions.

SECRET

Sid G — 25/1 — Exec Actions

— "The Magic button"



8

Narcotics Büro

"for a living" — RIS 201 Cover

Caution — Bankruptcy — No Stars

eyes — Jim A.

Contradistinct from U-2

not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —

— El Benefactor — assumptions —



Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job: [redacted]

[redacted] Memo.

[redacted]

[redacted] Fear

Anathesia —

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

26/1 — [redacted] Fanfani-DCI- Matter -

no file Review -

[redacted]

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. [redacted] Man of 2
3. Security Rules B-WKH-AS-3
4. Guide lines [redacted] - Review.

Last Resort - Brakes - Substitute 6 -

9

6. No [redacted]

7. no projects or papers except for cover.

8. Principal agent - If ([redacted])? - [redacted] Project Chief LCH -
Aebel 1500 - from NB -
Must spot agn. chief [redacted]
project - dv. Blake

9. Disposal -

10. Targets who & where - Must know before we can spot -

—

11. Case officering

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

FdS list - Remember

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10106

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-398

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM K. HARVEY

DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : ~~96~~ 104

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
POISON PILLS
CUBA
MCCONE, JOHN
CIA
BISSELL, RICHARD
WHITE HOUSE
MAFIA
ROWAN, DAN
GIANCANA, SAM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 245
Folder 14

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 21 JUN 94

SECRET

HARVEY EX I R371
6/25/75
9KJ

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~[illegible]~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with~~ ~~[illegible]~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objective: The objective of this project is [redacted] in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, [redacted]. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as ~~3. Background:~~ needed.

REC[illegible]
JUN 24 1975
CIA

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements [redacted], Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

period requirements [redacted] became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, [redacted], could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: ~~#~~ QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 [redacted] in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted ~~in~~ sporadically [redacted], in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ~~September~~ October 1960,

RECE[illegible]
JUN 24 1975
CIA

QJwin annual salary :	$7,200
Travel + ops expenses for QJwin + other agents & agent candidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates :	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrrifle activity :	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

REC
JUN 24 1975
CIA

1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience ([redacted]) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/KGB ([redacted]) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does [redacted] now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search), or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

RECEIVED
JUN 24 1975
CIA

f. No use of ~~amplo~~ any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., [redacted]) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

5

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: [redacted] search; this established (e.g., [redacted]).
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization [redacted] criminals, those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved—selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. [redacted]

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. [redacted]

Keeping of files.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

SECRET

freedom to travel 6

Legal, operational + ethical → moral problems. [redacted] case.

[redacted] not secure enough.

1) Maximum security + within Kubark only (e.g., how much does [redacted] now know?). Limitation on number [redacted] [redacted]. Guise of [redacted] objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of ~~5)~~ case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibilities of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) [redacted] recommended. [redacted]

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) [redacted] + stable in [redacted]

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sele~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~Too~~ Danger of standbys.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

sed A — 25/1 — Exec Action

— "The Magic Button"

8

Narcotics Büro



"for a living" - RIS 201 Cover

Caution - Bankruptcy - no Stars

eyes - Jim A.

not a TSD Problem

/ Contradistinct
from U-2 /

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness. —

- El Benefactor → assumptions -

Examples 3 "wrong"

Framework of [redacted] job. [redacted]

[redacted] memo.

[redacted]

[redacted] Fear

RECEIVED
JUN 24 1975
CIA

Anathesia —

26/1 — [redacted] — Fanfare 201 - Matter -

no file Review - [redacted]

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. [redacted] Max of 2/3
3. Security Rules B-WHM-AS-
4. Muse levels [redacted] - Reserve.

Last Resort - Brakes - Substitute - [illegible]

2

9

6. no [redacted]

7. no projects or papers
except for cover.

8. Principal Agent - QJ ([redacted] ?) -
[redacted] Project Chief LCH -
ticket 1500 - from PB -
mark spot rqm. staff of
project - see Elbike

9. Disposal —

10. Targets who & where —
Must know before
we can spot —

—

11. Case officering

12. [redacted]

13. [redacted]

Fd list — Remember

RECL FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

4
Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10148

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. O'CONNELL

DATE : 05/30/75
PAGES : 168

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
CASTRO
ASSASSINATION
CUBA
HUGHES
BISSELL
VERONA
VARONA
HARVEY, WILLIAM
ROSSELLI
GIANCANA
MAFIA
TRAFFICANTE
CIA
ROWAN, DAN
MCGUIRE, PHYLLIS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

COMMENTS :

Box 255
Folder 4

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Chairman Church. Would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that everything you will testify to in these proceedings shall be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. O'Connell. I do.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES P. O'CONNELL

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your name?

Mr. O'Connell. My name is James P. O'Connell.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is your address?

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Schwarz. Before we proceed substantively let me just put on the record some matters.

First, you understand that you have a right to counsel?

Mr. O'Connell. I understand that. I just read it.

Mr. Schwarz. And you should also be advised that you have your rights under the Constitution, including your rights under the Fifth Amendment, if at any point you wish to assert whatever rights that you do have that are under those Constitutional provisions.

Do you understand that?

Mr.O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you feel that you need an attorney you have the right to ask for an attorney, do you understand that?

pills?

Mr. O'Connell. The man that created them is Dr. Raymond Trichler.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he hand the pills to you?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he know what the pills were for?

Mr. O'Connell. I don't think so.

Mr. Schwarz. But he knew they were illegal?

Mr. O'Connell. He knew they were illegal.

Mr. Schwarz. And were the pills not tried out on some experimental subjects in the U.S.?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And proven to be lethal?

Mr. O'Connell. Well, to the extent -- I will tell you that, we used them on hamsters.

Mr. Schwarz. And also monkeys?

Mr. O'Connell. No, as far as I know, just the hamsters.

Mr. Schwarz. But anyway, you knew they were lethal.

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And you handed them over to Rosselli?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And had the Technical Services made poison pills before as far as you know?

Mr. O'Connell. As far as I know. I have no idea. This was my first experience with that sort of thing.

your possession, that might give you a more accurate timing than I am giving to you now.

Mr. Madigan. We don't have it presently.

Mr. O'Connell. I am sure it is over there.

Mr. Wides. With regard to the discussion of authorization, would it have been following on Mr. Madigan's point, that this was a fairly serious and unusual operation that you were given, and that you would have asked, is this authorized? Or how did the question of Mr. Dulles authorizing it come up, as best you recall?

Mr. O'Connell. I told you, I knew that Mr. Dulles -- I was told that Mr. Dulles had authorized it, I can't say quite when it happened, but I know I was told.

Mr. Wides. You testified this morning -- I don't want to put words in your mouth -- I thought you testified that you were sure that Mr. Edwards told you at this meeting when he first gave you the assignment that you were not sure that Mr. Bissell's also mentioned that when you later met in your office.

Mr. O'Connell. I would stick with that, yes. I think it probably was when I -- when Colonel Edwards called me he said, this probably has the blessing of the DCI.

Mr. Wides. Do you know if Dr. V. S. Roosevelt, who was head of the Technical Services Division at the time, was witnessing about this?

Mr. O'Connell. I wouldn't want to bet my life that he wasn't. But he was at a meeting when the bills were delivered, and [redacted] came over to Colonel Edwards'office.

Mr. Wides. But you don't recall whether you ever knew that [redacted] knew what it was in connection with as distinct from merely knowing it was a lethal pill, is that right?

Mr. O'Connell. I can't say -- to my personal knowledge, the discussion never came up when I was there. I don't think he is a dummy, and I don't think [redacted] is any dummy, and I think they had a general idea.

But as far as I know they were never officially told.

Mr. Wides. To your knowledge, before you went overseas no one else in the office of Security, Mr. Bannerman, Mr. White or Mr. Hall, none of those men or anyone else knew about the project, only yourself and Mr. Edwards?

Mr. O'Connell. Well, I would say this, to my knowledge they were never briefed. However, I think I brought up an incident this morning where Colonel Edwards was on leave and Colonel King called Mr. Bannerman, who was his deputy, and assumed that Bannerman knew all about it and started talking about it, what are we going to do about this -- I don't know what the conversation was about. And Bannerman called in and said, what was this all about?

Mr. Wides. This was in 1962 before you left?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes. It was while I was up in the office.

And I said, I don't have the authority to brief you on it.

Mr. Wides. Were you ever aware, whether you were formally notified or just got a rumble or heard through the grapevine, that the CIA was getting some information about these threats, or some information about groups who might pose a threat in the Washington area, not from Bureau sources or military sources, but from CIA sources, did you ever hear any rumble of that kind?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Wides. What did you hear?

Mr. O'Connell. The only way I got involved in it was that Howard Osborn would have a nine o'clock meeting every morning with his deputies.

And they had a proprietary organization in the Office of Security which I think had informants.

Now, I don't know their identities, but it would come out in the meeting, and they would have some names for them. I couldn't tell you what they were.

Mr. Madigan. What was the proprietary called?

Mr. O'Connell. The name that strikes me -- and I know part of it, but I couldn't tell you exactly -- I think it was [redacted] --

(1)(B) 9 Nov 93

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]?

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted], something like that.

Mr. Wides. You say you think they had informants?

Mr. O'Connell. They obviously did, I guess, because the way this would come out, so-and-so advised at a meeting last

(1)(B) 9 Nov 93

night.

Mr. Wides. If you associate that with Anderson you must have been told more than just, we have an informant. How would it be discussed at the meeting, through this proprietary we have access to information?

Mr. O'Connell. No, it usually would be the Deputy Director that that was under. And that was under OIS.

Mr. Wides. Victor White?

Mr. O'Connell. Victor White.

Mr. Wides. And what would he say about how Anderson fitted into the picture?

Mr. O'Connell. That never came up. I just drew that conclusion, that they had potential.

Mr. Wides. Why would you assume that they used a proprietary as opposed to just having some agents penetrate a group? Why would you think in terms of their using the Anderson --

Mr. O'Connell. I can tell you what I think.

First of all, I wouldn't want to use government employees.

Mr. Wides. Why couldn't the CIA personnel just run agents who would be --

Mr. O'Connell. That is in fact what they were doing. These people that were proprietary were not CIA employees. They were contract teams.

Mr. Wides. Why would you have thought that they would have gone the route of using the proprietary people as opposed to

Did you have any knowledge during the 1970-1971 time frame of any effort outside of Florida with regard to Cubans to fire on the Keys or on the Florida area there with a boat that would be disguised as a Russian boat, which was really a group of people, some of whom were assets of the Agency?

Mr. O'Connell. No.

Mr. Madigan. You never heard of anything like that?

Mr. O'Connell. Nothing of that, no.

Mr. Madigan. Did you ever run across a fellow by the name of Jerry Henning in your dealing with Roselli and Maheu?

Mr.O'Connell. No.

Mr. Madigan. You never heard of the name?

Mr. O'Connell. I never heard of the name.

Mr. Madigan. Did you handle the Agency contact with Mr. Maheu about having him coordinate or set up or be involved in [redacted]

Mr. O'Connelll. A couple of them, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Madigan. A couple [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Madigan. What was your involvement in that? Am I right about 1959?

Mr. O'Connell. It could be. There were two different occasions.

Mr. Madigan. What is your recollection as to the dates?

Mr.O'Connell. Well, the first one was __________ about 1959.

Mr. Madigan. And how did that come about? Why did it go to you in the Office of Security as opposed to --

Mr. O'Connell. Just like this other one came down from the DDP, it came from the __________ __________ Division, as I recall it. And __________ was coming into the --

Mr. Wides. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Madigan. What did your first contact with Maheu with regard to this project involve?

Mr. O'Connell. Well, the request came to the Security.

Mr. Madigan. It came down to you?

Mr. O'Connell. It came through Colonel Edwards.

Mr. Madigan. To you?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes. And the requirement was a certain type female who would attract this foreign leader. He wanted female companionship.

Mr. Madigan. The leader?

Mr. O'Connell. The leader did.

Mr. Madigan. So did you contact Maheu directly?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Wides. In this instance you were talking about a leader sho would be in America, or to supply companionship wherever the leader was abroad?

Mr.O'Connell. ~~He was visiting New York, and it was proposed to be a state visit, and so forth. And he really wanted some female companionship. And his case officer, the Agency's case officer that was handling the leader, said, let's stick to business while you are in New York. And we will take you out to the West Coast, and that is going to be a pleasure trip, and we will see that you meet the right people.~~

~~So Maheu lined up this young lady, who was a starlet, a little cutie, and they knew the type he liked, size and everything.~~

~~So, they threw a cocktail party for him, very informal cocktail party --~~

Mr. Madigan. Maheu did?

Mr. O'Connell. ~~It was a fellow named Gregg Bautzer. He used to be married to some very famous actress, and he knows just about anything and everything that walks in skirts in L.A. and Hollywood.~~

~~So Maheu called Gregg and asked him if he could come up with something according to certain specs. And he did. And she was placed in the right atmosphere, at the right time and the leader went head over heels in love with her, to the extent that it was beyond what we planned. He really fell in love with her.~~

Mr. Madigan. Was a fellow named Norman Paul involved in this?

Mr. O'Connell. No. Normal Paul at one time was the ~~head of the Division that I mentioned a little while ago. But he wasn't involved in it~~

~~So what we thought was going to be a passing fancy, he decided he had to go back to New York, and he insisted that she go back with him.~~

~~Well, this was getting a little embarrassing, because here he is the head of his country, and he has got this gal on the strings.~~

~~So, we agreed to it and she agreed to it, but we had to keep her in one hotel -- she was staying at the Waldorf-Astoria and he was staying in another place. And we got a house out in Long Island so they could have their rendevouz, and they would spend some time together.~~

Mr. Madigan. Was that an Agency house?

Mr. O'Connell. No, we rented the house from a private individual who was a friend of somebody who was with the Agency.

Mr. Madigan. Did you handle that?

Mr. O'Connell. The field office handled that, the New York field office.

Mr. Madigan. Of the Office of Security?

Mr. O'Connell. They handled procuring the house out in Long Island. And then they also supplied people to stay with the young lady while she was in New York, because they didn't

[redacted]

Mr. Madigan. And was that the end of that particular project that you recall?

Mr. O'Connell. That was the end of it, [redacted] ~~and was lovesick, and he was going to give up the throne, which would have caused all sorts of consternation in the Agency, because that was the last guy that the Agency wanted to leave.~~

~~But he was communicating with her for a while, and then eventually we got her a job in a local musical -- that is~~ [redacted]

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

Mr.O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. Did the Agency?

Mr. O'Connell. The agency.

Mr. Wides. Did the leader know that?

Mr. O'Connell. No.

Mr. Wides. And how did the letters go back and forth?

Mr. O'Connell. I don't know. We would just turn it over to the Division.

Mr. Wides. Did she understand that the Agency was somehow involved in the passage of return mail from the lady to the world leader, that she just didn't drop it on the mailbox on the corner?

Mr. O'Connell. She delivered it to somebody up in the field office, as I recall -- don't hold me to that, but I think that was it -- and then it was sent down to headquarters.

Mr. Wides. Was it your impression that the Agency read that mail, too, on its way back?

Mr. O'Connell. I would imagine so, because it got out of our control.

Mr. Wides. Let me go back.

With regard to the mail coming in, is it your imagination, or do you have information that the Agency was looking at the letters?

Mr. O'Connell. I knew that was being done.

Mr. Wides. You know from personal knowledge, or you were told by people involved?

Mr.O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Yousaid there was a second instance. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. O'Connell. [redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Did Maheu set that up?

Mr. O'Connelll. Yes.

Mr. Mdigan. Both the original contact and the later party in San Francisco?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. Madigan. And were those the only two times now that he was involved in the operations field?

Mr. O'Connelll. Oh, no. He did a lot of other things.

Mr. Madigan. Let me ask you this question.

When Maheu was having his problems with the authorities, was there any reference back to his involvement in those kind of activities, or was the only discussion about his role in the so-called assassination plot?

Mr. O'Connell. Well, I am not even so sure that they got into that aspect of it. It was just that he was involved to the extent that he had set up the operation against Rowan, or he was the one that got in touch with DuBois to do it.

Mr. Wides. When did you come back from overseas?

Mr. O'Connell. July of 1965.

Mr. Wides. After you came back did you learn of a time, either after you came back or very shortly before you came veillance?

Mr. O'Connell. Never, to my knowledge he never got involved in that, officially or otherwise.

Mr. Wides. Or surreptitious entry?

Mr. O'Connell. He did one surreptitious entry for us once.

Mr. Wides. What were the specifics of that?

Mr. O'Connell. There were a group of Iranian students. The Agency was sponsoring them, and they were going to the Georgetown School of Linguistics. And they were staying in a rooming house up there right outside of Georgetown somehere. And one of the students came to the case officer, and said that one of the group was acting very suspiciously, taking a lot of notes where they were not supposed to be taking notes,or certainly after operational briefings, and he would go back to his room and he would write voluminous notes. And he thought that was very strange that this guy was not acting as he should.

And that aroused the suspicion of the case officer. And they wanted to know whether we would get in and photograph what he was writing to see whether he was really violating his agreement.

So I called Maheu and he went up to the rooming house, and he went to the people who owned the house and asked if they had a room to rent and she had one. And he did know where the students were staying. And she showed him one room. And he said, anything up on thenext floor? And as luck would have it, she had the adjacent room.

So he brought what would appear to be a suitcase up there, which was his photographic equipment. And we knew the students were in school, and [redacted] was going to alert us if they came back, so he wouldn't get caught in the act.

And he went in, it was a very simple matter. It was a tin box that he could open with a paper clip and he took it out and photographed it, and put the case back in the drawer and locked up and left.

But [redacted] was a gal, a woman. And she was looking at one part of the school over there. And this guy comes out the back door. And as Maheu was coming down the stairs the students were coming up, with amatter of maybe a split second timing.

Mr. Madigan. This wasn't Mendoz?

Mr. O'Connell. No. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. What period was this that we are talking about?

Mr. O'Connell. This would have been about 1955.

Mr. Wides. And other than that, and the two incidents involving female companioship, what other kinds of sensitive things would he undertake? Was that in the period that you were paying him 500 a month?

Mr. O'Connell. We stopped paying the 500 way back when he nature as opposed to routine?

Mr. O'Connell. We had word that they wanted to -- apparently this foreign leader had visited the Kremlin, and we were reasonably certain -- he was quite a lady's man, and he liked just about any time to be accommodated.

So, we knew that he went to the Kremlin and stayed at the Kremlin. And the Division wanted us to come up with a simulated photograph or a film that showed him going through the act of taking on a female. And they simulated a back drop that looked like it was in a room in the Kremlin, and outside you could see the towers and everything, and the furniture was according to what they had.

And this was all done by people that knew generally what they looked like.

Now, we got Bob to make that film.

Mr. Wides. Is it correct that the Agency knew that the Soviets had made a film of the foreign leader when he was in Russia and was hoping to have a counterfeit film which they would circulate in the country, thereby making the foreign leader angry at the Soviets, was that the purpose?

Mr.O'Connell. I don't know whether they knew that the Soviets had made the film. But the purpose of the exercise was to have a film circulated in his own country, or neighboring countries, that would make him quite upset with the Soviets.

Mr. Wides. You mean they thought that the Russians had made a film?

Mr. O'Connell. Yes, to embarrass him.

Mr. Madigan. And that was accomplished as far as you know?

Mr. O'Connell. The film was made, but they never did release it, because things started to get better with the leader, and they felt that they wouldn't use it.

Mr. Madigan. Were Agency facilities used by Maheu for the production of this thing?

Mr. O'Connell . No. I hired a small independent studio in Los Angeles.

Mr. Madigan. And did Agency officials fly out there, the ones that knew about the backdrop and all that? How was that done?

Mr. O'Connell. It seems to me that they were just -- at this point I am not too sure whether they superimposed it, I guess is the word, with that background. I am not so sure at this point, it has been so long ago. That was away in the mid-fifties.

Mr. Wides. Could we get back to the question that we had started on, which was the files and where they would exist? You said that the operational files from all of your dealing with him would be in the Family Jewels, because they were all sensitive admissions.

Mr. O'Connell. Yes.

Mr. O'Connell. No.

Mr. Wides. Or Max Gonzales.

Mr. O'Connell. No.

Mr. Wides. While you were down there -- and this may overlap the question that Mr. Madigan asked before, but I think it is a little more -- did you have any awareness of any other efforts apart from Mr. Verona by Cubans in connection with the Agency to try and assassinate Castro?

Mr. O'Connell. No, none whatsoever.

Mr. Wides. I don't have any other questions.

Mr. Madigan. In your operational activities with Mr. Maheu, particularly in the New York area, did you ever have contact with a private investigator by the name of A. J. Woolston-Smith?

Mr. O'Connell. No, I never heard of him.

Mr. Wides. Do you know why there were two field offices in New York, two iffices in Manhatten?

What was the difference?

Mr. O'Connell. The cover. One was under Treasury cover and the other under Defense.

Mr. Wides. Were there two offices?

Mr. O'Connell. Why, they had them, it just grew like Topsy. They had two offices in Washington, and they had two offices in New York. And really the basis -- it was that that was the way they started, they figured they needed two different type covers because of the type of work they were doing.

Mr. Wides. What would the New York offices do as distinct from the Manhattan offices, or vice versa?

Mr. O'Connell. Nothing. They were basically investigative offices.

Mr. Wides. They just happened to have two?

Mr.O'Connell. They had two. [redacted]. The Manhattan field office. And then they eventually merged. Now they are over on [redacted] I think.

Mr. Wides. Thank you very much. That concludes the session. And we appreciate your staying so long.

(Whereupon, at 1:25 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)

end
nash

- - -

Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10150

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN

DATE : 08/28/75
PAGES : 96

SUBJECTS :
CIA
GIANCANA, SAM
MAHEU, ROBERT
CASTRO
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
HARVEY, WILLIAM
PAPICH, SAM
GAMBINO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 255
Folder 8

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN, ACCOMPANIED
BY JOHN W. DEBELIUS, COUNSEL

Mr. Osborn. My name is Howard J. Osborn, [redacted]

Mr. Wallach. And Counsel, would you just state your name.

Mr. Debelius. The name is John W. Debelius, 570 North Frederick Avenue, Gaithersburg, Maryland.

Mr. Wallac h. Once again, Mr. Osborn, as the Senator told you, and as you have been told before, you do have the full spectrum of rights available to you here that you have under the Constitution, and in particular you do have the right to remain silent if you choose to as to any particular question. And in addition, you have the right to request that a Senator be present if you desire that one be here.

Mr. Osborn. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. Very briefly, before Mr. Rhea begins his questions, I would like to ask if Mr. Debelius is here as your personal counsel today?

Mr. Osborn. That is right.

Mr. Osborn. I take it, then that the CIA in no way secured Mr. Debelius' representation for you?

Mr. Osborn. I wish they were paying him, but they are not. I am.

Mr. Wallach. I will ask Mr. Rhea to begin his segment of the examination.

Mr. Osborn. Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Rhea. That is all I have. Thank you very much.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Wallach. Mr. Osborn, if you would, just very briefly, on the subject matter that I am going to be directing your attention to, the mail programs, the various mail programs that you may have had knowledge of while you were with the CIA, I would like to have you very briefly trace your career for us in briefest terms with the Agency.

Mr. Osborn. All right.

I jointed the Agency on 10 October 1974 47.

I worked in what was then known as the Office of Collection and Dissemination, which concerned itself largely with the collection of any information that had any foreign intelligence import from other Government departments and agencies such as the Department of Commerce, the Department of Interior, the Department of the Treasury, and so forth. It was essentially a liaison job.

I served there about a year and a half, and I then jointed the Contact Division of the Office of Operations, which was concerned with the selection of foreign intelligence information from American businessmen and private organizations who had business abroad.

I served there until roughly 1950, when I jointed the Office of Special Operations, [redacted]

(1)(B)
15 Nov 93

[redacted]

(1)(B)
JC 15 NOV 93

This division, as I recall, was the Plans Staff of the Foreign Intelligence Division of the Clandestine Services which is known as the Deputy Director of Plans, DDP.

I was promoted from that position to be Chief of the Plans Staff. I served there until 1955, roughly 1955, when I became Assistant to the Inspector General of the Agency.

I served there until 19 -- correction. I think I joined the Inspector General's staff in 1954, and I left there in late 1955 to go abroad in the position of [redacted]

(1)(A)
(1)(C)
JC 15 NOV 93

After three years in that position I served brifely for six months as [redacted].

And then 11 months as [redacted].

I left there in September 1960 to take the position of Deputy Chief of the Soviet Russian Division in the Clandestine Services of the Agency in Washington. I served in that position for about a year and a half, and then became Chief of the Soviet Russian Division. And I held that position until Septemb er of 1963, when I accepted the position of Deputy Director of the Office of Security of the Agency.

Mr. Osborn. To the best of my recollection, I believe they were.

Mr. Wallach. Going back just a step, I take it that you had no knowledge of any mail opening projects while you were with the Inspector General's Office in 1954?

Mr. Osborn. To the best of my recollection, I don't believe I was briefed on what was then HT LINGUAL [redacted]

(1)(B)
15 NOV 93

Mr. Wallach. I think those just may have been different names for the same operation, different divisions.

Mr. Osborn. I think they were, yes, different code names. They changed them frequently.

Mr. Wallach. While you were in [redacted]

(1)(A)
(1)(C)
15 NOV 93

Mr. Osborn. [redacted]

Mr. Wallach. Did you have knowledge of the military's mail operation over there, mail intercept operation?

Mr. Osborn. I may have had, but I can't recall it specifically.

Mr. Wallach. Did you subsequently gain knowledge of that mail intercept operation?

Mr. Osborn. I have heard of it somewhere.

Mr. Wallach. What is the nature of the operation that you have heard of?

Mr. Osborn. That the military was intercepting mail. I don't know the details.

Mr. Wallach. Have you heard of any arrangements whereby the German authorities actually provide the mail?

Mr. Osborn. I can't recall that, honestly. I may have, but I can't recall it specifically.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, would it be fair to say that you are not familiar with that operation?

Mr. Osborn. I am not familiar at all with it.

Mr. Wallach. As I stated before, we have some documents here, and there are a couple that I think are relevant. And I would like you to review them later, but I want to get your state of recollection now. I realize that it is based on memory of events years ago, and things you read in the paper. And in no way am I questioning the truth of your memory.

Mr. Osborn. I understand.

Mr. Wallach. Could you just give us an overview of your understanding as to how the -- we will call it the New York intercept, [redacted] HT LINGUAL, whichever name you want to use, developed in the fifties?

(1)(B)
15 Nov 93
JC

Mr. Osborn. I have no specific knowledge of this. It is a little unusual, but even considering that this is one of the things, of course, that we reported to Director Schlesinger, I don't believe we reported this in any detail as to how it started, because I am not really sure that any of us knew. I don't recall exactly how it did start. But it was alsways

✓

which time I was briefed on this particular operation.

Mr. Wallach. Did you know whether or not the Postmaster General, the then Postmaster General, I am not sure who it was in 1964, July, whoever it was in that position, had knowledge of the fact that mail was opened in New York City?

Mr. Osborn. To the best of my recollection, I never heard that he was.

Mr. Wallach. Had you ever heard either way about the Attorney General, be it Robert Kennedy or any of his predecessors?

Mr. Osborn. Not to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Wallach. When you visited New York on this inspection trip that you described being possibly with Mr. White, do you recall whether or not Mr. ~~Fabrini~~ FAVORINI accompanied you out to the facility?

Mr. Osborn. I can't recall specifically, but I am sure that he did.

Mr. Wallach. Did you actually go out to [redacted] if it was changed?

Mr. Osborn. They had changed it. It was then [redacted] it was only changed [redacted] during the last three or four years of my tenure as Director of Security. Prior to that it was right in the office.

(1)(8)
15 NOV 83
JC

(1)(B)
15 NOV 93

Mr. Dick. Were you told that it was illegal?

Mr. Osborn. No. I assumed it was. You don't open mail in peacetime.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Office of Security also run the project in Washington [redacted]

Mr. Osborn. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any knowledge of the project?

Mr. Osborn. We had some arrangement [redacted] [redacted] And it may have been [redacted] [redacted] I am not sure that it was, but we did have some arrangements [redacted] But I can't recall the details of it. But I feel sure that we did.

Mr. Wallach. [redacted]?

Mr. Osborn. The one I specifically remember was [redacted]. And I am pretty sure it was [redacted]. But I can't recall the details, I really can't. But I have a recollection of this. Ang again, we were doing it just as a mechanism again. It was the Clendestine Services that had to be calling the shot of that.

Mr. Wallach. I am just asking for the extent of your knowledge.

Mr. Osborn. And if we did it [redacted] we must have done it some other places.

Mr. Wallach. What cooperative arrangement [redacted] areyou aware of?

Mr. Osborn. We had totally cooperative arrangement [redacted]

Mr. Wallach. With respect to mail?

Mr. Osborn. Anything.

Mr. Wallach. Could you go into that?

Mr. Osborn. I can't recall the details, but I can recall that we used to [redacted]

(1)(8)
15 Nov 93

Mr. Wallach. I am really just asking, not for techniques or narcotics or training or things like that we are aware of, but really with respect to [redacted] could not provide in certain situations.

Mr. Osborn. I have a recollection that they did cooperate with us in this respect. And I am sorry that I can't be more clear on the details.

Mr. Wallach. Was there a particular point of contact [redacted]?

Mr. Osborn. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. Who was that?

Mr. Osborn. The point of contact that we remember the best was [redacted], that I remember.

Mr. Wallach. And how late was [redacted] there [redacted]

Mr. Osborn. He retired about two and a half years ago.

Mr. Dick. What was his position [redacted]?

Mr. Osborn. He was a Deputy [redacted] He had a very high position [redacted] was his name.

Mr. Wallach. I note your attorney is taking notes. May I ask if those will be provided to the CIA?

Mr. Debelius. If they will be provided to the CIA it wouldn't be by me, Mr. Wallach. Really, I am doing it here to organize my own thoughts. And I would be happy to destroy them in your presence.

Mr. Wallach. I have absolutely no problem. I was just wondering if you were going under instructions.

Mr. Debelius. Could we go off the record just a moment?

Mr. Wallach. Surely.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall anybody else [redacted] that the Agency had contact with on a regular basis?

(1)(B)
15 Nov 93

Mr. Osborn. I can't recall any other, but I am sure there were others.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall any generic types of operations that [redacted] cooperated with?

Mr. Osborn. No. But to the best of my recollection, there was very little that we would ask [redacted] The same is true of [redacted] and many other departments.

Mr. Dick. Are you familiar with [redacted] operations that terminated in the mid-sixties that involved interceptions [redacted] from other countries to the US?

Mr. Osborn. I seem to have heard of this, but I can't recall it specifically. It sounds familiar to me.

Mr. Dick. Do you recall whether in any of those [redacted] programs the CIA might have received [redacted]

Mr. Osborn. Not specifically. And I can clarify one thing for you now. On this Dulles thing, I am sorry. It was not [redacted] It was [redacted] from the Soviet Union [redacted] And I seem to recall also in the same context of my discussion with you -- if you ask me specifically if I knew, I would say no, but I seem to recall that they did cooperate with us in the matter of [redacted]. I can't remember a specific instance, but I recall this.

(1)(B)
(1)(C)
15 NOV 93

Mr. Dick. Is that the extent of your recollection?

Mr. Osborn. Yes, really. But this [redacted] thing rings a loud bell in my mind.

Mr. Wallach. Aside from the mail opening projects which have publically come to light in recent months -- and I will go through them very briefly now -- there were the San Francisco project, which was repeated two or three times, the project in New Orleans which you have mentioned before in the

Communist China from San Francisco.

I said, does Mr. Karamessines approve this?

They said,yes.

I said, does Mr. Helms approve it -- and they said, we can assume that Mr. Karamessines has got Mr. Helms' approval.

And I said, I can't assume it. I will have to get it from him directly.

And I did. I sent one of my fellows, a senior fellow named Jack Turton. I made arrangements through Mr. Cotter, I believe, to send him out to San Francisco to talk to the Chief Postal Inspector in San Francisco, and I believe they set it up so that representatives of the Far East Division and the Technical Services Division, not the security people -- I can't recall, but I believe that they were to pose as Postal Inspectors, with access of certain categories of mail from Communist China to this country, for the purpose of photographing exteriors, examining it for possible eviddnce of censorship, but I did not know that they were going to open it, I had no idea they opened the mail. And I found out socially and personally from one of the people involved about a year ago that they opened the mail.

Mr. Wallach. Who was that from?

Mr. Osborn. A friend ofmine whowas involved, who is retired from the Agency, a fellow by the name of [redacted]

(1)(A)
15 Nov 73

[redacted]

Mr. Wallach. Was Mr. [redacted] actually involved in the operation?

Mr. Osborn. Yes, he was a part of it.

Mr. Wallach. Do you know Mr. [redacted]?

Mr. Osborn. I am sure there was one, but I never met anybody named [redacted].

Mr. Wallach. Are you saying, Mr. Osborn, that the operation you received approval from Mr. Helms for was not a mail opening operation?

Mr. Osborn. That is right. It was a mail cover operation.

Mr. Wallach. Would it be fair to say, then, that in gaining that approval from you you were actually misled?

Mr. Osborn. Yes, indeed -- I wasn't misled, but perhaps it seemed when I got out there and found out how easy it was to get it -- but I don't know, I wasn't told that they were to open mail. That isn't the circumstances under which I briefed Mr. Helms.

Mr. Wallach. Did you discuss this project with Mr. Cotter?

Mr. Osborn. Yes, I discussed it with him, I think, in arranging the original meeting with Mr. Turton. I don't know whether Mr. Turton went over and talked to Mr. Cotter directly, or whether Mr. Cotter just made the entre with the San Francisco

(1)(A)
15 Nov 93

In other words, I am sure they didn't go to Mr. Cotter every time they wanted something on a day-to-day relationship.

Mr. Wallach. I have just given Mr. Osborn a copy of a memorandum dated December 24, 1974, which is in fact after the time he left on sick leave, and there is no reason to believe that he was seen it. I would just like him to review it and possibly refresh his recollection.

Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. WAllach. Back on the record.

I think I misspoke when I gave Mr. Osborn a memo. It is a three-page undated memo captioned "Project West Pointer." I believe it was recently prepared.

But in any event I would like to call your attention to the last paragraph on the third page which states:

"The main difference between [redacted] and West Pointer is that the file shows specific reference to a statement by the Postal authorities that mail not to go out of Post Office control. While mail was opened and photographed by Agency personnel in New York City under [redacted], and not specific post office approval was given, neither is there written order not to do so. In West Pointer the opening of mail was contrary to specific orders that mail was not to out of post office control."

Mr. Osborn. There you are.

Mr. Wallach. Is that also your understanding, really?

Mr. Osborn. Yes, very definitely.. This fellow who is a close friend of mine -- and I don't want to necessarily put him on the spot, but he is retired and is in Florida -- came back and spent time with me at my home. And at one juncture, discussing such things as now, the Senate and the House, and what is going to happen, he said, well, you know, you remember that West Coast operation.

And I said, yes.

And he said, you didn't know we opened the mail, did you?

And I said, no, I didn't know you opened the mail. That was the first time I ever heard they opened it.

Mr. Dick. Are you referring to Mr. [redacted]?

Mr. Osborn. Yes.

Mr. Dick. What division was Mr. [redacted] in?

Mr. Osborn. He was with [redacted] at that time.

Mr. Wallach. I take it by your actions -- this might be speculation, and if you don't want to answer, feel free not to.

Mr. Osborn. If I do, I will establish that it is speculation.

Mr. Wallach. You would not have approved the West Coast operation if you knew it involved mail opening?

Mr. Osborn. I would not have approved it -- the

(1)(A)
15 NOV 93
JC

Director might have approved it, but it wasn't the way I briefed it, and it wasn't my understanding with Mr. Cotter.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you did give Mr. Cotter assurance that this was only a mail cover type of operation?

Mr. Osborn. That was the understanding I had with Mr. Cotter, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Wallach. Have you subsequently discussed the West Coast operation with Mr. Cotter?

Mr. Osborn. Yes, I have. Since I am under oath, I had lunch with Bill Cotter and Marv Gentile on Tuesday of this week, and we naturally discussed this stuff. We went over the fact that he recalled me, and that both of us were instrumental in terminating the New York project. And I have forgotten the exact context, but the San Francisco thing came up. And I told him, I didn't even know the mail was being opened until I talked to [redacted].

He said, you didn't?

And I said, no.

He said, well, it was. He said, I just found out about it. I presume through testimony or something.

But that was the essence of my discussion.

Mr. Wallach. Did Mr. Cotter talk to you about any FBI mail opening projects?

Mr. Osborn. No, he did not. We were in a public restaurant. We doubletalked.

(1)(A)
15 Nov 93

you have any knowledge of it?

Mr. Osborn. The first time I ever saw the Huston Plan was in the newspapers.

Mr. Wallach. Didn't Mr. Helms know that mail was being opened in New York in 1971?

Mr. Osborn. Of course he did.

Mr. Wallach. Did you know why Mr. Helms would have asked the President for authority to open mail in 1971, then?

Mr. Osborn. I have no idea.

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to a memorandum dated February 16, 1973, captioned "Visit to Headquarters re [redacted]," I will ask you to quickly read that over.

Mr. Osborn. I must have been Iden 18.

Mr. Wallach. The first question would be, do you recall a meeting in your office at which you notified Mr. Issaeff that the project would be terminated?

Mr. Osborn. I don't think I dealt with Issaeff. I think I would have dealt with one of my people. But it could have been Issaeff. I don't know. I remember suspending it.

Mr. Wallach. And do you remember telling Mr. Issaeff in words or substance that he should not tell anyone on the CI Staff that you wanted to tell the Director of the CIA Staff yourself?

Mr. Osborn. I very probably would have. I had very close relationships with Jim Angleton professionally.

memorandum from Chief, CI."

Mr. Wallach. Calling your attention to the first page, you stated this is Mr. Angleton's handwriting?

Mr. Osborn. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. I realize that most of it is illegible but I ask if you can read the line that begins with Osborn.

Mr. Osborn. "Osborn said he was under instructions from Colby to the effect that no pressure should be put on Cotter."

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall discussing that with Mr. Colby or Mr. Angleton?

Mr. Osborn. No. But I do remember talking to Bill Colby about the position that Cotter was in, and he was always extremely sympathetic. And I don't know what pressure anybody could put on Cotter.

Mr. Wallach. I believe you briefly touched on this before. How was the operation actually terminated?

Mr. Osborn. I called in Stan Ense, I believe, who was then Deputy Director of Security for Investigations and Operational Support, and I said [redacted] is terminated as of now. I think it was in the early afternoon. And that was the end of it.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, it was then Mr. Colby under Schlesinger who terminated it?

Mr. Osborn. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. And I take it --

Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10152

RECORDS SERIES :
INTERVIEW SUMMARY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
INTERVIEW WITH SAM PAPICH

DATE : 05/29/75
PAGES : 21

SUBJECTS :
PAPICH
FBI
CIA
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
CUBA
CASTRO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 256
Folder 4

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH: Sam Papich

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED EXCEPT
WHERE SHOWN OTHERWISE.

REGARDING:

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: May 29, 1975; 9 a.m.; Carroll Arms

PRESENT: morning: John ELLIFF, Mike Epstein, John Bayly

afternoon: John ELLIFF, Burt Wides, John Bayly

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

~~TOP SECRET~~

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

FBI w/p

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 5/5/94 gb
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

EXECUTIVE SESSION: __YES __NO

1/27/98
CLASSIFIED BY: 5668 SLD/ude
REASON: 1.5 (C,d)
DECLASSIFY ON: X (1)(6)
(JFK)

~~Classified by 05 RMB/GAT~~
~~Declassify on: OADR~~
1/94
(JFK)

SECRET

FILE:

Papich began with a brief summary of his experience in the FBI. During World War II and thereafter he ran certain operations in Latin America. In 1945-47, he ran counterintelligence operations in Brazil against the Communist Party of Brazil and bloc intelligence agents. In 1952 he became FBI liaison with CIA charged with coordinating and planning, including the development of sources. He also had special assignments overseas for Hoover.

Papich presented the following overview of the issues. He has a high respect and regard for the Soviet intelligence service, its efficiency, and effectiveness. He must be shown that their philosophy has changed since 1970. The pro[illegible] of the U. S. intelligence community regarding the KGB and GRU is very limited. In 1958, for example, the U. S. intelligence community had [illegible] believed was good information on the KGB structure. This had to be readily revised when new defectors and new operations succeeded showing that the premises were false. Papich stated "they've taken us to the cleaners in the last few years". There is no estimate of how many Soviet illegals are in the United States. The old view was that illegals would aim at middle-class government and business positions. It has been discovered that they take jobs like dishwasher to develop an employment background. There is no knowledge of Soviet objectives. Illegals may do nothing for years so they can be tapped for the future. There may be 100, 500, or 5,000 of them. Some were sent in as early as the 20's and 30's. They are the Rudolph Abel-type. His network was never identified. Therefore, Papich is clearly unhappy with U. S. results in identifying Soviet operations in the United States.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Papich stated that he played a controversial "devil's advocate" role between the FBI and the CIA. He did not confer with Attorney General Mitchell after Helms called his name to Mitchell's attention. Papich assumes Helms wanted Mitchell to get a review of the history of FBI-CIA relations. Papich would not have gone to Mitchell without checking with other FBI officials.

FBI w/o
REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 5/5/94
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART (See tabs)
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
[illegible] AND/OR
[illegible] DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 NOV 93

SECRET

SECRET

FILE:

To understand decisions in 1966 or 1970 it is necessary to go back to World War II, according to Papich. President Roosevelt got the FBI into the foreign intelligence field in World War II. Overnight the FBI had to generate the capability to move into Latin America against the German espionage operation which included business covers, radio networks, and influence in Latin American governments. The FBI had no precedent or guidance. Assistant FBI Director Hugh Klegg conferred with the British in London for assistance. FBI agents went into Latin America first under business covers, then in the embassies, which was thin cover. The legal attaches established official liaison with local authorities. The FBI's role was primarily counterintelligence but some positive intelligence was gathered about the stability of governments. FBI agents learned on the job. Most guidance from headquarters was ridiculous until [illegible] experiences were reported back.

~~TOP SECRET~~

The OSS ran operations in Europe and Asia as well as Latin America. Donovan also ran undercover operations in the United States. See the book by Donald Downs. OSS had a very close relationship with MI 5 and MI 6. The British also ran operations in the United States in 1939-41. No one knows how many. They saw the FBI as neophytes knowing little about the business. The British developed closer relations to OSS than to FBI.

At first, Donovan and Hoover were friendly but Hoover received complaints of OSS operations in the United States, for example, the OSS bugging of the Spanish Embassy. Other complaints came from Latin America. The friction between Hoover and Donovan is important background for Hoover's view of the CIA. Donovan would recruit persons regardless of their background if he thought they had the capability to penetrate the access. The OSS use of Communists "shook the hell" out of Hoover, as did OSS discussions in Moscow of cooperation with the NKVD. Hoover would never work with Communists. Hoover saw CIA roots in OSS. Papich stressed that OSS had some great people, extremely capable and dedicated, but OSS had an element that Hoover would never buy.

(S) 1B (FBI)

SECRET

FILE SECRET

In 1943-45, the government began looking toward a worldwide intelligence system. The alternatives were the military, OSS, State, and FBI. FDR allegedly assured Hoover that he would be responsible for setting up the post-war system. Papich never saw any documents showing that Hoover wanted this job. The Latin American operation was successful but Hoover never understood or had a feel for the problems. He felt insecure. He never traveled outside the U. S., and only saw things from Washington, D. C.

Under President Truman, Hoover did not have a "warm" relationship with the President. When the Central Intelligence group was formed and the 1947 Act drafted, Hoover's attitute was mistrust and lack of confidence in the group creating CIA. They were a different type of people, not law-enforcement oriented. Ivy League students of foreign [illegible] did not speak Hoover's language.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Papich states it was a "blessing that Hoover did not get the job. Hoover was uncomfortable" when confronted with worldwide issues. He did not understand relationships and operations abroad. In the U. S., for instance, if Hoover had a problem with a police chief, he just cut off relations. He couldn't do that with foreign police. A foreign intelligence service cannot operate like a domestic intelligence agency.

In 1952, when Papich became FBI-CIA liaison, relationships between the agencies were a mess. Beedle Smith was CIA director. There were many flaps between FBI and CIA over CIA political and psychological warfare, especially regarding the funding of labor groups, student groups, and political parties. At the time of the 1947 Act, these techniques of "covert action" were the subject of tremendously heated battles between CIA and State. There were fewer flaps in the counterintelligence field.

In the field of political and psychological warfare operations, the CIA didn't want stereotyped people. The CIA was not disciplined and ignored jurisdictional agreements. It would contact a U. S. newsman about a

SECRET

19

FILE: SECRET

possible assignment, the newsman would contact the FBI to ask what was going on, this would go to Hoover, who would raise hell with the CIA director. But Beedle Smith was tough. Communication between the FBI and CIA was almost nonexistent by 1952.

Papich had no CIA counterpart since the CIA is so compartmented. He had contacts at all levels, exchanging ideas for operations. He would push CIA ideas in the FBI. Flaps would come up. He would stamp them out and say "get on with the job". The FBI was easier to control since it was centralized. Papich's relations with Hoover would go up and down. He frequently asked to go to the field -- and sometimes Hoover considered keeping him there. But by the 1950's, most of the FBI's foreign intelligence talent had disappeared.

~~TOP SECRET~~

No formal consideration was [illegible] within the FBI to limiting its role to law enforcement. Tolson probably thought it should, but Hoover never expressed a desire to give up his intelligence job. Nobody, including Tolson, knew Hoover's reasons for doing what he did. He had his own conversations and contacts in the White House, Congress, and his personal sources. He knew what he was doing and had "a nose and ear for the political climate in Washington". This was true for "risky" operations.

Papich believes it would be disastrous to give both foreign and domestic intelligence duties to a CIA. While there would be advantages in coordinating fragmented sources, it is a risk to liberty, like a national police.

Papich did not recall any significant plan to improve coordination in 1958 when FBI joined USIB. FBI was part of the USIB predecessor group.

The CIA would suggest joint field operations but Hoover would rarely buy it. This was like his reluctance to join any operation with any other agencies. He thought the FBI should always have control, a commanding role. For example, Allan Dulles discussed the United Nations with Hoover. (S)

1B (FBI)

SECRET

FILE: SECRET

He knew Soviet agents and other countries' agents were [redacted] Dulles stressed that there was little coverage or penetration [redacted] The FBI "religiously observed" the ban on operating [redacted] Papich was present when Hoover and Dulles met. When Hoover objected to the plan, Dulles dropped it. Another example: Angelton might be disturbed about our lack of information about KGB operations out of [redacted] He would discuss with Papich how to penetrate the KGB.

(S) (FBI)
(S) (FBI)
(S) (FBI) 1B
(S) (FBI)

Friction would develop in "the gray area" of positive intelligence. For example, a top foreign official came to the United States for medical treatment. The CIA knew he was coming to the U. S. and wanted to know his relationship with Communists and wanted intelligence on the instability in the country. The CIA wants him surveilled to find out his contacts, what he's saying, and a wiretap or bug. The FBI would not do this since he was not an intelligence agent and not within FBI jurisdiction. The CIA would be upset. There were several cases like this, one involving a Bolivian official. Over the years, Papich sold Hoover on [illegible] this, but it was always a gray area. The N[illegible] coordination never worked with the FBI

~~TOP SECRET~~

(S) 1C (1)(C) 9 Nov 73 (CIA) per CIA

In summary, the sources of F[illegible] friction were (1) the OSS experience, (2) political and psychological warfare by CIA, and (3) the CIA desire for positive intelligence gathering in the U. S.

There was no major issue regarding CIA's desire to develop ~~"friends"~~ in the U.S. Papich recalls no more than three to six instances of disagreement. The FBI never helped the CIA create an organization for deep cover. It never needed FBI help because it moved on its own. The CIA Office of Security advised Papich that they had a relationship with the National Student Association. This never gave the FBI a problem.

The Katzenbach report would not give the FBI problems but many good CIA contacts overseas went down the drain when contacts through student groups were curtailed. Papich believes that if these contacts

SECRET

FILE: SECRET

had not been eliminated in 1967 the intelligence community could have dealt with the New Left later. The CIA would have had assets to assess the issues. Such questions involved New Left travels overseas and relationships with foreign agents.

The FBI and CIA did discuss developing a cover in the U. S. to get into [redacted] Travelers gained (S) very little. The immediate problem was the proposal for a joint approach. When Papich was there, it got no further than discussion. If the CIA did set up cover in the U. S., the FBI provided no support. However, if the CIA desired to use a company it would ask for a check of FBI files. Papich is not aware of any political organization created by the CIA, although it may have been done in the 50's or 60's. There was discussion in the FBI about creating its own group aimed at [redacted] (S) and discussion of whether or not to let the CIA know about it. There had to be coordination with CIA. Papich does not know if plans to create organizations were implemented. The decision would have been at Hoover's level.

(FBI) 1B

(FBI) 1B

~~TOP SECRET~~

FBI informant travel overseas was limited mainly to CPUSA members. The FBI would not tell CIA about informant trips to Moscow or Paris beforehand. The reason was that the CIA would have notified its field agencies that the informant's life should be protected. Instead, the FBI informed the CIA of the results upon the informant's return.

The FBI liaison section was made up of six or seven agents. Papich and Bill Creager handled the CIA. Creager dealt specifically with USIB, the Security Committee, the Interagency Defector Committee, and the Office of Security. Papich and Creager backed each other up in their respective areas. There were several liaison agents at the Pentagon. The liaison at State was Oren Bartlett. The other liaison agents were not so deeply involved in intelligence operations as was Papich. FBI liaison at NSA was Bill McDonnell, although Papich was also involved with [redacted] (S)

Requires NSA Review, (FBI)

SECRET

1.6

FILE: SECRET

Regarding FBI service and support to other agencies, Hoover was "goddamned careful". He was sensitive to any "risks" and thus any request for FBI support had to be established firmly. Hoover never responded "let them do it" within the United States. Hoover did not give other agencies any blessing or approval for questionable domestic activities such as the case of the Bolivian official mentioned above. (S)

(1)(c) JS, 10 Nov 73 (per CIA)

In both the FBI and the CIA, Papich stimulated interest in covering and recruiting people in the United States, for example embassy officials. (~~S~~)(u) The CIA wanted to use its sources to recruit foreign officials in the United States before the officials went home. These officials were not spies, therefore, when the CIA asked the FBI to recruit them, Hoover said no. This issue had its ups and downs, depending on the situation. Sometimes Papich did convince Hoover to let the CIA recruit a foreign official in the U. S.

1~~B~~ (FBI)

~~TOP SECRET~~

Hoover treated State Department requests differently than CIA requests since he considered them to be requests from the Secretary of State rather than the DCI. [illegible], on bugs or taps, (~~S~~)(u) Hoover was back-stopped because the issue went to the Attorney General. If NSA asked for help in getting codes, Hoover sometimes refused. (S) He based his evaluation on the feasibility of the operation. Neither NSA nor State had their own capabilities (S) and there was no formal discussion of their developing it. Papich stressed that Hoover treated State, CIA, and NSA each differently. (S)

1B (FBI)

(CIA) (CIA) (CIA) requires NSA (FBI) review

There were flaps in the 1950's when the CIA recruited without clearing with the FBI. The CIA asked for FBI wiretaps no more than five or six times. (~~S~~)(u) Papich was asked by FBI officials whether the CIA ever went to the Attorney General directly for wiretap authority. (~~S~~)(u) Papich says this may have happened, but not to his knowledge. Few Attorneys General would have stuck their neck out. It was a possibility with McCone and Robert Kennedy, where the relationship was unusually close. Papich says CIA wiretapping could only have happened once or twice since the FBI would have detected it most of the time. (~~S~~)(u) If it was done it would be through CIA

1B (FBI)

1B (FBI)

1B (FBI)

SECRET

FILE: SECRET

Office of Security, although that office had an excellent relationship with FBI. Allan Dulles would not have condoned it since he had great respect for the FBI. Papich believes the same is true of McCone and Helms. Papich also concedes the possibility of entries by the CIA, citing the independent operation conducted regarding the Bolivian official. (S) Hoover opposed going to CIA or NSA for technical support in a joint (S) surveillance operation. The FBI would only ask (S) for equipment for its own operation. (S)

1B

Regarding the memorandum of understanding between (S) CIA and FBI, the general problem was developing sources in the United States among foreign officials; as many as 12,000 of them a year assigned to the United States. CIA tried to [illegible] this source in the 50's. FBI involvement was "off and on" and some thought a new FBI division would be needed for it. The FBI as constituted did not have trained personnel or capability to develop foreign targets. The CIA had this capability. Papich proposed that FBI permit CIA to recruit in the United States. CIA would advise FBI of its interest in a target, the purposes of the contact, and any results. If the FBI had no interest in the target, that is, an interest in a KGB contact for example, it would OK the CIA contact. FBI required that CIA furnish it any information relevant to its needs, that is regarding KGB contacts (the New Left was handled separately from the memorandum of understanding procedures).

~~TOP SECRET~~

(1)(C)
(per CIA)
require NSA Review (FBI)
(FBI)
(FBI)
1B (FBI)

Alan Belmont headed the FBI Intelligence Division before Sullivan. A capable administrator, he operated behind the scene, stayed out of politics, had good rapport with agents, and was able to handle Hoover. When Belmont retired, the FBI "lost a rudder". This was a crucial point in FBI history, with Hoover getting old. Belmont stressed to his subordinates the need to develop a strong case for any proposal going to Hoover. Once that case was ready, Belmont would push it hard, but Papich and Belmont did disagree on such matters as counterintelligence operations against the KGB.

SECRET

FILE: SECRET

Regarding the CIA and domestic dissidents, in the 50's the CIA's general attitude was not to investigate or surveil Americans overseas. FBI-CIA communications rarely involved U. S. citizen targets unless they clearly involved a KGB agent. In the 1960's, Papich recalls two early incidents of FBI requests for CIA coverage overseas. One was the Republic of New Africa, a black group with contacts with Communists and foreign radicals (note by Elliff -- the individual was Robert Williams?). The second was Stokely Carmichael, who traveled around the world. The FBI asked the CIA for coverage of Carmichael's contacts overseas but there were no results since the CIA had no capability. In retrospect, Papich thinks his importance was exaggerated.

Papich does not recall any case or interest of the CIA regarding Dr. King. The FBI levied no requests on the CIA regarding Dr. King. Papich recalls that the FBI thought a black Communist Party member had contacts with King. The assumption was that the CPUSA was supported and financed by the Soviet Union. This influenced the FBI's view of the problem. There was no way the CIA would help abroad since the CIA had no penetration of the Communist Party in Russia. The CIA had little on the CPUSA links to the Soviet Union. CIA put little or no effort abroad into developing information on this. It was not a CIA priority. CIA was satisfied with FBI coverage of the Communist Party. If the KGB was using it for espionage or influence, the FBI would uncover it. The FBI would inform CIA of CPUSA activities. Regarding CPUSA, FBI determined that there was Soviet financial support into the 1960's. The FBI attitude as early as the 50's was that the CIA did not have the capability to discover CPUSA links to the Soviet Union. There were no leads for the CIA to explore in France, Czechoslovakia, etc. If a Communist Party member went to Rome or London, then FBI would ask CIA coverage, but the CIA gave it low priority and produced little. This led to FBI dissatisfaction with CIA, so FBI went through its legal attaches, who would contact foreign security services. Normally, the CIA was informed but sometimes the CIA was not notified if the FBI called it "an internal security" matter. Papich

~~TOP SECRET~~

SECRET

13

FILE: SECRET

stresses that this is a problem. What is the difference between "internal security" and "counterintelligence" and "positive intelligence"? FBI would use these distinctions as an excuse not to notify CIA.

Regarding the legal attaches, Papich was in Rio de Janerio after World War II. The FBI had moved out when the CIA moved in, but Hoover wanted to have someone there anyway. Papich stayed a year but wanted out since he disliked doing only liaison work with local police and CIA. The legal attaches were never operations and dealt with foreign security police and criminal police. A major exception was Mexico City where, with CIA acquiescence, the FBI was operational. Its coverage was through sources going back to [illegible] II and may still exist. The targets [illegible] iminals and CPUSA officials and [illegible] was apprehending fugitives. The [illegible] not cover the Soviets.

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~(S)~~(u) 1B (FBI)

(S) 1B (FBI)

There were six or seven legal attache offices from the 1950's until Papich left in 1970. Papich feels that if the FBI has legal attaches they should be closely coordinated with the CIA so that their assets and sources do not duplicate the CIA. A FBI man abroad can be useful to the intelligence community through his liaison with local police. Coverage in the counterintelligence field of a Soviet officer should be by the CIA. Coverage of a CPUSA member should be joint FBI-CIA. There never has been such coordination. The legal attache should be involved in operations through his liaison contacts.

(S) 1B (FBI)

Papich gave the following example: the CIA and the French DST have good liaison for counterintelligence coverage. If a joint CIA-French coverage target is coming to the U. S., the FBI legal attache should be involved in France to prepare for the transfer of coverage to FBI in the U.S. Papich sees the implications of this for the need to have a single counterintelligence agency. There would be advantages of centralization, communication, and security.

(S) (S) (S)

(1)(B)
(1)(C) (per CIA)

(CIA)

SECRET

FILE: SECRET

When the legal attache asks a foreign intelligence service for coverage of an FBI target, it asks for any information rather than specifying the data. This is because foreign services may be penetrated by the KGB.

Papich knew nothing about the tap on Joseph Krafft in France or the "17 wiretaps".

Regarding "leak" cases, over the years back to Eisenhower and Kennedy, the White House would go through the roof. Hoover wanted to stay out of these investigations since he suspected a source would be a top official and nothing would be done. For example, under President Kennedy the FBI did identify a top source of leaks, gave the information to Kennedy, and nothing was done. The security committee was created to deal with leaks. Each agency would handle its own, although the President could still order the FBI to enter the case.

~~TOP~~

Papich did not recall anything about Anna Chennault, but he did recall that during the Korean War there was a request of a top American citizen regarding those negotiations. Papich says he talked them out of it.

Regarding the CIA investigations of U.S. citizens, Papich recalls beginning to request CIA coverage of New Left travel abroad about 1967. He does not recall an FBI interest as early as 1965, at the time of the Hoover meeting at the White House on antiwar protests.

Papich did not know of the 1967 White House request to CIA nor did he know when Ober's unit was set up. He had no discussion with Ober on setting up his unit but he did know of its existence after it was established. The FBI was asking CIA about particular group leaders. The Bureau wanted to know if there was foreign money or guidance to antiwar leaders. These requests were directed to Ober (Papich did not know CIA project codewords). There was no CIA capability to cover antiwar contacts in Hanoi or Moscow. The CIA's attitude toward this new issue was similar to the old assumptions about the CPUSA. (S)(u) 1B (FBI)

SECRET

11

~~TOP SECRET~~

FILE: SECRET

The accepted view at CIA was that it was important to determine if there was foreign support or sabotage training. After 1967, FBI-CIA contacts on this topic developed rapidly. There were few really valuable CIA results nor was much obtained through the FBI, the legal attaches, or informants going abroad.

Papich referred to the climate of press commentary, assassinations, allegations of sabotage plans, and bombings. There was "a potential for panic within the intelligence community" since no one had the coverage they thought they needed. Travel of U.S. antiwar leaders to Communist nations seemed important, although sometimes after inquiry the individuals were found not to be important. Therefore, time was spent on targets who should not have been targets but this was a new task.

Hoover did not understand the issue. He thought New Left CPUSA links were most important. Papich never thought the CPUSA responsible for development of the New Left or SDS. CPUSA did try to use the New Left. Hoover assumed the Soviets controlled CPUSA day to day. Some of his assumptions had been proved wrong. In World War II days, yes, the Soviets used CPUSA for recruitment. In the late 40's and 50's, the Soviets changed their policy, no longer using CPUSA for this purpose. Hoover was never convinced of this change. Papich recognized the possibility that there might be a reversal of Soviet policy regarding CPUSA but Papich's top concern has always been KGB penetration of CIA, FBI, NSA, etc., as well as the question of how good the double agents are.

Regarding the theory of KGB aims) for using U.S. dissidents, the main problem was lack of knowledge. In the 40's and 50's, the FBI was confident of its knowledge of CPUSA and could assess its use to influence U. S. politics, but in the late 50's the Bureau's coverage of new groups was tremendously weak. The FBI recognized this. The CIA stressed it also for three reasons: (1) the increase in FBI requests for CIA information, (2) the White House requests, and (3) CIA officials own concern about inadequate coverage. The conclusion was that intelligence regarding people who went abroad was inadequate.

SECRET

FILE: SECRET

Papich had no personal involvement with White House requests. There was discussion both in the FBI and between CIA and FBI on expanding coverage and development of sources. For example, does CIA have anybody who can have an entree into SDS? The Katzenbach report had limited the CIA to foreign sources or to U. S. students recruited abroad. Papich dealt mainly with Ober on this, but also with Angleton and Tom Karamenses (DDP). Papich believes anything Ober said and did reflected CIA policy from the top. The operation grew like Topsy. CIA compartmented it very tightly and Ober was very security consc[illegible]n the FBI, W. C. Sullivan was concerned [illegible]d by the assassinations, riots, and b[illegible]e put on the pressure to find out [illegible]ehind it. He pressed Papich to pressure the [illegible]

TOP SECRET

Regarding assassination[illegible]ivan was ultimately convinced and Belmont wa[illegible]inced that Oswald acted alone. No one has answered the question of what Oswald did in the Soviet Union. Did he get any guidance? Why did they permit him to leave? Papich had frequent discussions with Dulles and the CIA regarding the Warren Commission although he thinks the formal FBI liaison was Jim Malloy. The question as to whether Oswald was a U. S. intelligence asset never arose. Critics at the time said the FBI should have surveilled Oswald. Papich recalls discussions of a plan to have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow but no such plan was ever implemented to his knowledge. It was not worth the risk. He does not know whether the CIA did it. He stresses that the FBI was not likely to use "nuts".

Regarding the Riha incident, Papich says this was not the reason for his retirement. Instead, there were problems with Hoover on operations and policy decisions. Papich was taking an aggressive stand on coverage of [redacted] (S)

1B (FBI)

Regarding McCone's proposal on expanded FBI coverage of [redacted] Papich stated that others in the CIA influenced McCone to press for more coverage. McCone was aggressive. Papich pushed it too. This was the time of the Cuban missile crisis. (S)

1B (FBI)

SECRET

Hoover would agree to expand on certain issues but proposals for major new operations went to PFIAB for support. Clifford was chairman. Papich doesn't know what Hoover said to Clifford, but the answer on the proposal was negative. The proposal involved more extensive and sophisticated electronic surveillance. This was at the time of discovery of microphones in the U. S. Embassy in Moscow, as well as an increase in the number of KGB attempts to recruit U. S. citizens abroad. He does not think COINTELPRO was developed as an alternative to this.

TOP SECRET

Hoover's rejection of McCone's plan did influence CIA attitudes toward the FBI. CIA saw the FBI as not being "a clandestine agency". CIA's view was that FBI had to reject CIA proposals as illegal. When Papich lectured to CIA recruits he attempted to orient CIA to the FBI's limits. On the other hand, FBI did not understand CIA functions abroad.

Returning to the Riha incident, Papich stressed that he clashed with Hoover every year and that their relationship had declined steadily after 1966. By fall of '69, he saw his value as nil. In December '69, he decided to retire the following spring. In February 1970, while winding up his normal business, the Riha incident arose. Professor Riha disappeared from the university. There was faculty and press interest in Boulder, Colorado, and a Congressional inquiry came to FBI. But FBI opened no case or investigation. In March of 1970 the president of the University of Colorado came to a CIA man in domestic contact service in Boulder to inquire about the disappearance. The CIA man called two friends in the Denver FBI office. FBI agent agreed to contact Denver police and discovered that marital problems had led to the disappearance. CIA man told the university president what he learned from "reliable government sources". The president told the press. The local district attorney called the president and asked his source. The president went back to his CIA source. The CIA source then promptly contacted the CIA officer in Denver, who contacted the Denver FBI SAC. The CIA officer suggested that he and the SAC go to the district attorney to say that the original source was local police, but the SAC rejected the idea and

SECRET

FILE:

wanted to know the identity of the FBI agent who gave the information. The CIA officer refused and there was a bitter clash. (Things like this had happened in the past. FBI field agents had contacted Papich and Papich had always told them to get on with the job.) The SAC sent a teletype to Hoover. Hoover said to Papich, go to Helms and get the identity of the FBI source. Helms called in the CIA man, who refused to identify him. Helms sent Hoover a letter [illegible]ng this and said he was "taking the nece[illegible]inis-trative action". Hoover noted on [illegible] "dis-continue liaison with CIA".

TOP SECRET

Papich then wrote a long [illegible] of resignation to Hoover instead of his p[illegible]brief resignation note. He strongly appealed to Hoover to reconsider and keep communications open. He also raised serious questions concerning Hoover's past decisions. Hoover was not happy. Papich says there had been dozens of incidents like this before. He did not confer with anyone in the FBI about his letter. W. C. Sullivan was angry with Papich for stirring things up. (Papich says if it is OK with the FBI it's OK with him for the Committee to get the letter, although he considers it personal to Hoover. The letter reviews FBI-CIA relations.)

Regarding the 1966 cutbacks, Papich thinks it started with the Long Committee hearings on the Internal Revenue Service. After the Kennedy Administration, and especially under Attorney General Clark, there were cutbacks in [redacted] (S)

1B } (FBI)

W. C. Sullivan saw Angleton and CIA directors at USIB meetings. Papich would discuss FBI-CIA problems with Sullivan. Papich stressed the need for [redacted] (S)

1B } (FBI)

SECRET

TOP SECRET

FILE: SECRET

Regarding the CIA and local police, the only thing Papich recalls is discussion of the CIA's relationship with New York City police. The purpose was not operations, but protection of CIA New York facilities. He was also aware of relationships between Washington, D. C., and suburban police for protection of CIA facilities and personnel. He knew that some CIA employees joined questionable groups and that the CIA was concerned about its personnel associating with radicals and protesters. The CIA Office of Security informed the FBI in 1967-1970 that it had developed from two to six sources to assess involvement of CIA personnel in protest groups. The information provided to the FBI from these sources about such groups was "crap". Papich was not involved in any meetings with CIA sources. He is not aware of any CIA activity regarding Women's Strike for Peace, nor was he aware of any CIA intelligence operations for the purpose of protecting CIA from violent demonstrations. CIA should have relied on FBI.

Bill Creager was succeeded as liaison with Office of Security by Fred Cassidy. They provided memoranda to the FBI Intelligence Division on all transactions with CIA. Creager kept Papich advised, especially of the potential for flaps and for successful operations. Papich believes Office of Security was restricted both in number of personnel and by CIA rules. It could claim a need to protect its own facilities and personnel but it didn't have significant capability. If it did, it would have been detected by the FBI.

Regarding the Dominican Republic in 1965, Papich recalls the fear of another Cuba by the President and the National Security Council. Johnson may have asked the FBI for help. An FBI agent from the office in San Juan, Puerto Rico, and possibly from Mexico City, were sent to the Dominican Republic. This was done with CIA approval and the joint effort was successful. There were no flaps. The FBI agent had sources all over Central America going back to World War II. Other FBI activities in the Caribbean grew out of the FBI's role in Havana before Castro, Jamaica, Miami, and San Juan. In all these areas the FBI's capability was based

SECRET

FILE SECRET

on personal relationships going back to World War II. In the late 1960's, the FBI went into El Salvador and Papich thought this was a waste of FBI manpower.

Regarding Cubans in Miami, there were many flaps with CIA. For example, CIA would attempt to recruit an exile for an operation in Cuba, the exile would ask the FBI about it, and Hoover would get mad. The FBI would not be informed about CIA cover companies screening exiles. The FBI investigated one cover company until it discovered the CIA cover. CIA tried to recruit FBI sources without checking out FBI. Papich is sure CIA "must have" used agents to cover local Miami Cubans. But FBI had excellent coverage and would protest when CIA took an interest in somebody FBI was investigating. There would be general protests to CIA to stay out of counterintelligence. Some problems were resolved locally with the FBI agent in charge. There was minimum FBI contact with CIA operations. Some names involved here are Freddy Frohbose, deceased; Bill Harvey; and a Fitzgerald. (S)

(1)(A) JC 10 Nov 93 per CIA

(CIA)

Regarding CIA counterintelligence against Cubans in New York, Papich said the policy was no counterintelligence by CIA. He has no recollection of CIA implication in anti-Castro Cuban illegal activities, but Papich admits he would have learned only if there was a flap.

Regarding CIA Domestic Operations Division, Papich formulated the 1966 agreement to ease FBI relationships. The problem, as noted earlier, was CIA desire to interview foreign officials in the U. S. or at the U. N. Hoover finally, reluctantly, agreed to the 1966 understanding. Papich warned CIA that if there were continuing flaps, Hoover would withdraw his agreement and "it would be my butt". There were flaps from 1966 to 1970 where Domestic Operations Division attempted to recruit and failed to advise FBI. If CIA was interested in a Soviet bloc intelligence service recruitment, FBI said no. If either Domestic Operations Division or the counterintelligence staff was interested in any Soviet in the U. S., they touched base with FBI. But they felt that if FBI had allowed them to recruit they could have succeeded. (S)

(1)(B) (1)(C) JC 10 Nov 93 per CIA

(CIA)

SECRET

12

~~TOP SECRET~~

FILE: SECRET

Regarding postal intercept, CIA came up with the proposition, said they had entree, and desired it for positive intelligence. CIA did all the work. The focus was air mail to and from Russia. (S) CIA gave FBI the products where FBI had "stops" on persons of interest and also where other information might be of interest to FBI. It provided some leads to intelligence agents. Papich recalls a brief mail intercept in the early 1950's on the West Coast regarding China. (S) It was stopped after a new postmaster arrived. Papich stated that the New York operation was of greater benefit to the CIA for positive intelligence regarding the Soviet Union. (S)

(FBI)
1B
(FBI)
(FBI) (CIA)

Papich recalls meetings with CIA and NSA on improving coverage, (S) but not much worthwhile resulted. There was COMINT in the Miami area DFing (S) and monitoring. The FBI would get leads for suspects. In CIA, Division D were the COMINT people. (S) Papich recalls no other areas for DFing in the U. S. (S)

requires NSA review (FBI)
(CIA)
(CIA)
(CIA)

(1)(B)
ok
10 Nov 73
per CIA

Regarding CIA Domestic Contact Service, FBI would get positive intelligence reports, for example, on an alien coming to the United States. The FBI was interested in his training in Russia as a possible source regarding Soviet intelligence activities. The CIA Domestic Contact Service would provide reports to FBI headquarters or the field on antiwar, Black Power, and protest groups. They got the information from faculty and students regarding future riots.

The Domestic Contact Service programs and priorities were set by the intelligence community, for example, gather whatever they can about missiles. The FBI would not task DCS. If DCS went into operations, FBI itself was upset. But DCS had good officers who would note potential for counterintelligence use. There was no increase in DCS traffic regarding dissidents in 1967 to 1969.

The creation of DCS in 1947 worried Hoover, who feared an internal security role. It was set up by NSCID. Until the 1960's, there was no contact between FBI and the DCS at the field level. The procedure developed that if DCS wanted to interview

SECRET

~~TOP SECRET~~

FILE: SECRET

an alien, a form was submitted by FBI. CIA then got FBI data on the alien and FBI had notice so it could protect any operation.

Regarding possible spies in foreign intelligence agencies, if the FBI discovers any it evaluates the potential for a double agent or the possibility of recruitment. FBI usually goes to the agency and tells them the situation to prevent access to sensitive information. Also, the agency can give FBI assistance. The CIA Office of Security is "paranoid" on this subject. It is very concerned if there is a report on a CIA employee associating with bloc nationals. Before telling the FBI, it would do as much as it could on its own so there would be something to discuss. In one case the CIA was absolutely convinced an employee was a spy, predicated on its analysts' conclusions from a photograph. FBI refused to move on the basis of this alone. There were other cases where FBI and CIA had different evaluations of evidence. It depended on what CIA gave FBI. CIA was "jumpier" than FBI.

If CIA did any electronic surveillance of its own employees, it never checked with FBI. The same was true for physical surveillance of its own employees. If the FBI had known, it would have raised hell, but it never came to FBI attention and there was no policy discussion of the subject. If the CIA wanted to do something with its own assets with Attorney General or White House approval, it would not check with FBI. But it would coordinate with FBI if it saw a risk that FBI would discover.

Papich recalls no CIA surveillance of newsmen. Papich adds his view that every newsman assigned to Moscow is useful to the KGB. A newman who may have been recruited by KGB in Moscow may become a target in the U. S.

Papich did not recall any problem of CIA activity "tainting" a criminal case. CIA would make sources available for criminal prosecutions.

SECRET

Regarding CIA Far East Division, Papich recalls proposals for developing cover in the U. S. for going overseas. Ober advised Papich of the development of sources in the U. S. to cover overseas targets. Papich would write a memo on the situation and provide any relevant FBI information. He also discussed with Ober giving FBI assets to CIA if they travel overseas. Papich stresses that FBI sources are sent overseas. He encouraged working through CIA but never got very far. Papich gives the example of an FBI source who went to Italy and reported back through CIA.

Ober asked FBI to use its sources to gather information on policy guidance, funding, and training of U. S. dissidents overseas. There was a large volume of communication covering names like Carmichael and leaders in domestic groups.

FBI told CIA that if there was ever an investigation regarding a possible U. S. crime, CIA must recognize the evidentiary rules. If there were prosecutions (very few), it was never necessary to disclose CIA data. CIA sources were not in a position to testify. Papich does not recall asking CIA if information sent to FBI from CIA might have originated with electronic surveillance overseas.

If Ober gave FBI information regarding domestic matters, FBI would ask for everything CIA knew about the sources. CIA memos would be very brief. Papich would insist on identification of the sources, since the FBI might want to use it. FBI did get access to sources, sometimes working through a CIA intermediary if source would not talk to FBI.

Papich recalls discussing creation of "notional" groups targeted at [redacted] The program was not implemented before he left in 1970. It could have been explored in the FBI Intelligence Division but they would have come to Papich if CIA was needed. Papich discussed with Far East Division in CIA. (S) 1B (FBI)

Regarding the several million dollar fund transfer to FBI, Papich recalls this was an effort of the entire intelligence community, including the White

SECRET

SECRET

FILE:

[redacted]

House, to acquire [redacted] The money was for [redacted] The FBI would run the operation to provide [redacted] Papich was not directly involved, but he heard of it. (S)

(CIA) (FBI) (CIA) 1B

Papich recalls discussion with [redacted] but he recalls no instance where TSD provided documents to FBI and he has no knowledge of any COINTELPRO-type use of CIA alias documentation or other document forging. If this had been done, it would have had to go through Papich. (S)

1B (FBI)

Papich knew nothing about Vesco.

On Ober memos to FBI, Papich recalls a code designation [redacted] The purpose was so that when information came back to CIA from FBI it could be sent directly to Ober. The counter-intelligence staff had an office to log communications. The determination as to what FBI information would go to Ober was first based on Ober's request for specifics and second based on FBI criteria which considered whether there would be any possible CIA results. FBI would alert Ober regarding an individual and ask for any information generally about his overseas activity. (S)

1B (FBI)

Papich does not recall any CIA breaking and entering operations in the 1960's.

Regarding CIA security research staff, Papich recalled that it concentrated on developing counter-intelligence equipment. It also was "an Angleton-type" operation, doing research on penetration of the CIA. It also analyzed and evaluated the exposure to the agency of OSS personnel who might have been Communists or have had World War II Communist contacts. For example, in Germany until the mid-50's, CIA was vulnerable to recruitment by Communist intelligence. CIA brought in brilliant minds who might still have strong identification with their home countries in eastern and middle Europe.

Finally, Papich and Creager felt that "the guts of liaison" was with DDP on counterintelligence, not on their internal security problems. With Office of Security there was a small number of investigations overlapping FBI.

SECRET

Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10002-10165

RECORDS SERIES :
TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R-696

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF DAVID ATLEE PHILLIPS

DATE : 07/31/75
PAGES : 178

SUBJECTS :
CIA
CUBA
CASTRO
LANSKY, MEYER
BAY OF PIGS
ASSASSINATION
TRAFFICANTE, SANTOS
RUBY, JACK
CHILE
ALLENDE
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 256
Folder 14

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Jack Ruby?

Mr. Phillips. No, I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. Do youknow him under the name of Rubenstein?

Mr. Phillips. I did not.

Mr. Schwarz. What did you do between your work in Cuba and the Chile matter which you were going to spend most of your time on?

Mr. Phillips. After the Bay of Pigs business I went to Mexico in late in 1961, and remained in Mexico until the very early part of 1965, when I was assigned to the Dominican Republic as Chief of Station.

Mr. Schwarz. And then --

Mr. Phillips. I stayed in the Dominican Republic until the summer of 1967.

And after that I returned to Washington and became the Chief of Cuban Operations through 1969.

In 1970 I went to Rio de Janiero as Station Chief. And in 1971, I suffered the traumatic shock of being moved to Brasilia from Rio de Janiero.

In 1972 I went to Venezuela as the Chief of Station. And in the summer of 1973 I was asked to return as Chief of the then Western Hemisphere Division.

Mr. Schwarz. And is that the position you held until or the other which would enable you to form a judgment as to his attitude toward either the subject of assassination or the question as to what kind of an explicit order would be necessary in order to justify Agency actions to actually assassinate some one.

Mr. Phillips. No, because I never heard Mr. Helms even get that close to the edge of such talk about such and such an option or possibility, I never heard him talk that way.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear anybody in the Agency talk that way?

Mr. Phillips. Under traumatic conditions I have heard human beings maybe with a few drinks or something like that saying, my God, we would be better off if so and so were bumped off or something.

But I have never heard two officers sit down and seriously talk about such an option. And if anyone has ever said that, it is the same way some people might get out of line and say almost anything.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever hear, in connection with the Chile operation, that certain Chilean officers, specifically a Major Marshall, [redacted] that they intended to assassinate Allende?

Mr. Phillips. It was five years ago. But as I recall, Major Marshall said a number of things. He was what I think of as a wild man. I seem to recall something about, yes, a

Mr. Schwarz. And you offered through Colonel Wimert, whom we will come to in a moment, $50,000 if they could accomplish it, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I think that was the correct sum, yes.

mr. Schwarz. And you gave them prior to their attempt on the 19th of October some tear gas and some gas masks to help accomplish the kidnapping?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. And subsequently you provided to the Valenzuela group some machine guns, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. That is ture.

Mr. Schwarz. And those were going to be used in a kidnapping effort by the Valenzuela group, and you knew that, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. I recall that they were going to be used by the group, and that kidnapping was a part of their plans. I can't recall that they said they needed them specifically for the kidnapping. I do recall that the reason was -- the automatic reaction from Latin America is, why do people need arms when they have got arms everywhere all over Latin America.

And they said something about, their own arms could be identified, and they needed some that couldn't be identified. I don't recall if it was specifically mentioned that it was just for that. It was certainly understood that they might

Consequently, I personally made this proposal, that we establish what I called a false flag base of people that would go from outside, and should there be any sort of flap, the chances of linking it to the U.S. Government would be much less, because they would appear to be from another nationality.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you a cable -- is this cable of 27 September in the Senator's book? I know that he asked for it after I came over.

Mr. Treverton. It is not.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to read from a cable which unfortunately is not in your book, but the key part is relatively simple.

This is a cable, Mr. Phillips, dated September 27, 1970, and it is signed by yourself and Mr. Broe. And it is sent to the Station in Chile, and it contains the following about the purposes of setting up the false flag office --

Mr. Phillips. We call it a base.

Mr. Schwarz. False flag bases: "Each member of base will enter and leave Chile with falst documents and operate as a representative of his country rather than as anAmerican".

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. Continue:

"Having at least one key Brazilian and one key Argentinian would be vital, and we have candidates."

And you did that.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And then it goes on as follows: "These officers will perform the delicate shows with great flap potential which cannot be done by Station personnel or any Chilean."

That is right, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr.Schwarz. And by flap potential you meant exposure?

Mr. Phillips. Contacting screwballs such as Marshall, that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. But generally pursuing the Track II activities?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "An example. We have candidates who can successfully pose as Brazilian intelligence officers." You did that, didn't you?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And this goes on: "If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean General, any flap would be a Brazilian one".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So the scheme was that not only would the U.S. not be blamed, but other countries like Brazil would be blamed if something went wrong.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, this is particularly sensitive to me, because my daughter happens to be married to a Brazilian foreign service officer. However, that was it. It was a devious move. It was the final result -- the idea being that if such a flap did occur, someone would think it was someone other than the U.S. The idea of false flag operations is not a new one. The idea I had of going to someone and saying, why don't you be a spy for us, I don't work for the Soviets, is not true.

But this is sort of new, the fact that action agents should pose as others. And yes, it is devious, but that was the idea.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, what were their instructions if they were to be caught? Were they to go to their death swearing they were [redacted] or whatever?

Mr. Phillips. I don't think it was quite that dramatic, Senator. They came to Washington before they went down. And I briefed them, and I think what I said to them was, this is going to be a tough and sensitive one, and you don't have to go if you don't want to, because you culd get in real trouble.

And if you get in trouble, I am not sure we can help you.

So, they shrugged their shoulders and went.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell the [redacted] that you were sending someone down to pose as a [redacted], and his instructions were that if he were caught he was to continue to pose as a Brazilian and the Brazilians were approached?

Mr. Phillips. It never occurred to us in our wildest dreams to do that.

Mr. Schwarz. I suppose the relationships between continuing intelligence services were things that were very important to preserve, and that we had very close and delicate relationships with the other intelligence services.

Mr. Phillips. We do. And if there had been such a man the Brazilians would be quite unhappy with us. But I thought that was better than letting the world know that was a U.S. Citizen down there.

Mr. Schwarz. You go on in the cable of September 27 to say this:

"Headquarters believes this false flag was manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give Station great flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations securely."

So, the use of false flag persons, at least judging from this cable, is something repeatedly done by the CIA?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, and by all intelligence services -- not all, but all major intelligence services. If you are living overseas and a man comes up to you and says, hey, I see you are a Marxist, and a man comes up and says, I am from Havana and we would like you to work with the Cuban intelligence service, he might not be from Havana, he might be from the Soviets, from us, or [redacted]

So, it is not an unusual practice.

Mr. Schwarz. Incidentally, you just let drop one thing in your testimony a moment ago. You said that in your 25-year involvement with intelligence matters you had been bothered by your activities on only two occasions, one of which was Chile.

And then you said what the other one was. What was that?

Mr. Phillips. I was in Washington attending the Chiefs of Station course, which is a training course for people who are going out on their first assignment as Chief of Station.

When President Johnson decided to send 22,000 Marines to the Dominican Republic, it occurred to me that in order to protect and evacuate American citizens, that that job might have been done with 400 Marines. I was scheduled to go there [redacted] And I just wasn't sure that I wanted to be associated with something like that. But I decided, well, I suppose President Johnson knows what he is doing, I will go -- I am going to go along. So, I did go along.

Senator Schweiker. One question on your differentiation between where you drew a personal commitment line on assassinations, but not overthrow. I have trouble quite understanding it, because as I understand Chile, the plot was to overthrow

Mr. Phillips. There is no question that I could understand why anyone concerned with world affairs, looking at Chile and what was happening there, would be concerned.

Salvadore Allende made his first statement saying that he was a Socialist and wanted to change the order some 32 years beforehe was elected.

Over the years he made it quite clear that he was an ardent socialist. Before this decision was made I believe that we had a visit from a man who had the code name of [redacted] he was a Cuban intelligence officer. The Cubans were moving in rapidly. The influence was great. I think that they saw a lot at stake, another Cuba in Latin America type of thing, the same thing perhaps that motivated President Johnson to send 22,000 rather than 400.

So, I can understand why they thought this was going, in the long strategic sense, in the long range against our interests. But that is an assumption.

It is true that Allende very definitely made it clear that he wanted to turn Chile into a Marxist state. The difference was that Allende refused to take Fidel Castro's advice and use violence. As I understand it, Fidel Castro went to Chile and said, if you want your revolution to last you are going to have to use violence.

I found it interesting to read in this morning's paper where someone from Portugal came back from Cuba and said, activities?

Mr. Phillips. No, sir. I was the Station Chief in Rio de Janiero in Brazil, and was called back in 1970 for six or seven weeks for what we are referring to as Track II.

Senator MOndale. Now, in that position you familiarized yourself with the Chilean government, Allende and so on, and tried to become as expert as you could in the political forces and so on?

Mr. Phillips. Yes. And in addition to that, Senator, one of the reasons I was called back was that I had lived for many years in Chile, so I knew something about it.

Senator Mondale. And it is your judgment as I think I just heard, that although Allende was a Marxist, and espoused Marxism, he also said he wanted to achieve this through the democratic process, and although there was some rough stuff on the press, and so on, essentially that was the course he was pursuing, is that correct?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall that he said it, but he indeed acted that way.

Senator Mondale. But in fact the course he was pursuing was an attempt to achieve the Marxist philosophy with the population support under constitutional system?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, essentially that is true, sir.

Senator Mondale. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to read to you in connection assignment by the President and by the White House?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, it doesn't make any difference today. On the contrary, since Watergate the people say, why should we? Before Watergate it was another ball game. The President was the Commander in Chief in every sense of the word.

And you said, who am I, a GS-15 bureaucrat, to say that we shouldn't do this? But that has changed since Watergate.

Senator Hart of Colorado. One other question.

I call your attention in our briefing books to what is Tab C, a cable which has your name at the end of it dated 21 September 1970, page 3 of 7. Are you an author or co-author of that cable?

Mr. Phillips. I believe I was the authenticating officer, yes.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What does that mean?

Mr. Phillips. That meant that the signature on the right of those cables is someone that is the authenticating officer in a sense, here is a fellow that is supposed to know the situation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But who wrote it, I guess is what I am after.

Mr. Phillips. I would guess that this cable was probably written by Mr. Poinzio, and perhaps myself, perhaps it was joint. But Mr. Poinzio wrote an awful lot of them. But by putting my signature on the authenticating part I said I was a part of it. And then, of course, the releasing officer is the one that accepts the responsibility.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Page 3 of 7 which has the paragraph identified as the paragraph F contains the following sentence or part of a sentence: You suggest sending us cables outlining objectives and course of events, et cetera, and he said, always conditioned by the fact that we have to keep our feet in the mud of practicality, and our eyes on the stars.

What does that mean in Agency talk?

Mr. Phillips. Senator, I want to assure you with real seriousness that I am not the author of that phrase.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It must have caught your eye, however.

Mr. Phillips. It did catch my eye. If this was indeed a joint venture, I can promise that that was [redacted] contribution, and if you ever meet him you will understand why. He was addicted to picturesque speech. And looking back, all I can say is that it probably went out at four o'clock in the morning, and we were very tired, and I just didn't want to argue about that phrase, and I let it go. I am not sure what it means even now.

SEnator Hart of Colorado. Neither am I. But it seems to describe a lot of what we have heard around here for the

Now, I read that as Helms' position being that the assassination of Schneider was something which presented the opportunity for the very thing that the U.S. wished to have done.

Do you agree with me?

Mr. Phillips. No, I can't agree with you on that. I am not sure about the suggestion from the language. But I will tell you the immediate reaction in our little task force when the word came that Schneider was dead, that is it, it is finishe Knowing Chileans, the moment that that violence occurred, Chileans, with the possible exception of a nut such as Marshall, immediately said,this is it, that is enough. There was still that tradition over the years. And I think that the moment we heard of it and we discussed it we said, that is it, there will be no more. In many countries in Latin America that would have been the signal for further action, weakness, and so forth. But in this case it was the end of the business.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to run through with you the activities which were being undertaken with the Valenzuela group and with the Viaux group. In the case of Viaux, was that one of the assignments that the false flag officers had?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the case of Valenzuela, was that one of the assignments that Colonel Wimert had?

Mr. Phillips. [redacted] Yes, I believe it was [redacted] that was in touch with that group.

Mr. Schwarz. And the two teams worked in tandem, didn't they?

Mr. Phillips. Are you referring to Chilean teams?

Mr. Schwarz. No, the false flag team [redacted]

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that there might have been some central direction from the office or from headquarters. I don't believe that anyone of the false flaggers had the slightest idea that [redacted] was working with us. And I don't believe that [redacted] -- I don't know that [redacted] knew about them.

So, no, they didn't work in tandem, except in sense of direction from the Station.

Mr. Schwarz. Headquarters down there, and you in Washington, were working with both the Valenzuela groupand the Viaux group?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, sir.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Are you in a chain here, counsel?

Mr. Schwarz. I am in a chain, but it is easily interruptible.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Phillips, did we chronologically -- maybe the staff can answer that, I am just

Viaux group was really acting in order to carry out step one of the Valenzuela group's plan?

Mr. Phillips. Yes, to address this point specifically. Obviously when the guns were passed [redacted] and the death occurred so soon after, immediately we thought they probably used those guns. It was then when we read the press reports that General Schneider died from handgun wounds. And that was the first time we thought we could really be sure in our own mind that it wasn't directly the Valenzuela group using those guns.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the gas masks that had been furnished earlier? WAsn't there evidence that there were gas masks in the care of the persons who attempted to abduct General Schneider?

Mr. PHillips. I don't recall. There may very well have been, but I am not real sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. I am going to go to another area, which is the relationship [redacted]. If there are any questions on the relationship between the two groups.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Concerning the October 19 attempts, under Tab 4 on page 7 of the longer memorandum by Dianne LaVoy under October 18 there is reference to a cable A66 dated October 19. And concerning the connection of these various conspirators, it says: "Valenzuela meets with [redacted] and gives him a 15 point plan for coup to be carried out on October 19. [redacted] witting of the above plan, has promised to keep the Carabineros away from the Schneier houseto assure that the abduction will not be interferred with. General Viaux is knowledgeable of the above operation, but is not directly involved."

What do you think "not directly involved" refers to? Why not just not involved?

Mr. Phillips. I think that probably referred to what I was saying before, that in these situations it is not very unusual that there is not some talk that everybody has a cousin that works with some group type of thing.

And I believe that it must refer to that.

Mr. Schwarz. Taking the actual cable, is the actual cable in the Senator's books?

Mr. Inderfurther. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me read the full text of that paragraph from the cable. It is a cable apparently dated 19 October on the subject of General Viaux:

"General Viaux, knowledgeable of above operation, but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation is not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week."

Now, I can't read that language any way other than meaning that the Valenzuela group and the Viaux group were in close cooperation, that was part of the abduction plan, it was agreed between the two that Viaux would appear -- would be out of town so that he would not appear to be involved. And you have to read that, do you not, as meaning that there was a close cooperation on this effort between the two groups.

Mr. Phillips. Yes, I think you do have to read it that way.

Miss Culbreth. Would you identify that paper more than just the statement?

Mr. Phillips. Cable sent to headquarters A66.

Mr. Schwarz. No. A66, eyes only to --

Mr. Inderfurth. DCOS, which was [redacted]

Mr. Treverton. It is Tab M, it is in the book.

Mr. Schwarz. I think we ought to mark that as an exhibit.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

As for the narrow part of your question, by all means it is a bad way to do business.

Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

Mr. Schwarz. Picking up on Senator Schweiker's line of quesioning, would you show the witness Tab A, the document Tab A.

It is a memorandum for the record by Mr. Broe dated 17 September, and then that is crossed out and it says 16 September, "Subject, Genesis of Project".

Incidentally, what was the code name for this project? Was it FU Belt?

Mr. Phillips. Beltway or FU Belt, one of the two.

Mr. Schwarz. Does FU stnd for anything in particular?

Mr. Phillips. Chile. So it would be FU. The first two letters there indicate a geographical araa. So it would be a lot of different ones, but that would mean Chile. FU Belt means Chile. Belt means nothing.

Mr. Schwarz. Everybody keeps saying that so many of these things mean nothing. Who is responsible for these names?

Mr. Phillips. There is somebody who is supposed to have a big liest to make sure that they were not duplicated. And I think sometimes there is a pixie-like quality that comes out in those things.

Senator Schweiker. That is an understatement, to call it pixie-like.

Mr. Phillips. But many times the cryptonums mean absolutely nothing, they have no meaning at all.

Senator Schweiker. SRRIFLE, ROGUE ELEPHANT --

Mr. Phillips. I am sorry, sir.

Senator Schweiker. We have come across a few other good ones.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't know if you have ever seen that document, and it doesn't matter. But the end of paragraph 2 indicates that the instructions from the President concluded:

"The Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Department of State or Defense".

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was your instruction?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in fact, of course, you did use in Chile a man called Colonel Wimert.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was in the Defense Department?

Mr. Phillips. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was assigned -- he was instructed to take his instructions only from the CIA inChile, is that right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And he was instructed indeed not to tell his superior in Chile, the man who was in charge of the defense attache system down there?

Mr. Phillips. That is true, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Wimert was the man from the Army and then there was someone else in the Air Force, the Navy, and there was a boss?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. And Wimert was told not to tell that boss?

Mr. Phillips. I believe that is true, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, how did it happen that Colonel Wimert came to work for and under the direction of the CIA?

Mr. Phillips. I believe the explanation for that was the fact that Colonel Wimert had been around Latin America, spoke perfect Spanish, his hobby was riding horses, and he developed really marvelous relationships with the military of officers that he had contact with. And I think it was just that someone recognized the fact that if we had been given the task of getting a coup going using the military, why not take advantage of the one man in Chile that they liked the most, trusted the most, and saw the most? It was perfectly natural for him to spend his weekends with these people.

Mr. Schwarz. And so he was a natural and helpful asset. But how was it arranged that he would work for the CIA, and lay that question against the instruction from President Nixon that the Defense Department was not to know, how did you accomplish it?

Mr. Phillips. I don't know. I have had my memory refreshed by looking at some documents now, and I know that someone came and gave me the piece of paper in this book that has been signed by General Philpott which was a message to [redacted] saying, cooperate with the CIA. What the process was for getting that approval, or who went to see Philpott, I wasn't involved with that, I just don't recall.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see Philpott ?

Mr. Phillips. I never did.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ever see --

Mr. Phillips. I may have seen Philpott in some large meeting or something like that, but I don't recall any meeting with any of the generals. I was relatively too junior to have attended these meetings. This would have been Mr. Broe, Mr. Karamessines, and so forth. And I would have been left back in the shop, sort of, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you ever see or talk to Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Not to my recollection. I think not.

Mr. Schwarz. I asked you if you ever saw General Philpott, or did you ever talk to General Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall such a talk. During this entire period, for instance, I never went outside of our building.I was there sort of in the shop. And other people would do that sort of thing.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that the form in which you sent the message which is contained in Exhibit 3 to Chile?

Mr. Phillips. It is.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, apparently Exhibit 4, which you drafted initially, said that it was from General Bennett, and then it was changed to say it was from General Philpott.

Did you make that change?

Mr. Phillips. That is my handwriting above that said Philpott, and someone else's handwriting below that said Bennett. I think the signature on the original document was from Philpott. But that is my change there.

Mr. Schwarz. And is the change on the second page -- the sentence reads:

"Do not allow Colonel Wimert to retain copy of this message", and then in handwriting it is asserted "Note that General Bennett is out of the country".

Mr. Phillips. Yes, that is my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Having seen that, and these changes, what do you recall about the circumstances that led you to make those changes?

Mr. Phillips. It is possible that this message is one of the rare messages that sometimes occur, that you are handed something that is written out, and there is no secretary, and it is two o'clock in the morning or something like that. On some occasions you will take a very rough draft and ask the communicators to send that, and youwill then later write for the record, and have typed for the record the formal cable. I am not sure about that.

Mr. Schwarz. You think what you sent used General Bennett's name and not General Philpott's name?

Mr. Phillips. I don't recall. But I believe if that had been the case that not only would the change have been made, but there would have been some sort of note on the side or something. So, I believe that the original must have said Philpott. But I can't be absolutely positive.

Mr. Schwarz. But the original typed version on the first page used Bennett's name, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, I am puzzled, because if you had previously obtained the document which is Exhibit 3, the "suggested message to be sent to Army attache from General Bennett", and which is in fact signed with a name that purports to be General Philpott's, if you had obtained that before drafting the typed message, I take it you would have used Philpott's name in the typed message and not Bennetts'.

Mr. PHillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. So that suggests that you typed the typed message before you obtained the document which is Exhibit 3 that has Mr. Philpott's signature?

Mr. Phillips. No, I would not have done that. I would wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Schwarz. After that initial occasion involving the use of Philpott's name in order to instruct [redacted] to work for the CIA, was anybody from the Defense Intelligence Agency further brought into the operation which we have been calling Track II?

Mr. PHillips. My answer to that until a few minutes ago would have been, I don't recall that. I have seen a document since then that indicates that someone else was talked to later. If I knew that I had forgotten it, or perhaps never knew it -- I must have known it if I saw the message.But until I saw this thing, to refresh my memory I would have said, I think that Philpott was the man.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the man, and was only contacted on that one occasion?

Mr. Phillips. As far as I know, that one occasion. But I didn't necessarily know what was outside of my little room with windows, and so there were other people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's then look at the other documents.

Would you mark Tab G as Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. And this is a cable releasing officer Willia Broe, authenticating officer David A Phillips, dated October 14, 1970, from CIA headquarters to Santiago, CIA. And it says:

"Please deliver the following message ('destroy immediately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett. "

Now, on what basis did you authenticate that message which purports to be to Colonel Wimert from Lieutenant General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. Obviously -- not obviously, but because I presume in this case -- I am sure in this case once again there was a document that was handed to me and I was told, send this down. In order to make this point, I was in there, and it was sort of a direct operational thing, and when I authenticated them I did it because I knew what was going on. If Bill Broe, my boss, came in and said, here is a document that we want to send, or if Tom Karamessines said, I worked on the assumption that they were passing on to me the authority to authenticate, and I didn't necesarily turn to them and say, hey --

Mr Schwarz. Prove that --

Mr. Phillips. Prove that you have been talking with General Bennett -- I obviously didn't do that.

Mr. Schwarz. Then mark as Exhibit 6 an undated document headed "Destroy immediately" from LTG Bennett to Colonel Wilmert "Eyes only".

(The document referred to was Marked Phillips Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now, that purports to be from LTG Bennett to Colonel Wimert, and has the text in it which you sent on to Colonel Wimert.

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is your best recollection as to who handed you that document?

Mr. Phillips. I cannot say definitely who did that. There were many occasions when Bill Broe would walk into the office and say, here is something to send. There were others which would come in a manila envelope with a yellow forwarding slip on it. There are times,I am sure, when I would go into Bill Broe's office, and he would say, by the way, send this.

I simply cannot recall the circumstances in which someone handed me that and said, send it to Chile. And I was paying less attention to those things, because I was in effect the postman for people doing other things.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection at all about this document?

Mr. Phillips. No, I am afraid I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. What is your reading of the signature on that document?

Mr. PHillips. Well, it certainly looks like the signature which was on the other document which was said to be Philpott's. But I am not an authority on these things.

military attache. And those instructions went down. Apparently it would appear that theremight be something here where they are going to bring in more people, as is known to several persons, it says down here.

And itmay have been because there was an attempt there not to say to these new people, by the way, we want to talk to you about something we are doing that we have kind of already done. That is theonly thing I can come up with. I can't give you a better explanation than that.

Mr. Schwarz. This you characterize also as a puzzling and strange document?

Mr. Phillips. Yes. And I am sorry that I can't be more helpful on this. But I was treating these -- these things were coming through my mail shoot, and I was putting headings on them. Even though I signed them and so forth, I wasn't paying the attention to things that I did to my own job.

Mr. Schwarz. That is an explanation that deals with some of the earlier documents. But here in the first place you were both the releasing officer and the authenticating officer.

And second, this is not simply taking some other message and putting a heading on it, is it? This is a substantive document purporting to explain a problem to your CIA Station Chief in Santiago, right, do you agree with that?

Mr. Phillips. I do. And I agree that it is puzzling, and there are some holes here. Perhaps I can be helpful when you have further testimony on this to help me job my memory. I can't remember the rationale for this.

Mr. Schwarz. Let's take some of the statements that are in the telegram and deal with them specifically.

Paragraph 2: "There seems little doubt this will confuse Colonel Wimert".

It has confused all of us here, so I suppose it would have confused him.

"Background for his information: both Generals Bennett and Philpott have been briefed by Broe".

Who told you that?

Mr. PHillips. I don't know for sure, but I presume this must have been Bill Broe.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection of his telling you that?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. But I don't think that I -- I don't see myself releasing that cable without being sure that Broe knew what was going out in that cable. In other words, that is hthe kind of cable that I wouldn't have released just because someone else came in and said that sort of thing. This cable I think must have originated either with a discussion with Broe that said, look, send the following word, write up something like this, or perhaps some notes, and say, do a cable from it, or just as possible -- and I can't read it here -- is the fact that it was actually drafted by someone else that was working in my shop, Mr. Pionzio, or someone else, that went in and talked to Broe. Maybe I was doing something else, and they came to me with a typed thing and said, here, I cleared this with Broe, and so he signed both things. So I really can't remember.

Mr. Schwarz. Under either assumption, either that Broe spoke to you directly or that someone on your staff spoke to Broe, you had Broe around at the time this cable goes out?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Then why wouldn't he sign it?

Mr. Phillips. Here is one thing. At the time the cable went out -- I can't remember well enough if it was late at night.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the time up above indicate 11:59?

Mr. Phillips. Where do you see that?

Mr. Schwarz. In the upper lefthand corner. It has a date 14 October 17, and right above that is 11:59 --

Mr. Phillips. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. -- in the customary place for the time.

Mr. Phillips. I don't see that on this copy.

The point I am trying to make is, if Mr. Broe were leaving the office and we had gone through this exchange, and he had done it with someone else in my office, he might well and saying, look, we want you to go along with this and use Colonel Wimert down there, he is really important to us, and that sort of thing, and was perhaps slightly embarrassed by the fact that they had been doing that before. That is the only explanation I can give.

Mr. Schwarz. So you would assume that these new interested parties and the several persons referred to in the two sentences are persons who were in higher authority than Bennett and Philpott?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that, but do not know. I just -- this thing was being so closely held, it just doesn't seem logical to me that they would start going outside and down, I thought that they would go outside and up. But I say, I only assume that.

Mr.Schwarz. You have characterized Exhibit 7 as itself being sort of puzzling. And the situation it deals with, as you now describe it, is one that is kind of ticklish, isn't it?

Mr. Phillips. I understand.

Mr. Schwarz. The CIA had been using Wimert, and knew some people in higher authority than General Bennett, which would mean very senior in the Defense Department, right?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Or outside the Defense Department, but very senior persons. They apparently are expressing an interest, and according to this telegram, or your reconstruction of it, General Bennett and General Philpott feel that they are embarrassed to refute the fact that they had already been doing the work for the CIA [redacted]

Now, all those things were not ordinary garden variety daily events, were they?

Mr. Phillips. They were not.

Mr. Schwarz. You don't remember this at all?

Mr. Phillips. No, and I didn't want to imply that it was necessarily because General Philpott would have been embarrassed, it could have been within CIA as well.

But this rather unusual step was made because of the talents of the military men, to bring him into a program that you weren't even talking with the State Department about. And so that indeed was unusual to a great degree. And I am really very sorry to appear to be so vague about these things that I obviously had something to do with.

But my explanation is that I was doing a certain job, and that other people were outside, and Mr. Karamessines would be talking with Mr. Helms about something, and this, that and the other, and I was on the day-by-day operation side, and when someone would come in and say, we want something to go down to Wimert, and it has something to do with General Philpott, I didn't pay the kind of attention I would to it if it had been one of our operations.

Mr. Schwarz. Go back up to the beginning at paragraph 2 there were it says, "There is no doubt that this will confuse Colonel Wimert. Background for his information".

Now, there are two ways in which those words "for his information" can be read. One is that it is the genuine background.

The other is that it is a story to be given Wimert for his information, which is the fact, if you know, and which way doyou read it if you do not know what the facts are?

Mr. Phillips. I assume that it is the true story, because nowhere during this period did I encounter anything, nor do I remember anything that I thought was devious to the extent of falsehood in putting something down like that.

So, I assume that it is really for his background of what happened.

Mr. Schwarz. And you don't remember from where you got the information which you provided in this cable?

Mr. Phillips. I do not. Perhaps I can be more helpful after you talk to others. But I simply do not.

Mr. Schwarz. The last paragraphs make the notation "that we must advise GEneral Bennett time when Wimert shown" the telegram which is Exhibit 3.

Did you advise General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I did not. If it was done -- and I presume it was -- I was not involved, and wouldn't have been involved. And they would not have sent me over to see General

Bennett, who was the head of DIA at the time. So, I don't know that it was.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is the tab at which the reply from Wimert is located? Is it K?

Mr. Treverton. K, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you mark as the next exhibit, Exhibit 8, another cable to headquarters, "Eyes only for Lieutenant General Bennett from Colonel Wimert".

(The document referred to was marked Phillips Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of it, are we correct that this is a document that was sent from the CIA station in Santiago to CIA headquarters purporting to come from [redacted] and purporting to be directed to Lieutenant General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. That is true.

Mr. Schwarz. In the ordinary course to whom would such a cable go? And the second question, who would have the responsibility of passing information on to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. In the ordinary course of events this cable would have come to me where I was working in the sense of an info copy and this, that and the other.

The action on this cable would have certainly have gone at least to Mr.Broe, and possibly higher, because it says, this is his message to the head of another government service. And so it would have gone to that level.

Mr. Schwarz. And in the ordinary course it would have come to you first, and then it would have been passed on to either Mr. Broe or someone higher to take action?

Mr. Phillips. For action -- not always. Sometimes a cable will come in and there will be more than one copy. And right away the action copy will go to the other fellow, and then you get the information copy, and so forth.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you tell from the face of this cable whether there would have been more than one copy?

Mr. Phillips. There is no indicator to say who it went to.

Mr. Schwarz. Does the"eyes only"have any significance to you in the third line?

Mr. Phillips. Only in the sense that what Colonel Wimert was saying was, this may go over to the Defense Department, but not through regular channels, and not to anyone else other than General Bennett.

Mr. Schwarz. Did it go to General Bennett?

Mr. Phillips. I do not know.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you pass it to someone?

Mr. Phillips. If it did not go it would have been highly unusual for a message to come in from overseas saying, give this to the head of another Agency, and for it not to be delivered it would have been extremely unusual.

Mr. Schwarz. What would be the normal form of its delivery? Would there be a cover note put on it?

Mr. Phillips. It would have probably been folded into an envelope and delivered by hand. Because if it is really an "eyes only" message of such import, if it goes through a communications channel, it means that they are going to be operators of machinery to see it, and so forth. If an American Ambassador overseas wants to get a very sensitive message up he has the option of sending it to us and saying, will you please hand carry this over to the Secretary of State?

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for 1/12/94

Mr. Schwarz. This message states:

"Please deliver the following message, ('destroy immediately') to Colonel Wimert eyes only from Lieutenant General Bennett." And the message was: "For your information suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded".

What are MAP and FMS.

Mr. Phillips. Military Assistance of some kind or another, Military Arms Procurement, or something like that.

Mr. Schwarz. Military Assistance Program?

Mr. Phillips. That is probably it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what is FMS?

Mr. Inderfurther. Foreign Military Sales.

Mr. Schwarz. Continuing: "This action does not, repeat not, imply change in our estimated situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date of situation".

Now, Bennett's job at that time was what?

Mr. Phillips. I believe he was the Chief of DIA.

Mr. Schwarz. Defense Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Is the Defense Intelligence Agency responsible for decisions to military assistance programs?

Mr. Phillips. My opinion is that they are not.

Mr. Schwarz. And they don't really have anything to do with that, do they?

Mr. Phillips. I would gather from this message that it is simply an explanation from -- it says General Bennett to Wimert, to explain something. As a part of Track I, and the whole business, all of these different options were being looked at and people were saying, let's don't help them with military things because it looks like Allende is going to get in. And the decision was made, well, let's go ahead and do it. And this was apparently sort of a request for Colonel Wimert to give him some rationale behind it when he was down there running away trying to foment the coup, saying, why is the U.S. Government still helping this government?

I am speculating. But this was another one of those messages quote unquote which went in our channels.

Mr. Schwarz. Who gave you this message?

Mr. Phillips. I do not remember.

Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection whatsoever?

Mr. Phillips. Sir, it is five years ago, and there are a lot of messages, and as I said, these were the ones that I was the least interested in in the sense of being involved, and so forth, and I just can't remember who handed it to me or how it arrived.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you expect that there should be another document which contains the purported message from

Mr. Fenn. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Talking about telephones, incidentally, was there a secure telephone between Washington and Santiago which was used for messages, or did you use the cable always?

Mr. Phillips. We never used the telephone, unless it is a personal message like your aunt died and you have to get on the next plane for the funeral. Otherwise you use those absolutely marvelous communications facilities that get it down there --a flash cable will get there in 20 minutes.

In the recess I have been thinking about this, and I realize that I have not been very helpful in what obviously is a contradictory situation here. As I read it, either General Bennett does not recall this, or else there was some sort of endeavor within CIA headquarters to use his name. Is that the approach we are making to this?

Mr. Schwarz. I don't think we are trying any approach. He has denied any knowledge of this.

Senator Schweiker. We are just confused.

Mr. Phillips. Maybe I am confused, too.

Senator Schweiker. Can you enlighten us at all?

Mr. PHillips. If it were someone in CIA headquarters saying, we are going to use Bennett's name without his knowledge because it has a lot of clout, I don't understand why. Because the messages went from Philpott [redacted] And [redacted] said, I am with you 100 percent, and from that moment began cooperating with the Chief of Station. I don't recall any instance where there was any indication of hesitancy on his part about doing what he was doing.

And I certainly can't comment about General Bennett's side, not having been involved with him.

From the CIA side I suppose it is conceivable that someone is using that business that I referred to in dispatches, General Bennett says, when they are really talking about what a subordinate of General Bennett says, and they figure he is acting for them, or something like that. I guess that is conceivable.

But I would find it very unusual to see some sort of little plot hatched here, because there was no need to.

Mr. Schwarz. What you are saying is that you can't see a motive?

Mr. Phillips. Precisely.

I can't see the motive for fooling [redacted], because [redacted] had already started working when he received the instructions from the number two man in his Agency, which is indeed pretty high up.

So, I am afraid the reasons that I am not being helpful is that I, too, am confused.

Mr. Schwarz. I just received a note indicating that Mr. Bolten of the Agency has told us that both of the October 14 cables were authored by you. I don't know if that adds

Senator Schweiker. Let me ask counsel this.

Can we establish that Philpott did communicate --

Mr. Schwarz. Philpott is going to testify on Tuesday. We have talked to him.He accepts at least one message. There are two which purport to be signed by him, and he is not sure if he accepted two.

Senator Schweiker. So, he has accepted one message?

Mr. Schwarz. He accepted one message, yes.

Mr. Phillips. You wanted to ask about a meeting.

Mr. Schwarz. It was a final meeting you had with Helms?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

The death of General Schneider had occurred. And while, as we said previously, things had fallen into place according to "plan", an egregious plan, it was absolutely my conviction that those orders that I had been predicting, which were very, very slim, were now completely unacceptable, one reason being that the inauguration was going to be in 48 hours -- not the inauguration, but the confirmation, and so forth.

And so as I recall, there was a meeting of quite a few of us, probably myself and Mr. Pionzio and Mr. Broe and Mr. Karamessines, and maybe Mr. Flannery, -- no, I guess not, but I do remember thatmeeting going up there and saying, if there ever was a chance, it is now finished, and somebody has got to say that it is finished. And so that is what I meant by that meeting.

what happens, it is all right with me. There was an inlet inside of Domingo which was dubbed, the Pasino, the swimming pool, and that is where Trujillo threw his friends and enemies to the sharks. And he used to hang people on meat hooks in refrigerated vaults. And it sometimes took them several days to die.

Miss Culbreth. You had served [redacted] in the Dominican Republic prior to the time that you served in this position on the Track II party?

Mr. Phillips. I have, after the assassination of Trujillo. But as a student of Latin America, I was very much aware of this. So, there is another aspect of involvement. U.S. policy has been to retreat from Trujillo. We cut off our arms aid, we brought our Ambassador out of there. So, while those plans were going on we weren't "dealing with a friendly nation", relations were very bad.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask you this. After General Schneider's death was his death characterized by you or by your colleagues in the CIA as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. It certainly was not. And I do not do that now.

Miss Culbreth. You would not this day characterize his death as having been an assassination?

Mr. Phillips. No. I think it was an accident that occurred because he turned out to be such a brave man that when he looked up and he saw a bunch of people standing around his car he drew his gun.

Miss Culbreth. Thank you.

I would like to direct your attention to this cable that you were questioned about. It is the one that is dated September27, 1970. And Mr. Schwarz read from that cable in talking with you earlier. This was the cable which said "A false flag base of staff would be established in Santiago by 10 October".

And you were questioned about this part: "These officers will perform the delicate chores with great flap potential which cannot be done by station personnel or any Chilean. An example: We have a [redacted] who can pose as [redacted] intelligence officer. If he approached, funded and ran a Chilean general, any flap would be a [redacted]".

In the second paragraph which was not read earlier, I would like to read this and then put a question to you:

"Headquarters believes this false flag base, manned by officers who have repeatedly proved their ability to operate and recruit under false colors, will give station great flexibility in handling delicate and fast-moving situations securely".

To me this second paragraph indicates that these false flag officers were people that had experience in this very kind of intelligence operations, is that correct?

Mr. Phillips. Every one of them was known to me personally and had worked for me.

Miss Culbreth. And had been in this kind of capacity as a false flag officer?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Miss Culbreth. So, this was not some unique and unusual, devious approach or mechanism that was being employed in this instance?

Mr. Phillips. The purpose of that explanation, especially the second paragraph that you read, was -- the immediate reaction, as I recall, from the station when they first heard that we were given their assignment, was, come on, that flap potential is great, it is not going to work, what are you talking about, this, that and the other.

As a matter of fact, as I recall, [redacted] was terribly upset, because he is a sort of an old pro, and he wanted to get into position, in other words, to plan for the future, and all of a sudden this new thing came in. The purpose of that cable was to explain to the station that we had been given this job to do and that we at headquarters saw that as the safest way for them to accomplish the job that they had been given with the least possibility of embarrassing the American Ambassador, and that sort of thing.

(1)(A)
17 Nov 93

Senator Schweiker. You said earlier, Mr. Phillips, I think in contact, but we didn't see it as such a sure thing; even though this says, probably by General Viaux and so forth.

Miss Culbreth. Was there any question in your mind as principal operating officer here in the states that there was a delineation or a demarcation of function between the Viaux group and the Valenzuela group, or did you regard them as one big group down there accomplishing this, or did you really regard them as separate groups?

Mr. Phillips. I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups, always with the caveat that in Latin America some one always has a cousin who talks to someone else. But I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups, and when General Viaux was called off earlier in October, I thought that General Viaux was out of the thing, and I thought that without support that he wasn't going to try anything.

And then we had the other group which seemed to be more serious people, and with more capabilities. And I very definitely regarded them as two separate groups.

Miss Culbreth. Let me ask just a few questions that might sort of help us a little bit in our housekeeping operations when we get to the point of trying to tie everything up on these.

With regard to the information that was given to you, the specific instructions on these cables that were sent to the Chief of Station and were directed to [redacted], who can

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Senator Hart of Michigan. Anyone else?

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Phillips, just one last question. How large was the room you were operating out of? You described it as a small windowless room.

Mr. Phillips. About from here to your wall back there -- no, not that big.

Mr. Johnston. This was the entire control area for the Task Force?

Mr. Phillips. That is right.

Mr. Johnston. How many people were on the Task Force besides you?

Mr. Phillips. Of course we had two shifts of secretaries, there was someone there all night, and that sort of thing. There were two or three secretaries, myself, Mr. [redacted] six, eight, something like that.

Mr. Johnston. And that included the secretaries?

Mr. Phillips. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. How many action officers were in the room?

Mr. Phillips. It was pretty much [redacted] and myself, as the real action officers. And then there were two junior officers that were assisting at the time. I think I have given Mr. O'Flaherty their names previously. So that was four. And there was someone from the CIA shop, the Counterintelligence ship, whose name I can't remember today. So that is five officers that I recall. And I think that there was a 6th that

Date:06/08/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10095

RECORDS SERIES :
REPORT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA

DATE : 03/17/64
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN PLOT TO ASSASSANATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA
PANAMA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/09/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

05763

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
New Orleans, Louisiana
March 17, 1964

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
GMB 4 FEB 94

①

ALLEGED CUBAN PLAN TO ASSASSINATE PRESIDENT OF PANAMA

At 4:55 PM, March 17, 1964, Orlando Piedra, formerly connected with Federal Police in Cuba and presently residing New Orleans, Louisiana, advised that about one week ago he received information from a source in Cuba whom he considers reliable that Castro is not satisfied with the way things are going in Panama and for that reason plans to have the President of Panama assassinated to create additional uprisings in that country. Piedra advised that he furnished the above information by letter to Colonel Bolivar Vallarino, Chief of the National Guard of Panama whom he has known for years. Piedra declines to identify the source and has no additional information to report.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is the property of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

This will confirm information orally furnished Mr. J. J. Kelly, State Department, and [redacted] *Central Intelligence Agency on March 17, 1964, by A. J. Decker of this Bureau. This will also confirm data furnished orally to Colonel Graham E. Schmid, Department of the Army; Major William Boyd, Department of the Air Force; and Mr. Don Gorhan, Department of the Navy, on March 19, 1964, by G. A. Day of this Bureau.*

1A per CIA

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CS COPY

Rec'd from L. Sternfield, CIA.
5-28-76. CHM

200-300-5

Date:07/14/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10144

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
MEETING WITH THE WARREN COMMISSION ON 12 MARCH 1964

DATE : 03/12/64
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
CIA MEETING WITH WARREN COMMISSION
HELMS, RICHARD
ROCCA, RAYMOND
WARREN COMMISSION
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/14/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

302-3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~EYES ONLY~~

daily movements while in Mexico City nor could they confirm the date of his departure or his mode of travel. The original assumption that he had returned by bus could not be proven. Several possibilities were discussed whereby the Commission could fill in the gaps of its investigation of the Mexican phase. The suggestion was made that the most effective way of resolving the questions they had would be to have a member of the Commission visit Mexico City and discuss the issues on the spot with those American and Mexican officials directly concerned. Mr. Helms noted that it would be possible for a member of the Commission to visit our Chief of Station who would then be able to work out with the Warren Commission staff member the best way to handle interviews with Mexican police officials, particularly if it is desired that these interviews be informal in nature. Our Chief of Station would also be able to put the Warren Commission staff member in contact with the FBI officials and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers stationed in Mexico City. Mr. Helms cautioned that our Chief of Station would be under State Department cover and that it would be proper to advise the Department of the planned visit and upon arrival to meet briefly with the Ambassador or Minister Counselor before proceeding to work out details with the CIA Chief of Station.

8. In connection with the Mexican phase of the investigation, members of Mr. Rankin's staff questioned Mr. Helms and Mr. Rocca regarding the extent of the CIA file on Oswald for the period 8 October to 22 November 1963. They questioned the sanitized extracts which they had been shown and wondered if there were not more. Mr. Rocca summarized the materials that had come to the attention of the Secret Service, or had been disseminated to the Secret Service, immediately after the assassination. Mr. Rocca said there was not additional substantive information and that the sanitized version seen by the Commission constituted the sum of our holdings. Mr. Helms then explained that as a matter of practice we did not release actual copies of our messages because they contained codewords and digraphs which would be unintelligible to a person not familiar with them. He added, however, that he would be happy to show the file with the original messages to any staff member of the Warren Commission who might come to visit him at Langley.

9. The question of why no action was taken by other agencies of the government after their receipt of CIA information that Oswald was in contact with the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City was next discussed. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff clearly felt that this was a crucial question which needed careful review. They appeared to

~~SECRET~~
~~EYES ONLY~~

believe that the information on Oswald was unusual enough to have caused recipients to take special measures which might conceivably have led to a closer scrutiny of Lee Harvey Oswald and his movements. Mr. Helms pointed out that the information on Oswald's visit to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City came from telephone intercepts which were placed on both embassies. These intercepts were recorded on tape and reviewed by persons at our Station for any information affecting U. S. security. Such information is routinely passed to other agencies and entered in CIA files. Given the enormous bulk which is involved, the tapes are not kept on file but erased after a brief period of time. Thus the information on Oswald was similar to that provided on other American citizens who might have made contacts of this type. In Oswald's case, it was the combination of visits to both Cuban and Soviet Embassies which caused the Mexico City Station to report this to Headquarters and Oswald's record of defection to the Soviet Union which prompted the Headquarters dissemination. At the conclusion of his remarks on this subject, Mr. Helms specified that the information he had given Mr. Rankin was extremely sensitive and that the very existence of these telephone intercepts had to be very carefully protected.

10. The Commission, Mr. Rankin said, would be interested in any information held by CIA on Jack Ruby. Mr. Rankin said the Commission staff had prepared a roundup on Ruby, a copy of which he handed Mr. Helms. He said he would appreciate any file reflections or comments that CIA analysts might make on this material. Mr. Rankin and members of his staff then discussed Ruby's confirmed trip to Havana in 1959. The Commission has received information from an unspecified source that Ruby was in Havana again in 1963 under a Czech passport. Mr. Rankin asked whether CIA could provide any assistance in verifying this story. Mr. Helms replied that CIA would be limited in its possibility of assisting, to air manifest checks in Mexico. These would be carried out he said.

11. Mr. Helms was then asked if CIA had done any follow up to its original telegraphic dissemination of the information on Oswald's visits to the Cuban and Soviet embassies in Mexico City. Mr. Helms replied that there had been no CIA action following our initial dissemination. Mr. Willems then asked if there were any liaison problems faced by CIA in its efforts to deal with other agencies in matters affecting internal security. Mr. Helms replied that there were always understandable human problems in conducting any liaison on any subject but

Date:09/02/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10270

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU

DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
OFFICE OF SECURITY
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

C-TO

SUBJECT: Robert Maheu - Foreign Head of State

1. In connection with the official State visit of a foreign Head of State in 1959, the Office of Security was requested to render special support during the Los Angeles and New York phases of the tour. According to ICA personnel, the foreign official was especially desirous of female companionship during his Los Angeles visit and it was requested that appropriate arrangements be made through a controlled source of the Office in order to assure a satisfied visit.

2. On 3 April 1959 Mr. Robert Maheu, a cleared Office of Security contact, was asked to arrange a party for the foreign official at Los Angeles, California. This was done by Mr. Maheu through Mr. Gregson Bautzer. Mr. Bautzer is a prominent Los Angeles attorney and Hollywood figure previously granted a covert security approval for use by FE Division. By pre-arrangement, during the course of this party the foreign official was introduced to a part-time screen and stage actress. For the duration of the foreign official's stay in Los Angeles, 3 through 7 April 1959, he and the actress became intimate friends. It was indicated by a CIA employee who was integrated into the State party, that the foreign official desired to continue his friendship with the actress and that he wished to meet with her during his stay in New York City from 14 through 18 April 1959.

3. On 13 April 1959 arrangements were made to rent the home of an Office of Security source, at Long Beach, Long Island, for the period 14 through 18 April 1959. The home was to be used as a confidential meeting place for the actress and the foreign official. At the same time the actress was registered at the Hotel Barclay, 111 East 48th Street, New York City, under an assumed name. The publicity touching on the relationship had become more pointed since some publicity mention had been made of the Jewish background of the actress. On 14 April 1959 a CIA employee and the actress were transported to the home on Long Island which was taken over as

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM (1)(A) (1)(B)
2-2-94 AS SANITIZED

01469

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET

the meeting place for the foreign official and the actress. Later the same day, by pre-arrangement, two Department of State Security Agents, a New York City police lieutenant and a hired chauffeur arrived with the foreign official. The actress remained at the site through 18 April 1959, and the foreign official and his party visited each evening and remained for about four to five hours.

4. During the stay at the Long Beach site, the actress discussed the publicity in the case at some length with the Security representatives. She speculated about the possible sources of certain personal information that she felt had been leaked to the press. Additionally she spoke of her deep feeling for the foreign official & commented on how Gregson Bautzer initially sought her out to serve as a party companion for the foreign official. At the time she said she was unclear as to just what part Mr. Bautzer wanted her to play. In attempting to clarify his case Mr. Bautzer said, "I am employed by the CIA. We want you to go to bed with him." The actress said she rejected the proposal but finally went to the party. She became quite taken with the foreign official and found him to be most charming.

5. All personal contacts by Security representatives in this case were under alias and implied State Department affiliation. There is no record or indication in any of the files in this case that involves Robert Maheu by name or reference. It is believed that Mr. Maheu was never introduced to the actress, and as far as can be determined Bautzer "fronted" for all arrangements. Office of Security investigation conducted variously from 25 May through 17 September 1959 of the actress reflected no substantive derogatory information regarding her.

01470

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

Date:09/02/94
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10004-10280

RECORDS SERIES :
CABLE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO : DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE :
ROBERT MAHEU'S TRANSPORTATION OF PROSTITUTES

DATE : 10/10/57
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROBERT A. MAHEU AND ASSOCIATES (RAMA)
PROSTITUTES
FOREIGN LEADERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/01/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SECRET

C-IV-4

Clean Copy of IN 20362

10 October 1957

DIRECTOR

[redacted]

IN 20362

CITE [redacted]

RE: [redacted]

1. CIA source called [redacted] urgently 9 Oct and turned over two documents charging that Robert M. Maheu violated Mann Act in procuring and transporting prostitutes for a foreign leader during state visit U. S. 1956, that this done with tacit approval State. Also charge Maheu with wire tapping OPS against Onassis Shipping Co in 55, that this done with tacit approval U. S. Government and known to CIA, State and FBI.

2. [redacted] expressed low interest info but agreed pouch to CIA.

3. On 8 Oct [redacted] gave identical documents to DCM who pouched same 9 Oct to State for action AMB Farland. Told DCM a high foreign official desires wide distribution U. S. Government agencies.

4. CIA source believes only possible source above documents is John Joseph Frank who formerly close to Maheu.

5. FC: [redacted] objective possibly blackmail U. S. Government, kill Frank Trial.

END OF MESSAGE

CS COMMENT: DISSEMINATION APPLICABLE TO KAPOK CABLES.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED
27-7-94

(1)(A)
(1)(B)

01450

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
K 2/23/98

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10141

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.
FROM : BELIN, DAVID W.
TO : HARVEY, WILLIAM K.

TITLE :
LETTER/ENCLOSURES

DATE : 05/01/75
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT OF INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY, WILLIAM K.
INTERVIEW WITH REGARD TO ASSASSINATION ATTEMPTS

Sent to NSC 11/22/93

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/30/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 435-3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bx 34

H: Would you make that please -- Do you mind my interrupting?

B: Sure - go ahead.

H: Make that Soviet Intelligence Branch.

B: -- and he was in charge of the Soviet Intelligence Branch of the Agency --

H: --which is a lesser position than the other reads like.

B: All right. He went to Berlin in the Fall of 1952 [redacted] until 1959. He came back to Washington in the Fall of 1959 where he stayed until June of 1963, except for possible short periods of temporary duty --

H: -- except for several periods of temporary duty.

B: -- except for several periods of temporary duty abroad. He went to Rome in June 1963 [redacted] until 1966. He came back to the Agency in Washington in 1966 and he retired from the Agency in 1967 on December 31. Now, Mr. Harvey, does that summarize basically part of your background, at least that we discussed?

H: That is correct. I would like to add one thing, if I may. During both the Berlin and Rome periods and for a considerable period of time in Washington after I returned from Berlin I was on the roles of the [redacted] which raises a ~~little~~ question of propriety. But I want you to know that in the handling of this.

B: All right. I first asked /you with regard to any knowledge of any assassination plans or plots within the Agency concerning Patrice Lumumba and you might indicate what your response was to that, Mr. Harvey.

H: I have no personal knowledge of any such plan or operation within or on the part of the Agency.

B: I also asked you apart from the question of Fidel Castro whether or not you had any knowledge of any assassination plans or plots in the Agency that involved any other foreign leader.

01771

PROPE... THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Date:10/01/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10224

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R174 1 OF 3

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS WITH EXHIBITS

DATE : 06/02/75
PAGES : 111

SUBJECTS :
HOUSTON, LAWRENCE - EXECUTIVE SESSION COMMITTEE MEETING
HOUSTON WAS FORMER CIA EMPLOYEE FROM 1947-1973
CIA OPERATIONS WITH REGARD TO CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/01/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 248-1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bx 25

trouble come see you?

Mr. Houston. Oh, no, there's a number of times. For instance, I think it was back in the '50's, there's a lot of them, but a couple might illustrate -- in those days we were doing a good deal of political action abroad in the sense of giving guidance to factions in foreign countries that U.S. policy favored in organizing elections. I don't mean in rigging them, but how to get down to the grass roots, the old-fashioned political advice on how to run a political campaign.

We didn't have many trained officers on this. We had one or two who were excellent and they wanted more, and they came to me with the proposition that -- this was an election year, which one I have forgotten -- that we put officers in both the Republican and Democratic campaign parties to get the practical experience, and I advised -- actually, I went over and talked with Malcolm Wilkie, who was then the legal counsel in the Department of Justice, and this was most ill-advisable, and I went back and they dropped the project.

More recently, our [communication] fellows down in Virginia found they could easily monitor [long distance telephone conversations] from Latin American to Canada, and in some cases to New York, and these frequently carried [conversations] involving [narcotics] in great detail. They had no [telephone] discipline at all, security discipline on [the telephone]. And they would even give the name of the person who's going to

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

receive the narcotics and where.

However, this immediately got us into an internal security and a police function. I told them they had to drop it, and they did. And it's too bad, because nobody else has found a way of doing it, and this information is floating over our heads right now and we cannot use it.

Mr. Schwarz. Have there been any instances where you or your office advised the Agency that it should not do something when nevertheless the Agency went ahead and did it?

Mr. Houston. I should think I would remember an occasion like that, but I don't.

Senator Mondale. Thank you.

(Senator Mondale left the hearing room.)

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Houston, with the Senator absent, you don't have to go ahead.

Mr. Houston. Fine, fine.

Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to go on to another subject. Does anyone else have anything else about the Robert Kennedy meeting?

Mr. Kirbow. I have only one other question, and perhaps more about the leadership of the Agency.

Mr. Houston, your reputation over the some twenty-six twenty-eight years you were General Counsel was one of intense loyalty to the Director and the Deputy Director of the Agency.

Mr. Houston. That is correct.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

chest operator, but so far as I know he always operated in the line of command, and something like this I think I should have been consulted, but I can understand the operator's viewpoint. They might have felt there were reasons why I should not be consulted.

But just what went on in the line of command between Harvey and the Director I just cannot fathom this.

Mr. Schwarz. Harvey worked for Helms at the time, did he not?

Mr. Houston. That's right.

Mr. Schwarz. And what was the nature of their relationship as you understood it?

Mr. Houston. They were not too compatible as people, but I have never known that there was any difficulty in complying with the chain of command. I wouldn't necessarily have known if there had been, but I didn't know it.

Mr. Wides. And Harvey had worked for Mr. Helms in Berlin?

Mr. Houston. He had been Chief of Station in Berlin, he had been Chief of Station in Rome, and I think it was after the Rome assignment he came back and took over the staff.

Mr. Wides. But in connection with some of the operations like the Berlin Tunnel and other intelligence operations he had a pretty close-working relationship with Mr. Helms?

Mr. Houston. They were all in the DDP and certainly anything of the importance of the Berlin Tunnel, they would be could you think of anything which would be of benefit to this Committee that we have not inquired into?

Mr. Houston. The only thing I thought you might ask that -- I thought you were going to mention it -- somewhere, and this is very vague in my mind, both where I heard it, in what context, and what the timing of the event was, but I have heard and I am sure you must have heard of the delivery of a sniper's rifle to the Embassy in Havanna, which may have been intended for some sort of assassination attempt.

Mr. Schwarz. The Embassy when we still had an Embassy there?

Mr. Houston. It was apparently when we still had the Embassy.

Mr. Kirbow. Was this a couched delivery, covert delivery, much like the later deliveries into the Dominican Republic?

Mr. Houston. I think so.

I don't know much about it. I just, through a vague recollection, I don't know any details or any specifics, it's one of the things you pick up.

Mr. Kirbow. When would that have been? I am trying to date when we no longer had an Embassy there.

Mr. Wides. Mr. Noll, I think Mr. Noll was the Station Chief, Jim Noll, and I believe he left in late 1959.

Mr. Kirbow. Was that about the correct time?

Date:10/01/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10225

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R891

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS WITH EXHIBITS

DATE : 08/12/75
PAGES : 90

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY OF HOUSTON, LAWRENCE RE: CIA AND CASTRO
EXHIBITS ARE INCLUDED

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/01/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 248-02

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bx 36

Niarchos' ship captains named Katopodes brought a libel action I believe it was, against Onassis for some letter he had written about some activities of Katapodes, I can't remember the details now.

We didn't know where this was leading. So this was in the Supreme Court of New York State, and so I went to a fellow I knew in the U.S. Attorney's office and asked him if he could keep track of how this suite was developing to see if it was leading into some of the connections we had, particularly with Niarchos.

And he got some of the pleadings and some of the pre-trial evidence --

Mr. Wides. But you don't recall any contacts between the Agency and the Justice Department resulting in Mr. Yeagley going up to try and halt some aspects of the grand jury proceedings in New York growing out --

Mr. Houston. It strikes no valve.

Mr. Wides. Let me ask just one more question in this area and then we will move on to the document I asked you to look at before we started.

Mr. Maxwell. I have just one other question.

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

~~employee. And at the time Mr. Joost and the other fellows were CIA employees of the station at Thailand in 1951 they were alleged to have been involved in disposing of Mr. Kilham's body, and there was a serious question as to whether one or both of them had been involved in his death. And then I believe in 1955 this was brought to the attention of the Agency through the efforts, among others, of Mr. O'Donnell, who was then the station chief, Justin O'Donnell, who came back and raised it with Mr. Wiesner, and then I believe it was raised with Mr. Kirkpatrick and with yourself.~~

~~Do you recall that incident and the eventual denouement of the affair?~~

~~Mr. Houston. I cannot remember the exact chronology. I had thought they had gotten the report on the problem a little earlier than you suggested. But I can't argue it.~~

~~Mr. Wides. Do youknow if any action was taken earlier than the time in 1955 when Mr. O'Donnell first raised it with Mr. Wiesner?~~

~~Mr. Houston. I didn't know that Justin O'Donnell was the one -- at least I don't recall it, so I don't know exactly how it first came to my attention. But when it did, to the best of my recollection, Lyman Kirkpatrick and I, and I think Frank Wiesner was probably involved, tried to assemble all the facts to find out insofar as possible what had gone on. It was a confused picture. All sorts of interpersonal feelings~~

~~that I recall were going on out there. And Ithink one of the Thai police might have been involved.~~

~~Mr. Wides. I don't know if it refreshes your recollection, but I believe a Colonel Rack was a local official who had some knowledge of it.~~

~~Mr. Houston. To the best of my recollection I put this together and talked to Allen Dulles who was much concerned about it. He said, I think we ought to report that to Justice.~~

~~And I said, there is no particular problem, because there is nothing we can do about it because there is no crime against the U.S. that I can find in this situation, it is a crime against the Thai sovereignty.~~

~~And Allen said, that well may be. But I still think that I want to report this to Justice.~~

~~And he asked me to prepare a detailed report on a classified basis. I hve forgotten the nature of the classification. I suppose the relations with CAT at that time were still basically top secret.~~

~~So, I did prepare a report and delivered it to -- I can't remember-- probably to the Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, who ever it was.~~

~~They said to the effect, thank you, that is it. There is nothing we can do.~~

~~Mr. Wides. Was there any discussion of the possibility~~

~~of giving information to the Thai authorities so that they could decide whether to exert jurisdication?~~

~~Mr. Houston. My recollection is that the indications were that the Thai authorities had as much information as we did. I don't remember to the contrary, but a lot of the information we got came from the Thais.~~

~~Mr. Wides. Did Mr. Kirkpatrick go over to Thailand to talk to some of the people there to find out what they knew about the situation?~~

~~Mr. Houston. I don't recall.~~

~~Mr. Maxwell. Was any action taken against either of the CAT employees?~~

~~Mr. Wides. Dennis Fleming was the other one. And he was recalled.~~

~~Mr. Houston. And Kilham?~~

~~Mr. Wides. Joost and Fleming were the two persons against whom the charges or allegations were raised. Kilham was the victim.~~

~~Mr. Houston. I remember Joost being a problem, but I can't remember what the outcome was. And Dennis Fleming just strikes a very faint bell. I can't remember at this time.~~

Mr. Wides. Did you have another question in this area?

Mr. Maxwell. I just wanted to say, if you wanted to continue, you said there were three cases that eliminated the kind of cases which CIA had with Justice, and the referrals, and you had gone through one. And I wondered if you wanted to go through the other two.

Mr. Houston. All right.

The second one was quite an interesting one. If I give it in too much detail, excuse me.

Mr. Maxwell. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Maxwell. Back on therecord.

Mr. Houston. The staff officer in Italy all of a sudden disappeared from his post, and there was indication that he had with him a considerable sum of money, something in the nature of $30,000, I can't remember the exact amount. This was promptly reported, and he disappeared into the blue.

The [redacted] started looking into it. And I believe we sent people over to try and look into it, and found that there had been a serious family problem between himself and his wife.

Finally, through some sort of source in Mexico we got word that this fellow was near Mexico City, and he passed word to the [redacted] through a lawyer that he had written all the operational details of what he had been engaged in in Italy, which again were very sensitive, sealed them, and put them in a vault which only thelawyers could get at, with instructions to his lawyers that if anything happened to him, no

The SEC, as a result has raised some questions with Justice between our justice and our statutory problems. This is before Justice now.

Mr. Wides. Is there a file in the OGC office generally regarding, not necessarily every one, but many of your -- which would contain many or most of OGC contacts with Administrative agencies over the years?

Mr.Houston. No, because they weren't -- there probably is a substantial file on relations with Internal Revenue. But those were to a large part either working out our own tax equations on our own personnel with cover problems which you probably know about, or the CAT situation, or Southern Air Transport, and not interferring with IRS prosecutions, although several times we were involved -- here is the type of case I guess you are talking about.

What is the fellow out in the Philippines -- I think his name is [redacted] -- who had one of the biggest tax assessments made against an individual made against him, I think, $2 million? And [redacted] very definitely tried to involve us in his defense. There was some connection with [redacted] in the Philippines, you couldn't be in the Philippines without some connection with them. And yet gave IRS the full information, and said, don't bother with us, we are not concerned.

Mr. Wides. What about such things as the contacts with

Mr. Houston. It was a memo of DITEL's that I saw. I think it was dated after I left. I saw it in draft afterward. It had to do, I recall, with operations in the Trust Territories.

Mr. Wides. In other words, the first category of issue that I mentioned?

Mr. Houston. Yes.

~~Mr. Wides. With regard to MH MUTUAL, which is a topic that we obviously don't have time to discuss fully today, and we have not yet seen the files, I wonder -- and Mr. Maxwell was going to pursue this, and I may be back -- if you could give me a rough idea during the period when it was under your stewardship of the organizational chart, as it were, for the policy committee, the investment committee, and so forth, how were the questions of what investments could be made with the pension fund and the insurance fund and the like, how was that policy developed, and whowas involved, and so forth?~~

~~Mr. Houston. The lawyer running the actual operation reported directly to me.~~

~~Mr. Wides. WAs he in the OGC office? Or part of ANVIL?~~

~~Mr.Houston. He was ANVIL, a staff official but under unofficial cover.~~

~~Mr. Wides. Meaning that he was in a law firm that was essentially a proprietary.~~

Mr. Houston. Not entirely a proprietary. We supported part of it, and part of it was a legitimate law firm, they worked together and shared the firm.

Mr. Wides. Is it possible for you to indicate who that is, or is that someone whom you would not like to disclose.

Mr. Houston. I can't do that.

Mr. Wides. How would we refer to him in terms of his position if we were trying to ascertain his identity, or if we were negotiating with the Agency, as it were? What was his title vis-a-vis the mutual management? Was he the project officer?

Mr. Houston. He was certainly -- let's call him the project officer for MM ANVIL.

Mr. Wides. And that was for a good many years, one particular person?

Mr. Houston. Yes. He was there from pretty near the start until he retired by,about two years ago, three years ago. So, he was there all through the sixties, I would say, or the seventies.

Mr. Wides. This is not John Keaney, is it?

Mr. Houston. No.

Mr. Wides. Was John Keaney's role more in terms of setting up proprietaries and incorporating them?

Mr. Houston. John Keaney?

Mr. Wides. Yes, a Washington attorney -- or Kenney.

Mr. Houston. Kenney. He must have been one of the central cover projects. He was not an OGC project that I recalled.

Mr. Wides. He was not prominently involved in establishing proprietaries or their incorporation?

Mr. Houston. He might have worked in some of the central cover situations, but I don't recall him being involved in any of the proprietaries I worked on.

Mr. Wides. With regard to MH MUTUAL, as you can readily understand, we are interested in exploring its dimensions in nature, and are really beginning to get access to materials on it. Without taking you through all of its multi-faceted aspects, which would take some time, let me ask you one or two questions with regard to concerns that have been raised by the committee.

Do you recall at any time questions arising about the conflict of interest or any questionable aspects of the investment decisions of the MH MUTUAL program or any part of it? And by that I do not mean an individual who obtained intelligence information and was trading on his own, or an investment club within the agency, or that kind of thing, but questions involving either the Agency using insider information, if you will, obtained through its intelligence activities or otherwise in making investment decisions or buying stock or debentures, or making other investments to assist the person or the corporation or country whose securities were being invested in?

Mr. Houston. There were about two or maybe three recommendations from the Investment Counsel we had at the time we were turned down --

Mr. Wides. Excuse me. Was the Investment Counsel the person you were referring to?

Mr. Houston. No, this was an outside investment counsel we retained for advice for a period of time.

Mr. Wides. Was it a firm or an individual?

Mr. Houston. It is a well-known firm. And they made at least two or three recommendations to invest in stock of companies which we questioned rather extensive oontractual arrangements, and in view of those contractual arrangements, I recommended that we reject the recommendations.

And we did.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall any instances where investments were made and it was then learned or there was adversion to the fact that there were contractual relationships, or whether they were known in advance and it was weighed and the decision was made to go ahead with the investment?

Mr. Houston. No. The only ones I recall were turned down. Since there was ample room to investigate, there was no need to get in a position of possible implication of conflict of interest. So, we erred on the side of turning down

~~rather than going ahead.~~

~~And incidentally, the outside investment counsel would not know why we turned it down.~~

~~Mr. Wides. Were all of the investment decisions for the assets of MH MUTUAL -- and you use that in the broad sense, I don't fully understand the relationships among all the aspects of the complex -- but were all of the investment decisions, the Eurodollars and the small amount of stock and the like made by outside counsel or were there some investment initiatives which originated within the Agency?~~

~~Mr. Houston. For a while almost all of them were made by this outside counsel. It was not too happy a relationship, not because of his fault. I think he was doing his honest best. But we took too long processing his recommendations and often lost a market by taking too long through our own internal controls.~~

~~So, finally, we decided that while we had gone to him for a good reason, that is, so we could show that we had relied on outside counsel of known stature, that it was not fair either to him or to us to be in circumstances where we were really secondguessing him through our own internal procedures and our own invetment sort of Board of Directors. So we left, I hope, on friendly terms.~~

~~Mr. Wides. About when was that?~~

~~Mr. Houston. Let me guess at around 1969, something~~

like that.

Mr. Wides. Up until then as far as you know there was no investment of Agency funds that were made as a result of any decisions or implications within the CIA which might then have been run by him for his independent advice but might have originated or prompted within the Agency?

Mr. Houston. There may have been those. You see, on our Board of Directors to which we referred all basic investment decisions we had three of our top economists, and at least one of them was a member of a couple of college investment boards, so that they had the benefit of the advice to those university investment counsel.

Mr. Wides. Was he a consulting economist or a member--

Mr. Houston. A member of the staff.

Mr. Maxwell. Mrs. Thunberg?

Mr. Houston. Yes.

Mr. Wides. And her relationship with the university board was what, as an alumni?

Mr. Houston. As an alumni. She was called as a consultant on their investment program.

We also had the advice of a couple of friendly banks, and at least a couple of insurance companies would freely give us the benefit of their investment policies.

Mr. Wides. What was the relationship between yourself and the banks and the insurance companies, the CIA?

~~(Discussion off the record.)~~

~~Mr. Houston. To go back to the start -- it may have already been told -- back in the last fifties we found in the OGC office that the hardest thing to cope with were benefits for death or disability insured under covert circumstances, particularly when, as so often happened, no prior planning had been made for this. Even the prior planning is difficult, because if you are going to put an agent into certain circumstances, and say you will get him insurance through Mutual of Omaha, if the circumstances of the Department are later known to Mutual of Omaha, they might say, well, that is not a risky cover, and continually you wouldn't have your insurance.~~

~~So, we came to the conclusion that we needed our own insurance business, and we started by buying two very small off-shore insurance companies, and started writing death and health policies. Now, the business grew quite rapidly to cover all sorts of covert operations. And we went to two large outside insurance companies and asked if they would cooperate and take some of the policies either on a fully protected basis from us, or if they saw fit, for their own account. And both of them did both. They would take some risks for their own account, and the only thing we would ask is that they protect the investigation in case it got into sensitive fields.~~

In others they would ostensibly take the risk and we would stand behind them.

Mr. Wikes. So that was indemnification?

Mr. Houston. Complete indemnification. And by and large this arrangement worked extremely well.

Mr. Wikes. So those were the kinds of insurance companies were were talking about that would give us the benefit of their investment?

Mr. Houston. Both of them had large investment portfolios of their own, and feel I gave us access to their investment manager, who were most cooperative in what they were investing.

Mr. Wikes. And what was the point of contact in the Agency during that period for the insurance companies?

Mr. Houston. I went in both cases to set up the original contact, and then this project officer was the primary.

Mr. Wikes. And he would have been the point of contact for receiving their investment views?

Mr. Houston. He or his office.

Mr. Wides. And you mentioned also a bank as an outside source.

Mr. Houston. There were a couple of banks, but one particularly. We kept some of the money on deposit with this bank. And we had some offshore assets that were ostensibly held by an offshore subsidiary of the bank. The bank at our request gave us a flat guarantee of repayment no matter what on these assets. So, we felt well protected on this. And also, when we deposited with them the certificates of deposit we got the normal prime rate on our deposits. And here again they particularly in the field of Eurobonds had some good advice, and we also went to another brokerage house in New York who had investment advisory staff that specialized in Eurobonds. So far as I know, they did not know the Agency was involved, but they gave advice on the best interest rates in Eurobonds and certificates. It was a highly specialized field.

Mr. Maxwell. Who was going to the investment house, the project officer?

Mr. Houston. The project officer.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall any dealings with Suydam and Company?

Mr. Houston.No. I have been asked time and time again about Suydam Company, and the only thing I knew was from personal knowledge going back to a trust my sister has an interest in in the Guaranty Trust. They had one of these holding companies which I think was called Suydam and Company. But you never heard -- who was it? I know. One of our directors of Southern Air Transport told me that he was continually being asked by contact with Suydam and Company. And he said that is the only one he knows, was the Guaranty Trust. There was someone else,I don't know about it.

Mr. Wides. GEtting back to the question I alluded to while we were off the record, did any questions arise about whether the people on the board, the investment board, or managing board of Mutual, who were from within the Agency, would have access to economic intelligence or political intelligence relevant to their own thinking on investments, and where there was any question of a proprietary involved?

Mr. Houston. The members of the board were always free to bring up their ideas for investments, particularly in the stock field, until more recent years. But mainly we were consulting the economic experts for their general economic knowledge on trends and any input they could give on basic investment policies.

Mr. Wides. That would include, I assume, economic intelligence regarding, for example, the trend of whether there was likely to be a copper shortage, or the trend of whether there was likely to be more nationalization of rubber plantations or oil?

How would you differentiate that from economic intelligence except that it would be --

Mr. Houston. Because our investments, except for the Eurobonds, were almost entirely in U.S.investments. And while these were trained economists, their main professional

~~interest was in the foreign field. And I don't remember them staying, for instance, let's get into copper, it is going to be in very short supply in Peru or whatever. I don't remember any discussion of that sort.~~

~~Mr. Wides. Do you recall any policy papers or reviews generally as to the use of Agency knowledge in the broadest sense of its intelligence fund in regard to the investment decisions as distinct from decisions that were generated wholly by outside?~~

~~Mr. Houston. There were various basic general policy papers -- usually I would prepare them and put them before the board -- in which this may have been touched on. I don't recall it specifically.~~

~~Mr. Maxwell. The source of funds invested under the auspices of the board were what?~~

~~Mr.Houston. The initial source of funds was usually reprogrammed at the year's end available for operational use. And this was regarded as an operational use necessary to support operations because of the need for the basic insurance function.~~

~~In other words, all these companies that we had in this insurance complex appeared to have the substance an insraance company would be expected to have. Actually, the whole fund for all of them was managed as a central fund under this one project officer. On the design and organizational~~

chart it looked very complicated. In operation it was quite simple. It was handled really as one entity with various faces appearing. And the complications of those whereby maintaining your directors, who took no part in the operation, your companies directors, and things, and keeping your letterhead straight for your writing for the different companies.

Mr. Maxwell. Were there other sources of funds, profits made by proprietaries in stock or bond transactions that went back into the investment fund?

Mr. Houston. They would all go into the central investment fund, and in the initial stages, particularly where there was income from funds and dividends -- until the stock market broke there were some capital gains registered. Then the investment policy went more and more, particularly as the interest rate went up, in the Eurobonds and certificates of deposit, where for a while you were getting -- I think we got a weighted average of over 11 percent. And then those would go back into the fund against the insurance loss accountability. The most difficult thing we had was trying to decide what was enough, because there was no actuarial experience such as in a nominal insurance company.

Mr. Wides. You mean the capitalization of particular companies against insurance?

Mr. Houston. Exactly.

Mr. Wides. What about proprietary profit, was that one source of funds that went into the total capital fund?

Mr. Houston. No. If you reorgnized a proprietary or disposed of it, the proceeds identified as the proceeds of that might go into this fund until their eventual disposition back into the Treasury, or whatever was decided.

Mr. Wides. What about prior to dissolution, just the annual operating profit, were any not left in the proprietary but taken out in part and put into the fund?

Mr. Houston. In the first place, this wasn't a frequent occurence in propriataries. In fact MH MUTUAL and Air America were the only substantially profitable operations. There were minor profits in others, but by and large as far as I know they were left in the companies until they were dissolved. And toward the end of Air America I believe we let off some of the profits before the final dissolution and then took the rest of them over, and they eventually turned them into the Treasury.

Mr. Wides. With regard to the investment, in the case of certificates of deposit abroad I take it that is what you are referring to as the weighted average, when you weighted Eurodollars, Eurobonds and certificates of deposit. Whatever the form, were some of the investments in foreign countries made in any way in consultation with the operating divisions in regard to the non-investment aspects of the loan, if you will, the possible use of them for covert assistance in the broadest sense of that term?

Mr. Houston. No.

Let us get one thing straight. The certificate of deposit were domestic.

Mr. Wides. Were there any foreign loans?

Mr. Houston. There were no foreign loans that I recall. The Eurodollar bonds were in the case those which were guaranteed by a U.S. company.

Mr. Wides. You don't recall any investment in obligations of a foreign country?

Mr. Houston. Not of a foreign country as such. I believe there were a couple in foreign companies. I can't even be sure of that, but my recollection is by and large of subsidiaries of U.S. companies which do not guarantee their subsidiary bonds.

Mr. Wides. Thank you.

Mr. Maxwell. I wouldlike to go through some of the material in the Olsen case. And I have marked as Houston Exhibit 5 the excerpts from the IG's diary which I showed you before.

(The document referred to was marked Houston Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Date:10/01/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10228

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R2146

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT/REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/AND EXHIBITS AS LISTED

DATE : 01/10/76
PAGES : 96

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY OF E. HOWARD HUNT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/01/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 248-10

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SSCI BOX 248-10

State of Florida)
) SS:
County of Okaloosa)

AFFIDAVIT

E. HOWARD HUNT, JR., being duly sworn, deposes and says:

1. On January 10, 1976, I was examined by Frederick D. Baron, a counsel for the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. On January 11, 1976, I was examined by both Mr. Baron and Howard Liebengood, another counsel for the Senate Select Committee. At both of these examinations I was accompanied by my counsel, Randall C. Coleman, and advised of my Constitutional rights.

2. I have read the transcripts of both of the above-mentioned examinations, and I hereby affirm that my testimony therein is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

E. Howard Hunt, Jr.

Sworn to before me this sixth
day of February, 1976.

John C. Henry

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 4, 1977

ORIGINAL

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Vol. 1 OF 3

R2146

INVENTORIED:
ON 5/23/77
BY EY

The United States Senate

TOP SECRET

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED
ON 3/3/77
BY EC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
14-4-94 lc

(1)(A)
(1)(B)

Saturday, January 10, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

might have directed me to this particular unit.

I was told that somewhere within the overall political and psychological staff there was located a man with a small office. This man's name was Pash, Colonel Boris Pash, and my understanding was that Colonel Pash had been doing business, let us say, with the Agency in West Germany for quite a while.

I sought out Colonel Pash. I was directed to his office and found sitting with him another Agency officer named [redacted] [redacted] I'm not sure whether it is [redacted].

Mr. Baron. It's a Greek name. [redacted] is his correct first name, but he goes by [redacted].

Mr. Hunt. Very good. But in any case, he was known throughout my career as [redacted]. And I was at that point on, let's say, a search mission to determine whether the alleged capability of Colonel Pash in "wet affairs," which is how it was referred to, that is liquidations, would have any relevance to our particular problem of the Albanian disappointments.

Mr. Baron. By liquidations, you mean assassinations?

Mr. Hunt. Assassinations. Assassinations, kidnappings, removals, let's say.

This had been alleged to me. So I spoke to Colonel Pash in Mr. [redacted]s presence. I explained the problem to him, although at that juncture I'm quite sure that we had not identified the Albanian suspect. So we were talking hypothetically earlier, that when I first inquired around for the location of Colonel Pash and his assistant, the reaction I encountered was a rather jesting one, and the impression I gained was here were a couple of men who were drawing salaries and doing very little.

And so when Colonel Pash seemed reluctant to become involved in responding affirmatively to my questions, my inference was that Colonel Pash and Lazarus could well not have such a capability but for purposes of employment and status, this was the job they had. But they didn't want anyone to call upon them to activate their particular abilities.

Now that was my impression, and I was a little disgusted by it. I think I talked to the Chief of the PP staff later, who was of course well aware of the Albanian problem and I said I didn't get any satisfaction from Pash, but it doesn't really make any difference because we don't have the name of the suspected individual.

Mr. Baron. Just to stop here for a second and clear up some of these details, were you under the impression that what you called wet affairs, assassinations, kidnappings, or other removals from the scene of troublesome individuals was the primary function of this unit that Pash and Lazarus were running?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact the only. As far as I knew, they had no other function. If they had another function, I was never made aware of what it was.

Do you know anything about Colonel Pash's background?

Mr. Baron. I know a bit, but if you think that there are relevant details to put on the background, go ahead.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I had not thought of Colonel Pash for years until I began reading a book called "Lawrence and Oppenheimer," and I saw quite a few references to Colonel Pash. I had known previously that he had been associated during the war with the Manhattan Project and that he had a security background. And as I believe I touched on briefly before, it was my impression that Pash had been active a couple of years at least before I knew him in West Germany with the sort of thing that we had been discussing so far today.

Mr. Baron. What kinds of stories had you heard about Pash's previous activities?

Mr. Hunt. Kidnappings mostly.

Mr. Baron. And where were those?

Mr. Hunt. West Germany and West Berlin.

Mr. Baron. Do you know the names of any of the victims of the kidnapping or any of the people involved other than Pash and [redacted]?

Mr. Hunt. I do not.

Mr. Baron. And are you aware from whatever source of any assassination planning or attempts that Pash was involved in?

Mr. Hunt. I am not.

Mr. Baron. Does your answer include not only the period of time before you talked with Colonel Pash but after you talked with Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, sir.

I might add that I was rather briefly at CIA headquarters at that time and within a very short period of time after I had had my interview with Colonel Pash, I was transferred to the Guatemala project, the overthrow of Guatemala.

Mr. Baron. Is that the reason why you did not follow up on the problem with this particular suspected double agent after not receiving satisfaction from Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. That certainly could have been one reason. On the other hand, I was chief of, I can see I'm really going to have to get into a lot more here. This is going to be dry and dull stuff for you.

[redacted] King Zog who was very upset about the disappearance and loss of all of his partisans in the operations that the Agency was conducting.

[redacted] -- the the counter-intelligence or espionage aspect, which is not my function, but [redacted] Why were they being parachuted to their deaths in Albania? And that was my introduction to the whole scene in West Germany, where the balance of his retainers were being held by the CIA. Well, not being held, but where they were being housed and trained for Albanian operations.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain the term "retainer"?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I understood that when he finally got out of Albania, that he brought with him what I can best describe as retainers. That is bodyguards, members of his personal staff, probably some relatives. I think he had four or five sisters with him. But the able-bodied portion of those loyalists who came out with him we had largely taken over [redacted] And then he never saw them again. He naturally became apprehensive.

So that was my interest in what was happening to the Albanians that we parachuted in [redacted] I had no functional counter-espionage interest in the affair. This would have been handled and this was handled by the Chief of Counter-espionage for the Division.

Mr. Baron. Who would that have been at the time?

Mr. Hunt. I can't remember at this point.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Baron. But that would be the person primarily responsible for taking care of this double agent problem?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of what happened with that suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. I have no idea because, as I may have indicated previously off the record, it became apparent some years later that the unfortunate fate of our Albanian agents was linked far more closely to the revelations of Kim Philby, the Soviet agent who was in direct liaison with us in Washington and in Great Britain, rather than any penetration, although the possibility of a penetration was of course always there. But I don't think that anybody was ever focused.

Again, I left for Latin American affairs. I left the Division about that time and I really never heard about it again. [redacted] the Albanian chief, departed for Southeast Asia, and the whole sort of complex of knowledgeable people was broken up through normal transfers and special activities like the Guatemala project.

Mr. Baron. Was [redacted] knowledeable about your approach to Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. Very likely he was, yes. I don't think I would have discussed anything with Colonel Pash about the matter without talking to [redacted] about it.

Mr. Baron. Who else would have known that you approached

Colonel Pash with the idea in mind of seeing if an assassination or a kidnapping couldn't be arranged?

Mr. Hunt. The then Chief of Foreign Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence for the Division. And I think now that that was [redacted]. I think he wore both hats. He had both foreign intelligence responsibility and the counter-intelligence responsibility. And I might have told the division chief about it, although it was not, it had not achieved such stature at that point that I would have necessarily talked to the Division Chief, who I believe at that time was John Richardson of later Vietnam fame.

It's also possible that the Division Chief in that era was John Baker, now deceased, who left that division to become Chief of the PP staff, and that would have been a normal follow through for me if I had discussed it with John Baker, my direct Chief, and then to have discussed it with him when he was my staff chief in the overall political and psychological staff.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else who would have known about your approach to Colonel Pash or about --

Mr. Hunt. Or his function.

Mr. Baron. Yes, that Colonel Pash was considered to have assassinations as one of his functions.

Mr. Hunt. We had a Colonel Buffington who at that time was a member of the PP staff, the overall PP staff, and I think

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

that he would hav e been knowledgeable about it.

Mr. Baron. Was that Milton Buffington?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I think he later went on and had a career in the Office of Security. Milton Buffington, yes.

Mr. Baron. Anyone else?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I have the names of three men who unfortunately are dead. I could give those names, though. Mr. C. Tracy Barnes, Mr. John Baker, who I've already mentioned, and Mr [redacted] These men were all at one time or another chiefs of the Agency's PP staff.

Another man now living to the best of my knowledge who might well have had knowledge of Pash's function was the then-chief of the Economic Warfare staff of the PP staff and his name was Gates Lloyd. He later became the Deputy Director for Support of the Agency.

There's a man named [redacted] who was in the Psychological Warfare Branch of the PP staff. I believe at that time there was an International Organizations Branch which later became the International Organizations Division, then headed by Cord Myer, Jr., and his Deputy at that time was Tom Braden, the now-columnist whose wife has just ascended to the Executive Office Building. There were members of the Labor Branch, and I'm trying to think of that branch of office that was down the hall.

There was a labor branch. The people in there might know. There was a lady lawyer named Carol somebody who was very knowledgeable about what was going on in that area.

Mr. Baron. Knowledeable about Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. Well, in the sense that when you have an adjoining office, you usually pretty much know what the other fellow is doing. Just in that sense, because her function in the labor branch had nothing to do with Pash, to my knowledge.

What I'm trying to do here is to give you sort of a congeries of people alive and dead who would have had contact knowledge, at the very least, of what Pash's function was.

Mr. Baron. Were each of these units referred to as PB with a number following it?

Operations and OPC, the staff structure emerged as follows:

Reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans, i.e. Frank Wisner, whose Chief of Operations then was Richard Helms, this is the Clandestine Services Organization. There was our support staff, the PP staff, the Foreign Intelligence staff, the Counter-Intelligence, Counter-Espionage staff, and of course the famous staff "D".

Also reporting to the Deputy Director for Plans were all of the geographical divisions, such as Western Europe, Southeast Europe, Asia, Near East, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Now at this point Frank Wisner was DDP, Richard Helms was his deputy.

Mr. Hunt. Richard Helms was his Chief of Operations.

Mr. Baron. All right. The Chief of the PP staff was --

Mr. Hunt. Either Tracy Barnes or John Baker or [redacted]

Mr. Baron. And you were located on the South European --

Mr. Hunt. Southern Europe Division.

Mr. Baron. Who headed that division at that point?

Mr. Hunt. Either John Baker or John Richardson.

So as you see, I had a line responsibility to the Chief of the Southeast Europe Division, as indicated in Exhibit 3. At the same time I had a functional responsibility to the Chief of the PP staff, who was Mr. Barnes or Mr. Baker or [redacted] just as the Chief of FI for the Southeast Europe

Mr. Hunt. Does this satisfy your request?

Mr. Baron. It does, indeed.

Of all of the individuals that you have just mentioned, which ones do you know to your own certainty were clearly knowledgeable of Boris Pash's activities?

Mr. Hunt. [redacted] would be the first one, and after that I can only speculate. I would have to assume that [redacted] acquired knowledge of it, but perhaps he acquired knowledge through me. I'm not sure. I have made a list of other people whom I have not mentioned who conceivably, by virtue of personal contact or functional responsibility, might well have been aware of Pash's true functional responsibility within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Before I ask you to tick off that list, let's make it clear that all of the names, in addition to [redacted], are names that you have given as people who are likely to have been knowledgeable of Pash's activities because of their place in the organization structure at that time.

Mr. Hunt. That's correct, or as I have indicated in some cases, as with the PP labor branch by virtue of physical proximity to that office.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Why don't you now just run very briefly through the names of other people who you think could conceivably have been knowledgeable of Pash's function?

Mr. Hunt. In some cases I'm going to have to give you their title designation rather than the name of the individual because, so much time has passed, I have simply forgotten who it was in that particular era.

[redacted], who at that time was a member of the German branch of the Western Europe Division, he has since retired and is running his family's [redacted]usiness in New York. Certainly the then Chief of Western Europe Division, of which Germany was a functional part and the Chief of Operations of Western Europe should know.

I would think that Jim Angleton, who would have had direct knowledge and always was the Chief of the CI/CE staff. The Chief of base in [redacted] if in fact Pash conducted any activities in that area, certainly the Chief of base in [redacted] would have been knowledgeable about it.

Also, the Chief of base at [redacted] which was where we had the [redacted]peration going on. I don't know whether Bill Harvy, that is William Harvy, at that time was Chief of Operations [redacted] or whether he was simply running the tunnel, but Harvy might well have some knowledge of Pash.

I would certainly assume that when we're talking about liquidations and that sort of thing that the Agency's overall Office of Security somewhere within it must have been involved, such German Division personnel as might be available today, West German, and I would also suggest that General Cushman might be knowledgeable for this reason.

End 1A, b. 1B

It was about that time that General Cushman was still assigned to the CIA. I could be wrong about that but I seem to have a memory of Cushman being around in those days. He was then a Colonel. I had associated with him. In fact, we had shared an office at one time, but that was several years earlier. I would place it about early 1949. But I'm quite sure that Cushman was around in that period of time and involved with the PP staff, though what his function was I don't know.

Now there are alive two close friends of mine who were then members of the PP staff, [redacted] and [redacted] These are men who in effect established the PP staff for Frank Wisner and then left to go on to other things. They are both well known writers.

Mr. Baron. Let me just return to one name that you mentioned and that is William Harvey.

Did you -- first, generally, what was the nature of your operational relationships to William Harvey after this period? Did you have any?

Mr. Hunt. I never had any, no. In fact, I've only seen him once in my life, to the best of my recollection.

Mr. Baron. As you may know, William Harvey was tasked in 1961 with setting up an executive action capability at the CIA, tasked originally by Richard Bissell to carry out assassinations if required.

because we're going to slop over into this other matter that Mr. Liebengood wants to talk about tomorrow.

Mr. Baron. Well, why don't we hold off then, except that for this one question, which is are you aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn had in assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, I'm not because I'm just not familiar with assassination planning. And specifically, for that reason, I'm not aware of any involvement that Dr. Gunn might have had.

Mr. Baron. Let's return now to the point of departure, which was your conversation with Colonel Pash and the events that led up to it.

Who were your supervisors that gave you the impression that Colonel Pash was prepared to carry out assassinations?

Mr. Hunt. I wish I could give you a distinct name. I think I covered that in an impressionistic way by saying that Tracy Barnes and John Baker, who were at different times sequentially chiefs of the PP staff, it seems to me that Barnes was probably the one who indicated that Pash had such a capability.

I know that I did not get it from [redacted] and I'm quite sure that my information did not come from within the Southeast Europe Division. It must have come accordingly from the Political and Psychological staff, the contacts there, and I would have to say Tracy Barnes or John Baker are the most likely.

Mr. Baron. And neither of those two men are alive today?

Mr. Hunt. That's right.

Mr. Baron. Did whoever gave you the information about Boris Pash indicate to you that there were any other units in the CIA that could take care of such problems by means of assassination?

Mr. Hunt. No. My distinct impression and recollection is the function, if indeed it existed, and I believed it then to have existed as I do today, was centralized or focused in Colonel Pash and [redacted].

Mr. Baron. Now what would have been the formal title of the unit that Colonel Pash and [redacted] were running?

Mr. Hunt. If it had one, I never knew it.

Mr. Baron. Can you add any other detail to the record on your talk with Colonel Pash and his reaction to your request that he consider on a general level the planning of an assassination of a suspected double agent?

Mr. Hunt. Well, as I recall it, my conversation with him was a relatively brief one. I stepped in the door, met him, saw [redacted], who I knew briefly, or at least knew him by sight, and I sat down and I said, we have this problem in the Albanian branch. We may need somebody liquidated in Western Germany. Can you handle it if that day comes, or if it comes to that?

And he seemed a little startled. I have already indicated that. What I'm trying to do now is to refine my thoughts more than I did previously when we were taking sort of a wide swipe at the canvas.

Colonel Pash indicated or said to me that it was a matter that would have to be approved by higher authority and as a relatively low ranking officer in those days, I thought he was probably referring to Frank Wisner. And indeed, he may have. It never got pushed up to Frank Wisner's level because there no direct approach or a request for such approval was ever made.

I left with the impression that Colonel Pash was glad that he wasn't going to have any business for me or that he had successfully deflected whatever approach I might be making to him because it would give him and [redacted] an opportunity to drink more coffee and to draw their salaries from the Agency while affecting to do a job that they were perhaps not equipped to do.

Now again, that impression I had when I left him was at variance with what I had heard before I came in, where I heard he and [redacted] or he at least had been active in West Germany in wet affairs, particularly kidnappings and that sort of thing.

Mr. Baron. And you carried into his office the impression that Colonel Pash was a man who could carry off an assassination

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss this matter with anyone other than Colonel Pash?

Mr. Hunt. In that context?

Mr. Baron. In the context of assassinations or kidnapping.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I wasn't involved in plotting or planning any kidnappings. Again, I would suggest that I might very well have gone back to [redacted] who was the most interested individual, because he was responsible at the branch level [redacted] as an operational tool, whereas, I had an overall political responsibility [redacted] And I have described the background of that, the rubric under which I became interested in the Albanian problem in the first place, and then having talked to Pash, it would have been only natural for me to have said to [redacted] look, I've talked with Pash and he says it will have to be approved by higher authority. Now have you gotten, we don't have a body yet, but when you get a name to put on the target, at that point you will have to carry the ball and take it on up the line.

Mr. Baron. And you never heard anything further about it?

Mr. Hunt. No, probably because I went within, I think, a comparatively few weeks off to the Guatemala operation.

Mr. Baron. Did anyone ever mention it to you, say did [redacted] ever mention it to you again?

Mr. Hunt. No. I next saw [redacted] in [redacted] in

End 13, b. 2A

it would be about '57 or '58, and I had dinner in his home in Taipei, and I'm quite sure I said at that time, whatever happened to Boris Pash, or what do you hear from Boris?

Now he was a rather unusual individual to say the least, and I don't think [redacted] told me that he was dead. I don't know who told me that Boris, that Pash died, but whatever he said, it was, well, he was okay the last time I saw him and that was the last time we ever discussed it.

Mr. Baron. And you didn't discuss this request?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Where did you receive the impression that Colonel Pash was dead?

Mr. Hunt. I guess when, either from reading the Lawrence and Oppenheimer book or from the newspapers, from the Crewdson story. I don't think at the first level when I began recalling the story, I don't think I was aware that Boris Pash was dead.

Mr. Baron. In the Crewdson story there is an allusion to the fact that Colonel Pash is probably dead.

Are you saying that that came from Crewdson's research and not from yourself?

Mr. Hunt. Oh, yes, that came from Crewdson's research, not mine.

Mr. Baron. This is more than a minor note on the record, Colonel Bash is not dead.

Mr. Hunt. Oh, good, I thought he was dead.

my assumption at that time was that authorization by Frank Wisner would have been all that would have been required to proceed with the project had it ever materialized. That is the Chief of the Clandestine Services.

Now whether Frank would have been required to go to Allen Dulles, I rather doubt it. I think it is something that he would have been able to authorize himself.

Mr. Baron. All right. Let me ask you now before we get into Colonel Pash's version of the story, which we will, whether it is possible that you are confusing the time periods here?

So as not to hold anything back from you, Colonel Pash has said that the time period has to be off because he retired from the Agency, or left the Agency in probably late '51. It's possible that it went into 1952. But he wasn't with the Agency in any capacity after '52. And in fact, his status was that of a military officer who had been detailed to the Agency from approximately 1948 to '52.

Now does that affect your recollection in any way of the period '54 to '55 as the period when your conversation with Boris Pash took place?

Mr. Hunt. Well, from 1950 to 1953, I was in Mexico [redacted]

Mr. Baron. And where were you from the time that you joined the Agency until you went to Mexico?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Hunt. I was a member of the PP staff.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that your conversation with Boris Pash about the assassination of a suspected double agent took place in that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say it's possible, yes.

Mr. Baron. Would you have been dealing with East European problems or --

Mr. Hunt. No, I was dealing with West European problems.

Mr. Baron. I'm sorry. Would you have been dealing with a problem like this one, a problem with a suspected Albanian double agent in West Germany during that time period?

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall having done so. The West European Division had its own PP staff officer and he would have been the one to take it up, whereas my recollection is that this was generated at a later time when I was in the Southeast European Division and had a direct reason to become interested in the matter.

I have to say that it is possible, but I would say maybe 5 percent possible.

Mr. Baron. And you accord so small a possibility to the hypothesis that you actually talked to Pash about this problem in '49 or '50 because you were not involved in operations in West Germany at that point.

Mr. Hunt. No, I was not.

Mr. Baron. And [redacted] at that

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

point?

Mr. Hunt. No, no. He was not.

Mr. Baron. Where were you in '49 and '50 physically?

Mr. Hunt. Physically I was in the JRK building with the PP staff and my direct supervisor at that time was [redacted] who I have mentioned earlier.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to West Germany during that period of time?

Mr. Hunt. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. In the later period, '50, '54, and '55, that you were discussing, did you travel often to West Germany?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. You were stationed in Washington?

Mr. Hunt. I was stationed in Washington and from the period after I left Mexico, which was in, I think, March of '54 for about the ensuing year when I left for the Guatemala project, I was in Washington or the SE Europe Division. So I had that continuous almost year there.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that adds to your sense of the probabilities that this conversation took place in '54 and '55?

Mr. Hunt. No. My restructuring is as I have given it to you, my recollections.

Mr. Baron. Okay. Let me ask you the same question in maybe a straightforward manner.

political affairs, and his was the 7th, which had less well defined functions. And [redacted] was a member of that unit.

Do you recall any dealings that you had in your earliest period of service with the CIA with PB7, now that I've refreshed your recollection?

Mr. Hunt. Not as such, no. Does Colonel Pash define what his functions were in the PB7?

Mr. Baron. Before I answer that one, let me ask you one.

Mr. Hunt. I've been trying to develop a helpful colloquy here.

Mr. Baron. This is very helpful.

Do you recall any charters that any of those planning branches had?

Mr. Hunt. At this juncture, no. I was only aware that, I think mine was PB2. This is when I first went in in 1949 or 1950. I think that was [redacted] outfit.

Mr. Baron. Colonel Pash described the charter of PB7 as giving PB7 responsibility for such other functions as the six other units didn't perform.

Does that square with your recollection of what he was doing in those early days?

Mr. Hunt. Well, you see, I don't associate Colonel Pash with the very early days. I associate him with a later period, about three years or five years later.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any specific recollection of Colonel

Pash's activities in the years 1949 to 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Not at all, no. My only other collateral recollection is that Colonel Pash was said to have come to us. He was recently assigned in Germany and he had come to us from there. That was all that I knew.

Mr. Baron. [redacted] who has also testified this past week on this subject, said that his recollection of the charter of PB7 was that it gave PB7 responsibility for assassinations, kidnappings and such other functions as higher authority may assign or as were not being performed by other units.

Does that square with the impression that you were given by your superiors of the functions of Colonel Pash's unit?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. I didn't even know that [redacted] was still alive. So [redacted] then supports my functional recollection, let's say.

Mr. Baron. Let's introduce as Exhibit 6 an article in the New York Times dated January 8th, 1976, headed "Retired Colonel Denies Heading CIA Unit for Assassinations."

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 6) with real certainty that no such conversation took place and that even in terms of exploring the possibility of assassination planning or inquiring into the capability for assassination planning, he maintains that assassinations were never raised with him, what do you then have to say about his testimony?

Mr. Hunt. I would have to say that his perceptions and mine were at variance and that we were engaged in some sort of an Aesopian dialogue in which neither of us understood what the other was saying.

I had no other reason to approach him. I had never heard of the man except in that particular context.

Mr Baron. And there was no other reason for them discussing capabilities for an assassination?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any specific function that Colonel Pash performed with the CIA after the date of 1952?

Mr. Hunt. Well, my recollection is that I saw him in '54 and '55 and that's the only specific function that I can relate him to.

Mr. Baron. Now you have drawn a chart of the PP staff, Exhibit 4, that locates Colonel Pash and [redacted] on the PP staff.

Is it possible that they served on the PP staff before the date the Colonel Pash gives as his retirement date from the

CIA, which is sometime in '52?

Mr. Hunt. Is it possible? Yes, I believe it's possible because [redacted] was one of the original people in OPC.

Mr. Baron. At what point did OPC merge or was it transformed?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it merged with OSO, I think, in 1953 when I was [redacted] in Mexico in '53, and I came out of there in, I think, March of '54, I left Mexico.

By that time the merger had taken place.

Mr. Baron. So is it possible that this chart could have been a chart of the PP staff as it operated under the OPC structure, the 453?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. In fact, I don't think that there was any particular change from the PB to the PP era.

Mr. Baron. The reason for my own confusion here is that Colonel Pash and [redacted] have both said that at the point when OPC was merged, or at some point shortly thereafter, PB7 was abolished and they don't know what became of it. They say the functions that these seven planning branches performed were scrambled and reorganized and they were never sure exactly who carried through the functions that had previously been assigned to PB7.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I never heard any more about it.

Just for perhaps a bit more clarification, the labor unit or branch as it appeared in the PP staff following the merger, that had the same function and the same personnel as let's say whatever PB enumerated or numerical designations. So it's just a question of terminology. I can see that for chronological purposes you are interested in how I recall it, whether I recall it by a PB numercial designation or by -- But since I never knew what the Pash-[redacted] unit was designated, whether it was designated by a word or by a number, it doesn't help me at all. And for that reason I can't be of more assistance to you.

Just go see Colonel Pash. He's in such and such an office down there.

Mr. Baron. Off the record for a second.

(Discussion off the record)

Mr. Baron. For the record now, while we were off the record we agreed to continue this session a while to get into one or two other areas. But I have a couple of questions to tag on to the end of this one.

First of all, [redacted], in his testimony to the Committee, said that he had no recollection of a conversation with you where he was present, and you discussed assassination of a double agent, or the planning for such a mission with Colonel Pash and himself.

Do you, even having heard his testimony, still have a clear recollection that [redacted] was present when you had this conversation?

Mr. Hunt. I do, because to the best of my knowledge and belief, it was the first time that I had met [redacted] That is, I had seen him in the corridors, but it was the first time that I was able to append a name to the particular individual who I had come to recognize visually.

My memory is further jogged in this respect, that [redacted] having identified me as a member of the SE division of the staff, at a later time but not much later, talked to me about the possibility of his being assigned to the SE division. And my recollection of the conversation is that [redacted] told me that he was a great friend of [redacted] and that this friendship should be put to use for the Agency's benefit, and it could be best done by his being transferred to SE division for ultimate assignment to Athens.

Mr. Baron. Do you have from anything in your experience in the CIA any personal animosity toward Colonel Pash or [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. On the contrary. I've always regarded myself as a friend of [redacted], and I only had one contact with Boris Pash. And I have no feeling about him one way or the other except that in his recent book I read about his involvement in the Manhattan Project and I certainly admired his contribution to national security in that era.

End 2A, b. 2B

Mr. Baron. In [redacted] testimony, he gave us an account of an incident when he was stationed at [redacted] and he said that he had written a cable to CIA headquarters outlining a propaganda program because he was involved in propaganda operations at that point. And he said, unbeknownst to him, someone else in his station with the approval of the Chief of Station attached an extra paragraph to this cable which suggested the assassination of Chou En Lai in preparation for the Bandoeng Conference where Chou En Lai was supposed to be an important spokesman on behalf of many Asian nations.

And the way that [redacted] recounted the incident, he knew nothing about the paragraph that had been attached to his cable until the reply came back very strongly in the negative and eventually, a high ranking CIA official came out to [redacted] to reprimand everyone involved in the incident for suggesting assassination.

Do you have any recollection of that incident?

Mr. Hunt. No, I have no knowledge. What year does [redacted] refer to because I was in [redacted] in Tokyo from, oh, about '55 to '56 or '57. And I would have seen most of the traffic that came out of [redacted] in that period of time. But I don't know if -- I know that [redacted] stayed on in [redacted] much after my time in the Far East.

I don't know when the Bandoeng Conference took place. I remember it, of course, but I don't remember the year.

Mr. Baron. It appears to me that the Bandoeng Conference took place, according to [redacted] testimony, in 1955 and that the incident he was describing was either in '55 or late in '54.

Mr. Hunt. I had no recollection of it whatever. [redacted] is not suggesting that is some basis for personal animosity, I trust.

Mr. Baron. No. He did say, though, that you might have had knowledge of that suggestion, although he wasn't sure of it. He said you were involved at that time in a place where you might have seen cable traffic like that.

Mr. Hunt. That's quite right, but I never saw that traffic.

Mr. Baron. Let me pick up one last general question for the moment at least on assassinations.

Do you have any knowledge of even the consideration of assassinations at high levels of the American governemnt?

In other words, we have been using the term higher authority and I would like to use it for the moment now to refer to the level of the DCI or the National Security Council, the President, his close White House advisors, Cabinet officials, and the DCI.

Do you have any knowledge of any people at that level seriously considering assassination planning?

Mr. Hunt. No, none. I think you have to bear in mind to me and I was surprised when on invasion day Castro was alive. I now realize from testimony that Harvey and others have given that the matter had been discussed long before my arrival on the scene and it was in hand one way or the other.

Mr. Baron. When was your arrival on the scene?

Mr. Hunt. Spring of 1960. I transferred up, I actually made my trip to Havana the summer of 1960, and then we had the Bay of Pigs invasion the following April of '61.

Mr. Baron. Now it is my own recollection of our assassination report that no action was taken to carry out an assassination plan against Castro as early as the spring of 1960.

Did something --

Mr. Hunt. No. I've giving you, I guess, a bureaucratic answer. I was officially transferred back to Washington in the spring of 1960 and I took some leave en route in Spain [redacted]

Eventually I made my way back to Washington in the spring and early summer and got on the scene within a few days of my actually reporting into the project managers, i.e., Bissell and Barnes, who decided I would go down to Havana for a period of time, and I went down for about a week and came back, and by that time we were talking maybe July or so.

Mr. Baron. July of '60?

Mr. Hunt. That's correct.

Mr. Baron. Before we move away from Cuban operations, let me show you one cable that we have which is from Madrid and it appears to be to CIA headquarters because it is marked IN 75100, and it is dated September 16, 1964 in handwriting that was put on the copy that we have by the Agency.

This is not the original copy of the cable but it appears to be a copy that was deleted and paraphrased for the purposes of providing it to the Committee in the early days of our inquiry.

We will mark this as Exhibit 7.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as Hunt Exhibit No. 7)

Mr. Hunt. That can't conceivably have been a reference to me.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Hunt. Because I had not been involved in Cuban activities for more than three years at that time. I was purposely isolated from all Cuban activities after the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Baron. You said you did operate out of Madrid for a period of time but it was later than September of '64?

Mr. Hunt. No. Let me clarify that.

I was sent to Madrid in either '64 or '65. I can't recall which, and I stayed there less than a year. [redacted] My communications were handled independently between myself and Tom Karramessines, who was then Deputy Director for Plans.

This was a project that had been laid on by Dick Helms. [redacted] and I had no Cuban activities of any kind.

Mr. Baron. And did you have any knowledge of a relationship, to a plan to assassinate Castro, supposedly to take place during a university ceremony?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. Let's move on now to an entirely different area, and I will ask you to begin by describing your general role in the middle of the 1960s on the CA staff with regard to

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

press publications or press placements or any responsibilities you may have had for media relations.

Mr. Hunt. After Allen Dulles's resignation and retirement, I was assigned for about a period of a week to the CA staff and I then transferred to the newly set up Domestic Operations Division under Tracy Barnes, which was really the Commercial Operations Division, although it was never so-called.

I was the first Chief of Covert Action for the Domestic Operations Division and we inherited as a new division a number of projects that had been running for a period of time, that had been run by the commercial staff of the Agency and by a number of the geographic divisions.

The purpose of turning these ongoing projects over to the Domestic Operations Division was to centralize contacts with publishers in the United States for the benefit of geographic divisions such as the Asian or Far East Division which might want a book published on [redacted] for a particular purpose. They would come to Tracy Barnes with a particular request.

And I should say that the relationship with the [redacted] Publishing Company had been in existence for quite a period of time and I think they were managed by Cord Myer International Division, if I'm not mistaken, or possibly the CA staff. But what we received were ongoing operations. We were sent the case files for the [redacted] project, for the [redacted] project, for [redacted] organization, which had been operating out of [redacted] [redacted] Building in Washington. We had a project in [redacted] which I visited on one occasion called [redacted] which we ran out of a [redacted] Virginia office.

I had no personal media contacts with American magazines or newspapers, if that is the thrust of your question.

Mr. Baron. Actually, I'm interested in this whole area, both contacts with specific reporters or media people domestically or contacts with publishing houses or contacts abroad in the publishing field.

Mr. Hunt. Well, I've given you the names of the publishing houses that we had contact with. I did on one occasion meet and I can't recall the purpose of it, it was a very large textbook publishing house and their main offices were in New Jersey. If I had an annual for publishers, I could pull it out.

But beside from that publishing house, we never did any business with them. I don't recall of any publishing houses beyond [redacted] that is trade publishers, that we dealt with.

We had our own press agency, [redacted] which I imagine you're quite familiar with.

Mr. Hunt. Can you describe the standard mode of operating with these various publishing outlets?

In other words, how would you have supplied them with material? Would you urge them to publish a manuscript they already had from another source? Would you give them a manuscript that CIA personnel had written under a pseudonym?

Mr. Hunt. I don't think that ever took place, to my knowledge.

What I recall is [redacted] meeting with Tracy Barnes and me or individually, either in Washington or New York during this period and saying I have a great book I would love to publish, but it's not economically feasible, and I think it would be good for you people abroad for the following reasons. And we might come up with the differential or we might not.

I don't recall any Agency-created manuscripts that were sent to [redacted] or for that matter, any other publisher.

I recall we had a lot of accounting problems with [redacted] and finally we got really almost bogged down in arguments about back copies. It was a little on the nightmarish side. We did turn out some good books, but I couldn't give you a title at this point. But I'm sure that they are a matter of record within the Agency.

Mr. Baron. What was the nightmarish aspect of it?

Mr. Hunt. Well, apparently, before the project came under DOD, it had been handled on a very freewheeling basis by the previous project managers. [redacted] got everything he wanted from the Agency in terms of subsidy money and expense money and publicity money and that sort of thing and when we took it over it was brought under -- I hesitate to use the term professional management, but I do so in a qualified sense in that I was the only one, I guess, who knew anything about the publishing industry, who had ever been connected with the project. So I knew a little about it.

And at that time, with the help of our own commercial people within the Division, our accountants and auditors and so forth determined that there were a number of aspects of our fiduciary relationship with the [redacted] company that would bear greater investigation.

So the relationship from a freewheeling one prior to our DOD managerial take-over, it became from a freewheeling thing, it became sort of an unpleasant continuous argument about dollars and cents, rather than functional matters.

Mr. Baron. Out of what funds at the CIA did these monies come from that we were giving to [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. I wouldn't have any idea, project money.

Mr. Baron. Who signed off on the project money?

Mr. Hunt. Well, it would depend on how much it cost. I think that Karamessines could sign off up to $50,000 and beyond that it had to be signed off on by Helms, I think. That's my best recollection. And I don't know -- as annual review was conducted, and of course the division chief had to approve it.

Mr. Baron. Did the operation involve companies other than the ones you've mentioned? In other words, supplying funds to companies other than the ones you've already mentioned?

Mr. Hunt. I don't know of any. None that I knew of. I would be very surprised if a memorandum showed up saying that we were dealing with Random House, for example. I just don't recall now.

Mr. Baron. Was there any other aspect to your liaison with these publishing houses other than their seeking funds to publish books that you were interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. Only this, that the USIA was, I think, finally brought into a formal relationship with DOD, at least my part of it, and the head of the book division at USIA and I would meet from time to time and he would indicate that he had a good one that we really ought to do rather than USIA and vice versa. And he knew fully of the [redacted] relationship.

Mr. Baron. Can you describe the process that you would go through to ensure the publication of a book that the CIA was interested in having published? An example that I was given by somebody on our staff who has been looking into this was books written by or ghosted for Chinese [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. As I recall it, the Chinese branch sort of ran a parallel operation. I don't recaall their coming through us. I don't recall a [redacted] book when I was in that particular job. What I do recall is, I remember the Near East Branch brining to our attention a book that they would like to have [redacted] publish, and it had to do with the [redacted] dispute, the name of which I can't recall. So the manuscript would have been read by [redacted] or his principal assistant, and he would give an indication of what he thought the marketability was. And at that point -- well, in this instance, we got the funds from the Near East Division. When it came down to that, why should DOD, who had no interest in the [redacted] dispute, provide money for that particular piece of propaganda. So the money would be transferred somehow from the Near East Division's allocation. It would be their project, but we would be the managers of it when it got down to the point of dealing face to face with [redacted] on the matter. My office would keep the division apprised of the project, when publication could be expected, and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Were there any other CIA publishing proprietaries than the two you have mentioned, [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. That I had personal knowledge of within the Domestic Operations Division, no.

Mr. Baron. You qualified that by saying within the Domestic Operations Division. Were there others?

Mr. Hunt. Because the international operations or International Organizational Division under Cord Myer, ran quite a few things in conjunction with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, for example. Radio Free Europe, those things that went on.

Mr. Baron. Did CIA do ghostwriting for non-CIA publications?

Mr. Hunt. I ghosted a couple of -- I'm very reluctant to go into this, although I have discussed it with John Crowdson. But this is another one of those difficult areas where it's very hard for me to prove.

There came a time in the spring of, I think it was the spring of about 1969, when the Soviet Russia Division asked me if I could cause to have published something on the -- by this time I was no longer with the Domestic Operation Division. I was with Western Europe -- on the increasing use by the [redacted]nd things like that, and Christ, I hope this doesn't get out.

And so I went to Helms. Howard Osborne was then Chief of the Division, as I recall. He was late Director of Security, and this had been staffed out. And I prepared the article and it appeared in large portions unchanged under the byline of [redacted] And it was not a fabricated article. It was just information which was supplied which he wrote somewhat in his own style, and there was a second article which appeared a month or two months later, and this was done by Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. Also under [redacted] byline?

Mr. Hunt. Yes. You could understand the difficulties involved here and I don't need any more enemies. I have plenty.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Now that is my own personal contribution to that sort of thing. But I can't think of anything else that was done.

Mr. Baron. By other people? Was it a general practice to supply either prefabricated articles or the material for articles to favorable press contacts in this country?

Mr. Hunt. Well, we know about the [redacted] book, [redacted] which was largely a cooperative venture with the Agency, and that was done by the SR Division.

You are aware of that, aren't you?

Now in that case, you see, the SR reached out on its own. Penkoski Papers was another example. We had nothing to do with that in DOD. That was done, again, by SR division. And I can understand why.

But basically, in answer to your question, I have given you everything that I have personal knowledge of.

Mr. Baron. When you made the arrangement with [redacted] [redacted]

Mr. Hunt. I made no arrangement with him.

Mr. Baron. Who handled liaison with him?

Mr. Hunt. Dick Helms.

Mr. Baron. And was that a one-on-one arrangement or were there other people knowledgeable?

Mr. Hunt. I believe it was a one-on-one, old school tie arrangement.

Mr. Baron. Was there any list kept at the CIA of favorable

Frederick A. Praeger organization. I felt that a strict construction of the CIA charter made the project quite suspect because if we were doing a book, for example, on Indonesian Communism, who was the target? It would have been highly inappropriate for United States citizens to be the target of the particular book, and we did a hell of a good book on Indonesian Communism. It became about this thick. I can't recall the title.

End Tape 2B

If your targets are foreign, then where are they? They don't all necessarily read English, and we had a [redacted] So unless the book goes into a lot of languages or it is published in India, for example, where English is a lingua franca, then you have some basic problems. And I think the way this was rationalized by the project review board that looked over the [redacted] operation, and the [redacted] and [redacted] and things like that was that the ultimate target was formed, which was true, but how much of the [redacted] output actually got abroad for any impact I think is highly arguable.

Now, in the case of [redacted] the material was physically mailed from Washington to foreign targets, the [redacted] newspapers, I think particularly the [redacted] Agency was a client. The mere fact that the project was rooted in the United States gave it sort of a credibility lustre abroad in that particular era. If it came out of Washington then it was probably okay.

But I -- [redacted] had no domestic U.S. papers as clients. What I'm trying to get at is that DOD handled operations which were based domestically in the United States, the commercial operations, and this includes proprietary airlines and things like that, whose ultimate target was abroad. The principal target or even a tangential target was not the United States citizen.

Mr. Baron. But, with anything that was published in English, the United States citizenry would become a likely audience for the publication?

Mr. Hunt. A likely audience, definitely.

Mr. Baron. Did you take some sort of steps to make sure that things that were published in English were kept out of or away from the American reading public?

Mr. Hunt. It was impossible because [redacted] was a commercial U.S. publisher. His books had to be seen, had to be reviewed, had to be bought here, had to be read. Again I say it was a matter of great difficulty. Mr. Barnes resolved all that philosophically, and I simply carried out the dicta.

Mr. Baron. What was your philosophical opinion of the danger of propagandizing Americans?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I knew that it was not a part of the Agency charter, and it was a matter that the USIA looked at. I talked about it occasionally. The USIA coincidentally had come under some criticism at that time for subsidizing certain publishers in the United States. That became known; I don't recall how. I discussed with the USIA book man and with Barnes the danger that we might be criticized for the same reasons. I was never enchanted with the [redacted] operation. I thought it cost far too much money and had minimal benefits abroad, and further, we had the liability, the vulnerability to quite reasonable critcism that we had U.S. citizens as a target, or an audience, I should say.

Mr. Baron. Were there any precautions taken against dissemination in America of publications by CIA proprietaries in English?

Mr. Hunt. Proprietaries, well, my only personal knowledge is the [redacted] operation which I say was simply mailed out of Washington. That was the only precaution, rather than our people mailing them themselves.

Mr. Baron. Were any techniques used to prevent contamination of American intelligence by picking up on things that the CIA was actually publishing or arranging to have published?

Mr. Hunt. I would assume so, and I would guess that that would be done in the first instance by the knowledgeability of the reports officers in the various geographic divisions at headquarters who would scan newspapers, for example, or they would receive raw reports from [redacted] let's say, and see that there had been a big sale of a particular book which we had sponsored, which they knew we had sponsored but nobody else knew. Of course, [redacted] would have known about it, too.

So I would say that it was a pretty good fail-safe. The area of knowledgeability was high. For one thing, I traveled some in those days. I traveled to Bombay. I talked to the [redacted] there. I traveled to New Delhi and talked to [redacted] there, who was my CA opposite number, and keep them up to date as to what we were planning. I would do the same in France and so forth.

Mr. Baron. Were there any specific instances that you know of of an eventual placement in the U.S. press of a story that the CIA generated or fabricated abroad somewhere? For instance, a story could conceivably be picked up by the UPI or by Reuters that the CIA had planted abroad.

Mr. Hunt. I can't recall anything significant. I would guess that during the Cuban, during the days of maximum Cuban operation that sort of thing happened. I would think it would be unavoidable, but I can't specify.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other instances than things you have mentioned of direct placements of stories in the U.S. press by the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. I have mentioned the [redacted] which was a cooperative venture with [redacted] the two [redacted] things. No, I can't recall.

Mr. Baron. I touched earlier upon the possibility of disseminating derogatory information about Agency targets. These were you aware of any general program of that nature to discredit either a foreign political leader or a foreign political faction, or domestic political groups or leaders?

Mr. Hunt. To the latter question, no. Domestic, I am not aware of any.

I think the Soviet Russia division was quite active, and it kept a list, for example, and maintained a very good list of KGB officers abroad, and when one would show up at Luanda, for example, they would make sure that the local press got the man's dossier, or at least a blind handout so that they would know who the fellow was, much as the Butz counterspy operation is doing today against the CIA.

Mr. Baron. Did you make arrangements, or did you know of arrangements being made for non-CIA authors to write pieces that were favorable to the CIA?

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. There was no funding of that kind of operaton?

Mr. Hunt. You mean sort of flackery, the favorable publicity for the Agency, is that what you imply?

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Hunt. No.

Mr. Baron. What about subsidizing non-CIA authors to write stories of any sort, or books of any sort that the CIA was interested in having published?

Mr. Hunt. I would say this in a qualified sense. Where in the past we had given [redacted] a commitment to buy X copies of his book on the [redacted] problem, obviously we were subsidizing the author of that book because it was our money that [redacted] was ultimately passing to the individual, but that was [redacted] doing it rather than us. In other words, there was never any face to face contact.

Mr. Baron. Aside from dealing through publishing houses that you had established contact with, did you deal individually with authors who were non-CIA employees?

Mr. Hunt. I did not. I don't think DOD did. I think that Far East Division did.

Mr. Baron. Do you know with whom?

Mr. Hunt. You mentioned Chinese [redacted] for example. Well, they dealt also, the Soviet Russia division dealt with [redacted] on the Penkoski case. In fact, I had lunch with [redacted] while he was doing the Penkoski Papers. So that was an example.

Mr. Baron. Did they have a regular program?

Mr. Hunt. Yes, I think so.

Mr. Baron. Both of those two divisions?

Mr. Hunt. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Is there anything else that you think we would need in order to have a fairly clear, complete picture of the relations to the media or the publishing industry?

Mr. Hunt. Well, I think you could get probably a good deal more information from Cord Myer, who had a lot of that directly under him when he was Chief of the International Organizations Division, and of course, he served as Deputy Chief of Clandestine Services for quite a while. He would probably have as panoramic knowledge as anybody. I guess he's was that we had made the -- the President had given certain undertakings to Cuban leadership and to our own paramilitary people, and had failed to carry them out.

However, this fact was successfully disguised for a number of years, but Dulles and Dick Bissell paid the price.

In any events, the Bay of Pigs cost Dulles his leadership of the Agency, and I had the utmost respect for him. I was associated with him as an assistant for the special Cuban Bay of Pigs purposes, for a period of several months prior to, perhaps six months prior to his eventual retirement.

I had had occasional contacts with him as a [redacted] [redacted] and I had seen him in Japan when he came over there and we had some discussions. Mr. Dulles brought into the formal Central Intelligence Agency the same feeling of esprit de corps that we had all enjoyed in the Office of Strategic Services, and this was largely lost during the McCone directorship. And I think we had some admiral after that, Admiral Radford, possibly. We got under a group of managers, and the human element that we had enjoyed in OSS was gone with the passage of Allen Dulles until Dick Helms came back in. You see, I'm an unrepentent admirer of Allen Dulles and the way we used to do business. Why do I say that? Because the way we did business during Mr. Dulles's directorate was precisely the way we did it in OSS during General Donovan's creation and direction of that organization. In OSS, which was Allan Dulles's training ground as much

COPY: Will

SECRET

Exhibit: 7

FROM [redacted]

ACTION: DC/WH/SA 3

INFO : DDP, VR *

16 Sept 64

IN 75100

SECRET 161228Z

PRIORITY DIR INFO PRIORITY WAVE CITE [redacted] 1705

REF [redacted] 1681 IN 73706

1. CIA OFFICERS MET WITH SUBJ REF 15 SEPT. ONLY "IMPORTANT" INFO HE PROVIDED WAS VAGUE REFERENCE TO AGENT-1 PLAN ASSASSINATE CASTRO ATTEMPT WOULD SUPPOSEDLY TAKE PLACE DURING UNIVERSITY CEREMONY AT WHICH CASTRO PRESENT. AGENT-1 REPORTEDLY RESPONSIBLE ARRANGING DELIVERY CUBA ONE BELGIAN FAL EQUIPPED WITH SILENCER. AGENT-1 WAS TO BE TRIGGERMAN SUPPORTED BY UNIDEN ARMY OFFICERS. ABOVE PLAN NOW APPARENTLY ABANDONED.

2. SAID AGENT-1 ANXIOUS LEAVE CUBA ON OFFICIAL VISIT ORDER CONTACT CIA RE HIS FUTURE ROLE WITH CUBA. SUBJ SUGGESTED REMOTE POSSIBILITY ARRANGE VISIT PRAGUE THRU AGENT-1 FRIEND JOSE, DELEG TO IUS. OUR IMPRESSION IS AGENT-1 WANTS COME OUT FOR GOOD AS PROBABLY FEELS PERSONAL SITUATION TENUOUS.

3. ACCORDING SUBJ, FOLL PERSONS OR INFLUENCE ON AGENT-1 TEAM. MAJOR, MAJOR AND EX-MAJOR (FNU).

4. SAID AGENT-2 HAS NUMEROUS CONTACTS CUBAN OFFICIAL CIRCLES MADRID, PARIS, BUT WORKING FOR ANOTHER GOV'T. SINCE HE IN BAD STANDING WITH U.S.G. HINTED CIA SHOULD BE IN TOUCH AGENT-V HOWEVER [redacted] HAS STRONG RESERVATIONS AGAINST AGENT-2 ON SECURITY GROUNDS

FROM

SECRET

AND FACT HE OUT FOR GOLD, PLUS LITTLE EVIDENCE CAPABILITY PRODUCE INFO OF INTEREST.

5. [redacted] WHO LEFT MEETING FIRST, CLEARLY INFERRED TO SUBJ IT HAD BEEN "GREAT WASTE OF TIME." OTHER CIA OFFICER PROCEEDED POLITELY "CHEW OUT" SUBJ FOR GETTING US TO ABOVE MEET ON FALSE PRETENSES. SUBJ FRANKLY ADMITTED HIS "RECRUITMENT" BY CIS WAS HANDLED IN SUCH SLOPPY MANNER AS BE CONSTRUED A FARCE. VIEW VAGUENESS HIS MISSION AND LACK SECURE CONTACTS, REPORTING CHANNELS, IT APPARENT CIS NOT EXPECTING MUCH RESULTS FROM OP WHICH PROBABLY MADE ON "HIT OR MISS" BASIS. QUITE LIKELY "EDUARDO" WILL NEVER APPEAR TO CONTACT SUBJ.

6. SEEING HIS "UTILITY" TO US AS DUBIOUS, SUBJ BEGAN SCRATCHIN HEAD FOR LEADS AND MENTIONED FOLL "FRIENDS" HE MIGHT CONTACT: ORLAND BLANCO [redacted], CHARGE IN BERN WHO COMING [redacted] 25 SEPT; (FNU) TRASANCO OF PAIR EMB WHO CONFIDANTE AMLASH 1 ALSO KNOWN AMLASH [redacted] AND ENRIQUE RODRIQUEZ LOECHES, AMB TO MOROCCO [redacted] 20 SEPT.

7. C/O SAID NOW UP TO SUBJ SHOW BONAFIDES SUGGESTING HE WOULD TAKE ADVANTAGE HIS "UNIQUE STATUS" AS CUBAN AGENT GAIN ENTRY OFFICIAL CIRCLES. SUBJ FEARS WE MAY DENY VISA AND DENOUNCE HIM TO [redacted] POLICE. ALTHOUGH HE PROMISED MAKE EVERY EFFORT, INDICATIONS TO DATE ARE HE WILL HAVE LITTLE, IF ANY, OPS UTILITY. IN ANY EVENT WAS TOLD EXAMINE THOROUGHLY ANY LEADS HE MIGHT HAVE IN NEXT FEW DAYS. WE WILL DECIDE IN NEXT MEETING OR TWO WHETHER HE DOES APPEAR TO HAVE ANY UTILITY, IF NOT HE WILL BE DROPPED.

S E C R E T

*DISSEM APPLICABLE TO SENSITIVE CABLES

RE[illegible] FROM
AUG [illegible] 1975
CIA

Exhibi

THE NEW YORK TIMES, THURSDAY, JANUARY 8, 1976

Retired Colonel Denies Heading C.I.A. Unit for Assassinations

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — A retired Army colonel has denied to Senate investigators an assertion by E. Howard Hunt Jr. that the colonel once headed a Central Intelligence Agency unit set up to arrange for the assassinations of suspected double-agents.

The colonel, Boris T. Pash, told the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence yesterday that during 1954 and 1955—the period in which Mr. Hunt, a former C.I.A. officer, said he was told that Colonel Pash ran such an operation—he had left the C.I.A. and returned to military service.

In a statement made public by the panel today, Colonel Pash termed Mr. Hunt's assertions "insidious and completely false.

He said he could not recall ever having met or spoken with Mr. Hunt, who is serving a prison term for his role in the Watergage case.

Nor, the colonel said, was he ever "involved in any assassination planning" between 1949 and 1951, the period in which he was temporarily assigned to the C.I.A., or at any other time in his career.

Mr. Hunt said in a recent interview that during his service with the C.I.A.'s Balkans division in the mid-1950's he had discussed with Colonel Pash, at his superiors' behest, the prospective assassination of an individual who was believed to be a double agent.

"I was told that we had that capability," Mr. Hunt said in the interview, and "that the guy to see about this sort of things was Colonel Pash."

Mr. Hunt, who said that he had understood that Colonel Pash was deceased, added that he did discuss the matter with the colonel, who seemed shocked "that the subject has ever been brought up," and that the matter consequently was left there.

Investigators for the Senate committee are now attempting to interview Mr. Hunt about this assertion, a committee spokesman said.

SPANISH TROOPS RUN SUBWAY IN MADRID

MADRID, Jan. 7 (AP)—The Spanish Army began running the Madrid subway system today as the Government moved gingerly to break a three-day wildcat strike that set off the worst traffic snarl in the city's history.

Fearing a possible labor backlash, the Government refrained for the moment, however, from drafting the rebellious subway workers into service.

About 3,000 electric company workers marched into the center of Madrid in support of the subway workers and the police used tear gas to disperse them. The police said they broke up similar demonstrations by factory workers on the city's outskirts. No arrests or injuries were reported.

Army personnel trained as railroad engineers reopened the main subway line, which runs through the center of the capital between working-class neighborhoods. Passengers were admitted free.

MADRID, Jan. 7 (Reuters)—Striking Madrid subway workers tonight voted to defy Government pressure and to continue their walk-out. Strike leaders said they would hold out until their wage demands were met.

The strikers voted not to accept an offer from the official Government-run union to hold talks if they returned to work.

BARCELONA, Spain, Jan. 7 (AP)—The Rev. Luis María Xirinachs, an outspoken Roman Catholic priest nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize last year, was arrested today while demonstrating near the local prison in support of amnesty for political prisoners, police sources said.

REMEMBER THE NEEDIEST!

lles,
ora slips
Smoothie

A printed two-piece

V
Ca
of Sa

MISSES
SEASC
STYLE

Find the la
single and double t
... pick from plenty (
want. We even have som

MISSES' AN

Discover dra
single and double

Exhibit 1

STATEMENT BY E. HOWARD HUNT

A year ago when Congress established the Church Committee, Senator Baker was quoted as saying that I would be an early witness. I was then free on Appeal and readily available to testify concerning CIA involvement in allegedly illegal activities. Moreover, I viewed testifying before the Committee as a further opportunity to testify under oath concerning my total non - involvement with Messrs Oswald, Bremer and Sirhan, persons with whom my name has been slanderously and libelously linked in press and electronic media. Although I had been interviewed previously by the FBI and the Rockefeller Commission with regard to these allegations a host of assassination buffs and media advocates continued irresponsibly to associate me with the deaths of the Kennedy brothers and the crippling of Governor Wallace.

My Appeal denied, I re-entered prison in April,1975. Three weeks later US Marshals escorted me to Washington DC for what turned out to be a three-hour interview with a new Watergate Assistant Special Prosecutor. For a 9-day period I was lodged at the Leesburg, Va., jail,and finally returned via Detroit and Tallahassee where I was imprisoned in the isolation area before being driven on May 26 to Eglin Federal Prison Camp. On May 27, Assistant Committee Counsel Michael Madigan telephoned me to say that the Church Committee wanted to interview me "within the next two weeks". I apprised Mr. Madigan of Public Law 93-209, Title 18. Sec.4082(c) Para. 1 (amended) which authorises minimum security prisoners such as myself to be furloughed for up to 30 days for purposes of testifying. Counsel Madigan agreed to my testifying on this furlough basis.

Over the summer,however, I heard nothing further from Mr. Madigan or his Committee associates. Then in mid-September a Washington POST story alleged that I had been assigned by a White House superior to assassinate columnist Jack Anderson. Senator Church was thereupon quoted as saying that his Committee would investigate the charges. I welcomed this apparent opportunity, for the allegations had gained wide credence while my own delayed response appeared only incompletely in the press. Still, nothing was heard from the Committee.

In December 1975 John Crewdson of the New York Times interviewed me in prison. He asked if I knew anything about "CIA assassination capabilities", and I related to him my encounter with Col. Boris T. Pash. Mr. Crewdson then inquired whether the Church Committee had interviewed me. I responded in terms of the foregoing, noting that I would have testified about the Pash encounter had I been given the publicized opportunities. My interview with Mr. Crewdson was published and shortly thereafter my attorney was contacted by a representative of the Committee.

I consider it highly discriminatory that the Committee is unwilling to have me testify in Washington as a furloughed witness. Further, the Committee's refusal to postpone interviewing me in prison until one of two counsel familiar with my career and affairs is available places me in a difficult position with regard to representation by informed legal counsel. And, as during the Ervin Committee hearings (whose cost in legal fees to me approached $100,000) I must again pay legal fees occasioned by the interest of the Senate in a matter of no discernible benefit to me.

Between last January and April I could freely have traveled to Washington to testify at the pleasure of the Senate. From then on I could have been furloughed for that purpose and testified accompanied by customary counsel who are not now available to me. Nevertheless, in demonstration of my willingness to cooperate fully with the Senate I agree to be interviewed under oath today.

E Howard Hunt

E. Howard Hunt

January 10, 1976

Exhib[illegible] 3


S[illegible] Div.
C/PP/SE
HUNT
C/FI/SE
C/SE - BAKER + RICHARDSON
DC/SE
ALBANIA
[redacted]
RUMANIA
GREECE
YUGOSLAVIA
TRIESTE
BULGARIA
[redacted] BASE
[redacted] BASE
W. GERMAN UNIT

Exh[illegible]t 4

PP STAFF


C/PP
BUFFINGTON
Barnes +
Baker ?+
[redacted]
Ec.War
GATES LLOYD
Psy War
ART
[redacted]
I.O.
CORD Myer
TOM BRADEN
LABOR
CAROL.....
PASH +
[redacted]

Exh. #5


DD/P
Wisner
upport
P P
FI
CI
CE
"D"
Geo. Divisions
WE
SE
Asia
NE

p 8 Jan 11 —

line 13 reached

15 I

14 5 - NONE

15 6 - flashed

24 l. 10 at

28 l. 22 ease

33 l. 10 JON

43 17 20

p. 9. line ~~say~~ 6 : subs: "for" for "with".

line 15 - quotes.

10 - J-K-L

p. 19 line 15 - LEWIS

p. 22 line 15 - [redacted]

17 et. seq. = HARVEY

25 l. 21 - The Special Group

30 l. 13 - NAGUIB

45 l. 4 - J OR K

l. 5 - [redacted]

[illegible] l. 8 TRACY

Jan-a

66 l. 15 aside

l. 23 BARON

67A 26 [illegible]

67 l. 5, 12, 15, 18, 23

76 - l. 11 - Y

77 l. 5 - "COUNTERSPY"

78 l. 10, 11 Y

Date:10/04/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10236

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R445

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS/TRANSCRIPT

DATE : 07/08/75
PAGES : 257

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY BY LANSDALE CONCERNING ALLEGED ASSASSINATION PLOTS
EXHIBITS ATTACHED IN THE FORM OF MEMOS/NEWS ARTICLES

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT/EXHIBITS
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 251-5

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Mr. Schwarz. These are minutes of the Special Group which you attended, and it states: "Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and [redacted]. He outlined various difficulties encountered and said that three agent teams had been infiltrated."

Now did Mr. Harvey, at that meeting, state anything -- do you recollect Mr. Harvey making that report?

General Lansdale. In general terms, yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he state anything relating to the passage of pills to persons to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro in the week prior to this meeting?

General Lansdale. No. As a matter of fact, we were very proud that he had gotten these teams in, that they had been infiltrated, and so forth, and collecting intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. Were they the first teams?

General Lansdale. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he say anything at that meeting that you recall about the subject of assassinations?

General Lansdale. Nothing.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you give the witness the May 7th '62 memorandum of General Taylor, Subject, Report of Progress to Higher Authority?

Now, Senators, that is supposedly slipped in your notebooks

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

FILE
N. B.

Program Review by
Brig. Gen. E. G. Lansdale,
Chief of Operations

18 January 1962

THE CUBA PROJECT

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

1(c)
1(b)
94

Cf March 22
(9 pages)

FILE
N. B.

I. OBJECTIVE

The U.S. objective is to help the Cubans overthrow the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

II. CONCEPT OF OPERATION

Basically, the operation is to bring about the revolt of the Cuban people. The revolt will overthrow the Communist regime and institute a new government with which the United States can live in peace.

The revolt requires a strongly motivated political action movement established within Cuba, to generate the revolt, to give it direction towards the objective, and to capitalize on the climactic moment. The political actions will be assisted by economic warfare to induce failure of the Communist regime to supply Cuba's economic needs, psychological operations to turn the peoples' resentment increasingly against the regime, and military-type groups to give the popular movement an action arm for sabotage and armed resistance in support of political objectives.

The failure of the U.S.-sponsored operation in April 1961 so shook the faith of Cuban patriots in U.S. competence and intentions in supporting a revolt against Castro that a new effort to generate a revolt against the regime in Cuba must have active support from key Latin American countries. Further, the foreigness (Soviet Union and Bloc) of the tyranny imposed on the Cuban people must be made clear to the people of the Western Hemisphere to the point of their deep anger and open actions to defend the Western Hemisphere against such foreign invasion. Such an anger will be generated, in part, by appeals from the popular movement within Cuba to other Latin Americans especially.

The preparation phase must result in a political action organization in being in key localities inside Cuba, with its own means for internal communications, its own voice for psychological operations, and its own action arm (small guerrilla bands, sabotage squads, etc.). It must have the sympathetic support of the majority of the Cuban people, and make this fact known to the outside world. (It is reported that the majority of Cubans are not for the present regime, but are growing apathetic towards what appears to be a hopeless future or the futility of their status.)

The climactic moment of revolt will come from an angry reaction of the people to a government action (sparked by an incident), or from a fracturing of the leadership cadre within the regime, or both. (A major goal of the Project must be to bring this about.) The popular movemen

FILE
N. B.

74-03-19-14
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
22
MAY 15 1962
RECORDS BRANCH
RECORD
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Excluded from automatic
regrading: DOD Dir.
5200.10 does not apply.

This document contains 9 pages.
Copy No. 1 of 14 copies.

SENSITIVE

TOP SECRET

JFK Papers

H. TV intrusion

Status: Equipment to enable TV intrusion of Havana TV broadcasts has been reactivated on a small vessel under CIA control. CIA plans to attempt intrusion on 22 January during Castro's forthcoming speech and parade demonstrations.

I. Special sabotage support

Status: State has explored, with negative results, the feasibility of pre-emptive action with respect to tanker charters (most Bloc shipments to Cuba are carried in Western bottoms). CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stoppage of some Cuban transport) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing [redacted] a corrosive additive, to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers [redacted] CIA expects to be able to have at least one agent recruited by 28 February to attempt introduction of a corrosive additive to jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba.

J. Military actions

Status: Defense has been tasked with preparing a contingency plan for U.S. military action, in case the Cuban people request U.S. help when their revolt starts making headway. This contingency plan will permit obtaining a policy decision on the major point of U.S. intentions, and is looked upon as a positive political-psychological factor in a people's revolt, even more than as a possible military action. Defense also has been tasked with fully assisting State and CIA, as commitments of Defense men, money, and materiel are required.

K. Major elements of the population

Status: Both State and CIA are continuing to explore their capabilities (with results largely negative to date) for mounting special group operations inside Cuba focused upon dynamic elements of the population, particularly operations through the Church to reach the women and families, and through Labor contacts to reach the workers. Other elements include enlistment of the youth and professional groupings. Special consideration is to be given to doing this through Latin American operational contacts. This is vital to the success of our political action nucleus when CIA can put it into place.

L. Outlook

Status: As reported to the Special Group last week, there has been a period of a realistic second look at CIA capabilities to mount the required clandestine operations against Cuba, and a subsequent start in "tooling up." After this second look, CIA has concluded that its realistic role should be to create at least the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overt action. This outlook, although arrived at thoughtfully within CIA, is far short of the Cuba project's goals. CIA must take yet another hard look at its potential capabilities, in the light of the following tasking, to determine if it cannot make the greater effort required.

RFK Papers

V. TARGET SCHEDULE

A. Intelligence

Task 1: NIE 85-62 on Cuba due 7 February (CIA).

Task 2: By 15 February, Opa Locka Interrogation Center to be made an effective operation for collection and processing of intelligence (CIA with support of Defense, State, I&NS, FBI).

Task 3: Intelligence collection from Cuban refugees elsewhere than Miami area. CIA to survey other refugee points (Puerto Rico, [redacted] etc.) and on a priority basis to ensure maximum coverage of all such source points. 15 February target date.

Task 4: CIA to continue its re-examination of intelligence assets, with priority on agents inside Cuba, and report on capability by 15 February. Also included is coverage of intelligence through third country sources, particularly those having diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Political

Task 5: CIA to submit plan by 1 February for defection of top Cuban government officials, to fracture the regime from within. This effort must be imaginative and bold enough to consider a "name" defector to be worth at least a million U.S. dollars. This can be the key to our political action goal and must be mounted without delay as a major CIA project.

Task 6: CIA to complete plans by 1 February for Cover and Deception actions, to help fracture the Communist regime in Cuba. Defense, State and FBI are to collaborate on this.

Task 7: By 1 February, CIA to submit operations schedule for initiating popular movement within Cuba. This must include localities selected inside Cuba, assessment of selected Cubans, their infiltration, activity assignments, and political platform. One section must deal with the "underground," assess its true status and plans to use it.

Task 8: State to follow up the OAS meeting by having U.S. Embassies in Latin America exploit all opportunities to enlist local sympathy for the Cuban people and to increase hostility towards the Communist regime in Cuba. State to submit report on results of this assignment by 13 February, so further planning can be programmed.

Task 9: By 15 February, State to submit an inventory of operational assets in the Caribbean area, including capabilities of local governments or groups to mount operations on their own, to help achieve the Project's goals. Plans for early use of such capabilities are due by 19 February.

Task 10: CIA to submit operational schedule for using assets in the Caribbean area to achieve the Project's political action goals. The objective of working on dynamic elements of the Cuban population (such as workers, farmers) is underscored. Due 19 February.

RFK PAPERS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
JAN 29 1962

27 Jan 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

FILE N. B.

FILE N. B.

exh. #4

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

(2 pages)
6J March 22 94
1(c)

Noting that you will be away from the country most of the month of February, there are some matters vital to our Project for which we should provide. Certain proposals should have evidence of your support. Some strong decisions may have to be made if our Project is to win its goal -- and the bureaucratic machine has too many people captive to it, one way or another.

It is my hope that you will make someone specifically responsible to speak for your determined course and have the role of being your "presence" as far as possible. This demands a personal conviction, freedom from bureaucratic instincts, and reasonably direct access to the President. Perhaps Dick Goodwin could fulfill this role. Secretary McNamara is an alternate suggestion; he has so many irons in the fire that I hesitated mentioning him. You might be considering General Taylor, but I do not believe he can quite play this role; he is still too much a fine military bureaucrat at heart.

FILE N. B.

As you know, I remain convinced that our goal can be won. Perhaps, if we can keep forcing U.S. agencies to work hard at it, the goal can be won through their efforts. Yet, their efforts haven't been impressive to date, and I still feel that we might uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional program we are spurring.

RFK Papers

It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups; [redacted] has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families

HH-03-19-14

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
22 JUN 6 1962
RECORDS BRANCH
RECORDED

FILE N. B.

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

ATTORNEY GENERAL

TOP SECRET

This document contains 2 pages.
Copy No. 1 of 2 copies. Series A

F. SABOTAGE SUPPORT PLAN

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
1. Sabotage Cuban supply of nickel to Soviets.	To deny supply to Soviets and to hinder Cuba's ability to pay for Bloc imports.	This can be an early sabotage action on the Nicaro Plant by a hit-and-run team based outside Cuba. Destruction of transformers, coolant pumps and towers seems more feasible than blocking the channel. Effect can be supported later by denial of [redacted] spare parts.
2. Sabotage fuel supply.	To cripple transportation.	Effects of CIA program of lubricating oil additive is expected on locomotives [redacted] Much more can be done with fuel contaminants, particularly on jet and diesel fuels. Crews aboard Western tankers offer real opportunity for more vigorous program.
3. Sabotage communications.	To dramatize and encourage the spirit of resistance.	Prime targets for hit-and-run teams based outside Cuba are CMQ TV and the Czech radio transmitter (believed now used to jam U.S. broadcasts). Attacks mounted only when operationally feasible. The G-2 micro-wave net should be dealt with when there are sufficient assets inside to make sabotage coincide with a critical need, in August-September.
4. Sabotage power supply.	To increase strain on regime and bring daily business to a standstill, by dramatic action all people will note.	This should be a concerted attack, as feasible in July-August, on power plants at Havana, Santiago, Cinfuegas, Vicente, Santa Clara, Cuatro Caminos, Matanzas. It is of a type requiring detailed planning and special equipment, and can be mounted from outside Cuba.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

march 22 94
1 (b), (c)

PROPERTY OF
00163

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

BJ 3/24/94
1(c)

1 - 15 March 1962 (cont)

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
4. * Caribbean Admission Center, Opa-Locka, Florida, fully activated by 15 March 1962.	To collect intelligence required for the operations, to identify and earmark intelligence assets as refugees arrive, and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	This operation, in response to early recommendation as essential by the Chief of Operations, is moving at utmost speed to become fully active by 15 March, with a new building completed and occupied, and with a staff of 43 at work. Operations commenced 15 February and, as of 9 March, 33 people were active at the Center. (CIA responsibility, with support by Defense, Justice, State, USIA.)
5. * Periodic intelligence estimates, as required by progress of operations.	To up-date NIE 85-62, so that current estimates can be considered at national policy levels.	As the operations develop, there will be both increased intelligence collection and a need for as current an Intelligence Estimate as the U.S. can produce meaningfully. It is likely that a more informal method of producing an Intelligence Estimate for use at the national level (than now governing the issuance of NIE's) may have to be followed. CIA is now publishing daily intelligence summaries on Cuba and is planning a bi-monthly or weekly report summing up intelligence for this purpose. (CIA responsibility, with support of others as required.)
OTHER OPERATIONS		
6. * Continue negotiating [redacted] in contaminating locomotive lubricants.	To cripple Cuba's rail transportation.	[redacted] is required to undertake a successful sabotage of Cuban locomotives, through contaminating lubricants. It is expected that a minimum of 3 months is required before locomotives in Cuba start breaking down, once the contaminant is introduced.
	16 - 31 March 1962	
INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS		
7. * Two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	One team of 4 and one team of 3 agents. Both teams include personnel who have had resistance training and some past experience.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3/24/94

16 - 31 March 1962 (cont.)

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

ACTIVITY	PURPOSE	CONSIDERATIONS
8. Establish 2 additional third-country resident agents in Cuba.	To collect intelligence.	Possible future use in communications and support.
9. By 31 March, have 105 agents selected and 50 agents trained.	To ready agent operations.	Effectiveness and numbers are dependent upon purpose of recruitment, nature of training, and policy decisions controlling these factors. If the recruitment and training are for resistance activities, the task of recruitment and training will be much less difficult than if they are limited to intelligence-collection purposes only.
10.* Develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U. S.	To exploit the intelligence possibilities of former residents of Cuba (including U. S. citizens) now in the United States.	There are "colonies" in Washington, D. C., and other U. S. cities which are "little Cubas." Family, Church, and business interests provoke unusual personal ties inside Cuba for some of these residents; a real potential exists for collection of intelligence not otherwise available. (FBI support and coordination is basic in this effort.)
11. * Develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962.	To collect intelligence in a Latin atmosphere, at different levels than now seem possible in the continental U. S., to spot additional intelligence assets and to provide security against Communist agent operations.	As Opa-Locka becomes fully activated, CIA will activate other interrogation centers as promptly as feasible. A center is being activated in [redacted] Negotiations with local authorities are being undertaken to activate centers, if possible, in [redacted] San Juan, Puerto Rico, [redacted] are being surveyed for possible centers. (CIA responsibility with support by others as necessary.)

OTHER OPERATIONS

None.

* Items marked by asterisk were approved by Special Group (Augmented), 5 March 1962.

TOP SECRET

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

A-33

Exh. #12

12 March 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale SL

Subject: Policy Questions, Operation Mongoose

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

SL 3/24/94

de sanitized 1(a)

As Operation Mongoose goes into the approved activities of Phase I, a number of policy questions have started to arise. Current problems, needing resolution, are listed below. It is requested that the Special Group (Augmented) provide guidance, as a matter of some urgency.

1. Use of U.S. military installations. CIA desires to train small groups of Cuban nationals [redacted], immediately. Defense reports that the proposed area is adequate for this training, but that such training of covert agents who will be introduced ultimately into Cuba represents a security problem and a departure from past security procedures, due to the fact that U.S. Government sponsorship will be apparent to trainees. Capture and interrogation of any of these covert agents could result in exposure (in international news media) of U.S. official involvement in efforts to unseat the present Communist Cuban regime. A policy determination is needed as to whether or not agents to be infiltrated into Cuba should be trained on U.S. Government installations.

There are other U.S. military installations and properties, in the Southeastern U.S. and Caribbean areas, which CIA would like to use for similar training and operational purposes in the future. The same policy determination could cover all uses of identifiable U.S. Government properties for training and deployment of Cuban nationals for covert infiltration into Cuba.

2. Arming of Cuban guerrillas. CIA needs a policy determination on the supplying of arms and equipment to deserving Cuban guerrillas, as they are located, assessed, and request help. Such requests are starting to surface, as the intelligence-collection effort is increased, and it is

00199

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

SENSITIVE
TOP SECRET

This document contains ___ pages.
Copy No. 1 of 7 copies. Series ___

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized
af 3/24/94
1(c)

Exh. #13

3 May 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Project Mongoose, 3 May 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor; Mr. Kennedy; Mr. Johnson; Mr. Gilpatric, General Decker, General Lansdale and General Craig; Mr. McCone, and Mr. Harvey

1. General Lansdale gave an interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the U. S. Army. He said the consensus is that there are not more than a thousand suitable individuals from whom additional recruits could be selected. The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number. General Lansdale said that various alternatives for training of such Cubans are being looked into.

It was agreed that such a cadre of Cubans would be an asset to the U.S., which might be used in a number of ways. General Lansdale, supported by General Taylor, pointed out that in this connection the matter of holding the individuals and giving them useful employment after they are trained is an important and a difficult one.

2. Mr. Harvey gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence, including the Opa-locka interrogation center and the [redacted] clandestine interrogation center. He outlined various difficulties encountered, and said that three agent teams have been infiltrated and that five W/T sets are in place. Approximately 72 actual or potential reporting sources are also in place. A significant development is that Major Duque has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely intelligence-gathering missions. (This sort of attitude had been forecast earlier as a possibility, but it now assumes particular importance in view of Duque's stature.)

3. Mr. Harvey also commented on the two attempts made to intrude into Havana TV programs. The Group asked that a check be made, as soon as possible, on how effective these operations were. They also asked that a copy of the scripts used be made available. The Group felt that it is worthwhile to check this capability out, as is now being done, but questioned whether once proved effective it should not perhaps be kept in reserve for a more meaningful time.

TAParrott
Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale
destroyed 4/9/63 - mn

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

Rtd 3/16/94

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10250
RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R654

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT/RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS/EXHIBITS

DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : 61

SUBJECTS :
PAGES 8-68 OF TESTIMONY BY SARNO, ALFRED J.

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 258-11

[R] - ITEM IS RES

TOP SECRET

Vol. 3 of 3

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Cuba

R654

The United States Senate

INVENTORIED: 5/25/77

BY GS

SSCI Box 258-11

Report of Proceedings

MINORITY DRAWER

[redacted] AL

[redacted] TIES

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

16 MAR 94

(1)(A)
(1)(B)

Friday, June 25, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF	PAGE
Alfred J. Sarno	3

- - -

for AMUTS?

Mr. Sarno. I think from December, 1961 or January, 1962 to September, 1967. Then from June -- August, 1968 to September, 1969.

Mr. Wides. Now let me go back, and can you give us a very brief summary of your positions with the Agency prior to that? I don't mean detailed as to what you were doing.

Mr. Sarno. I joined the Agency in September of 1951.

Mr. Wides. Yes?

Mr. Sarno. I was assigned to three countries before I hit Florida.

Mr. Wides. All in the Western Hemisphere Division?

Mr. Sarno. All in the Western Hemisphere.

Mr. Wides. So you had rather long stations in each of those, three or four years?

Mr. Sarno. (Nods in the affirmative)

Mr. DeMarco. When did you become an American citizen?

Mr. Sarno. I was born in Ohio.

Mr. DeMarco. Had you been stationed with Mr. Phillips in Cuba before you came to Miami, or were you in Cuba before you came to Miami?

Mr. Sarno. Yes.

Mr. Wides. And that is when Mr. Noel was the Chief?

Mr. Sarno. Jim Noel was the Chief.

Mr. Wides. And you had contact with Mr. Phillips then?

Mr. Wides. You never heard of any plots, nor of any arrested people attempting to shoot a bazooka when he was giving a speech at Havana Stadium?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Let me go to the period when you went to Florida.

When you first came here, that was before Station Chief [redacted] had moved the whole station to Miami?

Mr. Sarno. [redacted] wasn't there. When I arrived in Florida, [redacted] was not then -- no, sir, he was not the station chief.

Mr. Wides. Who was the station chief?

Mr. Sarno. I don't think I should give you his name. I don't know. YOu have the rest of all of them, but I can't recall --

I can state that there were two station chiefs between [redacted] and Shackley, three of them, in fact.

Mr. Wides. Shackley came in when, 1963?

Mr. Sarno. '62.

Mr. Wides. When in '62?

Mr. Sarno. I think the spring of '62 is when it was.

Mr. Wides. When was he replaced by Mr. Dimmer?

Mr. Sarno. If I am not mistaken, it was in '64, I think. June, July, I think, something like that, of '64.

Mr. Wides. And then Mr. Dimmer was replaced in '66 by Mr. [redacted] [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. And then Mr. Esterline replaced Mr. [redacted] or was there someone between?

Mr. Sarno. Mr. Esterline did not replace Mr. [redacted] Nobody replaced [redacted] because they closed up the station.

Mr. Wides. We understand that the station was operating very recently.

Mr. Sarno. Well, I'm not saying -- you see, the station you spoke to before, you spoke of, went out of business in June of 1960 when Mr. [redacted] left.

Mr. Wides. I see.

Now, what was the relationship between yourself and the station? Administratively, and in terms of reporting, when you first went down there.

Mr. Sarno. When I first went down there, I was outside. I believe it was concerning clearances to get me into the station, because I had never been working in a station before, so there were special clearances. So at that time, those two months you're speaking of, I attended a course and I may have been sent out once or twice to interview a Cuban refugee or one of our agents who had left Cuba.

Mr. Wides. And then you set up the [redacted] program? Did you start that project, or was that started when you came in?

Mr. Sarno. It had been started, the nucleus had been formed at that time.

Mr. Wides. And except where there's a question of an agent under cover who would be possibly exposed to harm or that kind of thing in regard to the mention of other Agency people, certainly at the level of Mr. Shackley or other officials, Mr. Dimmer, and so forth, that the general procedures have been that people at the Agency or retirees have not refused to disclose names.

Now, you certainly have your rights --

Mr. Sarno. No, sir. I am not questioning you, or anything, except I've been in this business a long time and I've never mentioned anybody's name. Now if somebody were to tell me, if Seymour Bolton were to tell me that I could tell you all the names of all my supervisors and everything, it's perfectly all right. But I've never mentioned a name and I feel that I shouldn't mention a name.

Mr. Wides. Well, we may have to take a break and do that, but let me go on.

With regard to the [redacted] program, the [redacted] Cubans were not contract agents of the station, is that correct?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. They were proprietary employees essentially of [redacted], essentially?

Mr. Sarno. [redacted] was a group -- that proprietary was set up in September of 1968. Prior to that time they were a bunch of Cubans just living down in Miami.

Mr. Wides. And what was their relationship to the Agency through you?

Mr. Sarno. They were a group of Cuban exiles who were being funded to collect information, intelligence information, on Cuba.

Mr. Wides. They were paid agents?

Mr. Sarno. They were paid agents.

Mr. Wides. Some of them received a fairly sophisticated training in tradecraft, in some cases communications intercept operations with regard to a station in Florida, and so forth, is that not correct?

Mr. Sarno. Sophisticated equipment, yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. And tradecraft, general tradecraft training?

Mr. Sarno. General tradecraft training, yes, sir. Communications training -- well, most of them weren't communicators, so they required very little if they did receive training.

Mr. Wides. Would that put them in a little bit more official status of some sort, whatever the category is called, than simply being a paid informant?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir. They were just like paid informants except we provided them funds to operate with.

They are no more -- they are not contract, we did not have them under contract.

Mr. Wides. But they would still get training?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. And the program first operated where? Where did you physically locate? Were you at the University of Miami, at the Naval Air Station at the begining?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Where were you at first?

Mr. Sarno. Are you speaking of our station? Our station was physically at the [redacted] but these Cubans did not know where the station was.

Mr. Wides. And you just contacted them separately?

Mr. Sarno. They had houses that they rented and they worked out of different houses, and there were many of them, so I can't recall them.

Mr. Wides. Did you have an office facility apart from the station?

Mr. Sarno. Myself?

Mr. Wides. Yes.

Mr. Sarno. On one occasion, for a very short period, I had an office.

Mr. Wides. Where was the [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. The [redacted] was located on the [redacted] of Miami.

Mr. Wides. Apart from the station?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. That was a cover?

Mr. Sarno. That was the station.

Mr. Wides. And what was the mission and purpose of AMUTS when you first started out, as indicated in the project outline?

Mr. Sarno. They were to collect intelligence on Cuba, debrief refugees and provide bodies for any possible operations required by the station.

Mr. Wides. They were to debrief refugees?

Mr. Sarno. Debrief refugees, collect and evaluate, maintain records.

Mr. Wides. Was there a division of the AMUTS members into two groups, with only a small group involving the debriefing of Cuban refugees?

Mr. Sarno. Well, it wasn't too small a group, but if you would speak of the whole organization overall, yes, it was a small group.

Mr. Wides. And at what point did you set up any cover apart from the station as a proprietary or notional company, in between the AMUTS people and the Miami station? In other words, were the companies prior to the Latin America social and economic research company that preceeded it, in time?

Mr. Sarno. In the time that I handled them, which is up to the LASER, I think there were three, three covers all told, or perhaps four. I think we had our debriefing, you know, under one cover.

Mr. Wides. That was from the start? You had a separate cover for the debriefing?

Mr. Sarno. Well, from the start we didn't have a place for them, and it wasn't pulled together as a debriefing unit. When a large flow of refugees started to come in is when we set up the special unit.

Mr. Wides. When was that?

Mr. Sarno. Well, they cut off --

Mr. Wides. '64, '63?

Mr. Sarno. It could have been '62, late '62 or '63. And before, we used to send our debriefers, they were within the [redacted] group, specialists in debriefing, area specialists is the kind we used. And we would go out to the reception center and check around and see who had come out of the particular area.

Mr. Wides. At Opa-Locka?

Mr. Sarno. At Opa-Locka.

And our debriefers would go out and check around with the people who came in and try to spot somebody who would be interesting to interview, debrief, concerning the particular area. And so they usually picked them up in a car and either took them to a restaurant or took them to a motel or something and would debrief them. And then we found that it would be better to get a building for them to be in where we located them altogether, where they could prepare their reports and everything.

Mr. Wides. And so that's when you first set up the proprietary for the smaller debriefing component of [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. Well, I set up the proprietaries, the notionary company for a small debriefing office, and at the same time, we rented a building, a larger building, and they used to operate in Coral Gables, received some publicity and we moved them out of Coral Gables to near the airport in a building where the main office was, where this main office was, where these reports from the debriefers or any other information was collected would be processed, typed in finished form, translated and provided to us.

Mr. Wides. About how many people did you have in [redacted] Cubans at that time?

Mr. Sarno. Well, that's difficult to say.

Mr. Wides. 150? Would you say 150?

Mr. Sarno. I would say inside, outside, it could be close to 150.

Mr. Wides. Did you have more than a dozen or so working in the component on debriefing?

Mr. Sarno. As I recall, at one time -- as I recall it, we had about 22, 23 people working in debriefing.

Mr. Wides. And apart from those Cubans, you had a staff under you of assistants and secretaries who were Agency assigned personnel?

Mr. Sarno. Yes.

Mr. Wides. What kind of staff did you have?

Mr. Sarno. Well, it started off originally since we weren't big, I started off with one secretary, and it eventually ended up that there were one or two Intel assistants --

Mr. Wides. These were Agency personnel?

Mr. Sarno. Agency personnel.

--.and two or three case officers.

Mr. Wides. The case officers handled segments of the [redacted]?

Mr. Sarno. Segments of the [redacted].

Mr. Wides. Now, the other, speaking very roughly, hundred and fifty or so [redacted] Cubans, you said some twenty were involved when the debriefing program intensified. What were the other hundred-odd Cubans involved in?

Mr. Sarno. Well, we had records personnel, we had I would say six or seven who only worked in records and maintaining of files, and general index cards, and that was it. Then we had what we called our reports section which may have had about fifteen people, twenty people, who wrote reports, checked them out, cross-referenced, and everything else that was involved in that.

Mr. Wides. What kind of reports did they write? What were they writing reports about?

Mr. Sarno. Economic -- whatever they were learning from against Cuba, and had weapons they weren't supposed to have.

Mr. Wides. Like Alpha-66?

Mr. Sarno. Alpha-66, there were many of them.

And we usually had one of our outside types, either recruit or get next to an individual of the group and he would penetrate the group himself to report to us what they were doing.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall the flights of the Diaz, or one of the Diz brothers, over Havana dropping leaflets?

Mr. Sarno. What date was it?

Mr. Wides. I believe it was quite early, and it was not in connection with the [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. I know the Diaz brothers.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall hearing of flights with -- one of them with Frank Sturgis over Havana dropping leaflets?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. It was fairly widely known.

Mr. Sarno. Well, I didn't get into Cubans until maybe it was June of '60, but the only leaflets I ever saw fly over Cuba was the day before the invasion. Those were the only ones I saw.

Mr. Wides. When you were in Miami, did you have any contact with Frank Sturgis, Frank Fiorini?

Mr. Sarno. Never, never. To my knowledge, he never worked for us.

Mr. Wides. Not getting back to the bulk of the AMOTS group, apart from the reporting on refugees and the efforts to keep tabs, which I guess is a summary of what you are saying on what exile groups might be doing that the government might otherwise not know about, is it correct that there was surveillance of the Miami community generally with regard to possible Castro agents?

Mr. Sarno. Not that I know of.

Mr. Wides. There was no counterintelligence program in the AMOTS?

Mr. Sarno. We had a counterintelligence component in the AMOTS Program.

Mr. Wides. Why don't you describe that?

Mr. Sarno. The counterintelligence program consisted of very capable Cubans who knew of the former -- the set-up of the intelligence agency inside of Cuba, so if anybody were to come out, any refugee were to come out and name an individual that was a friend of theirs that we knew or suspected of working for the internal security which was the DSE or their external service, the DGI, our counterintelligence group or one of the individuals would go out and debrief the fellow and collect names, and prepare reports on it, and they maintained files, and that is what it is.

They never got under a surveillance of any of them, because once a report was written they suspected somebody. They maintain a file of them, and when Cuban refugees would come in, they would receive lists of names to check in their files, and if they suspected one, then they would gather all of the information possible on this individual, prepare a report, name their sources, and they would pass it to the station. The station in turn would prepare a memorandum and send it to the bureau.

Mr. Wides. Is it your sworn testimony that you never knew of any surveillances or efforts to penetrate groups for counterintelligence purposes by Cubans under your supervision?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, no. You're speaking of penetrating groups, yes. They penetrated groups. Surveillance -- I never sent them out on a mission to surveil anybody concerning whether they were suspect or whatever.

Mr. Wides. Was there any surveillance of Cubans in Miami conducted by -- whether it was in cooperation with the Bureau or not -- conducted by any of the [redacted] Cubans that you were aware of?

Mr. Sarno. I cannot recall if there ever was.

Mr. Wides. I don't mean a specific one.

Mr. Sarno. I don't recall ever giving them any assignments.

Mr. Wides. I'm not talking about assignments, I'm talking about whether you're aware of their conducting --

Mr. Sarno. As I say, I do not recall them conducting any surveillance on anybody.

15

Mr. Wides. Any telephone taps?

Mr. Sarno. Never any telephone taps, we didn't have telephone tap capability.

Mr. Wides. Any photography?

Mr. Sarno. We had a photographer.

Mr. Wides. When was he used? In what circumstances?

Mr. Sarno. Well, the biggest majority of his work was to copy certain documents.

Mr. Wides. I mean photographic surveillance.

Mr. Sarno. There may have been. I really can't state which one he was used on if he was ever used for photographic surveillance.

Mr. Wides. Which what he was used on?

Mr. Sarno. I mean if he was used on photographic surveillance. I don't recall ever ordering him out on photographic surveillance.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall if there ever was any photographic surveillance carried out by any of the [redacted]?

Mr. Sarno. I have no recollection. I do not recall.

Mr. Wides. Were you getting reports of any sort, whether you would characterize it as surveillance or not, on people who had already come and were in Miami as distinct from the interview reports when the refugees first came?

Isn't it correct that the [redacted] personnel were providing you with reports on Cubans who were already in Miami?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. Would you describe that program?

Mr. Sarno. Certainly. As I said, they penetrated these groups, they would go around and then they would sit and talk and as you would call it, the surveillance, the fact that they penetrated, they would sit at the table and report on the individual and what the individual said and what they were planning. We call it penetration.

To me, surveillance is to put two men on the street following somebody from one place to another.

Mr. Wides. Were there ever occasions when the station was suspicious as to whether Cubans in Miami might be Castro agents that you were aware of?

Mr. Sarno. Many.

Mr. Wides. Did they ever ask for any assistance in the [redacted] group in trying to keep tabs on those individuals or to test their suspicions?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Who would do that?

Mr. Sarno. It would be the CI section of the station.

Mr. Wides. You don't recall any situation in which -

Mr Sarno. In which [redacted] participated? No, sir.

Mr. Wides. -- working with the FBI.

Mr. Sarno. The FBI occasionally would ask for the services of one of the [redacted], but it was mainly not to surveil anybody. It was to provide information to them because their name would come up somewhere in a case.

Mr. Wides. What kind of assistance? You mean more than just a chance to interview them?

Mr. Sarno. No, just interview. They never used them to run a man on the street or anything like that, no, sir. They tried to get one individual one time and they didn't know that he worked for us and they tried to hire him and he came back and reported it. We had to advise them that he was already working for us.

Mr. Wides. And you had 115 men and all---

Mr. Sarno. There were women also, sir.

Mr. Wides. And women, and all they were doing was interviewing refugees and writing reports on exile potential activities against Cuba?

Mr. Sarno. I would say that was the biggest majority of their job.

Mr. Wides. What was the rest of it?

Mr. Sarno. They also went out, if our station was going to run an operation and they needed X amount of bodies, certain specialized personnel, the [redacted] would go and locate the personnel, talk to them, spot them, get their personal history from them, send it in, and the people would be traced out and checked and cleared and eventually introduced to the station case officer who would use them in our operations.

Mr. Wides. Who arranged for the training at the training station at [redacted] (?), was that used?

Mr. Sarno. For whom?

Mr. Wides. When the [redacted] people received training, some various kind of tradecraft, who would arrange that, yourself?

Mr. Sarno. December, 1961 when I took it over there were only three cases of [redacted] who were sent away for special training. Three cases, three individuals.

One came here to Washington, the other was going to be loaned to a station overseas. He came up and received training. The majority of the training given to the [redacted] was down in Miami, Florida.

Mr. Wides. And what kind was that?

Mr. Sarno. Basic tradecraft, reports writing --

Mr. Wides. Did they ever get training in surveillance?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, they received training in surveillance.

Mr. Wides. Why did they get that?

Mr. Sarno. Well, that is part of their program of training them as a group.

Mr. Wides. Even though there was no use of them for surveillance purposes?

Mr. Sarno. I do not recall, sir, ever sending them out on a surveillance.

Mr. DeMarco. Who conducted the training?

Mr. Sarno. Our Training Branch, personnel from our

Training Branch.

Mr. DeMarco. From Washington?

Mr. Sarno. Yes.

Mr. Wides. You say the majority of the training was in Florida. What period are we talking about, throughout the period?

Mr. Sarno. It could be spread over. Reports writing, for instance, when the Agency, or when the station was being cut back in personnel, this group used to produce tons of reports, and when our station was being cut, the staff was being cut, I convinced the Chief of Station into having the reports officers, for instance, trained to prepare reports which would require very little editing or preparation once it arrived in the station, which would take a load off the station, and it was agreed to.

Mr. Wides. You arranged in general for the training or the training office?

Mr. Sarno. I never trained.

Mr. Wides. But they worked through you administratively?

Mr. Sarno. Yes.

Mr. Wides. So you were familiar with all the training [redacted] personnel would have got?

Mr. Sarno. I would say all of the training that they received during the period I was with them, with the exception of that one year there, and also I must state that although I

Mr. Wides. There were some new people coming in?

Mr. Sarno. Yes. Some of the people would move, they got a job that paid them more, but there were very few that came in after the original, say about 1964 I would say it was well established and very few dropped out or were taken aboard thereafter.

Mr. Wides. They all got what you referred to earlier as basic tradecraft training?

Mr. Sarno. No, not all of them.

Mr. Wides. How many?

Mr. Sarno. There were very few of them in the original group. I never had them trained in basic tradecraft. The original group which I took over which, if I am not mistaken, was about eighteen of them, and I understand that prior to the Bay of Pigs --

Mr. Wides. Eighteen in AMUTS or eighteen in training?

Mr. Sarno. Eighteen in AMUTS all told.

I understood that prior to the Bay of Pigs these AMUTS had been given basic tradecraft training. I never once sent them out to receive basic tradecraft training.

Mr. Wides. After you came -- when you came there were eighteen AMUTS and eventually we're talking about 150, roughly, or more?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. And you never knew of any of the people who joined [redacted] after you took over getting general tradecraft?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, no, sir.

Mr. Wides. And to your knowledge it was only report writing?

Mr. Sarno. Well, they trained them in each one of the sections, and I didn't train the debriefers, so if a new man was hired and he was put in a debriefing, he was trained u usually by the Chief of the Debriefing Group, he was put in there to work along with other debriefers to catch onto the thing.

Mr. Wides. Now your testimony with regard to surveillance training, who issued that, or how many people?

Mr. Sarno. If I am not mistaken, it was four or five.

Mr. Wides. When you first came, or shortly therafter?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, it was all at the -- now, now, just one second, because I went in surveillance training myself.

I don't recall whether this four or five whom we trained in surveillance were trained while I had them or they were trained before I took them.

Mr. Wides. Now after that, those four or five, no other [redacted] people to your knowledge received any surveillance training, is that your testimony?

Mr. Sarno. That is true, sir.

Mr. Wides. What about picks and locks?

Mr. Sarno. Nobody.

Mr. Wides. That you know of received --

Mr. Sarno. Not a single one that I know of.

Mr. Wides. Did you know anybody at AMOTS who had capability of any previous experience at picks and locks, surreptitious entry?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. You were not aware of anyone at AMOTS having that capability?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. You never discussed it with anyone at the station?

Mr. Sarno. Possibly.

Mr. Wides. Well, let me ask the question, the capabilities in the area of surreptitious entry or picking locks and no part of AMOTS people in all those years?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Were the group that were located in your homestate that were involved in the interception of any traffic, radio traffic or Cuban, were they under your supervision?

Mr. Sarno. They were originally under my supervision, and later the station brought an individual down from Headquarters and took over that operation.

Mr. Wides. And when was that?

Mr. Sarno. Well, the station always had somebody at the station who was reviewing all of their work and passing instructions. I handled them for a long time.

Mr. Wides. Until roughly?

Mr. Sarno. Until roughly the arrival of Mr. Dimmer. You have the date there. I think Mr. Dimmer's the one who brought down the fellow from Headquarters.

Mr. Wides. And these people received some training regarding the use of intercept equipment even if they had some experience as radio operators, isn't that true?

Mr. Sarno. Sir, I really don't know.

I know that I never brought an instructor down to train them in the use of radio equipment. These individuals had worked in this work in Cuba before they came out --

Mr. Wides. In intercept work like this?

Mr. Sarno. In intercept work, yes. We had two very brilliant fellows who were the top people in the communications field in Cuba.

And most of the radio operators had had up to twenty years experience, they were elderly people, and they had been in radio and they could read and they could send it out very well.

Mr. Wides. So your testimony is that --

Mr. Sarno. I do not recall them ever having been trained by anybody, in any sense.

Mr. Wides. Or communications in general?

Mr. Sarno. Now communications generally, I cannot say that.

because several of the [redacted] were trained and several of them who were brought out of Cuba, because several of them were in Cuba as radio operators and then they came out. They were in the Miami group not operating radios, but --

Mr. Wides. But during your administration of the [redacted] group as case officer, you don't recall any training being given in communications?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall any cooperation of the [redacted] people with the FBI and other Federal agencies trying to DF and identify suspected illegal wireless operators in Miami, Castro agents?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, they never did.

Mr. Wides. [redacted] was not involved in that?

Mr. Sarno. No, I never heard of any. You must remember that when Dimmer came down and brought the fellow, I never saw the traffic anymore, but during the period that I was looking at the traffic, and I was directing that special intercept group as part of the [redacted], I never once gave them an order and never saw any that they did.

Mr. Wides. When Mr. Shackley was the station chief, did you report to him or someone selse?

Mr. Sarno. I reported to my branch chief.

Mr. Wides. And what was that branch?

Mr. Sarno. FI Branch, Foreign Intelligence.

Mr. Wides. And that was the same procedure throughout the period?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. Up til '67?

Mr. Sarno. Through '67. Well, let's see, now. No, sir. Well, it was, because later they made the [redacted] group, it became a branch, and they brought in a very senior officer to be the Branch Chief, and I was considered the Deputy Branch Chief. Mr. Dimmer brought in the senior officer.

Mr. Wides. And you don't feel like you can give us his name?

Mr. Sarno. There's no reason not to. He is retired now. Bill Caldwell.

Mr. Wides. What contact did you have with a man who called himself [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. He was the Chief of the MI Group, the Cuban Chief.

Mr. Wides. [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. [redacted]

Mr. Wides. And he was your principal contact?

Mr. Sarno. He was my principal -- he was the head, the Cuban head of it.

Mr. Wides. Are you familiar with the history of the [redacted] group that he prepared in the late '60's, or worked on?

Mr Sarno. In the late '60's?

Mr. Wides. I thought so. I thought in '66 or '67, that is what I meant, that he had worked on the history of the [redacted] group.

Mr. Sarno. Well, no.

Mr. Wides. Are you familiar with the written history of the [redacted] program?

Mr. Sarno. I have never seen it. I had established the policy that every three months he had to write up about the group, so all of that, I understand, was all compiled into the history, so I don't know.

Mr. Wides. As part of the Miami Station?

Mr. Sarno. As part of the Miami Station, so I don't think he was told in '66 or '67, start all over and prepare it.

Mr. Wides. You think it was a consolidation?

Mr. Sarno. I think it was consolidated over the years.

Mr. Wides. And this is entitled what, do you know?

Mr. Sarno. I supposed it would be The History of the [redacted]

Mr. Wides. And you've never seen it?

Mr. Sarno. I've never seen it.

Mr. Wides. Do you know if it's at Headquarters in the Latin American Division?

Mr. Sarno. I do not know.

Mr. Wides. When the Cuban Operations Group was set up -- let's go back -- in '61 when you took over was approximately the period when Mr. Harvey was setting up the staff Task Force W, is that correct?

What contact, if any, did you have with Task Force W personnel as distinct from the station itself?

Mr. Sarno. None whatsoever.

Mr. Wides. They never came down and spoke to you?

Mr. Sarno. When I came out of Cuba, when I escaped from Cuba, I was brought up here to Headquarters and debriefed, so I imagine that the person that debriefed me, this is in July of '61, I would imagine that individual was part of the Task Force.

Mr. Wides. I think that was still in the Division. They had not split the Task Force until the winter of '61, '62.

Mr. Sarno. I see. Well --

Mr. Wides. But after that when you were in Florida, you had no contact with anyone, to your knowledge, other than the Station personnel?

Mr. Sarno. Well, I don't know. Occasionally they would call me to Washington to discuss something.

Mr. Wides. And did you discuss something with people in the Task Force, the Cuban Task Force?

Mr. Sarno. The Cuban Task Force.

Mr. Wides. Mr. [redacted]?

Mr. Sarno. I know Mr. [redacted], yes.

Mr. Wides. And did you have any contact with Desmond

FitzGerald when it became the Special Activities Staff and he took it over?

Mr. Sarno. I know Desmond FitzGerald, or I knew him, and discussed operations with him -- no, I never sat down and discussed an operation. I met him at a party, and that was all.

Mr. Wides. And when you came to Washington what kind of discussions would you have about the [redacted] program?

Mr. Sarno. I made so many trips to Washington, I say I was also the case officer, I used to travel and recruit people. I do not specifically recall ever being called to Washington to discuss [redacted].

Mr. Wides. But do you recall ever discussing the [redacted] program and the Cubans in it while you were in Washington?

Mr. Sarno. Well, if I would come up on a trip and some of the people who were sitting on a desk here who were maintaining the records and everything of the [redacted], I suppose, yes, they would come around and discuss perhaps the budget or perhaps get them to report in a different manner. I recall on one occasion discussing the set-up of how the [redacted] group prepared the debriefing reports, that they could remove the names from it, instead of filing them inside the report, they put the names on cards so they could be put into a computer machine here.

Mr. Wides. In the period when Mr. Shackley and Mr. Dimmer were Station Chiefs, which would be '63 through '65 or so, did you have any contact with Mr. Sternfeld or Mr. Esterline?

Mr. Sarno. Which period is this?

Mr. Wides. '62 to '65 or so.

Mr. Sarno. Mr. Esterline, who I believe at that time was -- Mr. Esterline was --

Mr. Wides. Was he in Miami?

Mr. Sarno. No, Mr. Esterline was on the staff he -- I don't know whether it was on the staff of the Task Force or who at that time, but I knew Mr. Esterline, first from his visits. I first met Mr. Esterline when he came to Miami in either late '61 or early '62, and I never saw him again until he used to make his trips down, and then I understand he was assigned overseas.

Mr. Wides. Did you discuss the [redacted] Program with him?

Mr. Sarno. At that period?

Mr. Wides. At any time.

Mr. Sarno. Well, yes, he was my Station Chief at one time.

Mr. Wides. You mean in '68 or '69?

Mr. Sarno. That's right.

Mr. Wides. But not prior to that?

Mr. Sarno. Well, yes, he came down on -- prior to his coming down and setting up the new station, he came down and discussed with all of us who might remain at our jobs there.

Mr. Wides. But not in the early period of the '60's?

Mr. Sarno. Not in the earlier --

Mr. Wides. What about Larry Sternfeld?

Mr. Sarno. No, Mr. Sternfeld was never connected with the Cuban thing until early '68.

Mr. Wides. Let me go back to the cover companies.

You say you set up one company for the smaller group, or one notional that was handling the --

Mr. Sarno. Refugees.

Mr. Wides. Refugees.

Can you give us the name of that?

Mr. Sarno. I don't recall it, sir.

Mr. Wides. Now, was there a separate company --

Mr. Sarno. For the principal group.

Mr. Wides. And what was that?

Mr. Sarno. Well, you named it off, the [redacted] --

Mr. Wides. I thought you said that didn't start until '68?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, [redacted] started in '68.

Mr. Wides. [redacted]?

Mr. Sarno. Is that what that stands for? There was a [redacted] that they had.

Mr. Wides. [redacted] Company?

Mr. Sarno. Yeah.

Mr. Wides. What was its cover?

Mr. Sarno. They were supposed to be doing, researching Latin America, since they had a lot of files, and you could hear a lot of typewriters clicking all over the place.

Mr. Wides. And what's your best recollection of the name?

Mr. Sarno. My best recollection is [redacted].

Mr. Wides. Company?

Mr. Sarno. Company.

Mr. Wides. Did it have any other names? I think you suggested there were even more than two proprietaries and more than two notionals. Did you have three or four going at one point?

Mr. Sarno. Well, it was at one point, at one point there were three of them, if you included the Intercept. The Intercept people had another name.

Mr. Wides. But basically there were --

Mr. Sarno. There could have been three of them at one time, and basically there were two, yes. One of them was [redacted] -- that's it. I think the debriefing group came under [redacted], or something like that.

Mr. Wides. When do you first recall being approached about possible use of [redacted] people outside the Miami area in the United States?

Mr. Sarno. Use of [redacted] people outside the Miami area?

Mr. Wides. In the United States.

Mr. Sarno. Nobody ever approached me on it. They were outside of Miami, but the thing that happens is the Chief of the Miami group, when an [redacted] would leave --

Mr. Wides. This is [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. When one of the [redacted] would leave for his reasons, they would always maintain contact with [redacted] when they would move to any area, and all they would do is to report on Cuban exiles in that area.

Mr. Wides. And would the fact that they were leaving and going to another area be reported by you, back through channels to Washington for relay to CIA personnel in the area where they were going? Was this ever done?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, it was done, yes.

Mr. Wides. And was it not uncommon in the case of Cubans going to the New York area? Does that happen fairly frequently?

Mr. Sarno. Well, since it was handled in such a loose way, in that it was between [redacted] and this individual and we didn't have them on the payroll.

Mr. Wides. You mean you didn't have them on the payroll in the sense of employees, they were regularly paid agents, informants?

Mr. Sarno. They were given funds by [redacted] which obviously were authorized for sort of like operational expenses.

Mr. Wides. Excuse me. You're talking about when they were in Florida, or when they were moving?

Mr. Sarno. No, when they were in New York, if they went to New York.

Mr. Wides. Well, let's go back.

The first question I was asking you was with regard to your relaying to CIA personnel the fact that someone who had been at [redacted] in Florida was going elsewhere and you said that that happened, and then I asked you -- we will come to the operational relationships in a moment -- how frequently that happened in regard to people coming to New York. For example, I assume that there were a fair number of Cubans generally in there for one or two members of [redacted] who went up to New York during the course of all of these years.

Mr Sarno. No, sir, no, sir.

Mr. Wides. Would you say several dozen or a dozen?

Mr. Sarno. So far as I recall, there was only one that ever went up there, and he in turn collected two or three of his other friends around him who formed a little nucleus, but there was only one [redacted] that went.

Mr. Wides. What about other cities? What other cities do you recall people went to?

Mr. Sarno. In the United States?

Mr. Wides. Yes.

Washington?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir. San Juan, Puerto Rico, and that's all, in the United States.

Mr. Wides. Chicago?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Anyplace on the West Coast or the Southwest?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Boston?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. So you only recall persons who had been in [redacted] telling -- why don't we refer to him as [redacted] that they were going to another city as being New York and San Juan?

Mr. Sarno. New York and San Juan are the only two I ever recall they ever had any [redacted] or ex-[redacted] or people that had been in the organization went.

Mr. Wides. Now when they went and they recruited other people, was that [redacted] suggestion or under his supervision?

Mr. Sarno. They usually collected a group around people that they trusted.

Mr. Wides. Was that up to [redacted] supervision and direction?

Mr. Sarno. He directed them to do it, yes. I didn't even know the individual, I never met him. It's one individual.

Mr. Wides. Did he speak to you about the fact that he was going to do this, [redacted]

Did he consult with you on it?

Mr. Sarno. Well, I believe it came up -- I knew the fellow was leaving, because he was taken off of the role as being in Miami, and we may have discussed his being used while he was in New York in case anything ever came up.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall discussing it?

Mr. Sarno. Well, yes, we did discuss it, obviously it was discussed, because this fellow came up with a big thing when they were going to bazooka the UN building.

Mr. Wides. Was this one of the Novo brothers -- or was either of the Novo brothers in [redacted] in Florida? I believe this is the name of the two people who were arrested at the time.

Mr. Sarno. No, the [redacted] that was in New York is the one that discovered the plot and we informed the Bureau and the Bureau moved in on it.

Mr. Wides. You informed the Bureau?

Mr. Sarno. We informed the Bureau of that shelling of the UN, and it was the [redacted], this one [redacted] up there who got the information.

Mr. Wides. And he relayed that to someone in New York, or back, through [redacted] to you?

Mr. Sarno. He relayed it to [redacted] and we -- he informed us, and we in turn advised our base in New York who in turn advised the Bureau.

Mr. Wides. Which base is that, the Domestic Operations or the Security Office?

tape 3a

Mr. Sarno. Domestic Operations.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Wides. With regard to the information received from the former [redacted] in New York about the plot to shoot a bazooka at the UN, was Mr. Shackley the Station Chief at the time you received that information?

Mr. Sarno. I don't recall the date, but the date was between early '62, which it had to have been, and -- because Shackley left which I think was in July of '64 and that would have meant he was the Chief of Station.

Mr. Wides. Well, didn't he just indicate before while we were taking a rbreak that you had recalled that Shackley was the Station Chief?

Mr. Sarno. I don't recall whether he was exactly the Station Chief or not. I can't place the date with what had happened, so I know I went back to the Station and I reported it, and it in turn was reported. Now, if I told it to Shackley or if I told it to Dimmer, if I told it to the two different Branch Chiefs that were there at the time, I do not recall.

Mr. Wides. Now would that report be in the [redacted] file?

Mr. Sarno. In the history?

Mr. Wides. No, in the file, the project file.

If we got that date when that took place, the date when the Agency had the information, would your report and report of the branch or station in Florida be in the [redacted] project file or would it be in some other file?

Mr. Sarno. I don't think that they maintain a chrono on AMUTS. It was voluminous. Once they were processed by the Agency and put into our communications channel, be it by dispatch or by cable, I don't think they retained all of those tons of files.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall who the FI Branch Chief was at the time?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

If you give me a date that I know --

Mr. Wides. I believe it was '64.

Mr. Sarno. If it was early 1964, then Mr. Shackley was there. If it was late 1964 when Dimmer came, then there was another branch, so there were two branch chiefs.

Mr. Wides. Now did you relay this information, did you say, to Washington, or directly to New York?

Mr. Sarno. Sir, I never handled communications.

Mr. Wides. Well, I didn't mean you --

Mr. Sarno. If I write it up, I give it to my branch chief, and my branch chief in turn sends it out. But to me, it would seem logical, knowing communications, that we would send the cable directly to New York with info to Washington.

Mr. Wides. Were you ever told that communications had been made to New York? You said before --

Mr. Sarno. Yes, I was told, because I think there may have been a cable or something coming down and giving the boys credit for the thing.

Mr. DeMarco. Do you recall now the name of this one [redacted] who went to New York?

Mr. Sarno. His name was Enrique.

Mr. Wides. Could you spell that?

Mr. Sarno. E-n-r-i-q-u-e, that is his first name. I don't recall his last name.

Mr. DeMarco. Lazarus?

Mr. Sarno. No. Lazarus is not a last name.

Mr. Wides. How many people did he have working with him?

Mr. Sarno. Sir, I don't recall, but I know there was more than one or two.

Mr. Wides. And would [redacted] give you reports that he sent down to [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. And what did the reports talk about?

Mr. Sarno. They were on Cuban exiles, groups, collection of money, Alpha 66 and people of that group who were up in New York City.

Mr. Wides. Was it your impression at the time that this group had no contact with any CIA offices in New York?

Mr. Sarno. Which group, sir?

Mr. Wides. The group that this fellow Enrique had.

Mr. Sarno. Had no contacts with anybody else?

Mr. Wides. With any CIA offices in New York. Was your impression that the only contact that he had with CIA was all the way back through Miami?

Mr. Sarno. I believe that was the case, yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. You had no understanding?

Mr. Sarno. Well, obviously once this thing came up, we put this fellow in contact with somebody in the base up there who in turn delivered them to the Bureau.

Mr. Wides. And this was the Domestic Operations Base, not the Security Office?

Mr. Sarno. Domestic Operations.

Mr. Wides. Now thereafter, did they keep contact wit- this group?

Mr. Sarno. I cannot recall.

Mr. Wides. Did you continue after that incident to get reports through [redacted]

Mr. Sarno. I believe so, yes.

Mr. Wides. With no indication whether they were also in touch with the Agency?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. You weren't curious, or did you ever inquire?

Mr. Sarno. Well, I would believe it to be that they were not in contact with anybody up there, because if the report were to come down, they would probably have indicated in their report that they had passed this information on.

Mr. Wides. No, I mean after that, after they were put in touch with the base.

Mr. Sarno. That's what I was speaking of. Many reports that came there after, they would have indicated that it had been passed, and I don't recall ever reading a report from them that he had passed the information on to any contact up there.

Mr. Wides. Do you recall any instance in which the Agency asked, through you, and in turn through [redacted] that particular people in New York be watched or investigated?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. How would they decide what groups or what individuals to penetrate or keep under surveillance?

Mr. Sarno. Well there were the active groups. This fellow used to come down to Miami and he would talk to [redacted] and [redacted] would tell him, here is people here who are talking about collecting money, about a supposed operation, how much money are they getting for it --

Mr. Wides. Where would he get that information from, from you?

Mr. Sarno. Get what?

Mr. Wides. Where would [redacted] get that --

Mr. Sarno. The MI group knew more about what was going on in Cuban operations in the Miami area than we did, so most of the information we obtained was through them.

Mr. Wides. So how would he get the information about potential targets in New York?

Mr. Sarno. Because they had the groups down in Miami penetrated, so in Miami, these groups in Miami, would discuss their contacts with the splinter group sitting up in New York and the information would come about.

Mr. Wides. You never got any written instructions or oral instructions when you were in Washington or Miami to see if you could arrange for this person to get information on people in New York?

Mr. Sarno. Never. Never once.

Mr. Wides. What about picketing in New York by Cuban personnel? There's some reference to that in testimony we've already received.

Mr. Sarno. There is one incident of the Mexico -- I think it was against Mexico, where they went to an affair or something and threw out leaflets.

Mr. Wides. What about picketing of an airline company or an airline office?

Mr. Sarno. I heard that that took place, but I was not in Miami at the time. I was away on a trip.

Mr. Wides. But your understanding was it involved [redacted] personnel?

Mr. Sarno. This individual was involved in it.

Mr. Wides. And what did you understand had been the origins of the picketing? How would it come about?

Mr. Sarno. Well, I don't believe it was started, I know it wasn't started in AMOTS because one individual cannot start it, but the groups, the Cuban exile groups who were located in New York decided to picket it because, I believe, of Mexico's relations with Cuba.

Mr. Wides. At this time, wasn't the Agency carrying on a wide variety of operations to try and isolate Cuba economically and commercially?

Mr. Sarno. I believe they were, yes. I was never involved in any of those operations.

Mr. Wides. And including air traffic people, airlines going to Cuba. That was one aspect of the efforts to isolate Cuba.

Mr. Sarno. Well, the airlines going to Cuba, if I can recall at that time, were not Mexican airlines.

Mr. Wides. You didn't have any idea at the time as to what --

Mr. Sarno. Mexican airlines do not fly to Cuba. The Cubans always flew their airplanes over. The Mexicans were not flying.

Mr. Wides. So you understood this to be harrassment of a Mexican Company or a Mexican national company, because of Mexico's general relations with Cuba?

Mr. Sarno. General relations with Cuba, that is what I understood it to be.

Mr. Wides. And you didn't have any information that the Agency was aware of it beforehand?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, I was never involved in it. I don't recall ever seeing the reports or anything, because as I say, I did an awful lot of travelling when I handled the AMUTS.

Mr. Wides. When you discussed this with the people at the Agency, is your testimony that you never heard any indication that the Agency was involved in that picketing?

Mr. Sarno. That is --

Mr. Wides. No one's ever suggested --

Mr. Sarno. Nobody ever suggested that the Agency was the one who backed the people who did the picketing, no.

Mr. Wides. Now was there a time when AMUTS personnel who had not moved outside of the Miami area were ever used or involved in any Agency operations to your knowledge outside of Miami, went on trips to do little jobs?

Mr. Sarno. AMUTS went out of Miami in order to do little jobs --

Mr. Wides. I don't mean to Cuba.

Mr. Sarno. No, they went out of Miami to do little jobs like for instance a specialist in say, sugar, would say come out of Cuba through Spain and he'd end up in New York, and so an AMUT would go from Miami to New York to debrief him. Or we would hear of somebody who knew of a well-known government figure in Cuba who came out and he goes to Louisiana or he goes to Chicago. Well, an [redacted] would be dispatched over to his house to debrief him. That is the only places I ever sent the [redacted], or the [redacted] were ever sent.

Mr. Wides. What about with regard to surveillances or breaking or entering?

Mr. Sarno. Never.

Mr. Wides. Mr. Sturbitz, do you know him?

Mr. Sarno. Sturbitz?

Mr. Wides. He was involved in economic warfare against Castro.

Mr. Sarno. Sturblitz or Sturbitz?

Mr. Wides. Sturbitz.

Mr. Sarno. Yes, I know Sturbitz.

Mr. Wides. He testified he conducted some inquiries in regard to the question of [redacted] involvement in possible illegal activities, breaking and entering, surveillance and so forth. Were you aware of those investigations?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Have you ever heard any charges or allegations or suggestions that [redacted] personnel were involved in breaking and entering in New York against groups like the Fair Play For Cuba Committee, the Vinceremos Brigade?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, no, sir.

Mr. Wides. And you never heard anything about the use of [redacted] in regard to any kind of harrassing action against those groups?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir, never.

Mr. Wides. Do you know if any members of [redacted] may have been used in these kinds of activities without your express direction or not as part of its CIA task?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. You never heard anything about it?

Mr. Sarno. Never heard.

Mr. Wides. In Florida also?

Mr. Sarno. In Florida also.

Mr. Wides. What about with regard to Puerto Rico and [redacted] going there. Tell us about that.

Mr. Sarno. Well, there were several [redacted] who left Miami and went over to Puerto Rico. There is a large Cuban community in Puerto Rico with the attendant Cuban exile groups, and it was the same thing as was going on in New York. They would collect data on what these groups were doing, operations that they were preparing, funds that they were collecting, et cetera.

Mr. Wides. Did you see those reports as they came in?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, they came in and [redacted] would prepare them and send them into the office.

Mr. Wides. When did they start including reports on Puerto Rican affairs?

Mr. Sarno. Never.

Mr. Wides. No discussion in those reports --

Mr. Sarno. Never once did they write up about Puerto Rican political affairs. I never once saw a report.

Mr. Wides. Did you ever have any discussion with [redacted] or anyone involved in the Puerto Rican Cuban community about Puerto Rican affairs?

Mr. Sarno. Never.

Mr. Wides. Was there a station operating at that time for the Caribbean in Puerto Rico?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. During the entire period, '61 til about '67?

Mr. Sarno. To my knowledge, there wasn't. There was not a station.

Mr. Wides. Do you want to go ahead?

Mr. DeMarco. Just a couple.

You mentioned, or it was touched upon earlier, the period of time you were actually in Cuba, 1961.

Mr. Sarno. '60 and '61.

Mr. DeMarco. What requirements were levied upon you when you left to go to Cuba?

Mr. Sarno. None.

Mr. DeMarco. Well, you'd better explain that. I don't understand that answer at all. You just went on a vacation?

Mr. Sarno. I was transferred from a foreign country to

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Cuba because they needed me.

Mr. DeMarco. What foreign country were you transferred from?

Mr. Sarno. I don't think that I should state that.

Mr. DeMarco. I insist that you answer that.

Mr. Wides. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. DeMarco. For the record, I think I should explain to you that we are highly interested in the sort of activities that you were involved in in Cuba in 1960 and '61, but our investigation has to a certain point been slowed down by the inability to obtain the right kinds of documents and that being the case, and your insistence here on not answering certain questions, will require us to simply have you come back once we have cleared this up with your superiors at the Agency and once they have been more forthcoming with documents that were long ago requested about your activities.

I don't want to pursue just suspicions with you, I'd rather talk to you about specific dates and facts.

We are going to pursue this very vigorously, and the reason I'm interested in it is the gambling background, and I would like to know your training in that area, your experience in that area and the reasons why you were down there.

Now if there is anything you want to tell me now, or do you want to come back --

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Sarno. Sure, I'll tell you now. I was in a country -- and I don't think I have to name the country because you are interested in Cuba and you are interested in the operation that I had in Miami and I don't think you're interested in what I did before I went to Cuba. I tell you that nobody gave me any instructions when I went to Cuba. I knew the Chief of Station in Cuba and had known him for many years. He asked for me specifically to come over for my abilities or qualifications or experience. I climbed on an airplane and I went to Cuba.

I met the Chief of Station and he told me what he wanted me to do.

Mr. DeMarco. What's his name?

Mr. Sarno. [redacted]

Mr. DeMarco. You met [redacted] and he told you what he wanted you to do?

What did he tell you?

Mr. Sarno. He told me he wanted me to set up a stay-behind net in Cuba because the situation was getting very bad and he would like to set a stay-behind net up in Cuba.

Mr. Wides. This is with the break in Cuban relations?

Mr. Sarno. That's right, the pending break in diplomatic relations and the rest of the things, and he wanted to set up a net over in Cuba. And that is why he called for me.

Mr. DeMarco. Okay. So you --

Mr. Sarno. I went into Cuba and did not have a job. I had no cover. I went in as a tourist, a tourist can wear thin so I had to scrounge around in different ways. w had a brother-in-law who was a professional gambler. When I was a kid, he died. He taught me a little about gambling, so I used to go to the black jack tables and I would win money here, there and the other place.

Mr. DeMarco. Is this the hotel black jack tables predominantly?

Mr. Sarno. No, they had black jack, roulette, they had baccarat. I would go in there, I would make myself seen, they would see that I was wearing good clothes and I was winning money at the gambling tables and that's it.

I am not to be tied into any Syndicate or anything like it. I didn't know a single soul.

Mr. DeMarco. You knew no one?

Mr. Sarno. Nobody.

Mr. DeMarco. And your task then, which you learned on arriving there, was to set up a network?

Mr. Sarno. To set up a network of agents in Cuba, yes.

Mr. DeMarco. So you started meeting people to do that?

Mr. Sarno. No.

We never meet people to do that.

Mr. DeMarco. Describe to me how you did it.

Mr. Sarno. People were spotted by other individuals and they're checked out, and once they're checked out and their clearance is obtained on them, they are delivered to me for me to handle and train and what have you.

Mr. DeMarco. I see.

Were any of those Americans?

Mr. Sarno. No, I never spotted any Americans. There were two Americans over there who were already working, and they were given to me to use as, to handle some of the other ones that were involved.

Mr. DeMarco. Were they also involved in the same type of cover you were, gambling?

Mr. Sarno. No. They were not in the same cover. As I say, it was a cover provided by the Agency. It was a cover I just naturally stumbled into since I was going to the different casinos and I was winning money there and I could pass myself off as a tourist-gambler.

Mr. DeMarco. These other two Americans you were talking about, can you name them?

Mr. Sarno. Well, I'll give you the name. One I would name, because I was not involved with the other one very long. One's name is Emelio Rodriquez, but he is dead now.

Mr. DeMarco. He was an American?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, he died of a heart attack. And the other was Julian.

Mr. DeMarco. Julian?

Mr. Sarno. Julian. I don't recall the last name, but he only remained for about two months after I arrived.

Mr. DeMarco. What were these two people doing in Cuba prior to the time they were turned over to you and you met them?

Mr. Sarno. Collection of intelligence.

Mr. DeMarco. For the Agency?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, for the Agency. They were agents of the Agency, as was I. But they were residing in Cuba.

Mr. DeMarco. At any time while you were in Cuba, for that matter, at any time, did you become aware of any Agency relationships with -- I'm going to use the term generically -- organized crime. Do you understand what I mean by that?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, certainly.

Mr. DeMarco. Whether or not organized, people who you've read about in the paper, or you would consider to be involved in that kind of business, are you aware of any relationships between any Agency personnel in Cuba or elsewhere?

Mr. Sarno. None whatsoever.

Mr. DeMarco. During the period of time that you were in the casinos, playing black jack and roulette and so forth, did you get an opportunity to meet the people that were running the casinos?

Mr. Sarno. No.

There was one big Swede in the Capri that because it was close to where I was living I would go in there more often, and as soon as I take off from my house, my apartment, I would head over there and he was always seeing me in and offer me drinks, but he was not a big wheel, he was just one of their employees.

Mr. DeMarco. Where was this?

Mr. Sarno. At the Capri.

Mr. DeMarco. You say a big Swede?

Mr. Sarno. A big Swede, a blond-haired fellow. I didn't even know his name, I'd just call him Swede.

Mr. DeMarco. Was he an American, or from Sweden?

Mr. Sarno. I think he was from America.

Mr. DeMarco. Were any of the people that you were involved in handling in Cuba commercial or airline people? Any airline people?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. DeMarco. Did any of them have official Cuban government positions?

Mr. Sarno. Yes.

Mr. DeMarco. They did?

Mr. Sarno. Some of them did, those were the ones that you were looking for.

Mr. DeMarco. I don't have anything more at this time.

Mr. Wides. I am just a little puzzled by your testimony regarding the [redacted] activity with regard to the Cuban community.

You indicated there was a CI capability, but if I understand it, you said the only penetration was for purposes of finding out about exile activities being planned against Cuba.

What was your testimony with regard to the use of AMUTS for members of the Cuban community who might come under suspicion as possibly being intentionally or unintentionally --

Mr. Sarno. Suspect?

Mr. Wides. They were employed or they were not employed in any way regarding checking on this?

Mr. Sarno. If you mean to say did they go around and surveil them --

Mr. Wides. No. In any sense of counterintelligence work, keeping their ears open and reporting back information that might be of a suspicious nature.

Mr. Sarno. Well, to explain it, if an AMUT were to walk into a place and see a friend and the friend says did you see Juan, do you know Juan is here, and the AMUT himself knows and the guy he's talking to that Juan used to work for the Internal Security in Cuba, it's obvious. Where's he at, try to find him.

And then they would go back to the files and dig out all the information and in would come a report. Juan is in the city of Miami and here's the stuff that we have on him. He was a Castro collaborator, or he's a member of the security forces over there, and everything.

Mr. Wides. So in general it would be fair to say -- and

I'm not trying to twist your testimony, I know you referred to the basic purpose being to keep tabs on what was going on so you would be aware of what Alpha-66 and groups like that were planning, but in general, they were the eyes and ears of the Station in the Cuban community and might come up with counterintelligence information as well as the information about the activities?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir, yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. And as you understand it on a smaller scale, this was also true with regards to the group in New York?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. It was not simply to find out about Alpha-66, but they would also report to the extent that they obtained CI, that is counterintelligence information, about the Cubans in New York?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. What about with regards to the activities at the UN? Any reports regarding UN activity relative to Cuba?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Was there a Cuban mission at the UN at this time?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, sir.

Mr. Wides. And this group never relayed any information regarding the Cuban mission or the people they contacted in New York?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. Why wouldn't they have been used for that purpose?

Mr. Sarno. Because that is the Bureau's domain. We never checked up on Cubans, the diplomats who were in the UN, nobody was ever in contact with them, they never reported on any Cuban diplomats in the UN or any of the Cubans seeing them or anything.

Mr. Wides. Did you ever hear any stories whether they were associated with AMUTS or not of Cuban exiles being involved in any harrassment or surveillance of groups in America friendly toward the Castro regime, such as the Vinceremos Brigade and the Fair Play For Cuba Committee?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. You were not aware of any activity by exiles? I'm not talking about necessarily AMUTS.

Mr. Sarno. Not of any activities.

Mr. Wides. You never heard anything?

Mr. Sarno. I never heard anything.

You're smiling. I'm telling you, I never heard anything.

Mr. Wides. What about Cubans in the late '60's after the Vietnam War arose, being involved, Cuban exiles, in any harrassment or surveillance of peace groups? What do you know about that?

Mr. Sarno. Nothing.

Mr. Wides. Do you know anything about Cubans coming up from Miami to be involved in surveillance or disruption of any peace demonstrations in Washington?

Mr. Sarno. No, sir.

Mr. Wides. You never heard of that?

Mr. Sarno. I never heard of it. I know no AMUTS and I never heard of any other Cubans.

Mr. Wides. Is there anything else that you -- have you gotten a clear understanding of our lines of interest?

Mr. Sarno. Yes, I have.

Mr. Wides. -- would like to tell us, or any information --

Mr. Sarno. I have no information. I ran a group there and we were never involved in anything which I would consider to be illegal. They were working against the government of Cuba.

Mr. Wides. I understand that.

Mr. Sarno. And that is where all of their energy went.

Mr. Wides. Who was it who would ask you to have members of AMUTS detailed for missions elsewhere in America?

You described one where they would go to another city to debrief somebody.

Mr. Sarno. I would --

Mr. Wides. How would you get those instructions? From the Branch Chief?

Mr. Sarno. No, I wouldn't get the instructions. Since it was a group and we were collecting economic and political intel --

Mr. Wides. Where would you get the information that there was a target of opportunity or someone to be debriefed in another city?

Mr. Sarno. If the AMUT were to come up with the information, if the AMUT were to come up with the information, he would come in and report it and I would authorize him to go into that city and find him, because the information could come in many ways.

See, they were known as the Cuban municipalities and operations in the city of Miami, and everybody that came out from like a province or a state would register in it, and as soon as they got information, the word would get around that Joe Blow came in or something like that, and the word would get back to the AMUTS and the AMUTS would say, well, we should discuss with this fellow, and that's it.

Mr. Wides. You never got any requests for AMUTS personnel to be made available for that kind of task from Washington?

Mr. Sarno. To debrief an individual?

Mr. Wides. Or to travel in general.

Mr. Sarno. Yes, yes, they would come down and say, we would like a person because Washington would hear of an individual and would like for him to go over and debrief.

Mr. Wides. What office?

Mr. Sarno. It would come out of the Cuban branch.

Mr. Wides. Cuban Operations Task?

Who would come down? Just a member of the staff?

Mr. Sarno. Come down? They usually came in a cable. It said, you know, we understand such and such a person is living at such and such an address and they worked at such and such, suggest send an [redacted] out to debrief.

Mr. Wides. Did you have a particular point of contact or several people who were particular points of contact for you that would tend to be the ones sending you cables?

Mr. Sarno. No, I wasn't the Station Chief. The cables come into the station, the Station Chief would pass it to me or to the Branch Chief, and that would be it.

Mr. Wides. Okay.

I think that's all the questions we have, and I want to thank you for your patience, it's been a long morning.

(Whereupon, at 12:42 o'clock p.m., the hearing recessed.)

- - -

Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10254

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : KELLEY, BOB
TO : THE FILE

TITLE :
MEMORANDUM

DATE : 05/30/75
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW WITH STEPHENS, JOHN HENRY-CIA COVERT ACTION OPS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 259-6

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

exact month) he was ordered to go to Guatamela to train the Cuban airborne brigade that eventually was parachuted into Cuba six hours in advance of the landing at the Bay of Pigs. This training was conducted at a site in the Guatamelan jungle called "De Finca" or "the Farm". A nearby village was "Retalalao" (phonetic spelling).

During the time this training was conducted, i.e. from 1959 to the Bay of Pigs invasion, Mr. Stephens recalls there were two occasions when he and/or members of his 4-5 man training cadre were told to give parachutes and weapons to individuals who were to be parachuted into Cuba to attempt to assassinate Castro. Mr. Stephens stated that he did not precisely recall whether he was expressly told these individuals were going to Cuba to try to kill Castro, but he said he was clear that from either the instructions he received or the nature and details of the particular situation that this was the mission.

I asked Mr. Stephens to describe what he would do after being told to outfit the individuals who were to be dropped into Cuba for these assassination efforts. He stated that he or members of his cadre (he declined to specify whether he personally outfitted these individuals or whether it was done by his co-workers) would provide parachutes and whatever weapons the individuals desired. He referred to an "assassination package." Such a "package" would contain a variety of weapons, grenades, and other armaments, including a special "assassination gun." This gun, Mr. Stephens said, was a 9 mm.

NE92
NE94
N970
N614
N965

136/RJ
8/3/98

Date:10/05/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10297
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT (UPDATED OCT 16, 1975)

DATE : 09/01/75
PAGES : 678

SUBJECTS :
SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT (CLASSIFIED) TABS A-J
TAB A: PROLOGUE
TAB B: INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
TAB C: COVERT ACTION
TAB D: CUBA
TAB E: CONGO
TAB F: EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY
TAB G: DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
TAB H: CHILE
TAB I: SOUTH VIETNAM
TAB J: FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
TAB K: RECOMMENDATIONS
TAB L: EPILOGUE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/05/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
COMMITTEE'S DRAFT REPORT
(UPDATED OCTOBER 16, 1975)

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

1(c)B

(update)
October 16, 1975

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TAB A: Prologue

TAB B: Introduction and Summary

TAB C: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation

TAB D: Cuba

1. Introduction
2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or Known About Within the CIA
3. The Question of Authorization Outside the Central Intelligence Agency in the Eisenhower Administration
4. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy Administration, Pre-Bay of Pigs
5. The Question of Authorization During the Kennedy Administration, Post-Bay of Pigs
6. The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assass Plot
7. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administratio

TAB E: Congo

TAB F: Executive Action Capability

TAB G: Dominican Republic

TAB H: Chile

TAB I: South Vietnam

TAB J: Findings and Conclusions

TAB K: Recommendations

TAB L: Epilogue

16 F [illegible]

(1)(A)
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

(e) AMLASH

(1) Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G., p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been

---

*Donovan was not aware of the plan.

TOP SECRET

A CIA cable dated February 2, 1965, stated that B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had "small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965 the 15-2 [redacted] Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-1's secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that "B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to AMLASH-1 [in Madrid"] (I.G., p. 103

In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).

"4. B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know B-1's location.

"5. B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH-1's war name."

Agreed to by Subcommittee 10/10/75
Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommitte
Editing and (2) Insertion of
Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

D. CONGO 1

- 1. Introduction 1
- 2. Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters" 3
- 3. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective Custody 8
- 4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba 14
  - (a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment 15
  - (b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba: September 1960 18
  - (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba 22
  - (d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It 24
  - (e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination Plot 31
    - (i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from Headquarters 31
    - (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot 34

Page

(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination Plot 41

  (i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison Lumumba 41

  (ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba for the Purpose of Assassination 44

  (iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether the Assassination Operation Had Moved from Planning to Implementation But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to the Congo 48

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo 52

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo 53

  (i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation 53

  (ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960 54

  (iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination Operation 59

  (iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station Safe 60

  (v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego 65

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960 67

DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975
Frederick D. Baron

TOP SECRET
For Internal Committee
Use Only

D. CONGO

1. Introduction

The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency scientist.

Although these instruments of assassination were never used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?

Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony received by the Committee.

Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese authorities announced Lumumba's death.

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the incident concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*

2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chief of Station to the Congo. The Chief of Station said that the briefings he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to headquarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassinating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters by the new Chief of Station:

---

* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October, November, and December.

** See Section 5, infra, for full discussion of the prevailing anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials.

> EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable (IN 39706), Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)

This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE [OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60). Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clandestine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable (Out 59741), Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Congolese leaders:

> ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable (IN 42761), Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)

The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba:

> IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966, Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)

Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized operation to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

---

* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.

** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).

Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

> TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contemplating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny" United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33, 64-65).*

---

* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell on the question of authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might assassinate Lumumba:

> TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 49679,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/7/60.)

The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM" and assured him that the United States would supply technicians (CIA Cable, 9/7/60).

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S. apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official position:

stet

> LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVERRIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE. (CIA Cable, (OUT 69233,) Director to Leopoldville, 9/13/60).

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded a safe base of operations:

> STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED [TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK. ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST. (CIA Cable, (IN 13374,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/15/60.)

On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning the meeting reported:

> [CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ... [THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS [ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, (IN 14228,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters that they should

> HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECESSARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).*

---

* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department representatives or operational contacts:

(footnote continued on next page)

Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station

> URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable, (IN 15643,) Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

> [IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.
>
> CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.
>
> (CIA Cable (OUT 04697,) Director to Leopoldville, 10/6/60.)

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal biological substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eyes Only" channel -- including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was terminated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba's death.*

---

* See Section 6, *infra*, for a discussion of the evidence about the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.

(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba, and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment

On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:

> ["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". . . IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. (CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60.)

The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator -- "PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the Chief of the Africa Division.*

---

* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick A. O. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chief of Station that he was to continue to use this indicator for

> ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF. (CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)

The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* -- testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a "most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11, 43). The cable advised, in his words, that:

> someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instructions for me.... I believe the message was also marked for my eyes only ... and contained instructions that I was not to discuss the message with anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)

Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instructions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).

Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensitivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only" basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

---

* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the Chief of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testified under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75, p. 4).

Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be required as an agent in the PROP operation:

> IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN] ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as "Sid" who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

> YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

---

* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections ____, ____, and ____, *infra*.

On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba:

> WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating:

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60)

(b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba

The Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".

Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:

Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?

Hedgman: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb.

> Q: And at that time, you knew who he was?
>
> Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the Agency . . . . I believe he referred to the fact that I had received a message and that he was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16)

The message carried by (Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to DDP Richard Bissell,) was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

> Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.
>
> Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
>
> Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was . . . my understanding of the primary means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was some other way of doing it.
>
> Q: Of doing what?
>
> Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)

Hedgman said that he and (Gottlieb) also may have discussed non-lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 28).

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, however:

> Q: And what did Mr. (Gottlieb) indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him?
>
> Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)

And again:

> Q: I take it that once you started discussing these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba?

> Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that this was one of the way[s], and probably what they thought was the only way that would work (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).

Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means of assassination:

> Q: And what did he tell you with regard to how that might be accomplished?
>
> Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents. I assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with him, which he passed to me....
>
> Q: These were lethal biological substances?
>
> Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding as a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)

Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

> Q: [W]hen he [Gottlieb] came to the Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the means for administering those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to be ingested by Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or toothpaste or any other substance that was to be ingested?
>
> Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)

Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:

> This was not a sine qua non that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).

There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassination should not be traceable to the United States:

> The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back to the United States. It had to be a way which could not be traced back ... either to an American or the United States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were produced to meet this requirement:

> I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured that these ... lethal agents would [leave] normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great surprise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46) and left him with the following impression:

> I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I

> stressed the difficulty of trying to carry out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 47.)

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his initial contact with (Gottlieb) was clearly an affirmative response to the assignment. The (Chief of) Station said that he and (Gottlieb) were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that [Mobutu's] government was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba, and said:

> HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

(c) Hedgman Testified That (Gottlieb) Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in Leopoldville, (Dr. Gottlieb) informed him that President Eisenhower had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

> Q: Did you raise with him the question of authorization of such instructions to you?
>
> Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong recollection, that I did.
>
> Q: What do you recall in essence was what you said to him?
>
> Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic, and I may have probably said that I never heard of it being done, which I had not, never in my training or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any references to such, in my recollection at least, such methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued.
>
> Q: And what did Mr. (Gottlieb) reply?

Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

> Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since that date, had the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34.)

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":

> Q: You have a very firm recollection that he [Gottlieb] represented to you that the President of the United States directed the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?
>
> Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It

On the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used in the following manner:

> HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by recalling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He informed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).

On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that headquarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so

The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority plan:

> YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH [redacted] TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE. ... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indicated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination operation:

> [SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory conversation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60):

> I believe that I queried the agent who had access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in detail about just what that access, what access he actually had, as opposed to speaking to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom, did he have access to the kitchen, things of that sort.
>
> I have a recollection of having queried him on that without specifying why I wanted to know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)

On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters on this meeting:

> CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES [AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:

> [C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild scheme professionally. I did not think that it ... was practical professionally. Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....
>
> I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

However, his cables indicate that he was planning to continue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate operative for the assassination mission in the event that they found his first choice unacceptable:

> IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES] BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to a de-briefing of Gottlieb upon his return to the United States. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy indicated that he was

> CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60.)

This expression of support for the operation was followed by an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476 Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against Lumumba that would be authorized:

> ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING [LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60.)

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396 Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

> YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH] ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC [LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION.
>
> RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indicating that communications about the assassination mission were restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell who testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly under the Chief of Station:

> SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.)

Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels, Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:

> POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.)

---

* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a), infra.

This series of cables sent during, and after Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassination mission. The cables also show an intent to severely restrict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other covert activities.

(e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination Plot

The testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen years after the events in question and without benefit of review of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.

(i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from Headquarters

Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb's instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).

Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions:

> There was some special channel ... because it was handled differently than any other normal message. For example, it was not put on a regular cable form, which, you know, you have several copies for your various files. And it was my recollection that I personally carried the message to the communicator to encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk way that even the communicator would not necessarily know what it was about."
> (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for confirmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment, he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

> I believe I received a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his instructions were ... duly authorized.
> (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)

Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was convinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman expressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving "final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).

Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his second appearance:

> I probably had authority to act on my own but ... it was possible that I had to go back and get clearance for my action. (Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75, p. 39.)

Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).

> I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)

Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so and to proceed to take action:

> Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had made a decision that an act should take place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision.
>
> Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader?
>
> Hedgman: Yes.
>
> Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?
>
> Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)

Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked with headquarters before taking action:

> I think probably that I would have gone back and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final approval before carrying it out had I been going to do it, had there been a way to do it. I did not see it as ... a matter which could be accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)

He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53).

(ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot

Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably" sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was the only other person with access to the safe and that she would not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 49).

Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he preserved the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any

The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For two months after Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to intensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).**

These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission

---

* CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60; CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section ____, supra, for full treatment of these cables.

** See Section ____, supra, for more complete text of this cable.

> HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE. THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable (IN 28936,)(Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60.)

Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 61). The (Chief of) Station continued to communicate with headquarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassination operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.

Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassination operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate on the progress of the assassination mission:

> ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable, (IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the (Chief of) Station responded enthusiastically to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:

> BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE [(CHIEF OF) STATION] WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable (IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)

The (Chief of) Station concluded this cable with the following cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to (Gottlieb) as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):

> IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable (IN 28936,) 10/17/60.)

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the (Chief of) Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:

> TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... CONGOLESE TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS. UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

> COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy.)

Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the assassination question would have been sent with the same extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably referring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb's visit and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

> I would have sent in a special channel anything dealing with Lumumba, at least that would touch upon his removal in one way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)

The Chief of Station also testified that sometime before leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91). But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said that eventually

---

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

> I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in which -- at one period I recall we had all of our files in the burn barrels. I mean, when you wanted a file, you went over and dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characterization of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times in which it took place. His response indicated that although he was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating Lumumba:

> I looked upon the Agency as an executive arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority.
>
> On the other hand, I looked at it as a kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency and the U.S. government could get along without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something.
>
> I might have had a somewhat different attitude if I thought that one man could bring on World War III and result in the deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw him as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 110-111.)

(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination Plot

There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA headquarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an assassination attempt.

(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of

Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he had debriefed Gottlieb upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan which emerged from the discussions between Gottlieb and Hedgman as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's entourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60).

Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:

> Q. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?
>
> Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

---

* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in Leopoldville.

When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by (Gottlieb), who carried instructions that they were to be used in the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:

> There is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on that point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)

Tweedy added that if (Gottlieb) went to the Congo as a courier, "I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35). Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal biological substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be "very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recollection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of the (Chief of) Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33).

Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the testimony of the (Chief of) Station,* the discrepancies in their testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:

---

* Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the (Chief of) Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

> I really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things. . . [T]he things that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were. . . the things I was basically concerned with all the time, which was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)

Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32, 36). Tweedy said:

> In such a matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of Assassination

Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assassination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruction from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assumption that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

> I would proceed with it on the basis that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assassinating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):

> Tweedy. . . .I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.
>
> Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
>
> Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, . . . never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his conversation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers sending to the Chief of Station asking him

> to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever have had to Lumumba. . .[in] the eventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)

Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24); rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were being explored:

> Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
>
> Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)
>
> Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being considered and which the (Chief of) Station should explore?
>
> Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities.

Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the (Chief of) Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).

Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a special channel concerning the "messenger" to the Congo or confirmation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the discretion of the (Chief of) Station and he did not know whether Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).

Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conversation with (Sidney Gottlieb) about "anything in his inventory that could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and (Sidney Gottlieb)," which Tweedy then would have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).

Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was imminent that somebody would say 'go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):

> Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we ever in a position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.
>
> Q. You didn't have any action plans for the assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?

> Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authorization for implementing the assassination operation, authorization for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the (Chief of) Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable (IN 24171) (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week which told the (Chief of) Station that Lumumba's

> DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable (OUT 81396), Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 10/15/60)

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether The Assassination Operation Had Moved From Planning To Implementation But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to The Congo

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).

Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:

> I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral authorization from me, would have had the authority to send such a cable without my signing off on it. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)

Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21). Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to Justin O'Donnell* with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that

---

* Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a)(i) and 5(a)(ii), infra.

Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22).

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . . I would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed the assassination of Lumumba with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60).

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission, (which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the testimony of the Chief of Station that Gottlieb carried poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged, however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an extraordinary event:

> It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).

Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,' " Gottlieb would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo

Justin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12). O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in the hands of Congolese authorities (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).

Shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in the Congo he was joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA Cable IN 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is unlikely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connection between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives -- QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation

In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national operative (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the suggestion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief of Station replied affirmatively:

> BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy).

The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

---

* See Section 4(e), supra, for full treatment of these cables.

(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960

Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached the subject with CIA officer Justin O'Donnell.

At that time, O'Donnell was the Deputy Chief of a component of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8).

Justin O'Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43):

> O'Donnell: He called me in and he told me he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate Lumumba . . . .
>
> Q: What did you understand him to mean by eliminate?
>
> O'Donnell: To kill him and thereby eliminate his influence.
>
> Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his remarks, whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination rather than merely neutralizing him through some other means?
>
> O'Donnell: It was not neutralization . . . Clearly the context of our talk was to kill him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)

O'Donnell reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:

> I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumumba. He said, I want you to go over and talk to Sidney Gottlieb. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)

Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).

O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorization was never raised by Bissell:

> I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such an important issue, but it was not discussed, nor did he purport to have higher authority to do it. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)

O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was "sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said that Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... lethal means of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13). O'Donnell recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others included poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said that Gottlieb "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A).

After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:

> I then left his office, and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no way would I have any part in the assassination of Lumumba ... and reasserted in absolute terms that I would not be involved in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell 9/11/75, p. 43.)

(O'Donnell) said that in one of his two conversations with Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be in violation of federal law" (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14). He said that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, (O'Donnell) agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba "as a political factor" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):

> I said I would go down and I would have no compunction about operating to draw Lumumba out [of UN custody], to run an operation to neutralize his operations which were against Western interests, against, I thought, American interests. (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 13.)

(O'Donnell) added that his objective was to

> neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his activities against [a Congolese leader], whom at that time you might say was our close instrument, he was the man we had put our chips on. (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassination, (O'Donnell) went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53).

Although (O'Donnell) did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:

> Mr. O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I would be willing to go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct.
>
> Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the Congolese authorities?
>
> Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered in the -- not to have him killed, but then it would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 38.)

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would receive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities, according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell "had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to assassination to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still interested in the assassination of Lumumba:

> in leaving at the conclusion of our second discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that possibility -- meaning the possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other words, even though you have said this, don't rule it out.... There is no question about it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (O'Donnell) 9/11/75, p. 45).

O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second discussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of record (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):

> [I]n the Agency, since you don't have documents, you have to be awfully canny and you have to get things on record, and I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and I told him that I would under no conditions do it, and Helms said you're absolutely right. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 15-16).

Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's version of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*

William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him about the conversations with Bissell:

> Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell ... to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)

Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).

O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second discussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 45-46).

---

* Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversation in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).

(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination Operation

Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked O'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).

Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assignment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked O'Donnell "to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance, however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24).

Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination operation because, "given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have deactivated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time, Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:

> [T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive assignment to him, limited -- with the knowledge of it limited very narrowly even within the Agency. And it is difficult to separate recollection from inference on occasion. But I seem to recollect that after this conversation with him, I wanted this put very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. Now that doesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different channels might have gone forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed this not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also as reason for at least postponing anything further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 25-26).

In Tweedy's mind, O'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo was linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).

(iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station Safe

On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed through the PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leopoldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields to Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 38052), Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60). (Chief of) Station Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that (O'Donnell) was coming to the Congo (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible" that as a new (Chief of) Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer like (O'Donnell) as a signal that CIA headquarters was "dissatisfied with my handling" of (Gottlieb)'s instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).

Hedgman had a general picture of (O'Donnell)'s mission:

> I understood it to be that -- similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutralization of Lumumba ... I have no clear recollection of his discussing the assassination. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of (O'Donnell) indicating one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Generally, however, Hedgman perceived (O'Donnell) as being unenthusiastic about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).

When (O'Donnell) arrived in the Congo, he met with the (Chief of) Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" ((O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). (O'Donnell) said he assumed it was a "lethal agent" ((O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 37), although Hedgman was not explicit:

> I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. ((O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 16.)

He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes, "it would have been in the custody of the State Department" personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 36).

O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8).* But O'Donnell assumed that it had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office:

> It would have had to have come from Washington, in my estimation, and I would think, since it had been discussed with Gottlieb that it probably would have emanated from his office. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)

Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo with O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 60-61).

O'Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the Congo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17).

O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where a lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was assassination:

---

* When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony on the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba, he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).

> My feeling definitely is that it was for a specific purpose, and was just not an all-purpose capability there begin held for targets of opportunity, unspecified targets. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49.)

At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

> I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connection with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50).

O'Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassination effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 54.)

While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his assassination operation with O'Donnell, he "assumed" that he had at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was "morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assessment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26).

O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no recollection of learning this from O'Donnell (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 56).

Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassination with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with "the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):

> From my point of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms, but objections. I didn't think it was the right thing to do. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 9).

When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination based on those discussions, O'Donnell said:

> I will answer your question just as fairly and as scrupulously as I can. I have a great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if he said something, I would believe him to be speaking the truth as he knew it without shading it.... The best I could say, I think, would be this, that he would not have been opposed in principle to assassination in the interests of national security.... I know that he is a man of great moral perception and decency and honor, and so forth. And that it would disturb him to be engaged in something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conversations, my memory of those, at no time would he rule it out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 18.)

(v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego

After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formulated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

> O'Donnell: [W]hat I wanted to do was to get him out, to trick him out, if I could, and then turn him over ... to the legal authorities and let him stand trial. Because he had atrocity attributed to him for which he could very well stand trial.
>
> Q: And for which he could very well have received capital punishment?
>
> O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 20-21.)*

To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an observation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"

---

* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop Chief of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:

> STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).

(O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a member of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).

O'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to CIA headquarters (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26). He also said that he informed the Chief of Station about his plan (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN custody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19):

> What I wanted to use him for was ... counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen the U.S. participation in this ... by using a foreign national whom we knew, trusted, and had worked with ... the idea was for me to use him as an alter ego. (O'Donnell Tr., pp. 19-20.)

In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA headquarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261, Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:

> LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556, Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

---

* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE" (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).

The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about the "operational circumstances."

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960

QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re: Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer [redacted] [redacted] In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by [redacted] to undertake a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to his mission:

> In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use.... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use [him]. (CIA Dispatch, [redacted]-147, 11/2/60.)

---

* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspecified mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various stations that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN completed this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33).

This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Dispatch, 22 [redacted]-147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960 (CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).

The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN

> had been recruited earlier by 03 [redacted] for use in a special operation in the Congo [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)

However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell refused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead, O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.)

According to O'Donnell, QJWIN was a man who was capable of undertaking an assassination mission:

> O'Donnell: ... I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples.
>
> Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
>
> O'Donnell: I would think so, yes.
>
> Q: And that would include assassination?
>
> O'Donnell: I would think so.
>
> (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)

---

* See Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii) above.

But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).

O'Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28). When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said:

> O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible -- or it could have been that somebody contacted him after he got down there, that they wanted him to do something along the lines of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29.)

But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).

Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.

In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to "PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This did not deter QJWIN:

> VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).

It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassination as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters came through the PROP channel the next day which was also susceptible of interpretation as an assassination order:

> CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.... WE ARE PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIN BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable (OUT 98314), Chief of Africa Division to (Chief of) Station, 11/30/60.)

(O'Donnell) said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "co-extensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell), 6/9/75, p. 19.) (O'Donnell) said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell), p. 20.) QJWIN left in December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom (O'Donnell) had worked before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). (O'Donnell) explained Harvey's reference to the fact that QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell), 9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, (O'Donnell) said: "Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that (O'Donnell)'s return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN's mission (Harvey, affidavit, p.).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.

The (Chief of) Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN was in the Congo working for (Justin O'Donnell). (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo

(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).

William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities in the Congo:

> I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge.... If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p.)

He stated that 03 [redacted] probably wrote the memoranda concerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Harvey affidavit, p.).

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE, a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT" figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE:

---

* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section ____, *infra*, on the "Executive Action Capability."

> [redacted] had not previously used QJWIN as an assassination capability or even viewed him as such. (Harvey affidavit, p.)

Although Harvey also had discussions with Sidney Gottlieb in connection with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Gottlieb's own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p.). Harvey had consulted with [redacted] about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he had never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was "quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Hedgman testified that [redacted] came to the Congo on a counterintelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to [redacted] in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:

> IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASH CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.)

(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960

The one incident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.

WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European who was " a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French Foreign Legion (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable OUT 86554, Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).

The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, developing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in touch with Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he received:

> On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa Division met with him to discuss "an operational assignment in Africa Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.... In October 1960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that ... Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as utility agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60). He was given two instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;" and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA Cable (IN 18739), 12/17/60.)

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is described by Leopoldville (Chief of) Station Hedgman in a cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):

> QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKINF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.
>
> ... IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN [(CHIEF OF) STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. [(CHIEF OF) STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.)

The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's actions:

> ... LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17/60.)

WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

The (Chief of) Station testified that he had not instructed WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

> I would like to stress that I don't know what WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an execution squad:

> His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

(Justin O'Donnell) had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollection of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). O'Donnell mentioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than assassinations:

> surveillance teams where you have to go into crime areas ... where you need a fellow that if he gets in a box can fight his way out of it. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 36).

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would "absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against Lumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn Fields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 101)

The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:

> I had difficulty controlling him in that he was not a professional intelligence officer as such. He seemed to act on his own without seeking guidance or authority ... I found he was rather an unguided missile ... the kind of man that could get you in trouble before you knew you were in trouble.... (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:

> [I]f you give a man an order and he carries it out and causes a problem for the Station, why then as Chief of Station, well, you accept responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad" was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassination plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But, when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office, the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be discarded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75)

6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.

(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960

The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from the (Chief of) Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, (Chief of) Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman reported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's

> POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality:

> DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY [AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... STATION HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville. In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circumstances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable IN 48484, Leopoldville to Director, 11/28/60).

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese troops:

> [STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT] TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED [BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable, 11/28/60.)

A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643, Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).

The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure from UN custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in tracking down Lumumba prior to his capture (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).

Despite the fact that (O'Donnell) had planned to draw Lumumba out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked by the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22).

(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed: January 17, 1960

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of 1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

---

* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, (O'Donnell,) and Helms (investigative report) should be inserted.

Group

> agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)

The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable (OUT 62966), Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."

Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).

On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the (Chief of) Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scientist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the (Chief of) Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the President for national security affairs testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the actual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19). NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong possibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making

7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these early meetings was vehement:

> Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was a Castro or worse . . . Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he described as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also, however, fits with his own orientation. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)

The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After looking at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to determine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testimony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopoldville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The September 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.

---

* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in detail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows: The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to consider "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60; *see* Section 7(a)(iii), *infra*). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in

The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the statement by the President was held on September 7, two days after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960, indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:

---

* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUARTERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to (Chief of) Station, 8/26/60). The Dulles cable added:

> WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY . . . INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . . . YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60)(See Section 2, supra, for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to (Chief of) Station, 9/19/60; see Section 4(a), supra). On September 21, in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a)(iv), infra). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scientist arrived in the Congo, provided the (Chief of) Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an assassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The (Chief of) Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section 4(e)(i), supra).

** In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently (Continued)

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60.)

Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a personal cable to the (Chief of Station) in Leopoldville which included the following message:

> WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, (OUT 73573), Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

On September 26, (Sidney Gottlieb), under assignment from CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable (IN 18989), Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the (Chief of) Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra).

Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination.

Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).

(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of a Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles

Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is problematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62, 65).

As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was contemplated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii), supra).

There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the (Chief of) Station in Leopoldville on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12). Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):

> It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation [of an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)

Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presidential authorization for him to order action to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):

> Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?
>
> Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.
>
> Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously through this kind of cable?
>
> Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)

As for discussions with Dulles about the source of authorization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated:

> I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48.)

When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the consideration or planning of assassination to order implementation of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such] authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).

When informed about the (Chief of) Station's testimony about the instructions he received from (Gottlieb), Bissell said that despite his absence of a specific recollection:

> I would strongly infer in this case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, if (Sid Gottlieb) gave that firm instruction to the Station (Chief.) (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)

Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).

Bissell did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruction without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were fully authorized:

> Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that point?
>
> Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 65).

Bissell further stated:

> Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instructions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)

With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he said that this specific assignment was made in the context that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had authorization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).

that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney Gottlieb, 03 the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and [redacted] a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial

discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10).

---

* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his notations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-[redacted]" 03 indicate that he spoke to Sidney Gottlieb and [redacted] 03 in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testified as follows:

> Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?
>
> Harvey: Yes, it is.
>
> Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?
>
> Harvey: . . . [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that [redacted] 03

> had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial instructions to establish an executive action capability:

> the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our posture, going back, if you will, even to the fundamental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38).

The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action project as follows:

> Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability.... Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turnover to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961.

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55). Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However, Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action "capability . .. for assassination" was "used against Castro", Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15, 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assassination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by 03 [redacted] his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which 03 [redacted] worked, had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch 22 [redacted] 147, 11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ___, supra.]

There are two factors which may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated. First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, QJ/WIN, 03 [redacted], and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of an assassination capability had already been discussed with 03 [redacted] and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75 p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate Lumumba.

Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with 03 [redacted] of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops.
(CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:

> "c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit) */

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms

---

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were

> "... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy."
> (Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine, were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60)*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with [redacted] and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division (Devine, p.7)

---

*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)

> have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember nothing in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club. (Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded during his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

03

In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coordinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell Dearborn

03 [redacted] testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (03 [redacted] pp. 78,79) Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew 03 [redacted] had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination consideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*

---

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:

> "There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:

> "C. Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to 03 [redacted] a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and 03 [redacted] testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; 03 [redacted] pp.38,73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and 03 [redacted]'s cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.

---

*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked 03 [redacted] to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) [redacted],03 on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols.03([redacted] p.72)

The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.30)

3. Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by [redacted] and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, [redacted] asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact [redacted] on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and [redacted] testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; [redacted] p. 39)

c. Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington

There is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable was sent while [redacted] was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a. [redacted] Requests Machine Guns (for Use in Assassination)

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 ([redacted] pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, [redacted] cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in [redacted]'s cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to [redacted] cable:

> "4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. [redacted] was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:

> "...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

---

* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.* Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while [redacted] was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and

> "especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)

b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:

> "B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took

---

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.

in cables from Dearborn and [redacted]. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, [redacted] advised Headquarters that [redacted] had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. [redacted] also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested [redacted] to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27, 1961, [redacted] replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

> additional support, coupled with fact ref. C items [the carbines] already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition member for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQS to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characterized his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as:

> " . . . having made already a considerable investment in this dissident group and its plans that we might as well make the additional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memorandum continued:

> "On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wanted to know what the policy should be.
>
> "I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have any thing to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert said he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo of Conversation, 5/3/61)

Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact, Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

> "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future." (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day, advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.* Herbert's attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. (Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation -- Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was considered and it was:

> "Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the

---

* By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the group was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State Cable, 5/27/61)

> fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."

The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicat however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)

B. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief [redacted] sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).

He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, 03 Owen did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying arms. 03 (Owen p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support. 03 Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

> "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn." (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

SCHNEIDER REPORT

Page

I. Summary 1

II. The President's Initial General Instruction and Background 6

A. September 15 White House Meeting 6

B. Background: Tracks I and II 8

C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II 17

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy 17

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach 17

2. Military Solution 18

B. The Chile Task Force 19

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations 20

D. The False Flag Base 26

E. Chief of Station 27

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup 29

A. The Chilean Conspirators 29

B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30

C. October 15 Decision 34

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36

E. The Killing of General Schneider 39

F. Post October 22 Events 41

V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II 43

A. September 45

B. October 46

C. December 54

D. Did Track II End? 54

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.

> There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

> Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.
> (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger) Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. (A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him) (with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23))

Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

> So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup....This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military....There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

> Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.
> (Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leadership of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.

A three-fold program was set into motion:

TOP SECRET

David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

stet

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

stet

stet

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military

very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

> We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.
>
> (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

> ...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
>
> Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.

---

* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile." (Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

---

* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended. The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

> FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded. This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situation. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters 934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that

---

* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a response from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth, Vol. II, p.)

TOP SECRET

"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth, p. 8)*

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

> I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through which they came.
>
> Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

---

* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testified that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)

TOP SECRET

Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p.) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:

> It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p.)

CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard:

> ...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly authorized representative.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
>
> We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)
>
> We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have been found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken place would have put us out of business.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache. (Kissinger testimony, p. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered

the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a "False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts with Chilean military officers.* Given the limitations of the Station's resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of "False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363, September 27, 1970)

---

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, "an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligence services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)

The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

> I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed. The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.* Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other active duty officers, including 06, 08 [redacted] 06, 06 [redacted] 06, 06 [redacted] and 06, 08 [redacted] (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of 06 [redacted] were in contact with Viaux as well.**

---

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with [redacted] 06 around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that [redacted] may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators 06 (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, [redacted] 06 was in contact with Viaux.

Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.

There was considerable communication among the various plotting elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:

> ...I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on (in addition to President Frei) and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.* (Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in earnest on October 5 when (Colonel Wimert) informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup

---

*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)* Three days later the Chief of Station told 06,08 [redacted] of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) 06 [redacted] informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army 08 [redacted] to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.** At this meeting, the 06 [redacted] told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were

> trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

---

*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the 08 [redacted] was affiliated with General [redacted] 06 (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the [redacted]'s 08 request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy [redacted] 08 were in league with Admiral [redacted] 06 (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. 06 However, as previously stated, both General [redacted] 06 and [redacted] were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral [redacted] was in contact with General Viaux. 06

The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:

> ...This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new state of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
> (Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

> President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and military are working against a military takeover.
> (Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals [redacted] and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions." (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,

13 October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)

At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

> Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military quarters, specifically, 06 an Army General (name deleted), Admiral [redacted] the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and [redacted] 06
> (Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Generals 06 [redacted] and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a rundown on Viaux, the 06 [redacted] meeting with 06 [redacted], and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:"

---

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters:

> We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup attempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

> Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to attempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

> It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.
>
> 3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of [redacted] [redacted] Valenzuela _et al_ and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

---

* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

[redacted]

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's 08 [redacted] on October 17. The 08 [redacted] responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's 08 [redacted] on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.* As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

> Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General Valenzuela and Admiral 6 [redacted] had always seemed more promising than the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and resources to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accordingly.
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army 06 [redacted] and the Navy 06 [redacted] They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades, three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy 06 [redacted] said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the 06 [redacted] and the Navy 06 [redacted] and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved.

---

*Two coup plotters, Generals 06 [redacted] and 06 [redacted], made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General [redacted] 6 eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)

The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy 06 [redacted] leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army 06 [redacted] and the Navy 06 [redacted] late in the evening of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*

---

* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. 06 An example of this shift in focus was the decision to provide the Army [redacted] and the Army 06 [redacted] the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action:

> Station plans give six tear gas grenades to Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces officers (deletion) instead of having False Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with active duty officers. Also False Flagger leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence important that Wimert credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened.
> (Santiago 562, 18 October)

That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he, General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

> General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physcian. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)*

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard failed to be withdrawn, but the Army [redacted] assured Colonel Wimert that another attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October) Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

---

* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:

> Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
>
> Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending.
>
> (Sarno testimony, p. 37)

but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concluded

> Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army [redacted] in an isolated section of Santiago.*

---

*Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the [redacted] was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the [redacted] to the Valenzuela group:

> ...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand.
>
> (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)

> ...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.
>
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)

At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army [redacted] nor the Navy [redacted] were there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.*

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army [redacted]. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

---

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which resulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for conspiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge were Generals Valenzuela and [redacted]. They received sentences of three years in exile.

> Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near certain that Admiral [redacted] 06, Army [redacted] 06 and Navy 06 [redacted] witting and involved. We have reason for believeing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario.
>
> (Santiago 598, 22 October)

F. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declaration of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

> With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the plotters' positions have been enhanced.
>
> (Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:

> It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them.
>
> (Task Force Log, 24 October)

A. September

September 18

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, (especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei.) According to

TOP SECRET

CIA records of the meeting, Kissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals --Prats, Valenzuela and [redacted]-named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony, p. 24)

> It seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all." (Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

.02

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

> I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along the substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:

> I am quite confident that, given my own conception of my role at that time, that I would have conveyed that information to Henry,...
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)
>
> ***
>
> Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr. Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of latitude did you have concerning what you would pass on to Dr. Kissinger?
>
> General Haig. At that time I would consider I had no degree of latitude, other than to convey to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)

October 14

A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from General Bennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers and convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington has authorized you to offer material support short of armed intervention to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters to Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President, for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization. Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)

However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, 06 [redacted] and 06 [redacted] and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

> 5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."
>
> 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.
>
> 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
> (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)

TOP SECRET

49b

meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14

The Senior Review Group met to discuss Chile. (Karamessines calendar)

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, 06 [redacted] and 06 [redacted] and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

> 5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."
>
> 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.
>
> 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
> (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)

Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....
>
> 4. There is great 6 and 06 continuing interest in the activities of [redacted], [redacted] Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.
> (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

> The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed....My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)

Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).

In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, Trueheart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend United States aid at his discretion.(Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:

---

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).

against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-216)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).* The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, 03 [redacted] cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

> "(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."**

---

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:

> "Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?
>
> "Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified:

> "I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled [redacted] on October 6:

> "McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

> "Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)

None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.*

---

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to [redacted], Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).

United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence.

First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

---

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential authorization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.

5/PN
8/3/95

Date:10/08/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10005-10424
RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R1076

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : ELDER, WALTER
TO : MILLER, WILLIAM G.

TITLE :
LETTER/ATTACHMENT

DATE : 09/09/75
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
LTR TRANSMITTING REQUESTED INFO-DD/O LIAISON CONTACTS-MIAMI

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/14/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 361-9

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Box 361-9

1076

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

1x-c-2-h-D1

10424

SSCI BOX # 361-9

Review Staff: 75/2883
9 September 1975

VI-6 (C

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activitites
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

In partial response to paragraph IV, (14) of your 31 July 1975 letter, we enclose for your information a self-explanatory memorandum which reports certain DD/O liaison contacts in the Miami area.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Assistant to the Director

Attachment:
As stated

RECEIVED
SEP 10 1975
CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions

Classified by [illegible]
[illegible]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL-REVIEW PROGRAM
AS SANITIZED 12-7-94 (1)(A)(1)(B)

X 1076

SECRET

28 AUG 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: SA/DDO (Mr. John H. Waller)

SUBJECT: JMWAVE Contacts with State, County and Local Police Organizations and Individuals, 1960-1973

REFERENCE: Mr. Waller's Memorandum to DC/LAD dated 19 August 1975

The following is a list from the Latin America Division of contacts between Station JMWAVE and state, county and local police organizations and individuals in the Miami area between 1960-1973:

1. State

24

a. The Department of Public Safety provided the Station with blank Florida drivers licenses when needed for operational purposes by Station officers. These licenses, which were never used as licenses to drive a vehicle, were filled in with aliases and utilized primarily by Station officers as a means of establishing identification under an assumed name with informants such as Cuban exiles living in the Miami area. The Station's point of contact (1962-1966) was a Colonel H. N. Kirkman, Director of Public Safety.

b. The Florida Highway Patrol, which is part of the Department of Public Safety, provided the Station with courtesy cards to facilitate their Agency work which requested Florida highway patrolmen to render assistance to the bearer of the cards. The Station also had access to the Highway Patrol's communication system that could be used in an emergency to establish contact with our officers in various parts of the State of Florida when needed. Major Lee Simmons, Inspector, Florida Highway Patrol, was the Station's point of contact at the time, 1962-1966. 24

c. The Commissioner of Motor Vehicles in Tallahassee, Florida, furnished the Station with "blocked" automobile license plates for use on Station vehicles. These plates protected Station personnel and installations, since the records for the plates were withdrawn from the issuing offices. Any inquiries made by outsiders [illegible]

24

RECE
SEP 10 1975

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 012180

SECRET

3

24

[redacted] ese vehicles (who might be engaged in a clandestine meeting r other operational activity) would be referred to the ommissioner's office, who would then "block" the information om being released. The Division's records (1962-1966) list [redacted]

2. County

a. The Criminal Intelligence Bureau of the Dade County Sheriff's Department provided the Station with access to other law enforcement agencies at state, county and local levels anywhere in the United States for the purpose of keeping track of Cuban exile movements. [redacted] ccess to these reports was of particular value when Station fficers, on occasion when driving with alias documentation nd involved in an automobile accident, had identified themselves in alias because of the presence of agent personnel [redacted] e vehicle. The Criminal Intelligence Bureau also provide [redacted] e Station with access to Cuban exile [redacted] At the time (1962-1966) a Lieutenant [redacted] was in charge of the Criminal Intelligence Bureau. 06

24

b. The Broward County Sheriff's Office provided the Station with identification of owners of automobiles and boats registered by Cuban exiles and other foreigners within the county. No names were recorded as the Station's point of contact in Broward County.

c. The Collier County Sheriff's Office provided information on berthing sites in Naples, Florida. This information was of security value as the Station maintained a major operational berthing site in Naples, and it was necessary to have advance information on over-the-road shipments and logistic movements in the area. [redacted] 06,24 1962-1966.

d. The Monroe County Sheriff's Office provided berthing site information south of Miami down to the Florida Keys. This information was of interest to keep track of Cuban exile boat movements into the Caribbean. [redacted] ct, 1962-1966. 06,24

RECEIVED
SEP 10 1975
CIA

2

The Station maintained liaison with the City of Miami Police Department, especially with the Criminal Intelligence Section and the Detective Division. [redacted] 24 The Criminal Intelligence Section (1962-1966) 06,06 was headed by Lt. [redacted], a Sergeant [redacted] of theDetective Division, 06 and a [redacted] of the Communications Division. 06,05

Contact with twenty-six other police departments in Dade County, including the City of South Miami, Coral Gables, and Miami Beach for operational purposes was available to the Station through liaison with other major police departments in the area. 24

R[illegible] FROM
SEP 10 1975
[illegible]

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 2/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :	157-10008-10150
RECORD SERIES :	MEMORANDUM
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SSCIA
FROM :	JOHNSON, LOCH
TO :	SENIOR STAFF
TITLE :	SUMMARY OF DOCUMENTS RETRIEVED FROM LBJ LIBRARY
DATE :	07/21/1975
PAGES :	14
SUBJECTS :	CASTRO COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/11/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 393-1

v9.1

21

5. Memo from Chase to Bundy, 4 December 1963.

Plans for a meeting regarding Cuban policy. John Crimmins will present several options for discussion including unleashing of Cuban exiles and the intensification of the covert program.

6. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 December 1963.

This memo is mainly important because it reveals who in the Administration was dealing with Cuban policy. The list of people to attend the meeting on Cuba held this day included: Lyndon B. Johnson, Rusk, Ed Martin, McNamara, McCone, Helms or Des Fitzgerald, Don Wilson, Bundy, and Chase.

7. Memo, Bundy to Lyndon B. Johnson, 12 December 1963.

For a press conference, Bundy recommends the following language regarding Cuba: "...say...that you expect to take every available means to stop and turn back the spread of Communism in this hemisphere."

8. CIA Summary of Costs for Cuban Operations, FY 1960-1964, dated 15 December 1963.

This table reveals that the CIA spent $106,155,774 on Cuban Operations, almost 50 percent of which was spent on paramilitary action ($47,815,122). The total covert action budget (psychological and paramilitary warfare) was approximately $81,000,000 in this four-year period.

NSC defers to CIA

9. Chase minutes on meeting with Lyndon B. Johnson, 27 December 1963.

The meeting appears to be the first major briefing for the new President on Cuba. Desmond Fitzgerald did most of the briefing, which included a detailed description of CIA assets in Cuba, proposed sabotage plans, and attempts by the CIA to stimulate an internal coup which would dislodge Castro. The CIA was aiding two exile groups in particular: one led by Manuel Artime, the other by Manolo Ray. Bundy recommends that Lyndon B. Johnso[illegible]ake "a more vigorous line /toward Cuba/ than we have in the past."

10. Memo, Bundy to L[illegible]on B. Johnson, 9 January 1964.

Bundy recommends a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. He notes that Rusk and McNamara do not support the program of sabotage, while 'McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealings with the Castro problem." Bundy concludes: "...in your position, I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy."

action up to or including invasion."

18. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 21 April 1964.

Notes that Alexis Johnson is in charge of contingency planning for a coup in Cuba.

19. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 14 May 1964.

This memo suggests that a primary goal of the Johnson Administration was "to keep the lid on Cuba" until after the November Presidential elections. Thus, the continued exile raids were viewed negatively since they increased the noise level. The memo makes it clear that the exile raids were becoming completely beyond U.S. control despite CIA financial support to the groups.

20. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 June 1964.

Chase notes that Castro has executed three anti-Castro Cubans and jailed two others as CIA agents. CIA admits having a connection with the executed Cubans "but that it is completely deniable."

21. Memo, Helms, DDP, to DCI, 10 June 1964. Subject: "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"

The CIA was made aware of certain plans to kill Castro. The Agency told the sources, according to Helms, that "the United States Government would not, under any circumstances, condone the planned actions." Apparently on 2 March 1964 a wealthy Cuban exile was approached with a Cosa Nostra offer to assassinate Castro for $150,000. The wealthy exile turned down the offer. Similar offers were make to other Cuban exiles in early March. A leading figure in the negotiations was Byron Cameron, a shipping-businessmen from Ft. Lauderdale. An agreement was finally made to pay the Cameron group $100,000 for killing Castro, plus $2,500 for expenses. Julio Lobo Olavarria, a wealthy Cuban exile in New York was to pay much of the money, and did pay the $2,500 on 25 April. Though Cameron's group remained anonymous, it was clear the Mafia was involved. Cameron revealed that his contact was a police officer in the St. Louis (Mo.) Vice Squad.

22. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 15 June 1964. Subject: "Assassination of Castro."

Referring to the above memo from DDP to DCI, Chase notes that John Crimmins feels the matter should be discussed at a Special Group meeting.

"John's own inclination is that the U.S. Government cannot knowingly permit any criminal American involvement in this sort of thing, " notes Chase, "and should go all out to stop the plot." In marginal notations, Bundy agrees with John and with the need to forward the matter to the Special Group.

23. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 16 June 1964, with attachment (Des FitzGerald's "A Reappraisal of Autonomous Operations")

FitzGerald makes a defense of the autonomous operations. Tom Mann and Chase disapprove of the operations, though for different reasons.

24. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 18 June 1964.

Chase warns that further U.S. support of the autonomous groups is more likely to lead to a U-2 shootdown and a Caribbean crisis than the overthrow of the Castro regime. Chase continues to be worried about noice levels and the November election. This memo is very much like his 14 May memo (see Item 19).

25. Memo for the Record, Peter Jessup, 22 June 1964.

In a reference to Helm's memo on assassination (see Item 21), it was pointed out in a 303 Committee meeting of 18 June that "these reports, in effect, put the United States Government on notice that failure to take preventive action could be construed as condonation. " The AG said Justice would look into the matter.

26. Memo, McCone to Bundy, 19 August 1964.

McCone summarizes the FBI investigation of Cuban exile plots against Castro as outlined in Helm's memo of 19 June (See Item 21). The Bureau interviewed many people allegedly involved, most of whom denied the existence of such a plan (The Bureau did not interview Cameron, since he was out of the country). The most interesting finding was that Lobo had in fact discussed the matter with CIA.

27. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 10 November 1964.

The election past, Chase *et al.* agreed that "we can usefully do some basic review work on Cuba." FitzGerald pushes for re-institution of CIA-directed covert program.

28. Memo, R.C. Bowman to Bundy, 12 November 1964, with JCS attachment dated 30 October 1964. Subject: SQUARE DANCE.

A contemptable proposal intiated by the Army to use germ warfare against Cuban sugar and livestock. Bowman and Bundy agree that the White House should "remain aloof from formal consideration of 'Square Dance' at this stage." I believe this plan for covert action is even more shocking and unacceptable than plans for assassination.

29. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 12 November 1964, and attachment (apparently a Bundy memo for a meeting with LBJ on 7 April 1964).

The Bundy memo suggests that LBJ approved various options "short of war to get rid of the Castro regime," including the possible contamination of sensitive Cuban imports (not food). The Chase memo indicates that a Fitzgerald operation was underway in November 1964 to ship contaminating elements into Cuba.

30. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 30 December 1964.

The Artime group is out of control, though State, Defense and CIA (as well as Bundy) all agree that it would be unwise to try to interfere with him at this stage.

31. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 5 January 1965.

Chase reports a plan told to Crimmins and the CIA about an Artime plot to stage a "palace coup" during which Castro and other top leaders would be "neutralized." D-Day was to be March 13. This matter was to be discussed at an upcoming Special Group meeting on whether or not "to cut off Artime's water." Chase notes: "CIA at this point is loath to make a hard evaluation of the Artime/Cubela plot."

32. Memo to 303 Committee, unsigned, 18 January 1965, presumably a CIA document.

Discusses the virtues of continuing Underwater Demolition Teams against ships in Cuban harbors. If such activities are disallowed, the CIA should be authorized to reduce its commitment in the paramilitary field.

33. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 8 February 1965.

This memo indicates that not even Artime had his group in control. The memo also discusses CIA covert activities in British Guiana, such as penetrating the PPP and proping up the democratic trade unionism.

34. Memo, Murat Wil[illegible] (INR) to Peter Jessup, White House staff, 23 February 1965.

Recommends immediate termination of Artime support.

35. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 2 March 1965

Discussion of who is for maintaining a covert capability against Cuba (presently on the shelf) and who is opposed. Chase guessed that CIA would be opposed ("fish or cut bait"); State would not. Rusk's general attitude toward Cuba at this time was to keep the temperature low while sorting out the Vietnam problem.

36. Memo, Chase to Bundy, 4 March 1965.

Chase recommends phasing out support to Artime. The CIA is considering diluting pesticides sent to Cuba; this is similar to the kinds of tactics mentioned in Items 28 and 29 above and are a manifestation of the moral bankruptcy of U.S. policy. Also some talk here of backing a new exile group, RECE, though not much enthusiasm for the idea from anyone apparently. Oddly, CIA wishes to drop its paramilitary capability, while DoD and State want the capability maintained.

37. Memo, Grant Hilliker (State) to Bundy, 18 June 1965.

This is a summary of U.S. policy toward Cuba. The ultimate objective is still to replace the Castro regime. The memo notes that "the paramilitary program involving CIA-controlled actions was set aside even before it really started."

38. Memo, Bundy to LBJ, 26 June 1965.

Adm. Raborn recommends reactivation of a paramilitary effort against Cuba. Bundy, Tommy Thompson, Rusk, McNamara, and Cy Vance are against this chiefly because of the concomitant international noise level. "Most of us," Bundy writes, "do not recommend visible violent actions against Cuba." Raborn's recommendations said nothing about assassination.

39. Memo, Rostow to LBJ, 30 May 1966.

Rostow notifies the President that a CIA exfiltration mission ran into ambush and the agents were captured. The President could expect "the noise level of Castro's charges of 'threatened Yankee aggression' may go up."

40. Memo, Karamessines, DDP, to Rostow, 7 August 1967.

This memo is important because it lists the names of two or three Cubans who worked on CIA missions. If they are in the U.S., it may be worthwhile talking to them about their activities.

41. Memo, W.G. Bowd[illegible]-Rostow, 18 December 1967.

The new CIA emph[illegible] is on developing contacts within Castro's inner circle. Dave Phillips was to be in charge of the new CIA Cuba program. Bowdler advises that "we be alert to indications that Castro is looking for accommodation or his disillusioned lieutenants want to know where we stand if they move to dump him."

G/FN
8/17/98

Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
6/1/98

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10234
RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R354

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : INDERFURTH, RICK
TO :

TITLE :
COMMISSION FILES

DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
LIST OF MATERIAL CONTAINED IN ROCKFELLER COMMISSION FILE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 437-16

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

C-VI-4	Phone interview with Richard Goodwin, May 23, 1975 Goodwin stated Kennedy had not been aware of the passage of guns.
C-VI-5	John Gorden, May 29, 1975
C-VI-6	Dr. Edward Gunn, May 17, 1975 Re: poison pills
C-VI-7	William Harvey, April 10, 1975
C-VI-8	McCone/Handwritten notes, April 18, 1975
C-VI-9	Robert McNamara, April 15, 1975
C-VI-10	Phone interview with Robert Murphy, June 30, 1975
C-VI-11	James O'Connell, June 17, 1975
C-VI-12	Conversation with Fletcher Prouty, June 11, 1975
C-VI-13	Phone interview with Roy Rubottom, June 30, 1975
C-VI-14	Notes on Dean Rusk interview, April 20, 1975
C-VI-15	Interview with Nestor Sanchez, May 19, 1975 1(A)
C-VI-16	Interview with Frank Sturgis, April 3,4, 1975
C-VI-17	Interview with Maxwell Taylor, May 16, 1975
C-VI-18	Conversation with Will Wilson, May 14, 1975

C-VII

C-VII-1 Letter/Jeanne Davis to Belin re: Review of NSC Documents Relating to Assassination, May 30, 1975

Attachments include excerpts from Special Group/303 Committee meetings.

C-VII-5 Memorandum/Cargill to Files re: Justice Department Documents Relating to Plots to Assassinate Castro, May 21, 1975

These documents relate to the wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

C-VII-6 Memorandum/Cargill to Files re: Documents from DPD Files Related to Cuban Operations, 1959-1961, May 21, 1975

C-VII-10 Memorandum/Cargill to Files re: Persons Identified in 1967 IG Report, May 15, 1975

C-VII-18 Letter/Jeanne Davis to Belin re: NSC Documents, May 9, 1975

Contains excerpts from a paper prepared for NSC discussion on May 5, 1961 re Cuba. Discusses "If Castro were removed from the scene."

C-VII-22 Letter/Dean Rusk to Belin, April 28, 1975

24

C-VIII Project TAMA

24

1(B)

Refers to the "Intelligence exploitation" of the United Nations 15th General Assembly by the CIA. There were allegations that there was a CIA plot against Castro to be carried out while he was in New York. Documents and papers in this file are directed towards this charge.

C-IX-28	Letter, Dearborn to Mann, October 27, 1960
C-IX-29	Memorandum of conversation re assassination, May 3, 1961
C-X	Trujillo II (3)
C-X-1	Transmittal letter/Knoche to Gray re: CIA documents concerning Dominican Republic, June 17, 1975
C-X-2	Agency Memorandum: Review of Dominican Operation for the Period Immediately Prior to, During and Subsequent to Trujillo's Death, June 20, 1962
C-X-3	Memorandum to Acting DCI from DDP re: Clandestine Delivery of Arms to Opposition Leadership in the Dominican Republic, July 1, 1960
C-X-4	Memorandum/Plan of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government, October 3, 1960
C-X-5	Memorandum/Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification, April 7, 1961
C-X-6	Cable re arms signed by Bissell, March 9, 1961
C-X-8	Memorandum for Chief, White House Division re: Request for Guidance on the Dominican Republic, 28 June 1960
C-X-9	Memorandum/Meeting on Project oz [redacted]DEED, April 11, 1961 1(B)
C-X-10	Special Briefing Paper on CIA covert activities against D.R. requested by Richard Goodwin, May 13, 1961
C-X-11	Memorandum/Conference with Source 1 and Source 2, February 13, 1961

C-X-12	Memorandum/Meeting with [redacted]DECK 4, February 16, 1961 02 [redacted]DECK the "King pin of the plot." 02 Discussion of ways to assassinate. 1(B)
C-X-13	Cable/re training Dominican in sabotage, February 27, 1961
C-X-14	Cable/re discussion of planned assassination attempt March 3, 1961
C-X-15	Cable/re delivery of arms, March 7, 1961
C-X-16	Request by [redacted]DAGGER for weapons, March 14, 1961 02 1(B)
C-X-17	Cable/re arms delivery, March 16, 1961
C-X-18	Letter/Dearborn to Devine, March 16, 1961 "...picnic...salad...pineapples."
C-X-19	Cable/re arms, March 17, 1961
C-X-20	Cable/re assassination plan, March 20, 1961
C-X-21	Cables/20 March 1961 - 31 May 1961
C-XI	Miscellaneous Materials (2)
C-XI-2	June 1964 CIA Memorandum for DCI entitled "Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Government Leaders"
C-XI-3	Sheffield Edwards Memorandum, dated May 14, 1962, re briefing of AG (R. Kennedy) of "sensitive CIA operation."

3/17
7/26/98
1/965

Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10238
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R421

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
6/12/98

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : TREVERTON, GREG
TO : SCHWARZ, F.A.O. JR.

TITLE :
MEMORANDUM

DATE : 07/02/75
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
TRUJILLO ASSASSINATION: MISSING DOCUMENTS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 437-23

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

437-23 R421

SSCI BOX # 437-23 /10238

MEMORANDUM

SEL COM SENSITIVE

FILE:__________

A COPY 3 OF 3

TO: F.A.O. Schwarz, Jr.

FROM: Greg Treverton

DATE: July 2, 1975

SUBJECT: Trujillo Assassination: Missing Documents

1. May 11, 1960. State Department Memorandum after debriefing of Ambassador Farland.

2. July, 1960. State Department documents with respect to the proposal for an air drop of 12 Springfield rifles "fixed and sighted." Rubottom had concurred in proposal. Mentioned in IG Report, page 26.

3. No date known. Cable informing Dearborn of plans to make the drop of the Springfields.

4. (December 29, 1960). Draft CIA proposal approved at the Special Group meeting, December 29, 1960.

5. February 10, 1961. Cable to CIA Headquarters, apparently from Chief of Station [redacted], asking that one "small-size high-power weapon" be sent in each pouch. 1 (A)

6. March 17, 1961. Station to Headquarters Memorandum indicating that Dearborn had requested three pistols to be transferred to the dissidents.

7. March 26, 1961. Station to Headquarters Cable requesting permission to pass three carbines to the dissidents.

8. May 5, 1961. Item from the record of the NSC meeting, this date, reflecting President's views with regard to the Dominican Republic.

9. May 25, 1961. Minutes of the Special Group meeting, this date.

10. June 5 or 6, 1961. CIA Memorandum for J.D. Esterline entitled "ØDACID (State Department)views on passage of arms." 1(B)

11. June 7, 1961. Memorandum from J.C. King describing White House meeting, this date,

12. May 10, 1962. FBI interview of 06 [redacted] the Dominican 24 [redacted] who had interrogated the assassins. 1(A)

GT:rs

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

22 JUN 94

FBI w/o

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE

ON 11/2/93 dcl

SEL COM SENSITIVE R425

FILE: ________

MEMORANDUM

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
6J 5/10/94

TO: David Aaron

FROM: Frederick A.O. Schwarz, Jr.

DATE: July 6, 1975

This will confirm our conversation concerning obtaining proof with respect to the alleged peace talks with Castro in October and November 1963. Box 45 "Cuba-William Attwood," reviewed by Susan Pitts in the Kennedy Library, is said to contain "correspondence concerning arrangements for negotiations for U.S./Castro talks, 10-11/63." We have also heard stories about French journalist Jean Daniel being an emissary from Kennedy to Castro at that time. As you know, during October and November assassination devices were being prepared and were offered to AMLASH.

You ought to at least see from the documents and from taking some single-Senator testimony from Attwood whether there was a genuine effort to make peace; if so, was that communicated to the Agency? Was the AMLASH assassination effort consistent?

In the telephone conversation I had with Arthur Schlesinger he said he thought Bill Attwood was more important than Daniel. Schlesinger will be here in Washington on July 9 and 10 and plans to come see us at 9:00 a.m. on July 10.

Would you take care of all of the above.

cc: Curtis Smothers
William Miller

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
23 JUN 94
(1)(c)

R422

SENSITIVE

FBI w/o COPY 3 OF 3

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 11/2/93 dab
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

MEMORANDUM

The Department of State has no objection to the
release or declassification of this document in full
under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records
Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 9/5/94

TO: The Files

FROM: Robert Kelley

DATE: July 2, 1975

SUBJECT: List of Documents Referred to in Special Group Minutes 1960-1964 (Less 1962) which the Committee May Wish to Obtain

1. The document reflecting a project discussed at the Special Group meeting on February 17, 1960, with respect to "a project providing for covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills." (Source: Special Group Minutes dated February 17, 1960)

2. Paper entitled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" which was read at the Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960. (Source: Special Group Minutes dated March 15, 1960, para. 1. Note that in para. 12 it is stated "Mr. Gray said he would like to submit later this week to his associate the paper entitled 'General Covert Action Plan for Cuba' but modified on the basis of this morning's discussion. Mr. Dulles promised a revised paper this week.")

3. Any paper which relates to the briefing by Mr. Dulles "on certain confidential aspects of the situation in the Dominican Republic" to the Special Group meeting on March 30, 1960. (Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting March 30, 1960. Note the Minutes do not indicate the nature of this briefing.)

4. Special Group Minutes dated October 27, 1960, state: "The paper outlining a proposal to aid Col. Mobutu in working toward the eventual formation of a moderate government was read by the Group." The Minutes indicate that "the Group approved the proposal." (Source: Minutes of Special Group meeting dated October 27, 1960.)

5. Any backup papers or documents relating to a reference in the minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, where it is stated: "Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct, positive action against Fidel, Raul, and Che Guevara."

6. The Minutes of November 10, 1960, Special Group meeting state: "Mr. Bissell mentioned briefly that we are making certain contingency plans for the Congo against the possibility of a pro-Soviet Lumumba government...."

7. The document containing the plan which was presented to the Special Group meeting on December 29, 1960, by Mr. Bissell. The Minutes for that meeting state: "Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime...he also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself."

8. Any paper or document used by Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell in the briefing they gave to new members of the Special Group at the meeting on 14 February 1961. The Minutes state: "Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue."

9. The memorandum which was requested by Mr. Bundy at the Special Group meeting on February 14, 1961. The minutes state: "Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo."

10. The reports referred to by the DCI at the Special Group meeting on May 4, 1961. The Minutes state: "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot."

11. The "Cuba Paper" mentioned in the Special Group Minutes of May 4, 1961. The Minutes state: "Mr. Bundy said that this point (anti-Trujillo plot planning) is covered in the Cuba Paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future."

12. Any Action Memoranda or other documents which would clarify the action taken by the Special Group at the meeting on May 18, 1961. At that meeting, Gen. Cabal noted that internal dissidents in the Dominican Republic were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms, "now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time." (It is not clear whether a contrary position signified contrary to the desire of the internal dissidents or contrary to Gen. Cabal's suggestion that these arms not be passed.) (Source: Special Group Minutes 18 May 1961,02769)

13. A paper on Covert Programs for Cuba was presented by the DCI at the July 20, 1961, Special Group meeting. The paper appeared to be a basic position paper: Its para. 2a read: "The basic objective is to provide support to a U.S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U.S." (Source: Minutes dated July 21, 1961, 02778)

14. On July 27, 1961, the Special Group discussed a CIA paper titled: "Internal Action Operations Against Cuba" dated July 25, 1961. The Group discussed its relevance to the "basic paper discussed last week." (Source: Special Group Minutes July 27, 1961, 02781)

15. On August 3, 1961, the Special Group reviewed "a condensed set of recommendations summing up the proposed Cuban program." This paper was approved for consideration by higher authority. (Source: Special Group Minutes August 3, 1961, 02782)

16. On October 6, 1961, Mr. Parrott told the Special Group that there was in preparation "a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene." (We should obtain this plan as it may relate to an assassination plot.) (Source: Special Group Minutes October 6, 1961, 02783)

17. On December 8, 1961, Gen. Lansdale presented "the outline of a program designed to overthrow the Castro government." (Source: Special Group Minutes December 8, 1961, 02795)

18. The March 26 Special Group Minutes referred to a "Shipping Sabotage Paper of 19 March. The proposal reflected in the paper was remanded for Group consideration by the Cottrell Committee." (Source: Special Group Minutes March 26, 1963, 02839)

19. On April 4, 1963, the Special Group approved three papers which were subsequently approved by "higher authority" on April 9. The papers were titled "Sabotage of Shipping," "Russian Language Broadcasts," and "Propaganda Inciting Cubans within Cuba to Attack Soviet Troops." (Source: Special Group Minutes April 4, 1963, 02844 and Memo for Members of the Special Group April 9, 1963, 02845)

20. The Minutes of April 11, 1963, Special Group meeting referred to "Three papers being considered at today's meeting." One of these papers may deal with sabotage in Cuba as there was a "lengthy discussion" of the entire question of sabotage at the meeting. Also, the Minutes state: "The comments from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated 11 April on the three papers being considered at today's meeting (were requested by the group to) be withdrawn and destroyed for security reasons." Note: We should perhaps make a request for such comments, to determine whether they were in fact destroyed. (Source: Minutes dated 11 April 1963, 02846)

21. The Minutes of 18 April 1963 indicate the Special Group "turned to discussion of the papers from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated April 16, 17, and 18." There is no indication of the subject matter of these papers. The Minutes state that it was agreed these papers should be "staffed and sharpened up for presentation at next week's meeting." Note that the Minutes indicate the title of the paper dated April 17, as "Maximum Covert Action Program" which consists basically of "sabotage and harrassment, plus support to Cuban exile groups and individuals who may be responsive to our advice but not certainly to our command." Note further that the Minutes state Mr. Bundy and McCone expressed doubts as to whether "we are in a position to decide major problems of this type (presumably reflected in the three papers) until we have a clearer picture of what the overall policy toward Cuba is likely to be...." Note also that Mr. Bundy stated he was not sure whether "it would be possible to embark on the activities proposed in the Coordinator's papers, without a drastic change in U.S. policy." (Source: Minutes dated 18 April 1963, 02848-49)

22. A memorandum for the Special Group dated April 26, 1963, (02853) which discusses a paper on "new covert policy and programs toward Cuba" states that decisions have been made regarding certain of the item numbers in that paper.

23. The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on April 25 (02855) refer to a paper on a "proposed new policy and program toward Cuba."

24. A memorandum for the Special Group dated June 19, 1963, subject: "Sabotage Program, Cuba," discusses a meeting with higher authority on that subject at which a "proposed program was approved dealing with 'external sabotage' directed at four major segments of the Cuban economy: (1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and highway transportation; and (4) production and manufacturing." (Source: Memorandum June 19, 1963, 02871)

25. The Minutes of Special Group meeting on 18 July 1963 state that higher authority had no objection to a program recommending a new "political action" plan for Haiti. Col. King told the Special Group that "everyone concerned with the project agrees that Duvalier must be removed in some manner or other." King went on to say that the existing plan is unworkable and thus it is "best to switch to a different kind of operation. This would include training of exiles in cross-border operations with a long-range objective of establishing a clandestine organization and building an effective opposition in Haiti." (Source: Minutes 18 July 1963, 02878)

26. Minutes of Special Group meeting 15 August 1963 (02880) indicate the Special Group approved a "Operational Proposal"dated 12 August 1963, relating to "a non-violent program to inhibit free world and neutral trade with Cuba."

27. The Minutes of Special Group meeting on August 29, 1963 (02883) state the Group considered a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 12, 1963, titled "Support of Autonomous Anti-Castro Groups."

28. The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on 5 September 1963 refer to a paper from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs dated August 13 on the "subject of Commandos L." Mr. Fitzgerald referred to the fact that "it would be feasible to take off from a point in the northern Bahamas, rather than from one of the keys very near Cuba." Note that the August 29 Minutes (02883) refer to the project for support of Commandos L as "useful, but not essential" and that the "economic damage which this group might inflict would be comparatively minor" but there might be "some psychological advantages...and such operations would serve to keep the Cuban security forces busy." Note further that the Minutes of October 3, 1963, state that higher authority (President Kennedy) had reviewed the proposed Commandos L operation and felt it might be "a worthwhile mission to undertake" provided certain conditions were met. The Special Group on August 3 agreed to review the project once

more if it still appears desirable in light of the comments at that meeting and by higher authority. Also note that the Minutes of October 24, 1963 (02898) state that "CIA is dropping its earlier proposal to support Commandos L, due to the crackdown on exile raids by various U.S. and British Government agencies."

29. The Minutes of November 12, 1963 (02905-08) indicate Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. Given the length of this report, there may have been some formal paper from which Fitzgerald spoke, although the minutes do not refer to any particular piece of paper.

30. A number of particular "operations" designated by number and purpose are mentioned in the minutes of Special Group meetings on 14 November, 5 December, 6 December, 19 December, 20 December, 1963 and January 2 and January 9, 1964. If desired, we might request the backup papers for these operations. Typical operations were described as "the exfiltration of two members of an existing resistance net," the"infiltration of a five-man team for the purpose of sabotaging a railway bridge."

31. The Minutes of a Special Group meeting on February 13, 1964, state the Special Group discuss "a specific Department of Defense paper" which dealt with, among others, the following topics: "Harrassment of Free World Shipping to Cuba," "Covert Economic Activities," "Encouraging Dissidents Among Factions," "Actions Against Cuban Subversion in Latin America." Source: Minutes dated 14 February 1964 (02919)

32. The Minutes of April 3, 1964 (02924) refer to a paper entitled "Status of Sabotage and Raiding Capability Against Cuba." The Minutes also state that "three separate papers" were submitted to all members of the Group and the Group concluded to approve five infiltration/exfiltration operations and five caching operations, but table the five sabotage proposals.

33. A memorandum for Mr. Bundy dated 18 June 1964 (02931) refers to a "Helms Memo to DCI entitled Plans of Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Selected Cuban Leaders, June 10, 1964."

34. The Minutes of a meeting on June 18, 1964, (02932) state that: "A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involved the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders." No other identification of this paper is given, it may refer to the Helms memo immediately above.

35. The Minutes of July 9, 1964, (02937) indicate that Mr. Bundy read a draft NSAM "dealing with the establishment of a new working group to examine the problem of Cuba."

36. A memorandum by John McCone to McGeorge Bundy dated August 19, 1965, summarizes seven reports regarding the status of an FBI investigation re "Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders." The reports apparently were of interviews by FBI agents of various individuals allegedly involved in the plans. (Source: 02943-44)

37. A memo dated September 3, 1964, refers to a paper titled "Request by Revolutionary Student Directorate for Permission to Move Personnel to the Dominican Republic for Purpose of Engaging in Hit and Run Activities Against Cuba." (Source: Memo for the Record, 02947)

38. A memo for the record dated 11 September 1964 (02948) states that "basic reports of the Cuban Study Group established by NSAM 311 of 10 July 1964 were nearing their final stages and that certain gaps were being closed between the SNIE findings and those of the Critical Collection Committee."

2/pd
7/28/98

Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10241
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R602

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
6/12/98

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

DATE : 07/24/75
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW WITH BRUCE CHEEVER
ASSASSINATION INQUIRY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
BOX 438-3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

438-3 R602

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

TOP SECRET

INTERVIEW WITH: Bruce Cheever

REGARDING: Assassination Inquiry

SSCI BOX # 438-3

SSCI BOX # 438-3

10241

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: July 24, 1975

PRESENT: Paul WALLACH and Joe DiGenova

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED: ____

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: ____

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S): ____

EXECUTIVE SESSION: ___YES ___NO

TOP SECRET FILE:

This morning Joe DiGenova and I interviewed Bruce Cheever at the Carroll Arms. We focused on Cheever's tenure as deputy director of Task Force W.

Background:

1938-43	Marine Corps
1943-44	OSS Parachute School
1944-46	Marine Corps
1950-53	Office Police Coordination; headed Plans Section for Western European Division
1953-56	[redacted] 14-3
1956-60	Deputy Chief, European Division
1960-3/62	Headquarters, U. S. European Command (U. S. representative)
3/62-65	Deputy Director: Task Force W
1965-71	[redacted] 12-12
1971	Retired from Agency
3/64-2/65	Deputy Chief, Special Operations Branch (developing paramilitary capabilities for Agency)

Apparently selected for Task Force W because of extensive paramilitary background. Not sure whether slotted by Harvey or Helms.

Prior to his Task Force W assignment, Harvey was known to Cheever by reputation only. He described Harvey as one of the finest operatives the Agency ever had, citing Harvey's Berlin tunnel.

Cheever understood that Task Force W was Mongoose's instrument to get rid of the Castro regime; that the Cuban operations had White House backing; and that the Agency had been given an operational carte blanche, with the caveat that each operation had to receive explicit SGA approval prior to getting off the drawing board.

Cheever told us: "You don't pull in fast-rising men like [Ted] Schakley unless you have solid backing." Cheever believes that Lansdale was RFK's representative and that Task Force W would not suggest aggressive covert action to the SGA without Lansdale's approval.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/O
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUME
AS SANITIZED
14 Jul 94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

Cheever confirmed what we knew about Harvey. Although Cheever worked closely with Harvey, he told us that Harvey was a loner and most surely would not inform him of operations unless he had a "must need to know". In Cheever's opinion, Harvey was one of the great believers in compartmentalization; Cheever "complained that Harvey turned him into his staff man" (as compared to an operational extension). Cheever also told us that Harvey was a two martini man at lunch with thyroid problems; this often "led to problems for Harvey at early afternoon meetings".

Cheever believes he attended at least ten SGA meetings. However, he does not recall RFK, only recalls briefing Bundy. (Maybe Cheever attended other than SGA meetings -- the minutes do not reflect his attendance.)

Cheever met weekly with designees of the SGA principals in Lansdale's office (Messrs. Califano, Haig, Hurwitch, Craig, and Johnson). Cheever would brief these designees on proposed operational plans; discussion of the details would ensue. Subsequent to the staff meetings, the principals would meet and decide whether or not the particular plan would be approved. Cheever did state that the Group often rejected proposals. In one instance, Max Taylor vetoed the maritime infiltration of a small team. Taylor felt that the chances of success were small and attributability great. (Cheever agreed with Taylor -- "but it was one of Lansdale's brain childs.")

Cheever told us that "around the Task Force W shop it was known that the Kennedys wanted to get rid of the Castro regime." In order to get this done, "the Kennedys built a fire under the Agency's tail and installed Lansdale as Chief of Operations". According to Cheever, Lansdale and the SGA were "geared to keeping the Kennedys informed as to what was happening".

However, after the Cuban missile crisis, Cuban operations were not pursued with the same sense of urgency.

7/22/98

Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10246
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : R560A

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
6/12/98

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY
DATE : 07/25/75
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
INTERVIEW WITH DAVID, PAUL (ALIAS)
SUBJ: ASSASSINATION INQUIRY
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
BOX 438-12

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

TOP

SSCI

438-12

10246

INTERVIEW WITH: Paul David (alias)

REGARDING: Assassination Inquiry

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: July 25, 1975; 608 Carroll Arms

PRESENT: Messrs. WALLACH and DiGenova

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

EXECUTIVE SESSION: [✓ Yes] No

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

Page 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

FILE:

This morning, Joe and I met with Paul David ("P.D.") at the Carroll Arms for approximately two hours. George Clarke from the CIA's General Counsel's staff was present for the last fifteen minutes of the interview.

Background:

1948-51 - Assistant to [redacted] - [redacted]
1951-54 - Chief Rumanian Desk
1954-58 - Chief of Operations Against Communist Areas (Eastern Bloc) - (Operations from 15-16 [redacted] - stationed in [redacted]
1958-61 - [redacted] 15-16
1961-62 - Special Assistant to Helms
1962-63 - National War College (June 1962 - July 1963)
1963-64 - Helms' Special Assistant
1965-66 - [redacted] 15-6
1966-69 - [redacted] 12-21
1969-73 - Chief of Operational Services - Chief of Staff in DDP. (Director Clandestine Services)
1973 - Chief Career Management Personnel
1973-74 - Chief Plans & Programs for Directorate

Interview Summary:

Bissell "out of the blue" asked P.D. to read and comment upon Zoogby's Cuban operations paper. P.D. told Bissell that the paper/proposals "stunk" (. . . "much like another Bay of Pigs"). Apparently, Helms also read and liked P.D.'s comments. After Bissell "left", Helms requested that P.D. come on board as his staff assistant.

P.D. stressed that he was not in the operational line of command -- "I provided an interface for intelligence information." A typical day in P.D.'s life:

-- Screening cable traffic (7 - 9 a.m.). Primarily cables relating to positive intelligence, to prepare Helms for his daily 9 a.m. hour-long meeting with DCI McCone.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
JC - 14 - Jul 94 -
(1)(A)
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

TOP SECRET

FILE:

-- Prepared a daily briefing for the White House on Cuban intelligence.

-- Preparing review of books such as "The Invisible Government" and damage reports (i.e., reports setting forth what sensitive information exposed by book).

P.D. stressed that he was "out of touch with the day-to-day operations of Task Force W". However, he believes that Harvey kept Helms fully briefed.

Harvey, in P.D.'s own words, was "not an ordinary man", . . . "egocentric", "bombastic", "one of the strongest proponents of compartmentalization and need to know". In addition, Harvey had a law degree and a successful FBI stint prior to joining the Agency.

Harvey had a thyroid problem. As one of the "CIA's most interesting characters", Harvey was often talked about; P.D. has difficulty separating personal experience from rumors. Describing Harvey as a "four martini man at lunch" . . . which, coupled with Harvey's thyroid medicine, caused Harvey to be sleepy, etc., after lunch. In fact, P.D. told us that this was the "last straw" in McCone's eyes; i.e., apparently when McCone called Harvey in to "discuss" the Kennedys' complaints about Harvey's utterings, it was immediately after lunch and Harvey either fell asleep or failed to pay attention. ("McCone did not have an audience.") P.D. added that there was general "bad chemistry" between McCone and Harvey.

P.D. noted Harvey's intense loyalty to "his people" (including Helms and [redacted]).03 However, P.D. is sure that even with these people, Harvey was likely to have been extremely close-mouthed.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 2/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10008-10253

RECORD SERIES : MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : RELATING TO "BOOK V" OF CHURCH COMMITTEE

DATE : 00/00/1976
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :

CASTRO
CUBA
NOTES RE: BOOK V OF CHURCH COMMITTEE REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : BOX 441

Book V, p. 79 In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino, New York jeweler who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the beginning. The report concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas. Tepedino lied in response to questions dealing with AMLASH's and his ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino stated that AMLASH had no plan to overthrow Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH never mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers; Teledino stated that AMLASH had mentioned them to him and almost everyone else he had met.

Book V, p. 25

Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10000

RECORDS SERIES :
INDEX CARDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

[R]

DATE : 07/01/75
PAGES : 494

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/28/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 132, Book 1 of 5,
Index Cards dated June-July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

7

Reviewed by NSA
On 1/10/94 [illegible]
Release in Part

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~
LANSDALE, TAYLOR, ~~JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK,~~ MCCONE, RFK, ~~LEMNITZER~~

DATES:
July 11, 1962

CATEGORIES:
Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." Memo quotes NSA summary on intelligence problems which notes that "Intelligence has been obtained of Soviet participation in Cuban tactical air training, Cuban air defense performance, and the presence of Soviet-type air defense equipments."

Sec 6(1)(b)

TOP [illegible]

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962 (00428-00430)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

UNCLASSIFIED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

4 Feb 94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

K 10/8/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY HELMS MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25,1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each projec must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections. Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

K 8/10/98

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF: diGenova

DATE: 2/3/75

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

2 Feb 94
(1)(A)
(1)(B)
8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Father Peyton Peter Grace	Dec. 5, 1960	Mongoose ✓ Special Group

OCCURRENCE: The Special Group discussed (1) the possibility of providing sixty thousand dollars from the Cuba budget to sponsor the religious activity of Father Peyton in Cuba; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.

SOURCE: Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
4 Feb 94
(1)(c)
(2 pp)

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
CIA deletions, (1)(c)
2/8/94

18/9/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED MONGOOSE,~~ TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, CARTER, LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT	DATES: July 12, 1962 ~~July 20, 1962~~ ~~April 9, 1963~~	CATEGORIES: Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)

FILE:

STAFF: (continued)

di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

Denied in full
by CIA,
4 Feb 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MCCONE, HARVEY, RUZ
[redacted]

DATES:
July 10, 1962
~~June 11, 1962~~
~~July 1, 1962~~
~~May 1962~~

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Rug, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. [redacted] contacted Ruz [redacted] in [redacted] Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Ruz in Mexico.

SOURCE: Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re: Juana Castro Ruz, 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

[redacted]

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
4 Feb 94
(1)(A)
K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRES. KENNEDY, HARVEY, TAYLOR Duque	MAY 7, 1962	MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED

OCCURRENCE: Memo: "I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. HARVEY'S briefing of the SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED on 3 MAY 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the DUQUE incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed we would continue along ~~the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August.~~"

[redacted]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, REPORT OF PROGRESS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, MAY 7, 1962, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (00024)

FILE:

STAFF: DiGenova

DATE: 7/2/75

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

[illegible] NO OBJECTION TO
[illegible]CATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MR. GRAY [redacted]	Oct 6, 1960	Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization Card 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

On October 6, 1960 the Special Group discussed relating to CUBA:

(1) Explanation by MR. DULLES of the "abortive supply drop to resistance elements" in Cuba.

(2) MR. DULLES' proposal for U-2 coverage of CUBA "All the members of the group said that they were in favor of proceeding with the coverage." Mr. Gray asked to have the memorandums on which Mr. Dulles had based his presentation forwarded to him for use in getting the required decision.
Mr. Dulles' proposal for use of American volunteers and foreign nationals in the Cuban operation. The group agreed Mr. Dulles could begin screening lists of potential candidates. [redacted]

(continued)

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Oct. 6, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Special Group
MONGOOSE
Presidential Authorization
Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
1 FEB 94
(1)(c)
8/10/98

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE [redacted]		MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

McCone testified that he recalled that activity to sabotage the shipment of spare parts [redacted] to Cuba. He did not recall whether it was [redacted] spare parts. (23).

SOURCE:
McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75

FILE:

STAFF:
Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
K 8/10/98

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
2 Feb 94
(1)(c)

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526. ~~except for~~
2/8/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/ is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; [redacted]. (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF:
di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

Reviewed by NSA
on 1/10/94 BMF
Release in Part

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for NSA deletions, (1)(B) & (C)
2/8/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
1 Feb 94
K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HELMS, LANSDALE,	Feb. 1, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: Memo for Richard Helms from Gen. Lansdale concerning NSA cover. The memo alludes to a conversation on the previous day, Jan. 31, 1962, about NSA cover for the Cuba Project. It indicates that Cuba cover is top priority. It indicated that this was not possibly known to the members of the United States Intelligence Board. The problem seemed to be to be able to decide how much of NSA (National Security Agency)'s assets were needed to provide cover for the Cuban project.

Sec 6(1)(b)(c)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for Richard Helms from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, dated Feb. 1, 1962 (00122)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 2 Feb 94

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, ~~except for~~ 2/8/94

(1)(c)

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE, .,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, 'how serious are you?', before risking their assets to help the U.S.". (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
2 Feb 94
(1)(B) & (1)(C)

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR~~
~~RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~
~~AS SANITIZED~~
K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Helms, Richard [redacted]	1962	Castro Mongoose ✓

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba, lets put it that way, and no limitations were placed on the means. In fact, I never recall having been told by anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26) (The above statements refer to Mongoose.) Helms testified that "the pressure was very intense and I remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several "very nutty schemes." (26) Helms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pigs and then lay dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. Afterwards interest tapered off, although Helms recalled efforts in 1963 involving "economic warfare" such as turning off oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries [redacted] (27)

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/28/75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(continuation)

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 2 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

meeting of foreign ministers which opened January 22, 1962. The object was to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the hemisphere. "The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA." The major task of the diplomatic capability was to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to the instant project seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. In the economic warfare area an embargo on Cuban trade was to be considered after the OAS meeting. The CIA was unable to undertake the action to sabotage the sugar harvest which commences about January 15 and upon which Cuba's one-crop economy depended. Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking in cane fields was explored, according to Lansdale's review. Special sabotage support was noted.→

SOURCE:

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(continuation)

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "lubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium. A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE:

NO OBJECTION as revised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CARD 3		Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)
In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)
The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for CIA deletions. (1)(c) 2/8/94

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

~~No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for~~ ~~2/8/94~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
2 Feb 94
(1)(c)

(2 pp)
K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE, [redacted] Y,	Mar 13, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓ CUBA

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Opa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for British help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, 13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for DIA deletions. (1)(A)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
2 Feb 94
(1)(A)

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, TAYLOR, R KENNEDY, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK GEN. DECKER, LANSDALE, CRAIG, MCCONE, HARVEY, PARROTT DUQUE	MAY 3, 1962	SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: LANSDALE gave interim report on the progress of stepping up recruitment of Cubans into the US Army. "The Attorney General commented that the President wishes to have a large number." Mr. HARVEY "gave a rundown on progress to date with agent teams and in the general field of intelligence." He said, "that three agent teams have been infiltrated." "A significant development is that Major DUQUE has refused to allow agents responsive to him to be dispatched on purely intelligence-gathering missions." HARVEY also reported on two attempts made to intrude into Havana TV programs.

TOP SECRE

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED ON PROJECT MONGOOSE, 3 MAY 1962. (00023)	STAFF: DiGenova
FILE:	DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7 Feb 94
(1)(A)
8/10/98

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
CIA deletions, (1)(A)
2/8/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, LANSDALE [redacted]	June 19, 1962	MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate a story from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The Cuban source to story need not await your determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration."

TOP

SOURCE: Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, from Lansdale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (00395)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
CIA deletion. (1)(A)
2/8/94

~~No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7 Feb 94
(1)(A)

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~ Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ✓ ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)	STAFF: di Genova
FILE:	DATE: July 1, 1975

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
CIA deletion, (1)(A)
2/8/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 7 Feb 94
(1)(A)
K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓ June 22, 1962 ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION as agreed
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for CIA deletions. (1)(A)
2/18/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
7 Feb 94
(1)(A)

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62 ✓	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
2/23/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
CIA deletions. (1)(A)
2/18/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7 Feb 94
(1)(A)

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ✓ ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. (The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad.) Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7 Feb 94
(1)(A)

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
CIA deletions. (1)(A)

K 8/10/98

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 ✓ 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE ✓

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, ~~1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations~~ representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)	STAFF: di Genova
FILE:	DATE: July 1, 1975

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10003

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : [R]
TO : [R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS [R]

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 161

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 132, Book 4 of 5, Index Cards, June, 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1)(B)
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
lw 7/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BISSELL DULLES GRAY MERCHANT	Aug. 12, 1960	MONGOOSE Special Group ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On August 12, 1960 the Special Group heard a summary of the budget for Cuban operations from MR. BISSELL. Approximately [redacted] million dollars were required to finance Cuban operations for the fiscal year and a balance of [redacted] was necessary for the remainder of the fiscal year. Major subheadings in the budget were (1) political action, (2) propaganda, (3) paramilitary, (4) intelligence collection, (5) counterintelligence, (6) communications support, (7) support.

It was agreed "This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next 10 days. This was believed to be wise, not because any

(continued)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting August 12, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF: Robert Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1) (B)
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
!	Oct. 6, 1960	Special Group MONGOOSE Presidential Authorization Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some Germans in this group and that we would talk informally to General Gehlen about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF:

DATE: Bob Kelley
June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
(1)(B)
lu 7/12/93

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY HELMS MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25,1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections. Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF: diGenova

DATE: 7/3/75

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group ✓ Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"; and [negotiating for British help in contaminating lubricants and fuels to cripple Cuban transportation. "The British want to know, 'how serious are you?', before risking their assets to help the U.S.".] (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF:
di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

(1)(B)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
lu 7/12/93

NO OBJECTION as revised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
(continuation)		Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. [redacted] A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

DATE:

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1)(B)
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED lec 7/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CARD 3

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)
In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)
The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in [redacted].

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
lec 7/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: ✓
LANSDALE, Y,	Mar 13, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE CUBA

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Opa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for [British] help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, 13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

TOP SECRET

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1)(B)
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE June 22, 1962

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced [redacted] For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1)(B)
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7/12/93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, ROIG, RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ✓ ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. The CIA has agreed as a matter of priority to reach a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig where he can be surfaced [redacted] For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They ~~will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department~~ of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
defer to NSA
1/6/94

Reviewed by NSA
on 1/10/94
Release in Part
☆ should be marked
SECRET SPOKE

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: ✓
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~ LANSDALE, TAYLOR, ~~JOHNSON, GILPATRICK,~~ MCCONE, RFK, ~~LEMNITZER,~~	July 11, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." Memo quotes NSA summary on intelligence problems which notes that "Intelligence has been obtained of Soviet participation in Cuban tactical air training, Cuban air defense performance, and the presence of Soviet-type air defense equipments."

sec 6(1)(b)

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962 (00428-00430)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(c)
lee 7/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE, HARVEY, ~~MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED~~ CARD ONE OF TWO	July 24, 1962 ~~July 11, 1962~~ ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~July 23, 1962~~ ~~March 16, 1962~~	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: As to Phase I, CIA staff personnel [redacted] are devoting full time to this effort. "A very large number of additional personnel are devoting part time efforts to Operation MONGOOSE." Hard intelligence coverage of Cuba has been developed. Fifty-nine controlled agents inside of Cuba exist. Not so successful on infiltrating intelligence reporting in resistence cadre teams. Failure to meet the original schedule of team infiltrations primarily was due to two factors: "(a) Lack of policy approval by higher authority to make any extensive utilization of Department of Defense personnel and support." "Had we been permitted to mount a more intensive and agressive, the original infiltration schedule probably would have been met, possibly exceeded." The speed and extent of future infiltration teams for resisitence purposes into Cuba "will of course depend upon policy approvals by higher authority and the amount of support we can count on thereunder." "It is our opinion that there is an excellent chance such a revolt could be incited

(CONTINUED)

SOURCE: Memorandum for Lansdale from William K. Harvey re: Operation MONGOOSE--end of Phase I, July 24, 1962 (00452-00458)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(B)
lec 7/12/93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale William K. Harvey	8/7/62	SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED OPERATION MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey states that the estimated cost of CIA in terms of personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least [redacted] (if stage two of Mongoose went into effect) and that the estimated fiscal budgets for 1963 and 1964 would have to be increased to over [redacted] million.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Aug 8, 1962 memo from Gen Lansdale to the Special Group Augmented (00587)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 2, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3/12/93

(1)(B)

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE CASTRO		MONGOOSE SGA ✓

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE TESTIFIED that the SGA approved a program to contaminate with Carbon dust [redacted] This was to be done at the time of shipment. The program met with some success. MCCONE could not recall where the actual sabotage of the purchased equipment took place (22-23).

SOURCE: McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/27/75

NO OBJECTION w/NSA Concurrence
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Reviewed by NSA
on 1/10/94 RoM-AJ
Release in part

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HELMS, LANSDALE,,	Feb. 1, 1962	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Memo for Richard Helms from Gen. Lansdale concerning NSA cover. The memo alludes to a conversation on the previous day, Jan. 31, 1962, about NSA cover for the Cuba Project. It indicates that Cuba cover is top priority. It indicated that this was not possibly known to the members of the United States Intelligence Board. The problem seemed to be to be able to decide how much of NSA (National Security Agency)'s assets were needed to provide cover for the Cuban project.

Sec 6(1)
(b)(c)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for Richard Helms from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, dated Feb. 1, 1962 (00122)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 29, 1975

NO OBJECTION as revised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

(1)(B)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
lec 3/12/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MURPHY MERCHANT GRAY IRWIN	DULLES	11/4/59	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Special group meeting on November 4, 1959, discuss the "Cuba Propaganda Project". 1. Mr. Dulles "went into details as to the possible location of radio transmitters" commenting that since the discussion of the program last week the situation had grown more critical." 2. Mr. Gray said "he was sure (the project) would meet with high level approval provided that any action taken was acceptable to the [redacted]]"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated 4 Nov 1959, Minues of Special Group Meeting.

FILE:

STAFF: KELLEY

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED (1)(B)
lu 3/12/93

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MERCHANT GATES GRAY DULLES	Nov. 18,1959	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On November 18, 1959, the Special Group Meeting, the Group, "agreed with the 'Cuba Propaganda' operation as outlined by Mr. DULLES. DULLES asked for approval of an operation based in [redacted]. These broadcasts were to be attributed "such that Cubans would be talking to Cubans" and the broadcasting equipment would not be adeqaute to reach other parts of Latin America. However, DULLES pointed out "we are using the capability to place unattributed propaganda and publications throughout the area..."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 18 Nov. 1959

FILE:

STAFF: KELLEY
DATE: 6/27/75

(1) (B)
CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
lec 3/12/93

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MERCHANT GRAY IRWIN BISSELL	Dec. 9, 1959	SPECIAL GROUP ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

On December 9, 1959, the Special Group continued discussion of the clandestine broadcasting to Cuba. Mr. BISSELL explained that it would not be possible to place the transmitter in [redacted] and there was discussion of alternate sites including three U.S. islands in the general area, the Canal Zone, and [redacted] or [redacted] soil.
"It was recognized that any radio broadcasting from [redacted] would undoubtedly be used by [redacted] to further his fight with TRUJILLO, but the group agreed that this was not necessarily a drawback. "

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group Meeting, December 9, 1959

FILE:

STAFF:
KELLEY

DATE: 6/27/75

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

(1)(B)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
lu 7/12/93

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
NSC excision; 6(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62 ✓	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, [redacted] ~~Effective July 1,~~ 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

(1)(B)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
lee 7/12/93

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
NWC excision: 6(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ✓ ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO (1)(B)
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7/12/93

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for
NSC excision (6(2)).

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 ✓ 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE
Harris Craig		

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/6/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
7/12/93
(1)(B)

NO OBJECTION
DEPT. OF STATE
2/24/93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED MONGOOSE,~~ TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, CARTER, LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT	July 12, 1962 ~~July 20, 1962~~ ~~April 9, 1963~~	Special Group Augmented ✓ MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of view, CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of this kind. He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)

FILE:

STAFF: (continued)
di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10005

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : [R]
TO : [R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS [R]

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 478

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO [R]
WIRETAP [R]
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 139, Book 1 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 1(c)
en 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Bautzer O'Connell Maheu Edwards ✓	/59-/65	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that Maheu helped CIA [redacted]. Request came to O'Connell from Edwards. [redacted]. CIA arranged for [redacted] to go to N.Y.C. to [redacted] in America. CIA monitored mail thereafter between [redacted] unbeknownest to either. (Tr. 144-151)

CIA, again through Maheu, ~~get~~ set up [redacted] in San Francisco.

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 1 B 1C
en 10 Mar 94

SOURCE:
Testimony of James O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:
John Bayly

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
ek 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

DATES:

FEB., 1961
(APPROXIMATE)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

(Card 1)

Castro
~~CUBA~~ - PHASE I

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. ~~SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security~~ ✓
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. RAY TREICHLER, Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(c)
en 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Maheu Edwards Rosselli Giancana Trafficante Breckinridge	3 or 4-61	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Maheu was on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) and "on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an important foreign leader." (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Roselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ...was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
on 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
(See list of names below.)

DATES:
Apr 17, 61 –

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

CASTRO ~~CUBA~~ – SYNDICATE/PHASE II –– KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)
5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. BRUCE CHEEVER, HARVEY's deputy in 1962 (CHEEVER knows that HARVEY was meeting with gansters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967 p. 55 – 56

TOP SECRET

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

Apr 17, '61

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. RAY TREISCHLER, TSD (TREISCHLER's participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(con't.)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(4)
10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Edwards King Bannerman	Gomez Holcomb O'Connell	11/62	Castro

OCCURRENCE:
O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarassed. No one but KING, not Gomez or Holcombe, knew (100) (Tr. 36, 99-100).

SOURCE:	STAFF:
5/30/75	John Bayly

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
10 Mar 94

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KING, J. C. IG REPORT BISSELL HALPERN HARVEY EDWARDS ✓	May 23, 1967	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, Ray Treichler, John Warner, Nestor Sanchez, William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, [redacted], Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
en 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER ✓ BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

BRUCE CHEEVER attended the 14 September 1962 MONGOOSE meeting for the CIA. He reported (according to WALT ELDER) that no decisions were made, and no new ideas were brought up, and nothing useful emerged from the meeting.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Elder

FILE: Cage

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
15 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially to alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries--Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- Walt Elder	PGW
FILE: Cage 00049	DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)(B)
en 10 Mar 94

[illegible] OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(b)(1)(c)
en 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Walt ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA),

DATES:
9/14/62

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:
Possibility of sabotage of VICKERS spare parts allegedly ready for shipment to Cuba by Canada is being looked into--Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Eler

FILE: Cage 00049

STAFF:
PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
en 10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
TREICHLER, Ray TSD BORTNER, Henry ESTERLINE, Jake	March-July 60	CUBA (Misc. Schemes)

OCCURRENCE: Aerosol attack on radio station: A scheme was discussed at CIA to "contaminate the air of the radio station where CASTRO broadcast his speeches with an aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions similar to those of Lysergic Acid (LSD)." (10) "Nothing came of the idea." (10) [redacted], of TSD, remembers the discussion and discouraged the scheme "because the chemical could not be relied upon to be effective." (10) Others who may be knowledgeable: 1. [redacted] (TSD) recalls general experimentation with psychic energizers. 2. Jake Esterline.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG Report, 1967

STAFF: Baron
7/3/75

FILE:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED (1)(A)
10 Mar 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

DATES:

FEB., 1961
(APPROXIMATE)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

Castro
~~CUBA~~ - PHASE I

(Card 1)

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4 ✓
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. RAY TREICHLER, Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

UNCLASSIFIED

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE HELMS BUNDY R. KENNEDY	HOOVER	Mar 2, 1964	✓Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U.S. would not condone the planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach to March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Che Guevera." "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy

TOP SECRE

SOURCE: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110)

FILE:

STAFF:
diGenova

DATE:
7/3/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MURPHY	LYMAN	4/23/63	CUBA
KILPATRICK	~~CASTRO~~		
~~MCCONE~~	CASTRO'S SISTER		SPECIAL GROUP
FITZGERALD ✓			

OCCURRENCE: Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that Castro's sister worked for us, but that she didn't always have inside information.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.

FILE:

STAFF: WALLACH

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
(292) 15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ✓	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Desmond FITZGERALD		
AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963	Castro
Nestor SANCHEZ	Nov. 13, 1963	
Robert KENNEDY		Card 1 of 2
HELMS		

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

> "FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SANCHEZ~~ FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 2)

In a memorandum by SANCHEZ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed AMLASH that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting " (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting AMLASH stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him."(90)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
IG REPORT 1967	F. Baron
FILE:	DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
(272) 15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Desmond FITZGERALD AMLASH Nestor SANCHEZ Robert KENNEDY HELMS	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro Card 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

> "FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:

IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:

F Baron

DATE:

7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SANCHEZ~~ FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

(CARD 2)

In a memorandum by SANCHEZ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed AMLASH that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting " (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. ~~In particular,~~ he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting AMLASH stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him."(90)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF: F. Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WAINWRIGHT TEPEDINO FITZGERALD ✓ AMLASH	November 14,1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

WAINWRIGHT met with TEPEDINO, who reported to him AMLASH's reaction to his meeting with FITZGERALD. TEPEDINO said that AMLASH dwelt constantly on the fact that "he could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the US Government gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. According to TEPEDINO, [AMLASH] feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technician, he will probably become fed up again, and we will lose whatever progress we have made to date." (91)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:
F Baron

DATE:
7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
~~SANCHEZ~~
AMLASH
FITZGERALD ✓

DATES:
Nov. 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:
Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Nestor SANCHEZ prepared a memorandum for the Record which indicated that the CIA would give ~~AMLASH~~ assassination weapons: "C/SAS (FITZGERALD) approved telling [AMLASH] he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include... high power rifles W/scopes.....C/SAS requested written reports on AMLASH operation ~~be kept to a minimum." (91) (Emphasis added)~~

Note: These are sniper/assassin weapons.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF: F Baron

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SANCHEZ AMLASH FITZGERALD ✓	Nov. 22, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Nester SANCHEZ met with AMLASH in Paris and gave him an assassination device (a ball-point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe for the injection of poison). (93-93a) According to the IG REPORT, "It is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot, a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against CASTRO." (94)

SANCHEZ stated "that he received an OPIM cable from FITZGERALD that night or early ~~the next~~ morning telling him that everything was off." (94) But, the IG REPORT authors did not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. (94)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	IG REPORT 19[illegible]7	STAFF:	F Baron
FILE:		DATE:	7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY HELMS MCCONE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD	July 25,1962	SPECIAL GROUP MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. [redacted] Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF: diGenova

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
TSD TREICHLER, Raymond EDWARDS, Sheffield O'CONNELL	GIANCANA ✓	Late January 1961	CUBA (Syndicate/Phase I)

OCCURRENCE:

TSD prepared poison pills (of Botulin) rather than liquid poison. (24).

Treichler remembers meeting with EDWARDS and O'CONNELL in EDWARDS' office to discuss the requirement "(24) for poison pills, which had initially been the preference of GIANCANA.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 7/3/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 15-3-94

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR~~
~~RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~ ~~as sanitized~~
~~15-3-94~~

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Maheu Edwards Rosselli Giancana ✓	Trafficante Breckinridge	3 or 4-61	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge testified that Maheu was on retainer to CIA "in the early days" (Tr. 99) ('50's?) and "on one occasion he obtained a female companion for an [redacted] [redacted]" (Tr. 99) Edwards contacted Maheu who contacted Roselli who contacted Giancana who contacted Trafficante, who "travelled to and from Cuba," (Tr. 100) and who "had a source inside Cuba (who) ...was believed to have access to Castro and a poison pill was developed that he was to insert into Castro's food." (Tr. 101)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Testimony of Wm. Colby, 5/23/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE:

7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
(3 of 3) 15-3-94 lec

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
(See list of names below.)

DATES:
Apr 17, '61 –

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
CASTRO ~~CUBA~~ – SYNDICATE/PHASE II -- KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II

CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)
5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. [redacted] HARVEY's deputy in 1962 [redacted] knows that HARVEY was meeting with gansters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967 p. 55 - 56

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(Same instruction as card 1.)

DATES:

Apr 17, '61

CATEGORIES:

CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. [redacted] TSD [redacted]s participation was limited to furnishing the bills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

0. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(con't.)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
RFK	Mr. McCone	[redacted]	Oct 9, 1962	Special Group (Augmented)
McGeorge Bundy	Mr. Wilson	Mr. Parrot		
Mr. Johnson	Dr. Charyk			
Mr. Gilpatric ✓	Dr. Scoville			
Gen. Taylor	Col. Steakley			Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of ✓ the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

FILE: (02821)

STAFF:

DATE: PGW

6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
15-3-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson Cheever	Oct 31, 1961	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

As for psychological operations, all CIA assets [redacted] had been turned over to USIA for operational use.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00744)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

09/29/93

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10006

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : [R]
TO : [R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS [R]

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 495

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO [R]
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 139, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Sam Gold ✓	Dr. Edward Gunn	September 25, 1961	Castro
Juan Orta Dr. Raymond Treichler Cornelius Roosevelt			

OCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but that if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethal content, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966.

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
Oct. 6, 1960

CATEGORIES:
Special Group
MONGOOSE
Presidential Authorization
Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (cont.)

including some [redacted] in this group and that we would talk informally to [redacted] about it. He emphasized that he was asking for no Special Group approval at this time in this specific connection."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group meeting October 6, 1960

FILE: Cage

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
[redacted]
Peter Grace ✓

DATES:
Dec. 5, 1960

CATEGORIES:
Mongoose
Special Group

OCCURRENCE: The Special Group discussed (1) [redacted]; (2) a proposal to survey the possibility of establishing a strike base in Nicaragua; (3) the necessity for the Defense Department to supply 38 military men to CIA. "Mr. Douglas questioned whether the present concept of 600 or 700 Cubans is any longer practicable. He said that it had been his understanding that the current thinking contemplated figures more on the order of 3,000." Mr. Barnes replied that the CIA believes what is required is enough individuals to serve as a rallying point for the anti-Castro elements in Cuba and thus 600 is as useful as 3,000. The CIA justified the request for 38 military men because it now believed it was necessary to train the Cubans in infantry tactics involved in a defense, in addition to the guerrilla warfare training previously contemplated.

SOURCE: Special Group meeting minutes Dec. 5, 1960

FILE:

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6-4-94
(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
GUNN, Dr. Edward [redacted] TSD	August 16, 1960	CUBA (Lethal Cigars)

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CARD 1 of 2

DR. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has a notation that on 16 August 1960, he received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with a lethal material. (21). He understood them to be CASTRO's favorite brand. (21). GUNN's notes show that within the next month he contacted [redacted] of TSD, (Sept. 6, 1960) and gave him the box of cigars (21). [redacted] recalls "that he did contaminate a full box of 50 cigars with Botulinum Toxin, a virulent poison," (21) which would kill the intended victim upon merely putting it in the mouth. [redacted] notes showed delivery of the box on February 13, 1961, although they do not indicate to whom. (22).

FILE: IG Report '67

7/3/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

DATES:

FEB., 1961
(APPROXIMATE)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

Castro
~~CUBA~~ - PHASE I

(Card 1)

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. [redacted], Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services ✓
10. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Sam Gold
Dr. Edward Gunn ✓
Juan Orta
Dr. Raymond Treichler
Cornelius Roosevelt

DATES:
September 25, 1961

CATEGORIES:
Castro

OCCURRENCE: In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing the mission, Sam Gold suggested that they not resort to firearms, but ~~that~~ if he could be furnished with some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official, who had been receiving back payments from the gambling interests who still had access to Castro, and was in a financial bind. Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD was consulted and assigned Dr. Raymond Treichler to develop a pill that had the elements of rapid solubility, high lethal content, and little or no traceability. Six of these items were produced and after being checked out for their effectiveness by Dr. Edward M. Gunn, three pills were ultimately turned over to Sam for the mission. Neither TSD nor Dr. Gunn was briefed on the ultimate use of the pills.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: CIA Justice File R-153 Memorandum by Howard J. Osborn to Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, Subj: Robert A. Maheu dated June 24, 1966.

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SANCHEZ~~ Samuel HALPERN AMLASH Dr. Edward GUNN ✓	Nov. 20, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

SANCHEZ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

Samuel HALPERN and SANCHEZ requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to SANCHEZ a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)

SOURCE: IG REPORT 19[illegible]

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF: F Baron

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Helms
Harvey, Wm.
Gunn, Dr. Edward
[redacted]

DATES:
5/25/67

CATEGORIES:
CASTRO

OCCURRENCE: The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services; and, brief records of [redacted] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used. For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant innaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).

SOURCE: IG Report/1967

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

[redacted]
Harvey
Bissell
Kennedy, Robert
HALPERN ✓

DATES:

~~E[illegible]~~ 1961
October

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [redacted] [redacted] was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occured in the middle of Oct. of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [redacted] and to me ~~for~~ were to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Halpern Gen Lansdale Bissell [redacted]	Oct 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Shortly after ~~his~~ Halpern's meeting with Bissell, Hapern, and [redacted] were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove ~~in~~ the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Shea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] Harvey Halpern Helms MCCONE	Dec 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted] sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) [redacted] told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to [redacted] office, checked into the organization of [redacted] operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division (14).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
FITZGERALD, Desmond HALPERN, Sam ✓ [redacted]	Early 1963	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

DESMOND FITZGERALD originated a scheme to assassinate CASTRO: "The idea was to taken an unusually spectacular sea shell that would be certain to catch CASTRO's eye, load it with an explosive trigger,d to blow when the shell was lifted, and submerge it in an area where CASTRO often went skin diving." (77). FITZGERALD explored this idea at several sessions with SAM HALPERN and [redacted] [redacted], but it was ultimately dismissed as impractical. (77).

DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: There is no indication that FITZGERALD told anyone above him in the CIA hierarchy of this plan.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: ~~JFD~~ Baron

FILE:

DATE: 6/29/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SANCHEZ Samuel HALPERN ✓ AMLASH Dr. Edward GUNN	Nov. 20, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

SANCHEZ reported that although AMLASH had wanted "a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards," (92) he decided finally that he knew, as a Doctor of Medicine, that "we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (92)

Samuel HALPERN and SANCHEZ requested assistance from Dr. Edward GUNN of the CIA Office of Medical Services. (92) On Nov. 20, 1963, they told GUNN that "the device for administering the poison (a ball point pen rigged as a hypodermic syringe) had to be ready in time for SANCHEZ to catch a plane at noon the next day." (93) The next day GUNN delivered to SANCHEZ a pen capable of injecting a poisonous insecticide known as "black leaf 40". (92-93)

SOURCE:	IG REPORT 1967	STAFF:	F Baron
FILE:		DATE:	7/1/75

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KING, J. C. HARVEY IG REPORT EDWARDS BISSELL HALPERN ✓	May 23, 1967	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, [redacted] J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, [redacted] John Warner, [redacted] William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman [redacted] Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER ✓Harris Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 ✓ 6/21-23/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, Roig, has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Harris / Craig	June 27, 1962 ~~June 21-23, 1962~~ 7/1/62 6/21-23/62 ✓	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: One infiltration team introduced into Oriente Province on June 4 and 5, 1962 reported that Cuban security measures made operations in that area difficult. Raul Castro on June 25 reported that the four had been captured and two had been executed, but to this date the report is not accepted as fact. June 21-22, 1962 a Marine operation to emplace a cache of arms and demolitions was accomplished without incident. The defector, [redacted] has begun to provide names of other Cuban G-2 personnel abroad. Effective July 1, 1962 Brig. Gen. B.T. Harris, U.S. Army will replace Brig. Gen. Craig as DOD operations representative.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Operation MONGOOSE, June 27, 1962 (00399-00400)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(a)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, William ~~Win, K.~~ J. ~~KJ~~ QJWIN [redacted]		EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that QJ.Win was an agent that he considered for possible use and used for a limited period through [redacted] for the spotting of individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multipurpose use, none of whom were ever advised of the use. (50) Or were ever used.

~~When HARVEY was asked if the multipurpose use included assassination, he stated that if~~ he had ever been directly ordered to perform an assassination, he would have considered the people spotted by Q.J.Win as possibilities. (50) He testified that before someone would have actually been approached to carry out that operation, there would have been a long period of assessment and cross checks. As far as he knew, the particular spotting mechanism never went that far. So far as HARVEY could recall K.J.Win was used only once in connection with an operation in the Congo, which was not an assassination operation. (51)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 50-51

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(c)
(1) B

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Helms, Richard ✓
Harvey, Mr. ✓

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that he does not recall whether he selected Harvey to head the Cuban operation, but ~~that~~ he did certainly approve Harvey's selection. Prior to receiving the commitment Harvey had been in charge of a staff in the foreign intelligence staff whose function was to mount operations against [redacted] (49-50)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that during World War II he worked on counterespionage matters with the FBI, having entered the Bureau as a Special Agent in 1940. He continued in that job until 1947, when he joined the CIA as the head of the Soviet Intelligence Branch. Between 1947 and 1952, he worked on Soviet counterespionage and special operations in the Department of Plans. Between 1952 and 1959, he was in Berlin as [redacted] for the CIA. He was instrumental in the Berlin tunnel operation. In 1959, he became Chief of the Foreign Intelligence Staff Division, D. This is the Division which is responsible [redacted] Operations of Staff D [redacted]

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, pp. 5-9

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 30.6.75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William ✓
O'DONNELL, Justin
BISSELL, Richard

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

LUMUMBA

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he worked with a man called JUSTIN O'DONNELL in Staff [illegible]. He stated that O'DONNELL came to him and said that he had been approached by RICHARD BISSELL, who was then the Deputy Director of Plans (DD/P) to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of PATRICE LUMUMBA. HARVEY testified that O'DONNELL told him that he had declined to undertake this assignment.

HARVEY testified that he subsequently had a conversation with BISSELL, in which BISSELL stated that he had requested O'DONNELL to undertake such an operation. (9-10)

HARVEY testified that he did not know about any steps undertaken on behalf of the Agency in connection with any proposals to eliminate LUMUMBA. (10)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975 (pp. 9-10)

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94 ee
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, WILLIAM ✓ [redacted] KUBARK	~~Spring, '61~~ ~~1/61~~ Jan. 26, 1961	EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey was asked about notes written by him and [redacted] from their meeting in January of 1961, concerning Executive Action. One portion of the notes stated, "Be within KUBARK, one focal point for control, search, training, case officering, etc. -- GDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?" (57) Harvey testified that he did not know whether the DCI was advised, that he had been asked to create a capability for Executive Action and had taken certain steps to have an assessment of assets in that connection. (57) Harvey clarified that the wording of the memo probably meant that consideration should be given to the question of how, whether and under what circumstances the DCI should be officially advised of his program, "I want to make it clear that this in no way means he should be advised. He should not be advised, he should never be advised, he should always be advised." (59). He testified that this matter would have been brought up again at any time the Executive Action Project led to specific targeting or specific operation or specific [illegible] for that purpose. (59)

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June [illegible], [illegible], pp. [illegible]

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: HARVEY ✓

DATES: Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES: EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rifle

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

"Harvey's hadwritten notes entitled Project Zrriffle (exhibit 1) state "Objectives". The objectives of this project is the procurement of [redacted]. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The Project will be conducted by division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed." (exhibht 1)
Harvey testified that his notes didnot cite assassination or assassination capability as an objective of project Zrriffle. However, assassination was a contemplated purpose of the project. If an agent had been recruited for assassination he would have been recruited under the cover [redacted] (49)

SOURCE: Harvey 6/25/75

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY ✓

DATES:

Jan 26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rifle

OCCURRENCE:

The notes in Harvey's handwriting entitled Project Zrriffle state "3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials division D in 1960 began spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sentative because most agencies are not equipped to conduct this type of operation, and because of the desirability to completely centralize control over this entire effort, it was determined that division d which was the closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category. (exhibit 1, page 1 - 2)

SOURCE:

FILE: Harvey 6/25/75

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, William ✓ [redacted] BISSELL, Richard	26 Jan. 1961	EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY testified that he had a conversation with [redacted] about the EXECUTIVE ACTION project on January 26, 1961, after HARVEY and BISSELL had already discussed the matter. (52) HARVEY testified that he learned early in the operation that BISSELL had discussed the question of assassination with [redacted] (52)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 30.6.75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94 (1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Silver, Arnold Harvey, William ✓ Bissell, Richard	1/26/61	EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE: Harvey testified that he had a conversation with Arnold Silver about the Executive Action Project on January 26, 1961, after Harvey and Bissell had already discussed the matter (52). Harvey testified that he learned early in the operation that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver. (52)

TOP SECR

SOURCE: HARVEY TESTIMONY, June 25, 1975, p. 52

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY ✓
K. G. WIN

DATES:

Jan.26, 1961

CATEGORIES:

EXECUTIVE ACTION

ZR Rifle

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey's handwritten notes eneitled Project Zrriffle state "4. Operational Assets: (1) personnel: K.G. Win is under written contact as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. K.G. Win was first contacted in 1958 to the Chief of the Luxembourgis by the chief of station, Luxembourg , in connection with illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For aperiod of a year and a half he was contacted spqreatically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by K. G. Win. In October 1960:

K. G. Win annual salary $7,200
Travel and OBS expenses for K. G. Win and other agents and agent candidates $2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates $2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrriffle $2,000
Hire of safe houses and other automobile expenses $1,000
Total $14,700

SOURCE:
(Harvey Exhibit 1, pages 1 - 3)

FILE: Harvey 6/27/75

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BISSELL, Richard ✓
HARVEY, William ✓
[redacted]
SILVER, Arnold
LUMUMBA, Patrice
O'DONNELL, Justin
BRECKENRIDGE, S.
HELMS, Richard
QJWIN

DATES:
FEB. ~~May~~ 1961

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE
CONGO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The EXECUTIVE ACTION program authorized by BISSELL and run by WILLIAM HARVEY "came to be known as ZRRIFLE. Its principal asset was an agent, QJWIN, who had been recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in a special operation in the Congo (the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA) to be run by JUSTIN O'DONNELL. (O'DONNELL made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in that assassination attempt, and asked to be released -- which BISSELL granted.)" (38)

NOTE: In the copy of the I.G. REPORT provided to the Committee, which was, according to EARMAN's cover memorandum the ribbon copy, which was the only text of the report in existence, the phrase in the above paragraph "(the assassination of PATRICE LUMUMBA)" was crossed out. S. BRECKENRIDGE indicated to the Committee that this phrase was crossed out by RICHARD HELMS when he read the report. Why?

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 38

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BRECKINRIDGE, SCOTT HARVEY, WILLIAM ✓	2/61	CASTRO EXECUTIVE ACTION/ZRRIFLE

OCCURRENCE: Breckinridge testified that from his review of the files of Project ZRRIFLE, the "controlling character" (80) of the Project was to steal codes rather than to develop the capability for assassination. (80)

Breckeinridge testified that on the face of the documents relating to Project ZRRIFLE, the Project was only directed at stealing codes. The fact that it related to developing the capability to assassinate came out in interviews with William Harvey. (81)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: BRECKINRIDGE testimony, 6/2/75

STAFF: WALLACH

DATE: 7/5/75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
BISSELL, Richard	GOTTLIEB, Sidney	February 1961 (HARVEY's rough estimate)	EXECUTIVE ACTION / ZRRIFLE
HARVEY ✓			CASTRO
WHITE HOUSE			~~[illegible]~~ CONGO
[redacted]			

OCCURRENCE:

BISSELL assigns to HARVEY the developing of "an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability; i.e., a general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required." (37)

"HARVEY's notes quote BISSELL as saying, 'The WHITE HOUSE has twice urged me to create such a capability.' BISSELL recalls discussing the question of developing a general capability with HARVEY." (37)

"HARVEY says that BISSELL had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with [redacted] [redacted] and with SIDNEY GOTTLIEB." (37-38).

(continued)

card 1 of 2

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

CARD 2 of 2

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard

DATES:

feb 61

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (continued from card 1)

HARVEY used SILVER in developing the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability (38).

RUGS states that ~~S~~ometime shortly after this initial meeting, and while HARVEY was still discussing the development of EXECUTIVE ACTION with BISSELL, "he briefed Mr. HELMS fully on the general concept but without mention of the then on-going plan to assassinate CASTRO." (38)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 37-38

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(See the 13 names listed below)

TOP SECRET

DATES:

FEB, 1961
(APPROXIMATE)

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

Castro
~~CUBA~~ – PHASE I

(Card 1)

OCCURRENCE: The I.G. REPORT identified the following persons who knew, in late 1960 or early 1961, of the PHASE I plan to assassinate CASTRO:

1. ALLEN DULLES, DCI
2. GEN. C. P. CABELL, DDCI
3. RICHARD BISSELL, DD/P
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security
5. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security, the case officer
6. J. D. ESTERLINE, Chief, WH/4
7. CORNELIUS ROOSEVELT, Chief, TSD
8. RAY TREICHLER, Chemical Division, TSD
9. EDWARD GUNN, Chief, Operations Division, Medical Services
10. ✓ WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, FI/D
11. SIDNEY GOTTLIEB, Special Assistant to the DD/P (GOTTLIEB's name was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he denies knowing of the operation in 1960-61.)
12. ROBERT BANNERMAN, DD/Security
13. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He too denies knowing of the operation at the time.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 34-35

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET
(See list of names below.)	Apr 17, '61 –	CASTRO ~~CUBA~~ – SYNDICATE/PHASE II -- KNOWLEDGE OF PHASE II CARD 1 of 3

OCCURRENCE: The list of persons with knowledge of PHASE II of the CASTRO ASSASSINATION OPERATION differs from those who knew of PHASE I. Those with knowledge of PHASE II are:

1. RICHARD HELMS, DD/P
2. WILLIAM HARVEY, Chief, Task Force W
3. JAMES O'CONNELL, Office of Security (He knows that Harvey took over the operation and delivered pills, arms, and equipment in April 1962. He does not know of developments after May 1962.)
4. SHEFFIELD EDWARDS, D/Security (He knows of the fact of the turnover to HARVEY, but states he knows nothing of developments thereafter.)
5. J. C. KING, Chief, WH Division (He stated in our interview with him that he knew that HARVEY was having meetings with members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.)
6. BRUCE CHEEVER, HARVEY's deputy in 1962 (CHEEVER knows that HARVEY was meeting with gansters in Reno (sic) in the winter of 1962.)
7. TED SHACKLEY, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted HARVEY in the delivery of arms and equipment to VARONA in April 1962, but presumably did not know the identities of the recipients nor (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967 p. 55 - 56

STAFF: Baron

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
(Same instruction as card 1.)	Apr 17, '61	CARD 2 of 3

OCCURRENCE:

SHACKLEY, cont: the purpose for which the material was to be used.)

8. RAY TREISCHLER, TSD (TREISCHLER's participation was limited to furnishing the pills to O'CONNELL on 18 April 1962.)

9. ANTONIO VARONA, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably was not aware of government sponsorship.)

10. VARONA'S SON-IN-LAW (He too was presumably not aware of government's role.)

11. MACEO, ROSELLI's "Man" (MACEO probably knew there was a government connection, but may not have identified CIA as the agency.)

(con't.)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
11-4-94 (1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

[redacted] ✓
Harvey ✓
Bissell
Kennedy, Robert
HALPERN

DATES:

~~[illegible]~~ 1961
October

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [redacted] [redacted] was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occured in the middle of Oct of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [redacted] and to me ~~for~~ were to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

[redacted]
Halpern
Helms
Harvey ✓
MCCONE

DATES:

Dec 1961

CATEGORIES:

Castro

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted], sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) [redacted] told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to [redacted]'s office, checked into the organization of [redacted]'s operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division (14).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

FILE:

STAFF: Shea

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
✓ HARVEY, LANSDALE
Roig, Pedro

DATES:
June 19, 1962

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: It was agreed that Harvey was to work towards reaching a stage in the interrogation of Pedro Roig, the Cuban economic official who defected to Mexico, where he can be surfaced to make public charges of Cuban Communist operations against Latin American nations. Harvey was to generate a story from Cuban refugee sources that the original Cardenas incident consisted of a demonstration concerning the shortage of food. This was to cause ridicule of the Communist regime's use of MIGs, tanks and troops against the unarmed people of Cardenas. "The Cuban source to story need not await your determination of the true cause of the Cardenas demonstration."

SOURCE: Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, from Lansdale, re: Impact Actions, 19 June 1962 (00395)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE, HARVEY, [redacted] [redacted]	July 10, 1962 ~~June 11, 1962~~ ~~July 1, 1962~~ ~~May 1962~~	MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Rug, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to [redacted], she contacted Ruz and obtained [redacted] agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm [redacted] Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of [redacted] in Mexico.

SOURCE: Memorandum for McCone from William Harvey re: [redacted], 10 July 1962 (02561)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	KIRKPATRICK DDP Mr. Halpern CHEEVER	11/14/62 Nov. 21, 1962 10/30/62	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORID teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:

STAFF: Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

William Harvey ✓ KIRKPATRICK
Gen. Lansdale DDP
Walter Elder Mr. Halpern
DCI CHEEVER

DATES:

11/14/62
Nov. 21, 1962
10/30/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongoose
Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and [redacted] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

STAFF: Paul Wallach

FILE:

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARVEY, William ✓
Chief, FI Staff, CIA
QJWIN

DATES:

27 June 1963
~~27 April 1964~~

CATEGORIES: TOP SECRET

EXECUTIVE ACTION

OCCURRENCE:

HARVEY writes a memorandum to the Chief, FI Staff, "stating that the original justification for employing QJWIN no longer existed." (41) ~~On 21 April 1964 QJWIN was terminated by~~ [redacted]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 41

FILE:

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 28.6.75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KING, J. C. IG REPORT BISSELL HALPERN HARVEY ✓ EDWARDS	May 23, 1967	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, [redacted] J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, [redacted] John Warner, [redacted] William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, Henry Bortner, Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Helms Harvey, Wm Gunn, Dr. Edward [redacted]	5/25/67	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE: The memorandum of April 25, 1967 which introduces the IG's Report on assassination plotting in relation to FIDEL CASTRO indicates that the only written records which served as a basis for the IG Report were: Notes of William Harvey; Records of Dr. Edward Gunn (Office of Medical Services; and, brief records of [redacted] (of TSD). Some operational files were also used. For the most part, the Inspector General's office relied upon information given to us orally by people who's memories are fogged by time. (1)

"We interviewed everyone whom we could identify as likely to be knowledgeable, with the exceptions of MR. DULLES and GENERAL CABELL." (2)

A complete list of the interviewees is attached to the IG Report at Tab A. "If there are significant innaccuracies in the Report they are most likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events." (2).

SOURCE: IG Report/1967

STAFF: Baron

[illegible]

FILE:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED.
14-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Edwards	Gomez ✓	11/62	Castro
King	Holcomb ✓		
Bannerman	O'Connell		

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or Holcombe, knew (100)

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HOUSTON ✓	'50-'60 '60's assume one date	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Houston testified that he cannot remember that his legal advice as to not continuing a project was ever rejected by CIA, (47) although Houston recalls vetoing two propositions: [redacted].

SOURCE:
Testimony of Lawrence Houston, 6/2/75

FILE:

STAFF:
John Bayly

DATE:
6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BUNDY KILPATRICK MCCONE HUGHES ✓	COL. KING	June 20,1963	DUVALIER Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On June 20, 1963the Special Group approved a CIA paper dated June 1970 regarding political action in Haita. (The substance of the paper is not expressed). "Mr. MCCONE said he has some reservations about the quality of any possible replacements for DUVALIER but agreed that it is necessary to take some action in order to prevent Haiti eventually going very far to the left. Colonel KING... said that in his opinion, we have no feasible alternatives to cooperate with BOSCH in attempting to unseat DUVALIER...

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutesof Special Group meeting June 20, 1963

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	8/19/64	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK		6/10/64	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE			
JMWAVE	VANCE			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--JOSE MARIO PEPIN [redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MCCONE FITZGERALD HUGHES
BUNDY PAPICH BOSCH, JOSE
JESSUP RFK
STEAKLEY JMWAVE
JMWAVE VANCE

DATES:
8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:
SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--[redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

Baron 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	8/19/64	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK		6/10/64	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE			
JMWAVE	VANCE			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.-[redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
14-4-94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey Gen. Lansdale Walter Elder DCI	KIRKPATRICK DDP Mr. Halpern CHEEVER	11/14/62 Nov. 21, 1962 10/30/62	Special Group Augmented Operation Mongoose Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and [redacted] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE: [illegible]

STAFF: Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10007

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : [R]
TO : [R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS [R]

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 192

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]
CASTRO [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 139, Book 3 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

7 FEB 94
1(A)

Box 139

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE~~, Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, [redacted] RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ✓ ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. [redacted] For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
GJ 7 FEB 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~ Lansdale, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER, [redacted] RUSK, KOHLER, HURWITCH	June 20, 1962 ~~July 31, 1962~~ ~~June 12, 1962~~ ~~May 17, 1962~~ June 22, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Due to reports of popular unrest, political strife, and economic disruptions inside Cuba, it was suggested that the Special Group Augmented consider the value of having an SNIE on Cuba made in the immediate future. [redacted] For operational effectiveness, the CIA has selected a new area in Cuba for its initial radio broadcasts from a submarine for "Voice of Cuba." The Navy states that the new area is feasible and State has concurred in the theme and content of the broadcast. They will take place around the end of the month. No proposals for actions by the Department of State have been submitted since the appointment of State's special representative, Mr. Hurwitch. They are expected on June 22, 1962.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress, Operation MONGOOSE, 20 June 1962 (00397-00398)

FILE:

STAFF:
di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized.
8 FEB 94
1(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KING, J. C. IG REPORT ✓ BISSELL HALPERN HARVEY EDWARDS	May 23, 1967	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, Bruce Cheever, J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, [redacted], John Warner, [redacted], William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, [redacted], Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized.
8 Feb 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	8/19/64	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK		6/10/64	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE			
JMWAVE	VANCE			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000. JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum, would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE:
Baron, 7/1/75

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
GJ 8 Feb 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	8/19/64	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	[redacted]	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK		6/10/64	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE			
JMWAVE	VANCE			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--[redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

8 Feb 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE
FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE
HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--[redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6L 8 FEB 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE

FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE

HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000. [redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6L 8 FEB 94
1 (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE

FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE ✓
VANCE

HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.- [redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6J 8 FEB 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE

FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE

HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.- [redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6J 8 FEB 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE
FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE
HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000. [redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 FEB 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE

FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE

HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICHof the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--[redacted] [redacted], [redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

8 Feb 94
1(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE
FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE
HUGHES
[redacted]

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--[redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
DJ Feb 9 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RFK
McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Johnson ✓
Mr. Gilpatric
Gen. Taylor
Mr. McCone
Mr. Wilson
[redacted]
Dr. Scoville
Col. Steakley
[redacted]
Mr. Parrot

DATES:

Oct 9, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group (Augmented)

Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of ✓ the island, [redacted]. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

FILE: (02831)

STAFF:

DATE: PGW

6/20/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized.
GJ Feb 9 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
JOHNSON ✓ KILPATRICK MCCONE	Sept.16,1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On September 16, 1963 a memorandum reported that "all members of the special group have approved project [redacted] activties in the area of Cuba.)"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum dated 16 September 1963 for members of the Special Group from Mr. Parrott

FILE:

STAFF:
Kelley

DATE:
6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized
8 Feb 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
James S. Leigh, Jr. ✓ Insp. General (CIA) ✓ CARTER USIB	Nov. 16, 1962	Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

On November 16, 1962 James Leigh at the CIA Inspector General's request and with General Carter's approval sent the Inspector General a brief summary of comments by USIB members regarding the FFIAB request that the Inspector General was working on.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: To memorandum from James S. Leigh to the Inspector General dated November 16, 1962. (00885)

FILE:

STAFF: Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/3/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :	157-10011-10008
RECORD SERIES :	INDEX CARDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SSCIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	INDEX CARDS
DATE :	06/00/1975
PAGES :	577
SUBJECTS :	OPERATION MONGOOSE
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; 1A; 1B; 1C; 2; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/01/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 140, Book 1 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

ID #

157-10011-10008

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Dec 93
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CARTER, MARSHALL KAMCHATKA ✓ [redacted]	9/20/62	SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE: Special Group meeting on 20 September, the proposed use of [redacted] against KAMCHATKA was disapproved. The A-DCI raised the possibility of using this [redacted] against Cuba, but no decision was made, although the Group appeared favorably inclined.

SOURCE: Memorandum by Carter, 9/21/62 (02637)

STAFF: WALLACH

FILE:

DATE: 7/2/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CARD 3		Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations [redacted]

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: PRES. KENNEDY, HARVEY, TAYLOR Duque	DATES: MAY 7, 1962	CATEGORIES: MONGOOSE, SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED

OCCURRENCE: Memo: "I reported to higher authority the substance of Mr. HARVEY'S briefing of the SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED on 3 MAY 1962, pointing out the very limited progress which has been made and the uncertainty of the ultimate effectiveness of our program. I mentioned the DUQUE incident as indicative of the morale problem. It was agreed we would continue along the present lines until the terminal date of the present phase in August."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: MEMO FOR RECORD, REPORT OF PROGRESS TO HIGHER AUTHORITY, MAY 7, 1962, MAXWELL D. TAYLOR (00024)

FILE:

STAFF: DiGenova

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Dec 93
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS ✓PRESIDENT KENNEDY
MCCONE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DATES:

July 25,1962

CATEGORIES:

SPECIAL GROUP
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. [redacted] Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF:

diGenova

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Dec 93
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
JFK ✓ Maxwell Taylor	27 Sept 62	Special Group Augmented MOONGOOSE Diem

OCCURRENCE:

Taylor states that the Special Group and the Sepcial Group Augmented considered a proposal by CIA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REpublic of Vietnam. This had been prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense. ✓

Taylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. It was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support of this program. [redacted]

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. (00050)

TOP SECRET

FILE:

STAFF: PGW

DATE: 6/29/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓ BUNDY ROBERT KENNEDY HELMS RUSK MCNAMARA	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On NOvember 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VaNCE, Mr.HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, MR. CHIEVER, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: 6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY ✓
ROBERT KENNEDY ✓
HELMS
RUSK
BUNDY
MCNAMARA

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On NOv. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitsgerald reported to the President that the United State economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: 6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Dec 93
(1)(c)

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Dec 93
(1)(2)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCone
Coloy ✓
Kennedy, John F.
McNamarra
Lodge

Nhu
Hillsman
[redacted]
Diem

DATES:

11 Sept 63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiusly, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context [redacted]

SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SMITH, DAVID	MCCONE	Oct. 29, 1963	DIEM
HARKINS, GENERAL	HELMS		
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM	COLBY		
KENNEDY, ROBERT			
KENNEDY, JOHN F. ✓			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy-making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
8 Dec 93
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED~~
~~MONGOOSE~~, TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON,
GILPATRICK, MCCONE, CARTER,
LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT

DATES:

July 12, 1962
~~July 20, 1962~~
April 9, ~~1963~~

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE

(CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." [redacted] He cautioned,

SOURCE: Memo for the record, Minutes of the Special Group (Augmented) meeting 12 July 1962 re: Operation MONGOOSE, (00031-00032)

FILE:

STAFF: (continued)

di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] Harvey Bissell Kennedy, Robert HALPERN	~~[illegible]~~ 1961 October	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Halpern testified that in the fall of 1961 he attended a meeting with Bissell and [redacted]. [redacted] was the Branch Chief (8). The meeting occured in the middle of Octo of 1961. Bissell stated at the meeting that he had recently "been chewed out in the cabinet room of the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime. His orders to both [redacted] and to me ~~for~~ were to plan an operation to accomplish that end." (8) Halpern testified that no limitations were put on the term "get rid of". Nothing was forbidden (8). The meeting involved only general discussions and not tactics.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Shea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

10 Doc 93
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BUNDY, GENERAL DECKER, MR. MURROW RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MARTIN GENERAL HARRIS, WILLIAM BUND, GENERAL CARTER	9/6/62	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Meeting of SGA On Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962. Discussion of LANSDALE's suggestion #32 (agricultural sabotage). GENERAL CARTER emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disasterous results that would flow from something going wrong particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. BUNDY said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as a result of local Cuban disaffection or a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc. unless they could be completely covered up. ✓

SOURCE:

SGA MONGOOSE Minutes 9/6/62 (00045-00046)

STAFF:

PGW

FILE:

Cage

DATE:

June 29, 1962

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 10 Dec 93
(1) (A)

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO~~
~~DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR~~
~~RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~
~~AS SANITIZED~~

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, [redacted] (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially to alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries--Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.

✓

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Elder

FILE: Cage 00049

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Doc

(1)(A)
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Walt ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, [redacted] (CIA),	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

Possibility of sabotage [redacted] is being looked into--Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962- Walt Eler

FILE: Cage 00049

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Dec 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER RFK ✓ GENERAL LANSDALE MCGEORGE BUNDY BRUCE CHEEVER (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

The 12 September addendum to the Phase II MONGOOSE operations was discussed and the entire Phase II was approved in priciple as a platform from which to proceed. ✓ Activities which may be especially sensitive are to be brought before the group, and this body wishes to be kept generally advised on progress.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE metting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Elder (00049)
FILE: Cage

STAFF: PGW
DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE MCGEORGE BUNDY, [redacted] (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

This memorandum reports that the ATTORNEY GENERAL "expressed concern that activities by certain Cuban exiles are reaching the point where the government may be forced to take action against them rather than to simply state that "we are investigating." The agency is requested to see what it can do to help the noise level of these activities. ✓

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting. 14 Sept 1962
Walt Elder (00818)
FILE: Cage

STAFF: PGW
DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~Nester SANCHEZ~~ Robert F. KENNEDY ✓ AMLASH-1	Oct. 11, 1963	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Nestor SANCHEZ (a Spanish-speaking case officer from Headquarters , acting as case officer for AMLASH-1) cabled that AMLASH-1 "was insistent upon meeting with a senior U.S. official, preferably Robert F. KENNEDY, for assurances of U.S. moral support" (88) for AMLASH's activities in Cuba. SANCHEZ recommended that "Highest and profound consideration be given" (88) because AMLASH-1 was determined to attempt an operation against Castro "with or without U.S. support" (88).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:
F Baron

DATE:
7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Desmond FITZGERALD AMLASH Nestor SANCHEZ Robert KENNEDY ✓ HELMS	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro Card 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

> "FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:
F Baron

DATE:
7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] ~~FITZGERALD~~ ~~AMLASH~~	Oct. ~~29,~~ 1963 Nov. ~~13,~~ 1963	Castro Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 2)

In a memorandum [redacted] on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact [redacted] that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting " (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the [redacted] memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him."(90)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT 1967	STAFF: F. Baron
FILE:	DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

[redacted]
HARKINS, GENERAL
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM
KENNEDY, ROBERT ✓
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MCCONE
HELMS
COLBY

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and [redacted] act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that [redacted] should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 10 Doc 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT KENNEDY ✓ HELMS [redacted] STEAKLEY	Nov. 5, 1963	CASTRO MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

Note that the minutes of the Special Group meeting on November 5, 1963 contain an underscored item on page 1 stating "see special minutes for additional items." This item appears on page 1 under a discussion of Cuban sabatoge and infiltration operations.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group meeting dated Nov. 6, 1963.

FILE:

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
10 Dec 93
(1)(3)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT KENNEDY✓	BUNDY	Nov. 12, 1963	MONGOOSE
ROBERT KENNEDY	MCNAMARA		PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL
HELMS			
RUSK			

OCCURRENCE:

On NOv. 12, 1963, Mr. Fitzgerald reported to the President that the United State economic denial program is contributing to Cuba's declining economy, but would be more effective if the Canadians would be willing to cooperate.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: 6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED —
10 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

PRESIDENT KENNEDY
ROBERT KENNEDY
HELMS
RUSK
MCNAMARA
BUNDY

DATES:

Nov. 12, 1963

CATEGORIES:

MONGOOSE
PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL

OCCURRENCE:

On NOvember 12, 1963 a meeting on "Cuban Operations" was held with "Higher Authority" (President Kennedy). Present were Mr. RUSK, Mr. MCNAMARA, Mr. ROBERT KENNEDY, Mr. BUNDY, Mr. MCCONE, Mr. JOHNSON, Mr. KILPAGRICK, Mr. VaNCE, Mr.HELMS, Mr. FITZGERALD, MR. CHIEVER, Mr. STEAKLEY. Mr. MCCONE gave a brief summary of recent developments inside Cuba and Mr. Fitzgerald reported on Cuban operations under six main headings. (Mr. FITZGERALD's discussions of these headings is contained in separate cards.)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record dated Nov. 12, 1963

FILE: "Cuban Operations"

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: 6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 13 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Desmond FITZGERALD AMLASH Nestor SANCHEZ Robert KENNEDY ✓ HELMS	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro Card 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 1)

Desmond FITZGERALD, Chief of SAS, met with AMLASH, using Nestor SANCHEZ as interpreter. (88-89). The cover of the "contact plan for the meeting, a copy of which is in the AMLASH file," (89) read as follows:

> "FITZGERALD will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. KENNEDY who traveled Paris for specific purpose meeting (AMLASH) and giving him assurances of full U.S. support if there is change of the present government in Cuba." (89)

According to FITZGERALD, he discussed the planned meeting with the DD/P (HELMS) who decided it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert KENNEDY for FITZGERALD to speak in his name." (89) (emphasis added)

SOURCE:
IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF:
F Baron

DATE:
7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SANCHEZ FITZGERALD AMLASH	Oct. 29, 1963 Nov. 13, 1963	Castro Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (CARD 2)

In a memorandum by SANCHEZ on November 13, 1963, it was reported that "FITZGERALD informed [AMLASH] that the U.S. is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-Communist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership." (89) Despite the fact that SANCHEZ reported that "nothing of an operational nature was discussed at the FITZGERALD meeting " (90), FITZGERALD recalled that AMLASH-1 "spoke repeatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-powered rifle with telescopic sights or some other weapon that could be used to kill Castro from a distance." (90) FITZGERALD said that he told AMLASH "that the U.S. Government would have no part of an attempt on CASTRO's life. (90) However, the SANCHEZ memorandum reported "After the meeting [AMLASH] stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion but now desired to know what technical support we could provide him."(90)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT 1967

FILE:

STAFF: F. Baron

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

13 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE HELMS BUNDY R. KENNEDY	HOOVER	Mar 2, 1964	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms states that agency officers have reported plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders. Agency officers told Cubans that U.S. would not condone the planned actions. Plans included: Cuban exile approach to March 2, 1964 by businessman to discuss a plan which was "still in the embryonic state to assassinate Fidel Castro." Businessman has underworld connections with Cosa Nostra. Latter group has offered to assassinate Castro for $150,000. Proposes to use 5 men. March 3, 1964 meeting in which Byron Cameron says he met an unidentified group which would be willing to assassinate selected Cuban officials for cash. Specifically the Cameron group is interested in assassinating Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, and Ernesto Che Guevera." "Cameron knows that he can indicted for conspiracy"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for DCI McCone from Richard Helms re plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate selected Cuban government leaders, June 10, 1964 (03105-031110)

FILE:

STAFF:
diGenova

DATE:
7/3/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE
FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE
HUGHES
BOSCH, JOSE

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.-JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF
DATE:
Baron, 7/1/75

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED -13 Dec 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE
BUNDY
JESSUP
STEAKLEY
JMWAVE
FITZGERALD
PAPICH
RFK
JMWAVE
VANCE
HUGHES
BOSCH, JOSE

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.-JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

STAFF:

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

JC 13 Dec 93

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	8/19/64	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK		6/10/64	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE			
JMWAVE	VANCE			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.-JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
MURPHY
KILPATRICK ✓
~~MCCONE~~
FITZGERALD
LYMAN
~~CASTRO~~
CASTRO'S SISTER

DATES:
4/23/63

CATEGORIES:
CUBA
SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE: Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied that Castro's sister worked for us, but that she didn't always have inside information.

TOP SEC

SOURCE:
Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.
FILE:

STAFF:
WALLACH
DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93
(1)(b)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
JOHNSON KILPATRICK ✓ MCCONE	Sept.16,1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On September 16, 1963 a memorandum reported that "all members of the special group have approved project [redacted] (having to do with certain [redacted] activties in the area of Cuba.)"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum dated 16 September 1963 for members of the Special Group from Mr. Parrott

FILE:

STAFF:
Kelley

DATE:
6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93
(1) (4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Edwards King ✓ Bannerman	Gomez Holcomb O'Connell	11/62	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

O'Connell testified that when EDWARDS was on leave, once, KING spoke to Robert BANNERMAN (Who was not witting of Castro project) and O'Connell had to tell BANNERMAN that B. was not "privy" to project. O'Connell was embarassed. (Tr. 36, 99-100). No one but KING, not Gomez or Holcombe, knew (100)

SOURCE:

Testimony of James P. O'Connell, 5/30/75

FILE:

STAFF:

John Bayly

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93
(1)(A)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KING, J. C. ✓ IG REPORT BISSELL HALPERN HARVEY EDWARDS	May 23, 1967	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

The following sources of information were used in preparing the IG REPORT of 1967: (1) Files: Furnished for review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, the General Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Chief of WH Division, and by Col. J. C. KING, former Chief of WH Division. Also, the Director of Central Reference furnished biographic files and intelligence publications. (2) Interviews: Desmond Fitzgerald, Sam Halpern, [redacted] J. C. King, Alfonso Rodriguez, J. D. Esterline, Edward Gunn, Howard Osborn, James O'Connell, Sidney Gottlieb, Sheffield Edwards, Richard Bissell, Lawrence Houston, [redacted] John Warner, [redacted] William Harvey, Cornelius Roosevelt, Robert Bannerman, [redacted] Richard Ober.

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Baron

DATE: 7/2/75

FILE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 19 Dec 63
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: KIRKPATRICK

William Harvey
Gen. Lansdale
Walter Elder
DCI
DDP
Mr. Halpern
CHEEVER

DATES:
11/14/62
Nov. 21, 1962
10/30/62

CATEGORIES:
Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongoose
Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORID teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:

STAFF: Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: KIRKPATRICK

William Harvey
Gen. Lansdale
Walter Elder
DCI
DDP
Mr. Halpern
CHEEVER

DATES:
11/14/62
Nov. 21, 1962
10/30/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongoose
Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and Cheever which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with Cheever and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA and AMTORID teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to Cheever's recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE:

FILE: Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

STAFF:
Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED — 13 Dec 93

(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: KIRKPATRICK

William Harvey
Gen. Lansdale
Walter Elder
DCI
DDP
Mr. Halpern
[redacted]

DATES:
11/14/62
Nov. 21, 1962
10/30/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongoose
Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [redacted] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with [redacted] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA [redacted] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [redacted] recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Paul Wallach

FILE:

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

13 Dec 93

(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place"[redacted]. (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

STAFF: di Genova

FILE:

DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

(continuation)

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 2 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 2

meeting of foreign ministers which opened January 22, 1962. The object was to get wide Western Hemisphere support for OAS resolutions condemning Cuba and isolating it from the rest of the hemisphere. "The OAS meeting is to be supported by public demonstrations in Latin America, generated by CIA and a psychological campaign assisted by USIA." The major task of the diplomatic capability was to encourage Latin American leaders to develop independent operations similar to the instant project seeking an internal revolt of the Cuban people against the Communist regime. In the economic warfare area an embargo on Cuban trade was to be considered after the OAS meeting. The CIA was unable to undertake the action to sabotage the sugar harvest which commences about January 15 and upon which Cuba's one-crop economy depended. Sabotage of transport, mills, sugar sacking in cane fields was explored, according to Lansdale's review. Special sabotage support was noted.→

SOURCE:

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
(continuation)		Card 3 of 4

OCCURRENCE: CARD 3

"CIA has initiated action to contaminate POL supplies for Cuba, although visible results (stopage of some Cuban transports) is not expected until mid-1962. CIA is introducing "Lubzol," a corrosive additive to Cuban locomotive diesel fuel oil through commercial suppliers in Belgium.) A similar project was noted for jet fuel storage tanks in Cuba. Lansdale noted that the CIA had concluded that its realistic role should be to at least create the illusion of a popular movement, to win external support for it, to improve CIA operational capability, and to help create a climate which will permit provocative actions in support of a shift to overaction. Lansdale wanted them to reevaluate to see whether or not they could make a greater effort. An outline of what the 33 tasks are for each of the entitities involved then follows in Lansdale's memo. The memorandum notes that the President directed that the Chief of Operations conduct the project through the appropriate organizations and departments of the government. In this regard the memo notes "Also, CIA apparently believes that its role should be to create and expand a popular

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CARD 3		Card 3 of 3

OCCURRENCE: (continued from Memo for the Special Group re: Cuba Project, Jan. 24, 1962 detectives and foreign police officials." (00106)

In regard to Task #7 of General Lansdale's review this memo notes, "Moreover, the development of a resisitence movement will not remain controllable, so that operational time tables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions." (00107)

The memorandum notes that six men to form the initial nucleus for work for inside Cuba have been assessed in depth. Fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers for resistence. It was also noted that in support of State's efforts, CIA has conducted propaganda operations including a number of mass demonstrations in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

SOURCE:

TOP SECRET

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
13 Dec 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Halpern Bissell [redacted] Gen Lansdale ✓	Oct 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Shortly after ~~his~~ Halpern's meeting with Bissell, Hapern, and [redacted] were introduced to Gen Lansdale who was the new Chief of Operations for an effort to remove ~~in~~ the Castro regime. The initial meeting was concerned with only organizational matters.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Shea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

13 Dec 93

(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE,	Mar 2, 1962 Nov 30, 1961	Special Group Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale traces the history of the project from its inception on Nov. 30, 1961 through March 1, 1962. Under the latter date, he notes, "The Chief of Operations /Lansdale/ is to report to the President through the Special Group (NSC 5412 Augmented by the Attorney General and the Chairman, JCS); the Special Group will be responsible for providing policy guidance for approving important operations, and for monitoring progress." (00181) Lansdale also submitted an intelligence plan for basic intelligence collection upon which to base the decision to undertake actions to cause the overthrow of Castro. The plan itself at pages 00183 through 00187, included establishing intelligence agents inside Cuba; collecting intelligence from Cubans inside the United States; counterfeiting ration cards and currency inside of Cuba; geographical surveys of air fields, military installations, communications centers; attempts to place trained agents inside the government organizations or to defect officials "in place" [redacted] (00180-00187)

SOURCE: Program review by Brig. Gen. Lansdale, Mar 2, 1962 on the Cuba Project (00180-00187)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LANSDALE,✓

Y,

DATES:

Mar 13, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE
CUBA

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: The planning for Operation MONGOOSE was prepared on a format of separate planning for each department and agency involved. Revised planning along that line was submitted with this memorandum. Activities already approved were marked with an asterisk. Approved were dispatching one intelligence agent operation to a key area selected by the CIA, ("Many of the agents infiltrated into Cuba will be trained for paramilitary skills as well as intelligence collection,...However, CIA has noted that, once the agents are inside Cuba, they cannot be controlled effectively from outside Cuba, although every effort will be made to attempt such control.") (00207), Carribbean Admissions Center Opa-Locka, Florida. Periodic intelligence estimates, continued negotiating for British help in contaminating locamotive lubricants, two teams of agents dispatched to Cuba approved for March 16-31, 1962, develop intelligence potential of Cuban "colonies" in U.S., develop additional interrogation centers in other areas by 31 March 1962 in South America and

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Institutional Planning, Operation MONGOOSE, 13 March 1962 (00206-00213)

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

JC 14 Dec 93
(1)(c)

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10009

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : [R]
TO : [R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 531

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]
CASTRO [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 140, Book 2 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
defer to NSA
1/5/94

CIA defers to NSA on deletion indicated,
JC 3 DEC 93

NSA delete bracketed information
RMcF 3/1/94
sec 6(1)(c)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE,~~ LANSDALE, TAYLOR, ~~JOHNSON, GIL-PATRICK,~~ MCCONE, RFK, ~~LEMNITZER,~~	July 11, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Notice to Special Group that operational representatives are preparing assessments of Operation MONGOOSE. These will cover among other things "factors worth considering in deciding on a future course of action (We have a working definition of four possible future courses of action)." [redacted]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented from Lansdale re: Progress OPERATION MONGOOSE 11 July 1962 (00428-00430)

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: di Genova
July 2, 1975

NSA Delete bracketed phrase 3/1/94
sec 6 (1)(c)

1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for excision. 1/12/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Lansdale	McCone	Rusk	8/31/62	SGA
Taylor	RFK	McNamara		MONGOOSE
Johnson	Lemnitzer	Harvey		
Gilpatrick	Bundy	PAN AM AIRLINES		

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale also suggests other activities to carry out objective C (ie intensification of intelligence collection).
These include the spotting, recruiting and training of [redacted] travelers who have potential access to significant information, maintaining Pan American Airlines service between the U.S. and Cuba, [expanding as practical communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications networks,] the continuing monitoring of overt Cuban broadcasts, etc.
For details see 00678-00680.

SOURCE: 8/31/62 memo from Gen Lansdale to SGA (00678-00680)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

NSA Delete bracketed info RMPf 3/1/94
sec 6 (1)(c)

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10/5/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, ~~except for~~
B 1/12/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY	4 Sept 1962	MONGOOSE (Phase II)

OCCURRENCE:

"Pursuant to our telephone conversation this afternoon, it would seem worthwhile to get the consensus of the group's views as to the type and timing of the activities in Phase II."

In my opinion, the following numbered activities may pose possible policy questions 20 (balloons), 23 (SWAN radio), 27 (sabotage), 32 (attack agriculture [redacted] [40 (COMINT)], 48-50 (Cuban exiles, Carribbean nations), 54 (post-Castro).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum from Lansdale to Bundy 4 Sept 1962

FILE: (00688)
Cape

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 29, 1975

NSA delete bracketed portion RMcF 3/1/94
sec 6 (1)(c)

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LANSDALE, General	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Groups Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

As reflected in the 14 Sept. 1962 minutes of the meeting of the SGA on Operation Mongoose, General LANSDALE "reported that the [NSA collection] program is being stepped up considerably and should be in full swing by 1 November".

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Minutes of meeting of SGA on Operation Mongoose 9/14/62
(00048)

FILE:
Cage

STAFF:
PGW

DATE:
6/30/75

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
but defer to STATE
on bracketed info

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
7 DEC 93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Helms, Richard ✓ Leyland Bus Co. ✓	1962	Castro Mongoose

OCCURRENCE: Helms testified that the aim of the Cuban operations was "to get rid of Castro or the Castro regime in Cuba; lets put it that way, and no limitations were placed on the means. In fact, I never recall having been told by anybody do not do this, do not do that, do not do the other thing." (26) (The above statements refer to Mongoose.) Helms testified that "the pressure was very intense and I remember vividly it was very intense." The pressure led to several "very nutty schemes." (26) Helms testified the pressure built up to the Bay of Pigs and then lay dormant for awhile and intensified again toward the end of 1961 and 1962. The Cuban Missile Crisis itself was the period of greatest intensity. Afterwards interest tapered off, although Helms recalled efforts in 1963 involving "economic warfare" such as turning off oil deliveries and stopping bus deliveries including an attempt to stop the sale by theLeyland Bus Company in Spain of buses to Cuba. (27)

SOURCE: Helms 6/13/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

TOP SECRET

DATE: 6/28/75

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

William Harvey
Gen. Lansdale
Walter Elder
DCI
KIRKPATRICK
DDP
Mr. Halpern
[redacted]

DATES:

11/14/62
Nov. 21, 1962
10/30/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
Operation Mongoose
Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to ~~a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and~~ [redacted] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with [redacted] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA [redacted] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [redacted] recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE:

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

STAFF:

Paul Wallach

FILE: [illegible]

DATE: July 1, 1975

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~
~~1 DEC 93~~

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
1 Dec 93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale ✓ William K. Harvey	8/7/62	SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED OPERATION MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Harvey states that the estimated cost of CIA in terms of personnel assigned full-time to Operation Mongoose would have to be increased to at least [redacted] (if stage two of Mongoose went into effect) and that the estimated fiscal budgets for 1963 and 1964 would have to be increased to over [redacted]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Aug 8, 1962 memo from Gen Lansdale to the Special Group Augmented (00587)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 2, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, except for excision. 1/12/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lansdale
Taylor
Johnson
Gilpatrick
McCone
RFK
Lemnitzer
Bundy
Rusk
McNamara
Harvey
PAN AM AIRLINES

DATES:
8/31/62

CATEGORIES:
SGA
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale also suggests other activities to carry out objective C (ie intensification of intelligence collection).
These include the spotting, recruiting and training of [redacted] travelers who have potential access to significant information, maintaining Pan American Airlines service between the U.S. and Cuba, expanding as practical communications intelligence coverage of Cuban communications networks, the continuing monitoring of overt Cuban broadcasts, etc.
For details see 00678-00680.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
8/31/62 memo from Gen Lansdale to SGA (00678-00680)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

No DoD objection to public disclosure pursuant to P.L. 102-526, ~~except for~~
1/12/94

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
☐ Retain class'n ☐ Change/classify to
☐ With concurrence of
☐ Declassify ☒ In part and excise as shown
EO 12356, Sec. 1.3 (a) (
FPC/HDR by Jaud 6/XII/93
grounds 6 (1)(B)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Lansdale	McCone	Rusk	8/31/62	SGA
Taylor	RFK	McNamara		MONGOOSE
Johnson	Lemnitzer	Harvey		
Gilpatrick	Bundy	VOA		

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale sets forth the psychological activities to be used to carry out objective A: (i.e., the discreditation and isolation of the Cuban regime).

The psychological activities include statements beamed to Cuba, Voice of America short-wave broadcasts, propaganda, cartoon books, tv outlets to Cuba, propaganda exhibits, developing specific proposals for use of balloons to deliver propaganda to Cuba, directing propaganda at Soviet and other Bloc personnel in Cuba, Voice of Free Cuba broadcasts from some submarines, making available to the international Narcotics Commission documented evidence of Cuban explortation/importation of narcotics, arranging for Caches of limited soviet check arms to be discovered in selected Latin American countries, ostensibly smuggled in from Cuba.

SOURCE: 8/31/62 memo from Gen Lansdale to SGA (00669-00672)

STAFF: Wallach

FILE:

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
10/5/94

No DoD objection to public disclosure
pursuant to P.L. 102-526, ~~except for~~
11/12/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY	4 Sept 1962	MONGOOSE (Phase II)

OCCURRENCE:

"Pursuant to our telephone conversation this afternoon, it would seem worthwhile to get the consensus of the group's views as to the type and timing of the activities in Phase II."

In my opinion, the following numbered activities may pose possible policy questions 20 (balloons), 23 (SWAN radio), 27 (sabotage), 32 (attack agriculture [with chemicals]), 40 (COMINT), 48-50 (Cuban exiles, Carribbean nations), 54 (post-Castro).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum from Lansdale to Bundy 4 Sept 1962

FILE: (00688)
Cage

STAFF:
PGW

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/5/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BUNDY, GENERAL DECKER, MR. MURROW
RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MARTIN
GENERAL HARRIS, WILLIAM BUND,
GENERAL CARTER

DATES:

9/6/62

CATEGORIES:

Special Group Augmented
MONGOOSE

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Meeting of SGA On Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962. Discussion of LANSDALE's suggestion #32 (agricultural sabotage). GENERAL CARTER emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disasterous results that would flow from something going wrong particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop failures [redacted] which would appear to be of natural origin. BUNDY said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as a result of local Cuban disaffection or a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc. unless they could be completely covered up. ✓

SOURCE:

SGA MONGOOSE Minutes 9/6/62 (00045-00046)

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

PGW

DATE:

June 29, 1962

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT 1 DEC 93~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, [redacted] (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

CIA Headquarters and all WH stations are to be especially to alert for any shipments of arms or other subversive material from Cuba to other Latin American countries--Chief, Task Force W says this alert has been laid on and is in force.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-Walt Elder

FILE: Cage 00049

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/5/94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Walt ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE, MCGEORGE BUNDY, [redacted] (CIA),

DATES:
9/14/62

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE
Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:
Possibility of sabotage [redacted] is being looked into--Chief, Task Force W says this activity is underway.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Eler

FILE: Cage 00049

STAFF: PGW

DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER RFK GENERAL LANSDALE ✓ MCGEORGE BUNDY [redacted] (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

The 12 September addendum to the Phase II MONGOOSE operations was discussed and the entire Phase II was approved in priciple as a platform from which to proceed. ✓ Activities which may be especially sensitive are to be brought before the group, and this body wishes to be kept generally advised on progress.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE metting, 14 Sept 1962-
Walt Elder (00049)
FILE: Cage

STAFF: PGW
DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
1 DEC 93

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ✓	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
WALT ELDER, RFK, GENERAL LANSDALE MCGEORGE BUNDY, [redacted] (CIA)	9/14/62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

This memorandum reports that the ATTORNEY GENERAL "expressed concern that activities by certain Cuban exiles are reaching the point where the government may be forced to take action against them rather than to simply state that "we are investigating." The agency is requested to see what it can do to help the noise level of these activities. ✓

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record on MONGOOSE meeting. 14 Sept 1962 Walt Elder (00818) FILE: Cage	STAFF: PGW DATE: June 30, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
jc 3 DEC 93
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	Huston Ryan	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Kennedy, Rob. Helms Lansdale ✓	Patchel, Col. Johnson, Gen. Hurwitch, R.	16 Oct 62	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: When RFK asked Helms for his comments, Helms stated that "we were prepared to get on with the new action program and that we would execute it agressively." Helms pointed out, however, that the objective of Operation MONGOOSE would have to be determined at some point since the Cubans with whom we have to work were seeking a reason for risking their lives in these operations. Helms detailed his conversation with the young Cuban [redacted] who pointed out that they were willing to commit people only on operations which they regarded as sensible. Helms defines sensible in Cuban terminology as meaning an action which would contribute to the liberatic of their country, another way of saying that the United States, perhaps in conjunction with other Latin American countries, would bail them out militarily. Helms' point was specially echoed by Huston and Ryan.

SOURCE:
16 Oct 62 memo for the record by R. Helms (01095)

FILE: (

STAFF:
PGW

DATE: 6/30

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale Bruce Cheever (CIA) HARVEY PATCHELL	25 Oct 1962	Cuba Mongoose Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE:

Cheever suggested to Patchell that Gen. Lansdale call Bill Harvey since Bill had briefed w. Gen. on what the CIA was doing. Patchell indicates that Ben. Lansdale was informed of Cheever's comments.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for record re Items for Meeting of Special Group Augmented on 26 Oct 1962, prepared by Lt. Col. Patchell on 10/26 (00737)	PGW DATE: 6/29

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
William Harvey	KIRKPATRICK DDP	11/14/62	
Gen. Lansdale	Mr. Halpern	Nov. 21, 1962	Special Group Augmented
Walter Elder	[redacted]		Operation Mongoose
DCI		10/30/62	Cuba

OCCURRENCE: With regard to paragraph 2 of Lansdale's memorandum to SGA dated 14 Nov. 1962 Harvey states: "The statement that Operation Mongoose had had no information on this operation since early October was patently false. Specific references made to the pen ultimate paragraph and Lansdale's memorandum concerning a report for the CIA which he used as a basis for memorandum dated 31 Oct. 1962 to Oswald Kirkpatrick. This refers to a telephonic conversation on the evening of 30 Oct. 1962 between Lansdale and [redacted] which is referred specifically in paragraph 2 on pages 7 and 8 of my reference memorandu. I have discussed this matter in detail with [redacted] and clearly recollects that his conversation with Lansdale on that date took place as reflected in my reference memorandum. During this conversation there was no discussion of previous operations except a brief discussion of the COBRA [redacted] teams and Lansdale did not ask, according to [redacted] recollection, any specific questions concerning assets inside or prior operations which would logically have led to the discussions at the time of the Matahambre operation."

SOURCE:

Memorandum dated Nov. 21, 1962 (01151)

FILE:

STAFF:

Paul Wallach

DATE: July 1, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale ✓ John McCone Gen. Carter [redacted] (CIA)	30 OCt 1962	Operation Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

After Lansdale's converation with McCone, he called [redacted] who assured him that he had received similar orders from Carter and that all militant actions under CIA were being held at a stop.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memo fro the record by Gen. Lansdale dated 30 Oct 1962. (00739)	PGW
FILE:	DATE: 6/29

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

3 DEC 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale John McCone Bundy [redacted] (CIA)	30 Oct 1962	Operation Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale said that he had been told by Bundy on Sunday, Oct 28, to hold up action on the twenty teams by submarine for 24 hrs. and Lansdale had promptly notified CIA. Lansdale added that yesterday (Oct 39) upon receipt from [redacted] on the subject Lansdale had again taken up w. Bundy, and Bundy had told Lansdale that he would tell McCone to have CIA hold everything. Lansdale opines that he presumes Bundy had so informed McCone.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memo for the record by Gen. Lansdale dated 30 Oct 1962. (00739)

FILE:

STAFF: PGW

DATE: 6/29

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson [redacted]	Oct 31, 1961	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

As for psychological operations, all CIA assets (including Lawrence Kieves) had been turned over to USIA for operational use.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00744)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Gen Lansdale
Gilpatrick
Don Wilson
[redacted]

DATES:
Oct 31, 1962

CATEGORIES:
Mongoose
SGA
Cuba

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale inquired about the balloon operation. [redacted] told Lansdale that this was not in being yet.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale
(00744)

FILE:

STAFF:
Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen Lansdale ✓ Gilpatrick Don Wilson [redacted]	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted] told Lansdale that there were only two action teams, a small one (Central Cuba) and the big one (200-man in Western Cuba), that they were definitely on intelligence collection.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00745)

STAFF: Wallach

FILE:

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] Gen Lansdale ✓ Gilpatrick Don Wilson	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale asked [redacted] if any independent groups were in motion. [redacted] said CIA couldn't guaranty any groups not under CIA control, but that the word had gotten around to stop actions at this time and none were known to CIA currently, although maybe ther3 was one not known to CIA. Lansdale commented again that any action would embarrass the negotiations, which was why he was asking. [redacted] said he understood.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00745)	STAFF:	Wallach
FILE:		DATE:	July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson [redacted]	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale spoke with USIA's Wilson, who confirmed that all CIA psychological assets had been turned over to USIA for operational use and were being used as desired by the President.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00745)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Dnn Wilson [redacted]	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale asked [redacted] whether the other teams were under control, no boats going out, etc. [redacted] said yes, but again pointed out that the Cubans were restive.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale
(00745)

FILE:

STAFF:
Wallach

DATE:
July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson [redacted]	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE: Lansdale asked [redacted] about covert operational assets both inside Cuba and outside, if they had stop orders on action. [redacted] said that they all had such orders,"but pointed out that some of the Cubans were quite emotional about stopping actions against Castro and he wasn't certain that everyone would hold to the orders"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00744)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] Gen Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale then asked [redacted] about assets inside Cuba, did they only have the two action teams--there? How about any psychological operations? [redacted] said he believed there were only two teams and would check further to be sure. He knew the teams were supposed to be collecting intelligence.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen Lansdale (00744)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach

DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale Gilpatrick Don Wilson [redacted]	Oct 31, 1962	MONGOOSE SGA CUBA

OCCURRENCE: Gilpatrick asked Lansdale to give him a brief outline of Operation Mongoose in light of current U.S./USSR negotiations re: Cuba. Lansdale talked to [redacted] and "sketched in the purpose, which was to get a fix for Gilpatrick as one of the U.S. negotiators with the Soviets on whether or not all actions (sabotag, etc.) had come to a stop---didn't want the U.S. embarrassed and Gilpatrick wanted to be sure of this.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Oct 31, 1962 memo for the record by Gen.Lansdale (00744)

FILE:

STAFF: Wallach
DATE: July 3, 1975

NO OBJECTION as excised
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
1/5/94

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Lansdale	31 Oct 1962	Mongoose Cuba SG

OCCURRENCE:

Unsigned memorandum (apparently prepared by Lansdale) states " Intelligene collection under US control, including by resources inside Cuba, continues. Note sensitivity of assets [redacted] in helping US."

SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum dated 31 Oct 1962, titled Outline of Covert Operations. (00740)

FILE:

STAFF: PGW 6/29

DATE:

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1) (A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Lansdale✓ [redacted]	31 Oct 1962	Operation Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted] told Lansdale that CIA intelligence reporting was spotty due to lack of mail deliveries from Cuba.

SOURCE:

Memo for the record prepared by GEn. Lansdale, dated 31 OCt 1962.

FILE:

STAFF:

PGW 6/29

DATE:

NO OBJECTION
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
3 DEC 93
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Gen. Lansdale Lt. Col. Patchell Gen. Johnson [redacted] Frank Hand	31 Oct 1962	Operation Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale states that the Mongoose outline was read by Messrs. Hand [redacted] and Patchell. Inaddition he states that he gave the general information contained therein to Gen. Johnson.

SECRET

SOURCE:

Memo for the record prepared by GEn. Lansdale, dated 31 Oct. 1962

FILE:

STAFF: PGW

DATE: 6/29

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10010

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : [R]
TO : [R]

TITLE :
INDEX CARDS

DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 601

SUBJECTS :
OPERATION MONGOOSE [R]
CASTRO [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 140, Book 3 of 3, Index Cards, June/July 1975

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

6 Apr 94
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

Box
~~Book~~ 140
~~Book~~ 39/3

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Mr. Merchant
Mr. Mann ✓
Mr. Douglas
General Lansdale
Mr. Gray
Mr. Bissell
Mr. Dulles

DATES: Nov. 19, 1960

CATEGORIES:

Mongoose
Special Group

OCCURRENCE: The Special Group heard Mr. Merchant state his opinion that the only solution is to move the Guatemalan train activities to the United States even though the U. S. could probably not get away with this either. A number of alternative base sites for the training of the Cubans was considered both in the United States, in Puerto Rico, at the CIA site on Saipan or in the Panama Canal zone. Mr. Douglas felt the "U. S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date." "Mr. Grey supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a malitia. Mr. Gray wondered how a few hundred exiles could be." "Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and settle down for a one- or two-year wait..."

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting Nov. 19, 1960.

STAFF: Bob Kelley

FILE:

DATE: June 29, 1975

TOP SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6 Apr 94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, WILLIAM ~~COMINT~~	~~11/14/62~~	MONGOOSE
MCCONE	11/3/62	SGA
HELMS		
MATAHAMBRE COPPER MINES ✓		

OCCURRENCE: Harvey states, "On 3 November, 1962, a fragmentary [redacted] report was received, reflecting the arrests by the Cuban authorities in Panar del Rio, of the infiltrees. It was impossible to determine, definitely, whether this report referred to the two members of the Matahambre sabotage team."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: 11/14/62, Memorandum of William Harvey, (00757)

STAFF: PGW

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 6 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: MATAHAMBRE		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Lansdale	Gilpatric	14 Nov 62	MONGOOSE
Bundy	McCone		
Johnson	Taylord		
RFk	Parrot		

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale states, "On October 30-31 for an 'Eyes Only' background memorandum requested by Ros~~s~~well Gilpatric, information was requested from CIA on the current status of all operations. CIA reported all militant operations have been ordered held at a stop, although the volatile Cubans were frustrated and not under complete control. The Matahambre operation was not mentioned by the CIA in reporting in operational teams inside Cuba, although I asked for specifics on militant teams inside. Two action teams CIA reported as being inside Cuba were described as in place only collecting intelligence, not actions, (sabotage,etc.)*

*NB: A hand-written note next to the above statement by Lansdale reads,"Harvy/ Chever say he did not ask."

SOURCE: 14 Nov 62 special memo for the Special Group Augmented, prepared by Brig. Gen. Lansdale (00761)

STAFF: PGW 6/30

FILE:

DATE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6 Apr 94
(1)(c)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE ✓ CASTRO		MONGOOSE SGA

OCCURRENCE:

MCCONE TESTIFIED that the SGA approved a program to contaminate with Carbon dust cylinders in trucks and locomotives which CASTRO has purchased from Europe. This was to be done at the time of shipment. The program met with some success. MCCONE could not recall where the actual sabotage of the purchased equipment took place (22-23).

SOURCE: McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75

FILE:

STAFF: Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as sanitized
6 Apr 94 (1)(8)
(1)(c)

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE ✓ [redacted]		MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE:

McCone testified that he recalled that activity to sabotage the shipment of spare parts [redacted] to Cuba. He did not recall whether it was [redacted] spare parts. (23).

SOURCE:
McCone, Testimony, 6/6/75

FILE:

STAFF:
Rhea

DATE: 6/27/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
6 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] Harvey Halpern Helms MCCONE ✓	Dec 1961	Castro

OCCURRENCE:

[redacted] sometime in Dec of 1961, described to Halpern a meeting at the director's office in which McCone had stated that Helms would henceforth "be his man on Cuba." (13) [redacted] told Halpern that Helms had no inkling that he would be appointed head of the Cuban operations before this meeting (13). Sometime after the meeting Helms came to [redacted] office, checked into the organization of [redacted] operations and directed that Cuba would be a separate activity and no longer part of the WH Division (14).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Halpern 6/18/75

STAFF: Rhea

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 6 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE FITZGERALD HUGHES BOSCH, JOSE
BUNDY PAPICH
JESSUP RFK
STEAKLEY JMWAVE
JMWAVE VANCE

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

JC 6 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
✓MCCONE, HARVEY, RUZ
de Cunha, Virginia

DATES:
July 10, 1962
~~June 11, 1962~~
~~July 1, 1962~~
~~May 1962~~

MONGOOSE

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: Efforts were made to establish contact with Juana Castro Rug, half sister of Fidel and Raul Castro Ruz, because she opposed the strong Communist nature of the Cuban regime. According to Mrs. Virginia Leitao de Cunha, she contacted Ruz and obtained Ruz agreement to provide intelligence on the Cuban political leadership and to work against the Cuban Communist regime, "short of engaging in activity which might result in direct personal harm to her brothers Raul and Fidel." Arrangements were being made for direct recruitment of Ruz in Mexico.

SOURCE:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6 Apr 94
(1)(c)
(2 pp)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED MONGOOSE,~~ TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, ~~CARTER,~~ LEMNITZER, LANSDALE, CLINE, PARROTT	July 12, 1962 ~~July 20, 1962~~ April 9, 1963	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE (CARD ONE OF TWO)

OCCURRENCE:

Lansdale briefed the group on numbers of agents in Cuba. Air resupply proposal submitted by CIA "should be deferred pending broader review of the entire situation." Taylor noted if urgent need for air supply proposal could be made to the Special Group Augmented at any time. "Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetrations of the Cuban government have yet been attained." "The Attorney General inquired about the status of popular support for Castro, and also the possibility of a revolt against him." Lansdale replied, "There is no rallying point for active opposition." The AG and Johnson emphasize need to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by Castro in the hemisphere. A complete review of MONGOOSE was set toward the end of July. Taylor emphasized need for summaries of results "and a statement of future alternatives open to the U.S. should be developed." Looking into proposal to subsidize Japanese purchases of Dominican sugars so that the Japanese could divert these purchases from Cuba. McCone said that his experts had informed him that from a legal point of vi
CIA could use unvouchered funds to support an operation of th

SOURCE:

Memo for the record. Mi
Group (Au

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION & RELEASE OF THIS AS SANITIZED

6 Apr 94

(1)(B)
(1)(C)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS
PRESIDENT KENNEDY
✓MCCONE
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

DATES:

July 25,1962

CATEGORIES:

SPECIAL GROUP
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: Helms notes that McCone briefed the panel of the President's foreign intelligence advisory board on political action projects. He pointed out that"each project must have his approval to the circulation to the members of the Special Group". For example, reconnasiance overflights are now approved. He noted covert financial support in Peruvian, Greek, Finnish, Italian, and Brazilian elections. Helms "read to the panel a paper on the operation Mongoose which theDirector had used earlier in the day for giving a briefing to the President."

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, re meeting on CA matters with the panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board of Helms, dated July 25, 1962 (00870)

FILE:

STAFF:

diGenova

DATE:

7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6 Apr 94

(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE FITZGERALD HUGHES
BUNDY PAPICH [redacted]
JESSUP RFK
STEAKLEY JMWAVE
JMWAVE VANCE

DATES:

8/19/64
7/30/64
6/10/64

CATEGORIES:

SGA
MONGOOSE
CASTRO

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000.--[redacted] would contribute $50,000. [redacted] approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

DATE:

Baron, 7/1/75

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11 Apr 94
(1)(4)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] LASH, A. M. [redacted] McCONE ✓	McNAMARA SPECIAL GRP. (AUGMENTED)	August 10-11 1962	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

CIA officer [redacted] and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with [redacted], in Copenhagen (85). [redacted] reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).

DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's suggestion that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967	STAFF: Baron
FILE:	DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
11 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:			DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE	FITZGERALD	HUGHES	8/19/64	SGA
BUNDY	PAPICH	BOSCH, JOSE	7/30/64	MONGOOSE
JESSUP	RFK		6/10/64	CASTRO
STEAKLEY	JMWAVE			
JMWAVE	VANCE			

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to the minutes of the 303 Committee on 7/30/64,"It was agreed that MR. FITZGERALD would contact SAM PAPICH of the FBI in regard to the earlier report of an alleged plot with Mafia overtones to assassinate Castro and which the AG agreed to handle as a matter of law enforcement." (116)" The reference is clearly to a 6/10/64 memorandum information report from the DDP to the Director," (116) which was disseminated to the Spec. Asst. to the Pres. for Natl. Security Affrs.; ASst. Sect. for Inter-American Affairs,Dept. of State; Dir. of Intell. and Research, State Dept.; Director, DIA; The AG; the Director, FBI; DDCI and the DCI. The 6/10/74 report"related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was made to prominent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved in the scheme." The asking price was $150,000. JOSE MARIO PEPIN BOSCH, Preso of Bacardi Rum would contribute $50,000. BOSCH approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested the U.S. government also contribute. This was rejected. The record indicates CIA's only involvement was to report information of its existence."

SOURCE: Last record of incident found by IG Rept. is memo from McCone to Bundy, 8/19/64, reporting the results of FBI intvws with the alleged participants."Obviously nothing came of the plot."(117)

STAFF:

FILE: IG REPORT 1967

DATE: Baron, 7/1/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11 Apr 94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARVEY, WILLIAM ~~COMINT~~ MCCONE ✓ HELMS MATAHAMBRE COPPER MINES	~~11/14/62~~ 11/3/62	MONGOOSE SGA

OCCURRENCE: Harvey states, "On 3 November, 1962, a fragmentary [redacted] report was received, reflecting the arrests by the Cuban authorities in Panar del Rio, of the infiltrees. It was impossible to determine, definitely, whether this report referred to the two members of the Matahambre sabotage team."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: 11/14/62, Memorandum of William Harvey, (00757)

STAFF: PGW

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT, as sanitized
JC 11 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ✓

RFK
McGeorge Bundy
Mr. Johnson
Mr. Gilpatric
Gen. Taylor
Mr. McCone
Mr. Wilson
Dr. Charyk
Dr. Scoville
Col. Steakley
[redacted]
Mr. Parrot

DATES:

Oct 9, 1962

CATEGORIES:

Special Group (Augmented)

Mongoose

OCCURRENCE:

SGA discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from very low level coverage by tactical aircraft to high performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed.

It was agreed that the first priority is one high performance mission in the western part of ✓ the island, to be accompanied by all out Elint support. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar searches may be mounted. First mission was later approved by higher authority, but the decision on the second proposition left open.

The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB, and by Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10th.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Memorandum for the record, dated October 9, 1962, effecting a meeting of Special Group Augmented and prepared by Thomas Parrot.

FILE: (02821)

STAFF: PGW

DATE: 6/29/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

11 Apr 94
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
JOHNSON KILPATRICK MCCONE ✓	Sept.16,1963	MONGOOSE SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On September 16, 1963 a memorandum reported that "all members of the special group have approved project [redacted] in the area of Cuba.)"

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Memorandum dated 16 September 1963 for members of the Special Group from Mr. Parrott

FILE:

STAFF:
Kelley

DATE:
6/28/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11 Apr 94
(1)(A)
(1)(B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Bundy [redacted] Thompson Vance McCone ✓ Desmond Fitzgerald	July 23, 1964	Duvalier Special Group/303

OCCURRENCE:

On July 23, 1964 the 303 Committee met and discussed Haiti. "At the present time there is no U.S. involvement with the insurgency effort against the Duvalier regime." The Committee approved [redacted] Ambassador Thompson noted that "The Dominican government had formerly requested U.S. assistance [redacted]

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:
Memorandum for the record, July 24, 1964, Minutes of 303 Committee meeting , July 23, 1964	Kelley
FILE: Cage	DATE: June 30, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
11 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
[redacted] LASH, A. M. [redacted] McCONE	McNAMARA SPECIAL GRP. (AUGMENTED)	August 10-11 1962	CASTRO

OCCURRENCE:

CIA officer [redacted] and A.M. LASH-1 meet, along with [redacted], in Copenhagen (85). [redacted] reported that the term "assassinate" was used in the discussion of A.M. LASH's future role in Cuba and it visibly upset A.M. LASH, who preferred the term "eliminate." (85).

DISCOVERY LEADS: Note: This discussion of assassination is taking place at the same time that DCI McCONE lodges his objection, after the SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) meeting, to McNAMARA's suggestion that the technique of assassination could be used against CASTRO.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: IG REPORT, 1967	STAFF: Baron
FILE:	DATE: 7/2/75

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 11 Apr 94
(1) (B)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BISSELL DULLES GRAY MERCHANT ✓	Aug. 12, 1960	MONGOOSE Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On August 12, 1960 the Special Group heard a summary of the budget for Cuban operations from MR. BISSELL. Approximately [redacted] dollars were required to finance Cuban operations for the fiscal year and a balance of [redacted] was necessary for the remainder of the fiscal year. Major subheadings in the budget were (1) political action, (2) propaganda, (3) paramilitary, (4) intelligence collection, (5) counterintelligence, (6) communications support, (7) support.

It was agreed "This matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next 10 days. This was believed to be wise, not because any

(continued)

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting August 12, 1960

FILE: Cage

TOP SECRET

STAFF: Robert Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
JC 11 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MURPHY ✓
KILPATRICK
~~MCCONE~~
FITZGERALD
LYMAN
~~CASTRO~~
[redacted]

DATES:
4/23/63

CATEGORIES:
CUBA
SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE: Murphy asked Fitzgerald whether Castro's immediate entourage had been penetrated. Fitzgerald replied [redacted]

TOP SEC

SOURCE:
Memorandum, dated 4/23/63, prepared by Lyman and Kilpatrick.

FILE:

STAFF:
WALLACH

DATE: 7/2/75

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
6 Apr 94

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, LANSDALE, TAYLOR, JOHNSON, GILPATRICK, MCCONE, RFK, LEMNITZER Mateos, Lopez JFK	July 5, 1962	MONGOOSE Special Group Augmented

OCCURRENCE: President Kennedy's visit to Mexico greatly enhanced U.S. goodwill in Mexico. It fulfilled U.S. plans to impress upon Castro that Mexico is solidly with the United States and the West. State believes this should ease the way for future discussions about Cuba with the Mexicans. Re: Operation MONGOOSE, the joint communique issued by President Kennedy and President Lopez Mateos included a phrase which was 'They proposed to respect and maintain the principles of non intervention--whether this intervention may come from a continental or extracontinental state--and of self-determination of peoples." In response to a Lansdale query, the Department of State noted that "There were no developments resulting from the President's trip to Mexico including the text of the joint United States-Mexico communique which alter the basic guidelines which govern the Cuba Project." Lansdale noted that the CIA now had [redacted] in Havana operating. In addition there are agents and teams in the provinces. "Voice of Cuba" broadcasts from the U.S. Navy submarine were successful. "It is noted that UPI carried this news item but spiced it up with added stories of Castro's use of militia against guerillas in Mantanzas. The 2 stories put together by UPI have no relationship in reality, and the 'Voice of Cuba' broadcasts are being closely directed to fit in with other operations and to keep within Mongoose guidelines.'

SOURCE: Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented re: MONGOOSE progress from Lansdale, July 5, 1962 (00406-00408)

FILE:

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 1, 1975

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

6 Apr 94
(1)(A)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
~~SPECIAL GROUP AUGMENTED, MONGOOSE, TAYLOR, RFK, JOHNSON, MARTIN, GILPATRICK, LEMNITZER,~~ MCCONE, ~~PARROTT, LANSDALE, HURWITCH~~	July 19, 1962	Special Group Augmented MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: McCone explained the situation which has resulted in a group led by Senor Bosch acquiring B-26's which are now in Costa Rica prepared to conduct a bombing raid on Cuba. The group discussed a draft State Department cable to various Latin American embassies related to this incident. It was agreed that the point should be made in the cable that any such contemplated raid would be premature at this time. Disassociation of the United States from any such endeavor was to be accomplished by leaking stories of the impending raid to the press.

SOURCE: Memorandum for the record, Minutes of meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 19 JULY, 1962 (00033)

STAFF: di Genova

DATE: July 2, 1975

Date:08/15/92
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10018

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
SSCI TRANSCRIPT DATED JUNE 11, 1975, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL

DATE : 06/11/75
PAGES : 135

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 231, Folder 5, Testimony of Richard Bissell

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to reactivate the operation, to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency, which was in February 1962.

Senator Mondale. Now, you say you discussed probably with Bundy and Rostow the capability in developing more capability of assassinations. And you may have discussed it in the context of various potential targets without deciding on them. Once you decided on a target, or you were going to recommend a target, what was the process of getting clearance?

Mr. Bissell. I can't answer you that, simply because no specific target was ever recommended. And to the best of my knowledge and belief, other than the case we have discussed at length of Castro, which in time preceded the SRRIFLE project. The issue of obtaining clearance never arose. I can speculate on how that would have worked if you wish.

Senator Mondale. No.

The Chairman. Let's go ahead then with the questions.

Mr. Schwarz. Senator Baker asked, did Helms succeed you?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you turn over SRRIFLE to him and did you tell him about it?

Mr. Bissell. I believe I did. And I also believe that Mr. Harvey told him about it promptly after the turnover.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a man called Justin O'Donnell?

Mr. Bissell. Yes, I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you ask him in words or substance to kill Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I asked him to investigate the possibility and to make explanation for so doing.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you do that?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember the date of that. I may have it on a chronology here, but I imagine that is a matter of record, or that he has testified to that date. I don't remember the date.

Mr.Schwarz. Did you tell him this connection with making plans to go see the passer of the poison, Mr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Bissell. I think I probably did.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he tell you he wouldn't do it?

Mr. Bissell. Later he told me that he didn't want to do it. But he also said that he thought it was an inappropriate action, and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways.

Mr. Schwarz. Who authorized you to tell Mr. O'Donnell to take steps to move toward assassinating Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. Nobody.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you inform the White House of that?

Mr. Bissell. No.

Mr. Schwarz. To the best of your knowledge, did anybody inform the White House of that?

Mr. Bissell. To the best of my knowledge, no.

Mr. Schwarz. Why did you seek to assassinate Mr. Lumumba?

Mr. Bissell. I didn't seek to assassinate him. I told a member of the clandestine service to make plans and develop the capability so to do if it were approved and ordered.

Senator Goldwater. Approved by who?

Mr. Bissell. It would have then had to have approval at the highest level of government.

The Chairman. Where did the idea come from?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember, Mr. Chairman. It could possibly have been mine.

The Chairman. It could possibly have been yours?

Mr. Schwarz. Did you tell Rostow that was your initiative?

Mr. Bissell. I told him that the instruction as to [redacted] was my initiative.

Senator Baker. How many others did you plan on, just as a contingency?

How many other people did you instruct to draw up plans to assassinate?

Mr. Bissell. I don't believe there were any others which went to the point of instructing that a man be prepared.

Senator Baker. How many were there that didn't go that far? How many murders did you contemplate?

Mr. Bissell. Well, Senator --

quoting a cable concerning the asset WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960.

The Chairman. Mr. Bissell, the memorandum to which counsel has referred reads as follows:

"In recommending the agent or asset ROGUE, the Chief of Station, Leopoldville, the Chief of the Agency's African Division, probably Bronson Tweedy, wrote in late 1960:

'He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment, which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world,but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions'".

Is that fairly representative of the philosophy that applied to such matters at the time?

Mr. Bissell. Well, it certainly applied within the range of matters that would have come under SRRIFLE.

Could I say, Mr. Chairman, that I know of no way in which it is possible to operate a secret intelligence agency or a secret service unless it has at least a number of employees who are willing to and can be depended upon to carry out orders involving acts of this sort.

The Chairman. That assumes, of course, that the United States ought to assassinate foreign leaders.

meant to suggest that that was entirely comparable?

Mr. Bissell. It was not meant to suggest that it was entirely comparable, but the individual whom I have mentioned were all perceived in their time and place as menaces to their own countries and the U.S. interests.

Senator Goldwater. Might I ask a question based on his experience?

From my readings in trying to learn more about intelligence, I gathered the impression that the actions such as you have been describing up to and including assassination, are practiced by every intelligence organization that I have been studying, is that correct?

Mr.Bissell. That is my impression likewise, Senator.

Senator Goldwater. Including England?

Mr. Bissell. I believe so. In fact, I think definitely it has been used by MI6. I couldn't give you specific cases.

Senator Goldwater. Certainly KGB.

Mr. Bissell. Certainly the KGB -- although as, the Chairman pointed out the other day, I at least cannot point to any case where the KGB has carried out the assassination of a chief of state.

Senator Goldwater. Would you assume that in the cases of those other countries that this ruler would have knowledge of this in every case?

Mr.Bissell. In the case specifically of the U.K., I would answer in the affirmative. I also believe, however, that the Chief of the Intelligence Service of any one of those countries would flatly deny that the chief of state had knowledge of such action.

Senator Goldwater. Thank you.

Senator Baker. Would you deny it?

Mr. Bissell. In our case here?

Senator Baker. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bissell. Yes, it would be appropriate to do so.

Senator Baker. Have you done so?

Mr. Bissell. I have not had occasion to, because I am unaware of any high level assassination that occurred by the U.S.

Senator Baker. Doesn't that amount to a denial?

Mr. Bissell. It is a denial that any has occurred, at least in the period that I am aware of.

Mr. Schwarz. Was your answer to Senator Baker meant to indicate that you would perjure yourself on this matter?

Mr. Bissell. It depends a little bit on the context. There are occasions when I would go a long way to protect the President of the United States from certain kinds of embarrassment.

Senator Baker. The question was, very simply, would you try to protect the President in such a case as you described, MI6 or otherwise?

Mr.Bissell. I can conceive of so doing, Senator.

Senator Tower. May I pursue that just a moment further?

You might say one thing in sworn testimony before a committee like this, but say another thing publicly, is that what you mean?

Mr. Bissell. That is exactly what I mean.

The Chairman. Have you lied to this committee?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir.

The Chairman. Would you lie to this committee?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir.

Senator Tower. I think that distinction has to be made. I think I would have lied about the U-2 myself.

The Chairman. Shall we proceed with the questions?

Mr. Schwarz. The remaining topic I have is Trujillo. It is respectfully indicated, and involves a lot of documents. And we have some procedural matters that we need to take up. I know we can't finish Trujillo before 12:30, and I would suggest that we ask the witness and whatever Senators that can return to come back this afternoon on Trujillo.

The Chairman. We have a Senate order that there will be no further committee meetings this afternoon.

I doubt that we can obtain unanimous consent.

ls

almost any kind of paramilitary operation, such as the Guatamalan operation, the Bay of Pigs itself is, the earlier operation that has been discussed in the press in Iran, and which resulted in the ouster of Mossedeg and the return of the Shah, there is an expectation that such operations will involve military or semimilitary action, and that some people will lose their lives in the process.

Senator Baker. Yes, but I am speaking rather more precisely of a single person or a group of people ~~who were~~ targeted, or discussions were held about targeting them, for what would be an assassination were it not for the legal significance of the term.

Mr. Bissell. I don't think I remember any cases in which that sort of matter was discussed or was the subject of planning, other than the ones which have already been mentioned in testimony.

Senator Mathias. Could I interject a question at this point.

But of course that contemplates what we have seen in the earlier testimony, that when you begin an operation -- and I think this was the history of the Castro operation -- to in some way incompacitate him politically, that it often moves to the extreme of incapacitating him physically, isn't that true?

Mr. Bissell. That is correct, sir.

AFTERNOON SESSION

2:17

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. BISSELL (CON'D)

The Chairman. The hearing will come to order.

Mr. Schwarz will commence the questioning.

It will be understood that the oath still continues to apply.

Mr. Schwarz. Before we turn to Trujillo, two quick questions. [redacted]

Mr. Bissell. I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Schwarz. And if I took out any of the details and broke it apart you would have no recollection?

Mr. Bissell. I am afraid not.

Mr. Schwarz. And the second thing, to pin down on Mr. Helms, did you brief him about the Mafia matter?

Mr. Bissell. I am reasonably clear that I did not brief him in the early stages, that is to say, in 1960. And my impression is that he may very well not have been briefed on it until I was about to leave the Agency in early 1962.

Mr. Schwarz. But at that point you did brief him?

Mr. Bissell. I don't remember whether I personally they might eventually be so used.

Mr. Schwarz. Is that a supposition, or is it based upon any recollection?

Mr. Bissell. I would say it is a faint recollection. But I find it very difficult in this case to distinguish between an element of supposition and a dim recollection.

Let me come to what I seem to remember about this matter. There was, as you have already indicated, several discussions in the Special Group, and one or more at least in other very small groups with representation from State, the White House and the Agency. And I am clear -- I do recollect that the plans at that time contemplated the arming of obviously a relatively small group inside the Dominican Republic, that is, the provision of arms perhaps for a dozen or so people, but not for something like a Bay of Pigs invasion or a major geurilla activity.

Now, in discussing that kind of an operation, I am perfectly certain that everyone that participated in the discussion was clear that weapons so supplied might very well be used against Trujillo or other senior supporters of his.

Mr. Schwarz. For how many countries in your experience at the CIA has the US Government supplied arms to dissident groups within the country?

Mr. Bissell. Well, we have talked about two cases; Indonesia is another case during the time I was in the Agency, or before I was DDP. Off hand I can't remember other cases, but there may have been some. Well, earlier before I was ever in the Agency, there was the case of Iran. And there was the reasonably well publicized case of Guatamala.

Mr. Schwarz. And the Iron Curtain countries?

Mr. Bissell. I think we have.

Mr. Schwarz. But what I am driving at, it is fairly common to supply arms to dissident elements in countries all over the world?

Mr. Bissell. Yes, that is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Does taht also imply that there is an assassination contemplated or not?

Mr. Bissell. I would say definitely not, in most cases not. In a large scale operation like Guatamala there was no intention of any assassination. I think you would include it under that term.

The same is true in Iran of course -- the possibility that a chief of state would be killed.

The Chairman. But you would distinguish this matter from just supplying of arms to dissidents? In other words, there was an element of knowledge here that the arms were supplied for a purpose, and that that purpose might well be the assassination of Trujillo or other highly placed people in this Government, correct?

Mr. Bissell. The way I would prefer to state it, Senator, I think is basically consistent with what you said. I would say that in the planning of this operation, and in the approval process, those involved would probably have given a higher probability to such use being made of the weapons than they would in some of the other operations that I have referred to.

Mr. Schwarz. However, just focusing on the Special Group as of the 12th of January, you can't tell from the minutes which state of mind existed, but you have a faint recollection that the more targeted state of mind existed as of the 12th of January?

Mr. Bissell. My impression is that as of that time, as I mentioned at the end of the testimony this morning, the reason that the State Department, and probably the Agency's representatives in the Special Group, favored this group was a pragmatic reason. It was to maintain and strengthen political ties with the dissidents.

Mr. Schwarz. The next matter of record that we should focus on is a memorandum of January 25, 1961, apparently reflecting a discussion of [redacted]. Was [redacted] the code for the overthrow of Trujillo?

Mr. Bissell. I suspect it was the code name for the project of support to the dissidents.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you remember the name EMSLEW?

I show you the memorandum of January 24, 1961 headed "Discussion of Project EMDEED." Does it appear to be a and this record, which is a record we have obtained from the Agency, may be unfair to you. But do you not agree that on this record it appears that on the item of the passing of the weapons which were the weapons that were in fact used, it appears that the AGency elected to keep the State Department uninformed on that item?

Mr. Bissell. No, sir, it does not quite appear that way. It appears -- if I put these two together --

Mr. Schwarz. By these two you mean your cable of March 24 and the cable of May 1 relating to certain matters is not to be discussed with the State Department?

Mr. Bissell. Yes. The earlier cable of those refers to machine guns.

Mr. Schwarz. And to the pouching of revolvers?

Mr. Bissell. And the pouching of revolvers. And I believe that what eventually passed to the dissidents were three rifles, not the revolvers. And, therefore, neither of these cables in fact refers to the passage to the dissidents out of U.K.'s control.

This cable states the conditional willingness at some time in the future to pass machine guns. That permission was never granted and they were never passed.

It refers to pouching revolvers. And I don't know whether there was a record that those were ever passed, or even intended to be passed, to the dissidents. And it would

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :	157-10011-10024
RECORD SERIES :	TRANSCRIPT
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SSCIA
FROM :	COLBY, WILLIAM E.
TO :	
TITLE :	SSCI TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF DCI WILLIAM COLBY
DATE :	05/21/1975
PAGES :	113
SUBJECTS :	CASTRO SSCI TRANSCRIPT, TESTIMONY OF DCI WILLIAM COLBY OPERATION MONGOOSE CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; 1B; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/04/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	SSCI Box 239, Folder 14

157-10011
10024

TOP SECRET

Vol. 1

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R 119

Colby

4 of 5

INVENTORIED:
ON 5/18/77
BY 96

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

Bf 4/19/94
1b

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:
2/16/77
BY BC

Hearing held before

Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

Record Number 157-10011-10024

COMMITTEE HEARING

SSCI Box 239, Folder 14

Wednesday, May 21, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

the first man contacted by Mr. Maheu, worked through a Cuban exile leader. And he offered -- and he said that he could do something of this nature provided he got some funds and the assistance. And he was supported in this regard. And I think again we have some doubts as to the accuracy of his reporting.

Mr. Schwarz. In November 1961 did Mr. Bissell indstruct a William Harvey to take charge of the gambling syndicate operation designed to kill Fidel Castro? Page 3 of Mr. Greer's report, which is at the beginning of your report.

Mr. Colby. I believe so, yes.

Yes. That is what our evidence says, the summary sais, "of the evidence available". And this is the evidence available in 1963. And there have been some minor changes in some of the details of this summary, very minor changes. But the essence of this report is still roughly accurate, I believe.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Harvey -- was Mr. Harvey the man that had hired an agent in order to kill Lmumba?

Mr. Colby. Mr. Harvey was the head of Staff D, Staff D of the Operations directorate [redacted]

1(B)

1(B)

[redacted], and in the process, you obviously work up some people who are able to do this kind of work, which is quite different from the normal life style of most of us.

Mr. Harvey had been a very venturesome officer in the past. He was responsible for the Berlin tunnel. And he was sent down to take this job. And he assumed as part of it the capability of -- he was given by Mr. Bissel this chore of carrying on this particular operation as well.

Mr. Schwarz. Had he been the person who had, in connection with the abortive effort to kill Mr. Lmumba, hired an agent for that purpose?

Mr. Colby. I have forgotten whether he hired him. He hired a foreigner. And this foreigner's job -- [redacted]. And there are some very obscure references that an additional assignment was to look into the possible assassination of Mr. Lmumba. The evidence is that he went down to what is now Kinshasa, Elizabethville in 1960, stayed there a few weeks, and left in October, I believe. And then Mr. Lmumba was killed thereafter in a totally separate set of circumstances in which we had nothing to do. There is some indication that a CIA officer who was asked to have something to do with this particular job said he did not want to do it.

1 (B)

was not advised of the assassination activities. Quite likely I cannot say that for sure, but I know the compartmentation system was such.

Chairman Church. What was the name of the CIA agent who was given the responsibility for liaison between the CIA and the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. To my knowledge it is Mr. Raymond Rocca.

Chairman Church. Where is it now?

Mr. Colby. He retired at the end of December of last year. He remained working for us for a few months. I think he is retired. I think he is retired. I believe he is still in the Washington area.

Mr. Knoche. Yes, he is still working with us.

Mr. Colby. Still working with us to help on the transition of the whole counter intelligence program.

Chairman Church. Why did he retire?

Mr. Colby. That was the Angleton case, Mr. Chairman, and the facts of that case were that I had had some professional differences in the organization with Mr. Angleton as to the way the counterintelligence business was run [redacted] 1(b). I believed that it required a higher degree of coordination of the other elements of the Directorate and of the Agency. We had debated this on various occasions in the past. I did reorganize that staff in 1973 and took a number of functions away from it. The liaison with the

FBi for instance, and a couple of other things. [redacted] 1(b)

Mr. Angleton [redacted].

[redacted]. 1(b)

Also, I believed that there was a undue degree of compartmentation of that staff, that it needed more interchange with our other divisions. We debated this and discussed it and I set as my time limit for this discussion the end of December because there were some very substantial retirement benefits that people would loose if they stayed after that point. Then unfortunately the Seymour Hirsh article of December 22nd came to our attention before it was actually published, and so I brought Mr. Angleton up and said that I was going to make two basic decisions. [redacted] I was going to put some sucessor leadership into the Head of the Counterintelligence Staff. I said I would offer him a post of tying together some counterintelligence doctrine, he could stay working with us. He did not have to

1 b

Chinese Communists subsequently blamed the Chinese Nationalists and the US for sabotaging the aircraft. The aircraft employee had fled to Taiwan. We had nothing to do with that incident and frankly heard about it after it occurred.

In the fall of 1956, a senior Chinese Nationalist official informed an officer of CIA that a Chinese National planned to assassinate Chou En Lai during his visit to Cambodia in November '56 and had been thwarted by the Cambodian arrest of the Chinese Nationalist officer sent to Phnom Penh to supervise the attempt. We learned of this after it had happened and we had nothing to do with it.

[redacted] Intelligence Service over the [redacted] 1bA

These are two that were separate.

Also I was asked to look at the photographs of Howard Hunt and Sturgis that appeared in Newsweek some years ago. We obtained this photograph from the FBI last night about 5 o'clock. We had not had it before. We had a copy of the Newsweek edition.

These are photographs of Howard Hunt in 1949, 1950 and 1961. This is the only photograph we have of Mr. Sturgis. It is taken out of the Newsweek.

We have had no connection with Mr. Sturgis and so we have individuals in it.

Senator Schweiker. Did you get the other photograph, the supposed Oswald photograph leaving the Embassy?

Mr. Colby. I don't have that with me. It is in the Warren Commission published report. It is in there.

Senator Schweiker. It is in there?

Mr. Colby. Yes. It was cropped slightly in order to conceal where it was taken but it was --

Senator Schweiker. It is in the Warren Commission?

Mr. Colby. Yes, it is in the Warren Commission.

Just one additional matter.

Chairman Church. Just one thing I would like to say to you, Mr. Colby, before I forget it. [redacted] 1(f)

Mr. Colby. Right.

Chairman Church. And I think you should prepare to discuss it with us and we will have further questions to ask you in connection with it.

I just wanted to give you notice.

Mr. Colby. Right. In our lexicon it doesn't count as a covert action but that is all right, no problem, I will cover it.

them.

Mr. Harvey was given the responsibility of this by Mr. Bissel and originally it continued as a separate action from the Castro operation, but Mr. Harvey was also given that responsibility, and for all intents and purposes they became wedded.

Mr. Helms was the person who formally approved ZR Rifle as a project. ZR Rifle had a dual purpose that has not been clarified by our inquiry. It apparently was in fact used for the stated purposes, as far as organizational activities went along, [redacted] and Mr. Helms, when he approved the project, authorized accounting on certification, which meant that rather than the usual vouchers supporting expenditures, that the officer involved would simply certify that the money had been spent and this would be accepted. It had a project amount of some dollars, $7500 - $10,000 -- some of it to include the salary of an agent, some to include operating expenses.

So Mr. Helms' main appearance in the approval of ZR Rifle does not necessarily equate with the date when he became familiar with the Castro operation.

Mr. Schwarz. Because of the dual purpose of Rifle, Rifle means both, rifle files and used rifles?

Mr. Breckinridge. It may mean either or both.

Mr. Colby. It is supposed to disassociate but sometimes

Mr. Schwarz. November 1961?

Mr. Breckinridge. I think that is probably correct. It was in the fall of 1961 that Mr. Harvey was given this assignment by Mr. Bissel. I think Mr. Bissel left in 1962. I am not sure of the dates, So Mr. Bissel would have known at that time. But I am not sure after that.

Chairman Church. Helms succeeded Mr. Bissel as chief of operations?

Mr. Colby. Deputy Director of Plans.

Chairman Church. Deputy Director for Plans.

Your record shows that Helms had knowledge of the ZR Rifle operation, which, among other things, was to develop an executive capability -- whatever that means. Presumably that means a capability to conduct an assassination if and when authorized by proper authority?

Mr. Breckinridge. That is my understanding.

Chairman Church. Is that your understanding?

Mr. Breckinridge. Yes, sir.

Chairman Church. Do your records show that, or is that based upon what has been revealed through your interrogation?

Mr. Breckinridge. First, let me go back and clarify, then I will answer this question, if I may.

Mr. Helms approved ZR Rifle, [redacted] 1(b)

My understanding, from my interviews, is that ZR Rifle had

Chairman Church. Senator Hart.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Colby, in connection with ZR Rifle, I think you testified or your associate said this was a multi-purpose operation, [redacted] and the development of the capability of what euphemistically is called executive action. 1(B)

In your professional judgment, and with your history of your background in the Agency, does it make any sense to you that a major operation, a major intelligence gathering operation [redacted] would be mounted under the direction of a man about whom all I know is that Mr. Harvey has a background of something like a soldier of fortune, and funded at the level, I should say, of $7500 to $10,000? 1(B)

Does it not suggest to you that [redacted] was in fact an internal cover for what was explicitly an assassination operation with unlimited, non-voucher financial capability? 1(B)

Mr. Colby. No, not that it is purely a cover.

In the first place, Mr. Harvey had a very successful tour in Berlin where he ran the Berlin tunnel operation, which was one of our major successful intelligence operations.

Mr. Harvey was a very colorful figure who had his lifestyle, which is different than some others, but he had been very effective at that, [redacted] and a very venturesome idea of that nature. 1(B)

He was in the assignment of Chief of the FI Division staff. [redacted] 1(B)

[redacted] 1(B)

Now, the thing that puts it together with this "capability", executive action, is the high degree of compartmentation of this material, that kind of a project. [redacted] 1(B) Therefore, there is a system of very sharp compartmentation of the work of that particular group.

You also are dealing with some very venturesome people [redacted] 1(B

So, given you have a man who had some good technical experience, who is a venturesome type himself and is running a program which is not too far off the requirements of high compartmentation, and a very high risk kind of operation, and therefore, for Mr. Bissel to have selected Harvey to carry out this project seems to me that it is compatible [redacted]

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

as well as this other activity.

Now, in the lifestyle at the time, not mentioning the second one, this gets back into the recordkeeping that we have been discussing. It was not to be put on the record although to be done. That is a perfectly proper hypothesis, it seems to me, but to say that [redacted] was only a cover I think is probably an unwarranted conclusion.

1 B

Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the level of funding of $7,500 to $10,000?

Mr. Colby. That is not very much money for that kind of an operation.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Precisely. I think it is too little.

Mr. Colby. No. For a capability of that nature, it is largely a staff operation. In other words, you use your own staff officers. You may hire an agent or something, but I don't think you can draw much conclusion from the actual number on the figure one way or the other.

This might not have been the only such project. You know, an assassination project would cost you more money than that, too.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Absolutely.

Mr. Colby. I find it hard to say that that is the only amount of money involved. I think you get into a situation where additional money would be put into either of those kinds

Chairman Church. Before you do, would you just explain exactly what the relationship between CIA and Giancana and Maheu was because that is not clear in my mind.

Would you develop for the Committee that whole relationship?

Mr. Breckinridge. Robert Maheu used to work for the FBI and he resigned from the FBI and opened a private investigative firm here in Washington and CIA used him from time to time for certain kinds of support activities.

Chairman Church. What kind of support activities?

Mr. Breckinridge. On one occasion he obtained a female companion [redacted]

1(B)

Chairman Church. What other kind of support?

Mr. Breckinridge. In the early days -- and this becomes an embarrassment. As nearly as I can reconstruct, the people who knew him decided to put him on a retainer in the Office of Security, which they did for awhile, until he was so successful he said he no longer needed the retainer, which he didn't do much to earn. He later got involved representing one of the Greek shipping interests and we were given the results of some of the information that he obtained from that where there was a fight between Niarchos and Onassis. We think he may have had some involvement in another [redacted] companionship when he was in this country. I don't have the details. I think we can probably reconstruct it for you.

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to pick up on the discussion we had.

Chairman Church. Mr. Schwarz has five minutes more, and we will conclude, and I would like to ask the Committee to stay on for ten more minutes for an executive session.

Mr. Schwarz. In the discussion we had on the use of criminal elements, we have dealt with the Castro operation.

In the middle of the book supplied to us by Mr. Breckinridge earlier this week, there is a discussion about the Lumumba operation, and the Agent Q. J. Win.

Now, is it a fact that Q. J. Win was the agent, or asset, however you would refer to him, who apparently was considered for the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which never took place; is that right?

Mr. Colby. Yes, sir.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, is it accurate that Q. J. Win operated [redacted] 1(B)

Mr. Colby. This is what is reported, and it is quite possible.

Mr. Breckinridge. The record indicates that.

Mr. Schwarz. And is it further so that one of the CIA officers who first met Q. J. Win [redacted] 1(B)

Mr. Colby. Yes, that is what it says.

Date:09/30/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10041

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCI
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING DATED JULY 16, 1975

DATE : 07/16/75
PAGES : 69

SUBJECTS :
TRANSCRIPT OF HEARING; TESTIMONY OF PROUTY, L. FLETCHER

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box number 283, Folder 6

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

they operate and the difference between a contact at a proprietary firm, like Air America or [redacted], Incorporated or the Mullen Company would contact, you deal with contact men, some of whom were military who are cleared, but others are agency who are in there.

Like Gil Greenaway was in the Pentagon, he was an Agency employee, he was not a military man. So when air lines contacted Greenaway they thought they were contacting a military man, but he was really an employee of the Agency, for other reasons. But he was a contact man. So there was an array of different contact men.

Now, in that elaborate context Schorr approached the subject, and he said, were there contacts in the White House?

And I said, well, sure. Being the senior members of NSC we had contact for our Forty Committee work, and then 54/12 Committee, and we knew who to deal with in the White House.

And he said, well, were there ever any otherkind of contacts?

And I said, the only POW contact was a very slight thing tied up with the Mullen Company, and then went on into the story.

And the only way that I heard about the contact was, not that I was able to say that Butterfield was the contact, but that they brought up the name of Butterfield, and they said, we will get this business done --

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10048

RECORD SERIES : TRANSCRIPT

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : TESTIMONY OF ROBERT MAHEU

DATE : 07/30/1975
PAGES : 95

SUBJECTS :
ACCOMPANIED BY COUNSEL: GALANE, MORTON R.
GIANCANA, SAM
WIRETAPS
MAHEU, ROBERT
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
MAFIA CONNECTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1A; 1B; 1C; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/19/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : SSCI Box 252, Folder 5

157-10011-

10048

tape 1b

am not too far off in what I am about to tell you. The contract was structured in such a way that as the bottoms of other companies became obsolete, they could only be replaced with Onassis' tankers. Even ARAMCO had to, by attrition, within a period of four-and-a-half to five-and-a-half years, would have, if their tankers became obsolete, they could only be replaced by Onassis tankers.

Our statistics, after having studied the contract and making what we considered to be proper projections, indicated that at the completion of approximately five-and-a-half years, Mr. Onassis would control more dead weight tonnage than the United States controlled in its entirety, that he would control on the high seas annually more oil by tens of thousands of gallons more than were used by all of the Allied nations during the most severe year of the Korean War, that in the first year his profit would be approximately $17 million dollars, that after five-and-a-half years his annual profit would be in the area of $200 million.

While this analysis is going on, we also found that a million dollar pay-off had been made to one of the top ministers in Saudi Arabia and we had the evidence [redacted].

We then prepared our inputs and presented them to the

National Security Council --

Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?

Mr. Maheu. -- of the United States, and within a matter, I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department denounced the agreement. It was the first time that anyone had actually seen what this meant, and frankly, there was an innate fear that with the initial $17 million, then there would be no way of stopping, I mean, he might go to Venezuela and do the same thing, and there were also other inputs about the background of Mr. Onassis that I would just as soon not make a matter of record, but they were not too favorable, that we presented to the National Security Council verbally but not in writing.

Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?

Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?

Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement and that same evening we were told that two [redacted] officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of Carl Twitchell by virtue of reading about the country, because I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name of Carl Twitchell who was living in Connecticut who turned out to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by

National Security Council --

Senator Huddleston. Of the United States?

Mr. Maheu. -- of the United States, and within a matter, I believe, of forty-eight hours, our State Department denounced the agreement. It was the first time that anyone had actually seen what this meant, and frankly, there was an innate fear that with the initial $17 million, then there would be no way of stopping, I mean, he might go to Venezuela and do the same thing, and there were also other inputs about the background of Mr. Onassis that I would just as soon not make a matter of record, but they were not too favorable, that we presented to the National Security Council verbally but not in writing.

Mr. Madigan. Who made the presentation?

Senator Schweiker. What subsequently happened then with the Security Council denunciation, et cetera?

Mr. Madigan. The State Department denounced the agreement and that same evening we were told that two [redacted] officials were on their way to Saudi Arabia.

Then I proceeded to dig up the gentleman by the name of ~~Carl Twitchell~~ by virtue of reading about the country, because I'm not about ready to go there and not know about the customs and the formation of the country. I dug up a man by the name of ~~Carl Twitchell~~ who was living in Connecticut who turned out to be the first American who had ever really been accepted by old King Saud. [redacted] had spent time in the country as a mining engineer to help them in the exploitation of mines. It was in fact to [redacted] that the old king gave the power of attorney to come to the United States government or come back to the United States and try to form a consortium for the exploitation of oil from which emanated ARAMCO.

[redacted] was the type of man who was only reimbursed for his expenses. I think his total expenses were slightly in excess of $8,000. He didn't even keep the banking and percentage for himself, or a piece of the action, so to speak, and he was highly, highly loved by the Saudis and although the old king was then gone and King Saud, the son, was in power, [redacted] had the same respect and reverence from the present leaders as he did from the father and I convinced [redacted] that -- he already had a clearance, a satisfactory clearance, and I convinced him to precede me to Saudi Arabia to try to lay the groundwork.

Senator Schweiker. What year was this, roughly?

Mr. Maheu. This, I believe, was in '54 or '55, yes.

Anyway, I finally ended up going to Saudi Arabia, having a meeting with the King's confidential assistant, presenting all of this evidence, frankly at the time not knowing if the King himself had a piece of the action --

Senator Huddleston. Had some of this evidence come from the wiretap?

Mr. Maheu. That tap was entirely unproductive, entirely unproductive.

Senator Schweiker. What happened then at your meeting?

Mr. Maheu. Well, it's very interesting, if we could take a little time, I mean, I was scheduled to have the meeting "with the King," but he doesn't show, he stays somewhere else and the confidential assistant shows up and one trusted minister that he had with [redacted] present.

And my meeting was scheduled for 8:00 p.m. one night, and this happaned to be the last day that the King was supposed to be in Jidda, he was then leaving for the capital further inland, Jidda being the only major port in Saudi where he spends his summers, and they were having a big parade for him, and from the balcony of the hotel, I'm watching the parade go by, and finally the King's car comes and he is arm and arm with the man on whom I'm going to give the evidence that night, and I frankly was not too comfortable, particularly in view of the fact that in those days -- and I don't know whether it has changed, but in Saudi, the same document did not give you permission to enter and leave; you had to make application for an exit visa after you arrived, and I was in constant contact with the then-United States Ambassador. He made it very clear that the government approved of everything I was doing, but if something went wrong they could not come to my rescue, I would have to be the fall guy, and I was prepared to do it. That was

Saudi Arabian government would have its flag flying the high seas, and at the time that all of this is going on they are building what then, upon completion of production, had been the biggest tanker in the world at that time, a ship named after the old King, a tanker which was scheduled to go and take a maiden flight and take off, and it turned out the biggest problem that we had was to find a save-face gimmick. But finally the whole thing was accomplished, and it took two and a half years to do it.

Senator Schweiker. I didn't mean to get you off the track.

Mr. Maheu. Well, I'm sorry I am so verbose.

Senator Huddleston. You said you bought a paper in Athens? You mean by that you actually bought the paper or just paid them to run the story?

Mr. Maheu. We bought a newspaper.

You'll have to understand, Senator, that in Rome, in those days, there were fifty newspapers. I mean, the big circulation in those days, big circulation in Rome was 20,000. It's hard for us to visualize that.

Senator Huddleston. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Yes.

Can we go off the record?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

Mr. Liebengood. Was this listening post that you referred to, was that a project that was related to work for the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Maheu. I don't believe it was.

Mr. Madigan. Did you have any New York assignments other than Onassis that you gave to Frank?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember any.

Mr. Madigan. How about [redacted] I may have asked you that yesterday. Do you recall whether he had any relationship with your company during the 1950's?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember a [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. A CIA employee.

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall his name.

Mr. Madigan. I got sidetracked off of my question of whether you recall a prosecution or an investigation of the Onassis wiretap. You may have already have answered that.

Mr. Maheu. I think I did, yes.

Mr. Madigan. What did you say?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I appeared before a Grand Jury that was investigating Mr. Frank on another matter.

Mr. Madigan. On another matter, but you had no recollection of any investigation of that particular tap?

Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

Mr. Madigan. Either an investigation of you or Frank or Leone or anyone?

Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

Mr. Madigan. No interviews by the FBI?

Mr. Maheu. It's conceivable, but I don't remember it.

Mr. Madigan. You don't remember it?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

tape 2a

Mr. Madigan. Did there come a time when you were asked by the Central Intelligence Agency to be involved in a project which would involve sending a woman by the name of Florence Horn over to a foreign country?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.

Mr. Madigan. And what were you asked to do with regard to that?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I was asked to find a woman, preferably from Los Angeles, who would agree to go to a foreign country and under some pretext try to meet the leader of the country and hopefully change his basic philosophies which at the time were thought to be detrimental to the United States, and that they were very, as a result, very seriously jeopardizing the national security of the government of the United States.

Mr. Madigan. Did you find such a woman?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

Mr. Madigan. And did the Agency sponsor her trip overseas, that is the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. I placed her in touch with a representative of the CIA. He made certain commitments, financial commitments to her. At the completion of the assignment, she claimed that she had additional funds coming to her which I paid out of my own pocket, so that I guess a more accurate way of saying it is that the Agency and I sponsored her trip.

Mr. Madigan. Did she ever get to meet the foreign leader, whom we will call A?

Mr. Maheu. I do not have any recollection.

Mr. Madigan. You don't know whether she did or she didn't?

Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know how long she was gone?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that she was gone for several months.

Mr. Madigan. And this person is the woman I referred to earlier by the name of Florence Horn, is that right?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. Now can you date that assignment as sometime in 1956 or '57, does that sound about right, or do you have any recollection of what year it was?

Mr. Maheu. I don't have any recollection. It was before

1960.

Mr. Madigan. It was sometime after you had begun in '54 with your Agency operation?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. Or your sponsorship?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. Subsequently, did this Leader "A" come to the United States to your knowledge after this?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall whether he came subsequently or prior to.

Mr. Madigan. When the same leader did come to the United States, were you involved in any assignment for the CIA with regard to his presence in the country?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I was.

Mr. Madigan. And what was that assignment?

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Who was the Agency representative that gave you this assignment? Did you go through Mr. O'Connell, or was it someone different?

Mr. Maheu. This request emanated from, directly from the State Department.

Mr. Madigan. Who in the State Department?

Mr. Maheu. Mr. Scott McCloud, who was then Director of the Office of Security and Consular Affairs.

Mr. Madigan. Was it coordinated with the CIA, or was this strictly between yourself and the State Department?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the CIA was kept apprised, however that the coordination was with the State Department, in connection with the security that was being provided for this leader during his visit to the United States.

Mr. Madigan. Did you meet with the State Department or CIA people or both in New York City when the leader arrived there?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I met with Security Personnel of the State Department.

Mr. Madigan. What did you do in New York for this assignment?

(Pause)

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. And did you meet with the New York police with regard to the assignment?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

[redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. No, I don't.

Mr. Madigan. Did you travel from New York to any other city with this leader?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I did.

Mr. Madigan. What occurred when you arrived at the other cities?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I contacted the security representatives of the State Department.

Mr. Madigan. And after you contacted the security representatives, what were you supposed to do in these other cities?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I, through local Police Department officials or law enforcement officials[redacted] not be a security risk insofar as the national security of our government was concerned.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't know what you mean[redacted] Mr. Madigan.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]?

Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection, yes.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that you did?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday when I asked you whether someone had travelled from city to city, you indicated that you thought maybe one did, but you weren't sure about how many others.

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. How many cities did you visit during the trip that this Leader "A" made?

Mr. Maheu. Several cities.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. Do you recall telling me yesterday that they were?

Mr. Maheu. Do you recall yesterday identifying the leader?

Mr. Madigan. I do.

Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. That they may have been, yes.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. And that occurred in New York and the other cities that he stayed at while he was in the United States?

Mr.Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted] --

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. But, you did not bring a crowd of six or seven.

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that any woman travelled with me, may have travelled independently, but I have no recollection of being on the same plane with any of these people.

Mr. Madigan. You think may have traveled from city to city, or four or five?

Mr. Maheu. One may have gone to one further city. That is the best of my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. And the others that were provided in each city were sort of local, so that they could be controlled, more or less, by the local police?

Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Is that the theory of the project?

Mr. Maheu. That's my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Now with regard to this same leader, did you ever receive an assignment from the CIA to produce any film with regard to him?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

Mr. Madigan. Do you remember when that assignment was in terms of whether it was before or after this visit to the United States?

Mr. Maheu. Subsequent to his visit to the United States he made a trip to Russia. Our inputs were to the effect that he brought back from Russia with him an attractive, Russian agent, and that his philosophies relative to the United States began to change appreciably and that the security of the United States was in great jeopardy as a result of whatever influence this female agent was able to have upon him.

Mr. Madigan. As a result of that, what assignment did you receive, if any, from the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. As a result, I was asked if -- well, as a result I was provided with pictures reflecting the quarters, allegedly reflected the quarters to which she was assigned during his trip to Russia, photographs of the female agent, and I was asked if I could find some contacts in Los Angeles who could produce a set resembling the headquarters reflected on the pictures, a woman who looked like the female agent, a male who looked like the leader, and take some pictures subsequently showing them together within the confines of the alleged headquarters.

Mr. Madigan. Did you recruit anybody to be in this film?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I did.

Mr. Madigan. Who was that?

Mr.Maheu. I recruited a man who was working for me in Tucson, Arizona by the name of Charles Kays, a female agent who was known to -- I mean a female who was known to the law

[redacted]

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection. I can't believe that where you would find [redacted], I don't believe so no.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Was that Bautzer?

Mr. Maheu. No, sir.

Mr. Madigan. Who was that?

Mr. Maheu. First I discussed the matter with Howard Hughes and he recommended that I contact Mr. Larry Crosby, which I did.

Mr. Madigan. Did Hughes have to approve your being involved in this?

Mr. Maheu. I am not sure he had to approve. I was just seeking his advice.

Mr. Madigan. You were more or less just telling him about it?

Mr. Maheu. I beg your pardon?

Mr. Madigan. You were just telling him about it?

Mr. Maheu. No, Mr. Hughes had been in the industry, he had been in movie studios, I thought he could be helpful to this contract.

Mr. Madigan. Did you deal with O'Connell with regard to this contract or with somebody else?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that I dealt with Mr. O'Connell and Colonel Edwards.

Mr. Madigan. Colonel Edwards?

Who was this person, the female who was known to --

Mr. Maheu. I really don't remember. The one and only time I have seen her in my life.

Mr. Madigan. Could this film have been described as a pornographic film, or was it something less than that?

Mr. Maheu. By today's technology, I would say definitely no.

Mr. Madigan. You say this woman was known to the law enforcement authorities. Was she suspected by yourself to be a prostitute?

Mr. Maheu. Not at all.

Mr. Madigan. Not at all?

Mr. Maheu. Not at all.

Mr. Madigan. She was just an actress of some kind?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall, but my recollection is she was highly respected by the law enforcement authorities. Whether she was an informant for them or what the relationship was, I don't know.

Mr. Madigan. So you produced one film? One film cannister as a result of this, movie film?

Mr. Maheu. Very short.

Mr. Madigan. Did you make any still photographs or anything like that?

Mr. Maheu. No, I did not.

Mr. Madigan. And then you turned the film over to the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

Mr. Madigan. And thereafter do you know what happened to it?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Madigan. Were you told what was going to be done with it?

Mr. Maheu. I was told that the stills would be distributed in the country of the leader in an attempt to embarrass him and hopefully as a result remove what was considered to be a very serious threat to the national security of our country.

Mr. Madigan. Were you ever familiar with the project names that were attached to these assignments by the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. Not that I recollect, no.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Madigan. Did you ever hear of project Happy Days?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. Or Project Harp Star?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. Or Project Norfok?

Mr. Maheu. No.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Yes, sir.

Mr. Madigan. What was your assignment in that regard?

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. And who did you contact with regard to that?

Mr. Maheu. I contacted Mr. Gregson Bautzer.

Mr. Madigan. Is that B-a-u-t-z-e-r?

Mr. Maheu. B-a-u-t-z-e-r, a Hollywood attorney.

Mr. Madigan. And did he hold the [redacted] that you refer to?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, he did.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that the intent was to have young movie starlets present at the party, but I do not have any recollection of receiving any instructions stating that, for instance, one specific person was to be his date, if that's what you're --

Mr. Madigan. So your understanding was to have a number available at the party, that's all. Not to have anyone --

Mr. Maheu. To have the party, period.

Mr. Madigan. Not to introduce one to him?

Mr. Maheu. That is correct.

I did not go to the party. I do not know who all was there. I do recall that there were quite a few people present and again, my recollection is that since this particular leader was enthralled with Hollywood that the intent was to have present people who -- with whom he would have an opportunity to converse concerning his interests in the movie industry, and the making of movies, and talk to not only starlets, but I believe that some male stars were also invited to the party.

Mr. Madigan. As a result of the party, did the leader associate himself with one particular female?

Mr. Maheu. I was subsequently told that as a result of the -- having met a young starlet at the party, that he subsequently invited her to spend time with him in his country.

Mr. Madigan. Were you ever asked to be involved in providing a house in Long Island for him to stay at with this particular female?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I was asked.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know who that person was?

Mr. Maheu. I do not recall the name.

Mr. Madigan. You indicated that your recollection was that there was some [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. Was your assignment in that regard solely [redacted] was that the end of it?

Mr. Maheu. That is my recollection of it, yes.

Mr. Madigan. Did you have any other assignments with regard to that Leader "B"?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Did you have any other assignments with regard to Leader "A"?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I did.

Mr. Madigan. Did you undertake any other Agency assignments with regard to any other leader of any other country?

Mr. Maheu. I have no recollection that I did.

Mr. Madigan. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. That name is familiar, yes, now that you mention it.

Mr. Madigan. Do you think [redacted] might have been the person?

Mr. Maheu. I think [redacted] might have been, yes.

Mr. Madigan. Did you contact Howard Hughes with regard to that assignment?

Mr. Maheu. No, I did not. However, Mr. Bautzer was, in those days, Mr. Hughes' personal attorney.

Mr. Madigan. Would you date that [redacted] assignment as being around 1959?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall. It was before 1960, but that would sound approximately right.

Mr. Madigan. Did you ever have your office in Washington used for cover purposes by the CIA?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, I have.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know on how many occasions?

Mr. Maheu. On several occasions.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know what the purpose of the agent that would be using it for cover was?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that my role was limited simply to fund their income. In other words, they would be on the payroll of Robert A. Maheu Associates and that I would be reimbursed the exact amount of their payroll.

As to the specific assignments, I have no recollection.

Mr. Madigan. What types of duties would they have for an employee who was working in [redacted] at some point in their career?

Mr. Maheu. Yes, we did.

Mr. Madigan. Would you recall that to be around 1968, or do you have a specific recollection?

Mr. Maheu. It would be about that time.

Mr. Madigan. About that time.

Mr. Maheu. Yes.

Mr. Madigan. And did you ever hear of the name [redacted] with regard to that cover arrangement? [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall. My recollection is that the guy's name was [redacted] but I don't recall the name [redacted] Perhaps he was placed on the payroll as [redacted] but I don't recall.

Mr. Madigan. You did not address him as [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. No, not to my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. What was he supposed to be doing in [redacted] do you know?

Mr. Maheu. Covertly or overtly?

Mr. Madigan. Both.

Let's start with covertly.

Mr. Maheu. Covertly he was -- he had an assignment from the Agency which I don't know. Overtly he was an employee of Robert A. Maheu Associates trying to exploit the possibility of business ventures in the country [redacted]

Mr. Madigan. You have no inclination or no feeling at all for what his assignment was?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Madigan. In covert terms whether it was an espionage assignment or whether it was a PR kind of assignment? No idea?

Mr. Maheu. I don't know.

Mr. Madigan. Was there ever an island involved with that assignment to your knowledge?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my knowledge or recollection.

Mr. Madigan. You never heard of an island called [redacted] have you?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. During the 1960's did you employ a fellow by the name of Jack Buckley? We may have discussed this before.

Mr. Maheu. I believe that from time to time a Jack Buckley did work for Robert A. Maheu Associates. I don't believe he was an employee.

Mr. Madigan. Would he be on a kind of an intermittent contract basis like Frank was? You would use him every once in awhile?

Mr. Maheu. My recollection is that he did some work for Robert A. Maheu Associates and, as I say, not an employee.

Mr. Madigan. Do you know what types of assignments he did?

Mr. Liebengood. Mr. Mort Jackson?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember his name.

Mr. Madigan. Mort Jackson being an attorney --

Mr. Liebengood. -- in Los Angeles.

Mr. Al Long of the Secret Service?

Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

Mr. Liebengood. [redacted] formerly of the Central Intelligence Agency, a resident of Florida.

Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

Mr. Liebengood. [redacted]

Mr. Maheu. Don't remember his name.

Mr. Liebengood. James McCord?

Mr. Maheu. Only what I saw in the newspapers.

Mr. Liebengood. But you had no dealings with him while you were in Washington?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my recollection.

Mr. Madigan. Just briefly, in that regard, we discussed yesterday whether you had any recollection of Mr. McCord being involved -- or at least I think we discussed it -- in any either sweeping of your office or electronic equipment or using of your office as a listening post or anything like that?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember.

Mr. Madigan. And your indication was you didn't have any recollection?

Mr. Maheu. No.

payroll, and for the second time I was turned down by Mr. Hughes. I believe it was in September of 1969 that I finally called Mr. Meier in and requested his resignation and then I informed Mr. Hughes that he had resigned.

After the departure of Mr. Meier, while going through his files, Mr. Ellson ran into some documents that indicated some very serious double escrows on mining properties and we recommended to Mr. Hughes that all the information be made available to the authorities and let the chips fall where they may.

Mr. Liebengood. Do you know why Mr. Hughes was not inclined to follow your recommendations with regards to Meier's termination at earlier dates?

Mr. Maheu. He was afraid that Meier would embarrass him. At least, that is what he told me.

Mr. Liebengood. You are aware of no CIA interest in Meier?

Mr. Maheu. The only thing I know is that Meier was cut in on the cover [redacted] and was aware of that operation.

Mr. Liebengood. How did that come about? How was he cut in on that?

Mr. Maheu. Because it was he who initially had worked on a deal for a venture in Mexico on the part of Hughes Aircraft for cable television and subsequent to -- well, when that

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

collapsed, the person who was to be the partner of Hughes Aircraft in that particular venture threatened to sue Howard Hughes and all of the Hughes interest for non-fulfillment of contract, and I made a recommendation to that person whose name slips my mind, but I believe his last name was Jamie, J-a-m-i-e or something like that, I don't recall. But to try to discourage him from filing such a lawsuit I suggested that he and I put up $10,000 in [redacted] and check into the possibility of developing business there.

I put up my ten, he never put his up, and Meier was the one who was involved. But when the Agency needed a cover for an assignment in [redacted] Meier was made privy of this by the Agency.

WARD & PAUL

tape 3b

Mr. Liebengood. Just to be certain I understand, this was because of Meier's role in reestablishing the operation in [redacted] Is that correct?

Mr. Maheu. Well, of trying to save the lawsuit, yes. That's right.

Mr. Liebengood. And you think the name of this would-be partner was Jamie?

Mr. Maheu. I don't remember whether that was the first name or last name.

Mr. Liebengood. How did [redacted] whatever way do you spell his last name, do you recall?

Mr. Maheu. I don't recall.

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Liebengood. Do you know who accompanied Meier and F. Donald Nixon on this trip to the Dominican Republic, the celebrated trip?

Mr. Maheu. No, I do not.

Mr. Liebengood. As far as you know, they had nothing to do with any Agency interest in that?

Mr. Maheu. No, sir, not as far as I know.

As a matter of fact, it's my recollection I found out about this afterwards.

Mr. Liebengood. Who else was witting of the cover arrangements that you had with the Agency through Robert A. Maheu Associates? You mentioned Meier and this particular one. Did you have other employees who were witting of the cover?

Mr. Maheu. I believe Bill Staton was aware of some of it.

Mr. Liebengood. And did he keep your books?

Mr. Maheu. Yes.

Mr. Liebengood. And outside of the [redacted] Meier was not witting of any other cover arrangements, I take it?

Mr. Maheu. Not to my knowledge.

Mr. Liebengood. Do you recall who the other personnel were through the years that obtained Robert A. Maheu Associates cover for the Agency?

Mr. Maheu. I don't.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066
RECORD SERIES : MEMORANDUM
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO : FILE
TITLE : FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE : 02/24/1975
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
BREWER, GEORGE
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted; 1A; 3; Donor Restricted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/1994

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10066

RECORDS SERIES :
MEMORANDUM

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO : FILE

TITLE :
FURTHER INFO OBTAINED FROM BREWER, GEORGE

DATE : 02/24/75
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
BREWER, GEORGE
TECHNICAL OPERATIONS
ASSISTANCE TO LOCAL POLICE
SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS
CIA - WASHINGTON FIELD OFFICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 3, DONOR REST., REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : X
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/94

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MASON
286-11

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

February 24, 1975

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

NOTE: Incidents without page numbers indicated were not specifically mentioned in the transcript.

SSCI Box 286, Folder 11

Record Number 157-10011-10066

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: JAMES N. ROETHE

SUBJECT: Further Information obtained from George Brewer
(See February 18 Interview)

On Monday, February 24, I again spoke with George Brewer in the Commission offices from approximately 9:00 am until 10:15 am. The following additional information was obtained.

Technical Operations

In 1960 and 1961, Brewer was primary involved in Bay of Pigs operations (providing support to the Miami Field Office in smuggling friendly Cubans into the United States). He was engaged in little technical activity during that time. Between 1962 and 1965, he was involved in approximately 30 technical operations, only four of which were telephone taps (the rest were mike and wire cases). During that same period four or five other support agents were also engaged in technical activities, each performing approximately the same amount of technical work that Brewer was performing. Some of the agents doing technical work were Jack Cryer, Hal Tittsler, and Bill Simpson, the latter being a former instructor of Brewer's. Both Cryer and Simpson had been doing technical work for quite some time (throughout the 50's). (1151-52)

In 1965 or 1966, following President Johnson's Executive Order precluding wire taps without court order or without approval of the Attorney General in security cases, technical work performed by Brewer and others at the Washington Field Office almost stopped completely. Brewer can recall only two taps that were placed during that period. One of these was placed in a Safe House in the Washington area, and the other was placed in a New York apartment in connection with Project PARAGON. Brewer assumes that the appropriate approvals were obtained prior to his placing these taps. (1147-48)

Most of the technical operations in the early 1960's were performed at the request of the Operations Directorate. While Brewer was not privy to the purpose for each technical operation that he performed, he believes that many involved

SECRET/SENSITIVE

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED
31 MAY 94
(1)(CA)
(3)

Safe Houses for use by defectors and the wiring of operations assets' apartments or other premises where conversations with assets would be forthcoming. For instance, in 1962 the apartment of a defector (Golitzen) was wired. It was believed that Golitzen had become unhappy with CIA treatment and was considering leaving the country. A telephone tap was placed on his phone to attempt to verify this. Brewer believes that these cases involved positive foreign intelligence gathering as opposed to being security cases. From the names of the individuals whose conversations were to be recorded, Brewer presumes that most of these technical operations were directed against foreigners.

Brewer is aware of a few technical operations relating to security. One involved the bugging of the premises of a former employee [redacted] in about 1964 because of his questionable associates. Another, in 1963, involved a telephone tap on a newsman (although Brewer was unaware at the time the tap was placed that it was being directed against a newsman). (1149)

The Technical Division of the Office of Security may have been involved in some technical operations in the United States during the 1960's and earlier. However, their primary responsibility was counter-audio work overseas. Brewer does not believe that they would have been involved in significant amounts of technical work in the States.
To his knowledge, FBI was not informed of these technical operations, p.1155)

Surveillance Operations

Prior to 1968, the Washington Field Office was performing some unsophisticated surveillance. This generally related to surveillance of defectors and training operations directed against perspective overseas CIA agents. The purpose of the training was to assist WFO in its surveillance techniques and to determine how well the perspective overseas agents could make contacts and "drops" without being detected. The Field Office had little equipment to undertake sophisticated surveillance at that time. (1120-28)

In 1968, with the creation of the Surveillance and Technical Unit, a much more concentrated effort was made in the area of surveillance. (1127)

Assistance to Local Police

Brewer remembers that at some point in time two sets of alias documents prepared by Technical Services were given to the Metropolitan Police Department. This included a social security card, driver's license, D. C. permit, etc.

****

I again interviewed Mr. Brewer at approximately 2:30 pm on the same day, just prior to his leaving for the Commission hearings, at which he was testifying. He indicated that it was the policy of the CIA to offer gratuities to various police officers in the Washington, D.C., area for their assistance to the CIA. Each Christmas a list would be prepared of those individuals from local police departments who had provided assistance,and appropriate gifts would be given to these individuals, ranging from candy and liquor to $25 gift certificates. The money for these gifts was taken from CIA's "Blue Jay" fund, used for miscellaneous expenses. Some police officials would not accept such gratuities. (11723,75)

Brewer is also aware of one occasion when police officials from several departments were flown to a hunting lodge owned by the Agency in southern Virginia. Brewer recalls several officers from the Montgomery County, Fairfax County (including [redacted]), and Metropolitan Police Departments(including [redacted], but not [redacted]--who refused an invitation) attending, as well as a high police official from Boston. Brewer himself attended this gathering and indicated that as best as he can remember it was strictly a social affair. Brewer could not recall ever having agreed to provide [redacted] of the Fairfax County Police Department with an automobile while [redacted] was on vacation in California, although he would not deny that he may have done so. (11727,73)

Brewer indicated that all gratuities given police officials were approved by Headquarters and that none were specifically connected with any particular request being made of the police by the CIA. (1172)

(full distribution)

JNR/vmr

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

February 20, 1975

SECRET/SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: FILE

FROM: JAMES N. ROETHE

SUBJECT: Summary of an Interview with George R. Brewer, Conducted on Tuesday, February 18, 1975, in the Offices of the Commission by James N. Roethe and Robert Olsen

The interview commenced at approximately 4:00 pm on February 18, 1975, and ended at approximately 8:30 pm on the same date. Mr. Brewer appeared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff.

Background of Mr. Brewer

Mr. Brewer is a graduate of the University of Maryland. He has been with the CIA for over twenty years and is presently Chief of the Director's Security Staff. The interview concerned itself primarily with the activities of the Washington Field Office of the Office of Security. Mr. Brewer first worked in that office from January 1955 to February 1956. From February 1956 to April 1959 he was on Director Dulles' personal security staff. He served with the Headquarters Field Office (now defunct) from April 1959 to August 1960 and again served with the Washington Field Office from August 1960 to July 1973, when he obtained his present position.

Activities at the Washington Field Office

The Washington Field Office is made up of 35-40 agents. Clericals bring the total of employees to about 100. It is by far the largest security field office. The majority of the agents are designated as field agents, whose primary activity is investigating applicants for employment with the Agency and some covert investigations (investigations under cover, such as investigations of contractor's employees or individuals planning to be sent overseas under cover). The remaining agents are designated as support agents (about 8 men) who provide a broad range of support to the field agents. In 1966 Mr. Brewer, a support agent, was designated as the Washington Field Office's liaison with the local police (including the Metropolitan Police Department, most suburban police departments, and the Virginia and Maryland State Police). In November of 1968, Mr. Brewer was placed in charge of a newly created "Surveillance and Technical Unit" of the Support Squad. He remained in both positions until he left the Office in July of 1973. Mr. Brewer emphasized that no activity was undertaken by the field office without the approval of headquarters. Requests for action in Mr. Brewer's areas of interest would be received by headquarters security, generally from the Operations Directorate. The "Security Support Branch" at headquarters would pass the request on to the

SECRET/SENSITIVE

"Assistant Special Agent in Charge of Support" at the field office (Mr. John Hutchinson during most of Mr. Brewer's tenure), who in turn would ask Mr. Brewer to carry out the request.

The following persons have headed the Washington Field Office as "Special Agent-in-Charge":

Charles Kane	1960-1963
Marvin Gentile	1963-1964
John Noble	1964-1968
Ed Klippa	1968-1973
Jack Cryer	Present

Covert Investigations by Field Agents

Such investigations were conducted much less frequently than overt investigations of applicants for employment. Several unofficial covers were used by investigators to prevent the person being investigated from being exposed as a CIA contact.

Technical Operations

Technical operations consisted of the planting of electronic listening devices (King) and the telephone taps (Queen). No technical devices were planted by the Washington Field Office after the formation in 1968 of the "Surveillance and Technical Unit." However, Mr. Brewer has planted technical devices prior to 1968:

1. In about 1966 Mr. Brewer planted a listening device in an apartment at the Savoy Apartments in Washington, D. C. (a CIA Safe House). This device was later removed and Brewer was told it was never used.

2. About 8 years ago Mr. Brewer placed several bugs in a Washington Safe House. He believes they have never been removed. They have never been used to his knowledge.

3. About 10 years ago Mr. Brewer was called back from vacation to bug a cadillac to be used by two Chinese generals.

4. At one time Mr. Brewer bugged hotel rooms in the Washington area where unwitting U-2 pilot applicants were being interviewed.

5. In 1963 Mr. Brewer placed telephone taps on phones in a home in Washington (MOCKINGBIRD case). At the time he did not know he was tapping a news columnist's phone, but he later learned that that had been the case.

6. Four houses in Miami were bugged by Mr. Brewer shortly after the Bay of Pigs incident.

7. A hotel room in Los Angeles was bugged by Brewer several years ago. It was to be used for some kind of interview.

8. A home in Bethesda, Maryland, was also bugged before being occupied by a Cuban National.

In all, Mr. Brewer believes he was involved in more than ten technical operations, but less than 100 prior to 1968. In all cases he was merely supplying technical support for operations at the request of his superiors, and was not witting to the actual operation. In each case he assumed the propriety and lawfulness of the operation.

Since 1966, Mr. Brewer has been engaged in only one technical operation (Operation PARAGON--threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew). When that threat was made, Brewer suggested that a line be run into the informing agent's apartment. Such a line was run from that agent's telephone (a telephone tap). This operation was approved by higher authority.

Surveillance

Surveillance was conducted off and on through the period from 1960 to 1973. However, active surveillance did not begin until 1968 when the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" was formed. Prior to 1968, surveillance was restricted to training exercises and surveillance of defectors. Mr. Brewer estimated that he engaged in about ten such operations prior to 1968. Training surveillance continued after 1968, but only one surveillance of a defector was made during that time.

In 1966 Headquarters requested that the Washington Field Headquarters form a sophisticated surveillance unit. Such a unit was not really created until Brewer took over the "Surveillance and Technical Unit" in 1968. After 1968 surveillance took up a large part of the time of the "Surveillance and Technical Unit's" time. The Unit consisted of 14 support agents and was expanded to 20-24 men during some surveillances. The Washington Field Office did surveillance for the entire country with regard to Security Office matters. If a surveillance was conducted anywhere in the country, Brewer believes he would know of it. If surveillance was conducted in the territory of another field office, that field office would have been in charge, with the Washington Office providing the support. The following surveillance was undertaken by Brewer's Unit:

1. Surveillance of Employees or Former Employees

✓ [redacted]

b. Project CAPUSTO (8 Ball): Employee associating with former defector was surveilled.

c. Project TOMCAT: An associate of CAPUSTO was surveilled.

d. Project MONEY: A former employee planning to attend the SALT talks with his new boss was surveilled.

e. Project SIESTA: Surveillance on a former employee and the suspected Castro agent she was living with.

f. Project PINEAPPLE: Surveillance of a former employee living above his means. Washington Field Office surveilled outside D.C. Anderson Associates surveilled in D.C. and at subject's Arlington home. Washington Field Office did not participate in any break-in of subject's apartment.

g. Project AMOS: Former employee surveilled to Champaign, Illinois.

h. Project PIXIE: (last job): Two employees and son of another surveilled for suspected drug use and/or sale.

i. Project PARAGON: Informer who reported threat against Director Helms and Vice President Agnew surveilled in New York and Detroit.

j. MARCHETTI: Former employee threatening to publish classified material (which he could not have obtained during the course of his employment) was surveilled. Three cars were used in surveillance. No police cover.

2. Surveillance of Newsmen (to determine source of security leaks)

a. Jack Anderson: Brewer knew that surveillance was to determine source of Anderson's publishing of classified information. Mr. Brewer questioned his superior (John Hutchinson) about the case. He wondered why the FBI was not involved and understood that the FBI didn't want to touch the case (rumor). Along with Jack Anderson, two of his aides--Les Whitten and Joe Spear--were surveilled.

b. Michael Getler: Mr. Brewer also questioned this surveillance, but not strongly as Getler was relatively unknown. Further, he really didn't know the reason why Getler was being surveilled until later.

3. Other Surveillances

a. A nephew of an assistant to Director McCone was surveilled after he went berserk and threatened to go to the Russians. He was surveilled for two days.

In all cases of surveillance, photographs of the subject and his contacts were taken. Further, the identity of the contact was also ascertained and reported to headquarters. No surveillance was ever placed on a Congressman, Senator, Judge or Justice or other public figure except the newsmen previously mentioned. Mr. Brewer believes that there were no cases of surveillance undertaken by his Unit which did not involve either (1) a threatened security leak to newsmen, or (2) a potential security violation, except Project PARAGON.

The records kept on surveillances include the letters assigning the surveillance to the Unit, the agents' logs, photographs taken and the final report of each project. This information was all sent to Headquarters. The Field Office would also retain copies but never made any use of these files.

Break-Ins:

Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was only involved in one break-in in connection with Project SIESTA, involving a former employee living with a suspected Castro sympathizer. A photographic studio, jointly operated by the employee and her Cuban boy friend, was broken into. This didn't bother Brewer, as there was strong evidence suggesting a possible security violation. Further, the suspected pair was soliciting passport photo business at CIA,which would give them information about the travels of CIA agents. A second break-in was effected by Anderson Associates (a CIA proprietary) in Project SIESTA. Brewer doesn't know who headed up Anderson Associates. He believes that Ralph True, Joe Langon and Don Connor may have had some connection with it.

Mr. Brewer's Surveillance Unit was disbanded in June or July of 1972. Brewer is not sure why the Unit was disbanded. The Washington Field Office still does training surveillance and surveillance of defectors. There have been no instances (to Brewer's knowledge) of potential employee security leaks since the Surveillance Unit was disbanded.

Activity with Dissident Groups

On three occasions (in 1969, 1970 and May 1971) the CIA participated with the Washington police in monitoring peace and anti-war demonstrations. In each case a request was made by the Washington Police Department (MPD), through Captain George Suter, for assistance. The Washington Field Office of CIA furnished six vehicles with communications gear and men to operate the gear. Mr. Brewer believes that two CIA agents and one police officer occupied each car. (More CIA agents than police were utilized,as MPD didn't have the necessary manpower.) The only purpose of this operation was to monitor the movements of the crowds. There was no attempt to penetrate any dissident organization or to photograph the crowds. The CIA agents involved in the May 1,1971, operation carried police ID's. CIA also provided a fully-staffed communications center at MPD to receive communications from the cars. This provided MPD a second radio frequency and freed MPD's own channels for other police business.

Brewer believes that the primary purpose of this operation was to render communications assistance to the local police. The secondary purpose was to monitor crowds so as to protect CIA installations. (For example, MPD had obtained some information that various dissident groups planned to picket CIA Headquarters and planned to harass Director Helms during a planned speech.) All of these CIA operations were verbally approved by Headquarters Support Branch (Mr. Cryer). Total period of time devoted to monitoring dissident groups with MPD (for all three occasions) was about five days. Brewer is not aware of any instance where the Washington Field Office tried to penetrate any dissident groups.

Collection of Information on Dissident Groups

During the period of the demonstrations in 1969-1971, all field offices and resident agents were requested by Headquarters to look out for literature and other information which might in any way affect the CIA. No conscious intelligence gathering of literature was requested. Items to be looked for included campus news clippings, etc.. This project was not a continuing one over the three-year period when most demonstrations occurred. It was renewed from time to time as flare-ups in activity occurred. Mr. Brewer does not know the quantity of material collected or the use made of that material. The only information that Brewer knows was collected by the Washington Field Office consisted of the weekly intelligence summary prepared by MPD. Headquarters specifically asked Brewer to get the summaries (either Jack Cryer, Tex Mills or Curt Rivers),and they were forwarded to Headquarters. No effort was made by Brewer to obtain information concerning any dissident group's intended activities.

Police Cover Operations

Mr. Brewer indicated that Washington Field Office agents have received police cover from the following police departments:

1. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) During the May 1971 demonstrations, MPD furnished ID's to those CIA agents monitoring the crowds along with police officers. These ID cards were in fact used. No other police cover was obtained from MPD.

2. Fairfax City Police Department: In connection with Operation SIESTA (which included a break-in at the photographic studio in Fairfax City, operated by a suspected Castro Agent) cover was obtained from the police. One CIA agent was given a Fairfax City police badge in case some one walked in on the break-in. The badge was never utilized. Brewer didn't actually remember obtaining this badge, but it was obtained by some one.

3. Fairfax County Police Department: Apparently undercover CIA agents in the county (under DOD cover) were being continuously harassed and challenged in the county while on operations. They feared their cover might be blown and felt it would be good to have police cover to prevent this from occurring. Mr. Brewer himself may have suggested getting badges and identification from the county police. In any event, he thought it was a good idea and Headquarters approved it (per John Hutchinson, Assistant Special Agent in Charge of the Washington Field Office). Thereafter, (latter part of 1971) Brewer went to [redacted] and asked about obtaining some badges and ID's. [redacted] reported that [redacted] was originally reluctant to give CIA the badges and ID, but in early spring of 1972 he changed his mind and relented. Brewer does not know if Osborn called [redacted] or if there was any arm-twisting by the CIA. Brewer himself did no arm-twisting. Nine patrolman's badges and one sergeant's badge were obtained, plus ten blank ID cards. The true names of CIA agents were placed on the cards by Brewer. It was understood that if the badges and ID's were ever used that [redacted] would immediately be notified. In fact, they were kept in a safe at Washington Field Office Headquarters and never used. They have recently been returned to Fairfax County.

No police cover was ever obtained by Washington Field Office, or used by them for the purpose of performing police activity. Brewer stated that local police were always kept informed of CIA activities in their jurisdiction.

Other Assistance Rendered CIA by Local Police

Project SIESTA:

This project involved the break-in into a photographic shop in Fairfax City. Three Fairfax City police assisted in the operation. One entered the apartment with several CIA agents; one stood watch on the front steps; and one waited in a squad car outside the building. Much material in the photographic studio was photographed. Surveillance was constantly maintained on the operators of the studio while the break-in was being carried out.

Use of Fairfax County Facilities:

On at least one occasion the Fairfax County police station was used for CIA training purposes. CIA desired to assure themselves that new recruits for covert overseas duty could not be "broken" if siezed by foreign authorities. Consequently, CIA officials would "arrest" these unwitting recruits on some bogus charge and take them to Fairfax County jail where they would be subject to strong interrogation to see if they would "break".

Other Assistance

Almost every police department has agreed to immediately notify the CIA if one of its agents is arrested.

Assistance Rendered to Local Police by the CIA

Training Programs:

In late 1971 a course in photography was offered to officers of local police departments by the Washington Field Office, and in 1972 courses in both surveillance techniques and photography were offered. Representatives from MPD and most large suburban police departments attended. These courses were stopped after the printing of a New York Times article criticizing the training of New York City police by the CIA.

Metropolitan Police Department:

1. May Day - 1971: MPD was furnished six cars equipped with communications gear, plus two men for each car, from the Washington Field Office (WFO). WFO also furnished a central communications command post plus operators. The purpose of this assistance was to permit the monitoring of crowds.

2. In about 1972, Brewer performed a telephone tap for MPD in connection with an internal affairs matter where eleven police officers were potentially involved in a bribe. Brewer understood that a court order was obtained before the taps were put on. [redacted] of MPD made this request and CIA Headquarters approved it.

3. During 1969 demonstrations, [redacted] of MPD asked Brewer if he could wire a lamp in the apartment of a witting police informant who had penetrated anti-war dissident groups. Brewer passed this request on to security headquarters, and the Technical Services Division performed the wiring. CIA did not monitor or receive copies of any conversations recorded.

4. Shortly after a CIA surveillance training course which several MPD officers attended, MPD became desirous of maintaining surveillance on one of its unwitting police informants to see if she was doing what the police paid her to do. MPD asked Brewer if his men would assist the new trainees in the project. Brewer's surveillance unit did furnish assistance, including four cars and at least one man for each car. These CIA agents, together with MPD officers, surveilled the subject for one and one-half days. This is the only time Brewer's surveillance team actually provided manpower to assist MPD in a surveillance.

5. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972 the Washington Field Office loaned the MPD Morals Division a device to tap a touch-tone telephone. The request came from [redacted] and [redacted] Ed Sayle of CIA was CIA's contact with [redacted] and [redacted] for equipment requests. Dollard or Foran would call Sayle, who in turn would direct Brewer to provide the equipment.

6. On two or three occasions between 1970 and 1972, Sayle directed Brewer to provide receiving devices to MPD. Once [redacted] of MPD personally contacted Brewer and requested a receiver. It was provided (ostensibly for training purposes).

7. On several occasions covert miniature transmitters were furnished to MPD on an indefinite loan.

8. The Washington Field Office also gave MPD personnel technical advice on use of double tape machines and advice on photography from time to time.

MPD received no assistance from the Washington Field Office when they set up their Intelligence Division in 1967-68. No other assistance was ever rendered MPD concerning solving particular crime or interrogating a particular witness. Sometime after Director Schlessinger became DCI, the MPD was asked to return all equipment previously loaned to it by the CIA, and most was returned. Apparently a list of this equipment has been prepared. (The list may include other police departments as well).

Montgomery County Police Department

In about 1970, Mr. Brewer loaned some transmitters to [redacted] (Ret.) and [redacted] of the county police. They had already been loaned some receivers before Brewer came with the Washington Field Office.

Fairfax County Police Department

1. Years ago the county was given an old Ampex 601 recorder equipped to take a telephone tap off a dial phone.

2. On one occasion Brewer accompanied a county police representative to U.S. Recording on S. Capitol Street to help him pick out a dial recorder for telephone taps.

3. In 1969-70, Brewer loaned some photographic equipment to the county police forces intelligence unit. The equipment has never been returned.

No personnel have ever been loaned to the county. No assistance has ever been given concerning a specific crime or witness.

Other

1. In 1969 or 1970 metal detection demonstrations were given at CIA Headquarters to representatives of all Virginia and Maryland Police Departments.

2. Director Helms owned a beach house near Lewes, Delaware. On one occasion Brewer met with the chief of police there concerning the security of the beach house, as Helms had been receiving threats. Apparently Osborn gave the police chief a box of flares and other equipment (as a gift to the department) for the chief's assistance.

****

At some point during the interview, Mr. Brewer indicated that he had not discussed his testimony with any representative of the Agency prior to the interview--except the General Counsel.

IMPRESSIONS

Mr. Brewer was originally somewhat reluctant to be interviewed and at one point was considering whether he should retain a lawyer. However, as we went along he opened up considerably to the point where I now believe I have a pretty good understanding of the Office of Security's Washington Field Office. It would appear that the Washington Field Office did conduct much, if not most, of the physical and technical surveillance directed against American citizens subsequent to 1968. In every case the surveillance was directed by higher authority. It also appears that the Washington Field Office gave substantial assistance to local police departments in the Washington, D. C. area. Much of this assistance was obviously an appropriate exchange of information between two intelligence units. Most disturbing is the incident where CIA agents assisted MPD officers in a bona fide police surveillance (a law enforcement function), but this seems to have been an isolated case.

JNR/vmr

Date:10/06/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10078

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : UNKNOWN
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD J.

DATE : 02/17/75
PAGES : 22

SUBJECTS :
MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN TESTIMONY OF OSBORN, HOWARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 288, Folder 9

Send to CIA 3/2/94

classified annex

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

288-9

TOP SECRET (XGDS)

MAJOR SUBJECTS TO BE COVERED IN THE TESTIMONY OF HOWARD J. OSBORN

February 17, 1975

Background of Mr. Osborn

See the written statement submitted to the Commission by Mr. Osborn dated February 11, 1975.

Activities of the Office of Security Giving Rise to Questions

1. Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices

In the offices of the DCI, the Deputy DCI, the Executive Director-Controller, the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration), the Director of Security, and the Deputy Director of Security, a system of telephone taps and microphones has existed. This system has made it possible to record covertly any telephone conversation or office conference taking place in those offices. All CIA officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being activated only by them. Portions of the system have been disconnected in recent years.

2. Covert Uses of Listening Devices by the Office of Security

In each instance the installation of listening devices was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence:

a. A conversation which occurred in a motel between [redacted] and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade Mr. [redacted] not to divulge sensitive information in a book which he was then writing;

b. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;

c. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign country;

TOP SECRET (XGDS 5B(2) EO 11652
By Authority of: ____________

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

3 AUG 94

d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded;

e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees.

3. Physical Surveillance

Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:

a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;

b. Victor Marchetti to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;

c. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and Michael Gettner, a staff writer for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;

d. A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her associates) who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. Watergate Contacts

a. The McCord Letters

b. The Pennington Matter

c. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg

5. Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

a. Within the Agency and Its Contractors
The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These

employees are paid additional compensation to act as infomers and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security problems which they observe among their fellow employees at the Agency.

A few outside employees, i.e., non-employees of the Agency, are also retained for the same purpose. This would include employees of the telephone company and construction workers engaged in the construction of Agency buildings. In all instances, however, the purpose is to maintain security among CIA employees and those working for CIA contractors.

Two proprietary companies, called Anderson Security Associates and General Personnel Investigations, have been used to do large-scale investigations of the personnel of companies who contract with the CIA.

b. Outside the Agency

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for Anderson Security Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of various organizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was provided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization monitored.

There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses, and its offices around the country. The field offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on campus and other newspapers to report on organizations and individuals who might represent threats to CIA personnel or offices.

As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and organizations.

6. Mail Intercept Programs in New York and San Francisco

7. Cover Operations Using Local Police Cover

Arrangements were made several years ago with [redacted] of the Fairfax County, Va., Police Department for the issuance of badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. This involved about 15 sets of identification.

These badges and other identification were never used by the CIA. They were all returned to [redacted]

Similar arrangements have been made with other police departments.

Strict orders were issued that the use of identification as local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual cover for surveillance purposes.

8. Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance

Assistance was rendered to many local police departments, including those of the cities of New York and Chicago, and to the Maryland and Virginia state police during the period 1965 to 1972. He states that this program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mr. Helms.

Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of intelligence operations.

This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments by the CIA.

9. Break-Ins Without Warrants

Mr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occurred to his knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under investigation for suspected disclosure or classified information.

10. Counter-Audio Sweeps

At the request of other departments and agencies, including Congressional Committees, the Office of Security conducts "counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hidden microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.

TOP SECRET (XGDS)

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

February 13, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

FROM: ROBERT OLSEN

SUBJECT: Summary of an Interview of Howard Osborn, conducted on February 10 and 11 in the offices of the Commission by Mr. Robert B. Olsen

Present throughout the interview, which was conducted from 2:00 pm to approximately 5:30 pm on February 10 and from 12 noon until 2:45 pm and from 4:45 pm to approximately 8:00 pm on February 11, was the attorney for Mr. Osborn, Jack Debelius.

Mr. Osborn appeared voluntarily at the request of the Commission staff. At the outset, Mr. Debelius raised a series of questions:

1. He asked us to supply an outline of the authority of the Commission. He was handed a copy of the Executive Order creating the Commission and spelling out its duties and powers.

2. He asked whether the Commission had subpoena powers, and he was advised that it did not.

3. He asked whether the Commission had power to grant immunity to witnesses, and he was advised that the Commission does not have such power.

4. He asked what liaison has been established, or will be established between the Commission and the various Senate and House Committees which will be investigating the CIA and other intelligence activities. He was told that the Commission expects to establish such liaison, but that none of the ground rules or arrangements have yet been agreed upon.

5. He asked whether Mr. Osborn would have an opportunity to review the transcript of any recorded testimony that he may give to the Commission or to the Commission staff. He was told that the Commission staff had agreed upon a policy of allowing any witness to examine the transcript of his own testimony.

6. He asked whether Mr. Olsen had been cleared for security and whether Mr. Osborn was free to reveal all levels of classified information in the course of the interview. He was advised that such a clearance had been obtained for Mr. Olsen and that Mr. Osborn was free to answer fully any questions put to him within the scope of the responsibilities of the Commission.

TOP SECRET (XGDS-5B(2) EO 11652
By Authority of ______________

Mr. Debelius stated that he had carefully reviewed his own situation as a former employee of the Office of Security within the CIA and that he had concluded that there was no prospect that he would be called as a witness either by the Commission or by any Congressional or other committee. Hence, he did not feel that there would be any conflict in his representation of Mr. Osborn under the canons of ethics applicable to the legal profession.

Background of Mr. Osborn

Howard Osborn graduated from the Virginia Polytechnic Institute in 1940 and shortly thereafter entered the military service. After World War II he was briefly with Firestone Tire and Rubber Company, and then joined the Central Intelligence Agency in late 1947. He served in various assignments within the United States and Europe prior to September 1963, including assignment as Assistant to the Inspector General and positions within the Directorate of Plans. In September 1963 he was named Deputy Director of Security. At that time the Director of Security was Bob Bannerman. On July 1, 1964, he was named Director of Security, and he continued in that position until early March 1974 when he applied for disability retirement and went on sick leave. He was retired on disability on December 31, 1974, having not returned to work since going on sick leave on March 8, 1974. He states that he had no involvement whatever with Agency activities after March 8, 1974.

Activities of the Office of Security

The Office of Security provides guards and security personnel to protect the physical facilities of the Agency. It has responsibility for overall security measures for all CIA installations, both in the United States and in foreign countries.

Counter-Audio Sweeps

At the request of other departments and agencies of the United States Government it conducts "counter-audio sweeps" of their offices to protect against telephone taps, hidden microphones, and other intercepts of audible communications.

In the case of Congressional committees and subcommittees, it conducts such sweeps of hearings rooms on the occasion of classified presentations by CIA personnel. Mr. Osborn further stated that there may have been other occasions when such sweeps were made of Congressional committee rooms, at the committee request, where classified presentations were to be made. Mr. Osborn does not, however, specifically recall such other occasions.

It also seems to Mr. Osborn that the Office of Security has made similar counter-audio sweeps for one or more individual congressmen or senators of their offices in the Senate or House Office Buildings, but he again has no specific recollection. The Office of Security also makes such sweeps of the homes of officials of the CIA with their knowledge.

He knows of no case in which the CIA has made a sweep of any other residences.

It does make sweeps of private firms who have CIA contracts, but always with the knowledge and consent of the firm.

He states that his Office has never used equipment for counter-audio sweeps for "positive intelligence."

The sweeps conducted included physical inspection, checking all telephones for taps, checking desks, walls, ceilings and floors for listening devices or radio receivers, and may involve such sophisticated measures as counter-laser measures and the use of a Dodge mobile home equipped with sophisticated equipment capable of picking up a radio transmission from nearby premises.

Taping Systems in Certain CIA Offices

Mr. Osborn stated that Mr. Helms had authorized for use in his office, in the office of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, in the office of the Executive Director-Controller, in the office of the Deputy Director for Support (now Administration), in the office of the Director of Security, and in the office of the Deputy Director of Security a system of telephone taps and secret microphones which made it possible to record covertly any telephone conversation or office conference taking place in those offices. The taping system could be activated with respect to telephones by depressing a button on the telephone in the office or on the telephone at the desk of the secretary in the adjacent office. The taping system to record office conversations would be activated by depressing a button under the carpet in the vicinity of the desk of the person occupying that office. All CIA officials in whose offices such equipment was installed were fully aware of its presence and its capability of being activated only by them.

The recorded conversations from all of these offices, except those in the Office of Security, were recorded in a central bank of recorders located in the basement of the building. Those emanating from the Office of the Director of Security or Deputy Director of Security were recorded on twin recorders located down the hall from those offices.

All recorded telephone and office conversations were transcribed. In some instances the tapes were retained, and in some instances they were erased. It is not known whether the Agency retains any copies of the typed transcripts. From time to time, particularly as an official has departed from the CIA, he has ordered tapes erased and transcripts destroyed.

Mr. Osborn reports that Mr. Colby directed the removal of the recording and telephone taping equipment from his office when he became Executive Director-Controller of the Agency and again when he became Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Bannerman also had the equipment taken out of his office when he became Deputy Director for Support (Administration). Apparently all other officials in whose offices such equipment was installed used it from time to time.

Positive Uses of Counter-Audio Equipment

Mr. Osborn stated that he wishes to clarify his previous testimony that counter-audio had not been used in a positive sense. What he meant was that it had not been used in the positive sense under any of the circumstances referred to above. There were, however, several situations in which telephone tapes and covert recording devices were employed by the Office of Security:

1. A conversation which occurred in a motel between [redacted] and Admiral Rufus Taylor, former Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, was covertly recorded. This was a meeting arranged by Admiral Taylor for the purpose of attempting to persuade [redacted] not to divulge sensitive information in a book which he was then writing;

2. Interviews with defectors have been covertly recorded from time to time;

3. With the approval of Attorney General Katzenbach, a telephone tap was placed on the telephone of a CIA employee who was alleged to be a spy of a foreign country;

4. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded;

5. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees. In each instance the installation of such listening devices was expressly approved by the Director of Central Intelligence. Mr. Osborn recalls only three such instances:

    a. In 1972-73 such a device was installed in an effort to uncover details where an old defector was being forced to make kickbacks of his compensation from CIA to his CIA case officer;

    b. At a date which could not be recalled by Mr. Osborn a device had been installed to record activity of a female employee of the CIA who had become closely and intimately associated with persons believed to be dissidents;

    c. In about 1968 or 1969 at the request of Mr. Frank Bartamo of the Department of Defense the CIA planted listening devices at the apartment of a serviceman doing highly sensitive cryptographic work. This was done with the full knowledge of Mr. William Sullivan of the FBI. Mr. Osborn speculates that the CIA was called upon to accomplish this task for the Department of Defense because Mr. Sullivan believed that J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, would not approve.

Mr. Osborn states that there may have been other instances where such listening devices were installed within the United States, but he does not recall any others. He is emphatic to the effect that after President Johnson issued an Executive Order prohibiting telephone taps without the authority of the Attorney General, the CIA never to his knowledge covertly tapped a telephone within the United States except in the one incidence authorized by Attorney General Katzenbach.

Physical Surveillance

Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted as being limited to the following:

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;

2. [redacted] to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;

3. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and [redacted] a staff writer for [redacted] for the same purpose;

4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full knowledge of the FBI.

   Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborn reports that a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel was also covertly recorded.)

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of physical surveillance in his experience was authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence except that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance, has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect to any conversations or communications, or has ever had a security check performed on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Helms in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail" received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord had shortly before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

McCord Letters (continued)

Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it. Thereafter a series of letters were received from Mr. McCord by Paul Gaynor, then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security. These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was promptly brought to the attention of Mr. Helms. The thrust of these letters was that the Committee to Re-elect the President and high officials within the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the Justice Department and that he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these letters to the Justice Department.

At a much later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Subcommittee.

2. The Pennington Matter: For many years a man named Lee Pennington, a former FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.

In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, Ermal Geiss, was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies and departments relating to Watergate matters.)

While Mr. Osborn was on vacation an FBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named "Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of Security. Mr. Kuhn's deputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent Parham to Ermal Geiss and asked whether the FBI should be given the names of both Penningtons or just one of them. Mr. Geiss instructed Whitaker that Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired employee of the CIA, who was not related in any way to Lee Pennington. Geiss instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.

Mr. Geiss would have known that James McCord while he was employed in the Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really interested in Lee Pennington.

Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to his attention in February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.

Pennington Matter (continued)

Lee Pennington and a man named Charles Wylie were the only two confidential informants who Osborn can think of who were employeed as such by the Office of Security during his tenure with that office. (This is in addition to CIA employees and the employees of propriety investigating companies who have been used as informants.) Mr. Wylie was a journalist and writer who was paid $10,000 per year, plus certain travel expenses, by the CIA to act as an informant, but Mr. Osborn has no idea what kind of information he provided to the Agency in recent years. He does recall that many years ago Wylie provided information regarding the Vienna, Austria, Youth Festival and also some information gathered on the trip he made to Japan. Mr. Osborn states that he has never met Lee Pennington or Charles Wylie, nor has he ever talked with either of them in person or by telephone.

(Mr. Pennington was apparently terminated as a CIA informant on December 31, 1973.) Mr. Osborn states that he "started action" to terminate Wylie in about January or February 1974. He thought that Wylie had never provided anything to the Office of Security and that it was "no time to have a domestic informant."

Both Pennington and Wylie had been informants for the Office of Security for many years. They had been retained in that capacity even before Mr. Osborn became Deputy Director of Security in 1963.

In February 1974 in connection with a search of files in the Office of Security some indication was turned up that Mr. Osborn had been informed in January 1973 about the fact that Lee Pennington had entered the home and the office of James McCord at the request of Mrs. McCord on January 22, 1972, to locate and destroy records which would have revealed a "link" between Mr. McCord and the CIA. Mr. Osborn denies that he received any such information. The information was allegedly given to him by Paul Gaynor, Chief of Security Research, in the Office of Security.

Mr. Gaynor retired in 1973 at the request of Mr. Osborn, who had been directed to cut a GS-16 from his staff in a personnel reduction move. He states that Mr. Gaynor accepted this request gracefully and retired.

Osborn and Gaynor have never discussed with each other the subject of Lee Pennington or the deception practiced on the FBI in August 1972. Osborn does not think that Gaynor opened up the subject, but he does believe that Gaynor has testified before either one of the Congressional committees investigating Watergate or the Special Prosecutor's Office.

After Mr. Gaynor retired, Lou Vasaly of the Office of Security has handled contacts with Wylie and Pennington.

In January or February 1974 Mr. Osborn sent Sidney Steinbridge of the Office of Security to New York to terminate Mr. Wylie.

Lee Pennington died in the fall of 1974 of natural causes. He was in his middle 70's.

3. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt re Ellsberg Break-In

Mr. Osborn states that the Office of Security had no involvement whatever with the assistance rendered by the CIA to Mr. Hunt in connection with the break-in of the offices of Ellsberg's psychiatrist and that he had no knowledge of that matter prior to the break-in. He is now acquainted with the White House request made to General Cushman for assistance to Mr.Hunt in 1971. He is also now familiar with the fact that the CIA provided to Mr. Hunt disguise equipment, false identification papers, and a camera , in response to the White House request. He also now knows that Mr. Hunt arranged for the development of the photographs which he had apparently taken on the occasion of the break-in at the office of Mr. Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

In 1971 Mr. Osborn received a request from Mr. Young at the White House for the psychological profile on Daniel Ellsberg. He says that Mr. Young stated that the White House had been very pleased with the profile which had been developed by the CIA on Fidel Castro and would like the same kind of profile on Ellsberg.

Osborn stated that he responded to Young that the CIA personnel had a great deal of biographical material on Ellsberg. Young assured Osborn that the White House would provide material on Ellsberg. Osborn responded that such a request would have to be approved by the DCI, Mr. Helms.

Osborn then took the matter to Mr. Helms, who approved the project and told him to provide the requested assistance to Young.

Young thereafter sent materials from time to time to Osborn relating to Ellsberg. It was Osborn's impression that these materials were very fragamentary and would not be sufficient to provide a meaningful psychological profile . Nonetheless, the request and the materials were turned over to the doctors at CIA and a draft of a profile was ultimately worked up. Mr. Young did not appear to be very well pleased with the draft.

Mr. Osborn surmises that the break-in at the offices of Dr. Fielding (Ellsberg's psychiatrist) was accomplished for the purpose of gathering more information with which to develop a better psychological profile.

Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These employees are paid additional compensation to act as informers and to report to the Office of Security on any potential security problems which they observe among their fellow employees at the Agency. If an employee, for example, has been convicted of a crime or is thought to be engaging in any contact which would make him susceptible to blackmail, that matter is supposed to be reported to the Office of Security. Likewise, if any employee is observed conducting himself in a suspicious manner, such as requesting information from files which do not concern him, that is to be reported.

A few outside employees, i.e., non- employees of the Agency, are also retained for the same purpose. This would include employees of the telephone company. In all instances, however, the purpose is to maintain security among the CIA employees and those working for the CIA.

The only staff employees retained as informers are those who work in the records office of the Directorate of Operations. Several staff employees in that office were recruited at the request of Mr. Thomas Karamessines because of the extremely high level of sensitivity and the records maintained in that office.

When the CIA Headquarters was constructed in the late 1950's, the Office of Security recruited various members of the construction work force to maintain security against the installation of listening devices, telephone taps, or other penetrations of the premises. [redacted]

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security arranged for the Anderson Security Associates to have its employees attend meetings and other functions of various organizations thought to represent potential threats to CIA personnel or installations and to report on such threats. A list of organizations to be checked for indications of such threats was provided to Anderson Security Associates, which in turn provided regular reports to the Office of Security on the activities of the organization monitored.

Anderson Security Associates was in reality run by Mr. Ralph True, a CIA Headquarters case officer, who also ran a similar wholly-owned proprietary company on the West Coast, General Personnel Investigations, Inc.

The Anderson company has since folded.

[redacted]

Surveillance of Dissident Groups and Activity

It has been mentioned above that Mr. Osborn informed us of the activity of the Anderson Security Associates in maintaining in the Washington, D.C. area a check on individuals and organizations who would represent potential threats to CIA personnel or organizations.

There was also coordination between the Office of Security and local police departments to cover the same activity. An effort was made to determine the size of anticipated demonstrations and to anticipate what security forces would be necessary to cope with them.

In 1967 and 1968 the Office of Security directed the field offices to solicit or report information on anti-war and dissident elements. The CIA was concerned about the safety of its personnel, such as recruiters on college campuses and its offices around the country. Its recruiting office in Ann Arbor, Michigan, had been bombed at about that time. Mr. Osborn also believes that the field offices were directed at about that time to establish a clipping service on campuses and other newspapers to report on organizations and individuals who might represent threats to CIA personnel or offices.

As a result of the information fed into the Office of Security relating to organizations and individuals who may represent such threats, a substantial number of files were accumulated on individuals and organizations.

Mail Intercepts

Mr. Osborn reports that a mail intercept program in New York City began in about 1952 and ended in 1973. He learned of this program when he became Director of the Soviet-Russian Division in the Operations Directorate. He states that the program involved the identification of parties within the United States sending and receiving mail with persons in the Soviet bloc countries and the identification of the persons in the Soviet bloc sending and receiving such mail. Selected items of mail were also opened and photographed, and then resealed and forwarded. Mr.Osborn states that he cannot recall any specific use made bv the CIA of the information so obtained. The primary purpose of the program as he understood it was to provide information to the FBI. He recalls several conferences regarding the program. It was his position that the three personnel from the Office of Security who worked on the program were not performing any useful service for the Office of Security, that it was a drain on the budget of his office, and that the CIA had no business tampering with the mail in the first place. Mr. Colby, when he was Executive Director-Controller of the Agency, supported Mr. Osborn's position on the matter. It was opposed by Mr. Angleton of the Directorate of Operations, who argued primarily that the information derived from the project was vitally necessary to the FBI. Mr. Helms elected to have the program continue. It was finally terminated bv Mr. Colby during the time that Mr. Schlesinger was DCI in 1973.

Mr. Osborn also thought that continuation of the program was too risky in the light of public and Congressional attitude toward the CIA. He thinks that the program originated while Allen Dulles was DCI and that it was undertaken with the knowledge and consent of the Postmaster General. However, this is hearsay, according to Mr. Osborn.

Mr. Osborn is also acquainted with the fact that from 1969 to 1971 the project of mail surveillance occurred from time to time in San Francisco. The Office of Security made the arrangements with the Post Office Department for this program, but it was carried out by the Far East Division and the Technical Services of the Directorate of Operations. The Technical Services Division at that time was headed by Rod M. Kenner, who is now retired and living in Florida.

The arrangements with the Post Office Department were made by Jack Turton of the Office of Security. Mr. Osborn has only the vaguest knowledge of the purpose of this project and could offer no further light than that it involved some checking on the stamping and postmarking of mail from the Peoples Republic of China. The project was orally okayed by Mr. Helms. Mr. Osborn has no knowledge of any other mail undercover projects in New Orleans or elsewhere.

Cover Operations Using Local Police Cover

Mr. Osborn stated that arrangements were made several years ago with [redacted] of the Fairfax County, Virginia, Police Department for the issuance of badges and other police identification for use by CIA security personnel. It is Mr. Osborn's recollection that this involved about 15 sets of identification.

These badges and other identification were never used bv the CIA. They were all returned to [redacted]

This arrangement was inspired by difficulties which had been encountered by security personnel in conducting a physical surveillance of [redacted] It seems that [redacted] lived in a residential community and his home was situation on a cul-de-sac. This made it extremely difficult to cruise by his home or station a security car anywhere near his home without attracting the attention of other residents in the neighborhood. Security personnel who may have been sitting in a car within several blocks of the [redacted] residence would have attracted the curiosity of the residents and the operation would be threatened if such residents approached the car and asked what the occupants were doing there and if they were given straight-forward answers. According to Mr. Osborn, it was highly desirable that the security personnel be able to respond to such inquiries by saying that they were police performing official duties. Most citizens, he says, would accept that as sufficient, whereas their curiosity would be even further aroused if the security personnel identified themselves as being with the CIA.

Mr. Osborn states that he had issued strict orders that the use of identification of local police officers was to be limited strictly to situations involving actual cover for surveillance purposes.

Mr. Osborn seems to recall that the Office of Security had similar arrangements with the Washington, D. C. Metropolitan Police Department, and he thinks that there were instances in which such cover was actually used, but he does not recall specific cases. He also states that it is possible that CIA field offices would have used similar cover of local police departments, but he has no knowledge of such instances.

Wire Taps

Mr. Osborn states that he has no acquaintance with the wire taps made of the office and home phones of two syndicated columnists in Washington in 1962 and 1963, which wire taps are revealed in the file as having been authorized by Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (The file reveals continuation of activity with respect to the surveillance of these columnists into the period of when Mr. Osborn was in the Office of Security as its Deputy Director. The file does not, however, show any indication of actual awareness on the part of Mr. Osborn that telephone tapping was involved. On the contrary, there are indications in the file that these telephone taps were discontinued immediately prior to Mr. Bannerman becoming the Director of Security in 1963, at which time Mr.Osborn also became the Deputy Director of Security.)

Training of State and Local Police and Other Assistance

Mr. Osborn states that assistance was rendered to many local police departments, including those of the cities of New YOrk and Chicago, and to the Maryland and Virginia state police during the period 1965 to 1972. He states that this program was vigorously and enthusiastically approved and supported by Mr. Helms.

Assistance consisted of training of personnel, the loaning of equipment, and the declassification of materials and techniques in such areas as photo analysis, surveillance techniques, metals detection, explosives detection, locks and picks, hidden microphones, telephotography and covert photography, and the setting up, handling, and organization of intelligence operations.

This program was terminated upon passage of an amendment to the Law Enforcement Assistance Act, which prohibited assistance to local and state police departments by the CIA.

Mr. Osborn feels very strongly that the program of cooperating with and assisting police departments in improving their capability to fight crime was proper and that its termination is a serious disservice to the American people. Referring to the prohibition on CIA "police and law enforcement functions" in the National Security Act of 1947, Mr. Osborn is of the opinion that the CIA in sharing its information and technical developments with state and local police departments was not exercising any police or law enforcement function.

The Huston Plan

Mr. Osborn states emphatically that the Office of Security had no knowledge whatever in developing or assisting in the so-called "Huston Plan," relating to domestic security operations. He states that he had never heard of it until it hit the papers at the time of the Watergate investigation. All relationships with the Inter-Agency Domestic Intelligence unit was handled for the CIA by Mr. Helms and Mr. Ober.

The Nosenko Affair

Nosenko was a KGB agent who defected to the United States in Switzerland in the early 1960's. His interrogation was handled under the supervision of the SR Division of the Directorate of Operations, especially by David Murphy and Peter Bagley of the SR Division.

Mr. Osborn states that he repeatedly protested the treatment of Nosenko. After more than two years of solitairy confinement in a special facility for which the Office of Security provided all security measures, Mr. Bruce Solie of the Security Office finally arranged for the release of Nosenko and gradually increased his privileges and freedom.

Mr. Osborn states that Nosenko has proved to be the most valuable defector in the entire history of the CIA. He has been responsible for identifying nine Soviet agents, including a major in the Pentagon.

Surveillance of Justice Douglas

Mr. Osborn has no knowledge of the alleged surveillance of Justice Douglas (referred to in an article in The Washington Post on February 3, 1975, page D-11).

Contact with The White House

Mr. Osborn states that he was not involved and has no information regarding any request from the White House for files relating to the coup in which Premier Diem was overthrown in Vietnam, or regarding the Bay of Pigs operation in Cuba. The CIA personnel who would have been involved in such matters were William Nelson, Deputy Director of Operations, on the Bay of Pigs matter; and George Carver, then Special Assistant to the DCI for Vietnam affairs, with respect to the Diem coup.

The only other contact of any nature with the White House recalled by Mr. Osborn was one which he seems to remember occurring in about 1963 when the Office of Security was consulted by the Secret Service with respect to counter-audio measures to protect against bugging and wire taps in the White House. He thinks this occurred during the Presidency of Lyndon Johnson.

Unauthorized Break-Ins

Mr. Osborn states that the only break-ins which have occured to his knowledge by security personnel of the CIA have been those involving employees, former employees, or CIA contact agents who were under investigation for suspected disclosure of classified information. (Details are in the files provided to the Commission.)

General

Mr. Osborn states categorically that the Office of Security has never to his knowledge:

- -- conducted any audio surveillance, telephone taps, physical surveillance or personal investigation of any member of Congress or public official;
- -- maintained any file for political or other improper purpose of any such congressmen or public official;
- -- pulled any file for examination for purpose of checking up on any such member of Conress or public official.

Mr. Osborn states that he does not recall any instance during his career with the CIA to which any particular activity of the Agency was examined in the specific light of Section 403 of the National Security Act of 1947; i.e., he does not recall any assessment of a proposed or ongoing activity from the standpoint of whether it was improper as a "police", "law enforcement", or "internal security" function.

Impression

Mr. Osborn impresses the interviewer as being honest, intelligent, and dedicated to the interests of the United States and its people. His memory appeared to be in error in some details, but considering the wide range of the interview and the time period involved, coupled with the wide breadth on responsibilities and the number of personnel under his supervision in the Office of Security, this is to be expected.

There is one area in which the interviewer was doubtful concerning the complete candor of Mr. Osborn. That was the area of his knowledge concerning the Pennington matter.

Feb. 11, 1975
Osborn

STATEMENT

Mr. Vice-President, Governor Reagan, distinguished members of this Commission. I am here willingly at your invitation; I shall answer all of your questions fully and candidly.

My federal service has extended over a 32 year period, 27 of those years were spent with the Central Intelligence Agency. I am proud of my service with the C.I.A., and I am proud of the thousands of dedicated men and women with whom I worked in the C.I.A. I retired from the C.I.A. on December 31, 1974, after having been on sick leave from March 8, 1974, until the date of my retirement. My last ten years of active service with the C.I.A. were spent as the Director of Security. I was responsible to the Director C.I.A. and to other senior C.I.A. officials for personnel security and for the security and protection of classified information, data and installations, both in the United States and abroad. During my tenure as Director of Security, I served successively under Mr. John A. McCone, Admiral William Raborn, Mr. Richard Helms, Mr. James R. Schlesinger and Mr. William F. Colby.

I am aware of allegations given recent prominence by the news media that C.I.A. conducted improper activities in the United States. Since my departure from active status in March, 1974, I have had no access to Agency files or records with which to verify or refute such charges. I can assure the members of this Commission my full cooperation but it is possible that my recollection of dates and details may be imprecise or unclear without access to particular files and records of the C.I.A. To

1992

8

the best of my knowledge and belief, all of the actions and activities in which - participated, or which I rected are recorded and documented in C.I.A. files.

At all times, while serving as Director of Security I acted with the knowledge and approval and at the instruction of the Director of C.I.A., and in many, if not most instances, with the knowledge and approval of other senior Agency officials in the chain of command. I should like to emphasize that Security in the Agency is a service and support function and its activities are not self-generated. Among other services, the Office of Security provided guidance and assistance to employees with personal problems; it provided support to other Agency components upon authorized request and performed tasks and special inquiri assigned to it by the Director of C.I.A. The Director of C.I.A. was empowered and directed by the National Security Act of 1947 to "protect intelligence sources and methods". By virtue of and extension of that authority, those actions and activities within my purview were designed to prevent potential penetration of the Agency by hostile intelligence services, afford protection to the Agency's domestic installations and to determine the sources of unauthorized disclosure of classified and sensitive intelligence information to public media.

While I am not now privy to precise statistical data, I believe the United States Government Agencies involved in intelligence activities can document the fact that the number of hostile foreign intelligence representatives in our country has increased significantly in the last ten years. One of their prime targets is the United States Intelligence Community.

Any investigation and review of C.I.A., or any other element of that community should be made within that context.

After many years of service in the security field, I can fully understand the extreme sense of frustration among the United States Government officials regarding unauthorized disclosure of classified information. It is devastating to read the contents of a highly classified document disseminated in the intelligence community and then a day or two later, to read the same information ad literatum in the press. I believe most firmly in freedom of the press, but I believe also that there should be a sense of responsibility accompanying such freedom; that sense of responsibility seems often to be buried or absent in the publication of classified information which could endanger our national security.

I welcome the opportunity to appear before this Commission and to assist it in acquiring facts relevant to its investigation. In the course of developing such facts, I am hopeful the Commission will look at the possible consequences of the Agency's failure to act even if the Commission should find fault with individual conclusions or judgments made by Agency officials.

I shall endeavor to answer all of your questions and I shall put aside my citizen's schield against self-incrimination. That decision is based on my desire to assist the Commission to the full extent of my ability and for the equally cogent reason that I do not believe that any action I performed was unlawful or in derogation of my duties to the United States Government.

HOWARD J. OSBORN

d. Polygraphs of job applicants and some contractors have been routinely covertly recorded;

e. The field offices of the CIA have from time to time installed covert recording devices to record conversations of CIA employees with others where there was some reason to be concerned about the loyalty of such employees.

3. Physical Surveillance

Physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. Circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted have been limited to the following:

a. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;

b. Victor Marchetti to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;

c. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and Michael Gettner, a staff writer for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;

d. A female contact of the Latin American Division (and some of her associates) who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence.

4. Watergate Contacts

a. The McCord Letters

b. The Pennington Matter

c. Assistance to E. Howard Hunt and White House re Ellsberg

5. Covert Informers Employed by the Agency

a. Within the Agency and Its Contractors

The Office of Security employs a wide range of confidential informers from among the general roster of employees of the Agency. Included here are plumbers, chauffeurs, guards, telephone maintenance men, electricians, members of the char force, etc. These

Physical Surveillance

Mr. Osborn states that physical surveillance of individuals in this country has been very rare as far as the Office of Security is concerned. He doubts that it has exceeded ten times during his tenure in the Office of Security.

He describes those circumstances under which surveillance has been conducted as being limited to the following:

1. CIA employees and contract agents believed to be divulging classified information to unauthorized persons;

2. Victor Marchetti to find out if he was getting information from current employees of the CIA;

3. Jack Anderson, Les Whitten and another legman to determine their sources of classified information, and Michael Getler, a staff writer for the Washington Post, for the same purpose;

4. A female agent of the Latin American Division who reported to the CIA the existence of a plot to assassinate the Vice President and to kidnap the Director of Central Intelligence. This surveillance was conducted under the supervision of Mr. Ober, of the Directorate of Operations, with the full knowledge of the FBI.

   Also included in this surveillance was some of the contacts of this agent in Detroit, Miami, and New York City. The agent involved here was Thelma King, and the surveillance took place in 1971. (Mr. Osborn reports that a conversation between Miss King and her case officer in a New York hotel was also covertly recorded.)

Mr. Osborn is emphatic to the fact that every instance of physical surveillance in his experience was authorized by the Director of Central Intelligence except that Mr. Brownman, the Deputy Director for Administration, may have been the official to authorize the surveillance of employees, but it is possible that these also were approved by Mr. Colby as DCI. Mr. Osborn is also emphatic to the effect that no member of Congress has ever been placed under physical surveillance, has ever had his telephone tapped, has ever been covertly monitored with respect to any conversations or communications, or has ever had a security check performed on him by the CIA.

Watergate Contacts

1. The McCord Letters: Mr. Osborn states that a letter directed to Mr. Helms in late June 1972 was referred to his office as a part of the "crank mail" received that day. He recognized the signature on the letter as being that of a former employee of the Office of Security, Mr. James McCord. Mr. McCord had shortly before that been arrested in connection with the breakin at the Democratic National Headquarters on June 16, 1972. Mr. Osborn states that he immediately brought this letter to the attention of Richard Helms, the DCI.

McCord Letters (continued)

Mr. Helms directed that the letter should be retained in the file, but that nothing further should be done about it and that he would take care of it. Thereafter a series of letters were received from Mr. McCord by Paul Gaynor, then the Chief of Security Research Staff within the Office of Security. These letters were received by Mr. Gaynor at his home. Each letter was promptly brought to the attention of Mr. Helms. The thrust of these letters was that the Committee to Re-elect the President and high officials within the Nixon Administration were planning to blame the CIA for the Watergate break-in. Mr. Helms directed that these letters not be referred to the Justice Department and that he would take care of them. Mr. Osborn recalls being present when the matter was discussed with the General Counsel of the CIA, Mr. Houston, who advised that the CIA was not obligated to reveal these letters to the Justice Department.

At a much later date, Mr. Osborn gave full testimony with respect to these McCord letters and the actions regarding them to the Nedzi Subcommittee of House Appropriations Committee and to the counterpart Senate Subcommittee.

2. The Pennington Matter: For many years a man named Lee Pennington, a former FBI agent, has been retained by the CIA as a confidential informant. His compensation from the CIA has been $250 per month. Mr. Osborn stated that he has no idea what kind of information has ever been supplied to the Agency by Mr. Pennington in exchange for the compensation paid him.

In August 1972 Mr. Osborn was on vacation during the time his deputy, [redacted] [redacted] was in charge of the Office of Security. (The Office of Security had been designated by the DCI as the liaison with all other governmental agencies and departments relating to Watergate matters.)

While Mr. Osborn was on vacation an FBI agent named Arnold Parham contacted the Office of Security and requested information on a man simply named "Pennington". The request was directed to Steve Kuhn of the Office of Security. Mr. Kuhn's deputy, Hollis Whitaker, took the request of agent Parham to [redacted] and asked whether the FBI should be given the names of both Penningtons or just one of them. [redacted] instructed Whitaker that Parham should be supplied only with the name of Cecil Pennington, a retired employee of the CIA, who was not related in any way to Lee Pennington. [redacted] instructed Whitaker that Lee Pennington's name should not be given to Parham.

[redacted] would have known that James McCord while he was employed in the Office of Security had acted as the case officer for Lee Pennington, that McCord was involved with the Watergate break-in, and that the FBI was really interested in Lee Pennington.

Mr. Osborn states that all of the above information came to his attention in February 1974 and that he had no knowledge of it until that time.

Date:10/06/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10083

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
DESPOSITION/TRANSCRIPT OF STURBITTS, WILLIAM C.

DATE : 04/16/75
PAGES : 114

SUBJECTS :
DEPOSITION OF STURBITTS, WILLIAM C. - [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 292, Folder 1

original

Sent to CIA 2/16/94

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

292-1

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

ORIGINAL

6 APR
(1)(A)
(1)(B)
(1)(C)

5-7
(II-W)

- SSCI Box 292, Folder 1 (3) -

- Record Number 157-10011-10083 -

Deposition of [illegible]

OF

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Langley, Virginia

WARD & PAUL

Verba volant- scripta manent

Spoken words fly- written words endure

TM

WASHINGTON, D.C.
410 First Street, S.E., 20003
Phone
(202) 544-6000

FAIRFAX, VIRGINIA
4055 Chain Bridge Rd., 22030
Phone
(703) 273-2400

SECRET

A

CONTENTS

Deposition of	Examination by Counsel For the Commission
William C. Sturbitts	2
(AFTERNOON SESSION Page 58)	
William C. Sturbitts (Resumed)	58

SECRET

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

PROCEEDINGS

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was [redacted]

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think [redacted] was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say [redacted] was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, [redacted] Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was [redacted]

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, [redacted]

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. [redacted] went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgeral in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some [redacted] rifles and a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q. All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the [redacted] base. But he, Martinez, would recei his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, [redacted]

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and [redacted]?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. [redacted] I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probabl some of the training was given by their people. [redacted] I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen, in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operation

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, [redacted] this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, [redacted]

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock [redacted]

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold [redacted]

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dilion?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturer well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down [redacted] some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. [redacted]

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connecti with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, [redacted]

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cuttin this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants,basically.

A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a [redacted] firm, [redacted] who was buying [redacted] output of the Nicaro mines. And this [redacted] firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these [redacted] exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the [redacted] provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, [redacted] found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. [redacted] We simply went to the [redacted] people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was [redacted] compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of paramilitary activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down [redacted] we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q [redacted] would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs, I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and [redacted] people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from [redacted]

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage [redacted] other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained ✓ sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time [redacted]

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have [redacted] bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a

couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a sta employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located [redacted]

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located [redacted] It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. [redacted] We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. [redacted]

Q [redacted] What was the cover?

A It was [redacted] It was called -- [redacted]

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could [redacted] last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- [redacted]

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, [redacted] The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the [redacted] had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q [redacted]

A [redacted]

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO [redacted]. When the [redacted] people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillan on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q. Were there many activities of that type?

A. Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world. . .

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the [redacted]

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. [redacted] Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under [redacted] -- I just don't recall what it was. [redacted]

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

A. That is right.

Q And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the [redacted] conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because [redacted]

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were debriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the [redacted] over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of [redacted] do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the [redacted] and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. [redacted]

Q. We can call them [redacted] for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment [redacted]

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human source

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

WARD & PAUL
...st Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The [redacted] are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the [redacted] have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of [redacted] that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted

I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they lid come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in [redacted]

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, [redacted]

Q. This is Southeast of [redacted]

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they [redacted]

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to [redacted] such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. [redacted]

Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what [redacted] has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the [redacted] it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the [redacted] exclusively foreign [redacted]?

A. Exclusively foreign [redacted]

Q. Were they [redacted] one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the [redacted] has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The [redacted] Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. [redacted] What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared[redacted]?

A. I think it was prepared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

activities of the [redacted].

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q So you were not involved in this Special Activities during the 1959 to '61 period?

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all durin the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or wh[illegible] you might have of some of these organizations in order

to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a

A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. [redacted]

Q. [redacted]

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is [redacted] with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were

A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know wheiter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took place in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they

Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me..

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was [redacted] for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I am sorry for the interruption but over the long haul I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were interrupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ought to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship with some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly the Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q. What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things that might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

lbh 1
folos
msl

Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of [redacted] we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably [redacted] received probably a little more attention [redacted]

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

mbh 3

Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with [redacted] but can you think of any other functions performed by [redacted] that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to [redacted]?

A [redacted] were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- [redacted] are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the [redacted] or -- these are the [redacted]

Q And [redacted] are [redacted]?

A The [redacted] are [redacted].

Q [redacted]

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So [redacted] and [redacted] --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. [redacted].

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested. all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

mbh 7

A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that [redacted] engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhattan -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the hell out of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami area now [redacted]?

A There are no domestic activities at all [redacted] [redacted] All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The [redacted] now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does [redacted] -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The [redacted] is under [redacted].

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between [redacted] and [redacted].

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

- - -

Date:10/06/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10085

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : UNKNOWN
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :
MEETING WITH DCS HEADQUARTERS' OFFICERS

DATE : 07/09/70
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
MEETING WITH DCS HEADQUARTERS' OFFICERS [R]
STETSON, SHIRLEY; WILSON, JOHN [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 292, Folder 12

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

292-12

9 July 1970

Q

Record Number 157-10011-10085

SUBJECT: Meeting with DCS Headquarters' Officers

Shirley STETSON, for at least ten years the backbone of DCS/OSS and recently reassigned to DCS/Washington, and John WILSON, recently designated as Jim DURBIN's replacement in Raleigh-Durham-Chapel Hill Office which covers North and South Carolina, visited CI/SO on 9 July 1970 and were briefed by CIA officer and the writer from 1100 to 1200 hours. This was follwed by lunch(CIA officer / could not accompany) and discussions until 1315 hours.

2. The following highlights are made a matter of record:

a. Reports from "Chico" concerning B'Nai Brith in NYC are still being received by DCS but, as is the custom, they are being sent to a / CIA officer in CI/SPG initially, ~~xxxx~~ rather than to CI/SO. It is believed that the CIA officer / has been absent for about two months and this may account for the fact that CI/SO has not been receiving the material.

b. Upon the departure of STETSON for Washington and of a CIA officer for LA, Peter HOUCK will assume responsibility for Case 52722. HOUCK has just completed his CT program and before that spent a year in DCS on the Soviet Block Desk where he handled nuclear matters. He is well-regarded.

c. John WILSON is young, short, red-haired, aggressive, slow-speaking, former CT who has spent two years in DCS Head quarters. He previously served as a missionary for the Mormon Church in Austria with his wife. He stems from Ogden, Utah and the wr opines that he could be slated for the job of Gen. Sterling RYSOR's replacement in Sal Lake City in five to ten years when RYSOR retires. WILSON is sensitive, flushes easil has a friendly somewhat-shy manner yet expresses his opinions easily. He does not as a ball of fire or a personality guy but seems serious and level-headed. As has noted with many Mormons, he seems to save his greatest enthusiasm for discussing a the Mormon Church. How true it is that there is no such thing as a half-committed person. As a result of his year or two of missionary duty in Austria with 300 other

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

1 MAR 94

Date:10/06/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10092

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO : FILE

TITLE :
MARCHETTI, VICTOR

DATE : 03/28/75
PAGES : 84

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY OF MARCHETTI, VICTOR
APRIL 3, 1975

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 294, Folder 11

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10092

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES N.
TO : FILE

TITLE :
MARCHETTI, VICTOR

DATE : 03/28/75
PAGES : 84

SUBJECTS :
TESTIMONY OF MARCHETTI, VICTOR
APRIL 3, 1975

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : T
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

SSCI Box 294, Folder 11

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

met him, I only saw him on the TV a few months ago, he looks like a broken man, he did that day anyway. But he was a very mysterious, very --

MR. OLSEN: To use the house term, he was a spook?

MR. MARCHETTI: Yes. He was a very exotic character. And all kinds of stories float around about Jim Angleton. And I am sure that some are nothing more than apocryphal and some are pure rumor.

What intrigued me about this Runge thing is that subsequently another reporter -- and this time the guy identified the man he had been talking to -- the man he had been talking to was Bill Harvey, who was one of the people responsible for exposing Philby, in fact Philby gives Harvey the credit in his book under a pseudonym -- that Harvey said to this guy, oh, yes, the Agency -- to this reporter -- yes, the Agency has been penetrated, it may even be now -- he made some pompous statements of that nature. But then when the guy tried to dig deeper, Harvey held him at arm's length.

MR. OLSEN: Who is Harvey?

1(B)

MR. MARCHETTI: Bill Harvey was a scenario officer. [redacted] He had been Head of the Cuban task force.

MR. OLSEN: Which Cuban task force do you refer to now? The one that was organized --

MR. MARCHETTI: Within the Agency, the Agency's own

Soviet defectors and peoplw who claim to be and have subsequently been found to be legitimate defectors.

MR. MARCHETTI: You mean foumd to be illegitimate defectors?

MR. OLSEN: No, found to be legitimate defectors -- well, either way.

(?)

MR. MARCHETTI: Well, they would turn up from time to time. Usually I didn't have any direct dealings. They were handled by the Clandestine Services. But you would know the case. There is the famous case of Olenevski (?), who is this Polish intelligence officer who said that he was a KGB plant in the Polish service, and he is the one that many people on the extreme right like to point to as having identified all kinds of agents within the US Government. Eventually I got to the point where he was taking out ads in the newspapers to the effect that he is the tsaravitch, he had survived the shooting, and the legal claim and the throne.

At this point you don't know if the guy was nuts all along, and I don't know what the official thinking about it at the Agency is.

But there have been anumber of others over the years. There is Golonevski.

MR. OLSEN: How do you spell his name.

MR. MARCHETTI: G-O-L-O-N-E-V-S-K-I.

These names are a matter of record. YOu will have defecotrs which you believe to be questionable as to whether or not it comes within the charter of the CIA?

MR. MARCHETTI: No. As I say, I have no first hand knowledge on this subject.

You remember the [redacted] case?

MR. OLSEN: Yes. YOu mentioned that in your book, I believe, don't you?

MR. MARCHETTI: I was in the Agency at the time that happened, but I knew practically nothing about it in the Agency. For one reason, I didn't pay any attention to it. I had no reason to. But it was after getting out of the Agency.

This happened to be a case where [redacted] under Agency orders, was directed to [redacted] as being a Soviet agent [redacted] And [redacted] apparently to this day claims absolute innocence, and said that he was framed, and it was done for other reasons, because he didn't see eye to eye with the Agency.

MR. OLSEN: YOu don't know the story behind that, I take it?

MR. MARCHETTI: No. But you could find out. I don't know what the Agency was doing. All I know is that Helms submitted some sort of affidavit which the judge accepted, and on the basis of that the case was resolved in favor of [redacted] He had to idneitify [redacted] as being in the Agency's employ and acting under orders from the Agency. The reasons why, they are

Delete bracketed info. NSA 3/1/94

seem to work properly except in the US. And I am wondering what kind of use in the US you might be aware of?

MR. MARCHETTI: That wasn't what I meant by that. What I meant was, it worked good under laboratory conditions here, but when I would take it out to the field, it wouldn't work.

MR. ROETHE: You weren't referring to any use of these beams here in the US?

MR. MARCHETTI: No, I was not.

But that is that system that people are talking about now, the laser people bugging system, where they can get a building across the street there and direct a beam here and pick it up. It has become quite popular in recent years, at least they talk about it.

MR. OLSEN: YOu mean in the spy literature?

MR. MARCHETTI: Yes.

MR. ROETHE: At page 196 you refer to monitoring of embassy traffic from Maryland and Virginia. Were you referring to CIA's activity in monitoring, [or NSA]?

MR. MARCHETTI: [NSA.]

MR. ROETHE: You are not aware of any CIA activity of this nature?

MR. MARCHETTI: No, not here in this country. [In fact, the only case that I was aware of overseas that the CIA did it, if they did it at all, they did it because NSA, for]

Delete bracketed info. NSA
3/1/94

~~certain political reasons, the Government didn't want NSA in there, the military personnel.~~]

MR. ROETHE: There is one reference to breaking into embassies at page 199. And there is no reference to any particular embassy. Are you aware of any activity where the CIA was actually implicated in breaking into an embassy? You have already talked about the Cilean Embassy.

MR. MARCHETTI: This was based on information that was availabe in the Houston Plan, which by that time had become public. And also certain background information about [~~the capabilities of the NSA in its technical field~~,] and certain CIA clandestine abilities. And it was all rolled into one as a supposition.

MR. ROETHE: On page 207 you indicate that many individuals at CIA were pressing for action against the KGB here in the US as the FBI was not doing a good enough job?

MR. MARCHETTI: Yes.

MR. ROETHE: Do you know of any actual operations that were ever taken by teh CIA, or do you have any evidence of such operations?

MR. MARCHETTI: No, I do not.

MR. ROETHE: On page 216 you refer to training of New and Chicago police. What kind of training are you referring to, or do you know?

MR. MARCHETTI: That is just it. I am not exactly sure

Date:10/06/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10093
RECORDS SERIES :
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM : ROETHE, JAMES, N.
TO : FILE
TITLE :
SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH PAPICH, SAM J.
DATE : 03/05/75
PAGES : 18
SUBJECTS :
PAPICH, SAM J. (INTERVIEW)
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 294, Folder 15

Ready to all.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

During this period Papich developed a good relationship with Jim Angleton of Counterintelligence and found that he could work effectively with Angleton. In the early 1960's the relationship between the two agencies was probably the best that it ever got. While some flaps continued to occur, both agencies seemed to be making an effort to learn the responsibilities and jurisdiction of the other.

Relationships Between 1965 and 1970

During the Johnson Administration there was a deterioration or a cut in the number of projects directed towards the Soviets. Hoover's desire to become engaged in extensive counterintelligence work lessened. Many of the FBI's programs to identify illegal aliens attempting to penetrate the U. S. Government broke down. Hoover became extremely cautious and conservative in the area of counterintelligence, which greatly disturbed Papich, who felt strongly about the Soviet threat and who was convinced that strong counter-measures were necessary. For example, Papich tried to promote consideration [redacted] 1B 1(S)

During 1967 and early 1968 Papich saw no signs from Hoover that the programs and projects that Papich felt so necessary would be reinstituted. Papich was receiving the message that his relationship with Hoover was coming to an end. Papich was physically and mentally worn out trying to keep the two agencies working together. In 1968 Papich wrote a polite letter to Hoover expressing his concern with what was happening in the area of counterintelligence. He appealed to Hoover to reinitiate some of the effective programs aimed at Soviet penetration of the United States. While Hoover was extremely angry at Papich for writing such a letter, he did not fire him to the surprise of many. Further appeals by Papich to Hoover to reinstate programs were of no avail. From that point on, the relationship between Papich and Hoover chilled and any idea that Papich brought to Hoover from the CIA concerning joint counterintelligence efforts was generally rejected and accompanied by a critical remark.

While Papich's 1968 letter had brought no change in Hoover's attitude, Hoover did keep Papich on as liaison. In the Fall of 1969 Papich confided to his wife that he was seriously considering retiring in the Spring of 1970. By the first of the year he realized that his career was effectively at an end and that he could no longer effectively accomplish his responsibilities as liaison between FBI and CIA. He decided to submit his letter of resignation, to be effective in early April of 1970.

OB
3/20/75

EFFORTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CIA AND FBI

Efforts by Papich

Under Hoover there was little exchange of ideas at the highest levels of the CIA and FBI. This was merely Hoover's style. Papich was able to get people exchanging ideas at the working level and this was done with Hoover's approval.

Papich supported CIA innovative approaches to targets of mutual interest to both agencies and frequently became involved in conflicts with Hoover. for such interest and action. When any CIA promoted projects were approved, the responsibility was placed on Papich to assure that there would not be any invasion of FBI jurisdiction or violation of agreements. For instance, the CIA through the Domestic Operations Division (now the Foreign Resources Division) was always looking for foreigners in the United States to recruit as agents abroad. [redacted] 1B (S) In the 1960's the CIA came to Papich to see how ~~the Domestic Operations~~ Division could recruit without conflicting with the Bureau. Papich set up a program and sent it to Hoover recommending approval, but Hoover indicated that he was concerned with possible CIA invasion of the FBI's jurisdiction. [redacted] 1B (S) The program apparently worked well and much valuable information was given to the FBI which satisfied Hoover. Perhaps more importantly, new CIA/FBI relations at the field level were developed. However, Papich was well aware at the time the program was set up that if it flapped, Hoover could immediately kill the project.

Papich also advocated the exchange of lecturers between CIA and FBI to give the two agencies some understanding of what the other agency was doing. Such an exchange of lecturers and training facilities did not come about until about the time that Papich retired.

Papich also suggested an actual trade of personnel for short periods of time so that personnel from one agency could become familiar with the various problems that faced personnel from the other agency on the working level. This suggestion was never approved while Papich worked for the FBI.

Papich reiterated the fact that he had a very good working relationship with Jim Angleton. He feels that this relationship was probably responsible for the FBI's arrest of the Russian spy Rudolph Abel. Apparently a Soviet agent came to the CIA with information on Able. The FBI was contacted concerning the debriefing of this agent, but Hoover wanted nothing to do with it. Papich cooperated with Angleton, and the information obtained led to Able's arrest and conviction.

3/24/75

The following grey areas were delineated by Papich:

1. The question of whether the FBI should recruit agents in the United States for use by the CIA overseas or whether this should be left to the CIA.

2. [redacted] (S) 1B

3. [redacted] (S) 1B

4. The question of who should provide cover in the United States for CIA operations overseas.

5. The handling of agents suspected by CIA to be Communist agents overseas who travel to the United States.

6. Inadequate communication between the two agencies in resolving bona fides of defectors of interest to both agencies.

7. See the subheadings below.

Papich believes that in fairness to the men in the field a more clear-cut delineation of jurisdiction is needed. He did state that from time to time documents were put forth by Hoover concerning the FBI's jurisdiction in particular areas. Generally such a guideline would be issued following a particular flap in an operation involving both the FBI and the CIA. Papich could not point to any specific document but suggested that we ask Kelley for this type of information.

Papich did feel that there were some areas of jurisdiction that were clear-cut. For instance, CIA is not to investigate violations of the law in the United States. However, it is not Papich's opinion that the determining factor of jurisdiction is a strictly geographic one. (At least it shouldn't be.)

Espionage Matters

Papich felt strongly that the FBI had the responsibility to investigate any possible violations of the espionage laws. He could point to no case where the FBI refused to undertake this responsibility where reasonable evidence of espionage existed, even if the suspect was an employee of the CIA. In some instances, the CIA might come to the FBI with information

Ober's Operation: (continued)

had the personnel, and the FBI would have become aware of such activity on a massive scale. However, Papich did receive a continuing supply of information from Ober. Most of this information related to the relationship between domestic and foreign groups. Incidentally, information pertinent to internal security may have been picked up and passed on to the CIA. Papich is also aware that some of Ober's recruits were gathering information in the United States as well as overseas on occasions when the student's travels ended and he or she returned to the States. This information was also passed on to Papich. Papich acknowledged that on occasion the FBI would provide CIA with an introduction to a sympathetic student in a dissident group.

2. Project [redacted] (Office of Security) (S)

(1)(B) per CIA

Papich knows almost nothing of efforts to penetrate dissident groups by the Office of Security. He feels that if such a project had been extensive, the FBI would have become aware of it, as FBI had a large Washington Field Office and was very interested in the dissident groups and constantly monitoring them. Papich could not recall an incident where a CIA asset working for Women's Strike for Peace was turned over to the FBI. He did recall occasions when Ober's group turned over assets to the FBI when the asset returned from overseas and no longer wished to work abroad. Papich believes that only a small amount of information on dissidents was ever sent to the FBI from the Office of Security.

Papich states that during this entire period of the dissidents, the atmosphere was such that something had to be done by someone to learn what the more militant of these dissident groups were planning. Riots, bombings, and destruction of property were rampant. Citizens and newspapers were screaming for action to bring this unrest to an end. It was a difficult time for all Federal agencies.

Criminal Cases

Papich is not aware of any instances when the CIA has undertaken law enforcement tasks in the United States. This does not mean that there was not some cooperation between the FBI and CIA in criminal cases. For instance, Angleton's overseas agents would frequently obtain information connecting Americans with criminal activities in the U.S. Angleton would contact the FBI and together Papich and Angleton would develop the CIA's source of information to assist the FBI. A good example of this led to the arrest and conviction of a New York City official during the Lindsay Administration.

5/24/98

Penetration of Embassies in the United States

Papich has no knowledge of any CIA efforts to obtain positive intelligence by [redacted] Papich believes that if the CIA attempted to gain positive intelligence information through [redacted] this was an improper action which should have been performed by the FBI. 1B (S) (S)

Information Obtained From Tax Returns

Papich is unaware of any instance where CIA has made use of tax returns to obtain information on Americans.

PAPICH'S PHILOSOPHY AND MISCELLANEOUS ITEMS

It is Papich's belief that while the intelligence services of the United States presently obtain great amounts of information through new technological developments, they are still unable to read the minds of the leaders of foreign countries. Consequently, they must attempt to penetrate through clandestine efforts. The only way to successfully penetrate is to permit those conducting the operation to go about their business unburdened by numerous reporting requirements. Papich's philosophy is "If you want the job done right, give me X number of men and leave me alone." He questions whether this philosophy can be adopted in the United States in 1975, as faith in the leadership is an essential factor. He believes that such operations can be controlled and overseen by the Director of the CIA, the Director of the FBI, and the President.

Papich indicated that the differences between Hoover and Sullivan have nothing to do with CIA. Hoover was convinced that all dissident groups were directed by the Communist Party, whereas Sullivan disagreed. These differences affected the Hoover-Sullivan relationship only after Papich retired.

Papich believes that the FBI lost stability when A. H. Belmont (the No. 3 man at the time) retired in 1967. He presently resides in Palo Alto, California. Belmont was loyal to Hoover, but he had excellent rapport with the agents and could put things in their proper perspective. In fact, Belmont was most useful in resolving differences between CIA and Hoover. Belmont's successors (DeLoach and Sullivan) could not measure up.

JNR/vmr

CC: D.Belin
Senior Counsels

SECRET

3/24/75

Date:10/07/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10011-10121

RECORDS SERIES :

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : DEMPSEY, JOHN P., CHIEF, RESEARCH
TO : DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF SECURITY

TITLE :
WILEY, CHARLES WILLIAM

DATE : 04/01/74
PAGES : 116

SUBJECTS :
SUMMARY REPORT BY VASALY, LOUIS W. RE WILEY, CHARLES W. [R]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : S
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/29/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
SSCI Box 221, Folder 10

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SSCI Box 221 Folder 10

Record Number 157-10011-10121

1 April 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Security

SUBJECT : Charles William Wiley

Attached herewith for your information is a summary report covering Subject prepared by CIA Cover Employee Louis W. Vasaly and the undersigned. It is limited to and based upon existing documents in the Office of Security files on Charles William Wiley; overt file #343 589, covert file #127 958 and thirteen volumes of Security Research Staff operational files. The report's accuracy and authenticity are necessarily based upon file documents, since the writers did little or no interpretation of those documents and quoted documents in toto wherever possible.

John P. Dempsey
Chief, Research Branch

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

062258

CONTENTS

- BACKGROUND 1
- EVENTS LEADING TO RECRUITMENT 2
- SECURITY PROCESSING 8
- ACTIVITIES, MARCH 1956 - JUNE 1959 9
- CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP 13
- ACTIVITIES, JULY 1959 - JANUARY 1974 15
  - WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, VIENNA 1959 15
  - CUBA TRIP, ARREST AND DETENTION 1960 19
  - AFRICA AND EAST EUROPEAN TRIP 1961 29
  - OTHER ACTIVITY 1959-1964 34
  - CLANDESTINE TRAINING 1961 40
  - WORLD YOUTH FESTIVEL, HELSINKI 1962 41
  - TAIWAN AND FAR EAST TRIP 1964 43
  - WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, ALGIERS 1965 44
  - SOUTH AMER. TRIP, SUMMER 1965 47
  - OTHER ACTIVITY 1965- 1974 53
  - VIETNAM TRIP 1967-1968 60
  - EUROPEAN TRIP 1970 63
  - WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL. EAST BERLIN 1973 64
- INVOLVEMENT IN CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES 65
- OVERSEAS TRAVEL 68
- UTILIZATION, CONTROL AND CASE OFFICERS 73
- COVER 101
- PERSONAL ACTIVITY 103
- TERMINATION 106
- CONTACTS AND RELATIONSHIP WITH JAMES McCORD, LEE PENNINGTON, DONALD SWEANY and HOWARD HUNT 109

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 062258

BACKGROUND

Charles William Wiley, lecturer, photographer and free lance journalist, was born 17 November 1926 at Flushing, New York, of American-born parents. He married Katina Calamara, who was born on 18 March 1927 in New York City, on 11 February 1950. They had three children, a daughter, now age 23, and two sons, currently (1974) ages 15 and 13, respectively. Katina died by suicide in April 1973. He currently resides with his two sons in Parlin, New Jersey.

The son of a professional actor, Wiley was, himself, a child actor on stage and radio from 1931-1941. In 1942 and 1943 he toured with U.S.O. shows and from 1943 through 1944, was an assistant stage manager in New York City. From 1933 to 1942, he attended the New York City Professional Children's School. He enlisted in the U. S. Navy and served honorably as a Seaman from November 1944 to July 1946. From 1946 to 1951, he held many part-time and temporary jobs in New York City and Miami, Florida, as a salesman, interviewer, bellhop and U. S. Postal Clerk. From 1949 through 1954 he attended night school at New York University and earned a B. S. degree in Journalism. Also, from 1951 to 1953, he was an underwriter for Guardian Life Insurance Company and from November 1953 to October 1954, an agent for Fidelity Life Insurance Company, both in New York City.

RECEI ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 062258

EVENTS LEADING TO RECRUITMENT

Charles W. Wiley first came to the official attention of the Office of Security (OS) on 9 September 1955, when Carl F. Heney (Executive Officer, OS) forwarded a letter written by Wiley to Ermal Geiss (Chief, Personnel Security Division, OS), who in turn directed the letter to James W. McCord [Security Research Staff of the Office of Security (SRS)]. How Heney obtained the Wiley letter is unknown, inasmuch as the name of the addressee was deleted in the letter. However, the letter was recorded in the Executive Registry under number 6-9881. The Wiley letter is dated 27 April 1955, gives Wiley's address and telephone number, and Wiley advised that he was working on an index of the Daily Worker for the years 1933-1945 "and thought that perhaps you might be interested in specific information that I am likely to find."

On 10 September 1955, James W. McCord contacted Wiley in Flushing, New York. At that time, Wiley explained the nature of the index of the Daily Worker for the years 1934-1945, by stating that he was preparing the index under a grant from the American Legion Americanism Committee, headed by Lee Pennington (a former employee of the FBI). Wiley started the index in November 1954. Wiley stated he contacted the major government agencies in Washington to ascertain what information in the Daily Worker would be of most interest to them, and in addition, contacted a couple of Congressional Committees which McCord surmised were the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senate Internal Security Committee. Wiley estimated it would take two and a half years to complete the index. At that time, Wiley was receiving part-time clerical assistance from the Women's Auxiliary of the American Legion Post in Flushing, New York. Wiley also indicated an interest in Agency employment after finishing the index.

The results of McCord's interview with Wiley were brought to the attention of Robert Bannerman, Deputy Director of Security, by 21 November 1955, when Bannerman opined that "this may be valuable."

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

McCord met next with Wiley in Washington, D. C., for two days, ending on 1 December 1955. By that time, Wiley had indexed 150,000 names of the Daily Worker covering January 1934 through June 1936. Wiley stated that the FBI in New York City and the American Legion were already making "extensive use" of the index cards. Wiley stated that one of his purposes being in Washington was to secure financing for the index continuation. He stated that his $5000 a year grant from the American Legion Americanism Committee would expire at the end of December 1955, and if negotiations with that body were unsuccessful, he would attempt to secure financing from the Senate and House Investigating Committees. Wiley stated that the FBI has indicated the strongest desire that he continue the indexing but that in his discussion with Mr. DeLoach (Cartha DeLoach, an FBI senior official), no indication of forthcoming financial support from the Bureau for this work was indicated.

In recording this contact with Wiley, McCord opined:

> "I think it is obvious that the index which Wiley is working on would be of considerable value to the Security Office and to CIA, particularly since the Communist Party membership and activities during the 1934-40 period were for the most part very open and extensively advertised in the Daily Worker. An example of how open their activities were is indicated in the fact that Elizabeth Bentley's name was mentioned in a 1935 issue of the Daily Worker at a time prior to her going underground and acquiring a RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) mission. If the Daily Worker thus bears a record of (Communist) Party activities of an individual such as Bentley, who later became so prominent in RIS activities in the United States, then the possibility always exists that the names of persons later connected with OSS (Office of Strategic Services) and other governmental activity may also be mentioned in the 1934-40 Daily Worker issues, which have heretofore never been indexed by any government agency.

[illegible]

SEP [illegible] 1975

CIA

> "Because of the obvious value of having access to such an index, the writer (McCord) recommends that we encourage the continuation of Wiley's index project in any way in which we are able to further such work."

(There is no objective evidence in the file other than the above to support Wiley's contention that he was given encouragement by Mr. DeLoach of the FBI to continue the project.)

The above was brought to the attention of Harlan Westrell (Chief, Counterintelligence Branch, SRS), who in turn brought the matter to the attention of Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, circa early December 1955.

Via a memorandum dated 19 December 1955, McCord informed Westrell of the receipt of additional correspondence from Wiley, and McCord included a rehash of the metter including statements:

> "I hope the Office of Security can encourage the continuation of the project, at least until the index is completed up through 1940, which would take about another year of work by Wiley. The index has considerable potential CE (counter espionage) value to this Office, for one thing, by virtue of the fact that there will be numerous heretofore unidentified Communists' names turn up in the index, some of whom went underground during the World War II years. The index may give us the one clue necessary to detect any such penetration existing within this Agency. The value in protecting the Agency thereby is of course inestimable. The continuation of the project would have other merits, which we have discussed previously."

McCord also recommended that, should the project fail, the Agency consider employing Wiley.

RECEIVED ROOM
SEP 1975
CIA

McCord recommended that Wiley had a personal acquaintance with a number of the well-known ex-Communist Party key functionaries, such as Louis Budenz, as well as a personal acquaintance with the heads and research people in all of the Federal Congressional Committees, and State Investigating Committees in New York State.

McCord was next in contact with Wiley on 27 December 1955, receiving an account of pertinent points retrieved by Wiley from the indexing project. In addition, Wiley stated he had discussed the indexing project with Herbert Philbrick (an ex-FBI penetration of the CPUSA), who had a continuing interest in the project and had indicated he would be willing to help Wiley get a job in the newspaper field should the project be terminated. Wiley also commented that he had had lengthy political discussions with Karl Wittfogel (one-time Communist) in recent years, and was in contact with Wittfogel a few weeks before.

Speculation on identity of Private Individual

When McCord's 27 December contact with Wiley was brought to the attention of Bannerman, he directed Westrell to "Explore with Jim Angleton (CI Staff) the possibility of getting about two months' expenses for subject (Wiley) and in the meantime we can complete our clearance of him and try to make out a project. We should also make a survey of his work to be certain a project is justified." Westrell, in turn, directed McCord to talk to Birch O'Neal (CI Staff) about the matter.

In the interim, on 24 December 1955, Wiley completed a Personal History Statement (and a report of medical history) reflecting he had been employed since November 1954

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

on a grant from the American Legion, 1608 K. Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., under the supervision of Lee Pennington. As a result, McCord scheduled National Agency Checks in the name of Wiley on 9 January 1956.

On 17 January 1956, McCord informed Westrell, receiving his OK, that Wiley intended to place an article in the monthly newsletter, "Political Research" published by an organization affiliated with the NTS (anti-Soviet Russian emigree organization). The article was to announce Wiley's indexing project and solicit funds.

On 27 January 1956, McCord informed Westrell, Paul F. Gaynor (Chief, SRS), Bannerman and Colonel Edwards of the results of a meeting he had that day discussing Wiley's indexing project with Birch O'Neal and Herman Horton (CI Staff). In essence, it was agreed that some Agency funding of the project should be forthcoming, and Horton evidenced interest in Wiley for CI Staff employment after completion of the project. Both Bannerman and Colonel Edwards evidenced interest in Agency funding of the project, the latter asking for figures as to cost.

McCord was next in direct contact with Wiley in Flushing, New York, on 29 January 1956, obtaining highlights of security interest developed from the indexing.

By 6 February 1956, figures were produced showing that $13,500 would cover one year continuation of the indexing, $7,000 for Wiley, $3,000 for a clerk typist; and $3,000 for part-time help and supplies. On this date, Gaynor noted he "would like to see this project completed if at all possible."

By the first week of March 1956, "front office" verbal approval had been given for OS funding of the project, labeled Operation Recall, concurrent with a meeting between McCord and Wiley and arrangements were made for transporting the completed portion of the index to Washington, D. C. McCord estimated the value of the index at that time as being between $15,000 to $25,000 in labor alone. During this week, favorable National Agency Name Checks were concluded on Wiley and Colonel Edwards and Colonel White had approved using Security Office funds to total $10,000 in all, to continue Wiley's indexing for one additional year. The partially completed index was turned over to the Agency on 8 March 1956.

RECE ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Following the approval of the project funding, McCord contacted Lee Pennington, of the Americanism Committee of the American Legion in Washington, D. C., asking, and receiving wholehearted agreement, for Pennington to provide cover for Wiley's work. The cover arrangements were so concluded. It was made clear to Wiley that CIA was purchasing the end product of his work and that he was not now a CIA employee. However, McCord did advise Wiley that he would attempt to secure Agency employment for him at the conclusion of the project; and that in the coming year Wiley should work on the indexing, continue regular contact with his sources of information in New York City - keeping the Agency advised of anything that may be pertinent to our areas of interest, and finally, build a cover story which would enable Wiley to contact and interview various ex-Communists and ex-Soviet agents in the New York area.

SEP 1975
CIA

SECURITY PROCESSING

On 9 January 1956, James McCord of SRS requested National Agency Checks (NACs), excluding CIC, to be made on Wiley. These checks were returned on 24 February 1956 and all were either favorable or no record. NACs were again requested on 30 September 1958 and were returned either favorable or no record on 30 October 1958. On 24 November 1958, a Covert Security Approval was issued to the Security Research Staff to permit Wiley's use as a covert associate of the Security Research Staff.

M
SEP 1975
CIA

ACTIVITIES

March 1956 - June 1959

In mid-March 1956, through a letter by McCord extended from his home address, arrangements were made for Wiley to come to Washington, D. C., for three days to brief Hazel Mackie, Personnel Pool (Office of Personnel), on certain administrative matters for the processing and typing of the index. The Personnel Pool work would result in 8 full copies of the index: three copies to the Security Office, one copy to Staff D, one copy to CI Staff, one copy for the FBI, one copy for the American Legion and one copy for Wiley.

(It is presumed that a copy of the index was given to the FBI; however, there is no document which could be located that states a copy was in fact given to the FBI.)

Concurrent with McCord's interest in Wiley, he and Morse Allen (SRS) were working on Operation Recovery, a project set up in 1955 whose objective was gaining access to and debriefing former and known agents of the international Communist movement who were involved in espionage activities directly or indirectly against the U.S. Government. Attendant to this operation, by April 1956, Wiley at the request of McCord had completed:

a. A summary of newspaper items on the Vladimir Asaturov case;

b. A summary of information on the Robert Osman case;

c. A summary of information on the Robert G. Switz case;

d. A summary of information on the Mary Martin espionage case; and

e. A summary of information on the Michael Gorin espionage case.

1975

CIA

Wiley was sent his first check covering the index project on 9 April 1956. By 22 May 1956, he had met Morse Allen.

McCord further reported on 1 May 1956 that during discussion with Wiley he told Wiley that there are three areas in which he could work during the coming year (1956-57) which would be of interest and would enhance his value to CIA. One would be the continuation of the index project, another would be the continuation of regular contact with his sources of information in New York City, keeping CIA advised of anything that may be pertinent to our areas of interest. The third would be the building for him a cover story which would enable him to contact and interview various ex-Communists and ex-Soviet agents in the New York area.

Wiley told McCord that he, Wiley, was in contact with Herbert Philbrick during the spring of 1956, and asked McCord to work on getting him, Wiley, some (American) Legion credentials. Wiley also enclosed reports on one Alexander Koral. He stated he had begun taking Russian language lessons from a Russian girl working for NTS.

On 20 March 1957, McCord informed his supervisor that Wiley's work on the index project would expire in May 1957. McCord indicated he would like to use Wiley for another year on the indexing project.

On 13 April 1957, Wiley tendered additional materials from the indexing project; a copy of an article by Alfred Kohlberg, "A Red Dream"; an open letter to the President of the United States requesting either a new trial or pardon for Morton Sobell, attaching a list of 200 signers; and a list of publications and organizations fighting Communism in the U.S. prepared by Herb Philbrick, given to Wiley. Wiley was advised that he may be called upon soon to work on some material on Soviet Espionage (David Dallin material, a noted author of books on Soviet Intelligence), requiring about one month's work; that he may be called upon to follow the Albam (Jacob Albam) trial developments in the press; and that an attempt would be made to renew his grant for another year.

RE
SEP 1975
CIA

On 21 June 1957, Harlan A. Westrell, Chief, SRS, requested the Director of Security for authorization to continue the Daily Worker indexing project for one year which had yielded approximately 500,000 names in the index. On 22 August 1957, Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security, requested and received, such authorization for circa $10,000 from the Deputy Director of Support.

During this period (1956-1959), Wiley worked with Herbert Philbrick on a book which Philbrick was preparing entitled "The Most Dangerous Group in the World." He also was "building his cover" as a newspaperman and had numerous contacts with Earl Browder (ex-chairman of the CPUSA).

From 5 to 19 January 1959, Wiley made a fact-finding trip through the Mid-West and the Southeastern states of the U.S. contacting newspapers, "conservative" individuals, police agencies, and information repositories to determine the extent of their information concerning Communism and the Communist movement.

During the summer of 1959, SRS initiated and completed a study through Wiley of the Columbia University newspaper, "Spectator" and the City College of New York newspaper. This, unlike the Daily Worker index, was a study of the various issues for information pertaining to Communists and radical organizations and individuals. Don Ingles, Wiley's cousin, conducted the study and was paid for his time.

Financial records indicate that the indexing project's gross funding from March 1956 through May 1957 was $10,000. Out of that amount, Wiley was given $8,600 in salary and the other $1,400 was for expenses. The same total amount was approved for the period June 1957 through May 1958 and was expended as follows: $7,900 for salary payments and $2,100 for expenses. A like amount ($10,000) was set aside for the period June 1958 through June 1959 and expended at the rate of $734.17 per month in salary payments and the rest, $265.83, in expenses.

In connection with the index, Wiley was also given specific requests to compile reports on several individuals and organizations which were of peripheral interest.

SEP 1975
CIA

On 30 April 1958, Wiley prepared a report on his contact (Charles Raphael) with the International Commission of Jurists, and the location of possible files on Soviet Espionage Commissioned by Philip Chancellor to be gathered by Sidney McLaglen.

On 2 May 1958, Wiley prepared a report on his chance meeting with Vladimir Oserov, Tass reporter.

Wiley reported that on 28 June 1958, he attended a birthday cocktail party at the apartment of and for Dr. J.B. Matthews, and identified others in attendance.

On 6 December 1956 (sic), Wiley reported receiving a call from J.B. Matthews inquiring about Jack Rubenstein (Rubinstein).

In the fall of 1958, Wiley reported meeting JoAnn Mellors, from England, active in the anti-Communist organization Common Cause.

On 1 November 1958, Wiley prepared a report on the "Links Between the Anti-Defamation League and the CIA in the Middle East," following a conversation with Michael Rich.

On 8 December 1958, Wiley prepared a report on a contact with Colonel Aharon Yariv, an Israeli Embassy official. On 3 March 1959, this report was sent by Helene Finan to James McCord and Clifton Carrico.

In March 1959, Wiley prepared four reviews of articles appearing in 1941 and 1942 editions of Social Justice Magazine pertaining to General Walter G. Krivitsky.

On 19 April 1959, Wiley prepared a report covering his introduction to Haviv Shiber, General Secretary of the Anti-Communist League in Israel. There is a notation on the report that Wiley was going to give the information also to the FBI.

CONTRACTUAL RELATIONSHIP - July 1959

On 1 July 1959, this Agency entered into contract with Wiley, as an independent contractor, at the salary rate of $9,100 per annum, with additional compensation in the amount of 5% of the above sum, to be paid in quarterly installments, representing the Government's contribution toward Wiley's choice of programs for insurance, retirement, medical and health. The contract specified that he would be reimbursed for operational travel as directed by OS, and for other approved operational expenses, subject to accounting applicable with Government regulations.

The annual compensation was subsequently increased on 1 July 1960 to $9,900 per annum and on 1 July 1961 to $10,500 per annum, plus additional 5% as noted above. Salary has remained at the latter level to the date of his termination. The contract was to run for an indefinite period, and could be terminated without notice in the event of a breach of contract or by Wiley rendering himself unavailable for acceptable service, and could otherwise be terminated by either Wiley or the Agency with 90 days' notice.

From 1955 to 1959, Wiley was paid in cash, and for several years after the contract was signed, officers of SRS continued to pay Wiley his salary either in cash or through bank money orders. In 1964 payments of salary were made by the Office of Finance directly into his bank account in New York City.

From 1959 to the present time, SRS obtained a copy of each year's Federal Income Tax Return, and on at least two occasions, Wiley was given a personal briefing on the management of the Agency funds, vis-a-vis income from his self-established firm, World News Analysis, by Agency Finance Officers. In 1964, because of his failure to comply with the SRS's instructions to furnish complete details on his claimed expenses, the regular payment of "operational" expenses was terminated, necessitating that he reduce expenses which were not reimburseable from the firm's income.

REC

SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

Regarding his overseas travel, for the early years, he was reimbursed in toto for travel expenses. However, once World News Analysis had become established and had acquired some regular source of income, the reimbursements for his overseas travel was decreased, and only a token contribution was made toward lengthy trips.

[illegible] FROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

ACTIVITIES, July 1959 - January 1974

WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, VIENNA 1959

Shortly after Wiley signed his contract with this Agency, he became involved in the World Youth Festival (WYF) held in Vienna during July 1959.

A memo dated 19 February 1959 to the Acting Chief, SRS, from Helene Finan (SRS) reports on a meeting between Finan and Wiley at which Wiley furnished information relative to the forthcoming WYF to be held in Europe in mid-summer 1959. According to this memo and an accompanying one, Wiley said that Herb Romerstein (ex-Communist and HCUA employee), with the aid of Alfred Kohlberg (NYC importer and long-time anti-Communist activitist) and Colonel Archibald Roosevelt, has a project extant to send a delegation of 10 or more people to the WYF in Vienna in July, along with the left-wing American delegation. Romerstein, who is running the "show" for us (Finan's words) has asked Wiley to help and Wiley will, but not in an overt manner. Wiley told Romerstein the project was his and Wiley should not be given any prominence. Wiley and his wife will sign up next week. Don Sweeny (sic) of the American Legion and several individuals from various state police will also be among the group witting of the project. The group, probably no more than 10 in all, will attempt subtle propaganda, will sit singley throughout the hall and interject controversial or embarrassing topics into discussions. Wiley will play the role of the typical American with his ever-ready camera. Wiley will also work on behalf of the I&NS in gathering names and pictures.

Helene Finan reported on 12 March 1959 to the AC/SRS that Wiley will attend the WYF in Vienna in summer of 1959 for us (SRS). A 17 March 1959 memo states Wiley will leave New York with the delegation on 20 June 1959. After the Festival, the group (less Katina Wiley) plans to spend three weeks in the USSR as members of the U.S. delegation to the Festival. Wiley later changed his plans to include a visit to Europe and the Middle East before and to Europe and England after the Vienna and USSR phases of the trip.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

On 18 May 1959, Morse Allen wrote a memo to the Chief, SRS that Wiley is now a newspaperman and a magazine writer, accredited under the auspices of the North American Newspaper Alliance, the Spades Syndicate, The Indianapolis Star, The Richmond Times Dispatch and probably several other publications. Wiley is a member of an anti-Communist group privately sponsored who will attend the Vienna Youth Festival and will make themselves known during the Festival. Wiley will probably cover the Festival for the Newhouse Newspaper Chain, National Review and U.S. News and World Report. He has received $500 in private subscriptions to cover the cost of his transportation to the WYF. The cost of his proposed itinerary amounts to $1,056.70 for transportation. Allen recommended the Office of Security pay the additional cost of $556.70 with the understanding that any remuneration received from his writings be offset on an equitable basis.

On 19 May 1959, James McCord noted to Allen, "Ok, see me," referring to the request to approve the additional cost and possible later offset. There is a 16 June report from Wiley acknowledging receipt of $556.70.

The New York Times reported on 3 August 1959 that Charles Wiley, his wife, and Joanne Mellor, a British subject living in New York City, were "roughed up" when they attempted to join a parade of Eastern Bloc delegates to the WYF. Wiley and company waited until the parade had started and then unfolded their banners with such slogans as "Remember Hungary," "Remember Tibet," and "What About Soviet Imperialism?" That incident got much press coverage, particularly because Wiley's wife was obviously pregnant.

A 14 September 1959 memo for the record from Wiley reflects that in a meeting with staff members of the HCUA, Wiley was instrumental in talking HCUA out of holding hearings which would be intended partially to expose the alleged inept, but expensive, effort made by CIA to infiltrate the WYF with a large group under cover of the Independent Service Committee. The Director of Security memoranda concerning the foregoing was forwarded to the Legislative Counsel on the 16th and 25th of September 1959 and the 27th of October 1959. They were also forwarded to the Office of the DCI.

FROM

SEP [illegible] 1975

CIA

In February 1960, Wiley did testify before HCUA as an expert regarding the 7th WYF and covered "violence" against himself and other anti-Communists and the Communist dominance of delegations.

On or about 1 April 1960, the House Committee on Un-American Activities was interested in consultations with Wiley based on articles by Wiley appearing in the American Legion Magazine, Elks magazine, National Review, and the Ukranian Quarterly, apparently based on Wiley's observations of Iron Curtain countries derived from his travels to the USSR, the World Youth Festival in Vienna, and other Iron Curtain countries during the summer of 1959. (In February 1960, Wiley had testified before HCUA about his experiences at the Vienna Youth Festival.) The HCUA staff members interested in Wiley were Francis McNamara and Richard Arens.

During the course of his trip to the WYF, Wiley apparently drew some official attention to himself in Israel.

Circa 20 August 1959, a State Department memorandum was forwarded to McCord regarding conversations William Anthony, Press Officer, American Embassy, Tel Aviv, Israel, had with Wiley at the American Embassy on 20 and 21 July 1959. In substance, Anthoney stated Wiley represented himself as a columnist connected with the "Newhouse Chain" but in his questioning of Anthony about Israeli politics, he (Wiley) "tries to give the impression he either is in or just outside the Washington intelligence community." Upon receipt of this memo, McCord advised Morse Allen, SRS, "We need to straighten Wiley out on being too clandestine."

Circa September 1959, Wiley prepared five reports relevant to some of his travels to the Middle East, Soviet Union and Austria attendant to activities of the World Youth Festival in Vienna in the summer of 1959. One report concerned a former Syrian Communist leader (Elias Mourkos); and Syrian intelligence agents. Another concerned Wiley's observations as of 9 August 1959 when he was in Kiev, USSR, relative to an anti-regime student in Kiev. A third report

RECEIVED FROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

concerned the presence of Anthony Churchill at the Vienna Youth Festival from late July to early August 1959. A fourth report concerned Wiley's meeting with one Damdindorje in Cairo, Egypt, on 2 July 1959 who Wiley characterized as a possible defector from the Mongolian Peoples' Republic; and the fifth report pertained to the possible compromise - through Soviet guides - of the Yale Chorus Group in the USSR in July 1959.

In the fall of 1959, Wiley prepared three additional reports attendant to his travels involving the World Youth Festival in the summer of 1959. One report concerned the presence of Chua Cheng Lok at the Youth Festival; another concerned Wiley's meeting with Dr. Waldemar Wajszczuk on a train travelling between the Soviet border at Brest and Warsaw on 16 August 1959, who Wiley characterized as a possible Polish defector; coupled with a report on Wiley's meeting with Bogdan Kolodziejski and Jerzy Solecki in Vienna in late July 1959, who Wiley characterized as "Polish journalists (intelligence agent?)"; and a third concerned a 29 June 1959 meeting in Belgrade with Tom Duckinovic, characterized as a defector from Yugoslavia.

R ROOM
SEP 1975
CIA

CUBA TRIP, ARREST AND DETENTION, 1960

(There is no conclusive evidence such as formal memoranda in the file to indicate that this Agency initiated action to send Wiley to Cuba. However, inferences from routing slips, memoranda and expense voucher payments would indicate that this trip was for CIA. Contrary to inferences by SRS officers, there is no indication, again such as a formal memorandum, in the Wiley files that he, under CIA instruction, courted arrest and detention so that he could find out information about the three staff employees who were imprisoned there. This does not preclude that there might not be written notes of such a plan buried in other files. The best indicator is Paul Gaynor's comment on a routing slip to CIA Cover Employee dated 2 February 1970, "His (Wiley's) imprisonment in Cuba was an operation on behalf of FE-TSD-OS-DCI-DDP.")

On 9 August 1960, Wiley reported the following information to Morse Allen of SRS concerning his trip to Cuba:

Mr. Wiley arrived in Havana the morning of 26 July 1960 and was arrested in Havana at the Libre Hotel at approximately 7:00 p.m. on the evening of 27 July 1960. During the period between his arrival and his arrest, Mr. Wiley stated that he had made no business type contacts and that he had merely wandered about the streets of Havana looking for news items. (Wiley is covered as a correspondent for radio station WOR of New York City plus other newspaper correspondent type coverage.) During this period, Wiley stated he contacted Ruby Phillips of the New York Times and he met and talked with Dave Webber, a stringer for NBC who was staying at the Libre Hotel. In addition, Wiley stated that he had spent a certain amount of time doing nothing but moving about the Libre Hotel. Wiley stated further that during the 26th and on the 27th he had been interviewing delegates to the Latin American Youth Congress then convening in Havana, Cuba. During these interviews, Wiley had acted as a typical newspaperman and had with him a tape recorder which he had brought with him when he came into Cuba and which he had previously registered with the Cuban customs authorities.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

Wiley stated that the actual arrest came about in the following way. He stated that he had talked with a young man from the United States. The young Cuban who was obviously violently pro-Castro and also had talked with a young man from the United States. The young Cuban had been telling Wiley that everything was fine in Cuba and that it was not a police state and he was conducting his discussion with this young Cuban in more or less routine reported style when all of a sudden a police officer with two others moved to the table where he was sitting and stated that they wanted to talk to Wiley outside. Wiley asked the ranking officer who he was and was told that he was the Chief of the Public Relations of the Youth Congress. However, after some argument , Wiley was forcibly taken outside although not roughed up by the two assistants to the ranking police officer and also taken at the same time was the young Cuban whom Wiley had been interviewing. All these police officers were in plain clothes.

Wiley stated that they were placed in a car and taken directly to G-2 Headquarters in the Miromar Section of Havana which is a building between 14th Street and Fifth Avenue and bears the number 1219 (this address known to the United States Embassy). Wiley stated that during the ride in the car to the G-2 Headquarters, he needled the young Cuban who kept insisting that this was not an arrest and seemed shocked by the whole performance. Wiley added that this Cuban, as far as he knows, was dismissed from the prison after a statement had been taken from him by the police the same evening.

Wiley stated that he was taken to a reception type of room in the G-2 Headquarters and to his complete amazement some fifteen minutes after he was taken there, into the reception room came Jake Rosen, a well known New York Communist whom Wiley spoke to and positively identified and another U.S. Communist whom Wiley identified as being one of those who was on tour of the Soviet Union with Wiley after he had gone to the Vienna Youth Festival previously. Wiley stated that he could not recall the name of the second Communist but stated he could be identified since Wiley has a photograph of him at his residence. Rosen and this other Communist were dirty and their feet

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 20 1975
CIA

covered with mud and he learned later from one of the guards in the reception room that both of these men had come from Sierra Maestre where they had been visiting.

Wiley said he talked to Rosen and there could be no question of his identity. (NOTE: In discussing the identity of these individuals with Wiley, it was agreed that a possible examination of both cases would be in order since a possibility exists that Rosen and the other Communist were illegally in Cuba.)

Following this short period of time in the reception room, Wiley was placed in a cell in the jail about 9 x 15 feet long which contained six bunks and 15 other prisoners. Wiley stated that in this cell he met FNU Acosta, a man named Costas and Major Gallo Martinez whom Wiley described as the former Adjutant General of Castro's Army.

Wiley stated that after about one hour in the cell, the guards came and took him to another room for interrogation. On the way to the interrogation room, Wiley stated he saw Jake Rosen and the other aforementioned man in one of the inner offices and both seemed in high spirits. Wiley commented that he had learned later from other prisonsers that Rosen and this other individual had complete run of the Headquarters and were allowed to make phone calls and Wiley stated that he established through other prisoners that Rosen had made at least three phone calls; one to the National Hotel, one possibly to the United States Embassy and one to an unknown private number. Wiley also learned that at one of the three numbers Rosen spoke to someone for about an hour and apparently this someone was known as "Mike." Wiley stated that he also learned that the two Communists were seen with Captain Alvarez of G-2 and were observed on most friendly terms with Alvarez and were, in fact, reported as being arm in arm with Alvarez. One prisoner believed that they were talking about Wiley since this prisoner overheard the name "Cholly" (ph), the way Cubans referred to Wiley's first name Charles.

According to Wiley, the interrogation was conducted by the previously mentioned Alvarez and a Cuban woman who claimed that she had been arrested by the FBI recently in

SEP [illegible] 1975

CIA

Miami, Florida, and further claimed that she had been slapped by an FBI agent. Wiley stated that this woman mentioned the name of the man but he cannot as yet recall the agent's name. Wiley also believed that the arrest had occurred in Miami within the last few months, also no specific date of arrest was mentioned. Wiley stated that Alvarez and the woman both spoke English although not well.

Wiley stated that the interrogation was strictly routine. They wanted to know why he was in Cuba, when he had arrived, had he ever been in Cuba before, who he worked for, etc. Wiley stated that he worked for radio station WOR and that he held strictly to his newspaper correspondent cover. Wiley stated that Alvarez attempted to talk tough at times but Wiley laughed at him and denounced the Cuban police, the Cuban military and the Cuban government to Alvarez and, in fact, invited Alvarez to do anything he wanted to. Wiley stated he bluntly asked Alvarez just why he was arrested and according to Alvarez said "we think you are an FBI spy." Wiley stated that he pointed out the stupidity of Alvarez to his face and that Alvarez from time to time became furious during the interrogation.

Wiley stated that the interrogation which was completely fruitless lasted about twenty minutes, at the conclusion of which he was given a sandwich and was told that he would be released in the morning. Wiley stated that he demanded that he be allowed to call the U.S. Embassy but this was denied. Because of this, Wiley stated that he wouldn't eat a thing until the U.S. Embassy or one of their representatives had made contact with him. He stated that he took the sandwich and gave it to some prisoners. Wiley stated at the conclusion of this interrogation he was taken to a different cell which he described as being about 15 x 15 feet having triple bunks in the cell occupied by 26 other men whom Wiley described as MRR types. Wiley described this cell as filthy, no ventilation, no lights. He stated he spent seven days in this cell and in fact went on a hunger strike. He stated he refused to eat anything and touched no food except on the Sunday following his arrest after he had been promised his release the following morning at which time he had a little soup and some other food. He added however because his release was not forthcoming as agreed, he went on another hunger strike and had no food until he was released on the following Wednesday, 3 August.

FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Wiley stated that there was no other attempt at interrogation made either directly or indirectly during his stay. He stated that on Saturday night an official from the U.S. Embassy visited him. Wiley did not know this man's name and Mr. Kessler from the Embassy who has been previously mentioned visited him Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday. Wiley commented that prior to his release he gave what he regarded as significant information (which will be referred to in the second section of this report) to Kessler, since he thought the information should be surfaced and he could not tell how long he would be kept in the prison. Wiley cautioned the writer at this time the possible compromise of his connections if this information was handled incorrectly.

Wiley stated that he suffered no particular harassments while in the prison. He stated that some of the guards talked tough and tried to act tough but Wiley stated he behaved in his completely stubborn and obstreperous manner at all times and refused to cooperate in every possible way. He stated that the regular prison guards were friendly and he had no trouble with them but the special military guards and the army type were the constant subjects of his scorn and hostility. He stated that as a form of annoyance he was told twice that he was going to leave and then after he had prepared to leave, he was told that it was a mistake and that his leaving had been cancelled.

Wiley stated that on Friday or Saturday in the morning which had been the 29th or 30th of July he was checked over by a doctor at the prison for fungus infection and because of the fact that he was on a hunger strike and that it was obvious that he was weak from hunger, Wiley said nothing came of this but on Tuesday the 2nd of August, he was taken within the prison to a doctor who immediately sent him to a hospital, address unknown (in Havana), Camp Libertad. At this hospital Wiley was given a check up and he was told he would have to eat. Wiley stated that he would resist any effort to force feed him and he refused to take any food and any medication from a Cuban doctor or Cuban attendant. Wiley said that at the hospital he was placed in a psycho cell with about twelve persons some of whom Wiley thought were political types but most of whom were criminally

RELEASED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

insane. Wiley commented that obviously the prison attendants and officials were very worried about Wiley's health because of his refusal to eat and he was constantly being checked by various doctors. Wiley stated that he was released from the hospital and was given back all of his effects except his tape recorder and his hat. On Wednesday, 3 August, he was released.

Wiley commented that the individuals who were political prisoners impressed him very much; they seemed "real men" and were fanatically anti-Castro; most as far as Wiley could tell were connected with the MRR. He stated the regular guards were obnoxious and were detested by the prisoners. He commented that the G-2 Headquarters, as far as he could tell, had been in operation somewhat over two months and that they had probably processed over 5,000 prisoners since he recalled seeing the number attached to his card as 5028.

Wiley commented that while at the hospital a civil officer, Rolando Fiallo, came to his cell and acted as an interpreter. Fiallo told Wiley that he wanted to help him and offered to do anything for him that he could. According to Wiley, Fiallo appeared to be a strong anti-Castro type who had a great desire to come to the United States. Fiallo told Wiley that he had a good friend who was an important defector from the Cuban Embassy in Mexico. Wiley commented that Fiallo sounded very honest but that he could not tell whether this man was a plant or not.

Wiley stated that while he was in prison, guards brought in a man by the name of Leonardo Julio Walter, an Argentine doctor. Wiley stated that he found out that this Walter had been picked up at the airport as soon as he had landed and that when he was placed in the cell with Wiley and the others, the doctor gave the impression of a perfectly furious individual. According to Wiley, Dr. Walter kept insisting that he was a friend of "Che" Gueverra. Walter was an obnoxious type, according to Wiley, and stated time and time again emphatically that he hated all North Americans and in no circumstances would he treat them medically. Wiley could not understand why this man was brought into the prison but reported it simply as an incident of interest.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Set out below are items of particular interest which have been reported in more specific terms by Mr. Wiley to assist Chief, SRS and are set forth below for record:

Wiley reported that MRR source who was interrogated said that a man FNU Gorky was a Russian or East German who sits in on all interrogations of political prisoners at the G-2 Headquarters Building. According to Wiley, this man does not speak Spanish and his source could furnish no description.

According to Wiley, an MRR source told him that he had received the following information from another MRR man who worked at the place mentioned. This source reported that there were twenty crated MIG fighter planes at the San Antonio "bath" (Wiley could not recall the Spanish word used here). This source stated that this was an air base built by the U.S. Government. The source further reported that he had heard that between 30 and 35 Cuban pilots were presently in Czechoslovakia on a seven months training course getting instructions for flying the aforementioned MIG fighters.

Wiley stated that he had given full details concerning the Soviet freighter that had come in with the large crates to Assistant Chief, SRS. Wiley stated that it was most interesting that his source told him that the freighter had come through Cuban customs and into the harbor without any routine harbor clearance and had swung immediately into its berth along side one of the Havana docks. According to Wiley the source was one of the longshoremen who had been impressed to unload this Soviet freighter. The crates unloaded were enormous being 70 feet long approximately. Source also stated that one of the crates had broken but because of the careful packing of whatever it contained, source was unable to identify its contents. According to Wiley, these huge crates were placed on big trucks and were taken to specific areas, each one accompanied by jeeps. Wiley himself could offer no explanation of the crates or what they were made of nor the size or capacity of the trucks that moved these large crates. Apparently Wiley's source could furnish no additional details other than those given to Assistant Chief, SRS.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Wiley stated that he learned from a former policeman who served under Batista that every G-2 station in Havana had cached 400 Czech machine guns and approximately two million rounds of ammunition. Source told Wiley that he knew this to be true because he had worked putting these items there. Wiley himself definitely discounts this story.

Wiley reported that a source had obtained from another source who worked at this place that there were 200 Russian or East German (European) technicians at the Baracoa (ph) base.

Wiley reported that he had received information that at Marianu or Marianal there had been observed a number of pairs of cranes. These pairs of cranes consisted of a large crane and a small crane which are apparently built together and are so designed that they are used for handling odd shaped or unusual sized material. No other details given.

Wiley stated that inside the prison cell while he was first incarcerated, he heard that the Cuban police claimed that they had in prison the head of the sabotage group, the head of the Activist group and the Chief of Finance of the MRR movement in Havana. Wiley stated that he got pretty close to the men in the cell. They apparently liked him and in fact talked quite freely to him and that when he mentioned this to several of these individuals, the various men did not deny to him the above. Wiley said that these prisoners admitted that they were connected with and were leaders of one of the two major sections of the MRR in Havana.

Wiley stated that one of the above mentioned men whose name is Hermando Marchecho claimed that while being interrogated he was able to see reports which were signed by three or four individuals which he recognized as double agents in the ranks of MRR. Marchecho stated that as far as he was concerned, the appearance of these names on reports indicated that a heavy penetration of the MRR had been made by Castro's intelligence. According to Wiley, Marchecho was completely discouraged by this but nevertheless clearly indicated to Wiley that he and his associates and his organization would continue the struggle against Castro.

ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

which he could then be considered an expert. Subject has contacted a number of organizations in radio, television, newspapers and magazines who had evidenced an interest in securing from him stories, pictures and taped interviews. Approval for the trip was requested and $3,000 toward financing of this trip. He was to depart toward the end of May and return around the first of August. The memo is initialed "OS/SE" (SE being Sheffield Edwards, Director of Security).

Ultimately his travel voucher covering this trip reflected expenses of $4,544.38 with $3,000 advanced and the "balance not claimed." His cover accounting for 7(6)-6/62 lists "Deficit on trip to Asia" 1,544.38 as an expense and is offset against listed income for that period. Besides other countries he was in during the period 5/15 to 8/18/62, he spent 12 days in the USSR and 14 days in Helsinki.

In September 1962, Wiley reported on an item from a September 1962 edition of the National Review concerning a statement by Red China's Marshal Chen.

Sometime in the fall of 1962, Wiley submitted three reports relevant to a trip he made during the summer of 1962. One report covered reports Wiley made to the U.S. Embassies in 1962, reflecting that after travelling through Sydney, Australia, Wiley contacted Rollard Haggart Bushner, American Embassy, Djakarta, in early June, reporting that the Dutch were preparing to pull out of New Guinea; that in late June Wiley gave a copy of an exclusive interview with President Diem of Vietnam to Robert Francis Krill, a USIS official in Vientiane; and that in late July (1962) Wiley contacted the political section of the American Embassy in Helsinki reporting information he had obtained in Samarkand and Tashkent, Soviet Union. In each case he identified himself only as a newsman who thought he should report interesting information to his government. Wiley also reported to SRS interesting persons visiting the USSR in July 1962, to wit: Cyla Singer and Professor and Mrs. Quincy Wright, who he met in Tashkent; and Douglas A. Dawkins, who he met in Tbilisi. He also formally reported on Ed Leland, who he met in mid-June 1962 on a flight from Phom Penh to Saigon. In addition, he formally reported information he received from an enlisted man at the U.S. Air Station in Peshawar, Pakistan, in early June 1962, concerning overflights by U.S. jets in Southern USSR.

RECE[illegible]ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

TAIWAN AND FAR EAST TRIP - 1964

According to a memorandum dated 27 October 1964 from Morse Allen to Chief, SRS, the "Chinat" government offered Wiley a two week, all expense paid, round trip to Taiwan as a result of Wiley's American Legion magazine article on Tibet. Wiley will lecture and talk in Taiwan, and his planned departure was on or about 5 November 1964.

Allen recommended that Wiley be authorized to proceed in this trip without any outside instruction in targets. Allen further recommended that Wiley be given money in amount of $500 to $1,000 to permit him to take advantage of the "Chinat" trip and make a "free lance" trip through Far East (Tokyo, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia) and return via Manila, P.I.

Paul F. Gaynor, Chief, SRS, noted in a slip of paper attached to Allen's memorandum that the Director of Security approved $1.000 advance on 28 October 1964. Wiley acknowledged receipt of the $1,000 cash on 10 November 1964.

On 16 February 1965, an accounting for the above trip was submitted by Wiley and $37.28 of the $1,000 advanced was returned as the unused portion of the advance.

In the interim, by 16 November 1964, Wiley had contacted Radio Free Europe in New York on his own, and had been slated to do research on the Far East utilizing RFE files or in conjunction with RFE officials. Wiley was also scheduled to act as a free lance interviewer and reporter during the course of an impending trip to the Far East. Through efforts of SRS, this activity on the part of Wiley was curtailed.

ROM
1975
CIA

WORLD YOUTH FESTIVAL, ALGIERS - 1965

The 9th Communist sponsored WYF, after early speculation as to the probable site at which it would be held, was finally announced for Algeria from 27 July to 6 August 1965. This WYF, however, was cancelled in late June 1965 despite the advance planning and arrangements that had gone into it.

An August 13, 1964, memo from Morse Allen to C/SRS, Subject: 9th WYF, concerns what, if anything, SRS and/or Wiley might do regarding the probable holding of a 9th WYF during the summer of 1965. Wiley had several weeks earlier reminded Allen that he, Wiley, had attended the last one at Helsinki and had been active in the "disruption of that festival." Wiley wanted to know if SRS had any planned operations in connection with 9th or had SRS given any thought to setting up some plans. He pointed out that it would take considerable time to execute plans for another penetration effort. Allen told Wiley that Wiley was too old and too well known to spearhead any U.S. activities in that direction. Allen said Wiley could, however, organize and direct it, possibly from without the area, if it were decided for SRS to take part. Wiley indicated that he would be perfectly willing to commence working on it and to direct the operations from behind the scenes. Allen asked Wiley to write up and submit a proposal regarding same if he had a chance. Allen suggested to C/SRS that the matter of penetration and a disruptive effort in connection with the 9th WYF be given consideration in the near future.

An October 1, 1964, memo for the record by Morse Allen records an interview he had with Wiley on 30 September 1964. One long paragraph titled "Communist Youth Festival, Algiers, July 1965" - notes that Wiley had spearheaded anti-Communist attacks on Youth Festivals in Vienna and in Helsinki previously, has disrupted their programs, and has to a considerable extent interfered with their propaganda at these festivals. Because of this, Wiley is interested once again in divisive and disruptive efforts against the Communists in Algiers in 1965. This time Wiley states

SEP 30 1975
CIA

that it would be impossible to bring a big group to Algiers and would in fact be dangerous because of the attitude of the Moroccan government. Wiley believes that it would be best to have a small team of 3 to 6 trained individuals who could proceed to the Youth Festival at Algiers and who would be directed not at disruption or propaganda, but would aim at intelligence gathering. Wiley himself stated that he would again volunteer to go to Algiers at this time, not ostensibly connected with the aforementioned group, and only as a free lance newspaperman. Wiley pointed out that undoubtedly he is now the top news authority in the U.S. on CP Youth Festivals. Wiley states that he believes he can arrange financing from private organizations and individuals for the 3 to 6 individuals mentioned above and possibly enough for travel by himself although this may not be obtainable. Wiley requests a study of this matter and advice.

Ethel Mendoza, SRS, received a phone call from Wiley on 30 March 1965, wherein Wiley advised he had mailed material to Mendoza she had requested. Wiley further advised he was then on a lecture tour of the United States. Wiley also discussed a previously proposed trip to Algiers to cover the World Youth Festival and requested information as to whether he would be allowed to cover the festival. Paul F. Gaynor recorded that the Director of Security gave his approval on 31 March 1965, but that Wiley's activity at the festival should be as a passive observer only.

A note dated 12 April 1965 to Chief, SRS from Ethel Mendoza regarding a 9 April 1965 phone conversation with Wiley states that in view of Wiley's plan to attend the Youth Festival in August, she suggested that he not repay the $1,000 advance for the China trip, but keep it until he is assured of complete outside financing for the Algiers trip. He would, as in the past, utilize this fund to cover any deficit for his own travel costs; not for any of the group which he supervises at the festival. Wiley also inquiried as to extending his travel in August to include 4-6 weeks in South America. Also, regarding Algiers financing, Mendoza said she learned only very recently that the anticipated funding in some part will come from the backers of the American Security Council.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

An April 16, 1965, note from Mendoza to C/SRS advised that CA Staff (Covert Action Staff of the DD/P) is definitely planning to send an American group to the 9th WYF in Algiers, 27 July - 6 August 1965 and some of the DDP area divisions also plan to infiltrate some of the foreign country groups.

A 21 June 1965 memo from Wiley reflects the status of his fund raising activities for the 9th WYF project and some data regarding the project. Funds raised to that date were some $1,485 or more under auspices of "Christianform, Inc." Wiley said the goal is to send 6 delegates, 5 young men and a girl with a seventh person in Algiers outside the delegation. He will take no active part in the project than to keep in touch through the coordinator outside the delegation. Among other things, each delegate is to get as much information as possible about the U.S. delegation, including photos. On return, all information on domestic leftists will be given to the FBI directly by the delegates. Wiley said there is good hope that the projected budget of $3,000 will be fulfilled and that none of the money raised for this project will be used to pay Wiley's expenses. They will be covered by the Cover Organization earnings.

Although the WYF was belatedly cancelled in late June, Wiley did follow through with the So. American phase of his planned travel. Expense and travel vouchers reflect that Wiley was in the U.S. in July and in the U.S. and South America in August and September 1965.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

SECRET

SOUTH AMERICAN TRIP - SUMMER 1965

Notes in early July 1965 indicate Wiley was planning a trip also to South America. There is indication he was to be in Washington, D.C., for SRS consultation on 12, 13 and 14 July 1965.

Sometime in July 1965, Wiley prepared a memorandum which he captioned "Re: Proposed South American Trip - July 1965." He suggested private financing and gave his targets as the political and military situation - especially Castro/Communist influence and insurgency war danger.

There are notes of discussion with Wiley on 15, 20 and 27 July 1965.

In response to a request from Morse Allen, Wiley prepared a partial list of his potential contacts for the South American trip and submitted the list on 27 July 1965. Paul F. Gaynor noted, "Ok to make trip to South American per Director of Security 7/28/65. P. F. Gaynor, SRS/OS." Wiley listed numerous personalities in South America apparently resulting from suggestions to Wiley by the following:

Admiral Radford, who suggested
Wiley contact

Brig. Gen, Vernon "Dick" Walters
in Rio de Janeiro

Norman Carignan, W. R. Grace Co.

Meade Brunet, RCA International
Operations

Spruille Braden

FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Michael J. Malone, rep of U.S. businesses in South America

Among the numerous potential contacts listed by Wiley were Paul Bethel and Jules Dubois who Wiley was told to avoid because they were being watched by local services in South America. Wiley was told to be careful in contacts with Manuel Artime and the DRE representatives.

On 30 July 1965, Allen met with Wiley in Washington, D.C., giving him instructions and a briefing for the South American trip. This data was formalized into a memorandum by Allen on 5 August 1965 and forwarded to Chief/SRS, P. F. Gaynor. Allen recorded:

> "1 - On Friday, 30 July 1965, pursuant to instruction from Chief, SRS, the writer met Wiley at the Washington National Airport and talked with him concerning his pending trip to South America.
>
> "2 - Wiley was given a series of suggestions and certain instructions which are set forth following:
>
> a. He was under no circumstances to visit Latin America and the trip was to include only countries on the continent of South America, starting at Panama and thence South.
>
> b. He was not to see either Paul Bethel or Jules Dubois.
>
> c. If he saw any of the Cuban colony in Miami on his way South, he was to stick strictly to his cover and he should remember that most of these people were connected with the Agency

SEP 30 1975
CIA

and would report the contact. He was specifically told to avoid Enrique Abascal.

d. Concerning the DRE representatives in any contacts either in Miami or in South America, he was to use extreme caution for two reasons: (1) Many are now or have been on our payroll and they would report any contact; (2) Many of these people are unreliable and some are clearly left wing.

e. He was told that he was at all cost to avoid risk of capture and was certainly not to subject himself to unnecessary hazard. (He was specifically told to stay only at the best hotels since low-grade hotels in South America often constitute a personal security risk.

f. He was told that he should use utmost discretion in contacting U.S. officials since many of these--State, USIA, AID would report his contact.

g. He was given specific and detailed instructions that he is to report without fail upon departure from each country except in the places in which he expects to stay more than

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

a few days. These reports are to be detailed and to cover contacts and information gained. He was not to make reports of any kind to any person or U.S. government agency except CIA and then through agreed-upon channels only.

NOTE: It was agreed that Wiley will send these reports by mail to his wife in New York City who will, in turn, send them by mail to the writer's Washington address. In the event of urgent matters, he is to cable his wife as a newspaperman would and she, in turn, is to call the information in as soon as possible. Wiley has agreed to this and has worked out the necessary details with his wife who will technically be the "office" of "World News Analysis."

"3. Chief, SRS made suggestions as follows relative to particular targets of interest:

a. Chicom activities which are reflected in the civil rights movement in the United States.

b. A study could be made of why universities and colleges in South America are safe haven for communist

RECEIVED
SEP 30 1975
CIA

and radical activities and apparently cannot be touched by police. Chief, SRS felt that this had possibilities of a serious article.

4. Writer obtained from Wiley a rough itinerary of his tour through South America. Hotels are not included but apparently Wiley's wife will have some of these forwarded to her by Wiley as moves from country to country. List follows:

Bolivia - to August 6

Ecuador - 2 or 3 days

Peru - to August 15

Bolivia - to August 20

Chile - 3 or 4 days

Argentina - to August 27

Uruguay - day or 2

Paraguay - to September 1

Brazil - 2 weeks

Venezuela - 2 or 3 days

Home - September 17

Wiley wrote reports from Lima on 10 and 13 August 1965; Buenos Aires received circa 2 September 1965; Asuncion on 31 August 1965; and Brasilia, on 8 September 1965.

A draft of some of the information was prepared on 15 September 1965.

SEP 30 1975
CIA

The file contains handwritten notes of interviews with Wiley, dated 5 and 9 March 1966; 3, 7, 14, 17 and 27 February 1966; and a copy of an article from the "National Review," dated 5 October 1965, by Robert Peter, captioned, "Communist Priests in South America."

Wiley prepared a fairly extensive report circa late captioned "Brazilian Intelligence, Recife," but which also has subheading of: Lino J. Rocha; Arturo Salazar Larrian; Irving Lee Sanders; Eleen Proud; Deak Rusk in Uruguay; Chicoms in Santiago, Chile; Peruvian Killed Righting for the Viet Cong; Guido A. Dias; A.U.D. Police Training; Return to Venezuela; Chinese Espionage in Argentina; Jose Roberta W. Penteado; and Dan Caswell. Circa the same time, Wiley prepared a report captioned, "Rolanda Garcia, Argentina," with subheadings of: Argentine Intelligence, Indonesian Embassy in Argentina; RIS in Rio; Jose A. Vega; Robert Prichard, Ruy Alencar; and Illegal Passports in Manus, Brazil.

A sterilized version of all the foregoing was prepared in SRS and passed to Jerry Mullane, WH/SO, on 27 December 1965 by Morse Allen.

Wiley had also given reports on: Chicoms in Chile; Barrientos Killed in Vietnam; Secret Talks Among Military; Lack of Soviet Response to Increased Chicom Propaganda; and Local Stringers for U.S. Publications Connected with Commies.

It was possible Wiley would prepare reports on: Action Popular; White Russian Refugees in Brazil, Russian Repartiates from South America; and Chicom Spy Suspects in Argentina.

[illegible] FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

OTHER ACTIVITY, 1965-1974

There are handwritten notes of conversations with Wiley dated 7, 14, 18, 19 and 24 May 1965. The gist is that Wiley was apparently planning a trip to the mid west and then later to Algiers in North Africa. During the 19 May 1965 conversation between Morse Allen and Wiley, "Allen talked to Charles re Miss M's (Mendoza's) comments that Charles had not complied with instructions re vouchers. He (Wiley) claimed misunderstanding and that he could not accurately furnish desired info on vouchers she presently held. Allen told Chrles to use his memory and any notes he had and to fill in desired info per the written instructions given him by Miss M. (Ethel Mendoza). He said he would do so. Allen then told him to explicitle follow written instructions from Miss M. (Ethel Mendoza) or vouchers could not be accepted.......Charles was also reminded of reports due which he should get out prior to leaving on his speaking tour. He agreed." Apparently, the trip was to start on 23 May lasting until 1 June 1965 and the Young Americans for Freedom were picking up all expenses. Wiley was going to Cleveland, Milwaukee, Chicago and Minneapolis.

There are notes of conversation with Wiley dated 2, 7, 10, 15, 17, 22, 25, 28 June; 2, 6, 9, July and 27 July 1965. Apparently Wiley was having trouble with his back at this time and could not sit down and bend for typing. He was given the name of Dr. David S. Baldwin, 20 East 68th St., N.W., to contact. Regarding his travels, Wiley was told he would have to submit detailed reports of contacts to show what he is doing, etc. Apparently, the mid-West speaking tour was partially geared to gather funds for Algerian trip.

There is a note in the file, to wit:

"For Wiley

"Why not get the American Legion magazine to publish an Article 'Chaos in our Colleges' with a hard attack on the weak knee college and university advisers that permit violence, disruptions, waste of college and tax payers money, phoney students - what about the decent students who want to study, etc." This note was apparently written by Morse Allen.

SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

A 2 July 1965 handwritten note apparently prepared for a briefing of Wiley states partially, "Turn over any assts to 'B' (FBI) they want - cooperate."

In July 1965, Mendoza received information from Wiley concerning his contacts with the American Security Council (ASC) and a mid-West speaking trip during the period 24 May to 1 June 1965. The latter trip, according to Wiley, was paid for by the Young Americans for Freedom. Regarding his contacts with the American Security Council, Wiley advised:

> "My contact with ASC goes back to the middle 1950's when I first met John Fisher. At that time he was setting up the organization based on Harry Jung's files. Before it was named ASC, the org. was the Mid-American Research Library, and, later, Fidelifax. (Perhaps vise versa).
>
> "Over the years I've been in touch with ASC frequently. In addition to Fisher, I know Jack Ison and Bill Lambie - both former FBI men who worked on the subversive desk in New York (and elsewhere?). Ison left ASC in 1962 to join the Hoover Co., Canton, Ohio. My last information is that he was in their White Plains, N.Y. office. Another man in the Chicago office whom I met was D. Alspaugh, a research specialist. I have no knowledge of his background.

"In the Washington Office, I know Lee Pennington a friend for years before he joined ASC. While he was in Washington, I also knew Frank Johnson (a former ONI man?). I believe he is presently in Europe.

"My first contact with Dewitt Copp was in the fall of 1964. (NOTE: During my conversation with Copp he told me that the Chinese Air Force U-2 Flights were tied in with CIA). I spoke to him about my trip to Asia because of his having been in the area and to obtain outlets for material. Copp was in close touch with the Chinese Embassy, and I think it was Frank Toa who

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

suggested I see him. Copp offered to take taped material from me. My only other contact was a phone talk with him in March 1965.

"While in Taiwan I was told by Col. Caithness of the U.S.M.A.A.G. office that Copp had directly attributed information to another MAAG officer who had briefed him. When the story was printed (by North American Newspaper Alliance?), the officer was in trouble. Caithness indicated that he thought it was an honest breakdown in communication between the officer and Copp and that it was not deliberate. During my March phone conversation with Copp I told him about Caithness' disclosure to me (he had agreed that I tell Copp about the situation). Copp seemed quite surprised.

"On March 16 I had dinner with John Lewis in New York. Lewis is handling radio programs for ASC (out of the Washington office). He also produces shows for NBC radio (including a farm program). I've also had several phone conversations with Lewis in Washington.

On 29 December 1965, Wiley called Morse Allen, gave information concerning a forthcoming Esquire article on espionage; and brought up the idea of moving to Washington. Apparently Allen arranged to have Wiley call Cecil Tighe, SRS, the following Monday and for Tighe to advise Wiley to come to Washington in the near future to discuss the matter with Tighe and Gaynor. Apparently, Allen was removing himself from contact with Wiley at about this time.

Apparently on 14 January 1966 Gaynor and Tighe met with Wiley discussing his possible move to Washington, his lecture tour and use of vouchers for travel expenses. A notation dated only 1966 states to the effect that Wiley's company, World News Analysis, is known on the "Hill" because of the relationship between Filipello (sic) and Congressman Daddario. "Numerous persons know Wiley is CIA, other than perhaps a half-dozen of his own friends. These include Eugene Lyons, Jay Kennedy, Elsa Bernaut, Hede Massing, etc. (Note: Mccord is not aware of the first two names above, and this possibly would have some bearing on any assignment McCord may have been considering.)"

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

A handbill dated 6 January 1966 reflects Wiley was to be a speaker at a "Pro-Vietnam Teach-In" sponsored by the Young Americans for Freedom and the Princeton Conservative Club. Wiley is characterized as a free lance journalist, and an authority on International Communism who covered wars in Katanga, New Guinea, Laos, Vietnam, Algeria and Angola.

In early 1966, Wiley provided adverse information on Fred Coldren, Executive Director, International Federation for Freedom, Inc.

In early 1966, Wiley prepared reports concerning Daniel Davidson, special assistant to William Bundy and Steve Tyler, a free lance writer who in 1957 had attended the World Youth Festival in Moscow.

In early 1966, Wiley prepared reports concerning Vladimir G. and Emma Treml; Dr. and Mrs. Ivan D. London, Robin Moore; and Peter Korn. An additional report concerning Treml was prepared in February 1966.

In February 1966, Wiley prepared a report concerning Christopher Emmet, William Pawley, William T. McConarty, Mr. (FNU) Aistrop, Mr. (FNU) Eng, and Jay Kennedy.

In February 1966, Wiley prepared a report concerning Gene Farmer, Sr., Editor, Life Magazine whom Wiley met while discussing an article on Soviet spies.

There are handwritten notes of contacts with Wiley on 19 and 21 April 1966 mainly concerning articles about CIA which appeared in the May 1966 issue of "Esquire." Wiley did not know the authors. After apparent approval by the Director of Security, Wiley was authorized to contact one (Fnu) Erickson of "Esquire" to determine the identity of the authors.

There are notes of a verbal report by Wiley dated 27 April 1966 concerning Alex Roark.

In March 1966, Wiley prepared a report captioned, "Rumours of John and Robert Kennedy Affairs" apparently based on information from Nancy Czarnecki with whom Wiley apparently had just had contact. She is from Los Angeles, California.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

In April 1966, Wiley prepared a report concerning George Freyman of Bellingham, Washington; and concurrently a report captioned, "Tourists Going to the USSR and Iron Curtain in Summer of 1966," specifically mentioning Stephen Talbott and Richard Bocklet.

In April 1966, Wiley prepared a report concerning Geoffrey Aldridge, USAF, Information Office of the Alaskan Air Command, Elmendort Air Force Base; and Lt. General Raymond J. Reeves, Commander-in-Chief, Alaska, who Wiley had apparently met in the area of Kotzebue on 8 April 1966.

Circa 6 June 1966, Wiley prepared two reports concerning John Riley, member of the Veterans of OSS.

On 28 July 1966, Wiley submitted a short report on Camera Press Pix, a British corporation engaged in world wide distribution of photos taken of the Vietnam war in and around Hanoi.

A report concerning Col. Esteban Venture Nova, dated 5 August 1966 was forwarded. Nova supplied certain information about Trujillo and Herb Romerstein, an HCUA investigation, sat in on the interview.

Wiley, on 2 September 1966, submitted information about the Queens Chapter (Long Island, New York) Women Strike for Peace.

On 21 October 1966, Wiley submitted a report concerning Michael Struenlins (Streulens) based on information he had received from John Lewis, American Security Council, Washington, D. C. on 22 September 1966. Concurrently, Wiley submitted a report on Ray McConnon as received from Herb Romerstein.

On 5 August 1966, Wiley prepared a report dealing with a potential trip to South Africa extended by Ghemus J. J. Geldenhuys, Public Affairs Officer, Information Service of South Africa, N. Y. Wiley again submitted a report on this topic on 21 October 1966.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

On 2 November 1966, Wiley submitted a report on Edward Scannel Butler who was in New York on 26 October 1966 to review a documentary film he had produced about Castro. Apparently Butler had a radio debate with Lee Harvey Oswald just prior to President Kennedy's assassination.

In late 1966 or early 1967, Wiley submitted a number of public brochures distributed attendant to the production of the films, "Troublemakers," "Mass," etc.

In early 1967, Wiley prepared a report concerning Vladimir G. and Emma Treml based on a personal letter; and concurrently a report on Dr. and Mrs. Ivan D. London.

Circa November 1966, Wiley prepared a report concerning a recent trip to Chicago and Milwaukee indicating some individuals he contacted. Wiley captioned the report, "Attempts to Stop Recruiting on College Campuses, (II)."

In late 1966, Wiley prepared a report on information he received from Lyle Munson on 30 November 1966 concerning a former CIA man (William Cornielson) connected with Dow Chemicals Company.

Sometime before 2 December 1966, Wiley prepared a report which he captioned, "Attempts to Stop Recruiting on College Campuses." Wiley leads off the report with the statement, "Under the cover of investigating a leftist campaign to drive U. S. Government spokesmen and recruiters for government agencies from the colleges, I talked over the situation with those listed below, the following report is based on the combined thinking of all. (Those interviewed: former Rep. Donald Bruce, Don Appel of HCUA, Bill Mavrye of Senate Internal Security SubCommittee, a number of Young Americans for Freedom leaders, Paul Brehhah of the New York City Police, Peter McEleney of the New York State Police, Ruth Matthews, Herbert Larson of the N.Y.C. FBI Office, Herbert Romerstein and Henry Durkin." Attendant to this report, Wiley submitted a report captioned, "Primary Conclusions Re: Investigation of Anti-Recruiting Drive on College Campuses."

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Arlington House Publishers was the subject of a report submitted during January 1967. The report discusses the factional fight to control the publishing company.

In March 1967, Wiley prepared a report which he captioned, "D.C. Reaction to Exposure of CIA Cover Operations." It would appear that the majority of the information came from Nick Nonnenmacher, administrative assistant to Rep. Henry C. Shadeburg.

Circa March 1967, Wiley forwarded three brochures distributed by the Canadian Loyalist Movement which were mailed to Wiley (?) by F.C. Pilkington, North Vancouver, B.C., Canada.

An undated report, captioned, "Edward (Ted) Scott" is based presumably on information provided to Wiley by Malcolm (Mac) Johnson, news manager, NBC-TV, New York City. Scott was then an NBC stringer in Cairo, Egypt.

An advertisement in Human Events, 19 August 1967, identifies Wiley as the Executive Director, National Committee for Responsible Patriotism, 500 Fifth Avenue, N.Y., N.Y., 10036. This group had planned a series of parades throughout the country on October 21-22 1967, mobilizing support for U.S. soldiers in Vietnam and respect for law and order. Wiley's participation with this group was the topic of an article appearing in the 20 August 1967 edition of The Worker, captioned, "The Elusive Charles Wiley," rehashing some of the prior material published about Wiley's background.

At least two magazine articles written by Wiley were introduced into the "Congressional Record." One on 22 June 1966 by Senator Peter H. Dominick (also previously submitted by Senator Joseph M. Montoya) and another on 27 April 1965 by Representative E. Bradford Morse.

In December 1970, Wiley prepared a report concerning David Braum of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War.

In early January 1972, Wiley submitted a program captioned "Friendship Program for Foreign Military Personnel Stationed in the United States," which in essence

REC ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

would be a U.S.O. for foreign military personnel stationed in the U.S. Wiley contended it would build up good will and friendship. Wiley was told we have no interest in such a project.

The fall 1972 "Arlington House Publishers" contained an article by Intelligence Source edited by Charles Wiley, as to why Source a charter member of the Americam Communist Party, joined the Party and then left to fight Communism. From 1970-72, Wiley, at the request of SRS, monitored Source book to make sure any operations in which Source might have been involved were not exposed.

Intelligence Source a former KGB officer who defected in , has been and continues to be of Agency interest. For some time, Source had expressed a personal desire to author a factual book on the KGB based on his personal knowledge and observations. The draft of a proposed manuscript was prepared, and Source requested assistance in obtaining an editorial review and an introduction to persons in the publishing business who might be interested in publishing a factual type book on the KGB.

Wiley was introduced to Source as an individual who could give editorial assistance and had certain contacts in the publishing business. During July - August 1972, Wiley met Source on three occasions. There was a degree of incompatibility of temperaments, in addition to a difference of opinion concerning general content, format and tenor of the proposed manuscript, and at the request of Source any further involvement of Wiley with regard to the proposed manuscript was terminated.

Circa September 1973, Wiley prepared a report which he captioned, "Personnel on Staff of Soviet Exhibition at EXPO, Montreal, Canada - July 1973," wherein he indicated he attended EXPO on 14 July 1973. He also provided a photograph of an individual believed Russian, he thought of interest. Vasaly directed the report of photos to John Dempsey, C/RB and Bruce Solie. The latter said he was unable to do anything with the photos at the time and directed the material back to Vasaly for the Wiley file.

On 6 November 1973, a report was received from Wiley concerning one Pamela Spates, who indicated to Wiley she had been active in SDS and later the Weathermen.

VIETNAM TRIP - 1967-68

On 4 December 1967, Wiley reported that he had received an official invitation to visit Vietnam through

ROM
SEP 1975
CIA

the Foreign Ministry of that country. The Vietnamese Government will pay all his transportation and living costs while on the trip and the invitation resulted from urgings by Nguyen Quoc Ten, press officer of the Vietnamese mission to the U.N. in New York City. Wiley was certain that his reputation as a friend of the Vietnamese triggered the invitation.

Approval was given him to make the trip; however, his request to extend the trip through other places in the Far East and Europe was turned down.

On 18 December 1967, Cecil Tighe(SRS) reported in the memo to the Chief, SRS, that Wiley briefed him on the forthcoming trip on 15 December 1967. Wiley was told to stay out of the front lines and take precautions not to involve himself in any situation that might jeopardize his safety. Ralph True (Chief/SAD, OS) accompanied Tighe to the meeting and True presented a requirement to Wiley to which he acceded. Apparently True's presence at the meeting had the approval of the Chief, SRS. Wiley agreed to cooperate whole-heartedly with True. For the record, Wiley was loaned a two-suit suitcase, "medication in the form of tablets," and was instructed to purchase a Leica camera case and sufficient color film. There is no explanation in the file concerning the requirement levied by True.

Wiley submitted a report concerning a debriefing concerning his Vietnam trip.

"During a debriefing session in Washington, D.C. 30 April 1968 (by Bob Long?), I was rather surprised by the lack of interest in my findings. The interviewer asked almost no questions and didn't take notes. In talking to someone who has a great many sources of information available, I had little way of knowing what might be of interest to him. On several occasions during the interview I specifically asked if there were any particular information that he wanted. There was no response.

"I was in Vietnam for over a month - through the Tet "truce" offensive - as a guest of that country's government. I had private discussions with President Thieu, Vice President Ky, Some of these were very frank. All were long (over two hours each with Thieu and KY) and I was treated as a friend. In addition, I saw many top U.S. leaders - including General Westmoreland and representatives of other nations (the chinese

SEP 10 1975

CIA

ambassador, the commander of all Thai troops in Vietnam, etc.). In nearly all cases I either knew them previously or reached these men through personal introductions from mutual friends. At no point in the debriefing was I asked whom I had contacted and there was no interest when I volunteered the information.

"The fact that I have an almost open door to the office of the Vietnamese ambassador in Washington and their United Nations Mission also met with no response. I am in a position to get their thinking on almost any subject and am also somewhat influential."

On the transmittal slip to the C/SRS, Tighe noted, "too bad Wiley went on about domestic political matters at the debriefing instead of concentrating on Vietnam."

REL ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

EUROPEAN TRIP, 1970

Wiley, who claims that the basic reason for the trip was an invitation from the German Ministry of Defense, visited West Germany, England, Italy, France, Belgium, The Netherlands and Yugoslavia. During the German sojourn he visited the German Army, Navy and Air Force installations. He was told prior to departure that CIA had no tasks for him to perform. The results of Wiley's trip appeared in the American Legion magazine for March 1971. Financial and other records fail to reflect any approval of and payment for Wiley for this trip.

Circa August 1970, Wiley prepared a report on one Benigno Naval from the Philippines, near Manila. Apparently, Wiley met Naval "enroute to the Bonn Airport." This information was formalized into a report on 25 September 1970 and sent to C/ID/1 with the intention it be provided to FE Division.

[illegible] FROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

WORLD FESTIVAL, EAST BERLIN, 1973

In 1973, the Communists sponsored another WYF, this time held in East Berlin. Sometime prior to the event, Wiley brought up the question of our possible interest (SRS or other Agency components) and his availability and capability to be helpful finding appropriate delegates, funding, and providing cover. Despite being shunted off such an activity, he did apparently assist a young woman acquaintance, Third Agency Source, to travel as one of the American delegates. He considered her his protegee and claimed to have given her training and counsel and also to have directed her to the FBI. Source, ostensibly a member of the leftist group of American delegates, observed, took photos, and went on to the USSR with the group. She allegedly made her information and photos available to the FBI in debriefings and reports after her return.

Circa 14 August 1973, Wiley submitted a list of attendees at the 1973 Berlin Youth Festival. When Louis Vasaly brought the list to the attention of John P. Dempsey, Chief, Research Branch, with the suggestion of providing the list to CAS and "Ober's shop," Dempsey indicated the latter.

SEP 1975
CIA

SECRET

INVOLVEMENT IN CUBAN EXILE ACTIVITIES

On 28 October 1960, Wiley prepared reports on Michael M. Moonry and Alex Rorke, the latter of which had been arrested in Cuba.

Wiley submitted an undated report captioned, "Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Cuban Student Directorate)," particularly concerning Lesmes Ruiz, Jr., of the Revolutionary Student Directorate (DRE).

A Wiley report captioned, "Contact with the Cuban Revolutionary Student Directorate" is undated, but reflects Wiley's first contact with the DRE.

Wiley informed Morse Allen on 19 December 1961 that an FBI approached him and asked him to "nose around" about the people coming off the island (Cuba) or to get one of his boys to do it. Wiley further advised that the agent who made the request was Third Agency Employee of the New York Office (FBI) who wanted to attend a meeting of the P.I. which, according to Wiley, is a small anti-Castro Cuban group.

ROM
SEP 1975
CIA

On 27 December 1962, Wiley reported of Ethel Mendoza of SRS, his then case officer, that he, Wiley, believed a trip to Miami, Fla, in the near future could be very profitable from both the straight reporting aspect, and through his thus being able to re-establish contact with several Cubans with whom he is acquainted. His most important contact is with Manuel Artime, one of the leaders of the Cuban invasion force, who has just been released by Castro. Miss Mendoza further noted that Wiley is also acquainted with several other Cubans of some importance, one of these being a member of the "Alpha 66" group which ran several small operations against Cuba during 1962.

From 31 January through 10 February 1963, Wiley was in Miami, Fla., contacting Cuban exiles and exile organizations. His main target was Manuel Artime and his associates, with secondary target, the Cuban Student Directorate. He submitted a long and detailed report of his trip. Some of the information was published into finished memoranda.

A report dated circa February 1963 concerns a "Castro Raid on British Islands."

Circa February 1963, Wiley preprared a report on U.S. citizens and Canadians in Cuba.

The file contains a copy of HN-1-30, dated 25 February 1963, announcing the Agency formation of a "Task Force on Cuba" under the direction of James J. Hitchcock. Colonel Edwards brought the matter to the attention of Robert Bannerman with the comment, "This might be the place to feed in reports from Morse Allen's source. Bannerman advised Paul Gaynor and Allen, "When you have report already, we can take this up with Hitchcock."

On 12 April 1963, SRS prepared two final reports based Wiley's information concerning J.M. Hernandez, aka: "Manolin;" and the Comite Latino Americano de Informacion (Latin American Information Center).

On 5 June 1963, Wiley prepared a report on "Cuban Exiles and Associates," specifically mentioning Paul Bethel, Manuel Ray, Manuel Artime and Alex Rorke.

RECD FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

On 8 August 1963, Wiley verbally reported information he had received regarding Cuban activities.

On 11 September 1963, a report was prepared in SRS on the basis of a phone call to Wiley, concerning Nira Hardon and "Artime."

An undated report prepared by Wiley (including conversations with Enrique Abascal in late September 1963) concerned recent information on Cuban exile activity from New York sources.

On 4 October 1963, Wiley prepared a report concerning the Revoluntionary Student Directorate leadership. He indicated he thought very highly of this organization.

On 15 September 1963, Wiley prepared a report which he captioned, "Details of Town Hall Rally and Cuban Planning for It" which concerned Cuban exile activity to be directed against the rally of leftist American visitors to Cuba." Wiley also indicated he was involved as an advisor to the Cuban exiles regarding his opinion as to American reaction to specific activities, the scope of press coverage, their rights in the hall, etc.

Under the date of 9 October 1963, SRS prepared a 7 page formal report based on Wiley's above-mentioned Cuban reports which was captioned, "Information Regarding DRE and Other Cubans - New York City." This report was given to WH Division on 11 October 1963.

Sometime after 10 November 1963, Wiley submitted a list of his contacts in New York City during the weeks of 28 October and 4 November 1963.

Sometime in very late 1963, Wiley prepared a report containing information on Lee Harvey Oswald which he received from Enrique Abascal, wherein Abascal alleged he met Oswald in New York "last winter in Greenwich Village." Wiley stated, "I urged Abascal to go to the FBI with the information and offered to arrange a meeting. He promised to tell them the story, and made contact through an agency (O'Brien) whom he knew because of past activities." Abascal also provided information on Cuban exile matters.

REC FROM

SEP 1975

CIA

On 26 December 1963, Wiley prepared a report on general Cuban matters based on information he received from Enrique Abascal. This matter was given to WH Division on 3 January 1964 by Morse Allen.

Sometime before 21 January 1964, Wiley prepared a list of his contacts for the period 9 December 1963 to the end of 1963.

Circa 30 September 1964, Wiley provided verbal information concerning Miss Manuela Fogel which was formalized into a report by Morse Allen on 11 January 1965.

The file contains notes of a conversation dated 7 October 1964. Apparently on the basis of this conversation, Morse Allen prepared a formal report which he captioned:

"Cuban Information, Source - Enrique via Wiley," which pertained to Soviet missile and submarine activity in Cuba. This report was brought to the attention of the Director of Security with the recommendation that a sterilized version be brought to the attention of Jerry Mullane, WH Div/Security or CIA Cover Employee of WH Div. On 9 October 1964, the material was passed to Bruce Cheever (DD/P) on the instructions of Howard Osborn.

On 30 April 1966, Wiley prepared a report on Oswaldo F. Hernandez-Campos, a veteran of the Bay of Pigs.

OVERSEAS TRAVEL

Wiley's financial records, i.e., travel vouchers, Federal Income tax forms and cover organization accountings, reflect the following travel:

From 17 June to 25 August 1959, Wiley went to France, Spain, Algeria, Tunisia, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Israel, Cyprus, Turkey,

[illegible] ROOM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

Germany, Vienna, Austria (7th World Youth Festival), USSR, Poland East Germany, West Germany and England.

SRS underwrote $556.70 of transporation costs to be offset by earnings, if sufficient. The amount was advanced on 16 June 1959. There are no other vouchers in the 1959 travel and salary vouchers file concerning this trip.

Apparently between 6 June and 29 June 1960, Wiley visited Cuba, Jamaica, Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico. The 1960 Federal income tax return shows two trips to the Caribbean; however, no dates are shown. One of 21 days to the areas mentioned above. The cover organization accounting for the period December 1959 to June 1960 shows a 21 day overseas trip - airfare: $232.18 and 21 days per diem.

Between 23 July and 4 August 1960, Wiley went to Cuba. The 1960 Federal income tax return noted above shows one trip of 9 days to Cuba. The July 1960-June 1961 cover fund accounting shows a Cuba trip expense of $500.80 and this expense was offset against cover fund income. There were no other vouchers available concerning this trip. It is felt that this trip was approved by the Agency. A news account, dated 4 August 1960, reflects that Charles Wiley was expelled by the Cubans on that date after 8 days in prison without charges.

From April through July 1961, Wiley traveled through Africa and Europe. The 1961 Federal income tax return reflects a trip of 73 days. The July 1960 through June 1961 cover accounting shows expenses of 73 days per diem $1,460.00 less a home office (CIA) advance of $147.29 - $1,312.71 as offset against income. A travel voucher for April-July 1961 shows: Per diem $1215.29. Transportation $1324.06, other $907.65 for a total of $3497.00. From this was subtracted an advance of $1900.00 by SRS on 13 April 1961. An itinerary for Africa and Europe for April to July 1961 shows: Lisbon, Tangier, Dakar, Conakry,

SEP 30 1975
CIA

Abidjan, Accra, Doula, Leopoldville, Luanda, Brazzaville, Elizabethville, Northern Rhodesia, Johannesburg, Salisbury, Dar es Salaam, Zanzibar, Kenya, Addis Ababa, Athens, Bulgaria, Rumania, Budapest, Prague, Berlin, London and Zurich.

15 May - 22 August 1962 - the 1962 Federal income tax return reflects a 93 day trip to Australia, S.E. and Mid-East, Asia, USSR and Europe. An April 1962 memorandum reflects that the Director of Security approved $3000 toward this planned trip. The cover accounting for July 1961-June 1962 shows a deficit on a trip to Asia of $4,538.38 minur $3,000.00 ($1,538.38). The file contains a billing from the Cosmos Travel Bureau, Inc. for $2,521.54 and receipts for same paid in April and May 1962. The file contains a copy of a Form 281 Request for Advance of $3000.00, dated 1 May 1962. A travel voucher form 22 covering May-August 1962 shows $4,544.38 in expenses for the trip. The itinerary is as follows: Auckland, Melbourne, Canberra, Syndey, Brisbane, Sydney, Djakarta, Singapore, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Rangoon, Calcutta, Katmandu, New Delhi, Agra, Srinagar, Rawalpinki, Peshawar, Kabul, USSR (11-23 July) Helsinki, (July - August) Stockholm, Oslo, Copenhagen, Berlin, Frankfurt, Lugano, London and New York City.

The 1964 Federal Income tax return reflects a 31 day trip to Asia from 15 November - 31 December 1964. On 27 October 1964, in a memo to Chief/SRS, Morse Allen stated that the CHINAT Govt. has offered C. Wiley a two week, all expense paid, round trip to Taiwan. He recommended approval, plus "I also recommend that Wiley be given some money in the amount of $500 to $1000 to permit him to take advantage of the CHINAT trip and make a 'free lance' trip through the Far East (Tokyo, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia) and return via Manila, P.I." A note in file indicates that $1000 was ok'd by the Director of Security on 30 October 1964. $1000 was advanced Wiley on 10 November 1964. The trip was made in November and December 1964. A travel allowance concerning the trip shows: Expenses of $962.78 expended out of $1000 advanced. Itinerary as of 15 November was Alaska, Tokyo, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Tokyo, Seoul, Taiwan (26 Nov-11 Dec) Hong Kong,

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Macao, Cambodia, Manila, Singapore, Kuching, Brunei, Singapore, Vietnam, Brussels, Amsterdam, London and New York City.

The 1965 Federal income tax return shows a 49 day trip to South America from 31 July to 17 September 1965. Originally an extended trip had been approved to include the 9th World Youth Festival as planned for Algiers. The World Youth Festival was cancelled, but a trip to cover Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay, Brazil and Venezuela remained. Expenses were to be covered by the cover fund. In a memo concerning his proposed South American trip for July 1965, Wiley advised that "The cover fund is sufficient to pay all expenses, and the income from the trip should be enough to return the money and show a profit (perhaps a very good one)." A travel voucher shows expenses for the trip 31 July 1965 to 17 September 1965 of $2234.72. The itinerary: New York City, Miami, Panama, Bogota, Quito, Lima, Cusco, La Paz, Santiago, Cordoba, Buenos Aires, Asuncion, Iguape, Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Brasilia, Rio de Janeiro, Reclife, Belem, Manaus, Caracas, New York City. The cover accounting for 1965 shows the South American trip expense of $2234.72 was offset against income and there is no record of an advance.

No foreign travel is reflected in the Federal Income Tax Returns or files for 1966 or 1967.

The 1968 Federal income tax return reflects a 55 day trip to Athens, Cairo, Indo-China, Manila, Taipei and Seoul. An 18 December 1967 memo to Chief, SRS, from Cecil C. Tighe related to his briefing Wiley regarding the up-coming trip by Wiley to Vietnam and Laos, warning him to exercise care and not expose himself unnecessarily to danger.

An accounting of the expenses for the trip 16 January to 9 March reflects that air transportation was supplied by the Government of Vietnam. The itinerary shows: Athens, Bangkok, Vientiane, Saigon, Hong Kong, Macao, Manila, Taipei and Seoul. Total other expenses of $828.11 were incurred and are reflected as an expense in the 1968 cover accounting and offset against income.

SEP 30 1975
CIA

Wiley's 1969 Federal income tax return reflects a 21 day trip to Germany, Belgium, and Luxemburg and claims transportation was furnished by the U.S. Armed Forces. A memo of a trip to Germany 20 January to 8 February 1969 indicates Wiley was covering airlift operation Reforger I. This trip was apparently as an invitee of the U.S. military which supplied most of the travel needs. No travel voucher was submitted to CIA but overseas trip expenses of $502.26 are charged as expenses in the 1969 cover fund accounting offset against income. The itinerary shows: Brussels, Germany and Luxemburg.

The 1970 Federal income tax return indicates a 2 month trip to Europe, primarily Germany, during July and August 1970. It says much of trip expense provided by the West German Government. Wiley did not make the usual claim for per diem expense in the Federal income tax return. In his cover accounting for 1970, Wiley shows an overseas trip expense of $664.74 to be offset against income. He indicates transportation from D.C. to Germany and return was provided by the German Air Force and that a three week tour of German bases was covered by the German Defense Ministry. The Trip took place in July and August 1970 and besides Germany included: London, Paris, Rome, Brussels, The Hague, and Zagreb.

No foreign travel is reflected in the Federal Income tax return or office records for 1971.

Wiley's 1973 Federal income tax return shows a one month trip to Vietnam, Hong Kong, and Taiwan. Wiley's 1972 cover fund accounting reflects expenses of $497.36 for a Vietnam trip but in his income he shows an allowance of $475.00 made by the National Committee for Responsible Patriots (NCRP), for the trip. The expense listing attached reflects those expenses and claims roundtrip airfare and some other expenses were provided by others (possibly air transportation expenses were provided by some segment of the Vietnam Government). The itinerary shows: Hong Kong, Vietnam, and Taipei.

Whether Wiley had any foreign travel in 1973 is unknown since his 1973 Federal income tax return and cover fund accountings have not been received to date, 25 March 1974.

SEP 30 1975

CIA

UTILIZATION, CONTROL AND CASE OFFICERS

On 9 January 1963, Morse Allen of SRS wrote the first memo spelling out Wiley's detailed use by the Agency. It is quoted in part as follows:

"UTILIZATION FROM 1957 TO DATE

"In the original plan, Mr. Wiley was to be used for special research work, special investigations, and in very general terms, as a penetration into right-wing groups and the right-wing literary field in New York City. He has conducted research on organizations of interest to SRS, carried out specialized assignments of a covert investigative nature on individuals of interest to this Staff, and gradually began to develop himself into a free lance writer and journalist. During this period, Mr. Wiley extended his field of contacts to include a great many persons and organizations in the right-wing and anti-Communist category, and thus was able to furnish us as required, information on activities and many individuals in this area. Under SRS guidance, he conducted harassment exercises against the Communist World Youth Festivals in Vienna (1959), and Helsinki (1962). In addition, he obtained considerable valuable information on individuals in attendance at the Festivals and the Communist tactics used in these Communist sponsored meetings.

"Further, during 1959-1962, Mr. Wiley made many trips in behalf of SRS, including a journalistic trip to Cuba where he served a jail sentence in Havana in an effort to obtain information of a matter of grave interest to this Agency. He has made many trips overseas; has visited most of Africa, the Near and Middle East, most of Europe, much of Asia, the Satellite countries and has been twice in the Soviet Union on our behalf. In addition to important information, photographs, etc., which he obtained for us, his stature as a writer-journalist-photographer has increased, which in turn has widened his circle of contacts. His last trip, which took him through

Southeast Asia, across the Soviet Union and ended at the Youth Festival in Helsinki this past summer, was highly productive, and it will be recalled that Mr. Wiley and his covert associates thoroughly disrupted the Communist Youth Festival. Information on the Soviet Union which he obtained while there has been given to SR Division in a series of debriefings.

"WORLD NEWS ANALYSIS

Approximately three years ago, in an effort to provide Mr. Wiley with a more substantial mechanism for operations and to increase his journalistic reputation, it was decided that he would set up a news-gathering service based in New York City and secure, where possible, the services of writers or journalists who would feed him news stories from various points in the world. This would have the advantage of being a legitimate news-gathering service and at the same time possibly being later used as an information-gathering organization for intelligence purposes. Acting under instructions from SRS, Mr. Wiley set in motion the World News Analysis; opened a small office in Flushing, New York, had press credentials made and conducted business to a certain extent in the name of this organization. CIA Covert Source

Details of this will not be covered in this report. Mr. Wiley still conducts certain business through this mechanism (WNA), but at the present, with the exception

CIA Covert Source

"CURRENT AND IMMEDIATE OPERATIONAL ACTIVITY

"Mr. Wiley is currently being used more or less in line with the original idea of the project. His activities can be grouped as follows:

A. Conducts special inquiries as required by Chief, SRS.

B. Maintains close association with organizations of the right, the extreme right

RJM

SEP 30 1975

CIA

and the numerous anti-Communist refugee groups, mainly in New York City.

C. Maintains personal contact across the board with the leaders and officers of practically every known anti-Communist group of significance in New York City and many in other parts of the United States. He knows on a personal basis nearly all of the outstanding anti-Communist writers, labor leaders, and Civic leaders in New York City.

D. He has close working connections with, and has written a great deal for, the American Legion (using his own by-line).

E. He has a great number of connections in Congress and is known personally to probably all of the Congressmen and staff of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the Senators and Staff of the Senate Internal Security Committee. He maintains continuous liaison with the FBI and State and City Police in New York.

F. He travels often, gives innumerable lectures and talks to all types of organizations who wish to use the services of a highly professional and talented anti-Communist speaker.

G. While not engaging in political activity of any type on the local scene, Mr. Wiley from time to time engages in the formation of committees for 'single-shot' organizations aimed at harassment of the Soviets or local Communists, particularly in New York City. It was he who spearheaded the anti-Khrushchev demonstrations in New York when Khrushchev visited the United Nations in 1961.

"LONG-RANGE TARGETS

"Much thought has gone into the ultimate disposition of Mr. Wiley and at present the basic thinking is as follows:

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

A. If Mr. Wiley, because of his talents and capacity as a writer-journalist and his considerable knowledge of Soviet activity throughout the world, is offered a highly remunerative job job with a major publication, news service or radio chain, Mr. Wiley (ostensibly) will sever his connection with us and go on the payroll of the organization chosen and will retain our connection on a purely personal basis.

B. If Mr. Wiley does not find this situation attractive, he is to be considered for conversion to staff employee, where his considerable capabilities could be fully exploited.

"However, these ideas are not yet at the point of development and Mr. Wiley is to continue to operate under the current arrangement."

On 15 January 1963, Allen wrote a further description of Wiley's use to the Chief, Security Research Staff through the Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff as follows:

"1. Attached herewith is a summary and a status report on Charles William Wiley which was requested by Chief, SRS, several weeks ago. The report was prepared after numerous conferences with Mr. Wiley by Miss Finan, Miss Mendoza and Mr. Allen. The attachment referred to as a 'Contact List' was prepared upon our instructions by Mr. Wiley himself and no additions or corrections have been made. It is believed self-explanatory.

"2. For matter of record, we wish to again emphasize that certain items are omitted from the Contact List and omitted generally from the report itself for security reasons. These are as follows:

1) Because of Mr. Wiley's various activities, he has succeeded in effecting several penetrations into Communist Party organizations in New York City. Details and names are omitted in this category.

FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

2) Mr. Wiley's contact with Earl Browder is not noted in the Contact List, for obvious reasons, although SRS ran Wiley against Earl Browder for several years, principally as a RECOVERY target. This contact is still being used, and, for the record, Browder apparently is fond of Wiley and enjoys his company.

3) In addition to the above, Mr. Wiley has conducted activities with cognizance of SRS which are omitted because of their sensitive nature. Very briefly, these activities can be summarized as follows:

a. Scouting anti-CIA attacks in the various media and organizations to which Wiley has access.

b. Stopping same insofar as possible (as demonstrated in American Legion activity).

c. Discovering and blocking anti-CIA attacks or attacks on Agency personnel 'on the Hill.'

d. Writing or helping write pro-CIA articles in the various media with which Wiley has contact.

"3. We have made no recommendation to the basic report, but it is the considered opinion of the writers of this report that Mr. Wiley's services are unique and outstanding and that he should be retained for the present in the same contractual way, with consideration strongly urged to effecting a method whereby his salary or reimbursement can be increased."

A hand written comment on the memo is as follows: "Concur in Retention - W. M. Knott (who was the then Deputy Chief, SRS).

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

The contact list is set out as follows:

CIA Covert Source · Long-time SRS consultant whom Mr. Wiley met through Mr. McCord. CIA Covert Source has furnished an entree for Mr. Wiley to several individuals whom he otherwise could not have seen.

CIA Covert Source Former OSS agent and a current SRS source whom Mr. Wiley also met through Mr. McCord.

CIA Covert Source During World War II he worked under CIA Covert So. and in recent years Source has performed specific assignments for this office. Introduced by Mr. McCord to Mr. Wiley. CIA Covert Source knows Wiley as a fellow journalist.

Donald Sweaney - Mr. Wiley became aware of our use of him when Mr. Wiley's articles on Communism were published in the organ of the American Legion.

Donald Ingles - Another cousin of Mr. Wiley.

Lee Pennington - Mr. McCord used Mr. Pennington as a confidential source when the latter was a member of the Americanism Committee of the American Legion. In turn, Mr. Pennington acted as liaison for Mr. McCord in funding Mr. Wiley.

CIA Covert Source , · These SRS sources used on occasion were introduced to Mr. Wiley in connection with a particular assignment of his.

CIA Covert Source - Mr. Wiley met this source of Mr. McCord's in connection with his debriefing on his (Wiley's) Cuban "sojourn."

William Gardiner - A long time friend of Mr. Wiley whose hobby is photography, and Mr. Wiley uses him in this capacity as the need arises.

George Hoyle - A long time friend and Mr. Wiley's insurance agent."

ROM

SEP 30 1975

CIA

(Apparently the summary and status report and Contact List to which Mr. Allen refers is the previous quoted memo of 9 January.)

During February and March 1963, SRS representatives met with Wiley for discussion of an objective to place a skilled and controlled source in the newspaper community in Washington, D. C. who would have normal, routine, and ready access to the Washington writing and radio colony. The long range plan was to have Wiley move to Washington, and begin extensive writing and lecturing to establish his prestige, and to slowly curtail his other activities except for keeping his "excellent Cuban and anti-Castro connections." The basic plan was to be forwarded to the Director of Security by the Chief, SRS, for consideration. Tentative approval must have been received inasmuch as on 26 March 1964, Morse Allen requested the assistance of Eugene Lyons for information as to an assessment of Wiley's work, and the best method for establishing prestige for a writer. Wiley was not identified by name.

In the interim, on 30 March 1964, Eugene Lyons contacted Morse Allen, confirmed Wiley's writing talent, and arranged for an introduction of Wiley to Lee Wood (or Woods), General Manager of Script (sic) Howard. Wiley contacted Wood through Lyons and they arranged for a personal meeting on 3 April 1964. The plan, however, fell through since Wiley never moved to Washington.

The plan, as follows, was presented in an undated memorandum form for the Director of Security:

> "During the week of February ____ and on 7 and 8 March 1963, extensive discussions were held with Wiley concerning matters which are set out in detail following. Mr. Wiley is in agreement with Chief/SRS and representatives of SRS that the proposed plan which follows is the most sound, logical, and secure method of obtaining the desired results:
>
> "OBJECT - To place a skilled and controlled source in some type of a position in Washington, D. C., which will have normal, routine, and ready access to the Washington writing and radio colony.
>
> "PROBLEM - Source must have sufficient background and prestige to be accepted; he must have

R FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

income adequate to be in Washington (ostensibly from his own efforts); he must have a valid reason for being in Washington; he must have high capacity to produce; he must have a strong security sense; and he must have unquestioned loyalty.

"PROPOSED SOLUTION:

"a. SOURCE - Source to be used is Wiley. Wiley fits in nearly every particular to the elements set out in the 'Problem' above.

"b. METHOD OF SOLUTION:

"1. Source will begin at once to write articles of importance, aiming at the placing of these articles in national magazines, particularly magazines of the type of Life, Look, Readers Digest, McCalls, Argosy, etc. Source has numerous valid ideas for these articles and already some interest has been shown in these writings by Editors of the aforementioned type magazines. Source will slowly divorce himself from his numerous activities in New York City, maintaining only strong interest in his Cuban connections. Source will need approximately three months to write these articles and to sell them. It is Source's intention that these articles carry his by-line, which is a basic element to building prestige necessary for Source's future activity. Source is convinced he can handle this successfully.

"Note: Heretofore Source has, under instruction, kept the use of his name to an absolute minimum for obvious reasons. This requirement will now be lifted.

"2. At the same time Source will prepare brochures for a lecture tour to be given by Source during the Fall and early Winter, basically on Cuba and Latin America. Already Source has drafted brochures and he will have professional guidance in this matter.

"Note: Source is an excellent lecturer. He has appeared before public forums many times and

RQM

SEP 1975

CIA

has a high capacity in this area. This lecture tour, details of which will be set out below, is considered of key importance to the basic problem.

"3. Starting on or about the first of July, Source will make an extensive tour of Central and South America as a free lance reporter/writer/photographer, using his credentials from the World News Analysis. Entree basically will be provided using numerous Cuban contacts Source has obtained throughout Latin and South American countries. This trip will take probably the most of July, August, and part of September and is regarded as essential for back up, for prestige, for area knowledge, and for lecture material.

"Note: Source is known to have excellent Cuban anti-Castro connections which will be sharpened for use on this tour. (Source has been in every area of the world except Latin and South America.)

"c. LECTURE TOUR: On or about the middle of September Source will return to New York City and prepare for the aforementioned lecture tour. (It should be noted that there is no lecture activity during the Summer months.) After preparation, Source will proceed to make a lecture tour covering all parts of the United States and addressing all types of audiences. Source's lecture tour will be run through the sponsorship of the Babcock Agency of Virginia Beach, Virginia. This Agency, which handles among others the important members of the National Review Staff, will be handled on a direct commission basis taking a usual ten percent fee. In addition, through other organizations Source will arrange lectures on his own which is routine and which will not conflict in any way with the Babcock Agency interest. Source anticipates completing the lecture tour about the first of the year 1964, at which time he will return to New York City.

"Note: This lecture tour will serve a dual purpose. It will build up the stature of the

[illegible] FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Source (spreadhis name before the public), and it will give him the necessary opportunity to conduct the following business: As Source makes his lecture tour he will attempt, by direct contact and through already established channels, to determine whether or not he can set up for the basic plan (a) a daily column, (b) a newsletter, (c) a radio spot news broadcast. The lecture tour, of course, will place Source in given areas and it would be completely logical for him to talk to local editors and radio station owners and managers while in the area. He will be backed up by the fact that he is lecturing and that he is a writer because of the previously mentioned articles.

"d. Upon his return to New York City on or about the first of the year 1964, Source will then be able to make a definitive statement as to whether or not he can conduct on a continuing basis and on an economically sound basis (a) a daily column; (b) a weekly newsletter; or (c) a radio newscast bureau.

"Note: Source has evolved an idea of making short newscasts which he believes can be peddled on a spot basis to various local radio chains, perhaps weekly. This idea, which is novel, appears to have a great deal of merit.

"e. After Source and SRS staff have had a chance to analyze the total result, a decision will then be reached as to the feasibility of moving Source to Washington. If the results of the above set out plans indicate that Source can logically appear in Washington, he will then, for a period of about 30 to 60 days while operating either his column, newsletter or radio broadcast bureau, shuttle back and forth between New York and Washington obviously seeking news. He will let it be known to his friends in the newspaper and writing business that the pressure of his work is such that he will need some office space in Washington at which time, more or less on a temporary basis, he will secure in a

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

downtown location a combination business office and living quarters, possibly at some such place as the 1028 Connecticut Avenue Building.

"f. After this test, Source will 'discover' that he can best operate out of Washington and he will then establish an office and purchase a house or other accommodations and bring his family to Washington.

"g. At this point Source will be operating on his own as a news gatherer. He will be established as such and he will have access to the various press conferences and other news making areas in Washington and he will by necessity mingle with the local newsmen and radio people.

"COMMENTS:

"The main question concerning the above plan was whether or not this could be accomplished in a shorter time guaranteeing soundness, logic, and security. Many approaches were studied and for the reasons set out below they were discarded as not workable or unsound. Details follow:

"1. Do we have a cover organization in Washington that would be usable in connection with the set out plan?

As far as we can now determine, there is no suitable cover organization in Washington that would cover the movement of the Source into Washington, explain his presence there, and give him a required freedom of movement in the area of interest. We have no totally controlled newspaper property, news bureau, or radio bureau in Washington, nor do we have any organization where Source could be planted without creating a questionable situation.

"2. Could we establish a 'grant' which would do as a cover for bringing Source into Washington?

"A very careful study of this problem indicates that this is probably not logical. A

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

grant for research would be difficult as Source is not what could be called a research type nor would he have freedom of movement, and he would not have a reasonable excuse for being in certain areas and asking certain questions of interest. If a cover is given, for instance for writing a book, it is believed that this cover would be limited and would preclude Source moving in certain areas of interest, i.e., if he were to write a book on ______________________________, he could logically talk on the subject and interview persons knowledgeable, visit the Hill and some of the press, but it seems doubtful to us that he could convert this into matters of specific interest to us.

"3. Could our Source obtain a position as full-time employee or perhaps stringer of a going organization such as a Washington news bureau or magazine of the type of 'Newsweek' or 'World Report'?

"If we would place legitimately or otherwise our Source in such a position, this might be very limiting. In other words, Source could be confined to desk work and have no access at all to the actual operations of the magazine or getting about Washington as a leg man and reporter. The chance also exists that if he were able to obtain such an assignment, because of his contacts he might be sent out of town immediately. Furthermore, Source does not necessarily have the background of taking a position as editor or similar type with any established news bureau or magazine. Furthermore, if through various Washington connections we were to approach an established magazine and ask for a 'roving' assignment of Source, it is most likely that the magazine editor or owner would turn down the idea automatically. Finally, in this connection, a possibility may exist that Source, himself, using his Cuban stories and entree, sell himself as a stringer to some Washington news bureau or magazine, but probably only working out of New York.

RECE ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

"4. Could Source obtain employment on a Congressional Committee on either side of the Hill which would give him access to the areas of interest?

"Source has exceptional connections on the Hill and it is believed that through these connections he might obtain some type of assignment on a temporary basis or perhaps on a regular basis. However, in the opinion of the SRS staff this is exceptionally hazardous and if it became known through some misfortune, it would be of enormous embarrassment to Agency officials. In addition, Source might well obtain employment with the Congressional Committee, but his work might be too limiting to permit him to move about and it might well preclude any opportunity he had of making contact with the local press. Furthermore, most Committee assignments, investigative or otherwise, generally follow a 9 to 5 routine on the Hill and free lancing and freedom of movement are not easily obtained in Congressional Committees. It is regarded as impossible to place Source on a Congressional Committee if the employing Senator or Congressman was to be informed even in a most nominal way of Source's mission.

"5. Can the basic plan be telescoped on a shorter basis?

"This is considered questionable by those who have worked in this area for some time. If we shorten the approach, we would obviously cut down on our Source's background and prestige, particularly in an area where stature is necessary. The articles using Source's by-line, if they are successful, would be very important and would serve as a basis for everything that would follow. The South American trip is needed and Source would have at the present time the best possible chance for success based on his Cuban contacts which are very strong at the present time. A possibility also exists on such a trip that Source might be fortunate enough to achieve an important newspaper scoop which, of course, would build prestige and quite conceivably place

RECE FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

his name prominently in the public eye. The lecture tour, of course, is essential not only for prestige purposes, but to make the necessary survey to determine the best possible media for Source if and when he ultimately moves to Washington.

"The long range proposal set out above appears to be the most secure and most logical way into the target. If it is necessary to go after a shorter method or a more direct approach, every effort can be aimed at this. However, it is possible that a long range plan as set out above might be used successfully in combination with a shorter more direct plan unless the shorter plan would result in the blowing of the Source prematurely."

RECE ROM
SEP. 30 1975
CIA

On 1 October 1964, Morse Allen wrote a memorandum for the record reporting an interview with Wiley as follows:

"On 30 September 1964, the writer talked with Wiley at the writer's apartment in Washington, D.C., for several hours. The conversation was general and part of it was devoted to the discussion of financial matters, routine operational problems, and comments primarily on the local New York scene.

"Of particular interest, however, in addition to the above, were the following:

> "(a) Earl Browder - After discussing Wiley's connections with Browder, the writer directed that Wiley interview Browder as soon as possible and discuss with him the recent deaths of Togliatti, Thorez, Elizabeth Gurley Flynn and find out what significance, if any, Browder makes of these matters. SRS recently had information that Browder had given some information of intelligence value to an English writer and it was felt that it would be of interest to reopen Wiley's connections with Browder. Wiley was asked to stress the Togliatti paper.
>
> "(b) Malcolm X - Wiley had previously interviewed Malcolm X (Malcolm Little) before the former's recent trip to Egypt and Africa and the Middle East. The writer requested Wiley, at his earliest possible convenience, to reinterview Malcolm X, particularly stressing Malcolm X's views of individuals with whom he had talked and any personalities of information which could be of intelligence use. It should be noted that Wiley regards Malcolm X as probably the shrewdest of the Negro leaders and according to Wiley, Malcolm X talks freely to him because Wiley and Malcolm X have an understanding not to mince words or to be evasive when they are talking.
>
> "(c) Communist Youth Festival, Algiers, July (?) 1965 -
>
> It should be noted that Wiley has spearheaded anti-Communist attacks on Youth Festivals in Vienna and in Helsinki previously, has disrupted their programs, and

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

has to a considerable extent interfered with their propaganda at these festivals. Because of this, Wiley is interested once again in divisive and disruptive efforts against the Communists in Algiers in 1965. This time Wiley states that it would be dangerous because of the attitude of the Moroccan Government. Wiley believes that it would be best to have a small team of three to six trained individuals who would proceed to the Youth Festival at Algiers and who would be directed not at disruption or propaganda, but would aim at intelligence gathering. Wiley himself stated that he would again volunteer to go to Algiers at this time, not ostensibly connected with the aforementioned group, and only as a free lance newspaperman. Wiley pointed out that undoubtedly he is not the top news authority in the United States on Communist Party Youth Festivals. Wiley states that he believes he can arrange financing from private organizations and individuals for the three to six individuals mentioned above and possibly enough for travel by himself although this may not be obtainable. Wiley requests a study of this matter and advice.

"(d) Bay of Pigs Book Review - Wiley stated that he cannot as yet explain why the National Review did not publish his Bay of Pigs review, but in fact paid him for it. He is convinced that the review was withheld because of some Agency influence. He submitted correspondence from Frank Meyer, one of the editors of the National Review in this connection.

"(e) The Kennedy Book - Wiley commented that his friend Dick Whalen, an outstanding young writer, has just completed a book on either Joseph B. Kennedy or the Kennedy family for which Whalen received $100,000 in advance. Wiley states that he has helped Whalen write the book, giving him advice and assisting him editorially. Wiley states that there are two items of which he is extremely pleased of his work in connection with this book:

(1) He convinced Whalen to rewrite the chapter on the Bay of Pigs, focusing the blame from the CIA to John F. Kennedy, and

RE FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

(2) He had deleted from the book an entire section which was devoted to alleging that CIA was responsible for the assassination of Trujillo.

(3) Wiley added that the Kennedy book contained an index and just before the book was to go to the printers, a proofreading of the index showed that there were numerous errors in it. The publishers, upon discovering this, asked Wiley to correct the index, making such annotations and corrections as necessary with highest priority. Wiley stated that it took him 36 hours of continuous work to complete and correct the index and for this effort he has sent the publishers a bill for $500.

"(f) Free China Weekly - Attached is a copy of the Free China Weekly, dated 6 September 1964. This publication is published for overseas distribution from Taiwan and is a propaganda sheet of the Chinese Nationalists. Wiley called attention to the article at the top of page 3 in which the Free China Weekly comments on the article written by Charles W. Wiley in the September issue of the American Legion Magazine concerning Tibet. Wiley indicates that is good publicity since the paper is sent all over the world."

RECE ROM
SEP 1975
CIA

In December 1964, SRS prepared a blind memorandum outlining the use of Wiley, to wit:

> "Wiley has been a contract agent of SRS since 1959 and operates under a non-official cover of a one-man news agency in New York City. He is actually assisted clerically by his wife, who is witting.
>
> "Wiley, 38 years of age, is a born and bred New Yorker who comes from a theatrical family. He came to our attention in 1955 when he was compiling an index of the Daily Worker on a grant from the Americanism Commission of American Legion. The grant was depleted before the index was completed; SRS arranged to finance same, and eventually obtained a copy of the index. From 1957-1959, Wiley was financed as a cleared source from both OS and CI Staff funds.
>
> "Wiley's contract does not require renewal and can be terminated for cause or otherwise with a maximum of 90 days notice. SRS has no agreements with Wiley as to length of contract and he is not entitled to leave, retirement, or other benefits normally due an employee.
>
> "Wiley is paid from OS funds in the amount of $10,500 base salary, plus a quarterly payment of $131.25 in lieu of retirement and hospitalization. He is paid his local travel expenses (which in the last fiscal year have been extremely low) on a monthly voucher arrangement. All payments are deposited through covert Agency channels into a separate bank account for Wiley in New York.
>
> "By virtue of his non-government activities in obtaining photographic assignments and in assisting other writers in research, in addition to occasional sales of his articles directly to publishers, Wiley's cover firm has so far been self-funding. He usually requires a large out-lay of cash in addition to his regular payments only if he is making an overseas trip.

REC [illegible] ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

"Wiley is known to be a CIA employee by numerous individuals, such as: the staff of National Review; Herbert Romerstein, a close friend of Wiley and a former Communist; Lee Pennington, Elsa Bernaut and Hede Massing; J. B. Matthews and his wife, former Communists with whom Wiley is friendly; and by CIA Covert Source He is suspected of being a CIA employee by various Cuban refugees with whom he became friendly following his incarceration in a Cuban prison.

"Wiley's firm was used as a cover for various assignments given by SRS to CIA Covert Source , to the extent that WNA press credentials were in their possession until 1964. CIA Covert So. is known to have discussed his Agency affiliation and correspondence through Wiley with at least several other persons and furnished considerable written material relating thereto to Congressman Daddario."

In February 1967, Wiley suggested that in light of the then recent disclosures about CIA and youth activities, he be actively engaged in many media activities designed to counteract the bad publicity.

On 3 March 1967, Cecil Tighe sent a note to Paul Gaynor stating that Wiley suggests he be permitted to make overtures to the media for personal appearances and articles regarding his involvement in the various youth festivals. Tighe said he advised Wiley: "Nix - to stay quiet." Tighe asked Gaynor whether he concurred. The memo is merely signed: "Noted" by Gaynor.

A blind memorandum dated 7 March 1967 contains the following:

"During Wiley's employment by OS/Security Research Staff, he attended the 7th World Youth Festival at Vienna in 1959, and the 8th at Helsinki in 1962, following which he furnished detailed information to this Agency, as well as to FBI, HCUA, etc. He also made trips to Cuba in an attempt to secure details relating to a matter of sensitive interest to DDP, and on the second trip in 1960 was confined for eight days by the Cuban authorities

REC[illegible] ROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

before being expelled. He has visited the USSR, and several Iron Curtain countries, the Far East, Middle East and Africa, Central and South America, Korea and the Republic of China. His interviews at the front in Vietnam with American enlisted men during 1964 received considerable attention when utilized by one of the major radio networks, and his articles regarding Vietnam and other projects which appeared in a well-known magazine received much favorable comment."

Sometime before 24 January 1967, Wiley prepared two reports relative to a possible trip to Hanoi. When the reports were presented to Paul F. Gaynor, Chief, SRS, on 27 February 1967, Gaynor designated "No" to certain proposals made by Wiley, to wit:

a. The use of credentials from established media.

b. Accompaniment of Wiley by FBI controlled sources (known to Wiley) in leftist circles.

On 7 April 1967, Cecil Tighe, SRS, wrote Wiley a letter which confirmed Paul Gaynor's oral instructions given Wiley in Washington on 29 March 1967. Wiley's instructions were as follows:

Limit your activities to:

1. Spotting contacts
2. To assessing them, but under no circumstances be guilty of any recruitment.

On 26 April 1967, Tighe formalized to the C/SRS a memorandum of discussion with Wiley, captioned "Wiley's affiliation with the Support Our Boys in Vietnam parade, New York City, 13 May 1967," to wit:

> "1. In accordance with your instructions, I advised Wiley that he had received your permission to become active with the above named Support Committee. He was advised, that under no circumstances, was he to indicate that he was in any way associated with or received any guidance from this source.

RECD FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

"2. Wiley advised he had been appointed Press Office for the Support Committee and had as his first act in this capacity obtained from the New York City Police Department a permit to parade on Fifth Avenue on 13 May. At the present time, he is attempting to locate a colored Congressional Medal of Honor Vietnam veteran to appear and speak on the day in question. At the moment, he is attempting to reach Gen. Westmorland to obtain a statement from him regarding the uplift of morale such a parade will have on the fighting forces in Vietnam.

"3. Today Wiley is also attempting to have an audience with George Meany, President, AFL, in order to enlist his assistance in obtaining participants for the parade. Wiley, in addition, is also going to request Mr. Meany to issue a directive to all AFL-CIO unions to send participants and back the parade to its fullest extent. According to Wiley, he has already seen Gleason, President of ILA and ILA has promised its full cooperation.

"4. The Support Committee has already lined up all of the veteran organizations in and around New York City who have promised that they will turn out their personnel in full. Wiley said that he has been in touch with the New York State National Guard, and they are going to furnish skydivers and a fly-over as an added attraction for the parade.

"5. Tomorrow, 27 April 1967, Wiley said that he has an appointment to see Cardinal Spellman to enlist his aid in

[illegible] FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

sending to the parade parochial school children and as many bands as can be accommodated. In addition to the above, Wiley states that he had many of the foreign newspapers alerted and has received some assurance from various foreign groups that they would like representation in the parade.

"6. Finally, Wiley said that if he had difficulty with the military in New York City with respect to his request for a Negro Medal of Honor winner to appear for the parade, he may ask assistance from us. In summary, he said that if this thing bombs, the New Left, including Martin Luther King, Stokley Carmichael, McKissic, et all will never let the country forget it."

When the C/SRS, Paul Gaynor, reviewed this memo, Gaynor - adjacent to the last paragraph - commented, "No. He should deal with Army. There is only one such (colored Medal of Honor winner), a medical corps specialist."

On 1 May 1967, Tighe wrote a formal memo of a discussion with Wiley on that date regarding "A report from Wiley regarding the forthcoming parade in New York on 13 May." The body of the memorandum reflects among other matters that Wiley claimed he had phone contact with John Roach regarding possible White House support for the parade. John Roach was an assistant to Harry McPherson of the White House Staff. "Roach has promised the Committee substantial support."

A brief memorandum by Tighe, dated 3 May 1967, contains as an attachment an article from the 3 May 1967 edition of the New York Times concerning the "Support Our Boys in Vietnam Parade." The C/SRS brought the article to the attention of the Director of Security, Howard J. Osborn, who penned the word "Encouraging" on the transmittal slip. Tighe also wrote a brief memo with an editorial New York Times article attachment, dated 5 May 1967.

RE[illegible] ROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Circa 2 June 1967, Wiley prepared a report which he captioned, "Basic Theme of Letter to Ex-Presidents" outlining an effort to further the "Parade" concept.

On 15 June 1967, Tighe formalized information from Wiley, to wit:

> "1. Success has gone to Wiley's head. Since he and Gilmer, the Fire Department Captain in New York put on a successful "Support the Boys in Vietnam Parade," Wiley now wants to stage parades in 120 cities throughout the United States.
>
> "2. Much of his ambition stems from a remark that Tina is reported to have made to him and to which he agrees. Wiley said that Tina said he could make a million dollars in public relations work if he promoted something in which he was really interested. Wiley stated to me that this is true because he has not had his heart in his recent work for us. He said now he plans to start selling America.
>
> "3. He is so carried away by his exuberance that he requested permission to use up to and including $1,000 of our funds to establish an office, print up letterheads and use our funds to make long distance telephone calls to the various 120 cities. He plans to call his office, The Committee for Responsible Patriotism. From what I can gather, he has no support from any source but on his own initiative he prepared two letters, one to General Eisenhower and one to former President Harry S. Truman, which I have attached for your information. He requested that through our liaison with General Eisenhower and Harry S. Truman we approach them and solicit their support in his behalf.

REC[illegible] ROM
SEP [illegible] 1975
CIA

> "4. I explained to Wiley that his interest was well motivated but under no circumstances would we permit an expenditure of any funds in this regard. I also told him it would be extremely awkward for us to approach General Eisenhower or Mr. Truman in his behalf.
>
> "5. There is a strong possibility he may call you thinking that you may give him authority for financial assistance. Let me know if I should continue to discourage Wiley in his efforts, particularly when it's going to cost us money."

At the conclusion of the last paragraph, C/SRS, Paul F. Gaynor, noted, "Yes. We cannot spend our funds for internal propaganda purposes."

There is a record of a 2 January 1970 phone conversation with Wiley concerning Wiley's involvement in pro-Viet Nam activity. "Wiley said had been coordinated at a high level with the Pentagon and he has their OK," regarding prisoner of war activity. The writer noted, "Discussion with Wiley relayed to P.G. I suggested that during next meeting with Wiley, he be told that while we do no (sic) disapproval of his actions in this respect, we cannot approve, sponsor or imply approval in any way. P.G. said 'OK tell him.'"

This record is quoted as follows:

> "Charles Wiley called collect and said his organization's campaign to get humane treatment for prisoners of Hanoi (i.e., signatures to petitions) was going very well and that they had 'tens of thousands' of signatures with the efforts his workers had put out. This activity, Wiley said had been coordinated at a high level with the Pentagon and he has their OK. Through the Pentagon, they have been in touch with the wives. However, they plan to

[illegible] FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

> phase out of this activity at the end of the month. They'll turn it over to the wives. They are running out of money and have enough to last until end of month. They'll put this activity on shelf for a few months. They have had 'unbelievable backing' from #2 man in New York State. Wants to hold off a week or so on status report on this. In coordination with Pentagon, they merely advise of what they plan and tell Pentagon to object in writing if they do. Discussion with Wiley relayed to P.G. I suggested that during next meeting with Wiley, he be told that while we do no disapprove of his actions in this respect, we can not approve, sponsor, or imply approval in any way. P.G. said OK tell him."

A blind memorandum regarding Wiley was prepared by CIA Covert Employee : SRS, on 14 April 1970, being directed to Paul F. Gaynor, who noted his concurrence. In total, the memorandum states:

> "Subject (Wiley) telephoned today after having talked with Mr. McCord and advised that he had unfortunately lost the race to be a Congressional candidate from his district. I extended sympathy but personally felt this resolved a problem that could have resulted in his termination should he have been elected a candidate.
>
> "Subject asked whether there were any questions concerning his income tax form, and I advised him, after consulting with the Head of the Covert Tax Committee, that there did not appear to be any significant questions. Subject

RE ROM

SEP 20 1975

CIA

informed me that he would then go ahead and file his return to IRS. Mr. Powell, however, of the Covert Tax Committee, did say that they had some questions concerning Subject's expenses under Schedule C. Specifically, whether Subject's trunk line to New York City, cable address, and trips to Washington had been reimbursed by the Agency. I informed Mr. Powell that we had no record of any such reimbursement and that these expenses were assumed by Subject, solely.

"It was indicated by Subject that it was hopeful his throat ailment would soon clear which would make it possible for him to visit Washington within the next week or two.

"It would seem prudent to me, prior to Subject's pending visit, that we prepare something akin to an agreement or letter of instruction which would clearly indicate to Subject that assignments to him, whether oral or not, would eventually be followed up by written confirmation of such assignment. Such a letter of understanding or agreement would, it seems to me, serve to protect Subject as well as the Agency in the event of any further problem or incident which might involve Subject. For example, many of Subject's activities may be construed as domestic political action and as such could be identified as an Agency contractual employee. From time to time, as you know, Subject has telephonically advised us of his personal activities

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

> and may assume that such advice and acknowledgement on our part would be Agency approval for his activities. While such is not the case, it is believed that we should formalize this part of our contract with him so that he knows that his personal activities, regardless of area, are not construed as an extension of Agency plans or programs. At the same time, Subject can be assured of our continuing interest in him as a "standby" asset.
>
> "Should you have any questions concerning this subject, I would be pleased to discuss them further."

Attached to this blind memorandum is a Memorandum of Understanding, dated 29 April, signed by Wiley, with an indicated copy given to Wiley, stating:

> "In order to avoid any possible misunderstanding in the future and in recognition of my many personal and official activities, I agree that any assignments given to me by my associates in Washington will be made a matter of written record. As security permits and when convenient and possible, I will be shown a copy of any such assignment and will initial same showing the date the assignment was received.
>
> "My acknowledgement of this arrangement does not in any way change or abrogate the nature of my association with my employer. I understand that this procedure is solely for the purpose of providing some evidence and a record of those assignments I have officially received."

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

From 1956 to 1962, Wiley's case officer was James W. McCord, Jr., with alternate contact H. Clifton Carrico. From 1962 to 1966, his case officer was Morse Allen, with alternate Ethel Mendoza. During 1966-1970, he was in contact with Cecil C. Tighe, and later with CIA Covert Employee From 1970 to January 1974, his case officer has been Louis W. Vasaly. During most of the period from 1957 to June 1973, Wiley was infrequently in contact with the Chief, Security Research Staff, Paul F. Gaynor.

1975
CIA

SECRET

COVER

James E. McCord reported in a memo dated 1 May 1956 to the Chief, External Branch/SRS, that he approached Lee Pennington of the Americanism Committee of the American Legion to determine whether he, Pennington, would be agreeable to supporting CIA by providing cover for Wiley's work. Pennington wholeheartedly agreed to do so, stating that:

> "1. Should questions arise from acquaintances or friends as to where the index cards for the 1933-1936 are located, that Wiley can tell them that their typing is being handled by the American Legion Americanism Committee in Washington.
>
> "2. That in Wiley's work for the coming year in continuing the index of the Daily Worker, that he can advise his friends and acquaintances that the financing and continuation of this work is being handled by the Americanism Committee of the American Legion. Should anyone press him for further details, he can merely refer them to Lee Pennington, who will furnish them with the same story."

On 23 August 1958, Wiley wrote a report entitled "The Problem of a 'Cover'" in which he claims his original cover given him has worn thin and for all purposes is not existent. Wiley cites examples to back up his contention and makes several suggestions for improvement of cover or the establishment of a new one.

Apparently this latter memorandum initiated some action by SRS officers who were handling Wiley since in the fall of 1958. Records indicate that Wiley had begun to build cover as a newsman and holds press credentials in the North American Newspaper Alliance, Indianapolis Star, and National Review and he will attempt to obtain credentials from all newspapers and magazines with which he comes affiliated.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

In an effort to provide Mr. Wiley with a more substantial mechanism for operations to increase his journalistic reputation, it was decided that he would set up a news-gathering service based in New York City and secure, where possible, the services of writers or journalists who would feed him news storeis from various points in the world. This would have the advantage of being a legitimate news-gathering service and at the same time possibly being later used as an information-gathering organization for intelligence purposes. Acting under instructions, Wiley, in 1959 or 1960, founded World News Analysis, opened an office in Flushing, New York, had press credentials made and conducted business to a certain extent in the name of this organization. Wiley has pretty much maintained this cover ever since.

RECEI...
SEP 30 1975
CIA

PERSONAL ACTIVITY

Since 1966, Wiley's specific assignments for OS have been at a minimum, whereas his personal activities have increased. Much of his personal activity has been or might be construed as having been domestic political action. In 1970, his name was placed as a candidate for U.S. Representative from the 15th district of New Jersey, but he failed to receive the nomination. However, in 1972, he did campaign as an Independent candidate for the U.S. Senate in New Jersey. He received approximately one per cent of the ballots cast in the election won by Senator Clifford P. Case.

He has been active in and frequently the prime mover in a number of organizations of conservative or right-wing persuasion. As such, he has earned considerable reputation as a capable coordinator and organizer through actions in support of "pro-American" and conservative causes. The parades, receptions, petition gathering, demonstrations and other publicity making ventures in which he has participated have run the gamut of support for the Republic of Vietnam, U.S. war policies, strong national defense posture, the Nationalist Chinese, U.S. prisoners in foreign lands and anti-bussing for integration.

Among these organizations with which he has been prominently identified are:

Parents and Taxpayers: an organization opposing bussing for integration. He was doing public relations for this group as early as 1964 and has been periodically involved in this activity with this and other organizations to date.

Free China Support Group and The Committee of 1,000,000: these organizations are pro-Nationalist China and actively opposed the U.S. recognition of the Peoples Republic of China.

Young Americans for Freedom: a conservatively oriented youth group.

Committee to Unite America: as a member in 1971, he was active in its efforts aimed at lowering the level of public hostility toward government policies.

RECEI
SEP 30 1975
CIA

National Committee for Responsible Patriotism (NCRP): as its Executive Director and one of its founders in 1967, he has been its principal member and has been involved with managing its office, raising funds, and charting its activities. Operating principally with volunteers and donated funds, Wiley, who has occasionally received some private remuneration for his services, has organized numerous parades, receptions, motorcades, banquets and programs. He has arranged publicity and made a number of media appearances. In connection with these and other activities he has had close contact with labor leaders, the military and the White House. In April 1973, Wiley received a signed commendation from President Nixon in recognition of his efforts, which states:

> "Dear Mr. Wiley:
>
> "The overwhelming success of the recent New York parade in honor of our Vietnam veterans was truly heartening, and I know that the greatest share of the credit for this is due to the remarkable efforts of you and your organization. The tribute that was paid to our Nation's servicemen is an inspiring reminder of the pride all Americans feel for those who gave so much in the cause of freedom. I am sure I speak for citizens throughout the country in expressing deep appreciation for your unselfish dedication of time and talent to this patriotic project.
>
> "With my gratitude and very best wishes,
>
> Sincerely,
>
> Richard Nixon"

Among activities which the NCRP organized are:

Free USS Pueblo Sailors
Free American Citizen George Pellezo from Cuban Prison

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Honor America Week (1969)
Support Our POW's and MIA's (1970)
Operation Gratitude for Firemen and Law Enforcement
   Forces (1970)
Welcome Home with Honor Day (1973)

The NCRP is currently engaged in the initial stages of planning for a possible reception and program in the near future for the recently exiled Soviet author, Alexander I. Solzhenitsyn.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

TERMINATION

During the course of the reorganization of the Office of Security, it was decided that the Security Research Staff would be abolished. This decision led to the preparation of a memorandum for the Director of Security from the Chief, Security Staff, dated 1 June 1973, captioned "Request for Director of Security Assessment Regarding Continuance of Functions and Possible Replacement." The last paragraph of this memorandum stated:

> "For immediate planning purposes, to fulfill the early deadline already established, it would be appreciated if you would review the attached outlines of existing functions and indicate your desires regarding the function (continue, continue with low priority, discontinue) and where you wish any retained functions to be placed in the reorganization structure. In the latter instance, I have attempted to indicate the more likely options for this to facilitate your assessment."

On 4 June 1973, the Director of Security indicated that "Special Access Sources" (Charles W, Lee P.) should continue on a low priority and be transferred to the Operational Support Branch.

On 8 June 1973, CIA Cover Employee (SRS), in a memorandum to the Chairman, Clearance Division Implementation Committee, OS/PSI, reorganization subject "Research Branch, Clearance Division, OS/DD/PSI, Implementation" noted that Special Access Source Wiley had been approved to be continued, but on a low priority basis and transferred to the Operational Support Branch.

Shortly after the implementation of the reorganization of the Office of Security on 1 August 1973, John Dempsey, Chief, Research Branch, verbally discussed and reviewed with Edwal Jones, Chief, Clearance Division, the disposition of certain SRS functions still in the possession of the

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Research Branch, but recommended and approved for transfer to other components of the Office of Security. Among those items discussed was "Special Access Source" Charles Wiley. Messrs. Jones and Dempsey agreed that Wiley was not worth the money spent, performed little or no useful service for the Office of Security, and in fact had done little or nothing to justify his keep. It was further agreed that Mr. Jones would discuss Wiley and make known to the Deputy Director of Security (PSI), Stanton Ense, the agreed assessment of Wiley.

Mr. Jones next informed Mr. Dempsey that a memorandum should be prepared reviewing the Wiley case, making recommendations as to disposition. A memorandum was then prepared by Louis Vasaly of the Research Branch, dated 18 September 1973, which recalled the history of Wiley's association with the Office of Security with a recommendation for termination. The only disagreement was as to timing. Mr. Dempsey recommended 30 June 1974; Mr. Jones 1 February 1974. The Deputy Director of Security (PSI) agreed with the 1 February 1974 termination date and suggested using the same procedure as in the Pennington case.

On 25 October 1973, Louis Vasaly and John Dempsey, both of the Research Branch, met Wiley at the Key Bridge Marriot Motel, Arlington, Virginia, to effect his termination. Wiley was most unhappy with the proceeding although claiming to understand that budget problems and curtailment of domestic activities lead to his separation. He acknowledged that written notice of his termination by his signature; however, he appended that the notice was "signed with the reservation that the terms will be appealed," and stating he would seek redress either with the Director of Central Intelligence or contacts on Capitol Hill.

Wiley was contacted twice more on 6 November 1973, and on 12 February 1974, both times in New York City, by Sidney Stembridge, Deputy Director of Security (P&M) and Louis Vasaly. At the former meeting, Mr. Stembridge politely explained to Wiley that CIA is no longer engaged in matters in which he had been assisting and that there was, therefore, no further need for his services. Mr. Stembridge indicated that the Office of Security might be able to assist financially in a limited sense beyond the 31 January termination date, but that would be the limit of any help.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

On the latter occasion, Mr. Stembridge informed Wiley that he had been awarded a termination bonus of $4,000, which figure, in essence, represented his salary covered forward from 31 January through 30 June 1974. He again objected to OS help, expressing dissatisfaction with his termination, and rejected the terminal bonus. Mr. Stembridge concluded the interview by reminding Wiley that his termination was effective, previously executed Secrecy Agreement was still binding and Mr. Stembridge would be available to him for additional assistance if required. It was definitely made clear to Wiley that the next action is to come from him.

An "information only" memorandum from the Director of Security to the Director of Central Intelligence concerning Wiley was sent on 25 February 1974.

RECEIV
SEP 30 1975
CIA

CHARLES WILEY'S CONTACTS AND RELATIONSHIPS WITH JAMES McCORD, LEE PENNINGTON, DONALD SWEANY AND HOWARD HUNT

JAMES McCORD

James McCord was the first representative of the Office of Security to have contact with Wiley and was undoubtedly the driving force behind the Agency's funding of the Daily Worker index. McCord was Wiley's primary case officer from 1956 through January 1962 and during this period, guided and was more or less responsible for Wiley's direction and control.

The nature of McCord's contacts with Wiley after 1962 are not exactly known since McCord left SRS in January 1962 for other positions within the Office of Security. The files do, however, contain the following information which indicate some contact between McCord and Wiley after 1969. The exact nature of these contacts is not definitely known, especially those in May - June 1969; however, the presumption is that Wiley at the direction of McCord may have reported on and photographed anti-Viet Nam War demonstrations in Washington, D. C., during that period and gave the results of his work to McCord who retired from CIA on 31 August 1970.

On 30 May 1969, Cecil Tighe of SRS recorded, "Jim McCord notified me today that Wiley would arrive in Washington, D. C., tonight for a meeting with McCord concerning some Mayday Project that has been assigned to Wiley."

On 5 June 1969, Tighe recorded, "Wiley telephoned from New York City on 4 June 1969 to request that I turn over to Jim McCord the light meter which we drew from Logistics for his use last month in connection with his photography work. Wiley said that Jim McCord planned to meet him in New York City over the week-end." Tighe then called McCord's office and instructed them that Tighe had the meter and it would be available in a package for transmittal to Wiley if someone would come by and pick it up. As of June 1969, no one had called or inquired further into the matter.

RECEIVED
SEP 30 1975
CIA

On 6 June 1969, Tighe recorded that Jim McCord advised him on that date that he, McCord, had visited Wiley in New York City on the 4th and 5th of June 1969. McCord gave Tighe photographs from Wiley which had been "entrusted" to Wiley "many years ago" by Morse Allen. The photograph had the following names on the back: Vianamin Belitsky, Fred Borodin, Michel Reschal, and Deak Zoltan.

Memorandum, dated 12 March 1970 by CIA Cover Employee states: "Wiley apparently had telephoned Jim McCord and at the end of their discussion, Wiley, or McCord, had the call transferred to our number."

Memorandum, dated 6 April 1970 by CIA Cover Employee to Chief, SRS states: "I received the attached vouchers and an accounting from Wiley on Saturday. I note that among other things, he spent over $120.00 on film. Should this part of the accounting be referred to McCord, or do we accept it as presented? It is not clear that it meets Agency requirements, as all expenses are not matched up by necessary receipts."

A memorandum, dated 14 April 1970, captioned "Charles Wiley" states: "Subject telephoned today after having talked with Mr. McCord and advised that he had unfortunately lost the race to be a Congressional candidate from his district."

McCord may also have been in contact with Wiley during 1970-71 concerning the monitoring of a book to be written by CIA Covert Agent an ex-Communist and CIA source, who had been involved in certain operations for this Agency (not mentioned in the file) in Mexico. The Agency was rather concerned whether CIA Covert Agent would expose his working for CIA and assigned Wiley to help edit the book. The following excerpts from the file tend to support the above contention:

A memorandum, dated 30 June 1970, captioned "Contact Report, Charles Wiley," states: "Wiley further suggested that, along with Jim McCord, he continue to handle CIA Covert Agent and would brief CIA Covert Agent so as to keep him content until he, Wiley, returns from his European trip." (This very probably refers to CIA Covert Agent

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

A memorandum, dated 13 January 1971 captioned "Charles Wiley" states: "Says CIA Covert Agent has stated that he now wants to leave in some material (Mexico) that earlier McCord suggested not be included." (Apparently material for book CIA Covert Agent was writing with Wiley's assistance.)

A memorandum, dated 5 February 1971, captioned "Charles Wiley (records problem Wiley reported having with CIA Covert Agent states: "Wiley thinks that perhaps Jim McCord could reason with him if matters don't improve. says McCord isn't with us any more, but Wiley says still has high regard for McCord and might listen. Wiley believes he, Wiley, may be able to settle the problem, but if not, thinks we ought to have McCord talk to "

A similar memorandum, dated 9 February 1971, further outlines Wiley's problem with CIA Covert Agent and states: "Wiley suggested it's time to see what McCord can do with If we bring McCord back in, he ought to discuss the case with Wiley before he has contact with CIA Covert Agent

Another memorandum, dated 12 February 1971 reflects: called McCord. Details of discussion unknown; however, gather that Jim impressed with fact that any mention of the company or personnel by in his book would be at least potentially damaging to activities that are of interest currently."

In a memorandum, dated 19 February 1971, it is reflected that Vasaly "had brief telephone conversation with Wiley this p.m. He understood from CIA Covert Agent that CIA Covert Agent had conversed with Jim McCord recently but did not know the essence of the conversation nor any future plans for contact between them. Advised Wiley that it was our understanding that McCord had again emphasized the need for CIA Covert Agent to leave his Agency contact and any identification of Agency people out of the book's chapter on his 'Mexican Phase' and that apparently CIA Covert Agent had agreed."

In a memorandum, dated 23 February 1971, captioned "Charles Wiley," the problem with reportedly continues: said McCord had in effect okayed what wanted to include in his chapter on Mexican Operations"...

ROM
SEP [illegible]0 1975
CIA

CIA Covert Agent told Wiley that McCord is out of it anyway and that another person is supposed to get in touch with CIA Covert Agent ...."Wiley will call McCord tonight for a briefing on handling the Mexican material. Afterwards, Wiley can stall for a week or so by saying he had to send the material to McCord for perusal and opinion."

A memorandum, dated 9 March 1971, captioned "Charles Wiley" suggests Wiley intended to contact McCord regarding the CIA Covert Agent matter in the near future.

A memorandum, dated 29 December 1971 records a conversation with Wiley concluding with the statement: "He repeated his holiday greetings and was a little concerned apparently that he hadn't had a card from McCord - wondered if anything had happened to him, etc."

On 28 June 1972, Wiley telephoned Louis W. Vasaly of SRS and remarked that he, Wiley, was really surprised at the depth the FBI must be covering this, i.e., Watergate, as he had already been approached and interviewed by a couple of FBI agents based on several long distance calls Jim, i.e., McCord, had made to him. Wiley further stated he only told them, i.e., FBI, Jim was an old friend and occasionally solicited information from Wiley, just as the Bureau did.

On 9 April 1973, Wiley called Louis W. Vasaly to inform him that his wife, Tina, had taken her life. Wiley suggested that Ruth and Jim McCord, Lee Pennington, Morse Allen, Cliff Carrico and Paul Gaynor be advised. Mr. Vasaly called Lee Pennington who in turn would advise Ruth McCord on the afternoon of 9 April.

LEE PENNINGTON

The exact degree of Wiley's knowledge of and association with Lee Pennington is not fully known from records available in the Wiley file. However, it is known that Pennington probably knew Wiley as early as 1954 from Pennington's work with the Americanism Committee of the American Legion and Wiley's index work on behalf of that organization. Wiley has claimed on several occasions to

SEP 30 1975

CIA

have a close association with Pennington without elaborating as to specific details. For example: On March 1967, Wiley prepared a report which states as follows - "In dealing with Don (Sweaney) and Lee (Pennington), both of whom know of my connection, I avoid any talk of my company activities. At one time, both knew some of my work because we received cooperation from them on certain projects. However, since Don went to his present job there has been little contact.

I talk to Don as I do to everyone else. I ignore any questions or statements with double meanings, surreptitious glances, etc. This is because of two reasons - need-to-know rule and Don is seldom out of earshot of fellow workers. No one overhearing us will learn anything I don't want them to know.

"Since the recent exposure of company activities is the chief topic of discussion, and especially since I am considered by many as an 'expert' on one of the projects, there is little way of avoiding the subject without arousing suspicion. I have always taken the same stand, that of a critic - but with qualifications - regarding the area of my knowledge. Under the circumstances, it would be quite impossible to take any other position.

"During my discussion with Don, the only company business that was mentioned was the project with which everyone knows I am familiar. It is, therefore, obvious that I could not have said what was reported. I would suggest that someone other than the original source talk to Don. I would also urge that both Don and Lee be reminded not to mention, under any circumstances, their knowledge of me."

DONALD SWEANY

Wiley's knowledge of and association with Sweany is not fully known from the Wiley files, nor is there any reference to any such association in the Office of Security file on Donald Sweany. However, it can be presumed, based upon their mutual association with Lee Pennington at the American Legion, that they probably have known each other

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
C.I.A.

since 1954. Other than Wiley's comment concerning Pennington and Sweany, previously mentioned, there is nothing else from Wiley concerning Sweany.

HOWARD HUNT

There is nothing in the Wiley files to indicate any contact or association with Howard Hunt. Sometime prior to 24 August 1970 and probably between the fall of 1969 and April 1970, Wiley provided SRS with a manuscript entitled "Give Us This Day," which was circulating amongst some New York publishers none of whom wished to publish it because of its controversial nature, i.e. Bay of Pigs operation. The writer of the manuscript was later identified as Howard Hunt. The exact details concerning this incident are not available in the Wiley files.

Further on this theme, on 19 June 1973, Wiley called Louis Vasaly of SRS to say that he had in his hands a copy of Howard Hunt's manuscript "Give Us This Day." Wiley was advised that he had probably forgotten but that we had had access to it several years ago when Hunt submitted it to a different publisher. (Wiley reportedly had made it available at that time). Wiley said that he believed that this publisher was going to take advantage of the recent publicity (meaning Watergate apparently) and, of course, bring it out under Hunt's true name. Wiley was told that we (SRS) had no interest in his copy and that he could return it to the contact who made it available to him. There was no further discussion on the matter.

The above is the extent of references to Howard Hunt in the Wiley files.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 30 1975
CIA

Date : 08/06/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10005
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-05

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 06/19/75
PAGES : 113
SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES

USSR

CIA

FBI

NOSENKO, YURI

CIA, RELATIONSHIP WITH WC

OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : NOT ASSASSINATION RELATED
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

R378

TOP SECRET

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings Trautman

INVENTORIED
ON 2/15/77
BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7600011404

Thursday, June 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600011405

C O N T E N T S

TESTIMONY OF	PAGE
James Angleton	2

shelburne
nash

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000011496

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, June 19, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Government.
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:20 p.m., in Room S.123, The Capitol, Senator John G. Tower, presiding.

Present: Senators Tower (presiding), Baker and Mathias.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Charles Kirbow and David Aaron, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

Senator Tower. Mr. Angleton, I understand that you came on very short notice. And I appreciate your accommodating the Committee.

YOu will have to be sworn.

Would you rise, please, and raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this committee is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Senator Tower. Counsel, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

Mr. Schwarz. I would like to first get your name and address on the record.

Mr. Angleton. James Angleton, Arlington, Virginia.

Mr. Schwarz. Just some procedural matters. You have a right to counsel, you understand that?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand it.

Mr. Schwarz. And if at any time you want to stop to obtain counsel you have a right to do that. And if you wish to claim any of your Constitutional rights you have a right to do that, you understand those things also, do you?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I understand them.

Mr. Schwarz. You were employed at the CIA for what period of time?

Mr. Angleton. From the beginning until December, the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NbR

end of December.

Mr. Schwarz. 1974?

Mr. Angleton. 1974.

Mr. Schwarz. And were you the Chief of Counterintelligence at the CIA for that period?

Mr. Angleton. I was.

Mr. Schwarz. For that entire period of time?

Mr. Angleton. No, from 1954.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you also responsible for relations with Israeli intelligence agencies?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you briefly state the connection, if any, between your counter intelligence work and the Israeli work, or put even more generally, how did you happen to have both those jobs?

Mr. Angleton. Well, if I could ask you some clarification, are we addressing ourselves here in terms of this meeting to the Szulc business, or are we trying to take up everything?

Mr. Schwarz. No, we are not going to try to take up everything. We may try to take up a few things beyond the Szulc business. What we are trying to do --

Mr. Angleton. I can direct my answers to you better if I know more where we are going.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to the Szulc business, but it

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

7600011179

it would be helpful to have a few background first.

Senator Baker. If I may say so, so that Mr. Angleton will not be taken by surprise, there are one or two things that I would like to discuss. The nature of that material would be similar to what you have already discussed with Rockefeller, having to do with the Oswald situation and other things.

Mr. Angleton. Well, to begin with, I went into OSS in 1943, in 1943 from the infantry. And then Iwas assigned to an embryonic counter intelligence unit under General Donovan. My immediate chief was James R. Murphy, who had been a protegee and obtained his law degree in General Donovan's office. And he is a practicing attorney here in Washington. And he was Chief of X-2, which was the counter intelligence. And during that time a number of us were put together who had never had any experience in the subject. And that included people such as Jonnie Oaks, who was the head of the editorial page of the New York Times, and Ben Wells, and a tremendous cross-section of American life.

And therewas a training intensive in this country, and I was sent to London. And the purpose of that was to absorb the British experience, and more important, the breaking of German codes.

The breaking of the German codes, which is relevant to our activity, was really done in England. And by way of digression, the Germans were using a receiver machine called

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

Enigma, the blue prints of which were originally obtained by a Frenchman. And I might add that the Frenchman never received credit for it. And yet that perhaps was the most single important breakthrough of the entire war. And he had obtained it about eitht to nine or ten years prior to the outbreak of war, when it was non-operative. And he had the prescience to know that the systems could only be one thing, that it would be operative in a time of war.

I give this digression simply to point out that the fruits of that breakthrough would first go to the military and the military operations. And the counter intelligence use of it would be the bottom of the list of priorities, in one sense.

But it would mean that a compromise of the material in any fashion to the Germans would destroy the military uses. And during the war or when the Germans went into the war, they brought it up from 10 percent recovery to about 100 percent.

And I believe it was in the neighborhood of some 22,000 operational messages from the German high command. I know the Battle of Tobruk was fought on six intercepts.

So our job was to make use of the counter intelligence for the purpose of playing back German agents to their high command. And this was an elaborate deception. And when the war ended I would say that 99 percent of all reporting agents

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

7600011411

that the Germans had were under our control. And in fact when many of the German hierarchy tried to escape to the west under aliases, their only point of contact for most documentation and money was to our agent under control. And it was called the Safe Haven program.

So London was in a sense a staging area with full access to British, or the fruits of British activity, going back through their entire history. And it was the advance headquarters for General Donovan, and Mr. Murphy.

I was then sent to Italy in 1943. And I took over the counter intelligence for Italy, the OSS, AFHQ, Allied Forces Headquarters.

Subsequently I became the Chief of OSS Italy. And I want to say that my work then became more broad in terms of espionage and all the other branches of OSS. And I re-established the counter intelligence services. And I brought the French back into existence, particularly the man who originally acquired the code, and who worked on it for many years. And by this time it was shifted to the Saud! Saudi bloc.

I left Italy in 1947 or 1948 and came back, and was discharged and went into the Agency immediately. And during the period I was in the Agency, of course, I had both agent operations, long distance operations, and counter intelligence, and some sabotage, black propaganda, infiltration.

And probably the first overnight operation that there was, which was known as Plan Hope, which is simply putting the Italians in an airplane and having them fly over to the Roumanian border and make very primitive photographs of the whole region.

And I was sent back to the Air Force. And then I had code operations, embassy penetrations, and so on.

So, in a sense the resuscitation of the Italian service, Army and Navy, Air Force, and the Minister of the Interior, was American rehabilitation. And I am not going to go into the details of the political situation. There was the civil war in Greece, and the revival of the international Brigade and in fact the Soviets had built up, when they were not fighting the war, in the post-war period, assassinations, and instability.

And throughout this we had very close supervision from Mr. Murphy, and General Donovan. And we had special interest in the Vatican, and what was happening in Berlin behind the Curtain.

And the then acting Secretary of State for the Vatican, Montini, who is the present Pope. And so there was much to do through our channels, and General Donovan, with Montini, the Pope, who is now the Pope, one of the basic problems was the cold war. We did not buy the cold war, it came to us and we worked with the Germans, and as we broke down the opposition, we began to find that we were not getting the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

7600011413

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Germans, we were getting the Soviets.

But the penetrations and the operations which we ran during the military phase began to take on a character of their own in the civilian phase in the very long term Soviet objectives against the U.S. in particular, and against the allies.

And then I got into all fields of labor, subversion, illegal immigrants, and then revolution. I was in Greece. And our penetrations at that period were fairly high level and sophisticated, because of the reaction to Stalin.

And as the Soviet troops occupied new territories, it was faced with these ambiguities, the defectors coming over to us at very high levels.

And in the course of this, of course, was the Israeli immigration. Technically we were still a part of AFHQ, which was a combined and Allied Headquarters. And the British desires were that our activities be directed in supporting their responsibilities in the Middle East, and, therefore, to prevent the immigration.

And I think the only policy cable that was ever received during that period was one we sent to Mr. Murphy, and through General Donovan to the President. That was where we exercised our influences on the Italians to prevent immigration. And they addressed themselves to this issue, and they came back with an ambiguity, but it leaned

NBR

toward the general proposition that we should not discourage the British nor hurt the British directly, but we should not interfere with the Italians to support the British position.

And so my dealings were with Admiral Maugeria, who had been Chief of the Italian Naval Intelligence, but was then the Commanding Admiral of the Turanian Fleet generally south, where all these illegal immigrants collected and were sent down.

And then they blew up the Irgum, and blew up the British embassy in Rome, who were my opposite numbers. And the man with whom we had set up as the Italian intelligence through the rest of the Israelis -- we had the members of the group, and then we had the dilemma again as to whether we turned them over to the British authorities, and so on.

And we were in a position to make decisions one way or the other. And eventually we came down on the side of releasing them.

And there is so much more of it. I am trying to keep the thread of it.

Mr. schwarz. So you developed some kind of a relationship, perhaps a friendly relationship, with persons connected with the new State of Israel or the hoped-for state of Israeli back in the 1940's?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

NBR

7600011415

Mr. Schwarz. And was there any other significant reason why you kept the Israeli account, if that is the right expression?

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't one after I left there, nor was there one here in Washington.

But the other side of the Israeli problem was that you had thousands coming from the Soviet Union. And you had the Soviets making use of the immigration for the purpose of sending illegal agents into the West, and breaking down all the travel control, identifications and so on.

And so there was both a security problem and a political problem. And one of my men married, I might say, the head of the Zionist movement in Italy, the underground. So I had a connection to this man. He was very important.

So,coming back to Washington, I was Special Assistant to Colonal Donald H. Galloway, who was head of the clandestine side and covered the world, on all sides of clandestine activity.

And subsequently I was Chief of Operations for Espionage.

And in 1954 I had a special operational unit, and was made head of the counter intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. In the period beginning in 1954 and lasting until 1974, when you left the Agency, did you have any relationship -- is the Israeli account the wrong way to say it?

NBR

Mr. Angleton. It is all right. It is as good as any other.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you have any relationship with the Israeli account?

Mr. Angleton. No. That began in 1951. There was no relationship between the Agency and the Israeli intelligence.

Mr. Schwarz. You mean at all, or prior to 1951.

Mr. Angleton. There wasn't any from 1947 -- 1946 on.

Mr. Schwarz. Then it began in 1951. And all I am trying to establish, and not spend a lot of time with it, is, do you have any relationship with Israel, Israeli intelligence, or the Israeli account on behalf of the Agency between 1951 and 1974.

Mr. Angleton. It was resonstituted in 1951. And I was the negotiator of the arrangement. The Mayor of Jerusalem, Pete Teddy Kollek, was at the other end of the negotiation. He was stationed in Washington. But during the Jewish Agency period he was head of the intelligence in Turkey, during the war and prior.

Mr. Miller. How was that agreement negotiated?

Mr. Angleton. It was negotiated by finding waat dis we have in common. It was reviewed by Admiral Hillenkoetter, who was then Director. And he was to be succeeded by General Walter Bedell Smith. And the decision was made during the war that Bedell Smith was to take over, and Allen Dulles return

NBR

to this activity, that we would go ahead and re-establish a relationship. And after a lot of bureaucratic problems, they gave me the account.

Mr. Miller. What ws the nature of the arrangement that was agreed upon between the two services?

Mr. Angleton. In most simplistic terms, they were informed that we would not work with them against the Arabs, that we would work with them on Soviet intelligence and Soviet bloc intelligence and communism, where it existed.

Mr. Schwarz. Did that agreement -- which I take it was more flexible that -- but did it remain in effect throughout the period of your service with the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. More or less.

Mr. Miller. Was this agreement in the form of a paper?

Mr. Angleton. Paper and operations, discussion.

Mr. Miller. And under whose authority was the agreement made?

Mr. Angleton. Under the authority of the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Prime Minister of Israel on the other side.

Mr. Miller. And this involved the exchange of resources of both countries?

Mr. Angleton. The term "resources" is not quite correct. Everything except their own people. It was giving

7600011413

NBR

up papers and signals, communications intelligence, and all the other products of intelligence action.

Mr. Miller. So the Director of Central Intelligence was aware of the agreement. Was the President?

Mr. Angleton. The President was aware of it. And the Secretary of State was the brother of the Deputy Chief of the CIA, and eventually was very much involved.

Mr. Miller. Where is a record of this agreement kept, as an instrument of the U.S.?

Mr. Angleton. The internal papers would be in the Agency. The letters, copies of the letters from Ben Gurion to the President or to the Secretary of State I assume are still in the Agency. I dealt with other departments in connection with Africa, and so on, underdeveloped areas.

If you are speaking as to whether there was a representative treaty which was cleared -- and people wanted these things cleared -- I don't think there were any clearances obtained from the Hill.

Mr. Miller. Was it regarded as an obligation or a commitment from the U.S. to Israel on certain matters?

Mr. Angleton. When you use the word U.S. while you may use it as contracting officers and all that, there was very little reduced to writing. And it is a custom of intelligence that intelligence supersedes writing. And there have been very few directors to my knowledge that would put their pen to hand to sign an agreement to some understanding. It is based on a fiduciary relationship and common understanding.

So, these were all understandings that were generated by events. WE had the arrest of the nine doctors, and the pogrom in Russia. And obviously you didn't go through a lot of bureaucracy, it was there for everyone to see. And it had a direct impact on the question of immigration of agents, and everything else that goes along with it. And I think that characterizes any good operation.

Mr. Miller. How was it possible for succeeding directors of the intelligence agency to understand what the agreements were between, in this case the Israeli intelligence service and the U.S. Intelligence Service?

Mr. Angleton. Very simple. They saw the production to begin with. And they met with directors or the head of Israeli intelligence. And they met with Ambassadors and prime ministers. And they were very much involved.

Mr. Schwarz. Just one more background question and then we will turn to the principle subject.

Following through on the subject of Israel up to your departure in 1974, is there any connection between your departure and handling of Israel? And if there is, what is the connection?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I have said it all to the

NBR

76000111419

NBR

76000111420

~~commission -- I don't know how wisely. You can always get different information from different people. But Colby told them, so I would like to give him the benefit of the doubt on it. But over a period of time Colby -- who is not my cup of tea professionally or in any other way, and in my view is on the negative side of life -- and Dr. Schlesinger, before he went to Defense, said that Colby was the only other person on Watergate. So you have got certain persons who were prominent. And there was the negative aspect of self-inspection, and inferiors reporting on superiors, until they came through the snake pit.~~

~~And in the course of all of this there was time when he assumed the authority, and in total contrast to Schlesinger, he began to regard the Israeli account as something where we had to open the windows and let the air in. And he used phrases such as, we must help out Henry and a few other things.~~

~~Any position was that it was a political relationship, and that we were not bound, or should not be bound, to using the Agency on tactical ventures when we had relationships which had strategic implications.~~

~~But one must rembmer that there are still three million Jews in the Soviet Union. And the relationship is the only place where you do it with high level agencies who work for ideology and do not work for money. So it is unique.~~

And my second point was that everything should be run on the grounds of need-to-know, and should not go into the Arab Division until there was peace in the area. There was no identity of interest or fundamental interest between Israelis and an example is 500 Polish intelligence officers who were Jewish who immigrated to Israel. They knew more about Polish intelligence than the Poles. And the Soviets had worked with the Poles in the West, and trained them in Moscow, where you had the cohesion of 27 bloc services working together through their own congress party apparatus into a collective with Moscow.

And most important, our job was to preserve the integrity of the immigration from the bloc, because the problem of escape to Israel is a religious problem, it is not a political problem. There could not be a prime minister who would survive the day if he did not go along with the idea of the return.

And, therefore, there is a certain kind of parallelism, you might say, between handling the communications intelligence during the war and where a low priority makes use of it and endangers the whole with the question of immigration, where the fruits of that immigration come to this government.

(Recess.)

Senator Tower. Will you go ahead and resume the questioning?

NBR

7600011421

NBR

Mr. Schwarz. You were in the middle of an answer, I believe.

Mr. Angleton. What I am trying to say is that immigration is a source of very high level information, and it is very comparable with its problems as communications intelligence during the war when the lives of men were involved in troop movements.

And, therefore, the idea of opening up the doors and things, and so on, to me seemed absolutely contrary to the spirit, and what had been going on for 22 years.

And during that time we had obtained, for example, by way of production, Khrushchev's secret speech which practically created revolutions in Hungary and Poland.

I was just simply reiterating the problem of the immigration. This idea of opening the doors and letting the light in, and breaking down compartmentation, and breaking down the need to know, would inevitably put in jeopardy the immigration, if the Soviets should learn the extent of the activities.

Now, the production ran from everything, such as the secret speech of Khrushchev's against Stalin, it ran into the first hard information on nuclear explosives, and it ran into practically the whole gamut. And I think in a certain period of time it resulted in over 22,000 reports dealing with the Soviet bloc which were unique. And much of this

NBR

came from, say, an engineer that had a factory, or what not, in other words, it had a very direct bearing on our own R&D and our own defense budget.

Now, our own way of handling it was to give false attribution, reports, so that if the report was ever compromised, it would not compromise the operations, or the immigration. And, therefore, that was one of the issues.

On the other issue was that to politicize the Agency, as I stated, on the tactical problems, which are going to be with us for a long time.

And to break down the fiduciary relationship-- which is after all a personal business -- all the men I have had were men who stayed in it and came back to headquarters and went back to Tel Aviv, they went to the National Security Council, and went back to Tal Aviv, et cetera, a small group of men. It was probably the most economical operation that has ever been devised in the U.S. Government. I don't think there was more than 10 people that were hired in the same process.

I started from the south side with two Jewish men who worked with me during the war. He sent them over as ordinary people under cover to establish the working hours of things, and I brought over six others and put them through some months of training, outside of the structure.

And one of them rose to be Deputy Chief of the Service. But it is a part of the whole fiduciary business.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600011124

NBL

For example, we had certain political overtones where we were used in an affirmative way under President Eisenhower. He wanted to make a real attempt to see if there could ever be a peace in the Middle East. And with Alan Dulles, his brothers, and myself, and Kermit Roosevelt, we put up a plan to bringing in Robert B. Anderson, who had been Assistant Secretary of the Defense.

And he was accredited as special emissary from the President. And I handled his base to Israel, which was secret, black, as we call them, to see Ben Gurion -- and Shaffetz was the Foreign Minister -- and Kollek, who was in the Prime Minister's office, and later Mayor.

And we took him back to Rome. And Kermit Roosevelt would take him over to see Nasser. And this went on back and forth on many trips, until the conclusions were reached that there could not be any peace.

But those types of initiatives could be done without publicizing or without destroying it.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, some dispute in connection with these Israeli matters underlay your dispute with Mr. Colby, which underlay your leaving the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. He offered me jobs or what not. But these are matters of principle, as far as I am concerned.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Angleton, you described the fiduciary relationship. Were there points along the way where the U.S.

NBR

7600011435

interests and the interests of Israel were in conflict?

Mr. Angleton. We never got into that. Of course, you only had to read the paper every day to see that.

Mr. MIller. But how did they come up ? You say they didn't come up at all?

Mr. Angleton. Of course, they came up. There wasn't anything secret about it.

Mr. Miller. But what examples can you give?

Mr Angleton. The recent visit of Rabun is a classic case. The so-called reassessment of the Middle East. The Times has better accounts of it than the Agency has.

Mr. Miller. I mean at your level.

Mr. Angleton. I don't quite get the thrust of your question.

Mr. Miller. What I am saying is that you had an unusually close relationship --

Mr. Angleton. It was not unusual. I have had it with many chiefs of services in 80 different countries, so it is not any more unusual than a lot of others. The Frenchman who got the code is closer to me than the Israelis are.

Mr. Miller. Similar to the relationship --

Mr. Angleton. I don't like the word unusual, because to me it is usual.

Mr. Miller. Delete that. If your working relationship

7600011456

NBR

with the Israelis, where you had conflict of U.S. interests --

Mr. Angleton. Give me an example of what you regard as a conflict.

Mr. Miller. Can you thing k of any?

Mr. Angleton. You are the one who is posing it. I think a lot of these things are illusions. But what would you regard as a conflict? I don't think there is a conflict regarding the Soviet Union or the balance of power. I don't think there is any question in my view --

Senator Mathias. May I suggest Suez as a conflict that might have posed --

Mr. Angleton. Which Suez are we talking about?

Senator Mathias. The Israeli-British-French attack on Suez.

Mr. Angleton. The U.S. Government position was that we had no commitments with Israel and we had no binding treaties. We had two allies that had just fought a war with us, and both of whom betrayed us. And Eden's head went with it. And that is very clear and well documented. The Israelis were not blamed because we didn't have any agreements with them, they had violated no agreements. The British had agreements. The British tried to give us a deception plan, should they have naval vessels in the Mediterranean, and they were there for a different purpose.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me see if I can make a point on just a common sense level.

NBR

7600011427

Senator Mathias. Let me follow this Suez question a little more closely.

That is a point at which the U.S. policy differed from the policy which was adopted by British and France and Israel?

Mr. Angleton. Correct.

Senator Mathias. And would a situation of that sort confront you with difficulties in your operations because --

Mr. Angleton.There have always been crises with them.

Senator Mathias. And how do you resolve a crisis of that kind?

Mr. Angleton. You don't see the fellow for a few days.

Mr. Miller. I see.

So your method was to deal with them on those matters --

Mr. Angleton. A total neutrality of interest.

Mr. Schwarz. Could we turn to the subject of atomic technology?

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me. I think for the record we should make it clear, I think Mr. Angleton has had an interview with the staff, and he has been made aware that a witness testified here under oath as to certain matters, and that that is the approach that we are going to take now.

Is that clear?

Mr. Schwarz. I want to ask the question generally first and then come to the other testimony.

NBR

7600011122

Mr. Angleton, has the Central Intelligence Agency directly or indirectly transferred any atomic technology or know-how to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. From my knowledge, the answer is an absolute no. That would be one of those grounds that Mr. Miller was referring to, where the Agency, in the person of Mr. John McCone, had some of the sharpest words probably in the history of the relationship.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned those at lunch, and you might just put that on the record.

Mr. Angleton. I want to state that to my knowledge the Israelis themselves never raised the question of their atomic capability or their atomic interests, with one or two small exceptions, which was where there had been somebody who had been PGed from the U.S., were he ever to get his visa to come back and attend some meeting, something on that level.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that I have asked the question broadly enough.

Did the Agency take any steps to make available to the Israelis any personnel who had knowledge about atomic matters.

Mr. Angleton. None whatsoever.

Mr. Schwarz. And specifically with respect to a man -- let's go off the record for a minute.

NBR

7600011429

(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Back on the record.

Do you know a scientist called Dr. Wilfred Mann?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Does he have any knowledge of atomic matters?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. He was one of the originators.

Mr. Schwarz. To your knowledge was he ever put in contact with any Israeli person directly or indirectly?

Mr. Angleton. Not to my knowledge, never.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you know a journalist called Tad Sculc?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you meet with him sometime this year?

Mr. Angleton. In March.

Mr. Schwarz. Where did you meet him?

Mr. Angleton. At the house of Ben Wells.

Mr. Schwarz. And did the three of you then go for dinner some place?

Mr. Angleton. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did you discuss --

Mr. Angleton. We went as Sculz's guests somewhere to dinner.

Mr. Schwarz. At that meeting did he raise with you the subject of the transfer of atomic technology from the CIA to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7500011439

NBR

Mr. Schwarz. What did he say to you?

Mr. Angleton. They prefaced his remarks by stating that he was not a professional scientist, but he was a Jew, and so was his good friend Hersh. And they had some strange ESP working in which one said to the other, have you heard what I have heard, and the other one said, I think I may have heard what you have heard. And then this thing went back and forth, and then it finally devolved, one said, did it have anything to do with Angleton, and the other one said yes, and it went on to where they discovered that each had had separate sources that I had been instrumental in acquiring plutonium for the Israelis, and as a follow-up, to help the Israelis on their know-how by sending Dr. Mann to Israel clandestinely. And they both had their stories, and they had a gentleman's agreement.

And the matter was published without notifying the other.

Mr. Schwarz. And what did you say in response?

Mr. Angleton. My response to him was, it was wrong. But he had not identified the scientist. So, I asked him --

Mr. Scharz. When you say it was wrong --

Mr. Angleton. His statement was wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. So you denied the story that atomic technology had been transferred to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I said, it is wrong.

Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure what it is. It

NBR

7600011131

does constitute a denial.

Mr. Angleton. His story was wrong.

Senator Baker. Let me ask you, Mr. Angleton, do I understand by that that you mean every material aspect of the story was wrong and incorrect?

Mr. Angleton. I didn't mean quite that. I was more interested in the fact that, one, he knew Tad Szulc -- I am sorry, that I knew Hersh -- and that Hersh told him that his source was the man who gave him the December 22 article, and whether he "had been set up" --

Senator Baker. What December 22?

Mr. Angleton. That is the time they kicked off the entire furor on the past espionage thing.

Senator Baker. Against American citizens?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Senator Baker. Did they do that once?

Mr. Angleton. No, because neither disclosed their independent sources to the other.

Senator Baker. The point I am trying to clarify for my own purposes is that the conversation you just related you said was wrong.

Do I understand you to mean that every material aspect of that statement was wrong?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. But I didn't know my motives on a lot of questions that I had with him. Because this was the first live human being I saw that had actually allegedly heard from Hersh. And he thought they had been set up -- and that was the biggest agony in the Agency.

Senator Baker. And the person who set him up --

Mr. Angleton. Hersh told him, according to Szulc, that he was scared of the story, because this was his source on the December 22 article. And therefore he wondered aloud whether he had been set up.

Senator Baker. Did he say who had been the source of the December 22 information?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely no.

Mr. Kirbow. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. I just want to make sure, in your conversation with Mr. Szulc as opposed to your testimony here today on the merits, did you deny to Mr. Szulc that you or the Agency had facilitated the transfer of atomic technology to Israel?

Mr. Angleton. I denied it. But the conversation drifted rapidly, because Szulc was talking about a very great agent that he had in the Agency. And he was bragging about the fact that he had more sources than Hersh had. And then he said, do you know Australia?

And I said, yes, I know Australia.

Does the word Sydney mean anything to me?

NBR

R

Yes, he word Sydney does mean something to me.

Do you know sho is bicycling in India?

And Isaid, I am afraid I am not with you.

And he said, Sidney X. And Sidney X is one of our most sensitive employees who retired, and is bicycling in India.

And I give this as an illustration of the cat and mouse business of this whole evening.

And he said he got that from his source.

Now, that man's name is Sidney Gottlieb. And he was the head of our technical services department, which means that there is a cross plant in our business. And the man who was bugging and performing all the hundreds of technical services, has access, unfortunately, to many of our operations.

There is one juncture point in the business where there is a breakdown of compartmentation. And for him to indicate that he knew Gottlieb, and the sources that had been raised in my mind, since I was talking about a scientist, plutonium, atomic energy, and all these matters, that his source might be in our Technical Services Division, which, if he was, he would know everything, or could get into everything.

But I didn't tell him that.

In fact, I expressed little or no interest in his source other than asking him a few questions, is he Jewish, and this or that and so on.

Senator Baker. Could I ask you a question at this point?

NBR

7600011473

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600011434

NBR

Mr. Angleton. Surely.

Senator Baker. What you are relating to me seems to imply that Szulc's information was very, very good on sensitive information?

Mr. Angleton. No. That information, sir, would have been unclassified.

Senator Baker. I am speaking more of the Sidney X Gottlieb relationship.

Mr. Angleton. But he only said that he was bicycling in India. But the way he went about it, do you know Australia, do you know Sidney, do you think this, and so on -- it was that sort of thing.

Senator Baker. Do you think he had a source in India?

Mr. Angleton. It started to worry me, because he was talking plutonium, which was scientific. Gottlieb, before he went to that whole department of his, was transferred to Carl Duckett. And that is the reason Gottlieb left.

Senator Baker. You mean he didn't want to work for Duckett?

Mr. Angleton. That is part of it.

And there are also questions of principle. You take it from one director -- it is lifeblood -- and get it to another director.

Senator Baker. Is this the same Gottlieb who was in charge of processing the photographs that were taken in Dr.

NBR

7600011433

Fielding's office?

Mr. Angleton. His office would have been.

Senator Baker. Do you know of that situation?

Mr.Angleton. No, except --

Senator Baker. Het me ask you this and I will turn it back to counsel.

Was there any conversation in which Szulc or Hersh talked to Colby about thesematters? Did you ever get any impression that they were implying that Colby was their source?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing that came up is that when I saw Colby yesterday -- which is the first time since December -- he told me that he had bought a theory of mine on Szulc, but he did not look with any misgivings on Hersh. He said that one year before he had seen Hersh about the submarine article, and that had Hersh been a Soviet agent, the Soviets would not have permitted the operation to take place.

And I told him that he was erroneous, that to use that guide was simply not to understand what the game is all about.

And when Philby was stationed in Washington he helped the FBI in working on some communications intelligence which led to the identification of Klaus Fuchs. But in spite of Philby being a Soviet agent, the Soviets were prepared to let Klaus Fuchs go down the drain rather than hurt Philby.

Senator Baker. As an ultimate cover?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

NBR

7600011436

He was a more valuable agent. If he had not been uncovered he would have been today Chief of British Intelligence.

In the case of George Blake, who was in the British secret service, he gave to the Soviets one year in advance the entire plans of our so-called Tunnel of Love, that is, the tunnel we built in Berlin -- very elaborate -- to tap all of the Soviet military lines.

Now, even one year in advance, they took no preventive action in order to save George Blake.

Now, what has happened since December 22 to the U.S. intelligence community, in the position that Hersh enjoys, with the prestige and the impact on the U.S. public, it stands to reason that you can't get them to give any baby talk as to what the Soviets would or would not do, when you see something that is the objective from the end of the last war to the present, and destroy the agent.

Senator Baker. Do you think Hersh is a Soviet Agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am not saying that he is a Soviet agent. To begin with, when I went back to see Wells, who was in counter intelligence with me in London during the war, I told him I could not buy Szulc's article regarding Hersh, the alleged meetings and that they had certain sources, and the introduction of Dr. Mann's name and so on simply didn't hold water, and something was wrong.

But Dr. Mann is a suspect Soviet agent, a friend of

NBR

7 6 0 0 0 1 1 4 3 7

Burgess, and a friend of Philby. And the home background which is a factual thing, is only known to very few services. And for him to introduce it into this scenario gave it a taint that lifted it out of just simply gossip.

How would he ever know the name Mann?

Senator Baker. That is what I was driving at, is it fair to infer from that conversation that there was an indication that Szulc had a very good source within the Agency?

Mr Angleton. Either that, or the way I look at it, I am prepared to admit, because of an article he wrote, in the cryptonym Easy Chair in the Oval Office of the White House.

Senator Baker. Talking about the bugging situation?

Mr. Angleton. That crytonym Easy Chair was the most s sanctified word in the Agency. And what it dealt with was -- it was called Easy Chair for the simple reason that if the Soviets were blocked, people abroad were moving into this house or this office.

Senator Baker. Off the record.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Angleton. But let me put it this way.

He said, I called Ben Wells to see you, because I wanted a safe place in which to raise all this stuff.

Mr. Schwarz. This is Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. This is Szulc.

NBR

7600011433

~~And in fact, I think they had been talking sometime before I arrived.~~

~~And with Wells' background, the New York Times abroad, nd Szulc's time abroad, apparently --~~

~~Senator Tower. Excuse me. Will you go back just a bit here? You raised a question of how did Szulc know the name of Mann and know about his association with Philby and Burgess.~~

~~Mr. Angleton. Yes.~~

~~Senator Tower. You raised the question but did not answer it.~~

~~How do you think he could have known it?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. This is what bothers me, that he is either unwitting, or has a source who has knowledge and is working for an opposition, or he has a source who is mischievously exploiting him by, who may be retired, and does know some facts, and therefore it is 10 percent true and 90 percent false.~~

~~I would assume his financial situation is such that he is very hungry. I mean that is my general observation, and that he is having a rough time of saving a very lucrative contract with Penthouse for supplying X number of articles. I mean, that is my general feeling.~~

~~Senator Tower. Let's go back a moment. You say that he could have come by knowledge of the Mann-Burgess-Philby relationship through an external source?~~

NBR

76000114 3

Mr Angleton. Yes, either witting or unwitting.

Senator Tower. The KBG knows this, and, therefore, it could have come directly or indirectly from that source?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Senator Tower. That is a possibility?

Mr. Angleton. That is a possibility. And he has some brains about the fact that he does have contacts -- he knows the Roumanian Ambassador better than anybody in Washington, and he knows the Poles, and he knows this. And it goes on and on.

So, he is dealing with bloc people who will be reporting back to their headquarters very detailed -- assuming he is totally innocent, and given his position in Washington, Szulc would be a normal, witting or unwitting, channel for them in disinformation and for any other motive.

So, as to whether he is himself knowing what he is doing, whether he is a dupe, is an outstanding question. But for a man who goes and socializes with the black --

Mr. Schwarz. Did Mr. Szulc ever work for the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. He may have for some of our people in the field.

Mr. Schwarz. Did he ever provide services?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. Have you heard that?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

7600011410

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Angleton. I have heard that, but I haven'tlooked at the dossier for the last ten years. He came to our attention basically in connection with the leaks in the Bay of Pigs.

Senator Tower. Will you go back to the Szulc-Wells-Angleton meeting?

Mr. Angleton. This basically -- the thing that began to really disturb me was, number one, his comment, as I said before, tha Hersh told him that the thing that really bothered him about this story was that it came fromthe same source who gave him the 22nd of December, without identifying him, and the fact that when he was going through this business that he had the best sources in the Agency, and that was Sidney Gottlieb, and here was a scientific allegation, plutonium and the scientist and all the rest of them.

And again, if he did have a live source in that area, that means he would have a live source across the board.

When he asked me about my successor, I told him that I was not prepared to respond to that, that every new man was entitled to one free shave.

And he says, I know your successor. And I don't think he actually mentioned the name. But in this article which has just come out he mentions him with his biographical sketch.

Senator Baker. Who was your successor?

Mr. Angleton. George Kalaris.

I had never known him before.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

So obviously he was talking to me as somebody disaffected from the Agency, et cetera.I mean that is my view of why he was doing all this. Whereas my concerns were quite different than his.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you think it is possible, because of those different concerns, that your effort to deny the story did not get across to Mr. Szulc?

In other words, you are saying you had some concerns that dealt with the scientist being involved, that dealt with the newspaper source, that dealt with Easy Chair, that dealt with the statement that maybe the December 1974 article was inaccurate. And he pursued all these matters with some vigor and interest.

Do you think it is possible that because of that that whatever denial you made of the transfer of atomic parts of thestory didn't get across to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. No, I think it got across to him.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you recall your words to him that denied the atomic transfer?

Mr. Angleton. My chief words to him was, I said, do you realize what a thing like this implies, and what it would do, depending on how the media picks it up, in destroying all the efforts in the Middle East?

Mr. Schwarz. But words like that are as consistent with beingtrue as being false?

NBR

Mr. Angleton. They were consistent, but they weren't stated in that fashion. They were stated in the fashion that Dr. Mann is a person who fits within the Philby, et cetera, complex in a false story of this sort, which comes to the British, who pull out a file on Mann, and they read down and go back into the fact of Mann's association with me, Mann's association with Philby, all this stuff of my actions with the Israelis and all that, regardless of what the U.S. Government tells the British or the French, or the Canadians, or the Australians, or the New Zealanders, all of whom have fundamentally the basic information -- it would be a confirmation to them, based on very high level secret information, that the story was true.

Senator Tower. Let me pursue just about three questions here.

Did Szulc specifically ask you whether or not, during the early sixties, fissionable material, along with nuclear technology and technological assistance, was passed to the Israelis?

Did he ask youto confirm or deny that?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember it with precisely that type of precision. The story that he gave was a very lucid, straightforward story without any if's, and's and but's .

Senator Twoer. Did you deny only in part the validity of the question that he asked?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

7600011113

In other words, if he askedyou about the passage of both fissionable material and technology, did you deny wholly or in part that there had been a passage of fissionable material?

Mr. Angleton. No, I denied his story -- I would like to keep that as his story, something he came and presented. And then when he got down into the other things, which had to do with technology, all I can say is that anyone who follows closely the Nasser, and then later on Sadat accusations against CIA, it is voluminous in terms of their spelling out the sophisticated gadgetry which they discovered, which came from Central Intelligence.

This is a thing that has always concerned us, because in the last war we lost -- and we still do this today, we don't know the extent of this -- we lost some of the installations which we had put in there.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say "we", you mean the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. The CIA -- the Israeli lost entirely --

Mr. Schwarz. When he say we put in there, you mean the CIA put in there?

Senator Baker. What installations?

Mr. Angleton.The line of sight, electronics --

Senator Baker. YOu are not talking about --

Mr. Angleton. I am talking about the signal intelligence. And there was some very sophisticated gear that was put in

7600011111

NBR

there. And I want to complete this -- because of the fact that most of the information which we gained from the SAM's, which had a direct bearing on using B-52's in Vietnam, we gained through Israel. We could read a whole lot of the computerizing and so on of those SAM's. And therefore we were prepared to give highly sophisticated equipment to Israel to work against that Russian business in order to transfer the knowledge to Vietnam.

So I told them, I said, yes, we have worked on questions -- we have always helped them out technologically. And I think I made the comment that any piece of gear we ever gave them, that they turned it to a far greater sophisticated use than we had, which was true in many instances.

And they would cannibalize and we would get the product.

But there was no -- so that this is clearcut, there was no attempt to lead him on regarding the nuclear one, because the nuclear one was very clearly stated to him, that the injection of Mann into the story had a certain significance of its own.

And I think Wells will bear me out very clearly on this, that the injection of that could not be magic, it had to come from somebody who is in the intelligence service. I mean that element -- and if this story without the introduction of Mann had been told, it would be just another of the many rumors.

And Senator, there is something I forgot, and I want to

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000 11415

NBR

get back to it. After the Six-Day War the Soviets sent out a barrage of propaganda in Arabic fto the Middle East from Ardio Moscow that the CIA -- and then mentioned Bill Harvey, who was working for us, and whom I had put in touch with the Israelis during the Cuban business -- had met on a ship with Morris, the Chief of the British Intelligence, who had a background in the war with the Israelis, and had met there and prepared and carried out all the strategic part of the Six-Day War. And this is all PFIS. And there was a tremendous pike of Soviet materials -- they never got much into our media, because it is directed to the Middle East in Arabic, and which obviously they knew.

They used Harveys' name instead of my name, because professionally we were very close, and more important, I had introduced Harvey as the only officer to the Israeli operational people on the Cuban business. And, therefore, it showed they had knowledge of Harvey's, and so on.

The query then raised was whether the penetration was here or was it in Israel.

Mr. Kirbow. Did you express any concern to Mr. Szulc about the use of Dr. Mann's name in this article?

Mr. Angleton. Not Dr. Mann's name. My expression was that if you -- I said that article, false as it is, with the many things injected in it -- I will be very frank with you, I became scared of the thought, because, one, the story of

NBR

76000 11416

these two journalists was so implausable, and I looked over to Ben a few times -- and I know him well -- and he had absolutely a stoney expression, no expression on his face. And this was something very, very queer, and the whole thing was initiated by him. And that was why I asked Mr. Szulc, did he come to you or did you come to him.

Senator Baker. Did he come to you?

Mr. Schwarz. He came to us.

Senator Tower. Let me ask you one specific question, yes or no.

Did you confirm to Szulc that during the late fifties subsequent to the Suez War that the CIA made available to the Israeli Government technical assistance and the availability of one or more distinguished nuclear scientists or physicists for the purpose of developing atomic weapons?

Mr. Angleton. That is completely false.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, did you confirm or deny that to Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. I am stating that I never made any such statement. And I stayed off of the nuclear business.

Mr. Aaron. So you didn't confirm and you didn't deny, is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. It is very difficult for me to respond to that, because after all, this was a fast-moving discussion covering an awful lot of subject. And furthermore, in the

NBR

7600011413

back of my mind was the fact that we had problems with the Israelis in the nuclear field.

Mr. Aaron. What problems were those?

Mr. Angleton. They were very sensitive problems. And I don't think that they really shed any light on things that you are talking about here.

Mr. Aaron. Do you recall a conversation with me and Mr. Schwarz in which, in discussing this same matter, you said you felt under no obligation to either confirm or deny this story with Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I know I used that phrase. There was a denial. And I think that Wells would second the fact that there was a denial. But when I got down to a lot of the other questioning, my thinking was to try to lead him around back into the meeting with Hersh, and lead him back to this source that had to do with Sidney Gottlieb, and so on.

Senator Tower. Are you saying in effect, then, that any questions he raised with you about the transfer of visual material or deeper technology, or manpower, for that matter, to the Israeli Government, was couched in circumlocutry terms of some kind?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it this way.

Senator Tower. That you got no direct questions of that sort?

Mr. Angleton. I would say this to you, Senator. When

NBR

7600011413

I left there -- and I think this is a very important point -- first, I will have to explain we went to the restaurant, he invited us to the restaurant, he was insistent on it. And we went there. And here in the restaurant the entire discussion was a recapitulation by him, in a restaurant that was fairly full of people. Hersh was a person who had requested a secret meeting in Wells'house, and then proceeded in a restaurant to regurgitate this entire matter.

Senator Tower. Which restaurant was it?

Mr. Angleton. It was the Sea Catch.

Senator Baker. Did you ever have any impression that it might be recorded, is that what you are driving at?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. The thought crossed my mind. I looked at him, and he sort of -- he could hide a lot of things.

And so we got back to Wells' house. And it was very late. And he tried to get me to come back to his place. And I told him I just wouldn't do it. And that is how the thing broke up.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, in your long relationship and position with the Agency, did you ever express your concern to anyone out there that you thought this might have been a setup by a foreign source, or from internally?

Mr. Angleton. What might be a setup?

Mr. Kirbow. That this whole Szulc interview, story and

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

7600011113

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

everything else.

Mr. Angleton. I never discussed this with anybody in the Agency until we had this lunch.

Senator Baker. Do you suspect that now?

Mr. Angleton. I do not -- I don't know what to suspect, because I don't have access to files. And I think one has to review a lot of material. I think one has to review Szulc's files.

Mr. Miller. You spoke of that earlier, you described it as a dossier.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there is a file on it, a security file. I think he was one of the journalists, the first one, who made a reputation for blowing the whole Bay of Pigs, and so on. And I think the fact that he is foreign-born, and the allegations and so on. And so the Bureau has a similar file. And many of these files are created -- and they get to be accredited to the Pentagon, and therefore a routine security check is made.

Mr. Schwarz. Are you aware of any surveillance of Mr. Szulc?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Past surveillance?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I am not aware of it. As I say, I don't think I have ever seen his file for five or ten years.

NBR

76000111470

Mr. Kirbow. In your official capacity in the CIA you never had any occasion to cross Mr. Szulc's trail or consider him as a person --

Mr. Angleton. I separated him once in a fight with a friend of mine.

Mr. Kirbow. But nothing in an official capacity?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Miller. Let me ask another question on this file matter.

Yousaid that to your knowledge there were files on Mr. Szulc. Were there files on other newspapermen?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, there are files on other newspapermen.

Mr. Miller. And other Americans?

Mr. Angleton. A lot of them.

Senator Baker. Hersh wrote a story about -- what did he say -- 7,000 files. Was that right or wrong?

Mr. Angleton. I think it would be many more. I have never counted them.

Senator Baker. How many? A hundred thousand, a million?

Mr. Angleton. Well, when you consider all visa checks -- and we do 500,000 visa checks on foreigners -- and the question of American sponsors and so on -- this thing on all of this is a question of the gradual deterioration of our efficiency, because our staff was cut in half, and we had the problems of the Watergate, and we had all of these things. And so a great deal of this stuff was there, but it wasn't being professionally worked upon.

Senator Baker. You have mentioned the Watergate twice, Mr. Angleton.

Can you shed any light on that period in the Agency's life, the impact that the Watergate investigation had or any involvement of the Agency in any of the so-called Watergate affairs?

Mr. Angleton. Of the Agency itself?

Senator Baker. Or anybody connected with it.

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry, sir, that is a debatable question there, and I want to get it accurate.

What was that again?

Senator Baker. I don't want to narrow it. I want to make it broad.

Mr. Angleton. I want to make sure I understand you.

Senator Baker. There are two parts of the question. One, do you know of any Agency involvement of those who were working in the -- working with the AGency in the Watergate, in your break-in or the preparation for the cover-up or the attempted cover-up?

Mr. Angelton. My answer on that is, I do not. And by that I am separating the midnight channel 26 things and the newspapers. I know Jim McCord extremely well.

NBR

76000111451

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000114?

NBR

Senator Baker. Are you aware of the letters that McCord wrote to the DCI after the Watergate suggesting how you could avoid having this blamed on the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. I am aware of what was in the press. Gaynor. And Paul Nabami recently died who wrote those letters, and it made great sense to me, and I had personal relationships beyond an official relationship.

Senator Baker. He wrote two to Gaynor and three to Helms.

Mr. Angleton. I didn't know.

Senator Baker. I believe so.

Mr. Angleton. In any event, I can say that Gaynor's connection, because he had great trust in Gaynor -- and he was a very stubborn man and he left the AGency on conviction, I assume, or troubles in the Office of Security.

Senator Baker. In connection with Watergate?

Mr. Angleton. He left much earlier.

Mr. Miller. He being McCord?

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Miller. Why did he leave?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. And I was really surprised that he didn't come by and say goodbye.

Senator Baker. Was he a prominent official at the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. He was not.

Senator Baker. Did he have a prominent responsibility?

Mr. Angleton. He was a man that had a very difficult case abroad, which meant that it had to be buried, no leakages. And I used him twice, and one was a pretty lengthy use of him. And he followed instructions to the letter. He strayed on the one. And it is not important. It is just something that he did something that wasn't very wise.

Senator Baker. Doyou know why he went into the Watergate Complex?

Mr. Angleton. I can't understand it, because I would say it was ideological with him. There wasn't any difficulty in understanding his views on a given subject.

Senator Baker. The equipment that was used, I am told, was a fairly primitive sort for that sort of operation. Does that agree with your appraisal of him?

Mr. Angleton. That is what I read. And that surprised me also, because as a rule -- let me put it this way, what I am saying is, it was the Soviets who made an allegation that in a certain country very close to us they were using a laser beam on a window of the Minister of Defense, and acquiring everything.

So, instead of using anybody in the clandestine side, I took McCord and the group and sent them to that country for six or seven weeks to work on it. So, McCord has great knowledge of the -- he knows the counter electronics. And

WBR

7600011473

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

~~to know that you have got to know the other.~~

~~Senator Baker. He was familiar with the most exotic source of intelligence gathering?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. Precisely.~~

~~And that is why I can't understand -- I mean, if the papers are correct in what they have stated, although many of the sources were people who also sell electronic equipment.~~

Senator Baker. I don't want to lead you too far away from the original subject. But I would be interested in knowing what if any information you can give us about the Oswald situation.

For instance, does the Agency keep a file, or does it have a file on Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. They have a file. They have, I think, more than one. I think they have a subject file, and in that they have all the documentation that went to the Warren Commission through Mr. Raymond Rocca, who is my deputy.

And then there is a lot of undigested material that was brought out after the Warren Commission.

Senator Baker. Was there ever any inquiry? Or do you have any opinion as to whether Oswald was a Soviet Agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, I have a very strong opinion. I know the time factor, I will try to shorten this.

But I tried to prevail on Mr. Dulles that there should not be -- that there should be a statement to the effect that the Commission, in the life of the Commission -- that these are

7600011431

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600011475

the conclusions on the available evidence. But given the fact that the Soviet Government has a Department 13, which is under the Central Committee, who is taxed with the assassination of Western Leaders, that the door is open, and that is for future generations to speculate. So that it would not be closing the door, that it would really mean the investigation would be pursued.

Senator Baker. John McCone, as I remember, was queried once on whether we could establish the bona fides of certain people, including Oswald.

Mr. Angleton. And Nosenko.

Senator Baker. Was there any advice by you at that time to McCone or other wise that the bona fides of that Soviet person or of Oswald ought not to be stated in categorical terms?

Mr. Angleton. During the period of the Warren Commission we prevented as far as we could any information from Nosenko going under the record, on a question of bona fides.

Senator Baker. Why?

Mr. Angleton. Because we didn't regard him as bona fides.

Senator Baker. What did you regard him as?

Mr. Angleton. We thought he was a dispatch agent who was sent to mutilated the leads of very high grade Soviet~~s~~ whom we had acquired prior to that.

Senator Baker. To mutilate leads relating to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr Angleton. Relating to assassination, KGB agents, VASSALL ~~Vassily~~, the British agents, and many agents in France, a alleged penetration in the U.S., et cetera.

Senator Baker. And did McCone accept your advice?

Mr. Angleton. He did, except that I understood that a lot of it has been declassified. And when he gave this interview recently with Schorr Shor, I called his executive officer Elder and I asked him, and he said, who in the Agency ever alleged to McCone that we now had re-established the bona fides?

And I said, he is an old man and doesn't think too well, et cetera, and don't give me that stuff.

And he said, well, I will give it to you.

And I never heard from him since. But McCone was a man whowould not have made this statement. He has total recall.

Senator Baker. I am sure he does.

Do you have an opinion as to whether or not Oswald was infact a Soviet agent?

Mr. Angleton. Well, let me put it this way.

I don't think that the Oswald case is dead. There are too many leads that were never followed up. There's too much information that has been developed later.

For example, in 1966, in a Soviet book on Cuba there is a photograph of Khrushchev, a photograph of Castro, a photograph of a man called [illegible] Alexiev, real name [illegible] Shettov, KGB, with the first

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Soviet Ambassador to Havana, and a man named Leontov, who was the Soviet KGB operational man in Mexico. When the Mexican police arrested Castro as a student, they found in his notebooks the name of Leontov, KGB, Mexico.

Now, photographs 61, and so on, are in a KGB journal for Soviet citizens abroad. It is a bible,75 percent KGB staff. Photograph of Brezhnev, Castro, Alexiev, Leontov.

Now, we had a double agent after the assassination, who made a number of allegations that he acquired from the Chief of KGB, Mexico, Yatskov and he was a superior of Leontov. Now, after the assassination Khrushchev was in Cairo on a state visit. And he pulled an American journalist aside, and totally out of context, expressed the view that there was a conspiracy, and it involved the Right Wing of the U.S.

The thingwas totally out of context. And he planted this bug in this fellow's ear.

WE had double agents who stated that the KGB put all of their personnel for six months on working on the assassination, and had concluded that an American Right Wing business under Johnson was to succeed in power. And I am not talking about petty informants. I am talking about men whowere ascertained members of the KGB and part of the Soviet elite.

And I can multiply that. Those cases, those leads have never been followed up. One is because of lack of manpower. Two, the general problem in Washington and the government

7600011453

that there is no forum which can adjudicate issues in the intelligence community of a counter-intelligence nature. I may have allegations, very firm, that relate to somebody in high office. But there isn't anyone, ombudsman or somebody, to whom you can go with the information and talk to the Soviets and pull the bureau and ourselves and everybody together.

FBI

Senator Baker. Could you give us at your leisure a memorandum of your recommendations in that respect, how that might be constituded?

Mr. Angleton. It would not be a pleasant one. I have submitted -- and I don't think it is breaking any confidence -- such a memorandum to the Commission. And I have submitted a personal letter to the Vice Prsident. And my whole plea was that my days were numbered, but regardless, that in and beyond the life of that Commission, that in his position as Vice President he had a rare opportunity the first time these matters were ever aired, and that the disaster of Hoover's death, and Gray, and the Watergate and so forth, has destroyed the counter-intelligence forces.

And this added thing of Hersh has about dealt the final blow.

~~Senator Baker. I hate to interrupt you, and I also hate to ask you this question, but can you make an evaluation of the effectiveness of the Agency, in particularly its counter-intelligence activities at this time?~~

NSR

NBR

Mr. Angleton. Very, very poor.

I have put in there, and I think it is very conservative, that it has put us back 20 years. But I think in the eyes of every intelligence service in the Western World, where we have had the leadership and we pulled everything together, and where they have looked to us for guidance and for traces and for understanding, that we have lost all of our prestige.

Senator Baker. Two more quick questions, and I will yield my turn.

Do you know of or have any substantial information about Russian KGB activities in the U.S. such as the infiltration of Congressional offices?

Mr. Angleton. There is a whole history of information that relates to the past and to modus operandi and to targets, and so on. And that is inclusive of all the American life, and in particularly visits to the Soviet Union, and so on. Thereare communications intelligence more sensitive which was broken during and after the war, KGB communications, New York to Moscow, and Washington to Moscow, et cetera. And there were cryptnyms given. And it runs into hundreds of thousands of messages, of which a small percentage have been broken.

And they relate to Hiss and many things. And most of those cases will not be subject to prosecution, because they would not be admissible. And there are a lot of problems there. We have worked on it, and we brought the British, the

NBR

7600011459

Canadians, and New Zealanders and Australians, because we have this common denominator of the military and other agreements where they do share common information.

And there are many unresolved cases.

Senator Baker. Do you know of any cases, though, dealing with penetration of a Congressional office?

Mr. Angleton. No. But my statement doesn't mean anything, because I can assure you that it is the last thingI have been concerned with in some months. But I have seen these allegations in the paper, I wouldn't be surprised. And this is the second time in my life, or the third time, I have ever been here. To come here and see how this whole set up is is quite a shock.

Senator Baker. What about communications intercept, Congressional conversations, are you aware of any methodical effort by the Russians or the KGB vis-a-vis Congressional telephone conversations?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely. I think -- I am assuming now that the people in NSR are correct, they usually are, that the telephone, the formal telephone company traffic apparently, without the knowledge of the caller, is quickly shifted to microwave. That runs into hundreds of thousands of telephone calls.

NSA

Now, I used to be quite deeply involved in the penetration of embassies, and so forth, in my youth. And it

NBR

76000011451

is a fingernail, arm and body affair. It takes an awfully long time before you finally get into a code room and a place where you can do something securely.

What I am trying to say is that if you get enough depth on any target or any installation you begin to know much more about that installation than anybody who occupies it.

Senator Baker. If I were trying to confirm the rumor that the KGB had the capability and did in fact record as many as 30 or 40 thousand simultaneous telephone conversations, mostly related to governmental officials, and transmitted them to the Soviet Union, and kept individual files on them, would you confirm that for me?

Mr. Angleton. I would state that that is absolutely in my view correct. And I would say that the man who technically could respond to that would be Dr. Lou Tordello, a retired Chief of NSA who is now, I think, still a consultant there. And he is probably amore sophisticated person to relate the products of NSA to the realities of the question you asked.

And I think the other point I would make is simply that what their KGB has, which we never will have, is manpower. In other words, we have to narrow the size of the target some day the way the British did, and expel that 105,

Our State Department says that what happened in England has no relevancy here, because we have had a different setup, because among those expelled men who served in Washington,

NBR

and who weren't in the U.K., were those who were on the Anglo-American Desk, which meant that there was an American whom they had handled in Washington who had been transferred to London where the case officer follows the agent.

And that statement, official statement, was put out without any consultation with the Bureau or ourselves. So, we are living in a dream world here in terms of Soviets, and time is short, it is detente, and it is all the fallacious fallation kind of discussions and arguments one hears on the subject. We have come to detente for information through operations and our understanding of it, not wishful thinking.

And our views are shared by professionals all through the Western World. And they laugh at the U.S. in terms of what detente has done. But what it has done to the intelligence services, or to the FBI, the FBI is only a shadow of what it once was. And so there isn't any real internal security protection.

The Bureau's problems -- and I had the case of a KGB officer threatening one of the people we are dealing with in the Mid-west, he was from the United Nations, a young KGB fellow. And I asked the Bureau, was he a ________?

And they said, we put him to bed.

They didn't put him to bed, he was where he wasn't supposed to be. And I tried to get the department to go in with him. And I am still up there.

NBR

~~on two or three points. And I said, I am exercising my rights under the CIA, and so on.~~

~~But he said, I have got to run, and it was about five past five. And I asked him if he understood in effect what he was doing, the implications.~~

~~And he said, that is the responsibility I would assume.~~

~~And I said, what about Mr. Meyer, and building up to be our successors?~~

~~And we were about the same age. And he introduced Meyer over the years into more sensitive operations, and all the foreigns with whom we worked, agents and what not. And the reaction to him universally was, he was to be the successor.~~

~~And he said, that is something I will have to negotiate.~~

~~And I said, what do you mean negotiate?~~

~~And he said, we will talk about it next week.~~

~~So, I got up and shook hands with him and walked out.~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

(?)

NBR

~~Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone having electronic surveillance conversational recording in the Oval Office other than the Presidential (?) capability?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. Never.~~

~~Senator Baker. Do you know of anyone who ever penetrated the Presidential apparatus?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. Never, Senator.~~

~~What has come out about the Joint Chiefs and all that stuff in the paper?~~

~~Senator Baker. I am speaking of anyone who might have penetrated the taping capability in the Oval Office?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. No.~~

Mr. Schwarz. Can I follow up some of the questions that Senator Baker asked you about Oswald?

What about the pictures, one of which was a picture of Leontov that was in a piece of paper found in Mr. Oswald's pocket when he was arrested in Mexico?

Mr. Angleton. There is an allegation.

Mr. Schwarz. What connection is there between that picture and that allegation and Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. The only thing is, Oswald's trip to Mexico was to go to Cuba allegedly to contact the Soviets.

Mr. Schwarz. And was Leontov then in Mexico, or --

Mr. Angleton. I don't know, because the double agent whom we believe was actually controlled by the Soviets, Byetkov, gave us information which we would now regard as private, which would tend to absolve the Soviets of any implication with Oswald.

Mr. Schwarz. When you acquired from a number of sources the information that the KGB had spent some six months --

Mr. Angleton. We only acquired the hard stuff of six months and what they did from one man who was very high in the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Without getting into what his name was, when did you acquire the information?

Mr. Angleton. 1967, or thereabouts.

Mr. Schwarz. So it was after the Warren Commission had reached its conclusions?

Mr. Angleton. Did you have any such information during the life of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I think the only thing was the Nosenko --

Senator Baker. Which was suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. We suppressed it, because Nosenko arrived at a very brief time after the assassination as a KGB defector.

Senator Baker. And he is the one that you think now as a planted agent?

Mr. Angleton. Yes. They thought he was sent on a mission.

Mr. Schwarz. Suppressed by whom?

Mr. Angleton. Suppressed from the Warren Commission.

Mr. Schwarz. You said that Nosenko, one of the reasons you suspected Nosenko was a double agent, or a planted agent, rather, was because he was saying things that were contradictory to some other high quality person who theretofore had been giving you information before Nosenko came to this country?

Mr. Angleton. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the nature of the information relating to the Kennedy assassination that the high quality person had given you?

Mr. Schwarz. Let me say this so that it makes a little more sense.

In December 1961 a member of the KGB in Helsinki defected to us. His name is Golitzen. GOLITSYN He has never been in service, except Jack Anderson came out with an erroneous account of it, alleging that he had stated there was a plot to assassinate Nixon. He did not make such a statement.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you think this statement should be on the record?

Mr. Angleton. I don't mind it being on the record after the Anderson article. They have been looking for him.

Now, his is probably without any question the most major defection since World War II as far as Soviet intentions, Soviet organization, and Soviet operations are concerned. And the reason, among others, that it was so important was

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

he had decided to defect many years prior to December of 1961, if the opportunity ever arrived. And therefore he used those many years breaking down the compartmentalization of the KGB in order to acquire the kind of information which would be most valuable to the US, and to our allies.

Therefore he refused many assignemtns abroad, but tried to always remain in headquarters and get himself appointed to investigative commissions and other things of this sort which would get into everybody elses's business. Among other things, he spent many years in the training schools for people who came back for six weeks from different parts of the world to brag about their achievements. And he absorbed all of this information.

And among other things, he stated that he gave the crytograms and circumstantial evidence of penetrations throughout the West.

And then the Soviets rapidly transferred 300 of their people after his defection. And as is normal in a case of this kind, the big problem is to write a damage report, which means the whole service would come to a standstill. And the objective would be to review all paper files and everything that showed his initials. And you usually would have three categories of information: you would have information which he definitely had knowledge of, and information which he did not have knowledge of, and information which you are not ceratin about.

Now, when we did a similar operation on the Sergeant Dunlop who was working in the National Security Agency and committed suicide, if I am not mistaken we came to approximately 400,000 documents that he could have had access to, although he may not have had. And it is interesting to note that after his assassination, in a search of the quarters, the Bureay, or whoever did the search, found six of my letters to NSA relating to information from Golitzen.

Senator Baker. Did you speak of the assassination?

Mr. Angleton. What did you say?

Mr. Miller. Did you say Mr. Dunlop?

Mr. Angleton. After his suicide. I am sorry.

Mr. Miller. You used the term assassination.

Mr. Angleton. I meant suicide.

Mr. Miller. The word is interesting, because it is charged, as you know, that he was assassinated.

Mr. Angleton. Maybe I was thinking out loud or something.

In any event, the 1969 Golitzen reports to NSA were in a plastic bag, as I recall, in the attic. And there was a question of whether he passed them before or after.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, what we were on was, I was asking you, you testified earlier --

Mr. Angleton. I just wanted to say Golitzen was so enormous to the Western world because we immediately moved on

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

those cases which were perishable, the French, the British, and ourselves, et cetera. And we had never had a second Chief Director, which means the FBI type of Soviet, defector in our lives, and all of this out of the blue, and no contact as in Geneva six months after the defection of Golitzen.

Mr. Schwarz. And the date is when in relations to the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. Well, this was a contact, this was not a defection. He came to us once for information prior to the assassination.

And then in Moscow the Soviets -- and I am not going into a lot of names, a member of the Second Chief Directorate, gave an American tourist a stack of documents from the Second Chief Directorate, the FBI, relating to how they got (blank), and others of our agents, which showed they didn't get them through a two-headed source, but they got it through a (blank) on our side.

So the leads rant into the thousands from Golitzen, and thousands and thousands of pages of transcript, interrogation, exhibiting photographs, and identifications, which in turn would refresh his memory on other courses. And out of that came the finalization of the case of Philby, Burgess, and all that, the Vassily case in the British Admiralty, and some other cases, and many cases in France and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Did Oswald show up at that time?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Angleton. No, not from Golit~~zen~~syn.

But when the assassination took place --

Mr. Schwarz. The Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Angleton. When the Kennedy assassination took place, Golit~~zen~~syn called me immediately and stated that the modus operandi with any defector from anybody's army to the Soviet Union required that he go through processing by the 13th Department of the KGB.

Mr. Schwarz. Which is their assassination department?

Mr. Angleton. Which is their assassination department, which is called their Affairs for Executive Action.

And there are two reasons for it. Number one was, to find out what sophisticated weaponry or training he might have had that would be of use to them. And number two, whether it was more valuable to reinfiltrate him into the National Army for future activity.

Mr. Schwarz. Of the nature of assassinations?

Mr. Angleton. Of anything. It could be sabotage, or intelligence, or whatever.

AND THIS WAS THE SOP on the dealing with military defectors.

Now. when the Soviet Government turned over to the US all the documents that led to the interest regarding Oswald stay in the Soviet Union, there was nothing there indicating processing by Department 13. Then after the assassination

Nosenko, whom we hid once in Geneva, he went back to Moscow. And in my view he would have never come back on the scene because they brought this CHEREPANOV Cheraponov thing in to have the locus shifted from where we would have controls, in Geneva, to Moscow where they would have all the controls. And that would be the Directorate. And therefore they would have the direct means of counteracting and mutilating the leads and the importance of Golitzen's defection.

But the tourist gave the documents to the American Embassy. And we photographed them. The Charge insisted on giving them back to the Soviets on grounds that it would be appropriate.

Mr. Schwarz. These are not the official documents dealing with Oswald but the documents that the man tried to pass in Switzerland?

Mr. Angleton. The Second Chief Directorate, he took all of the documents out of the FBI Soviet section and gave them to the tourist and we read how we got caught on things.

So there is the assassination. Cheraponov allegedly was chased to the Turkish border and shot. And in my view this is a myth, because in 1948 Cheraponov was stationed in Belgrade, and he tried to defect to us, and at another time tried to establish liaison and contact with the Birtish MI-6, at a time when Philby was Chief of Intelligence, meaning that the approach would have been under Philby in 1948, and then he reappears in the early 1960's as a member of the Second Chief Directorate.

That is enough of Cherapanov. But it is important only from the Soviet point of view, the best laid plans fall apart.

And then out of the blue, Nosenko, whom we would never have seen again, reappears after the assassination in Geneva, and tells us he wants to defect.

Mr. Schwarz. And he provided information which was inconsistent with Oswald being the Russian agent?

Mr. Angleton. I am coming to that.

So immediately we tried to get the breadth of his career so that we know where the priorities are. And the first thing he tells us is that while he was in the Second Chief Directorate in the American Section, Oswald's KGB dossier went over his desk. And his first story, as I recall it, was that it was two volumes or three volumes. And finally it went down to one volume and a small sheaf of papers.

Also he said that the dossier showed clearly that Oswald was mentally unbalanced, and that he was a poor shot, and therefore couldn't get a hunting license, and a lot of stuff of this sort.

And then on all of these outstanding leads -- penetrations, of the French, the Americans, the British codes, bugging of the Embassy, all of these different sorts -- Nosenko had something to do which diverted us from Nosenko's leads. And in the normal course of events, we might have put Golitzen in contact with Nosenko, which may have meant the assassination of Golitzen, because the whole approach of Nosenko was one where logically you would bring them in and have two bodies, one from the First Chief Directorate, that is, Golitzen, the CIA part of the system, and the other from the FBI part of the system, and therefore you would have a very strong balance against the KGB. But we didn't do that. Because there were certain things, litmus papers, questions put to Nosenko. And as far as I was concerned, if he was bona fide he would have answered one way, and he did not answer that way. And they had to do with some deeper secrets regarding a meeting of the 2000 members of the KGB and the Soviet Government in May of 1959, presided over by Shelepin and attended by many members of the Central Committee on the reorientation of the Soviet Services and the return to Leninism wherever intelligence operations has a political objective. And this is a part of the process of de-Stalinization. And so when we took him unwittingly chronologically through his career, he omits all of this phase. And we had three or four or five other test things, where their damage report would not show that Golitzen had access, because it was part of his way of getting in and breaking compartmentation. And therefore they would have no evidence that he had sufficient knowledge.

Mr. Schwarz. And so Nosenko looked funny to you, he looked wrong to you?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Schwarz. He looked like a plant to you?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely.

Mr. Schwarz. And among the information that he provided to you was that Oswald was a mental case and was a bad shot?

Mr. Angleton. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. And you had also received from Nosenko --

Mr. Angleton. Golitzen -- from Golitzen -- information that suggested the normal practice was for Department 13, which had responsibility from the Russian KGB for assassinations, to interview military defectors. And we had observed that when the Russians transferred documents concerning Oswald, that there was no reference in there to any such debriefing by Department 13. And another important part of it is that there was a man who was handling George Blake from London, who was Counselor of the Soviet Embassy. And when he returned he became head of the 13 Department, General Rodin. But he was there under an alias as a civilian. He was the Chief of the KGB in London, and a very high grade man. Then he took over the Department 13 and reinvigorated it.

Mr. Schwarz. And what was his connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying that he was head of Department 13, and was head of Department 13 at a time -- I mean, he had a long history in that, in other words, the prominence of

76000011475

Department 13 and this is a point I think I should make, that the Agency, unlike the Soviets, does not have an assassination department. The Soviets have always had an assassination department, which is totally sealed off from the rest of the organization. People from the outside know very little about what goes on in that. People career-wise stay in there. And they report to the Chairman of the KGB, and drop off, who in turn report to the Politboro. And therefore it is an entirely sealed organization which is capable of all forms of action, whether it be sabotage -- an illegal sabotage or what, an illegal directorate which is independent of the rest of the KGB -- nuclear sabotage, and all this type of thing, and infiltration of enemy forces in the event of war. And of course assassination, the assassination of Ukrainian leaders in West Germany.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you recount that simply because it makes more significant the absence of any reference to Oswald because you are giving evidence as to the vigor of Department 13, or did you recount it because there is a more direct connection with Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. This is related to what I told Mr. Dulles, I thought it was absolutely wrong to close the door on the life of the Commission, and instead there should be a statement that we are not in a position -- that on the fact available to us during the given period, these are our conclusions. And then to spell out in detail Department 13 and its organization -- and the burden of proof shigts. But not only the burden of proof, but you never know when a worm goes into somebody's head to defect from Department 13. And that bring you up on the entire story.

Mr. Schwarz. So you have recounted the importance of Department 13. You have recounted the significance in your mind of the absence of any reference to Department 13 in the documentation on Oswald turned over by the Soviets to the US. And you have recounted the strange nature of the information provided by Nosenko.

Mr. Angleton. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me ask you another line of questions about each one of these items. As to the Nosenko information, you stated that that information was suppressed from the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. The word suppression is probably not the right word because, I will be very honest with you, I was told the other day that the information was given classified, and it was given to Helms or somebody, or Mr. McCone, who passed it as a classified document. I have asked for it, but I haven't seen it.

Mr. Schwarz. Why did you say a moment ago that it was suppressed?

Mr. Angleton. Because I never knew where it went. When

I was sitting in the position as to where that information would go, I was opposed to it. And my pfficial position was that. And I ghought until relatively recently that it never went.

And then all of a sudden they have declassified a lot of stuff. And Mr. Rocca Rocha, who was the point of record of the Agency's dealing with the Warren Commission, told me that Nosenko stuff was the stuff they were declassifying. Now, his role was not one of the executive nature. Actually it was simply because he was a great scholar and a great many other things, and therefore he had the most catholic background to handle something as eomplex as the Warren Commission, not in exercising executive power, but working on behalf of the Director and all the Directorates and everything pertaining to the Warren Commission. He is a tidy individual. And in fact Mr. Belin has made a great deal of use of him in the Commission's business, and he is the one that had done all the digging for the Commission, and so on, on a whole series of matters that I am not familiar with.

But my point to you -- and this is very difficult to explain -- is that the question of Nosenko created a very great division in the life of all counterintelligence as to bona fides, as in all questions of when you are dealing with double identification agents, there is always dispute.

But let me just line up the order of battle here. Our

Chief of the Soviet Division accepted the fact that the man was a provocation. His Chief of Counterintelligence accepted the fact that the man was a provocation.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you mean provocation, or providing false information?

Mr. Angleton. An Agent Provocateur.

I said he was false. My man said he was false. And it isn't a parrot affair, each one reads the same stuff and analyzes and come to their own conclusion. And Golitzen, who defected, based only on the Geneva, first encounter in Geneva, not the defection, had predicted in advance that because of the enormity of his defection they would send a provocateur into the West to destroy and mutilate his leads.

So it was a question of awaiting, you might say, who knocks on the door. And here is Nosenko.

Now, since then the Chief of the Soviet Division who is no longer there, has recanted in a way -- the Inspector General went into all this -- he is today the NIO dealing in Soviet Affairs, the National Intelligence Officer on Soviet Affairs. And his counterintelligence man, a fellow named Pete Bagley, who is the brother of the two Admirals Bagley, and one of the best men we had, left the Agency and is now in Belgium in private life. And I can go all the way through these other people who have been dispersed. But the record will clearly reflect that the preponderance of all individuals was that Nosenko was sent on a mission.

Mr. Schwarz. And provided false information?

Now, is it your current understanding that what was provided to the Warren Commission was the raw infomration brought by Nosenko, or was the Warren Commission also provided with the opinion of persons such as yourself and others as you have recounted that he was providing false information?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Warren Commission was ever faced with the issue of the internal issues of Golitzen or Nosenko.

Mr. Schwarz. You first said that the information was suppressed from the Warren Commission, and then you said no, it is your understanding now --

Mr. Angleton. Well, the word suppression isn't the right word, I said. One went to argue the matter and it was agreed by higher authority that the information shouldn't be --

Senator Mathias. There was a value judgment made as to the usefulness of the material?

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- and not to do what the Soviet in our mind wanted us to do, which eas to give it prominence and have it come out as an official part of the record and documents and articles, and so on.

Mr. Schwarz. But your current understanding is that the information was provided?

Mr. Angleton. That was classified, and never came out in public.

Mr. Schwarz. But was nevertheless provided to the Commission?

Mr. Angleton. It was made known to them in some fashion.

Mr. Schwarz. Was it made known to them at the same time that at leat certain experts withing the Agency thought it was false information?

Mr. Angleton. I think, as I understand it now, that in spite of our feelings, either Helms or McCone made a presentation of it.

Mr. Schwarz. But without mentioning your feelings, certain experts thought that it was false?

Mr. Angleton. I can't respond to that. I don't know.

Mr. Schwarz. What about the information derived from Golitzen, which indicated in your expert opinion that the documents provided by the Soviet Union were, I think you put it, funny, or strange, or misleading, because they did not include any reference to debriefing by Department 13, was that information provided to the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. I don't think so. But all I can say there is this, to be realistic. No one would expect the Soviet Government, regardless, to provide documents, secret documents, on Oswald, whether he was or was not their agent. And I say, I can go all the way back through history, the way they falsified the official record, they had it with the Italians in 1923, Constatinople, and cases on diplomatic issues, the complete thing was fabricated, and so on. And there is no way of testing them, the security is such that they can't be tested.

So we are not under any illusions of expecting them to state that he went through the 13 Department, which asked him the following questions.

Mr. Schwarz. So you say that as far as that matter goes there is no possibility that anybody on the Warren Commission was fooled?

Mr. Angleton. I mean, I don't think anybody was. I didn't follow the Warren Commission, Rocha followed it, and he was running over there all the time, and so on.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me ask you. There would have been no reason why anyone on the Warren Commission would have known that as a matter of everyday business that they did in fact run every defector through Department 13?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think we ever told them. But you see, Allen Dulles -- that is what I am coming to -- I used to see Allen Dulles regularly, and I was an advisor officially to him on a lot of headaches, and I dida lot of leg work for him. And I regarded him as a very personal friend. And I am Executor of his papers, among other things.

But the point I am coming to is, to try to give him guidance of what the jungle is around here in terms of the

FBI's position and Mr. Hoover's, and so on, so that he would be more sensitive to the things, no longer being Director, that were no longer germain to his position on the matter.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there a connection between the FBI and Oswald?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know the full FBI story. I know there was a tremendous flap in the Bureau. And one of the best men they had in my view is a professional a man called Burt Turner, who I understand just got his law degree. And Burt Turner was one of the finest men on Soviet KGB activities in the US, one of the analyzts. And he was in the Washington Field Office. And it is my understanding -- and this is basically hearsay, but from pretty good sources -- that Burt Turner was handling the Oswald or~~e~~ related matters at the time the President made the trip down to Texas, and that there was some confusion that the Bureau had not turned over, or had not taken enough initiative in turning over, all the information on Oswald to the local police. I had been told that there was a black mark put against Turner's name, and that he confronted Mr. Hoover and stated he was not going to permit, or have it be known to his children, that his negligence was responsible for the death of the President. And he was pretty forceful about his position. And as a result, this was expunged or something to that effect. And that is the reason he went to the Washington Field Office instead of staying in

Headquarters.

And then he retired. And I think his retirement had something to do with this fact.

But this is all by virtue of hindsight with the thousands of cases. And I cannot see any Western intelligence service seizing on facts that Oswald will return to the US, and then going and saying, we will get all of this, and we will send it to Texas.

What I am trying to say, is that the difference in their system. With the manpower and the computers, which are mainly ours, and whatnot, a situation of that sort is automatic. And we know enought about the Second Chief Directorate and the controls, the total controls, to know that if a Soviet returned automatically, to any part of the Soviet Union he went, there would be a dossier that would go, and there would be also an operational directive to put him on tap, check his mail, to do the following, and so on and to put an agent near him. There wouldn't be any leaking anything in the air on that. There would be total encapsulation of that individual until it was ceratin beyond a shadow of a doubt that he was not sent back as an agent.

Mr. Schwarz. A moment ago in talking about the line-up, as I think you put it, of views on Nosenko, you recounted the views of a number of people. And you said that one person had changed his mind or recanted subsequently. And you made a reference in that connection to an Inspector General's report. What was that report?

Mr. Angleton. At one stage in all of this -- and it was much later, after all the dust settled -- Helms got the Inspector General, who had come from the clandestine side of our business, to institute -- I don't like to use the word inspection, it is too authoritative -- to go into the Nosenko matter and see if there is anything there that he should know, because Helms is fully aware of the split on this whole question of bona fides, and it bothered him, because I had brought him in touch with Golitzen, and he was fully aware of all my activities, and travels and so on.

And so this person who was chosen began to interview everybody and reopen the whole thing. I mean, there were 21 safe leads of stuff if you really got into all of the Golitzen and Nosenko and the other things that pertained, as I pointed out. to the Warren Commission, to the asininity of what has happened, of 27 years of experience of myself and my two colleagues, that these are the facts, that there are 20 cases --

Mr. Schwarz. You said Warren Commission. You mean Rockefeller?

Mr. Angleton. Excuse me, Rockefeller.

There are 20 some odd cases that a counterintelligence officer in our busienss should know before he even begins to get his feet wet.

Now, when Dr. Schlesinger came in, and I started hearing all of these things of manaement by objectives, and synergistic and a lot of other things, being applied to the art forms which we had developed, I finally got so frustrated that I thought I would take him up on his own thing. So I got statisticians in to take all the safes and figure out the linear footage of every safe drawer, all the way on through, and to computerize how long it would take the normal case officer to come up to this elemental stage of being able to be launched.

That was sort of a preparatory business. And they figured it out and they said it would take 22 man years, we meant that if we were 100 percent incorrect, it would be 11 man years. And that was simply to apprise Schlesinger, and Colby, who had never been in counterintelligence, of what all this problem was about. They had the idea of transferring people back and forth and all the rest of it. And I nver chose anybody in that job as a rule who had [not] either been in the FBI or had not had very rich experience in counterintelligence. And normally I kept outside leaks to anybody in the business -- I had men who stayed with me for 11 years, Rocca was with me for 31 years, even though they went into operational situations abroad and returned, and so on.

And I say this to you, because here was an IG, and Inspector General, who had had a very lofty mission in Germany, where we used to have two or 300 new people --

Mr. Schwarz. Was this Mr. Ermine?

Mr. Angleton. No, he was never brought. He was Gordon Stewart -- and he is retired -- a very able man, and a fine executive. And I mean this sincerely. He is one of the really top-notch men.

But he as to undertake this burden. And it was a farce in terms -- so he would talk to people and get their views and so on.

When I went to the former Chief of the Soviet Division, who was then stationed in Paris -- and this is only hearsay, I never read the report -- the former Chief of the Soviet Division stated, when I look back it, perhaps I have given too much latitude to my subordinates. And he wouldn't say yea or nay, but he withdrew his very firm statement of the past that this man Nosenko was an agent provocateur.

Mr. Schwarz. Did the review concern in any way the handling of the matter with the Warren Commission?

Mr. Angleton. No, not to my knowledge. I mean, this may be something. I don't think I have evern seen the review -- in fact, I don't know whether the review was ever put in the paper. But I mention it simply so that you don't get the idea that it was just the ~~CIA~~ CI staff that had this view. This was a view that was shared by numbers of people who had dealings with Nosenko. And I think the greatest authority of all is Golitzen himself, who was in the KGB, and who knew everything. And he lived there for 16 or 18 years of his life.

Mr. Schwarz. Earlier you mentioned that you put Mr. Harvey in touch with the Israeli's during the Cuban business. And we have had a lot of testimony about Mr. Harvey, so we are moderately well aware of his activities.

Mr. Angleton. I am sorry.

Mr. Schwarz. We know who Mr. Harvy is and we have had a fair amount of testimony about some of the things he had done. What was the connection between him and the Israeli's during the Cuban business?

Mr. Angleton. I will put it very briefly --

Senator Tower. What is the Cuban business specifically?

Mr. Schwarz. The witness used the expression Cuban business. I guess I should ask first, what do you mean by the Cuban business, and second, what was is the connection between Mr. Harvey and the Israeli's on this matter?

Mr. Kirbow. You are really asking, what is the importance of putting him in touch with them in relation to Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey was put in charge of taking over the Cuban business, the Cuban business being the Clandestine Services activity into Cuba. Now, what struck me, not having had any part of the Bay of Pigs, because of differences with Bissell, was that it seemed to me that both the Cubans and the Soviets knew everything that was being

7600011433

planned. In other words, they had the thing penetrated, and it was foredoomed.

Mr. Schwarz. Through the exile community in Miami?

Mr. Angleton. No, through Soviet agents and everything, and so on, there was no cover or second investigation or anything.

So when Bill took over in the Cuban business, then I decided that since we were very close friends that I would try to help him out by getting him a source totally unknown to everybody. And I went to the Israeli's. And I had them assign a man to Havana, whom I happened to know very well. He was born in Bulgaris. He can speak Russian and the Balkan countries' languages. He is today their senior man on Soviet intelligence. He was a young officer in the days I am speaking of. And he was sent to Havana, which meant that here he was -- and the communications were from him in a one time pattern, I mean total security, from Havana to Tel Aviv, to me, and from me to Bill. And no one knew of his existence or his identify, except Harvey and myself, and of course, Dick Helms.

Mr. Schwarz. McCone?

Mr. Angleton. I can't remember whether -- yes, McCone would have know, but he wouldn't have been interested.

What I am trying to say is, he knew.

Mr. Kirbow. Helms knew because he was DDP --

Mr. Angleton. He knew, because even before I went into this I told him what I was going to do, and he agreed, and so on.

And also I wanted a person, because there was a radio going to be put into Havana, and let somebody say we need a radio in Havana, or drop some men in. And then the point is, I get the radio to Tel Aviv, and to Havana and then put it someplace, and then tell him, you go to such and such a place and find the radio, and then have some men come in and call some men to make contact, with the view that I couldn't trust the whole setup.

So for many a long period of time this worked perfectly. This individual established his cover. They only had two or three people in the Embassy there. He would go to a Hungarian restaurant where the Soviet officers would also go. And he would spot one of the waiters or a headwater who was Jewish and it wouldn't be long before he would say, you are from the Israeli Embassy, and pretty soon one thing led to another, and his production was without question the greatest production there was.

Well, it got so complex in names and geography, and so on, that is when I came to the point that I brought Harvey together secretly with this individual, the only person I put in touch was an Israeli in this context. So later on the Soviets come out with the statement, is Bill Harvey on the with. It looks big today to you, but when you think of what the Agency's efforts were at that time in the Miami base with all the boats and the biggest Navy in the world, and all the rest, a little thing involving one man was not a thing that you went up and made a fuss to Mr. McCone about.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know Mr. Harvey pretty well, was he someone you knew?

Mr. Angleton. Very well indeed. In fact, I just called him the other day, his mother died.

Mr. Schwarz. I heard that.

Did you know anything about his use of underworld figures in connection with --

Mr. Angleton. I know the allegations.

Mr. Schwarz. At the time did you know of that?

Mr. Angleton. I only know one incident.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

Mr. Angleton. Simply the Bureau, the FBI, ran a surveillance. And Sam Papich, who was the Liaison Officer of the FBI, who is now Head of the Criminal Commission in

Italy

Mexico, was at my house around 10 o'clock at night. And the Washington Field Office or Headquarters Miami located Papich at my house. They were absolutely boiling, because they had surveiled the Mafia all the way from California to National Airport, and he had got off the plane and was met by a man who was the physical description of Bill to a teel. And they thought it was Bill. And they were checking with Papich what to do.

Mr. Schwarz. That was Mr. Roselli, was it?

Mr. Angleton. I think it was.

Mr. Kirbow. And the Bill you speak of here is Bill Harvey?

Mr. Angleton. Bill Harvey.

So I could get the gist of Bill's questions to them. And I told him -- I made a motion to put his hand over the phone and not to let them discuss it. And I said, tell them not to do anything until they hear from you.

And that is what he told them, he said, stand down on this and I will be back in touch.

And then Bill told me the whole story in detail of how he had gone over from California and followed him in this thing, and how Harvey had put him in his car and he went off.

Mr. Schwarz. That was in 1973 shortly before Mr. Harvey went to Rome?

Mr. Angleton. It wasn't shortly before, it was, I think quite a long time before.

So then I told Sam, I said, look, let's go very easy on this -- because I didn't know anything about Bill's connection with the Mafia and all that, but I did know him well enough to know that he was not a frivolous man, and that this thing happened, and keep in mind that ex-FBI men, contrary to public opinion, were not very much liked by Mr. Hoover when they left the FBI.

So I called Bill's house, and I asked his wife, is Bill around?

And she said, no, he is out to dinner tonight.

And I said, look, we have some very serious trouble. Would you please tell me where I can locate him.

And she said, he is at Duke Zeibert's. And I called Duke Zeibert's and I managed to get him. And I turned the phone over to Papich, because I did not want to be on the record showing that this was Angleton, et cetera.

And Papich talked to Bill, and actually I didn't hear the discussion. It was something about, I will see you tomorrow.

And Sam told the surveillance and all the other people to forget it, and the Headquarters would take over.

And that is my knowledge, direct knowledge of what Anderson and everybody else has stated.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Angleton, to your specific knowledge did Bill ever attempt to use the excellent contact he had in Havana to carry out the mission of eliminating the leader down there, or try to get any help out of him in that regard?

Mr. Angleton. He knows that I would have cut his throat.

Mr. Kirbow. That would have jeopardized your entire contact with the Israeli's?

Mr. Angleton. Yes sir.

NBR

Senator Tower. We will take a recess for about two minutes while we go up and vote.

(A short recess was taken)

~~Senator Tower. On the record.~~

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't have anything more.

Senator Tower. You have read this, and Szulc says in this galley -- this is a galley of the Szulc article in Penthouse:

"Although the details of the Israeli nuclear enterprise are still top secret, it is known that in the wake of the 1956 Suez war, the Eisenhower Administration resolved to provide Israel with all possible help in developing an atomic weapon. The Israelis had the theoretical knowledge, but they needed technological support at their Dimona nuclear research center in the Negev Desert.

"According to the top intelligence sources, the CIA was charged with the responsibility of providing this support to the Israelis."

Do you have knowledge that the CIA was charged with such responsibilities?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely to the contrary.

Senator Tower. "--Angleton directed the effort?"

Mr. Angleton. False.

Senator Tower. That it totally false?

Mr. Angleton. That is totally false.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

7600011195

"Several nuclear scientists were secretly sent to Israel to work with Dimona scientists."

Mr. Angleton. False. I will interject here that the French sent 400 as a matter of the original deal with the Israeli's to Dimona.

Senator Tower. The reference here is to nuclear weaponry. And this means sent by the CIA, as I interpret it.

Mr. Angleton. It is false.

Senator Tower. "The most important of them, according to intelligence sources, was a British-born physicist, now an American citizen working for the US Government in Washington, with special and esoteric ties to the CIA."

Mr. Angleton. No. The allegation is false.

Senator Tower. The answer to your previous question would cover that one, too, I assume.

"Persons close to Angleton have confirmed this account in recent interviews. Reflecting Angleton's own position, however, they have denied assertions from other sources that the CIA team made fissinoable material -- plutonimum -- available to the Israelies from United States stocks."

Mr. Schwarz. As far as your are concerned is that statement right or wrong?

Mr. Angleton. I am saying, when he says deny it, I deny it.

Senator Tower. I think it was taken care of in that

TOP SECRET

NBR

7600011497

second paragraph, is where all the questions are raised.

Really, the CIA would be hard put to transfer any fissionable materials without the knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission, would it not?

Mr. Angleton. Sir, I can assure you that the CIA -- I don't really know what the word fissionable means anymore. There is so much use of the atomic energy. We have atomic battery --

Senator Tower. By fissionable materials, I think the reference here is that could be converted to weapons.

Mr. Angleton. I just don't categorically -- in my whole history in the CIA, nothing ever involved fissionable material except intelligence about it or speculations regarding leakages and so forth.

Senator Tower. In other words, the CIA doesn't have control over any stocks of fissionable materials independently?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Senator Tower. And therefore the CIA could not acquire such materials except through the knowledge of the Atomic Energy Commission?

Mr. Angleton. That is right -- I hate to nit pick, but I want to simply state that there was a problem in the Agency once where you have, say, somebody simply approach you and state, I have access to fissionable materials, and therefore if it is a covert thing, and it raises a big policy question.

NBR

~~how do we deal with those kinds of cases, where someone allegedly, a confidence man, or whatnot, who wants to sell you the stuff? The purpose then was to penetrate, or try to penetrate. And I wonder if there wasn't a question at one stage as to what we do about it, and what the dangers would be if we use the diplomatic pouch, and there are thousands of questions. And it did happen in the Far East. And it was a false case, confidential case. But it did happen. There was an offer to sell us atomic fissionable material or something. But my point is, there has never been initiative to my knowledge, or an interest of the CIA in any shape or form wanting any fissionable material.~~

~~Senator Tower. Dave.~~

~~Mr. Aaron. Two small points. Mr. Szulc said that "In effect Mr. Angleton said at one point that should I surface Mr. Mann's name, Dr. Mann's name, he may go as far as to commit suicide."~~

~~Did you ever say that to Mr. Szulc?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. I don't think I said it to him. But in the back of my mind -- after I left you -- was what I think I told you -- and maybe I didn't tell you, maybe I told Colby, that is what bothers me -- the Royal Canadian Mounted Police still have an open espionage case in which a report of theirs alleges that either Dr. Mann being present or something that someone tried to cut his throat in Philby's house in~~

NBR

7600011433

~~Washington, when Philby was stationed there. Now, whether we had the report or not I don't know. So I am a little confused as to that statement. Because I don't think the question of using Mann's name came up other than in the context of the allegation that Mann was sent by me, and would this mean, if it came out in terms of the Head of Services, who had called for phrases, British, French, et cetera, and they would have this confirmation, one, do they know anything about my Israeli activities now, and then the most damaging would be the entire information on Mann and Philby, et cetera.~~

~~Mr. Aaron. Let me just read one other segment of his testimony: "Angleton said after recounting the story of the transfer of atomic technology Mr. Szulc went on and said, Angleton said that he was rather taken back by this information, said that in effect he could confirm it with corrections: one, the timeframe was wrong, that it was not the early '60's, but indeed the late '50's after the Suez war, and number two, that as far as he was concerned there was not delivered by the CIA, or anyone to his knowledge any fissionable material such as plutonium or other material."~~

~~Mr. Angleton. I don't follow that at all.~~

~~Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.~~

~~Mr. Aaron. Did you make those two corrections?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. I don't understand what you are saying.~~

NBR

76000 11590

Senator Tower. He is reading -- actually what he read a little earlier to you was in terms of trying to bring out that you did not agree with his story, that you did not confirm the validity of it.

Mr. Angleton. That part is correct. But I am not following this last part you are reading.

Mr. Aaron. Let me show it to you and you read it.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you identify the page and the line?

Mr. Aaron. The page is page 40, beginning at line 19 and running to the end of the page.

Mr. Angleton. That said in effect he could confirm it, that is the "it" business?

Mr. Aaron. Start back further and get the general story.

Mr. Angleton. This is false, on page 40, from line 8, "Mr. Angleton told me that essentially this information was correct," that is absolutely false.

And I never made any such statement that I could confirm it -- lines 19 and 20, "Angleton said he was really taken back and in effect he could confirm the two corrections." That is false.

Mr. Aaron. I think that covers it.

Mr. Angleton. And this is false: "one or more distinguished pure scientists or physicists whose services were available to the US Government", that is totally false.

Mr. Aaron. Let me ask one last question.

Mr. Angleton. When I say technical assistance, that is a quite different matter.

Mr. Kirbow. You do not mean technical assistance in the nuclear field whatever?

Mr. Angleton. He knew what I was stating was this stuff that has come out in volumes of Sadat's resume of CIA's help to the Israelis, which was accurate.

Senator Tower. By technical assistance here, as I understand it, he means technical assistance and nuclear weapons development.

Mr. Angleton. That is right. And that is deliberately on his part a misstatement of the fact. And that is what I am trying to say.

Senator Tower. He did admit to technical assistance in terms of intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. No, it wasn't a question of my admitting, I told him that it was well-known that in the whole field of ELINT and many things, that we have worked closely with the Israelis.

Senator Tower. But not specifically, technical assistance and nuclear weapon development?

Mr. Angleton. That subject wasn't in existence.

Mr. Aaron. Mr. Angleton, is it possible that one source of this story could be alleged operations by the Israelis

NBR

intelligence service in the US in regard to the efforts to acquire nuclear technology or material?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Let me just state my own feeling about some of this. After he talked to me about having all those great sources which were better than Hirsch's, he said, I also have talked to Israeli intelligence. Well, I knew right away that that was a lie. I said, after 22 years' work with some people, they would have been having me out of bed at 3 in the morning. In other words, in 22 years I have never known them to withhold anything germain to our common activity. So that for American jounalists to go and try to pump things out of me regarding the subject, he wouldn't have got home before -- that is the first thing. That is the fact. And he said this Israeli fellow said something about, something I don't discuss, or words to that effect, I can't remember that part of it.

So there isn't much more to say about that.

Mr. Aaron. Were there Israeli intelligence efforts in the US in the 1960's or at any time aimed at acquiring either nuclear technology or information that would have a bearing on this story?

Mr. Angleton. There have been many efforts by many countries to acquire technical knowledge in this country, and that doesn't exclude the Israelis.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you have specific knowledge of instances

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

760001150[illegible]

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

~~while you were employed with the Agency, Mr. Angleton? I believe that might be a fair question.~~

~~Senator Tower. In your capacity as Head of Counterintelligence, did it ever come to your attention -- did you ever have any certain knowledge that Israeli agents were actually trying to acquire nuclear secrets in the US, atomic secrets?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. Do I have to respond to that?~~

~~Mr. Kirbow. Would you like to go off the record a moment, Mr. Chairman.~~

~~Senator Tower. We can go off the record.~~

~~(Off the record discussion)~~

NBR

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I would suggest that perhaps we defer that subject for the moment. I am sure we will be meeting with Mr. Angleton again.

Senator Tower. Then, too, we can get the FBI matter in the meantime.

I have just a couple of questions that I would appreciate it if Mr. Angleton would give us his evaluations as an expert on. And they go back to his testimony relative to the Kennedy assassination.

As I recall, you said that immediately after the assassination Golitzen on his own initiative communicated with you and advised you that it was normal practice for a defector who had a military background to be processed in Department 13?

Mr. Angleton. Interrogated, or processed.

Senator Mathias. And that the implication certainly of this was that Oswald was an ex-Marine, and had been through this process, and that therefore at least that he might have been acting within the context of the Soviet plan, is that right?

Mr. Angleton. That is the thrust of what he was trying to say. His English is such that it is very difficult.

Senator Mathias. I understand. But then some years later -- my recollection is that you said it was in 1967 or 1969 -- you learned that the KGB had spent six month of employment of their top operators in the investigation of the Kennedy assassination, and wouldn't this fact in your mind negate the implication of the original Golitzen call or that they were involved?

Mr. Angleton. I want to congratulate you, because that man is a man who is also a suspect of Nosenko.

Senator Mathias. You mean in 1967?

Mr. Angleton. Just to show you the ground you are treading on, Golitzen gave us information regarding the penetration of our own organization. And we worked down to an identity. And the FBI disagreed with us. And I am talking about not a few minutes, but several weeks and months of work. And the Bureau's attitude was, you have got the wrong man, and the allegation therefore does not affect the CIA, and we

7600011155

advise that you send it to the Army.

And I might add, the man who wrote that memorandum was the Burt Turner I mentioned who was one of the competent FBI analysts. So it was in limbo. And we stated that "X" was the penetration agent, and the Bureau refused to accept that. And in 1967 a Soviet -- on whom we had a dossier on this thing, because he was once stationed in India, and therefore we knew who he was, and all the rest of it -- with an unknown coming to us as Nosenko was, he was a real man, we had years of surveillance on him, and so on. And he came, and he alleged -- and he was a TDY TDC, temporary duty in Washington here -- and he established contact with the first Mrs. Helms. And eventually I was called to take the case. And he stated that among his missions to the US was to effect the redefection or the return to the Soviet Union of a man, and that man was the man whom we had identified as a Soviet agent. And he went into the whole background, that this man was one of the highest grade illegals that they had ever had, and he was in our Agency.

So this had a tremendous impact on Burt Turner, because he was one of the two interrogating officers. And I can't talk to you about professional pride, but for a man of his competence to have done it the wrong way, that hurt.

So I had a question injected, which was, what do you know about George Blake?

Geo Blake

And then his response was, he says, we think he is dead.

Now, hwere is a man who is supposed to be Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence in KGB, whose mother was a secretary to Litvinov, and he comes therefore from the aristocracy, as Nosenko does, because his father was the Minister of Maritime Affairs. And there is a statue of Nosenko's father. And Golitzen had told us that men chosen for very dangerous missions of penetration and duplicity came from the aristocracy. Everyone trusted them, and their fathers and their families are heroes of the Soviet Union.

So here was this man who said as to Blake, we think he is dead.

Two to three weeks later is when Blake escaped from Scrubb's Woods to the Soviet Union. Now, if he had come to the US to exfiltrate as the Special Assistant to the Head of Counterintelligence, to exfiltrate a person who worked in the West as an illegal from the end of World War II, and gradually worked into us, why wouldn't he have known the exfiltartion plans of George Blake, which would have been simultaneous, because he was a Headquarters man here on TDC.

So we handled him for six or seven weeks.

And some of the most telling parts of the interrogation was that when he went back to the Soviet Union he would have access to archives. And what was on our mind, and what cryptonym that we wanted him to work up -- and this would relate to the third part of the damage part on Golitzen -- what did Golitzen know that they did not know he knew? What agents in the West could be under our control as a result of Golitzen's disclosures regarding those things?

And you can see the tremendous quality this man had of almost getting from our man those four or five crytonyms, which would have told them what they wanted to know, because there are cases they are not sure whether he knows or doesn't know, and so on. And these are officials, and so on.

So he wasn't given that. He was given stuff that was sort of medium low level stuff, you couldn't call it chicken feed -- but we never told him we disbelieved in him. And he said, if you do those things for me, I have an opportunity, because of my mother and so on, to become Head of the American Department of the KGB.

And the other thing he wanted, was, we took him to the Soviet Agency and we came out later for contacts, and he stated there was a telegram there, and he had been requested to acquire all the information possible on the whereabouts of Golitzen and Nosenko. And I was actually in Wisconsin. And I called my Deputy long distance and I said, if there is any proposal put up by that individual that would expose -- and I use the crytonym name of Golitzen -- don't.

A week later is when he got to Moscow and he sent a cable to tell us that he can give them word on everything on

Golitzen.

Coming back to what you stated, with our litmus paper and with our analysis of him, we treated him as a walk-in, as a part of the thing to confirm Nosenko's bona fides, and the build-up. And he is the one who gave the full description of the fact that for six months the place was immobilized for this investigation, of all the high level all over the works, is the way he put it.

Senator Mathias. You contrasted the way that the Russians treat a returned defector, ahd the way we treat them. And in that connection, to your knowledge was Oswald every interrogated when he teturned from Russia?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know -- I probably would know, but I don't know whether the military -- normally that would fall within the jurisdiciton of the military, since he was a military man who defected. So I don't know the answer to that.

Senator Mathias. What about from Cuba?

Mr. Angleton. I can't answer that.

Senator Mathias. Or at any time?

Mr. Angleton. I think the Bureau interviewed him.

Senator Mathias. The Bureau, not the CIA?

Mr. Angleton. I am certain we never did, no.

Senator Mathias. But you think the FBI did?

Mr. Angleton. That is just my sensation that they did.

Senator Mathias. We will follow that up.

This is the very last question. You referred to files that are maintained on persons who have some contact with the Soviet Union and the Soviet nationals. And I would like to pursue that in a personal way.

About two years ago Arbotov was in this country, and he came to lunch in my office. And we had several members of Congress there. Would this kind of thing be a matter of record?

NBR

7600011599

~~Mr. Angleton. If there was any technical coverage from the Soviet Embassy, then my answer would be yes.~~

~~Senator Mathias. My recollection is, he came with one person with him, whose name I don't remember.~~

~~Mr. Angleton. If the Bureau had him under surveillance, and he came here -- now, I am getting onto ground I don't know -- the newspaper said Mr. Hoover gave an order that the Hill was off-base, and when the Soviet came here he was never surveilled, and whom he saw was unknown. That is what the newspaper said. My own observation would be in any technical coverage of an installation, the door of an individual, would result in dossiers on all people who had contacts, if the man was suspect, or there is a reason.~~

~~Senator Tower. Excuse me. You are talking about a Soviet person visiting members here on the Hill?~~

~~Senator Mathias. Yes. And what I am trying to get at is the circumstances under which a file or dossier might be~~

NBR

7600011710

opened on a member of Congress, and I offered myself as a guinea pig that Arbatov lunch as a starting point.

At this point my question is on purely hypothetical point. I plan to go next week with the Senate group which is making a parliamentary visit to Russia. And may see Arbatov in Moscow, I would assume it would be likely. Would that become a continuing entry in such a dossier as far as you know?

Mr. Angleton. We don't have any coverage in Moscow.

Senator Mathias. Is that the kind of thing that --

Mr. Angleton. We are not living in a very ideal world in the Agency. We can't even process the hard material.

Senator Mathias. Since it is a hypothetical question, let me make it even more hypothetical. Let's say our mission, instead of visiting Moscow, visits Rome or Paris or someplace, where it is very easy for you to operate. And there were meetings with Russians who were known to have visitied me in Washington. Would that be the kind of thing which would get to a Congressional file?

Mr. Angleton. No. I imagine the British MI-5, though, because of the Russians in London, would pass through liaison to us, if there was something suspicious, would pass through a report on the meeting. And we have examples where Czech defector told us about a member of Parliament, a Soviet agent, and what the cryptonum was, and how he was recruited. And you have got other cryptonyms on British members of Parliament

NBR

7600011151

that you have not then identified. We know what they passed or some of the stuff which was passed.

Senator Mathias. Assuming a file was set up on that lunch two years ago --

Mr. Angleton. The file wouldn't be set up there on the fact -- with your name on it, it would be the Soviets, and you would be buried in the file, which would probably be that thick, of that Soviet activity in the US. And there would be the fact that he was here, and that he went to New York, and he did this or that.

Senator Mathias. So that wouldn't show up in Mathias' file, that would show up in an Arbatov file?

Mr. Angleton. That is right. That is the way it is supposed to be. And the only time where I can see a file would be opened on an American Congressman or Senator would be where there was a substantial basis for opening up that file. But that wouldn't be at the initiative of the CIA, it would be a matter that would go to the FBI and the Attorney General, and then there would be somebody in the Senate or the Congress who would be contacted and notified, and so on. And I think Mr. Hoover's practice was that he would learn through his own sources that a person who is not good was going to have lunch with a Congressman or was cultivating him, and he would pick up the money -- or this is what they say. And I think this is the way he handled it -- he would simply

NBR

call him on the phone and say, I think you should know the following, and there would be a notification that Mr. Hoover notified, et cetera. He called me once when there wasn't enough time factor for him to send a letter to me. He said, you are doing something at such and such an hour, you should know that this man is a homosexual, or so on and so on. And it may have been useful to change the course in a hurry. But it is formalized in the Bureau. When Mr. Hoover intervened on those things, it was either a question of time or a question of emphasis. But the formal part goes on regardless, if a person, regardless of who he is, is involved, or is passed a document, or comes up in a telephone tap, or any number of things, their is a record on it.

Senator Mathias. In other words, you are saying what a political friend of mine once said, that you don't get news unless you make news?

Mr. Angleton. That is one way of looking at it.

Senator Mathias. That is all, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Angleton. I want to commend you again on that question, because that fixes several things. Because if there is one thing I regret about leaving the Agency, it is the unresolved cases. And that is one of the biggest, because we know so much about that person when he was in India. And he was the most sophisticated, cultivated, high level intelligence person.

NBR

7600011513

~~Senator Baker. What would you do, Mr. Angleton, to try to rehabilitate the Agency in particular in counterintelligence capability, since you feel that it is deteriorating, what things in particular would you do?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. My feeling is that the Agency has to go through the purgatory that -- these fires that no man would put out -- and therefore let it be shocking or whatever. And let all the political repercussions take place, and if you go to purgatory, my view is, the bigger the fires, the better. So my view is, let it all come out. And let people take the consequences. I am not a believer that an agency can have two fathers. And I don't believe in inferiors reporting on their superiors by directive. And I don't believe that the Agency below the Director has to be responsive to two authorities.~~

~~Senator Baker. What two authorities?~~

~~Mr. Angleton. I mean the Congress and the Executive. In other words, if Colby is asked, what do you know about Chile, my view is that on Chile would yoy please ask the White House. And that is what I am trying to get at, at least so then they can come back with Colby after the Executive part has told Colby what it might be. But to throw the burden on the Director to respond to a question on Chile, gives him -- he is always in that dual position. And something doesn't seem to work that way. And the lower you go in the Agency, even to~~

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

7600011151

my level, to be resonsive to more than one authoity is chaos. And I am not making any puns.

Senator Baker. To be responsible to the Congress and to the --

Mr. Angleton. The word response is what disturbs me somewhat, because the secrets that we have just been discussing here are so germain to everything in this country relating to the world balance of power and what the Soviets will strike at, and what the role of detente is. That is what I am trying to get at. The Executive -- in other words, the intelligence community has never really had a day of peace in a way. When Hoover passed away, and Gray came aboard, everyone in the intelligence community believed, now we can normalize this situation. It has never been normal before. Mr. Hoover never attended an Agency meeting. Mr. Hoover never permitted one of his representatives to go beyond this jurisdiciton question. And you cannot run a government that way, and you cannot run counterintelligence that way. So when Mr. Gray came to see Mr. Helms, and Helms called me in before him and said, what position should I take, and I said, he wants to come and normalize relations, and he wants to reestablish liaison. And he said, I wouldn't accept it form him, they are the ones who brok it off. Therefore tell him that when he has read your correspondence with Mr. Hoover, and reviewed all of that, if he feels that he is capable of handling it, that you will be

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

NBR

76000111515

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

prepared to sit down and discuss the question of liaison, because liaison is a tiny part of the question of penetration and double agents and all the rest of it.

And in fact that happened, and everybody thought, we had got a captain that didn't make admiral aboard who will settle this. And then we will have his demise.

And then you had Mr. Ruckelshaus come in as as acting Director. And then the Watergate and all of that. So there has never been a stabilizing factor in this Government as it relates to, not counterintelligence alone, but the intelligence community. And now I amstrongly opposed to professionals being Directors.

I would say that a professional Director of the Agency doesn't work, he doesn't have a basis on the outside, or the perspective. And I think the Rockefeller Commission's observations were first rate in terms of the idea of two Deputy Directors who have to be confirmed and whatnot. And I think that no directorate should be expected to follow the nuts and bolts and at the same time handle all the duties of meeting and all the rest of it and try to keep an eye inside the business.

Senator Baker. What do you think of the Rockefeller Commission reports?

Mr. Angleton. I don't see anything wrong with it.

Senator Baker. Do you think it will work?

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

NBR

7600011515

Mr. Angleton. I really don't know this area. So I am not competent to speak or go around seeing what will happen in Congress, just on the simple question of Chile and the leakages and the damage that is done to US posture abroad, how much of it does this take?

Senator Baker. It wouldn't take many. That is an argumentative thing.

Mr. Angleton. All the cases we are discussing, in the hands of the wrong people, and our files in the hands of the wrong people, would have very decisive political impact upon our elections. That is what I mean, to be very frank about it.

Senator Baker. How would that happen?

Mr. Angleton. There are all kinds of information which, if it falls into the wrong hands or should they want to use it for their own ulterior motives, would be absolutely damaging.

Senator Tower. In other words, this information could be used by politicians as a political football?

Mr. Angleton. Precisely. But a man who would do it damages --

Senator Mathias. Would you give an example?

(Off the record discussion)

(Whereupon, at 6:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10006

RECORD SERIES : HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-08

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/22/1976
PAGES : 74

SUBJECTS :

ANGLETON, JAMES
CIA, METHODOLOGY
MILER, SCOTTY
DEFECTORS
FBI
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : ~~SSCSGO~~ SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10006
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 01-H-08

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : ANGLETON, JAMES; MILER, SCOTTY
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 01/22/76
PAGES : 74
SUBJECTS : ANGLETON, JAMES

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE

CIA, METHODOLOGY

FBI

MILER, SCOTTY

DEFECTORS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/24/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 1

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

R2352

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED
ON 2/15/77
BY BC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7600011259

Thursday, January 22, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF: PAGE

James Angleton
--accompanied by--
Scotty Miler 3

FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Thursday, January 22, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:10 o'clock p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Gary Hart presiding.

Present: Senators Hart of Colorado (presiding), and Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; and Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Jim Johnston, Britt Snider, Loch Johnson, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreath, Bob Kelley, Michael Epstein, Rick Inderfurth, Charles Lombard, and Pat Shea, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Hart of Colorado. Gentlemen, let's go ahead and be sworn and get under way if you don't mind.

Do you swear the testimony you're about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Angleton. I do.

Mr. Miler. I do.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Thank you very much.

Mr. Angleton at least has been before us before, and routinely we remind all witnesses that they preserve all of their constitutional rights, including the right to counsel, the right to remain silent and so forth and so on, and to have a member of the Committee present during all of the testimony.

It is my understanding we have no prepared statements to start with, so I think I'll just open it up to staff questions and interject some of my own, and I understand that the general subject matter to be discussed here today -- and we are interested in your expertise regarding the question of counterintelligence. So, we'll just have the staff members start.

TESTIMONY OF JAMES ANGLETON

ACCOMPANIED BY SCOTTY MILER

Mr. Johnson. I wonder if we could begin by having both of your gentlemen give us some information on your backgrounds, beginning with Mr. Angleton.

Mr. Angleton. I entered the OSS in 1943 from the Army, went into training in Washington and environs and then to London, and then eventually to Italy, and I took over as Chief, Counterintelligence in Italy, and eventually took over as Chief, OSS.

I returned in about '47, '48, and various jobs in both espionage and counterintelligence. At one time Chief of Operations and eventually Chief of Counterintelligence, and that was from about 1954 until 1974.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Miler?

Mr. Miler. I entered OSS in 1946. I was sent to China. I was in China until 1949, transferred to Japan, became involved in intelligence aspects of the Korean War. I served in Thailand, the Philippines, as I said, China, Japan, Ethiopia. I traveled extensively, was a station chief abroad, and for the last ten years I have been in Counterintelligence, first in the Special Investigations, and subsequently as Chief of Operations for Mr. Angleton's Counterintelligence Staff.

And when I left the Agency in December of '74, that was my position.

Mr. Johnson. So both of you left the CIA in December, 1974.

Since that time we understand there have been some changes in how counterintelligence is conducted at the CIA.

Could you give us some understanding of those changes?

Mr. Angleton. I would like to defer to Mr. Miler on this, if I may?

Mr. Miler. Yes.

My understanding is there have been some rather fundamental and substantive changes which are a continuation, actually, of changes that were made first in 1973, in July of 1973 when many of the centralized counterintelligence functions were decentralized and reallocated to different components of the Directorate of Operations. Such things as agent approvals and security, operational security reviews for intelligence collection and covert action operations, the oversight on intelligence operations, and oversight on counterintelligence operations in the field were decentralized. Research and Analysis has been curtailed, and the emphasis on it has changed.

There have been changes in the record procedures.

Mr. Johnson. Could you be more specific on these changes, for example, in research?

Mr. Miler. In research, the research is now, as I understand it, pretty much on a case by case basis, not in an overall perception of worldwide or national counterintelligence problems. There is no -- the application of historical cases,

750011255

historical problems is not being applied, as I understand it, to current operational efforts or investigative needs. There is an entirely different philosophy being applied as to what may be required in terms of understanding the counterintelligence threat to this nation. There is very little emphasis, if any, or concern with such things as deception and disinformation. There is little application of analytical and assessment work to the overall role of foreign intelligence and security services in political action.

There have been some fundamental changes in operational philosophies stemming from an application of what is termed management by objectives as it is being applied in the CIA to operations, and there is a -- has been a distinct change in some of the attention which has been previously placed on the problem of penetration from foreign and particularly hostile intelligence services into the American community.

And there has been a very, very substantive change in the perception and the conduct of counterintelligence in that there has been what is in my view a very serious erosion of security and compartmentation of operations, and leakage of information which has not been to the best interests of a national counterintelligence effort.

Mr. Johnson. So, from going from a rather centralized apparatus to a decentralized situation, the dangers of penetration have increased.

Mr. Miler. The dangers of penetration have increased significantly, and this extends also to the methods by which relations with foreign intelligence services are conducted.

Mr. Johnson. But how do you respond to the criticism that during your tenure and Mr. Angleton's tenure, too tight a rein was kept on counterintelligence information, and individuals in the field at the station level failed to get the information they needed to conduct their counterintelligence operation?

Mr. Miler. I would have to respond to that, Mr. Johnson, and I could only respond to it in the context of specifics. To my knowledge, and as practiced from my position as Chief of Operations, whenever there was information which was judged to be of significance, importance to a field station, that field station was advised, unless there was some overriding security source protection or other considerations, and the decision then not to advise them was made at the Deputy Director for Operations, as it is now called, or the Director level.

There was, certainly, a very tight security, a very tight compartmentation of counterintelligence information and activities, which in my view was essential, and still is essential, and will be even more essential in the future if we are to regain a counterintelligence initiative and to do our job in the future. And I think this is the fundamental question that the management of the CIA and the Senate and the

Executive have to decide, is do we want a counterintelligence effort, and if so, then we have to get to it, and we have to put our best minds to it.

Mr. Johnson. Were there instances during your period in counterintelligence where the Counterintelligence Staff would conduct its own counterespionage activities, without the knowledge of the various geographic division chiefs?

Mr. Miler. There were very few of them, with the chiefs. There may have been some.

Mr. Johnson. In those cases where there were such operations, were they cleared with the DDO?

Mr. Miler. Every single one of them was cleared with the DDO and/or the Director and/or the Deputy Director.

Mr. Johnson. On important counterespionage operations, could you tell us in more detail what the approval and clearance process is?

We know that for covert action the 40 Committee frequently becomes involved. What about for important counterespionage operations?

Mr. Miler. Well, Mr. Angleton might want to qualify my response, because obviously he was involved more in this than I was, but there would be the two primary considerations. One was a strictly CIA, counterintelligence or counterespionage activity. The derivation of the authority for this came from the statutes which set up the CIA and from National Security

5/5 5/5

Council directives 53, 55 and so forth. The authority rested in there. The approval would go to the then DDP, now Deputy Director for Operations, the Deputy Director and/or the Director.

The authorities, if it were a significant counterintelligence or counterespionage case, the authorities, as I understood it then, might require the Director to go outside the Agency to the White House or the Attorney General and so forth.

Alternatively, we in the CI Staff might be directed to coordinate this with the FBI. We would go to the FBI, explain the case and so forth. The FBI would then go to the Attorney -- the Department of Justice and get authorities, whatever authorities they would require in order to pursue the investigations, conduct the case, and do it according to whatever stipulations that the Department of Justice would put on it in order to either neutralize the suspected spy or agent, and/or conclude the case by prosecution.

And I am talking now of primarily in terms of a serious counterespionage case involving an American citizen.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, do you know of any instances where the CI Staff or higher authority within the CIA went outside the Agency for approval for important counterespionage operations?

Mr. Angleton. I know of cases, yes.

Mr. Johnson. And what would the approval system be?

76000011259

Mr. Angleton. Well, it would be an ad hoc discussion between the Director and the Secretary, and probably others, the Attorney General.

Mr. Johnson. Does this happen frequently? Is this a typical procedure for a major counter operation?

Mr. Angleton. If it's a major matter, it's on the basis of need to know.

You have another kind of case where a foreigner came to me and stated his government had a defector from the Bloc, an excellent agent, and they would be prepared to give us the agent if we would take it over lock, stock and barrel, handle it in such a fashion that there would be no exposure, because of the political consequences to their government.

I would go to the Director and the Deputy Director, spell out the matter, and come to a determination with them whether we wanted to take the case on. This particular case involved not only a person who had been in the intelligence service of the opposition a long time, but he had access to codes, and also a great deal of deciphered material. So it was kicked back and forth, and there was a determination made that we would take it over, the staff would take it over in its entirety.

And therefore, it meant that I called in Scotty and we pulled together our team, we sent them abroad. We handled the man in the field for a long time, and then eventually brought him back here.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 4 0 0 0 1 1 2 7 0

In a case of that sort, the instruction was agreed upon by all concerned, and the Director's instruction was that the Division was not to be informed, the Division where this individual came from, the Bloc area, should not be informed; that the Bureau, only two or three people in the Bureau, by name, should be informed, and that we would run the operation and bury the individual at the end.

Now, it went along --

Mr. Johnson. Did you say "bury the individual"?

Mr. Angleton. I'm not using it in your Committee terms.

Mr. Kirbow. You'd better clear that up for the record.

Mr. Miler. We would integrate him in to the American society in such a way that he would be non-identifiable.

Mr. Angleton. He would be buried.

Mr. Miler. May I just add here also that the authorities, the approval are very specific in terms of the agents' and the CIA's responsibility to advise and get the approval of the Attorney General in bringing someone like this into the United States.

The Director got this approval. It was a formal letter to the Attorney General, a formal reply. There was a formal but very limited advice to the Immigration. All of the legal requirements required by the Attorney General, Immigration, all other agencies, were done. However, in this instance, they were done on a very narrow, select basis, directly to Attorney

General and so forth, rather than to go through the normal bureaucratic chain of command out of the CIA and its various components.

Mr. Angleton. With the added fact that we did not disclose all of the facts, nor identity.

Now, this is important, because the individual was of such prominence that the country concerned would be placed in jeopardy diplomatically, the place where he was residing on tour. There would be intensive investigations by his headquarters, and therefore we had to have covers. And so we laid on in such a fashion that another service received information regarding the target country that would induce them to take certain observable actions, and then to spread the word that the fellow had actually defected to another country, so that their entire investigative thrust would be directed toward that country.

end 1
begin 2

Senator Hart of Colorado. So far we've talked about process, and I think we'll keep going on it, and return to it, but I would like to quantify some of this if I can.

First of all, by terms of definition, is the phrase or the term "counterintelligence" interchangeable with counterespionage?

Mr. Angleton. It can be. I think technically counterintelligence is regarded to be all forms of investigative activity, travel control, your data files, your dossiers, all of the systems that go into counterintelligence as such.

Out of that emerges a product, and one of the products is counterespionage.

Senator Hart of Colorado. I see.

How big was the Counterintelligence Staff?

Mr. Angleton. When? Well, when it was in its prime it was around, it was 200 some odd people. After this decentralization took place, when we lost international Communism, which in no service in the world has it ever been divorced from counterintelligence; we lost our police division where we train police from throughout the world; we lost operation 3(approval, which is approval of agents; we lost our controls over the Technical Services Division; we lost the geographic representation; we lost liaison, which was the liaison was with the FBI and 26 other government agencies who do investigations.

Mr. Miler. They took counterintelligence and liaison away from the counterintelligence component, if you can imagine such a situation.

Mr. Angleton. So that reduced us to less than 80 people, and this comes to, Senator, if I can just point to one of the most important things in the legislation or in whatever the Executive does, is that you cannot have in my view a Director of the FBI and a Director of CIA who are independent of one another. You have to have some higher authority to whom you can make an appeal when decisions of this sort are made so that it is aired, and it is not done without the knowledge of anyone, and then breaks, as it did, in the New York Times and what not.

Mr. Johnson. Yesterday we had the Bureau representatives telling us that there was really no problem or conflict when it came to questions of this, and that there was no problem with higher authority. Apparently you would disagree with that.

Mr. Angleton. I disagree in total with that. I'm saying the decline in the Bureau over 20 years from when they had very high grade counterintelligence until today when there has probably been -- well, it is least effective.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think it has to do with the number of diversions it had in the days of the Vietnam war, when internal security lost a tremendous number of men to other assignments and duties.

Second, I don't think that counterintelligence or the real thrust of Soviet Bloc intelligence has ever been brought up to policy level, and, more important, anything that involves penetration has always been swept under the rug. In other words, the question of penetration in this government or penetration in any agency has never been brought to a responsible level of finding out how it happened and what has gone wrong.

And let's take one defector who said -- in this case he spent 16 years in the Soviet Union in the KGB. He gave us over 180 leads of penetration in France, and it occasioned my drafting a letter for Mr. McCone to give to President Kennedy to give to DeGaulle. DeGaulle secretly sent to this country one of his highest trusted military men. He was here incognito. He met with the defector for three days.

The French original reaction to President Kennedy's letter was, it was Soviet provocation, because this was at the stage when France was making certain very sensitive agreements in the atomic field and otherwise with the United States, and therefore these allegations of penetration had a very direct bearing on those negotiations. And so the General who came over was totally prepared to believe this was provocation, but after three days with the defector, in a meeting with Helms and myself, he stated without any question that this man was 100 percent bona fide, because he could ask him those questions right on the nerve of their secrets, and he got the responses.

Now, this defector also gave considerable data on the status of penetration in the U.S. Government, documents which he had seen in Moscow, cryptonyms of operating agents, documents which could only have been prepared by our organization, and many other cases going back into the early '50s, going almost to Cabinet level. So all of this information was made available to the Bureau. But in due course Mr. Hoover regarded or made the pronouncement -- and I won't say when he makes a pronouncement that it is one that has been recommended to him from higher level -- that the defector in question was probably a provocation, and the Bureau ceased contact with that individual, and I would say they have not had any contact with him since 1965.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Why did Hoover make that decision?

Mr. Angleton. Well, among other things, this defector wanted to have access to ongoing and to past cases with the view that he had a tremendous amount of data that he could not relate to anything, but if he could see things that were going on, then it would be meaningful to him in terms of what he had to contribute. And I can take the example that, with another allied service; immediately we brought them into it and he had seen certain naval documents that dealt with infrastructure and budget. This happened to be British.

In time they found the documents, and when they presented them to him, he could identify those he had seen and those he had not seen. This led to the apprehension of vassal Vassil, who was in the A admiralty. And this was the quality of his information.

All through the west agents were apprehended on the basis of his information. But there is a tremendous bulk of it which is made up of fragments, made up of documents he's seen where we have not been able to identify the document; a great number of cryptonyms of reporting sources where we cannot find the body to fit the cryptonym. So this is the reality. And he is

7 6 0 0 0 1 1 0 7 5

being contacted perhaps by nine different intelligence services.

Now, there is no one who has supported the question of his mala fides. In other words, everyone, to a man, has stated that he is bona fide, that they have never been able to disprove a statement of fact that he has given as a statement of fact, although they do not necessarily agree with his hypotheses. That is the official statement.

Mr. Miler. May I just add two things on this?

First, Mr. Johnson, it goes back to the business of compartmentation and not advising stations. In the case Mr. Angleton cited, the Paris station of the CIA was not told anything about the information, and I think this is a very good example of why you would not.

The second point I would like to follow up on is with respect to this defector's information, there were five leads which were passed to the FBI about penetration which involved the CIA, for action. And one case was solved, but it was solved only after the FBI officially sent us a letter saying that they concluded that there was no substance to this information.

They had to reopen the investigation --

Mr. Angleton. And they also said: send it to the Army.

Mr. Miler. Yes, send it to the Army.

Now, they had to reopen the investigation when their surveillance spotted a man coming out of the Soviet embassy, and it was subsequently proved that he was a Soviet spy.

Mr. Angleton. Now, that individual had performed four separate missions for Soviet intelligence since about 1938 or '39. One, he had been dropped in by the Soviets into Germany on a mission with the WT set, to be captured in order to be played back and to penetrate the German intelligence.

Second, he had moved from that into the penetration of VLASOV the Vassilov movement, which were the captured Russians in the German -- in the VLASOV Vassilov Army.

Third, he had penetrated the anti-Soviet forces in Germany, and then he was taken on by us in 1948 or '51 is when they sent to renew his inks.

So he was with us from '51 to around '60.

Well, when the defection occurred, it was '62.

Mr. Johnson. And Mr. Angleton, you used a term that is unfamiliar to us: his inks.

Mr. Miler. Secret inks.

Mr. Angleton. Secret inks. In other words, the Germans had captured a Soviet agent who had the same kind of inks, and so therefore the inks were compromised, so they laid on a large operation in Berlin and trained him in highly sophisticated inks. And he is now residing not too far distant from us.

But I might add that it is very important to note that while we maintained that he is a Soviet agent, and the Bureau disagreed

7600011277

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

and told us to send this off, we had a development occur which it is not necessary for me to go into, it's still a relatively live case, in which proof positive came that he was a Soviet agent, and it was in the face of that proof positive that the Bureau moved in and interrogated him. And that is what prompted him to go to the Soviet embassy.

And after some hours there he came out, he was asked why did you go to the Soviet embassy, and he said I went there to get my personal history and particulars regarding my family since those are the questions you have been asking me. In other words, instead of -- in this case the man had a wife who was having an affair off and on with a Japanese military person here -- instead of recruiting the Japanese and the wife to work in to him, because what we wanted was a confession, because the point I want to stress here is in a case of this sort, a penetration there, he is not there as a solo person. He is there as a spotter. He is a person used for entrapment abroad. He is a person who can originate an operation, induce you to go into the operation and bring in a weak element, and put them in a position for further recruitment. And I can stretch this on and on.

And the classic example is the Philby case. Philby would have been Chief of British Intelligence. He was also identified positively in the end by this defector. When the defector first knew about it, it was called the Ring of Five in the Soviet intelligence, five people, Philby being one.

But from the time he knew about it, in actual fact it was a ring that went into the twenties, because the purpose of the penetration is simply not to be a passive figure; it is to be an aggressive figure who creates situations for recruitment. And that case has never been prosecuted. The man has never confessed. He's never been broken. And yet it was in the heart of our SB, Soviet Division activities.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Could you give us, back to the quantification, could you give us some figures for numbers of counterintelligence cases handled per year?

Mr. Angleton. Scotty, you can.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Just so we can have an idea of the magnitude of volume.

Mr. Miler. Well, for example, one program that we had going was an attempt to record penetration recruitment attempts of U.S., American officials abroad, strictly abroad. And over a ten year period the number of attempts to recruit and penetrate hit close to 1200. So we were running around 250 or so a year, just in that one small area of counterintelligence concern.

The number of cases that we had would vary, but I would say that from defectors in the last ten year, from Soviet and Soviet Bloc defectors, we averaged around 150 cases a year. At one time -- I do know that at one time we had over

500 active cases which required investigation.

We were concerned with approximately 140 to 160 double agent operations a year. We had investigations which would probably have a range, 25 to 30, significant investigations that were going on, in addition to which we would have a number of investigations, leads and operations with cooperative foreign intelligence and security services which would probably hit an average of about 50, if you would.

There were other operations which were generated from other investigations and so forth, leads from the FBI, leads from the military services, which would perhaps hit 30 or 40 a year.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What about the number of cases involving penetration, successful or otherwise, of the Agency itself?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the basic responsibility would be the Office of Security. In other words, we would work with them, but it tends to be a one way street, as it should be, namely, they are responsible for personnel and for installations. But from the one defector alone, I would say there were five hard leads.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Over what period of time?

Mr. Angleton. Of this one defector who came out in December of '61. But his leads were going back to '51, 1951.

Mr. diGenova. Is this the same defector with whom the

7600011031

FBI has had no contact since 1965?

Mr. Angleton. That's correct.

Mr. diGenova. Has the Agency had any contact with him since 1965?

Mr. Angleton. Yes, we've had it, but we've had our ups and downs.

Mr. diGenova. And what have those ups and downs been attributable to?

Mr. Angleton. Well, they are basic -- well, first, there are two different attitudes in the American intelligence community regarding defectors. One of them is to give them the harsh treatment and to treat them as second class citizens, and we actually have taken on more salvage cases in the Counterintelligence Staff and rehabilitated these people. In fact, we came into that case basically because the fellow had gone sour. And --

Mr. Kirbow. Meaning he had failed to continue cooperating or was not giving you the right information?

Mr. Angleton. That's right. Well, no, it was simply that he refused to cooperate any further, because one didn't appreciate the ideological reasons for his defection.

So these ups and downs would go on -- I mean, we would have to change case officers because they would simply have a breakdown in communication.

Mr. diGenova. Did the failure of the FBI to utilize this asset inhibit you in any way from using the asset or the Agency from utilizing it?

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely, because so much of the information that we wanted to take up with him was also related to FBI information.

Mr. diGenova. In other words, you needed access to information the FBI had, and you couldn't get it?

Mr. Angleton. We could get it but they wouldn't give permission that their information would be submitted to him.

Mr. diGenova. In other words, you had a third agency rule blocking you?

Mr. Angleton. A third agency, also in the attitude. For instance, in one session in which I participated, the Bureau asked him to give the name of a source. He refused to give it on the grounds that the man was in the KGB, was a friend of his, and he didn't want that man's name ever to get back to the KGB because it would mean the man's life. And therefore he had a direct confrontation, refusing to give it, very understandable.

end 2
begin 3

Mr. diGenova. Was this lack of cooperation directly attributable to Mr. Hoover, to your knowledge?

Mr. Angleton. no.

Mr. diGenova. Was this problem ever brought to the attention of the President of the United States at any time?

Mr. Angleton. No, but he raised it with the Attorney

General Mr. Kennedy, he had a direct meeting with him.

Mr. diGenova. And what, if anything, happened?

Mr. Angleton. Only encouragement.

Mr. diGenova. Could you amplify on that?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the Attorney General handled him very well indeed, but nothing further came out of it.

Mr. diGenova. But there was no commitment on the part of the Attorney General to see if he could budge Mr. Hoover to assist the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the issue didn't come up in that fashion, just the general, the general agreement that he was prepared to work for the United States at the highest level, because the intelligence he had went far beyond simply KGB. It went into Soviet policy. It went into Soviet reorientation. It went into Soviet Bloc. It went into Soviet defense matters. It went into some of the major secrets. And therefore it wasn't simply counterintelligence. It had to do with policy or political action.

He knew, for example, the identity of a Prime Minister who was a Soviet agent, who at that time was trying to get us to go into several political arrangements, and he knew exactly how he was recruited and how he was being used as an agent of influence.

So these were matters that went beyond simply intelligence scope.

7600011233

Mr. Kirbow. How long is a man like that good for, Mr. Angleton? I mean, by this time, or a decade from now, a lot of that information is of no longer any value to you.

Mr. Angleton. No, that's not so. It is a fact that the man has a computer mind. In other words, if you took all of his interrogation reports, they ran to some 20 filing cabinets. You try to have anyone retain in their mind, to apply that same data against a new problem that comes up, it requires an individual who lived that to be able to look at a case that has arisen, and he knows the case officer on the Soviet side, and he can give an analysis that this fellow was on the Scandinavian desk and that he was promoted to this, and that his background is ciphers. He had not told you that he was ciphers before because it wasn't relevant. So it's a new, added factor.

And then you find that someone is known as a code clerk, and therefore the pieces begin to fit together, that the man who was sent to the field by the Soviets to handle some unknown American is a cipher expert, and therefore you look among who are the code clerks.

Mr. diGenova. I'd like to --

Mr. Miller. Could I interrupt just a moment?

You spoke in this instance of 20 file cabinets from the interrogation of one defector.

Mr. Angleton. Yes.

Mr. Miller. What kind of volume did you put together in your years in this activity? If this is the product of one interrogation, what kind of volume did you put together to make a workable capability?

Mr. Angleton. Well, the first thing was to computerize everything, and the second was to break it out case by case, British cases, Australian cases, New Zealand cases, Dutch cases, Finnish cases, French cases, Italian cases, all the way on across the board, American cases; and then to take all of the data, all of the voluminous stuff that was pertinent to each of the leads, including the unknowns, in other words, Unknown 1, Unknown 2, Unknown 3, etc.

So you had the ability to pick out a file on X subject or X individual, and there would be the direct quotation from the interrogation, and then whatever traces there were of follow-ups, action taken, dissemination, etc.

Mr. Miller. Just to press that -- yes.

Mr. Miler. I think your question is the total volume of the files that were available to the Counterintelligence?

Mr. Miller. Yes. I was impressed by the fact that one interrogation yielded 20 file cabinets, and was wondering the total volume.

Mr. Miler. What were the figures on the cases to read?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think I've already presented that once, but when we were dealing with the new management and it was all this business of objectives and management by objectives, and the idea of changing Counterintelligence personnel every two years and new faces and open it all up and the rest of it, we ran a basic job on how many, if you took 20 cases that were imperative for a Counterintelligence officer to read, what the statistical side would be. Those 20 cases would run into enough linear footage, which according to the mathematicians in the Agency would take 22 man years to read, or if they were 100 percent incorrect, 11 years to read. Those would be the 20 basic counterintelligence cases.

And the purpose of it was simply to show that it was a profession, and that there had to be longevity to build up Counterintelligence officers.

Mr. Johnson. Generally speaking, within the counterintelligence organizations, it seems to you perform four activities: liaison, research, operations and security.

Could you give us an idea of your own priorities in terms of distributing manpower across those four activities?

Can you break it out that way?

Mr. Angleton. Well, it is difficult to break out, but the primary thing of all is the question of penetration in the U.S. Government, and then in allied governments. That would be my priority. In other words, when we had a defector from the Cuban service who had information of an agreement made between the KGB and the DGI in Cuba to work against the U.S. and how they would differentiate the priorities, and areas where the KGB was oversurveilled, the DGI would take over the surveillance of our personnel and so on.

The moment this defector arrived in the United States, I sent Scotty to the airport immediately to see him because that's the number one priority. Here was an individual whose job was to work on Americans and who allegedly had seen information from one of our embassies. Now, that is the highest priority, and particularly because information of a counterintelligence nature is perishable. Some is and some isn't.

The moment there is a defector, the opposition runs a damage report. So you know certain information will be known to them immediately that is compromised, and they will take action to correct it. But there are certain secrets that the man knows that their damage report will not turn up. Those you put on the back burner. But the ones you reach for first are those that are perishable, and this is -- the priority is established by the fact that here is a live, highly valuable source force, and we only have so much time to extract the cream off of him and determine those things that would disappear.

Mr. Miler. But the whole thrust of all of our operations, research, analysis, everything, was toward that goal. And much of the reason for the security of the compartmentation for the CI activity was to protect that concern.

Mr. Lombard. I wonder if I could ask a question concerning

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 6 0 0 1 1 1 3 3

the Bureau.

Would it help today if there was a separate Bureau under the Attorney General for counterintelligence, separate from the FBI?

Mr. Angleton. You are posing the same problem that the RCMP in Canada had. In other words, they set up, I might add because of us, because we brought them into counterintelligence in a way they had never been brought into it, we brought them down when this first defector, this major defector came out, and the cases that were revealed to them, cryptonyms, telegrams that were taken from them, an ambassador who was recruited, one of their ambassadors and all this, led in time to the Canadian Prime Minister desiring to set up a special counter-intelligence. And so they had this problem of how you take a law enforcement force and what do you do about it. And their ultimate decision was that you had to keep it within the RCMP. You created the separate office, and you created sort of a director general of it, but the cadre, your people came from the regular force, even though they are separated from the rest of the RCMP, and they are independent of the Commissioner of the RCMP. I mean, they are there for rations and quarters.

Mr. Lombard. I guess what I had in mind was more the British model of the Yard having --

Mr. Angleton. Well, the British model is the most overexaggerated model in the world. I think I can quite

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600011039

honestly state that since World War II the British have never caught an agent where the lead didn't come from us or somebody else. It was never self-generated.

Now, in the last year or so maybe they caught an agent, but up until that time they have never caught an agent.

Mr. Lombard. So your answer, in effect, would be that the counterintelligence function should stay within the Bureau.

Mr. Angleton. That is correct. I mean, not that it's ideal, but in terms of the realities, in terms of the realities it should be kept within the Bureau. It should be greatly enlarged, and the head of that should be, in my view, a Deputy Director of the Bureau.

Mr. Lombard. All right.

Now, let me ask you this. In your experience were there problems where the law enforcement impded the running of counterintelligence or counterespionage operations domestically? In other words, were there times when you would have liked to have run an agent domestically for a longer period of time in order to get the rest of the guys, but they said no, we've got to take this fellow to court now?

Mr. Angleton. That used to be prevalent back in the '50s. Today I don't think they've got many cases. I mean, I don't think that the job is being done, not in the last ten years.

Mr. Johnson. Mr. Angleton, when I asked you earlier what your priorities were, you mentioned making sure that we were not penetrated in conducting investigations to see if in fact we were, which seems to give the impression that we are defensively oriented, and that was your main priority.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think that how could you have it any other way?

If you've got a cryptonym of telegrams disappearing and are in possession of the opposition --

Mr. Johnson. But isn't the aggressive dimension even more important and trying to penetrate the hostile service?

Mr. Angleton. Those are all kind of theoretical arguments to my way of thinking.

Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're penetrating first.

Mr. Angleton. I mean, this idea of running operations is not really understood.

To run a double agent operation requires a tremendous amount of manpower. It is a commitment that very few people understand. If you are going to run a double, I mean, to start from the beginning, you've got to be able to keep a diary. Now, one is the real life is the real life of the agent and the other is his double life, because you can have a question from his headquarters that says, that agent you had three years ago, would you please go back to him. You've got to be able to read into a diary of the fictional life in order to answer that question.

Now, this takes manpower. You've got to have meetings.

You've got to be able to satisfy the questionnaires, and you can go all the way on down the line. This ties up thousands of man-hours.

Mr. Johnson. Could you explain that "satisfy the questionnaires?"

What does that phrase mean, "satisfy the questionnaires?"

Mr. Angleton. The opposition wants to know, find out from your sources the following questions.

Mr. Miler. In other words, the requirements they put on the agent.

Mr. Angleton. Now, that agent is allegedly in the CIA and there is a penetration, then you are just going through games, and they will play such an operation. They could have a very senior penetration into the Agency and play along on a double in order to lead you to believe that they do not have a penetration. And they can tie up your manpower and put doubles underneath him and another agent, and they can give him a radio set, and with the radio set they can give him crystals, and he needs other crystals, and it involves more and more of your own personnel and manpower. And you can tie up NSA monitoring all the links.

And so this idea that has all of a sudden been novel and newly discovered in the Agency that Counterintelligence must be aggressive is in my view a joke. It's a joke.

Mr. Miler. You have to know what you're dealing with.

7 6 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0

You have to understand the enemy intelligence service before you're going to penetrate it, and you have to be secure from penetration yourself, and you then have to run that penetration very securely and on a very compartmented basis.

Mr. Angleton. And there is one added proviso, then, that you can only run a first rate double agent if you have a source superior to him that he is unaware of. In the war, when we broke the German code, it was no problem to run German double agents because we could read their messages back to their headquarters, re-enciphered, and the headquarters messages back to the control, back to our double. So questions of danger signals, questions of alerting him that he was under control and so on was taken care of because of communications intelligence.

When you don't have communications intelligence, then the only other source that is superior is penetration, that is, somebody who can read back from their headquarters how they are, in fact, absorbing the thrust of that double agent. And those conditions do not exist for the Bureau or for ourselves.

Mr. Miler. Or for the military services, to run a lot of double agents.

Mr. Angleton. I mean, they do not have the superior source of control over double agents.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Why is that?

Mr. Angleton. Because they are one, not breaking codes, or

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

they don't have the penetrations in the opposition against whom you run the double.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But what is the prescription? Does that mean we can't do that or we aren't, or what?

Mr. Angleton. Well, we haven't succeeded. I mean, we have had Popov and Penkosky, and both of them are dead. They were shot.

Mr. Johnson. It must be easier to penetrate the so-called Third World than it is the so-called Soviet Bloc.

Mr. Angleton. Absolutely.

Mr. Miler. But that's not getting you exactly what you want or need either. And you can divert an awful lot of time, effort and manpower to running what in essence would eventually boil down in a year or two years to operations for operations' sake. It will look good in statistics. It will justify your budget request to the OMB. It will justify your counterintelligence effort in terms of management objectives, because you've increased from 22 double agent operations to 46 last year, but what is the net result, and how much time, effort and so forth are you actually using, and where are you losing focus on what the real problems are facing the country in terms of penetration and in terms of knowledge and in counterintelligence?

Mr. diGenova. The picture which both you and Mr. Angleton paint this new face of counterintelligence from your point of view is a rather gloomy one because your comments seem to indicate that you believe that this decentralization, lack of compartmentation and in general, spreading the counterintelligence function around is eventually going to lead to a breakdown in the end product. We're not going to be getting what we should be getting. You may be getting bigger statistics, and on the face it may look like we're getting more, but in fact we're not.

Mr. Miler. You're not going to get substance.

Mr. diGenova. Why was that decision made? That seems to be so fundamentally apparent by the way you explain it? Surely the Director must have made that decision for a reason?

Do you know why?

Mr. Angleton. Mr. Miler has known him more than -- longer than I have. Would you?

Mr. Miler. Yes, I'll offer my opinion on it.

Mr. diGenova. We would like to have it.

Mr. Miler. The basic reason is that neither the current director nor the incumbent DDO understand or perceive of what counterintelligence actually is and what function it has, and what the CIA's responsibility is for counterintelligence to the nation. That is my personal opinion. They do not -- they have not had experience in counterintelligence. They've never worked in counterintelligence. And quite frankly, they do not understand the problems involved in counterintelligence.

Counterintelligence, as articulated previously by the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 6 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 5

current DDO, was station security and liaison.

Mr. Kirbow. Can you see this getting any better with your new selectee who is coming from the outside world? Probably knows the term counterintelligence, but knows nothing about the intelligence community basically?

Mr. Miler. I don't -- quite frankly, I couldn't comment on Mr. Bush at all, but if Mr. Bush is going to have to rely on the current management and the current management of counterintelligence in the CIA, it is my view that he will get completely erroneous information and not have the advantage of understanding counterintelligence, and would be forced to make decisions which ultimately will be tragic to this country as far as counterintelligence is concerned, from ignorance.

Senator Hart of Colorado. What kind of erroneous information?

Mr. Miler. What counterintelligence is, how it should be organized, what the threat to the nation is that can be hopefully countered by an effective counterintelligence organization which is integrated between the CIA, the FBI, the military services, the Department of State, and all other agencies concerned.

You are going to have to have a perception of the real problems and what is involved in counterintelligence in order to organize or reorganize the CIA's counterintelligence efforts, to promote the best kind of a national program.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Assume something about, Mr. Angleton mentioned earlier, about the tendency to sweep penetrations under the rug in this country.

Has there been a pattern in the past that still prevails of reluctance on the part of professional intelligence officials as well as administration officials to admit that we are susceptible to that?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there is no question that there has been a tremendous dishonesty in facing up to hard facts an intelligence.

I'll take the Yom Kippur war as an example. As you know, it was a complete failure in terms of prediction. As I maintained in my testimony, if you cannot make a proper estimate in a primitive area, then God help you when you come into the Bloc area, and I still hold by that conviction.

But in that case, a few days prior to the Yom Kippur war, the FBI disseminated a report to the President, the Secretary of State, Defense and the Director of CIA which purported to be a discussion between Gromyko and a very senior source to the effect that they had given up on the Arabs, that they would no longer support the Arabs, they would no longer give them arms, that they were going to recognize Israel, and in fact they had the draft notes ready for the recognition of Israel.

Now, I have never seen the post mortem of the whole project on the estimation, but I would assume that any estimator who received information by letter or memorandum, hand-carried, quoting Gromyko, would tend to discount the fact that the Arabs were about to attack Israel where they would have to depend on Soviet arms, and therefore the question of the Yom Kippur war would be out of the question. In other words, that one report, I give it as an example.

Now, independently a study group of the Joint Chiefs came up with the whole question of Soviet disinformation, strategic disinformation to put us off balance on our estimating process.

Now, in our own Agency we were heavily frowned upon for raising these questions, that there was a strong element of Soviet deception and disinformation that had been injected into the intelligence collecting program.

Mr. Miler. Prior to the Yom Kippur war.

Mr. Angleton. Prior to that. But the important thing is that that source who provided the Bureau with that information has been providing information over a number of years, but no one has made a study of information in hindsight in order to evaluate that source.

And I could go into many more sensitive cases of where again intention has come through a highly questionable source, and yet there has been no re-examination. There has been no grouping or forum in which there can be any disputation. Each

end 3

party goes along on his own.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000411333

Senator Hart of Colorado. It seems to me that you're suggesting at the very least a naivete on the part of our government and at the worst, I don't know what.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I do suggest that there is a naivete. There is no counter-disinformation group. There's no one who ever studies -- most of the information today that goes into much of -- it's mainly scientific. The human part of it is small.

Now most of it is from overt sources.

Mr. Johnson. What about the Inner-agency Committee on Defectors? Doesn't that review?

Mr. Angleton. It has nothing to do with it.

Mr. Johnson. What does that do?

Mr. Angleton. That only allocates or handles the mechanics of who talks to the defector and what are the priorities and questionnaires and whatnot.

Mr. diGenova. The order of interrogation.

Mr. Miler. It is a clearing house to get the information disseminated.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Angleton, I'm interested in going back to one part of your most recent response about the fact of your or the CI staff's concerns about the Israeli problem which you alluded to was frowned upon within the Agency.

What form did that take? I'd be interested to know that.

Mr. Angleton. Well, it took this form, that a person working with Scotty who takes his military duty over there, two weeks every year and whatnot, and who is very high on S&T intelligence, arranged for these Joint Chiefs and this group to come over and to address an audience of hand-picked people. So this covered both the overt side of the House --

Mr. Miler. The three directorates, intelligence, operations, and S&T.

Mr. Angleton. And they laid out their entire thesis, and we added to that to the FBI report to which I referred. Afterwards I was severely criticized for having wasted everybody's time on that matter and told that if they realized it was going to be that type of thing, we would never have permitted it to have taken place, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. Kirbow. Was this by the three directorates?

Mr. Miler. No, that was from the directorate of operations. The directorate of S&T, Scientific and Technical was impressed by the presentation and subsequently said that there was very great need for thought in this. And I think also, Jim, that concurrently in the operations I had an officer who was working on discernible or apparent deception as reflected in CIA reporting from the field of Soviet disinformation concerning the situation in the Middle East.

And we did a tremendous study on this and which was completely discounted and thrown out and it wasn't even considered.

Mr. Miller. Well, in the Yom Kippur War, if I'm not

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

mistaken, there was a SIGINT alert. The NSA collection systems were of such nature their analysts said it looks like there's going to be a war within 24 hours. They predicted the time. They sent it over. It was immediately said, go back to bed. Is that correct?

Mr. Angleton. All I know about it is the alleged part of that. I remember the Pike Report that caused a great deal of comment. I thought that the four magic words were that NSA was not able to make a contribution because the Egyptians had gone into a high SIGINT alert.

In other words, that through SIGINT they couldn't learn the intention. I don't know this fact that you are tabelling.

Mr. Miller. I think Mr. Miler is --

Mr. Miler. The point that we're trying to make in this connection is part and parcel of Soviet espionage, Soviet intelligence service activity and Soviet bloc intelligence service activity is in the political field. It involves deception and disinformation. A properly coordinated and run counter-intelligence effort will bring research and analytical work to bear which would give an analysis and an assessment of the situation, which should be of value to policy-makers in the government, to the intelligence directorate of the CIA, to the Director of the CIA, and that what has happened in the CIA since mid-1973 is that there has been erosion of this facility which cannot be divorced from counter-intelligence because as you focus and even as you focus on what the current popular term, aggressive counter-intelligence operations, you have to have some knowledge of this in order to be able to equate, assess and evaluate your so-called penetration of a Soviet or Soviet bloc intelligence service to see if it is real. You have to have a litmus paper to judge your penetration. And without that litmus, you are completely at the mercy of a system which is orchestrated and which is essentially directed and controlled.

Mr. Miller. So what you're saying is from mid-1973 on the country, or at least the CIA has lost a valuable asset.

What happened in '73? What was the decision?

Mr. Angleton. That's the decentralization, when all of these components were taken away from us, including the liaison and whatnot, including international communist parties.

So this completely viscerated the counter-intelligence as we have built it up since 1954.

We were, I would say without question in the Western world, we gave the leadership. We created all of the inter-governmental committees. We brought services from tiny fragmented units up into major components of their government, the five major countries, which meant we reoriented their services along priorities that met our requirements, and I don't think there was any question that we were the acknowledged leaders in the Western world.

By the same token, it induced people to bring their cases to us for analysis. They came to see us many times to see the defectors, the stable of defectors that we had for interrogation.

So that alone was a tremendous acquisition of counter-intelligence data which would not have otherwise have been available to this country.

Mr. Kirbow. And it's not available today because of this spreading of the --

Mr. Angleton. Well, that's what they say. I mean I've had one or more chief of intelligence who have surreptitiously seen me since my departure. And they will naturally work as far as they can with the agency.

Mr. Miller. When you say us, who do you mean?

Mr. Angleton. How did I use it?

Mr. Miller. You were referring to your capability prior to 1973.

Mr. Miler. The CI staff.

Mr. Angleton. The CI staff.

Mr. Miller. The CI staff. Well, what were the numbers, what was the capability that you had translated into people, into files?

Mr. Angleton. Well, at the highest point we had a little over 200 people. That was clerical and officers.

Mr. Miller. That seems a fairly small group.

Mr. Angleton. Well, they were a hardworking group. We were understaffed. There were many things we could have taken on and I'll give you one example because it is still pending, and it gets down to the question of penetration.

But when Philby was stationed in Washington, he was given communications intelligence clearance so if NSA broke into the Bulgarian traffic, he could go to his Soviet control and tell them that we were reading Bulgarian traffic. A secret of that sort permits them to make use of the Bulgarian traffic as a deception channel the moment they know you are reading it. That becomes a powerful instrument in their hands to deceive.

Now my point is this: No one has made an analysis from the day that he was briefed on that particular traffic of why the traffic continued for two more years and then gradually petered out of what was put into that traffic which, if you took that and identified an item of deception that came from the opposition, you then look at your own agent reports and find what agents at the same time were fortifying that lie or that piece of deception. And it would point a finger on agents who, in fact, were under control.

Now this is just one small exercise. NSA has preserved every single piece of paper. In other words, there's literally hundreds of thousands of pages of available material for such an analysis, and I worked very closely with Lou Tordella.

In fact, one of our effort or common efforts was I brought him into counter-intelligence. I brought him in with all these foreign chiefs and whatnot in order to enlarge the scope of NSA, since they can study and frame these patterns, they can get into illegal traffics and get into many facets.

It's one of the best outfits, as far as I know, in the U.S. government, but they had always been denied these facts that I just stated, such as Philby's access, the clearances, the various espionage cases that have happened in the west, the people that have had communications intelligence clearance.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Could we have a Philby level penetration of our intelligence community?

Mr. Angleton. I'm not stating that there is one, but I have probably done more recruitment of higher level people in my youth in the business and I have never been any respector of rank. I've dealt with prime ministers, and I've dealt with them at all levels.

And therefore, my point is it is conceivable, it's conceivable if you've got enough information, spotting information, and you can put a person into a certain kind of situation regardless of his rank, you will find that he is recruitable. It is a process of a fingernail, finger, hand, arm and body.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But all of the grills that new people of the Agency have to go through, lie detector and so on, you're saying that they can get through that.

gsh 8

Mr. Angleton. I don't think anyone regards the lie detector to be anything more than just another investigative instrument. It does help in the sense that there are certain people susceptible. They will in turn reveal something of their past which they should have revealed, which, if you had discovered independently, would have given you grounds to believe they were penetration, but once the machine begins to find that they're goggling on something, then they come out and say, well there's a story I haven't told you when I was in Turkey, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, and wipes the slate clean.

So it serves a useful purpose. But it's not -- I wouldn't give it 20 percent credibility. Now the Office of Security probably gives it 70 or maybe higher.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Angleton, the point you made of the lack of study of traffic which followed the deception in the cable traffic, as I understand it, you're saying that there's been no analysis that you're aware of since that time done of of everything since then.

Mr. Angleton. There's never been any analysis ever.

Mr. diGenova. Is the current research set-up which CI staff now has which is oriented toward instant studies, quote unquote, to provide data for ongoing operations inconsistent with wanting to achieve that sort of goal, like analyzing that data?

7600011306

gsh

Mr. Angleton. Well, I don't know what that really means, instant analysis. I mean we've always done instant analysis.

Mr. diGenova. I know that but it's our understanding, we've learned from the Agency that there has been a movement away from in-depth historical research toward more current sort of analyses.

What you're suggesting to me by saying that there's been no analysis done of those cables is that we've lost a valuable CI tool since that study hasn't been done, and I'd like to know if your assessment of the current trend toward research is a bad one?

Mr. Angleton. I think it makes no sense whatsoever.

Mr. Miler. It's disastrous. It will lead to complete chaos within a very short time because you're trying to analyse an individual case without having the ability to relate 40 other cases to that case.

Mr. diGenova. There's no integration in other words.

Mr. Miler. That's right and you cannot operate in a vacuum.

Mr. Angleton. We have learned from one defector, the one of December '61 a complete new understanding of what happened from the days of Lenin.

That is not in the public record. A complete new picture of the growth of the OGPU and of the Cheka. And in the reorientation of KGB part of the deStalinization in May

7600011707

of 1959, it was a return to the modus operandi of the Cheka. And this is from an individual, fully, who had seen all of the documents, fully versed in it so that this plunged us back into it and we began then to find leads. And I give one example.

General Orlov, who died not long ago in the United States, was the most senior NKVD KGB officer ever to defect, and he died last year. The Bureau had interrogated him in 1953 after the death of Stalin with little or no success. He knew the code name of Philby. The Agency tried to contact him in '58 and had a very unhappy handling problem. We went back into it shortly thereafter and we were able to go through his book with him and he gave us the true identities of 34 agents in France.

His uncle had been one of the senior men under Lenin, head of NKVD in the Ukraine but with tremendous operations. He himself was a senior NKVD man in Spain during the civil war. So we spent up until his death, Mr. Rocc~~o~~a, who was my deputy, would travel to the Midwest and spend several weekends with him of dredging out and recreating the operations and penetrations in British intelligence and the British navy and whatnot, eventually getting down, by recreating and reconstructing, down to the identity. Now this is research, and these are cases where the Soviets had every reason to believe that those agents were safe and secure because nothing had happened.

And when you make that type of identification unbeknownst

gsh 11

to them, then it gives you tremendous leverage of how you want to play it, whether you move in to take him on as a double or whether you move in to arrest him.

Mr. diGenova. And that isn't being done today.

Mr. Angleton. Well, they can't do it because they don't have Mr. Rocca and they have fired most of the personnel. One of the best men we had was from the Library of Congress and knowing where to find every piece of information in the government has just been transferred to, or he's been released or hired back on contract, and when they are putting him in the Freedom of Information section as a contract agent.

And he has handled Ukrainians, he's run agents, he speaks Russian.

Mr. Johnson. We are going down with a representative of military intelligence later on this afternoon. Could you tell us about the coordination between military CI and CIA CI especially in the area of double agentry.

Mr. Angleton. Then I will just say one thing and then Scotty will speak authoritatively to it.

We all came out of the war and therefore we are very strongly in favor of a very strong military counter-intelligence. And therefore, we've always given them highest priority of our time. We've done the original training of the OSI people.

We trained teachers who went out, who in turn trained other people. That was a three months course, if I recall.

76000[illegible]11309

We rean a seminar using the highest talent that we had and revealing as much information as we could conceivably reveal.

And so our whole mental attitude was that counter-intelligence, one of its highest priorities is the defense of its own forces. And I'm not going to justify the mail program at this time, but some day I'll justify it in print or otherwise because it represents only .001 percent of Americans -- a small coterie of Americans who wrote to the Soviets when we had troops in the field on two occasions, and our primary duty was the support of those troops.

So that background Scotty can tell you but the relationships we've had with the military.

Mr. Miler. Well, the relationships with the counter-intelligence with the military have varied. I would say that for the most part it has been reasonably good, it has been perhaps better in Washington than it has been in the field. With few exceptions CIA field representatives have not been terribly concerned with conducting counter-intelligence. They have not cooperated to the extent that the military commanders in the field have wanted.

Some of this has to do with priorities that are imposed on the CIA representatives from Washington. Some of it has to do with lack of manpower. Some of it has to do with the fact that in the opinion of many of the CIA operatives, the Army in particular, to a lesser extent the other services, have not undertaken counter-intelligence activities which are of a high enough level to justify the time and attention, particularly of senior CIA representatives abroad.

It is, I think, also a bit of a problem because the priorities of military counter-intelligence in many instances do not parallel or support CIA's priorities. They have the responsibility for the protection of their installations and there have also been imposed on the military the requirement to build assets, what we term double agents which the military term controlled foreign assets, as a contingency for possible deception use.

Traditionally, also, the CIA, and in recent years this has been quite true, the CIA field operatives have wanted to exploit military counter-intelligence assets for what is termed aggressive positive intelligence or recruitment attempts of the enemy agent or officer who was controlling the double agent of the controlled foreign asset.

There has been traditionally a problem of coordination between the military services, the CIA, and the FBI on double agent operations.

I think overall this has worked reasonably well, given the fact that -- in particular, for example, the system of chain of command in the Army is a very confused one and is not easy to put your finger on. There are various echelons and reporting procedures and so forth.

gsh 14

From the counter-intelligence staff standpoint, in particular what I was concerned with was an attempt to make sure that there was a full integration. You see, under the operating procedures and the responsibilities, the military services are required to advise the CIA of its activities, counter-intelligence and so forth abroad. In turn, they advise the FBI of their counter-intelligence activities and so forth here in the United States.

So you have, when an activity here in the United States, the individual involved, the double agent, the controlled foreign asset transfers abroad, then there is a transfer of coordination and vice versa.

Mr. Angleton. I'd like to inject this. There is concurrent jurisdiction since the double is usually an American citizen. So regardless of where he is, we would always persuade the Army or whoever it is, to notify the Bureau through their own channel because you're dealing with Americans, so geography is not really the important element.

Mr. Miler. From a counter-intelligence standpoint, it has had, there have been some problems as a result of that in terms of the regular CIA representation abroad. There is a means of working together with the military services and so forth in terms of notifying each of the services, each of the agencies of the potential for deception feeding and so forth.

Mr. Johnson. Does the CIA have veto powers over military proposed double-agents?

Mr. Miler. No, not the veto power.

Mr. Angleton. Well, it never really comes up to a veto. But if we took a stand against it and supplied reasoning that made sense, they would go along the way that we wanted. We've never had a head-on collision.

Mr. Miler. There would oftentimes be differences in the field, that would be presented through the proper channels, say from the Army back to the ACSI from our field station to headquarters. And then there would be a discussion and a resolution at the Washington level.

Now obviously, in any kind of a situation like that, there have been instances where, you know, there was bad feelings and misunderstandings and so forth. But I think that overall, at least in my experience in the way we try to conduct the business was that it was mutually beneficial.

Now the military services have complained to me because I represented and a couple of my people represented the Agency on double agents to the military services and so forth, that we were not as forthcoming in providing them information about our possible assets and so forth as they were.

Their system was different. They had a clearinghouse system where this was available and so forth. Our position on it was that if we had a requirement, we would perhaps find a source or an asset in which to fulfill the requirement. But for security and compartmentation reasons, not exclusively due to the counter-intelligence concerns but also to the general security and operations procedures of the Agency as a whole, there was a reluctance to put this information forward except when and as needed.

End Tape 4A

Begin 4B

Mr. Angleton. And there's another point that has to be raised here. That is when you get into the field of deception you are bound by certain charters. Those charters have not been approved at the highest policy level. So there's been a great deal of tactical military cover and deception.

Our interest is more on the strategic deception, and that paper has been resting with Dr. Kissinger for some 2 1/2 years or more for approval.

Mr. Miler. Three.

Mr. Angleton. Three years.

So that is bogged down a great deal of the whole overall deception program.

Mr. Maxwell. The paper that is in front of Dr. Kissinger now makes what deceptions?

Mr. Angleton. It was a paper that was pulled together by the Joint Chiefs, ourselves, and the FBI.

Mr. Maxwell. And it proposes what?

Mr. Angleton. It outlines procedures for strategic deceptions, political deception and other deception.

Mr. Johnson. Could you give a brief example of the CIA role in strategic deception, a specific example?

Mr. Angleton. No, I can't. I mean I could get into cases but it's too vague. It's always been something that has been arrived at ad hoc and it served the purpose, but I wouldn't call it strategic.

Mr. Miler. No program, in other words.

Mr. Angleton. In other words, the proper strategic deception would be the President calls in the Director and says, no one knows that in three months I'm going on the following trip. I will have meetings with the following people. I'm not going to announce it until a week before I leave.

So it gives you a time span of two months to use all of your sources to put across disinformation or information, a letter in the mailbox to the proper addressee that, you know, favor his role or favor his mission and helps him out. And that's what we are trying to seek and have been trying to seek for a long time. But there has to be a way of knowing what are some of the intentions of the government in order to advance it through disinformation or deception.

Mr. Miler. With respect to the military, if I may return to that, I think that one of the -- probably the greatest difference and failure with respect to CIA counter-intelligence relationships with the military was with respect to the situation in Vietnam because CIA did not perform a counter-

7600011315

intelligence function of any responsibility or significance in Vietnam. That was a tragic failure on the part of CIA and it goes back to the basic problem of the present management, to answer your earlier question, the present management because the present management of the CIA was involved in the decisions which prohibited a good counter-intelligence effort in Vietnam.

Mr. Shea. In that paper that is before Dr. Kissinger, are there any proposed control mechanisms that would act as a filter so that the misinformation in a sense could not flow back into the policy circles within the United States?

Mr. Angleton. Well, there wouldn't be. The kind of channels used, there wouldn't be any of that happening. This would be information given to an agent who was reporting, say to the KGB back, say it would never hit the light of day.

Mr. Shea. So the process of misinformation as it normally relates to the intelligence field is totally separate in terms of the active process of misinformation as it goes on in counter-intelligence?

Mr. Angleton. We are not dealing in overt. There may be some overt things put out that support a document that was given to a double who would pass it to KGB. But if the man is regarded to be an agent of the KGB, the KGB is not going to publicize that document without having blown the alleged agent.

Mr. Shea. But they could work on it in their process of disinformation to come back, and you would be caught.

7600011717

Mr. Miler. No. To be successful you would have to have a means of monitoring. You would have to have your penetration of, you would have to have your own litmus to see where it is played back or what reflections or what requirements are put on other double agents on the basis of the information from this agent.

That requires a centralized screening and control of double agents.

Mr. Angleton. If you sent the information through Agent A to KGB headquarters in Moscow, part of your testing would be to see whether your other double agents received questionnaires which you knew related to that document.

Mr. Shea. But it seems like in order to make strategic misinformation functional, you would have to have the same requirements that you had when you were talking about having a double agent: namely, somebody in a superior point of information penetrated into that organization to make sure that they are getting that information you're sending out is misinformation.

Mr. Miler. Not necessarily.

Mr. Angleton. It's not quite the same.

Mr. Miler. It's not quite that simple because you could see reflections of it perhaps in other areas in political actions, in failure to act.

Mr. Angleton. There are other ways of doing it. You can go to a diplomat who has a weak cipher system and you yourself can tell that diplomat in great confidence a whole series of things. You know the Soviets are going to break the code and read that message.

That would be one way of doing it. There are other ways of having, telling a friendly foreign service whom you know is penetrated.

I mean it's all case by case. But once you are given the task, that's when you begin to look at all of your assets and you begin to do the creative side of running a double, or how are you going to put this across. And there are many ways of doing it without bringing many people in.

Mr. diGenova. I'd like to change the subject matter just briefly. Part of the responsibility of the CI research personnel is to produce reports on various subjects which include current analyses on proprietary companies used by foreign intelligence services.

I would like to know whether or not either of you could shed any light on the question of whether or not we have any evidence that foreign intelligence services have established and used proprietary companies in the United States?

Mr. Angleton. Well, there's one case that comes to mind. I can't remember the details but I think that as a result of it, one of our deputy directors had a big project with this company and they dropped it because the Foreign Intelligence

Service had quite a penetration into it.

Mr. diGenova. Would that be the only instance of which you are familiar that there was in fact knowledge of an operating proprietary company run by a foreign intelligence service within the continental United States?

Mr. Angleton. Offhand I can't say because the Office of Security would be working with the Bureau, usually. I mean to say that S&T are the most likely people to have contracts with a number of contractors and companies. It would be Office of Security's job.

Mr. diGenova. Maybe I'm not making my point clear. I just thought that maybe in the course of your counter-intelligence function you may have discovered by whatever means that there was in fact such a company operating in the United States which was being used, not to contract with the Agency but to contract or just do anything, whether it was a bookkeeping firm or a law firm or anything, and was in fact engaged in espionage.

Mr. Miler. Well, we've had a number in the past. We've had a number of leads which were to the effect that Soviet intelligence money was in such and such a company, or something such as that. That was turned over to the FBI. And whether or not we ever heard anything back or did anything further on it, no.

In other words, unless there was an investigative angle

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

which we could pursue abroad or something, I'm a little bit confused by the question because it's outside -- the investigation of such a thing is outside the purview of the CIA unless it is abroad, unless it would be funded through Switzerland or Luxembourg or unless there was a Messagerie Maritime connection where Soviet money was being put in and they had representation here.

Mr. diGenova. Well, the staff has been given information that these analyses are done by CI research personnel or proprietary companies of foreign intelligence services, and either that information is wrong or we just do not understand each other.

Mr. Angleton. Well, I mean it's true that there have been analyses done. But the one that comes to mind is the one I mentioned, was the one where in this case it was French, had a heavy penetration of a company and that company was contracting with our STT people and therefore, our question was rather a project for large sums of money of using this company would proceed, and the decision based on our counter-intelligence analyses was to drop the project.

Mr. diGenova. I'd like to ask the question.

We've been told that one of the benefits which occurs to U.S. counter-intelligence when it focuses on bloc countries is the fact that these totalitarian regimes have a habit of acquiring great amounts of information about their citizenry and storing it, and that this is, on occasion, accessible to and makes them somewhat vulnerable as a result of that.

Turning the coin around a little bit and looking at ourselves, are the computerized systems which we now have in our country which put in a central location large amounts of information about individual citizens and large groups of citizens, making us vulnerable to penetration in terms of information, more vulnerable in terms of penetration by foreign counter-intelligence services?

Mr. Angleton. Vulnerable in what sense?

Mr. diGenova. Getting information about us, period, which I understand is one of the key goals of counter-intelligence, finding out what the other side is doing.

Mr. Angleton. You mean surreptitiously getting it from us or officially getting it from us?

Mr. diGenova. Both. The fact of the matter is the information exists and it's vulnerable for them to have it, is it vulnerable for us to have it?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I wouldn't put it down as vulnerable because when anyone makes a request on you for information, the first question is why. So the burden is on them to justify that they have a counter-espionage reason for asking for that information. And in the bulk of the cases you'll find that they are doing your work for you.

In other words, they've come across a telephone tap of some American who's arrived, he's made a call to the Bulgarian embassy and it looks as though there's a meeting being set up, so immediately you get a flash. And they ask that service for traces on the individual and you come back with the why, and they tell you about the entire Bulgarian business. And so we start an investigation as to Bulgarian antecedents or anything dealing with Bulgaria, et cetera. And if it's justified, we give them the information.

Mr. diGenova. Well, I don't think, Mr. Angleton, that's not what I'm getting at.

We as a country are amassing properly, quote, unquote, large amounts of information about ourselves through the use of computer systems.

Mr. Angleton. That's right.

Mr. diGenova. The CIA tells us that that is one of the things they like so much about foreign countries, because the totalitarian regimes have the tendency to amass large amounts of information about their citizenry and when we penetrate and get that information, that helps us.

My question is when we do that, when we centralize the information by using our own computer systems, no matter where it is, do we help them?

And in this regard I would note that in 1970 the Inspector General's report on the question of cover noted that the fact that credit bureaus in this country were amassing so much information about people, including CIA personnel, that it posed a major threat to maintain cover, both in the United States and abroad for CIA agents.

Now the question I raise is are we cutting off our nose to spite our face by using computers to really marshall together large amounts of evidence which can be made accessible to foreign powers either by surreptitiously or by simply openly getting it?

Mr. Miler. Yes, the answer is yes.

Mr. diGenova. Good.

Mr. Miler. Because it's very easy to get this information. And, for example, the Soviets have had, you can confirm this from the Bureau, have had a systematic system of purchasing from the State of Maryland, the District of Columbia, the State of Virginia, the business directories, residence directories, license directories for less than $350 apiece.

Mr. Johnson. If we're going to keep on our schedule, we've got a witness who's supposed to be here at 3:30, so is there a final question?

Mr. Kirbow. I have two questions. Because of the vast years of experience, Mr. Chairman, that we should ask them to comment on, and either one of you all should answer.

What do you all consider today to be the major threats to this country? And the second question is, what has been the major foreign covert action program directed against this country in your lifetime and experience in the Agency?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think, no question, it's the Soviet bloc services that represent the major threat because they are really a small, they are directly subordinated to the central committee and to the basic objectives, as I've seen them all my life to the change and balance of military power.

Further, that practically all intelligence operations more and more have political objectives, and I think it is the fact that since '59 they have elevated the Cuban intelligence and all of the other bloc services to a very high degree of efficiency, that they are coordinated and they work as equals.

And I think that is the major threat, that is the inability of the FBI by lack of personnel and manpower to be able to cover these people. There isn't the minimal coverage. The people they cover are people who have been "identified," and I defy anyone to have a list of identified agents in this country.

Now that is the legal side of it. Now the larger part of it is the illegal, where there's been little or no success. The only one that has really come out is the Abel case, which we handled through Hayhanen Hahannan. And then there was one or two minor ones.

But that is a whole program of bloc activity, and according to one of the best sources we had, his view was that the illegals would be placed primarily in airports, docks, factories, and they give a whole listing. And these are the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

areas where you have sabotage, you have explosions you can't identify, et cetera.

Now the illegal directorate represents a very major part of Soviet intelligence and bloc intelligence and we just -- there are not successes. It's just happenstance.

Mr. Epstein. It's disruption of our defense effort? Is that what you're speaking of now? Their goal being disruption of this country's defense effort?

Mr. Angleton. Well, they have many assignments. But the point is they have also the sabotage-assassination part, which is totally apart from the body politic of the KGB, and it raises questions in everybody's mind when there is sabotage and all other kinds of activities and you cannot find the culprits.

One defector stated that he believed that the computer fire they had in the Pentagon several years ago was KGB. He was KGB. But he stated in effect that he thought that was one of their operations.

Scotty?

Mr. Miler. The major threat to the U.S., I think, is based on the fact, as we referred to earlier, as this should affect counter-intelligence, the national counter-intelligence effort, is to have your national counter-intelligence focused on the fact that the Soviets and the Soviet blocs, since May of 1959 have rededicated themselves to the principles of

Leninism. They have rededicated themselves to the shift in the military balance of power. They have reinstituted, in effect, what was the policy of the NEP period, the New Economic Policy, the attraction of Western business, the attraction of Western capital into the Soviet Union to bolster the Soviet Union, the disruption of the economies of other nations, which would have an adverse effect on the economy of this nation -- all of this centrally controlled and directed, used through such countries as Romania, where we have for several years now deluded ourselves that Romania is independent, through Bulgaria, through Hungary, through Poland, all the rest of it.

This is the major threat to the United States. Counterintelligence is probably, in my view, at least, one of the major ways that you're going to be able to counter this and at least get the information brought to the attention of the people who are making the decisions and making the policy for this country.

Mr. Epstein. Has our penetration effort been good enough to establish whether or not the Soviet Union has been involved in direct covert action against the United States, such as to undermine our economy, not using other countries but directly?

Mr. Angleton. There's been a tremendous amount of information on this. I mean, for example today the second head of the Chamber of Commerce in Moscow is General Pitovranov.

Prior, he was Deputy Chief of the NKVD. He was the resident KGB resident in Peking. He's the one who with Mao set up the underground that took over China. He was the head of Karlshorst, the largest KGB in Germany. He operated people like George Blake. He organized the kidnapping of Otto John, the head of Security, West Germany.

He has now been placed as the Deputy Chief, or Deputy Chairman, of the Moscow Chamber of Commerce, the same role that Lenin had DZHERZHINSKY Derjensky in the NEP. That is the role to be able to deal with Western capitalists with the view of abroad recruitments and with the view of using them as agents of influence.

Now there's a tremendous amount of data. Now this is what I'm trying to say, that counter-intelligence has always been kept at a very low level as far as its ability to submit such studies or whatnot to the National Security Council or to a forum where they are debated. But they happen to be the only hard intelligence because they are coming from men who were 16 years in this one case, a part of that mechanism and who read all the files.

Mr. Epstein. What happens to all that?

Mr. Angleton. Well, that's been used by directors in briefings but there's never yet been a forum where you can actually have a confrontation with people who hold contrary views.

7600 011327

Mr. Miler. In other words, how significant is the fact then, how significant would it be if our Congress, our Executive and our business people knew that as of 1974 the last figures I have of 187 Soviets identified with the USSR all union chamber of commerce, the people that are doing all of the business with our businessmen who are coming here to the United States, work them and so forth, when 47 of those were appointed to that from the KGB.

I mean, what significance does this have to the United States?

Senator Schweiker. 47 out of how many?

Mr. Miler. About 182.

Mr. Angleton. Let's go to the scientific side on this. The scientific side, in May of 1969 the central committee ordered that there be added 2,000 staff officers to KGB from the Academy of Sciences in order to exploit the opening to the West and the scientific levels.

Mr. Epstein. And how would that exploitation be accomplished?

Mr. Angleton. For recruitment and exploitation of contacts in the West in the scientific exchanges.

Mr. Epstein. The goal being espionage or something else?

Mr. Angleton. Espionage.

Mr. Miler. Espionage and influence. How many KGB officers?

Mr. Angleton. In 1961, 1000 of those had been pulled together. There was a briefing given by the general staff to high KGB people regarding the field of military electronics, and during that briefing it was pointed out that they were 14 years behind us, but they would overcome and surpass us through three means: Number one was the Central Committee adding the 2,000 staff officers for espionage; Second would be disinformation leading our scientific efforts in the wrong directions; And third was to enter into those kind of treaties which would bind our own scientific progress in military fields.

When I left the Agency, I read a report by a man who knew nothing of this lecture, and this was a group of American electronic experts who had made a very sensitive, Top Secret study which stated that in this field the Soviets were four years behind us.

This was in 1974.

Mr. Epstein. A final question. In the last 10 or 15 years have you experienced any situations where any hostile powers were involved in covert action against the election process in this country?

Mr. Angleton. Well, I think there's no question that influence has been brought to bear.

Mr. Inderfurth. How?

Mr. Epstein. Meaning what?

Mr. Angleton. Propaganda, among other things.

For example, one of the most famous of the disinformation agents, I mean they had established contact at political levels in this country.

Mr. Epstein. How about campaign financing?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think it figures unless it would be the CP.

But just to add one last point to this question of the threat, it is my view, seeing Angola and seeing the unwillingness of this country to resist or to define its purpose, or to deal fairly with its allies, that within a period of four years there will be a form of confrontation on an unpopular issue between the Soviet bloc and the United States in which we will back down. We will then go into our supreme isolation, because in December of '61, when this Soviet defected and he had read the political action programs, he spelled out in detail that one of the primary purposes of the reorientations was that all intelligence operations or political objectives, and the main political objective was to reaffirm the United States as the main enemy, to achieve its isolation and to achieve political hegemony over most of Africa and Latin America.

He pointed out that the two largest and newest divisions created in KGB were Africa and Latin America.

Now this was not speculative. This was reading actual documents of a Top Secret nature in which you had to have a communications intelligence clearance to even have access to them, and I think what he has spelled out, and I might add that when I took him to many countries we talked on higher levels than we could talk in the United States. And I took him to some countries that we could talk to Prime Ministers. I have seen Prime Ministers and have been able to expose this. But the machinery here is not of such a nature that you can get into these matters.

Mr. Epstein. Are they disseminated?

Mr. Angleton. We're not going to disseminate. These are matters that should go to the Secretary of State. They shouldn't be going up through people because many of the secrets are within that.

Mr. Epstein. Do they go to the Secretary of State?

Mr. Angleton. No.

Mr. Epstein. Why not?

Mr. Angleton. I don't think the Secretary of State has ever been much interested in asking for opinions. On Romania we sent something to the President prior to our trip.

Mr. Epstein. But the documents you're talking about, the Top Secret documents --

Mr. Angleton. We don't have the document. I'm stating he read those documents in Moscow.

Mr. Epstein. But the report that he read, was that disseminated?

Mr. Angleton. I don't know. It went to the Director and it went to many other people. But whether it actually got to the Secretary of State, I do not know.

Mr. Miler. I think one important point here that I would like to make is that what has happened, in my opinion what has happened in counter-intelligence in the Agency and the so-called aggressive operations, the increase in double agent operations and so forth and the dispersal of the centralized counter-intelligence is not going to produce a counter-intelligence program within the CIA which is going to focus on attempting to provide the government, policy-makers and so forth, with the kind of information and analytical product that is necessary if we're going to have a successful counter-intelligence.

Mr. Johnson. I would like to thank the witnesses, and unless Senator Schweiker has any questions, we will adjourn for five minutes.

Is that acceptable?

Thank you very much.

Senator Schweiker. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 4:10 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-mentioned matter was concluded.)

- - -

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10017
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 05-H-01

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 02/11/76
PAGES : 106
SUBJECTS : AMLASH

CIA

CASTRO, FIDEL

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608 Date: 03-18-2025

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 2

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

ORIGINAL
Vol.
1 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

R2574

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate SElect Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

7600010774

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

A

smn

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010775

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF: PAGE

AMLASH Case Officer 3

EXHIBITS

AMLASH Case Officer Exhibit No. 1 70

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010775

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Wednesday, February 11, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:20 o'clock am., in Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Staff: Paul Wallach, Ed Greissing, Jim Johnston, Dan Dwyer and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.

7600010077

PROCEEDINGS

Senator Schweiker. Will you stand and raise your right hand.

Do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. First of all, sir, we'll start with some procedural matters. I'm not going to ask you to state your name for the record because we have agreed before beginning here today that you would testify under an alias so as not to jeopardize your ongoing activities.

Is that the way you understand our agreement?

TESTIMONY OF AMLASH CASE OFFICER

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Is that satisfactory to you?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Now, you understand that at any time we refer to your participation or your authorship of a document or receipt of a document, we are prepared to substantiate the reference that we are making, and we are not trying to avoid proving the fact that it is indeed you that were involved in the incident. It is simply because we were not able to use your name.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Now, you've previously testified before this Committee, and I assume you've had a copy of the Committee rules, and we have another copy available in case you want to refer to them.

And are you appearing here voluntarily today without a counsel?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. Do you understand that at any point during this examination you are free to stop answering any questions and request the advice of Counsel?

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. And do you understand as well that all your constitutional rights are intact here before the Committee

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000 1 0779

including the Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent, if you choose.

AMLASH Case Officer. I do.

Mr. Johnston. All right.

Let me state that the purpose of this interview is to refine and clarify certain questions about the AMLASH operation.

It is my understanding that you were the case officer on the AMLASH operation from the time period, say, of the first of September on through, for all relevant purposes, December '63, and November '64, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. At this time you were a member of what was called the Special Affairs Staff, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. And that's abbreviated SAS.

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Would you describe your position in SAS and your relationship to Mr. Fitzgerald, who was Chief of SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was a special assistant to Mr. Fitzgerald, charged with the responsibility of attempting to organize a military coup inside Cuba against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Did you report directly to Mr. Fitzgerald on your work?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I did.

Mr. Johnston. Was there anyone else knowledgeable in SAS of what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only the other people who were involved working on the project.

Mr. Johnston. What was the relationship between SAS and the Western Hemisphere Division under, at that time, I believe, Mr. J. C. King?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall exactly what the organizational relationship was at that time. I do know that we operated on a somewhat -- I wouldn't say autonomous basis from the Division itself, but the chain of command was certainly from Mr. Fitzgerald, not necessarily through the Division Chief, but up to the DDP at that time.

Mr. Johnston. Who was Mr. Helms.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. In other words, there could be direct reporting from Mr. Fitzgerald to Mr. Helms.

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Is it necessary that Mr. King was knowledgeable of all operations of SAS?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not necessarily. I don't know if he was kept fully advised of all the operations or not.

Mr. Johnston. Did he know generally what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. I presume he did, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And how often did he and Mr. Fitzgerald

7600010731

meet to coordinate. They do coordination of their work?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I wasn't involved in that part of it.

Mr. Johnston. Was SAS targeted directly at Cuba, or were there other countries under its jurisdiction?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. SAS was strictly a task force set up to deal with the Cuban problem.

Mr. Johnston. And finally on this general matter, who did -- who gave the counterintelligence support for SAS operations?

AMLASH Case Officer. We had a Counterintelligence Branch within SAS.

Mr. Johnston. Who headed that in the fall of '63?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. There was a change. I don't recall the name.

Mr. Johnston. Let me -- as I stated earlier, you of course have testified before, and I have before me the transcript and I'm not proposing really to trap you in any nature with this transcript. However, there are some things that were not asked before that I would like to clarify.

First of all, how and why was AMLASH first contacted to set up the September meeting that you attended?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had been contacted the year before in Helsinki, and we found out at that time that he was coming out to a sporting event in the Western Hemisphere, so we went down and contacted him.

Mr. Johnston. In my review of the file -- and I don't think we have the document here today, but my notes indicate there was a cable from Langley to Rome on 19 June 1963, that is in the AMLASH file.

AMLASH Case Officer. Would you repeat the question?

Mr. Johnston. In my review of the AMLASH file, there is a cable from headquarters to Rome on 19 June 1963 which states that AMWHIP, who was your contact with AMLASH, had sent a letter as part of "an activation effort to reluctant dragon."

I ask , do you have any recollection or any knowledge that this was a sign to AMLASH that CIA was back in contact with him or wanted to go back in contact with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't comment on that because I didn't get into the operation until September of '63, and this took place before I became involved in that part of the AMLASH operation.

Mr. Johnston. So in other words, you're saying you don't really know who made the contact with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. We had contact with AMLASH from the year before. He had been contacted by a CIA case officer in Helsinki.

Mr. Johnston. In July and August, 1962.

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Then he returned to Cuba.

AMLASH Case Officer. And this was the first time, to the best of my knowledge, that he had come out from Cuba since the Helsinki trip.

Mr. Johnston. In other words, you're not aware of any prior contact between CIA or an intermediary and AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not between that period of time.

Mr. Johnston. All right. You met with AMLASH in Brazil on September 5th through 9th. I don't mean you specifically, but the general meetings with AMLASH were in that time frame.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall seeing a cable, or receiving instructions from headquarters to the effect -- and this is after your series of meetings -- instructions to the effect that headquarters felt that AMLASH appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer, and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him initially in FI and ops reporting and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on a more orderly basis.

Do you recall seeing something to that effect after your Brazil meetings with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall the cable itself, but certainly that would be in line with the thinking at that time.

If I may state, he was not considered a controlled asset,

760001070

1B (NSA)

shall we say, and it was somebody with whom we felt that we could collaborate in organizing the internal group.

Mr.Johnston. But my summary of the cable would indicate that on September 9th, or after your meetings in Brazil, you really didn't think of him as a gatherer of information, but as someone who wanted to go on to other things, as a conspirator of some kind.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. The file also has a document in it, the AMLASH file, dated 16 September, marked OFPA 72775. I don't really know what an OFPA is.

AMLASH Case Officer. It's a dispatch.

Mr. Johnston. In any event, it reports a transcript of the conversation, and to the best of my ability to understand the document, it's a conversation of an intercept in the Cuban Embassy in Paris. The document says "Mary: I don't want to imagine things, but this thing of" AMLASH -- uses his real name. I have sanitized this -- "Moreno. It is either a tremendous secret or a top secret matter." And then there is an unreadable portion, and then a word either "treason" or "reason" I'm not sure what is referred to, and then a participant whose name is Betty says, "I believe it is a top secret matter."

My question to you is, did you, in September of '63, know about this intercept?

1/18R

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically recall today that I would have known about it. I presume if we had it in file, that I was working with it, that I would have seen it.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any information about any recollection about something on this order?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. And assume that at least the portion I quoted seems to reflect on the Cubans' view of AMLASH's activities in Paris.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it may have. As I recall, I think that he was also at that time -- I may be wrong, and we would have to go back to the files to check, but he was rather outspoken to some of his closer friends in the fact that he was no longer happy with the revolution, with Castro.

Mr. Johnston. I don't want to dwell on this, if you don't have a recollection, but this conversation seems to indicate that the employees in the Cuban embassy think that AMLASH is there on a top secret mission.

1B (NSA)

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so because of his independent way of comportment. He didn't answer to anybody.

Senator Schweiker. What was his role in government at that point?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was -- excuse me, this must have been '63. He was a personal representative of Castro to the games, first in Brazil, and I don't think he had a specific post in '63, as I recall. He had been Deputy Minister of Interior. He had been a military attache in Spain. I don't think he had a specific post at that time.

Excuse me, if I may add just one more point. Before that he had been President of the Student Federation at the University of Havana. He may still have been in that post, or about the time that he was getting out of it, and this is, I think, where really the trouble between this particular fellow and the Castro brothers more or less came to ahead.

Mr. Johnston. On the 19th of September, Jim Wave sent a message to headquarters basically warning, giving a warning, making the statement that there was an anti-Communist group in Cuba, and the name AMLASH is part of that group, and it concluded by saying that Fidel is allegedly aware of both the anti-Communist group and a Communist group, and that he acts as a moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the government of Cuba.

Do you recall receiving that information?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically receiving that information, but I do recall that at that time Fidel Castro himself was talking about -- was concerned about a Communist takeover of the revolution, and he did meet with the subject and some other friends of his in order to prevent this.

Mr. Johnston. When was this?

AMLASH Case Officer. This was in the early '60s sometime.

Senator Schweiker. What year were you in?

Mr. Johnston. '63.

AMLASH Case Officer. This was before '63. This must have been in '62.

Mr. Wallach. This is before his trip to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Johnston. Before Castro's trip?

Mr. Wallach. Right.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

MR. Johnston. The question being put is after your meeting in Brazil with AMLASH, Jim Wave cabled headquarters that AMLASH was part of a group of anti-Communist Cuban government leaders and that Castro was aware of that fact.

AMLASH Case Officer. My answer to you is that he certainly was because he had been talking with these people, including AMLASH, a year before. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. Castro was aware that he was anti-Communist?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that he was one of the anti-Communist group.

Senator Schweiker. Why would he be so trusted and be the special representative at that point in time if he was known as anti-Communist?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the relationship with Castro. Castro himself had not declared his Communist, more or less intentions, as of that time.

Senator Schweiker. Wait, this was after the Cuban missile crisis. This was '63, and the Cuban missile crisis was '62. I'm confused here.

AMLASH Case Officer. Let's go back to the dates here.

Senator Schweiker. The Jim Wave date is September 1963, and he knows at this point, allegedly now, that this AMLASH was a member of an anti-Communist group. I have trouble reconciling that with not pinpointing AMLASH and his possible subversive agent. I think that is what Jim is getting to.

AMLASH Case Officer. Again, my answer is I don't know specifically why or what the origin of the '63 J. M. Wave cable was.

My answer again to the question is that Castro, from his previous knowledge, going back to '62, did know and had consulted with this group of people of which AMLASH was one, who were the group of Anti-Communist officers in the revolution.

Mr. Johnston. So --

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why in '63 this report would have come out, but it would confirm Castro's knowledge of this group, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Let me move on into October. There was a meeting with AMLASH.

Senator Schweiker. How long did he tolerate anti-Communist officers in high positions in his government? I've got to believe there's some cutoff here. I realize the uniqueness and broadness of his support earlier, but it would just seem to me that at some point he really had to weed out, nottnecessarily weed out or be suspect of anti-Communist officers who had too high decision making in his government, would he not, or am I missing something?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not really, because out of this group that was mentioned, and with whom he himself discussed the need in the early '60s to keep, say, the Communists out, some of those officers are still in his goverment today.

Now, they may have changed, or Castro may have changed, but he didn't purge all this group of officers. Maybe he won them over, and if they are still there, evidently he has some confidence in them.

Mr. Johnston. According to the file, there was a meeting on October 5th, apparently, in Paris, and I'm not sure that you were the case officer at that meeting, and the cable from Paris sets the tone of that meeting as AMLASH apparently was trying to get things off his chest in talking to you.

Were you the case officer at that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was the case officer during that period of time.

Go into a little of the detail because we did talk about these problems.

Mr. Johnston. There appeared from the file two meetings in early October 1963, the first meeting on or about October 5th that AMLASH comes in and says I want to get things off my chest, and seems to express great dissatisfaction with the CIA's position.

Then there's a second meeting on October 13th or so where he specifically asks to meet with Robert Kennedy, and you previously testified about that second meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Now, the file indicates there was an earlier meeting on October 5th, and AMLASH was complaining apparently about the low level espionage matters that had been discussed in Brazil, and implying that he had a more valuable role to play, and the file says the case officer provided the necessary assurances that his feelings were not in fact true, and that his case was receiving the consideration at the highest levels.

With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering AMLASH off his chest, a much more relaxed AMLASH departed, stating his desire to return to Cuba to undertake the big job.

Do you recall that meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. I think you are getting those two meetings mixed up. In other words, the later one, yes. I was there and talking to him in the second meeting. In the first meeting I don't recall precisely, but there could have been a meeting with a contact in Paris, in other words, not a case officer, but the contact we had in Paris. I don't remember who that was, one of the officers there.

Mr. Johnston. In addition to you he was in contact with --

AMLASH Case Officer. Only for purposes of contact. I mean, only to make contact with me, not to carry on the case. But he knew that the other officer was a friend of mine, and he was in touch with him, and when he came to Paris he would get in touch with him. So I would be notified.

Mr. Johnston. I think you have used his name in the prior transcript, [redacted], the case officer?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, because he was the one who furnished the quarters where we had the meetings.

Mr. Johnston. In furnishing the quarters, did you have a taping system going as to the discussions that would take place?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't believe we taped any of those meetings?

Mr. Johnston. Is it procedure to tape meetings with Agents?

AMLASH Case Officer. Sometimes. It is not a standard procedure. Sometimes it is not physically possible.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go back into this meeting of October 5th, which you don't recall that you were at this meeting, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. There probably could have been the

end 1a
begin 1b

meeting when he first arrived in Paris, and the meeting that he had -- I don't recall specifically.

I do recall, if I may, I do recall that he said he was unhappy because of the requirements, the intelligence requirements that we had levied on him in Brazil, and it is true that his position was at that time, even in Brazil, and later in Paris, that he was not disposed to cooperate just to furnish intelligence. In other words, he felt that he wanted to do something about the removal of Castro but was not just prepared to keep us advised as to what was going on. He recognized that this was certainly part of a needed operation, but he did not consider himself just as a provider of information.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go off the record for a minute because I want to use a code name.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnston. Having mentioned the code name that is used in this cable, you now recall you were at the 5 October meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And the cable, you can look at it, indicates that AMLASH was in a confessional mood.

My question to you is, after recalling that meeting, was it basically one where he was expressing his concern about the CIA role for him?

Mr. Johnston. He was expressing his concern for what?

Mr. Johnston. The CIA's plans for using him.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. He was concerned as to how and in what way he was to cooperate with CIA. He was also -- and we must underline this, right from the beginning, dubious as to our resolve to really follow through on initiating a coup against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Is the cable correct in stating that he was assured that his case was receiving consideration at the highest levels?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Was the word "highest level" used, or was a name used?

AMLASH Case Officer. Highest levels, but at that stage of the game he knew he was talking to CIA, so highest levels in CIA is what was meant at that particular time.

Mr. Johnston. That's the word you used?

You didn't say Director McCone?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not use names, no.

Mr. Johnston. On October 5th, you reassured him that his consideration, that his case was receiving consideration at least at the highest levels of CIA, and the cable reflects that when he left that meeting he seemed much more relaxed about the case.

Is that an accurate portrayal of the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010711

Mr. Johnston. As I mentioned, there was another meeting on or about October 13th, where, as I understand it, AMLASH made his demand or his request to meet with Robert Kennedy, and he made that request to meet with Kennedy by name.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he did.

Well, he said somebody such as, somebody high in the administration, again, to receive the assurances that we were prepared to -- that we were serious about developing and organizing a coup.

Mr. Johnston. After that meeting, you were recalled to Langley for discussions, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was traveling back and forth between Paris and Langley, yes. I don't recall if I was recalled at that particular time, but I would go there -- I was TDY.

Mr. Johnston. I want to set the stage. There is a message from the Director, 75683, to London, directing you to return to headquarters for discussion of all facets of the case.

This is after you reported that AMLASH wants to meet with someone like Robert Kennedy.

Do you recall that flow of events?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. What discussions did you have at Langley, and I don't want to go through your previous testimony again, but basically are we correct in understanding that out of the discussions at Langley came a decision to go to Paris with Mr. Fitzgerald representing himself as a personal representative of Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Then you met on October 29, according to the file, with AMLASH, Mr. Fitzgerald, in Paris.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. Can I go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Wallach. I think you stated that AMLASH said that he would like to meet with one of the U.S. leaders such as Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. A high representative in the U.S. Government.

Mr. Wallach. Did he mention any other names that you recall?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

Mr. Wallach. Just Robert Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Such as Robert Kennedy.

Mr. Wallach. Did AMLASH, to the best of your knowledge, from what he told you, know about any prior assassination attempts that had been run by the U.S.?

7600010795

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. Did he have any reason to believe that Robert Kennedy had been involved with any of the sabotage operations as contrasted with any assassination attempts?

AMLASH Case Officer. If he knew, he never mentioned it to me. We never discussed that.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you didn't say to him, how did you know that Robert Kennedy -- or why did you pick Robert Kennedy.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all. I mean, it's a perfectly, I think, logical name to have been mentioned at that time, because by him, since he was the President's brother and since he was the Attorney General, he wanted somebody high in the Government; at one time he had mentioned the President, you know, I want to talk to the President.

Mr. Wallach. It seems strange to me he didn't pick the Secretary of State or someone like that.

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at --

AMLASH Case Officer. He wanted somebody directly to the President. In other words, he wanted the assurances from the highest authority, again, from the President of the United States.

Mr. Wallach. What I'm trying to get at is we, from our examination of the alleged assassination attempts, have also gone into the sabotage attempts, MONGOOSE, etc, and found out that Bobby Kennedy did play a role in the sabotage attempts.

What I'm trying to get from you is your understanding of whether or not AMLASH, from his Cuban side, knew that the Kennedy's had played that role and would necessarily say I want to talk to Robert Kennedy for that reason.

AMLASH Case Officer. No. He never mentioned it, not at all in any way.

Mr. Johnston. Let me finally go to the October 29th meeting, and before we went on the record this morning, you were explaining to us how you characterized the AMLASH operation.

Would you repeat in summary form what you told us before we went on the record?

AMLASH Case Officer. The operation was never conceived, certainly, carried out during the period I was associated with it, but was never conceived as an assassination plot. It was conceived as a coup in order to organize a military group within Cuba to overthrow Castro.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have the understanding that if necessary AMLASH was proposing to assassinate the Castro brothers?

AMLASH Case Officer. Assassination was not a subject of discussion that came up at every meeting or contact that we had with AMLASH. It was so stated by him that he felt that the only way to initiate a coup in Cuba was to direct the first blow at the leadership.

Since we were not willing to discuss specifically eliminating Castro, this was never discussed in terms of the operation. We certainly had no doubt that in his mind this was the only way to go about it.

Mr. Johnston. And you dealt with him on that basis?

AMLASH Case Officer. Trying to temporize this, and if possible we were not looking for a bloody coup at that time, planning a bloody coup inside Cuba, but we were trying to certainly get him to think in terms of much more than just the elimination of the leadership.

Mr. Johnston. And to broaden it.

AMLASH Case Officer. To broaden it into a coup. Our interest was the coup, not the specifics of how he got it started.

Mr. Johnston. You were concerned about whether his plans were realistic, weren't you?

AMLASH Case Officer. Very definitely, yes.

Senator Schweiker. Did you personally evaluate AMLASH as fully capable of leading a coup and being able to implement it and carry it out if support were given?

How did you evaluate AMLASH?

As I understand from the dialogue here, and also from reading a summary of these, at first the operations talk was fairly low level sabotage, which he out of hand rejected, and

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010799

he pictured himself as a leader of a top level effort on the condition that it had assurances of government support and top level support here.

Now, I guess my question to you is, how, as case officer, did you evaluate his capability? Did you evaluate him as someone who could lead a coup and who would, that our government could put trust in, faith in in terms of his ability to carry it out or not?

AMLASH Case Officer. At that time we did not evaluate him as the leader of a coup. He was not our candidate to be the next ruler of Cuba. He was only evaluated in our dealings with him on the basis of what he and his group could contribute to a coup inside Cuba.

So I don't recall at any time that he was selected or that anybody ever talked of him as the next leader in Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Wasn't there some thought that he would be a good rallying point for strong leaders of a new government in Cuba, that he had an ability to attract good people to work with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had proven this because he had been one of the two leaders, or the two top leaders of the Directorado Revolutionario, which is the Revolutionary Directorate which is a group not part of the 26th of July Movement, but a separate group, which is -- he was one of the leaders, and became a military commander of that group, separate from the 26 of July movement.

So he had a group in the DR which we knew about, and he afforded himself very well in the fighting -- this was in the province of Lasvillas, during the time that Castro was -- he was in a separate area of the country.

Mr. Baron. I had a recollection which I haven't checked against our transcripts that when we discussed this before, you had said although AMLASH might not be considered the leader of a new government, that he was a potential candidate for that job. He might not be a good military leader, but he would have an ability to bring good people together in a new government.

AMLASH Case Officer. Of the people left in Cuba at that time, we didn't have much of a choice. I mean, you know, we weren't in contact. He was one of the few who could travel.

Senator Schweiker. You put him up near the top but not necessarily at the top.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, as one being able to contribute.

Senator Schweiker. And you didn't have too many options at that point.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. One of the documents that CIA previously provided us in a sanitized version is a memorandum for the record dated 19 November 1963, and the subject is Plans for AMLASH Contact, and let me just show you that and ask you if you not necessarily prepared that document, because it is a sanitized document, but whether you prepared a document that that apparently came from, the memorandum for record of November 19th.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I recall.

Mr. Johnston. You prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer. I believe I prepared the memorandum from which that extract was made, yes.

Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

AMLASH Case Officer. It had to be late October sometime.

Mr. Johnston. November 19th is the date.

AMLASH Case Officer. Early November, certainly after my October meeting with him in Paris, and before going back, 19 November, that's probably it.

Mr. Johnston. Is that the date you prepared it?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's the date I prepared it. I don't remember when I returned from Paris after the October- meetings.

Mr. Johnston. You prepared a memorandum for the record on the contact before you went to the meeting in Paris on November 22nd?

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Part of that document, Paragraph 3, states that you would show AMLASH a copy of the President's speech in Miami.

AMLASH Case Officer. No. I didn't show him a copy of the speech at all.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you Paragraph 3 of that.

They were talking about leading up to the November 22nd meeting with AMLASH.

end t. 1b

HARRIS:GSH
Sen Sel, CIA
2/11/76
Tape 1

7600010803

AMLASH Case Officer. It may have been planned to show him a copy of the speech, but as I recall it was not shown him. I talked to him about it, but I don't recall having shown him the speech. But it was probably clear that I could have taken a copy of that speech to him and shown it to him.

Mr. Johnston. Paragraph 4 of that document states --- would you just read it?

AMLASH Case Officer. "Chief SA has requested written reports on AMLASH operation be kept to a minimum."

Mr. Johnston. And that's Desmond Fitzgerald, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. Did Mr. Fitzgerald tell you that on November 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. It might not have been the first time he mentioned this because -- in other words, on sensitive operations it was always a case of trying to limit the number of people aware of sensitive operations and this certainly is considered in that category.

He reiterated, I presume, since I put it in the memo at that time that the written communications would be minimized.

Mr. Johnston. And this is a memorandum for record.

AMLASH Case Officer. Remember also this is primarily the cables because I had to communicate with headquarters and the station in Paris. I didn't have my independent communications.

Mr. Johnston. Where were you on November 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. At headquarters. He told me this personally.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. Is it normal to prepare a memorandum for the record about plans for contact of an agent?

AMLASH Case Officer. Normally, yes.

Mr. Johnston. So there's nothing unusual in your preparing this memorandum for record. Is that your testimony?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there wasn't anything unusual about it. That's the usual thing unless advised to the contrary.

Mr. Johnston. The last time you testified before the Committee you mentioned on November 22nd you had a pen-like device with a hypodermic needle on it. This memorandum for record of November 19th does not mention that.

Is there some reason that it doesn't?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't remember why it would not have been mentioned. I don't recall when I left for Paris. I may have left for Paris on the 21st and --

Mr. Johnston. I think that's correct.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know if the decision had been made that we would even show him something like this that time.

Mr. Johnston. You're talking about the 19th?

AMLASH Case Officer. About the 19th, when I wrote the memorandum.

Mr. Johnston. When you left for Paris my understanding is that you carried the device.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right, I carried it with me.

Mr. Johnston. And you had approval to show it to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I had approval to show it to him.

Mr. Johnston. The file indicates that AMLASH was contacted on November 20th, I believe, in order to set up the November 22nd meeting and he was telephoned by, I assume, somebody in Paris.

Did you arrange that or were you knowledgeable of that fact?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I was going to go there to see him. We would have made arrangements to set the meeting up.

Mr. Johnston. The cable reporting the telephone call on November 20th states that somebody apparently was in the room with AMLASH when he was telephoned, and that therefore there had to be a telephone conversation by the CIA agent calling him and the CIA agent --

Pardon me. AMLASH asked if the meeting would be of interest to him, and the CIA agent said, I don't know if it's going to be of interest to you but it's the meeting you requested. And I ask you your understanding of what was meant by the meeting that you requested?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably to give him an answer on the caches that he wanted inside Cuba, and I understand that was the primary point which had not been, he had not been informed of this at the previous meeting with Fitzgerald, so were we going to give him that material. In other words, it was given to him later in the caches, was that material going to be given to him?

Mr. Johnston. What about the pen device?

AMLASH Case Officer. The pen device was something again, it could have been part of that package. I don't think he was specifically asking about the pen device because we had been so reluctant to even discuss something like this with him and he knew it that he was primarily concerned with the caches.

Mr. Johnston. Is it correct to say that at the October 29th meeting AMLASH was happy with the U.S. policy but asking for equipment to do the job?

AMLASH Case Officer. To initiate the coup.

In other words, he didn't want a massive amount of equipment but he said we do need some equipment to get the thing started.

Mr. Johnston. And that that was in his mind on November 20th.

AMLASH Case Officer. When he made the call?

Mr. Johnston. When the call was made to him and he was told that the November 22nd meeting was the one that he had requested.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000010802

Mr. Johnston. And that AMLASH would have understood that that was what you were going to give him, some or all of the things discussed at the October 29th meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. To see what could be given to him, not if it was or anything like this because Paris didn't know what we were prepared to tell him at the 22 November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. As you said before, you were at Langley on the 20th. There's a cable indicating you left Washington arriving in Paris on the morning of November 22nd.

Is that your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did anyone go with you from Washington to Paris?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Fitzgerald was where at the time?

AMLASH Case Officer. At Langley. He was present at the meeting, at the late October meeting, not at the 22 November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. Let's go then to the November 22nd meeting. You previously testified as you recall it was late afternoon or evening because it was dark when you came out.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Where was it held? What kind of place was it held?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that we used a safe gs 7

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600010873

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

house or in the study of [redacted] home.

Mr. Johnston. Who was there at the meeting? You and AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. The October meeting?

Mr. Johnston. I'm sorry, November 22nd meeting.

AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH and myself.

Mr. Johnston. Nobody else was there?

03

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was [redacted] home, it may have been in another part of the house but he was not at the meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have that meeting taped?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I recall.

Mr. Johnston. If you did have it taped, where would the tape be today?

AMLASH Case Officer. In the file.

Mr. Johnston. In this file?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I don't recall that that meeting was taped. I don't think it was possible to tape it.

Mr. Johnston. Who was knowledgeable of that meeting outside yourself and AMLASH? Generally, were the people at the Paris station aware of it?

03

AMLASH Case Officer. Not generally, no. It could have been the Chief of Station, naturally, and [redacted].

Mr. Johnston. At a meeting like that did you have some kind of back-up support, counter-surveillance, any kind of

[redacted]

gsh

7600000809

back-up support so that you could be assured that you were not under surveillance at the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I took the necessary precautions in going to the meeting to assure myself. I didn't have somebody else following me to tell me if I had any surveillance on me.

Mr. Johnston. What about AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know. I don't know if he was counter-surveilled.

Senator Schweiker. Could AMLASH have been a double agent?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's a good question. I can only give you an opinion. I didn't think so then and even with everything that has happened today, I don't think so today.

Again, that is strictly my opinion.

Senator Schweiker. In a nutshell, and I realize this is a very difficult, complex area, why don't you think so?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because of the power play that was taking place in Cuba at that time between certainly the 26th of July people and Castro trying to consolidate his position, this was the early '60s now, around his people and his movement, the fact that we had information from several sources that he was disillusioned with the revolution.

Senator Schweiker. He, meaning AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. He, AMLASH, was disillusioned.

Senator Schweiker. And he wasn't in the 26th of July?

AMLASH Case Officer. He was not in the 26th of July.

He was DR. So he was not a member of Castro's July 26th movement. He was one of the other revolutionary groups which had student support primarily and urban support and compared to Castro's rural so-called support.

So there was a struggle going on there. In other words, this was not an imaginary type of thing. The background that we could check did not, to the best of my recollection at any time lead us to believe in our relation with him at that time that he was playing a double game.

The other reason that I felt that way at the time was that we had to persuade him to return to Cuba to stay. He was ready to defect, to leave. He didn't want to come to the United States with all the rest of the Cubans who were here because he had stayed on, he felt, too long with the revolution. But he was ready to leave Cuba and to defect. He was fed up with the way life was. A lot of the travel that he did was that he would take any opportunity to get off of the island. He had told us, me personally, that and this was also confirmed by other sources.

Senator Schweiker. Wouldn't one of your reasons also be that he is in jail now?

AMLASH Case Officer. That would be a very good reason. I think I mentioned that the last time, certainly when I was talking about this. If he was taken back --

Senator Schweiker. Are we absolutely certain he's in jail now??

AMLASH Case Officer. We checked that I believe the last time, I think the last report we had was what, a couple of years ago?

Mr. Baron. I was given the name of a CIA contact in Florida who had been on the Island of Pines at one point and said as far as he knew, although he hadn't been in Cuba for several years, AMLASH was a prisoner, but he wasn't in prison. He was doing some sort of hospital work which was considered part of his rehabilitation program.

AMLASH Case Officer. He was a doctor, wasn't he, for the prison?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

AMLASH Case Officer. He had more freedom because he was being used as a doctor for the prisoner but he still was still on the Isle of Pines.

Mr. Baron. It is my understanding that he was working as a doctor even outside the prison and again, this is just hearsay of one contact that I called on the phone.

Mr. Wallach. Are you positive that someone just not using his name is there, that he switched over using an alias? You wouldn't have intelligence of that type?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Wallach. I want to quickly follow-up on somethin that Jim and the Senator were getting at.

gsh 11

Why were you not willing to discuss with AMLASH the assassination of Castro?

AMLASH Case Officer. We?

Mr. Wallach. You have told us --

AMLASH Case Officer. We were very reluctant to discuss the subject.

Mr. Wallach. Why?

AMLASH Case Office. I guess we didn't want to get involved in assassinations.

Mr. Wallach. But you had them before this.

AMLASH Case Officer. I didn't know this, and certainly in this operation the objective of this operation was not to go in and assassinate Castro but a much bigger type of program.

Mr. Wallach. But that was the first step, or at least the potential first step.

AMLASH Case Officer. He was convinced that was the only first step. AMLASH. We weren't convinced that it had to be, at that time that it had to be the first step, and that's why we didn't want to discuss and we didn't discuss and we were reluctant to discuss this subject with him.

Mr. Wallach. At the late October meeting I think you said before that -- what did you request that led to the giving him of the pen, the hypodermic needle?

AMLASH Case Officer. The pen he requested was something with which to protect himself now.

7600010813

Mr. Wallach. A pen with a hypodermic needle would protect himself?

AMLASH Case Officer. He put himself in a situation and asked us the question. He said I may be confronted by Castro or by Raoul or by one or the other of Castro's people in a meeting in which I am not armed, and I may be confronted with an accusation of plotting against the regime.

And at that time he said this would be before we are ready to move in formenting the coup, and he said, I would like to have something with which I can protect myself at that time. In fact, the words that I think I mentioned here before was, if I fall, I don't want to be the only one going down.

So he was seeing himself in a situation of going back into Cuba, of being in a meeting in which he could have been, because, again, of the relationships. Fidel Castro himself or Raoul Castro could confront him in their office, accuse him.

Mr. Wallach. Couldn't he use that pen offensively and not defensively?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, he could have. He was not at that time talking about using it offensively and we weren't discussing the offensive use of that pen.

Senator Schweiker. Following up the point that I switched away from as to whether Cuban intelligence might have been trailing him or following him or observing what you were doing with him, we have some knowledge, I gather, from a summary

76000010814

here that AMLASH's one-time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be Cuban intelligence.

If this is correct, wouldn't that pretty well mean that whatever he was doing over there might well be observed by Cuban intelligence even though he might have been a straight single agent in terms of working with us and not a double agent that they may well have known or monitored what in fact he was doing with us?

AMLASH Case Officer. This is possible, Senator. We had no indication at the time that they were monitoring his activities. Again, he was at such a level and the people certainly in Paris and the Cubans overseas knew that he was at such a level that we never heard that they were ever given this mission.

Senator Schweiker. Have you heard that his Cuban mistress was working with Cuban intelligence?

AMLASH Case Officer. Which one of his mistresses, because he's had several, including his sister who worked for the Presidency, his own sister.

Mr. Johnston. We extracted that from a file and I'm sorry but in the respect and the need to keep that information compartmented I did not take her name down and I don't think we have the file that indicates that.

My recollection is that he had a mistress for a considerable period of time who was, who was suspected of being the GI, anc certainly her brother was actually known to be an employee of the GI.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall the specific case, but let me remind you that he was the Deputy Minister of the Interior, which did have the security services at that time under that ministry. So it wouldn't surprise me that there would be somebody he would know in that ministry.

Mr. Johnston. AMLASH was?

AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH was at one time before he was President of the Student Federation.

Mr. Johnston. Not in '63?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Senator Schweiker. And Cuban intelligence would have come under him?

AMLASH Case Officer. Some of the security apparatus was under the Ministry of Interior, but he was in that job, I don't recall, a very short period of time.

Mr. Wallach. If Castro knew about the assassination attempts, you would assume that AMLASH would have known, wouldn't you, from being in that position?

AMLASH Case Officer. We don't know if at that time that he knew that -- well, he was saying, in other words, he was on the radio every day saying that the Yankees were making an attempt on his life but that he knew the specifics of operations, I don't think we have that information, or at least I never have seen it.

After the Bay of Pigs every occasion that he had he would accuse the imperialists of mounting another operation against him.

Mr. Baron. Just a couple more questions on this point. Did you take any special precautions aside from the standard precautions that you would take in dealing with any foreign contact?

Were special precautions taken in dealing with AMLASH to guard against the prospect that he was either a double agent or under surveillance by Cuban intelligence?

AMLASH Case Officer. What would you mean by special precautions?

Mr. Baron. You would have to tell me more about the techniques that you could use, than I could tell you.

AMLASH Case Officer. What I would do is to make sure that I wasn't under surveillance in going to the meeting or at the meeting, and we would certainly check the meeting places to make sure that the meeting places were not under surveillance by them, which would also hopefully would have picked up in the surveillance that he would have had on him coming to the meetings.

I don't recall that we ever put him under surveillance in Paris, which would have meant disclosing our interest in him either to our surveillance team or the French police, or whoever.

So we never did that because, again, of our interest in protecting and minimizing the number of people who knew we were in contact with him.

Again, I refer you, I think, to what the Senator raised before, that he was arrested and sentenced, and as I recall, I may be wrong but as I recall the contacts that we had with him in Paris never surfaced in that trial. He never, as far as the transcript that we have of the trial, he never reported, he never testified about the contacts that he had with us. It was only afterwards when he was in contact with the exile group.

Mr. Baron. So you never took any affirmative action against him or investigated him or treated him in any way that you would treat a person suspected of being a double agent or being closely watched by an intelligence service?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not in mounting an investigation against him because in doing that we would have to show our interest in him to other people, so we did not do that.

What we could do with myself and with the other knowledgeable people say in Paris, of him, we did do and did everything we possibly could do.

In other words, to check where he was and who he was seeing and through the telephone taps and to ensure that when he came to meet us that that meeting was secure, gsb 17

that we did.

Mr. Johnston. Let me go back to the November 22nd meeting.

As you recall, after you met AMLASH there, did you give him the newspaper article about the Kennedy speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall. I may have shown him the article. To the best of my recollection, we talked about the speech and he had, I think, at that time, the article had already appeared in the French newspaper and he had read it.

Mr. Johnston. What did you tell him about the article?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he liked the article. It was one in which I think the Administration, as I vaguely recall, was taking a rather positive stand.

Mr. Johnston. Was this Kennedy's speech before the Inter-American Press Association in Miami on November 18th?

AMLASH Case Officer. I believe so.

Mr. Johnston. I have an extract from that.

AMLASH Case Officer. I'm not 100 percent certain, but I think it was.

Mr. Johnston. There's an indication that you told him that Fitzgerald helped to write the speech.

Do you recall doing that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I could have.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall specifically?

AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, no, but we did discuss

sh 18

End 2A, b 2B

76000910912

the speech.

Mr. Johnston. You have testified a great deal about the poisbn pen or the pen device and my only question is what is your best recollection about what happened to the pen? Did he take it with him? Did you take it with you when you left the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Again, as I mentioned to you the last time, I don't remember specifically if I kept the pen and threw it away or if he kept it.

What I do remember was his reaction when I showed him the pen. I can't today tell you for sure that he kept the pen.

Mr. Johnston. It seems to me that's rather compromising evidence, if he kept the pen and you recall that. It's also such compromising evidence -- I have difficulty believing you would have thrown it away.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, because it was compromising evidence. I had carried it one way. I mean I wasn't going to carry it back. It was nothing but a Papermate pen in which a hypodermic needle had been inserted.

In other words, it wasn't a $10,000 piece of equipment or anything like this.

Mr. Johnston. I agree, but it's a very compromising piece of evidence to have around.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right. But what I can't

gsh 19

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

recall specifically is whether it was broken, thrown away or --

Mr. Wallach. Why do you believe he wouldn't have taken it with him?

AMLASH Case Officer. He said he wouldn't. I specifically remember this. He says, and then later on he says, I'm not going to take any compromising material back with me.

This would have been a piece of compromising material. He did not like the pen. The only point probably that we made with him is that we were willing to consider, because he knew our opposition to something like this, that we were even willing to consider showing him something that -- whether he could again defend himself.

He did not think it was a good idea.

Senator Schweiker. What kind of weapon or substance could he get that would not compromise him? I'm a little confused. He wanted something to defend himself, but he doesn't want anything that will compromise him.

Unless you have a disappearing weapon, what could he possibly get that would not compromise him to take back?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, we were talking also about caches inside Cuba at that time, so it could have been dropped to him inside Cuba. He didn't exactly have to take it back with him.

In other words, here again, the whole idea of this was not to give him something there that he would be able to take

gsh 20

back with him.

Mr. Wallach. Were arrangements made for caches inside Cuba if he was worried about defending himself?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had asked for caches inside Cuba.

Mr. Johnston. Can you be positive that he did not leave the meeting with the pen in his possession?

AMLASH Case Officer. I cannot be positive that he didn't. I'm almost sure that he didn't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever ask him for the pen back? Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back before the meeting concluded or after the conclusion of the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Since I recollect his reaction to it that, you know, it's no good, I just can't logically believe that he would have kept the pen. This is the point. But I don't specifically recall what was done with it except that it was probably destroyed.

In other words, you know, broken, throw the needle out of it and break the pen.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall asking him to give you the pen back?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, but I don't recall that he took it in the first place, because what I recall is, gee, is that the best that you can come up with type of thing.

So he was not in any way enthused about what we had shown

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

him.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, is it correct you did promise him at this meeting that you would drop rifles with telescopic sights for him in Cuba?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Was there any mention of paying him money to support his coup plans?

AMLASH Case Officer. He had never really asked for money. In promising him full support for the coup, if money was required I presume that could be conjecture that he could get that also, but he did not specifically ask for money.

Mr. Johnston. Was there discussion of his escape in the event he assassinated Castro or killed Castro but did not pull off the coup?

AMLASH Case Officer. At the last meeting I don't believe that was discussed.

Mr. Johnston. At your prior meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was, it was touched upon, but as I recall, and this is from reading the file afterward. where this was discussed was a year later when he was in contact with the exile group. I think it was with the exile group that he was then concerned about, how do I get out if something goes wrong and we can't pull the coup.

But we did not at the 22 November meeting, I don't believe we discussed that. In fact, I'm sure we didn't discuss it.

Mr. Johnston. When did the meeting end? About what time?

What time did the meeting end?

AMLASH Case Officer. Approximately 10:00 in the evening.

Mr. Johnston. And we basically discussed while we were off the record the fact that the assassination occurred at 12:30 in Dallas, which we think would have been around 7:30 in Paris, and the meeting was then over at 10:00 o'clock.

When you walked out of the meeting you testified previously that you heard about the assassination.

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. And that's the first word you heard about the assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. You previously said that AMLASH made a comment about that. Was there any other discussion of the assassination by AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. That was it, because I left him at that time.

Mr. Johnston. I don't understand. If the meeting is either in a house or somewhere else how you would leave together and you would have access to a radio or something to hear the report.

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in the house, it could have been the occupant of the house who told us. In fact, I am sure it was the occupant of the house, [redacted], who told us he had just heard on the radio about the assassination when we came out of the meeting. We didn't go or come together to the house. He left on his own and then I left after he left.

Mr. Johnston. So in other words, what you're saying is that you're not walking out of the building but you're in the house and the meeting is over and [redacted] knows that the meeting is over and that he tells you.

AMLASH Case Officer. We came out of the room, out of the study in which we were holding the meeting, and when we came out of that into his living room he told us what he had just heard on the radio.

Mr. Johnston. And then AMLASH made this comment and walked out of the door?

AMLASH Case Officer. AMLASH made this comment and shortly thereafter I don't recall, we finished our business. He was -- I don't remember the exact quote. You have it on the record there, like why does it have to happen to somebody like that.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know who committed the assassinatio at this time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. And even with that you don't recall whether AMLASH walked out the door with the poison pen?

gsh 24

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't believe he did, I don't believe he did and it could very well be that what I would have done is pull the hypodermic needle out of it, that's very simple, and then it's just a pen, throw the pen away or keep the pen.

It's not a complicated object, in other words. It was very simple to just pull the hypodermic needle out of it, and that's probably what was done. But I don't recall specifically that I did it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you do that after the meeting was over?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it was during the meeting, not after.

Mr. Johnston. Now there's an indication that you got instructions from Washington after the meeting to break off contact with AMLASH.

Do you recall receiving those instructions or instructions to that effect?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, there was a cable, I believe, as I recall. It wasn't necessarily to break off contact with AMLASH because everybody knew that that was the last meeting. He was preparing to, we knew this, he had been preparing and we had been talking to him since October since he was out about his return to Cuba.

Senator Schweiker. Did the arms drop cache ever occur?

AMLASH Case Officer. I had left, I wasn't involved in

7600010083

76000010825

that part of it, Senator. Again, only from the record that I read afterwards, I think a couple of drops were made to him. In fact, the next year or something like that.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure exactly what was left or what he received or what was available.

AMLASH Case Officer. And I don't know if he ever picked them up. I don't think we know that.

Mr. Wallach. Why did he tell you he wanted the rifles with telescopic sights?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he wanted grenades and he wanted dynamite too to storm the headquarters later on. We said, well, look, could you expand this somewhat too, and he was talking about, well, yes, and we should probably attack the radio station at the same time. It was a matter of attacking a building, whether it was a radio station or whatever it was, in order to, in his mind, he was probably thinking of attacking the headquarters, Castro's headquarters.

Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection. In your previous testimony with the Select Committee on page 114 you stated:

"When we came out of that meeting we heard the news of President Kennedy's assassination and I received a cable after that which I thought that this was probably the reason the whole operation was being re-assessed.

AMLASH Case Officer. That was strictly my thought at that time.

Mr. Johnston. And on page 115 of your prior transcript you said, "well, the whole Cuban operation, the way I interpreted it, was being called on."

Did you receive a cable to that effect?

AMLASH Case Officer. It was a very cryptic cable saying, you know, return to Washington, which I was going to do anyway, so this is why --

Mr. Johnston. Did it say to break off contact with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that it did but it didn't make any difference because headquarters knew that that was the last meeting with him before he was returning to Cuba anyway.

So there was no reason to tell me to break off contact with him. This is what I'm trying to say.

Mr. Johnston. Supposedly the 1967 IG report, and I don't know where they got their information, said that was an OPIM cable.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's Operation Immediate. In other words, it's an immediate cable. That set precedence on the cable.

Mr. Johnston. And what does that mean for transmitting --

AMLASH Case Officer. It was transmitted before a routine cable or a priority cable. It's just the precedence --

gsh 7

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Johnston. It has the highest priority next to FLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's the one below FLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And that tells you to break off the meeting or to come back to Washington?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall receiving that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And you read that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, or I was told about it because I didn't go into the embassy to read it, so I don't think they brought the cable out to me but I was told to go on back to Washington.

Mr. Johnston. Let me state that that cable is apparently not in the AMLASH file and the 1967 Inspector General could not find that cable.

Does that surprise you?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it doesn't really because I don't think there was that much importance given to that kind of cable at that time.

What you say about the Operation Immediate, we handled all of our traffic, more or less, in this case on an immediate basis because of the short periods of time that we had with AMLASH.

So if you are implying that because of the OP AM cable that there was something else behind this, no, I don't think that

7600010823

there was in any way. It was just, you know, return to Washington, and as I assumed, and I assumed at that time that certainly the whole Cuban operation was going to be re-assessed after what happened to President Kennedy.

Mr. Johnston. Now there is in the file a cable reporting from Paris to Washington reporting that you planned to depart Paris that morning of November 23rd and arrive in Washington 8:10.

Did you in fact take that flight?

AMLASH Case Officer. Did you ever find that cable?

Mr. Johnston. I saw the cable of your return to Washington.

AMLASH Case Officer. If it referred to a cable, that was the one telling me to come back. This is a travel-type of exchange.

Mr. Johnston. Did you in fact arrive back in Washington I said 8:10. I'm sorry, it would be 18:10, which would be 6·00 Washington time.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Where did you go when you arrived in Washington at 6:10 in the evening on November 23rd?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall specifically if I stopped by my home, which is en route to the office, whether I went right back to the office before going home

Mr. Johnston. But you did go to the office sometime that

7600010830

evening?

AMLASH Case Officer. I may have.

Mr. Johnston. Did you go to the office on the 24th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes.

Mr. Johnston. That was a Sunday?

AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been.

Mr. Wallach. One question about the cable that we can't find.

Did you have any other business in Paris besides AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically at that time.

Mr. Wallach. Was there a date that you intended to return?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Wallach. When was that date officially?

AMLASH Case Officer. About the time that I returned.

Mr. Wallach. Why would they have sent you a cable telling you to return if you intended to return that day?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. This was probably a reaction to what had happened. But again, I want to point out to you that travel cables of this type, even if your plans are such, and the way I was travelling at that time I was not travelling on a 99 diplomatic passport or anything like that. You don't even need a regular passport to travel France. It was just to keep track and record of our personal travel.

In other words, it's our security to make sure that

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

that headquarters knows that we are coming back and I sent a cable saying I'm arriving on such and such a date, the same way I sent a cable to Paris telling them I'm arriving on such and such a date.

Mr. Johnston. Would you have sent your cable without getting a cable first from them?

AMLASH Case Officer. I could have, sure.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not sure I understand the purpose of their cable. Were you saying it's a regular thing that they will send extra traffic?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't tell you what the purpose of their cable was except what I'm trying to explain to you is that keeping headquarters informed or headquarters inquiring of you in such circumstances, it's not unusual to get a cable, you know, advise us when you're going to return or please return or us sending a cable.

If there was any other reason for sending that cable, I can only conjecture, I don't know, that it was because of what had happened.

End 2B

Begin 3A

Mr. Johnston. I'd like the record to show that Senator Schweiker has left and you are aware that without the Senator being here you have the prerogative to stop your testimony.

Do you understand that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And that if we proceed, that you can continue

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to stop at any time during the testimony and ask for it to continue when we have a Senator present.

Do you understand that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. Are you willing to continue under the conditions of not having a Senator here?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. We have you back in Washington at 6:10 on November 23rd, and you may or may not have gone to the office that day and you said you definitely did go to the office on November 24th, on Sunday.

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so. Scratch definitely. I'm probably not that definite about it, but I'm sure I touched base with the office as soon as I returned, either telephonically or physically going there.

Mr. Johnston. Let me refresh your recollection then and remind you that Oswald was killed on November 24th, Sunday.

Does that aid you in recalling where you were at that time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. I mean I was home, certainly.

Mr. Johnston. You mean home in Washington?

AMLASH Case Officer. In Washington.

Mr. Johnston. But you don't know whether you were at the office or at home on that day?

AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on the hour that we may have been working.

If you're going back to asking about normal hours that we kept during that period of time, Sunday was just another working day, so you know, it wasn't because it was Sunday that we would not have been in the office.

Mr. Johnston. But you can't recall being in the office?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall being in the office. When we heard the information that Oswald was involved, I could very well have been home.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall being in the office when you heard that Oswald was shot?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you hold, when did you first talk to the chief of the section about your meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Specifically, I don't recall when. What would have been ususual is for me to have called the office when I got in and whether I went there or not, I don't recall. And then I either talked to Fitzgerald who would have been, he would have been the only person I would have talked to. If he was in on that Sunday and I went in, I would have talked to him on Sunday, and if not, it would have been on Monday.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. Helms about the November 22nd meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I did not talk to Helms.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to Mr. McCone about the

November 22nd meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Did you talk to anyone in technical services about the pen device or the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not at the time, no.

Mr. Johnston. So it was your recollection that the only one you talked to in this time period of November 23rd and November 24th, November 25th about the meeting in Paris is Mr. Fitzgerald?

AMLASH Case Officer. To the best of my recollection, yes.

Mr. Johnston. And what is your recollection of that discussion?

AMLASH Case Officer. The report, as to what had taken place, reporting that he had not thought highly of the device that we had provided him with, that he did not intend to carry it back, that he was pleased with the fact that we had decided that we would put caches down for him inside Cuba, the reaffirmation of U.S. support for his movement inside of Cuba, the fact that he had decided definitely to return and had made his reservations to return, and his dismay and his reaction when he had heard that Kennedy had been assassinated when we got to the meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion about any link between AMLASH or your Cuban operations and the Kennedy assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever that I can remember.

Mr. Johnston. No discussion between you and Fitzgerald at all about any connection?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not that I can recall.

Mr. Johnston. When you say not that you can recall, are you saying that it's possible but you don't recall it, or are you certain, fairly certain to the best of your recollection?

AMLASH Case Officer. I'm fairly certain to the best of my knowledge that there was no connection between the AMLASH -- in other words, that we discussed it, we discussed the Kennedy assassination. I'm sure we did. I mean who wasn't discussing the Kennedy assassination at that time. That we tied the Kennedy assassination in with AMLASH, I don't recall any kind of conversation of that nature.

Mr. Johnston. On November 23rd and November 24th and November 25th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Right.

Mr. Johnston. All right. Let me point you to one of the documents we wanted to ask you about and it is a contact report dated 25 November, and let me just show that to you.

Is that a document -- let me state for the record what it is.

It's the original, apparently copy, of the November 25th contact report of the November 22nd meeting.

Did you prepare that contact report?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And is that the document you prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. I'm asking you directly is that the very document you prepared? That's a very specific question.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. When did you prepare that?

AMLASH Case Officer. The date is 25 November.

Mr. Johnston. Is it your recollection that that's the date you prepared that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably so.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection of doing it on that date?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not specifically on the 25th, but if the document is dated the 25th, I presume that's the day that I did the memorandum.

Mr. Johnston. Now how did you prepare it? Did you dictate it to somebody who then typed it up, or did you yourself personally prepare it? And in asking you that question, is there any way to tell from the document how it was prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, the secretary probably typed it. I mean I didn't type it myself.

Mr. Johnston. You did not type it yourself.

Is there any way to tell from the document? There are no initials on it or anything that would indicate that it was dictated and typed?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. What are you asking me?

Mr. Johnston. I'm just asking you if you're the one that prepared that or how it got prepared?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it's a contact report of my meeting with AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And you prepared that document?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. But you did not type it?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not type it, so I could have dictated it to a secretary or wrote it out longhand and gave it to her and she typed it.

Mr. Johnston. What about the fact that on November 19th in your memorandum for record you indicated that Fitzgerald wanted written reports to be kept to a mimimum?

With those instructions why did you prepare a contract report?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because I probably contacted Fitzgerald about it and he said prepare the one on this meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall that but that would be a normal thing.

Mr. Johnston. That he would have in effect --

AMLASH Case Officer. I briefed him on this, and then said, let's have a memorandum, a contact report on that.

In other words, when he said, minimize the written communications on the operation, he didn't say we won't have any other communications on any other memos on it or any further memorandums on it.

So what would happen if you put things within the dates here, I had briefed him on this and then it was by agreement or maybe by his order that he told me to write up a contact report.

Mr. Johnston. Have you had an opportunity to examine that report either before you came here? I'm not sure we've given you enough opportunity to look at it closely while here. Maybe you could take that time right now to look at the document.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. Look at page 3 of the document. Compare page 2 and page 3. Page 3 is in a much different type than page 2.

Do you notice that? It's much fainter.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, it's fainter, and I don't know if the type looks like it's the same but it's fainter.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any explanation for that?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Was page 3 what you prepared on November [illegible]

AMLASH Officer. I didn't personally prepare it again, so I could have given the secretary my long hand report, something could have happened, and then I finished it and she put it on a second page. That is possible. I don't have any explanation why it's lighter than the other one. The type appears to be the same.

Mr. Johnston. Are you saying that the way you prepared it it's possible that the second page and third page were prepared on different days?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it could have been at different times of the day. If I had writen out the first part of the contact report and I hadn't finished it, the secretary could very well have started to type it, and then when I finished it I would have given her the last page to type because it was all on the 25th.

Mr. Johnston. Are you saying --

AMLASH Case Officer. Because there's no date on the second page.

Mr. Johnston. You're stating that your recollection is that that document was typed on one day by one person.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, probably so. That's the usual case. I have no reason to doubt why it would have been done any differently.

Mr. Johnston. What about the information on page 3? Is that the substance, in fact? Is that exactly what you wrote on November 25th about the contact?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, and in fact I draw your attention to the part on the secret writing material because we were very concerned as to how we would continue to communicate with him inside Cuba and this was one of the subjects that were discussed at the last meeting, communications. So that is not a new subject matter. That is definitely part of the subject matter that was discussed at the last meeting, which was communications with him.

Mr. Johnston. And it's your testimony that this report as it exists in that file is exactly the report that you prepared on November 25th?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes..

Mr. Johnston. You'll note that the report does not mention the pen device or AMLASH's reaction to your giving it to him.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. You left that out of your original report. You did not make a written report on --

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not make a written report on that.

Mr. Johnston. Why was that?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably because Fitzgerald said not to.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Fitzgerald saying not to?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall it, but that's certainly what I'd have to assume.

In other words, don't include that part of it.

Mr. Johnston. Should it have gone in there in a normal

gsh 40

report?

AMLASH Case Officer. In a normal report, yes. But this certainly was a rather, again, sensitive subject that we were talking about. He did not accept it and I don't think that at that time it was felt that anything else should be said about it.

Mr. Johnston. Why is that?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know why. Again, because of the sensitivity, I presume, of the subject.

Mr. Johnston. And again, is it your recollection that Fitzgerald, is it your testimony that Fitzgerald told you not to put a reference to the pen device in the report?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't recall if he specifically told me not to put it in or if when I gave him the report he was satisfied that it was not in.

Mr. Baron. Why would a reference to the pen device be any more sensitive than references to arms caches or suggestions of assassinations or all the other kinds of things that were already in the file?

AMLASH Case Officer. Because again, in conjunction with this particular operation it was not an assassination operation. It was a coup operation. This was one of the aberrations of the operation which we got involved in strictly to provide bona fides to the man that we were dealing with and we were concerned for his personal security.

In other words, it was not part of the operational plan to provide him with any such devices for the purposes of assassinating Castro. The rifles and the grenades and all of this was something that was necessary to start a coup.

In other words, it was not directed at one particular person.

I think this was probably the thinking at that time and why such points did not get into it because this was not part of the AMLASH plan of operation.

Mr. Baron. For the sake of the accuracy of the records and the protection of the people who were involved at the CIA, wouldn't even the tender of such a device to AMLASH for whatever purposes normally be put into the records?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not in a contact report because in a contact report this goes into the regular file. Whether Fitzgerald would have made a note of this some place else I don't know, but in the regular contact report which goes into the regular file -- in other words, say the secretary would know about it and this could have been the other part of it.

In other words, to reduce the number of people, to contain the number of people.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything in your discussions with Fitzgerald that led you to believe that one of the factors that was in his mind in assessing the sensitivity of this tender of a poison pen device was the day on which it

gsh 42

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

happened as opposed to simply the fact that such a device was offered?

AMLASH Case Officer. If it was in his mind, he never stated it to me. I think it was just the overall sensitivity that the Agency had been, has now, and always has had on assassinations.

I mean it's not the specific of what had happened that time. Assassinations were not part of the routine business of the Agency.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you, you have mentioned the secretary who prepared it. Do you recall the name of the secretary who prepared this document?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have a regular secretary?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. What was her name?

AMLASH Case Officer. She could have prepared it or it could have been Fitzgerald's secretary because, again, of the days, the Sunday.

I don't recall the name.

Mr. Johnston. You don't recall your secretary's name?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, I don't remember if a girl by the name of Bobbie Hernandez was still with me. She was my secretary during part of that time. She was probably my secretary then.

7600010813

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

I don't recall Fitzgerald's secretary's name, and she could have typed it, but it would have been one of the two girls

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the report again and on page 1 of the report, I think it's paragraph 2 of that that discusses the newspaper article, the Kennedy speech. Paragraph two:

"AMLASH stated he was returning to Cuba." The second sentence of that is --"subject was pleased to read a copy of President Kennedy's 18 November speech in Miami and was even more pleased to hear that Fitzgerald had helped to prepare the President's speech. You the case officer reiterated the assurances given by Fitzgerald of full U.S. support if a real coup against the regime was successful."

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that's right.

Mr. Johnston. Does that refresh your recollection about whether or not you gave him the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, because at that time it could have already been printed in the Paris newspaper and he could very well have read it in one of the Parisian newspapers. But again, I could have had a copy of a newspaper clipping of the speech with me.

Mr. Johnston. But in the least does that refresh your recollection that you told AMLASH that Fitzgerald helped prepare the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, Fitzgerald told me that we could tell him.

Mr. Johnston. Would you recall the portion of the speech you pointed out to AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. No portion was pointed out to him. It was just that Fitzgerald had helped in preparation of the speech.

Mr. Johnston. I could show you a copy. This is an extract I have prepared from the November 19th, 1963 Washington Post, page A15, which carries an AP story of November 18th saying:

"The following is the text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association."

And I have extracted the only portions as are relevant to Cuba. Now I'll give you a chance to read it.

Incidentally, I'd like to have this marked as Exhibit 1 for the record.

(The document referred to was marked for identification as AMLASH Case Officer Exhibit No. 1)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010815

Mr. Johnston. I point out that in that speech, do you have a recollection of this being the part of the speech or you discussed this aspect of the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. We did not discuss the speech paragraph by paragraph. All we did was a very small passing remark about the speech.

He had probably to the best of my recollection already read it in one of the Parisian newspapers, or if I had a newspaper clipping of the speech, he glanced at it while we were there, but I don't recall that. But he was certainly satisfied with the tone of the speech.

Mr. Johnston. You must have read the speech before you mentioned it to him. Is this the portion that you had in mind that would satisfy him about the tone of the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. Certainly this sets the tone for the whole speech. The extracts that you have made here sets the tone for the full speech and specifically the one in which once the barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which in a few short years stirred the hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

Mr. Johnston. Was it your intent by making reference to the speech in your meeting with AMLASH to show that higher authority was behind what you were doing?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, precisely.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010817

Mr. Johnston. And you felt that this speech coincided with what you were telling AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, that the U.S. Government was prepared, the assurances at first that Gerald had given him and I had been giving him that the U.S. Government was willing to support the Cuban people.

Mr. Baron. In the excerpt from the speech that we have just shown you it says:

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries. It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and soverignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere.

Then it continues: "This and this alone divides us. As long as this is true, nothing is possible. Without it, everything is possible. Once this barrier is removed, we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people."

That's the end of the quote.

Is it your understanding that this reference to a small band of conspirators is a reference to the Castro government?

AMLASH Case Officer. Precisely.

Mr. Baron. And in your report of November 19th, or your memorandum for the record of November 19th, you had mentioned that -- well, I will simply quote from the report. It says:

"Show AMLASH One copy of President's Miami speech(remark

gsh 47

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

to AMLASH One that blank helped with speech).

AMLASH Case Officer. Fitzgerald.

Mr. Baron. Blank is Fitzgerald.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. This memorandum was written before I went to Paris, so, in effect, these were my marching orders that I could use showing that the U.S. Government, indeed --

Mr. Baron. Would support a move against the Castro government.

AMLASH Case Officer. Would support the move against Castro.

Mr. Baron. And did you know for a fact that Fitzgerald helped with the preparation of the speech?

AMLASH Case Officer. Only from what Fitzgerald told me.

Mr. Baron. What did Fitzgerald tell you?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't give you a specific quote but I presume that he had had some input into the speech. This, again, wouldn't necessarily be Fitzgerald himself. It could be but it could also be the SAS, the CIA input into the speech, which is normal in Presidential speeches that there are inputs from different agencies.

End 3A, b 3B

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald say anything to you about preparation of this speech that led you to believe that the President or anyone close to him who had been involved in the preparation of the speech had been made knowledgeable of the

7600010R13

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E. Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600010819

AMLASH operation?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. Fitzgerald never told me specifically that the President had been apprised of this. The general objective, I never had any doubts in my mind that the general objective of organizing a coup against Castro did not have the highest governmental approval. I mean this was never a question, I don't think, in my mind. Again, not specifically assassination because what I mentioned before, I don't think Fitzgerald or Helms or anybody else would specifically have briefed anybody that the AMLASH operation was an assassination plot because it wasn't.

Mr. Baron. So you had no basis for believing that the President was informed that a component of the AMLASH operation was assassination?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, I have no reason. I don't know. Nobody told me that he had or he hadn't.

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald make it clear to you that in providing input to this speech he had the specific purpose in mind of giving a public signal to AMLASH that he would receive support from the highest quarters of the U.S. Government if he would move for a coup?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, this was my understanding.

Mr. Baron. That the speech was to be a specific signal to opponents of Castro inside Cuba as opposed to a general statement of U.S. policy?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Baron. Can you recall anything about your conversation that produced that understanding?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, just the general conversation of the time and what we were trying to do.

In other words, we were trying to organize a coup and the problems that we had been through specifically with AMLASH in trying to persuade him that the U.S. government was serious about supporting Cubans who were opposed to Castro.

So this statement that appeared in the speech was certainly public notice that this was the case.

Mr. Baron. Did Fitzgerald or anyone else say anything to you that led you to believe that the President had been specifically informed that representations would be made such as the ones on October 29th that Robert Kennedy or other high American officials would stand behind AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, he didn't specifically tell me.

Mr. Baron. Did your conversations with Fitzgerald about this speech, his input to this speech, lead you to believe that the President had been specifically informed that a poison pen device was being prepared to be tendered on November 22nd?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Let me ask you in a different context now, was there a decision after the assassination to break off further contacts with AMLASH?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but that decision evolved, it wasn't an automatic decision right after the assassination. In fact, as you recall from my previous testimony we had contact with AMLASH again in late '64 when he came out. I think the only hesitancy at that time was what's the new policy? Does the new President want to continue to, in our attempts to organize a plot against Castro, a coup against Castro --

That probably was the hesitancy, not the fact that it was immediately decided to stop contact, which, as I said before, it wasn't, because we saw him again.

Mr. Johnston. Was there a discussion at all in November or December 1963 about the relationship between the AMLASH operation and the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not that I recall.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you, we have in several versions and the one that is most available is this document here, and I have got the document you're looking at is in Volume 12, I believe, of the AMLASH file.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And it is a yellow legal size paper.

AMLASH Case Officer. Let me correct. It's not a document. It is evidently somebody's type-written notes of probably the recollection of what had happened.

Mr. Johnston. Okay, and it's on yellow legal-size paper typed. And I also have a document that I'm sure is in the file

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

but we don't have it pointed out. It's the sanitized version of a memorandum for the record dated 29 March, 1965, subject AMLASH, and both of them convey the same subject, the same information. And on the paragraph that has the marking at the left and the language of those documents, those documents say "22 November, '63, Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed."

Is that the portion you're reading?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. "(Telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). Situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassination. Because of this fact, plans of subject changed and it was decided that this Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (incl Castro), and it would not aid subject in his attempt.

"This included the following: ' We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escap from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.'"

Did you prepare this document?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not prepare this document. I was not with the task force with SAS at the time this document was prepared on 29 March, '65. I had already left.

Again, the only thing I can state for you here on what

I knew of the operation, that this was somebody trying to put together, this was a memo from Chief FI probably in the task force trying to put together by this time, 29 March, what had happened. The other document since it's, it's probably a later date, the yellow document was somebody probably again trying to reconstruct what had happened. The facts are not as I knew them at the time.

Both paragraphs have condensed an evolution that took place over a period of a year and the decision probably was not made until '65 after I had left the operation, that we were pulling out.

But the facts as stated here in those two documents are incorrect, and certainly the timing that they insinuate is wrong.

Mr. Johnston. I think we should develop that on the record and if you want to point out what facts are incorrect, why don't you do so?

AMLASH Case Officer. "The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated." That's incorrect.

Fitzgerald wasn't with me on the 22nd of November meeting.

Mr. Johnston. Okay. What about the sentence before that, that Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed, with your qualifier that Fitzgerald was not at the meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. This was at the meeting in October and not at the November meeting because that is correct, provided you put it in the right context.

Mr. Johnston. What about the statement, all the money he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. Inferred. I mean I don't recall that money was ever discussed with this man at any time. In fact I was asked this question before and I couldn't really recollect when I had given him some money.

It turns out that the record shows that I did give him $350 for his expenses. But money, specifically, again, that is somebody else interpreting. I don't know of any other document or certainly any memorandum for the record that I prepared in which money specifically was mentioned.

Mr. Johnston. But would you disagree with the statement?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, the statement as a whole, if you leave out the money, which again, anything that he needs.

Mr. Johnston. Well, that's what we want to leave in, the money.

AMLASH Case Officer. If he needs the money, I think it was not excluded in the offer. But what I'm saying --

Mr. Johnston. This makes a positive statement, him saying that you and Mr. Fitzgerald assured AMLASH that the Agency would give him everything he needed, all the money he wanted.

And I'm asking you directly either on October 29th, or November 22nd did you make that assurance to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't recall that such an issue was made of money because he never asked for money and we specifically didn't have to respond to telling him that we would give him money. In telling him that the support necessary, all of the support necessary for a coup, I think it is implied that he would get whatever he needed, which would mean supplies, but not specifically money, and the reason I state this is that money was never a subject of contention between the Agency and AMLASH. He never asked for money, he never was offered specifically money.

Mr. Johnston. Was he assured that he would get all the money he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. All the support he needed, not the money that he wanted. He never asked for money.

Mr. Johnston. I'm not asking you what he asked for. I'm asking you what you told him. In this thing it says you assured him that you would give him all the money that he wanted.

Did you give that assurance to him?

AMLASH Case Officer. I did not because I did not write this document. And the person who wrote this document that I know of didn't write it from any factual report at any time.

This is not a document. This is somebody's notes in putting together. These are rough notes typed on yellow, legal sized paper of somebody trying to reconstruct what happened here probably two or three years afterwards.

Mr. Johnston. I guess what I'm asking is a yes or no answer. In October or November, 1963, did you or Mr. Fitzgerald, to your knowledge, assure AMLASH that he would receive all the money he wanted?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, and I must qualify that. Unless you want to infer that in giving him the support that he needed he would also receive money. But money specifically, all he wanted, was never a part of the conversations, to the best of my knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. We have talked about the next sentence and it continues.

"Because of this fact plans of subject changed and it was decided the Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader, including Castro."

Is that accurate? I'm giving you an opportunity to rebut the document.

AMLASH Case Officer. It's accurate from the point of view --

You have to put it in the right time frame, in the right context. When he was met in late '64, after having visited and lived in Cuba for a year or almost a year, he came back more

7600010857

convinced than before that the only way a coup could be launched in Cuba was the elimination of Castro and when he expressed this conviction, not in '63 but in late '64, is when the Agency, and I presume the U.S. Government at that time felt we can't continue that directly involved with AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. And the last sentence of that:

"This included the following -- 'We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope, nor any money for direct assassination. Furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help the subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro.'"

Was that the substance of the discussion immediately after the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. A year later in November of '64.

Mr. Johnston. And you're saying that this does not describe the fall AMLASH meeting?

AMLASH Case Officer. It does not. It is a mixture of what happened over at least a two year period.

Mr. Johnston. It perplexes me somewhat that your failure to keep written records would so warp later thinkers as to what was going on. I mean take the March, 1965 document. As of March, 1965 CIA is going on the assumption that you and Fitzgerald met AMLASH in Paris, that you assured him that he would get all the money he wanted and that your plans changed after the meeting because of the Kennedy assassination.

AMLASH Case Officer. I can't sit here and presume to give you an explanation for that as to where the person who prepared that particular memorandum got that information. The file itself indicates, as you are well aware, that Fitzgerald did not travel to Paris in November. He travelled in October.

So the person who prepared the 29 March, 1965 memo came up with this particular type of information, I don't know.

Mr. Johnston. Who is that memo addressed to again?

AMLASH Case Officer. This is to Chief, FI from Chief, Reports.

Mr. Johnston. So your only explanation, your explanation for the memo is that it is inaccurate but even if it is inaccurate, it indicates that in March, 1965 these people had it all wrong as to what the AMLASH operation was all about.

AMLASH Case Officer. If you want to interpret exactly what they wrote here, yes, it was wrong. Now I'm not saying that it was wrong because it could have been. I don't know. I'm just saying it could have been that they didn't have access to all the restricted files because this operation until it received its recent publicity was kept on a very restricted basis.

So the Chief of Reports, I don't even know, well, probably the Chief of Reports in the division or maybe some place, probably did not have access to all of the operational files.

gsh 58

Mr. Greissing. You're saying that the information itself is inaccurate only in a chronological way that it is developed?

AMLASH Case Officer. Certainly wrong in its chronological context, definitely because it throws everything into one very small period of time in reporting or trying to report what took place over a much longer period of time.

Mr. Greissing. But the facts that are there over a period of a year would be true?

AMLASH Case Officer. But not in this context.

Mr. Greissing. But I'm saying over the period of a year from 1 November to the following November when you actually informed AMLASH of the feelings that the Agency had developed at that time, I believe it is the next sentence down.

AMLASH Case Officer. What is wrong here, what is wrong is that after we left that meeting, which I presume they left the meeting, I presume they're talking about, yes, the 22 November, '63 meeting -- this is absolutely wrong, that when we left that meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated, we had told him, you know, that this was all off.

That is wrong. It was not at that meeting that he was told that. He went back after that meeting with the idea of organizing a coup inside Cuba.

Mr. Greissing. I believe it clarifies that later in the next paragraph. It says that this information was given to AMLASH the following November in 1964.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. So I don't know why we're taking that particular piece of information out of context because in that same memorandum it does state that.

Mr. Johnston. Let me move off these documents. The file on AMLASH contains a November 27th report from Paris which indicated a source in the Cuban embassy in Paris.

AMLASH Case Officer. Excuse me. November 27th of what year?

Mr. Johnston. 1963. A source in the Cuban embassy in Paris was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the revolution.

Did you see that report on November 27th, 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. I probably did. I can't specifically recall that I did.

Mr. Johnston. And as I read the report, or my statement to you of its substance, it would suggest to you that AMLASH was known by given diplomatic personnel in Paris to be putting down the Castro revolution.

AMLASH Case Officer. It depends on who. In other words, who did he say this to because he did have friends in the different embassies.

Mr. Johnston. The Cuban embassy?

AMLASH Case Officer. He stayed at the Cuban embassy. He was a Cuban official at that time. So he had friends who were of like mind that he was. They were not happy with the way the revolution was moving.

Mr. Johnston. So that fact would have been more broadly known say in the Cuban embassy?

AMLASH Case Officer. Oh, yes. This was fairly well known.

End 3B

Mr. Johnston. The cable seems to indicate that the source of the information was complaining about AMLASH's denigrating the revolution, and went on to say that she or he wished he or she had a tape recorder to record what AMLASH and another person were saying, suggesting it is not a friendly source to AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, that suggests -- and again, I can't give you any definitive explanation for it -- what that suggests is that she overheard AMLASH talking with somebody else of like mind, and she didn't like what she heard, I guess.

Mr. Johnston. Let's go now to again what you talked about, any link in your mind or in Fitzgerald's mind in November and December 1963 between what you had been doing with AMLASH and the assassination of President Kennedy?

AMLASH Case Officer. None whatsoever, none whatsoever, and no discussion, and again, again, I go back and take you back in time, if you can place yourself back in 1963 and not 1976, after all of this has taken place, after we have had all the public theories expressed of the connections, all built on circumstantial evidence of what and who were involved in the Kennedy Assassination. I take you back and try to place yourself back within the context of this operation in 1963 when this happened.

First of all, I have to preface what I have to say by saying that this was not an assassination plot, so there would be no reason why we would be connecting Kennedy's assassination with this assassination plot. This was not an assassination plot, it was not conceived as an assassination plot. As a coup against Fidel Castro, yes. The fact that the U.S. Government was not happy and was supporting people who were opposed to Castro, this was well known. This was in the aftermath, '63, of the Bay of Pigs. So there was really in the context of the time the fact that this was not an assassination plot conceived as an assassination plot, there was really no reason to connect this one particular operation with the tragedy of President Kennedy.

Mr. Johnston. Okay.

We do know that on the 29th of October Fitzgerald told AMLASH that Robert Kennedy was behind the plot or behind AMLASH's proposal, is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. What we told him was that the U.S. Government was prepared to support a coup against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Johnston. And AMLASH had previously told you that at least one of his plans for a coup would require the assassination of the Castro Brothers.

AMLASH Case Officer. He had not exactly put it in those terms, but he certainly felt that the first move would have to be against the leadership, yes. In other words, we never talked to him in terms of assassination, and I want this perfectly clear.

Mr. Johnston. And he told you before the 29th meeting that the first step would probably have to be the assassination of the Castros?

AMLASH Case Officer. He never told me assassination because he didn't even like to use the word "assassination."

Mr. Johnston. What word did he like to use?

AMLASH Case Officer. The neutralization, the elimination if you will, of the leadership.

The first move in any coup attempt, in order for the other officers to fall in line, would have to be the removal, the removal of Fidel Castro, because of the loyalties that he still had personally with some of the officers.

Mr. Johnston. And after he told you that on October 29th, you gave him an assurance that Robert Kennedy backed his proposal generally.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, the U.S. Government and Fitzgerald as the representative of Robert Kennedy, supported a coup against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. On the very day of the assassination, you referenced the speech of President Kennedy's talking about an ouster of the current regime in Cuba.

AMLASH Case Officer. That's right.

Mr. Johnston. Were you aware of the September 7th statement of Fidel Castro's, threatening the lives of U.S.

leaders, and let me -- I have a poor Xerox copy, but especially a portion of that statement by Fidel Castro on September 7th at a party at the Brazilian embassy in Havana, he talked to a reporter, Daniel Harker of AP and said, among other things, "we are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. The United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

I would think from your description of the AMLASH operation that AMLASH had a plan to eliminate Cuban leaders, and that it is very possible --

AMLASH Case Officer. So did everybody else. So did every other Cuban exile who was plotting against Castro.

Mr. Johnston. But this is in the Brazilian Embassy on September 7th, and you started meeting with AMLASH on September 5th in Brazil, and it may be coincidence, but Castro does give a warning about United States leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, and you were doing that very thing.

AMLASH Case Officer. There is probably a coincidence there. I don't recall that I knew of this at that time. I've certainly heard of it since, but I don't see the point that you are trying to make, because if Castro is behind or was behind AMLASH to involve him in the assassination of an American leader, then are you proposing that he would also publicly in the Brazilian embassy state that this was going to take place?

In other words, was he telegraphing this plan that he had?

Mr. Johnston. I don't know. I assume not.

AMLASH Case Officer. I would find it highly unusual that if he was serious about being involved in something like this, that he would publicly announce his plan, but I may be wrong. That's just my opinion.

Mr. Johnston. So we have this Castro speech of September 7th, whatever that means, and we have the AMLASH operations we talked about in November and October, and then almost at the very moment of the Kennedy assassination we have your meeting with AMLASH and giving him the technical equipment or the assurances of technical equipment that he had requested at the October 29th meeting.

You knew on November 24th, certainly November 25th, that the alleged assassin of President Kennedy was pro-Castro, Lee Harvey Oswald was pro-Castro.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't even know that at this time.

Mr. Johnston. You don't know that at this time?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, where did you get that?

Mr. Johnston. You don't know?

AMLASH Case Officer. That he was pro-Castro?

Mr. Baron. Wasn't that a logical deduction from the fact that he was part of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee?

AMLASH Case Officer. It could have been, but I haven't seen that.

Mr. Greissing. He had come out publicly in interviews stating that he was for Castro and would defend Castro if the U.S. took action.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, probably so, but I never had --

Mr. Johnston. And in fact, Oswald had visited Mexico City, and on November 25th, the very day you wrote your contact report, the Mexico City chief of station cabled headquarters and reminded them about the Castro speech threat, and I assume that our information is that Mr. King was handling the activity in Mexico City.

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. So on November 25th he was aware of the threat, reminded of the threat.

I think it is fair to say that Mr. King knew that Oswald had visited the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. He knew that on November 25th.

Another CIA document indicates that Chief of Station Wynn Scott -- I don't know whether you knew him -- in Mexico City, on November 25th read a message to the President of Mexico in which he said, Mr. Scott's memo says there are still some important questions concerning Oswald and his visit to Mexico

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

City. Was the assassination of President Kennedy planned by Fidel Castro, and were the final details worked out inside the Cuban embassy in Mexico?

That's again on November 25th.

There's no reason for you to have seen the document.

AMLASH Case Office. I don't know that, but again, I'll just question, this was just a question that was asked. I wouldn't report it as fact.

Mr. Johnston. No, on November 25th that is a question being raised.

Knowing now, looking back at Mr. King, we have the Western Hemisphere Division on November 25th is informed that Castro has made a threat against U.S. leaders, that the chief of station in Mexico City is telling 08 [redacted] that there is a possibility that Castro was behind it, Oswald was known to be pro-Castro, and on November 22nd, you in turn were meeting in Paris, giving a high level Cuban assurances that his coup plot that might include assassination of Castro was backed by the U.S. and that yet you made no connection between those, all those events, and there was no discussion of any connection.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, there was no discussion between the -- the connection between the assassination of President Kennedy and the AMLASH operation.

Mr. Johnston. Was there an investigation?

AMLASH Case Officer. Not to my knowledge. I left the operation right after that, so I wouldn't know if there was or wasn't. But the coincidence that you are talking about, if you are connecting or trying now to imply that there was a connection between AMLASH and the fact that it was on the 22nd of November, the same date as President Kennedy's assassination, they must have had a very terrific system of communication.

Mr. Johnston. Although you had set up the meeting on the 20th of November, is that right?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, but he didn't know specifically what we were going to say. In fact, the answer that we could have given him could have been reversed.

Mr. Johnston. Well, you said he requested it.

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, he requested it before he left, but the assurances, you can go back before that. You can go back to the October meeting when the assurances of support were given to him.

So I can't -- I find it very difficult to follow what you are trying to imply or to relate AMLASH directly to the assassination on 22 November. This is what I find difficult to understand.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you a copy of a cable, no indication that the cable went to SAS. The cable is Mexico City, 7045, dated 24 November '63 and by way of background, tell you that immediately upon the assassination, the personnel in Mexico City then started putting the entire Soviet apparatus in Mexico City under surveillance and pulling the records, and I don't want to read this into the record because it uses a true name.

Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnston. Let me read it, except for the true name.

It says "Provided below sufficiently definitive summary of local contacts of Ivan Gavrilovich Alferiev." It gives his contacts, it says "23 December 1961 with the Third Secretary of Cuban Cultural Attache," naming her, and arranging a press conference for AMLASH. It's a very tangential relationship with the AMLASH operation, but again, on November 24th, 1963, Mexico City is reporting KGB or Alferiev's contacts, and it includes a contact in '61 with AMLASH.

So I have difficulty believing that they are, in hindsight, not related, and that on November 24th or November 25th no one at CIA related the two events.

AMLASH Case Officer. What I'm telling you is -- I'm not telling you that no one at CIA relates the two events. You asked me the specific question, did you and Fitzgerald discuss any relationship. My answer to you was that Fitzgerald and I did not specifically discuss that.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of anyone who discussed it?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know of any investigation that was conducted?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Johnston. Let me now talk -- and again the groundwork is that you were unaware of any investigation of a connection between the two, and you were unaware of any discussion about a connection between AMLASH and Kennedy's assassination.

Is that a correct summary?

AMLASH Case Officer. That's correct.

Mr. Johnston. I will show you a document. For the record, this is a document appearing in Volume IV of the AMLASH file, and the first page of it has AMLASH's name on it, but I call your attention to the red handwriting in the upper right hand corner of that, on that cover sheet, and it says, "not to leave this office, per" blank's "orders."

Is that correct?

This document has handwriting in the upper writing hand corner that it is not to leave this office, whatever that is.

AMLASH Case Officer. Without specific clearance, without orders.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of such orders being given by any one, yourself, or Mr. Fitzgerald?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes, what we have talked about before, that Mr. Fitzgerald gave orders to minimize the knowledgeability

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

1500010087

of this particular operation because of its sensitivity.

Mr. Johnston. And that is the reason that this instruction was given about the file, this particular file or this particular document?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I can't see at this time that anything else would have been thought of at that time.

Mr. Johnston. What suddenly required that order to be given?

AMLASH Case Officer. Well, nothing specific except that by December of '63, the man with whom we were dealing, AMLASH I, was going back, or was probably back by that time already in Cuba. It was primarily probably I would say as much to protect his security as anything else.

Mr. Johnston. So that nobody else -- did this have the effect of blocking knowledge of the AMLASH operation from other people within the Agency?

AMLASH Case Officer. Probably from my office down. Certainly not Fitzgerald, not the Director or not anybody else who needed to know about the operation, absolutely not. This was just circulation within other components of SAS. That would not -- in other words, a note of this type would only mean that I would be, or whoever would clear the order would be asked before this file was allowed to circulate or was given to anybody.

Mr. Johnston. And I don't want to indicate -- my question

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

does not imply intent or anyone's purpose, but would this notation have blocked anyone but Mr. Helms or Mr. Fitzgerald from getting access to this file?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. This is too informal. If you want to block a file like this, there is a much more formal procedure to go by, to block the file for, say, the Director's use only, or even at that time, the Chief of SAS. A note like this is strictly, can only be interpreted to restrict the circulation of this file for the other people in SAS below my office, not restricting it for anybody else.

Mr. Johnston. Upwards.

What about laterally? What about to the other divisions?

AMLASH Case Officer. Laterally also. In other words, they would have to be checked out. It would have to be. We would have to know who got the file. It is a matter of control. This is what it amounts to, really. It is to know who the file goes to. It is to control the file.

Mr. Johnston. But you do that anyway, right?

That's routine procedure. This seems to be something more than that, of saying don't let this leave without my approval.

AMLASH Case Officer. No, it isn't anything more than that, and I think that you're really much more into it than what it is.

I don't even recall giving -- telling the secretary this particular thing. It probably came about from the miminized circulation order that Fitzgerald had given way before in October, as I recall.

Mr. Johnston. Did you expect this instruction to be carried out, that the file would not leave the office until you had given your personal approval or Fitzgerald had approved it?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes. I would have thought that my secretary would not have permitted this file to leave unless cleared.

Mr. Johnston. We previously discussed whether Mr. King knew about the operation.

Did he specifically know, to your knowledge, about the AMLASH operation in the fall of 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't know. I never briefed him personally.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have any reason to know that he did know about AMLASH operation?

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. Our notes indicate that on February 4th, 1964, Mr. King sent a memo to you, requirements for AMLASH, and I'll show you our notes. They basically detail questions, intelligence information to be gathered from AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. I don't specifically remember receiving this, but if we have -- certainly the fact that we have an asset who can surface any intelligence requirements from the community or anybody else in the Agency, it would be perfectly

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000010075

normal for anybody to send these requirements.

Mr. Johnston. Would you agree, at least-- from that summary of the document, that really he's asking you to get intelligence type information from AMLASH?

Is that correct?

AMLASH Case Officer. Yes.

Mr. Johnston. And given the October 5th, 1963 meeting when AMLASH sort of indicated he didn't want anything to do with that, this would be very inconsistent for someone who was knowledable about AMLASH.

AMLASH Case Officer. What are the dates?

Mr. Johnston. October 5th, 1963, is when AMLASH complained about the low level espionage requirements.

AMLASH Case Officer. He did not want -- he did not say that he would not surface intelligence requirements. He did not want to exclusively be that type of an asset.

So therefore it would be perfectly normal, regardless of what he thought himself to be, or what even we may have thought for him to be, that if he had access to information, we were going to levy the requirements on him.

Mr. Johnston. My direct question is, then, having read the summary apparently prepared by Mr. King, and sent on February 2nd, 1964, do you think that Mr. King knew about the AMLASH operation, the events of October and November?

AMLASH Case Officer. If he sent us a memo giving us requirements for AMLASH, at a minimum he had to know that we had an agent with this particular access. But he knew about the operation?" Not necessarily so.

Mr. Johnston. Do you find this consistent with the nature of the operation as of November 22nd, 1963?

AMLASH Case Officer. Explain that. I don't understand. What are you -- what is your question?

Mr. Johnston. As of November 22nd, 1963, you were now involved in coup plotting with AMLASH, and were delivering or planned to deliver the equipment, rifles, sights, explosives, to assist him in that coup. It seems inconsistent, suddenly in February, to go back to trying to get espionage information from him.

AMLASH Case Officer. First of all, I have to address that question from this point. Receiving a memo from King at that time doesn't necessarily mean that we are going to levy the requirements on AMLASH.

Mr. Johnston. Oh, I agree with that.

AMLASH Case Officer. So, to clarify the other part of your question, that if we needed intelligence after the October '63 meeting in which he said I'm not going to be strictly a source for intelligence, I want to do something more for my country, it would not be in any way out of the orderinary to ask him to send information that we felt was required on the outside.

Mr. Johnston. So you are saying you would not infer from this document a conclusion one way or the other about whether Mr. King knew the details of the AMLASH coup plotting.

AMLASH Case Officer. No.

Mr. Johnston. As a final matter from my point, as we did in your past meetings, could you briefly summarize, were you contacted prior to today's session at the Agency, and did you discuss your testimony or the ramifications of your testimony with anyone at the Agency?

AMLASH Case Officer. I was called yesterday morning, February 10th, by Mr. Walter Elder, and informed that I was to come here at 10:00 o'clock to discuss the AMLASH operation, and that you would be over yesterday afternoon to mark those portions of the file that you wished to discuss.

I picked up the files from the review staff last night and came here this morning.

Mr. Johnston. Did you discuss the substance or proposed substance of your testimony with anyone?

AMLASH Case Officer. No. I read the file and informed myself as to those points that you wanted to talk about.

Mr. Johnston. That's all the questions we have.

I want to thank you very much for spending the time with us today.

Is there any other comment you would like to make?

AMLASH Case Officer. No, not at all.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

You're quite welcome.

(Whereupon, at 1:15 o'clock p.m., the hearing in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

- - -

Exhibit 1

7600011087

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

* * *

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

* * *

Date : 08/04/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10018
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 05-H-02

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCSGO
FROM : BUNDY, MCGEORGE
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 07/11/75
PAGES : 168
SUBJECTS : BUNDY, MCGEORGE

ROSTOW, WALT

CASTRO, FIDEL

CIA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 2

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bundy

ORIGINAL

TOP SECRET Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

R496

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:
ON 2/16/77
BY B.C.

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

7600030141

Friday, July 11, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

nash

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

760003041

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF	PAGE
McGeorge Bundy	2

EXHIBITS

Bundy No. 1	65
Bundy No. 2A	66
Bundy No. 2B	67
Bundy No. 2C	68
Bundy No. 2D	69
Bundy No. 2	74
Bundy No. 3	74
Bundy No. 3A	74
Bundy No. 3B	75
Bundy No. 4	91
Bundy No. 5	93
Bundy No. 6	130
Bundy No. 6-A	131
Bundy No. 6-B	132
Bundy No. 6-C	133
Bundy No. 6-D	134
Bundy No. 6-E	135
Bundy No. 6-F	136
Bundy No. 6-G	137
Bundy No. 6-H	138
Bundy No. 6-I	139
Bundy No. 7	144

shelburne nash

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

COMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Friday, July 11, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 8:40 a.m., in Room S-407, The Capitol, Senator Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker, Mathias and Schweiker.

Also present: Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Lombard, Patrick Shea, David Aaron, Robert Kelley, Frederick Baron and Michael Madigan, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000304

The Chairman. The hearing will please come to order.

Mr. Bundy, would you please stand and take the oath.

Do you swear that the testimony you will give in this hearing will be the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Bundy. I do.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

TESTIMONY OF McGEORGE BUNDY

Mr. Schwarz. Would you state your full name and address for the record, please?

Mr. Bundy. My name is McGeorge Bundy. I live in New York. My home address is 1040 Fifth Avenue.

Mr. Schwarz. And you are currently the Chairman or the President of the Ford Foundation?

Mr. Bundy. The President of the Ford Foundation.

Mr. Schwarz. In the Kennedy Administration what position did you hold?

Mr. Bundy. I was Special Assistant for National Security Affairs.

Mr. Schwarz. And you held that all the way through the Kennedy Administration and for how many years in the Johnson Administration?

Mr. Bundy. I held that office from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration to the end of February 1966.

Mr. Schwarz. Prior to commencing work with the Kennedy

30445—

Administration, had you had anything to do with the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Bundy. I had a brother who worked for many years in the Central Intelligence Agency. I occasionally talked with members of the Agency during the forties and the fifties, both about substantive questions of what one thought about the conditions in the Soviet Union, and occasionally also about efforts that they were then making to recruit talented graduates of colleges.

Mr. Schwarz. You mentioned your brother. To put something of a different kind in the record than we have gotten recently, would you recount the position taken by Allan Dulles in connection with the problem that your brother had in the 1950's.

Mr. Bundy. Well, my brother came under attack from Senator Joseph McCarthy. And the ground was, as I recall it, in general that he had been a friend and supporter of Alger Hiss and was therefore not to be trusted in a place as sensitive as the Central Intelligence Agency.

Allan Dulles -- and my impression is that this was quite characteristic of him -- took an extremely firm stand on this matter, and stood by his estimate that my brother was in fact in no sense a security risk, rather, to the contrary. And the defense was successful, and my brother continued in the Central Intelligence Agency until the Kennedy

Administration came in, at which time he moved over to the Defense Department.

Mr. Schwarz. We have indicated to you that we are going to discuss the countries of Cuba, the Dominican Republic and Vietnam, although not much on Vietnam. And the majority and minority staff have shown you some documents of that period, some 15 years ago. Before I get to those three countries, I would like to ask you some questions about a subject called Executive Action. Have you ever heard of the subject called Executive Action?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.

Mr. Schwarz. When did you first hear of it?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I have told your staff, that is a real difficulty for me, because I cannot pinpoint the time at which I heard of it. My impression was that it was some time in the early months of 1961.

Mr. Schwarz. And do you have a recollection as to the context in which you heard about it, the person from whom you heard about it, and will you provide to the Committee your full recollection of the subject of Executive Action in the early 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Would it help if I try to describe in a general way what I now understand of this matter, the part which is recollection and the part which is clarified by discussions with the staff and what I now think about it?

Mr. Schwarz. Would you distinguish, though, the part that is recollection and the part that is based upon other matters?

Mr. Bundy. That is exactly what I would like to do.

The part that is recollection is very vague. And I would say that I have no recollection of more than one conversation on this subject. And the impression that sticks in my mind is that I was told about it in a general way. And it was described to me as an effort to study through the possibilities by which one might act against an individual in a context other than that of espionage and counter-espionage, a context more political.

Mr. Schwarz. When you say "act against an individual", act in what fashion?

Mr. Bundy. Act in a variety of fashions, as I recollect it, but up to and including killing the individual.

The two things that I think are clear in my recollection about that -- three -- one, that it was a concept presented or described to me -- I was in effect being briefed on it.

Two, that it was entirely an untargetted -- that it was in no sense a plan to do anything to anyone.

And third, and I think quite important, that it was not anoperation which had any specific target.

Mr. Schwarz. You said you were in effect briefed on it. By whom?

Mr. Bundy. That is what I don't know. I cannot recollect who it was. And I think it inappropate to guess when I have no recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. What time? I don't mean what time of day, but what time?

Mr. Bundy. As I say, sometime I think in the early months of 1961. And searching memory is an uncertain business, but it sticks in my mind that I heard about it in the rooms of the Executive Office Building. And that would place it in time, because I moved from the Executive Office Building to the West Basement of the White House sometime after the Bay of Pigs, perhaps in May.

Mr. Schwarz. So based on that fact you place it in time sometime prior to the Bay of Pigs and sometime after--

Mr. Bundy. After my arrival in Washington.

Mr. Schwarz. And when did you arrive in Washington?

Mr. Bundy. About the 10th of January. I would place it more closely, because I think it was after I was in the Office of the Special Assistant, which, of course, was occupied until the 20th of January by others.

Mr. Schwarz. So you place it after the 20th of January, but before the Bay of Pigs, which was April 14 or 17?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Did it come up in a context where you urged that such a capacity be created?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. What context did it come up in?

Mr. Bundy. It came up in a context in which it was being described to me by someone else. And that is really about as far as I can take it with precision.

Mr. Schwarz. WAs it described to you by someone else as a capacity in being?

Mr. Bundy. As a capacity -- and this is not something I want to be too certain about, Mr. Schwarz, but my recollection would be that it was a capacity coming into being.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, receiving that information, did you take any steps to discourage or dissuade the person, whoever it was, who was describing to you the capacity coming into being?

Mr. Bundy. What I recollect is that I was satisfied with the description I received on two points.

First, that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against an individual.

Being satisfied that these two things were not happening -- and I am now giving you a reconstruction rather than a precise recollection -- I am confident that what I did was

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600030450

to place this notion in the category of hypotheticals, of things with no current urgency to them, and in that sense not a question that cried for attention in the sense that so many others did. If I may make a straightforward comparison, we were, I think, even before the inauguration, but certainly very quickly thereafter, very heavily engaged in a real question of choice, which was the question of choices around what would you do with the Cuban brigade which led eventually to the Bay of Pigs. And that occupied a very large amount of time and attention, as did the crisis in Berlin and the crisis in Laos.

In the same period there were briefings on contingency plans for the uses of nuclear weapons, other weapons, and a whole swarm of, sort of, and here were reports that came naturally to the Special Assistant's office, which was also being reorganized.

So, I think that what I did was simply to put this one aside. I cannot claim to have thought about it seriously, because it was in the flow of business that would come to the Special Assistant's office.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to see if we can be more precise on dates to check on what other evidence we have. We have other evidence that discussions of this matter were going on in the Central Intelligence Agency on the 25th and 26th of January 1961.

Now, are you able to testify with respect to the likelihood of the conversation you have recounted taking place prior to the 25th or the 26th of January 1961.

Mr. Bundy. I would rate it very, very unlikely. This is a matter I have thought about since you did mention those dates to me. And I would say that the chance that within the first four days after being sworn in I would have been drawn to consider this question is, from my side, as near zero as I can put it. I had been teaching international relations over a period of ten years. I was deeply interested in many of the immediate problems, most notably the problem of the crisis in Berlin and the concomitant question of relations with the Soviet Union. And I was preoccupied with all of the things that happened when you moved to Washington from helping the Secretary to buy a house, and working out a staff, and I was under instruction from the President to reorganize the White House National Security staff. This subject was far out of my mind, and I would not have brought it up. I doubt that anyone wouldhave brought it to me in those early days.

The Chairman. May I interrupt for a moment.

As I understand your testimony, Mr. Bundy, you were briefed on the concept of Executive capability sometime early in 1961, and you can't remember now who it was who briefed you.

Do you recall whether or not you instructed anyone at the CIA to develop such a capability?

Mr. Bundy. I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment after I was briefed.

The Chairman. But your best recollection is that somebody toldyou that such a capability was being developed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't want to be too firm on that, but that would be my best recollection.

The Chairman. We received testimony from Mr. Bissell. Are you acquainted with Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, sir. I have known him a long time, and he has been a great friend of mine.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz, since you are very familiar with the record, are you going to take Mr. Bundy through the record of Mr. Bissell's testimony?

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell testified --

The Chairman. And we have the transcript. If it would be helpful for Mr. Bundy to look directly at the transcript. I think he should have it.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissell's testimony was, first, that in the first instance he said he did not recall any specific conversation. Then, however, he said, after having reviewed certain notes by Mr. Harvey, he concluded that if Mr. Harvey's note indicated, as they did, that he, Bissell, told Harvey in 1961 that he had been twice urged by the White House to set up an Executive Action capability, then he had no reason to doubt that testimony. And then he went on through a series of comments to end up saying that he would have been given that urging by either Rostow or Bundy, more likely Rostow.

First, let's focus on Rostow. Was Rostow involved in the briefing?

Mr. Bundy. No -- now, that I can't tell you out of my recollection, but only out of my knowledge of the way the office was organized. The first things we did, Walt Rostow and I, was to work out an informal but nevertheless reasonably clear-cut division of labor. And the whole business of what I thought of as special group business, namely, matters that related to covert action, and would, if they came for division, come through the special group, fell on my side of that division. I don't recall that Mr. Rostow was ever involved in any matter of this sort.

The Chairman. It is fair to say that this was Mr. Rostow's testimony.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bissel is, as you say, a friend of yours of long standing, and still is a friend of yours?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, he is.

Mr. Schwarz. Wehave his testimony which, while it did have gradations within it, ended up saying that he believed either you or Mr. Rostow urged him to set up the Executive Action capability. And you have testified that the fact is that you were given a briefing, and you didn't urge it, but on the other hand you didn't say it should stop.

How can you explain, if you can, the testimony of your friend Mr. Bissell, and the contrast between that and your testimony?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understand Mr. Bissell's testimony -- and I should add, so that there will be no misunderstanding, that I have not only the advantage of discussions with you, but I have talked with him about it -- as I understand that testimony from that conversation, he was trying to explain a situation in which he had no reason to question an Agency history to the effect that he first gave instructions on this matter in February 1961. And in that context -- and he had no reason to question the report that he had received White House encouragement -- it is in that context that his speculations about Mr. Rostow and about me seem to fall.

I would be surprised, if his memory were refreshed with respect to the dates of January which you have described to me, if he were to believe that any initiative in this enterprise would come in the first instance from the Kennedy Administration.

The Chairman. Mr. Bundy, our transcript of the Bissell testimony makes it clear that Mr. Bissell himself does not dispute the documented record. He said in effect, if Harvey says that I told him that I had been twice instructed by the White House to develop an Executive capability, I have no basis on which to dispute that record.

Then when we asked him, very well, who in the White House told you, and when were you told, he replied, it must have been early in 1960, and I don't recall who told me, but it must have been either Rostow or Bundy.

He then recounts that he had numerous conversations with both of you during the period, and concludes that the instruction must have come either from you or from Mr. Rostow.

Now, Mr. Rostow tells us he never gave such an instruction, and in fact has no memory of every having discussed such an instruction.

Mr. Bundy. He would have in fact have had no authority to give such an instruction.

The Chairman. That is right.

And he pointed that out.

Mr. Bundy. And in fact I wouldn't have the authority to give any such instruction, and I would have been only the channel to give such instruction.

Senator Baker. Who would have had the authority?

Mr. Bundy. If the authority were required outside the AGency it would have to have been the President himself.

The Chairman. What I would like to ask you --

Mr. Bundy. Could I continue with Senator Baker's question for one second.

My own impression as to this matter -- and I have already testified to the fact that I am relying on a recollection of a meeting of which there is no record -- is that had I been briefed on this essentially hypothetical internal, undirected character, it did not appear to me to be a matter that required further authority outside the CIA. That may or may not have been right, but that is the quick judgment I appear to have reached. Because I certainly did not raise the question with others.

Senator Baker. Do you recall that, Mr. Bundy, or is that your surmise?

Mr. Bundy. That is my reconstruction more than my -- I know I did not raise it, I did not press the question, and I did not feel, therefore, that it was a question that needed further analysis, and it did not, so far as I know, get further consideration inthe White House. My own recollection is that I didn'thear the words again in any serious context that I can recall until this year.

The Chairman. And you cannot recall who it was who briefed you?

Mr. Bundy. I really cannot.

Mr. Schwarz. Can you narrow the field?

Mr. Bundy. I can narrow the field. It would have to have been a senior officer at the Agency, or someone with previous understanding in the White House. I have no reason to suppose that it was the latter, but I cannot exclude that.

The Chairman. Might it have been Bissell himself?

Mr. Bundy. It surely might have been.

The Chairman. Based upon your best recollection of that briefing, you have already testified that you interpose no objection?

Mr. Bundy. I am pretty sure I satisfied myself as to the character of the enterprise. But I did not interpose an objection.

The Chairman. Do you recall, then, having reported the briefing to the President?

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.

The Chairman. Did it strike you -- before I ask that question, based upon your best recollection of the briefing, were you told that this was a new capability that was being developed, or were you told simply that the Agency possessed such a capability?

Mr. Bundy. I would put it that the Agency was working on such a capability, but without any great sense of precision.

The Chairman. Were you given the impression at that briefing that the Agency was seeking your authority or the authority of the White House?

Mr. Bundy. I think they were testing my reaction, as I now look back on it. But I do not recall that they were seeking authority. If it had come to me as a matter of White

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

House authority, I know from the context -- my own concept of my job what I would have done.

The Chairman. What would you have done?

Mr. Bundy. I would have had to take the matter to the President, because I had no independent authority.

The Chairman. And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?

Mr. Bundy. As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Well, this is a subject dealing, as it does, with the development of a capability to kill that would have been of the character that if you had been asked for authority you would have discussed with the President?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

The Chairman. And furthermore, is it not a subject of a character that you would be very likely to recall?

Mr. Bundy. If I had been asked for authority I would recall it. If I were the initiating or deciding agent, I would recall that I had had that role.

You speak of the seriousness of it. It deals with a capability to kill. One of the sobering facts about coming into the government from outside into a sensitive position like that one is the number of things on which you are briefed which deal with the capability to kill. Contingency plans for protecting West Berlin, contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons -- shelf plans, a shade more remote, perhaps, for the use of different kinds of gases -- an operational plan for the invasion of Cuba -- these were uncertainties as to whether there would have to be military landings in Laos. In the context of 1961 -- and I am not in any sense trying to understate the seriousness of the context of 1975-- this was a hypothetical kind of a thing with two strong locks between it and any decision. And I simply didn't pay it the attention then that we are paying to it now. We are right to pay that attention now.

The Chairman. I understand that very well. And this Committee is endeavoring in every way it can to place this whole issue within the context of the time. Nevertheless, we are faced with a very real dilemma. We know that at the very time you were being briefed the Agency was not only interested in developing a capability, but was in fact engaged in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro, and had been involved in other murder plots and murder attempts against the leaders of certain foreign governments.

The question we are endeavoring to answer is whether the Agency had been authorized by the policy makers of the government to engage in this activity, or whether it was operating fast and loose on a wild gambit of its own in an area of extreme sensitivity that could have the most serious repercussions upon the government of the U.S. and its reputation in the world.

We are told by Mr. Bissell, who apparently was not only a very good friend of yours, but also a very good friend of Mr. Rostow's --

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

The Chairman. -- a man whose credibility as a witness would seem to have to be respected -- that he was at least engaged in developing such a capability on direct instructions from the White House.

But when we pressed him for specifics, his testimony becomes very vague. He can't remember just who it was who told him, he can't dispute the record, which says that in effect he so advised Mr. Harvey when he engaged Mr. Harvey to develop the capability. And everyone else of high authority in the Administration that we have questioned so far testifies that it was not the policy of the Administration to engage in assassination, and no such attempts were ever authorized, and indeed, with the exception of one occasion in the Special Group, the subject never even surfaced for discussion.

And when it did, if it did, it was quickly shot down.

Nevertheless, the CIA was in fact embarked upon such attempts during the period under review.

Now, we are led to conclude either that we are not being told the truth concerning the policy of the Administration, which is very hard for me to accept, given the reputation of the witnesses that have come before us, for integrity and

7 5 0 0 0 3 0 4 5 1

truthfulness, or that the CIA was running wild, and acting on its own initiative, engaging in murder plots, murder attempts, and not informing, let alone securing the authority from, those in government who held the responsibility, which in a way is even more frightening.

Now, you tell us that you remember being briefed. You don't remember advising the President. It didn't seem too important at the time.Did you ever follow up on whether such a capability had in fact been perfected by the agency?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall pursuing the matter at all, Mr. Chairman, any more than I would have pursued any other shelf capability on which no question was being pushed to me, either from below or above.

If I may go back and comment on one aspect of your, I think, important and impressive description of the difficulty the Committee faces, I am sure that if in the early months of 1961 I had known what I now know, in part from the newspapers and in part from discussions with your staff, about what was really in train, I would have had a very different approach.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Yesterday Secretary Rusk testified before us. And some of the minutes or notes made following one of themeetings of the Special Group Augmented at least suggest that the question of assassination occurred. And, Mr. Rusk said, did you think anyone would bring that up at a town meeting? And by that I gather he meant that these meetings had large attendance from all different groups and prinicples and staff assistants and so on, and as a result, if there were matters of exceeding delicacy, that was not the forum at which such matters would be discussed.

Would you comment on that?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. My impression would be that the Secretary was probably referring to the much discussed meeting of August 10, 1962.

Senator Mondale. Right.

Mr. Bundy. That was a large meeting, 16 or 18 people. And the comment seems to be pertinent to that meeting. The Special Group as such, the one which I would have had in mind, for example, in early 1961, was set up under a national security regulation of some sort whose number was 54/12.

Senator Mondale. That was the Special Group.

Mr. Bundy. That was the Special Group. And the Special Group in and of itself was quite a small group.

Senator Mondale. But people would volunteer to attend --

Mr. Bundy. No.

Senator Mondale. They would not?

Mr. Bundy. No. The meeting of August 10 is a very special meeting in a variety of respects. That included --

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 6 0 0 0 0 0 4 4 3

The Chairman. You were present at that meeting?

Mr. Bundy. I was present. My memory is entirely a refreshed memory on this, I had no recollection of the meeting until recent months. But I have found a scratch pad that I apparently doodled on on that date, and it shows who was there, and not much else.

Mr. Schwarz. There were some beautiful drawings.

Mr. Bundy. There were.

They were not very beautiful drawings.

The Special Group Augmented met in August -- and this does coincide with my general recollection of the matter -- in response to concerns wihch were first, I think, and most energetically pressed by Mr. McCone with respect to, what the hell are the Russians doing in Cuba. And that was the center of that meeting, and the center of later meetings, and the center of a national security action memorandum of considerable complexity which was put out toward the end of August, most of which dealt with this question, how do we know what they are going to do, what do we do if they do it, and so forth, with respect to missiles in Cuba.

It was therefore in a sense much more than an ordinary MONGOOSE meeting, let alone a Special Group meeting. And while I quite agree with the Secretary that that meeting as a planning session for anything as horrendous as assassination is implausible in the extreme. Quite serious covert actions were discussed in the Special Group. And as your Committee pursues its studies of covert action it will find that that group is the nodal point for policy decisions, good or bad, well or badly handled. And that was quite a small group.

Senator Mondale. The reason I ask that is that it seems to me that the Chairman's question pursues the two alternatives, either what we now know to have occurred was ordered at the highest level, or at a very high level, such as the Special Group Augmented, or they operated on their own, in which case they were out of control and irresponsible, or there was some extra communications system that went around the formal structure that we have been examining, and would account for the sou of authority that these operators testified to when they were with us.

Now, their testimony was not very specific. They said, we thought we had authority, and we think we heard from somebody, and so on.

What are the changes, based upon your experience, that there was such extra official communications and order passi

Senator Baker. Before Mr. Bundy answers, I might say to Senator Mondale that I am struck by the first paragraph of the Inspector General's report, which we don't have here now, I don't believe, but as I remember it, it says, it is difficult to reconstruct history of assassination plots, becau of the high sensitivity of the subject matter, no written records were kept, and it was not discussed at open meetings. That is generally what was said. And it seems to me that is implying, then, that as a matter of policy there was no formalization of this sort of communication.

I am sorry to interrupt.

Senator Mondale. Yes.

And in that August 10 meeting two or three principals testified that it did come up. And in fact it is not reflected in the notes.

Mr. Bundy. Perhaps the best way for me to begin at least with an answer to your question is to describe my own sense -- my own understanding of the way in which covert operations of all types were brought forward. And this was perhaps the most important and the most constantly reiterated fact of the process that I was exposed to when I began to consider this whole range of subjects on coming to Washington. And whether it was with Mr. Gordon Gray, my predecessor, or with Allen Dulles, or with incoming and outgoing friends in the Department of State, or with Mr. Bissell, or with anyone else concerned with these matters, what I learned then and what I applied throughout my time there to the best of my ability was that all covert operations, whether intelligence operations, clandestine political activity, and clandestine propaganda activity, and clandestine subversion, or sabotage, which did occur in the case of Cuba, all of them took their authority from and came for their authority to the 54/12 group.

And when there was a question in such a meeting as to whether the matter required further judgment, it was the responsibility of the Chairman of that group to make sure that that was checked out.

The papers will usually say, higher authority, et cetera, et cetera, and the President's name will often not appear -- any more than the precise character of the operation is likely to appear in the minutes for the reasons that Senator Baker has spoken of.

But I never knew of any operation of this kind of any sort, with one exception, which is quite different, which did not have that channel. The exception is the Bay of Pigs, which was so big, so complicated, and overflowed in so many directions, and in which the President himself was involved in so many ways, as he fully recognized and explained at the time, that it did not go through this Committee process, it went through a quite Presidential process, and everybody involved knew that.

But with that one exception, I would have told you up until the beginning of this current public discussion, that was the way it went, and that nothing went outside it, and that the Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agencies, with their more sensitive intelligence operations, were meticulous in that respect.

Now, I clearly am wrong. But that is what I would have told you.

Senator Mondale. Well, are you wrong?

In other words, what you testified to --

Mr. Bundy. Excuse me, I misstate myself. I beg your pardon for interrupting.

I am wrong in that things happened that didn't go through that group.

Senator Mondale. Yes.

In other words, that is the big question, either they we acting on authority, which apparently flowed around channels --

The Chairman. Covertly --

Senator Mondale. Covertly -- or they were acting on thei own, and our attempts to find direct authority in these officia meetings led us nowhere.

And your testimony is that you find it very unlikely that there was this covert way of communicating authority.

Mr. Bundy. My testimony was that I wouldn't have believed it existed. I have to consider the same alternative that the Chairman has so clearly pointed out. I don't find it agreeable to conclude that the Agency was a rogue elephant at a time when I strongly believe it was not.

Senator Mondale. We asked General Taylor that question, and he said he found it incredible to believe that they would have gone around the Special Group Augmented with such.

Mr. Bundy. General Taylor, of course -- and this is an important point -- was a-pointed to this responsibility after the Bay of Pigs, after a review of the failures that led to the Bay of Pigs, and after a conclusion had been reached that it would strengthen the White House to have a man with a particular responsibility for the oversight of intelligence operations. He was called military representative to the President, but in the announcement of his appointment -- I happened to look it up the other day -- President Kennedy made it clear that he would be his representative for intelligence matters. And he did in fact take over the chairmanship during the time that he was military representative of all of the Special Groups, 54/12, the Special Group Counterinsurgency, and the Special Group Augmented, MONGOOSE. And when he said -- if he has testified that his expectation would have been that nothing was going to go around him, he is saying exactly what I thought through the same period.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, in that respect --

The Chairman. Before I forget the question, let me ask, since you were at the August 10 meeting, and since we have received testimony buttressed by certain documentary evidence that the subject of assassination of Castro did come up at that meeting, do you have any recollection of subject coming up or being discussed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recollect the meeting. And I don't recollect the subject ever coming up in a meeting of that size, or indeed in any -- I don't have any recollection of it coming up, although I do have a general recollection of there being times at which this possibility was heard of. I wouldn't want to testify that I never heard anyone say, there is somebody thinking about this, because that would be different from my vague recollection.

But I have no recollection of that meeting, and therefore none of any specific statement made by anyone in it.

The Chairman. Senator Baker?

Senator Baker. In that connection, before I go to the question I had in mind, is it fair to say, Mr. Bundy, that all, or virtually all, of your testimony this morning, about MONGOOSE, about the August 10 meeting, and about the general situation, is from reconstructed memory rather than first impression memory?

Mr. Bundy. I didn't want to go that far, Senator Baker. My knowledge, my sense of what 54/12 and Special Group Augmented were, and where they stood in the line of authority, is very clear, and is not reconstructed. I spent five years -- except for the time when General Taylor was there, I was the chairman of these things.

Senator Baker. Let's take a piece at a time, then.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 5 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 r

On the question of the Executive Action capability, I believe referred to as the ZRRIFLE project --

Mr. Bundy. Imust say that if I had known that was its name I would have looked harder, Senator Baker.

Senator Baker. It is a fairly picturesque name -- as to Executive Action Capability, or ZRRIFLE, do you have a separate recollection?

Mr. Bundy. I have a recollection of what I think of is one, I don't want to say there wasn't more, but of one discussion of the matter. And I know I was informed of it in some fashion at the time.

Senator Baker. Do you remember by whom?

Mr. Bundy. That is my difficulty, as I said earlier, I don't know.

Senator Baker. The reason I ask is, from the other documentation I have, which consists primarily of the Inspector General of the CIA's report, and maybe other material that I can't think of at the moment, it is clear and unmistakeable that they think of RZRIFLE or Executive Action Capability as a White House initiative, or a White House request of considerable insistence from the White House that they get on with the job.

Mr. Bundy. That is totally inconsistent with my unreconstructed recollection.

Senator Baker. Let me track that carefully.

Do you recall that there was not?

Mr. Bundy. I can only speak for myself here, and for my colleague Rostow, and my knowledge of his assignments. I recall that his assignments would have made it wildly out of place, and totally out of character, for him to initiate a matter of this kind. And I recall that I did not. And I recall that quite independently of any reconstruction of recent months.

Senator Baker. I would like to limit this, then, just to your assignment.

Was it your general assignment to take care of so-called covert operations?

Mr. Bundy. It was my assignment -- may I take a minute on this?

Senator Baker. Yes, sir.

Mr. Bundy. There were two ways in which I could become involved in covert -- three ways. I might have thought up an idea myself. I will have to say that I have no recollection that I ever did. It was not a subject in which I had an independent personal motivating interest. So, there were two ways in which I could get involved in it. One was by a proposal upward from the Agency or the Defense Intelligence Services, which would come to the Special Group.

And the other was when the President had an interest-- and I did have an interest -- from time to time in these

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

matters. He had a great interest at different points in 1961, 1962, in doing more about Cuba. And part of the more he wanted to do was covert. And he would say so to me. And I would say so to somebody else.

Senator Baker. Can you give us examples of that?

Mr. Bundy. No, I can't. I can only say that the kind of things he was talking about was, why do all these raids not get us anywhere? They say they can do something about the oil refineries, why don't they? These are purely hypothetical, Senator Baker, but they would be in a category, subversion and sabotage.

Senator Baker. WAs it Harvey that was spoken of as our 007?

Mr. Schwarz. Once yesterday.

SEnator Baker. Do you remember when Mr. Harvey was brought to see the President at the Oval Office?

Mr. Bundy. I have been told about that, but I am afraid that is non-refreshed recollection. I don't know anything about it.

Senator Baker. Would that have been the character of the things that the President was interested in, 007?

Mr. Bundy. I am not going to try to repair the record at this late stage and say that the President never read Ian Fleming.

Senator Baker. Or ever seen Ian Fleming?

Mr. Bundy. I don't think the President ever acted Ian Fleming.

Senator Baker. I think that is right. But I think it is important for us, Mr. Bundy, to try to establish, as the Chairman said, the range of available information or evidence that sheds some light on the three alternative possibilities, and the type of things that the President interested himself in is terribly important in that respect.

I believe that you said you had no information or no recollection of what particular situation, or what other deals that were made he was interested in.

Mr. Bundy. I will put it more concretely than that.

The President said, can't we do something more about Cuba? Why don't you get ahold of these people who are dealing with this and see if they can't do better, and pass the word that I am interested, that kind of thing.

Senator Baker. Do I understand that to mean that he never spoke of a particular practice?

Mr. Bundy. I can't tell you that, because I know, the record indeed reminds me, that particular actions that are related to Cuba that came up through the group of ten went to him, and some were approved and some were not.

So, he clearly looked at them.

I would have to have the documents there in order to be precise, and I don't have them with me.

Senator Baker. Which documents?

Mr. Bundy. Documents which the Committee staff has provided.

Mr. Schwarz. We have them.

Senator Baker. Tell me what they are.

Mr. Schwarz. November 30, 1961, Tab -- is that Tab H or Tab 4 about the November 30, 1961, which authorizes MONGOOSE?

Mr. Kelley. Tab 4.

Mr. Schwarz. May 5, '62, Lansdale Tab 21.

Senator Baker. Let's stop there, if I may.

Do you have a copy of this memorandum, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Kelley. He will have it in a moment.

Mr. Bundy. One place these documents did not go is into the memorabilia of former members.

Mr. Kelley. We are talking about Tab 4.

Senator Baker. Mine says, see Lansdale Tab 4.

Mr. Kelley. Yes. November 30, 1961.

Senator Baker. I would really prefer if someone gave Mr. Bundy a copy of the same material I am working on.

Mr. Kelley. All right, that is the chronology.

Mr. Bundy. November 30, 1961?

Senator Baker. Yes, sir. It is on page 3, the third item.

Mr. Bundy. I have it.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Senator Baker. President Kennedy's decision to begin MONGOOSE. Is it clear, Mr. Bundy, that President Kennedy made the decision to initiate the MONGOOSE program?

Mr. Bundy. No question.

Senator Baker. I notice in the staff interpretation under the column "Issues and Questions" that they alleged that you recall probably writing this memorandum.

Mr. Bundy. That is really a logical inference. The President would not himself have written a long memorandum of instructions of this kind. It is possible that General Taylor wrote it. But I think it is more likely that I did. But in any event, whichever of us did so was doing it as a staff officer for the Prsident's convenience in recording his decision.

Senator Baker. So at least to this extent there is no question about the chain of command, or the chance to control it, the President authorized it?

Mr. Bundy. Just to underline that point, as I recall the paper which was shown to me, it is one from Mrs. Lincoln to General Taylor saying, the President wants you to have this as a description of the decisions.

Senator Baker. Would you repeat that?

Mr. Bundy. I think the covering memorandum on that document is from Mrs. Lincoln to General Taylor, and it says, the President wants you to have this as a record of his decisions.

Senator Baker. Thank you, sir.

Do you have an independent recollection of the meeting or the encounter with President Kennedy in connection with MONGOOSE?

Mr. Bundy. Not a specific meeting, but of the process which led to this decision, yes.

Senator Baker. Describe for me, if you will, what MONGOOSE was intended to be?

Mr. Bundy. Well, MONGOOSE in a general way was the whole set of things to be concerned with mostly, but not only, covert activities against the Communist regime in Cuba.

Senator Baker. The chronology also quotes the memo as saying, one, we will use our available assets to go ahead with the discussed project in order to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime.

Can you elaborate on that?

Mr. Bundy. Not without documentary assistance beyond what I have just said. It was to be a fairly wide ranging program. I believe that what that really sort of implies to me is that all departments are to cooperate, that the Committee is to review possibilities, proposals, to seek them out, and that the thing is to be coordinated by the Committee, whose chairman will be -- this summary doesn't say so, but my recollection is that the chairman was to be

General Taylor, and it does say that General Lansdale was to be the Chief of Operations.

The Chairman. I have some questions at this point, please.

Item 4 of this memorandum reads: "The NSC 54/12 Group will be kept closely informed of activities, and will be available for advice and recommendation".

Does this suggest to you that the regular channel was supposed to operate with respect to MONGOOSE, that is to say, a central role was to be played by the Special Group in connection with its activities?

Mr. Bundy. It is a puzzling sentence to me as I read it now. And I can't give you a precise answer on that. I think the general answer has to be that the 54/12 Group continu through this period. General Taylor was the chairman of both. The overlapping of membership was extensive. And I think you would get a more precise answer as to the exact relation from General Taylor than I am in a position to give you.

The Chairman. I have a very clear memory of General Taylor's testimony. And his testimony was that the Special Group Augmented was the group that had charge of operation MONGOOSE. It was further his testimony that all plans, all operations, were to be brought to the Special Group Augmented for its approval. And the approval of that Group was necessary before any such plans were actually implemented.

Mr. Bundy. I would certainly be clear on that, Mr. Chairman. I thought you were asking whether there was a further requirement that it go from the Special Group Augmented to the Special Group. And I have no precise view on that.

The Chairman. I see.

Now, when you refer to the NSC 54/12 Group --

Mr. Bundy. That is what I think of as the Special Group.

The Chairman. That is what you think of as the Special Group.

I asked the question because the language is a little fuzzy.

Mr. Bundy. It is.

The Chairman. This language might suggest that there is an independent line of authority, and that the Special Group Augmented or the Special Group was simply to be kept informed, and its advice and recommendations would be taken under advisement.

Mr. Bundy. I think myself, Mr. Chairman, that we don't have a very serious problem here, because I would agree with General Taylor's recollection that the Special Group Augmented was the Cuba group.

Now, the Special Group is simply the same people less two or three. And the only real operational value of this paragraph is that perhaps the staff officer who serviced the

54/12 would be available in a decision to the staff officer servicing the Special Group Augmented. But the decision-making persons are simply a smaller number of the very people that both General Taylor and I recollect as having the main responsibility.

The Chairman. So according to your best remembrance, you would agree with the testimony we have received from General Taylor?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would.

The Chairman. Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, perhaps we could get some help in how the recollections come together here. I might pursue for just a moment some of the background regarding other sources of information you may have had regarding the subject matter of his testimony.

You indicated earlier that you had talked with Mr. Bissell about his testimony.

Did you talk with persons other than Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Bundy. Oh, yes.

Mr. Smothers. Did you talk with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Smothers. Regarding these events?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Have you spoken with Mr. Gilpatric?

Mr. Bundy. NO, I don't think I have.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Rusk?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. McCone?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Are there others?

Mr. Bundy. I am sure there are. Mr. Rostow. Mr. Goodwin. There may well be others, Mr. Schlesinger and Mr. Dungam -- who has very little to do with it, but I talked to them because of my own absence of recollection about the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Smothers. Let me just raise a few questions regarding those discussions, and perhaps it will be somewhat helpful to us in trying to piece this together.

Has any documentary evidence passed between you and the persons previously mentioned regarding the subject matter of these hearings?

Mr. Bundy. Not that I know of.

Mr. Smothers. Did Mr. McCone provide you any documentary evidence?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smother. Did you receive any documentary evidence from any source other than the staff?

Mr. Bundy. No -- I beg your pardon. When I testified before the Rockefeller Commission I asked through that Commission whether I could look at NCS files particularly in order to clarify my recollection of the 6th of August 1962. And I was allowed to look at the NSAM files. And my memory was refreshed by NSAM-1, which I believe the committee has.

Mr. Smothers. Have you made a similar request to persons now within the Agency or on the White House staff?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smothers. Could we go back into your conversation with Mr. Bissell? Could you describe for the Committee, please, your reaction when Mr. Bissell indicated to you that he had in testimony before this Committee told the Committee that either you or Mr. Rostow had asked him to establish an Executive Action Capability?

Mr. Bundy. He didn't report it that way to me. He reported it to me that the testimony that had been given by others placed this event in February 1961. Testimony by others indicated that he had said to them that he had been encouraged to do this by the White House, and that in casting around as to who might have encouraged, he had given the names of Rostow and Bundy. I think this is roughly what he said to me.

The Chairman. That was the character of his testimony?

Mr. Bundy. I told him that I thought he must be wrong about Rostow, because that wasn't the way it worked, and that my own recollection was not that we had encouraged him, but that I had at some stage been informed about it.

We then went on to a discussion of what it was. And we agreed that whatever else it was, it was not an operation plan, and it was not targeted against anyone.

Mr. Smothers. What was his reaction to your comment that he had been informed as opposed to initiating?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that we had a very extended discussion on it. I don't recall his reaction, and I don't recall exactly how I put the point.

The Chairman. Let me just ask at that point, the way you have characterized Bissell's testimony correspnds with my memory of it. It is hard for me, however, to understand how Mr. Bissell -- why Mr. Bissell would have directed Mr. Harvey to develop such a capability, and apparently represented, if the documents are to be believed, to Mr. Harvey that he had been twice instructed to do this by the White House, if he had not in fact received such authority.

Do you think that Mr. Bissell would have undertaken on his own initiative to develop such a capability and simply represented to his subordinate that he was doing so on instructions from the White House?

Mr. Bundy. I think there is a prior question, Mr. Chairman, which is the credibility of the witness from whom he is taking this recollection.

The Chairman. That is fair.

Though Mr. Bissell himself did not seem disposed --

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Bundy. Mr. Bissell may not recollect that I did not give him this instruction, but I do, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Did Mr. Bissell at any time during the period under question, or at any later time, ever inform you of CIA activities or involvement in assassination attempts against any foreign leader?

Mr. Bundy. No.

The Chairman. Doesn't it strike you as strange, since Mr. Bissell was aware of such attempts, that he would not have told him?

Mr. Bundy. Well, I don't want, for reasons that I have already explained, to speculate as to why he did or did not. I was operating, working on the assumption that I would know that kind of anything if it existed.

The Chairman. Senator Mathias?

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I don't want to leave the record, or Mr. Bundy's mind, or in the alternative, my mind, in a state of confusion as to what exactly Mr. Bissell's recollection was.

Now, he was depending somewhat on Mr. Harvey's recollection and notes in the first instance. But as I recall, he was very clear as a matter of independent recollection that he had been horsed along a couple of times by the White House on proceeding with the development of the Executive Action Capability. And that was a matter of independent recollection, it didn't depend on anybody else's notes or anybody else's refreshing his recollection.

Mr. Bundy. That he didn't say to me, and I have no way of commenting on it.

The Chairman. I think we must carefully review the record on that score.

Senator Baker. It may be necessary to ask him to come back for that purpose.

May I ask a question there?

Mr. Bundy, do you have any recollection of any specific covert plans that would involve poisons, hypdermic syringes, or other potentially lethal devices in conjunction with activities against Cuba?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific plan. I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I have been able to take it in my own memory.

Senator Baker. Can you remember who may have mentioned it to you and what the purposes of the poison may have been?

Mr. Bundy. Nothing at all about it in detail.

Senator Baker. A poison pen?

Mr. Bundy. No, some kind of poison about which -- one thing that does stick in my mind is that it seems totally impractical because it was going to kill a large group of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort.

Senator Baker. Do you remember whether the plan was declared non-feasible or infeasible by the Department of Defense?

Mr. Bundy. No, I have no such recollection.

Senator Baker. Do you remember anything about a hypodermic syringe to carry poisons in a ballpoint pen?

Mr. Bundy. That is the sort of thing that I was asked the other day, and I said I remember it, and then it seems to me about ten seconds later was that what I was remembering was murder mysteries and nothing related to Cuba. I have no recollection of connecting anything like that to Cuba.

Senator Baker. I have another question, but I will wait, if you have something else.

The Chairman. Go ahead, sir.

Senator Baker. Do you feel that you have a good insight into the relationship between the President and his brother Robert Kennedy in this respect, that is, having to do with Cuba operations, and Robert Kennedy and Richard Helms?

Mr. Bundy. I have a pretty good picture of the relationship between President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy on Cuba, and on many other things. It is a recollection which grows stronger as the administration goes on, because I got to know them better, and, of course, they got to know me better, and the relationship tends to become closer, my relation with both of them. I had known the President for many, many years, and the Attorney General much more briefly.

I do not have any clear picture of the relationship between the Attorney General and Mr. Helms. My curbstone judgment would have been that it was not close.

Senator Baker. Based on your insight, did the President delegate to Robert Kennedy substantial aspects of Cuba policy during the period we are speaking of?

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that way, Senator Baker. He certainly counted on the Attorney General to be a kind of gingerman on a great many subjects, of which Cuba and counterinsurgency were the two that came more closely within my area of interest.

Senator Baker. Counterinsurgency meaning what?

Mr. Bundy. Counterinsurgency meaning all those efforts like the Green Berets and organizing to be able to assist countries threatened by Communist subversion internally.

Senator Baker. Are you speaking of counterinsurgency as it led to Cuba, or as a general capability?

Mr. Bundy. There was a separate committee, the Special Committee on CI, counterinsurgency. And the Attorney General was an active member of that. And I used to see him playing this very important role of poking and prodding, and why can't you do more, and why can't you do better, and why aren't we making more progress.

Senator Baker. Who was on that committee?

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I can't decide from recollection. General Taylor was again the Chairman, but the membership was different.

Senator Baker. Do you have minutes or records of that group?

Mr. Schwarz. No.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would like to request that with Mr. Bundy's assistance after this hearing that we identify as much as we can what that group is, and make a fomral request for documentation.

Mr. Aaron. We have reviewed some of that material at the John F. Kennedy Library. It is essentially in fact the group that reviewed paramilitary operations and potential insurgency situations in a number of countries. There was an insurgency list. It did not seem to relate to the subject we are speaking of here. So we did not request the documents. But we could have gotten them.

Senator Baker. Will you do that, please?

Is that agreeable, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. What is your request?

Senator Baker. I would like documentation or any records relating to the counterinsurgency group during the period in question.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000000430

The Chairman. Let me suggest that we designate a member of the committee staff to undertake that review, and report back to the committee.

Would that be satisfactory?

Senator Baker. That is fine. I just want to know if there is any worthwhile documentation.

The Chairman. Yes. Because it may be entirely ancillary to this issue.

Senator Baker. Let me ask Mr. Bundy this. Would that group have been important toward American policy during this period?

Mr. Bundy. The CI Group?

Senator Baker. Yes.

Mr. Bundy. I would think only most marginally, Senator Baker, simply because the existence of other groups, the Special Group Augmented or the MONGOOSE Group, was so clearly dominant and was the Central Committee for that subject.

Senator Baker. The gingerbread man concept?

Mr. Bundy. The gingerman concept.

Senator Baker. The gingerman concept. There is a difference.

Do I directly infer from that description that the President would authorize Robert Kennedy to urge and expedite action to move from assignment to assignment and to push people along to produce a result?

Mr. Bundy. In a general way that is right. But the form it took in the areas in which I was concerned was in one sense quite informal. I know of no instance where the Attorney General tried to replace the normal channel -- let's stay away for the moment from the covert question and the Cuban question, which I know you will want to talk about more precisely -- but if he felt, as he often did, that American policy in Africa, for example, was insufficiently sensitive to the aspirations of black people in Africa, he wouldn't fire off a kick, he would come in and say, why can't you people do something about the State Department on news and stuff.

Senator Baker. There is some evidence -- we had direct testimony that Mr. Helms, who was DDP at the time in question, rather than DCI, clearly thought that the authority of the Agency was to overthrow the Castro regime by any means, including assassination.

And when pressed on the source of that authority he designed to say that anyone specifically told him that, but that he talked to Robert Kennedy frequently about it. Would this be in the gingerman concept you are speaking of?

Mr. Bundy. Now we are right at the specific point I would like to make. But everything I knew about Bobby Kennedy when he was goading and spurring people on is that he never took away from the existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility.

Senator Baker. Would what I describe be consistent with whatyou describe?

Mr. Bundy. Not if it is interpreted as meaning that he was providing a separate channel of authority.

Senator Baker. What I meant was just what it was, and that is, Helms described for us meeting with Kennedy apparently to stimulate the Agency's activities to produce the overthrow of the Castro regime, and that he met regularly with Kennedy in this respect.

Mr. Bundy. I don't know how often they met or what was said, I know nothing about that. I would have said, just in passing, that the Attorney General's relationship to the Director of Central Intelligence was much closer and more important than his relationship to Mr. Helms.

Senator Baker. I am correct, am I, that Helms at the time was DDP and not DCI?

Mr. Schwarz. That is right.

Senator Baker. Do you have any idea why he would have met regularly with the DDP rather than the DCI?

Mr. Bundy. I have no idea that he did. I know that he met often and intimately and easily with the Director of Central Intelligence, who was a close personal friend of his.

Senator Baker. You are speaking of Mr. McCone?

Mr. Bundy. Mr. McCone.

The Chairman. I think that since the point is important, that when the Committee Staff complete its review of the evidence it ought to be reminded to look closely at that Helms testimony and identify exactly what words Helms might have used to describe his relationship with Robert Kennedy.

Senator Baker. And the time involved and what position Helms occupied at the time.

The Chairman. I have another question.

Mr. Bundy, we also have it from Mr. Bissell that at one time he called in an officer, a subordinate, O'Donnell, -- that at one time Mr. Bissell called in a subordinate whose name was Mr. O'Donnell, and asked Mr. O'Donnell if he would be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba.

Mr. O'Connell testifies that he said he would not be willing to undertake the assassination of Mr. Lumumba, because he had moral compunctions against killing.

Mr. O'Donnell further testifies that he was then or thereafter dispatched to the Congo, where he was informed that some poison had been made available -- had come to the CIA headquarters in the Congo.

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I missed that last.

The Chairman. He was informed that some poison had arrived at the CIA headquarters in the Congo.

When we asked Mr. Bissell on what authority he had asked O'Connell as to his willingness to undertake the assassination of Lumumba, he could not provide us with that authority, except to say that he may have done it on his own initiative.

Do you have any reaction to that?

Mr. Bundy. Where is it in time?

Senator Church. It was in the fall of 1960. It was not during the Kennedy Administration, it preceded the Kennedy Administration. But I asked you the question, because it strikes me as being a very disturbing piece of testimony, that any man so positioned, in the CIA could not identify higher authority for such an action, and would under oath say that it might have been on his own initiative.

Mr. Bundy. I can't add to your comment on that, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Very well.

Senator Morgan. Let me ask him a question or two, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Senator Morgan?

Senator Morgan. Mr. Bundy, you recall very vividly talking with the President on many occasions about Cuba, is that right?

Mr. Bundy. I recall vividly that I talked to him on many occasions, I am not very good on remembering specific discussions.

Senator Morgan. You told us a few minutes ago that he was constantly prodding, and why don't you do this, and why doesn't so and so work?

Mr. Bundy. If I may correct that, I said he prodded me from time to time, not all the time.

Senator Morgan. Quite frequently?

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't put it that often. It might have been three or four times.

Senator MOrgan. Mr. Bundy, you were head of the Security Council, you were his assistant?

Mr. Bundy. I am trying to give an accurate picture of the number of times, Senator.

Senator Morgan. You are trying to give such an accurate picture that you are not giving much of a picture at all.

Are you telling this committee that throughout the time you assumed your duties, throughout the Cuban crisis, and all the MONGOOSE operations, that you might have talked to him two or three times about it?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Could I separate and try and clarify my answer?

Senator Morgan. Yes.

Mr. Bundy. I talked to the President, I suppose, many, many times in the context of the events that led up to and followed the Bay of Pigs. I talked to him dozens of times, maybe even hundreds of times, in the context of the events that led up to and followed the Cuban missile crisis. Those are the two great moments of Presidential concern over Cuba during the time I was in Washington. I talked to him much less -- I can't give you a number-- on these intervening matters. And that is the distinction I am trying to make.

Senator MOrgan. You were something between himself and the National Security Council, were you not?

Mr. Bundy. That isn't exactly the way it works.

Senator Morgan. Just tell me what did you do.

Mr. Bundy. I am trying to.

Senator Morgan. I have been listening all morning, Mr. Bundy, and I just don't get it.

Let me go to one other question. Was it true a while ago when you said that Robert Kennedy was constantly prodding people? Why can't we do more?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, that is certainly true.

Senator Morgan. I have no other questions.

Senator Mondale. Could I ask one, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. I don't like to ask this question, but I think it is important.

Have you talked to others involved during this period when you may have been testifying before us and before the Rockefeller Commission, say, in the last five months about this testimony?

Mr. Bundy. I answered that question. Yes, I have.

Senator Mondale. Would you repeat it briefly for us?

7500003424

Mr. Smothers. I was about to pursue that line, Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Go ahead.

Mr. Smothers. I believe you indicated previously, Mr. Bundy, that you talked to Mr. Bissell, Mr. McNamara, Mr. McCone, Mr. Rostow, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Schleinger, and others that may not be on that list. And you indicated that you had spoken to Mr. Bissell after his testimony regarding executive action.

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Smothers. Had you spoken with him also before that testimony?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Smothers. Did he call you or did you call him?

Mr. Bundy. I don't honestly recall. I think I said the other day that he had called me, but I think actually what happened that he called me, and my first words were, I needed to call you.

Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversations with Mr. McNamara. When did you first talk with him about these matters being testified to?

Mr. Bundy. I think pretty much as soon as it hit the papers.

Mr. Smothers. Can you give the Committee the sense of your conversations with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. There have been a number of them. Mr. McNamara and I not only have been close friends, but are very closely associated now. So, I see him and talk with him frequently, both about substance of matters of international development, and about the business of the Ford Foundation.

So, I have talked to him a number of times both on the telephone and face to face. The essence of the conversation is the exploration of questions raised or doubts raised babout the conviction we both share, which is that no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA.

end nash
cb fols

begin cb 1
fls dn.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss with him, or did he raise with you specifically, the fact that he had received from Mr. McCone a memorandum from Mr. McCone in 1967?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, he told me that.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the substance of that memorandum?

Mr. Bundy. I discussed it initially with Mr. McCone.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss it with Mr. McNamara?

Mr. Bundy. He mentioned it to me. I don't recall much about it.

Mr. Smothers. Did you discuss the meeting of August 10 in Secretary Rusk's office?

Mr. Bundy. That was the first discussed because the newspapers said that there had been a meeting of three, four or five of us, and the question was whether there had been such a meeting limited to three, four, or five. And we were able to satisfy ourselves that that was wrong.

Mr. Smothers. That was wrong. What do you recall to have been Mr. McNamara's reaction of the August 10 meeting?

Mr. Bundy. He didn't seem to have any that I can recall, at least I don't recall that he told me of any reaction of it.

Mr. Smothers. Do you recall the substance of his comment regarding the 1967 McCone report?

Mr. Bundy. No. I don't think he commented on it. He

76000 30129

told me what it said.

Mr. Smothers. With regard to your conversation with Mr. McCone, when did this occur, approximately?

Mr. Bundy. That occurred earlier on.

Mr. Smothers. Before the Rockefeller Commission inquiry?

Mr. Bundy. I don't know exactly when it was. But it was within the context of the Rockefeller Commission inquiry and not this inquiry.

Mr. Smothers. Are you talking about more than one conversation?

Mr. Bundy. No, I think I talked to him on the phone and then I had a meeting with him.

Mr. Smothers. In either the phone conversation or the meeting did you discuss Mr. McCone's 1967 report?

Mr. Bundy. He told me that he had heard of it. I don't think he had then seen it.

Mr. Smothers. You don't think he had then seen it?

Mr. Bundy. He had then seen it as of 1975. He obviously saw it in 1967.

Mr. Smothers. Can you give us a feeling for the approximate time when this conversation occurred?

Mr. Bundy. I could probably work it out from my own calendar, but I don't have it in my head.

Mr. Smothers. But at this time he had not seen the report?

Mr. Bundy. He had not seen the report in 1975. But since it is a report that -- as I understand it, it is a report that he made in 1967, and he had seen it then.

Mr. Smothers. Did he indicate to you that he was making an effort to get that report?

Mr. Bundy. I think he told me that he had been in touch with the Agency and would be seeing the report, but I don't really recall.

Mr. Smothers. To go into your conversation with Mr. Rostow, would you indicate to the Committee, please, the substance of that conversation?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. I called him after my conversation with Mr. Bissell, because it seemed to me that he ought to be informed, and the two of them ought to talke with each other about that testimony.

Mr. Smothers. At the time you called him it was your impression that Mr. Bissell had not talked with Mr. Rostow?

Mr. Bundy. But was planning to.

Mr. Smothers. And this was after Mr. Bissell's testimony?

Mr. Bundy. That if right.

Mr. Smothers. Did you and Mr. Rostow discuss the fact that both you and Mr. Rostow had been named as potential sources for the Exective Action authorization?

Mr. Bundy. My emphasis in talking about Mr. Rostow was the fact that he had been mentioned, because it seemed to me that in my recollection that must be wrong, and he would be interested in getting it straightened out.

Mr. Smothers. Can we go to your conversation with Mr. Goodwin. Did you call him or did he call you?

Mr. Bundy. I called him.

Mr. Smothers. And the nature of that conversation?

Mr. Bundy. That conversation was about the Dominican Republic, because of my complete failure of recollection as to who or what the White House line of action,responsibility and concern was with respect to the Dominican Republic in 1961. And I called him, and I called Dungan, and I called Schlesinger, because they were the the who had been very much involved in things like the Alliance for Progress, and new appointments to embassies in Latin America, and Latin American Policy generally, except for the Bay of Pigs. And I wanted to see if they had recollections about events in that spring that were more extensive than mine. I didn't learn very much, but that was the purpose of the call.

Mr. Smothers. And it it your testimony that your first exposure to the documentary evidence beyond these recollections was when either the Rockefeller Commission staff or this staff showed you documents pertaining to this inquiry.

Mr. Bundy. I want to be precise about the Rockefeller Commission staff. They did not show me the documents, the

7600030500

White House Staff showed me the documents.

Mr. Smothers. The White House Staff showed you the documents?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Under what circumstance did the White House Staff provide these documents to you? Was it at your request, or their request?

Mr. Bundy. My request.

Mr. Smothers. When did it occur?

Mr. Bundy. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings.

Mr. Smothers. At the time of the Rockefeller hearings?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. And prior to your testimony?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Who provided these documents to you?

Mr. Bundy. I never have testified on -- this is not a serious matter, because there is no secret about it. But I have always taken the position that White House decisions are for the White House to discuss, and I perfer to hold to that position now.

Mr. Smothers. Are you saying that you do not feel at liberty --

Mr. Bundy. No, I am not saying, I am saying that I would request the committee to address that question with the White House.

The Chairman. What is the question?

Mr. Smothers. The question is who in the White House provided Mr. Bundy with documents relevant to this investigation. And I believe his position is that he would prefer not to disclose that matter, or that that is a matter for the Committee's determination.

Mr. Bundy. Let me explain, Mr. Chairman, because you were out of the room, that I have always taken the position that decisions of the White House are for the White House to discuss. I always asked permission to see documentation and permission was given. I looked at the document, but I would rather not discuss it, because I think it is for the White House to discuss it.

The Chairman. What is the document?

Mr. Bundy. I just described it, it is National Security Action Memorandum No. 1, we showed us the National Security Action file, which I believe your staff has.

Mr. Schwarz. We have it here.

Mr. Smothers. My question was, who had the request been made to, and showed him the document?

Mr. Bundy. My point is that I have tried historically not to discuss this kind of question when it is something that concerns the White House, but to leave it to the White House to discuss it, and I would prefer to hold to that position.

(Off the record.)

Mr. Smothers. This quite frankly, Mr. Bundy, this related to an ancillary matter that is of concern to the Committee.

You mentioned conversations with Mr. Schlesinger. Again, were those initiated by you?

Mr. Bundy. The most recent one, he called me. And I think there were earlier ones, but I don't know. I can't be precise. I must say I don't know that I understand the line of questioning. Those are very important matters, and people closely involved in them should be trying to get a clear sense of what each other remembers after this many years, it seems to me this would be entirely natural.

Mr. Smothers. I don't question the fact that it is natural, Mr. Bundy. I think one of the difficult things for this Committee to do is to separate out, if you will, the independent recollections from the documentary evidence we have shown you, and from conversations with others --

Mr. Bundy. You are quite right. And I have tried quite carefully to tell you my recollection.

Mr. Smothers. We are merely trying now to establish those relationships so that when we get the point in the record there is some question regarding the nature of the recollection that might be of some assistance to us. That is not an attack on your veracity, it is not an attempt to see if there has been any effort at collusion or whatever, but merely to give us some guidelines in looking at the record.

Do you recall, Mr. Bundy, from these conversations that we have just mentioned, any matters which have been raised by the participants that may be inconsistent with the documentary record as you have seen it? We know, of course, that Mr. McNamara's recollection appears to be inconsistent with the documentary evidence regarding the August 10 meeting.

Mr. Bundy. Well, so was mine. And I have no such recollection.

Mr. Smothers. I am speaking now of the recollection of others, if you will.

Mr. Bundy. I can't really recite on that, because I haven't made the kind of comparison document by document and conversation by conversation that would allow me to make a clearcut and comprehensive answer. But I don't have any recollection of sharp divergency of that sort.

The Chairman. Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to pick up on one thing that you testified to that was left hanging and then come back through your involvement with Cuba and starting from the beginning. You testified that to your knowledge no authorization for an assassination was given. I want to come at the subject from another direction. Were you ever told at any time by anybody that assassination efforts were actually under way with respect to Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that the Central Intelligence Agency had hired the Mafia to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that during the MONGOOSE program Mr. Harvey was engaged in assassination efforts upon Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was passing assassination devices to a Cuban military officer?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you ever told by anybody that in the fall of 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency was engaged in an assassination effort with respect to Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, after the Bay of Pigs, was there a reevaluation or reconsideration of what the policy toward Cuba should be? And would you turn in that connection to Tab B, of the Bundy Book 1 of 2 --

Senator Tower. May I raise a purely technical point. I know it is not intentional, but I think we use the term, the Mafia was hired to assassinate Castro, I think that was inaccurate, because I don't think we have anything that indicates that we contacted the syndicate as such, and I think if we use, "individuals likely associated with the Mafia," or something like that -- it is a little technical.

Mr. Schwarz. Let me restate the question to make sure that there is not a problem with the scope of my question. And Senator Tower is correct.

Were you ever told that the Agency had contacted a man called John Roselli?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. A man called Sam Giancana?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. A man called Santos Traficante?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Any person who was a criminal or allegedly a criminal for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any recollection whatsoever related to the subject we have been exploring in that group of questions?

Mr. Bundy. No -- you are familiar with the fact that -- refreshed my recollection of activities associated with the Mafia in a law enforcement context in Florida in 1964.

Mr. Schwarz. Since you raised it, let's just pin that down right now. What happened in 1964 with respect to the Mavia and Cuba, to the best or your recollection? And then we will just mark some documents.

Mr. Bundy. Let me be clear that my recollection here is entirely refreshed. Perhaps you would rather come back to it?

Mr. Schwarz. Let's put it in the record here, since we have raised the subject.

Let's mark as Bundy Exhibit 1 the Helms memo to DCA on the Cuban exile plan dated June 10, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76000[illegible]70508

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 2A, the minutes of the meeting of the 303 Committee dated June 22, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2A for identification.)

cb 13

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 2B the minutes of the 303 Committee of 18 June 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2B for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. And Bundy Exhibit 2C the minutes of the 303 Committee of July 31, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2C for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Schwarz. And as Bundy Exhibit 2D the memorandum for the Honorable McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President, "Status of FBI Investigation re Plans by Cuban Exiles to Assassinate Cuban Government Leaders," dated August 19, 1964.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2D for identification.)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, based upon your having had an opportunity prior to the testimony, and now again if you seek to do so, to refresh your recollection, will you recount for the Committee what happened in the summer of 1964 in connection with this matter?

Mr. Bundy. Well, it is a relatively small matter in the context of what you are discussing, but what happened in the summer of 1964 was that it came to our attention that there were relations between Cuban refugees in Cuba and people apparently associated with the Mafia. And this did not seem to be a good idea. And this was in a period in which sentiment had been steadily growing for some time against activities by Cuban refugees that were wholly outside the control and not really in the interest of the U.S., and that they should be associated with a criminal group.

And so when the matter came to the Special Group, the decision was made to refer it to the Department of Justice as a matter of internal American law enforcement. That was done.

And the Department said that it was going after the matter, which it then did, and reported back.

The reports don't give any conclusive picture of what really was going on, but they do show that the Bureau went to a number of people asking around about these matters, and as far as I know, it then faded away.

Mr. Schwarz. In the context of that discussion did anybody from the Central Intelligence Agency or anybody else inform you that in earlier years there had been a relationship with -- to use Senator Tower's caution -- with persons alledgedly involved with the criminal syndicate -- in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castor?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, going back to the post-Bay of Pigs period, would you put before the witness and mark as Exhibit 2 the National Security minutes of a meeting held May 5, 1961. It is at Tab B of the Senator's Book 1 of 2. This reflects, am I correct, Mr. Bundy, a discussion of Cuba, held with the President and high officials of the government who are all listed on the front page?

Mr. Bundy. Correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And Cuba was discussed, and it was agreed, following the discussion that U.S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action?

Mr. Bundy. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, can you describe the measures agreed to at that point?

Mr. Bundy. My only way of doing that with any accuracy is to in effect to quote from or summarize this document, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. The document speaks for itself, then. And you can add nothing to it?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. But can you say that the measures did or did not include assassination?

Mr. Bundy. There is nothing in my recollection and nothing in the document that seems to me to imply assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, following this instruction, was Cuban policy reviewed again in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And ultimately out of the fall review in 1961 came the so-called MONGOOSE program; is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, prior to discussing upon the MONGOOSE program, did you consider a lot of other options?

Mr. Bundy. I think we were -- and this is a hard question, but I think what we were doing was working toward an organization that would be able to take charge of the complicated, varied inter-departmental kinds of things involved in Cuba. We have been concentrating this morning on covert actions, but there were also propaganda problems, economic problems, and Cuban refugee problems in Miami, and a number of others that did not all fall within one jurisdiction. Anytime you get that kind of problem you have an organization problem. And the solution of 1961, which took sometime to work out, as the passage of time suggests, was the creation of a Special Committee under the Chairmanship of General Taylor and with General Lansdale as its operating officer.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in the course of the review that did take place prior to the establishment of that Special Committee which then got called the MONGOOSE program, was one of the matters which was considered the assassination of Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. As I have already said, I can not tell you that this question never came up. But I recall no sustained discussion of that matter in that period.

Mr. Schwarz. Whether you recall a sustained discussion or not --

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall a discussion that I can pinpoint anywhere, but over the period of 1961 to 1963 the subject was mentioned from time to time by different individuals, never to me that I can recall by the President. But it did come up.

Mr. Schwarz. And it may have come up in this period in the fall of 1961 as something to consider, is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. As something to talk about rather than to consider, would be my answer.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you put before the witness as Bundy

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 6 0 0 0 3 0 5 1 6

Exhibit 3 the National Security Action Memorandum No. 100, dated October 5, 1961, Tab C of the Senator's Bundy Book 1.

And as Bundy Exhibit 3A the minutes of the Special Group meeting dated October 6, 1961, which is at Lansdale Tab 2.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3A for identification.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you give a copy of the other document, the Parrott document, to all the Senators too?

And finally, as Bundy Exhibit 3B a memorandum which we have retyped from an indistinct original dated October 5, 1961 For the Record, Subject: Cuba, signed by Mr. Parrott. And the indistinct original is attached.

(Document referred to is marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 3B for identification)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr.Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, to summarize -- before I ask you the question -- in NSAM No. 100 you sent to the Secretary of State the following note: "In conformation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward, a plan is desired to the indicated contingency in Cuba". Do you have an independent recollection of what that indicated contingency was?

Mr. Bundy. Before seeing this document?

Mr. Schwarz. Before seeing the documents.

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Having looked at not only Exhibit 3, but Exhibit 3A and 3B, do you agree that the contingency referred to in 3A and the contingency referred to in 3B are related to NSAM No. 100?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I do.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency referred to in 3B, which is the earlier of the two following documents, is said by Mr. Parrott to be a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scent. And I am going to come to some of the other parts of that document with respect to the President's interest or not.

And the contingency in 3A, which is the minutes of the Special Group, as characterized as follows: "Mr. Parrott also told the Group that two other exercises are in progress in connection with Cuba, the preparation of a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene, and an updating of the overall plan for covert operations".

Now, after having reviewed those documents, and in the light of your testimony that it is possible that the consideration of the possibility of assassination which you say did occur at some point, occurred in the fall of 1961, do you agree that at that time the contingency under consideration here was the possibility of the assassination of Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No, I would put it another way. The contingency here is, what would we do if Castro were no longer there. So that the question of how Castro ceased to be there is left out of this set of papers. Clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination, but only one of them. What we are talking about here, as I read the documents, is a plan against the contingency that I am not reading from the Parrott memorandum, against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene. NSAM 100, whose language is indirect, nonetheless indicates, to me at least, rereading it, that the President wanted to know what was likely to happen if Castro were no longer there. He was, in other words, trying to get a picture of whether that would really change things, and if so, in what way.

Mr. Schwarz. Just one detail that Mr. Smothers suggested to me. Is NSAM 100 what the White House showed you, or is it another document?

Mr. Bundy. No, 181. But let me be precise. I asked to see the documents relating to -- from the National Security files relating to August 1962. And they gave me the NSAM file identified as the significant memorandum, NSAM 181.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, the contingency to be examined, therefore, was what would happen -- would it help the U.S., that is the question, if Castro were to disappear?

Mr. Bundy. What would it be like if Castro were to disappear? The question is open ended.

Mr. Schwarz. What was the conclusion?

Mr. Bundy. I don't remember. My unaided sense of the matter is that intelligent political analysis would have suggested in 1961 or at any time later that the removal of a single individual in a revolution complex and general as this would have quite unpredictable and not necessarily helpful effects.

Mr. Schwarz. You said that while you were clear the assassination was not in fact authorized, you believe that at some point it was examined, is that a fair characterization.

Mr. Bundy. That isn't the word I used. Talk about.

Mr. Schwarz. Talk about. And this exercise constitutes an analysis of what Cuba/the U.S. would be like if Castro were removed.

Mr. Bundy. It constitutes a request for such an analysis.

Mr. Schwarz. Was the analysis made?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. If one were exploring the possibility of assassination, I take it this kind of analysis is the sort of analysis one would wish to make if one was not simply ruling assassination out as a matter of principle in the first instance.

Mr. Bundy. Let me put it another way. If people were suggesting this to you, and you were curious about whether it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any further with that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer.

You will notice that this National Security Action Memorandum is not addressed to the Central Intelligence Agency, less still to the covert part of the Agency, but rather to the Secretary of State. And specifically clearly the action of certain is Assistant Secretary Woodward.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, document 3B indicates -- and you have had an opportunity to review this one before, I think --

Mr. Bundy. Which one are we now talking about?

Mr. Schwarz. 3B, Mr. Parrott's memo.

Mr. Bundy. Yes. I have a clearer copy now than I had yesterday, for which I am grateful.

Mr. Schwarz. It indicates that there was a Presidential interest in the matter. And then General Taylor told Mr. Parrott that he prefered that the State Department, or Mr. Woodward in the State Department, not be told about the Presidential interest in the matter. First, was there a Presidential interest in the matter? You have no reason to doubt that there was, I take it.

Mr. Bundy. I am sorry, I was reading a note, and I didn't hear the last part of the question.

Mr. Schwarz. I asked really two questions, the first of which is a direct question, was there a Presidential interest in the matter?

Mr. Bundy. There was a Presidential -- there was no doubt in my mind that when I write in a National Security Action Memorandum a plan as desired, that the desire is not mine.

Mr. Schwarz. And the desire is in fact the Presidents?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, have you any other recollection of calling your attention to the fall of 1969?

Mr. Bundy. Could I go back and comment on your earlier question.

You correctly pointed out that there was concern to keep the President's name out of this process of request,

7 6 0 0 0 3 0 5 0 0

although you correctly point out that the President was the one who wanted to know. My impression here is that whatever concern we have, General Taylor or I, in the frame of this language, it was precisely to insulate the President from any false inference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy to confuse the question. What are things going to be like after Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus attention on the information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it. That is the distinction, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have any further recollection of discussion of this matter in this fall of 1961? And by this matter I mean either the broader inquiry into what it would be like if Castro disappeared, or a scenario arising of the specific subject of assassination.

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't.

Mr. Schwarz. Had you ever heard before I asked you about the last night about a conversation, an alledged conversation, between the President and the Journalist Theodore Schwartz, and or Mr. Goodwin in this timeframe?

Mr. Bundy? I saw that in the newspapers.

Mr. Schwarz. Or in Esquire magazine?

Mr. Bundy. Wherever I saw it, I saw it in print.

Mr. Schwarz. But you have no independent recollection of that or of the fact that Mr. Schultz met with the President?

Mr. Bundy. No. But I will say this -- and it is a random observation -- if I were planning an action of great sensitivity I wouldn't discuss it with any journalist, I don't think.

Mr. Schwarz. The record from Mr. Schwartz is that the President said he was opposed to assassination, but that he brought it up in a conversation with Mr. Schwartz, saying that he was being encouraged to order assassination.

Now, you have said that you do recall that the subject was talked about, your words, at some point, and that it might have been in the fall of 1961.

Mr. Bundy. I wouldn't want to say that it was only in any given period.

Mr. Schwarz. But that one of the points in which it might have been discussed was the fall of 1961.

Mr. Bundy. Certainly.

Mr. Schwarz. We are going to come to another period which relates to you.

Mr. Bundy. May I interrupt one second.

Could we go off the record for a moment?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Let's put that on the record.

Would you restate what I have just stated?

Mr. Bundy. Going back to your earlier question, I have a message through the courtesy of the Committee from the White House that there is no objection to answering the question as to how the White House came to show me the NSC file. When I learned of some of the interests of the Rockefeller Commission, it seemed to me that it would be useful if I could refresh my recollection. I telephoned Dr. Kissinger, who it seemed to me would be the right person both in his capacity as Special Assistant and the capacity as Secretary of State, and he called me back to say that General Scocroft would show me the documents I needed, and he did not.

Mr. Smothers. Just one question.

This file contained what, now, other than the NSAM?

Mr. Bundy. The only file that I had time to go through that I can recollect was the NSAM file, which is a relatively short one.

Mr. Smothers. For which time period?

Mr. Bundy. For the period surrounding August 1962.

Mr. Smothers. It was given to us as an existing file, or matters that had been pulled, or organized --

Mr. Bundy. No, they gave me the whole file, they were all documents that I have been involved with, it was nothing new to me. But the ones I was looking for were the ones relating to this subject.

Mr. Smothers. Were these only your documents?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Bundy. As far as I recollect.

Mr. Smothers. And by your documents, I mean documents signed by you?

Mr. Bundy. They wouldn't be all signed by me, not every NSMA was signed by me. But they would all be documents for which I had responsibility.

Mr. Smothers. And the timeframe was --

Mr. Bundy. Sufficiently before and after to give me a picture of the political context of August 1962 in relation to Cuba.

Mr. Smothers. And do you recall when you saw this file?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I say, it was in the context of my appearance before the Rockeferrer Commission. And that would be early this year. I don't have the dates, and I don't want to make a mistake on it.

Mr. Smothers. I am not trying to pin the date down. It would be helpful if you remember. But we can ask.

Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. I want to make sure that we have what we have done so for accurately summarized, and that you agree with it.

Can I use discussion of an assassination, will you accept that?

Mr. Bundy. It implies more seriousness and more sustained argument than I recollect.

Mr. Schwarz. So your records are, with respect to persons asking about --

Mr. Bundy. Or talking about.

Mr. Schwarz. -- or talking about assassination, that did occur, that it probably occurred on more than one occasion?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And that one of the occasions may have been in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. What I recollect about the fall of 1961 is this question, what would happen if he is not there?

Mr. Schwarz. Which would be a relevant question to ask if one was talking about assassination.

Mr. Bundy. Yes. But I have no independent recollection of talks about assassination, Mr. Schwarz, and I musn't lead you by saying that I did.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, passing from talking about or discussions or contingencies, to authorizations for action, and specifically focusing on this concrete period, was assassination authorized in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Schwarz. In fact what was authorized in the fall of 1961?

Mr. Bundy. Well, we have a long document on that, I think.

Mr. Schwarz. And that is the MONGOOSE program?

Mr. Bundy. And that is the MONGOOSE programs.

Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the MONGOOSE program, you had some dialogue about the Attorney General which was quite extensive. Let me ask you one additional question on that subject. What was the relationship personally and professionally between the Attorney General and General Maxwell Taylor?

Mr. Bundy. It was very close. I think that they first met in a hardworking sense when they were -- I think they were both members of the committee to look into what happened after the Bay of Pigs, or if the Attorney General was not a member he was certainly closely interested.

Mr. Schwarz. He was a member.

Mr. Bundy. And I am sure the Attorney General was one of the people strongly favoring the appointment of General Taylor as the President's military advisor. They were both active and ardent tennis players, they liked each other, and they visited back and forth. One of the Kennedy children is named for General Taylor, I think. There was a relation of real trust and confidence between them. And the measure of its strength is that I think it easily survived later very shart differences over Vietnam.

Mr. Schwarz. Now recognizing that, what I am asking for you is a matter of opinion and not a fact, given your understanding of that relationship, will you give us your opinion the likelihood that Robert Kennedy, in the face of Maxwell Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special Group Augmented -- was Maxwell Taylor understood to be the Chairman of the Special Group Augmented?

Mr. Bundy. It certainly is my understanding.

Mr. Schwarz. Would Robert Kennedy in your opinion, in the fact of Maxwell Taylor's Chairmanship of the Special Group Augmented, have developed a bach-channel relationship with someone else for the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, in connection with MONGOOSE, you were a member of the Special Group Augmented, were you?

Mr. Bundy. I was. I wasn't its most faithful attender, but I was a member.

Mr. Schwarz. To the extent that you did attend, would you describe the nature of the meetings, what kind of items were brought before you, what was the process for decision making?

Mr. Bundy. It is very difficult to do that without documentary reconstruction. But in the broadest sense, I think I can do it. The kinds of things would be Cuban exiles, training them, how united are they, whose the leader, and what kind of operations against the island are we able to mount, specific proposals, just because I have seen it in the last two or three days -- I saw a sabotage program which involved, I think, oil facilities, tranrportation facilities, and a couple of other categories -- exfiltration was a frequent problem. I don't recall that we worried so much about getting the agents in, but there seems always to be a great problem about getting them out. And that sort of thing that I mentioned, propaganda, there was the one island enterprise -- was Florida doing much good, and how much does it cost and things of that sort.

Mr. Schwarz. At any MONGOOSE meeting did Mr. Harvey state that he had taken steps to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I never heard anything from Mr. Harvey in any context in any meeting at any time on that subject.

Mr. Schwarz. And it was clear that the President was the person basically in control, perhaps not of the details, but of the general program; is that right?

Mr. Bundy. The President had worked it. The day to day operations where in the hands of different departments for different categories of programs. The coordinator was General Lansdale, and the Chairman of the Committee was General Taylor.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you turn to Lansdale Tab 38, please? Where is the August 8 document that transmits the new guidelines for MONGOOSE?

Mr. Kelley. That is Lansdale Tab 20.

Mr. Schwarz. The new guidelines, I mean the August guidelines.

Mr. Kelley. 38.

Mr. Schwarz. 38A.

Was there a change in or about August between what was characterized as Phase I of Operation MONGOOSE and a step-up activities under the MONGOOSE?

Mr. Bundy. It appeared to be so from the documents I have been reviewing. I couldn't give you an independent recollection on that point.

Mr. Schwarz. You have got no reason to doubt that there was some step-up commencing in August?

Mr. Bundy. I think that sounds reasonable. I just don't have any expertise other than as a reader many years later.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, with respect to the August 10 meeting, you have previously testified - - I am not sure you have -- do you recall the subject of assassinations being brought up?

Mr. Bundy. In the August 10 meeting? No.

Mr. Schwarz. Specifically, do you recall Mr. McNamara ever bringing the subject of assassinations up?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. We have shown you notes of Mr. Harvey on August 14, and General Lansdale's memorandum of August 13 that refers to the liquidation of leaders and certain things whited out. Do you remember seeing those?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Do they refresh your recollection?

Mr. Bundy. No. They give me no -- they do not persuade me. I simply don't from that suddenly have any flash, so and so said that, not at all.

Mr. Schwarz. But you don't have any reason to question them, you just don't have a recollection, is that fair?

Mr. Bundy. I simply tell you that I was in a large meeting in which a great many subjects were discussed, and I have no recollection of that.

Mr. Schwarz. I will pass around Mr. Bundy's notes from the meeting. If someone thinks they should be marked we can do that.

Mr. Bundy. If the Committee is feeling charitable I hope they may not go into them.

Mr. Schwarz. I don't think they will, but I thought we would pass them around in case they were.

The Chairman. Let the Senators see them.

Mr. Schwarz. We will make one observation, though. Both Mr. Rusk's calendar and Mr. Bundy's notes do not indicate Mr. Lansdale's being present at the meeting, although the minutes of the meeting do. And I take it you have no independent recollection of whether or not he was not there.

Mr. Bundy. I have no objection to entering anything in anything that memorandum that the Committee thinks is relevant. It simply illustrates what the hand will do while the mind is elsewhere.

The Chairman. Can you identify what you meant by the words, "Worms who were opposing".

Mr. Bundy. "Worms" was a Cuban word, gusanos, and it was their own word for themselves, Cubans in opposition to Castor.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, would you mark with a B your notes of the August 10 meeting.

And Mr. Reporter, will you mark that as Bundy Exhibit 4.

(Document referred to was marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

The Chairman. Going back to the doodle sheet, the last item in your handwritten underlined -- do you have this?

Mr. Bundy. The Lansdale concept?

The Chairman. Is that concept?

Mr. Bundy. Concept. I don't wonder you ask.

The Chairman. Do you recall what you meant by that?

Mr. Bundy. My guess -- and this is a reconstruction really -- is that that has to do with the Lansdale plan which we were referring to a minute ago, his long memorandum of August 8, outlining all the things that might now be done under the MONGOOSE.

Mr. Smothers. Would that have been planned plus?

Mr. Bundy. We argue about plans -- this is again reconstruction -- and I think I saw it in some discussion -- we argued about plans A and B and C, and settled on so-called B Plus, which I hope you have for the record, because that would show what the decision was.

Mr. Schwarz. We do have it.

The Chairman. This was the 10th day of August 1962. And that was about the time that some concern was given to be expressed as to the possibility that the Russians were moving into Cuba -- moving missiles into Cuba. You have on the memorandum, I think, "USSR will put missiles". Do you recall what you meant by that?

Mr. Bundy. I think what that is, a hand following somebody elses, and the somebody else would most likely to be Mr. McCone.

The Chairman. All right.

Where are we, Mr. Schwarz.

Mr. Schwarz. In NSAM 181 -- which will you please mark as Exhibit 5. You will find it at Lansdale Tab 41.

(Document referred to was marked as Lansdale Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Do you have that in front of you, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I have.

Mr. Schwarz. This reflects a number of options or study that the President called for in the light of the evidence of new block activities in Cuba. Was that evidence connected with the missiles?

Mr. Bundy. Well, there was quite a buildup reported in the press and in the intelligence initially of Soviet military personnel, of Soviet surface-to-air missiles. And the crucial question was, what for and what is coming. And the Director of Central Intelligence -- who was proved in the end to be right -- was almost alone in his belief that this was going to lead to a nuclear capability in Cuba that could hit the U.S. And he raised these questions in the month of August in a number of different ways. And the National Security meeting from which this memorandum emerged reviewed those problems, and as the memorandum itself shows, the heavy emphasis of the President's concern and of the Group's concern on the likelihood that developed and what should be done about it, or in preparation for it, in August.

Mr. Schwarz. The memorandum has quite a range of matters to be considered. And they range from, if I can use the characterization, on the soft side, Item 1, which was consideration of the U.S. pulling its missiles near the Soviet Union out

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7600030537

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

of Turkey, two, on the hard side, Items 7 and 8 , which are military possibilities of invasion or some other military possibilities in connection with Cuba. Now, is that a typical exercise that that White House, the President and yourself would go through to look at a number of options ranging from the soft to the very tough?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Let me say in passing that there was nothing soft about the problem of getting the Jupiter missiles out of Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. Conciliatory, would that be the word?

Mr. Bundy. It problem of actually getting them out which we came to in the following year was one which demanded great diplomatic energy and finesse on the part of the State and Defense Departments. But you are right. A wide range of issues charactically would be discussed. And the President had a habit of trying to look at problems from many angles.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you fully in touch with the President in connection with what became the missile crisis.

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there any discussion of assassinating Fidel Castro during that period?

Mr. Bundy. None.

Mr. Schwarz. Was there agreement reached that as part of the solution to the missile crisis that related to U.S.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

action vis-a-vis Cuba. There was a so-called no invasion pledge. There was an undertaking on our side that if the offensive capabilities -- and there was an argument on what those were -- were removed, we on our side would undertake -- I don't want to present this language as if it is deeply mathmatically precise -- but there was an undertaking on our side that there would not be an assassination of Cuba.

The Chairman. Was that ever published?

Mr. Bundy. Yes. If my language is inconsistent with what was published, then what was published should take precedence, because I am only trying to report that.

Mr. Schwarz. Did this agreement exclude the sabotage of Cuban facilities?

Mr. Bundy. Not in my view or in anyones' view in the U.S. Government. Just to give you an example of things it did not exclude, it did not exclude continued surveillance, which is not perfectly normal in relations between friendly states, that you overfly and check out what they are doing. But surveillance was an explicit and public part of the necessary concern for U.S. satisfaction with the resolution of the Cuban missile crisis.

Mr. Schwarz. Recognizing again that this is calling for an opinion, during the course of the missile crisis did anything happen with respect to the attitudes and actions of either the President or the Attorney General that in your end cb. fls fw.

opinion bears upon the likelihood that at other times one or the other of them ordered the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. Well, yes. There are a great many things that enter into my judgment about whether the President or the Attorney General would ever have done that, and I would like to say, Mr. Chairman, that the most important point I want to make, just from where I stand personally is that I find the notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with what I knew of both of them. And as an example, I would cite -- and only one among very many -- the role played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a quarrantine or a blockade.

The Chairman. Well, Mr. Bundy, let me put what may be the same question a little different way.

You came to know both the President and the Attorney General rather intimately in the period of your long association with them, did you not?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during that whole period, either one of them would have authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I most emphatically do not.

7 6 0 0 0 3 0 5 1 1

Let me make a more general point that comes at it from another way.

If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.

Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is that there was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes and their nature and the way they confronted international affairs that I find it incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to everything that I know about their character, they had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in any doubt about it.

The Chairman. Then have you any way to explain to the Committee, or any explanation to give to the Committee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he was under, or that he had no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I have no explanation of that.

Senator Mondale. Part of our attempt to solve this riddle of what would appear to be a record at the highest level, which is at least not directly an order of an assassination plot or attempt, and square it with the fact that attempts were made, is to seek to understand the personalities and motivations and methods of operation of people further down the chain of command.

We have heard quite a few evaluations of Mr. Harvey as a free-wheeling, James Bond kind of operator, and it has been suggested through some disquiet and apprehension at higher levels about the nature of his conduct. And I would -- I don't know. I am beginning to have doubts about Mr. Helms whom I have always admired. There is, for example, a memorandum that is in the record to Mr. Rusk in response to a memo which the Secretary wrote Mr. Helms following an article appearing in some Cuban newspaper charging that the Mafia had been hired and used by the CIA to assassinate Castro, in which Helms specifically and categorically denies flat out that any such relationship existed when in fact it did and when in fact Mr. Helms was part of it.

Now, how do we sort this out? Is Mr. Helms someone who might have, on his own, gone beyond the authority conferred upon him by persons higher up?

76005 13

Mr. Bundy. Well, if you had asked me that question a year ago, Senator, I would have said in my experience with him he was not such an officer, but I have no way of dealing with the kind of thing you have just described.

Senator Mondale. It shatters me because I have always respected him. Because we know that these assassination attempts occurred. We know that Mr. Helms was a part of it. We have testimony that Mr. Helms and Mr. Harvey met and agreed not to tell Mr. McCone what they were doing. And then we have a document here -- well, that was Cubella -- and then we have a memo from Helms to Rusk which, in Minnesota language looks like a lie. Now, I just don't know. Maybe there are other explanations.

The Chairman. The memo to Rusk had to do with Cubella rather than the Mafia.

Senator Mondale. Is that it? It was not the Mafia?

Mr. Schwarz. It was Cubella, except if you just substitute Cubella for the word Mafia.

The Chairman. What you said otherwise is correct.

Senator Mondale. But he was involved personally with Cubella, wasn't he? And he knew that, and this memo said no. Is there a plausible explanation?

Mr. Madigan. Helms has one.

Senator Baker. Helms' position is that he did not lie, that he did not have anything to do with the Cubella incident,

5

is that right?

Mr. Madigan. I think Helms claimed that Cubella is in the strict context of the memos, operating on his own.

The Chairman. Well, I believe rather than speculate, we had better look back carefully, and that ought to be another subject for Mr. Helms when he returns.

Senator Mondale. Well, then I will stand corrected.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would you yield?

I want to make the same record note that I suspend the comment I made about that document yesterday. I thought it was a flat-out lie.

Senator Mondale. I did too. I withdraw that, and I think it would be good if the staff would write us a little memo.

Senator Baker. Fritz might like to know that yesterday I asked Counsel if they, as a combined staff operation, would prepare for us, and I believe they agreed to do this, prepare for us two briefs, one citing the testimony and the exhibit evidence, that would support an inference that the authority was Presidential; and another brief, citing the record and the exhibit evidence citing the inference that it was not. There is an abundance of both, to be frank with you. So that we can lay them down side by side and make our own separate judgment.

Do I understand the staff is going to do it?

The Chairman. That is right.

6

Now, I have a couple of items of business, and you have been testifying for quite a long while. I think you ought to be given a break, Mr. Bundy.

Mr. Bundy. Do you want me to come back, Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Yes, please, if you want to take a break for about five or ten minutes and then be available out in the anteroom, that will give us a chance to take care of this business.

(Pause)

(Whereupon at 11:17 a.m. the witness left the hearing room.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

The Chairman. We seem to have a developing problem for reasons unexplained with the Justice Department. I have already mentioned one aspect of that problem, in connection with the failure of the Department to supply most of the material that we have requested, though that request was put to the Department two months ago, and it has been decided already by the Committee that Mr. Levy and Mr. Kelley should be brought before the Committee in the hopes that these delays can be overcome.

The first question before the Committee is when that can be done. It is suggested that the Attorney General has Tuesday morning available. If it is all right with the Committee, I would like to schedule his appearance, together with that of Mr. Kelley, for Tuesday morning.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I don't mean to intrude my personal convenience into this consideration unduly, but if the Attorney General could do it at Tuesday noon, say, it would help me. I have a commitment in Tennessee Monday night. If I catch the Tuesday morning plane I can't get here until 11:50.

If that's not possible, I will cancel Monday.

The Chairman. This is procedural in character, so it is not altogether important that every member be present. I think that from the standpoint of this Committee schedule, Tuesday morning, the Attorney General and Mr. Kelley would be good, would it not?

8

Mr. Miller. Yes.

Senator Baker. Well, why don't you leave it Tuesday morning.

The Chairman. We are only informed that he has Tuesday morning available.

Mr. Gitenstein. I spoke to Doug Marvin, one of his Executive Assistants, and he said Tuesday was a possibility, Wednesday is a problem because he has a Cabinet meeting and he wasn't sure about Tuesday and he was going to get back to us in the next hour or two.

The Chairman. Well, let's see if we can't set it up Tuesday.

Senator Baker. If you can set it up Tuesday afternoon and nobody objects, that would be better for me.

The Chairman. Well, if we can, we'll set it up Tuesday afternoon.

Senator Mathias. What is that for?

The Chairman. That is for Levy and Kelley to appear for the purpose of telling us why they can't, or why it has taken two months and we still are waiting for the documents, most of the documents we requested.

Senator Mathias. Well, I won't be here, but that's no reason.

Senator Baker. Are you going to be here Tuesday morning?

76 00 9 3 0 5 4 9

Senator Mathias. Don't worry about it.

The Chairman. All right.

The second thing I would like to bring up in this connection is that I was informed yesterday by the staff that the FBI has undoubtedly received instructions that none of its agents are to be interrogated or interviewed by the staff of this Committee. I would like someone who knows the details and can be very specific to tell the Committee the exact status of that situation, how we have been informed and if we can rely on that information as being authoritative.

Mr. Elliff. Yesterday morning at 9:00 o'clock or shortly thereafter, I received a phone call from the FBI's liaison with this Committee with respect to a series of interviews that had been arranged with the Bureau some relating to the Huston Plan, some relating to Martin Luther King matters. I was informed that I had to address this request to the Justice Department in order to secure approval for these staff interviews.

I then called our liaison in the Justice Department, Special Counsel William O'Conner, and he told me I might as well submit these requests in writing, because the Justice Department would take at least ten days to give us an answer on these requests and he didn't know what the answer was going to be.

I then explored with him what some of the reasons might be for this delay and what the problems seemed to be, and the explanation that he gave me verbally was that the fact that the Committee had notified the Department in its letter of June 27th that certain cases that we were investigating were abuse cases meant that any interviews that would be conducted in connection with those matters would be considered by the Department to be demand interviews, and therefore this brought into play the provisions of the Federal Regulations which require the Attorney General's approval.

Then the question as to whether the Attorney General would approve or not involved two issues. First was that since we had indicated the likelihood of an abuse in a particular area that the Department itself would have to consider whether it should institute a criminal investigation of that matter, and then, if so, whether our interview would interfere with that ongoing criminal investigation.

And second, that the Department considered that any interviews undertaken by the Committee in such cases might inadvertently immunize the subject of the interview, and he referred generally to some cases and we have attempted to do legal research on those cases and find this to be a very shaky position but they have good lawyers over there and if they want to come up with a sophisticated argument, we expect that they could be able to do that.

The Chairman. Lawyers can make an argument over anything.

Mr. Elliff. That's so. And so the final conclusion is that he did anticipate that subpoenas would be required in every instance and this position is very difficult for us to accept because interviews, the low-key interview in the non-pressure situation is an opportunity to elicit information that is not matched by the formal subpoena situation, and to be able to proceed initially by interview and then confirm, under oath, via subpoena, is just absolutely essential for an effective investitation. So this is where we stand on this issue.

We later received a letter pertaining to an earlier request for interviews relating to FBI COINTELPRO disruptive activities where we had asked for certain interviews, and this letter did not go into specifics, but merely stated that there were problems that would have to be resolved, that the characterization of an area of the Committee inquiry as abuse might significantly alter arrangements of access to witnesses who are present employees of the Department.

The Chairman. In other words, the thrust of all of this is that the more serious the nature of the inquiry, the more difficult it will be to obtain the information, that if we are concerned about a possible illegality or abuse, then the Department will make it as difficult as possible for us to secure the information.

Mr. Elliff. I might add that it seems to be in the nature of the documents also, the more serious the allegation, the more resistance there is to providing us --

They have given us a good many documents. They have not given us the documents on the controversial matters. They've given us plenty of documentation on less controversial matters.

The Chairman. I think it is ironic that the resistance we get from the Justice Department is so much more substantial than the resistance we have gotten from the CIA.

Senator Baker. That's not necessarily so. I agree with you the resistance is unfortunate and inappropriate, but I can think of a request for documentation from the CIA that is now more than a month old and they haven't had the good grace to tell us no. They have told us nothing.

The Chairman. But on the whole we've gotten a greater measure of cooperation from the CIA.

Senator Schweiker. I wonder, does either counsel know, Mr. Chairman, whether the Attorney General or the FBI Director initially confirmed whether they made any commitments to Congress about supplying documents or materials to the Committee?

Mr. Miller. Senator Mathias can tell you, and Senator Hart.

Senator Schweiker. Might there be a statement in their testimony in confirmation, in agreeing to furnish Congress with materials of this nature?

Senator Mathias. Yes, those statements were made, but let me say, since my opinion has been asked, that I had a most discouraging talk with the Attorney General a couple of weeks ago. I went down to talk to him about privacy legislation and the Department of Justice at the moment is taking about as hard a line as any kind that I know of in the last fifteen years. Its whole kind of attitude --

Senator Tower. I just wonder if we shouldn't take this up with them.

The Chairman. I think we should, but I think we should also, in advance of that, in view of the kinds of signals we are now getting from the Justice Department, indicate that we believe that these objections that they are raising, or questions that they are raising, are a serious impediment procedurally to our Committee and that we have every intention of interviewing such agents as may be necessary, and that if necessary, we will subpoena them.

Mr. Elliff. Our feeling is it is preferable not to proceed by subpoena, but we do have a subpoena for one FBI agent which we brought with us today which we would like to proceed with.

The Chairman. Can you give us the facts of that case?

Mr. Epstein. This is an agent who is presently in Atlanta, Georgia, and the information we've received from other witnesses was that in 1964, I believe, he visited a newspaper editor in Atlanta, closed the door, put his hat on the desk, and said he noted from reading The Constitution that we were picturing Dr. King as a moral leader and something of a hero and then this agent went on to talk in great detail about Dr. King's personal life which he claimed he had learned from a confidential source, and our interest in interviewing this agent obviously relates to the circumstances surrounding that visit to a newspaperman, who directed him to do that, what the purpose of that visit was, whether there was any documentation --

Senator Baker. Who was the newspaper man?

Mr. Epstein. His name was Eugene Patterson and he was with the Atlanta Constitution at that time. He's now with a newspaper in Florida.

The Chairman. Do you believe the subpoena now to be necessary because of what you have been told by the Justice Department?

Mr. Elliff. We have other agents which we would like to proceed with at the interview level, so we would like to proceed at both levels to get their reaction to both types of requests. What is their reaction to a subpoena going to be, what is their reaction to a renewed request to interview going to be?

So we crystallize each issue.

Senator Tower. I still think it might be good for us to hold that up until we talk about it, since they are coming in Tuesday morning or Tuesday sometime, it's not going to push things too far.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Would it be useful, at least, if it is the feeling of the Committee to authorize you people, or Bill, today, to say that the Committee barely suppressed its outrage and that it won't do, and we will see you Tuesday? Don't wait till Tuesday.

The Chairman. I think something should be said, actually.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, it prejudges the hell out of it, but unless we get an extension to 1980 for this Committee --

The Chairman. I think you're right. Something needs to be said publicly that the Committee is determined that we feel that not only has time -- we've already said, we've already made public the letter we have sent. I think a follow-up needs to be that we are concerned that impediments that are now being suggested which would interfere with the Committee's right to interrogate witnesses, we do not intend to allow the Committee's work to be obstructed and if necessary we will be prepared to subpoena witnesses though we would hope that that would not have to be the case.

Senator Baker. And we are going to try to work it out from Tueday.

The Chairman. We're going to try to work it out from Tuesday.

Senator Baker. I have a business matter.

The Chairman. So does Senator Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Just one point.

7600030555

There is this troublesome dictum in U.S. vs. Nixon about what might be nondiscoverable, all of which seems to bear on sort of foreign policy matters.

Am I correct -- I think we're going to hear a lot about that -- but am I correct in reading that decision that it really is almost stands wholly that they have the duty to produce all of the documentation and that case holds for that proposition, so that in our CIA matters, while they might raise some of this dictum, the FBI has no such defense, unless we're really trodding on those same grounds.

Mr. Epstein. Of course, there is another issue in the Bureau materials, because we're on the issue of investigative files, which has never been really litigated, and that is the propriety of Executive Privilege when it comes to that.

I might add that the importance of the issue of going to subpoena on these really raises that, because if we go to subpoena on documents, then that is going to be worthless unless we know in advance that we are going to win in court in a short period of time, including whether we have jurisdiction to be there.

Senator Mondale. In other words, you are saying they are going to raise the Executive Privilege defense, but that was the Nixon defense.

Mr. Epstein. I think that they would love for us to be in the position of having to issue a subpoena for documents, because then it would be a year.

Mr. Schwarz. The problem is the Ervin Committee was found not to have jurisdiction to issue the subpoena.

The Chairman. Well, we know we're going to do the next step on that.

Now, may I raise one other point --

Senator Baker. That's not quite true. The Ervin Committee wasn't found to have no jurisdiction or standing to seek the documents or to issue subpoenas, but they failed to carry the burden of proving that it was required under the mandate of their inquiry.

Now, I have another matter, Frank.

The Chairman. We have two or three matters. Can I recognize Senator Mondale first, because he had asked it.

Senator Mondale. A few days ago, when the White House people were here, they showed us a document which we have in our files which disclosed that President Nixon in 1970 had ordered the delivery of three machine guns to some people in Chile and had done so with instructions that that order should go directly to some subordinate officials in CIA and should be done without advising the official channels. And it is thought that they were directed against a General Schneider, who was a top official in the Chilean government opposed to a coup. He was a Constitutionalist.

Schneider was killed, and there was a machine gun in the possession of those who did so.

Now what I would like is, while we finish this cycle on assassinations, that we include among our studies of alleged assassinations this matter and we request the documentation, of all appropriate documents, under the category of assassination.

Mr. Schwarz. Senator, when that document came to our attention, we questioned a person who expands upon the allegations contained in the documents. I wrote a letter to the White House and the CIA. We wanted forthwith to receive copies of all such documents relating to the passage of weapons. We have had no response from the CIA.

Mr. Hills, we met with in the White House a week ago Tuesday or Wednesday, and I said we must have the documents and he said you cannot have them until you have the briefing on Chile, because we refuse to accept this as an assassination plan.

The Chairman. May I make this suggestion, Senator Mondale?

First of all, I believe that it is absolutely imperative that the Committee complete its investigation on the issue of the assassination of foreign government leaders before the recess and issue its report. That puts us under great pressure, but if we don't do it, I am going to ask the Committee to stay on the job. I would like very much to go to China, that is my first opportunity in forty years to go to China, and I have such a trip laid on, but I am going to set it aside and ask the Committee to continue its work right into the recess until this is done. Otherwise, we are in a hopeless situation.

Senator Schweiker. I think, Mr. Chairman, if we don't finish it by then, we never will.

tape 1b

The Chairman. We never will!

I think we should look into this assassination, it is an assassination. I think it's part of our responsibility to look into it. But it is not an assassination, whatever the CIA input may have been, it is not an assassination of a head of state, and so therefore I don't want it to further delay the completion of this phase of our inquiry.

Now with that in mind, I am in full accord with what Senator Mondale says.

Senator Schweiker. Could we put it to another phase and not in this phase?

The Chairman. Yes, we are going to have a phase on Chile, anyway. It would fit into the Chilean case.

Senator Mondale. It is significant because if we accept their interpretation that it is not assassination, then we avoid an understanding that we had that these documents, all supposed to be available, then we get into a discovery problem.

In other words, I know what we're getting at, and I would guess that we should proceed as rapidly as possible, but we shouldn't hold up the cycle of --

76 0 0 0 3 0 5 5 5

Senator Schweiker. Well Fritz, there is another question along the same lines, and that is why I don't want to see it cloud this issue, and that is the Glomar Explorer, stopped by the NLRB proceeding was shown to have stopped in Chile just about a week or so before Allende was killed, just by coincidence for mechanical repairs. I would like to find out that one, too.

But this is a whole new thing. This puts us into the Chile thing. Because I'm just as interested as you are. I don't see that it hurts anything to put it in a Phase II proposition with Chile.

The Chairman. And Fritz, we can say that the Committee regards it in the category of assassination, but we can differentiate it from the initial report, which does deal with foreign leaders.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Mr. Chairman, before you go to a new subject -- and I am uneasy raising this -- but your reply reminds me, you say that we are going to conclude assassinations and issue our report before we go on recess. I think that disposes too readily of the problem that is going to confront us in a very few weeks, and that is having heard all of this, now what do we do? I don't think we have decided yet how we are going to present, once we open the doors, we've got to know how we are going to handle it. I don't think we ought to lock ourselves in at the moment to a written report, as we leave town

7600030560

the first of August.

Senator Baker. I agree with you 100 percent.

The Chairman. This Committee has got to get its business done and I know the purpose of the delay downtown is to make it as difficult as possible for us to cope with our work. We will be engulfed completely if we cannot deal with this phase of our work in the time that we have given it and put it over until the fall. What I'm suggesting is not just simply the report of the Committee. We are going to complete our witnesses, that we have time to issue such a report.

I am also suggesting the recommendations the Committee will make with respect to this issue. We have to put this behind us. It is just folly not to do it, because we must get on with the other phases of the report and there is no reason we cannot do it. If we can't do it by the end of this month, then we're not going to be any more advantaged or any better advantaged to then go out on our recess and come back and take it up anew in the fall. It is a very clear-cut issue.

Senator Hart of Michigan. But what is not clear-cut to me is how we report to our peers.

The Chairman. We will take that up.

Senator Schweiker. We discussed that at one meeting. We had a little informal meeting. Maybe you missed that, Phil.

The Chairman. There is nothing that could be gained by putting it off or defering it or postponing it. It is very clear that we are working at a highly intensified pace in order to get the necessary evidence, and then there is no reason why we can't address ourselves to this question.

Senator Hart of Michigan. The only reason that I raise that is that I am as anxious to conclude this chapter, but this Committee, as a Committee, then must decide the ultimate question: do you have open hearings? Do you go to a closed Senate?

The Chairman. That will be a top item of consideration for the Committee. I have only deferred this discussion thinking that we had best get all of the evidence first. That is all. Then we will take it up at an appropriate time and discuss it.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand the situation to be then it is your hope that we will finish our Executive Session testimony before the August recess, but not a report to the Senate?

The Chairman. No, that is not my position. My position is that we should complete the testimony and make our report and recommendation on this issue.

Senator Baker. But without prejudice to a future determination of whether we have public hearings?

The Chairman. Oh, yes, that's always open to us. But I -- let me make it -- let's not have any misunderstanding there.

It is always open to this Committee to decide whether public hearings on this or any other issue should be arranged in the fall. Obviously, we cannot have them until fall.

My personal position is against public hearings on the issue of assassination. But what I am proposing is that the Committee make its report, and I think that is a question the Committee will have to take up and decide, and I think the appropriate way to disclose these facts, and I personally believe they must be disclosed, is through a report of the Committee that is made public, and I think that report should be made before the recess.

Senator Baker. I don't think we can do that.

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, physically we have got three weeks. Whether we can hear all of these witnesses and sit down and prepare the report and have the Committee agree on the report, report it to the Senate and have the Senate act on it in three weeks is questionable in my mind. I, like you, want to do it, but I wonder if we can do a workmanlike job and do it in that time.

The Chairman. Well, let me say this, that the very request that Senator Baker has made, and I hope we don't get into a too prolonged discussion on this issue because we cannot decide it right now, but the very report that Senator Baker has asked for is now in the process of preparation. That report gives, by necessity, as much of the meat, the briefs that Senator Baker has asked for, as much of the report, laying out the factual, the evidence that the Committee has seen. And I think

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

this can be done. I know that we have to work very hard to do it, but I know that our position will be much worse in every way if we fail to do it.

Now without trying to decide that now, let us proceed.

Senator Schweiker. May I make one comment on that, Mr. Chairman?

I have had vacillating feelings on public hearings, and I think what I have come down on is this. I think we should go ahead and issue a preliminary report without public hearings. I think we should put the matter of public hearings in abeyance until we get into the Chile thing and some of the other areas of so-called assassinations that may not be Presidential assassinations per se and leave the Committee option that we may well want to elect to go into what happened in Chile publicly and bring up that assassination if that is what we determined.

I have trouble determining at this point in time whether we should have public hearings, and I think we ought to keep that option open as we go along.

The Chairman. I have no argument with the Senator on that score.

Senator Schweiker. I know. As I say, it reconciles with your views and it protects the rights of those who say they want public hearings.

The Chairman. I have no argument with that.

Senator Baker has another matter.

Senator Baker. It won't take but a brief moment.

I think I owe the Committee a report on the statement that I made to the Press a few moments ago. I did not intend to make a statement, but that it becomes impossible to avoid when you step outside in these circumstances.

The Chairman. It is a good thing for you that Senator Morgan is not present.

Senator Baker. As some of you may know, the news last night and again this morning carried a story to the effect that a Colonel, a retired Colonel in the Air Force by the name of Fletcher Prowdy, has alleged by Alexander Butterfield was an associate or an employee or a plant of something of the sort of the CIA when he was at the White House.

I was asked if I had any comment on that. I was asked if I was surprised by that, and my reply was I had heard that story before. I had never commented on it because I had no proof of it. And it's really so. As you know, in this town if you don't have confirmation of it you get into deep trouble.

Second, that I think it is worthy of looking into, and I said I thought the Prowdy statement added a new dimension to the rumors and I thought that it did warrant further investigation, that I would recommend that to this Committee at the appropriate time.

The Chairman. That is fine, and I have also said that I would ask the Committee for an investigation of this charge, and Bill Miller tells me we have already received from the Agency a preliminary report that is not satisfactory. We are pursuing it and getting further information.

Senator Schweiker?

Senator Schweiker. I have a brief matter I would like to seek the Committee's advice on.

Could we go off the record a minute?

The Chairman. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Hart of Colorado. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman, I have an item of business also.

When I was in Europe last week and pursuant to the direction of the Chairman and staff I tried to contact our friend QJWIN to try to wrap up that link of the chain with, I must say, the complete cooperation of the CIA and Mr. Colby, who in fact sent a person over there to help uncover this individual. We know who he is and where he is.

The CIA American contact talked to him, largely for the reason that he feels extreme loyalty still to the Agency and to one or two particular people that he worked with and through. He opted not to meet with me or anybody else. The feeling is, both on my part and Mr. Colby's, that if we got his contact in that chain to get in touch with him directly that he would talk to us, and I leave it to the Committee whether this is important enough for us to pursue and it would probably involve a couple of people going back over.

Senator Baker. What is your recommendation?

Senator Hart of Colorado. My own feeling, based almost purely on the principle that no stone should be left unturned is that we should do it.

There are some unanswered questions. He was here in the states in '63, he was not confined to one operation and we don't know what he was doing.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would recommend that we commission Senator Hart to do that for us.

Senator Hart of Colorado. It would take the cooperation of one of the witnesses we've had here before to do it.

The Chairman. What is your recommendation, Senator Hart, I'm sorry?

Senator Hart of Colorado. That we should do it, that we should get the cooperation of Mr. O'Donnell.

The Chairman. That we should do what?

Senator Baker. Interview QJWIN in Europe.

Senator Mathias. Which means somebody has to do it and take O'Donnell with him.

Senator Baker. Take Mathias and Hart.

The Chairman. It is a very sensitive matter, if his cover -- well, one thing this Committee must worry about --

Senator Schweiker. What would you hope to get out of it, Gary?

Senator Hart of Colorado. What his orders were, what his scope of authority was, what he was doing over and above -- well, what he was doing in the Congo, what he was doing over and above his Congo operations, why he was in Florida in 1963.

The Chairman. Well, Gary, when you told me this, you told me that this man had said to the CIA go between who was trying to arrange this interview that first of all he preferred not to be questioned, and secondly, if he were questioned, he would lie.

Senator Hart of Colorado. That was on the basis of the appointment we were trying to arrange then, and that was purely because of his loyalties to the Agency. The case was not presented well to him. What I am saying is if we took back his contact for whom he feels loyalty and the fellow should talk, I think the feeling of the person who had made the original contact is that he would talk.

It was not presented to him in the way that the Agency wanted him to do it.

The Chairman. How valuable do you think this information is to the Committee? I'll tell you my concern. My concern is the one thing I have feared more than anything else, in this investigation is that we take some action that allows them to say that we have blown the cover of some valuable agent abroad,

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

76 0 0 0 3 0 5 5 9

and this is what they feared all along, and the whole intelligence apparatus would be gravely weakened and the men in the field would be jeopardized by investigation of this kind.

We take that chance with this kind of -- and what do we learn from it? Is it worth that chance?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, that question could be asked of any witness that we have in here. Number two, the CIA, Mr. Colby and the Chief of Station in 15-25 Amsterdam, have no doubts that this can be carried out without any security breach whatsoever. Now that's the CIA. He has not worked for them in ten years.

The Chairman. And the CIA would be the first to jump upon the breach and say, we told you so.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, I leave it to the Committee. I can't tell you what we're going to find out, it may be zero.

Senator Mathias. The Station Chief does not raise that as one of the dangers.

Senator Baker. Yes, they did.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Nor does Colby.

Mr. Wides. Mr. Chairman, excuse me. The paper that suggests the possibility that Mr. Win might have been in the United States in 1963 is a paper involving the activity records of William Harvey who will be here this afternoon and that may be that you can get more testimony under oath from him that will

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600030559

shed some light as to whether he was just using QJWIN as a cover which is what he told me, the designation for billing, or whether he's willing to give out some more testimony.

The Chairman. Well, let us get that additional information --

Senator Baker. One further point, Mr. Chairman, that might be of interest if my memory is correct, and I believe it is correct, is that the major commercial cover for the Agency in Amsterdam was run by the Mullin Company.

15-25 29

Senator Hart of Colorado. Frank, he's not worked for the Agency in ten years. He's not an active agent.

The Chairman. Suppose that he were to tell us something that is of importance, then how do we cross-examine him? Then we have to bring him here for cross-examination, then we have blown his cover.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, may I say one other thing? I meant to say it, and I frankly forgot, just so my colleagues know what I'm about and not that I'm doing it behind their back.

I got a call last night from one of the editors of Harper's magazine in Europe relaying to me that Bernard Barker wanted to talk to me, and he thinks about the Butterfield situation, and I intended to call him, but I wanted you to know that.

The Chairman. That's fine.

Let's defer decision right now, on that decision, Senator

Hart.

Let's get our witness back and complete his testimony this morning.

32

(Whereupon, at 12:00 noon the witness re-entered the hearing room.)

The Chairman. All right.

You understand that the oath still applies to this part of the testimony?

Mr. Schwarz will renew the questioning.

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Bundy, I want to call your attention now to 1963, the Missile Crisis is over. Was there another reassessment of Cuban policy in the winter and spring of '63?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, there was.

Mr. Schwarz. Again, did that reassessment of Cuban policy involve a lot of reassessment of a lot of options?

Mr. Bundy. That is my refreshed recollection.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

We've shown you a lot of documents, mostly by you in that period, but some to you as well, and was one of the options the consideration of the possibility that Mr. Castro might defect or might be communicated to in a way that would bring him around more closely to the United States?

Mr. Bundy. The question of opening communications with Fidel Castro arises in 1963, I think at more than one time, and without having my attention drawn to specific documents, I wouldn't be able to spell that out very much.

Mr. Schwarz. But you agree that it is in there, and it is in there?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now did you also consider, in the spring of 1963, as you had in the fall of 1961, what would happen if Castro died or were killed?

Mr. Bundy. What we did, we certainly posed the question, the precise form is not clear to me, but what I now know from the documents you have shown me, is we posed to the Director of the Office of National Estimates, a Dr. Sherman Kent --

Mr. Schwarz. And what did Dr. Sherman Kent say in response to that inquiry?

Mr. Bundy. Well, I would have to look at his response.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

I would like to then mark a string of documents so you can have that in front of you.

All right, would you mark as item 6, Bundy item 6, the Bundy memorandum to the President dated January 4, 1963, which appears at Bundy Tab K.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

34

Mr. Schwarz. I'll mark a string, Mr. Bundy, and if Mr. Kelley could put it in front of you, we'll then talk about them.

As Bundy Exhibit 6-A, the memorandum for the record, Meeting on Cuba, 3 April '63, between the President, the Attorney General, yourself and five or six other people.

Mr. Bundy. Right.

(The document referred to was marked as Bundy Exhibit No. 6-A for identification.)

35

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-B, the Special Group minutes of April 11, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 6-B for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy Exhibit 6-C, the memorandum also dated April 11, 1963 from Mr. Gordon Chase to yourself, headed Cuban Policy.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-C for identification.)

37

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-D, the minutes of a meeting of the Special Group, 18 April 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-D for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-E the Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-E for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-F, the memorandum for Mr. Bundy, Subject, Cuba Policy, dated April 23, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-F for identification.)

40

Mr. Schwarz. As Bundy 6-G, the Agenda for the meeting of the Standing Group, meeting Tuesday, April 30th, the document being dated April 29th and signed by you.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-G for identification.)

41

Mr. Schwarz. 6-H, the memorandum for members of the Standing Group dated May 2, 1963.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit 6-H for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Schwarz. Finally, as Bundy 6-I, the Central Intelligence Agency, Office of National Estimates, May 13th, 1963, draft memorandum, Subject: Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death.

(The document referred to was marked as Bundy Exhibit 6-I for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now, have you had a chance to read them again, Mr. Bundy?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. In summary, Mr. Bundy, is it a fair characterization of these papers that you were, and the Standing Group was, examining the question of what the situation would be if Castro were to die?

Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were examining, certainly.

Mr. Schwarz. That was a gamut of matters I tried to pose at the beginning of this line of questioning?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. That was one of the things you were considering?

Mr. Bundy. Right.

Mr. Schwarz. This was a period of time, as the fall of 1961 may also have been, when people asked about or talked about assassinations as a means of causing Mr. Castro's death.

Mr. Bundy. I am not aware of much conversation on that subject in the spring of '63, so I would have to take your word on that.

Mr. Schwarz. I am asking you, I have no word on that.

Mr. Bundy. No, I don't think there was much discussion in the spring of '63 on that subject.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's see if we can agree on some things first.

Can we further agree that the ultimate conclusion was that Castro's death would not be desirable for the United States?

Mr. Bundy. The recommendation, or the assessment, which comes back from the Office of National Estimates, makes it clear that the odds would be that, upon Castro's death, his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help take over control.

Then it goes on to say that there might be divisions and splits, but that it was unlikely that anti-Communist forces would be able to take over without extensive U.S. help and probably U.S. military intervention.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Now, I would like to avoid having to go through every single document.

Mr. Bundy. So would I.

Mr. Schwarz. And see if I could get you to agree with this statement. You do agree that you were looking at a situation that would exist as if Castro were killed?

Mr. Bundy. That is one of the things we were looking at.

Mr. Schwarz. And in connection with that, was his being killed by assassination one of the ways which you understood he might be killed?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any recollection of that point, of it being on our minds.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Then why were you looking at the question of his being killed? Was there something known?

Mr. Bundy. I really don't have any independent of it. My sense of events in 1963 is that the internal pressure from within the Administration to "do something about Cuba" was very much lower. There was, however, external pressure. There was political pressure in the United States, critics of the Administration were making speeches about how not enough was being done and we must get rid of the Castro regime, and as I think I may have said earlier, and I would like to say now, I think that one reason for getting an estimate of this kind was to get it on record from the point of view of those who did not think we should be fussing with questions of assassination or anything like it, that it was not a sound policy, leaving aside its moral meaning and wider political meaning from the point of view of the narrow objectives we had in Cuba.

Mr. Schwarz. Who was taking the position that assassination could be --

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.

Mr. Schwarz. But someone was?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection on that.

Mr. Schwarz. You have no recollection of any position being taken pro or con?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of any specific

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

conversation or position that triggered this particular inquiry.

The Chairman. Well, isn't it perfectly plausible that this inquiry sought to examine what the situation would be in the event of Castro's death by whatever means it might occur?

Does it necessarily follow that because the Administration was making such a plausible inquiry against such a contingency that might arise at any time that therefore it was within the mind of the Administration to kill Castro? I don't see the connection.

Mr. Bundy. Well, you make my point, Mr. Chairman. That's just my point.

Mr. Schwarz. Now in connection with that, would you look at your own Agenda for the April 19th meeting, 6-G?

Under item 1 -- you distinguish between item 1 and item 2. Item 1 is the possible use of contingencies for the achievement of wider political objectives; and item 2 is programs that might be initiated by the United States government.

I call your attention to the fact that the reference to the possible death of Castro is one of the items under item 1 and not under item 2.

Mr. Bundy. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. And do you regard that as relevant to the exchange you had with the Chairman just now?

Mr. Bundy. It seems to me it bears out the Chairman's

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600030537

point, that you have a number of possible things that might happen, that you would then have something to do something about, or to act in the light of. The other are the things that you might do without waiting for some contingency to arise.

Mr. Schwarz. Now the only remaining question I have on this group of documents is, how was it that the subject of the death of Castro -- do you investigate the possibilities of the death of foreign leaders as a regular matter?

Mr. Bundy. Well, the question "After Stalin, What?" was the staple of discussions in the 1940's, everywhere, academies and I would assume inside the United States government; the question after DeGaulle was a question about Western European policy for a great many years. And one could pick smaller figures, more and less controversial, and have the same kind of question coming up, in a situation in which a particular individual is as dominant a figure in a set of events which it had the two, quite contrasting but heavy consequences of the Bay of Pigs and the Missile Crisis, it doesn't seem to me to be an irrational question to ask, without any relation as to whether the United States itself would have any active advisory role or any role whatever in having that event come to pass.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Would you mark as Exhibit 7 the September 20 document -- which is the page -- which states the assassination of Castro was excluded in order to avoid his martyrdom.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Mr. Kelley, would you take over the questioning of Mr. Bundy, with the permission of the Chairman, on that particular series of documents, which is at the heading, September 20th '63 on the chronology.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

Let me show Mr. Bundy the documents.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, first, will you tell us where the documents are, because I couldn't find them under the heading you gave us.

Mr. Kelley. Yes.

In Bundy Book 2, there is at Tab A the memorandum dated July 25th, 1963 from Mr. George Denney to Mr. Crimmins, entitled "Cuba, Possible Courses of Action.

At Tab B of Bundy Book 2 is a memorandum dated September 20th, 1963, from Gordon Chase to Mr. Bundy, and this memorandum summarizes the Denney memorandum of July 25th.

Mr. Bundy, did you review these documents with members of the staff earlier this week?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I did.

Mr. Kelley. Do you have any independent recollection of these documents?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I read a document of this kind, which comes to me from a member of my own staff, I am very often reminded and I am in this case, that this is a document which I did review and that it reflects his arguments as I then heard them.

Mr. Kelley. Who was Mr. Gordon Chase?

Mr. Bundy. Well, he was an assistant of mine at the time with special responsibilities for Cuban affairs, and perhaps more widely in Latin America. He was at that time a foreign service officer secunded to the White House.

Mr. Kelley. Did he have any responsibility for covert actions?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Kelley. Did he provide staff assistance to you with respect to the Special Group or the Special Group (Augmented)?

Mr. Bundy. Well, he may have done in some exceptional case when I needed his opinion on a matter, but in ordinary cases he would not have been party to Special Group work.

Mr. Kelley. What kind of things did he do with the special responsibility for Cuba? What did that involve?

Mr. Bundy. He would be keeping in touch with the Cuban Task Force, which by this time was in the Department of State, the MONGOOSE operation having been disbanded. He would have been responsible for keeping me alert to matters that were proceeding in that Task Force that might have an implication for the White House.

Mr. Kellay. Who was the head of the Cuban Task Force?

Mr. Bundy. Well I don't want to get this wrong, but I think by this time it was Mr. Crimmins.

Mr. Kelley. Mr. Crimmins was in the State Department and he was a foreign service officer?

Mr. Bundy. That is right.

Mr. Kelley. The Cuban Task Force, what was that?

Mr. Bundy. Well, it was the successor to the MONGOOSE group, but much less oriented toward secret operations than MONGOOSE, and the review of secret operations then came back under the complete control of the Special Group, by now, I think, called the 303 Committee, which was a lineal successor of 5412.

Mr. Kelley. I call your attention now to Mr. Denney's memorandum, which is at Tab A in Book 2, and it is true, is it not that the memorandum is to Mr. Crimmins?

Mr. Bundy. Right.

Senator Tower. Do you have any independent recollection of this memorandum?

Mr. Bundy. I have no knowledge that I ever saw it, and I did not find it familiar when I looked at it the other day.

Mr. Kelley. It is true, is it not, that Mr. Chase's memo to you summarizes this much longer memorandum by Mr. Denney?

Mr. Bundy. Is that what it is?

Mr. Schwarz. Does it do that, Mr. Kelley, because Chase memorandum starts by saying, here is a summary of Paul Sakwa's

Mr. Kelley. I think that is an error in Mr. Chase's memo, because it is clear that what is being summarized here is Mr.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Denney's memorandum.

Mr. Bundy. Let me suggest that you focus on Mr. Chase's memorandum with respect to my recollection and responsibility, that is clearly the operative document.

Mr. Kelley. With respect to Mr. Chase's memorandum, in his summary of the rationale of proposals, he states, as second, "the present importance of Castro as a nationalist symbol makes him the obvious operational target; assassination is excluded to avoid Castro's martyrdom."

Do you have any recollection of why he would exclude assassination? Does that imply to you, or do you recollect, whether Castro's assassination was being considered and here is a staff paper excluding it, because someone asked them to consider it?

Mr. Bundy. No, I think it's a simple statement of what I would regard as a rationale assessment of the situation by whoever the original author was, and certainly by the staff man with respect to a subject that emerges directly from the notion that he is an operational target, whatever that means and goes on to say, but we don't mean assassination, because it would make him a martyr, what other reasons against that there may be. It doesn't seem to me that you can read the statement that assassination is excluded as an inference that somebody else is including it.

Mr. Kelley. That's all.

Mr. Schwarz. In any event, Mr. Bundy, the document says it is excluded.

Mr. Kelley. That's right.

Mr. Schwarz. Now at that period of time in the fall of 1963, were you aware that through the offices of Ambassador Atwood, or Mr. Atwood, as he may have then been called, and through the offices of a French journalist called Jean Daniel, another effort was being made to establish contact with Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. I remember the Atwood effort, as I recollect that he came to see me about it. I don't recollect specifically Jean Daniel, although it strikes a chord as you mention it.

Mr. Schwarz. What the purpose, very briefly, of Mr. Atwood's effort?

Mr. Bundy. Well, as I understood it, he had been approached by someone he knew from Cuba and had been given to understand that there was interest in, Castro had an interest in, opening communication, and he was exploring with us whether he could be encouraged to undertake such an explanation.

Mr. Schwarz. And did you encourage him?

Mr. Bundy. The exact form of our message to him, or our if you want to call it, the instruction to him, the President's decision, I can no longer recollect, but my impression is that we were interested, and that we did want him to explore it without engaging the President any more than he could help.

Mr. Schwarz. But was the President in fact informed and in fact approved the actions taken?

Mr. Bundy. That is my understanding.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it your understanding or your recollection?

Mr. Bundy. It is my recollection, but it is a recollection that is refreshed by what I have learned and hearing more about it in the last few days.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, were you told, in the fall of 1963, that assassination devices had been requested by a Cuban for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Castro, and that assassination devices were offered to the Cuban in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Bundy. No.

Mr. Schwarz. Now again, here, calling for a matter of opinion, as a matter of opinion, do you believe that at the same time, at a possible rapprochement with Mr. Castro was being pursued, the President would have authorized or permitted the passage of assassination devices intended for their use on Mr. Castro?

Mr. Bundy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Castro.

The Chairman. Is there more?

Mr. Schwarz. Well, on Trujillo and Diem, with respect to Diem --

Mr. Smothers. Well, if you're going on to something else, there are a couple of things.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7600030554

Going back to an earlier memorandum which I don't believe is in the Bundy materials, but it has been talked about previously in a Committee hearing, a memorandum which will be identified as a Memorandum for the Record, dated 16 October 1962, a memorandum signed by Mr. Richard Helms.

(The document referred to was marked Bundy Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Bundy, I am going to read through this memorandum and ask you a couple of questions about that. It's a memorandum from Helms for the record on MONGOOSE.

Reading from this memorandum, Mr. Bundy, reading from Paragraph 2: "The Attorney General" -- well, let me read the entire paragraph.

"The Attorney General opened the meeting" -- we're talking about a MONGOOSE meeting -- by expressing the general dissatisfaction of the President," --"'dissatisfaction of the President'" in quotes -- "with Operation MONGOOSE."

Mr. Bundy. What date are we at? The date?

Mr. Smothers. The date of the memorandum is 16 October 1962.

"He pointed out that the Operation had been underway for a year, that the results were discouraging, that there had been no acts of sabotage, and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice. He indicated that there had been noticeable improvement during the year in the collection of intelligence, but that other actions had failed to influence significantly the course of events in Cuba. He spoke of the weekly meetings of top officials on this problem, and again noted the small accomplishments, despite the fact that Secretaries Rusk and McNamara, General Taylor, McGeorge Bundy and he personally had all been charged by the President with finding a solution. He traced the history of General Lansdale's personal appointment by the President a year ago.

"The Attorney General then stated that in view of this lack of progress, he was going to give Operation MONGOOSE more personal attention. In order to do this, he would hold a meeting every morning at 0930 with the MONGOOSE operational representatives from the various agencies (Lansdale, Harvey, Hurwich, Ryan and General Johnson)."

Now, the best of our information, Mr. Bundy, is that these meetings were in fact held on a daily basis as indicated, and that they did involve Lansdale and these members of the working group noted.

Were you aware of such meetings?

Mr. Bundy. I have no independent recollection of them, but that does not sound implausible to me at all.

Mr. Smothers. It doesn't sound implausible to me that the Attorney General Lansdale and members of the working group to develop MONGOOSE activities with him?

Mr. Bundy. To report to him how they were getting on, and to see if he couldn't, by listening to those reports and keeping a lively -- keeping his lively concern in their consciousness move the thing more rapidly.

Mr. Smothers. This is your interpretation of giving more personal attention to it?

Mr. Bundy. Exactly.

Mr. Smothers. You say you had no knowledge of these in

1962?

Mr. Bundy. I didn't say that. I said I had no independent recollection of them.

Mr. Smothers. They did not come to your attention at that point?

Mr. Bundy. I didn't say say that. I don't know that they did, but I don't know that they didn't.

Mr. Smothers. But your recollection at this point is that they did not come to your attention?

Mr. Bundy. That is not my recollection. I don't recall that one way or the other.

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

Let me ask you then about your knowledge of the Lansdale situation.

Do you know General Lansdale?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. Do you know his reputation for truth and honesty?

Mr. Bundy. I don't think I have any -- his reputation for truth and honesty, if you ask me the question as one asks it about, you know, all kinds of people, I have no reason to question it. I have doubts about some of the things I have seen attributed to him in recent weeks.

Mr. Smothers. Well, let me put it this way. Would you believe General Lansdale under oath?

Mr. Bundy. It would depend on what he said.

Mr. Smothers. It would depend upon what he said.

Is your experience that General Lansdale is trustworthy only on a selective basis?

Mr. Bundy. You are asking me questions about matters essentially in which his testimony, as I have seen it reported.

Mr. Smothers. No, I am not asking you about his testimony. I am asking you if you would believe him under oath, based on your knowledge.

Mr. Bundy. It would depend upon what he said, and if it was a matter on which I had my own knowledge.

Mr. Smothers. Without regard to matters that General Lansdale has testified to before this Committee, based on your knowledge of him, your working relationship with him, your knowledge of what other people know of General Lansdale, his reputation in the community, if you will, would you believe him under oath?

Mr. Bundy. I would currently have to say that I could not give you a definite affirmative answer to that question.

Mr. Smothers. That's fine.

Now, let's go back to the period of General Lansdale's appointment.

General Lansdale was appointed as the coordinator of the Special Group, the Chief of Operations.

After General Taylor's efforts had been under effort for

76 0 0 0 3 0 0 0

some time, six months, seven months, General Taylor comes in, I believe, in July after he completes his Bay of Pigs examination, General Lansdale is appointed by the President at the end of November.

Do you have any present recollection of the circumstances surrounding that appointment?

Mr. Bundy. None that goes beyond what I discussed earlier.

Mr. Smothers. To the best of your knowledge or recollection, did the appointment of this Chief of Staff or Chief of Operations reflect any lack of confidence in General Taylor on the part of either the Attorney General or the President?

Mr. Bundy. No, the opposite. General Taylor had heavy responsibilities in his general responsibility as military representative of the President. He was made Chairman of the Committee to keep oversight on this. It was inappropriate entirely in terms of his rank and his other duties that he should be the day to day action officer.

Mr. Smothers. Are you familiar with the degree of General Taylor's involvement with the development of the Special Group (Augmented) agendas? Was this done by General Taylor? Was it really General Lansdale's responsibility?

Mr. Bundy. I don't have any knowledge of the details of the operations of the staff. It was clear to me, and I think to everyone else, that the man in charge of that operation, of that Committee, was General Taylor.

Mr. Smothers. Okay.

Just one final series of questions.

If we might, Mr. Bundy, go back to our conversations regarding your request to see documents prior to your testimony before the Rockefeller Commission, when you talked to Mr. Kissinger, precisely what did you request of him?

Mr. Bundy. I said to him -- and again I cannot be precise -- and I thought that there were going to be questions with respect to which it would be much easier for me to give helpful and more accurate answers if I could have access to appropriate documents since I have taken no documents of that character, no official documents of that character, from the White House. And he said he entirely agreed and he made the appropriate arrangements.

Mr. Smothers. Did you ask for a timeframe for these documents?

Mr. Bundy. I don't recall that I did, but when I came to look more closely at what I needed to see, as I told you earlier, it related specifically to the period around August 1962.

Mr. Smothers. Did the White House make the selection of documents for you?

Mr. Bundy. No. The White House handed me a file of documents which covered the period.

Mr. Smothers. They handed you a file of documents covering roughly the August 1962 period?

Mr. Bundy. That's right.

Mr. Smothers. Had you made a request for documents covering this August '62 timeframe?

Mr. Bundy. I must have told him the rough period with which I am concerned. Again, I don't understand the drift of your question.

Mr. Smothers. Well, the drift of my question is, if indeed you selected the August 1962 documents, why did you select that?

Mr. Bundy. Because Counsel to the Rockefeller Commission had directed my attention to the period.

Mr. Smothers. To August 1962?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Smothers. In the file that centered roughly on this point in this timeframe, included NSA memo 181, was the file put together by the White House pursuant to this guidance?

Mr. Bundy. The file that came into my hands, whether they put it together or whether it was a file drawn off the shelf, I can't tell you. You'll have to ask them.

Mr. Smothers. Did it appear to you to be an off-the-shelf file?

Mr. Bundy. I don't know what it was.

The Chairman. What is the object of this series of questions, Curtis?

Mr. Smothers. Well, I am trying to determine, Mr. Chairman,

7600030661

what Mr. Kissinger was requested to do and what actually happened.

The Chairman. Don't we have that now in the record? It just seems to me like we're going over the same series of questions.

Mr. Smothers. Well, since we don't know what was in the file --

Mr. Bundy. Well, I thought I said the file was a file of National Security Action memoranda, a file which you already have here.

Mr. Smothers. Relating to August, 1962?

Mr. Bundy. Uh-huh.

Mr. Smothers. That's all I have, Mr. Chairman.

tape 2b

Mr. Schwarz. On the Trujillo matter --

Mr. Bundy. Sure.

Mr. Schwarz. You know Mr. Trujillo was killed. Did you know or do you know that the persons who killed him had obtained some weapons from the United States?

Mr. Bundy. I did not know, and do not now know, of my own knowledge that that was the case.

I did know, or at least I believe I must have been on notice because of documents again that you have shown me, that weapons by a decision of the Special Group in early January had been or were being passed to Dominican dissidents.

Mr. Schwarz. Were you involved in the sending of a telegram

63

to the Domincan Republic, either two or three days prior to the actual assassination of Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. Bundy. I have no recollection of it, and when I saw those telegrams in discussions with your staff, they stirred no recollection on my part.

Mr. Schwarz. Is it fair to state that Mr. Richard Goodwin is the best witness on those subjects from the White House for that period of time?

Mr. Bundy. It appears that way to me, although that appears more from the fact that important documents seem to have been addressed to him than because of my own recollection that he was interested in the matters and because of my phone conversation with him, he showed a considerable familiarity with events in the Domincan Republic, political events during that spring.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, you got a memo from Mr. Bissell in February, 17th February '61. It is Tab R of the Trujillo Book 1 of 2, in which you were informed that the dissidents had been told by the United States that it was prepared to provide them with a limited supply of arms and equipment.

When you got such information, did it trigger in your mind anything to the effect of, let's be concerned about how they're going to use those weapons, or did you just accept the information and do nothing about it?

Mr. Bundy. It is clear that the information was sent to me and it was clear, in that sense, that I had become responsible for knowing what was in the document, but I have to say that as I reread it I have no recollection that I ever, in fact, did read it at the time. Whether that was because of the flow, the very heavy flow of other documents or because I passed it to someone else or because I just simply didn't get to it, I cannot tell you, but I have no recollection that I saw it.

Mr. Schwarz. You did make a request for a briefing paper?

Mr. Bundy. It must have been done and it was either done in my name or I did it.

Mr. Schwarz. So you're not capable -- you don't remember it. Are you capable of making a comment on my question, which was having received information that arms had been supplied --

Mr. Bundy. Having that information on my desk, anyway.

Mr. Schwarz. Okay.

In the light of hindsight, should persons in your position when they receive such information inquire into the purpose for which the arms are to be used?

Mr. Bundy. Yes, I would -- and my own guess on this, and it's not much better than that, is that the decision which had been taken only a week before the new Administration came in, in the Special Group, was partly reviewed in some fashion, with the Special Group as reconstituted after the change in Administration. So I would have to say that I suppose I knew that weapons were being introduced into the Dominican Republic

66

and I would have to add that I did not, or I have no recollection and I think I would recollect it, if I had engaged in a careful inquiry to find out just what, who, when where and so on did not do that, and I think -- you ask in hindsight, I think it would clearly be important to have that kind of understanding, because as I understand the evidence that has now been developed, there was a level of communication and connection with the plotters in the Dominican Republic which exceeded what political authority appears to have expected or believed was going on.

Mr. Schwarz. Would you agree with one further point, that it is very difficult for the United States to control events once it has made a decision to cooperate with dissident elements, and in particular once it's made a decision to cooperate with dissident elements by providing them with arms?

Mr. Bundy. I think that -- one thing, I don't want to generalize here, but I think -- I would agree with the generalization, let me put it that way, if I could add that in the case of the Dominican Republic, I think one has also to recognize retrospectively that there was no way to have any communication with dissidents that would not involve recognition that, if you propose to be an effective dissident in that country under that ruler, you would probably be contemplating fairly violent action.

Mr. Schwarz. I have nothing further on Trujillo.

One question of Vietnam.

You were involved in the question of the possible coup in Vietnam that actually took place?

Mr. Bundy. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. And you were substantially involved in that as a matter of personal --

Mr. Bundy. I was working closely with the President and was probably the draftsman under his instruction of some of the cables that went out.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, Diem was killed. It does not appear to me from the record that the United States wanted him killed. Is that fair?

Mr. Bundy. That is correct.

Mr. Schwarz. But the United States did want him deposed if a coup could be successful? Is that correct?

Mr. Bundy. The United States really had two views. Right up to the end, the United States hoped, hoped against hope, as it became more and more difficult to communicate with Diem, that he would see the, or come to share the kinds of argument, that were made to him, primarily by Ambassador Lodge, and that a change in his government and a lower, much lower, role for his brother and sister-in-law would assist him in recapturing public confidence. That was always the preferred solution.

As prospects for that became more and more dim, the United States did come to take the view that there might be no alternative to a coup, and it certainly had the view that if there was going to be a coup, I believe the language somewhere in one of the cables is that it was in the interests of the United States that it should succeed.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, on the day of the coup, Ambassador Lodge told Mr. Diem that he would provide help to get him out of the country and do so by airplane, but he couldn't have the plane for twenty-four hours. A, did you know of the twenty-four hour point?

Mr. Bundy. I don't remember that we did.

Mr. Schwarz. B, don't you find it incomprehensible that the United States was not able to supply an airplane for twenty-four hours?

Mr. Bundy. I don't really know because it depends on where the plane was going to go, what kind of plane. I don't think I'm competent to answer that question.

What occurs to me is, there were lots of other ways of offering asylum for a twenty-four hour period, and I don't think I really find that a very significant point.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

If there are no further questions, I want to thank you for your testimony, it has been long, a very long morning, and it has been very helpful testimony. We appreciate it very much.

Mr. Bundy. And I am thankful to you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, if it is not inappropriate and there is no objection, I have a brief statement that I intend to make to the Press which will simply re-emphasize to them what I think I have said a number of times this morning about my view of the role of President Kennedy and Attorney General Kennedy.

The Chairman. I leave that up to you. I certainly would not want to interpose any objection.

Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 12:42 o'clock p.m., the Committee recessed.)

- - -

Date : 08/06/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10046
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-04

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : HALLEY
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 08/19/75
PAGES : 159
SUBJECTS : JMWAVE

CIA

OPERATION MONGOOSE

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/31/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 2

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET Vol. 3 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

R866

The United States Senate

transcript file

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/2/77
BY EL

Hearing held before

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL
OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

76000070076

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003
(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

A

76 0 0 0 7 0 0 7

CONTENTS

(Witness: Halley)

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT	FOR IDENTIFICATION
No. 1	2
No. 2	60
No. 3	92
No. 4	110

- - -

STAFF INTERVIEW

- - -

Tuesday, August 19, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:25 o'clock p.m. in Room 608, The Carroll Arms.

Staff: Frederick Baron, Joseph diGenova, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

7600007007

76000070070

PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Baron. Mr. Halley, is it true that you are here testifying today under alias, and that Halley is not actually your true identity?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Your true identity will be on file with the review staff of the CIA and available for verification by the Committee if that becomes necessary?

Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you a piece of paper marked "Statement Regarding Testimony and Alias" and let me ask you whether this is the statement you signed as we were beginning here today which indicates your true identity and which I have witnessed?

Mr. Halley. Yes, that is the correct statement that I signed today. There is a blank there where we have not filled in the Senator's name.

Mr. Baron. All right.

For the moment, let us leave that blank and enter it into the record as is, as Exhibit 1.

(The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. It is your understanding, is it not, that we have worked out an arrangement with the review staff whereby the statement will be attached to your transcript as an Exhibit and in a sanitized form, leaving out either of the two references to your true identity which will only be available at this Agency.

Mr. Halley. That is my understanding.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel before the Committee?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you appearing here, voluntarily here today without counsel?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that at any point you are entitled to cease answering any questions and consult with counsel if you wish?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of that.

Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all your Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee here today, including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. I think we should put into the record the arrangement that we made before we began, and correct me if this is not your understanding of the arrangement, that we are testifying here today without placing you under oath because there is no Senator available for that purpose, but both you and I are contemplating having a Senator swear you in and ask you if your transcript is true to the best of your knowledge at some point as soon as possible as it can be arranged after today's session.

Mr. Halley. Yes. The statement that you have just made is my understanding of the agreement that we entered into prior to this conversation going on the record.

Mr. Baron. Thank you.

Let us begin then with some very broad questions about your background in the Agency. Can you tell me what you were doing in the Agency prior to your involvement with the JMWAVE station?

Mr. Halley. I became involved with the Cuban affair in approximately February of 1962. At that time, I was in Headquarters. I was Chief of Foreign Intelligence Activities for the Eastern European Division. I was asked to be released from those duties to conduct a survey of the opportunities for running intelligence operations against Cuba. I was released from those duties; I did engage in a survey of the possibilities for running intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary operations against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Your position as Chief of Foreign Intelligence for Eastern Europe did not involve Cuba in any way? That was your last position before you became involved in Cuban affairs, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

I want to qualify that. Undoubtedly, there were some actions that were being conducted in the Eastern European area that reflected on Cuba, but I was not involved in the Bay of Pigs operation. I was not fully focused on Cuban operations until approximately February of 1962.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the Agency?

Mr. Halley. I joined the Agency originally in 1951.

Mr. Baron. In a very general way, can you describe the nature of your activities at the Agency prior to February of '62?

Mr. Halley. When I was first assigned to the Agency, I was an Army officer on active duty. I went through the usual Agency training program. I was assigned to Eastern European activities where I originally was focused on Polish and German operations.

I subsequently served from 1952 to 1959 in Germany. In the course of that service, I spent most of my time working on the Eastern European satellites, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. In addition, I was involved on occasion in Soviet operations and East German operations.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any involvement in Latin American affairs prior to February of '62?

Mr. Halley. Yes. In the period 1960-62, I was responsible for setting up operational activity in Latin America that was targetted more explicitly on the Eastern European satellites to some extent on the Soviet Union. This was in a period of time where the Eastern European satellites were expanding their presence in Latin America. In my duties in the Eastern European Division, I was responsible for getting this program going in Latin America, so I did have an extensive exposure to Latin America in the period '60 to '62, as I recall those dates.

The accuracy of those dates can be checked from my official travel records, and so on.

Mr. Baron. During that period of time you were actually in Latin America helping to set up this program?

Mr. Halley. No, I was stationed in Washington, but I travelled to Latin America during this particular period of time.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to Cuba at any point during the course of that operation?

Mr. Halley. Not specifically. I think I transitted Cuba on air stops being routed to various countries. I think I was at one or two Cuban airfields, but simply in transit.

Mr. Baron. Not long enough even to talk to the people at the Station in Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, I had no contact at any time with the Havana Station.

Mr. Baron. Did you pick up, during this period of time, a general sense of the attitude of Latin American governments toward the Castro government? Could you characterize that attitude, if you did?

Mr. Halley. I certainly was aware, I think, of the broad political trend in the Hemisphere at that time, my interest was much more narrowly focused at that time on the Eastern European targets, and on the Soviet target, and I was not certainly specializing in Cuban affairs at that juncture.

Mr. Baron. Cuba was not viewed at that juncture as part of the Soviet target, as a Soviet satellite?

Mr. Halley. No, it was not.

Mr. Baron. Coming then to February of '62, is that the point at which you joined the JMWAVE Station in Miami?

Mr. Halley. No. When I first entered into this survey, it was to do this on a TDY basis, temporary duty assignment, to complete a report on my findings, to report those at that particular juncture to Mr. Harvey who was the head of the Task Force that was attempting to expand intelligence coverage of Cuba and I was not assigned to the station at that particular point in time.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you join the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. Shortly after having completed this survey. These dates are blurred now because the survey soon turned into a permanent assignment. I would have to check the exact dates from my service records, but after having completed the survey report, shortly thereafter I was asked to go to Miami to become permanently assigned to the station in Miami. I do not recall the exact date at which that permanent change of station took place.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that that was sometime before the end of May of '62?

Mr. Halley. Yes. It was probably before that, but as I say, there are a couple of weeks gap that we would have to look at my service record to get the exact dates, but certainly it could have been March, it could have been April: But I reserve, you know, the right to check my record if that is a critical point in terms of what you are trying to establish.

Mr. Baron. Certainly.

I should say generally at this point, if anything we cover today gives you that kind of problem it would be immensely helpful to us if you would check your answers against documents that might be available in the CIA.

Mr. Halley. Yes, all right.

Mr. Baron. In fact, let me ask you if you would check that one out, because it would be useful to know exactly when you joined the JMWAVE station.

During the period of time before you joined JMWAVE, while you were conducting the survey, did you report to anyone other than William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. In a formal sense, this TDY was conducted on behalf of the task force commander, who was Mr. Harvey. While I was in Miami conducting the survey, I obviously discussed matters pertaining to that survey to the team who was then in charge of the operational activity in Miami. That team was essentially headed by Mr. Al Cox, who has since died.

Mr. Baron. Was that team the equivalent of JMWAVE station?

Mr. Halley. Yes. Mr. Cox was the head, then, of what would be the equivalent of the JMWAVE Station.

Mr. Baron. Was he the head of JMWAVE until the point when you replaced him, or until the point you became Chief of the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. That is correct. He was the head of that unit until such time as I replaced him.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware during this survey that you were conducting of any link between Task Force W and the so-called Special Group in the White House which was part of the National Security Council structure and used the project named MONGOOSE for anti-Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. My understanding at the time that I conducted this survey was that there was a three-man group in existence which was headed by Mr. Robert Kennedy that was conducting a survey to see what kind of activities could be conducted against Cuba. The other members of that particular group were General Lansdale and Mr. Helms.

This three-man group had subordinate to it for all practical purposes the task force unit which was managed by Mr. Harvey. I am not familiar, however, with the other terminology that you used, that is Project MONGOOSE, or whatever you said. I do not know the exact words you used. I am not familiar with that terminology.

Mr Baron. During the whole period of your involvement with JMWAVE, you were not made aware of Project MONGOOSE as such?

Mr. Halley. I am not aware of Project MONGOOSE. I do not recall it as an acronym, cryptonym or anything else that was in common usage in my conversations.

Also, you have to understand that during that particular time, Mr. Harvey was subordinate to the normal Agency chain of command. In other words, he had parallel lines, if you will. There was this three-man Task Force to whom he was reporting regularly. At the same time, as the Task Force Commander, he was reporting to the then-DDP who was Mr. Helms.

Mr Baron. You began your survey just about the time that Mr. Helms replaced Mr. Bissell as DDP?

Mr. Halley. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the command relationship between the three-man group that you have mentioned and William Harvey as head of Task Force W? Did that group task Harvey directly, or did Harvey's assignments have to come through Helms and through the DCI as opposed to this group that did not include the DCI?

Mr. Halley. My understanding of it at the time was we were really talking about parallel lines. In other words, this three-man group was meeting. Mr. Helms was both a member of that particular group and the DDP. Therefore, when he came back from one of these meetings and issued instructions to Mr. Harvey, it was, you know, tantamount to these things coming through two channels simultaneously, one coming from this three-man task force and the other instruction simultaneously coming from Mr. Helms who was the DDP.

Mr. Baron. As far as Mr. Harvey was concerned, an assignment or order from Richard Helms was an order to be taken at face value? Harvey did not have to question whether it had the stamp of approval from the DCI or not? Would that have been your operating understanding?

Mr. Halley. That would have been my understanding, yes. Certainly an instruction received from Mr. Helms was a valid Agency instruction.

Mr. Baron. The DCI at this point was John McCone.

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of the relationship between this three-man group and John McCone at that point?

Mr. Halley. Not on a day to day basis. Once I went to Miami, I came back on a regular basis to review operational plans and programs. On one occasion I accompanied Mr. McCone to the White House to give a presentation or sit in while the presentation was being made.

Mr. Baron. Where was this? What was the forum in which the presentation was made.

Mr. Halley. This was a meeting with President Kennedy and other members of the then-Cabinet were present at that particular meeting.

Mr. Baron. Was that a Cabinet meeting or was it a Special Group meeting as a sub-unit of the National Security Council?

Mr. Halley. You know, that happened in 1962. This is 1975. I do not recall then with precision as to whether it was a meeting of the Cabinet or whether it was a meeting of the National Security Council, or whether it was a meeting of the Special Group.

Mr. Baron. That is perfectly understandable. Do you recall which Cabinet members were present at that meeting?

Mr. Halley. Yes. My recollection of that was that Mr. McNamara was present, Mr. Rusk was present, Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, was present. You know, I am just vague now at this particular point. Those are the ones that stick out in my memory as being present.

Mr. Baron. Was the DCI present?

Mr. Halley. Yes, the DCI was present, and he gave a portion of the presentation. As I recall, Mr. FitzGerald gave the other portion of the presentation.

Mr. Baron. Who at that point replaced William Harvey as Chief of Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Right. You know, the chronology of the Chiefs of our Task Force were that it was Harvey, then FitzGerald, then Screber, after that, Hart. I served with all four of those. This was a very active period, you know, with precision, I cannot outline for you today the dates when Harvey left and FitzGerald took over, you know, when FitzGerald left and Screber took over and so forth. This is something that I would have to research to give you the precise dates.

Mr. Baron. What was the substance of this meeting that they had in which the President was present?

Mr. Halley. This was a general review of activities that were being conducted against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Was there any mention of any assassination effort at that meeting?

Mr. Halley. No, there was not.

Mr. Baron. You were attending at that point in connection with the survey you conducted?

Mr. Halley. No. I was attending at that point as the Station Chief from Miami in order to make a contribution to the issues that were being discussed, to the fact that detailed, substantive back-up for whatever questions might be put to the Agency spokesmen. I made reference to that because you asked me if I knew the relationship between Mr. McCone and this three-man group. I said no, on a day-to-day basis I did not know the relationship, but that there were meetings that were attended by me in which Mr. McCone was talking to individuals like Mr. Kennedy, the Attorney General, who was a member of that group.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that that group might have gone by any particular name or designation?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

Mr. Baron. You are not familiar with the term Special Group?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am aware of the term Special Group. I am aware that the chronology of the 303 Committee, Special Group, 40 Committees and so forth, but as I mentioned to you earlier, that particular time, I cannot distinguish between whether this was an ad hoc meeting or this was a Special Group meeting, or what it was.

Mr. Baron. Did you assume at that time that the three-man group that you referred to, including the Attorney General, General Lansdale and Richard Helms, had a formal relationship to this larger Special Group? In other words, was that three-man group a kind of decision-making sub-unit of the Special Group, or do you think it operated entirely independent from the National Security Council structure.

Mr. Halley. I do not think I can give you an authoritative answer to that. I would go back to what I previously told you. When I entered into this project in February of '62, the chain of command that I was familiar with was this three-man group in constant contact with Mr. Harvey. The second chain of command, paralleling that, was Mr. Harvey reporting to the DDP and the DDP subsequently reporting through his chain of command to the Director, and that would be the only way that I could characterize that with any accuracy.

Mr. Baron. Did those two chains of command continue as the channels of decision-making and tasking when you were -- or during your tenure as Chief of Station at JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. That relationship changed, and again I do not have the date at my fingertips at what time that changed.

I know that shortly thereafter I was in Miami, General Lansdale came down to visit me, to talk with me, about the progress that was being made in the operational program. At some point after that, this three-man group for all intents and purposes disappeared. General Lansdale was reassigned; the group broke up; subsequent reviews of the program were made at the Special Group level. As an example, we would have to submit every month the number of operations that we were going to run, such as infiltrations into Cuba through what would be paramilitary means, and these were approved by the Special Group. There was an approval procedure for setting those up, so subsequently the three-man group disappeared and the regular mechanism of the Special Group came into play.

I am sorry, I cannot give you a precise date for that change, but I am sure it is in the record and I am sure you even have the date because the Agency has been researching all sorts of material for you. I feel that you would just have to get those dates for the record.

Mr. Baron. We can do that.

Would you say that every major operation that you undertook at JMWAVE would have been approved by the Special Group or at least they would have been put on notice of the nature of any major operation that you were planning?

Mr. Halley. Why do you not define for me what you consider to be a major operation so we do not get into, you know, a problem? If you feel that you cannot do that [illegible].

Mr. Baron. Perhaps we can turn it around and say, could you characterize the kinds of operations generally that you would refer to this three-man group initially, ~~in~~ to the Special Group later, for their approval, or at least to put them on notice, the kinds that you might not refer and instead proceed unilaterally?

Mr. Halley. Initially, the three-man group was seized with the problem of conducting the survey of what could be done against Cuba. As soon as that was more or less agreed upon, my understanding of this, as I told you, the three-man group was disbanded or atrophied or went on to other things and then the formal mechanism came in for approval, that is, the Special Group. As procedures became more formalized, we had to submit a monthly schedule of the kind of operations that would be conducted against Cuba in the paramilitary fields.

In other words, if we were going to run an operation that was going to be a cache replacement in the Cuban mainland, that had to be put in, say in our October schedule, that October schedule had to be submitted to the Washington Headquarters so they could make it available to the Special Group sometime in September. So I would regard a cache, say the lowest kind of operation in terms of sensitivity, and then you could move up from team infiltrations that had to be approved in advance, resupply missions, paramiltary operations against fixed installations would all be approved.

Mr. Baron. If there had been any operation with the assassination of Fidel Castro, or other high Cuban government leaders as its objective, would such an operation have been referred to either the three-man group or later the Special Group.

Mr. Halley. If such an operation had been proposed from Miami, it would have had to have gone through that particular process.

Mr. Baron. Your answer seems to indicate that only operations that originated at the JMWAVE Station would be referred up for approval. Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is the kind of activity that I have firsthand knowledge of. When I became the Station Chief, I told you my time at this was essentially February of 1962 through

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

either June or July of '65. That was my stewardship. That was my involvement in the Cuban operation.

During that particular period of time, my firsthand knowledge of these events would be, if that kind of operation were to go forward it would have had to go through this approval mechanism, it would have had to have been some formal action taken. If it were something that certainly would -- for some reason might not be committed to paper, somebody may have wanted to discuss it orally from Miami, the chain of command would have been from me to whomever was the head of the Task Force in Washington, or later, when the Task Force became reintegrated into the Western Hemisphere Division, I would have had to talk to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, who at one time was FitzGerald.

Mr. Baron. But a plan that originated at the CIA above the level of the Chief of Station at JMWAVE would not necessarily have been referred to Special Group for approval, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. I have no firsthand knowledge of that, therefore I am trying to restrict myself to those things that I have personal knowledge of. In other words, that is the kind of thing that I think you should talk to, you know, those who were involved directly, because I think you can talk to Mr. Harvey or Mr. Screber or others who would be able to give you a better perception of that.

I want to make one point here, that once I went to Miami, I was a regular visitor to Washington, but always for one or two days at a time when there was always a full agenda of events to be discussed that related to the Station in Miami. I did not carry here, I did not engage, you know, in idle conversation with my associates. Therefore, I was not aware of the firsthand situation of how they conducted business on a sustained basis on items that did not immediately impact on Miami.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any personal knowledge of any operation run out of the JMWAVE Station that could be construed as an assassination effort?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have firsthand knowledge of any operation run out of Florida with CIA involvement that could be construed as an assassination effort?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any firsthand knowledge. You also have to put this in a historical perspective. In other words, from what I have read in the Press since then, obviously I could put certain things together. You are asking me in this timeframe, 1962 to 1965, did I have any firsthand knowledge at that particular time?

Mr. Baron. Exactly.

Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no, I did not.

You also have to put yourself in the historical context of that particular time. Thousands of refugees were coming out of Cuba, coming into Miami, Dade County up and down the Florida

Keys. There was a regular mechanism to screen these people. Any number of these people had plans or ideas for changing the situation in Cuba, among those ideas for changing the situation in Cuba were plans to assassinate any number of people in Cuba. This was something that was talked about, you could go down to any coffee house in downtown Miami and Cubans would be talking that kind of language.

So I do not want to leave you with the impression that the word assassination never came across my radar screen, but we are talking about, and my answer was geared to a planned operation by CIA.

Mr. Baron. Or with CIA involvement of any sort?

Mr. Halley. CIA involvement? I know of no operation that was a planned operational activity, you know, for the sole purpose of assassinating, you know, Mr. A, B or Mr. C. This was the ambiente allenteof the time. People were talking about these things in the refugee community, these kind of things were being discussed.

Mr. Baron. Mr. A, B or C could have been Fidel Castro, Raul Castro? [illegible]

Mr. Halley. It could have been anyone. This was the mood of the Latin American revolutionary where a coup, you know, is a way of life, where restaurants and coffee houses abound with conversation about how to run a coup. In the running of a coup, one of the things that people talk about is how do you control the leadership which then exists at that time.

Mr. Baron. Are you saying that you are not aware of any operation which could have had as one of its subsidiary objectives, whether the primary objective or not, the assassination of Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, or Che Guevara, which was run with CIA involvement?

Mr. Halley. I would like to phrase that question slightly differently, because I think, you know, you have several things tied together. I would like to answer your question this way.

During my tenure in Miami, I did not put forth any proposals to mount an assassination operation. In other words, there was no formal plan, I did not put forth any operational proposals along this line.

Secondly, I am not aware of any assassination plans being put forth, you know, by Mr. Harvey or by anyone else at that particular time. That is the way I would prefer to answer that.

Mr. Baron. What kind of problem did you have with the question as it was asked?

Mr. Halley. Well, you lumped a number of things together. I am trying to separate these out. In other words, you put in there a secondary or tertiary consideration.

Mr. Baron. Right, I am interested in that.

Mr. Halley. That is what bothers me, because I did not put forth any plans. On the other hand, I do not want to be held responsible for such things as CIA being in touch with a paramilitary group in Cuba whose primary mission was the collection of intelligence, whose secondary mission might be to organize a resistance and, unbeknownst to me, might have had their own ideas which were never consulted with us, you know, never discussed with us, through the communications channels that we had, who may have been thinking, may have planned, and may have attempted, to implement assassination operations.

I do not feel under the command and control mechanism that existed that I could exercise through the Station over such a situation that I could be held responsible for that. Therefore, I cannot accept your question on the secondary or tertiary situation because I have no knowledge of those. You may have some knowledge and you can confront me with some statement by some Cuban who said that this was part of his mission. I have to look at that at the time.

Mr. Baron. We will go over some statements, but in trying to recover this ground one more time, I think it is important to distinguish an attempt to pin the responsibility on you, which I am not trying to do by my questioning --

Mr. Halley. That is a complicated question.

Mr. Baron. The attempt to simply -- undoubtedly, the attempt to simply bring out your knowledge and any awareness that you may have had of any kind of operation that had assassination as one of its objectives, and also involved the CIA to any extent. That is what I am asking you for.

Mr. Halley. Right, and I will stand by my answer, that is, I put forth no plans, I know of no plans put forth, you know, during my tenure in Miami in which assassination was part of the operational rationale. You know, the only way we can clarify this perhaps to your satisfaction is to discuss some specifics. If you are prepared to talk about specifics, maybe I can deal with those within the framework of that general statement that I made, you know. I know how Cubans talk. I know the rumors that have existed over the years. I simply do not want to be identified with any action conducted by some group over which I had no knowledge or control. That is my key point.

Mr. Baron. I think that answers it for now, and we will cover some specifics later.

One more question on this dual chain of command: on the one hand, the Agency chain of command from the DDP to Harvey to you at JMWAVE, and on the other hand, the three-man decision making group consisting of the Attorney General, Lansdale and Helms. Would you say in the early days that this three-man group appeared to you to be in control of the decision making before the Special Group stepped in, that decisions were made in a less formal way than they were later under the Special Group?

Mr. Halley. I really could not address myself to that. In other words, I never sat in on a meeting of the three-man group. In other words --

Mr. Baron. What about the kind of reporting that was required of you by the three-man group as opposed to the Special Group?

Mr. Halley. My requirements for reporting really stemmed in the early days from Harvey. If there were any special requirements, he was taking them from the three-man group and translating them and, in fact, much of the system of reporting in those early days was generated by me and what I thought was required to keep Mr. Harvey as a Task Force Commander fully informed. I think that you undoubtedly know from the record that I worked for Mr. Harvey prior to 1962 and therefore I was familiar, you know, with his style of operation and though I had a clear understanding of what he needed in an informationa sense. So when I went to Miami, I organized much of the reporting flow upward, if you will, from the field unit to Headquarters.

Mr. Baron. Had you worked for Mr. Harvey in Germany?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I had.

Mr. Baron. In Berlin?

Mr. Halley. Yes, sir.

Mr. Baron. This was on the famous and successful tunnel operation?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not deserve any credit for the tunnel operation. That is Mr. Harvey's activity. He kept that very tightly compartmented and in the days when that was going on, I was involved primarily with Eastern European activities.

Mr. Baron. You were aware of Mr. Harvey's style of operating?

Mr. Halley. Yes. I worked with him -- I think the date is somewhere in June or July of '54 to somewhere in '59. I would have to look that up in the record, the exact date.

Mr. Baron. But you say you not only had a close working relationship with Mr. Harvey, but you came to be a personal friend of his?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I would like to say I am a personal friend of Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Returning to your statements about the chain of command, you seem to be saying that Mr. Harvey served as the funnel for both of these chains of command; as far as you were concerned, you received directives from him, whatever the source may have been originally, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Correct.

I want to make a point. Insofar as the three-man group was concerned, I would see Helms in his role as the DDP in the three-man group. I would see Lansdale -- as I told you, Lansdale came down to visit me in Miami on one occasion. He came as part of that three-man group. But my chain of command, during my visit was still from me to Harvey. Lansdale was down there, I was to be, you know, straightforward, candid, discuss plans, programs, problems. But I received my orders and instructions the control of money and so forth was vested in the Task Force Commander, Mr. Harvey.

Therefore, I never dealt with this three-man group as a body. I dealt with the individuals, you know, and various mutations.

Mr. Baron. Would you say that the three-man group had a less formal, more free-wheeling style of decision making, and there was a real change in the rigor with which you were required to report after the Special Group took over?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say that the total reporting became more formalized the longer we stayed in business. I cannot ascribe this to the difference of style of the three-man group as opposed to the Agency chain of command or subsequent with the requirements of the Special Group. This evolved from a body of experience that was gained as the operation was established and got some experience.

So I would not want to characterize that as being a result of the groups.

Mr. Baron. You did not have any problem with the propriety of the three-man group in the early stages?

Mr. Halley. No, I had no reason to believe that it was not a duly constituted body. In other words, the officers that I reported to, in that particular case, Mr. Harvey, Mr. Helms, were my chain of command at that particular point, were the ones who briefed me on the existence of this three-man body and I felt that that was a perfectly legitimate function of that body.

Mr. Baron. Who briefed you on the existence of the body?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of the initial briefing was from Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall how he described that three-man group and the responsibilities?

Mr. Halley. No. This was 1962, and this is 1975. As you know from my records, these intervening years have been very active for me, therefore, I do not remember with precision that conversation in all of its details. I do recall my first briefing on the existence of this three-man group being from Harvey.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned that General Lansdale might occasionally meet with you personally. This is in Miami, at JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. I can only recall at this point one specific meeting where he came down to Florida in Miami to visit.

Mr. Baron. What was the substance of that meeting?

Mr. Halley. He was given some briefings by my staff on their areas of specialization, whether it was foreign intelligence collection, whether it was maritime activities, or whether it was paramilitary activities. I spent a lot of time with him personally, talking about where we stood, where we were making progress in the collection of intelligence, where we were having

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

problems, and so on. It was a substantive management operation, problem-oriented type of conversation.

Mr. Baronv. What period of time would you place this in?

Mr. Halley. Probably sometime in the summer of '62, because my family was already in Miami at that point, and when I first went to Miami my family was not with me. I think my wife joined me in Miami sometime in the summer of '62, you know, I would have to research that. It is obviously available from the records as to when my family moved and a permanent change of station.

Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion whether direct or indirect of assassination of Cuban leaders during your meetings with General Lansdale?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such conversations. You know, I think that from my point of view, we are off a little bit on this perspective. I would like to try to focus on the perspective for you in the historical setting.

Mr. Baron. Please do.

Mr. Halley. I think by your questions and your interest, you are narrowly focused on this assassination thing, but let me turn that around a bit, and let me put it in my context at the time which may help you understand my answers.

Mr. Baron. Before you do, can I stop you for one moment? I would like to get back on the track that we originally started on of asking you about the JMWAVE Station in general and the context at that time. Could I ask just a couple of specific questions before we do that, about the three-man group that you raised, and then give you a full opportunity to ~~pull~~ put ~~out of~~ what we have said so far and everything that will follow into context.

Did you have any individual meetings with Robert Kennedy, who was then-Attorney General?

Mr. Halley. You mean individual, one on one?

Are you saying did I have a meeting, a personal, private meeting with the Attorney General?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. The answer to that is no.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with the Attorney General of any sort during this period of time?

Mr. Halley. I mentioned to you earlier that at this meeting that I went to with Director McCone, the Attorney General, Mr. Robert Kennedy, was present at that White House briefing. He did ask some questions, which I do not remember what the questions were at this particular point in time. I answered some of those questions that were put during the course of that particular presentation. Throughout that whole period of time, that was the only, if you will, direct contact with him that I can remember. You know, unless you can show me something.

Mr. Baron. During the entire period that you were involved with JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. That is right.

Mr. Baron. At that meeting -- again, I realize what we are doing is in isolation, out of context -- at that meeting that you attended, with the Cabinet members and the President, was there any discussion either directly or indirectly or by means of any circumlocutions of the subject of assassination?

Mr. Halley. Not that I can recall.

You know, my recollection of that meeting is, we went to it en masse, the first -- you know, Director McCone, myself, Bruce Cheever, several other people who went. We went in several cars. We went to the meeting, the Cuban issue was the first item on the agenda. As I recall the thing, the Cuban thing was over after this period of time. We, the technocrats left, the Director John McCone stayed on. You know, during my presence at the meeting there was nothing discussed about assassinations.

Mr. Baron. Was there any such discussion between yourself and John McCone or Richard Helms at any point?

Mr. Halley. I never recall discussing assassinations with John McCone. Now, in terms of discussions with Richard Helms, these were conversations in which atmospherics in Miami and problems like that would be discussed, and I am sure somewhere in some of these conversations the mood of the community, the subject of assassinations undoubtedly came up. This was part of the life of that particular period.

I cannot remember a specific date, you know, some time at which that was discussed, and you know I never received any instruction from Helms to mount an assassination operation.

Mr. Baron. Again, I am not trying to unfairly pull these kinds of conversations out of their historical context. Before we flesh out the historical context, do you have any recollection of the manner in which assassination might have come up between yourself and Helms?

Mr. Halley. Again, I put it in this overall context of the times. We were running foreign intelligence collection operations against Cuba with classical agent means. We were running collection against Cuba through paramilitary teams. We were involved in paramilitary operations that could be described as commando raids. Those were the kinds of activities.

We were dealing with exile groups, we were debriefing refugees and in all of this conversations of assassination, the Cuban penchant for it had to come up. I cannot pinpoint --

Mr. Baron. You do not recall any reference of means to be used or people to be involved?

Mr. Halley. No. Even such things as discussions of various kinds of weapons, you know, people, as you probably know from this experience, every individual who deals with weapons has a different view on what is the ideal weapon. If you took a squad of ten men and gave them the free choice, I am sure all ten of them would come up with a different weapon.

Therefore, when we were standardizing weapons to our paramilitary teams, things like that, weapons would be discussed in terms of, you know, muzzle velocity, rate of fire, weight of the weapon for the Cuban to carry, because many of them were quite small. In this context, people would discuss what is the range, can a guy use it to shoot somebody at a particular range? Is this an assassination weapon? Is this a good weapon for close combat?

Therefore the term assassination was just a part of the life, of the fabric at that time. That is what I am trying to get across. I just cannot articulate any more eloquently than that.

Mr. Baron. I think you are being quite eloquent and extremely informative. You mentioned that the phrase assassination would be used in the discussions about the kinds of weapons that would be used for commando raids or equipping your operatives.

Mr. Halley. Paramilitary teams, right.

Mr. Baron. Was the capacity of a weapon to be used as an assassination weapon among other uses a desirable capacity?

In other words, was that phrase used positively?

Mr. Halley. No, it was not. It is the kind of thing that weaves itself into, you know, a conversation.

For instance, if you are planning a commando raid against something like an oil refinery, you have to think about how are you going to get across the guard force that is around a refinery? One of the questions you have, of course, is if you bypass them, you are successful to get in without a trail or any kind of a struggle, that is great. But what happens if you are implanting your target and the guard stumbles on you, you know, the guard force then becomes an immediate risk to your operation and usually there is a fire fight. Therefore, this becomes a question of weapons. In other words, what weapon is going to give the highest muzzle velocity and make the largest amount of noise. Therefore, if you have two weapons of co-equal cyclic rate of fire and one made less rate of noise than the other for that job you would pick the weapon with the lowest noise. You might even silence it. You may make a silenced submachine gune out of it.

These are the kinds of things that go into these discussions of weapons.

Mr. Baron. The technology of assassination and targetted shooting, are you referring to -- when you say assassination weapon -- to a weapon generally capable of targetted shooting?

Mr. Halley. In this particular context, I think most people felt that the Cuban penchant for assassination, for discussing assassination, was the kind that would have to be done from a long range.

You know, I think that it is generally an accepted thesis that a group of dedicated men who are prepared to give their lives can in time assassinate almost anybody. Now, the Cuban was not that kind of a person. That was not his psychological make-up. He tends to want to live, to enjoy life, to talk about his accomplishment. Therefore, while they were brave and dedicated, they were the kind of people who would probably engage in something like this in the context of using the sniper weapon as a vehicle for assassination, long distance.

Therefore, in this context you are talking about range, you know, one of the key factors becomes what is the accurate range of a weapon if fired by an expert marksman. Therefore, that is the kind of thing that would go into, you know, discussions of weapons.

Mr. Baron. When you were discussing weapons with high range and low muzzle velocity, was this ever discussed in the context of shooting Fidel Castro or other key Cuban leaders as opposed to targetted shooting on a commando raid.

Mr. Halley. I can recall, you know, no conversation in which it was narrowly focused on the question of Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. Let us go back, then, to putting this all into historical context. I am going to ask you if you can explain more about the structure of the JMWAVE Station, both the channels upward from you to the Agency and the Special Group and the channels downward from you to your operatives, if in the course of explaining the structure, you would like to make some comments about the historical context, that would be appreciated.

Mr. Halley. I think what I would like to do is to try to put this into some perspective.

The perspective really starts with the failure of the Bay of Pigs Operation. After the failure of the Bay of Pigs, the Kennedy Administration wanted another look taken at the problem of Cuba. In order to get that other look started, the Kennedy Administration created this three-man task force or this three-man group and wanted to see what else could be done against Cuba, and that is when I came into this problem in February of '62.

Mr. Baron. Is it possible that the three-man group that you are referring to is actually the Robert Kennedy-Maxwell Taylor Board of Inquiry into the reasons for the failure of the Bay of Pigs operation?

Mr. Halley. This three-man group stemmed out of that inquiry. What its relationship was to the inquiry, I do not know, because I was not involved and I never had an opportunity once I plunged into this job, to go back and read those historical documents. You know, I am sure there is a Maxwell Taylor Report, and so forth, but I have never read it.

All right.

Therefore, my first task when I became involved in this was the task of coming up with an operational plan to see what kinds of intelligence could be collected in Cuba, so that by collecting this intelligence, an assessment could be made based on hard facts as to what could be done against Castro. In other words, the difference here was that people thought that the Bay of Pigs operation was not soundly grounded in intelligence. Therefore, this was an attempt to start the collection of intelligence to see what could be done.

In order to collect intelligence at that particular time, it was believed that all avenues of approach should be used, so that meant classical foreign intelligence operations, counterintelligence operations, the debriefing of refugees, and the use of paramilitary means to put teams into Cuba to collect intelligence on that part of the island that could not be covered by what you would call the more classical means of foreign intelligence collection.

As the program was started essentially by me or accelerated by me, we in fact got caught up with the Cuban Missile Crisis -- that is, the advent of the Soviet intervention into Cuba -- and our whole effort shifted to covering that Soviet build-up in Cuba, and this was an integral part to our having detected the Soviet build-up and the United States government taking the actions which they did, that is, to verify this.

There was a great problem for a while when we were all talking about hard intelligence, the President, John Kennedy, was telling us, give us hard intelligence. We thought we were giving him hard intelligence. What he meant, in his definition

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76 WARD & PAUL 70114

of hard intelligence, as it turned out to be, was a U-2 photograph. He never articulated that to us in those terms.

Then we got caught up into the eyeball to eyeball confrontation of the Cuban Missile Crisis. When that was over, we got caught up with the problem of monitoring the disengagement of the Soviet presence in Cuba. That took us up through sometime into early '63.

Then we took a look again, because we knew an awful lot more about them than we had when we started in February of '62, to see what could be done against Cuba, and it was clear at that point that no external invasion was going to be possible, because that was something that was excluded by the Khruschev-Kennedy agreement and then it was not feasible. In any event, therefore it was a question of what could be done. So we were collecting intelligence to continue to stay on top of the situation. We were attempting to establish contacts with the military establishment in Cuba to see if there was any force that was opposed to Castro within the military establishment that would be used to alter the situation and continue to see whether there were any economic pressures that could be brought on Cuba that would accelerate the whole problem of creating an environment in which a resistance could be created on an island.

Mr. Baron. Were those the two primary tactics used at that point when Castro had consolidated his strength and

tape 3

when the United States and Russia reached an agreement that no external invasion of Cuba would take place, did you turn primarily to the ways and means of finding a dissident group within Cuba that might be capable of overthrowing Castro, number one, and number two, of finding means of undermining the economic strength of the Castro government.

Mr. Halley. In addition, we were continuing to support certain elements of resistance, you know, that were still there that were not in the Army.

Mr. Baron. What kinds of elements were those?

Mr. Halley. These were paramilitary forces that were in Cuba, that we had put in or established contact with, or people who were already in the bush who we had already established contact with or they had established contact with us, and we were providing them with food, weapons and so forth so that they could survive. So that it was a multifaceted approach at that particular time.

That went on from the middle of '63 until the middle of '65, and these are two distinct phases of this operation. In effect, one, a survey, and two, the Missile Crisis and its post-mortem, and then the next phase was the continuation of intelligence collection, the working or taking the sounding with military dissidents, economic pressure, and working with natural dissident elements that were still on the island.

I think you know that all of your questions have to be put

7600070116

into these various timeframes. When you talk about, was there ever a discussion of assassination, you know, when people were coming out and being interviewed, yes, some Cuban refugee would say, by God, I would like to go back and shoot, you know, X, Y or Z. It might have been some commandante in his particular area; it could have been Fidel Castro. This was just part of the fabric of the times.

Mr. Baron. Can we turn now to the structure of the JMWAVE Station and explain that a bit? How large was the Station? What was the command structure within the Station?

Mr. Halley. The Station started expanding in whatever timeframe it was, somewhere after the survey was completed. It must have started expanding sometime in March of 1962. You know, by the time that it was at its peak, which was probably somewhere just before the Cuban Missile Crisis, July, August of 1962, it was either the largest or the second largest -- my recollection was that it was the second largest station in existence at that time. I would not want to be pinned down on a particular number of people on any particular day.

Mr. Baron. Could you give some idea as to the number of employees at the Station during its peak?

Mr. Halley. I would say somewhere in the neighbordhood of, you know, three hundred. You know, again, this means staff and contract employees.

21

Mr. Baron. What do you cover with the term contract employees?

Mr. Halley. These would be, for instance, maritime case officers. We hired people who had specialized skills, that is, that they could manage a series of vessels for us, but they were not longterm staff employees. These would be people who would be used, if you will, in a management organization, basic implementation of the program.

Mr. Baron. Did you have other agents or operatives among the Cuban community or outside the Cuban community that were affiliated with the Station although not employed by it directly?

Mr. Halley. I think we are going to have to define some terms.

Mr. Baron. What I am trying to do now is simply get a picture of the scope of the Station's strength and ~~in~~ its activities, how many people the Station had to call upon for its activities.

Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to give you an answer, because I think we are going to get into a semantic problem here.

When I talk about the Station, as such, I would say that is roughly in the neighborhood of [three hundred] people, and that was those people who would be involved in the management effort, the direction effort, the financial logistics, cover procedures, security, that kind of thing. All right? Flowing out from that were people whom we would call agents, that is, 21

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

76000701119

WARD & PAUL

people who were not knowledgeable necessarily of whom they worked for or where the cover offices were located and so forth. Let us say, in the maritime part of the operation we might have had at any one point in time, you know, up to five hundred people involved in maritime activities, you know?

Again, if you pick a date, I am sure we can research it. The records are still available and you know how many people we had, but let us take these five hundred. What am I talking about? These would be essentially Cubans who were the captains of the vessles that were used in infiltration operations to put people on the shore of Cuba, and there were a variety of techniques. In other words, you might start on with the mother ship, which would be an LCI -- I am not sure how familiar you are with various kinds of vessels.

Mr. Baron. What is an LCI?

Mr. Halley. Landing craft kind of vessle, or a patrol craft, a PC, 110-foot vessle, that would be a mother ship. This is the kind of ship that would take fuel supplies and water, so that other smaller vessels could be serviced by it. So you might start with an operation of a mother ship towing a smaller boat, or having it on its decks and going down to fifteen or twenty miles from Cuba, putting the smaller boat over the side, which was a faster boat, lower silhouette, less likely to be picked up by Cuban coastal radar, and then that would take the team in close to the shore where we might finally

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

put them into rubber rafts, where they would paddle in or use a silent outboard motor if the surf was high.

Mr. Baron. The people involved in manning those crafts would not necessarily be employees of the Station directly? They might be agents, even non-paid agents?

Mr. Halley. No, they were not paid. For instance, they might work for a particular cover company. In other words, I am only using this as an example. Let us say we had the ABC Shipping Company. That shipping company was a subsidiary of the Station, if you will, and the ABC Shipping Company ran maybe one LCI and maybe two or three smaller boats which it could deck load and that company might have fifty or seventy-five employees, as an example, all Cubans, maybe some of them was Nicaraguans or Costa Ricans as most of these vessels -- I would have to go and look at each vessel.

Does that give you a feel for the size of the problem?

Mr. Baron. How many such companies would have been in existence at that time, companies operating as CIA proprietaries or companies in cover and supplying the JMWAVE Station with personnel or with equipment?

Mr. Halley. We are talking about all of these companies, they probably went up into the hundreds. I distinguish between companies that were set up simply to provide cover as opposed to companies that were proprietaries. You know, these terms mean different things to me. The nature of the Agency's involvement in each is different. I am having a little trouble --

Mr. Baron. Could you explain what different categories of companies you were receiving help from at that point, and about how many of each there might have been?

Mr. Halley. I do not think I could do that. We are talking about hundreds of companies that we used during that period of time. Some of them might simply have been a company set up and registered and run out of some attorney's office. It simply provided back stopping for the ownership of the small boat.

Everything has to be owned by somebody, it has to have a Coast Guard registration, you know, things like that. Even if I had access to the files to answer your question, it would take me weeks to pull all that together to give you an answer. I don't think there is an overview statement.

Mr. Baron. Would it be fair to say that you had cooperation on a grand scale from all kinds of people in private enterprise in the Miami area, or in Southern Florida?

Mr. Halley. I think it would be fair to say that we had extensive cooperation -- I do not like your word "grand" -- that we had extensive cooperation from the civilian sector in Florida, in the state of Florida, to facilitate the conduct of this clandestine mission.

Mr. Baron. Did you also have extensive cooperation from civic officials and law enforcement agencies in being allowed to operate free or the law? For instance, were you allowed to put vessels onto the water which were not properly registered, or which could be held immune for inspection by the Coast Guard or other maritime authorities, and were you allowed to send people through the streets of Southern Florida who may have been armed or violating local law in some other way, who were held immune by arrangements that you had with law enforcement agencies?

Mr. Halley. You have asked me, in essence, three questions.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Halley. Let me try to divide that and deal with each question separately.

Let me first deal with the vessels. Every vessel that we had was appropriately registered. There were no short-cuts insofar as the U.S. Coast Guard was concerned. That is, any vessel that was registered in the United States met appropriate safety standards and so forth, so we were not putting any vessels into the water that any citizen could not have put into the water. That is we are talking about ten, fifteen, twenty foot boats, thirty foot boats, thirty-five foot boats, things like that. These boats were owned in either a corporate name or by a private individual who had to register them with the Coast Guard and pass normal Coast Guard regulations.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

7 6 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 :

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. To continue with this, I understand that safety regulations would have been complied with, but was there some sort of immunity from inspection, say inspection for carrying armaments aboard a vessel that the CIA had arranged with maritime authorities, or local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. When we had operations going, these were coordinated with the Coast Guard in terms of their knowing that, you know, at a particular date, time group, that there would be a rendezvous between two vessels which were our vessels, and this was coordinated with the Coast Guard.

Mr. Baron. Would you return to the second part of that large question? Without reference to vessels, were CIA employees or agents on the streets of cities in Southern Florida immune from search or arrest by local law enforcement authorities?

Mr. Halley. They were not immune.

Let me ask to dispel one myth that I think has developed which is reflected in your question. We were meticulous to insure that no weapons were issued to anybody until the men were on the vessel outside of the immediate waters of south Florida, and we were meticulous to insure that when they came back from a mission that they were met at sea and all the weapons were taken away from them.

So, when you talk about a group moving around in Florida, we did work out through the entire state, and I did not want you to feel that I was being less than candid with you, and you keep saying south Florida, I want to say to you that we operated in the state of Florida, men moving around armed under our control in the state of Florida, is just not correct. This was all carefully controlled and they did not have their weapons when they came back, we took them before they landed, so they were not immune.

Mr. Baron. You did have general arrangements or agreements with law enforcement agencies throughout Florida for the treatment of CIA operatives who were affiliated with the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. We did have, through our Office of Security, a continuing dialogue with a number of law enforcement agencies in Florida. If a problem developed, we would then contact them and look at the issue within the context of what had transpired. Certainly there was no immunity. In other words, this has to be looked at on a case by case basis.

For instance, you know, we had a training site in north Florida, as an example. If somebody came off of that site that was drunk and disorderly in town and could not speak English, the local authorities did have a number to call to raise this with us to see whether this was somebody that was of interest to us, and then we would have to go and settle that particular case.

7600070124

Mr. Baron. Back to the structure of the relationships between yourself as Chief of Station at JMWAVE and any operatives or employees who worked underneath you at that Station, would it be fair to say that any activities run out of the Station ultimately were channeled out through you?

Mr. Halley. They should have been, and they were -- you know this Station went through several mutations in organization during its existence. I guess the organizational structure that existed for the longest period of time was something like I am going to describe to you.

There was a Chief of Station, which was myself. I had a Deputy Chief of Station for operations. That is the gentleman who is now retired, I think he is still alive, by the name of Moore, Robert Moore. I had a second Deputy Chief of Station and he was for Support Patterns. That is a gentleman who is also retired, a Mr. Corris.

Then the rest of the Station was organized into a number of branches. Each branch was organized along functional lines. Let me give you an example. There was a Foreign Intelligence Branch. These were people in, what in my terminology would be classical foreign intelligence operations. That is, trying to recruit a Cuban diplomat abroad, as an example, dealing with, you know, a Uruguayan diplomat in the Uruguayan Embassy in Havana. They are working with resident agents in Cuba who might live in some city like Havana and have a legal job as a baker or butcher or something but had a radio set in which they could communicate with us, through which they could communicate to us.

Then there was the Paramilitary Branch. This was the group that ran the commando operations. This was the group that ran, and put people back into Cuba, into resistance groups, or established contact with resistance groups. This was a group that also worked in putting in caches that would supply people, either paramilitary forces in Cuba or agents that were being run by the Foreign Intelligence Group.

All right. Then there was a Covert Action, people who dealt with exiled refugee groups that were involved in radio activities, publications, that kind of thing. Then there is a whole panoply of -- then there was Maritime, in terms of finance, and so on. Security was a branch. Obviously, under that kind of system, no executive, whether he is president of a corporation or a Station Chief, can see every single piece of paper that comes in or out, but clearly there was a review procedure whereby program reviews were conducted, individual operational reviews were conducted.

Mr. Baron. By yourself?

Mr. Halley. By myself. I do not want to leave you with the impression that I knew every single thing that was going on every minute and could account for the activities of three hundred employees on a daily basis.

Mr. Baron. In talking about the personnel affiliated with the Station a moment ago, I think we may have created a misimpression that the only people involved in CIA operations were people who were paid by the Agency. Isn't it also true that there were many members of Cuban exile groups in Florida who participated voluntarily from time to time in CIA sponsored operations?

Mr. Halley. I think that you may have to sharpen that up for me. I am not sure what you really mean.

If you are talking about foreign intelligence collections, you know, the people who were producing --

Mr. Baron. I am talking now about the paramilitary operations.

Mr. Halley. No. I do not know of any people that were involved in paramilitary operations that were not in some way paid.

Mr. Baron. By the Agency?

Mr. Halley. By the Agency.

Let me make sure that we understand each other, because during this period of time there were a lot of independent Cuban groups who claimed that they had sponsorship from the Agency but did not, and were operating, and there was a period in time when these groups could not run their operations from Florida without running the risk of being picked up by Customs, Immigration, Coast Guard, the FBI, or if we had information on it, you know, we might pass the information to the Coast Guard so that they could keep them from going.

If that is what you are referring to, somebody like Alpha 6 or Commando L or somebody like that, they were not a part of the CIA apparatus.

Mr. Baron. Although you might be aware of their activities?

Mr. Halley. We would be aware of their activities, certainly.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain if there is anything to add to what we have already said? The chain of command, apart from yourself as Chief of Station, to Task Force W and to the Directorate of Plans within the Agency?

You would report directly to William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. William Harvey was Chief of Task Force W, later FitzGerald. My chain of command was from me to them. You know, they had a subordinate staff who helped them monitor the Station's activity, so that it just was not the fact, you know, that Mr. Harvey and Mr. FitzGerald were totally dependent on what I told them. To have an appreciation of what was going on in Miami they had their own staff that was following individual operations.

For instance, they had a paramilitary staff that would review our proposals for a paramilitary operation and might say we think that the Station has overextended itself this month, they want to run twenty-five operations given the weather during this particular month of October. We do not

7 6 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 2

think they could do it. We think they should be guided to run only twenty, fifteen, something like that. So they were not totally dependent on me.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the split of responsibility between Task Force W and JMWAVE Station?

In other words, were there certain operations that were run directly out of Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Also, you have to put this into a historical time. What period are you talking about?

Mr. Baron. During the period of your tenure. If there were changes during your tenure at JMWAVE, why do you not explain those?

Mr. Halley. There were. Each one is different. Let me give you a couple of examples.

Washington, Task Force W, essentially did not run any paramilitary operations where they took command and control for sending people to Cuba. For instance, if Task Force W in Washington wanted to plant a radio in Cuba which was to be picked up by foreign intelligence agents who could report, they would task us to implant that radio in a cache in a particular area in Cuba, for instance, Oriente province. We would know simply that it was a radio perhaps. We would then put it into Oriente province, write up the site, give them the rip cord. They would communicate to the agents in Cuba who would go recover the cache.

So they had agents in Cuba that were reporting foreign intelligence to them so they had collection assets that were reporting to them along the same lines that we did. They did work at a downstream point when FitzGerald came in with a couple of groups -- in other words, they had contact with Artime. I had no contact with the Artime group as a general rule. They also had contact with Manolo Ray which I did not have contact with. So they were working with these kinds of larger exile groups.

The Task Force also specialized in much more economic activity than I did. That is a question of looking at such things as [redacted] bus exports from [redacted] to Cuba. 13,13

Mr. Baron. In terms of paramilitary operations, if an assassination operation had been run by Task Force W, would you have assumed as Chief of Station in Miami you would have been aware of such an operation?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not assume that.

Mr. Baron. Would it not have been sound managerial practice to let you know that there was an operation that might have been run through Florida into Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No.

You know, the Agency is a highly compartmented mechanism. You know, let us dispel one thing very promptly here. If you are asking me was I aware of all these contacts, you know, with the Mafia -- and I think I can tell you frankly at that time I was not -- Harvey would come, you know, to Miami, to visit me to review the activities of the station, and while there would go off on his own and make his contact with whomever he was meeting. I knew he was meeting somebody, but it was not up to me to find out with whom he was meeting or why he was meeting them or what he was doing with them.

Mr. Baron. My question really was, I think more innocent than that.

Was it strictly one of involving what correct management techniques would be, or what kind of knowledge the Chief of Station of JMWAVE would have to have in order to do an effective job in dealing with the Cuban community and running operations into Cuba? You seem to be saying that it would not be necessary to run an effective job to have knowledge of every other operation that the CIA is running against Castro?

Mr. Halley. I think what I am saying during that particular time -- I do not want you to come to the conclusion that I was knowledgeable of everything that ran in from or through the state of Florida, because during that period of time, for instance, Mr. Harvey in particular was a very compartmented gentleman, and it would be keeping with his style to run an operation in which the locus of the operation might be Florida and I would not know about it.

Now, that would be an unusual thing, but it is not precluded.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn for a moment to following up on the nature of your contacts with William Harvey in reference to any operations he may have in running unilaterally against Castro. Do you recall aiding Harvey in an operation that he was in charge of and that was not affiliated with JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall anything, I do not recall anything specific. In other words, the pattern was in terms of command and control, I would come to Washington on a regular basis to review activity with Harvey after we submitted our paperwork. Harvey was also a frequent visitor to Florida.

We would have operational discussions. He would talk to the Branch Chiefs, he talked to people. He also went out on his own, and he was meeting somebody, it was clear to me that he was meeting people. But it was frankly in the way that the Agency is run and managed, it was not a concern to me whom he was meeting.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper of you to inquire of him whom he was meeting?

Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been.

Mr. Baron. Did you have suspicions or speculation about whom he might have been meeting or for what purpose that he was having these meetings?

Mr. Halley. No, not for what purpose. There is a whole, you know, panoply of things going on at that time. You know, frankly I was a very busy guy; when Harvey was there, it occupied one hunk of a lot of my time. If he wanted to go off, you know, do something else and was going to meet someone else, that was fine with me. It enabled me to get back to my immediate and more pressing problems.

In this business you just do not ask your superior, what are you doing? That is just not cricket; that is not the way the game is played.

tape 4

Mr. Baron. Do you recall a time when Harvey asked you to procure arms and equipment to be passed to a Cuban exile?

Mr. Halley. To a Cuban exile?

Mr. Baron. Let me strike the reference to a Cuban exile.

Do you recall a time when Harvey asked your aid in procuring arms and equipment to be given to a man named Tony Varona who was a contact of Harvey's?

Mr. Halley. I know Tony Varona. He was in the period -- prior to the Bay of Pigs, he was part of the consejo.

Frankly, if you've got something that you can sharpen that up, I think you need some basis, that I think that can trigger my memory here. I do not remember frankly Tony Varona being in Harvey's --

Mr. Baron. In contact with Harvey?

Mr. Halley. You know, I may have procured something for Harvey, some kind of equipment or done some kind of operational support task.

Mr. Baron. Let us make it more specific.

Do you recall helping Harvey load a U-Haul trailer full of about $5,000 worth of arms and equipment to be left in a parking lot and picked up there by a contact of Harvey's? And this would be in approximately April of 1962.

Mr. Halley. I do vaguely remember something about a rented truck. Quite frankly, I do not really recall all the details of this at this particular time. I do not remember, you know, personally procuring any material, but it is conceivable that I did get a request from Harvey, that I did go to the logistics apparatus, and whatever he had requested from official stocks he was provided.

Mr. Baron. During that same period of time --

Mr. Halley. I do recall something about a truck. I do not recall anything about a trailer. My recollection of this truck incident seems to be -- I do not remember what it was. We did do something for him logistically, I do remember a truck being involved with some logistic material in terms of a parking lot. But frankly that is about all I can recall of it at this particular time.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of hearing of poison pills in any connection during your tenure at JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall -- poison pills? Poison pills, the only kind of thing I can recall occasionally when people were talking about being on mother ships, you know, what would happen if they were captured. This was a discussion occasionally of whether any kind of drugs should be issued to

7600070134

the people who were manning these vessels so they could do themselves in if they were to be captured, things like that, but we never issued any such pills but there were discussions of that kind of a problem. I do recall specific agents who were sent back to Cuba to run a collection or to go back into the bush and so forth who asked for some sort of pills which they could kill themselves with if they were captured.

But other than that -- if that is what you were referring to, I think they are called L pills, or something, as they were referred to in those days.

Mr. Baron. Why were they called L pills?

Mr. Hallev. Everything has a number or nomenclature, I do not know.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of poison pills to be used in assassination operations against Fidel Castro or other Cuban leaders?

Mr. Halley. No.

Is that referencing to this material that I might have provided for Harvey? Because if that is the case, I can dispel that quickly, because I would not have had access to them.

Mr. Baron. You would not have access to poison pills?

Mr. Halley. No, I would not have access to them.

Mr. Baron. Why not?

Mr. Halley. I did not have them in my inventory. That is not anything that I have, you know, command and control of. That is why --

Mr. Baron. They would have had to come directly from Technical Services Division at CIA?

Mr. Halley. That is what I'm trying to clarify what it is that you are trying to establish from me.

In other words, if you are saying --

Mr. Baron. Let us move further, I think we can be more specific now.

We have a document that I am about to show you. I just wanted to clear up the background of it before we discussed the document.

Mr. Halley. Let me just make this point. If you are talking about drug pills, I had no source of such things, so if that is the nature of your question, I can say I had nothing to do with that. If you are talking about, you know --

Mr. Baron. Arms and equipment --

Mr. Halley. -- weapons or something, yes, that was in my inventory. I could have issued that to Harvey, you know, guns, ammunition, plastics, that kind of thing I could have had access to, yes. That is why I am trying to sort out really where the thrust of your questioning is.

Mr. Baron. There were two prongs to the question, you have picked both of them up. One is whether you had ever heard of poison pills in connection with an assassination operation against Fidel Castro, and your testimony would be that you had not, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is right. I would not have had access to those pills myself, nor did the Station. In other words, if I had wanted something like that, I would have had to corresponded with Washington in order to have had access to it, if in fact it existed.

Mr. Baron. You never had any such correspondence?

Mr. Halley. I never had any correspondence that I can recall.

Mr. Baron. The other problem was the supply of arms and equipment to which you already replied.

Have you ever read that Inspector General's Report of 1967, prepared at the request of the DCI to fill him in on any assassination efforts to which the CIA may have been connected?

Mr. Halley. No, I have not read the report.

Mr. Baron. Before you came here today you were not shown any excerpts from this report to refresh your recollection at the CIA?

Mr. Halley. The IG Report?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. No, I have not.

Mr. Baron. Were you shown any other documents at the CIA today to refresh -- or in preparation for today's session --

Mr. Halley. No.

In preparation for today's session I have had several conversations with Seymour Boultin --

Mr. Baron. Walt Elder?

Mr. Halley. I talked to Walt Elder on the phone. You know the people who are involved in this thing. I have asked for that, I talked to our attorney, Clarke --

Mr. Baron. George Clarke?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

-- I talked to a number of people, I asked to see the newspaper clipping from the Miami Herald on the McGovern activity. Yes, I have looked at that kind of thing. But I have not looked at the specific IG Report. I have not read it, I have not seen an extract of the IG Report.

Mr. Baron. Were you given any specific instructions as to the kinds of things that you could say or not say here today?

Mr. Halley. You know, nothing beyond what you and I touched on which you have already put on the record.

Mr. Baron. Which is not to mention the names of CIA officers who are still operating under cover?

Mr. Halley. Right, or agents who would still be viable that I know of.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Then let me show you a document which we will mark as Halley Exhibit No. 2.

(The document referred to was marked Halley

Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Baron. Which is an excerpt from the Inspector General's Report of 1967 at pages 49 and 50, and I will ask you to read the portions that I will bracket which deal with a report of a meeting between yourself and William Harvey involving the supply of arms and equipment.

(Pause)

Mr. Halley. I have no reason to doubt this. I may have provided this support. I do not recall sitting in a parking lot observing --

Mr. Baron. For the record, we are discussing the passage that begins, "When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of [Mr. Halley], the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured" --

Continuing.--And then it continues to say a large shopping list of arms and equipment, which cost about $5,000 and were supplied in a parking lot of a drive-in restaurant in a rented U-Haul truck.

Would the cost of $5,000 have been an unusual expenditure at that time at JMWAVE Station for arms and equipment?

Mr. Halley. No, $5,000 would not have been an unusual expenditure.

Mr. Baron. Not unusual enough, in fact, for you to have a particular memory of the event?

Mr. Halley. No.

Now that I read over this thing, I do recall, as I told you earlier before you showed me this document something about a rented truck and being involved with Harvey in providing him some logistical support for an activity. I do not recall this specific list of equipment being involved, you know, somewhere you got this and if I could check it against the files, if there are any files available, I could verify whether this is correct or not.

Mr. Baron. Whether or not the particular list is correct, you would say that these couple of passages from the IG Report generally characterize your involvement with Harvey in this one incident correctly?

Mr. Halley. I would want to sharpen this up, because you have one, two, two paragraphs here. In the first paragraph there is a reference to some pills. I had nothing to do with any pills. I have no recollection of any pills.

Mr. Baron. Let us jump then to the very last statement and let me ask you if this confirms your own sense of your knowledge.

The report says: "Harvey says that [Halley]" -- here I am using your alias -- "never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what purpose. [Halley] was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded."

Does that generally characterize correctly your point of involvement with this activity?

Mr. Halley. I would say that is correct.

I want to go back to these other points, though, because I want to be meticulously correct here. I do not recall the specifics of this inventory of equipment. I do not recall, you know, sitting in a parking lot, surveilling any kind of a vehicle. On the other hand, I do recall having been involved with Harvey in some sort of an effort with a U-Haul truck. Now therefore that last sentence you have read is correct, I knew nothing about any of this delivery and I was called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which I was otherwise excluded.

Mr. Baron. You are not denying, are you, that you may have sat near the parking lot and surveilled the truck until it was picked up?

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection --

Mr. Baron. One way or the other?

Mr. Halley. No, I would say that my sitting in a parked car with Harvey surveilling a parking lot is the kind of thing that would have stuck in my mind. I do not recall ever doing that and that is the thing that has me a little perplexed here and I am having trouble matching this thing up with my own memory. It would have been damned unusual for Harvey and I to have sat in a parking lot, and I just do not recall that.

I do have a vague recollection of being involved with him in some sort of caper involving a U-Haul truck.

Mr. Baron. At that time, if Harvey had made a request of you to supply $5,000 worth of equipment like explosives, detonators, .30 caliber rifles, .45 caliber handguns, radios and boat radar, would you have supplied that equipment to Harvey or to anyone he designated without asking him what the purpose of the operation was?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I would have supplied it to Harvey or to his designated representative, depending on how that person identified himself to me with the equipment that he requested. That was my chain of command and, if he had told me that he had wanted this material for any operational activity, I would have seen to it that it was issued to him. That is the way the Agency functions.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure in a paramilitary operation to procure equipment that would not have been traceable to the United States as the IG Report indicates was done in this case?

Mr. Halley. It depends. It depends on what was the sponsorship that was trying to be conveyed to the paramilitary group.

In other words, let us say there was a Venezuelan businessman who may have been giving some assistance to a Cuban exile group. If somebody had gotten in touch with that Venezuelan businessman and he was saying I brought weapons into Florida or equipment which I will give you, then maybe under that kind of a circumstance we wouldn't want anything that would clearly identify it with the U.S. government and then that would be the normal thing to do. I would have to know the sponsorship.

Mr. Baron. This request would not have been extraordinary either, to provide "sterile" equipment to a contact of Harvey's?

Mr. Halley. It would not have attracted my attention to make it seem out of the ordinary.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the presence of a CIA officer named Jim O'Connell in Florida at that time?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron. Had you been aware of any operational involvement that Jim O'Connell had with anyone in Florida at any time?

Mr. Halley. I do not know Jim O'Connell. I have seen references to Jim O'Connell in Jack Anderson's columns and things like that since I have been reading the Press, but I do not know Jim O'Connell. If he walked into this room, I would not recognize him because I do not think I ever met the man. I do not know who he is. I asked several of my colleagues when I first saw his name appear in the Press who it was, and nobody could describe him in a way that would enable me to remember ever having seen or met the man.

Mr. Baron. Had you heard of the man in connection with operations against Cuba --

Mr. Halley. I had not.

Mr. Baron. -- before reading it in the newspapers recently?

Mr. Halley. Before reading in the newspapers and I do not know what year I first read this, because somewhere in the back of my mind is a Jack Anderson column --

Mr. Baron. And a Drew Pearson column before that.

Mr. Halley. -- a couple of years ago in which it was obvious that this was obtained from a military assignee to the Agency named Brad something -- I cannot think of his name right now -- and that he was the source of that information. I think somewhere in one of those articles, his name had appeared several years ago. I frankly do not know who the guy is.

Mr. Baron. At any point in your operational relationship with William Harvey in connection with Cuban affairs, did you suspect that an assassination operation was being run out of Task Force W against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron. I would like to run down a list of the names of some people who were involved in one way or the other with an assassination operation that was being run out of Task Force W, and I will represent to you that there was indeed an assassination effort or a series of efforts run out of Task Force W beginning -- and out of the CIA -- beginning in October of 1960 involving connections between CIA officials and people who have been characterized as members of the Mafia, of the gambling Syndicate who had interests in Havana and which involved the passage of poison pills to people inside Cuba purportedly for use against Castro in the restaurant that he frequented. And this plot by William Harvey's own admission was directed by Harvey during Harvey's tenure as the Chief of Task Force W.

Mr. Halley. I take due note of what you are saying. I have no knowledge of that. I will be glad to comment on any of the names. My commenting on names is in no way to reflect any knowledge on my part of this particular activity, because I have no knowledge of it.

Mr. Baron. You have already stated that you have no knowledge of any assassination effort involving poison pills?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of any assassination schemes which may or may not have been put into effect involving exploding sea shells that Castro might pick up by scuba diving?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not recall any exploding sea shells while Castro was scuba diving, but the problem of Castro being an avid scuba diver is well-known to me. As I recall, somewhere in this thing there was a refugee group or Cuban exile group or somebody at one time in this whole activity who had focused on the question of whether Fidel Castro was vulnerable at the time that he was scuba diving. I have heard that discussed but frankly I do not remember in what forum, and your reference to the scuba diving has triggered that response. Nothing about exploding sea shells.

Mr. Baron. You do not recall ever hearing Desmond FitzGerald mention that subject or hearing that Desmond FitzGerald was involved in exploring that possibility, planting an exploding sea shell?

Mr. Halley. The exploding sea shell is enough of an off-beat kind of thing that I think I would have recalled it. I don't recall it.

I do recall Castro's scuba diving, and that representing a vulnerability and somewhere in the recesses of my memory, that does strike a bell with me that some exile group, somebody was talking about Fidel Castro being vulnerable while he was scuba diving.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear of a plan to present Castro with a skin-diving suit in which bacteria injurious to his health would have been cultured, bacteria that would have produced tuberculosis and would have produced a dreadful disease?

Mr. Halley. I have never heard of any bacteria approach to the problem of dealing with Fidel Castro.

I do want to come back to this that I do recall something about scuba diving, you know, on the range of Fidel being vulnerable at the time he was scuba diving, but I do not recall exploding sea shells or bacteria.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to the list of name --

Mr. Halley. Wait a minute. Just let me make a note to myself.

(Pause)

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge, acquired directly or indirectly, of any involvement of John Roselli in Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. Other than reading the papers --

Mr. Baron. Other than what you read recently in the papers did you acquire any knowledge during your period as Chief of Station at JMWAVE of John Roselli's involvement in Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. No. I had the impression from Harvey going off that he was meeting with somebody, and at one point in time I came to the impression that he was meeting a guy by the name of John. Who John was, I had no idea. We were involved in an attempt to try to find two Soviets at one point who were of interest. The fellow who provided the lead to that had been a member of one of the casinos in Cuba at some time.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember who that was?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. I do not remember the man's name. It may come to me. You are asking me things that happened, you know, in 1962. As I have told you, I have been in a lot of places.

Anyway, when we put in a request for a trace on the source of this lead, I was surprised with the speed with which we got a response back on this man and the details run down that we got on him in terms of who he was and where he worked and so forth, and I think I concluded at that time that somebody knew this fellow very well and somewhere in the whole labrynth, either Justice or we or somebody had access to somebody who could give us a great deal of insight into people who had been involved with the gambling establishment in Cuba.

Those are the only two things that I can say to you that I knew at the time. Obviously I have since read the papers and I have put together in my own mind by deduction that the John that I was aware of that Harvey was in touch with must be John Roselli, but I cannot provide to you --

Mr. Baron. Would this person with contacts with gambling interests in Havana have been Santos Trafficante?

Mr. Halley. I would have no way of knowing. I know who Santos Trafficante is.

Mr. Baron. How do you know this?

Mr. Halley. This is like asking me whether I knew where 7th Street is in downtown Miami. Santos Trafficante is a name that constantly was discussed among Cuban exiles and he was a well-known figure. You could not possibly be involved--

Mr. Baron. Did you know of any involvement that he had in Cuban operations that were connected in any way to the CIA?

Mr. Halley. None that I know of. To the best of my recollection when I was in Miami, Santos Trafficante was in the Tampa area and that is my recollection of it at the time.

I also think that there was some large scandal, when I was in Miami, that was played up in the Press. I forget, some Federal agent who was somehow involved with the Mafia and with the Syndicate and there was some linkage in the Press between Santos Trafficante, Cubans and the Federal agent, but I do not remember the details of it.

Mr. Baron. The Federal agent was not a CIA employee?

Mr. Halley. No, he was not. My recollection is he was Narcotics or something.

Mr. Baron. You would make the same statement about John Roselli that you had no knowledge of his connection with any CIA sponsored operation against the Cuban government or against Castro personally?

Mr. Halley. At the time that I was there -- you know, I want to caution you that I have read the Press. If I have trouble sorting this out, I want you to understand that --

Mr. Baron. I understand that clearly.

Mr. Halley. -- that this is a dilemma for me. Obviously I told you I made my own deduction that John, the one that Harvey was in touch with, must have turned out in the context of 20/15 hindsight to be John Roselli. At the time, I did not know that.

Mr. Baron. What about Robert Maheu? Did you have any knowledge that he was involved with Cuban operations affiliated with the CIA?

Mr. Halley. No.

Again, at the time I had no knowledge of Robert Maheu. I have since read about Robert Maheu in the Press, allegations and so forth. The name is familiar to me now.

Mr. Baron. The same question for Sam Giancana.

Mr. Halley. Again, I say in answer that at the time that I was involved in '62 and '65 I did not know anything about Sam Giancana. I have since read in the Press about him. Therefore, the name is familiar to me today.

Mr. Baron. Did you know at that time that Sheffield Edwards, who was then Director of the Office of Security, was connected in any way with those efforts against Castro personally or against the Castro government?

Mr. Halley. At that time, Shef Edwards was known to me as Director of Security. That is all. I had no knowledge of his involvement in any activity against Fidel Castro in a personal sense.

Shef Edwards did help Security Officers assigned to my staff in Miami. Therefore I would periodically go to him about the performance of his officers who were on my staff. So during the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs, yes, I did see him, yes, I did talk to him about Cuban affairs in Miami, the performance of his officers on my staff, but nothing about anything that he might be doing, you know, against Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. I will represent to you that we have testimony from Edwards and from Jim O'Connell who was an officer working in the Office of Security under Edwards that they were involved in the early stages of an assassination plot against Castro which was run out of the Office of Security and later transferred to the DDP. But you are saying that you had no knowledge of any such operation at that time?

Mr. Halley. I had no knowledge. As I told you before, I did not even know Jim O'Connell.

Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Juan Orta?

Mr. Halley. That name is familiar to me. It is a name that has appeared, you know, across my scope. I cannot tell you why I am familiar with it. I would have to have a trace run, you know, and look at the results of the trace. But the name Juan Orta is known to me. That does ring a passive bell in my memory.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember William Harvey having any direct contact with Juan Orta?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. You do not have any specific recollection of Juan Orta's point of involvement in operations against Castro?

Mr. Halley. Juan Orta, no. It is a name I am familiar with. I think you will find, you know, that there are a number of names -- you asked me to look at that other thing -- a number of names that do ring bells with me. I really would have to have back-up material to clarify why they ring a bell. This is one that happens to ring a bell with me, but I have no way of linking it to anything, and certainly I do not link it in any way in my memory to Mr. Harvey.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember ever hearing of a Cuban contact of William Harvey's who went by the name of Maceo?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. He also used the name of Garcia Gomez and the name Godoy.

Mr. Halley. The only name that rings any bell with me in Cuban contacts is Arturo Godoy. Is this the same man?

Mr. Baron. We do not have the first name of that alias. In what connection had you heard of Arturo Godoy?

Mr. Halley. My recollection is I've known Arturo Godoy is that he was the fellow who was active in the Cuban immigre community in Miami. That is all I can tell you at this point. I would have to go back.

Mr. Baron. You do not remember what group he was connected with?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. But it was a name that obviously, you know, frequently referred to in reports. You know at one time we did monitor the Cuban community as to what was going on in terms of these various groups and what they had been doing. For some reason, Arturo Godoy rings a bell with me. As I recall, he was some sort of an activist in some Cuban exile group. To give you a definitive answer, you know, I would have to get the name, trace him, have a run on this fellow and try to put it together in some kind of context, but that is the only Godoy that rings any bells with me.

Certainly in my relationship with Harvey, this has no meaning to me. Godoy and Harvey just do not ring any bells.

Mr. Baron. One more name that we already discussed, that is Tony Varona.

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. You said that you did know Tony Varona?

tape 5

Mr. Halley. I know of Tony Varona, that he was leader of the consejo, the revolutionary counsel that had been set up to sort of administer the Bay of Pigs operation. In the post Bay of Pigs era, Nua Cardona and Tony Varona were people who still appeared on the exile scene and were prominent. We had some dealings with Nua Cardona , officers in the Station had dealings with Nua Cardona and Tony Varona to pay off, you know, injuries to peopoe who had been suffered during the Bay of Pigs, things like that, widows and so on. I know who he is and so forth, the name is very familiar to me. I never personally met with Tony Varona.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that William Harvey had an independent line of communication with Tony Varona?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Baron. Would it surprise you if that were the case?

Mr. Halley. The Tony Varona thing would surprise me, frankly. I think I would not -- I would be surprised, yes.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Halley. Well, because here is a case where the guy was a prominent exile figure, essentially residing in Miami, and I knew of no contacts or had no reasons to suspect any contacts with this kind of an exile figure, though once it specifically appeared, I was aware of and it was discussed. This was done under FitzGerald's stewardship with the Task Force. I was aware of that. I would be surprised if someone was in touch with Tony Varona and I did not know about it. If you told me that is what happened, that is what Harvey has testified to, I accept that. I am surprised by it.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of the CIA relationship to Artime?

Mr. Halley. Well, the Miami Station had no direct relationship with him. As to the nature of the project, you know Artime ran from the Agency, from other people who actually worked with him on a first time basis.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of a project called AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. Let me make sure we are talking about the same thing.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. We have just gone off the record to straighten out the fact that we are both talking about the same Cuban high military officer who was known to the CIA by the cryptonym of AMLASH.

Correct me if I am wrong, Mr. Halley, that you and I agree that we are referring to the same person that we have identified off the record?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we have.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of contacts between AMLASH-1, as he was known, and Artime?

Mr. Halley. I think at the time that this was going on, I do not know whether I was or I was not -- I was aware that the CIA was in touch with AMLASH.

Mr. Baron. Did you deal directly with the case officers who ran AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. I did not. My recollection of this AMLASH case is as follows. At some point in time, I had a conversation with Desmond FitzGerald in Washington during one of my periodic visits to Washington from Miami. We discussed at that meeting the nature of our approach to the military establishment in Cuba. In the context of that conversation, Mr. FitzGerald asked me if I thought whether it would be a good idea for him to meet one of these Cuban military personalities, and he subsequently identified to me the personality he was talking about was AMLASH-1.

My advice to him was that it would probably not be a good idea for him to meet him, and the only thing that I could see coming out of that kind of a contact would be that he, Mr. FitzGerald, would get a personal feel for what makes some of these people tick, in human terms, and that that probably was too high a price to pay for the prospect if anything went wrong, an individual as prominent in Washington as, both within the Agency and the social world in Washington, would be exposed in the Press. That would create a flap that I thought was not worth what would be gained from that meeting.

Mr. Baron. Would this have been in the fall of 1963?

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the time.

Subsequent to that, Mr. FitzGerald told me that he had indeed met him and that he had had an interesting conversation with him. I subsequently recall that this gentleman was met in Spain at some point in time --

Mr. Baron. This gentleman being AMLASH-1?

Mr. Halley. This gentleman, being AMLASH-1, was met in Spain. I also recall after having left the Cuban activity that I read a Press article showing that he had been apprehended and I remember reading the publicity of that particular activity. It is also my recollection that we put in a cache for him.

That is about the sum and substance of it.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall what the purpose of that cache was? Was it a cache of arms?

Mr. Halley. It was a cache. I think that you could go to the record to establish what was in the cache. I do not recall specifically what the material was that was in the cache.

Mr. Baron. At the point that you were having these conversations with Desmond FitzGerald, though, in the first instance the prospect of his contact directly with AMLASH-1, in the second instance his reaction to his contact with AMLASH-1 do you recall FitzGerald mentioning to you the fact that AMLASH had requested assurances that high officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him if he undertook operations on behalf of the CIA?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall this at the time.

You know, I also want to say, as you probably know from the record, I was later Chief of the WH Division from 1972 to 1973, and I did read some of the files. I am familiar with the case. But at the time -- I am trying to be schizophrenic, you know, to put this in the time sequence in which we are talking about. My recollection of that is that I did not know that.

Mr. Baron. It would then be your testimony that Mr. FitzGerald never broached with you the subject of making a representation to AMLASH-1 that Robert Kennedy or other high officials of the U.S. government would stand behind him?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall that kind of a conversation taking place with FitzGerald in this timeframe that we are talking about.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any such conversation at any point?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not, in the timeframe that we are talking about.

Mr. Baron. When I say at any point, I mean at any point since 1962.

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, in the period 1972-73, I did look at some of the files, I did read some of the files. I am familiar that such conversations took place and that there were a series of meetings. You know, I know who the case officer was and so forth.

Mr. Baron. You never discussed the subject directly with FitzGerald?

Mr. Halley. With FitzGerald, no. I can only say that my knowledge of that is secondhand from having subsequently read the files.

Mr. Baron. Was it your impression at that time that one of the objectives of the contact with AMLASH-1 was the assassination of Fidel Castro or other high Cuban leaders?

Mr. Halley. No. I never had the impression that assassination was a thrust of the activity. In other words, we were working across-the-board, both in the context that Desmond

FitzGerald and his staff were working on what I was doing in Miami to try to establish contacts with the Cuban military. In other words, we saw this as a multi-faceted approach. First, we wanted penetrations of the Cuban military so that we could collect intelligence. What were their strengths, weaknesses, what was their mood, where were things going? Secondly, we wanted from these sources operational intelligence. Who -- in other words, who in these groups were dissatisfied as Fidel consolidated. Who could provide leadership for a counter-movement against Fidel?

We were looking for people, once we had identified them, to see if we could establish contacts with any of these leaders so we could see whether there was a basis for working toward an overthrow of the Castro government. You know, those were the basic steps.

Now as you got down to talking about how you overthrow Castro, obviously the question comes in of how does a group who wants to run a coup or take power take power, and obviously one of the things that has to be looked at is where does the existing leadership going to be during this event, who has control of the various units. So our discussions were all in that context.

Mr. Baron. Would it have surprised you or would it surprise you now to learn that at least part of the contact with AMLASH would have involved planning for an assassination attempt against Castro.

Mr. Halley. I certainly was not aware of that at the time, as I recall from, you know, looking at the files in the '72-'73 period, seeing any evidence of that in the file at the time.

Mr. Baron. There are fourteen folders in the AMLASH file. Did you read all of those files?

Mr. Halley. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. How did you gather your impression that that was in the AMLASH files?

Mr. Halley. I think I may have read one or two volumes of whatever my question was at the time, because these cases keep coming up. You know, there must have been some inquiry at the time that necessitated my looking at the folder or discussing it with my staff and so on.

Mr. Baron. As far as you knew, what was the objective of the contact with Artime?

Mr. Halley. You mean the CIA contact with Artime?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. As a concept, the Artime thing was looked at as another track, an approach to the overall Cuban problem to see if they could sort of do it on their own. If they could simply be given, you know, X number of dollars, some equipment, some guidance, and give them an opportunity to find a Cuban solution to what was a Cuban problem. That was also, you know, and if you have not, you should talk to the people who ran the Artime operation, when this was set up, I think I participated in giving Artime some tutorial training for a couple of weeks when this operation was first established in order to familiarize him with some of the problems of trying to manage a large operation against Cuba because he had been out of things for a couple of years.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that he had been supplied a weapon which we already agreed could be characterized as an assassination weapon?

Mr. Halley. You say "we." You and I?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. Which weapon was that?

Mr. Baron. A high-powered rifle with long-range and low muzzle velocity.

Mr. Halley. I am aware of the fact of this project that Artime was involved in that he got a number of weapons, any number of which could have been used for sniper type activities. I am aware of the fact that he had a base in Nicaragua to have activities, so I would find it hard to single out a weapon. My recollection of that that he was given a large number of weapons.

Mr. Baron. Was one of Artime's objectives to have been to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear any discussion to the effect that the Agency was attempting to achieve through Artime indirectly what they did not want to achieve directly in a fashion that would be attributed to the CIA, namely the assassination of Castro?

Mr. Halley. I think that you have tied two issues together there and I do not think I can answer the question that way. I would like to separate the question into two parts.

Mr. Baron. Go ahead.

Mr. Halley. The first part, as I mentioned to you earlier the CIA did establish a relationship with Artime and he was given funds and other support to run his approach to solving the Cuban problem. He was one of two such activities that were run at the time. And therefore I think that your statement is correct that perhaps he was set up so that there could be no direct attribution in his activities to the United States, because he set up a base in Nicaragua, and the story as I recall it was put out that he was receiving assistance from the Nicaraguan government, and therefore there was a part of the whole cover story, if you will, for him.

So, yes, there was an attempt to set him up as a parallel track or a separate track. That does not follow from that, in my perspective, that was geared towards an assassination operation, because that was a fantastically large operation involving lots of people, you know, with substantial amounts of money. I was opposed to it at the time. And once it was set up, and I did what I was supposed to do, which was to train Artime and contribute to his training, I then did not pay an awful lot of attention to the thing except what I picked up, you know, over the years, and again in the '72-'73 period, and talked to officers who had, you know, more intimate knowledge of it and got an appraisal of it as to what they thought had occurred.

Mr. Baron. Had you heard at any point that Artime was supplied weapons for the specific purpose of assassinating Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, not for the specific purpose of assassinating Castro.

Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that AMLASH-1 was a reliable agent?

Mr. Halley. I really do not know that much about him, you know. This was an operation that was run at that time out of Washington and, you know, my knowledge was as I described it to you, the conversations with FitzGerald, Madrid, newspaper articles, so forth, in that particular timeframe.

Mr. Baron. Did the CIA to your knowledge use any gambling Syndicate contacts inside Cuba or people outside Cuba who were connected to gambling interests inside Cuba for any operational purpose including the intelligence gathering?

Mr. Halley. The only case that I recall is this case that

I mentioned to you earlier when we were in touch with an individual whose name I cannot remember who had been involved with one of the gambling houses in Cuba who came to us with leads to Soviets from a missile site who wanted to defect. That is the only case that I know of. I cannot think of the man's name. I can give you a physical description of him, and so forth. I honestly cannot think of his name.

Mr. Baron. You are not aware of any other use of people with gambling interests in Cuba for intelligence gathering?

Mr. Halley. Not that I am aware of. If you have something specific that you want to pursue, if you can give me some other clue than that, I just do not, out of my past memory, I simply do not recall any other case but that one.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of any contact between the CIA and Meyer Lansky?

Mr. Halley. No, I am not aware of any contact between the CIA and Meyer Lansky.

Mr. Baron. Was Howard Hunt connected with any Cuban operations during the period of your tenure at JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. Howard Hunt was involved in the Bay of Pigs Operation. After the Bay of Pigs Operation wss over, he did not participate in the Cuban activities that I was aware of. You may know something that I do not know, because, you know, you have asked me a couple of questions here of things that I am not aware of. You may know something that I do not, but certainly he did not come across my horizon at the time that I was in Miami.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard the phrase Executive Action?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Mr. Baron. What does that signify to you?

Mr. Halley. Well, Executive Action is some sort of a euphemism -- to eliminate somebody, I guess is how it appears in the popular jargon.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear it in the Agency?

Mr. Halley. No, I think that this is a term that has been bandied about in the Press that has come about in the Press to be synonymous with killing somebody or something like that.

Mr. Baron. It is not, as far as you know, a euphemism in common usage within the Agency?

Mr. Halley. No.

Mr. Baron. Had you ever heard of the ZRRIFLE Project run by William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not know what it is.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever heard of --

Mr. Halley. I want to make sure here that I am accurate, you know. You are asking me ZRFIFLE. That is a cryptonym for something.

Mr. Baron. Let me explain further.

Mr. Halley. I want to sort of say, in the last thirteen years I have seen literally --

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley. Let me go back. You asked me about ZRRIFLE. This is one of a thousand or hundreds of cryptonyms. Every day I read, you know, hundreds of pages of traffic, so when you ask me do I know what ZRRIFLE is, I must answer you off the top of my head no. I have tried to be helpful. I have asked you several times if you could give me a steering tip or show me what direction you are going, I might be able to try to comment on it, but ZRRIFLE as such means nothing to me. You really could not expect that it would, given the thousands of these things that come across my desk.

Mr. Baron. That is absolutely understandable. I want to try to see what happens in the way of getting an unrefreshed recollection from you, then I will go back over these two, especially the next one, QJWIN. Do you recall a CIA asset who went by the cryptonym QJWIN?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. Knowing the system, and so forth, normally it would have something to do with Spain. It does not ring any bells with me. That is all I can give you, a sort of Pavlovian response. You flash QJWIN on the screen, I am telling you now I do not know, but it probably has something to do with Spain.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that a project involving the development of a capability of carrying on assassination was run by William Harvey?

Mr. Halley. To develop the capability to carry on the assassination?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. No. I have no knowledge of Harvey being focused on a project or given the capability of carrying one out.

Mr. Baron. Harvey has testified, as has Richard Bissell, I will represent to you, that instruction was given by Bissell to Harvey to set up, to develop such a capability in early 1961 and that Harvey took steps to develop such a capability in coordination with an asset in New York named QJWIN and I think that period of greatest activity was in 1962 and WIN was involved in spotting potential assets among the criminal underworld in Europe and might be used for any number of dirty deeds.

Mr. diGenova. It should be emphasized that the Executive Action Plan that you are referring to has had as its goal the incapacitation of foreign leaders, one possibility of incapacitation being the ultimate weapon, assassination. It was just not assassination. It was a spectrum of activities that could be used to incapacitate a foreign leader anywhere from illness, chemical warfare, and then including death. Correct me if I am wrong, but it was not just assassination.

Mr. Baron. Does that ring any bells?

Mr. Halley. No, it does not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection that the ZRRIFLE Project involving the development of an "Executive Action" capability would have been tied in in any way to an operation against Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, that does not ring any bells, none whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. I would like to introduce as Halley Exhibit 3 an article from Harper's Magazine entitled "The Kennedy Vendetta," subtitled "How the CIA Waged a Silent War Against Cuba," written by Taylor Branch and George Crile III.

Let me show you this article and let me ask you whether you have read it?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I have read the article.

(The document referred
to was marked Halley
Exhibit No. 3 for
identification.)

Mr. Baron. Let us pick out some specifics and discuss them briefly here.

Near the beginning of this article, it mentions that JMWAVE Station operated within an annual budget of well in excess of $50 million.

Would that be accurate to you?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall whether that is an accurate figure. We would have to go back to the records. You know, as I explained to you earlier, the start of the operation taking place in March and escalated up to a high point and then dropped off. In the budgetary cycle, we are dealing with a mass of figures, and I would not want to give you an inaccurate answer. That is something that could be researched -- we have the files -- rather than speculate for you on the buildup and reduction in the operation. I do not feel that is useful.

Mr. Baron. As a ballpark figure, would you be able to place the annual budget of the Station in the neighborhood of tens of millions of dollars?

Mr. Halley. No, I would not, because of this transition, you know, period, the costs were very high in the beginning to get a start-up operation, brought to a certain peak, and then tapered off and starting to be peeled back. I would not want to draw a figure of --

Mr. diGenova. What would the start-up cost?

Mr. Halley. In terms of what they involved or dollars?

Mr. diGenova. Dollars.

Mr. Halley. I have no recollection of the dollars.

Mr. Baron. Would you say that $50 million would be in the right ballpark for your activities at the peak?

Mr. Halley. I just have no recollection of the dollar figure. You might want to get that figure when you can retrieve it in the files. It is available.

Mr. Baron. Were the operations of JMWAVE coordinated with other Latin American CIA Station's, as the article indicates here?

Mr. Halley. I think my recollection of that phase is that Cuban activities with other Latin American stations were coordinated with JMWAVE.

Mr. Baron. Coordinated with JMWAVE?

Mr. Halley. With JMWAVE.

Mr. Baron. Who had the central coordinating responsibility?

Mr. Halley. Washington.

Mr. Baron. Was that delegated by Washington to you?

Mr. Halley. No. Essentially Washington had the overall coordinating responsibility, but that needs some elaboration. Let me say that we would become aware in our activities in Miami that a number of interesting people had come in on a flight to Mexico City. We would send a cable down to Mexico City with an information copy to Washington outlining who we were interested in, and I would probably send somebody down to

Mexico to look at the particular Cuban or the operational opportunity in conjunction with the Station Chief in Mexico City. So we were in some cases a clearinghouse.

The final coordination authority rested in Washington. I will say that if Miami wanted to do something and for local political reasons in Mexico the Mexican Station Chief did not want to do it, that would be adjudicated, not by Miami, but by Washington.

Mr. Baron. Let me quote you a passage here and see if it comports with our discussions earlier of special arrangements you may have, the JMWAVE Station may have had, with law enforcement authorities in Florida.

The article says: "All the boat missions to Cuba were technically illegal under the Neutrality Act, the Maritime Laws, and Immigtation statutes, so that the Station had to work out special arrangements with Customs, Immigration and the Coast Guard."

Is that generally accurate?

Mr. Halley. I think, as I described to you before, there was coordination with the Coast Guard in terms of vessel departures. The other is Immigration?

Mr. Baron. Customs, Immigration and Coast Guard.

Mr. Halley. Immigration, there would not have been coordination on a particular, you know, boat dispatch. On the other hand, let's say if a mission aborted for some reason and a small boat could not recover its position and get back to the mother ship to be picked up and it was adrift or came in to one of the islands or came in to the Florida coast anywhere and was picked up and picked up by Immigration inspectors, then they would ask to have their case referred to a particular individual. It may have been a code number, a color code, it may have been phrase. But then Immigration would get in touch with us and say we have this group, here is what they say, what is your interest in this particular group, and then that would be adjudicated at that point.

Now the third group was Customs. Customs did have a number of patrols and at times when boat loadings were conducted off the Florida Keys in particular, those were coordinated with the Coast Guard so they would not be expending their manpower to run down groups that were extricating with us, in fact the Agency was doing.

Mr. Baron. The article continues to say: "It was illegal for agents to travel around with machine guns and plastic explosives in the cars, as they often did. The Station had to establish liaison with seventeen police jurisdictions along the Florida coast and into the Keys. The result was that any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released."

Is that accurate?

Mr. Halley. I commented on that before, and we are on the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

record on that as saying that we did not drive around, there were no vehicles moving, manned by these Cubans with arms and weapons on them.

In other words, you are coming back to the same point, because as I explained to you, the weapons were only given to them on the vessel and taken back from them when they came back from a mission, so that the statement is not actually correct.

Mr. Baron. What about the end of that passage where they say that the result, and I understand that you would disagree as to whether it was a result of this kind of a practice which you say was not carried on at all.--

Mr. Halley. It was not.

Mr. Baron. Did a situation exist where any agent who was arrested for anything from drunken driving to illegal possession of firearms would be quickly released.

tape 6

Mr. Halley. I have to go back and divide your question into two parts. There were no firearms --

Mr. Baron. I am not saying firearms supplied to them by the CIA for a CIA mission or any agent travelling down the street in Miami who happened to have a Saturday Night Special in his car or who happened to be drunk while driving. Would such a person be released right away or once the CIA connection surfaced?

Mr. Halley. My answer to that is no. In other words, if he had a Saturday Night Special and was picked up by the police

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

and detained, and if he then asked to be in contact with us, the case would be looked at at that particular point and if he had a Saturday Night Special, you know, there would not be any intervention on his behalf because it had nothing to do with his task on the behalf of CIA.

I did mention to you earlier we had training camps in various parts of the State. If somebody came out of the training camp and did get drunk and was picked up and did not speak English or something and the police jurisdictions did have a way of getting in touch with us and we might intervene on a case of disorderly conduct.

Mr. diGenova. How was that established, the relationship of liaison with these jurisdictions. Had it been set up with JMWAVE directly through Washington and down through the FBI? How had that been done?

Mr. Halley. It varied. When we started expanding the operation, you know, there had already been a Station there and there also were two security units in the greater Miami area. In some cases the existing contacts at the Station were expanded, the same with Dade County. In other cases, the security of personnel who had established contact with other jurisdictions were used to effect the introduction. In some cases, we had our security people who were on my staff go out to these jurisdictions and identify themselves simply with a badge and a name and discuss the kinds of things that they were interested in so that there would not be a cross of problems with these jurisdictions and therefore a liaison was opened on that basis, a multiplicity of approaches.

Mr. Baron. The article discusses the fact that regular commando raids were run out of JMWAVE Station to the shore of Cuba, and that those commandos were equipped with all kinds of explosives and armaments.

Is that generally a fair statement, that we were running on a regular basis commando raids to Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Yes. There were a series of commando raids run from the Miami Station against targets in Cuba.

Mr. Baron. Were assassination weapons, that is, high-powered rifles with low muzzle velocity and telescopic sights, supplied to those commando teams as a matter of course?

Mr. Halley. No, they were not. For most of those commando teams, you were looking for a different kind of a weapon. You are looking for a weapon with a high range of fire power over a short distance to deal with an emergency situation rather than the kind of, you know, weapon that we are talking about.

In other words, you would find that type of a group armed with a submachine gun, as for example.

Mr. Baron. If an assassination weapon as we have described it was supplied to a commando team, they would have to have a specific purpose in mind for its use?

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Also, again, all of these weapons were controlled, the weapons that were issued at the time of the mission on the mother ship and picked up on the team's return to the mother ship, so there was accountability for the weapons.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been unusual to supply what we have called an assassination weapon to a commando team?

Mr. Halley. Well, that depends on the mission. For instance, let me use an example.

Most of the missions that were run were run against targets that were in fairly close proximity to the shore. If you are going to put a party to attack your objectives, let us say the objective was a petroleum storage tank, if you were going to do this by putting charges up against the petroleum storage tank that meant that you had to have a group infiltrate close enough to put the charges on the tank. Some distance away from them you would give them a second element of the commando team which would be providing covering fire for this group in case they got into trouble and cannot handle it on the ground. This covering fire group might have had a light machine gun, a Belgian weapon. They could have these kinds of weapons and they did have these kinds of weapons which in the definition you are using could be used as a sniper weapon or whatever, but the basic reason for having that weapon was to provide fire support for the other members of the commando team. And therefore when this mission was over and they returned, those weapons were taken back from them and accounted for. They were shaken down so that we did not have weapons disappearing out of our control.

Mr. Baron. Such weapons, high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes, conceivably with silencers, were supplied with some regularity, but they were kept under tight control?

Mr. Halley. We had high-powered rifles. I cannot think now of a case where there was a sniper scope attached to the rifle. I can think of no case where there was a silencer attached to a rifle in any of these commando raids. There were a number of raids conducted, some of them involved teams of fifteen or twenty men. I am not prepared to say that no man ever had one, but I do not recall one. You know, if you gave me an inventory which are in the files, for each of the operations and say here is the operation plan, does this list of equipment fifteen years later look reasonable to you, I would be able to tell you yes or no. But off the top of my head, I do not recall a sniper scope or a silenced rifle.

Mr. Baron. Do you know a man by the name of Rolando Martinez?

Mr. Halley. Of Watergate involvement?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I know of him. I have never met him personally. I know of him. He was a member of our boat infiltration team. He was a UDT man.

Mr. Baron. In the Harper's article, it says that Martinez indicated that "More than once he was given personal charge of weapons drops in which special rifles with silencers and telescopic sights were left in designated inland spots."

Do you know of a factual basis for that statement?

Mr. Halley. Martinez is undoubtedly factually correct when he says he put caches on the coast of Cuba that contained weapons. I do not know how he would be able to tell what kind of weapons were in the cache. The reason I say that is that when one of these missions were planned, the cache was put together and packed by our logistics group and once the cache was put together it was brought on board the vessel and the cache was then turned over to the team for infiltration so he would never have seen the contents of the cache, he would not have opened it up because it was always in a sealed container.

It is conceivable that in the pre-mission briefing that he got before he went down that he was told that we are putting in a cache containing a radio or putting in a cache containing weapons because that would influence what he selected as a cache type. In other words, if it were a radio, we would want it higher and drier than we would a can containing weapons that were wraped in cosmolene and so forth. He might know that they were weapons, but he wouldn't know that they were silenced and they had a scope. I must honestly say to you I doubt that.

Mr. Baron. Did you know of any weapons drops that were made for the purpose of supplying someone inside Cuba with a weapon for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, not for that clearly stated purpose. As I told you, we put a lot of weapons caches in. The weapons were multi-purpose weapons, could be used. I know of no cache that went in specifically for the task of playing a contributory role to assassinating Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. It would not have been contrary to the policy directives under which you were operating at the time to supply such a weapon to someone inside Cuba who might have access to Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, it would not have been. For instance, I can remember several resistance groups that we had that had two or three hundred men that we were supplying on a regular basis.

Mr. diGenova. Inside Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba, that were essentially living in the bush to a large extent, whom we did supply weapons to and got ammunition to them and so forth. And that was why I was very careful when you mentioned this linkage before to saying that I could not be a guarantor as to what these men would do with these weapons once they got their hands on them. They were free agents.

Mr. diGenova. This is an interesting point. This has come up before. We are aware of our reading of the record that what you have said is a concern of not only yourself in terms of realizing that it was a possibility but of people like Dean Rusk and Mr. McCone, who also said, you have to realize then once these agents are in another country and are supplied that there is little if anything we can do to control those weapons after they receive them. It would be safe to say that that, of course, was understood that there was a lack of control, and to the extent that it was a problem, it existed and had to be tolerated because of the nature of the operation, would that be correct?

Mr. Halley. I do not know whether I want to phrase it exactly as you have in terms of this lack of control. Our mission in dealing with these groups was to first, to put them in areas where we did not have other intelligence covers. Their first task was to collect intelligence.

The second task was to organize a resistance which would take armed action if we ever got a total package put together that gave us an opportunity -- that was the first and secondary missions. Once we issued the weapons to the team leader, if you will, he had freedom to recruit from among the peasants anybody he wanted to. If he gave the peasant a weapon, there was no guarantee either by the team leader or by us that that peasant would not do something that we did not want him to do. To even shoot a militiaman, you could have an argument, you know, over a woman. Any number of things.

Mr. diGenova. Were there any restrictions, once, for example, those weapons caches were delivered either by land or air -- and we have spoken to Mr. Murray who was in the Havana Station, for example, for awhile and Arthur Avignon who was head of the Havana Station for awhile who indicated that they were aware of the weapons drops and were intimately familiar with where they would be.

Mr. Halley. That was all before my time. I have no knowledge of that. During my time, we made no drops by air.

Mr. diGenova. Were there any limitations that were placed of how the weapons would be used that were delivered into Cuba to these internal resistance groups?

Mr. Halley. I cannot speak to this period that you are addressing.

Mr. diGenova. During your period.

Mr. Halley. During my period, the weapons were issued essentially as self-protection for the people who were living in the bush. Secondly, to be used in a military operation at such time as we got the whole package together. Thirdly, they were to be used for self-protection if they conducted raids, ambushes, sabotage operations.

Mr. Baron. There is one further quote from Martinez in this article that I would like to ask you to comment on. He is quoted as saying: "I took a lot of weapons to Cuba, some of them were very special weapons for special purposes. They

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

were powerful rifles with sophisticated scopes, Springfields with bolt action, rifles only used by snipers. They were not sent to shoot pigeons or to kill rabbits. Everyone in the Underground was plotting to kill Castro and the CIA was helping the Underground. I was with the Underground as well as the CIA, so you can see I was involved in the plots too, but that is also obvious."

You commented before that there was a lot of talk in the air about assassinating Castro. Martinez seems to be taking that a few steps further, saying that there were actual plots underway in the Cuban Underground to assassinate Castro and that people who worked with the CIA were aware of those plots and were aiding them in effect by the weapons they were supplying.

Is that an accurate statement?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not think I can go along with that statement. Martinez' role as I described it to you, he is accurate when he says that weapons were put in and that he participated in putting them in. I again question how he would know what was in each cache. I just do not see that, and I would have to accept that as a sort of secondhand statement by him because of the way that the caches were put together. I just do not see his knowing that.

Now I don't want to exclude, however, that any particular kind of weapon did not go to Cuba. Maybe bolt-action

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Springfields did go in.

Mr. diGenova. Could he have found out about this after the fact from people that he knew in Cuba, members of the resistance in Cuba that he knew of who would have told him the nature of the items that they would have received in a cache delivery? Would that be one way that he could have found out? Was he that intimately involved, to your knowledge?

Mr. Halley. He was not at the time. This is the period that I am familiar with, '62-'65. I do not know. Maybe some of these people have come out since then, and maybe he has talked to people who have come out in '68, '69, things like that I cannot exclude that.

At the time, I do not think, however, he would have had that kind of firsthand knowledge, and therefore I have trouble with that statement and I cannot identify with it.

Mr. Baron. The Harper's article says: "By the end of 1961, several men affiliated with the CIA had already been foiled in attempts to kill him" -- meaning Castro -- "among them, Luis Toroella, executed; Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, still in prison; William Morgan, executed; and Antonio Veciana, escaped to the United States. Had these men succeeded, their efforts would have been tied to the U.S. only indirectly, if at all."

Let me show you the passage I am reading from and ask you whether you have any knowledge of the connection of any of those men named to the CIA.

(Pause)

Mr. Halley. No, there is no connection that I know of between these names and CIA. This guy Luis Toroella does not ring any bells with me. Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo was a leader of Alpha 66. He may have been in Cuba in '61. During the time that I was involved in Cuban affairs he was in exile for -- he was in Miami for a long period of time.

Mr. Baron. Can you explain what Alpha 66 is for the record?

Mr. Halley. Alpha 66 was a Cuban exile organization that was engaged in a number of raids against the Cuban government. They claimed to have attacked Cuban shipping, fishing boats, and claimed to have an organization in Cuba that was a resistance organization. Gutierrez Menoyo was therefore a well-known name to me. We had no direct contact with him.

William Morgan is also a well-known name. His activities and exploits in Cuba are well-known to anybody that has dealt with Cuban affairs.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a connection between any of these people and assassination attempts against Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I have none, no connection between these names and CIA and attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Mr. Baron. The fact that they are listed here as having been involved in assassination attempts whether or not they

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

were connected with CIA is news to you?

Mr. Halley. Well, no, I would not say that. If you had Gutierrez Menoyo sitting here and if he were to say in 1962 I attempted to shoot Fidel Castro, that is Gutierrez Menoyo did this, I would have no reason to doubt. I would have no basis for proving it, either.

Mr. Baron. You have never heard of these alleged assassination attempts before?

Mr. Halley. No.

Morgan's name I would have to do a file trace to get myself back up to date. Morgan did get himself in trouble with Fidel over some issue;, as I recall was in prison. I do not recall, remember if he was executed, although this says he was executed.

Mr. Baron. What about the last name on the list, Antonio Veciana?

Mr. Halley. That is a name that rings a bell with me, but I do not attach anything to it. In other words, it is a name I have probably read in various and sundry kinds of reports. I remember no operational relationship with him between the Miami Station and this man during my tenure in Miami.

Mr. Baron. During your tenure, would you have been in a position to know that these people had led assassination attempts against Castro, if that were indeed the fact?

Mr. Halley. Not necessarily. I would say that the odds would have been high that we would have, particularly, say

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Gutierrez Menoyo. We did have a steady stream of reporting on the activities of all exile groups and Alpha 66 was high on the list of groups that had a capability of doing this kind of thing. Therefore, they received quite a bit of coverage from us, from the FBI, from Customs, and others.

They were on everybody's sort of watch list.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn now to a document that we will introduce as Exhibit 4, which is a report by Fidel Castro on alleged attempts to assassinate him that he connects to the United States government and especially to the CIA.

(The document referred to was marked Halley Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Baron. Which was released recently by George McGovern, to whom Castro had sent this report.

Mr. Halley, is it true that I had asked you to review this report before we began our session today?

Mr. Halley. Yes, you did, you did ask me to look at the report.

Mr. Baron. Can you point to any names or incidents in this report that are connected in any way in your mind to actual assassination attempts against Cuba -- Castro?

Mr. Halley. No, I cannot point to any names that in my mind are attached to an assassination attempt against Castro. You asked me to look at this originally to see if any of the names were familiar to me in any way. I made a list of some of the names that rang a bell with me, for various reasons.

One name is Humberto Sori Marin. I recall that he was active, he was active with the DRE.

Mr. Baron. At what page is that?

Mr. Halley. There is no page number.

For instance, here's a name, Humberto Sori Marin. That is familiar to me. I do not know whether that was from the reporting showing that he was in prison, you know, we constantly got reporting on, or why, it is a name that I recognize in the counterrevolutionary sense, that it is something that crossed my desk, to see the name.

All right. The other name that is familiar is Tony Varona.

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

That was a Cuban exile leader. We talked about Tony Varona. I told you I did not know that Tony Varona had any connection with Mr. Harvey.

There is another name in here, Manolo Ray. I mentioned Manolo Ray to you. He was one of two exile leaders who had a relationship with the Agency. You know, I told you Artime was one; Manolo Ray is another. He is familiar to me as a result of that.

Mr. Baron. You did not know of any involvement of Manolo Ray in an assassination effort against Castro?

Mr. Halley. I do not.

Here is another name mentioned in the same paragraph, Aureliano Sanchez Arango. That is a name that is familiar to me as a prominent Cuban exile.

Mr. Baron. You have no more specific recollection?

Mr. Halley. I am trying to be responsive to your question, telling you which names ring a bell with me as I run through this.

Mr. Baron. All I am trying to do is clarify for the record the exact nature of your recollection of each of these names.

Do you have any recollection of a plot alluded to in this report to shoot Castro with a bazooka at the Havana Stadium?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not have any recollection of that. According to this, if this is correct, it took place in October of '61 which I would not have had any knowledge of because I was not involved in Cuban affairs until, as I told, you, early February 1962.

Mr. Baron. The same would go for the shooting of a bazooka towards the Presidential Palace?

Mr. Halley. I have no knowledge.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of any efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro run out of Guantanamo Bay Naval Base?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not. As you know, Guantanamo had a number of Cuban exiles in it, people who had taken refuge in the base at one time or another. During the time that I was the Station Chief in Miami we did have contacts with people at Guantanamo. We did use them for intelligence collection purposes, but I do not have any linkage between that intelligence project and assassination.

Mr. Baron. Were paramilitary operations run out of Guantanamo Bay?

Mr. Halley. They were not during my time as Station Chief in Miami by CIA. There was an office of ONI, Office of Naval Intelligence representative on Guantanamo. I have no knowledge of what they may have been doing during various periods of time. I am talking about CIA.

Mr. Baron. Any other names that struck a chord with you in this report?

Mr. Halley. Well, you have a name here, Mario Salabarria

Aquiar; that name rings a bell with me, for what reason, I do not know. You know, we would have to run a name trace to get a rundown of what is in the files and what is in the central index for me to be able to comment on it. As I told you earlier I know that the Agency is doing all these traces after they are completed and you get them and you want me to take a look at it, I will be glad to do so. It may trigger some response.

This name, Ramon Grau Scerio, it rings a bell with me. It is quite possible that he may have been a collection agent, just as is written here. I am making a deduction, but again, I would have to look at the name traces, but it is a name that rings a bell with me.

Mr. Baron. You do not remember him in connection with an attempt to poison the Prime Minister in June of 1965 as it says there?

Mr. Halley. No, I do not.

Then the next name that is on here, that is familiar. Here is one that we discussed, that is AMLASH-1. We already went over that one.

The other name was Manuel Artime, whom we have talked about.

Mr. Baron. Right.

Mr. Baron. The last name on here -- I cannot find it -- the other name is Antonio Cuesta Valle. I cannot find it now, but that is the last name that rang a bell.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of Cuesta Valle's specific activities with the CIA?

Mr. Halley. No. I would have to run traces on him and take a look at what the information is.

Mr. Baron. Was Frank Sturgis connected with the JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. He was not.

Mr. Baron. Not under the name of Frank Fiorino either?

Mr. Halley. No, he was not. This is again one of these great myths. At this whole Cuba thing, Frank Sturgis was a soldier of fortune, was constantly involved on the periphery of the Cuban exile community. He was involved in free lance operations against Cuba. He was somebody that the FBI, Customs, CIA, everybody, reported on. He was a household name, but he was not on the CIA payroll during the period that I was involved in Cuban affairs, that is the payroll of the Miami Station. I remember name traces being run on this guy and so forth, and the Agency had no contact with him during that period of time.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of his ever having been on the payroll of the CIA?

Mr. Halley. I personally am not aware of it, and I think, you know, if you had gone to the Agency that they must have given you all sorts of traces on this fellow and told you the same thing.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware of the AMOT program?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. How was that spelled?

Mr. Halley. AMOT.

Mr. Baron. What was that program?

Mr. Halley. That was a program involving a Cuban emigre group that was used as an operational support mechanism to support the Miami Station.

Mr. Baron. What kind of support did they provide?

Mr. Halley. They were interviewers of refugees who came out of Cuba. They provided translator personnel to translate the Spanish language publications that were of interest to us. They provided information on the various mainstream activities that were going on in the Cuban exile community.

Mr. Baron. Did they provide support for paramilitary operations against Cuba?

Mr. Halley. They might have identified people whom they thought we should interview or look to or see if they would fit into other paramilitary programs. In other words, they had the contacts in the Cuban community. Say we had a requirement for a diesel engineer. We would say to the AMOT organization, we would say we are looking for a Cuban who is a diesel engineer who has a first engine's license, and they would go through all of their contacts until they would come up with one, a week or ten days or whatever, having identified the fellow, where he was, what he was doing. We would then send somebody around to talk to him independant of them and pick him up to work for us in our maritime activities.

It was that kind of operational support.

Mr. Baron. People who were part of this program were not used as paramilitary operatives, at least insofar as they operated under the aegis of this program. There were some of them who may have been in the paramilitary program and then left it and were subsequently picked up in the AMOT organization.

Could we go off the record for a moment?

(Discussion off the record.)

tape 7

Mr. Halley. We are now back on the record.

The AMOTs also worked with us on a common project, which was monitoring Cuban naval traffic, things like that, so they were used across the board for operational support tasks.

Mr. Baron. One more general question.

Did the JMWAVE Station have an operational relationship with the FBI?

Mr. Halley. I would not --

Mr. Baron. Was the FBI involved in supporting your activities in any way?

Mr. Halley. I would rather phrase that in my language, because I think --

Mr. Baron. Go right ahead.

Mr. Halley. I do not know if your question means the same thing to me. I would prefer to say we had a liaison relationship with the FBI, that is, on matters dealing with counterintelligence matters. There was a regular exchange of data with the FBI. There was an exchange of name traces on people that they were conducting investigations on, for counterintelligence purposes.We would trace certain individuals and with the FBI there were a couple of counterintelligence cases that we discovered that were turned over to the FBI.

So this is in the context of the normal CIA-FBI liaison that existed between the two agencies.

Mr. Baron. But the FBI was not involved in supporting paramilitary commando raids to the shore of Cuba, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. I do not know what you are driving at there. I am having a little trouble with that. Are you saying that the FBI dispatched paramilitary teams to Cuba as an organization?

Mr. Baron. Were they involved in paramilitary training of any of the CIA operatives?

Mr. Halley. No. The FBI did not train any CIA personnel during my tenure in the Miami Station.

Mr. Baron. Did the FBI at any point provide with you links to people who had gambling interests inside Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No. We covered the gambling thing previously.

7 6 0 0 0 7 0 1 0 4

The one case that I mentioned is this man who gave us the lead of the two Soviets from the missile site, and that did not come to the Miami Station through the FBI.

Mr. Baron. Were you ever made aware of a CIA attempt to secure the aid of a pilot, a Cuban pilot, to arrange for an "accident," to occur to Raul Castro when he flew on a Cuban plane?

Mr. Halley. I read this somewhere in the record in post years, but I was not aware of this at the time, at the time I was in Miami.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had been given to the tactic of assassination at CIA Headquarters during your period of involvement with Cuban affairs?

Mr. Halley. No, that is in the period 1962 to '65 when I was the Station Chief in Miami, I was not aware of any serious you know, program operational effort towards assassinating Castro.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that serious consideration had been given to the tactic or to the use of the tool of assassination at CIA Headquarters prior to your coming on as JMWAVE Station Chief?

Mr. Halley. No, I was not aware of any, you know, planned program effort at assassination.

Mr. Baron. If we limit it --

Mr. diGenova. What do you mean when you say that?

7 6 0 0 0 7 0 1 7 6

Mr. Halley. I went through this before before you came in and explained to Mr. Baron that the subject of assassination was constantly being discussed in the Cuban community and was a part of the fabric of the times.

Mr. diGenova. That I am aware of. You are not the only one who has expressed that knowledge that they were all saying let's kill him, let's get together.

Mr. Halley. There was a lot of discussion of this kind of subject of assassination and that is why I keep trying to be precise that there was no programmatic operational program that I was aware of to assassinate Castro.

Mr. Baron. Although the context in which we discussed the talk that was in the air of assassinating Castro was coffee shops in Miami and conversation among Cubans as opposed to conversations among high CIA officials back in Headquarters, were you aware that there were at least serious discussions of the use of assassination against Castro at CIA Headquarters?

Mr. Halley. No, I was not. We are plowing the same ground that we covered before in this.

As I indicated to you, people would come out of Cuba and discuss these kinds of things. Some of these were reported in, you know, traffic back to Washington. People would discuss what are the prospects of somebody assigned to assassinate Castro. In that particular context, yes, discussions on the assassination of Castro took place. That is why I keep coming back, if you are saying that if anybody outlined an operational plan to me, did I help construct the plan, did I make a contribution to a plan, my answer is again no. We talked earlier, you asked me about those exploding sea shells of which I said I had never heard of but I had heard discussions of Castro's vulnerability because he was a scuba diver. And you asked me about bacteria, I said I had never heard of an introduction of bacteria, but I had heard again about Castro's vulnerability in this context. Where I heard it, as I told you before, I do not remember.

Mr. Baron. I realize we are plowing some of the same furroughs again. I am trying to be meticulous in the way you were before. You just now said that the subject of assassination probably came up in the context of discussing the contingencies of Castro's death. Did it come up in terms of discussing whether or not a plan should be put together to assassinate Castro, whether or not an operation should be mounted --

Mr. Halley. I cannot recall any such discussion, but in any state where there is a leadership dominated by one man, it is always a discussion of succession. That question has come up, you know, if something happened to Fidel Castro, if he is thrown over, if he does something foolish himself or if somebody is successful in assassinating him, somebody who decides suddenly to take his machetti and just get out in the sugar cane field, again, the question was, who replaces Castro, and we generally focused on Raul. There was talk of a collective leadership.

These are all kinds of things that are always done against that kind of a one-man state, whether it is, you know, a Communist state or whatever you want to talk, call it a military dictatorship or a dictatorship of the Right or the Left.

Mr. Baron. Again, discussion of what to do upon the contingency that Castro dies, by whatever means --

Mr. Halley. Non-Agency induced.

Mr. Baron. As opposed to this, which is my question: were you aware of any kind of a discussion at CIA Headquarters on whether or not the CIA should induce the death of Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I do not recall any such discussion. That is why I have gone into all this background to try to explain the mood of the times and that is why I keep referring to, in my sense of the word, as a professional intelligence officer, of an operational plan, I was not a participant in any discussion in which an operational plan for the assassination of Castro was discussed. That is, I think, the heart of the matter.

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

Joe, do you have any?

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, who was your immediate superior in terms of reporting from Miami?

Mr. Halley. Could we go off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Halley, we have just had a brief discussion here about some of the things that were covered before I arrived by Mr. Baron and you. I do not want to cover any more of that ground.

It is my understanding in discussing the structure of JMWAVE's relationship with Headquarters, General Lansdale's name came up, and that on one occasion, General Lansdale actually came down to Miami to visit the Station to get firsthand knowledge of what was transpiring. Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. diGenova. Do you have any idea when that was?

Mr. Halley. No. I stated earlier it was in 1962. It probably was in the summer of 1962 because it was after my family arrived in Miami. I do not remember the exact dates. It could be established probably from records of the Agency. I do not recall it specifically.

Mr. diGenova. To your knowledge, did he travel by himself or was he with compatriots or aides?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of that was that he came down on a special airplane. There may have been other people on the plane with him, I do not recall, but he landed at Homestead Air Force Base. As I recall, we picked him up from there.

Mr. diGenova. Did General Lansdale travel under his own name or under a cover name?

Mr. Halley. Throughout the time that he was in contact with me and the Station he was operating as General Lansdale.

Mr. diGenova. Did he have contact when he was there with some of the assets themselves?

Mr. Halley. He had no contact with any Cubans that I am aware of. He did spend the night that he came down with some friends at Homestead Air Force Base, but I do not recall, I would have no way of knowing what he did that evening.

Mr. diGenova. For the time that he was at JMWAVE he was with officials such as yourself who had a supervisory capacity at JMWAVE Station?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. diGenova. I have no further questions.

Mr. Baron. On the record, I just want to thank you for your testimony here today. It has been a long day and we have gone over a lot of things quite carefully and it has been most informative.

I would also like to ask you, if you would, to pursue for us that one name of the man who was connected with gambling interests in Cuba and supplied some intelligence to JMWAVE Station.

(Discussion off the record.)

(Whereupon, at 5:00 o'clock the hearing was concluded.)

HALLEY EXHIBIT

believed he was being supported by U.S. businessmen with financial stakes in Cuba. Roselli needed Giancana and Trafficante in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase, because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume that Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher-ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate.)

When the pills were given to Varona through Roselli, Varona requested arms and equipment needed for the support of his end of the operation. Roselli passed the request to Harvey. Harvey, with the help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMWAVE Station, procured explosives, detonators, twenty .30 caliber rifles, twenty .45 caliber hand guns, two radios, and one boat radar. Harvey says that the "shopping list" included some items that could be obtained only from the U.S. Government. Harvey omitted those items, because Roselli, posing as a representative of private business interests, would not have had access to such equipment. The cost of the arms and equipment, about $5,000, was T/A'd to headquarters.

Harvey and Shackley rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name, loaded it with the arms and equipment, and parked it in the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. The keys were then given to Roselli for delivery either to Maceo, to Varona, or to Varona's son-in-law. Evidently Harvey and Roselli had not yet come to trust each other. Perhaps fearing a double-cross, each set about independently to assure himself that the equipment reached the proper hands. After parking the truck, Harvey and Shackley kept the parking lot under surveillance until the pass was completed. Roselli, accompanied by O'Connell, did the same. Neither pair knew that the other was watching. Eventually the truck was picked up and driven away. It was returned later, empty, and with the keys under the seat as prearranged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says that Shackley never knew to whom delivery was made nor for what purpose. Shackley was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation from which he was otherwise excluded.

May 1962

Harvey and Roselli arranged a system of telephone communication by which Harvey was kept posted on any developments. Harvey, using a pay phone, could call Roselli at the Friars Club in Los Angeles at 1600 hours, Los Angeles time. Roselli could phone Harvey at Harvey's home in the evening. Roselli reported that the pills were in Cuba and at the restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

①

La Agencia Central de Inteligencia(CIA) de Estados Unidos, ha jugado el papel - principal en la historia de las agresiones contra Cuba, promoviendo, organizando, financiando y en muchos casos dirigiendo acciones vandálicas, no sólo contra el territorio cubano sino también - contra nuestras representaciones e intereses en países extranjeros o en aguas- internacionales.

En esta amplia gama de actividades desplegadas por la CIA, y demás órganos -- subversivos de Estados Unidos contra -- nuestro país, se destacan por su peligrosidad, los reiterados planes dirigidos a la eliminación física de los principales dirigentes de la Revolución y,- en especial, contra la figura de nuestro Primer Ministro.

Las pruebas que aportamos evidencian -- que, desde 1959, éste ha sido uno de sus objetivos principales, mediante el empleo de los más variados métodos técnicos de precisión.En los casos de agentes radicados en el exterior, les han - facilitado medios de traslación y comunicación.

The United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has played the leading role in the history of the agressions against Cuba,promoting, organizing, financing, and, in many cases,--- directing vandalic actions, not only against- the Cuban territory, but also against our --- representations and interest in foreign countries, or in international waters.

In this wide variety of activities carried -- out by the CIA and by other United States --- subversive bodies against our country ,the --- reiterated plans toward the physical elimination, of the principal leaders of the Revolution, and specially, against our Prime~~r~~ Minister, stand out because of their dangerousness.

The proofs we provide, evidence that, since - 1959, this has been one of its major aims, by using the most varied technical precision --- methods. In the case of agents living abroad, they have been given means of transportation- and communication.

(2)

Es de destacar que en las innumerables infiltraciones organizadas por la CIA, utilizando miembros de organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, uno de los objetivos constantes ha sido también la eliminación física del Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz.

La CIA, para la ejecución de sus planes, ha utilizado elementos contrarrevolucionarios en el interior y exterior del país. No sólo ha tenido como colaboradores a los desplazados del poder, sino también a elementos de distinta procedencia social, incluyendo a exponentes de todo tipo de lacras.

Igualmente, no han tenido reparo en reclutar a destacados jefes y elementos de la maffia norteamericana, a quienes les han conmutado fechorías a cambio de su participación en los planes de atentado contra nuestros dirigentes.

No han vacilado tampoco en tratar de ejecutar sus acciones en lugares públicos, donde el número de víctimas inocentes hubiese sido incalculable, como fueron: los atentados planificados en el Stadium Latinoamericano, Plaza de la Re

It is worth noticing that, in the innumerable infiltrations organized by the CIA, using members of counterrevolutionary organizations, one of the permanent goals has also been the physical elimination of Commander in Chief, Fidel Castro Ruz.

The CIA, in orden to carry out its plans, has used counterrevolutionary individuals inside and outside the country. It has had as collaborators, not only those who had been shifted fron power, but also individuals of different social origins, including samples of all types of viciousness.

In the same way, they have had no objection to recruting well-known leaders and members from the American maffia, to whom they have barred their offences, in exchange for their participation in the plots against our leaders.

Nor have they hesitated in trying to carry out their actions in public places, where the number of innocent victims would have been incalculable, as were the crimes planned to take place at the Latin American Stadium, the Revolution Square and the University of Ha-

③

Durante los últimos meses, la prensa norteamericana ha publicado una creciente y amplia información sobre la realización de estas actividades, ofreciendo en detalles la participación de la Agencia Central de Inteligencia en la elaboración y ejecución de los planes de atentado.

En los informes rendidos por la llamada Comisión Rockefeller y la presidida por el senador Frank Church, para las investigaciones sobre las actividades ilegales de la CIA, ha quedado demostrado de forma categórica lo antes expuesto.

Un ex-agente hizo públicas declaraciones sobre la participación de dicha agencia en el criminal atentado perpetrado contra el vapor francés "La Coubre", donde más de un centenar de cubanos resultaron muertos y alrededor de 200, heridos graves.

Brinda detalles pormenorizados sobre su realización, tratando de "justificar" esta matanza por un desperfecto en el mecanismo del equipo explosivo utilizado.

During the last month, the American press has published an increasing and extensive information about the accomplishment of these activities, offering details about the participation of the Central Intelligence Agency in the elaboration and execution of the criminal plans.

In the reports of the so-called Rockefeller-Commission, as well as the one headed by Senator Frank Church, for the researches on the illegal activities of the Central Intelligence Agenci (CIA), all that we have stated above, has been undoubtedly demonstrated.

A former agent made public statements about the participation of this Agency in the criminal act carried out against the French steamship"La Coubre", where more than one hundred Cubans were killed and about 200, were seriously injured. He offers details about his accomplisments trying to"justify" this killing by blaming a slight damage in the mechanism of the blowing equipment which was used.

Resulta significativa la información --- aportada por el columnista Jack Anderson en el diario "The Washington Post" sobre la intervención del ganster John Rosselli en varios planes de atentados contra el- Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, algunos de ellos mediante envenenamiento con pastillas entregadas por la CIA. Posteriormente, según la propia prensa norteamericana, Rosselli admitió ante la Comisión de Inteligencia del Senado su participación con esta Agencia en varios complots para asesinar al Primer Ministro Cubano.

Paulatinamente, funcionarios, senadores, jefes, oficiales y ex-agentes de la CIA, así como conocidos columnistas de la --- prensa norteamericana, han hecho categóricas declaraciones, que coinciden con - las denuncias formuladas, oportunamente - por el gobierno de Cuba.

Sin pretender relacionar todos los planes de atentados fraguados, exponemos a continuación algunos casos, que en su -- casi totalidad no han sido de conocimiento público y prueban la diversidad y reiteración de la participación de la CIA y otras agencias subversivas en estos he--

Very significant is the information given by- the journalist Jack Anderson from"The Washington Post" about the gangster John Rosselli's- participation in varicus plots against Prime- Minister Fidel Castro, somo of them by means- of poisoning, with pills handed to him by the CIA. Afterwards, according to the American -- press itself, Rosselli, before the Senate --- Intelligence Commission, conceded having participated with this Agency in various plots for assassinating the Cuban Prime Minister.

Gradually, officials, Senators, chiefs, officers and former CIA agents, as well as well -known American press press journalists, have- made categorical statements, which coincide-- with the denounces expressed, apropos, by the- Cuban Government.

Without pretending to mention all the plots-- attempted, we expose some of them the majority of which have not been publicly known. They prove the diversity and recurrence of -- the CIA as well as other subversive agencies participation in these actions:

5

A mediados del año 1960,los elementos con
trarrevolucionarios Armando Cubría Ramos-
y Mario Tauler Sagué,miembros de la orga-
nización contrarrevolucionaria"La Cruz",-
se infiltraron por la zona de Punta de Hi
cacos, Matanzas.

Tauler Sagué, elemento gansteril,junto a-
Cubría Ramos traían la misión de realizar
un atentado a nuestro Primer Ministro,así
como perpetrar distintas acciones de sabo
taje y terrorismo. Para cumplirla fueron-
pertrechados por la CIA de gran cantidad-
de material bélico y equipos, los que fue
ron ocupados al ser detenidos.

In mid 1960,the counterrevolutionary Armando -
Cubría Ramos and Mario Tauler Sagué, members--
of the "La Cruz" counterrevolutionary organiza
tion, were infiltrated through the Punta Hica-
cos zone, in Matanzas Province.

Tauler Sagué,a gangster,together with Cubría -
Ramos, were instructed to carry out a plot ---
against our Prime Minister, as well as to ----
commit various sabotage and terrorism actions.
For accomplishing this, they were given great
quantity of warlike material and equipment by-
the CIA,which were taken from them when arres-
ted.

6

El traidor Humberto Sorí Marín, con cuatro contrarrevolucionarios más, se infiltraron en marzo de 1961, por la costa norte de La Habana con el objetivo de reagrupar a las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias, realizar un atentado al Comandante en Jefe y desarrollar todo tipo de actividades subversivas para apoyar la invasión de Playa Girón.

Para tales fines fueron entrenados y armados por la CIA, ocupándoseles gran cantidad de material bélico y otros equipos al ser detenidos.

Entre los principales encartados figuraban: Rogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodríguez Navarrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona, Eufemio J. Fernandez Ortega y Rafael Díaz Hanscons, responsables de diversos grupos y organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias dirigidas por la CIA.

The traitor Humberto Sorí Marín with four other counterrevolutionaries, were infiltrated in March 1961, through the north coast of Havana, with the purpose of grouping the counterrevolutionary organizations, of carrying out the assassination of Commander in Chief and of developing all type of subversive activities in order tu support the Playa Girón invasion.

For this purpose, they were trained and armed by the Central Intelligence Agency. A great quantity of warlike material and other equipment were taken from them when arrested.

Among the participants were Rogelio González Corcho, Manuel Lorenzo Puig Millán, Nemesio Rodríguez Navarrete, Gaspar Domínguez Trueba Varona, Eufemio J. Fernández Ortega and Rafael Díaz Hanscons, heads of various counterrevolutionary groups and organization directed by the CIA.

En junio de 1961, se celebra una reunión con la asistencia de un elemento infil-- trado en Cuba por la organización contrarevolucionaria "Frente Revolucionario Democrático"(FRD), quien traía la orden de realizar un atentado al Comandante en Jefe Fidel Castro Ruz.

Para ejecutar dicha acción fueron designados: Juan Basigalupe Hornedo, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer y otros, entregándoseles dinero para sufragar los gastos de la operación.

El plan consistía en situar dos jeeps -- con bazookas en el garage, sito en las - Avenidas de Rancho Boyeros y Santa Catalina, y un panel por la Ciudad Deportiva, con hombres portando granadas. Al pasar nuestro dirigente obstaculizarían el --- tránsito, abriendo fuego.

Al ser detenidos, Guillermo Coula Ferrer e Higinio Menéndez acusaron a la CIA de ser el principal director del plan. Los encartados mantenían contactos a través de la Base Naval de Guantánamo y la Embajada Suiza, con miembros de la CIA y autoridades norteamericanas, quienes les pro

In June 1961, a meeting was celebrated with the attendance of an individual infiltrated in Cuba by the "Frente Revolucionario Democrático"(FRD) counterrevolutionary organitation, who was instructed to carry out a --- a plot against Commander in Chief Fidel Castro Ruz.

To accomplish this action, Juan Basigalupe - Hornedo, Higinio Menéndez Beltrán, Guillermo Coula Ferrer and others were appointed, and they were given money to meet the expensés - of the operation.

The plan was to place two jeeps with bazookas in the garage which is at Rancho Boyeros and Santa Catalina Avenues, and a light truck at the Ciudad Deportiva(Sports City) with men - carrying grenades. When our leaders would -- pass by, they would stop ~~out~~ the traffic and open fire.

When they were arrested, Guillermo Caula Ferrer and Higinio Menéndez accused the CIA of being the principal director of the plot. The indicted kept contacts through Guantánamo Naval Base and the Swiss Embassy, with members of the CIA and American authorities, who gave them means and instructions to carry out ---

Después del descalabro de Playa Girón, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia continuó sus actividades subversivas contra nuestro país, iniciando el reagrupamiento de las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias bajo la organización "Unidad Resistencia".

Esa labor fue llevada a cabo por los agentes de la CIA infiltrados: Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro(Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) y Jorge García Rubio(Tony) entre otros. Seguidamente se dieron a la tarea de desarrollar todo tipo de actividades subversivas, incluyendo un atentado contra el Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz durante el desarrollo del acto provincial del 26 de julio de 1961 en Oriente; la autoagresión a la Base Naval de Guantánamo, con el fin de justificar la agresión por parte de las Fuerzas Armadas norteamericanas; así como ataques a las repúblicas cercanas para provocar un conflicto internacional.

Los planes contemplan también un atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe en el acto central de la misma fecha en la Plaza-

After the Playa Girón defeat, the Central Intelligence Agency continued its subversive activities against our country, starting the prouping of the disperse counterrevolutionary organization, under the "Unidad Resistencia" organization.

This task was carried out by the infiltrated CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro ~~(Brand)~~, Adolfo Mendoza (Raúl) and Jorge García Rubio (Tony) among others. Afterwards, they tried to develop all types of subversive activities, including a plot against Division Commander(Lieutenant Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, during the provincial celebration of the 26 de July at Oriente Province in 1961; the selfaggression to Guantánamo Naval Base, with the purpose of justifying the aggression by the American Armed Forces, as well as attacks to neghbor republics, in order to provoke an international conflict.

The plans included also a plot against the Commander in Chief, during the central rally the same day, at the Revolution ----

de la Revolución, para lo cual fue a coordinar en territorio de Estados Unidos el- contrarrevolucionario José Pujals Mederos, quien salió clandestinamente hacia ese -- país. Allí se entrevistó con los oficiales de la CIA, Jim Bender, conocido por Jim Boulding, Harold Bishop y Carl Hitch. En esta entrevista Mederos fue nombrado jefe de - los oficiales de la CIA que operaban en - Cuba, en sustitución de Alfredo Izaguirre conocido por Tito, que estaba detenido.

En la Base Naval de Guantánamo se llevaron a cabo las reuniones conspirativas, y- sus autoridades(Capitán Schenweias)proporcionaron gran cantidad de material bélico y equipos para la realización de estos -- planes.

El mencionado Capitán Carl.E.Schenweias, ex jefe de la Base Naval, fue uno de los más activos organizadores de las agresiones.

Detenidos todos los encartados, se les ocupó gran cantidad de material y equipos bélicos.

Es de significar, que todos estos planes - subversivos fueron denunciados oportunamente por el Comandante Ernesto Guevara - en Punta del Este.

Square. For this purpose, the counterrevolutionary José Pujals Mederos made an undercover visit to the United States, in order- to coordinate this action. There, he met -- CIA officers Jim Bender, known as Jim Boulding, Harold Bischop and Carl Hitch. During this meeting, Mederos was appointed chief - of the CIA officers, who opperated in Cuba, substituting Aldredo Izaguirre, known as -- Tito, who was arrested.

The conspiratory meeting were carried out-- at the Guantánamo Naval Base, and its ----- authorities (Captain Schenweias) supplied a lot of warlike material and equipment for - the accomplishment of these plans.

The mentioned Captain Carl.E.Schenweias, - formes chief of the Naval Base, was one of the most active organizers of the aggressions.

When all the indicated were arrested, a -- great number of warlike material and equipment was taken from them.
It is worth noticing that all these subversive plans were denounced opportunely, by- Commander Ernesto Guevara, at Punta del -- Este.

(10)

En la segunda quincena de julio de 1961, un grupo de elementos contrarrevolucionarios de las organizaciones "30 de Noviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo" y "Frente Revolucionario Democrático", planeaban atentar contra nuestro Comandante en Jefe y otros dirigentes.

Recibían orientaciones de la CIA a través de contactos con Tony Varona, Manuel Ray y Aureliano Sánchez Arango en el exterior del país, y con el Almirante Burke y agentes de la CIA en la Base Naval de Guantánamo. El atentado se efectuaría en las cercanías del domicilio de la compañera Celia Sánchez Manduley, en el Vedado. Resultaron detenidos Mario Chanez de Armas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto Coscuyuela Valcárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González González y otros, a quienes se les ocuparon armas y explosivos.

During the second fortnight of July, 1961, a group of counterrevolutionaries from "30 de Noviembre", "Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo" and "Frente Revolucionario Democrático" organizations, were plotting against our Commander in Chief and other leaders.

They received CIA instructions through contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel Ray and Aureliano Sánchez Arango, and with Admiral Burke and CIA agents in Guantánamo Naval Base. The plot would be carried out in the proximity of Celia Sánchez Manduley's house, in Vedado. Mario Chanez de Armas, Francisco Chanez de Armas, Roberto Coscuyuela Valcárcel, Orlando Ulacia Valdés, Francisco Gil Cruz, Segundo González González and others were arrested and weapons and explosives were taken from them.

11

Entre sus planes figuraba también el fracasado atentado al Dr.Carlos Rafael Rodríguez llevado a efecto el 13 de setiembre de 1961 cuando dicho dirigente regresaba de Matanzas hacia La Habana. Con ese fin, un grupo de contrarrevolucionarios pertenecientes a las organizaciones antes mencionadas, establecieron contactos con representantes del "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR). Al frente de los mismo se hallaba -- Juan José Martore Silva.

Estos elementos mantenían estrechos vínculos con un agente de la CIA, así como con un jefe de bandidos en la provincia de Matanzas. Al resultar detenidos se les ocupó el material bélico que poseían.

Among their plans was also the failed plot against Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodríguez, which was attempted on September 13th,1961, when he was coming back from Matanzas to Havana. With thar purpose, a group of counterrevolutionary individuals, belonging to the --- organizations mentioned above, contacted -- representatives of the "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR). The group's leader was Juan José Martore Silva.

These individuals kept close relation with a CIA agent as well as with the chief of a band in Matanzas Province. When arrested, warlike material was taken from them.

7 6 0 0 0 0 7 0

12

En octubre de 1961, las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias "II Frente del Escambray" y "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria" (MRR) dirigidas por la Agencia Central de Inteligencia (CIA), aprobaron un plan conjunto de sabotajes en la capital, a fin de provocar la indignación popular e influir sobre la concurrencia masiva al acto de recibimiento al Presidente de la República, Dr. Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, a su llegada de Punta del Este.

Esta táctica estaba encaminada a viabilizar el plan de atentado que ejecutarían el día 4 del propio mes, disparando con una bazooka hacia la tribuna situada en la terraza del antiguo Palacio Presidencial desde un apartamento situado en un edificio contiguo. La retirada sería cubierta con el criminal lanzamiento de granadas contra el público, para crear la confusión y el pánico.

Sus propósitos fueron frustrados al ser detenidos todos los encartados, ocupándose gran cantidad de material bélico.

On Octuber 1961, "II Frente del Escambray" and "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR) counterrevolutionary organizations, directed by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), approved a joint plan for a sabotage in the capital, in order to cause people's indignation and to influence on the mass gathering to welcome the President of the Republic Osvaldo Dorticós Torrado, on his arrival from Punta del Este.

This tactic was aimed to facilitate the plot, which would be carried out on the 4th of the same month, shooting with a bazooka in direction to the tribune located on the terrace of the former Presidential Palace, from an apartament located in a nearby building. The withdrawal would be covered by the criminal launching of grenades against the public, in order to cause confusion and panic.

Their purposes were frustrated when all of the indicted were arrested and a great number of warlike material was taken from them.

(13)

A principios de 1962, siguiendo orientacio
nes de la CIA y la Base Naval de Guantána-
mo, el contrarrevolucionario Jorge Luis --
Cuervo Calvo se da a la tarea de restructu
rar algunos grupos y organizaciones contra
revolucionarias, creando la denominada ---
"Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias"(UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña,Raúl Cay
Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert y otros se reu
nieron para elaborar planes de alzamiento-
e informar sobre los contactos estableci--
dos en la Base Naval norteamericana de ---
Guantánamo para recibir material bélico y-
equipos.

La CIA persiste en sus planes de atentar -
contra la vida del Primer Ministro y de --
producir una autoagresión a la Base Naval.
Cumpliendo estas órdenes, el contrarrevo--
lucionario Cuervo Calvo hace contacto con-
la organización DRE, procediendo a elabo--
rar lo que denominaron "Plan Z", que con--
sistía en: atentar contra la vida del Dr.-
Raúl Roa, Ministro de Relaciones Exterio--
res, lo que les permitiría llevar a vías -
de hecho otro atentado de mayor proporcio-
nes contra el Primer Ministro y demás diri
gentes de la Revolución que concurrieran -
al sepelio.

In early 1962, following instructions from the CIA and the Guantánamo Naval Base, the counterrevolutionary Jorge Luis Cuervo Cal vo reorganized several group and counter-- revolutionary organizations, and created - the "Unión de Unidades Revolucionarias" -- (UDUR).

Cuervo Calvo, Humberto Gómez Peña, Raúl -- Cay Hernández, Raúl Cay Gispert and others met in order to prepare plans for uprising and inform about the contacts established- with the Guantánamo Naval Base for receiving warlike material and equipment.

The Central Intelligence Agency insisted - on its plots against the Prime Minister's- life, and to carry out a self-aggression - to the Naval Base. Following these instruc tions, the counterrevolutionary Cuervo --- Calvo made contacts with the DRE organiza- tion, ~~and~~ elaborated what would be known - as "Plan Z", which consisted on attempt--- ing against the life of the Minister of -- Foreign Relations Raúl Roa, what would --- enable them to carry out another plot of - bigger proportions agains the Prime Minister and other revolucionary leaders who would- attend the burial.

⑭

Es de destacar que los autores intelectuales de este plan fueron los contrarevolucionarios Cay Hernández y Cay --Gispert, militantes de la organización DRE, que era dirigida por el agente de la CIA, infiltrado en nuestro país, Julio Hernández Rojo.

It is worth noticing that the intellectual authors of this plan were the counter-----revolutionaries Cay Hernández y Cay Gis---pert, members of the DRE organization, ---which was headed by Julio Hernández Rojó,-a CIA agent infiltrated into our country.

76000070216

15

La organización "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista"(RCA) en cuyo seno se agruparon el "Ejército de Liberación Nacional"(ELN) "Movimiento de Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR), "Agrupación Montecristi", y -- otros, era dirigida desde el exterior por la CIA, a través de su agente Nino Díaz.

En 1963, la CIA orientó al bloque RCA organizar y ejecutar acciones internas que- aparentaran la existencia de una resistencia popular activa, con vista a solicitar la intervención armada a Cuba, en la reunión de Presidentes de países miembros de la OEA.

Las instrucciones eran suministradas por- la CIA a través de la Base Naval de Guantánamo. A partir de entonces la RCA elaboran nuevos planes de acción y atentados, en apoyo a la invasión armada que esperaban- en el mes de julio.

Con motivo de los actos conmemorativos -- del 13 de Marzo, planearon asesinar al -- Comandante en Jefe, desde una casa cercana a la Universidad de la Habana, disparando hacia la tribuna, con un mortero. Los- principales encartados fueron Samuel Car-

The "Resistencia Cívica Anticomunista"---- organizaticn (RCA), to which "Ejército de- Liberación Nacional"(ELN), "Movimiento de- Recuperación Revolucionaria"(MRR), "Agrupa-- ción Montecristi" and others were joined,- was directed from abroad by the CIA, through its agent Nino Díaz.

In 1963, the CIA gave instructions to the- RCA block for organizing and carrying out-- internal actions in order to give the ---- impression of the existence of a popular -- civic resistence, and therefore, demanding - an armed intervention in Cuba, at the ---- meeting of the Presidents of countries ---- members of the OAS.

The instructions were given by the CIA ---- through Guantánamo Naval Base. Since then,- the RCA elaborated new plans for actions -- and crimes, for supporting the armed inva-- tion which was expected in July.

On the occasion of the acts conmmemrating - the 13th of March, they plan-ed to assesinate the Commander in Chief, from a house near - the University of Havana, shooting with a - mortar in direction to the tribune. The --- principal persons indicted were Samuel Car-

76

(16)

ballo Moreno (agente de la CIA, Luis David Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales Sosa y otros.

Simultáneamente al atentado proyectaron ataques a locales de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolución y Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias.

ballo Moreno CIA agent), Luis David Rodríguez González, Ricardo Olmedo Moreno, José A. López Rodríguez, Juan Lucio Morales -- Sosa and others.

Simultaneously with this plot, attacks to the Committees of Defense of the Revolution and the National Revolutionary Militias sites, were planned to be carried out.

(17)

Ante el fracaso, la RCA elabora un nuevo plan contra el Primer Ministro, esta vez en el stadium Latinoamericano el 7 de abril de 1963. En el mismo participarían 16 hombres armados de pistolas y granadas de fragmentación.

Entre los principales encartados se encontraban Enrique Rodríguez Valdés conocido por "Mulgado", Ricardo López Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo y Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

Having failed, the RCA elaborated a new plot against the Prime Minister, this time at the Latin American Stadium on April 7th, 1963. Sixteen men armed with pistols and fragmentation grenades would participate in it.

Among the principal persons indicted were Enrique Rodríguez Valdés, known as "Mülgado" Ricardo López Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

Elaboraron otro plan, esta vez contra la vida del Ministro de las Fuerzas Armadas Comandante de División Raúl Castro Ruz,- en la Plaza de la Revolución, con motivo de la celebración del 26 de Julio. En el mismo tomarían parte cuatro grupos dirigidos por René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila Soria y Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez. El jefe de estos grupos era Ibrahim Machin Hernández.

Todas estas acciones, organizadas y fomentadas por la CIA a través del bloque RCA, fueron frustradas, detenidos sus encartados y ocupadas gran cantidad de armas y equipos.

They elaborated another plot, this time ---- against the life of the Minister of the --- Armed Forces, División Commander (Lieutenant Colonel) Raúl Castro Ruz, at the Revolution Square, during the celebration of the 26th of July. Four groups leaded by René Sigler Sánchez Evias, Jesús Montes de Oca Cruz, Oscar Sibila Soria and Eliecer Rodríguez Suárez, would participate. The head of these - groups was Ibrahim Machin Hernández.

All these actions, organized and promoted - by the CIA through the RCA block, were ---- frustrated, the persons indicted were - --- arrested and a great number of weapons and equipment were taken from them.

(19)

76000070331

Para el 28 de setiembre de 1963, aniversario de los Comités de Defensa de la Revolucion, los contrarrevolucionarios Orlando -Martiniano de la Cruz Sánchez,Juan Israel-Cazañas León,Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosquera,Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez,Francisco Vlanco de los Cuetos,Federico Hernández González y otros, vinculados al agente de-la CIA Pierre Owen Diez de Ure,prepararon-un plan de atentado contra nuestro Primer-Ministro.

Estos elementos, agrupados en las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias"Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria"(FIUR),"Triple A","Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario" (MDR),"Ejército de Liberación Nacional" --(ELN),contaron con el asescramiento y aseguramiento de la CIA.

El plan consistía en dinamitar las conductoras del alcantarillado que pasa por debajo de la tribuna presidencial.Liquidado el plan y detenidos los autores, el agente --Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, ciudadano francés residente en nuestro país, confesó que trabajaba para la CIA desde hacía dos años --aproximadamente, facilitándole informaciones de diversa índole.

For September the 28th 1963,anniversary of the Committees of Defense of the Revolution, the counterrevolutionary Orlando Martiniano de la Cruz Sánchez, Juan Israel Cazañas León, Jesús Plácido Rodríguez Mosquera, Luis Beltrán Arencibia Pérez, Francisco Vlanco de los Cuetos, Federico Hernándes González and others, related to the --CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, prepared a plot against our Prime Minister.

These individuals grouped into the "Frente Interno de Unidad Revolucionaria"(FIUR), -"Triple A", "Movimiento Democrático Revolucionario" (MDR),"Ejército de Liberación Nacional" (ELN) counterrevolutionary organizations, had CIA advice and support.

The plan was to dynamite the sewage pipes -which pass under the presidential tribune. Once the plan frustrated and the authors --arrested, the agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, French citizen living in our country, ----confessed that he had been working for the-CIA for aproximately two years, and that he had given this Agency information of various sorts.

20

En el mes de marzo de 1964, se gestó otro plan de atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe. El principal encartado, Mario Salabarría Aguiar, elemento gansteril, mantenía contactos con la CIA a través del agente Dr. Bernardo Milanés López, Jefe de una red, quien pasó la información del plan al Centro CIA y gestionó desde España la ayuda de los apátridas Tony Varona y Juan Bosch, amigos de Salabarría.

El plan consistía en instalar una ametralladora calibre 30 ó 50 en un vehículo y aguardar la posibilidad del paso del Comandante en Jefe, para atentar contra su vida. La CIA entregó a Salabarría las armas y medios necesarios, incluyendo grandes sumas de dinero.

In March 1964, another plot against Commander-in Chief was elaborated. The principal indicted Mario Salabarría Aguiar, a gangster, had contacts with the CIA through the agent Dr. Bernardo Milanés López head of a net, who informed the CIA center of the plan and sought, from Spain, the support of Salabarría's friends, Tony Varona and Juan Bosch.

The plan consisted in installing a machine gun caliber 30 or 50 in a vehicle and waiting for the occasion when the Commander in Chief would pass by, in order to attempt against his life. The CIA gave Salabarría the necessary weapons and means, including great sums of money.

(21)

A mediados del año 1954, los contrarrevolucionarios Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, conocido por "Mankeca", Reynaldo Figueroa-Gálvez, Felipe Alonso Herrera y José Ma--- nuel Rodríguez Cruz, conocido por "Lolo",- miembros de la organización "Movimiento de Liberación Nacional", que formaba parte -- del bloque de organizaciones, RCA, dirigi-- das por la CIA, comienzan a preparar un -- plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

Estos individuos estaban vinculados a los - agentes de la CIA, Alberto y Ramón Grau --- Sierra, quienes formaban parte de la red -- dirigida por Ramón y María Leopoldina Grau-Alsina, que posteriormente-en junio de 1965 intentaron envenenar al Primer Ministro.

El plan consistía en el lanzamiento de granadas contra nuestro Primer Ministro en el-Stadium Latinoamericano, por un grupo de -- nueve hombres, quienes fueron detenidos, y-ocupados los equipos bélicos.

In mid-1964, the counterrevolutionaries Osvaldo Valentín Figueroa Gálvez, known as --- "Mankeca", Reinaldo Figueroa Gálvez, Felipe-Alonso Herrera and José Manuel Rodríguez - Cruz, known as "Lolo" members of the "Movimiento de Liberación Nacional", which be--- longed to the RCA block of organizations,-- directed by the CIA, began to prepare a --- plot against the Prime Minister.

These persons were related to the CIA agents Alberto and Ramón Grau Sierra, who belonged to the net headed by Ramón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who latter in June 1965.- attempted to poison the Prime Minister.

The plan consisted on throwing grenades --- against our Prime Minister at the Latin -- American Stadium, by a group of nine men -- who were arrested and whose warlike equip-- ment was taken from them.

22

En setiembre de ese mismo año(1964), un grupo de contrarrevolucionarios de las organizaciones "Ejército de Liberación Nacional"(ELN) y "Frente Interno de Liberación"(FIL), que cumplían misiones de obtención de información para la CIA, comenzaron a gestionar la unificación, cumpliendo también órdenes de dicha Agencia.

Enfrascados en estas labores de unidad,el contrarrevolucionario Nemesio Cubillas Pérez, pone en conocimiento de Angel Miguel Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola y otros el plan de atentado que venían fraguando contra nuestro Primer Ministro en la Calle 11, en el Vedado, orientados por la CIA.

A principios de 1965, los contrarrevolucionarios Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia,Fermín González Carballo y Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano, miembros del "Ejército de Liberación Nacional(integrado al bloque de la RCA,dirigida por la CIA) comienzan a ultimar detalles de un plan de atentados contra el Comandante en Jefe en Santiago de las Vegas.

In september of this same year (1964),a group of counterrevolutionaries from the"Ejército de Liberación Nacional(ELN), and"Frente Interno de Liberación"(FIL) organizations, who were accomplishing instructions of obtaining information for the CIA, began to seek unification, according, to the CIA's orders.

While accomplishing these tasks for archieving unity, the counterrevolutionary Nemesio Cubillas Pérez, informed Angel Miguel Arencibia Virán, Rolando Galdós Ranzola and others about the plot they were elaborating against our Primer Minister at 11 St.,Vedado, according to the CIA instructions.

At the beginning of 1965, the counterrevolutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermín González Carballo and Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano, members of the "Ejército de Liberación Nacional(integrated into the RCA block, directed by the CIA) began to complete details of a plot against the Commander in Chief in Santiago de las Vegas.

Desisten de esta primera variante y proyectan otro plan que sería perpetrado en el stadium Latincamericano con hombres armados de granadas de fragmentación, y otro grupo, apostado en un edificio cercano, abriría fuego de ametralladoras contra el público para crear el pánico y la confusión y garantizando así la retirada.

They gave up this first plan and devised another plot, which would be committed by armed men with fragmentation grenades at the Latin American Stadium, and in a near building, there was another group which would open fire with machine guns against the people producing panic and confusion and, thus, guaranteeing the withdrawal.

En junio de este mismo año- según se ha mencionado anteriormente- una red de agentes de la CIA, dirigidos por Ramón y María Leopoldina Grau Alsina(conocida por "Polita") se dedicaba a todo tipo de actividades enemigas y otras de carácter antisocial para lo cual se valían de contactos con sedes capitalistas en el país, que servían de enlace con la Agencia Central de Inteligencia.

Estos elementos formaban parte de las organizaciones "Rescate", "Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario"(MAR) y otras dirigidas y subversionadas por esa Agencia.

María Leopoldina Grau Alsina recibió instrucciones de la CIA de fraguar un plan para envenenar al Primer Ministro Fidel Castro, para lo cual le enviaron un frasco de pastillas venenosas, que fueron entregadas a Alberto Cruz Caso, quien a su vez las entregó a los miembros de la organización(MAR) Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez Núñez, para que efectuaran el atentado en el hotel Habana Libre.

As it has been said before, in June of this same year, a net of CIA agents, headed by Ramón and María Leopoldina Grau Alsina (known as Polita) were devoted to all type of enemy activities, as well as others of antisocial nature. For this purpose, they made use of contacts with capitalist representations in the country, which were used as liaisons with the Central Intelligence Agency.

These individuals were part of the organizations"Rescate","Movimiento Anticomunista Revolucionario" (MAR) and other organizations directed and sponsored by that Agency.

María Leopoldina Grau was given instructions by the CIA to plot for poisoning Primer Minister Fidel Castro,thereby,she was sent a poisonous pill bottle,which was given to Alberto Cruz Caso,who,in turn,gave it to Jesús Campanioni Souza y Santos de la Caridad Pérez Núñez,members of the Organization(MAR), so that they would commit the attempted crime at the Havana Libre Hotel.

25

Al fallar este intento, el contrarrevolucionario Tony Varona envió otro frasco con 500 cápsulas, a fin de tratar de realizar nuevamente el hecho.

Asimismo, "Polita" recibió de la CIA para -- iguales propósitos, varias armas con silenciadores y proyectiles especiales para atentados personales, las que fueron ocupadas - en junio de 1965, al ser detenidos estos -- elementos.

The counterrevolutionary Tony Varona sent another bottle with 500 capsules when --- this attempt failed, in order to try to - carry out the act again.

Likewise, "Polita" received from the CIA - some weapons with mufflers and special - projectiles for personal assassinations, - which were taken from them when arrested- in June, 1965.

26

Una vez más, en 1965, la Agencia Central de Inteligencia intentó reagrupar las dispersas organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias,- bajo la denominada"Unidad Resistencia ----- (UNARE).

En estas actividades, los elementos contrarevolucionarios Enrique Abreu Vilahu,conocido por Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernandez, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga y -- otros, planean un atentado contra el Comandante en Jefe, aprovechando su visita al -- restaurant "Vita Nuova",en el Vedado.En este lugar, Abreu Vilahu abriría fuego con -- una subametralladora Thompson contra el --- Primer Ministro y postas del Ministerio del Interior ubicadas frente al restaurant, a - fin de crear confusión y evadirse.

Al detenérseles, en julio de ese propio año, se les ocupó el material bélico para la realización de sus propósitos.

Once more, in 1965, the Central Intelligence Agency attempted to group the dispersed ---- counterrevolutionary organizations, under -- the named "Unidad Resistencia"(UNARE). In -- these activities, the counterrevolutionaries Enrique Abreu Vilahu, known as Henry, Carlos Vicente Sánchez Hernández, Julio de las Nieves Ruiz Pitaluga and others, plotted against the Commander in Chief, taking advantage of his visit to Vita Nouva's restaurant, in the Vedado. In this place, Abreu Vilahu would -- open fire with a Thompson machine gun against the Prime Minister and the guards of the --- Ministry of the Interior building located -- across the restaurant, in order to create -- confusion and escape.

On being arrested on July of that same year, warlike material they had for the fulfillment of their purposes, was taken from them.

27

También en 1966, fue detenido el ex-Comandante Rolando Cubela Secades, por ser el principal encartado en un plan de atentado contra el Primer Ministro. Dicho plan fue articulado por la CIA aprovhchando el viaje de Cubela a Madrid, lugar donde fue reclutado por los agentes de la CIA, Manuel Artime, Jorge Robreño conocido por el "Mago", luis Enrique Trasancos y Carlos Tepedino.

Igualmente intervinieron en los planes del atentado, los traidores José Luis González Gallarreta, funcionario de la embajada de Cuba en Madrid y Alberto Blanco conocido por "El Loco".

En la entrevista de Cubela con Manuel Artime éste último le garantizó la entrega de embarcaciones piratas, armas y hombres para una invasión que sería el complemento, en menos de 72 horas, de un atentado contra el Primer Ministro.

A tal efecto, antes de regresar Cubela a Cuba, recibió de José Luis González Gallarreta un fusil con mirilla telescópica y silenciador que le fue ocupado al ser detenido, conjuntamente con gran cantidad de armas y equipos que la CIA le había hecho llegar. También fueron detenidos Alberto Blanco Romariz y Jo

Being the principal indicted in a plan to kill the Prime Minister, the former Commander Rolando Cubela Secades was also arrested in 1965. That plan was prepared by the CIA, takin advantage Cubela's trip to Madrid, where he was recrutide by the CIA agents Manuel Artime, Jorge Robreño known as "The Magician" (El Mago), Luis Enrique Trasancos and Carlos Tepedino.

Others that also partipated in the plot, were the traitors José Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid and Alberto Blanco known as "The Crazy" (El Loco).

In the interview of Cubela with Manuel Artime, the later garanteed the delibery of pirate crafts, weapons and men for an invasion wich would support the plan for the assassination of the Prime Minister in les that 72 hours.

For that purpose, before Cubela came back to Cuba, he receiver from José Luis González Gallarreta a rifle with telescopic peephole and muffler, wich was taken from him when arrested, together with a great number of weapons and equipment that the CIA had sent to him. Alberto Blanco Romariz and José Luis-

28

Dirigidos por la CIA, las organizaciones "Comando L" y "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre", con representación en territorio - norteamericano,se dan a la tarea de preparar dos embarcaciones artilladas para infiltrarse en nuestro país y realizar - actividades subversivas,a mediados de -- 1965.

Desisten de la infiltración y deciden tirotear la zona de becados de Miramar y - el hotel Riviera,dirigiendo sus ataques-fundamentalmente contra la residencia -- del Presidente de la República.Después - de esta acción regresan a Estados Unidos.

En mayo de 1966, estos elementos se infiltraron por la zona de Monte Barreto,- en la capital,con la misión de realizar un atentado al Primer Ministro.En la acción resultaron muertos Armando Romero - Martínez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García, y detenidos: Antonio Cuesta Valle,cabecilla principal de los"Comandos L",y Eugenio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas,a quienes se les ocupó gran cantidad de equipos y-material bélico.

Estos elementos recibieron entrenamiento de la CIA en Puerto Rico y algunos de --

The "Comandos L" and the "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre", with representation in the U.S. territory, directed by the CIA,undertook - the task of making ready two crafts equipped with guns to be infitrated, and ----- committ subversive activities in our --- country, about the mid-1965.

They gave up the infiltration and decided to shoot at the scholarship zone in Miramar and at the Riviera Hotel,mainly in direction to the residence of the President of the -- Republic. After this action they returned - to the United States.

In May, 1966, these men were infiltrated by the Monte Barreto zone, in the capital,with the mission of assassinating the Primer -- Minister. In the action, Armando Romero Martinez y Sandalio Herminio Díaz García were killed, and Antonio Cuesta Valle, principal head of the "Comandos L", and Eugenio Enrique Zaldívar Cárdenas, were arrested and - a great number of equipment and warlike material was taken from them.

These men were trainned by the CIA in Puerto Rico, and some of them were the authors-

29

ellos fueron los autores del cañoneo al buque mercante "San Pascual", fondeado en el Puerto de Caibarién, Las Villas.

of the bombardment to the "San Pascual" merchant vessel anchored at the Caibarién Port, in Las Villas Province.

(30)

El 17 de marzo de 1967, resultaron detenidos Félix Asencio Crespo,Wilfredo Martínez Díaz y Gustavo Areces Alvarez,al tratar de infiltrarse por la zona de Cayo Fragoso, - procedentes de Estados Unidos.

El objetivo principal que traían era realizar un atentado contra nuestro Primer Ministro y desatar una actividad sistemática de sabotajes con explosivos plásticos,todo ello complementado con ataques piratas,para dar la imagen en el exterior de actividades subversivas de grupos en distintas - zonas y crear una situación que permitiera a las organizaciones contrarrevolucionarias radicadas en Estados Unidos,recabar - ayuda oficial.

Para llevar a cabo sus actividades en territorio cubano, los mismos fueron entrenados por la CIA, a través de las organizaciones "M-30-11","RECE","Los Pinos Nuevos", "Comandos L", "Alpha-66" y otras.
Para esta misión se les facilitó todo el - material bélico necesario.

Félix Asencio Crespo,Wilfredo Martínez Díaz and Gustavo Areces Alvarez were arrested on March 17th, while they tried to infiltrate- by the Cayo Fragoso zone, coming from the - United States.

The main objective they should carry out- was to assassinate our Prime Minister and - launch a sistematic activity of sabotage -- with plastic explosives, all that supported with pirate attacks, in order to give abroad an image of the existence of subversive --- activities in different areas and, thus, to create a situation which would permit the - counterrrevolutionary organizations located in the United States to succeed in getting- official support.

In order to carry out their activities in - Cuban territory, they were trained by the - CIA through the "M-30-11","RECE","Los Pinos Nuevos","Comandos L", "Alpha-66" and others organizations. For this mission they were - given all the neccessary warlike material.

(31)

En 1971, con motivo del viaje del Comandante en Jefe a Chile, se fragua un atentado - en ese país, para el cual se unen la CIA, - fascista chilenos y contrarrevolucionarios- cubanos de la organización "Alpha-66".

El principal encartado en este plan era Jesús Domínguez Benítez, conocido por " El -- Isleño", para quien(a través de contrarrevolucionarios cubanos radicados en Venezuela) se obtuvo documentación falsa que lo acreditaba como periodista venezolano, lo que le permitió cubrir la visita de nuestro Primer Ministro en dicho país.

El plan se ejecutaría mediante una pistola- adaptada a una cámara de televisión, pero - desistieron efectuarlo por considerar que - no existían garantías para la conservación- de sus vidas.

Domínguez Benítez, perteneció a la organización terrorista "Poder Cubano", fue acusado por las autoridades norteamericanas de promover acciones terroristas en Estados Unidos y otros países como miembro de dicha organización, y arrestado por el FBI en 1968.

On 1971, due to Commander in Chief's trip to Chile, a plot was elaborated in that country for which the CIA, the Chilean fascists and- Cubans counterrevolutionaries from "Alpha-66" organization came together.

The major indicted in this plan was Jesús Domínguez Benítez, known as"The Islander". Through Cuban counterrevolutionaries settled down at Venezuela, he obtained false documents which identified him as a Venezuelan newspaperman, which permitted him to report our Prime-Minister's visit in that country.

The plan would be carried out using a gun --- camouflaged into a television camera, but --- they gave this up on considering there were - no guarantees for the preservation of their - lives.

Domínguez Benítez, belonged to the "Poder Cubano" terrorist organization. He was accused by the American authorities of promoting --- terrorist actions inside the United States - and other countries, as a member of that organization, and was arrested by the FBI in - 1968!

(32)

Sin embargo, en 1970 participa en el frustrado intento de infiltración del "Alpha-66" por Oriente, refugiándose en la Base Naval,donde-nuevamente se le arrestó, esta vez, por in---fringir las condiciones de una fianza sobre - una condena de 18 meses por la causa anteriormente mencionada.

No obstante, queda en libertad y sale sin dificultades de Estados Unidos a Sudamérica para-participar en el atentado. Posteriormente regresa a Estados Unidos.

However, in 1970 he participated in the --- "Alpha-66" unsuccessful attempt of infiltration through Oriente Province, and sought - refuge at the Naval Base, where he was --- arrested again, this time because he violated the conditions of a bond over an 18 months-condemn due to the trial just mentioned --- before.

Nevertheless, he is set free and leaves --- United States without any difficulty, and - moves to South America in order to participate in the plot. Afterwards, he returns to the United States.

㉝

Consideramos que el análisis de las informaciones que aportamos, las públicamente conocidas y las que las autoridades norteamericanas poseen y no han sido publicadas, permiten afirmar que la eliminación física de dirigentes de la Revolución Cubana, principalmente del Primer Ministro Fidel Castro Ruz, ha constituído una política reiterada de los Estados Unidos a través de sus agencias subversivas, utilizando para ello a contrarrevolucionarios cubanos, ciudadanos norteamericanos y todo tipo de elemento corrompido, tanto interna como externamente, sin tomar en consideración las víctimas que ocasionarían estas acciones.

Con este objetivo han sido facilitadas en grandes cantidades, armas, explosivos, medios técnicos, de transporte y comunicación a los participantes, para la realización de sus planes.

Estos son algunos hechos connotados y comprobados de las numerosas actividades subversivas que ha realizado la CIA destinadas a la eliminación física de los dirigentes del Gobierno Revolucionario de Cuba.

We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer, the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities possess and have not been published, allow us to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, specially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its subversive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into consideration the victims that would result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of their plans.

These are some of the coonoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out aimed to the assassination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/29/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10047

RECORD SERIES : HEARINGS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-H-05

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/06/1976
PAGES : 80

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO, FIDEL
OPERATION MONGOOSE
JMWAVE
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/26/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 2

ORIGINAL

TOP SECRET

Vol. 1 of 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

The United States Senate

R3014

Report of Proceedings

[illegible]
ON 3/2/77
BY 9?

Hearing held before

INVENTORIED
ON 4/15/77
BY EC

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Thursday, May 6, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
3017 WILSON BOULEVARD
ARLINGTON, VA 22201

(703) 841-0800

TOP SECRET

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF:	PAGE
Robert G. Halley --accompanied by-- John Rigall and Seymour R. Bolten	3

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, May 6, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:40 o'clock p.m., in Room 608, the Carroll Arms Hotel, the Honorable Richard S. Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Jim Johnston and Paul Wallach, Professional Staff Members.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

TOP SECRET

P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Schweiker. I guess we will swear you in, so if you will stand up and raise your right hand, do you solemnly swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Senator Schweiker. Be seated.

Mr. Johnston. Would you state for the record your full name?

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT G. HALLEY

ACCOMPANIED BY JOHN RIGALL AND SEYMOUR R. BOLTEN

Mr. Halley. My name is Robert G. Halley.

Mr. Johnston. And I understand that is an alias and your true identity will be preserved by the Agency.

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Bolten, would you state your full name?

Mr. Bolten. Seymour Bolten, Seymour R. Bolten.

Mr. Johnston. And John, the alias you are testifying under?

Mr. Rigall. John Rigall, R-i-g-a-l-l.

Mr. Johnston. And Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigal, would you state your capacity in this session today?

Mr. Bolten. I am chief of the Review Staff of the CIA, and responsible for dealings with the Senate Select Committee.

Mr. Rigall. I am Special Assistant to the DDO, sitting in here as an alternate monitor.

Mr. Johnston. And the discussion that has taken place prior to going on the record today basically has resulted i decision to have Mr. Bolten and Mr. Rigall attend as monitor to this session, and do you understand that, Mr. Halley?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Halley, what was your capacity with Agency in November, 1963?

Mr. Halley. In November, 1963, I was the Chief of Sta of the CIA operation that was based in Miami, Florida, targeted as its primarily responsibility for the Cuban operation.

Mr. Johnston. Mr. Wallach has reminded me to remind you of a procedural matter which, you understand you have the right to counsel.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I do.

Mr. Johnston. And you understand you have a right not to answer questions if you don't wish to, or not to answer questions until you consult with Counsel, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. And you are appearing here voluntarily without counsel.

Mr. Halley. That is correct.

Mr. Johnston. And going back to substantive questions, how long did you remain as Chief of Station?

What were the dates of your service?

Mr. Halley. Well, I arrived, or became involved in the Cuban operations in the early 1962, and I stayed there until approximately June of 1965.

Senator Schweiker. What month again in '62?

Mr. Halley. Early '62. I didn't give you the month, Senator, because I originally came down to Florida to conduct a survey of this operation to see what possibilities could be carried out in terms of the collection of intelligence. I later filed a report on it, and I was later assigned down to

Senator Schweiker. And this was called JMWAVE, was it?

Mr. Halley. That is the cryptonym that the Agency used for the Miami station.

Senator SChweiker. And to whom in that chain of command at the CIA did you report when you were the operating head?

Mr. Halley. There were different people at different times. When I first went to Miami, the task force commander wa Mr. William Harvey. He reported then to the DDP, who reported to the Director of Central Intelligence. At a later point in the operation, Mr. Harvey moved on to other tasks, and Mr. Fitzgerald became the chief of that particular unit, and then after Mr. Fitzgerald, Mr. Hart was the head of that particular unit.

And between Harvey and Fitzgerald, I think there was a short period of time when a fellow by the name of Bruce Cheev was the acting chief of that particular unit, or the chief. I have forgotten the exact arrangement there.

Senator Schweiker. Sometime during this period did it change its title from Task Force W to SAS, is that correct or not correct, or do I have it mixed up?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of that chronology was th it was first called SAS and then became Task Force W, and th became integrated back into WH Division, which was the Weste Hemisphere Division.

Senator Schweiker. SAS preceded Task Force W?

Mr. Halley. Yes. That's off the top of my head. That's my recollection of it.

Mr. Johnston. Just for the record, I think it was the other way around. Task Force W was first and SAS was second.

Senator Schweiker. But in sum and substance your duties were basically the same, whether it was Task Force W or SAS under Harvey and Fitzgerald, was that not true?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think you have to break this period up into two phases, Senator. The early phase, 1962, was focused on coming up with an appraisal of what kind of an operation could be run against Cuba in the context which existed at that time, in other words, after the Bay of Pigs, after the post mortems had been conducted. The Administration at the time decided that they wanted to take another look at Cuba as an intelligence and national security problem. Therefore, an assessment was to be made in the early period of time as to what kind of an operation could be run in pursuit of U.S. policy objectives, which was to see if Fidel Castro's government could be removed. And when that assessment was conducted as to what kind of intelligence operations could be conducted, what kind of paramilitary or other operations could be run, that was an initial phase, and that phase was approved and put into effect, but as that operation was being put into effect the missile crisis came upon us, so that that was not really carried to its logical conclusion because the operation

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

then shifted.

Senator Schweiker. After October of '62?

Mr. Halley. No, prior to October of '62, because the Cuban crisis was in October of '62, but the buildup preceded it, and our operations which were collecting intelligence in Cuba detected this buildup as it was unfolding. Therefore, the national priority became now how do you take action against Fidel Castro, but what is the nature of this Soviet buildup. And therefore the operation changed.

Then after the Cuban missile crisis of October of 1962, the problem became one of monitoring the Soviet disengagement from Cuba, and then there was another phase after that when the Soviets were out, Castro was clearly recognized as the established power in Cuba, and the problem became one of looking at Cuba in the context of was there some other way to get a political change in Cuba other than by military action or by paramilitary action. In other words, the emphasis shifted to looking at the Castro military establishment to see if a coup could be pulled from within, to see if economic pressures could be put on the Castro regime.

So the tasking of this particular unit did change, and change of nuances and degrees during this period, but in our professional sense it was focused on the Cuban targets. So in that sense you are correct, but it did go through various changes as events changed.

Senator Schweiker. What was the relationship of your station and your assignment to General Lansdale? What role did he play?

Mr. Halley. Well, in the early days, in the early period of 1962, General Lansdale was a member of a group that was looking at the basic problem of what could be done against the Cuban activity. This came up in one of my previous conversations with Mr. Baron.

Senator Schweiker. Are you talking about something we call Operation MONGOOSE, are we talking about Special Group Augmented, or what are we talking about?

Mr. Halley. Well, when I first came into this activity in 1962, the principal people that seemed to be involved with it at that time were Robert Kennedy, General Lansdale, Dick Helms, and William Harvey, and the group of Kennedy, Lansdale and Helms were providing, if you will, the guidance and the direction as to where this thing should go in the early days.

Shortly after the operation was established and I was in Miami, Lansdale seems to have faded out of this particular picture, and I was not involved in the Washington nuances of this, so I am not clear as to exactly what was the reason for his departure from this particular scene.

Senator Schweiker. And was that -- do you remember the cryptonym, Operation MONGOOSE?

Mr. Halley. I've heard the cryptonym Operation MONGOOSE, but that didn't impact on my life at that particular time.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Johnston. Moving to the time of the Kennedy assassination, were you Chief of Station and in Miami when the President was assassinated?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I was the Chief of Station and I was in Miami.

Mr. Johnston. You were physically in Miami on November 22nd.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I was.

Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any orders through CIA channels to conduct an investigation in any fashion into the assassination of the President?

Mr. Halley. Well, my recollection of that was that we had requests for name traces at the time that Oswald was arrested, and that was our contribution to the investigation.

Mr. Johnston. Did you receive any order in the form of a cable or any other fashion to conduct an investigation?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall receiving one, but if you showed me a cable, I would have to comment on it. In other words this was in 1963. This is 1976, and as you know from record, I've been in an awful lot of high volume projects sin that time, and I don't think it is likely that I would reca a specific cable, you know, on a particular day. I mean, I have been in Berlin, Laos, Vietnam. My life has been active, therefore I do not recall a specific cable. If you've got a cable, I'd be glad to comment on it.

Mr. Johnston. Well, I don't have one, and I'm asking you whether one would exist.

Mr. Halley. I don't recall one.

Mr. Johnston. And your judgment would be that there was not a cable ordering an investigation.

Mr. Halley. I can't say that. I can only say that I don't recall one, but I do recall that at a later point, once Oswald was detained by the police and there was some investigative material emanating from that, we participated in name trace activity of whatever was sent to us at that time from Washington, because I do recall that at the time that the name traces were conducted, that one of the Cuban groups that we were in touch with at DRE, they did come up with a tape of a debate which had taken place between Oswald and some member of the DRE in New Orleans, and you know, that sort of sticks in my mind as an event of that particular time. And we commented on it, and as I recall, forwarded the tapes to Washington.

Senator Schweiker. That was Bringuier's group, was it not?

Mr. Halley. That was the DRE, the Direccion Revolucionario

Senators Schweiker. Wasn't Carlos Bringuier -- maybe I'm pronouncing it wrong, involved in that, and wasn't he associated with you folks at that time?

Mr. Halley. Well, I don't recall that specific name, Senator, at this time.

We did have a relationship with the DRE. We did deal with a number of their top leaders.

Mr. Johnston. Let me come back to that later.

Did you receive any orders not to investigate an area, or not to conduct an investigation of any kind?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall receiving any such orders.

Mr. Johnston. At this time period, November 22nd, November 23rd, 1963, what was your capability in regard to conducting an investigation among Cuban exiles, and with Cuban sources?

Mr. Halley. Well, in relationship to Cubans living in the United States, I would say that our capability was quite good.

Now, if you are referring to our capability to conduct an investigation in Cuba, I would have to say it was limited. have to know where specifically you are referring to. In other words, if you're talking in the area --

Mr. Johnston. First I'm talking domestically of Cuban exiles in the United States, and your answer is --

Mr. Halley. That it would have been quite good.

Mr. Johnston. Secondly, with regard to collecting intelligence as to possible Cuban involvement -

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Halley. From Cuba or in Cuba?

Mr. Johnston. Any other source.

Mr. Halley. Well, if you're talking about collecting information in Cuba --

Mr. Johnston. I see.

Mr. Halley. It would then have to be focused specifically on different geographic areas. In other words, as an example, if you told me I want some information on a specific town in the province of Pinar del Rio, that probably was within our capability at that time because we had a rather extensive network in Pinar del Rio. If you had said to me, you know, in that same timeframe on this day, I want you to conduct a kind of an investigation in the province of Camaguey, I probably would have had to say, you know, we're not as well equipped, because our coverage varied from province to provin

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources -- and I mean specifica JMWAVE station, did JMWAVE station control sources in Cuban intelligence?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall that we had any staff offic in the Cuban intelligence service under our control. We may have been involved in some double agent operations at that ti, but certainly we did not have a staff officer penetration of the Cuban services.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever receive any orders to conta whatever your contacts were in the Cuban intelligence, to inquire about the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall receiving any such instruction.

Mr. Johnston. Did that ever occur to you on your own?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think as you probably see from some of the traffic, we did come up on our own with samplings of opinion, what was happening in the Cuban community. We were reporting what was coming out of Cuba in terms of information brought by, you know, refugees, material that was being made available through people corresponding and so forth, yes, we were sensitive to that particular problem.

Mr. Johnston. But did you affirmatively go out and seek the information from sources in Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Well, to the extent that this was available to us, you know, we had lots of agents. If you're asking me did we send an SW message and task a specific agent to conduct an investigation, or did we send them a radio message or something like that, I don't recall one.

Mr. Johnston. Why didn't you do that?

Mr. Halley. My recollection of this is that we felt that the nature of our capability was to simply respond to what we were able to obtain in the Miami area, and from our sources in a passive way, because this was an investigation that was being conducted in the United States with the primary responsibility with agencies other than CIA.

Mr. Johnston. I guess I don't quite understand the answer because the CIA did have responsibility and certainly the capability to collect information from foreign countries.

Mr. Halley. Well, we had no reason at the particular time to feel that there was any kind of a case, hard information, that the Cubans were behind the assassination.

In other words, you know, at that particular period in time there were a large number of rumors, gossip, in the Cuban Community. Those that came to our attention were reported, and we tried to put them in some perspective, that is, who was the individual, what access did he have to this data and so forth.

But we had no persuasion that this was being mounted by the Cubans at that particular time.

Mr. Wallach. I would like to ask a couple of questions by way of background and let Jim go right back to his line of questioning.

Taking the period as exemplary, October of 1963 --

Mr. Halley. October of '63, okay.

Mr. Wallach. Which I take it would be fairly indicati of what was going on in May, June, July and August of the same year, I want to pick a fairly standard month for that period.

Mr. Halley. Uh-huh.

Mr. Wallach. Before the assassination.

It's my understanding that in addition to getting po intelligence from refugees, etc., coming to this country, that your station did operate agents and did have sources, whatever terms you want to use, inside Cuba, is that correct?

Mr. Hailey. Yes, we did have sources inside Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. Could you briefly for the record --

(Pause)

Mr. Wallach. What I'd like to do very briefly for the record, as you know, I think you had an interview with Mr. Baron and went into it with you, but very briefly describe generally the type of operations that your station was conducting vis-a-vis Cuba.

Mr. Hailey. Well, in the first instance we were engaged in foreign intelligence collection activities, that is, trying to establish information which related to the plans, intentions and capabilities of the Cuban government. We were also involved in counterintelligence operations, that is, trying to figure out what the Cubans were doing in terms of their intelligence operations in the United States, or through the United States into Central and Latin America. We were also involved in propaganda operations against Cuba, and covert action in the sense of trying to establish contact with dissident military personalities in Cuba.

Mr. Wallach. Without naming names, did you in the time period I've been talking about, October of 1963, have either sources or agents fairly highly placed within the Cuban

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

government?

Mr. Halley. I don't think -- there I'd have to get a better definition from you of what is highly placed. If you are talking about Fidel Castro and his immediate entourage --

Mr. Wallach. People who could possibly have been in meetings or dinner with Castro, or meetings with Castro. I don't know enough about how Castro operated.

Mr. Halley. I would say if you are talking about somebody who was a member of his immediate entourage and who was dealing with him in a governmental sense, then the answer is no, but we did have people who were on the periphery of this. That is, they wouldn't have been major participants, but they would have been in social contact with Castro or members of his entourage.

Mr. Wallach. How about persons within the DGI, whatever the correct name for Cuban intelligence is.

Mr. Halley. Well, again as I mentioned earlier, we had no staff officer penetration of the Cuban intelligence servi We had some reporting on people who were in touch with various leaders in the Cuban intelligence, and it was all social or family or other context that these people were reporting on.

Mr. Wallach. Do you recall at any time in 1962 or the fact being brought to your attention that certain Cuban agents out of New York City were actually beginning to run assassination plots against Cuban exile leaders down in Miami?

Mr. Halley. Out of New York? No, I don't recall that. One thing, just before we leave this, so we don't have an incomplete record, you asked me the other kinds of operations that we were running. We were running a full scope of para-military operations against Cuba. That is, we were putting people back into Cuba who may have come from a particular province, and who then went into the bush and lived in the bush, and we kept them supplied with food, arms, basic equipment. We did have radio contact with them. We were involved in raids against the Cuban coast, we were involved in putting caches into the Cuban coast.

Senator Schweiker. Does that finish your point?

Mr. Halley. Yes, sir, that's roughly it.

Senator Schweiker. Following up this other question, was any one part of your job plugging intelligence leaks at this given time?

Was there any concern during your timeframe that you were involved in Cuban operations of intelligence leaks from our country to theirs through the Cuban intelligence system?

Was this ever a consideration or priority of you as Station Chief?

Mr. Halley. Yes, in terms of -- well, yes, the answer to that is yes. Now, let me elaborate on it.

We had a jurisdictional problem. For instance, a Cuban agent detected in the United States or being suspected of being a Cuban agent would have been a case that we would have had to have coordinated with the FBI, and essentially the FBI took primary action on this.

I recall one case where we detected a Cuban agent in the United States, and the case was transferred to the Bureau, and it involved a fundamental jurisdictional issue, which was clearly the Bureau's right to take that particular case over. So in that sense, the primary responsibility in the Miami area in the counterintelligence sense that you are discussing, Senator, would have rested with the Bureau.

Senator Schweiker. Did you ever attempt to find a leak by placing one of our agents into the system to plug a leak? I mean, was it ever that magnitude of concern attached?

Mr. Hailey. No, I don't recall that kind of a case. In other words, I do recall cases where people came out of Cuba, gave us a story that we did not necessarily believe, where we would turn them back and send them back to Cuba, so that over a longer period of time we could determine what it is that they were really after, what they were trying to do. In other words, were they trying to come into the United States to penetrate and immigrate, were they trying to get in touch with American intelligence, and if so, why. But it was all done back into the Cuban context.

Senator Schweiker. This is a tough question to answer, but at that period of time, how successful in your opinion was the Cuban intelligence system in doing some of that penetration, and I realize that we had a lot of Cuban exiles here, and it is pretty hard to tell the players from the scorecard we are in. It is a tough relevant question, but I wonder how you would analyze it.

Mr. Halley. Well, I think it would be fair to say that given the Cuban propensity to talk -- in other words, you have to start off with a fundamental point of departure that if you get two Cubans that have got a secret, it is not going to be a secret, because they do talk, and therefore they all constantly talk.

Our biggest problem in maintaining security of our own operations, such as an infiltration operation into Cuba to put in a cache or run a commando raid or put a person back in was to maintain security. The only way we could do it would be to take all participants of that operation and take them out of the Cuban community and in fact isolate them for a week or ten days or more prior to the mounting of the operation so that they wouldn't talk, and we could know where they would be constantly, 24 hours a day. And within that milieu, I think it is safe to say that the Cuban intelligence service did have some agents and could be expected to have a general feel for the pulse of the community at that time.

Senator Schweiker. During that same time frame, or during the time frame that you were Station Chief, what are some other Cuban groups that you worked with that come to mind? I have mentioned DRE. I realize there were several different ones?

Any others particularly that were helpful and worked with you like the DRE?

Mr. Halley. Well, the DRE was the main group because what had happened is after the -- or prior to the Bay of Pigs there was a great collaboration between CIA and a number of these groups. After the Bay of Pigs, the dialogue with these groups sort of dried up, and during my tenure, the main group that we worked with in that sense as an organizational entity was the DRE because they had a lot of active, imaginative young student leaders who had contacts throughout the Western Hemisphere who were equally interested in using them in the propaganda and covert action sense in Central and Latin America as we were actually using them against Cuba itself.

Senator Schweiker. Where did Alpha 66 fit or not fit into that?

Mr. Halley. We did not have an organizational relationship with Alpha 66. Alpha 66 was in being. We monitored their activities so that we would know when they were going to run raids against Cuba. We may have had people who at one time or another were in our paramilitary teams who left us for one reason or another and may have ended up in Alpha 66.

Senator Schweiker. We realize that one of the other intelligence agencies might have had a liaison or working operation with Alpha 66, not the CIA, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I think -- you know, in the back of my memory I believe that one of the military services --

Senator Schweiker. Might it have been the Army Intelligence?

Mr. Halley. My recollection, it was probably a military service, and it probably was the Army, but I would have to check the record.

Senator Schweiker. We also were informed, and I just wondered if this was your recollection, that at some point some of the operations got a little bit overlapping and duplicating, and that the boats would -- I'm simplifying it of course, but that the boats weren't coordinated too well, and at one point it got to be a problem with whoever else was involved, and that finally an agreement was worked out with Army intelligence that all the boats would be supplied by CIA instead of having them sort of fly-by-nighting and possibly mess up some things because of duplication or confli

Do you recall any of that at all?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think there were periods when the U.S. Government was putting a clamp-down on refugee group going out, and the whole apparatus of government, Coast Gu

Customs, Immigration and Naturalization, FBI, CIA, were working together to try to keep these operations from going to Cuba.

In that context, the military did have some problems, but my recollection of that, Senator, is that we put them into the coordination mechanism that we had for getting boats our. I don't recall our taking their people --

Senator Schweiker. I might have stated it wrong.

What do you mean by a coordination mechanism?

Mr. Halley. Well, for instance, we had, let's say, for the month of October 1963, we would draw up an operational plan in September. In the course of that operational plan and geared to the dark of the moon, we would have a number of infiltration missions scheduled to put in caches. We'd have a number of missions scheduled to put in teams or to take people out of Cuba. We'd have a number of missions scheduled to conduct commando raids against fixed installations.

So we would draw up the schedule and coordinate the schedule with the appropriate agencies like Coast Guard or Customs so that we could move our boats in and out and not cause the U.S. Government to expend manhours and money in pursuing our boats.

Senator Schweiker. I think that is what I had in mind.

Mr. Halley. And therefore, on this schedule, when we worked this out, we therefore would tack on the military operations and work this out so that there was a central clearinghouse, and the U. S. government had a grip on what it was doing in this clandestine field.

Senator Schweiker. To your recollection, besides Army intelligence, were there any other intelligence services that were involved to any extent with that general picture?

Mr. Halley. Well, with the mutation of that, as I recall, the Navy had some activities in and out of Guantanamo, and there were some discussions at various times on how their people in Guantanamo could be supported, and the people were going in and out of Guantanamo.

Senator Schweiker. Were the Army operations very extensive or not compared to yours?

Mr. Halley. No. Compared to ours, they were infinitesimal.

Senator Schweiker. And Navy?

Mr. Halley. Navy, as I think all of this was limited to the perimeter all around Guantanamo, and Guantanamo.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Wallach. I just want to ask you a couple of more questions as I was going to before.

I realize this question is going to your expertise, and if you have any trouble with definitional terms, let's get them straight.

Mr. Halley. Right.

Mr. Wallach. Did JMWAVE itself as an entity have the capability to conduct an investigation to determine whether or not there had been Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy in 1963?

Mr. Halley. I don't think there would have been a real world capability. I mean, if you're talking in my terms of conducting an investigation of this type in Cuba, which would have been professionally sound, that people would have put confidence in, I think the answer to that is probably no. I'm giving you an opinion. That is my opinion.

Mr. Wallach. Let's go back to terms, then. I'm not talking about an investigation where you could obviously have the freedom to go up and interview anyone you wanted to interview.

Mr. Halley. No. We are talking about through clandestine resources. In other words, to conduct this kind of investigation, you know, in my view, you would have had to have had a penetration of one or more of the Cuban intelligence services. The penetration would have had to have been in the 26th of July Movement, and had enough rapport with the top leadership that it could have moved freely in and out of a specific circle. would probably had to have been at the level of a Comandante. We did not have that kind of resource in depth to conduct that kind of investigation.

Mr. Wallach. Were there ever any discussions at that time that you remember between yourself, Fitzgerald, Helms, anyone, as to whether or not the CIA did have the capability to conduct such an investigation?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall such a discussion, but again, the reason for it was, it was essentially felt at that time, as name traces were done, the whole mood and the whole atmosphere was that this was a case that was being investigated by the FBI. It was their jurisdictional problem.

Mr. Wallach. Did the FBI, to your knowledge, have the capacity to investigate or to conduct any sort of investigation inside Cuba?

Mr. Halley. Inside Cuba? No, I don't think they did.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have direct contact with anyone from the Bureau on a continuing basis from the FBI?

Mr. Johnston. Let's restructure that whole area.

What was the liaison relationship between JMWAVE, the Bureau and Florida?

Mr. Halley. There was a direct liaison on a daily working basis, if this was required, between JMWAVE and the Miami Field Office, I think it was called, as a separate field office.

Mr. Johnston. At what level was this liaison conducted, directly with you?

Mr. Halley. No. This was conducted at at least three levels that I can recall: periodically the Chief of the Field Office and I would meet to review problems, if we had any particular problems, or frankly, just to get together just to make sure that we did not have any problems. There was a direct liaison on a working level between the people in the Counterintelligence shop of the Station and what I think the Bureau used to call the Tamale Squad, which were former Bureau agents who had been down in Havana, who had left when Fidel came into power, and were still working in Miami. And the third liaison was essentially with people who were working specific cases, where the name trace mechanism between ourselves and the Bureau would show some mutuality of interest in a particular case.

For instance, as an example, the Bureau might call up and say, look, what do you know about Juan Jose Gonzalez of the Second Front of the Escambrai. We'll say, okay, we'll take the question, we'll do a trace, prepare the answer, and somebody would go down and talk to them. So it was close. I would say it was close.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever do the reverse? Did you ever ask the Bureau for information?

Mr. Halley. Yes. We traced specific people with the Bureau.

Mr. Johnston. In November, after the assassination of President Kennedy, did you personally meet with anybody from the FBI regarding the investigation?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall meeting on that specific subject.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether anyone in JMWAVE met with the FBI in regard to the FBI investigation in Florida?

Mr. Halley. My recollection is that this name trace procedure was working, whatever they were working in relationshi to their investigation, was being run through us. In other words, how many traces, who was being traced, I couldn't answer that.

Mr. Johnston. Well, name traces are one thing. I guess I am talking one step above that. Did anyone in JMWAVE to your knowledge discuss with anyone in FBI in Florida the CIA's capability to assist the FBI investigation?

Mr. Halley. I have no way of answering that. I don't recall that. I don't recall that kind of thing. You know, this is -- you know, we're talking about 1963. This is 13 years ago, and I keep telling you, you know, I've had a busy, active life.

Senator Schweiker. You are doing so far very well.

Mr. Halley. I feel you are pressing me on something tha is almost unreasonable. I mean, I don't recall each and every conversation. I mean, I had a 300 man station.

Mr. Johnston. I agree with you on that, but you are describing name traces, which you do seem to recall, but I' saying was there anything beyond name traces that you recal Was there any assistance given beyond name traces?

Senator Schweiker. Was there any higher level investi that you can recall?

Mr. Halley. The reason this name trace thing sticks in my mind, frankly, is because of the name traces that were conducted on Oswald when we got the hit, and I recall, the hit was made on the fact that there was the discussion and debate between Oswald and the DRE fellow, and we were tracing a lot of names at that time, and in conjunction with this particular event, once people were arrested and detained and there was some reason to expect that there was what I called an investigative follow-up, you know, you've got to start from some fact. What was the fact? You had a name, an address, a telephone number, that kind of tracing was going on. That is what impacts on me, what is this, you know, 13 years later.

Senator Schweiker. In connection with that, the group, the DRE group, there was some allegation that Oswald, I guess part of it is reality for sure, that he tried to penetrate the group himself by coming in when he was in New Orleans and infiltrate it on his own, which I guess is known,and what is in doubt, there was an allegation that while he was doing that, that he possibly talked of assassinating Kennedy or be paid money to assassinate Kennedy.

Does any of that conversation strike any bells or recollection with regard to DRE?

Mr. Halley. No, it doesn't, Senator, and I think I've got to explain this to you as to what was the nature of our relationship with the DRE. In other words, we had a relationship with the DRE where we gave them a monthly subsidy. In other words, this would make them in our category like independent contractors. In return for this particular subsidy, they were to collect intelligence for us on the island of Cuba where they still had people. They were to be a symbol of a certain amount of resistance, therefore they had to engage in certain activities, propaganda, radio broadcasts, correspondence to their friends and associates on the inside to show that there was a spark on the outside, around which people coul rally.

They also wanted to have a boat to move people inside and out of Cuba, and the money, the subsidy that we gave them helped them do all of these things. And we got an accounting from them. But we did not control each and every action that they took, so that if they chose, you know, not to report something to us, we wouldn't necessarily know it, and not every little detail of their organization did we know. If they met somebody --

Senator Schweiker. Well, I can understand that because there were a lot of groups like that, I'm sure.

Mr. Halley. But that particular one was one with which we had a subsidy relationship.

Senator Schweiker. Do you recall who your control relationship was with that particular group? I assume there was a CIA control relationship.

Mr. Halley. Yes, there was a particular man that was in liaison with that group, and there were several during that period of time.

Senator Schweiker. Might it have been Carlos Bringuier, the name we mentioned before?

Mr. Halley. You mentioned the name, and to be honest, the name doesn't ring a bell. But is he also known as Fatty?

Senator Schweiker. Well, you've got me now.

Mr. Halley. Well, every Cuban has an alias, like, they call him El Gordo or something like that.

Senator Schweiker. Well, it might be. He fits it.

Mr. Halley. Well, you might be able to answer this. Was he the fellow that was on the DRE boat that raided Havana? I have trouble matching up some of these names, and frankly, that name doesn't ring a bell, but I might have known him as El Gordo, and he was on the boat, and we dealt with different people.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you WAVE cable 8049, dated 22 November '63, which is your report on this DRE matter, and that cable basically indicates that you got information from DRE about Oswald.

Is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Yes. The wording of this particular cable shows that we did get from the DRE files this information.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

7 6 0 0 0 7 0 3 1 7

Mr. Johnston. My question to you is, of partial significance, and that is the fact that that cable says that Oswald "allegedly lives in home of Foreign Minister for two months."

My question is that this allegation that he lived in the home of the Soviet foreign minister has never been substantiated through any other source, and I wonder whether you have a recollection of going back to DRE to see where they got that information.

Mr. Halley. No, I don't have a recollection of going back on that specific cable.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any recollection of headquarter ever coming back to you and saying what is the source of that?

Mr. Halley. Xyou know, I don't see how you can expect me to remember that, really. You know, in the course of a day, a normal day, I might read a thousand cables.

Senator Schweiker. Well, does the fact that he might have lived in a Soviet foreign minister's home for two months ring a bell?

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, showing me that cable, I have to accept the cable at face value. That is what it says. I acknowledge that is what it says. The cable says we got it from the DRE. I accept it on face value. That incident, the foreign minister's residence, does not ring a bell with me.

Senator Schweiker. So you wouldn't know offhand where that allegation came from.

Mr. Halley. No, I don't know. We would have to go back to them and their criteria for carding might not coincide with ours. In other words, many of these Cuban groups were prone to act on rumors. They were prone to publicize things that were not true. The DRE had a record of publicizing, embroidering, elaborating on things, and therefore we treated a lot of their material with caution.

Senator Schweiker. Right.

Go ahead, Paul.

Mr. Wallach. Generally, now, and I'm not asking for specific conversations at all. I think it is entirely true, it is a caveat throughout this entire thing, we are talking about 13 years ago, millions of matters ago. But generally, do you recall whether or not the FBI, the people you dealt with had any general knowledge of the CIA's capability inside Cuba to get information?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think it would be fair to say that the FBI knew the kinds of operations that we were running, and I think they could have drawn certain conclusions about, you know, what our capability might have been. That is, let me put this in perspective. I'm talking about the people in Miami. Occasionally when I would come to Washington for conferences, I would meet somebody like Papich. We happened to be, you know, friends, and I would talk to him and say how are you doing, how are things going, what kind of activit are you involved in?

Papich probably have a feel for the scope of our activity, but whether he would have an appreciation of the kinds of specific sources, I doubt it.

Mr. Wallach. In other words, you would doubt whether or not anyone in the Bureau would have known whether or not you had an extremely high level source in Castro's entourage.

Mr. Halley. I doubt that they would know that.

Mr. Wallach. At any time, do you recall after the assassi-nation anyone from the Bureau, even from the Miami field offic or from headquarters, through Papich, through your headquarte contacting you to determine whether or not you had the capabil to conduct investigations on Cuba?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall that.

Do you want me -- can we go off the record for a minute?

Senator Schweiker. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Wallach. Let's go back on the record.

Were you known to the FBI under your real name or unde an alias?

Mr. Halley. No, I was known to the FBI under my true name. If you are wondering about whether the name is going t show up in the FBI records, I think they always would, in t writing of reports, do not use the true names. In other wo they say, you know, source or confidential informant, or A-whatever it was called, and that is the way they write their reports.

Mr. Wallach. Let me ask you this. I realize this was a subject matter that was covered in your previous testimony. I deem it of relevance, and I would like to ask you here, were you aware on November 22nd, 1963, that the CIA had at some poin in time prior to that date itself engaged in attempts to assassinate or used others in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. No. I think the basic answer to that questio is no, but if you looked at my previous testimony, I previousl said that in the case of this Cuban comandante over the years, I had acquired some knowledge of the fact that he existed and he was being run by my colleagues in Washington, but that cas was not known to me as a clearcut assassination operation. I other words, at one point in time I knew that Des Fitzgerald was going to meet this fellow. I knew at one point in time there was going to be a meeting in Spain. I knew at one poin in time that we were putting caches in to support this partic fellow. I never knew whether the caches were recovered. An things like that. But the fundamental answer is no.

I have also previously testified that on some of the activities that were being engaged in by Mr. Harvey, that I was not knowledgeable on, you know, the thrust of those activities.

Mr. Wallach. Did your own sources in the Cuban communi tell you that the, what we call the underworld, the Mafia, was engaging in attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall any such reports, but I've explained this, and let me go again on this, that assassination, the word "assassination" was part of the ambience of that time. In other words, every Cuban that you talked to, nobody could be involved in Cuban operations without having had some sort of a discussion at some time with some Cuban who said, gee, we ought to knock this guy off, or I'd shoot him if I had the chance, or the way to create a revolution is to shoot Fidel and Raul, and then go down through the whole proposition. So the fact that somebody would talk about assassination just wasn't anything that was really out of th ordinary at the time. It was part of the climate. These were professional revolutionaries in some cases, men who had been in the 26th of July movement and left, and come in and become exiles, and had been exiles two or three times. Revolution and assassination was a way of life for them.

Mr. Wallach. Did you have any doubt in your mind that Castro was aware in November 1963 that the CIA was supporti these revolutionaries?

Mr. Halley. Supporting revolutionaries.

Mr. Wallach. Right.

Mr. Halley. Yes, I think Castro knew that the United States was in touch with groups like the DRE, that people were being infiltrated by CIA into Cuba, because they apprehended some of them.

Mr. Wallach. Groups that were trying to overthrow Castro.

Mr. Halley. But he had to assume that if they were coming in, they were setting up guerilla forces in places like Oriente Province, and Pinar del Rio, that yes, they were going to work to overthrow him, and he had to know that.

Mr. Wallach. Were you aware of any other country that the United States Government was at that time attempting to overthrow the government of, and we can get your answer off the record if it is positive.

Mr. Halley. Well, wait a minute. Would you rephrase that? I'm not sure I follow that particular one.

Mr. Wallach. You came back to me with the word assassination, said it was part of the ambience of the times, that that might have been discussed at one time or another. My belief, as a layman, has been I don't see that much of a distinction between sending someone in who is going to try to foment a revolution, the result of which would probably be the death of Castro as opposed to sending someone in to -- I don't want to get into this, but I think that may have been something that you were touching on.

In any event, are you aware of any other country that the U.S. at that time was directing attempts to overthrow the government of?

Mr. Halley. No. Off the top of my head, no, but I do want to come back to your point. I do think there is a difference in the Latin American revolutionary sense of plotting a revolution against somebody as opposed to plotting a specific assassination operation against a particular individual. You know, maybe we have an honest difference of opinion on that point, but my view differs from yours.

Mr. Wallach. All right, let me continue on.

You also mentioned before that some of the people, the people that you felt were making general policy, were Helms, Bobby Kennedy, at one point Ed Lansdale.

Mr. Halley. Uh-huh.

Mr. Wallach. Did the Cubans know that? Did the Cubans know that Bobby Kennedy was involved?

Mr. Halley. I don't know that they were at that point in time, but clearly at later points of time when the Brigade 2506 returned, yes, they knew that Bobby Kennedy was in the Cuban policy affairs. Leaders of the Brigade like Artime, Oliva, the San Juan brothers and others were brought to Washington for lunches, dinners with, I guess at that time it was the Attorney General, because there were various phases in this thing.

Yes, they knew he was involved in Cuban affairs.

Mr. Wallach. Are you familiar with an article that app in I think it was the September 7th issue of the New Orleans Times-Picayune, among other newspapers, which reflected an interview Castro had with Daniel Harker of the AP, within which he said in substance that U.S. leaders would be in danger if they continued in their attempts, I think he used the word "eliminate".

Mr. Halley. Yes, I'm familiar with the general article, yes, but I can't tell you with certainty that I was aware of that article at the time that it appeared. In other words, you're asking about 1961, did you say it appeared?

Mr. Wallach. September 7, 1963.

Mr. Halley. I cannot swear that I knew about it in 1963. I since know that that article has been referred to a number of times.

Mr. Johnston. Let me just state for the record that I did not bring the WAVE cable on it, but WAVE did pass to headquarters the gist of that article as it appeared in Miami articles, passed that information to headquarters either on the 23rd or 24th of November because the FBI was inquiring about exile groups claiming that Castro had threatened Kennedy anyway, so that at least WAVE had knowledge right after the assassination of that article.

Mr. Halley. All right. The reason I qualify my response that may have been a cable that would have been released by some member of my staff. It didn't necessarily follow that

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

was a WAVE cable, that I personally released it. I don't happen to recall it, but I am familiar with the article and the thrust of it.

Mr. Wallach. I realize again you may not have been famili with it at that time, or even before the assassination, but what -- and I'm not asking specifically for what facts, but you have testified previously that -- I don't want to paraphras your testimony, it speaks for itself -- that you had no reason to believe that the Cubans were involved in the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. Yes, at the time that the incident occurred, and when Oswald was apprehended, I had no reason to believe that the Cubans were involved.

Mr. Wallach. Taking the other side of the coin, what evidence was there in your mind that they were not involved?

Mr. Halley. Well, because we didn't have any evidence that they were.

Mr. Wallach. Did you conduct any investigation at all t determine if there was any involvement?

Mr. Halley. I didn't have any charter for that. I mean, people were arrested. The FBI and the authorities in that particular, in Dallas, were pursuing the case. I had no charter to pursue that.

Mr. Wallach. Did you ever ask Mr. Helms whether or not you could conduct such an investigation, or did he ever tell you that you could or could not?

Mr. Halley. No, I answered that, that I don't recall any such conversation where Helms told me I could or could not. I mean, this was not a subject that was being discussed.

I think the frame of reference at the time was that this was not a jurisdictional case for the CIA to pursue.

Mr. Wallach. You mean, the President of the United States is murdered, and it is not within the jurisdiction of the CIA to determine if a foreign country is involved?

Mr. Halley. Not if the investigation is run by the FBI and a person is apprehended, and one is going to assume that he is going to be interrogated, investigative leads are going to be obtained from it, and a particular agency has got the action responsibility. Under those circumstances, my perception of the various rules is that CIA performs a support function. In other words, if you are asked for a name trace, or traces on telephone numbers, physical descriptions, you know, license plates, whatever it may be, you respond.

Mr. Wallach. Who gave you those instructions, that CIA was only going to have a support function?

Mr. Halley. That is my perception.

Mr. Wallach. Who told you that?

Mr. Halley. Nobody has to tell you that. You're an intelligence human being. You're allowed to think for yourse and you can come to logical conclusions.

Mr. Wallach. Did somebody tell youthat the FBI had primary jurisdiction?

Mr. Halley. No, but the FBI has primary jurisdiction, this is something we are taught in our training courses, in the United States, you know, for cases in the United States. For instance, my explanation of this -- I gave you an explanation of the counterintelligence case in the States where we found a Cuban agent in the United States,and the jurisdiction of the case reverted to the FBI.

Senator Schweiker. Do you want to make a comment here, Seymour?

Mr. Bolten. I'd like to go off the record.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Schweiker. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Wallach. I have one or two more questions on this.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

Mr. Wallach. Did at any time during the existence of the Warren Commission, do you recall -- and I'm not asking for a specific event, but do you recall having any type of indirect relationship with that Commission, in essence, responding to requests that were made of the Agency and they asking you for general information?

Mr. Halley. Would you give me the dates of the Warren Commission?

Mr. Wallach. December 1, '63 --

Mr. Halley. December 1, '63 to when?

Mr. Wallach. September of '64.

Mr. Halley. No. No.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any reason today to believe that there was Cuban involvement in the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Halley. I have no hard information on that.

Mr. Wallach. Do you have any hearsay information?

Mr. Halley. No. I mean, hearsay information, what constitutes hearsay? Criel wrote an article in the Washington Post, you know, suggesting that there is some -- is that hearsay evidence? I mean, I don't happen to believe his thesis.

Mr. Wallach. I am asking you if you have any belief as an expert?

Mr. Halley. As an expert I only deal in facts, in other words not -- what I consider hard intelligence, I don't have any hard intelligence.

Mr. Johnston. Other than the FBI, did you have a liaison with other investigative agencies?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I did.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have an investigative relationship with the U.S. Customs Department, specifically a Customs agent who was on detail to CIA?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we had a relationship with a Customs agent by the name of Caesar DeEstado. Caesar DeEstado was detailed on an arrangement between CIA which was in being when I came to the station. His primary function was to be stationed in Key West, Florida. He generally covered the area from Key West to either Marathon or it could have been -- either Marathon or El Marado, and his tasks were, one, to find Cubans who were coming into the United States in small boats, and to ensure that he took a quick look at them to see if any one of them could be turned around to be used as intelligence sources. If they couldn't be used as intelligence sources, he skimmed off the perishable information that was really critical, and then put it into our system. He also flagged the knowledgeable people for further exploitation by us when the went to the Opa Loca briefing center. He also picked up equipment, that is documents from these people, weapons, clothing, so that we could use authentic clothing to equip our own teams.

Mr. Johnston. Did he also stay in contact with certain Cuban exiles?

Mr. Halley. He did stay in contact with Cuban exile groups because it was part of his job to know when they were going out so that we didn't have these uncoordinated problems. In other words, at one point we tried to stop them. He also has to know who was in the area running a training camp or something like that, so that our operations would not be compromised by coming into a camp next to where some exiled Cubans were already working.

Mr. Johnston. And did he -- let me back up. First, have you participated in the Agency's response to the Committee's written inquiry about this?

Mr. Halley. Well, to this extent, somebody in the Agency called me and said the Committee had a request in for some data on a Customs officer. Nobody could remember his name. I happened to remember his name. I said Caesar DeEstado was the guy's name. I don't remember how to spell it. Phonetically I think it is as follows, and try to find a file on it. And so to that extent, yes, I am aware that there was some sort of a response being prepared. I did not see the response. I don't know what it says.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he was asked either by you or by anybody in WAVE to contact Cuban exiles after the assassination to see what knowledge they might have?

Mr. Halley. Well, let me try to clarify that. I was not his contact point. In other words, I was a manager of a large operation.

Mr. Johnston. I understand that. So did anybody under your control contact him?

Mr. Halley. His point of contact was in Key West. Periodically he would either come to Miami or meet with one of our people, and once every three months or something like that I would have a meeting with him to review broad trends, either in Key West or in Miami. I never taked him with this type of thing. I don't recall anybody else in the station tasking him to conduct an investigation of Cuban groups relative to the President's assassination. But as we were putting together mood cables -- you showed me an example of one there -- it is conceivable that he is the kind of person that we would have talked to to find out what was going on in the Cuban community at that time.

Mr. Johnston. Do you know whether he did in fact contact Cuban exiles about it? Do you have any knowledge of his contacts with Cuban exiles?

Mr. Halley. I don't have any firsthand knowledge.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have any knowledge whatsoever?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say firsthand, I don't recall any information of any subordinate of mine reporting to me that he had done that.

Mr. Johnston. You testified earlier that you met with Mr. Fitzgerald at some point, and that he told you at that time that he made contact personally with a Cuban agent, one named AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. I think my testimony was something along that line, that I had a conversation with Fitzgerald, that he was going to meet a Cuban source. My recollection was that the name may have come up, that he was asking my opinion and advice

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

as to whether this would be a useful thing to do. And as I have testified before, my recollection is I told him I thought I would find this conversation interesting, but I didn't think it was worth his doing because he had too high a profile, and it would not be a good thing to do from the point of view of attribution in relationship to a clandestine agent.

Mr. Johnston. And let me go through what you have just told me.

First of all, was this agent, when he used the true name, was it the agent whose cryptonym is AMLASH?

Mr. Halley. Yes. Subsequently I have concluded that th is who it is.

Mr. Johnston. Did he tell you or indicate that a meetin between him and AMLASH was proposed?

Mr. Halley. Well, he was considering a meeting with AMLASH, with this particular person.

Mr. Johnston. Do you have a recollection as to what timeframe your discussion with Mr. Fitzgerald was?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Knowing that Mr. Fitzgerald met with AMLASH on October 29th, 1963, does that refresh your recoll as to whether the conversation took place earlier in 1963?

Mr. Halley. I am sorry, I can't narrow that down for you.

Mr. Johnston. But you advised against the meeting.

Mr. Halley. Right.

Mr. Johnston. You were knowledgeable, I take it, of the Agency's dealing with AMLASH from time to time, as part of JMWAVE.

Mr. Halley. Yes. I mentioned to you earlier that we had put in caches which were scheduled to be retrieved by AMLASH or his people, so yes, I knew that we were providing support to an agent in Cuba, but that was not unusual because we were putting in a large number of caches for a wide variety of people who were being run out of Washington, over and out of other stations.

Mr. Johnston. And you may have testified about this before but was it common to drop caches of rifles or telescopic sights for agents?

Mr. Halley. I would not necessarily have known what was in each cache.

Mr. Johnston. Well, was it common to drop, to your knowledge, to drop rifles with telescopic sights?

Mr. Halley. Well, I think the thing that would be uncommon would be telescopic sights. Many of our caches were weapons caches. A large bulk of the caches were rifles of one kind or another. We put in the FAL, the Belgian FAL, we put in M-1s. We put in carbines, we put in Springfields, we put in Thompson submachine guns. I think if I were looking at a cache list and I saw a telescope on it matched up with a

Springfield '03 rifle, that probably would have struck me as being unusual, but I did not see the inventories of all the caches.

Mr. Johnston. Would you commonly or routinely see cables from the Director, especially on the AMLASH operation?

Mr. Halley. No.

From the Director to whom?

Mr. Johnston. To JMWAVE.

Mr. Halley. My recollection is, other than specific requests to put in caches, that there wasn't any cable traffic between Washington and JMWAVE on that particular operation.

Mr. Johnston. I am searching through my notes --

Mr. Halley. Right.

Mr. Johnston. The Committee does not have copies of the file of AMLASH. That is at the Agency. Let me, if you'll accept it as a fact that there was a cable in early December 1963 from the Director to JMWAVE directing, using the crypt AMLASH and directing that a cache be supplied him, including in that, itemizing two rifles with telescopic sights.

Mr. Halley. That kind of a cable I may or may not have seen. In other words, that would have been a fairly standard logistics kind of thing to get a cache and it would have come up on my briefing chart for the month, the operation, X number of days before the operation was launched, I would have had a briefing with all of the paramilitary and maritime officers and our COMINT, ELINT and other specialists to look at the CV and make a decision as to whether the operation should go or not go. At that point I probably would have known that it was a cache, that it contained weapons, that it was in support of a headquarters run operation.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall on or about 7 or 8 December 1963 a stop being put on operations, certain operations that went into Cuba?

Mr. Halley. I don't recall that specific timeframe, but there were periodic ups and downs in the number of operations that could be run. We would get policy guidance to stand down for a period of time, that once one of those things came out, I think that we had a series of discussions, I think, with Washington, and appeals, that if there was a standdown, and we had to say something, who were dependent on us in Cuba for food and a continuing flow of weapons, that we couldn't have them preparing these caches and risking their lives to come to the reception points and not be able to meet the schedules.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall, though, in the period 6, 7 and 8 December, headquarters first authorizing certain operations and then calling off the operations, and specifical cables which said, and I quote -- pardon me, I don't quote, the operations being called off, "pending major top level Cuban-Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis for decision."

Mr. Halley. I don't recall your specific dates or your timeframe, but the point I would like to leave with you is that there were several periods like that where we had upsand downs, and yes, I do recall standdowns on operations.

Mr. Johnston. You don't recall a standdown within two weeks of the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. I am sorry, I don't. You know, I accept that it occurred, but you know, there were so many of those during the three and a half year period of time that I don't recall that specific one.

Mr. Johnston. What does the phrase "higher authority" generally mean in Agency cables?

Mr. Halley. Well, at that particular point in time, I think higher authority was a euphemism for the President and top level policy decisionmakers at the NSC 40 Committee level.

Mr. Johnston. And again, you don't recall knowing in the same time period, December 1963, that you were cabled that the headquarters procedure was to present the infiltration procedures to higher authority.

Mr. Halley. Well, I have forgotten the date when this transition took place. As of a fixed date, in the course of this operation, we had to supply all of our infiltration operations a month in advance. I'm sorry, I just don't recall when that went into effect. Prior to that time we were pretty well scheduling these ourselves, but then a request came in that we put these in a month in advance. So as I told you before, if I wanted to run a schedule for October, I had to have it in in Washington with all of the Ops plans by I think the 15th of September.

Senator Schweiker. Did a former ambassador William Pauley, a man called William Pauley, who at one time owned properties in Havana and now living in Miami, did he ever finance some of the operations that you are aware of out of Miami, William Pauley?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I know Bill Pauley. He was involved in, in my time, in one specific operational activity. I don't think it would be proper to say that he financed it, however.

Senator Schweiker. This is the one where people were killed in a boat raid?

Mr. Halley. Well, we don't know what happened to them. My recollection of the operation is that Bill Pauley was approached by Life Magazine, and this was involved with an individual by the name of John Martino, because this has come up recently. The Committee has asked me about this before I told them at first I couldn't remember the name, and I had to go back and conduct a file search, and I came up with John Martino's name, who had been involved in gambling casinos in Cuba.

Martino was in touch with a number of Cubans who

76000170340

claimed that they had access to two Soviet missile technicians. Pauley brought this operation to the Agency, and the Agency agreed that we would cooperate with them in pursuit of this operation.

Senator Schweiker. And Time-Life did some funding for it, too?

Mr. Halley. Well, they were involved, but they did not fund it. My recollection is Pauley made the boat available, the Flying Tiger, which was his yacht, we paid for the gas and oil for that particular boat, and we provided all of the other equipment that went into the operation. Pauley went on that vessel down to the launch point. The men were launched in a small infiltration boat. It took off, went off toward the Cuban mainland, and were never seen or heard from since then. We never had any reporting on them.

Senator Schweiker. Was Pauley involved with other operations with you folks, or is that the only one?

Mr. Halley. That is the only operation that he was involved with the Agency. He, however, was very helpful in terms of providing advice on various people that he had known from his long involvement in Cuba. He was useful in providing introductions to various people that we wanted to meet. I recall on one occasion he introduced me to a prominent Cuban that I wanted to meet. He brokered that.

Pauley, on his own, gave money to various Cuban groups, unrelated to what we were doing. He was also a participant in the raising of the initial ransom for the members of Brigade 2506.

Senator Schweiker. Here is an article -- rather than me read it, I'll give you a chance to read it. It is Claire Booth Luce. As you know, she is on the Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and has been for some time, and Bill Colby was her chief of station when she was ambassador to Italy. This story came to me not through the paper, frankly, but from Mrs. Luce personally, expressing her concern. It subsequently did appear in a paper and I did not release it. Mrs. Luce specifically released it to Betty Beale, and the reason it is relevant here is that from what I read here, the group she is referring to is probably the DRE group or some part of the DRE group in New Orleans, and while that is not too clear, she did associate Mr. William Pauley with it. But that is somewhat confused, because you said he wasn't involved in any other operation other than the one you mentioned.

Mr. Halley. Well, I'm -- Mr. Pauley, I know Mr. Pauley and Mrs. Luce are friends. They see each other, or they used to. I haven't seen them in a number of years, but they used to be in the same social circuit, so I am sure that Mr. Pauley recounted a war story in his contacts, so she is probably aware of the general operation to get the two Soviets out of Cuba. That is the only operation that he ran with us durin my stewardship of the station.

Senator Schweiker. There is a vast difference of recollection between the two on what happened. She very strongly recollects that in addition to the thing that you described, which is a matter of record, by the way, with the Senate Committee, it is a matter of Committee record, in addition to that, that this is in it also.

Rather than read the whole thing, you might read the paragraphs I have outlined. She feels very strongly about it. She has called me several times about it. She is absolutely certain of her information, and her Cuban source doesn't want to talk for fear of his life.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Halley. No, that doesn't ring any bells. I cannot put that in any context.

Let me go back to this Pauley business. I think at one time, one other thing that Pauley did for us, I think he provided an opportunity for us to pick up some cargo in the Dominican Republic to provide cover for one of our vessels that we were using at that time for infiltration operations in the area but those are the only things that I can remember off the top of my head.

Senator Schweiker. You see, where he says here that he [illegible] contact with a group, the story goes on to say that this group supplied a tape and pictures of that contact, and that [illegible]

FBI did not follow them up, which is a rather serious charge itself, and that is why I wonder if there is some DRE relationship here with Bringuier.

Maybe you can give us that case officer's name, Seymour.

Mr. Bolten. Which one?

Senator Schweiker. The case officer for the DRE group.

It would have to be the one at the time when Oswald was in New Orleans, which is -- when was that?

Mr. Johnston. The fall of '63.

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator Schweiker. Going on, I didn't follow the final question on DeEstada, your detail man to Customs.

Were you aware that he was doing some investigating after the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't have any firsthand recollection of that.

Senator Schweiker. And the way you were structured, would he be the logical person to, if somebody asked for either a name check or some follow-up --

Mr. Halley. He would have been the logical person if we had something specific to pursue or he would have been the logical person to put a question to if we were looking for atmospheric, you know, what the Cuban community was thinking.

Senator Schweiker. How about Julio Lobo?

Mr. Halley. He's the sugar king.

Senator Schweiker. He's the sugar king there.

Did he assist with any of your operations, either financially or in terms of his people or in terms of his organizatio

Mr. Halley. My recollection of that, there was no direct contact between us and Julio Lobo. We did have various Cuban investigative and research groups that we were working with. My belief is that one of these groups must have been tapping Lobo for his knowledge of the sugar market, because we were constantly making projections of where the sugar crop was going in Cuba, because that impacted on the stability of th Cuban economy. In other words, when it was a good crop, you could figure that Castro's going to have X millions of dollar When he didn't have a good crop, this was going to impact on where he wanted to go with building the revolution.

Senator Schweiker. There is another name that I believe had some relationship with him, maybe businesswise, James Cogswell, or Caldwell.

Mr. Halley. Caldwell. I think that was the fellow that was employed by the Agency at one time.

Senator Schweiker. Right.

Mr. Halley. Who was --

Senator Schweiker. What was his project at that point?

Mr. Halley. He was working here in Washington. He was on the Cuban project in Washington. He was primarily concer with economic activities and how pressure could be put on th

Cuban economy.

Senator Schweiker. And how about an Antonio Veciana, a Cuban name?

Mr. Halley. Yeah, I think he's the owner, one of the part owners in the restaurant in Miami called Las Violinas.

Senator Schweiker. At one point he worked for --

Mr. Halley. Could you spell the name?

Senator Schweiker. Maybe I'm not pronouncing it right. V-e-c-i-a-n-a.

Mr. Halley. I think that's the fellow who used to run the restaurant called Las Violinas, and he was involved with a number of Cuban exile groups. I think he was connected with the second front of the Escambray, but that is off the top of my head. We'd have to do a trace.

Senator Schweiker. Did David Phillips, during your tenure there, have any assignment in Cuba?

What was his relationship at the time of this period? David Phillips? That's head of the Retired --

Mr. Halley. Yes, at that point in time he was stationed in Mexico City, and my recollection was that he was involved in covert operational actions against Cuba out of Mexico City, and he may have been involved in operations against the Cuban embassy in Mexico City. I am a little vaguer on that than I am on the first part.

I know we had some travelers going down to Mexico City

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

and their point of contact frequently was Dave Phillips, but most of those fellows were dealing with propaganda distribution, but he could well also have worked against the installation.

At that time he was not the station chief. He was a secondary figure, I guess, at the station.

Senator Schweiker. Did Howard Hughes or his organization or Intertel, assist you in any operations, and I am going to exclude for the moment Mr. Maheu, who we know had a very specific role, excluding the Maheu situation with Giancana and Rosselli that I think you are familiar wity --

Mr. Halley. Yes.

Senator Schweiker. To your knowledge, did Howard Hughes, Intertel or any of his other groups or associations assist or work with you in the Cuban operation?

Mr. Halley. Not with the Miami station that I am aware of.

Senator Schweiker. Well, I'm not talking about --

Mr. Halley. Well, back here in Washington that could be, but I have no knowledge of it. I can only answer it out of the Miami context.

Senator Schweiker. At one point in time, probably when you first came aboard, there was a Lt. Colonel Samuel Kail, who was a military attache to the Havana embassy.

Does that name ring a bell?

Mr. Halley. Yes, it does.

Senator Schweiker. What role was he playing when you came aboard?

Mr. Halley. He either came about the same time that I did or shortly after I arrived in Miami, and he was in fact the number two fellow at the Opa Locka debriefing center. We ha inter-agency debriefing center set up at Opa Locka. The head of the center was a CIA officer. His principal deputy was Kale. He was the general administrator of the program and he supervised the military personnel who were on detail to the center, and there were debriefing people there for positive intelligence, and when they found someone who was particular knowledgeable or had some operational exploitation, they wo flag them to us.

Senator Schweiker. Was he ever detailed to CIA or was he strictly Army intelligence?

Mr. Halley. No, at that time he was an Army officer working on a joint project that wasn't a detail assignment. was just assigned to Opa Locka.

Senator Schweiker. Purely Army, but working with you cooperatively.

Mr. Halley. Well, I think what happened, unlike what would go on overseas, a table of organization was drawn up for the Opa Locka center, and it was agreed that the head of this center would be Jim, so we assigned that man to that. It was agreed that the deputy of the center would be a Mil officer. Therefore Kale was assigned to that. He continued to receive his pay, quarters, and other allowance through the military establishment.

Senator Schweiker. What about when he was at the Havana embassy?

You are talking about, I guess, after he left the Havana embassy.

Mr. Halley. Yes. I am talking about the period 1962 forward, and as I recall, he must have been there up to the end of my tenure there. I have forgotten when he left. I have no knowledge of his activities in Havana. That was before my time. I simply know that he served in Havana, that he was a social acquaintance of a number of the officers that I had in the station, but I had no firsthand knowledge.

Senator Schweiker. How about Robert Brown or Colonel Nichols, the same question, Robert Brown?

Mr. Halley. Senator, you'll have to give me something more than Robert Brown. That doesn't give me anything. I'm sorry. The other was what, Colonel Nichols?

Senator Schweiker. Colonel Nichols. He was also at the Havana embassy at some point in time.

Mr. Halley. I would have no knowledge of him.

Senator Schweiker. Now, there was a group called Celula Fantasma. Are you familiar with that group?

Mr. Halley. I have heard the name.

Senator Schweiker. And it was a project where two American pilots were killed. The group conducted some para-military operation.

Mr. Halley. That doesn't ring a bell, but the Celula Fantasma is a name that I've heard. I can't put it into any broader context for you. It certainly was not one of our operations.

Senator Schweiker. That was really my question.

Do you recall -- was there anyone using the name or cryptoname of Bishop for you at any point in time in terms of the Cuban operations, either Morris Bishop or some other Bishop?

Mr. Halley. That name doesn't mean anything to me.

Senator Schweiker. Here is a sketch of a person. Does this sketch look like anyone that might have been associated cuban operations, either pro-Castro or anti-Castro?

(The Witness looks at a sketch.)

Mr. Halley. No, it doesn't. I mean, there is somethi about the face that is familiar, but I can't put a name to it and it doesn't ring any bells with me in relationship to Cuban operation.

Senator Schweiker. We'll ask Seymour.

Seymour, how about you, any recollection?

Mr. Bolten. Is it supposed to be Cuban or an American

Senator Schweiker. I think an American, but I'm not c on that, someone who did do some work in the Cuban activities, supposedly on the anti-Castro side.

Mr. Bolten. He has very regular features, so he could be almost anybody, you know.

And like John says, it is a sort of -- he could be familiar. No, I wouldn't place him with anyone I know.

Senator Schweiker. Go ahead.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall Director McCone visiting the station in early December or mid-December of 1963?

Mr. Hailey. Mr. McCone made a couple of visits to Florida. I'm not sure it would be fair to say that he visited the station. My recollection of that is he came to Florida. He was put in the property that we had, we had conversations with him out at that property, but he didn't come out to the physical plant, that is, our station premises, and in most cases he was usually en route to or coming back from somewhere.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a visit in December of 1963?

Mr. Hailey. I can't pin it down to that timeframe. In other words, my memory is McCone came to Miami several times.

Mr. Johnston. Well, let's put it in the timeframe of a short period after the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Hailey. I cannot put it into the timeframe, I just can't. All I can tell you is McCone came down to Florida on a number of occasions. You know, if you asked me what your impression, I don't know, maybe three, four.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall anyone from headquarters coming down to visit with you in December 1963? Again, this is shortly after the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Halley. Do you have the chronology? Was Harvey still --

Mr. Johnston. No, it was Fitzgerald.

Mr. Halley. Okay. No, I don't, because Harvey periodically when he was in used to come down at the time of the Orange Bowl game. I do remember going to an Orange Bowl game with Harvey. So I would have to say no, I don't.

But look again --

Mr. Johnston. Well, let me just back up.

Do you know -- did you have any discussions with anyone from the headquarters staff about the effect of the assassination of President Kennedy on Cuban operations?

Mr. Halley. Well, it seems to me logical that there may have been some sort of discussion at that time, but I don't recall it. You know, you have to put this in this kind of a context. It was a steady stream of people coming from Washington to Miami. I came to Washington on a regular basis. There would be times when I would come up once every two weeks. There would be times when I wouldn't be up here for six weeks, and this was a very active period. I was working 14, 15, 16 hours a day, seven days a week, and a lot of this is a blur to me.

So when you say do you remember McCone coming, yes, I do remember that. Can you put it in a time frame of 7 to 8 December, no, I can't.

Mr. Johnston. Can you put it in the timeframe of shortly after the assassination of the President?

Mr. Halley. I can. You know, you asked me, did anybody come down to visit you in the December timeframe. That's why I asked youabout who was the chief because I do recall going to an Orange Bowl game with Harvey one year. Des came down, Fitzgerald came down a couple of times, but I don't remember him ever coming in the Christmas timeframe, you know?

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall having discussions with -- and I take it your answer is yes -- do you recall discussions between you and someone from headquarters about the effect of President Kennedy's assassination on the Cuban operation?

Mr. Halley. I am sure that there were such discussions, you know, where is the program going to go, how are we going to be tasked.

But if you ask when, what date, where, Washington or Miami, I couldn't sharpen it up for you.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with Director McCone?

Mr. Halley. No, I don't.

Mr. Johnston. Do you recall such a discussion with Mr. Helms?

Mr. Halley. No, I have to come back to the basic point. I don't recall this kind of specific conversation with a particular individual, but I am sure that these kinds of conversations must have taken place with somebody from Washington or when I was up here in Washington.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you the cable that you looked at previously before we went on the record, which is WAVE cable 8130 of 24 November 1963, and the copy we have is barely legible. The gist of that in the last numbered paragraph reports information WAVE obtained on an individual named Rodriguez in Dallas, and also, I think, reports, if you can read through the poor Xeroxing, that Rodriguez was thought to be anti-Kennedy.

My question being, where would you have gotten that kind of information?

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Halley. Well, to be honest with you, I can't read the message. It says read Para 2, [illegible] 2. We'd have to go up and look up who the man is. This is one of literally thousands of cryptonyms across my desk.

It looks to me like [illegible] 2.

Mr. Johnston. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Halley. WAVE traces, now, that indicates to me that whatever was done here was based on the material that was passively in the files.

Where did material that was in our files. We got material that was in these files from agent reporting, we got it from refugee debriefings, we got it from our, you know, from sources in the Cuban community who were reporting on Cuban groups. We got it on a monitoring of the Cuban press, and the Spanish press in Miami, we got it from monitoring radio broadcasts and so forth. So that it was this kind of a conglomerate of information.

Now, let's take a name, you know, like Rodriguez. A name like Rodriguez in the card file, there might be two inches of Rodriguezes. You know, if you were looking for a specific Rodriguez, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, you know, somethin like that, then you'd have to pin it down, in other words, age, what his membership was in he party and things like that. So that indicates to me that we found this material in the file.

Who the source is, I don't know. We'd have to look up the crypt and find the true name, and maybe even then I couldn't tell you.

Mr. Johnston. But that source is liable to be a Cuban exile in Miami, is that correct?

Mr. Halley. Well, not being able to read the thing, don't even want to speculate on it.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in Alpha 66?

Mr. Halley. Yes, at times there were sources in Alpha 66.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in SNFE?

Mr. Halley. At times, yes.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources, in the time period we are talking about, November '63 through the spring of 1964?

Mr. Halley. Well, I would have to say the probability is high that we had some sort of a source in that group, but I'd have to go back, you know, and check the record, and it would have to be researched, but my recollection to that is we would have sources in that group one way or another.

Mr. Johnston. Are you aware of a Cuban exile organization of anti-Castro organization called the Christian Democratic Movement, or MDC?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I am.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have sources in MDC?

Mr. Halley. Yes, we did.

Mr. Johnston. And in November of 1963, do you recall who was the leadership of MDC?

Mr. Halley. Off the top of my head, no, but you know there is a book, we put out a book at that time which was a [illegible], of all of the anti-Castro groups that were located in Miami, and the figures are still with me, approximately. There were 250 some-odd exile groupings, and we didn't have all 250 penetrated, if you really want to know the answer to that. We'll have to get the book, look up the dates, and try to see who the leadership were.

Mr. Johnston. Does that book contain the names of the leadership?

Mr. Halley. Yes. In most of the cases it contains the names of the major leaders.

Mr. Johnston. Did you have that book at approximately the timeperiod of November '63 through December '63?

Mr. Halley. The book was put out and revised several times. I just have trouble coming into specific dates.

Mr. Johnston. I appreciate that fact. I understand it.

Mr. Halley. There is just a mass of information on these things now coming out, and the only way I know to answer you in a prudent manner is to say that there was such a group. steer you to the information. You know, we can look it up for you.

Mr. Johnston. Did you know who Dr. Portell-Villa was, Herminio Portell-Villa?

Mr. Halley. Portell-Villa or [illegible]?

Mr. Johnston. Portell-Villa.

Mr. Halley. Portell-Villa, no, I do not.

Mr. Johnston. [illegible] source crypt of [illegible] and I will show you to refresh your recollection WAVE cable 0455, 4/7/1963.

(The Witness reads the document.)

Mr. Halley. No, I don't. You know, the cryptonym AMKNOB rings a bell with me. I am familiar with the cryptonym. Wha specifically AMKNOB 1 is I can't tell you. REading the contents of this message, you know, this is a message dated 4 December '63, I would say that we got a message in secret writing via the mail from some source in Cuba, and he is givi this information.

Who he is, what reliability we placed on a particular source --

Mr. Johnston. That's what I'm asking you.

Mr. Halley. what access he had and so forth, I couldn't tell you. We'd have to, you know, get the file. I would li to read it and see what the file says.

Mr. Johnston. And in connection with the assassination President Kennedy, when you got information like that, you viewed your responsibility as what?

Mr. Halley. Essentially putting it to headquarters, wh was the focal point for pulling together all kinds of dat that were dealing with the Cubans and others.

Mr. Johnston. And again the substance of this is a source in Cuba reporting to you on possibly seeing Oswald, possible Cuban assassinations.

Mr. Halley. That is the deduction I come to by rea their message. I don't want you to hold me to this, and I' will get the file and it says that this was an SW message from a guy in Mexico or something. I'm just reading a message and deductive analysis of what I know the case to have been at the time.

Mr. Johnston. Well, that's a correct statement of the message, is that right?

Mr. Halley. Yes, I'd have to go on the basis that we recorded material accurately. Therefore, by the way this message is written, by analysis I am having to conclude that it was a source inside Cuba.

Mr. Johnston. Then I put to you the question in regard to your previous testimony about tapping sources in Cuba, although you were getting messages out of Cuba, you recall no action being taken through the WAVE station to tap sources in Cuba.

Mr. Halley. Now, with a message like this it is [illegible] You'd have to look back at the file, and where there are additional questions, you know, like who are these people, you try to clarify the reporting that you are receiving, but I can't clarify that off the top of my head. The only thing I could suggest is to go back to the file.

Mr. Johnston. Let me show you also Director Cable [illegible] which WAVE got, dated 30 November 1963. WAVE got an [illegible] of it.

Do you have any recollection of either receiving that . . .

or of receiving that information?

Mr. Halley. I would have to say because of the indicator on here, the communication system was very reliable, that this message was received, because that's what it shows, but I personally have no recollection of this message.

Mr. Johnston. Could WAVE have made a contribution to that report?

Mr. Halley. Well, again, I have to go back to the first. It says the above is from a KMULSER diplomat. I assume that that was from a Mexican diplomat. Italian?

Then that would determine whether we could have made a contribution. There was a time when we in WAVE had as recruited agents Mexican and Italian diplomats in Havana. That cryptonym doesn't ring any bells with me. Now you have to go back and look it up, look in the file, and that would tell you whether we were running the guy or not.

Mr. Johnston. Is that the only evaluation you could have made?

Mr. Halley. Yes. Looking at this, I'd say that's the only evaluation we could have made, but there is one other possibility. There is a Cuban aircraft. It might be that some of the monitoring of communications that we had in the exile groups going, that we [illegible] might have had some contribution to make to it.

Mr. Johnston. For verifying the flight?

Mr. Halley. Or what was the message, how was it sent, what was the text of the message.

Senator Schweiker. What was your relationship with a group called the Free Cuba Committee that I believe was organ[illegible] through the Mullen Company here in Washington?

Mr. Halley. Could you give me some additional information. Was this Bethel, Paul Bethel, the Free Cuba Committee?

Senator Schweiker. Well, again I believe Mrs. Luce was involved with this Committee as well, and there were some others.

Who is Paul Bethel?

Mr. Halley. Paul Bethel was an American who had been employed by I think USIA at one time, and later came to Miami and was very active in one of these Cuban --

Senator Schweiker. Well, I'm not sure. It might have been. I don't have all the names.

Mr. Halley. Well, the Free Cuba Committee, as such, with something to do with it, doesn't strike a response.

Senator Schweiker. Well, would you, in the operation, as you recall, would you have any association with them [illegible] [illegible]?

Mr. Halley. No, I have to say no, and the reason I [illegible] some of these other names, we were constantly getting [illegible] [illegible] or opposition from [illegible] people.

Senator Schweiker. And there were all kinds of Cuban Committees.

Mr. Halley. That's right, and therefore, unless there is a name that goes with it, I have trouble dredging it out.

Senator Schweiker. All right.

I meant, did your work involve any working relationship to the Mullen Company in Washington?

Did you use them in any relationship at all?

Mr. Halley. No, my knowledge of the Mullen Company doesn't start until about 1972.

Senator Schweiker. Okay, I'll let somebody else handle that.

Now about the Fair Play for Cuba Committee? What, under your program, what role or relationship forgetting Oswald [illegible] did you have with them since they obviously had some foreign intelligence relationship?

Mr. Halley. None. In other words, we felt that that was an organization that really of interest to the FBI.

Senator Schweiker. However, you did have a counterintelligence section.

Mr. Halley. Yes, we did have a counterintelligence section, but not operating against these kinds of groups, and counterintelligence section was primarily concerned with the [illegible] kinds of things, [illegible] the infiltration of Cuban agents on those boats and other forms, like the Pan

American flight coming into the United States, and the refugees coming to identify agents on that, identify agents who might be trying to penetrate our paramilitary teams or one of our collection of operations.

We also were looking at Cuban intelligence officers who were stationed overseas, in other words, could our debriefing of knowledgeable people result in our identifying, let's say, the DGI guy in Mexico City or in Madrid? We could then mount an operation on the basis of that to recruit him, to maintain him in place as a source within the Cuban intelligence service. So it was that kind of counterintelligence approach.

You know, as the head of the Cuban Service, [illegible] at the time, you know, people would come out and say I know him, we would look at that and see whether we could use it.

Senator Schweiker. I have just a few small ones, and then I'd like to ask you for some advice off the record, would you just give us some guidance.

On the record here, how about an organization called CUSA, Conservatives, U.S.A. I believe they were an anti-Castro group, and they did own some boats in paramilitary raids.

Mr. Halley. That doesn't ring a bell.

Senator Schweiker. One of the ships or one of the boats was called the CUSA.

Does that ring any bell at all?

Mr. Halley. I don't know that they were, you know, [illegible] tied in to say the CIA.

No, that doesn't ring any bells with me.

Senator Schweiker. Then there is a Paul Helowell.

Mr. Halley. He's a --

Senator Schweiker. Florida banker. He was involved in paramilitary or some kind of operations.

Mr. Halley. Well, there were two phases. Paul Helowell was involved in the Bay of Pigs operation, in cleaning up some claims that the families of one or two of the pilots had who crashed involved in the Bay of Pigs. And I would have known that through the file.

Helowell later was in touch with us at the time when I was in the Miami station, and he provided, as I recall, he had real estate interests, banks, and he helped us create some cover companies through which we bought or leased such things as dock space at marinas for boats and items like that.

Senator Schweiker. Okay.

Do you have anything else on the record?

Mr. Johnston. Just one more thing.

How major a role did you have with Paul Helowell? How many personal contacts did you have with him?

Mr. Halley. My recollection would be that I probably only met him once or twice personally, but you know, you [illegible] have to understand this, at that time, our major cover in Miami was a commercial company. I was a vice president of that company. As a result, I traveled extensively in the business social community. At that point we had one of the larger covert payrolls in South Miami, and I was a member of a number of clubs, and people like Helowell I would meet at cocktail parties or dinners, you know, or the yacht club that I belonged to or whatever, but officially, in terms of a business sense, I only recall talking with Helowell twice, I think.

Senator Schweiker. Would he look anything like that picture?

(The Witness looks at the sketch.)

Mr. Halley. No. At that time he would have been much heavier.

Mr. Johnston. Did you ever discuss the Kennedy assassination with him?

Mr. Halley. No, I wouldn't have. I wouldn't have talked about that. My recollection of the kind of things that I would have talked about with Helowell would have been the formation of such cover company, the purchase of a boat, the rental or term lease of you know large pieces of acreage for training sites and things like that. That's about what I recall of Helowell's relationship with us at the time.

Mr. Johnston. I guess I just have a little bit of trouble, and that is with your recollection of conversation with him, but you don't recall whether you talked to McCone or Helms about a connection between the Kennedy assassination and the Cuban operation.

Mr. Halley. Well, you know, some of these things make different kinds of impact on you. I mean, Holowell was in that part of the county where we were located was an important figure. He had a bank not too far from where we were located. Many of our people did their banking with him, and so forth, and he's a name that sticks out.

Mr. Johnston. I thought that Mr. Helms and Mr. McCone would also make an impression.

Mr. Halley. Well, McCone, yes, you know, I went to three meetings with McCone in Washington and other places, and I -- I don't mean this to sound blase, but a visit of the Director to a place you recall, but you don't necessarily recall the exact timeframe of it. I've had lots of visits at stations that I've been in from Directors, I've been involved in Presidential visits and Vice Presidential visits, and you know, I can tell you when the President came to Vietnam or something and you told me [illegible] exact date, and I don't remember it.

Mr. Johnston. I guess I wasn't asking you to pin down the exact date of a meeting with Mr. Helms or Director McCone, but just whether you had a discussion with them on the relationship between the assassination of President Kennedy and the covert operations against Cuba.

Mr. Halley. I don't recall it.

Mr. Johnston. Is it you don't recall such a discussion, having such a discussion, or you have a recollection and your recollection is there were no discussions.

Mr. Halley. No, I don't recall such a discussion. That's what I've said several times. I assume that such discussions took place, but frankly, I don't recall them.

Senator Schweiker. All right, that's all we have. We appreciate your cooperation and your testimony. I do want to ask for some guidance off the record.

(Whereupon, at 4:50 o'clock p.m., the interview in the above-entitled matter was concluded.)

- - -

Date : 08/06/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10067
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 09-H-08

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 09/09/75
PAGES : 76
SUBJECTS : CONGO

ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET ORIGINAL
Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

R1124

The United States Senate

Report of Proceedings

[redacted]
DT. 3/12/77
BY EC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF	PAGE
Bronson Tweedy	3

EXHIBITS

NUMBER	
Tweedy Exhibit No. 1	44
Tweedy Exhibit No. 2	47
Tweedy Exhibit No. 3	49
Tweedy Exhibit No. 4	50
Tweedy Exhibit No. 5	56
Tweedy Exhibit No. 6	62
Tweedy Exhibit No.7	65

(The above exhibits were retained by counsel.)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Tuesday, September 9, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:15 p.m., in Room 443, Russell Office Building, Senator Walter F. Mondale presiding.

Present: Senator Mondale (presiding).

Also present: Rhett Dawson and Frederick Baron, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

Senator Mondale. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Mr.Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the right to counsel here today?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. And are you appearing voluntarily here today without counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

(At this point, the hearing was removed to Room 608, Carroll Arms Hotel.)

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that all of your Constitutional rights are intact before the Committee, including your Fifth Amendment rights?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, are you aware that you have the right to cease answering questions at any time and consult with an attorney?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. I gather that was implicit in what you said in the Senator's office.

Mr. Baron. It was.

Now, that we are no longer in the Senator's presence I would like to make it clear to you that you are under no obligation to continue testifying, although the Committee would obviously appreciate it if you would.

Are you willing to do so?

Mr. Tweedy. I have no intention of not cooperating.

Mr. Baron. And you are willing to continue to testify to the truth as best you can?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed I will.

Mr. Baron. Perhaps we should begin by putting on the record a bit of your background in Agency activities leading to the point at which you assumed the position as Chief of the African Division.

TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Mr. Tweedy. I came aborad the Agency in the first of May, 1947 and after training was sent to Switzerland. I returned in 1950 and did a series of desk jobs in what was known as the Central European Division, I guess, and went through a number of different assignments at that time, until May of 1953 when I went out as Chief of Station to 15-14 Vienna, Austria. I was there until the middle of 1956 and returned very briefly to the States, went to 15-1 London as Deputy Chief of Station there. I took over as Chief of Station there in the middle of 1958 and was then replaced by Frank Wisner, in 15-1 London, early in October 1959, and I took over the African Division I should think somewhere around between the 15th and 18th of November 1959.

That brings me up to date.

Mr. Baron. And how long did you serve as Chie f of the African Division?

Mr. Tweedy. Until September of '63.

Mr. Baron. In that position did you consult frequent with people in policy-making positions at the State Department?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, as I was explaining to you as we were strolling around, the simple answer to that is yes. These consultations would take many, many different forms.

On the Congo, for example, the State Department obviously was just as involved as practically the rest of the U.S. Government and they had a Congolese task force. I would attend their meetings or a representative of mine would attend their meetings. They took place almost daily, sometimes I guess even more than once daily.

Mr. Baron. During what period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, Lord, from the time the Congo thing really hotted up, and I am talking then particularly under the Kennedy Administration, when Mennen Williams organized the task force and Wayne Fredericks was his deputy; those meetings were State's meetings, they weren't CIA meetings, they weren't meetings primarily to discuss the CIA policy, but we had to be there to maintain, to keep abreast of what the policy was.

Mr. Baron. If we could focus our attention on the period between the independence of the Congo in June of '60 and the announcement of the death of Lumumba in February of '61.

Mr. Tweedy. WAs that the month of his death?

Mr. Baron. The month the death was announced.

As you know, there is a lot of mystery surrounding his death and the probable cause of his death. AS far as the U.N. investigation was concerned it was January 17 or perhaps January 18, 1961.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. What was the nature of your contact with the State Department during that period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. My recollection of this is far less Congo and far more general, as I was mentioning to you as we strolled, and particularly my talks with Jim Penfield, to whom Joe Satterswate was dedicated.

Joe Satterswate, who was Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, and Penfield and I were colleagues in Vienna together. He had the minister. But we did a great deal of talking together about CIA deployment in Africa. I was forming a division both at home and abroad and I had a lot of things to negotiate with him 32 [redacted] and he naturally had his views on a lot of the things we wanted to do, and we spent a great deal of time arguing these things out, making arrangements and so on and so forth.

To be frank with you, I have far less recollection about intimate policy talks on places like the Congo with that particular group than I did after 19-what, the beginning of the Kennedy Administration.

Mr. Baron. It was during the Kennedy Administration that the large scale paramilitary operations in the Congo were geared up.

Mr. Tweedy. All that happened then, absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember discussions with Livingstone Merchant in the State Department before the turn of Administrations?

Mr. Tweedy. I knew Livingstone Merchant but specific discussions with him I really do not recall, no. Later on I remember having a couple of meetings along with Mr. Rusk.

Mr. Baron. Did any of those meetings concern Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. No, Mr. Rusk, I think they exclusively concerned Portuguese Africa.

Mr. Baron. Do you remember having any meetings alone with Herter, Secretary Herter, about Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure I have had a meeting with Mr. Herter.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any meetings with Secretary Herter or Douglas Dillon or Livingstone Merchant?

Mr. Tweedy. Never met Mr. Dillon.

Mr. Baron. About Congolese affairs?

Mr. Tweedy. Never met Mr. Dillon and I do not recall having met with Livingstone Merchant on the Congo. I may have done so but I really don't recall, I had very little professional contact with Mr. Merchant. I knew him mostly slightly socially.

Mr. Baron. When you met regularly with Mr. Satterswatc or Mr. Penfield did you discuss Lumumba with them?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure we discussed Lumumba in the sense of which would be all the time, assessing the situation, assessing where Lumumba was heading, where the Congo was heading. I did this with, you know, almost all of the African situations, individual African country situations.

We would spend a great deal of time, their points of view, our point of view, our perspective, their perspective, but never as an action matter that I can recall.

Mr. Baron. Was the assassination of Patrice Lumumba ever contemplated or raised in those meetings?

Mr. Tweedy. Never.

Mr. Baron. Did you meet regularly in this period between Congolese independence and the announced death of Lumumba with people at the NSC level or people in the White House?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall so at all. For example, if President Eisenhower had an African representative the same way President Kennedy later had, then I can't recall who he was. President Kennedy had two. The first name escapes me. He later went on down to South Africa as Ambassador and one that I saw most of for a considerable period of time was Carl Kazen, recently retired head of the School of Advanced Studies in Princeton.

Mr. Baron. During the Eisenhower Administration did you have direct contact with Gordon Gray or Andrew Goodpaster with reference to Congolese affairs.

You are shaking your head and we have to put it on the record.

Mr. Tweedy. I am alsmot convinced that the answer is no. I am just thinking. I know Gordon Gray quite well. I don't recall ever having policy discussions with him at all, nor General Goodpaster. I think the answer is certainly no.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned to me earlier that you had attended only two National Security Council meetings in your memory and that those two meetings were both long after the death of Lumumba, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. I can only imagine that they must have been because this was well into the Kennedy Administration. I wouldn't be able to put any dates on it now.

Mr. Baron. It was during the directorship of John McCone at CIA?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is without question. And McBundy was at the meetings. Yes, it must have been well after the death of Lumumba, maybe even the following year.

Mr. Baron. During the latter part of the Eisenhower

Administration when events in Congo were heatingup, after Congolese independence, what was the general atmosphere in the State Department and at the CIA in relation to Lumumba, the general attitude toward Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think you would have to start by saying what was the general assessment of the situation in the Congo. Lumumba was really sort of the last thing you came down to.

The worry in WAshington about the situation in the Congo was that here was the largest geographical expression in Africa that thretened to go up in smoke, up because the Kremlin was about to march in and take it over, not because it was about to break up tribally and do all the things that those African countries in their early years were at least vulnerable to. The only trouble with the Congo was if it happened there the side effects would have been infinitely greater than, of course, if it had happened anywhere else.

Mr. Baron. What would those side effects have been?

Mr. Tweedy. All one culd do was assess those, but it would have set a precedent, for example, the neighboring country by which great store was set by the West was Nigeria and if the same infection crossed that border one was afraid that this would go up in smoke and that in effect there was a possibility of the continent disintegrating before it really had had a chance to get under way under its own aegis.

This was the concern.

Mr. Baron. Were these political side effects only that were being taken into account or were there also fears for American business interests in the Congo that were part of the side effects?

Mr. Tweedy. Insofar as my assessments were concerned, and those of the Agency and any conversations I can recall with the State Department, American business was just not a great factor.

If you want to talk about business, the big factor, of course, was Katanga and eventually when Tschombe threatened to succeed resulting in the great involvement of both the U.N. and the U.S. in the Congo affair, the fear there was that if you put together the Congo without Katanga it was like constructing a Cadillac and purposely omitting the gas station.

Mr. Baron. That is because Kutanga is the home of most of the natural resources that are in the Congo.

Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that keeps that country going.

Now, I don't say there weren't a lot of economic considerations in back of that but these were political economic concerns much more than anything parochial, but is what was going to happen to U.S. business was not a factor insofar as I recall.

Mr. Baron. So the primary concern was for political stability in Africa.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, political stability in Africa. In a quick phrase you put your foot right on that.

Mr. Dawson. During the summer of 1960 you mentioned earlier that in the time frame you did not think the Kremlin was ready to march in there, as that was a fear with you but --

Mr. Tweedy. I don't mean to say this was nothing that anybody was worred about but it was not the primary concern.

Mr. Dawson. But there was significant Soviet interest in infiltrating and taking advantage of the situation in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I think it would be much more accurate to say it was our assumption, we were not privy to Soviet intentions with respect to Africa, which I suspect in those days like a great many other things about African culture round the globe were ill informed at that point, and undoubtedly seeking their own polcies in Africa just the way this country was. It was obviously a worry.

Mr. Baron. Was it also our assumption if the Soviets moved into the Congo they would move on the side of Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes, I think there would have been little doubt in our minds that that would have been the case.

Mr. Baron. And is it also true that the general perception at the Agency and in the State Department was that Lumumba posed the threat in the Congo beyond the mere threat of political instability because of his closeness to the Soviets or his willingness to accept aid from the Soviets?

Mr. Tweedy. It made the cheese more binding but I don't think we had any information indicating there was any close umbilicus between the Soviets and Lumumba but it was potentially there.

Mr. Baron. And that potential --

Mr. Tweedy. This increased one's nervousness about the situation.

Mr. Baron. In your capacity as Chief of the African Division to whom did you report and from whom did you receive orders?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, the normal chain of command was through DDD, Dick Bissell and --

Mr. Baron. Would you meet regularly with Richard Bissell during this period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. Regularly would be a big word. Not necessarily that often. We might talk on the phone. To say that I saw him all the time, how often I don't know. It would go in fits and starts, undoubtedly but --

Mr. Baron. In formulating actions to be taken in the Congo, would you consult with Bissell before you undertook any major operation.

Mr. Tweedy. Well, depending on what you mean by major operation. Major operation per se, if you are not talking about just intelligence operations, call for instructions and formalization either inside the Agency or outside.

Mr. Baron. So any major covert action would be formulated in consultation not only with Bissell but with the DCI, Allen Dulles at that time, and probably higher levels than that.

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose the DCI, if Bissell felt that was necessary, and, of course, he used to talk to the DCI without my being present, and undoubtedly certain instructions I would receive from time to time undoubtedly stem from conversations that Bissell would have had with the DCI and funnelled down to me.

I didn't always know who talked to whom before I received instructions.

Mr. Baron. So if you received an instruction from Richard Bissell as DDP you would proceed to implement that instruction on the assumption it was fully authorized above the level of DDP?

Mr. Tweedy. I think I would proceed with it on the basis that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do.

I couldn't run his affairs for him to that extent, but by and large I reckon the Agency worked and that was the way it was set up to work and that is the way it worked, but to say every time Bissell talked to me he always talked to Allen Dulles first I would think is nonsense.

Mr. Baron. You didn't consider it your duty to question Bissell about the source of authority for some covert action he was asking you to undertake?

Mr. Tweedy. I would have never hesitated to do if I felt that it was necessary to do so.

I can't recall having done so. He and I used to have disagreements philosophically on operations. We were very good friends and I never had any hesitation about telling him when I thought he didn't make any sense but --

Mr. Dawson. Could you describe that philosophical difference, or is it describable?

Mr. Tweedy. Well it varied a lot. I think Dick was by and large inclined to feel that almost anything was possible, you know, in the clandestine service, if they put their minds to it, and my view was this wasn't the case.

Mr. Dawson. Thank you.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever discuss the question of assassinating Lumumba with Richard Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, this was the way the whole thing came up in the first instance. I can't remember how it came up except undoubtedly we had a conversation.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall when it came up?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I don't. It obviously must have come up, I assume, what, the fall of 1960. But I have no way of putting a date to it.

Mr. Baron. And what was said during that discussion or perhaps I should backtrack first and ask whether this was one discussion or a series of discussions?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, we must have discussed it more than once. I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.

Mr. Baron. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, but a planning exercise which, in other words, never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well.

Mr. Baron. So, in effect you were asked to move ahead at least as far as developing the capability to carry of an assassination if an order should be given?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, or to examine the potential for doing that.

Mr. Dawson. I know that you have indicated you won't be able to put a precise date to this conversation with Bissell or conversations with Bissell, but maybe we can narrow it down a little bit.

Would you assume that it would be after the proclamation of the Congolese independence on June 30, 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. Oh, yes.

Mr. Dawson. Would you assume it would be before Lumumba's being put into U.N. protective custody on September15, 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. I think it must have been, yes. I didn't realize he had gone into custody that early.

Mr. Baron. So then it would be sometime during the summer or early fall of '60?

Mr. Tweedy. What happened to Lumumba after that?

Mr. Baron. He was in protective custody at the United Nations force from mid-September until late November and it was in late November that he left to go traveling towards Stanleyville and he was captured by Mobutu's troops at that point in very early December and from early December until mid-January he was in the custody of the Congolese in prison and then it was in mid-January 1961 that he was flown from a prison in Tysville to Katanga where his death was announced shortly thereafter.

Mr. Tweedy. That I recall. I have got to assume it was sometime after September 15th. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. When you say "after" --

Mr. Tweedy. After you put September 15 the day he came under. The only thing is I have no recollection that it would have happened as early as, say, early August or early September.

Mr. Baron. It was in August or early September that Lumumba was Premier of the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And there was obviously a struggle for power between Lumumba and Kasavubu going on.

Mr. Dawson. I guess the crucial question.

Mr. Tweedy. You have really got me at this point.

Mr. Dawson. It would be whether or not you would have considered the plan had he been in U.N. protective custody. If you assume that would be the case, then I don't think any more precision in the date would necessarily be productive.

Mr. Treedy. My whole recollection of the thing would be that only purpose of the exercise would have been to have a plan when he was in nobody's custody.

Mr. Baron. That would have been before --

Mr. Tweedy. That is the only thing that makes sense to me, September, because --

Mr. Baron. Well, I will go on.

In a moment I will show you some cable traffic that went back and forth between headquarters and the Congo after he was in U.N. custody to see if that refreshes your recollection about the general attitude with regard to Lumumba at that time.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. But, you are saying now, that it would only make sense to you that --

Mr. Tweedy. In retrospect nothing makes sense to me but --

Mr. Baron. -- that this initial consideration of the feasibility of the assassination of Lumumba between Bissell and yourself?

Mr. Tweedy. I should have thought that would have been during the period when he was in effect in power. I should have thought, but the record may prove me wrong.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any discussion with Bissell where he indicated that his own consideration of the assassination of Lumumba had moved beyond the realm of possibility to an actual plan that he was prepared to carry out or taking steps to carry out.

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot recall a conversation with Bissell where in effect he said, let's move from A to B or C to D or something like this. I do not recall that. My recollection of the whole interval when this was under consideration was that it was a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I even felt it was imminent that somebody would say go, (a) we never came up with a plan that was go-able. or anything really very close to it. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency at which somebody would have said something more about it and it never occurred to me I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and say go to it.

Nor were we ever in position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.

Mr. Baron. You didn't have any action plans for assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?

Mr. Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere.

Mr. Baron. What kind of planning was done?

Mr. Tweedy. It was mostly the kind of thing where one asked the Chief of Station to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever have had to Lumumba for whatever purpose. It was this kind of thing, as best I recollect.

Mr. Baron. Did you send cables raising the question of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him?

Mr. Tweedy. I suspect that was the first cable that ever went out. In other words, the first cable that ever went out to Larry Hedgman. He must have realized, he would have been perfectly clear on his end, the way one's minds were running even though it was purely a contingency.

Mr. Baron. I am sorry. I don't think I understood that.

You say the first cable that went out.

Mr. Tweedy. That was the first way that Hedgman was ever advised that there was any thinking of that kind in Washington, was via our cable. I am sure he wasn't back in the States over anything of this kind.

Mr. Baron. Today you distinctly remember a cable sent?

Mr. Tweedy. I think I remember that much more distinctly than anything I remember in the last few minutes that it was a cable which asked him to be thinking of that.

Mr. Baron. That was pursuant to your conversation with Mr. Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. That was.

Mr. Baron. Did you send that cable or Mr. Bissell send that cable.

Mr. Tweedy. It probably would have been a cable I wouldhave written and probably released by him.

Mr. Baron. Do you know what was in that cable?

Mr. Tweedy. God knows, I don't.

Mr. Baron. Or the effect of the language in the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. The effect of the language in the cable would be to get Hedgman to be thinking along these lines.

Mr. Dawson. Would you describe the purpose?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been the eventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally.

Mr. Dawson. Is that language you think might have been used or that is how you think it might have been done?

Mr. Tweedy. I couldn't even start to reproduce the cable.

Mr. Baron. Did you send a number of such cables to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I imagine there were a few over a period of time. It was not an intensive correspondence as I remember it.

Mr. Baron. It wouldn't be thenormal practice to have an intensive correspondence on such a sensitive subject, would it?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know. It is the only time I ever had one but I have had very sensitive subjects,operationally sensitive subjects that I have dealt with in extensive cables over a very long period of time, but nothing of this nature whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. Were these cables from headquarters to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville sent in a specially restricted channel?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, all sensitive cables are sent in various types of restricted channels I am sure you aware.

Mr. Baron. This channel even more tightly held and closely restricted than the normal cable traffic that would flow to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. That would be a very fair statement, yes.

Mr. Baron. Do you know whether the cable included instructions to destroy it after reading it?

Mr. Tweedy. That wouldn't have been normal.

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that on a subject like this such an instruction would have been given?

Mr. Tweedy. It would really be up to the Chief of Station, I think. It would be up to the Chief of Station what was in the cable and the degree to which he felt he needed to maintain a record for quick reference purposes in the future.

But, he was perfectly capable of keeping a file which would be accessable only to him and the station and if he was sure of his own security within the station I don't think this would have been a problem for him,but to answer your question I don't know what Hedgman himself did.

Mr. Baron. What kind of response did you receive from Hedgman or from the Chief of Station in Leopoldville?

Mr. Tweedy. It was a serious answer. I can't do better than that. It was a serious answer. It wasn't argumentative, I guess it started to discuss, not the pros and cons of policy, at least I don't recall it did, but what it was that he might be able to do. It was a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters.

Mr. Baron. Did he mention any specific means that he had of gaining access to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall now. I don't recall. I think he said it was certainly not beyond the question that means could either be developed or might arise but I certainly do not recall that he came up with any very specific ideas in the first instance. On that I am afraid I am terribly hedgy.

Mr. Baron. At the time that you were requesting the Chief of Station to report back on means of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of eliminating him, was this access made any more explicit in terms of the kind of personal access that would be needed?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure that must have been covered at some point, i.e., in perhaps a series of types of accesses.

Mr. Baron. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered.

Mr. Baron. But this was not access in the sense of --

finding a way to sneak inside the U.N. guard to simply snatch Lumumba from custody, this was clearly access to assassinate him, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. That would certainly be my recollection. Kidnapping was never a factor that I recall at all or even considered, at least I don't remember it.

Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Richard Bissell about the prospect of assassinating Lumumba, did he mention to you that he had had similar discussions with Justin O'Donnell?

Mr. Tweedy. I was reminded of Justin O'Donnell's role in all this. As you may recall, when I talked to you and Mr. Wides, and until you reminded me I had forgotten that Justin O'Donnell played any role whatsoever and now that it has been brought to my recollection I recall it. I recall it almost in detail.

I remember being told that he had expressed reservations or disagreement or refusal to participate to Bissell and I think my response to you was if he said that I would believe him but I didn't recall it.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you that he had asked Justin O'Donnell to go to the Congo to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, he must have indeed have told me that he was going to ask O'Donnell to go to the Congo to examine the thing on the ground, but I don't recall him ever

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

saying, I am going to send O'Donnell to the Congo to knock off Lumumba, not in those words.

Mr. Baron. When you say examine the thing on the ground you mean he would send O'Donnell to the Congo to take a first-hand look at the means?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, conceivably I suppose this all might have resulted in a climax there but at least my recollection certainly was never that he told me that I am sending O'Donnell to the Congo to knock off Lumumba in those words but that he, I am sure the philosophy was that if anything was done you would want to keep it as separate from the station as possible and thus a man from the outside. It was Bissell's idea that O'Connell might be the man.

Mr. Baron. The man from outside?

Mr. Tweedy. Outside the station.

Mr. Baron. The CIA station in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Right.

Mr. Baron. That such a man would be necessary to carry out an assassination operation if one were to be mounted?

Mr. Tweedy. That if one was mounted it would obviously be desirable to do it under auspices which would protect the security of the station or involvement of the station.

That I am sure was the philosophy behind it.

Mr. Baron. But it is your recollection that O'Donnell, was sent to the Congo to assess the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to mount some sort of kidnapping plan to draw Lumumba out from the U.N. guard and put him in the hands of Congolese authorities?

Mr. Tweedy. That is certainly my recollection but I would not want to put too high a value on it. I just don't recall kidnapping as a factor is all.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bussell ever mention to you that lethal biological agents had been developed in the CIA laboratories for possible use in the Congo to assassinate Lumumba? Or they were available for such use?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be closer that TSD probably had the capability or had the agent or whatever it was. When I say agent I mean chemical agent. I suspect I heard that, yes.

Mr. Baron. Would this have been under Sidney Gottlieb's auspices or direction in TSD?

Mr. Tweedy. If he was Chief of TSD at the time it would have been. I don't recall. Was he? I think he was.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you directly that Sidney Gottlieb was involved in developing poisons that might be used for assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all.

Mr. Baron. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being considered and which the Chief of Station should explore?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station ever make a response to you via cable which indicated that he was exploring means of gaining access to Lumumba for the possible use of poisoning -- purpose of poisoning him.

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he must have done that. I don't recall specifically, but that effect is what he was charged to do in the first instance, examine the possibilities.

I would be very surprised if Hedgman didn't come back and in effect comment on this but the nature of his comments I really don't recall.

Mr. Dawson. When you and Bissell had your conversations, whatever time it was, concerning this matter, did he mention to you that he had approval or direction from highest authority to undertake to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, no. I guess I was under the impression when he talked to me that -- I don't know whether this is fair or not -- I honestly don't know what my impression was at the time whether this was something that Bissell had in effect sucked out of his own thumb as a contingency plan which he then raised with higher authority, and because it was contingency planning I don't think at that stage I was particularly concerned. But to answer the question I just don't know.

Mr. Dawson. You stated earlier you knew Gordon Gray very well.

Mr. Tweedy. I didn't say that. I have known Gordon Gray far better since than I did then. I knew Gordon Gray very slightly indeed then, and I am not sure I ever had a -- while he was in office -- that I ever had a personal conversation with him. I have seen a lot of him since he was on the President's Board.

Mr. Dawson. That answers my question.

Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell never made a representation to you one way or the other as to whether he had approval from any authority higher than DDP for this consideration of assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not recall so.

Mr. Baron. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate to you that he was directly in contact with the Chief of Station in

Leopoldville or that he had means of dealing directly with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville without going through you?

Mr. Tweedy. He always said that any DDP, of course, that has the capability, and right, it was never my impression that he was using it and going around me, no. But that he did, but he might have done it, I wouldn't gainsay it, he certainly had the right and capability to go into it.

Mr. Dawson. Can we go into how the right was able to be exercised?

Mr. Tweedy. All he had to do was send a cable. He could establish his own channel to Leopoldville with his own set of slugs which would exclude the Chief of African Division. He has the right to do that.

Mr. Baron. It would not be improper for a DDP to send a cable or messenger to the Chief of Station in another country?

Mr. Tweedy. I wouldn't comment on the appropriateness. He obviously had the authority. My relationships with Bissell were such that I do not believe it.

I never had the impression that he ever had any intention or desire to go around me on matters of this kind.

Mr. Dawson. Who else other than the DDP or DCI would have such authority?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. Would the President?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, but he would probably have to come to the Agency to find out how to do it. I imagine the President could send a personal representative, I am damn sure he would have no way of knowing how to send a cable out there. He would make a muck of it if he did.

Mr. Baron. Did you learn at any point that lethal biological substances were actually in the custody of the Chief of Station in Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. This was mentioned when I talked to you and Mr. Wides and my answer was that I don't recall it, but that it was perfectly possible for them to be sent there.

Mr. Baron. How would they have been sent?

Mr. Tweedy. They could have been sent one or two ways, they would have been sent through the pouch with the whole thing wrapped in and addressed in such manner that it would be opened only by the Chief of Station or somebody coming out by hand of officer or hand of somebody either way it could be done.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that point that he had received a cable from headquarters saying that a messenger would arrive in the Congo and would be someone that he would recognize and this messenger would give him instructions that he was to carry out.

Did you ever know of such a cable being sent to the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I should be very surprised if I didn't, but I certainly have no recollection of it whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. And the Chief of Station further testified that shortly after receiving such a cable he received a visit from [redacted] who arrived in Leopoldville and made himself known to the Chief of Station, the Chief of Station said that he immediately recognized [redacted] as an officer of the Agency, and as the messenger that this cable referred to.

Subsequently, the Chief of Station said he had meetings with [redacted] in his apartment in Leopoldville where [redacted] gave him instructions that he said came from the headquarters to carry out the assassination of Lumumba and [redacted] also, according to the Chief of Station, gave him lethal biological substances and medical equipment with which to administer them.

Were you aware of that chain of events?

Mr. Tweedy. That sounds far more definitive than anything I have any recollection of at all.

Scheider

If I understand what you said was, Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered the Chief of Station at the conclusion of their conversations, to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters?

Mr. Baron. That is --

Mr. Tweedy. If that is the case I don't believe it.

Mr. Baron. That is the essence of the testimony that the Chief of Station although he did say that he was not anxious to carry out an assassination mission. He didn't think it was practical or wise and he probably would have gone back to headquarters to consult with them if he thought he was in a position to move immediately to carry out the assassination plan, but it was his opinion that the policy decision had been made and that he had authority to move ahead although he doubted --

Mr. Tweedy. My recollection doesn't go anywhere near that far.

Mr. Dawson. He checked that authority by immediately cabling back to headquarters saying, this guy has made himself available to me as well as he has delivered something and has told me that he had the approval of the highest authority

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

in the land to order me to do what he so ordered, which got another cable back through the specially slugged cable saying yes, what he told you is correct.

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that, which surprises me, because once again I would be very surprised, I wouldn't have been privy to those.

Mr. Baron. If a request such as the plan Mr. Dawson outlined had been sent from the Congo to headquarters and it were in more narrow cryptic terms, for instance, if it had said simply I have seen your messenger and received instructions and request confirmation that I am to carry them out, would that refresh your recollection as to whether you had seen such a cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I can't be at all sure it will refresh my recollection but if you and Hedgman say that such a cable was sent, I am not going to gainsay it.

Mr. Baron. Would that be the manner in which confirmation for such a sensitive operation would be requested?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know because I never saw one before or since but it sounds highly reasonable to me. This is the way, this would be the way I should have thought any two sensible people would confer on sensitive matters when each knew that the other knew exactly what he was talking about and, of course, you don't have to use unnecessary words but beyond the likelihood of this I can't say that is what

Mr. Dawson. This leaves us with one or two alternatives, either the Chief of Station who has appeared and testified although not necessarily reluctantly, but certainly reluctantly as to substance of his testimony, is not telling us the truth, or he is telling us the truth and you were not privy to what was going on.

Mr. Tweedy. Or I literally don't recall it. This is my problem. I will tell you quite frankly with these things --

Mr. Dawson. It is 15 years ago.

Mr. Tweedy. I really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things about the things that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were basically the things I was basically concerned with all the time which was putting this division together and the rest of it.

When it comes to operational detail I start getting fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case.

I spent days in a row not even giving Lumumba one single bloody thought. This is my problem.

Mr. Dawson. Let's try to jog your memory on this.

Do you recall any time during that period of any discussions of the use of Dr. Gottlieb whatsoever as a courier?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Dawson. All right.

Mr. Tweedy. But if he went as a courier, I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it.

Mr. Baron. Having heard this story, would it be your assumption it is more likely to be true than not?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I put it purely this way.

Mr. Baron. I am asking you for your expert opinion here as someone experienced.

Mr. Tweedy. Expert opinion.

Mr. Dawson. You had been the person responsible for promoting this Chief of Station or at least appointing him Chief of Station, I assume?

Mr. Tweedy. That in actual fact isn't true. His appointment was already in the works when I came aboard and I had met Hedgman in London on his previous assignment which, if I remember correctly, was in Brussels and he came to London to discuss an operational matter with me which had nothing whatsoever to do with that and we had a very good discussion. It was only, I think, when I got back to headquarters as it were, took up the reins after the division that I learned that he had been appointed Chief of Station in the Congo, a decision with which I took absolutely no exception whatsoever, but as a number of assignments may be made before I came they had to be they couldn't wait for me to get the word.

Mr. Dawson. Have you ever had any occasion to doubt his veracity or integrity?

Mr. Tweedy. I have not.

I think when I say yes to your basic question, it would be that I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity.

Mr. Baron. We don't question it.

Mr. Tweedy. All of this happened pretty much the way you gave it to me.

Mr. Baron. That would be your --

Mr. Tweedy. The aspect of it I find very difficult to believe it that at any time headquarters said on receipt of these instructions, go ahead and do it. This I find very difficult to -- I do not recall and I find difficult to believe and I believe implicitly the reaction he gave you which was, reaction, that if he found it not feasible he sure as hell would have referred again to headquarters before he did it.

Mr. Baron. Why did you find it difficult to believe such an instruction would have been given?

Mr. Tweedy. That way I would have said in such a matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute.

[illegible]

Not one of these things that Gottlieb runs off to the

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington

Congo and by the time he has found Hedgman, given his instructions and all of which could have been four or five or six days later and Hedgman in turn had found a way to do it even then set about his leisure to do it or without further reference to headquarters that is not the way my organization has ever run operations.

Mr. Baron. Was it likely at all that Schneider Dr. Gottlieb would have gone off on his own with these poisons to the Congo to deliver them to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I should have said quite impossible.

Mr. Baron. Without an instruction from the DDP at least?

Mr. Tweedy. That is quite impossible.

Mr. Baron. Would Schneider Dr. Gottlieb have proceeded to the Congo in the way the organization normally worked if the DCI had tasked him directly with such a mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid I don't quite understand.

Mr. Baron. If the DCI had given Schneider Dr. Gottlieb an instruction to go to the Congo and deliver poisons to the Chief of Station would he have done it without consulting with the DDP?

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose so.

But I don't believe it. I don't believe it ever happened.

To answer your question, I suppose if anybody got a personal private instruction from the DCI, and was instructed to proceed without reference to anybody else he would presumably go ahead and do so.

Mr. Baron. But, because the feasibility of this assassination of Lumumba had been discussed, this was not such a tightly held subject that the DDP would have been circumvented?

Mr. Tweedy. DDP as far as I was concerned was the person with whom the division first discussed the matter entirely. I don't recall ever having discussed it with Allen Dulles. I am sure when I say I am sure I assume Bissell discussed it with Allen Dulles but, this was never a matter which was between the DCI's office and the Leopoldville station insofar as I was aware, and to this day I don't believe it ever was.

Mr. Baron. Just to clarify something we talked about earlier when I think we were jumbling two questions together, it is your expert opinion, expert in the sense of your knowledge of the Agency, and your opinion as a participant at that time that the testimony, the basic testimony we have received about poisons being delivered to the Congo by Schneider Dr. Gottlieb with instructions to use them in the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, would be true testimony?

Mr. Tweedy. Only way I can answer that question, Mr. Baron, is to say I see not the slightest reason and do not believe that you would have been lied to on this point.

But, there is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on that point whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. Did you travel to the Congo shortly before the independence of the Congo was declared?

Mr. Tweedy. That was my first visit to the Congo as I recall, it was two weeks before independence. I made a long trip through Sub-Saharan Africa which culminated in a drive from Kampala to Sambura and I flew from Sambura, I guess, to Albertville and from Albertville to Leopoldville and that is thefirst time I ever saw Leopoldville.

Mr. Dawson. Do you know whether Mr. Hedgman was there at that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Hedgman I am almost sure was not. His predecessor was there. He had many children, I can't remember his name.

Mr. Baron. And you left the Congo before independence was declared.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was only there for, I suppose I was there for four or five days and I thought I was going to end my whole tour there and whole trip there but eventually I had to go up to the Ivory Coast to settle an unexpected problem.

Mr. Baron. For the record would you agree with me that independence was declared about June 30, 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Did you make another trip during which you visited the Congo at some point before the death of Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, well, it is this one that I regurgitated finally which must have been as near as the early part of December and which had started with a visit to Rome in the latter part of November, followed by a trip to Nairobi followed by a brief visit to South Africa, then I think Congo, then briefly Brazzaville and home via Europe.

Mr. Baron. And this meeting in November '60 in Rome was a meeting of Aftican --

Mr. Tweedy. South - Northern African Station Chiefs. [redacted] and these would have been chiefs of stations of [redacted]

Mr. Baron. And the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. So the Congo Chief of Station would not normally have been --

Mr. Tweedy. If he came up he must have come up to see Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Richard Bissell was traveling with you on this --

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. -- tour to Rome and Nairobi?

Mr. Tweedy. He called the meetings. The whole purpose of the exercise was that he wanted to meet a large number of our new Chiefs of Stations in Africa and rather than make a trip around Africa, which he hardly had time, he used a device which we often used, which is to hold regional meetings at a central point to which these people could have ready access and, therefore, it was easy for people on the north Mediterranean littoral or South Mediterranean littoral to proceed to Rome, and the same way it was easy for East African Station Chiefs to proceed to Nairobi, and he had the meetings there, each one two or three days, I suppose.

Mr. Baron. Did the Chief of Station in the Congo attend the meeting in Rome?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure he would not. In other words, if he saw Bissell he would have merely come to Rome and have seen him, but he would have had no reason whatsoever, in fact it would have been ridiculous for Bissell to invite a man who didn't belong in the North African meetings and merely raised the question whether Hedgman was there.

Mr. Baron. What region in the CIA organization chart would the Chief of Station in the Congo belong to?

Mr. Tweedy. We change around there. We had in those days, we had the North African branch, we had the East African branch, we had a Southern African branch, which included South Africa, Rhodesia, probably Portuguese Africa, maybe the Congo in those days. Later on the Congo was sort of Sui Generis but in that early time I suspect it fell down in Southern Africa but I am not absolutely sure. It might have fallen just in French-speaking West Africa.

We always had a French West Africa, an English-speaking West Africa.

Mr. Baron. We have received testimony from the Chief of Station in the Congo at that point that he did come to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell and he belives that he also met with yourself and Mr. Karamessines at Mr. Karamessines' house.

Mr. Tweedy. I doubt if he saw Mr. Karamessines. It would only be because Mr. Karamessines was host as Chief of Station in Rome. But I am sure he was not discussing any policy problems with Mr. Karamessines who had absolutely no jurisdiction over them in those days whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. That was his testimony, but it was incidental, but if, as he has testified, that he met with Mr. Bissell and yourself, you wouldn't dispute that testimony?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely not.

Mr. Baron. And that would be due to the intensity of activity in the Congo at this point and the intensity of concern over that activity?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. It was obviously becoming more and more of a commitment of both the U.S. Government and thus the agency. I think leaving Lumumba entirely aside this was the main reason that I am sure I went to the Congo at that point was the fact that it obviously was going to become a major personnel drain, if you like, on the Division and a major commitment both at headquarters and in the field, thus it was important I sort of look the thing over.

Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection about this meeting between the Chief of Station and Mr. Bissell and yourself in Rome, do you recall what was discussed when you were together?

Mr. Tweedy. I can only assume that some of the things that we discussed by cable traffic were discussed.

The other thing I am sure must have been discussed was what I would call the general assessment of the Congolese situation and what the station might be required to do, thus the sort of support headquarters was going to have to give the Station.

Mr. Baron. Was there any discussion of the assassination of Lumumba or the prospect of --

Mr. Tweedy. I would be immensely surprised if it wasn't discussed but I don't recall in what context it was discussed. In fact, I don't believe it wasn't discussed. It was after all on the agenda, as it were, at least I assume it was, at that point.

Mr. Baron. The prospect of assassinating Lumumba continued to be on the agenda of the Agency until the point that

Lumumba was actually dead?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall. You probably are much more knowledgeable on that than I am. I don't recall when in effect we no longer considered it or it no longer was a factor. I just don't remember.

Mr. Baron. But, just now you were assuming that that would have the case?

Mr. Tweedy. If it was still on, it was still on the agenda, inevitably we must have discussed it. If it was off the agenda then no, but I honestly don't remember.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now some cable traffic between the agency and Leopoldville which consists of a series of cables that begins shortly before Lumumba was placed into U.N. custody, then continues after he was placed in U.N. custody.

In an attempt to refresh your recollection about the attitude at the Agency toward Lumumba after he was in U.N. custody --

Mr. Tweedy. Okay.

Mr. Baron. -- the first cable which we will mark Tweedy Exhibit 1 is dated August 26, 1960, from Leopoldville to the Director.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

Mr. Tweedy. That is the way all cables were addressed. I see he sent one specifically to DCI.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Onthe record.

Let's turn back now.

I believe while we were off the record and examining this cable closely you corrected me, Mr. Tweedy, on the fact that this cable was not sent from Leopoldville to the Director but rather it was sent from headquarters to Leopoldville; is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

Mr. Baron. And it appears to you from the designation "Allen W. Dulles", at the top of the telegram, that this was a personal message signed off by the DCI himself to the Chief of Station.

Mr. Tweedy. Correct. As I said, he might not have drafted it but it certainly would have been his sign off.

Mr. Baron. And let me direct your attention to the portion of the cable that says in high quarters here it is the clear-cut conclusion that if LLL continues to hold high office the inevitable result will at best be chaos and at worst pave the way to a Communist takeover of the Congo with disastrous consequences for the prestige of the U.N. and for the interests of the Free World generally.

Consequently we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditi this should be a high priority of our covert action.

Now, do you believe that LLL refers to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Mr. Baron. And why would three L's have been used in the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. Would that be a standard way of making sure that at least one of the L's was clear in transmission?

Mr. Tweedy. I honestly don't know.

Now, that isn't the normal way to do it at all. I honestly don't know how. His name was Patrice.

Mr. Baron. But it is nonetheless your opinion tha LLL does refer to Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do indeed.

Mr. Baron. Does this accord with your general sense of the policy toward Lumumba at that time at the Agency and State Department?

Mr. Tweedy. It accords much more with my recollect of our attitude toward the potentially disastrous situati the Congo than it does on he personally, but he obviousl was always in the background.

Mr. Baron. Where the cable says we conclude that his removal must be an urgent and prime objective and that under existing conditions this should be a high priority of out covert action, close quotes, -- is that consistent with the policy towards Lumumba as you recall it?

In other words,that Lumumba's removal was a prime objective of the covert actions of the Agency.

Mr. Tweedy. We would have given our eye teeth to have Lumumba not the head of the Congolese state, certainly I would agree with that.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 2, let's turn to a cable dated September 16, 1960.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. This contains references to the fact that "the station ws flooded with reports re outcome Mobutu coup".

And the cable goes on to discuss the fact that U.N. troops had interferred with Congolese troops and prevented them from arresting Lumumba.

Now, this cable was sent to the CIA headquarters from Leopoldville one day after Lumumba sought protective custody from the United Nations and two days after the Mobutu coup where Mobutu took over the government.

In the cable as it has been sanitized by the Agency it now reads:

"Station advised two moderate Congolese politician try work with key Congolese contact in effort eliminate Lumumba. Fear U.N. protection will give Lumumba opportunity to organize counterattack. Only solution is remove him from scene soonest".

WAs that the attitude of the Agency at this point, as far as you understood it, that the fact that Lumumba was in U.N. protective custody did not eliminate him as a threat in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't really recall but I think the chances are that we feared that U.N. protective custody might very well result in his early release or his ability sti to control matters. I should think that is very probable.

Mr. Baron. And that is the reason why there would be this fear of counterattack organized by Lumumba while he was protected by the U.N. --

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, that is probably true.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 3 let's turn to a cable dated September 20, 1960, which is sent -- off the record.

(The document referred to was
marked Tweedy Exhibit 3 for
identification.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

Although the top of this cable does not indicate where the cable was sent to and from, because we don't have the cover sheet for the cable, you have indicated to me by looking at the designations that this cable must have been sent from Leopoldville to headquarters, is that correct, Mr. Tweedy?

Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. Let me direct your attention to paragraph 7 which says:

"Station checking recurring reports of Kasavubu Lumumba reconcilation. Kasavubu denies Bolikango failed deny possibility of Lumumba entering new government, possibly as vice Premier. Believe some substance to rumor but will do best prevent if Lumumba allowed even minor role he most apt come out on top".

Does that indicate to you that the Chief of Station in the Congo at this point continued to be extremely concerned that Lumumba should not be allowed even a minor role in the government of the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

Mr. Baron. Next, as Exhibit 4, we have a cable dated January 19, 1961.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Baron. This was sent from the Congo to --

Mr. Tweedy. Sent from Elizabethville to Leopoldville info headquarters, information headquarters.

Mr. Baron. So that headquarters would have received a copy of this cable sent by the base chief in Elizabethville to the Station Chief in Leopoldville?

Mr. Tweedy. Right.

Mr. Baron. And paragraph 1 of this cable says:

"Thanks for Patrice. If we had known he was coming we would have baked a snake".

Do you have an independent recollection of this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, of course I do, for the simple reason of that phrase, which is another way of saying, a lighthearted way of saying, on the part of Elizabethville Lumumba arrived in Kutanga and he had no idea he was coming.

Mr. Baron. So this cable does not indicate that there was any connection between the CIA and Lumumba's eventual death, the actual causes of his death in Kutanga?

Mr. Tweedy. Will you say that again? I am not quite sure I understood that.

Mr. Baron. Does that cable indicate in any way that the CI was knowledgeable of the actual causes of Lumumba's death at the point when it occurred?

In other words, that they were connected to the people who caused his death?

Mr. Tweedy. I must say I have a hard time following the question. This means that Lumumba arrived under the Congolese auspices in Kutanga and that Elizabethville, the base at Elizabethville didn't know he was coming, our base, didn't know very much, didn't presumably know very much about what occurred, and reported very briefly on what they had heard.

Mr. Baron. Let me put the question in context.

On January 17, Lumumba had been flown to Kutanga?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And later United Nations investigations concluded that it was the 17th or perhaps the 18th that Lumumba was actually killed in Kutanga.

I was asking you before whether this cable would indicate that the United States would have been involved in bringing about the death of Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought that it merely indicates that this part of the Agency, i.e., Elizabethville had no idea he was coming, knew nothing about his fate except these few phrases that he put down here and would imp although it certainly doesn't say so, that he was adding a little information to what was perhaps an enormously ignorant Leopoldville which, of course, is the fact of the matter. We didn't know how all this was occurring and were not able to follow the event except after the event.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Baron. Was the CIA connected in any way to the events that immediately led to Lumumba's death?

Mr. Tweedy. None whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. CIA was not involved in a plot to fly Lumumba from his previous place of imprisonment in Tysville out to Kutanga where the authorities were known to be so hostile to him that he would probably meet his death there?

Mr. Tweedy. The fate of Lumumba in the end was purely an African event.

Mr. Baron. At what point did you learn of Lumumba's death?

Mr. Tweedy. I suspect probably about the time that the world did. No one had a beat on this.

Mr. Baron. You had no advanced warning that Mobutu intended to fly Lumumba to Katanga?

Mr. Tweedy. Not that I recall, and I am sure the cable traffic would reflect it if I had.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, do you recall an asset who was sent from Europe, where he had been recruited by [redacted] 03 , to the Congo in the fall of 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. I think Iwas reminded of this when I talked to you and Mr. Wides a couple or so months ago.

Mr. Baron. This would be an asset who went by the cryptonym of QJWIN.

Mr. Tweedy. So I was reminded then, which was a cryptonym

I didn't remember at all, whereas I do remember quite a number of cryptonyms when reminded of them.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the cryptonym, do you recall 03 there was an asset who had been recruited by [redacted] in Europe and who was sent to the Congo to perform some mission in November and December of 1960?

Mr. Tweedy. I was generally reminded of it by that conversation with you and Mr. Wides but I will confess that my recollection doesn't go any further than that.

But unlike some of the things I have been reminded 03 of, I think recalled that asset of [redacted] had been involved. That is just as about as deep as my recollection goes.

Mr. Baron. Let me see if I can refresh your recollection, first, by relating to you the testimony of Justin O'Donnell who said that he did make use of QJWIN in the Congo as a kind of "alter ego" of his, a general operative of his.

Does that remind you at all of the nature of the mission that QJWIN had in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. No, it doesn't.

Mr. Baron. Have you heard the phrase executive action?

Mr. Tweedy. In the newspapers.

Mr. Baron. During your tenure as a CIA official you never heard the phrase executive action discussed as part of a CIA program or plan.

Mr. Tweedy. No. Only in bureaucratic Washington terms of executive action.

Mr. Baron. Meaning administrative action?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any project at CIA to develop the capability of carrying off an assassination of a foreign leader, if required?

Mr. Tweedy. Will you repeat that?

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA had a project which operated under the cryptonym ZRRIFLE to develop the mea pardon me, to develop the capability of carrying out assassinations if required?

Mr. Tweedy. You mean just generically?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the discussions that you had with Richard Bissell about the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, did you participate in any other discussions at the Agency about assassination capabilities?

Mr. Tweedy. Never.

Mr. Baron. Did you bring anyone else connected with the Agency into the discussion of the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba, other than the Chief of Station in Congo?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Mr. Tweedy. The only other person who was aware of it was my deputy.

Mr. Baron. That would be?

Mr. Tweedy. Glenn Fields. He was aware of it in that sense.

Mr. Baron. Did he take any action in realtion to that plan or consideration?

Mr. Tweedy. No; just he was in matters of this kind he would have been my alterego but he was aware of it, that is all.

Mr. Baron. Do you know William Harvey?

Mr. Tweedy. Sure, I know Bill Harvey well. Haven't seen him in a long while.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware that William Harvey was in contact with 03 [redacted] to develop the standby capability for carrying out assassinations?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know anything about it whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. Did you at any point talk with William Harvey about any CIA activity in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Not that I remember.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document now that we will Mark Exhibit 5.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

VBR

Mr. Baron. This is a dispatch from the Chief of KUTUBE/D, which I believe is --

Mr. Tweedy. That is Staff D.

Mr. Baron. In the Foreign Intelligence Division, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

12-10

Mr. Baron. Written to the Chief of Station in [redacted] and Chief of Station in Luxemburg through Chief AF and Chief WE.

Would Chief AF have been yourself, Chief of the African Division?

Mr. Tweedy. What is the date?

Mr. BAron. The date is November 2, 1960.

Mr. Tweedy. I would have been.

Mr. Baron. And William Harvey would hve been Chief of KU2D?

Mr. Tweedy. I suppose he was then. He certainly was Chief of Staff D, in which case he could have, that is what he would have been then.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, while we have been off the record you have had a chance to review this document and tell me some things about it I would like to repeat on the record.

First of all, on this copy of the document there is typed the words Danuel M. Pressland, under the space for officer's signature, and you said to me a moment ago that you are almost 100 percent sure that that is the pseudonym of William Harvey, is that right?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. And you were just pointing to --

Mr. Tweedy. Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief of ID at the time. He certainly was Chief of ID. You told me he was Chief of ID than, I put those two together and say I am pretty sure my recollection is Pressland was Harvey, I can't swear to it, but I am virtually sure.

Mr. Baron. And do you have any independent recollection of the subject matter that is discussed in this document?

Mr. Tweedy. None at all. It doesn't ring a bell at all.

Mr. Baron. Even after reviewing the document do you have any recollection of what QJWIN's mission in the Congo would be, would have been?

Mr. Tweedy. No.

Mr. Baron. You said that such a memo --

Mr. Tweedy. You told me he was going out there to work with O'Donnell and when O'Donnell went out there I guess he was going to look into a number of things for headquarters and the Station pertaining to Congolese matters. When I say I guess I am in effect asking you because I don't recollect by any emeans what the full auspices of O'Donnell's visit to the Congo were and you said that Mr. QJWIN was going out as sort of his caddy, if you like, he was going to work for him and act as his general assistant.

Mr. Baron. That was the way Mr. O'Donnell described it, although in this lengthy memo which apparently precedes the dispatch of QJWIN to the Congo there is no mention of Mr. O'Donnell.

Mr. Tweedy. This I don't think necessarily has anything to do with O'Donnell's mission whatsoever. This, I think, is generic mission, seems to indicate that he is going to muck around with Corsicans. I don't recall Corsicans, I know O'Donnell in the Congo at all.

Mr. Baron. Would this kind of dispatch have been written by the Chief of Staff D without consultation with the Chief of the African Division?

Mr. Tweedy. He did consult, that is to say, he wrote the dispatch. I haven't read the whole thing but I gather from this -- you see there is also a reference here. I don't know what the reference is about. But I gather that Dakar is brought into this activity because they wanted to act in a support capacity to this headquarters activity.

Mr. Baron. You don't have any recollection of a mission in Dakar Senegal about this time that headquarters was concerned with?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I surely don't. On the contrary.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been proper for the Chief of Staff D to arrange an operation in the Congo directly without going through the African Division although keeeping the African Chief informed?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, the two are mutually exclusive. You can't have one without the other. To answer your first question, it would be quite improper and wouldn't have occurred that the Chief of Staff D was operating in an African Station without the African Division being informed. This, however, makes it amply clear that that was not the case, the African Division was informed. In what depth in terms of terms of headquarters purposes I don't know but it would have been sufficient for Harvey to have done what he did and coordinate this with the Division and if the Division had perceived any objection or saw any problems they would have raised it before the dispatch went out.

Also I noticed Dakar is also invited to find problems with this, if it did, and say so.

Mr. Baron. What kind of missions generally would Staff D have been carrying out in Africa at this time?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, you know what the role of Staff D was.

Mr. Baron. This would be obtaining codes by surreptitious entry.

Mr. Tweedy. This is in effect the obtaining of signals intelligence by whatever means, yes, absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Would it be surprising to you that QJWIN might have been used in some manner in connection with an assassination plot against Lumumba and have been directed or supervised by William Harvey without your knowledge?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have surprised me exceedingly and would today. To put it differently, I am sure it didn't occur.

Mr. Baron. After reading this memo, you told me a moment ago that you thought this might indicate that QJWIN was being recruited for ZRRIFLE activities.

Mr. Tweedy. Well, you mentioned ZRRIFLE, which frankly I hadn't heard before. This sounds as if he was going to have some kind of generic assignment. I merely put those two together but I know nothing about it at all.

Mr. Baron. The dispatch says, "In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do."

Do you have any knowledge of what it was precisely that QJWIN was asked to do?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not.

Mr. Baron. Then, on page 3 of the dispatch it says:

"The operation we have in mind is too sensitive to risk blowing it in this phase and the search for assets must be conducted with truly" -- which is underscored -- "minimum risk".

What would these assets have been used for, what was the search for assets all about?

Mr. Tweedy. I just do not know.

Mr. Baron. Let's turn now to a document that we will mark Exhibit 6, dated January 11, 1961, which is a memo for the FN Division from William K. Harvey, Chief of FI Division D.

In this memo I will direct your attention to the sentence that says in that cable COS Luxemburg was told to TA/A all QJWIN expenses to headquarters since QJWIN was being used for FI/D purposes."

Do you know what FID purposes QJWIN was being used for?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't know.

Mr. Baron. The memo goes on to say that:

"QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specifically sensitive operational purpose which has been completed".

Were you informed by William Harvey that QJWIN's mission was completed?

Mr. Tweedy. I don't recall that at all and don't recall any aspect of the mission or its completion.

Mr. Baron. Okay.

Did you know of an asset of the Chief of Station in the Congo known as WIROGUE, who was sent to the Congo after receiving plastic surgery so that he wouldn't be recognized by his fellow Europeans who might be traveling through the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I do recollect that and you brought it to my attention, when you and Mr. Wides and I discussed this a couple of months ago. I do remember the cryptonym and remember generally the circumstances in which he was sent as a sort of general purpose agent to the Congo with the thought if we got involved in paramilitary activity he would be helpful and he was recruited on that rather general basis, and when you discussed with me a later alarming exchange of cables which indicated that he landed running and made some rather irresponsible remarks and we commented on them to the station.

My best recollection is that in the long haul he stayed on in the Congo and I think became, I believe he became a somewhat useful intelligence source, but Hedgman would have a much better recollection of that. But I do remember quite well his dispatch. He had been seen by two or three members of my Division, including my deputy. I don't recall that I ever met him unless I met him in the Congo. If I did I just don't remember. But I remember he was assessed, as it were, recruited in the United States and dispatched on a general purpose mission.

Mr. Baron. So, he would be viewed as one of the major assets that Hedgman had in the Congo at that point?

Mr. Tweedy. How major I don't know. He was an asset. Only time would have told how major it would have been. He was thought qualified to perform one of a variety of things in the Congo by Hedgman.

Mr. Baron. Would one of those things for which he was qualified have been an assassination mission against Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. As I told you previously, told you and Mr. Wides previously, absolutely not, for the simple reason he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division, not by me personally, Glenn Fields personally, and he was in effect a station as set mounted by the Division.

The Division knew nothing about the balance of this thing.

Mr. Baron. You are saying that Division personnel outside of yourself and Glenn Fields would not have known --

Mr. Tweedy. To my knowledge.

Mr. Baron . -- would not have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being considered?

Mr. Tweedy. Considered at all, that is correct.

Mr. Baron. And --

Mr. Tweedy. If they did learn of it I never knew that they learned of it and certainly never learned of it through me or Fields.

Mr. Baron. The fact that you left the recruitment and training of this asset to other people in the Division than yourself and Fields would indicate to you that he wasn't being considered at that point for an assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I will put it differently. As far as I know he was never considered for an assassination mission at all.

He thought he was presumably being sent ouf for deeds of daring in the PM field and began to talk rather lusty when he arrived, but I think he was soon put straight.

Mr. Baron. PM is paramilitary operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you a document we will mark Exhibit 7, dated December 17, 1960, which is a cable to the headquarters, marked to Director fromLeopoldville dealing with WIROGUE on an approach he made to agent QJWIN.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I know that. This is the one we discussed two months ago and this happens all the time.

Mr. Baron. We are referring specifically to QJWIN's report that"WIROGUE had offered him $300 per month to participate in intel net and be member" --I am sorry -- "member 'execution squad'".

Mr. Tweedy. Yes; I remember all of this as a result of your having previously brought it to my attention and I recall it, it was a typical example of an agent or asset full of piss and vinegar exceeding his brief and he was certainly put back on the track very early on.

But in this business do not confuse execution squad with anything to do with the assassination of Lumumba or anything else. It had nothing to do with that.

Mr. Baron. You are saying even though you would assume that Mr. Hedgman's testimony about poisons coming to the Congo and instructions to carry out an assassination coming to the Congo was true, the approach that WIROGUE made to QJWIN was probably not a part of that mission.

Mr. Tweedy. It was quite specifically not a part of that mission. There was a chapter of accidents. You have seen it happen, I have seen it happen, a thousand times before, two people who are periphically involved in the same thing and run into each [illegible]er and one smells something on the other.

Mr. Baron. Again, why are you so sure that this would not have been connected in any way to the assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. I thought I made that clear because this man went out up to a point through what I would call the open channel, it was developed by the Division, giving training by the Division and was sent out. This had nothing to do whatsoever with the other thing and wouldn't have been handled that way.

Mr. Baron. Could he have been instructed by Mr. Hedgman, after he got to the Congo, that he was to undertake recruitment of assets for participation in an assassination mission as part of his general duties in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. It is purely a speculative question. He could have been but Hedgman would also have been required and would have told headquarters what he was doing with him. That was not the purpose for his being sent. The purpose for which he was sent out was unspecific at the time, generally in the PM field.

Mr. Baron. Did this report create a flap at headquarters at the time when the cable was sent?

Mr. Tweedy. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. It would have been considered a fairly usual --

Mr. Tweedy. It is not.

Mr. Baron. -- example of free wheeling by an operative?

Mr. Tweedy. It is the sort of thing that can happen. What you want to do is put a stop to it. But no great problem. The problem must have lasted 30 minutes.

Mr. Baron. Have you ever discussed events in the Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. Have I ever discussed events in the Congo with Sidney Gottlieb?

I can only assume I must have seen Sid during this period, during this period, but I don't recall any discussions. In fact, if there had been any discussions with Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo it would have been at that time.

Mr. Baron. Why would that be so?

Mr. Tweedy. Otherwise Sidney Gottlieb would have had no interest in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. So you mean if there had been any discussions between yourself and Sidney Gottlieb it probably would have --

Mr. Tweedy. It would have surrounded these events.

Mr. Baron. The development of lethal biological substances in his laboratory?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, sir. Not necessarily that, because I think that would have been Sidney Gottlieb's business as to what he developed in his laboratory. My only interest presumably would have been was there anything in his inventory that could possibly be used if we ever wanted to use something.

Mr. Baron. You might have had at least an exploratory conversation with him on that subject?

Mr. Tweedy. I would be surprised if I didn't. Or perhaps Bussell had a conversation with him and then I followed it up, something like that. I would suspect that probably the first conversation would undoubtely have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb but this is merely what I would suspect was the way it occurred.

I don't say that that is the way it occurred. But other than that no conversation with Sidney Gottlieb on the Congo at all.

Mr. Baron. I am at the end of my questions on specific facts concerning the Congo during this period of time leading up to Lumumba's death which, as you know, is the narrow subject of our inquiry right now, and first of all I want to say that I appreciate tremendously and know that the Committee is appreciative and grateful for your testimony here today. It is a difficult subject. It is only one narrow aspect of what the Committee is undertaking, and unpleasant, but unnecessary aspect to assemble.

I wonder if you have any facts that you would like to add to the record that you think are necessary to put our discussion today into context?

Mr. Tweedy. I think the strongest recollection about my period as Chief of the African Division and the Congo -- let's leave the balance of Africa out -- and U.N. and U.S. involvement in the Congolese matter, that I have never seen an element of the Agency so totally involved in a matter which clearly had the highest policy approval. I am not talking about Lumumba, I am talking about the Congo.

Mr. Baron. There was an extreme sense of urgency at that time?

Mr. Tweedy. Not only an extreme sense of urgency, the U.S. was supporting the U.N., the Agency was supporting the U.S. Government, the U.S. Government requests. What the Agency was doing was very closely coordinated appropriately with any organs of government that need to be covered, mostly State, the White House. I must say the Executive Department was very much working as a team during these days. AGain forget Lumumba. I am now talking the whole Congo action. And I never felt that anything we were doing was wandering off into left field or that I didn't know the way the White House was thinking about things, or the State Department was thinking about things, and the National Security was thinking about things, and I have no reason to believe they ever felt that they didn't know how CIA was thinking about things. It was an extraordinarily close thing.

I remember Mennen Williams trying to form a Congo club. When I retired from the African Division I was given a little thing for a watch chain, if I had one, which would be a member of the Congo Club, and it was rather typical of the way the government worked on this thing and I personally felt excellent advised that the U.S. was absolutely right to support the U.N. on this. I think it could have been a total disaster if Kutanga had been allowed to succeed, and although Mobutu was acting like an ass now, that is Africa for you, but on the whole that country has done pretty well and I consider we had a considerable role in giving it a chance to move the way it has.

There are going to be ups and downs with the things but that is the way it is. I feel very strongly about it.

Does that somewhat answer your question, does that help?

Mr. Baron. I simply wanted to give you a chance.

Mr. Tweedy. I felt that very strongly and no other assignment that I have ever had was this kind of government team and cooperation ever really required because we weren't engaged or I wasn't engaged in that kind of activity.

Mr. Baron. Is this government team efforts that you are talking about one that was primarily put together to carry out the paramilitary activities in the Congo in the latter part of the 60's, '62, '63.

Mr. Tweedy. It was put together to preside over whatever activity the United States Government felt it needed to be engaged in in the Congo. This included such things as purely policy questions of what the Ambassddor to the U.N. might say to the Secretary General of the U.N.or what the President might want to say conceivably I suppose to the Chief of the Belgium state on such matters. Everything certainly didn't just involve what CIA was going to be involved in. It was the whole policy ball of wax with respect to the Congo which obviously had many ganglia and which the CIA part and paramilitary activity was just a bit.

Mr. Baron. Did this high degree of organization and intensity of concern begin sometime after the death of Lumumba or had it gotten rolling?

Mr. Tweedy. I think --

Mr. Baron. After the Congolese independence?

Mr. Tweedy. I think the U.S. Government was thoroughly seized with the intimate problem and danger of a disintegrating Congo that started in the earliest days of independence and continued and, of course, when the Tschombe-Kutanga thing became a fact of life, which is basically why the U.N. was there, then, of course, that was it.

In other words, I would say that U.S. involvement, U.S. concern, merely moved with the events, as anybody could read them in the press just continued and continued, but one thing was perfectly clear, was that the U.S. was quite determined to see this thing through. Nothing had been clearer than the way President Kennedy presided over those two meetings. He was annoyed by the Congo and irritated by it and he was worried that he had to spend so much bloody time on it, but he was damn well determined to see the thing through and he was continually goosing his staff to do just that , but in support of the U.N. We weren't going to do it all by ourselves. It couldn't have been clearer.

Mr. Baron. All right, as I mentioned before, the Committee is interested in your wisdom on policy-making and analysis in the intelligence community generally and there may be other members of the Committee staff that would like to call upon you to testify on other subjects because of your long experience in Agency activities.

But I want to thank you now for your complete cooperation and the tremendous amount of information that you have provided on this one subject that has been very helpful?

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you, Mr. Baron. I can assure you anything I can do to help the Committee in other areas I will be glad to do it and if I don't think I can help because I don't think I know enough about the subject I will just say so, otherwise I am not afraid to put my two bits in.

Mr. Baron. As far as your two bits goes, we would be interested in your two bits worth on policy recommendations in general, institutional, critique or suggestions for change or any kind of recommendations that you would care to make, and we will take that up at some point in the future. But you have obviously had a good deal of experience at the policy level in the Agency and we like to take advantage of that.

That is all, thank you.

Mr. Tweedy. All right, than you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:55 p.m., the hearing was concluded.)

- - -

Date : 08/04/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10081
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 10-H-13

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : GOODWIN, RICHARD
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 07/10/75
PAGES : 61
SUBJECTS : ASSASSINATION, TRUJILLO

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

CIA

EISENHOWER, DWIGHT

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/12/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

Vol 2 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

R478

The United States Senate

Goodwin

Report of Proceedings

INVENTORIED
ON 3/2/77
BY EC

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000031326

Thursday, July 10, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF	PAGE
Richard M. Goodwin	5

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT	FOR IDENTIFICATION
No. 1	10
No. 2	11
No. 3-A	21
N9. 3-B	23

- - -

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, July 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Governmental Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 5:02 o'clock p.m. in Room S-128, The Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Hart of Michigan, Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Baker and Schweiker.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Schwarz, Jr., Chief Counsel; Curtis R. Smothers, Minority Counsel; Charles Kirbow, Charles Lombard, Michael J. Madigan, David Aaron, Joe Dennin, Elizabeth Culbreth and Patrick Shea, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

PROCEEDINGS

The Chairman. We will come back into order.

Mr. Goodwin, would you please take the oath?

Do you swear that all the testimony you are about to give in this proceeding will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Goodwin. I do.

The Chairman. I am given to understand that there has been some problem in connection with your appearance here today and that there are some notes that you have that you feel you need for purposes of your testimony which you have not brought with you. Is that the case?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I think they might be helpful. They have been in storage for several years and I just had no access to them. I have to go get them out of the storage. They were notes -- my files and everything have been in storage for several years. I've had no access to them. And they consist of the files that I brought from the White House with me.

The Chairman. Have you been interviewed by members of the staff and shown certain documents that the staff believes will be pertinent to your testimony?

Mr. Goodwin. I have been shown documents connected with the Dominican Republic and the assassination of Trujillo today.

The Chairman. And do you believe that you are prepared today to give us testimony relating to Mr. Trujillo or do you believe that you need to or ought to review those notes before you give any testimony?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm of course fully prepared to testify to the best of my recollection to any matter, and I think probably in the case of the Dominican Republic, the documents have been adequate. I think there's a good chance that going through the files may very well add something to my recollection of Cuba and Castro.

The Chairman. Well I will have this suggestion to make. We will take your testimony on the Trujillo matter today, and then -- how long will it take you to get your files and review them and come back fully prepared to give us your testimony on the other issues?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it will take a day or two. It is possible I will not be able to get access to them until Monday morning. It's kind of like trying to get to Pocatello and find them in a warehouse, because I'm up in Rumford, Maine. But I am sure that it would not take more than a day or two.

The Chairman. So that if the Committee were to give you that opportunity, would you then get those files, review them, and respond to the request by the Committee that you appear the first of next week to testify?

Mr. Goodwin. If that is your wish, certainly.

The Chairman. We are most anxious to complete the record and your testimony is necessary, and it would certainly accomodate our need if you would cooperate.

Mr. Goodwin. I would be glad to.

The Chairman. All right.

With that understanding then, Mr. Schwarz, are you prepared to proceed with the questioning on Trujillo?

Mr. Schwarz. I'm sorry Mr. Goodwin that we didn't have a chance to get together. I thought we were going to have a chance to do that on Tuesday, and I have not had a chance to speak to you but I do know some of the material, and perhaps we can work on the material.

Before we do so, could you state your full name and your address please?

TESTIMONY OF RICHARD M. GOODWIN

Mr. Goodwin. Richard M. Goodwin, 1536 32nd Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Mr. Schwarz. And as a matter of course, we tell all of our witnesses what they no doubt know, that they have their right to counsel, and you know that, and if you want to stop to obtain counsel, you know that you can do that?

Mr. Goodwin. I already have too many lawyers.

Mr. Schwarz. And you know what your constitutional rights are?

Mr. Goodwin. Hopefully.

Mr. Schwarz. Now, what connection did you have with the Dominican Republic in the winter and spring of 1961?

Mr. Goodwin. I came into the White House as Assistant Special Counsel to the President, having worked on Latin American affairs policy statements in the preceding campaign. I became involved in Latin America. And from that period until I left to go to the State Department, I was involved on a daily basis with President Kennedy and his activities in Latin America which included what was happening in the Dominican Republic in terms that I drafted contingency plans, I prepared cables that went to Mr. Dearborn focussing on the areas that you are interested in, and I was with him every day on something connected with Latin America.

Mr. Schwarz. Without your turning to the documentary material, would you recount for the Committee your understandin of what the United States government policy toward the Dominic Republic was in the winter and spring of '61 and what actions were taken to implement that policy.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that policy was a continuation of the policy established by President Eisenhower when he, in accordance with the vote of the OAS, voted to sever -- decided to sever diplomatic and commercial relations with the Dominican Republic and the situation which you know arose was precipitated by the attempted assassination of President Betancourt by the President of the Dominican Republic.

So that from that point on when we came in, the feeling was, first of all, of course that Trujillo was even more at odds with the philosophy of the Alliance for Progress than had been and beyond that, having cut off diplomatic and other relations, that Trujillo's time in office was probably numbered. The principal support of the regime in that decade which was often in great domestic difficulty had been the concept of American support, it strengthened Trujillo against his opposition.

At that point our policy became one of trying to anticipa at least, the fall of Trujillo. Of course the Castro thing was very much in everybody's mind and the principal concern of the President, the one thing he didn't want was for Trujillo to go and a Communist leader to come in. So I think the policy

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

was to keep up our economic and diplomatic pressure to hope that when Trujillo went, however he went, whether violently or peacefully or died a natural death that the succession would be a moderate, democratic group friendly to the interests of the United States in the Caribbean and therefore try to keep in touch with and help out and keep communications open with the potential successor groups, and it was very hard to pinpoint.

Mr. Schwarz. What steps did you take during the period of time you were involved, or prior thereto, if you know about it, in order to assist one or more of the dissident groups?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, we did all sorts -- everything from policy statements, the use of USIA, the use of economic pressure, to maintain our network of contacts with exile groups principally in New York and elsewhere. A certain number of limited covert operations, some transfer of arms. Dearborn of course was one of the principals, his principal instruction was to try to keep all channels of communication open, he was zealous in this because he disliked Trujillo intensely himself and felt that he ought to be allied with these other groups. And I read through the sort of overall planning papers, and I think they fairly reflect that range of operations.

None of them were terribly effective.

Mr. Schwarz. In connection with the transfer of arms, what, to your understanding, was the time at which authorizatio was provided to transfer arms?

Mr. Goodwin. January 12, 1960, under President Eisenhower.

Mr. Schwarz. And that was at a meeting of the Special Group?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't know because they didn't let me in that week, but there was an NSC action memorandum of some kind which just set forth the authorization. I don't really know the procedure.

Mr. Schwarz. When were the arms passed?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. I became aware of the transfer of arms. The transfer I think you're thinking of is the transfer of a couple of carbines and .38 pistols. After the transfer had been made, in the message of communication that came to us from the Dominican Republic along with the request for the transfer of machine guns which were to be used in an effort to kill Trujillo, the smaller guns were to be given as Dearborn told me later in conversation after the assassination because these people felt their own lives were in danger, especially if they embarked on anything as risky as trying to kill Trujillo, and they wanted some self-defense weapons, and they were given to them for self-defense and then they made a request that they wanted weapons to try an assassination, they wanted a machine gun.

Assassinating Trujillo, of course, a lot of people had tried and most of them, they were all dead. It was a very risky business. It's not the kind of thing they would want to try with a .38.

And I think also, I mean nobody, I think -- as I say, we had no particular anticipation that this or any other group would be successful in something that nobody had been able to do for thirty years, but at any rate, those were the backstops.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know how the arms were passed into the Dominican Republic, as opposed to passed to the dissidents?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I only know what Dearborn later told me in conversation. I only have this fifteen year old memory on my part that he gave them to them in the consulate. I may have known at one time how he got them. There were a lot of guns in the Dominican Republic.

24

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know that arms were passed through the diplomatic pouch?

Mr. Goodwin. I did not know that, but I wouldn't be surprised, weapons of that size.

Mr. Schwarz. Now again, when were the arms passed, as far as you know?

Mr. Goodwin. Well I don't know. I don't have the exact -- the message is in here. I think it was after President Kennedy took office.

My knowledge of it was on the basis of the message --

The Chairman. Is there someone that can help Mr. Goodwin with the documents?

Mr. Schwarz. Let's mark that as Goodwin Exhibit No. 1, a document consisting -- dated May 13, 1961 and headed Subject, CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic, stating: "Attached is the special briefing paper of CIA covert activities directed against the Dominican Republic which is requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin at the White House," and attaching a several page document with that heading and that date.

Mr. Goodwin. This is the paper that they sent me and that's where, I guess, I found out about it.

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Now that indicates, does it not, that the weapons were passed sometime after late January, you can tell that?

Mr. Goodwin. Yeah.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

You can tell that by looking at the heading 2 which indicates when the request for the passage of the arms was made.

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, it says in late January. Of course they weren't authdrized until the 12th.

Mr. Schwarz. But they were passed, in any event, after the Kennedy Administration took office.

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

Mr. Schwarz. Now you told President Johnson, Vice President Johnson,-- we will mark this Goodwin Exhibit 2, a memorandum which, Senators, is at Tab H, the book which is marked book 2 of 2 and dated June 1, 1961.

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Would you read into the record, Mr. Goodwin, this is a memorandum for the files dated June 1, 1961, subject Report of Point Raised at meeting with Vice President.

Would you read into the record the second paragraph?

Mr. Goodwin. "At one point during the meeting, the Vice President asked about the three carbines which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents, specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made a statement to the effect that this was done under the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

Can you tell me if this his memo I'm reading? I'd like to know.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, there are some initials at the bottom of the page, do they help you decide whose memo it is?

Mr. Dennin. I believe we were told by Secretary of State Rusk that it's Under Secretary of State Johnson. That's what the U stands for.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you make that statement, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember making it. It is an inaccurate statement, and there was a clear record that it would be inaccurate in documents that I had already seen. I thought that I wouldn't have made it. I had no purpose in making it. And this is --

The Chairman. What is the inaccuracy of this?

Mr. Goodwin. The delivery of the arms was not made prior to January 20th. The authorization, Senator, was prior to January 20th.

Senator Schweiker. Was when, again? Was what date?

Mr. Goodwin. The authorization was the 12th of January.

Senator Schweiker. What year?

Mr. Goodwin. 1961.

Senator Schweiker. And delivery was when?

Mr. Schwarz. Sometime subsequent to January 20th.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, now that I look at this, all it says was late January.

The Chairman. This is June 1st, this is dated June 1st, and you are reported to have said, "At one point during the meeting the Vice President asked about the three carbines which the Agency had turned over to the dissidents and specifically asked about the date of delivery. Mr. Goodwin made the statement to the effect that this was done under the previous Administration, i.e., prior to January 20th, 1961, pursuant to a decision of the Special Group."

Actually the delivery took place after January 20th 1961.

Mr. Goodwin. Well that was my first impression on reading that, but I notice that all it says was late January, Senator, so I suppose the 20th or the 19th in somebody's mind could be late January. I mean, I don't really remember.

Mr. Schwarz. But Mr. Goodwin, you know, independent of the document which we marked as Exhibit 1, in fact the arms were delivered after January 20th.

Mr. Goodwin. I may have known. All I -- my first knowledge was this document, the timetable that I requested which simply informed me that the delivery of carbines had been made in late January. I don't know any more than that.

Mr. Schwarz. All right.

Mr. Goodwin. This is my source of knowledge. I may have learned more subsequent to it if Dearborn pinpointed it.

Mr. Schwarz. In addition with dealing with Dearborn, were you dealing with anybody from the CIA on this?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, they were always at the meetings.

Mr. Schwarz. Who do you remember from the CIA?

Mr. Goodwin. Tracy Barnes -- I can't be sure who all was there. At the meeting with the Vice President, I'm sure somebody like Bissell, at least, would have been there. But I'm sure you must have a list.

Mr. Schwarz. Now I would like you to testify in answer to a series of questions as to what you were or were not told.

Now, were you told that the arms which had been delivered had been delivered to persons who said at times that they wanted to use them for personal defense, but who said more often that they wanted to use them for assassination purposes?

Mr. Goodwin. I was given to understand and told specifically and it's reflected in the documents, that they wanted -- in order to carry out an assassination, they thought they needed transfer of additional weapons, of submachine guns. I don't remember any indication that anyone thought that a carbine or a .38 was adequate to mount an effort of that kind against Trujillo. But they, of course, were interested in assassinating Trujillo, involved as they were in a very life and death struggle, their families were being slaughtered --

Mr. Schwarz. The record demonstrates that the Agency was informed in April, prior to the memorandum that went to you which we marked as Exhibit 1, that the dissidents intended to undertake the assassination effort and to do so within the means that they eventually actually did, by blockading the road and shooting Mr. Trujillo as he was visiting his mistress. And that they intended to do it whether or not they received the machine guns, but they would like the machine guns, just to help.

Now, were you informed by the Agency or by anyone else that the dissidents intended to accomplish the assassination with the small arms whether or not they got the machines?

Mr. Goodwin. I was informed that both this and other groups intended and wanted to assassinate Trujillo. We got reports of assassinations about to occur almost every two or three weeks in the White House. There is a long gap between wanting to kill Trujillo and being able to do it, and -- but at all times, continually, up into May, there was the very insistent request for additional arms that would make the plot feasible and at the specific request of President Kennedy, those arms were denied and --

Mr. Schwarz. I'm going to come to that. I want to know what you were informed about the intentions of the dissidents. You didn't answer my question. You said you were frequently informed about assassination plots all over the world, but specifically with respect to the Dominican Republic, were you or were you not informed that the Agency had been told by the dissidents that they intended to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro -- excuse me, of Trujillo -- whether or not they received the machine guns?

Mr. Goodwin. I was told that afterwards by Dearborn. I wasn't told that particularly at the time, although that wouldn't surprise me if they said that. By the Agency, you mean Dearborn, or --

Mr. Schwarz. I mean the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goodwin. They communicated directly with the Agency in this instance?

Mr. Schwarz. There were Agency people in the Republic. Did you know there were Agency people in the Republic?

Mr. Goodwin. I knew they were in and out.

Mr. Schwarz. In and out?

Mr. Goodwin. They ran some guns in at one time, as I remember, and they also were engaged in the collection of intelligence about dissident groups.

Mr. Schwarz. Was it your impression that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic, or the Agency personnel was in charge of the Dominican Republic?

Mr. Goodwin. My impression at the time was that the instructions given to Dearborn were carried out, and all instructions from the President went to Dearborn.

Mr. Schwarz. Apart from instructions from the President, was it your impression that the Agency was in charge of the Dominican Republic or that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Goodwin. My impression was that Dearborn was in charge of the Dominican Republic, subject to very close supervision from Washington.

The Chairman. Dearborn was the --

Mr. Goodwin. He was the Consul. We had no formal relations.

The Chairman. He was the Consul?

Mr. Goodwin. Right.

Wasn't that true?

Mr. Schwarz. The paper record makes it look quite likely that the Agency, at least from their point of view, thought that they were in charge.

Mr. Goodwin. They should have told the President. We sent all of our messages to Dearborn.

Mr. Schwarz. What was your understanding of the location of the machine guns that the dissidents wanted?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't remember, but it's in here somewhere in the paper.

(Pause)

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let me cut through the question.

Did you know that the machine guns were sent to the Dominican Republic through the diplomatic pouch?

24

Mr. Goodwin. I know now.

Mr. Schwarz. Did you know about it?

Mr. Goodwin. No. I knew, when the issue arose in May that we had -- we had brought in machine guns, but the precise method by which they were brought in I never asked about.

The Chairman. I am having a little difficulty following.

We began with your being told that it was the policy of the previous Administration to encourage dissident groups and do whatever possible to isolate or to undermine and bring down the Trujillo regime. Then, following the Inauguration of President Kennedy, certain weapons are passed to these dissidents in the Dominican Republic for the purpose of assassinating -- of their use in the assassinating President Trujillo.

Now when did you learn that weapons had been in fact passed to dissident groups, that obviously had occurred after President Kennedy had been inaugurated. When did you first learn?

Mr. Goodwin. On the 13th of May when we requested from the White House a briefing paper on all covert activities in the Dominican Republic, that had been conducted in the Dominican Republic.

Mr. Schwarz. Now that briefing paper was requested from whom?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it would have been requested by me for the President.

Mr. Schwarz. From the CIA?

Mr. Goodwin. From the CIA.

The Chairman. From the CIA, and that briefing paper has been identified for the record?

Mr. Goodwin. That is correct.

The Chairman. All right.

When you found out that these weapons had been transferred in January to certain dissident groups for the purpose of assassinating Trujillo, what did you do?

Was it then your understanding that this was President Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. No.

The Chairman. Then what did you do when you received that information?

Mr. Goodwin. If I may go back for a moment, Senator, and that is the briefing paper involved a very clear distinction between these weapons which were to be used for purposes of personal type side-arms, the self-defense attendant to any project and the desire for assassination weapons which would have consisted of machine guns.

Our response to this briefing paper was immediately to try to review our entire policy toward the Dominican Republic and prepare, which we did over the next couple of weeks, instructions to the Consul about the nature of future relations with dissidents, because the President felt that things might be getting out of hand, with what was happening in the Dominican Republic.

So we did prepare that paper. The President had, as I said, two great concerns. He didn't want anybody trying to push Trujillo over unless he knew what was going to happen next, because he would much rather have Trujillo in there than a Communist leader. And secondly, that the United States not be associated with any kind of violent overthrow. And in the telegram that was --

The Chairman. All right.

Now when the President told you that those were his two concerns, what action was then taken to implement the President's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. The action that was then taken was to take and set aside the original instructions from the State Department and at the President's instructions, I typed up the telegram which is here in my handwriting, which was to go and did go, slightly revised to --

Mr. Schwarz. All right. Let me mark the one in your hand as Exhibit 3.

(The document referred to was marked as Goodwin Exhibit No. 3-A for identification.)

Mr. Schwarz. Well, let's mark them, Mr. Goodwin -- you know how to do this as well as I do. Make them 3-A, 3-B and 3-C.

Mr. Goodwin. In which I personally added in the course of rewriting --

The Chairman. Can you identify in the Senators' books where these documents appear?

Mr. Schwarz. Where is 3-A?

Mr. Goodwin. This is 233 at the bottom.

(Pause)

This xerox of my raw, personally typewritten draft appears on page 237. That's my very bad typing and handwriting.

And then page 256 is the final. And the same page, 242, page 237 and 242.

The Chairman. Is 242 the final version of the message that went out?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. This is for Dearborn from State?

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct.

The Chairman. And by whom was the messages signed?

Mr. Goodwin. Probably the Secretary, I guess, but they are both my drafts. I received a draft from the State Department, discussed it with the President, and at his instruction prepared this redraft. I never would have overridden the State Department on my own, and adding to it two major points aside from rewording it. The first one is on a different matter, and the second one was to say in the final version, "However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassinations, since the United States as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassinations. This last principle is overriding and most prevail in doubtful situations."

That was inserted at the instruction of the President, a much stronger statement of that than occurs in the State Department draft, and it finishes again with -- it says, "Clearly, at the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. We feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose."

(The document referred to was marked Goodwin Exhibit No. 3-B for identification.)

The Chairman. Now you saw this telegram and approved it before it was sent by State?

Mr. Goodwin. I wrote it.

The Chairman. But you said that the State Department changed the language.

Mr. Goodwin. No. They had prepared an original draft which I changed and redrafted. Now that is here too, including a note from them saying that I wasn't satisfied with their draft.

The Chairman. So this was your own message, then, that you believed accurately reflected President Kennedy's policy?

Mr. Goodwin. It was prepared at the specific instruction of the President. It was shown to him before transmission.

The Chairman. It was shown to the President?

Mr. Goodwin. Oh, yes.

The Chairman. Very well.

Then, reading the first paragraph, "The President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception. You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups."

Mr. Goodwin. I can explain that, Senator.

There was a proposal made in the State Department version that has been discussed that the dissident groups, that in case they managed to take over the government and there was some kind of fighting that they should request help from Venezuela, Columbia, a few of our allies and therefore we ought to prepare them in advance for such a request. The President thought that putting such a document in their hands would amount to a declaration of war and wanted it struck.

The Chairman. All right.

Then the second paragraph, "We consider it essential that you continue to work" -- well, before we go on with the second paragraph, in the first paragraph you say, "The President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception."

Now, what were those contingency plans that had been discussed?

Mr. Goodwin. They have them here, I believe. I think -- this is a very thick document, where you have a series of contingency plans, it discusses here. "The paramount interest of the United States is to assure that Castro-Communist elements not take over." It says Trujillo is weak, and then it is an analysis of the dissidents and their intention, the weakness of the Trujillo regime, and it goes into the covert activities, which, I think probably -- is that your principal interest at this time?

The Chairman. Yes.

Mr. Goodwin. There's an Appendix that sets forth all the covert activities. Recommendation A of the United States, not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo, that we inform pro-U.S.

tape 5b

dissidents that if they succeed on their own and form an acceptable government we will be glad to come in and help them and then the rest talks about here; ways of recognizing --

The Chairman. There is nothing in that contingency plan that contemplated the assassination of Trujillo himself?

Mr. Goodwin. It contemplated only the possibility that he might be assassinated, not that we would assassinate him.

The Chairman. But if he were assassinated, it would have presumably been the result of an action by a dissident group to overthrow his regime?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. All right.

Moving to Paragraph 2 in your message -- the President's message to Mr. Dearborn, "We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable. However, we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

Now that language, it has been suggested by some members of the Committee that your concern here had to do with avoiding any relationship that might lead to a disclosure that the United States had indeed an interest in or was somehow involved in a plot to assassinate Trujillo. Because you say, "however we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since the U.S. as a matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situations."

Now don't those words at least convey or lend themselves to the interpretation that your primary concern was that the United States should not get caught?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I don't believe so, Senator, because I think, to me, the plain meaning of the words and as I understood it was that we must not run the risk of U.S. association with political assassination. That means not be associated with the process of political assassination in any form.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman?

In that same vein, if I could interrupt for just a second, is it true -- and would Counsel prompt me -- that the guns had already been dispatched?

Mr. Schwarz. Certain guns.

Senator Baker. I'm not talking about how many, Fritz. Guns had been dispatched.

Mr. Schwarz. But this telegram refuses the passage of four machine guns.

Senator Baker. I'm not going to argue with you. I am just saying that guns had been dispatched.

Senator Schweiker. What's the date of this telegram?

Senator Baker. This was just before the assassination, two days before the assassination.

Mr. Smothers. Carbines and pistols had been dispatched. Machine guns were in the country but had not been turned over to the dissidents.

Senator Baker. And now, in retrospect, we're not quite sure -- or there's no indication that the guns were actually used in the assassination, although they may have been in the back seat. Is that about the way it stacks up?

The Chairman. And the dissidents had requested machine guns.

Senator Baker. And the witness, or another witness, has said we thought the signals for assassination efforts for machine guns, when in fact it would appear that they went ahead with the material in hand.

Mr. Goodwin. I believe they had additional guns of their own. You wouldn't try it with a .38.

Senator Tower. I think the type of guns is important, because carbines or pistols wouldn't be used in an assassination against a heavily armed --

Mr. Goodwin. Trujillo travelled with bodyguards in a heavily armed car.

Also, if I might add, Senator --

The Chairman. Just to understand what you have said, as the author of this instruction and having conferred about it and having shown it to President Kennedy, are you testifying that it was your understanding that the meaning of that sentence -- that that sentence was intended to convey to Mr. Dearborn a prohibition against involving the United States in an assassination attempt on the life of Mr. Trujillo?

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely. And in my first draft, I did it in terms of disclosure and changed that, struck that phrase about disclosure in order to make the point, and always at the President's instruction, to make absolutely clear to the Consul; because I used the very word disclosure, you can see here, and I crossed it out, in my handwriting.

Mr. Schwarz. Could you read into the record how you changed it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, it's not very grammatical, it's embarrassing. Also, on the xerox -- I can't read the handwriting on the xerox.

"However we also must not" -- something -- "permit any danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political assassination or intervention in the Dominican Republic," it says or intervention. All that was struck.

Senator Baker. That sounds like exactly what the Chairman asked you. It sounds like it might be interpreted as, please don't get caught.

Mr. Goodwin. Absolutely, which is why I changed it, Senator, to read "However, we must not run risks of U.S.

association with political assassination since the U.S., as a matter of general policy, cannot condone assassination."

Senator Baker. I've got to say, and I don't mean it to be critical of this witness, but on first reading of this document, which was some time ago, it sounded a lot to me like the Mission Impossible opening when they say, if you get caught the Secretary will disavow any knowledge of this undertaking.

Mr. Goodwin. I wasn't familiar with the program at this time.

Senator Baker. Nor was I, at that time.

I need reassurance, and I think the record does, that the coincidence of that this cable, this wire, going out, say two days before the assassination, ' after guns in fact had been dispatched, although not the guns they requested, and under the circumstances it might lend itself to that interpretation.

This witness says it does not. There is no evidence to the contrary that I'm aware of, and I don't know that we need to pursue the issue any further.

Mr. Goodwin. If I may, Senator --

Senator Baker. And it also, as Smothers points out, that there was another communication saying destroy anything you've got, all those communications except this cable.

Mr. Aaron. That is standard practice. That is the standard practice for covert operations.

Mr. Goodwin. My response, Senator, is that the carbines and pistols were transferred in late January, 1960, subsequent to an authorization of January 12th, prior to Kennedy's taking office. I'm not sure of the date of the transfer. I haven't seen any indication of the date of that transfer. I do know that the President was not aware of any transfer of guns, because he told me he was not aware of it, until we finally requested a review a couple of months, a few months later, of our complete covert operations in the Dominican Republic, at which point we became aware that this transfer had occurred. I still don't know the date of that transfer.

And then it was the basis of that briefing paper, which obviously the Dominican Republic was not the first matter on President Kennedy's agenda when he came into office, on the basis of that briefing paper, he reviewed our policy and sent this telegram.

The Chairman. And was the purpose of the telegram to call off any further involvement by the United States government in an assassination attempt against Mr. Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. The purpose was to make sure the United States was not involved in any assassination. The purpose was to slow down that kind of over-zealousness. The President was not that anxious to see Trujillo thrown out.

Senator Tower. That doesn't totally answer the question.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I'm sorry.

The Chairman. Well, you see, we know, from your testimony, that you had been advised in May that certain weapons had been transferred to certain dissident groups who at least had expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo.

Mr. Goodwin. Correct.

The Chairman. So there was a connection, the connection being that the American government, through the CIA, furnished weapons to a group that had communicated its interest, if not its intention, to assassinate Trujillo.

So then you send this message, and I'm asking you if the message was meant to call this off, this involvement. What exactly was meant? You weren't saying recover those arms.

Mr. Goodwin. No, I wasn't. No.

The Chairman. But at the same time, you were saying, don't transfer the machine guns, were you not?

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. I think the President -- what we were saying is --

The Chairman. What exactly were you saying?

Mr. Goodwin. We were saying that we didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo.

The Chairman. I see. I see.

Mr. Goodwin. Because we were not for assassination.

Senator Baker. The distinction is --

Senator Tower. Well, it says here in number 3, it says, continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support of their position. So what, again the interpretation that can be drawn from this is that we don't want to be involved, but go ahead and have the other guys on, because their position would be to assassinate Trujillo, so what you are in effect doing is saying, let's don't be involved in it but let's indicate our support for what they are doing.

Mr. Goodwin. We were indicating our support for what they were doing on the basis of the estimate in the contingency paper that Trujillo's days were numbered and whoever took office we wanted to be our man, that is correct. And so we were going to support and try to retain relations and say we would support, which is not a difficult thing to do, as you know, any group that might take office and be moderate and pro-United States. That was all we were interested in, was having a pro-American government.

Senator Schweiker. Well, there are two other references here, Mr. Goodwin. Paragraph 3, "In case of assassination or overthrow" -- obviously you still had a reference there, whether initiated by a pro-U.S. group or not, was still part of the planning, and then back on page 3 you say, "In actual fact, we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of ultimate disclosure in participation in an assassination attempt," and that is scratched out, and says "assassination attempt," meaning that there was -- to me -- some other plan afoot to assassinate since the ultimate would still be disclosed if you gave this.

So what interpretation? I mean, this is rift here with assassination propositions, and the fact that you have "ultimate disclosure," fear of ultimate disclosure of participation, meant that certainly there was something already afoot, that ultimately would be disclosed if you went ahead with this pass through.

Mr. Goodwin. I think what we were saying is if we did, it would be found out ultimately, which means not right away, but later. In the case of assassination or overthrow, there were many groups, a continual flow of groups, of information, that there were various groups planning to assassinate Trujillo.

Senator Schweiker. Well, if that's what it meant, then why did you delete it?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I think --

Senator Schweiker. If that was your interpretation, why in fact did you delete those four words, "ultimate disclosure of participation?"

Mr. Goodwin. Could you tell me what page you're reading from?

Senator Schweiker. Page 3.

The very words that you interpret one way were in fact deleted, which shows to me that you meant them another way, or they wouldn't have been deleted, and you substitute two words for it.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I mean --

Senator Schweiker. So that you disguise that.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, the words were deleted because they were words that were going to give exactly the impression you are talking about. By talking about ultimate disclosure, we were afraid of being found out and what we didn't want was any association with the assassination attempts, so the reference to disclosure was struck and the words association were inserted.

Senator Schweiker. But you still call off -- you still left the language, in actual fact we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempts. That still makes the point that you want to make, but you had other language, that says "ultimate disclosure of participation" which implies to me you were concerned about other things you were doing and things that had already been programmed and an operation that you were as much concerned about those being -- or you wouldn't have changed the language to still say the same thing with that one distinction about something else being afoot. I don't --

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I changed it, I believe, Senator -- I mean it's hard to be held responsible for language that was rejected because it was inaccurate. The problem was not one of disclosure, the problem was we did not want to be associated with assassination. That's why I struck it out.

Senator Schweiker. You changed the language, but the first part of it remained exactly the same. In fact, we feel the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States. So while you changed the language, you had the same condition there that you were not going to supply those arms.

Mr. Goodwin. We weren't, that's correct. We were not --

Senator Schweiker. But why were you not concerned about the other language, because --

Mr. Goodwin. Because the implication of the other language was that, well, we were worried about being found out, when in fact what the policy was was that we did not want to be involved. So I struck the implication.

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Goodwin, why was the communication of our withdrawing to Dearborn? The only way Dearborn could have been any closer to this plot would have been to become one of the dissident group. They told him everything they did, down to and including when the car was coming down the road. And we knew that, didn't we?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I haven't seen any communications to us that said that. I would not have -- I mean, one of his instructions was to keep in very close contact with these dissident groups. I wouldn't be surprised if they dropped by and if they told him everything they were planning to do. But it's a long jump between saying you're going out and kill Trujillo and pulling it off, as many people tried.

But I was not aware, as I can remember, that he had any kind of detailed information.

Mr. Smothers. His messages back to CIA, in fact, convey those details, don't they?

Mr. Goodwin. Not that I saw after this, when these -- none of them that --

Mr. Schwarz. Well, did you know or did you not know that the dissidents intended to use the small arms, carbines and pistols, and other materials they had themselves, but intended to use the weapons we had supplied to assassinate Trujillo in precisely the way he was, in fact, assassinated? Did you know that before you wrote the telegram, or not?

Mr. Goodwin. No, because what I'm responding to is a request that says we can't do it unless we have the machine guns, and that's to be used for the assassination. We are saying, don't give them machine guns.

Later on they said to Dearborn, I mean he did tell me that afterwards, I don't know when they told him, well, we'll do it, whether or not we get the machine guns. I mean, that might also just bravado, or an effort to bluff us into saying, well, you might as well give it to them anyway since they're going to do it. I don't know why anyone would take on

Trujillo with a .38. I wouldn't have thought that, if I thought about it.

President Kennedy went to Paris a week or two later. When the assassination actually occurred, we were all taken by surprise, so that Dearborn had detailed knowledge of when it was going to occur, we didn't. The Vice President -- he called an emergency meeting with the Vice President, a telegram was sent to Paris, and then the assassination ended up getting announced by Pierre Salinger.

But this instruction, the President told me he wanted to make it absolutely clear we're not getting involved in assassinations.

Senator Mondale. Mr. Goodwin, the record shows -- I think you've testified to this -- that toward the end of the Eisenhower Administration, they decided to supply arms to this dissident group and assist in the assassination of Mr. Trujillo. Then, as these documents show, at some point very near to the time that Mr. Trujillo was actually assassinated, a telegram was sent to our Consul saying, we don't want to be associated with this.

Why didn't we also say stop it, tell these people not to proceed further, in light of the fact that they may have thought, because of previous history, that their efforts to assassinate Trujillo had our blessing? In other words, there is still a piece missing, in my opinion, that should have

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

suggested --

Senator Tower. Well, the next line says, "Continue to inform dissidents of U.S. support for their position."

Senator Mondale. In other words, if I were one of those dissidents and I got that from the United States pursuant to this earlier agreement, I would feel encouraged to believe that I had the support of the United States in killing Trujillo, and that we weren't exactly neutral in that, at least, our government was not really neutral, that it encouraged them.

It is true that they didn't get the machine guns, and it is true, apparently that what you understood was that they wanted the machine guns for assassination and they wanted the other weapons for personal defense, but there was still, it would seem to me, reason for them to believe that they had our support.

Why didn't we say or communicate to them we want you to stop and we don't want this man assassinated, and we want you to know that we will have nothing to do with it?

Why wasn't that final -- I just want to make one more point --

There was a similar telegram sent just before Diem was assassinated -- now these are entirely different matters, and I appreciate that -- but it always seems to me that if we're worried about human life, if we're worried about correcting a policy that may have set a possible assassination in motion, the way to really disassociate it is to say stop, and that is really what I don't understand.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, let me say, Senator, first of all, that the question of assassination now is paramount in people's minds. There is no doubt that we hoped that Trujillo would be overthrown. Not only was their no doubt, but there was a unanimous vote of the Organization of American States that it be ostracized and sanctions imposed with the hope that it might happen. And that occurred ever before we took office and we were in full agreement with it.

There are papers here which talk about the event of a coup of how you're going to get Trujillo some money to get him out of the country. Assassination was always a possibility, but a coup d'etat, a revolution or a civil war of some kind, a whole range of possibilities. And we did, in fact, believe that Trujillo was going to be overthrown one way or another and not necessarily, or even in paramount in our minds, by assassination because -- in fact, it would seem at that time to be the most difficult thing of all to do. He was heavily guarded and protected, ordinarily. They knew more about it than we did.

And when that happened, which we favored that happened, because we felt that the establishment of a democratic regime in the Dominican Republic was something not only beneficial to the United States and to our policies. I mean, when we're talking about Trujillo he was not -- I mean, about human life, the man was not only a Fascist, but he was a murderer. He used to have a freezer room in the back of his house where he would take people and show them the bodies of enemies.

But in any event, that's none of our concern, but our real concern was that this was regarded as an inevitability and we wanted to be associated with the new government.

Senator Mondale. I understand, but the argument is made with respect to that last telegram that it was a fig leaf telegram designed to cover our tracks should assassination occur and you argue, and I think persuasively, that you intended much more than that, you intended to make it clear that we were not supporting the assassination, that machine guns were not going to be used.

If that was our intent, and I take it that it was, why we didn't we go one step further and say please communicate to these dissidents who have every reason to believe from past history that we may be supporting the overthrow, including assassination, that we oppose the assassination of Mr. Trujillo.

Wouldn't that make it very clear then that we were out of the business?

Mr. Goodwin. I don't know. It would have made it, I suppose, clearer to them. On the other hand, I think, it's their country, and they could deal with Trujillo as they wanted to. It was not going to be us that dealt with him in this fashion.

Senator Mondale. Yeah, but see, if we were completely neutral I'd agree with that. If they wanted to assassinate Trujillo that's their business. I agree with it, that's none of our business.

But I think we were already implicated. It's sort of like being in a criminal conspiracy and then pulling out the day before the job is done and not telling anybody. It seems to me you should say, boys, I'm out and I don't want you to do it.

The Chairman. I've changed my mind.

Senator Mondale. That's why I don't understand.

Senator Baker. It's sort of like the situation that's been described to us where people were beyond control and you couldn't communicate with them after the forces had been set in motion.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, may I tell you, I don't know that there ever was any statement that those guns that were authorized on January 12th, either in the authorization or subsequent, for the purposes of assassination or otherwise.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, there were scores of those, and whether they reached you or not is a separate and important question, but there are four or five examples of communication to the Agency, and I think passed on to the State Department, and that those guns were to be used for an assassination effort whether or not the machine guns were obtained.

Senator Mondale. Well, you see, that could be important.

because if your understanding was as you have just described then the telegram makes more sense. But if in fact we were implicated, as I understood earlier in assassination attempts --

The Chairman. Fritz, look at the way Dearborn is. I think it's very important to understand this matter, to look at the way Dearborn apparently understood the instruction. He was the one to whom it was given, and he wires back, having received the instruction, the following -- now this is at Tab J, book 2 of 2, the second J.

It says -- first of all, do you have that, Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes, I do.

The Chairman. It says: "One, I believe we can hold pro-United States dissidents, although with some grumbling on the basis set forth." Now you're not likely to hold them if you tell them you're no longer connected with their scheme and Mr. Dearborn had not been instructed to tell them that.

"Two, following our observations for Department and CAS considerations, A) if attempt is made by United States' friends to assassinate Trujillo, there will be accusations against us and the best we can do is see there is no proof."

Senator Baker. To see there is no proof.

The Chairman. "The greatest danger point is Thomas Stockard. He was given a small number of arms by dissident agents to hold several days and has told several persons dissidents obtained these items from Consulate. Stockard told me saying, I have informed him this cannot be true or I would know and when he requested me supply arms through him for dissidents, I told him it was impossible. He is greater danger because of personal embitterment against CAS, a matter of which CAS headquarters is fully informed."

Then he goes on to say that "since local CAS is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from the Dominican Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materizlie they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer now. These three have engaged in fully authorized activity which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public position. There is still considerable job in counterespionage and the collection and reporting and need to follow GODR, foster Leftist activities."

Now there's a vote on.

I read this because it suggests that Mr. Dearborn got a different message than the one you say you intended to send.

(A brief recess was taken.)

tape 6a

The Chairman. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, that paragraph, to me, Senator, Paragraph A -- I am not sure whether his interpretation of instructions, or at least in specifics, seems to be clear. He says that he has informed them that he cannot supply arms to the dissidents, and that is what is what Kennedy, of course, had said in the telegram. And the request had been to know whether or not he could supply arms.

So that I see from that point of view, I am not sure, quite clear, in what way he misinterpreted the telegram.

The Chairman. Well, let's go down -- I don't think he has misinterpreted his instructions not to supply more arms. That's clear enough. But if you go down to B -- are you with me now?

Mr. Goodwin. Yes.

The Chairman. "Since local CAS" -- I guess that should be Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station, then" -- and that would be CIA Chief of Station -- "Since local Chief of Station is now to engage mainly in intelligence collection and reporting, I recommend urgent transfer from Dominican Republic of three CIA officers. If simmering assassination plot should materialize" -- now that in itself, if I may digress a moment, suggests that in Dearborn's opinion assassination might be imminent. For he says "If simmering assassination plot should materialize, they would be in danger and might be picked up for Trujillo-type questioning. This is easily avoidable by quick transfer now." -- again the indication of his feeling that an assassination might be imminent, otherwise, why transfer them. "These three have engaged in fully authorized activities which, if uncovered, could put the United States in bad public position."

Now I would read those words as meaning that Mr. Dearborn anticipated at least the real possibility of assassination attempts in the immediate future and that he was recommending that those CIA officers that had been connected with having supplied weapons should be taken out of the Dominican Republic right away.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, I would agree with a good part of that, Senator, although I think that there were assassination plots simmering in the Dominican Republic and now, and of course this in fact took place. And I think he was concerned that the assassination would be unsuccessful, that Trujillo would pick up the Americans and find out not simply about the transfer of guns but the whole range of covert activities that they had been engaged in, torture them and perhaps kill them.

And he thought the safest thing to do, with this thing in the air, was to get them out of the country. There was nothing, I think, in the telegram that was sent to him that denies the possibility that Trujillo might be assassinated or that there might be an attempted assassination, which is the purport of Dearborn's, because if the assassination was successful, there was no need to get the CIA out.

The Chairman. But there is something more, really. If the possibility of assassination was a long continuing thing, always on the mind of Dearborn, why does he respond to this instruction by saying, get these men out now?

Mr. Goodwin. Well I think obviously these people had relayed to him that they're going to try to make the attempt anyway, with or without the machine guns. He thought the attempt might be abortive, and if so, he thought that all Americans or people that worked for him or with him would be in danger.

The Chairman. Then you would have to agree with me, wouldn't you, that in his opinion, Dearborn's opinion, he had evidence that suggested to him that an assassination attempt was imminent.

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's clear. Yes, I think it was.

The Chairman. And he took this sufficiently serious to recommend getting the three CIA agents out without further delay?

Mr. Goodwin. I think that's right. That's absolutely true, because I think he believed that there was a serious attempt in the offing, as indeed there was, and he was absolutely right and he was doing his job well.

I would like to say, if I might go back, that in terms of the telegram, is that I sat in the office with President Kennedy who instructed me to draft a telegram to say that he wanted nothing to do with political assassinations, which I did, so it's not a matter of interpretation, because he cannot testify to that matter, so it's not a question of reading the text so much as deciding whether or not I'm telling the truth about that instruction.

Mr. Schwarz. Assuming that you are telling the truth --

Mr. Goodwin. Thank you.

Mr. Schwarz. We have to explore whether something went wrong in the communication process, and I want to put some information in front of you and then see if you can help us explain what, if anything, went wrong.

Would you show him Exhibit 2-A.

Now Exhibit 2-A is a cable dated March 20th from the Agency in the Dominican Republic to the Agency in Washington. And reading in Paragraph 3, it describes the way in which -- it describes a plot.

In Paragraph 4, it says the following: "To do, they need five M-3's or comparable machine guns and 1500 rounds ammunition for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." Now the basic job is apparently the assassination.

Now again, were you told -- now, in Exhibit 1, you were told in the briefing on covert action by the CIA that the carbines and the pistols had been passed for personal defense weapons and not to do the basic job, as this telegram indicates.

Mr. Goodwin. That's correct. That's what it says.

Mr. Schwarz. Right. I understand that.

Now, what I am trying to understand is, in telling you that the weapons had been passed for personal defense purposes, do you think that is consistent, is candid, in light of the fact that the Agency had been told that other weapons were going to be used for the basic job, that is the assassination.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are several communications regarding the weapon details of the plan and they are obviously inconsistent.

Mr. Schwarz. They are.

Mr. Goodwin. The telegrams say it, but on the other hand, a carbine or pistol is hardly a quiet weapon. I mean, I would regard that as saying I am going to strangle him. And if you're going to have a fire fight with machine guns, I mean in other words, it seems to me that somebody is interpretting what they say, or they might have had five or six different plans.

The request that came to the White House, finally, was very specific, and this is too, that additional weapons are needed in order to carry out an assassination plot. I mean, however you read this, they do say they need additional weapons to carry off an assassination. And that is what the President at that point had in mind on May 13th, around May 13th, about the original transfer, which was not pursuant to any policy that he had established or any directions that he had given, immediately said, you know, make it clear to Dearborn that we're not getting involved in assassinations. They can do what they want, but we are not going to get involved.

Senator Mondale. In other words, the President was advised by you that there was an assassination plot in which we were implicated and he told you that we don't want any part of it and you are to send a message on his authority saying that, and that is what you thought you had done?

Mr. Goodwin. I would phrase it a little bit differently, Senator, which is to say I would say there were people who wanted to assassinate Trujillo to whom we had given some guns and his response was probably like, you mean some idiot gave them guns? I said, yes. He said -- this is a paraphrase -- you know, if you knew Senator Kennedy, or President Kennedy, I mean, he said, well, let's make it clear. And if you compare my draft with the State Department draft, I was overriding, as they point out, because their draft says, we're trying to get this message through but we're blocked by Mr. Goodwin and have to send his message instead. They would rather blame me, of course, than the President.

It is clear that the stress is changed to make it clear that the President wants nothing to do and cannot condone assassination. It does not say cannot condone being caught at assassination, it says cannot condone assassination. And I did that because he told me to do that.

The Chairman. And you have characterized the Kennedy policy as one of getting the government no further involved because there had been a past involvement? He knew that and you knew that, to the extent that weapons had been furnished dissident groups who had expressed an interest in assassinating Trujillo. And your intention here in sending this telegram was to convey to Mr. Dearborn that the Kennedy Administration wanted no further involvement in this --

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We found -- the President found out on May 13th that pursuant to the authorization that preceded his coming into office that a couple of carbines and pistols had been transferred in order to mount a major assault on a government that had lasted for thirty years, and it seemed at that point like a formidable threat to Trujillo.

He wanted to make it absolutely clear when he found out that anybody who wanted to assassinate Trujillo in the Dominican Republic that they were going to do it on their own, the United States would have nothing to do with it and we give out no more weapons and this is why he said we do not want to condone assassination or be associated with it. And that's why I wrote the telegram that I drafted that's in my handwriting.

Senator Tower. Well, may I ask you, then, what you interpretted the meaning of the first sentence in number 3, "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position?"

Mr. Goodwin. They were -- their position was that, what they regarded as that Trujillo should be overthrown and replaced by a moderate government. We supported that position, as did the other members of the Organization of American States, and we wanted to make it very clear that we did support that position, and we wished them well in their efforts to establish that position and if they did we would recognize their government and send them assistance, which we did.

As a matter of fact, we took much greater efforts to get rid of Ramfes Trujillo in the six months that followed the assassination than anything that preceeded it, including bringing the American fleet practically into the harbor at Cuidad Trujillo at the direction of the Secretary of Defense. Instead of carbines and pistols, we brought in destroyers, aircraft carriers and Marine battalions so that they would know what the consequences might be if they didn't get out when they got out.

If I might make one more point, Senator, if I may, is that the countries of South America are full of guns sent there by the American government to be used to kill thousands of people over the last several decades, and with the lone exception of both revolutionaries from underneath and armies from on top -- of course you're well-acquainted with that -- sent knowing that they would be used to kill people in internal struggles. The only distinction in this case is that Trujillo happened to be the head of State, which is a practical distinction, but you could hardly make a moral one.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a question in that respect?

The Chairman. Well, I am not sure I agree with that, although that is a philosophical argument.

Senator Baker. Are you telling us, Mr. Goodwin, that assassination, not of heads of state, but assassination of lesser figures was a common, ordinary occurrence in South America at the behest of America or with American support?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I am talking about that we supply arms to revolutionary groups or to armed groups which we did in say Bolivia, or sometimes to the government itself, or in Chile we gave assistance of various kinds to dissident groups with the knowledge that our assistance would be used in internal struggles.

I don't have to use the word assassinations.

Senator Baker. But how about for internal struggles, then, as opposed to assassination?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, this is an internal struggle in the Dominican Republic.

The Chairman. I think you recognize the distinction, because it is well-defined in our criminal laws. There is a difference between first degree murder and manslaughter. There is supposed to connote a certain difference in moral connotations, and undertaking deliberate action that is targetted against a particular person with the intention of murdering that person is normally regarded under our criminal laws as the most reprehensible kind of homicide and therefore definted as murder in the first degree. So there must be some gradation there.

Mr. Goodwin. Well, there are gradations, although I do think that many of the activities against, say, someone like Allende or others are equally targetted in Latin American countries and not just general conflict or the killing of particular -- Mexicans, of course, traditionally go out and shoot down leaders of new guerrilla groups or insurgents, but not necessarily with our guns.

The Chairman. But in any event you're not testifying here to your certain knowledge the United States government participated in an assassination attempt or assisting in an assassination attempt --

Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't have any deep knowledge of that subject, what was the natural end consequence of our acts. In any event, I do want to return to this.

This was -- clearly President Kennedy was much closer to yours.

Mr. Schwarz. After the Trujillo assassination took place, President Kennedy was in Paris and as one of the documents we looked at indicates, there was a meeting at which Vice President Johnson was interested in finding out what had happened and you had a review of this, and discussed in that review that the weapons had been passed, the small arms and the machine guns hadn't been passed and the assassination occurred.

Now, after that review, were any steps taken to make, as a matter of more general, governmental policy, the policy which is expressed in the telegram you drafted at President Kennedy's instruction?

Mr. Goodwin. Not to my knowledge.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. Do you have any more questions?

Mr. Schwarz. I don't have any more questions.

The Chairman. Do you have any other matters that you can tell us about the Trujillo assassination for our enlightenment?

Mr. Goodwin. On the assassination?

The Chairman. On the assassination.

Mr. Goodwin. I don't think so, but let me read through all of this, and when I come back the next time, I might have something else, if I can find anything else in there -- I do think this is pretty complete.

The Chairman. We will expect to hear you again early next week, on the Cuban phase of your testimony.

Mr. Goodwin. And Duvallier.

The Chairman. Mr. Dennin, they've been up all night, would like to ask two questions.

Mr. Dennin. Well, when you said there were no more questions, I just raised the possibility and you discussed it about meetings held after the assassination back in Washington when Mr. Dearborn came back as well as those meetings held after the assassination before he came back, at which the whole matter was discussed, initially with Vice President Johnson presiding and ultimately, the last one, with President Kennedy.

Mr. Goodwin. That's right. We had, of course, a series of emergencies. We had an emergency meeting, and cabled the President who was in Paris, and the first matter on our mind was how to keep Ramfes Trujillo, who was the son of Trujillo, from taking over, and we didn't know where he was, at first, it took us awhile to find out that he was in Paris, which at least indicated, Senator, that if they were planning it, it wasn't done in a very comprehensive fashion, and we found he was in Paris and we wanted to stop him from returning, to detain him, but it was too late. By the time we found out, he had already chartered an Air France jet and was on his way to Cuidad Trujillo, and I believe there was some effort made to bluff him off by sending messages to the plane in flight, diverting it to some American airport, but he didn't do that, and he landed and took over. And I think the principal aim of our policy from that point on was how to get him and his uncle, Hector -- and I forget the other fellow's name -- out of there so that the kind of moderate government that we wanted could be installed.

And John Martin was sent down to talk to him and to make various inducements like he could take his money out, it was discussed that if he would leave peaceably, but what finally happened was when McNamara moved the fleet in over the horizon and an Air Force General bombed the palace, that was the end, he got on his boat and left.

The Chairman. Air Force General?

Mr. Goodwin. A Dominican Air Force General.

He decided that was an easier target than the American fleet.

The Chairman. Was the bombing done at our instruction?

Mr. Goodwin. No, I don't believe so. I was trying to remember that, but I don't believe it was. As I remember, it was quite a surprise to us that this fellow had taken the initiative. The moving of the fleet was intended as sort of a threat that if they didn't get out we might come in and get them. There was no, however, no, at that point, no country attempted to do that, just to scare them. And the fleet was actually cheered in the Dominican Republic, a very rare occasion.

But this Air Force General did, and then he tried to make himself dictator and two of his own officers arrested him. They all had been trained in American military schools.

Mr. Schwarz. To complete the record on the response to the telegram We had Dearborn's reaction. We will read into the record the cable back from the CIA Chief of Station in response to the telegram Mr. Goodwin drafted.

Assume -- reference B, that's the telegram. "Final word on present policy in which KUBARK" -- that's CIA -- "work here must be based. Para 2 and Para 5, that reference, are for practical purposes retreat from previous policy. However, Headquarters aware extent to which ODYOKE" that is, the United States --"already associated with 01 EMSLEW" -- that is the assassination of Trujillo. -- "if we are to at least try 'cover up tracks' KUBARK personnel directly involved in 01 EMSLEW preparations must be withdrawn now."

I don't know if that merits comment or not. It just happens to be how it was interpretted by CIA.

Mr. Goodwin. I think it's accurate and it also reflects Dearborn's own disappointment that --

Mr. Schwarz. CIA.

Mr. Goodwin. CIA's disappointment, which is understandable.

The Chairman. Any further questions?

Senator Tower?

Mr. Smothers?

Mr. Smothers. Mr. Chairman, I'd rather wait till the return of the witness.

The Chairman. Yes.

Let's make certain that Mr. Goodwin has an opportunity to meet with the staff so that the pertinent documents that will up in connection with our interrogation on Castro will be reviewed. We're not interested in any kind of entrapment. We want you to be fully aware of whatever documentation we have so you can help enlighten us of your understanding of the policy at the time.

Mr. Goodwin. And whatever I bring I can give to you and then duplicate it.

Mr. Schwarz. Well, shall we plan, for safety, on the staff seeing you on Wednesday morning and having your testimony Wednesday afternoon, or could you be here by Tuesday?

Mr. Goodwin. Well, since I'm going to Rumford, Maine and getting the things out, I think it will be safer Wednesday, if that's not too inconvenient.

The Chairman. Wednesday?

All right. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 6:35 o'clock p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene at 8:30 o'clock a.m., Friday, July 11, 1975.)

- - -

Date : 08/06/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10089
RECORDS SERIES : HEARINGS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 11-H-08

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : TWEEDY, BRONSON
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 10/09/75
PAGES : 92
SUBJECTS : CIA

ASSASSINATION, LUMUMBA, PATRICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/25/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ORIGINAL

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject
to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

The United States Senate

R1572

Report of Proceedings

[redacted]
DATE 3/19/77
BY EG

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

76000151021

Thursday, October 9, 1975

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction.)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL

C O N T E N T S

WITNESS	PAGE
Bronson Tweedy	4

EXHIBITS

EXHIBIT	FOR IDENTIFICATION
No. 1	3
No. 2	11
No. 3	28
No. 4	32
No. 5	35
No. 6	39
No. 7	41
No. 8	43
No. 9	46
No. 10	57
No. 11	58
No. 12	63

- - -

TASCIONE:amt

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Thursday, October 10, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 11:25 o'clock a.m. in Room 407, The Capitol, the Honorable Richard Schweiker presiding.

Present: Senator Schweiker (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

PROCEEDINGS

Senator Schweiker. Would you raise your right hand?

Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Tweedy. I do.

Senator Schweiker. It has been nice meeting you.

Mr. Tweedy. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, Senator Schweiker left the hearing room.)

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Mr. Tweedy, you have just received the oath from Senator Schweiker, who has now left the room, and you are under no obligation to continue to testify in his absence, but obviously the Committee would appreciate it greatly if you would continue to testify.

Are you willing to continue to testify in the Senator's absence?

Mr. Tweedy. I plan to testify fully.

Mr. Baron. You are willing to testify to the truth as best as you can do it?

Mr. Tweedy. I will indeed.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that you have the right to counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. You are appearing here voluntarily without counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you may cease answering questions at any point if you wish to consult with counsel?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. Finally, are you aware that all of your Constitutional rights are intact, including your Fifth Amendment rights to remain silent?

Mr. Tweedy. I am.

Mr. Baron. All right, then.

Let us proceed to review a set of documents which were not available to us in your first examination. The attempt here today is not to go over a lot of old ground that we covered in your first examination but to focus our concerns on a few main events in the alleged story of an assassination plot against Lumumba, and to refresh your recollection by review of these documents.

Let me introduce as Exhibit 1 a cable from Allen Dulles to the Leopoldville Station, marked for Robert Guthman on October 26th, 1960.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 1 for identification.)

TESTIMONY OF BRONSON TWEEDY

Mr. Baron. We discussed this cable in your previous appearance, did we not?

Mr. Tweedy. August 26th.

May I correct the date? It is August 26th.

Mr. Baron. Certainly.

Mr. Tweedy. It is rather important.

Mr. Baron. It is August 26th.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, we did indeed discuss it the last time.

Mr. Baron. After you took another look at this cable this morning before we went on the record, you made a remark to the effect that this cable was a source of authority as far as you were concerned at the time.

Is that your impression now?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Let me just add to that a bit. The cable per se I did not remember, but it is perfectly obvious the cable is the authority. When I first talked to Mr. Bissell about this, he certainly implied the only reason the subject was being raised is because it had been of national policy level concern. I do not think it could be more clear-cut than that. This was basically, this was the formal expression of that by the Director himself.

I cannot remember which came first, did I see this cable first, or did I talk to Mr. Bissell first. I suspect that I talked to Mr. Bissell first. It must have been absolutely in the same time period.

This merely confirmed what I think I probably heard from Mr. Bissell first.

Mr. Baron. In this discussion with Mr. Bissell, you are referring to the subject of getting access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination.

Mr. Tweedy. I think it probably came up in the sense that the thrust of the American position was that there was no solution in the Congo without the fall from power of Mr. Lumumba, and no measure should be overlooked to achieve this -- constitutional, revolutionary and indeed, executive action, if you want to call it that.

Mr. Baron. Meaning assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

But none of these possible measures were excluded, and the main point was that everybody agreed that Lumumba had to go or we were in for very serious trouble in the Congo.

Mr. Baron. You were referring a moment ago in discussing this cable from Allen Dulles to the fact that when you first discussed the possibility of assassinating Lumumba as one means of removing him from power with Richard Bissell, Bissell referred to this cable.

Mr. Tweedy. No, I would have seen this cable when it went out. I am afraid you cannot pin me down on this, because I cannot remember the sequence of events. It would have been a perfectly natural follow-up to my discussion with Bissell. It is conceivable that this went out before I talked to Bissell, I do not exclude that, but the two were totally in tandem.

Mr. Baron. Having taken a look at all of the documents that we are about to introduce into the record today, before we begin taking your testimony on the record, are you able to pinpoint with any more precision your initial discussion with Mr. Bissell of the prospect of assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Pinpoint it in terms of time?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

Mr. Tweedy. No, not in terms of time. I can only assume --

Mr. Baron. It would have taken place shortly before this Allen Dulles cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Either shortly before, or shortly after, because the next series of cables obviously get the show, as it were, on the road.

May I comment just generally on those cables as a group? There are no surprises in them as far as I am concerned, in terms of detail. Much of it, even to this day, I still do not remember.

One aspect emerges very clearly for me, that we were very careful about examining this on the possibilities of doing anything against Lumumba. Basically, this whole period was a series of exchanges with the field who were seeking, as you can see from that cable traffic, various measures that might perfor or achieve the goal, including, indded assassination, but not by any means limited to that, that we were in trouble finding means which appeared secure, particularly means which kept the U.S. hand hidden. It is the to and from, and the atmosphere of it which is very familiar to me; the details of it, much of it even on reading them, is rather unfamiliar to me. I found no surprises in it.

Mr. Baron. Having refreshed your recollection by reviewing these cables, can you add any greater specificity to the record about the substance of your conversations with Richard Bissell on the possibility of assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I think what we used to do, as I remember it, when it came to the technical exchange with the Station on one asset versus another, the possible security weakness of this man versus the possible strengths of another, Bissell left this largely to me. I do not mean to say that we did not from time to time review it. He did not debate with me on whether White Clam.lu was somebody who was worth dealing with or not, because he had Belgian connections, for example.

Mr. Baron. You are saying he would have left the operational details to you?

Mr. Tweedy. The operational details of trying to come up with some solution that looked as if it made sense, and had a promise of success. I do not recall that we would discuss this type of a cable in detail. As you can see, he released quite a number of them, because he wanted to remain familiar with them.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record on this subject.

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not have any further recollection of detailed discussions with Bissell on this. On the other hand, it was perfectly clear that he remained actively interested in it. I am sure that he was the one that had the idea of Justin O'Donnell, for example, I think he undoubtedly came up with that idea. As you recall, I had forgotten entirely that Justin O'Donnell had ever played a role in this. I am sure when he fixed on O'Donnell the possibility to assist the Chief of Station he must have discussed this with him. I can almost say I remember it, but hardly.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any recollection of what Bissell said to you in the series of discussions on the prospect of assassinating Lumumba about the level at which the exploration of this prospect had been authorized?

Mr. Tweedy. No. That is the aspect I was never clear on except that it was perfectly clear to me that he was quite confident that this was -- I am now talking about the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means. I am not talking necessarily about assassination; I want to be quite clear on that.

I was quite clear in my mind that the policy levels of Washington were agreed that Lumumba must go. I cannot go any further than that. I cannot say, for example, that Bissell said I think as an Agency we should consider assassination on this or that this had been discussed with the policy levels of government. I do not know, and it was never made clear to me nor does this cable make clear, but it was perfectly clear that Mr. Dulles felt quite quiet in his mind about discussing any of these aspects with the State Department or the Ambassador.

Mr. Baron. Off the record.

(Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Baron. We are back on the record now.

When we stopped, we were discussing your account of your meetings with Richard Bissell where the subject of assassinating Lumumba had arisen among other means that had been considered in disposing of Lumumba. Did Richard Bissell ever indicate directly or indirectly to you that he had the authority of the President of the United States for moving forward with an operation which might include assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Let me make it quite clear, he certainly never mentioned the President at all.

Mr. Baron. By name?

Mr. Tweedy. By name, or even by any indication. It was merely my impression reinforced, certainly, either before or after, of this cable of Allen Dulles that this was a policy level decision, but the extent to which the Executive had assassination discussed with him at all, I cannot comment on.

WARD & PAUL

It is perfectly obvious that the Agency felt that it had the support of the Executive in efforts to eliminate Lumumba. It was at least my impression throughout this whole period that if it ever came down to the point where somebody said, I think we can do it, and we decided upon the means, that someone would have said, well, before we do, obviously there has to be final approval. I would not have known where the final approval would have come from. I would not expect that my correspondence with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville would result in the assassination of Mr. Lumumba without further reference.

Mr. Baron. You were under the impression that whatever steps you were involved in toward eliminating Lumumba, as you put it, were fully authorized at the highest level of the government?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, I was.

Mr. Baron. That would include the President?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not really think I can answer that question, Mr. Baron. When somebody at my level, fairly senior though it was, receives clear-cut assurances that the policy level wants something done, it is very difficult for him to judge whether the President per se has been in contact with the Agency or that he has done this through his National Security Advisor, the Secretary of State, or whoever. There could be no way that I could judge that.

I think it would be quite misleading if I were to try to read into it either then or now.

Mr. Baron. Whatever impression you had of the extent of the authority for the steps that you were taking to eliminate Lumumba was derived from your conversations with Richard Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. And the cable.

Mr. Baron. And the cable by Allen Dulles.

Mr. Tweedy. Which merely indicated to me that the Agency was confident that it had its policy guidance and was thus acting accordingly.

Mr. Baron. Between this cable on August 26th which Allen Dulles dispatched to the Congo and the cable we will now mark Exhibit 2, which is a cable from yourself to Leopoldville on September 19th, marked Eyes Only, Guthman from Jadwin--

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 2 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Were there any other meetings that you recall between yourself and Richard Bissell where he asked you to move beyond the exploratory stage to the implementation stage in assassinating Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not know at all. I just do not recall that that ever occurred.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn, then, to this cable.

This cable indicates --

Mr. Tweedy. This is the one on the 19th?

Mr. Baron. Yes.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

This cable begins with your indication to the Chief of Station that someone was proceeding shortly to the Congo who would announce himself as Sid from Paris.

First of all, to backtrack, Guthman, in this cable, is the Chief of Station, is that right?

Mr. Tweedy. Correct.

Mr. Baron. Who we agreed would be referred to as the Chief of Station or by his alias, Hedgmena, and Jadwin is --

Mr. Tweedy. My pseudonym.

Mr. Baron. Did you have a first name in the pseudonym?

Mr. Tweedy. Thomas K.

Mr. Baron. Who was Sid from Paris?

Mr. Tweedy. I was trying to think. The identity is Sid

Brown. Sid Brown as a name means nothing to me.

Mr. Baron. If I represent to you that we have had testimony from Sidney Gottlieb that this identity stood for himself, does that refresh your recollection?

Mr. Tweedy. It would not surprise me. It was my assumption that it probably was, but I could not recall, so I find -- in other words, your explanation, I think, is what I would have expected.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection of dispatching Sidney Gottlieb on a mission to the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. I have the most unclear recollection that I discussed with Mr. Bissell Sidney Gottlieb's going to the Congo. I have no recollections of any conversations I had with Mr. Gottlieb himself, although I am quite convinced I had them.

In other words, it is inconceivable to me that he would have gone to the Congo without seeing me. I cannot recall the substance of our discussions, although I assume, and I imagine Mr. Bissell must have shared in this, we discussed what it was all about, the operational problems involved, so that he, in turn, could be somewhat sensible about what his own supporting role in this might be.

When I say this, it is a reasonable assumption but it is not direct recollection.

Mr. Baron. Does this cable indicate to you that you did dispatch Sidney Gottlieb to the Congo on a highly sensitive mission?

Mr. Tweedy. It does indeed.

When you say I dispatched him, I would say it would be more accurate to say that Mr. Bissell and I dispatched him. I am sure the authority for him going would have come from he rather than me, but we arranged the details.

Mr. Baron. Your comment about the fact that the authority would have flowed from Mr. Bissell directy is borne out, is it not, by Mr. Bissell's initials on this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, exactly.

Mr. Baron. Was that a fairly unusual practice, to have both the DDP and the Chief of the Africa Division sign a cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Quite common. Throughout the organization on matters of either particular sensitivity or so important that the DDP wished to be constantly informed about correspondence on a subject, the Chief of the Division would originate and send out cables and have it actually signed off by the DDP. That was quite a common practice in the Agency.

Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection, having seen this document, of the fact that you set up a special channel using the YQPROP sensitivity indicator?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not recall YQPROP, but I recall special channels.

Mr. Baron. This would have restricted all traffic from yourself to Chief of Station, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. My Deputy would also have access to it in my absence.

Mr. Baron. That would be Glen Fields?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. Would Richard Bissell have access to it?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed he would.

Mr. Baron. Allen Dulles also?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly if he wanted, absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Why was a special communications channel set up in this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. Because of the sensitivity of the subject. This, again, was a frequent procedure in the Agency on sensitive matters. If one was about to mount a sensitive operation, one of the first things normally done was to set up special communications procedures so the dissemination of the messages could be restricted to what was required.

Mr. Baron. In this case, the especially sensitive subject to which you were restricting communications access was the elimination of Lumumba by one means or another?

Mr. Tweedy. That is correct.

Mr. Baron. What was the assignment that Sidney Gottlieb was to explain to the Chief of Station when he arrived in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. That, I do not recall. I can only assume that Sidney Gottlieb would have discussed with the Chief of Station instruments which TSD might have which could be of assistance in an assassination attempt. I assumed he discussed his inventory, whatever it might be, and the two presumably were trying to come to some conclusions as to what might have the best chance or the most practical chance of being used.

This is my assumption. I think in this early stage, that would have been the purpose of the exercise.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you the testimony of Sidney Gottlieb about two conversations that he had at Headquarters before he undertook the mission to the Congo in September of 1960.

First, when Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable and some subsequent cables which we will discuss today, he said these cables applied to himself. He confirmed the fact that he took a trip to the Congo and arrived on September 26th as is indicated by a subsequent cable, and left on October 5th, as is indicated by another cable.

Dr. Gottlieb said before he left the Congo -- I am sorry, before he left for the Congo -- he had a conversation with you and Glen Fields in which you instructed him to take a lethal material to the Congo and give it to the Chief of Station with instructions to assassinate Lumumba if it were possible and to instruct the Chief of Station in the technical means by which this lethal material could be administered through Lumumba's food or toothpaste or something that he would ingest.

Mr. Gottlieb also testified that in that conversation you indicated to him that these instructions were being given at Richard Bissell's authority.

Did that conversation take place?

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Tweedy. His testimony does not basically refresh my memory. The only aspect of it which I would find unrealistic is that he had an instruction from me to tell the Chief of Station to use this material and go ahead and assassinate Lumumba, as if, in effect, that is all the authority that was necessary.

To be frank, that does not make sense. The rest of it is perfectly feasible. I do not recall it in the detail, but I am not going to deny what Sid said. I think his recollection that I told him, in effect, to go to the Chief of Station and sort of get the show on the road and use the poison and assassinate Lumumba without any further ceremony is just not the way it would have happened.

Mr. Baron. Why is that?

Mr. Tweedy. For the simple reason that under no circumstances would that instruction have been given by me without reference to higher authority up through the chain of command.

Mr. Baron. When you say reference to higher authority, what do you mean?

Mr. Tweedy. My higher authority in the first instance would be Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb did testify --

Mr. Tweedy. I understand.

Mr. Baron. -- that you referred in your conversation with him to the fact that you had authority from Mr. Bissell for the assignment you were giving to Gottlieb.

Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that Mr. Gottlieb would disagree on is that there would be no further reference, which his statement implies from Leopoldville before they took any action on this matter, in other words, take the final action on this matter, and that was never a matter, to the best of my recollection, that was ever delegated by Mr. Bissell. In other words, Mr. Bissell never said, look, you have the picture, go ahead and do it in your own good time without any further reference to me or anybody else, nor is the tenor of this correspondence as I read it that way at all.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall if Mr. Bissell ever went as far as telling you that if an opportunity arose to carry off the assassination of Lumumba in a situation where it would be practically impossible to confirm, that there was authority for proceeding with the assassination with Headquarters, that the Chief of Station would be, under those circumstances, authorized to proceed to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Do you have a recollection about that one way or the other?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that he ever put it to me this way.

Mr. Baron. Let us then break down your statement about this meeting with Dr. Gottlieb into component parts.

You agree now, having heard Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, that it is true that you had asked Dr. Gottlieb to go to the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed, as I assumed I had, yes.

Mr. Baron. It is also true that you knew that Dr. Gottlieb was to carry a lethal material to the Chief of Station in the Congo?

Mr. Tweedy. If he says so, I do not disagree with him. I do not frankly recall that at this point, but I am perfectly wedded to accept what he says.

Mr. Baron. Assuming, for the moment, that you would have required the Chief of Station to check back with Headquarters before he carried out an assassination mission, would it be true that you assigned Dr. Gottlieb the task of instructing the Chief of Station to assassinate Lumumba on that basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Dr. Gottlieb was the head of the Technical Services Division, or whatever it was called in those days.

Mr. Baron. Let me jump in for a moment.

At this point, for about a year and a half, he was the Science Advisor to Mr. Bissell, and he moved to Technical

Services shortly thereafter.

Mr. Tweedy. The way you put it to me was that I instructed Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. The answer to that is, I am sure I never instructed Gottlieb to assassinate Lumumba. This is the way you put it to me.

Mr. Baron. Let me correct that.

What I meant to say was, would you have asked Gottlieb to convey the instruction to the Chief of Station that he was to assassinate Lumumba if he found a way to do it and if he confirmed it with Headquarters?

Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that is almost certainly not. That would have been covered in other correspondence, which I think is demonstrated by these cables, to the Chief of Station direct from me with authority of Mr. Bissell. I would not have used, neither would Mr. Bissell, Mr. Gottlieb as the channel for this instruction.

Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb has also testified that, aside from carrying the materials to the Chief of Station and instructing in their use and giving him an instruction about a mission to assassinate Lumumba, that he had one further role in the Congo; he was to serve as a technical advisor to the Chief of Station on the feasibility of using these biological substances to carry off the operation.

As Gottlieb put it, Gottlieb was to stay down there for a short period of time to determine the technical feasibility of the operational plan that the Chief of Station might come up with.

Mr. Tweedy. This seems quite reasonable to me. Presumably with his technical knowledge of the nature of these materials he would be in a position to either comment on or advise the Chief of Station as he attempted to put together some kind of operation. That makes good sense to me.

He would require, basically, a technical advisor.

Mr. Baron. Dr. Gottlieb also testified that the materials he took with him were of a fairly short life. Their toxicity would wane within a matter of weeks.

Given that bit of information to refresh your recollection, does that make it more likely that Gottlieb was there to aid the Chief of Station in actually carrying off the administration of these drugs, as opposed to giving him general instructions in the use of such lethal substances?

Mr. Tweedy. I do not know really that I can comment on that. If the materials would deteriorate fast, the use of them, if possible, I would stress the latter, would necessarily have to be expeditied, but the overwhelming concern of Headquarters and the field, again, demonstrated in this correspondence was our concern that this thing could be done at all, that it be done right, securely, and that the U.S. hand should be concealed.

If this were at odds with the life of these materials, I think that would have just been too bad. But I think it is perfectly clear that we would not have expedited anything at the risk of doing it unprofessionally.

tape 1b

Mr. Baron. At the point that Gottlieb left for the Congo after talking with you, would he have been enpowered to convey to the Chief of Station that an assassination of Lumumba could be carried off if he could meet the criteria you just laid out, concealment of the U.S. hand and use of these materials before their potency waned?

Mr. Tweedy. My answer to that would be he would be in no position to do anything more with the Chief of Station if they reached that point in planning, that as of the last time he was at Headquarters that there would probably be an approval from Washington.

Mr. Baron. You would expect, then, the Chief of Station would have been expected to reconfirm with Headquarters the fact that he had a go-ahead?

Mr. Tweedy. It would never have occurred to me otherwise.

Mr. Baron. It would be your testimony that, although you do not specifically recall your conversation with Dr. Gottlieb, you would have made that clear to Dr. Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. I would have thought so, yes, but I could not comment any further.

Mr. Baron. The reason for that is you do not recall the conversation?

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Tweedy. Not only that; Dr. Gottlieb was as familiar as I was with (a) the sensitivity of this particular project and what was involved and the way that the Agency did its business, which was things of this kind were not dealt with on sort of an offhand basis.

Mr. Dawson. What is offhand?

Mr. Tweedy. The fact that the field and Dr. Gottlieb were given something in the nature of a blank check as to how they would go about it and when, without further reference to Headquarters.

Mr. Dawson. If we are to tie this to the cables, then, is there something in the cables predating Gottlieb's visit to the Congo which would lead you to believe that it had previously been authorized by some words in those cables?

Mr. Tweedy. What, Mr. Dawson, had previously been authorized?

Mr. Dawson. The authorization of the assassination effort, the elimination of Lumumba.

Mr. Tweedy. Only in the most general terms. No operation had been put forward by the field. In our business, these things were done by operational planning, at which point one came up with an operation that was agreed upon by the Station and by Headquarters, and this, then, would have been either implemented or not, according to the say-so from Headquarters.

Mr. Dawson. That kind of operational planning is after Mr. Gottlieb arrives in the Congo, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. This, in effect, is that (Indicating). You can tell by the Chief of Station, there is no further reference to Mr. Gottlieb, as I recall.

Mr. Baron. In this cable traffic?

Mr. Tweedy. In this cable traffic, was looking at all sorts of ways and means of eliminating Lumumba, not restricted to assassination, which coincides exactly with my recollection of the period between when the subject was first broached to the Station and that rather indefinable period when, in effect, it was all over, which, I suppose, basically is the disappearance of Lumumba.

I think all of this traffic supports my contention that under the instructions he was given, the Chief of Station in Leopoldville set about exploring all alleys and found none crystal clear. There were problems with all of them. Some looked more promising than others. Individuals who might be used obviously looked more promising than others. Some were discussed and discarded. We commented on some. And so it went.

Mr. Baron. I think that we should proceed in a moment to go through these cables with a close eye, one by one.

One further point in Dr. Gottlieb's testimony, to be fair to him, he said he was under the impression that it was general Agency procedure that in a mission like this one the Chief of

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Station probably would check back with Headquarters, that any prudent Chief of Station would check back to reconfirm his authorityto go ahead with an assassination operation, but Dr. Gottlieb said in his conversation with you he was not told that he should convey to the Chief of Station the requirement that he should check back with Headquarters before he proceeded with the assassination of Lumumba.

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot comment on his statements, because I cannot recall what I said to him. It certainly is perfectly conceivable to me that I could have had this conversation with him and not mentioned this, that this would be covered in all the basic correspondence that I was having with the Chief of Station.

Mr. Baron. So then it is possible -- or is it probable that in your instructions to Sidney Gottlieb about his mission to the Congo you might not have explicitly mentioned the requirement that the Chief of Station return to Headquarters to reconfirm his authority to move ahead with the assassination.

Mr. Tweedy. It is, I suppose, possible. I am not going to say it is not possible. I am merely saying that that is not the way we did business, and on the whole, Sidney Gottlieb would be as familiar with that as I would -- perhaps not as familiar with it, because he was on the technical side where I was on the operational side and used to this chain of command thing and the relationship between the Division and Station

Chiefs in the field, to a greater extent than Dr. Gottlieb would.

The last thing I am doing is impugning his veracity and his testimony.

Mr. Baron. When you say it is not the way we do business, you meant to say it was your understanding in general Agency practice that the Chief of Station in a situation like this would be expected to check back with Headquarters?

Mr. Tweedy. When a Chief of Station was given the authority to carry out something entirely on his own initiative, that was made quite clear -- I'm not talking about this case, I mean generally -- this was made quite clear.

Mr. Baron. When you were talking about the fact that "this was not the way that we generally did business," you were not referring to the fact that you would have made it absolutely explicit in any conversation with Sidney Gottlieb or anybody like him who was undertaking a sensitive mission that the Chief of Station would be expected to check back?

Mr. Tweedy. If I had not mentioned this to Sidney Gottlieb and he said I did not, I am perfectly prepared to believe him, it would be because it never occurred to me that the Chief of Station would act in any other way. That is it.

Mr. Dawson. Of course, Mr. Hedgeman also testified that it never would have occured to him to have carried this out without having checked back, and he did so, of course; the cables will show that very clearly. What we are trying to focus on is exactly what Mr. Gottlieb conveyed to Mr. Hedgeman, which, of course, you could not testify to.

Mr. Tweedy. I could not.

Mr. Baron. Or what you said to him.

Mr. Tweedy. I think it is quite possible that I did not say to Mr. Gottlieb, Sid, for Heaven's sake, do not have the Chief of Station go off assassinating this fellow without referring back to Headquarters. It would never have occurred to me to do that. It would have been, in my view, superfluous.

Mr. Dawson. You are, of course, aware that Mr. Hedgeman was aware of this practice in the Agency?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly.

Mr. Dawson. You had seen that happen. He had only been Station Chief for a short time; in spite of that, he was still aware of Agency practice?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that it would be perfectly true to say that any clandestine services officer who had reached a certain seniority in field experience whether he was Chief of Station or not, he would have sucked this in with his mother's milk. We were, if I may say so, a very disciplined organization in that regard.

Mr. Dawson. Specifically as to Mr. Hedgeman, that would apply to him also?

Mr. Tweedy. It would indeed.

Mr. Baron. Let us proceed then to a document we will mark

Exhibit 3, which is a cable from Bronson Tweedy to the Chief of Station for his eyes only on September 22, 1960.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

Mr. Tweedy. This is mostly discussion of 04 [redacted]

Mr. Baron. The man you referred to was at this time an agent that was in contact with the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I remember him very well. I could not possibly remember his name. I remember him very well; I met him later.

Mr. Baron. He proved to be a highly effective agent for the Station?

Mr. Tweedy. He was a very good intelligence agent, an excellent intelligence agent, for the simple reason that he was able to make contact with groups and media in the Congo which was very difficult for non-Africans to reach. He was, for a year or two, a first-class intelligence source basically: not an action source, but an intelligence source.

Mr. Baron. When you read the sentence that is at the beginning of paragraph B on the first page where it says: "Concur this possibility worth watching, but if decided support for YQPROP objectives. Believe essential such be provided through third national channel with PBPRIME role completely concealed."

What are you referring to there?

Mr. Tweedy. I am not sure; I do not remember. I do not recall what the incoming cable said.

What I am obviously saying is 04 [redacted] had, I guess, an 05 [redacted] wife who was, at least had been, 08 [redacted] [redacted]. I think what I was saying is, if we wanted to use

Schotroffe directly in an assassination attempt, that I would not dismiss it out of hand.

Mr. Baron. You would be concerned about its security?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. You then would say the phrase "YOPROP objectives" would refer to an assassination attempt?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baren. That the assassination, discussion of an assassination attempt, was being restricted to the YOPROP channel?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. On the last page of this document --

Mr. Tweedy. The only thing that worries me about this conclusion of mine is this, the more I read it, 2-B is another paragraph, which may not have had anything to do with Schotroffe at all and I do not feel, at least I cannot recollect, why any leaks would almost certainly have included the French if Schotroffe were involved in this. Thus, I am inclined to feel I am talking about somebody else and not Schotroffe.

Mr. Baron. I will represent to you in other cable traffic, I believe, which we will review as we proceed here, there was discussion of the use of ano[illegible].

Mr. Tweedy. This was probably the case. I do not think this refers to Schotroffe. B here I do not think refers to Schotroffe. I cannot recall --

Mr. Baron. Who?

YQPROP objectives would still refer to exploring possibilities to an assassination attempt?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. This may refer to exploring it with a different agent?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. On the last page, paragraph 3, it tells the Chief of Station: "Not intended you construe above comments as basically negative. You and colleague understand we cannot read over your shoulder as you plan and assess opportunities. Our primary concern must be concealment PBPRIME role unless outstanding opportunity emerges which makes calculated risk first class bet. Ready entertain any serious proposals you make based our high regard both your professional judgments."

What are you referring to in that paragraph? What message are you conveying to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Well, I think if you read the cable you will notice that we have found difficulty with a number of his proposals. These were exploratory proposals. I wanted --

Mr. Baron. For carrying off an assassination mission?

Mr. Tweedy. You keep coming off with an assassination mission as if this was always just around the corner. What I am saying is, we are in a period here quite common in our business of very intensive operational planning and exploration.

All sorts of things were coming up from the field. I had commented on it here; in the end, I say, do not be discouraged because you do not see the probable channel we will use. I assume the colleague was Sid Gottlieb, because I guess he was still there.

Mr. Baron. The first time he had not arrived, but you had already cabled that his arrival was imminent?

Mr. Tweedy. I assume that that is the colleague. I do not think he would have talked to anybody else on it. That is all it means.

It is, if you like, a technique of management.

Mr. Baron. Moving on to a document that we will mark Exhibit 4, the next cable, is from Allen W. Dulles of September 24, 1960 and your pseudonym is also listed as one of the senders of the cable to the Chief of Station.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. In this cable, in the first paragraph, it says: "We wish give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position or if he fails in Leop" -- meaning Leopoldville -- "setting himself in Stanleyville or elsewhere."

First, for the record, any time your pseudonym "Jadwin" or your name "Tweedy" appears in the upper lefthand corner of a cable or your signature appears on the bottom, you dispatched that cable? Is that not right?

I am referring generally to the cable traffic.

Mr. Tweedy. What it means is this. It could mean several things, but I personally dictated the cable and dispatched it without further reference, or for some reason I constructed the cable and had it released by a higher authority, either Mr. Bissell or Mr. Dulles. Although those were not the only alternatives, if my name was on it, I was connected with it in one form or another.

I would guess that I dictated the cable and that Mr. Dulles -- and I do not have any idea how this came about -- Mr. Dulles wanted to see it, and Mr. Bissell suggested that it go out from Mr. Dulles and myself, I just do not know. What this means is, Dulles and Tweedy were totally aware of the cable.

Mr. Baron. Returning then to the sentence I cited from the cable where you and Dulles were talking about giving every possible support in eliminating Lumumba, what message --

Mr. Tweedy. "Eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position." This, if I may say so, reverts to the original instruction from Mr. Dulles which was that the U.S. position was that Mr. Lumumba must be removed from a position of authority in the Congo and that assassination was not by any means the only way by which this might be accomplished.

This, I think, merely reiterates that it is not a -- being a YQPROP cable does not refer specifically to assassination.

Mr. Baron. Would this cable, in using the phrase "eliminating Lumumba" in this context contemplate assassination as at least one of the possible means that might be used?

Mr. Tweedy. I am afraid if I may say so you are putting words in my mouth. This is exactly what it says. He has two messages now from Mr. Dulles. The first one, I think, was perfectly clear. Since then he has had messages from Mr. Dulles' subordinates like myself. This merely makes it clear again that Headquarters wishes to "give every possible support in eliminating Lumumba from any possibility resuming governmental position." and I cannot say more than that, and I think to say that this stresses assassination would be quite untrue. But the Chief of Station in Leopoldville was already under instruction to be considering this as one of the possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Assassination?

Mr. Tweedy. This does not change that.

Mr. Baron. I think that is fine.

The interesting aspect of that sentence for me is the rest of the sentence where it makes it clear that not only is there a concern about Lumumba being able to resume his position in Leopoldville, but anywhere else, and it would seem that assassination would at least have to be one of very few means that could insure that fact that Lumumba would not resume a position of power anywhere.

Mr. Tweedy. I do not think I can comment any further.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 5 a cable dispatched from the Chief of Station on September 27th, 1960 for your eyes only, and this cable begins with a reference to Dr. Gottlieb.

It says he was contacted 26 September. "We on same wave length." Then it continues, "Hence believe most rapid action consistent with security indicated."

The next paragraph says, "Basis 2 talks considering possibilities:" -- there follows a list of possibilities from A to G and paragraph 3 on the bottom of page 2 says, "Plan proceed on basis priorities as listed above, unless instructed to contrary."

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 5 for
identification.)

Mr. Baron. Does that indicate to you that on the list of priorities, priority A would have been considered by the Chief of Station to be his top priority?

Mr. Tweedy. Can you read, by the way, paragraph 2: "Basis 2 talks considering possibilities" of dispatching 04 [redacted] to Stanleyville and taking refuge -- that would be refuge, would it not?

Mr. Baron. Yes. "Recall 04 [redacted] from Stanleyville" --

Mr. Tweedy. -- "and have him take refuge with Big Brother" --

Mr. Baron. -- "Would thus act as inside man to brush up details to razor edge. Also would provide info on food and agricultural problem. Guthman recalling 04 [redacted] to Leop."

When Dr. Gottlieb looked at this cable, he testified that this cable indicated that he arrived in the Congo on the 26th of September. He had two talks with the Chief of Station where they discussed various operational possibilities of getting rid of Lumumba. The letter A represented their top priority plan.

Would you agree with that interpretation of the cable?

Mr. Tweedy. I would think so.

Mr. Baron. Would you --

Mr. Tweedy. When he says: "Plan proceed on basis priorities as listed above" this again is not what he was going to do at the conclusion of this without further reference carry out an assassination. He says, what we see is 04 [redacted] the best answer to our problem.

Mr. Baron. Does he not indicate in this cable though that he would proceed to implement these plans unless he were instructed to the contrary? In other words, this very cable might constitute his request for a confirmation.

Mr. Tweedy. I disagree. I think these various possibilities still need further exploration is what he was suggesting to Headquarters he concentrate on, that is the best possible use of 04 Schotroffe on this including further operational intelligence on the situation which might lead to an agreement that we would use this man, and then all these others, but it does not in any sense, as far as I am concerned, it is not in any sense the Chief of Station saying, if A looks terribly good I shall just go ahead and finish the job without further reference. Not at all.

Mr. Baron. I do not understand how you can read the phrase "unless instructed to the contrary" in that way.

Mr. Tweedy. Because there are other possibilities here. I am sorry, but I am afraid looking at it fifteen years later -- in the subject that you are engaged in, I think you would look at it entirely differently than I would, working on a day-to-day matter with the Chief of Station. There is absolutely nothing in this cable which says that they have the answer to 04 Schotroffe's use.

Mr. Baron. Does paragraph A indicate that 04 Schotroffe woul take refuge with Big Brother, meaning move into Lumumba's entourage?

Mr. Tweedy. I think probably this would be -- I am trying to think how this was.

06

Was this possibly [redacted]?

Mr. Baron. I do not know the operational details.

Mr. Tweedy. He did have some access to Lumumba's entourage, which was the reason we were so interested.

04

Mr. Baron. Would you assume that this cable is suggesting that [redacted] be recalled to Leopoldville so that he might move into Lumumba's entourage?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. Where it says he "would thus act as inside man to brush up details to razor edge," would you assume that refers to exploring the means by which Lumumba might be poisoned?

Mr. Tweedy. I think that is quite a possibility. I cannot specifically say yes. I suspect he was our best potential source for operational intelligence, if you like, on this.

Then he says "Also would provide info on food and agricultural problems." I have a vague recollection at this point that he was reporting rather importantly on aspects of food and agriculture which was a major political factor within the Congo then. I cannot put it any more clearly than that.

I think it is that this would be a byproduct of this, that we would get more good reporting on the subject.

WARD & PAUL

2

Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence literally instead of an oblique reference to getting access to Lumumba's food by which he might be poisoned?

Mr. Tweedy. I would read it much more literally than that.

Mr. Baron. Let us turn then to Exhibit 6, which is a cable from the Chief of Station on September 30th to Jadwin, which is yourself --

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 6 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Baron. -- in which the Chief of Station says: "No really airtight op possible with assets now available. Must choose between cancelling op or accepting calculated risks of varying degrees."

[redacted] best asset available. View necessity act immediately, if at all, urge Headquarters authorize exploratory conversations to determine if [redacted] willing take role as active agent or cut-out this op."

First, would you read the sentence or the phrase "view necessity act immediately, if at all" to refer to the fact that at this point Gottlieb had informed the Chief of Station that the lethal material was of a limited life?

Mr. Tweedy. I cannot really comment on that. That is certainly a perfectly reasonable explanation for that remark, but as I do not know exactly where Lumumba sat on that particular moment when this cable was sent, it might have something to do with his availability or something else, I just do not know.

Certainly your first point is a possibility. It equally makes clear, of course, that although [redacted] had been use in an operational intelligence support role, he at this point had never been cut in on plans. Of course, Chief of Station did not know whether he would be willing to go along with this set up or not.

Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station here is considering an

04

approach to Schotroff first on a hypothetical basis --

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

04

Mr. Baron. It is clear here, is it not, that Schotroff is being viewed as a potential assassination asset?

Mr. Tweedy. Indeed.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as Exhibit 7 a cable on 30 September 1960 signed by Glen Fields to the Chief of Station, again in the YQPROP channel.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 7 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Presumably, it is responding to the cable that we just looked at, and in this cable, Glen Fields says, "You are authorized have exploratory talks with OY [redacted] to assess his attitude toward possible active agent or cut-out role."

Would you assume that Glen Fields consulted you before sending this authorization to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. Not necessarily. I might have been out of town that day. As you will notice, all he says is, "You are authorized have exploratory talks" and "Agree with you initial discussions should be on hypothetical basis." And, of course, at that point, we would expect a report from the field on how it went. He was taking it one step further. He might not have cleared that with me if I were away. He might also have perhaps cleared it with Mr. Bissell.

Mr. Baron. As your Deputy, it would have been perfectly proper in your eyes for Glen Fields to have issued this cable without consulting you?

Mr. Tweedy. Certainly. It is quite possible, too, that he even told Mr. Bissell what he was planning to do. I cannot tell you specifically. This is all that this cable authorizes. I find it entirely within his delegated responsibilities.

Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for Glen Fields, in your absence, to mention to Richard Bissell the fact that such authorization to be sent to the Chief of Station on an exceptional and sensitive mission like this one?

Mr. Tweedy. Would you say that again?

Mr. Baron. Would it have been standard procedure for Fields to check with Bissell in your absence before he sent such a cable?

Mr. Tweedy. No. Field's understanding of his authorities and his relationships with the DDP on such matters were exactly the same as mine. We would have seen eye to eye with him.

If I had sent the cable, undoubtedly I would have let Mr. Bissell know that I was planning to carry this thing that much closer. The reason for that is that we were getting close to informing a third party that this was in the wind. Therefore, before we actually took this step, I think something like this, a third party being 04 [redacted].

tape 2a

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 8, we will introduce a cable on October 7th, 1960, from the Chief of Statin to Jadwin, which is yourself.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 8 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. This cable begins with a reference to Sidney Gottlieb, and he: "Departed Leop for PBPRIME 5 October, view expiration date his materials. However, left certain items of continuing usefulness. Guthman plans continue try implement op."

Do you have any independent recollection of receiving this cable?

Mr. Tweedy. You know, it's terribly hard when you see something that clearly occurred, and to me I read, it's terribly hard at this stage to say, of course I remember. It all reads perfectly familiar to me now. To say quite specifically I recall receiving the cable will perhaps go a little beyond my memory.

Mr. Baron. Based upon having read this cable at that time, which you assume you did, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely.

Mr. Baron. You would have known that Sidney Gottlieb had left the Congo on October 5th and that the Chief of Station planned to continue to try to implement the operation.

Mr. Tweedy. Which means that he would continue his exploratory operational work to see if he could come to some solution.

Mr. Baron. You would read that sentence still to apply to an exploratory phase, a phase in which the Chief of Station was exploring the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba as opposed to moving to implementing?

Mr. Tweedy. Absolutely. Under no circumstances anything else.

Mr. Dawson. Based upon this Exhibit and the previous one then, Mr. Tweedy, is it your opinion that in this case no agent was ever asked to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes, indeed. That also coincides with my best recollection which is not all that damn good. It is perfectly obvious that 04 [redacted] was never requested to assassinate Lumumba, and I have no recollection of anybody having been asked to do this.

Mr. Dawson. Whether the discussion was hypothetical, as outlined in the previous exhibit.

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Dawson. Why is it obvious that 04. [redacted] was never asked to assassinate Lumumba in light of the sentence in this cable that reads, "Although did not pick up ball," -- referrin to the fact that 04 [redacted] did not necessarily pick up the ball on assassinating Lumumba in his conversation with the Chie of Station, the Chief of Station nevertheless believed "he prepared take any role necessary within limits security acco plish objective."

Does that not indicate that 04 [redacted] was at least viewed as someone who was prepared to undertake an assassination mission if he should be tasked with it?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not say he was not. This at that time is the Chief of Station's best assessment of what the 04 [redacted] reaction would be if the thing was formally put to him so bluntly that he understood entirely what it was all about. I do not recall, I do not believe any of this residual traffic indicates that it ever got so far that we did that, and I think, my own belief is it is a 50-50 proposition on whether 04 [redacted] would agree to do it. I think probably in "limits security accomplish objective" is probably the controlling factor. I cannot really recall anymore.

Mr. Dawson. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Baron. Back on the record.

This report on October 7th by the Chief of Station refers back to the exploratory conversations that he mentioned he was --

Mr. Tweedy. Implied to by Fields.

Mr. Baron. -- authorized by Fields in the previous cable of the 30th.

Mr. Tweedy. Right.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 9, we will introduce a cable signed by B. Tweedy to the Chief of Station in the YOPROP channel.

(The document referred
to was marked Tweedy
Exhibit No. 9 for

2

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

identification.)

Mr. Baron. It begins, "Had good discussion your colleague 7 October. Comments follow:"

"A. Be assured did not expect YOPROP objectives be reached in short period and understand current situation fully warranted return your colleague."

And then it continues to discuss the fact that you were considering dispatching a third country national operator and a senior case officer from the CIA who would "run this op and outside agent full time under your direction."

Does this cable refer to the fact that you debriefed Sidney Gottlieb?

Mr. Tweedy. I am sure it does. That is what it must be, yes.

Mr. Baron. The first paragraph is meant to indicate that the Chief of Station should not feel that Headquarters would be disappointed in the fact that he did not pull off an assassination mission in such a short period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. I want to be careful to how I reply to that. All I was saying to a very professional colleague was that we had no illusions about the fact that the planning operation of this would be very difficult, at best, and would take time and thoroughly agree with the fact that prospects, immediate prospects, were such that there was no alternative for Sidney Gottlieb to return. That is all I was saying.

But to say what I was trying to express to him was the fact that we were not overly disappointed that Lumumba was not assassinated at this point is just not the level of intercourse that I had with a very professional Chief of Station. That is all.

Mr. Baron. Does not the paragraph A here indicate that the objective of the mission that was discussed in the YQPROP channel was to assassinate Lumumba in view or in light of the fact that Gottlieb had gone to the Congo with materials that were only going to be lethal for a short period of time?

Mr. Tweedy. That is what it says.

Mr. Baron. In other words, what I am trying to explore with you is your characterization of this entire stage of the operation as one of planning and exploration when we know that Gottlieb took materials to the Congo which would only be lethal for a short period of time and presumably was prepared to move from exploration to implementation?

Mr. Tweedy. If, as a result of the Station focusing on the problem for the first time, as a result of Headquarters' request, they had come up with a plan that they thought was exceedingly solid and which Headquarters approved, it is not surprising, perhaps, that we wanted the materials there to take advantage of such, if you like, an unlikely event. But this would not change the normal sequence of events, which would be that the Station would explore, keep Headquarters informed, Headquarters would comment, it would then be a cresendo of agreement or no agreement at all resulting from either a final request for approval or either approval or no approval. This would not have changed.

Mr. Baron. Because Gottlieb took lethal materials to the Congo with him that had such a short period of lethality, were you not contemplating at that time that the operation might well move from the exploration phase to the implementation phase just as soon as Gottlieb and Hedgeman determined that it was feasible?

Mr. Tweedy. I think I would put it quite differently. I think that I would say that we would have been remiss in not being in a position to exploit, if we reached the point where we all agreed that the thing was possible.

If they had merely gone over and said we think we can do it, by why do you not send the stuff from Headquarters, that would have been sort of nonsense, if you follow me.

Mr. Baron. You would have expected the Chief of Station to cable back for confirmation, but it was certainly within your contemplation at the time that when Gottlieb went to the Congo, when the Chief of Station cabled for confirmation, you would probably give him a go ahead to assassinate Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all.

Mr. Baron. If the operation were feasible?

Mr. Tweedy. I did not say that at all. It would not have been my say-so. I do not know what the policy levels of my Agency, who in turn would have been reflected in the policy levels of the government, would have done if it had come to the point where somebody said, we can do it, do you want us to do it.

Mr. Baron. You would have referred that to Bissell?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

Mr. Baron. He would have referred it?

Mr. Tweedy. He would have referred it according to his lights. That was not my business. He was his own level of authority. He was as aware of his authority as I was at my level. I only assume that this would have been discussed at the highest level, certainly at the Agency. I assume that the decision would have had to have been made by Allen Dulles and who else he wished to consult in Washington.

These are pure assumptions on my part. Under no circumstances would I have given the go ahead.

Mr. Dawson. That is interesting.

Mr. Baron. I just have one more question on this line. I realize we are going very closely over this ground. We would not be doing it if it weren't important in trying to get you to clarify for the record exactly what shade of meaning you want to attach here.

Would it be fair to say that when you dispatched Gottlieb to the Congo you expected to hear back --

Mr. Tweedy. I expected this would result in a dialogue between the Station and ourselves as to what might be feasible.

Mr. Baron. You were hoping?

Mr. Tweedy. Gottlieb assisting the Chief of Station in his explorations.

Mr. Baron. In view of the entire policy of the Agency at that time, as indicated in the cables of Dulles and the cables from yourself and Bissell to the Congo, you were hoping that Gottlieb and the Chief of Station would find a feasible means of carrying out an assassination mission and then inform you of that.

Mr. Tweedy. I am not going to comment on the hope. I do not know what my frame of mind was on that.

The purpose of the exercise was to see whether this was possible. One thing was clear, that I was the instrument of policy in carrying out the exploration which was entirely a professional matter. If the exploration had reached a point where we felt that we could submit to higher authority a plan which we thought made some sense, at that point higher authority would have to take the ball and run with it and let us know what they concluded.

Mr. Baron. By higher authority here, you mean any authority higher than yourself?

Mr. Tweedy. It would start with me in my chain of command. I would not be concerned with the National Security Advisor to the President or anybody else, I was perfectly clear in my mind because of what had occurred and the way that these matters had been broached to the field by Mr. Dulles, that the thing was in the national arena and was just not in the Agency's arena.

What Mr. Dulles would have done and what he felt his authorities were from higher authority I cannot tell you.

Mr. Dawson. That would have been a matter that would have been between Mr. Bissell and Mr. Dulles, is that correct?

Mr. Tweedy. In the first instance, it would have been between Mr. Dulles and the outside world, the Executive.

Mr. Dawson. The chain of command would have been, you would have talked to Bissell, you would not have been expected or would have asked what Mr. Dulles' view were?

Mr. Tweedy. Mind you, we were also an Agency that was very flexible. I am not saying Mr. Dulles might not have talked to me about this, that was because Mr. Bissell was not immediately available, or something of this kind.

What I am saying is at the working level, the operational level, the Divisional and the Station level, we had come up with a plan which made professional sense to us which we felt sound enough so that we would present it to our masters, we would have done so and the resultant instruction to the field would have depended on their reaction as far as I was concerned within the Agency. As far as Mr. Dulles was concerned, I cannot

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

tell you.

In other words, the degree to which he thought he would have to refer further to Washington on, I have no idea.

Mr. Baron. It was your job to find a feasible way to carry out an assassination; it was the job of Bissell and those above him to decide whether to go ahead, as far as you were concerned?

Mr. Tweedy. As far as I was concerned, that is the way it started.

Mr. Dawson. You have no independent or specific recollection that you ever went to Mr. Bissell and said, we do not have a shot at this, or we do, and we could do it this way, and him saying one thing or another? You have no recollection either way?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell read the same traffic I did.

Mr. Dawson. I did not know that.

Mr. Tweedy. He read these cables. When I say he read every single one of them word for word -- all I can say is he had full access to these cables and anything he had not read or had any reason to believe he had not read, I would have kept him generally briefed on the progress of the planning. Naturally, he would have been interested. He would not have followed it in detail.

Mr. Dawson. Would Mr. Dulles have had any access to these cables?

Mr. Tweedy. Not routinely. I think he would have expected

Mr. Bissell to keep him orally informed on a thing like this. He did not want any more paper floating around in those days. Mr. Dulles was in even another building. Now, we were all down at the Reflecting Pool at that point, were we not, and Mr. Dulles was on E Street. It doesn't make any difference. The number of papers on this YQPROP thing would have been restricted to the absolute minimum. I do not think Mr. Dulles would have expedted to be bothered with the operational details. What he would have expected from Mr. Bissell was progress on planning the elimination of Lumumba by whatever means.

Mr. Dawson. Was the routine way that that information would have been given to Mr. Dulles -- for instance, what I'm thinking was, were there staff meetings at which you attended with Mr. Bissell in Mr. Dulles' presence concerning what was happening generally on a routine quarterly or weekly basis?

Mr. Tweedy. Mr. Bissell would have seen Mr. Dulles by and large every day.

Mr. Dawson. They would not review meetings on a weekly or routine basis?

Mr. Tweedy. He had his own staff meeting every morning, Mr. Dulles did. These were attended by his Deputy Directors, of which Mr. Bissell was one.

I used to see Mr. Bissell -- he had a staff meeting once a week which all Chiefs of Division attended. Nothing like this would be discussed at those. I had my own private meetings with him on these matters whenever it seemed necessary by one or the other of us.

Mr. Baron. Returning to the cable of October 7th, 1960, which you sent to the Chief of Station, the reference to a senior case officer who might be dispatched to the Congo, is that a reference to the fact that Bissell was considering dispatching Justin O'Donnell?

Mr. Tweedy. No other candidate, no other. I assume that is who it is.

Mr. Baron. O'Donnell's account that he was asked by Bissell to go to the Congo to carry off the assassination of Lumumba would fit here?

Mr. Tweedy. Sure.

Mr. Baron. The third country national referred to in this cable and in other cables as someone you are considering dispatching to the Congo to help with the operation, would that be QJWIN or WIROGUB?

Mr. Tweedy. As I told you before, definitely not WIROGUE. Presumably this other fellow, whose identity and what he was is very, very unclear to me.

03

Mr. Baron. The agent that was run by Arnold Silver?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. This would have been the man that would have worked with Justin O'Donnell if it had all happened.

Mr. Baron. That was QJWIN. I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent who was supervised by Justin O'Donnell.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Tweedy. We read that that time, which is my only recollection of it. That is the person I am sure.

Mr. Baron. Let me correct myself here.

I will represent to you that QJWIN was the agent that was recruited by Arnold Silver 03 and sent by Silver 03 to the Congo for use by O'Donnell and perhaps by the Chief of Station.

Is that consistent with your recollection?

Mr. Tweedy. No, it is not consistent with my recollection. It is certainly consistent with what I read the last time I saw you, which I have no reason to dispute. I just cannot remember the blighter at all.

Mr. Baron. As Exhibit 10, let us introduce a cable of October 15th, 1960, which is not sent in the YQPROP channel. It is marked RIBAT[redacted]FLAT 02 in the space where sensitivity indicators are usually placed.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 10 for identification.)

3182

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Baron. This cable requests the views of the Chief of Station on suggestions A, B and C for various covert operations. In paragraph C, there is a reference to 02 WIROAK.

Mr. Tweedy, we have received the representation from the CIA that that was a cryptonym used to refer to Lumumba. Is that consistent with your interaptation of the cable?

Mr. Baron. It is indeed.

Mr. Tweedy. This paragraph C says in part: "Only direct action we can now stand behind is to support immobolizing or arresting 02 WIROAK, desirable as more definitive action might be. Any action taken would have to be entirely Congolese."

Now, you signed this cable, but it was not sent in the special sensitivity channel that dealt with Gottlieb's mission to the Congo?

Before we discuss this cable, let us also introduce into the record as Exhibit 11 another cable which you signed on October 15, 1960 which was sent in the YOPROP channel to the Chief of Station.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 11 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. This contains the following language: "You will note from cable through normal channel currently being transmitted" then it continues "on YQPROP suggestions. You will probably receive more along these lines as stumbling bloc OZ WIROAK represents increasingly apparent all studying Congo situation closely and his disposition spontaneously becomes number one consideration."

Mr. Tweedy. I think by that, I think it is perfectly God-awful English.

Mr. Baron. The cable continues --

Mr. Tweedy. Obviously that means that everyone one talked to said there is no solution to the Congo as long as Lumumba stays in a position of power or influence there. That is what that means.

Mr. Baron. The cable continues: "Raise above so you not confused by any apparent duplication. This channel remains for specific purpose you discussed with colleague and also remains highest priority."

Now, does this pair of cables indicate that at this point despite the indication in the first cable that we looked at that "direct action would be limited to entirely Congolese action" the actual position of yourself and others at Headquarters involved in this operation was that exploration of an assassination mission remained the highest priority for the Chief of Station?

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Mr. Tweedy. I think that is accurate.

We had come to the end of the road, at least temporarily on the YQPROP aspect and for the time being we were in no position to approve anything but what was discussed in the 02 WIFLAP cable. Nonetheless, as long as the threat to the Congo from Lumumba existed, there remained a high priority to search for means to take care of the YQPROP planning aspects.

Mr. Baron. When the cable refers to the specific purpose you discussed with colleague --

Mr. Tweedy. This is assassination with Gottlieb, I am sure.

Mr. Baron. It then says: This purpose remains highest priority. Would that not indicate to the Chief of Station that he should proceed to find a way that Lumumba could be assassinated?

Mr. Tweedy. What this would mean to the Chief of Station was that he should retain exploration of possible means of assassinating Lumumba as highest priority. He should continue to seek means to do this, not to do it.

Mr. Baron. Again, you are maintaining you have just made yourself clear, as far as you were concerned, you were still asking him to explore and not implement at this point?

Mr. Tweedy. Nothing else but.

Mr. Baron. Who would have had access to or received distribution of the first cable we looked at which travelled in

02
the [redacted]FLAT channel?

Mr. Tweedy. It would have been restricted, but not as restricted as the other.

Mr. Baron. Would somebody at the Embassy conceivably have been cut in on cable traffic in the channel that dealt with 02 [redacted]FLAT operations?

Mr. Tweedy. Could be, certainly.

Mr. Baron. In other words, the purpose of sending a second cable on the same day which dealt with action against Lumumba was what?

Mr. Tweedy. The simple reason I think -- I say I think, because I cannot tell you so -- as I said a few minutes ago, obviously you'd come temporarily to the end of the line on YQPROP. Measures taken to shore up 01 [redacted] position in the Congo, Mabutu, would have served to support the general objective, of containing Lumumba by whatever means. It is all part of the same purpose.

Once again referring to the original cable from Mr. Dulles which said all means, in effect, and I think the reason I'm putting this in the open channel, the open channel is still --

Mr. Baron. Simply the ordinary channel used between yourself --

Mr. Tweedy. Still a restricted channel. RIBAT is a restricted thing, in any event. This could have been discussed with the Ambassador or the Embassy, if any aspect of it seemed appropriate by the Chief of Station.

Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable would only have been seen by the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. The Embassy would not have been shown this cable anyway. We do not show the traffic to the Embassy; we discussed it.

Mr. Baron. It would have been propr for the 02 [redacted]FLAT cable to be conveyed in some manner?

Mr. Tweedy. To be discussed.

Mr. Baron. Between the Chief of Station and perhaps the Ambassador?

Mr. Tweedy. Discussed; only orally.

Mr. Baron. By contrast, the YQPROP cable clearly would have been restricted to the Chief of Station?

Mr. Tweedy. I have no reason to believe that the YQPROP business was discussed with the Ambassador, I do not believe it was, although Mr. Dulles, in his original cable, said he could, if he wanted to.

Mr. Baron. Let us introduce as the final exhibit for the moment Exhibit 12, a cable of October 17, 1960 going to Jadwin from the Chief of Station.

In this cable, the Chief of Station is responding to your suggestion that a senior case officer might be dispatched to the Congo to handle the YQPROP operation. He says it is an excellent idea. Is that a fair interpretation?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes.

(The document referred to was marked Tweedy Exhibit No. 12 for identification.)

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Baron. The Chief of Station then makes a suggestion in the fourth paragraph for equipment that might be provided if such a case officer were to be sent. He says, "If case officer sent, recommend Headquarters pouch soonest high powered foreign make rifle with telescopic sight and silencer. Hunting good here when lights right. However as hunting rifles now forbidden, would keep rifle in office pending opening of hunting season."

Would you take that to be a recommendation by the Chief of Station, if a case officer was sent to the Congo to concentrate on the YQPROP operation, he should be provided with the kind of weapon that would be suited for a sniper shot at Lumumba?

Mr. Tweedy. Yes. Not necessarily to be fired by the case officer, obviously not, but at least used in the operation.

Mr. Baron. This reference to the hunting season can be taken as a reference obliquely to the fact that Lumumba was in UN custody and that there would not be, in effect, "open season" on him until he showed his face outside of UN custody. Would that be a fair interpretation?

Mr. Tweedy. I would not have interpreted it quite the same way. I would have interpreted it this way, which was if it, as a result of Headquarters suggestion that a rifle be provided to the Station, the Station would come up with an operational plan involving the use of the rifle which Headquarters would approve, and that thus, in effect, the operation was on by a rifle, that would be the opening of the hunting season. In other words, the point where they knew how it could be used and Headquarters had approved its use.

Mr. Baron. I have one other general question before we take a break, and that is, returning to Sidney Gottlieb's account of his conversation with Richard Bissell about making preparations for carrying off an assassination against an African foreign leader if it were required, Gottlieb said in that context that he had higher authority for such an operation. Gottlieb also said that he clearly interpreted Bissell to mean that Bissell had Presidential authority for such an operation? Did you have any knowledge of such a conversation between Gottlieb and Bissell from any source?

tape 2b

Mr. Tweedy. I do not recall that Gottlieb and I ever discussed higher authority and approval. I do not say that it did not occur. If Gottlieb said that he had this impression in talking to Bissell, I cannot say no, but I cannot comment on it further.

Mr. Baron. For the moment, we have no further questions and we will take a break now and pick up again before the full Committee and Executive Session this afternoon.

Thank you very much for your patience in going through these documents one by one. It has been extremely helpful to us.

(Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m. the hearing concluded.)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

ALLEN W. DULLES

DCI

8301

AUGUST 26, 1960

SECRET

PRIORITY X

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

ROUTING

1 2 3 4 5 6

OUT 62966

TO: LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: CCP

LEOP INFO CITE DIR 47587

PRIORITY

RYBAT

FOR ROBERT GUTHMAN FROM ASCHAM

1. IN HIGH QUARTERS HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE ~~XX~~ WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION.

2. HENCE WE WISH TO GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY ALONG LINES LEOP 0772 AND LEOP 0745 AND DIR 46115 INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT. WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU AND IN ADDITION TO SUMS HERETOFORE AUTHORIZED, WE FURTHER AUTHORIZE EXPENDITURE

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

INITIALS

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

PAGE 2

OUT 62366
DIR 47567

INFO

CITE DIR

P TO A TOTAL OF $100,000 TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT HIM. ADVISE OUR CASH NEEDS.

3. TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, OU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE HE OES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY HERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE.

4. THIS MESSAGE HAS BEEN SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT EVEL ODACID.

END OF MESSAGE

*(IN 39706)
**(IN 41222)
***(OUT 59559)

CABLE SECRETARIAT: LIMIT DISTRIBUTION TO MR. HELMS.

RVM

SEP 24 1975

CIA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

C/AF SR

SECRET

2443

DATE: 19 September 1960

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3			

Sep 19 19 19Z

TO : LEOPOLDVILLE

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: C/AF

INFO: DDP, S/C 2

☐	DEFERRED	
☐	ROUTINE	
☒	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☐	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

71464

OUT 71464

TO (PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 014

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN FROM JADWIN

RYBAT YQPROP

1. IDEN PROCEEDING BRAZZAVILLE SHORTLY AND SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. HE WILL MAKE HIS WAY LEOP SOONEST THEREAFTER CALL YOU AT OFFICE ON ARRIVAL. WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID F PARIS". BRIEF COVER DISCUSSION WILL THEN BE HELD IN WHICH "SID" SUGGESTS MEETING YOU AT OFFICE AND YOU WILL RESPOND BY AGREEING AND SETTING THE TIME. HOWEVER THE ACTUAL MEETING WILL TAKE PLA ONE HOUR EARLIER THAN TIME MENTIONED IN THIS CONVERSATION AND IN FRONT MAIN ENTRANCE NEW STANLEY HOTEL. "SID" WILL CARRY UNROLLE COPY OF "PARIS MATCH" IN LEFT HAND.

2. IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE IDEN SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS A MENT TO YOU. HOWEVER HIS ETA NOT FIRM AND YOU SHOULD NOT BE CONCERNED BY SOME DELAY.

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

NW

IRECTOR

PRECEDENCE		DEFERRED	
		ROUTINE	
		PRIORITY	INITIALS
		OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT [illegible]

INFO

CITE DIR

PAGE TWO

3. ACKNOWLEDGE ABOVE SOONEST, WITH ANY REVISIONS YOU WISH MAKE IN ABOVE PROCEDURES. CONTINUE USE YOPROP INDICATOR ALL TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF.

END OF MESSAGE

DD/P

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/AF

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

B. Tweedy 589
C/AF
2445
19 September 1960

LEOPOLDVILELE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DDP, S/C 2

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

SEP 19 19 60

SECT.

PRECEDENCE		
	DEFERRED	
	ROUTINE	
X	PRIORITY	INITIALS
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

71464

OUT 71465
71465

CITE DIR 01

(PRITY) LEOP INFO

RYBAT YQPROP

RE DIR 71464 (OUT 01443)

IDEN SIDNEY BRAUN.

END OF MESSAGE

DD/P
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

C/AF
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

D. Tweedy
C/AF
2445 670
22 September 1960

SECRET

ROUTING

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DDP, C/C 2

	DEFERRED
	ROUTINE
X	PRIORITY
	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 71837

(PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 0303

05094

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

RE LEOP 0025 (IN 18989)

IF VERY WELCOME. COMMENTS FOLLOW.

A. RE 2A. CONCUR MAXIMUM USE 04 [redacted] FOR COLLECTI OF INTEL. MUST REMAIN UNWITTING FOR TIME BEING ALTHOUGH PRESU YOU WILL BE ASSESSING FOR MORE ACTIVE ROLE. ALTHOUGH 04 [redacted] HAS APPARENTLY MAINTAINED SPLENDID COVER, MUST REMEMBER CLOS EXAMINATION HIS BACKGROUND WILL REVEAL HE RESIDENT ALIEN 11 [redacted], ONE LEG ON 11 [redacted] PASSPORT AND WIFE 08 [redacted]

B. RE 2B. CONCUR THIS POSSIBILITY WORTH WATCHING BUT IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR YQPROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SU BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH PBPRIME ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. IMAGINE YOU CONCUR OUR BELIEF SUBJECT'S SECURITY LIKELY BE POOR AND LEAKS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INCLUDE [redacted]

24 1975

CIA

USR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

SECRET

MESSAGE ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO :

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF :

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
☐ PRIORITY
☐ OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT 7[illegible]

TO INFO CITE DIR 03094

PAGE TWO

C. RE 2C. YOU MUST HAVE MUCH BETTER PERSPECTIVE

05 [redacted] THAN WE, BUT TRACES INDICATE 11 [redacted] CONNECTI

AND THUS OUR COMMENTS ALONG LINES B ABOVE.

D. RE 2D. UNDERSTAND STATION HAS HAD REASONS QUESTION

02 [redacted]LAM REPORTING RELIABILITY AND WE MUST ASSUME 11 [redacted]

CONNECTIONS COMMENTS AS ABOVE.

E. RE 2E. FROM TRACES HERE ASSUME SUBJECT MAY BE STRO

ARM SUPPORTER OF KASAVUBU. NOTE PREVIOUS CZECH CONNECTIONS.

COMMENTS ALSO AS ABOVE.

F. RE 2F. AWAITING YOUR FURTHER EXPLORATION CNA CAPTA

CERTAINLY INTERESTED ANY POSSIBLE CNA SOLUTION. THIS SHOULD

PROVIDE MAXIMUM CREDIBILITY.

G. RE 2G. ASSUME YOU AGREE SUBJECT LEOP 0009 LIKELY BE

MOST RISKY VEHICLE THESE PURPOSES.

SEP 24 1975

CIA

RE PARAS THREE AND FOUR, INTERESTED YOUR CONTINUING

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER [redacted]

SECRET

DIRECTOR

			DEFERRED	
			ROUTINE	
			PRIORITY	INITIALS
			OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

OUT [illegible]

INFO **PAGE THREE** CITE DIR [illegible]

07

ASSESSMENT [redacted]BOTTLE AS GENUINE THIRD NATIONAL ASSET ON GROUND F WHATEVER ROLE THIS OP YOU MIGHT CONSIDER HIM. SOMEWHAT CONC YOUR RECENT REPORT HE MISUNDERSTOOD OR DISOBEYED INSTRUCTIONS

06

RE [redacted] EXPLOITATION, BUT HIS APPARENT INCREASING ACCESS TO MILIEU OF GREAT INTEREST. WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT ~~CONTACT~~ CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL AND WILL A SHORTLY.

3. NOT INTENDED YOU CONSTRUE ABOVE COMMENTS AS BASICALLY NEGATIVE. YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YO SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONC MUST BE CONCEALMENT PBPRIME ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUN EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGA BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS.

END OF MESSAGE

1975

2

C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

A. W. Dulles
DCI 570
2901
24 Sept. 60

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

X OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

TO DIRECTOR

[illegible]

[illegible], ADDP/A, [illegible], C/CI, C/FI 2, C/AF 3, S/C 2

OUT 73573
OUT 73573

OP IM LEOP INFO CITE DIR 02521
02521

RYBAT [redacted]FLAT 07

FROM ASCHAM AND JADWIN

RE: LEOP 0002 (IN 17384)

1. APPRECIATE EXCELLENT REPORTING YOUR REFERENCE AND COMMEND SCHOTROFFE 04 HIS ALERT ROLE. WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP, SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE.

2. WHILE FULLY AWARE OF NEFARIOUS PLOTTING GHANA, GUINEA, UAR, TO RESTORE LUMUMBA, GREATLY DISTURBED AT REFERENCE TO MOROCCO AND PARTICULARLY TUNISIA AS MEMBER OF THIS CLIQUE. CAN YOU SUGGEST ANY ACTION WE CAN PROPOSE ODACID OR TAKE OTHERWISE TO HELP DETACH THEM FROM LUMUMBA CAMP?

END

SEP 24 1975

CIA

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

PAGE 2

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

INFO

CITE DIR [illegible]

3. DISTURBED AT POSSIBILITY THAT 01 [redacted] MIGHT LOST CONTROL OF HIS FORCES DUE POSSIBLE HIGHER PAY BEING OFFERED SOURCES HOSTILE TO US AS SUGGESTED PARA 4 YOUR REFERENCE. IS PAY SITUATION IN ORDER AND CAN ANYTHING FURTHER BE DONE ABOUT THIS THROUGH UN OR COVERTLY THROUGH 01 [redacted]?

4. AGREE POSITION OUTLINED LAST SENTENCE REFERENCE WHICH WE ASSUME IS FULLY ENDORSED BY AMBASSADOR.

5. AT YOUR DISCRETION, SHARE THIS MESSAGE WITH AMBASSADOR.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: 04 [redacted] (2) reported on 23 September that Pierre Mulele, Gabriel Yumbu, and Antoine Gizenga of the PSA were mounting a coup against Mobutu and the Council of Commissioners

SEP 24 1975

CIA

DCI

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

RECE[illegible] FROM
SEP 2 1975
CIA

PRIORITY

IN 18989
LEOP 0026

02 [redacted]CLAM IN CONTACT 5 BALUBAS WHO HE SAYS ANXIOUS LAUNCH REF PROGRAM IF PROPER INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE.

E. HECTOR GEORGES MASSIANGA RECENTLY TOLD ODACID OFFICER AND GUTHMAN HE IN CONTACT SMALL GROUP CNA TROOPS WHO WOULD PARTICIPATE IF RECEIVE FINANCIAL ENCOURAGEMENT. GUTHMAN WITHDREW FROM TALKS AND ARRANGED HAVE ODACID OFFICER INTRODUCE MASSIANGA [illegible] NO RESULTS. THIS COULD BE PUSHED THROUGH ANOTHER

02 [redacted]CLAM TOLD BETTELHEIM HE IN CONTACT CNA CAPTAIN [illegible] REPRESENTS GROUP OF 4 (KASAVUBU, DEFENSE [illegible] [illegible] OF COMMISSIONERS, BOLIKANGO AND CAPTAIN). ASKED 02 [redacted]CLAM PUT HIM IN CONTACT BELGIAN, FRENCH OR OTHER GROUPS WILLING TRAIN AND ARM 1500 TROOPS LOCATED KITONA AREA. SAID HIS GROUP WANTS MOVE THEM LEOP IN ABOUT 8 DAYS TO TRY TAKE OVER CITY. PLAN NOT FEASIBLE AND DOUBT KASAVUBU AGREES. BUT MIGHT GET CAPTAIN INVOLVED REF OP.

G. SLIGHT CHANCE 02 [redacted]BOTTLE MIGHT TRY THROUGH SUBJECT LEOP 0009 (IN 18077).

3. PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY.

S-E-C-R-E-T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

PRIORITY

IN 18909
LEOP 2220

[illegible] IF PARA 4 A NOT FEASIBLE, 04 [redacted] POSSIBLE [illegible]

FOR PLANS [illegible] AWARE 04 [redacted] LIKE THIRD NAT[illegible]

IMMEDIATELY AVAILABLE FOR CUTOUT FUNCTIONS, SUCH PERSON [illegible]

CONTRIBUTE TO [illegible]

END OF MESSAGE

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 22 1975
CIA

[illegible] LEOPOLDVILLE

Sept 27

SEP 22 1975

CIA

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 18989

DIR [illegible] LEOP 0926

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 01443 (OUT 71464)

1. IDEN REF CONTACTED 26 SEPTEMBER. WE ON SAME WAVE LENGTH. GUTHMAN AFRAID 01 [redacted] WEAKENING UNDER AFRO-ARAB PRESSURE. HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED.

2. BASED [illegible] TALKS CONSIDERING POSSIBILITIES:

A. [illegible] 01 [redacted] FROM STANLEYVILLE AND HAVE HIM TAKE [illegible] WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRING [illegible] RAZOR EDGE. ALSO WOULD PROVIDE INFO ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURAL PROBLEM. GUTHMAN RECALLING 04 [redacted] TO LEOP.

B. SUBJECT LEOP 0981 (IN 16686) SAID HE PLANNED ACTION WITHIN 8 DAYS. DATE PASSED AND NO ACTION BUT IF PRICE RIGHT MIGHT GET SHOW ON ROAD.

C. 05 [redacted] WHO UNWITTING GUTHMAN POLITICAL CONTACT VISITED STATION 26 SEPTEMBER. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. SAID HAS NAMES 4-MAN SQUAD WHO WANT INTERVENE ACHIEVE POSITIVE SETTLEMENT. IF 05 [redacted] GROUP USED WOULD NEED CUT-OUT SUCH AS ROWTON. REALIZE PREFERABLE USE THIRD NATION[illegible]

S E C R E T

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

5

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (DR [redacted], AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DDP, S/C 2

SEP 30 23 40Z 60

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 20857

DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0[illegible]

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 03094 (OUT 74837)

[illegible] SEP 22 1975

CIA

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

04

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [redacted] BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF 04 [redacted] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS 04 [redacted] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

02

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [redacted]POTTLE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [redacted]

11

SECRET

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF (DR [redacted], AF DIV NOTIFIED 1940 30 SEP)

DDP, S/C 2

SEP 30 23 40 00

REC'D CABLE SECT.

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 20857

DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0[illegible]

RE[illegible] FROM

SEP 22 1975

CIA

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 03094 (OUT 74837)

1. NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. WE MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.

2. RE PARA 1 REF: WE BELIEVE [redacted] BEST ASSET AVAILABLE. VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [redacted] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS). IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM IN ORDER OBTAIN FULL VALUE HIS POTENTIAL. ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [redacted] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT.

3. FEAR MIGHT HAVE OVERSTATED POSSIBILITY [redacted] BOTTLE PARTICIPATION. BELIEVE HE UNSUITED ROLE AT PRESENT TIME, VIEW POSSIBILITY MAY ALSO BE REPORTING TO [redacted]

SECRET

PAGE 2

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

IN 22[illegible]
LECP [illegible]

TO INFO CITE

4. NEW POSSIBILITY EXISTS VIEW 29 SEPTEMBER GUTHMAN 02 KALISLE 1 TALKS. ALTHOUGH 02 KALISLE 1 PREVIOUSLY FAVORED SUBJECT REF OP, NOW BELIEVES HIS ANGOLAN GROUP WOULD BE SUPPRESSED IN CONGO AND REPLACED BY GUINEAN SUPPORTED GROUP IF SUBJECT EVER REGAINS ASCENDANCY. EXPRESSED VIEW NEED TAKE IMMEDIATE ACTION. THEREFORE PROPOSE EXPLORE 02 KALISLE 1 THINKING SOONEST TO SEE HOW FAR HE WILLING GO AND DETERMINE HIS ASSETS. ASSUMING 02 KALISLE 1 MEETING POSITIVE, DOES HQS CONSIDER HIM BE TRUE THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL FROM POINT VIEW SECURITY OF OP? IF 02 KALISLE 1 REACTION FAVORABLE, BELIEVE THIS OFFERS MEANS ACHIEVE OBJECTIVE EARLY ON PAR WITH 04 SCHOTROFFE IN SO FAR AS ACCESS AND SECURITY CONCERNED.

5. RE PARA 1F REF: AS OF NOW DO NOT HAVE ENOUGH INFO EVALUATE POTENTIAL OF CNA.

6. VIEW IMMINENT 04 SCHOTROFFE AND 02 KALISLE 1 MEETINGS, REQUEST HQS REPLY OPIM VIA EQUERRY LINK.

END OF MESSAGE

8/BR

SECRET

30 SEPTEMBER 1960

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

C/AF

DDP, S/C 2

☐	DEFERRED	30 31 32 54'[illegible]
☐	ROUTINE	
☐	PRIORITY	INITIALS
☒	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS

REPRO [illegible]

SEP 22 1975

OUT 75[illegible]

OUT 7590

LEOP INFO CIA CITE DIR 03680

03680

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

RE LEOP 0052 (IN 20857)

CS COMMENT:* URGED HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORAT[illegible] TALKS TO DETERMINE IF SCHOTROFFE WILLING [illegible] ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT.

1. YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH [redacted] 04 TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE. AGREE WITH YOU INITIAL DISCUSSIONS SHOULD BE ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS.

2. IT DOES APPEAR FROM HERE THAT OF POSSIBILITIES AVAILABLE [redacted] 04 BEST. WE STILL HAVE SOME WORRY ABOUT PBPRIME STAY TOGETHER WITH QUESTION OF WIFE. HOWEVER WE WILL WEIGH VERY CAREFULLY YOUR INITIAL ASSESSMENT HIS ATTITUDE AS WELL AS ANY SPECIFIC APPROACHES THAT MAY EMERGE. WE WOULD HOPE THA[illegible] A FEW DAYS STATUS QUO SITUATION WOULD ALLOW FOR MODERATE HASTE.

3. IN ABSENCE MORE DETAILS WE ARE RELUCTANT CONSIDER [redacted]LISLE ONE. 02 WHEREAS HE HAS BEEN LONG TIME CONTACT AND IN HIS SPECIFIC FIELD HE IS IN MOST RESPECTS AN AGENT WE WOULD STILL HAVE BASIC QUESTIONS AS TO CONTROL AND SECURITY. WE DO AGREE YOU SHOULD EXPLORE HIS THINKING WITH QUESTIONS MORE OBLIQUE THAN DIRECT. IF YOU FEEL WE ARE WRONG ON [redacted]LISLE ONE ASSESSMENT PLEA[illegible] 02 ADVISE AFTER NEXT TALKS WITH HIM.

4. APPRECIATE [illegible] YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM.

(END of MESSAGE)

GLENN FIELDS C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

Glenn Fields

COORDINATING OFFICERS

S-E-C-R-E-T

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Log

07 OCT 60 | SECRET

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF

DD/P, S/C 2

OCT 8 03 08 '60

REC'D CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 24171

LEOP [illegible]

PRITY DIR

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN*

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: DIR 03583 (OUT 75900)**

1. IDEN DIR 01443 (OUT 71464) DEPARTED LEOP FOR PBPRIME 5 OCT, VIEW EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS. HOWEVER LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. GUTHMAN PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP.

2. CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [redacted] REF. AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES, [redacted] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

3. IF HQS BELIEVES [redacted] PBPRIME STAY OR LOCATION WIFE PERMANENT BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. RECRUITMENT SUCH ASSET LOCALLY NOT FEASIBLE VIEW SECURITY PROBLEM AND LIMITED NUMBER POTENTIAL ASSETS. ONLY OTHER POSSIBLE ASSET HERE IS 03 WIBOTTLE 1. GUTHMAN DOUBTS HE CAPABLE SUCH ACTION. ALSO FEAR HE MIGHT REVEAL DETAILS TO UNION[illegible]

SECRET

DATE : 07 OCT 60

SECRET

TO

FROM

ACTION

INFO

IN 24171

LDEP [illegible]

PAGE -2-

4. PLEASE ADVISE.

END OF MESSAGE

DIS COMMENT: *EYES ONLY APPEARS TO BE IMPROPERLY USED. IN YOUR REPLY PLEASE ADVISE THE FIELD TO COMPLY WITH REGULATION 50-400.

**HQS AUTHORIZED GUTHMAN TO HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT ROLE

SECRET

C/AF
2445
7 October 1960

504

SECRET

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

FROM

1975

CIA

X PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

78336

(PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 048

RYBAT YQPROP

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

XXXXXXXX

1. HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT. COMMENTS FOLLOW:

A. BE ASSURED DID NOT EXPECT YQPROP OBJECTIVES BE REACHED IN SHORT PERIOD AND UNDERSTAND CURRENT SITUATION FULLY WARRANTED RETURN YOUR COLLEAGUE.

B. UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES [redacted] 04 SHOULD CERTAINLY NOT BE MADE WITTING BUT FUTURE CIRCUMSTANCES TARGET WILL CONTROL WHETHER YOU WISH RAISE THIS POSSIBILITY AGAIN FOR OP INTEL OR MORE ACTIVE ROLE.

C. MEANWHILE WE CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD NATIO OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR

WR

RELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

RECEIVED FROM
SEP 22 1975
CIA

PAGE TWO

[illegible] CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. IF YOU CONCLUDE H
SUITABLE AND BEARING IN MIND HEAVY EXTRA LOAD THIS PLACES
ON YOU, WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY SENIOR CASE OFFICER RU
THIS OP AND OUTSIDE AGENT FULL TIME UNDER YOUR DIRECTION.
IN ANY CASE THIRD NATIONAL WOULD NOT BE WITTING PRIOR DISPATCH
FROM HERE AND WOULD OSTENSIBLY BE SCHEDULED PERFORM
GENERAL OPS ROLE. WILL ADVISE PROGRESS ON THIS MAN.

2. COLLEAGUE MENTIONED ARRIVAL YOUR FAMILY AND HOPE TAK
LUANDA WEEKEND. WARMLY SUPPORT THIS AND ANY OTHER SHORT
LEAVE YOU CAN SCROUNGE. DO NOT WAIT TILL YOU TOO TIRED TO
BENEFIT FROM IT.

END OF MESSAGE

C/AF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

[redacted] I. Pro
[redacted] AFRICA
[redacted] 3662
15 October 1960

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

LEOPOLDVILLE

DIRECTOR

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

OUT81476

LEOP INFO CITE DIR 05205

05205

RYBAT WIFLAT 02

RE A. LEOP 0101 (IN 25261)
B. LEOP 0104 (IN 25967)
C. LEOP 0072 (IN 23052)

WOULD APPRECIATE YOUR VIEWS FOLLOWING:

A. FORMATION WIFLAT 1 01 [redacted] PRAETORIAN GUARD BY GIVING EXTRA PAY PERHAPS 25-50 PERCENT MORE THAN NOW BEING RECEIVED TO CORPS OF OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN UP TO 200. DO NOT FEEL THAT NATIONAL MILITARY SCHOOL GROUP CAN BE USED FOR THIS. RAISE QUESTION WHETHER LOYALTY ENLISTED MEN COULD BE SO HELD FOR LONG. SUGGEST THIS BEST HANDLED BY GIVING FUNDS TO WIFLAT 4 02 FOR HIM TO GIVE TO WIFLAT 1 01. PURPOSE THIS TO USE WIFLAT 4 02 TO KEEP HIS 01 SPINE STRENGTHENED.

B. AMMUNITION: WHAT RESERVES AMMUNITION TO BE HELD UNDER WIFLAT 1 01 CONTROL WOULD BE REQUIRED. ASSUME 10,000 ROUNDS FOR SMALL ARMS MIGHT SUFFICE. WE WOULD REQUIRE INFO CALIBRE AND

REC

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SEP 24 1975

NW

SECRET

IRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

DIR [illegible]

INFO PAGE TWO CITE DIR

TYPE WEAPONS INVOLVED. POSSIBLE METHODS DELIVERY ARE FOR [redacted] 02 CLAM PLANE TO TRANSPORT FROM ADJACENT TERRITORY, OR POSSIBLY FROM MATADI BY PLANE OR TRUCK. ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE GIVE MONEY TO [redacted] 02 LAT 5 TO GIVE TO [redacted] 02 LAT 7 FOR HIM TO PURCHASE DIRECT AND HAND OVER TO [redacted] 01

C. [redacted] 02 ROAK - IN VIEW OUR DISTRUST SUBJECT REF A EXPLORE [redacted] 02 CLAX KNOWLEDGE OF AND ACCESS TO FETICHEURS TO DETERMINE WHETHER BUYING OFF FETICHEUR AS [redacted] 02 ROAK SPIRITUAL SUPPORT MIGHT BE SERIOUS BLOW TO HIM. ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING [redacted] 02 ROAK, DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WELCOME YOUR VIEWS FOR OUR REVIEW ON ANY WAY THIS COULD POSSIBLY BE ACCOMPLISHED.

END OF MESSAGE

SEP 23 1960

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

S/GR

NW

511

15 October 1960

LEOPOLDVILLE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

(PRITY) LEOP INFO CITE DIR 0625

RYBAT YQPROP

EYES ONLY GUTHMAN

1. YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA ON YQPROP TYPE SUGGESTION. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING 02 BLOC WIROAK REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. FOR EXAMPLE WE HAD SOME AFRICAN TALKS WITH 11 FRENCH SERVICE THIS WEEK AND RE CONGO THEY CAME UP WITH THIS IMMEDIATELY. (NO INDICATION AT ALL 11 FRENCH SERVICE DOING ANYTHING SPECIFIC ABOUT IT.)

2. RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. RE DIR 04302, YOUR REACTION TO POSSIBLE DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OF

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

SECRET

ROUTING

1
2
3
4
5
6

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PRIORITY

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE

INITIALS

INITIALS

REC'D ... FROM
SEP 22 1975
CIA

INFO PAGE TWO CITE DIR

SOONEST TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT. WE STILL WORKING ON THIRD NATIONAL MENTIONED THAT REF, BUT WONDER WHETHER YOU THINK EARLY ARRIVAL CASE OFFICER WOULD MAKE SENSE. SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENT[illegible] AT YQPROP. ADVISE.

3. HAVE DISCUSSED 02 [redacted]CLAM WITH BETTELHEIM AND POSSIBILITY [illegible] COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION 02 [redacted]ROAK, EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF 02 [redacted]ROAK ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN AS RECENTLY. PICKED GROUP OF 01 [redacted]CNA TROOPS MIGHT ALSO BE CONSIDERED. REQUEST YOUR VIEWS.

END OF MESSAGE

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFI[illegible]

DIRECTOR

LEOPOLDVILLE

C/AF

DDP, S/C 2

Oct 17 23 48'60

RECD CABLE SECT.

PRIORITY

IN 25936

[illegible] FROM

1975

DIR INFO CITE LEOP 0145

EYES ONLY JADWIN FROM GUTHMAN

RYBAT YQPROP

REF: A. DIR 04632 (OUT 78336)

B. DIR 06250 (OUT 81396) *

1. 04 [redacted] HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE. THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB.

2. BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE [illegible] OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. SITUATION WILL BE EVEN MORE COMPLICATED WHEN WHATE GOES ELIZ 19 OCTOBER. IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE, GUTHMAN WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS.

3. SERIOUSLY DOUBT POSSIBILITY ASSAULT HOUSE, VIEW STRONG [illegible] CONCUR OP FEASIBLE IF SUBJECT GOES OUT INTO TOWN BUT VIEW UNA [illegible] WATCHING HOUSE, DOUBT HE WILL TRY THIS IN NEAR FUTURE. BELIEVE POSSIBLE TO MOUNT COMMANDO, PER REF B, BUT ASSUME HQS WOULD WANT THIS DONE BY THIRD NATIONAL ASSET.

4. IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH

SECRET

PAGE 2 SEP [illegible] 1975

CIA

PRIORITY

IN 2593

LEOP 01

INFO

CITE

POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SIGHT AND SILENCER HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLE NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON.

END OF MESSAGE

C/S COMMENT: *REQUESTED STA VIEWS RE POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP F ABDUCTION (SUBJ).

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :	157-10014-10100
RECORD SERIES :	MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	07-M-06

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SSCIA
FROM :	SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
TO :	
TITLE :	NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
DATE :	07/04/1975
PAGES :	72
SUBJECTS :	ASSASSINATIONS CIA TRUJILLO LUMUMBA, PATRICE GRAY, GORDON
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/05/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	CCBOX 450

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10100
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-06

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : SCHWARZ, FREDERICK A.O. JR.
TO :
TITLE : NOTES ON GORDON GRAY
DATE : 07/04/75
PAGES : 72
SUBJECTS : GRAY, GORDON

ASSASSINATIONS

TRUJILLO

LUMUMBA, PATRICE

CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 450

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

GORDON GRAY

450-2

Box 458

[redacted]

ToLmm Rmk Files
From: Frederick [redacted]
Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY
Date: 7/4/75

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Page	Subject
2262 XXXXX xxxxx	Biographical background
2268	Opinions on PFIAB generally
2272	Never heard of Executive Action
2273	"I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that ever came to President Eisenhower with respect to any assassinations,"XXX(2272-3)
2273	In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, xmkm: sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda, and the xkx training of Cuban refugees"
2274	There was one xx "well known individual" on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in Nor Vietnam". XxxxXxxxxxxxxx Gray says that "Agency polic was against assassination on the ground that it didn't accomplish anything".
2275	"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government".
2276	Xxxxxxxx At a meeting with Gray and a representative of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wante the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of this government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon the wisdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations."
2278-9	Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congress al xoversight committee because of danger of leake
2281	Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence office (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for In
2292	X ~~TRUJILLO~~: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Dom. Rep. wan high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subseque received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Se of State through the DCI.
2293	Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eis hower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. --"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

ToLxx Xxk Files
From: Frederick Bal
Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY
Date: 7/4/75

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Page	Subject
2262	Biographical background
~~XXXXX~~	
~~XXXX~~	
2268	Opinions on PFIAB generally
2272	Never heard of Executive Action
2273	"I know of no plan, plot, operational organization that ever came to President Eisenhower with respect to any assassinations," ~~xxx~~ (2272-3)
2273	In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, ~~xxxxx~~ sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda, and the ~~xxx~~ training of Cuban refugees"
2274	There was one ~~xx~~ "well known individual" on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North Vietnam". ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ Gray says that "Agency policy was against assassination on the ground that it didn't accomplish anything".
2275	"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government".
2276	~~xxxxxxx~~ At a meeting with Gray and a representative of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wanted the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of this government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon the wisdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations."
2278-9	Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congressional ~~x~~oversight committee because of danger of leaks
2281	Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer" (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)
2292	~~X TRUJILLO:~~ Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Dom. Rep. wanted high powered rifles with telescopic scopes~~x~~ and subsequentl received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy of State through the DCI.
2293	Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisenhower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. --"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

ToLxx Rxk Files
From: Frederick Ba
Re: Notes on GORDON GRAY
Date: 7/4/75

ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION TESTIMONY

Page	Subject
2262 XXXXX XXxXx	Biographical background
2268	Opinions on PFIAB generally
2272	Never heard of Executive Action
2273	"I know of no plan,plot, operational organization that ever came to President Eisenhower with respect to any assassinations,"XXX (2272-3)
2273	In 1960, Eisenhower "approved a four point program, xxxxx sabotage, stepped up economic sanctions, propaganda, and the xxx training of Cuban refugees"
2274	There was one xx "well known individual" on PFIAB who would ask at each CIA briefing on Vietnam "have you considered trying to bump off some of the leaders in North Vietnam". Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx Gray says that "Agency policy was against assassination on the ground that it didn't accomplish anything".
2275	"I know of no (assassination) plan or operational capability that has ever been authorized at any high level of government".
2276	Xxxxxxxx At a meeting with Gray and a representative of the CIA in 1958, "the President told me that he wanted the 54/12 gropp to pass upon all activities of this government which impinged upon the sovereignty or the people of some other nation....President Eisenhower was very sensitive to the necessity of having the top people in government from the appropriate agencies pass upon the wisdom, and in some cases, feasibility of those kinds of operations."
2278-9	Gray is unenthusiastic about proposal for Joint Congressional xoversight committee because of danger of leaks
2281	Gray recommends creation of a "chief intelligence officer" (either the DCI or a Special Assist. to the Pres. for Int.)
2292	X TRUJILLO: Gray did not recall Ambassador Farland's report in May, 1960 that dissidents in the Dom. Rep. wanted high powered rifles with telescopic scopesx and subsequentl received authorization to provide them by the Assist. Secy of State through the DCI.
2293	Gray did not recall Special Group meetings at end of Eisenhower Admin. (11/29/60; 1/12/61) at which it was agreed to furnish arms to dissidents in the Dom.Rep. --"I would think our concern was, if we had that kind of concern, was with being of assistance to the dissidents, and not assasssination, or that kind of activity."

These documents were pulled from a Special Group file by John Bayly. They should be replaced after we xerox those minutes we intend to use as exhibits for the Gray testimony.

Attached on top is copy of a CIA memo to be used as an exhibit.

BARON

July 8, 1975

GORDON GRAY

TOP SECRET

Chronology and Issues

Biographical Background

1942-1947	U.S. Army (Private to Captain)
1949-1950	Department of Army (ultimately Secretary of the Army)
1950-1951	Special Assistant to President TRUMAN
1951	Organized for TRUMAN the Psychological Strategy Board, which involved close contact with intelligence community
1951-1955	President, University of North Carolina
1955	Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA)
1958	Director, Office of Defense Mobilization
1958-1961	SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT (EISENHOWER) FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (Head of NSC)
1961-1975	Member, PFIAB (President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board) appointed by JFK

Chronology of Events

1959

		Issues and Questions
November 4	Special Group discusses Allen DULLES' "Cuba Propaganda Project" for use of radio transmitters. GRAY said "he was sure (the project would meet with high level approval" provided it was acceptable to the President of Mexico.	GRAY represents President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings.

1960 (Cont'd)		Issues and Questions
February 12	A "special" NSC meeting was held on this day. The only record of this meeting in the NSC minutes states: "On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written." (NSC Minutes)	Why were no minutes written?
February 17	Special Group approves evaluation of agents for Cuban sugar mill sabotage. GRAY "discussed this matter with his associate" (Eisenhower) and reported two tactical objections. (SG Minutes)	Does context show that phrase "his associate" refers to President EISENHOWER?
March 9	GRAY tells Special Group that any covert action like sugar mill sabotage should be undertaken only after overall consideration of "whether and how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO." (SG Minutes)	Did such consideration involve assassination plotting?
March 14	At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES "reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. Admiral BURKE suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the leaders around CASTRO were even worse than CASTRO." (NSC Minutes)	Was this "package deal" the simultaneous triple assassination plot that was mentioned on November 3, 1960?
	At a Special Group meeting, after a paper titled "General Covert Action Plan for Cuba" was read, there was "a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if FIDEL and RAUL CASTRO and CHE GUEVARA should disappear simultaneously." (SG Minutes)	Does this simultaneous disappearance plan refer to assassination planning? Is there a connection between this Special Group discussion and the NSC discussion on March 14, 1960, re a plan to remove Cuban leaders?
April 7	"GRAY asked the [Special] Group's views on what happens after TRUJILLO, specifically how CASTRO can be kept out of the Dominican Republic." Acting DCI CABELL recommends U.S. military intervention after TRUJILLO departs. (SG Minutes)	Did U.S. support TRUJILLO'S opponents out of a desire to keep CASTRO out of the Dominican Republic?

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
April 14	At an NSC meeting presided over by Vice President NIXON, Allen DULLES reported "TRUJILLO'S position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious. . . [he] thought further attempts will be made to kill or oust TRUJILLO." Under Secretary of State DILLON said "if TRUJILLO could be removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-CASTRO elements were prevented from seizing power in that country, our anti-CASTRO campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost. The Vice President agreed that getting rid of TRUJILLO would be a favorable development for us." (NSC Minutes)	Were these U.S. attempts to kill TRUJILLO? DILLON'S comment indicates that the U.S. had an active interest in removing TRUJILL What did NIXON mean by "getting TRUJILLO"?
April 14	Allen DULLES predicted at an NSC meeting, that one possible outcome with respect to CASTRO was an assassination that would make CASTRO a martyr. (NSC Minutes)	Does this show that assassination was not a favored alternative because it would produce martyrdom?
June 30	GRAY says "the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the CASTRO government." (SG Minutes)	General atmosphere of vehement opposition to CASTRO.
July 1	Memo from the Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI recommending delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes to the opponents of TRUJILLO. The memo said: "approval for delivery of these arms has been given by ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM."	Was the Special Group aware of this action Was the President aware of the plan? Purpose of weapons?
July 5	President EISENHOWER met with Secretary of State HERTER and others to discuss the Dominican Republic. "The President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution." (Conference Memorandum)	

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
July 7	Allen DULLES reported to the NSC that the Venezuelan government wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with TRUJILLO. DULLES stated: The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of TRUJILLO. . . . [Because] they have convincing evidence that TRUJILLO was responsible for the assassination attempt on BETANCOURT [President of Venezuela] . . . BETANCOURT believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it [his government] wants a showdown without delay." (NSC Minutes)	The U.S. was under pressure to move against TRUJILLO. Did TRUJILLO'S attempt against BETANCOURT make him "fair game" for assassination in the eyes of OAS nations including the U.S.
	"Mr. DULLES stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of TRUJILLO must be settled before the problem of CASTRO can be dealt with, even though CASTRO is the greater threat." (NSC Minutes)	
	The NSC Minutes further state that BETANCOURT was told that the U.S. cannot act without ascertaining TRUJILLO'S successor. The U.S. will work with BETANCOURT and FIGUERES of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor to TRUJILLO. President EISENHOWER suggested that a government in exile should be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of TRUJILLO'S downfall. (NSC Minutes)	Did the U.S. determine a successor? Did the U.S. "act"?
July 21	GRAY said "his associates" would favor the development of sabotage operations in CUBA. (SG Minutes)	"Associate" is the euphemism for Eisenhower. Does sabotage imply the further steps of assassination?

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
July 28	President EISENHOWER stated at an NSC meeting: "Until TRUJILLO is eliminated, we cannot get our Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with CASTRO." In this regard, "the President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the TRUJILLO situation, we would be the loser." (NSC Minutes)	Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?
August 12	BISSELL outlines 13.3 million dollar budget for Cuban operations which was to be laid before "higher authorities" for decision. (SG Minutes)	
August 16	Dr. Edward GUNN (CIA Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison for use against CASTRO. (IG REPORT p. 21)	Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or DCI DULLES aware of this?
August 25	After the Special Group approved anti-LUMUMBA operations in the Congo, "GRAY commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined would be sufficient to accomplish this . . . . It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA." (SG Minutes; emphasis added) At the NSC meeting, Mr. STANS suggested that the U.S. might "throw out LUMUMBA by peaceful means." (NSC Minutes)	Is this circumlocutious order for assassination from the President? An indication that at the least, assassination was within the range of acceptable means for "getting rid of LUMUMBA"?
August (approx)	BISSELL asks EDWARDS to find underworld contacts with Cuba to aid in an assassination operation	Were EISENHOWER, GRAY, or Allen DULLES aware of this? Was it authorized by

1960 (cont'd		Issues and Questions
September 8	During brief discussion of CONGO developments, "GRAY said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)	Against LUMUMBA personally?
September 21	Allen DULLES stated at an NSC meeting that "LUMUMBA was not disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of." (NSC Minutes)	Did the NSC contemplate "disposing of" LUMUMBA by assassination?
October 24	At an NSC meeting, Allen DULLES reported that "five Congolese soldiers had attempted to assassinate MOBUTO on the 15th of October. The U.S. had prior information of this attempt and had warned MOBUTO . . . (NSC Minutes)	Did this information prompt the U.S. to plot the assassination of LUMUMBA in retaliation or to protect MOBUTO?
November 3	At a Special Group meeting, Mr. MERCHANT "asked whether any real planning has been done in taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL and CHE GUEVARA. He said that without these three the Cuban government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously."	Was MERCHANT referring to an assassination of Cuban leaders?
	The minutes further state: "General CABELL pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cuban. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. MERCHANT'S suggestion is beyond our capabilities." (SG Minutes)	Shortly before this, CIA had made the assassination contract with the Mafia. Was General CABELL unaware of this CIA contract? Was General CABELL expressing a traditional CIA objection to assassination proposals? If so, on what other occasion did Mr. GRAY hear the CIA objection?

TOP SECRET

1960 (cont'd)		Issues and Questions
December 29	At a Special Group meeting, Mr. BISSELL gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the TRUJILLO regime, but "he also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against TRUJILLO himself." (SG Minutes) (Source: Minutes, December 29, 1960, by T. Parrott, of Special Group Meeting, December 29, 1960, 02752)	TRUJILLO was assassinated on May 30, 1961. Did Mr. BISSELL or the Special Group propose to approve aiding Dominicans who might assassinate TRUJILLO to effect such a "decisive stroke"?
1961		
January 12	Special Group approves the State Department proposal explained by MERCHANT "that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the DOMINICAN REPUBLIC." (SG Minutes; emphasis added)	Were these assassination-type weapons? If not, was this Special Group action used as implicit authority for subsequent provision of weapons for the assassination of TRUJILLO?
Late Jan.- Early Feb.	DDP BISSELL asks William HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. HARVEY'S notes are quoted as saying that BISSELL said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability, including the capability to assassinaate political leaders.	Was the EXECUTIVE ACTION project initiated or authorized during the EISENHOWER Adminis tration?

GORDON GRAY: Short Summary

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from 1958-1961. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA"; provision of small arms to opponents to TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U. S. wishes to move against CASTRO".

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions (see attached list of exhibits):

CASTRO

1. What was Admiral Burke referring to at the March 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he spoke of "a plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal"? (Exhibit at Tab E)

2. Is there a connection between the plan referred to by Admiral Burke at the March 14 NSC meeting and the discussion at the March 14 Special Group meeting on the "effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raoul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously"? (Exhibit at Tab F)

3. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that on August 16, 1960, the CIA Office of Medical Services received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated with poison for use against Castro? (Exhibit at Tab O)

4. Were President Eisenhower or Mr. Gray aware that in August 1960 Bissell asked Edwards to find underworld contacts with Cuba for an assassination mission? (Exhibit at Tab R)

5. At the November 3, 1960, Special Group meeting, was Mr. Merchant referring to planning for assassination when he asked whether planning had been done "in taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raoul, and Che Guevara"? How does General Cabell's response (that Merchant's suggestion "is beyond our capabilities") square with the fact that shortly before November 1960 the CIA had made contact with the Mafia for a Castro assassination effort? (Exhibit at Tab V)

TRUJILLO

1. Was Vice President Nixon referring to assassination at the April 14, 1960, NSC meeting when he said "getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development"? (Exhibit at Tab H)

2. Was the Special Group, Mr. Gray, or President Eisenhower aware that Assistant Secretary of State Rubottom was reported, on July 1, 1960, by the CIA Western Hemisphere Division Chief to have approved delivery of high-powered rifles with telescopic sights to Trujillo opponents? (Exhibit at Tab YZ)

3. When President Eisenhower was reported at the July 28, 1960, NSC meeting to have said that "until Trujillo is eliminated . . .", was he referring to an assassination? (Exhibit at Tab M)

4. On January 12, 1961, the Special Group approved making available "small arms" to dissidents in the Dominican Republic. Were these assassination-type weapons such as the rifles with telescopic sights referred to in Exhibit at Tab YZ? (Exhibit at Tab X re January 12 meeting)

5. Did the attempts by Trujillo to assassinate President Betancourt of Venezuela prompt the Special Group to favor supplying arms to Dominican dissidents who might try to assassinate Trujillo? (Exhibit at Tab K)

LUMUMBA

1. When Mr. Gray commented at the August 25, 1960, Special Group meeting that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action", was he referring to assassination? Do Mr. Dulles' reservations indicate that he was objecting to a suggested assassination? (Exhibit at Tab P)

2. When Mr. Gray said at the Special Group meeting on September 8, 1960, that "he hoped that agency people in the field are fully aware of the top level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss", was he referring to assassination of Lumumba? (Exhibit at Tab S)

COMMAND and CONTROL

What was the command and control system for covert action operations in the Eisenhower Administration?

Pertinent Relationships

President Eisenhower	Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Special Group).
DCI Allen Dulles	Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
DDP Richard Bissell	Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate Castro and the Executive Action capability.

FB/RKK
7/8/75

TO: Fritz Schwarz and Curt Smothers
FROM: Frederick Baron
DATE: July 6, 1975

SECRET

GORDON GRAY: SHORT SUMMARY

Gordon Gray was Special Assistant to the President for Natonal Security Affairs from 1958-61. During this period Gray represented President EISENHOWER at Special Group meetings at which the following subjects were discussed: "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of LUMUMBA;" provision of small arms to opponents of TRUJILLO in the Dominican Republic; and detailed planning for "how the U.S. wishes to move against CASTRO"

Gray's testimony should involve the following questions:

- Did any of the Special Group meetings implicitly or explicitly contemplate or plan assassination attempts against LUMUMBA, TRUJILLO, or CASTRO?
- To what extent were CIA plans against these leaders authorized by or made known to President EISENHOWER, Gordon GRAY, DCI Allen DULLES, or the Special Group as a whole?
- What were the general command & control practices?

Questioning of Gray should focus upon the following documents:

- Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.
- Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.
- Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere **Division** to the Acting DCI.
- Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

PERTINENT RELATIONSHIPS

President Eisenhower	Gray was the President's liaison to the intelligence community and the National Security Council (including the Special Group).
DCI Allen Dulles	Gray met with Dulles in the Special Group.
DDP Richard Bissell	Gray knew Bissell well. Bissell initiated the CIA-Gambling Syndicate plot to assassinate CASTRO and the EXECUTIVE ACTION capability.
President Truman	Gray was Secretary of the Army and Special Assistant to the President
Livingston Merchant	Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs representing the State Department at Special Group meetings.

EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*

Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Lumumba

Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Trujillo

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

3 November 1960 E-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Lansdale

1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CO HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220
—DO NOT DESTROY—

PROPERTY OF
HE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

✓4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

✓5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

✓6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements ~~for this~~.

✓ 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960.

TAParrott as
THOMAS A. PARROTT

SECRET
EYES ONLY

15 aug 60

12 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

SECRET - EYES ONLY

2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year. The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows:

Political Action	$ 960,000.00	
Propaganda	2,152,120.00	
Paramilitary	8,055,753.00	
Intelligence Collection	833,200.00	
Counter Intelligence	325,400.00	
Communications Support	229,420.00	
Support	731,718.00	
	$ 13,287,611.00	Total

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

EYES ONLY
SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE [illegible]
IN CS [illegible]
PAPER NO. 230

It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward.

Richard M. Bissell Jr.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

DD/P C.3573

SECRET C-X-3

ER 60.5A7

1 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT: Clandestine Delivery of Arms to Opposition Leadership in the Dominican Republic.

1. This memorandum recommends action by the Acting Director of Central Intelligence. Such recommendation is contained in para 5.

2. While Ambassador Farland was in the Dominican Republic, a principal leader of the opposition requested that a limited number of arms be made available which could be used to precipitate the overthrow of the regime of General Rafael Leonidas Trujillo. These arms presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime.

Within recent months, the Trujillo regime has become increasingly unstable due to growing opposition within the professional and middle classes to the excesses of the dictatorship. Political oppression of these groups has brought about severely strained relations between the Catholic Church and the Trujillo regime. Most knowledgeable sources have been predicting that the fall of the regime is imminent.

Since the fall of the Trujillo regime appears inevitable, is to the interest of the U.S. that our relations with the opposition be as close as possible. Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end.

3. It is proposed to procure and deliver to underground opposition forces in the Dominican Republic twelve (12) sterile U.S. rifles, Model 1903 (Springfield), with telescopic sights, together with five hundred (500) rounds of ammunition for same. Arms and ammunition are immediately available at [illegible] depot; approximate cost is $2700. It is planned to deliver these weapons by air through DPD facilities provided arrangements can be worked out with the opposition for their reception. If they cannot be delivered by air, plans are currently being studied in the CA staff for delivery by sea.

4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in the hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment.

02283

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC

SECRET

5. It is recommended that the opposition in the Dominican Republic be provided the arms as requested.

SIGNED

Chief
Western Hemisphere Division

cc: DDCI

CONCUR:

____________________ ____________
Deputy Director (Plans) Date

The recommendation contained in paragraph 5 is approved:

SIGNED
____
Director of Central Intelligence

Date 2 JUL 1960

DDP/WH :klb (1 July 60)

Distribution:
- Orig & 1 - Addressee
- 1 - DDCI
- 1 - DDP
- 1 - COPS
- 1 - C/WHD

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

29 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 29 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles, Bissell

3. Air Drops - Cuba

Mr. Bissell notified the Group of plans for five supply drops in the next three days.

5. Dominican Republic

Mr. Bissell gave the broad outlines of a two-pronged plan for proceeding with certain limited covert activities directed against the Trujillo regime. He emphasized that although support would be given to the Figueres group, there is no intention of establishing a para-military force as such, since this would be impractical in view of requirements for Cuba. He also emphasized that the proposed actions would not of themselves bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself.

The Group agreed with the proposal as outlined and felt that it should be mentioned at the Tuesday meeting. It was noted that Mr. Pawley feels that overt intervention in the Dominican Republic should be mounted simultaneously with the Cuban operation. The consensus of the Group was that this would not be entirely consistent. However, it was agreed that the plan is worth beginning at this time no matter what the eventual decision on overt intervention may be.

6. Cuba

Mr. Merchant reported a brief conversation he had had with Mr. Gray's associates this morning. The latter had made two points: (a) it would be desirable to obtain the cooperation and support of individual Latin American governments, (b) it would be desirable, if possible, for the U.S. to break relations with Cuba, in concert with other countries, some time before January 20th.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SECRET - EYES ONLY

12 January 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 12 January 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

" ✓3. Delegation from the Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front

Mr. Dulles reported the information received from General Goodpaster to the effect that a large delegation from the above-mentioned group reportedly will visit Washington on Saturday. "

" ✓5. Contingency Planning for Cuba

Mr. Willauer outlined a proposal to establish a task force consisting of representatives of State, CIA, Defense and the Joint Staff to draw up contingency plans covering the possible eventual use of overt U.S. forces.

All members agreed that such planning is an essential step. Mr. Gray asked that a preliminary report of the task force be available for the meeting of January 19th.

✓ 7. Capture of Supplies in Cuba

In answer to a question, Mr. Barnes gave details of the Cuban government's capture of materiel from two airdrops plus one cache.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220

SECRET EYES ONLY

✓9. Dominican Republic

Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other materiel should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project.

✓11. U-2 Flights - Vietnam

Mr. Dulles and Mr. Parrott outlined generally the results of the three successful U-2 flights over Vietnam, noting that Hanoi had not been covered because of clouds, and that it is planned to fly a mission to cover that area as soon as the weather permits.

The Group agreed that no such flight should take place after January 20th. They also requested a brief memo summarizing results, for the meeting of the 19th.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET EYES ONLY

3 November 1960

E-5

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 3 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Lansdale

✓ 1. Cuba

Mr. Gray inquired once more as to the status of planning for problems which would arise post-Castro. Mr. Merchant said he would check into the progress of the State Department group which has been charged with developing recommendations on this matter.

From this the Group launched into a far-ranging discussion of the entire concept of U.S. efforts against Castro. Mr. Douglas, supported by Mr. Gray and Mr. Merchant, expounded the idea that perhaps things have now progressed to a point where covert activities of the type originally envisaged for CIA to undertake will not be effective. Mr. Douglas referred to the extensive program of the militia, Mr. Gray cited the matter of arms from the Soviet bloc, and Mr. Merchant dwelt on the increasing effectiveness of Castro's measures to control the population in ways which the Communists have developed so well. The latter said that he and others in the State Department had originally thought that a popular rebellion would develop within Cuba and that this could be augmented by the comparatively small-scale efforts of exiles under CIA control. Now the same people are beginning to feel more and more that despite the numerous defections and the economic deprivations being experienced by the middle and upper classes, time is actually working on Castro's side. Mr. Merchant said that he foresaw that there would occur a point in time beyond which covert intervention would not do the job.

Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that we will never be able to "clean up" the situation without the use of overt U.S. military force. He suggested the possibility of using the CIA-backed exiles to mount a simulated attack on Guantanamo in order to offer an excuse for overt

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220
—DO NOT DESTROY—

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

intervention. This led to an involved discussion, the general conclusion of which was that such action on our part would not be desirable, but that should Castro be foolish enough actually to attack Guantanamo this would almost certainly mean war. Mr. Gray said that he had had the subject of Cuba inscribed on the NSC agenda for next Monday in order to be able to arrive at a top-level decision on this very point. He thought it essential that the policy of the U.S. should be completely understood by responsible officials, so that any overt Cuban act would be met with a previously-agreed-on response.

Mr. Merchant stated that, apart from any attack on Guantanamo, he thought that some of the previous argumentation in today's meeting was faulty, in that we could not have it both ways. By this he meant that it is not logical to conclude that an indigenous uprising is impossible and yet that it is feasible for the U.S. to go in overtly and "clean up the mess." He pointed out that if Castro's support were such that an uprising was out of the question then an open invasion by the U.S. would be met by a hostile population and we would be plunged into a situation like Algeria.

Turning to the immediate problem before the Group, Gen. Cabell outlined the general proposal to establish bases in the U.S., with the reasons for coming to this conclusion. He cited specifically the possibility of U.N. investigation in Guatemala and the increased scope of the program, which has been brought about by the increased strength of the Castro regime. All members of the Group expressed serious doubts as to whether such activity could be kept at all secure. Mr. Merchant said at one point, that although this does not represent a final conclusion on his part, he is inclined to think that the proposal embodies the worst aspect of both worlds; that is, the choice should rest between continuing our operations entirely on foreign soil or preparing to make the best possible case for overt intervention.

Mr. Gray suggested that the decision could be put up to his associates at the same time Tibet is discussed. Mr. Merchant agreed that this is where it should end up, but asserted that he is not prepared to move in that direction until a survey has been made of the possibilities of keeping operations in the U.S. unrevealed.

In this connection Gen. Cabell mentioned the possibility of using a refugee organization - either an existing one or a contrived one - to backstop the operations.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

Mr. Douglas said that in any case he would be prepared to have the Department of Defense investigate the availability of specific locations that would be suitable.

Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning has been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. Gen. Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

✓4. Supply Drops - Cuba

Gen. Cabell explained that the Pinar de Rio supply mission had not taken place because of the absence of specified communication from the DZ, and the Escambray operation had been canceled because of weather. He said that these missions are still planned, and assumed that the Group had no objections. The members so signified.

✓5. U-2, Cuba

Gen. Cabell said that the photographic coverage on the first flight had been only about 50%, because of cloud cover. He continued that we are analyzing the exact results on a priority basis and that some time after the middle of next week we should be in a position to make recommendations for the missions required to extend the coverage.

Mr. Gray commented somewhat wryly that this was all right with him since he "would certainly not be available to discuss anything of this kind before the middle of next week." The other members appeared to have the same reaction.

✓6. Policy Consideration Re Cuban Exiles

Mr. Gray said that Assistant Attorney General Yeagley had spoken to him after his meeting with Col. King and Messrs. Esterline and Holman. He had said that the information given to him by the CIA representatives, and the arrangements for future coordination if necessary, were entirely satisfactory to him. He had stated, however, that a problem remains with respect to action the FBI should take; that is, the FBI needs guidance in its handling of Cuban exile groups other than those under the direction of CIA.

The Group agreed that the best way to attack this problem would be to have Mr. Yeagley attend next week's Special Group meeting and discuss the matter at first hand. Mr. Parrott was asked to make arrangements ~~for this.~~

✓ 7. Value of Cuba to the USSR as a Base Vis-a-vis Cape Canaveral

Mr. Parrott gave Mr. Merchant the gist of the OSI memorandum

C2[illegible]86

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

on this subject, which had been discussed with the rest of the Group on 20 October 1960.

TAParrott as
THOMAS A. PARROTT

[illegible]

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET
EYES ONLY

15 Aug 60

12 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting - 11 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Dulles, and Bissell

SECRET - EYES ONLY

2. Budget for Cuban Operations: Mr. Bissell summarized the budget which had been prepared as a basis for seeking a release from the Reserve to finance Cuban operations for the balance of the fiscal year. The budget for the year totals approximately thirteen and a quarter million dollars, not including provision for the replacement of material with an estimated value of 1.6 million dollars to be withdrawn from Agency inventory. Since 2.5 million dollars of budgeted and Reserve funds have been made available for this program by an earlier action, the balance required is about ten and three-quarters million dollars. Mr. Dulles stated that a release of ten million would be requested at this time since there is inevitably a wide margin of uncertainty as to what the actual costs will turn out to be. Mr. Bissell stated the amounts required by major sub-headings as follows:

Political Action	$ 960,000.00	
Propaganda	2,152,120.00	
Paramilitary	8,055,753.00	
Intelligence Collection	833,200.00	
Counter Intelligence	325,400.00	
Communications Support	229,420.00	
Support	731,718.00	
	$ 13,287,611.00	Total

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

EYES ONLY
SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 230

It was agreed that the operations in question must go forward and that the amount did not seem unreasonable for activities of this scope and scale but it was understood that Messrs. Merchant and Gray could not state that they had reviewed in any detail the manner in which the estimates had been arrived at. Following further discussion, it was agreed that this matter should be laid before the appropriate higher authorities and a presentation would be arranged hopefully within the next ten days. This was believed to be wise, not because any actions involving major political risks were to be taken in the near future, but because the Agency would soon become committed to various substantial expenditures which should not be undertaken without reasonable assurance that the operation was to go forward.

Richard M. Bissell Jr.
RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

02009

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY ( )

E-3

25 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

C2[illegible]

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220
—DO NOT DESTROY—

SECRET - EYES ONLY

outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

√4. Cuba

The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.

One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country.

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans' point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

TAParrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

PROPERTY
THE WHITE HOUSE

While agreeing that the Government could not take an official stand, Mr. Merchant expressed his personal opinion that if the companies should suspend operations, this would give the Soviets a great opportunity, given the fact that the Cuban economy is so dependent on oil. He pointed out that no alternative leader to Castro has yet emerged, and that the United States would be held liable for any economic crisis that might be precipitated in this way.

Mr. Gray related the consideration of this sort of action to the sugar project discussed three weeks ago by the Group. He emphasized that in his opinion these are isolated actions and that any moves of this kind should be made only after an over-all consideration of whether and how the United States wishes to move against Castro. Mr. Irwin took some exception to this, indicating that he thought it was possible and perhaps desirable to take such actions as those contemplated in the sugar proposal, apart from any concerted across-the-board program. Mr. Dulles emphasized that in any case we will have to decide before long whether covert action should be taken in Cuba.

It was then agreed that a special meeting of the Group should be held on Monday, March 14th, to consider what might and should be done in Cuba. It was agreed that in addition to the regular members, Mr. Rubottom, Admiral Burke, Mr. Bissell, Mr. King and perhaps Colonel Lansdale should attend.

There was then a brief discussion of Admiral Burke's letter to Mr. Merchant. It developed that the attachment to this letter has now been given the status of a JCS document but that it has not been forwarded to the NSC as the JCS had desired. (Mr. Irwin said that he had held up this action because of the informal nature of the letter.) Mr. Merchant said the Department is preparing comments and that he hoped the JCS paper would not be considered apart from State's comments.

Mr. Dulles said that we would require a policy decision on whether a black radio could be established on U.S. territory, probably in the Florida Keys. It was agreed that this proposal should be staffed through the Scott office.

[illegible]

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

7 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 7 April 1960

PRESENT: Mr. Merchant, Mr. Douglas, Mr. Gray, Gen. Cabell

✓3. Dominican Republic

Mr. Gray asked the Acting DCI whether he had anything to add on the situation in the Dominican Republic to what had been covered by himself and the Secretary of State that morning at the NSC meeting. General Cabell replied that he would only like to add the comment that it appears evident that Trujillo will not consider making any arrangements for an orderly succession to himself, but that he will either hang on to the bitter end or flee the country on short notice, à la Batista.

Mr. Gray asked the Group's views on what happens after Trujillo, specifically how Castro can be kept out of the Dominican Republic. General Cabell commented that so far no worthwhile opposition to the Benefactor has been identified, and that in his opinion it might well become necessary to dispatch U.S. forces, openly identified as such, to the country in the immediate aftermath of the demise or flight of Trujillo. Mr. Merchant said that his preliminary thoughts were that there would probably be a good chance to get OAS support for a move of this kind to forestall Castro; on the other hand, we might expect some internal revulsion at the arrival of U.S. forces because of the memory of the Marine occupation.

Mr. Merchant added that Mr. Rubottom was thinking seriously of a plan to seal off the land approaches to the Dominican Republic via Haiti, thereby requiring any sizeable Castro effort to be an amphibious one. He said that this plan has not yet been formally

4. Cuba

Mr. Gray expressed satisfaction with the organizational arrangements for interagency groups considering the continuing development of the Cuban situation. In this connection he expressed some concern that USIA and CIA might be working on parallel or conflicting lines with respect to radio. General Cabell assured him that the top people in USIA are aware of CIA plans and there should be no crossing of wires.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

28 April 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group ~~Meeting, 28 April 1960~~

PRESENT: Messrs. Hare, Gray, Dulles

Mr. Joseph Scott of the Department of State sat in as an observer.

✓ 8. Cuba

Mr. Gray said that he had discussed with his associates the organizational entities within the U.S. Government which have been established to deal with the Cuban situation. He noted that a number of different groups and committees, with varying interests and objectives, are concerning themselves with this situation and that there seemed to him to be no "chief of staff" to whom all could look as a central point.

He said that the opinion had been expressed to him that Mr. Dillon should assume this function, but that in Dillon's absence, Mr. Hare should take on the responsibility and should inform himself of the general outlines of what has been going on in the Government. Mr. Gray said that it had been felt essential to have such an official available over the coming weekend, because of the expected May Day troubles, and that since this official should be of such a stature as to permit access to the highest levels, Mr. Hare had been decided upon, pending Mr. Dillon's availability.

In this connection it was agreed that Mr. Dillon should be brought up to date at an appropriate time on the status of covert operations with respect to Cuba.

C2084

Inter alia, Mr. Gray expressed concern and some surprise at statements and actions by UAR officials with regard to Cuba. Mr. Hare explained at some length his conviction that Deputy Foreign Minister Sabri (older brother of Ali Sabri) is largely responsible for this kind of thing, and that it does not represent the feelings of Nasser or Ali Sabri. He traced the brother's background and described him as a "twisted personality."

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HO

SECRET - EYES ONLY

19 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 19 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas and Gen. Lansdale; Gray; Dulles and Bissell

2. Cuba

Mr. Merchant began by stating that in his opinion we are putting more burden on the Guatemalan government with our training base than that government can support for very long. He noted that Mr. Mann believes the solution is to move our training activities to the U.S., but Mr. Merchant does not think we can get away with this, particularly if an increase in numbers is contemplated. Therefore, the only solution would seem to be to move to another base or bases in other countries; this would involve the same burden on the other countries as now exists with respect to Guatemala. Although he has not discussed this point with Secretary Herter, Mr. Merchant believes that it is time to take another look at Cuba and if the U.S. attitude toward Castro remains unchanged then we should consider shifting our entire posture. This would involve a break in diplomatic relations, the support of a government in exile, and other activities mostly overt, including some training in the U.S.

PROPERTY OF
HE WHITE HOUSE

THIS DOCU [illegible]
A SOURC [illegible]
IN C [illegible]
[illegible] 220
—DO NOT [illegible]—

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Mr. Mann commented that he thinks we cannot maintain training anywhere in Latin America indefinitely, although he does think we could maintain small airstrips without too much danger. He said that he believes everyone in Guatemala knows by now the true nature of our activities there, and that if they are going to be publicized before the world he would rather have them exposed in the U.S. rather than in Latin America. He recognized that this would be highly embarrassing for this country, but that for most Latin American governments it could be fatal. He spoke of the impending OAS investigation of Guatemala, and conceded that OAS support would be required to carry out training successfully in the U.S. To this, Mr. Merchant replied that he did not think exposure of such activities on American soil would be acceptable, particularly in the U.N.

Mr. Bissell then said that he has agreed for some time with Mr. Mann's point as to the strain on Guatemala. He said that we have developed an evacuation plan to be used in the event of outside investigation, but that this is not a satisfactory answer to the problem. He said that within about four weeks an alternate site could be established in Nicaragua but that this would be very expensive, would tie us into the Somoza brothers, and would call attention to Nicaragua in the same way as Guatemala.

Mr. Bissell said that he foresaw several possibilities for constructive change in the training operation, some for the immediate future and some over a period of longer range. They include:

a. A sort of refugee camp in the U.S. ostensibly designed for temporary care of Cuban exiles. This story could be defended but it is difficult to say for how long or how effectively.

b. A guarded military facility in the U.S. This could be handled more securely, but the existence of an area where peculiar things are going on could not be kept secret indefinitely. An alternative would be private property such as the King Ranch, but this would take longer to arrange than a military base.

c. Vieques Island, off Puerto Rico. This is fairly remote, but the government of Puerto Rico is already trying to get the U.S. Marines out.

d. The CIA site on Saipan. This would be very secure but would require a large amount of airlift.

e. Fort Randolph, in the Panama Canal Zone. At this location the trainees could be kept secure but would almost certainly know where they were.

Mr. Douglas said that a military base could be made available, such as Laughlin Air Force Base near Del Rio, Texas. He said that the use of such real estate might be tied into some sort of cooperation with Tracy Voorhees' Committee on Cuban Refugees. He felt also that the U.S. capability for intervention in Cuba will probably not be effective enough unless there is more overt participation than has been contemplated to date. Gen. Lansdale said that he and Gen. Bonesteel were of the same opinion.

Mr. Gray supported this general position, stating that when the current Cuban plan was approved, the situation in that country was different than it is now. Since then, the Cubans have received sizeable amounts of bloc arms and have organized a militia, and Mr. Gray wondered how effective a few hundred exiles could be. Mr. Dulles acknowledged that it would be necessary to have internal support if the Castro government were to be successfully overthrown; he felt that there is reason to believe such support might develop, perhaps within the militia itself.

Mr. Mann expressed the opinion that the way to proceed is to seal Cuba off from the rest of Latin America and to settle down for a one or two year wait, presumably to see whether the tide might not turn in our favor. He said that in the meantime we could infiltrate small groups of trained Cubans as a token, but that we should postpone a decision on a striking force for four or five months. In this general connection, Mr. Bissell said that even if it is finally decided that overt U.S. forces should be used, there still should be a nucleus of trained Cubans available. Therefore, our present activities should be continued in any case.

Summing up, the Group decided that the possibility of splitting the present body of trainees into three or four groups should be examined urgently (particularly in view of Mr. Mann's estimate that the OAS investigation might take place in two or three weeks). Alternate sites to be examined would include Vieques, Laughlin AFB and Fort Randolph.

[illegible]

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE

The latter location should absorb no more than 200. Mr. Douglas cautioned that the use of DOD facilities should at the present time be considered as a holding operation rather than a continuation or stepping up of present training. The possibilities of establishing a kind of CCC under the Voorhees auspices should be examined.

✓3. Advice to Assistant Attorney General

Mr. Parrott tabled the draft of suggested advice to Mr. Yeagley in connection with Cuban exiles. Mr. Douglas felt that it was not desirable to give Mr. Yeagley any piece of paper. He suggested that Yeagley should simply be advised that the Group feels the best method of procedure might be to prosecute one test case, e.g. Masferrer, but not to institute wholesale prosecutions. In answer to a question, Mr. Parrott stated that he did not know whether this procedure would satisfy Mr. Yeagley, but that he would discuss it with Mr. Gray, who had by that time left the meeting. (Later, Mr. Gray talked to Yeagley, who appeared satisfied with the oral guidance.)

✓ 5. U-2 for Cuba

Mr. Bissell summarized the results of the first U-2 flight over Cuba and asked for the Group's permission for two additional sorties to fill in the remaining 50% coverage. The Group agreed, subject to Mr. Gray's concurrence. (This was obtained later.)

C8782

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

23 November 1960

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 23 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Gen. Lansdale, Dulles and Bissell

2. Cuba

Mr. Bissell reported that further consideration following the meeting of last Saturday had led to a tentative conclusion that Saipan would be the best place to which to move the bulk of the Cuban trainees. He emphasized the security advantages of the location, and said that it is believed the move can be accomplished with our own transportation plus two roundtrips by C-124s. These we would request the Department of Defense to provide. We would probably move some small commando-type units - about 50 men - to Fort Randolph. Mr. Bissell also stressed the fact that additional construction costs would be significantly less at Saipan than anywhere else.

The DCI agreed in general with this preliminary thinking. He urged, however, that the matter of morale of the trainees be borne constantly in mind, and that the move not be accomplished all at once. Gen. Lansdale agreed. Mr. Dulles also asked that President Ydigoras be informed.

Mr. Bissell concluded that plans would not be firmed up until receipt of Defense's report on facilities available in the U.S.

Mr. Bissell then spoke of the report of a possible attempt by Cuban dissidents to take over the Isle of Pines. He explained that we have nothing to do with the plan and would in fact be unable to give much support to it. He said that it is highly questionable whether this attempt will take place on the reported time schedule, or indeed at all, but emphasized that this illustrates how initiative might be taken by others, so that we could be presented with drastic requests for assistance on very short notice. Mr. Bissell also mentioned the report of possible major sabotage to be carried out in the very near future. In addition, he said that we now have six B-26s, plus eleven crews, available for combat, with other aircraft for supply. He noted that Nicaragua might be used for refueling in the event of actual operations, but that the immediate objective would be to obtain strips on the Isle of Pines. Mr. Dulles remarked that this would of course require an active revolt.

Mr. Dulles also mentioned the proposal by Peter Grace to encourage Father Peyton (described as a sort of Catholic Billy Graham) to carry out activities in Cuba.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

30 November 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 November 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant and Mann; Douglas; Gray;
Dulles and Bissell

02788

2. Cuba

Mr. Gray solicited the Group's assistance in arriving at a consensus of views as to what exactly had been decided as a result of the high-level meeting of the day before. The following points were agreed:

a. Mr. Gray's associates stand ready to deny U.S. activity based in Guatemala, even though it may become blown (Mr. Douglas urged that every effort be made to make it possible to deny plausibly).

b. If the program is enlarged, additional facilities may be obtained, but at this stage not in the U.S. No training of Cubans will be conducted in the U.S. under present circumstances. (Mr. Bissell told the Group of the possibility of an additional finca in Guatemala.)

c. Evacuation plans should be kept in readiness. (Mr. Mann said that he thought he could arrange a week's

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220
—DO NOT DESTROY—

notice before any OAS committee actually visited Guatemala and that it might be possible even then to avoid actual investigation on the spot. Mr. Bissell said that if we do have a week, evacuation could be carried out by Agency aircraft; if more speed is required DOD assistance might be necessary. Mr. Douglas, with Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell concurring, felt that the possibility of emergency evacuation to Florida under the guise of ordinary refugees should be kept in mind.)

Mr. Dulles suggested that questions on Cuba might be asked at the next Presidential press conference and that we should be prepared with a statement along the lines that we do not entirely discourage revolutionary activity. Mr. Merchant said he would arrange to have a draft prepared along these lines. In this connection, Mr. Parrott reported the request from Assistant Attorney General Yeagley for guidance as to possible action against an alleged collaborator of General Pedraza. (Note: Mr. Yeagley was later told that we have no operational interest and no objection to the Department of Justice's pursuing the case. Mr. Yeagley said that they would proceed with investigation, but that it is by no means certain the case will ever come to trial.)

Mr. Gray then outlined his understanding of his friends' desires with respect to organization of the anti-Castro effort. He said that the principal need foreseen was for an individual to serve as a focal point for diverse interests in this situation, and to be available to meet with Mr. Gray's friends at any time. In addition, someone should be available to deal with the FRD and to talk to other Latin American governments.

After a considerable amount of discussion, the consensus of the Group was as follows: Probably two men will be required, one to handle the overt and the other the covert aspects. They would work together on a daily basis and both would have the entire picture in mind, but responsibility for the execution of covert operations would have to rest with CIA. The overt man should ideally be a government official, preferably someone senior in the Foreign Service or the Department of State. There should be a sort of "board of directors" to oversee all aspects of the operation. This should be the Special Group plus Secretary Anderson when matters of major policy are considered. (Mr. Gray was not entirely sure that his friends would accept the two-man concept but Mr. Dulles and Mr. Merchant emphasized that whether

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFI

there were one man or two, CIA would have to maintain its own organizational integrity.)

There then ensued a lengthy examination of qualifications and availability of a number of individuals. It was finally decided that, taking all things into consideration, including the aspect of quick availability, Ambassador Willauer would probably be the best choice. On the CIA side, Mr. Dulles nominated Mr. Barnes. It was recognized that these nominees would have to be checked with Mr. Gray's associates.

Mr. Mann suggested that Mr. Willauer might also do the FRD job, but the DCI pointed out that this requires a covert approach and must be done by the Agency.

As to Mr. Pawley, it was decided that it would be unwise to have him embark on a grand tour or to endow him with official government status. Mr. Merchant said he would not object, however, to Mr. Pawley's talking to President Frondizi.

Mr. Gray then mentioned the report which had reached his friends about a representative of the FRD who had apparently just returned from a trip around Latin America. It was noted that the individual referred to was probably Sardinius, and Mr. Dulles said he would obtain a written report of the trip, for passage to Mr. Gray's associates.

Mr. Bissell reminded Mr. Douglas of the outstanding request to the DOD for thirty-eight NCOs and officers for service outside the U.S.

TAParrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

[illegible]

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

17 February 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 17 February 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Gray, Irwin, Dulles

Mr. Joseph Scott of the State Department sat in as an observer.

1. Cuba

The project providing for covert spotting and assessment of potential agents for eventual sabotage of sugar mills was discussed at some length. Within the limits outlined - that is, that no action would be initiated under the terms of any approval reached at this meeting, but rather that approval would cover only the identification and evaluation of assets - the Group expressed general approval. Mr. Dulles reiterated that he was not asking for approval actually to proceed with operations. Mr. Irwin stated that he and Secretary Douglas were enthusiastic about the project. It was agreed that it should be presented to the Secretary of State and that Mr. Gray would discuss it further.

(Later Mr. Gray reported that he had discussed this matter with his associate. The latter had made two points:

a. He doubted the efficacy of the proposed action, feeling that if it were successful in denying money to the Castro regime which could otherwise be used for subversive activities, the Cuban government could obtain offsetting funds from other sources.

b. He would not agree to identifying assets for this particular sabotage operation. He would agree that the Agency could proceed to spot and assess potential agents for a variety of possible tasks. He said that once this

[illegible] IS
A [illegible]
[illegible] HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 220
—DO NOT DESTROY—

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

was done and a comprehensive program of suggested action was drawn up, it should be submitted to the Special Group, and if the Group recommended approval it should probably then be discussed with him. It was stipulated that in any case no action should take place until his return from the trip on which he is about to embark.

Mr. Joseph Scott of State also reported later that Mr. Herter had made exactly the same point as outlined in b. above.) //

✓2. Dominican Republic

There was a brief discussion of the situation in the Dominican Republic. Mr. Irwin commented that the Defense Department is most interested in determining whether or not a sort of Third Force can be identified.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

28 December 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 28 December 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray and Dulles

✓2. Special Meeting on Cuba

Mr. Gray said that it is desired to set up a special meeting on Cuba for 9:00 AM Monday, 2 January. His associates wanted particularly to make certain that everyone concerned "clearly sees the sequence of events." He also said that Mr. Pawley had had a recent conference in the White House.

Mr. Gray asked that Mr. Merchant and Mr. Douglas determine whether their respective Secretaries wish to attend. He said that Mr. Willauer would also be on hand. Finally, he asked that the Army colonel (Lt. Col. Egan) who had given such an enlightening description of the qualities of the Cuban volunteers be on hand for the meeting. It was noted that Col. Egan is currently out of the country, but the DCI agreed to have him brought to Washington for the meeting.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

IN CS HISTORICAL
PAPER NO. 230
—DO NOT DESTROY—

SECRET - EYES ONLY

SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
CONCLUDING REMARKS

You will, I hope, permit me some personal, but I think not unimportant observations. I hope that you will complete your work as expeditiously as possible as I feel very strongly the need for a viable Central Intelligence Agency operating, of course, within its charter. I believe that the present furor about C.I.A. is impeding it in the performance of its mission and the sooner it is able to go about its business, not in a fish bowl, the better our country will be served. I believe that we will continue to need effective, intelligent collection and analysis for our policy makers and I think there will be occasions when covert activities should be undertaken in the interests of our National security.

Finally, one thing that bothers me, Mr. Chairman, is that there is tremendous concern now -- and I don't suggest that it is improper -- with the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, while at the same time people seem not to be equally concerned about what the Soviet Union is up to in this country, especially through its very many KGB agents here. I would hope that a Congressional Committee would be interested enough to investigate this most serious matter.

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, DOUGLAS DILLON, GENERAL GOODPASTER (and Under	July 5, 1960	TRUJILLO

state

OCCURRENCE: On July 5, 1960 President Eisenhower met with Secretary of State Herter, Secretary of ~~the Treasury~~ Dillon. Also present were Gen. Goodpaster and General Persons. The memorandum of the conference stated: "With regard to the Dominican Republic, Mr. Herter said there are various things being done which could result in a provisional government being set up. The President said if such a government were set up we should recognize it quickly. We could then move in with troops on their request if need should arise. In so far as the question is one of internal intervention, we must use the CIA in order to avoid attribution. The ~~President thought we should knock out of any documents on file any reference to starting a revolution~~."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (DDE DIARY SERIES) – Abilene

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, MR. GRAY, DOUGLAS DILLON	March 14, 1960	CASTRO MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on March 14, 1960 Mr. Dillon said: "Our objective is to bring another government to power in Cuba...there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover."

'Mr. Dulles reported that a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on. ~~Admiral Burke suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be package deal~~, since many of the leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series) 436th NSC meeting, March 10, 1960 – Abilene

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY	April 14, 1960	TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: AT a National Security Council meeting on April 14, 1960, Vice President Nixon presiding, ": 'Mr. Dulles reported..Trujillo's position continued to weaken and was now quite precarious...(he) ~~thought further attempts will be made to kill or oust Trujillo~~."

'Mr. Dillon said there was one favorable aspect...~~if Trujillo could be removed from power in the Dominican Republic while pro-Castro elements were prevented from seizing power in that country,~~ our anti-Castro ~~campaign throughout Latin America would receive a great boost.~~ The Vice President ~~agreed that getting rid of Trujillo would be a favorable development for us.~~"

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 441st meeting, April 14, 1960) – Abilene

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, H. SHELDON (CIA), MR. LAY

DATES:
April 14, 1960

CATEGORIES:
TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On April 14, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. ~~Dulles~~ reported that a SR. Betancourt /no relation to Venezuelan leader/ had defected from Cuba and predicted three outcomes with respect to Castro: (~~1) an assassinatio~~ ~~that would make Castro a martyr,~~ (2) Castro's suicide as a result of the failure of the Cuban experiment and (3) a trend to a socialist dictatorship and a Batista terror regime.

Does this indicate that assass. was not a favored alternative at NSC level?

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whiteman File) (NSC meeting series, 441 st meeting, April 14 1960)
FILE: - Abilene

STAFF: Kelley
DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES

DATES:
July 7, 1960

CATEGORIES:
TRUJILLO
CASTRO
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council meeting on July 7, 1960 Mr. Dulles stated: "The Venezuelan government was engaged in an all-out effort, through the OAS and otherwise, to isolate, condemn and cause the downfall of Trujillo. An important reason for the vigor of the Venezuelan efforts was the fact they have convincing evidence that Trujillo was responsible for the assassination attempt on Betancourt /President of Venezuela/*** "Betancourt believes another attempt will be made momentarily and therefore it wants a showdown without delay." Mr. Dulles further explained that the Venezuelan Foreign Minister wants the United States to lead the way in breaking relations with Trujillo and that Betancourt wants a meeting of the OAS nations to deal with the Trujillo problem.

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, FILE: July 7, 1960)
- Abilene

STAFF: Kelley
DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, VICE PRESIDENT NIXON, DOUGLAS DILLON, ALLEN DULLES

DATES:
July 7, 1960

CATEGORIES:
TRUJILLO
CASTRO
MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: On July 7, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting ~~"Mr. Dulles stated that he believes, and the intelligence community agrees, that the problem of Trujillo must be settled before the problem of Castro can be dealt with, even though Castro is the greater threat."~~

The NSC minutes further state that the United States told Betancourt of Venezuela that the United States can't act without knowing who the successor to Trujillo would be. The U.S. will work with Betancourt and Figueres of Costa Rica on suggestions for a successor for Trujillo. President Eisenhower suggested a government in exile be ready to go into the Dominican Republic in the event of Trujillo's downfall.

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, 450th NSC meeting, FILE: July 7, 1960)
- Abilene

STAFF: Kelley
DATE July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MR. GRAY, PRESIDENT EISENHOWER	July 28, 1960	CASTRO TRUJILLO MONGOOSE

OCCURRENCE: On July 28, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting ~~President Eisenhower said: "Until Trujillo is eliminated, we cannot get out Latin American friends to reach a proper level of indignation in dealing with Castro."~~ It was noted that Venezuela was trying to separate the Cuban and Domincan Republic problems in OAS forms. On this matter, "The President said if we attempted to take any action with respect to Cuba before settling the Trujillo situation, we would be the loser."

Does "elimination" mean "assassination"?

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of July 28, 1960

FILE: Abilene

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, MAURICE STANS, MR. GRAY	Aug. 25, 1960	LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On August 25, 1960 the minutes of the National Security Council meeting that day state: "The President suggested the United Nations might recognize Katanga. Mr. Stans suggested that we might base ourselves on Tshombe and Kasavubu and throw out Lumumba by peaceful means." (page 15)

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of August 25, 1960

FILE: – Abilene

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY,	Sept. 21, 1960	LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On September 21, 1960, at a National Security meeting, Mr. Dulles said: "~~A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed~~. ***Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but ~~Lumumba was not disposed of and remained a great danger as long as he was not disposed of~~."

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, meeting of Sept. 21, 1960)

FILE: – Abilene

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
PRESIDENT EISENHOWER, GORDON GRAY	Oct. 24, 1960	LUMUMBA

OCCURRENCE: On October 24, 1960 at a National Security Council meeting Mr. Dulles reported:

"An intercepted UAR /Egypt/ message indicated that five Congolese soldiers had attempted to assassinate Mobutu on the 15th of October. ~~The U.S. had prior information of this attempt and had warned Mobutu...if he had not been warned, it was probable that he would have been caught."~~ (page 16) X

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, minutes of meeting, October 24, 1960)

FILE: - Abilene

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
GORDON GRAY, MARION W. BOGGS	Feb. 12, 1960	LUMUMBA CASTRO TRUJILLO

OCCURRENCE: On ~~Febraury 12, 1960~~ a "special" National Security Council meeting was held, and Marion W. Boggs, Deputy Executive Secretary, attended as Acting Executive Secretary. The only record of this meeting appearing in the NSC meeting series of minutes is a one-page notation which states: ~~"On instructions from the Executive Secretary no memorandum was written."~~

What was discussed? is NOT indicated in document.

SOURCE: Presidential Papers of Dwight Eisenhower (Whitman File) (NSC meeting series, special NSC meeting, Feb. 12, 1960

FILE: Abilene

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: July 6, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

NOTE ON GRAY TESTIMONY FOR FAOS:

If we don't re-write the Gray ~~chronology~~ short summary, you should note to the senators that since we w drafted it we have received a new batch of key documents from the Eisenhower library which are reflected (quoted) in the Gray Chronology.

Add NIXON to short summary

To: Files

From: Frederick Baron

Re: DELETION IN SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES OF NOVEMBER 3, 1960

Date: July 7, 1975

In a phone conversation with Jim Wilderotter of the White House, Wilderotter assured me that after the line "beyond our capabilities" on page 3, there was a double space followed by Item 2, which deals with the African continent (not Congo), followed by a double space, then Item 3, which deals with Southeast Asia.

Wilderotter assured me that neither item related to our inquiry. He said that there was nothing deleted on page 3 that related to Cuba.

EXHIBITS FOR THE EXAMINATION OF GORDON GRAY

Castro*

Special Group Minutes, November 3, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, August 12, 1960.

Lumumba

Special Group Minutes, August 25, 1960.

Special Group Minutes, September 8, 1960.

Trujillo

Memorandum of July 1, 1960 from J. C. King, Chief, Western Hemisphere Division to the Acting DCI.

Minutes of the Special Group of December 29, 1960.

Minutes of the Special Group of January 12, 1961.

---

* The Special Group Minutes of February 17, 1960 could be used for two purposes: (1) To establish the general atmosphere in the Special Group of planning, sabotage, operations in Cuba; and (2) The fact that, at least in this case, Gray's "associate" was President Eisenhower.

MEMORANDUM

TOP SECRET

TO: Files

FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: July 5, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF INTERVIEW WITH GORDON GRAY

GENERAL BACKGROUND

1. Staff Responsibilities Under Eisenhower:

Gray said that the structural chain of command ran directly from the DCI to the President during the Eisenhower administration. Allen Dulles was able to approach Eisenhower directly, rather than through Gray.

Andrew Goodpaster staffed President Eisenhower on many of the same subjects that Gray worked on. Gray was responsible for long-range planning; Goodpaster was responsible for spot work. Gray said that Goodpaster and he kept each other "intimately informed". However, Gray said that any covert action program would go through him and not Goodpaster. "Although I would tell Goodpaster about anything I discussed with the President." Some covert action programs were extremely tightly held, for example, on the U-2 incident only the following people were knowledgeable: Eisenhower, Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower.

"I didn't live with Eisenhower 24 hours a day. I don't know everything that he did. But I do think I knew every major decision, approval, or action of Eisenhower's."

2. Special Group Function

At the 54/12 committee, Gray said, "I represented the President's interest, that was my role."

Gray said that shortly after the BERLIN TUNNEL, Eisenhower said, "I want the 54/12 committee to consider any action that impinges upon the sovereignty of another country."

TOP SECRET

Gray said that in almost every case, a proposed covert action would have been discussed with the State Department and would have been staffed out before Special Group meeting. "Most of the rest of us did not have a chance to reflect before the meeting."

Gray said that during his tenure, there was no chairman of the 54/12 (Special Group). But perhaps Merchant conducted the meetings.

Gray said that during the transition to the Kennedy administration, he asked McGeorge Bundy to promise him that the Special Group would not be washed out. Gray explained that the Special Group was necessary for the protection of the President. The Special Group discussions allow the President the chance to know in advance about actions which are potentially embarrassing to him. The President's representative to the Group (Gray, then Bundy) has the right to object to an action and take it up with the President. The President has a chance to know about everything that goes on in the Special Group, and through his Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the President would have a chance to say "no" to a proposed action. Gray said that the presence of the Special Group would protect a President from operations such as assassinations.

3. "His Associate":

Initially, Gray did not recognize the phrase used by Parrott in the Special Group minutes "Mr. Gray's associate" or "his associates". Gray's first reaction was that "his associates" would probably refer to members of his NSC staff.

But after seeing the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that it was clear that in those minutes "his associate" referred to President Eisenhower.

Gray said that he never used the phrase "associate", that was Parrott's phrase. Gray was not aware the phrase was used at the time in those minutes and couldn't, without reconstructing each minute, be sure it referred to the President in each case. He said that when he attended the meetings,he would refer to "the President" directly.

(Note: Since the phrase "the President" is never used in Parrott's minutes, it is fair to assume that at least some of the references to "Mr. Gray's associate" are euphemisms for President Eisenhower.)

NSC DOCUMENTS

Gray recalls that the President called him, and perhaps Allen Dulles, into his office shortly after Gray's appointment and said that "no minutes, notes, or memos of Special Group meetings are to be kept, except by the DCI and they are to be kept in the DCI's files." Gray said that Dulles was not present at this meeting. He knows that he would have told Dulles shortly afterwards.

Gray did not keep personal notes of the Special Group meetings. Although he did defy the Presidential directive in one specific instance, by deciding to make a memorandum of every meeting with the President relating to the subject of Cuba. These memoranda are on file at the Presidential Library in Abilene, Kansas.

Gray said that he never reviewed Thomas Parrott's minutes of the Special Group. But the NSC minutes were passed to the principals at the meeting for their review. Gray prepared the "records of action" for the NSC, along with Jimmy Lay, Gray's assistant.

LUMUMBA

Gray said that he did not remember the August 25, 1960 meeting at which it was reported that Gray commented that "his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straight-forward action" in relation to LUMUMBA. Gray said at first that he did not remember LUMUMBA's position in the Congo. Gray said that he did not remember talking with Eisenhower about LUMUMBA.

However, Gray does remember that "we were anti-LUMUMBA and wanted to see him removed from his position of responsibility."

In reference to the August 25 meeting, after he had seen the minutes of the meeting, Gray said that "when I said 'straightforward action', certainly assassination would be one possibility." Gray continued to say that Allen DULLES was consistently in opposition to assassination and "he was probably saying to me that assassination was one of the things we shouldn't do."

With reference to testimony received by the Select Committee from Robert JOHNSON, a State Department official who was a member of the Policy Planning Council, he said that he had no recollection of a meeting in the summer of 1960, at which President EISENHOWER ordered the assassination of LUMUMBA or said words to that effect.

Gray said that he knows Bronson TWEEDY, but he never discussed LUMUMBA with TWEEDY.

TOP SECRET

TRUJILLO

"I am sure there was no discussion with EISENHOWER about the assassination of TRUJILLO."

"I don't see how the DCI and the Department of State could have approved arms shipments without going up to the Special Group. The DCI should have taken a suggested course of action to the Special Group after checking with State."

Gray said: "A high-powered weapon with a telescopic site would connote to me that it would be used for the purpose of assassinating an individual."

CUBA

Gray said that President EISENHOWER would frequently remark at meetings on Cuba that an operation should be planned so that it would be carried through successfully, otherwise it should not be planned at all.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of February 17, 1960, Gray said that at some point during that period of time, Allen DULLES brought his sugar mill sabotage plan to President EISENHOWER, who listened attentively. Afterward, the President said, "I don't think sabotage of sugar mills will do something significant. Bring me a complete plan." Subsequently, DULLES brought the President a four-point program: propaganda; economic sanction; sabotage; and the training of Cuban exiles. GRAY said the President approved this memo. (Note that Gray also said that he made a memo of this meeting and subsequent meetings on Cuba.)

After the BAY OF PIGS, Gray called President EISENHOWER and offered to show him all of the memos that Gray had prepared on Presidential meetings on Cuba. Gray said that JOHN EISENHOWER obtained the memos and brought them to Gettysburg. Gray and President EISENHOWER reviewed the memos. Gray said that the President objected to the word "planning" in reference to a Cuban invasion, on the basis that there was no actual military planning. EISENHOWER suggested that the page should be retyped to change the word "planning". Gray said they did retype the page.

Gray said that although in his mind and EISENHOWER's, there was no military "planning", definitely EISENHOWER knew that Cuban exiles were being trained for an amphibious landing in Cuba.

President EISENHOWER went so far in contingency planning, said Gray, as to advocate to Allen DULLES the formation of a government in exile among the Cuban community. But, Gray said, the Cubans could never settle among themselves who would constitute the leadership of such a government.

Referring to the minutes of Special Group meeting of August 12, 1960, Gray remembers the presentation by Richard BISSELL of a budget for Cuban operations over 13 million dollars, with a heavy emphasis on paramilitary operations. Gray said that the reference at the end of the memo to laying this budget before "higher authorities" for approval clearly referred to President EISENHOWER.

Referring to the minutes of the Special Group meeting of November 3, 1960, at which MERCHANT asked a question about whether there had been planning "for taking direct positive action against FIDEL, RAUL, and CHE GUEVARA," Gray said

TOP SECRET

that he did not remember the meeting. Gray acknowledged, however, that the phrase "direct positive action" in this context "could have included assassination." Gray said that the reaction by General CABELL that such action would be beyond CIA capabilities, was the "usual DCI reaction".

Referring to the Special Group minutes of December 28, 1960, Gray said that "the special meeting" mentioned therein is clearly a meeting with the President. Gray though that this must have been the last meeting on Cuba with the President, the purpose of which would have been to clean up the Cuba project for the new administration. Gray said that there must have been dozens of meetings on Cuba (all of which will be reflected in the Gray memos in Abilene).

CASTRO/GAMBLING SYNDICATE OPERATION, PHASE I

Gray said that he was completely unaware of any conversation between Richard BISSELL and Sheffield EDWARDS about establishing underworld contacts for the purpose of an assassination attempt on CASTRO. Gray also said that he was unaware of any development, within the Technical Services Division of the CIA, of assassination devices to be used against CASTRO such as lethal cigars. Likewise, he was unaware of the development of any devices designed for the disorientation or embarrassment of CASTRO.

Gray said that he knew BISSELL well, but not EDWARDS.

Gray said that, if such operations were in progress, the DCI should have known about them. Gray said that if the DCI knew about such operations, "he would have raised it at the Special Group or with me. He didn't. I think I would have known if Allen DULLES had discussed such subjects with the President." Gray said that it was possible that BISSELL was acting unilaterally on this

TOP SECRET

matter. Gray said that he'd talked to Andrew GOODPASTER about the recent news stories which indicate that there was assassination planning against CASTRO during this period of time, and GOODPASTER said that he'd never heard about such things.

EXECUTIVE ACTION

"I never heard of EXECUTIVE ACTION until David BELIN mentioned it to me."

ASSASSINATIONS GENERALLY

Gray said that he remembered two mentions of assassination: (1) When NASSAR was riding high, someone at the planning board said "we ought to bump him off". But Gray said this was not a serious discussion. Assassination was not an option that went to the President. (2) At the PFIAB meetings, one member consistently would ask the CIA "about bumping off the leadership in Hanoi". Gray did not think this was a serious suggestion. Gray said the member who suggested this is "well-known" and he was reluctant to provide the name to us.

"I followed closely any covert operations I was interested in." Gray said that "if I had known of any assassination attempt, I probably would have called" the responsible official to stay abreast. He said he didn't know of any such attempts.

TOP SECRET

Interview Questions For Gordon Gray

TRUJILLO

1. MEMO of July 1, 1960 from J.C. King, (Chief, WHD) to Acting DCI recommending the delivery of arms (high-powered rifles with telescopic scopes) to the opposition of TRUJILLO. The Memo says that "APPROVAL FOR DELIVERY OF THESE ARMS HAS BEEN GIVEN BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE ROY RUBOTTOM".

- Were there any proceedings of the Special Group at this time which authorized delivery of arms? (We don't have record of any authorization until January 12, 1961 S.G. Minutes)

- If not, did the DCI and Assistant Secretary of State exceed their authority?

- Generally, what was the procedure in the Eisenhower administratio for handling the approval of such a project?
  - Could the DCI approve it under his own authority?
  - Did the Assistant Secretary of State exceed his authority by not requesting and receiving approval from the Secy of Stat

  - Shouldn't the Special Group have been consulted?

2. SPECIAL GROUP MINUTES of 12 JANUARY 196~~2~~1. GRAY was present. The Group approves shipment of arms to "dissidents inside the Dominican Republic".
   - Do you remember this event? Are the minutes accurate?
   - What was the policy behind the approval?
   - Weren't the weapons intended for use in assassination?

To; Files
From: FDB
Re: NOTES ON TESTIMONY OF ROBERT H. JOHNSON (6/18/75)
Date: 7/5/75

Biographical Background

1951-62 National Security Council staff member

1962-67 State Department, member of Policy Planning Council

Chronology of Events

Summer, 1960 Johnson attended a meeting of the NSC to discuss developments in the CONGO. "At some time during that discussion, President EISENHOWER said something -- I can no longer remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassination of LUMUMBA...There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on."

- --Johnson said he might have omitted the statement from his de-briefing memo due to its sensitivity.
- -- J. said probably Allen DULLES and Gordon GRAY were present at the meeting (in the Cabinet Room).
- --The formal record of decision by the NSC is unlikely to contain information on this subject, he said.
- --The memos which Johnson did on the meetings would be with President Eisenhower's papers.(10)

"I was surprised ...that I would ever hear a President say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled."

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/8/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10109

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-15

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/25/1975
PAGES : 19

SUBJECTS :
HARVEY, WILLIAM
ZRRIFLE
OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/08/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 418

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10109
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-15

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 06/25/75
PAGES : 19
SUBJECTS : HARVEY, WILLIAM

OPERATION MONGOOSE

ZRRIFLE

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 418

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BOX 418

MEETING 25 JUNE 75

[illegible] 418-13

TOP SECRET

AGENDA

TWENTY-FOURTH MEETING OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

10:00 A.M. ON JUNE 25, 1975 IN 457 RUSSELL BUILDING

Testimony by Mr. William Harvey

INVENTORIED:
ON MAR 24 1976
BY

WILLIAM HARVEY

Short Chronology*

Biographical	
1940-47	Counterespionage work as FBI agent
1947	Joined CIA as head of Soviet Intelligence Branch
1948	Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Special Operations (which became DDP)
1952	Chief of Station, Berlin (Berlin Tunnel operation)
1959	Became Chief of Foreign Intelligence staff Division D (FI/D) which handles communications intelligence and sensitive methods of obtaining it (e.g., surreptitious entries)
1960	
August 16	DR. EDWARD GUNN (Office of Medical Services) receives box of Cuban cigars to be treated with lethal poison. (21)
1961	
Late January (approx.)	EDWARDS and O'CONNELL ask for development of POISON PILLS. (24)
February (approx.)	BISSELL (DDP) asks HARVEY to establish an EXECUTIVE ACTION capability under project ZRRIFLE. Harvey's notes are quoted as saying that Bissell said he had been "twice urged by the White House" to establish such a capability. (37) Harvey is briefed, probably by both BISSELL and EDWARDS, on the Phase I assassination plot run by Sheffield EDWARDS and James O'CONNELL (Office of Security) which involved criminal syndicate connections. (37) HARVEY uses agent QJWIN (recruited earlier by ARNOLD SILVER for use in an assassination operation against LUMUMBA) as the principle asset for ZRRIFLE. (38) Edwards has the POISON PILLS tested. (25)

---

* Page references in parentheses are from the 1967 Report of the Inspector General of the CIA.

1961 (cont'd)

Early Feb.	According to Dr. GUNN, HARVEY asked about the pills he tested. Gunn briefed Harvey, who told him to brief SIDNEY GOTTLIEB about techniques but not targets. (27)
Late Feb.	Pills given to ROSELLI by O'CONNELL are passed to TRAFFICANTE. (27) ROSELLI reports to O'CONNELL that pills reached ORTA in Cuba. ORTA returns pills in couple weeks. (27)
March-Early April	O'CONNELL gives pills and money to ROSELLI who passes them to VARONA. (32)
Mid-April	Bay of Pigs invasion fails; JFK appoints Taylor Committee.
November 15	Beginning of PHASE II: BISSELL instructs HARVEY to apply the ZRRIFLE assassination capability to Castro. (39) Harvey takes over the criminal syndicate contacts developed in Phase I. (39) HARVEY is told by HELMS that he is to take over the CIA Cuba task force. (39)
November 29	MC CONE replaces Allen Dulles as DCI

1962

February	EDWARDS briefs HARVEY on Castro operation. (40)
February 7	EDWARDS meets with FBI to ask them not to prosecute the Rowan wiretap case because of CIA concern. (60)
February 19	HELMS (DDP nominee) authorizes HARVEY to handle ZRRIFLE project with unvouchered funds. (38)
April 8-9	HARVEY, ROSELLI, O'CONNELL, and perhaps MAHEU meet in New York to plan Phase II. (43) (Harvey disputes O'Connell's recollection that Maheu was there and knowledgeable of Phase II.) Both Edwards and Harvey check with HELMS before the meeting is arranged and HARVEY obtains Helm's approval not to brief MC CONE (41). Harvey thereafter begins regular reporting to Helms on Phase II. (41)
April 14	HARVEY, ROSELLI, and O'CONNELL meet in Miami. (46)
April 18-19	Pills are delivered to Harvey in Washington. (46)

TOP SECRET

1962 (cont'd)

April 21	HARVEY passes the pills to ROSELLI in Florida. (47) Roselli was to give the pills to Varona, who had an asset in Cuba with access to Castro's restaurant. At this point Roselli is using Tony VARONA and "MACEO" as contacts with Cuba rather than Trafficante. (47-8)
Late April	HARVEY, with help of Ted SHACKLEY (Chief of JMWAVE station in Miami), loaded arms and equipment in a U-Haul truck which was left in a parking lot for Roselli, who delivered it to a Cuban contact. (49-50)
Throughout May	Intense contact between HARVEY and ROSELLI. Roselli reports that pills are in Cuba at the restaurant frequented by Castro awaiting the opportunity to use them. (50)
May 7	EDWARDS and HOUSTON brief ATTORNEY GENERAL ROBERT F. KENNEDY on PHASE I of the assassination operation. (62a)*
May 14	Edwards tells HARVEY of the briefing of RFK. (65) Harvey says that he briefed HELMS about this and advised against briefing McCone (DCI) or Carter (DDCI); Helms agreed. (65)
	HARVEY is told by EDWARDS that the "tacit approval" of the DCI should be obtained if Roselli was to be used any further. (65) Harvey told Edwards that Roselli would not be used any more. (According to Edwards' memorandum of 5/14/62.) (42)
June 21	ROSELLI tells HARVEY that VARONA has sent three men to Cuba to recruit others for the pill plot. (51)
August 10	Special Group (Augmented) meets on OPERATION MONGOOSE. HARVEY and MC CONE said that McNAMARA raised the subject of assassinations at this meeting in regard to new plans.
August 13	General LANSDALE'S memorandum assigns to HARVEY the drafting of an outline of intelligence, political, economic, and paramilitary activities for the implementation of MONGOOSE. The task includes planning for "splitting the regime, including liquidation of leaders".

---

* RFK asks to be told before the CIA works with the Mafia again. (62a)

1962 (cont'd)

August 14	HARVEY writes a memorandum to DDP HELMS saying that he advised Lansdale's aide FRANK HAND to excise the words "including liquidation of leaders" from the LANSDALE memo because of "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document". Harvey also tells Helms that he has "careful notes" on MC NAMARA'S discussion of assassination at the Special Group meeting of August 10.
September	Pills still in place; HARVEY learns that VARONA is ready to send another team to Cuba. (51)
October	CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

1963

February	HARVEY and ROSELLI agree in Los Angeles to call off the operation, although not to break precipitously with VARONA. (52)
June	HARVEY and ROSELLI have last dinner in Washington and are observed by SAM PAPICH of the FBI, who has ROSELLI under intensive surveillance. Harvey asks Papich to let him know if HOOVER is going to call MC CONE. (53-4) Harvey briefs Helms and Helms agrees not to brief McCone unless it appears that McCone will receive a call from Hoover. (54)
August 16	Spurred by a Chicago newspaper story of the same day, HELMS sends MC CONE the Edwards memo of 5/14/62 of the RFK briefing. (69)

TOP SECRET

SECRET
EYES ONLY

Edwards Ex 1
5/30/75
1 pg.

14 May 1962

INVENTORIED:
ON MAR 2 1977
BY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: John Rosselli

1. In early April Mr. William Harvey asked me to arrange a contact with Subject. The meeting in New York City was arranged for 9 April. I explained to Mr. Harvey that the undersigned would take no part in future operations proposed for Subject.

2. In the interim I have kept Mr. Harvey fully informed reference to my briefing of The Attorney General on the former project and cautioned him that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence.

3 On this date Mr. Harvey called me and indicated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Subject for the future.

not true

Sheffield Edwards
Sheffield Edwards
Director of Security

EYES ONLY

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE ←
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Subject: Alternate Course B

INVENTORIED MAR 21 1977

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [redacted]), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

SEC DEF CONTR No. X-1530 EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

43

TOP SECRET-NOFORN SPECIAL HANDLING

OSD Rcy No. 1

This document contains 2 pages.
Copy No.______ of ______ copies, Series ______

D-43410

HELMS Ex 2.
6/13/75

SECRET
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

14 August 1962

MAR 21 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SECRET
SENSITIVE

EYES ONLY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and

SECRET

R371 1

[illegible]
ON MAR 2 1977
BY

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use agent assets for Division D operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of code and cipher materials, and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as needed.

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

SECRET

Classified by 007789
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational Assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJWIN was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I. S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Marcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJWIN. In October 1960,

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

QJWIN annual salary:	$ 7,200
Travel & ops expenses for QJWIN & other agents & agent condidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates:	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in ARRIFLE activity:	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses:	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

1) Legal, ethical-morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (and effect on DDP) and experiences with KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) - require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search and with guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, and w/known high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Government agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, training case officering, etc. DDP authority in this focal point mandatory.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth and no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign governments.

f. No use of any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Government agency. Training by opposition would ________.

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Manuel in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Rubarkers who can pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Kutube/D search; this established (e.g., Rome).

j. No discussions in Stations.

k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4) Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in house territory.

d. Exclude organization criminals (e.g., Sicilians) those with record of arrests, those with instability of purpose as criminals.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 24 1975
CIA

e. Staffers ________-selection.

5) Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6) Should have phoney 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged and backdated. Should look like a CE file.

7) Testing of moninees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

8) Former resistance personnel a possibility.

9) Use ~~nobody~~ nobody who has ever dealt with criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

10) Possible use of staffers for the action.

11) Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

Freedom to travel

Khokhlov case.

Legal, operational & ethical-morale problems.

1) Maximum security & within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering & deciphering. Guise of Louvide objection. Siglen not secure enough.

2) One focal point for search, control, training, case-officer & PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

4) Non-attributability: No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of case officers who can pass as foreigners -- and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selecter in house territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., QJWIN) has been examined.

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

RECEIVED F
JUN 24 1975
CIA

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne & stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) Danger of Standbys.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 24 1975
CIA

Scd G - 25/1 Exec Actions

"The Magic Button"

Narcotics Bureau

"for a living" RIS 201 cover

caution - Bankruptcy -- No star eyes - Jim A. Contradestinct from U-2
Not a TSD problem

Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort & a confession of weakness.

--El Benefactor -- assumptions
Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job. Ledford
Ehut R&D - memo.

"Translating machines" - of E basic sounds project.
pherious - (V with CB)

comment - Gear

Anathesia --

26/1 -- AS -- Fanforn - DCI Matter
No file

Never mentions word assassination.

1. Select proper oern to run --
2. Place a cover
3. Security Rules
4. Guide leves
5. Last Resort - Brakes -
6. No other agencies
7. No projects or papers except per cover.
8. Principal agent - (Mankel) ?
AF - Project draft LCH tested 1500 - from NB.
Mask spat rqm. stall AF project - cler Dbieke

Max as ~~3~~ 2
B - WKH - AS -
Sid - Reserv.
Substitute - What next

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

9. Disposal --
10. Targets who & where -- Must know before we can spot --
11. Case officering
12. Cover file - create to provide RIS or ~~abe~~tobel it. - non Sov
13. Note dangers of RIS counter action and monitor if they are blamed -
    Fd J list - Remember

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 24 1975
CIA

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY :	SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER :	157-10014-10117
RECORD SERIES :	MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	07-M-23

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SSCIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
DATE :	00/00/1975
PAGES :	103
SUBJECTS :	ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/21/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	CCBOX 453

Date : 08/07/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10117
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-23

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER
DATE : 00/00/75
PAGES : 103
SUBJECTS : ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 453

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

RICHARD GOODWIN BINDER

453-2

GOODWIN TESTIMONY NOTEBOOK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

		Summary on Richard Goodwin by DiGenova.
A.	4/26/61	Memo to Bundy re "Cuba Problem" from Goodwin.
B.	5/2/61	Memo to Goodwin re "Possible Covert Activities against Cuba," from Bissell.
C.	5/4/61	Draft of NSC Action No. 2413.
D.	5/5/61	Draft Record of Actions, 483rd NSC meeting (5/5/61)...
E.	5/24/61	Memorandum of Conversation with Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes, by Goodwin.
F.	6/10/61	Memorandum for the President re "CIA Reorganization," from Schlesinger.
G.	7/8/61	Memorandum for Mr. Richard Goodwin re "Cuban Covert Plan," from Schlesinger.
H.	9/1/61	Memorandum to the President re Cuban Task Force Meeting, 8/31, from Goodwin.
I.	11/1/61	Memorandum to the President, 'Eyes Only for the President," re concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, from Goodwin.
J.	11/2/61	Memorandum, Eyes Only for the President and the Attorney General," re "operation should be organized with five staff components," from Goodwin.
K.	11/4/61	Memo, "Eyes Only," re recommendations that "the Cuban Operation be organized in five components."
L.	11/22/61	Memorandum to Sec. of State, Sec. of Defense, Director of CIA, AG, Gen. Taylor, Gen. Lansdale, Richard Goodwin re"...summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operations" from Goodwin.
M.	8/10/62	Memorandum for Record re "Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August, 1962.
N.	8/13/62	Memorandum for William Harvey, CIA, Robert Hurwitch, State, Gen. Benjamin Harris, Defense, Don Wilson, USIA re "Alternate Course B," from Lansdale.
O.	8/14/62	Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans) re "Operation MONGOOSE," from Harvey.
P.	5/27/75	Summary of Goodwin Interview w. Aaron re "Intelligence Activities in Latin America."

Q.	6/10/75	Szulc Testimony before SSC, excerpt.
R.	7/17/75	Summary of documents produced by Goodwin on 7/16/75, by Dennin.
S.	5/13/61	Memorandum to Goodwin re "CIA Covert Activities in the Dominican Republic."
T.	5/29/61 (date of cable)	Drafts and original of cable from State Dept. to Dearborn.

July 17, 1975

To: F.A.O. Schwarz/Curtis Smothers

From: Joseph E. DiGenova

Re: Richard Goodwin Materials and Summary

Summary

A. Goodwin Interview of July 16, 1975

Mr. Goodwin was interviewed for a second time on July 16, 1975. He indicated that he chaired the "Cuba Task Force" after the Bay of Pigs. Paul Nitze had previously chaired the group. It was this Cuba Task Force that suggested the establishment of the Lansdale project. In this regard, Goodwin noted that Lansdale proved to be very efficient. Goodwin indicated that he was present during the conversation between President Kennedy and Tad Szulc concerning the question of assassinating Castro. (See Szulc's testimony infra.) He spoke with the President after that conversation and remembers JFK saying about assassination: "We can't get into that -- we'll all be targets." He noted that Bissell never mentioned anything to him, Goodwin, about assassination attempts. With regard to the August 10, 1962, meeting which he attended, Goodwin noted that McCone never made any oration upon the immorality of assassinating Castro. He remembered the August 10 meeting and said that "assassination was not shot down". When pressed for details at this point, and after being shown the Lansdale (8/13/62) and Harvey (8/14/62) memoranda, he said he wanted to think about the meeting before he made any more statements about who said and did what. He noted, however, that in 1966 while in Peru with Robert Kennedy that Kennedy, in a fleeting retort to a series of questions about U. S. assassination attempts against Castro, said "Tell him (the interpreter) I saved his (Castro's) life."

At the conclusion of the interview he turned over to the Committee various documents related to Cuba which he had found in his personal papers. Those are appended to this summary.

B. Goodwin Interview of May 27, 1975

During the course of this earlier interview, Goodwin alluded to the Cuba Task Force. According to the Committee notes of that interview, the discussion went as follows:

> In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of

> assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro", someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant "Executive Action". McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. (See interview infra.)

C. The Goodwin Documents

The documents which Mr. Goodwin has furnished the Committee are of no startling significance. One document, the May 2, 1961, memorandum from Bissell to Goodwin, is noteworthy because it does not advise him of the Roselli connection or the efforts to assassinate Castro. Bissell notes, "I have not attempted to provide you with much detail." A May 24, 1961, Memorandum of Conversation with Bissell by Goodwin does not mention any reference by Bissell to actions against Castro on the assassination front. An Arthur Schlesinger memorandum of June 30, 1961, to the President discusses the need for revamping of the "intelligence set-up" of the United States. In a footnote in that memorandum, Schlesinger notes that the CIA is not able to control its operatives once they are in the field and of the attendant dangers this poses. (See page 6 of the memo.)

The other documents indicate the thinking that went on up to the point where the Lansdale group was established as the coordinated effort against Cuba.

Areas of Inquiry for Goodwin

-- What, if anything, does Goodwin remember of the August 10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group which he attended?

-- Is this meeting different than the meeting he refers to in his initial interview where McNamara broached the subject of assassinating Castro? Or has he simply confused them and are they one and the same?

-- How does he explain McCone's recollection of having given an oration on the immorality of assassinating Castro when it was brought up at the August 10 meeting?

-- Was McNamara the person who brought up the subject at that meeting?

-- What discussion, if any, followed?

SECRET

Draft
4/26/61

MEMORANDUM

To: McGeorge Bundy
From: Dick Goodwin

Here are a few scattered thoughts on the "Cuba" problem.

Cuba is a threat to the security of the United States in two basic ways:

1. As a direct military menace in the Caribbean, a menace which will be intensified as communist arms shipments continue. However, even this increased danger will be minimal. Our treaty obligations commit us to the defense of any American nation which is attacked directly. Any military moves by Castro could be met immediately by our forces. Similarly we could intervene in case of Castro military aid to guerilla operations in the Americas.

2. As an exporter of revolution: There is no doubt that Cuba is being used as a base for export of the communist-fidelista revolution. This is done through the actual supply of funds and technical assistance to insurgent elements, through widespread and reasonably effective propaganda apparatus including a news service and radio network and through the use of Cuba as an example of the alliance between fidelismo and necessary social reform -- identification with the welfare of the people.

This threat is significant -- especially in the Carribean area. However, even here, in the last six months there has been a significant decline in Cuban effectiveness. This has come because of the growing isolation of communist--fiedlista elements from the Democratic left as Castro's pro-Soviet bent has become more apparent; and as Castro has become increasingly erratic in his personal behavior. There are signs, in fact, that, the communists are looking for another, more stable, hero -- perhaps Cardenas of Mexico.

3. While this means a declining influence of fidelismo over popular movements; it does not necessarily lessen the importance of Cuban-Soviet-Chinese material and technical aid to revolutionary movements. It is important to remember that even if Castro were wiped out tomorrow we would not have solved the problem of communist influence in the Americas. In fact, most of the greatest danger spots (E.G. Northeast Brazil, Columbia back-country, communist dominated student movements, etc.) do not owe either their existence or strength to Castro, but to local and independent leadership. This danger has been steadily growing, and would continue to grow if our only anti-communist move were to knock out Castro. These movements will Benefit from material assistance, even if they do not look to Cuba for leadership.

Suggested Course of Action:

Action Aimed At Cuba Directly

1. Before acting directly against Castro, in any fashion, we need a complete reassessment of the vulnerability of his regime -- the degree of popular support, the probably declining position of the Cuban economy and its impact on the Cuban people, the efficiency of his police state, the possibilities of underground organization, etc. Without such an assessment it is

impossible to realistically determine what alternative courses of action are open to us.

2. To meet the military threat we can work out defense agreements with Central American nations along the lines suggested with Professor Berle.

3. We should approach the government of Chile to call an Inter-American arms limitation conference. This conference should deal with methods of stopping external arms shipments in the context of the over-all limitations which are desparately needed in Latin America. We should decide, before this meeting, whether the risks in an OAS blockade of arms shipments to Cuba are outweighed by the dangers involved in halting and searching international shipping.

4. Immediately consult with heads of major nations in Latin America to see how far they are willing to go in terms of collective action. This should be done via a personal emissary. Although we should have a reasonably clear idea of what we want to do, this should be a genuine consultation among allies. All the myriad proposals for OAS action, etc., depend on the reaction of other Latin nations -- a reaction as yet undetermined.

5. Underlying all these proposals is the feeling that we should not move quickly in direct action against Cuba. I do not believe that there is any course of direct action which we can wisely take on the basis of current knowledge and conditions.

Attempts to stop direct export of Castroism

1. We should provide Carribean nations with the technical help (e.g. radar to spot incoming planes) and navy patrol assistance to meet the dangers of arms shipments from Cuba to insurgent elements in those nations.

2. There are two or three real danger spots (E.g. Dominican Republic and Haiti) where we should now be developing democratic alternatives to the present regime -- organizing replacement governments. If we do not do this then the inevitable changes in government may be followed by Castro-type regimes. When Democratic alternatives are organized we should consider means of precipitating the fall of Trujillo and Duvalier and possibly Somoza. In this way we can exert maximum control over the type of replacement government -- the timing and initiative should be ours.

3. Help provide counter-propaganda assistance to Latin governments -- e.g. radio transmitters. The more we can work through Democratic-liberal forces in Latin America, rather than through USIA alone, the more effective will be our propaganda.

General counter-communist operations

Our long-range strategy in the Americas should have two basic elements: First, the organization of a strong political counter-force. We have a ready instrument in the newly organized League of Democratic parties.

We should assist these parties -- financially and technically -- to develop progressive political movements (in some cases revolutionary movements, especially in the less progressive countries) through helping them in techniques of organization down to the village level, ideological warfare, etc. U. S. government help should be covert.

Second, the Alianza para el progreso. This program with its emphasis on social and economic advance is the real hope of preventing a communist takeover. The Alianza is proceeding about as rapidly as possible given present organization of effort, and the magnitude of available funds. Both of these elements are unsatisfactory.

A. Funds: Present plans provide for the allocation of 250-350 million dollars worth of economic assistance to Latin America in fiscal 1962. This is out of a total of 2. 4. billion. (This sum does not include the social development fund). One hundred million of this will go to Brazil to get them over their current financial crisis. I am not clear that any substantial allocation could be made given the enormous needs in Asia (especially in India and Pakistan) -- although I believe there can be some increase. However, these funds are probably not sufficient to make a real and effective start in economic development.

B. Organization: If communist takeover comes in Latin America it probably will not come through guerilla warfare, but through the capture of indigenous revolutionary movements. We cannot meet such a threat effectively -- well-organized as it is -- when our overseas operations are as diffuse and uncoordinated as they are today. The aid program, the political bureaus of State, the USIA, educational exchange, CIA activities all go, to too great an extent, their own way under separate heads and often in pursuit of separate goals. I believe that resulting diffusion of effort, results in great waste of resources and intelligence. We must organize our non-military overseas operation to reflect our basic objective in Latin America -- the strengthening of democratic Western-oriented nations and governments so that they have the capacity to resist communist attack in all its forms. Those who are charged with the responsiblity for achieving this objective must have control over the instruments which our government provides. Just as we have seen the need for some centralization of command in fighting hot wars -- it is needed for effectively waging a cold war. This does not necessarily mean a "Chief of Hemisphere Operations"; but at the very least it means that, within each key country there must be a central operational capacity and authority with direct lines to the levels of action in Washington.

EYES ONLY

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the
President

SUBJECT: Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject and our conversations over the past few days, I have not attempted to provide you with much detail.

Richard M. Bissell Jr.
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachment: Paper as stated above

EYES ONLY

SECRET

2 May 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard N. Goodwin
Assistant Special Counsel to the
President

SUBJECT: Possible Covert Activities against Cuba

Attached is a brief statement regarding covert operations against Cuba. In view of your familiarity with this subject and our conversations over the past few days, I have not attempted to provide you with much detail.

(Signed) Richard M. Bissell, Jr.

Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
Deputy Director
(Plans)

Attachment: Paper as stated above

SECRET

EYES ONLY

2 May 1961

As indicated by the combined INR/ONE estimate, anti-Castro activity within Cuba will probably be muted at least for the next several months. Most individuals whose loyalty is in any way suspect have been arrested. A recent report from the Swiss Ambassador indicated that political prisoners now number 100,000. All internal services will continue to work on a theory of repression plus undoubtedly swift and brutal penalties. Consequently, it will be very difficult to carry on any clandestine operations and it is doubtful that such operations can have any significant impact in weakening the Castro regime.

In spite of this, evidence is still available that there is opposition to the regime among individuals still at large and that such opposition is prepared to undertake action despite the risks involved. Moreover, there are still agents distributed through most of the six provinces and communications can still be had either directly or indirectly with these individuals. At the very least these agents can and will continue to collect information and to transmit it to the Agency. In addition, certain of these individuals, plus some additional ones who might be infiltrated, could attempt to carry out some sabotage. Individual acts of sabotage are possible with relatively few men and small amounts of material. Successive acts of sabotage or extensive

SECRET

sabotage operations are more difficult and inevitably more costly in terms of loss of men. Nevertheless, it would be possible, starting in the near future, to attempt limited sabotage with a view to determining its feasibility and with the hope that gradually an increased program might be developed.

A capability also exists for types of maritime operations including infiltration and exfiltration of individuals, landing and caching of arms, under-water sabotage of shipping and small raider operations. Under present circumstances it would seem wrong to attempt these except on a very limited scale and, in all likelihood, raider operations should not be attempted until more information regarding feasibility has been obtained.

The Agency also has a small air arm including some transport aircraft (C-54 and C-46 types) plus attack bomber aircraft (B-26). Although it is not absolutely certain, there is reason to suppose that Cuban crews also are available for operational flights. At the moment, air operations should be substantially eliminated with the possible exception of supply flights to support opposition elements unable to survive without such support. Even with respect to such operations, however, it should be remembered that the percentage of successful night drops is extremely limited so that the urgency should be great to justify the risk. B-26 strikes could, of course, be flown against chosen targets (e.g. refineries, power plants, tire plants) and, if successful, might have the effect of extensive sabotage. In view of the risks involved, however, and the poor deniability of U.S. support where aircraft are involved, it is recommended that such operations be avoided at least for the present.

Manolo Ray of the MRP has asserted an independent MRP capability to conduct infiltration, intelligence collection, sabotage and defection operations into Cuba. He recognizes a need for U.S. support but is very firm in his desire to operate as independently as possible of any official U.S. connection. His initial request is for five boats, some materiel and some money. He admits, however, that, looking ahead, additional support such as real estate, some help with training and communications will be required. He offers to share his information with the U.S. Government, seek U.S. advice and, at least for a period of time, be willing to operate with the Revolutionary Council. The Council's views are being canvassed and Ray has been asked to prepare a prospectus giving in some detail his needs for U.S. support for the immediate future and the step-up required over a period of time should his efforts prove successful.

The Ray proposal should certainly be examined and given support within reasonable limits if the relationships proposed both with the Council and with the U.S. are satisfactory.

In addition to the activities described above, propaganda activities such as radio broadcasts and publication of magazines and newspapers can be continued independently by the Agency or in support of Ray or the Revolutionary Council. Moreover, limited political action operations are possible. As to both propaganda and political action, however, the amount of effort and the type of activity undertaken will depend to a large extent on the decisions with respect to the operations described above. Consequently, these will be noted here as mere possibilities.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

a. Agreed that the political objective of U. S. policy toward Cuba is to bring about the downfall of the Castro regime.

b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

Open until after
[illegible]
[illegible] with NSC

c. Agreed that the Cuban situation should be kept under constant review, in the light of the possibility that actions by Castro would prompt a reconsideration of the decision not to intervene.

d. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval or air blockade against Cuba at this time.

e. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet Bloc military assistance, taking into account the possibility of U. S. intervention at a future [redacted] date.

f. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime.

[illegible]

g. Noted the President's direction that the Task Force on Cuba make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.

h. ~~Noted that a Special Committee, under the direction of the Director of Central Intelligence, would prepare a plan of special covert operations with respect to Cuba, for the consideration of the President.~~

i. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces and trained ~~in special units consisting of Spanish-speaking nationals~~, under a plan to be presented by the Secretary of Defense in connection with his review of U. S. conventional forces.

j. Agreed that Cuban nationals now in the United States will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status.

All refugees should
ineligible [illegible] for
[illegible] privileges
may [illegible] be made eligible for
[illegible]

k. Agreed not to impose a complete trade embargo on Cuba for the present, but if later actions by Castro resulted in a decision to do so, all trade with Cuba would be stopped. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of how a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba would affect our trade relations with other countries under the Battle Act.

l. Noted that the President would discuss with Canada the position of Canadian subsidiaries of U. S. corporations in the event of U. S. impositions in trade embargoes on Cuba.

m. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements to quarantine Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling

DRAFT

subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

n. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans.

o. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America rather than initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime. [illegible]

p. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

DRAFT

g. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.

4. **U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI**

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

Bring Dearborn back for a day or two

Berle & Goodwin

US policy, back to

COPY NO. 50

DRAFT RECORD OF ACTIONS
483rd NSC Meeting
(5/5/61)

1. U. S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN

Agreed that a Task Force should be established under the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

2. U. S. POLICY TOWARD KOREA

Agreed that a Task Force under the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs should be established to prepare and circulate a report on the subject by May 15 for discussion by the Council on May 19.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA
(NSC Action No. 2413-c; Memo for NSC, same subject, dated May 4, 1961)

a. Agreed that U. S. policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro, and that since the measures agreed below are not likely to achieve this end, the matter should be reviewed at intervals with a view to further action.

b. Agreed that the United States should not undertake military intervention in Cuba now, but should do nothing that would foreclose the possibility of military intervention in the future.

3. U.S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

c. Agreed that the United States should not impose a naval blockade or attempt an air war against Cuba; it was noted that neither course had the support of the Department of Defense or the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

d. Noted the importance the President attaches to obtaining timely and adequate intelligence as to Cuban military capabilities, especially the enhancement of such capabilities by Sino-Soviet bloc military assistance, so that U. S. capabilities for possible intervention may be maintained at an adequate level.

e. Noted the importance the President attaches to publication in the Free World press of the terroristic actions of the Castro regime, and to possible political action to end the current terror.

f. Noted the President's direction that the Central Intelligence Agency, with other departments, should make a detailed study of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the elements which exert control in Cuba today.

g. Agreed that relations with the Revolutionary Council should be improved and made more open, and while it cannot be recognized as a government-in-exile, support should be given to it insofar as it continues to represent substantial Cuban sentiment.

h. Agreed that no separate Cuban military force should be organized in the United States, but that Cuban nationals would be encouraged to enlist in the U. S. armed forces under plans to be developed by the Secretary of Defense.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

i. Agreed that Cuban nationals now holding U. S. visitors' visas will be given refugee status and assisted, under a program to be developed and directed by the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, in carrying on their former occupations. Refugees now in Miami will be encouraged to locate in other areas. Cuban nationals entering the United States will be given refugee status. All refugees will be eligible to apply for travel privileges, and it was understood that they would also be eligible for citizenship.

j. Agreed not to impose an immediate trade embargo on Cuba. The Secretary of State agreed to send to the President an analysis of the effects of a U. S. embargo on trade with Cuba in relation to the Battle Act. It was agreed that when an embargo is imposed, it should be as complete as possible, with certain exceptions for Canada and with Red Cross distribution of drugs.

k. Agreed that the United States should at once initiate negotiation to enlarge the willingness of other American states to join in bilateral, multilateral and OAS arrangements against Castro, such as (1) breaking diplomatic relations with Cuba; (2) controlling subversive activities of Cuban agents; (3) preventing arms shipments to Castro; (4) limiting economic relations with Cuba; (5) creating a Caribbean security force; (6) initiating a naval patrol to prevent Cuban invasion of other states in the Caribbean; and (7) denunciation of Castro as an agent of international communism by all nations of this hemisphere.

3. U. S. POLICY TOWARD CUBA (Continued)

l. Agreed that the Alliance For Progress should be strengthened by such measures as (1) rapid implementation of selected social development projects; (2) acceleration of the implementation of other Latin American aid; and (3) provision of additional resources for Latin American economic and social development, including consideration of a supplemental appropriation for development loans of the order of $200-$400 million.

m. Agreed that the U. S. Information Agency would expand its existing program in Latin America, but not initiate electronic warfare against the Castro regime; means of propaganda should be made available to non-U. S. groups.

n. Agreed that U. S. military officers, under general guidance to be prepared by the Department of State, would discuss the Castro threat to all Latin America with Latin American officers.

o. Agreed that the Secretary of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.

p. Agreed that pending appointment of an Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, the Task Force on Cuba should be continued under the chairmanship of Richard N. Goodwin, Assistant to the Special Counsel to the President.

DRAFT

4. U. S. POLICY TOWARD THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral.

5. U. S. POLICY TOWARD BRITISH GUIANA

Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would consider what can be done in cooperation with the British to forestall a communist take-over in that country.

6. U. S. POLICY IN MAINLAND SOUTHEAST ASIA

a. Noted that efforts should be made to reassure Sarit and Diem that we are not abandoning Southeast Asia.

b. Noted the President's view that Sarit could be told that we are considering inclusion of U. S. troops in SEATO forces to be stationed in Thailand, the timing to be dependent on developments during or after the forthcoming 14-nation Geneva Conference.

c. Noted that the Secretaries of State and Defense would be sending recommendations to the President promptly on the number of U. S. training troops to be stationed in Thailand.

May 24, 1961

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH:

Dick Bissell
Tracy Barnes

Mr. Bissell agreed that no major decisions concerning covert activities in Cuba should be made before the President returns from his European trip. However there are a few things he thought should be done immediately:

1. That he revise the internal CIA organization in preparation for possible covert activities. This means changes bothehere and in Miami.

2. That a small group (30 to 40) Cuban pilots be continued as pilots under commercial cover in Central America and perhaps one or two American companies. No commitment should be made to them that they would be used in future activities. They would be trained as individuals and not as any group or "movement." This is primarily to keep their skills alive and to keep them available.

3. He wishes to clean up the Nicaraguan situation. We have left a lot of Military hardware there as a residue of the Cuban operation. He would like to pull this equipment out of there, turning some of the B 26's over to Somoza and allowing some of the Cuban pilots to remain there to train Nicaraguans in flying these planes. This would be at Somoza's request and would only be done if he insisted upon it as a re-payment for services rendered. I stressed that no Americans should be involved in the training of Nicaraguan pilots.

4. He would like to train a few Cubans as radio operators. They would be trained as individuals and would not know each other or that any others were being trained. This amounts to training some individual agents for possible future use. No commitments would be made to any of the men trained. It is felt that this much activity is necessary in the next few weeks.

5. In addition, the Agency would like to survey the various potential insurrectionary groups which now exist. There are several of these groups, three or four of which claim to have an underground in Cuba. We should speak to them. We should tell them we could make absolutely no commitment as to any future activities. However, he would like from them an assesment of what they thought they could do in the future and -- if they were to be active -- what help they would require from the United States.

TOP SECRET

This would enable us to make a judgment as to whether we should engage in covert activity based partly upon this information -- information which would tell us what help in specific terms would be required and what we could expect from these groups. This has already been done in the case of Mirona Ray. The groups contacted would include the Council, the MRP, UNIDAD and MRR.

6. In addition, he was informed that Swan radio could not be used by the USIA. They are unable to assimilate it into their system. I suggested that we might try to find a good Latin American group, e.g., The League of Democratic Parties or the Institute of Political Education run by Jose Figures, to use it. I said that for the Council to operate the station did not seem to me to be desirable.

7. I discussed the general situation in Miami and the various newspaper reports. I pointed out that the CIA agents now in Miami were known to everyone, including the press, and were the same people who were identified with pre-invasion activities. Their presence I felt only intensified the rivalry among Cuban groups and served as a focal point of discontent. I requested that this group be broken up and that to the extent agents were necessary new people -- people not identified with the pre-invasion activities -- should be sent to Miami.

8. It was agreed that no future covert activities should be conducted in the Miami area and that the groups with whom we dealt should be scattered in other cities throughout the Southeastern part of the country. I said that working in Miami was like trying to carry on covert activities in the city room of a newspaper.

9. We also agreed that Dr. Miro could be informed that we were making a survey of other Cuban groups but that he should be told nothing more specific than that.

10. I also referred to the newspaper stories which reported that Batistianos were being used supported by U.S.-CIA funds. They said this was not accurate. They said that this would be very carefully looked into and that the most specific instructions would be given that absolutely no Batistianos should be supported directly or indirectly by the U.S. government.

11. I am strongly of the opinion that we must clear up the Miami area as soon as possible. Therefore, I will get Ribicoff to expedite the Refugee program, probably through the use of Mutual Security funds in order to get these people into jobs, schools, etc. in other parts of the country. Unless we do this we are going to have continually increasing problems in the Miami area.

Richard N. Goodwin

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present manned and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

---

*Or should be -- a grave and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," *Saturday Evening Post*, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 1954).

conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on those functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accompli; State never had title to control over clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operatio Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether th advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derive from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement o the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

---

*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 *Foreign Service List* as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them: when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support; and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia: "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

SECRET

5. _How to Establish Policy Control?_ Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adopted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation

SECRET

that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

Cuba

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 8, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD GOODWIN

SUBJECT: Cuban Covert Plan

Analysis of this plan shows that it envisages (a) "an island-wide resistance organization responsive to Agency direction"; "internal assets under close Agency control and direction"; (b) "support and guidance to those anti-Castro groups who are revealed to have a potential for clandestine operations"; and (c) "primary operations bases" in the US. In short, what is intended is a CIA underground formed on criteria of operational convenience rather than a Cuban underground formed on criteria of building political strength sufficient to overthrow Castro.

Despite the pretense of political impartiality, the effect of these CIA specifications is obviously to favor those groups most willing to accept CIA identification and control, and to discriminate against those groups most eager to control their own operations. I. e., the plan discriminates in favor of mercenaries, reactionaries, etc., and discriminates against men of independence and principle. Thus these criteria eliminate the Manuel Ray group; yet I can find nowhere in the documents any explicit exclusion of pro-Batista people.

Leaving aside the moral merits of this discrimination, the practical effect is to invest our resources in the people least capable of generating broad support within Cuba. The Agency fails to confront the key problem: i. e., that those most capable of rallying popular support against the Castro regime are going to be more independent, more principled and perhaps even more radical than the compliant and manageable types which CIA would prefer for operational purposes.

My recommendation is that you stop this paper in its present form and demand that it be recast to make political sense. The key is the statement that our covert activity "should be viewed only as the covert contribution to any national program designed to bring about the eventual replacement of the Castro government." This is correct; and there follows from it (a) that our covert activity should encourage the spread of the political sentiments within Cuba most likely to rally support for Castro's overthrow (which means, for example, Ray rather than Batista), and (b) that our covert activity should harmonize with our basic national policy of rescuing the Cuban Revolution, as set forth in the White Paper.

It is a fallacy to suppose that clandestine activity can be carried out in a political vacuum.

A. S. Jr.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

September 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

The Cuban Task Force met at the White House on Thursday, August 31. Present were Under Secretary Ball, Assistant Secretary Woodward, two members of the ARA Bureau, Dick Bissell, Tracy Barnes and myself.

The following decisions were made:

1. We would proceed immediately to discuss with other Carribean governments the possibility of organizing a Carribean Security Force. This could be organized on the basis of informal understandings within the framework of existing treaty arrangements, as a series of new bilateral treaties, or a formal, multilateral treaty. It was thought that the basis of organization would depend on the judgment of other Carribean countries as to how they could accomplish the objective of establishing the force without running serious internal political risks. The United States, for its part, would prefer the formal multi-lateral arrangement. Such a Carribean Security Force would have at least four major aspects:

(1) Advance committment to come to the aid of other signatories threatened by Castro revolutions and, perhaps the designation of specific units for participation in necessary multi-lateral actions.

(2) The establishment of a pool of intelligence information concerning subversive activities with provision for exchange of such information.

(3) The establishment of a Carribean air and sea patrol to watch for suspected infiltration of Castro arms or agents.

(4) A training program in combatting subversive tactics, police organization and procedure, etc.

It was conceded that the substantive aspects of this arrangement could, if necessary, be achieved informally. However, the decision to seek a more formal arrangement was primarily arrived at on the basis of internal political considerations in the United States.

SECRET

2. It was decided that our public posture toward Cuba should be as quiet as possible -- trying to ignore Castro and his island.

3. Our covert activities would now be directed toward the destruction of targets important to the economy, e.g., refineries, plants using U.S. equipment, etc. This would be done within the general framework of covert operations -- which is based on the principle that para-military activities ought to be carried out through Cuban revolutionary groups which have a potential for establishing an effective political opposition to Castro within Cuba. Within that principle we will do all we can to identify and suggest targets whose destruction will have the maximum economic impact.

4. We will intensify our surveillance of Cuban trade with other countries and especially U. S. subsidiaries in other countries; and then employ informal methods to attempt to divert this trade -- depriving Cuba of markets and sources of supply. I understand that we have already had a few successes in this effort.

5. We will establish next week -- in the State Department -- a psychological warfare group. This will be a full-time group of three or four people charged with the responsibility of assembling all available information on the Sovietization of Cuba, repression of human rights, failure of the Cuban economy, etc. -- much of which has been hitherto classified -- putting this information into readable, popularized form, and developing methods of disseminating it through Latin America. Such dissemination would be primarily through USIA channels but would include feeding it to Latin papers for "exclusive" stories, helping to prepare scripts for Latin American broadcasts, perhaps a direct mailing list of intellectuals and government officials to be handled by a front group, etc. The basic idea is to get this stuff into channels of Latin American communication, instead of treating it as official U. S. propaganda. We have selected someone to head this effort -- Jim O'Donnell of George Ball's office who was a free-lance magazine writer (including work for the Saturday Evening Post) for many years and who Ball highly recommends.

6. The CIA was asked to come up -- within the week -- with a precise, covert procedure for continuing the below-ground dialogue with the Cuban government. The object of this dialogue -- to explore the possibility of a split within the governmental hierarchy of Cuba and to encourage such a split -- was fully detailed in my last memorandum to you. This is an effort to find an operational technique.

Richard N. Goodwin

November 1, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

I believe that the concept of a "command operation" for Cuba, asdiscussed with you by the Attorney General, is the only effective way to handle an all-out attack on the Cuban problem. Since I understand you are favorably disposed toward the idea I will not discuss why the present disorganized and uncoordinated operation cannot do the job effectively.

The beauty of such an operation over the next few months is that we cannot lose. If the best happens we will unseat Castro. If not, then at lease we will emerge with a stronger underground, better propaganda and a far clearer idea of the dimensions of the problems which affect us.

The question then is who should head this operation. I know of no one currently in Cuban affairs at the State Department who can do it. Nor is it a very good idea to get the State Department involved in depth in such covert activities. I do not think it should be centered in the CIA. Even if the CIA can find someone of sufficient force and stature, one of the major problems will be to revamp CIA operations and thinking -- and this will be very hard to do from the inside.

I believe that the Attorney General would be the most effective commander of such an operation. Either I or someone else should be assigned to him as Deputy for this activity, since he obviously will not be able to devote full time to it. The one danger here is that he might become too closely identified with what might not be a successful operation. Indeed, chances of success are very speculative. There are a few answers to this:

(1) Everyone knowledgeable in these affairs -- in and out of government -- is aware that the United States is already helping the underground. The precise manner of aid may be unknown but the fact of aid is common knowledge. We will be blamed for not winning Cuba back whether or not we have a "command operation" and whether or not the Attorney General heads it.

(2) His role should be told to only a few people at the very top with most of the contact work in carrying out his decisions being left to his deputy. If that deputy is someone already closely identified with the conduct of Cuban affairs then it would appear as if normal channels are being followed except that decisive attention would be given to the decisions which came through those channels. There are probably three or four people who could fulfill this criterion.

This still leaves a substantial danger of identifying the Attorney General as the fellow in charge. This danger must be weighed against the increased effectiveness of an operation under his command.

Richard N. Goodwin

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

2 November 1961

MEMORANDUM

I believe that the operation should be organized with five staff components:

1. Intelligence collection and evaluation
2. Guerilla and underground
3. Propaganda
4. Economic warfare (exclusive of covert activities within Cuba)
5. Diplomatic relations

Each of these divisions would be headed by someone directly responsible to you. In addition you would have a deputy who would do the actual contact work between this operation and the various government agencies involved. He would be the one identified as the source of orders and directives when direct contact with the agencies was needed. ~~In fact he would perform a largely ministerial function.~~ He should be from CIA for reasons discussed below. I would act as Staff Assistant to you. My primary job would be to see that current questions for decision were presented to you at your morning staff meetings with the alternatives fully discussed. I would have no direct operational duties; thus keeping in the back ground.

I have talked to MacNamara and he has promised to supply a topflight guerilla and underground man, as well as whatever additional personnel we need. I think this is the best way to handle it. However, it will be necessary to use the CIA apparatus and agents for this. That is why it will be valuable to assign a CIA man to you as deputy in order to keep them happy and ~~make them feel~~ ~~[illegible]~~ deeply involved at the command level. In this way we can probably avoid an internal struggle between the CIA field operatives and the Defense command.

Both the diplomatic relations and economic warfare people can come from State. I have some ideas on this and -- if you give the signal -- will discuss it with George Ball.

EYES ONLY FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

TOP SECRET

One of Bob Amory's brightest young men should be assigned to intelligence collection and evaluation.

As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one -- although we should check with Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell.

These people should have a headquarters. It should probably be at the Pentagon because (a) we might get better security; (b) MacNamara will be easier to work with in terms of getting whatever staff services, secretarial personnel, etc; (c) It is a relatively neutral place between State and CIA; (d) you could rearrange your schedule to stop in on the way to Justice every morning -- perhaps for a breakfast or post-breakfast meeting.

This operation should not be discussed at tomorrow's meeting. Initially only George Ball (and Rusk, of course), MacNamara, McCone and Bissell should know of your participation. When they are named, the five section heads will have to know -- ~~the~~ the initial organizing work and contact work should be done through your Deputy and myself. If this subject is discussed tomorrow then already too many people will know about it.

The first steps are (a) name the section chiefs (b) review with them all current operations in their field, establish their authority over operations, get necessary staff assistance (on as small as possible basis), and start them to work; (c) establish the physical headquarters; (d) arrange for financing -- presumably coming largely from CIA.

If this meets with your approval I will begin work on the above items with all final decisions on personnel and other matters subject, of course, to your approval.

Richard N. Goodwin

11

Copy

EYES ONLY

November 4, 1961

The following are some tentative recommendations meant to serve as a basis of discussion:

I would recommend that the Cuban operation be organized in five components:

a. Intelligence collection and evaluation
b. Underground and guerilla
c. Propaganda
d. Economic warfare (other than covert activities within Cuba)
e. Diplomatic relations

Although these sections will make use of available agency capabilities the operational authority for each of these aspects of the operation will be in the hands of the section leader who is responsible to the chairman of the group. All of these activities will be compartmentalized as much as possible, i.e., only the chairman will be kept completely informed on all aspects of the operation.

The operation should have its physical headquarters in the Department of Defense, both for maximum security and to detach it as much as possible from identification as a CIA activity.

The first steps are:

1. Designation of section chiefs;
2. A complete survey by each section chief of current operations in his field;
3. The establishment of control over operations by the section chief;
4. The expansion of operations where feasible.

Bob Amory should be asked to designate one of his best men to centralize the intelligence collection and evaluation.

The Defense Department should designate the section chief for underground and guerilla activities.

EYES ONLY

TOP SECRET

We should discuss expansion of propaganda operations with Ed Murrow and appropriate CIA officers -- not relating it to stepped up operations in other fields. With these people we should select a single person to be the propaganda chief, coordinating CIA and USIA operations. I have suggested that Tad Szulc -- if he can be persuaded to take a leave of absence -- would be a useful person to advise on this aspect of the operation.

Both economic warfare and diplomatic relations should be handled by a designee of the State Department. It is important to keep the diplomatic relations aspect of this operation under some sort of control so that we con't involve ourselves in potentially embarrassing situations in the OAS, e.g. voting to send an investigating committee to Cuba when our operations are at a height and Fidel has evidence to present of U.S. participation.

The Deputy should be from CIA.

The President should not talk to the press. It may be that some contacts with a few key newsmen should be made -- in the most general way. But if the President approaches them personally and the operation does not succeed it is inevitable that he will become the focus of another Cuban failure. There are two types of newsmen involved here. There is a rather large group which will hear rumors and stories of various kind. There is nothing to be done about them. There are a few newsmen whose contacts in the Cuban community are so extensive that they might be able to put together a coherent story. If any approaches are to be made it should be restricted to these; although they should never be told we are going to wage an all-out operation. In addition, as much contact and operational work as possible should be done outside the Miami area.

Our next step should be to designate section chiefs, establish their authority and have them make a complete survey of pessent operations. This would include a survey of current covert operations and capacities here and in Miami (and anywhere else they are going on), as the first task of the Defense Department designee with CIA assistance. The physical headquarters should be established.

Although the Attorney General should maintain a general operational supervision, it is probably unwise for him to be the formal chairman of the group because the risk of identification is fairly high.

If such identification is made, and the operation is not successful, another Cuban failure may be directly traceable to the President. I regard this as fairly remote in this type of operation but the danger can be decreased if the operation is formally headed by someone who is not so clearly acting at the direct behest of the President. The Attorney General can give assistance and maintain general supervision on behalf of the President, working with the Chairman alone -- rather than extending his contacts to include all the operation chiefs.

November 22, 1961

Bob --

If you approve this (it is based on a brief memo from General Lansdale) I will send it on its way. In addition you should have a meeting -- as soon as possible -- with Lansdale and the senior representatives of State, Defense and CIA. If you want to call me on this after you have read the memo I will suggest a procedure for getting them together.

Richard N. Goodwin

TOP SECRET -- EYES ONLY

November 22, 1961

MEMORANDUM TO: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of CIA
The Attorney General
General Taylor
General Lansdale
Richard Goodwin

The following is a summary of the major decisions which have been made in regard to the Cuba Operation.

1. We will go ahead with the discussed project to help Cuba overthrow the communist regime and establish a free Cuba. All available assets will be directed to this end as a matter of urgent national priority.

2. The program will be conducted under the general guidance of the Attorney General, with General Lansdale as his chief of operations.

3. The program will be reviewed in two weeks in order to determine whether General Lansdale will continue as chief of operations.

4. The NSC 5412 group will be kept informed of activities.

5. The Secretaries of State and Defense and the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency will appoint senior officers of their department as personal representatives to assist the chief of operations as required. These senior officers should be able to exercise -- either themselves or through the Secretaries and Director -- effective operational control over all aspects of their Department's operations dealing with Cuba.

6. Knowledge of the existence of this operation should be restricted to the recipients of this memorandum, members of the 5412 group, and the representatives appointed by the Secretaries and the Director. Any further dissemination of this knowledge will be only with the authority of the Secretaries of State or Defense, the Attorney General, or the Chief of Operations.

TOP SECRET--EYES ONLY

HARVEY #5

[illegible] Ex. 13 18
7-1-75

MONGOOSE

10 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 10 August 1962

PRESENT: State: Mr. Rusk, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Martin, Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Hurwitch

White House: General Taylor, Mr. Bundy

Defense/JCS: Mr. McNamara, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale

CIA: Mr. McCone, Mr. Harvey

USIA: Mr. Murrow, Mr. Wilson

1. Mr. McCone said that the conclusion of the Board of National Estimates was that the Soviets will not let the Castro regime fail because of its own inherent weaknesses. This thought had not been contained as such in the NIE. Later in the meeting, Mr. McCone said that he believes we must face the fact that Cuba will be stronger in a year or two than it is now; he added his personal opinion that the Soviets might consider establishing an MRBM base in Cuba. He noted that these two points are not necessarily concurred in by the Board of National Estimates or by the USIB.

2. At Secretary Rusk's request, General Lansdale gave a brief explanation of the four possible courses of action outlined in recent papers. He then summarized progress to date by saying that during Phase I, now completed, an intensive intelligence look has been taken at Cuba, that we have learned a great deal, but that we do not yet have a true assessment of resistance potential.

3. Mr. Rusk suggested the possibility that in the event of a blockade of Berlin, the U.S. might wish to change its posture toward Cuba, perhaps engaging in direct retaliation against Soviet shipping, etc. He suggested that the Berlin and Cuba contingency plans should be closely meshed. Mr. McNamara was uncertain on this point, saying that he did not believe limited retaliation of this kind would constitute an adequate response to a Berlin blockade, whereas world-wide harrassment of Soviet facilities would be a different matter.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE O

4. Mr. Rusk emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists. He pointed out that such a split would be bound to be beneficial to U.S. interests no matter which way the balance of power swung. In this general connection, it was hard for him to visualize a valid pretext for U.S. military intervention in Cuba under any circumstances currently foreseen. However, should reasonably viable resistance develop to the extent for example that some provinces might oppose the Havana Government, then the U.S. might desire to give support to such provincial officials.

In response to the above, Mr. McCone pointed out that at the moment the previously-cited frictions between Castro and the old-line Communists have been resolved in Castro's favor, and no issue currently exists. There has additionally been at least a temporary rapprochement between Fidel and Moscow. He indicated that this of course may be temporary. He said that there has been some success in recruiting Cuban officials abroad to work for the U.S., and that there have been some defections.

5. The discussion then turned to the objectives of the MONGOOSE program. Mr. McNamara questioned whether we cannot separate the building up of agent assets within Cuba from actions that would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion. This led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the over-all objective from one of overthrowing the Castro regime to one of causing its visible failure.

In this context Mr. McCone then presented an alternate plan (called hereafter the "CIA variant") to the stepped-up Course B described by General Lansdale, which he said had been prepared as a result of the conclusion that stepped-up B would not in fact result in the overthrow of Castro. He emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of U.S. military force. Mr. McCone said that a stepped-up B will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary-type blood bath if unsupported. Not only would the U.S. be blamed, but there would also be a high noise level in the press and eventually a situation would be created which would require intervention.

On the other hand, the CIA variant now proposed would, in Mr. McCone's view, avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising. Again he repeated his view that the U.S. might, however, face a stronger Cuba in the future.

6. The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. Mr. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split. It was emphasized that any actions under this plan must be so designed as to avoid major attribution to the U.S.

7. General Lemnitzer told the Group that the Navy does not wish Guantanamo used as a base for operational activities, as suggested by CIA. He said that the other Chiefs have not yet given an opinion on this but he thought that they would agree with the Navy, as he himself does. The view is that this base is too important to the U.S. and too vulnerable to Cuban pressure to take the chance of provoking Cuban reaction. The State representatives agreed with this view.

8. Mr. Bundy suggested that a hard look be taken at the possibility of support to selected Cuban exiles on a strictly "disengaged" basis; in other words, should they be given covert financial and material support, with the idea of seeing what they could generate on their own.

9. Mr. Rusk suggested that continued pressure should be placed on Castro by keeping interest in the prisoner issue alive.

10. Action to be taken:

CIA to prepare a new version of its variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wesnesday, August 15th.

Thomas A. Parrott

cc: General Lansdale
destroyed 4/9/63 · mn.

Attachment - Agenda for Meeting

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

T & D

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

MONGOOSE

* (S)

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

D

13 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR WILLIAM HARVEY, CIA
ROBERT HURWITCH, STATE
GEN. BENJAMIN HARRIS, DEFENSE ←
DON WILSON, USIA

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale

Subject: Alternate Course B

In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the 10 August policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission. The CIA paper "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort)" will be used as the starting basis.

Since this is to be a bare outline, to permit further policy guidance to be developed, I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the headings of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military.

We will hold an Operational Representatives work session in my office, at 1400 hours, Tuesday, 14 August, to complete the outline paper for submission. Each of you is to bring 5 copies of completed assigned work to this work session, to permit each of us to work from a full set of drafts.

Papers required from each of you for the Tuesday meeting:

Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political (splitting the regime, [redacted]), Economic (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Hurwitch: Statement of Objectives, Political, and Economic. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
[illegible]
DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET-NOFORN
SPECIAL HANDLING

This document contains ___ pages.
Copy No. ________ of ________ copies.

03075

Gen. Harris: Economic (limited deception), Paramilitary (limited deception), and Military. Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

Mr. Wilson: Psychological (including covert). Also, any suggestions for inclusion in other sections of the paper.

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY 6/15/75

14 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director (Plans)

SUBJECT : Operation MONGOOSE

1. Action. None. This memorandum is for your information.

2. Reference is made to our conversation on 13 August 1962, concerning the memorandum of that date from General Lansdale. Attached is a copy of this memorandum, excised from which are four words in the second line of the penultimate paragraph on page 1. These four words were "including liquidation of leaders."

3. The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point.

4. Upon receipt of the attached memorandum, I called Lansdale's office and, in his absence, pointed out to Frank Hand the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document. I advised Frank Hand that, as far as CIA was concerned, we would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it. I strongly urged Hand to recommend to Lansdale that he excise the phrase in question from all copies of this memorandum, including those disseminated to State, Defense, and USIA. Shortly thereafter, Lansdale called back and left the message that he agreed and that he had done so.

SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

5. For your information also, in your absence and since the attached memorandum already had been distributed and in view of the possibility that this might come to the Director's attention, I informally briefed Walt Elder on the above.

WILLIAM K. HARVEY
Chief, Task Force W

Attachment
Memo fr Gen Lansdale dtd 13 Aug 62

/

SENSITIVE

FILE:

INTERVIEW WITH RICHARD GOODWIN

Date: May 27, 1975 Time: 10:00 a.m.

Place: Goodwin's residence, 1536 32nd St. NW

Participants: Sel. Com. - David Aaron, Rick Inderfurth, Greg Treverton

Subject: Intelligence Activities in Latin America

Submitted by: Gregory F. Treverton

During the 1960 Presidential campaign, Goodwin did foreign policy work for John Kennedy, specializing in Latin America. After the election he moved into the White House to handle Latin America. During that period he spoke with the President about a Latin American matter on the average once a day. Goodwin left the White House in the fall of 1962, becoming Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs under, first, Robert Woodward and then Edwin Martin. After working for the Peace Corps, Goodwin was brought back to the White House by President Johnson, in the spring of 1964, after the Panama crisis. At that time, however, he did not specialize on Latin America, instead writing speeches for Johnson. He left the Administration late in 1965.

1. Assassinations:

In general, Goodwin had not heard much specific talk of assassination, although it would not have surprised him if it had gone on. He mentioned one specific instance in which he had heard talk of assassinating Castro. After the Bay of Pigs, a Cuba Task Force was established, first chaired by Paul Nitze and then by Goodwin in his capacity as White House Staff Officer. At a meeting of the Task Force, held at the State Department, McNamara suggested "getting rid of Castro," someone from the CIA, perhaps Bissell, then asked if McNamara meant

6

"Executive Action." McNamara responded that he did and stressed his interest in the idea. However, Goodwin did not bring the topic up later in the meeting after McNamara left. To Goodwin, the idea was not reasonable even apart from moral objections, for the Bay of Pigs had shown that Cuba was politically stable; Castro would merely have been replaced with Raul or with Che Guevara, both worse than Castro. Somewhat later, Goodwin sat in on an interview Tad Szulc had with Kennedy in which the President pledged not to kill Castro. Szulc reported that pledge in an article in Esquire. When he finished his period as Chairman of the Cuba Task Force, Goodwin wrote a memo recommending that the United States let Castro alone; anything the United States did to him could only buttress his position in Latin America.

During his time at the State Department, Goodwin met every week or so with E. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA, and King never mentioned a plan to assassinate Castro. Nor did Robert Kennedy ever mention such a plan to Goodwin when Goodwin worked for Kennedy, in 1966 and 1967.

Goodwin did believe, however, that the United States was involved, at least indirectly, in the successful plot on Trujillo's life. During the Eisenhower Administration, the United States had severed diplomatic relations with Trujillo and attempted to isolate the Dominican Republic. There were frequent reports that Trujillo was about to be assassinated, but the assassination never came off. In fact, the government was surprised when it occurred. Henry Dearborn, the American Consul in Santo Domingo, had been charged with staying in contact with anti-Trujillo forces. Prior to the assassination, he had transferred some weapons, presumably handguns, to those forces. Goodwin suspected that

FILE:

the President probably did not know of the gun transfer, but he said that the assassination and the U.S. role with respect to it would have come as no surprise to the President. He doubted that the CIA even would have had to clear the transfer, although a general policy of that sort might have been passed by the Special Group.

Goodwin reported no other mention of assassinations. In fact, he said he once heard a CIA man say that assassination was a bad idea because once started, it never ended. However, an agent in the field might regard killings of one sort or another as within his mission in supporting one political faction over another. And of course someone might have gotten carried away. It was clear from the Bay of Pigs that the CIA sometimes acted without, or even against, instructions (e.g. by bringing Batista followers into the Bay of Pigs invasion team). In general, Latin American work seemed to attract the worst personnel in all Washington agencies including the CIA.

2. CIA Activities in Brazil:

Goodwin knew little of CIA activities in Brazil. The United States had strongly backed Quadros and never liked Goulart. In the period before 1964, the U.S. gave political support to anti-Goulart factions: followers of Kubitschek and even to the Furtado in the Brazilian northeast. The U.S. had been involved in Brazilian elections for many years and presumably spent a good deal in the 1963 congressional elections.On the military side, Walters was brought from Rome to keep a contact with the Brazilian military. How much further Walters' activities might have extended Goodwin did not know.

3. CIA Activities in Chile:

The Kennedy Administration decided that left wing democratic forces in Latin America were the only means of combatting communist influence and promoting development in the region. That decision was applied to Chile, and the U.S. switched its support from the conservative Alessandri. Goodwin sat in on meetings of the Special Group only rarely, only if Latin America were the subject of the meeting. As he remembered it, the proposals that came to the Special Group were genera statements, policy papers, not descriptions of recipients of support or conduits. In line with the policy, support was given to left democrati political elements. The U.S. certainly provided assistance to the Christian Democrats in the 1964 elections, but Goodwin did not know how much. The figure of $20 million, mentioned by Stern, did not seem inconceivable to Goodwin. He contested, however, the assertion that the Chilean election was the most intensely watched election in Washington since the 1948 Italian campaign. From his vantage point in the White House it did not seem so.

4. Changes during the Johnson Administration:

Johnson cared less about Latin America than had Kennedy--Johnson was interested only in Mexico--and so knew less about covert actions in the region. Thomas Mann was left to run Latin American policy, although the President did become active in the two crises--Panama and then the Dominican Republic. Goodwin saw a sharp change in United States' policy under Mann. Mann supported the military and conservative elements in Latin American societies, and American support

?

for left democratic reform ended. Goodwin professed himself puzzled by Johnson's assertion that he had discovered a "murder incorporated" in the Caribbean. The only specific instance Johnson ever cited was Trujillo, yet Johnson had known about the Trujillo assassination from the very beginning and so could hardly have "discovered" it after he became President.

5. Covert Operations and Counterinsurgency:

When asked about the ethos surrounding covert actions during the Kennedy Administration, Goodwin responded that the major emphasis was counterinsurgency, not covert action. There was certainly no reluctance to use covert action, but no one believed that American objectives could be secured through it. Counterinsurgency was something different. A good deal of money was spent training police through AID, much more was spent through the Pentagon equipping Latin American militaries, and there was as well some CIA activity. At that point, the U.S. really believed that the communists could not get elected to power and that the threat was subversion. Paramilitary operations were considered by the Special Group (counterinsurgency). Latin American matters were considered there, and in some ways Latin America was considered a kind of training ground for Southeast Asia. Goodwin believed that in sum U.S. counterinsurgency efforts made little difference to the course of events in Latin America. Cuba could not in any case provide support to guerilla movements in South America without substantial support from the Soviet Union, and the guerilla movements that began had little indigenous support.

FILE:

In response to a question about NSAM's, Goodwin noted that these came out of the Bundy shop, which had little formal staff. Goodwin often wrote these documents. They were both general and, on occasion, specific, indicating groups to be supported and the like. Kennedy wanted to know the details of American activities in Latin America.

6. Goodwin Suggestions:

Goodwin believed it impossible to control the activities of intelligence organizations without becoming involved in their day-to-day operations. What is required is an active Congressional committee, on the model of the early Joint Atomic Energy Committee, with an active staff. Once the President is permitted both to decide what is a major operation, and thus needs to be communicated to Congress, and who to tell, the game is over. Confidence in men will not do; institutional checks are required.

With respect to people to be interviewed, Goodwin mentioned that the Station Chief in Mexico functioned as a kind of regional sub-director. He also thought we might talk with the FBI person in Puerto Rico, with Arthur Schlesinger, and with Tad Szulc. In response to a question, Goodwin indicated that Nixon had been interested in the Bay of Pigs through Cushman. He thought that Douglas Dillon might know of that.

the United States. Several months later, I presume because of that trip and several other contacts I maintain with representatives of the Cuban government at the United Nations and the Organization of American States, because of my personal friendship with a number of people at the White House and Mr. Goodwin, Mr. Donnegan and others, in a conversation with Mr. Goodwin it was suggested that I come and see the Attorney General. I was invited to lunch with Mr. Kennedy at the Justice Department. We discussed in considerable length the situation in Cuba following the invasion, the pros and cons of some different possible actions by the United States government in that context.

At the end of this conversation, the Attorney General asked me whether I would have objections to meeting with his brother the President. I said I would of course be pleased to do so.

The following day I received a call from the White House indicating that the President would like for me to come in at 11:00 o'clock in the morning on that day in November, which I did. And I was received by the President in the company of Mr. Goodwin in the Oval Office for a conversation which lasted, if memory serves, in excess of an hour and a half, in which the President discussed a number of his views on Cuba in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my conversations with Premier Castro, a general review of the situation in Cuba, you know, what the United States should do, could do, might do in terms of either in a hostile way or in establishing some kind of a dialogue, most relevant of which I suppose was that at one point the President rather unexpectedly turned to me and said what would you say, what would you think, if I decided to authorize the assssination of Premier Castro?

Let me add for the record that the precise wording appears in the Esquire article from the notes taken at the time. I am now paraphrasing from memory. This was a rather --

Mr. Aaron. Let me read this into the record. "We chatted for a while about Cuba, and then Kennedy leaned forward in his rocking chair and hurled a question at me: 'What would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated?'"

Mr. Szulc. I was taken aback and so indicated to the Preside To the best of my recollection, I said in the first instance as a practical matter I thought this would not make all that much difference even if he were because I thought that by then the Cuban structure had been established to a sufficient degree where the murder and disappearance of Fidel Castro would not necessarily mean the collapse of the governing system, if this were the purpose of the United States government.

In the second place, it was more important to me, I said to the President, that my personal feeling was that the United States government should not be party to murders and political assassinations at which point the President leaned back and smiled and said, well I was testing you. I agree with you completely.

And then he went on for a few minutes to make the point how strongly he felt and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination in foreign policy. Again, the precise quotes and the precise paraphrase I placed in the article and again I'm paraphrasing from memory now.

And the President added in this context that the reason I have raised it with you, or words to this effect, is because I am under very, very strong or powerful pressure from certain people, whom he did not identify, to authorize an operation resulting in the assassination of Premier Castro. And I think we talked about this for a few more minutes, and I think I repeated the points I made originally and the President said he felt very strongly that same way and the fact he was testing me or trying to see what my response as a reporter or as a citizen would be.

I might add that several days ago Mr. Goodwin and I had the opportunity to discuss this and compare our respective recollections of it, and Mr. Goodwin's recollection is exactly the same as mine. We discussed this at some length, this being last week, and the subject being relevant to the current flow of news and Mr. Goodwin made the point to me, obviously if President Kennedy were planning to authorize the assassination of Castro, he would not likely be discussing it with you in the full knowledge of a reporter and if Castro were killed or an attempt to kill him would surface you would have the professional duty to rush to your typewriter and report on this conversation, even though it was on a personal basis. And Mr. Goodwin's judgment, and in which I concur, was that presumably the President would not have floated this issue with me, and this is really responsive to my own effort to re-evaluate after the passage of time the President's sincerity in disclaiming any desire to do so.

My impression at the time and today fourteen years later is that the President was sincere and serious in affirming his revulsion to such an idea of assassination.

Mr. Aaron. Let me ask you, when was your conversation with Mr. Goodwin?

Mr. Szulc. The most recent one?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, the one you just mentioned.

Mr. Szulc. Last Friday which would have been the 6th of June of this year.

Mr. Aaron. May I read into the record the following paragraph from your article. "Kennedy leaned back in his chair, smiled, and said that he had been testing me because he was under great pressure from advisers in the Intelligence community (whom he did not name) to have Castro killed, but that he himself violently opposed it on the grounds that for

GOODWIN (TRUJILLO)

The papers produced by Mr. Goodwin on 7/16/75 contained some Trujillo-related material. Certain documents were selected from this material and are produced herein under Tabs **S** and **T**. All of the attached Trujillo-related documents have been produced before the Committee, and Mr. Goodwin has been questioned concerning them. They are attached again herein for possible use in connection with questions concerning handwritten notations appearing on the documents.

TAB S. May 13, 1961 Memorandum to Goodwin re CIA Covert Activities in the Dominican Republic

Page 2 of this document contains, on the original ribbon copy, a pencilled-in circle. Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that this circle was placed on the original copy of the memorandum by him and indicates that the encircled material (a report of the passage of revolvers and carbines) struck Goodwin as both significant and new to him. Further, the word "neutralize" is underscored in pencil on the original copy of the memorandum. Goodwin might be questioned concerning the significance of this underscore.

TAB T. Various drafts, together with the original of the 5/29/61 cable from the State Department to Dearborn are attached herein. Goodwin stated on 7/16/75 that the handwriting on pages numbered 237, 238, 239, and 240 is his handwriting. The handwriting on pages 233, 234, and 235, a subsequent draft of the same proposed cable is not Goodwin's. Goodwin suggested this handwriting may be that of President Kennedy.

SECRET

EYES ONLY

13 May 1961

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT : CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic

Attached is the special briefing paper on CIA covert activities directed against the Dominican Republic which was requested by Mr. Richard Goodwin of the White House.

EYES ONLY

SECRET

PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION FOR THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I. BACKGROUND

A. On 29 December 1960 the Special Group approved a plan of covert action to support the internal and exiled Dominican dissidents which involved provision for increased propaganda directed against Trujillo, and the financial support of selected exiled groups. Additionally this authority included authorization for CIA to make available to selected exile groups communications and equipment support necessary for them to develop a capability to undertake the infiltration of personnel and equipment into the Dominican Republic. Since none of the exiled groups had an existing underground organization within the area, it was the Special Group's concept that this delivery capability could be eventually used to support the plans and activities of the internal opposition with whom the Agency and the Consulate are currently in contact.

B. On 12 January 1961 the Special Group authorized CIA to make available to Dominican dissidents a limited supply of small arms and other materials on the condition that the internal opposition develop the capability to receive these materials and that the materials be introduced into the Dominican Republic by Dominicans themselves.

II. CURRENT COVERT ACTION OPERATIONS

A. In late January 1961, CIA advised selected internal opposition leaders that we were prepared to make available to them limited supplies of arms, communications, equipment, and sabotage materials which they had repeatedly requested provided they developed a capability to receive it via air drops or sea infiltration. To date the internal opposition has not been able to develop this capability, nor have they been able to nominate training candidates for code radio operators or saboteurs. This turn of events is primarily due to the comprehensive nature of Trujillo's security services, the understandable fear that prevails throughout the Republic of being caught or suspected of anti-Trujillo activities, and the fact that the organized internal opposition apparently consists of only a few individuals with no real underground structure. CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support.

B. CIA has established working relationships with selected exile groups. These relationships have taken into account that President Betancourt of Venezuela has in effect designated former Costa Rican President Jose Figueres as his emissary and representative to work with Dominican exile groups. Through Figueres and with the knowledge of President Betancourt, CIA is providing financial support and technical guidance to the following activities:

(1) The development of a Dominican exile council in San Jose, Costa Rica, composed of representatives of the two older exile organizations,

a representative designated by Betancourt, and chaired by Figueres. The council had its first organizational meeting in San Jose on 12 May 1961. Subject to CIA's review of the council's proposed program and with the concurrence of President Betancourt, CIA has indicated to Betancourt and Figueres that it is prepared to support the council's program in the amount of $15,000 a month. It is Figueres' initial concept that the council will undertake propaganda activities directed against Trujillo, and train selected Dominicans in democratic process, administrative skills, and public administration so as to equip them to assume positions of responsibility in any successor government. Figueres has also proposed that an exile paramilitary force be trained, but CIA has discouraged this activity to date since neither Betancourt nor Figueres have indicated a clear plan for its eventual use. It is CIA's judgment that the exile groups represented on Figueres' council have little if any popular support among the internal dissidents. However one of the chief advantages that can and is being gained by support of the council is the number of credits that this gives to the United States Government in its dealings with Betancourt and Figueres in utilizing them in other operations. Betancourt has been adamant that no action be taken against Castro until Trujillo is disposed of. This support has served to neutralize his attitude on that point since it amounts to a guarantee to Betancourt of the United States's basic attitude toward Trujillo. Likewise it serves to solidify the attitudes of dissident exiled Dominicans so that they are not anti-U.S. and will make them more approachable and amenable to U.S. Government objectives once Trujillo is overthrown. (2) The conduct of radio propaganda from Ponce, Puerto Rico, which is under the direction of Horacio ORNES, Secretary General of Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD). This radio program is heard in the Dominican Republic as the voice of the ORNES organization.

(3) CIA has refurbished a small yacht belonging to ORNES so as to give it the capability to deliver small quantities of arms or personnel into the Dominican Republic. This potential para-military boat capability has not been utilized to date. It is contemplated that both the ORNES propaganda program and this limited boat capability will be absorbed by the exile council now being formed by Figueres.

C. With the knowledge of President Betancourt, and using his government as the ostensible source of funds, CIA has provided limited financial support to a small group of Dominicans who are developing a para-military capability in Venezuela.

D. CIA has recently re-located Dr. Juan Isidro Jimenez Grullon from Venezuela to San Juan, Puerto Rico. Jimenez, a physician and university professor, is a highly respected Dominican exile and enjoys the confidence of the internal opposition. He is currently working with the Puerto Rican Government in developing a training program within the structure of the Puerto Rican Government. The objective of this program is to provide "on-the-job" training for selected Dominicans in democratic processes and selected administrative skills. Through Jimenez and a small group of recently exiled Dominicans who were active in the internal opposition, CIA is in the process of establishing communication channels to the internal opposition which will supplement those currently in being through our Station in Ciudad Trujillo.

E. CIA has a continuing program utilizing news media assets throughout the hemisphere in an effort to discredit Trujillo.

III. COVERT ACTIVITIES CIA IS PREPARED TO UNDERTAKE BUT HAS NOT INITIATED

A. Train selected members of the internal opposition as code radio operators. CIA has the appropriate radio equipment "on-the-shelf" at our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. However, this program has not been initiated due to the internal opposition's failure to provide individuals who are able to undergo the required training outside of the Dominican Republic and willing to run the risk of having the radio equipment in their possession.

B. Train selected members of the opposition in sabotage and underground resistance techniques. Here again the internal opposition has provided no training candidates or developed a capability to receive explosive materials through clandestine channels.

IV. POSSIBLE COVERT ACTIONS WHICH REQUIRE ADDITIONAL AUTHORIZATION

A. CIA has a supply of four (4) calibre 45 sub-machine guns and a small number of grenades which are currently in the direct custody of our Station in Ciudad Trujillo. A secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition for their use in personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo can be developed by the Station.

B. CIA can initiate leaflet drops over the Dominican Republic, in response to past requests from the internal opposition for leaflets exploiting the excesses of the Trujillo regime.

C. While to date the internal opposition has developed no capability to receive arms or sabotage materials by either air or sea delivery, CIA could initiate operations to cache such supplies off the coast of the Dominican Republic for later retrival by the opposition when they develop such a capability.

D. Initiate the training of para-military cadres. CIA has been reluctant to recommend the initiation of such training since current information indicates that any invasion of the Republic unless massively supported by overt action would be impractical.

Note: We [illegible] this message were blocked by Mr. Goodwin & [illegible] his message instead.

SECRET

mThis document consists of 2 pages
Copy No. ___ of 9 copies; Series

(Drafted 5/24/61)

FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT

1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subsequen your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve uncertainties reflected ref ___ but your comments and requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and yourself and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price tag~~x~~ for friendship of dissidents, whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quanti places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands o involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted, feel su you will agree we should stand firm.

3. While fully cong~~a~~izant ~~x~~unique circumstances within D~~o~~ominican Republ which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerne by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover and cut-out safeguards with ~~xxxxxx~~ result USG too openly identifi with what should be clandestine activities.

4. Running through entire ~~xxxx~~ dilemma has been conflict between two objec

(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive cr among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which migh occur.

SECRET

228

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFIC

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted opposition leaders at this x time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them.

5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sough disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government' continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve represent tive government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.

6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made cont upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.

7. In light foregoing suggest you withhold further action and to ~~xxx~~ extent feasible substantave conversations with dissidents pending receipt documents now to be pouched.

END OF MESSAGE

ARA:FJDevine:jsr 5/24/61

229

SECRET

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

May 26, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McGeorge Bundy
The White House

Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans. The text of this draft telegram has been shown to the Agency and agreed to by them. I am also forwarding copies of the exchange with Dearborn leading up to the present draft telegram to him.

I know it will be difficult for the President to find time before he leaves to have a look at this but, in view of the situation in the Dominican Republic, I feel that he should approve it personally so as to be sure that it is consistent with his views as stated in the NSC Record of Actions for May 5.

Chester Bowles

Attachments:

Tab A - Proposed outgoing telegram

Tab B - Previous exchange of telegrams

SECRET

PROPOSED TELEGRAM
to US Consul General in
Ciudad Trujillo

FOR DEARBORN FROM DEPARTMENT

1. President has now approved contingency plans somewhat revised subsequent your departure and copy will be pouched to you soonest. Hope this will resolve uncertainties reflected your telegram of May 21 but your comments and requests for any necessary clarification will be welcomed.

2. Department appreciates valuable work performed by Amb. Farland and yourself and CAS in developing pro-US attitude among dissident elements. Would hope this could be retained and strengthened but only if at a cost acceptable from standpoint US national interest. If price tag for friendship of dissidents, whose action capabilities and realistic prospects thus far remain unknown quantity, places too great strain upon moral position and principles for which US stands or involves risks which in our considered judgment should not be accepted, feel sure you will agree we should stand firm.

3. While fully cognizant unique circumstances within Dominican Republic which precluded normal CAS operation, Department is nonetheless deeply concerned by degree to which covert activities this case have been forced to deviate from normal cover and cut-out safeguards with result USG too openly identified with what should be clandestine activities.

4. Running through entire dilemma has been conflict between two objectives:

(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;

(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur.

In Department's considered opinion, former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter. For this reason you should not, repeat not, inform trusted opposition leaders at this time of draft document which you now hold nor deliver copy to them. If you believe conditions specified in second and third paras Department's telegram of May 17 fulfilled, you may advise trusted opposition leaders that you assume any friendly group seeking to establish authority after overthrow of Trujillo would promptly declare itself provisional government and request armed assistance from OAS, US, Venezuela and perhaps other governments. If reply affirmative, you may advise them orally lines you think such request should take.

5. In May 19 meeting here with Yaguate and Cibao Department spokesman sought disabuse them expectation USG acting either through Department or CIA could be party to any political assassination. At same time assured them this government's continuing sympathy for legitimate aspirations Dominican people achieve representative government offering civil rights and guarantees all citizens.

6. In response your comment re covert activities program you should be aware Department's growing feeling any continuation thereof should be made contingent upon deepening of cover arrangements so as effectively to disassociate USG.

7. In light foregoing suggest further action and to extent feasible substantive conversations with dissidents be withheld pending receipt documents now to be pouched.

END OF MESSAGE

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

FOR DEARBORN FROM STATE

1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line has been invaluable. However, we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, [illegible] U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However, there is much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of policy; including most of the measures in which you are now engaged. Specific instructions follow.

3. Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position. In case of ~~assasination or~~ overthrow of Trujillo--whether or not initiated by pro-U.S. group--the pro-U.S. group should promptly make every effort to constitute itself as reasonable and plausible provisional government. It should immediately declare itself such and request assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and OAS. If advance discussions

233

show that dissidents are favorable to this procedure discuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling it. All possible preparations should be made short of actual formulation in writing of a ~~signed~~ request in advance of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist type takeover in the Dominican Republic even if we must intervene without a request. This last possibility should not be discussed with the dissidents.

4. Reference to multilateral action in record of actions means only that further open sanctions will be multilateral; and that in the case of direct intervention it would be preferable for forces to be multilateral. No broader interpretation is justified. All other U.S. actions--whether propaganda or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral basis.

5. Covert activities are, as you know, very small due to inability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies which will effectively disassociate U.S., and failure to provide candidates for training as radio operators or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, you must request

and receive further specific instructions for any specific covert activity. At the present time we are unable to transfer arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of ~~ultimate~~ association with ~~disclosure of participation in~~ assassination attempt. The basic policy is to continue to hold open offer of covert help, while carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested. This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert help is very slight except for verbal encouragement and exchange of information.

6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo propaganda campaign and other external pressures.

7. FYI, in event overthrow of Trujillo military forces will be dispatched immediately to stand-by ~~pre-invasion~~ positions. On receipt of request from provisional government, and your concurrence, we will be prepared to go in immediately ~~will go in~~ If no request is received and there appears to be any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made in Washington whether to intervene regardless. This makes it imperative that a request be obtained if at all possible. End FYI

8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents informing them of U.S. position and the necessity for an immediate request. If they are favorable to this procedure take all possible measures to prepare for the immediate transmittal of such a request short of the actual preparation of a written document for advance transfer to you.

236

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

TOP SECRET

For Dearborn from State

1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during your stay here with one ~~[illegible]~~ major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed request for help from Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen pro-U.S. sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line had been ~~[illegible]~~ invaluable. However, we ~~also~~ must not ~~[illegible]~~ permit ~~any~~ danger of disclosing any U.S. association with political assasination ~~or intervention in the Dominican Republic~~. This last principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However, there is much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of policy: including most of the measures in which you are now engaged. Specific instructions follow:

3. ~~Inform~~ Conitune to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position. In case of assassination or overthrow of Trujillo--whether or not initiated by pro-U.S. group--the group should ~~be encouraged~~ told to make an immediate request for assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and the O.A.S. This request will be responded to favorably by the United States. They should declare themselves the provisional government and request help whether or not they actually are able to assume power. If they are favorable to this procedure ~~[illegible]~~

237

TOP SECRET

For Dearborn from State

1. President has now approved contingency plans discussed during
stay here with one ~~xxxx~~ major exception: You are not to request a pre-signed
quest for help from Dominican dissident groups.

2. We consider it essential that you continue to work to strengthen
sentiment among dissident groups. Your work along this line had been
However, we ~~also~~ must not ~~xxxxxxx~~ permit ~~see~~ danger of disclosing any U.S.
with political assasination ~~or intervention in the Dominican Republic~~. This
principle is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation. However,
much you can do to protect U.S. interests within this framework of
most of the measures in which you are

3.

ase of ~~assination or~~ overthrow of Trujillo=whether or not
tiated by pro U.S. group--the pro U.S. group should promptly
ke every effort to constitute itself as reasonable and plausible
rovisional government. It should immediately to declare itself
uch and request assistance from U.S., Venezuela, Colombia and OAS.
favorable to this procedure

238

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

discuss the specific content of such a request and procedures for handling it. All possible preparations should be made short of actual ~~preparation~~ [illegible] in writing of a ~~signed~~ request in advance of the event. Underlying this procedure is the policy that, under no circumstances, can we take the chance of a communist type takeover in the Dominican Republic even if we must ~~go in~~ intervene without a request. This last possiblity should not be discussed with the dissidents.

4. ~~Multilateral~~ Reference to multilateral action in record of actions means only that ~~further~~ open sanctions will be multilateral, and that in the case of direct intervention it would be preferable for ~~for~~ forces to be multilateral. No ~~broader~~ broader interpretation is justified. All other U.S. actions--whether propganda or covert activities--will be continued on a bilateral basis.

5. Covert activities are, as you know, very small due to inability of dissidents to develop a method of receiving supplies which will effectively dissacoitate U.S.) and failure to provide candidates for training as radio operators or saboteurs. Our offer to help along these lines--provided they develop capacity and effective cover--remains open. However, ~~xx~~ you must request further ~~have~~ specific instructions for any specific covert activity. At ~~this~~ the present time we are unable to transfer ~~more~~ arms to dissidents. Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be ~~under suspicion~~. In actual fact we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose

TOP SECRET THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

[illegible]

and expose the United States to great danger of ~~thx ultimate~~ disclosure of assassinat[illegible]

attempt. ~~[illegible]~~ The basic policy is to ~~[illegible]~~ continue to hold open offer

of covert help, whule carefully examining and clearing the specific help requested.

This is feasible because, in actual fact, the covert help is very slight except

for verbal ancouragement and existing informationx.

6. We intend to keep up anti-Trujillo proaganda campaign and other external

pressures.

~~7.~~ 7. In event overthrow of Trujillo military forces will be dispatched immedictely

to ~~pre-invasion~~ [illegible] positions. On recept of request from ~~self-styled~~ provisional governent

and your concurrence, we will [illegible] go in. If no request is received and there appears to

be ~~[illegible]~~ any danger of communist takeover then decision will be made in

Washington whether to ~~g~~ interven regardless. This makes it imperative that a

request be obtained if at all possible.

8. Begin conversations immediately with dissidents informing them of U.S.

position and the ~~[illegible]~~ necessity for an immediate request. ~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~ If they are favorable to this procedure take all possible measures to

prepare for the immeditate transmittal of such a request short of the actual

preparation of a written document ~~by the dissidents~~ for advance transfer to you.

Goodwin

Sa

240

IG :
NIT : WH/3/DR&H
XT :
ATE : 29 MAY 1961 1580

TOP SECRET

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

29 MAY 61 20 27z

O CIUDAD TRUJILLO (OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE)

OM: DIRECTOR

ONF: C/WH 1-5

FO: DCI 6, D/DCI 7, DDP 8, COP 9, ADDP/A 10, C/CA 11, S/C 11-12

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE
TOP SECRET OUT 60

0694

O TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443

REF: TRUJ 0609 (IN 13990) *

42443

EMDEED

Officer
FOR CIA/ FROM STATE

1. PRESIDENT HAS NOW APPROVED CONTINGENCY PLANS DISCUSSED DURING YOUR STAY HERE WITH ONE MAJOR EXCEPTION: YOU ARE NOT TO REQUEST A PRE-SIGNED REQUEST FOR HELP FROM DOMINICAN DISSIDENT GROUPS.

2. WE CONSIDER IT ESSENTIAL THAT YOU CONTINUE TO WORK TO STRENGTHEN PRO-U.S. SENTIMENT AMONG DISSIDENT GROUPS. YOUR WORK ALONG THIS LINE HAS BEEN INVALUABLE. HOWEVER, WE MUST NOT RUN RISK OF U.S. ASSOCIATION WITH POLITICAL ASSASSINATION, SINCE U.S. AS MATTER OF GENERAL POLICY CANNOT CONDONE ASSASSINATION. THIS LAST PRINCIPLE IS OVERRIDING AND MUST PREVAIL IN DOUBTFUL SITUATION. HOWEVER, THERE IS MUCH YOU CAN DO TO PROTECT U.S. INTERESTS WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK OF POLICY, INCLUDING MOST OF THE MEASURES IN WHICH YOU ARE NOW ENGAGED. SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOLLOW.

3. CONTINUE TO INFORM DISSIDENT ELEMENTS OF U.S. SUPPORT FOR THEIR POSITION. IN CASE OF OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO--WHETHER OR NOT INITIATED BY PRO-U.S. GROUP--THE PRO-U.S. GROUP SHOULD PROMPTLY MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO CONSTITUTE ITSELF AS REASONABLE AND PLAUSIBLE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. IT SHOULD IMMEDIATELY DECLARE ITSELF SUCH AND REQUEST ASSISTANCE FROM U.S., VENEZUELA, COLOMBIA AND OAS.

(CONTINUED)

ELEASING OFFICER COORDINATING OFFICERS AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

TOP SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DATE :

TO

FROM : DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE TWO

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE

OUT 60694

TO TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443

IF ADVANCE DISCUSSIONS SHOW THAT DISSIDENTS ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE, DISCUSS THE SPECIFIC CONTENT OF SUCH A REQUEST AND PROCEDURES FOR HANDLING IT. ALL POSSIBLE PREPARATIONS SHOULD BE MADE SHORT OF ACTUAL FORMULATION IN WRITING OF A REQUEST IN ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. UNDERLYING THIS PROCEDURE IS THE POLICY THAT, UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES, CAN WE TAKE THE CHANCE OF A COMMUNIST TYPE TAKEOVER IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC EVEN IF WE MUST INTERVENE WITHOUT A REQUEST. THIS LAST POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH THE DISSIDENTS.

4. REFERENCE TO MULTILATERAL ACTION IN RECORD OF ACTIONS MEANS ONLY THAT FURTHER OPEN SANCTIONS WILL BE MULTILATERAL: AND THAT IN THE CASE OF DIRECT INTERVENTION IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR FORCES TO BE MULTILATERAL. NO BROADER INTERPRETATION IS JUSTIFIED. ALL OTHER U.S. ACTIONS--WHETHER PROPAGANDA OR COVERT ACTIVITIES--WILL BE CONTINUED ON A BILATERAL BASIS.

5. COVERT ACTIVITIES ARE, AS YOU KNOW, VERY SMALL DUE TO INABILITY OF DISSIDENTS TO DEVELOP A METHOD OF RECEIVING SUPPLIES WHICH WILL EFFECTIVELY DISASSOCIATE U.S., AND FAILURE TO PROVIDE CANDIDATES FOR TRAINING AS RADIO OPERATORS OR SABOTEURS. OUR OFFER TO HELP ALONG THESE LINES--PROVIDED THEY DEVELOP CAPACITY AND EFFECT COVER--REMAINS OPEN. HOWEVER, YOU MUST REQUEST AND RECEIVE FURTHER SPECIFIC INSTRUCTIONS FOR ANY SPECIFIC COVERT ACTIVITY. AT THE PRESENT TIME WE ARE UNABLE TO TRANSFER ARMS TO DISSIDENTS. TELL THEM THAT THIS IS BECAUSE OF

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGE THREE

TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO CITE DIR 42443

OUR SUSPICION THAT METHOD OF TRANSFER MAY BE UNSAFE. IN ACTUAL FACT WE FEEL THAT THE TRANSFER OF ARMS WOULD SERVE VERY LITTLE PURPOSE AND EXPOSE THE UNITED STATES TO GREAT DANGER OF ASSOCIATION WITH ASSASSINATION ATTEMPT. THE BASIC POLICY IS TO CONTINUE TO HOLD OPEN OFFER OF COVERT HELP, WHILE CAREFULLY EXAMINING AND CLEARING THE SPECIFIC HELP REQUESTED. THIS IS FEASIBLE BECAUSE, IN ACTUAL FACT, THE COVERT HELP IS VERY SLIGHT EXCEPT FOR VERBAL ENCOURAGEMENT AND EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION.

6. WE INTEND TO KEEP UP ANTI-TRUJILLO PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AND OTHER EXTERNAL PRESSURES.

7. FYI, IN EVENT OVERTHROW OF TRUJILLO MILITARY FORCES WILL BE DISPATCHED IMMEDIATELY TO STAND-BY POSITIONS. ON RECEIPT OF REQUEST FROM PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT, AND YOUR CONCURRENCE, WE WILL BE PREPARED TO GO IN IMMEDIATELY. IF NO REQUEST IS RECEIVED AND THERE APPEARS TO BE ANY DANGER OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER THEN DECISION WILL BE MADE IN WASHINGTON WHETHER TO INTERVENE REGARDLESS. THIS MAKES IT IMPERATIVE THAT A REQUEST BE OBTAINED IF AT ALL POSSIBLE. END FYI.

8. BEGIN CONVERSATIONS IMMEDIATELY WITH DISSIDENTS INFORMING THEM OF U.S. POSITION AND THE NECESSITY FOR AN IMMEDIATE REQUEST. IF THEY ARE FAVORABLE TO THIS PROCEDURE TAKE ALL POSSIBLE MEASURES TO ARRANGE FOR THE IMMEDIATE TRANSMITTAL OF SUCH A REQUEST SHORT OF THE ACTUAL PREPARATION OF A WRITTEN DOCUMENT FOR ADVANCE

(CONTINUED)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

TOP SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

3	6

DIRECTOR

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

OUT 60694

PAGE FOUR

CITE DIR 42443

TRUJ (OPIM) TOP SECRET INFO

TO YOU.

END OF MESSAGE

WH/Comment: *Ref was message from CIA/ officer to State in which he asked what guidance and encouragement he could give dissidents, if he could provide dissidents with draft document request U.S./OAS assistance in event TRUJILLO overthrown, and asked clarification of President's statement that any action against TRUJILLO should be multilateral.

'S COMMENT: **DISSEMINATION RESTRICTED. TEXT DIRECTED TO ANOTHER U.S. GOVT. ORGANIZATION.

C/WHD

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

TOP SECRET

C/WH/3

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10121

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-27

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/09/1976
PAGES : 147

SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY
COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/22/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

Date : 08/07/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10121
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-27

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/09/76
PAGES : 147
SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Vol.

2 of 3

Kilbourn
16 mar

The United States Senate

R2784

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate SElect Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities

324-1

Tuesday, March 9, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION

- - -

Foreign & Military Subcommittee Meeting

- - -

Tuesday, March 9, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:30 o'clock a.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, Senator Walter D. Huddleston (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston, presiding, Hart of Colorado, and Mathias.

Also present: William Miller, Staff Director; Joseph diGenova, Charles Kirbow, Elliot Maxwell, Elizabeth Culbreth, Jan Orloff, William Bader, Lynn Davis, Al Quanbeck, Charles Lombard, Rick Inderfurth, Bob Kelley, Greg Treverton, Jim Johnston, and Britt Snider, Professional Staff Members.

TOP SECRET

PROCEEDINGS

Senator Huddleston. Let's come to order.

Mr. Aaron. The agenda today is to proceed with the DCI section and in addition we would like to get the Subcommittee's if you will substantive approval of the paper on the production of intelligence so that it might go to the Agency and we could go through the process of clearing its details.

I don't know which of those you wish to take up first but --

Mr. Kirbow. We should really take up the paper first because it already went out this morning.

Mr. Aaron. Well, they are reading it but we have not negotiated with them yet.

Senator Huddleston. Any comment on that paper?

Mr. Miller. Which paper?

Senator Huddleston. The production of intelligence.

Mr. Aaron. It is in the larger book.

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, I have some comments but I defer to the Senators if they have some comments first.

Mr. Aaron. It's at Tab III. C6.

Senator Huddleston. Charley, go ahead.

Mr. Kirbow. Thank you.

The concern that has been expressed by the senior witnesses from the Agency and other parts of the community not only before this Committee but as a matter of record for

TOP SECRET

the Senators. I'm sure they know that the big fight in the House last year was to avoid the excruciating details on budget figures and I think we had kind of discussed perhaps publishing 3 or 4 major features. I'd like to point out that in this particular document, such great detail as that portion of the CIA, the DDI which produces intelligence, we speak of an authorized project to $70.9 million with 2,269 employees, exact percentage of the Agency's budget and the exact percentage of the personnel. That one page of this document is probably the most classified single compilation.

Senator Huddleston. What page is that?

Mr. Kirbow. Page 3.

Senator Huddleston. Of course it's out of the Agency. I would assume they would have some comment on it.

Mr. Aaron. The point was not, the view was not to produce these precise numbers but A, to have them for the Subcommittee so that they could understand them and much as in the case of the DCI's original paper to expect that these things will be modified and to lay the basis for an appropriate discussion with them as to how one might modify it and yet capture the essence of the argument, and we'll just see how far that goes in trying to reach --

Certainly we have no intention of --

Senator Huddleston. Could we say this Department represents a substantial expenditure with a large number of employees?

Mr. Kirbow. Well if I could tell you what my position on it is, in speaking to Beth Bloomfield last night I specificall asked her -- well, she says that's to give them something out there to take out so that we'll have enough left in here that would be a worthwhile document at the end.

And I think that if we are kidding ourselves that we have either the time or -- and we should not have the inclination in my opinion to waste the time of the people at the Agency or anything by "putting in things which will give Mr. Boldin something to gnaw on so he won't bother the rest of the thing," I just didn't think that we were going to get into that kind of dealing with the Agency people. I thought we were going to be forthright in what we thought we should put in and what we would put in a document like this because the whole production of intelligence thing or the whole theme of the paper is [illegible] this inadequate attention given to the analytical portion of production.

And if we are doing this and sending it out there in this classified form full well knowing at the outset -- she says, well, that's not even material. If they want to take it out, just take it out.

Well, if it's not material, I would hope that we're not wasting both our times -- we've read about 10,000 words in the last month.

TOP SECRET

Senator Huddleston. I think it's probably material to also to have a firmer grasp when we start discussing and defending the report maybe, even to the extent of having specific figures.

I think it's highly unlikely that they will let that stay in there and we'll probably have to modify it. I see your point in a way that we might save ourselves time by scaling it down to begin with to what we think will be acceptable, but on the other hand, we may not guess right.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, for the record then, Senator, I do have exception to this type writing where we deliberately beef it up with known classified information full well knowing that it's going to be taken out and not get to the point that we are trying to make. But I won't dwell on it any further.

Senator Huddleston. Do you have any comment on that aspect, Senator Hart?

Senator Hart. No.

Senator Huddleston. All right, that one's ready to go.

Mr. Aaron. Thank you.

Now we left off yesterday on page 25. We had discussed two oral proposals by way of recommendations. The first was to set a tone for the DCI which was rejected and the second was to confirm the new community wide deputy for the DCI to have him subject to Senate confirmation to establish him as, in effect, the first deputy of the DCI, the man who would succeed in his place.

We also discussed briefly the recommendation number 16 and we agreed that we would make some change in the language relating to what in effect is the re-establishment of the board of national estimates to make clear that they weren't there just for the purpose of endorsing estimates but from the standpoint that they are there for the purpose of reviewing them.

So the next recommendation is recommendation 17, and it is long and complicated. Essentially what the recommendation does is spell out more precisely what the DCI's responsibilities will be for the overall allocation of resources and coordination of the community's activities apart from the production of finished intelligence, which is the purpose of recommendation 16.

Now what it does, the first paragraph summarizes the essential responsibilities along the lines of the President's Executive Order.

Now it is slightly different from the Executive Order in the following sense. The Executive Order establishes an NSC Committee, gives the Committee the responsibility of preparing a national intelligence budget, makes the DCI the Chairman of that Committee, and gives the DCI in his person, if you will, the responsibility for presenting that budget to the President

Now we sort of cut through that somewhat complicated and not entirely clear allocation of authority to the DCI by simply saying he is responsible for preparing the community's budget, and he has this Committee for this purpose in trying to place responsibility squarely on him to do that.

Now this would not mean, however, that the Secretary of Defense be senior to him in the cabinet. I mean the National Security Council could not make a reclama and could not go over his head.

That situation will still exist and this Committee is in fact a committee of the National Security Council, so there is another layer at which inter-Agency disputes, if they continue beyond the level of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, where they could be resolved.

Now the first -- it also designates him as responsible for preparing the budget and providing guidance for operations programs in general terms and puts him in as chairman of the appropriate NSC committee, and then we reference the CFI and then authorize the following specific responsibilities.

First of all, the establishment of national intelligence requirements for the entire community and it empowers him to draw upon representatives of the members of the intelligence community to help him in the task of establishing these requiremen

Now this is an increase in his authority from his current posture. He has now the authority to issue guidance in the preparation of requirements but he can't really say do this or do that. These are the things we want.

Now as a practical matter, I think it's fair to say that he goes pretty far in getting his way at the present time, but on some of these requirements on a national basis, this would give him the clear authority to ask them to do things.

Now his requirements, the level of detail and so forth, would obviously be something that would have to be negotiated out in the course of his work.

Now that is the recommendation of the first paragraph and paragraph A.

I might just say it also gives the DCI in connection with the requirements process, it refers here to the fact that he may determine the success of various agencies in fulfilling and in fact what the paragraph sets up is a system whereby the DCI can establish requirements and then through the budget process and in the process of evaluating requirements make some estimate of how well the community is doing and either add to the budgets or take away in certain areas and so forth.

This provides some of the real system as opposed to a paper system which he has had in the past.

Paragraph B describes the preparation of the national intelligence budget and points out that he should prepare this budget, present it to the President and to the Congress who would make some reference here to the language in the President's Executive Order in this regard.

It makes the further point that the definition of the elements to be included within a national intelligence budget -- in other words, what parts of the community would fit into that, where you draw the line between technical and national intelligence, between departmental and national intelligence.

This definition would be established by the Congress in consultation with the Executive Branch.

It further points out that he should be involved early in the process of preparing budgets in the budget cycle, and then it makes some hortatory kind of statements about how he should try to consider trade-offs between programs and between collection and production and so forth.

Senator Huddleston. I would suggest there that we use another word besides trade-off. While it is common for us to use it up here in committee work, I don't think it conveys the best connotation to the public.

What we're saying is that he balances out or apportions resources, whatever.

Mr. Aaron. Now I think the final sentence is this important one, and the Senators should note this. The proposal and perhaps this ought to be made somewhat more clear than it is now as to who will do this, but the authority -- I'm sorry, it is clear. But the authority of the DCI to reprogram funds within the intelligence budget should be limited by statute. The President. th Executive Order gives to the Committee on Foreign Intelligence not only the authority to prepare the national intelligence budget, but to reprogram moneys within that budget.

Now our estimate is that that budget would be on the order of $3, 4, perhaps up to $5 billion, depending on what is included in it, and I asked the White House, the NSC member of that Committee what the purpose of that particular provision was, and I asked him specifically did this mean that you would be able to, as in the case of Angola, reprogram money away from some other part of the budget, NSA, NRO, some other major program, and put it into the covert military, para-military action program?

And he said yes, that is the reason that he is given a sort of broad authority to reprogram money.

Senator Huddleston. Well, they were doing some of that, weren't they?

Mr. Aaron. To some extent I believe that's true, but I personally don't know what that extent was.

Now to the extent we will see later that we place some or make some recommendations concerning limitations on the authority to draw upon different funds and to replenish certain funds for the purposes of covert action, this squares with that proposal by saying that there should be by statute certain limitations on the reprogramming of funds.

We're not saying what those ought to be there really thinking that the oversight committees would have to work out.

Now the next paragraph, C --

Mr. Kirbow. Could we take these one at a time because these are rather critical?

Mr. Chairman, one of the things that came before this Committee when I guess it was Mr. Colby testifying and at each meeting that Mr. Miller and the staff had with the people from the White House and the CIA when we were preparing the oversight bill, we heard many good reasons why we should not deprive the DCI of this ability to sign certifying out of certain funds and being able to expend them without a great big red tape machine to hinder that type of operation.

If, as David says, his recommendation here is to prevent reprogramming, except within very narrowly defined statutory limits, is a first step toward restricting that further activity. I would like to except on this and have it discussed before the Full Committee, or in the absence of that, or connected with it, have the record that we have that shows us that we should restrict by legislation here --

Senator Huddleston. What is the major thrust there? Is it to in fact limit or restrict or is it to actually have it defined and specified in the statute as to what circumstances might prevail?

Mr. Aaron. The thrust here is as follows. The DCI can now reprogram money within his own agency to some extent. That budget, depending on the parts he can reprogram, I don't believe he can reprogram it within about $750 million of his own appropriation.

Senator Huddleston. We can't take something out of the NSA now and put it over?

Mr. Aaron. No, we can't do that. But in his new responsibilities as DCI for preparing the budget of the entire national intelligence program, he will now be in a position to reprogram the entire budget and therefore it's a much larger kind of flexibility.

Now the thrust of this particular proposal is not really aimed, this particular one -- later one we do have one which does place some constraints and the purpose is to make it clear where the money comes from and where it's going to go to make it clear to the Congress at least. But this particular one simply says that because this is a much wider reprogramming flexibility, that it ought to be subject to certain kinds of definitions and consider the limitations so that the Congress knows what is happening to the moneys that it appropriates for particular purposes.

Senator Huddleston. Well, for this particular paragraph, then, would define or specify, suffice the word limited, or not?

Mr. Aaron. It should be defined. That's correct.

Mr. Kirbow. I do wish to point out, Mr. Chairman, that that is a departure from the standard reprogramming process that

TOP SECRET

has been adopted in the Senate over the last 10 or 15 years, for instance, with the Committee on Armed Services.

Senator Huddleston. For other departments?

Mr. Kirbow. Where there is an authorizing and an appropriations type action in the Congress, as Senator Hart will know from his experience on that committee, if they wish to reprogram missile money over to aircraft, for instance, it has to be approved by all four of those committees, both Arms Services and both appropriations committees with the exact transfer of the amounts of money and the justifications given therefore.

My concern is not that the Congress should not have a control of this or that you would make it so rigid by making recommendations that leave the oversight committee and the appropriations committee no flexibility to do this. And I would think that unless we have a very good record on this, we should recommend that this should be a matter that the oversight committee in its new rule gives good consideration to.

Mr. Miller. The oversight committees and the appropriations committees would have flexibility. Every appropriations act is a statute, after all.

Mr. Kirbow. They certainly would unless you restrict them by statute.

Senator Huddleston. But we are suggesting a statute which the new oversight committee that has passed,

TOP SECRET

so far would have legislative authority over. So we're really just recommending here that in this statute they provide the framework under which these kinds of reprogramming can be done in view of the fact that we are extending the DCI from his own little bailiwick to the entire intelligence community.

Mr. Kirbow. If that's the intent of the committee, I have no reservations about it.

Senator Huddleston. I don't think the military people would object to that kind of language. They'd like to have some definite framework for a man to reach into his budget.

Mr. Kirbow. I think all the various agencies would like to have that kind of protection.

Senator Huddleston. Okay.

Mr. Davis. Number C, the DCI should have responsibility to review all intelligence activities and intelligence resource allocations, including tactical military intelligence in order to carry out his more general responsibilities.

We've used the word "review" very carefully here. This is not a responsibility to direct those operations but simply to be able to look at the whole in order to sort of balance it out.

We're not saying that he's taking over responsibility from the military commanders. If you read the Executive Order the language is different and it says that the CFI and the DCI will not have responsibility for tactical military intelligence. But then it uses the word guidance. That is that the DCI will provide guidance on the relationship between the two and that is ambiguous to us and so we wanted to make sure that the DCI would be able to look at the whole but not have responsibility for directing the tactical military intelligence programs.

Mr. diGenova. The original drafting of that Section C, I think it's actually clearer than the way it's drafted now. The original draft says, while the DCI shall not have responsibil for directing tactical military operations, the DCI shall have responsibility to review all intelligence activities, et cetera.

I think the original one is better because it makes it clearer what you are trying to say.

Mr. Kirbow. If you're going to use that for Senate, you have to say tactical military intelligence operations.

Mr. diGenova. Yes. There's a word missing from the original formulation.

Mr. Davis. The reason it was taken out is because it was a negative and there was the thought that this is saying what he does do and leaving what he doesn't do not to be said. It's up to the Committee how you want to --

Mr. diGenova. But you don't want to do the same thing the President did and leave the thing ambiguous.

Mr. Davis. I have no problem making that first statement.

Senator Huddleston. If you want to be positive you can say while the responsibility for directing tactical military operations resides with whoever it is, the DCI still shall have the review.

Mr. Davis. Well, review is, I think, the right word because he's going to try to look at the whole.

Senator Huddleston. I think Joe makes a point there because that could lead to some misinterpretation.

Mr. Davis. Section D goes on to ask the Director of Central Intelligence to establish a staff to support him in these responsibilities and to draw a staff as widely and from the best talent that he can.

Senator Hart. Is this another staff or is this the staff that is in being?

Mr. Davis. This is the staff in being. He has always had people to help him in this role.

Senator Hart. Why do we have to authorize him to do something he's already doing?

Mr. Davis. We don't want him not to do that. I mean we want him to have a special staff to carry out these responsibilities.

Senator Huddleston. This is about the second or third time we've referred to him having the staff.

Senator Mathias. Why don't you say maintain instead of establish?

Senator Hart. Why if he doesn't want the staff?

Mr. Davis. He's authorized. He doesn't have to.

Mr. Kirbow. He's authorized to have a staff under the President's executive order or in any other normal course of business.

This appears to be dipping down below the kind of statutory authority position that you have and telling them how t structure all of the organizations underneath.

That's my objection to that particular aspect of the recommendation. I kind of side with Senator Hart. He has the authority to do his business and I don't think anyone in their wildest imagination would think that the Congressional record or history in this would establish that he's supposed to do it by himself.

Senator Hart. You took the words right out of my mouth.

Mr. Kirbow. And I once more say this is one of the recommendations that we recommend be taken out.

Senator Hart. Who's we?

Mr. Kirbow. The staff had had discussions at the staff level where several recommendations that things like this be taken out for that very reason be considered, and I think it is inadvertent that they are back in the redraft.

Senator Huddleston. You have no strong feeling about that? Let's omit that paragraph.

Senator Hart. In that connection, and I hate to do this, but I'd like to back up because David sailed right by this --

TOP SECRET

page 24, recommendation 16. The Director also would be empowered to establish a board of senior advisors.

Now who is that? Who is that board?

Mr. Davis. This would be something similar to the board of national estimates.

Senator Hart. Is he empowered to do that now?

Mr. Aaron. He is not empowered to do that now because it was abolished on him.

Mr. Davis. But he could do it.

Mr. Aaron. I don't think that's correct.

Mr. Maxwell. He abolished it. It was not abolished on him.

Senator Hart. Could Mr. Bush reconstitute it if he wants?

Mr. Bader. Senator, this is in a way a call to the DCI. It is based, I think, on really extensive testimony we have taken here about the utility of the board of national estimates.

Senator Huddleston. It may be more a recommendation than an authorization.

Mr. Davis. At the same time we didn't want to tell him he had to because it is more or less up to him because if he doesn't want to run his shop that way --

Senator Hart. Who are these people?

Mr. Davis. In the past they have been former senior officials and academics who would serve to review the estimates and comment on them for the director.

Senator Hart. Do they perform any function? Have they in the past?

Mr. Miller. Oh, yes. Llewelyn Thompson, for example. There are senior diplomats, senior military men from the outside, people of distinction, people who have seen a lot and have something to contribute.

Senator Hart. Have they had something to contribute?

Mr. Miller. Yes.

Mr. Aaron. There are two functions they can perform. More or less, they can bring their wisdom to bear on the product.

Senator Hart. I want to know what they have done in the past.

Mr. Miller. Soviet matters. Llewelyn Thompson's roles, for example.

Mr. Aaron. And the second thing they have done was to provide some senior support for the DCI and the judgements he is making.

End 1A b 1B

Now the extent to which that support has been translated into horsepower is unclear, except it was sufficiently strong that it was of concern to the previous administration and was one of the reasons that the board among others was dis-established.

Senator Hart. Have they prevented any problems in the past that we know of?

Mr. Inderfurth. I think that's in relation to helping to insulate the DCI from pressures to modify him. In the past, the board of national estimates insulated the DCI from pressures.

Senator Hart. Chile, Angola, all these cases where the DCI comes in and says we don't really want to do that but the President made us, does he bring in the senior advisor to the President and say, Llewelyn Thompson doesn't want us to, either.

Mr. Lombard. I think part of the problem here, Senator, is that the office of estimates was created under the Eisenhower Administration and fitted very well into the formalistic way in which foreign policy was evolved during that administration. Perhaps as a matter of fact it's been criticized as being overly formalistic and the board of estimates was viewed as being somewhat too long-range and somewhat other world and not geared to what the President perceived as being his day to day needs on estimates.

Now I don't know where the equities lie in this thing, but it seems as though these insitutions have changed according to individual Presidents.

So really, beginning with the Kennedy administration, you had the decline of the office of national estimates because it no longer seemed to fit the fabric.

Mr. Aaron. I'm not sure that's really a fair picture of the history of the board. Perhaps you could tell us since you were associated with it Ball.

Mr. Kirbow. I want to talk about the testimony that was given before the committee on this from two of the former DCIs. Mr. Colby, at both the breakfast briefings he gave and in testimony, favored the use of individual intelligence offices around in these various agencies, originating estimates and everything else; whereas Mr. Helms, when he testified here, says I really don't know how that system is working right now. I didn't favor it when Mr. Colby established it, and I had the other system and it worked well for me.

So I think here again you are talking about a man's staffing requirements as they suit the particular times and the individual as to how he wants to run the intelligence community and what apparently suited Mr. Helms fine didn't suit Mr. Colby and he used a different system which he says works great. And I say that that is, again, a step down thing. Unless you want to encourage him to do it in a recommendation and not mandate that he do it, it kind of makes him run his business the way you want it run and to no apparent abuse problems or anything like that.

Senator Hart. Well, my only thought here is that some future oversight committee or select committee is going to be trying to pinpoint responsibility, and there are so many boards and committees and rocks to hide behind that a DCI has or a President or anybody has that --

So again, my intent here is not to be a know-nothing. It just to keep the structure as clean as possible to identify responsibility. That's all. And if this is important to do, let's do it.

Mr. Bader. The record, Senator, and I can only speak from personal experience with the board of national estimates -- I certainly know of at least four estimates with which I had a part of which the board's role was very important in shielding both the DCI and indeed the analyst from the ravages in two cases of the military who felt very strongly that the continuation of our bases in the Azores was much more important than say some hard political realities about the future of Portugese Africa.

And I could cite other cases where this kind of insulating function was enormously important. It had a great deal to do with the experience, the background and the very presence of some of these board members.

They also play a role as the chairman of the coordinating sessions of these national estimates. There's not just an advisory board that sits quite far from the process. Each national intelligence estimate, one of these board members becomes the chairman.

So they do play a very active role in the preparation.

Mr. Aaron. I might mention that in this connection your concern about the accountability problem, which I think is a fair one. We have testimony that Helms' disposition on this was very clear. When he signed the estimate it was his estimate and it really wasn't the board's estimate.

Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps it might be useful because I think it is clear that he is empowered to do it. Two, if the committee desires to make clear that as a recommendation, on the basis of the committee's examination of their record that this is a desirable thing rather than saying that it would be empowered, by statute, because he does have that power.

Mr. Kirbow. Is it the desire of the Committee though, to change the current system which the present director has not seen fit to change yet, which he has full authority to change if he wishes to do so and which the previous DCI established and developed into a working mechanism?

Mr. Miller. The records show that the function of the board had been official results. Then it seems to me we should so state that it is a desirable structure.

Mr. Kirbow. I had one difference with Bill. I don't know that it is desirable to insulate the DCI from the opinions of the respective military departments if they have a vested interest in the outcome of the decision being rendered.

Mr. Miller. The board has distinguished members from the military.

Mr. Kirbow. Then I don't know how it can be used to isolate.

Mr. Miller. Insulate the political pressure. That's the point. Not the point of view of opinion.

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I move that this paragraph stay in, that we move on.

Senator Huddleston. Yes. I think we discussed that thoroughly yesterday, as a matter of fact.

Mr. Aaron. On E, this is the clause which, in effect, makes clear that there is a definite limit to the DCI's authority and the limit being the conduct of warfare, at which time there should be a clear system and process whereby these activities of the intelligence community over which he has responsibility in some general sense here for budget and so forth, that these basic activities come under the Secretary of Defense. It's simply recognizing the fact that we really have two problems. On the one hand, the conduct of intelligence in what is essential peacetime and the conduct of intelligence in wartime.

Mr. Inderfurth. David, could we get some examples of what high tension means?

Mr. Kirbow. We recommended that that come out. Everyone had agreed on that and I think it was put back in. It's something that you can't define. The Secretary of Defense may feel there's very high tension but the DCI may not be willing to give up his control at that time and you wind up with a wrestling match.

Senator Hart. But there's a phrase of art here national emergency maybe?

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think the way we came on it was to simply say if you have the process for a time of war, the President may exercise it, and he may exercise it if he feels it's a crisis.

The point was just to have a process and have it understood what happens.

Mr. diGenova. Is it good to have a system that is operating all right in peacetime and then when you come to the time you really need, you give it to someone else to run?

Mr. Aaron. Well, the requirements change in time of war.

Mr. Quanbeck. The collection would become almost completely operational. The sites would be dedicated to opeational purposes and there'd be no purpose to have direction from the DCI.

In that case it would be a supporting military operation. Similarly, the new satellite systems would be used to support ongoing operations.

Mr. diGenova. In other words, you're saying there wouldn't be very many national intelligence needs.

Mr. Quanbeck. Well, economic intelligence would be relatively unimportant. Verification of arms control agreements would not be a matter of concern.

Mr. diGenova. You're talking about the use of hardware.

Mr. Quanbeck. Yes.

Mr. Kirbow. There's no difference of opinion between the former DCI's -- I don't know Mr. Bush's position -- or the former Secretaries of Defense. Everyone concedes that the control of intelligence should go for Defense's purposes in time of war, the principal control.

Mr. Davis. The point is, too, the argument in the past has been the Secretary of Defense needs the control he has had in order to prepare for war and now you're saying the DCI's going to do more but you don't want to upset the military commanders. And this is a way of saying that we understand that in wartime it is going to go back. It is more symbolic.

Mr. Kirbow. One of the recommendations in the military area we'll come to later is on this same subject with the bulk of the work I guess on the subject being done by that group.

Mr. Davis. This also happens with the clandestine service today. In war the clandestine service comes under the military commander in the field.

Mr. Aaron. There are some arrangements of this character because of the expanded authority of the DCI that is granted both in the order and our proposed statute, particularly in the area of requirements.

It's important to have this caveat, if you will.

Now recommendation 11 really suggests that the oversight

TOP SECRET

committee look at carrying the budget process a step further and instead of appropriating or authorizing the appropriation funds to the different departments for intelligence purposes, that in fact they are authorized to the DCI who would then parcel them out, and it doesn't come down hard to say that this ought to be done but that this is the next logical step in this process and it is something for the oversight committee's agenda.

Now number 19 --

Mr. Kirbow. I would like to except on that until such time as the whole subject of the budget and release of the figures and everything else is considered, the whole budget aspect at the same time.

Senator Hart. I don't understand this exception procedure. How does that work?

Mr. Kirbow. Senator Tower has asked the Chairman that if there was anything that had not been in agreement among the staff, that it could be brought before, that it would certainly come to the subcommittee.

Senator Hart. Well, the Subcommittee can go ahead and vote on something, can't they?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Senator Hart. I think every member of the Full Committee reserves his rights when the matter comes before the Full Committee. I don't think there need to be exceptions filed.

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

It's all de novo when it gets up to the Full Committee anyway.

Mr. Kirbow. I simply indicated to the Chairman earlier that I didn't want to have a reservation like that and not point it out to him because I didn't want the absent member to appear to be sandbagging the subcommittee.

Senator Huddleston. He's putting us on notice.

Mr. Aaron. Option 13, this option steps up to the question of whether the DCI in his new capacity as the overall manager of the community, and by manager I don't mean down in the nuts and bolts but having the general management responsibilit of interpreting the budget in terms of requirements, in terms of general guidance for the management of some of these activities, whether that function should be separated from that of running the CIA as an agency.

Now we have heard some testimony about the inconsistency between those two responsibilities. I think the arguments, if I can set them on the two sides, would be as follows. And by the way, there's a difference of opinion in the staff as to which of these is the right one to follow. The argument in favor of going ahead now to separate them is that these are inconsistent, that one could have, you remove the DCI from a conflict of interest situation in which he is both running one of the principal agencies responsible for not only clandestine activities but for a small segment of signals intelligence, the development of certain research and development programs that are

TOP SECRET

of great interest to the community, and you take him out of the position of having to judge other people's research and development programs and other people's SIGINT programs, and other activities when he is the overall director of Central Intelligence, and that therefore this separation, his removal from that, would be a good idea.

The second argument is that you really want to place the authority squarely on the new director of this agency who's going to be responsible for clandestine activities. If he still has a boss above him who is kind of responsible but who in fact because of his increased responsibilities won't be able to give the day to day attention to clandestine activities that he might, if he didn't have these greater responsibilities, one should make the lines of authority clear and place the responsibility for the head of this agency on that agency and leave it there.

Now the argument against that is that -- well, there are two kinds of arguments against. One is that the situation now is justified and that this is a good thing and we don't need to make any change and there are good reasons to believe that.

The second argument might follow in the middle and says, well, there is some inconsistency potentially. There might be some advantages to separating them as well as some costs, but we have now just instituted this new system whereby you have broader responsibilities for the DCI. Let's see how it works for awhile before stepping up to the question of whether he can really adequately perform and wear both hats.

Those are essentially, I think, the arguments. If there are others that ought to be offered in explanation of the choice--

Mr. Bader. I would just underline that, Mr. Chairman, the second point that David has made about recommending the situation to stay the way it is today. That is, that the two hats would stay together.

I think some of us feel that the period in front of us will be a period of experimentation and testing where there are new responsibilities that will flow to the DCI. We'll see how they work, we'll see where his authority takes us. We'll see whether he really will in fact establish himself as the responsible director of, in a DCI sense, and we argued here that the oversight committee should be attentive to this to see how it works out and that if sometime in the future after we've had a chance to see how these expanded responsibilities work in practice, that will be a time to see whether the DCI and the Director of CIA function should be separated.

Mr. Aaron. I think that to argue the first case a little more strongly, if I could, there are two additional points to be made about it.

One is that in fact having the second half, running the agency will be an impediment to him effectively running the overall community.

TOP SECRET

So it isn't really just a question, I would argue, of seeing where the current system takes us. It's a matter of looking at what we have learned as a result of our inquiry and saying, in fact, this is going to be an impediment and it is my personal opinion and I think supported at least by some testimony that that would be the case.

The second argument, I think, is a somewhat broader one, and I guess I'm not prepared to make it. But we've had an inquiry into the CIA, some of its problems, some of its accountability problems, some of its management problems, and as a result of this inquiry there is, at least it strikes me as being some inconsistency to be argued between having this broad inquiry and ending up with a much stronger, larger, and more powerful Central Intelligence Agency in every respect with greater authority over other elements of the intelligence community.

Now you can only carry that so far but it seems to me that there is a serious question here as to, and it is seen in part by other elements of the intelligence community who really are concerned that by wearing the two hats, the DCI will still really be representing the Agency vis a vis their particular agencies like NSA and the others.

That's the choice.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Chairman, if I could just note for the record that of the witnesses who testified before the

Committee. I believe the record reflects that Mr. Schlesinger was the only former DCI who was in favor of separating the Agency from the Director and all those who were still alive to testify who were former directors favored it, most notably Mr. McCone and also Mr. Helms, Mr. Helms characterizing the director as ending up with a disembodied spirit if he were deprived of this analytical vehicle.

So I think as far as the record goes, I think the record is against divesting the director of the Agency, although there is certainly evidence from those who felt that he should be.

Mr. Aaron. Let me see if I can clarify that record a little more.

First of all, the proposal is not to divest him from the analytical and production function. That we clearly provide for and that would not take place.

The second point is that I believe the record goes to the question of sorting out or separating the director as he has to this time existed in the sort of general kind of overseer and the kind of jawbone authority that he has had. And the questions that have been put to the witnesses generally have been put in the context of what was, up until recently, his authority in that capacity, and I might say personally I would agree with that.

I think if you were to divorce the director who essentially only had jawbone authority from an agency and the specific gravity that that gave him, then he would be a disembodied spirit. But we're talking about a somewhat different situation now where he has real authority over the budget.

Mr. Kirbow. But also presupposes, Mr. Chairman, that you have decided already that you're going to separate the analytical side of the house up there from the clandestine side of the house and put them into separate agencies.

I don't believe the committee has decided that. The staff may have.

Mr. Treverton. It doesn't necessarily presuppose that.

Mr. Kirbow. If he's going to put the analytical side of the house over there with the DCI --

Mr. Treverton. Well, in any situation we would leave the DCI with his responsibility for estimates and a staff to do that.

I grant that the argument for separating the DCI from the CIA is stronger.

Senator Huddleston. Well, he wouldn't be without authority over the Central Intelligence Agency. He recommends the budget and tasks them. He gives them the responsibility and apportions the resources.

Mr. Lombard. I wonder if I could ask a question.

We have had previous DCIs who have testified that you should not have the dividing of the DCI from the agency but that was based upon the organization as they then knew it.

Now my question is this. Assuming that we were to achieve all of the measures in the recommendations that we have here for the DCI budget and all the rest, it seems to me that that is an awful lot of work without having to be concerned with the day to day operations of the CIA.

I don't know. I just raise the question.

Senator Huddleston. I think that's a good point.

Mr. Lombard. He first of all has to present the budget to the President. He has to defend the budget up on the hill, and that's in at least four committees. And then he's got to have an analytical base, and presumably the national estimate function and on top of that, worrying about the day to day operations of the Agency.

I don't know if that is more than one may should be asked to do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, when we talk about major reorganization and re-assignment of functions, almost, and we're probably confusing that by continuing to call the man who is going to supervise all of the intelligence the DCI.

Mr. Bader. Senator, what we are entering into here is a period of transition for the DCI where he has new responsibilities which are not certain at this point how they will be implemented.

Part of our problem with this decision is, as has been stated and noted, most of the testimony of former DCIs is against the background of the present situation. So most of it is not really relevant to the question of what the DCI will be doing if, and I underline the word if, these new responsibilities that are being thrust on him by both the Executive and by the Congress, are in fact implemented.

The argument I would make here is that the oversight committee should take some time and consider this, certainly in light of how these reforms, if they are reforms, are carried out.

Senator Huddleston. So that's option one.

Mr. Davis. The Executive Order is an attempt to look at the problem and to make one step which says there will be two deputies, and therefore the DCI will have someone who is managing his operations and takes some of the burden off and that's why they did it. And in a sense they recognized the conflict of interest and this was a step in that direction which we are accepting.

And when you say who prepares the budget, you have to be a little careful as to what that means. I mean the money is still authorized to the departments. They will still have their own budgetary process, and how exactly he gets control over that at this point is unclear. We're giving him language about how it's going to happen, and I think that's the argument for waiting a short time to see whether or not he actually does get control.

Mr. Aaron. I might just say that we have to look at this recommendation as well, not simply in the context of the President's own proposals and own measures that he has taken but in terms of the measures which we propose be taken in statute, which of course the oversight committee or whatever responsible legislative committee will have the power to dispose of these proposals or recommendations.

But in that context it's very clear that we do give very unambiguous authority, very strong authority -- I think I've noted a few other points where we actually strengthened the thrust of the Executive Order. And so when we look at the question of whether he should or should not, whether we should or should not recommend that in the context of this kind of authority there will also be development of a statute that would separate these functions, it has to be seen against what we propose and not what the President just proposed.

Senator Huddleston. The fact is that if everything we have recommended so far should come to pass and the DCI should have the expanded responsibility and authority, he would be a more powerful man if he was separated from the operation of the Agency. He would be a more powerful man then than he is now as running the Agency and being the so-called coordinator, would he not?

Mr. Davis. That's correct, that's the purpose.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, do we have any testimony from other agency heads, how they would view this question?

Mr. Lombard. We have some from the DIA.

Senator Huddleston. The DIA would favor separating the two.

Mr. Miller. General Allen has also said that.

Mr. Kirbow. General Allen at the meeting when this was discussed, he indicated that this has not created any problem for him, that he didn't see any favoritism being displayed on the part of Mr. Colby and the people he dealt with.

Mr. Maxwell. I think that's part of the reason why a number of us had favored option number one, was that a great deal of the trouble with the President's Executive Order and our recommendations was to give the DCI more authority. But for the period of time in which that has not been sorted out and we don't have a record for, to take away or recommend taking away essentially the troops that the DCI had used, which in the future hopefully he would not need if recommendations on both sides come into being would be to weaken him at a crucial time as people try to fill in the vacuum that is created.

Senator Huddleston. I think the question then is whether or not what we are recommending actually comes to pass. If it does come to pass, then this is an issue that needs to be addressed.

Now the other question is should we remain silent on it in the report or should we, as option one indicates here, leave it as it is until such time as it has been determined that it would be advantageous to separate them.

Is that what we're saying there?

Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think there are really three options. One is to leave the stuff out, and my own personal preference would be to leave it out entirely if the Committee did not feel that, if it didn't want to recommend that. It's kind of a half-hearted --

Senator Hart. Has the Administration already taken a step in this direction with the reorganization?

Mr. Aaron. It has by charging the new deputy out there and saying he's going to have more authority.

Senator Hart. How does one register disagreement with that? Vote for option one?

Mr. Aaron. If you thought that was inadequate, you would vote for number one.

Senator Hart. I don't think it's inadequate, I think it's wrong. I vote for option one.

Mr. Inderfurth. This also comes up under part 5(d), this whole discussion of options separating out.

Mr. Aaron. That's a separable question, the question of the structure of the Agency itself.

Mr. Davis. Under the Executive Order this new deputy for the intelligence community is physically moving out of Langley and coming downtown. That's supposed to be symbolic as well of the separation of the two roles.

Senator Huddleston. Could we solve it by just having a narrative statement at the end of all of these recommendations relating to the DCI to say that the foregoing, preceding recommendations would, if carried out, substantially strengthen the role of the DCI or they are intended to do that?

And this brings up the question as to whether or not in this expanded role he should also at the same time be essentially responsible for the operation of one of the agencies and that this matter, as his duties are expanded, this matter needs to be considered further and a determination made whether or not it's appropriate that he continue to hold that responsibility.

That's not a recommendation. It's just a commentary on what we have done.

Mr. Kirbow. It highlights the problem and passes it to the oversight committee, which would have time to conduct hearings on it after some history had been established on the new role.

Senator Mathias. Could Senator Hart elaborate on his brief statement of position?

Senator Hart. I think the division out there that apparently the President has worked out is a bad one, and I for one would like to go on record somewhere or another as opposing it.

Mr. Miller. Do you mean, Senator, that --

TOP SECRET

Senator Hart. I don't think this little dotted line means a damned thing, frankly. I've never seen an organization like that work in my life.

This is the --

Ms. Culbreth. That's ours.

Mr. Kirbow. At the present time, Senator, the Executive Order leaves the DCI as head of the CIA with a strong kind of executive deputy out there that does the day to day running of that.

Senator Hart. Well, I like that equally less well. That's the same thing.

Mr. Aaron. Senator, do you have -- is there another solution that we haven't considered?

Senator Hart. Yes. Leave it the way it is now.

Mr. Aaron. Make him run it but give him other responsibilities in other areas?

Senator Hart. Well, I don't want to name any names but some of the sort of nameless, faceless people that have been out there running operations in effect with some vague responsibility to report upward.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we say that in practice when these other, if indeed these other recommendations go into effect and he does assume this additional authority over the total community, once that happened, then it ought to be reviewed to see whether or not that additional authority still ought to be operating head.

You know, that can be a dissipation of his accountability. You have a man that is so involved in so many other things that some nameless person is under him calling the shots. But if we were to move him away from that, then that nameless person becomes the man that we're looking to as far as the operation of the CIA is concerned.

Mr. Kirbow. At that time too wouldn't you expect that that person would be named as the Director of the CIA, would be nominated by the President and confirmed by the Senate?

Mr. Miller. What's wrong with having the DCI in charge of the community as long as the deputy is under his direct control?

Senator Huddleston. Well, you have the community of the NSA. You don't call the director out there the director of the DCI.

We should be consistent.

Mr. Aaron. Option 2 -- we'd have a clear deputy, we'd know who he was. He'd be confirmed by the Senate. He'd be a man of stature and he wouldn't be anybody's deputy. He would be responsible.

Mr. Kirbow. He wouldn't be a deputy at all. He'd be the director of CIA.

Senator Huddleston. We'd just elevate the deputy for operations to be the director.

TOP SECRET

Senator Mathias. Isn't that in effect today except for the titles?

Mr. Aaron. Not exactly because he still reports to the DCI. Maybe part of your question goes to who that person ought to be and what kind of requirements there ought to be on that, whether you want to describe the kind of person you want out there.

Senator Mathias. Option 2 is really the President's order except for the semantics.

Mr. Bader. Not really, Senator.

Mr. Quanbeck. Option 2 actually separates. The DCI would be different from the Director of CIA.

Mr. Aaron. The guy you would hold responsible under the current system still has to be the DCI. Under option 2 the guy you would hold responsible would be the head of that agency and not Mr. Bush, in effect.

Senator Huddleston. If we go to my narrativeparagraph --

Senator Hart. Can we have that written up and brought back?

Senator Mathias. I think this could be a critical recommendation.

Senator Huddleston. I was going to say we might add a line in there that a reason to review it and possibly to change it would be to give a better fix on responsibility for the actual operations of the Central Intelligence Agency.

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

That would be the main reason that I would think that you would move the DCI away from that.

Senator Mathias. But it does not appear to me that you exonerate your national intelligence officer, whatever you call him, just because you have someone else you can also point to.

I think you'd get two fish on the same hook if something goes wrong.

Mr. Aaron. I think that would be in part true depending upon what the particular problem was.

Senator Mathias. Well, sure, if their checkwriter is out of wack and they haven't called in the repairman, they might confine the responsibility to --

Senator Huddleston. Actually, you don't exonerate him. As I see it for the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency you have added to him the responsibility for the operations of the other intelligence agencies, too, and he has to review authority and he in fact would be the focal point of any misdeed or wrong deed that may occur, whether it's in NSA or CIA or whatever.

Mr. Aaron. It would really be very similar to the role he would now have under the Executive Order to the NSA. It's much closer to that.

We'll go back and draft a paragraph and present it either this afternoon or at our next meeting.

Now the next section refers to the Central Intelligence Agency in general. Now because so much of our inquiry is focused on the Central Intelligence Agency, we have a rather long series of recommendations regarding it.

Now the sections are briefly these -- those dealing with the charter for the Agency, for its conduct of espionage, counter-intelligence and covert action, and the question of covert action itself, how it might be conducted and what limitati might specifically, or rules and regulations might apply to it.

The production of intelligence, which is on its way, but it's not in here, there is another section. Then the impact on the domestic world of these activities both intelligence collection and covert action and I believe you had a good discussion of that longer paper prepared by Mr. Bader the other day.

And then finally, some discussions of the inspection system, the general counsel, the inspector general and so forth, and some recommendations in regard to that.

Those are the central parts of it. It includes, of course, such matters as proprietaries, cover and so forth.

Now if we could turn to the first set of recommendations, let me just make sure that there are not disagreements in the text that need to be brought to your attention.

Mr. Maxwell. I think there are. There are things that were agreed upon at the staff level that were left out.

Mr. Aaron. I have one here.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, just for your information, there appears to be several things which were not just an occasional one but several things that were agreed on at the staff level that subsequently found their way back here in the exact original language.

But I won't dwell on that now.

Mr. Aaron. I'd be happy to take that out to see what we can do about it.

Now the first bracket that I find is on page 36. If there are any others before that that people have, we can take that up.

Mr. Maxwell. There's one on 33. It's not a bracket but it was a statement that would have been included as to the committee's findings as to internal controls on espionage activities by the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Aaron. Yes, I recall that one.

Mr. Maxwell. Also on that page there's no effective machinery to make sure that those outside the clandestine service. I think that was addressed to the CIA because unless a finding is made at the CIA that the DCI at this point, the Director --

Mr. Aaron. I don't understand

Mr. Maxwell. The second full paragraph on 33 the way it reads, it assumes that the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency who is outside the clandestine service is not able to ensure --

Mr. Aaron. I understand. You're right. Okay, if these are agreed things and they have been dropped out, then let's just get them back in. I don't know that we have to take the subcommittee's time to do it.

But if we missed some that were disagreed and need to be brought to the subcommittee, I'd like to make sure we get them out.

Senator Huddleston. At the bottom of the page on 33, maybe it's just not coming through to me but the CIA engages in both overt and clandestine activity within the United States for the purpose of foreign intelligence collection by overt means from American citizens.

Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry. I think that foreign intelligence collection, period, and then the rest of that sentence comes out.

And then it says the domestic collection does the overt, and the foreign resources does the covert.

Okay, my first bracket is on page 36 and it is that the Committee questions the practice of recruiting for foreign espionage purpose immigrants desiring American citizenship.

The point was made that there have in the past been instances in which those who were immigrants to the United States who wished to have citizenship were then approached by the intelligence agencies and either sent back as legal travellers and what have you and the question being the point of concern being that their vulnerable status of wanting to have permanent citizenship in the country made them more susceptible to either actual or implied or even imagined threats or imagined coercion.

Mr. diGenova. Can I ask a question about that? I'm totally unfamiliar with the subject and I'd like to know what the evidence was on the record.

Mr. Aaron. It came up in two cases that I recall and I'd like for Bill to speak to one of them. One case involved the Chinese in which the Chinese were approached and used for this purpose. I am not aware of any testimony that there was in fact coercion involved. The question was the practice and whether it has within it elements of coercion or at least the potential for it.

Now the second case I think you can speak to.

Mr. Bader. We have received testimony from a professor from a university in the Southwest that said that he had acted or was the middleman in an operation of recruitment of Jewish Russian immigrants who came to the United States who in particular were interested in some of the Russian Jewish immigrants who were quite young in hopes that presumably after recruitment they would return to the United States. I mean the Soviet Union. We did not take that testimony any further than receiving his testimony. That is, we have not taken it to the point of asking the agency whether in fact they have such a program in the Southwest. So the testimony was limited to that one charge which I personally gave some real credibility to.

Ms. Culbreth. Can you explain just what the charge is here? What is the wrong that has been done?

Mr, Kirbow. What's wrong with that? That's the question I had in the original suggestion at the staff level.

The only human collection we are getting from behind the Iron Curtain in Russia today is principally either through our cooperation with the Israeli intelligence community using just this sort of individual and sending them back, or sending this type of individual from the United States back inside. We're not getting the other human intelligence.

Mr. Bader. I was only responding to the question of what the testimony was.

To go on to the further issue which I think is going to be addressed by the Committee, it's not the question of whether we should, the Central Intelligence Agency should be recruiting foreigners in this country for intelligence purposes, people who may return to their country of origin.

The question is whether the individual who is in the process of seeking American citizenship are in quotes "vulnerable

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

to exploitation for such purposes and whether in that shading the Committee would want to take a position about recruitment of that particular group.

Mr. diGenova. My position is this, Bill. The first time I heard about this was when I read it in these findings and conclusions. I never saw a hearing on it, I never saw a document about it, I never had a chance to comment on it as a designee, and I never had a chance to bring it up with my Senator.

I'm not sure that we want to say this, ask the Senators to say this, without having something in a report about what the practice is, how it's been conducted, who has objected to it, what's the extent of it, before we start making a recommendation.

We're saying we question the practice of recruiting.

I have no objection to the Committee ultimately making a statement like this. I just don't know what the record is. This is the first time I've ever seen this.

Mr. Bader. That's why I wanted it bracketed so it could be so discussed.

Senator Hart. What if we said we urge the permanent oversight committee to look into this question?

Mr. Aaron. I think it would make some sense to have gotten the Agency on the record that in fact this is a practice or something that happens.

Senator Hart. If it's happening, I don't think it should. If we have to sacrifice some human intelligence, I don't think we ought to have a CIA guy tugging on somebody's sleeve who's filling out his immigration forms because it is a very subtle and very powerful form of coercion.

I don't think it should go on if it is going on but I think the oversight committee should find out.

Mr. Bader. It's my personal position on this that we don't have the evidence. We have not taken it through to come to a conclusion on this .

I personally think that it's a problem that should be pointed out, and I think perhaps my own view is that the formulation of a recommenation to look into this as a possible, as a problem would be my recommendation.

I don't believe that is David's recommendation.

Senator Mathias. I would think that you might as you contemplate this thing, there are all types of opportunities for this and I don't have any idea whether it's been done or not, but I would think an illegal alien, for example, would be a tremendous target.

Mr. Aaron. I might just say --

Senator Mathias. It's a different problem.

Mr. Aaron. It's a subtle problem because abroad I personall was involved in a case in which someone seeking to emigrate to the United States, his desire to do that was exploited abroad for the purpose of getting him into the Agency.

Senator Mathias. This is the kind of situation I'm thinking of, perhaps not an illegal alien, but someone who is in this country in some sort of legal status but which is of temporary duration and he wants to change his status.

Senator Huddleston. I can see that. Of course you're not going to get one unless there's something he wants. Most of them, it's either money or some change in his status.

Mr. Aaron. We drafted this language to make clear that they were really immigrants and they were not illegal aliens or people here changing their status or people outside trying to get in, but people who are inside applying for their citizenship.

Senator Hart. We could offer an option to have the Statue of Liberty say give us your huddled masses if you work for the CIA.

Senator Huddleston. I think there's a legitimate concern and that exploiting people who legitimately want to be United States citizens.

I also believe that, particularly anyone from the Soviet Union over here trying to become an American citizen, it's going to pretty well diminish his chances if he does go back to the Soviet Union that he's going to be taken into the confidence of very many people over there.

Mr. Kirbow. This is not an uncommon practice for the

United States. We've been doing it in the United States military for generations in giving earlier consideration for citizenship if he serves on active duty as an alien in the United States armed forces.

It's been done as long as I can remember and I was in the military over 25 years.

Mr. Maxwell. I think the only question is if we m[illegible] recommend against this practice if we don't even know --

Senator Huddleston. It bothers me that we would indict the Agency with such scant evidence we have.

Mr. Aaron. My recommendation is that we get the Agency on record as to whether this is the practice or not.

Mr. Kirbow. I recommend it be dropped from this if we had only one witness and we've not heard the Agency or that we develop a record to support both that and the same part of that first paragraph, which I don't think we have a record on either.

Mr. Aaron. We do have a record on that. It's an interview record, it's not a sworn testimony record. But the first sentence, there is an interview to support that.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think the subcommittee then should carefully consider whether or not it is concerned about the use of American companies in the pursuit of foreign intelligence and if so, how this impacts on anybody's rights or otherwise.

TOP SECRET

We just went through this the other day with the labor unions. The whole paragraph.

Senator Huddleston. I have some concern with that too. When we talk about expressly prohibiting penetration of American companies, it seems to me that the question is whether or not we're penetrating those companies with company executives being unwitting or whether --

Mr. Aaron. That's the point.

Senator Huddleston. It seems to me the real problem is when we were doing it secretly.

Mr. Aaron. And that's the point.

Senator Huddleston. The company ought to have the right to make a determination as to whether or not its interest would be severely jeopardized if this were to happen.

Mr. Treverton. I think this language probably isn't clear enough. If we did human penetration without the knowledge of the company on the operation of the company primarily --

Mr. Kirbow. We're talking about a corporate operation against a U.S. company in the United States?

Mr. Treverton. Presumably it would not be in the U.S.

Mr. Kirbow. If that's what's intended, it does not convey it to even an informed reader.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we say foreign intelligence collection.

Mr. diGenova. May I ask in this regard, it ends up by saying, although according to CIA officials such activity has not taken place -- what's the other evidence that it has which created the sentence?

End 2A, b 2B

Mr. Aaron. In looking at what the foreign resources division does in the way of penetration of businesses as opposed to collecting agents on campuses or in some other walk of life, we found that the FRD actually runs agents in only a few cases.

The cases are Americans employed by local industries in the United States or consulates.

In other words, in diplomat consulate establishments in which there are few cases in which indeed the Americans working for those diplomatic establishments are agents of the CIA through the foreign resources division, and the Americans are not officers of the CIA but they were agents of the CIA in that respect.

Mr. Kirbow. They work in the embassies as you say?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, here in the United States, and this is talking about domestic impact. This is not the foreign situation.

There has been at least one case and I belive there are two but only one I can specify, in which the FRD had an American agent in a foreign company, a foreign-based company. It was very unambiguous that the company was a foreign company because in effect it was a public company of a country whose most business enterprises are owned by the government. But it's a company and it's business and it was a foreign company and the question was, and it related to --

Mr. Kirbow. And this agent was apparently here in the United States?

Mr. Aaron. Collecting intelligence on the activities of that company because that company had foreign policy implications for us.

The next question that was put to, I believe, the chief of the FRD was do you have any regulations that prohibited you from doing the same thing with an American company? And the answer was no, we don't, although we don't do that or we haven't done that or something to that effect.

That is essentially the story and how it came to pass.

Mr. Maxwell. There's some question on both of these whether there are ways of saying things that are important as recommendations without implying that A, these had gone on and B, that we have a record to support that.

There's also, I guess, a slight question in my mind as to the order of magnitude of the recommendations that flow from this in the promulgation of a specific directive.

That's slightly out of synch with the order of some of the other recommendations. The Committee might want to choose to drop that to a footnote or to do it in some other way.

Mr. Aaron. The recommendation that relates to that is where?

Mr. Maxwell. I thought that we had made a finding. It was number 25 on 39. That's a somewhat different order.

Mr. Aaron. Do I take it that --

Senator Huddleston. Is this penetration always in the context that it's unwitting?

Mr. Aaron. Yes. If it's witting, it's really collaborati which is another matter.

Senator Huddleston. So although you could be witting --

Mr. Aaron. Well. the penetrating also applies and maybe we should also make this clear, but for the purposes of conducting some operation with regard to the organization, whether to make it do something in the covert action sense which collect information on it.

If it were simply unwitting cover, that's a different thing.

Mr. Maxwell. I don't think, David, that penetration was used in a context in the agency in the MH/BOUND --

Mr. diGenova. Penetration was for security purposes. It's to discover whether or not there is in fact a fly in the ointment with regard to the security of an American company.

That's the way it was used in MH/BOUND.

Senator Huddleston. That's putting a spy in the organization.

Mr. diGenova. Well, yes. In this case they penetrated Burbank, California and other companies, mostly defense contractors building planes in order to find out they had security risks, a laborer or an executive inside.

Mr. Maxwell. It was witting to a certain extent.

Mr. Bader. I think one of the problems we have here is this question of whether in our formal recommendations that we should enjoin the agency from doing things that they don't do. And where there's no evidence they have any intention --

Mr. Kirbow. The '47 Act prohibits this kind of conduct within the United States.

Mr. Bader. And I think that that should be carefully considered. We have no evidence that the Central Intelligence Agency penetrates Congressional staff, but we have not put it in as a recommendation that they should not penetrate Congressional staffs.

I think the other matter that has been raised about the operational exploitation of recruiting individuals who are in an immigrant status and seeking a change a change in status, we do at least have what I hold to be a responsible source saying that this practice, he has seen this in practice.

I think we should separate the two issues and on the second one it seems to me that if we could frame some language that is language of caution and concern, or we should move very quickly, it seems to me, to take some testimony from the Agency on that matter before we can talk about the matter of the practice of recruiting because I don't think we can use the word practice until such time as we have --

Mr. diGenova. I didn't mean to impugn the integrity of your source.

The question is if the Committee gets asked a question about it later on and someone comes back and reviews these records and sees one person was spoken to or something. I don't really think that's much of a record to go around making findings and conclusions in a final report.

It has nothing to do with the integrity of the man from whom the information came. He's probably right.

Mr. Aaron. I'd like to recommend that on that particular point we tried to nail down with the Agency a little more carefully what the current policy or practice is and on the question -- but I still stand with the view, I might say, on the second one of expressing concern if indeed there is a practice and we do know that some of it has taken place in the past, if there's still no guard against it, then I think perhaps Senator Hart's recommendation about how the oversight committee should pursue this question further would be sufficient.

Senator Huddleston. Well, paragraph 22 over on 39, if applied to the FBD, would be a pretty good approach, I think.

Mr. Aaron. That would not necessarily rule out -- it would not step up to this question. This really is aimed abroad

TOP SECRET

at the question of duplication with overt reporting by the military attaches or by the foreign service or whomever.

In other words, it's trying to establish a standard.

Senator Huddleston. Okay, so where are we?

Mr. Aaron. I think we're at the following point that as far as the bracketed sentence is concerned, we'll go back to the Agency and establish what the practice is when review is necessary of including the paragraph along the lines suggested by Senator Hart saying the oversight committee should look into this particular practice if indeed it is a practice with the absence of policy on this point.

As to the question of American companies, I think I still need to be directed as to how to deal with that. I think when in doubt, delete.

Senator Hart. Can we just commend them for that? Can we say it's a good practice?

Mr. Aaron. Well, the Committee notes that it's been the practice not to do this and that that should continue as a part of their standard procedures.

Senator Mathias. Have we ever commended them?

Mr. Bader. There is much text here which talks about sensible, responsible practices.

Senator Mathias. I do think you should mention that we're talking about their domestic operations of American companies.

Mr. Aaron. Yes. FRD is supposed to tell you that but it doesn't .

Senator Mathias. I think on page 36 and 39 it ought to refer to domestic operations.

Mr. Kirbow. I think we might want to consider too that there's an extensive section of the domestic activities of the CIA coming into the domestic task force report, the subcommittee's report. And if don't put in a comment like this, it'll probably ' all go in that other section. Whereas here we're dealing with an apparent possibility that sometime in the remote future there could be an abuse and there dealing with the abuse section and this kind of departs from what you've done otherwise.

Mr. Bader. I would say on that score that this is a foreign intelligence matter. That is the objective. And I think if it's going to be mentioned, it should be mentioned here.

Mr. Kirbow. It is on the immigrants, but I don't think whether or not you're penetrating an American company to illegally or anything else, if there's any way you can get around the 1947 Act which prohibits that kind of activity by the CIA in the United States for whatever purpose, to penetrate them other than security of your own facility.

Mr. Maxwell. One thing that might make this easier is I think that if weexpressed any concern in that direction exists in regard to this practice, we would get one promulgated quite quickly.

Mr. Aaron. I would recommend that we accept the suggestion that we put this in a positive sense and proceed on that basis and clarify the word penetrate and the fact that it is the domestic aspect.

Mr. Kirbow. Could we ask the Agency to comment in some way so that at least we don't recommend to you that you --

Mr. Aaron. I'd be happy to do that again.

Senator Huddleston. Well, now it's 12:00. I hope there's some way we can get through this today, which would include of course a night session which Senator Mathias and I are available for.

We've done 38 pages out of 160.

Mr. Aaron. I think it will give focus essentially on the recommendations and the bracketed portions that that should prove possible to at least break the back of it.

Senator Huddleston. We can at least try.

Mr. Aaron. If we come back at 2:00, I think we could probably have cleared away a couple of the other sections and then we will be really ready. We will have the full book here and we can go at it.

Senator Mathias. 2:00, I think, would be better for me. Let's say 2:00.

Senator Huddleston. We'll adjourn until 2:00.

(Whereupon, at 12:00 o'clock noon, the hearing in the above-mentioned matter was recessed, to reconvene at 2:00 o'clock of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION (2:20 p.m.)

Mr. BAder. Mr. Chairman, before you begin I might mention that tomorrow morning at either 9 or 10:00, depending upon whether this subcommittee meets tomorrow morning, we've arranged for representatives of the FRD, the Foreign REsources Division of the Central Intelligence Agency, to give us testimony on some of these issues that have been raised, such as the use of immigrants, some of the figures that they've given us, and this question of penetration of American businesses.

That will be scheduled, as I say, at either 9 or 10:00 depending on whether the subcommittee meets tomorrow morning.

We would like to have a Senator swear those witnesses and then obviously any Senator who would like to attend is invited.

Senator Huddleston. My thinking now is that we would meet probably at 10:00.

Mr. Bader. We could certainly do it in an hour's time.

Senator Huddleston. I would like to attend that session.

Mr. Bader. So we'll start at 9:00 promptly.

Senator Huddleston. Senator Mathias had the suggestion that in view of the fact that there is specific legislation relating to that subject and that's in the Immigration Act --

Mr. Bader. I've asked them to be prepared to speak to their interpretation of the provisions and restrictions in the Immigration Act.

Senator Huddleston. But our recommendation is that we would review the act and the practices.

Mr. Bader. If we have this room, as I hope we do, we would take the testimony right here and if need be, move it to another room.

Senator Mathias. In the event that I should not be able to be here, and I hope I will, I think we ought to look at this thing pretty closely.

As Senator Huddleston said earlier, you don't recruit these people just out of the blue unless there's some reason for them to sign up, and I don't think we want to be too critical of recruiting procedures; to revert to the phrase that we used yesterday, these are consenting adults.

I think what we have to look at is the degree of coercion which is implied here, the kind of bind that you get these people in where they really are perhaps totally alienated from wherever they came from, and what sort of a crack do you put them in and that not only goes to the humanitarian aspect of it but to questions over liability and the rest.

Senator Huddleston. I think they could be very helpful to us.

Mr. Bader. Senator, I could also try to adjust the time, Senator Mathias. It could be before or after our afternoon meeting, if that would be more in your reach.

Senator Mathias. Well, I haven't gotten my walking papers for the morning yet.

Mr. Inderfurth. It's interesting in this respect to th about Lee Harvey Oswald, about his being over there, and we're talking about immigrants coming here and defectors and so on.

Senator Mathias. It's the other side of the coin.

Senator Huddleston. There's a question of how many doors we ought to close.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I regret to raise a further complication. There's a meeting that I had for 6:00 that's now been postponed to 6:30. So it would probably mean I can't get here until 7:30.

Senator Huddleston. Maybe 7:30 would be a better time; I don't know. These people need to get out and get some fresh air too, I would expect.

Before we get into the substance here, I understand that our new mandate is if possible to complete ours no later than Friday. So we're going to try to shoot for tomorrow.

What the Chairman would like to do would be for us to have our report in some kind of form that we can give to the Full Committee by Friday so that they can review it over the weekend and the Full Committee can start on it on Monday.

Now how do you think you would stand on that proposition?

Mr. Bader. This is the principle findings, conclusions and recommendations?

Senator Huddleston. Yes, which would mean that whatever changes we are making here in phraseology and so forth should be incorporated and retyped.

We have that problem.

Mr. Aaron. I would think that that's do-able. I mean it remains to be seen how extensively you would want to debate some issues and the extent to which you will simply want to bracket them or identify them and have the principal discussion take place in the Full Committee.

But I would think that that's feasible.

Senator Huddleston. To delay it past Friday, of course, would delay the time that the Full Committee could consider it because they need to have it in their hands at least one day. It might go fast in the Full Committee. I have no way of knowing.

Mr. Kirbow. Bill, because you and I both know Senator Mathias's previous intentions stated in the letter to the Chairman, was there somewhere a discussion about releasing this piecemeal ahead of time that might, that should go on the record here?

Mr. Miller. If it's agreeable to the Subcommittee to get it done by the weekend, he proposes that they take up in Full Committee the findings and recommendations of the foreign group.

The domestic group is much further behind, so they would not take it up until about the 24th.

The question of whether to release any information or any report that may be decided by the Committee --

Senator Huddleston. We'll let the Full Committee decide that when they get the report.

Now where are we then on the report part?

Mr. Aaron. We have, we're in an extensive program of trying to get the Agency's views as to what information is sources and methods and what is classified for other reasons and what have you.

We have, I believe, all but four papers have been read by the Agency in one form or another and are in the process of going out there. The four that are not are the Congression oversight and the CIA budget paper, although the budget section of the defense report, which is the substance of that has been discussed at great length with the Defense Department and they are happy with it except -- well, happy with it may be an exaggeration but they have no problems with it except for the numbers and the Committee itself will have to step up to the question of whether the large number or any subsets of numbers will be released.

The internal oversight, the Office of General Counsel and Inspector General has not been.

Is that right?

Mr. Maxwell. That's right. No material that was used there was derived from classified material.

Mr. Aaron. So that shouldn't be a problem. The general papers on covert action and espionage have not been given to them. They are just being completed by the staff essentially. All the others, and the chemical and biological one has not been shared with them.

Now beyond that all the others, I believe, have now gone out to the Agency in one form or another. The only one that seems to be approved, or at least we've gotten the go-ahead on, is the Department of State's paper and the Department requested one deletion, which we are prepared to make.

Senator Huddleston. All right, then. As I understand it, the Chairman, if we are able to get ours to him so the Full Committee can begin on findings and recommendations on

Monday or Tuesday, even. his hope is that during the course of the next week the Full Committee will finish that.

In the meantime, of course, we can still be working on these reports looking toward, hopefully, if we could have those by the end of next week, too, then the Full Committee would be in a position of at least having the material available to them if we decided to release everything at one time or if we needed a few more days to refine the reports themselves.

That's about as much as we can hope for.

Mr. Aaron. Okay. I think that to be realistic about the longer material, it is a lot longer and I think to be at all proud of the material we will want to be sure that we have gone through it.

So therefore I think the end of next week is probably not realistic of having it in shape for the Full Committee to bless it.

On the other hand, I think that before the end of the month it would be possible to have a product, unless we run into some enormous snag.

Senator Mathias. But that does not contemplate the executive review.

Mr. Aaron. No, I'm sorry, that is including executive review.

Mr. Miller. But it does not contemplate printing.

Mr. Aaron. That's correct.

Mr. diGenova. Yesterday, Mr. Bolton indicated to me when I was there that there was no way that they could complete sources and methods review by the 15th of March, and I said I didn't see how they could either, since they had just really begun having access a week or so ago or whatever it was. And they seem to think that the end of the month is probably, considering the rewrites and a chance to look at the rewrites--

Senator Mathias. I have been independently advised of the same thing, that the end of the month is maybe a little optimistic.

Mr. Miller. Senator Church just talked to Director Bush and I talked to Mitch Rogovin just prior and worked out an arrangement on the question of clearances of sensitive material and the Chairman told Mr. Bush that he will take whatever time is required, he asked for expeditious effort on their part. Mr. Bush said that he would urge his troops onward, and he recognized that there had been snags and difficulties. The Chairman said that he was not going to press beyond the capability of either side. He wants to do the proper job and whatever time is required.

He said that he hoped that we could cooperate and work it out so that we could finish by the end of the month. And Mr. Bush said that he would make every effort to do that.

So that seems amicable between the Chairman and the Director.

Then the question arose about the deadline on the 15th and the Chairman is going to ask that this deadline be set aside because of the problems of not being able to finish security and those other matters.

So he is taking steps to do that now.

Senator Huddleston. But I think it's still encumbent on us to make a special effort to move as fast as we can, and we plan to go ahead tonight.

Okay, now we get back.

Mr. Aaron. We're on page 37 and the procedure we're trying to follow to expedite things is to look particularly at the recommendations and at the bracketed language.

Now recommendation 20 --

Senator Huddleston. Before we get to 20, there's a problem in wording. "The last paragraph before 20, the Committee also found that there's no established inter-Agency mechanisms for establishing the bona fides of defectors." You've used established twice there.

Mr. Aaron. I think we can take the first one out.

Ms. Culbreth. We might say, David, that the staff hopes to take a real editorial shot at this before it gets published, anyway, and maybe even before it gets to everybody next week, and we would hope that we can get a lot of these things.

But certainly, any that you see that you want us to be sure that we get to, point out.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on that particular thing, at the staff level I had bracketed that entire paragraph because I'm not sure what we're trying to accomplish by what you say there.

This is probably the most difficult task that faces a counter-intelligence organization any place in the world is to establish whether or not a defector that you have just picked up is a double agent or not.

I listened to the man who has done this all his adult life at the Agency, Mr. Angleton, and he never made it clear just how you ever are sure that you have a bona fide.

And then his follow-on said basically the same thing. What do we intend to do with this finding? Do we intend then to legislate something? What are we going to do with it?

Mr. Aaron. The finding goes to the recommendation later that there be essentially for other purposes. But a subcommittee of the National Security Council on the subject of counter-intelligence which would look at other matters and we will get to that in a moment, but among its tasks is that it would be a forum in which differences of opinion as to the bona fides of a defector could be discussed and potentially reconciled.

Mr. Angleton testified and spoke at length in other forums with us about the fact that when -- that at present there really is no way that there's a difference between the FBI and

CIA as to the bona fides of a defector and there's no way for the government to come to a decision about it.

And this really makes that point and leads to the further point that we believe there ought to be some mechanism whereby some decision can be reached. Now people may still have reservations, as they do about this particular individual we refer to here. But in the end one has to make a decision and simply keeping him in a jail some place is probably not a useful way to proceed, and in fact, this is the kind of recommendation that comes from Mr. Angleton and seems to be supported by other people, even his successor at the Agency.

Mr. Kirbow. Do we have any place in our findings that discusses the so-called, this single case of some sort here? Is there some evidence?

Mr. Aaron. Yes.

Mr. Kirbow. It's going to be in the report when somebody else reads this? They'll be able to go some place else and see what you're talking about?

Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It will be in, I believe it's in the paper on counter-intelligence. It's also addressed in the Rockefeller Commission report.

Now as the first recommendation, I think that we have agreed at the staff level to take out the brackets and put a footnote which would make it clear that while the primary mission of the CIA would be to collect denied or protected foreign intelligence information, that this would not, you know, that at the same time the Agency could be directed to perform such other collection tasks as directed by the NSC.

In other words, the point is that certainly they do some overt collection. For example, foreign broadcast information service is done by them as a service and so forth. But at the same time the point of giving the CIA a charter is to give it a charter for its primary mission and as set forth NSCID 5, for example, that mission is to conduct espionage.

Senator Mathias. What about the role of statistical analysis? That kind of analysis that can be deduced from [illegible] study of voluminous quantity of economic information much of which is public?

I'll go back to the ball bearings, the ball bearing factory.

Mr. Aaron. Well, this goes to the point really of the organization of this section. There's a separate section on the production of intelligence which would authorize the CIA to produce national intelligence. That kind of thing. The Central Intelligence Agency as the producer of national intelligence must be the recipient of all intelligence flowing into our overall national intelligence effort, and that intelligence includes overt intelligence as collected from the Treasury Department, from Commerce, from Labor attaches abroad, the full scope of information collecting, most of which

TOP SECRET

is not secret or clandestine and is available to the CIA and it would be their job to compile it.

And that does not exclude other functions. For example, the analytical function is not mentioned here. This is simply to give it the collection function and that is because the paper is simply organized in that fashion. It doesn't try to step up to the whole charter, every aspect of it. We just try to break it down.

Mr. Maxwell. Should there be a kind of overt foreign intelligence which the NSC with the mechanism for allocating priorities within the intelligence community should be done by the CIA?

It could under the formulation now do that.

Mr. Aaron. That's why for example there's one thing that they do that's overt. Even their clandestine people abroad do an overt collection job and that is biographic information and that, while it was once in the State Department, was transferred to the CIA because they have a lot of clandestine biographic information and as a matter of centralizing and efficiency the decision was made to move it over there.

That kind of thing would not be precluded and would still exist.

Now it goes on to state that in doing this we would also recommend authorizing the CIA to carry out the recruitment of agents within the United States for this purpose. And it goes further to say that there would be an annual review of this activity by the Senate oversight committee and by the counter-intelligence committee which we proposed be established and has been agreed here as a recommendation of the National Security Council.

Now the further sentence that is in brackets calls upon the Attorney General to certify to the President and to the oversight committee that these actions are being taken in a manner that does not violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other provision of law.

Trying to keep track of the domestic intelligence recommendations is a little bit like painting a moving train, but this tends to coincide with their recommendation, and the purpose of this is obviously to place a little tighter restriction and more authority in the hands of the Attorney General to ensure that these domestic espionage-related actions that are conducted on a covert or clandestine basis are in fact not infringing on Constitutional rights or attempting to break the law in any way.

Mr. Kirbow. You're really talking about recruitments now. You're not talking about other clandestine and covert activities and operations?

Mr. Aaron. That's correct. It's not, for example, if you were to establish a base in Florida for the purposes of harassing Cuban shipping. That would not come up here.

Mr. Kirbow. And the bracketed information, Mr. Chairman, was that I didn't feel at the time we considered this and I asked that it be bracketed, that the Attorney General who is never going to operate in this area alone, he is not going to make these decisions without staff support of some description, and if he's going to do that with people in the Department of Justice, which is where he gets the staff, the concern of the people in the Agency about broadening even within their own agency those people that know about the agent procurements and where they are and whom they are is of vital concern. It's probably one of the most carefully guarded secrets. Even to the extent that Mr. Colby testified before this Committee under oath, he said, I don't want to know the names of the agents because someone may want to decide some day to wrassle it out of me.

I don't know what the Attorney General certifying here does for you if on the same subcommittee you have the DCI, who is the President's principal man, you have the secretaries of state and all these other people apparently at the beck and call in intelligence matters to put the Attorney General and his staff into the agent procurement business.

Senator Hart. Not in the agent procurement business.

Mr. Kirbow. I mean with knowledge of agent procurement.

Senator Hart. Well, the Attorney General is in the business of upholding and defending the laws of this country and he can't do that if he doesn't know when one of the agencies of the Federal government might be breaking them.

It's a chicken and egg situation.

Mr. Kirbow. You think he should approve the policies or the actual procurement of the agent.

Senator Hart. The procedures. Nothing in here. I mean we have argued this thing for 13 months, there's nothing here that requires the Agency to turn over names of their sources or anything like that.

The Attorney General doesn't need to know the names even more than Bill Colby does. or less. Just to find out that the procedures of violating the laws of this country, that's all.

Ms. Culbreth. Could I raise another point, Mr. Chairman?

It seems to me that one of the concerns that you have with having the Attorney General certify in this specific case to the President and also to the oversight committee is a consistent problem that I think runs throughout our recommendations.

On the one hand, we are describing for accountability within the Executive Branch of the proper people, and on the other hand we are afraid that if we make him accountable, we're giving him so much power that they are going to disregard the Constitutional obligations.

In this specific situation, for example, we've already got the Attorney General being involved with the oversight responsibilities. When he takes office he already has the obligation to see that all the laws and activities of agencies are carried out as they're supposed to be.

And in addition to that, we are proposing in another part of our recommendations that the general counsel and the inspector general of the CIA be subject to Senate confirmation so that there are lots of other kinds of checks, and I would just hope that as the Senators consider additional proposals like this, that we don't get to the point that the Congress is hamstringing them inside the agencies on how they carry out the responsibilities.

Each one of these standing by itself may look like, well, this is a good idea and we should have this additional certification or this addition chain of reporting and making sure you get it authorized.

But I have a fear after having looked through a good bit of this, that we are getting too many layers in there, and I would just urge a caution if there are situations where we maybe have it pretty well covered until we get some opportunity to see how this new set-up is going to work, whether we're going to have the kind of abuses we had before. Maybe we don't need each of these details of Congress going down into the agencies and saying how they go about their day to day business.

Mr. diGenova. Mr. Chairman, I would add in that regard that with regard to the specific recommendation, this is not going down into the Agency. This is talking about the Attorney General who is the head of an agency, first of all, and the history has shown that other Attorneys General who took the same oath that this man did didn't do their jobs and one of the reasons was that they didn't know about certain things.

And the purpose of this provision is to make them aware of what is going on, to make legal judgements and to advise the President about the legality of procedures attending the recruitment of agents and other activities within the confines of the United States.

The provision for confirming the inspector general and general counsel is a wholly unrelated thing to this although it doesn't go to the problem of reaching down into the Agency.

I don't see how that does that because he's going to be dealing with the DCI.

Senator Huddleston. Contrary to many of the things that we do, we provide ways to correct abuses once they've happened and it seems to me this is a principal way of trying to avoid abuses to start with.

If I were on the oversight committee I would certainly, and if were getting the information that we contemplate the committee would get, then that is we would know about these things

TOP SECRET

I would certainly want to know whether or not the chief law enforcement officer of the country thought they were legal or illegal, or if there was a question about it.

Senator Mathias. I have a real question if I were Attorney General whether I would sign what we would call for here.

Senator Huddleston. The certification bothers me a little bit.

Senator Mathias. How could I as Attorney General say that I certify that all the actions in this area do not violate Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other provision of law?

I have worked in a state law department and had to sign some certifications much simpler than this, and I agonized over them. And this is so far beyond the personal knowledge of the Attorney General for him to make any kind of certification, I think we should get him involved but I question whether it should be a certifying.

Senator Huddleston. What's the step just under actually certifying?

He could review. He could certainly raise a red flag. His oath would require that he do something.

Senator Mathias. If you force him to certify, I think you're going to get such a wishy-washy thing that to his knowledge and he was not advised to the contrary and stuff like

TOP SECRET

that.

Mr. Aaron. I think that's a fair point. The question, I guess, the case at which the certification would run most would add to what already is in the sentence preceeding it which is review by the Committee which the Attorney General is to chair, would be the case in which the Attorney General is aware of a particular activity, is aware that it is illegal but just doesn't do anything about it on the theory that it is somebody else's business. And he doesn't really, he doesn't have an obligation in this category of matters to render a judgment and bring it to the attention of the President or the Congress.

Senator Mathias. Why don't we say this, that the Attorney General be required to advise the President and the oversight committee that he is familiar with the procedures established to accomplish this purpose and that he is not aware of any violation of the Constitution or other law in the execution of the action.

I think you can lay that kind of a burden on the Attorney General.

Mr. Aaron. Would it be possible to just make it sort of a reporting function in which he said, and this is in the same direction, the Attorney General will be required to advise the President and the oversight committee if he finds that these options are being taken in a manner that violates?

Senator Huddleston. Yes. First he must review them.

Mr. Aaron. And if he finds a violation, evidence of violation, then he must report to the President and the oversight committee. Just place the responsibility there.

Senator Huddleston. If in his opinion.

Senator Mathias. I wouldn't have any trouble with that.

Mr. Maxwell. I have one other point on that paragraph and that is it provides for annual review by the counter-intelligence committee of the National Security Council.

I had understood we were dealing with the recruitment of agents for the United States foreign intelligence purposes, and the question is whether the counter intelligence committee which was to focus on resolving issues involving the bona fides of defectors, issues between the FBI and CIA, would be the body which would have the appropriate knowledge in the positive intelligence value, or whether it should be assigned to a counter-intelligence function.

It's simply a question of where the responsibility should be allocated for reviewing those within the National Security Council structure, and I wasn't clear whether the counter-intelligence committee was the appropriate one.

Mr. Aaron. Well, on that point, the purpose of setting up the counter-intelligence committee is essentially to look at the domestic impact of our intelligence activities, the primary ones being in the counter intelligence field but also in the positive intelligence field.

In fact, the resolution of the bona fides problem is a much smaller aspect of those two problems but the existence of the committee with some knowledge of the problem of counter-intelligence makes it possible to have a forum at the National Security Council level to address it.

Mr. Kirbow. What abuse that has been brought up in the past either in the press or accusations about a committee is this aimed at?

Has there been abuses that we have documented or reported that indicate that this has violated the Constitutional rights of anybody, including these foreigners for this purpose?

We must be aiming this at something other than just kind of pulling it out of the air?

Mr. Aaron. I think it really comes more in the category of questionable practices and I wish I had the domestic fellow here but it's really a question of, for example, when you're in the process of trying to recruit foreign assets or even Americans to perform foreign intelligence missions where you may begin collecting information on Americans for the purposes of assessing whether they are helpful to you in approaching the particular person or whether they would be a good access agent or whether you might conduct some other kinds of surveillance. It's more of a safeguard, I think.

TOP SECRET

I don't think we're really necessarily closing the barn door to some enormous abuse.

Mr. Kirbow. I had never heard of one in that area.

Mr. Aaron. I think by and large the FRD's quite clear. In other words, when we went through the CHAOS and some of these other programs that were questionable, there were some cases in which some of the reporting that took place as a result of the foreign resources division got into the CHAOS net. But the foreign resources division managed to stay clear of in general and resisted in fact the effort on the part of the CHAOS team to go out and actively recruit in this area on a clandestine basis.

This is really sort of more in the category of A. insuring that that doesn't take place and B. giving them help that they can say no, giving them a place to go if pressures such as the Huston Plan type pressures are brought to bear.

Senator Huddleston. Well, there are several places in our report findings, several cases indicated in the testimony we've taken that the Attorney General ought to review and recommend.

And I'm wondering whether or not rather than just spotting it at these various places whether we couldn't make a general recommendation. We've already got the Attorney General on the Committee and that he review, if not all practices but at least whatever practices, the same language we were just talking abo

TOP SECRET

for this paragraph, that he review and that he advise the President and the committee if in his opinion any of these practices violate the Constitutional rights of American citizens or any other laws.

Mr. Kirbow. I would feel much better about this since it hasn't been an apparent abuse but to see that go in the general recommendation that all of the activities of the intelligence community be reviewed by him or be examined in whatever way you think it should be done for that purpose.

But it would seem that it cuts then to a general preventive type mechanism instead of being here kind of put in against the FBI, which as we say apparently has been doing it properly all along and not in violation of the law.

We don't appear to be accusing them of it here although the language may not be quite so specific.

Mr. Aaron. I might just say that there is a further recommendation that involves the Attorney General on page 40, which is number 27 dealing with the same committee, a different aspect of it.

What this does is it elaborates with the recommendation number 17, which establishes the counter intelligence committee and it deals with the two sides of these activities. On the one hand it's going to review program for positive foreign intelligence collection, clandestine within the United States and on the other hand it's going to review the counter intelligenc programs of the CIA and FBI that are conducted inside the United States both from the standpoint of their legality.

Now I think it's possible to consolidate those recommendations so that we don't say it twice, and I also think it's possible to take out any implication that these programs were not necessarily conducted properly in the past.

But I would hate to sort of just have, and my personal feeling is that I would hate to have a general kind of thing that the Attorney General ought to do this because he ought to do this already. And what we're trying to do is make some recommendations that are more specifically targeted on the subject matter that we have reviewed and give him, in effect, specific charge.

Senator Huddleston. Well, we are giving him the specific charge of reviewing it, which apparently he didn't have before. Now before when something came to his attention he certainly had the responsibility to move on it if in his opinion it was contrary to Constitutional rights.

Mr. Aaron. So I see you're discussing the last sentence still, is that right, not the review point?

Mr. Kirbow. He rightfully assumes, as the common law does, that all government officials in an official position are performing their duties properly.

Senator Huddleston. We want to go beyond that, though. We want him to know what they're doing.

Mr. Kirbow. And when you say he should review it in kind of a general recommendation, then you talk about all of the intelligence functions having any possibility of affecting the laws of the United States.

I really would like to see that kind of requirement placed on the Attorney General as a general requirement instead of trying to just pick out little specifics unless we have an abuse connected with it.

Now in the domestic task force they have specific abuses and they make specific recommendations of corrective action, but that doesn't appear to be the case in either of these here, either the true covert operations --

Mr. Aaron. I might make a suggestion along those lines just in terms of simplifying some of this. It might be possible to take the first part of the review section here, follow it with the recommendation on the top of 27 saying the domestic counter-intelligence activities of the CIA would be subject to this review and then follow that with a third recommendation that the Attorney General would be required to advise the President and the oversight committee if he found any irregularities in either one of these programs.

Senator Mathias. I think that's more reasonable and it does what you want to do which is to force the Attorney General's attention to it.

Mr. Aaron. All right. Could we turn for a moment to number 27 because it has a bracketed portion that we might considerably do away with.

That's page 40.

The bracketed portion says that the NSC would approve all counter-intelligence activities of the CIA in the United States and it spells out a kind of procedure there.

Now the net effect of this kind of procedure really is to establish that the FBI is without question, I mean the practical effect is that the FBI is without question the counter-intelligence agency and you've got to get the President to approve anything that the CIA is going to do in this field. And that is really it inside the United States. That's the net effect of this paragraph.

Now my own personal view of this paragraph is that it's probably not necessary. We have the NSC committee. It is supposed to resolve the question of where the FBI lets off and the CIA begins and it is an NSC committe that can report to the President if they have a disagreement.

I'm not sure I feel strongly about it.

Mr. diGenova. I would only add that I spoke to John Elliff about this paragraph and he also feels that it's unnecessary to do this. He thinks that this consolidation would be bad, first of all, and it's unnecessary second of all.

Mr. Miller. Which consolidation?

Mr. diGenova. Aren't you talking about the consolidation?

Mr. Aaron. No, we're talking about the paragraph that just precedes it. I'm sorry, this is the bracketed portion. I'll read it out.

"The CIA should receive NSC approval of all counter-intelligence activities within the United States. This approval should be given by the President and be supported by the recommendation of the NSC counter-intelligence committee, Attorney General and the Director of the FBI. All such projects should be reported annually to the oversight committee."

Mr. Maxwell. I would move that we just strike that as unnecessary.

Senator Huddleston. That's a vote. We'll be right back.

(A brief recess was taken)

Senator Huddleston. Well, it's 3:30. Let's see if we can resolve anything.

Mr. Aaron. Now the next recommendation, which is number 21 goes to the establishment of a special committee of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence, which would review human intelligence collection problems.

This is an area where there has been some effort institutionally to try to get a handle on it but it is essentially split about as widely in the government as you can do it. You have a State Department that produces at least in volume the most material and according to CIA analysts most of that information, a large proportion of that is keyed to their report and yet obviously a great deal of clandestine collection is carried out by the CIA itself and the military services account for a significant amount of collection, some of which is extremely important in countries with military governments.

The issue then becomes whether there shouldn't be a particular mechanism to deal with it and the proposal here is to create a subcommittee of the CFI for that purpose, or a special committee of the CFI. And the reason for that is to put in the chair the Department of State or the Secretary of State's designee and representatives of the Secretary of State and it would e a committee essentially of the CIA, the Department of State and the Department of Defense trying to bring some focus into those programs and making some choices and so forth.

I might have Bill Bader speak to it. I think the recommendation originates with him.

Mr. Bader. This recommendation is part of two basic recommendations that deal with the question of human intelligence collection.

First is the question of the approval mechanism. As you'l see when we get into the latter part of the paper, one of these very strong recommendations that we have as the committee, or is being offered to the committee as a possible recommendation is that human collection projects would go to the operations advisory group for approval. That is, for operational approval.

As you know from our testimony these kinds of projects do not go to the 40 Committee type organizations where they deal with covert action projects.

So on the one hand we're hoping to deal with the question of operational approval. In this particular subcommittee we go to the question of overall management and direction of tasking, what should we be doing, what should the United States be doing in the human collection field? Where should we be in x number of years? What should the principal objectives of human collection be?

And in this way we hope to bring the diversity that now exists in the community from the CIA to the military services and bring it together under the chairmanship of the Secretary of State who would help provide this kind of overall direction and management guidance.

It is not an important elaboration of the committee on foreign intelligence. It should be there in any event because it's a management problem. This gives it focus, this gives the Secretary of State the chairmanship of a committee and I think properly so, that deals with this larger problem of whither human intelligence collection.

Mr. Maxwell. It's unclear here whether it's chaired by a representative of the Secretary of State and the DCI and

Secretary of Defense are expected to attend or whether they're all supposed to be designees.

I don't know what the protocol is but is it likely that the Secretary of Defense would attend if it were a designee of the Secretary of State?

Mr. Miller. Sometimes, sure.

Mr. Bader. They certainly did on these other committees. But what would you propose?

Mr. diGenova. The language is a little unclear.

Mr. Bader. Perhaps it should say that the Secretary of State is chairman and he presumably then could designate whomever he pleased.

Mr. Kirbow. As a matter of practicality, if the Secretary of State doesn't show up and the Secretary of Defense is there, who's going to chair the meeting?

Mr. Aaron. As a matter of practicality if the Secretary of State doesn't show up, the Secretary of Defense won't be there.

Mr. Kirbow. And you digress down because he's never going to go to this kind of meeting where he takes up the day to day operations.

Aren't you really talking here, don't you leave the language so vague that you fail to imply that what you want is a review of the policies and not the day to day, we need one more agent in Amsterdam and two more in Brussels?

Mr. Aaron. That is not what we want to convey and so you are correct.

Mr. Kirbow. They should review the policies and goals and requirements, really.

Mr. diGenova. How about policy at the end of the first sentence?

Mr. Aaron. Human intelligence collection policy.

Senator Huddleston. And eliminate the part about size.

Mr. Bader. Review and make recommendations with regard to policies and priorities, and then there's a misprint here. We don't need American U.S. clandestine.

Mr. Kirbow. Down through the word, the two words, human collection before the last sentence, you get into kind of a great deal of detail about what they're supposed to consider, whereas if you said they should consider the policies of human intelligence, human collection and the trade-offs between covert and overt collection and the sorts of things you have brought to a committee a consideration of this problem which they have never taken before.

Mr. Bader. I think we could add the word policy here and policies and we will underline that.

Recommend the establishment of a special committee of the CFI to review all foreign human intelligence collection policies. It would review and make recommendations with regard to the priorities and policies of U.S. clandestine human collectio operations and choices between overt and clandestine human collection.

Mr. Kirbow. And Mr. Chairman, without going back and belaboring one of the other recommendations, I think that the staff should do that in each instance where we may have given a task to a committee to do a great deal more detail because even on this domestic counter intelligence activities my earlier recommendation was that by statute the policies governing domestic counter-intelligence should be considered.

You don't want them to consider the day to day operation I don't believe.

Mr. Aaron. But I do think that we shouldn't lose sight of the fact that we are interested particularly in the latter case and I think in this case that you're interested in the program.

I mean you just don't want to say it will be the policy of the U.S. to do some or it would be the policy -- I mean you really want to have an opportunity in a management sense to look at the overall program -- is the program achieving what it's supposed to achieve, is the scale of the program here as opposed to there in the right balance to reflect our priorities?

In other words, I think that --

Mr. Miller. It's not a rubber stamp, you're saying.

Mr. Aaron. That's right and it isn't just to deal with words on paper. It tries to get at the problem of what are the programs and are they doing their job?

Mr. diGenova. Who do they make the recommendations to? The CFI?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, or the President.

Mr. Maxwell. One remark in connection with --

Mr. diGenova. Let's make that clear. It just says make recommendations.

Mr. Maxwell. In Bill's fix, to specify, I think it was intended that it's all human intelligence collection abroad.

Mr. Aaron. Yes, that's right.

All right, perhaps we can go on to the next recommendation. Now this is bracketed. I think it might be better first before we take up the bracket let's take up what is not bracketed and just indicate that this is in effect hortatory, if you will. It urges the oversight committee to examine the question of clandestine collection to ensure that it's really focused on things that need clandestine collection that are of high priority, not only the highest, but certainly deserve that kind of risk and effort and areas in which clandestine collection are the only means available so as to emphasize something of the extraordinary nature of espionage.

Now beyond that there's the recommendation that the clandestine services like the military services and the foreign service, be subject to a manpower ceiling.

TOP SECRET

I think this would not suggest that that ceiling be a public figure but that the Congress establish a manpower ceiling for that, just as it has these other services that serve in the field of national security.

Now I know Charley has some reservations about that.

Mr. Kirbow. Yes. But to put it in the proper context and I didn't bring it up at that point, nor did Elliot, if you look at the bottom of page 32, we in our findings section discuss a point on the fact that we don't know whether the size of the clandestine service is the right size.

We also indicate that over the past decade the size has been reduced significantly, particularly in the field.

Then we come over here and recommend that there be a manpower ceiling for the clandestine services only of the CIA. Today there is a budget ceiling on the number of people in the CIA that is governed by the amount of money that they get and the amount of money that they put forward to support that kind complement.

I objected to kind of the dipping down process of going into a segment of an agency and limiting its manpower because if we had a crystal ball, we could do that very carefully and properly, I think. But I can't see into the future and two years from now we may need the largest clandestine service we've ever had because of the problems that would confront the nation and I think that since it is carefully controlled by the Congress through its budget levels and manpower levels, let's let the agency decide how many people it takes to run a segment of its own organization.

Mr. Inderfurth. A very special segment, though.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, special only because we have concerned ourselves with the abuse aspects of it under the assassination type thing. Of more concern to us should be the fact that the analytical section out there probably needs strengthening instead of worrying about regulating the size of the clandestine service.

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, that comes up later as well.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you think that size in any way contributed to the plot against Castro or some of these other people?

Mr. Inderfurth. I think it has in covert action throughout Latin America.

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, I would support Mr. Kirbow on this one.

My own view is unless you're going to go to the full extent of addressing the question of establishing manpower ceilings throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, to single out one directorate at this point doesn't really make much sense to me, though I understand the principle behind it.

End 3B. b 4A

Senator Huddleston. Well, I do too. I think we can make a flat statement that you could get too big, that there may be a point somewhere up there beyond which is a very dangerous situation. But I don't think we have determined that any specific size has yet been shown to be so detrimental and we could say that there ought to be a specific level.

I think the rest of that paragraph certainly ought to be continuously examined.

Mr. diGenova. The second part of that paragraph really assumes that that kind of review would go on and if necessary, the committee could make a recommendation at the appropriate time.

Mr. Aaron. It proposes that kind of a review. The purpose of having a manpower ceiling as it exists, as I say in other agencies where one could argue that you would have the same problem, the military might have an emergency next week which would require an enormous expansion of military services.

Now the point of it is to give really, simply to give or suggest that the oversight committee put in its arsenal of controls over the clandestine activities that the CIA, some handle on the clandestine services number because it makes a difference. I mean they could put their money elsewhere.

Senator Mathias. How about saying establish and annually adjust, or from time to time adjust?

Mr. Aaron. The point is not just to set a higher limit but rather to say, to have this tool, and even ask the Agency to tell us what that ceiling -- you know, they might well be under their authorized strength.

Mr. Inderfurth. Another alternative is to say should consider establishing a manpower ceiling.

Mr. Kirbow. Could I make the point that oversight of any agency necessarily entails looking at the number of people it has every year because you have to determine how much money they've got to support and they have to come tell you that.

If we're going to have an oversight committee that is one of the functions that it performs. We do it with our military services, but we don't tell them that we can't put them all over in, that they can't put all the Navy people in destroyers.

Senator Huddleston. That's right, but I don't think you can exactly equate clandestine operation with other types of agency operations.

I think there's a difference here in the potential impact. It's a secret operation.

Mr. Aaron. Should consider establishing?

Senator Huddleston. I think that it ought to follow the paragraph. Leave the paragraph as it was and say the committee should also consider the advisability of establishing a manpower ceiling.

Senator Mathias. Adjustable ceiling.

Mr. Kirbow. I don't really know what such a recommendation does for this committee to recommend to another committee that maybe they ought to do something, but I guess it's all right.

Mr. Aaron. I'm afraid we do that quite a bit.

Mr. Miller. We're just laying out the agenda.

Mr. Kirbow. Which is not binding on them.

Mr. Miller. In the Government Operations Committee one of the provisions of the bill, as you know, is an agenda, and many of the items that are in that agenda are subsumed in this.

Mr. Kirbow. Doesn't it go to the make-up of the individual divisions? Overall size of the intelligence community is the way they recommended it, and I think that's a reasonable approach.

Mr. Aaron. Turning to the question of the Agency itself, number 23, this again is not in the category of statutory proposals but in the category of urging the Agency to ensure that the skills of intelligence collection are the primary criteria for advancement within the clandestine services.

Senator Mathias. Versus management?

Mr. Aaron. Versus covert operations.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on this one I can conceive of nothing that would do more harm to either side of this question than to say to a man who wants to devote his life and make a career in the clandestine service that you can't get promoted on being good at what you're supposed to be doing. You get promoted on being good at this other aspect of it, and think it's just totally out of keeping with what you want. If you want a good clandestine operation, you want the best you can find, and I think that he should get the same amount of credit for being good at whatever he's assigned to as being in this other intelligence business.

Mr. Aaron. The intelligence business, of course, is their primary mission.

Mr. Kirbow. Not if he's a clandestine operator. That's his primary business and he doesn't have any choice over whether or not he gets assigned when he goes in out there as a junior executive to the clandestine side of the day to day operation.

Senator Huddleston. What does this address?

Mr. Aaron. This addresses the problem of the clandestine service which goes to the several things. Primarily it collects intelligence. But it is in the nature of, or at least the past history of the Agency, which Bill can speak more directly to than I, that the covert operations people get the better advancement. It's in part built into the system in that you can measure the effect of the covert action operation easier than this endless effort to recruit a good agent many times which will fall through through no fault of the agent himself.

Furthermore, covert action operatives simply come to higher level attention easier than somebody who's a good agent handler but who is really operating off in a very secure and remote environment.

So in an effort to try to suggest that they make a real effort to compensate for what we have found in this area, this particular thing is designed to urge them to do their best to try to overcome that problem.

Now we wanted to put it in a way that was not pejorative and that did not exclude the advancement of good covert operators. If you want to keep covert operations, I agree with Charley, you have to have good ones and you've got to reward them.

I don't think that this particular recommendation which is to the Agency and not to statute does what perhaps Charley fears it would do. It simply urges that they give the proper weight to what for the clandestine services is their primary mission.

Mr. Bader. The problem of it is we're not after this really and perhaps it's a language problem. We're not trying to suggest here that the intelligence collectors in the career matters should be favored over the operator. What we were after really was that we have noticed over the years and in the record that the intelligence operator has tended to move along much faster.

What he has done, his projects are very quickly visible while intelligence collection can be something that runs over years and it's hard work in the trenches. And I think the

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

Mr. Kirbow. I'm sorry. I don't believe that that's the case. What I'm really saying is this. Over the years from about 1947 on through the '60s, clandestine operations were a way of life in the CIA. Whether it is in favor today or not is probably on the side of no, it's not in favor at the CIA because there are only 165 versus some 500 or 600.

Senator Huddleston. I really don't see that as being relevant.

As I see this it's not a question of whether we like clandestine operations or not. It's seems to me the question is whether or not those individuals who serve are getting undue

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

preferential treatment and advancement within the Agency.

Is that what we're trying to get to here?

Mr. Kirbow. They say it's within the clandestine services, that the covert operator gets more advancement within the clandestine services side of the house than the other people, and I don't think our record supports that.

It may be that you have found more of the directors being from the covert side of the house but that is not what the attack is here.

Senator Huddleston. Can't we say that within the clandestine services our inquiry indicates that those in the covert section have advanced in great r numbers more rapidly?

Mr. Bader. Yes. I think the record is clear on that within the clandestine services.

Senator Huddleston. And the Committee believes that the Agency ought to ensure that all employees, whatever side, be given the opportunity based on their actual skills.

Mr. Aaron. That's the thrust of what we're trying to express here.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I would like to reserve for Senator Tower on this one because I don't think the record of the Committee supports that.

Mr. diGenova. How about if we said this - the Central Intelligence should ensure that the skills of intelligence collection are given equal consideration as a criterion for

TOP SECRET

WARD & PAUL

advancement within the clandestine services.

Ms. Culbreth. Then you get back in to what we struck out from the original, which was as opposed to covert action operations. We deleted that from the earlier thing to try to avoid --

Mr. diGenova. I'm trying to just paraphrase what the Senator just said, what they said was the thrust, which was that intelligence collection capabilities are put on an equal footing with operations.

Mr. Aaron. What I think is a better way to put the point, and it's along that same line, might be to simply say, to urge that the Agency ensure that the skills of intelligence collection are given importance in advancement within the clandestine services of that mission for the clandestine services, if you will.

In other words, the great bulk of the people in the clandestine services, as Charley pointed out, are in fact intelligence collectors. They are case officers for trying to acquire information, and I think that what we're trying to arrive at here is that it should be given an importance, that this skill should be given an importance and significance in proportion to the significance that the Agency accords to that particular task.

Senator Mathias. What skill are we trying to get at here? Are we getting at the fact that you get some stars who, becaus of their clandestine skills sop up all the available promotions, most of them, that they get ahead and I think that that is a problem. You see it in the armed services all the time. I remember Commander Buckley who, because he was a big PT boat man, and he just happened to be called on to take MacArthur off Corrigedor, ended up an Admiral, and I won't comment further.

Now I think there is such a human response to courage and daring and unusual skill that it's going to be very hard to deflect that from having its natural outlet in recognition.

Mr. Aaron. As I say, a lot of the problem is in the nature of things and the recommendation goes to an effort to put us on record as trying to compensate for what I think you rightly say.

Covert action draws attention to the operator. Clandestine collection, you do not draw attention to yourself.

Mr. Kirbow. There is a more basic problem to this at the Agency. I did spend some considerable time in this business. The excellent people, the people who turn out to be excellent in the Agency and get the quick promotions are not necessarily promoted because they are covert operators alone.

Most of the very fine people that they have, or that they had in the early years wanted to be in that business because that's what being a spy was, and they will end up with a majority of the good people.

Why shouldn't they be promoted? That's exactly the decision.

Senator Huddleston. Well, there are too many elements here involved in who ought to be promoted. There are too many human elements and somebody has to make a decision.

I just don't know how we can advise them on that. I think I would strike that. I would favor taking it out.

Mr. Aaron. Okay. Number 24 goes to the question of the relationship between the domestic contact division and the directorate of operations, or what is otherwise known as the clandestine services.

In 1972, I believe it was, when Mr. Schlesinger went to the CIA, this directorate whose primary responsibility is for collecting overt intelligence but which has a support function for the clandestine collection or the clandestine recruitment of agents within the United States was then moved into the directorate of operations.

The Committee's own hearings and testimony on the subject indicated that a reasonably large portion of their activity and their contacts are used for the initial stages of trying to spot, assess, and get people close to foreign intelligence agent recruitment targets.

Now there are, one concern about that is that unlike the foreign resources division whose mission is clearly clandestin the domestic contact division approaches their people on an open basis, it says, [illegible] I'm not a spy. I'm not doing any

TOP SECRET

saying. I am an overt open person. I belong to the CIA. I would like you to tell me about your travels or advise us on some subject or what have you on an open basis, and that this relationship is completely above board in every way.

And you don't have to worry that this relationship is going to be used for any covert purpose.

However, it turns out that some of those relationships are or do or are brought to evolve into support for clandestine activities in which information is gathered on people who might be helpful in all the ways and I think we had a pretty good attendance at that session when this was discussed.

So the question comes down to this -- this blurring of the line between an organization as to whether its mission really is overt or not in every respect, should this be a concern to the Committee? And if it is of concern to the Committee, should we take some steps to try to reinforce its overt character and separate it out from the clandestine services where it is now located and where at least a few of the people in the DCD have expressed some concern that they will now become populated with real clandestine operators and that they will really sort of become another arm of that organization.

Now Bill Bader would like to talk to this point. It formerly was part of the directorate of intelligence which is the more overt arm of the Agency to begin with and collected that information.

TOP SECRET

In other governments this same function is done, for example, in Britain it's done by the board of trade because a lot of the information is technical, economic, or scientific in nature, which is also true for the DCD, as a matter of fact.

And so the question that is presented to the Committee is do we want to leave the DCD where it is in the Director of Clandestine Operations? Do we want to have the clandestine service, if you will, have a quasi-overt arm within the United States widely spread out throughout the United States? Would we want to confine the clandestine activities to the clandestine service and the overt activities to some overt organization, be that back in the directorate of intelligence in the Agency or moved out to the State Department or some other organization which does operate openly as a matter of course?

Mr. Inderfurth. What would that mean in terms of numbers? How large is the DCD?

Mr. Aaron. I believe it is about 150 or 200.

Mr. Bader. There are 38 offices.

Mr. Aaron. And they are about two or three man offices. A lot of the personnel in the DCD are in fact succunded from the military services or ERDA. You know there are different areas of the country that have different kinds, you know, or agriculture, for example, if they're interested in agricultural intelligence a lot of these people come out of agriculture. I mean it's a funny kind of mixture of people.

The CIA sort of does this in part as a service of common concern to the intelligence community and in part at least heretofore it does the overt collection function as a service to its own analysts.

This was particularly in the early days when we had less access to information in the denied areas of the world. It was a very rich source of information for us. It still is quite a good and important and economical source, and it's a good program. The question is how much it should be involved in clandestine support and if you want to find a way to encourage it, to, if you will, emphasize its overt mission over its covert mission or do you want to put it back into some overt side of the Agency or the government?

Mr. Maxwell. I have some very mixed feelings about this recommendation and the problem might be described better by looking at the flow of information from the end point.

The FRD now is involved in the recruitment of agents for foreign intelligence gathering within the United States. A number of times they need, and I think they have indicated to the Committee that they need some help in determining whether they should go to an individual and say, can you introduce me to this potential agent of influence in a country, can you introduce me to the student without that blowing up in their faces?

TOP SECRET

The question then is how can they be provided with the information that they need to allow them to make a recruitment that the Committee may find is valuable.

If it is from the DCD, it has all the problems that David articulated, and I appreciate those problems. The question the Committee has to face is where they are going to get that information, whether it should be for the DCD, whether it's located in DDO from the DCD, whether it's located in the DDI or from the DCD, or located in the State Department or under State Department control.

My own sense of that is that the decision that was made by Director Schlesinger in moving it from the DDI to the DDO did raise the potential of compromising the overt character, but it also made the liaison which we find important more efficient and easier to manage and potentially easier to control if both elements are under the same set of guidelines and regulations which would govern the DDO as a whole as to who may be approached, who may be used operationally.

If it's put in another directorate or outside, I think there's a difficulty in that kind of control and I think it's also, it obviously raises the question of whether the FRD was going to get the information that it needed for a valuable function of recruiting foreigners while they're in the United States.

I think the Committee can go any number of ways but I

TOP SECRET

think that the end product has to be looked at in the recruitment of spies, and secondly you have to look at what kinds of assurances could be made in any branch of the government if overt collection is being done as to whether that information would be used by another branch of the government.

If DCD were entirely overt and a promise were made to Mr. Bader that this would never be used for an operational purpose or you would never be asked as a consenting adult to aid in an operational purpose, then the end production might well be that the FRD is going to be sending people out covertly within the United States to covertly obtain information to determine if they are going to make a covert approach to a foreign sov. and I think that I have real hesitation about, rather than the information being available from consenting individuals on an open basis.

Mr. Aaron. If I could add to that. I agree, I think the question is if you're going to allow the conduct of recruitments to take place and you're going to allow information to be collected on these people, somebody has to do it and so you're not going to avoid any of those questions by this.

The issue goes in part to whether the people who will initially begin developing that information will be people with every incentive to keep it within certain bounds or whether there will be incentives that work at cross purposes to that.

I think that [illegible] you have a situation in which the

TOP SECRET

DCD could legitimately have contact with academics and large numbers of people who otherwise, if our other recommendations in here are accepted and even some of the internal regulations of the CIA are written into law, people would be kind of off bounds for operational use.

Now the DCD, however, because it is overt, is allowed to deal with these people, and the question is, well, the incentives to be scrupulous in their activities, keeping them overt and not trying to use people sort of for operational support and so forth, the question is would those incentives be better outside the DDO or inside the DDO or would it make a difference.

The second point is, and this is a somewhat different point, the DCD is having an increasing problem, quite frankly, and we have had testimony from Mr. Nelson and others, he's having a problem because it is associated with the CIA.

Now people are reluctant to cooperate with them because of concern about being associated with the CIA. The fact that they actually do engage in operational support doesn't help that very much.

And so the question is if you really want the fullest exploitation of the foreign intelligence, open foreign intelligence potential of the American people who are willing to cooperate openly, shouldn't that be done by some organization which does not have this aura of clandestine activity?

associated with it?

That is somewhat separate but relevant.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, apparently they're not talking about doing it with any fewer people or any different people, but you're talking about calling it something else.

In discussing this with Mr. Nelson, under whom it comes now, and with Mr. Proctor, under whom it previously came, they do not distinguish any of the problems, that they are having any problems in maintaining contact with over 100,000 American citizens who are kind of returning travellers and that they are getting the type of information that these loyal citizens are willing to give to them.

These people advertize their address and probably put their telephone number in the public telephones in each of these 38 offices, and all you have to do is look it up and say that's a CIA function there.

It is probably as overt as anything they do except testify on the Hill, which has become very overt in the past year or two. But just to talk about moving it back into a place where they just moved it out of on the lack of some kind of record that is not working properly now or more properly there. I don't think we're in a position to decide that. To decide that you want to move it out of the CIA and into the Department of State. I think the record is totally void on that subject.

I just hate to see us recommend taking away from one place and putting it some place else without a record.

Senator Hart. Can't we recommend that we put it back in intelligence and the oversight committee consider that after it's created and so on.

Senator Huddleston. Why was it taken out of intelligence?

Mr. Bader. It was a question of consolidation of collection in one directorate.

End 4A, b. 4B

You see, while the domestic contract service was under the DDI, it was a collection service. It was in an analytical branch and Schlesinger, as I understand it, felt that it was the tidy thing to do to put all collectors under the same --

Senator Huddleston. Overt and covert?

Mr. Bader. Yes. And I think the issues here have been very well articulated.

I had very little to add to them. I think it is an issue. I have a personal concern that we have not taken the responsible officials at any length on the record on this question of the relative advantages or disadvantages.

My own personal view with some experience is that it seems to me it would make a great deal of sense for this function to be under the DDI to emphasize and underline its overtness and that the individuals who are in this particular service or office then would flow naturally from the analytical side and it would be very different kinds of people as they tended to be before 1971, 1972.

Senator Huddleston. Is there any chance that anybody would be denied the product of this investigation if we changed it?

Mr. Bader. One of the things we should bear in mind, Mr. Chairman, is that if you go down the road and talk about these various reforms or changes in the intelligence structure, that moving the DCI function and enhancing his powers and then perhaps eventually separating the Director of CIA from the DCI, that at this point it would seem logical for an overt collection side of an intelligence agency to be with the DCI.

But that is down the road as well and perhaps what we want to do with something like this is -- you don't understand that point?

Mr. Maxwell. No, I don't.

Mr. Kirbow. What he's really saying is that if you move all of this overt side out of the DCI, you leave the covert side out there without any of the support function, which this group furnishes to them.

Mr. Bader. Down the road when you have a DCI --

Mr. Maxwell. If you assume that the DCI is going to take the entire DDI --

Senator Huddleston. Could we have a situation where an agent might be both covert and overt?

Mr. Kirbow. These people out there are not agents. These are employees. And most of them, by the way, are former employees. They are retired CIA officers.

Senator Huddleston. They are not mixing the assignments?

Mr. Kirbow. No. They, for example. I don't mind putting this on the record.

We had a large international organization in the company I was with before I returned to the Senate. Before we departed we could get a briefing on the place where we were going to kind of safeguard against making defense mistakes, and when we came back, they came and had lunch with you and asked you to kind of reveal or when you were dealing with the director of whatever it was in Singapore, what was the situation? What was the atmosphere? What's going out there because you were in a business atmosphere and rubbed elbows and they came and met with you and did this. Or occasionally you would stop by the San Francisco office and you'd do this.

That's the business these people are in, principally. Isn't that correct?

Senator Huddleston. Mac, do you have any thoughts on this?

Senator Mathias. I don't think anyone has discussed option number 2 while I've been sitting here, and I haven't been sitting here consistently. But is there any value to cutting it out and sending it over to State?

Just to be the devil's advocate, one of the values that occurs to me is to bring the State Department in touch with reality.

Mr. Kirbow. Well you'll never get me to tell a member of the Department of State personal business that I was conductin for my company in Singapore because I don't think that it would be --

I'll put it personally. I don't think that I would have trusted them with the secrets of what my company's operations were versus an intelligence organization. Not an open organization like the Department of State.

Mr. Aaron. The information collected by the DCD is fully available to every agency of the government. It's not considered classified or secret or anything else.

Mr. Kirbow. They ask you a lot of questions.

Senator Hart. The principal argument, Mac, is that there's no record on this and for us just to haphazardly make this recommendation without our record --

The compromise I suggested was a recommended option 1 and that the new committee look at option 2 when it is in existence and has made a record.

Senator Huddleston. I'm inclined to go with option 1. I have a question, it says the Committee recommends the permanent oversight committee remove --

How is this going to work?

TOP SECRET

Mr. Aaron. I just think that in drafting the charter -- actually you can just say you recommend by statute or you could say that the Committee recommends that it be removed or moved back, and you can leave it to the DCI to do it.

Senator Huddleston. Just recommend that it be done.

Mr. Kirbow. May I respectfully reserve on that?

Mr. Aaron. All right. Now 25, we're going to get some testimony tomorrow morning on 25 and 26 as to what they actually do and we will have that on the record.

And 27 will be moved up, as we have talked about it earlier. And 28, then, was the order of business, and that is the proposal that in fact we ought to consider a model rather like the British, which is that counter intelligence by the CIA and by -- I'm sorry the author of this is not here -- by the counter intelligence, by the CIA, and the FBI, be consolidated into one organization along the lines of MI 5 or 6. I can never keep them straight.

Mr. Inderfurth. Five. This would --

Senator Huddleston. Where would that agency be in the structure?

Mr. diGenova. This is the point I was getting at before that the domestic task force and John Elliff has some problems with these recommendations that I'm just spotlighting this now. He doesn't understand the advisability of this. He doesn't see why it's a good reason.

Mr. Miller. That's because he hasn't heard the recommendations that this be done by others. It's just an idea to be considered.

Mr. Kirbow. He's read it. I reserve on this.

Mr. diGenova. I'm not sure that's --

Mr. Inderfurth. Well, the military intelligence services should be added to this FBI, CIA and military intelligence.

Mr. Aaron. If you're going to consolidate that function, it ought to be consolidated all the way around.

Mr. Miller. They're slightly different activities on the part of the military because they're involved in base protection.

Isn't that correct?

Mr. Snider. Well, that counter-espionage operation involves their own personnel world-wide.

Mr. Miller. But in connection with bases, that's their connection.

Mr. Snider. Not necessarily bases, but information, military information. As long as you are consolidating that function, I don't see why you shouldn't include the military services. It's just a small point.

Senator Hart. Mr. Chairman, I certainly favor the concept that if there's any one area where we saw even a little rogue elements, they were in the counter-intelligence areas. And I am, as you know, opposed to further complication of

TOP SECRET

the hiding places for responsibility or accountability. But I think creation of a separate unit here and consolidation would enhance accountability rather than make it more difficult.

We have found out in our look at the Kennedy assassination and I think in a number of other instances, COINTELPRO and so on there was duplication and overlap and abuse and poor performance and misperformance and about everything you can think of going on here between the FBI and the CIA and maybe even the military.

So I think we have to look at something and not just a mandate on counter-intelligence. I think this is a sound recommendation to make.

Mr. Miller. It doesn't have to be into a new agency. It may be a relationship that is less than an agency.

Mr. Aaron. Is it the concept here that this organization would conduct all the counter-intelligence activities abroad? I mean in other words, the counter-intelligence functions that every station has to, in effect, conduct, for example that establishes, perhaps puts an agent in a local security service to make sure that local security service is cooperating with us and not cooperating with the Soviets.

That is the counter-intelligence action. Is that something this organization would do as well, or would there be departmental counter-intelligence permitted?

Mr. Kirbow. If we're talking about duplicating in major proportions, major aspects of the FBI because they use their agents for dual purposes -- if he isn't out here law enforcing on a Friday afternoon, then he's doing whatever else he's qualified to do in this field.

Mr. Miller. That's part of the reason perhaps that some of the abuses have occurred. The grey area becomes very murky indeed because of the dual nature of the agent's activities, whereas the pursuit of foreign enemies, and rather than having the hand-offs of the situation that we've had in the past, that consolidation might remove that problem and it might upon examination lead to clarification of role and remove the kinds of grey areas that existed in the past. But it's only a suggestion to look into more thoroughly. It's nothing more than that and I think it has merit to at least look into it thoroughly.

Mr. diGenova. That's a specific recommendation that the new oversight committee consider that question.

Mr. Kirbow. I was just reminded by my colleagues that that recommendation is rather innocuous. They can do anything or not do anything.

I do think here again, as we suggested earlier we should remove the words during the next year because if they do everything that we have recommended, they won't have time to go to lunch the way things are going. Why don't we say that the oversight committee should consider this? I think that

TOP SECRET

you're now directing another committee to do many things within a short perid of time and they may have more important recommendations that they consider too.

Mr. Aaron. Now --

Senator Huddleston. I would like for our recommendations to be more specific, but I recognize that there are times when we can't.

The natural question is going to be to us as members what about recommending this study? Are you for it? Do you recommend it's a good thing or a bad thing? And our only response can be, well, we don't know. We just think we ought to look at it.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think in some cases we're really talking about some ideas that deserve a measure of legitimacy to be seriously considered. I mean, for example, we were talking earlier about the DCI being separated from the Agency. I think the way the Committee came out it was essentially to give legitimacy to the idea and its practicality or wisdom one might well question and look at further with the oversight committee.

I think that sort of falls in that same category.

Senator Huddleston. Would it help any to say that because of the nature of this kind of activity or the fact that it does lend itself to specific abuses, that they ought to do this?

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, the individuals, we don't have any great big record that there were rogue agents out there in the FBI doing this. There were rogue policies down at the headquarter

Now if you have the same kind of rogue policy in a new agency, you'll have the same end result.

So it doesn't accomplish anything for us to do this and point at the individuals because it was a principal.

Senator Huddleston. I didn't specify individuals. I just said it has happened and it's the area where it is susceptible.

Mr. Kirbow. Certainly the potential for abuse is great in this area and it should be studied carefully and probably urgently by the Subcommittee. I mean the new oversight committee.

Senator Hart. It wasn't potential, it was actual. I'd like to see the committee recommend strongly that they go in this direction on the basis of our 13 months of looking at the damn thing.

I don't know how long you have to study some problem before you do something about it.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I'm content to leave it as it is, taking out during the next year.

Ms. Culbreth. Did we add military services?

Mr. Miller. That's a good point.

Mr. Kirbow. All counter intelligence functions and lea

TOP SECRET

out the agencies individually. Leave out the FBI and the CIA.

Mr. Miller. I think naming them is a good idea.

Senator Huddleston. I guess this gets into the domestic task force also.

Mr. Aaron. Yes. The Committee will want to look at that.

Now if we go on to our next set of recommendations for covert action, we can be halfway through the report. That would be moving to page 48, where we will take up a number of recommendations related to covert action and paramilitary activities, which relate to what the stated purpose in law of these activities ought to be, what restrictions might be placed upon them, what review and accountability procedures might apply to them and what kind of controls from the Congress's standpoint might be placed on them from the standpoint of either the budget or some other aspects, particularly the paramilitary activities.

If we start with the first one on page 48 --

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, don't you think we ought to skim lightly. Much as we are all desirous to get to that halfway mark, I think we had better look at the text very lightly beginning on page 42. It wouldn't take very long to do that.

(Pause)

Senator Mathias. Any problem with the Angola reference? What kind of controversy are we going to raise? Do we have a record to support the

Indonesian reference?

Mr. Bader. Yes, we have a major study to support that. In fact, one of our biggest studies.

Mr. diGenova. That raises the issue, if I might say, of a question that I just want to know as a matter of information.

Have we resolved the question of whether or not the Agency agrees to the release of a second covert action paper when there was an agreement apparently reached before that there would be only one covert action paper and that was on Chile?

What's the status of negotiations now to release the Indonesia paper? The one you're talking about.

Wasn't there another detailed paper on a covert action paper that we were considering?

Mr. Aaron. There was a paramilitary paper on Laos which the Agency would like us to release and they are now reviewing with the view toward permitting us to do so.

Senator Mathias. What about the Indonesian?

Mr. Miller. That's classified.

Mr. Kirbow. And the one on Greece?

Mr. Miller. That's classified, too.

Mr. Kirbow. There is a classified record that will support this comment. There will not be a public record, but if you read this there, you could go look at it in our other report.

Senator Huddleston. Could we make some kind of a footnote

Mr. Bader. Senator, on the result of the Indonesian operation, the '57 operation is widely known but it was a failure. We went to support the Sumatra rebels and they failed and so did we.

This was when Pope was shot down.

Senator Huddleston. Back on page 44, this term sheep dip, is that sufficient?

Mr. Aaron. We had a long discussion of that, as a matter of fact. We'll be guided by the Committee.

Senator Huddleston. Sterilized equipment, what does that mean?

Mr. Aaron. That's equipment whose origin cannot be traced.

Senator Mathias. Whoever is the editor, I hope that some of these howevers that are used to begin sentences with will be put following the first verb instead of at the beginning of the sentence.

At the top of page 48 I think you should make that a little stronger, effective Congressional oversight, too, if they have the guts to use it. I mean if they don't use it, it isn't worth anything.

Mr. diGenova. Senator, would you move to put that language in there?

Senator Mathias. Well, I'm serious about it, although

I would like to be a little bit more liberal.

Mr. Aaron. If there is the will to exercise it.

Senator Mathias. Because you know, you head into the Executive Branch and there's an emotional appeal with the flag waving and the Star Spangled Banner being played on the Capitol steps and all that kind of thing. It takes some courage, and I don't think we ought to downplay the fact that, just the mere fact that you hold the power of the purse, that it makes it an easy power to exercise.

Senator Huddleston. All right, we're ready for recommendation number 1 on page 48.

Mr. Aaron. I'm going to ask Bill Bader to speak to these recommendations. He has done the major work on this. I'll just simply make one point with regard to the first one, and that is that in giving the Agency a charter and writing down some of the things that it is to do, including the conduct of covert operations, the concept would be to use the Title I device of trying to also set forth some of the purposes of these missions that the Agency would be given and in that context the general injunctions of --

The first recommenation would arise to be supplemented by the specifics that follow.

Mr. Bader. I trust the language is clear here. It is intended in the first instance to underline the view of the Committee that the use of covert action should be an exceptional act and not a routine procedure. It is also intended to underline the Committee position that covert action again in the exceptional nature should be used only when other means will not do.

And then it goes on to talk about that there should be procedures for seeing that there is both careful and thoughtful and thorough consideration of the general policies governing covert action and that these procedures include participation of policy makers at the highest level and be marked by accountability.

What we're intending to do here is to underline these various points, the exceptional nature, full accountability, thorough, systematic review.

Mr. Inderfurth. The first is legislation authorizing the conduct of covert actions makes clear. That seems to be sort of present legislation. There is none.

Mr. Aaron. It should say, recommendation 1, that the legislation authorizing the conduct of covert actions make clear that its purpose is to respond.

Mr. Maxwell. The problem is there isn't following from the charter section in the first set of recommendations the recommendation other than the very early one about NSC that a charter for the CIA authorizing the following functions should be drawn and that because there is not that recommendation in this section, I think Rick's comment is appropriate.

Mr. Inderfurth. Maybe just add a line that that charter should state that and then go into this.

Mr. Kirbow. Are you recommending a revision of the 1947 Act to change the charter of the CIA or to make it clearer or more specific, or do you want to simply indicate here that the Committee recommends that by statute, covert operations or covert action be authorized?

Mr. Inderfurth. I thin it should all be in one piece in the omnibus legislation.

Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think that in fact in the beginning and also in the section it simply says that the CIA is authorized to conduct, if you will, espionage and that it also ought to authorize. It also suggests that they're authorized to conduct a certain amount of counter-intelligence.

Mr. Bader. We can go now to page 49 where we have attempted here to lay out for the Subcommittee's consideration.

Mr. Maxwell. Just one comment on 48. The first clause after the semicolon, there may be a more artful way of saying that legislation should make sure that procedures be developed within the Executive Branch.

Is that designed to do that by legislation or is that a recommendation? We made some recommendations by statute to set up a mechanism, and there may be a more artful way of saying that.

Mr. Bader. Perhaps we can just go from that procedures be developed within the Executive Branch.

Mr. Miller. You can do this in various ways by requirement of reporting to the Congress.

Mr. Bader. On page 49, top of the page, we come to the hard problems here, and this section is addressed to the question of specific prohibitions on varieties of covert action. It notes that the Committee has after its investigation of alleged assassination attempts has recommended a statute to forbid such activities.

What we put before the Committee for consideration is a staff list of other possible recommendations. You can see the first bracketed one where there is some dispute as to whether that should be so included is all political assassinations That is to move from foreign leaders to all political assassinations, and we can come back to that. The others you can see are clear, and we would welcome comment.

Senator Mathias. What about religious assassiations?

Mr. Bader. That seems to be part of the problem, Senator, with using all political assassinations. It becomes a bit hard at that stage to be limited.

Mr. Davis. The Executive Order has all political assassinations. Theyare ahead of us.

Senator Huddleston. In the bill that we have prepared and introduced what does it say?

Mr. Bader. It does note that the Executive Order does take us a step further.

Senator Huddleston. No, we introduced an anti-assassination bill, didn't we?

Mr. Bader. Yes. That spoke to foreign leaders.

Mr. Maxwell. The bill itself, I think, would have covered foreign individuals as well as, because leadership was so broadly defined.

Part of the problem in the recommendation that came out at the staff level was that anything that we said about non-foreign leaders or domestic assassinations or the like implied that the Committee had investigated allegations about that and might imply that some credence should be given to charges that the Agency had been involved in attempts to assassinate people in the United States, and that was the problem of trying to word some prohibition that went beyond the bill that has already been introduced by the Senators.

Mr. Kirbow. Or of some lesser military-type individual in a foreign country. You know, assassinating a sergeant is pretty bad as far as he is concerned but it would not necessarily be political.

Senator Huddleston. What about peace time? Should that be in there?

Mr. Kirbow. I think our bill distinguished between peace time and war time, Mr. Chairman.

End 4B

I question whether or not having done that before, that political assassinations need to be discussed further as a prohibition at all.

Mr. Maxwell. Perhaps if the Senators think it is desirable to say something, the staff could get language which would not imply in any way that the Committee has found credible evidence that the CIA was engaged in activities beyond this, but which would reflect their desire not to; their desire to make clear that the CIA could not do that.

Mr. Kirbow. It's a moral finding that it isn't necessarily based on wrongdoing in the past.

Senator Mathias. It's repetitive but that's all right for emphasis.

Mr. Kirbow. We could work on the language and show it to you again.

Senator Mathias. What about the second one?

Mr. Aaron. I'm not quite clear on this first one. We will draft some language that makes clear that we did not find any evidence of anything other than what we've found?

Mr. Kirbow. That we didn't find any evidence that would indicate that they had engaged in these other types of assassination activities but that we would prohibit it anyway, other than political leaders. In that, though, we considered that major or colonel over in one of, in the health alteration committee thing. We considered that. We can make this clear and show you the additional languages because I think that the

TOP SECRET

was concern that it not indicate that we had found some evidence that we had just not revealed.

Mr. Bader. Perhaps it would be helpful, Senator, but at the same time the Administration has come forward with language of all political assassinations, which seems to me would indicate that it's not a question of a finding.

Senator Huddleston. We ought to recommend passage of the bill that we have submitted, if nothing else.

Mr. Kirbow. And continue to support that legislation. I think you could just add right on to this. We recommended it then and the Committee continues to support enactment of such legislation.

Mr. Aaron. Number 2 begins the Committee has already recommended following its investigation of alleged assassination attempts, a statute to forbid such activities. The Committee continues to endorse that.

Mr. Maxwell. It could say the Committee also endorses or recommends that by statute the present Executive Order in regard to permitting any political assassination be enacted in peace time.

Senator Huddleston. What about democratically elected governments?

Senator Mathias. Why don't we do both? Why don t we say the Committee reiterates its support of that position and the Presidential directive? They may not be exactly parallel, but we support both.

Mr. Aaron. Would that include supporting the Executive Order provision being in the law or just supporting?

Senator Mathias. And the Presidential -- why don't we be ambiguous?

Mr. Kirbow. We endorse the concept.

Mr. Davis. If they're not different.

Mr. diGenova. There is a recommendation here that other types of covert action which should be banned, and since we're talking about a statute which we have submitted which bans it we would then ban by statute, recommend banning by statute all political assassinations which would enlarge the President's Executive Order into a law and then the rest of these just assuming for the sake of argument that the Committee wanted to do that, it would be a recommendation for legislation which would ban all peacetime political assassinations.

Mr. Kirbow. The staff could work on that language a little and get it back to you.

I think we know what you want to do here, don't you, David?

Mr. Aaron. Yes. I think we can make a fix, just make the point that the political assassinations point is putting in law what the Executive Order is as proposed by the Executive Order or as provided by the Executive Order.

Senator Huddleston. All right. It's then to overthrow democratically elected governments.

Mr. Inderfurth. I might mention that Cyrus Vance went beyond this. He said all interference in the electoral processes of a country should be banned, which goes beyond this.

Senator Mathias. Perhaps that was some subliminal influence on me, but I've written down efforts to subvert a valid electoral process.

It seems to me that that is better because when you talk about overthrowing a democratically elected government, God knows what that is. And I don't know that you're really going to know what a valid electoral process is. The Republic of Venice, where they have a very limited electorate, elected those. But nonetheless, it was their constitution and it wasn't very democratic. But whatever it is, and this would be in line with George Cannon's testimony also.

We finally have acknowledged that the Soviet Union has a legislature of sorts and we acknowledge their electoral process, although we don't think much of it.

Ms. Culbreth. Would your use of the term subvert, would you intend to include within that preventing the CIA from any kind of political or propaganda in connection with the elections in another country or any kind of support to one of the candidates that we might think was a better candddate?

Mr. Kirbow. Well, you said results of --

Ms. Culbreth. But could you not subvert the results by influencing the carrying out of the election?

Senator Huddleston. Well, we subvert our own elections every time we run.

Senator Mathias. The original suggestion was efforts to overthrow democratically elected governments. I mean both of these -- efforts to subvert the results of a valid electoral process.

Senator Huddleston. I think that's all right.

Mr. Inderfurth. In a sense what is a democratically elected government?

Moynihan says that in the U.N. there are 24, so in a sense we could actually list them.

Mr. diGenova. What about, what is a valid electoral process? Whatever it is in each country? I mean the communists have one party and that's a valid electoral process in that country.

Senator Mathias. This would be Cannon's advice.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think we have to recognize the right of another country to have their electoral process and it would be valid if someone in that country were attempting to circumvent their established constitutional processes.

Mr. Maxwell. The qualifier in the Senator's proposal was democratic, so that at least in some way it restricts the notion of a dictator.

Senator Huddleston. Self-determination maybe should be

TOP SECRET

in there.

Mr. Miller. What cases would this prohibit? In our actions in the past it would prohibit Chile. Iran --

Mr. Kirbow. That stage of the Chile operation.

Mr. Miller. Guatemala.

Senator Huddleston. It would not prohibit Angola.

Mr. Aaron. It would prohibit some things that transpired in Iraq.

Mr. Miller. It would prohibit the actions in Italy, wouldn't it, and France?

Senator Huddleston. It depends on the term subversion. We were just assisting one side.

Mr. Kirbow. Assisting the head of an election during the election process does not appear to be the intent of the Committee.

Mr. Aaron. I wouldn't think that what is going on in Portugal insofar as we know that that is would come under this prohibition.

Mr. Miller. So it would really affect the cases like Iran, Guatemala, and Chile.

Mr. Aaron. And Indonesia.

Senator Huddleston. Cuba?

Mr. Aaron. No.

Senator Huddleston. I think you'all might [illegible] on that a little bit, but I think that's pretty close.

TOP SECRET

Mr. Inderfurth. But just to be a devil's advocate for a moment, we don't want to insert then, using your language, Senator, the efforts to influence or subvert the results of a valid electoral process?

Senator Mathias. That may be too short a leash.

Mr. Inderfurth. But I think that's a question the Committee has to address. It would be a very short leash.

Senator Huddleston. Well, there are different ways to influence, and there may be a proper way to influence.

Mr. Inderfurth. If there were a proper, then perhaps one could define the improper way, influencing by passing money, covert propaganda, and that type of thing.

Mr. Kirbow. If the Committee's intention is after the person is elected and you don't want to prevent that kind of person being put into office by any means, then you do it here.

If you do not intend as a committee to preclude using the press or using other things to influence the outcome of the election, then we should be solid on that and stay out of that area. But it's up to the committee to decide.

Mr. Bader. This language speaks to subverting the results, not influencing the outcome.

Mr. Kirbow. And he says that was his intent.

Senator Huddleston. This does not preclude us from getting involved as we did in Italy.

TOP SECRET

Mr. Bader. Or in Portugal?

Senator Huddleston. That's not a subversion of the process, that's an assistance.

Senator Mathias. That's participation in the process.

Mr. Inderfurth. What about after an election but prior to the formation of a coalition government?

Senator Mathias. I would think that would be subverting, if you get in there and say, well, we are worried about who these people have elected.

I didn't know it was General Haig until this afternoon but I was aware that some American official had made a threat to Mitterand that he would be in trouble if he were elected Prime Minister and attempted to bring some radical leftists into the French Cabinet.

Now it seems to me that that is a threat to subvert the French electoral process and if in fact we carried out that threat I think that that would be prohibited by this language.

Mr. Aaron. I take it the word subvert goes to covert activities. In other words, if General Haig said that privately but didn't mean it in terms of covert action, he just said the United States government will --

Senator Mathias. I think the President of the United States or the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense might very well stand up in front of the television cameras and might say, look, if you put a communist in the French Cabinet

TOP SECRET

and under the parliamentary system you give him access to NATO's secrets, then there's going to be hell to pay, and we're telling you right now.

I don't think that's prohibited.

But if we shadow men around and catch him in some compromising personal position and use the photographs to blackmail him, or anything of that sort --

Mr. Bader. That's a covert action project.

Senator Huddleston. There's no question that this whole matter of internal intervention in another country --

Mr. Kirbow. Senator, whatever you say here is going to be one of the highest considerations given by the Full Committee.

Senator Huddleston. I feel there ought to be some restrictions and constraint on our interference in the internal operation of the government.

Mr. Aaron. The next one, support for his beliefs or other internal security -- other security groups which engage in torture.

Senator Huddleston. Don't we have some legislation to that effect?

Mr. Aaron. There are amendments regarding foreign aid. Now this is open foreign aid. We're talking about covert assistance programs.

Mr. diGenova. This doesn't make sense to me.

TOP SECRET

Mr. Kirbow. Which language in torture.

Senator Mathias. Can I make a semantic suggestion here that we try to bring this in line with the language in the Constitution, cruel and unusual punishment, because I think this really reflects, if it's going to mean anything, we ought to be reflecting our national ethic in both of these, both in subverting the results of a valid electoral process--

Senator Huddleston. Except you get into the question of capital punishment.

Mr. Maxwell. There's another problem and that is one of the things that the torture is engaged in is before a person has been judged to be guilty of a crime, someone who is being tortured in an interrogation, that person would not be subject to cruel and unusual punishment but the systematic violation of human rights or some other --

Senator Mathias. That's a phrase, though, with which Americans have been familiar since 1787, and it seems to me it has some value.

Senator Hart. The problem is we don't give serious thought to the way we treat prisoners in this country.

Senator Mathias. Yes, I think that's a problem. I think that's a problem in this whole thing.

Someone once said at the time that the Italian payments were exposed, you know, the Russians do this all the time and nobody blinks at it. And of course the difference is we go

TOP SECRET

around and preaching all over the world about our high ethical standards and then when we are shown that we don't live up to our own standards, that's what brings us the retribution.

But I still think that we ought to notwithstanding that this is an opportunity for some linkage with the Constitution. But I don't press the point. I just offer it.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think this is something we should all give some thought to in the next few hours.

Mr. Kirbow. If we are going to do that, may I suggest that here we talk about support for police or internal security forces.

The remainder of that sentence shouldn't we apply it so that it is the policy of the country involved? Otherwise you're talking about aid in a covert manner governed by maybe an inadvertent, without authority type series of exposures of torture and whatnot, and you cut off the aid to a country.

Mr. Aaron. Can I speak to that point?

I think that Charley raises an interesting example and we have sort of that kind of situation today in Brazil where it is difficult to ascertain whether it is the policy of the government or whether the internal security forces which are very fragmented among the military and the states and what have you, whether these internal security forces and police are just on their own

Mr. diGenova. Should it matter?

TOP SECRET

Mr. Aaron. I think this is the question. It goes to the point not of assistance to the government in general or even covertly, but assistance to these particular forces, and that I think does narrow it down to the problem.

Senator Huddleston. What kind of support do we give the security forces?

Mr. Kirbow. Training.

Mr. Aaron. We have in the past, we can give them technical training, electronic devices.

Mr. Kirbow. A whole spectrum except for U.S. military support.

Mr. diGenova. Some of the proprietaries were used for exactly that purpose, to provide training and secure procurement and sale and loan of devices which ultimately found their way into the hands of foreign torturers.

We certainly don't deprive the Agency of any legitimate source of intelligence because they themselves claim that they have never engaged in this activity knowingly and don't want to.

They say they don't want anything to do with this type of activity and they say they don't want to be involved with internal police forces that conduct this type of activity.

They have said recently that they have discontinued those sorts of liaisons, so to prohibit them by banning it seems to me to say fine, we agree with you and we will do it.

TOP SECRET

Mr. Aaron. What occurs to me is that it would be helpful to have a finding on this point.

Mr. diGenova. That's the next issue I was going to raise. We don't write anything about this any place in the report.

Senator Huddleston. Does the Agency have a directive to that effect that they have discontinued or are discontinuing that we can refer to and say we approve of it?

Mr. Inderfurth. As well as in the Chile covert action study there is discussion of liaison with the current Chilean internal security forces and that the CIA was saying, well, we want to talk to them but we don't want to be involved in what they're doing and we want to try to stop them from their practices of torture and the rest.

So I mean that's something we can look to as a basis for our findings.

Mr. diGenova. There's also a parallel with the drug thing.

Mr. Aaron. Senator, shall we try to see if we can come back with some language that tries to work in the Constitutional point? I must say I personally have a little difficulty figuring out how you turn this around to try to apply to what the police do?

Senator Mathias. Let's think about it.

Senator Huddleston. Let's get back at 7:30. That's a whole two hours and a half.

(Whereupon, at 5:00 p.m., the hearing in the above mentioned matter was recessed, to reconvene at 7:30 o'clock p.m. of the same day.)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10125

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-31

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/10/1976
PAGES : 78

SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY
COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/22/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10125
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-31

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/10/76
PAGES : 78
SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Vol. 2 OF 3

R2829

The United States Senate

324-4

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Wednesday, March 10, 1976

Washington, D.C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

FOREIGN AND MILITARY SUBCOMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Wednesday, March 10, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:45 o'clock p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Walter D. Huddleston presiding.

Present: Senators Huddleston (presiding), Hart of Colorado and Mathias.

Staff: William G. Miller, Staff Director, and David Aaron, Joseph diGenova, Lynn Davis, William Bader, Elizabeth Culbreath, Charles Kirbow, Rick Inderfurth, Pat Shea, Elliot Maxwell and Al Quanbeck, Professional Staff Members, And then the question is whether or not there is a prohibition on printing in the English language.

Mr. Bader. And as I heard the consensus this morning, we would not move to that recommendation for a prohibition. I did not hear whether on the distribution this would be by law, though I took it it was to be by law, though I can be corrected on that. I don't think we addressed that this morning.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, on these that we considered to be rather -- that we have a fairly light record on or that we are not too sure what the future holds, one of the members that I rode over with on the car suggested that perhaps in those instances we could recommend fairly strongly whatever we want the followon people to do to ensure that the recommendation does not create havoc within the Agency or does not leave the rights of citizens unprotected.

But that is not a cop out. It is something that you frequently do, say, let us reserve this for the permanent oversight committee or for whatever other group. We may have all the information we need.

Senator Huddleston. Let them make the determination whether or not it should be a statute.

Mr.Kirbow. Determine whether in the law whether it is working all right under the set of regulations.

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, may I say in this instance in the publishing trade there is no lack of record? The evidence

P R O C E E D I N G S

Senator Huddleston. I call the Committee to order.

Mr. Aaron. I believe Bill Bader had the temerity to summarize where we stand.

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, where I think we are at the moment is taking the three major issues before the Subcommittee in the order they were presented, and discussed this morning, the first being the academic issue, and as I heard the Subcommittee this morning, then I will have another go at the options, give enough options in the option paper and bring it back before the Committee for a further look before we go on.

Senator Huddleston. By Friday.

Mr. Bader. By Friday, without question.

I think by this time we will all have -- we will try to include a positive option, that is to say, to approve if not applaud the expanded efforts of FRD to undertake these activities, or at least to endorse them.

Now, going to the second was the covert use of books and publishing houses. We discussed two recommendations: one which I believe here the Committee has agreed to, and that is a prohibition on the distribution or subsidy of any books, magazines or other publications not attributed to the CIA inside the United States.

Senator Huddleston. I think we can all accept that, can't we.

and inquiry into it has been thorough, and I think we know this well. There is no dispute from the Agency.

Senator Huddleston. Well, is the law inconsistent with the statute on the information service?

Mr. Bader. It is the same thing. I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, that this would be by law, by statute.

Senator Huddleston. On the publication.

Mr. Bader. On the publication.

Senator Mathias. I would support that.

Senator Huddleston. I think Gary Hart would also, so I think we will make that recommendation, that this one on the academics is the one we are not sure of.

Mr. Bader. That's the one we would go forward with, and now we are moving to -- I would also reiterate that in our session the other night, I took it as agreement that the recommendation by statute the CIA should be prohibited from making operational use of all educational and cultural grantees of all U.S. Government sponsored programs, this was the issue which was raised of government funded programs such as the Fulbright program.

Senator Huddleston. And that's either already a regulation or a directive or something to that effect.

Mr. Aaron. Certain categories.

Mr. Bader. Certain categories.

Mr. Kirbow. That is brand new ground.

Mr. diGenova. The John McCloy exceptions to that rule, they are the only ones that are protected.

Mr. Aaron. That justifies Charles' view that there are some similarities between Ford Foundation and Government sponsored activities.

Mr. Bader. Where our discussion was left before lunch was on the question of the covert use of U.S. journalists and media institutions, and as it was laid out, it was indicated that the CIA's intended internal prohibition on the use of the media extended to the internal prohibitions on the use, operational use of individuals, American and foreign, who were accredited to American media organizations.

As I heard it this morning, what we were discussing and moving to was to extend that prohibition to cover all American individuals and media organizations, and that the question then was whether this would be recommended to be something done in law or a recommendation, or an insistence, if you will, to the Agency that it further amend its internal directives, its 50-10, to put all media personnel, American media personnel on the prohibited list, and that is I think where we were.

Senator Huddleston. I think that's an accurate statement. That's where we were.

I had expressed a thought that I thought that it ought to be expanded to include all, but we should hold off on the statute business for the time being.

Senator Mathias. My role here seems to be the Devil's advocate.

Senator Huddleston. Good.

Senator Mathias. There is no question about the writing American press or the value in print domestically. Maybe the role, any legitimate role that news men could, journalists, writers could fulfill is available through the information agencies, USIA and groups of that sort.

So does anybody know whether there is any real need for allowing some latitude, which is not covered by situations that can be envisioned under USIA or other programs?

Mr. Kirbow. Well, Senator, the one that I discussed earlier that I probably didn't make my point well because no one seemed to have picked it up, is we do, by the words here, if I understand Mr. Bader, prohibit an American citizen living in Brussels and working for a local newspaper there from having anything to do with the CIA.

Senator Huddleston. No we don't, do we?

You mean by his extension?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. But not by --

Mr. Kirbow. But wasn't that what you wanted to put in the law, that you didn't know if you wanted --

Senator Mathias. This is the point I wanted to raise here.

Mr. Kirbow. That kind of relationship is something that we should stay away from because I don't see any harm in it, nor do I think the record demonstrates any harm in it. I don't see -- I don't know how in the world this person doing that taints the minds of the American reading public, which is apparently what you are trying -- you're not trying to protect the newsman. You are trying to protect the reader who doesn't know that what he's getting is being spoonfed to him from the CIA, and I don't know why we would be so concerned about protecting newsmen from working, or prohibiting them from working, because I think they have a right to do that as American citizens, just as they do to work with the Department of Defense or any other agency.

Mr. Bader. You would then rescind the Agency's standing prohibition?

Mr. Kirbow. I just don't think you ever prohibit it in law.

Mr. diGenova. Are you talking about an affiliated, accredited journalist, because that's what the Agency regulation deals with. It doesn't deal with an American citizen. It deals with an accredited person, whether he is a foreign national or an American.

Mr. Bader. To an American media organization.

Mr. diGenova. But that's not the example Charles gave you.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, perhaps I misunderstand the extension that you, your full recommendation.

Do you want to go beyond where the administration is in their position?

Mr. Bader. I am recommending to go beyond where the Administration is at this stage, to extend the operational prohibition on the part of CIA to use American -- Americans in the media --

Mr. Kirbow. Wherever located.

Mr. Bader. Where they are using them undercover, at this stage, to the extent that it is a cover proposition.

Senator Huddleston. Even if they are in foreign media?

Mr. Bader. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. And even though all of their activities are related to foreign; they are not writing for American news services.

Mr. Bader. Alternately, they could be with American media organizations.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is a single shred of evidence on our record that that is in any way wrongdoing or in any way adversely affects the rights of American citizens. Clearly it will prohibit or could prohibit in the future the proper use of an individual that could be essential to the intelligence collection processes of the CIA, and it singles out a specific agency which is not doing any harm to the American citizenry, and says no, you cannot do this because you happen to be a secret organization.

Senator Mathias. If I wanted to do it, Charlie, I think I could work out a scheme. I would hire a prominent American columnist to go and live in Paris, as Art Buchwald did, for example.

Mr. Kirbow. And to pick off his columns and run them in the New York Times.

Senator Mathias. And run them in the Paris Trib first, and then let the domestic press pick him up.

Mr. Kirbow. But if he's in the Paris Trib, that's an affiliated U.S. --

Mr. Aaron. Well, suppose he writes for the Financial Times?

Senator Mathias. Well, you could work out an echo program if you wanted.

Senator Huddleston. Well, the basic point, instead of picking instances, it seems to me, is whether or not as an official policy of the United States Government we want an institution such as the press with all it means and all it is supposed to be in American with its constitutional provisions and whatever, to be subverted to the secret, clandestine operation that it can; Anytime we put any prohibition anywhere, we are eliminating somebody as a potential agent. You can't use that as a guideline.

Mr. Kirbow. These people are not necessarily subverted.

Senator Huddleston. I'm talking about the institution of the free press being subverted, not the individual.

Mr. Kirbow. I'll extend that one further. I don't see how using them for cover, which has no direct effect, like the example I guess you gave, Senator, of a vice president of a bureau of some sort who has nothing to do with the writing or editing or anything; he is the business head of the operation just like any other corporation. This thing extends to that.

Senator Huddleston. He may have something do with the selection of the people who do write.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, if you could give us an abuse that we are trying to correct, or some reason for it?

Mr. Bader. It's not a question of abuse, it's a question of the use, the operational use of an institution such as the press for operational purposes.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, explain then, and perhaps I'm going -- explain the sanctity of the press if it is not to protect an uninformed reader from having his mind tainted by the relationship. What is the sanctity of the press as an organization?

It is not sanctity like the church and state. I just don't see the record for this.

Senator Huddleston. Well, the clergy and the press I think are institutions.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, I think the clergy and maybe the academic, like you say, that teaches the student directly, but a businessman who happens to have elected going into the business of running a newspaper or a magazine, to be singled out and say you as a patriotic American are proscribed against doing any business, and if you are going to do it with an agency, you should do it with the whole United States Government. I don't see how we can single out the CIA and not single out military or FBI.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think the domestic group will have -- may well have some recommendations regarding the FBI's covert use of American media.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, domestic media, obviously.

Mr. Aaron. I would like to say, to take Charles' example of an American working for a foreign press, and what the problem is. I think the problem is that you have two kinds of problems with the press. One is the fact, if it is operating domestically, if it is working for American media institutions, it is clear that they are subject to some manipulation or at least questionable manipulation, and there are issues in people's minds as to its integrity.

Now, the question goes beyond that to what about people who might be working for some foreign -- American journalists, American writers or what have you, working for foreign media institutions. There you have a somewhat more extended situation. But it seems to me that what you have is the possibility of the American press getting discredited, having problems of being able to perform its normal functions in the world and performing in the United States because it is part of a clandestine intelligence organization.

Mr. Kirbow. Don't you think that's an individual right that a person has the right to exercise both ways, instead of one way?

Mr. Aaron. Charles, what I think I have told the Committee, I have a real problem with the concept of the American people having the right to spy, somehow, and these prohibitions don't go to what people are allowed to do on the outset. They go to what the Government is allowed to do.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, let's take a different kind of example.

What would happen if in some way -- and it's not, I think, impossible to imagine -- an American citizen was writing full time for the Communist Party paper in Italy or Portugal or France.

Now, that obviously would be covered by the example that Bill has provided as a prohibition.

There are two questions. One is whether the person has any real operational use that you want to preserve, and second, whether it goes to the question that David presents, which is the possible contamination of the American press, which seems a difficult extension in that example, as well as the possibility of distortion, the flowback problem in America.

And the second problem seems to be, with an example like that, is that it seems to -- there is very little stock in the argument, because the argument about distortion of what goes on in foreign countries and people's perceptions is at the heart of the question of whether the CIA or any government agency should be engaged in- propaganda, because it is quite possible the propaganda gets picked up in the same way, and the question is obviously of line drawing: how do you want to draw the line.

It strikes me that there may be better ways to draw the line than the suggested prohibition that Bill has for any American, regardless of status, or who they write for or what they are doing.

Mr. Kirbow. By having citizenship as an American --

Mr. Bader. Well, you misunderstood me. I was putting out the various possibilities.

Let's turn to the text for just a moment and maybe that will help.

First turn to 61. Let's try to get some idea of what the problem is before we get to the semantics of it. All right, just let me go through this, then we'll see what is actually being recommended here.

I have confused you, obviously, by giving a series of possibilities, not what the recommendations are.

"Ten U.S. news organizations and five U.S. publishing houses provide cover for CIA agents abroad. Four of the organizations do not know that they provide this cover."

Then there are some examples.

Mr. Kirbow. Meaning management or individual?

Mr. Bader. Management.

Mr. Kirbow. At any level.

Mr. Bader. At any level.

Mr. Kirbow. All right.

Mr. Bader. Then there are some examples of the kinds of relationships that the CIA officer engages in intelligence collection under cover as a roving international news correspondent, a CIA officer under cover as a European representative of an American company while working as a stringer for a United States publication engages in intelligence collection and covert action. In this case the company is aware of the CIA relationship while the publication is not. Bona fide journalists who regularly provide the CIA with intelligence, some are paid regularly while others are not. In one case the journalist is apparently not aware that the U.S. embassy official to whom he is providing information is actually a CIA officer.

Now, what the recommendation here on 64, or the bracketed recommendations -- and I'm sorry I created this situation by giving various options -- by statute the CIA should be prohibited from using American media organizations for cover. That is the extent of it.

What is the trouble, Joe?

Mr. diGenova. That seems to be somewhat -- that seems to be a back-off from what the Agency prohibits as well. I mean do you want to make a recommendation saying that the Agency's prohibition against using Americans who are accredited --

Mr. Bader. No.

This is the additive. The recommendation here is to take the Agency's prohibitions which go to the question of American and foreign journalists, accredited to American media organizations, and extend it to what is not covered under those prohibitions, which is the use of these American media organizations for cover purposes.

Mr. Maxwell. Is it clear that people who are in media organizations are not accredited to those organizations?

Mr. Aaron. If they were, then they would be covered. If they are accredited journalists, then they would not.

Mr. Maxwell. So the issue is whether individuals who don't write --

Mr. Aaron. But may edit.

Mr. Maxwell. But may edit.

Ms. Culbreath. Or may type it up.

Mr. Aaron. Or may type it up.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, is this the same point that we're talking about less than 25 people, where you are going to make a statutory prohibition against use of all people in that category because on page 61 it says, "of the 65 Americans employed by the CIA in the media field, only a little over one third are journalists; another third are CIA agents operating under media cover, and the remaining individuals are either employed as CIA media proprietaries abroad or are propaganda writers and consultants."

So we are really talking about making a major prohibition against a segment of our society where at the present time there is less than 25 people who have any direct contact with the reading mind, apparently.

Senator Hart of Colordado. I think, Charlie, it's called a principle. If it was only one person, you've still got the problem. I don't think it is the quantity.

Ms. Davis. Bill, in your examples on 61, the first one at the bottom, would that now be covered under your prohibition? CIA officer engages in intelligence collection under cover as a roving international news correspondent?

Mr. Bader. I can't remember from the text here whether the man is accredited or not.

If he is accredited, it would be covered.

Ms. Davis. If not, he is not additionally covered by your prohibition.

Senator Huddleston. This does not extend to the example that you gave, Charlie.

Mr. Kirbow. No, sir, it doesn't here.

Mr. Bader. Only if he is affiliated with that group.

Mr. Kirbow. His affiliation covers anybody who is an American citizen is forever and hereafter would be prohibited, if it goes into the statute, from dealing.

Mr. diGenova. That's only one of the possibilities.

Mr. Kirbow. That's one of those recommendations based on investigation.

Mr. Bader. I wasn't recommending that. I was saying that was one of the possibilities of the whole list.

Senator Huddleston. But the recommendation at the top of 64 doesn't cover an American citizen who is using the foreign media as cover.

Mr. Bader. This would not cover an American citizen who is, let's say, is working for Stompe, or Le Monde, and who is not accredited, and at the same time is not accredited to an American media organization.

It does not cover an American citizen who is a stringer to a Latin American newspaper unless he is accredited to an American media organization.

Mr. Kirbow. Let me try one more time, then, to state the position of not Senator Tower in this case, but another Senator, as I indicated, spoke to me on this very subject, and indicate to you that we not do to harm or to prevent the use by the agency of certain people unless in some way that use affects the rights and/or in some vague way affects the mental processes to the detriment of the American citizenry, that we don't concern ourselves with passing laws to protect the person who reads something that these people do. If you do this, you open that can of worms which gets you into a prohibition against any work in the press or elsewhere in a propaganda fashion.

Now, the Committee may decide that propaganda is in fact something that we should prohibit by law, but doing this piecemeal like this, it does just exactly that. I see nothing in our record that indicates that the use of certain of these people overseas or for cover in any way -- there is not any evidence that it has adversely affected the rights of the citizens of the United States. There is a potential for abuse in practically anything secret and covert.

Senator Huddleston. I don't believe the recommendation at the top of page 64 violates what you have just said.

Mr. Maxwell. I would not think that --

Mr. Kirbow. Well, it says, Mr. Chairman, that by statute, by statute, which means by law, the CIA should be prohibited from using American media organizations for cover. We apparently have 65 people, a portion of which are being used for cover, and apparently they consider them to be an essential asset, or they wouldn't be using them.

Is that correct, Mr. Bader?

Mr. Bader. The CIA?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Mr. Bader. I would assume that they would have extended their prohibition to this, or on the other hand one could argue I don't know what their motives were. It could have been they felt that this, the first step they took was the one that was dealing with what the public was demanding.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, I really don't see anything in our record or any evidence that they have given us or anything other than a staff position on this which we are trying to sell the Committee that this is a harmful procedure.

Senator Huddleston. What this does is extends beyond the practice of journalists to any other person, be it an executive or clerk or typist or whatever, on the assumption that you can't be a little bit pregnant. If the agency is going to be subverted anywhere, not the agency, if the institution of the press is, that it is going to be subverted.

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, the Agency has accepted the basic principle, because it has removed from its list of operational assets a rather larger number than this would call for.

Mr. Kirbow. But if I hear correctly what you are saying then, we are out to protect the American media from being made pregnant by the CIA and not worrying at all about the reading public or the other, but just the media.

Senator Huddleston. The assumption is if the media of the press is subverted, that it will affect the citizens, or they will suffer.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, in the interest of expedition, I move the passage of these three recommendations.

Senator Huddleston. All right. Let's see what the three are.

Mr. Aaron. Well, let me summarize the first one. I think we have agreed the first is that the prohibition on distribution of CIA funded, supported, subsidized and so forth, that that be prohibited within the United States.

Mr. Inderfurth. Printed.

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me. Not printed.

Mr. Aaron. The word "printed" dropped out for the following reason. One, it makes it easier to prohibit the distribution if you don't identify where the printing is taking place, and secondly, while there is no printing going on here, the question really goes to distribution. I think that was the concurrence of the Committee.

The second point is that the prohibitions of -- that the Agency now has upon itself, be made law.

Mr. diGenova. On the use of media personnel and institutions?

Mr. Aaron. On the use of media personnel and institutions, and the third point is that it be extended to say by statute the CIA should be prohibited from using American media organizations for cover.

Senator Huddleston. Well, the style of this ought to be changed, it seems to me, because one of the recommendations, instead of listed under recommendations, is the last paragraph on 63, is that correct?

Mr. Aaron. Yes, that would be picked up as a recommendation, that is correct.

Mr. diGenova. Plus the other one, which is not on 64.

Mr. Aaron. Well, the one on 64, the bottom one comes out.

end 1a
begin 1b

Senator Huddleston. Right.

Senator Mathias. Before you leave that, as a matter of record, I am requested to note an exception on behalf of minority.

Mr. Aaron. The second section was the covert use of American clergy and laity. This is on Page 64.

Senator Huddleston. Was that included in your motion?

Senator Hart of Colorado. No.

Mr. Aaron. I think that covers the recommendation.

Mr. Maxwell. They hadn't discussed whether it should be made public.

Senator Huddleston. Well, if it becomes a statute, it becomes public .

Mr. Inderfurth. But the statute will remain secret.

Mr. Aaron. No, we are ready to move on it, to covert use of American clergy and laity.

Senator Huddleston. Well, the covert action is with the noted exception, those recommendations go before the Committee.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Just for clarification, Mac, is that the entire minority or what?

Senator Mathias. No, it's only one member.

Senator Huddleston. Now we are ready to deal with the clergy.

Mr. Aaron. The point here is, I think, the CIA takes the position that it has no covert arrangements with American clergy and laity, and that this will continue as policy, but they have relationship of a clandestine character which don't involve remuneration.

Senator Huddleston. Incidentally, is that a new policy?

Mr. Bader. Yes, as of February 10, 1976.

Mr. Aaron. It's pretty short. This is the sum total of our findings, and it explains it better than I can.

Mr. Bader. This has not been, obviously you can see, Senator and members of the Committee, from the text that the Committee has found the CIA has a total of 14 covert arrangements involving direct operational use of 21, that should be religious persons, and I found it very difficult in this to properly or respectively address the category here, whether they are American clergy, regligious persons, or what. It is a term of art I really haven't quite been able to deal with.

As of February 10th, the CIA announced that the CIA has not secret paid or contractual relationships with an American clergyman or missionary. This practice will be continued as a matter of policy.

Senator Huddleston. I think we ought to clarify that religious persons. That would include Chuck Colson.

Mr. Bader. The issue here is, we are saying in the first instance, we welcome this policy which they intend to put into their operational prohibitions, and the recommendation that we bring to you is a very simple one, in addition to that, is that it be extended from contractual to all operational relationships, paid and unpaid.

Senator Huddleston. By statute.

Mr. Bader. By statute.

Mr. Inderfurth. May I ask a question here?

How does this conform to Senator Hatfield's bill on this?

Mr. Bader. I don't know.

Mr.Inderfurth. I don't know. I'll get a copy of it, but I think to the degree possible, if the committee recommends by statute a prohibition, it should be made to conform to that because he has put in a great deal of work on that, or without knowing the facts, I might add.

Mr. Kirbow. The other thing is the Committee may want to support legislation that is already pending.

Mr. Maxwell. What is the nature of the covert relationship with religious persons now in effect?

Senator Mathias. A few patriotic volunteers.

Mr. Bader. Patriotic volunteers, at least one of them, from the operational records.

I think, too, they have what is called a memorandum of agreement which is not contractual in the sense that it involves paid or unpaid.

Mr. Maxwell. What are they doing?

Mr. Bader. They collect intelligence information.

Mr. Kirbow. What is a religious person, Mr. Bader, as they use it or as you use it here?

Would that mean the organ player that is a civilian who travels with a preacher and plays the organ?

Mr. Bader. No. It is intended to be the American clergy, although I certainly would lean on whoever can tell me what a proper term is to define American clergy.

Senator Mathias. What about this fellow around, Maharaja Rani?

Senator Huddleston. I'll think on your defintion.

Mr. Bader. I think we'll have to have a footnote as to what American clergy may be.

Mr. diGenova. American clergy or missionaries, certainly.

Senator Huddleston. Well, missionary gets a little fuzzy.

Mr. Bader. The Agency uses "American clergy or missionary."

Senator Huddleston. It has to be a person whose primary occupation is for a religious order or sect or something, it seems to me.

Mr. Kirbow. How about the Mormon youth who do their things overseas?

Would this take care of them and prevent them from getting gobbled up?

Senator Huddleston. I think that's a good question. They receive no pay.

Mr. Kirbow. They are not church people, per se. It is part of their religion, doing the service. You see, this gets tobe a rather broad extension, or you leave out certain things if you are not careful with your definition.

Senator Huddleston. I think there may be somewhere in our litany a definition. I am not sure.

Mr. Inderfurth. I would imagine that Senator Hatfield's bill, a definition of what clergy -- that would be spelled out. There are copies coming over now.

Mr. Bader. Well, I think maybe we will get a copy of the definition of clergy or missionary. Maybe that will clear that up.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think, you know, some churches send people over for a very short period of time. They are lay people, really, but while they are there, they are there more or less under the auspices of the church group.

Mr. Kirbow. At least a local church frequently sponsored them.

Senator Huddleston. I don't think you can prohibit all those kinds of people. I think some kind of definition should include the primary occupation of clergy, clergy itself.

Senator Mathias. Well, why don't we commit to staff for the moment the question of definition?

Senator Huddleston. I think we will have to do that.

Okay. Are we ready to move on that?

Mr. Aaron. The recommendation is that whomever or however we define them -- and that's obviously an important question, that they either be prohibited by statute. The other alternative is to simply prohibit any further or recommend the prohibition of any further CIA recruitment in this field.

Ms. Culbreath. The way this is worded, this would get anybody who is a lay member of a church. You have got recruitments of American clergy or laity.

If I am a member of the Methodist church, I am in the laity of the church.

Mr. Miller. You have raised a question. There are people who are not priests in the religious hierarchy in a particular sect who may devote their entire lives to that particular church.

Senator Mathias. Well, I think the word "a religious" --

I'm serious here -- should be considered.

Mr. Aaron. "A religious?"

Mr. Bader. We'll have to obviously work on that. Laity was not meant here to be a member of a church, for technical terms, the technical terms Mr. Miller mentioned.

Mr. Miller. As distinct from the congregation, it was meant to deal with the administrators in a religious order.

Senator Huddleston. Well, some sects have lay preachers and lay clergy.

Mr. Kirbow. Senator Hart, do you want each of these categories like this examined in the light of the constitutional question that you raised earlier?

Senator Hart of Colorado. I just raised the issue where the academics were concerned to resolve it, so I'm sure it should be raised by somebody.

Senator Huddleston. Are you ready to go on the religious insofar as what is the definition? Then that will be --

Senator Hart of Colorado. Yes, sir.

Senator Huddleston. Then that will be moved up, I assume, with exceptions noted?

Mr. Kirbow. I don't have any exception to that one, sir.

Mr. Inderfurth. That is by statute, right?

Senator Huddleston. Pardon?

Mr. Inderfurth. Is that by statute?

Senator Huddleston. Right.

Mr. Maxwell. There may be a First Amendment argument here, particularly in fundamentalist groups whose religious beliefs are committed, are directed toward opposition toward Godless atheism.

Mr. diGenova. Except that the control of religious organization has historically been subject to governmental regulation in this sense: the Supreme Court in light of Senator Hart's question last night, I did a little bit of research. The example, the prime example of regulation doesn't deal so much with prohibition of the Government dealing with someone, although there are vast areas where the government is not permitted to get into. The question is, for years the Supreme Court has ruled that there are certain health regulations of states that religious sects must comply with, and they have to comply with it even if it conflicts with their basic religious belief, that they have to comply with it, like quarantines or things of that nature.

So there is clearly an area where the First Amendment of religious freedom concept falls in the face of a greater good, the need of the general public, and that has generally been in the health area, where there is some practice of the religion which conflicts with some standard which has been set in the community at large, and that generally has dealt with health.

Mr. Kirbow. Maybe the HEW Act can bring the CIA under one of these health threats.

Mr. diGenova. Self-immolation.

Senator Huddleston. The snake acts and innoculations.

Mr. diGenova. That's exactly right.

Mr. Maxwell. The problem is that's not quite applicable to this, and one has to argue in the past the Court has ruled on things that are found to be a threat to the personal livelihood or health of the individual rather than something that could be construed in a fundamentalist sense.

Senator Huddleston. This doesn't preclude a sect that may be anti-atheist and as such anti-Communist from pursuing its principles, but the restriction would be pursing them through a government agency, which happens to be the CIA, or any other methods.

Ms. Culbreath. Would this prohibit, then, somebody who was a member of one of these sects that was in an area where they gained information that would be helpful from them being sources?

Senator Huddleston. I wouldn't think so if they wanted to write letters to the CIA.

Ms. Culbreath. Well, just in terms of the debriefing kind of thing, or contact.

Ms. Davis. We are talking about operational, not coming in to the Domestic Contact Service.

Mr. diGenova. It is not very clear on this.

Mr. Maxwell. The problem in part goes back to the difficult we had with the Domestic Contact Division in trying to determine what was operational support, if operational support would be what did you learn about individuals there who might be receptive to American approaches. Then the clergy would be prohibited from providing that kind of information if that is operational support.

Senator Mathias. Well, it seems to me if the religious came in and said I was at a meeting of the Holy Rollers last night and we all went down on the mourner's bench, and I heard the most remarkable things, and this is what I heard, there would be no prohibition against listening. Now, if you say, go back to the Holy Rollers tonight --

Mr. Kirbow. And listen again.

Senator Mathias. Then you've got a question.

Senator Huddleston. Then it is operational.

I don't think there's a need to write in that it doesn't pertain to the voluntary furnishing of information. I don't know.

Mr. Aaron. I don't think -- no, that's really not an operational use, quite frankly. It's very similar to the DCD which takes information from lots of people, including people who are and have been for some time proscribed by CIA's own --

Senator Huddleston. Well, anyway, that would be worked out in the statute itself.

Mr. Aaron. We are spared the problem.

Senator Huddleston. We ought to move on.

Mr. Aaron. The next section is proprietaries and cover.

Senator Huddleston. I just wonder if in presenting this, these three, these four, now, that we have just approved, it would be of any value to assert in our report that we recognize that the Agency has to find proper cover for its agents, that restricting that cover is a matter of some importance, but there are certain institutions that the Committee feels because of their nature and because of their standing in the country, and because of the need for the public to have confidence in them, that they should be, in effect, off limits, and because of that we recommend that these four recommendations be brought. I don't know whether you want to make it sound any better or not.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, does the absence of brackets on the next set of recommendations mean that they are non-controversial?

Senator Huddleston. On the proprietaries?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Yes.

Mr. Aaron. That is correct.

Senator Huddleston. The gentleman did such a great job that nobody can question them.

Mr. Aaron. I think there is only one set of brackets, and the next section is on page 67 in which it says that --

Mr. diGenova. Oh, yes, there is something.

Mr. Kirbow. What page are you on?

Mr. diGenova. 67.

At the bottom of page 67 is a bracketed quote about Admiral Raborn, a former Director of Central Intelligence.

Now, if my memory serves me correctly -- now, first of all, this is the first time that anyone is mentioned by name in the findings.

Senator Huddleston. And the total findings are in that section.

Mr. Kirbow. The findings are this foreign and military.

Senator Huddleston. We referred to Helms and Laird, but I think we decided we could write around that.

Mr. diGenova. Well, here's what happened here. This paragraph deals with the fact that when the Agency disposes or dissolves a proprietary, it tries to avoid conflicts of interest.

However, when noted that sometimes pressures were brought to bear on the Agency to dispose of the entity as a favor to someone, so that it would benefit someone else.

Now, the most glaring example of this was this activity of the former Director, Admiral Raborn, who actually became involved in negotiations on behalf of a client, Overseas National Airways, which he represented, and he wanted the sale of Southern Air Transport, which was a CIA proprietary, large assets and large property, to Overseas National Airways, which of course would have acquired Southern Air Transport's lucrative routes.

Now, the way I originally had it written was "A former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency sought unsuccessfully to influence the sale." However, if it was left that way, people would have to guess at which one of these guys did this and it would unfairly impugn all of the directors. The name was inserted. Therefore, the question now becomes whether it should be left in at all since the name is inserted, and since the name is mentioned in the report, and whether or not the whole sentence--

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, what if we just said "A former Director"?

Mr. diGenova. Well, the problem there, Senator, is then people say, which one was it?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Good.

Mr. diGenova. Oh, all right.

Mr. Inderfurth. I think the assumption would be Richard Helms.

Mr. diGenova. McCone more than Helms.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, we ran into this last summer with the Exener matter and all like that.

Ms. Culbreath. A former person.

Mr. diGenova. The Agency itself cited this as the most flagrant example of intercession on behalf of anyone. As a matter of fact, the memorandums on this refer to dozens of phone calls and overtures, and it is a former Director trying to gain a benefit. It is an unseemly situation, and they labeled it as a conflict of interest which they sought to avoid, and in fact they did, and they are praised for it in the report because they were really under tremendous pressure.

So I have no feeling one way or the other. I think to leave out his name unfairly impugns the other. To leave it in, also, is only the second time in the whole findings and conclusio that we mention anybody's name, so I don't care.

Senator Huddleston. And you've got one, Recommendation No. 5, related to the disposal of the proprietaries, that the Justice Department approve?

Mr. diGenova. Be consulted on the disposition.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, can I be heard on that?

Senator Huddleston. Yes, sir.

Mr. Kirbow. Senator Hart, in this regard we have consistently attempted by most every reasonable means to not use the names of people unless they had committed something illegal.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Well, don't side with me. I'm not taking a position.

Mr. Kirbow. But the Exener thing was a big example, but we must have had 20 other names that we went through on that assassination, and we wrote around them.

Senator Hart of Colorado. But a number of people argued strongly that we ought to name her and go into details, so I suppose the same arguments could be used here on this matter.

Mr. Kirbow. But the point I raised at the staff meeting just before the Committee came back, when the subject was raised, was did Admiral Raborn, as a retired military officer, currently in a civilian status, although he was former -- break any American law, or had they sold it to this, would it have been a violation of the law, and the answer was no.

If he was involved -- or they knew of no law that he had violated, and none is apparently cited in the record. Pressure was brought to bear, there is no doubt about it, by Admiral Raborn. I think there's another example. I'm not sure whether Joe described it to me or someone else, of a very senior official out there dealing back with the Agency.

Now, the military, as Senator Hart knows, is prohibited from this by regulations and I think by law. I know that as a regular military officer, you are not allowed to do contractual business with your agency forever, but with the other military departments and the Department of Defense, I think you have to have a cleansing period of five to seven years.

I don't believe there is any such provision in the Act that applies to former Directors, and probably what the Committee should do is consider this action without necessarily naming him unless he was in violation of some really serious wrongdoing, and make a prohibition, drawn similarly, with what now applies to senior officials going back and kind of exerting undue influence on those people.

Senator Huddleston. Joe, is it accurate to say that pressures were often brought to bear?

Mr. diGenova. We changed that to say sometimes. This is a rewrite. Someone else wrote this after I had submitted it, and we had a meeting today, and we changed several things in there.

So I leave it up to the Committee. This was a matter that I -- I wanted to flag it and leave it there. The explanation is as clear as I can give it.

Mr. Inderfurth. This is the first time he is mentioned in the entire paper.

Mr. diGenova. That's right.

Senator Huddleston. Why don't we delete that sentence and keep it in our full report, our big report.

Mr. Kirbow. There is a major classified report on this that would contain all the facts.

Senator Huddleston. I am concerned now whether any other instances of someone may be, of similar standing as Admiral Raborn.

Mr. diGenova. Yes. There are instances in the record which do not deal with proprietaries, of John McCone interceding on behalf of Pan American directly with the Director of Central Intelligence, and it is not mentioned in the report, and it should be, and it is a problem that we have had, Mr.

Chairman, has been that the work involving the relationship of the Central Intelligence Agency with American business companies was severed off from the proprietary work for the simple reason that they are not the same thing.

That work has been done. It has not been pursued vigorously, not because the individual who was responsible for itd didn't want to.

Senator Huddleston. That happened after he left.

Mr. diGenova. That's right, after Mr. McCone left the DCI, he had frequent contacts, according to the records, with the Agency, with high level Agency personnel, and in one instance he interceded personally with the Director of Central Intelligence to avoid actions which would be taken by another government and its airline which would adversely affect Pan American World Airways.

Senator Huddleston. It is hard to separate a man from his past totally.

Mr. diGenova. It seems particularly hard with DCIs.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, not only here, this is not with the Agency, but it came up in my experience with the Armed Services Committee involving Continental Airlines.

Senator Mathias. This sentence.

Senator Huddleston. Just the sentence in brackets.

Senator Mathias. Well, I think if you've got a Raborn Case, a McCone Case and whatnot, that you can't make fish of one and fowl of the other.

Senator Huddleston. I think we've already said that pressures sometimes were brought to bear and we make recommendations to correct that.

Ms. Culbreath. Mr. Chairman, could I suggest that maybe if we do delete that, that we perhaps redo that previous sentence to make it a little stronger, and perhaps in some way indicate that these were serious pressures, and they were, I think, hard pressures to withstand when somebody in that kind of position --

Senator Huddleston. They were withstood, though.

Mr. Maxwell. They would get lost the way the sentence is cut.

Mr. diGenova. I think what we will do is David and I will get together, and Elizabeth, and we will change this "however" sentence, the sentence that precedes the one that has just been deleted, and we will expand that sentence to more accurately explain that the pressures came from high sources sometimes. Some of them may have been maybe former Agency directors.

Senator Huddleston. I think we should make the point that it was former.

Senator Mathias. Well, if they were former directors, then you may as well leave in the last sentence.

Mr. diGenova. Maybe.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, may I suggest that maybe perhaps we use this type of part of the investigation and what we know from certain of the other files to prohibit this type of conduct by law in the future in our general recommendations?

Senator Huddleston. And make it similar to --

Mr. Kirbow. Similar. I think you would have to look at something from the staff.

Mr. diGenova. I didn't have that recommendation in there, but I think the record indicates it ought to be there.

Mr. Kirbow. It wouldn't be proper, necessarily, to put it right here under proprietaries, but let's put it in the general recommendations.

Mr. diGenova. David, did you get that?

Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry.

There's a recommendation that --

Mr. diGenova. That Agency personnel --

Mr. Kirbow. Senior officials.

Senator Huddleston.. Similar to what applies now for military.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, perhaps the statute, perhaps we could recommend a statute similar to that governing the Department of Defense.

Mr. Kirbow. Be enacted by the next Committee, similar in effect to.

Senator Huddleston. And find a proper place to put it in our recommendations.

1b
begin 2a

Mr. Aaron. Okay.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, Charlie, correct me. I think the proprietary section would be the appropriate section because that would be where it came up most,,unless there is another one that you see more readily.

Mr. diGenova. We can work that out. I don't think that's terribly --

Mr. Kirbow. I think there have been two or three suggestions made here that will result in general recommendations on a page that isn't necessarily supported by findings, but you come to this overally conclusion based upon your total concept of the Agency and its procedures and everything else in view of the findings.

Mr. diGenova. The only thing I want to do is -- David, I know you have gone through this, but the Senators may want to look at page 68 through 70, which deal with cover, and particularly with Mr. Welch.

Ms. Culbreath. I had a point I wanted to raise on that.

Mr. diGenova. Well, Mr. Chairman, I think the Senators want to read this.

Ms. Culbreath. Why don't we let them look through it.

(Pause.)

Senator Huddleston. Let's go back on the record.

Mr. diGenova. I do know the Agency is going to come in tomorrow to review the cover paper from which this summary is drawn. I know Eric has some problems with the cover paper, both editorially, because they view it as overly simplistic and harsh because it reflects all of the Inspector General's judgments, but they have some problems with cover in general, but I don't think this is going to be part of that problem.

Senator Huddleston. I have some problem with this page 70 relating to Welch because it seems the whole implication of that is that he was murdered because his cover was blown, and so far there has been no evidence that that is the case. It highlights the argument, I think, correctly, but it seems to me it leaves the impression that here is a case where a fellow's cover or lack of cover resulted in his death.

I think the Agency people have specifically said to us so far that they have no reason at this point yet to expect that that was the reason he got killed.

Mr. Maxwell. In regard to the specific quote, I think we have to be very careful as to getting involved in an argument which would imply that anything that we possibly did had an effect on it, and also, that it seems to point to Mr. Welch and say, well, it is all his fault.

Senator Huddleston. He didn't protect his cover, he didn't do what they advised him to do, and you see down here we have another quote which says, referring to international terrorism and incitement for these kind of people to take the kind of action which unfortunately led to the death of Dick Welch. There again we are ascribing something to the death of Dick Welch which nobody knows yet, you know, what terrorists killed him or why; at least our record doesn't show.

Mr. diGenova. These statements here, Senator, this is a direct quote from Eric Eisenstead's memo. Do you think that we should maybe in the findings and recommendations shorten this and maybe --

Mr. Kirbow. I think the part of the record which is an unknown fact is why Dick Welch was killed, and we should stay away from any quotes or other pronouncements in our paper which attribute his death to any particular thing unless we know something.

Mr. Aaron. I think that is a good point. We might put in here a statement which says the Committee has no information as to the reasons, purposes or cause, specific cause, of his death. The point is to get at the question of cover, to step out to the question of cover in the report, as we do, I think, appropriately, but not have talked about the one case where this all came out in public, rightly or wrongly.

Mr. Kirbow. Why don't we use the cover for the gentleman in London, then, where as the tour buses go by, of course, you know this is the home of the CIA chief, and he hasn't been killed yet or anything like that. If we want to use that kind instead of using this death example, which, by the way, has brought some thousands of letters from the constituency of certain southern Senators who shall remain unnamed or near-Southern Senators, because it kind of was a catalytic agent in getting a lot of complaints on the Committee and everything else, and this pointing out or explaining Welch's death goes back to it.

Senator Huddleston. I'm sort of southern.

Mr. Kirbow. And you've got a lot of them.

Senator Huddleston. Of course, it was used for that purpose by certain high officials for that.

Mr. Kirbow. The very highest, including attending the funeral.

Mr. diGenova. Well, I think one of the things we wanted to pinpoint here, and first of all, I think we can summarize the Agency's testimony a little better. The Agency said, nothing this Committee did, first of all, had anything to do with his death, as far as they know.

Ms. Culbreath. But they don't know.

Mr. diGenova. As far as they know, they don't know one way or another, but the impression that was created in the press was, and was pandered to by the DCI and the President, was that the general actions of exposure of Agency operations were responsible for the death of Mr. Welch, and they pandered that by inviting Committee members to the funeral as if they bore some responsibility.

Now, the obvious public relations value of Mr. Welch's death, the first time in history the DDO and the DCI go to a funeral in public, they never did that, and there is no doubt that they tried to make political hay out of his death. I think it is only fair that the Committee ultimately say --

Senator Huddleston. Right, but I think you've got two different problems. You've got a problem with whether the Committee wants to present its case and exonerate itself on the basis of everything that is known about the death of Welch, and whether that is pertinent to the problem of cover.

Now, we make a recommendation that the CIA shall make an effort to place a greater proportion of its officer abroad under nonofficial cover. It seems like what we need, there's a statement here is that official cover has not proved to be effective, and if we mention Welsh at all, I think the point we mention there is that his name was carried, that while he was there supposedly under cover, his name was in fact carried in a newspaper, the name of his newspaper had been carried in a foreign newspaper, and he was living in a house that was known to be the house.

Mr. Kirbow. His true identity was widely known.

Senator Huddleston. We can cite him as an example without indicating why he had been killed, of here is a case that everybody knows about, so-called official cover was not in fact very deep cover. There may be other instances that we want to refer to, but if we get into his death at all, I think we have got to present the case, that blowing his cover is not necessarily what killed him. Nobody knows that as of now, so far as I know. Nobody knows it wasn't just a street gang or an idiot.

Mr. Kirbow. It could have been like the Senator John Stennis case, where they buttonholed him in front of his house and killed him for robbery purposes.

Senator Huddleston. We've asked them two or three times here, have we not?

Mr. diGenova. Yes, we have. In fact they don't know.

Senator Huddleston. In fact, the last time Nelson was here we asked him.

Mr. Aaron. Can I try a fix on this, turning to page 70, instead of saying "the career and tragic death of the station chief," let's just say the "situation of the station chief in Athens illustrates the tension. As the Chief of the Cover Staff stated, by the time a person becomes a chief of station, there is not a great deal of cover left," leaving in the rest of that sentence, and then add in here, as you did, "Mr. Welch and his predecessor were both identified and named in the local press. Further, Mr. Welch occupied the same house."

Senator Huddleston. Which presumably was known to be the house of the station chief.

Mr. diGenova. In fact, the station chief's name and address in Athens had been presented, so when he was in there the address had already been printed previously.

Mr. Aaron. Which was also known.

Senator Huddleston. Now, if we want to say something about an added dimension to the seriousness on blowing cover or cover being diminished, is the situation in the world with terrorism or the vulnerability it makes of people --

Mr. Kirbow. To the unstable.

Mr. Aaron. Well, the point in the testimony is that this was an added danger, but because they've got a job to do, they're not going to really do too much about it. It's a real risk they are just going to have to bear.

Senator Huddleston. That's an occupational hazard, but we are talking about how to protect their cover, and our recommendation is that they use -- have an official cover.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, can the staff change the language, because we know exactly what you want to do, and without taking further time, why don't we just change it.

Mr. Maxwell. I would just hope that the two quotes after the one that David cited, the quote, he, Welch, was asked, the last quote, we could make the point in a different way because the impact of the first quote, I think, is this guy was stupid and irresponsible, and I don't think we need to have any implication like that in the report, and the second one, I think we can make the point that terrorism may constitute a greater threat now.

Senator Huddleston. I think that quote ought to go entirely because it does leave the implication that there was a direct link to losing his cover and his assassination.

Now, we don't know that.

Mr. Aaron. So just take out the last one.

Mr. diGenova. But still speak about the added danger of international terrorism. Just stop at the word "international terrorism."

Senator Huddleston. Down in the recommendations I've been talking to Joe about defining the small business, and I think we fairly well understand what the concern is, or do we, Joe?

Mr. diGenova. Senator, I was going to suggest, if you look at Recommendation No. 3, while it doesn't define what a large proprietary is, the Senator was concerned about what was meant by "should be kept small," and I tried to indicate really we are talking about Air America where you had 8000 employees of the CIA, both in Langley and abroad, and then another 8000 employees of the Air America complex. That is big.

But I think what we should say is, organizationally small, and organizationally and numerically small, because what we are really talking about is when they get big, whether it is in numbers or finances, and larger in terms of people usually means larger in terms of finances, also. Then you have both of the problems we addressed in the paper, which was the risk of unfair competition with private enterprise, and the risk of blowing cover, of compromising security.

So I think that --

Senator Huddleston. I was wondering if it could be designed in such a way as care should be taken that it not be any larger than necessary to achieve the objective for which it was established.

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, Senator. It would not get the Air America thing because at the time they needed one twice that size.

Senator Huddleston. They needed it that big, that's right.

Mr. diGenova. The reason this language is in here is that the Agency officials themselves who testified, all of them, including the DDO, said they would like to have small ones, in other words, a small number of employees, small operation.

Senator Huddleston. What about their insurance business?

Mr. diGenova. That's kind of an exception, although actually that is an example of a lot of money with only a few employees. There are only a couple of people that run that whole thing, Isenstead and a couple of -- one investor, Istenstead, and an auditor. There are three men that run that $32 million complex. So that is a different animal, really.

Senator Huddleston. So if you are going to use the term "small," you've got to say it from the standpoint of employees or resources.

Ms. Culbreath. I was just going to suggest that, since another of our recommendations suggests annual review of all of these criteria, and since their budgets are going to have to be included for the oversight committee with review for the others, and we have got a proposal that the Committee also establish guidelines for the approval of the creation of large proprietaries, should these become necessary.

Perhaps the better thing to do, since these proprietaries are for a specific need at a specific time, and since we have got the review procedure, is sort of trust it- to the oversight committee to see to it that they don't get too big, whatever that may be, and leave it to them, maybe just delete that second sentence.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, that's certainly a workable way.

Senator Huddleston. I don't see how you are going to keep that sentence in there without having it.

Mr. Aaron. I would also suggest that perhaps in the section on proprietaries, where we make a comment about how large proprietaries run risks in blowing their cover, we might would it be possible, do you think, to make a finding or make an example in regard to Air America?

Mr. diGenova. Absolutely, because they have conceded that's the one that ran all of the problems.

Senator Huddleston. You do mention that somewhere, don't you?

Mr. Aaron. It's not mentioned specifically, but it might be possible to say, you know, maybe you can put a footnote on the first paragraph which simply said --

Mr. diGenova. You mean on the findings of page 66 that "too often large proprietaries have created unfair" --

Mr. Aaron. "Unwarranted risks of unfair competition with with private business in compromising their cover." You should say, "for example," "Air America, for example, which had 8,000 employees," and so forth, ran into both of these problems.

Senator Huddleston. I think that would be all right.

Mr. Aaron. And then you would have at least some reference to what "large" was.

Senator Huddleston. Then you've got the review and the oversight.

Mr. Inderfurth. So the idea here in the recommendation was to take out the second sentence.

Mr. diGenova. Yes.

Mr. Inderfurth. Why not take out the first as well and just go to Recommendation No. 2 as No. 1?

Mr. diGenova. Well, I think -- can I just say this -- that by indirection, approving of an activity is, I suppose, one way of doing it. I don't see anything wrong with stepping up and saying we examined proprietaries, we found them to be -- they had problems but basically they were all right.

Mr. Inderfurth. Couldn't that be in the body as well?

Mr. Kirbow. The one thing we have failed to do on this Committee is where we are strongly in favor of, is to speak out in a manner supporting an agency under otherwise violent attack from many sources, and I think --

Mr. Inderfurth. I think that is not true, Charlie. I think you will find, if you read the findings of Bill Miller and others wrote in the first part, it says very strongly, intelligence is necessary; we need it.

Mr. Kirbow. I'm saying up until now it has been an agency under attack. I think this whole section on foreign and military has been to make a balance between past wrongdoing and current operations.

The Chairman. There can't be anything wrong with leaving the sentence in there.

Mr. Maxwell. May I raise a question to the second recommendation, as to the reason why by statute there would be an annual review rather than recommending that to Congressional Committees.

The second part of that is, my understanding of a number of the proprietaries is that they are not operating, and to require GAO audit of a whole group of in a sense notional organizations may be preempting the kind of review that the oversight committee should be doing rather than setting it out here. It's just a question.

Mr. diGenova. This is a rewrite of my original recommendation, and it is a good point. It may very well be that that is superfluous, if you are considering oversight by a committee.

Senator Huddleston. The Committee cannot conduct an audit, though.

Mr. diGenova. And that was the purpose for the Committee taking on board independent GAO auditors.

Mr. Maxwell. The Committee can request GAO auditors.

Mr. Kirbow. Anything that appears to be on an audit calls for an audit.

Senator Huddleston. Calls for a GAO audit or gives the Committee authority to call for one.

Mr. diGenova. I don't think we need a statute. We can talk about it as part of Congressional oversight. As part of the Congressional oversight function, the oversight committee should review proprietaries annually and where necessary conduct audits with the assistance of the General Accounting Office.

Mr. Kirbow. Here, Mr. Chairman, I think again the point we made yesterday, that we should say at least annually, so that they don't put you in a box if you want one every two months because of circumstances, "at least annually."

Senator Huddleston. You could add in Section 3, at least there, giving the Committee authority to establish guidelines, to establish for large proprietaries, should they become necessary.

You could also make the statement there that the Committee may call for a GAO audit periodically.

Mr. diGenova. So we will rewrite 2 to eliminate the statute

Senator Huddleston. Independent GAO audit.

Mr. Aaron. No. 2 is rewritten so it is not required by statute that there be an audit, internal audit?

Mr. Kirbow. No GAO audit.

Senator Huddleston. The only thing I had in mind of taking out of 2 was just the independent GAO audit being required by statute, and leave that to the discretion of the Committee, but leave the rest of the review, right?

Mr. Maxwell. You amend it by statute that an annual review of all proprietaries?

Senator Huddleston. An internal CIA audit.

Mr. Maxwell. Or would it recommend that, I'm not sure which.

Mr. diGenova. I'm wondering whether it should be done by statute. Maybe we should recommend to the oversight committee that there should be an annual review consisting of internal CIA audit.

Mr. Maxwell. An annual report to the oversight committee and such GAO audits as the Committee --

Mr. diGenova. May deem necessary.

Senator Huddleston. That's all right.

Mr. diGenova. And then we could add, as part of its annual report, the GAO should record all of its intercessions. That should be "report." They record all of them, so change "record" to "report".

We can rewrite that.

Senator Huddleston. Make that a little stronger.

Mr. diGenova. Must report?

Senator Huddleston. Shall be required to report.

Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry.

Could we now have a recapitulation by whomever thinks they followed this?

Mr. diGenova. Elliot?

I defer.

Mr. Maxwell. "There should be an annual review"--

Mr. Aaron. There is no longer a statute. The Committee recommends that there be, right?

Mr. Maxwell. -- "a review, at least annually, of all CIA proprietaries."

Mr. Aaron. By whom?

Ms. Culbreath. By the oversight committee.

Senator Huddleston. By the oversight committee.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, you're defining what the review is in the next part. "consisting of an internal CIA audit and a report to the oversight committee as well as such independent GAO audits as the committee shall direct. As part of its annual report to the oversight Committee" -- "As part of its report to the oversight Committee, the CIA shall report," and then the rest of the sentence, "all its intercessions on behalf of its proprietaries."

Mr. Aaron. May I just make a quick editorial fix? "The Committee recommends the overight Committee conduct an annual review of all proprietaries consisting of an internal CIA audit and report to the oversight Committee."

Mr. Kirbow. No, the Committee cannot conduct a GAO audit. They can insist that that's part of the report that is presented to it.

Mr. Aaron. That's it, consisting of a report to the oversight Committee of an internal CIA audit, is that rigt?

Mr. Kirbow. What you are trying to do is to require the CIA to reveiw it, to conduct a CIA audit, and to report fully all of the review entailed.

Mr. diGenova. Not just the audit themselves. There are certain operational details you are going to want to know about also, not just financial security.

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, let us rewrite that one. We will include it.

Senator Huddleston. Well, you see, you could combine 1 and 2 together, since we are just going to use one sentence, the first sentence in No. 1, and after we say the external and internal controls, the oversight committee should require an annual report of all proprietaries by the CIA, including an internal CIA audit and all intercessions that the CIA may have made on behalf of proprietaries.

Mr. diGenova. That's it, that's all in one sentence. We can fix that.

Mr. Aaron. All right. We'll take Joe's fix.

Mr. Kirbow. In three I am not sure what you mean, "In the DCI's budget presentation." That almost has a word of art connotation in the Senate. A budget presentation is that thing which the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the CIA makes to the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. diGenova. We are talking about an authorization, aren't we, an annual authorization here?

Mr. Inderfurth. Look on page 26 and you'll see the definition of that under (b). The DCI shall have responsibility for preparing the budget of the national intelligence program for presentation to the President and the Congress. This is the budget presentation that's being referred to under this.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, now you come to the real question, proprietaries being listed in the DCI's budget presentation. Most of his proprietaries neither use any money up nor make any money or anything. They are just shelf items.

Here again you come to the notional.

Mr. diGenova. No, no, Charles, because the point they made during our review out there was that never have the proprietaries appeared in the budget presentation. They have been hidden, and the object is to identify them in the budget as a line item, for example.

Mr. Maxwell. One suggestion might be, be listed, that implies a list of proprietaries.

Senator Huddleston. Where does this list go?

Mr. Kirbow. What you want to do is to require them to include a discussion of the proprietaries in his annual report to the oversight committee is what you want to do, isn't it, because they don't have that now. They don't report to the Armed Services Committee. They only report to Appropriations

Senator Huddleston. How would it be listed in the budget under your proposition here, Joe?

Mr. diGenova. Well, I'm just assuming -- well, I am assuming in terms of oversight the Committee is going to want to know, even though this is not going to be published, where this money is going and what it is going to be used for, if they are going to authorize it.

Mr. Aaron. I think the term really should be --

Mr. Kirbow. I think it ought to be more than in the budget.

Mr. diGenova. I know that's not just what they are going to be asking, but the thrust of this was to make sure that proprietaries found their way into the budget, and that Senators knew what they were authorizing when they authorized the budget.

Now, how it gets in there, I am not a budget expert.

Mr. Kirbow. That is what I am trying to supply here because in this process there is a procedure that when you say there shal be authorizing legislation, where the line items are discussed before the authorizing committee and not before the budget committee, which is the appropriations committee, and if you require that he discuss or report the annual operation of the proprietaries in his annual report to the oversight committee, you will accomplish what you are trying to do, and not exclude it only for the presentation before the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. Maxwell. Could I try a fix on this?

Mr. diGenova. You are invited.

Mr. Maxwell. The oversight committee should require that the DCI's budget presentation to the Appropriations Committee and the oversight committee include a specific discussion of the financial aspects of CIA proprietaries. I mean, we are trying to bring them out and see what the impact is on the budget, where do they fit in.

Senator Huddleston. Can they do that, though, without identifying the proprietary and where it is located and whatever.

Mr. diGenova. They have indicated they could.

Mr. Aaron. Jim, Taylor, when he was here talking to the

Committee, talked about how they are beginning to -- drawing a way to work in the proprietaries so that they can both identify them and indicate their cash flow implications for the budget, and in effect --

Senator Huddleston. What would you have proprietaries --

Mr. Aaron. Proprietaries, income and outgo.

Mr. Kirbow. But that would never be published, Senator.

If you want to accomplish what you are suggesting here, that they report the cash status or the financial status, you add that additional sentence to this combined 1 and 2 up here that the Senator just proposed a minute ago, and indicate that that report should also include the financial status or the --

Senator Huddleston. But you do that with the audit, don't you, the internal audit?

Mr. Kirbow. Well, in fact you do, in fact you do.

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think the point -- maybe I'm not captioning this properly, Joe, but I think the point here is that proprietaries either earn money or cost money, sometimes a little of both, and it has an impact, therefore, on the overall CIA budget, particularly in the past when income from the proprietaries could be placed in either the contingency reserve or used to finance, in effect, operational purposes of the proprietary. In other words, Air America was earning money on its operations, and yet it was costing them more because they were engaged in certain risky operations. In

In effect, the proprietary was earning money which was financing the proprietary organization.

Mr. Kirbow. But they can no longer do that. What they earn now must go into the general Treasury.

Mr. Aaron. No, gross earnings do not go into the general Treasury. Their net, and part of the cost of doing business would include the cost of some of their operational purposes.

I think the point of this inclusion here was to see if one could require in connection with the budget, not just in general, with an audit of what it does specifically, but in terms of the entire activity of the CIA, to get a spelling out of its sort of macrobudget implications in terms of up or down, and secondly, its budget implications for the certain categories of operations which were involved, such as, if you are talking about the conduct of the support for the activities in Laos.

Mr. diGenova. Paramilitary operations.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, leave it like it is if that is what you are trying to do, because they will be sure to report it to the Appropriations Committee in excruciating detail, but they won't report it to the authorization committee unless they require it to get money.

So if you want to leave it a detailed budget, their presentation to the budget committee, this language will get that done.

Senator Huddleston. Well, what if you said something like this, furthermore, or adding to that, the fiscal impact or the budgetary impact of the proprietaries should be included or defined in the DCI's budget presentation.

Mr. Maxwell. Specifically discussed?

Mr. diGenova. That language would mean it's included in his presentation in some way because the allusion that David made to Jim Taylor is that they are beginning to put it into their budget presentation. I know that is a term of art.

Senator Huddleston. That eliminates any idea of listing them.

Mr. diGenova. Elliot's point also about the authorization committee should be added in there.

Senator Huddleston. We've got so much money invested, and 33 money made money and 40 made money for a net gain of so and so.

Mr. Maxwell. And you should have some notion of that and the problem was that you weren't able to get ahold of it.

Senator Huddleston. And we sold two or three of them for this amount.

Mr. diGenova. That is the whole issue of their visibility in the budget, the whole question.

Senator Huddleston. Well, where does that visibility disappear?

Mr. diGenova. Well, before they never showed up.

Mr. Maxwell. Before you had the covert action.

Senator Huddleston. Well, where will it disappear now? It won't come to the authorization committee and the appropriations committee. I mean, it won't be a line item.

Mr. Aaron. Proprietaries as a category?

Mr. Maxwell. I would assume it is going to be a subsection of operational support in covert action.

Mr. Aaron. Not necessarily. I think they are struggling with that at this point trying to define it properly and how it should be presented. I mean, I really don't think we know. They have an intention to do it because they recognize that potentially it is a source of real question as to how much money is being spent on clandestinc activities that is self-generated by the Agency because of its proprietary activities.

Mr. diGenova. The impact, Senator, was also to show that the Committee had looked at this broadly, was aware of possible budget and authorization implications of various entities, including proprietaries, and that it wanted to say something about that. It was not necessarily anything dramatic.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I will agree with that. I am just worried about if you say you expose proprietaries too much, you are exposing cover.

Mr. Aaron. Well, this is internal. This is classified.

Mr. diGenova. This is not public.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, I think the language the Senator suggested got to that.

Mr. Aaron. Well, let me see if I can read out what I would propose along the lines I think we discussed.

The oversight committee should require that the fiscal impact of proprietaries be made clear in the DCI's budget presentation to the oversight committee. If you want to add the appropriations committee, you can, but I think the point is that that happens.

Mr. Kirbow. If you'll listen just one minute, Mr. Miller knows and I believe the Senator knows that "in the Senate there is a formal budget presentation made to the Appropriations Committees." They are not made elsewyere. Reports are made to oversight committees on the status and all of these other things, and if they request any money for those proprietaries, they would request that before the authorizing committee. If you are just trying to accomplish getting it made known to the oversight committee, drop the word "budget presentation" and adopt the common usage of the annual report of the Agency or of the DCI.

But that is kind of a word of art. Those are words of art in the Senate, and they will seize on it because today they don't do it for anybody else but the Appropriations Committee.

Senator Huddleston. I think that's reasonable enough. It ought to be clear.

Mr. Aaron. Let me try another fix here because I'm not too sure.

The oversight committee shall require the fiscal impact of proprietaries in the CIA's budget be made clear in the Director's authorization presentation, or what phrase is that? In the Director's what?

Mr. Kirbow. The DCI's annual report to the appropriate oversight committee.

Senator Huddleston. The DCI's annual report.

Mr. Kirbow. The Agency would not report separately. They should make their presentation a part of the DCI's report to the appropriate oversight committee.

Mr. Maxwell. While we are on that, could I, on No. 6, we have already, I thought, by statute prevented any covert action being funded other than by (a) appropriation to a covert action budget, or (b) the contingency reserve.

Mr. diGenova. That's right.

Mr. Maxwell. D oes that make No. 6 redundant?

Mr. Kirbow. Yes.

Senator Huddleston. The only comment I would make is that the other is not an accomplished fact yet. This might be accepted and that might not.

Mr. Maxwell. Well, the reason I say that is that the way this reads, I would have or would be opposed to it because it provides an exception with the approval of the oversight committees, when we want, I think, to be able to go to the Congress and say, we recommend most strenuously that only these two methods be used for funding, rather than providing a third method and someone says, well, maybe we should have a fourth method, and I would like to go with the strongest possible recommendation in regard to the earlier statutory requirement that it only be by specific appropriation to covert action and the contingency reserve fund.

Mr. Kirbow. Otherwise, Mr. Chairman, we will stand a chance of getting the other amended, to allow the oversight committee to allow it.

Mr. diGenova. Why don't we say this by statute, and then have the rest of the sentence an addendum which would just allude to the fact that funding is to be accomplished to the method we set out if you want to eliminate it.

Well, this was the problem that was raised, or an issue that was raised during the study, and this is set in here for that reason. It can easily be removed if it is inconsistent with another recommendation of the Committee.

Mr. Aaron. Well, we have two or three different earlier provisions that relate to this. The first is that reprogramming authority, defining reprogramming authority, the possibility that something used for a program covert action X which involves a proprietary that generates a certain amount of money, can be used for program Y.

The second issue is we have proposed that covert actions be funded either by line item or by the contingency reserve.

The third thing we proposed is that the contingency reserve be replenished, if I am correct, only by appropriation, concurrence of the oversight Committee.

Now, what this in effect does, I think the question that he's driving at is, what do you do with the profits of a proprietary organization? Can you put it in the contingency reserve?

If so, our other recommendation would pick up the notion that it can only be done with the concurrence of the Committee.

Is there some other purpose, direct transfer? Well, presumably one of the limitations on reprogramming -- and this would be a fair point to make here, as part of its definition of limitations on reprogramming, it is recommended that the oversight committee proscribe the allocation of profits from any proprietary to a covert operation without their express consent. And this is really kind of -- if it doesn't go through the contingency reserve, it really goes to the question of reprogramming.

Now, I realize that we have said that our other recommendation by implication would prohibit this, but it is only by implication, I would think.

Mr. Maxwell. My sense is that by providing this --

Mr. Aaron. You kind of create a channel.

Mr. Maxwell. It's not that you create a channel, but you aid the, increase the temptation for the proprietaries to try to generate funds, and secondly, I think it is the easiest way for the oversight committee to have a handle on covert action, and particularly its funding, is to say there are two ways you can do it. You can do it either by the regular appropriation process, or you can do it through the contingency reserve fund. But if you start to build in the ways that the contingency reserve fund can be replenished, I think people -- I think there may be a loss of control.

Mr. Aaron. Well, this is a way it can be replenished, and this is not prohibited by anything we have recommended yet.

Mr. Maxwell. I understand that, but I guess I was trying to clean up the organizational structure.

Mr. Kirbow. I think this is the problem with recommending the legislation piecemeal, is that the insurance company out there is a covert operation. It is a secret operation at the agency conducted in that manner, and if you allow only covert operation to be funded only from the contingency reserve, whatever monies they generate will have to go back into the general treasury because they cannot be used to either replenish the contingency reserve or to operate a covert or to perform a covert function or operation.

So they are not even -- they can't not only use the profits to do that, they cannot use the general monies that they generate from that to conduct. They will have to fund that insurance program in the contingency reserve.

Mr. diGenova. No, not at all, because it is not a covert operation. That is not being use to fund a covert operation. It has been used to pay pensions and annuities to foreign agents. It's not a covert operation.

Senator Huddleston. Agents are covert. If you restrict it to use of funds, if it is not already done, no funds derived from the operations of proprietaries shall be used for any other purpose except the operation of the proprietary and any profits shall be returned to the general treasury.

It precludes it, doesn't it?

Mr. Aaron. That would solve the problem, yes.

Mr. Kirbow. And that's what they are doing today by regulation.

Senator Huddleston. Can we say that?

Mr. Aaron. I don't see why not.

Mr. diGenova. Well, we say that in our recommendation No. 4.

Mr. Aaron. Well, this says --

Mr. diGenova. That deals with terminations and liquidations.

Mr. Aaron. This is liquidations, and terminations. This is not just operations.

Mr. Maxwell. There is one problem, a slight problem. That is that some of the profits are reinvested. It is not that they take everything over or break even.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I didn't say that. I said all funds not needed in the operation.

Mr. Bader. Perhaps, Mr. Chairman, you could amend No. 4 to all returns of funds or profits not needed for the operation.

Mr. diGenova. There you go, whether from liquidations, terminations or profits exceed for the needs of the operation of the individual proprietaries should be remitted to the U.S. Treasury.

Senator Huddleston. You can work that out so that it would be understood that there is a need to keep a certain reserve back.

Mr. diGenova. We will unite 4 and 6.

Senator Huddleston. That's all but 5.

Mr. diGenova. 5 is only about the Department of Justice being notified as to the disposition.

Mr. Aaron. Now, we have two recommendations with respect to cover. The first is just to recommend that the Department of State stop publishing data which makes it possible to identify people under cover.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, just a minute. On No. 5 I do have a question here.

The Agency doesn't sign off on any other disposal of United States properties and military bases or major edifices or anything like that.

Mr. diGenova. And the reason for that is every other government agency is subject to the rules and statutes of the Federal Disposal of Property Act, and the CIA isn't.

Mr. Kirbow. Do you see this could be an abuse area?

Mr. diGenova. I could see the Attorney General, if he knew that Admiral Raborn or some other Director is putting pressure on the CIA to dispose of a piece of property, would want to know about that, since they are not subject to the Federal Disposal of Property Act like every other government agency is.

I don't think -- I think the record clearly shows, and the General Counsel indicated that he was not opposed to having outside review of their disposals, provided it was classified or done in a classified way since they have never had any problem.

Mr. Kirbow. What you are doing here, approving the final disposition of disposal, if you are intending that he review the disposal process or participate in it, he wouldn't have known about Raborn. He wouldn't have known about Raborn at all because he didn't dispose of it to his client, and this would not pick up that kind of abuse that you have discussed here.

Mr. diGenova. Suppose it had been disposed of to Admiral Raborn, and they knew about it, and the AG said, why is this being done? It would raise a red flag which would not otherwise be raised since the Federal Disposal of Property Act would not have applied which would have flagged that legally to any other agency.

Mr. Aaron. It would also strengthen the Agency's hand to resist those purposes, to just simply say, hey, this has to be signed out by the Attorney General. This isn't going to work.

It seems to me that what we do need here --

Mr. Kirbow. If what we are trying to do is get his participation, just having him approve it doesn't get his participation, I think we ought to put that in if that's what we want to do.

Mr. diGenova. I think the word "approve" is wrong. It should be "participate." The sale or disposition of any CIA proprietary --

Senator Huddleston. How are you going to make it "participate?"

Mr. diGenova. I think the word we want is "consultation."

Senator Huddleston. I think what we are trying to do is replace what other agencies have to do in an overt way and under a specific law, which this agency is not under, so it will have some assurance that it is being done in a proper way.

Mr. Kirbow. I don't disagree with the AG being in on the act, but this one gets you participation on disposition.

Senator Huddleston. Well, figure a way to get it done.

Mr. Aaron. Well, what I wanted to say was I would like to note that back on page 67 where we have struck out the reference to Mr. Raborn and intend to expand on the pressures having been brought to bear, part of that expansion should include a statement that there is no -- or that the Federal Disposal of Property Act does not apply to the CIA, which is a crucial aspect.

Mr. Kirbow. They are exempt, and then bring in the requirement for CIA, or for the AG participation.

Mr. Aaron. And that includes that.

Mr. diGenova. So we will rewrite 5 to make it consultation.

Ms. Culbreath. David, on cover, may I just say, didn't we decide to delete the opening paragraph?

Mr. Aaron. You're right, you're right.

Ms. Culbreath. We were just going to list the recommendations.

Mr. diGenova. Yeah, we already said that.

Mr. Aaron. NOw, we have a recommendation that the CIA should make an effort to place a greater proportion of its officers abroad under nonofficial cover, and that recommendation is in brackets. Recommendation (a), that the CIA make a greater effort to place a greater proportion of its officers abroad, "under nonofficial cover" is in brackets.

Senator Huddleston. That relates to the Welch discussion.

Mr. Aaron. It relates to the Welch discussion and it relates to the difficulties and problems of official cover.

Mr. Bader. How do you feel about this, Joe?

Mr. diGenova. This is a problem because just like the man says, cover is a relative thing. I don't think there is anything wrong with saying that the CIA, that they should make an effort to put -- really not much of a recommendation -- should make an effort to place a greater proportion of its officers abroad under nonofficial cover, and the Agency does not see that in this form, wouldn't view that as a bad thing. They thin cover is, if it is deep and effective, is okay. They just say well, their answer this way, well, you know, you don't do much work under deep, nonofficial cover, and one of the prices you pay is you don't have a lot of operational freedom. You have to work hard at your regular job and you don't do a whole heck of a lot.

The recommendation, the way it is phrased, is sort of a push to them to see if they can find better ways. It also probably tells them that maybe they should use proprietaries abroad a little more, which are very, very efficient, according to Eric, according to both things, operations and cover.

Mr. Aaron. I think we have got to be careful on this point. I mean, we ought to wait until the staff director returns because I think he has a particular interest in this suggestion, but we are talking about moving more people into unofficial cover. I would like to express my own persional reservations about that in terms of its relationship to a number of things that the Committee has already decided to do.

Senator Huddleston. We are eliminating a lot of cover.

Mr. Aaron. That's the first thing.

Now, the second thing -- and these are nonoffocial cover categories. The second thing that we are doing is trying to place somewhat greater authority in the hands of the ambassador and the missions overseas to know what is going on. That is something that they can do when it is in their house. It is something that's extremely difficult for them to do when it is off in the forest someplace.

So it is -- and as Joe just said, it looks like a recommendation to use more proprietaries, in part because it is in the same section, but in reality because that is one of the ways they might do it, and I just wonder how much we have thought through for ourselves where the balance of our recommendations lie, particularly since most of the stuff is derived basically from operational experience anyway.

There was a period, toward the end of Mr. Bissell's career in the Agency, or maybe shortly thereafter, when they began to try to put more people in unofficial cover, and it wasn't a very good experience for them.

Mr. Kirbow. David, how does the ambassador lose control, whether it is official or unofficial, except that he has got them in his compound? It is an official government function over which he has absolute control.

Senator Huddleston. But if they keep coming to the embassy to check with him, they blow their cover, unless they do it by telephone.

Mr. Kirbow. Well, I don't think they should go to the embassy at all. I think their contact should become covert.

Mr. diGenova. Well, we're sort of caught between a rock and a hard place because we know the official cover is we cover it best .

Senator Huddleston. Well, maybe we could approach in that one way is to improve official covert

Mr. Aaron. That is the one recommendation we make here, but the limits on that are very -- they are just structural, like.

Senator Huddleston. It seems to me like we are in an area that we know a lot less about than the people who are in the business.

Mr. Aaron. That is sort of my feeling.

Mr. Kirbow. We are asking them to proscribe against anything that they can convince an oversight committee in the future is essential in the trend of that time.

Senator Huddleston. Shouldn't we say that the time has come for a whole review of cover to see whether or not they can find some better ways?

Mr. Maxwell. We might say that the first large scale study in '48 and '49 of the Agency, done by Mr. Dulles, among others, recommended very strongly that there be more unofficial cover.

I think the Agency has been under considerable pressure throughout its existence to do that, and as Joe pointed out there are certain limits to what it has been able to do.

Senator Huddleston. Well, I think rather than suggest what ought to be more or less official or unofficial cover, the whole matter ought to be studied immediately by the Agency, and see if they can find some new ways consistent with all the restraints and prohibitions that the Committee has placed upon them.

(General laughter.)

Senator Huddleston. All right, where does that leave us here today as we close out today's session?

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, might I suggest that in keeping with an earlier discussion today, that because it is a summary of findings as well as an introduction, that perhaps while we are nice and fresh, tomorrow we might take up the introductory section prepared by the Staff Director, so that if we change it much, we either make the rest of our --

Senator Huddleston. Have any of the other members seen it at all, Bill?

Mr. Miller. Just Senator Mathias.

Senator Huddleston. All right, do you want to meet at 10:00 o'clock in the morning?

Mr. Aaron. Are we going to terminate now?

Senator Huddleston. They've got a vote going and it's 5:10. I think we'd better.

(Whereupon, at 5:10 o'clock p.m., the Subcommittee recessed subject to the call of the Chair.)

- - -

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10133

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-39

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/25/1976
PAGES : 40

SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY
COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/22/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10133
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-39

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/25/76
PAGES : 40
SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, METHODOLOGY

COMMITTEE BUSINESS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 324

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TOP SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Vol. 2 OF 3

The United States Senate

R2873

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

324-13

Thursday, March 25, 1976

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

COMMITTEE MEETING

- - -

Thursday, March 25, 1976

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:43 o'clock p.m., in Room S-407, the Capitol, the Honorable Frank Church (Chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Church (presiding), Mondale, Huddleston, Hart of Michigan, Morgan, Hart of Colorado, Tower, Mathias, Baker and Schweiker.

Also present: William G. Miller, Staff Director; Frederick A. O. Scwharz, Jr., Chief Counsel; and Charles Kirbow, Elizabeth Culbreath, Michael Madican, Charles Lombard, William Bader, Ted Rolson, Burt Wides, Walter Ricks, Rick Inderfurth, John Bayly, David Aaron, Elliot Maxwell, Joseph Dennin, Margaret Carpenter, Martha Talley, Paul Wallach and Jim Johnston, Professional Staff Members.

PROCEEDINGS

The Chairman. We will soon have a quorum. Why don't we begin with the Recommendation No. 43 on page 77, having to do with academics.

My understanding is that this recommendation has been redrafted along the lines of the Committee's recommendations, and as it now stands it calls for the CIA academics and the institution to be informed, and for any student being recruited to be so informed.

There is a choice in the latter case in informing him before he is paid or informing him before he leaves the U.S. Will you explain that to me, please?

Mr. Aaron. In the course of our discussion about the recruitment of students off campuses, there were two categories of concern. One was for the integrity of the institutions themselves, and the second was, in turn, for the students that might be involved.

To take the second one first, the Committee received testimony that some foreign students recruited as agents for the CIA were brought into kind of a holding status at a certain point in which they were working for, if you will, CIA proprietaries or CIA front organizations where they might conduct some operational activity, provide some information, under the impression that they were not working for the CIA but for a company or, I think as one put it, I think, a group of investors.

Concern was expressed by the Committee in considering this testimony that this might be rather severe for the student once he discovered the fact he had been working for the CIA, or should his government find that out, so that it was an element of coercion to hire somebody under, if you will, false pretenses.

That second proviso, then, in effect says that we may pitch and recruit a student as an agent, but you must, when you do that, when you really bring him into an operational relationship with the Agency, he should be so informed and not brought into this sort of --

The Chairman. Let's go off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. The question that I have on this recommendation is why shouldn't the foreign student being recruited by the CIA be informed of his relationship with the CIA at the time that that relationship is established?

Why do you condition it upon payment or leaving the country?

Senator Huddleston. Well, I was going to say there are many, many initial contacts that do not advance maybe much further than that, and for the CIA to have to be exposed maybe on each of those might not be reasonable. What we have tried to do is to make the wittingness be known about the time that they are to perform some service. Up to that time they are still maybe prospects, where they may not have been recruited.

The Chairman. Which do you think the Committee should adopt of these two options?

Mr. Aaron. Actually, one could use both of these. I think the point is that the danger to the student, if there is any, comes when he leaves the United States, either to return to his own country or perhaps someplace else, but the commitment or involvement which ought to be witting really needs to come when he starts being paid, when he becomes in fact, or has a real relationship with the Agency. You could really establish both standards, because it might well be that he could leave the country but not have yet been paid, and not really have a relationship that was anything more than kind of an association or an option, something of that character.

The Chairman. Well, what is the will of the Committee as to these two options?

Senator Huddleston. Well, this represents a distillation of what we have been proposing as Senator Mondale develops for us, I believe, and I would move that we adopt this report, and use both of these, an either/or.

The Chairman. Whichever comes first, huh, either before he is given payment of any kind or leaves the United States, whichever may occur first.

Would that be satisfactory to the Committee?

All right. Without objection, then, that will be the decision of the Committee.

What else do you have?

Mr. Aaron. We have two other recommendations.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Mr. Chairman, could I be recorded in opposition to this?

The Chairman. Yes, Senator Hart of Colorado is recorded as in opposition.

Mr. Madigan. Senator, there is a proxy in opposition as well.

The Chairman. Senator Baker wants to be recorded in opposition as well.

Senator Mathias. I would, I think Senator Goldwater had a very strong proxy that I read into the record on this subject at the last meeting.

Mr. Kirbow. Against restricting any use of academics.

Senator Mathias. I don't have a proxy with him today, but I feel his position ought to be noted.

The Chairman. Very well, then, with those particular reservations made part of the record, the Committee will approve the amended Recommendation No. 43.

We move then to Recommendation 45 on page 78.

Mr. Aaron. We attempted to redraft this along the lines as we were instructed, I believe.

As it came out, it would prohibit the subsidy of any writing, publication, distribution within the United States or its territories, of any book, magazine, article and so forth. It has been pointed out that this formulation would prevent the writing of a book, even in a foreign language, within the United States, to be published abroad and distributed abroad, or any such materials from being published within the United States, even if they were distributed abroad.

Now, that may be too restrictive and go beyond what the Committee intended, and so therefore we wanted to raise this here, to get a better understanding of what we were attempting to accomplish.

As I understand it, what we were -- it was not clear, but it is possible that what the Committee had in mind was that any writing, publication for distribution in the United States would have been the appropriate formulation for this, and if that is correct, we can make a very easy fix.

Senator Morgan. Why wouldn't it?

The Chairman. Why wouldn't it accomplish it if we say that by statute the CIA should be prohibited from subsidizing the writing or production or distribution within the United States or its territories of any book, magazine, article, publication, film, or video or audio tape unless attributed to the CIA.

Wouldn't that take care of it?

Mr. Aaron. If that is what the Committee intends, that would take care of it.

Senator Mondale. Publicly attributed.

Mr. Aaron. Publicly.

Senator Huddleston. That is getting at what really we are trying to do.

The Chairman. How about the balance of 45, "nor should the CIA be permitted to undertake any activity to accomplish indirectly such distribution within the United States or its territories.

Well, I think that follows and should be a part of it.

Very well.

Senator Mathias. Mr. Chairman, I wonder, while we are in this area, if you could refresh my recollection, whether "grantees" in No. 44 applies to both foreign and American grantees.

Mr. Bader. Yes, it would, Senator, under this language, because the Fulbright program or the -- such government-sponsored programs to include, too, include foreigners. As I understood it from the discussion of the Committee, the intent here was to ensure that public funds that were publicly devoted to a specific purpose were so spent and that was the issue that was involved here, was the appropriated funds for educational programs be kept to educational programs and not to be used operationally. But the language here would certainly include foreigners.

Mr. Maxwell. Bill, would this prohibit the use of any individual person who is sponsored by an educational or cultural program, although not fully funded by the Federal Government?

Senator Tower. This is a question I wanted to ask.

Could one of our networks pick up a portion of a film broadcast abroad by the CIA and run it as part of a documentary to show what they are doing and that kind of thing?

The Chairman. I think the way it has been modified that is not a problem. This says "by statute the CIA should be prohibited from subsidizing writings," or production.

Senator Tower. That is what I mean, you are not precluded from showing it, but it should not be done under CIA auspices or government auspices.

The Chairman. And it should not be written for the purpose of being shown in this country.

Senator Tower. Yes.

Mr. Aaron. Nor under the indirect clause, I think, nor should the CIA go to CBS and say "we've got this wonderful film."

The Chairman. Using a network for the purpose of bringing it back. That would be an indirect way, and that would be wrong also.

Senator Tower. I understand, yes.

The Chairman. Well, then, if everybody understands the way we have recommended the change in 45, without objection the Committee approves it.

Let us go, then, to the next subject, the structural changes, the role of the DCI on page 61.

Mr. Aaron. I'm sorry, Mr. Chairman. We have one other question, that would be Recommendation 47. The Committee agreed to extend --

Mr. Kirbow. Excuse me, Mr. Aaron. Senator Mathias's question was on recommendation 44.

The Chairman. Were you satisfied with the answer?

Senator Mathias. Well, the question that was left floating was what about a student who is in a program which is primarily funded by some private institution, although there may be some small element --

Mr. Maxwell. For instance, any major university that sponsored an individual coming under 44, which receives Federal Government funds, might be barred under a broad reading of 44, and it might be helpful to make that intent clearer in 44, if that is a concern of the Committee.

Mr. Aaron. I think this goes to the grantee as opposed to the institution.

Now, if it is true --

The Chairman. It is the grantee that is receiving funds.

Mr. Aaron. If you have a grantee receiving funds from more than one source, then he receives them from more than one source, but if he is a grantee of a Federal program --

Mr. Maxwell. But the problem is receiving funds through educational and/or cultural programs.

For instance, if he were totally funded by the University of Maryland, which received financial support from the United States Government, arguably he is covered by that. It is not that he is receiving Federal grants. I think that is the intention.

Mr. Aaron. It should be U.S. Government educational --

Mr. Bader. Would that help?

The Chairman. Through educational and/or cultural programs sponsored by the United States Government. Wouldn't that take care of it?

Senator Huddleston. Well, grantees who are receiving directly from the United States Government or through educational or cultural programs supported by the United States Government.

The Chairman. Sponsored by.

Senator Huddleston. Well, in other words, whether he is getting them directly himself as a grantee, or whether he is receiving them from an educational program that is itself supported by the Federal Government.

Senator Mathias. I don't want to prolong this, but what about a program which is really directed right at this area which has been referred to, the armed services military educational operate?

Mr. Bader. I'm sorry, sir?

Mr. Aaron. Well, let me see if I understand the different examples. The student leader grant or the political leader grant that the State Department has where they bring foreigners to the United States for a period of time, presumably to acquaint them with the country and what have you, under this language those people while on the grant would be immune from being recruited by the CIA. This doesn't mean that they couldn't recruit them at some other point in their careers, but that during the period of that grant they would not be in effect brought here and used for that purpose. That is, I think, part of the intent of this particular provision.

nd 1

gin]2

Senator Mathias. Let me give you another example. Say you have an Iranian naval officer who comes over here to Fort McNair.

Is he fair game?

Mr. Miller. That is not educational or cultural. It would be military.

Senator Huddleston. I believe if he were going through the War College --

Senator Tower. If he were going through the National War College, how do you classify that?

Senator Mathias. He could come to the industrial base or civilian --

Mr. Kirbow. He could go to the Industrial College or the War College.

Senator Schweiker. Can you exclude military training?

Senator Mathias. I don't know. I don't know what you want.

Senator Huddleston. We are training a lot of them or we entertain a lot of them.

Senator Schweiker. It seems to me you have to put some proviso about military training in there.

The Chairman. Well, it depends upon what the policy should be. I had thought the attempt here was to immunize any foreigner who comes here on a program sponsored by the Government of the United States and receives a grant for that program, to immunize him during that period from being recruited by the CIA.

Senator Schweiker. Well, if he is here for military purposes, then we know it is a military relationship, I would think that is suspect.

The Chairman. Would you want him subject to recruitment?

Senator Schweiker. Well, if he comes over here militarily, you are so close to him, what is the difference?

Mr. Aaron. Well, I think the point of the prohibition really is this, that these programs are created for one particular purpose. They are considered by the Congress for that particular purpose and the funds are voted for that particular purpose. If the programs are then used for another purpose by the Government, that was considered and suggested that that second purpose should not be used.

Now, if you want to exempt certain categories here and say, well, the military is a different thing, you can do that. You can find a way to express that.

The Chairman. Well, it could be done. If you want to recruit foreign military officers, we can bring them over to put them through the War College.

Mr. Miller. What other training?

Senator Huddleston. Well, we have a steady stream at Fort Knox, Kentucky of military people. I don't know what kind of training. Most of them are, of course, are from friendly nations to start with.

I don't know, you know, military. Once a person puts on a uniform, he becomes fair game in a number of ways. He gives up a lot of protections that civilians have.

Senator Schweiker. You allow him to recruit -- under other policies here we allow them to recruit foreign military officers because I think that's an even more valid relationship than the students, but I make it clear that what we don't want to do, which is to abort our honest to goodness cultural exchange and other programs.

The Chairman. This could be done by saying "By statute the CIA should be prohibited from using operationally grantees programs is much clearer.

Senator Schweiker. Can we talk about Defense and military training programs at the same time? It seems to me that's the criteria, bringing a guy over here and educating him on defense and military must be to the advantage of our military, so you know what the relationship is to begin with. You are not unwittingly using the guy. You are pretty witting.

If the guy goes to the American War College, he is pretty fair game.

The Chairman. You can write an exception for the American War College and all of the military and civilian personnel receiving training under the auspices of the United States armed services who are fair game.

(General laughter.)

Senator Huddleston. Except I agree with Dave, that is a little awkward to zero in on this particular group. Couldn't we find some way --

Mr. Kirbow. Mr. Chairman, I think it is not intended this apply only to foreign students coming this way, you include all American students going in the other direction, or under any other grant.

Mr. Aaron. The intention of the provision initially, as a matter of fact, its primary effect was for American students traveling abroad.

Senator Tower. Well, I see no problem with that. I know I don't have the votes here, but --

The Chairman. Which part do you have?

Senator Tower. Well, not being able to use American students abroad on some grant to gather intelligence, when most of the people the damned Soviets send over here on these cultural exchanges are really clued into the government program, indoctrinated and briefed thoroughly before they get here. I am not going to tie our hands like that. The rest of you can, but I'm not going to.

I will write a vigorous dissent on that.

Senator Morgan. May I make a comment on that?

I'm inclined to agree, and I'm also inclined to agree that we are going so far in our foreign intelligence that we are endangering the whole report, so you make that kind of an argument on the floor of the Senate on this and on two or three other things. I'm not picking at any of them. I am just sort of accepting the recommendations of the Subcommittee, but my reaction has been that maybe we are getting a little bit so far afield that we may endanger the acceptance of our whole report.

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston?

Senator Huddleston. I would just say this, that the Subcommittee has been cognizant of that situation. I think it is because of that that some of these recommendations are already softer than some of us thought would be appropriate, and this is one of the fields. There was a considerable amount of support of the idea that academics be off limits, period, and students in order to protect the integrity of our entire academic community, and it is the realization that if we continued to close the possibilities for recruitment, and the adverse effect that that would have, maybe, on our ability to gather intelligence, that some of us backed off of this, what would be the optimum, we think, position to take. So this already represents somewhat of a retreat from the principle that some would like to see established, and in this case I think we are again faced with the question of whether or not we want a government-sponsored program to enjoy a high level of integrity so that the people who are participating in it and the American taxpayer who is supporting it can have some confidence that it is doing what it was set out to do and what the publicly announced purposes of it are.

And if we don't do that, if we permit it to be used as an operational intelligence operation, then it seems to me like we ought to announce that, that that ought to be one of the purposes so stated in the grant to start with, while we are likely to get an education, it is also likely if we can we will have you gather intelligence for us.

Senator Morgan. Well, Dee, I think you are getting off base for us. There is nothing that says they are required to do it.

Senator Huddleston. That is correct.

Senator Morgan. In other words, we are not going to condition this grant on --

Senator Huddleston. Well --

Senator Morgan. Let me finish out, now. What you are leading up to is you are saying we are going to condition this grant on your cooperation with other governmental agencies.

Senator Huddleston. I am saying that is not beyond the realm of possibility in some cases, if we don't put some prohibition.

Senator Morgan. Well, I think there may be times, especially in the light of what we heard in the past year, when, you know, we might make that assumption, but I don't think that on the whole when you are dealing with the United States Government that you can really assume --

Senator Hudddleston. But you can't assume he is not, either.

The Chairman. But what worries me is you get a student who in good faith goes abroad for the purpose of study and qualifies for a Government grant, and he depends upon that money and then he, when he gets over there and wants to complete his studies, he is approached, and he can be approached in such a way that he can be made to feel that if he does not throw in with the CIA and do this and that, he may find that the grant will be cut off or he can't complete the study as he intended. He feels a certain dependency upon the money that he is receiving, and he has an expectation he wants to fulfill. And thus he is in a very vulnerable position when he is approached.

Senator Morgan. Well, that is a persuasive argument, but let me ask you, have we had any evidence that that sort of thing has happened?

The Chairman. Well, I don't know.

Senator Morgan. Well, it is a very persuasive argument, but I just wonder if we should, in the absence of abuse on that part, whether or not we should go this far.

The Chairman. What about it, Mr. Bader?

Mr. Bader. Mr. Chairman, I might say in partial response to Senator Tower's remarks that the Agency's basic instruction for the operational use of individuals, 50-10, specifically prohibits the operational use of Fulbright grantees. They have already made that decision in 1967, and reconfirmed in 1973. I assume part of that came from agitation at the time in '67 and Senator Fulbright's own determination that that program not be used for operational purposes.

It was the original intent of this language to extend that prohibition, which is now a matter of public record, this -- actually, that part of the instruction is in the public record now under the Freedom of Information Act, that part of 50-10 that talks about Fulbright grantees. It was the original intent of the recommendation that is now before you to extend that prohibition on Fulbright grantees to all of those under the Fulbright-Hayes legislation. Under the specifics of the Agency's interpretation, it makes a distinction between those students, or graduate students, or professors selected by the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and the rest -- and the rest includes cultural leader grants and the like.

Now, perhaps it might be the sensible thing in the language like this to confine it to the Fulbright-Hayes Act, which is the basic legislation which deals with this.

Senator Schweiker. How many others would you have outside of that? Would you have a lot of other programs?

Mr. Bader. Other programs?

Senator Schweiker. What percent of the total picture is the Fulbright-Hayes Act?

Mr. Bader. I really wouldn't know, Senator. I think it is the major part of it, actually. You could have a National Endowment for the Humanities fellowship in which a person would go overseas, and this, under the language we now have before you, that would include those individuals.

The Chairman. Well, I can see how vulnerable a grantee might be when approached, and if we have already written into law a prohibition that relates to the Fulbright scholars, I should think it ought to apply to any others that are receiving educational or cultural grants from the United States.

Senator Tower. That is not a law, that is a regulation.

Mr. Aaron. And CIA's own regulation.

The Chairman. But then it was adopted as part of the law, I thought you said.

Mr. Bader. No, sir. I said it has been made public through the Freedom of Information Act. This is an internal directive of the Agency, and as the Senators know, those directives are certainly subject to change, so there really are, in effect, two basic parts of this recommendation. One was to commit the present internal prohibitions of the CIA to law, and then to extend it, and the issue before the Committee, in addition to whether there should be an extension, is sort of how far and what language should be used to portray or convey that prohibition?

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do we have anything from the Agency on this?

Senator Huddleston. I think you've got to weigh, to some extent, the value of the two programs, of our cultural exchange programs' importance. I think the public knowledge of any one individual becomes known as a spy who is associated with a program, it has a devastating effect, in my judgment, on the program and on all students who are participating in it. I just think the risk is too great.

Senator Tower. Well, my question at that point would be to what extent does our cultural exchange program impact on people behind the Iron Curtain, to convince them as people that we are nice folks, that they ought to influence their government to be a little bit more friendly toward us? It doesn't have any impact at all in a totalitarian state, none.

It is really a one way street.

Now, I am all for cultural exchange, simply because I like to watch Russian ballet dancers, especially females, but the fact of the matter is cultural change does more to soften up the American public toward the Iron Curtain than the other way around.

The Chairman. That is an argument as to the merits of cultural exchange, and how you view ballerinas, but the question here we face is whether or not we should put American students in a position where they feel they must --

Senator Tower. I don't think they must be coerced.

The Chairman. But there is an element of intimidation involved if they are receiving a grant from the government.

Senator Tower. Well, I would favor a specific prohibition against making that a condition of getting a grant or scholarship of some sort.

Senator Baker. Or continuing one.

Senator Tower. Or continuing one.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Well, John, what do you say to Dee's point? If my roommate turns out to be a spy, it is automatically assumed I am, and every guy in the outfit. What does this do to the American that is over there, all of them? I don't think that is right.

Senator Tower. Well, I think in many instances American operations abroad that have been completely innocent have been labeled as spy operations for propaganda purposes by the other side, and they will do that if they choose to. They will not do it if they choose not to do it.

The Chairman. But you have many of these students who are not inside Russia or in a Communist country. We have educational and cultural programs in Third World countries and in the western world.

Senator Tower. I understand that.

The Chairman. And there, if someone is caught engaging in a CIA action of some kind, then everybody is contaminated. The whole thing then becomes suspect in France or England or wherever it might be.

Senator Tower. What if the grantee comes to CIA and says, I have made some contacts over here that I think would be of value in terms of passing intelligence along to you?

Are you going to turn him down and say, no, you are on a Fulbright grant, we can't let you do that?

Senator Huddleston. No, they could use his information to contact somebody else. He would not necessarily be operational.

Mr. Bader. Operational use, under the Agency's definition, has two major elements to it. First is that the purposes to be accomplished, and objectives, are established by the Agency, and the second is that the individual involved is tasked to do that, ordered to do it, if you please.

Operational use does not, by the Agency's definition, involve individuals who would come to the Central Intelligence Agency to voluntarily give whatever information that they think would be of value to the Agency, the kind of information that the Contacts Division normally would like to have.

Senator Tower. Yes, but once having done that, the Agency determines this person is valuable and they observe this person and they put him under a control officer.

Mr. Bader. Then he would come under this condition. That would be operational use.

Senator Huddleston. It would not include a debriefing of him when he came back.

Mr. Kirbow. Nor could he be asked to go to a single meeting more and report back on the very same subject that he just reported on, which might be a critical target to the United States Governments' national security.

Mr. Bader. Once he is operational, he has to accomplish a particular task or purpose, then he is operationally used under the terms.

Senator Tower. Even if he initiates the contact with the Agency in the first place.

Mr. Bader. Only, Senator, if there is a second stage in this, if the individual --

Senator Tower. I know. The second stage may be the most important.

Mr. Bader. It certainly may, and at that stage, under the Agency's definition, he would be operationally --

Senator Huddleston. I can't believe the Agency wouldn't have another entre of some sort.

Senator Tower. What kind of widespread abuse are we trying to prevent?

Has there been widespread abuse?

Mr. Bader. No, sir, there has not.

Senator Tower. There has not been.

Mr. Aaron. This occurs.

Mr. Bader. This occurs, yes.

Senator Hart of Michigan. What is the benefit -- there has been no abuse, but what benefit?

Senator Mondale. It's not -- that's not the word. It's not no abuse. It's not widespread.

Mr. Bader. The term is "not widespread."

Senator Tower. I said "widespread."

Mr. Bader. Yes, I said "widespread."

Senator Hart of Michigan. The question is, what benefits? Do we know?

Senator Huddleston. That is very difficult to ascertain.

Senator Tower. Significant abuse? Any record of abuse?

What record of abuse do we have?

Senator Hart of Michigan. Any record of significant benefit.

Mr. Bader. A record of significant abuse in the sense that Fulbright students or those under American educational programs have been used operationally. There is an extensive record over the years, but it is not of major importance to the Agency.

The Chairman. Well, apparently the Agency itself has restricted or has put the Fulbright scholars off limits, right?

Mr. Bader. That is correct, sir.

The Chairman. Well, then, --

Senator Hart of Michigan. That must be the result of a conclusion that either they were not beneficial or they didn't want to poison the program.

Why doesn't that reasoning apply to these others?

The Chairman. Well, I think it does, but we might as well come to a vote on it and decide whether we want to keep it or strike it.

Senator Huddleston. Well, to bring it to a vote, Mr. Chairman, I would move that Paragraph 44 --

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I would just kind of make one inquiry, I believe, and I already know the answer to it, that even though we are voting on this section, I believe the arrangement we had previously, that is to say, that none of this is final, and certainly not until we hear the comments of the Agency.

Is that still observed?

The Chairman. Yes, that is still the situation. Nothing becomes final until the final vote is taken, and anything can be reconsidered.

Senator Baker. Then we are going to have comments from the Agency. When, Bill, tomorrow?

Mr. Miller. Staff is going to get them tomorrow afternoon out there, and they are going to give it to us in writing, I think, tomorrow afternoon.

The Chairman. I suspect that the Agency will oppose many of these recommendations.

Senator Huddleston. No question about that.

The Chairman. I hope that won't be the single basis upon which we decide for or against.

Senator Huddleston. My motion includes, Mr. Chairman, that we exempt the military.

Senator Schweiker. You say it will include --

Senator Huddleston. That will be in my motion, in 44, that we exclude foreign military people.

The Chairman. All right.

The motion is made that Recommendation No. 44 be approved with the exception that it does not apply to foreign military personnel coming into this country, is that right?

Senator Huddleston. Yes.

The Chairman. Let's have a vote.

Do you want to call the roll, Mr. Miller?

Mr. Miller. Yes.

Mr. Hart of Michigan.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Morgan.

Senator Morgan. No.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Hart of Colorado?

Senator Hart of Colorado. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Baker.

Senator Baker. No.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mathias?

Senator Tower. You missed Goldwater. You missed Senator Goldwater.

Goldwater no by written proxy.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mathias is in the phone booth.

Mr. Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Tower?

Senator Tower. No.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Church?

The Chairman. Aye.

Senator Tower. I don't think it is going to affect the outcome, so I ask consent that he be recorded.

Mr. Miller. The ayes have it. It is six to four. Mr. Mathias is still in the phone booth.

Senator Tower. I ask consent that he be allowed to be recorded. It might change the outcome.

The Chairman. All right.

Let's go to 61 next.

Mr. Aaron. The next issue is on page 78A, Recommendation 47.

The Committee previously agreed to extend the CIA prohibitions on the use of media to the use of any person who regularly contributes material to publications and those involved directly or indirectly in the editing or setting policy and direction in the direction of the activities of U.S. media organizations.

What was unclear was whether this was the recommendation of the Committee to the CIA that it amend its regulations to do that, or whether this was to be embodied in statute as had been recommended in Recommendation 46.

ε 2
egin 3

The Chairman. I'm sorry, I have lost you.

Mr. Aaron. You will find the words "proposed statutory

CIA prohibition" and you see the words "proposed" and "statutory" are in brackets, reflecting uncertainty on our part as to whether it was the intention of the Committee that this prohibition simply be a CIA regulation or embodied in the statute, which is recommended in the recommendation of procedures.

The Chairman. Senator Huddleston, do you have any comment on this?

Senator Huddleston. I have a personal feeling that when we go too far statutorily in dealing with the press, that we sometimes get on thin ice. I don't know whether it would be appropriate to make some suggestion here that the press itself initiate certain standards and methods. Many of them in the press believe they ought to have anyhow.

I think the recommendation for the CIA is probably sufficient.

The Chairman. And let that be handled as a matter of CIA regulations.

Senator Huddleston. Rather than by statute.

The Chairman. Rather than by statute.

Is that acceptable to the Committee?

Senator Tower. I am sorry, Mr. Chairman. Would you repeat the proposition?

The Chairman. The proposition is that the Committee recommend that the CIA, by regulation, handle this matter rather than make it statutory.

Senator Tower. Well, I oppose it either by statute or by regulation, so I would suggest that those who favor the concept determine whether they want to do it by either statute or regulation. I am opposed to doing it by either.

Senator Schweiker. I would like to see it by statute if we are going to do it.

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, does this make any distinction between domestic media and -- on the media located physically within the United States and the U.S. media outside the United States?

The Chairman. No, it does not. It simply attempts to prevent the CIA from involving itself with personnel who are part of the U.S. media, whether here or abroad, as I read it.

Senator Tower. Okay, now, let me ask you a question.

What is there is a Reuters reporter in Moscow who is cooperating with us, and Reuters contributes regularly to U.S. media?

Senator Schweiker. We spent an hour on that. They are excluded. We argued that for an hour and I lost the point, so they would be excluded.

Senator Huddleston. This basically just extends to CIA's own prohibition that they had initiated against what we would normally think of as working journalists, and includes into it the executives and editors and those who may be freelancing.

Senator Tower. What if we got a freelancer for Time Magazine who is indeed a foreign national? Does he come under this prohibition?

Senator Huddleston. If he has some regular association with Time he would be.

Mr. Aaron. Under the Agency's current regulations and own prohibitions, a foreign journalist working for Time Magazine oversees would be prohibited from being used by them for operational purposes. That is their own position today. This would extend that prohibition to someone who is, what in the trade jargon is a stringer, or --

Senator Tower. This would include a stringer?

Senator Schweiker. It wouldn't cover Reuters or some other foreign news service.

Mr. Aaron. It would also apply to a foreigner who was, for example, if there were such a thing as an editor in the Paris Bureau of Time Magazine. I don't think they work that way, but say there were such a person, it would apply to him as well.

Senator Tower. What about the Paris Trib? What about that?

Mr. Aaron. A U.S. media organization.

Mr. Kirbow. It is excluded.

Senator Schweiker. That is a subsidiary of an American company.

Senator Tower. What about Reader's Digest Selecciones, which is their Spanish publication? Is that included?

Mr. Aaron. I assume so.

The Chairman. Well, according to the CIA's own restrictions, it is excluded now, except this would simply extend the exclusion to stringers, those who do not have regular employment.

Senator Huddleston. And editors and executives.

The Chairman. And editors and executives.

Mr. Bader. The present restriction, Senator Tower, that has been extended by the Agency in February, went to accredited journalists, accredited to U.S. media organizations. The only difference between this prohibition and the one already assumed by the Agency is that this moves further accreditation to include those who regularly contribute to U.S. media organizations or are a part of their structure.

Mr. Kirbow. The management structure.

Mr. Bader. The management structure, whether they contribute material to or are involved directly or indirectly in the preparation of material.

The Chairman. Well, I think if we are going to do it, we had better decide on the policy. If we want to keep the CIA out of U.S. media both at home and abroad, and we want to extend that to stringers as well, then I think it ought to be done by statute rather than just a recommendation by the Committee that the CIA do it, because the CIA regulations may or may not issue, and they can be changed at any time without notice.

Senator Tower. Well, Mr. Chairman, aren't we talking about two different things?

I don't mean foreign, you know, our foreign correspondents abroad writing CIA propaganda for American publications. We are talking about operations here, operational use, not use to write some article that the CIA wants planted in an American publication. That's not what I'm talking about. I'm talking about using him to gather intelligence, and it goes back directly to the CIA which doesn't serve as a publication.

The Chairman. But operational use can include many things, including writing propaganda and usually would if it involved journalists.

Senator Tower. Well, I think we have already got a prohibition on that.

Mr. Bader. The prohibition that the Central Intelligence Agency has self-imposed extends across the line from cover to placement to all operational use of individuals, accredited individuals to American media organizations. As I say, the difference between what the Agency has already taken upon itself and what this recommendation involves is this recommendation extends it to individuals who are not accredited.

There are a number -- the figures that the Committee has which have been authenticated by the Agency, that there are some 60 Americans who are affiliated or are part of American media organizations around the world, part of a larger network of some 400 journalists and the like who are part of the Agency's overall media asset program, and of those 60 under the Agency's present prohibitions, the ones recently imposed, it would go to just one third of those individuals.

This prohibition would extend it from the one third to all because the other two thirds include people that are under cover, who are in management, and who are not under the technical term accredited to U.S. media organizations.

Mr. Chairman, I might say if the Committee would look at the Recommendation 46 that goes before 47, perhaps it might bear in mind that the recommendation in 46, which takes the present Agency prohibitions and says that they should be established in law, if in 47, if the Committee should so decide to do it by recommendation, that they change their internal prohibitions, there will be a contrast between 46 and 47.

The Chairman. Well, let's have a vote. Let's go back to 46, and I take it that the recommendation is that this prohibition that the CIA has imposed upon itself ought to be written in statutory form.

Mr. Bader. That is the recommendation.

The Chairman. All right. Let's have a vote on that first of all, and then we'll take up 47.

Mr. Miller, will you call the roll?

Senator Huddleston. Mr. Chairman, I think I am probably the only one that has suggested that it should not be statutory, and I would just point out that that might be a result of the fact that I am in the media, so I would withdraw that unless somebody else wants to make that recommendation.

The Chairman. I thought yours went to 47.

This is 46.

Senator Huddleston. It did, but they both relate to the media.

The Chairman. Well, let's take a vote on 46, which would recommend that Congress enact a statute conforming to the CIA's self-imposed prohibition on U.S. journalists or foreign journalists accredited to the U.S. media abroad.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Hart of Michigan.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Did you want a roll call?

The Chairman. Yes.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Huddleston?

Senator Huddleston. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Morgan.

Senator Morgan. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Hart of Colorado.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Baker.

Senator Baker. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Goldwater.

Senator Tower. No by proxy.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mathias.

(No response.)

Mr. Miller. Mr. Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Tower.

Senator Tower. No.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Church..

The Chairman. Aye.

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Mathias be recorded. It will not be changed.

The Chairman. All right.

Now can we go to 47 and vote it up or down on the understanding that this recommendation having to do with stringers and the use of executives would not take statutory form but it would be a recommendation to the CIA without such regulation.

Ms. Culbreath. Mr. Chairman, could I say just a word, please sir, with regard to whether it was done by directive or regulation or by statute. Yesterday one of the general recommendation that we discussed and the staff was asked to rewrite went to the question of any changes or waivers of Agency directives or recommendations, and as considered by the Committee yesterday. The agreement was -- and if that proposal is one of the general recommendations goes through any waiver of an existing regulation or any amendment of an existing regulation, that affected the significant policies or programs of the Agency, would have to go immediately to NSC and to the oversight committee so that they would know.

So what I am saying is that if you had a directive and there was a change in something like this which would be significant, there would have to be notice to the oversight committee and to the NSC.

The Chairman. Can we have a vote, then, on 47 before we go down to the Senate to this roll call.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Hart of Michigan.

Senator Hart of Michigan. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mondale.

Senator Mondale. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Huddleston.

Senator Huddleston. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Morgan.

Senator Morgan. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Hart of Colorado.

Senator Hart of Colorado. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Baker.

Senator Baker. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Goldwater.

Senator Tower. No by proxy.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Mathias.

(No response.)

Mr. Miller. Mr. Schweiker.

Senator Schweiker. Aye.

Mr. Miller. Mr. Tower.

Senator Tower. No.

Mr.Miller. Mr. Church.

The Chairman. Aye.

Senator Tower. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that Senator Mathias be allowed to vote.

The Chairman. That will be so ordered.

All right, let's take a short recess and come back.

(Whereupon, at 4:05 o'clock p.m. the Committee recessed to reconvene at 10:00 o'clock a.m., Friday, March 26, 1976.)

- - -

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10137

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-43

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : DRAFT REPORT

DATE : 09/08/1975
PAGES : 207

SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/05/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 349

Date : 08/07/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10137
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-43

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : DRAFT REPORT
DATE : 09/08/75
PAGES : 207
SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 349

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

(Draft--9/8/75)

Box 349

The "Executive Action" Capability

Along with the question of authorization for actual assassination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element, the development of an assassination capability.

(a) Introduction

Sometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans) instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish an "executive action capability" which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51; Harvey 6/25/75, pp. 36-37.) At some time within the same period, Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.

Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the "generalized" capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75, p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52).

"Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, defined by the testimony before the Committee as a project for research into developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, including a "capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75, p. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action on the spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The Inspector General's Report described executive action as a "general stand-by capability" to carry out assassination when required (I.G., p. 37). The project was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*

A single agent ("asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project, but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts. Richard Helms described QJ/WIN's "capability":

> "If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 53).

Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot "individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QJ/WIN reported that a potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins" (CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches).

However, Harvey testified that:

> "during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project . . . no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassination, and no even tentative targeting or target list was ever drawn." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.)

Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the problems and requirements of assassination and developing a standby assassination capability; more specifically, it involved "spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that "after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (I.G. pp. 40-41.)*

---

* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs. One was the executive action assassination capability. The other was another program which is not part of the subject matter of this report. (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section with general responsibility for such programs.) This second program was genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.)

(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project

There is general agreement on one fact: at some point in early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which the evidence varied widely.

Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that "the White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability and the Inspector General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated

that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project.

---

* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d), *infra*.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial

---

* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his notations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testified as follows:

> Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?
>
> Harvey: Yes, it is.
>
> Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?
>
> Harvey: . . . . [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver

discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10).

> had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial instructions to establish an executive action capability:

> the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, our posture, going back, if you will, even to the fundamental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38).

The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action project as follows:

> Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability.... Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turnover to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961.

Harvey testified that the "executive action" capability was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35). His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, preserved at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness", "the magic button", and "never mention word assassination". (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75).*

The Inspector General's Report did not mention these notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's initial assignment of the "executive action" project to Harvey, it referred to another set of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, "The White House had twice urged me to create such a capability" (I.G., P. 37). Harvey also testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial discussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to Bissell.

---

* Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his concern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) counter-action and monitor if they are blamed." (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).

The following testimony regarding the relationship between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee:

Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indicated that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an executive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that he "particularly remember[ed]" that Bissell said that he received "more than one" urging from the White House (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p. 59). However, he had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House." No specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been "improper" for him to have asked Bissell who he had talked to and "grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37).

Bissell: Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harvey to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). However, Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in the White House as the origin" of his instruction to Harvey (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51).

During the course of several appearances before the Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had been urged by the White House to develop an executive action capability.

In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" quotation of Harvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in his initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was true that he was asked by the White House to create a general stand-by assassination capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49).

Based again upon Harvey's missing notes ("White House urging") and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge their accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy (Id., 6/9/75, p. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (Id., p. 51), Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from whom such a request was most likely to have come (Id., p. 53) because they were "the two members of the White House staff who were closest to CIA operations." (Id., p. 54).

At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: "there is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46).

When Bissell returned to the Committee on July 17 and 22, his testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier appearances, was that there was no White House urging for the creation of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the "research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.

First, he was shown the Harvey notes which had been preserved and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated Harvey had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Those dates -- just 5 days after the change of administration -- made Bissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignment to [Harvey] was taken as a result of White House urging or consultation" (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). Bissell said that Bundy did not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before the Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23). Bissell added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new administration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23).

Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he was convinced by telephone conversations with Rostow and Bundy that based upon Rostow's duties -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with covert action -- he "never discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22).

As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone contact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22). But Bissell confirmed his original testimony (6/9/75, pp. _____) that he did not brief Bundy on the actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell testified:

> Q. Would you think the development of a capability to kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the President?
>
> Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the limited scope of activities within that project, I would not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35).

Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted "capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). Bissell said that although he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" mentioned Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51).

Bissell said his impression was that Bundy, in addition to expressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, might have actually given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28). Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30).

> Q: ... I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was, in your view, tantamount to approval?
>
> Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call it approval, or you could say no objection. He (Bundy)

> was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation on which such a person could have had differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33).

Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any "actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 31).

Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White House urgings to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to Harvey (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25).

Bissell testified that the development of an executive action capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual:

> it was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose. The whole ongoing job of ... a secret intelligence service of recruiting agents is of that character.... So it would not be particularly surprising to me if the

> decision to create ... this capability had been taken without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68).*

Bundy: McGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was discussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). Bundy's testimony comports with Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability, rather than an assassination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy, p. 5).** Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority" (Bundy, p. 15). Bundy summarized his testimony by saying:

> I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment either. (Bundy, p. 10)

Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all" (Bundy, p. 19) because he was satisfied

> that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against the individual. (Bundy, p. 7).

---

* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he had requested a CIA officer to go to the Congo to "make plans and develop the capability" for an assassination attempt against Lumumba, if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55).

** Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)

Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had been fulfilled (Bundy, p. 7).

Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sometime in the early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the conversation about executive action took place before January 25 -- when Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's directive -- as "near zero" because the new Administration had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National Security staff (Bundy, p. 9).

Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the executive action project:

> Chairman: And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?
>
> Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman.
> (Bundy, p. 16)

Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert operations, making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project like ZRRIFLE (Bundy, p. 11; Rostow, p. 11).

Rostow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference to executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to act by the U.S." (Rostow, pp. 10, 13).

Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration was borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there was no evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the development of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11; Gray, p. 56.)

(c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project by DCI

Richard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that Allen Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for two reasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at the time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the Agency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell "would imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms on Project ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project (McCone, p. 43).

William Harvey said it was assumed that the project was within the parameters permitted by the DCI. But Harvey testified that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a specific recruitment." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59).

---

* Harvey's transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until late in 1961.

(d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassination Plots

The Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA development of an executive action capability was related in any way to the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have perceived the executive action capability as in some way lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.

(i) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy

In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing the project to develop an executive action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible that I would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). He continued:

> in such a discussion of a capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51).

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that their discussion of the development of the capability for assassination did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans or attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversation raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward. Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about covert operations at the CIA.

(ii) Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility for Underworld Contact: November 1961

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86; and 6/11/75, p. 19)--which had been used for the initial poison pill plot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meeting on November 15, 1961 (I.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harvey was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the Castro regime.

According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meeting involved only the planning and research of a capability rather than a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it [the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated that because the assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate

> had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs . . . and there was no authorization to pursue it actively . . . . the responsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that of taking over an inactive contact." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)

Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over the contact in case any action should be required and further testified that it was never required.

The Inspector General's Report stated: "After Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZRRIFLE." (I.G., p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a discussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability, Bissell advised him of "a then going operation" involving the names of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part of the Agency's effort to develop . . . a capability for executive action." (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approximately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54).

Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project" and the "specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that "specific White House authority for this given operation was implied or stated". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell does not recall telling anyone in the White House that something had been done to

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55). Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However, Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action "capability . . . for assassination" was "used against Castro", Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15, 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assassination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked, had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147, 11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ___, supra.]

There are two factors which may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated. First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate Lumumba.

FINAL DRAFT

TOP SECRET

R948

TRUJILLO

Agreed to by drafting
subcommittee on
August 28, 1975*

Summary

Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on May 30, 1961.

Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents. Although there is no evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination plans.

Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two Administrations information about the dissidents' assassination plots had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.

Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination. Thereafter, however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents was denied, and the guns were never passed. Two days before the assassination, President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissidents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.

---

* The second paragraph under V.A.3.c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been reviewed by the Subcommittee.

I. Background

Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many Latin Americans.

Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdication or downfall.

As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents. (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60). In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further:

> "...the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and -- if necessary -- military support." (Memo from Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60; Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)

Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin-

American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, pressed the United States to take affirmative action against Trujillo to dispel criticism that the U.S. opposed dictatorships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)

II. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms

During the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's grasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these rifles was approved both within the State Department and the CIA, the rifles were never provided.

A. Dissident Contacts

Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland affidavit) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that

---

* This loosely-organized group, with which contact was established, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and memoranda as "the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.

Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA Headquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communications link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/ that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R./ Rubottom" (Emphasis in original.) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60).

Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the U.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but would not "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic" (Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station cable 6/19/60).

B. The Sniper Rifles

During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambassador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland affidavit). He apparently did so after returning to Washington in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).

---

* As used herein "Headquarters" refers to Headquarters of the Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the Department of State.

Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops.
(CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:

> "c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)*/

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms

---

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)

"presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided, since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable, and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as close as possible. "Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end." (CIA memo, 7/1/60)

Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile* rifles with telescopic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.

Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:

> "4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment." (Id.)

Gomez's recommendation was concurred in by Richard Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell, (I.G. Report, p. 26).

The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).

On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12 telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14, 1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against any further action in the Dominican Republic until after resolution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending against Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed that sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished to the dissidents.

---

*"Sterile" rifles are "untraceable" rifles. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p.69)

On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960, dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For the next several months, consideration centered on providing 200 to 300 guns.

II. Summer and Fall of 1960

In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and *de facto* CIA Chief of Station. Consideration was given both to providing arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo forces, both within and without the country, was approved.

A. Diplomatic Development -- Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel

Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further intensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan President Betancourt. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and imposed economic sanctions.

With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by both CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20, 1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic, Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.

B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime

Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were

> "... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy."
> (Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine, were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60)*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division (Devine, p.7)

---

*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)

Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn replied in a detailed letter which concluded:

> "One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo before he leaves this island. If he has his millions and is a free agent, he will devote his life from exile to preventing stable government in the D.R., to overturning democratic governments and establishing dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as being the first necessary step in the salvation of my country and I would regard this, in fact, as my Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will remember it was necessary to drive a stake through his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes. I believe sudden death would be more humane than the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and lingering illness." (Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)

C. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate

Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within and without the ranks of government, was considered. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60) None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960 Trujillo was still in absolute control.

D. CIA Plans of October 1960

A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled

"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans which "have been developed on a tentative basis which appear feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part, for the following:

> "a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols, together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to secure cache on the South shore of the island, about 14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo.
>
> "b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an electronic detonating device with remote control features, which could be planted by the dissidents in such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo henchmen. This might necessitate training and introducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained technician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasis added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)

E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action

On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces. The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to both Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents. The exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and undertake anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not, of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself." (Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)

IV. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "Limited Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material"

On January 12, 1961, with all members present,* the Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:

> "Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)

A. Memoranda Underlying the Special Group Action

On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sent through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United States for its failure to furnish them with any tangible or concrete assistance. Further, it reported:

> Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply them with "hardware" of various types. This has included quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persistently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items and devices which they associate with revolutationary effort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)

---

* The members of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs; John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents. Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would place some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident elements, but stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic) by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61) This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.

A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special Group meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that the Special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo" and that the Secretary of State was informed of that decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group, other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to be used by them in assassination efforts.* While it is, of course, possible that such information was passed orally to some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which would establish this to be the case.

---

*Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.

On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that approval had been given for supplying arms and other material to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61). Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver "exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)

V. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961
(the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)

On January 20, 1961, the Kennedy administration took office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all except Allen Dulles) retired.

Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in which specific assassination plans were discussed, requests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage by U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the Dominican Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.*

---

*As indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, *infra*, permission to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never passed.

These events are discussed below under subheading A.

Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein, "senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.

A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S. to Dissidents' Assassination Plans

1. Assassination Discussions and Requests for Explosives

At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot [to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:

(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of Trujillo.

(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles.

(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.

(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several miles. (*Id.*)

Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents

TOP SECRET

at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning Trujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)*

The dissidents' "latest plot", as described in the February CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful bomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device, along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)

On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic asked for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters on March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additional request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons, and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. This further request was also passed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to the dissidents.

The documentary record makes clear that Frank Devine at the State Department was also advised of related developments in a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained that his spirits were in the doldrums because:

> ". . . the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have developed a plan for the picnic, which just might work if they could find the proper food. They

---

* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the questions raised by the dissidents did not require an answer.

> have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember nothing in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club. (Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded during his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coordinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell Dearborn

Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79) Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination consideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*

---

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:

> "There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:

> "C. Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp.38,73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.

---

*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen, on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. (Owen, p.72)

The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables, 3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.30)

3. Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact, Wimpy Berry, on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)

c. Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington

There is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use in Assassination

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to Owen's cable:

> "4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:

> "...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

---

* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.* Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and

> "especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)

b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:

> "B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took

---

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.

TOP SECRET

> the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration."

The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)

The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report, p. 42; Station to Headquarters cable, 4/19/61).

On April 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued a memorandum which stated:

> "Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without his approval." (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).**

The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching had been approved.

B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)

On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a month after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.

---

* Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed in detail beginning at page ;

** Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)

The minutes state that:

> "Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes of 2/14/61)

In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others, was made:

> "(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo." (Id.)

The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Dominican Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed the new members.

What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if the new members of the Special Group were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was advised that the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican government could not be overthrown without the assassination of Trujillo.

Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unable to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102) Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Group in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the February 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by either Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo. (McNamara affidavit).

February Memoranda

The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning progress to assure an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall." The memorandum advised that:

> "Our representatives in the Dominican Republic have, at considerable risk to those involved, established contacts with numerous leaders of the underground opposition . . . /and/ . . . the CIA has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms and sabotage equipment."

This reference to recent authorization for delivery of arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961

Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective positions throughout the transition period. The Committee has been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly had knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's National Security Advisor. The paper made note of the outstanding Special Group approval for the provision of arms and equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents had been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to receive them.

The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders had informed CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various witnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300 men would, standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell, 7/29, p.80),

Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:

> "... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the time of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these dissident groups were, and had for a long time, been hoping they could accomplish the assassination of Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests since some seven or eight months earlier was a perfectly clear indication of that, so that fact was not new knowledge." (Bissell 7/22, p.102)

When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell replied:

> "I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not remember what considerations moved me. I don't know whether it was because this was common knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, there was an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if it were the latter, in this case." (Bissell, 7/22, p.101)

In response to questions concerning the lack of information in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents, Bissell stated:

> " . . . I would say that the Agency's failure, if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to state in writing that the plans of the dissidents would include assassination attempts." (Bissell, 7/22, p.99)

Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo and the internal opposition, "which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fear was expressed that existing schedules for the delivery of weapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficiently timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be given to caching the requested arms and other materials. (Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)

Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior members of the new administration, and in view of the "for higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was no modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Group approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard the approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new administration.

During March and early April 1961, operational levels within both the CIA and the State Department learned of increasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group, except Allen Dulles.* Similarly, there is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.**

VI. April 17, 1961 - May 31, 1961 (Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination)

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassination attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would result from Trujillo's death.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never left the Consulate.

Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.

Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed the decision not to pass the machine guns.

---

* Copies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress were apparently sent to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.

A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort

By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had /operation was a failed/. As a result, there developed a general realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11, p.113) A cable from Headquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April 19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier admonition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody until further notice was repeated in a second cable from Headquarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have been "based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assassination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area." (HQs. to Station cable, 4/20/61)

The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters in cables from Dearborn and Owen. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Headquarters that Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27, 1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt was going to take place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS cable, 4/30/61)

Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic relationship. The cable concluded:

> "Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non release of requested items, Headquarters may wish discuss foregoing with State Department." (_Id._)

B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns

In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authorizing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch, provided:

> "Since it appears that opposition group has committed itself to action with or without

> additional support, coupled with fact ref. C items [the carbines] already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition member for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQS to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characterized his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as:

> " . . . having made already a considerable investment in this dissident group and its plans that we might as well make the additional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memorandum continued:

> "On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wanted to know what the policy should be.
>
> "I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have any thing to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert said he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo of Conversation, 5/3/61)

Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact, Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

> "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very near future." (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

minutes:

> " Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time."* (Emphasis supplied). (Special Group Minutes, 5/18/61)

D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns

On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department, attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgent request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable advised that the assassination attempt was scheduled for the night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were 80 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed to Dearborn that if the effort failed,due to U.S. refusal to supply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held responsible and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn to State cable, 5/16/61)

A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

---

* There was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Dominican Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May 18 Group meeting, perhaps at the May 4, 1961 meeting.

Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day, advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.* Herbert's attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. (Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation -- Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was considered and it was:

> "Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the

---

* By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the group was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State cable, 5/27/61)

> Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral." (Record of Actions by National Security Council, 5/5/61) (Approved by the President, 5/16/61)

Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washington at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.

While in Washington, Dearborn met with State Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying before the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican Republic was discussed. He did not recall any discussion with Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin had been reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)

On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping up the covert program were considered in separate papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961) This Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used as a basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency Paper" discussed below.

Two documents entitled, "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic" were provided to the Committee staff from State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May 11, 1961 memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating it was attached to "Dominican Republic -- Contingency," dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310).

Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered points including the following:

> "1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination.
>
> "2. US moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.

"3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen.

"4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust ourselves and our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof?

"7. Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document from State Department files bearing No. 313)

The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately be revealed.

On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Programs Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommendation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)

During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter circulated within the State Department.* This document, entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic" reported:

> "CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support."

This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.

The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above quoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize" is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee that he circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandum because the information concerning passage of the arms was new to him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49)

Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and a small number of grenades currently in the direct custody of the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in -

---

* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy of Goodwin memorandum.

personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memorandum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage of these weapons. (Id.)

On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received by Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an underlying document which began:

> "Recent reports indicate that the internal Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and their plans in this regard are well advanced."

The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment recommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidents that if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their own responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents from State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286).

F. Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961

A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard Goodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin, the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17, and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before knowing what government would succeed him. (Department to Dearborn, 5/17/61)

Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that for over a year State Department representatives in the Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort

to overthrow Trujillo and had assisted the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited further guidance from State.

In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict between two objectives:

> "(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
>
> "(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur."

It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that "former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter." (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 - not sent)

This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative" and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present tomorrow morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)

A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:

> "Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans."

Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not, however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic. If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known what the discussion involved or what decisions, if any, were made.

Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testified that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United States:

> " . . . didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo." (Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)

At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.

It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the new government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2) to avoid any action which might further involve the United States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose is clearly evident in the cable which advised:

> " . . . we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)

* * * * * * *

> "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position."

According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy. (Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23).

With respect to the four machine guns which were in the Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable to transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was instructed to:

> "Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual

> fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."

The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)

B. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).

He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support. Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

> "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn." (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dearborn. (HQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.

C. Immediate Post-Assassination Period

The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated, and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most concerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his father's death from the press secretary to the President of the U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk, 32, 33.)

SCHNEIDER REPORT

Reviewed and Agreed to by
Drafting Subcommittee on
August 27, 1975

[illegible]

SCHNEIDER REPORT

Page

I. Summary 1

II. The President's Initial General Instruction and Background 6

  A. September 15 White House Meeting 6

  B. Background: Tracks I and II 8

  C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project 15

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II 17

  A. Evolution of CIA Strategy 17

    1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach 17

    2. Military Solution 18

  B. The Chile Task Force 19

  C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations 20

  D. The False Flag Base 26

  E. Chief of Station 27

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup 29

  A. The Chilean Conspirators 29

  B. Contacts Prior to October 15 30

  C. October 15 Decision 34

  D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15 36

  E. The Killing of General Schneider 39

  F. Post October 22 Events 41

V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II 43

  A. September 45

  B. October 46

  C. December 54

  D. Did Track II End? 54

TOP SECRET

I. Summary

On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.* Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a joint session of its Congress decide between the first and second place finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session was October 24, 1970.

On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to report, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.

---

*Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge Alessandri Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won 36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 million votes cast in the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.

In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities.

Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both before and after a coup.

One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspirators other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier in the day.

A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers, both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of conspiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were associates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting.

The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:

1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.

2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean military entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.

3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would be to kidnap General Schneider.

4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19, the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.

5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abortive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of the killing.*

6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed--that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testified that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and

---

* The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the three supplied by the CIA.

thus authorized by the White House.*

This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves unanswered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/Haig view).

---

* The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized. No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persuasive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer weapons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer, but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually were sent.

II. The President's Initial General Instruction and Background

A. September 15 White House Meeting

On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions:

> 1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
> worth spending
> not concerned risks involved
> no involvement of Embassy
> $10,000,000 available, more if necessary
> full-time job--best men we have
> game plan
> make the economy scream
> 48 hours for plan of action

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:

> ...(the) impression...that the President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared to make money available....This was a pretty all-inclusive order....If I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day.* (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11)

---

* Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washington. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversation was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio and other anti-Allende forces. According to Mr. Helms:

> I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President) the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels here, this having been arranged through Don Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have this impression that the President called this meeting where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there.
> (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)

However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within the guidelines Helms had been given.

> Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende from assuming office, include physical elimination?
>
> Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they will tell you this.

The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instructions:

> 2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense.
> (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)

Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.* Although Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:

> ...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

***

---

* The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, however, agreement about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week between October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider killing.

> It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms) to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12)

Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:

> 3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.
> (Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)

***

> B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem. As part of authority we were explicitly told that 40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September 1970)

B. Background: Tracks I and II

United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA.* For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda. At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile. At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will

---

* Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in 1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.
(Colby testimony, July 14, 1975, p. 5)

TOP SECRET

not be effective unless an early enough start is made.* On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities--be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970." Phase II was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 election. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.

The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plurality of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15.** At both these meetings the question of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised. Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings when he testified before the Select Committee:

---

*This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regarding Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Government to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the Committee received 46 documents from the White House relating to Chile covering the period September 5 to October 14, 1970.

**See Page 9a.

TOP SECRET

**Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated:

> Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:
>
> 1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.
>
> 2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.
>
> 3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:
>
>   a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.
>
>   b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/ "Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, 7 September 1970)

> I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two previous meetings of the 40 Committee on September 8th and September 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look at the pros and cons and the problems and prospects of a Chilean military coup to be organized with United States assistance.
>
> (Kissinger testimony, p. 5)

According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September 8, the following was discussed:

> ...all concerned realized that previous plans for a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn.... The DCI made the point, however, that congressional action against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse rapidly. While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed that a military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported this view....At the close of the...meeting the Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-blooded assessment" of:
>
> 1) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean military coup be organized now with U.S. assistance, and
>
> 2) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende.
>
> (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a "cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to say that "Our own military people /are/ unanimous in rejecting possi-

TOP SECRET

bility of meaningful military intervention in political situation." He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean Situation, 12 September 1970)

The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military action is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14, September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and what action was to be taken:

> Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Committee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second election for the presidency.

TOP SECRET

> Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the Agency to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover....
>
> (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks.* Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, including the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track

---

*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials inquiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline. All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware of Track II.

II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimony before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks I and II:

> ...There was work by all of the agencies to try to prevent Allende from being seated, and there was work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track I to encourage the military to move against Allende ...the difference between the September 15th meeting and what was being done in general within the government was that President Nixon was encouraging a more direct role for the CIA in actually organizing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after September 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other "appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to intensify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their willingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to run for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in order to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry to Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying, Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which Track I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on Track II." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21)

Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I and Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador was authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his own recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson:

---

*In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should Allende assume office.

> Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be strictly illusory.

The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions and of instructions to the field. Helms' notes from the September 15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation "make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primary topic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger, Helms and Karamessines.

> 2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately required. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)

The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry were excluded from Track II:

> That was not a decision that we made. But the best I can do is suggest that there was concern about two things. Number one, that there might be serious objections lodged, for example, by the State Department particularly if Track 2 were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. And the only other thing I can contribute to that is that it was felt that the security of the activity would be better protected if knowledge of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122)

TOP SE

C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project

On one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in Track II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible, that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order.

A few excerpts from the testimony follow:

Richard Helms, CIA Director -

> ...my heart sank over this meeting, because...the possibility of bringing off something like this seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as anything could be. In practical terms, the Army was constitutionalist....And when you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable....
>
> What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)

David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -

> ...it is my feeling that the odds are unacceptable, it is something that is not going to work, and we are going to be burned if we get into it ...what are the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency?...we never even got to two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)
>
> ...I assure you that those people that I was in touch with at the Agency just about universally said, my God, why are we given this assignment? (Phillips testimony, p. 53)

James Flannery, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -

> There was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20)

Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the September 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough." (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something, there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.

> There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

> Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.
> (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger) Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)

Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

> So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup....This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military....There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

> Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.
> (Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leadership of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.

A three-fold program was set into motion:

TOP SECRET

a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;

b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup;*(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)

c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)

B. The Chile Task Force

Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it. The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the task force.

---

*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:

1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism...You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel. that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state....B)Economic situation collapsing.....C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes from Allende on this.)
2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.
3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plotters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper.

(Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)

David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military

very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

> We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.
>
> (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

> ...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
>
> Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.

---

* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

TOP SECRET

> This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

---

* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.

TOP SECRET

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile." (Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended. The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

> FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded. This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situation. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters 934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that

---

* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a response from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth, Vol. II, p.   )

TOP SECRET

"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth, p. 8)*

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

> I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through which they came.
>
> Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

---

* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testified that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)

TOP SECRET

Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p.) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:

> It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p.)

CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard:

> ...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly authorized representative.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

> We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

> We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have been found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken place would have put us out of business.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache. (Kissinger testimony, p. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered

the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby. Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a "False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts with Chilean military officers.* Given the limitations of the Station's resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of "False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363, September 27, 1970)

---

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, "an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligence services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)

The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

> I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed. The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his claim to have dissented:

> Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceedingly narrow and available options are quite limited and relatively simple.
> (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)

> Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we not become victims of our own propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)

> Urge you do not convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2)

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.* Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command, Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales, were in contact with Viaux as well.**

---

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.

Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.

There was considerable communication among the various plotting elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:

> ...I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on in addition to President Frei and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.* (Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup

---

*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)*
Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.** At this meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were

> trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

---

*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was affiliated with General Canales. (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in league with Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.

TOP SECRET

The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:

> ...This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new state of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
> (Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

> President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and military are working against a military takeover.
> (Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions." (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,

13 October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)

At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

> Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military quarters, specifically, an Army General (name deleted), Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.
> (Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Generals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a rundown on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:"

---

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters:

> We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup attempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

> Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to attempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

> It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.
>
> 3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela _et al_ and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

---

* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.* As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

> Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more promising than the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and resources to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accordingly.
>
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades, three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved.

---

*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General Canales' eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)

The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*

---

* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action:

> Station plans give six tear gas grenades to Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces officers (deletion) instead of having False Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with active duty officers. Also False Flagger leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence important that Wimert credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened.
> (Santiago 562, 18 October)

That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he, General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

> General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that another attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October) Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

---

* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:

> Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
>
> Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending.
>
> (Sarno testimony, p. 37)

but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concluded

> Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt. Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.*

---

*Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:

> ...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand.
>
> (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)

> ...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.
>
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)

At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.*

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

---

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which resulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for conspiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three years in exile.

> Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt. Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved. We have reason for believeing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneider is affording Armed Forces one last opportunity to prevent Allende's election if they are willing to follow Valenzuela's scenario.
>
> (Santiago 598, 22 October)

F. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediately in a declaration of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to succeed Schneider as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Valenzuela as chief of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, caused the Chile Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

> With only 24 hours remaining before the Congressional runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The attack on General Schneider has produced developments which closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequently the plotters' positions have been enhanced.
>
> (Chile Task Force Log, 22 October)

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed Track II:

> It was agreed...that a maximum effort has been achieved, and that now only the Chileans themselves can manage a successful coup. The Chileans have been guided to a point where a military solution is at least open to them. (Task Force Log, 24 October)

Although it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of constitutionalism" was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider died the next day.

TOP SECRET

V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II

The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.

Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.

By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.

The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testified that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the abduction of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.

CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony, page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments. (Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Haig took place--but does not establish with certainty that the topic was

TOP SECRET

Track II. The calendar also suggests that Karamessines and Kissinger met on three other occasions and so might have had the opportunity to discuss Track II.

Henry Kissinger's testimony before the Committee differs from Karamessines in two respects: He believed Track II was "turned off" on October 15; and, after that date, he was informed neither of the coup plans of the Chilean conspirators nor of the passage of weapons to them. He said that Track II was

> in the nature of a probe and not in the nature of a plan,...no plan for a coup was ever submitted to the White House. So my recollection of events, this was a request by President Nixon for Track II which led to two or three meetings which then on October 15th led to being turned off by the White House, after which Track II was dead as far as my office was concerned, and we never received another report on the subject. (Kissinger testimony, p. 15)
>
> ***
>
> In my mind Track II was finished on October 15th and I never received any further CIA information after October 15th on the basis of any records that I have been able to find. (Ibid., p. 59)

General Haig's testimony generally coincided with Kissinger's recollection:

> I left (the October 15th meeting) with the distinct impression that there was nothing that could be done in this covert area that offered promise or hope for success. I had the distinct impression that was Dr. Kissinger's conclusion, and that in effect these things--and I wasn't even really familiar with what these two groups were to do and how they were to do it, but they were to cease and desist. (Haig testimony, pp. 26-27)
>
> ***
>
> My recollection would be that we had no hope for a viable, covert plan of action. That is the impression I got. (Ibid., p. 29)

The following pages present the Committee's record of communication between the White House and the CIA from September 18 through December 2:

TOP SECRET

A. September

September 18

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

CIA records of the meeting, Kissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals --Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony, p. 24)

Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:

> My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come...back to us before triggering it...at no time during the period did they, in fact, tell us...that they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed, they generally told us the opposite.
> (Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)

As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meeting on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed. However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:

> Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as proposed in NSSM 97. It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait accompli and higher authority had no intention of conceding before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October 1970)

October 8

Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)

In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going contacts.

TOP SECRET

> It seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all." (Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

> I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

Haig indicated to the Committee that he would have passed along the substance of that conversation to Kissinger, and that in general his role at the time was one of a conduit to Kissinger:

> I am quite confident that, given my own conception of my role at that time, that I would have conveyed that information to Henry,...
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)

***

> Q. If Mr. Karamessines was unable to see Dr. Kissinger, and talked to you, what degree of latitude did you have concerning what you would pass on to Dr. Kissinger?
>
> General Haig. At that time I would consider I had no degree of latitude, other than to convey to him what had been given to me. (Ibid., p. 15)

October 14

A cable to Santiago for Colonel Wimert, ostensibly from General Bennett, authorized Wimert to select two Chilean general officers and convey to them the following message: "High authority in Washington has authorized you to offer material support short of armed intervention to Chilean Armed Forces in any endeavors they may undertake to prevent the election of Allende on October 24...." (Headquarters to Station cable 762, October 14, 1970) Karamessines testified that in this case "high authority" would have been Kissinger or the President, for no one else could have given Wimert such broad authorization. Karamessines presumed that the message had been drafted in, or at least cleared with, the White House. (Karamessines testimony, p. 91)

However, Kissinger did not recall having authorized the October 14th cable. He found the sequence of events puzzling: having been told on the 10th that little was happening, he would have expected in the meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14

The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In addition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA, Charles Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.

According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile. Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist." He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful one were slight." Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines' assessment and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that "there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another." Other participants at the meeting concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)

TOP SECRET

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

> 5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."
>
> 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.
>
> 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
> (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)

Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....
>
> 4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.
> (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

> The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed....My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)

October 10-October 22 (approximate)

Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89) According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted."* As they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)

October 19

Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan, beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Committee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to the White House...." (Karamessines testimony, p. 72)

> And as I say, if for no other reason we would have wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the White House as soon as possible, and it would be my best estimate now that that is precisely what we did. (p. 72)

In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then, Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela

---

*If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting. Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. Those calendars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have been subpoenaed.

TOP SECRET

plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haig had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor did he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan. "This is all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiar with this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that are described in here." (Haig testimony, pp. 38-39)

Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October 15th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., p. 53) He indicated that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was no further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs (the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me." (Ibid., p. 62)

Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved the abduction of General Schneider:

> Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure that the record clearly shows you answer to the direct question of whether you knew or did not know that we were negotiating with military officers with regard to a plot that did involve the abduction of General Schneider.
>
> Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know.
> (Kissinger testimony, p. 86)

Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction plans before the fact.

Q. Were you aware during that period of time of the plans to kidnap General Schneider?

General Haig. I was aware after the fact....

Q. But you were never informed prior to his attempted abduction?

General Haig. I don't believe I was at all.

October 20

A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines testified that the references to "high levels" in the cable of the 20th meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan for the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is this all about?'" (Kissinger transcript, p. 68)

October 22

Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as "a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had told him. (Haig testimony, p. 36)

C. December

December 2

A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)." (Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18 November 1970)

In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiving the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an "after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I, dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by a number of aspects of the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 71, 74)

D. Did Track II End?

The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indicated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presidential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.

The Committee does not have this new "marching order" in its possession. However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in Chile. Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:

> Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26)
>
> ***
>
> Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there a specific order ending it?
>
> Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned, Track II was really never ended. What we were told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now President. So Track II, which sought to prevent him from becoming President, was technically out, it was done. But what we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II. That being the case, I don't think it is proper to say that Track II was ended.
> (Ibid., pp. 128-129)

When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never ended, Kissinger testified:

> The Chairman. Would you take issue with that, with the (Karamessines) testimony?
>
> Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear that...after October 15th that there was no separate channel by the CIA to the White House and that all actions with respect to Chile were taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to or contact with military people, no plots which I am familiar with, and all the covert operations in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress were directed towards maintaining the democratic opposition for the 1976 election. And that was the exclusive thrust, and if there was any further contact with military plotting, it was totally unauthorized and this is the first that I have heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)

A. Summary

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee indicates that the United States Government offered encouragement for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations. Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup.

On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") outlined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing the government in the near future. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which would rip the Army and the country asunder" (CIA cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated "[w]e cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination", and the second directed that the recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63); CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).

B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963

On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the Diem regime.*

On May 18, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting met with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired him to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapture public confidence. These steps included admitting responsibility for the Hue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) On June 3, Madame Nhu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents; Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to dis-associate the United States from any repressive measures against the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308). Shortly thereafter, Madame Nhu commented on the self-immolation of Quang

---

* Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, pp. 207-208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon Papers). Former Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, John Mecklin), in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965, (hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the "vulnerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this period noting that it "offered a classic opportunity for a Communist sleeper ploy."

Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would break with his government if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers, p. 208.)

Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)

By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed on the necessity for a coup.**

In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting, Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory and asked for harmony and support of the government.

---

* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved in the coup

> "for many years. Some of them I had known back even in World War II. Some of them were in powerful positions, and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a government official." (Conein, p. 17.)

** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:

> "The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report, p. 10.)

Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Nhu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p.210)*

On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable (Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and was approved by President Kennedy. (Pentagon Papers, p.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take "prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists.

> "We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of the Nhu's from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism . . . . Concurrently with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's replacement if this should become necessary . . . ."

---

* Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur when no American Ambassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few days before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, p.21).

In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, Trueheart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:

---

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).

> "I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support. We will do all that we can to help you conclude this operations successfully . . . . Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63).

In a reply cable, Lodge stated:

> "1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change course at any time. Of course I will always respect that right.
>
> 2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of its own. Should this happen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the "go signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge to President, 8/30/63)

A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:

> "This particular coup is finished . . . . Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces . . . . There is little doubt that GVN (South Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have considerable detail . . . ." (SAIG 0499, 8/31/63)

Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations between the United States representatives and the generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength of American support, grew in confidence.

C. The November 1963 Coup

American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell, in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course

(Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to determine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the regime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with White House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were curtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215).

In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's actions, recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers, p. 215.)

On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington and presented their findings to the National Security Council. Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by the end of the year, ending support for the forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended

against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-216)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).* The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

> "(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."**

---

* The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

** Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:

> "Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?
>
> "Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified:

> "I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:

> "McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

> "Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)

Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,* testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20 (Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate in his detailed After-Action Report) that he then told General Don that the United States opposed assassination, and that the General responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).

The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3) informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217). On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American requests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219).

On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who had received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the United States on October 31. (I.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219.)

---

* Conein described his role as follows:

> "My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals who were planning the coup, to get as much information so that our government would not be caught with their pants down" (Conein, pp. 38-39).

On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely in Vietnamese hands. General Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers, p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup" (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolvement and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers, p. 220.)

Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters (Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits to those killed in the coup (Conein, 6/20, p. 72).*

Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during most of the coup (I.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15). The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30 p.m. the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).

According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report, pp. 17-18.)

At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General

---

* CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). On October 29, Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated (Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63). Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe in his house.

Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-Action Report, p. 24).

At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests (Conein, p. 57).

The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.*

---

* Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He opined that an informant must have identified them and called the General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23). Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report states that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their backs (I.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint General Staff headquarters.

None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.*

---

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).

R1440

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IV. Findings and Conclusions 1

A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves . . . 2

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba 2

2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As A Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States 3

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider 3

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions 3A

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders . . . 4

6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts 5

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. . 5

1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination 5

a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments. 6

b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them 8

Page

- (a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions to Reveal The Plots To Their Superiors Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and Clarity 27
  - Castro 27
  - Trujillo 34
  - Schneider 36
- (b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration. 37
  - Schneider 38
  - Lumumba 38
  - Castro 39

6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary 46
   - (a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial . . . 47
   - (b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism" 48
   - (c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions. 49
   - (d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization". 50
   - (e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert Capabilities 50

TOP SECRET

Approved, Drafting Subcommittee,
10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open
to possible reconsideration)

IV. Findings and Conclusions

In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.

1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future.

2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony.

3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the events under examination while at the same time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.

With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions.

A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba

The Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.

The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quickly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination.

The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the 1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and provided the means for carrying out the assassination.

2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States

The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assassinate Castro failed.

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider

American officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissidents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols and rifles.

American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States.

The record reveals that the United States officials offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.

As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed, although the possibility of his death should have been recognized as a forseeable risk of his kidnapping.

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions

The Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we described the perception, generally shared within the United States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed, although it does not justify them. Those involved nevertheless appeared to believe they were advancing the best interests of their country.

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

Running throughout the cases considered in this report was the expectation of American officials that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were supporting in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.

Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government.

6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts

Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.

Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination

We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.

In addition to considerations, there were several practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of this report recommending a statute making assassination a crime.

a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments

Two of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and the degree to which United States officials motivated the coups.

The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigated by the United States must be prohibited.

Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises questions concerning the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.

This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants. But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics should be used; and how such actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government. The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of covert action in general.

b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them

The Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justified the assassination plots:

First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Castro's assassination had been planned by the CIA long before that crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis.

Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of totalitarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending.

Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend.

The first was written in 1954 by a special committee formed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than [those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."*

Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)

---

* The full text of the passage is as follows:

> . . . another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.
>
> The second consideration, it is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U. S. is to survive, long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered.

We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy".

A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent -- WIROGUE -- because

> He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. (Memo dated / /60; Bissell Tr., 6/11/75, p.)

The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation.

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents

We conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involves the following dangers:

---

*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.

a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIA also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.

b. The use of persons experienced in criminal techniques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are necessarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper activities is increased when persons of criminal background are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.

---

*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fighting organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.

In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the operation had involved assassination, he did, according to a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld figures should not be used before checking with him first, but failed to direct that they must never be used.

c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their association with the government to advance their own projects and interests.

d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society forbid.

The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago:

> Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 439, 485 (1927)

C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authorization and Control

In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and explains those conclusions.

The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove.

No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government. But the record leaves serious doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by the Administrations. Even if the plots were not expressly authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel believed they were acting improperly.

1. The Command and Control System for Assassinations Was Such That the Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization

As emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility for the assassination plots. Even after our long investigation, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization which made it possible for assassination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials outside of those agencies.

Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the highest level. The command and control system revealed by the record made it possible for the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without express authorization by officials outside the Agency.

The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While there is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system has succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered in this report, the possibility that a system exists which might permit those responsible for authorizing major operations to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government requires that public officials be held accountable for their decisions.

2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized

a. Diem

We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top State Department officials did know, however, that the death of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders.

b. Schneider

We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnapping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.

c. Trujillo

The Presidents and other senior officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end.

The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents' intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of the government responsible for formulating policy is less clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961 senior American officials, including the President, learned that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special Group disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself, in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the

United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence.

e. Castro

There was no evidence from which the Committee could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro.

We find that the effort against Castro was clearly authorized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.

The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been planned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.

First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

---

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential authorization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.

Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they served never asked them to consider assassination.

There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency.

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permissible Course of Action

The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts testified that they had believed that their activities had been fully authorized.*

In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation, Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in the Agency.

In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the operation involving underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times, exact words, or channels through which such authority may have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized "from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed:

---

* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since they had clear orders from their immediate superiors.

> ". . . that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, that they were what we had been asked to do. . . . In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro and . . . there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time.

The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have been within the parameters of permissible action, but Administration officials (including McCone) responsible for formulating policy were not aware of the effort and did not authorize it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders.

The various Presidents and their senior advisors strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example, President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day." Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort against Cuba as "a combat situation", and Attorney General Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carries top priority". Helms testified that the pressure to "get rid of [Castro and the Castro regime]" was intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to "get off your ass about Cuba".

It is possible that there was a failure of communication between policymakers and the agency personnel who were experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although policymakers testified that assassination was not intended by such words as "get rid of Castro", some of their subordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that assassination was desired and that they should proceed without troubling their superiors.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations appropriately observed:

> The point is that of frequent resort to synechdoche -- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro", which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.

Differing perceptions between superiors and their subordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.* McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows:

> Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro", "remove Castro", "knock off Castro", etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban government.

---

* "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, 'who will rid me of this turbulent priest?'. He didn't say, 'go out and murder him'. He said, 'who will rid me of this man', and let it go at that.

"Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.

"Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?

"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir.

"Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the

Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them as conveying authority for assassination.

Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as providing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director."

Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and McManus testified

---

director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?

"Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office."

that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert operations.*

The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was within the range of permissible activity was reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level and by the failure of the successive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section.

---

* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience, construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret them.

TOP SECRET

4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:

(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations To Their Superiors; and

(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Precise Orders Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations.

While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassination attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case), Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassination to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities that they did authorize.

(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and Clarity

Several of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their activities.

Castro

The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly troubling.

Richard Bissell testified that he and Sheffield Edwards told Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously" and only after the project had begun about the operation which used members of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP, Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the operation with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the operation with McCone or any Government official above the level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation, and virtually certain that it continued into McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge or approval.

On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against Castro, he either failed to inform them or misled them.

Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then only after contact had been made with the underworld and a price had been offered for Castro's death.

Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had no duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Administration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*

The failure to either inform those officials or to make certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action. But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He did not tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assassination operation that was underway.

---

* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further, even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell "guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had been planned and was being attempted".

The failures to make forthright disclosures to policymakers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he learned that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1962, and did so then in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified, "not truthful".

When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH operation which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked.

Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration officials because he had assumed that the project had been previously authorized, and that the aggressive character of the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime made assassination permissible even in the absence of an express instruction. He added that he had never been convinced that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go anyplace".

Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them were reasons why he should have sought express authority. As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be submitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and equivocal permission.

William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because he believed that it was Helms', not his, duty to inform higher authorities.

Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special Group Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known that covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet Harvey did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor, and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April 1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.

The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not having informed those responsible for formulating policy about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading, and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not sufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it in August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was up to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helms remarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back pocket".

The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform his superiors.

Trujillo

In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.

At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions. At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential" and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying of small arms]."

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that the dissidents' "plan of action" included arms for 300 men. Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.

The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA headquarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently unaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of the machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.

The State Department official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States should have nothing to do with assassination plots "anywhere, anytime", even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for use in connection with a planned assassination.

Schneider

The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that President Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics. The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after October 15 there is some doubt.

The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between September 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communication on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House.

The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax. Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are and are not permissible, and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities once begun.

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.

While we cannot find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassination. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued by Director Helms.

Schneider

As explained above, there is no evidence that assassination was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presidential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably short time. Apart from the question of whether any intervention was justified under the circumstances of this case, the committee believes that the Executive in any event should have defined the limits of permissible action.

Lumumba

We are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings, led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of" Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity for straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out any activity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.

Castro

The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro regime. Richard Helms recalled that:

> "I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very intense. And therefore, when you go into the record, you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure. And we were quite frustrated."

Bissell recalled that:

> "During that entire period, the administration was extremely sensitive about the defeat that had been afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of getting rid of Castro."

Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was

> "chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime."

General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation

Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter".

Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Augmented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority . . . no time, money, effort--or manpower is to be spared."* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that were considered by the top policymakers included incapacitating sugar workers during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging merchandise in third countries--even those allied with the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines, and harbors.

---

* The Attorney General himself took a personal interest in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert war against the Castro government.

Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting in November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action" against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied that such a capability did not exist, but might well have left the meeting with the impression that assassination was not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed at inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime", and included in the final phase an "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposal stated that "this should be a 'Special Target" operation . . . . Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential against police. . ." Several minutes from Special Group meetings contain language such as "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposal was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was not ruled out.

On several occasions, the subject of assassination was -

discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials. While those officials never consented to actual assassination efforts, they also failed to indicate that assassination was impermissible as a matter of principle.

In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability to assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then underway, the fact that he believed that the development of an assassination capability had been approved by the White House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited.

Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA officials present at the briefing, the Attorney General indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must not engage in assassination plots.

---

* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.

At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August 1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway, Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored, and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.

---

* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld figures in an operation against Cuba. The documentary record further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that the operation had involved assassination efforts until May of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him as having been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it had not in fact been terminated. While it is curious that the Attorney General would not have inquired further into the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that he did.

One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled "Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders. Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assassination might be permissible.

While the ambivalence of Administration officials does not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it displayed an insufficient concern about assassination which may have contributed to the perception that assassination was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's general objectives.

With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose, precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring prior permission for the details of other proposed covert operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assassination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order in 1972. In light of the number of times in which the subject of assassination arose, Administration officials were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.

* * * * * *

The Committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible.

For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.

In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.

When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed, but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had exhibited strong aversion to assassination.

6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary.

Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We find this disturbing, and view the following concepts as particularly dangerous:

(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries to an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsibility for certain operations.

(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings ought to be made clear.

(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons.

(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one director or one administration could be presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials.

(5) The creation of capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that such capabilities might be used without further authorization.

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial

The original concept of plausible denial envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the United States resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed. In addition, the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed.

Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government.

(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism"

According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of circumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.

Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand no less.

Euphemism may actually have been preferred--not because of plausible denial--but because the persons involved could not bring themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate, murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be proposed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done.

(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing activities.

In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objectives and the specific actions undertaken to achieve them was far too wide.

It is important that policymakers review the manner in which their directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from public scrutiny.

(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"

One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project had already been approved by McCone's predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more advanced stage.

Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961, at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.

The idea that authority might continue from one administration or director to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ. New officials should be given the opportunity to review significant programs.

(e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert Capabilities

The development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert activity increases the probability that it will occur, since the capability represents a tool that is available for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use without need for obtaining explicit authorization.

Of course, an assassination capability should never have been created in the first place.

Approved by
Drafting
Subcommittee
10/8/75
(with possible reservation
as to language of statute)

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

During our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues came into sharp focus.

Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law.

We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making it a crime to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so.

A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassination. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by the Administration.

President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to deal with the assassination issue, stated:

> I am opposed to political assassination. This administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.

The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4)

The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:

> With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)

Colby's predecessor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot, said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and practical reasons:

> As a result of my experiences through the years, when I became Director I had made up my mind that this option...of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen on my watch. My reasons for this were these:
>
> There are not only moral reasons but there are also some other rather practical reasons.
>
> It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep anything like that secret.... Somebody would go to a Congressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, whatever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alternative, it seems to me, in our society.
>
> Then there is another consideration...if you are going to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that country, and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then had a revolving door of prime ministers after that for quite some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government at a time in its history when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker government....In other words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of the United States.
>
> ...there is no sense in my sitting here with all the experience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. It isn't because I have lost my cool, or because I have lost my guts, it simply is because I don't think it is a viable option in the United States of America these days.
>
> Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms -- I agree with what you have said fully --- but doesn't it also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians

> involved themselves in political assassinations, but under their system they at least have a better prospect of keeping it concealed. Since we do like a free society and since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the revelation will then do serious injury to the good name and reputation of the United States.
>
> Would you agree with that?
>
> Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.
>
> The Chairman. And finally, if we were to reserve to ourselves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may invite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prerogative as well, and that is another danger that we at least invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?
>
> Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)

Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations because:

> I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p. 15)

B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms and then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helms said:

> It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel....(Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)

Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency's own review of prior "questionable activity," issued an order which stated:

> CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)

C. The need for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, these CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change, and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a temptation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do all that we can do to prevent their happening again. Laws express our society's values; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who want to resist.

The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this report, makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to assassinate a foreign official.

Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign official or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States. 18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which makes it a crime to assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official while such official is outside the United States. Our proposed statute is thus designed to close this gap in the law.

Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the United States. Subsection (b) is necessary to eliminate the loophole which would otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or to kill a foreign official outside the United States.

Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.

government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation to the U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies within the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not a United States citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassinate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction of U.S. law. Subsections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or not they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United States of persons who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as a officer or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such conduct takes place.

The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The definition makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the official belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmental political party. Our investigation -- as well as the reality of international politics -- has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.*/

The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is not politically motivated would not be punishable under this statute.

The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such person must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense. /insert discussion of paramilitary aspect/

---

*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.

* * * * *

In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning assassination, asked whether, as a matter of theory, assassination should absolutely be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was cited as an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not of that character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution "is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).

Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented power based on the need to preserve the nation:

> ...my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government -- that nation -- of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation .... The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X, pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).

---

*/Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis -- the Cuban missile crisis -- assassination was not even considered.

Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers, it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system that these powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pursuant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the action truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to the life of the Nation.

As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861).

Appro[illegible]d by Drafting
Subcommittee on 9/9/75

EPILOGUE

We do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.

We must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.

Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear it and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10144

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-49

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1976
PAGES : 263

SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/1999

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10144
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-49

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 00/00/76
PAGES : 263
SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/05/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

no dating

SECRET SENSITIVE

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PROPRIETARIES

I. Introduction and Philosophy of Use 1

A. Operating Proprietaries 3

B. Non-Operating Proprietaries 7

II. Statutory Authority for Proprietaries 9

III. Specific Controls 10

A. Agency Regulations and Policies 10

B. Project Reviews and Control 11

C. Financial Controls/Operating Companies and Non-Operating Companies Keeping Books of Accounts 11

D. Financial Controls/Non-Operating Companies Except Those Keeping Books of Accounts 13

E. Treatment of Profits 14

F. Disposition of Funds Returned from Proprietaries ... 16

G. Disposal of Proprietaries 16

H. Relations with Tax, Regulatory, and Other Agencies . 18

IV. A Description of the Various Proprietaries 21

Proprietary List 24

Employees of Proprietaries as of October 1975 41

Funding and Payroll Mechanisms 42

Description of Major Headquarters-Controlled Proprietaries as of September 1975 43

Listing of Proprietaries During the Period 1952 through 1974 (Total 399) 46

V. The Disposal of Agency Proprietaries 59

a. An Overview 59

Entities Dissolved 63

Entities Sold 68

Entities "Otherwise Disposed Of" 71

Description of Disposition of Entities Sold or Otherwise Disposed Of 74

b. The Sale of SouthernAir Transport, Inc.: A Case Study In Disposal of a CIA Proprietary 89-1

Background 89-1

The Sale 89-4

Declassification of Relationship With CIA ...89-14

Conflict Of Interest 89-15

Conclusion 89-17

VI. Project MHBOUND 90

VII. Beyond "Doing Business": Peak Non-Government Security Investments by Proprietaries Active as of December 31, 1974 95

VII. MHMUTUAL: The Insurance-Investment Complex 99

a. A Brief History 99

b. Current Status 106

Stock Portfolio Performance Chart 108

IX. The Air Proprietaries 113

X. Issues Posed, Conclusions, and Recommendations 129

I. INTRODUCTION AND PHILOSOPHY OF USE

Questions have arisen as to CIA's use of proprietary mechanisms to help carry out the Agency's missions. In particular, concerns have been expressed about the Agency's financial and management control over these entities and about the treatment of funds related to such entities. A careful review of these entities has revealed that CIA's proprietaries are appropriately limited and controlled with careful consideration given to their use within the spirit and letter of the law.

Proprietaries fall into two main categories:

1. Operating companies that actually do business as would any private firm; and
2. Non-operating companies or entities that appear to do business under commercial guise.

These entities may be legally constituted as corporations, partnerships, or sole proprietorships; or they may have no such legal standing, i.e., they may be "notional" entities which have bank accounts and backstopped addresses controlled by the Agency. Corporate proprietaries are incorporated in accordance with the statutory provisions of the jurisdiction of incorporation, are subject to the same review as any corporate entity within that jurisdiction, file applicable state and/or federal tax returns, and obtain the necessary licenses to conduct their normal business. The purposes served by them are two-fold: they provide cover, attribution for funding, and administrative assistance to agents and covert activities; and they provide services not securely available through normal commercial facilities. Because these instrumentalities are established as private organizations, they must be established and managed, to the extent possible, in accordance with practice and requirements that are normal for the types of enterprises they give the appearance of being.

Of the legally constituted entities, the Agency uses the corporate form in most cases because of the advantages and flexibility of corporate management control. These corporations are legally organized under the laws of a state, country, or other jurisdiction and are either wholly owned by CIA or controlled through majority stock ownership. Services of bona fide businessmen are enlisted as nominee officers, directors, and stockholders.

The Agency generally has employed proprietaries when it was the only way, or clearly the best way, to achieve an approved objective. Under Agency rules proprietaries are established or allowed to continue in existence only so long as they contribute to accomplishment of the Agency's mission and remain the most advantageous operational means of achieving certain particular and necessary objectives. Current policy calls for limited use of operating proprietary mechanisms. The capability to use the mechanism is to be retained (this the Agency terms its "capability in being"), and smaller entities used.

A review of Agency files shows that the number of operating proprietaries has been consciously pared by about 50 percent since the mid 1960's. These reductions began as a result both of the Katzenbach guidelines associated with the National Student Association affair in 1967 and the CIA's own IG survey in that same year. In addition, the need for proprietaries has declined as a result of a general shift in emphasis away from covert action; transfer of Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty to the Board of International Broadcasting with funding through State Department; continuing liquidation of the assets of the Air America complex as requirements for CIA support in Southeast Asia have diminished; the sale of Southern Air Transport and the continuing liquidation of assets of Intermountain Aviation with their exposure in the press and the decreased need for contingency air capabilities.

The evidence establishes that activities of all proprietaries, directly or indirectly, support the Agency's foreign intelligence collectio or covert action missions. Some of these proprietaries are located within the United States for reasons of operational or administrative necessity, but their ultimate impact is overseas. Some of the questionable domestic uses of these entities is dealt with in the sections of the Report on "Chaos" and related programs. And in one area, MHMUTUAL, serious questions remain as to the propriety of using such a mechanism to provide insurance and retirement benefits. This problem is detailed later. (See Section VIII).

A. Operating Proprietaries

As discussed in greater detail later, operating proprietaries conduct business in the commercial sphere, but they are not in direct competititon with privately owned corporations to such a degree as to deprive the private companies of legitimate income. There is no doubt, however, that they were and are in competition. The Agency has been careful to limit the amount of commercial business engaged in by these proprietaries to only that necessary to support the viability of the commercial cover and keep it alive in the commercial world. Revenues have been used as partial offsets to operating costs. Aggregate profits over the years have been relatively small. Only two proprietaries have shown significant profits: the Air America complex in fulfilling mostly Government contracts in Southeast Asia, and the insurance company handling trust funds and insurance (MHMUTUAL). The air proprietary overview, infra Section IX., details the dilemmas posed by size. Moreover, it sheds light on questions concerning whether commercial viability became more of a bronze god than was necessary to maintain adequate cover.

Operating proprietaries may be large or small in terms of capitalization and total assets, depending upon the functions they perform. When the commercial purpose of an operating proprietary is incidental to its CIA mission -- such as an export-import firm which engages in commercial operations only to the extent necessary to provide cover for a CIA officer in a foreign country -- a minimum capitalization, usually in the neighborhood of $25,000 or less, is all that is required. Examples of an operating proprietary in which commercial operations are incidental to the Agency mission are:

> A United States frozen seafood importing company which operates in the Far East and provides cover for an Agency employee engaged in intelligence activities. The Agency provided $25,000 in capital to purchase and activate a dormant but long-established privately-owned United States seafood distributing company. The former owner and his partner, who are cleared and witting, provide training, business management, and product distribution in the United States for one-half the profits on seafood imports financed by the proprietary. The Agency subsequently provided $10,000 annually for fiscal years 1972, 1973, and 1974 as working capital. The proprietary since 1971 has provided excellent cover with a minimum amount of business. As of 20 June 1974, the proprietary had assets of $104,222.67 and a net worth (assets minus liabilities) of $74,051.15. The company's financial accounts are handled by an Agency proprietary management firm.

> A foreign travel service company which operates in a Southeast Asia country and provides cover for an agent targeted against the local Communist Party. The company was established in 1973 with an initial investment of $5,900.

Operating proprietaries whose commercial purposes are in themselves essential to the CIA mission require much larger capitalization and investment. They are staffed by Agency personnel plus cleared commercial employees as required. Among the Agency's operating proprietaries of this type are four management companies which provide commercial assistance to other proprietaries and an audit firm which conducts commercial audits of operating companies and those non-operating proprietaries with substantial assets. The Agency's largest operating proprietaries are Air America, an insurance complex, and the aviation facility, Intermountain Aviation, Inc. The assets of Intermountain have been sold, with operations ceasing on 28 February 1975, and the corporation is in the process of being dissolved.

Air America, the Agency's largest proprietary, which is in the process of liquidation, provided aircraft in support of Agency operations in Southeast Asia. This support has been under cover of a commercial flying service in fulfillment of U.S. Government contracts. Corporate Headquarters has been in Washington, D. C., with field Headquarters in Taipei, Taiwan.

The insurance complex provides a mechanism for the payment of annuities and other benefits to sensitive agents and for self-insurance of risks involved in covert operations which, for security reasons, cannot be attributed to the U.S. Government or handled through private firms. The complex was formed in 1962 as a clandestine commercial support mechanism to provide death and disability benefits to agents or their beneficiaries when security considerations precluded payments attributable to the U.S. Government. This function was broadened to include self-insurance for many risks involved in covert operations, including property risks incurred by operational activities of Agency-owned air and marine companies. From an early date, the complex has administered agents' escrow accounts and life insurance, and provided annuity and pension programs for selected agent personnel employed by the Agency. These programs are solely for the purpose of meeting the Agency's obligations to agent-type personnel who have rendered services over a substantial period of time and cannot be handled under normal U.S. Government retirement programs. Individuals who qualify for the CIA Retirement System or the Civil Service System are not handled through the proprietary system. In addition, the complex has been used to provide a limited amount of support to covert operations -- specifically, for the acquisition of operational real estate and as a conduit for the funding of selected covert activities.

Intermountain Aviation, Inc., has the purpose of providing a variety of nonattributable air support capabilities available for quick deployment overseas to support Agency activities. The Agency is in the process of disposing of its assets and terminating this activity.

As of 1 July 1974 there were 71 operating proprietary companies, of which 21 are part of the Agency's proprietary insurance complex. The combined net worth (assets minus liabilities) of these companies is approximately $57.3 million. Although some, such as those in the insurance complex, are commercially self-supporting, most operating proprietaries usually require budgetary support.

B. Nonoperating Proprietaries

Nonoperating proprietaries vary in complexity according to their Agency task, are, for the most part, either corporate shells or less that facilitate foreign operations, and clearly pose no competitive threat to bona fide businesses. The most elaborate are legally licensed and established to conduct bona fide business. They have nominee stockholders, directors, and officers and are generally directed by one of four Agency proprietary management companies. The company address may be a Post Office Box, a legitimate address provided by a cleared and witting company official or attorney, or in a few cases the address of a proprietary management company. They maintain bank accounts, generate business correspondence, keep books of account which can withstand commercial and tax audit, file State and Federal tax returns, and perform normal business reporting to regulatory authorities in order to backstop fully their Agency tasks. They are moderately capitalized, generally around $5,000, and their net worth at any one time varies according to the Agency task they are performing. As of 31 December 1973, 38 of these companies had a combined net worth of approximately $325,000. Of this amount, almost $200,000 was operating capital for three companies which provide cover for several Agency personnel. Examples of two nonoperating companies which are commercially managed, keep books of account, and can withstand commercial and tax audit are:

> A Florida corporation capitalized at $7,000 and whose legal address is the office of a cleared and witting attorney. Under the auspices of the Florida corporation, an Agency officer established a branch office in a Central American country and conducts a sporting goods business which provides him cover. Administration of the corporation, including purchase of inventory for the branch office, is handled by a proprietary management company.

> A Liechtenstein Anstalt which an Agency nominee established using a reliable but nonwitting Liechtenstein lawyer as a resident agent. The Anstalt was used to purchase a property in a European country from which an audio operation was mounted against an installation of a Communist country. Upon conclusion of the operation, the property will be sold by the Anstalt and the proceeds returned to CIA via its nominee.

Requiring less elaborate commercial administration because of the nature of Agency tasks performed are 31 legally incorporated companies which are directly managed by Agency Headquarters specialists operating in alias as signatories to the company bank accounts. Each of these companies generally have a capitalization of $5,000 or less and are domiciled in the offices of cleared and witting attorneys. No commercial books of account are kept, and in the event of a tax audit the Agency has to brief the auditing authority. Depending on use, administration may be as simple as maintaining bank accounts and filing annual franchise taxes or more extensive as required when obtaining Employee Identification numbers, paying personnel, withholding taxes and Social Security, and filing tax returns. Examples of this type of Headquarters-managed proprietary corporation are:

> A Nevada proprietary corporation domiciled at the offices of a California law form. Three members of the firm serve as Agency nominee stockholders, directors, and officers for the proprietary which holds title to two aircraft used by the Agency for flight training and testing avionics equipment. In this case, only administration is required to maintain a bank account, file a franchise tax, and coordinate with the law firm.

Although not proprietary corporations, but proprietaries in the sense of being Agency-owned and administered, are 64 ostensible sole-proprietorships. The Agency establishes and registers these sole-proprietorships in the name of fictitious persons and opens a bank account on which Agency officers in alias have signatory power. Arrangements are made with cleared and witting businessmen to provide a domiciliary address for these entities at a law office or telephone answering service. These entities, like the proprietary corporation administered by Agency Headquarters specialists, provide cover, payrolling, and tax attribution for Agency personnel and are similarly administered.

Another type of entity used by the Agency and a proprietary only in the sense of being Agency-owned and administered is exemplified by some 215 notional companies which are not legally registered but have names and bank accounts controlled by the Agency. The Agency arranges with cleared and witting attorneys or proprietors of telephone answering services to provide a domiciliary address and to refer any queries to the Agency specialists concerned. These notional entities are used to provide status and operational cover for Agency personnel involved in all types of high-risk intelligence operations. They are also used as ostensible clients for purposes of funding Agency proprietaries or bona fide American companies which provide cover and payrolling of Agency personnel.

II. STATUTORY AUTHORITY FOR PROPRIETARIES

The Agency's statutory authority to spend money for proprietary corporations in support of Agency operations derives from Section 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949. This Act states:

> "The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified."

The language contained in Section 8(b) is adequate authority to exclude the operation of these proprietary corporations from the law governing Government corporations in 31 U.S.C.A. 841 et. seq. However, the CIA General Counsel ruled in 1958 that the CIA should comply with the principles in that Act to the extent possible, and this has been done. Attached as Appendix A is a classified Memorandum of Law by the Agency's Office of General Counsel on CIA's authority to acquire and dispose of a proprietary without regard to provisions of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act, which position was upheld by the U.S. District Court in the Southern District of Florida in dismissing the suit Farmer vs. Southern Air Transport on 17 July 1974.

III. SPECIFIC CONTROLS

The formation and activities of proprietaries are controlled through various mechanisms to assure their proper use, as discussed below.

A. Agency Regulations and Policies

Headquarters Regulation 230-8 and Headquarters Handbook 230-1 prescribe the administrative procedures to be followed in the establishment, operation, and liquidation of proprietaries (see Appendix B). An Administrative Plan (specifying the operational purpose, administrative and management procedures, and cost) and a Liquidation Plan (specifying details of liquidation and disposition of funds when liquidation is contemplated) must both be coordinated among components concerned and approved at appropriate management levels. This regulatory control along with policy memoranda are intended to assure proper conduct by entities. Each Agency component involved is responsible for compliance, and the Chief of the Cover and Commercial Staff, the Director of Finance, and the Comptroller are particularly watchful in their areas of concern.

B. Project Reviews and Control

The controls and procedures applicable to each operating proprietary are specified in a project outline and administrative plan approved at the Deputy Director level. Normal control and administration is carried out by a project officer at Headquarters. Semi-annual reviews are conducted to determine whether or not the operational need still exists, and regular audits are performed to assure proper management and financial accountability. Proprietaries are liquidated as their usefulness ends; new ones are formed as needed.

C. Financial Controls/Operating Companies and Non-Operating Companies Keeping Books of Accounts

Under Agency regulations, these proprietaries are established and managed to appear to be consistent with normal commercial practices and requirements of the type of enterprise concerned. Specific requirements for the general management and financial controls of each such proprietary are provided in the administrative plan described above which specifies the basic framework within which the instrumentality is to operate. All facets of an administrative plan relating to funding the proprietary and its financial management are subject to the concurrence of designated representatives of the Director of Finance and the Comptroller. A primary purpose of this coordination is to assure that the financial controls and procedures prescribed for the proprietary are compatible and consistent with normal practices and requirements for the type of instrumentality being established. The Director of Finance representative is the Chief of the Commercial Systems and Audit Division, a position normally occupied by a certified public accountant.

The initial and all subsequent passages of funds to such proprietaries are from the current year Agency operating budget. Receipts of funds by the proprietary are documented as appropriate ostensibly to appear to be from a source usual to a commercial enterprise of similar type, e.g., capital stock, paid in capital, income from ostensible sales, etc.

The Agency treats all disbursements to such proprietaries as current year budgetary expenditures and concurrently establishes as a control mechanism a fully reserved investment account which is reconciled periodically to reported net worth of the proprietary as reflected in required financial statements received from each proprietary. Each such statement is reviewed to reconcile the approved financial activity of the proprietary to reported changes in net worth before adjusting the Agency investment account to conform with the reported net worth.

All control documents evidencing Agency equity or interest in the proprietary, e.g., executed stock certificates, irrevocable stock powers, declaration of trust, etc., are held in safekeeping by the Commercial Systems and Audit Division/OF provided that when such documents need to be retained by the proprietary, a report will be made to identify the documents retained, location, name of custodian and reason for the retention, and copies of the documents, if appropriate.

The Chief of the Agency Audit Staff is responsible for the audit of Agency proprietaries, utilizing Audit Staff personnel under a suitable cover arrangement or witting or unwitting public accounting firms as is most appropriate to the requirements of a particular proprietary. An example of the type of audit conducted appears at p. 105 Section VIII and concerns MHMUTUAL, the proprietary insurance-investment complex.

D. Financial Controls/Non-Operating Companies Except Those Keeping Books of Account

Entities in this category are financed if financing is required through the establishment of bank checking accounts on which Agency officers have signatory power in alias. All such accounts are maintained in the accounting records of the Agency as current asset accounts subject to monthly reconciliation with statements of accounts issued by the depository banks.

All passages of funds to these accounts add to the accountable balance of the accounts. No income is produced by these activities. All disbursements from these accounts are charged as current expenditures in liquidation of obligations of the operational activity on behalf of which the entity was established.

Signatories are Agency officials who in each case execute a declaration of trust acknowledging Government ownership of the account. Payments are initiated only in response to request of an authorized official responsible for the operational activity for which the entity was established.

The Chief of the Agency's Audit Staff is responsible for the audit of all accounts maintained for these entities.

Balances of each of these accounts are monitored periodically to assure that balances do not exceed a level warranted by the activity for which the respective account was established. Balances excess to current requirements and balances for entities which are dissolved are returned to the Agency and in turn remitted to the U.S. Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts. (See discussion of Disposition of Funds Returned from Proprietaries on p. 16.)

E. Treatment of Profits

The CIA General Counsel, in a 6 January 1958 memorandum, ruled that "income of proprietaries, including profits, need not be considered miscellaneous receipts to be covered into the Treasury but may be used for proper corporate or company purposes." This subject was reviewed and the opinion reaffirmed by the General Counsel in July 1965. The policy of retaining profits has continued, although as already noted only a very few of Agency proprietaries have ever been profitable. The CIA's legal basis for retaining profits for the use of the operating corporate entities is discussed below.

Section 104 of the Government Corporations Control Act, 31 U.S.C. 849, provides that Congress shall enact necessary legislation to make available for expenditure such corporate funds or other financial resources or limiting the use thereof as the Congress may determine. It is further provided that "this section shall not be construed as preventing the Government corporations from carrying out and financing their activities as authorized by existing law . . ." The legislative history explaining this section of the act states that "in cases where no other law required a congressional authorization of expenditures, the corporation, if it had means of financing other than annual appropriations, could continue to operate in the absence of any action by Congress on its budget program." The statute creating a particular Government corporation may provide specifically that the corporation may use its profits in the conduct of its business.

The Government Corporations Control Act certainly did not contemplate Government corporations in the sense that the Agency must have them. Neither is it feasible for Agency proprietaries to be created by act of Congress or overseen precisely as provided for in the normal Government corporation in the Act. Nevertheless, the Agency has felt that the appropriate and reasonable policy would be to treat and control them insofar as possible in accordance with the terms of that law. Such being the case, the Agency believes there is no need to have more restrictive rules applied to its corporations in the use of funds, including profits, than are applied to Government Corporations under the other Act or statutes. Thus, the use by a proprietary of its earnings to carry on its corporate affairs without an offset against Agency appropriations is considered a legitimate practice and does not constitute an illegal augmentation of appropriations.

With rare exception, principally the large air and insurance proprietaries, operating proprietaries have not been self-sustaining from bona fide income. Such income, including profits, as is received is retained by the proprietaries consistent with the usual operating practices of business enterprises.

The use of proprietaries' profits, however, is controlled by annual reviews and audits within the Agency of the total capital, investment, and profits situations of the corporations in the context of the operational objectives and the cover needs of the corporations. In effect the annual project review is based upon an audit as searching as that required for statutory Government corporations.

F. Disposition of Funds Returned from Proprietaries

Any proprietary with funds excess to its current or foreseeable needs is required to return such funds to the Agency. Also, all funds realized from the liquidation or termination of a proprietary are returned to the Agency except in a limited number of situations when transferred to another proprietary for "similar use." On the basis of an opinion of 3 February 1975 by the CIA General Counsel, the Agency has revised its policy for the treatment of all returns of funds from proprietaries; all such returns are to be remitted to the U.S. Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts. Prior to this change in policy, returns had been treated as refunds of the previously recorded expenses up to the amount of such expense for a particular proprietary with any excess amounts returned to the Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts.(Appendix C)

G. Disposal of Proprietaries

Air America, the Agency's largest proprietary, at its peak had total assets of some $50 million and more than 8,000 employees (who accounted for more than 90 percent of the people employed directly by all proprietaries). It is in the process of being liquidated because it is no longer required. The Air America complex included a number of other companies with the Pacific Corporation as the holding company. The general plan for liquidation of Air America is for the Pacific Corporation to sell off Air America, Inc. and Air Asia, Ltd. (the Taipei maintenance operation). A private New York firm (R. Dixon

Speas Company) was engaged to estimate a fair market value for the complex. Although an intensive search for competitive bidders was made, the Agency was unable to find buyers for any of the affiliated companies except the Taipei maintenance facility. The sale of this company as a going concern to the successful bidder was closed on 31 January 1975. The remaining parts of Air America are being liquidated by sale of individual assets upon completion of existing contracts. Funds realized from the sales could be as much as $25 million and will be returned to the Treasury.

Agency financial support for Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe, both sizeable proprietaries, was terminated in FY 1971 and responsibility for their funding and operation was assumed by the Department of State.

Southern Air Transport was sold on 31 December 1973 because its contingency capability was no longer needed. The Agency realized $6,470,000 from this sale. Cash received was $3,345,000 which included a $1.2 million award in arbitration of a dispute over the proceeds of the sale of an aircraft by Southern Air Transport after the sale of the company by the Agency. The balance was paid by the purchaser to Air America to retire a debt owed by Southern Air Transport. A group of employees of Southern Air Transport filed a civil action disputing the propriety of the sale of the company by the Agency, but the case was dismissed with prejudice on 17 July 1974.

A more detailed list of various disposals of smaller proprietaries and what, if any, relationships remained thereafter between the Agency and any subsequent entity appears infra page 39, Section V.

H. Relations with Tax, Regulatory, and Other Agencies

Management and control of proprietaries often requires "cooperative interface" with outside agencies to gain beneficial working relationships and, as necessary, any appropriate authorizations. These relationships are described below.

For those proprietaries which maintain commercial books and other financial records. U.S. and State tax returns are prepared annually by commercial managers based on the corporation's financial records. For other entities where only internal Agency records are maintained, tax returns are prepared by Agency specialists in a manner to reflect the normal operations of a bona fide commercial business. Close coordination is maintained with the Internal Revenue Service, which is aware of the Agency's use of proprietary commercial entities. In the event an Agency entity is singled out for IRS audit, it has been agreed that the Agency, through the Office of General Counsel, will notify IRS of Agency ownership. The IRS then cancels the audit in order to conserve auditor manpower.

The Air proprietaries necessitated contact with the Civil Aeronautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency and the National Transportation Safety Board. Specific problems were discussed, usually with the Office of General Counsel of the agency concerned by the CIA General Counsel.

The Air Proprietaries dealt with State Department and the Agency for International Development, generally on a contractor/customer basis, although senior personnel of those agencies were advised by the Agency of its ownership of the companies.

Those proprietaries which engaged in the shipment of weapons or other items on the Munitions Control list required Agency assistance in obtaining the necessary export licenses. The ownership of the companies was discussed with State Department Office of Munitions Control and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tax and Firearms.

The radio proprietaries, while funded by CIA, did receive policy guidance from the Department of State to ensure that their broadcasts were in conformance with U.S. foreign policy.

The Agency has intervened with the Department of Labor on behalf of survivors of employees of the proprietaries in order to assist them in receiving the available benefits under the applicable Workmen's Compensation Acts.

The Agency, on behalf of the proprietaries, interceded with the Defense Department to have the proprietaries' contracts exempt from the Renegotiation Board. There was a normal exemption based on the rules of the Board which was given for contracts performed entirely outside the United States.

CIA requested the Air Force to consider the interest of the Agency in connection with the awarding of commercial contracts to its proprietaries. Initially this was done in the mid-1950's on the basis of a policy decision by the Operations Coordination Board that the air proprietary in the Far East, then operating at a deficit, was an instrument of value to national security. The Agency was able to maintain a standby capability without budget subsidies if awarded enough business to support large commercial aircraft. This applied to the passenger and cargo aircraft.

The U.S. Forest Service was advised of the ownership of a proprietary and asked to award contracts to the proprietary in order to help it develop a commercial posture and permit its aircraft to be associated with that type of flying.

IV. A DESCRIPTION OF THE VARIOUS PROPRIETARIES

The operational needs of the Agency have required it to venture forth into many areas where proprietaries were a perceived necessary vehicle. These areas have included air support, media publications, proprietary management (accounting and management), insurance (personal insurance coverage, annuity coverages, and escrow account maintenance for agent personnel), covert procurement (general merchandise, arms, ammunition and police related equipment), cover support (commercial cover, such as management consultant firms, importing companies, travel agencies, energy research organizations, behavior psychology companies), personnel services (tape transcription, personnel investigations for security clearances and approvals, public accounting firms, electoral and political analysis firm keyed into foreign elections), operational support (purchase of condominiums in foreign countries, sporting goods business in United States with sales in Latin America, various overseas foundations to provide grants, export/import firms, a company which holds a note for certain U.S. Government funds borrowed by a consortium of aluminum companies for the extraction of bauxite in Guinea to insure U.S. control of bauxite extraction activities in Guinea), and various other miscellaneous categories.

The number of employees of proprietaries as of October 30, 1975 was 321. Of this number 78 were U.S. Agency employees, 178 were U.S. proprietary hires, and 65 were foreign proprietary hires. The various types of funding and payrolling mechanisms used by the Agency (Devised Facilities incorporated in the U.S.; Devised Facilities-Notionals which are not incorporated but are sole proprietorships; and Notionals, which are merely business names, are not formally constituted or registered which do business at the address of an answering service or witting attorney) totaled 326 as of October 31, 1975. There were 31 Devised Facilities, 67 Devised Facilities-Notionals, and 228 Notionals.

There follows a list of some of these proprietaries with brief descriptions of their functions. There are 97 in number. Following that list is a description of the major headquarters-controlled proprietaries provided as of September 24, 1975. In addition, there is included a listing of all proprietaries during the period 1952 through 1974 (total 399) with the highest net equity balance on agency records and the net worth balance as of December 31, 1974. The smallest net worth balance is $400 and the largest is $31,778,000.

The year 1967 was selected to demonstrate the number of employees in use by Agency proprietaries. In that year, the Agency owned approximately 158 proprietaries. These proprietaries employed approximately 14,416 persons. Ninety-two percent of the employees were accounted for by three proprietary complexes as follows:

JBGREED	10,218
TPTONIC	1,800
QRACTIVE	1,300
	13,318

TPTONIC and QRACTIVE (Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty) were turned over to the Department of State and are now being managed by the Board of International Broadcasters. The JBGREED complex (air support capability in the Far East) is in the process of liquidation and currently has 63 employees. In addition to the proprietaries mentioned above, the Agency managed 243 funding and payrolling mechanisms which provided payrolling services for 149 employees.

PROPRIETARY LIST

AIR SUPPORT

IUBETON Complex

The below four companies comprise an air support capability for worldwide contingency use. The complex is based in the Southeastern portion of the United States with certain commercial business operations overseas.

1. IUCONTROL

A Florida corporation which acts as the holding company for the principal operating company in the complex (immediately below); assets consist solely of stock in the principal operating company; no employees.

2. IUBERYL

A Florida corporation based in South Florida; a small air service company which can be quickly expanded to meet Agency air support requirements.

3. IUEPOCH

A Florida corporation which operates from an airport in the Southeastern United States; a wholly owned subsidiary of IUBERYL (immediately above) which operates a fixed base aviation facility; provides an alternative air support capability.

4. IUPIECES

A Florida corporation based in Miami which acts as a purchasing agent for aviation supplies for the activities of the complex; can provide the same service for prospective Agency air support activities; is a wholly-owned subsidiary of IUBERYL (above).

SECRET

JBGREED Complex

The below five companies comprised an air support capability in the Far East. All entities are in process of being liquidated or sold.

5. JBCRYING

A Delaware corporation with corporate offices in Washington, D.C., which acts as the holding company for JBCHOKE, JBHEEDFUL, and PROPRIETARY C (see below).

6. JBCHOKE

A Delaware corporation ~~which~~ with corporate offices in Washington, D.C., which has terminated all flying services contracts. The company will be liquidated by sale or disposal of assets.

7. JBHEEDFUL

A Taiwan corporation with corporate offices in Taipei which ceased flying operations in 1968 but has continued to provide ticketing and other services on behalf of other affiliated companies.

8. PROPRIETARY B

A Hong Kong corporation located in Hong Kong which provides computerized accounting services for JBCHOKE.

9. PROPRIETARY C

A Thailand corporation located in Bangkok, Thailand which is the custodian for JBCHOKE files pertaining to Thai employees and contractual services in Thailand; will be dissolved when Thai law no longer requires retention of these records.

FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

Single Entity

10. HBSANDTRAP

A Delaware corporation located at Washington National Airport which has provided secure air support for Agency employees and classified pouches between Headquarters and other Agency facilities in

20

the United States; the company has accepted commercial charter flights from non-Agency customers for income and cover purposes.

Media Publications

The below six companies comprise a worldwide book distribution and manuscript publishing activity.

11. QRBLOND

A Liberian corporation with a representative (banker) in Brussels which pays book distribution costs; funds are controlled by members of the New York corporation (PDPORTAL/300 - below) and paid through this corporation to avoid some of the problems of funding a domestic company in the total amount required to effect project operations; no employees except for the Brussels representative, who is paid on a fee basis.

12. QRBLUFF

A Liberian corporation which is used as attribution for Agency funding to the above two proprietaries; no employees.

13. PDPORTAL/200

A German non-profit organization, located in Munich, which acts as the home office of its Rome Branch and is also used as the ostensible source of all the Agency funding to other project entities; no employees; maintains a branch, PDPORTAL/500, in Rome, Italy.

14. PDPORTAL/100

A limited partnership located in London, England.

15. PDPORTAL/400

A corporation located in Paris, France.

16. PDPORTAL/300

A New York corporation located in New York City.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

Single Entities

17. TOMOSAIC

A Delaware corporation based in London which provided an international news feature service; the project also supported the publication of books of propaganda value; the news feature service has been discontinued and the corporation will soon be dissolved.

18. AELEDGER

A French corporate entity located in Europe which publishes a foreign-language weekly periodical, which is disseminated to recipients in and out of Russia and contains articles on Soviet and Bloc matters including a large amount of material prepared covertly in the USSR by Soviet dissidents; the periodical attempts to encourage and assist activities of moderate segments of Soviet society.

19. AEDYNAMIC

A New York corporation located in New York City which publishes periodicals and selected books for infiltration into the Soviet Union and distribution to travelers and Soviets residing outside the USSR; fosters regional nationalism within the USSR; supports a private organization of regional nationalities; supports the AEDYNAMIC branch office in Munich, Germany.

20. QRMYSTIC

A sole proprietorship located in the Washington metropolitan area owned ostensibly by an Agency employee whose journalistic services are utilized in support of foreign operations.

Proprietary Management

LPPANDA Complex

The below three companies support a one man accounting and management company in Europe which provides services to other proprietary operations.

FROM

NOV 6 1975

CIA

21. LPREMEDY

A one man accounting and management company located in Europe.

22. LPCLOUD

A dormant company at one time associated with the cover of the individual now covered by LPREMEDY.

23. LPCHAIR/A

A New York company with no employees which serves as a communication channel from Headquarters to LPREMEDY.

Single Entities

24. LPHOCUS

A New York management and accounting company (three employees) which provides accounting and related financial management assistance to other proprietary organizations.

25. LPSUGAR

A Maryland management and accounting company (three employees) which provides accounting and related services to other proprietary organizations.

26. LPBERRY/B

A New York legal and accounting firm (three employees) which provides legal and accounting services to other proprietary organizations.

Insurance

MHMUTUAL Complex

The below 25 proprietaries comprise a clandestine support mechanism which provides personal insurance coverages, annuity coverages, and escrow account maintenance for agent personnel in a manner to preclude attribution to the United

RE FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

States Government. The complex also underwrites insurance risks of certain proprietary organizations and administers the pension plans of these organizations. In addition, the complex has been used to provide a limited amount of support to other Agency operations -- specifically, the acquisition of operational real estate and as a conduit for the funding of selected foreign covert activities. Twelve full-time employees are involved in the management of the complex, with the assistance of three proprietary management firms. All expenses except for the salaries of Government employees assigned to the complex are paid from earned income. The companies involved are:

27. MHANVIL/A

An attorney at law operating as a sole proprietor in Washington, D.C.; he is the Agency manager of the insurance complex.

28. MHGRET

A Panamanian company which provides ownership for MHCROZE, an investment proprietary, (see below) and owns an apartment in Buenos Aires; no employees.

29. MHCROZE

A Panamanian company which serves as an investment vehicle and a primary mechanism for the management of funds, no employees.

30. MHSLACK

A Delaware corporation which provides payroll cover for project personnel and serves as an investment vehicle for funds; seven employees.

31. MHVODKA

A Bermuda company which is a reinsurance vehicle for all types of casualty and property insurance for other Agency proprietaries and directly issues death and disability, term life, annuity and other coverages for Agency non-staff personnel; no employees.

32. MHDRYAD

A Panamanian company which serves as owner of MHLUMEN and MHSPRAY (see below); no employees.

ROM

NOV 6 1975

CIA

CRET

-6-

16

33. MHLUMEN

A Liberian company which serves as owner of MHFETCH (see below) and as the source of an operational loan; no employees.

34. MHFETCH

A Bahamian company which serves as owner of MHKOALA and MHWHIFF (see below); an investment vehicle and manager of non-staff pension plan; no employees.

35. MHKOALA

A Liberian company currently inactive and slated for dissolution; no employees.

36. MHWHIFF

A Bermuda company which is a reinsurance vehicle for all types of casualty and property insurance for Agency proprietaries and for life and annuity coverages for non-staff personnel; no employees.

37. MHMOLAR

Liechtenstein anstalt which serves as the beneficial owner of MHBOMBE (see below); no employees.

38. MHBOMBE

A Bahamian company which serves as a holding company for MHTWANG and MHONSET (see below) and as an investment vehicle; no employees.

39. MHONSET

A Delaware corporation which serves as an investment vehicle and guarantor of a mortgage on a former Agency activity; no employees.

40. MHTWANG

A Cayman Island corporation which handles certain annuities, escrow, term life insurance, a pension plan and funding of MHPIQUE (see below); no employees.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

SECRET

SECRET

41. MHPIQUE

A Florida company which provides payroll cover for three non-staff personnel who handle the Cuban dependents program payments and correspondence; three employees.

42. MHDELFT

A Swiss company which serves as a holding company for MHHAWSE (see below) and as a standby asset; no employees.

43. MHHAWSE

A channel Island company that serves as a direct underwriter of term life insurance and annuity contracts for non-staff Agency personnel; no employees.

44. MHSEPOY

A Panamanian company that serves as beneficial owner of MHUNDER (see below) and for direct underwriting of term life and annuities for non-staff personnel; no employees.

45. MHUNDER

A Panamanian company which is slated for dissolution; no employees.

46. MHALATE

A Liechtenstein company which owns property in Lusaka; no employees.

47. MHJORUM

A Panamanian company which directly underwrites death and disability, term life and annuities for non-staff personnel, no employees.

48. MHBLARE

A Florida company now in dissolution resulting from abandonment of Agency project; no employees.

R[illegible]

NOV 5 1975

CIA

SECRET

49. MHRUCHE

A Liechtenstein anstalt which is a general use standby asset; no employees.

50. MHCLUMP

A Liechtenstein anstalt which serves as a standby asset for general reinsurance use; no employees.

51. BGJASMINE

A European insurance and reinsurance company which issued direct death and disability coverage to contractor personnel engaged for a DDS&T project, and reinsured other risks arising out of the project; no employees.

Logistics Support

The below three entities operated by the Office of Logistics provide a covert procurement mechanism for the Agency.

52. KMJAGGERY

A Delaware corporation located in Washington, D.C., which purchases general merchandise in a manner which cannot be traced to the United States Government; total purchases from January to September 1974 were $437,500; no outside commercial business; five employees.

53. TPLENTIC

A Delaware corporation with an address in New York which arranges research and development and production contracts in a manner which cannot be traced to the United States Government; the company has no employees and is managed by Headquarters officials in alias.

ROM

NOV 6 1975

CIA

54. Stock Account #3

A Delaware corporation with an address in Baltimore which purchases arms, ammunition, and police related equipment in a manner which cannot be traced to the United States Government; the company has no employees and is managed by Headquarters officials in alias.

Cover Support

WUDIRK Complex

The below five entities located in New York comprise a Foreign Resources Division activity which provides commercial cover for certain personnel assigned to the New York Base of FR Division; no commercial activities are undertaken by the companies in the complex, and all revenue comes from Agency sources; two of the entities are in the process of dissolution, and two recently established entities will replace the ones in dissolution.

55. WUBODKIN

A New York corporation with offices in midtown Manhattan which is styled as a management consulting firm; the entity will be dissolved in the near future as soon as other cover facilities are available for the individuals presently covered by the entity; used by New York Base personnel for employment attribution and office space.

56. WUCURULE

A New York corporation with offices in mid-town Manhattan which is styled as a management consulting firm; the entity will be dissolved in the near future as soon as other cover facilities are available for the individuals presently covered by the entity; used by New York Base personnel for employment attribution and office space.

57. WUXIPHOID

A New York corporation with offices in mid-town Manhattan which is styled as a management consulting firm; the entity will continue to provide cover support to the New York Base; used by New York Base personnel for employment attribution and office space.

FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

58. WUBACH

A newly established New York corporation with offices in mid-town Manhattan which is styled as a management consulting firm; was created to replace WUBODKIN and WUCURULE (above); used by New York Base personnel for employment attribution and office space.

59. WUKNOX

A newly established New York corporation with offices in mid-town Manhattan which is styled as a management consulting firm; was created to replace WUBODKIN and WUCURULE (above); used by New York Base personnel for employment attribution and office space.

Single Entities

60. LPPIKE

A New York importing company with a branch office in a Far East country; the branch office provides cover for one Agency employee; no employees in New York.

61. MOKITH

A Thai company located in Bangkok, Thailand, which functions as a travel agency and provides cover for one Agency employee in Bangkok.

62. LKBASE

A Virginia corporation located in Washington, D.C., which, in the past, has provided cover and funding for nonofficial cover officers in the middle east; it is styled as a research organization on energy matters and is now in the process of liquidation.

63. MKDILLY

A Virginia corporation operating out of the residence of its president in Northern Virginia; the company provides cover for one Agency officer who provides behavior psychology assistance to the DDO.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

Personnel Services

Single Entities

64. SLAVE

A Delaware corporation having its principal office in Falls Church, Virginia, which provided a centralized facility in the Headquarters area with the capability of fulfilling field and Headquarters requirements for tape transcription and document translation; three employees; steps are now underway to convert two of the employees who were proprietary hires to contract employee status and move the function to Agency controlled buildings.

65. MHBOUND/3

A California corporation, with its headquarters in Los Angeles, which conducts personnel investigations for security clearances/approvals in those cases where no United States Government interest can be disclosed. It also renders security assistance, i.e., badging, counter-audio inspections, etc., to Agency projects in those cases where United States Government involvement cannot be revealed; the company will be dissolved by 30 June 1976.

66. MHCLIMB

Represented as the Washington, D.C. branch office or affiliate of a legitimate New York based public accounting firm, but actually under sole control and administration of the Agency Audit Staff, this facility enables site audits of Agency covert projects by experienced Agency auditors.

67. VWCADENZA

A Maryland company located in Bethesda, which is used as cover for an Agency employee who provides electoral and political analysis on South American and European elections; he also trains Agency personnel in polling techniques and electoral analysis; no outside business.

FROM

NOV 6 1975

CIA

SRET

10

Operational Support

WUTACTIC Complex

The below 27 companies are managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff to provide operational support mechanisms for DDO foreign operations. Some companies are inactive and held for future use.

68. LPCEMENT

A Liechtenstein company used to purchase a condominum apartment in France for use as a listening post; net assets $84,226; no employees, being terminated in the near future.

69. LPKILT

A Latin American company established to provide cover and funds to an East Asian agent; agent exports goods to Latin America for resale; gross sales last year of $1,000; assets $12,870; one field agent.

70. LPKNIT

A Florida corporation formed to provide cover and source of livelihood to an Agency employee in Latin America; employee opened branch office of this parent company and sells sporting goods; gross sales last year (first year of operation) $3,367; assets $14,125; one employee and wife.

71. LPPURSUIT

A Liberian corporation used to backstop a field agent in the renewal of his visa; assets of $375; no employees.

72. LPCAMEO

A Liberian corporation used as the ostensible employer of two Agency employees in the recruitment of a foreign agent; no assets no real employees.

73. LPMISSIVE

A Liechtenstein anstalt which holds a mortgage on property in Austria used by a field agent; assets of $788; the mortgage is not recorded on the books of the corporation; no employees.

FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

74. LPBANGO

A Liechtenstein foundation used to give ostensible grants-in-aid to field agents as a source of their livelihood; assets of $165; no employees.

75. LPABBEY

A Liechtenstein foundation presently inactive; assets $3,202; no employees.

76. LPKITTY

A Liechtenstein foundation presently inactive; assets $3,205; no employees.

77. LPALONE

A Liechtenstein foundation presently inactive; assets $633; no employees.

78. LPDOUBLE

A Liechtenstein company used as a funding channel for a cover placement, assets $2,853; no employees.

79. LPRAISIN

A Liechtenstein anstalt export/import firm formed to provide additional status and prestige to an employee operating in alias; assets $7,942; no employees.

80. LPBRAID

A Panamanian company used as a note holder in the sale of an Agency proprietary entity; assets $1,818; no employees.

81. LPADVANCE

A Panamanian company currently inactive; assets $3,589; no employees.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

82. LPGLITTER

A Panamanian company which was used as an investment vehicle for funds reserved for new commercial operations requiring Agency investments; The investment project was terminated and all funds returned to the Agency; the company has no employees.

83. LPLOTUS

A Panamanian company currently inactive; assets of $2,831; no employees.

84. LPVISION

A Panamanian company currently inactive; assets of $2,831; no employees.

85. LPRANGE

A Panamanian company which holds a note for certain United States Government funds borrowed by a consortium of aluminum companies for the extraction of bauxite in Guinea; purpose of United States Govenment involvement was to insure U.S. control of bauxite extraction activities in Guinea; the note, issued in 1961, was in the principal amount of $2,855,000, balance of $1,752,000 has remained uncollected since 1962, when payments stopped, (at the time the Government of Guinea nationalized the extraction effort); aside from the note, the company has no other assets and has no employees.

86. LPSHADE

A Delaware company previously used as a holder of a note on a loan to a field agent; company now inactive; assets of $2,829; no employees.

87. LPMANTLE

A Delaware corporation which is used to collect the proceeds from the sale of Agency proprietary entities and to refund such proceeds to the Agency; at 31 December 1973, total assets $650,220, total liabilities $633,897, total stockholders equity $16,323; no employees.

RECEIVED FROM

NOV 6 1975

CIA

88. LPEPIC

A Delaware corporation based in New York City with a branch office in the Far East which provides commercial cover to a contract employee in the Far East targeted against foreign intelligence; net assets $27,265; one employee.

89. LPSHORE

A Delaware corporation currently inactive but retained for future use; net assets of $2,023; no employees.

90. LPRERUN

A Delaware company used to provide compensation and tax attribution to an independent contractor, assets of $7,094; no employees.

91. LPGRASS

A Delaware company used as the ostensible investors of funds in LPKILT; assets of $1,826; no employees.

92. LPSHUFFLE

A New York company incorporated but never opened for business; being held in reserve for possible future use; no assets; no employees.

93. LPDAIS

A New York corporation based in New York with a branch office in Europe. Used as the ostensible employer of an Agency employee during his tour in Europe targeted against foreign intelligence; net assets $6,845; one employee.

94. LPDUPE

A Massachusetts company incorporated to provide cover and source of livelihood to an Agency employee on a tour in the Near East; assets of $9,647; one employee.

ROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

Miscellaneous

Single Entities

95. CATAR

A Liechtenstein corporation operated by a lawyer in Europe which has been used as the lessee of apartments of operational interest in two European cities; also used as the ostensible employer of certain Agency employees in the Far East when they operate in alias; no real employees; funds have been passed through the company bank account in amounts necessary to meet lease payments and maintain commercial image; net worth of about $5,000 (represents minimum bank balance); company now in the process of dissolution.

96. LPBYZAS/B

A Swiss entity which holds a current equity interest (30 percent) in a European trucking company; all other owners of the trucking company are unwitting of Agency interest and the Agency has been trying to sell its equity since 1973; both entities provided cover for a career associate for four years; when sale is completed, LPBYZAS/B will be dissolved and proceeds returned to the Agency for credit to Miscellaneous Receipts.

97. LPESTATE

A Liechtenstein anstalt with no employees which owned a house of operational interest in a European city; the house was recently sold and the entity will be dissolved as soon as the proceeds from the sale are received and the company can be liquidated in accordance with the laws of Liechtenstein; liquidating dividends will be returned to the Agency for credit to Miscellaneous Receipts.

R FROM
NOV 6 1975
CIA

SECRET

5

TAB B

Employees* of Proprietaries as of October 30, 1975

	U.S. Agency Employees	U.S. Prop. Hire	Foreign Prop. Hires	Totals
IUBETON Complex	3	116	1	120
JBGREED Complex	2	31	30	63
HBSANDTRAP	6	0	0	6
PDPORTAL Complex	0	10	9	19
TOMOSAIC	0	0	0	0
AELEDGER	1	0	20	21
AEDYNAMIC	0	7	3	10
QRMYSTIC	1	0	0	1
LPPANDA Complex	1	0	0	1
LPHOCUS	2	1	0	3
LPSUGAR	3	0	0	3
LPBERRY/B	1	2	0	3
MHMUTUAL Complex	8	3	1	12
Logistic Support Complex	5	0	0	5
WUDIRK Complex	23	0	0	23
LPPIKE	1	0	0	1
MOKITH	1	0	0	1
LKBASE	0	0	0	0
MKDILLY	1	0	0	1
SLAVE	5	0	0	5
MHBOUND/3	7	6	0	13
MHCLIMB	3	1	0	4
VWCADENZA	1	1	0	2
LPTACTIC Complex	3	0	1	4
CATAR	0	0	0	0
LPBYZAS/B	0	0	0	0
LPESTATE	0	0	0	0
Totals	78	178	65	321

* No Foreign National Agency employees are presently employed by Agency proprietaries.

JM

NOV 6 1975

CIA

TAB C

FUNDING AND PAYROLLING MECHANISMS

1. The various types of Funding and Payrolling Mechanisms used by the Agency are described below:

a. Devised Facilities--Those Agency-owned and managed mechanisms which are incorporated in U.S. jurisdictions (various States) with nominee stockholders and are used to provide nonofficial cover payroll support to Agency assets who do not have to show highly visible cover employment. They are also used for other nonofficial cover support tasks such as funding of proprietary organizations. No books of account are maintained but annual tax returns are prepared by Headquarters specialists in a manner to make it appear that the mechanism is conducting normal commercial business. Since the tax return cannot be substantiated from commercial records, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) must be notified of Agency interest in the entity in the event of a proposed IRS audit. Management, including direct control of the corporate bank accounts, is effected by specialists at Headquarters. Funds are transferred from Headquarters to the bank account of each entity in amounts and at times necessary to meet funding obligations; otherwise, minimum balances are maintained in the accounts to keep them open.

b. Devised Facilities-Notionals--Those Agency-owned and managed mechanisms similar to Devised Facilities except that the mechanisms are not incorporated; they are sole proprietorships. The same administrative procedures are used as for Devised Facilities.

c. Notionals--Those Agency-owned and managed mechanisms which are merely business names (not formally constituted or registered) which ostensibly do business at the address of an answering service or witting attorney. Operating officials are usually fictitious and management is effected by specialists at Headquarters. These entities are generally used as funding attribution for monies paid to bona fide corporations in reimbursement of cover costs for Agency assets, and they are also used to fund proprietary organizations. The same administrative procedures are used as for Devised Facilities.

2. As of 31 October 1975, the number of mechanisms in each category is as follows:

a. Devised Facilities	31
b. Devised Facilities-Notionals	67
c. Notionals	228
Total	326

1975

R1779

16

DESCRIPTIONS OF MAJOR HEADQUARTERS-CONTROLLED PROPRIETARIES FOUND ON THE SCHEDULE ATTACHED TO A 24 SEPTEMBER 1975 MEMORANDUM TO THE COMPTROLLER FROM THE OFFICE OF FINANCE

LPBERRY/B	- A one man, one secretary accounting and legal firm in New York City which provides services to Agency proprietary clients as well as commercial customers. The majority of the costs of this proprietary are usually subsidized by the Agency, however, during the past 12-month period the proprietary did earn substantial fees from legal clients including a $20,000 fee which was congingent upon the favorable settlement of a civil case.
LPPIKE	- A small importing firm in New York City which provides cover for one Agency officer in the Far East. In the past, the company has earned substantial revenue, however, in recent months and for the next year it is expected that the company will be subsidized completely by the Agency.
PDPORTAL	- A complex of companies both in the U.S. and abroad which comprise a worldwide book distribution and manuscript publishing activity. Except for $4,000 to $5,000 a year from outside sources, all proprietaries in this complex are subsidized completely by the Agency.
PDLEDGER	- A small company in Europe which publishes a weekly periodical and disseminates this and other material to recipients in and out of Russia; the various written materials produced for dissemination by the company contain Soviet dissident literature and other articles to encourage and assist activities of moderate segments of Soviet society. This company receives outside revenue from the sale of its publications and over the past 12 months this revenue contributed to approximately one-half of the costs. The balance was provided by the Agency.

RE[illegible]ROM

NOV 4 1975

CIA

SECRET

39

PDDYNAMIC	-	A domestic based corporation with a German branch which fosters the aims of a nationalistic group within the USSR and publishes selected books and periodicals for distribution to members of this nationalistic group. The New York and German offices under this project are largely subsidized by the Agency with some revenue to the German office from the sale of publications.
VWCADENZA	-	A one man, one secretary, consulting company which provides Agency officers with training and advice on polling techniques as applicable to foreign operations. This company is wholly subsidized by the Agency.
MHBOUND	-	MHBOUND/3, a security services company which supports Agency programs involving contractor personnel and offers limited services to commercial customers for cover purposes. This company is almost completely subsidized by the Agency.
KMJAGGERY	-	A small purchasing company operated by the Agency, Office of Logistics, which provides covert procurement for that office. This company is wholly subsidized by the Agency.
QRMYSTIC	-	A sole proprietorship in the Washington area ostensibly owned by an Agency employee whose writing and research talents are utilized exclusively by the Agency in support of overseas operations. This company is wholly subsidized by the Agency.
WUDIRK	-	A group of three companies in New York which provide cover for personnel assigned to FR Division's New York Base. The three companies involved are supported wholly by the Agency.
LPHOCUS	-	A two accountant, one secretary firm in New York City which provides accounting services for Agency proprietary organizations. This company is supported almost exclusively by the Agency.

RE[illegible] FROM

NOV 4 1975

CIA

LPBYZAS/3 - A European company with no employees which holds the Agency's interest in another European company which was used in the past to provide cover for one Agency employee. This company is being retained solely for the purpose of holding an Agency investment. Until this investment is sold, the expenses incident to the operation of the company will be wholly subsidized by the Agency.

LPPANDA - One company in New York without employees and a one accountant, part-time secretary firm in Europe which provides accounting support to Agency proprietary organizations. This company is almost exclusively subsidized by the Agency.

MHMUTUAL - This is the Agency insurance complex which, through interest and dividends earned on its investment portfolio, pays for all Project expenses except for funds provided by the Agency to meet the salary costs of staff and contract employees in the complex.

LPSUGAR - A two accountant, one secretary firm in the Washington area which provides accounting services to other Agency proprietary organizations. This company is almost completely subsidized by the Agency.

[illegible] FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

LISTING OF PROPRIETARIES DURING THE PERIOD 1952 THROUGH 1974

(Total 399)

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
ABUNA (Same as JBCASHBOX)	$ 98,000	$
AEEGGHEAD	65,000	
AEMARSH	1,414	
AEMIRROR	42,000	
AEPOKER	135,900	
[redacted]	[redacted]	
AEWILDFIRE	37,000	
AESILVER/D	60,000	
AKAROA	147,000	
AMIDEA	275,000	
BEDEVIL	214,000	
BEHOVE	141,000	
BEUSEFUL	9,200	
BEVALID	291,000	
BGJAGUAR	59,400	84,400
BGMARQUE	3,500,000	
BGSPEED	2,200	
BGTENTS	13,500	
BGTHANKS	88,200	
CABANA	17,000	
CALANCET	29,000	
CAPOX	64,800	
DEINDEED	2,829,000	
DEWARK	333,000	
DTCRAZE	85,000	
DTLAMPREY	264,500	
DTLIQUOR	4,600	
DTPHENYL	189,500	
DTPIGGLE	38,500	
DTPILLAR	7,123,000	
DTTEEPEE	117,400	
DUPLICITY/1	39,000	

REC [illegible] FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
ENDOMORPH	$	$
ENGAGE	202,000	5,300(a)
FELIX	6,200	
FJCITIES	33,000	
FJREFLECT	7,959,000	
FJHOLIDAY	77,464	
FJSTRICT	304,000	
FUARROW	29,000	
FURIOSO/H	22,000	
FUSEE	25,000	
GINSENG/G (was GIMMICK)	31,000	
HACKMORE	600	
HALARC	9,600	
HBDERRICK (was WU) (same as OILSTONE)		
HBCLUBHOUSE	917,543	
HBSANDTRAP	1,103,000	
HBEPITOME	546,200	
H[illegible]CKORY	142,500	
HBQUAIL	2,100	
Housing Fund ISOLATION	16,600	
HTB ALARD	14,800	
HTGARLIC	203,300	
HTNAMABLE	2,066,000	
HTPENULT	7,000	
ICIRON	8,000	
IUAIREDALE	89,000	
IUQUEST		
IUABATE	3,484,000	3,484,000(a)
IUPAGAN	3,332,000	880,000(a)
IUPROTON (*)	1,830,000	7,220(a)
JBFOLDAGE	43,000	
JBGREED	34,110,000	31,778,000(a)
LPCRYING		
JBCHOKE		
JBARGON		

REC[illegible] FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

(*) See attached schedule for non-government investments.
(a) In process of liquidation

-2-

35

SECRET
SENSITIVE

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
JBGREED (continued)	$	$
JBHEEDFUL		
PROP B		
PROP C		
JBOPOSONIC	3,500	
JBWHIST	205,000	
JMATE		
JMDUST	512,000	
JMHOPE	345,000	
JMPOPLAR	61,400	
KMHELMSMAN	19,400	
KMARDISH	8,200	
KMCARDUEL	20,000	
KMCASADE	49,000	
KMJAGUARO	1,088,000	
KMFERRY	4,000	
KMJAGGERY	294,700	
MHOLENT	11,000	
Sr. STOCK ACCT. #2	4,105,000	
Sr. STOCK ACCT. #3	50,000	
TPLENITIC	153,500	
KMOCHRIOD	50,500	
KMPRICE	141,000	
KMSMORCH	8,300	
LADYCHAPEL	223,000	
LCFURTHER	31,800	
LCKNIFE	335,300	
LCPEDANT	59,800	
LCROPES	311,000	
LFUPRISE		
MIASTOR	29,000	
LILISP/G	121,700	
LIMERRY	129,000	
LPBERRY (was BGLEADWAY)	41,600	
LPBERRY/A	65,000	
LPBERRY/B	52,000	53,200
LPBYZAS/A	67,000	340(a)
LPBYZAS/B	357,000	357,000

REC[illegible] [illegible]OM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

(a) In process of liquidation.

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
LPCAPTAIN	$ 20,000	$
LPCANAL	34,800	2,000(a)
LPDICTUM(was ZRSALTY,(same as WUBRINY) ZRSALTY)	500,000	
LPDICTUM/F	931,900	
LPESTATE	87,000	84,400
LPSPICE (*)	206,000	10,500(a)
LPDICTUM/P	75,000	
LPSALINE (*)	1,597,000	
LPETHNIC(same as WUAMICE)		
LPCYHAMMER	800	
LPHALTER	67,000	
MODAISY	5,400	
LPTOTEM	242,000	81,200(a)
LPFUNNEL	1,500	
LPGAMP	27,000	
LPGLOBE	29,000	
LPHOCUS(same as WUHOCUS)	88,000	35,700
LPJACK (*)	49,000	54,400(a)
LPMINERAL		
[illegible]AIL	52,000	
L[illegible]CHICKEN	13,000	
LPMINOR		
LPMINOR/1	523,000	
LPMINOR/G	91,000	
LPMETAL	166,000	47,800(a)
PULSE	9,000	
WUHALIBUT	311,100	
LPPANDA(same as ZRBADGE)		
CHAIR A(same as WUPSYCHE/	77,500	1,900
CHAIR B WUCHAIR/A & WUCHAIR/B)	7,000	
LPCLOUD(same as WUCLOUD)	5,900	
LPMET (*)	16,200	16,200
LPREMEDY	34,000	27,400
LPRECLAIM		
LPPITCH	58,000	
LPROE/		
LPPIKE	73,700	56,200
LPSIPHON	12,500	
LPSUGAR	55,000	35,600
LPTACTIC		
LPABBEY	3,500	4,300
LPACROSS	1,700	

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 1975

(*) See attached schedule

(a) In process of liquidation

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
LPTACITC (continued)	$	$
LPABOUT	1,000	
LPACTION	4,300	
LPADVANCE	20,000	3,600
LPALONE	6,000	400
LPASSIST	2,500	
LPBAIL	11,400	
LPBANJO	1,900	1,200
LPBEAVER	2,200	
LPBRAID	2,200	1,800
LPBRICK	4,200	
LPCAMEO	2,000	
LPCAREFREE	16,000	
LPCEMENT	64,000	86,200
LPCHANNEL	500	
LPCHAOS	2,500	
LPDAIS	31,000	20,500
LPDARE	21,000	
LPDECOR	98,700	
LPDOLLOP	3,000	
DOUBLE	4,700	2,800
LPDRAGUN	7,000	
LPDUPE	19,000	3,600
LPELECT	1,300	
LPEPIC	49,000	6,600
LPFINAL	1,100	
LPFLASH	101,900	
LPGAMP	15,400	
LPGRASS	2,000	2,400
LPGLITTER (*)	1,418,500	132,000
LPIMPORT	1,100	
LPKAYO	700	
LPKILT	10,600	7,800
LPKITTY	7,000	2,500
LPKIVA	6,000	
LPKNIT	12,200	14,800
LPLAZY	55,000	
LPLOTUS	3,700	2,400
LPMANTLE (*)	591,000	37,800
LPMASSIVE	2,400	1,800
LPORDER	68,500	
WUOUTDONE	15,000	
LPOXAZOLE	5,100	

(*) See attached schedule.

D FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
LPTACTIC (continued)		
LPPITCH	28,200	
LPPURSUIT	2,100	2,500
LPRAISON	8,000	5,900
LPRANGE	750,000	14,000
LPRERUN	5,000	5,900
LPRIVER	4,000	
LPROCKY	1,100	
WUSENOR	2,700	
LPSERVICE	4,400	
LPSHADE	47,000	2,400
LPSHOFFLE	60	
LPSHORE	6,700	1,900
LPSOLO	398,000	1,800
LPSUMMIT	5,500	
LPVISION	3,800	2,800
LPWAMPUM	40,000	
LPWEARY	4,400	
LPWHISPER(same as LPCAPTAIN/LPWHISPER	9,900	
LPL TY/1	500	
LPWANDER	5,000	
LUMINANT	12,800	
MENNONITE	1,200	
MHAMISH	38,000	
MHANVIL/A	28,000	
MHANVIL/B	2,700	
MHANVIL/B	3,300	
MHANVIL/F	2,400	
MHANVIL/G	2,000	
MHBOUND/1 (same as ZRLINEN)	136,900	
MHBOUND/2	28,000	
MHBOUND/3	351,600	494,400
MHCLIMB	46,000	20,000
MHMUTUAL		
MHALATE (*)	165,900	103,600
MHBOMBE (*)	2,251,000	873,335
WUCAREFUL (*)	39,900	
WUCHILI (*)	80,000	
MHCLUMP (*)	76,500	81,400
MHCROZE (*)	2,026,600	1,605,200
MHDELFT (*)	9,400	9,300
MHDRYAD (*)	62,000	46,300

(*) See attached schedule

RECI   OM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
MHMUTUAL (continued)		
MHEGRET (*)	$ 35,000	$ 33,800
WUFACET (*)	1,128,000	
MHFETCH (*)	1,261,000	(363,500)
MHHAWSE (*)	48,600	54,600
MHJORUM (*)	115,000	141,500
MHKEVEL (*)	357,000	
MHKOALA (*)	250,000	211,200
MHLIBERTY (*)	4,400	
MHLITRE (*)	1,600	
MHLUMEN (*)	59,000	35,500
MHMATTE (*)	49,000	
MHMOLAR (*)	850	550
MHNAVAL (*)	26,800	
MHONSET (*)	126,000	199,000
MHPIQUE (*)	28,500	15,900
WUPRUDENT (*)	1,025,000	
WUSAFETY (*)	412,799	
MHSEPOY (*)	18,000	(6,100)
MHSLACK (*)	691,500	574,800
TWANG (*)	638,900	648,500
UNDER (*)	33,500	(590)
MHVODKA (*)	7,053,500	8,230,000
MHWHIFF (*)	8,385,000	6,361,000
MHNERVE		
MHFUGUE	325,500	
MHSHANK	244,000	17,600(a)/(b)
MIASTOR	34,700	
MICLINIC	2,500	
MIPACT		
MIHOLDING	21,400	
MIPUSHER	37,000	
MKCOTTON	459,000	
MKCRUSH		
MKKILLY	35,500	6,000
MKPENNY (same as MKPENNY)	366,000	82,000(a)
MOKITH	20,200	20,300
MONARRON	51,700	
MONITION	52,000	

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

(*) See attached schedule. (a) In process of liquidation.
(b) Liquidation completed in March 1975.

30

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
NOVEL	$ 51,200	$
NTEICACER	80,768	
OBLIVIOUS	14,600	
OKMAJOR	411,000	
OKSALE	46,600	
OQKADIAK	92,800	
OQKAIL	170,150	
PAFANFARE(same as FANFARE)	30,300	
PARABASIS	39,000	
PAWALRUS (was WU)	92,800	
PBGREGALE	47,800	
PBTEMPLE	5,000	
PDBASIC	1,053,500	465,800
PDBASIC/200		
PDBASIC/100		
PDBASIC/400		
PDBASIC/300		
PE[illegible]CID	13,000	
PO[illegible]S	25,000	
PODEARLY	32,800	
POVARSITY		
POSPOKE(same as POVARSITY)	31,900	18,000(a)
PBPOUTER	36,700	
PSLAWFUL	11,000	
QKACTIVE	5,500,000	
QKBOTTOM	4,179	
QKFEARFUL	236,900	
QKHUMMER	5,000	
QKOPERA	1,605,400	
QKSHOGUN	21,000	
QRBASTE	533,000	389,400
QRBLAZE		
QRBLOND		
QRBLUFF		
QRBEND	220,000	
QRBIBB	102,500	
QRBUZZ	12,900	
QRDYNAMIC(same as AEDYNAMIC)	151,500	
QRTENURE	89,200	
QRTERRACE	40,700	
QRGLAD	16,700	

REC[illegible] FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

(*) See attached schedule.

29

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
QRLEDGER	$ 165,500	$ 91,400
QRMASTER	538,600	
QRMOSAIC		
QRHAWKBIT	106,000	94,500(a)
QRMYSTIC		
QRCYNIC	9,200	2,700
QRTRIG	100	
QRTROW (*)	775,700	
RIPCORD	200,000	
RIPSNOTER	457,300	
ROCKOIL	3,879,000	
RONDURE	29,500	
SEASONAL	39,900	
SERING	10,500	
SGSUMMON	62,100	
SILVER/A	1,250	
SIPUZZLE	32,000	
SL.	35,000	4,900
SOPRANO	16,000	
SORTIE	16,000	
STFANWEED	28,000	
STSKI	11,600	
TENACIOUS	21,000	
TETARCH	243,800	
TGVIVID	23,700	
THADMIRE	42,000	
THOPUS	25,000	
TPFOCUS	1,764,000	
TPFOUMART	97,500	
TPGLARE	525,000	
TPGULLET	70,000	
TPHERSEY	326,700	
TPMANJACK	62,600	
TPPELLENT	635,000	
TPSAUCER	210,000	
TPTONIC(same as FJINDULGE)	34,260,000	
TURBINE	17,000	
TUXEDO	26,000	

(a) In process of liquidation.

REC[illegible] FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

PROJECT/ EQUITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
UNAU	$ 6,000	$
UNTWIG	1,200	
UT-00-67-61	69,600	
VWCADENZA	12,200	2,600
WSFLUFFER	291,000	
WSPELICAN	34,900	
WSREVOLT	14,900	
WSWATERSOAK	6,000	
WSWIDDER	32,700	
WUADIOS		
WUTABOO	243,400	
WUAMPLE		
WUCOTTON	27,000	
WUATLAS		
WUPESKY	192,000	
WUAVON	546,600	
WUE ON		
IUBERYL	723,700	
IUCONTROL	70,000	1,700
IUEPOCH	72,200	72,200
IUPICES	28,000	28,000
LOBSTER	53,000	
WUSETTLE	11,200	
WUBEVY (same as ZRGUIDE)	262,800	
WUCLOAK (same as ZRCLOAK)		
WUABOUT	8,000	
WUACROSS	1,437	
WUDUSTER	100,000	
WUHARPY	210,000	
WUHUMID(was WUSHINE)	815,700	(same as WUSHINE/WUHUMID)
WUMANTLE	687,000	
WUOCEAN	8,200	
WUSEASIDE(same as WUSHINE/WUSEASIDE)	180,000	
WUSNAPPY	1,100	
WUWAMPUM(same as WUEMBARK/ WUWAMPUM)	1,315,000	
WUDIRK		
WUBODKIN	102,500	50,100(a)
WUCRULE(same as WUDIRK/WUSTILETTO)	91,000	112,500(a)
WUXIPHOID	41,300	41,300

(a) In process of liquidation.

FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

PROJECT/ EQUITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
WUEMBARK		
WUHALFLIN	$ 250,000	$
WUENTREE	8,500	
WUMOREL	25,500	
WUFILET(same as PBLANGUID)	1,537,000	
WUFLOWER		
WUPROOF	48,000	
WUSWAMP	62,600	
WUGAZELLE		
WUBLOWGUN	365,700	
WUGIRAFFE	380,700	
WUZEBU	252,900	
WUHELPFUL	16,600	
WUMUG	53,400	
WUPADDY		
WUACROSS	12,000	
WUORDER	450	
WUTROUBLE	396,000	
WUPANEL		
WUCORAL	556,900	
WUPEACE	351,700	
WUPIGMY		
WUSNAPPY	375,000	
WUPILOT		
WUTWINE	150,400	
WURABBIT		
WUDOLPHIN	44,000	
WUSAUTE	77,000	
WUSAXA	983,000	
WUACUTE	15,500	
WUSHINE(same as ZRSHINE)		
WUCOMET	1,400,000	
WUSHINE	1,264,000	
WUINVEST	325,000	
WUNOTICE	149,000	
WUPUMA	(81,000)	
WUREVEL	261,000	
WUSOLID (same as ZRSOLID)		
WUTOPSY	1,972,000	
WUTRADE	460,000	
WUSTAKE	387,800	
WUSUNTAN		
WUFLAME	44,000	

R[illegible] FROM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

26

PROJECT/ ENTITY	HIGHEST NET EQUITY BALANCE ON AGENCY RECORDS 1952-1974	NET WORTH BALANCE 31 DEC 74
WUVENTURE		
LPARCH (same as LPARCH)	$ 69,000	$
WUABLE	209,000	
WUBAKER	3,000	
YJPASTIES	2,300	2,300(a)
YOBLADE	636,000	
YODOOR	285,000	
YOENTITY	82,000	
YOTART	755,000	
YOYARD	285,700	
YQFLUENT	356,000	
YQFLUX	33,000	
ZRBENCH	118,000	
ZRCREST		
ZRAVAST	72,000	
LIFF	4,277,000	
ZRDAMSEL	100,000	
ZRDRIVE	57,500	
ZRDROVE	211,000	
ZRMORBID		
MORGLAY	12,000	
ZROCCUR	59,000	
ZRTINDER		
ARCORONA	845,000	

THE FOLLOWING ARE ON CCS NON OP LIST
(NOT INCLUDED IN ABOVE 'OF' LISTING)

CATAR LKBASE MHMUTUAL MHBLARE MHRUCHE MHSPRAY PROPRIETARY D SLOGAN	These proprietaries are not on Headquarters, Office of Finance records; hence no net worth figure was presented. CCS estimates that no one of these companies had a net worth of over $50,000 during their existance.

RE OM
NOV 4 1975
CIA

(a) In process of liquidation.

V. THE DISPOSAL OF AGENCY PROPRIETARIES

a) An Overview

The Agency has emphasized the degree to which the extensive proprietary system it has maintained in the past has been disposed of in recent years. Indeed, according to the current Chief of the Cover and Commercial Staff, at least in so far as large proprietaries are concerned, "because of multitudinous reasons they will be viewed as the solution of last resort."* Size was a problem and made it "inevitable that cover would not last." Moreover, there simply is not a need, according to the Agency, for the kind of capabilities supplied by an Air America either now or in the foreseeable future. In this regard, the Agency has indicated that no "real proprietaries" are in planning because there are no such operational requirements before the Cover and Commercial Staff (hereafter "CCS"). But the Committee has learned from its study that the Agency retains the capability "in being" to create even large proprietaries.* Moreover, numerous "shelf" corporations are kept available to provide cover. These latter entities are generally only of the notional variety and pose no threat either competitively or in terms of domestic activity beyond the Agency's charter. Nonetheless, the Agency has emphasized the need to retain this general vehicle for at least one purpose: to retain assets. The CCS has indicated that a method is needed to keep "good men" who are loyal, but who need continuing work in both their ordinary and also somewhat byzantine fields. Consequently, proprietaries offer a viable alternative to solve this dilemma of maintaining assets.

---

* As William E. Nelson, Deputy Director of Operations, noted recently to the Rockefeller Commission:

> I think by and large that the day of the big proprietary is over. We have attempted over the past few years to try to squeeze down on those kinds of proprietaries and I think we have really gone now to a fairly small number, and a fairly tightly controlled group of proprietaries who are doing legitimate operational jobs, particularly in the media field.
>
> Our experience with proprietaries in the past has been if left by themselves, they tend to absorb larger and larger amounts of government money and are not particularly for a business. They are not very viable in the business sense and quickly become suspect as not having any commercial validity. And we have, I think in the past ten years, we have in this past ten years gotten rid of an enormous number of proprietaries in this field. I don't foresee us getting in the immediate future into any expansion of that proprietary record. I think we are about right in terms of where we are now.

As a result of this, the Committee studied which proprietaries had been sold or otherwise disposed of during the period from 1965 to 1975. It sought to find out which of those proprietaries so disposed of in the last ten years maintained a significant relationship with the Agency by contract or informal understanding for any purpose. More specifically, the Committee sought answers to the following questions:

(1) How many proprietaries, by type or function, have been dissolved or sold as a going enterprise or otherwise disposed of by the Agency?

---

* Mr. Nelson closed his recent testimony with a caveat:

> I can visualize, however, depending on what happens to the Agency in the future, the possibility that we might want to use more proprietaries, particularly in the field of cover if this gets terribly tight or terribly difficult. But the average operational purpose, except for some of these media operations, all we need is cover and I think that most of the proprietaries that we have fall into that category.

(2) How many proprietaries have been sold, or their assets sold, to persons, or a group including persons, who had previously served as directors, officers or employees of the proprietaries?

(3) In how many instances were proprietaries sold pursuant to a written agreement, or an unwritten agreement or understanding, that the purchased proprietary, any successor entity or the parties purchasing the proprietary's assets would provide the Agency with goods, services or other assistance? In each case, indicate the nature of the business involved, whether the agreement was written or, if unwritten, the way it is reflected in Agency files, and the amounts of any specific business volume, retainers or financial support agreed to in connection with the proprietary's transfer. This request covers both firm contracts for the provision of goods and services and general agreements that the parties acquiring the proprietary or its assets would provide them, at the Agency's option, if requested to do so.

(4) In how many instances did the parties acquiring the proprietary in fact subsequently provide goods, services or other assistance to the Agency, whether or not there was a written or informal agreement of such a relationship at the time the proprietary or its assets were acquired from the Agency? Indicate for each instance the nature of the business, the dollar amounts of the transactions involved and the period of years during which they occurred.

Our study revealed that during the indicated period 209 proprietaries were dissolved, sold or otherwise disposed of, thus substantiating the Agency's claim that it had moved decisively to extricate itself from this area of activity.* But in a very real sense it is nearly impossible to evaluate whether a "link" still exists between the Agency and a former asset related to a proprietary because circumstances can be conceived of whereby even though formal and informal Agency ties are discontinued, social and other ties remain. The impact of such liaisons is difficult to assess. The following entities were dissolved during the referenced period:

---

* The Agency's Office of Finance originally compiled a list of 305 cryptonyms of "entities" which were dropped from Office of Finance records at Headquarters during the period 1965-1975. Nineteen (19) other entities were added from other Agency divisions. Later this list was reconciled with other Agency records to eliminate cryptonym changes and other administrative actions not related to the actual disposal of a proprietary organization. Ultimately, these administrative "eliminations" totaled 115.

TAB A

ENTITIES DISSOLVED

AIR SUPPORT

WUSOLID/WUTRADE
WUSOLID/WUTOPSY
WUDERRICK/WUCLUBHOUSE
WUCLOAK/WUOCEAN
WUCLOAK/WUSEASIDE
WUCLOAK/WUSNAPPY
IUQUEST/IUPROTON
WUBETON/WUGLOBAL
WUBETON/WUAISLE
WUSHINE/WUINVEST
WUSHINE/WUREBEL
WUGAZELLE/WUEASEL
WUGAZELLE/WUGIRAFFE
WUPADDY/WUTROUBLE

MARITIME SUPPORT

YOENTITY/YODOOR
YOENTITY/YOMONEY
YOTART
IUMUG
IUHISTEP/IULAPEL
IUHISTEP/IULATCH

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

LPTACTIC/LPDECOR
WUTACTIC/WUDARE
LPTACTIC/LPDRAGON
LPTACTIC/WUELECT
LPTACTIC/LPFINAL
WUTACTIC/WUFLOOD
WUTACTIC/WUGAMP
LPTACTIC/LPHUMID
WUTACTIC/WUIMPORT
WUTACTIC/WUKIWA
WUTACTIC/NERVE
LPTACTIC/LPPITCH
WUTACTIC/WUROCKY
WUTACTIC/WUSUMMIT
WUTACTIC/LPWAMPUM
LPTACTIC/LPWHISPER
LPTACTIC/LPORDER

REC[illegible] FROM
DEC 16 [illegible]

15

TAB A
Page 2

(OPERATIONAL SUPPORT - Cont'd)

WUTACTIC/WUABOUT
LPTACTIC/LPACROSS
WUTACTIC/WUBAIL
LPTACTIC/LPCAREFREE
WUTACTIC/WUCHAOS

COVER SUPPORT

STLARGO
STMOD
STLAD
STUPLIFT/STKNAP
STUPLIFT/STPACER
MIPACT/MIHOLDING
HALARC
MIPACT/MOPUSHER
CYTABARD
WUDIRK/WUCURULE
WUDIRK/WUBODKIN
WUENTREE/WUMOREL
WUPANEL/WUCORAL
WUPILOT/WUTWINE
LPBYZAS/A
WUBRINY/WUTROCHUS
LPDICTUM/F
LPDICTUM/P
LPMINERAL/LPCHICKEN
LPARCH/LPDUCAT
WUATLAS/GIBLUFF —

ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT

QUBUZZ
MHAMISH
LPPANDA/LPCHAIR/B
LPBERRY/A
WUSUNTAN/WUFLAME
WUSUGAR/B

INSURANCE

MHANVIL/B
MHANVIL/D
MHANVIL/F
MHSPRAY
MHKEVEL
MHNAVAL

14

COVERT PROCUREMENT

WUMINOR/I
WUMINOR/WUHALIBUT
LPMINOR/LPMETAL
WUMINOR/PULSE
IUAIREDALE/IUOASIS

FOUNDATION OR INSTITUTE

AEWILDFIRE
LPUNITY/1

MEDIA

UOACORN/VOACTOR
FUSEE
YOYARD
TOMOSAIC/TOHAWKBIT

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

WUETHNIC/MODAISY
WUETHNIC/LPHALTER
WUETHNIC/LPCYHAMMER
WUETHNIC/LPTOTEM

PERSONAL SERVICES

MKCRUSH/MKPENNY
MKCRUSH/MKCOTTON
BEUSEFUL
BGJAGUAR
ENDOMORPH/ENGAGE

INVESTMENT

LPDICTUM/K
LPDICTUM/LPSPICE
LPDICTUM/WUSALINE

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

MHSHANK

RECEIVED FROM

DEC 16 1975

12

TAB A

ENTITIES DISSOLVED

AIR SUPPORT

JBGREED/JBCRYING (In Liquidation)
JBGREED/QKHEAVERLY (In Liquidation)
JBGREED/QKHEEDFUL (In Liquidation)
JBGREED/JBCHOKE (In Liquidation)
ZRBENCH
WUBETON/ WULOBSTER

MARITIME SUPPORT

YOBLADE
AMCRAFT
AMSALLY

MEDIA AND/OR PUBLICATIONS

ESMIDWAY
AMIDEA
AMWIDE (SLOGAN)
AMRAPT
WURABBIT

INSTITUTE OR FOUNDATION

LPWANDER/1
LPWANDER/2
LPWANDER/3
LPWANDER/4
JMCLIPPER
QKBOTTOM
QRBIBB
PBGREGALE
QRTRIG

RECEIVED FROM
CIA

COVER SUPPORT

JMDUSK
FUARROW
YQFLUX
KGHELMSMAN
ECIRON
GINSENG/G

14

TAB A

ENTITIES DISSOLVED (Continued)

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

LPGLOBE/WASH
SLIGO
SLAPJACK

LOGISTICS SUPPORT

STOCK ACCOUNT #2
KMFERRY
KMKANGANI
MHOLENT
OPSOMIC

MANAGEMENT & ACCOUNTING

LPPANDA/LPCLOUD

INVESTMENT

WUVENTURE/WUABLE
WUVENTURE/WUBAKER

COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

WUAMICE

SECURITY SERVICES

MHBOUND/1
MHBOUND/2

The following entities were sold during the referenced period:

TAB B

ENTITIES SOLD

AIR SUPPORT

WUSHINE/WUCOMET
WUSHINE/WUELBOW
WUSHINE/WUNOTICE
WUSHINE/WUPUMA
WUGAZELLE/WUBLOWGUN
WUGAZELLE/WUZEBU
ZRCREST/ZRAVAST
ZRCREST/ZRCLIFF
WUCLOAK/WUDUSTER
WUCLOAK/WUHARPY
WUCLOAK/WUVITAL
* IUQUEST/IUABATE
* IUQUEST/IUPAGAN
WUSAXA/WUACUTE

TRAVEL BUSINESS

WUBEVY

COVER SUPPORT

POEARLY
CALANCET
STFANWEED/STDOLLAR
STMYSTIC
MIHELEN
MIPACT/MICOUNCIL

INSURANCE

MHTHROW
MHMATTE
MHIRONY

RECEIVED FROM
DEC [illegible]

* Substantial Assets Sold; Entities Dissolved

TAB B

ENTITIES SOLD

AIR SUPPORT

JBGREED/JBARGON

FOUNDATION OR INSTITUTE

DEINDEED/IUINHAUL

TRAVEL SERVICE

LPJACK

LOW COST HOUSING

WUFLOWER/WUSWAMP

RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT

HTNAMABLE

RECEIVED FROM
DEC 10 1975
CIA

The following entities were "otherwise disposed of" during the referenced period:

TAB C

ENTITIES OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF

AIR SUPPORT

WUEMBARK/WUHALFLIN
WUSTAKE/WUHOBBY
WUSAXA/WUBLUSEE
MOMARRON
WULAZY

COVER SUPPORT

YJPASTIS

FOUNDATIONS OR INSTITUTES

QRBEND
ZROCCUR/ZRMIDDY
QRSENSE/KMOCHRIOD
AESILVER

MEDIA

PAWALRUS
POVARSITY
QRGLAD
AEEGGHEAD

ACCOUNTING & MANAGEMENT

LPCAPTAIN/LPCANAL

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

LADYCHAPEL
WUTACTIC/WUDOLLOP

RECEIVED FROM
DEC [illegible]

9

TAB C

ENTITIES OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF

MEDIA AND/OR PUBLICATION

LILISP/G
AMHIM
QKACTIVE
QRMASTER
TPTONIC
TPTONIC/FJINDULGE
TPTONIC/ZRNACARAT

FOUNDATION OR INSTITUTE

ZRCANNY
DTHABEAS
DTEMBARGO
ZRTINDER
QRTROW
PAFANFARE
QKFEARFUL
WSFLUFFER
DTPILLER
DTLAMPREY
QKOPERA/DTGODOWN

COVER SUPPORT

QRMUGWUMP

TRAVEL SERVICE

TGVIVID

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT

AMOT

RECEIVED FROM
DEC 10 1975
CIA

There follows a description of the disposition of entities sold or otherwise disposed of during the referenced period. Twenty-nine (29) of the entities were sold or given to witting individuals (former officers, employees, managers, contractors, etc.) Five (5) were sold or given to witting individuals who had no formal relationship with the proprietary. Ten (10) proprietaries continued to provide goods or services to the Agency after the disposal. Thirty-four (34) proprietaries did not continue to provide goods or services to the Agency after disposal. In nine (9) instances the provision or offer to provide goods or services were formal or informal conditions of the sale or gift. In thirty-seven (37) instances this was not the case. Six (6) proprietaries were sold to unwitting individuals or organizations and thus no provision for services or goods was indicated. Several miscellaneous dispositions developed which did not fit neatly into any of the above categories. For example, there was one merger of an Agency proprietary with another Agency proprietary. In two instances the Agency retained a non-proprietary relationship with a former employee. On two occasions the Agency turned over proprietaries to other government departments and on one occasion it sold a proprietary to another government department. There were several instances where the Agency gave the assets of a proprietary after liquidation (books, materials, etc.) to previously uncompensated participants in the various ventures. On occasion, the corporate shells were given to attorneys in lieu of fees for dissolution. Some participants were permitted to retain proceeds of sales in order to continue the original effort of the particular proprietary. And finally, assets were sometimes given to other proprietaries but without the benefit of a merger.

TAB D

DISPOSITION OF ENTITIES SOLD OR OTHERWISE DISPOSED OF

WUSHINE/WUGAZELLE - The six air proprietaries in the WUSHINE and WUGAZELLE complexes were sold as a package in 1969 to a group of witting U.S. businessmen who had acted as nominee officers, directors, and stockholders for the companies in the WUSHINE complex. Although the group offered to provide cover and/or air support to the Agency after the sale, this offer was not made a condition of the sale, and no understanding or contract was negotiated for prospective purchase of goods or services or cover support. To date, the proprietaries sold have not been used by the Agency.

ZRCREST - These two air proprietary entities were sold in 1974 to the businessman who managed both entities during the period of Agency ownership. No agreements for the continued use of the entities sold were negotiated or implied at the time of sale, and, to date, no subsequent use has been made of the entities by the Agency.

WUCLOAK/WUDUSTER - This air proprietary was sold in 1968 to the witting businessman who managed the entity during the period of Agency ownership. No agreement for the continued use of the entity sold was negotiated or implied at the time of sale, and, to date, no subsequent use has been made of the entity by the Agency.

WUHARPY - This air proprietary (parts procurement) was sold in 1965 after all assets had been removed (a corporate shell) to the witting group of businessmen from which the entity was originally purchased. No agreement for the continued use of the entity sold was negotiated or implied at the time of sale, and, to date, no subsequent use has been made of the entity by the Agency.

WUCLOAK/WUVITAL - This air proprietary entity was sold in 1972 to an unwitting, bona fide airline company. No agreement for the continued use of the entity was negotiated or implied at the time of sale, and, to date, no subsequent use has been made of the entity by the Agency.

RE[illegible] FROM

DEC [illegible]

IUQUEST/IUABATE/IUPAGAN - Substantial assets of these two IUQUEST air proprietary entities were sold in 1975 to a bona fide aviation company which was made witting for purposes of the sale. No agreement was negotiated or implied at the time of sale for Agency use or purchase of goods or services from the company which purchased the assets. To date, no goods or services have been purchased from the buyer. The entities were subsequently liquidated.

WUSAXA/WUACUTE - This air proprietary entity was sold in 1971 to an unwitting businessman. No agreement for continued use of the entity by the Agency was negotiated or implied at the time of sale, and, to date, no such use has been made of the entity.

WUBEVY - This proprietary, which published travel guides and was used as cover for Agency officers worldwide, was sold in 1968 to the editor of the travel guides. The editor was an Agency employee and retired at the time of the sale. No agreement was negotiated or implied for the continuing use of the entity after sale. To date, no goods or services have been purchased from the entity by the Agency.

POEARLY - This proprietary entity, which provided status and access cover for several case officers in the Far East, was sold in 1975 to unwitting purchasers. There have been no Agency contacts with the purchaser since then. All sale proceeds were returned to the Agency.

CALANCET - This proprietary, which provided cover support in Europe, was sold in 1965 to a witting, bona fide company which provided technical assistance and marketing support to the proprietary during the period of Agency ownership. No agreement was negotiated or implied for prospective use of the entity by the Agency, and no such use was made by the Agency. The bona fide company, did, however, continue to provide cover for Agency officers in other areas and under offices not related to the former proprietary's business activities.

STFANWEED/STDOLLAR - This proprietary was an import-export firm which provided cover for one Agency employee in the Far East. The entity was sold to the Agency employee in 1966 at the time of his retirement from the Agency. No agreement was negotiated

REC[illegible] FROM
DEC [illegible]

6

STFANWEED/STDOLLAR (continued) - or implied at the time of sale for the Agency's purchase of goods or services, and, to date, no such use has been made of the entity.

STYMYSTIC - This small proprietary, which provided cover for one Agency employee in the Far East, was liquidated in 1974. A covert relationship has continued with the owner of the parent company of which the Agency proprietary was a subsidiary. The owner provides cover in the parent company for another Agency employee, and the parent company moved into the premises vacated by the subsidiary and was allowed to take over fixtures and a rental deposit at no cost.

MIHELEN - This proprietary, which provided cover for one Agency case officer in the Far East, was sold in 1974 to two local-hire employees of the firm. All Agency connections with the firm were severed at the time of sale.

MIPACT/MICOUNCIL - This proprietary, which provided cover for one Agency employee, was sold in 1970 to the unwitting members of its Board of Directors. At the time of sale all Agency connections with the entity were severed.

MHTHROW - This proprietary (part of the insurance complex) was formed for the purpose of purchasing an apartment overseas which was used for operational purposes. When the apartment was no longer of operational use in 1970, the company (and the apartment) was sold to a non-Agency connected party. No agreement for the continued use of the corporation or the apartment was made with the purchaser, and, to date, no such use has been made of the entity or the apartment.

MHMATTE - This proprietary (part of the insurance complex) was established to purchase an apartment overseas of operational interest to the Agency. When the apartment was no longer needed for operational purposes in 1970, the corporation (and the apartment) was sold to a non-Agency connected party. No agreement for the continued use of the apartment or the entity was made with the purchaser, and, to date, no such use has been made of the apartment or the entity.

RECEIVED FROM
DEC [illegible]
[illegible]

MHIRONY - This proprietary was established for the use of the insurance complex, but it was never activated. The corporate shell was sold in 1974 to the unwitting attornies who served as resident agents. No agreement was made with the purchaser for the continued use of the entity, and, to date, no such use has been made of the entity.

WUEMBARK/WUHALFIN - This air proprietary was merged with another air proprietary (ZRCLIFF) in 1968.

WUSTAKE/WUHOBBY - This air proprietary was sold to the businessman who managed the proprietary during the period of Agency ownership on the condition that the Agency would buy back the proprietary if the contract which sustained the proprietary was not renewed by USAID. The USAID contract was not renewed, and the businessman dissolved the entity on behalf of the Agency in 1968.

WUSAXA/WUBLUSEE - This air proprietary was disposed of by transferring all assets to another air proprietary and turning over the corporate shell to two unwitting foreign national nominees. No agreement with the nominees for the purchase of goods or services subsequent to the turn over was negotiated or implied, and, to date, no use has been made of the entity by the Agency.

MOMARRON - This proprietary was established in the Far East by two foreign agents of the Agency to provide support services for Agency-sponsored air operations. The company failed, at least partly due to embezzlement by the two agents, and was liquidated apparently in late 1962 or early 1963. The Agency station in the country involved continued to maintain a covert relationship with the two agents who were politically significant for some time after the liquidation. The relationship was non-proprietary.

WULAZY - This proprietary was involved in support of air activities for a large Agency paramilitary program in Africa. At such time as the program was concluded, all assets were removed from the company, and the corporate shell was given to the attorney who established the entity in lieu of paying his prospective fee for dissolving the corporation.

RECEIVED FROM

YJPASTIS	-	This proprietary, which provided cover support for one Agency officer in the Far East, was abandoned when the country was overrun by Communist forces. The assets left behind will be written off.
QRBEND	-	This proprietary, non-profit organization was turned over to its management in 1967 when the Agency withdrew its support to the entity. No further Agency support has been given to the entity, and the management intended to continue the program with private and USAID support.
ZROCCUR/ZRMIDDY	-	This proprietary non-profit, medical organization was disposed of in 1967 by transfer of all of its assets to the witting Board of Directors for continuation without Agency support. No further Agency support was given to the entity.
QRSENSE/KMOCHRIOD	-	This proprietary, non-profit entity was disposed of in 1968 when all assets were turned over to the witting trustees who intended to continue the operation with private support. No further support was given to the entity by the Agency.
AESILVER	-	This foreign proprietary research institute was disposed of in 1967, at which time the Institute was surge funded to permit it to continue operations for approximately two years while a search was made for private funds to enable continuation of the Institute or permit its orderly liquidation. In mid-1969, the Institute ceased its activity since sufficient private funds could not be located to fund Institute programs. No Agency support was provided after 1967.
PAWALRUS	-	This proprietary entity published an English language periodical in the Near East. The publishing rights plus certain assets were sold to indigenous purchasers and the proceeds of sale were used to pay off corporate liabilities prior to dissolution of the entity. Since the periodical continued to publish articles which coincided with U.S. objectives for the area concerned, the Agency provided limited support to the new owners to enable them to continue the publication.

REC

POVARSITY - This proprietary publishing firm in the Far East provided cover support for one Agency employee who introduced foreign books and articles to Far Eastern media sources. In 1975 the firm was de-registered and certain assets were sold to a former employee of the firm who re-registered the firm under a different name. The Agency employee who was provided cover by the entity is still active in the Far East under a new cover and the only contact with the purchaser is in the interest of maintaining the cover story of the active Agency employee. No support is being extended to the re-registered entity.

QRGLAD - This activity provides support to a foreign based asset to permit him to publish a foreign language journal. The activity was inaccurately and inappropriately categorized as a proprietary when an Administrative Plan was prepared in 1971. The error was corrected in 1975 when the activity was accurately categorized as a controlled subsidy. The operation continues with Agency subsidy support.

AEEGGHEAD - The U.S. proprietary portion of this book publishing activity was legally liquidated in 1968. Funds remaining after settlement of all liabilities were transferred overseas to other parts of the operation and were used to meet approved operational expenses. Some of the remaining stock of foreign language books was given to a cleared and witting contact who had served without compensation as an officer of the proprietary mechanism. The remainder was shipped overseas to be distributed by the overseas mechanisms of the operation which are not proprietaries. They continue to distribute books with Agency subsidy support.

LPCAPTAIN/LPCANAL - This proprietary, which provided management and accounting services for Agency activities in Europe, was disposed of in 1974 by removal of all assets from the entity and transfer of the corporate shell to the U.S. businessman who had backstopped the company without compensation. No support has been given to the entity or use made thereof by the Agency.

RE[illegible] FROM
DEC

SECRET

LADYCHAPEL	-	This proprietary was established to purchase an apartment building in Europe for Agency office and residential use. In 1968, then the building was of no further use to the Agency, the entity with the apartment building was ostensibly given to the Department of State as a gift. The Department actually reimbursed the Agency for the building in Washington. The Agency, on behalf of the Department, is attempting to liquidate the company. This is complicated by a disputed foreign tax claim.
WUTACTIC/WUDOLLOP	-	This operational support mechanism had no assets at the time of its disposal in 1971, and the corporate shell was turned over to the attorney who established the company in lieu of payment of his prospective fee for dissolving the entity.

REC[illegible] [illegible]M
DEC [illegible]

SECRET

TAB D

Disposition of Entities Sold or Otherwise Disposed Of

JBARGON - This air support proprietary (maintenance facility) was sold in January 1975 to a bona fide aviation concern which was made witting of the Agency's ownership of the firm for purposes of the sale. At the time of sale, it was agreed that JBARGON would continue to provide aircraft maintenance, supply, and bookkeeping services to JBCHOKE, the former parent company of JBARGON. Since the date of sale, JBARGON has provided $612,000 worth of aircraft maintenance, supply, and bookkeeping services to JBCHOKE; JBCHOKE is now in the process of liquidation.

DEINHAUL - This proprietary lending institution (bank) was established in a European country in 1955 to provide loans and outright grants to non-communist cooperatives. The proprietary was ostensibly owned (backstopped) by a bona fide U.S. foundation which was subsidized by the Agency, and the bank was managed by a bona fide management company on behalf of the Agency. By 1962 when it was determined that the bank had accomplished its purposes, the Special Group (predecessor to the 40 Committee) instructed that the bank be phased out in an orderly manner over the next five years. Various disposal plans were considered over the next few years, and in 1965 the Agency sold the bank (through its ostensible owner--the foundation) to the firm which managed the bank during the period of Agency ownership. In payment, the foundation accepted notes from the management firm, payable over a four year period. It was expected that the payments of the purchase price would come from the proceeds derived from the repayment of various types of loans made by the bank, and it was recognized that certain unsecured bank loans were of questionable collectibility. Accordingly, that portion of the purchase price which was tied to the repayment of these loans was subject to adjustment for litigation expenses associated with collection and a 20% collection fee. Also, this portion of the purchase price was not subject to interest on the unpaid balance. It was also agreed that the bank would administer a fund of $100,000 set aside by the Agency for continuing grants in less than $25,000 amounts for Agency approved activities which were

RECEIVED FROM
DEC [illegible]

7

DEINHAUL (Cont'd) - in concert with the original objectives of the project. In 1967 under the terms of the Katzenbach Report, it was necessary for the Agency to discontinue its support to the bona fide U.S. foundation (ostensible former owner of the bank as mentioned above) which had acted as a collection agent for the sale proceeds. Incident to the Agency's disengagement from support of the foundation, the foundation was allowed to keep all proceeds from subsequent payments on the purchase price for the bank.

LPJACK - This travel service proprietary was sold in 1975 to an Agency employee at the time of his retirement. This individual had ostensibly owned the firm but in fact only managed it for the Agency. No agreement was negotiated for the continued use of the travel service by the Agency, however, the Agency was using the travel service at the time of sale largely for the purchase of airline tickets for travel in support of sensitive projects. This practice still continues, and it is estimated that Agency business represents about 30% of the gross airline ticket sales of the entity on an annual basis.

WUSWAMP - The Agency owned 50% of the equity in this foreign entity which constructed low cost housing in one of the less developed countries of the world. The Agency's equity was sold to WUPESKY, a private company which provided cover for an Agency employee who managed the Agency's foreign low cost housing program. No agreement was made with WUPESKY for the subsequent purchase of services or products of WUSWAMP, and no such purchases were made. Nevertheless, WUPESKY continued to provide cover for the Agency Employee until 1973.

HTNAMABLE - This proprietary was a non-profit organization which undertook high risk scientific research programs in support of Government sponsored reconnaissance programs. In 1966, the Agency decided to terminate its proprietary relationship with the entity and it was determined that, because of the charter of non-profit organizations, any proceeds from the liquidation would have to be given to other non-profit organizations or foundations. Accordingly, the plant and equipment were sold to a profit making corporation which created a subsidiary around the assets purchased. The proceeds of the sale were distributed among

REC
DEC 10 1975
CIA

several non-profit organizations under Agency control. An unwritten condition of the sale was that the Agency would contract with the new organiziation for scientific research of interest to the Agency in the amount of about $900,000 over an eighteen month period. Only about $770,000 was so committed, and all Agency relations with the successor organization were terminated in 1968.

LILISP/G - This media type proprietary provided cover for an Agency employee who arranged for a foreign motion picture firm run by an American to produce and distribute foreign language films throughout Latin America. For funding purposes, the proprietary borrowed working capital from another proprietary, LPBERRY/A, and paid production and distribution costs in anticipation of a return on the proceeds of film distribution. The proprietary was dissolved in 1961, and all rights to the net profits of distribution were assigned to LPBERRY/A in return for cancellation of the note it held from the proprietary. After much wrangling with the American owner of the film production and distribution company, it became evident that appropriate reports were not being submitted covering recoupments or net profits and the Agency negotiated a settlement which provided that LPBERRY/A and the distribution company would render no further claims against each other. Relations eased at that point.

AMHIM - This media proprietary compiled, published, and distributed a newsletter overseas. In 1975, when the Agency withdrew its support, it was decided to discontinue the publication activity, and the assets of the company were turned over to AMHIM/1, the editor and manager, to enable him to maintain a status independent of the Agency as a commercial print shop.

QKACTIVE - This proprietary radio broadcasting activity was turned over to the Department of State for support and subsequently placed under the control of the Board of International Broadcasters for continued operation with Congressional support.

QRMASTER - This media type proprietary which was involved in radio and TV projects was established in 1963 and continued under Agency ownership until 1969 when it was sold

5

QRMASTER (Cont'd) -	to its manager with full expectation of continued operation with heavy Agency subsidy. At the time of sale, substantial funds were removed from the entity leaving it without sufficient working capital. Consequently, the Agency arranged for a line of credit through a bank guaranteed by the funds removed from the entity. Subsequently, the manager, with Agency permission, sold the entity to a group of foreign nationals. The manager formed his own corporation which contracted with the Agency for services including the continued management of the company sold of which he was still president. A management dispute resulted in the removal of the manager from the first corporation and the bank seized the guarantee for the line of credit which had been drawn down and used as working capital for the first entity. The manager, no longer supported by the Agency, is the channel through which the Agency is to receive repayment of loans which arose out of the line of credit. So far, the Agency has received no payments.
TPTONIC TPTONIC/FJINDULGE LPTONIC/ZRNACARAT -	These three proprietary entities were part of a substantial radio broadcasting activity which was turned over to the Department of State for support and subsequently placed under the control of the Board of International Broadcasters for continued operation with Congressional support.
ZRCANNY -	This U.S. foundation type proprietary served as a funding mechanism for a labor organization supported by the Agency. In 1968 all assets plus a termination grant were turned over to the group of U.S. businessmen who backstopped the Agency entity. All Agency funds destined for the labor union were transferred to that organization, and the Agency created a foreign funding company (QRSPIDER) utilizing the same businessmen to continue support to the union. The foreign entity is still in being, although inactive, and will be dissolved after all tag end negotiations are concluded with the former management of the labor organization which continues in revised form without Agency support.
DTHABEAS	This proprietary non-profit entity was supported by the Agency until December 1974 when all Agency funds were withdrawn and the furniture and fixtures

RECEIVED FROM

DTHABEAS (Cont'd) - were given as a gift to the witting directors who proposed to continue the entity as a private organization. No further contact has been maintained with the entity.

DTEMBARGO - This foundation was established in 1938 without Agency support. After a long period of inactivity, the Agency took over the entity in 1953 and used it to support a publication produced at a U.S. University and aimed at Latin America. In 1967, the Agency withdrew its support to the publication, withdrew Agency funds from the foundation, and gave the office furnishings to the witting directors of the foundation with the stipulation that the furnishings would be turned over to the university.

ZRTINDER - This proprietary institute was supported by the Agency until 1968 when all assets and liabilities plus a termination grant was turned over to the management and ostensible owners of the entity to enable the organization to continue without Agency control or support. No further contact was maintained with the organization.

QRTROW - This former proprietary is an institute located in Europe which seeks to influence and encourage moderate and pro-democratic youth leaders and government officials concerned with youth and higher education. The Agency withdrew its support from the institute in 1974 and turned over all assets to the management of the organization. In addition, the Agency provided surge funding in the amount necessary to enable the entity to exist in reduced form for about one year during which time the management would attempt to arrange private support. All Agency employees involved in the project terminated their employment relationship with the Agency or were reassigned, and the Agency has not rendered further assistance to the operation.

PAFANFARE - This foundation type proprietary provided grants and other support to individuals and organizations of interest to the Agency in the Near East. At the project's termination residual funds were turned over to one of the witting trustees to permit the continuation of the activity for a period of time without Agency support. No further Agency support has been given to the organization.

RECEIVED FROM
DEC 10 1975
CIA

3

QKFEARFUL - This foundation type proprietary provided support to a bona fide international organization interested in international legal matters. At the time the Agency withdrew its support for the activity in 1969 the assets of the proprietary plus termination funding were turned over to the witting Board of Directors. The organization, now under a new name, continues to exist without Agency support.

WSFLUFFER - This foundation type proprietary provided funds to a bona fide foundation involved with the development of international cooperatives. At the time the Agency withdrew its support from the cooperative program, the entity was dissolved, however, it had been anticipated that the entity would be the recipient of funds resulting from the sale of a proprietary lending institution in Europe. The bona fide foundation which was part of the funding channel for the European bank was allowed to retain the proceeds of the sale when WSFLUFFER was dissolved. See the write-up under DEINHAUL for more details of the sale of the European bank.

DTPILLAR - This foundation type proprietary supported individuals and organizations of interest to the Agency in the Far East. At the time the Agency withdrew its support for the activity in 1967, the assets of the organization with a substantial termination payment were turned over to the witting Board of Directors of the entity. The entity has continued its work without Agency support.

DTLAMPREY - This foundation type proprietary supported an international organization concerned with individuals in the teaching profession. At the time the Agency withdrew its support from the international organization, the proprietary was dissolved after making one last termination grant to the international organization. The international entity has continued without Agency support.

QKOPERA/DTGODOWN - This foundation type proprietary supported individuals and international organizations involved with cultural matters. To give the entity substance and provide funds for day-to-day administration, the Agency started the organization with a substantial grant which was invested in

RECEIVED
CIA

2

QKOPERA/DTGODOWN (Cont'd) - income producing securities. At the time the Agency withdrew its support, the assets of the entity were given to its witting Board of Directors with the understanding that approximately 60% of the portfolio of investments would be retained by the organization to sustain its continued operation without Agency support, and 40% of the proceeds of the portfolio would be immediately granted to other organizations and activities which fostered the objectives of the QKOPERA project.

QRMUGWUMP - This small proprietary provided cover for one individual overseas. In 1972, the employee resigned and expressed a desire to continue the business without Agency support. Accordingly, the meager assets of the entity were sold to the resigned employee. Payment for the entity took the form of offset against funds due the employee on separation, lump sum leave payment, return travel, etc. The Agency has had no further interest in the entity.

TGVIVID - This proprietary travel Agency provided cover for an Agency employee overseas. When the employee was reassigned in 1966, all assets were converted to cash and turned back to the Agency. Nevertheless, an indigenous employee of the entity, and a contact of the Agency Station in the country involved, was allowed to take over the name and clientele and continue the business. No commitments or agreements were made for continued use of the business, and no support was subsequently provided or sought from the business.

AMOT - This proprietary, which produced economic and sociological reports in support of Cuban operations, was dissolved in 1973 and its assets turned over to another proprietary, SLIGO. SLIGO was subsequently dissolved in 1975 (see list of dissolved entities.)

RECEIVED FROM

b) THE SALE OF SOUTHERN AIR TRANSPORT, INC.: A CASE STUDY IN DISPOSAL OF A CIA PROPRIETARY

BACKGROUND

Southern Air Transport Incorporated (SAT) is a U.S. Air Carrier, incorporated in the State of Florida on October 31, 1949. From its inception until its purchase in 1960 by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), it was privately owned by Messrs. Fredrick C. Moor and Stanley G. Williams. It was purchased by the CIA on August 5, 1960, and owned by the CIA through December 31, 1973. CIA sold the firm back to Mr. Williams on December 31, 1973.

The decision to acquire Southern Air Transport was triggered by a change in the regulations governing the award of Military Air Transport Service (MATS) contracts. On April 1, 1960, Air America (AAM) had begun flying a seven-month MATS contract operating out of Tachikawa AFB in Japan, to other Pacific locations. In June of 1960, the Department of Defense (DOD) and the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) changed the regulations governing the awarding of MATS contracts to require that bidders hold at least a Supplemental Certificate of Convenience and Necessity for an Air Carrier and that they participate in the Civil Reserve Air Fleet Program (CRAF). Air America did not meet either of these new criteria and could not obtain appropriate waivers to them. The Air America heavy airlift capability represented an asset for use by the U.S. Government in future operational contingencies throughout the Far East area. Loss of the MATS contract would result in under utilization of aircraft and air crews and the

MATS contract revenues were needed to sustain these assets. Therefore, it was proposed that either AAM should obtain the necessary certification or that the Agency should buy another commercial firm that already held these certifications. The October 1, 1960, contract date and the need for public hearings and lengthy proceedings militated against AAM applying for the certificate themselves. Also, again in order to avoid lengthy public hearings, which would be time-consuming and generate public exposure, it was decided that the ownership of the company to be acquired must be kept completely separate from AAM. This solution was concurred in by the CAB, the DOD, the CIA, and AAM management.

It was anticipated that if the new company were awarded the ongoing MATS contract, it would actually perform the flying service but would use equipment under conditional sale from AAM and would employ personnel transferred from AAM. Under inter-company agreements Air America would provide all maintenance work, ground handling, and other services for which it would be reimbursed by the new company. In this way, Air America would share in the revenues generated by the MATS contracts.

The proposal to purchase a supplemental carrier and operate it under the above arrangement was approved by Allen Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) on July 15, 1960. Funds from the Clandestine Services budget for FY 61 were made available for the purchase.

After World War II there ~~had been~~ were over 200 supplemental carriers in existence. By 1960 there were only 18 still operating. Air

America management made a survey of the 18 and determined that Southern Air Transport in Miami, Florida was the most attractive as a purchase possibility. It operated two C-46s -- one owned, one leased -- between Miami and points in the Caribbean and South America. Its associated company owned the four-acre property on which SAT was located. Moreover, it operated at a modest profit and had no long-term debts.

Negotiations for the purchase of SAT were successful and on August 5, 1960, the CIA exchanged $307,506.10 for all outstanding shares of capital stock of SAT and its real property owning affiliate. The Agency owned these shares in the name of Roger C. Hyatt, a former board member of Air America. Mr. Hyatt together with Percival Brundage and Perkins McGuire were added to the SAT board of directors.

Under CIA management Southern Air Transport operated with two semi-autonomous divisions: the Pacific Division and the Atlantic Division. The Pacific Division performed the MATS contract and supported Agency heavylift requirements in East Asia. The Atlantic Division continued to operate in the Caribbean and South America; doing the same sort of flying SAT had done prior to Agency acquisition. The Atlantic Division was also able to furnish certain support for the Cuban and Congo operations. At the peak of its activities, the SAT fleet, comprised of both owned and leased aircraft, included Douglas DC-6, Boeing 727, and Lockheed L-100 Hercules aircraft.

THE SALE

In 1972 it became apparent that the Agency's air capabilities were becoming excess to its needs, and that political realities and future operational requirements in the post-war era of Southeast Asia would not require large air proprietary assets. On April 21, 1972, the Director of Central Intelligence approved in principle the divestiture of CIA ownership and control of the Air America complex and Southern Air Transport. He approved recommendations calling for Air America to be retained until the end of the war in Southeast Asia, the immediate elimination of the Pacific Division of SAT, the sale of the two 727 aircraft leased to SAT by Air America, and subsequent divestiture of Agency ownership and control of the remainder of SAT.* Specific note was made that conflict of interest should be avoided and that no employee should receive a windfall benefit as a result of these transactions.**

In May 1972, Agency officials (Charles Kane and Lawrence Houston) met with the Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board, Secor D. Browne, and his Administrative Assistant, Edwin Rector, to seek informal advice as to the best way to disengage from SAT. Three alternatives were discussed: (1) dissolve the company and sell the assets; (2) sell the assets to the current operators of the company; (3) sell SAT to, or merge SAT into, one of the other supplemental carriers.

---

* The Director determined that "we no longer should retain air proprietaries purely for contingent requirements and that on the record, therefore, the Agency should divest itself of the Southern Air Transport complex entirely. He stated the opinion that the desirable course of action would be dissolution, although he realized that the problems were many and complex. Also, he did not rule out other solutions which might achieve the end and yet better satisfy the interests of all concerned."

** A condition imposed by the DCI was that "in the disposition of any of the assets involved nothing inure to the benefit of Agency employees or former employees or persons whose relationship with the Agency has been or is of such a nature as might raise a question of conflict of interest."

The CAB chairman discouraged option (3) because it would involve public hearings and would be subject to criticism by the other supplementals. Option (1), although least troublesome from the legal and exposure standpoints, would further reduce the shrinking number of U.S. supplementals (by 1972, there were only eleven supplemental carriers left) and would be unfair to SAT employees. The CAB officials had no problem with option (2). On 5 May 1972, the DCI was presented with the results of the meeting with the CAB chairman. He approved the recommendation to explore the sale of the equity in SAT to the current management. It was noted that SAT had been operating as a supplemental carrier for 25 years, none of the employees of SAT had ever been an employee of the Agency and that both the Department of Defense and the chairman of the CAB considered it in their best interests to keep SAT as a viable carrier rather than dissolving the company and selling the assets. The rationale behind selling SAT intact to its management was:

a. Liquidation would deprive the U.S. of a useful air carrier and would be unfair to the employees.

b. Sale of SAT as a going concern on the open market would generate an unacceptable level of public interest and scrutiny. A publicly advertised disposition would run contrary to the Director's statutory mandate to protect intelligence sources and methods.

c. Although a potential for conflict of interest and windfall profit existed, sale of SAT to its management would best satisfy the requirements of everyone involved.

The DCI was, apparently, allowed this flexibility in method of disposal by statute. 40 U.S.C. § 474(17) provides that nothing in the regulations relating to disposal of surplus government property shall affect any authority of the CIA. In addition, 50 U.S.C. § 403(d)(5) provides that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. It was determined that sale of SAT stock to Mr. Williams in a confidential manner would best prevent damage to national security and foreign relations of the United States which could result from disclosure of CIA ownership.

Agency officials began exploring ways in which SAT could be sold to its management without permitting a windfall to accrue to the buyer and in a way that could not be construed as a conflict of interest. To establish a reasonable selling price, the Agency asked the Certified Public Accounting firm of Lybrand, Ross Brothers and Montgomery (now doing business as Coopers & Lybrand) to perform a valuation study. They in turn engaged R. Dixon Speas Associates, Inc., aviation consultants, to establish an evaluation for the aircraft. The following values were developed:

a.	Book Value of SAT	$3.9 million
b.	Estimated Total Value of SAT Capital Stock on Open Market	$2.645 million
c.	Disposal as going concern	$2.1 million
d.	Liquidation Value	$1.25 million
e.	Agency Investment	$1.5 million

Based on these figures, the Executive Director-Comptroller on August 17, 1972, approved an asking price of $2.7 million. Sale at this price to the management would require simultaneous payment in full of the $3.2 million note payable to Air America through

Actus Technology (as the associated land holding company had been renamed) and would not include any equity in the leas~~t~~e/purchase ? agreement between SAT and Air America for a Lockheed L 100-30 Hercules aircraft. Although this $2.7 million price was less than the $3.9 million book value, it did exceed the fair market value of the company as calculated by professional appraisers. The appraisals were based not on depreciated purchase prices for assets, as reflected in book values, but rather on either the earning power of the assets adjusted to "present value" or the current resale value for all assets.

On August 23, 1972, Mr. Williams was advised of the asking price for SAT of $2.7 million for the acquisition of stock and $3.2 million for payment of debt to Air America or a total of $5.9 million. A deadline date of October 1, 1972, was established; otherwise Mr. Williams was advised that the firm would be dissolved and the assets liquidated. Although Mr. Williams contended the asking figure should be reduced since the outstanding loan to Air America had been reduced since the date of the study by Coopers & Lybrands, Mr. Williams stated he would attempt to work out financing within the deadline date of October 1, 1972. This deadline was extended by the Agency to December 4, 1972.

On December 5, 1972, Mr. Williams submitted an offer for SAT of $5 million which comprised $1.875 million for the acquisition of SAT and $3.125 million to pay off the debt to AAM. On December 26, 1972, the Executive Director-Comptroller approved the recommendation that Mr. Williams' offer be rejected and that if Mr. Williams was unable to raise by January 20, 1973, the additional funds required for the original purchase price of $5.9 million, including the Air America debt, that the Agency proceed with liquidation plans and dismissal of SAT employees not later than February 1, 1973.

On January 11, 1973, Mr. Williams submitted a new proposal to purchase SAT for a total price of $5,605,000. Mr. Williams cited a tentative commitment for a loan of $4.0 million and his offer was contingent upon an additional loan. The offer called for a total payment of $5,605,000 broken down as follows:

Acquisition of stock for Actus and SAT	$2.145 million
Payment of debt to Air America	3.125 million
Credit for payments to AAM since 10 June 1972, in liquidation of long term debt	.335 million
Total payment	$5.605 million

Prior to accepting Mr. Williams' offer, CIA representatives again discussed the sale of SAT to Mr. Williams with the CAB. Mr. R. Tenney Johnson of CAB indicated that the board would be interested in seeing SAT continued. Mr. Johnson stated it would not be necessary to surface the Agency's name as the true owner of SAT in the CAB proceedings, and that he did not anticipate any problems with other supplemental carriers as a result of the sale to Mr. Williams.

On January 19, 1973, the DCI approved the sale of SAT to Mr. Williams. It was noted that Mr. Williams' offer was within 5 percent of the original asking price, was above the independent evaluation for sale as a going concern and was at a figure which would not seem to give the buyer windfall profit. Such sale would constitute a clean break-away of SAT from the Agency with the exception of a one year extension on the lease/purchase agreement for an L 100-30 aircraft from SAT. This agreement for sale between Mr. Williams and the Agency included a provision that any profit derived from the sale of assets within one year would constitute a windfall and would be added to the total sale price.

On February 28, 1973, the Board of Directors of SAT executed corporate action on the Agreement for Sale of SAT to Mr. Williams. Closing date was established at not later than 30 days after CAB approval. On March 1, 1973 application for approval of acquisition of control of SAT by Mr. Williams was filed with the CAB under Docket No. 252-64. It was anticipated that CAB approval would be forthcoming within 60 days.

Subsequent to the agreement for sale and application to CAB, several supplemental carriers generated a great deal of pressure to prevent SAT from being sold to Mr. Williams and to prevent SAT from operating as a supplemental carrier. They applied This pressure ~~was applied~~ through their Congressional representatives, the General Accounting Office, the General Services Administration, and other ways. The various supplemental carriers objected to the sale of SAT for a variety of reasons. Basically each objected to the portions of SAT's operating authority which would allow SAT to compete with it. Specifically, representatives of Overseas National Airways (ONA) indicated that ONA would not oppose the sale if Mr. Williams would voluntarily renounce his rights to Trans-Pacific routes. World

Airways and Trans International Airways (TIA) objected to SAT operating any aircraft as large or larger than a 727 in the Far East. Saturn Airways objected to SAT bidding on any domestic MAC contracts. To restrict SAT to satisfy all potential competition could make SAT sufficiently unattractive as a profitable investment that financing could become unobtainable. With this in mind the Agency took the position that agreement for sale of SAT had been executed, subject to CAB approval. If the CAB ruled against the sale and ownership reverted to the Agency, the Agency would cease any bids or service under MAC contracts and dissolve SAT.

Two of the other supplementals, Saturn and ONA, expressed interest in buying SAT. ONA did not make a cash offer. On June 29, 1973, Saturn Airways, however, made a cash offer of about $2 million in excess of what Mr. Williams had offered. There were, however, according to the Agency, compelling reasons not to pursue these offers. Agency officers had reason to believe that ONA was not as interested in actually buying SAT as they were in getting a commitment from the Agency which could be used to compromise the Agency's position in future CAB hearings. Three reasons for not accepting either offer were:

a. Any merger with another supplemental carrier would necessitate a very difficult series of CAB hearings during which all other major supplementals would certainly voice loud and strenuous objections.

b. To sell the firm on a sole-source basis to either outside buyer without soliciting public bids would be contrary to sound business practice and would attract even more adverse publicity.

c. Both offers were made directly to officials of the CIA and not to the stockholders of record. Although the relationship between the CIA and SAT was the subject of much public speculation, such relationship was still classified and an acceptance of either offer would be a violation of security and cover.

These procedures were unacceptable to the Agency and dissolution of the firm or sale to Mr. Williams continued as the most acceptable method of divestiture, subject to CAB approval.

In view of the objections by other supplemental carriers to the sale of SAT to Mr. Williams and the award by the Air Force of a Logistics Air contract (LOGAIR) to SAT, the DCI directed on July 31, 1973, that SAT be dissolved, that SAT withdraw from the LOGAIR contract and withdraw its application for renewal of supplemental certificate. Mr. Williams was advised of this decision, but made a counteroffer to purchase the company under the previous financial offer but turn in his supplemental certificate, withdraw application for acquisition for sale from CAB, and operate SAT as a commercial carrier under Federal Aviation Regulation Part 121 authority. Such action would remove SAT from direct competition with the supplementals, but leave it with a worthwhile market in which to operate. Additionally, no CAB hearing would be necessary to obtain this type of operating authority.

On October 1, 1973, the DCI agreed to entertain the proposal to continue the sale of SAT to Mr. Williams as a Part 121 operator, but on the condition that Mr. Williams must obtain prompt financing. Otherwise, the firm would be dissolved.

On October 5, 1973, the SAT Board of Directors approved and executed a new agreement for sale including the following provisions:

a. Mr. Williams to acquire stock of SAT Actus for $2,145,000.

b. Mr. Williams to pay off $3,125,000 owed to Air America.

c. Agreement subject to Mr. Williams obtaining $4 million loan.

d. Agreement to be subject to SAT withdrawing application for renewal of its Certificate of Necessity and Convenience for an Air Carrier (Supplemental Certificate).

e. Lease/purchase agreement for L-100 between AAM and SAT to be extended one year.

f. Anti-windfall provision to be effective for one year from date of sale.

On November 29, 1973, Mr. Williams received a commitment from The First National Bank of Chicago for a loan of $4.5 million thereby making the October 5, 1973, agreement operative. On November 30, 1973, the DCI approved the sale of SAT in accordance with the October 5 agreement for sale. On the same day, the application to the CAB for acquisition of SAT under Docket No. 252-64 was withdrawn.

and petition for cancellation of certificate and termination of exemption authority was filed with an effective date of December 30, 1973. On December 31, 1973, the sale was closed, the note to Air America was paid off, and Stanley G. Williams became the sole owner of SAT.

In early January 1974, CIA officials learned from Air America management that SAT had exercised the purchase option of the lease/purchase agreement between SAT and Air America for the Lockheed L 100-30 Hercules aircraft. The option sale price from Air America was $3,150,000. SAT immediately resold the aircraft to Saturn Airways for $4,350,000 turning a quick $1.2 million profit. The Agency interpreted this sale as a violation of the anti-windfall provisions of the agreement for sale. On January 25, 1974, Air America executed an Escrow and Arbitration Agreement on behalf of the CIA with SAT on the disputed $1.2 million profit. The agreement called for $750,000 to be placed in escrow with the American Security and Trust Company of Washington, D.C. The escrow funds were to be held as a Certificate of Deposit purchased at the prevailing market rate. It was further agreed that SAT would also place in escrow a Promissory Note to Air America for the remaining $450,000 of the disputed amount. The note was to bear interest at the same rate currently being earned on the Certificate of Deposit in escrow. It was arranged that the escrow deposits plus accrued interest would be paid to the party deemed in favor by an arbitrator with each party to pay one-half of the costs of arbitration. On September 5, 1974, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Air America. This decision caused an additional $1,304,243 to accrue to the Agency from the SAT sale. This was the sum of the $1.2 million under arbitration plus accrued interest, less the Agency's share of arbitration costs.

DECLASSIFICATION OF RELATIONSHIP WITH CIA

In March 1974 the employees of SAT retained an attorney and brought a class action suit in U.S. District Court for Southern Florida against Southern Air Transport, Inc., and the Central Intelligence Agency. The employees as plaintiffs sued for injunctive relief and damages. In this suit the employees alleged:

a. That the CIA sold the stock of SAT to Mr. Williams illegally,

b. That SAT had embarked on a program to sell off its assets, depriving the plaintiffs of employment,

c. That the plaintiffs were entitled to the benefits of the CIA Retirement and Disability System, and

d. That their civil rights had been violated.

In view of the publicity arising from the allegations made by the other supplemental carriers during the CAB proceedings and the publicity arising from this suit, it was determined that no useful purpose would be served by continuing to deny the true ownership relationship of SAT by the CIA. It is noted, however, that the operational activities performed by SAT on behalf of the CIA were and remain classified. As a part of the Agency's defense in this suit, an affidavit of Mr. Harold L. Brownman, Deputy Director for Management and Services of the CIA, was presented in court. In the affidavit Mr. Brownman delineated the relationship between the CIA and SAT and the authorities for purchasing and later selling the capital stock of SAT. He also defined the employment status of the plaintiffs as not being government employees and not being CIA employees and therefore not being eligible for participation in the CIA Retirement and Disability System.

In the Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment, the court found that the sale of SAT capital stock to Mr. Williams was not in violation of law; the plaintiffs claim to be U.S. Government employees and entitled to CIA retirement benefits invalid; and that the SAT employees were not deprived of any civil right under any state law. As a result, the action was dismissed with prejudice as to the plaintiff. Although this suit did cause the relationship between the Agency and SAT to be officially made public, it did establish, in a court of law, two points favorable to the Agency:

a. The sale of SAT to Stanley Williams violated no laws and was within the authority of the DCI; and

b. The directly hired employees of CIA-owned proprietary firms such as SAT do not necessarily enjoy the status of U.S. Government employees.

CONFLICT OF INTEREST

In the SAT divestiture, the Agency took precautions to avoid conflict of interest. Mr. George A. Doole, Jr., retired Staff Agent and retired Managing Director of Air America, Inc., made several offers to acquire SAT. In early 1972 he and some other members of AAM management made an informal offer to buy SAT. Then on August 7, 1972, Mr. Doole told Mr. Charles W. Kane, Agency official responsible for the management of SAT and AAM, that he, in association with World Airways and TIA, wanted to offer "book value" for SAT. He stated that they were not interested in SAT's certificate, but rather in the equipment and that if allowed to make an offer, it would be one that would not require CAB hearings. In both these cases, the Agency's General Counsel determined that because of Mr. Doole's close association with the Agency, the offer would be unacceptable. In later discussions, Mr. Doole asked to be allowed to bid on SAT in open bidding. The General Counsel's position on this request was that open bids would be begging the question in terms of conflict of interest. In any transaction this complex, selecting the bid is only a preliminary to the negotiated final sale.

Another potential conflict of interest involved Overseas National Airways. From the time the Agency first decided to divest, until the sale to Mr. Williams was consummated, ONA expressed continuing interest in an ONA/SAT merger. Their representative making these continuing overtures to the Agency was retired Admiral William F. Raborn, former Director of Central Intelligence. Admiral Raborn made literally dozens of phone calls to Agency officials and arranged many meetings, all for the purpose of pressing ONA's case to purchase SAT. ONA also proposed to arrange "shadow financing" for Mr. Williams if he would agree to merge with ONA at some later time. These offers were all rejected because merger with another supplemental was not an acceptable solution and the apparent conflict of interest was too great.

The sale of SAT to the President of the firm, Mr. Stanley Williams, was another area of possible conflict of interest. However, Mr. Williams was not an employee of the U.S. Government during any period of association with SAT or CIA. He had been the owner prior to CIA acquisition and his role as nominal President of SAT during CIA ownership was at the direction of the CIA, which made or approved all decisions in regard to acquisition of aircraft and other major policy determinations. Additionally, this potential area of conflict had been recognized at the outset of sale proceedings, which was the basis for obtaining third-party professional evaluation and appraisals and the provision in the sale agreement against windfall profit from disposition of assets. An underlying philosophy for sale back to Mr. Williams was to restore the corporation to the status of private ownership once the need for it as a Government-controlled entity had terminated. Such action was considered in the best interests of the SAT employees as well as in the interest of the U.S. Government to maintain another viable commercial air carrier.

CONCLUSION

The CIA acquired ownership of SAT and its real property owning affiliate, by purchase of all outstanding shares of capital stock on August 5, 1960. Such acquisition was accomplished under the authority of the Central Intelligence Act of 1949 in order to acquire a certificated air carrier to support its foreign intelligence operations. The purchase was accomplished after consultation and approval by the CAB and the DOD, and was not in violation of Section 410 of the Federal Aviation Act.

Following determination by CIA in 1972 that ownership of SAT was no longer required to support its foreign intelligence operations, the CIA undertook to dispose of SAT under the authority of the CIA Act of 1949 and the specific provision in the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPAS Act) that nothing in the act shall impair or affect any authority of the Central Intelligence Agency. In the case of Robert Farmer, et al., vs. Southern Air Transport, Inc., et al., the U.S. District Court, Southern District of Florida, Case No. 74-467-CIV-WM, upheld the authority of CIA to dispose of Southern Air Transport, Inc.

In disposing of SAT, the CIA determined after discussions with CAB that SAT should not be sold as a going concern in an open competitive market nor should merger with another air carrier be considered. Such action would involve lengthy procedures, hearings, and publicity which posed a threat to CIA's ability to protect intelligence sources and methods. While CIA initially was inclined to dissolve SAT and sell the assets, CAB and DOD both indicated their desire to maintain SAT as a supplemental commercial air carrier. Since this solution also would be in the best interest of the SAT employees and there were indications this could be accomplished without revealing ownership by CIA, CIA approved exploring the sale of SAT to its previous owner and current nominal President, Mr. Stanley Williams.

The CIA took reasonable precautions to assure that a fair market price was received for the sale of SAT, and that no short term windfall profit would ensue. The CIA was mindful of conflict of interest problems, and obtained independent professional advice and guidance prior to executing an agreement for sale. The sale price finally received by the CIA exceeded the parameters established by this independent study.

In retrospect, it is possible that open competitive bidding for sale of SAT as a going concern could have achieved as much or more return to the U.S. Government for the assets of SAT. However, such assessment is only conjecture since this market was not fully tested. Also this method of disposal had the potential for greater publicity and revelation of intelligence sources and methods. In retrospect, the alternate solution of dissolution of the corporation and sale of assets probably would have created less publicity but again this is only conjecture, since the SAT employee law suit may well have been forthcoming in any event.

In conclusion, the CIA obtained a fair market value for the sale of SAT as evaluated by an independent professional appraisal. The legality of the disposal of Southern Air Transport by the CIA has been tested in court and has been shown to be fully within the statutory authorities and responsibilities of the DCI. The precautions taken and the procedures established by the CIA considered the varying factors of responsibility for public funds, conflicts of interest, U.S. Government interests for the aviation industry and its employees, and national security. The CIA actions in the disposal of SAT, accordingly, were reasonable and proper.

VI. Project MHBOUND

In 1958, at the time construction of the new CIA headquarters building in Langley was begun, a small counterintelligence operation was established to maintain surveillance of activities to prevent hostile penetration and sabotage. It was successful in its objectives and, therefore, upon occupancy of the building in 1962 the Project, now known as MHBOUND, was established as an outgrowth of the initial effort.

From a single office in Arlington, Virginia, the project expanded to four field offices (Arlington, Falls Church, Los Angeles and St. Louis). Also, it grew from a single corporate entity into three separate corporations. The parent organization in 1962 was Anderson Enterprises, Inc., which operated in the greater Washington area and was set up to create a bona fide commercial corporation which would perform security services on a competitive basis for any and all individuals and companies which might require them, as well as Federal and local governmental units. In addition, it would conduct operations for the Office of Security of the CIA. This activity proved most successful, with customers utilizing it for document destruction, for consultation, for guard work, and for investigations.

Anderson Enterprises, Inc. developed legitimate business contracts with agencies of the Federal government and with commercial firms. The provisions of the so-called "Anti-Pinkerton Act" prohibit a company engaged in investigative work from contracting with the Federal government. In order to protect the commercial cover, it became necessary to form a separate company to handle investigations in response to the requirements of commercial firms. Further, it became necessary to set up notional commercial firms through which to fund MHBOUND for investigative work levied upon it by the Office of Security. At the time this split was accomplished, Anderson Enterprises, Inc. changed its name to Anderson Security Consultants, Inc., with its headquarters remaining in Arlington. The new company was called Anderson Security Services, Inc. and made Los Angeles its home office. As activity expanded and work increased, a third corporation called General Personnel Investigations, Inc. was organized and also headquartered in Los Angeles.

On January 23, 1966, for legal, cover and operational reasons and increased administrative efficiency, Anderson Security Services, Inc. (ASSI) merged into General Personnel Investigations, Inc. (GPII) and remained incorporated in the state of California. Upon the merger, ASSI ceased and GPII succeeded it. The corporate officers and the board of directors of all three companies consisted of the same persons. Subsequently, GPII was sold and new legal straw men were introduced as officers, directors and shareholders. The home office of General Personnel Investigations, Inc. was subsequently established in Falls Church, Virginia in March 1966 for greater administrative efficiency and firmer monetary controls on the projects as a whole, and to greatly enhance cover viability. Also of particular note, the "home office", with its investigative charter, has been used in the conduct of covert investigations.

In addition to the conduct of investigations, MHBOUND was used in the following activities:

(a) TPOCTONAL - covert monitoring of construction of CIA Headquarters building;

(b) Monitoring of construction of West Gate Research Park buildings, which were to be occupied by Agency components;

(c) TAPIR - covert monitoring of construction of CIA printing services building;

(d) ZULU - surveillance of DOD civilian employees suspected to be potential defectors to Soviets;

(e) STPROBE - testing security effectiveness at domestic DDS&T sites and contractor facilities;

(f) MERRIMAC - monitoring of dissident groups in D.C.;*

(g) AEDONOR - the proprietary hired and paid contract guards for one phase of this activity;

(h) ISOTROPIC - the proprietary was a civilian contractor for the guard force at this installation;

(i) TWOFOLD - was an Office of Security cryptonym for an operation to recruit, process and train undercover internal security agents for the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs;

---

* This particular project and other aspects of MHBOUND's domestic activities are treated in greater detail in the Committee's Staff Report dealing with the operations of MHBOUND.

(j) DELICATE - security support for DDS&T project, consisting mainly of badging and entry controls, background investigations, and escort of sensitive material; this is the only such activity currently being serviced by MHBOUND;

(k) PINEAPPLE - physical surveillance of an Agency courier suspected of living beyond his means; also involved a surreptitious entry into his apartment;

(l) BOOTS - physical surveillance of an Agency employee "who maintained contact with people of questionable loyalty"; also involved an audio penetration of the employee's apartment and a mail cover.

Funding for the proprietary is accomplished through a cut-out mechanism whereby the Agency sends U. S. Treasury checks to ten contractors. The proprietary then bills the contractors for "services rendered" in the same amount as received by the contractor via Treasury check. Funding for the other corporations was done through use of notional firms. The ISOTROPIC guard force contract was handled by intra-Agency transfer of funds. BNDD reimbursed the Agency for all TWOFOLD expenses, except for salary of the one staff agent. DOD reimbursed the Agency for all ZULU expenses.

Los Angeles is the only MHBOUND office currently in operation. During Fiscal Year 1975, 2,226 investigations were conducted, 6,125 man-hours were rendered in support of DELICATE, and a total of $551,000 was expended. Purely commercial income averages between $20,000 to $25,000. Much of this comes from walk-in business, which, for cover reasons, cannot be refused. Over the past few years, this has involved badging operations for private companies, i.e. airlines, schools, etc. The company has never made a true profit. To maintain its image among its competitors, however, its books reflect a small profit on which Federal and state taxes are paid. The office presently employes four staff agents, five contract agents and fourteen proprietary employees. During Fiscal Year 1974, the project expended 2.9% of the OS budget ($551,000 vs. $19,026,530).

MHBOUND, as noted, has provided support to the Office of Security and Agency operators on sensitive covert operations and investigative matters, CI/CE support for components of the Agency, custodial support, courier support on truly covert activity, guard support, special non-government and sensitive inquiries (CI/CE probes through STPROBE), technical and physical support in surveillances and Agency proprietary support. Its commercial capabilities have included: confidential consultants, internal security management, security surveys, counter-audio measures and inspections, development, installation and maintenance of security protective equipment and devices, classified material storage equipment, secure destruction of classified waste, incinerator equipment sales, polygraph examination, investigations (personnel), and industrial undercover activities.

A unique example of its Agency security function was project STPROBE, which utilized both security probes and security penetrations. A security probe is a testing of the current effectiveness of all or part of a security system within an Agency or Agency contractor's installation. A security penetration is an internal covert investigation and search targeted at possible subversive elements within a facility who may be engaged in foreign intelligence or acts of sabotage or who by lack of security discipline or gross malfeasance may be weakening the security structure of the project or facility. It is, in essence, counterintelligence against a domestic installation. Eastman Kodak, for example, was the target of a probe. An agent was sent under the natural[*] cover of a union construction man to Eastman to gain employment as a pipefitter. He succeeded in gaining access to the target, and developed information on the installation and its personnel in surrounding areas of the union hall, bars, cafes, and in other appropriate places around the target area. Similar probes were conducted against Pratt and Whitney in West Palm Beach, Florida, Lockheed Aircraft Corporation in Burbank, California, and other targets in New York, Nevada, and Arizona.

These entities serve a useful function within the scheme of necessary security required by sensitive Agency operations. Their utility, however, as in the case of nearly all proprietaries is relative to policy and "flap" demands. As one Agency commentator phrased it when Newsweek revealed the relationship of L. Lee Bean and Paul Hellmuth of the Boston law firm of Hale and Dorr with the CIA in setting up proprietaries:

---

[*] He was in fact a legitimate tradesman.

> Proprietaries have been and will continue to be an important tool to achieve selected operational objectives. Their use, however, has been drastically cut back, more because of changes in the international scene and in operational priorities than as a result of embarrassing exposures.

Of course, as has been the case with nearly all other proprietaries, not everyone within the Agency has been satisfied with the mechanism. Indeed, there has been constant review, criticism and internal restraint due to a certain fear and suspicion of entities such as Anderson which are "out there" and not readily accessible to the leash. For example, in June of 1964, the Chief of the Operation Support Division wrote to the Deputy Director of Security (Investigations and Operational Support) concerning MHBOUND's policy and procedures. In terms of operational objectives he noted that they had "created an operational support entity of dubious capability and with ill-defined objectives or purpose." He suggested that they "look this ugly duckling in the face" and see if it could be terminated gracefully or "see if we can nurture it into a productive and responsive bird of acceptable countenance."*

He "received the definite impression that there may be some grey area with regard to the internal channels of command and administrative direction." He noted that there was confusion resulting from lack of a clear-cut distinction "at just what level policy matters may be decided . . ." Management procedures for the project were such that "under the current status everyone may take credit but no one could be blamed." As far as operational capability was concerned he remarked:

---

* In many cases these concerns dealt with the inability of the entity to provide adequate cover for itself in order to more adequately fulfill its role. In one instance, the physical backstopping of MHBOUND was inadequate. After this was rectified, one official noted:

> It is felt that this step has strengthened the Anderson Enterprises' cover, both in Boston and Washington so that now the company could withstand any inquiries, except that of an official government investigation.

> Quite candidly, I am somewhat concerned about the operational capability of Project MHBOUND. It seems, as a result of its Topsy-like growth, to be oriented toward the military and the building trades. Quite candidly, it is felt that the base must be broadened. Further, I am far from convinced that we have yet developed anywhere near the professional status necessary to "sell" this Project as one having unique operational capabilities sufficient to justify its existence. In other words, I am not impressed with the capability as it now exists nor am I sure that we can sell this product and then be assured that it can perform in a satisfactory manner.

His comments concerning the attitude of Agency personnel were not unique to this proprietary, but they are set out here as illustrative of the singular problems these entities pose. His remarks also show the dangers inherent in some areas of this activity.

> It would seem that this Agency, particularly operating components, are insistent upon pursuing an "ostrich policy" when it comes to their operational security procedures. I have personally witnessed almost hysterical reactions to criticisms as well as total rejections of practical suggestions with regard to operational security procedures. Now it seems to me that we are going about this in a very awkward and embarrassing manner. WE ARE, IN EFFECT, ALLOWING THE WRITERS OF SENSATIONAL BOOKS SUCH AS THE "INVISIBLE GOVERNMENT" TO PROVIDE THE NECESSARY INFORMATION AND PRESSURE ON TOP AGENCY MANAGEMENT TO CORRECT GLARING AND STUPID COURSES OF ACTION BEING PURSUED AT THE WORKING LEVEL. I have been the object of considerable personal ridicule due to my stand in opposition to the unrealistic cover and operational security procedures as they relate to certain aspects of (CIA Operational Base) for example.

> IF we had the authority and capability to have made an objective probe of this sensitive activity we may have been able to have surfaced these obviously ridiculous procedures in such a manner that corrective action would have been taken. Now is the time to present the case in light of the abiding fear of publicity currently permeating the Agency. I recommend that we go after the authority to make independent (unilateral) probes and/or probes requested and known only at the very highest levels of the Agency with the results discreetly channeled where they will do the most good. There necessarily follows the unpleasant subject of money. As distasteful as it may be, it is no good to have the authority without a sufficiently large confidential fund set aside and earmarked for independently iniated activities.

He emphasized that if the Agency did not take the above kind of action to monitor its "image" at the operational level, "we will continue to be plagued with the unsolicited and uncontrolled critique through the newspapers, periodicals and books." He critically concluded:

> Further, I challenge anyone to deny that such exposes to date are largely true and usually the result of our own "ostrich policy" and refusal to face the fact that we have operated in some relatively amateurish manners over the years.

Such concerns have extended beyond these operational levels to general issues of propriety and legality. For example, as noted earlier (supra, p. 90) the so-called "Anti-Pinkerton Act" prohibits a company engaged in investigative work from contracting with the Federal government. But

> the Agency and its predecessor organizations began contracting as early as November 1942 with certain commercial, investigating companies to perform investigations and to provide commercial credentials to, and cover backstopping for, Agency investigators.

As of March 1975, the Office of Security had a relationship with three such companies which issue their credentials to Agency investigators and backstop the cover of same. Two of the three have previously "conducted limited personnel investigations" on behalf of the Agency. During that same period the Director of Security asked the General Counsel of the CIA whether the "Anti-Pinkerton Act" prohibited the Office's continued contractual relationship with these three private companies or their employees for purposes of conducting investigations or providing cover, or both. The General Counsel responded as follows:

> I am aware that in fulfilling the responsibilities placed upon your office in support of the Agency's mission, many investigations must be conducted without revealing Agency interest and in some, without even revealing Government interest. Absent the relationships you question, you could not discharge your responsibilities. It is this inability to accomplish your tasks which causes recourse to the Agency's rather broad statutory authority to expend funds as contained in Section 8 of the CIA Act of 1949, as amended. This authority provides

> (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, sums made available to the Agency by appropriation or otherwise may be expended for purposes necessary to carry out its functions, including --
>
> > (1) personal services, including personal services without regard to limitations on types of persons to be employed, ...
>
> * * * *
>
> (b) The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified.
>
> It is my opinion that this authority permits the Agency to continue the two practices as set out above without fear of violation of the Anti-Pinkerton Statute.

He closed, however, with the following admonitions:

> There are, of course, other dimensions to the question you raise. As a matter of policy I believe the practices should be reviewed at the highest levels within the Agency and, perhaps, cleared with the Agency's oversight committees. In addition, if one of these relationships became public, it must be recognized that there will be allegations that the law has been violated. On balance, it is my view that these considerations are not so significant as to warrant a termination of the two practices with the three companies. It is suggested, however, that any subsequent, projected association with a detective company or private investigative company beyond the three present companies be reviewed with this Office prior to its initiation.

VII. BEYOND "DOING BUSINESS": PEAK NON-GOVERNMENT SECURITY INVESTMENTS BY PROPRIETARIES ACTIVE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1974

As described infra, MHMUTUAL (the insurance and pension complex) has invested heavily in both domestic and foreign securities markets. Its portfolio runs the gamut of notes, bonds, debentures, etc. But other proprietaries have also used this investment route as a method of increasing capital and insuring adequate cover.

For example, KMJAGGERY is a Delaware corporation located in Washington, D.C., which purchases general merchandise in a manner which cannot be traced to the United States Government. It provides covert procurement for the Office of Logistics (CIA). Its total purchases from January to September 1974 were $437,500. It has no outside commercial business and has five employees. Yet, as of December 31, 1974, that entity had invested $149,000 in time deposits. Another covert procurement mechanism under this same Office is SPECIAL STOCK ACCOUNT #3. This is also a Delaware corporation with an address in Baltimore which purchases arms, ammunition, and police related equipment in a manner which cannot be traced to the United States Government. The company has no employees and is managed by Headquarters officials in alias. As of December 31, 1974, that entity had invested $37,500 in a certificate of deposit.

LPJACK was a travel service which was sold recently to an Agency employee at the time of his reitrement, who had ostensibly owned the firm before but in fact only managed it for the Agency. As of December 31, 1974, that entity had invested $35,000 in a certificate of deposit.*

LPDICTUM/LPSPICE was an investment company which was dissolved. As of March 31, 1973, it had invested $100,080 in Petrolcos Mexicanos, S.A. Mexico.

HBSANDSTRAP is a Delaware corporation located at Washington National Airport which has provided secure air support for Agency employees and classified pouches between Headquarters and other Agency facilities in the United States. The company has accepted commercial charter flights from non-Agency customers for income and cover purposes. As of December 31, 1974, it had invested $144,000 in a certificate of deposit.

QRTROW was a former proprietary and is now an institute located in Europe which "seeks to influence and encourage moderate and pro-democratic youth leaders and government officials concerned with youth and higher education." According to the Agency

> The Agency withdrew its support from the institute in 1974 and turned over all assets to the management of the organization. In addition, the Agency provided surge funding in the amount necessary to enable the entity to exist in reduced form for about one year during which time the management would attempt to arrange private support.

As of March 31, 1972, that proprietary had invested $50,000 in time deposits.

LPMANTLE is part of the WUTACTIC complex managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff to provide operational support mechanisms for DDO foreign operations. It is a Delaware corporation which is used to collect the proceeds from the sale of Agency proprietary entities and to refund such proceeds to the Agency. At December 31, 1973, its total assets were $650,220 and its total liabilities were $633,897. Total stockholders equity was $16,323. It has no employees. As of December 31, 1974, it had invested $400,000 in a convertible subordinated debenture from the sale of a company and $45,440 in notes receivable. Another company in this TACTIC complex is LPGLITTER. It is a Panamanian company which was used as an investment vehicle for funds reserved for new commercial operations requiring Agency investments. The investment project was terminated and all funds were returned to the Agency. The company has no employees. As of December 31, 1973, it had invested $246,757 in a Security Note of Pepsico Corporation, N.V.

---

* The Agency today uses this firm for the purchase of airline tickets for travel in support of sensitive projects. It is estimated by the Agency that CIA business represents about 30% of the gross airline ticket sales of the entity on an annual basis.

IUQUEST was part of the air support complex of the Agency proprietaries. Substantial assets of it were sold and the entity dissolved. As of December 31, 1974, it had invested $215,000 in a certificate of deposit.

LPPANDA/LPMET is part of the management and accounting complex. As of December 31, 1974, it had $470,000 invested in time deposits.

SCHEDULE I

PEAK NON-GOVERNMENT SECURITY INVESTMENTS BY PROPRIETARIES

ACTIVE AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1974

PROJECT/ENTITY	TYPE INVESTMENT	DATE	AMOUNT
MHMUTUAL	See Portfolio		
LPPANDA/LPMET	Time Deposits	12/31/74	$470,000
IUQUEST	Certificate of Deposit	12/31/74	215,000
LPTACTIC/LPGLITTER	Security Note - Pepsico Corp. N.V.	12/31/73	246,757
LPTACTIC/LPMANTLE	Convertible Subordinated Debenture from Sale of Company	12/31/74	400,000
	Notes Receivable	12/31/74	45,440
QRTROW	Time Deposits	3/31/72	50,000
HBDERRICK/HBSANDTRAP	Certificate of Deposit	12/31/74	144,000
LPDICTUM/LPSPICE	Petrolcos Mexicanos, S.A. Mexico	3/31/73	100,080
LPJACK	Certificate of Deposit	12/31/74	35,000
KMJAGUARO/KMJAGGERY	Time Deposit	12/31/74	149,000
KMJAGUARO/SPECIAL STOCK ACCT. #3	Certificate of Deposit	12/31/74	37,500

VIII: MHMUTUAL: THE INSURANCE-INVESTMENT COMPLEX

a) A BRIEF HISTORY

MHMUTUAL is a complex of insurance companies, most of which are located abroad, operated by the Agency to provide the following services:

a) reinsurance of aircraft damage or liability risks ostensibly insured under commercially issued policies (for cover);

b) extending term life insurance, annuities, trusts and workmen's compensation for independent contractors and agents working for the Agency who are not entitled to U.S. Government benefits;

c) handling escrow accounts* for agents;

d) limited operational support activities, i.e., holding real estate formerly used in Agency operations abroad; ** and

e) investing in domestic and foreign markets to obtain earnings to fund the above.

MHMUTUAL was created in 1962 to provide death and disability benefits to agents and beneficiaries when security considerations preclude attribution to the U.S. Government. The losses during the Bay of Pigs prompted its establishment. From sixty-seven (67) to seventy-three (73) companies operated originally under the Domestic Operations Division and later a board of directors controlled by the Office of General Counsel. This internal board of the project made investment decisions.

---

* Escrow accounts are established when an agent cannot receive his full payment from the CIA without attracting suspicion. The funds not paid to the agent go into escrow accounts and are invested under MHMUTUAL.

** The CIA's domestic real property holdings appear as Appendix E.

Lawrence Houston, retired General Counsel of the Agency, testified that his office instigated the establishment of MHMUTUAL. This was because his staff would be the repository of all problems related to the death or disability of a person during the course of his Agency work. These problems were all handled in what Houston called a very "sketchy way" and this was simply undesirable from all points of view. Moreover, when the Agency went into air proprietaries on a large scale there were certain risks which simply could not be underwritten commercially.

> So somewhere in the late 1950s or around 1960, I think I was the one that posed that we might organize our own insurance entities. I had a couple of lawyer friends deep in the insurance business, and I suggest I talk to one of them, and he promptly said, well, it so happens that I have a couple of offshore insurance entities that I can make available to you. And we took a look at them. It looked like they were organized properly for the purpose. They cost practically nothing. They were just shells. But they could be filled out. So if my recollection is correct, we acquired these two as the first step in what became the MUTUAL project.

Simultaneously, the decision was made that if the Agency was going to maintain such a capability,

> they had to have enough body and backstopping so that if a suspicious foreign intelligence outfit tried to investigate, they would stand up under investigation as would any normal insurance outfit. In other words, they had to appear to have financial stability, they had to have names that could stand up and answer questions, and in other words appear to be in the normal business of writing the type of annuities (and) insurance, death and disability.

This concept was totally organized originally then under the Domestic Operations Division. DOD eventually recommended that the complex be transferred to the Office of General Counsel. This occurred, and it remained there until Director Colby decided in conjunction with Mr. Houston to transfer for operational reasons to the Cover and Commercial Staff. This was done because CSS had the expertise and manpower. Moreover, Mr. Colby took exception to the Board concept because he felt that it diluted the line responsibility by which all other projects were administered.

As the number of insurance companies grew to cover increasing demands placed upon the Agency by more agents, the general fund which was retained to backstop all the needs of these companies grew, and "the question was what to do with your money." Houston explained

> Now, insurance companies are normally in the business of investing their funds, and so this being the normal thing, it appeared to us necessary to preserve the normal appearance of these insurance companies to carry on investment programs for the funds involved, and there were a variety of investments to be considered. You could go into U.S. Treasury Bonds, notes and bills, but actually, from the point of view of insurance business practice, this was very unusual. It would be very, very unusual in the insurance field. Usually some of them would have some investment in bills, notes or bonds, but it was a very small part of their portfolio, and to put it in nothing that that we thought would be a dead giveaway. So we first went in the direction of having a general portfolio somewhat similar to the normal insurance company's investment practices, and I originally recommended that we have the board of directors so that we could have available and demonstrate that we had available the best competence the Agency had internally to pass judgment on what to do with their money.

Because of shifts in the stock market which made it not look as promising as it had been during the 1960s, MHMUTUAL went into certificates of deposit, the Eurodollar market and the bond market.

It was decided to invest, however, only in Eurodollar bonds that were "guaranteed by the American parent company." It was thought that "they were a pretty secure investment." On occasion, "when we got the advice of our economists on the DDI side, we took some government paper that they considered -- foreign government paper that they considered really a good security." Houston became the central figure in this investment scenario:

> More and more I continued on this Board of Directors as giving basic policy advice. We had long discussions on the areas of discussion, what to stay away from, what to go into, what it looked like as far ahead as they might think they could see. And more and more I would make the individual decisions on my own in light of their policy guidance and with the information which my staff in MUTUAL could get from the many friends they now had in various underwriting and investment places on an unwitting basis, who just thought they were customers. For instance, on the Eurodollar bonds, they were dealing with several houses who just thought the fellow was another investor coming into them and would get very detailed and on the whole pretty good advice, which often we could check from inside through some other of our sources. . . .Profits from primarily the interest operations were very profitable, and these built up over the years quite rapidly and were brought into the insurance funding identified as profits for future possible use.
>
> It was always recognized that a policy decision might be made at any time that we had funds excess to the valid backing up of our underwriting, which would be brought back into the government for such disposition as might be appropriate at that time.

In terms of actually providing insurance in the aviation and maritime field, a study would be conducted in each case where insurance was required. If it looked as though normal commercial insurance would handle it, as was the case with most of Air America's needs, then the particular entity would go ahead and procure the normal commercial insurance. If there was something peculiar in the operational setup that precluded commercial companies from accepting the risk or if there were security problems, then it would be handled through MHMUTUAL.

> What we would do when it came to aviation and marine, we would go to one of the cooperating companies and see if they wanted the insurance for their own accounts, because we had made arrangements that if there were operations security problems in any one claim, that they could handle the investigation so it wouldn't be a problem if they wanted to take for their own account. If they didn't want to take it for their own account or they didn't want to take it all for their own account, they might then seed back to us what they didn't want. And it would be then underwritten technically out of MUTUAL's account, although they would be the ostensible insurers.

Several of the aviation entities, other than Air America which dealt almost exclusively with regular commercial insurance companies, did nto feel quite secure with regular insurance. They turned to MUTUAL. MUTUAL would in turn offer the risk to one of the cooperating insurance companies. If they would take the risk, they would then negotiate the premium with the proprietary. If they did not want the risk, "then they would seed back to us and we would take the portion of the premium that should come back. Usually it if went through a company, they would take a small underwriting premium to pay their costs, 3 percent or something like that. And the rest of the premium would go back in MUTUAL, if they were actually taking the risk."

In 1970 the Inspector General conducted a survey of the securities held by MHMUTUAL. He concluded that the project seemed to be secure in its operations in the fields of insurance and investment. The IG looked at the investments from a security (i.e. cover) point of view in terms of MHMUTUAL's operational support function. His concern was that each time MHMUTUAL bought a safehouse, for example, there was the possibility that audio surveillance of the house by the Soviets would lead to a discovery of the purchase mechanism used by the Agency. He reasoned that, therefore, the purchase of such items by the complex was operationally unsound because it exposed the entire complex to compromise if a foreign intelligence agency tracked back the transactions through various corporations. According to the Inspector General, no funds of MHMUTUAL were used for specific projects. What would occur, however, was that a project would transfer funds to the complex which would then disburse them as needed through an appropriate entity. This method left him with major reservations about MHMUTUAL security when it supported sensitive clandestine operations. Thus, MHMUTUAL's provision of cover, funding for active operations, and record ownership acquired for sensitive operations was deemed inappropriate and, accordingly, the IG proposed separating operational support activities of MHANVIL from the instrumentalities of MHMUTUAL. It was to be restrained to the purposes for which it had been established in 1962*

---

* During the course of the IG inquiry no instances were discovered where MHMUTUAL or its funds were used to influence foreign stock markets or currencies. The Committee has also found no such instances.

At the time of this 1970 review by the IG, MHMUTUAL held a surplus of $9 million. It also earned income from sources supported by public taxation. It appears from the questions that were raised at the time about briefing congressional committees on MHMUTUAL that this was not done, providing a situation where an organization with assets of $30 million has been created and was operating without oversight knowledge or approval. Moreover, because MHMUTUAL was no longer a project after its removal from the Domestic Operations Division, there was no annual allotment and no annual operational review.

Houston indicated that MHMUTUAL had been operating "before we told our committees any detail. I think it was mentioned as a problem that we had to make arrangements to cope with insurance problems fairly early on. But the fact that it was a business and a business of this substance was not done for some time. My recollection is there was not deliberate avoidance; we just didn't get to it." On the question of lack of annual project review, Houston commented that this was "technically correct." But, he added,

> As a matter of practice I would say that MUTUAL was more carefully reviewed in some respects than almost any other project in the Agency in the sense that we had the bookkeeper inside the project who was a finance officer and bookkeeper. The project published at least monthly reports in detail which went not only to me but to Colonel (L.K.) White (the Comptroller) and the Director. These were very detailed reports which often raised questions which went back for answers.

The Inspector General was invited in, according to Houston. In addition, the Finance Office kept its own books in the proprietary accounts branch on MUTUAL. Such reviews were done, he said, "on a constant basis."

> We were very conscious of the amount of money involved and the possibilities of someone trying to, someone yielding to temptation and trying to do something with all of this money.

b) THE CURRENT STATUS

The project currently consists of twenty-six (26) companies of which five (5) are domestic. All of the clients of MHMUTUAL are under non-official cover.** The Office of Finance has indicated that the current net worth of the project is $18 million which is the result of retaining earnings. It was originally capitalized in 1962 with $4 million. A Washington, D. C. lawyer (MHANVIL) is currently the investment manager and he provides day-to-day direction. MHANVIL is a sole proprietorship proprietary of the Office of General Counsel. Total assets are currently

---

** MHMUTUAL itself is only for covert non-staff officers of the CIA. In essence, it only works for what would broadly be described as "agents," those not entitled to participate in the CIA retirement plan or in the Civil Service Reitrement Plan. They are primarily foreigners, and usually DDO employees. Those individuals who were formerly known as contract agents and who are now known as independent contractors also participate in MHMUTUAL. In the case of most agents, the CIA contributes 7 percent and the agent contributes 7 percent, in keeping with CIA practice for regular employees. In cases where the agent is well along in years and contributions from the Agency and the agent would not provide enough funds to capitalize an annuity, the Agency provides the initial capitalization; however, approval of this must come from the DDO.

$31 million, most of which are held outside the U.S. The companies do not write insurance in the United States, but rather reinsure with cooperating companies who then sell the risk to the CIA for a percentage of the premium. The policies are written directly abroad. Each of the U. S. companies pays little tax and a proprietary auditing firm audits the books of MHMUTUAL. This method of self-insurance enables the Agency to funnel money where needed in any of its project categories. Currently, 60 percent of the investments are in Eurobonds, 20 percent in off-shore time deposits in U. S. banks, and the balance is in common stocks, debentures and commercial paper of various types. For example, the current breakdown is:

$7 million in time deposits abroad;
$2.4 million in Common Stock (at cost);
$20.8 million in Eurobonds;
$1 million Eurodollar convertible debentures;
$.5 million in short-term commercial paper overseas; and
$.2 million in domestic debentures.

The performance of the MHMUTUAL stock portfolio is noted at this juncture. Comparisons of cost against market value for the years 1970 through 1975 are given first. Following that are the gains or losses on the sales of stock for the years 1963 through 1975.

R1819

STOCK PORTFOLIO PERFORMANCE

Comparison of Cost Against Market Value

Year	Cost	Market Value
1970	$ 3,792,804	$ 3,689,294
1971	1,123,651	1,069,301
1972	2,969,403	2,872,557
1973	2,650,904	1,242,915
1974	2,440,686	699,422
1975	2,440,686	876,507

Gain or (loss) on Sales of Stocks

Year	Gain or (loss)
1963-1969	$ 197,348.15
1970	(19,910.64)
1971	118,943.90
1972	310,346.37
1973	150,447.03
1974	(172,796.04)
1975	-0-
Total Gain	$ 584,378.77

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 1975

Included as Appendix D is an in-depth list of common stock purchases from 1971 through September 30, 1975. In addition, there are schedules of portfolio sales from 1964 through 1974.

A look at the Project MHMUTUAL Consolidated Balance Sheet for December 31, 1974 will give some idea of the scale as of that late date. Current assets (cash in banks, premiums receivable, advances receivable, accounts receivable, client notes receivable, rent receivable, interest receivable, and investments maturing in one year) totaled $6,910,891.00. Investments (time deposits, bonds and commercial paper, and stocks at market value) totaled $25,342,772.53. Fixed assets (real estate and furniture and fixtures) totaled $73,084.12. Other Assets (prepaid insurance, recoverable deposits, and other prepaid expenses) totaled $32,682.00. These combined for Total Assets of $32,359,430.45.

As usual, the Project was subjected to an extensive audit for that year.

> The audit included site examination of books and financial records of 12 of the instrumentalities administered by Agency-owned management firms as well as review and evaluation of related records, controls, and procedures at Headquarters. Five instrumentalities administered by Agency-owned management firms are located abroad and will be audited later. Audit of the other six instrumentalities administered abroad by foreign accounting companies was limited to examination of financial reports and such other documentation as was available at Headquarters. These latter examinations provided us reasonable assurance that Agency resources, totaling about one percent of project accountability, are adequately protected.

That audit concluded that MHMUTUAL "continue(d) to be administered in an efficient and effective manner and in compliance with applicable Agency regulations and directives." Prior audit reports had commented on the need for a revised administrative plan and in accordance with these reports, the audit noted, a "new plan was approved in March 1975." In addition, "(m)inor administrative and financial problems surfaced during the audit were discussed with MHMUTUAL officials and resolved." The audit noted that total income for that year (from interest, premiums, gain or loss on sale of securities, dividends, rentals, professional fees, gain on foreign exchange, gain on sale of property and from miscellaneous transactions) was $4,113,590.00. The total expenses for that year (allocation of premium income to reserve for claims, interest, salaries, rent, accounting fees, taxes, loss on property write-off, legal and other fees, communications, depreciation and amortization, travel, equipment rent, real estate expenses, pensions, dues and subscriptions, directors fees, entertainment, and miscellaneous) were $2,459,260.00. These combined for a net income of $1,654,330.00.

The current Chief/Central Cover Staff has focused on MHMUTUAL in a number of interviews with both the Rockefeller Commission staff and our own. He has suggested that the real question for MHMUTUAL is what should its role and shape be after the termination of the large air proprietaries. One of MHMUTUAL's original purposes was to provide reinsurance for Air America, CAT, Southern Air Transport, Inter-Mountain Air, and the other air proprietaries. With their passage, a reorganization and redefinition is needed.

As to the issue of safeguards against misuse of project funds or insider information by the Agency, the Chief CCS has told the Committee that compartmentation, the honesty of the Chief of CCS, and display of the portfolios to appropriate congressional committees are what have prevented or will prevent such abuse.

Houston agreed with the three safeguards outlined by the CSS Chief. However, he added a fourth:

> When we were investing in stock, I would have the list of stock, the portfolio, reviewed by our contract people, and if I found we had any contract relationship with any of the companies involved, we'd either refuse to -- Well, a couple of times our investment advisor recommended a stock which I knew we had big contracts with, and I told the board no, this involves a conflict of interest. We won't touch it. And if we had anything from the Agency contract office that indicated a relationship, we would either sell the stock or wouldn't buy it.

Houston believes that the complex should continue in some form. One reason is that "assets are few and far between." The acquisition of a board of directors, the establishing of accounts, basic credibility and relations with the jurisdiction in which the entity is located are not easy things to do according to Houston. This creates the "tendency, once you've got something that looks good, to hang on to it." He would recommend in this regard that the Agency be constantly forming new companies and phasing out old ones on a rotational basis so that the same complex would not remain for security reasons.

~~The current Chi Chief of CCS believes~~

> So it's not easy but I still think that they should make the effort. [The Chief CCS] knows my views on this pretty well, and we're all worried about the security of the damn thing. But we don't know another way to do it.

He believes that the current method while not perfect is the best that can be devised. The problem, of course, is that the generation of funds for these companies must literally be shown to be legitimate and non-governmental if the beneficiaries are to be protected. Consequently, if the government were to create an office that would funnel money to these companies without the benefit of investment, this would create the risk that a trace-back investigation by a foreign power could discover that the entity is being funded by the U.S. government. Houston closed by saying that he would invite any controls that Congress would choose to put on the mechanism in terms of insuring propriety.

The Chief of CCS has ~~[illegible]~~ characterized the insurance complex as "indispensable" and as an item for which there is no viable alternative. (1-27-76, Tr. 12-)

3. THE AIR PROPRIETARIES

Lawrence R. Houston, the former General Counsel of the Agency, was involved in the establishment of the first set of proprietaries of the Agency back in the late 1940's and early 1950's. As noted later on in section 10, page , Houston has concluded that proprietaries should be a mechanism of last resort. He asserts that the Agency learned this in part "the hard way and almost all of the lessons involved probably came out one way or the other in connection with a major aviation proprietary in the Far East. Others had there own special problems, but I think the Air America complex had pretty near everything."

The theory of the acquisition of Air America in 1949 was denial of the assets to the Red Chinese. The CIA first arranged advances to the company to keep them going when they were running short of cash in 1949. These advances were used up and were actually credited to the purchase price eventually. The airline at that time had been organized by General Claire Chennault and Whiting Willauer. It was a joint venture with the Chinese Minister of Transport and was called Civil Air Transport. Houston described it as follows:

> This normal aviation organization, this would have no meaning at all, was completely at all, it would have not standing in international law, aviation rights, or any of that. But it worked for what they wanted, which was to take supplies up-country into inland China and then to bring back whatever cargo they could get commercially: tallow, hides, bristles, all that sort of trade, and then they traded that off for their own account. And for awhile the operations was fairly successful, the C-47's and C-46's.

To finance this activity and to facilitate the trading of produce, their lawyer, Thomas Corcoran, had organized a company. That company was known as C.A.T. Inc. In addition there was a Panamanian corporation which was involved that did most of the funding. There was also an envy known as the Civil Air Transport "to further complicate the picture, at this time Chennault and Willauer were also negotiating with the Chinese CNAC, for the takeover of their planes and equipment." Chennault and Willauer came to the Agency in connection with that operation in the Spring of 1949. At that point the Nationalist Chinese were being "squeezed down south by the Communists and they were really backing down toward Shanghi, restricting their area of operation and consequently the productivity of their commercial venture." Chennault and Willauer indicated to the Agency that unless they got help they would have to go out of business.

The agency held a series of meetings in which it was determined that it had a need for some air transport for some of its operations particularly involving arms and ammunition and consequently the Agency needed a contract with someone.

> And so we entered into an arrangement, I think in about September of 1949 whereby we would advance them, the figure of $750,000 sticks in my mind, against which we could draw for actual use of the planes at an agreed on rate. . . . And we did draw down, I think, all the flying time and expended the $750,000 between September and about January, at which time we suspended any further payments or draw-downs. I think the money was exhausted.

Chennault and Willauer came to Washington about January or February of 1950 and through a series of negotiations, the Agency agreed to advance them more funds, taking at the same time an option to purchase the assets of Civil Air Transport, with the liabilities left to their account. Any unused portion of the advances were to be credited to the purchase price. They then operated through the

Spring of 1950 under this arrangement and Chennault and Willauer "came in in the Summer of 1950 and said again they were in desperate straits for funds." Once again a series of meetings was held at which the prognosis was that the operations in the Far East would have a continuing need for secure airlift and also, there was a general estimate that the loss of this airlift to the Chinese Communists would give them a considerably greater advantage than then possessed because they had almost no airlift of their own at that time. "The Agency then made the decision that they would exercise the option given there was no objection otherwise."

The Agency felt that it was necessary to get the concurrence of the Department of State. Frank G. Wisner, at that time the Head of the Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) which was responsible for conduct of covert actions as opposed to clandestine intelligence, and Mr. Houston visited Mr. Livingston Merchant, who was Assistant Secretary of State for the Far East.

> He and I went to see Mr. Merchant and explained the situation. And Mr. Merchant reminded us that it was basic U.S. policy not to get the government in competition with U.S. private industry. But under the particular circumstances, in particular as there was really no U.S. private industry involved in the area, and they agreed it was important to divide the assets to the Red Chinese. State would go along on the understanding that we would divest ourselves of the private enterprise as soon as such a divestment was feasible, and all of the circumstances that might obtain.

Of course, the divestiture of these entities did not actually occur until 1975. And, indeed, some of the entities still as yet have not been divested. Mr. Houston noted, however, that:

> We did not disregard that guidance because after very considerable use of this asset during the early '50's, there was a question of whether to continue it, and the matter was taken up in the National Security Counsel. And Allan Dulles, as Director, opposed that we continue the ownership and control of the assets of Air America, as it then was known including the subsidy as needed. And there was a subsidy at that time. It was about $1,200,000 per year.*

This consideration by the National Security Counsel as to whether or not to continue to retain this asset and Mr. Dulles' recommendation that it be retained occurred in 1956.

During this period of time the business of the air proprietary consisted almost entirely of Agency cargo carriage under contracts which were usually using a military designation. The company was not organized, according to Houston, to fly common carriage and had no status in the international air business.

The evidence indicates that during this period of time, there were two struggles going on. One was where control should lie in the Agency and the other was the policies to be applied to the operation of the company itself.

> The struggle within the Agency ranged all the way from sort of quiet management discussions as to what was good management, to sometimes rather vociferous auguments of whose in charge here. And the operators always said, well, we need to call the shots because it's our operation. . . . And this is what we were running into all the time, of red hot operators opposed to what we would consider good management.

---

*/"Houston indicated that there had been a subsidy running to the entities since 1949. "$1.2 million represented about the maximum subsidy given until, I believe, about 1958 was the turning point, and from 1958 on, there was no subsidy as such that went into it." The reason for that, of course, was that the air complex had become "money-making."

The management of the air proprietary at this time was in the OPC structure and was therefore responsive to operations. An example of some of the problems which were created as a result of this is the acquisition in August of 1950 of the entity. Houston was participating in the negotiations. He had been invited to do so by Frank Wisner.

> OPC was a curious organization. Determined as being attached to the Agency for quarters and rationing with policy guidance from State, which was an impossible situation. Very nice fellows were doing the negotiating with Wisner -- Frank Lindsay and Chad Breckinridge, who is now dead. Frank Lindsay has been head of ITEK and quite unknown to me, when they made the agreement to purchase carrying out the option, they gave the vendors the right to repurchase at any time within two years. And I thought this was really inconsistent with our whole position. And during the next two years they negotiated out that repurchase agreement and in its place substituted an agreement to give them a first refusal, if we were to dispose of the airline. That first refusal plagued us for years. They use to make all sorts of extraordinary claims under it and it was never exercised and eventually it was sort of forgotten when Chennault and Willauer died. It ran to them personally, whether it ran to them and two others personally, and they all are dead now. But this shows a part of the learning curve, which was thing we were going through. It also became clear that the organization of the airline was really impossible, it's sort've semi-formal partnership with the Ministry of Transportation or the Ministry of Communications (of the Nationalist Chinese Government).*

That basically describes the preliminary situation from the period 1950 through 1954. It was in 1954 that George Doole first came onboard as a consultant. Doole and Houston went to the Far East in the summer of 1954 to observe the operation. "George went out there specifically to look at the organization of the Airline." In this regard, it is noted that at the time the Agency purchased the Airline it had formed a Delaware corporation to buy it which was first called the Airdale Corporation, counsel for which was Brackley Shaw. Shaw and Doole were both very concerned about the technical organization or lack of it, of the operation. Doole demonstrated to Houston

---

* The Nationalist Chinese had by this time retreated to Taiwan, they maintained a maintenance base tied to Hainan "The maintenance base at that time was on a LST and a great big steel barge. And we brought the LST and the steel barge up to Kiaoshung, and it was really extraordinary what a maintenance job they did on what was almost impossible facilities. I went down and was enormously impressed by the difficulties and how well they had overcome them," noted Houston.

> to my satisfaction that it was an absolute situation and that no one out there had the slightest understanding of the problem or what they were up against, or wanted to do anything about it (in terms of airline management).

As a result of this Shaw and Doole planned the organization which they thought was necessary for the future of the operation. Hugh Grundi was installed as President of the corporation by the end of 1954. Management responsibility internally was given to Lyle Shannon "who was a management type, although he was assigned to the DDO, or by that time it might have been the DDP."

The upshot of this review by the Agency was that the theory of running the airline was that it would be managed by management to be responsive to Operations "but not managed by Operations."

In order to improve its cover "the Chinese not only were willing, but at that time wanted it to be the airline that showed the flag of China." This was done on overt records through Civil Air Transport Company, Ltd., which was the subsidiary of Pacific Corporation. Pacific Corporation held title to 40 percent of the equity in the corporation and 60 percent of the equity was ostensibly owned by the Chinese, who gave deeds of trust to the Agency for their shares. This overt arrangement demonstrated for purposes of international law that the company was majority-owned and controlled by Chinese. The Chinese continued to press the company to get into the international common carriage field. The company had several DC-4's and began modest operations between Hong Kong, Taipei and Tokyo. They graduated to DC-6's, and it was at this time that the Agency first got into the question of competition with U.S. industry. Northwest was then flying to Tokyo and Seoul and to Manila, and was trying to obtain rights into Hong Kong. Don Nyrop had noted the Agency's interest in this area when he had been Chairman of the Civil Aeronautics Board in the late 1940's and the early 1950's. Houston told the Committee:

> He (Nyrop) became head of Northwest, a very tight manager, a very capable fellow, and he used to complain that we were interfering, we were taking passengers off his airline, and we would go to him and say, we have to keep the airline in this business because the Chinese say they need an international airline. They're not ready to start their own yet. And it is necessary to its overall cover status as a going commercial concern.

By 1959 Mr. Nyrop was complaining that the Agency was doing too much. Finally Nyrop decided to complain to the Civil Aeronautics Board and the Agency agreed to place it before that Agency for a decision. A meeting was held with the entire Board, at which time Nyrop was able to make his case "for the fact that he was a private industry, he should not be interfered with by government competition."

The Agency explained its situation, the cover need, the Chinese pressures, and the fact that they were keeping the carriage to what they thought was a minimum that appearances could stand.

> And it ended up by one of the members of the Board turning to Nyrop and saying, Don, you ought to be glad that you don't have a really good, reliable competitor in there. He said, If you were being competed with by private business, you'd have real headaches. You ought to be real glad that it's not worse than it is. And that's the end of that.

Houston conceded that some passengers were going on basically CIA planes instead of Nyrop's Northwest planes. The impact, however, was minimal. Moreover, the CAB in this proceeding was advised of the dilemma. They did participate in discussions with both the Agency and the particular business entity that was making the complaint, and the CAB, after hearing both sides, "came down on the side of the Agency after making a reasoned judgment."

By this time the airline's commercial international business was not making money. A maintenance contract work, which was being done at Taiwan, however, was "normally a money-maker, and this was primarily, although not exclusively, with the U. S. Air Force."*

There were management problems in terms of the maintenance aspects of this operation. This originally stemmed from the fact that individuals out in the field are not particularly astute at costing their contracts. Doole gave excellent advice in this area. Moreover, Doole was quick to advise when an operation is bordering on not being responsive to the demands of good management. Houston cited one instance when Doole replaced a controller in the corporation who was very able but "had his own ideas of bookkeeping and controls." Doole insisted that the corporation put in bookkeeping and controls completely consistent with U. S. CAB and FAA practices. And of course the maintenance contracts with the military were audited constantly by the military audit teams that were right in the plant.

---

* The LST and barge which had previously been used for maintenance purposes became inadequate. Therefore the Agency built a plant in Taiwan "that is now there but has been recently disposed of to E Systems, and a very good plant it was." E Systems' role in the acquisition of proprietary assets is detailed later.

By this time the Agency had organized an exemption from the Contract Renegotiation Board on the grounds that if the renegotiation personnel became too involved in the business, they might recognize that this was not a straight commercial operation and discover the fact that the CIA was involved. The Agency went to the head of the Contract Renegotiation Board and got a letter from the Department of Defense asking for an exemption on what the Agency and the Department considered "perfectly legitimate grounds." Indeed, there was a basis for exemption in the Renegotiation Act if the business was entirely overseas, which was the case with this airline. And so, the exemption was granted on that basis. The Agency was concerned, however, by the fact that it had in principle made a type of profit, over 40 percent on these Air Force maintenance contracts, that might have well have been the subject of renegotiation, had it not been subject to the exemption. "So the question was what to do about it. And finally, we made a voluntary repayment against part of the profit on that contract to the Air Force."

As noted previously, the commercial airline aspect of the operation was not making a profit and in fact operated mostly at a loss. Indeed, there were periods of time when the C-46's and C-47's cargo carriers were very busy on either CIA contracts, the Korean War, Diem Bien Phu, and other paramilitary aspects. There would be periods in between these activities when there was nothing for the airlines to do. Nonetheless, the airline was still saddled with expenses such as crews' salaries and maintenance of the aircraft which sat on the ground.

> So George posed, and we finally organized, the stand-by contract, which was an apparent military entity on Okinawa. It was our entity, but it had a military designation. I can't remember the name for it. And that entity contracted with Air America for so many hours of cargo stand-by to be available any time on call, and that they would pay so much for that capability being maintained. . . so that is how we kept the subsidy going to maintain them during periods when there was not profitable flying.

Another area of concern was the question of the relationship with the Internal Revenue Service. From the very start, the company management was informed that they would be required to pay the appropriate U. S. taxes, and while there were the usual business arguments about whether certain items were appropriate for taxation and whether certain deductions should have been granted, the relationship maintained with the IRS was basically a normal one. Houston recalled that in the mid-50's the company, Air America, received a notice that they were going to be audited by the IRS. Company officials came to the Agency and indicated that this might pose a problem in terms of security. The Agency went to the Commissioner of the Internal Revenue Service and indicated that they would like to have the Commission conduct the audit and have the audit done by a team on an unwitting basis to see what they could find out. "We thought it would be a good test of the security of our arrangements."

> They put a very bright young fellow on and he went into it. They came up with discrepancies and things that would be settled in the normal tax argument, corporate-IRS argument, and all of these were worked eventually, and then we went to this fellow and said, Now, this was owned and backed by the CIA, the U. S. Government. What was your guess as to what was happening?
>
> And he said, Well, I knew there was something there, and I thought, what a wonderful asset it would be for the Russians to have, but I came to the conclusion that it was Rockefeller money.

Thereafter, the IRS would be notified if it began to conduct an audit on an Agency proprietary, and the audit would be discontinued.

As the operations of Air America developed the problem of large cargo carriers arose. In the early days of its operation the airline was using C-54's, which had an extremely limited range but were able to perform notwithstanding under demanding circumstances. Discussions proceeded during that period about modernizing the equipment and the Agency, through the proprietary, bought DC-6AB's, a conversion of the DC-6, which had large cargo doors installed in it. They, however, did not maintain any jet equipment at that point. This cargo system which they developed was getting heavily into a military air transport contract system. The system was first known as MATS, and then it became MAC.

> They got MATS contracts, and Air America got these, and these were very good to keep a constant utilization at a good rate, the MATS rates were usually good, because the policy was not to do competitive bidding for the lowest bidder because then you got the poorest service, but give good rates to the carriers, and then require the carrier belong to the Civil Reserve Air Fleet.

In 1956 MATS changed its policy and required that bidders on the contracts to be certificated. Of course, there was no real way that Air America could become certificated and so the Agency decided to purchase Southern Air Transport. While it was technically a separate entity, not involved in the Air America complex, it was actually an integral part from the management point of view, in that all management decisions were centered again in George Doole and the advisory team in the Agency. MAC eventually also decided to require that bidders not only have to be certificated, but had to have equipment qualified for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and this meant jet equipment. As a result the Agency went into the acquisition of Boeing 727's. Mr. Doole eventually convinced Boeing that they should modify the 727 to enlarge the ventral exist, which was already in the plane, so that the plane would then have a large airdrop capability. Boeing did so modify the plane and it proved entirely useful for these purposes. "So the theory was that the

727's would be used on MAC contracts to be available on an overriding basis if needed for some major national security operation."

> They were used, usually when they had spare time. To my recollection, they were only called off once, off the actual contract time, and this was for a possible use which didn't go through. But the White House asked if we had the capability to move something from here to there, I think from the Philippines to somewhere in Southeast Asia, I don't recall, and so they sent word to management that they wanted a plane available at the earliest opportunity at Clark Field. They pulled one of them off the MAC contract and had it available, I think ready to go, in twelve hours, all set for the operation. And the operation was never called. But it showed what the capability was. And what they had to do was get substitute service for the MAC contract.

During the late 1960's several Chinese airline enterprises started, both of them on quite a small basis, but one of them which became CAL had official backing. This occurred while the CIA's proprietary was still flying under the flag of China. With the establishment of these indigenous Chinese nationalist airlines which would fly these routes, the Agency began to plan reducing its international carriage work. It decided it would keep the MAC contracts because this did not bother the Chinese. There was in fact no competition in this area. But plans were started to reduce the international common carriage. This Agency proprietary, Civil Air Transport Company, Ltd., which had been organized in 1954, had the right in international air auditing to negotiate for air routes. That was the entity that therefore did the common carriage. Thereafter, Air America did the American contracting followed on then by Southern Air Transport, due to its certification. Southern was brought on to perform the MAC and MATS contracts with planes leased from Air America, which included 727's. Southern Air Transport actually owned one 727 and leased two from Air America.

Houston noted that it was at this time that an internal decision was made "we probably couldn't justify this major airlift with the big jets, and so we started giving rid of them. See, they had no utilization to speak of down in Southeast Asia. A couple of supply flights went into India, and I think we used prop planes for that, to my recollection." So the Agency began to phase out the 727's. This, of course, led to the decision to divest the Agency of Southern Air Transport and eventually of Air America.

Internal management problems were assisted in 1963 by the establishment of an executive committee of the board of directors of the Pacific Company, Air America and Air Asia. The overt board of directors in New York City passed a resolution organizing an executive committee, which included Mr. Doole and two other directors. Covertly, the Agency put with that executive committee some of its representatives. This resulted in management and the Agency being represented on the executive committee of the Board, and permitted the viewpoints of management, Agency and the operators to meet in this executive committee to consider policies and make actual determinations and give guidance to the company. Houston indicated that this mechanism was extremely effective in controlling the company.

> So I think for the last, oh, fifteen, eighteen years, the proprietary management system was on the whole pretty effective fromthe Agency point of view. I think we knew what was going on. I think we were able to get things up for decisions, and if we couldn't resolve them at the staff level, we would take them up to the Director for decisions; quite different from the early days in the early 50's that I described, and the operators at least made the claim that they had the right to call the tune.

> During this period of time Operations people

> were getting themselves involved in the acquisition of aircraft and which were getting awfully damned expensive at this time, and separate projects were going after some of this expensive equipment without consideration of what might be available elsewhere to the Agency by contract or old aircraft. And so the Director of Central Intelligence set up EXCOMAIR, of which I was Chairman, and had representation from both the operation and management and finance out of the Agency, to try and coordinate the overall control and acquisition and disposition of aircraft.

Indeed, a February 5, 1963 memorandum entitled "Establishment of Executive Committee for Air Proprietary Operations," noted that the Committee was "to provide general policy guidance for the management of air proprietary projects, and review and final recommendations for approval of air proprietary project actions." Houston indicated that EXCOMAIR "was sort of an amorphous group" which tried to focus on the question of whether it reviewed the needs first and then came up with recommendations on the operational solutions, or whether the operators came up with a solution and put it through EXCOMAIR. Houston noted that EXCOMAIR worked on a very informal basis because "I knew all these people well, and I said 'Let's get together and sort these out.'" He indicated that EXCOMAIR was reasonably effective in getting overall coordination. It was responsible for making a thorough inventory of all the equipment that the Agency had in the aviation field, and by and large was able to keep track of who needed what and whether an asset was available that could take care of a problem without the necessity of acquiring a new asset.

According to Houston, a general shift in thinking at the Agency occurred between 1968 and 1972 on the desirability of their holding substantial contingent capacity of airlift. The records seem to indicate that Mr. Houston apparently convinced the Director in the early 1970's that the capacity should no longer should be retained. Houston commented on this assessment as follows:

> Through what knowledge I had of the utilization of the various assets, it seemed to me that utilization, particularly of large assets, that is, heavy flight equipment, was going down to the point where there was very little of it. Consequently, we couldn't forecast a specific requirement. Such requirements as you could forecast were highly contingent. But I also remember a couple of times putting the caveat into the Director that with a changing world and with the complications in the aviation field, once you liquidate it, you could not rebuild, and so you ought to think very, very carefully before getting rid of an asset that did have a contingent capability.

X: ISSUES POSED, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The preceding sections provide a general picture of the nature, extent, purpose, function and problems of proprietaries. Not unlike other areas of our inquiry, the issues raised were not simply black and white. They were, rather, grey in nature. During recent years, particularly at the time of the Vietnam War, serious questions were raised about this proprietary capability. Much of the accompanying criticism stemmed from a lack of understanding of their role in the scheme of both United States foreign policy and intelligence. Some of the criticism stemmed from the suspected entrance of some proprietaries into areas where they were in apparent competition with legitimate business interests, such as the airline industry. It is not unusual that there would be misunderstanding since much of what would have explained the proper role of these entities had to remain secret for innumerable reasons. But the Committee has not been stymied by that same embargo and has had a broad look into these operations.

In general, these mechanism have been operated with the utmost concern for legality, propriety and ethical standards. What slippages have occurred were in the field and generally in the area of air operators, not management. Moreover, their use and past expansion was a direct result of the demands placed upon the Agency by Presidents, Secretaries of State and the policy mechanisms of government. This is particularly true of the large air proprietary complex which was used to support paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia. The only exception to this is the investment-insurance complex which was established on Agency initiative to fill a pressing need.

A. An Overview

Using broad authority under the National Security Act of 1949, the Directors of Central Intelligence have established Government-owned business enterprises, foundations and quasi-business enterprises ("notionals") to serve a variety of intelligence and covert action purposes. Chief among those purposes have been:

1) Cover for intelligence collection and action projects. Commercial firms established in foreign countries have in the past and continue to provide plausible reasons for the presence of CIA case officers. Agency-funded foundations (e.g., the Asia Foundation) served as conduits of funds to scholars and groups doing research supporting U.S. foreign policy positions.

2) Extension of Agency influence and information network in overseas business community. The very act of establishing a firm -- e.g., an air or shipping firm -- requires banking, insurance, and other services that entail support, communications, and intimate business relationships with the bonafide American and foreign commercial world. In turn, this entails at a minimum the clearance and access of outside top management into Agency business; the relationship on occasion can entail using the Agency's commercial contacts for information or assistance.

3) Provide supporting services for covert operations. In paramilitary operations, airlife and sealift by Agency-owned carriers has many advantages -- flexibility, ability to implant photographic equipment and other sensors, etc. CIA agents, engaged in hazardous business ordinarily uninsurable, can obtain commercial insurance at standard or subsidized rates via MHMUTUAL, a conglomerate

of some 26 CIA-owned companies. In country locations where physical contact with the nearest CIA station is not operationally discreet, proprietaries can provide pay outlets and other administrative services for CIA personnel and agents. On occasion, firms based in locations with permissive corporate laws and regulations -- Liechtenstein, Panama, Delaware -- can engage in many activities unrelated to their charters. For example, insurance firms can acquire real estate surrounding targeted embassies on a non-attributed basis.

4) Actual conduct of covert action. In establishing the "radios" (Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty) in the 1950's, CIA acquired a means of directly influencing populations behind the Iron Curtain. These, of course, were eventually disposed of and placed under the aegis of the Department of State, but related enterprises, such as the book distribution program, which had operated under radio sponsorship, continued within the Agency framework.

5) Outlets for private investment. The Agency would deny that this is a purpose of proprietaries. Agency officials state that the standing policy is to prohibit the investment of operational funds of the CIA into private fields without explicit DCI authorization. Actually, the existence of proprietary enterprises which, on occasion, return sizable profits, affirms that private investment has indeed been a widespread Agency policy. Moreover, the Agency specifically has authorized MHMUTUAL to act as an institutional investor for its own and any other Agency proprietary. So the question really is one of definition and shading.

B. Size of U.S. Financial Stakes

The size and variety of U.S. Government financial stakes in CIA proprietaries has already been described in great detail. The attached Table I gives an overview of proprietary income and expenditures over the years. Some 450 proprietaries have been created over the years with 20 presently active (See Table II.) The largest sixteen proprietaries received about 80% of U.S. investment (i.e., subsidies). Accordingly, most proprietaries are shown to be small-scale operations. In many cases -- the so-called "notionals" -- the overseas proprietary actually conducts no business at all; it simply has a commercial charter, staff, and cover arrangements for Agency collection and action projects.

Table I also shows that proprietary income consists of a mixture of CIA subsidy and income. In some cases, the outside income is from sources outside the U.S. Government income -- e.g., Air America has received income for aircraft maintenance of KLM airliners in Southeast Asia. But for the most part, proprietary income is in the form of "cross-orders," from CIA and other Government Agencies. . For example, the CIA paramilitary project in the Congo placed orders for aircraft engines and pilot services with Intermountain Aviation, Inc. As an example of order placed by other U.S. Government Agencies, AID contracted with Air America to carry rice shipments in Laos. In this sense, many proprietaries are analagous to what are called "intragovernmental funds" or "industrial funds" in traditional U.S. Government budget and accounting terms.

Table I shows, and as we remarked previously, that compared with earlier years, the size of proprietary expenditures has markedly declined. The potential for future expansion is nevertheless present.

Indeed, new proprietaries have been formed within the last several years.

In terms of U.S. budgetary impact, Table I indicates that proprietaries do not add much new capital to CIA available resources -- i.e., while they have a very large expenditure level and momentum over the years, the "cross-order" phenomenon means that most of these expenditures originated in CIA and other U.S. Government appropriations and that net profits generated by outside business or investment have been relatively small. On the other hand, another way of interpreting the figures is to observe that nearly half the $1.6 billion gross income of CIA proprietaries has been supplied by sources outside CIA.

Table II shows the pattern of income, expense, and net U.S. investment for the twenty largest proprietaries now active, reviewing their financial experience in the twelve months preceding June 30, 1975, or the indicated reference date. The two biggest proprietaries, Air America and MHMUTUAL, are seen to dwarf the others. Air America will be phased out by June 30, 1976, ending CIA's owned airlift and returning an estimated $20 million to the U.S. Treasury. MHMUTUAL will continue.

Today, the CIA operates 45 major proprietaries, of which 25 are in the process of liquidation. The 16 biggest proprietaries did a gross total of $4 million business in 1975, compared with an average volume of $75 million annually in the heyday period of proprietaries, 1967-1973, exclusive of CIA subsidies. On the subsidy front, the contrast is equally striking: no net subsidy in 1975 vs. $26 million annual subsidy in the 1967-73 period. Put differently, if these sixteen biggest proprietaries had operated throughout the 1967-1973 period at the level of gross income of all kinds realized in 1975 ($4 million), the total gross income would have aggregated $116 million. Actually, the CIA reports that for this for this period gross income aggregated at $1,606 million. By this measure, CIA's biggest proprietaries are shadows of their former selves; their annual gross income of $4 million is about one-fourteenth of the average gross annual income of $55 million during the 29-year span. Shrinkage would be even greater if these figures were adjusted for the effect of inflation.

The chief impact is decline of the bigger air proprietaries. The Agency estimates that of some $761 million of outside income, at least $658 million was generated by Air America ($559 million) and Southern Air Transport ($99 million), in the period from incep-to 1975. As late as 1974, these two airlines were garnering some $50 million in outside contracts. With their disposal, total CIA proprietary annual outside income in 1975 therefore shrinks to the cited $4 million level. Most of this residual is represented by MHMUTUAL, the insurance investment complex, where Agency investment are generating an outside income of about $3.5 million annually.

In programmatic terms, this contrast of today and yesterday reflects the decline of paramilitary operations in Southeast Asia. Large volumes of outside orders by Defense and AID, along with sizable levies by CIA components and some maintenance and passenger income from commercial operations, had been generated by a covert war. In turn, these operations had their echoes in Agency air support for the Congo, Cuba, and other areas. Looking toward the future, will new air proprietaries be established? The CIA thinks not -- but the matter is not resolved as discussion below indicates. Ultimately the program question is whether there will be future U.S. involvement in covert wars -- and whether, if so, some substitute for CIA-owned air support can meet the operational requirements of secure, well-maintained local aircraft in place, with responsive schedules and capacity to gather a limited amount of signals and imagery intelligence. The Chief of CSS ventured the possibility that third-country assets could be used. Another possibility is use of U.S. military aircraft, overtly or "sanitized".

One thing became clear: CIA sees itself as entering a different era of proprietaries. It has rejected the long-held doctrine of "stand-by" capability -- i.e., the notion that it is worth investing considerable capital and operating resources in airlift, sealift, and other assets primarily targeted toward contingency requirements. Instead, assert the Agency representatives, CIA is keeping today's and tomorrow's proprietaries strictly centered on current operational tasks. The test of retention is the utility of a proprietary in carrying out assigned roles instrumental in approved Agency projects.

This concept can be examined by listing the twenty major proprietaries which the Agency says will survive into the post-1976 time frame:

Code Name	Latest 12-mo. Earned Income ($000)
LPBERRY	$43
LPROE/PIKE	139
PDPORTAL	5
BASTE	($1,250 subsidy)
BASIC	(1,126 subsidy)
PDLEDGER	102
PDDYNAMIC	35
TENURE	($199 subsidy)
TERRACE	(76 subsidy)

VWCADENZA	(36 subsidy)
MHBOUND	(432 subsidy)
KMJAGUARO/JAGGERY	809
QRMYSTIC/CYNIC	($10 subsidy)
WUDIRK	0
XIPHOID	($ 191 subisdy)
BACH	(50 subsidy)
KNOX	(50 subsidy)
LPHOCUS	22
LPBYZAS/B	2
LPPANDA	21
CHAIR/A	(4 subsidy)
REMEDY	21
MHMUTUAL	(consolidation of 21 firms) $3,560
LPSUGAR	34 (plus $35 subsidy)

The above listing covers only the 20 biggest proprietaries which currently operate and which will survive liquidation. It excludes 25 major proprietaries currently operational but being phased out -- such as Air America and other airlift.

What does the whole picture of currently operated proprietaries look like? How many and by what major types?

The Numbers of CIA Proprietaries, by type,
as of July, 1974 are:

Operating proprietaries (includes 21 props. in MUTUAL insurance complex)	71
Non-operating proprietaries	38
Devised facilities	31
Devised facilities/Notionals ("DFN"'s)	61
Subtotal, externally registered	201
Notionals -- no external registration; Identity and financing wholly within CIA control	215
Grand total, current proprietaries	416

Generally, the notionals have increased in number by about 30% since the current CCS chief's takeover of Cover operations in 1967. This reflects a policy of increasing the number of cutout arrangements to increase security -- i.e., reduce likelihood of outside discovery of the identity of agents or case officers working under cover of the end-point notional by introducing intermediate notionals for payments or identity backstops.

What does this table tell us about basic distinctions of one type of proprietary from another? First, it indicates that external registration divides the pot in half. Those which have some form of legal standing with U.S. (State, local) and foreign corporate regulatory and tax authorities are subject to external governmental scrutiny. This occasions additonal expense and manpower to assure that in all respects this group of proprietaries behaves in accordance with local law and commercial expectations. The second group -- the notionals -- exist only as names on doors and phone directories and stationery, with backstopping for identification provided by Agency switchboards, mailstops, and check issuance.

The next level of distinction is within the class of legally registered proprietaries: those which carry on a commercial income-producing operation and those which are simply cover arrangements, with at most a bank account and an attorney backstopping calls and mail. The latter are shown in the table above as "devised faciltiies" and "DFN"'s.

Within the class of commercial, income--productive proprietaries, there is a distinction between those which are wholly dependent upon

CIA income in the form of orders placed and/or subsidies; and those which have mixed outside and inside income.

Even for those with mixed income, it is possible over the years to distinguish those which have outside income wholly within the U.S. Government (i.e., a mix of CIA-derived income and income from other Government agencies) and those which have both U.S. Government income and income from private contracts.

C. Visibility in the Budget

Accountability to the President and Congress depends in budget review upon the extent to which the Federal agencies' budget review upon the extent to which the Federal agencies' budget requests provide enough information to make possible well-formed judgments. Therefore, Circular A-11, issued by the Office of Management and Budget, prescribes the financial schedules and analytical and explanatory supporting data which all Federal agencies must provide in their budget submissions, consistent with the Budget and Accounting Acts of 1920 and 1950 as amended.

The Central Intelligence Agency regards itself as subject to these prescriptions. The Agency limits its application of this principle, however to provision of such A-11 materials as OMB and the Congress ask for.

With regard to proprietaries, this policy has resulted in near invisibility of proprietaries in the CIA budget submission. Circular A-11 requires agencies to provide schedules and narrative for each public enterprise or intragovernmental fund. The utility of such data is to reveal all sources of funding, purposes and levels of expenditure, and at least approximate indications of performance through comparisons of past and proposed funding by activity. As applied to proprietaries, the CIA, perhaps, should have been providing a whole family of schedules for the proprietaries which actually do business (i.e., excluding "notionals.")

Then, there is the question of the program impact of proprietaries. Table I indicates that proprietaries in fact have been heavily involved in CIA intelligence collection and covert action. None of this is shown in the CIA budget submission. Yet a bona-fide policy review of the budget requires programmatic judgments of the necessity and appropriate use of proprietaries in overseas areas.

The Angolan question has brought into sharp focus the role of the CIA's Contingency Reserve. All U.S. aid to forces in Angola came from this fund. The only place in the budgets of CIA where proprietaries have taken on even a limited visibility is in those years when supplemental financing was needed to establish or strengthen a proprietary. The budget then shows, tersely, that for a past year or for completed portions of the current years that Contingency Reserve drawdowns had been made for such purposes. For example, one past budget showed a certain amount for "RFE," meaning a subsidy for Radio Free Europe, but providing no justification materials. In turn, this practice reflects the unwritten, post-hoc nature of the Contingency Reserve financing process -- in effect, an Executive Branch supplemental in which Congress is informed after the OMB has acted. The budget does not normally indicate Agency intentions to create or establish a proprietary in the budget year ahead. For any other Federal agency, the notion of establishing a new publicly owned enterprise without advance notice to the Appropriations and substantive committees of Congress would be proscribed.

For the small-scale proprietaries, those which require small subsidies to get underway, CIA is able to launch them without supplemental financing -- i.e., within its regular budget -- and, therefore, these remain completely invisible in the Agency budget submission.

D. Some General Considerations

a. The relationship of utility to size: The evidence established a dilemma faced by CIA planners who recognize that proprietaries can sometimes be most effective operationally when they are large; indeed, as in Laos, there can be a thrust toward enormity imposed by the very nature of the operation. The dilemma is that large size conflicts with deniability: In areas of the world or types of activity where there is little commercial appeal or few operating commercial firms, where would large-scale enterprises get financing but from the U.S. Government? Laotion operations actually could not be covered in the end. The experience suggests that proprietaries may have limited utility for paramilitary operations in the future.

b. The factor of competition with private enterprises. Do CIA proprietaries of the income-producing class unfairly compete with private U.S. businesses, both with regard to their Government financing and their secrecy? Is the utility to the Government of such a kind and of such magnitude that CIA proprietaries should be retained regardless of their competitive impact? Generally, the CIA believes that CIA operating proprietaries do not compete with U.S. private enterprise because they tend to do things which the latter are not equipped, motivated, or staffed to perform. For example, CIA proprietaries purchase weapons and foreign armaments and technical devices; conduct security clearances; purchase real estate; insure uninsurable risks; train foreign policy forces; run airlines in remote areas or on commercially unattractive routes. Would private enterprise do any or all of these things; It is true that private enterprise does a lot of similar activity under contract to the Government, including highly sensitive contracts for CIA in technical intelligence collection and research and development. If CIA scrapped its proprietaries and coopted private firms, suitably cleared, would this be more desirable in policy terms? In economy? In operational flexibility?

c. Relative scarcity of commercial and official cover. The continuing push of CIA for notionals reflects the scarcity of U.S. Government official cover in many areas of the world, the developing desire of U.S. companies not to cooperate.

Some question concerning profits have been raised. Does proprietary profit constitute a significant add-on to the resources available to CIA? How is such profit treated in the budget? How is it controlled? How can the Congress (or the President, for that matter) be sure that proprietary profits are not siphoned off to accomplish projects not countenanced by the regular CIA budget?

First, profits (defined as net income to a proprietary after coverage of operating expenses) are relatively small. Even in the days when the most profitable air proprietaries were at full swing, the most that any single firm netted was $3.9 million (Air America in 1967). Over the entire period 1947-1975, total profits have been $50 million, an average of about $1.6 million annually, for the 16 biggest CIA proprietaries. And in these years, a net loss was sustained three times -- $2.5 million in 1971, $0.5 million in 1973, and $0.3 million in 1975. Looking to the future, after liquidation of the air proprietaries has been completed, there is forecast to be only one profitable proprietary: MHMUTUAL a complex of insurance, reinsurance and, and escrow-holding companies which derives most of its profit from investment portfolios. MUTUAL's net income in 1974 was $1.8 million and this general magnitude of profit is expected in the foreseeable future.

As for treatment in the budget, there is both a policy and procedural aspect. The policy of CIA has changed; in February, 1975 the General Counsel of CIA ruled that profits of proprietaries and proceeds of liquidation must be returned to the Treasury as miscellaneous receipts and cannot be used to augment the Contingency Reserve or otherwise be applied to CIA operations. This ruling overturned the practice of the past which, on the few occasions where profits were not applied to augment net worth of proprietaries --i.e., plowed back into the enterprise or investment portfolios--, was to apply proprietary net proceeds to the Contingency Reserve for later release to operations.

The budgetary presentation and review procedures only partially focus upon proprietary profits. MUTUAL's profits are invisible in the Agency budget; they are taken into account and subject to scrutiny only within CIA; operationally, the DDO annual operational review has the most detailed grasp of MUTUAL at the Agency review levels. A stadard set of public enterprise fund schedules, as prescribed by OMB Circular A-11, would be appropriate for making MUTUAL visible in the Agency budget. Other commercial proprietaries should show these schedules as well. The Agency has indicated that the Comptroller is working with DDO and DDA to develop a new style and content of budgetary presentation and review procedures for CIA proprietaries in future budgets.

To what extent can these new procedures prevent abuses of proprietary profits? To what extent do they preclude the need for legislation in this area? What form of Congressional oversight is needed here-- at what point should Congress exert control? Improvement of visibility in the budget of proprietary resources and provision for review of the major proprietaries as a regular part of budget review by CIA, OMB, and Congressional Committees would seem to preclude most of the dangers of abuse. On the other hand, there is one type of abuse for which additional Congressional scrutiny and safeguards may be needed: the possibility of a small-scale, high-risk covert project directed by the President or DCI which is not covered by the regular appropriation but financed by proprietary profits. No foolproof preventives can be designed by law or regulation; nevertheless, the possibility of such abuse or avoidance of Congressional review can be minimized by requiring that all CIA proprietaries have an operational charter approved by Congress which forbids launcing activities by proprietaries or using their funds which are contrary to the charter. This internal CIA standard would probably strengthen the existing requirement that covert action projects be certified by the President and flagged to Congressional Committees. At present, MHMUTUAL has such a charter (not reviewed or set by Congress) which restricts MUTUAL to insurance operations. This charter was established in 1974 (called an "Administrative Plan") and must be formally amended before the Chief of Cover Staff will authorize use of MUTUAL resources for other missions.

D. Private Investment by CIA.

The authority of the Agency to engage in private investments and its general policy ambivalence on this matter already have been noted. Two types of general as well as budget issues are presented, one the inverse of the other: 1) Could or should CIA engage in investments which could accumulate funds outside the budget process and hence be available for operations that have not public scrutiny outside CIA? 2) Is CIA investment policy too restrictive in regard to bank deposits? Specifically, should CIA place large amounts of money in private banks without charging interest? Some 20% of its annual $1.2 billion of appropriated and advanced funds goes into private deposit here and abroad, with year-end balances of about $150 million and average deposits considerably greater. The banks selected get an interest or investment bonus. Their selection is non-competitive, rooted in historic circumstance, albeit in institutions that have shown themselves flexible and responsive in providing the Agency services. Much more investigation is needed here and we encourage the new oversight committee to study this issue in greater detail than we have been able. Probably this is one area where exclusion of the General Accounting Office from CIA audits has had an unfortunate effect: Whether or not there has been abuse, there is no outside reviewer of a complex set of financial records and relationships and consequently the question of confidence in the Agency's role in this area may have been eroded.

What is the future for proprietaries?

Discussion on these questions already has been covered in part. No new proprietaries are in formation or planned. This past fiscal year, 1975, one new proprietary was created to purchase a site for the new location of the New York CIA base; it serves as a real estate holding company or lessor for land and building.

The main provison for new growth is the plan of some years standing for establishment in MHMUTUAL of several corporate "shells" -- legally constituted and registered companies that do very little commercial business but which can be adapted to various new CIA missions. To adapt to these new missions, as noted, would require CIA to amend the MUTUAL Administrative Plan. But this could be done quickly; the existence of the shells avoids the leadtime of creating new corporate entities, with all the complications of local laws and risk of exposure.

While CIA proprietaries are small today compared with yesterday, they are so largely for administrative reasons-- i.e., responsive to Executive Branch direction. In this sense, there is no reason in law, although there may well not be another era or set of occasions when CIA will find proprietary expansion to be operationally desirable. The Congress should be a partner in the process of reviewing such expansion, if it should occur, by providing for changes in the charter process. Another approach is the setting of substantive guidelines for proprietary operation. This approach is typified by the post-Katzenbach guidelines that prohibit CIA operation of tax-exempt foundations.

Lawrence R. Houston, the former General Counsel of the Agency, was intimately involved with all of the proprietaries for his entire tenure with CIA. Consequently, his views have been invaluable to the Committee in reviewing and evaluating the history and the role of these mechanisms. In the course of a far-ranging interview with the Committee Houston concluded that proprietaries "should be the last resort for use to backstop Agency activities." He grounded this opinion on the fact that:

> they are cumbersome. To be properly run they take many, many man-hours of many, many different parts of the Agency, so they are expensive in man-hours. There are built-in difficulties in running what appears to be a normal business for operational purposes. There's really a built-in dichotomy there that leads to a continual conflict with policies. And due to the number of people involved, there is a security problem on the old grounds that security doesn't go by the mathematical increase in the number of people. It goes geometrically as to the number of people, the security risk.

This assessment seems correct based on all the evidence.

The current Director of Central Intelligence has insisted on the streamlining of such operations, and is keenly aware of the potential for abuse. (See appendix F). It is, for example, the current written policy of the Agency that "to the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations."

In the one area of continuing large-scale activity, the investment complex, the Director has moved to insure propriety even in an area where there is no evidence that any illegal conduct has occurred. The current policy, established as of June 1975 is:

> Project MHMUTUAL will be operated in conformance with appropriate legal restrictions. Arrangements are being made for the briefing of the appropriate Congressional committees. Particular attention will be given to avoiding any possible conflict of interest situations with firms with which the Agency has contracts. Particular concern will also be exhibited over possible improper influence on the stock market or stock dealings through the investments involved in MHMUTUAL.

The Committee is mindful of the potential danger inherent in such operations. Therefore, it recommends that the review of this and other similar projects by the appropriate oversight Committees be stringent in the extreme.

The disposal of proprietaries has also generally proceeded along legal and ethical lines with more than due concern for conflicts of interest. Most notable in this spectrum of actions was the degree to which the Agency tried and did in fact avoid any conflicts of interest when it sold off Southern Air Transport. Such internal vigilance no doubt should and will continue. Moreover, with the establishment of a permanent oversight committee, the CIA's job in this regard will be made easier because it will be able to report on its dealings on a regular basis and avoid criticism.

SECRET

TABLE I

SUMMARY OF 16 MAJOR PROPRIETARIES BY YEAR REFLECTING APPROXIMATELY 80% OF TOTAL FUNDS *

	DIRECT FUNDING SUBSIDY	OTHER INCOME AGENCY CONTRACTS	OTHER INCOME OUTSIDE OF AGENCY	GROSS TOTAL	TOTAL EXPENSES	NET
Inception through 1964	$378,596,533	$ 13,298,782	$236,372,776	$ 628,268,091	$ 600,174,573	$28,093,518
1965	44,549,432	7,824,682	35,324,243	87,698,357	74,697,484	13,000,873
1966	36,917,328	15,487,306	46,189,505	98,594,139	94,713,002	3,881,137
1967	48,416,970	21,476,541	69,625,534	139,519,045	134,622,493	4,896,552
1968	30,252,926	21,876,197	61,385,548	113,514,671	111,330,900	2,183,771
1969	35,385,835	22,375,362	57,313,623	115,074,820	110,304,688	4,770,132
1970	32,674,350	20,134,250	57,214,126	110,022,726	108,871,504	1,151,222
1971	34,073,032	23,968,141	48,967,610	107,008,783	109,535,656	(2,526,873)
1972	1,212,896	28,525,628	45,433,428	75,171,952	70,254,485	4,917,467
1973	2,367,008	21,124,434	53,480,302	76,971,744	77,470,477	(498,733)
1974	327,181	14,240,049	45,524,446	60,091,676	60,033,050	58,626
1975	(275,382) **	208,527	4,034,699	3,967,844	4,290,926	(323,082)
TOTALS	$644,498,109	$210,539,809	$760,865,840	$1,615,903,848	$1,556,299,238	$59,604,610

* This information has been extrapolated from a number of sources and represents the best approximation we can make based upon the time and information available.

** No Agency funding during 1975; this credit represents miscellaneous accounting adjustments.

SECRET

SECRET

5c

TABLE II

ACTIVE MAJOR HEADQUARTERS CONTROLLED PROPRIETARIES FINANCIAL CONDITION AND SUMMARY OF FUNDING, INCOME AND EXPENSES FOR TWELVE MONTH PERIODS SHOWN BELOW PER AGENCY RECORDS 30 JUNE 1975

		LPROE/	(PDPORTAL)			PDDYNAMIC				
	LPBERRY/B	LPPIKE	PDBASTE	PDBASIC	PDLEDGER	PDTENURE	PDTERRACE	VWCADENZA	[illegible]	K[illegible]
ASSETS										
Cash	$ 26,190	$ 34,674	$ 279,887	$ 319,660	$ 104,068	$ 49,555	$ 26,288	$ 621	$ 517,969	$ 44,4
Investments					676					153,7
Other Assets	9,482	13,043	6,063	36,159	17,385	6,209			42,575	101,6
Fixed Assets	1,408	6,503	7,113	14,828	10,286	5,788		1,056	13,908	4,
Total Assets	$ 37,080	$ 54,220	$ 293,063	$ 370,647	$ 132,415	$ 61,552	$ 26,288	$ 1,677	$ 574,452	$303,8
LIABILITIES	$ 923	$ 131	$ 142	$ 60,063	$ 41,010	$ 1,934	$ -0-	$ 174	$ 1,229	$ 1,8
NET WORTH										
Investment	$383,699	$218,464	$6,039,344	$4,357,743	$ 812,365	$823,448	$257,441	$235,716	$5,036,126	$ 5,0
Gains & (Losses)	(352,542)	(164,375)	(5,746,423)	(4,047,159)	(720,960)	(763,830)	(231,153)	(234,213)	(4,462,903)	297,0
	$ 36,157	$ 54,089	$ 292,921	$ 310,584	$ 91,405	$ 59,618	$ 26,288	$ 1,503	$ 573,223	$302,0
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH	$ 37,080	$ 54,220	$ 293,063	$ 370,647	$ 132,415	$ 61,552	$ 26,288	$ 1,677	$ 574,452	$303,8
ACTIVITY FOR TWELVE MONTHS ENDED	3/31/75	6/30/75	3/31/75	6/30/75	12/21/74	6/30/75	6/30/75	3/31/75	6/30/75	6/30/
Funding	$ 47,112	$ 51,120	$1,250,000	$1,126,500	$ 206,000	$197,200	$ 76,000	$ 36,150	$ 431,718	$ -0-
Income - Other Agency Sources	$ 3,685	$ -0-	$ 10	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ 1,885	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ -0-	$807,7
Income - Outside Commercial	$ 40,541	$139,428	$ -0-	$ 4,839	$ 102,363	$ -0-	$ 35,483	$ -0-	$ 5,610(a)	$ -0-
Expenses	$ 43,215	$217,484	$1,015,866	$1,145,936	$ 322,432	$190,526	$104,728	$ 44,266	$ 463,058	$793,9
	(***)		(***) (****)	(****)	(***)			(***)		

NOTES: (a) Interest Income

(*) New projects, no financial statements submitted to date, figures are for one quarter.
(**) Consolidated figures not available.
(***) Latest period for which financial statements have been submitted.
(****) PDBASTE and PDBASIC are being consolidated into one (1) entity, PDPORTAL.

TABLE II

ACTIVE MAJOR HEADQUARTERS CONTROLLED PROPRIETARIES FINANCIAL CONDITION AND SUMMARY OF FUNDING, INCOME AND EXPENSES FOR TWELVE MONTH PERIODS SHOWN BELOW PER AGENCY RECORDS 30 JUNE 1975

	QRMYSTIC/	WUDIRK					LPPANDA		(Consolidated)	
	QRCYNIC	WUXIPHOID	WUBACH	WUKNOX	LPHCCUS	LPBYZAS/B	LPGKAIR/A	LPREMEDY	MHMUTUAL	LPSUGAR
ASSETS										
Cash	$ 3,974	$ 17,757	$50,525	$50,000	$ 7,000	$ 7,954	$ 2,770	$ 7,548	$ 177,158	$ 44,379
Investments						385,984			29,577,012	
Other Assets	500	2,296			24,348	37,581		13,172	1,531,315	808
Fixed Assets	627	11,074			3,052	1,636		1,826	69,953	1,507
Total Assets	$ 5,101	$ 31,127	$50,525	$50,000	$34,400	$433,155	$ 2,770	$ 22,546	$31,355,438	$ 46,694
LIABILITIES	$ 11	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ 2,700	$ 3,766	$ -0-	$ 10,831	$17,243,754	$ 4,269
NET WORTH										
Investments	$79,657	$296,000	$50,525	$50,000	$945,000	$442,832	$376,345	$116,081	$ (**)	$624,619
Gains & (Losses)	(74,567)	(264,873)			(913,300)	(13,443)	(373,575)	(104,366)	(**)	(582,194)
	$ 5,090	$ 31,127	$50,525	$50,000	$ 31,700	$429,389	$ 2,770	$ 11,715	$14,11[illegible]	$ 42,425
TOTAL LIABILITIES AND NET WORTH	$ 5,101	$ 31,127	$50,525	$50,000	$ 34,400	$433,155	$ 2,770	$ 22,546	$31,355,438	$ 46,694
ACTIVITY FOR TWELVE MONTHS ENDED	6/30/75	3/31/75	6/30/75	6/30/75	6/30/75	12/31/74	6/30/75	6/30/75	6/30/75	6/30/75
Funding	$10,000	$191,000	$50,525	$50,000	$ 76,213	$ -0-	$ 3,965	$ 27,465	$ 107,413	$ 35,200
Income - Other Agency Sources	$ -0-	$ 230	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ 22,252	$ -0-	$ -0-	$15,000	$ -0-	$ 29,675
Income - Outside Commercial	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ 2,289(a)	$ -0-	$ 6,167	$ 3,560,406(b)	$ 5,425
Expenses	$13,745	$190,800	$ -0-	$ -0-	$ 99,600	$ 12,738	$ 2,415	$50,189	$ 2,110,521	$ 77,[illegible]
		(***)	(*)	(*)		(***)				

NOTES:
(a) Interest Income
(b) Includes $423,902.00 in insurance premiums from other Agency components

(*) New projects, no financial statements submitted to date, figures are for one quarter.
(**) Consolidated figures not available.
(***) Latest period for which financial statements have bee submitted.
(****) PDBASTE and PDBASIC are being consolidated into one (1) entity, PDPORTAL.

Annex A

Memorandum of Law

Legal Authority to Dispose of a Proprietary

January 1974

REC[illegible] FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

DOES THE CIA POSSESS THE LEGAL AUTHORITY TO SELL A WHOLLY-OWNED GOVERNMENT AIRLINE WITHOUT RECOURSE TO THE FEDERAL PROPERTY AND ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES ACT OF 1949, AS AMENDED?

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

I. FACTS

There exist two airline corporations wholly owned by the United States Government, which corporations were purchased by, and are under the direct control of, the Central Intelligence Agency. Ownersh of the corporations was acquired by means of appropriated funds expended by the Agency under its confidential funds authority, the procurements thus being made outside of the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act. Both corporations were created by the Agency to assist it in fulfilling its statutory responsibilities and, over the years, both have engaged in many sensitive support activities in the furtherance of the national security of the United States. It has been widely reported in unclassified media that the Central Intelligence Agency on behalf of the United States Government i the de facto owner of the corporations. Notwithstanding, that ownership is still a classified fact. The activities and missions of these corporations in support of the national security of the United States would have been impossible if United States Government ownership had been officially admitted. Within this context it is the statutory responsibility of the Direc of Central Intelligence to protect the overt commercial posture of these corporations and the classified nature of certain of their activities. Now the Director has determined that the corporations are no longer required by the Agency in the discharge of its responsibilities, that they are excess to Agency requirements, and he has directed that they be disposed of either by sale or liquidation.

II. STATUTES

The Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, as amended, (40 U.S.C.A. 471 et seq., hereinafter referred to as "the Act"), is in general the controlling statute insofar as Government propert is procured, used and disposed of:

> It is the intent of the Congress in enacting this legislation to provide for the Government an economical and efficient system for (a) the procurement and supply of personal property and nonpersonal services, including related functions such as contracting, inspection, storage, issue, specifications, property identification and classification, transportation and traffic management, establishment of pools or systems for transportation of Government personnel and property by motor vehicle within specific areas, management of public utility services, repairing and converting, establishment of inventory levels, establishment of forms and procedures, and representation before Federal and State regulatory bodies; (b) the utilization of available property; (c) the disposal of surplus property; and (d) records management. 40 U.S.C.A. 471.

As an executive agency, the Central Intelligence Agency is within the purv of the Act (40 U.S.C.A. 472; 481), but along with a number of other agenc and activities, it was exempted from the Act:

Congress, departments, agencies, corporations and persons exempted from provisions

RE FROM
OCT 30 1975

* * *

Nothing in this Act shall impair or affect any authority of—

* * *

(17) the Central Intelligence Agency; . . . .
40 U.S.C.A. 474(17).

The Act's legislative history provides an insight into the breadt of the exemption and, to a limited degree, Congress' intent for giving it.

> Special exemptions from the act.—This subsection exempts from operations under the act a number of activities requiring special treatment. Chief among these are programs for price support, stabilization, grants to farmers, and foreign aid; procurement procedures under the Armed Services Procurement Act of 1947. . . ; the stock-piling of critical materials; the national school lunch program; the Housing and Home Finance Agency with respect to the disposal of residential property; the Atomic Energy Commission; and the Central Intelligence Agency.
>
> It is not intended by these exemptions that those administering the agencies or programs listed shall be free from all obligation to comply with the provisions of the act or from all jurisdiction of the Administrator. On the contrary, it is expected that they will as far as practicable procure, utilize, and dispose of property in accordance with the provisions of the act and the regulations issued thereunder, particularly so far as common-use items and administrative supplies are concerned. Likewise, it is intended that the Administrator shall have full authority, with respect to the agencies or programs mentioned, to make surveys of, and obtain reports on, property and property-management practices, to cooperate in the establishment of inventory levels, and to report excessive stocking, in accordance with the provisions of section 206 (a) (1) and (2).

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 20 1975
CIA

> In other words, to the extent that compliance with the act and submission to the jurisdiction of the Administrator will not so 'impair or affect the authority' of the several agencies to which the subsection applies as to interfere with the operation of their programs, the act will govern. Any disputes that arise can be settled by the President under the authority to prescribe policies and directives vested in him by section 205 (a). U.S. Code Congressional Service, 1949, Vol. 2, p. 1504. (emphasis added)

One authority of the Central Intelligence Agency which complete application of the Act would "impair or affect" is clearly the Agency's authority to expend confidential funds.

> The sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; and for objects of a confidential, extraordinary, or emergency nature, such expenditures to be accounted for solely on the certificate of the Director and every such certificate shall be deemed a sufficient voucher for the amount therein certified. Sec. 8(b), CIA Act of 1949, as amended; 50 U.S.C.A. 403j(b).

The CIA Act of 1949 (63 Stat. 208, P.L. 81-110) became effective June 20, 1949; the Act (63 Stat. 378, P.L. 81-152), July 1, 1949.

The question of law thus presented is: In selling and disposing of the two airline corporations, must the Agency adhere to the Act and submit to the jurisdiction of the Administrator, General Services Administration?

D FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

III. ARGUMENT

The broad authority afforded the Agency by Section 8(b), supra, is conclusive—"(t)he sums made available to the Agency may be expended without regard to the provisions of law and regulations relating to the expenditure of Government funds; ...." That authority is enhanced, not limited, by the Act—"(N)othing shall impair or affect the authority of— ... the Central Intelligence Agency", and by the Act's legislative history. It follows naturally that the Agency's authority to procure on a confidential basis without recourse to the Act inherently carries with it the authority to dispose on a confidential basis without recourse to the Act. By way of an extreme hypothetical, suppose the Agency had procured a Soviet weapons system, without Soviet knowledge. Using Section 8(b) authority, it had expended funds through a secure facility for the procurement and brought the system to this country where it was studied and tested. By virtue of the testing the Government was able to develop electronic counter measures which would effectively nullity the system. Upon a determinatio that the system is of no further use, can it be seriously argued that its disposition by the Agency should be anything other than confidential? The purchase was confidential; possession of it by the United States Governmen was confidential; and, the knowledge gained and the countermeasures developed are confidential. To hold otherwise would render the intended purpose of Section 8(b) a nullity.

R[illegible]D FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

The short expression of Congressional intent found in the Act's legislative history supports the view that the Agency's activities in the confidential funds area are not within the purview of the Act. "As far as practicable..." procurement, use and disposition should be "...in accord with the provisions of the Act...particularly so far as common-use items and administrative supplies are concerned." It is suggested that a Government-owned, but overtly commercial, airline used in support of foreign intelligence activities does not fall within a "common-use items and administrative supplies" categorization. Similarly, if the last paragraph of legislative history (emphasized portion) quoted above is read in the negative, the proposition becomes clear. "...(T)he act will...(not)... govern...(if)...compliance with the act and submission to the jurisdiction of the Administrator will...'impair or affect the authority' of the several agencies to which the subsection applies as to interfere with the operation of their programs...." Were the Agency required to comply with the Act and submit to the jurisdiction of the Administrator in the exercise of its confidential funds authority, not only would that authority be impaire or affected, but many of the Agency's most significant statutory authoritie and responsibilities would be frustrated.

R) FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

In looking at CIA's express authority to procure on a confidenti basis and examining the nature of its implied authority to dispose, genera statements on the rules of statutory construction are helpful. For example:

> Where a statute confers powers or duties in general terms, all powers and duties incidental and necessary to make such legislation effective are included by implication. Thus it has been stated, 'An express statutory grant of power or the imposition of a definite duty carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, authority to employ all the means that are usually employed and that are necessary to the exercise of the power or the performance of the duty.... That which is clearly implied is as much a part of a law as that which is expressed.'
>
> * * *
>
> The rule whereby a statute is, by necessary implication, extended has been most frequently applied in the construction of laws delegating powers to public officers and administrative agencies.... Thus where the power to create an office is granted, the power to abolish it will be implied, and where an administrative body is given power to enact regulations or exercise quasi-judicial power, the power to provide for internal rules of procedure will be implied.... The power of a municipality to sue and be sued was held to imply the power to employ special counsel for those purposes although the city had a regular salaried attorney. A municipality, empowered by statute to construct sewers for the preservation of the public health, interest and convenience, was permitted to construct a protecting wall and pumping plant which were unnecessary for the proper working of the sewer, but were essential to public health. Sutherland Statutory Construction § 5402.

R D FROM
OCT 30 1975

Similarly,

> . . . (I)t has been held that an express statutory grant of a right, power or privilege carries with it by implication, in the absence of a limitation, all the means that are usually employed and that are necessary and proper to the exercise or enjoyment of the right, power or privilege granted. In such case, the power necessarily implied is a part of the legislative act. There is even authority in support of the rule that power in a statutory grant may be implied although it is not indispensible to the exercise of the powers granted. . . . 50 Am. Jur., Statutes § 428.

Cases which speak to the subject of implied statutory powers are abundant. In Schmiedigen v. Celebrezze, Judge Holtzoff held that: "(I)t is a well established principle of statutory construction that every legislative enactment must receive a sensible and reasonable constructio that would effectuate its purposes. If a strict, literal interpretation woul frustrate the objective of the legislative body and would lead to an absurd or futile result, it must be avoided." 245 F. Supp. 825, 827 (1965). In U. S. v. Jones, where a statute gave federal officers the power to enforce compliance with the law but was silent on the power to arrest the court stated:

> So, though the term arrest is not used in the statute, the language employed necessarily implies that such power was included.

REC [illegible] OM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

> Necessary implication refers to a logical necessity; it means that no other interpretation is permitted by the words of the Acts construed; and so has been defined as an implication which results from so strong a probability of intention that an intention contrary to that imputed cannot be supported. The term is used where the intention with regard to the subject matter may not be manifested by explicit and direct words, but is gathered by implication or necessary deduction from the circumstances and the general language.

> Consequently that which is implied in a statute is as much a part of it as that which is expressed, for a statutory grant of a power carries with it, by implication, everything necessary to carry out the power and make it effectual and complete. 204 F. 2d 745, 754 (1953); certiorari denied, 98 L. Ed. 368; rehearing denied, 98 L. Ed. 404.

IV. CONCLUSION

Adherence to the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act in disposing of the two airline corporations would do far more than impair or affect Agency programs. It would endanger the national security which the statutory authorities available to the Agency were designed to protect. The Central Intelligence Agency, because of the unique statutory

R [illegible] ROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

grant provided it in Section 8(b) of the CIA Act, and because of the unique nature of its statutory responsibilities, possesses both the express powe to procure property confidentially without recourse to the Act and the implied power to dispose of property confidentially without recourse to th Act.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED

Gary M

Gary M. Breneman
Assistant General Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency

R OM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

Annex B

HR 230-8 and HHB 230-1

Concerning Regulation and Administration of Agency's Proprietaries

RE[illegible] OM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

8. ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS, LIQUIDATION PLANS, AND FISCAL ANNEXES

a. GENERAL

(1) In the furtherance of some Agency objectives it is necessary to establish, operate and support overt instrumentalities which do not have ostensible affiliation with the U.S. Government. These ostensibly private organizations which may be susceptible to scrutiny by a variety of tax and regulatory authorities, the press, hostile elements and others, require operational security of a high order. It is essential that they are established and managed in accordance with normal practices and requirements of the type of enterprise concerned, and that they are staffed with qualified personnel whose cover histories are compatible with such employment. It is also essential that there are adequate general management, financial and security controls consistent with both operational effectiveness and the requirements of nonattribution, for the protection of the Agency's interests.

(2) The controls and procedures which are applicable to an instrumentality will be specified in a project outline and administrative plan or fiscal annex. Standards and format for administrative plans and fiscal annexes, as well as for liquidation plans to be followed when an instrumentality is to be discontinued, are prescribed in HHB 230-1.

b. POLICY

(1) The establishment or continuance of an instrumentality is justified only when it contributes to the accomplishment of the Agency's mission and is operationally determined to be the most advantageous means of gaining a particular and necessary objective. The purpose of an instrumentality shall be to conduct secret operations or support such operations under cover of its overt function.

(2) No binding commitment with respect to the establishment of any instrumentality shall be made before the approval required by this regulation has been obtained.

c. DEFINITIONS

(1) PROJECT. A project is a management device through which specific operational activities are undertaken to meet programmed objectives. Budgeting and financial accountability are maintained against the project for funds and resources authorized for it.

(2) INSTRUMENTALITY. An instrumentality is a corporation, a foundation, partnership, sole proprietorship, or other legal entity (within the private sector, domestic or foreign) for which specific funds or other assets have been authorized under a formally approved project. Within a project there may be one or more instrumentalities.

(a) Proprietary. A proprietary is an instrumentality in which the Agency acquires ownership of a controlling interest, through appropriate nominee or legal entity arrangements. The Agency exercises, through stockholder or other equity arrangements, control of the instrumentality in terms of the policy, administration, formulation of budgets, and the application of funds.

(b) Operational Investment. An operational investment is the acquisition by the Agency of an equity in an instrumentality, through appropriate nominee or legal entity arrangements, of *less than* a controlling interest, with the expectation of recovering some or all of its investment. Any influence the Agency may exert over budget formulation and

OCT 30 1975

the application of funds is a matter of negotiation. (NOTE: Operational loans shall be handled in accordance with provisions of HR 30-9 and chapter IX of HHB 30-1.)

(c) Subsidy. A subsidy is the contribution of funds or materiel to an instrumentality by the Agency, with the Agency acquiring no equity in the assets nor right of participation in either the income or the profits of the entity. (Payments to foreign liaison services are excluded from this definition.) There are two types of subsidy:

(*1*) Controlled. A controlled subsidy involves support of an instrumentality whose income is primarily derived from Agency funds and which is therefore largely dependent upon such support. To the extent that the Agency is able to exercise control it does so through the formulation of budgets, the requirement for financial accountings, and the application of funds. Where a project consists of a combination of separate subsidy and proprietary instrumentalities, proprietary regulations will be applied to the proprietary instrumentality.

(*2*) Noncontrolled. A noncontrolled subsidy involves support of an instrumentality to which negotiated fixed-sum incentive payments of Agency funds are made, but budget formulation and the exercise of discretion over expenditures are at a point essentially beyond Agency control. Evaluation of performance is a matter of operational judgment, not necessarily related to the amount of the fixed-sum payments.

(d) Funding and Payrolling Instrumentalities. A funding or payrolling instrumentality is used to fund or payroll Agency activities when, for reasons of security or cover, funding or payrolling must be accomplished through an overt mechanism. The Agency has legal or beneficial ownership of a funding or payrolling instrumentality through appropriate nominee or legal entity arrangements. Although these instrumentalities are proprietaries, they operate under special authorizations that may vary substantially from the requirements of this regulation and HHB 230-1.

(3) PROJECT OUTLINE. A project outline is a written plan for accomplishing programmed operational objectives. Upon approval by appropriate authority it becomes the framework within which the project is implemented and its effectiveness initially evaluated.

(4) PROJECT RENEWAL. A project renewal is the approval after evaluation by appropriate authority for continuation of a project beyond the period covered by its initial approval or previous renewal. The renewal may update or supersede certain provisions of the project outline.

(5) ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN. An administrative plan is a supplement to the project outline which upon approval by appropriate authority constitutes the administrative framework within which the instrumentality is to operate. To that extent it replaces all Agency regulations, except this regulation and HR 230-9, in the management of project instrumentalities, their internal activities and non-Agency employees. An administrative plan is required for all projects establishing and utilizing proprietaries, operational investments, funding and payrolling instrumentalities, and controlled subsidies.

(6) TERMINATION. Termination is the discontinuance of a project or an instrumentality, upon written approval of the Deputy Director or Head of Independent Office concerned.

(7) LIQUIDATION. Liquidation is the settlement of accounts of an instrumentality, the final disposition of its remaining assets, and dissolution of the instrumentality.

RE ROM

OCT 30 1975

(8) DEACTIVATION. Deactivation is the discontinuance of the functioning of an instrumentality, with the charter or franchise retained but in an inactive status, pending determination as to liquidation or reactivation of the instrumentality.

(9) LIQUIDATION PLAN. A liquidation plan prescribes the procedures for implementing a properly authorized operational decision to terminate the Agency's active use of a specific instrumentality and to dispose of the Agency's portion of the assets. An approved plan is required for liquidation of all proprietaries, operational investments, and controlled subsidies with proprietary aspects. No liquidating action will begin until the liquidation plan has been approved.

(10) FISCAL ANNEX. A fiscal annex is a supplement to the project outline that sets forth funding arrangements, specific accounting control, financial reporting requirements, and writeoff provisions. A fiscal annex is required for all noncontrolled subsidies.

d. AUTHORITIES AND RESPONSIBILITIES

(1) AUTHENTICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS, LIQUIDATION PLANS, AND FISCAL ANNEXES (HEREAFTER CALLED SUPPORT SUPPLEMENTS)

(a) The joint approval of the Deputy Director having jurisdiction over the project and the Deputy Director for Administration is required for

(1) establishment, deactivation, or reactivation of an instrumentality;

(2) all support supplements and amendments thereto, including specific deviations because of unforeseen or emergency conditions;

(3) transfer between projects of any instrumentality and remaining assets.

(b) Advances of funds to an instrumentality before approval of the related administrative plan or fiscal annex require the approval of the Deputy Director concerned, the Deputy Director for Administration, and the Comptroller.

(c) All liquidation plans require the approval of the Deputy Director concerned and the Deputy Director for Administration.

(2) PREPARATION

(a) The Operating Official having jurisdiction over the project is responsible for the preparation and coordination of the administrative plan or fiscal annex, and, when required in connection with termination of the instrumentality, the liquidation plan.

(b) Administrative plans require the concurrences of designated representatives of the General Counsel; the Director of Finance; the Comptroller; the Director of Security; and the Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff. Liquidation plans require the concurrences of the designated representatives of the General Counsel; the Director of Finance; the Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff; and in addition, the Comptroller for those liquidation plans involving the disposition of assets with an estimated market value in excess of $50,000. The assistance and counsel of other offices will be obtained when their functional responsibility is involved.

(c) Fiscal annexes require concurrence of the Director of Finance and the Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff.

REC FROM

OCT 30 1975

(3) PERIODIC REVIEW AND REAFFIRMATION. The Operating Official responsible for the project will review each approved administrative plan or fiscal annex at least once each year, coincident with consideration of renewal of the project and will either

(a) affirm in writing to the responsible Deputy Director that the previously approved provisions remain adequate and valid; or

(b) initiate appropriate revision when changing circumstances dictate the need.

[illegible]

O/COMPT
NOV 32 8 18 AM '74

Revised: 29 October 1974 (840)

ROM

OCT 20 1975

FOREWORD

Rescission: HHB 230-1 dated 1 August 1969, 10 January 1973, and 16 March 1973

This handbook incorporates the Agency procedures pertaining to the administration of project instrumentalities that will be followed in carrying out policies prescribed in HR 230-8.

FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE:

JOHN F. BLAKE
Deputy Director
for
Administration

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

R[illegible] FROM
OCT 20 1975
CIA

Revised: 29 October 1974

CONTENTS

Paragraph — Page

1. PURPOSE 1
2. GENERAL 1
3. ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN PRESENTATION 1
4. STANDARD PROVISIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS 2
   - a. BUDGETING 2
   - b. FUNDING 3
   - c. REFUNDS 5
   - d. AGENCY CERTIFICATION AND APPROVAL 5
   - e. ACCOUNTING IN AGENCY RECORDS 6
   - f. PROTECTION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST 6
   - g. PERSONNEL POLICY 6
   - h. INSURANCE COVERAGE 7
   - i. CASUALTY PROVISION 8
   - j. LEGAL SERVICES 8
   - k. SECURITY POLICY 8
   - l. Not used
   - m. AUDIT 8
   - n. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING 9
   - o. BORROWING, LENDING, AND PLEDGING OF ASSETS 10
   - p. INVESTMENT POLICY 10
   - q. REAL PROPERTY AND OFFICE FURNISHINGS 11
   - r. LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL DISBURSEMENTS AND CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS 11
   - s. SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE POLICY 12
   - t. TERMINATION AND LIQUIDATION 12
5. CONTINGENCY CASUALTY PLAN 13
6. LIQUIDATION PLAN 13
7. FISCAL ANNEXES 14
   - a. GENERAL 14
   - b. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES 15
   - c. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS 15
   - d. USE OF CERTIFICATION AS EVIDENCE OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH FUNDS WERE ADVANCED 15
   - e. USE OF CERTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONAL REVIEW 16
   - f. FINANCIAL DATA FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES 16
   - g. REIMBURSEMENT FOR OPERATIONAL DEFICITS 16
   - h. FORMAT OF FISCAL ANNEXES 16

FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

SUPPORT SUPPLEMENTS FOR AGENCY INSTRUMENTALITIES

1. PURPOSE

This handbook sets forth guidance for developing support supplements (administrative plans, fiscal annexes, and liquidation plans) governing Agency instrumentalities, as required by HR 230-8.

2. GENERAL

Properly approved support supplements modify or waive specific provisions of Agency regulations except HR 230-9 and, in lieu thereof, set forth the provisions for special authorizations and management control of instrumentalities in the conduct of their affairs. They are designed to promote

a. the most effective management, to include staffing of each instrumentality with personnel qualified to manage it in accordance with Agency objectives, under sound personnel policies and practices;

b. the establishment of an effective budgeting, accounting, and reporting system that will produce accurate, timely, and useful reports of financial status and financial results of the operations of each instrumentality;

c. the establishment of an accounting system for the instrumentalities that is compatible and reconcilable with Agency financial records;

d. the highest degree of cover and security compatible with the overt character of each instrumentality and its operation or support objectives;

e. the effective Agency control of funding to, and assets held by, the instrumentalities;

f. the orderly deactivation or liquidation of any instrumentality that has ceased to be of operational value to the Agency.

ED FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

3. ADMINISTRATIVE PLAN PRESENTATION

The administrative plan presentation should consist of (a) a memorandum requesting approval of the administrative plan by the Deputy Director having jurisdiction over the project and the Deputy Director for Administration; (b) the administrative plan (usually drafted by the support element in the operating component concerned); and (c) a concurrence sheet evidencing concurrence in applicable provisions of the administrative plan by the designated representatives of the General Counsel; the Comptroller; the Director of Finance; the Director of Security; the

Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff; and such other Agency components whose functional responsibilities are involved. The memorandum should state the project's operational objectives, the reason why it is believed that an instrumentality is the most advantageous means for attaining the objective, the type of instrumentality to be used, funds approved for the current year, funds programmed for the ensuing fiscal year, and, in the case of a revised plan, a statement as to the need for the revision and funds expended for the past two years.

4. STANDARD PROVISIONS AND REQUIREMENTS OF ADMINISTRATIVE PLANS

Standard provisions and requirements of administrative plans are listed below. A single reference may be made in each administrative plan that the provisions of HHB 230-1 are applicable. Substitute or additional provisions may be included in each plan to the extent necessary wherever the standard provisions and requirements are not applicable.

a. BUDGETING

(1) Purpose

The approved annual operating budget for a project provides the means to integrate it into the planning and budgeting system of the Agency. The process for the annual renewal of a project permits the appropriate Deputy Director, through his review, evaluation, and formal approval of the project and its operating budget, to authorize the continuation of the activity, under which funds may be advanced, controlled, expended, and accounted for, within the terms of the approved operating budget of the project. The approved operating budget of the project provides a basis for an objective evaluation of the real (total) cost of the activity, to include:

(a) Funds Available

Clear identification of funds either available or presumed to be available to the project (or instrumentality) from all sources during the period of the proposed operating budget, which will include

(1) any prior-year funds (beginning cash balance, including liquid assets);

(2) other U.S. Government (non-CIA) funds;

(3) other CIA funds;

(4) all other income;

(5) the new funds requirement of the project (from current appropriation).

RE [illegible]
OCT 30 1975
CIA

Revised: 29 October 1974

(b) Proposed Expenditures

Clear identification of all proposed expenditures requiring cash, broken down in sufficient detail to separate

(1) fixed expenses (overhead); and

(2) operating expense.

(c) Estimated Cash Balance at the End of the Fiscal Year

(2) Preparation

(a) Operating budgets are to be prepared annually for each approved project, with a detailed breakdown for each instrumentality. The budget will cover the past year (estimated obligations), the current year (proposed), and a forecast for at least the next year's operations in agreement with the limitations contained in the relevant operational program. The categories of expense will be consistent for all years and will follow the general classification of accounts in its prescribed accounting reports, to facilitate comparison and justify increases or decreases (overhead vs. operational; stateside vs. overseas; salaries, travel, etc., as applicable).

(b) Scheduling of approvals of operating budgets will conform with the schedules established by the appropriate Deputy Director for annual project renewals.

(c) The Office of the Comptroller is to be provided a copy of the approved operating budget for the project immediately following formal approval by the appropriate Deputy Director. This requirement also pertains to any subsequently approved revision of the project operating budget.

b. FUNDING

(1) Instrumentalities generally should be provided with cash not in excess of three months' normal operating cash requirements. Further funding of any instrumentality should be deferred whenever available funds exceed this limitation. If substantial amounts above this limitation are on hand, the instrumentality should be required to return the excess to the Agency.

ROM
1975
CIA

(2) Funds in any instrumentality that are in excess of normal operating requirements may be held for operational purposes when justified by the appropriate Operating Official and when approved by the Deputy Director concerned and the Deputy Director for Administration in the following circumstances:

(a) In order that the instrumentality may present periodic financial statements reflecting substantial cash balances and investments for the purpose of strengthening cover and providing the appropriate stature in the community of its operations

(b) To permit the instrumentality to make investments for the purpose of providing income in such amounts that will lend the appearance for cover purposes of not having to rely solely on periodic contributions throughout the year (Agency funding)

(c) To provide the instrumentality with funds for any unusually large anticipated disbursement(s) in order to preclude undue attention which might be created by injection of a large amount of funds and their immediate withdrawal

(3) Funds, as needed, will be made available to an instrumentality through various appropriate funding mechanisms in coordination with the Cover and Commercial Staff and the Office of Finance. All funds received by the instrumentality will be deposited in its bank account(s) whose use and authorized signatories have been approved by the Operating Official responsible for the project. Dual signatories are preferred on all bank accounts.

(4) All bank accounts established by instrumentalities will be reported to the Office of Finance when opened, or notice thereof will be included as a part of the first financial report submitted by the instrumentality covering the period in which the bank account is established. Data reported will include the name and address of the bank; names and titles of signatory authorities; the reason why an account is operable only by a single signatory, if such is the case; and whether the signatories will be covered by a fidelity bond. Bank accounts normally will be in the name of the instrumentality unless deemed operationally inadvisable by the responsible Operating Official, reported and explained concurrently to the Director of Finance for review. If the bank account is to be in some other name, appropriate protective control documents will be executed.

CIA

(5) Requests for advances of funds to instrumentalities must indicate (a) the specific purpose of the advance; (b) the identity of any intermediate instrumentalities used to introduce the funds; and (c) the accounting treatment to be given the funds in each receiving instrumentality, as well as any other information that will assist in the clear identification of Agency funding on overt records and statements.

(6) The concurrence of the Director of Finance and the Comptroller and the approval of the Deputy Director concerned are required for a transfer of funds to be made between instrumentalities of different projects. Excepted from this requirement are transfers involving payment for actual services rendered, reimbursement of expenditures made in behalf of the transmitting instrumentality, or accommodation funding.

c. REFUNDS

(1) All refunds from instrumentalities to the Agency, whether permanent or temporary, must be explained by a memorandum stating the purpose of the refund and the effect of the refund on the overt records and statements of the instrumentality.

(2) In the event funds are to be returned to the Agency under paragraph 4b(1) above, the Operating Official having jurisdiction over the project will devise the method of repayment in coordination with the Director of Finance and the Cover and Commercial Staff.

d. AGENCY CERTIFICATION AND APPROVAL

The project case officer will review financial statements submitted by the instrumentality (see paragraph 4n(3) below) and attach his certification that "to the best of my knowledge and belief the statements are true and correct and the reported expenditures are within the scope of the project authorization." In addition, the financial statements will be approved by an appropriate Agency approving officer and forwarded to the Proprietary Systems Branch, Office of Finance, at the earliest possible date and not later than sixty days after the close of the accounting period; extensions of time will be granted by the Director of Finance upon appropriate and reasonable request. Approval procedures for the writeoff of assets are outlined in HHB 30-1 chapter VIII for cash and receivables and HR 45-6 for inventory or property items. A copy of the financial statements will be forwarded to the Office of the Comptroller. When the instrumentality is funded by more than one Agency component, the case officer certification and approving officer approval of such components also will be obtained.

OCT 30 1975
CIA

e. ACCOUNTING IN AGENCY RECORDS

The Office of Finance is authorized to accept the financial statements referred to in paragraph d above, for appropriate recording in the Agency's system of accounts.

f. PROTECTION OF U.S. GOVERNMENT INTEREST

(1) In the case of a stock-issuing instrumentality, all purely nominal stockholders (as specifically differentiated from Agency-controlled holding companies or non-Agency connected beneficial shareholders) either will endorse in blank at time of issue the stock certificates issued in their names or execute an irrevocable stock power covering the stock issued.

(2) In the case of a nonstock-issuing instrumentality, control documents protecting the equity or other interests of the Agency will be executed. Those documents may be overt or classified, and will be prepared by the Office of the General Counsel. The classified documents will be executed on behalf of the Agency by the Special Contracting Officer, Office of Personnel.

(3) The executed stock certificates, irrevocable stock powers, declarations of trust, memoranda of understanding or other control documents evidencing Agency equity or interest in instrumentalities will be forwarded promptly to the Proprietary Systems Branch, Office of Finance, for recording and custody. When such documents need to be retained by an instrumentality, the reasons that necessitate such retention will be reported to the Proprietary Systems Branch, Office of Finance, by the Operating Official responsible for the project. This report will detail the documentation retained and the location and type of safekeeping facility in which it is held, and include a signed statement of the custodian acknowledging responsibility for the documents. When possible, copies of the documents will accompany this report.

g. PERSONNEL POLICY

(1) Unless covered in the project outline, certain personnel data must be included in the Administrative Plan. This should set forth a table of organization, salary scales, benefits and allowances to be provided, and a statement of key personnel selection procedures. Such data will be reviewed and approved by the Director of Personnel.

RE[illegible]D FROM

OCT [illegible] 1975

6
CIA

Revised: 29 October 1974

(2) Neither salaried employees of instrumentalities nor persons engaged by instrumentalities in other than an employee status will receive pay in excess of the maximum rate of a GS-15 unless approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) No commitment regarding benefits or insurance coverages will be made to personnel of an instrumentality until such proposals have been reviewed and approved by the Deputy Director concerned and the Director of Personnel.

(4) If cover employment is to be provided Agency personnel, such action requires prior coordination with the Cover and Commercial Staff on an individual basis.

(5) The employment of an individual who will be responsible for the maintenance of the instrumentality accounting records will be subject to approval by the Director of Finance.

h. INSURANCE COVERAGE

(1) The insurance program required by proprietary instrumentalities will be coordinated with the Cover and Commercial Staff for implementation through MHMUTUAL facilities or through an alternate method agreed upon by the responsible directorate and the Cover and Commercial Staff. Insurance coverages provided through MHMUTUAL include, but are not limited to, workmen's compensation, aviation, marine and other equipment coverages, property damage, liability, fire and extended coverages as well as those personnel coverages referred to below.

(2) All staff and contract employees as well as detailed civilian and military personnel assigned to a proprietary instrumentality are entitled to the statutory or contractual insurance benefits applicable to them by reason of their Government employment status. All personnel directly hired by a proprietary instrumentality are entitled to the following:

(a) Life insurance and commitments for death and disability benefits in the performance of duty in accordance with HR 20-49.

(b) Retirement pension and annuity benefits if approved by the Director of Personnel.

(c) Medical and hospital insurance benefits if approved by the Director of Personnel. MHMUTUAL does not normally either directly underwrite or reinsure these coverages, but the Cover and Commercial Staff will provide advice and assistance upon request.

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

i. CASUALTY PROVISION

See paragraph 5 below.

j. LEGAL SERVICES

The Office of General Counsel at all times will be kept advised of the current status of the legal requirements of the instrumentality and will be responsible for accommodating its legal problems and for approving the use and the fee of outside counsel. Any attorney used by an instrumentality will be selected or approved by the Office of General Counsel.

k. SECURITY POLICY

(1) Unless covered in the project outline, there should be a statement in the Administrative Plan outlining the security requirements. This should include the types of operational security approvals; physical and document security controls; contact and communications procedures between the instrumentality and the Agency; security indoctrination of personnel; procedures for periodic review of operational security and related matters by CI Operations; emergency procedures, if applicable; and requirements for storage of classified or sensitive material.

(2) An instrumentality will be managed in a manner consistent with its overt purpose to avoid disclosure of its true nature and the Agency's connection with it. No non-Agency person will be made witting of the true nature of an instrumentality without prior approval by both the Operating Official concerned and the Director of Security. All persons considered for employment in an unwitting capacity also will be reported for approval, with appropriate biographic information. The responsible directorate may establish additional requirements and procedures as required.

l. Not used

m. AUDIT

An audit program will be developed and implemented in accordance with the requirements of HR 31-1. The prior approval of the Chief, Audit Staff is required for the employment of either witting or unwitting public accountants for audit purposes.

ROM

OCT 30 1975

n. FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING AND REPORTING

(1) The instrumentality will maintain an accounting and a financial reporting system consistent with the dictates of cover and security and approved by the Director of Finance.

(2) The accounting system will provide

(a) full recording of the financial operation of each instrumentality;

(b) control over and accountability for all funds, property, and other assets for which each instrumentality is responsible;

(c) information required for integration of instrumentality accountings into the accounting records of the Agency;

(d) any other financial or cost information required for effective management of the instrumentality by the responsible Operating Official.

(3) The instrumentality will submit the following financial statements and related data on at least a quarterly basis:

(a) Balance Sheet.

(b) Statement of Income and Expense.

(c) Summary Statement of Cash Receipts.

(d) Summary statements of each transaction in Certificates of Deposit and interest-bearing accounts.

(e) Schedule of salaries paid to Agency staff and contract personnel.

(f) Schedule of salaries and expenses, classified by general categories, paid to directors and principal executives of the instrumentality.

(g) Schedule of cash in bank accounts with certification that reconciliation with instrumentality accounts has been made and reviewed.

(h) If an asset has been written off during the reporting period, a schedule also will be included with the financial report describing the item(s) written off and the circumstances that support the writeoff action. Write-off action is subject to the approval procedures in HHB 30-1 chapter VIII and HR 45-6.

RE[illegible] FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

(i) Any other financial reports required by the Office of Finance and concurred in by the Agency component responsible for the project.

(4) The statements will be certified as true and correct by the principal agent of the instrumentality. The statements will clearly reflect Agency funding for the period covered, or such funds will be identified in a covering memorandum signed by the appropriate Agency approving officer transmitting the statements to the Office of Finance, including specific identification of the manner in which the funding is recorded on the books of the instrumentality. In addition, the covering memorandum will identify all fictitious accounts and amounts included in asset, liability, capital, income, or expense accounts, the balances of which are distorted to cover present or anticipated Agency funding or interproject transfers of funds or equipment. If overt records must be deceptive for cover purposes, supplemental reporting should give complete and accurate information for internal Agency records.

o. BORROWING, LENDING, AND PLEDGING OF ASSETS

The prior concurrence of the Director of Finance and approval of the Deputy Director having jurisdiction over the instrumentality are required for borrowing or lending funds or pledging any asset by an instrumentality. Bank overdraft privileges will be considered as borrowings and require the same concurrence and approval as stated above. Notional borrowing or lending in order to pass Agency funds between instrumentalities for approved funding purposes does not require the above concurrence and approval.

p. INVESTMENT POLICY

(1) When an Operating Official wishes to invest funds that have been approved for retention in accordance with paragraph 4b(2) above or funds that are a portion of the three months normal operating cash requirements, he will forward to the Director of Finance for his approval a memorandum recommending the investment of funds. The memorandum recommending the investment of funds will provide the following data:

(a) Reason for the investment.

(b) Types of investment recommended, restricted to the following:

(1) U.S. Government securities.

(2) Interest-bearing accounts or Certificates of Deposit in member banks of the Federal Reserve System only.

ROM
30 1975
CIA

(3) Non-U.S. Government securities; list specific issues recommended for purchase.

(c) Maximum amount recommended for investment in each type.

(d) Length of time investment of funds is anticipated.

(e) In the event of investments in securities, state the name in which they will be registered and the type and location of safekeeping facilities to be used for the securities.

(2) After initial approval of the Director of Finance, the instrumentality may, at its discretion, make continuing investments in U.S. Government securities or in interest-bearing accounts or Certificates of Deposit of approved bank(s) having maturities of one year or less. Each purchase of Certificates of Deposit having maturities of greater than one year and each investment in non-U.S. Government securities must have prior approval of the Director of Finance and the Comptroller.

q. REAL PROPERTY AND OFFICE FURNISHINGS

(1) The lease of real property requires approval of the designated Agency approving officer for the project concerned. Purchase, construction, improvements, or alterations of real property (except improvements or alterations included in approved operating budgets) require approval of the designated approving officer for the project concerned and, in appropriate cases, the technical authorization of the Director of Logistics. (The component responsible for the project will maintain a record of real property held by the instrumentality, including the following information as applicable: country or state of location; type, i.e., purchased or leased; size, i.e., square footage of building and acreage of land; purchase price; permanent improvements or alterations totaling $1,000 or more; annual rental and term of lease, unless the property is acquired for less than 12 months and the rent does not exceed $250 per month. This information will be made available to the Director of Logistics upon request.)

(2) The procurement of office furnishings not included in approved operating budgets requires the prior written approval of the Operating Official responsible for the project.

FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

r. LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL DISBURSEMENTS AND CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS

Except for funding transactions, any disbursement in excess of $5,000 or contractual arrangement of more than 12 months' duration requires the prior approval of the designated Agency approving officer for the project concerned.

s. SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSE POLICY

(1) Travel and subsistence expenses incurred in behalf of the instrumentality by authorized representatives will be paid on the basis of actual and necessary expenses. When actual and necessary expenses exceed the maximum allowable rate established for reimbursement for actual expenses under HR 22-7, the claimant will provide detailed justification. Authorized representatives may include stockholders, officers, directors, employees, any individual retained in a professional or independent contractor capacity on a fee basis, and staff agent or contract personnel wholly integrated into the project. Air transportation less costly than first-class will be used to the extent practicable. When first-class fares are paid, such payment will be justified in writing in the files of the instrumentality.

(2) Operational entertainment expenses incurred by any of the above personnel will be reimbursed on an actual cost basis in accordance with HHB 30-1 chapter IX, to the extent that such expenses are reasonable and necessary to the accomplishment of operational objectives.

(3) Directors of instrumentalities may be paid up to $50 per day, and travel and subsistence expenses for their attendance at directors' meetings, except that the payment of $50 per day will not be allowed to directors having an employment relationship with the Agency or with the instrumentality.

(4) Expenditures authorized in paragraphs s(1), (2), and (3) above will be reviewed at periodic intervals by the responsible case officer to evaluate the necessity for such expenditures and their reasonableness.

t. TERMINATION AND LIQUIDATION

(1) The Administrative Plan will provide that when a proprietary project or part thereof ceases to have operational value or will cease to have such value in the immediate future, the responsible Operating Official will prepare and submit to the Deputy Director concerned for his approval a proposal to terminate the project or a part thereof.

(2) The proposal will set forth any conditions or considerations that have a bearing on the decision to discontinue the project or a part thereof and include the date that it is recommended operations cease.

(3) The liquidation plan will be prepared in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 6 below.

FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

(4) If the proposal includes deactivation of any project instrumentality, together with a disposition of a portion of its assets, the memorandum will set forth, in an attachment, information concerning planned disposition, after settlement of obligations, of cash and noncash assets of the instrumentality. The plan for partial disposition of assets requires the same approvals as a liquidation plan.

5. CONTINGENCY CASUALTY PLAN

A contingency casualty plan should be prepared for instrumentalities if required by HR 20-49.

6. LIQUIDATION PLAN

When the Deputy Director concerned has approved liquidation and dissolution of a project instrumentality, a liquidation plan will be developed by the responsible Operating Official to cover liquidation of the assets and liabilities of the instrumentality as required by HR 230-8 and in accordance with the format and substance set forth below. It will be forwarded for approval as provided in HR 230-8d.

a. Identification of instrumentality(s) to be liquidated

b. Approval for termination (cite approved proposal as required in paragraph 4t(1) above)

c. A concurrence sheet showing concurrences in the applicable provisions of the liquidation plan by the designated representatives of the General Counsel; the Director of Finance; the Chief, Cover and Commercial Staff; the Director of Logistics, when real and personal property holdings are involved; other Agency components when their functional responsibilities are involved; and the Comptroller when assets of an estimated market value in excess of $50,000 are involved

d. Financial Statements

Furnish a current statement of assets and liabilities, and a projected statement of assets and liabilities at date of termination to include terminating expenses.

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

e. Method of Liquidation

(1) Party responsible for actual liquidation. Explain how liquidation of the instrumentality will be handled, such as by principal agent, cleared and witting attorney, etc.

(2) How will the instrumentality be disposed of?

(a) Will it be disposed of intact? If so, by bid, negotiation, gift, etc.; or

(b) Will the instrumentality shell be transferred to another Agency project; or

(c) Will the charter be terminated; or

(d) Will the instrumentality continue to operate without Agency participation; or

(e) Will the instrumentality be deactivated but retained in a dormant state for future possible use?

f. Requirement, if any, for additional funds to cover liquidation and estimated date of financial liquidation

g. Disposition of Assets and Liquidation

(1) If the instrumentality is not to be sold intact, how will noncash assets be disposed of? By bid, negotiation, transfer to another Agency project, gift, etc.?

(2) Include a positive recommendation to be developed in consultation with the Director of Finance for the disposition of all cash assets including funds recovered or realized through the liquidation process.

h. Final Audit

The plan should provide for a final audit before the instrumentality is liquidated or sold.

i. Authorization for adjustment of Agency financial records for profit or loss.

j. A positive statement that the Office of Finance is authorized to make necessary adjustments to the instrumentality's investment account based on the final liquidation financial statement

7. FISCAL ANNEXES

a. GENERAL

Use of the fiscal annex is based on the principle that accounting requirements should be determined by the nature of the relationship between the instrumentality and the Agency, the degree of control

REC ROM
OCT 30 1975

exercised by the Agency and, finally, the availability of meaningful accounting data within the instrumentality. In this light, fixed, pro forma accounting requirements are not sought; rather, each case will be approached individually through the fiscal annex with a view to establishing accounting requirements that will assure that use of Agency funds is controlled and adequately documented to a degree consistent with the nature of the instrumentality and its relationship with the Agency. A fiscal annex is required for all noncontrolled subsidies.

b. ACCOUNTING PRINCIPLES

The purpose of the fiscal annex is to document the particular fiscal realities of an individual noncontrolled subsidy (HR 230-8c(2)(c)(2)). The fiscal annex may authorize appropriate deviation from normal Agency accounting requirements. It should establish funding arrangements, specific accounting controls, financial reporting requirements, and writeoff provisions consistent both with the fiscal realities and with the Agency's responsibilities for proper use of funds. Accounting control should be established through the use of Agency advance accounts, intransit accounts, and memorandum accounts to follow the flow of funds from the case officer to the ultimate recipient.

c. FINANCIAL STATEMENTS

Provision should be made in the fiscal annex for financial statements to be used as the final element of accounting control through use of Agency memorandum accounts

(1) when financial statements are the normal practice of an instrumentality;

(2) when they are available to the Agency within the operational relationship; and

(3) when the Agency contribution is identifiable therein.

d. USE OF CERTIFICATION AS EVIDENCE OF FULFILLMENT OF THE PURPOSES FOR WHICH FUNDS WERE ADVANCED

When meaningful financial statements are not available and the nature of the operation is such that insistence upon financial statements is inadvisable, it is considered appropriate and consistent with Agency practice to provide for documentation of "services rendered" in the form of a certification signed by an appropriate case officer and approved by the designated Agency approving officer for the project concerned. Such certification executed on requests for advance subsequent to the initial advance should read substantially as follows:

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 30 1975
CIA

> I certify that to the best of my knowledge and belief funds advanced to this project have been or are being used for the purposes for which they were drawn and further advances are warranted.

In these instances appropriate evidence of receipt of funds by the instrumentality or its representatives normally will constitute full accounting for use of the funds and no memorandum accounting procedure need be used.

e. USE OF CERTIFICATION FOR OPERATIONAL REVIEW

In addition to the use of certifications to support use of funds, Operating Officials occasionally desire to use this procedure to ensure that appropriate periodic review of the financial aspects of the instrumentality is accomplished by responsible officers. In such cases the fiscal annex may provide that certifications will be the basis for recording and clearing the memorandum account even though accounting requirements are satisfied prior to such recording and clearing.

f. FINANCIAL DATA FOR OPERATIONAL PURPOSES

Occasionally operational interest in projects requires that certain financial information be obtained from the instrumentality. This information ordinarily consists of data regarding the use of funds that indicates that such use is, in general, consistent with the purpose of the project. Although these data are of accounting significance, the format, arrangement, and objective of the reports may be in a form that is not susceptible to technical treatment and recording in the accounts of the Agency. In such cases the fiscal annex should indicate that the financial report is required for operational but not accountability purposes.

g. REIMBURSEMENT FOR OPERATIONAL DEFICITS

If the amount of Agency support is determined by the operating deficit of an instrumentality, payments must be supported by financial statements or other satisfactory evidence establishing the amount of the deficit.

h. FORMAT OF FISCAL ANNEXES

Although the format is not rigid, the sections described below are the minimum requirements of a fiscal annex. Other sections may be added as necessary.

R[illegible] ROM
OCT 30 1975

(1) Purpose and Instrumentality

Furnish a brief, sterile statement of the nature and purpose of the project and instrumentality to be used. Include a brief description of the Agency's relationship with the instrumentality, showing the degree of control that the Agency can exercise over the facility in its use of and accounting for funds.

(2) Funding

Describe the basis for advances to the instrumentality, and the mechanisms to be used in introducing funds into the activity; state whether it will be funded by headquarters or specified field stations. Any special or unusual requirements should be set forth in this section.

(3) Accounting and Writeoff

Define the accounting requirements applicable to the instrumentality and prescribe the documentation required to permit certification and writeoff by the authorized certifying officer. The use of memorandum accounts should also be described in this section.

DISTRIBUTION: SPECIAL

RECEIVED FROM
OCT 30 1975

OGC [illegible]-0331

3 February 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Proprietary Withdrawals and the Contingency Reserve

1. I am attaching a memorandum of law entitled "Proprietary Withdrawals and the Contingency Reserve." This was discussed with you last week.

2. It is obvious that a number of policy decisions and actions will flow from this decision. Our congressional committees need to be appropriately informed, the Comptroller will need to work out certain adjustments with OMB, and I also believe there are certain policy decisions that the Comptroller will have to work out with Finance with respect to pending transactions which would have placed returns from proprietaries in the Reserve. I shall send copies of this memorandum of law to all interested components and will assist them in any way they wish.

John S. Warner
JOHN S. WARNER
General Counsel

Attachment

cc: DDA
DDO
OLC
Comptroller
D/Finance

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 30 1976
CIA

OGC:JSW:sin
Original - Addressee
1 - ER via Ex Secty w/att
1 - OGC Subj: APPROPRIATIONS w/att
1 - Chrono

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 000276

SECRET

3 February 1975

MEMORANDUM OF LAW

SUBJECT: Proprietary Withdrawals and the Contingency Reserve

REFERENCES: A. Memo to DCI fr C/CCS, dtd 8 Jan 74, subj: Project MHMUTUAL Policy

B. Memo for the Record fr Comptroller, dtd 19 Aug 74, same subject

1. Reference A recommended that there be returned to the Agency Reserve starting with calendar year 1973 that portion of MHMUTUAL annual profits not required for Project needs. The Director approved the basic paper on 8 February, but noted "surplus funds from MHMUTUAL earnings will be returned to the Treasury rather than the Agency Reserve." Reference B recorded a telephone decision by the Director that "[w]hen funds are withdrawn from proprietaries, they will be transferred to the Contingency Reserve...."

2. The purpose of this paper is to examine the legal aspects of these policy decisions. The concept of the Reserve was established in 1952 as a means by which the Agency would have flexibility to fund projects or activities which had not been contemplated in the normal appropriation request. Its purpose was to create a mechanism to provide funds for unforeseeable requirements which would be more rapid and secure than the supplemental appropriation procedure employed by other Government agencies. The Reserve has been funded by direct appropriation and by transfer of unobligated appropriations at appropriate times after the close of the fiscal year. Funds were and are released from the Reserve only with the approval of OMB with subsequent notice of each Reserve withdrawal furnished in writing to the two appropriations committees.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 30 1975
CIA

E-2 IMPDET
CL BY 000276

3. In lieu of a specific annual appropriation act for the Agency, OMB by letter notifies the chairmen of the two appropriations committees that the Agency budget of a specific number of dollars is contained in the DOD appropriation request. The letter also specifies the accounts in which these funds are located. In the past where there were appropriations to the Reserve, that letter would specify the amount of the operating budget and the amount to be applied to the Reserve. After committee action, appropriate letters, sometimes separately and sometimes jointly signed by the chairmen of the two committees, are sent to OMB specifying what has been approved for the Agency budget and confirming the accounts in which they are located. Thereafter, the necessary transfers to the Agency are accomplished pursuant to the authority of Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949, which was specifically worded so as to permit appropriations for the Agency to be placed in the accounts of other agencies and then transferred to the Agency free of all limitations and restrictions on the appropriation from which transferred. The effect of this was to permit those funds to be expended under the authorities of the CIA Act of 1949, rather than the authorities of the appropriation acts from which transferred. A transfer under other authority such as the Economy Act would require that the funds be spent in accordance with limitations of the appropriation from which transferred, both as to purpose and annuality. Unlike any other agency, our "appropriation act" is the process described above and consists of the following principal elements:

a. the OMB letter;
b. the chairmen letters;
c. the DOD appropriations act approved by the whole Congress and signed by the President; and
d. the transfers to the Agency approved by OMB and authorized by Section 5 of the CIA Act of 1949.

4. The question then arises whether a return of money from a previously established proprietary can be placed in the Reserve and later expended by the Agency under the law. There are several provisions of law based on Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, which states that "no money may be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law." Twenty years after the Constitution was ratified, the act from which present law derives was enacted. That law is section 628 of Title 31 of the U. S. Code which states:

> Except as otherwise provided by law, sums appropriated for the various branches of expenditure in the public service shall be applied solely to the objects for which they are respectively made, and for no others.

RECEIVED
JUN 30 1975
CIA

5. Illustrative of the uniformly strict interpretation given to 31 U.S.C. 628 is a decision rendered by the Comptroller General to the Secretary of the Treasury and reported at 37 Comp. Gen. 732 (1958). In this case Congress had authorized an appropriation for payment of inequitable losses in pay sustained by military officers under emergency economy legislation, but did not thereafter include funds for this purpose when it enacted appropriations for the Treasury. The Commandant of the Coast Guard had advised a subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations during appropriation hearings that, unless the Committee had an objection, it was intended to pay such claims for losses in pay from the Coast Guard appropriation for "Operating Expenses." Thereafter, the General Accounting Office Claims Division determined that over $30,000 in such claims were allowable, but the Comptroller General was forced to conclude that no claims could be certified for payment because there was no available appropriation earmarked for their payment. Citing 31 U.S.C. 628 and stating the rule that "the appropriations provided by Congress to the Federal agencies may be used only for the objects for which they are made and no others," the Comptroller General decided that the statement made by the Commandant before the House subcommittee did not have the effect of making funds appropriated as "Operating Expenses" available for payment of the special claims. The Comptroller General held that the appropriate recourse was to submit a request for appropriation to the Congress.

6. In 1849 the Congress sought to buttress the appropriation principle set forth in the Constitution by passing a law from which is derived 31 U.S.C. 484, which provides in part:

> The gross amount of all moneys received from whatever source for the use of the United States, ... shall be paid by the officer or agent receiving the same into the Treasury, at as early a day as practicable, without any abatement or deduction on account of salary, fees, costs, charges, expenses, or claim of any description whatever.

Also, Section 487 of 31 U.S.C. (originally passed in 1877) provides specifically that all proceeds of sales of public property of any kind, (with certain exceptions not relevant here) shall be deposited and covered into the Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts and shall not be withdrawn or applied, except in consequence of a subsequent appropriation.

7. Where the Agency makes funds available to establish a proprietary or to add additional investments, the funds are recorded on Agency books as having been expended and the Director certifies to the expenditure

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 30 1975

CIA

under section 8(b) of the CIA Act of 1949. I am informed that when an expenditure of this type is recorded on Agency books, nevertheless, a memorandum account is maintained so that the Agency has a record of the precise amount of Government funds invested in the proprietary. I am also informed that, if a proprietary were to be fully liquidated with the proceeds scheduled to go to the Reserve, but the funds returned are in excess of the investment, the excess would not be placed in the Reserve, but would be credited to Miscellaneous Receipts. Where funds are returned to the Agency from a proprietary, the current procedure is for the Agency to "reverse" the original expenditure entry and, for those funds which are to go into the Reserve, the Reserve account on the Agency books is credited, with notification to OMB.

8. Let us take a hypothetical situation where 20 years ago the Agency expended $1 million to establish a proprietary. At that time the $1 million would have been recorded as expended, certified under the Director's authority for purposes contemplated by the appropriation of 20 years ago. In the meantime, that $1 million would have been spent by the proprietary for salaries, purchase of equipment, or for other purposes. The Agency either supplemented its original expenditure with additional monies or the proprietary might have made a profit during these years. This proprietary, at Agency direction, now liquidates its activities, including the selling of assets. Under the Constitution and the laws cited above, it is my opinion that the law requires all such return of funds to the Agency to be covered into the Treasury as Miscellaneous Receipts.

9. The Agency may not legally expend these funds once again without the approval of the Congress, and by that I mean the full appropriations process and not merely the approval of OMB and notification to our two appropriations committees. The essential element missing in this latter procedure is that there has not been an appropriation bill approved by the Congress as a whole and signed by the President. In effect, the Agency would have had its appropriation supplemented without the full appropriation process.

John S. Warner

JOHN S. WARNER
General Counsel

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 30 1975
CIA

CURRENT EQUITY INVESTMENTS

Stocks	No. of Shares	Average Cost Per Share	Cost	[illegible]
Abbott Laboratories	3000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
American Elec. Power	5000	37-1/8	185,5[illegible]	[illegible]
American T&T	4000	50-1/2	200,7[illegible]	[illegible]
Ampex	4000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Central & Southwest	1000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Coca Cola	4000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Control Data	1000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Dr. Pepper	2000	16-1/2	[illegible]	[illegible]
Eastman Kodak	3000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Ford Motor	3000	51-1/2	[illegible]	[illegible]
Gillette	3000	55-1/4	165,997	[illegible]
Houston Nat. Gas. Cov. Pref.	60	52-1/8	3,126	[illegible]
IBM	400	275-1/2	110,28[illegible]	[illegible]
Johns Manville	6000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Liberty National Life	6000	23-1/8	138,6[illegible]	23-3/4
Minnesota Mining & Manufacturing	2000	81-1/2	163,013	93
National Cash Register	2000	53-3/8	106,738	[illegible]
Pillsbury	2000	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]
Reynolds Metal	1000	[illegible]	55,407	[illegible]
Scott Paper	5000	33-1/4	166,650	[illegible]
Southern	10000	28-1/8	281,317	[illegible]
Sterling Drug	4000	30-1/2	121,808	[illegible]
Texaco	4000	37-1/4	[illegible]	[illegible]
U. S. F. delity & Guaranty	3000	34-3/4	[illegible]	[illegible]
Universal Oil	4000	28-3/8	[illegible]	[illegible]
Va. Electric & Power	1333	32-5/8	[illegible]	[illegible]
Xerox	2000	80-7/8	[illegible]	[illegible]
			$3,292,804	

Net dividends received through December 31, 1970: $107,9[illegible]

Purchases for December 1970: None

*Per closing price December 31, 1970 from THE WALL STREET JOURNAL

R1819

Common Stock

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at		31 December 1971		
			Per Share	Amount	Per Share	Amount	P/E Ra
	Electrical Equipment						
3/31/71	Combustion Engineering	1000	61-3/4	62,201.18	62-1/8	62,125	
4/ 5/71	Combustion Engineering	500	61-3/4	31,115.90	62-1/8	31,062	
4/ 5/71	Combustion Engineering	500	61-5/8	31,038.30	62-1/8	31,063	
4/23/71	Combustion Engineering	100	69-3/4	7,020.98	62-1/8	6,212	
4/23/71	Combustion Engineering	2900	69-7/8	203,810.21	62-1/8	180,163	
	Total and Average Price	5000	66-3/4	335,186.57	62-1/8	310,625	18
6/ 9/71	McGraw Edison	3500	43	151,597.50	34-1/4	119,875	
6/10/71	McGraw Edison	1000	43-1/4	43,496.30	34-1/4	34,250	
6/10/71	McGraw Edison	500	42-3/4	21,576.90	34-1/4	17,125	
	Total and Average Price	5000	43	216,670.70	34-1/4	171,250	14
	Insurance						
10/21/71	Crum and Forster	5000	29-7/8	149,375.00	31-1/2	157,500	11
11/ 1/71	Hanover Insurance	1000	36-7/8	36,800.00	41-1/4	41,250	
12/ 7/71	Hanover Insurance	1000	38-5/8	38,650.00	41-1/4	41,250	
	Total and Average Price	2000	37-3/4	75,450.00	41-1/4	82,500	7
11/ 1/71	Ohio Casualty	1000	43-3/4	43,750.00	48	48,000	13
	Office & Business Equipment						
6/19/70	IBM	400	275	110,281.00	336-1/2	134,600	36
	Oil						
7/11/69	Texaco	4000	37-1/3	149,365.60	34-3/8	137,500	10

ECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

Common Stock

ate of urchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	31 December 1971 Per Share	31 December 1971 Amount	P/E Ratic
	Utilities						
/11/64	VEPCO	533	32-3/8	17,241.07	20-1/2	10,926	
5/18/66	VEPCO	800	32-15/16	26,331.94	20-1/2	16,400	
	Total and Average Price	1333	32-11/16	43,573.01	20-1/2	27,326	11
				$ 1,123,651.88		$ 1,069,301	

ot shown above are stock options to buy 7,500 shares of Arabian Shield Development Company stock @ $.25 per share.. he option is good until April 3, 1975. December 31, 1971, prices on Arabian Shield are 1-5/8 - 2-1/8.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 1975
CIA

COMMON 'OCK

ate of urchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	29 December 1972 Per Share	29 December 1972 Amount	P/E Ratio
	Automotive Supplies						
2/23/72	Irvin Industries	5000	13-5/8	67,929.63	9-1/8	45,625	15
6/20/72	Javelin Corporation	6000	22-5/16	133,875.00	10-1/2	63,000	13
	Broadcasting						
8/21/72	Metromedia Incorporated	5500	38-1/4	210,218.00	32-1/2	178,750	19
	Conglomerates						
1/28/72	W.R. Grace	5000	29-15/16	149,683.16	26-1/2	132,500	
3/ 6/72	W.R. Grace	2000	29-1/16	58,121.08	26-1/2	53,000	
3/ 8/72	W.R. Grace	1000	28-1/16	28,093.80	26-1/2	26,500	
	Total and Average Price	8000	29-1/2	235,898.04	26-1/2	212,000	13
	Electrical Equipment						
6/ 9/72	McGraw Edison	5000	43-1/4	216,670.70	40-3/8	201,875	16
	Food and Beverage						
11/ 1/72	Quaker Oats	3000	40-1/2	121,389.50	45	135,000	
11/ 2/72	Quaker Oats	1000	40-7/8	40,864.00	45	45,000	
	Total and Average Price	4000	40-5/8	162,253.50	45	180,000	24
	Food Services						
8/21/72	Servomation Corporation	7500	28-5/8	214,765.80	25-5/8	192,187	
11/10/72	Servomation Corporation	150	Stk Div	.00	25-5/8	3,844	
	Total and Average Price	7650	28-1/8	214,765.80	25-5/8	196,031	14

RECEIVED FR
NOV 10 1975

COMMON STOCK

ate of urchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	29 December 1972 Per Share	29 December 1972 Amount	P/E Ratic
	Housing						
2/24/72	Shapell Industries	5000	25-1/2	127,859.50	20-5/8	103,125	12
	Insurance						
9/14/72	Hanover Insurance	1000	52	52,000.00	54-1/4	54,250	
0/19/72	Hanover Insurance	2000	51-3/4	103,575.00	54-1/4	108,500	
1/20/72	Hanover Insurance	200	52	10,400.00	54-1/4	10,850	
	Total and Average Price	3200	51-7/8	165,975.00	54-1/4	173,600	10
5/18/72	Leasco	5000	20-1/2	102,731.20	19-1/8	95,625	7
.0/23/72	Monarch Capital Corporation	5000	17	84,925.00	18-1/4	91,250	16
	Office and Business Equipment						
.0/27/72	IBM	300	380-1/16	114,020.00	402	120,600	
.1/ 8/72	IBM	500	378-5/8	188,925.00	402	201,000	
	Total and Average Price	800	378-5/8	302,945.00	402	321,600	37
	Retail Clothing						
2/24/72	Associated Drygoods	1600	54-7/8	87,826.00	52-1/2	84,000	
3/15/72	Associated Drygoods	2000	58-1/8	116,266.60	52-1/2	105,000	
	Total and Average Price	3600	58-5/8	204,092.60	52-1/2	189,000	18

RECEIVED
NOV

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at		29 December 1972		
			Per Share	Amount	Per Share	Amount	P/E Ratio
	Utilities						
4/ 3/72	American Tel & Tel	10000	43-9/16	435,545.00	52-3/4	527,500	
12/22/72	American Tel & Tel	5000	52	260,147.00	52-3/4	263,750	
	Total and Average Price	15000	46-3/8	695,692.00	52-3/4	791,250	12
1/64	VEPCO	533	32-3/8	17,241.07	22-3/8	11,926	
5,18/64	VEPCO	800	32-15/16	26,331.94	22-3/8	17,900	
	Total and Average Price	1333	32-11/16	43,573.01	22-3/8	29,826	11
				$ 2,969,403.98		$ 2,872,557	

Not shown above are stock options to buy 7,500 shares of Arabian Shield Development Company stock @ $.25 per share. The option is good until July 29, 1975. December 29, 1972, prices on Arabian Shield are 2-1/4 to 2-5/8.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	31 Dec 1973 Per Share	31 Dec 1973 Amount	P/E Ratio
	Automotive Supplies						
4/72	Irvin Industries	5000	13-5/8	67,929.63	3	15,000	4
6/72	Javelin Corporation	6000	22-5/16	133,875.00	2	12,000	2
	Broadcasting						
8/72	Metromedia Incorporated	5500	38-1/4	210,218.00	7-3/4	42,625	4
	Electrical Equipment						
6/72	McGraw Edison	5000	43-1/4	216,670.70	19-5/8	98,125	7
	Food and Beverage						
11/72	Quaker Oats	4000	40-5/8	162,253.50	28-7/8	115,500	17
	Food Services						
8/72	Servomation Corporation	7650	28-1/8	214,765.80	11-1/2	87,975	5

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at		31 Dec 1973		P/E Rati
			Per Share	Amount	Per Share	Amount	
	Housing						
2/72	**Shapell Industries**	5000	25-1/2	127,859.50	7-3/4	38,750	3
	Insurance						
2/73	American Reinsurance	8000	42-7/8	342,850.00	24-1/4	194,000	
4/73	American Reinsurance	2000	38-1/2	77,000.00	24-1/4	48,500	
	Total and Average Price	10000	42	419,850.00	24-1/4	242,500	9
1/73	Gulf Life Holdings	24,000	17-3/4	426,572.95	10	240,000	5
9/72	Hanover Insurance	2000	26	52,000.00	12	24,000	
10/72	Hanover Insurance	4000	25-7/8	103,575.00	12	48,000	
11/72	Hanover Insurance	400	26	10,400.00	12	4,800	
	Total and Average Price	6400	25-7/8	165,975.00	12	76,800	8
5/72	Reliance Group	5000	20-1/2	102,731.20	10-1/8	50,625	
2/73	Reliance Group	2000	12-5/8	25,332.00	10-1/8	20,250	
	Total and Average Price	7000	18-1/4	128,063.20	10-1/8	70,875	4
10/72	Monarch Capital Corporation	5000	17	84,925.00	9-3/4	48,750	6
1/73	U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty	1100	40-1/4	44,280.94	36-1/8	39,737	10

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	31 Dec 1973 Per Share	31 Dec 1973 Amount	P/E Rat
	Retail Clothing						
2/72	Associated Drygoods	1600	54-7/8	87,826.00	26-3/8	42,200	
3/72	Associated Drygoods	2000	58-1/8	116,266.60	26-3/8	52,750	
	Total and Average Price	3600	56-5/8	204,092.60	26-3/8	94,950	7
	Utilities						
5/64	VEPCO	800	32-15/16	26,331.94	14-1/2	11,600	
6/64	VEPCO	533	32-3/8	17,241.07	14-1/2	7,728	
	Total and Average Price	1333	32-11/16	43,573.01	14-1/2	19,328	6
				$ 2,650,904.83		$ 1,242,915	

Not shown above are stock options to buy 7,500 shares of Arabian Shield Development Company stock @$.25 per share. The option is good until July 21, 1974. December 31, 1973 prices on Arabian shield are 1-3/4 - 2-1/4.

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

ate of urchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	31 December 1974 Per Share	31 December 1974 Amount	P/E Ratic
	Automotive Supplies						
2/72	Irvin Industries	5000	13-5/8	67,929.63	1-1/2	7,500	2
6/72	Javelin Corporation	6000	22-5/16	133,875.00	1	6,000	4
	Electrical Equipment						
6/72	McGraw Edison	5000	43-1/4	216,670.70	11-3/8	56,875	6
	Food and Beverage						
11/72	Quaker Oats	4000	40-5/8	162,253.50	13	52,000	6
	Food Services						
8/72	Servomation Corporation	7650	28-1/8	214,765.80	5-1/2	42,075	3

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	31 December 1974 Per Share	31 December 1974 Amount	P/E Rati
	Housing						
2/72	Shapell Industries	5000	25-1/2	127,859.50	5-1/2	27,500	3
	Insurance						
2/73	American Reinsurance	8000	42-7/8	342,850.00	13	104,000	
4/73	American Reinsurance	2000	38-1/2	77,000.00	13	26,000	
	Total and Average Price	10000	42	419,850.00	13	130,000	Def
1/73	Gulf Life Holdings	24,000	17-3/4	426,572.95	6-3/8	153,000	4
9/72	Hanover Insurance	2000	26	52,000.00	5-3/4	11,500	
10/72	Hanover Insurance	4000	25-7/8	103,575.00	5-3/4	23,000	
11/72	Hanover Insurance	400	26	10,400.00	5-3/4	2,300	
	Total and Average Price	6400	25-7/8	165,975.00	5-3/4	36,800	5
5/72	Reliance Group	5000	20-1/2	102,731.20	5-3/4	28,750	
[illegible]/73	Reliance Group	2000	12-5/8	25,332.00	5-3/4	11,500	
	Total and Average Price	7000	18-1/4	128,063.20	5-3/4	40,250	9
1[illegible]2	Monarch Capital Corporation	5000	17	84,925.00	8-3/4	43,750	6
1/73	U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty	1100	40-1/4	44,280.94	25-3/4	28,325	9

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at		31 December 1974		
			Per Share	Amount	Per Share	Amount	P/E Rati
	Retail Clothing						
2/72	Associated Drygoods	1600	54-7/8	87,826.00	17-7/8	28,600	
[illegible]/72	Associated Drygoods	2000	58-1/8	116,266.60	17-7/8	35,750	
	Total and Average Price	3600	56-5/8	204,092.60	17-7/8	64,350	6
	Utilities						
5/64	VEPCO	800	32-15/16	26,331.94	8-1/4	6,600	
6/64	VEPCO	533	32-3/8	17,241.07	8-1/4	4,397	
	Total and Average Price	1333	32-11/16	43,573.01	8-1/4	10,997	6
				$ 2,440,686.83		$699,422	

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at		30 September 1975		
			Per Share	Amount	Per Share	Amount	P/E Rat
	Automotive Supplies						
2/72	Irvin Industries	5000	13-5/8	67,929.63	4	20,000	5
5/72	Javelin Corporation	6000	22-5/16	133,875.00	1	6,000	3
	Electrical Equipment						
6/72	McGraw Edison	5000	43-1/4	216,670.70	18-3/4	93,750	15
	Food and Beverage						
11/72	Quaker Oats	4000	40-5/8	162,253.50	18	72,000	12
	Food Services						
8/72	Servomation Corporation	7650	28-1/8	214,765.80	8-5/8	65,981	6

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at Per Share	Purchased at Amount	30 September 1975 Per Share	30 September 1975 Amount	P/E Rat
	Housing						
2/72	Shapell Industries	5000	25-1/2	127,859.50	8-1/8	40,625	6
	Insurance						
2/73	American Reinsurance	8000	42-7/8	342,850.00	13-3/4	110,000	
4/73	American Reinsurance	2000	38-1/2	77,000.00	13-3/4	27,500	
	Total and Average Price	10000	42	419,850.00	13-3/4	137,500	Def
1/73	Gulf Life Holdings	24,000	17-3/4	426,572.95	6-7/8	165,000	7
9/72	Hanover Insurance	2000	26	52,000.00	6-3/8	12,750	
10/72	Hanover Insurance	4000	25-7/8	103,575.00	6-3/8	25,500	
11/72	Hanover Insurance	400	26	10,400.00	6-3/8	2,550	
	Total and Average Price	6400	25-7/8	165,975.00	6-3/8	40,800	Def
5/72	Reliance Group	5000	20-1/2	102,731.20	6-1/8	30,625	
2/73	Reliance Group	2000	12-5/8	25,332.00	6-1/8	12,250	
	Total and Average Price	7000	18-1/4	128,063.20	6-1/8	42,875	Def
0/72	Monarch Capital Corporation	5000	17	84,925.00	9-1/4	46,250	8
'73	U.S. Fidelity and Guaranty	1100	40-1/4	44,280.94	29-7/8	32,863	12

RECEIVED F
NOV 10 1975
CIA

COMMON STOCK

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Purchased at		30 September 1975		
			Per Share	Amount	Per Share	Amount	P/E Ra
	Retail Clothing						
2/72	Associated Drygoods	1600	54-7/8	87,826.00	27	43,200	
3/72	Associated Drygoods	2000	58-1/8	116,266.60	27	54,000	
	Total and Average Price	3600	56-5/8	204,092.60	27	97,200	11
	Utilities						
5/64	VEPCO	800	32-15/16	26,331.94	11-3/4	9,400	
6/64	VEPCO	533	32-3/8	17,241.07	11-3/4	6,263	
	Total and Average Price	1333	32-11/16	43,573.01	11-3/4	15,663	6
				$ 2,440,686.83		$876,507	

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

NOTES ON THE SCHEDULES OF GAIN OR LOSS ON THE SALE OF MHMUTUAL INVESTMENTS

Note #1

The MHMUTUAL portfolio, from which the attached schedules of gain or loss on the sale of investments were taken, is not an accounting document in the sense that it is used to account for funds handled by the Activity. The purpose of the portfolio is to provide management with a picture of the investments held by the complex at any point in time. The portfolio is not audited per se, and in past years no attempt was made to insure that each presentation tied directly back to the previous portfolio; that has been done in recent years. Due to the lack of audit, certain errors were not discovered, and they were carried forward to the present. One example is on the 1970 presentation of the sales of stocks to date. The total sale price of $2,226,883.29 when subtracted from the total purchase price of $2,246,793.93 results in a loss of $19,910.64 instead of the loss of $27,802.99 as shown under the column marked gain or (loss) on sales. The total gain on sales to date should therefore be $177,437.51. For some unknown reason, the balance carried forward to the 1971 schedule of gain on the sale of equity is stated as $206,314.47 which involves an overstatement in the cumulative gain on the sale of equity in the amount of $28,876.96. This error has been carried forward to the present.

Note #2

The portfolio figures cannot be directly tied in with the financial statements for MHMUTUAL in the case of bonds since the statements reflect an average cost for all the bonds of a particular issuer, and the appreciation on a discounted bond is recorded as income each year with a commensurate increase in the book value of the bond.

Note #3

The only bond transaction during 1970 was the sale of $50,000 of U.S. Treasury bonds. This transaction is found on the schedule titled "Debenture Investments."

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

SECRET

Extracted from
11/17/69 Portfolio

PORTFOLIO SALES OF STOCKS TO DATE

Date of Purchase	Stocks	No. of Shares	Total Purchase Price	Date of Sale	Net Sale Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale*
4/22/64	Burlington Industries, Inc.	300	$ 13,812.93	6/ 8/65	20,466.70	$ 6,653.77
4/22/64	National Steel Corporation	300	16,559.22	11/ 4/66	11,992.11	(4,567.11)
7/23/64 4/2[illegible]/66)	Scott Paper Company	1100	37,556.77	11/ 4/66	28,913.79	(8,642.98)
10/ 2/64	J. C. Penny Company	250	16,278.21	11/ 4/66	13,112.15	(3,166.06)
12/ 7/64	Columbia Broadcasting System	408	16,669.52	11/ 4/66	21,938.58	5,2[illegible]
7/19/65	Scott Foresman & Company	800	20,976.80	11/15/66	23,849.15	2,872.35
[illegible]/30/64 5/12/6[illegible])	North American Aviation	300	16,332.75	1/16/67	15,052.48	(1,280.27)
1/ 6/66	Corn Products Company	500	26,691.90	9/21/67	22,279.48	(4,412.42)
2/[illegible]/65	General Public Utilities	1500	49,253.63	9/21/67	43,3[illegible].42	(5,[illegible])
4/ [illegible]/6[illegible] 8/1[illegible]/6[illegible])	Newmont Mining Corporation	650	50,712.36	12/13/67	56,943.45	6,231.09
3/13/67	Freeport Sulphur Company	1200	32,613.52	8/ 5/68	48,217.24	15,603.72
3/ 5/64 11/[illegible]/64); 1/6/66)	Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Company	900	48,683.58	11/27/68	64,901.16	16,217.58
6/ 8/65	Deere & Company	400	15,904.76	11/27/68	22,370.93	6,466.17
2/17/67	General Reinsurance Corporation	150	43,018.90	11/27/68	54,012.45	10,993.55
3/13/67	International Minerals & Chemicals *	1200	51,935.78	11/27/68	25,766.84	(26,168.94)
2/ 3/65	Norwich Pharmacal Company	600	14,302.89	11/27/68	26,322.46	12,019.57
3/17/65 1/6/6[illegible]); 2/23/66); 4/23/68)	Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company	2000	101,334.37	2/28/69	111,416.04	10,081.67
3/ 5/64	Gulf Oil Corporation	600	15,544.92	2/28/69	24,917.05	9,372.13
4/13/67	U.S. Gypsum Company	200	13,891.80	2/28/69	16,395.17	2,503.37
6/ 5/65 4/2[illegible]/6[illegible])	Weyerhaeuser Company	1000	43,794.46	2/28/69	79,228.60	35,434.14
[illegible]/11/6[illegible] [illegible]/27/6[illegible]); 1/15/65)	McLouth Steel Corporation	4000	164,801.26	4/30/69	154,985.62	(9,815.64)
6/14/67 4/23/6[illegible])	Searle, (G.D.) & Company	2000	104,089.62	4/30/69	82,959.74	(21,129.88)
11/27/6[illegible]	Union Corp Corporation	3000	166,084.80	4/30/69	200,224.06	34,139.26
11/15/6[illegible] 4/2[illegible]/6[illegible])	American Hospital Supply	6000	150,725.24	10/17/69	241,385.21	90,659.97
1/1[illegible]/67 2/2[illegible]/6[illegible])	Northwestern Life Insurance	3000	135,419.79	11/ 7/69	153,333.50	17,913.71
			$1,366,980.78		$1,56[illegible]	$[illegible]

* The foreign-based companies are not subject to U.S. taxes on capital gains.
** Net dividends reported are net amounts received after deductions of 30 per cent Federal Withholding Tax.

-7-

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

PORTFOLIO SALES OF STOCKS TO DATE

Date of Sale	Stocks	No. of Shares	Total Purchase Price	Net Sale Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
	Sales Through 1969		$1,166,380.28	$1,564,328.43	$[illegible].15
[illegible]/17/70	American Home Products	3000	$ 202,287.09	$ 186,643.75	$(23,[illegible])
4/24/70	American Natural Gas	4000	168,997.93	136,329.65	(31,[illegible])
[illegible]	Burlington Industries	4000	175,0[illegible].63	155,637.60	([illegible])
[illegible]	Cincinnati Milling Machine	2000	114,323.52	85,472.10	([illegible])
11/3/70	Coca Cola	2000	140,665.67	157,575.15	16,[illegible]
4/10/70	Dr. Pepper	6000	146,521.20	161,748.91	15,[illegible].61
6/1/70	General Dynamics	2000	98,75[illegible].51	47,168.35	(51,[illegible])
4/10/70	General Foods	1000	77,216.80	84,233.50	7,016.70
4/10/70	Hewlett-Packard	4000	112,991.20	170,3[illegible]8.37	57,[illegible].77
[illegible]	IBM	500	110,240.55	147,114.55	36,[illegible]
11/3/70	Liberty National Life	6000	138,699.90	130,700.00	([illegible])
4/16/70	National Cash Register	1500	216,000.00	165,648.75	([illegible],351.25)
4/16/70	RCA	4000	160,426.85	102,445.54	(57,531.34)
4/24/70	Skelly Oil Products	1000	69,459.00	31,086.87	(38,372.13)
4/16/70	Tampax	400	36,742.56	81,727.00	44,[illegible]
11/3/70	U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty	3000	104,356.00	104,072.90	([illegible])
4/10/70	Xerox	3000	175,016.29	257,943.30	82,[illegible]
	Total Sales 1970		$2,246,793.93	$2,226,863.29	$ 37,522.09
	Total Sales to date		$3,613,774.21	$3,791,211.72	$169,[illegible].16

* Foreign-based companies are not subject to U.S. taxes on capital gain.

12/31/70 Portfolio

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

EQUITY SALES TO DATE

of ale	Stocks	No. of Shares	Total Purchase Price	Net Sale Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
	Sales Through 1970		$ 3,584,897.25	$ 3,791,211.72	$ 206,314.47
10/71	Abbott Laboratories	4000	$ 257,534.86	$ 278,083.99	$ 20,549.13
22/71	American Tel. & Tel.	4000	200,373.50	193,615.88	(6,757.62)
30/71	American Electric Power	5000	185,594.44	141,819.03	(43,775.41)
16/71	Ampex	4000	146,568.14	89,542.58	(57,025.56)
'71	Bankers National Life	1000	29,750.00	33,500.00	3,750.00
71	Bankers National Life	1500	44,625.00	50,550.00	5,925.00
30/71	Bankers National Life	1000	29,750.00	34,250.00	4,500.00
/14/71	Central & Southwest	1000	48,229.01	46,509.06	(1,719.95)
/1/71	Control Data	1000	143,370.36	37,429.84	(105,940.52)
17/71	Coca Cola	4000	317,479.10	394,210.53	76,731.43
17/71	Continental Telephone	8000	206,557.89	166,917.41	(39,640.48)
/10/71	Chubb Corporation	2000	121,500.00	131,750.00	10,250.00
29/71	Dr. Pepper	2000	33,357.50	63,383.59	30,026.09
22/71	Eastman Kodak	3000	198,656.73	218,339.70	19,682.97
/17/71	Emerson Electric	2500	186,467.44	185,489.51	(977.93)
4/71	Fleetwood Enterprises	1000	38,219.13	46,260.26	8,041.13
/71	Ford Motor	3000	154,237.41	181,127.95	26,890.54
22/71	Gillette	3000	165,947.09	133,250.78	(32,696.31)
/14/71	Hardee Foods	5000	60,000.00	69,224.35	9,224.35
5/71	Houston Natural Gas	60	3,124.15	2,905.16	(218.99)
/14/71	Johns Manville	6000	236,419.04	256,064.84	19,645.80
5/71	Liberty National Life	6000	131.279.00	178.200.00	46,921.00
21/71	MMM	2000	163,032.52	230,733.41	67,700.89
'71	National Cash Register	2000	106,738.00	78,830.54	(27,907.46)
/71	Pepsico	4000	238,440.41	255,933.19	17,492.78
25/71	Pillsbury	2000	94,178.57	107,153.84	12,975.27
18/71	Reynolds Metals	1000	55,407.47	21,025.77	(34,381.70)
16/71	Scott Paper	5000	166,649.10	117,592.02	(49,057.08)
/15/71	Shappell Industries	4000	129,643.25	137,822.01	8,178.76
20/71	Southern Company	10000	281,317.00	197,966.00	(83,351.00)
27/71	Sterling Drug	4000	121,807.73	172,658.95	50,851.22

RECEIVED FRO
NOV 10 1975
CIA

12/31/71

EQUITY SALES TO DATE

Date of Sale	Stocks	No. of Shares	Total Purchase Price	Net Sale Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
7/29/71	U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty	3500	127,361.80	160,076.64	32,714.84
8/18/71	U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty	3500	154,000.00	172,835.59	18,835.59
7/30/71	Universal Oil Products	4000	113,444.75	102,221.53	(11,223.22)
10/15/71	Warner Lambert	2500	102,928.50	105,513.66	2,585.16
7/29/71	Western Casualty & Surety	400	25,000.00	31,180.00	6,180.00
8/18/71	Western Casualty & Surety	1400	93,400.00	112,150.00	18,750.00
8/19/71	Western Casualty & Surety	2200	139,975.00	174,900.00	34,925.00
6/24/71	Xerox	2000	161,652.30	221,942.48	60,290.18
	Total Sales 1971				$ 118,943.90
	Total Sales to Date				$ 325,258.37

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

EQUITY SALES TO DATE

ate of Sale	Stocks	No. of Shares	Total Purchase Price	Net Sale Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
	Sales Through 1971				$ 325,258.37
1/ 1/72	American Reinsurance	8000	$ 331,687.40	386,350.00	$ 54,662.60
9/ 8/72	Ashland Oil	8000	220,314.00	235,986.93	15,672.93
8/ 5/72	Combined Insurance Company	5000	122,500.00	131,375.00	8,875.00
6/12/72	Combustion Engineering	5000	335,186.57	364,278.67	29,092.10
1/21/72	Crum & Forster	2000	59,750.00	60,712.50	962.50
8/18/72	Crum & Forster	3000	89,625.00	99,000.00	9,375.00
2/11/72	Dean Witter	300	6,900.00	8,196.36	1,296.36
1/ 6/72	Gulf Life Holdings	2700	137,927.17	151,531.74	13,604.57
1/ 9/72	Gulf Life Holdings	1200	60,574.92	66,958.65	6,383.73
1/10/72	Gulf Life Holdings	2100	104,372.42	119,390.69	15,018.27
1/18/72	Hanover Insurance	2000	75,450.00	98,750.00	23,300.00
9/ 7/72	IBM	400	110,281.00	159,316.80	49,035.80
4/ 3/72	International Tel & Tel	7000	433,870.42	394,861.05	(39,009.37)
8/17/72	John Deere	5000	321,474.10	358,647.16	37,173.06
1/ 2/72	Life Insurance of Georgia	2500	83,125.00	93,000.00	9,875.00
3/ 7/72	Nationwide Corporation	10000	110,000.00	130,875.00	20,875.00
1/ 7/72	Ohio Casualty	1000	43,750.00	49,000.00	5,250.00
8/ 9/72	Old Line Life Insurance Company	500	16,925.00	21,875.00	4,950.00
8/10/72	Old Line Life Insurance Company	6000	203,115.88	262,500.00	59,384.12
9/14/72	Texaco	4000	149,365.60	133,935.30	(15,430.30)
	Total Sales 1972				$ 310,346.37
	Total Sales to Date				$ 635,604.74

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

12/31/72

EQUITY SALES TO DATE

ecurity	No. of Shares	Date of Purchase	Date of Sale	Purchase Price	Sales Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
ales through 1972						$635,604.74
merican Tel and Tel	10000	4/72	1/73	43-9/16	53-1/2	99,609.74
merican Tel and Tel	5000	12/72	1/73	52	53-7/8	9,450.35
	800	11/72	2/73	378-5/8	430-7/8	41,772.09
rican Tel and Tel	1000	2/73	5/73	51	51-1/4	264.99
merican Tel and Tel	9000	2/73	6/73	51	50-7/8	(1,123.68)
.S. Fidelity and Guaranty	2000	1/73	7/73	40-1/4	41-7/8	3,162.80
ngersoll Rand	4000	1/73	10/73	67-3/8	72-1/2	20,544.91
ontinental Corp	5000	2/73	10/73	40-5/8	40	(3,549.37)
. R. Grace	8000	1/72	10/73	29-1/2	28	(11,136.53)
.S. Fidelity and Guaranty	1000	1/73	11/73	40-1/4	40-1/4	24.01
hio Casualty	1000	2/73	11/73	44-3/8	44-3/4	375.00
hio Casualty	4000	2/73	11/73	44-3/8	44-1/2	500.00
afeco Corp	4000	2/73	11/73	50-7/8	49-1/8	(7,000.00)
.S. Fidelity & Guaranty	2900	1/73	11/73	40-1/4	39-3/8	(2,447.28)
Total Sales 1973						$150,447.03
Total Sales to Date						$786,051.77

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

1/1/74

EQUITY SALES TO DATE

ity	No. of Shares	Date of Purchase	Date of Sale	Purchase Price	Sales Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
through 1973						$786,051.77
media	5,610	8/72	7/74	37-1/2	5-7/8	(176,996.04)
an Shield Devel. Co.	7,500	4/74	10/74	1/4	13/16	4,200.00
cals						$613,255.73

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

1/1/75

EQUITY SALES TO DATE

ecurity	No. of Shares	Date of Purchase	Date of Sale	Purchase Price	Sales Price	Gain or (Loss) on Sale
ales through 1974						$613,255.73

RECEIVED FROM
NOV 10 1975
CIA

9/1/75

CIA Domestic Real Property Holdings*

CIA has a variety of real property holdings in the United States ranging from the major, overt Headquarters complex in McLean, Virginia, to small leased "safehouse" apartments in many cities. Real property holdings also include seven CIA-controlled installations used as training sites, supply depots, research and development centers, and communications transmitting and receiving facilities. The 237 domestic real property holdings are summarized for this report as follows:

a. Overt or nominal properties (overt properties are identified as CIA; nominal properties as Executive Office of the President, but CIA control is admitted upon request) of which there are sixty-two (62);

b. Official cover properties (identified as under the control of other U.S. Government agencies and CIA relationship is classified from CONFIDENTIAL through TOP SECRET) of which there are fifty-three (53);

c. Safehouses (properties, generally apartments or residences and generally leased, acquired for covert meetings) of which there are eighty-one (81); and

---

* The information contained in this section has extreme sensitivity as a grouped data package. It lists the entirety of CIA real property holdings and personnel assets in the United States as of 13 January 1975; accordingly, release, unauthorized disclosure, or loss of this information would have severe operational impact on the activities of CIA.

d. Non-official properties (identified as private firms which may be wholly or partially controlled by CIA and housing CIA employees) of which there are forty-one (41).

Attachment 1 lists CIA domestic real property and provides specific addresses for all overt and nominal CIA real property holdings. Official cover properties, safehouses, and non-official properties are listed by general location. Numbers of personnel and utilization purpose are shown for each category of real property. This report is developed as a real property summary; therefore, personnel data supplied are predominantly based on CIA space utilization reports, and slight variation may exist in some instances. A limited number of CIA personnel are located in non-CIA-controlled space -- for example, in the Pentagon, in private residences, or in commercial companies -- and these properties are not listed in this real property summary. Non-official properties not occupied by CIA staff or contract employees are not listed. Attachment 2 is a summary sheet of all the previous figures.

SECRET

Attachment 1

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Washington, D. C. & Suburbs			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Langley, Va	Route 123 (CIA)	7,469	Hqs. admin. offices & printing bldg.
Washington, D. C.	Central Bldg. 2430 E St. N.W. (CIA)	88	Technical labs & offices
Washington, D. C.	East Bldg. 2430 E St. N.W. (CIA)	28	Technical labs & offices
Washington, D. C.	South Bldg. 2430 E St. N.W. (CIA)	307	Technical labs & offices
Oxon Hill, Md	10530 Riverview Rd. (FBIS)	4	Counter-audio training & FBIS antenna field
Washington, D. C.	Navy Yard, Bldg. 213, 1st & M, S.E. (EOP)	1,265	Photo development & analysis
Washington, D. C.	Navy Yard, Bldg. 159E, 1st & M, S.E. (EOP)	45	Map storage
Washington, D. C.	Navy Yard, Bldg. 202, 1st & M, S.E. (EOP)	0	Storage
Rosslyn, Va	Ames Bldg., 1820 N. Ft. Myer Dr. (EOP)	510	Hqs. admin. offices
Rosslyn, Va	Key Bldg., 1200 Wilson Blvd. (EOP)	668	Hqs. admin. offices
Rosslyn, Va	Magazine Bldg., 1815 N. Lynn St. (EOP)	340	Hqs. admin. offices
Franconia, Va	(EOP)	213	Supply depot & R&D shops
McLean, Va	Tyler Bldg., 1759 Old Meadows Rd. (EOP)	274	Elint & tech. admin. offices
Arlington, Va	Chamber Commerce Bldg, 4600 N. Fairfax (EOP)	364	Hqs. trng. offices
Alexandria, Va	901 Columbus Rd. (EOP)	4	Technical training area
Washington, D. C.	AJAX Bldg., 1901 Penna Ave., N.W. (EOP)	9	U.S. resident contact
Arlington, Va	1000 Glebe Road (EOP)	9	FBIS photo & printing
B. Official Cover Properties			
3 Locations		18	Research & operational support
4 Locations		84	Translation & operational support
1 Location		22	Foreign intell. collection
1 Location		5	Supply depot & ELINT training
1 Location		48	Counter audio lab & office
1 Location		8	Document research analysis
1 Location		15	Training lab & office
1 Location		62	Field investigation office

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
C. Safehouses			
37 Locations		N.A.	Covert meetings
D. Non-Official Properties			
1 Location		13	Manages agent accounts & cover backstop
1 Location		1	Operational support (dormant)
1 Location		1	Foreign intelligence collection
2 Locations		13	Human source assessment
1 Location		3	Debriefing site
1 Location		3	Mgt. services for proprietaries
1 Location		2	Research & operational support
1 Location		2	Public opinion analysis
1 Location		16	Research admin. office
1 Location		1	Travel support
1 Location		3	Translation
1 Location		3	Airline, foreign operational supp.
1 Location		9	Airline, covert admin. travel
1 Location		3	Covert procurement, general
1 Location		4	Covert commercial audit
Arizona	1 Non-Official Installation	11	Aviation equip. R&D and procure.
California			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Los Angeles, Ca	312 North Spring Street (EOP)	13	U.S. resident contact
San Francisco, Ca	Customs Hse, 555 Battery St. (EOP)	14	U.S. resident contact
San Diego, Ca	Gross Ctr. Bldg, 3045 Rosecrans St. (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact
Hawthorne, Ca	Fed. Bldg., 15000 Creation Road (EOP)	1	Personnel & recruiting office

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
California			
B. Official Cover Properties			
2 Locations		38	Field investigation office
2 Locations		14	Foreign intelligence collection
1 Location		14	Paper plant
1 Location		8	Field procurement office
1 Location		1	Field supply office
1 Location		22	Gen. admin. support to sensitive projects
1 Location		3	Air logistics support
1 Location		1	Audit of covert operations
C. Safehouses			
12 Locations		N.A.	Covert meetings
D. Non-Official Cover			
1 Location		9	Covert Commercial investigation
4 Locations		4	Foreign intelligence collection
1 Location		19	Management & admin. of sensitive projects
3 Locations		13	Contractor liaison, sensitive projects
Colorado			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Denver, Co	Bankers Bldg., 2401 E 2nd St. (EOP)	7	U.S. resident contact
Denver, Co	Bldg. 56 DFC, 6th & Kipling Sts. (EOP)	1	Field recuriting office
Connecticut			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Hartford, Ct	Fed. Bldg., 450 Main St. (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

S E C R E T

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Florida			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Key West, Fl	U.S. Naval Base (FBIS)	5	Foreign broadcast station
Coral Gables, Fl	R&N Bldg., 299 Alambra Cir. (EOP)	6	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
2 Locations		25	Foreign intelligence station
1 Location		33	Foreign commo. center
1 Location		16	Field investigation office
C. Safehouses			
2 Locations		N.A.	Covert meetings
D. Non-Offical Cover			
1 Location		3	Administers survivers' benefits
2 Locations		7	R&D and procurement, aviation equipment
1 Location		9	Cuban propaganda operations
Georgia			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Atlanta, Ga	3 Dunwoody Park (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		6	Foreign intelligence collection
Hawaii			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Honolulu, Hi	Dellingham Bldg., 735 Bishop St. (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact

S E C R E T

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Hawaii			
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		5	Field liaison CINCPAC
1 Installation		9	Commo relay station
Illinois			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Chicago, Ill	Derksen Bldg., 219 S. Dearborn St. (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Chicago, Ill	Derksen Bldg., 219 S. Dearborn St. (EOP)	10	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		22	Field Investigation office
1 Location		11	Foreign intelligence collection
C. Safehouses			
2 Locations		N.A.	Covert meetings
Indiana			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Indianapolis, In	Fed. Bldg., 46 E. Ohio St. (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact
Louisiana			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
New Orleans, La	Masonic Bldg., 333 St. Charles St. (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Massachusetts			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Cambridge, Ma	Beta Bldg., 545 Technology (EOP)	12	U.S. resident contact
Boston, Ma	Fed. Bldg., Government Center (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		13	Field investigation office
1 Location		7	Foreign intelligence collection
C. Safehouses			
2 Locations		N.A.	Covert meetings
Maryland			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Highland Pk, Md	14048 Woodward St. (EOP)	7	U.S. resident contact
Baltimore, Md	103 S. Gay Street (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		11	Maritime research & training
1 Location		1	Security liaison
1 Location		6	Training facility
C. Safehouses			
1 Location		N.A.	Covert meetings

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Minnesota			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Minneapolis, Mn	Fed. Bldg., Ft. Snelling (EOP)	7	U.S. resident contact
St. Paul, Mn	Fed. Bldg., 316 Robert St. (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Missouri			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
St. Louis, Mo	Fed. Bldg., 1520 Market St. (EOP)	6	U.S. resident contact
Overland, Mo	MPRC Bldg., 9700 Page Blvd. (EOP)	2	Field investigation office
Kansas City, Mo	Fed. Bldg., 601 East 12th St. (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Nevada			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
None			
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		35	Training & R&D installation
New York			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
New York, NY	575 Lexington Avenue (EOP)	28	U.S. resident contact
New York, NY	Fed. Bldg., 26 Federal Plaza (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Niagara, NY	United Office Bldg., 220-222 First St. (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact
Schenectady, NY	650 Franklin St. (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact
Syracuse, NY	Loew Bldg., 108 W. Jefferson St. (EOP)	5	U.S. resident contact

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
New York			
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		30	Foreign intelligence collection
1 Location		22	Field investigation office
1 Location		2	Photo procurement, foreign persons
C. Safehouses			
23 Locations		N.A.	Covert meetings
D. Non-Official Properties			
1 Location		9	Foreign newspaper service
2 Locations		11	Foreign intelligence collection
2 Locations		7	Proprietary management services
3 Locations		28	Overseas book distribution
1 Location		2	Contractor's Liaison
North Carolina			
1 Official Cover Installation		24	Field training facility
Ohio			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Cleveland, Oh	Fed. Bldg., 1240 E 9th St. (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact
Cincinnati, Oh	Fed. Bldg., 553 Main St. (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		5	Foreign intelligence collection

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Oklahoma			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Tulsa, Ok	Center Office Bldg., 630 W. 7th (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact
Oregon			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Portland, Or	Courthouse, Broadway & Main Sts. (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Pennsylvania			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Philadelphia, Pa	Fed. Bldg., 600 Arch Street (EOP)	7	U.S. resident contact
Philadelphia, Pa	Fed. Bldg., 600 Arch Street (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Pittsburgh, Pa	Fed. Bldg., 1000 Liberty Ave. (EOP)	8	U.S. resident contact
Pittsburgh, Pa	Fed. Bldg., 1000 Liberty Ave. (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Tennessee			
1 Non-Official Installation		(47 Company)	Aviation equipment procurement & R&D
Texas			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Austin, Tx	Fed. Bldg., 300 E. 8th St. (EOP)	1	Field recruiting office
Austin, Tx	Fed. Bldg., 300 E. 8th St. (EOP)	1	U.S. resident contact
Dallas, Tx	Courthouse, 1100 Commerce St. (EOP)	7	U.S. resident contact
Houston, Tx	Courthouse, 515 Rusk Ave. (EOP)	4	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Installation		2	Ordnance depot

SECRET

E2 CL By 029557

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Texas			
C. Safehouses			
1 Location		N.A.	Covert meetings
Utah			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Salt Lake, Ut	Fed. Bldg., 125 S. State St. (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact
Virginia			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Richmond, Va	Fed. Bldg., 400 N. 8th St. (EOP)	3	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Installation (4 Stations)		286	Records Center, Training, R&D, Commo Facilities
1 Installation		76	Field Training Site
1 Location		72	Technical R&D
1 Installation		3	R&D project
1 Location		0	Minor ordnance storage
Washington			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Seattle, Wa	Courthouse, 1010 Fifth Ave. (EOP)	5	U.S. resident contact
B. Official Cover Properties			
1 Location		24	Foreign equipment analysis

E2 CL By 029557

SECRET

DOMESTIC REAL PROPERTY LISTING

Location	Street Address	Personnel	Purpose
Washington			
C. Safehouses			
1 Location		N.A.	Covert meetings
D. Non-Official Properties			
1 Location		3	Contractor liaison
Wisconsin			
A. Overt & Nominal Properties			
Milwaukee, Wi	Courthouse, 517 E. Wisconsin Ave. (EOP)	2	U.S. resident contact

CIA Domestic Real Property Summary Sheet

Location	Overt & Nominal	Official	Safehouses	Non-Official	TOTAL
Washington, D. C. and Suburbs	17	13	37	16	83
Arizona				1	1
California	4	10	12	9	35
Colorado	2				2
Connecticut	1				1
Florida	2	4	2	4	12
Georgia	1	1			2
Hawaii	1	2			3
Illinois	2	2	2		6
Indiana	1				1
Louisiana	1				1
Maryland	2	3	1		6
Massachusetts	2	2	2		6
Minnesota	2				2
issouri	3				3
Nevada		1			1
New York	5	3	23	9	40
North Carolina		1			1
Ohio	2	1			3
Oklahoma	1				1
Oregon	1				1
Pennsylvania	4				4
Tennessee				1	1
Texas	4	1	1		6
Utah	1				1
Virginia	1	8			9
Washington	1	1	1	1	4
Wisconsin	1				1
TOTALS	62	53	81	41	237

29 AUG 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Science and Technology
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
Deputy Director for Operations

INFO : Inspector General

SUBJECT : Questionable Activities

1. As an aspect of the allegations of improper CIA activity in connection with the Watergate and associated matters, the Inspector General was directed to assemble all information available in the Agency on any such activities. Certain specific matters were provided to him, and the Director by memorandum of 9 May 1973 directed all employees to report any activities, current or past, "which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency." This information was assembled and consolidated by the Inspector General in a memorandum of 21 May 1973 and certain individual memoranda thereafter supplementing it. This material was used in a detailed, page-by-page review of all such information with Senator Symington and Congressman Nedzi, as Chairmen of the Senate and the House Armed Services Intelligence Subcommittees, respectively. In addition, I undertook very specific commitments in my confirmation hearings to ensure that the Agency will remain within its legislative charter. I am arranging for the published transcripts of those hearings to be circulated throughout the Agency for compliance, and at that time will reaffirm the specific direction made by Dr. Schlesinger in his memorandum of 9 May 1973. This will also be incorporated into appropriate regulations.

2. With respect to the specific questionable activities which were reported as a result of the search made throughout the Agency, however, I believe it essential to take specific action in order that these not seem to be condoned or overlooked. I have therefore developed specific instructions on each reported activity. These are included in the attachments to this memorandum, and have the force of specific direction to you to pass on to appropriate subordinates the instructions outlined. Separate packages of such instructions are being developed for each Directorate in order to respect the sensitivity of some of the activities discussed, including those which are deemed quite appropriate within CIA's charter.

FROM

JUN 25 1975

CIA

E2 IMPDET CL BY 056041

SECRET—EYES ONLY

220

Similarly, each activity is placed on a separate page so that the Deputy Director concerned may most easily forward it to the office or offices directly concerned without distributing it more broadly.

3. In the event that these instructions raise substantial difficulties of implementation or compliance, I would appreciate your raising such cases with me directly, with whatever recommendations you may have for modification to carry out the spirit of the action undertaken here but to avoid undue disruption of legitimate activities. In the absence of such notice, I will expect full compliance with the instructions outlined herein.

4. Each addressee Deputy Director is instructed to recommend to the DDM&S modification or addition to Agency regulations of appropriate language to reflect the direction included in this memorandum and attachments addressed to him. DDM&S will be responsible for consolidating such recommendations and making an overall report to the Director through the IG, coordinating with General Counsel.

W. E. Colby

Attachments

EC:ydc (27 August 1973)

istribution:
Original - IG
1 - Mr. Colby
1 - DDS&T
1 - DDI
1 - DDM&S
1 - DDO
1 - OGC - w/o atts
1 - OLC - w/o atts
1 ER (w/o atts - being held in IG file)

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 25 1975
CIA

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Domestic Proprietary Companies

Corporate cover, as managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff, is an appropriate support for our overseas operations. To the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 25 1975
CIA

SECRET—EYES ONLY

3.

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project MHMUTUAL

Project MHMUTUAL will be operated in conformance with appropriate legal restrictions. Arrangements are being made for the briefing of the appropriate Congressional committees. Particular attention will be given to avoiding any possible conflict of interest situations with firms with which the Agency has contracts. Particular concern will also be exhibited over possible improper influence on the stock market or stock dealings through the investments involved in MHMUTUAL.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 25 1975
CIA

SECRET—EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Domestic Proprietary Companies

Corporate cover, as managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff, is an appropriate support for our overseas operations. To the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations.

Suggested addition:

Corporate cover, including notional companies, as managed by the Cover and Commercial Staff, is an appropriate support for our overseas operations. To the degree that domestic proprietary or cover companies are required, a clear justification will be developed as to the relationship of their support of our overseas operations.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 25 1975
CIA

SECRET
EYES ONLY

SECRET
EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Project MHMUTUAL

Project MHMUTUAL will be operated in conformance with appropriate legal restrictions. Arrangements are being made for the briefing of the appropriate Congressional committees. Particular attention will be given to avoiding any possible conflict of interest situations with firms with which the Agency has contracts. Particular concern will also be exhibited over possible improper influence on the stock market or stock dealings through the investments involved in MHMUTUAL.

The DDO has no problem with this as written.

REC
JUN 25 1975
CIA

SECRET
EYES ONLY

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10151

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-56

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT

DATE : 09/01/1975
PAGES : 560

SUBJECTS :
SSCSGO, REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/21/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10151
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMIITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-56

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : SELECT COMMITTEE ASSASSINATION REPORT
DATE : 09/01/75
PAGES : 560
SUBJECTS : SSCSGO, REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/08/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

September 1, 1975

SELECT COMMITTEE - ASSASSINATION REPORT

Tab A: PROLOGUE

✓Tab B: Part I: Introduction and Summary

Tab C: Part II: Covert Action as Vehicle for Foreign Policy Implementation

Tab D: Part III/Cuba

Tab E: Part III/Dominican Republic

Tab F: Part III/Chile

Tab G: Part III/Congo

Tab H: Part III/South Vietnam

Tab I: Part IV: Findings and Conclusions

Tab J: Part V: Recommendations

Agreed to by Subcommittee
October 8, 1975

PROLOGUE

The events discussed in this Interim Report must be viewed in the context of United States policy and actions designed to counter the threat of spreading Communism. Following the end of World War II, many nations in eastern Europe and elsewhere fell under Communist influence or control. The defeat of the Axis powers was accompanied by the rapid disintegration of the Western colonial empires. The Second World War no sooner ended than a new struggle began. The Communist threat, emanating from what was then called the "Sino-Soviet bloc," produced a policy of containment intended to prevent further encroachment by Communism into the "free world."

United States strategy for conducting the Cold War called for the establishment of interlocking treaty arrangements and military bases throughout the world. Our concern over the expansion of an aggressive Communist monolith led the United States to fight two major wars in Asia. In addition, it was considered necessary to wage a relentless cold war against Communist expansion wherever it appeared in the "back alleys of the world." This called for a full range of clandestine activities in response to the operations of Communist clandestine services.

Any ref to these?

The fear of expanding Communism was particularly acute when Fidel Castro emerged as the leader of Cuba in the late 1950's. His takeover was seen as the first significant penetration by the Communists into the Western Hemisphere. U.S. leaders, including most Members of Congress, called for vigorous action to stem the Communist infection in this hemisphere. These policies rested on widespread popular support and encouragement.

Throughout this period, the U.S. felt impelled to respond to threats which were, or seemed to be, skirmishes in a global Cold War against Communism. Castro's Cuba raised the spectre of a Soviet outpost at America's doorstep. Events in the Dominican Republic appeared to offer more such opportunities for the Russians and their allies. The Congo, freed from Belgian rule, occupied the strategic center of the African continent, and the prospect of Communist penetration there was viewed as a threat to American interests in emerging Africa. Americans are well aware of the powerful reactions set off in the United States in the 1960's by the domino theory in Indochina. And, even the election in 1970 of a Marxist president in Chile was seen by some as a threat similar to that of Castro's takeover in Cuba.

The Committee regards the unfortunate events dealt with in this Interim Report as an aberration, explainable at least in part, but not justified, by the pressure of events at the time. The Committee believes that it is still in the national interest of the United States to do what it can to help nations resist Communist domination, but it is clear that this cannot justify in the future the kind of abuses covered in this report. Indeed, the Committee has resolved that steps must be taken to prevent them from happening again.

do what they
can FOR SELF-
DETERMINATION

TOP SECRET

Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee on August 27, 1975*

I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

This interim report covers allegations of United States involvement in assassination plots against foreign political leaders. Of equal significance in this report are certain other cases where foreign political leaders in fact were killed, where the United States was in some manner involved in activity leading up to the killing, but where it would be incorrect to say that the purpose of United States involvement had been to encourage assassination.

The evidence establishes that the United States was implicated in several assassination plots. The Committee believes that the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy is incompatible with American principles, international order, and morality. It should be rejected.

Our inquiry also revealed serious problems with respect to United States involvement in coups directed against foreign governments. Some of these problems are addressed here on the basis of our investigation to date; others we raise as questions to be answered after our investigation into covert action has been completed.

We stress the interim nature of this report. In the course of the Committee's continuing work, other alleged assassination plots may surface, and new evidence concerning the cases covered herein may come to light. However, it is the Committee's view that the cases covered herein have been developed in sufficient detail to clarify the issues which are at the heart of the Committee's mandate to recommend legislative and other reforms relating to the vital matters discussed below.

---

* The Vice Chairman reserved as to the first sentence in the discussion of the similarities and differences among the plots. (See p.

In depth treatment of the assassination question has lengthened the Committee's schedule but has greatly increased the Committee's awareness of the hard issues it must face in the months ahead. The Committee intends, nevertheless, to complete, by February 1976, its main job of undertaking the first comprehensive review of the intelligence community.

A. The Committee's Mandate

Under Senate Resolution 21, the Committee was instructed to investigate the full range of governmental intelligence activities and the extent, if any, to which such activities were "illegal, improper or unethical". In addition to that very broad general mandate, the Committee was required by the Senate to investigate, study and make recommendations concerning various specific matters, several of which relate to the assassination issue.*

Although the Rockefeller Commission conducted an inquiry into reported assassination plots, the Commission declared it was unable, for a variety of reasons, to complete its inquiry. At the direction of the President, the Executive Branch turned over to the Select Committee the work the Commission had done, along with other documents relating to assassinations.

---

* For example, S. Res. 21 requires the Committee to study and investigate the following:

> the extent and necessity of . . . covert intelligence activities . . . abroad";
>
> "[the] nature and extent of executive branch oversight of all United States intelligence activities";
>
> "the need for improved, strengthened, or consolidated oversight of United States intelligence activities by the Congress"; and the need for new legislation.

B. Committee Decision To Make This Report Public

This report raises important questions of national policy. We believe that the public is entitled to know what certain instrumentalities of their Government have done. Further, our recommendations can only be judged in light of the factual record. Therefore, this interim report should be made public.

Because of our faith in the democratic system, and the paramount importance of strengthening the institutions of this country, the Committee believes the truth about the assassination allegations should be told. Democracy depends upon a well-informed electorate. Truth underlies both justice and freedom.

STRESS the FACT THAT EXTRAORDI that IT CAN + will be done

We reject any contention that the facts disclosed herein should be kept secret because they are embarrassing to the United States. Despite the possible injury to our national reputation, the Committee believes that foreign peoples will, upon sober reflection, respect the United States more for keeping faith with its democratic ideal than they will condemn us for the misconduct itself.

The fact that portions of the story have already been publicly disclosed only accentuates the need for full disclosure. Innuendo and misleading partial disclosures are neither fair to the individuals involved, nor a responsible way to lay the groundwork for informed public policy judgments.

C. The Scope of the Committee's Investigation

The investigation of the assassination issue has been an unpleasant duty, but one that the Select Committee had to meet. The Committee has compiled a massive record in the months that the inquiry has been underway.

The hearing record includes some _______ pages of sworn testimony from ___ witnesses*during ____ hearing days as well as numerous staff interviews. The documents which the Committee obtained included raw files from the agencies and departments, from the White House, and from the Presidential libraries of the Administrations of former Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy Kennedy and Johnson.**

We obtained evidence of two general types: first, evidence which related to the overall setting of events, the national policy of the time, and descriptions of normal operating procedures including channels of command and control; and second, evidence relating to specific events.

A Senate Committee is not a court. It looks to the past, not to determine guilt or innocence, but in order to make recommendations for the future. Therefore, where we found the evidence to be ambiguous--as we did on some issues--we have set out both sides, in order that the evidence may speak for itself.

Despite the number of witnesses and documents examined by the Committee, there were the following shortcomings in the evidence available to us:

---

* The names of the witnesses are set forth in Appendix A.

** The Committee served both general and specific document requests upon the Executive Branch and the Administration represented to the Committee that it did not know of any additional relevant documents, except, of course, for the possibility that the "Nixon papers" (which the Committee is attempting to obtain) may contain material relevant to the allegations relating to Chile.

TOP SECRET

Many of the events under consideration occurred as long as fifteen years ago. With one exception, they occurred during the administrations of Presidents now dead. Other high officials, whose testimony might have additional light upon the thorny issues of authorization and control, are also dead. Moreover, with the passage of time, the memories of those still alive have dimmed.

The Committee often faced the difficult task of distinguishing refreshed recollection from speculation. In many instances, witnesses were unable to testify from independent recollection and had to rely on documents contemporaneous with the events to refresh their recollections. While informed speculation is of some assistance, it can only be assigned limited weight in judging specific events.

Assassination is not a subject on which one would expect many records or documents to be made or retained. In fact, there were more relevant contemporaneous documents then we had expected, and the CIA in 1967 made internal study of the Castro, Trujillo and Diem assassination allegations. That study was quite useful, particularly in suggesting leads for uncovering the story of the actual assassination activity. Unfortunately, some material

---

* Those studies were made at the direction of CIA Director Richard Helms to provide him with information to respond to questions put to him by President Johnson. The President's questions, as to Castro, were provoked by a Drew Pearson newspaper column of March [6], 1967, which had alleged CIA attempts on the life of Castro using the Mafia.

The President asked Helms at the same time to provide information about Trujillo and Diem.

relating to that investigation was destroyed upon its completion.*

TOP SECRET

A final deficiency in the evidence stems from the doctrine that CIA covert operations should be concealed from the world and performed in such a way that if they were discovered, the role of the United States could be plausibly denied. As an extension of this doctrine of "plausible deniability" communications between the Agency and high Administration officials were often convoluted and imprecise.**

See if Ref to 10/2 very weak

The evidence contains sharp conflicts, some of which relate to basic facts. But the most important conflicts relate not so much to basic facts as to differing perceptions and opinions based upon relatively undisputed facts.

With respect to both kinds of conflicts, the Committee has attempted to set forth the evidence extensively so that it may speak for itself. In the findings and conclusions section, we suggest resolutions of some of the conflicts. Remembering that the Committee's main job is to find lessons for the future, there are also occasions where we point out that resolving conflicts in the evidence may be less important than making certain that the system which produced the ambiguities is corrected.

---

* This was done pursuant to the instructions of CIA Director Richard Helms (Helms Ex.___; 6/13/75 Tr.__). In fairness to Director Helms it should be added, however, that he was responsible for requesting the preparation of the I.G. Reports and for preserving them.

** For a full discussion of this doctrine see pages

D. Summary of Findings and Conclusions

1. The Questions Presented

The Committee sought to answer four broad questions:

ASSASSINATION PLOTS. Did U.S. officials instigate, attempt, aid and abet, or acquiesce in plots designed to assassinate foreign leaders?

INVOLVEMENT IN OTHER KILLINGS. Did U.S. officials assist foreign dissidents in a way which significantly contributed to the killing of foreign leaders?

AUTHORIZATION. Where there was involvement by U.S. officials in assassination plots or other killings, were such activities ordered and if so, at what levels of our Government?

COMMUNICATION AND CONTROL. Even if not authorized, were the assassination activities perceived to be within the scope of agency authority, and was adequate control exercised over its activities.

2. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Plots

The Seven Allegations. The Committee investigated alleged U.S. involvement in assassination plots in five foreign countries.* They were:

Country	Individual Involved**
Cuba	Fidel Castro
Congo (Zaire)	Patrice Lumumba

---

* Insert Footnote on Sukarno and Duvalier.

** Insert re Raul and Che and Ngo Dinh Nhu.

Country	Individual Involved
Dominican Republic	Rafael Trujillo
Chile	General Rene Schneider
South Vietnam	Ngo Dinh Diem

In summary, the evidence with respect to each allegation disclosed the following.*

Fidel Castro (Cuba). United States Government personnel plotted to kill Castro beginning in 1960. American underworld figures were used in these plots as well as Cubans hostile to the Castro regime. One of the later plots, which lasted until 1965, involved a Cuban dissident who was provided encouragement and material support by the United States.

Patrice Lumumba (Congo/Zaire). In the Fall of 1960, two CIA officials were asked by superiors to assassinate Lumumba. Poisons were sent to the Congo and some exploratory steps were taken toward gaining access to Lumumba. Subsequently, in early 1961, Lumumba was killed by Congolese rivals. It does not appear from the evidence that the United States was involved in the actual killing.

—CALLED OFF!

Rafael Trujillo (Dominican Republic). Trujillo was shot by Dominican dissidents on May 31, 1961. Commencing in 1960 and continuing to the time of the assassination, the U.S. Government generally supported these dissidents and some Government personnel were aware that they intended to kill Trujillo. Three pistols and three carbines were furnished by American officials, although a request for machine guns was later refused. There was conflicting evidence whether the weapons were knowingly supplied for use in the assassination and whether any were present at the scene.

---

* See Section III for a detailed treatment of the evidence.

General Rene Schneider (Chile). On October 25, 1970, General Schneider died of gunshot wounds inflicted while resisting a kidnap attempt three days earlier. Schneider, as Commander in Chief of the Army and a constitutionalist opposed to military coups, was considered an obstacle to efforts to prevent Salvador Allende from assuming the office of President of Chile. The United States Government supported, and sought to instigate, a military coup to block Allende. U.S. officials supplied financial aid, machine guns and other equipment to various military figures who opposed Allende. There was conflicting evidence on whether the United States had previously severed relations with the group that kidnapped and killed Schneider and on whether any of the equipment supplied was actually used in the kidnapping.

Have to be clearer.

Ngo Dinh Diem (South Vietnam). Diem and his brother, Nhu, were killed on November 2, 1963, in the course of a South Vietnamese Generals' coup. Although the United States Government supported the coup, there was no evidence that American officials favored the assassination. Indeed, it appeared that the assassination of Diem was not part of the Generals' pre-coup planning but was instead a spontaneous act which occurred during the coup and with which there was no American connection.

In addition to these five cases the Committee received evidence that ranking government officials discussed, and may have authorized, the establishment within the CIA of a generalized capability to assassinate.

Similarities and Differences Among the Plots. The plots all involved Third World countries, most of which were relatively small and none of which possessed great political or military strength. Apart from that similarity, there were significant differences among the plots. The following distinctions are pertinent:

ce-Chairman
wer reserved
ght to
ange to
clude con-
pt of Com-
nist sphere
luence
thin
stern Hemi-
here.

TOP SECRET

(1) Whether United States officials initiated the plot or were responding to requests of local dissidents for aid.

(2) Whether the plot was specifically intended to kill a foreign leader, or whether the leader's death was a reasonably foreseeable consequence of an attempt to overthrow the government.

The Castro case is an example of a plot conceived by United States officials to kill a foreign leader. The Lumumba plot falls into the same category.

In the case of Trujillo, although the U. S. Government certainly opposed his regime, it did not initiate the plot. Rather, United States officials responded to requests for aid from local dissidents whose aim clearly was to assassinate Trujillo. By aiding them this country was implicated, whether the specific weaponry actually supplied was meant to kill Trujillo or was only intended as a symbol of U.S. support for the dissidents.

IS THAT
FAIR
distinc
Do you
NOT mee
w/those
planning
(say if
they w
TO
ASSASS

The Schneider case is different from that of both Castro and Trujillo. The United States Government sought a coup and provided support to local dissidents, knowing they believed that General Schneider was an obstacle to their plans. However, even though the support included deadly weapons, it appears that the intention of both the dissidents and the United States officials was to abduct, not to kill, General Schneider. Similarly, in the Diem case, United States officials did want a change in Government, but there is no evidence that the United States sought the death of Diem himself.

3. Summary of Findings and Conclusions on the Issues of Authority and Control.

To put the inquiry into assassination allegations in context, two points must be made clear. First, there is no doubt that the United States Government opposed the various leaders in question. U.S. officials at the highest levels objected to the Castro and Trujillo regimes, believed the accession of Allende to power in Chile would be harmful to American interests, and thought of Lumumba as a dangerous force in the heart of Africa. Second, the evidence on assassinations has to be viewed in the context of other, more massive activities directed against the regimes in question. For example, the plots directed against Fidel Castro personally, cannot be understood without considering the fully authorized, comprehensive, assaults upon his regime, such as the Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961 and Operation Mongoose in 1962.

However, the issue of Governmental authorization of assassination is of independent importance. There is a significant difference between a coldblooded, targeted, intentional killing of an individual foreign leader and other forms of intervention in the affairs of foreign nations. Therefore, the Committee endeavored to explore as fully as possible the question of how and why the plots happened, whether they were authorized, and if so, from what level the authorization came.

what is it

We discovered a murky picture. It is not clear whether this is due to the system of deniability and the consequent state of the evidence which even after our long investigation remains conflicting and inconclusive, or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization so that activities such as assassinations could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without express authority.

Based upon the record of our investigation, the Committee's single most important finding is that the system was such that assassination activity could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the highest level.

Along with that paramount conclusion, the Committee makes four other major findings.* The first relates to the lack of direct evidence of authorization of the assassination plots by Presidents or other persons above the Governmental agency or agencies involved. The second explains why certain officials may have, nonetheless, perceived that, according to their judgment AUTHORIZED and experience, assassination was an acceptable course of action. The third criticizes agency officials for failing on several occasions to described? reveal their plans and activities to superior authorities, or for failing to do so with sufficient detail and clarity. The fourth criticizes Administration officials for, on occasion, giving vague and indirect instructions to subordinates, and for not making sufficiently clear that assassination should be excluded from consideration. ASSUMES THAT THAT WAS INTENTION

There is admittedly a tension within the four findings. The first and third points tend to suggest a lack of authority while the second and fourth points explain why agency officials could nonetheless have perceived that their actions were proper. This tension reflects a basic conflict in the evidence. While there are some conflicts over facts, it is more important that there may often have been two differing perceptions of the same facts. This distinction may be the result of the differing backgrounds and experience of those persons experienced in covert operations as distinquished from those who were not. Words of urgency which to the former may have meant killing, to the latter may have meant nothing of the sort.

---

* The Committee's findings are elaborated in Section   , *infra*.

While we are critical of certain individual actions, the Committee is mindful of the inherent problems in a system which relies upon secrecy, compartmentation, circumlocution, and the avoidance of clear responsibility. This sytem creates the risk of confusion and rashness in the very areas where clarity and sober judgment are most necessary. Hence, before turning to an extensive review of the evidence relating to the cases, we briefly deal with the general subject of covert action during the relevant period.

TOP SECRET

Agreed to by Drafting Subcommittee
on August 28, 1975

II. COVERT ACTION AS VEHICLE FOR FOREIGN POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Simply stated, covert action may be defined as activity which supports the sponsoring nation's foreign policy objectives but is concealed under circumstances permitting that nation to plausibly deny its actions.

The National Security Act of 1947 did not specifically include authority for covert operations. However, it granted to the National Security Council, then created as an instrument of the President, the authority to direct the CIA to "perform such other functions and duties related to intelligence affecting the national security as the National Security Council may from time to time direct." Thereafter, at its first meeting in December 1947, the National Security Council issued a top secret directive granting the CIA the authority to conduct covert operations. From 1955 to 1970, the basic authority for these operations was National Security Council 5412/2.*

This directive framed the purposes of covert operations entirely in terms of opposition to "International Communism,"** directing the CIA to counter, reduce and discredit "International Communism" throughout the world in a manner consistent with U. S. foreign and military policies. It also directed the CIA to undertake covert operations to achieve this end, and defined covert operations as any covert activities related to propaganda, economic warfare, political action (including sabotage, demolition and assistance to resistance movements) and all activities compatible with the directive (emphasis supplied). In 1962, the CIA's General Counsel rendered the opinion that the Agency's activities are "not inhibited by any limitations other than those broadly set forth in NSC 5412/2." (CIA General Counsel Memorandum 4/6/62)

---

* Today the basic authority for CIA covert action operations is National Security Decision Memorandum 40, which superceded NSC 5412/2 on February 17, 1970.

** By contrast, NSAM 40 of 1970 described covert actions as those secret activities designed to further official U. S. programs and policies abroad. It made no reference to communism.

POLICY DEVELOPMENT AND APPROVAL MECHANISM

The evidence dealt with in Part III is concerned with what actually happened as far as obtaining, or not obtaining, authorization for the activities under review by the Committee. With respect to what was meant to happen in regard to covert action generally, the CIA's General Counsel stated in 1962:

> CIA must necessarily be responsible for planning. Occasionally suggestions for action will come from outside sources but, to depend entirely on such requirements would be an evasion of the Agency's responsibilities. Also, the average person, both in government and outside, is thinking along normal lines and to develop clandestine cold war activities properly, persons knowing both the capabilities and limitations of clandestine action must be studying and devising how such actions can be undertaken effectively.

With respect to policy approval, the General Counsel went on to say:

> Both in developing ideas or plans for action it is incumbent upon the Agency to obtain necessary policy approval, and for this purpose these matters should be explored with proper officials in other departments and agencies, particularly in the Departments of State and Defense, so the determination can be made as to whether any one proposal should go to the Special Group or higher for policy determination.

The General Counsel's 1962 memorandum made it clear that the CIA considered itself responsible for developing proposals and plans to implement the specific objectives of NSC 5412/2. At the same time, however, the memorandum stated that even in the development of ideas or plans for action, it was incumbent upon the Agency not only to coordinate with other executive departments and agencies, but also to "obtain *necessary* policy approval" (emphasis added). The issue which faced the Committee, of course, was whether such approval was, in fact, sought and obtained for assassination plans, and whether CIA officials thought it was "necessary" to obtain express approval for these activities.

Beginning in 1955, the responsibility for authorizing CIA covert action operations rested in the Special Group, a sub-Cabinet level subcommittee of the National Security Council composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. Today this group is known as the 40 Committee, and its membership now includes the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staffs. In addition, during 1962 another subcommittee of the NSC was established to oversee covert operations relating to Cuba. It was known as the Special Group (Augmented) and was composed of the members of the Special Group, the Attorney General and certain other high officials.

The overriding purpose of the Special Group and its successors has been to exercise control over covert operations abroad. The Special Group was charged with the responsibility of considering the objectives of any proposed activity, whether or not it would accomplish these aims. how likely it would be to succeed, and in general whether or not it would be "proper" and in the American interest. The Special Group Chairman usually was responsible for determining which projects required Presidential consideration, as well as keeping him abreast of progress or changes.

The foregoing should not be taken to imply that the procedures always have been clear and tidy, nor that they have always been followed. Prior to 1955, formal procedures barely existed at all. In 1955 the Special Group procedures were made more formal. Nevertheless, the procedures that were followed during the period of 1959-63 were characterized by an internal CIA memorandum as "somewhat cloudy and thus can probably be described as having been based on value judgments by the DCI." (Memorandum for the Record, C/CA/PEG, "Policy Coordination of CIA's Covert Action Operations," 21 February 1967)

In addition to the "somewhat cloudy" nature of the formal procedures themselves, there are other options available to any Chief Executive. The Committee recognizes that an agency charter to plan covert action could not preempt Presidential authority to develop and mandate foreign policy. Similarly, it is equally clear that what may be represented as the "desire" of a President is often communicated by intermediary officials whose perceptions may or may not accurately reflect the true Presidential purpose. Obviously, formal procedures can be disregarded from above or below. In at least one case, for example, a President instructed CIA officials not to consult with the Special Group or other departments. In at least one other case, Agency officials decided not to bring matters to the attention of the Special Group. It should also be noted that all of the above procedures apply to activities labeled "covert action" whereas some of the activities considered in this report were treated as "counter-intelligence" actions. Such actions are not normally subject to 40 Committee-type interdepartmental authorization and review.

what

TOP SECRET

The Concept of "Plausible Deniability"

Non-attribution for U. S. Government covert operations was the original and principal purpose of the so-called doctrine of plausible denial.

Bit more historical Feel

Evidence before the Committee clearly demonstrates that this concept, designed to protect the U. S. and its operatives from the consequences of disclosures, has been significantly expanded to: (1) mask not only Presidential decisions but those of his senior staffers; (2) support less than complete advice to such persons regarding these operations.

The quest for "plausible denial" has shaped the processes of the U. S. Government for approving and evaluating covert actions. The 40 Committee and its predecessors can serve as "circuit breakers" for a President, placing the locus of consideration of covert action at several removes from the Oval office. One consequence of the doctrine of plausible denial is an incomplete documentary record.

The quest for "plausible denial" has also led to the use of certain techniques, including euphemism and circumlocution. These techniques have had as their purpose the objective of allowing the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed. In addition, the use of indirect reference to inform a President could be reversed--a President could communicate his desire to see a highly sensitive operation undertaken in a similar indirect, circumlocutious manner. Whether, at times circumlocution had the affect of failing to let Presidents or other officials accurately understand what was being said, was a question faced by the Committee.

Need testimony cite

one way or the other

"Plausible deniability" raises a number of other issues which the Committee has had to confront. Differing interpretations of the practice of plausible denial has affected the extent to which sensitive matters were raised or considered. The evidence discussed below revealed that very serious problems of assessing and insuring accountability and control can arise out of plausible deniability.

B. Cuba

We have divided the facts with respect to Cuba into three broad sections.

The first discusses the plots against Fidel Castro's life without attempting to confront the question of authorization.

The second deals with the evidence concerning whether or not the successive Directors of Central Intelligence, Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized or knew about the various plots. (Although we have organizationally divided the evidence relating to the DCI's from the proof relating to other high administration officials, it is important to remember that the Director of Central Intelligence is the principal advisor to the President on intelligence matters, a member of major administrative policy-making councils as well as head of the Central Intelligence Agency.)

The third section covers the evidence concerning whether or not other high officials--including the various Presidents--authorized or knew about the plots. This section also considers the evidence relating to whether or not the CIA officials who were involved with the plots believed them to be consistent with the general policy objectives of the various administrations even if they had no personal knowledge as to whether the plots were or were not specifically authorized by higher authority.

1. The Assassination Plots Themselves

We have found concrete evidence of at least eight plots involving the CIA to assassinate Fidel Castro from 1960 to 1965. Although some of the assassination plots did not advance beyond the stage of planning and preparation, one plot involving the use of underworld figures reportedly twice progressed to the point of sending poison pills to Cuba and dispatching teams to commit the deed. Another plot involved furnishing weapons and other assassination devices to a Cuban dissident. The assassination proposals ran the gamut from high-powered rifles to poison pills, poison pens, deadly bacterial powders, and other devices which would strain ~~the~~ imagination.

The most ironic of these plots took place on November 22, 1963--the very day that President Kennedy was shot in Dallas--when a CIA official in Paris offered a poison pen to a Cuban for use against Castro while at the same time an emissary from President Kennedy was meeting with Castro to explore the possibility of improved relations.

The following narrative sets forth the facts of assassination plots against Castro as established before the Committee by witnesses and documentary evidence. The question of the level and degree of authorization of the plots is considered in the sections that follow.

(a) Plots: Early 1960

(1) Plots to Destroy Castro's Public Image

Efforts against Castro did not begin with assassination attempts.

From March through August 1960, during the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA considered plans to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches. According to the Inspector General's Report, an official in the Technical Services Division (TSD) recalled discussing a scheme to spray Castro's broadcasting studio with a chemical which produced effects similar to LSD, but rejected the scheme because the chemical was not reliable. During this period, TSD impregnated a box of cigars with a chemical which produced temporary disorientation, hoping to induce Castro to smoke one of the cigars before delivering a speech. The Inspector General also reported a plan to destroy Castro's image as "The Beard" by dusting his shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out. The chemical was to be administered during a trip outside of Cuba, in which it was anticipated Castro would leave his shoes outside the door of his hotel room to be shined. TSD procured the chemical and tested it on animals, but apparently abandoned the scheme because Castro cancelled his trip. (I.G., pp. 10-13.)

(2) Proposal to Sabotage Flight

The first proposed action against the life of a Cuban leader sponsored by the CIA of which the Committee is aware took place in July 1960. On July 18, 1960, a Cuban airline

JOE D.

pilot who had volunteered to assist the CIA in gathering intelligence informed his case officer in Havana that he would probably be chosen to fly to Prague on July 21 to return Raul Castro to Cuba (Memo to I.G., 1/17/75). On July 20 the pilot confirmed that he would definitely fly the plane. CIA Headquarters and field stations along the route were requested to inform the Havana Station of any intelligence needs that the pilot might fulfill. The case officer testified that he and the pilot contemplated only acquiring information about Czechoslovakia and Raul Castro, and that assassination was not considered.*

The cable from the Havana Station was received at Headquarters on the night of July 20. The duty officer, who was summoned to Headquarters from his home, contacted Tracy Barnes, Deputy to DDP Richard Bissell, and J.C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division.** Following their instructions, he sent a cable to the Havana Station early in the morning of July 21, stating: "Possible removal top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at HQS." The cable inquired whether the pilot was sufficiently motivated to risk "arranging an accident during return trip" and advised that the station could "at discretion contact subject to determine willingness to cooperate and his suggestions on details". Ten thousand dollars was authorized as payment "after successful completion", but no advance payment was permitted because of the possibility that the pilot was a double agent. According to the case officer, this cable represented "quite a departure from the conventional activities we'd been asked to handle". (Case Officer interview, 8/4/75, p. 2)*

---

* A cable to Headquarters requesting any intelligence needs supports this account.

** The duty officer testified that he must have spoken with King because he would not otherwise have signed the cable "by direction, J.S. King". (Duty Officer, p. 16) He also would "very definitely" have read the cable to Barnes before sending it, because "Barnes was the man to whom we went . . . for our authority and for work connected with the Cuban Project." (Duty Officer, pp. 4, 25) Since King at that time was giving only "nominal attention" to Cuban affairs, the officer concluded that a proposal of the gravity of an assassination could only have "come from Mr. Barnes". (Duty Officer, p. 24)

The case officer contacted the pilot and told him of the proposal while accompanying him to the airport for the flight. The case officer avoided the word "assassinate", but made it clear that the CIA contemplated an "accident to neutralize this leader's (Raul's) influence". (Case Officer interview, p. 2) After being assured that his sons would be given a college education in the event of his death, the pilot agreed to take a "calculated risk", limited to possibilities that might pass as accidental.** (Cable, Havana to Director, 7/22/70)

Immediately after returning to the station the case officer was told that a cable had just arrived stating: "Do not pursue ref. Would like to drop matter." (Cable, Director to Havana, 7/22/60; Memo to I.G., 1/17/75)* It was, of course, too late to "drop the matter" since the plane had already departed. When the Cuban pilot returned, he told the case officer that he had not had an opportunity to arrange an accident.

---

* The duty officer remembered the cable and some of the surrounding facts for precisely that reason: "[I]t was an unusual type of [cable], and I say this because I can remember it 15 years later." (Duty Officer, p. 14) The case officer recalled that when he saw the cable, he "swallowed hard". (Case Officer interview, p. 3)

** The cable from Havana to Headquarters stated that the pilot was willing to risk: "A. Engine burnout on takeoff to delay or harrass trip: B. Vague possibility water ditching approximately three hours out from Cuba."

(3) Poison Cigars

A notation in the records of the Chief, Operations Div., Office of Medical Services indicates that on August 16, 1960, he was given a box of Castro's favorite cigars with instructions to treat them with ~~a~~ lethal poison (I.G., p. 21). The cigars were contaminated with a botulinum toxin so potent that a person would die after putting one in his mouth (I.G., p. 22). The Chief reported that the cigars were ready on October 7, 1960; TSD notes indicate that they were delivered to an unidentified person on February 13, 1961 (I.G., p. 22). The record does not disclose whether an attempt was made to pass the cigars to Castro.

(b) Use of Underworld Figures--Phase I

(1) The Initial Plan

In August 1960, the CIA took steps to enlist the aid of members of the criminal underworld with gambling syndicate contacts to assassinate Castro. The earliest evidence of the operation is a conversation between Deputy Director of Plans (DDP) Richard Bissell and Colonel Sheffield Edwards, Chief of the Office of Security. Edwards recalled that Bissell asked him to locate someone who could assassinate Castro (Edwards, pp. 2-3). Bissell confirmed that he requested Edwards to find someone to assassinate Castro, and believed that Edwards raised the idea of contacting members of a gambling syndicate operating in Cuba* (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 71-73). Edwards assigned the mission to James P. O'Connell, Chief of the Operational Support Division of the CIA's Office of Security, explaining that he and Bissell were looking for someone to "eliminate" or "assassinate" Castro (O'Connell, pp. 6-8, 95-96).

---

* This cable was signed by Tracy Barnes (Duty Officer, p. 28) The duty officer recalled seeing this cable, and testified that he had heard that Allen Dulles had countermanded the cable authorizing the possible assassination attempt against Raul Castro. (Duty Officer, pp. 29-30) The reasons for Dulles' action are discussed *infra* at .

Edwards and O'Connell decided to rely on Robert A. Maheu to recruit someone "tough enough" to handle the job (O'Connell, p. 8). Maheu was an ex-FBI agent who had entered into a career as a private investigator in 1954. Robert Cunningham, a former FBI associate of Maheu's who was employed in the CIA's Office of Security, had arranged for the CIA to use Maheu in several sensitive covert operations in which "he didn't want to have an Agency person or a government person get caught"* (O'Connell, p. 158). Maheu was initially paid a monthly retainer by the CIA of $500, which was terminated after his practice became more lucrative (O'Connell, pp. 13-14; I.G., p. 15). O'Connell had served as Maheu's case officer since the Agency first began using Maheu's services, and by 1960 they had become close personal friends (Maheu, p. 6).

---

* Although Castro closed the gambling casinos in Cuba when he first came to power, they were reopened for use by foreign tourists in late February 1959, and remained open until late September 1961.

Sometime in late August or early September 1960, O'Connell approached Maheu about the proposed operation (O'Connell, p. 9; Maheu, 7/29, p. 6). As Maheu recalls the conversation, O'Connell asked him to contact John Roselli, an underworld figure with possible gambling contacts in Las Vegas, to determine if he

---

* During 1954-1955, Maheu cooperated with the CIA in attempting to undermine Aristotle Onassis' contract with the Saudi Arabian government that would have given Onassis virtually complete control over shipping of oil from Saudi Arabia. Although he was employed by Onassis' competitor, Niarchos, Maheu worked closely with the CIA. He testified that he contracted for a listening device to be placed on Onassis' room in New York after first consulting with the Agency, and that he provided the impetus for the termination of the contract by publicizing its terms in a newspaper in Rome that he said he purchased with CIA funds. (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 14-25.)

O'Connell testified that Maheu, at the CIA's request had also previously arranged for the production of a film in Hollywood depicting a foreign leader with a woman in the Soviet Union. The CIA planned to circulate the film, representing it to have been produced, but not released (O'Connell, pp. 159, 162-163). Maheu testified that he had located an actor resembling the leader and had arranged for the production of the film (Maheu, 7/30/75, pp. 39-42).

Nec
other evid

would participate in a plan to "dispose" of Castro* (Maheu, 7/29, p. 8). Maheu had known Roselli since the late 1950's (Maheu, 7/29, pp. 58-60). Although Maheu claims not to have been aware of the extent of Roselli's underworld connections and activities, he recalled that

> "it was certainly evident to me that he was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention" (Maheu, 7/29, p. 60).

O'Connell had previously met Roselli at Maheu's home (Maheu, 7/29, p. 8). O'Connell and Maheu each claimed that the other had raised the idea of using Roselli, and Maheu said O'Connell was aware that Roselli had contacts with the gambling syndicate (Maheu, 7/29, p. 8; O'Connell, pp. 15-16).

— did O'Connell testify

Maheu was at first reluctant to become involved in the operation because it might interfere with his relationship with his new client, Howard Hughes. He finally agreed because he felt that he owed the Agency a commitment (O'Connell, pp. 12-13, 103). O'Connell recalled that Maheu was to approach Roselli using a cover story that he represented business firms suffering heavy financial losses caused by Castro's actions** (O'Connell, p. 16). O'Connell testified that Maheu was told to offer money, probably $150,000, for Castro's assassination* (O'Connell, pp. 16, 111; Memorandum, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66).

---

* Maheu testified that he was told that the plan to assassinate Castro was one phase of a larger project to invade Cuba (Maheu, pp. 7, 13, 47).

** Roselli testified that the story was developed later and used as a mutual "cover" by O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli in dealing with Cubans recruited for the project (Roselli, pp. 16-17).

(2) Contact With The Syndicate

In early September 1960, Maheu met Roselli at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills, told him that "high government officials" needed his cooperation in getting rid of Castro, and asked him to help recurit Cubans to do the job (Roselli, p. 8). Maheu recalled that Roselli was at first reluctant to participate in the project and insisted on meeting with a representative of the government (Maheu, 7/29, pp. 10-11; Roselli, p. 9). A meeting with O'Connell was arranged in New York City at the Plaza Hotel during the week of September 14, 1960 (Roselli, pp. 10-11; I.G., p. 16). O'Connell testified that he was introduced to Roselli as a business associate of Maheu, and that Maheu told Roselli that he represented international business interests which were pooling money to pay for the assassination of Castro (O'Connell, p. 26). Roselli claimed that Maheu told him at that time that O'Connell was with the CIA** (Roselli, pp. 11, 85).

---

* The I.G. Report places the amount at $150,000; O'Connell thought it might have been $100,000 (O'Connell, p. 16), Roselli recalled $250,000 (Roselli, p. 25) and Edwards confirmed the $150,000 figure (Edwards, p. 9). Maheu could recall no "price tag" for Castro's assassination (Maheu, p. 34).

** The weight of the testimony indicates that Roselli realized the CIA was behind the assassination attempt at an early stage.

It was arranged that Roselli would go to Florida and recruit Cubans for the operation (Roselli, pp. 11-12). Edwards informed Bissell that contact had been made with the gambling syndicate (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21; I.G., p. 17).

During the week of September 24, 1960, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met in Miami to work out the details of the operation (O'Connell, pp. 25-26; Roselli, p. 12; I.G., p. 18). Roselli used the cover name of "John Rawlston" and represented himself to the Cuban contacts as an agent of

business

> "some business interests of Wall Street that had . . . nickel interests and properties around in Cuba, and I was getting financial assistance from them" (Roselli, pp. 9, 17).

nec?

Maheu handled the details of setting up the operation and keeping O'Connell informed of developments. After they had been in Miami for a short time, and certainly prior to October 18,* Roselli introduced Maheu to two indivi-

---

Maheu substantially confirmed his account (Maheu, p. 111). O'Connell recalled that about three weeks after the New York meeting, Roselli told him, "I am not kidding, I know who you work for." (O'Connell, p. 26.)

* Maheu recalls that he first met "Sam Gold" (Giancana) after November , 1960, when he was staying at the Fountainbleu Hotel (Maheu, p. 17). Other evidence indicates that the meeting took place earlier. When they first went to Miami, Maheu and Roselli stayed at the Kennilworth Hotel (Maheu, pp. 15-16); FBI records reveal that Maheu and Roselli (alias J. A. Rollins) were registered at the Kennilworth from October 11-30 (File R-505, FBI summary, p. 10). Giancana must have been involved in the operation during the October period at the Kennilworth because (1) the wiretap of Rowan's apartment, discussed infra, was made on October 30; (2) on October 18, the FBI sent a memorandum to Bissell stating that Giancana had been telling several people that he was involved in an assassination attempt against Castro (see infra, p.).

duals on whom he intended to rely: "Sam Gold", who would serve as a "back-up man" (Roselli, p. 15), or "Key" man (Maheu, p. 17), and "Joe", whom "Gold" said would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there (I.G., p. 19). O'Connell, who was using the name "Jim Olds", met "Sam" and "Joe" only briefly (O'Connell, pp. 26-29).

— see p13

O'Connell testified that he learned the true identities of his associates one morning when Maheu called and asked him to examine the "Parade" supplement to the Miami Times.* An article on the Attorney General's ten-most-wanted criminals list revealed that "Sam Gold" was Mom Salvatore Giancana, a Chicago-based gangster,** and "Joe" was Santos Trafficante, the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba† (O'Connell, pp. 28-30); I.G., p. 19). O'Connell reported his discovery to Edwards (O'Connell, pp. 31, 33) but did not know whether Edwards reported this fact to his superiors (O'Connell, pp. 32, 41). O'Connell testified that this incident occurred after "we were in this thing up to our ears", a month or so after

---

* A search of supplements to all Miami papers during this period did not reveal the article described by O'Connell.

** Sam Giancana was murdered in his home on June 20, 1975.

† Trafficante made regular trips between Miami and Cuba on gambling syndicate business (I.G., pp. 19-20).

Giancana had been brought into the operation, but prior to giving the poison pills to Roselli (O'Connell, pp. 30, 44). cryptic - not really introduced

Maheu recalled that it was Giancana's job to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination (Maheu, p. 19), and that he met almost daily with Giancana over a substantial period of time (Maheu, p. 18). Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key role" (Maheu, p. 34), Roselli claimed that none of the Cubans eventually used in the operation were acquired through Giancana's contacts (Roselli, p. 15).

(3) Rowan Wiretap Incident

In late October 1960, Maheu arranged for a Florida investigator, Edward DuBois, to place an electronic "bug" in comedian Dan Rowan's room in Las Vegas (Maheu, p. 36). DuBois' employee, Arthur J. Balletti, flew to Las Vegas and installed a tap on Rowan's phone (Maheu, p. 38). O'Connell characterized the ensuing events as a "Keystone comedy act" (O'Connell, p. 68). On October 31, 1960, Balletti, believing that Rowan would be out for the afternoon, left the wiretap equipment unattended. A maid discovered the equipment and notified the local sheriff, who arrested Balletti and brought

---

* According to O'Connell and Roselli, DuBois had been requested to place a legal electronic bug against the wall from an adjacent apartment. Balletti instead installed an electronic tap on the phone (O'Connell, pp. 67-68; Maheu, pp. 36-37).

him to the jail. Balletti called Maheu in Miami, tying "Maheu into this thing up to his ear" (O'Connell, pp. 71-72; File R-505, FBI memorandum). Balletti's bail was paid by Roselli (Roselli, p. 52).

(i) Evidence Concerning CIA involvement in the Tap. The Committee received conflicting evidence on whether the agency was consulted prior to the installation of the tap.* O'Connell testified that he had called Edwards and cleared the placement of an electronic "bug" in Rowan's apartment prior to the installation of the tap (O'Connell, pp. 67-71). Maheu recalled that he had initially asked O'Connell if the CIA would handle the job, and that O'Connell had told him that

> "he would call Mr. Edwards and see if they would have the capability of accomplishing this, . . . and that subsequently he informed me that Mr. Edwards had said that they would not do it, but approved paying for it if we hired an independent private detective to put it on." (Maheu, 7/29, p. 37).

On the other hand, Edwards, in a May 14, 1962 memorandum for the Attorney General (discussed at length, infra, p.), stated that

> "At the time of the incident neither the Agency nor the undersigned knew of the proposed technical installation."**

Directly

* Regardless of whether the CIA initially authorized the tap, it is apparent that the CIA paid for the tap. DuBois told FBI agents that Maheu had paid him a retainer of $1,000 (File R-505, p. 14). O'Connell confirmed that CIA "indirectly" paid for the tap because "we paid Maheu a certain amount of money, and he just paid it out of what we were giving him."

"Q: But it was understood, or you understood, that out of the money the CIA made available to Maheu, Dubois would be paid for the tap?
A: Yes.

* * *

Q: And Colonel Edwards. . . knew somebody was being employed in order to accomplish a tap?
A: That is right." (O'Connell, p. 69.)

** A memorandum by J. Edgar Hoover states that the Attorney General said he had been told by Edwards that the "CIA admitted that they had assisted Maheu in making the installation" (Memo, Hoover, 4/10/62).

The Inspector General's Report accepted Edwards' assertion that "the Agency was first unwitting and then a reluctant accessory after the fact", but offered no further evidence to support that contention (I.G., p. 67).

The Committee also received conflicting evidence concerning whether the tap had been placed to keep Giancana in Miami or to check on security leaks. O'Connell testified that during the early stages of negotiations with the gambling syndicate, Maheu informed O'Connell that a girl friend of Giancana was having an affair with Rowan. Giancana wanted Maheu to bug Rowan's room; otherwise, Giancana threatened to fly to Las Vegas himself. Maheu was concerned that Giancana's departure would disrupt the negotiations, and secured O'Connell's permission to arrange for a bug to ensure Giancana's continued presence and cooperation. (O'Connell, pp. 68-67.) Maheu substantially confirmed this account (Maheu, pp. 25-30).

There is some evidence suggesting that the CIA itself may have instituted the tap to determine whether Giancana was leaking information about his involvement in an assassination attempt against Castro. Bissell was informed that Giancana had been talking about Giancana's involvement in an assassination plot* (without indicating the CIA was

pretty thin

---

* When Roselli talked with Giancana after the wiretap had been discovered, Giancana "laughed. . . I remember his expression, smoking a cigar, he almost swallowed it laughing about it" (Roselli, p. 52). Roselli claims that he was "perturbed" because "It was blowing everything, blowing every kind of cover that I had tried to arrange to keep quiet" (Roselli, p. 52).

Roselli said that he told Giancana that the CIA was involved in the operation "in order to have him keep his mouth shut" (Roselli, p. 27).

involved) by an October 18, 1960 memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover, which stated that "a source whose reliability has not been tested" reported:

> "(D)uring recent conversations with several friends, Giancana stated that Fidel Castro was to be done away with very shortly. When doubt was expressed regarding this statement, Giancana reportedly assured those present that Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions. . . Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the 'assassin' had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's." (File R-505, memo from Hoover to DCI (Att: DDP), 10/19/60.)

Roselli testified that Maheu had given him two explanations for the tap on different occasions: first, that Giancana was concerned about a possible affair between Rowan and his girl friend; and, second, that he had arranged the tap to determine whether Giancana had told his girl friend about the assassination plot, and whether she was spreading the story (Roselli, pp. 47-48). Maheu gave the second explanation to the FBI when he was questioned about his involvement in the tap (File R-505, FBI Summary), and Edwards wrote in the memorandum to the Attorney General:

> "Maheu stated that Sam Giancana thought that (Giancana's girl friend) might know of the proposed operation and might pass on the information to one Dan Rowan, a friend of (Giancana's girl friend)". (Memorandum, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62.)

(ii) Consequences of the tap. Edwards told Maheu that if he was "approached by the FBI, he could refer them to me to be briefed that he was engaged in an intelligence operation directed at Cuba" (Memo, Edwards to Kennedy, 5/14/62). FBI records indicate that on April 18, 1961, Maheu informed the FBI that the tap involved the CIA, and suggested that Sheffield Edwards be contacted (File R-505, Memo, 4/20/61). Edwards subsequently informed the Bureau that the CIA would object to Maheu's prosecution because it might reveal sensitive information relating to the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion* (R-505, Summary of FBI file). In a memo dated April 24, 1962, Herbett J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, advised the Attorney General that the "national interest" would preclude any prosecutions based upon the tap. Following a briefing of the Attorney General by the CIA, a decision was made not to prosecute.**

---

* Details of the discussions between the CIA and FBI are described fully _infra_ at pp. .

** Maheu subsequently drew on his involvement with the CIA to avoid testifying before Senator Edward Long's Committee investigating invasions of privacy in 1966. According to the Inspector General's Report, when Maheu learned that the Committee intended to call him, "he applied pressure on the Agency in a variety of ways--suggesting that publicity might expose his past sensitive work for the CIA" (I.G., p. 74). Lawrence Houston, General Counsel for the CIA, met with Maheu and his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, and informed Senator Long that Maheu had been involved in CIA operations (Houston, pp. 58-60). As a result, the Long Committee did not call Maheu to testify.

(4) Poison Pills Are Prepared and Delivered to Cuba

The Inspector General's Report described conversations among Bissell, Edwards, and Cornelius Roosevelt, necessary? Chief of the Technical Services Division (TSD), concerning the most effective method of poisoning Castro (I.G., pp. 23-24). There is some evidence that Giancana or Roselli originated the idea of depositing a poison pill in Castro's drink to give the "asset" a chance to escape (I.G., p. 25). O'Connell recalled Roselli's request for something "nice and clean, without getting into any kind of out and out ambushing", preferably a poison that would disappear without a trace (O'Connell, p. 116). The Inspector General's Report cited O'Connell as stating that the Agency had first considered a "gangland-style killing" in which Castro would be gunned down. Giancana reportedly opposed the idea because it would be difficult to recruit someone for such a dangerous operation, and suggested instead the use of poison. (I.G., p. 25)

Edwards rejected the first batch of pills prepared by TSD because they would not dissolve in water. A second batch, containing botulinum toxin, "did the job expected of them" when tested on monkeys. (I.G., pp. 25-26; O'Connell, p. 43) O'Connell received the pills from TSD, probably in February 1961, with reassurances that they were lethal,* and then gave them to Roselli (O'Connell, p. 43).

---

* Records of the TSD still extant in 1967 indicate that the pills were tested on February 10 and delivered to O'Connell sometime thereafter.

In late February or March 1961, Roselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered in Cuba to an official close to Castro who may have received kickbacks from the gambling interests (I.G., p. 23). The official kept the pills for a few weeks, then returned them. Roselli and O'Connell ascribed his failure to a case of "cold feet" (Roselli, p. 24; O'Connell, p. 44). The Inspector General noted that he had lost his position in the Prime Minister's office, and thus access to Castro, before he received the pills (I.G., p. 28).

(5) A Second Delivery Is Attempted

Following this first failure, Roselli told O'Connell that Trafficante believed Tony Varona, a leading figure in the Cuban exile movement, might be able to accomplish the assassination (I.G., p. 29).* Dr. Manuel Antonio de Varona y Lorado headed the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a Cuban exile group supported by the CIA. The Inspector General's Report suggests that Varona may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing "gambling, prostitution, and dope monopolies" in

---

* O'Connell testified that he met Varona only once, and that after the meeting Varona told Roselli:

> "Look, I don't know [sic] like the CIA and you can't tell me that this guy isn't a CIA man". O'Connell recalled, "I don't know whether I showed it or what, but he suspected that I wasn't what I was represented to be." (O'Connell, p. 22.)

Cuba after the overthrow of Castro (I.G., p. 29). The Report speculated that Varona was interested in the assassination scheme as a means of financing the purchase of arms and communications equipment (I.G., p. 31).

Varona claimed to have a contact inside a restaurant frequented by Castro (Roselli, p. 21). As a prerequisite to the deal, he demanded cash and $1,000 worth of communications equipment (I.G., pp. 31-32; O'Connell, p. 23). O'Connell recalls that Colonel J. C. King, head of the Western Hemisphere Division, gave him $50,000 in Bissell's office to pay Varona if he successfully assassinated Castro (O'Connell, pp. 17-21). O'Connell stated that Bissell also authorized him to give Varona the electronics equipment that he requested (O'Connell, pp. 20-24).

Bissell testified that he did not doubt that some cash was given to O'Connell, and that he was aware that the poison pills had been prepared. He did not recall the meeting, and considered it unlikely that O'Connell would have been given the money in his office (Bissell, 6/11, p. 40). The Inspector General's Report, relying on an Office of Security memorandum to the DDCI dated June 24, 1966, as well as on an interview with the person who signed the voucher for the funds, placed the amount at $10,000 (I.G., pp. 31-32). If the Inspector General's conclusions were correct, the funds which Bissell allegedly authorized were probably the advance payment to Varona, and not the $150,000 that was to be paid to Varona after Castro's death.

The record does clearly reflect, however, that communications equipment was delivered to Varona* and that he was paid advance money to cover his expenses, probably in the amount of $10,000 (I.G., p. 32). The money and pills were delivered at a meeting between Maheu, Roselli, Trafficante, and Varona at the Fontainebleau Hotel in Miami. As Roselli recalled, Maheu

> "opened his briefcase and dumped a whole lot of money on his lap . . . and also came up with the capsules and he explained how they were going to be used. As far as I remember, they couldn't be used in boiling soups and things like that, but they could be used in water or otherwise, but they couldn't last forever . . . . It had to be done as quickly as possible. (Roselli, p. 21). **

Varona had no better success than Orta. According to the Inspector General's Report, Edwards believed the scheme failed because Castro stopped visiting the restaurant where the "asset" was employed. Maheu suggested an

NAmE?

---

* O'Connell testified that a man from the communications office delivered the communications equipment that Varona had requested to Miami (O'Connell, p. 20). Maheu recalled delivering an automobile which he had been told contained communications equipment to an empty lot (Maheu, p. 52).

** Maheu denied that this dramatic event ever occurred, and did not recall being present at a meeting at which the pills were passed (Maheu, pp. 40-41). Maheu did recall that O'Connell showed him the pills in an envelope and told him that the pills would be given to a Cuban (Maheu, p. 40).

alternative reason. He recalled being informed that after the pills had been delivered to Cuba, "the go signal still had to be received before in fact they were administered" (Maheu, p. 42). He testified that he was informed by O'Connell sometime after the operation that the Cubans had an opportunity to administer the pills to Fidel Castro and either Che Guevarra or Raul Castro, but that the "go signal" never came (Maheu, pp. 43-44, 60-61). He did not know who was responsible for giving the signal (Maheu, p. 44-45). Varona subsequently returned the cash and the pills (O'Connell, pp. 19-20; CIA Justice file R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to DCI, 6/24/66).

The date of the Varona operation is unclear. The Inspector General's Report places it in March-April 1961, prior to the Bay of Pigs (I.G., p. 29). Bissell testified that the effort against Castro was called off after the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/11, p. 52) and Maheu testified that he had no involvement in the operation after the Bay of Pigs (Maheu, p. 50). O'Connell, however, was certain that it occurred during early 1962 (O'Connell, pp. 47-48).

(c) Use of Underworld Figures: Phase II

(1) Change in Leadership

The Inspector General's Report divides the gambling syndicate operation into Phase I, termina-

TOP SECRET

ting with the Bay of Pigs, and Phase II, beginning with William Harvey's involvement in late 1961. The distinction between a clearly demarcated Phase I and Phase II may be an artificial one, as there is considerable evidence that the operation was continuous, perhaps lying dormant for the period immediately following the Bay of Pigs.*

In early 1961, Harvey** was assigned the responsibility for establishing a general capability within the CIA for disabling foreign leaders, including assassination as a "last resort" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25, pp. 34-35).

---

* Harvey said that he took over a "going operation" from Edwards (I.G., p. 42; Harvey, 6/25, p. 67) and emphasized that:

> "I would like to make as clear as I can that there was no phase 1, phase 2 in this. This is an ongoing matter which I injected into . . . . (Harvey, 6/25, p. 90).

Continuity was provided by retaining O'Connell as the case officer for the project well into May 1962. During interviews for the Inspector General's Report, O'Connell recalled that there was "something going on" between the Bay of Pigs and Harvey's assumption of control, (I.G., p. 43). When testifying before the Committee, O'Connell firmly recalled several trips to Miami in the Fall of 1961, and "right up to the time I turned it over to Harvey I was in and out of Miami" (O'Connell, pp. 89-90).

** Harvey had a long background in clandestine activities. He had conceived and carried out the Berlin tunnel operation (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9), and served as Chief of the division, which was responsible for the surreptitious acquisition of code information (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 8-9).

The capability was called Executive Action and was later included under the cryptonym ZR/RIFLE. It and the evidence relating to (i) its connection to the "White House" and (ii) whether or not it involved action as well as "capability" is discussed extensively infra at ______.

Harvey's notes reflect that Bissell asked him to take over the gambling syndicate operation from Edwards and discussed the "application of ZR/RIFLE to Cuba" on November 16, 1961 (I.G., p. 39). Bissell confirmed that the conversation took place and accepted the November date as accurate (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 12-13). He also testified that the operation

> "was not reactivated, in other words, no instructions went out to Roselli or to others . . . to renew the attempt, until after I had left the Agency" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 53).

Harvey agreed that his conversation with Bissell was limited to exploring the feasibility of using the gambling syndicate against Castro (Harvey, 7/11, p. 60).

Richard Helms replaced Bissell as DDP in February 1962. As such, he was Harvey's superior. Harvey testified that he kept Helms informed of the gambling syndicate operation at all stages* (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 65-66; 7/11, p. 42; I.G., p. 41).

(2) The Operation is Reactivated

In early April 1962, Harvey, who testified that he was acting on "explicit orders" from Helms (Harvey, 7/11, p. 18), requested Edwards to put him in touch with Roselli (CIA Justice File R-153; Edwards memorandum, 5/14/62). O'Connell first introduced Harvey to Roselli in Miami, where Harvey told Roselli to maintain his Cuban contacts, but not to deal with Maheu or Giancana (O'Connell, p. 50; Roselli, pp. 27-30), whom he had decided were "untrustworthy" and "surplus" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 65). O'Connell recalled that Roselli did not initially trust Harvey, although they subsequently developed a close friendship. (O'Connell, p. 52).

---

*When interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Harvey stated that he briefed Helms on his first meeting with Roselli, and "thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the Castro operation" (I.G., p. 41).

Helms' recollection was less certain. Helms did recall that he was briefed by Harvey when Harvey first contacted Roselli in April 1962. He remembered that he "reluctantly" had approved the operation, but that he had no confidence that it would succeed (Helms, 7/17, p. 23).

When asked if he authorized sending the poison pills to Florida, Helms testified:

> "I believe they were poison pills, and I don't recall necessarily approving them, but since Harvey alleges to have them and says that he took them to Miami, I must have, I must have authorized them in some fashion." (Helms, 6/13, p. 44).

Helms confirmed that Harvey was "reporting quite regularly what was going on. Whether he reported everything or not, I do not know." It was Helms' expectation that Harvey would have reported to him a matter such as the pills. (Helms, 6/13, p. 105). However, Helms also testified:

> "You saw the I.G. Report says that I was kept currently informed. Maybe I was and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it, as I have said. But I do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life"(Helms, 7/18, p. 32).

Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli met for a second time in New York on April 8-9, 1962 (I.G., p. 43). A notation made during this time in the files of the Technical Services Division indicates that four poison pills were given to O'Connell on April 18, 1962 (I.G., pp. 46-47). The pills were passed to Harvey, who arrived in Miami on April 21, and found Roselli already in touch with Varona (I.G., p. 47). He gave the pills to Roselli, explaining that "these would work anywhere and at any time with anything" (Roselli, p. 31). Roselli testified that he told Harvey that the Cubans intended to use the pills to assassinate Che Guevara as well as Fidel and Raul Castro. According to Roselli's testimony, Harvey approved of the targets, stating "everything is all right, what they want to do" (Roselli, p. 34).

Varona requested arms and equipment as a quid pro quo for carrying out the assassination operation (O'Connell, pp. 53-54). Harvey, with the help of the CIA's Miami station (JMWAVE), procured explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios, and boat radar costing about $5,000 (I.G., p. 49). Harvey and the chief of the JMWAVE station rented a U-Haul truck under an assumed name and delivered the equipment to a parking lot (Harvey, 6/25, p. 63). The keys were given to Roselli, who watched the delivery from across the street with O'Connell (O'Connell, pp. 92-93).

The truckload of equipment was finally picked up by either Varona or Roselli's agent, Maceo (I.G., pp. 49-50; Roselli, p. 40). Harvey testified that the arms "could" have been for use in the assassination attempt, but that they were not given to Varona solely for that purpose (Harvey, 7/11, p. 9).

Roselli kept Harvey informed of the operation's progress. Sometime in May 1962, he reported that the pills and guns had arrived in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 64; Roselli, pp. 34, 42-43). On June 21, he told Harvey that Varona had dispatched a three-man team to Cuba. The Inspector General's Report described the team's mission as "vague" and conjectured that the team would kill Castro or recruit others to do the job, using the poison pills if the opportunity arose (I.G., p. 51).

Harvey met Roselli in Miami on September 7 and 11, 1962. Varona was reported to be preparing to send in another three-man team to penetrate Castro's bodyguard. Harvey was told that the pills, referred to as "the medicine," were still "safe" in Cuba (Harvey, 6/25, p. 103; I.G., p. 51).

Harvey testified that by this time he had grave doubts about whether the operation would ever take place, and told Roselli that "there's not much likelihood that this is going anyplace, or that it should be continued" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 104). Varona's second team never left for Cuba, claiming that "conditions" in Cuba were not right (I.G., p. 51-52). During early January 1963, Harvey paid Roselli $2,700 to defray Varona's expenses (I.G., p. 52).

Harvey terminated the operation in mid-February 1963. At a meeting with Roselli in Los Angeles, it was agreed that Roselli would taper off his communications with Varona (I.G., pp. 52-53). Roselli testified that he simply broke off contact with the Cubans. However, he never informed them that the offer of $150,000 for Castro's assassination had been withdrawn* (Roselli, p. 45).

The agency personnel who dealt with Roselli attributed his motivation to patriotism** and testified that he was not paid for his services. According to O'Connell, Roselli

> "paid his way, he paid his own hotel fees, he paid his own travel.... And he never took a nickel, he said, no, as long as it is for the government of the United States, this is the least I can do, because I owe it a lot." (O'Connell, p. 27).

Edwards agreed that Roselli was "never paid a cent" (Edwards, p. 16), and Maheu testified that "Giancana was paid nothing at all, not even for expenses, and that Mr. Roselli was given a pittance that did not even begin to cover his expenses (Maheu, 7/29, p. 68). It is clear, however, that the CIA did pay Roselli's hotel bill during his stay in Miami in October 1960.* The CIA's involvement with Roselli caused the Agency some difficulty during Roselli's subsequent prosecutions for fraudulent gambling activities and living in the country under an assumed name.**

---

* "Q: As far as those Cubans knew, then the offer which they understood from you to come from Wall Street was still outstanding?

"A: I don't know if they still think so ... I didn't see them after that to tell them that" (Roselli, p. 45)."

** Roselli claims that he was motivated by "honor and dedication" (Roselli, p. 59).

In 1943, Roselli had been convicted of extorting money from motion picture producers to insure studios against labor strikes, and during the period of his contacts with the CIA, Roselli was deeply involved in hotel and gambling operations in Las Vegas (File R-505, Summary of FBI Documents). It is possible that he believed cooperating with the government in the assassination operation might serve him well in the future.

(d) Plans in Early 1963

Two plans to assassinate Castro were explored by Task Force W, the section concerned with covert Cuban operations, in early 1963. Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), Chief of the Task Force, asked Samuel Halpern to determine whether an exotic seashell, rigged to explode, could be deposited in an area where Castro commonly went skin diving (Halpern, p. 28). The idea was explored by the Technical Division and discarded as impractical (Helms, 6/13, p. 135; I.G., p.77)

A second plan involved having James Donovan (who was negotiating with Castro for the release of prisoners

---

* FBI reports reveal that Roselli's expenses at the Kennilworth Hotel, where he was registered from October 11 - 30, 1960 under the name of J.A. Rollins, were paid by Maheu (File R-505, FBI file summary, p.10). Maheu's expenses were reimbursed by the CIA.

** In May 1966, the FBI threatened to deport Roselli for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia. (Roselli, whose true name is Filippo Saco, was born in Italy and allegedly brought illegally into the United States while still a child.) Roselli contacted Edwards, who informed the FBI that Roselli wanted to "keep square with the Bureau," but was afraid that gangsters might kill him for "talking" (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum, Osborn to FBI, 5/27/66). After Roselli was arrested for fraudulent gambling activities at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills in 1967, he requested Harvey, who had left the Agency, to represent him (CIA Justice File R-153, Memorandum for Record by Osborn, 12/11/67). Harvey contacted the Agency and suggested that it prevent the prosecution (Osborn Memorandum, supra). Roselli was subsequently convicted of violating United States interstate gambling laws. In 1971, the CIA approached the Immigration and Naturalizaation Service, Department of Justice, to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with CIA "that might occur if deportation proceedings were brought. (CIA to Select Committee, 7/21/75). It was agreed that CIA would be kept informed of developments in that case. The deportation order is presently being litigated in the courts.

did I do anything to stop it -

taken during the Bay of Pigs operation) present Castro with a contaminated diving suit* (Colby, 5/21, pp. 38-39).

The Inspector General's Report dates this operation in January 1963, when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as Chief of Task Force W, although it is unclear whether Harvey or Fitzgerald conceived of the plan (I.G., p. 75). It is likely that the activity took place earlier, since Donovan had completed his negotiations by the middle of January 1963. Helms characterized the plan as "cockeyed" (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

TSD bought a diving suit, dusted the inside with a fungus that would produce a chronic skin disease (Madura foot), and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercule bacillus (I.G., p. 75). The Inspector General's Report states that the plan was abandoned because Donovan gave Castro a different diving suit on his own initiative (I.G., p. 75). Helms testified that the diving suit never left the laboratory (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

(e) AMLASH

(1) Origin of the Project

In March 1961, an officer of the Mexico City CIA station met with a highly-placed Cuban official to determine if he would cooperate in efforts against the Castro regime (I.G., p. 78). The Cuban, referred to by the cryptonym AMLASH-1, had been involved with an anti-Batista faction that only grudgingly accepted Castro's rule (Case Officer 2, p. 9, 39).* The meeting was inconclusive, but lead to subsequent meetings at which AM/LASH-1 agreed to cooperate with the CIA.

---

*Donovan was not aware of the plan.

AM/LASH-1 was viewed as an important "asset" inside Cuba. As a high-ranking military leader who enjoyed the confidence of Fidel Castro, he could keep the CIA informed of the internal workings of the regime (Case Officer 2, pp. 23, 40). It was also believed that he might play a part in fomenting a coup within Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 43).**

From the first contact with AM/LASH-1, until the latter part of 1963, it was uncertain whether he would defect or remain in Cuba. His initial requests to the CIA and FBI for aid in defecting were rebuffed (I.G., pp. 80, 82-83). When Case Officer 1 joined the AM/LASH-1 operation in June 1967, his assignment was to "stay in place and report to us" (Case Officer 1, p. 38). At a meeting in August 1962 in a foreign capital, AM/LASH-1 stated that he would remain in Cuba if he "could do something really significant for the creation of a new Cuba", and expressed a desire to plan the execution of Fidel Castro (Case Officer 1 Contact Report, August 1 meeting). The subject of assassinating Castro was again discussed at a meeting on August 10, 1962, between AM/LASH-1 and his case officer. The case officer's contact report states that assassination was raised in discussing AM/LASH-1's role in Cuba, and that AM/LASH-1 was visibly upset. "It was not the act that he objected to, but merely the choice of the word used to describe it. 'Eliminate' was acceptable." (Case Officer 1, Contact Report, August 7-10, meetings).

---

* The Committee has taken the testimoy of the two case officers involved in the AM/LASH project. Case officer 1 dealt with AM/LASH-1 through September 1963; Case Officer 2 continued until mid-1965 (Case Officer 2, p.). The Committee has agreed not to divulge their names as they are still in active service with the Agency.

why nAm GJ

** AM/LASH-1 was the major "asset" in the AM/LASH operation. During this period the CIA also sponsored a separate operation to

> "penetrate the Cuban military to encourage either defections or an attempt to produce information from dissidents, or perhaps even to forming a group which would be capable of replacing the then present government in Cuba" (Case Officer 1, pp. 18, 22).

The case officers for AM/LASH were also involved in this second related program.

The case officers who testified before the Committee said that AM/LASH-1 was not directly requested to assassinate Castro. The record clearly reveals, however, that the agency personnel dealing with AM/LASH-1 were aware of his desire to take such action. A cable to headquarters reporting an August 16, 1963 meeting with AM/LASH-1 stated:

> "Have no intention give AMLASH-1 physical elimination mission as requirement but recognize this something he could or might try to carry out on his own initiative."*

---

* Case Officer 1 testified that AM/LASH-1 discussed "eliminating" Castro, although he attributed such remarks to AMLASH-1's "mercurial" nature, and stated that no specific plans for assassinations were ever discussed (Case Officer 1, pp. 39-41, 62). The case officer who took over the AMLASH project in September 1963 recalled being briefed by Case Officer 1 on AMLASH's belief that Castro's assassination was a necessary first step in a coup. (Case Officer 2, p. 28).

The second AMLASH case officer described the context in which AMLASH-1 generally raised the topic of assassination:

> "You also must recognize that AMLASH was a rather temperamental man whose temperament was of a mercurial nature and whereas he may have said something like this in one fit of pique, he would settle down and talk about organizing a regular military coup in the next breath." (Case Officer 2, p.29)

At a meeting on October 3, 1963, AMLASH-1 again raised the possibility of defecting, but indicated that he would be willing to continue working against the Castro regime if he received firm assurances of American support (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49). According to Case Officer 2, AMLASH-1 asked for military supplies, a device with which to protect himself if his plots against Castro were discovered, and a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy (Case Officer 2, pp. 48-49).

Desmond Fitzgerald (now deceased), who was then Chief, SAS * agreed to meet AMLASH-1 and give him the assurances he sought. The Inspector General's Report states that Fitzgerald consulted with the DDP, Helms, who agreed that Fitzgerald should hold himself out as a personal representative of Attorney General Kennedy (I.G., p.89).**

this is problem

Helms testified that he did not recall the conversation, and speculated that the Attorney General might not have been consulted because

> "this was so central to the whole theme of what we had been trying to do . . .(find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to replace Castro). This is obviously what we had been pushing, what everybody had been pushing for us to try to do, and it is that context that I would have made some remark like this." (Helms, 6/13, p. 117)

---

* SAS (Special Affairs Staff) was the name given to Task Force W in early 1963 when Fitzgerald replaced Harvey as head of the covert Cuban operations. The AMLASH Case Officers reported directly to Fitzgerald.

** The contact plan for the proposed meeting stated:

> "Fitzgerald will represent self as personal representative of Robert F. Kennedy who travelled to (foreign capital) for specific purpose meeting AMLASH-1 and giving him assurances of full support with a change of the present government in Cuba."

Helms recalled that he told Fitzgerald to

> "go ahead and say that from the standpoint of political support, the United States government will be behind you if you are successful. This had nothing to do with killings. This had only to do with the political action part of it". (Helms, 6/13, p. 131.)

Fitzgerald met AM/LASH-1 on October 29, 1963, in a foreign capital, and promised that the United States would support a coup against Castro* (Case Officer 2, p. 60). When later interviewed for the Inspector General's Report, Fitzgerald recalled that AM/LASH-1 repeatedly requested an assassination weapon, particularly a "high powered rifle with telescopic sights that could be used to kill Castro from a distance" (I.G., p. 90). Fitzgerald stated that he told AM/LASH-1 that the United States would have "no part of an attempt on Castro's life" (I.G., p. 90). Case Officer 2 recalled that AM/LASH-1 raised the prospect of assassinating Castro, but did not propose an explicit plan (Case Officer 2, pp. 62, 85). AM/LASH-1, was, however, "convinced that Castro had to be removed from power before a coup could be under-

pretty specific

---

* Case Officer 2 did not recall whether Robert Kennedy's name was used (Case Officer 2, p. 60).

taken in Cuba" (Case Officer 2, p. 61).

AMLASH-1 also requested high-powered rifles and grenades (Case Officer 2, p. 77). A memorandum by Case Officer 2, dated November 18, 1963, states:

> "C/SAS (Fitzgerald) approved telling AMLASH-1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. Cache could, if he requested it, include . . . high powered rifles with scopes . . ."

Goes other way from p 33

AMLASH-1 was told on November 22, 1963, that the cache would be dropped in Cuba (Case Officer 2, p. 92).

(2) The Poison Pen Device

On November 22, 1963, Case Officer 2 met with AMLASH-1 in a foreign capital, offered him a ball-point pen rigged with a hypodermic needle, and suggested that Blackleaf 40 would be an effective poison to use in the device. (Case Officer 2, p. 110) The needle was designed to be so fine that the victim would not notice its insertion (Case Officer 2, p. 103).

The Inspector General's Report states that Case Officer 2, when he was interviewed in 1967, stated that AMLASH-1 had requested the Agency to

> "devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try." (I.G., p. 92)

The Report concluded that:

> "although none of the participants so stated, it may be inferred that they were seeking a means of assassination of a sort that AMLASH-1 might reasonably have been expected to have devised himself." (I.G., p. 92)

Halpern, Fitzgerald's assistant, told the Committee that the pen was intended to show "bona fides" and

> "The orders were to do something to get rid of Castro . . . and we thought this other method might work whereas a rifle wouldn't." (Halpern, p. 26)

Helms confirmed that the pen was manufactured

> "to take care of a request from him that he have some device for getting rid of Castro, for killing him, murdering him, whatever the case may be." (Helms, 6/13, p. 113)
>
> ". . . (t)his was a temporizing gesture." (Helms, 6/11, p. 133)*

On November 22, 1963, Fitzgerald and the case officer met with AMLASH-1 in a European capital and offered him the poison pen, recommending that he use Blackleaf-40, a deadly poison which is commercially available. (Case Officer 2, p. 112) The Inspector General's Report noted that

> "it is likely that at the very moment President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer was meeting with a Cuban agent in Paris and giving him an assassination device for use against Castro." (I.G., p. 94)

---

* In his testimony before the Committee, Case Officer 2 offered a conflicting story. He said that the purpose of the pen was

> "to provide AMLASH with a device which would serve him to protect himself in case he was confronted with and charged with being involved in a military coup against Castro." (Case Officer 2, p. 107)

According to the case officer, AMLASH-1 had requested an "esoteric device which could easily be concealed and which he could use in self-defense (Case Officer 2, po. 98-99). The device was not intended for offensive use against any person, but was rather

> "a kind of psychological crutch . . .to help him think that we were interested in his own protection, his own security" (Case Officer 2, pp. 104-105).

This version is wholly inconsistent with documents in the CIA files, some of which were written by the AMLASH case officer, which establish that AMLASH-1 intended to kill Castro, and that the CIA knew his desire and endeavored to supply the means that he needed.

The case officer later recalled that AMLASH-1 did not "think much of the device," and complained that CIA could surely "come up with something more sophisticated than that" (I.G., p. 93a).

The case officer recalled offering the pen to AMLASH-1, but could not remember whether AMLASH-1 threw it away then or took it with him (Case Officer 2, pp. 105, 110). He did recall that AMLASH-1 said he would not take the pen back to Cuba, but did not know what AMLASH-1 in fact did with the pen (Case Officer 2, pp. 110-111).

An entry in the CIA files on AMLASH dated March 29, 1965, states:

> "Although Fitzgerald and the case officer assured AMLASH-1 on November 22, 1963, that CIA would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted) the situation changed when the case officer and Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with AMLASH-1 changed and it was decided that we could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and would not aid AMLASH-1 in this attempt. . . AMLASH-1 was not informed of (this decision) until he was seen by the case officer in November, 1964."

(3) Providing AMLASH-1 with Arms

CIA cables indicate that one cache of arms for AMLASH-1 was delivered in Cuba in March 1964 and another in June. An entry in the AMLASH file for May 5, 1964, states that the case officer requested the Technical Services Division to produce, on a "crash basis," a silencer which would fit an FAL rifle. The contact report of a meeting between the case officer and a confidant of AMLASH states that AMLASH was subsequently informed that it was not feasible to make a silencer for an FAL.

Toward the latter part of 1964, AMLASH-1 became more insistent on the fact that the assassination of the Cuban leadership was a necessary initial step in a successful coup. (Case Officer 2, pp. 129-133). In a memorandum dated December 10, 1964, the case officer wrote:

> "AMLASH-1 was told and fully understands that the United States Government cannot become involved to any degree in the 'first step' of his plan. If he needs support, he realizes he will have to get it elsewhere. FYI: This is where B-1 could fit in nicely in giving any support he would request."

Documents in the AMLASH file establish that in early 1965, the CIA put AMLASH in contact with B-1, the leader of an anti-Castro group. As the case officer explained to the Inspector General:

> " . . . what had happened was that SAS had contrived to put B-1 and AMLASH together in such a way that neither of them knew that the contact had been engineered by CIA. The thought was that B-1 needed a man inside and AMLASH wanted a silenced weapon, which CIA was unwilling to furnish to him directly. By putting the two together, B-1 might get its man inside Cuba and AMLASH might get his silenced weapon -- from B-1." (I.G., p. 101)

A report of a meeting between a case officer and B-1 states that B-1, in his initial contacts with AMLASH-1, discussed plans for assassinating Castro. AMLASH-1 suggested that guerrilla raids against Cuba should be stepped up one month before the "attempt on Fidel Castro" to "prepare the public and raise the morale and resistance spirit of the people." B-1 reported that AMLASH-1 believed that the only solution to the problems in Cuba would be

> "to get rid of Fidel Castro. He is able either to shoot him with a silencer or place a bomb in some place where Fidel will be. He might use, for example, a small bomb that he can carry and place, or with his group attack, the residence where Fidel lives . . . . B-1 is going to provide AMLASH-1 with escape routes and places where B-1 is able to pick him up. He will memorize these points and escape routes. . . Next, B-1 is to provide AMLASH-1 either a silencer for a FAL or a rifle with a silencer.*

---

* A CIA document dated January 3, 1965, states that B-1 told a case officer that he and AM/LASH-1 had reached an agreement on the following points:

"1. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH-1 with a silencer for the FAL; if this is impossible, B-1 is to cache in a designated location a rifle with a scope and silencer plus several bombs concealed either in a suitcase, a lamp or some other concealment device which he would be able to carry and place next to Fidel Castro.

"2. B-1 is to provide AM/LASH-1 with escape routes controlled by B-1 and not by the Americans. The lack of confidence built up by the Bay of Pigs looms large.

"3. B-1 is to prepare one of the western provinces, either Pinar del Rio or Havana, with arms caches and a clandestine underground mechanism. This would be a fall back position and a safe area where men and weapons are available to the group.

A CIA cable dated February 2, 1965, stated that B-1 had given AMLASH-1 a silencer and that AMLASH-1 had "small, highly concentrated explosives." On February 11, 1965 the Madrid Station cabled that AMLASH-1 would soon receive "one pistol with silencer and one FAL rifle with a silencer from B-1's secretary" (I.G., p. 103). A subsequent cable reported that "B-1 had three packages of special items made up by his technical people and delivered to AMLASH-1 in Madrid" (I.G., p. 103

In June 1965, CIA terminated all contact with AMLASH-1 and his associates because of reports that his activities were widely known (I.G., pp. 104-105).

"4. B-1 is to be in Cuba one week before the elimination of Fidel, but no one, including AM/LASH-1 will know B-1's location.

"5. B-1 is to arrange for recongition by at least five Latin American countries as soon as Fidel is neutralized and a junta is formed. This junta will be established even though Raul Castro and Che Guevara may still be alive and may still be in control of the part of the country. This is the reason AM/LASH-1 requested that B-1 be able to establish some control over one of the provinces so that the junta can be formed in that location.

"6. One month to the day before the neutralization of Fidel, B-1 will increase the number of commando attacks to a maximum in order to raise the spirit and morale of the people inside Cuba. In all communiques, in all radio messages, in all propaganda put out by B-1 he must relate that the raid was possible thanks to the information received from clandestine sources inside Cuba and from the clandestine underground apparatus directed by "P". This will be AM/LASH-1's war name."

Approved by Drafting
Subcommiteee 9/5/75

2. At What Level Were the Castro Plots Authorized or Known About Within the Central Intelligence Agency?

(a) The Question Presented. As we have seen, first Richard Bissell and then Richard Helms, each as Deputy Director of Plans (DDP), were aware of plots to assassinate Fidel Castro. The evidence set forth herein relates to whether their superiors in the Agency, in particular Allen Dulles and John McCone, authorized or were aware of the assassination plots.

Dulles served as Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) from 1953 to November 1961. McCone served as DCI from November 1961 to 1965.* The Committee took considerable testimony on whether Dulles and McCone (or their Deputy DCI's, General Cabell and General Carter, respectively) knew about or authorized the plots against Fidel Castro's life.

In summary, the evidence is as follows:

(i) Dulles: Bissell and Edwards both expressed the belief that Dulles (and his Deputy, General Cabell) authorized the initial phase of the assassination plot involving underworld figures. They acknowledged, however, that Dulles (and his Deputy) were not told about the plot until after the underworld figures had been contacted. The words said to have been used to brief them--"an intelligence operation"--do not convey on their face that the plot involved assassination, although Bissell and Edwards insist the real meaning must have been understood. There is some other evidence which can be said both to suggest that Dulles and Cabell did know and to suggest that they did not know. (See Section (b) below.)

---

* Bissell served as DDP from January 1, 1959, to February 17, 1962. (President Kennedy decided to replace Dulles and Bissell because of the failure of the Bay of Pigs (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 6-8).) Helms, who had been Bissell's Deputy, succeeded Bissell in February 1962 as DDP. He was appointed DDCI in April 1965, and DCI in June 1966.

(ii) McCone: McCone testified that he did not know about or authorize the plots. Helms and Bissell both stated that McCone was not told by them of the earlier assassination efforts when McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961. The I.G. Report states that Harvey received Helms' approval not to brief McCone when the actual efforts were resumed in 1962. Harvey testified this accorded with his recollection. Thereafter, Helms and Harvey did not tell McCone about assassination activity on several occasions. Helms did not recall any agreement not to brief McCone, but did not call into question the position taken by Harvey or the I.G. Report on this matter. Helms did say that McCone never told him not to assassinate Castro, but added that he was not claiming that he told McCone about the plots. (These matters, as well as the various reasons put forward by Harvey and Helms for not briefing McCone, are set forth in Section (c) below.)

(b) Did Allen Dulles Know of or Authorize the Initial Plots Against Castro?* Both Allen Dulles and his Deputy (DDCI),

---

* This testimony relates to the "airplane" incident in July 1960 and what the I.G. Report referred to as the initial phase of the assassination effort involving the underworld. With respect to the "schemes" prior to that operation, the I.G. Report concluded they could "find no evidence that any of the schemes were approved at any level higher than division, if that". (I.G., p. 10.)

General Cabell, are deceased. Since we were unable to take any testimony from either, the Committee's investigation centered around the documents available and the testimony of those still alive who served under Dulles and Cabell.*

---

*The Inspector General questioned neither Dulles nor Cabell in preparing his Report in 1967.

(i) Dulles' January 1960 Statement to the Special Group Suggesting Contingency Plans for the Overthrow of the Casto Government, but Ruling Out "Elimination" of Castro.

January 13, 1960, Allen Dulles, in what was apparently the first Special Group discussion of a covert program to overthrow Castro, emphasized that "a quick elimination of Castro" was not contemplated by the CIA (minutes of Special Group meeting, 1/13/60). According to the minutes of the meeting, Dulles first "noted the possibility that over the long run the U.S. will not be able to tolerate the Castro regime in Cuba, and suggested that covert contingency planning to accomplish the fall of the Castro government might be in order." Then, in response to the State Department representative's comment that "timing was very important so as to permit a solidly based opposition to take over," Dulles

> "emphasized that we do not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro, but rather actions designed to enable responsible opposition leaders to get a foothold."

(ii) Dulles' Alleged Recission of the July 1960 Airplane Assassination Plan Upon Learning of It.

As discussed in greater detail above (see p. _____), in July, 1960, Tracy Barnes, Bissell's assistant, approved the sending of, in July, 1960, a cable to the Havana station stating that "possible removal of top three leaders (was) receiving serious consideration," and instructions were given to carry out a plan to kill Raul Castro. That plan was, however, abandoned shortly after it had been approved.

The Executive Officer to the Chief of the Cuba court action project, who had sent the cables testified that he had "heard" that Dulles had countermanded Barnes' plan and had indicated that "assassination was not to be considered." (Duty Officer, p. 29).* The officer added, however, that he had no personal knowledge of the reason for calling off the plan, or even if Dulles had been the one who called it off, he further testified that

> "assassination had not been part of the Cuba covert action project in 1960 and that Dulles' action in this incident conformed with CIA policy against the use of assassination." (Duty Officer, p. ____).**

---

* The countermanding cable to the Havana station, which was "Operational Immediate," was sent the morning after the cable of the previous night. The officer who sent that cable testified:

> "...I saw the cable and was told that, to the best of my knowledge, my memory is that the Director [Dulles], not the Deputy Director [Bissell] ... had countermanded the cable and had directed that -- had indicated that ... assassination was not to be considered." (Duty Officer, p. 29).

The officer stated that he did not talk to either Dulles or Bissell about the countermanding cable, but that he did see the cable and in all likelihood heard of the reason for Dulles' reaction in discussions the same morning with his superior, the Chief of the Cuba project. (Duty Officer, pp. 30-32).

** The officer testified:

> "...we were schooled that although other countries [used assassination] we do not, and I had always understood this as a basic rule." (Duty Officer, p 14).

> "Question: So was it your understanding after this cable, and in view of your knowledge of the Agency general practice with respect to assassination in which you had been schooled that it was not done, that assassination was not part of the Cuba Project, as far as you knew?"

"Officer: That's correct."

* * *

"Question: And would it be accuaate to say that your recollections concerning what you now view as what Mr. Dulles' attitudes were ... are based on your general training about what had always been said ... [and] that after this incident, what you were told ... fortified that previous belief [in] that Dulles had nullified at least this particular cable?"

"Officer: Correct."

"Question: Do you have anything in your recollection or as a result of your informed opinion or experience that would indicate to the contrary; that is, that Mr. Dulles did have assassination in his arsenal, so to speak?"

"Officer: I have no basis for any such speculation." (Duty Officer, pp. 31, ___).

(iii) Dulles Briefing on Use of Underworld Figures in September 1960.

1. Bissell and Edwards Said Dulles Was Told About An "Intelligence Operation" With No "Bad Words" Used, But That Dulles (and his Deputy) Understood That to Mean Assassination.

Bissell recalled that "in the latter part of September" there was "a meeting in which Col. Edwards and I briefed Mr. Dulles and General Cabell" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 20). Bissell testified that "Colonel Edwards outlined in somewhat circumlocutious terms the plan that he had discussed with syndicate representatives" (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22). He stated that Edwards had said:

> "that contact had been made with [the underworld], that a plan had been prepared for their use, and I think he either said in as many words or strongly inferred that the plan would be put into effect unless at that time or subsequently he was told by Mr. Dulles that it should not be". (Bissell, 6/9, p. 22.)*

The CIA's 1967 I.G. Report, based upon interviews with Edwards and Bissell, said Dulles and Cabell were briefed as follows:

> "The discussion was circumspect. Edwards deliberately avoided the use of any 'bad words'. The descriptive term used was 'an intelligence operation'. Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing. He

---

* Bissell testified that he was relying on the dating provided in the Inspector General's Report, but that his statements concerning what was said at the meeting were of his personal knowledge (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-22).

> recalls describing the channel as being 'from A to B to C'. As he then envisioned it, A was Maheu, B was Roselli, and C was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in understanding and approval. Certainly there was no opposition. Edwards states that, while there was no formal approval as such, he felt that he clearly had tacit approval to use his own judgement." (I.G., pp. 17-18.)

Bissell testified that the description sounded "highly plausible". (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75 at 24.) Edwards said it was "accurate" (Edwards Tr. at 11).

In light of the manner in which Bissell and Edwards described briefing Dulles, the question arises as to whether Dulles in fact would have understood that the operation involved assassination. The Inspector General, in attempting to "conjecture as to just what the Director did approve", decided

> "It is safe to conclude, given the men participating and the general subject of the meeting, that there was little likelihood of misunderstanding--even though the details were deliberately blurred and the specific intended result was never stated to unmistakable language. It is also reasonable to conclude that the pointed avoidance of 'bad words' emphasized to the participants the extreme sensitivity of the operation." (I.G., p.18).

Bissell testified that

> "I can only say that I am quite sure I came away from that meeting--and there was, I think, subsequent occasions when this came up between Mr. Dulles and myself, and I am quite convinced that he knew the nature of the operation."

* * *

> "Q.: What were the subsequent conversations you had with Mr. Dulles in which you concluded that he knew that this was an assassination effort?
>
> "Bissell.: . . . it's really a guess on my part that

> such conversations occurred . . . I do believe they did occur is that during the entire autumn I suppose I must have spoken to Mr. Dulles practically daily about some aspect of the whole Cuban operation and I am virtually certain that he would in one or another of those conversations and probably more than once have asked if there was anything to report about the Sheffield Edwards' operation. He also may have been in direct contact with Edwards at that time." (Bissell Tr. 6/9/75, pp. 24-26)

When asked by the Chairman why, in this context, persons within the Agency talked "in riddles to one another", Bissell replied that:

> ". . . I think there was a reluctance to spread even on an oral record some aspects of this operation.
>
> "Chairman: Did the reluctance spring from the fact that it simply grated against your conscience to have to speak more explicitly?
>
> "Bissell: I don't think it grated against my conscience. I think it may have been a feeling that the Director [Dulles] preferred the use of the sort of language that is described in the I.G. Report."

Bissell, in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, again addressed the issue of whether he and Edwards had made it clear to Dulles that what was involved was an assassination operation:

> "I thought I made clear that it was my impression--and I believe the impression incidentally that I thought was confirmed in the [I.G. Report]--that in discussing this with Dulles and Cabell . . . the objective of the operation was made unmistakably clear to them. The terms 'an intelligence operation', I think someone said, was that not a cover designation? But we would not under any circumstances have told Allen Dulles that this was an intelligence collection operation. If I said that on Monday, I must have given a wrong impression." (Bissell Tr. 6/11, p. 24.)

On the other hand, Scott Breckenridge, the only author of the Inspector General's Report still with the CIA, testified that in his opinion a "pointed avoidance of 'bad words'" would have made it less likely that an "intelligence operation" would have been understood as an assassination attempt, and that "it was open to question how clearly this was stated to Mr. Dulles and whether or not Mr. Dulles understood" (Colby/Breckenridge, 5/ , p. .)

Sheffield Edwards was quite infirm when examined by the Committee and has since died.* Edwards testified before the Committee as follows:

> ". . . [T]his possible project was approved by Allen B. Dulles, Director of CIA, and by General Cabell, the Deputy Director. They are both dead.
>
> "The Chairman: How do you know, Colonel, that the project had been approved by these two gentlemen?
>
> "Edwards: I personally briefed Allen Dulles . . . and Cabell." (Edwards, 5/30/75, pp. 5-6)

In his interview with the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards testified (Edwards interview, p. 5):

> "Q.: Now, who inside the Agency besides Bissell did you have any contact with on the top echelon?
>
> "A.: Very important. The plan was approved by Allen W. Dulles and General Cabell."

---

* As the investigation proceeded, members of the Committee requested that Edwards be recalled. Edwards passed away before this could be accomplished. As a result of Edwards' infirmity and subsequent death, the Committee was unable to examine him effectively concerning his conflicting prior statements concerning Dulles' knowledge of the plots.

James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the operation involving underworld figures, testified that when he and Edwards discussed the matter in 1975, prior to giving evidence to the Rockefeller Commission, he was sure that Edwards had told him Dulles had approved the plot (O'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 58-59). He added that he was "reasonably sure" or "knew" in the "back of my mind" that either Edwards or Bissell had also told him of Dulles' knowledge when the plot was underway in 1960-62 (O'Connell Tr. 5/30, pp. 33-34; 36; 60).*

A review of Dulles' calendar for August through December 1960 showed no meeting involving Dulles, Cabell, Bissell and Edwards.** Of course, such a meeting could have occurred without having been recorded.

2. Whatever Was Said to Dulles, He Was Not Briefed Until After Contact With the Underworld Figures Had Been Made.

Bissell and the Inspector General's Report (which relied on Edwards) placed the briefing of Dulles in "the latter part of September 1960".

---

* In June 1966, Howard J. Osborn, Edwards' successor as Director of Security, wrote a memorandum for Helms on Maheu stating that "the DCI was briefed and gave his approval". When questioned about this memorandum, Osborn stated that he had no firsthand knowledge of the briefing, and that he had most likely obtained this statement from Edwards or O'Connell.

** The calendar also reflects no meetings during that period between Dulles, Edwards and Bissell, or between Dulles and Edwards.

Bissell did not have a clear independent recollection of the dates involved, but recalled that discussions concerning the possible use of syndicate members against Castro began "in the Autumn of 1960".* He recalled initial discussions among himself, Edwards, and Colonel J. C. King, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, which he said occurred before Dulles and Cabell were approached about assassinating Castro. According to Bissell,

> "those conversations, the subject matter was a capability to eliminate Castro if such action should be decided upon.
>
> "It is, therefore, accurate to say that my best recollection of those conversations (with Edwards and King) is that they addressed themselves to the existence or non-existence of the capability and to the possibility of developing a capability. They were not conclusive or decisive conversations . . . nor would they have revealed a prior decision to implement such a plan by anybody." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 19.)

---

* "Q.: When did you first become aware of any plan or effort to assassinate Mr. Castro?

"Bissell: Well, I became aware of planning a contingency basis for such an operation. My recollection is August . . .

"Q.: August of 1960?

"Bissell: '60, correct . . . but without reading [the I.G. Report], I would have remembered initial conversations early in the autumn of 1960." (Bissell Tr. 6/9, pp. 17-18.)

O'Connell contacted Roselli in early September 1960. During the week of September 25, O'Connell, Maheu, and Roselli met with Giancana and Trafficante in Miami. Bissell testified as follows concerning the sequence of those events:

> "Q.: Well, before we come to the meeting [with Dulles], you had been informed, prior to that, had you not, that contact had been made with the Mafia?
>
> "Mr. Bissell.: I had.
>
> "Q.: Now were you informed that the Mafia had been given the go ahead to proceed with actual efforts to assassinate Castro?
>
> "Bissell: Not that early, to my best recollection. . . . I cannot date that at all well. I would suppose that it was within the next two or three weeks." (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 20-21.)

On the other hand, Roselli's testimony suggests that Maheu had indicated prior to the "latter part of September" 1960 that a large sum of money would be paid for Castro's death (Roselli, p. 17), and Edwards' May 14, 1962 memorandum indicated the briefing of "senior officials" took place after the money had been offered.

It is clear, then, that even if Dulles was informed about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, subordinate agency officials had previously decided to take steps toward arranging for the killing of Castro, including discussing it with organized crime leaders.

(iv) Questions Raised by Edwards' Communications to the Justice Department in 1961 and 1962.

As fully described *supra*, pp.___, the FBI discovered in the late 1960's that Maheu had been involved in an illegal wiretap in Las Vegas. In April 1961, Maheu told the FBI that the tap had been placed in connection with a CIA operation, and suggested that the FBI contact Edwards to verify this fact.

An FBI report of a May 3, 1961 interview with Edwards (in which Edwards vaguely described the use of Giancana as relating to "clandestine efforts against the Castro Government" with no mention of assassination, and a copy of which was given to the Attorney General) stated:

> "Col. Edwards advised that only Mr. Bissell (Director of Plans, CIA) and two others in CIA were aware of the Giancana-Maheu activity in behalf of CIA's program and Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu in this connection. He added that Mr. Bissell, in his recent briefings of Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General in connection with their inquiries into CIA relating to the Cuban situation, told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro." (FBI memorandum entitled "Arthur James Balletti et al.",May 22, 1961, p. 2.) (Emphasis added)

Bissell said he was certain, however, that the statement regarding Dulles' knowledge about the operation was wrong, and testified that "it is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times" (Bissell, 6/11, p. 27).*

When asked to speculate on why Edwards would have told the FBI that Dulles was unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu, Bissell replied:

> "I can only surmise that he believed he could secure the cooperation of the Justice Department that he required without in any way involving his superior, Mr. Dulles, and simply did this in a protective fashion." (Bissell, 7/17/, p. 20).

A year later, on May 7, 1962, Edwards and CIA's General Counsel met with Attorney General Robert Kennedy. (That meeting, is discussed extensively below at p. _____). Edwards' memorandum of the meeting indicated that he had said that after Roselli and Giancana had been offered $150,000, Edwards had "then briefed the proper senior officials of [the]

---

* Now, it (the FBI memorandum) is just flatly contrary to my recollection that Allen Dulles was unaware of these contacts, as I have testified several times. Also, I submit it is quite implausible that I would have briefed Gen. Taylor and the Attorney General--and incidentally, I have no recollection of briefing those two gentle men except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member--it is quite implausible that I would have briefed them on a matter which had been going on for some months, and some which the Director, Mr. Dulles himself, had never been informed."

Agency" (without specifying whom) and they had "duly orally approved."* It further states that "knowledge" of the project had been "kept to a total of six persons." **

Dulles had left the Agency between the time of Edwards' two statements.

(v) Remarks Made to the Special Group by General Cabell in November 1960.

Bissell and Edwards testified that Cabell was aware of the Castro plots (Bissell Tr. 6/9, p. 22; Edwards Tr. 5/30/75, pp. 5-6).***

---

* On the same day as writing that memorandum for the Attorney General, Edwards wrote another memorandum for his own files indicating that after putting Harvey in contact with Roselli in early April, he had:

> "cautioned him [Harvey] that I felt that any future projects of this nature should have the tacit approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." (5/14/62, Memorandum for the Record.)

This memorandum, which contained other information which Harvey and Edwards had agreed to include to "falsify" the record, is discussed *infra*, p. _____.

** The 1967 Inspector General's Report surmised that thirteen people knew of the plot, including Dulles, based upon Bissell's and Edwards' account of the Dulles briefing. (See discussion, *supra*. at .)

*** The Inspector General's Report stated:

> "With Bissell present, Edwards briefed the Director (Dulles) and the DDCI (Cabell) on the existence of a plan involving members of the syndicate. . . Edwards is quite sure that the DCI and the DDCI clearly understood the nature of the operation he was discussing." (IG Report, p. 17.)

O'Connell testified that prior to O'Connell's testifying before the Rockefeller Commission, Edwards told O'Connell that Cabell had been aware of and authorized the project.

The testimony indicates that the meeting between Dulles, Bissell, Edwards, and Cabell occurred sometime "in the autumn" of 1960, probably around September. The minutes of a meeting of the Special Group, the high-level governmental body for considering covert action, on November 3, 1960, reflect the following remarks:

> "Finally, Mr. Merchant asked whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara. He said that without these three the Cuban Government would be leaderless and probably brainless. He conceded that it would be necessary to act against all three simultaneously. General Cabell pointed out that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity of simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that Mr. Merchant's suggestion is beyond our capabilities." (11/3/60 Special Group Minutes, P. 3).

is thi
inconsis

might auth
but not
believe poss.

Exactly what the term "direct positive action" meant to the speaker or those listening is uncertain. Neither was able to offer any interpretive help to the Committee. However, other participants at this meeting have testified that the reference could mean or include assassination.*

---

*

"Q: Do you read. . . direct, positive action. . . as meaning killing (Fidel Castro, Raul Castro and Che Guevara)?"

"A: I would read it that way, yes." (Lansdale Tr. 7/8/75, p. 103.)

"Q: . . .would you agree that the words 'direct positive action' appear to question whether there's been any planning in connection with assassinating (the Castros and Guevara)?"

"A: I think the phrase 'positive action' could include assassinations, but. . . I'm not sure what was in Mr. Merchant's mind." (Gray Tr. 7/9/75, p. 9.)

Bissell was also asked about the minutes of the November 3 meeting. After reading the reference to "direct positive action," Bissell said "I find it difficult to understand" (Bissell Tr. 7/17, p. 18). He was then asked

> "Q: Do you, in light of the November 3 minutes) remain firm that Cabell was knowledgeable (of the assassination plots)?"
>
> "A: It casts some doubt on that in my mind."

When asked if it cast "some significant doubt in light of (Cabell's) character",Bissell answered "yes" (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 22-23).

(c) Did John McCone Know of or Authorize Assassination Plots During His Tenure as DCI

The CIA considered several assassination plots against Castro during McCone's tenure as Director. Harvey initiated his contact with Roselli in April 1962, and the operation involving underworld figures continued into early 1963. In early 1963 the CIA looked into the possibility of assassinating Castro with an exploding seashell and contaminated diving suit. AM/LASH was offered a poison pen device in November 1963, and caches of arms were delivered to Cuba for his use in the following year.

(i) McCone Testified That He Did Not Authorize or Know About the Castro Plots and That He Would Have Disapproved the Plots Had He Been Asked

McCone testified that he was not aware of the plots to assassinate Castro which took place during the years in which he was DCI, and that he did not authorize those plots.* (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 33, 44-45) He testified that he was not briefed about the assassination plots by Dulles, Bissell, Helms, or anyone else when he succeeded Dulles as Director in November 1961 (McCone, 6/6/75, pp. 6-7, 17), and that if he had ever been asked about the plots, he would have disapproved. (McCone, 6/6/75, p. 47) McCone testified:

---

* McCone testified that he first learned of the Roselli operation in August, 1963, long after it had been terminated. See discussion, p.___.

> I had no knowledge of any authorized plan or planning that might lead to a request for authorization. Of course, during those days it was almost common for one person or another to say, we ought to dispose of Castro . . . [b]ut at no time did anyone come to me, or come to other authorities to my knowledge, with a plan for the actual undertaking of an assassination.
>
> * * * * *
>
> Senator Hart of Colorado: . . . Did you ever discuss the subject of assassinations with your predecessor, Mr. Dulles?
>
> McCone: No, I did not.

ASSASS CAPAB? re MKNAOMI?

(ii) Helms, Bissell, and Other Subordinate Agency Employees Testified That They Did Not Ask McCone to Approve the Plots or Know If He Had Knowledge Of Them.

Richard Bissell was DDP under McCone for three months, from November 1961 until February 1962. Richard Helms assumed the duties of DDP from Bissell.

Bissell testified about McCone's knowledge as follows:

> Q.: Your testimony is that you never discussed assassinations with Mr. McCone?
>
> A.: That is correct.
>
> Q.: . . . [D]id you tell McCone anything about that conversation with Mr. Harvey in which you at least told him (Harvey) to take over the relationship with the criminal syndicate?
>
> A.: I don't remember so doing.

Helms testified that he did not recall ever having discussed the assassination plots with McCone while the plots were continuing.* When asked whether McCone was aware of the assassination plots against Castro, Helms testified:

> No, it isn't my impression that I told him, at least I don't have any impression, unfortunately. . . . Mr. McCone is an honorable man. He has done his own testifying, and all I can say is that I do not know specifically whether he was aware or not. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 90, 101-102)

Helms further testified:

> Q.: I believe Mr. McCone testified that he never heard of any of these attempts when he was Director. Would you have any reason to disagree with his testimony?
>
> Helms: Sir, I have always liked McCone and I don't want to get into an altercation with him. He had access to Harvey and everybody else just the way I had and he had regular access to the Attorney General.
>
> * * * * *
>
> Q.: If you were a member of this Committee wouldn't you assume that Mr. McCone was unaware of the assassination attempts while they were underway?
>
> Helms: I don't know how to answer that, Senator Mondale. He was involved in this up to his scuppers just the way everybody else

---

*Helms testified that he first told McCone about the plot using underworld figures in August 1963. See discussion supra at p. ____.

> was that was in it, and I just don't know. I have no reason to impugn his integrity. On the other hand, I don't understand how it was he didn't hear about some of these things that he claims that he didn't. (Helms, 7/13/75, pp. 32-33)

* * * * *

> I honestly didn't recall that Mr. McCone was not informed and when I was told that there was evidence that he wasn't informed, I was trying to scratch my head as to why I didn't tell him at the time and my surmises are the best I can come up with. I am really surprised I did not discuss it with him at the time. My relations with him were good, and so my surmises are just the best I am able to do in 1975 over an episode that took place that many years ago. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 90)

Several other Agency officials who were aware of the assassination plots testified that they had not told McCone of the plots. William Harvey testified that he never spoke with McCone about the operation involving underworld figures or assassination and that, to the best of his knowledge, McCone had not been told about the project. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 66)

Sheffield Edwards, when asked whether he had informed McCone about the plot, replied:

> Edwards: No, I did not inform Mr. McCone.
>
> Q.: Was there a reason for why you did not inform Mr. McCone?

> Edwards: Well, I did not want to drag Mr. McCone into this thing that in my opinion had petered out, and I did not want to involve him. (Edwards, p. 18)

James O'Connell, who was the case officer for the operation under Edwards, testified that he recalled that Edwards had told him during a discussion about the plots in 1965 that Edwards had not briefed McCone on the operation.

> As a matter of fact, I don't think he ever knew about it. From later conversations with Colonel Edwards, not recently, we talked about it, and he said that he was convinced that Mr. McCone never knew about it, it wasn't on his watch, so to speak, and he didn't want to get him involved. (O'Connell, pp. 37, 39)

George McManus, Helms' Special Assistant for Cuba during the relevant period, testified that he was not told about the assassination activities, and gave his opinion that if McCone had been asked to approve an assassination, he "would have reacted violently immediately".*

---

*McManus advanced two reasons for this opinion:

(1) McCone had a great love for the President of the United States and he sort of looked at him as an older son or a brother, a very protective sense he had about the President, President Kennedy, and McCone would have immediately said Jesus, this is a no win ball game.

(2) Secondly, as an individual, he would have found it morally reprehensible. (McManus, p. 33)

(Continued)

Walter Elder, McCone's Executive Assistant, testified that he had not known of the underworld operation until August 1963, and that in his opinion McCone did not learn of the operation prior to that time.* (Elder, p. 15)

(iii) Helms and Harvey Did Not Brief McCone About the Assassination Plots

McCone assumed the position of DCI in November 1961. It was also in November 1961 that Bissell asked Harvey to assume operational control over the Castro plot involving underworld figures.** Richard Helms replaced Bissell in February of 1962 and was subsequently briefed by Harvey on

---

(Continued)

McManus also testified:

> I always assumed that Mr. Helms would keep the Director fully informed of any activity that he thought was sensitive. . . . Under most circumstances, and indeed under all circumstances you can imagine, Helms would have told McCone, with the exception of a situation in which Helms had been told by higher authority not to tell him. (McManus, pp. 32-34)

*In August 1963 Helms gave McCone a copy of Edwards' May 14, 1962, memorandum to the Attorney General. See discussion infra at p. ____.

With respect to the Cuban assassination matters, where Colby's knowledge was only second-hand, Colby said: "Mr. McCone did not know of it." (Colby, 5/21/75, p. 101)

**See earlier discussion supra.

the existence of the assassination plots. Helms was Harvey's immediate superior and the person to whom he reported about the Castro plot activities.

Harvey testified that in the spring of 1962, when he was preparing to contact Roselli, he briefed Helms on the assassination plot. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65) Harvey said:

> . . . I briefed Helms generally on the take-over of Roselli, on the doubts about the operation, on the possible . . . future of it, and to the extent it had then been possible, the assessment of Roselli and the cutting out of various individuals.*

Harvey testified that when he briefed Helms on the assassination plot operation, they decided that it would not be appropriate at that point to brief John McCone.

> There was a fairly detailed discussion between myself and Helms as to whether or not the Director should at that time be briefed concerning this. For a variety of reasons

---

*Harvey testified that when he took over the Roselli operation, he had "cut out" both Maheu and Giancana because "regardless of what I may have thought of their trustworthiness, . . . they were surplus" to the operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 65)

> which were tossed back and forth, we agreed that it was not necessary or advisable to brief him at that time.
>
> I then said, as I recall, to Mr. Helms, if you decide in the future that he should be briefed, I would like to know about it in advance to which, to my best recollection, he agreed. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 66)

Harvey then offered the following explanation for why he and Helms had decided not to discuss the matter with McCone at that time:

> There were several reasons for this. One, this operation at that stage had not been assessed. It was obviously questionable on several grounds. It obviously involved knowledge by too many people. We were not even sure at that point it had any remote possibility or rather any real possibility for success. It had arisen with full authority insofar as either of us knew long before I knew anything about it, and before the then-Director became Director of the Agency.
>
> I saw no reason at that time to charge him with knowledge of this, at least until we reached the point where it appeared it might come to fruitation or had had a chance to assess the individuals involved and determine exactly the problem we faced, including the possible problem -- and it was a very, or it appeared to be, and in my opinion was, at that time, a very real possibility of this government being blackmailed either by Cubans for political purposes or by figures in organized crime for their own self-protection or aggrandizement, which, as it turned out, did not happen, but at that time was a very pregnant possibility. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 67-68)

* * * * *

> I am definitely not saying that there was any effort to hide or conceal any information from the Director. There was not. This was a discussion as to whether or not it was even necessary or appropriate at this point to take details of this particular operation in an unassessed form to the then-Director at that time. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69)

Harvey stated that he did not have any reason to believe that the assassination activities would have been "disapproved by the Director" had he been advised of the project (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 69) and stated that he had thought the plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 66) When asked why McCone had not been given an opportunity to consider the plot, Harvey replied:

> One of the things that I don't know from my own . . . knowledge . . . is who was briefed in exactly what terms at the time of the so-called Las Vegas flop that involved attempts to place a technical surveillance . . . in Dan Rowan's hotel room. (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 46)

Harvey was queried on whether the reasons he had given for not briefing McCone were actually "reasons why he should [have been] briefed forthwith". Harvey replied:

> Well, Senator Huddleston, it will be quite easy in looking at it now to say, well, I can see your argument.
>
> All I can say to you in answer is at that time I didn't feel that it was necessary or advisable. I did not make this decision except in consultation, and had I been disagreed with, that would have been it. And I am not off-loading this on Richard Helms or attempting to at all. It isn't all that easy for me to go back this many years and sort of recast all of the reasoning and be sure I am accurate. And I don't also want to evade it by saying, well, it seemed like a good idea at the time. But actually it did.
>
> In other words, this was not something that either Helms or myself felt that at that stage there was any point in attempting to brief the Director on it until, at least, we had a somewhat better handle on it. . . .
>
> * * * * *
>
> And I might also add, if I may, . . . but as far as either one of us knew at that point he might have been or should have been briefed, if you want it that way, by either Allen Dulles or Richard Bissell. (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 67-71)

The 1967 Report prepared by the Inspector General for Helms states that Harvey said: "When he briefed Helms on Roselli, he obtained Helms' approval not to brief the Director." (I.G., p. 41)

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation, but that he had no reason to doubt the accuracy of Harvey's testimony and the Inspector General's Report. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 32, 106)

Helms, when asked about Harvey's testimony that he and Harvey had agreed not to brief McCone, stated "I frankly don't recall having agreed to this."

> My recollection is that I had very grave doubts about the wisdom of this. . . . And as I recall it, we had so few assets inside Cuba at that time that I was willing to try almost anything. But the thing did not loom large in my mind at that time. I was enormously busy with a lot of other things, taking over a new job [as DDP]. Mr. McCone was realtively new in the Agency and I guess I must have thought to myself, well this is going to look peculiar to him and I doubt very much this is going to go anyplace, but if it does, then that is time enough to bring him into the picture. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 33)

Helms also stated:

> It was a Mafia connection and Mr. McCone was relatively new to the organization and this was, you know, not a very savory effort. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 92)

Helms later testified that he did not "recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life."

> I am having a very difficult time justifying before this Committee, because there is something in here that doesn't come together, even for me, I am sorry to say. Because if this was all that clear, as everybody seems to think it

> was, that there were those pills in that restaurant in Cuba and Castro was about to die, I certainly would have talked to McCone about it. And this never was that clear, I am sorry to say, but it never was, not at that time. (Helms, 7/17/75, p. 34)

On May 7, 1962, Edwards and the CIA's General Counsel, Lawrence Houston, briefed Attorney General Robert Kennedy on the operation involving underworld figures, describing it as terminated.*

Harvey told the Inspector General that:

> . . . on 14 May he briefed Helms on the meeting with the Attorney General, as told to him by Edwards. Harvey, too, advised against briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and states that Helms concurred in this. (I.G., p. 65)

Harvey testified that what he had probably told Helms was that:

> Any briefing of the Director on the discussion with the Attorney General concerning this should come from Colonel Edwards and Larry Houston, the General Counsel, and not from the DDP unless we are asked. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 99)

Helms testified that he did not recall this conversation and remarked:

> It seems odd to me only because, if the Attorney General had been briefed on something it would seem very logical that it would be very important to brief the Director at that time on the same thing. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 107)

---

*The briefing is exhaustively described supra at p. ____.

According to the Inspector General's Report, Harvey and Roselli had a farewell dinner before Harvey went on an assignment to Rome in June 1963. The meeting was observed by the FBI, and Sam Papich, the FBI liaison with the CIA, notified Harvey

Harvey supplied poison pills and weapons to Roselli and his Cuban associates during a trip to Miami in April, 1962.* At a Special Group meeting on April 26, General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities" (Memo, McCone, 4/26/62). On April 26, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request and McCone's wish to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss the Task Force Activities." (Memorandum, Elder to Harvey, 4/27/62).

Harvey testified that upon his return, he reported to the Special Group on the "status of the active and potential sources inside Cuba. . ."

> Q.: "Did you report on the passage of the pills to Roselli?
>
> Harvey: No, I did not.
>
> Q.: Which you had just accomplished in Miami. . .for the purpose of assassinating Fidel Castro.
>
> Harvey: No.
>
> Q.: And did you report that to Mr. McCone when he asked you to tell him what you had done in Miami?
>
> Harvey: No, I did not." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 16-17.)

---

that Hoover would be informed. Harvey asked Papich to call him if he felt that Hoover would inform the Director about the incident.

> "Harvey said that he then told Mr. Helms of the incident and that Helms agreed that there was no need to brief McCone unless a call from Hoover was expected. (I.G., p. 54.)

* Harvey described the trip to Miami as

> "one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of reviewing in toto. . . the actual and potential operations at the Miami base. . . and this covered the whole gamut from personnel administration, operational support in the way of small craft (and) so on. . ." (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 15-16).

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone or the Special Group about the operation at that time because:

> "I did not consider either, A, that this should be in any sense in this amorphous stage, surfaced to the Special Group, nor, as I have attempted to explain before that it should be briefed to John McCone at that point in the state that it was in with as little as we knew about it, and with all of the attendant background which at that point, and I was not personally cognizant of all of this, had been going on for approximately, as I recall, two to two-and-a-half years." (Harvey, 7/11, p. 18.)

Harvey attended an August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented.* He testified that a person [Robert McNamara] at that meeting suggested that the Special Group "consider the elimination or assassination of Fidel" (Harvey, 7/11, p. 30). Harvey then testified that on the day following this Special Group meeting (Harvey, 6/25, p. 71):

> "in connection with a morning briefing of John McCone, the question again came up and I expressed some opinion as to the inappropriateness of this having been raised in this form and at that forum [Special Group meeting], at which point Mr. McCone stated in substance that he agreed and also that he had felt so strongly that he had, I believe, the preceding afternoon or evening, personally called the gentleman who made the proposal or suggestion and had stated similar views as to the inappropriateness and that he [McCone] said in addition . . . if I got myself involved in something like this, I might end up getting myself ex-communicated."

McCone should he have asked

Harvey stated that he did not tell McCone on that occasion about the actual assassination operation involving Roselli. He said (Harvey, 6/25, p. 73):

---

*This meeting and the raising of the suggestion of assassination is discussed in depth in part _____, *infra*.

> "I would like to recast the time that this took place. This was August of '62. This was at the start of the so-called Missile Crisis. . . .
>
> "A tentative decision had been made at that point that the only sensible thing to do with [the Roselli operation] was to terminate it as rapidly and cleanly as it could be done . . . I am sure that I had discussed with Roselli, at least on a tentative basis, by August, the probable necessity of terminating this . . . ."

According to the Inspector General's Report, the "medicine" was reported to be still in Cuba at this time. (I.G., pp. 51-52) Harvey testified that the Report was referring to the pills (Harvey, 6/25, p. 105).*

In relation to the August 10 meeting, Helms was asked whether he believed McCone would have stopped an assassination attempt if he had known that one was underway. Helms stated:

> Mr. Helms: "The reason I say I don't know . . . is that elsewhere Mr. McCone states that he went to see Mr. McNamara in connection with this August 1962 affair and told Mr. McNamara that he wouldn't have anything to do with this, that I have no recollection that I don't believe he ever said anything to me about his not wanting to have anything to do with it.
>
> Q.: "And you were close to Mr. McCone in that period? You are his Deputy for Plans?
>
> Mr. Helms: "I saw him almost daily.
>
> Q.: "And is it your belief that if he had made any such statement to Mr. McNamara that he would have come to you and told you about it at some point?
>
> Mr. Helms: "I just don't know why he didn't but I don't recall any such statement. As I said, and I would like to repeat it, Mr. McCone had given me my job, he had promoted me, I felt close to him, I felt loyal to him, and I would not have violated an instruction he gave me if I could have possibly helped it.

---

*Harvey said:
"I may have deferred for a period of a few weeks giving an actual order to terminate this as soon as possible, ..." (Harvey, 6/25, p. 74).

> Q.: "But in any event, it is your judgment that he did not indicate that he was opposed to assassinations?
>
> Mr. Helms: "Not to me."

Walter Elder, who served as McCone's Executive Assistant, testified, however, that he had personally told Helms of McCone's opposition to assassination after the August 10 meeting.*

(iv) The August 1963 Briefing of McCone

An August 16, 1963, Chicago Sun Times article claimed that the CIA had had a connection with Giancana.** McCone asked Helms for a report about the article. McCone testified that when Helms came to see him, he brought the following memorandum:

> "1. Attached is the only copy in the Agency of a memorandum on subject, the ribbon copy of which was sent to the Attorney General in May of 1962. I was vaguely aware of the existence of such a memorandum since I was informed that it had been written as a result of a briefing given by Colonel Edwards and Lawrence Houston to the Attorney General in May of last year.
>
> "2. I spoke with Colonel Edwards on the telephone last evening, and, in the absence of Mr. Bannerman on leave, I was with Colonel Edwards' assistance able to locate this copy. As far as I

---

*Elder told the Committee:

> "I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling . . . that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consideration of assassination because it left the impression that the subject had received serious consideration by governmental policy makers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, 'I understand'. The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assassination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation." (Elder Affidavit.)

**The 8/16/63 Chicago Sun Times article states that "Justice Department sources" believed that Giancana never did any spying for the CIA, but pretended to go along with the Agency "in the hopes that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed - or at least affected - by his ruse of cooperation with another government agency."

> am aware, this is the only written information available on Agency relationships with subject. I hope that this will serve your purpose.
>
> "3. I assume you are aware of the nature of the operation discussed in the attachment." (Memorandum to Director of Central Intelligence, re: Sam Giancana, from Helms, 8/16/63.)*

That memorandum attached the May 14, 1962, memorandum to Attorney General Kennedy from Sheffield Edwards which described the operation as having been terminated before McCone became DCI. (See discussion, infra, p. _____.)

Neither McCone nor Helms were able to remember what was said at the meeting. Walter Elder, who was then McCone's Executive Assistant, recalled:

> "Mr. Helms came in with [the memorandum]. He handed it to [McCone] who read it and . . . handed it back without any particular comment other than to say, 'Well, this did not happen during my tenure.'"

* * * * *

> Q.: "Was anything else said?
>
> A.: "No, he had very little to say about it.
>
> Q.: "Did Mr. Helms then leave?
>
> A.: "Mr. Helms left." (Elder, pp. 16-17, 57-59.)

Elder testified that he had concluded that the operation involved assassination from reading the two memoranda that were given to McCone (Elder, 8/13, p. 60). Elder "further concluded that [McCone] was perfectly aware of what Mr. Helms was trying to say to him" (Elder, p. 60). Elder further testified:

---

*When asked whether this entry in the memorandum suggested that he had previously been aware of the operation, McCone testified that Helms had orally informed him "on that day in August" that it involved assassination (McCone, p. 9).

> Q.: "Other than that conversation that you just described between yourself and Mr. McCone, did he have anything else to say about that memorandum?
>
> ~~Mr. E~~lder: "No."
>
> Q.: "I take it then he did not tell either you or Mr. Helms that we absolutely could not have this activity going on in the future?
>
> Mr. Elder: "No."

The Inspector General's Report concluded that:

> "This is the earliest date on which we have evidence of Mr. McCone's being aware of any aspect of the scheme to assassinate Castro using members of the gambling syndicate." (I.G., p. 70).

9/1/75
Draft Based on
Subcommittee
Meeting, 8/29/75

(b) The Question of Authorization Outside The Central Intelligence Agency In The Eisenhower Administration.

1. Summary

As discussed in the preceding section, the evidence as to whether Allen Dulles, CIA Director during the Eisenhower Administration, was informed of the Castro assassination operation is not clear.

Even assuming that Dulles was so informed, authorization outside the CIA for a Castro assassination could, according to the testimony, only have come from President Eisenhower, from someone speaking for him, or from the Special Group.* At issue, therefore, is whether President Eisenhower, his close aides, or the Special Group authorized or had knowledge of the Castro assassination plots.

In addition to Bissell, we took considerable testimony from President Eisenhower's principal staff assistants, Gordon Gray (Special Assistant for National Security Affairs and President Eisenhower's representative on the Special Group); General Andrew Goodpaster (Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower with particular responsibility for national security operational matters); John Eisenhower (Assistant Staff Secretary and the President's son) and from Thomas Parrott (Secretary to the Special Group and special assistant to Allen Dulles). In summary, the evidence was:

---

* With respect to then Vice President Nixon, Bissell testified--and he was supported by the principal White House assistants and the documents--that Nixon was not significantly involved in Cuban matters generally at the critical times. There is no evidence suggesting his knowledge of the Castro assassination effort during the period under review, significant parts of which occurred during the Presidential campaign. (Bissell   , p.   ; Gray, 7/9, p. 39) Therefore, we concluded that, despite the indications in Nixon's book My Six Crises (p.   ) that he was involved in Cuban matters generally--and Howard Hunt's characterization of him as the [action officer] for the Bay of Pigs, there was insufficient reason to examine Mr. Nixon on Cuba looked at alone. We came to a contrary conclusion on Chile and . . . .

(i) Bissell testified that he did not inform the Special Group or President Eisenhower of the Castro assassination operation, and he had no personal knowledge that Allen Dulles informed either President Eisenhower or the Special Group. However, Bissell expressed the belief that Allen Dulles would have advised President Eisenhower (but not the Special Group) in a "circumlocutious" or "oblique" way. Bissell based this "pure personal opinion" on his understanding of Dulles' practice with respect to other particularly sensitive covert operations. But Bissell testified that Dulles never told him that he had so advised President Eisenhower regarding the Castro assassination operation, even though Dulles had told Bissell when he had employed this "circumlocutious" approach to the President on certain other occasions.

(ii) Gordon Gray testified that the Special Group never approved a Castro assassination, and that President Eisenhower had charged the Special Group with the responsibility of authorizing all important covert operations. A review of the records of Special Group meetings shows that a query concerning a plan to take "direct positive action" against Castro at a Special Group meeting caused Allen Dulles' Deputy, General Cabell, to advise that such action was beyond the CIA's capability. Gray, Goodpaster and John Eisenhower all affirmed (i) that they did not believe President Eisenhower would have considered such a matter in a private meeting with Dulles, or indeed that President Eisenhower would have approved a Castro assassination in any event, and (ii) that he would not have discussed such a matter without telling them. They conclude, therefore, as a matter of opinion, that President Eisenhower was never told, and testify, as a matter of fact, that they never heard anything about any assassination at any time.

(iii) In addition to the I.G. Report (which found that the CIA could not say that any assassination activity carried on during this period was responsive to Administration pressure), the documentary evidence showed that the subject of Castro's removal was discussed at two meetings of the National Security Council and the Special Group in March 1960. The minutes of these meetings indicated that the discussions were in the context of a general consideration of the proposal to train a Cuban exile force for an invasion of Cuba and an assessment that Castro's overthrow might result in a Communist takeover. Gray and Admiral Burke testified that the discussion of Castro's removal at these meetings did not refer to assassination, but rather to the problem of creating an anti-Castro exile force strong enough to insure a non-Communist successor to the Castro regime. In any event, no action was shown to have stemmed from those meetings. An additional Special Group document showed that when a question regarding planning for "direct positive action" against Cuban leaders was raised at a meeting in the Fall of 1960 (shortly after Phase I of the CIA/underworld assassination operation was initiated), the Deputy Director of the CIA told the Special Group that such action was beyond the CIA's capability.

LUMUMBA

what did IG say

not supported by p 12

2. Richard Bissell's Testimony

(a) Lack of Personal Knowledge. Bissell testified that he knew nothing of clearances outside the CIA for the Castro assassination effort. (Bissell, 6/9, p. 30). Indeed, Bissell met frequently with the Special Group in the Fall of 1960 for the purpose of discussing Cuban operations, but never informed the Special Group that there was a plot underway involving use of underworld figures to assassinate Castro, (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 25-26); nor did Bissell inform President Eisenhower or Vice President Nixon or any other person outside the CIA (Bissell, 6/9, pp. 26-29). Bissell testified that his reason for not doing so was that as Deputy Director of Plans, he reported to the Director and under Agency procedures relied upon the Director to inform the appropriate persons outside the Agency. Thus, the question of President Eisenhower's knowledge rests on whether Allen Dulles personally informed him of the Castro plot.

(b) Assumptions Concerning Dulles. Based upon his belief that Dulles had been briefed about the operation involving underworld figures and understood that it involved assassination, Bissell assumed that Allen Dulles would have sought authorization above the CIA level. As Bissell testified:

> "I went on the assumption that, in a matter of this sensitivity, the Director would handle higher level clearances. By clearance I mean authorization."* (Bissell, 6/9, p. 26.) */

---

*Bissell reiterated this view on his second day of testimony: ". . . I felt that the responsibility for obtaining necessary authorization should remain with the Director." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 4)

Bissell further stated that although he believed that Dulles "probably" talked with President Eisenhower:

> "the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there were much more important matters to talk about with the President." (Bissell, 7/17, p. 25.)

Bissell said he was "guessing" that Dulles informed Eisenhower. (Bissell 7/17, pp. 38-39.) He said, however, that he based his assumption on his knowledge of "command relationship, of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his [Dulles'] mode of operations". (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained, his guess that Dulles informed President Eisenhower "is not based on hard evidence" but is "pure personal opinion". (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61.) Nevertheless, he believed it to be so, and that the President thereupon gave his authorization "perhaps only tacitly". (Bissell, 6/11, p. 6.) As Bissell explained,

> "My guess is that indeed whoever informed him, that is Dulles directly or Dulles through a staff member, would have had the same desire. . . to shield the President and to shield him in the sense of intimating or making clear that something of the sort was going forward, but giving the President as little information about it as possible, and the purpose of it would have been to give the President an opportunity, if he so elected, to cancel it, to order it cancelled, or to allow it to continue but without, in effect, extracting from him an explicit endorsement of the detailed specific plan." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 61)

Bissell said circumlocution would have been used "to protect the President" in accord with the concept of "plausible deniability".*

As noted above, Bissell testified he had no personal knowledge that Dulles informed President Eisenhower of the Castro plot. On other specific occasions involving sensitive covert operations, Dulles had told Bissell he had used the "circumlocutious" approach with President Eisenhower. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 10.) But with respect to the Castro assassination attempt, Dulles did not so inform Bissell. (Bissell, 6/11, p. 11.) As Bissell testified:

> "I still want to be quite clear, I do not have a recollection of the Director telling me that on this specific operation he had made such an approach and received assent, approval, tacit or otherwise." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 11.)

does he not recall or is it that he did not say it

As to whether Dulles knew of the plots and informed Eisenhower, we have discussed above the fact that in January 1960 Dulles had told the Special Group that the CIA "did not have in mind a quick elimination of Castro." (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, January 13, 1960, p.__). And in July 1960 an instruction by Bissell's deputy to attempt to kill Raul Castro, which also stated that "possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at headquarters" had been countermanded. The CIA officer who drafted this instruction testified that he had heard at the time that it was Dulles who countermanded this instruction ~~and in~~ doing so had "indicated that assassination was not to be considered." (Hinkle, p. 29).

---

* Bissell explained the "plausible deniability" practice as follows:

> "Any covert operations, but especially covert operations . . . that if successful, would have very visible consequences, it was of course an objective to carry out in such a way that they could be plausibly disclaimed by the U.S. Government." (Bissell, 6/11, p. 5.)

Bissell apparently assumed that a corollary to that doctrine required the use of "oblique", "circumlocutious" language.

(iii) White House Officials Denied Knowledge of Assassination Efforts and Gave the Opinion that President Eisenhower Was Not Informed.

1. Gordon Gray. Gordon Gray served as President Eisenhower's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from July 1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration on January 20, 1961. (Gray, p. 4.) In this capacity, Gray served as the President's representative on the Special Group. (Gray, p. 4.) President Eisenhower specifically instructed Gray that all covert actions impinging on the sovereignty of another country must be deliberated by the Special Group. (Gray, p. 6.) Gray testified that during the period July 1958 to January 20, 1961, the Special Group never approved an action to assassinate Castro (Gray, p. 6) and no such suggestion was made by Bissell. (Gray, p. 37.)

Gray testified he did not believe Allen Dulles would have approached President Eisenhower without informing Gray. Gray stated:

> "I find it very difficult to believe, and I do not believe, that Mr. Dulles would have gone independently to him with such a proposal without, for that matter, my knowing about it from Mr. Dulles." (Gray, p. 35.)*

---

* Gray pointed out "that I was not with President Eisenhower twenty-four hours a day. It was a few minutes every day, practically every day." (Gray, p. 35.)

According to the records of the Eisenhower Library, Dulles was alone with President Eisenhower on one occasion in the Fall of 1960. That meeting lasted ten minutes on November 25, 1960. The record of the previous portion of the meeting attended by Gray indicates only that, in addition to discussion of operations in another country, "there was also some discussion of Cuba". (Memorandum, November 28, 1960, by Gordon Gray, of Meeting with the President, November 25, 1960 at 10:40 A.M.). We feel compelled to state that the fact of this brief meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any, significance or relevance.

Gray further testified that his relationship with President Eisenhower was such that President Eisenhower "would discuss with me anything that came to his attention independently of me.". (Gray, p. 7.) And Gray testified that President Eisenhower never discussed with him the subject of a Castro assassination or of the use of the underworld figures and Cubans in such an effort. (Gray, p. 7.)

2. Andrew Goodpaster. Goodpaster served as President Eisenhower's Staff Secretary and Defense Liaison Officer during the last two years of the Eisenhower Administration. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) In addition to responsibility for the President's schedule and the supervision of the White House staff, Goodpaster was responsible for handling with the President "all matters of day to day operations" in the foreign affairs and national security field, including the activities of the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. (Goodpaster, p. 3.) Goodpaster testified that he had a "very close personal relationship" with President Eisenhower and saw the President "essentially every day when [President Eisenhower] was in Washington (Goodpaster, p. 4). Along with Gordon Gray, Goodpaster served as the channel between the CIA and the President. Goodpaster was the particular channel for "operations in which [President Eisenhower] might take a personal part". (Goodpaster, p. 4.)

Goodpaster testified that he never heard any mention of assassination efforts. (Goodpaster, p. 5.) He said that President Eisenhower never told him about any assassination effort and that it was his belief, under White House procedures and by virtue of his close relationship with President Eisenhower, that if an assassination plan or operation had ever been raised with the President, he would have learned of it. (Goodpaster, p. 5.)

Beyond this General Goodpaster testified that he found Bissell's assumption of a "circumlocutious" personal conversation between Dulles and the President "completely unlikely".

> "That was simply not the President's way of doing business. He had made it very clear to us how he wanted to handle matters of this kind, and we had set up procedures to see that they were then handled that way." (Goodpaster, pp. 6-7)

According to Goodpaster, after the collapse of the Paris Summit Conference between President Eisenhower and Premier Khruschev as a result of the U-2 incident in the Spring of 1960, the Eisenhower Administration reviewed its procedures for approval of CIA operations and tightened them. General Goodpaster testified that this review was carried out

> "with the aim in mind of being sure we had full and explicit understanding of any proposals that came to us and we knew from [President Eisenhower] that in doing that we were responsive to a desire on his part." (Goodpaster, p. 7.)

Secondly, according to Goodpaster, the relationship between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles was quite different from that between the President and John Foster Dulles. He said John Foster Dulles was a confidant of the President while Allen Dulles was not. (Goodpaster, p. 8.)

3. Thomas Parrott. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer, served as Secretary of the Special Group from 1957 through the end of the Eisenhower Administration (and thereafter until October 1963). (Parrott, p. 4.) Parrott stated that, by virtue of this assignment, he functioned as Allen Dulles' assistant in connection with the Special Group, knew Dulles well, and gained an understanding of Dulles' method of expression and his

practice for dealing with the President. (Parrott, pp. 13-14.)*

Parrott testified that early in 1959, President Eisenhower directed the Special Group to meet at least once a week to consider, approve, or reject all significant covert action operations (Parrott, p. 4.) Parrott testified it would have been "highly unlikely" for President Eisenhower to have instructed the CIA to carry out a covert operation without informing the Special Group. Parrott testified:

> "as evidenced in his . . . revitalization . . . of this Committee [the Special Group], [President Eisenhower was] highly conscious of the necessity to be protective . . . in this field, and I just cannot conceive that [President Eisenhower] would have gone off and mounted some kind of covert operation on his own. This certainly would not have been consistent with President Eisenhower's staff method of doing business . . . "** (Parrott, p. 7.)

4. John Eisenhower. John Eisenhower, President Eisenhower's son, served in Goodpaster's office as Assistant Staff Secretary from mid-1958 to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. (Eisenhower, pp. 5, 9) He testified that his father had confided secret matters in him "to a very large extent". (Eisenhower, p. 3.) For example, he said that after the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, then Gen. Eisenhower told him that the United States had developed the atomic bomb at a time when this was highly

---

* Parrott testified:

> "I saw him [Allen Dulles] several times a week for hours at a time. I had known him somewhat before . . . but I got to know him very well indeed during these four years." (Parrott, p. 13.)

** Parrott further testified that Allen Dulles followed a practice of insisting upon specific orders rather than "tacit approval" and he also found Bissell's assumptions regarding a circumlocutious conversation between President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles "hard to believe". (Parrott, p. 14.)

re Lumumba

secret information. (Eisenhower, p. 3.) And he said that as early as 1956, President Eisenhower told him of the secret U-2 flights. (Eisenhower, p. 4.)

John Eisenhower testified, as a matter of fact, that President Eisenhower never told him of any CIA activity involving an assassination plan or attempt with respect to Castro. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) Based on his father's practice in other matters, it was his opinion that President Eisenhower would have told him if the President had known of any such activity. (Eisenhower, p. 5.) He further testified that President Eisenhower did not deal with important subjects in a circumlocutious manner. (Eisenhower, p. 8.) John Eisenhower further testified that it was his father's belief that no leader was indispensable, and thus assassination was not an alternative in the conduct of foreign policy. (Eisenhower, p. 14.)

(iv) The Documents

1. The Inspector General's Report

The document latest in date which bears upon the issue of authorization for Phase I of the Castro assassination efforts is the 1967 Inspector General's Report. In the concluding section of the Report to Director Helms, the authors advanced several possible Agency responses to Drew Pearson's public charges regarding CIA/underworld links.* One of the questions they asked was whether the Agency could say it was acting pursuant to Government policy -- or as they put the question: "Can CIA state or imply that it was merely an instrument of policy?" The answer given was:

---

* On March 3, 1967, Drew Pearson stated in his newspaper column that there was a U.S. "plot" to assassinate Castro, and that "one version claims that underworld figures actually were recruited to carry out the plot." (Pearson, Washington Merry Go-Round, March 3, 1967)

> "Not in this case. While it is true that Phase Two (the attempt commencing in April 1962) was carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy Administration pressure to do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase." (I.G., p. 132).

In addition to the I.G. Report, we examined the records of the National Security Council and the Special Group, as well as other relevant White House files bearing on the question of authorization for the period from Castro's rise to power to the end of the Eisenhower Administration. As we discuss below, three documents were found which contained references arguably related to the subject of assassination.

2. The Contemporaneous Documents

In March 1960, the National Security Council and the Special Group focused on Cuban policy. President Eisenhower had just returned from a foreign trip in which

> "Latin American Presidents had counseled further forbearance by the U.S. in the hope that the members of the Organization of American States would finally see the potential danger in Cuba and take concerted action." (Gray, Ex. 2, Memorandum of March 10, 1960 NSC Meeting, p. 8).

Castro was characterized as hostile, but his Communist ties were apparently then unclear. Indeed, it may have been the prevailing opinion, at that time, that Castro was not actually a Communist.* For it was stated in the minutes of the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting:

> "there is no apparent alternative to the present government in the event Castro disappears. Indeed the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray, Ex. 2, p. 7).

---

* Castro apparently first announced publicly that he was a "Marxist-Lenist" on December 2, 1961. (David Larson, Cuba Crisis of 1962, p. 304).

Out of these March 1960 meetings of the NSC and Special Group came the general covert action plan against Cuba.*

Against this background of general discussions of Cuba, we considered certain remarks appearing in the records of a March 10, 1960 National Security Council meeting and a March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting.

The record of the NSC meeting of March 10, 1960 (at which President Eisenhower was present) states that Admiral Arleigh Burke, in commenting on Allen Dulles' statement that the Cuba covert action plan was in preparation, "suggested that any plan for the removal of Cuban leaders should be a package deal, since many of the Cuban leaders around Castro were even worse than Castro." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9). And, according to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on March 14, 1960 (which President Eisenhower did not attend) "there was a general discussion as to what would be the effect on the Cuban scene if Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara should disappear simultaneously." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2).

Admiral Burke, who served as Chief of Naval Operations from 1955 to 1961, stated in an affidavit** that although he did not have a specific recollection of the March 10, 1960 meeting of the National Security Council, he had a clear recollection of the discussions of Cuba policy that took place in the spring of 1960. (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated that the reference to the suggestion by him at the March 10, 1960 meeting "clearly refers to the general covert action plan reported by Allen Dulles at that meeting and to the general consideration given at that time in the U. S. Government to identify Cuban groups with which the U.S. might work to overthrow the Castro regime." (Burke affidavit, p. 1). Burke stated:

---

* As Gray testified, this plan covered four areas: sabotage, economic sanctions, propaganda, and training of a Cuban exile force for a possible invasion. Gray stated that this plan had nothing to do with assassination. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17).

** Admiral Burke was unable to testify in person before the Committee because he was in the hospital.

> "In this connection, it was my view that the U.S. must support those Cuban groups who would have a sufficient power base among the Cuban people, not merely to overthrow Castro, but to be able to cope with and dismantle his organization as well. It was my firm belief at the time that many people in Castro's organization were Communist and that Castro was probably a Communist. I therefore advocated that any effort to support groups so as to achieve Castro's overthrow must focus, not merely on the leaders at the top of the Castro regime, but on the very strong organization that had been the key to Castro's rise to power, and was the basis for his power." (Burke affidavit, p. 1-2).*

Burke stated further:

> "The question of a Castro assassination never arose at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting or at any other meeting or discussion that I attended or in which I participated. It is my firm conviction based on five years of close association with President Eisenhower during my service as Chief of Naval Operations, that President Eisenhower would never have tolerated such a discussion, or have permitted anyone to propose assassination, nor would he have ever authorized, condoned, or permitted an assassination attempt." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).

Gray testified that the discussion at the March 10 and March 14, 1960 meetings dealt with plans to overthrow the Castro government, rather than to assassinate Castro himself. He said that Admiral Burke's recorded comment at the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting was part of a lengthy and general discussion of the problem of Cuba. At the outset of that discussion, it was Under Secretary of State Douglas Dillon who pointed out that "the result of Castro's disappearance might be a Communist takeover." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 7; Gray, p. 11). And

Admiral Burke's reference to a "package deal" for the removal of Cuban leaders was in direct response to a comment by Allen Dulles recorded in the minutes that "a plan to affect the situation in Cuba was being worked on." (Gray Ex. 2, p. 9; Gray pp. 13-14). Gray said he believed that Mr. Dulles "was certainly referring to" the Eisenhower Administration's plan to train Cuban exiles for an invasion, rather than a targeted attempt on Castro's life.*/ (Gray pp. 14, 45). Gray testified that viewing Admiral Burke's remarks in context, he believed it was clear that "Admiral

impt
comm
why
den't
w/in.
Bn Asvoo

---

*/ A CIA memorandum of an internal CIA meeting (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960), shows that the first meeting of the CIA task force established to plan the training of a Cuban exile force was held on March 9, 1960, the day before the March 10, 1960 NSC meeting. (Memorandum of First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, March 9, 1960). At that March 9, 1960, CIA meeting, the CIA task force discussed "an operation directed at the overthrow of the Castro regime" and described that operation as one in which a Cuban exile force would be trained for "6-7 months." In the discussion of this operation, it was noted that a principal problem was the weakness of the Cuban exile groups which "had no real leader and are divided into many parts," but it was hoped that during the long training period the "opposition groups will have been merged and will have formed a government-in-exile to which all trained elements could be attached." (Id., p. 2).

According to the memorandum of the meeting, chief of the CIA's Western Hemisphere division J. C. King, had stated, "unless Fidel and Raul Castro and Che Guevara could be eliminated in onepackage - which is highly unlikely - this operation can be a long, drawn-out affair and the present government will only be overthrown by the use of force." (Id., p. 1).

Burke ... was expressing his opinion that if you have any plan /for the overthrow of Castro/ it ought to take these factors into consideration, that you might end up with a Communist government." (Gray, p. 45).

With respect to the March 14, 1960 Special Group meeting, Admiral Burke stated that the "general discussion" referred to in the record of that meeting "clearly did not involve a discussion of assassination of Cuban leaders, but to the possible effects should only those leaders be overthrown by a group not powerful enough to also master the organization those leaders had established in Cuba." (Burke affidavit, p. 2) Burke stated further:

> "Thus, it was consistent with my views then that I should have been recorded in the record of the March 14 meeting as warning in this discussion that the Communists might move into control even if these three top leaders should be overthrown. As stated above, I strongly believed that a strong, organized group must be in the forefront of any effort to overthrow the Castro government." (Burke affidavit, p. 2).

In any event, when a question "whether any real planning had been done for taking direct positive action against Fidel, Raul and Che Guevara" was subsequently asked at a Special Group meeting on November 3, 1960, the Deputy Director of the CIA, General Cabell, according to the record of that meeting, pointed out

> "that action of this kind is uncertain of results and highly dangerous in conception and execution, because the instruments must be Cubans. He felt that, particularly because of the necessity for simultaneous action, it would have to be concluded that (such action) is beyond our capabilities." (Gray Ex. 1, p. 3).

---

* The record of the March 14 meeting states: "Admiral Burke said that the only organized group within Cuba today were the Communists and there was therefore the danger they might move into control." (Gray Ex. 3, p. 2)

The reference to "direct positive action" is ambiguous and can be subject to a number of different interpretations, including a question suggesting exploration of assassination.* However, it is clear that at most a question was being asked. Moreover, assuming that "direct positive action" meant killing, it is significant that shortly after assassination plots were begun, the CIA Deputy Director told the Special Group that such action was "beyond our capabilities."

---

* Testimony varied as to the meaning of the phrase "direct positive action" and General Cabell's response in the November 3, 1960 memorandum.

Gray testified that the phrase "direct positive action" could be taken to include assassination, but he did not know whether Mr. Merchant intended to refer to assassination or not. (Gray, 7/9, p. 9).

Parrott, the author of the memorandum, testified that, although he had no recollection of the November 3, 1960 meeting, it was his opinion, based on the context of weekly Special Group meetings and discussion in the Fall of 1960, that this discussion centered on the possibility of a palace coup, as opposed to a paramilitary operation mounted from outside Cuba; General Cabell was indicating that "we simply do not have agents inside of Cuba to carry out this kind" of a coup. (Parrott, pp. 19-21) Parrott also testified that the phrase "direct positive action" was not a euphemism, and that he did not employ euphemisms in Special Group records, except for references to the President. (Parrott, pp. 19-21). We discuss in greater detail at pp. ____, ____, and ____ other ambiguous phrases in minutes and memoranda drafted by Parrott.

Bissell testified that he found it "difficult to understand" that General Cabell would have told the Special Group that it was beyond the CIA's capabilities to take "direct positive action" (if that referred to assassination) in light of Bissell's assumption that General Cabell was informed of the CIA/underworld assassination effort. (Bissell, 7/17, pp. 15-18).

assass capability briefing by SG

Mr. Merchant was unable to testify because of ill health and orders of his physician.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS ---------------------------- 1

a. BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTED ---------------------- 1

b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS -- 1

c. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED ------------------------------------ 6

d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS --- 10

(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT ------------------ 10

(ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY" ------------------------------------- 11

(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY --------------- 12

(iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ---------------- 13

e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERS -- 16

c. THE QUESTION OF AUTHORIZATION DURING THE KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION

The evidence on the issue of whether or not assassination plots were authorized during the Kennedy Administration is divided herein into two broad sections. The first primarily relates to the assassination operation involving underworld figures and occurring prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion of April, 1961. The second section deals with the Post-Bay of Pigs period, including the Roselli operation in the spring of 1962, Operation Mongoose, the laboratory schemes in early 1963, and the AM/LASH plot in the fall of 1963.

(i) PRE-BAY OF PIGS ASSASSINATION PLOTS

The pattern of testimony for this period was essentially the same as for the Eisenhower Administration. Bissell, once again, said he assumed and believed that Dulles had met with President Kennedy and informed him, in a circumlocutious fashion, that the operation had been planned and was being attempted. Bissell also testified that he (Bissell) did not inform the President about the assassination efforts or any of the other non-CIA persons with whom he was working on covert Cuban operations. The Kennedy Administration officials all testified that they did not know about or authorize the plots. Furthermore, they said they did not believe the President did or would authorize an assassination plot.

There were for this period no significant contemporaneous documents.

a. BISSELL WAS OF THE OPINION THAT DULLES HAD INFORMED PRESIDENT KENNEDY THAT THE ASSASSINATION OPERATION HAD BEEN PLANNED AND WAS BEING ATTEMPTED

When John F. Kennedy became President in January, 1961, Richard Bissell was still Deputy Director for Plans and the principal agency official responsible for the ongoing efforts against the Castro regime, including both the Bay of Pigs operation and the assassination plots. Bissell is the only surviving CIA policy maker with first hand knowledge of high-level decision-making in the early phases of the Castro assassination efforts. Bissell testified that he believed Allen Dulles had informed the President (although Dulles did not so inform him) and that accordingly the plots had been approved by the highest authority. Bissell was questioned about how he felt the President would have been made aware of the plots:

> "Senator Baker: ...You have no reason to think that he [Dulles] didn't or he did [brief President Kennedy]. But the question I put was whether or not in the ordinary course of the operations of the CIA as you know it under their traditions, their rules and regulations, their policies as you knew them what in your opinion -- [w]as the President, President-elect briefed or was he in the light of all these circumstances?
>
> Bissell: I believe at some stage the President and the President-elect both were advised that such an operation had been planned and was being attempted.
>
> Senator Baker: By whom?
>
> Bissell: I would guess through some channel by Allen Dulles.
>
> The Chairman: But you're guessing, aren't you?
>
> Mr. Bissell: I am, Mr. Chairman, and I have said that I cannot recollect the giving of such briefing at the meeting with the President-elect in November or in any meeting with President Eisenhower." (6/9/75, pp. 38-39).

Bissell's testimony varied with respect to the force with which he stated his belief that the President had been informed. Once he referred to it as "a pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 60-1); on another occasion he testified as follows:

> "Senator Morgan: Mr. Bissell, it's a serious matter to attribute knowledge of this sort to the President of the U.S., especially one who cannot speak for himself. Is it fair to assume that out of an abundance of caution you are simply telling us that you have no knowledge unless you are absolutely certain?...I gather that you think ...it [assassination plot information] came out but because of the seriousness of the accusation you are just being extremely cautious...is that a fair assumption to make?
>
> Bissell: That is very close to a fair assumption, sir. It's just that I have no direct knowledge, first-hand knowledge of his [President Kennedy's] being advised, but my belief is that he knew of it [assassination plans]." (Bissell, 6/9, p. 56).

When asked why he had not himself informed White House officials or the President of the assassination plots, Bissell said since Dulles was the DCI, he "left the question of advising senior officials of the government and obtaining clearances in Allen Dulles' hands" (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 29, 33). As with President Eisenhower, Bissell said that, based upon his testimony that Dulles knew about the assassination plot, he "assumed" that Dulles

> "had at least intimated [to President Kennedy] that some such thing was underway." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 33).*

---

* The Presidential logs from the Kennedy Administration indicate only one meeting before the Bay of Pigs invasion at which the President and Allen Dulles may have met privately. This meeting took place on March 25, 1961. (There is no record of the meeting. We feel compelled to state that the fact of this meeting, on the evidence available, is of little, if any significance or relevance.

Again as part of his "pure personal opinion" (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 60) that this was done, Bissell speculated that Dulles would have engaged in a "circumlocutious" sort of conversation. (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 6), using "rather general terms."

Bissell repeatedly coupled Eisenhower and Kennedy together when he speculated about the manner in which he felt the Presidents would have been advised to maintain "plausible deniability." (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 38, 57; 6/11/75, pp. 5-6):

> "In the case of an operation of high sensitivity of the sort that we are discussing, there was a further objective that would have been pursued at various levels, and that was specifically with respect to the President, to protect the President. And, therefore, the way in which I believe that Allen Dulles would have attempted to do that was to have indicated to the two successive Presidents the general objective of the operation that was contemplated, to make that sufficiently clear so that the President -- either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy -- could have ordered the termination of the operation, but to give the President just as little information about it as possible beyond an understanding of its general purpose. Such an approach to the President would have had as its purpose to leave him in the position to deny knowledge of the operation if it should surface.
>
> "My belief -- a belief based, as I have said, only to me knowledge of command relationship of Allen Dulles as an individual, and of his mode of operations -- is that authorization was obtained by him in the manner that I have indicated. I used the word on Monday "circumlocutious," and it was to this approach that I referred.
>
> "Assuming for the moment that I am correct, since the effort would have been to minimize the possibility of embarrassment to the President, it is, I think, understandable that neither I nor anyone else in the Agency would have discussed this operation on our own initiative with, for instance, members of the White House staff.

> The effort would have been to hold to the absolute minimum the number of people who knew that the President had been consulted, had been notified and had given, perhaps only tacitly, his authorization." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).

However, Bissell testified that Dulles never told him he had briefed President Kennedy and he did not recall asking Dulles. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34; 6/11/75, p. xx; 7/17/75, p. 27). In contrast, Bissell testified that on certain other occasions, Dulles had mentioned that a "circumlocutious" approach had been used to brief President Eisenhower on sensitive subjects (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 10-14). Bissell also said that he never asked to what degree Dulles had advised McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, of the assassination plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34).

What About JFK

b. BISSELL TESTIFIED HE DID NOT INFORM THE PRESIDENT OR WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS OF THE ONGOING ASSASSINATION PLOTS.

When asked if he had informed anyone outside the CIA that an effort to assassinate Fidel Castro was underway, Bissell stated, "not to my recollection." He added that he was not told that any Administration official had been made aware of such efforts. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-30).

After the change of Administration, McGeorge Bundy was the White House official who was the liaison with Bissell concerning Cuba and in general was the principal White House official responsible for CIA matters (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16). Bundy was a former student of Bissell's at Yale and they were personal friends (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 28). Bissell testified that he did not tell Bundy about the ongoing Castro assassination plots (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 28-29; 7/22, p. 31), and Bundy confirmed this (Bundy, p. 41).

Cuban affairs during this period leading up to the Bay of Pigs received active high-level attention. Bissell said that, in a continuation of the kind of intense weekly scrutiny the Eisenhower Administration had given the invasion plans (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 13).

> "...almost from the beginning of the Kennedy Administration, the President himslef and a number of Cabinet members and other senior officials took a very active interest in the operation(s) concerning Cuba." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 16).

Bissell "almost invariably" was present at meetings in which the President and other senior officials took an "active interest" in Cuba (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 17). Bissell testified that he did not inform any of them of the assassination plot. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 39).

c. KENNEDY ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS DENIED KNOWLEDGE OF ASSASSINATION EFFORTS AND GAVE OPINION THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY WAS NOT INFORMED

Testimony was taken by the Committee from all living officials high in the Kennedy Administration who dealt with Cuban affairs.* The theme of their testimony -- which is set forth in detail below -- was that they had no knowledge of any assassination plan or attempt by the U.S. government before or after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

As with the Eisenhower Administration officials, members of the Kennedy Administration also said they did not believe the President's character or style of operating would be consistent with approval of such a matter. (McNamara, p. 4; Bundy, p. 98; Taylor, pp. 45,51).

---

* Most of the testimony from officials high in the Kennedy Administration dealt with the period after the Bay of Pigs invasion, involving Operation Mongoose and related activities. (See Section ,infra.) It was during this period that most of the high officials in the White House, State Department, Defense Department, and the CIA were drawn into the detailed planning of Cuban operations. During this period, an extraordinary amount of decision making memoranda and other documents were generated in response to the Cuban situation.

Secretary of State Dean Rusk testified:

> "I never had any reason to believe that anyone that I ever talked to knew about had any active planning of assassination underway." (Rusk, pp. 65,49).

Likewise, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara stated that he had "no knowledge or information about...plans or preparations for a possible assassination attempt against Premier Castro." (McNamara, pp. 7,4). [The question of whether McNamara once raised the issue of assassinating Castro is discussed at Section ,infra.]

Roswell Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense under McNamara, said that killing Castro was not within the mandate of the Special Group which he construed to be the weakening and undermining of "the Cuban system." (Gilpatric, p. 28).

This was supported by General Maxwell Taylor, who chaired Special Group meetings on Operation Mongoose. Taylor stated that he had "never heard" of the assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, pp. 72, 7-8). Taylor stated that he never raised the question of assassination with anyone. (Taylor, p. 19). Moreover, Taylor testified that he was not aware of a directive for an assassination effort from the President or the Attorney General, nor was he aware of a proposal for the assassination of a foreign leader in any form by anyone to the Special Group (Taylor, pp. 41,45,62).

McGeorge Bundy stated that it was his "conviction" that

> "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House, or in the Capitol, ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54)

Furthermore, Bundy testified that he was never told by anyone at any time that assassination efforts were being conducted against Castro (Bundy, p. 63). Bundy said that Richard Bissell never informed him about CIA involvement in assassination attempts against any foreign leader (Bundy, p. 41). Bundy acknowledged, however, that he had once been briefed by Richard Bissell on the development of an "executive action capability" at the CIA (see Section , infra).*

? Impt.

Walt Rostow, who shared national security duties with Bundy before moving to the Department of State, testified that during his entire tenure in government he "never heard a reference" to an intention to undertake an assassination effort (Rostow, pp. 10, 12-13, 38).

Asked if he had ever been told anything about CIA efforts to assassinate Castro, Richard Goodwin, Assistant Special Counsel to the President, replied, "No, I never heard of such a thing." (Goodwin, p. 13).**

prior statements

---

* As indicated further below, Bundy also said (i) that the matter of a Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time ... as something to talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73); and (ii) he had a "very vague, essentially refreshed recollection" that at some time he had heard about "poison" in connection with a "possibility of action in Cuba" -- what stuck in his mind was that it seemed "totally impractical because it was going to kill a large number of people in a headquarters mess or something like that." (Bundy, pp. 42-43). Bundy stated flatly, however, that no assassination plot was approved and that he was never informed about the various plots. (Bundy, pp. 54, 63-64).

** As indicated below, Goodwin did on two occasions hear questions raised about assassination. One involved the President, who said he was opposed (see p.); the other involved the meeting of August 10, 1962 (see pp. to).

Presidential Assistant Theodore Sorensen said that his "first-hand knowledge" of Cuban affairs was limited to the post-Bay of Pigs period (Sorensen, p. 4). Sorensen stated, however, that his general opinion based upon his close contact with President Kennedy, was that

Verbiage

> "such an act [as assassination] was totally foreign to his character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but inevitably counterproductive a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable could only provoke reprisals and inflame hostility." (Sorensen, p. 5).

Sorensen also said that President Kennedy "would not make major foreign policy decisions alone without the knowledge or participation of one or more of those senior foreign policy officials in whose judgment and discretion he had confidence." (Sorensen, pp. 5-6).

Sorensen concluded his testimony by providing the Committee his judgment on the following question:

> "Q: Would you think it would be possible that ... the Agency, the CIA could somehow have been under the impression that they had a tacit authorization for assassination due to a circumspect discussion that might have taken place in any of these meetings?
>
> Sorensen: It is possible, indeed, I think the President on more than one occasion felt that Mr. Dulles, by making rather vague and sweeping references to particular countries was seeking tacit approval without ever asking for it, and the President was rather concerned that he was not being asked for explicit direction and was not being given explicit information, so it is possible. But on something of this kind, assassination, I would doubt it very much. Either you are for it or you are not for it, and he was not for it. " (Sorensen, 7/21/75, pp. 32-33.)

d. THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ASSASSINATION EFFORTS WERE DISCLOSED IN VARIOUS BRIEFINGS OF ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS.

(i) BRIEFING OF THE PRESIDENT-ELECT.

After the election, in the latter part of November, 1960, Dulles and Bissell jointly briefed President-elect Kennedy on "the most important details with respect to the operation which became the Bay of Pigs." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 34). Bissell testified that he did not believe the ongoing assassination efforts were mentioned to the President-elect, and that to the best of his recollection they were not. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 27, 35-36). Bissell surmised that the reasons he and Dulles did not tell Kennedy at that initial meeting were: (a) "apparently" they had not thought it was an important matter*; and (b) they "would have thought that that was a matter of which he should be advised upon assuming office rather than in advance." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35). The latter comment led to the following exchange:

> "The Chairman: Isn't it a strange distinction that you draw that on the one hand (as) a Presidential designate, as President-elect, he should have all of the details concerning a planned invasion of Cuba, but that he should not be told about an ongoing attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro?
>
> Mr. Bissell: I think that in hindsight it could be regarded as peculiar, yes.
>
> "The Chairman: ...(I)t just seems too strange that if you were charged with briefing the man who

---

* This was subsequently repeated by Bissell in response to examination of his assumption that Dulles probably told President Eisenhower about the assassination operation:

> "...the Mafia operation was not regarded as of enormous importance and there were much more important matters to talk about with the President." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 25).

> was to become President of the U.S. on matters so important as a planned invasion of a neighboring country, and that if you knew at the time in addition to the planned invasion there was an ongoing attempt to assassinate the leader of that country, that you would tell Mr. Kennedy about one matter and not the other.'"
>
> Mr. Bissell: Well, Mr. Chairman, it is quite possible that Mr. Dulles did say something about an attempt to or the possibility of making use of syndicate characters for this purpose. I do not remember his doing so at that briefing. My belief is that had he done so, he probably would have done so in rather general terms and that neither of us was in a position to go into detail on the matter. " (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 35).

However, Bissell also testified generally that pursuant to the doctrine of plausible denial, efforts were made to keep matters that might be "embarrassing" away from Presidents (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 5-6).

(ii) DISCUSSION WITH BUNDY ON "EXECUTIVE ACTION CAPABILITY"

As explained in the next section, sometime during the early period of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell discussed with Bundy the subject of a "capability" for "executive action" -- a term said by Bissell to include various means of "eliminating the effectiveness" of foreign leaders up to and including assassinations (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32).

There is some dispute concerning when this occurred and who initiated it, and this subject is discussed at length at Section , infra.

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that Bissell did not tell Bundy -- in the course of discussing the executive action capability or at any other time -- of the actual assassination plots against Castro (Bissell, 7/22, p. 31; Bundy, p. 41). (However, there was some testimony that the names of Castro, Trujillo, and Lumumba might have been mentioned in connection with the discussion of "research" into the capability. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51)).

(iii) TAYLOR/KENNEDY BAY OF PIGS INQUIRY

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy convened a "board of inquiry" which reviewed "the causes of...[the] failure" of the operation (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 42,45). The members of the board were Robert Kennedy, General Maxwell Taylor, Allen Dulles and Admiral Arleigh Burke. The panel examined the Bay of Pigs failure for several weeks and issued its report on June 13, 1961. The "Taylor Report" does not mention the assassination plots.

Bissell was questioned extensively and appeared to General Taylor to have been the principal person involved in the operation and much more knowledgeable than Dulles who had deliberately kept himself out of the planning and delegated responsibility to Bissell. (Taylor, p. 73).

Bissell testified that he did not disclose to the Taylor/Kennedy Committee that there had been an assassination effort against Castro (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 42). He put forward several reasons for not having done so. First, "the question was never asked." Second, he claimed Dulles already knew about the operation. Third, Bissell said "by that time the assassination attempt had been called off." Fourth, he contended that the assassination effort was "not germane" because it did not contribute to the failure of the Bay of Pigs. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 44-46; 6/11/75, p. 39).

Bissell hastened to add that he had no reason to believe" that Allen Dulles, himself a board member, did not discuss the plots with one or more members (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 46).

However, both General Taylor and Admiral Burke stated that neither Bissell nor Dulles informed them of the assassination plots (Taylor, pp. 72-73; Burke affidavit, 8/25/75, p. 3).

When asked if Richard Bissell ever informed him that underworld figures had been offered a large sum to assassinate Castro, General Taylor responded, "No, I never heard that, and it amazes me" (Taylor, p. 72). Taylor said that during his review of the Bay of Pigs operation no mention was made of an assassination effort against Castro (Taylor, p. 72). Despite the fact that Dulles met with Taylor on the Board of Inquiry thirty or forty times, Taylor testified that Dulles never told him about the plot (Taylor, p. 73).

(iv) MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

Bissell's testimony that he had not disclosed assassination plots to the Kennedy/Taylor "court of inquiry" was consistent with his statement that

> "I have no knowledge that Robert Kennedy was advised of this (the plot to kill Mr. Castro)." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 41).

The Committee tested this statement against other parts of Bissell's testimony. An attachment to the May 22, 1961 FBI memorandum (regarding the Las Vegas tap) which Director Hoover had sent to the Attorney General* had quoted Edwards as saying that Bissell in "recent briefings" of Taylor and Kennedy,

> "told the Attorney General that some of the associated planning included the use of Giancana and the underworld against Castro." (Bissell, 7/17/75, Ex. 3).

When first shown this document, Bissell said,

---

* A handwritten note from the Attorney General to his assistant on the face of the memorandum indicates that he had actually seen the document. This memorandum is discussed in detail at Section , infra.

> "I have no recollection of briefing those two gentlemen except as members of the Board of Inquiry that I have described, of which Allen Dulles himself was a member." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 27).

As mentioned above (Section (e), supra), Bissell testified that his briefings to the Board of Inquiry did not deal with assassination efforts. (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 45-46).

Discussing the document in a subsequent appearance before the Committee, Bissell again said that he had no recollection of any such conversation (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56) but he was sure that it did not take place in front of the Kennedy/Taylor board of inquiry (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 64).

However, Bissell speculated, the report quoted language which "I might very well have used, that is, the use of the underworld against Castro." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 21).

The examination of Bissell on whether he had had any such discussion and, if so, why he used such obscure and indirect language, elicited the following testimony:

> "Q: Did you, sometime in May of 1961 communicate the state of your awareness to the Attorney General in your briefing to him?
>
> Bissell: Well, there is a report which I was shown, I think it was last week, I believe it also came from the FBI, but I could be wrong about that, or indicating that I did, at that time in May, brief the Attorney General, and I think General Taylor to the effect that the Agency had been using -- I don't know whether Giancana was mentioned by name, but in effect, the Underworld against the Castro regime.
>
> Q: Did you tell them -- them being the Attorney General and General Taylor -- that this use included actual attempts to assassinate Mr. Castro?"

> "Bissell: I have no idea whether I did [.] I have no idea of the wording. I think it might quite possibly have been left in the more general terms of using the underworld against the Castro regime, or the leadership of the Castro regime.
>
> Q. Mr. Bissell, given the state of your knowledge at that time, wouldn't that have been deliberately misleading information?
>
> Bissell: I don't think it would have been. We were indeed doing precisely that. We were trying to use elements of the underworld against Castro and the Cuban leadership.
>
> Q. But you had information, didn't you, that you were, in fact, trying to kill him?
>
> Bissell: I think that is a way of using these people against him.
>
> Q. That's incredible. You're saying that in briefing the Attorney General you are telling him you are using the underworld against Castro, and you intended that to mean, Mr. Attorney General, we are trying to kill him?
>
> Bissell: I thought it signalled just exactly that to the Attorney General, I'm sure.
>
> Q. Then it's your belief that you communicated to the Attorney General that you were, in fact, trying to kill Castro?
>
> Bissell: I think it is best to rest on that report we do have, which is from a source over which I had no influence and it does use the phrase I have quoted here. Now you can surmise and I can surmise as to just whattthe Attorney General would have read into that phrase." (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-54).

Bissell then testified:

> "Q. Was it your intent to circumlocutiously or otherwise, to advise the Attorney General that you were in the process of trying to kill Castro?
>
> Mr. Bissell: [U]nless I remembered the conversation at the time, which I don't, I don't have any recollection as to whether that was my intent or not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 56).

Bissell proceeded to speculate that a "proper" briefing might not have included any reference to the assassination plot. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). He gave two reasons for this speculation: (i) even if he had "thoroughly briefed" the Attorney General he would have chosen "circumlocutious" language to tell him about the activity involving Giancana. (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 53-56); and (ii) the assassination effort had been "stood down by then." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 59). Bissell concluded by reiterating that he had "no knowledge" that the Attorney General was "specifically advised" of the assassination plot against Castro (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 62).*

e. CONVERSATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GEORGE SMATHERS

George Smathers, former U.S. Senator from Florida, testified that the subject of the possible assassination of Castro arose in a conversation between Smathers and President Kennedy on the White House lawn in 1961.** Smathers said he discussed the general Cuban situation with the President many times (Smathers, p. 6). Smathers had many Cuban constituents, was familiar with Latin American affairs, and was a long-time friend of the President (Smathers, p. 6).

---

* If the FBI quotation of Edwards is to be accorded significant weight, then it is important to note that another section of it contradicts Bissell's assumption that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy had been circumlocutiously advised by Dulles of the assassination plot. Edwards told the FBI that "Allen Dulles was completely unaware of Edwards' contact with Maheu" in connection with Cuban operations.

Bissell's explanation for Edwards' statement was that Edwards was being "protective" of the DCI. (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 20). But this testimony must be reconciled with Bissell's previous testimony that Dulles knew of the operation and probably would have told the President about it.

** Smathers' testimony about this conversation referred to the transcript of an Oral HIstory interview, conducted on March 31, 1964, in which his testimony was based gives an indication that the conversation transpired in 1961, before the Bay of Pigs invasion in mid-April.

It appears from the White House logs of Presidential meetings that there were only two occasions in 1961 when Senator Smathers met with the President alone for as much as twenty minutes. Both of those meetings took place in March. (Supra, p.).

Smathers had the "impression" that the President raised the subject of assassination with him because someone "had apparently discussed this and other possibilities with respect to Cuba" with the President (Smathers, pp. 16, 25). Smathers had no direct knowledge of any such discussion, nor did he know who might have been involved (Smathers, pp. 18-19, 25). The President did not indicate directly that assassination had been proposed to him (Smathers, p. 18).

According to Smathers:

does this imply proposal for IG co
it does affect negligence (TA-DRAN

> "...[President Kennedy] asked me what reaction I thought there would be throughout South America were Fidel Castro to be assassinated... I told the President that even as much as I disliked Fidel Castro that I did not think it would be a good idea for there to be even considered an assassination of Fidel Castro, and the President of the United States completely agreed with me, that it would be a very unwise thing to do, the reason obviously being that no matter who did it and no matter how it was done and no matter what, that the United States would receive full credit for it, and the President receive full credit for it, and it would work to his great disadvantage with all of the other countries in Central and South America...I disapproved of it, and he completely disapproved of the idea." (Smathers, p. 22).

Smathers further testified that he had said the reason it would work to "great disadvantage" with the nations of Central and South America was because they would blame the United States for any assassination of Castro (Smathers, p. 6).

Smathers said that on a later occasion he tried to raise the subject of "Cuba and what could be done" with President Kennedy (Smathers, p. 22). The President made it clear to Smathers that he should not raise the subject with him again.*

what does this imply

Senator Smathers concluded his testimony by indicating that on Cuban affairs in general, he felt he was "taking a tougher stance than was the President" (Smathers, p. 24). But Smathers said that he disapproved of even thinking about assassinating Castro and said he was "positive" that Kennedy also opposed it (Smathers, p. 16).

---

* One night at dinner with Senator Smathers, the President emphasized his point by cracking his plate at the mention of Cuba. (Smathers, p. 22).

Meeting 8/30/75
(pp. 75-80 reserved by
Senator Tower)

(iii) Kennedy Administration -- The Question of Authorization Outside the Agency During the Post Bay of Pigs, Mongoose, and 1963 Periods

This section discusses the question of authorization outside the Agency for the assassination plots during 1962 and 1963 -- the period of Operation Mongoose (the 1962 Kennedy Administration program aimed at overthrowing Castro by an internal revolt), the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, and the subsequent program in 1963 which saw a more limited covert action program directed against Cuba.

A. Recap of the Assassination Activity After the Bay of Pigs

During 1962 and 1963 there were three principal assassination plots.

1. In the spring of 1962, William Harvey reactivated the contact with John Roselli and in April provided lethal pills and guns to Roselli and Cuban associates in Miami. In May it was reported that the pills reached Cuba.

2. In early 1963 the science fiction schemes -- exploding sea shell and poisoned diving suit -- were contrived and then abandoned.

3. In November 1963 the dissident Cuban who was code-named AMLASH was given a poison pen device.

B. The Issue of Authority

The fundamental issue dealt with in this section is whether the above assassination plots were authorized outside the Agency. The issue arises from the differing perceptions of Helms and his subordinates, on the one hand, and members of the Kennedy Administration, including the Director of the CIA, on the other hand.

While Helms stated that he never received a direct order to assassinate Castro, Helms testified that he fully believed that the CIA was at all times acting within the scope of its authority and that he believed a Castro assassination came within the bounds of the Kennedy Administration's effort to overthrow Castro and his regime. Helms stated that he never informed McCone or any officials of the Kennedy

TOP SECRET

Administration of the assassination plots. On the other hand, McCone and the surviving members of the Kennedy Administration testified that they did not believe a Castro assassination was permissible without a direct order, that assassination was not within the parameters of the Administration's anti-Castro program, and testified that to their knowledge no such direct order was given to Helms.

Before setting out the testimony in detail, we discuss below the Kennedy Administration's 1962 covert action program, Operation Mongoose (as well as the events in 1961 leading to that program) which was designed to overthrow the Castro regime. An understanding of that program is essential to an evaluation of the testimony on the issue of authorization.

C. Events From the Bay of Pigs to the Establishment of Mongoose

1. The Taylor Review

On April 22, 1961, following the Bay of Pigs failure, the President requested General Maxwell Taylor to conduct a re-evaluation of "our practices and programs in the areas of military and paramilitary, guerilla and anti-guerilla activity which fall short of outright war." The President hoped that Taylor would give special attention to Cuba. (Letter to Maxwell Taylor, April 22, 1961) Robert Kennedy was to be Taylor's principal colleague in this effort. The resulting review of the U.S. policy in this area concluded:

> "We have been struck with the general feeling that there can be no long-term living with Castro as a neighbor. His continued presence within the hemispheric community as a dangerously effective exponent of Communism and Anti-Americanism constitutes a real menace capable of eventually overthrowing the elected governments in any one or more of weak Latin American republics.
>
> ***
>
> "It is recommended that the Cuban situation be reappraised in the light of all presently known factors and new guidance be provided for political, military, economic and propaganda action against Castro." (Report to the President, June 13, 1961, memorandum No. 4, p. 8)

TOP SECRET

It is clear from the record, moreover, that the defeat at the Bay of Pigs had been regarded as a humiliation for the President personally and for the CIA institutionally.

By July the Special Group had agreed that the basic objective "is to provide support to a U. S. program to develop opposition to Castro and to help bring about a regime acceptable to the U. S." (Memo for the Record, July 21, 1961.) Occasional harrassment operations were mounted during the summer but there was neither over-all strategy nor much activity.

2. National Security Action Memorandum 100 of October 5, 1961, and the CIA Intelligence Estimate

The documentary evidence and testimony indicate that in the fall of 1961 the question of the effect of Castro's removal from power and the prospects in that event, for U. S. military intervention were considered by the Kennedy Administration.

Two studies were prepared in this connection. Pursuant to National Security Action Memorandum 100 ("NSAM 100"), the State Department was asked to assess the potential courses of action open to the U. S. should Castro be removed from the Cuban scene, and to prepare a contingency plan with the Department of Defense for military intervention in that event. The CIA, prepared an "Intelligence Estimate" on the "situation and prospects" in Cuba. As discussed below, the evidence indicates that the focus of these studies was on the possible courses of action open to the U. S. in a post-Castro Cuba, rather than on the means that might bring about Castro's removal. However, it also appears that assassination was not excluded from the potential means by which Castro might be removed.

TOP SECRET

NSAM 100

On October 5, 1961, Bundy issued National Security Action Memorandum No. 100 ("NSAM 100") (Bundy, Ex 3) entitled "Contingency Planning for Cuba", NSAM 100 was addressed to the Secretary of State stated in full: "In confirmation of oral instructions conveyed to Assistant Secretary of State Woodward*, a plan is desired for the indicated contingency."

Related documents indicate that the subject matter of the contingency referred to in NSAM 100 was the "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene". (Bundy Ex 3A, Minutes of Special Group Meeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.)

The Minutes of the Special Group meeting on October 6, 1961, (the day after the issuance of NSAM 100) state that the Group was told that in addition to an overall plan for Cuban covert operations," a contingency plan in connection with the possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene" was in preparation. (Bundy, Ex 3A, Memorandum for the Record of Special Group meeting, October 6, 1961, p. 1.)

In addition, a Memorandum for the Record by Parrott on October 5, 1961, states that Parrott informed Assistant Secretary Woodward's Deputy that "what was wanted was a plan against the contingency that Castro would in some way or other be removed from the Cuban scene". (Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.) Parrott's memorandum further stated that in preparing the plan, "the presence and positions of Raul (Castro) and Che Guevara must be taken into account", and that General Taylor had told Parrott he preferred "the President's interest in the matter not be mentioned" toto Woodward. (Bundy, Ex 3B.) Parrott's memorandum also stated that "on the covert side, I talked to Tracy Barnes in CIA and asked that an up-to-date report be furnished as soon as possible on what is going on and what is being planned". (Bundy, Ex 3B, p. 1.)

TOP SECRET

---

*Woodward at that time was Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs.

Testimony of Bundy

Bundy testified that the contingency referred to in NSAM 100 and the related documents was "what would we do if Castro were no longer there", but that "clearly one of the possibilities would be assassination". (Bundy, p. 77.) However, Bundy emphasized that NSAM 100 represented an effort to assess the effect should Castro be removed from power by any means (including assassination) but "without going further with the notion (of assassination) itself".* (Bundy, p. 77.)

---

*"If people were suggesting this to you and you were curious about whether it was worth exploring, one way of getting more light on it without going any further with that notion itself would be to ask political people, not intelligence people, what they thought would happen if Castro were not there any longer." (Bundy, p. .)

Bundy further contended that the President was not considering an assassination, but rather "what are things going to be like after Castro." (Bundy, p. 81.)*

Taylor's Testimony

Taylor testified that he had no recollection of NSAM 100 of the events described in the related documents set out above. (Taylor, p. 18.) On the basis of his review of the documents, Taylor testified that "it sounds like purely a political consideration of the sequence of power in Cuba."** Taylor emphasized, moreover, that"never at any time" did he raise the question of of assassination with Parrott, or with anybody else. (Taylor, p. 19)

Parrott's Testimony

Parrott, the Special Group Secretary who transmitted the request for the NSAM 100 study to the State Department, testified that the request for a plan reflected in his memorandum of October 5, 1961, and the reference in that memorandum to the "contingency that Castro would in some way or another be removed from the Cuban scene" (described above, p. 18), reflected interest in a contingency study for Castro's removal, but by means "short of being killed." (Parrott, p. 83)

on what based

---

*Thus, with respect to the desire not to indicate the President's interest in the plan requested from the State Department, Bundy testified:

> "...it was precisely to insulate the President from any false inference that what he was asking about was assassination. It is easy to confuse the question, what are things going to be like after Castro, with the other question, and we were trying to focus attention on the information he obviously wanted, which is, what would happen if we did do this sort of thing, and not get one into the frame of mind of thinking that he was considering doing it." (Bundy, p. 81)

**Taylor said he was puzzled by the wording of NSAM 100 and the related documents and stated, "I just cannot tie in the language here with a plausible explanation." (Taylor, p. 18)

The CIA's Intelligence Estimate

The CIA study in connection with the consideration of Castro's removal was an intelligence estimate prepared by the CIA's Board of National Estimates (which was not part of the CIA's covert action directorate), entitled "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba"*. The CIA Estimate was pessimistic regarding the chances for success of a Cuban internal revolt, and further found that a Castro assassination would likely strengthen the Communist position in Cuba.

was being discussion — How does that square w/ McN et al

After a general review of the economic, military, and political situation in Cuba, the CIA estimate concluded that the Castro regime had sufficient popular and repressive capabilities to cope with any internal threat. The concluding paragraph of the estimate was entitled "If Castro were to Die". It noted that:

> "His (Castro's) loss now, by assassination or by natural causes, would have an unsettling effect, but would almost certainly not prove fatal to the regime...(I)ts principal surviving leaders would probably rally together in the face of a common danger." (Estimate, p. 9.)

The CIA study further predicted that should Castro die, "some sort of power struggle would almost certainly develop eventually," but that whatever the outcome of such a struggle, the Communist Party's influence would be "significantly" increased.** (Estimate, p. 9.)

TOP SECRET

---

*The IG Report apparently refers to an earlier draft of this intelligence estimate. (IG, p. 4.) The IG Report, in reporting that many CIA officers interviewed in the IG investigation stressed the point that "elimination of the dominant figures in a government...will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government," stated:

> "This point was stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in an internal CIA draft paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Taylor's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, from whatever cause, would offer little opportunity for the liberation of Cuba from Communist and Soviet Bloc control." (IG, p. 4.) The CIA was unable to locate the draft paper referred to in the IG Report.

**A cover memorandum by Lansdale transmitting the CIA estimate to Robert Kennedy stated that the estimate "seems to be the major evidence to be used to oppose your program" (referring to the proposed overall Mongoose operation). Lansdale's memorandum criticized the estimate's assessment that "it is highly improbable that an extensive popular uprising could be fomented" against Castro as a "conclusion of fact quite outside the area of intelligence." (Lansdale Memorandum to Robert Kennedy, 11/62, p.1) As discussed in detail at pp.__ below. Lansdale's basic concept for the Mongoose program was to overthrow Castro through an internal revolt of the Cuban people.

At the close of the meeting, Robert Kennedy asked Szulc to meet with President Kennedy the following day (Szulc, p. 25). On November 9, 1961, Szulc, accompanied only by Goodwin, met with President Kennedy for over an hour in the Oval Office.* (Szulc, 6/10, p. 25.) Szulc recalled that the President discussed "a number of his views on Cuba in the wake of the Bay of Pigs, asked me a number of questions concerning my conversations with Premier Castro, and...what the United States could /or/ might do in...either a hostile way or in establishing some kind of a dialogue..." (Szulc, 6/10, pp. 25-26).

Szulc testified that after this general discussion, the President then asked "what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated.*/*/ (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26; Szulc Notes of conversation with President Kennedy, November 9, 1961). Szulc testified that he replied that an assassination would not necessarily cause a change in the Cuban system, and that it was Szulc's personal view that the United States should not be party to murders and political assassinations. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 26). Szulc testified that

Do we want to get out that [illegible] in the air / raises new [illegible] quests

TOP SECRET

---

*/Goodwin testified that President Kennedy met frequently with members of the press and others who were experts in their fields, but that it was "possible" that the meeting with Szulc may have been an occasion for the President to consider Szulc for a position in the Administration (Goodwin, p. 29-30).
On November 2, 1961 Goodwin had addressed an "eyes only" memorandum to the President and the Attorney General outlining a suggested organization for what became the Mongoose operation. Goodwin proposed five "staff components," including "intelligence collection," "guerrilla and underground," and "propaganda." The memorandum stated: "As for propaganda, I thought we might ask Tad Szulc to take a leave of absence from the Times and work on this one--although we should check with /USIA Director/ Ed Murrow and Dick Bissell." (Goodwin Ex. 2, p. 1, 2).

// Szulc made notes of the conversation with President Kennedy as soon as he returned to his office, based on his memory of the meeting. President Kennedy's question regarding a Castro assassination appears in quotation marks in Szulc's notes, which were made the same day from "reasonably fresh" memory. (Szulc, 6/10, p.30).

3. Testimony of Szulc on President Kennedy's November 9, 1961 Question Regarding a Possible Castro Assassination

Tad Szulc* testified that in a private meeting he had with President Kennedy on Novebmer 9, 1961, the President asked"Szulc what would you think if I ordered Castro to be assassinated," and said "I agree with you completely" when Szulc answered that a Castro assassination should be ruled out on both practical and moral grounds. Szulc further testified that President Kennedy went on "to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons" must not be involved in assassinations. (Szulc, p.27).

In early November 1961 Szulc was asked by Richard Goodwin, the Special Assistant to President Kennedy, to meet with Attorney General Robert Kennedy on November 8, 1961, to discuss the situation in Cuba. The meeting was an "off-the-record" one which Szulc attended as a friend of Goodwin's and not as a reporter. (Szulc, p. 24.) During the meeting with Robert Kennedy, the discussion centered on "the situation in Cuba following the (Bay of Pigs) invasion (and) the pros and cons of some different possible actions by the U. S. in that context" (Szulc, p. 25). The subject of assassination was not mentioned during this meeting. (Szulc, p. 31.)

---

*In November 1961 Tad Szulc was employed as a reporter in the Washington Bureau of the New York Times (Szulc, p. 24). Szulc had visited Cuba in May-June 1961, following the Bay of Pigs invasion. (Szulc, p. 24) During the course of that trip, Szulc had a "series of very long conversations with Castro". (Szulc, p. 24.)

thereupon the President said, "I agree with you completely." Szulc stated further:

> "He /President Kennedy/ then went on for a few minutes to make the point how strongly he and his brother felt that the United States for moral reasons should never be in a situation of having recourse to assassination." (Szulc, p.27).

Szulc's notes of the meeting with the President state:

> "JFK then said he was testing me, that he felt the same way -- he added 'I'm glad you feel the same way' -- because indeed U.S. morally must not be part /sic/ to assassinations."

Szulc's notes of the conversation further state:

> "JFK said he raised question because he was under terrific pressure from advisers (think he said intelligence people, but not positive) to okay a Castro murder. sed /sic/ he was resisting pressures." (Szulc note of conversation with President Kennedy, November 9, 1961).

Szulc stated, relying on his memory, that it is "possible" and he "believed" that President Kennedy used such words as "someone in the intelligence business," as the source of the pressure for a Castro assassination. (Szulc, 6/10, p. 29). The President did not identify the person or persons. (Szulc, 6/19, p. 27).

raised w/him

why not ask

intel comm.--

takes on meaning

If anyone was in fact putting pressure on the President, there was no other evidence on this point adduced before the Committee. This was particularly troublesome since everyone questioned by the Committee, both within and without the CIA, denied ever having discussed assassination with the President, let alone having pressured him.

TOP SECRET

Testimony of Goodwin.

Goodwin attended the November 9, 1961 meeting between President Kennedy and Szulc. (Goodwin, p. 3). Goodwin testified that, after asking Szulc for his reaction to a suggestion that Castro be assassinated, President Kennedy said "well, that's the kind of thing I'm never going to do." (Goodwin, p. 3).

Goodwin testified further that several days after the meeting with Szulc, Goodwin referred to the mention of assassination to Szulc, and President Kennedy said only "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets". (Goodwin, p. 4, 11.)

4. The Rejection of Assassination in President Kennedy's November 16, 1961 Speech

A few days after the meeting with Szulc and Goodwin, and some six weeks after the issuance of NSAM 100, President Kennedy delivered a speech at the University of Washington. In that public address, President Kennedy stated:

> "We cannot, as a free nation, compete with our adversaries in tactics of terror, assassination, false promises, counterfeit mobs and crises." (Public Papers of the Presidents, John F. Kennedy, 1961, p. 724)

How does that compare w/ Mongoose

We discuss in the next section the nature of the program which was initiated against the Castro regime at the end of November 1961 pursuant to President Kennedy's instruction, and which continued to the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962.

TOP SECRET

D. Operation Mongoose

1. The Creation of Operation Mongoose. In November 1962 the proposal for a major covert program to overthrow Castro was developed. Richard Goodwin, a special assistant to President Kennedy, and Edward Lansdale, a military officer with experience in counter-insurgency operations, played major staff roles in the creation of Mongoose. Both Goodwin and Lansdale worked closely with Robert Kennedy, who took an active interest in this preparatory stage and in the later conduct of Mongoose. On November 1, 1961, Goodwin advised the President that Robert Kennedy "would be the most effective commander" of the proposed operation. (Memorandum to the President, November 1, 1961, p.). Lansdale, in a memorandum to Robert Kennedy on November 15, 1961, outlining the Mongoose proposal, stated that a "picture of the situation has emerged clearly enough to indicate what needs to be done and to support your sense of urgency concerning Cuba". (Memorandum, November 15, 1961, p.)

At the end of the month, on November 30, 1962, President Kennedy issued a memorandum recording his decision to begin the Mongoose project--to "use our available assets . . . to help Cuba overthrow the Communist regime". (Lansdale Ex. 17, Memorandum to the Secretary of State, Defense, et al., November 30, 1961).

TOP SECRET

Important organizational changes were made in establishing Operation MONGOOSE.

a. The Special Group Augmented. A new control group, the Special Group Augmented, was put in charge of Operation MONGOOSE. The SGA consisted of the regular Special Group (i.e., Bundy, Johnson of State, Gilpatric of Defense, McCone of CIA, and Gen. Lemnitzer of the Joint Chiefs) plus Robert Kennedy and General Taylor. Also, Secretaries Rusk and McNamara more frequently attended its meetings than they did those of the Special Group itself.

b. General Lansdale as the Chief of Operations of MONGOOSE. General Edward Lansdale was named the Chief of Operations of the MONGOOSE activities by President Kennedy. Lansdale had developed a reputation in the Philippines and Vietnam for having an ability to deal with revolutionary insurgencies in less developed countries. In addition, as a result of the Bay of Pigs failure, President Kennedy distrusted the CIA and believed he required someone from outside the Agency to oversee major covert action programs. Rather than appoint Robert Kennedy to head Mongoose as proposed by Goodwin, President Kennedy gave Lansdale the task of coordinating the CIA's Mongoose operations with those of the Departments of State and Defense, and made General Taylor the Chairman of the Special Group Augmented. However, Robert Kennedy did play an active role in the Mongoose structure, unrelated to his position as Attorney General.

c. CIA Organization for Mongoose. In late 1961 or early 1962, William Harvey was put in charge of the CIA's Task Force W, the CIA arm for Mongoose Operations. Task Force W operated under the Special Group Augmented and employed some 400 people at CIA headquarters and at the Miami Station. McCone and Harvey were thereafter the principal CIA participants in Operation Mongoose. Helms attended only some 7 of 40 Mongoose meetings and testified that it was fair to state that McCone and Harvey, rather than Helms, were principally concerned with Mongoose. Helms was, however, substantially involved in Mongoose and testified that he "was as interested" in Mongoose as Harvey and McCone were. (Helms, 7/18, p. 10)

2. Lansdale's Theory and Objective for Mongoose

In the fall of 1961, Lansdale had been asked by President Kennedy to examine the Administration's Cuba policy and to make recommendations. Lansdale testified that, in reporting his recommendations to President Kennedy, he emphasized that "Castro ... had aroused considerable affection for himself personally with the Cuban population...." (Lansdale, p. 4), and that the U.S. "should take a very different course" from the "harassment" operations that had been directed against Castro up to that time. (Lansdale, p. 3). These prior U.S. operations were conceived and led by Americans, Lansdale informed the President. (Lansdale, p. 5). In contrast, Lansdale proposed that the U.S. work with all exiles, particularly professionals who had opposed Batista and then became disillusioned by Castro. (Lansdale, pp. 4, 10-11). Lansdale's ultimate objective was to have "the people themselves overthrow the Castro regime rather than U.S. engineered efforts from outside Cuba." (Lansdale, p. 41).*/

Hence, after his appointment as Chief of Operations, Lansdale's concept for the MONGOOSE project emphasized as a first step the development of leadership elements, and "a very necessary political basis" among the Cubans opposed to Castro, before any large actions began. (Lansdale, p. 11). At the same time, Lansdale sought to develop "means to infiltrate Cuba successfully" and to organize "cells and activities inside Cuba ... who could work secretly and safely." (Lansdale, p. 11). Lansdale's plan was designed so as not to "arouse premature actions, not to bring great reprisals on the people, and abort any eventual success." (Lansdale, p. 11).

TOP SECRET

---

*/ As Lansdale described his "concept of operation" for Mongoose in a memorandum to the President on January 18, 1962, it was to "help the Cubans from within Cuba" to overthrow the Castro regime through a "revolt of the Cuban people." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 2).

3. Bissell's Testimony Concerning Presidential Instructions to Act More Vigorously, But That Assassination Was Not Included.

Not gram

Sometime in the early fall of 1961, Bissell was apparently called to the White House and was said to have been

> "chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro regime."

NAME

This description comes from the testimony of Samuel Halpern, a middle-level CIA covert action officer, who said Bissell told him about the meeting, and directed him to come up with some plans. (Halpern, pp. 8, 36-37). Bissell said he did not remember that precise meeting but that he had been, in essence, told to "get off your ass about Cuba." (Bissell, 7/25/75, pp. 37-38).

Bissell was asked whether he considered such an instruction to constitute authority for proceeding to assassinate Castro. He said it would not, and that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination action (Id., 38-39).

Bissell also testified that there was in fact no assassination activity between the pre-Bay of Pigs/Roselli operation and his departure from the Agency in February 1962.

In late 1961 Halpern became Harvey's Executive Assistant on Task Force W, the CIA action arm of Operation Mongoose. He testified that he never heard of the Roselli assassination operation (Halpern, pp. 15-16).

TOP SECRET

4. The January 19, 1962 Meeting at Which the Attorney General Was Quoted As Saying Cuba Should Have the "Top Priority" in the United States Government. On January 19, 1962, a meeting attended by Lansdale, probably Helms, Helms' Executive Assistant George McManus, and other representatives of the agencies involved in Mongoose, took place in Attorney General Kennedy's office.* (McManus, p. 6). Notes taken at the meeting by McManus contain the following passages:

> "Conclusion Overthrow of Castro is Possible"
>
> "....
>
> "... 'a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority in U.S. Gov/ernmen/t. No time, money, effort -- or manpower is to be spared.'"
>
> "'Yesterday ... the President had indicated to him' that final chapter had not been written -- its got to be done and will be done."

(McManus Ex. 1, Memorandum, January 19, 1962, p. 2). McManus stated that the words "the top priority in the U.S. Gov/ernmen/t -- no time, money, effort or manpower is to be spared" had been spoken by the Attorney General (McManus, pp. 8-9).

TOP SECRET

---

*/ Others who attended the meeting were Brig. Gen. Craig, representing the Joint Chiefs, Don Wilson of USIA, Major Patchell of the Secretary of Defense's office, and Frank Hand of CIA.

Helms stated that those words reflected the "kind of atmosphere" on which he relied for his perception that assassination was implicitly authorized. (Helms, 7/17, p. 60-61.) McManus, who wrote the memorandum, agreed that Robert Kennedy "was very vehement in his speech" and "really wanted action" but McManus disagreed with Helms perception, stating that "it never occurred to me" that the words quoted above from Robert Kennedy included permission to assassinate Castro. (McManus, p. 9.) Nor did the spirit of the meeting as a whole give McManus any idea that assassination was either contemplated or authorized. (Tr., p. 9-10.)*

5. General Lansdale's Mongoose Planning Tasks

On January 18, 1962, Lansdale assigned 32 planning tasks to the agencies participating in Mongoose. (Lansdale Ex. 3, Program Review of the Cuba Project.) In a memorandum to the working group members, Lansdale emphasized that "it is our job to put the American genius to work on this project, quickly and effectively. This demands a change from the business as usual and a hard facing of the fact that we are in a combat situation--where we have been given full command." (Lansdale memorandum, 1/20/62, p. 1.)

The 32 tasks comprised a variety of activities, ranging from intelligence collection to planning for "use of U. S. military force to support the Cuban popular movement" and developing an "operational schedule for sabotage actions inside Cuba." (Lansdale Ex. 3, p. 5, 7.)*

---

*/ With respect to the question of priorities and emphasis in the Kennedy Administration, there was a great deal of proof showing that Cuba indeed had a high priority and the very existence of a high level group like the Special Group Augmented further demonstrates its importance. MacNamara, for example, stated that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter." (In the same context, MacNamara stated "I don't believe we contemplated assassination.) (MacNamara, p. 93). Similarly, General Lansdale informed the members of his inter-agency committee that Mongoose "demands a change from business-as-usual and a hard facing of the fact that you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command." (, Ex. , Memorandum, January 20, 1962, from Lansdale).

Clear IT was contemplated

On the other hand, Sorensen testified that "there were lots of top priorities, and it was the job of some of /us/ to continually tell various agencies their particular subject was the top priority" and although Cuba was "important" it was "fairly well down on the list of the President's agenda." (Sorensen, p. 12). For example, when told that his first letter to Khruschev in the secret correspondence that lasted two or three years would be "the single most important document you will write during your Presidency," President Kenndy said, "Yes, we get these every day over here." (Sorensen, p. 12).

In focusing on intelligence collection, propaganda and various sabotage actions, Lansdale's tasks were consistent with the underlying strategy of Mongoose to build gradually towards an internal revolt of the Cuban people. (See p. above.)

Lansdale transmitted a copy of the tasks to Robert Kennedy on January 18, 1962, with a handwritten note stating "my review does not include the sensitive work I have reported to you; I felt you preferred informing the President privately." Lansdale testified that this did not refer to assassinations and that he "never took up assassination with either the Attorney General or the President."** Lansdale testified that he could not precisely recall the nature of this "sensitive work" but that it might have involved a special trip he made under cover to meet Cuban leaders in Florida and to assess their political strengths. (Lansdale, p. 30.)

---

*There was testimony regarding one Lansdale plan that a witness thought was an example of Lansdale's "perspicacity" in planning operations. Parrott, the Secretary to the Special Group Augmented, testified:

> "I'll give you one example of Lansdale's perspicacity. He had a wonderful plan for getting rid of Castro. This plan consisted of spreading the word that the Second Coming of Christ was imminent and that Christ was against Castro (who) was anti-Christ. And you would spread this word around Cuba, and then on whatever date it was, that there would be a manifestation of this thing. And at that time--this is absolutely true--and at that time there would be an American submarine which would surface just over the horizon off of Cuba and send up some starshells. And this would be the manifestation of the Second Coming and Castro would be overthrown..."
>
> "Well, some wag called this operation--by this time Lansdale was something of a joke in many quarters--and somebody dubbed this Elimination by Illumination. (Parrott, p. .)

**Harvey testified that he never received any instructions from Lansdale to undertake assassinations, although as noted below (p.), in August 1962, Lansdale asked Harvey to consider the feasibility of a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders. (Harvey, 7/ /75, p. .)

Lansdale also referred, in a memorandum to the Attorney General on January 27, 1962, to his feeling that "we might uncork the touchdown play" "independently of the institutional program we are spurring." (Lansdale Ex. 4, p.1). Lansdale testified that in this memorandum the phrase "touchdown play" was a "breezy way of referring to "a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime" rather than to a Castro assassination. (Lansdale, p.45).*/ The examples of such "plays cited in the memorandum

---

*/ The testimony was as follows:

> "The Chairman: What precisely did you mean by "uncork the touchdown play independently of the institutional programs we are spurring?"
>
> "General Lansdale: Well, I was holding almost daily meetings with my working group, and -- in tasking, and finding how they were developing plans I was becoming more and more concerned that they kept going back to doing what I felt were pro forma American types of actions rather than actively exploring how to get the Cubans into this, and to have them undertake actions.
>
> "To me, the touchdown play was a Cuban revolt to overthrow the regime. I did not feel that we had gotten into the real internal part of getting Cubans into the action, and I was concerned about that."
>
> "Senator Baker: In the same context, is it fair to say that the name of the game was to get rid of Castro or his regime and that touchdown play was one of several methods that might have been used for that purpose?"
>
> "General Lansdale: Yes."
>
> "Senator Baker: All right, now what was the touchdown play that you had in mind here?"
>
> "General Lansdale: Well, it was a revolt by the Cubans themselves ... a revolution that would break down the police controls of the state and to drive the top people out of power and to do that, there needed to be political actions cells, psychological propaganda action cells, and eventually when possible, guerilla forces developed in the country in a safe place for a new government to set up and direct the revolution that would eventually move into Havana and take over." (Lansdale, pp. 45-56).

TOP SECRET

(e.g., "stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba," work through "ethnic language groups," "youth elements," or families through the Church") do not contain any indication of assassination.* (Lansdale, Ex. 4, p. 1.)

On January 19, 1962, Lansdale added an additional task to those assigned on January 18. This "Task 33" involved a plan to "incapacitate" Cuban sugar workers during the harvest by the use of chemical warfare means. (Lansdale, p. 29). Lansdale testified that the plan involved the use of non-lethal chemicals to sicken Cubans temporarily and keep them away from the fields for a 24-48 hour period "without ill effects." After initial approval for planning purposes (with the notation that it would require "policy determination" before final approval), the plan was ultimately cancelled after a study showed it was not feasible and before debate by the SGA. (Lansdale, p. 29, Special Group Minutes, 1/30/62, p. 1.)

Lansdale's 33 tasks were approved for planning purposes by the Special Group on January 30, 1962 (Minutes of Special Group meeting, 1/30/62, p. 1). Thereafter, on February 20, 1962, Lansdale detailed a six phase schedule for Mongoose, designed to culminate in October, 1962, with an "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime." (Lansdale Ex. 11, Program Review of the Cuba Project, 2/20/62, p. 2). As one of the operations for the "Resistance" phase proposed for September, 1962, Lansdale listed "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders." (*Id.*, p. 151). Lansdale's plan stated:

TOP SECRET

---

*/ Lansdale's memorandum described the "touchdown plays" as follows:

> "It may be a special effort which professional labor operators can launch to stir up workers in Latin America and Cuba. It may be through ethnic-language groups; Spain has an untapped action potential. It could be a warming-up of the always lively youth element in Latin America and Cuba, through some contacts specially used. It could be with the families through the Church, with families resisting the disciplined destruction of social justice by the Communists. It could be an imaginative defection project which cracks the top echelon of the Communist gang now running Cuba."

> "This should be a 'Special Target' operation ... Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential for actions against police -- G2 /intelligence/ officials." (Id., p. 151). */

Lansdale testified that early in the Mongoose operation he had suggested to the working level representatives of the Mongoose agencies that they get in touch with "criminal elements" to obtain intelligence and "possible actions against the police structure" in Cuba. (Lansdale, p. 104). But Lansdale conceded that his proposal to recruit gangster elements for attacks on "key leaders" contemplated the targeted killing of individuals, in addition to the casualties that might occur in the course of the revolt itself. (Lansdale, p. 107).

These 33 plans of Lansdale were, however, never approved for implementation by the Special Group Augmented. As discussed below in greater detail (see p.), the Special Group Augmented tabled Lansdale's six phase plan altogether in February 1962, and directed Lansdale to plan for and conduct an intelligence collection plan only. (Memo, 3/2/62; Minutes of Special Group Augmented Meeting, 3/5/62).

a. Lansdale's Rejection of a Suggestion That a Propaganda Campaign, Including Rewards for Assassination, Be Explored

On January 30, 1962, the representative of the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs on the Mongoose Working Group forwarded for Lansdale's consideration "a concept for creating distrust and apprehension in the Cuban Communist Hierarchy" (Lansdale Ex. 1, Memorandum, 1/30/62, from Craig to Lansdale, p. 1). This concept, titled Operation Bounty, was described as a "system of financial rewards, commensurate with position and stature, for killing or delivering alive known Communists." (Id., p. 2) Under the concept, leaflets would be dropped in Cuba listing rewards, which

---

*/An earlier reference to use of gangster-type elements had appeared in a CIA memorandum for the Special Group on January 24, 1962. Commenting on Task 5 of Lansdale's original 32 tasks (which called for planning for "defection of top Cuban government officials"), the CIA memorandum noted that planning for the task will "necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries" and listed "crime syndicates" along with other groups as possible intermediaries.

were proposed as ranging from $5,000 for an "informer" to $100,000 for "government officials." A reward of "2¢" was listed for Castro himself. (Id., p. 3). Lansdale testified that price was designed "to denigrate ... Castro in the eyes of the Cuban population." (Lansdale, Tr. 26).

Lansdale testified that he "tabled" this concept when he received it, on the ground that "I did not think that it was something that should be seriously undertaken or supported further." (Lansdale, p. 26). Lansdale did not bring the proposal before the Special Group Augmented.

6. The Control System for Mongoose Operations.

In establishing the Mongoose Operation on November 30, 1961, President Kennedy had emphasized that the Special Group should be "kept closely informed" of Mongoose activities. (memorandum by the President, 11/30/62; Goodwin, p.).

In practice, as Samuel Halpern, Harvey's Executive Assistant on the CIA Mongoose Task Force W testified, this resulted in the submission of "specific detailed plans for every activity carried out by the task force." (Halpern, p. 16). Halpern testified that those plans were submitted "in nauseating detail:"

> "It went down to such things as the gradients on the beach, and the composition of the sand on the beach in many cases. Every single solitary thing was in those plans, full details, times, events, weaponry, how it was going to happen, who was going to do what ... the full details of every single thing we did." (Halpern, p. 17).

TOP SECRET

Harvey similarly characterized the control process (Harvey, 6/25, p. 123), as one which required the submission of "excruciating detail" and where it was understood that the Special Group Augmented was to be given an opportunity to debate and decide after weighing the strengths and weaknesses of any given proposed action. (Harvey, 6/25, pp. 114, 124).

a. The Documentary Evidence

The documentary evidence illustrates the tight control procedures set out for Mongoose by the Special Group Augmented. For example, as discussed above (p.), Lansdale initially submitted 32 specific tasks with his "basic concept" on January 18, 1962 for consideration by the Special Group Augmented. (Lansdale Ex. 3) After consideration of Lansdale's concept and the 32 tasks in February, the Special Group Augmented ordered Lansdale to cut back his plan to limit it to an intelligence collection program for the March-May 1962 period, rather than the five-stage plan to culminate in an October "popular revolution" as originally conceived by Lansdale. (Memo 3/2/62, by Lansdale) In approving the intelligence collection program, the Special Group Augmented pointed out that:

NO
COMMENT
ON
ASSASS...

> ". . . any actions which are not specifically spelled out in the plan but seem to be desirable as the project progresses, will be brought to the Special Group for resolution." (Helms Ex. 1, 7/18, p.1)

In addition, the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized the Special Group Augmented's responsibility for control and prior approval of important operations:

TOP SECRET

> "The Special Group (5412 Augmented) is responsible for providing policy guidance to the (Mongoose) project, for approving important operations and for monitoring progress. (Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962, p.2)

Further indication of the Mongoose control process is the request given to Helms a month prior to Harvey's trip to meet Roselli in Miami. Pursuant to the discussion at the Special Group's meeting on March 5, Helms was asked to estimate "for each week as far into the next twelve months as possible . . . the members and type of agents you will establish inside Cuba . . . (and) brief descriptions . . . of actions contemplated." (Memo to Helms from Lansdale, March 5, 1962)

Moreover, the approved plan for Operation Mongoose, as of the time of Harvey's meeting with Roselli in Miami required that any proposal to supply arms and equipment to particular resistance groups inside Cuba "be submitted to the Special Group for decision, ad hoc." (Lansdale Memo to ________________________, April 11, 1962, p.). And the Guidelines for the Mongoose program emphasized that, after specific tasks were approved by the Special Group Augmented and given to participating agencies by Lansdale, normal command channels were to be observed. As the Guidelines stated:

> During this period, General Lansdale will continue as Chief of Operations, calling directly on the participating departments and agencies for support and implementation of agreed tasks. The heads of these departments and agencies are responsible for performance through normal command channels to higher authority.*/ (Guideline for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962, p.2)

---

* The initial draft of these Guidelines had referred to the President but was later amended to read "higher authority." (Draft Guidelines, March 5, 1962, p.2) The minutes of the consideration of these Guidelines were also amended with respect to the manner in which the Guidelines were approved. On March 16, 1962, a Memorandum for Record of "Discussion of Operation Mongoose with the President" of the Special Group (Augmented) stated:

> "In the presence of the Special Group (Augmented) the President was given a progress report on Operation MONGOOSE. The guidelines dated March 14, 1962 were circulated and were used as the basis of the discussion. After a prolonged consideration of the visibility, noise level and risks entailed, General Lansdale and the Special Group (Augmented) were given tacit authorization to proceed in accordance with the guidelines.

(footnote cont'd.)

In a Memorandum to McCone on April 10, 1962, Harvey recognized that the Special Group Augmented control process required advance approval of "major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence." But Harvey stated that these "tight controls" were unduly "stultifying:"

> "To permit requisite flexibility and professionalism for a maximum operational effort against Cuba, the right controls exercised by the Special Group and the present time-consuming coordination and briefing procedures should, if at all possible, be made less restrictive and less stultifying." (Memo, April 10, 1962, Harvey to McCone, p.4) *

Even as the Cuban Missile Crisis approached, and the pressure to act against the Castro regime increased through a "stepped up" Mongoose plan, the Special Group continued to insist on prior approval of sensitive operations. Thus, when the Special Group Augmented on September 14, 1962, approved in principle a proposed set of operations,

---

(Footnote cont'd)

Not Clear

However, a note at the bottom of this memorandum, dated March 22, 1962, stated:

> This minute was read to the Special Group (Augmented) today. The Group was unanimous in feeling that no authorization, either tacit or otherwise, was given by higher authority. The members of the Group asked that the minute be amended to indicate that the Group itself had decided to proceed in accordance with the Guidelines.

Bundy, speaking to the Group,

> "... made it clear that this did not constitute a blanket approval of every item in the paper and that sensitive ones such as sabotage, for example, will have to be presented in more detail on a case by case basis." (Memo of Special Group Augmented meeting, September 14, 1962, p.).

Helms and the members of the Special Group Augmented differed on whether or not these control requirements were consistent with Helms' perception that assassination was permissible without a direct order. We discuss that testimony below at __________.

7. The Pattern of Mongoose Action. The documentary evidence and the testimony reveal that the Kennedy Administration pressed the Mongoose operation with vigorous language and although the collection of intelligence information was the central objective of Mongoose up until August 1962, sabotage and para military actions were conducted.*/ Thus, there was a major sabotage operation aimed at a large Cuban copper mine, and other sabotage operations. As Lansdale described them in his testimony, the sabotage acts involved "blowing up bridges to stop communications and blowing up certain production plants" (Lansdale, p. 36). And during the Missile Crisis in the fall of 1962, sabotage was increasingly urged.

TOP SECRET

---

*/ In early March, 1962, the SGA recognized the need to begin "preliminary actions ... involving such things as spotting, assessing and training action-type agents" but the Group agreed that it must "keep its hand tightly" on these actions. The Group saw, however, that such control might not be completely effective and recognized "that many of the agents infiltrated would be of an all-purpose type; that is, they would be trained in paramilitary skills, as well as those of exclusively intelligence concern. It was noted that once the agents are within the country, they cannot be effectively controlled from the U.S., although every effort will be made to attempt such control." (Minutes of Special Group meeting, March 5, 1962).

At the same time, however, the record shows that the Special Group Augmented turned away from proposed sabotage and similar violent action throughout 1962, including the period of the Missile Crisis. (See p. above.) Thus, Helms noted in a memorandum of a meeting on October 16, 1962, that Robert Kennedy in expressing the "general dissatisfaction of the President" with Mongoose, "pointed out that (Mongoose) had been underway for a year...that there had been no acts of sabotage and that even the one which had been attempted had failed twice". (Memorandum by Helms, October 16, 1962, p. 1.) Similiarly a memorandum to Helms by his Executive Assistant (who spent full time on Cuba matters), which reviewed the Mongoose program in the aftermath of the Missile Crisis, stated:

> "During the past year, while one of the options of the project was to create internal dissension and resistance leading to eventual U.S. intervention, a review shows that policymakers not only shied away from the military intervention aspect but were generally apprehensive of sabotage proposals. (McManus, Ex. 2, p. 1, McManus, p. 11).

Harvey testified that this assessment of the Special Group Augmented's position was an accurate one. (Harvey, 6/25, p.). This is also borne out by the record of Mongoose activity. For example, after Lansdale's initial six phase plan to overthrow Castro by the fall of 1962, the single phase approved for January August 1962 was described by Lansdale as "essentially an intelligence collection" effort. (Memorandum, April 11, 1962, by Lansdale). Indeed, the guidelines for Operation Mongoose, approved on March 5, 1962, stated that the acquisition of intelligence was the "immediate priority objective of U.S. efforts in the coming months." (Taylor Ex. 3, p. 2, Guidelines for Operation Mongoose, March 14, 1962). The Guidelines further stated that although other covert actions would be undertaken concurrently with intelligence collection, these were to be on a scale "short of those reasonably calculated to inspire a revolt" in Cuba. (Id., p. 2). And the Special Group stipulated that Mongoose action beyond the acquisition of intelligence "must be inconspicuous." (Memorandum, 3/2/62, Lansdale, p. 3).

TOP SECRET

With the scheduled conclusion of that intelligence collection phase in August 1962, the Special Group Augmented considered whether to adopt a "stepped-up Course B plus," which, in contrast to Phase I, was designed to inspire a revolt against the Castro regime. (Memorandum for the Special Group Augmented, 8/8/62, from Lansdale, p. 1). Initially, the Special Group Augmented decided against this course and in favor of a "CIA variant," at a meeting of Special Group Augmented principals on August 10, 1962. (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, August 10, 1962). The "CIA variant," which was proposed by McCone on August 10, posited more limited actions to avoid inciting a revolt and sought not Castro's overthrow, but a split between Castro and "old-line Communists." (Id., p. 2).

The onset of the Missile Crisis caused an initial reversion to the stepped-up Course B plan, but ultimately, however, an order was issued on October 30, 1962 to halt all sabotage operations. (Lansdale, Ex.8, Memo by Lansdale, 10/30/62)

Thus, on August 20, Taylor told the President that the Special Group Augmented perceived no likelihood of an overthrow of the Castro government by internal means without direct U.S. military intervention, and that the Special Group Augmented favored a more agressive Mongoose program. (Memo from Taylor to President.) Shortly thereafter, on August 23, McGeorge Bundy issued NSC Memo Number 181 to Lansdale and Taylor stating that, at the President's directive, "the line of activity projected for Operation MONGOOSE Plan B plus should be developed with all possible speed." One week later, on August 30, the CIA was instructed by the Special Group Augmented to submit a list of possible sabotage targets they might propose and it was noted that this list could serve as the limit for action on the Agency's own initiative: "The Group, by reacting to this list, could define the limits within which the Agency could operate on its own initiative." Special Group Augmented Minutes of August 30, 1962.)

Thus, at a Special Group Augmented meeting on October 4, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that the President "is concerned about progress on the Mongoose program and feels that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations". And Robert Kennedy urged that "massive activity" be undertaken within the Mongoose framework. In line with this proposal, the Special Group Augmented decided that "considerably more sabotage" should be undertaken, and that "all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches with the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime". (Minutes of Special Group Augmented meeting, October 4, 1962, p.)*. On October 30, 1962, however, the order to stop all sabotage operations was issued (Lansdale, Ex. 8).**

---

* The SGA also decided on October 4, 1962, that Robert Kennedy would chair the Group's meetings "for the time being." (Id., p.). Subsequently, at a meeting on October 16, 1962, Robert Kennedy stated that he was going to give Mongoose "more personal attention" in view of the lack of progress and would hold daily meetings with the working group representatives, i.e., Lansdale, Harvey, and the other Agency members. (Harvey, Ex. 12, Memorandum of Meeting, October 16, 1962, by Helms, p. 1). Helms testified that he did not recall any such daily meetings with the Attorney General, but he had the impression there may have been several at first, but then they ceased. (Helms, 7/17/ , pp. 54-55).

**Harvey testified that he had a "confrontation" with Robert Kennedy at the height of the Missile Crisis concerning Harvey's order that agent teams be sent into Cuba to support any conventional U.S. military operation that might occur. Harvey stated that Robert Kennedy "took a great deal of exception" to this order and as a result McCone ordered Harvey to stop the agent operations. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 80-81.) Elder, McCone's assistant at the time, similarly described this incident and stated that, although Harvey had attempted to get guidance from top officials during the Missile Crisis, Harvey "earned another black mark as not being fully under control". (Elder, p. 34-35.)

SECRET

As Sorensen (a member of the Executive Committee established to deal with the Missile Crisis) testified, even though Cuba was the "No. 1 priority" during the Missile Crisis, and "all alternatives, plans, possibilities were exhaustively surveyed" during that time, the subject of assassination was never raised in the high-level National Security Council Executive Committee (of which Helms was not a member) that was formed to deal with the Missile Crisis. (Sorensen, 7/21, p. 11.)***

*** There are references in the Special Group Augmented records to attacks on Soviet personnel in Cuba. The record of the SGA meeting on September 9, 1962, states:

> "It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered." (SGA Minutes, 9/9/62, p.).

Earlier, on August 31, 1962, Lansdale had included a task "to provoke incidents between Cubans and Bloc personnel to exacerbate tensions," in a proposed projection of actions for Phase II of Mongoose. (Memorandum to SGA, 8/31/62, from Lansdale, Action No. 47). The Special Group thereafter decided, as a means of "emphasizing such activity" to replace that task with one to "cause actions by Cubans against Bloc personnel," and to note that "consideration will be given to provoking and conducting physical attacks on Bloc personnel." (Memorandum to Taylor, Rusk, and MacNamara, 9/12/62, from Lansdale, pp. 1-2).

E. The Issue of Authority Outside the Agency

This section discusses the evidence as to whether there was authorization from outside the Agency for the assassination activity that took place during the Mongoose operation.

TR. 7/17, p.4)

As discussed below in detail, both Helms and the Kennedy Administration officials agreed that no direct order was ever given for Castro's assassination and that no one outside the Agency (including McCone) was informed about the assassination activity. Helms testified, however, that he believed the assassination activity was permissible and that it was within the scope of the authority given to the Agency. McCone and the other Kennedy Administration officials disagreed, testifying that assassination was not permissible without a direct order and that a Castro assassination was not within the authorized bounds of the Mongoose operation.

In April 1962, when the poison pills were given to Roselli in Miami, Helms was the CIA Deputy Director in charge of covert operations and reported to McCone, the CIA Director. Helms had succeeded Bissell in this job, following Bissell's retirement in February, 1962, as a consequence of the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion. Helms testified that, after the Bay of Pigs, "Those of us who were still (in the Agency) were enormously anxious to try and be successful at what we were being asked to do by what was then a relatively new Administration. We wanted to earn our spurs with the President and with other officers of the Kennedy Administration." (Helms

1. Helms' Testimony Concerning Authority

As set forth below, Helms testified that while he doubted whether he was initially informed that Harvey gave poison pills to Roselli and did not recall having authorized a Castro assassination in that form, nevertheless, Helms had authorized the 1962 assassination plot because "we felt that we were operating as we were supposed to operate, that these things if not specifically authorized, at least were authorized in general terms." (Helms, 6/13, p.61)

a. His Perception of Authority

Need clearer statement of pressure

Helms testified that based upon the "intense" pressure exerted by the Kennedy Administration to overthrow Castro it was his perception that the CIA was at all times acting within the scope of its authority with respect to the assassination activity.* But, Helms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro from anyone, including the President or the Attorney General. (Helms, 6/14, p. 88.) (This point is discussed in detail infra p.___,___.) (Helms, 6/13, p. 137; Helms, 7/17, p. 62, 7/17, p. 4-5.) Helms testified that this authority, as he perceived it, was implicit in the U. S. policy and attitude towards Castro. (Helms, 6/13, p. 165.) As Helms testified:

TOP SECRET

> "I believe it was the policy at the time to get rid of Castro and if killing him was one of the things that was to be done in this connection, that was within what was expected." (Helms, 6/13, p. 137.)

---

*The extent to which pressure in fact existed "to do something about Castro" is discussed in detail in the section immediately above dealing with Operation Mongoose, its strategy of causing an internal revolt of the Cuban people against Castro, the strict control system established by the Special Group Augmented, and the pattern of intelligence collection and sabotage activity actually authorized and undertaken.

Helms testified that "I remember vividly (the pressure to overthrow Castro) was very intense." (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.) Helms stated that this pressure intensified during the period of Operation Mongoose during late 1961 and throughout 1962, and then continued on through much of 1963. (Helms, 6/13, p. 27.) As these pressures rose, "obviously the extent of the means that one thought were available, obvious increased too." (Helms, 6/13, p. 26.)

Helms stated that during the Mongoose Operations period "it was made abundantly clear...to everybody involved in the operation that the desire was to get rid of the Castro regime and to get rid of Castro...the point was that no limitations were put on this injunction." (Helms, 7/17, p. 16-17). In Helms' testimony, the following exchange occurred:

> "Senator Mathias: 'Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A. Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said who will rid me of this man. He didn't say to somebody go out and murder him. He said who will rid me of this man, and let it go at that.
>
> "Mr. Helms: 'That is a warming reference to the problem.'
>
> "Senator Mathias: 'You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?'
>
> "Mr. Helms: 'I think it does, sir.'
>
> "Senator Mathias: 'And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?'
>
> "Mr. Helms: 'That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in [the] tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we're hired out to keep those things out of the oval office.'
>
> "Senator Mathias: 'Yet at the same time you felt that some spark had been transmitted, that that was within the permissible limits?'
>
> "Mr. Helms: 'Yes, and if he had disappeared from the scene they would not have been unhappy.'" (Helms Tr. 6/13, pp. 72-73)

Helms said that although he never was told by his superiors to kill Castro (Helms, 7/17, p. 15), there was at the same time never any injunction laid down by the Kennedy Administration that proscribed a Castro assassination: "No member of the Kennedy Administration...ever told me that (assassination) was proscribed, (or) ever referred to it in that fashion..." (Helms, 7/71, p. 18.) "Nobody ever said that (assassination) was ruled out..."*/(Helms 7/17, p. 43.)

Helms stated that during the Mongoose period, the delivery of poison pills for assassination of Castro, "with all the other things that were going on at that time...seemed to be within the permissible part of this effort." (Helms, 6/13, p. 99.) "In the perceptions of the time and the things we were trying to do this was one human life against many other human lives that were being lost." (Helms, 6/13, p. 64.)**/

TOP SECRET

---

*As Helms declared: "In my 25 years in the Central Intelligence Agency, I always thought I was working within authorization, that I was doing what I had been asked to do by proper authority and when I was operating on my own I was doing what I believed to be the legitimate business of the Agency as it would have been expected of me." (Helms, 6/13, p. 30-31.)

**As set out above (p.______), Helms stated: "...people were losing their lives in raids, a lot of people had lost their life at the Bay of Pigs, agents were being arrested left and right and put before the wall and shot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 64.)

b. Helms' Testimony That He Had No Direct Order to Assassinate Castro and Did Not Inform the President or the Special Group of the Assassination Activity

Helms testified that there was no direct order to assassinate Castro. He said that his perceptions of authority did not reach the point where he could testify that he had specific instructions to kill Castro. As he put it:

> "I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired, and I don't want to take refuge in saying that I was instructed to specifically murder Castro. . ." (Helms, 6/13, p.88).

On the question of whether the President was informed of any assassination plots, Helms pointed out that "nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence" (6/13, p. 29), and that the Special Group was "the mechanism that was set up. . .to use as a circuit breaker so that these things did not explode in the President's face and that he was not held responsible for them." (6/13, p. 29). However, Helms also testified that he had "no knowledge that a Castro assassination was ever authorized by the Special Group (Augmented)" (6/13, pp.28-29).

TOP SECRET

In addition, Helms said he never informed the Special Group Augmented or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms, 7/18, p.18).*/ Helms also stated he never told Robert Kennedy about any assassination activity and my "presumption is he wasn't informed" (Helms, 6/13, p.58), and that "Harvey kept (the Roselli pill plot) pretty much in his back pocket." (Helms, 6/13,pp.57-58).

Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was "constantly in touch" with him in 1962 and 1963, Robert Kennedy never instructed Helms to assassinate Castro:

> "The Chairman. 'Since he was on the phone to you repeatedly did he ever tell you to kill Castro?'
>
> "Mr. Helms. 'No.'
>
> "The Chairman: 'He did not?'
>
> "Mr. Helms: 'Not in those words, no.'" (Helms, 7/17, p.13)*/

Any test as to
not to do it
particularly
when learned about
"terminated" plot

---

* Helms immediately reiterated after this exchange that his perception of authority for a Castro assassination rested on the pressure exerted by the Administration against Castro. The exchange between the Chairman and Helms continued as follows:

> "The Chairman: 'Well, did he ever tell you in other words that clearly conveyed to you the message that he wanted to kill Castro?'
>
> "Helms: 'Sir, the last time I was (before the Committee), I did the best I could about what I believed to be the parameters under which we were working, and that was to get rid of Castro. And I don't, I am sorry to say . . . see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassinating would become part of a large group of people sitting around a table in the United States Government. I can't imagine any Cabinet officer wanting to sign off on something like that. I can't imagine anybody wanting something in writing saying I have just charged Mr. Jones to go out and shoot Mr. Smith." (Helms, 7/17, pp. 13-14)

c. Helms Testimony that he Doubted Whether he had Authorized a Specific Assassination Attempt or was Informed of the Passage of the Pills

There is some doubt whether Helms ever authorized a specific attempt at Castro's assassination, or was informed of the passage of the pioson pills to Roselli in April, 1962. Although Helms testified that Harvey regularly reported to Helms on Harvey's Mongoose work (Helms, 6/13, p.95), and Helms "would have thought" that Harvey would have reported to Helms the transfer of the pills into Cuba (Helms, 6/13, p.105), Helms does not recall Harvey ever telling him that the pills were delivered to Roselli. (Helms, 7/17, p.22).

Thus, as indicated above, Helms testified he never informed the Special Group Augmented or any member of that Group that Harvey had given the pills to Roselli in Miami "because I am not even sure I knew about it at the time." (Helms, 7/18, p. 18.)* And with respect to the pills, Helms testified that, although he agreed to the Harvey-Roselli operation (and believed there was implicit authorization for assassination activity) he testified "I never recall having okayed the killing of Castro myself in that form." (Helms, 7/17, p. 9.)

d. Helms' Perception of Robert Kennedy's Position on a Castro Assassination

In testifying as to his perception of authority, Helms emphasized the particular role played by Robert Kennedy in pressing for progress and results

---

*/ Helms' testimony that he may not have been informed that the pills were delivered is corroborated by Harvey's testimony. Harvey testified that when he returned from Miami he reported to Helms on his contacts with Roselli. But Harvey said that he only "briefed Helms generally", on the subjects of Harvey's takeover of the Roselli operation, the prospects of the operation, and the fact that Harvey had dropped Maheu and Giancana from the operation. (Harvey, 6/25, p.65).

Robert Kennedy often talked directly with Helms and other CIA officials working on the Mongoose program, outside of the Special Group Augmented channels. (Helms, 7/17, p.13; 7/18, pp.60-61). As Helms stated:

> "I can say absolutely fairly we are constantly in touch with each other in these matters. The Attorney General was on the phone to me, he was on the phone to Mr. Harvey, to Mr. Fitzgerald, his successor. He was on the phone even to people on Harvey's staff, as I recall it." (Helms, 7/17, p.13).

Helms said that although he did not know whether a Castro assassination would have been morally acceptable to Robert Kennedy, Helms believed that Robert Kennedy "would not (have been) unhappy if (Castro) had disappeared off the scene by whatever means." (Helms, 7/17. p.17-18). And Helms stated that Robert Kennedy never told him that a Castro assassination was ruled out. (Helms, 7/17, p.21).

However, Helms further testified that although Robert Kennedy was "constantly in touch" with Helms and their exchanges were marked by detailed, factual, and highly specific discussions on anti-Castro operations. Robert Kennedy never raised the subject of a Castro assassination and never instructed Helms to assassinate Castro.** Helms further testified that he had no knowledge that Robert Kennedy "was ever asked to specifically approve an assassination plot." (Helms, 6/13, p. 57.).

---

* Q: "So it was your impression that he was sort of setting the tone for the group's action or activity."
A: "Oh, yes...there wasn't any doubt about that. He was very much interested in this and spent a great deal of time on it." (Helms, 6/13, p. 22.)

**The telephone records of the Attorney General's office indicate frequent contact between the Attorney General and Helms and Helms stated that his conversations with Robert Kennedy were "candid" and that "he and I used to deal in facts most of the time." (Helms, 6/18, p.63.) Helms testified as to the level of detail in his talks with Robert Kennedy:

> "For example, we had projects to land sabotage teams.*/ Well, (the Attorney General would ask) have you got the team organized, did the team go? Well, no, we've been delayed a week because the weather is bad or the boats don't run, or something of this kind. It even got down to that degree of specificity." (Helms, 7/17, p.40)

And, as stated above, Helms also testified that "Harvey kept Phase 2 (the Roselli pill operation) pretty much in his back pocket" and that although Helms stated "I do not know this for sure," he testified it was his "presumption" that Robert Kennedy was not informed of the PHase 2 operation.* (Helms, 6/13, p. 57-58.)

e. Helms' Testimony as to Why He Did Not Obtain a Direct Order

Helms testified that assassination "was not part of the CIA's policy" or a part of CIA's "armory". (Helms, 6/13, p. 87-88.) And, in his own view, Helms said that he "never liked assassination". (And, in fact, banned its use _____ years after he became CIA Director.) (Helms, ______.)

Moreover, Helms testified that he had serious reservations regarding the CIA working with underworld figures. (Helms, 7/18 p.31). When Harvey proposed to contact Roselli to see if gangster links to Cuba could be developed, Helms "had very grave doubts about the wisdom of dealing with underworld figures. (Helms, 6/13, p.33; 7/18, p.31).

TOP SECRET

Despite these reservations, Helms did not seek approval for the assassination activity because he said assassination was not a subject that he felt should be aired with higher authority. (Helms, 7/18, pp.31-32). With respect to the question of obtaining express authority

by him rather than DCI

---

* Helms based this presumption on a review of relevant documents at the time of his testimony. (Helms, 6/13, p.58).

from the Special Group or Special Group Augmented, Helms stated: "... I didn't see how one would have expected that a thing like killing or murdering or assassination would become a part of a large group of people sitting around a table in the United States Government." (Helms, 7/17, p. 14). And with regard to informing the President or obtaining explicit authority from him, Helms stated that "nobody wants to embarrass a President of the United States (by) discussing the assassination of foreign leaders in his presence." (Helms, 6/13, p. 29).

Thus, in the following exchange Helms stated that it "wouldn't have occurred to me to ask" for clarification or express authority for assassination activity from Robert Kennedy or the Special Group:

> "Senator Huddleston: "...it did not occur to you to inquire of the Attorney General or of the Special Group or of anyone that when they kept pushing and asking for action...to clarify that question of whether you should actually be trying to assassinate?"
>
> "Mr. Helms: "I don't know whether it was in training experience, tradition or exactly what one points to, but I think to go up to a Cabinet officer and say, am I right in assuming that you want me to assassinate Castro or to try to assassinate Castro, is a question it wouldn't have occurred to me to ask."
>
> ***
>
> "Senator Huddleston: "...(because assassination has such serious consequences) seems to fortify the thought that I would want to be dead certain, I would want to hear it from the horse's mouth in plain, simple English language before I would want to undertake that kind of activity." (Helms, 7/17, pp.51-52).

Helms also pointed out his reason for not seeking express authority in the following exchange:

TOP SECRET

> "Senator Morgan: "In light of your previous statement that this is a Christian country and that this Committee has to face up to the prime moral issue of whether or not killing is...acceptable...don't you think it would have taken affirmative permission or authority to kill, rather than just saying it was not eliminated from the authority or you were not restricted...?"

> "Mr. Helms: "...killing was not part of the CIA's policy. It was not part of the CIA's armory...but in this Castro operation...I have testified as best I could about the atmosphere of the time, what I understood was desired (and) that this was getting rid of Castro, if he had been gotten rid of by this means that this would have been acceptable to certain individuals...I was just doing my best to do what I thought I was supposed to do." (Helms, 6/13. pp.87-88).

When asked why he did not seek clarification from the Special Group, its members, or Robert Kennedy whether it was "in fact, the policy of the U.S. Government to actually kill Fidel Castro," Helms answered "I don't know..."

> "...There is something about the whole chain of episodes in conncection with this Roselli business that I am simply not able to bring back in a coherent fashion. And there was something about the ineffectuality of all this, or the lack of conviction that anything ever happened, that I believe in the end made this thing simply collapse, disappear. And I don't recall what I was briefed on at the time. Maybe I was kept currently informed and maybe I wasn't, and today I don't remember it...But I do not recall ever having been convinced that any attempt was really made on Castro's life. And since I didn't believe any attempt had been made on Castro's life, I saw no reason to pursue the matter further." (Helms, 7/18, pp.31-32).

f. Helms' Perception of the Relevance of Special Group Controls to Assassination Activity

The evidence concerning the control system established by the Special Group for the Mongoose Operation is discussed above (see p. ____).

Helms stated, however, that the control system established by the Special Group for Mongoose was not intended to apply to assassination activity. (Helms, 7/18, p.21). Thus, with respect to the Special Group Augmented's decision on March 5, 1962 that major operations going beyond the collection of intelligence must receive advance approval, Helms stated that this referred to "rather specific items that the Special Group had on its agenda" from the outset of Mongoose. (Helms, 7/18, p.21). Since assassination was not among such items, Helms stated

TOP SECRET

that the Special Group would not have expected assassination activity to come under this particular policy. (Helms, 7/18, p.21). And with respect to the Special Group Augmented's desire to "keep its hands tightly on preliminary actions" leading towards sabotage and other actions beyond intelligence collection, Helms stated that was the kind of injunction "that appears in all kinds of governmental minutes of meetings." (Helms, 7/18, p.17). Helms said he regarded these as "general injunctions: rather than an "all inclusive injunction" to keep the Group informed of all matters. (Helms, 7/18, -.17).

Helms said he recognized, however, that there were limits on permissible activity during Mongoose.*/ (Helms, 7/18,p.9). Thus, Helms stated that although there were "no limitations" on actions to remove Castro during Mongoose, there were restraints on sabotage operations and he did not understand the absence of specific limitations to authorize more drastic actions, such as committing the U.S. military to an invasion of Cuba. (Helms, 7/18, p.9).

In addition, Helms testified that he saw no need to inform the Special Group of the Harvey-Roselli operation because that operation was characterized by "ineffectuality" and a "lack of conviction that anything ever happened." (Helms, 7/18, p.32). Helms stated he did not believe any attempt had been made on Castro's life by virtue of Harvey's meetings in Miami with Roselli. (Helms, 7/18, p.32).

TOP SECRET

---

*/ Helms testified, that although loss of life was implicit in the Mongoose operations,

> "I think there was an effort made not to take tacks that would recklessly kill a lot of people and not achieve very much. I think there was an effort, if you had a sabotage operation, not to throw a lot of hand grenades into a city, but rather take out the power plant which would actually damage the economy of the country. There was an effort made to find devices that would seem to have a useful end. (Helms, 7/17, p.63-64).

2. Harvey's Testimony Concerning Authority

a. Harvey's Perception of Authority

Harvey stressed that at all times he was acting as a line officer reporting to his immediate superior within the Agency, the Deputy Director for covert actions (first Bissell, then Helms.)* (Harvey, 6/25, p. 83).

Similarly, Harvey also pointed out that his information with respect to authorization from outside the agency came from the Deputy Director:

> "(a)t no time during this entire period...did I ever personally believe or have any feeling that I was either free-wheeling or end-running or engaging in any activity that was not in response to a considered, decided U. S. policy, properly approved, admittedly, perhaps, or through channels and at levels I personally had no involvement in, or first-hand acquaintance with, and did not consider it at that point my province to, if you will, cross-examine either the Deputy Director or the Director concering it." (Harvey 6/25, p. 83.)

Thus, Harvey relied upon his superiors within the Agency for authority. Indeed, Harvey indicated that his perception of the authorization for the 1962 assassination activity may have come from the period when Allen Dulles was DCI. As Harvey stated:

> "But I had every right to believe organizationally, humanly, whatever way you want to put it, that nothing that was being told to me by Bissell had not in fact come to him from /Allen Dulles/.

But Harvey made clear that this did not imply that McCone knew of or authorized the assassination activity:

> "The Chairman: 'That doesn't necessarily mean that because the previous director had knowledge that Mr. McCone had knowledge. It is not like a covenant that runs in the land.'"
>
> 'Mr. Harvey: 'No, of course not, and they don't always brief their successors.'" (Harvey, 6/25, p. 85.)

b. Harvey and the Special Group Augmented

Harvey testified that he never informed the Special Group Augmented, or any of its members individually, of the ongoing assassination plots. As we described earlier, the Special Group Augmented and its Mongoose program began its Cuba activities in late 1961 through 1962. Harvey attended many of the Special Group Augmented meetings as the CIA's representative. He testified that at no time was assassination discussed at any of the meetings, except for the August 10, 1962 meeting.* where

crucial meeting / goes to MC + Bundy + Goodwin test

We took substantial testimony covering the April/May 1962 period when the underworld contact was reactivated, the pills were passed to Roselli and delivered to Cuba. Harvey had been appointed several months earlier as head of the CIA's Task Force W, which operated under the Special Group Augmented as the CIA's action arm for Mongoose activities.

In the latter part of April, Harvey went to Miami where the CIA had its large (at least 200 persons) JM/WAVE Station. As Harvey testified, in addition to his meeting with Roselli and the delivery of the poison pills, Harvey's trip had other totally unrelated (in Harvey's view) purposes as well:

> "...this was one of a number of periodic trips for the purpose of reviewing in toto...the actual and potential operations at the Miami base...and this covered the whole gamut from personnel administration, operational support in the way of small craft [and] so on.."(Harvey., 7/11, pp. 15-16).

The Special Group Augmented expected to receive a report from Harvey on his April trip to Miami. On April 19, 1962, while Harvey was in Miami, Lansdale told the Special Group Augmented that:

> "Upon the return of Mr. Harvey from his current field visit, more specific information on the status of agent training and operations should be made available." (Memorandum for

TOP SECRET

---

* This meeting and the testimony concerning it is treated in depth in the section, *infra*, pp._____.

the Special Group, April 19, 1962, from Lansdale, p._____). On April 26, 1962, the Special Group Augmented was informed by Lansdale that Harvey was in Florida "initiating a new series of agent infiltrations" and would return to Washington on April 30. (Memorandum for the Special Group /Augmented/, April 26, 1962, from Lansdale.) At the Special Group meeting on the same day General Taylor requested that Harvey "attend the next meeting and report on agent activities." (Memorandum for the Record, April 26, 1962, by McCone.) The next day, April 26, 1962, Harvey was sent a memorandum informing him of General Taylor's request as well as the fact that McCone wanted to meet with Harvey and Lansdale "immediately on your return to discuss the Task Force activities." (Memorandum for Action, Elder to Harvey, April 27, 1962.)

Harvey did report to the Special Group upon his return but did not mention his meeting with Roselli or the delivery of the pills and the weapons.

Harvey testified that when he reported to the Special Group Augmented on his trip to Miami, he did not inform them or, indeed, any individual outside the Agency, that he had given the pills to Roselli. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 16.)* And when McCone asked Harvey to brief him on what Harvey had done in Miami, Harvey did not tell McCone of the pills. As indicated above, Harvey did not believe it was necessary to do so. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 17.)*

TOP SECRET

---

* Harvey testified with respect to why he did not brief the Special Group Augmented, in the following exchange:

> "Q.: '...Did you believe that the White House did not want the Special Group to know?'"
>
> "A.: 'Well, I would have had no basis for that belief, but I would have felt that if the White House (tasked) this (operation to the CIA) and wanted the Special Group to know about it, it was up to the White House to brief the Special Group and not up to me to brief them, and I would have considered that I would have been very far out of line and would have been subject to severe censure."* (Harvey Tr. 7/11, p. 77).

The minutes of the May 3, 1962, Special Group Augmented meeting make no mention of Harvey's above-related plot activities. The minutes of that meeting show that on his return from Miami, Harvey gave a progress report to the Special Group Augmented on "agent teams" and the "general field of intelligence". (Harvey, Ex. 3, Memorandum of Special Group Augmented Meeting, May 1962, p. 1.) Harvey reported that three agent teams had been infiltrated and that 72 actual or potential reporting sources were also in place. (Harvey Ex. 3, p. 1.)

Shortly after the May 3 meeting, General Taylor went to see the President to give him what he called a "routine briefing" (Taylor Tr. _____, p. _____). General Taylor's memorandum of his briefing of the President similarly makes no reference to Harvey's contacts with Roselli or the delivery of pills and guns. (Memorandum for Record May 7, 1962, by General Taylor.) Taylor testified that he had never heard of Harvey delivering pills to poison Castro, or of any assassination attempts. (Taylor Tr. _______, p. 42.)

3. Testimony of Kennedy Administration Officials

In addition to examining the actual nature of the Mongoose operation (discussed above at p. ___), we took considerable testimony from Kennedy Administration officials on the question of authority for a Castro assassination in the Mongoose period. Set out in the section below is the testimony of the Kennedy Administration officials principally involved in the MOngoose operation and the Special Group Augmented, all of whom testified the assassination plots were not authorized. These were McCone, the Director of CIA and a member of the Special Group Augmented; General Taylor, Chairman of the Special Group Augmented; General Lansdale, Chief of Operations for Mongoose; Special Group Augmented members Bundy and Gilpatric; Secretary of State Rusk; and Secretary of Defense McNamara. Their testimony focused on the principal issues raised by Helms, including: (1) whether any authority for a Castro assassination existed; and (2) whether they had knowledge of any Castro assassination activity.*

why prior to April

In the succeeding section we discuss the August 10, 1962, meeting where the subject of a Castro assassination was raised.

a. Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that at no time during his service in the Kennedy Administration as DCI (1961-1963), did President Kennedy, Robert Kennedy or any member of the Cabinet or White House staff discuss with him any Castro assassination plans or operations. (McCone, p. 44.)

As discussed above in greater detail, McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence and Helms immediate superior, testified he did not authorize and was not informed about, the assassination activity. (McCone, p. 3.)

---

*In addition, the Committee questioned the Kennedy Administration members as to the likelihood that an assassination order might have been given to Helms by Robert Kennedy through a "back channel", outside the normal chain of command; however, Helms subsequently appeared and testified that no such order was ever given by Robert Kennedy. (See p. ___ above.)

McCone pointed out that although the Cuban problem was discussed in terms of "dispose of Castro," or "knock off Castro", these terms were meant to refer to "the overthrow of the Communist Government in Cuba" and not a Castro assassination. (McCone, p. 44; McCone Ex. 4, memorandum April 14, 1967, to Helms.)

McCone further stated that "it is very hard for me to believe" that Robert Kennedy would have initiated a Castro assassination activity without consulting with the Special Group Augmented. (McCone, p. 52).

b. Testimony of Taylor

Taylor served as Chairman of the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operation (Taylor, 7/9, p.). In addition, Taylor also served as President Kennedy's Military Representative and Intelligence Advisor after the Bay of Pigs until his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in November 1962 (Taylor, 7/9, p. ; Bundy, 7/11, p. 25).

Taylor testified that a Castro assassination plan was "never" submitted to the Special Group Augmented, either orally or in writing. (Taylor, p. 41). Taylor further testified that he and the Special Group Augmented were never told of the passage of the poison pills to Roselli in April 1962, and that the passage of these pills without the knowledge of the Special Group Augmented was "entirely, completely out of /the/ context and character of the way the /Special Group Augmented/ operated or the way it would accept" that an operation was properly authorized. (Taylor, p. 43). And Taylor testified that although the Special Group Augmented was "certainly anxious for the downfall of Castro" an "assassination never came up" in the meetings and discussions of the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 62).

— 32 meeting proposal

With respect to whether President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have bypassed the Special Group Augmented to deal directly with Helms or CIA officers to assassinate

Castro, Taylor testified that this would have been "entirely contradictory to every method of operation I ever saw on the part of the President and his brother." (Taylor, p. 45). Taylor stated "the President and the Attorney General would never have gone around" the Special Group Augmented. (Taylor, p. 49).

Although Taylor acknowledged that Robert Kennedy frequently pushed for more direct action during Mongoose, Taylor stated that "there was no suggestion /of/ assassination" in these urgings. (Taylor, p. 67). Taylor testified that Robert Kennedy dealt directly with Lansdale outside Special Group Augmented channels "only for the purpose of imparting his own sense of urgency" but "never" would Robert Kennedy have done so on substantive issues:

> "Senator Hart of Colorado: But on substantive issues, he wouldn't, in effect, been dealing behind your back?"
>
> "General Taylor: Never. Never. That was not his way." (Taylor, p. 53). */

c. Testimony of Lansdale

Lansdale testified that he "was very certain" that he never discussed a Castro assassination with either President Kennedy

---

* The evidence showed, however, that there were occasions when the Attorney General dealt with those concered with Mongoose without consulting General Taylor. For example, as discussed in greater detail (in the section on Mongoose operations) on January 18, 1962, General Lansdale sent a copy of his program review to Robert Kennedy attached to which was a cover memorandum indicating that other "sensitive work" not in the review was to be dealt with only between the President, the Attorney General, and Lansdale. The nature of that work (which Lansdale testified involved political contacts in the Cuba exile community) is discussed at p. ____ above.

might hav
?

TOP

or Robert Kennedy:

> "The Chairman: You do not recall ever having discussed with the Attorney General a plan or a proposal to assassinate Fidel Castro?"
>
> "General Lansdale: No. And I am very certain Senator, that such a discussion never came up...neither with the Attorney General or the President." (Lansdale, p. 18.)*

Lansdale further testified that the plausible deniability concept had no part in the fact that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy or the Attorney General.** Lansdale testified that he "had doubts" that assassination was a "useful action, and one which I had never employed in the past, and during work in copying with revolutions and I had considerable doubts as to its utility and I was trying to be very pragmatic." (Lansdale, p. 31.) When asked if he thought the President was not aware of efforts to depose Castro and his government by any means including assassination, Lansdale answered "I am certain he was aware of efforts to dispose of the Castro regime. I am really not one to guess what he knew of assassinations, because I don't know." (_Id._, p. 32.)

With regard to the Castro assassination attempts, Lansdale testified that Harvey "never" told him that Harvey was attempting to assassinate Castro. (Lansdale, p. 24.) Lansdale stated:

> "I had no knowledge of such a thing. I know of no order or permission for such a thing and I was given no information at all that such a thing was going on by people who I have now learned were involved with it." (Lansdale, p. 58). */

---

*/ Thus, when Lansdale was questioned about the "touchdown plays" (discussed in detail above at p.), there was this testimony:

"Senator Baker: Now do you completely rule out the possibility that the touchdown play had to do with the possible assassination efforts against Fidel Castro?"

"General Lansdale: Yes ... I never discussed, nor conceived, nor received orders about an assassination of Castro with my dealings with either the Attorney General or the President."

**/ "Senator Baker: Is that the reason you didn't, because of the principle of deniability?"

"General Lansdale: No, it wasn't. The subject never came up, and I had no reason to bring it up with him."

TOP SECRET

As discussed below in detail at pp ____, after the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10, 1962 meeting of the Special Group Augmented, Lansdale directed Harvey to prepare a plan for the "liquidation" of Cuban leaders. However, no such plan was ever prepared and, as the IG Report concluded, the August 10 meeting was "unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination." (IG, p. 118).

With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy might have by-passed the SGA and Lansdale to deal directly with Agency officials on a Castro assassination, Lansdale testified:

> "I never knew of a direct line of communication between the President or the Attorney General and Harvey apart from me on this...."

During the course of the Committee's investigation into these allegations of assassination efforts by the U.S. government, however, General Lansdale spoke with several reporters concerning the subject of a Castro assassination plan in 1962. Lansdale's comments to the reporters are dealt with below in connection with the August 10, 1962, meeting of the Special Group.

---

*/ "Senator Huddleston: You never had any reason to believe that the Attorney General had dealt directly with Mr. Harvey?"

"General Lansdale: I hadn't known about that at all, no...."

"Senator Huddleston: ...You have no reason to believe that he might have broached (a Castro assassination) with the Attorney General?"

"General Lansdale: I wouldn't know that -- I certainly didn't know it."

"Senator Huddleston: You had no reason to believe that there was any kind of activity going on in relation to Cuba outside of what you were proposing or what was coming before the Special Group?"

"General Lansdale: No, I was supposed to know it all, and I had no indication that I did not know it all (except for one operation by Harvey unrelated to assassinations)."

d. Testimony of Bundy

Bundy served as President Kennedy's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs throughout the Kennedy Administration. (Bundy, p. 2). In addition, Bundy participated in the planning that led to the creation of Operation Mongoose and was a member of the Special Group Augmented. (Bundy, pp. 34, 87).

Bundy testified that the matter of a Castro assassination was "mentioned from time to time" over the period 1961-1963 but "never to me that I can recall by the President." (Bundy, p. 73). Bundy emphasized that the question came up "as something to talk about rather than to consider." (Bundy, p. 73.)

Bundy testified that it was his conviction that "no one in the Kennedy Administration, in the White House ... ever gave any authorization, approval, or instruction of any kind for any effort to assassinate anyone by the CIA." (Bundy, p. 54). Bundy testified that he knew and worked on an intimate basis with both President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration, and testified that it was "incredible" that they would have authorized a Castro

TOP SECRET

assassination, either explicitly or implicitly as a result of pressure they exerted in the anti-Castro effort:

> "The Chairman: Based upon that acquaintanceship, do you believe, under any of the circumstances that occurred during that whole period, either one of them would have authorized the assassination of Fidel Castro?"
>
> "Mr. Bundy: I most emphatically do not ... If you have heard testimony that there was pressure to do something about Cuba, there was. There was an effort, both from the President in his style and from the Attorney General in his style to keep the government active in looking for ways to weaken the Cuban regime. There was. But if you, as I understand it, and not even those who pressed the matter most closely as having essentially been inspired by the White House can tell you that anyone ever said to them, go and kill anyone.
>
> Let me say one other thing about these two men, and that is that there was something that they really wanted done, they did not leave people in doubt, so that on the one hand, I would say about their character, their purposes, and their nature and the way they confronted international affairs that I find it incredible that they would have ordered or authorized explicitly or implicitly an assassination of Castro. I also feel that if, contrary to everything that I know about their character, they had had such a decision and such a purpose, people would not have been in any doubt about it." (Tr. 98-99).

Bundy was asked "have you any way to explain to the Committee, as to why Mr. Helms would testify that he...had no doubts, that the Agency was fully authorized to proceed to not only develop schemes, but to engage in active attempts to assassinate Castro?" Bundy replied: "I have no explanation of that." (Bundy, pp. 99-100)

Bundy further testified that despite the extreme sense of urgency that arose during the Cuban Missile Crisis, Castro's assassination was never discussed, and it was "totally inconsistent" with the policies and actions taken by the President and Robert Kennedy in that

TOP SECRET

crisis for them to have authorized a Castro assassination. (Bundy, p. 95, 97-98).*

Bundy further stated that he was never told by anyone that assassination efforts were underway against Castro, that underworld figures were hired by the CIA in this regard, or that Harvey was engaged in Castro assassination activity. (Bundy, p. 63.)

Bundy testified that he heard about the concept of "executive action" why! "Some time in the early months of 1961". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 4.) But since this was presented to him as an untargeted capability only he did not "discourage or dissuade" the person who briefed him on this. (Bundy, p. 4, 7, 10.) When asked if he had any recollection of any specific covert plans that involved poisons in conjunction with activities against Cuba, Bundy stated

> "I have no recollection of any specific plan. I do have a very vague, essentially refreshed recollection that I heard the word poison at some point in connection with a possibility of action in Cuba. But that is as far as I have been able to take it in my own memory. (Bundy, p. 42).

Bundy stated further that this recollection relating to poison involved a proposal that seemed "impractical" because it was going to kill a large group of people in a headquarters mess, or something of that sort." (Bundy, p.42-43).

---

*/ Bundy stated:

> "... the most important point I want to make... is that I find the notion that they separately, privately encouraged, ordered, arranged efforts at assassination totally inconsistent with what I knew of both of them. And, as an example, I would cite -- and one among very many -- the role played by the Attorney General in the Missile Crisis, because it was he who, most emphatically, argued against a so-called surgical air strike or any other action that would bring death upon many, in favor of the more careful approach which was eventually adopted by the President in the form of a quarantine or a blockade." (Bundy, p. 98).

With respect to the possibility that Robert Kennedy may have authorized assassination outside of Special Group Augmented channels, Bundy stated that although Robert Kennedy did spur people to greater effort during Mongoose, "he never took away from the existing channel of authority its authority or responsibility." (Bundy, pp. 47-48). Bundy further testified that there existed between Robert Kennedy and Maxwell Taylor (the Special Group Augmented Chairman) "a relation of real trust and confidence." In view of this relation, Bundy stated it was his opinion that Robert Kennedy would not have by-passed Taylor to develop a "back-channel" relationship with someone else to assassinate Castro. (Bundy, p. 87).

e. Testimony of MacNamara

MacNamara served as Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations. In that capacity, he represented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose Operations.

SECRET

McNamara stated that he had no knowledge or information of any proposal for the assassination of Premier Castro coming from President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy. (McNamara, 7/11/75, p. 4.) He did note that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter, and that there was pressure from (President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy) to do something about Castro. But I don't believe we contemplated assassination. We did, however, contemplate overthrow." (McNamara, p. 93.)

There occurred during McNamara's testimony an exchange which is appropriate to set out in full because of the manner in which it captures the dilemma posed by the evidence on the question of authority:

> "The Chairman. We also have received evidence from your senior associates that they never participated in the authorization of an assassination attempt against Castro nor ever directed the CIA to undertake such attempts.
>
> We have much testimony establishing the chain of command where covert action was concerned, and all of it has been to the effect that the Special Group or the Special Group Augmented had full charge of covert operations, and that in that chain of command any proposal of this character or any other proposal having to do with covert operations being directed against the Castro regime, or against Castro personally, were to be laid before the Special Group Augmented and were not to be undertaken except with the authority of that group and at the direction of that group.
>
> Now, at the same time we know from the evidence that the CIA was in fact engaged during the period in a series of attempts to assassinate Castro.
>
> Now, you see what we are faced with is this dilemma. Either the CIA was a rogue elephant rampaging out of control, over which no effective direction was being given in this matter of assassination, or there was

TOP SECRET

> some secret channel circumventing the whole structure of command by which the CIA and certain officials in the CIA were authorized to proceed with assassination plots and assassination attempts against Castro. Or the third and final point that I can think of is that somehow these officials of the CIA who were so engaged misunderstood or misinterpreted their scope of authority.
>
> Now it is terribly important, if there is any way that we can find out which of these three points represented what actually happened. That is the nature, that is the quandary.
>
> Now, is there anything that you can tell us that would assist us in finding an answer to this central question?
>
> Mr. McNamara. I can only tell you what will further your uneasiness. Because I have stated before and I believe today that the CIA was a highly disciplined organization, fully under the control of senior officials of the government, so much so that I feel as a senior official of the government I must assume responsibility for the actions of the two, putting assassination aside just for the moment. But I know of no major action taken by CIA during the time I was in the government that was not properly authorized by senior officials. And when I say that I want to emphasize also that I believe with hindsight we authorized actions that were contrary to the interest of the Republic but I don't want it on the record that the CIA was uncontrolled, was operating with its own authority and we can be absolved of responsibility for what CIA did, again with exception of assassination, again which I say I never heard of.
>
> The second point you say that you have, you know that CIA was engaged in a series of attempts of assassination. I think to use your words. I don't know that. I accept the fact that you do and that you have information I was not aware of. I find that impossible to reconcile. I just can't understand how it could have happened and I don't accept the third point, that they operated on the basis of minunderstanding, because it seems to me that the McCone position that he was opposed to it, his clear recollection and his written memo of 1967 that I was strongly opposed to it, his statement that Murrow opposed, all should eliminate any point of misunderstanding. So I frankly can't reconcile. (TR. 38-41)

McNamara further stated that "I find it almost inconceivable that the assassination attempts were carried on during the Kennedy Administration

SECRET

days without the senior members know it, and I understand the contradiction that this carries with respect to the face." (McNamara, p. 4.) He further emphasized that for the President or Robert Kennedy to have approved a Castro assassination was "totally inconsistent with everything I know about the two men." (McNamara p. 90.)

f. Testimony of Gilpatric

Gilpatric served as Deputy Secretary of Defense throughout the Kennedy Administration. (Gilpatric, p. 5; Gilpatric Ex. 1, p. 5.) In that capacity, Gilpatric represented the Department of Defense as a member of the Special Group and the Special Group Augmented during the Mongoose operation. (Gilpatric, p. 5.)

Gilpatric testified that he understood the mandate of the Special Group during Mongoose was not to kill Castro, but to "so undermine, so disrupt the Cuban system under Castro that it could not be effective."* (Gilpatric, p. 28). Gilpatric emphasized that "it was the system we had to deal with" and words such as "get rid of Castro" were said "in the context of the system, of the .... government he had installed and was presiding over, but of which /Castro/ was only one part." (Gilpatric, p. 29).

---

* Initially in his first appearances before the Committee Mr. Gilpatric was unable to recall any of the events or characters involved in Operation Mongoose. He failed to recall that General Lansdale was the Chief of Operations for the project, or Lansdale's involvement in the Special Group Augmented even though Gilpatric recommended Lansdale for promotion to Brigadier General. Gilpatric testified that the lapse of time, approximately fifteen years, had impaired his memory on these events. (Gilpatric, pp. 6-9.) (Insert possible proposed additional language by Smothers.)

Gilpatric said that he knew of no express restriction that would have barred the killing of Castro. But Gilpatic testified that he understood "There were limits on the use of power" and that these precluded the use of assassination. (Gilpatric, p. 31). Thus, while Gilpatric said that it was "perfectly possible" that one might reasonably have inferred assassination was authorized, nevertheless, the limits on action set down by the Special Group Augmented would have required that specific efforts be made by one receiving general instructions to clarify whether those instructions authorized assassination.*/ He added that "within our charter, so to speak, the one thing that was off limits was military invasion." (Id. p. 45). In this context of the Mongoose charter, Gilpatric, when asked whether the "killing of Castro by a paramilitary group (would) have been within bounds." he responded, "I know of no restriction that would have barred it." (Id.) In response to a question as to whether there was any concern for the limits on the activities of personnel involved in these raids and infiltration efforts, Gilpatric said: "No, to the contrary. The complaint that the Attorney General had, if we assume he was reflecting the President's views on it, /was that/ the steps taken by the CIA up to that point, /and/ their plans were too petty, were too minor, they weren't massive enough, they weren't going to be effective enough." (Id., p. 47.) However, as discussed above at p._____, on March 5, 1962, the Special Group Augmented had agreed, with respect to "action-type" agents, that it "must keep its hand tightly" on these agents activities, and although once such agents were inside Cuba, they could not be "effectively controlled," the Group would make "every effort...to attempt such control."

push

---

*/ In Gilpatric's testimony, there was the following exchange:

> "Senator Huddleston:...It's on the basis of these words that everybody admits were used, like replace or get rid of, on the basis of these kinds of conversation alone that /Helms/ was firmly convinced and that apparently went right down through the whole rank of command, firmly convinced that he had the authority to move against the life of a head of state.

(Footnote continued on next page.)

Gilpatric testified that "it was not unusual" for President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy to deal directly with people at various levels in the Executive Branch. (Gilpatric, p. 58). With respect to Mongoose, Gilpatric said that Robert Kennedy was the "moving spirit" (Gilpatric, p. 11). But Gilpatric stated that Robert Kennedy's role was "principally to spur us on, to get going, get cracking." (Gilpatric, p. 47). Thus, although Robert Kennedy frequently complained that the plans of the CIA and Mongoose weren't "massive enough" and that "we should get in there and do more," Gilpatric pointed out that Robert Kennedy was not making specific proposals in these urgings, and the result he desired was a general one "to limit the Castro regime's effectiveness," rather than any specific measure. (Gilpatric, p. 47).

g. Testimony of Rusk

Dean Rusk served as Secretary of State throughout the Kennedy Administration. Rusk participated in a number of Special Group Augmented meetings during the Mongoose operation. (Rusk, p. ___).

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

> Now this disturbs me, and I don't know whether our councils of government operate that way in all areas or not, but if they do then it seems to me it would raise a very serious question as to whether or not the troops are getting the right orders."
>
> "Mr. Gilpatric....I thought there were limits on the use of power, and that was one of them."
>
> "Senator Huddleston. And going beyond that would require that somebody make a specific effort to make sure he understood precisely what they were talking about, would that be your interpretation?"
>
> "Mr. Gilpatric. It would." (Gilpatric, p. 31).

TOP SECRET

Rusk testified that he had never been informed of any Castro assassination plans or undertakings and had no knowledge of any such activity. (Rusk, p. 52).

Rusk further testified that he found it "very hard to believe" that President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy would have, in the course of urging action against Castro, sanctioned the use of any measure against Castro.*/ Rusk said that, while it was "possible" that a person, in good faith, might have thought specific courses of action were authorized from the emphasis given to taking action against Castro, nevertheless Rusk testified that with respect to a Castro assassintion,

> "It would have been an abuse of the President and the Attorney General if somebody had thought they were getting that without confirming that this was, in fact, an official, firm policy decision. (Rusk, pp. 98-99).

With respect to whether President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy might have communicated directly with Helms or Harvey on a Castro assassination effort, Rusk testified that, based on his experience and the manner in which foreign affairs matters were handled, I don't see how it could have happened." (Rusk, p. 99).**/

---

*/ "Senator Huddleston...(Do) your contacts with Robert Kennedy or President Kennedy, indicate to you that they were agitated to such an extent about Cuba and Mongoose progress that in a conversation with someone urging them to get off their rear-end and get something done that they might convey the message that they meant anything, go to any length to do something about the Castro regime?
"Mr. Rusk. I find it very hard to believe that Robert Kennedy standing alone, or particularly Robert Kennedy alleging to speak for President Kennedy, would have gone down that trail..."

**/"Senator Mondale...We asked General Taylor yesterday whether he thought something of informal, subterranean, whatever kinds of communications from the highest level to Helms would have been possible without his (Footnote continued on following page.)

TOP SECRET

h. Testimony of Sorensen

Sorensen served as a Special Assistant to President Kennedy during the entire Kennedy Administration. Sorensen was a member of the National Security Council Executive Committee that dealt with the Missile Crisis, although he was not involved with Mongoose.

Sorensen testified that in his daily personal meetings with the President and at all the National Security Council meetings he attended, there was "not at any time any mention -- much less approval by him -- of any U.S.-sponsored plan to assassinate any foreign leaders" (Sorensen, p. 4). Based upon his close contact with President Kennedy, Sorensen stated that it was his opinion that:

> "such an act (as assassination) was totally foreign to his character and conscience, foreign to his fundamental reverence for human life and his respect for his adversaries, foreign to his insistence upon a moral dimension in U.S. foreign policy and his concern for his country's reputation abroad, and foreign to his pragmatic recognition that so horrendous but inevitably counter-productive a precedent committed by a country whose own chief of state was inevitably vulnerable." (Sorensen, p. 5).

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

knowledge, and he said he felt that was incredible, he didn't think it was possible.

Do you think that it would be likely that an informal order around channels, say to Helms or to Harvey--

The Chairman. Over a three-year period.

Senator Mondale. Over a three-year period would have been possible without your being informed?

Mr. Rusk. Theoretically, Senator, one would have to say it is possible.

Senator Mondale. But based on your experience?

Mr. Rusk. In terms of practicality, probability and so forth, I don't see how it could have happened.

You know those things, in these circles we were moving in could not be limited in that way. You know the echoes would come back."

F. The August 10, 1962 Meeting

As indicated above (see p. ____), the question of a Castro assassination was raised at a meeting of the Special Group Augmented on August 10, 1962. Thereafter, on August 13, 1962, Lansdale directed Harvey to include in a proposed plan for Phase II of Mongoose a plan for the "liquidation of leaders" as an option. We took considerable testimony and examined the documents relating to the August 10 meeting, the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination, and Lansdale's subsequent request for a contingency plan.

goes to Bundy level raison

At the outset, it should be noted that the documents and testimony showed that discussion of a Castro assassination at the Agust 10, 1962 meeting had no connection to the assassination activity undertaken by Harvey and Roselli, or any other Castro assassination plans or efforts. As the CIA Inspector General found:

do we want this intro?

> "The subject (of a Castro assassination) was raised at a meeting at State on 10 August 1962, but it is unrelated to any actual attempts at assassination. It did result in a MONGOOSE action memorandum by Lansdale assigning to CIA action for planning liquidation of leaders. (IG, p. 118).

The finding of the Inspector General is supported both by the chronology of the Castro assassination efforts and the testimony of Harvey. The chronology shows that it was three months prior to the August 10, 1962 meeting that Harvey gave Roselli the poison pills for use against Castro, and that shortly thereafter (and well before August 10, 1962) Harvey was informed that the pills were inside Cuba. (see p. ___ above). Moreover, after the August 10, 1962 meeting there was no Castro assassination activity during the remainder of 1962. (see p. ____ above).

In addition, Harvey (who attended the August 10, 1962 meeting and recalled that the question of a Castro assassination was raised) declared that the discussion was not related to his assassination activity with Roselli. (Harvey, 7/11, pp. 48-50). Harvey further testified that he did not view the August 10, 1962, discussion of a Castro assassination as authorization for the Roselli operation because "the authority, as I understood it, for this particular operation went back long before the formation" of the Special Group Augmented. (Harvey, 7/11, p. 49).

1. The Contemporaneous Documents

a. Lansdale's August 13, 1962 Memorandum

Following the August 10, 1962 meeting, Lansdale sent a memorandum on August 13, 1962, to Harvey and the other members of Lansdale's interagency working group.*/ (Lansdale Ex. 15, Memorandum from Lansdale, August 13, 1962). The Memorandum began by stating: "In compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policy meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B for submission." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).

Lansdale further set out his concept of what was required: "I believe the paper need contain only a statement of objectives and a list of implementing activities. The list of activities will be under the heading of: Intelligence, Political, Economic, Psychological, Paramilitary, and Military." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).

---

* In addition to Harvey, copies of Lansdale's August 13, 1962, memorandum were sent to Robert Hurwitch (State Dept), Gen. Benjamin Harris (Defense Dept) and Don Wilson (U.S. Information Agency). (Lansdale Ex. 15.)

In his testimony, Gen Harris identified a document drafted by the Mongoose Working Group in the Defense Dept shortly before the August 10 meeting. The document listed a number of steps that could be taken in the event of an intensified Mongoose program that might involve U. S. military intervention. One such step was "assassinate Castro and his handful of top men." (Harris Ex. 4.) Gen. Harris stated that this was "not out of the ordinary in terms of contingency planning... it's one of the things you look at. (Harris, p. 37.) There was no evidence that this document was distributed outside the Defense Dept's Mongoose working group.

Lansdale's memorandum then assigned to Harvey papers on the following subjects by the means of the following passage, which contained a deleted phrase:

> "Mr. Harvey: Intelligence, Political, /words deleted/, Economic, (sabotage, limited deception), and Paramilitary." (Lansdale, Ex. 15, p. 1).

According to a memorandum by Harvey to Helms the following day, August 14, 1962, the words deleted from the above-quoted passage were "including liquidation of leaders." (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum by Harvey, August 4, 1962, to Helms).

b. Harvey's August 14, 1962 Memorandum

When Harvey received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, Harvey wrote a memorandum to Helms attaching a copy of Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, and noting that Harvey had excised the words "including liquidation of leaders." (Lansdale Ex. 16, Memorandum, August 14, 1962, from Harvey to Helms). Harvey's Memorandum stated:

> "The question of assassination, particularly of Fidel Castro, was brought up by Secretary McNamara at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) in Secretary Rusk's office on 10 August. It was the obvious consensus at that meeting, in answer to a comment by Mr. Ed Murrow, that this is not a subject which has been made a matter of official record. I took careful notes on the comments at this meeting on this point, and the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point. (Lansdale Ex. 16).

Harvey's memorandum further stated that, on receipt of Lansdale's memorandum, Harvey had called Lansdale's office and pointed out "the inadmissibility and stupidity of putting this type of comment in writing in such a document," and that the CIA "would write no document pertaining to this and would participate in no open meeting discussing it." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1).

c. The Minutes of the August 10, 1962 Meeting

The minutes of the August 10 meeting contain no reference to the subject of a Castro assassination. (Memorandum for Record, Special Group Augmented Meeting, August 10, 1962, by Parrott, hereafter referred to as the "August 10 Minutes"). Parrott, the author of the August 10 Minutes, testified that he did not recall a discussion of assassination at that meeting, but the fact that the minutes do not reflect such a discussion is not an indication that the matter did not come up. (Parrott, p. 34). Parrott pointed out that his minutes "were not intended to be a verbatim transcript of everything that was said," since the purpose of his minutes was "to interpret what the decisions were and to record those and to use them as a useful action document." (Parrott, 34-35). Parrott testified:

> "we had 15 or 16 people (at the August 10, 1962 meeting)...all of them well informed, all of them highly articulate.
>
> This meeting, as I recall, went on for several hours...Now I'm sure that particularly in a group like this that there were a great many proposals made that were just shot down immediately." (Parrott, p. 34-35).

Parrott further testified that he did not record proposals that were quickly rejected at the August 10 meeting. (Parrott, p. 35). Parrott stated that, although he had no recollection of a discussion of Castro's assassination at the August 10 meeting, he would infer from the related documents (the Lansdale and Harvey Memoranda of August 13 and 14) that the subject was raised but "it never got off the ground....Therefore, I did not record it." (Parrott, p. 35).

The documents and testimony of Parrott suggest several possible inferences with respect to the nature of the discussion of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting. First, as indicated by the Lansdale and Harvey memorandum, it is possible that a contingency plan was requested but that it was decided not to make this "a matter of official record." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1). However, if it had been decided to commission a written contingency plan, as Lansdale requested Harvey prepare, it is difficult to see how this request could have been reconciled with a decision to make to written record.

plausible deniability

Second, it is possible that, as Parrott's testimony indicated, the subject was raised but quickly rejected. This inference is apparently consistent with the fact that the subject did not appear in Parrott's minutes, and perhaps, although less so, with Harvey's August 14 Memorandum. Harvey's Memorandum states that the Special Group Augmented "is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." (Lansdale Ex. 16, p. 1).

consistent do the plan don't come to us w/ a memo

Before turning to the testimony on these questions, we discuss the context of the August 10 discussion of a Castro assassination as reflected in the minutes of the August 10 Meeting.

d. The August 10 Meeting

The August 10 Meeting was held to decide upon a further course of action to succeed the intelligence collection phase of Mongoose which was scheduled to conclude in August. (McCone, p. 34). As a policy meeting, there were in attendance a larger number of officials than usually participated in Special Group Augmented meetings. The Meeting was chaired by Secretary of State Rusk (and held in his office), and attended by a total of 15 officials, including the principals of the agencies taking part in Mongoose, i.e., Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, CIA Director McCone, and USIA Director Murrow.

At the August 10 meeting, General Lansdale proposed that a "stepped-up Course B" be adopted for Mongoose, (August 10 Minutes, p. ___). This plan involved operations to "exert all possible diplomatic, economic, psychological, and other overt pressures to overthrow the Castro-Communist regime, without overt employment of U.S. military." (Memorandum for Special Group Augmented, August 8, 1962, p. 1).

However, the Special Group Augmented decided against consideration of the "stepped-up Course B". In the discussion of Lansdale's Course B proposal, Rusk "emphasized the desirability of attempting to create a split between Castro and old-line Communists". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). In addition, McNamara questioned whether the practice of building up agents in Cuba would not lead to actions that "would hurt the U.S. in the eyes of world opinion". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2) (A remark which seems inconsistent with McNamara at the same Meeting raising the question of assassination in any sense of advocacy). The Minutes state that McNamara's concern "led to the suggestion by General Taylor that we should consider changing the overall objective /of Mongoose/ from one of overthrowing the Castro regime" to one of causing its failure. (August 10 Minutes, p. 2).

DOES IT not Appear inconsistent w/ his Approval of sabotage etc

this wouldn't hurt us in eyes of world

Hence, in lieu of Lansdale's "stepped-up Course B", the Special Group

Augmented chose a plan advanced by McCone that assumed Castro's continuance in power and had the more limited objective of splitting off Castro from "old-line Communists".* (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). The decision and "action" of the Special Group Augmented at the August 10 meeting was stated as follows:

> "The principal members of the Special Group felt, after some discussion, that the CIA variant should be developed further for consideration at next Thursday's meeting of the Special Group. McCone was asked to stress economic sabotage, and to emphasize measures to foment a Castro-oldline Communist split." (August Memorandum, p. 2).
>
> * * *
>
> "Action to be taken:
>
> CIA to prepare a new version of ~~its~~ variant plan, in accordance with the above-summarized discussion. This should be ready by Wednesday, August 15." (August 10 Memorandum, p. 3).

It was therefore in this context that Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum to Harvey stated that "in compliance with the desires and guidance expressed in the August 10 policies meeting on Operation Mongoose, we will produce an outline of an alternate Course B. "Indeed, pursuant to the August 10 decision to adopt McCone's proposal for a more limited plan that assumed Castro's continuation in power, Lansdale's memorandum stated that a CIA paper titled "Operational Plan (Reduced Effort) will be used as the starting basis." (Lansdale Ex. 15, p. 1).

---

*/ The August 10 Minutes show that McCone pointed out that the stepped-up Course B "will risk inviting an uprising, which might result in a Hungary type blood bath if unsupported". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2). McCone "emphasized that the stepped-up plan should not be undertaken unless the U.S. is prepared to accept attributability for the necessary actions, including the eventual use of military force". (August 10 Minutes). The August 10 Minutes further stated that, in McCone's view, the CIA variant "would avoid all of these dangers because it would not invite an uprising". (August 10 Minutes, p. 2).

In view of the issues raised by these documents we took testimony from the principal participants in that meeting. In particular, we discuss below the testimony as to whether Lansdale's request for an assassination plan reflected the desire of the SGA or was contemplated by the SGA's decision to proceed with a plan of "reduced effort" that posited Castro's continuance in power.

2. The Testimony

As set out below, Harvey, McCone, and Goodwin recall the question of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.* We discuss that testimony, first with respect to the August 10 meeting itself, and, second, with regard to the action that followed that meeting.

a. Testimony as to the August 10 Meeting

(1) Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that the question of a "liquidation" or removal of Castro and other Cuban leaders arose at the August 10 meeting in the context of "exploring the alternatives that were available" for the next phase of Mongoose. (McCone, p. 33). McCone testified that he did not recall who made this suggestion, but that he and Mr. Murrow took "strong exception" to the suggestion. A memorandum of McCone's recollection of the August 10 Meeting, written in 1967,**/ states:

---

*/ Other participants (Rusk, McNamara, Bundy, and Gilpatric) did not recall the August 10 discussion.

**/ On April 14, 1967, after McCone left the CIA, he dictated a memorandum of his recollection regarding the August 10, 1962 meeting. The memorandum was prompted by a telephone call from the newspaper columnist, Jack Anderson, who at that time was preparing a column on Castro assassination (Continued on the following page.)

> "I took immediate exception to this suggestion, stating that the subject was completely out of bounds as far as the USG (U.S. Government) and CIA were concerned and the idea should not be discussed nor should it appear in any papers, as the USG could not consider such actions on moral or ethical grounds." (McCone Ex. 4).

McCone testified that there was no decision at the August 10 meeting that assassination should not be part of any program, but that "the subject was just dropped" after his objection. (McCone, p. ___). McCone's 1967 memorandum stated that

wh. did h

> "At no time did the suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augmented) nor by any individual responsible for policy." (McCone, Ex. 4).

(2) Testimony of Harvey

Harvey's testimony that the August 10 discussion was unrelated to any actual Castro assassination activity is discussed above (see p. ___). With respect to that discussion itself, Harvey testified that it was his recollection that the question of a Castro assassination was raised by Secretary McNamara. (Harvey, p. 30). Harvey said it was his impression that McNamara raised the question as one of "shouldn't we consider the elimination or assassination" of Castro. (Harvey, p. 30).

With respect to the reaction of the Special Group Augmented to this

---

(Footnote continued from the previous page.)

talk w/ anyone else

attempts, implicating President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy. After talking with Anderson on the telephone, at Robert Kennedy's request, McCone dictated the April 14, 1967 memorandum, which stated that at one of several Mongoose meetings on August 8, 9 or 10, 1962, "I recall a suggestion being made to liquidate top people in the Castro regime, including Castro." (McCone, Ex. 4, p. 1).

suggestion, Harvey testified:

> "I think the consensus of the Group was to sweep that particular proposal or suggestion or question or consideration off the record and under the rug as rapidly as possible. There was no extensive discussion of it, no discussion, no back and forth as the whys and wherefores and possibilities and so on."
> (Harvey, p. 30).

(3) Testimony of Goodwin

Goodwin testified that he had a recollection of "limited certainty" that the subject of a Castro assassination was raised at the August 10 meeting.*/

Goodwin testified that "I am unable to say with any certainty who it was" who raised the subject of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting. (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8)**/

---

*/ In a staff interview prior to his testimony, Goodwin recalled the date of the meeting at which a Castro assassination was raised as falling in early 1961, after the Bay of Pigs. (Memorandum of Staff Interview with Goodwin, May 27, 1975, p. 2). After reviewing the Minutes of the August 10, 1962 meeting and the Lansdale and Harvey memoranda of August 13 and 14, respectively, Goodwin testified that he had "misplaced the date of the meeting in my own memory." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 7). In placing the incident on August 10, 1962, Goodwin stated

> "Now, of course, you know, it may not be. That's the best recollection I now have. It's a little better than the earlier one, but it's not certain." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 8).

**/In a magazine article in June 1975, Goodwin was quoted as stating that at one of the meetings of a White House task force on Cuba it was McNamara who "said that Castro's assassination was the only productive way of dealing with Cuba." (Branch and Crile, "The Kennedy Vendetta," Harpers, July, 1975, p. 61). In his testimony on July 18, 1975, Goodwin stated: "that's not an exact quote" in the article, and explained further: (Footnote continued on following page.)

(4) Testimony of McNamara

McNamara testified that, although he had no recollection of the question of a Castro assassination being raised at the August 10 meeting, he did express opposition to any assassination attempt or plan when he spoke with McCone several days after the August 10 meeting. (McNamara, p. 7,8). McNamara's testimony with respect to his conversation with McCone is discussed below with the testimony as to actions after the August 10 meeting.

b. Testimony as to Actions After the August 10, 1962 Meeting

(1) Testimony of McCone

McCone testified that he called McNamara after he received Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum and,

> "insisted that that Memorandum be withdrawn because no decision was made on this subject, and since no decision was made, then Lansdale was quite out of order in tasking the Central Intelligence Agency to consider the matter."*/

(Footnote continued from the previous page.)

> "I didn't tell (the author of the magazine article) that it was definitely McNamara, that very possibly it was McNamara. He asked me about McNamara's role, and I said it very well could have been McNamara." (Goodwin, 7/18, p. 33).

If Goodwin's recollection was as uncertain as he swore it was in his testimony, it is difficult to understand how he could have spoken in the terms he testified he did to the author of the magazine article, particularly in view of Goodwin's statement that "it's not a light matter to perhaps destroy a man's career on the basis of a fifteen year old memory of a single sentence that he might have said at a meeting without substantial certainty in your own mind /and/ I do not have that." (Goodwin, pp. 34-35).

*/ McCone's 1967 Memorandum stated:
"Immediately after the meeting, I called on Secretary McNamara personally and re-emphasized my position, in which he heartily agreed. I did this because Operation Mongoose--an interdepartmental affair--was under the operational control of (the Defense Department)...(McCone Ex. 4).

McCone also testified that McNamara agreed that the Lansdale Memorandum should be withdrawn for the same reason expressed by McCone, i.e. because the topic of a Castro assassination had not been given consideration by the Special Group Augmented. (McCone, p. 39).

(2) Testimony of Harvey

As discussed above (see p. ___) Harvey's Memorandum of August 14, 1962 states that upon receiving Lansdale's August 13 Memorandum, Harvey demanded that Lansdale excise the words referring to "liquidation of leaders." Harvey's Memorandum further stated that "the Special Group (Augmented) is not expecting any written comments or study on this point." This latter passage raises the issue whether Harvey meant to state that the Special Group Augmented authorized a Castro assassination plan or activity but that no written record should be made. In his testimony, Harvey clarified this point by stating that the Special Group did not express a desire to proceed with the suggestion of a Castro assassination:

> "Senator Schweiker:...was it understood in an unwritten way that (assassination) was to proceed?"
>
> "Mr. Harvey: Not to my knowledge, no.... If there was any unwritten understanding on the part of the members of the Special Group concerning this, other than what was said at the meeting, I do not know of it..." (Harvey, pp. 30-31).

NOT resp TO the pt -

Harvey further testified that shortly after the August 10 meeting, McCone told Harvey that he had called McNamara to state that assassiantion should not be discussed and that he had told McNamara that if he was involved in such matters, he might be excommunicated from his church. (Harvey, p. 25).

did Harvey FEEL - about relat w/ LATER ATTEMPTS

(3) Testimony of McNamara

McNamara testified that he did not recall any discussion of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting, but that he did express opposition to any assasssination attempt when McCone telephone him after Lansdale's August 13 memorandum was brought to McCone's attention. (McNamara, P. 7,8). McNamara stated that

> "I agreed with Mr. McCone that no such planning should be undertaken." (McNamara, p. 8).

McNamara stated further that

> "I have no knowledge or information about any other plans or preparations for a Castro assassination." (McNamara, p. 7).

(4) Testimony of Elder

Elder, a career CIA officer, served as McCone's Executive Assistant from May 1962 until McCone's departure from the Agency in April 1965. Elder testified that he was present when McCone telephone McNamara after the August 10 meeting. Elder stated that McCone told McNamara

> "the subject you just brought up, I think it is highly improper. I do not think it should be discussed. It is not an action that should ever be condoned. It is not proper for us to discuss, and I intend to have it expunged from the record." (Elder, p. 23).

Elder testified that this was the essence of the conversation but that he remembered "several exact phrases, like 'would not be condoned' and 'improper'". (Elder, pp. 23, 24).*/

---

*/ Elder, who stated he heard both McCone and McNamara's pact of the telephone conversation via a speaker phone, said that McNamara "just more or less accepted what Mr. McCone said without comment or rejoinder." (Elder, p. 24).

When Harvey later received Lansdale's August 13 memorandum, McCone spoke to Harvey in Elder's presence, and "McCone made his views quite clear in the same language and tone...that he used with Mr. McNamara." (Elder, p. 25). Elder testified that Harvey did not tell McCone that Harvey was engage in the Castro assassination effort at that time. (Elder, p. 25).

Elder also described a meeting he had with Helms in Elder's office shortly after the August 10 meeting to convey to Helms McCone's views regarding the subject of assassinations. Elder stated:

> "I told Mr. Helms that Mr. McCone had expressed his feeling to Mr. McNamara and Mr. Harvey that assassination could not be condoned and would not be approved. Furthermore, I conveyed Mr. McCone's statement that it would be unthinkable to record in writing any consideration of assassination because it left the impression that the subject had received serious consideration by governmental policymakers, which it had not. Mr. Helms responded, 'I understand.' The point is that I made Mr. Helms aware of the strength of Mr. McCone's opposition to assasination. I know that Mr. Helms could not have been under any misapprehension about Mr. McCone's feelings after this conversation." (Elder Affidavit, 8/__/75, p. ___).

(5) Testimony of Lansdale

Lansdale testified that he recalled that the subject of Castro's assassination surfaced at the August 10 meeting, but that the "consensus was ...hell no on this and there was a very violent reaction." (Lansdale, p. 20).

inconsistent w/explanation / If so minutes would have reflected

With respect to why he asked Harvey on August 13 for a Castro assasination plan, Lansdale testified:

> "Senator Baker: Why did you, three days later if they all said, hell no, /go/ ahead with it?"

> "General Lansdale:...the meeting at which they said that was still on a development of my original task, which was a revolt and an overthrow of a regime. At the same time, we were getting intelligence accumulating very quickly of something very different taking place in Cuba than we had expected, which was the Soviet technicians starting to come in and the possibilities of Soviet missiles being placed there... At that time, I thought it would be a possibility someplace down the road in which there would be some possible need to take action such as /assassination/."*/ (Lansdale, p. 21).

Lansdale stated that he had only one brief conversation with Harvey after the August 13 memorandum in which Harvey stated "he would look into it... see about developing some plans" but that was the last Lansdale ever heard of the matter. (Lansdale, p. 124). Lansdale stated that with the development of the Missile Crisis, Mongoose "was being rapidly shifted out of consideration" and thus "I wasn't pressing for answers... it was very obvious that another situation was developing that would be handled quite differently in Cuba." (Lansdale, P. 124).

Lansdale testified that he was "very certain" that a discussion of a Castro assassination plan or proposal never came up in his discussions with Robert Kennedy or with President Kennedy, and that he had originated the request to Harvey for plan without discussing the matter with anyone:

---

*/

> "Q:...Why, if it is true that assassination idea was turned down on August 10, you sent out your memo of August 13?"
>
> "General Lansdale:...I don't recall that thoroughly, I don't remember the reasons why I would."
>
> "Q: Is it your testimony that the August 10 meeting turned down assassinations as a subject to look into, and that you nevertheless asked Mr. Harvey to look into it?"
>
> "General Lansdale: I guess it is, yes. The way you put it to me now has me baffled about why I did it. I don't know." (Lansdale, pp. 123-124.

"Senator Baker:...did you originate this idea of laying on the CIA a requirement to report on the feasibility of the assassination of Castro or did someone else suggest that?"

"General Lansdale: I did, as far as I recall."

"Senator Baker: Who did you discuss it with before you laid on that requirement?"

"General Lansdale: I don't believe I discussed it with anyone."

"Senator Baker: Only with Harvey?"

"General Lansdale: Only with Harvey."

"Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Helms?"

"General Lansdale: I might have, and I don't believe that I did. I think it was just with Harvey."

"Senator Baker: Did you ever discuss it with Robert Kennedy?"

"General Lansdale: No, not that I recall."

"Senator Baker: With the President?"

"General Lansdale: No."
(Lansdale, pp. 19-20).

c. Testimony of News Reporters as to Lansdale's Comments on the August 10 Meeting

During the Committee's investigation, news reports concerning the August 10 meeting and Lansdale's request for a Castro assassination plan appeared in the press. Two of these reports were based on statements made by Lansdale to David Martin of the Associated Press and Jeremiah O'Leary of the Washington Star-News. In view of the apparent conflict between Lansdale's testimony to the Committee and what Lansdale was reported to have said to Martin and O'Leary, the Committee invited these reporters to testify as to Lansdale's statements to them. Martin testified under a subpoena issued by the Committee pursuant to Senate Resolution 21. O'Leary appeared voluntarily but stated the policy of his newspaper with regard to disclosing news sources precluded him from any comment going beyond that contained in a prepared statement he read under oath. O'Leary's statement declared that his news report "represents accurately my understanding of the relevant information I obtained from news sources." (O'Leary, page 5).

We discuss below Martin's testimony and the news reports as they compare to Lansdale's testimony.

(1) The Martin News Report

Martin's news report stated, in its lead paragraph:

> "Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale said Friday that acting on orders from President John F. Kennedy delivered through an intermediary, he developed plans for removing Cuban Premier Fidel Castro by any means including assassination." (Ex. 2 to Martin Affidavit)

Martin testified that this lead paragraph was accurate and that it was a conclusion which he drew based upon the totality of his interview on May 30, 1975 with Lansdale. (Martin, pp. 19-20) In contrast, Lansdale testified that, after reading Martin's report in the press, he told Martin "your first sentence is not only completely untrue, but there is not a single thing in your story that says it is true." (Lansdale, p. 65) As discussed above (see p. __), Lansdale testified that on his own initiative he had originated the request to Harvey without discussing the matter with anyone and that a Castro assassination plan never came up in his discussions with Robert Kennedy (or with President Kennedy).

In view of Martin's testimony that the lead paragraph of his report was a conclusion based on the totality of his interview with Lansdale, it should be noted that the remainder of Martin's story does not state that Lansdale was ordered by President Kennedy or Robert Kennedy to develop plans for a Castro assassination. The report quotes Lansdale as stating "I was working for the highest authority in the land...the President" and goes on to state that Lansdale said he did not deal directly with the President but "worked through" an intermediary more intimate to the President than Bundy.*/ It can be noted that the phrases "working for" and "working through" are not the same as the lead paragraph's conclusion that Lansdale was "acting on orders" to develop a Castro assassination plan.

Not Inconsist

In addition, subsequent paragraphs in the Martin report indicate that Lansdale said the decision to include assassination in his planning was Lansdale's own, as he testified it was to the Committee. Thus, the Martin report states Lansdale said that assassination was "one of the means he /Lansdale/ considered," that it was Lansdale's belief that assassination would not have been "incompatible" with his assignment, and that Lansdale said "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities."

---

*/ The Martin report states that Lansdale refused to provide this intermediary's name for the record. In respecting the confidentiality of news sources, the Committee did not seek to ask Martin what was said off the record to him in the course of his newsgathering efforts. (Martin, p. ____).

Moreover, in his testimony as to the conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975 that was the basis for his report, Martin said he did not specifically ask Lansdale if he had acted on orders with regard to an assassination plan, nor did Lansdale say he acted on orders. Rather, Martin asked Lansdale "who were you working for?"*/ When Martin did specifically ask Lansdale in a subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975 if he had acted on orders, Martin testified that Lansdale stated that he had not. In this subsequent conversation on June 4, 1975, Martin said he asked Lansdale specifically, "were you ever ordered by President Kennedy or any other Kennedy to draw up plans to assassinate Castro?" (Martin, p. 21). Martin testified that Lansdale replied "no" and that his orders were "very broad." (Martin, p. 21). Martin further testified that in this June 4 conversation he asked Lansdale whether "any assassination planning you did was done on your own initiative," and that Lansdale replied "yes." (Martin, p. 21). Martin stated that it was his belief that his June 4 conversation was at variance with Lansdale's statements to him on May 30, 1975. (Martin, p. 21). It may also be the case, based on Martin's testimony as to the differences between the questions he posed to Lansdale on May 30 and on June 4, 1975, that he and Lansdale may have misunderstood each other.

note
reation

---

*/ Martin testified that his conversation with Lansdale on May 30, 1975 involved two subjects: 1) "what were you (Lansdale) doing in August 1962" (Martin, p. 16), and 2) "who were you working for." (Martin, p. 17). Martin stated that in the first portion of the conversation dealing with Lansdale's activities in August 1962, Lansdale stated, according to Martin, "I just wanted to see if the U.S. had any such capabilities" and that this included "assassination" as well as other means of disposing of Castro. As to the second portion of the conversation, Martin stated he asked Lansdale "who were you working for" and Lansdale replied "on that project I was working for the highest authority in the land." (Martin, p. 18).

(2) The O'Leary Report

O'Leary's news report read as follows in its lead paragraphs:

> "Retired Maj. Gen. Edward G. Lansdale has named Robert F. Kennedy as the administration official who ordered him in 1962 to launch a CIA project to work out all feasible plans for "getting rid of" Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro.
>
> "Lansdale, in an interview with the Washington Star, never used the word "assassination" and said it was not used by Kennedy, then the attorney general.
>
> But he said there could be no doubt that "the project for disposing of Castro envisioned the whole spectrum of plans from overthrowing the Cuban leader to assassinating him."

O'Leary's report also stated that "Lansdale said he was contacted by Robert Kennedy in mid-summer of 1962...." In his appearance before the Committee, O'Leary pointed out that this reference to the mid-summer of 1962 modified the reference in the lead paragraph of his report. (O'Leary, p. 13).

In his testimony, Lansdale said he submitted a statement to the Washington Star stating that this report was "a distortion of my remarks." (Lansdale, p.61). Lansdale testified that he stated to the Washington Star that "perhaps someplace in the planning there is something about what to do with a leader who would threaten the lives of millions of Americans /with Soviet Missiles/...but I can say I never did receive any order from President Kennedy or from Robert Kennedy about taking action against Castro personally." (Lansdale, pp.61-62). Lansdale further testified that he told O'Leary that he did take orders from Robert Kennedy, but made clear that "it was on a very wide-ranging type of thing." (Lansdale, p.62). Lansdale testified as follows concerning his statement to the Star following the O'Leary report:

> "After the story appeared, the... Washington Star asked me what wide-ranging things were you talking about?
>
> "I said there were economic matters and military matters and military things and they were very wide-ranging things. I said perhaps all O'Leary was thinking of was assassination. I was thinking of far wider than that." (Lansdale, pp.62-63)

O'Leary's report makes clear that Lansdale did not state that Robert Kennedy instructed Lansdale to develop an assassination plan. The O'Leary report states:

> "Lansdale said he is certain Robert Kennedy's instructions to him did not include the word "assassination." He said the attorney general, as best he could recall, spoke in more general terms of exploring all feasible means and practicalities of doing something "to get rid of" Castro.

In view of the above, it appears that although he may have been imprecise in his conversations with O'Leary and Martin, Lansdale nevertheless did not tell them that he was ordered to develop an assassination plan by Robert Kennedy or the President. As discussed above (see p. ____), Lansdale testified that he never discussed a Castro assassination with President Kennedy or with Robert Kennedy. Lansdale's reported statements that he was ordered to plan to "get rid of Castro by all feasible means" is also consistent with Lansdale's testimony, as well as that of the other witnesses, with respect to the objective of the Mongoose operation. As discussed above in section ______, however, it was the testimony of all witnesses except Helms that such statements did not include assassination. Lansdale's statements to O'Leary and Martin appear consistent with his sworn testimony that it was his own idea to request an assassination plan from Harvey and that he did not discuss this idea with anyone except Harvey. (see p. ____above). With respect to this latter point, however, it is a fact that Lansdale's request for an assassination plan followed almost immediately after the August 10 meeting, where the question of a Castro assassination was raised. Hence, it is not unreasonable to conclude that the raising of the question of a Castro assassination at the August 10 meeting prompted Lansdale to request an assassination plan (although it was the finding of the IG Report as well as the testimony of Harvey that the August 10 meeting had no relation to the question of authorization for the 1962 assassination plot).

porate Helms testimony on 9/12/75)

R1080

TOP SECRET

H. The Question of Authorization for the 1963 Assassination Plot

1. The 1963 Assassination Plot

This section discusses the specific question of authorization above the Agency for the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH on November 22, 1963, and reviews certain policies of the Kennedy Administration during 1963 which are relevant to that question.*/ (The facts relating to the poison pen plot are set out at pp. ___ above).

2. The Issue of Authority

Much of the testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members discussed in the preceding section (see pp. ___ to ___) is relevant to the question of authorization for the 1963 assassination activity. Once again there was no evidence that anyone above the Agency was informed about or specifically authorized the plot.

As in the case of the 1962 assassination plot, however, Helms testified that he believed the 1963 assassination activity was permissible in view of his perception of continuing pressure exerted by the Administration to overthrow Castro /and his perception that there were no limits placed on the means that could be used to achieve Castro's downfall. (Helms, 9/11/75, pp. 11-13)./

The testimony of Helms and the Kennedy Administration members on the issue of whether the pressure to overthrow Castro made assassination permissible without a direct order is discussed in detail in the preceding section and is not repeated here. Before turning to Helms' specific testimony relating to AM/LASH (including his view that AM/LAsh was not seen as a potential assassin) we discuss below the Kennedy Administration Cuba policy in 1963. In

---

*/The evidence showed that the "science-fiction" devices of an exploding sea shell and a poison diving suit were abandoned at the laboratory stage within the CIA and that no authorization was sought for their development or eventual use. Hence, the focus in this section is on the activity involving the delivery of the poison pen to AM/LASH.

TOP SECRET

general, the 1963 covert action program and pressure was less intense than it had been in 1962.

3. The Kennedy Administration's Policy Towards Cuba in 1963

(a) Organization

The Mongoose Operation was disbanded following the Cuban Missile Crisis. An interagency "Cuban Coordinating Committee" was established within the State Department with responsibility for developing covert action proposals. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.) The review and approval function was taken from the Special Group Augmented (which passed out of existence) and was placed under the Special Group, chaired by Bundy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 148.)

U.S. policy towards Cuba in 1963 was also treated in the National Security Council's Standing Group, the successor to the Executive Committee which had dealt with the Missile Crisis. Members of the Standing Group included Robert Kennedy, McNamara, McCone, Bundy and Sorensen.

We discuss below four aspects of the Kennedy Administration's 1963 Cuba policy. These are: (1) the Standing Group's discussion of possible developments in the event of Castro's death; (2) the Standing Group's discussion of policy options; (3) the covert action program approved by the Special Group; and (4) the diplomatic effort to explore the possibility of reestablishing relations with Castro. The first three of these took place in the Spring or early Summer of 1963; the fourth aspect -- the effort to communicate with Castro -- took place at the same time as the 1963 assassination activity.

(b) The Discussion of the Contingency of Castro's Death

In the Spring of 1963, the Standing Group discussed contingency planning in the event of Castro's death. The documentary evidence and testimony indicated that Castro's death was discussed as a contingency which might occur independent of U.S. action. The Group found that the possibilities for favorable developments to the United States should Castro die were "singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of Standing Group Meeting, May 28, 1963, p. 1).

The discussion stemmed from a memorandum by Bundy which discussed "possible new directions" for U.S. Cuban policy. (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963). The memorandum distinguished between (i) events which might occur independently of U.S. action and (ii) steps the U.S. might "initiate". (Bundy memorandum, p. 2.)

When the Standing Group discussed the Bundy memorandum, Robert Kennedy proposed a study of the "measures we would take following contingencies such as the death of Castro or the shooting down of a U-2." (Bundy Ex. 6E, Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting, April 23, 1963, p. 2). The downing of a U-2 had been listed in the Bundy memorandum as a subject for contingency planning under the category of steps for which the U.S. must "await events" as distinguished from "initiate actions".

Bundy's follow-up memorandum, an agenda for a further Standing Group discussion of Cuban policy, listed the subject of a

Castro death contingency under a category comprising subjects not involving U.S. initiatives, e.g., "occurrence of revolt or repression in the manner of Hungary", attributable interference by Castro in other countries", and "the reintroduction of offensive weapons". (Bundy Ex. 6-G, 4/29/63).

After the meeting of April 23, 1963, the Standing Group assigned to CIA's Office of National Estimates*/ the task of estimating possible developments if Castro should die. (Bundy Ex. 6-H, Memorandum for Members of the Standing Group, May 2, 1963).

The resulting paper analyzed the various forces which would come into play in Cuba after Castro's death, including the likely behavior of Castro's top aides, Raul Castro and Che Guevara, as well as possible Soviet reaction. (Bundy Ex. 6-I, Draft Memorandum by Office of National Estimates titled "Developments in Cuba and Possible U.S. Actions in the Event of Castro's Death", pp. 2-5, hereafter called the "ONE paper"). The ONE Paper concluded that "the odds are that upon Castro's death, his brother Raul or some other figure in the regime would, with Soviet backing and help, take over control".**/

---

*/The Office of National Estimates is the research division of the CIA responsible for analyzing foreign intelligence. The Office is not part of the CIA's covert operations organization.

**/The ONE Paper also saw little chance that a government disposed towards the United States would be able to come to power without extensive U.S. military support: "Anti-Moscow Cuban nationalists would require extensive U.S. help in order to win, and probably U.S. military intervention." (Bundy Ex. 6-I, p. ii).

TOP SECRET

In addition, the ONE Paper warned that the United States would most likely be blamed if Castro should die by another's hand. "If Castro were to die by other than natural causes the U.S. would be widely charged with complicity, even though it is widely known that Castro has many enemies". (Bundy Ex. 6-I, p. 4.)

The ONE Paper also identified a number of possible U.S. actions in the event of Castro's death, ranging along a spectrum that included no U.S. initiatives, action to support a government in exile, quarantine and blockade, and outright invasion. (Bundy Ex. 6-I, pp. 7-12.)

On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group discussed the ONE Paper. The Standing Group found that "all of the courses of action [open to the U.S. should Castro die] were singularly unpromising". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1).

Bundy agreed that the Standing Group "certainly posed the question" in the Spring of 1963 as to what would happen if Castro died or were killed. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 130.) But he testified that he had no recollection of a Castro assassination being on the minds of Standing Group members when they discussed this contingency. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 14.)*/

---

*/As indicated above p.), Bundy did recall that over the period 1961 and 1963 "the subject of a Castro assassination was mentioned from time to time by different individuals", but said that he was not aware of "much discussion in the Spring of 1963 on that subject". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 140.)

Bundy testified, however, that one reason for getting an estimate of this kind was to get it on record that we should not be "fussing" with questions of assassination and that it was not a sound policy. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 142.)

Bundy further testified that it was not unusual to assess the implications of a foreign leader's possible death, giving the cases of Stalin and DeGaulle as examples. In the case of Castro, Bundy said he felt it was only prudent to attempt to assess the question of a post-Castro Cuba since Castro was such a "dominant figure". (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 145.)

(c) The Standing Group's Discussion of U.S. Policy Towards Cuba

The Standing Group's documents indicate it continued to assume the desirability of harassment, but recognized there were few practical measures the U.S. could take that were likely to achieve Castro's overthrow.

In his April 21, 1963 memorandum on "Cuban Alternatives" Bundy identified three possible new alternatives: (1) forcing "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means", (2) insisting on "major but limited ends", or (3) moving "in the direction of a gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro". (Bundy Memorandum to the Standing Group, April 21, 1963, p. 3.) These alternatives were discussed at Standing Group meetings on April 23 and May 28, 1963.

TOP SECRET

Sorensen, who participated in these meetings, testified that the "widest possible range of alternatives" were discussed, but that "assassination was not even on the list". (Sorensen, 7/21/75, p. 4.) He said that consideration of possible options such as forcing "a non-Communist solution in Cuba by all necessary means" did not encompass assassination:

> "[this] could not have included or implied assassination. Instead, it expressly referred to 'the development of pressures' and 'gradual escalation of the confrontation in Cuba' to produce an overthrow of the regime, including 'a willingness to use military force to invade Cuba'. Such a course was obviously not adopted by the President, and in any event expressed an approach far different from assassination". (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75, p. 4).*/

The record of the first Standing Group discussion of Bundy's memorandum shows that a number of alternatives were discussed (none of which involved assassination) but no conclusions were reached.

On May 28, 1963, the Standing Group met again. McCone argued for steps to "increase economic hardship" in Cuba, supplemented by sabotage to "create a situation in Cuba in which it would be possible to subvert military leaders to the point of their acting to overthrow Castro". (Summary Record of NSC Standing Group Meeting No. 7/63, May 28, 1963, p. 1.) McNamara said that sabotage would not be "conclusive" and suggested study of "economic pressures which could upset Castro." Robert Kennedy said "the U.S. must do something against Castro, even though we do not believe our actions would bring him down". (Id., p. 2) In conclusion, Bundy summarized by stating that the task was "to decide now what actions we would take against Castro, acknowledging that the measures practical for us to take will not result in his overthrow". (Id., p. 2.)

---

*/ The Bundy memorandum also used the phrase "all necessary measures" to describe the steps the U.S. was willing to take to "prevent" a direct military threat to the U.S. or to the Western Hemisphere from Cuba. Sorensen explained the meaning of this phrase in the context of the April 23 discussion of Kennedy Administration policy.

> "[this phrase] could not by any stretch of semantics or logic have included assassination or any other initiative. It reflected the purely defensive posture implemented six months earlier when long-range missiles and other offensive weapons were placed in Cuba." (Sorensen affidavit, 7/25/75, p. 4.)

(d) The Special Group's Authorization of a Sabotage Program Against Cuba

During the first six months of 1963, little, if any, sabotage activity against Cuba was undertaken.*/ However, on June 19, 1963, following the Standing Group's discussion of Cuba policy in the Spring, President Kennedy approved a Cuba sabotage program.**/ (Memorandum for the Special Group, 6/19/63, p. 1.)

---

*/ At an April 3, 1963 meeting on Cuba, Bundy stated that no sabotage operations were then underway because the Special Group "had decided . . . that such activity is not worth the effort expended on it." (Memorandum of Meeting on Cuba, 4/3/63, p. 1).

**/ The sabotage program approved on June 19, 1963 was directed at "four major segments of the Cuban economy", (1) electric power; (2) petroleum refineries and storage facilities; (3) railroad and highway transportation and (4) production and manufacturing. (Memorandum for the Special Group, June 19, 1963, p. 1) Operations under this program were to be conducted by CIA-controlled Cuban agents from a U.S. island off Florida and it was to complement a similar effort designed to "develop internal resistance elements which could carry out sabotage." (Id., p. 2.)

In contrast to the Mongoose program, which sought to build toward an eventual internal revolt, the 1963 covert action program had a more limited objective, i.e., "to nourish a spirit of resistance and disaffection which could lead to significant defections and other byproducts of unrest". (Id., p. 2.)

After the initial approval, particular intelligence and sabotage operations were submitted to the Special Group for specific prior authorization. On October 3, 1963, the Special Group approved nine operations in Cuba, including several sabotage operations. And on October 24, 1963, thirteen major sabotage operations were approved to be undertaken in the period November 1963 through January 1964, including the sabotage of an electric power plant, an oil refinery, and a sugar mill. (Memorandum, July 11, 1975, CIA Review Staff to Select Committee, on "Approved CIA Covert Operations into Cuba.").

(e) The Diplomatic Effort to Explore an Accommodation With Castro

As early as January 4, 1963, Bundy proposed to President Kennedy that the possibility of communicating with Castro be explored. (Bundy Ex. 6, Memorandum to the President, January 4, 1963, p. 3.) Bundy's memorandum on "Cuba Alternatives" to the Standing Group on April 23, 1963, also listed the "gradual development of some form of accommodation with Castro" among policy alternatives. (Bundy memorandum, p. 3).

TOP SECRET

And, at a meeting on June 3, 1963, the Special Group agreed it would be a "useful endeavor" to explore "various possibilities of establishing channels of communication to Castro". (Memorandum of Special Group meeting, June 6, 1963, p. 2).

In the Fall of 1963, William Atwood was a Special Advisor to the U.S. Delegation to the United Nations with the rank of Ambassador. (Atwood, 7/10/75, p. 3.) Atwood testified that during the period of September-November, 1963, he held a series of talks with the Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations to discuss opening negotiations on an accommodation between Castro and the United States. (Atwood, pp. 5-9.)

Atwood testified that at the outset he informed Robert Kennedy, who told him that the effort "was worth pursuing".(Atwood,p.6). Atwood said he regularly reported on the talks to the White House and to his superior at the United Nations, Adlai Stevenson. (Atwood pp. 6-7.) Atwood further stated that he was told by Bundy that President Kennedy was in favor of "pushing towards an opening toward Cuba" to take Castro "out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal". (Atwood, p.7-8 .)

Atwood stated that he believed the only people who knew of his contacts with the Cubans were the President, Harriman, Stevenson, Robert Kennedy, Bundy, Bundy's assistant, and journalist Lisa Howard. (Howard had initially placed Atwood in contact with the Cuban Ambassador after reporting to Atwood that during a trip to Cuba she had learned Castro was anxious to establish communications with the United States. Thereafter Howard served as an intermediary in arranging Atwood's meetings with the Cubans. (Atwood, pp. 4, 18)).

Atwood also testified that he arranged for a French journalist, Jean Daniel, to visit the White House prior to Daniel's scheduled trip to see Castro. (Atwood, p. 19.) (According to an article by Daniel in December, 1963, Daniel met with President Kennedy on October 24, 1963. They discussed the prospects for reestablishing U.S.-Cuba relations and President Kennedy asked Daniel to report back to him after seeing Castro.)*/

Atwood's efforts reached their high point on November 18, 1963, when Atwood spoke by telephone with a member of Castro's staff in Cuba. (Atwood, p. 8). Pursuant to White House instructions, Atwood informed Castro's staff member that the U.S. favored preliminary negotiations at the U.N. (rather than in Cuba as proposed by the Cubans), and that the U.S. desired to work out an agenda for these talks. (Atwood, pp. 8-9). After receiving Atwood's report on this conversation, Bundy told Atwood that after the Cuban agenda was received, President Kennedy wanted to see Atwood to "decide what to say and whether to go or what we should do next". (Id., p. 9.) Four days later, on November 22, 1963, (the same day AM/LASH was given the poison pen), Jean Daniel was meeting with Castro. On that same day, President Kennedy was assassinated. With the change of Administrations, Atwood's talks with the Cubans became less frequent and eventually ended in early 1964. (Atwood, p. 10.)

---

*/ Daniel, Unofficial Envoy: A Historic Report from Two Capitals, (New Republic, December 14, 1963). Daniel was with Castro when Castro received the report of President Kennedy's assassination. Daniel, When Castro Heard the News, (New Republic, December 7, 1963).

4. Testimony on the Question of Authorization for the AM/LASH Poison Pen Device

(a) Testimony of Helms

(i) The October 29 Meeting and the Use of Robert Kennedy's Name Without Obtaining His Approval

As discussed above in detail (see pp.), Fitzgerald met with AM/LASH on October 29, 1963, in a foreign capital. Fitzgerald represented to AM/LASH that he was the personal representative of Robert Kennedy, and gave AM/LASH assurances of full support should AM/LASH succeed in overthrowing Castro.

The IG Report states that, according to Fitzgerald, Helms and Fitzgerald discussed the planned meeting with AM/LASH and Helms decided "it was not necessary to seek approval from Robert Kennedy for Fitzgerald to speak in his name". (IG, pp. 88-89). In his testimony, Helms stated he did not recall such a discussion with Fitzgerald, but that he believed he had pre-existing authority to deal with AM/LASH with respect to "a change in government"(as opposed to assassination) and that this made it unnecessary to obtain Robert Kennedy's approval.*/ "I felt so sure that if I went to see Mr. Kennedy that he would have

---

*/The following exchange occurred in Helms' testimony:

> "Sen. Hart of Michigan: Dealing with respect to what? A change in government, or assassination?"
> Mr. Helms: A change in government, Senator Hart. This is what we were trying to do. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132)

TOP SECRET

said yes, that I didn't think there was any need to." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 132.)

Helms said his view was that AM/LASH was a political action agent, not a potential assassin, and that the meeting with AM/LASH and his decision not to contact Robert Kennedy should be viewed in that light:

> "...given this Cuban of his standing and all the history...of trying to find someone inside Cuba who might head a government and have a group to replace Castro...this was so central to the whole theme of everything we had been trying to do, that I find it totally unnecessary to ask Robert Kennedy at that point (whether) we should go ahead with this. This is obviously what he had been pushing, what everybody had been pushing for us to try to do...let's get on with doing it. (Helms, 6/13/75, pp. 117-118), */

(ii) The Delivery of the Poison Pen on November 22

While Helms stated that the delivery of a poison pen to AM/LASH was not part of an assassination plot, Helms testified

---

*/As discussed above (see pp. ___), there was conflicting testimony from CIA officers as to whether they viewed AM/LASH as an assassin and as to the purpose of giving him the poison pen. The documentary evidence, however, indicates that AM/LASH in 1963 was intent upon assassinating Castro, that the CIA officers knew of this, and, in addition to offering a poison pen, told AM/LASH they would supply him with high powered rifles with telescopic sights. (see p. ___, above).

Helms testified that because Amlash 'was the asset we were looking for, (w)e didn't want him to blow himself or blow anything else by getting involved in something like this [assassination] and have it fail. We wanted him to stay in place." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 131). Helms stated that "at no time was it the idea of [the AM/LASH-1] case officers, or those people in the chain behind, to use [AM/LASH-1] to assassinate Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135).

Helms further stated "...there was an enormous amount of temporizing with this fellow to keep him on the team, to keep him working away at this job, but to try and persuade him that this was not the way to go about it." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 135). Helms testified that AM/LASH-1 was given the poison pen "because he was insisting on something and this was a temporizing gesture rather than giving him some kind of a gun he had asked for...." (Helms, 6/13, p. 135).

that he believed Castro's assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority. /(Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12)./ As in the case of the 1962 plots, Helms based this on the vigor of the Administration's policy towards Cuba /and his perception that there were no limits put on the means that could be used in the effort against Castro. (Helms, 9/12/75, pp. 11-12). Thus,/ Helms testified that after the missile crisis the U.S. continued to conduct covert actions whose purpose was "to overthrow Castro." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 24.) /Helms was asked whether it was his opinion that the offer of the poison pen to AM/LASH was authorized because it came within the scope of the 1963 program against Castro. Helms responded:

> /"I think the only way I know how to answer that is that I do not recall when things got cranked up in 1963 any dramatic changes or limitations being put on this operation. There was still an effort by whatever device, and perhaps only slightly differently oriented at this time, to try to get rid of Castro...But I do not recall specific things being said, now, (we are not) going to do this, we're not going to do that, and we're not going to do the other thing, and we will do just these things."/

(b) Testimony of Administration Officials

As with the Mongoose period, the Administration officials agreed that they were not informed about any assassination plot and that there was no order that Castro be assassinated. Again, they disagreed with Helms' position that an assassination plot could be undertaken without express authority. The only added part relating to the AM/LASH plot was certain testimony which asserted that it was inconceivable that the President would have approved an assassination plot at the very same time he had authorized talks to explore the possibility of improved relations with Castro.*/

---

*/Rusk testified that "I find it extraordinarily difficult to believe" and that "I just can't conceive" President Kennedy would have authorized the passage of an assassination device for use against Castro while Atwood was exploring the possibility

Since Helms did not claim any higher specific authorization for or knowledge of the AM/LASH assassination plot, however, the additional issue posed by that testimony does not really arise.

(continued)

of normalizing relations with Castro. (Rusk, 7/10/75, p. 85). Similarly, Bundy testified he "absolutely" did not believe President Kennedy would have authorized or permitted an assassination device to have been passed at the same time a possible rapprochment with Castro was being pursued. (Bundy, 7/11/75, p. 151).

On the other hand, when the possibility of exploring better relations with Castro was initially raised (but before any talks were begun) Bundy indicated that it could be explored on a "separate track" while other proposed actions, such as sabotage, were going on. (Agenda for Special Group meeting of 4/29/63, p. 2.)

d. The Question of Authorization in the Johnson Administration

1. Summary of the Assassination Activity. As discussed above (see pp. ______), the Agency delivered arms to AM/LASH in Cuba in March and June 1964. In early 1965 after AM/LASH became more insistent that a Castro assassination was necessary and had asked for a silenced weapon, the Agency put AM/LASH in contact with the leader of an anti-Castro group, B-1, with the intention that AM/LASH obtain such a weapon. Thereafter, the Agency learned that AM/LASH had received a silencer and other special equipment from B-1 and was preparing to assassinate Castro.

2. The Issue of Authorization. The issue of authority in the Johnson Administration is similar to that in the Kennedy Administration. During this phase of the AM/LASH plot, Helms continued as Deputy Director for covert operations, and the principal members of the Kennedy Administration continued in their positions in the relevant period of the Johnson Administration (Robert Kennedy left the Administration in the midst of this period, on _______).* Helms' testimony that he believed a Castro assassination was within the scope of the CIA's authority in view of Administration policy towards Cuba applied to the AM/LASH operation in both 1963 and 1964-65. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 137-138.) Again, there was no evidence that McCone or anyone above the Agency specifically authorized or knew about the 1964-65 plot. We discuss below four other matters occurring during the Johnson Administration: (1) the covert action program against Cuba in 1964-1965; (2) the Special Groups' action in investigating reports of Cuban exile underworld

---

*Rusk (Secretary of State), McNamara (Secretary of Defense), McCone (Director of Central Intelligence); and Bundy (Special Assistant for National Security and Chairman of the Special Group).

plots to assassinate Castro; (3) Helms' report to Rusk that CIA was not involved with AM/LASH in a Castro assassination plot; and (4) Helms' briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 IG Report on alleged CIA assassination plots.

3. The Covert Action Program Against Cuba in 1964-1965. According to the minutes of a Special Group meeting on April 7, 1964, which he chaired, President Johnson decided to discontinue the use of CIA-controlled sabotage raids against Cuba.* (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. ___.) A memorandum by McCone indicated that in deciding this question, President Johnson abandoned the objective of Castro's overthrow.**

At the April 7, Special Group meeting, Rusk had emphasized his opposition to the use of sabotage raids, stating his belief that they were unproductive, and had a "high noise level" that called attention to them. In addition, Rusk stated that "he suspects the Cuban exiles who actually conduct the raids of possible wishing to leave fingerprints pointing to U. S. involvement in order to increase that involvement." (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, page 2.)

---

*A memorandum by Bundy on April 7, 1964, listed seven aspects of the covert action program which had been in effect. These were: (1) collection of intelligence; (2) covert propaganda to encourage low risk forms of active and passive resistance; (3) cooperation with other agencies in economic denial; (4) attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements inside Cuba; (5) indirect economic sabotage; (6) CIA-controlled sabotage raiding; and (7) autonomous operations. (Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group, April 7, 1964, p. 1-2.)

**At the April 7, 1964, meeting Rusk and Bundy opposed continuation of sabotage actions by CIA-controlled assets as "unproductive" and impractical. McCone disagreed, noting that the covert action program relied on a "well-planned series of sabotage efforts". (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, April 7, 1964, p. 3.) In this connection, Bundy noted that since the approval of the current sabotage in June 1963 "policymakers...had turned sabotage operations on and off to such an extent that (the sabotage program) simply does not, in the nature of things, appear feasible". (Id., p. 2.)

SENSITIVE

4. The Special Group Investigation of Reported Castro Assassination Plots by Cuban Exiles. On June 10, 1964, Helms informed McCone by memorandum that Agency officials had learned of several plots of Cuban exiles to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders. (Memorandum, Helms to McCone, June 10, 1964.) Several of the plots, according to the memorandum, involved "people apparently associated with the Mafia". Reportedly the exiles had offered people associated with the Mafia $150,000 to perform the deed. In his memorandum, Helms stated that the sources of the reports were parties to the plots and in submitting the information to Agency officers were presumably seeking legal immunity should the plots succeed. (Id., p. 1.)

Helms' memorandum, however, made no mention of any of the CIA assassination plots against Castro.*

(Footnote continued from previous page.)

In a memorandum the day after President Johnson's decision to stop CIA-controlled sabotage operations, McCone stated: "the real issue to be considered at the meeting and by the President was a question of whether we wished to implement the policy (outlined in certain memoranda) or abandon the basic objective of bringing about the liquidation of the Castro Communist entourage and the elimination of Communist presence in Cuba and thus rely on future events of an undisclosed nature which might accomplish this objective". (Memorandum by McCone, April 8, 1964, p. ___.)

In the context of the Special Group's discussion, McCone's use of the words "liquidation" and "elimination" appears to be another example of inartful language. A literal interpretation of these words leaves one with the impression that assassination was contemplated. But the context of the discussion does not bear out such an interpretation. Thus in specifying what he meant by "future events of an undisclosed nature" McCone pointed to "extreme economic distress caused by a sharp drop in sugar prices", and "other external factors". (Id, p. 8.) McCone testified that such references as the "elimination" or "liquidation" of the Castro regime did not refer to assassination. (McCone, p. ___.)

**Moreover, according to Bundy, no one from the CIA or anyone else informed him at the meetings that "in earlier years there had been a relationship with...persons allegedly involved with the criminal syndicate--in order to accomplish the assassination of Fidel Castro". (Bundy, p. 71.)

SENSITIVE

Indeed, it stated that "Agency officers made clear to each of the sources that the United States Government would not under any circumstances, condone the planned actions". (Id., p. 1.)

When the Special Group considered the information in Helms memorandum on June 18, 1964, McCone stated he was "somewhat skeptical" and proposed additional investigation, but "others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the U. S. was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention". (Memorandum of Special Group Meeting, June 18, 1964.) In a memorandum on the June 18 meeting, McCone indicated he had dissented from the Special Group's decision, stating his belief that the Special Group was "overly exercised" and that he was inclined to dismiss the matter as 'Miami cocktail party talk". McCone noted, however, that the Special Group "was more concerned than I and therefore planning to discuss the subject with the Attorney General and possibly Mr. Hoover". (Memorandum June 18, 1964, p. 1.)

The Special Group decided that the reports be transmitted to the Attorney General "as a matter of law enforcement". (Id.) Robert Kennedy was informed of this matter a few days later and stated that the Justice Department would investigate. (Memorandum of Meeting, 22 June 1964.) Thereafter the FBI conducted an investigation, the results of which were submitted to the Special Group on August 19, 1964, by McCone.* (Memorandum, August 19, 1964, McCone to Bundy.)

---

*McCone's memorandum summarized seven FBI reports on its investigation. The FBI found that several of the persons it interviewed stated they had knowledge of the exile's plots and had reported the information to the CIA. Others interviewed denied knowledge of the plans.

5. Helms' Report to Rusk that CIA was not Involved with Amlash in a Castro Assassination Plot

In March 1966, Helms reported to Rusk by memorandum on the CIA's relations with Amlash. (Rusk Ex. 7, Memorandum, March 7, 1966, Helms to Rusk). In this report, Helms stated that the CIA's contact with Amlash was for "the express purpose" of intelligence collection. (Id.). Noting Cuban press claims that Amlash and a second Cuban had been involved with the CIA in a Castro assassination plot, Helms stated:

> The Agency was not involved with either of these two men in a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, as claimed in /a Cuban news release/ nor did it ever encourage either of these two persons to attempt such an act. (Rusk Ex. 7, p. 1).

The Helms memorandum to Rusk made no mention of the fact that CIA officers, with Helms' knowledge, had offered a poison pen to Amlash on November 22, 1963, that CIA had supplied arms to Amlash in 1964, or that CIA had put Amlash in touch with B-1 to enable him to obtain a silenced weapon to assassinate Castro.

In his testimony, Helms stated that this memorandum to Rusk was "inaccurate" and "not truthful". (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)

The CIA's copy of the Helms' memorandum to Rusk contains a typed notation in which Helms' signature was recommended by the CIA's then Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines. (Rusk Ex. 7, p. 2.) Helms testified that the day before his June 13, 1975, testimony to the Committee he had asked Karamessines why the memorandum to Rusk had been written as it was. Helms stated he and Karamessines concluded they did not know the reason but Helms speculated that "it may be until we conducted (the 1967 IG investigation) somewhat later we didn't have the facts straight, or maybe we had the facts straight then but we did not have them straight later". (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 115.)

6. Helms' Briefing of President Johnson on the 1967 Inspector General's Report. Drew Pearson's article in the spring of 1967 alleging U. S. involvement in plots to assassinate Fidel Castro prompted President Johnson to request Helms, who by then had become the DCI, to conduct an investigation. The result was the Inspector General's Report of May 23, 1967. (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 35.) After receiving the report, Helms briefed the President "orally about the contents". (Id. at 36.) During his testimony, Helms was shown his handwritten notes apparently prepared for his briefing of the President. Those notes carried the story through mid-1963. When asked if he told President Johnson that, according to the 1967 study, the efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro had continued into Johnson's presidency, Helms replied, "I just can't answer that, I just don't know. I can't recall having done so". (Id. at 38.) He did note that it would not have occurred to him to brief President Johnson on the 1964 AM/LASH gun deliveries because "I don't think one would have approached the AM/LASH thing as an assassination plot against Castro". (Id. at 39.) Helms had testified that AM/LASH was an intelligence and political action agent. (Helms, ____, p. ____.) The IG Report however, treated the AM/LASH operation as an assassination plot. (IG, p. ____-___.)

7. Helms Testimony on Authorization in the Johnson Administration. In his testimony, Helms was asked if the Agnecy regarded "whatever marching orders they had obtained prior to the dealth of President Kennedy as still being valid and operative" when President Johnson succeeded to the office. Helms replied:

> This is not very clear to me at this stage. A lot of the same officers were serving President Johnson as they served President Kennedy, and...I can't recall anymore whether there was any specific issue about whether this was taken up with President Johnson at any meeting or any session. If it had been, I would have thought there would have been records someplace." (Helms, 6/13, p. 139.)

When asked whether President Johnson had been informed of or had authorized continuing efforts to assassinate Castro, Helms replied indirectly that "the Special Group would have continued to consider these matters, and I would have assumed that whoever was chairing the Special Group would have in turn reported to the President, which was the usual practice". (Id.)

But the records of the Special Group do not show any consideration of a Castro assassination or of the AM/LASH plot during the Johnson Administration (or earlier). And, as discussed above, there was no evidence that McCone or anyone above the Agency was informed of or specifically authorized the AM/LASH plots.

Agreed to by Subcommittee 10/10/75
Pending (1) Rewrite per Subcommittee
Editing and (2) Insertion of
Gottlieb and Tweedy Testimony

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

D. CONGO 1

1. Introduction 1

2. Dulles Cabled Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters" 3

3. CIA Encouraged Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" Lumumba, Who Was Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even After Being Deposed and Placed in U.N. Protective Custody 8

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba 14

    (a) Dulles Cabled Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba, and a Messenger Was Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment 15

    (b) Gottlieb Delivered Lethal Substance to Hedgman in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba: September 1960 18

    (c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba 22

    (d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It 24

    (e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination Plot 31

        (i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from Headquarters 31

        (ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot 34

Page

(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination Plot 41

(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison Lumumba 41

(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba for the Purpose of Assassination 44

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether the Assassination Operation Had Moved from Planning to Implementation But it Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to the Congo 48

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo 52

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo 53

(i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation 53

(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960 54

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Asked O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination Operation 59

(iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station Safe 60

(v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego 65

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960 67

Page

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE 72

(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960 74

6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga 79

(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960 79

(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed: January 17, 1960 81

7. The Question of the Level at Which the Assassination Plot Was Authorized 82

(a) High-Level Meetings at Which "Getting Rid of Lumumba" is Discussed 84

(i) Dillon Testified That the Question of Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960 84

(ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the President Order Lumumba's Assassination at an NSC Meeting 88

(iii) The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Lead the Special Group to Consider Anything That Might Get Rid of Lumumba and Dulles Cables for Lumumba's Removal: August 25-26, 1960 101

(iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until "Disposed Of" 106

(b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of Assassination 110

(c) Richard Bissell Testified That He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized By President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles 114

DRAFT: OCTOBER 6, 1975
Frederick D. Baron

TOP SECRET
For Internal Committee Use Only

D. CONGO

1. Introduction

The Committee has received solid evidence of a CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The plot proceeded to the point where lethal substances and instruments specifically intended for use in an assassination were placed in the hands of the CIA Chief of Station in Leopoldville by an Agency scientist.

Although these instruments of assassination were never used, a number of questions are presented by the Lumumba case which reflect general issues that run throughout the Committee's assassination inquiry. First, did CIA officers and operatives in the Congo take steps to attempt the assassination of Lumumba?

Second, how high in the United States government was the source of authorization for the CIA assassination plot? Finally, was the CIA connected in any way to the events that actually led to the death of Lumumba while in Congolese custody?

A thread of historical background is necessary to weave these broad questions together with the documents and testimony received by the Committee.

In the summer of 1960, there was a great deal of concern at the highest levels in the United States government about the role of Patrice Lumumba in the Congo.* Lumumba, who served briefly as Premier of the newly independent nation, was viewed with alarm by United States foreign policymakers because of what they perceived as his magnetic public appeal and his leanings toward the Soviet Union.

Under the leadership of Lumumba and the new President, Joseph Kasavubu, the Congo declared its independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960. In the turbulent month that followed, Lumumba threatened to invite Soviet troops to hasten the withdrawal of Belgian armed forces. The United Nations Security Council requested a Belgian withdrawal and dispatched a neutral force to the Congo to preserve order. In late July, Lumumba visited Washington and received pledges of economic aid from Secretary of State Christian Herter. At the beginning of September, Soviet airplanes, trucks, and technicians were arriving in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest.

By mid-September, Lumumba sought protection from the UN guard in Leopoldville after losing a struggle over the leadership of the government with Kasavubu and Joseph Mobutu, Chief of Staff of the Congolese armed forces. In early December, Mobutu's troops captured Lumumba while he was traveling toward his stronghold at

---

* Since the period in which the events under examination occurred, the names of many geographical units and governmental institutions have changed. For instance, the nation formerly known as the Republic of the Congo is now the Republic of Zaire and the present capital city, Kinshasa, was known then as Leopoldville. For the sake of clarity in dealing with many of the documents involved in this section, the names used in this report are those which applied in the early 1960's, contemporaneously with the events under consideration.

Stanleyville, and he was imprisoned. The central government of the Congo transferred Lumumba on January 17, 1961 to the custody of authorities in the province of Katanga, which was asserting its own independence at that time. Several weeks later, the Katangese authorities announced Lumumba's death.

There are various accounts of the circumstances and timing of Lumumba's death. The United Nations investigation of the incident concluded that Lumumba was killed on January 17.*

2. Dulles Cables Leopoldville That "Removal" of Lumumba is an Urgent Objective in "High Quarters"

Shortly after the Congolese declaration of independence from Belgium on June 30, 1960, the CIA assigned a new Chief of Station to the Congo. The Chief of Station said that the briefings he received at CIA headquarters in preparation for his departure contained no discussion of the possibility of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 8). On his brief return to headquarters in connection with Lumumba's visit to Washington in late July, the Chief of Station again heard no discussion of assassinating Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 9).

During August, great concern about Lumumba's political strength in the Congo was growing among the foreign policy-makers of the Eisenhower Administration.** This concern was nurtured by intelligence reports such as that cabled to CIA headquarters by the new Chief of Station:

---

* Report of the Commission of Investigation, 11/61, UN Security Council, Official Records, Supplement for October, November, and December.

** _See_ Section 5, _infra_, for full discussion of the prevailing anti-Lumumba attitude in the United States government as shown by minutes of the National Security Council and Special Group and the testimony of high Administration officials.

> EMBASSY AND STATION BELIEVE CONGO EXPERIENCING CLASSIC COMMUNIST EFFORT TAKEOVER GOVERNMENT. MANY FORCES AT WORK HERE: SOVIETS ... COMMUNIST PARTY, ETC. ALTHOUGH DIFFICULT DETERMINE MAJOR INFLUENCING FACTORS TO PREDICT OUTCOME STRUGGLE FOR POWER, DECISIVE PERIOD NOT FAR OFF. WHETHER OR NOT LUMUMBA ACTUALLY COMMIE OR JUST PLAYING COMMIE GAME TO ASSIST HIS SOLIDIFYING POWER, ANTI-WEST FORCES RAPIDLY INCREASING POWER CONGO AND THERE MAY BE LITTLE TIME LEFT IN WHICH TAKE ACTION TO AVOID ANOTHER CUBA.... (CIA Cable IN 39706, Leopoldville to Director, 8/18/60.)

This cable also stated the Chief of Station's operational "OBJECTIVE [OF] REPLACING LUMUMBA WITH PRO WESTERN GROUP" (CIA Cable, 8/18/60). Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the Africa Division of CIA's clandestine services, replied the same day that he was seeking State Department approval for the proposed operation based upon "OUR BELIEF LUMUMBA MUST BE REMOVED IF POSSIBLE" (CIA Cable Out 59741, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 8/18/60). On August 19, Richard Bissell, Director of CIA's covert operations branch, signed a follow-up cable to Leopoldville: "YOU ARE AUTHORIZED PROCEED WITH OPERATION" (CIA Cable OUT 59959, Director to Leopoldville, 8/19/60).

Several days later, the Chief of Station reported that a plan to assassinate Lumumba had been proposed to President Kasavubu by Congolese leaders:

> ANTI-LUMUMBA LEADERS APPROACHED KASAVUBU WITH PLAN ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA ... KASAVUBU REFUSED AGREE SAYING HE RELUCTANT RESORT VIOLENCE AND NO OTHER LEADER SUFFICIENT STATURE REPLACE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable IN 42761, Leopoldville to Director, 8/24/60.)

This incident indicates that the CIA was aware that there was some Congolese support for the assassination of Lumumba, but that the moderate President of the Congo still respected Lumumba and refused to consider assassination.

On August 25, 1960, Allen Dulles attended a meeting of the Special Group -- the National Security Council subcommittee responsible for the planning of covert operations.* In response to the outline of some CIA plans for political actions against Lumumba, such as arranging a vote of no confidence by the Congolese Parliament, the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs reported that the President

> had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)

After this discussion, the Special Group

> finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60.)

---

* This Special Group meeting and the testimony about its significance on the issue of authorization is discussed in detail in Section 5 (iii), infra.

The next day, Allen Dulles personally signed a cable* to the Leopoldville Chief of Station which stressed the urgency of "removing" Lumumba:

> IN HIGH QUARTERS** HERE IT IS THE CLEAR-CUT CONCLUSION THAT IF LLL [LUMUMBA] CONTINUES TO HOLD HIGH OFFICE, THE INEVITABLE RESULT WILL AT BEST BE CHAOS AND AT WORST PAVE THE WAY TO COMMUNIST TAKEOVER OF THE CONGO WITH DISASTROUS CONSEQUENCES FOR THE PRESTIGE OF THE UN AND FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE FREE WORLD GENERALLY. CONSEQUENTLY WE CONCLUDE THAT HIS REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE THAT UNDER EXISTING CONDITIONS THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION. (CIA Cable, OUT 62966, Director to Leopoldville, 8/26/60.)

Dulles cabled that the Chief of Station was to be given "WIDER AUTHORITY" -- along the lines of the previously authorized operation to replace Lumumba with a pro-Western group -- "INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). "WE REALIZE THAT TARGETS OF OPPORTUNITY MAY PRESENT THEMSELVES TO YOU," the cable continued (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

---

* Cables issued under the personal signature of the DCI are a relative rarity in CIA communitations and call attention to the importance and sensitivity of the matter discussed.

** As discussed in Section 5(c), infra, Richard Bisell testified that Allen Dulles would have used the phrase "higher quarters" to refer to the President (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48).

Dulles also authorized the expenditure of up to $100,000 "TO CARRY OUT ANY CRASH PROGRAMS ON WHICH YOU DO NOT HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO CONSULT HQS" (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). He assured the Chief of Station that the message had been "SEEN AND APPROVED AT COMPETENT LEVEL" in the State Department (CIA Cable, 8/26/60). But the Director of Central Intelligence made a special point of assuring the Chief of Station that he was authorized to act unilaterally in a case where the United States Ambassador to the Congo would prefer to remain uninformed:

> TO THE EXTENT THAT AMBASSADOR MAY DESIRE TO BE CONSULTED, YOU SHOULD SEEK HIS CONCURRENCE. IF IN ANY PARTICULAR CASE, HE DOES NOT WISH TO BE CONSULTED YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE (CIA Cable, 8/26/60).

This mandate raises a question as to whether the DCI was contemplating a particular form of action against Lumumba which the Ambassador would want to be in a position to "plausibly deny" United States involvement. DDP Richard Bissell testified that he was "almost certain" that he was informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission and that it was his "belief" that the cable was a circumlocutious means of indicating that the President wanted Lumumba to be killed (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33, 64-65).*

---

* See Section 5(c), infra, for additional testimony by Bissell on the question of authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

3. CIA Encourages Congolese Efforts to "Eliminate" Lumumba, Who is Viewed as a "Grave Danger" Even After Being Deposed and Placed in UN Protective Custody

On September 5, 1960, President Kasavubu dismissed Premier Lumumba from the government despite the strong support for Lumumba that existed in the Congolese Parliament. After losing the ensuing power struggle with Kasavubu and Mobutu, who seized the government by a military coup on September 14, Lumumba sought protection from the United Nations peace-keeping force. The evidence indicates that the ouster of Lumumba from the government did not alleviate the concern about him in the United States government.

Rather, the CIA and high Eisenhower Administration officials* continued to view him as a threat, at least until early December when he was captured by Mobutu's troops and imprisoned. During this period, CIA officers in the Congo advised and aided Congolese contacts known to have any intent to kill Lumumba. They also opposed the resumption of the democratic process after the coup -- by reopening the Parliament -- because of the likelihood that this would return Lumumba to power.

The day after Lumumba was deposed by Kasavubu, two CIA officers met with a high level Congolese politician who had a close relationship to the Leopoldville Station. The Station reported to CIA headquarters that the politician had made a response to a remark by the Chief of Station that implied that he might assassinate Lumumba:

---

* A detailed treatment of the expressions of continued concern over Lumumba at the National Security Council level is set forth in Section ____, *infra*.

> TO COS COMMENT THAT LUMUMBA IN OPPOSITION IS ALMOST AS DANGEROUS AS IN OFFICE, [THE CONGOLESE POLITICIAN] INDICATED UNDERSTOOD AND IMPLIED MIGHT PHYSICALLY ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 49679, Leopoldville to Director, 9/7/60.)

The cable continued to report that the Chief of Station had offered to assist this politician "IN PREPARATION NEW GOVERNMENT PROGRAM" and assured him that the United States would supply technicians (CIA Cable, 9/7/60).

As the chaotic struggle for power raged, the Chief of the Africa Division succinctly summarized the prevalent U. S. apprehension about Lumumba's ability to influence events in the Congo by virtue of personality, irrespective of his official position:

> LUMUMBA TALENTS AND DYNAMISM APPEAR OVERRIDING FACTOR IN REESTABLISHING HIS POSITION EACH TIME IT SEEMS HALF LOST. IN OTHER WORDS EACH TIME LUMUMBA HAS OPPORTUNITY HAVE LAST WORD HE CAN SWAY EVENTS TO HIS ADVANTAGE. (CIA Cable, OUT 69233, Director to Leopoldville, 9/13/60).

The day after Mobutu's coup, the Chief of Station reported that he was serving as an advisor to a Congolese effort to "eliminate" Lumumba due to his "fear" that Lumumba might, in fact, have been strengthened by placing himself in UN custody, which afforded a safe base of operations:

> STILL DIFFICULT DETERMINE WHETHER MOBUTU HAS SUFFICIENT CONTROL ARMY TO ENFORCE DECISIONS ANNOUNCED NIGHT 14 SEPTEMBER. STATION ADVISED [TWO MODERATE CONGOLESE POLITICIANS] TRY WORK WITH [KEY CONGOLESE CONTACT] IN EFFORT ELIMINATE LUMUMBA. FEAR UN PROTECTION WILL GIVE LUMUMBA OPPORTUNITY ORGANIZE COUNTER ATTACK. ONLY SOLUTION IS REMOVE HIM FROM SCENE SOONEST. (CIA Cable, IN 13374, Leopoldville to Director, 9/15/60.)

On September 17, another CIA operative in the Congo met with a leading Congolese senator. At this meeting, the senator requested a clandestine supply of small arms to equip some Congolese Army troops. The cable to CIA headquarters concerning the meeting reported:

> [CONGOLESE SENATOR] REQUESTED CLANDESTINE SUPPLY SMALL ARMS TO EQUIP ... TROOPS RECENTLY ARRIVED LEOP[OLDVILLE] AREA ... [THE SENATOR] SAYS THIS WOULD PROVIDE CORE ARMED MEN WILLING AND ABLE TAKE DIRECT ACTION ... [SENATOR] RELUCTANTLY AGREES LUMUMBA MUST GO PERMANENTLY. DISTRUSTS [ANOTHER CONGOLESE LEADER] BUT WILLING MAKE PEACE WITH HIM FOR PURPOSES ELIMINATION LUMUMBA. (CIA Cable, IN 14228, Leopoldville to Director, 9/17/60.)

The CIA operative told the Congolese senator that "HE WOULD EXPLORE POSSIBILITY OBTAINING ARMS" and recommended to CIA headquarters that they should

> HAVE [ARMS] SUPPLIES READY TO GO AT NEAREST BASE PENDING [UNITED STATES] DECISION THAT SUPPLY WARRANTED AND NECESSARY (CIA Cable, 9/17/60).*

---

* This recommendation proved to be in line with large scale planning at CIA headquarters for clandestine paramilitary support to anti-Lumumba elements. On October 6, 1960, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cable concerning plans which the Chief of Station was instructed not to discuss with State Department representatives or operational contacts:

(footnote continued on next page)

Several days later, while warning a key Congolese leader about coup plots led by Lumumba and two of his supporters, the Chief of Station

> URGED ARREST OR OTHER MORE PERMANENT DISPOSAL OF LUMUMBA, GIZENGA, AND MULELE (CIA Cable, IN 15643, Leopoldville to Director, 9/20/61).

Gizenga and Mulele were Lumumba's lieutenants who were leading his supporters while Lumumba was in UN custody.

(Footnote continued from previous page)

> [IN]VIEW UNCERTAIN OUTCOME CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS [CIA] CONDUCTING CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR CONGO AT REQUEST POLICY ECHELONS. THIS PLANNING DESIGNED TO PREPARE FOR SITUATION IN WAY [UNITED STATES] WOULD PROVIDE CLANDESTINE SUPPORT TO ELEMENTS IN ARMED OPPOSITION TO LUMUMBA.
>
> CONTEMPLATED ACTION INCLUDES PROVISION ARMS, SUPPLIES AND PERHAPS SOME TRAINING TO ANTI-LUMUMBA RESISTANCE GROUPS.
>
> (CIA Cable OUT 04697, Director to Leopoldville, 10/6/60.)

Throughout the fall of 1960, the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a serious political threat while he remained in UN protective custody.* One concern was that if the Parliament -- which had been closed by the coup -- were re-opened and the moderates failed to obtain a majority vote, the "PRESSURES FOR [LUMUMBA'S] RETURN WILL BE ALMOST IRRESISTABLE" (CIA Cable, IN 33499, Leopoldville to Director, 10/26/60).* Another general concern at CIA headquarters was that foreign powers would intervene in the Congo and bring Lumumba to power (CIA Cable, OUT 81720, Director to Leopoldville, 10/17/60). Similarly, throughout this period Lumumba was viewed by CIA officials and the Eisenhower Administration** as a stalking horse for "what appeared to be a Soviet effort to take over the Congo" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 10, 45).

---

* Both Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy, then Chief of the CIA Africa Division, confirmed that the CIA continued to view Lumumba as a threat even after he placed himself in UN custody (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. ; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp.). Both Bissell and Tweedy referred to two factors to substantiate this view: first, Lumumba was a spellbinding orator with the ability to stir masses of people to action; and second, the UN forces did not restrain Lumumba's freedom of movement and the Congolese army surrounding them were often lax in maintaining their vigil.

[Quote/Cite from transcripts.]

During this period, the Leopoldville station continued to maintain close operational relationships with, and offer aid to, Congolese contacts who expressed a desire to assassinate Lumumba*** although there is no direct evidence that aid was provided for the specific purpose of assassination.

---

* A CIA Cable (IN 37289) from Leopoldville to the Director on November 3, 1960 returns to this theme: the opening of the Congolese Parliament by the United Nations is opposed because it "WOULD PROBABLY RETURN LUMUMBA TO POWER."

** See Section ____, infra, on such analysis at high-level policy meetings.

*** A Congolese security officer in liaison with the CIA on an attempt to tap Lumumba's phones "IMPLIED HE TRYING HAVE [LUMUMBA] KILLED BUT ADDED THIS MOST DIFFICULT AS JOB WOULD HAVE BE DONE BY AFRICAN WITH NO APPARENT INVOLVEMENT WHITE MAN. (CIA Cable, IN 34867, Leopoldville to Director, 10/28/60.)

4. The Plot to Assassinate Lumumba

In the fall of 1960, a scientist from CIA headquarters delivered to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville lethal biological substances to be used to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. The Chief of Station testified that after requesting and receiving confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to carry out the scientist's instructions, he proceeded to take "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot. The Chief of Station testified that in the course of his discussion with the CIA scientist, Sidney Gottlieb, he was informed that President Eisenhower had ordered the assassination mission against Patrice Lumumba. Gottlieb's mission to the Congo was both preceded and followed by general cables urging the "elimination" of Lumumba sent from CIA headquarters in an extraordinarily restricted "Eyes Only" channel -- including two messages under the personal signature of Allen Dulles.

The lethal substances were never used by the Chief of Station. But despite the fact that Lumumba had placed himself in the protective custody of the UN peace-keeping force shortly before the poisons were delivered to the Chief of Station, there is no clear evidence that the assassination operation was terminated before Lumumba's death. There is, however, no direct evidence of a connection between the CIA assassination plot and the events which actually led to Lumumba's death.*

---

* See Section 6, infra, for a discussion of the evidence about the circumstances that led to Lumumba's death in Katanga.

(a) Dulles Cables Again for "Elimination" of Lumumba, and a Messenger is Sent to Congo With a Highly Sensitive Assignment

On September 19, 1960, several days after Lumumba placed himself in the protective custody of the United Nations peacekeeping force in Leopoldville, Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy signed a cryptic cable to Leopoldville to arrange a clandestine meeting between the Chief of Station and "Sidney Braun," who was traveling to the Congo on an unspecified assignment:

> ["SID"] SHOULD ARRIVE APPROX 27 SEPT. . . WILL ANNOUNCE HIMSELF AS "SID FROM PARIS". . . IT URGENT YOU SHOULD SEE ["SID"] SOONEST POSSIBLE AFTER HE PHONES YOU. HE WILL FULLY IDENTIFY HIMSELF AND EXPLAIN HIS ASSIGNMENT TO YOU. (CIA Cable, OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60.)

The cable bore a highly unusual sensitivity indicator -- "PROP" -- that restricted circulation at CIA headquarters to the Chief of the Africa Division.*

---

* In a letter of September 23, 1975, the Chief of the CIA Review Staff informed the Committee that "PROP" was normally used "to denote sensitive personnel matters" (Seymour R. Bolton to Frederick A. O. Schwarz and Frederick D. Baron, 9/23/75. It appears that this sensitivity indicator, while created for other purposes, was utilized by Bissell, Tweedy, and the Chief of Station to restrict distribution of their communications about an assassination operation. The cable traffic cited in this report that was sent through the PROP channel did not touch upon personnel matters except in terms of recruiting additional CIA officers and agents for the assassination operation.

The Bissell/Tweedy cable informed the Chief of Station that he was to continue to use this indicator for

> ALL [CABLE] TRAFFIC THIS OP, WHICH YOU INSTRUCTED HOLD ENTIRELY TO YOURSELF. (CIA Cable, 9/19/60.)

The Chief of Station -- referred to herein as "Hedgman"* -- testified to a clear, independent recollection of receiving such a cable. Hedgman stated that in September of 1960 he received a "most unusual" cable from CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 11, 43). The cable advised, in his words, that:

> someone who I would have recognized would arrive with instructions for me.... I believe the message was also marked for my eyes only ... and contained instructions that I was not to discuss the message with anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 12-13.)

Hedgman said that the cable did not specify the kind of instructions he was to receive, and it "did not refer to Lumumba in any way" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 12).

Three days after the Bissell/Tweedy message that Hedgman was to meet "Sid" in Leopoldville, Bronson Tweedy uses the same sensitivity indicator on a cable sent to Hedgman on an "Eyes Only" basis (CIA Cable, OUT 74837, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 9/22/60).

---

* Due to fear of reprisal from Lumumba's followers, the Chief of Station for the Congo from mid-summer 1960 through 1961 testified under the alias "Hedgman" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 2; 8/25/75, p. 4).

On September 24, Allen Dulles personally issued a cable to Leopoldville expressing in absolute terms his desire to "eliminate" Lumumba:

> WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

Dulles had expressed a similar view three days before in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, stating:

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60)

(b) Gottlieb Delivers Lethal Substances to the Chief of Station in the Congo for the Assassination of Lumumba

The Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Bronson Tweedy that he had made contact with the man dispatched to Leopoldville with a highly sensitive assignment on September 26. (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60) This was the same week in which Dulles cabled about the "elimination" of Lumumba and made his statement to the NSC about the "grave danger" that existed as long as Lumumba was not "disposed of".

Hedgman testified about the identity of "SID" -- the messenger referred to in the first cable through the PROP channel:

> Q: Who was the messenger who arrived?
>
> Hedgman: Mr. Sidney Gottlieb

Tweedy's cable indicated that a third country national would be required as an agent in the PROP operation:

> IF DECIDED SUPPORT FOR PROP OBJECTIVES, BELIEVE ESSENTIAL SUCH BE PROVIDED THROUGH THIRD NATIONAL CHANNEL WITH [AMERICAN] ROLE COMPLETELY CONCEALED. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

Tweedy expressed reservations about two agents that the station was using for other operations and said "WE ARE CONSIDERING A THIRD NATIONAL CUTOUT CONTACT CANDIDATE AVAILABLE HERE WHO MIGHT FILL BILL"* (CIA Cable, 9/22/60). Despite Tweedy's concern about the two existing station contacts, he indicated that the Chief of station and his "colleague" -- presumably the man identified as "Sid" who was to arrive in the Congo shortly to explain the PROP operation to Hedgman -- were to be afforded considerable latitude in exercising their judgment on the conduct of the operation:

> YOU AND COLLEAGUE UNDERSTAND WE CANNOT READ OVER YOUR SHOULDER AS YOU PLAN AND ASSESS OPPORTUNITIES. OUR PRIMARY CONCERN MUST BE CONCEALMENT [AMERICAN] ROLE, UNLESS OUTSTANDING OPPORTUNITY EMERGES WHICH MAKES CALCULATED RISK FIRST CLASS BET. READY ENTERTAIN ANY SERIOUS PROPOSALS YOU MAKE BASED OUR HIGH REGARD BOTH YOUR PROFESSIONAL JUDGMENTS. (CIA Cable, 9/22/60.)

---

* This is probably a reference to agent QJWIN, who was later dispatched to the Congo. His mission is discussed in Sections ____, ____, and ____, *infra*.

> Q: And at that time, you knew who he was?
>
> Hedgman: I recognized him as an officer of the Agency . . . . I believe he referred to the fact that I had received a message and that he was the person concerned. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 15-16)

The message carried by Gottlieb, then Science Advisor to DDP Richard Bissell, was unmistakeably clear according to Hedgman:

> Hedgman: It is my recollection that he advised me, or my instructions were, to eliminate Lumumba.
>
> Q: By eliminate, do you mean assassinate?
>
> Hedgman: Yes. I would say that was . . . my understanding of the primary means. I don't think it was probably limited to that, if there was some other way of doing it.
>
> Q: Of doing what?
>
> Hedgman: Of removing him from a position of political threat. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 17-18.)

Hedgman said that he and Gottlieb also may have discussed non-lethal means of removing Lumumba as a "political threat", but he said, "I cannot recall with certainty on that" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 28).

He clearly recalled the discussion of assassination, however:

> Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb indicate with regard to the possibility of physically eliminating him?
>
> Hedgman: It was my understanding that that was probably expected of me. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 18.)

And again:

> Q: I take it that once you started discussing these lethal agents, there was no doubt in your mind that the kind of elimination he was there particularly to discuss was killing Lumumba?

> Hedgman: There was no doubt in my mind that this was one of the way[s], and probably what they thought was the only way that would work (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 25).

Hedgman explained Gottlieb provided him with poisons as a means of assassination:

> Q: And what did he tell you with regard to how that might be accomplished?
>
> Hedgman: ... He brought some biological agents. I assume that that's the correct word. But in any case, poisonous agent with him, which he passed to me....
>
> Q: These were lethal biological substances?
>
> Hedgman: Yes. That was my understanding as a non-expert. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 18-19.)

Hedgman testified that he received "rubber gloves, a mask, and a syringe" along with the poisons and that Gottlieb instructed him in their use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 20-21). Hedgman indicated that this paraphernalia was for administering the poisons to Lumumba:

> Q: [W]hen he [Gottlieb] came to the Congo to give you lethal biological agents for the assassination of Lumumba, was it clear at that time that the means for administering those biological agents was to inject them into a substance that was to be ingested by Lumumba, whether it be food, or drink, or toothpaste or any other substance that was to be ingested?
>
> Hedgman: That's my recollection, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 82; accord. p. 24.)

Hedgman said that the means of assassination was not restricted to use of the poisons provided by Gottlieb:

> This was not a sine qua non that I employ this. If there were another method, another way, it would have been acceptable. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

For example, Hedgman testified that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29).

There was a firm requirement, however, that the means of assassination should not be traceable to the United States:

> The biological substance, or specimens, what have you, I think it was up to my judgment, and if there was a better way -- certainly. [T]he point I now recall was in no way, if I implemented these instructions, no way could it be traced back to the United States. It had to be a way which could not be traced back ... either to an American or the United States government. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 19.)

Hedgman said Gottlieb assured him that the poisons were produced to meet this requirement:

> I believe I raised the point that poisons left traces in the human body, which could be found on autopsy ... I believe that I was assured that these ... lethal agents would [leave] normal traces found in people that die of certain diseases. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 23.)

Hedgman said that he had an "emotional reaction of great surprise" when it first became clear that Gottlieb was there to discuss an assassination plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 30). But the Chief of Station said that he did not give any indication that he would not carry out the instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46). Instead, he told Gottlieb he "would explore this" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 46) and left him with the following impression:

> I think it would be a fair impression that he would take away the thought that I was going to look into it and try and figure if there was a way ... I believe I

> stressed the difficulty of trying to carry out such an operation. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 47.)

The cable that Hedgman sent to headquarters reporting his initial contact with Gottlieb was clearly an affirmative response to the assignment. The Chief of Station said that he and Gottlieb were "ON SAME WAVELENGTH." (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/27/60.) Hedgman was "afraid" that Mobutu's government was "weakening under" foreign pressure to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba, and said:

> HENCE BELIEVE MOST RAPID ACTION CONSISTENT WITH SECURITY INDICATED. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

(c) Hedgman Testified That Gottlieb Told Him That President Eisenhower Had Ordered the Assassination of Lumumba

Hedgman testified that in the course of their meeting in Leopoldville, Dr. Gottlieb informed him that President Eisenhower had authorized the assassination of Lumumba:

> Q: Did you raise with him the question of authorization of such instructions to you?
>
> Hedgman: Yes, I did. That's my quite strong recollection, that I did.
>
> Q: What do you recall in essence was what you said to him?
>
> Hedgman: In essence, I think I must have ... pointed out that this was not a common or usual Agency tactic, and I may have probably said that I never heard of it being done, which I had not, never in my training or previous work in the Agency had I ever heard any references to such, in my recollection at least, such methods. And it is my recollection I asked on whose authority these instructions were issued.
>
> Q: And what did Mr. Gottlieb reply?

> Hedgman: It is my recollection that he identified the President, and I cannot -- the President of the United States -- and I cannot recall whether he said "the President," or whether he identified him by name. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 30-31.)

Hedgman continued to explain that he was told "something to the effect that the President had instructed the Director" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32, 34). Hedgman was clear that the ultimate source of authority for the assassination mission was the President:

> Q: Your understanding then was that these instructions were instructions coming to you from the office of the President?
>
> Hedgman: That's correct.
>
> Q: Or that he had instructed the Agency, and they were passed on to you?
>
> Hedgman: That's right.
>
> Q: You are not the least unclear whether or not you became aware with a very clear impression that the President's name had been invoked in some fashion?
>
> Hedgman: Yes. I came -- certainly that is my recollection.
>
> Q: You have no doubt about that?
>
> Q: At the time.
>
> Hedgman: At the time, I certainly felt that I was under instructions from the President, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 32-33.)

Hedgman cautioned that he was recalling events long past:

> Hedgman: Gentlemen, after fifteen years, I cannot be 100 per cent certain, but I have always, since that date, had the impression in my mind that these orders had come from the President. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 34.)

But he left no doubt about the strength of his "impression":

> Q: You have a very firm recollection that he [Gottlieb] represented to you that the President of the United States directed the assassination of Patrice Lumumba, is that correct?
>
> Hedgman: That's my recollection. Yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102; accord, p. 34.)

(d) Headquarters Makes the Assassination Plot "Highest Priority" and Authorizes Steps in Furtherance of It

On the basis of his talks with "Sid," Hedgman listed a number of "possibilities" for covert action against Lumumba. At the top of the list was the suggestion that a particular agent be used in the following manner:

> HAVE HIM TAKE REFUGE WITH BIG BROTHER. WOULD THUS ACT AS INSIDE MAN TO BRUSH UP DETAILS TO RAZOR EDGE. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.)

Hedgman indicated that he would begin to follow this course by recalling the agent to Leopoldville. (CIA Cable, 9/27/60.) He informed headquarters: "PLAN PROCEED ON BASIS PRIORITIES AS LISTED ABOVE, UNLESS INSTRUCTED TO CONTRARY" (CIA Cable, 9/27/60).

On September 30, the Chief of Station urged that headquarters authorize "exploratory conversations" with this agent so that he could proceed with the plan that was his top priority:

> NO REALLY AIRTIGHT OP POSSIBLE WITH ASSETS NOW AVAILABLE. MUST CHOOSE BETWEEN CANCELLING OP OR ACCEPTING CALCULATED RISKS OF VARYING DEGREES.
>
> ... [IN] VIEW NECESSITY ACT IMMEDIATELY, IF AT ALL, URGE HQS AUTHORIZE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS TO DETERMINE IF [AGENT] WILLING TAKE ROLE AS ACTIVE AGENT OR CUT-OUT THIS OP. (WOULD APPROACH ON HYPOTHETICAL BASIS AND NOT REVEAL PLANS.) IF HE APPEARS WILLING ACCEPT ROLE, WE BELIEVE IT NECESSARY REVEAL OBJECTIVE OP TO HIM.
>
> ... REQUEST HQS REPLY [IMMEDIATELY]. (CIA Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 9/30/60.)

Hedgman's cables -- sent for Tweedy's "Eyes Only" in the PROP channel -- indicated that the assassination operation had been mounted. They show that a specific operational plan had been set in motion to the extent that Hedgman thought that it would have to be clearly "cancelled" by headquarters before he would stop proceeding with the plan. Hedgman's description of the means of maintaining the security of the operation could be taken as a reference to a lethal biological agent which would be slow to take effect or which would leave no traces:

> ALTHOUGH TOO EARLY SEE SPECIFIC DETAILS [AGENT'S] PART IN OP, BELIEVE RISK MINIMIZED IF HE LEAVES AREA BEFORE EFFECTS OP ARE APPARENT. (CIA Cable, IN 20857, Leopoldville to Tweedy.)

The same day, through the PROP channel, Hedgman received authorization from headquarters to proceed with his top priority plan:

> YOU ARE AUTHORIZED HAVE EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH SCHOTROFFE TO ASSESS HIS ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBLE ACTIVE AGENT OR CUTOUT ROLE. ... APPRECIATE MANNER YOUR APPROACH TO PROBLEM. (CIA Cable, OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

In this cable, Glenn Fields, Assistant Chief of the Africa Division, expressed a "HOPE ... FOR MODERATE HASTE" (CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Leopoldville, 9/30/60.)

According to the report of the Chief of Station, Gottlieb left the Congo to return to headquarters on October 5 in view of the "EXPIRATION DATE HIS MATERIALS" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60). The "expiration" of Gottlieb's "materials" probably refers to the date beyond which the substances would no longer have lethal strength. Although the relation of the "expiration date" to Gottlieb's departure is unclear from the cables, it probably signifies that some of the biological substances had lost their toxicity. Nonetheless, the Chief of Station indicated that Gottlieb left some biological substances that were still lethal and that he intended to proceed with the assassination operation:

> [SID] LEFT CERTAIN ITEMS OF CONTINUING USEFULNESS. [CHIEF OF STATION] PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

By this point, Hedgman had conducted his "exploratory conversation" with the agent who was his best candidate for gaining access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). Hedgman testified that the subject he "explored" was the agent's ability to find a means to inject poison into Lumumba's food or toothpaste (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60):

> I believe that I queried the agent who had access to Lumumba, and his entourage, in detail about just what that access, what access he actually had, as opposed to speaking to people. In other words, did he have access to the bathroom, did he have access to the kitchen, things of that sort.
>
> I have a recollection of having queried him on that without specifying why I wanted to know this. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 48.)

On October 7, the Chief of Station reported to headquarters on this meeting:

> CONDUCTED EXPLORATORY CONVERSATION WITH [AGENT] ... AFTER EXPLORING ALL POSSIBILITIES [AGENT] SUGGESTED SOLUTION RECOMMENDED BY HQS. ALTHOUGH DID NOT PICK UP BALL, BELIEVE HE PREPARED TAKE ANY ROLE NECESSARY WITHIN LIMITS SECURITY ACCOMPLISH OBJECTIVE.

Hedgman testified that his exploratory steps left him with doubts about the wisdom or practicality of the assassination plot:

> [C]ertainly I looked on it as a pretty wild scheme professionally. I did not think that it ... was practical professionally. Certainly ... to keep the U.S. out of it....
>
> I explored it, but I doubt that I ever really expected to carry it out. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 111.)

However, his cables indicate that he was planning to continue to implement the operation and sought the resources to do it successfully. He urged headquarters to send him an alternate operative for the assassination mission in the event that they found his first choice unacceptable:

> IF HQS BELIEVE [AGENT'S CIRCUMSTANCES] BAR HIS PARTICIPATION, WISH STRESS NECESSITY PROVIDE STATION WITH QUALIFIED THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL. (CIA Cable IN 24171, Leopoldville to Tweedy, 10/7/60.)

Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station the same day that he "HAD GOOD DISCUSSION YOUR COLLEAGUE 7 OCT" -- presumably referring to a de-briefing of Gottlieb upon his return to the United States. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Leopoldville, 10/7/60.) Tweedy indicated that he was

> CONSIDERING DISPATCHING THIRD COUNTRY NATIONAL OPERATOR WHO, WHEN HE ARRIVES, SHOULD THEN BE ASSESSED BY YOU OVER PERIOD TO SEE WHETHER HE MIGHT PLAY ACTIVE OR CUTOUT ROLE ON FULL TIME BASIS. (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60.)

This expression of support for the operation was followed by an extraordinary pair of cables from headquarters on October 15, 1960. One of these cables was issued by a desk officer in CIA's Africa Division and released under Bronson Tweedy's signature, as Division Chief, and sent to Leopoldville through standard CIA channels, which would allow for distribution of the message to appropriate personnel in the CIA station and the United States embassy. This cable ... generally discussed the possibility of covertly supplying certain Congolese leaders with funds and military aid (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60). This cable also delimited the kind of action against Lumumba that would be authorized:

> ONLY DIRECT ACTION WE CAN NOW STAND BEHIND IS TO SUPPORT IMMOBILIZING OR ARRESTING [LUMUMBA], DESIRABLE AS MORE DEFINITIVE ACTION MIGHT BE. ANY ACTION TAKEN WOULD HAVE TO BE ENTIRELY CONGOLESE. (CIA Cable OUT 81476, Director to Leopoldville, 10/15/60.)

On the same day that this message was dispatched, a second cable was sent to Leopoldville. This cable was issued personally by Bronson Tweedy and sent in the special PROP channel for Hedgman's "EYES ONLY" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

> YOU WILL NOTE FROM CABLE THROUGH NORMAL CHANNEL CURRENTLY BEING TRANSMITTED A PARA[GRAPH] ON PROP TYPE SUGGESTIONS. YOU WILL PROBABLY RECEIVE MORE ALONG THESE LINES AS STUMBLING BLOC [LUMUMBA] REPRESENTS INCREASINGLY APPARENT ALL STUDYING CONGO SITUATION CLOSELY AND HIS DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION.
>
> RAISE ABOVE SO YOU NOT CONFUSED BY ANY APPARENT DUPLICATION. THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).

Thus, Tweedy resolved the apparent duplication of cables by indicating that communications about the assassination mission were restricted to the PROP channel and that the assassination mission was to move forward. He went on to request Hedgman's reaction to the prospect of sending a senior CIA case officer to the Congo on a "DIRECTED ASSIGNMENT ... TO CONCENTRATE ENTIRELY THIS ASPECT" (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). This referred to CIA officer Justin O'Donnell, who testified that in late October he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Lumumba.*

In the course of suggesting the assignment of an additional officer to the Congo, the cable provided insight into the reason that the assassination mission had not progressed more rapidly under the Chief of Station:

> SEEMS TO US YOUR OTHER COMMITMENTS TOO HEAVY GIVE NECESSARY CONCENTRATION PROP. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.)

Again, in contradiction of the limitations on anti-Lumumba activity outlined in the cable sent through normal channels, Tweedy's cable also proposed a plan to kidnap Lumumba:

> POSSIBILITY USE COMMANDO TYPE GROUP FOR ABDUCTION [LUMUMBA], EITHER VIA ASSAULT ON HOUSE UP CLIFF FROM RIVER OR, MORE PROBABLY, IF [LUMUMBA] ATTEMPTS ANOTHER BREAKOUT INTO TOWN ... REQUEST YOUR VIEWS. (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60.)

---

* For a full account of the meeting between Bissell and O'Donnell and O'Donnell's subsequent activities in the Congo, see Section 5(a), *infra*.

This series of cables sent during, and after Gottlieb's visit to the Congo demonstrated a clear intent at CIA headquarters to authorize and support rapid progress on the assassination mission. The cables also show an intent to severely restrict knowledge of the assassination operation among officers in CIA's Africa Division and among United States personnel in the Congo, including those who were aware of and involved in other covert activities.

(e) The Chief of Station Moves Forward With Assassination Plot

The testimony of the Chief of Station, taken fifteen years after the events in question and without benefit of review of the cables discussed above, was compatible with the picture derived from the cables of a fully authorized and tightly restricted assassination operation. Hedgman's testimony is at variance from the cables only with respect to the lack of vigor with which he claims to have pursued the assignment which he dealt with in an affirmative, aggressive manner in the cables.

(i) The Chief of Station Testified That He Requested and Received Confirmation of the Assassination Plan from Headquarters

Hedgman testified that, after receiving Gottlieb's instructions, he cabled CIA headquarters seeking confirmation that he was to carry out Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 36). Hedgman did not recall whether he identified Gottlieb by name, and he doubted that he "would have" mentioned the President in such a cable (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 36, 43).

Hedgman described the extraordinary security precautions he took cabling his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions:

> There was some special channel ... because it was handled differently than any other normal message. For example, it was not put on a regular cable form, which, you know, you have several copies for your various files. And it was my recollection that I personally carried the message to the communicator to encrypt, and that was worded in a doublt-talk way that even the communicator would not necessarily know what it was about." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 42-43.)

This description approximates the PROP channel that was used for all cables relating to the assassination mission.

Hedgman testified that soon after cabling his request for confirmation that he was to carry out the assassination assignment, he received an affirmative reply from headquarters:

> I believe I received a reply which I interpreted to mean yes, that he was the messenger and his instructions were ... duly authorized. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 37-38.)

Despite the cryptic nature of the cables, Hedgman said "I was convinced that yes, it was right." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 44, 50.)

Hedgman did not recall receiving any indication, either from Gottlieb or by cable, that he was to await further authorization before using the poisons (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 38). Hedgman expressed some uncertainty about whether he "had an absolute free hand" to proceed with an assassination attempt without receiving "final confirmation" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 38, 47, 53).

Hedgman summarized his testimony on this question in his second appearance:

> I probably had authority to act on my own but ... it was possible that I had to go back and get clearance for my action. (Hedgman, 8/25/75, p. 11; see also 8/21/75, p. 39.)

Hedgman testified, however, that a "policy decision" had been made -- that assassination had been "approved" as "one means" of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52).

> I thought the policy decision had been made in the White House, not in the Agency, and that the Agency had been selected as the Executive Agent, if you will, to carry out a political decision. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 52.)

Although Hedgman assumed that the President had not personally selected the means of assassination, he testified that he was under the impression that the President had authorized the CIA to do so and to proceed to take action:

> Hedgman: ... I doubt that I thought the President had said, you use this system. But my understanding is the President had made a decision that an act should take place, but then put that into the hands of the Agency to carry out his decision.
>
> Q: Whatever that act was to be, it was clearly to be assassination or the death of the foreign political leader?
>
> Hedgman: Yes.
>
> Q: Instigated by the CIA, initiated by the CIA?
>
> Hedgman: Certainly if those -- if Dr. Gottlieb's lethal agents were employed, that would have been the result, yes. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 104.)

Nonetheless, Hedgman said he had no "desire to carry out these instructions" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 106). Whether or not he felt there was authority to attempt an assassination without seeking final confirmation, he said that he would have checked with headquarters before taking action:

> I think probably that I would have gone back and advised that I intended to carry out and sought final approval before carrying it out had I been going to do it, had there been a way to do it. I did not see it as ... a matter which could be accomplished practically, certainly. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 51-52.)

He proceeded to affirm that his reason for seeking a final approval would have been to receive assurances about the practicality of the specific mode of assassination that he planned to use (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 53).

(ii) The Chief of Station Took "Exploratory Steps" in Furtherance of the Assassination Plot and Testified That He Destroyed Cable Traffic Related to the Plot

Hedgman testified that after Gottlieb's visit, he locked the lethal substances in the bottom drawer of his safe, "probably" sealed in an envelope marked "Eyes Only" with his name on it (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 48-49). He said that his secretary was the only other person with access to the safe and that she would not have examined a package marked in this fashion (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 49).

Hedgman testified that it was "possible" that he preserved the poisons in his safe until after Lumumba's death; at any rate, they were not disposed of before Lumumba was "successfully neutralized" by being captured and imprisoned by the Congolese government (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 85-86) at the beginning of December, 1960. Hedgman said that he does not recall taking the poisons out of his safe on any occasion other than when he disposed of them on the banks of the Congo River:

> I think that I took them out probably in a briefcase, or an air bag of some sort, and I believe that the things like the rubber gloves and the mask were thrown away in a bushy area or something where, you know, if they were found, it didn't matter that much. I believe I buried the other matters. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 84.)

Hedgman testified, however, that in the intervening months, while the poisons were in his safe, he took "exploratory steps" in furtherance of the assassination plot (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 60). He said that he sent several cables to CIA headquarters, after his request for confirmation of the assassination instructions, which "probably reflected further steps I had taken" (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 59-60).

Hedgman stated that his cables to headquarters on this matter were essentially "progress reports" on his attempts to find a means of access to Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50). He also said that he "would bet on the fact that there was at least one or two more [cables] back" to him from CIA headquarters in response (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 50).

The cable traffic conforms to Hedgman's recollection. For two months after Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo, a regular stream of messages flowed between the Leopoldville Chief of Station and headquarters through the PROP channel. In late September and early October the cables concerned the initiation of Hedgman's top priority plan -- recruiting the aid of a particular agent thought to have sufficient access to Lumumba's entourage to be able to poison Lumumba.* In mid-October, Tweedy notified the Chief of Station that the assassination mission remained "HIGHEST PRIORITY", and he suggested sending additional personnel to Leopoldville to intensify "CONCENTRATION" on this operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60).**

These cables were followed by Hedgman's report to Tweedy on October 17 that the agent he had picked for the assassination mission

---

* CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60; CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable OUT 75900, Fields to Chief of Station, 9/30/60; CIA Cable IN 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60. See Section ____, _supra_, for full treatment of these cables.

** See Section ____, _supra_, for more complete text of this cable.

> HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PENETRATE ENTOURAGE. THUS HE HAS NOT BEEN ABLE PROVIDE OPS INTEL NEEDED THIS JOB. (CIA Cable IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60.)

Hedgman testified that this operative left Leopoldville "sometime in October" which terminated their discussions about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 61). The Chief of Station continued to communicate with headquarters about finding a means to move forward with the assassination operation and securing the necessary manpower to do so.

Hedgman confirmed Tweedy's view that although the assassination operation was still his highest priority, he was overburdened with responsibility for other operations so that he could not concentrate on the progress of the assassination mission:

> ALTHOUGH MAINTAINING PRIORITY INTEREST THIS OP, ABLE DEVOTE ONLY LIMITED AMOUNT TIME, VIEW MULTIPLE OPS COMMITMENTS. (CIA Cable, IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

Due to his workload, the Chief of Station responded enthusiastically to Tweedy's suggestion of an additional case officer:

> BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA ... IF CASE OFFICER AVAILABLE [CHIEF OF STATION] WOULD DEVOTE AS MUCH TIME AS POSSIBLE TO ASSISTING AND DIRECTING HIS EFFORTS. (CIA Cable IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

The Chief of Station concluded this cable with the following cryptic recommendation, reminiscent of his testimony that he may have "suggested" shooting Lumumba to Gottlieb as an alternative to poisoning (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 27-29):

> IF CASE OFFICER SENT, RECOMMEND HQS POUCH SOONEST HIGH POWERED FOREIGN MAKE RIFLE WITH TELESCOPIC SCOPE AND SILENCER. HUNTING GOOD HERE WHEN LIGHTS RIGHT. HOWEVER AS HUNTING RIFLES NOW FORBIDDEN, WOULD KEEP RIFLE IN OFFICE PENDING OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON. (CIA Cable IN 28936, 10/17/60.)

The first sentence of Hedgman's recommendation clearly refers to sending a sniper rifle to the Congo via diplomatic pouch. The rest of the message is probably an oblique reference to the possibility of shooting Lumumba at the "OPENING OF HUNTING SEASON" -- in other words, at the first opportunity to find Lumumba outside the residence where he remained in UN protective custody. This interpretation is bolstered by a report sent the next month by the Chief of Station through the PROP channel for Tweedy's "EYES ALONE." Hedgman's cable described the stalemate which prevailed from mid-September until Lumumba's departure for Stanleyville on November 27; Lumumba was virtually a prisoner in UN custody, but inaccessible to CIA agents and the Congolese:

> TARGET HAS NOT LEFT BUILDING IN SEVERAL WEEKS. HOUSE GUARDED DAY AND NIGHT BY CONGOLESE AND UN TROOP.... CONGOLESE TROOPS ARE THERE TO PREVENT TARGET'S ESCAPE AND TO ARREST HIM IF HE ATTEMPTS. UN TROOPS THERE TO PREVENT STORMING OF PALACE BY CONGOLESE. CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE. ATTEMPTING GET

> COVERAGE OF ANY MOVEMENT INTO OR OUT OF HOUSE BY CONGOLESE.... TARGET HAS DISMISSED MOST OF SERVANTS SO ENTRY THIS MEANS SEEMS REMOTE. (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy.)

Hedgman testified that all of his cable traffic about the assassination question would have been sent with the same extraordinarily stringent security precautions -- presumably referring to the PROP channel -- which concerned Gottlieb's visit and the confirmation of authorization for his instructions:

> I would have sent in a special channel anything dealing with Lumumba, at least that would touch upon his removal in one way or another. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 62.)

The Chief of Station also testified that sometime before leaving the Station, he destroyed all cable traffic relating to the assassination mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 89). Hedgman's best recollection was that he had received instructions to destroy those cables (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96). Hedgman said he had never before in his tenure as Chief of Station in the Congo destroyed cable traffic because of its sensitivity (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91). But he stated that the cables relating to assassination were destroyed because of their extremely sensitive nature.* He said that eventually

---

* It is possible that copies of cables dealing with such a sensitive operation were also destroyed at CIA headquarters.

> I destroyed a great deal of traffic, because the Congo was a highly sensitive area in which -- at one period I recall we had all of our files in the burn barrels. I mean, when you wanted a file, you went over and dug it out of the burn barrell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 91.)

At the conclusion of his testimony about the assassination plot, the Chief of Station was asked to give a general characterization of the advisability of the plot and the tenor of the times in which it took place. His response indicated that although he was willing to carry out what he considered a duly authorized order, he was not convinced of the necessity of assassinating Lumumba:

> I looked upon the Agency as an executive arm of the Presidency.... Therefore, I suppose I thought that it was an order issued in due form from an authorized authority.
>
> On the other hand, I looked at it as a kind of operation that I could do without, that I thought that probably the Agency and the U.S. government could get along without. I didn't regard Lumumba as the kind of person who was going to bring on World War III or something.
>
> I might have had a somewhat different attitude if I thought that one man could bring on World War III and result in the deaths of millions of people or something, but I didn't see him in that light. I saw him as a danger to the political position of the United States in Africa, but nothing more than that. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 110-111.)

(f) Testimony of Bissell and Tweedy About the Degree of Support for and Perpetration of the Assassination Plot

There is a great variance between the testimony of Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy and the picture of the assassination plot presented by the Chief of Station and the cable traffic from the period. While the weight of the evidence demonstrates that the assassination effort was the "highest priority" at CIA headquarters among operations in the Congo, Bissell has no direct recollection of Gottlieb's mission to the Congo and Tweedy can recall nothing more than consideration of the feasibility of an assassination attempt.

(i) Tweedy Had No Recollection of the Operation To Poison Lumumba

As Chief of the Africa Division, Bronson Tweedy was the principal liaison at CIA headquarters with the Chief of Station in Leopoldville for all instructions, plans, and progress reports concerning the effort to assassinate Lumumba, which were communicated through the special PROP channel. Most of the reports and recommendations cabled to headquarters by the Chief of Station on the assassination operation were marked for Tweedy's "Eyes Only."

Tweedy personally signed both the cable which initially informed the Chief of Station that "SID" would arrive in Leopoldville, with an assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of

Station, 9/19/60) and the cable of October 7 indicating that he had debriefed Gottlieb upon his return from the Congo (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). Tweedy was also the "Eyes Only" recipient of Hedgman's reports on Gottlieb's arrival in the Congo (CIA Cable IN 18989, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/27/60) and the subsequent communications about the plan which emerged from the discussions between Gottlieb and Hedgman as the top priority -- infiltration of an agent into Lumumba's entourage to administer a lethal poison to the Congolese leader (CIA Cable IN 20857, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 9/30/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60; CIA Cable, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/17/60).

Tweedy testified, however, without benefit of reviewing these cables, that he had no knowledge of the plot to poison Lumumba:

> Q. Do you have any knowledge of a messenger from CIA headquarters having to go to the Congo to provide the Chief of Station in the Congo with instructions to carry out the assassination of Lumumba, if possible, and also provide him with the tools to carry out such an assassination, namely, poisons and medical equipment for administering them?
>
> Mr. Tweedy. No, I do not. (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 30-31)

---

* See Sections 4(a) - 4(e) for full treatment of the cables sent in the PROP channel between Tweedy and the Chief of Station in Leopoldville.

When asked his opinion about the truth of the testimony received by the Committee that poisons were delivered to the Congo by Gottlieb, who carried instructions that they were to be used in the assassination of Lumumba, Tweedy replied:

> There is nothing in my experience with the Agency which would really bear on that point whatsoever. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 39-39)

Tweedy added that if Gottlieb went to the Congo as a courier, "I will bet I knew it, but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 35). Tweedy testified that it was "perfectly possible" for lethal biological substances to have been sent to the Congo, "but I don't recall it" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 30).

In response to a question about whether he knew about a cable from headquarters informing Hedgman that a messenger was to come to the Congo with instructions for him, Tweedy said that he would be "very surprised if I didn't [know], but I certainly have no recollection of it whatsoever (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 31).

Tweedy said that he "was not going to gainsay" the testimony of the Chief of Station that a cable was sent to headquarters through a special channel requesting confirmation that the instructions were to be carried out but he did not recall it (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32-33).

Tweedy commented that rather than questioning the truth of the testimony of the Chief of Station,* the discrepancies in their testimony could be attributed to his own lack of recall:

---

* Tweedy expressed a high regard for the general credibility of the Chief of Station. Tweedy said that he never had occasion to doubt Hedgman's veracity or integrity, adding, "I would trust his memory and I certainly trust his integrity." (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

> I really am having trouble with this. I had to be reminded of so many things. . .[T]he things that I recall the most vividly about all my African experiences were. . . the things I was basically concerned with all the time, which was putting this division together and the rest of it. When it comes to operational detail I start fuzzy and you would have thought with something like thinking about Mr. Lumumba in these terms, that I would have gone to bed and got up thinking about Lumumba, I can assure you this wasn't the case. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 34)

Tweedy was firm, however, in his disbelief that "Gottlieb would have left instructions with the Chief of Station which would have empowered [him]. . . to go out and assassinate Lumumba, without any further recourse or reference to headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 32, 36). Tweedy said:

> In such a matter of this kind, headquarters would have wanted to have a last word up to the last minute. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 36)

(ii) Tweedy Testified That He Discussed With Bissell the Feasibility of Assassinating Lumumba and He Cabled Hedgman About Gaining Access to Lumumba For the Purpose of Assassination

Despite Tweedy's lack of recollection about the actual plot to poison Lumumba, he did recall exploring the feasibility of an assassination attempt.

Tweedy testified that he had discussed the subject of assassinating Lumumba "more than once" with Richard Bissell in the fall of 1960 (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 14-15). Tweedy stated that he did not know whether Bissell had consulted with any "higher authority" about exploring the possibilities for assassinating Lumumba (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 28). Generally, Tweedy said, when he received an instruction from Bissell he would proceed to implement it on the assumption that it was fully authorized above the level of DDP:

> I would proceed with it on the basis that he was authorized to give me instructions and it was up to him to bloody well know what he was empowered to tell me to do. (Tweedy, 9/9, p.13)

Tweedy characterized his discussions with Bissell about assassinating Lumumba as "contingency planning" (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 28):

> Tweedy. . . . I think it came up in the sense that Dick would have said we probably better be thinking about whether it might ever be necessary or desirable to get rid of Lumumba, in which case we presumably should be in position to assess whether we could do it or not successfully.
>
> Q. Do it, meaning carry off an assassination?
>
> Tweedy. Yes, but it was never discussed with him in any other sense but a planning exercise, . . . never were we instructed to do anything of this kind. We were instructed to ask whether such a thing would be feasible and to have the Chief of Station be thinking along those lines as well. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 15)

Tweedy said that the planning that he undertook pursuant to his conversation with Bissell included "a few" cables that he remembers sending to the Chief of Station asking him

> to keep in mind what sort of access one might ever have had to Lumumba. . .[in] the eventuality that we might wish to get rid of Mr. Lumumba personally. (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 19-21)

Tweedy did not recall inquiring about gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of abducting him from UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 24); rather he "supposed" that various means of assassination were being explored:

> Q. Would this be access to shoot him or would this be access to his personal food or drink or toiletries?
>
> Tweedy. I suppose all those types of things might have been considered. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 23)
>
> Q. In your discussions with Bissell, about the feasibility of an assassination operation, did poisons come up as one means that was being considered and which the Chief of Station should explore?
>
> Tweedy. I am sure it must have. After all, there are not many ways of doing it. Shoot a man, poison him, of course you could, I suppose, stab him or something like that. But basically you are talking about a contingency plan which I assume has the best possibility of protecting the involvement of the U.S. Government and if you want to do it in a manner which would be as distant, if that is the right word, as possible, I think poison would then stand high on the list of possibilities.

Tweedy did not "recall specifically" the response from the Chief of Station, but said he was "sure" that he received "a serious answer. . . a disciplined reply to an instruction from headquarters" (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 23,27).

Although Tweedy did not recall sending or receiving cables in a special channel concerning the "messenger" to the Congo or confirmation of his instructions, he acknowledged that the cables exploring access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassination would have been sent in a channel that was even more closely restricted than the normal CIA cable traffic (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 22, 32-33). Tweedy said destruction of such cable traffic would have been left to the discretion of the Chief of Station and he did not know whether Hedgman destroyed the Station's copies (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 22).

Tweedy said "I would be surprised if I didn't" have a conversation with Sidney Gottlieb about "anything in his inventory that could possibly be used, including lethal biological substances (Tweedy, 9/9, pp. 68-69). Tweedy "suspected" that "the first conversation along these lines would undoubtedly have been held between Dick Bissell and Sidney Gottlieb," which Tweedy then would have "followed-up" (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 69).

Tweedy maintained that the period in which he explored the means of access for assassinating Lumumba remained "a planning interval and at no point can I recall that I ever felt it was imminent that somebody would say 'go'" (Tweedy, 9/9. pp. 18-19):

> Tweedy. It was always my assumption that at the time anything like this should occur there would have been some kind of real focus on the problem at probably a very considerable policy level within the Agency. . . and it never occurred to me that I would get a call or Bissell would ask me to come down to his office and sya go to it. Nor were we ever in a position where he said that I would merely implement plan so-and-so. We never got that far.
>
> Q. You didn't have any action plans for the assassination of Lumumba that you had prepared or were aware of?

> Tweedy. No. Planning, yes, but nothing that ever got anywhere. (Tweedy, 9/9, p. 19)

It is difficult to reconcile the cable traffic with Tweedy's testimony that no action plans were launched and that no authorization for implementing the assassination operation, authorization for Hedgman's approach to his agent to explore access to Lumumba's entourage is in accord with Tweedy's description of his inquiries about gaining access to Lumumba.

However, the fact that Tweedy was personnaly informed that the Chief of Station "PLANS CONTINUE TRY IMPLEMENT OP" (CIA Cable IN 24171, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 10/7/60) is harder to reconcile with his statements that a "go ahead" on the operation was never imminent, especially in light of Tweedy's PROP cable the next week which told the Chief of Station that Lumumba's

> DISPOSITION SPONTANEOUSLY BECOMES NUMBER ONE CONSIDERATION. . . THIS CHANNEL REMAINS FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSE YOU DISCUSSED WITH COLLEAGUE AND ALSO REMAINS HIGHEST PRIORITY (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60)

(iii) Bissell Testified That He Did Not Recall Whether The Assassination Operation Had Moved From Planning To Implementation But It Was Not Against Agency Policy to Send Poisons to The Congo

Richard Bissell testified that he did not remember discussing the feasibility of assassinating Lumumba with Bronson Tweedy, but it seemed "entirely probable" to him that such discussions took place (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 3-4).

Bissell said he "may have" given Tweedy specific instructions about steps he was to take to further an assassination plan, but he did not remember to do so (Bissell, 9/10,p.4). Bissell said that exploring access to Lumumba --"almost certainly" seeking information from the Chief of Station about access for poisoning -- would have been a "key part" of his "planning and preparatory activity" but he had no specific recollection of cable communications on this subject (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 6-8). Bissell remembered that he was aware that the Chief of Station had an agent thought to have direct access to Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10, p. 80).

Bissell testified that he "most certainly" approved any cables that Tweedy sent to the Chief of Station seeking information about gaining access to Lumumba but it was so sensitive a matter (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8) Bissell added:

> I think Mr. Tweedy, on the basis of an oral authorization from me, would have had the authority to send such a cable without my signing off on it. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 8)

Bissell believed that Tweedy would have known of Gottlieb's trip to the Congo, although it was possible that Tweedy was "cut out of knowledge of the specific operation" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 21). Bissell's lack of recollection of discussing his assignment to Justin O'Donnell* with Tweedy was the reason for his speculation that

---

* Bissell's assignment to O'Donnell is discussed in Sections 5(a) (i) and 5(a)(ii), infra.

Tweedy might have been unaware of the true purpose of Gottlieb's visit (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 20-22).

Bissell did not recall cables concerning the dispatch of a messenger and subsequently confirming that his instructions were to be followed, but he said "This sounds highly likely. . . I would expect, given the background, that the confirmation would have been forthcoming" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 43).

It was "very probable," according to Bissell, that he discussed the assassination of Lumumba with Sidney Gottlieb, who was then his Science Advisor (Bissell, 9/10, p. 14). Bissell said that on a number of occasions he discussed with Gottlieb "the availability of means of incapacitation, including assassination" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 60).

Although he had no "specific recollection," Bissell assumed that, if Gottlieb went to the Congo, he had approved the mission, (which "might very well" have dealt with the assassination of Lumumba) (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 18, 20, 44). Despite his absence of specific recollection of these events, Bissell said, "There is nothing in mind that I remember that would be in conflict" with the testimony of the Chief of Station that Gottlieb carried poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

Bissell testified that it would not have been against CIA policy in the fall of 1960 to send poisons to the Congo (Bissell, 9/10, p. 35).

He classified "the act of taking the kit to the Congo. . . as still in the planning stage" (Bissell, 9/10, p. 49). Bissell acknowledged, however, that the dispatch of poisons and paraphernalia with which to administer them was an extraordinary event:

> It would indeed have been rather unusual to send such materials -- a specific kit. . . of this sort -- out to a relatively small station, unless planning for their use were quite far along. (Bissell, 9/10, p. 37).

Nonetheless, Bissell said that he "probably believed" that he had sufficient authority at that point to direct CIA officers to move from the stage of planning to implementation (Bissell, 9/10, pp. 60-61). In light of his absence of a specific recollection of these events, he stated that "if it be taken as established that Mr. Gottlieb took specific instructions 'to implement,' " Gottlieb would not have been acting beyond the mandate given to him by Bissell and it would show that the assassination plot "had then passed into an implementation phase" and that "authorization was given" (Bissell, 9/10/ pp. 39, 41, 49).

5. The Question of a Connection Between the Assassination Plot and Other Actions of CIA Officers and Operatives in the Congo

Justin O'Donnell, a senior CIA officer in the clandestine operations division in 1960, testified that during this period he had been asked by DDP Richard Bissell to go to the Congo to carry out the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12). O'Donnell said that he refused to participate in an assassination operation, but proceeded to the Congo to attempt to draw Lumumba away from the protective custody of the UN guard and place him in the hands of Congolese authorities (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14).

Shortly after O'Donnell's arrival in the Congo he was joined by a CIA agent with a criminal background who was used the following year by the CIA as part of a program to develop a stand-by assassination capability. Late in 1960, one of the operatives of the Chief of Station in Leopoldville approached this agent of O'Donnell's with a proposition to join an "execution squad" (CIA Cable IN 18739, Leopoldville to Director, 12/7/60).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell was initially approached to be part of the plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba, it is unlikely that O'Donnell was actually involved in the implementation of that plot by the Chief of Station. Whether there is any connection between the assassination plot and either of the two operatives -- QJWIN and WIROGUE -- is less clear.

(a) O'Donnell's Operations in the Congo

(i) Tweedy and the Chief of Station Agreed That a Senior Case Officer Should be Sent to the Congo to Concentrate on the Assassination Operation

In early October, 1960, several cables sent in the specially restricted PROP channel dealt with a plan to send a "senior case officer" to the Congo to aid the Chief of Station with the assassination operation.* On October 7, Bronson Tweedy informed Hedgman that he "WOULD EXPECT DISPATCH TDY [TEMPORARY DUTY] SENIOR CASE OFFICER RUN THIS OP" by supervising a third country national operative (CIA Cable OUT 78336, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/7/60). On October 15, Tweedy requested Hedgman's reaction to the suggestion of dispatching the senior case officer as soon as possible to concentrate on the assassination operation (CIA Cable OUT 81396, Tweedy to Chief of Station, 10/15/60). Two days later, the Chief of Station replied affirmatively:

> BELIEVE EARLY ASSIGNMENT SENIOR CASE OFFICER HANDLE PROP OPS EXCELLENT IDEA. (CIA Cable IN 28936, Chief of Station to Tweedy).

The Chief of Station advised that his responsibilities for "MULTIPLE OPS" had restricted the amount of time he was able to devote to the assassination operation (CIA Cable, 10/17/60).

---

* See Section 4(e), _supra_, for full treatment of these cables.

(ii) Bissell Discussed Assassination of Lumumba With O'Donnell and Sent Him to Congo: October-November 1960

Probably shortly after the Chief of Station's cable of October 17 requesting the assignment of a senior case officer to concentrate on the assassination operation, Richard Bissell broached the subject with CIA officer Justin O'Donnell.

At that time, O'Donnell was the Deputy Chief of a component of the Directorate of Plans -- the CIA's covert action arm O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 8).

Justin O'Donnell testified that in October of 1960, he was asked by Richard Bissell to undertake the mission of assassinating Patrice Lumumba (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12; 9/11/75, pp. 19, 43):

> O'Donnell: He called me in and he told me he wanted to go down to the Belgian Congo, the former Belgian Congo, and to eliminate Lumumba . . . .
>
> Q: What did you understand him to mean by eliminate?
>
> O'Donnell: To kill him and thereby eliminate his influence.
>
> Q: What was the basis for your interpreting his remarks, whatever his precise language, as meaning that he was talking about assassination rather than merely neutralizing him through some other means?
>
> O'Donnell: It was not neutralization . . . Clearly the context of our talk was to kill him. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 11-12.)

O'Donnell reacted strongly to Bissell's instruction:

> I told him that I would absolutely not have any part of killing Lumumba. He said, I want you to go over and talk to Sidney Gottlieb. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12.)

Gottlieb was a CIA scientist who was at that time the Science Advisor to Bissell (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 14).

O'Donnell said it was "inconceivable that Bissell would direct such a mission without the personal permission of Allen Dulles" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 44). But the question of authorization was never raised by Bissell:

> I assumed that he had authority from Mr. Dulles in such an important issue, but it was not discussed, nor did he purport to have higher authority to do it. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 15.)

O'Donnell promptly met with Gottlieb and testified that he was "sure that Mr. Bissell had called Gottlieb and told him I was coming over" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said that Gottlieb told him "that there were four or five ... lethal means of disposing of Lumumba" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13). O'Donnell recalled that "one of the methods was a virus and the others included poison" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 12; 9/11/75, p. 7). O'Donnell said that Gottlieb "didn't even hint ... that he had been in the Congo and that he had transported any lethal agent to the Congo" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A).

After speaking with Gottlieb, O'Donnell said:

> I then left his office, and I went back to Mr. Bissell's office and I told him in no way would I have any part in the assassination of Lumumba ... and reasserted in absolute terms that I would not be involved in a murder attempt. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 43.)

O'Donnell said that in one of his two conversations with Bissell about Lumumba, he raised the prospect "that conspiracy to commit murder being done in the District of Columbia might be in violation of federal law" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14). He said that Bissell "airily dismissed" this prospect (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Despite his refusal to participate in assassination, O'Donnell agreed to go to the Congo on a general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba "as a political factor" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 43-44):

> I said I would go down and I would have no compunction about operating to draw Lumumba out [of UN custody], to run an operation to neutralize his operations which were against Western interests, against, I thought, American interests. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 13.)

O'Donnell added that his objective was to

> neutralize Lumumba's influence ... and his activities against [a Congolese leader], whom at that time you might say was our close instrument, he was the man we had put our chips on. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 20.)

Bissell also recalled that, after their discussions about assassination, O'Donnell went to the Congo "with the assignment ... of looking at other ways of neutralizing Lumumba" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 53).

Although O'Donnell did not formulate a precise plan until he reached the Congo, he discussed a general strategy with Bissell:

> Mr. O'Donnell: I told Mr. Bissell that I would be willing to go down to neutralize his activities and operations and try to bring him out [of UN custody] and turn him over to the Congolese authorities, that is correct.
>
> Senator Mondale: Was it discussed then that his life might be taken by the Congolese authorities?
>
> Mr. O'Donnell: It was, I think, considered in the -- not to have him killed, but then it would have been a Congolese being judged by Congolese for Congolese crimes. Yes, I think it was discussed. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 38.)

There was a "very, very high probability" that Lumumba would receive capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese authorities, according to O'Donnell (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 24). But O'Donnell "had no compunction about bringing him out and then having him tried by a jury of his peers" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 14).

Although O'Donnell had expressed his aversion to assassination to Bissell and had undertaken a more general mission to "neutralize" Lumumba's influence, it was clear to him that Bissell was still interested in the assassination of Lumumba:

> in leaving at the conclusion of our second discussion ... he said, well, I wouldn't rule out that possibility -- meaning the possibility of the elimination or the killing of Lumumba -- I wouldn't rule it. In other words, even though you have said this, don't rule it out.... There is no question about it, he said, I wouldn't rule this other out, meaning the elimination or the assassination (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 45).

O'Donnell had a distinctive recollection that after his second discussion of Lumumba with Bissell, he met with Richard Helms in order to make his opposition to assassinating Lumumba a matter of record (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 44-45):

> [I]n the Agency, since you don't have documents, you have to be awfully canny and you have to get things on record, and I went into Mr. Helms' office, and I said, Dick, here is what Mr. Bissell proposed to me, and I told him that I would under no conditions do it, and Helms said you're absolutely right. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 15-16).

Richard Helms testified that it was "likely" that he had such a conversation with O'Donnell and he assumed that O'Donnell's version of their conversation was correct (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 22-23).*

William Harvey testified that O'Donnell had informed him about the conversations with Bissell:

> Mr. O'Donnell came to me and said that he had been approached by Richard Bissell ... to undertake an operation in the Congo, one of the objectives of which was the elimination of Patrice Lumumba. He also told me that he had declined to undertake this assignment. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9.)

Harvey said that in a later conversation with Bissell, Bissell told him that he had asked O'Donnell to undertake such an operation (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 9).

O'Donnell said that within forty-eight hours of his second discussion with Bissell, he departed for the Congo (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 45-46).

---

* Helms testified that he did not follow-up on this conversation in any way. He did not recall why O'Donnell had gone to the Congo or what his mission was (Helms, 9/16/75, pp. 32-33).

(iii) Bissell Testified That he Asked O'Donnell to Plan and Prepare for an Assassination Operation

Bissell remembered "very clearly" that he and O'Donnell discussed the assassination of Lumumba in the fall of 1960 (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 75) and that O'Donnell reacted negatively (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 18). According to Bissell, O'Donnell said that he thought that assassination "was an inappropriate action and that the desired object could be accomplished better in other ways" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54).

Bissell also confirmed the fact that he had asked O'Donnell to see Sidney Gottlieb (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 44).

Bissell differs with O'Donnell's account on only one important point -- the degree to which Bissell's initial assignment to O'Donnell contemplated the mounting of an operation as opposed to contingency planning. O'Donnell flatly testified that Bissell requested him to attempt to kill Lumumba. In his first testimony on the subject, Bissell said that he asked O'Donnell "to investigate the possibility of killing Lumumba" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 54; see also pp. 55, 75). In a later appearance, however, Bissell stated that O'Donnell "had been asked to plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24).

Bissell said that after his conversations with O'Donnell, he felt that it would be necessary to "postpone" the assassination operation because, "given O'Donnell's reaction, there was a risk that the planning of such an operation would be blown" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 25). Despite his impression that he might have deactivated assassination operations against Lumumba at that time, Bissell could not preclude the possibility that the Hedgman/Gobblieb poison plot continued to move foward:

> [T]his had been in my mind a very sensitive assignment to him, limited -- with the knowledge of it limited very narrowly even within the Agency. And it is difficult to separate recollection from inference on occasion. But I seem to recollect that after this conversation with him, I wanted this put very much on the back burner and inactivated for quite some time. Now that doesn't rule out the possibility that some action through completely different channels might have gone forward. But the best of my recollection is, I viewed this not only as terminating the assignment for him, but also as reason for at least postponing anything further along that line. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 25-26).

In Tweedy's mind, O'Donnell's eventual mission to the Congo was linked to assessing the possibility for assassinating Lumumba rather than to a general plan to draw Lumumba out of UN custody (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 26).

(iv) O'Donnell Arrived in the Congo and Learned That a Virus Was in the Station Safe

On October 29, the Chief of Station was informed through the PROP channel that Justin O'Donnell was soon to arrive in Leopoldville "IN FURTHERANCE THIS PROJECT" (CIA Cable OUT 86798, Fields to Chief of Station, 10/29/60). On November 3, O'Donnell arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 38052, Leopoldville to Director, 11/4/60). Chief of Station Hedgman testified that he had been made aware by cable that O'Donnell was coming to the Congo (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 40). Hedgman said it was "very possible" that as a new Chief of Station he took the dispatch to the Congo of a senior officer like O'Donnell as a signal that CIA headquarters was "dissatisfied with my handling" of Gottlieb's instructions (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 42).

Hedgman had a general picture of O'Donnell's mission:

> I understood it to be that -- similar to mine, that is, the removal or neutralization of Lumumba ... I have no clear recollection of his discussing the assassination. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 54.)

Hedgman said that he had no recollection of O'Donnell indicating one way or the other whether he was considering assassination as a means of "neutralizing" Lumumba (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Hedgman said, "in view of my instructions, I may have assumed that he was" considering assassination (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 55). Generally, however, Hedgman perceived O'Donnell as being unenthusiastic about his mission (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 56, 88-89).

When O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he met with the Chief of Station, who informed him that there was "a virus in the safe" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 7-A; 6/9/75, p. 16). O'Donnell said he assumed it was a "lethal agent" (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 37), although Hedgman was not explicit:

> I knew it wasn't for somebody to get his polio shot up to date. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 16.)

He added that if the virus was to be used for medical purposes, "it would have been in the custody of the State Department" personnel, not the CIA station (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 36).

O'Donnell said that he did not recall that Hedgman mentioned the source of the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 8).* But O'Donnell assumed that it had come from Sidney Gottlieb's office:

> It would have had to have come from Washington, in my estimation, and I would think, since it had been discussed with Gottlieb that it probably would have emanated from his office. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 28.)

Hedgman did not recall discussing Gottlieb's trip to the Congo with O'Donnell, but "assumed" that he did so (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 60-61).

O'Donnell was "certain" that the virus had arrived before he did (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24). He was surprised to learn that such a virus was being held at the Leopoldville station because he had refused an assassination mission before departing for the Congo (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17).

O'Donnell stated that he knew of no other instance where a lethal biological substance was in the possession of a CIA station (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50). He assumed that its purpose was assassination:

---

* When O'Donnell was informed about Hedgman's testimony on the visit of Gottlieb to the Congo and the plot to poison Lumumba, he said, "I believe absolutely in its credibility" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 53). O'Donnell found nothing in the facts as he knew them, nor in Hedgman's character to raise a question about that testimony. O'Donnell regarded Hedgman as "an honest and a decent man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19) -- "a totally truthful man" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).

> My feeling definitely is that it was for a specific purpose, and was just not an all-purpose capability there begin held for targets of opportunity, unspecified targets. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 49.)

At several points, O'Donnell stated that he did not think that Lumumba was the target specified for the use of the virus (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 17; 9/11/75, p. 48). But he allowed for that possibility:

> I supposed it was for a lethal operation, very possibly Lumumba, but very possibly in connection with other people. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 24; accord. 6/9/75, p. 17.)

His final word on the subject was that he assumed that the "specific purpose" of the virus was the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 50).

O'Donnell said that the Chief of Station never indicated that O'Donnell was to employ the virus (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 52). In fact, O'Donnell testified that Hedgman "never discussed his assassination effort, he never even indicated that this was one." (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 54.)

While Hedgman has no direct recollection of discussing his assassination operation with O'Donnell, he "assumed" that he had at least discussed with O'Donnell the problem of gaining access to Lumumba for the purpose of assassinating him (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 55, 60). O'Donnell testified, however, that because he was "morally opposed to assassination" he would "absolutely not" have explored the means by which such access could be gained, nor would he have undertaken a mission to the Congo if it involved assessment of the situation for an assassination operation by someone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26).

O'Donnell was "sure" that he "related everything" to Hedgman about his conversations with Bissell concerning the assassination of Lumumba (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 46). Hedgman, however, had no recollection of learning this from O'Donnell (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 56).

Beyond this, O'Donnell said that his discussions of assassination with Hedgman were general and philosophical, dealing with "the morality of assassinations" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 46, 54):

> From my point of view I told him I had moral objections to it, not just qualms, but objections. I didn't think it was the right thing to do. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 9).

When asked to characterize Hedgman's attitude toward assassination based on those discussions, O'Donnell said:

> I will answer your question just as fairly and as scrupulously as I can. I have a great deal of respect for Hedgman. And if he said something, I would believe him to be speaking the truth as he knew it without shading it.... The best I could say, I think, would be this, that he would not have been opposed in principle to assassination in the interests of national security.... I know that he is a man of great moral perception and decency and honor, and so forth. And that it would disturb him to be engaged in something like that. But I think I would have to say that in our conversations, my memory of those, at no time would he rule it out as being a possibility. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 18.)

(v) O'Donnell Planned to "Neutralize" Lumumba by Turning Him Over to Congolese Authorities and Requested the Assignment of Agent QJWIN to Leopoldville as His Alter Ego

After Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo, he formulated a plan for "neutralizing" Lumumba by drawing him away from the custody of the UN force which was guarding his residence:

> O'Donnell: [W]hat I wanted to do was to get him out, to trick him out, if I could, and then turn him over ... to the legal authorities and let him stand trial. Because he had atrocity attributed to him for which he could very well stand trial.
>
> Q: And for which he could very well have received capital punishment?
>
> O'Donnell: Yes. And I am not opposed to capital punishment. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 20-21.)*

To implement his plan, O'Donnell made arrangements to rent "an observation post over the palace in which Lumumba was safely ensconced"

---

* According to an earlier report from the Chief of Station, it was the view of the Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations that arrest by Congolese authorities was "JUST A TRICK TO ASSASSINATE LUMUMBA" (CIA Cable Leop Chief of Station to Director, 10/11/60). The Chief of Station proceeded to recommend Lumumba's arrest in the same cable:

> STATION HAS CONSISTENTLY URGED [CONGOLESE] LEADERS ARREST LUMUMBA IN BELIEF LUMUMBA WILL CONTINUE BE THREAT TO STABILITY CONGO UNTIL REMOVED FROM SCENE (CIA Cable, 10/11/60).

(O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20).* O'Donnell also "spotted" a member of the UN guard and made his acquaintance to recruit him for an attempt to lure Lumumba outside UN protective custody (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 20; 9/11/75, p. 21).

O'Donnell said that he cabled progress reports on his plan to CIA headquarters (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 26). He also said that he informed the Chief of Station about his plan (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 56).

In connection with his effort to draw Lumumba out of UN custody, O'Donnell arranged for a CIA agent, whose code name was QJWIN, to come to the Congo to work with him (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 19):

> What I wanted to use him for was ... counter-espionage[.]... I had to screen the U.S. participation in this ... by using a foreign national whom we knew, trusted, and had worked with ... the idea was for me to use him as an alter ego. (O'Donnell Tr., pp. 19-20.)

In mid-November, two cables from Leopoldville urged CIA headquarters to send QJWIN as soon as possible (CIA Cable IN 41261, Leopoldville to Director, 11/11/60) with this message:

> LOCAL OPERATIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES REQUIRE IMMEDIATE EXPEDITION OF QJWIN TRAVEL TO LEOPOLDVILLE. (CIA Cable IN 41556, Leopoldville to Director, 11/13/60.)

---

* A cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy in mid-November reported that the double guard of United Nations and Congolese troops around Lumumba's residence thwarted this plan: "CONCENTRIC RINGS OF DEFENSE MAKE ESTABLISHMENT OF OBSERVATION POST IMPOSSIBLE" (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60).

The cables contained no exploration of this sense of urgency about the "operational circumstances."

(b) Agent QJWIN's Mission in the Congo: November-December 1960

QJWIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background, recruited in Europe (Memorandum to CIA Finance Division, Re: Payments to QJWIN, 1/31/61), and supervised by CIA officer Arnold Silver. In November 1960, at O'Donnell's request (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19), agent QJWIN was dispatched to the Congo by Silver, to undertake a mission that "might involve a large element of personal risk." (CIA Cable IN 36814, 11/2/60.)*

A dispatch from the CIA headquarters on his pending trip to Africa made clear the high degree of sensitivity accorded to his mission:

> In view of the extreme sensitivity of the objective for which we want him to perform his task, he was not told precisely what we want him to do.... Instead, he was told ... that we would like to have him spot, assess, and recommend some dependable, quick-witted persons for our use.... It was thought best to withhold our true, specific requirements pending the final decision to use [him]. (CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)

---

* Part of the purpose in dispatching QJWIN to Africa was to send him from the Congo to another African country for an unspecified mission. QJWIN's mission to this country is not explained in the cable traffic between CIA headquarters and the various stations that dealt with him.

There is no indication in CIA files as to whether QJWIN completed this mission. O'Donnell said he had no knowledge of any mission that would have taken QJWIN to this country (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 32-33).

This message itself was deemed too sensitive to be retained at the station: "this dispatch should be reduced to cryptic necessary notes and destroyed after the first reading." (CIA Dispatch, AUDW-147, 11/2/60.)

QJWIN arrived in Leopoldville on November 21, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 49486, 11/29/60) and returned to Europe in late December 1960 (CIA Cable OUT 54710, Director to Leopoldville, 12/9/60).

The CIA Inspector General's Report said that QJWIN

> had been recruited earlier by Arnold Silver for use in a special operation in the Congo [the assassination of Patrice Lumumba] to be run by Justin O'Donnell. (I.G. Report, p. 38.)

However, both O'Donnell and Bissell testified that O'Donnell refused to be associated with an assassination operation.* Instead, O'Donnell said he went to the Congo to attempt to snatch Lumumba from the protective custody of the U.N. guard and place him in the hands of the Congolese army. (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, pp. 13-14, 37.)

According to O'Donnell, QJWIN was a man who was capable of undertaking an assassination mission:

> O'Donnell: ... I would say that he would not be a man of many scruples.
>
> Q: So he was a man capable of doing anything?
>
> O'Donnell: I would think so, yes.
>
> Q: And that would include assassination?
>
> O'Donnell: I would think so.
>
> (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 35-36.)

---

* See Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii) above.

But O'Donnell had no knowledge that QJWIN was ever used for an assassination mission (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 36, 42).

O'Donnell said that, as far as he knew, he was the only CIA officer with supervisory responsibility for QJWIN and QJWIN did not report independently to anyone else (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 28). When asked if it was possible that QJWIN had a mission independent of that he was performing for O'Donnell, he said:

> O'Donnell: Yes, that is possible -- or it could have been that somebody contacted him after he got down there, that they wanted him to do something along the lines of assassination. I don't know. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29.)

But he discounted this possibility as "highly unlikely" because it would be a departure from standard CIA practice -- placing an agent in a position of knowledge superior to that of his supervising officer (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 29).

Despite O'Donnell's doubt that QJWIN had an independent line of responsibility to the Chief of Station, a cable of November 29 shows that Hedgman was aware of WIN's activities.

In that cable, the Chief of Station reported through the PROP channel to Tweedy that QJWIN had begun implementation of a plan to "PIERCE BOTH CONGOLESE AND UN GUARDS" to enter Lumumba's residence and "PROVIDE ESCORT OUT OF RESIDENCE" (CIA Cable IN 49486, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/29/60). O'Donnell said that he had directed QJWIN to make the acquaintanceship of the member of the UN force whose help he sought for the plan to snatch Lumumba from UN custody

(O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 21). But Lumumba had left UN custody at this point to travel toward his stronghold at Stanleyville. This did not deter QJWIN:

> VIEW CHANGE IN LOCATION TARGET, QJWIN ANXIOUS GO STANLEYVILLE AND EXPRESSED DESIRE EXECUTE PLAN BY HIMSELF WITHOUT USING ANY APPARAT (CIA Cable, 11/29/60).

It is unclear whether this latter "plan" contemplated assassination as well as abduction. An affirmative reply from headquarters came through the PROP channel the next day which was also susceptible of interpretation as an assassination order:

> CONCUR QJWIN GO STANLEYVILLE.... WE ARE PREPARED CONSIDER DIRECT ACTION BY QJWIN BUT WOULD LIKE YOUR READING ON SECURITY FACTORS. HOW CLOSE WOULD THIS PLACE [UNITED STATES] TO THE ACTION? (CIA Cable OUT 98314, Chief of Africa Division to Chief of Station, 11/30/60.)

O'Donnell said that agent QJWIN's stay in the Congo was "coextensive with my own, allowing for the fact that he came after I did." (O'Donnell, 6/9/75, p. 19.) O'Donnell said he left the Congo around the time of Lumumba's death in Katanga at the hands of Congolese authorities. (O'Donnell, p. 20.) QJWIN left in December shortly after Lumumba was captured by the Congolese army.

In a memorandum to arrange the accounting for QJWIN's activities in the Congo, William K. Harvey -- under whom O'Donnell had worked before being detached for assignment to the Congo -- noted the success of QJWIN's mission: "QJWIN was sent on this trip for a specific, highly sensitive operational purpose which has been completed" (Memorandum for Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). O'Donnell explained Harvey's reference to the fact that QJWIN's mission had been "completed" by saying that once Lumumba was in the hands of the Congolese authorities "the reason for the mounting of the project ... had become moot" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). When asked if he and QJWIN were responsible for Lumumba's departure from UN custody and subsequent capture, O'Donnell said: "Absolutely not" (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 35). Harvey did not recall the meaning of the memorandum, but he assumed that O'Donnell's return from the Congo constituted the "completion" of QJWIN's mission (Harvey, affidavit, p.).

Despite the indication in the Inspector General's Report that QJWIN may have been recruited initially for an assassination mission and the suggestive language of the cables at the end of November, there is no clear evidence that QJWIN was actually involved in any assassination plan or attempt. The CIA officers who were involved in or knowledgeable of an assassination plot against Lumumba gave no testimony that tended to show that QJWIN was related to that plot.

The Chief of Station had a "vague recollection" that QJWIN was in the Congo working for Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) But Hedgman did not recall why QJWIN was in the Congo. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) QJWIN was not a major operative of Hedgman's. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Richard Bissell and Bronson Tweedy did not recall anything about QJWIN's mission in the Congo

(Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 54-57; Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 54, 61).

William Harvey, from whose division QJWIN was on loan for his Congo assignment, had no specific knowledge of WIN's activities in the Congo:

> I was kept informed of the arrangements for QJWIN's trip to the Congo and, subsequently, of his presence in the Congo. I do not know specifically what QJWIN did in the Congo. I do not think that I ever had such knowledge.... If QJWIN were to be used on an assassination mission, it would have been cleared with me. I was never informed that he was to be used for such a mission. (Harvey affidavit, p. .)

He stated that Arnold Silver probably wrote the memoranda concerning QJWIN and submitted them for HARVEY's signature (Harvey affidavit, p.).

(c) QJWIN's Connection to Project ZRRIFLE

After leaving the Congo in early 1961, QJWIN was used by CIA officer William Harvey as the principal asset in Project ZRRIFLE, a project which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders.* QJWIN's role in Project ZRRIFLE was to "SPOT" figures of the European underworld who could be utilized as agents by the CIA if required. Harvey stated that before the formation of Project ZRRIFLE:

---

* For a full treatment of Project ZRRIFLE, see Section ____, *infra*, on the "Executive Action Capability."

> Arnold Silver had not previously used QJWIN as an assassination capability or even viewed him as such. (Harvey affidavit, p.)

Although Harvey also had discussions with Sidney Gottlieb in connection with Project ZRRIFLE, he believed that Gottlieb never mentioned to him either QJWIN's activities in the Congo or Gottlieb's own trip to Leopoldville (Harvey affidavit, p.). Harvey had consulted with Arnold Silver about the initiation of Project ZRRIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

The Chief of Station in Leopoldville testified that he had never heard of Project ZRRIFLE, nor was he aware of any CIA project to develop the capability of assassinating foreign leaders. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 93.) Furthermore, Hedgman said that he was "quite certain" that he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey at any time. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 95.) Hedgman testified that Arnold Silver came to the Congo on a counter-intelligence mission during his tenure, but they did not discuss the plan to assassinate Lumumba. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 92.)

An interesting note on the value accorded QJWIN by the CIA and the inherent predicament for an intelligence agency that employs hoodlums is found in a cable from CIA headquarters to Arnold Silver in 1962. The CIA had learned that QJWIN was about to go on trial in Europe on smuggling charges. The cable suggested:

> IF ... INFOR TRUE WE MAY WISH ATTEMPT QUASH CHARGES OR ARRANGE SOMEHOW SALVAGE QJWIN FOR OUR PURPOSES. (CIA Cable OUT 73943, 4/18/62.)

(d) Agent QJWIN Was Asked By Hedgman's Operative WIROGUE to Join an "Execution Squad": December 1960

The one incident where there is an explicit reference to assassination in connection with QJWIN involved his contact with WIROGUE, another asset of the Congo station.

WIROGUE was an "essentially stateless" European who was " a forger and former bank robber" and had fought with the French Foreign Legion. (Inspector General Memorandum, 3/14/75.) He was sent to the Congo after being given plastic surgery and a toupee by the CIA so that he would not be recognized by Europeans traveling through the Congo. (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) WIROGUE was assessed by the CIA as a man who "LEARNS QUICKLY AND CARRIES OUT ANY ASSIGNMENT WITHOUT REGARD FOR DANGER" (CIA Cable OUT 86554, Africa Division to Leopoldville, 10/27/60).

The Chief of Station described WIROGE as "a man with a rather unsavory reputation, who would try anything once, at least." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman used him as "a general utility agent" because "I felt we needed surveillance capability, developing new contacts, various things." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 96.) Hedgman supervised WIROGUE directly and did not put WIROGUE in touch with Justin O'Donnell. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

A report on agent WIROGUE, prepared for the CIA Inspector General's office in 1975, described the training and tasking he received:

> On 19 September 1960 two members of Africa Division met with him to discuss "an operational assignment in Africa Division." In connection with this assignment, WIROGUE/1 was to be trained in demolitions, small arms, and medical immunization.... In October 1960 a cable to Leopoldville stated that ... Headquarters [had] ... intent to use him as utility agent in order to "(a) organize and conduct a surveillance team; (b) intercept packages; (c) blow up bridges; and (d) execute other assignments requiring positive action. His utilization is not to be restricted to Leopoldville." (I.G. Memorandu, 3/14/75.)

WIROGUE made his initial contact with Hedgman in Leopoldville on December 2, 1960 (CIA Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60). He was given two instructions by Hedgman: (1) to "build cover during initial period;" and (2) to "spot persons for [a] surveillance team" of intelligence assets in the province where Lumumba's support was strongest. (CIA Cable IN 18739, 12/17/60.)

Soon after receiving these instructions, agent WIROGUE approached QJWIN and asked him to join an "execution squad." This incident is described by Leopoldville Chief of Station Hedgman in a cable to CIA headquarters (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 99):

> QJWIN WHO RESIDES SAME HOTEL AS WIROGUE REPORTED LATTER TOLD HIM HE HAD LIVED ALASKA, JAPAN, SOUTH AMERICA, GERMANY AND OTHER PARTS EUROPE. QJWIN SAID WIROGUE SMELLED AS THOUGH HE IN INTEL BUSINESS. STATION DENIED ANY INFO ON WIROGUE. 14 DEC QJWIN REPORTED WIROGUE HAD OFFERED HIM THREE HUNDRED DOLLARS PER MONTH TO PARTICIPATE IN INTEL NET AND BE MEMBER "EXECUTION SQUAD." WHEN QJWIN SAID HE NOT INTERESTED, WIROGUE ADDED THERE WOULD BE BONUSES FOR SPECIAL JOBS. UNDER QJWIN QUESTIONING, WIROGUE LATER SAID HE WORKINF FOR [AMERICAN] SERVICE.
>
> ... IN DISCUSSING LOCAL CONTACTS, WIROGUE MENTIONED QJWIN BUT DID NOT ADMIT TO HAVING TRIED RECRUIT HIM. THEN [CHIEF OF STATION] TRIED LEARN WHETHER WIROGUE HAD MADE APPROACH LATTER CLAIMED HAD TAKEN NO STEPS. [CHIEF OF STATION] WAS UNABLE CONTRADICT, AS DID NOT WISH REVEAL QJWIN CONNECTION [CIA]. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17, 60.)

The cable also expressed Hedgman's concern about WIROGUE's actions:

> ... LEOP CONCERNED BY WIROGUE FREE WHEELING AND LACK SECURITY. STATION HAS ENOUGH HEADACHES WITHOUT WORRYING ABOUT AGENT WHO NOT ABLE HANDLE FINANCES AND WHO NOT WILLING FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS. IF HQS DESIRES, WILLING KEEP HIM ON PROBATION, BUT IF CONTINUE HAVE DIFFICULTIES, BELIEVE WIROGUE RECALL BEST SOLUTION. (CIA Cable, Leopoldville to Director, 12/17/60.)

WIROGUE's attempt to recruit QJWIN for an execution squad is explained by Hedgman as a mistake and by the actions of QJWIN as an unauthorized, unexpected contact which he did not initiate.

The Chief of Station testified that he had not instructed WIROGUE to make this kind of proposition to QJWIN or anyone else. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.) He added:

> I would like to stress that I don't know what WIROGUE was talking about as a[n] "execution squad," and I am sure he was never tasked to go out and execute anyone. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Hedgman suggested that WIROGUE may have concocted the idea of an execution squad:

> His idea of what an intelligence operative should do, I think, had been gathered by reading a few novels or something of the sort. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 100.)

Justin O'Donnell had no knowledge of an attempt by anyone connected to the CIA to recruit an execution squad and no recollection of WIROGUE (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, pp. 39-42). O'Donnell mentioned that agent QJWIN was considered for use on a "strong arm squad," but said that this was for purposes more general than assassinations:

> surveillance teams where you have to go into crime areas ... where you need a fellow that if he gets in a box can fight his way out of it. (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 36).

Richard Bissell recalled nothing of the WIROUGE approach to QJWIN (Bissell, 9/11/75, p. 71). Bronson Tweedy did recall that WIROGUE was "dispatched on a general purpose mission" to the Congo (Tweedy, 9/9/75, p. 63). But Tweedy testified that WIROGUE would "absolutely not" have been used on an assassination mission against Lumumba because "he was basically dispatched, assessed and dealt with by the balance of the Division" rather than by the two people in the Africa Division -- Tweedy himself and his deputy, Glenn Fields -- who would have known that the assassination of Lumumba was being considered (Tweedy, 9/9/75, pp. 64-65).

The Chief of Station said that if the WIROGUE incident was connected to an actual assassination plan, he would have transmitted a message in a more narrowly restricted channel than that in which this cable was sent. His cable on WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN was sent to headquarters with a security designation that allowed much wider distribution than the PROP cables that he sent and received concerning the Gottlieb assassination assignment. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 102.) In contrast, he limited distribution of the cable about

WIROGUE only as a CIA officer would "normally do ... when you speak in a derogatory manner of an asset." (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 101)

The Chief of Station maintained that WIROGUE's proposition to QJWIN to join an "execution squad" could be attributed to WIROGUE's "freewheeling" nature. Hedgman said:

> I had difficulty controlling him in that he was not a professional intelligence officer as such. He seemed to act on his own without seeking guidance or authority ... I found he was rather an unguided missile ... the kind of man that could get you in trouble before you knew you were in trouble.... (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 96-97).

But Hedgman did not disavow all responsibility for WIROGUE's actions:

> [I]f you give a man an order and he carries it out and causes a problem for the Station, why then as Chief of Station, well, you accept responsibility. (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 97.)

In sum, the Chief of Station testified that despite the fact that the CIA was interested in the assassination of Lumumba during this period, agent WIROGUE's attempt to form an "execution squad" was an unauthorized, maverick action, unconnected to the CIA assassination plan.

Nonetheless, the fact that WIROGUE was to be trained in "medical immunization" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75) raises the possibility that he was connected to the plot to assassinate Lumumba by means of lethal biological substances. The 1975 report on WIROGUE's case by the Inspector General's office leaves this question open. The report concludes with the statement that "WIROGUE/1 spent most of his time trying to develop contacts and was not directly involved in any particular operation." (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75.) But, when the report was circulated in the Inspector General's office, the following comment was handwritten by Scott Breckinridge, one of the principal authors of the 1967 report on CIA involvement in assassination attempts: "ROGUE's pitch is too clear to be discarded out of hand as 'exceeding instructions.'" (I.G. Memorandum, 3/14/75)

6. The Question of Whether the CIA Was Involved in Bringing About Lumumba's Death in Katanga

There is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga. The CIA officers most closely connected to the plot to poison Lumumba testified uniformly that they knew of no CIA involvement in Lumumba's death.

(a) Lumumba's Escape from UN Custody, Capture by Congolese Army, and Imprisonment at Thysville: November 27-December 3, 1960

The strongest hint that the CIA may have been involved in the capture of Lumumba by Mobutu's troops after his departure from UN custody on November 27, was contained in a PROP cable from the Chief of Station to Tweedy on November 14 (CIA Cable IN 42478, Chief of Station to Tweedy, 11/14/60). In the cable, Hedgman reported that an agent of his had learned that Lumumba's

> POLITICAL FOLLOWERS IN STANLEYVILLE DESIRE THAT HE BREAK OUT OF HIS CONFINEMENT AND PROCEED TO THAT CITY BY CAR TO ENGAGE IN POLITICAL ACTIVITY. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

The Chief of Station was confident that he would have foreknowledge of Lumumba's departure and that action plans were prepared for that eventuality:

> DECISION ON BREAKOUT WILL PROBABLY BE MADE SHORTLY. STATION EXPECTS TO BE ADVISED BY [AGENT] OF DECISION WHEN MADE.... STATION HAS SEVERAL POSSIBLE ASSETS TO USE IN EVENT OF BREAKOUT AND STUDYING SEVERAL PLANS OF ACTION. (CIA Cable, 11/14/60.)

There is no other evidence, however, that the CIA actually gained prior knowledge of Lumumba's plan to depart for Stanleyville. In fact, a cable from Leopoldville on the day after Lumumba's escape betrays the station's complete ignorance about the circumstances of Lumumba's departure (CIA Cable IN 48484, Leopoldville to Director, 11/28/60).

But the same cable raises at least a question as to whether the CIA was involved in the capture of Lumumba enroute by Congolese troops:

> [STATION] WORKING WITH [CONGOLESE GOVERNMENT] TO GET ROADS BLOCKED AND TROOPS ALERTED [BLOCK] POSSIBLE ESCAPE ROUTE. (CIA Cable, 11/28/60.)

A cable of December 2 reporting Lumumba's capture militates against CIA involvement, however, because it portrays the Congolese forces as the source of the station's information (CIA Cable IN 10643, Leopoldville to Director, 12/3/60).

The Chief of Station testified that he was "quite certain that there was no Agency involvement in any way" in Lumumba's departure from UN custody and that he had no foreknowledge of Lumumba's plan (Hedgman, 8/21/75, pp. 63-64). He stated that he consulted with Congolese officers about the possible routes Lumumba might take to Stanleyville, but he was "not a major assistance" in tracking down Lumumba prior to his capture (Hedgman, 8/21/75, p. 65).

Despite the fact that O'Donnell had planned to draw Lumumba out of UN custody and turn him over to Congolese authorities, he insisted that Lumumba escaped by his own devices and was not tricked by the CIA (O'Donnell, 9/11/75, p. 22).

(b) Transfer of Lumumba to Katanga Where He Was Killed: January 17, 1960

The contemporaneous cable traffic shows that the CIA was kept informed of Lumumba's condition and movements in January of 1961 by the Congolese and that the CIA still considered Lumumba a serious political threat. But there is no direct evidence of CIA involvement in bringing about Lumumba's death in Katanga.

---

* Excerpts from cable traffic of January 1961 and from the testimony of CIA officers Hedgman, Tweedy, O'Donnell, and Helms (investigative report) should be inserted.

7. The Question of the Level at which the Assassination Plot Was Authorized

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

At the least, the chronological relationship between strong Presidential or other White House expressions of hostility to Lumumba and CIA steps toward the assassination of Lumumba is close enough to make it appear that Dulles thought he was acting in response to pressure from above in approving assassination as one means of removing Lumumba from the political scene.

Nevertheless, there is enough countervailing testimony by Eisenhower Administration officials and enough ambiguity in the records of high-level policy meetings to raise a doubt as to whether President Eisenhower intended an assassination effort against Lumumba.

The chain of significant events in the Lumumba case begins with the testimony that President Eisenhower made a statement at a meeting of the National Security Council in the Summer or early Fall of 1960 that came across to one staff member in attendance as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba. The next link is a memorandum of the Special Group meeting of August 25, 1960, which indicated that when the President's "extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action" were conveyed, the Special

Group

> agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960)

The next day CIA Director Allen Dulles, who had attended the Special Group meeting, personally cabled to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE . . . A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Leopoldville, 8/26/60). Dulles added: "YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE."

Although the Dulles cable does not explicitly mention assassination, Richard Bissell -- the CIA official under whose aegis the assassination effort against Lumumba took place -- testified that, in his opinion, this cable was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting and signaled to him that the President had authorized assassination as one means of removing Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 33-34, 61-62; see Section 7(c), infra). Bronson Tweedy, who bore the primary administrative responsibility for activities against Lumumba, testified that the Dulles cable confirmed the policy that no measure, including assassination, was to be overlooked in the attempt to remove Lumumba from a position of influence (Tweedy, 10/9/75, pp. 4-5).

On September 19, 1960, Bissell and Tweedy cabled the Chief of Station to expect a messenger from CIA headquarters. Two days later, in the presence of the President at a meeting of the National Security

Council, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "would remain a grave danger as long as he was not yet disposed of" (Memorandum, 460th NSC Meeting, 9/21/60). Five days after this meeting, a CIA scientist arrived in Leopoldville and provided the Chief of Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had authorized this operation.

Two mitigating factors weaken this chain just enough so that it will not support an absolute finding of Presidential authorization for the assassination effort against Lumumba.

First, the two officials of the Eisenhower Administration responsible to the President for national security affairs testified that they knew of no Presidential approval for, or knowledge of, an assassination plot.

Second, the minutes of discussions at meetings of the National Security Council and its Special Group do not record an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba. The Secretary of the Special Group maintained that his memoranda reflect the actual language used at the meetings without omission or euphemism for extremely sensitive statements (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 18-19). NSC staff executives stated, however, that there was a strong possibility that a statement as sensitive as an assassination order would have been omitted from the record or handled by means of euphemism. Several high Government officials involved in policy-making and planning for covert operations testified that the language in these minutes clearly indicated that assassination was contemplated at the NSC as one means of eliminating Lumumba as a political threat; other officials testified to the contrary.

(a) High-Level Meetings at which "Getting Rid of Lumumba" Was Discussed

(i) Dillon Testified that the Question of Assassination Was Raised at Pentagon Meeting: Summer 1960

In late July 1960, Patrice Lumumba visited the United States and met with Secretary of State Christian Herter and Undersecretary of State C. Douglas Dillon. While Lumumba was in Washington, D.C., Secretary Herter pledged aid to the newly formed Government of the Congo (New York Times, 7/28/60, p.).

According to Dillon, the impression that Lumumba left with the Government officials was that of an irrational, almost psychotic personality:

> When he was in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the Secretary in my presence . . . he would never look you in the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the particular things that we wanted to discuss . . . . You had a feeling that he was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only characterize as messianic . . . . [H]e was just not a rational being. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 24.)

Dillon said that the willingness of the United States Government to work with Lumumba vanished after these meetings:

> [T]he impression that was left was . . . very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time . . . . We [had] hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to better understanding with him. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 23-24.)

Dillon testified that shortly after Lumumba's visit to Washington, in late July or August, he attended a meeting at the Pentagon where representatives of the State Department, Defense Department, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the CIA were present (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 17-20, 25-26).*

According to Dillon, "a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised" at the meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 15; see also 17, 25). Dillon did not recall anything about the language used in raising the question (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon assumed that when the subject of Lumumba's assassination was raised, "it was turned off by the CIA" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30). Dillon said that "the CIA people, whoever they were, were negative to any such action" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). This opposition "wasn't moral," according to Dillon, but rather an objection on the grounds that it was "not a possible thing" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Dillon said the CIA reaction "might have been" made out of the feeling that the group was too large for such a sensitive discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 60).

---

* Dillon was unable to recall the precise date of this meeting (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 25-26).

Dillon was clear about the fact that "top level" CIA people were in attendance, although he did not remember who lodged the negative reaction to the assassination question (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 22, 25). He said it "would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly [General] Cabell . . . most likely Cabell" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 25). He added that it was "very likely" that Richard Bissell was in attendance (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 21).

Dillon stated that this discussion could not have served as authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 31). But he believed that the expression of concern typified a prevalent attitude toward Lumumba that might have justified the CIA's development of a capability to assassinate him:

> I think they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability . . . just by knowing the concern that everyone had about Lumumba. . . . They wouldn't have had to tell anyone about that. That is just developing their own internal capability, and then they would have to come and get permission. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 30)

Dillon testified that he had never heard any mention of the plot to poison Lumumba; nor, by implication, had he heard even a hint that the CIA asked permission to mount such an operation (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 50). But after being informed of the poison plot, Dillon made the following comment about the Pentagon meeting he attended:

> I think it is . . . likely that it might have been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in August. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 61)

Dillon said that it was unlikely that formal notes were taken at the meeting or preserved because it was a small "ad hoc" group rather than an official body (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 18). Such interdepartmental meetings were "not unusual," according to Dillon (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 20).

The only officials Dillon named as probable participants other than the CIA representatives were Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas and Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 19, 21). Douglas stated that it was possible that he attended such a meeting at the Pentagon, but he does not recall it (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Nor does he recall the question of Lumumba's assassination ever being raised in his presence (Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75). Likewise, Irwin stated that it was "likely" that he attended the meeting to which Dillon referred; but he did not remember whether he was present "at any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 3).

(ii) Robert Johnson Testified That He Heard the President Order Lumumba's Assassination at an NSC Meeting

Robert H. Johnson, a member of the National Security

Council staff from 1951 to January 1962, offered what he termed a "clue" to the extent of Presidential involvement in the decision to assassinate Lumumba (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5).* Johnson recounted the following occurrence at an NSC meeting in the Summer of 1960 which began with a briefing on world developments by the Director of Central Intelligence:

---

* Robert Johnson introduced his testimony with the following statement:

> . . . I would like to preface my remarks by pointing out that my decision to offer testimony to this committee has involved for me a profound personal, moral dilemma. In my role as a member of the NSC Staff for ten and one-half years, I was privy to a great deal of information that involved relationships of confidentiality with high officials of the United States government. I have always taken very seriously the responsibilities implied in such relationships.
>
> These responsibilities extend, in my view, far beyond questions of security classification or other legal or foreign policy concerns. They relate to the very basis of human society and government -- to the relationships of trust without which no free society can long survive and no government can operate.
>
> I have been forced by recent developments, however, to weigh against these considerable responsibilities my broader responsibilities as a citizen on an issue that involves major questions of public morality, as well as questions of sound policy. Having done so, I have concluded, not without a great deal of reluctance, to come to your committee with information bearing upon your inquiry into government decisions relating to the assassination of foreign leaders. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 4-5)

After his tenure on the staff of the National Security Council, Robert Johnson served from 1962 to 1967 on the Policy Planning Council at the Department of State.

> At some time during that discussion, President Eisenhower said something -- I can no longer remember his words -- that came across to me as an order for the assassination of Lumumba who was then at the center of political conflict and controversy in the Congo. There was no discussion; the meeting simply moved on. I remember my sense of that moment quite clearly because the President's statement came as a great shock to me. I cannot, however, reconstruct the moment more specifically.
>
> Although I was convinced at the time -- and remained convinced when I thought about it later -- that the President's statement was intended as an order for the assassination of Lumumba, I must confess that in thinking about the incident more recently I have had some doubts. As is well known, it was quite uncharacteristic of President Eisenhower to make or announce policy decisions in NSC meetings. Certainly, it was strange if he departed from that normal pattern on a subject so sensitive as this. Moreover, it was not long after this, I believe, that Lumumba was dismissed as premier by Kasavubu in an action that was a quasi-coup. I have come to wonder whether what I really heard was only an order for some such political action. All I can tell you with any certainty at the present moment is my sense of that moment in the Cabinet Room of the White House. (Johnson, 6/18/75, pp. 6-7)

Johnson "presumed" that the President made his statement while "looking toward the Director of Central Intelligence" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 11). He was unable to recall with any greater specificity the words used by the President (Johnson 9/13/75, p. 10).

When asked about the strength of the possibility that he had heard only a general directive for the political overthrow of Lumumba, Johnson testified that it was his clear impression at the time of the meeting, and has remained so for the fifteen years since, that he had heard an assassination order:

> Q: . . . Would it be fair to say that although you allow for the possibility that a coup or some more general

> political action was being discussed, it is your clear impression that you had heard an order for the assassination of Lumumba?
>
> Johnson: It was my clear impression at the time.
>
> Q: And it remains your impression now?
>
> Johnson: It remains my impression now. I have reflected on this other kind of possibility, but that is the sense . . . that persists. (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 24-25)

Johnson explained that his allowance for the possibility that he had heard an order for a coup did not disturb his recollection of hearing an assassination order:

> It was a retrospective reflection on what I had heard, and since this coup did occur, it occurred to me that it was possible that that is what I heard, but that would not change my sense of the moment when I heard the President speak, which I felt then, and I continue to feel, was a statement designed to direct the disposal, assassination, of Lumumba. (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12)

Johnson stated that the incident provoked a strong reaction from him:

> I was surprised . . . that I would ever hear a President say anything like this in my presence or the presence of a group of people. I was startled. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 13)

A succinct summary of Johnson's testimony was elicited by Senator Mathias in the following exchange:

> Mathias: . . . What comes across is that you do have a memory, if not of exact words, but of your own reaction really to a Presidential order which you considered to be an order for an assassination.
>
> Johnson: That is correct.
>
> Mathias: And that although precise words have escaped

> you in the passage of fifteen years, that sense of shock remains?
>
> Johnson: Right. Yes, sir. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 8)

After the meeting, Johnson, who was responsible for writing the memorandum of the discussion, consulted with a senior official on the NSC staff to determine how to handle the President's statement in the memorandum and in the debriefing of the NSC Planning Board that followed each meeting:

> I suspect -- but no longer have an exact recollection -- that I omitted it from the debriefing. I also do not recall how I handled the subject in the memo of the meeting, though I suspect that some kind of reference to the President's statement was made. (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 7)

In his second appearance, Johnson reiterated that it was "quite likely that it was handled through some kind of euphemism or may have been omitted altogether" (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 21).*

---

* In 1960, Johnson was Director of the Planning Board Secretariat -- third in command on the NSC staff. He attended NSC meetings to take notes on the discussions whenever one of the two senior NSC officials was absent.

Johnson testified that the person with whom he consulted about the manner of recording the President's statement in the minutes was one of the two top NSC staff officials at that time: NSC Executive Secretary James Lay or Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs (Johnson, 9/13/75, pp. 12-13). Johnson could not recall which of the two officials he had consulted, but he "inferred" that it must have been the "top career NSC staff person present" at the meeting where he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 12). At both of the NSC meetings where the President and Johnson were present for a discussion of Lumumba -- August 18 and September 7 -- James Lay was absent and Marion Boggs served as Acting Executive Secretary.

Marion Bogg's statement about his method of handling the situation described by Johnson is in accord with Johnson's testimony:

As Johnson stated, his testimony standing alone is "a clue, rather than precise evidence of Presidential involvement in decision-making with respect to assassinations" (Johnson, 6/18/75, p. 5). To determine the significance of this "clue," it must be placed in the context of the records of the NSC meetings attended by Johnson, testimony about those meetings, and the series of events that preceded the dispatch of poisons to the Congo for Lumumba's assassination.

In the Summer of 1960, there were four NSC meetings where developments in the Congo were discussed at which Robert Johnson was present. The President was not in attendance at two of those occasions -- July 15 and July 21 (NSC Minutes, 7/15/60; NSC Minutes,

---

> I have no independent recollection of being consulted by Mr. Johnson about how to handle in the memorandum of discussion any sensitive statement regarding Lumumba. I am not saying I was not consulted; merely that I do not remember such an incident. If I had been consulted, I would almost certainly have directed Mr. Johnson to omit the matter from the memorandum of discussion. (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2)

James Lay, who attended other NSC meetings where Lumumba was discussed (e.g., September 21, 1960), also confirmed the fact that NSC minutes would not be likely to record a statement as sensitive as a Presidential order for an assassination, if such an order were given:

> If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject as the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes. (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 2)

7/21/60). Nonetheless, the attitude toward Lumumba even at these early meetings was vehement:

> Mr. Dulles said that in Lumumba we were faced with a person who was a Castro or worse . . . Mr. Dulles went on to describe Mr. Lumumba's background which he described as "harrowing" . . . It is safe to go on the assumption that Lumumba has been bought by the Communists; this also, however, fits with his own orientation. (NSC Minutes, 7/21/60)

The President presided over the other two NSC meetings. After looking at the records of those meetings, Johnson was unable to determine with certainty which one was the meeting at which he heard the President's statement (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 16).

However, the chronology of meetings, cables, and events in the Congo during this period makes it most likely that Johnson's testimony refers to the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960.

The meeting of August 18 took place at the beginning of a series of events that preceded the dispatch of a CIA scientist to Leopoldville with poisons for the assassination of Lumumba.* The September 7 meeting took place in the midst of this series of events.

---

* The major events in the series, each of which is discussed in detail in other sections of the report, may be summarized as follows: The week following the NSC meeting of August 18, the Special Group was informed of the President's "extremely strong feelings about the necessity for very straightforward action" and the Group agreed to consider "any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). At this meeting, DCI Allen Dulles commented that "he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60; see Section 7(a)(iii), infra). The next day, Dulles sent an "Eyes Only" cable under his personal signature to the Chief of Station in

The NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, was held three weeks before the "quasi-coup" in the Congo -- the dismissal of Lumumba by Kasavubu -- which Johnson remembers as taking place "not long after" he heard the President's statement. The only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the statement by the President was held on September 7, two days after this event.

Robert Johnson's memorandum of the meeting of August 18, 1960, indicates that Acting Secretary of State C. Douglas Dillon* introduced the discussion of U.S. policy toward the Congo. In the course of his remarks, Dillon maintained that the presence of United Nations troops in the Congo was necessary to prevent Soviet intervention at Lumumba's request:

---

* Leopoldville, indicating that it had been concluded in "HIGH QUARTERS" that Lumumba's "REMOVAL MUST BE AN URGENT AND PRIME OBJECTIVE AND THAT . . . THIS SHOULD BE A HIGH PRIORITY OF OUR COVERT ACTION" (CIA Cable OUT 62966, Dulles to Chief of Station, 8/26/60). The Dulles cable added:

> WE WISH GIVE YOU WIDER AUTHORITY . . . INCLUDING EVEN MORE AGGRESSIVE ACTION IF IT CAN REMAIN COVERT . . . YOU CAN ACT ON YOUR OWN AUTHORITY WHERE TIME DOES NOT PERMIT REFERRAL HERE. (CIA Cable, 8/26/60)(See Section 2, supra, for more complete treatment of this cable.)

On September 19, a CIA scientist was dispatched from headquarters to the Congo on an extraordinarily sensitive assignment (CIA Cable OUT 71464, Bissell/Tweedy to Chief of Station, 9/19/60; see Section 4(a), supra). On September 21, in the presence of the President at an NSC meeting, Allen Dulles stated that Lumumba "remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of" (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60; see Section 7(a)(iv), infra). Finally, on September 26, the CIA scientist arrived in the Congo, provided the Chief of Station with lethal biological substances, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and informed him that the President had ordered the DCI to undertake an assassination effort (see Sections 4(a)-4(c), supra). The Chief of Station stated that he received confirmation from CIA headquarters that he was to follow the instructions he had been given (see Section 4(e)(i), supra).

** In 1960, Dillon served as Undersecretary of State, the "number two position in the State Department," the name of which subsequently changed to Deputy Secretary of State. In this position, he frequently (Continued)

> If . . . Lumumba carried out his threat to force the UN out, he might then offer to accept help from anyone. . . . The elimination of the UN would be a disaster which, Secretary Dillon stated, we should do everything we could to prevent. If the UN were forced out, we might be faced by a situation where the Soviets intervened by invitation of the Congo. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)

The discussion then continued to raise the spectre of an alliance between Lumumba and the Soviet Union:

> Secretary Dillon said that he [Lumumba] was working to serve the purposes of the Soviets and Mr. Dulles pointed out that Lumumba was in Soviet pay. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)

In this context, the following exchange between President Eisenhower and Secretary Dillon was recorded:

> The President said that the possibility that the UN would be forced out was simply inconceivable. We should keep the UN in the Congo even if we had to ask for European troops to do it. We should do so even if such action was used by the Soviets as the basis for starting a fight. Mr. Dillon indicated that this was State's feeling but that the Secretary General and Mr. Lodge doubted whether, if the Congo put up really determined opposition to the UN, the UN could stay in. In response, the President stated that Mr. Lodge was wrong to this extent -- we were talking of one man forcing us out of the Congo; of Lumumba supported by the Soviets. There was no indication, the

---

served as Acting Secretary of State and either attended or was kept informed about NSC and Special Group meetings. Dillon later served as Secretary of the Treasury under President Kennedy. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 2-4.)

> President stated, that the Congolese did not want UN support and the maintenance of order. Secretary Dillon reiterated that this was State's feeling about the matter. The situation that would be created by a UN withdrawal was altogether too ghastly to contemplate. (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60)

This is the only statement about Lumumba which the memorandum of the meeting attributed to the President.

As reported, it clearly does not contain an order for the assassination of Lumumba. But the statement does indicate extreme Presidential concern focused on Lumumba: The President was so disturbed by the situation in the Congo that he was willing to risk a fight with the Soviet Union and he felt that Lumumba was the "one man" who was responsible for this situation, a man who did not represent the sentiments of the Congolese people in the President's estimation.

After reviewing NSC documents and being informed of Robert Johnson's testimony, Douglas Dillon stated his "opinion that it is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson." (Dillon affidavit, 9/15/75.) However, Dillon testified that he did not "remember such a thing" as an explicit Presidential order for the assassination of Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 32). Dillon explained how he thought the President may have expressed himself about Lumumba:

> Dillon: . . . . It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was [a] very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world,

> that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him. I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it other ways. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 32-33.)
>
> Q: Did you ever hear the President make such a remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take action right away on this?
>
> Dillon: I don't remember that. But certainly this was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33.)

Dillon said that he would have thought that such a statement "was not a direct order to have an assassination" (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 33). But he testified that it was "perfectly possible" that Allen Dulles would have translated such strong Presidential language about "getting rid of" Lumumba into authorization for an assassination effort (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 34-35):

> I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization, because he felt very strongly that we should not involve the President directly in things of this nature. And he was perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 34.)

Marion Boggs, who attended the meeting of August 18, as Acting Executive Secretary of the NSC, stated after reviewing the Memorandum of Discussion at that meeting:

> I recall the discussion at that meeting, but have no independent recollection of any statements or discussion not summarized in the memorandum. Specifically, I have no recollection of any statement, order or reference by the President (or anyone else present at the meeting) which could be interpreted as favoring action by the United States to bring about the assassination of Lumumba.* (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, pp. 1-2.)

The Memorandum of Discussion at the NSC meeting of September 7, 1960--the only other meeting at which Johnson could have heard the President's statement--records only a brief, general discussion of developments in the Congo (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60). As part of Allen Dulles' introductory intelligence briefing on world events, the Memorandum related his remarks on the situation in the Congo following Kasavubu's dismissal of Lumumba from his position in the government (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 4). Neither the length nor the substance of the record of this discussion indicates that Lumumba's role in the Congo received the same intense kind of consideration as the NSC had given it on August 18.** There is no record of any statement by the President during this discussion (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5).

---

* Boggs added:

> "Based on my whole experience with the NSC, I would have considered it highly unusual if a matter of this nature had been referred to in a Council meeting where a number of persons with no 'need to know' were present." (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2.)

** The NSC minutes of the meeting of September 7, deal with the discussion of the Congo in two pages (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, pp. 4-5). By comparison, the August 18 meeting required an

Nevertheless, in the course of his briefing Dulles expressed his continuing concern over the amount of personnel and equipment that was being sent to the Congo by the Soviet Union, primarily to aid Lumumba (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5). Dulles concluded this part of his briefing with an observation that demonstrated that Lumumba's dismissal from the government had not lessened the extent to which he was regarded at the NSC as a potent political threat in any power struggle in the Congo:

> Mr. Dulles stated that Lumumba always seemed to come out on top in each of these struggles. (NSC Minutes, 9/7/60, p. 5.)

The day after this NSC meeting, Gordon Gray made a pointed reminder of the President's concern about the Congo to Allen Dulles at a meeting of the Special Group:

> Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60.)

There are three possible interpretations of the failure of NSC records to reveal whether the President ordered the assassination of Lumumba at one of these meetings. First, an

---

extraordinarily lengthy (fifteen pages) summary of discussion on the Congo and related policy problems in Africa, indicating that this topic was the focal point of the meeting (NSC Minutes, 8/18/60, pp. 1-15).

assassination order could have been issued but omitted from the records. Robert Johnson testified that it was "very likely" that the Presidential statement he heard would have been handled by means of a euphemistic reference or by complete omission "rather than given as [a] . . . direct quotation" in the Memorandum of Discussion (Johnson, 9/13/75, p. 14). Second, as illustrated by Douglas Dillon's testimony, the President could have made a general statement about "getting rid of" Lumumba with the intent to convey to Allen Dulles that there was implicit authorization for an assassination effort. Third, despite general discussions about removing Lumumba, the President may not have intended to order the assassination of Lumumba even though Allen Dulles may have thought an assassination effort had been authorized. The three White House staff members responsible to the President for national security affairs testified that there was no such order. Gordon Gray, Andrew Goodpaster, and John Eisenhower were all in attendance at the NSC meetings of August 18 and September 7.*

(iii) The President's "Extremely Strong Feelings" Led The Special Group to Consider Anything That Might Get Rid of Lumumba: August 25, 1960

On August 25, 1960 five men** attended a meeting of the

---

* See Section 7(b), infra, for a general treatment of the testimony of Gray, Goodpaster and Eisenhower.

** There were four standing members of the Special Group at this time: Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence; Gordon

Special Group, the subcommittee of the National Security Council responsible for planning covert operations. Thomas Parrott, a CIA officer who served as Secretary to the Group, began the meeting by outlining the CIA operations that had been undertaken in "mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo" (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60). This campaign involved covert operations through certain labor groups and "the planned attempt . . . to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba" in the Congolese Senate (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60).

The outline of this campaign evoked the following dialogue:

> The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba. (Special Group Minutes, 8/25/60, p. 1.)

Both Gordon Gray and Thomas Parrott testified that reference to Mr. Gray's "associates" was a euphemism for President

---

Gray, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Livingston Merchant, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs; and John N. Irwin II, Assistant Secretary of Defense. Also in regular attendance was Thomas A. Parrott, Secretary to the Special Group.

Eisenhower which was employed to preserve "plausible deniability" by the President of discussion of covert operations memorialized in Special Group Minutes (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 27; Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 8-9).

The four living participants at the meeting have all stated that they do not recall any discussion of or planning for the assassination of Lumumba (Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 27, 32; Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 25-26). Gray said that he did not consider the President's desire for "very straightforward action" to include "any thought in his mind of assassination" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 32). Parrott testified to the same effect, maintaining that he would have recorded a discussion of assassination in explicit terms in the Special Group Minutes if such a discussion had taken place (Parrott, 7/10/75, pp. 26-27).

John N. Irwin II acknowledged, however, that while he did not have "any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting", the reference in the minutes to the planning for "getting rid of Lumumba" was "broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2).

Irwin's interpretation is shared by Douglas Dillon and Richard Bissell--two high government officials who were not participants at this Special Group meeting but who were involved in the planning and policymaking for covert operations in the Congo during this period.

As a participant in National Security Council meetings of this period, Dillon said that he would read the Special Group minutes of August 25, 1960, to indicate that assassination was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might be used to "get rid of" Lumumba (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 42). Dillon noted that the reference in the minutes to the fact that Allen Dulles stated that he "had taken the comments referred to seriously" probably pointed to the President's statement at the previous NSC meeting at which Robert Johnson took notes (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 39-40).

When asked whether the CIA would have the authority to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba on the basis of the discussion at the Special Group, Dillon said:

> They would certainly have the authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything just on their own. I think they would have checked back at least with the senior people in the State Department or the Defense Department. (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43.)

Dillon said that if the CIA checked with the State Department, it might have been done in such a way that it would not appear on any record (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 43). Dillon added that "to protect the President as the public representative of the U.S. from any bad publicity in connection with this", Allen Dulles "wouldn't return to the President" to seek further approval if an assassination operation were mounted (Dillon, 9/2/60, pp. 42-43).

Richard Bissell stated that in his opinion the language of the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 indicated that the assassination of Lumumba was part of a general strategy at the NSC and within the CIA for removing Lumumba from the political scene (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 29, 32). Bissell added:

> The Agency had put a top priority, probably, on a range of different methods of getting rid of Lumumba in the sense of either destroying him physically, incapacitating him, or eliminating his political influence. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 29.)

Bissell pointed to the Special Group Minutes of August 25, 1960 as a "prime example" of the circumlocutious manner in which a topic like assassination would be discussed by high government officials:

> Bissell: When you use the language that no particular means were ruled out, that is obviously what it meant, and it meant that to everybody in the room. . . . Meant that if it had to be assassination, that that was a permissible means.
>
> You don't use language of that kind except to mean in effect, the Director is being told, get rid of the guy, and if you have to use extreme means up to and including assassination, go ahead. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33.)

Bissell added that this message was, "in effect", being given to Dulles by the President through his representative Gordon Gray (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33).

(iv) NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960: Dulles Said Lumumba Would Remain a Grave Danger Until "Disposed Of"

In the course of his intelligence briefing to the NSC on September 21, 1960, Allen Dulles stressed the danger of Soviet influence in the Congo. Despite the fact that Lumumba had been deposed from his position as Premier and was in UN custody, Dulles continued to regard him as a threat, especially in light of reports of an impending reconciliation between Lumumba and the post-coup Congolese government:

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the monent but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of. (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60.)

Three days after this NSC meeting, Allen Dulles sent a personal cable to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville which included the following message:

> WE WISH GIVE EVERY POSSIBLE SUPPORT IN ELIMINATING LUMUMBA FROM ANY POSSIBILITY RESUMING GOVERNMENTAL POSITION OR IF HE FAILS IN LEOP[OLDVILLE], SETTING HIMSELF IN STANLEYVILLE OR ELSEWHERE. (CIA Cable, OUT 73573, Dulles to Leopoldville, 9/24/60.)

On September 26, Sidney Gottlieb, under assignment from CIA headquarters, arrived in Leopoldville (CIA Cable IN 18989, Leopoldville to Director, 9/27/60), provided the Chief of Station with poisons, instructed him to assassinate Lumumba, and assured him that there was Presidential authorization for this mission (see Sections 4(b)-4(c), supra).

Marion Boggs, NSC Deputy Executive Secretary, who wrote the memorandum of the discussion of September 21, did not interpret Dulles' remark as referring to assassination:

> I have examined the memorandum (which I prepared) summarizing the discussion of the Congo at the September 21, 1960 meeting of the NSC. I recall the discussion and believe it is accurately and adequately summarized in the memorandum. I have no recollection of any discussion of a possible assassination of Lumumba at this meeting. With specific reference to the statement of the Director of Central Intelligence . . . I believe this is almost a literal rendering of what Mr. Dulles said. My own interpretation of this statement . . . was that Mr. Dulles was speaking in the context of efforts being made within the Congolese government to force Lumumba from power. I did not interpret it as referring to assassination* (Boggs affidavit 10/10/75, pp. 2-3.)

Boggs was not, however, in a position to analyze Dulles' remark in light of the actual planning for covert operations that took place during this period because Boggs was not privy to most such discussions (Boggs affidavit, 10/10/75, p. 2).

C. Douglas Dillon, who attended this NSC meeting as Acting Secretary of State, said that he did not recall the discussion (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 47). Dillon said that the minutes "could mean that" assassination would have been one acceptable means of "disposing of" Lumumba, although he felt that "getting him out [of the Congo] or locking him up" would have been a preferable disposition of Lumumba at that point since he was already out of office (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 48).* When reminded of the fact that Lumumba's movement and communications were not restricted by the UN force and that the Congolese army continued to seek his arrest long after the NSC meeting, Dillon acknowledged that during this period Lumumba continued to be viewed by the United States as a potential threat and a volatile force in the Congo:

---

* NSC Executive Secretary James Lay, who was also present at the meeting of September 21, 1960, stated: "I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings." (Lay affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1.)

> . . . . He had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started to talk to a battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes. (Dillon, 9/20/75, p. 49.)

John N. Irwin II, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant Secretary of Defense, stated that although he had no recollection of the discussion, the language of the minutes was "broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination" (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, p. 2).

Richard Bissell testified that, based upon his understanding of the policy of the NSC toward Lumumba even after Lumumba was in UN custody, he would read the minutes of September 21 to indicate that assassination was contemplated "as one possible means" of "disposing of" Lumumba. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 70.) Bissell was not present at the NSC meeting (NSC Minutes, 9/21/60).

---

* See Section 3, _supra_, for discussion of CIA cable traffic indicating that Lumumba continued to be regarded as capable of taking over the government after he was deposed and that pressure to "eliminate" him did not cease until his death.

Bissell's opinion stands in opposition to that of Gordon Gray, the President's National Security Advisor, who likewise testified that he could not remember the NSC discussion in which he participated (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57). When asked to interpret the reference to "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray said he "put it in the same category as 'get rid of', 'eliminate'" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57). Early in his testimony, Gray stated that "assassination could have been on the minds of some people when they used these words "'eliminate' or 'get rid of'" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17). Nonetheless, when asked to comment on the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21, he said: "It was not my impression that we had in mind the assassination of Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 57).*

---

* John Eisenhower, who attended the NSC meeting as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, said that he had no "direct recollection" of the discussion but he found the minutes of the meeting consonant with his "recollection of the atmosphere" at the time: "the U.S. position was very much anti-Lumumba" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 9). He said:

> I would not conjecture that the words "disposed of" meant an assassination, if for no other reason than if I had something as nasty as this to plot, I wouldn't do it in front of 21 people . . . the number present [at] the meeting. (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 10.)

(b) Testimony of Eisenhower White House Officials That They Knew of No Presidential Consideration of Assassination

The two members of President Eisenhower's staff who were responsible for national security affairs--Gordon Gray and Andrew Goodpaster--both made general disclaimers of any knowledge of Presidential consideration of assassination during their tenure.

Gordon Gray served as Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, in which capacity he coordinated the National Security Council and represented the President at Special Group meetings. Gray testified that he did not recall President Eisenhower "ever saying anything that contemplated killing Lumumba" (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 28).* When asked to interpret phrases from the minutes of particular NSC and Special Group meetings such as "getting rid of" or "disposing of" Lumumba, Gray stated:

> It is the intent of the user of the expression or the phrase that is controlling and there may well have been in the Central Intelligence Agency plans and/or discussions of assassinations, but . . . at the level of the Forty Committee [Special Group] or a higher level than that, the National Security Council , there was no active discussion in any way planning assassination.
>
> . . . I agree that assassination could have

---

* At the outset of his testimony on the subject, Gordon Gray acknowledged that he did not have a clear, independent recollection of Lumumba's role in the Congo (Gray, 7/9/75, pp. 25-26).

> been on the minds of some people when they used these words 'eliminate' or 'get rid of' . . . I am just trying to say that it was not seriously considered as a program of action by the President or even the Forty [Special] Group. (Gray, 7/9/75, p. 17.)

Andrew Goodpaster, the White House Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower, said that he and Gray were the "principal channels" between the President and the CIA, outside of NSC meetings (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 4). Goodpaster was responsible for "handling with the President all matters of day-to-day operations in the general fields of international affairs and security affairs" (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 3). He regularly attended NSC meetings and was listed among the participants at the NSC meetings of August 18, 1960 and September 21, 1960.

When asked if he ever heard about any assassination effort during the Eisenhower Administration, Goodpaster replied unequivocally:

> . . . at no time and in no way did I ever know of or hear about any proposal, any mention of such an acitvity. . . . [I]t is my belief that had such a thing been raised with the President other than in my presence, I would have known about it, and . . . it would have been a matter of such significance and sensitivity that I am confident that . . . I would have recalled it had such a thing happened. (Goodpaster, 7/17/75, p. 5.)

John Eisenhower, the President's son who served under Goodpaster as Assistant White House Staff Secretary, stated that the use of assassination was contrary to the President's philosophy that "no man is indispensable" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 14.)* As a participant at NSC meetings who frequently attended discussions in the Oval Office relating to national security affairs, John Eisenhower testified that nothing that came to his attention in his experience at the White House "can be construed in my mind in the remotest way to mean any Presidential knowledge of or concurrence in any assassination plots or plans" (Eisenhower, 7/18/75, p. 4).

---

* Douglas Dillon testified that the subject of assassination never arose in his "direct dealings with either President Eisenhower or President Kennedy (Dillon, 9/2/75, p. 22). He was asked by a member of the Committee, however, to speculate upon the general philosophical approach that Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy would have taken to decisionmaking on the question of using assassination as a tool of foreign policy:

> Senator Hart (Colorado): I would invite your speculation at this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?
>
> Dillon: Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle. That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy of the U.S., generally both of them were very much opposed to it. (Dillon, 9/2/75, pp. 22-23.)

Dillon served as Undersecretary of State in the Eisenhower Administration and as Secretary of the Treasury under Kennedy.

Other Eisenhower Administration officials who were active in the Special Group in late 1960--Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin II, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs Livingston Merchant, and Deputy Secretary of Defense James Douglas--stated that they did not recall any discussion about assassinating Lumumba (Irwin affidavit, 9/22/75, pp. 1-2; Merchant affidavit, 9/8/75, p. 1; Douglas affidavit, 9/5/75).

(c) Richard Bissell Testified That, Despite His Lack of a Specific Recollection, He "Strongly Inferred" That the Assassination Effort Against Lumumba Was Authorized by President Eisenhower and Allen Dulles

Richard Bissell's testimony on the question of high-level authorization for the effort to assassinate Lumumba is problematic. Bissell insisted that he had no direct recollection of receiving such authorization and that all of his testimony on this subject "has to be described as inference" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48). Bissell began his testimony on the subject by asserting that it was on his own initiative that he instructed Justin O'Donnell to plan the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 54-55). Nevertheless, Bissell's conclusion--based on his inferences from the totality of circumstances relating to the entire assassination effort against Lumumba--was that an assassination attempt had been authorized at the highest levels of the government (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 32-33, 47-49, 60-62, 65).

As discussed above, Bissell testified that the minutes of meetings of the Special Group on August 25, 1960 and the NSC on September 21, 1960 indicate that assassination was contemplated at the Presidential level as one acceptable means of "getting rid of Lumumba" (see Sections 5(a)(ii) and 5(a)(iii), supra).

There was "no question", according to Bissell, that the cable from Allen Dulles to the Chief of Station in Leopoldville on August 26, which called for Lumumba's removal and authorized Hedgman to take action without consulting headquarters, was a direct outgrowth of the Special Group meeting Dulles had attended the previous day (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 31-32). Bissell was "almost certain" that he had been informed about the Dulles cable shortly after its transmission (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 12). Bissell testified that he assumed that assassination was one of the means of removing Lumumba from the scene that is contemplated within the language of Dulles' cable (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 32):

> It is my belief on the basis of the cable drafted by Allen Dulles that he regarded the action of the Special Group as authorizing implementation [of an assassination] if favorable circumstances presented themselves, if it could be done covertly. (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 64-65.)

Dulles' cable signalled to Bissell that there was Presidential authorization for him to order action to assassinate Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62):

Q: Did Mr. Dulles tell you that President Eisenhower wanted Lumumba killed?

Mr. Bissell: I am sure he didn't.

Q: Did he ever tell you even circumlocutiously through this kind of cable?

Mr. Bissell: Yes, I think his cable says it in effect. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 33.)

As for discussions with Dulles about the source of authorization for an assassination effort against Lumumba, Bissell stated:

> I think it is probably unlikely that Allen Dulles would have said either the President or President Eisenhower even to me. I think he would have said, this is authorized in the highest quarters, and I would have known what he meant. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 48.)

When asked if he had sufficient authority to move beyond the consideration or planning of assassination to order implementation of a plan, Bissell said, "I probably did think I had [such] authority" (Bissell, 9/10/75, pp. 61-62).

When informed about the Chief of Station's testimony about the instructions he received from Gottlieb, Bissell said that despite his absence of a specific recollection:

> I would strongly infer in this case that such an authorization did pass through me, as it were, if Sid Gottlieb gave that firm instruction to the Station Chief. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40.)

Bissell said that the DCI would have been the source of this authorization (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 40).

Bissell did not recall being informed by Gottlieb that Gottlieb had represented to the Chief of Station that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 46). But Bissell said that assuming he had instructed Gottlieb to carry poison to the Congo, "there was no possibility" that he would have issued such an instruction without authorization from Dulles (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). Likewise Bissell said he "probably did" tell Gottlieb that the mission had the approval of President Eisenhower (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 47). This led to Bissell's conclusion that if, in fact, the testimony of the Chief of Station about Gottlieb's actions is accurate, then Gottlieb's actions were fully authorized:

> Q: In light of the entire atmosphere at the Agency and the policy at the Agency at the time, Mr. Gottlieb's representation to the Chief of Station that the President had instructed the DCI to carry out this mission would not have been beyond the pale of Mr. Gottlieb's authority at that point?
>
> Bissell: No, it would not. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 65).

Bissell further stated:

> Knowing Mr. Gottlieb, it is literally inconceivable to me that he would have acted beyond his instructions. (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 41.)

With respect to his assignment to Justin O'Donnell to "plan and prepare for" the assassination of Lumumba (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 24) Bissell testified that "it was my own idea to give

O'Donnell this assignment" (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50). But he said that this specific assignment was made in the context that an assassination mission against Lumumba already had authorization above the level of DDP (Bissell, 9/10/75, p. 50; see also pp. 32-33, 47-48, 60-62).

The "Executive Action" Capability

Along with the question of authorization for actual assassination attempts, the Committee considered the extent and nature of authorization for a CIA project which included, as one element, the development of an assassination capability.

(a) Introduction

Sometime in early 1961, Richard Bissell (Deputy Director of Plans) instructed William Harvey, who was at that time the Chief of one of CIA's Foreign Intelligence staffs, to establish an "executive action capability" which included research into a capability to assassinate foreign leaders. (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 51; Harvey 6/25/75, pp. 36-37.) At some time within the same period, Bissell and McGeorge Bundy (Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) had a conversation about the matter.

Bissell, Harvey and Helms all agreed that the "generalized" capability was never used" (Bissell 6/9/75, p. 87; Harvey 6/25/75, p. 45; Helms 6/13/75, p. 52).

note coming

"Executive action" is a CIA euphemism, defined by the testimony before the Committee as a project for research into developing means for overthrowing foreign political leaders, including a "capability to perform assassinations". (Harvey 6/25/75, p. 34.) Bissell indicated that executive action covered a "wide spectrum of actions" to "eliminate the effectiveness" of foreign leaders, with assassination as the "most extreme" action on the spectrum (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The Inspector General's Report described executive action as a "general stand-by capability" to carry out assassination when required (I.G., p. 37). The project was given the code name ZR/RIFLE by the CIA.*

A single agent ("asset"), given the cryptonym QJ/WIN, was placed under Harvey's supervision for the ZR/RIFLE project, but never used in connection with any actual assassination efforts. Richard Helms described QJ/WIN's "capability":

> "If you needed somebody to carry out murder, I guess you had a man who might be prepared to carry it out." (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 53).

Harvey did use agent QJ/WIN, however, to spot "individuals with criminal and underworld connections in Europe for possible multi-purpose use" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 50). For example, QJ/WIN reported that a potential asset in the Middle East was "the leader of a gambling syndicate" with "an available pool of assassins" (CIA file, ZR/RIFLE/Personality Sketches).

However, Harvey testified that:

> "during the entire existence of the entire ZRRIFLE project . . . no agent was recruited for the purpose of assassination, and no even tentative targeting or target list was ever drawn." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 45.)

Project ZR/RIFLE involved, generally, assessing the problems and requirements of assassination and developing a standby assassination capability; more specifically, it involved "spotting" potential agents and "researching" assassination techniques that might be used (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11 and 6/9/75, p. 73; Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 45). Bissell characterized Project ZR/RIFLE as "internal and purely preparatory" (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 32). The I.G. Report of 1967 found "no indication in the file that the Executive Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE-QJ/WIN was ever used", but said that "after Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZR/RIFLE". (I.G. pp. 40-41.)*

---

* ZR/RIFLE was a cryptonym relating to two programs. One was the executive action assassination capability. The other was another program which is not part of the subject matter of this report. (William Harvey had been in charge of the CIA section with general responsibility for such programs.) This second program was genuine, but it was also to provide a cover for any executive action operation. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 49.)

(b) The Question of White House Initiation, Authorization, or Knowledge of the Executive Action Project

There is general agreement on one fact: at some point in early 1961 Bissell discussed the executive action capability with Bundy. The timing of that conversation and whether "the White House" urged that a capability be created were matters on which the evidence varied widely.

Harvey testified that Bissell had told him that "the White House" had twice urged the creation of such a capability and the Inspector General's Report quoted notes of Harvey's (no longer in existence) to that effect. Bissell did not recall any specific conversation with the "White House". However, his initial testimony assumed the correctness of Harvey's notes, and stated

that, while he could have created the capability on his own, any urgings would have come from Bundy or Walt Rostow. In a later appearance, however, Bissell said he merely informed Bundy of the capability and that the context was a briefing by him and not urging by Bundy. Bundy said he received a briefing and gave no urging, though he raised no objections. Rostow said he never heard of the project.

---

* A discussion of whether ZR/RIFLE was related to the actual assassination efforts against Castro is found at Section (d), infra.

William Harvey testified that he was "almost certain" that on January 25 and 26, 1961, he met with CIA officials Sidney Gottlieb, the new Chief of CIA's Technical Services Division, and Arnold Silver, a CIA recruiting officer, to discuss the feasibility of creating a capability within the Agency for "executive action" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). After reviewing his notes of those meetings,* Harvey testified that they took place after his initial

Names Accuracy

---

* As to the date of these notes, Harvey was asked whether his notations "25/1-Sid G" and "26/1-AS" indicate that he spoke to Sidney Gottlieb and Arnold Silver in 1961, as opposed to 1962. Harvey testified as follows:

> Q: And is it your judgment that that is January 26, 1961 and is about the subject of Executive Action?
>
> Harvey: Yes, it is.
>
> Q: And it followed your conversation with Mr. Bissell that you have recounted?
>
> Harvey: . . . [W]ell, when I first looked at this, I thought this, well, this has got to be '62, but I am almost certain now that it is not. If this is true, this might place the first discussion that I had with Dick Bissell in early January and this is difficult to pinpoint because there were several such discussions in varying degrees of detail during the period in the spring, and very early in '61 to the fall of '61 period, but I did find out fairly early on that Silver

discussion of executive action with Bissell, which, he said, might have transpired in "early January" (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52). When Bissell was shown these notes, he agreed with Harvey about the timing of their initial discussion (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10).

> had -- or that Bissell had discussed the question of assassination with Arnold Silver, and this discussion, at the very least, had to take place after I know Bissell already had discussed the matter with Silver. (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52).

Harvey had also testified that, after receiving Bissell's initial instructions to establish an executive action capability:

> the first thing I did . . . was discuss in theoretical terms with a few officers whom I trusted quite implicitly the whole subject of assassination, our possible assets, our posture, going back, if you will, even to the fundamental questions of A, is assassination a proper weapon of an American intelligence service, and B, even if you assume that it is, is it within our capability within the framework of this government to do it effectively and properly, securely and discreetly. (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 37-A, 38).

The Inspector General's Report connected Silver and Gottlieb to the early stages of the executive action project as follows:

> Harvey says that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects of the problem with Arnold Silver and with Sidney Gottlieb. Since Silver was already cut in, Harvey used him in developing the Executive Action Capability.... Harvey's mention of him [Gottlieb] in this connection may explain a notation by Dr. Gunn that Harvey instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Gottlieb without associating the discussion with the Castro operation. (I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

It is evident from the testimony of Harvey and Bissell that the turnover to Harvey of the Roselli contact in November 1961 was discussed as part of ZRRIFLE (see Section (d), infra). Thus, their initial discussion of executive action can, at the least, be dated before November 1961 and the "25/1" and "26/1" notations would have to refer to January 1961.

Harvey testified that the "executive action" capability was intended to include assassinations (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 35). His cryptic handwritten notes of the January 25/26 meetings, preserved at the CIA, contain phrases which suggest a discussion of assassination--and Harvey confirmed this interpretation: "last resort beyond last resort and a confession of weakness", "the magic button", and "never mention word assassination". (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75).*

The Inspector General's Report did not mention these notes, or their dates. However, in describing Richard Bissell's initial assignment of the "executive action" project to Harvey, it referred to another set of Harvey's notes, which were destroyed after the preparation of the Report. The excerpt from these notes quoted Bissell as saying to Harvey, "The White House had twice urged me to create such a capability" (I.G., P. 37). Harvey also testified that this "urging" was mentioned in his initial discussion of "executive action" with Bissell (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). However, the testimony from Bissell and White House aides in the Kennedy and Eisenhower Administrations is in conflict with Harvey's testimony as to whether such "urging" had in fact been given to Bissell.

---

* Harvey's notes also contained a phrase which suggests his concern that any U.S. assassination attempts might breed retaliation from other governments: "dangers of RIS (Russian Intelligence Service) counter-action and monitor if they are blamed." (Harvey, Ex. 1, 6/25/75; Bissell, Ex. 1, 7/17/75).

The following testimony regarding the relationship between "the White House" and the executive action capability was obtained by the Committee:

Harvey: Harvey testified that his missing notes indicated that Bissell mentioned White House urgings to develop an executive action capability (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37). Harvey said that he "particularly remember[ed]" that Bissell said that he received "more than one" urging from the White House (Harvey, 6/25/75, pp. 36-37; 7/11/75, p. 59). However, he had no direct evidence that Bissell actually had any such discussion with "the White House." No specific individual in the White House was named to Harvey (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 31). Moreover, he said that it would have been "improper" for him to have asked Bissell who he had talked to and "grossly improper" for Bissell to have volunteered that name (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 37).

Bissell: Bissell specifically recalled assigning Harvey to investigate the capability (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). However, Bissell did not recall "a specific conversation with anybody in the White House as the origin" of his instruction to Harvey (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51).

During the course of several appearances before the Committee, Bissell's testimony varied as to whether or not he had been urged by the White House to develop an executive action capability.

In his initial appearances before the Committee on June 9 and 11, 1975, Bissell made statements that tended to indicate that White House authorization had been given. In response to the "twice urged" quotation of Harvey's notes in the Inspector General's Report, Bissell said, "I have no reason to believe that Harvey's quote is wrong." (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 51). Bissell accordingly said in his initial testimony that as far as he knew, it was true that he was asked by the White House to create a general stand-by assassination capability. (Bissell, 6/9/75, p. 49).

Based again upon Harvey's missing notes ("White House urging") and his initial statement that he had no reason to challenge their accuracy, Bissell initially gave the opinion that McGeorge Bundy (Id., 6/9/75, p. 49), Special Assistant to President Kennedy for National Security Affairs, and Walt Rostow (Id., p. 51), Deputy Assistant to President Kennedy during 1961, were the two people from whom such a request was most likely to have come (Id., p. 53) because they were "the two members of the White House staff who were closest to CIA operations." (Id., p. 54).

At another point in his initial testimony, Bissell said that the creation of the capability "may have been initiated within the Agency" (Id., p. 81). And still later he said: "there is little doubt in my mind that Project RIFLE was discussed with Rostow and possibly Bundy" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 46).

not consistent

When Bissell returned to the Committee on July 17 and 22, his testimony, given in light of information gained since his earlier appearances, was that there was no White House urging for the creation of the executive action project, although tacit approval for the "research" project was probably given by Bundy after it was established.

First, he was shown the Harvey notes which had been preserved and which, without any mention of the White House, indicated Harvey had received his assignment prior to January 25/26, 1961. Those dates -- just 5 days after the change of administration -- made Bissell conclude that it was "very unlikely that that assignment to [Harvey] was taken as a result of White House urging or consultation" (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10). Bissell said that Bundy did not have any influence on the performance of his Agency duties before the Presidential inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23). Bissell added that he did not remember meeting with anyone in the new administration on matters prior to the inauguration (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 23).

Second, when he returned in July, Bissell also said he was convinced by telephone conversations with Rostow and Bundy that based upon Rostow's duties -- which, in 1961, had nothing to do with covert action -- he "never discussed" executive action with Rostow (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 10; 7/27/75, p. 22).

As for Bundy, Bissell's final testimony (after telephone contact with Bundy) was that he believed that he had informed Bundy about the capability after it had been created (Bissell, 7/17/75, pp. 10-11; 7/22/75, pp. 21-22). But Bissell confirmed his original testimony (6/9/75, pp. _____) that he did not brief Bundy on the actual assassination plots against Castro already undertaken by the CIA (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47; 7/22/75, p. 31). Bissell was "quite certain" that he would not have expected Bundy to mention the executive action capability to the President. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell testified:

> Q. Would you think the development of a capability to kill foreign leaders was a matter of sufficient importance to bring to the attention of the President?
>
> Bissell: In that context and at that time and given the limited scope of activities within that project, I would not." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35).

Bissell said that he and Bundy spoke about an untargeted "capability" rather than the plan or approval for an assassination operation (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). Bissell said that although he does not have a specific recollection, he "might have" mentioned Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo in the course of a discussion of executive action "because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 50-51).

Bissell said his impression was that Bundy, in addition to expressing no unfavorable reaction to the project, might have actually given a more affirmative reaction (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 25, 28). Bissell testified that he might have interpreted Bundy's reaction as approval for the executive action concept (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 30).

> Q: ... I think the testimony of this witness is going further in saying what you received from (Bundy) was, in your view, tantamount to approval?
>
> Bissell: I, at least, interpreted it as you can call it approval, or you could say no objection. He (Bundy)

> was briefed on something that was being done, as I now believe, on the initiative of the Agency. His (Bundy's) comment is that he made no objection to it. I suspect that his reaction was somewhat more favorable than that, but this is a matter that probably someone listening to the conversation on which such a person could have had differing interpretations. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 33).

Bissell's testimony on any conversation with Bundy regarding executive action was speculative reconstruction from first appearance to last because he had no "clear recollection" of the events (Bissell, 7/22/75, pp. 29, 36). But Bissell maintained that more "formal and specific and explicit approval would have been required" before any "actual overt steps in use of the capability." (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 31).

Bissell said that Harvey's notation about White House urgings to develop an executive action capability may have been a slightly confused account of a conversation subsequent to the initiation of the project in which Bissell relayed Bundy's reaction to Harvey (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 25).

Bissell testified that the development of an executive action capability was "undoubtedly" initiated within the Agency (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 22). He had acknowledged on his first day of testimony that this would not have been unusual:

> it was the normal practice in the Agency and an important part of its mission to create various kinds of capability long before there was any reason to be certain whether those would be used or where or how or for what purpose. The whole ongoing job of ... a secret intelligence service of recruiting agents is of that character.... So it would not be particularly surprising to me if the

> decision to create ... this capability had been taken without an outside request. (Bissell, 6/9/75, pp. 67-68).*

Bundy: McGeorge Bundy also testified that he had a conversation with Bissell, during which the executive action capability was discussed (Bundy, pp. 4-5). Bundy's testimony comports with Bissell's on the fact that they spoke about an untargeted capability, rather than an assassination operation (Bundy, pp. 4-5). But Bundy said that the capability included "killing the individual" (Bundy, p. 5).** Bundy's impression was that the CIA was "testing my reaction," not "seeking authority" (Bundy, p. 15). Bundy summarized his testimony by saying:

> I am sure I gave no instruction. But it is only fair to add that I do not recall that I offered any impediment either. (Bundy, p. 10)

Bundy said that he did not take steps to halt the development of the executive action capability or "pursue the matter at all" (Bundy, p. 19) because he was satisfied

> that this was not an operational activity, and would not become such without two conditions: first, that there be a desire or a request or a guidance that there should be planning against some specific individual; and second, that there should be a decision to move against the individual. (Bundy, p. 7).

---

* For example, Bissell testified that on his own initiative, he had requested a CIA officer to go to the Congo to "make plans and develop the capability" for an assassination attempt against Lumumba, if ordered (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 55).

** Bundy also testified that he had a vague recollection of hearing about poison in relation to Cuba, but he did not connect this to the conversation about executive action. (See footnote, p. 6, Kennedy Pre-Bay of Pigs section, supra.)

Bundy testified that he believed that neither of these conditions had been fulfilled (Bundy, p. 7).

Bundy recalled the conversation as taking place "sometime in the early months of 1961." (Bundy, p. 4). When questioned about the dates in Harvey's notes, Bundy rated the chance that the conversation about executive action took place before January 25 -- when Harvey was already discussing the project at the CIA pursuant to Bissell's directive -- as "near zero" because the new Administration had been in office less than a week and he had been preoccupied with other problems, including the Berlin crisis and reorganizing the National Security staff (Bundy, p. 9).

Bundy testified that he did not brief the President on the executive action project:

> Chairman: And you have testified that you did not take the matter to the President?
>
> Bundy: As far as I can recall, Mr. Chairman. (Bundy, p. 16)

Bundy explained that the division of responsibility for national security affairs excluded Rostow from jurisdiction over covert operations, making it unlikely that Rostow would be briefed on a project like ZRRIFLE (Bundy, p. 11; Rostow, p. 11).

Rostow: Rostow testified that he was "morally certain" that during his entire tenure in government, he never heard a reference to executive action or "such a capability or such an intention to act by the U.S." (Rostow, pp. 10, 13).

Goodpaster and Gray: The responsibility for national security affairs during the latter part of the Eisenhower Administration was borne by Andrew Goodpaster and Gordon Gray. However, there was no evidence which raised the name of either man in connection with the development of an executive action capability. Both Goodpaster and Gray testified to having no knowledge of it. (Goodpaster, p. 11; Gray, p. 56.)

(c) Authorization or Knowledge of Executive Action Project by DCI

Richard Bissell said he was "quite certain" that Allen Dulles had full knowledge of the executive action project for two reasons: first, it "would have come to the DCI's attention" at the time of the transfer of William Harvey between components of the Agency to work on Cuban operations;* and second, Bissell "would imagine" it was mentioned to Dulles at the initiation of the project (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 35). Bissell and Harvey briefed Richard Helms on Project ZRRIFLE when he became DDP (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 53; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 63). But Bissell did not recall briefing John McCone about the project when McCone took over as DCI (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 11). McCone testified that he had no knowledge of such a project (McCone, p. 43).

William Harvey said it was assumed that the project was within the parameters permitted by the DCI. But Harvey testified that officially advising the DCI of the existence of the project was "a bridge we did not cross" and would not have crossed until "there was either specific targeting or a specific operation or a specific recruitment." (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 59).

---

* Harvey's transfer to Cuban operations was not completed until late in 1961.

(d) The Question of Whether Project ZRRIFLE was Connected to Any Actual Assassination Plots

The Committee has sought to determine whether the CIA development of an executive action capability was related in any way to the actual assassination efforts. One question raised by this inquiry is whether the participants in the assassination operations might have perceived the executive action capability as in some way lending legitimacy to the actual assassination efforts.

(i) Conversation Between Bissell and Bundy

In his early testimony, Bissell said he did not have a recollection of whether he discussed the names of Castro, Lumumba, and Trujillo with anyone in the White House in the course of discussing the project to develop an executive action capability (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). However, Bissell testified that it was "perfectly plausible that I would have used examples" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51). He continued:

> in such a discussion of a capability, I might well have used the three names that I just gave, because these were the sorts of individuals at that moment in history against whom such a capability might possibly have been employed." (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 51).

Bissell and Bundy both testified, however, that their discussion of the development of the capability for assassination did not involve any mention of actual assassination plans or attempts (see detailed treatment at Section (b), supra). There is no testimony to the contrary. The account of this conversation raises a question as to whether Bissell acted properly in withholding from Bundy the fact that assassination efforts against Castro had already been mounted and were moving forward. Bundy was responsible to a new President for national security affairs and Bissell was his principal source of information about covert operations at the CIA.

OR
Bundy
acted
properly
in
not
giving
attention

(ii) Bissell's Instruction to Take Over Responsibility for Underworld Contact: November 1961

Both Bissell and Harvey recall a meeting in November 1961 in which Harvey was instructed to take over the contact with John Roselli (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19, 47; Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 86; and 6/11/75, p. 19)--which had been used for the initial poison pill plot as part of Project ZR/RIFLE. Harvey's notes placed the meeting on November 15, 1961 (I.G., p. 39), during the period in which Harvey was freed from his duties on another Agency staff to take over direction of Task Force W, the locus of CIA activity against the Castro regime.

According to Bissell and Harvey, the November meeting involved only the planning and research of a capability rather than a targeted operation against Castro (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 13; Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 60). But Bissell acknowledged that the purpose of the Roselli contact had been to assassinate Castro, and that "it is a fair inference that there would have been no reason to maintain it [the contact] unless there was some possibility of reactivating that operation" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 19). Bissell stated that because the assassination plot against Castro involving the syndicate

> had been stood down after the Bay of Pigs . . . and there was no authorization to pursue it actively . . . the responsibility that was given to him [Harvey] was that of taking over an inactive contact." (Bissell, 7/17/75, p. 14)

Bissell said that he had, in effect, asked Harvey to stand watch over the contact in case any action should be required and further testified that it was never required.

The Inspector General's Report stated: "After Harvey took over the Castro operation, he ran it as one aspect of ZRRIFLE." (I.G., p. 40). Harvey recalled that during a discussion with Bissell of the creation of an executive action capability, Bissell advised him of "a then going operation" involving the names of Maheu and possibly Roselli and Giancana, "which was a part of the Agency's effort to develop . . . a capability for executive action." (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 55, 61). Harvey said that at the time of this discussion, the operation had been "in train" for "approximately two years or perhaps 18 months." (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54).

Although his "net impression" was that both the "exploratory project" and the "specific operation" were "fully authorized and approved", Harvey said he could not testify that "specific White House authority for this given operation was implied or stated". (Harvey, 7/11/75, p. 54.) Bissell does not recall telling anyone in the White House that something had been done to

bring a CIA officer together with the criminal syndicate (Bissell, 6/11/75, pp. 19-20). Harvey did not recall any mention of the White House or any higher authority than the DDP in his November meeting with Bissell (Harvey, 7/11/75, pp. 60-61).

Although Richard Helms was briefed and given administrative responsibility (as DDP) for Project ZR/RIFLE three months later, he did not recall that ZR/RIFLE was ever contemplated as a capability to assassinate Castro (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 55). Asked whether the actual assassination efforts against Castro were related to ZR/RIFLE (executive action), Helms testified: "In my mind those lines never crossed" (Helms, 6/13/75, p. 52). However, Bissell's testimony leaves more ambiguity: "the contact with the syndicate which had Castro as its target . . . folded into the ZR/RIFLE project . . . and they became one" (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). When asked by Senator Baker whether the executive action "capability . .. for assassination" was "used against Castro", Bissell replied that it was "in the later phase". (Bissell, 6/11/75, p. 47). The instruction from Bissell to Harvey on November 15, 1961, however, preceded the reactivation of the CIA-syndicate assasination operation against Castro by approximately five months.

(iii) Use of Agent QJ/WIN in Africa

QJ/WIN was a foreign citizen with a criminal background who had been recruited by the CIA for certain sensitive programs involving surreptitious entries which pre-dated Project

ZR/RIFLE. Harvey testified that QJ/WIN's function after the advent of Project ZR/RIFLE in 1961 was restricted to the "spotting" of potential assets for "multi-purpose" covert use.

However, in the Fall of 1960--before Harvey was assigned to create Project ZR/RIFLE by Richard Bissell--agent QJ/WIN had been dispatched to the Congo by Arnold Silver, his supervising CIA case officer in Europe. William Harvey, as the Chief of the CIA Foreign Intelligence staff on which Silver worked, had ordered QJ/WIN's mission to the Congo (CIA Dispatch AUDW-147, 11/2/60) and arranged the financial accounting for the mission afterward (Memorandum to Finance Division from William K. Harvey, 1/11/61). [QJ/WIN's activities in the Congo are treated in detail in the discussion of the Lumumba case; see Section ___, supra.]

There are two factors which may raise a question as to whether QJ/WIN was being used in an ad hoc capacity to develop an assassination capability before ZR/RIFLE was formally initiated. First, there is a similarity in the cast of characters: Harvey, QJ/WIN, Silver, and Gottlieb were connected with the Lumumba matter and reappear in connection with the subsequent development of ZR/RIFLE. Second, Bissell informed Harvey that the development of an assassination capability had already been discussed with Silver and Gottlieb before Harvey's assignment to ZR/RIFLE (Harvey, 6/25/75, p. 52; I.G. Report, pp. 37-38).

Nevertheless, there does not appear to be any firm evidence of a connection between QJ/WIN and the plot to assassinate Lumumba.

FINAL DRAFT

TOP SECRET

R948

TRUJILLO

Agreed to by drafting
subcommittee on
August 28, 1975*

Summary

Rafael Trujillo was assassinated by a group of Dominican dissidents on May 30, 1961.

Trujillo was a brutal dictator, and both the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations encouraged the overthrow of his regime by Dominican dissidents. Toward that end the highest policy levels of both Administrations approved or condoned supplying arms to the dissidents. Although there is no evidence that the United States instigated any assassination activity, certain evidence tends to link United States officials to the assassination plans.

Material support, consisting of three pistols and three carbines, was supplied to various dissidents. While United States' officials knew that the dissidents intended to overthrow Trujillo, probably by assassination, there is no direct evidence that the weapons which were passed were used in the assassination. The evidence is inconclusive as to how high in the two Administrations information about the dissidents' assassination plots had been passed prior to the spring of 1961.

Beginning in March of 1961, the dissidents began asking United States officials for machine guns. By the time four M-3 machine guns were shipped to the CIA Station Chief in the Dominican capitol in April, it was well known that the dissidents wanted them for use in connection with the assassination. Thereafter, however, permission to deliver the machine guns to the dissidents was denied, and the guns were never passed. Two days before the assassination, President Kennedy personally authorized a cable to the U.S. Consul General in the Dominican Republic stating that the United States government, as a matter of general principle, could not condone political assassinations, but at the same time indicating the United States continued to support the dissidents and stood ready to recognize them in the event they were successful in their endeavor to overthrow Trujillo.

---

* The second paragraph under V.A.3.c. and the paragraph under VII.C. were drafted pursuant to the directions of the Subcommittee but have not been reviewed by the Subcommittee.

I. Background

Rafael Trujillo came to power in the Dominican Republic in 1930. For most of his tenure, the United States government supported him and he was regarded throughout much of the Caribbean and Latin America as a protege of the United States. Trujillo's rule, always harsh and dictatorial, became more arbitrary during the 1950's. As a result, the United States States' image was increasingly tarnished in the eyes of many Latin Americans.

Increasing American awareness of Trujillo's brutality and fear that it would lead to a Castro-type revolution caused U.S. officials to consider various plans to hasten his abdication or downfall.

As early as February 1960 the Eisenhower administration gave high level consideration to a program of covert aid to Dominican dissidents. (Special Group minutes, 2/10/60). In April 1960 President Eisenhower approved a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic which provided, in part, that if the situation deteriorated still further:

> "...the United States would immediately take political action to remove Trujillo from the Dominican Republic as soon as a suitable successor regime can be induced to take over with the assurance of U.S. political, economic, and -- if necessary -- military support." (Memo from Secretary of State Herter to the President, 4/14/60; Presidential approval indicated in Herter letter to Secretary of Defense Gates, 4/21/60.)

Simultaneously, the United States was trying to organize hemispheric opposition to the Castro regime in Cuba. Latin

American leaders, such as President Betancourt of Venezuela, pressed the United States to take affirmative action against Trujillo to dispel criticism that the U.S. opposed dictatorships of the left only. A belief that Castro's road to power was paved by the excesses of Batista led to concern that the Dominican Republic might also eventually fall victim to a Castro-style Communist regime. (Rusk, pp. 8,9)

II. Initial Contact with Dissidents and Request for Arms

During the spring of 1960, the U.S. ambassador to the Dominican Republic, Joseph Farland, made initial contact with dissidents who sought to free their country from Trujillo's grasp. They asked for sniper rifles. Although documentary evidence indicates that a recommendation to provide these rifles was approved both within the State Department and the CIA, the rifles were never provided.

A. Dissident Contacts

Ambassador Farland established contact with a group of dissidents regarded as moderate, pro-U.S. and desirous of establishing a democratic form of government.* (Farland affidavit) Prior to his final departure from the Dominican Republic in May 1960, the Ambassador introduced his Deputy-Chief-of-Mission, Henry Dearborn, to the dissident leaders, indicating that

---

* This loosely-organized group, with which contact was established, was referred to in cables, correspondence, and memoranda as "the dissidents" and is so referenced herein.

Dearborn could be trusted. Then on June 16, 1960, CIA Headquarters* cabled a request that Dearborn become the "communications link" between the dissidents and CIA. The cable /stated/ that Dearborn's role had the "unofficial approval of /Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Roy R./ Rubottom" (Emphasis in original.) (HQS to Station cable 6/16/60).

Dearborn agreed. He requested, however, that the CIA confirm the arrangement with the dissidents as being that the U.S. would "clandestinely" assist the opposition to "develop effective force to accomplish Trujillo overthrow," but would not "undertake any overt action itself against Trujillo government while it is in full control of Dominican Republic" (Station to HQS cable 6/17/60). CIA Headqaurters confirmed Dearborn's understanding of the arrangement (HQS to Station cable 6/19/60).

B. The Sniper Rifles

During the course of a cocktail party in the Dominican Republic, a leading dissident made a specific request to Ambassador Farland for a limited number of rifles with telescopic sights. The Ambassador promised to pass on the request (Farland affidavit) He apparently did so after returning to Washington in May 1960 (CIA memorandum for the record, 6/7/61).

---

* As used herein "Headquarters" refers to Headquarters of the Central Intelligency Agency; "Department" indicates the Department of State.

Documents indicate that consideration was given within the CIA to airdropping rifles into the Dominican Republic. At a June 21, 1960, meeting with Ned Holman of the CIA Western Hemisphere Division, Ambassador Farland reportedly suggested possible sites for the drops. (CIA memo, 6/21/60)

Documents also indicate that a meeting was held around the end of June 1960 between Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Roy R. Rubottom and Col. J. C. King, Chief of CIA's Western Hemisphere Division. Apparently King sought to learn the Assistant Secretary's view regarding "To what extent will the U.S. government participate in the overthrow of Trujillo." A number of questions were raised by King, among them:

> "c. Would it provide a small number of sniper rifles or other devices for the removal of key Trujillo people from the scene?"

King's handwritten notes indicate that Rubottom's response to that question was "yes" (CIA memo of 6/28/60; King affidavit)*/

On July 1, 1960, a memorandum directed to General Cabell, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, was prepared for Colonel King's signature and, in his absence, signed by his principal deputy, Rudy Gomez (I.G. Report, p. 26). The memorandum stated that [illegible] a principal leader of the anti-Trujillo opposition had asked Ambassador Farland for a limited number of arms to precipitate Trujillo's overthrow, and recognized that such arms

---

* Neither King nor Rubottom recalls such a meeting, nor does either recall any proposal for supplying sniper rifles. (Rubottom affidavit, King affidavit.)

"presumably would be used against key members of the Trujillo regime." The memorandum recommended that the arms be provided, since the fall of the Trujillo regime appeared inevitable, and therefore U.S. relations with the opposition should be as close as possible. "Providing the arms as requested would contribute significantly toward this end."
(CIA memo, 7/1/60)

Specifically, the recommendation was to deliver to dissidents in the Dominican Republic 12 sterile* rifles with telescopic sights, together with 500 rounds of ammunition.

Paragraph 4 of the memorandum stated:

> "4. Approval for delivery of these arms has been given by Assistant Secretary of State Roy Rubottom, who requests that the arms be placed in hands of the opposition at the earliest possible moment." (Id.)

Gomez's recommendation was concurred in by Richard Helms, as Acting DDP, and approved by General Cabell, (I.G. Report, p. 26).

The kind of arms approved, sterile rifles with telescopic sights, together with the statement that they would be presumably used against key members of the Trujillo regime clearly indicated the "targeted use" for which the weapons were intended. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p. 77).

On July 1, 1960, a cable was sent to Dearborn by CIA Headquarters informing him of the plan to airdrop 12 telescopically-sighted rifles into the Dominican Republic. The cable inquired whether the dissidents had the capability to realign the sights if thrown off by the drop. On July 14, 1960, Dearborn replied that the dissident leaders were against any further action in the Dominican Republic until after resolution by the OAS of a Venezuelan complaint then pending against Trujillo. The dissidents reportedly believed that sufficiently strong action by the OAS could bring Trujillo's downfall without further effort on their part. (Station to HQS cable, 7/14/60) The 12 sniper rifles were never furnished to the dissidents.

---

*"Sterile" rifles are "untraceable" rifles. (Bissell, 7/22/75, p.69)

On August 26, 1960, Dearborn cabled Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lester Mallory reporting on a meeting between a dissident leader and John Barfield, the Consulate's political officer. The dissident leader was reported to have lost enthusiasm for an assassination attempt and was then speaking of an invasion from Venezuela. However, by September 1, 1960, dissidents were again speaking about the possible provision to them of arms. This time the request was for 200 rifles. For the next several months, consideration centered on providing 200 to 300 guns.

II. Summer and Fall of 1960

In August 1960, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and recalled most of its personnel. Dearborn was left as Consul General and *de facto* CIA Chief of Station. Consideration was given both to providing arms and explosive devices and to the use of high level emissaries to persuade Trujillo to abdicate. By the end of the year, a broad plan of general support to anti-Trujillo forces, both within and without the country, was approved.

A. Diplomatic Development -- Withdrawal of U.S. Personnel

Events occurring during the summer of 1960 further intensified hemispheric opposition to the Trujillo regime. In June agents of Trujillo tried to assassinate Venezuelan President Betancourt. As a result, the OAS censured the Trujillo government. At the same time, in August 1960, the United States broke interupted diplomatic relations with the Dominican Republic and imposed economic sanctions.

With the severance of diplomatic relations, the United States closed its Embassy. Most American personnel, including the CIA Chief of Station, left the Dominican Republic. With the departure of the CIA Chief of Station, Dearborn became de facto CIA Chief of Station and was recognized as such by both CIA and the State Department. Although on January 20, 1961, a new CIA Chief of Station came to the Dominican Republic, Dearborn continued to serve as a link to the dissidents.

B. Dearborn Reports Assassination May be Only Way to Overthrow Trujillo Regime

Dearborn came to believe that no effort to overthrow the

Trujillo government could be successful unless it involved Trujillo's assassination.

He communicated this opinion to both the State Department and the CIA. In July 1960, he advised Assistant Secretary Rubottom that the dissidents were

> "... in no way ready to carry on any type of revolutionary activity in the foreseeable future except the assassination of their principal enemy."
> (Dearborn to Rubottam letter, 7/14/60)

It is uncertain what portion of the information provided by Dearborn to State was passed above the Assistant Secretary level. Through August of 1960, only Assistant Secretary Rubottom, his Deputy, Lester Mallory, and Staff Assistant Frank Devine, were, within the Latin American Division of the Department, aware of Dearborn's "current projects." (Devine to Dearborn letter, 8/15/60)*

By September 1960, Thomas Mann had replaced Roy Rubottom as Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and Frank Devine had become a Special Assistant to Mr. Mann. While serving as Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary, Devine reportedly spent ninety percent of his time coordinating State activities in Latin America. It was in this capacity that Devine maintained almost daily communication with Ned Holman and other officials of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division (Devine, p.7)

---

*Dearborn's candid reporting to State during the summer of 1960 raised concern with the Department and he was advised that certain specific information should more appropriately come through "the other channel" (presumably, CIA communications). Dearborn was advised that his cables to State were distributed to at least 19 different recipient offices. (Id.)

Mann solicited Dearborn's comments concerning plans under discussion for forcing Trujillo from power. Dearborn replied in a detailed letter which concluded:

> "One further point which I should probably not even make. From a purely practical standpoint, it will be best for us, for the OAS, and for the Dominican Republic if the Dominicans put an end to Trujillo before he leaves this island. If he has his millions and is a free agent, he will devote his life from exile to preventing stable government in the D.R., to overturning democratic governments and establishing dictatorships in the Caribbean, and to assassinating his enemies. If I were a Dominican, which thank heaven I am not, I would favor destroying Trujillo as being the first necessary step in the salvation of my country and I would regard this, in fact, as my Christian duty. If you recall Dracula, you will remember it was necessary to drive a stake through his heart to prevent a continuation of his crimes. I believe sudden death would be more humane than the solution of the Nuncio who once told me he thought he should pray that Trujillo would have a long and lingering illness." (Dearborn to Mann letter, 10/27/60)

C. Efforts to Convince Trujillo to Abdicate

Throughout the fall of 1960, efforts were made on both the diplomatic and economic fronts aimed at pressuring Trujillo into relinquishing control, and ideally, leaving the Dominican Republic. The use of high level emissaries, both from within and without the ranks of government, was considered. (Special Group Minutes, 9/8/60; Mann to Dearborn corres., 10/10/60) None of the efforts proved successful, and at the end of 1960 Trujillo was still in absolute control.

D. CIA Plans of October 1960

A CIA internal memorandum dated October 3, 1960 entitled

"Plans of the Dominican Internal Opposition and Dominican Desk for Overthrow of the Trujillo Government" set forth plans which "have been developed on a tentative basis which appear feasible and which might be carried out..covertly by CIA with a minimal risk of exposure." These plans provided, in part, for the following:

> "a. Delivery of approximately 300 rifles and pistols, together with ammunition and a supply of grenades, to secure cache on the South shore of the island, about 14 miles East of Ciudad Trujillo.
>
> "b. Delivery to the same cache described above, of an electronic detonating device with remote control features, which could be planted by the dissidents in such manner as to eliminate certain key Trujillo henchmen. This might necessitate training and introducing into the country by illegal entry, a trained technician to set the bomb and detonator." (Emphasis added) (CIA Memorandum, 10/3/60)

E. December 1960 Special Group Plan of Covert Action

On December 29, 1960, the Special Group considered and approved a broad plan of covert support to anti-Trujillo forces. The plan, presented by Bissell, envisioned support to both Dominican exile groups and internal dissidents. The exile groups were to be furnished money to organize and undertake anti-Trujillo propaganda efforts and to refurbish a yacht for use in paramilitary activities. Bissell emphasized to the Special Group that "the proposed actions would not, of themselves, bring about the desired result in the near future, lacking some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself." (Special Group Minutes, 12/29/60)

IV. January 12, 1961 Special Group Approval of "Limited Supplies of Small Arms and Other Material"

On January 12, 1961, with all members present,* the Special Group met and, according to its Minutes, took the following action with respect to the Dominican Republic:

> "Mr. Merchant explained the feeling of the Department of State that limited supplies of small arms and other material should be made available for dissidents inside the Dominican Republic. Mr. Parrott said that we believe this can be managed securely by CIA, and that the plan would call for final transportation into the country being provided by the dissidents themselves. The Group approved the project." (Special Group Minutes, 1/12/61)

A. Memoranda Underlying the Special Group Action

On January 12, 1961, Thomas Mann sent a memorandum to Under Secretary Livingston Merchant. The memorandum, sent through Joseph Scott, Merchant's Special Assistant, reported on the disillusionment of Dominican dissidents with the United States for its failure to furnish them with any tangible or concrete assistance. Further, it reported:

> Opposition elements have consistently asked us to supply them with "hardware" of various types. This has included quantities of conventional arms and also, rather persistently, they have asked for some of the more exotic items and devices which they associate with revolutationary effort. (Mann to Merchant memo of 1/12/61)

---

* The members of the Special Group were at the time: Livingston Merchant, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; Gordon Gray, Advisor to the President for National Security Affairs; John N. Irwin, Deputy Secretary of Defense; and Allen Dulles, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

Mann suggested for Merchant's consideration and, if he approved, for discussion by the Special Group, the provision of token quantities of selected items desired by the dissidents. Mann specifically mentioned small explosive devices which would place some "sabotage potential" in the hands of dissident elements, but stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the GODR (Government of Dominican Republic) by any such minor measure." (Mann to Merchant memo, 1/12/61) This memorandum was drafted on January 11 by Mann's Special Assistant for CIA liaison, Frank Devine.

A covering memorandum from Scott to Merchant, forwarding Mann's memo, was apparently taken by Merchant to the Special Group meeting. Merchant's handwritten notations indicate that the Special Group "agreed in terms of Tom Mann's memo" and that the Secretary of State was informed of that decision by late afternoon on January 12, 1961. (Scott to Merchant memo, 1/12/61)

There is no evidence that any member of the Special Group, other than Allen Dulles, knew that the dissidents had clearly and repeatedly expressed a desire for arms and explosives to be used by them in assassination efforts.* While it is, of course, possible that such information was passed orally to some or all of the members of the Special Group, and perhaps even discussed by them on January 12, 1961, there is no

JOE
D-

---

*Various CIA cables, including those dealing with the sniper rifles, indicate that copies were sent to the DCI, Allen Dulles.

documentary evidence of which the Committee is aware which would establish this to be the case.

On January 19, 1961, the last day of the Eisenhower administration, Consul General Dearborn was advised that approval had been given for supplying arms and other material to the Dominican dissidents (HQS to Station cable, 1/19/61). Shortly thereafter, Dearborn informed Devine that the dissidents were "delighted" about the decision to deliver "exotic equipment." (Dearborn to Devine cable, 1/31/61)

V. January 20, 1961 - April 17, 1961
(the Kennedy Administration Through the Bay of Pigs)

On January 20, 1961, the Kennedy administration took office. Three of the four members of the Special Group (all except Allen Dulles) retired.

Prior to the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961, a number of significant events occurred. These events included meetings with Dominican dissidents in which specific assassination plans were discussed, requests by dissidents for explosive devices, the passage by U.S. officials of pistols and carbines to dissidents inside the Dominican Republic, and the pouching to the Dominican Republic of machine guns which had been requested by the dissidents for use in connection with an assassination attempt.*

---

*As indicated in the post-Bay of Pigs section, infra, permission to pass those machine guns was denied and the guns were never passed.

These events are discussed below under subheading A.

Evidence reflecting the degree of knowledge of those events possessed by senior American officials is treated thereafter. As used herein, "senior American officials" means individuals in the White House or serving as members of the Special Group.

A. Specific Events Indirectly Linking U.S. to Dissidents' Assassination Plans

1. Assassination Discussions and Requests for Explosives

At meetings held with dissident leaders in New York City on February 10 and 15, 1961, CIA officials were told repeatedly by dissident leaders that "the key to the success of the plot [to overthrow the Trujillo regime] would be the assassination of Trujillo." (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61) Among the requests made of the CIA by dissident leaders were the following:

(a) Ex-FBI agents who would plan and execute the death of Trujillo.

(b) Cameras and other items that could be used to fire projectiles.

(c) A slow-working chemical that could be rubbed on the palm of one's hand and transferred to Trujillo in a handshake, causing delayed lethal results.

(d) Silencers for rifles that could kill from a distance of several miles. (Id.)

Other methods of assassinating Trujillo proposed by dissidents at the February 10 or February 15 meetings included poisoning Trujillo's food or medicines, ambushing his automobile, and attacking him with firearms and grenades. (CIA memo for the record, 2/13/61; 2/16/61)*

The dissidents' "latest plot", as described in the February CIA memoranda, was said to involve the planting of a powerful bomb, which could be detonated from a nearby electric device, along the route of Trujillo's evening walk. (Id.)

On March 13, 1961, a dissident in the Dominican Republic asked for fragmentation grenades "for use during the next week or so." This request was communicated to CIA Headquarters on March 14, 1961, and was followed the next day by an additional request for 50 fragmentation grenades, 5 rapid-fire weapons, and 10 64 mm anti-tank rockets. This further request was also passed on to CIA Headquarters. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) There is no evidence that any of these arms were supplied to the dissidents.

The documentary record makes clear that Frank Devine at the State Department was also advised of related developments in a March 16, 1961, "picnic" letter from Dearborn who complained that his spirits were in the doldrums because:

> ". . . the members of our club are now prepared in their minds to have a picnic but do not have the ingredients for the salad. Lately they have developed a plan for the picnic, which just might work if they could find the proper food. They

---

* There is no record that the CIA responded affirmatively to any of these requests and the CIA officer who drafted the February 13 memorandum stated the view that some of the questions raised by the dissidents did not require an answer.

> have asked us for a few sandwiches, hardly more, and we are not prepared to make them available. Last week we were asked to furnish three or four pineapples for a party in the near future, but I could remember nothing in my instructions that would have allowed me to contribute this ingredient. Don't think I wasn't tempted. I have rather specific guidelines to the effect that salad ingredients will be delivered outside the picnic grounds and will be brought to the area by another club. (Dearborn letter to Devine, 3/16/61)

After reviewing his "picnic" letter, together with the requests in the March 14 and 15 cables discussed above, Dearborn concluded during his testimony before the Committee that the "pineapples" were probably the requested fragmentation grenades and the restriction on delivering salad ingredients outside of the picnic grounds was, almost certainly, meant to refer to the requirements of the January 12 Special Group order that arms be delivered outside the Dominican Republic. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 25-27)

2. The Passage of Pistols

a. Pouching to the Dominican Republic

In a March 15, 1961 cable, Chief of Station Owen reported that Dearborn had asked for three .38 caliber pistols for issue to several dissidents. In reply, Headquarters cabled: "Regret no authorization exists to suspend pouch regulations against shipment of arms" and indicated that their reply had been coordinated with State. (HQS to Station cable, 3/17/61) The Station Chief then asked Headquarters to seek the necessary authorization and noted that at his last two posts, he had received pistols via the pouch for "worthy purposes" and,

what were they

therefore, he knew it could be done. (Station to Hqs cable, 3/21/61) Two days later, Headquarters cabled that the pistols and ammunition were being pouched. However, the Station Chief was instructed not to advise Dearborn. (Hqs. to Station cable, 3/24/61)*

b. Reason for the CIA Instruction Not to Tell Dearborn

Owen testified that he believed the "don't tell Dearborn the pistol is being pouched" language simply meant that the sending of firearms through the diplomatic pouch was not something to be unnecessarily discussed. (Owen, pp. 78,79) Dearborn said he never doubted the pouch was used, since he knew Owen had no other means of receiving weapons. (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 33)

c. Were the Pistols Related to Assassination?

Dearborn testified that he had asked for a single pistol for purposes completely unrelated to any assassination consideration. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 29-31) He said he had been approached by a Dominican contact who lived in a remote area and was concerned for the safety of his family in the event of political reprisals. Dearborn testified that he had believed

the man's fears were well-founded and had promised to seek a pistol.*

---

* The Inspector General's Report, issued in connection with a review of these events, concludes that:

> "There is no indication in the EMDEED operational files that the pistols were actually pouched. The request for pistols appears to have been overtaken by a subsequent request for submachine guns." (I.G. Report, p. 60)

This conclusion is difficult to understand in light of the March 24, 1961, Headquarters to Station cable, which provides:

> "C. Pouching revolvers and ammo requested TRUJ 0462 (in 20040) on 28 March. Do not advise (name Dearborn deleted) this material being pouched. Explanation follows."

Although there is no direct evidence linking any of these pistols to the assassination of Trujillo, a June 7, 1961, CIA memorandum, unsigned and with no attribution as to source, states that two of the three pistols were passed by Owen to Lorenzo "Wimpy" Berry, a United States citizen who was in direct contact with the action element of the dissident group. It should also be noted that the assassination was apparently conducted with almost complete reliance upon hand weapons. Whether one or more of these .38 caliber Smith & Wesson pistols eventually came into the hands of the assassins and, if so, whether they were used in connection with the assassination, remain open questions.

Both Dearborn and Owen testified that they regarded the pistols as weapons for self-defense purposes and they never considered them in any way connected with the then-current assassination plans. (Dearborn 7/29, p.70; Owen, pp.38,73) However, none of the Headquarters cables inquired as to the purpose for which the handguns were sought and Owen's cable stated only that Dearborn wanted them for passage to dissidents. (Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61) Indeed, the March 24, 1961,

cable advising that the pistols were being pouched is the very cable which was sent in response to a request by the dissidents for machine guns to be used in an assassination effort which had been previously described to Headquarters. As with the carbines discussed below, it appears that little, if any, concern was expressed within the Agency over passing these weapons to would-be assassins.

---

*Dearborn is clear in his recollection that he asked Owen to request only one pistol. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp.30,31) Owen, on the other hand, testified that if his cables requested three pistols for Dearborn then Dearborn must have asked for three pistols. (Owen, p.72)

The pistols were, however, apparently sent in one package (HQS to Station cables,3/27/61 and 3/24/61) and Dearborn testified that, what he believed to be the one gun, came "wrapped up" and that he passed it. (Dearborn, 7/29,p.30)

or outside CIA?

3. Passing of the Carbines

a. Request by Owen and Dearborn and Approval by CIA

In a March 26, 1961 cable to CIA Headquarters, Owen asked for permission to pass to the dissidents three 30 caliber M1 carbines. The guns had been left behind in the Consulate by Navy personnel after the U.S. broke formal diplomatic relations in August 1960. Dearborn testified that he knew of and concurred in the proposal to supply the carbines to the dissidents. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 42,43) On March 31, 1961 CIA Headquarters cabled approval of the request to pass the carbines. (Hqs to Station cable, 3/31/61)

b. Were the Carbines Related to Assassination?

The carbines were passed to the action group contact, Wimpy Berry, on April 7, 1961. (Station to HQS cable, 4/8/61) Eventually, they found their way into the hands of one of the assassins, Antonio de la Maza. (Station to HQS cable, 4/26/61; I.G. Report pp. 46, 49) Both Dearborn and Owen testified that the carbines were at all times viewed as strictly a token show of support, indicating U.S. support of the dissidents' efforts to overthrow Trujillo. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 46-48; Owen p. 39)

c. Failure to Disclose to State Department Officials in Washington

There is no indication that the request or the passage of the carbines was disclosed to State Department officials in Washington until several weeks after the passage. In fact, on April 5, Headquarters requested its Station to ask Dearborn not to comment in correspondence with State that the carbines and ammunition were being passed to the dissidents. This cable was sent while Owen was in Washington, and it indicated that upon his return to the Dominican Republic, he would explain the request. The Station replied that Dearborn had not commented on the carbines and ammunition in his correspondence with State and he realized the necessity not to do so. (Station to HQS cable, 4/6/61)

Dearborn testified, however, that he believed, at the time of his April 6 cable, that someone in the State Department had been consulted in advance and had approved the passage of the carbines (Dearborn 7/29, p. 44)

3. Requests For and Pouching of the Machine Guns

a. Owen Requests Machine Guns for Use in Assassination

The Station Chief suggested that Headquarters consider pouching an M3 machine gun on February 10, 1961 (Owen, pp. 63,64; Station to HQS cable, 3/15/61). The request was raised again in March but no action was taken. On March 20, 1961, Owen cabled a dissident request for five M3 or comparable machine guns specifying their wish that the arms be sent via the diplomatic pouch or similar means. The dissidents were said to feel that delivery by air drop or transfer at sea would overly-tax their resources. (Station to HQS cable, 3/20/61)

The machine guns sought by the dissidents were clearly identified, in Owen's cable, as being sought for use in connection with an attempt to assassinate Trujillo. This plan was to kill Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress and, according to Owen's cable:

> "4. To do they need five M3 or comparable machine-guns. and 1500 rounds ammo for personal defense in event fire fight. Will use quiet weapons for basic job." (Id.)

In essence, CIA's response was that the timing for an assassination was wrong. Owen was told that precipitious or uncoordinated action could lead to the emergence of a leftist, Castro-type regime and the "mere disposal of Trujillo may create more problems than solutions." It was Headquarters' position that:

> "...we should attempt to avoid precipitous action by the internal dissidents until opposition group and HQS are better prepared to support /assassination/*, effect a change in the regime, and cope with the aftermath." (HQS to Station cable, 3/24/61)

---

* Word supplied by CIA in previously sanitized cable.

The cable also stated that Headquarters was prepared to deliver machine guns and ammunition to the dissidents when they developed a capability to received them, but that security considerations precluded use of U.S. facilities as a carrier.* Soon, thereafter, on April 6, 1961, while Owen was in Washington for consultation with Headquarters, he reported on events in the Dominican Republic and

> "especially on the insistence of the EMOTH [dissident] leaders that they be provided with a limited number of small arms for their own protection (specifically, five M3 caliber .45 SMG's)." (CIA memo for the record, 4/11/61)

b. Pouching the Machine Guns is Approved by Bissell

Accordingly, on April 7, 1961, a Pouch Restriction Waiver Request and Certification was submitted seeking permission to pouch "four M3 machine guns and 240 rounds of ammunition on a priority basis for issuance to a small action group to be used for self protection." (Pouch Restriction Waiver Request 4/7/61)

The request, submitted on behalf of the Chief, Western Hemisphere Division, further provided:

> "B. A determination has been made that the issuance of this equipment to the action group is desirable if for no other reason than to assure this important group's continued cooperation with and confidence in this Agency's determination to live up to its earlier commitments to the group. These commitments took

---

* This same cable of March 24, 1961, is the one which advised that the revolvers and ammunition were being pouched.

> the form of advising the group in January 1961 that we would provide limited arms and assistance to them provided they develop the capability to receive it. Operational circumstances have prevented this group from developing the assets capable of receiving the above equipment through normal clandestine channels such as air drops or sea infiltration."

The Waiver Request was approved by Richard Bissell, as Deputy Director (Plans), on April 10, 1961. (Id.)

The machine guns were pouched to the Dominican Republic and were received by the station on April 19, 1961.* (I.G. Report, p. 42; Station to Headquarters cable, 4/19/61).

On April 10, Walter Elder, Assistant to the Director, had issued a memorandum which stated:

> "Mr. Dulles wants no action on drops of leaflets or arms in the Dominican Republic taken without his approval." (Elder memorandum of 4/10/61).**

The Elder memorandum suggests that Dulles did not know that an air drop of arms was regarded as unfeasible and that pouching had been approved.

B. Knowledge of Senior American Officials (pre-Bay of Pigs)

On February 14, 1961, prior to the passage of weapons, but a month after the generalized approval of the passage of arms by the prior administration, a meeting of the Special Group was held with Messrs. McNamara, Gilpatric, Bowles, Bundy, Dulles, Bissell, and General Cabell in attendance.

---

* Permission to pass the machine guns was never obtained and the guns never passed into the hands of the dissidents. The matter is discussed in detail beginning at page ;

** Elder testified that this note, sent the weekend before the Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, was intended to make sure that there were no unusual planes shot down or any unnecessary noise in the Dominican Republic" prior to the Cuba invasion. (Elder, p. 51)

The minutes state that:

> "Mr. Dulles, assisted by Mr. Bissell, then summarized for the benefit of the new members of the Special Group the specific actions taken by the predecessor group during the past year, and also a list of significant projects which antedate the beginning of 1960 and which it is planned to continue." (Special Group Minutes of 2/14/61)

In the course of the discussion, the following point, among others, was made:

> "(a) Dominican Republic -- Mr. Bundy asked that a memorandum be prepared for higher authority on the subject of what plans can be made for a successor government to Trujillo." (Id.)

suggests that knew of means of disposal

The request attributed to Bundy suggests that the Dominican Republic had been one of the matters on which Dulles and Bissell briefed the new members.

What is unclear from the February 14 minutes (just as it is unclear from the January 12 minutes) is the degree to which the Special Group was informed concerning the means by which the dissidents planned to accomplish the overthrow of the Trujillo regime. Specifically, it is not known if the new members of the Special Group were told that the dissident group had expressed the desire to assassinate Trujillo. Nor is it known if the Special Group was

why don't they ask

advised that the State Department representative in the Dominican Republic had made the assessment that the Dominican government could not be overthrown without the assassination of Trujillo.

Bissell testified that he had no clear recollection of the details of the February 14 briefing and he was unable to say whether or not the method of overthrow to be attempted by the dissidents was discussed. (Bissell, 7/22, pp. 101, 102) Robert McNamara, one of the new members of the Special Group in attendance for the briefing, has no recollection as to the specificity in which the Dominican Republic was discussed at the February 14 meeting. He does not recall any mention by either Dulles or Bissell of dissident plans to assassinate Trujillo. (McNamara affidavit).

February Memoranda

The Secretary of State sent the President a memorandum on February 15, 1961, in response to a request concerning progress to assure an orderly takeover "should Trujillo fall." The memorandum advised that:

> "Our representatives in the Dominican Republic have, at considerable risk to those involved, established contacts with numerous leaders of the underground opposition . . . /and/ . . . the CIA has recently been authorized to arrange for delivery to them outside the Dominican Republic of small arms and sabotage equipment."

This reference to recent authorization for delivery of arms indicates that Secretary Rusk had received some briefing concerning events in the Dominican Republic and the January 1961

If [illegible] authorized then obviously knew

Special Group decision to provide arms to anti-Trujillo elements. Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas Mann; Deputy Assistant Secretary William Coerr; and Special Assistant Frank Devine continued in their respective positions throughout the transition period. The Committee has been furnished no documents indicating that Secretary Rusk or Under Secretary Bowles were specifically advised as to the intentions of the Dominican dissidents to kill Trujillo; intentions of which the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs certainly had knowledge. Indeed, Secretary Rusk testified that he was not personally so advised. (Rusk, 7/10, pp. 41,42)

How explanation?

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a briefing paper on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy, President Kennedy's National Security Advisor. The paper made note of the outstanding Special Group approval for the provision of arms and equipment to Dominican dissidents and stated that the dissidents had been informed that the U.S. was prepared to provide such arms and equipment as soon as they developed the capability to receive them.

The briefing paper also indicated that dissident leaders had informed CIA of "their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices." Various witnesses have testified, however, that supplying arms for 300 men would, standing alone, indicate a "non-targeted" use for the

[illegible] someone personally ask what their plan(s)?

arms (i.e., a paramilitary or revolutionary implementation as opposed to a specifically targeted assassination use). (Bissell, 7/29, p.80),

Concerning the briefing paper, Bissell testified that:

> "... it is perfectly clear that I was aware at the time of the memorandum to Mr. Bundy that these dissident groups were, and had for a long time, been hoping they could accomplish the assassination of Trujillo. As a matter of fact, the requests since some seven or eight months earlier was a perfectly clear indication of that, so that fact was not new knowledge." (Bissell 7/22, p.102)

When asked why the memorandum did not include the fact that the dissidents intended the assassination of Trujillo, Bissell replied:

> "I cannot tell you, Mr. Chairman. I do not remember what considerations moved me. I don't know whether it was because this was common knowledge and it seemed to me unnecessary to include it, or as you are implying, there was an element of concealment here. I would be very surprised if it were the latter, in this case." (Bissell, 7/22, p.101)

why didn't Bundy ask

In response to questions concerning the lack of information in the February 17, 1961 briefing paper concerning the uses to which the requested arms might likely be put by the dissidents, Bissell stated:

> " . . . I would say that the Agency's failure, if there be a failure here was [not] (sic) to state in writing that the plans of the dissidents would include assassination attempts." (Bissell, 7/22, p.99)

Bissell's briefing paper for Bundy concluded with the assessment that a violent clash might soon occur between Trujillo and the internal opposition, "which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll up of the internal opposition." In this regard, the fear was expressed that existing schedules for the delivery of weapons to the internal opposition might not be sufficiently timely, and it was therefore recommended that consideration be given to caching the requested arms and other materials. (Bissell to Bundy memo, 2/17/61)

Thus, by the middle of February 1961, the senior members of the new administration, and in view of the "for higher authority" nature of Bundy's request, presumably President Kennedy himself, were aware of the outstanding Special Group approval for the passage of arms and other materials to opposition elements within the Dominican Republic. There was no modification or recision of the "inherited" Special Group approval and it would seem fair, therefore, to regard the approval as having been at least acquiesced in by the new administration.

Bundy knew of liquidation

During March and early April 1961, operational levels within both the CIA and the State Department learned of increasingly detailed plans by the dissidents to assassinate Trujillo. There is no evidence that this information was passed to the White House or to any member of the Special Group,

Is this true

except Allen Dulles.* Similarly, there is no evidence that the passage of the pistols or the carbines or the pouching of the machine guns to the Dominican Republic was disclosed to anyone outside of the CIA during this period.**

VI. April 17, 1961 - May 31, 1961
(Bay of Pigs Through Trujillo Assassination)

Following the failure of the Bay of Pigs invasion, attempts were made by State and CIA representatives in the Dominican Republic to dissuade the dissidents from a precipitous assassination attempt. These efforts to halt the assassination of Trujillo were the result of instructions from CIA Headquarters and were prompted by concern over filling the power vacuum which would result from Trujillo's death.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic but permission to pass them to the dissidents was never given and the guns never left the Consulate.

Dearborn returned to Washington for consultation and a contingency plan for the Dominican Republic was drafted.

Two days before Trujillo's assassination, Dearborn received a cable of instructions and guidance from President Kennedy. The cable advised that the U.S. must not run the risk of association with political assassination, since the U.S., as a matter of general policy, could not condone assassination. The cable

How does this square w/ [illegible] Disclosure further advised Dearborn to continue to hold open offers of material assistance to the dissidents and to advise them of U.S. support for them if they were successful in overthrowing the Trujillo government. The cable also reconfirmed the decision not to pass the machine guns.

---

* Copies of CIA cables, including the March 20, 1961 cable describing the plan to assassinate Trujillo in the apartment of his mistress were apparently sent to the office of the Director of Central Intelligence.

** Although a copy of the CIA cable advising that the pistols were being pouched was sent to the Director's office, Dulles apparently did not receive copies of the cables approving passage of the carbines or pouching of the machine guns.

A. Decision Not to Pass the Machine Guns and Unsuccessful U.S. Attempt to Stop Assassination Effort

By April 17, 1961, the Bay of Pigs invasion had [operation was a failed]. As a result, there developed a general realization that precipitous action should be avoided in the Dominican Republic until Washington was able to give further consideration to the consequences of a Trujillo overthrow and the power vacuum which would be created. (Bissell, 6/11, p.113) A cable from Headquarters to the Station, on April 17, 1961, advised that it was most important that the machine guns not be passed without additional Headquarters approval.

The machine guns arrived in the Dominican Republic on April 19, 1961, and Headquarters was so advised. The earlier admonition that the machine guns should be held in Station custody until further notice was repeated in a second cable from Headquarters, sent April 20, 1961. This decision was said to have been "based on judgment that filling a vacuum created by assassination now bigger question than ever view unsettled conditions in Caribbean area." (HQs. to Station cable, 4/20/61)

The dissidents continued to press for the release of the machine guns and their requests were passed on to Headquarters in cables from Dearborn and Owen. (Station to HQS cables 4/25/61) On April 25, 1961, Owen advised Headquarters that Wimpy Berry had informed him that Antonio de la Maza was going to attempt the assassination between April 29 and May 2. Owen also reported that this attempt would use the three carbines passed from the American Consulate, together with whatever else was available. (Id.)

In response to the April 26 cable, Headquarters restated that there was no approval to pass any additional arms to the dissidents and requested Owen to advise the dissidents that the United States was simply not prepared at that time to cope with the aftermath of the assassination. (See C/S comments, Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61) The following day, April 27, 1961, Owen replied that, based upon further discussions with the dissidents, "We doubt statement U.S. government not now prepared to cope with aftermath will dissuade them from attempt." (Station to HQS cable, 4/27/61)

Dearborn recalls receiving instructions that an effort be made to turn off the assassination attempt and testified that efforts to carry out the instructions were unsuccessful. In effect, the dissidents informed him that this was their affair and it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the U.S. government.

(Dearborn, 7/29, p.52)

On April 30, 1961, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the dissidents had reported to him the assassination attempt was going to take place during the first week of May. The action group was reported to have in its possession three carbines, four to six 12-gauge shotguns and other small arms. Although they reportedly still wanted the machine guns, Dearborn advised Headquarters that the group was going to go ahead with what they had, whether the U.S. wanted them to or not. (Station to HQS cable, 4/30/61)

Dearborn's cable set forth the argument of the action group that, since the U.S. had already assisted the group to some extent and was therefore implicated, the additional assistance of releasing the machine guns would not change the basic relationship. The cable concluded:

> "Owing to far-reaching political implications involved in release or non release of requested items, Headquarters may wish discuss foregoing with State Department." (Id.)

B. Further Consideration of Passing Machine Guns

In reponse, a cable was drafted at CIA Headquarters authorizing passage of the machine guns. The cable which was sent to Allen Dulles, with Bissell's recommendation for its dispatch, provided:

> "Since it appears that opposition group has committed itself to action with or without

> additional support, coupled with fact ref. C items [the carbines] already made available to them for personal defense; station authorized pass ref. A items [the machine guns] to opposition member for their additional protection on their proposed endeavor." (Draft of HQS to Station cable, 5/2/61).

The cable was never sent.

In his testimony before the Committee, Bissell characterized his reasoning for recommending release of the machine guns as:

> " . . . having made already a considerable investment in this dissident group and its plans that we might as well make the additional investment." (Bissell, 7/22, p.127)

NAMG

The following day, May 3, 1961, Ray Herbert, Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of CIA, who frequently acted as liaison with the State Department in matters concerning covert operations in the Dominican Republic, met with Adolph Berle, Chairman of the State Department's Interagency Task Force on Latin America.

A Berle memorandum of the meeting states that Herbert informed Berle that a local group in the Dominican Republic wished to overthrow Trujillo and sought arms for that purpose. The memorandum continued:

> "On cross examination it developed that the real plan was to assassinate Trujillo and they wanted guns for that purpose. Herbert wanted to know what the policy should be.
>
> "I told him I could not care less for Trujillo and that this was the general sentiment. But we did not wish to have any thing to do with any assassination plots anywhere, any time. Herbert said he felt the same way." (Berle, Memo of Conversation, 5/3/61)

Copies of Berle's memorandum were sent to Wymberly Coerr, the Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, and to Special Assistant Frank Devine.

Both Herbert and Devine, who had been in almost daily contact with each other since August of 1960, had been advised of the assassination plans of the dissident group. In fact, Herbert, along with Bissell, had signed off on the proposed cable of May 2, releasing the machine guns for passage.

why didn't they tell Berle

C. Special Group Meetings of May 4 and May 18, 1961

On the day following the Berle-Herbert meeting, the Special Group met and, according to the minutes:

> "The DCI referred to recent reports of a new anti-Trujillo plot. He said we never know if one of these is going to work or not, and asked what is the status of contingency planning should the plot come off. Mr. Bundy said that this point is covered in the Cuba paper which will be discussed at a high level in the very ~~near~~ future." (Special Group Minutes, 5/4/61)

What's this

Once again, the cryptic reporting of Special Group Minutes makes subsequent analysis as to the scope of matters discussed speculative. It is not known to what extent and in what detail Allen Dulles referred to "recent reports" of a new anti-Trujillo plot. Certainly, the most recent report of such a plot was Dearborn's April 30 cable -- disclosing an imminent assassination attempt potentially utilizing U.S.-supplied weapons.

On May 18, 1961, the Special Group again considered the situation in the Dominican Republic and, according to the

minutes:

> " Cabell [Deputy DCI] noted that the internal dissidents were pressing for the release to them of certain small arms now in U.S. hands in the Dominican Republic. He inquired whether the feeling of the Group remained that these arms should not be passed. The members showed no inclination to take a contrary position at this time."* (Emphasis supplied) (Special Group Minutes, 5/18/61)

D. Final Requests by Dissidents for Machine Guns

On May 16, 1961, Dearborn cabled the State Department, attention Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr, with an urgent request from the dissidents for the machine guns. The cable advised that the assassination attempt was scheduled for the night of May 16 and that, while the chances of success were 80 percent, provision of the machine guns would reduce the possibility of failure. The dissidents reportedly stressed to Dearborn that if the effort failed, due to U.S. refusal to supply the machine guns, the U.S. would be held responsible and would never be forgiven. Dearborn reported that he had informed the dissidents that, based on his recent conversations in Washington, he was reasonably certain that authorization could not be obtained for handing over machine guns. (Dearborn to State cable, 5/16/61)

A return cable from the State Department to Dearborn, sent the same day, confirmed Dearborn's judgment. It instructed him

to continue to take the same line until he received contrary instructions which clearly indicated they had been cleared in advance by the State Department itself. This cable from State was approved by Under Secretary Bowles. (Department to Dearborn, 5/16/61)

---

* There was no meeting of the Special Group at which the Dominican Republic was discussed between May 4 and May 18. The language attributed to General Cabell as to whether the feeling of the Group remained not to pass the arms, tends to suggest that the question of passing these arms must have been raised prior to the May 18 Group meeting, perhaps at the May 4, 1961 meeting.

Ray Herbert referred to Dearborn's May 16 request in a memorandum he sent to Devine on the same date and asked to be advised as to the Department's policy concerning passage of the machine guns. Herbert noted that when this request was last taken to the Department, Berle made the decision that the weapons not be passed. (Memo to ARA from CIA, 5/16/61)

Devine responded to Herbert's memorandum on the same day, advising Herbert that the Department's policy continued to be negative on the matter of passing the machine guns.* Herbert's attention was directed to the January 12, 1961 Special Group limitation concerning the passage of arms outside of the Dominican Republic. A copy of Devine's memorandum to Herbert was forwarded to the Office of the Under Secretary of State, to the attention of his personal assistant, Joseph Scott. (Devine to Herbert memo, 5/16/61)

E. Dearborn in Washington for Consultation -- Drafting of Contingency Plans

At a meeting of the National Security Council on May 5, 1961, the question of U.S. policy toward the Dominican Republic was considered and it was:

> "Agreed that the Task Force on Cuba would prepare promptly both emergency and long-range plans for anti-communist intervention in the event of crises in Haiti or the

---

* By May 27, 1961 Dearborn was advising the State Department that the roup was no longer requesting the arms and had accepted the fact that it must make do with what it had. (Dearborn to State 5/27/61)

> Dominican Republic. Noted the President's view that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before we knew what government would succeed him, and that any action against Trujillo should be multilateral." (Record of Actions bv National Security Council, 5/5/61) (Approved by the President, 5/16/61)

Although the precise dates are uncertain, Dearborn was recalled to Washington to participate in drafting of these contingency plans and recommendations. Dearborn was in Washington at least from May 10 through May 13, 1961.

While in Washington, Dearborn met with State Department personnel and with Richard Goodwin and Arthur Schlesinger of the White House staff. When testifying before the Committee, he was unable to recall the substance of his discussions with Goodwin and Schlesinger, aside from his general assumption that the current situation in the Dominican Republic was discussed. He did not recall any discussion with Goodwin or Schlesinger concerning arms, either those which had been passed to the dissidents or those which were being sought. (Dearborn, 7/29, pp. 58-61) Dearborn left the meeting at the White House, however, with the firm impression that Goodwin had been reviewing cable traffic between Washington and the Dominican Republic and was very familiar with events as they then stood. (Dearborn, 7/29, p.62)

On May 11, 1961, Dearborn prepared a two-page draft document which set forth ways in which the U.S. could overtly aid and encourage the opposition to Trujillo. The draft noted that means of stepping up the covert program were considered in separate papers. (Dearborn draft document of May 11, 1961) This Dearborn draft of May 11, 1961, was apparently used as a basis for portions of the "Dominican Republic -- Contingency Paper" discussed below.

Two documents entitled, "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic" were provided to the Committee staff from State Department files. Each appears to be a draft of the covert activities paper described in Dearborn's May 11, 1961 memorandum. One draft recommended an expanded U.S. offer to deliver small explosive devices and arms. (Document indicating it was attached to "Dominican Republic -- Contingency," dated 5/12/61 and bearing Nos. 306-308). The other draft is very similar except that it concludes that delivery of arms within the Dominican Republic to members of the underground is not recommended. (Document from State Dept. files bearing No. 310).

Attached to the second draft was a one-page document which Frank Devine believes he wrote. It listed eight numbered points including the following:

"1. The USG should not lend itself to direct political assassination. but [illegible] this

"2. US moral posture can ill afford further tarnishing in the eyes of the world.

who says this

"3. We would be encouraging the action, supplying the weapons, effecting the delivery, and then turning over only the final execution to (unskilled) local triggermen.

"4. So far we have seen no real evidence of action capability. Should we entrust ourselves and our reputation to this extent in the absence thereof?

"7. Can we afford a precedent which may convince the world that our diplomatic pouches are used to deliver assassination weapons?" (Document from State Department files bearing No. 313)

The other points raised in document No. 313 related to the likelihood that any such involvement by the U.S. would ultimately be revealed.

On May 15, 1961, Acting Assistant Secretary Coerr sent to Under Secretary Bowles a document entitled "Covert Action Programs Authorized With Respect to the Dominican Republic". That document outlined the existing Special Group approvals for covert assistance to Dominican dissidents and, while making no recommendation as to further policy, suggested that the Special Group review the outstanding approvals and communicate to interested agencies the status of such authorizations. (State Dept. document from Coerr to Bowles, 5/15/61)

During this period a document dated May 13, 1961, was prepared at the request of Richard Goodwin and was thereafter circulated within the State Department.* This document, entitled "Program of Covert Action for the Dominican Republic" reported:

> "CIA has had in the direct custody of its Station in Ciudad Trujillo, a very limited supply of weapons and grenades. In response to the urgent requests from the internal opposition leaders for personal defense weapons attendant to their projected efforts to neutralize TRUJILLO, three (3) 38 Cal revolvers and three (3) carbines with accompanying ammunition have been passed by secure means to the opposition. The recipients have repeatedly requested additional armed support."

This memorandum is the first direct evidence of disclosure to anyone on the White House staff of the fact that arms had been passed to dissidents in the Dominican Republic.

The original ribbon copy of the memorandum has the above quoted material circled in pencil and the word "neutralize" is underscored. Goodwin testified before the Committee that he circled the above paragraph when first reading the memorandum because the information concerning passage of the arms was new to him and struck him as significant. (Goodwin 7/18, pp. 48,49)

Under the heading of "Possible Covert Actions Which Require Additional Authorization," the memorandum to Goodwin indicated that the CIA had a supply of four 45 caliber machine guns and a small number of grenades currently in the direct custody of the Station in Ciudad Trujillo and that a secure means of passing these weapons to the internal opposition "for their use in personal defense attendant to their projected efforts to remove Trujillo" could be developed by the Station. The memorandum made no recommendation to approve or disapprove passage of these weapons. (Id.)

---

* See Scott to Bowles memorandum of May 19, 1961, enclosing copy of Goodwin memorandum.

On May 15, 1961, Bundy forwarded to Goodwin another memorandum. This one, entitled "The Current Situation in and Contingency Plans for the Dominican Republic," had been received by Bundy from the State Department. Attached was an underlying document which began:

> "Recent reports indicate that the internal Dominican dissidents are becoming increasingly determined to oust Trunillo by any means, and their plans in this regard are well advanced."

The May 15 memorandum stressed that it was highly desirable for the U.S. to be identified with and to support the elements seeking to overthrow Trujillo. The attachment recommended that Consul General Dearborn inform the dissidents that if they succeed "at their own initiative and on their own responsibility in forming an acceptable provisional government they can be assured that any reasonable request for assistance from the U.S. will be promptly and favorably answered." (Documents from State Dept. files bearing Nos. 279-286).

F. Drafts Leading to and Final Cable of May 29, 1961

A copy of Dearborn's cable of May 16, 1961, requesting urgent State Department guidance, was forwarded to Richard Goodwin. At the specific request of Goodwin, the State Department replied to Dearborn on May 17, and advised him to keep in mind the President's view, as expressed at the May 5 National Security Council Meeting, that the United States should not initiate the overthrow of Trujillo before knowing what government would succeed him. (Department to Dearborn, 5/17/61)

Not moral Oppositn

Dearborn responded on May 21, 1961, pointing out that for over a year State Department representatives in the Dominican Republic had been nurturing the effort to overthrow Trujillo and had assisted the dissidents in numerous ways, all of which were known to the Department. It was, Dearborn stated, "too late to consider whether United States will initiate overthrow of Trujillo." Dearborn invited further guidance from State.

In response to Dearborn's request for guidance, the State Department drafted a reply on May 24. The draft discussed a conflict between two objectives:

> "(1) To be so associated with removal Trujillo regime as to derive credit among DR dissidents and liberal elements throughout Latin America;
>
> "(2) To disassociate US from any obvious intervention in Dominican Republic and even more so from any political assassination which might occur."

TOP SECRET

It was said to be the Department's considered opinion that "former objective cannot, repeat not, easily override latter." (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/24/61 - not sent)

This State Department draft was forwarded to Under Secretary Bowles with the comment that Goodwin considered it "too negative" and that he would try his hand on a draft "for Bundy to present tomorrow morning." (Memo from Achilles to Bowles, 5/24/61)

A May 26, 1961, memorandum from Bowles to Bundy begins:

> "Following up on our discussion of the Dominican Republic at yesterday's meeting of the Special Group, I am forwarding you a draft telegram which we would like to send to Henry Dearborn, our Consul General in Ciudad Trujillo, supplementing the guidance he will be receiving on the recently approved contingency plans."

Minutes of the Special Group meeting on May 25, 1961 do not, however, reflect any discussion of the Dominican Republic. If, as Bowles' memorandum suggests, a discussion concerning the Dominican Republic did occur at the May 25 meeting, it is not known what the discussion involved or what decisions, if any, were made.

Richard Goodwin personally prepared alternate drafts to the proposed State Department cable to Dearborn. Goodwin testified that it was his intent in revising the cable to communicate to Dearborn, President Kennedy's personal belief that the United States:

how derived

> " . . . didn't want to do anything that would involve us further, the United States further, in any effort to assassinate Trujillo." (Goodwin, 7/10, p.32)

At the same time, Goodwin's draft raised the issue of further covert action and transfer of arms to the dissidents and advised Dearborn to hold out the arms as being available to the dissidents pending their ability to receive them.

According to whom?

It was the twofold intent of the cable as revised by Goodwin, (1) to express the desire to remain in the good graces of the dissidents who, it was believed, would constitute the new government following Trujillo's assassination, and (2) to avoid any action which might further involve the United States in the anticipated assassination. This dual purpose is clearly evident in the cable which advised:

> " . . . we must not run risk of U.S. association with political assassination, since U.S. as matter of general policy cannot condone assassination. This last principal is overriding and must prevail in doubtful situation." (Emphasis added)

doubtful in what ways

* * * * * * *

> "Continue to inform dissident elements of U.S. support for their position."

According to Goodwin, the underscored material was inserted in the cable at the specific direction of President Kennedy. (Goodwin, 7/10, pp. 22, 23).

more on this — general v. specific

With respect to the four machine guns which were in the Consulate and which had been repeatedly requested by the dissidents, the cable advised Dearborn that the U.S. was unable to transfer these arms to the dissidents. Dearborn was instructed to:

> "Tell them that this is because of our suspicion that method of transfer may be unsafe. In actual

> fact, we feel that the transfer of arms would serve very little purpose and expose the United States to great danger of association with assassination attempt."

The cable, as revised by Goodwin and approved by President Kennedy, was sent to Dearborn on May 29, 1961. (State Dept. to Dearborn cable, 5/29/61)

VII. May 30, 1961 and Immediately Thereafter:

A. Trujillo Assassinated

Late in the evening of May 30, 1961, Trujillo was ambushed and assassinated near San Cristobal, Dominican Republic. The assassination closely paralleled the plan disclosed by the action group to American representatives in the Dominican Republic and passed on to officials in Washington at both the CIA and the State Department. (Dearborn cable to State, 5/30/61) The assassination was conducted by members of the action group, to whom the American carbines had been passed, and such sketchy information as is available indicates that one or more of the carbines were in the possession of the assassination group when Trujillo was killed. (I. G. Report, pp. 60-61). This evidence indicate however, that the actual assassination was accomplished by handguns and shotguns. (I.G. Report, p.61)

B. Cables to Washington

After receiving the May 29 cable from Washington, both Consul General Dearborn and Station Chief Owen sent replies. According to Dearborn's testimony, he did not regard the May 29 cable as a change in U.S. policy concerning support for assassinations. (Dearborn 7/29/75, p. 74).

He interpreted the May 29 cable as saying:

> "...we don't care if the Dominicans assassinate Trujillo, that is all right. But we don't want anything to pin this on us, because we aren't doing it, it is the Dominicans who are doing it." (Dearborn, 7/29, p. 104)

Dearborn testified that this accorded with what he said had always been his personal belief; that the U.S. should not be involved in an assassination and that if an assassination occurred it would be strictly a Dominican affair. (Dearborn 7/29, pp. 100, 101)

In contrast the CIA Station Chief, Owen, did regard the cable as manifesting a change in U.S. policy, particularly on the question of supplying arms. (Owen p. 120) He believed the May 29 cable was the final word in U.S. policy on this matter and consequently felt that the government had retreated from its prior position, of offering material support to the dissidents, and had adopted a new position of withholding such support. Owen's responsive cable to Headquarters stated:

> "HQS aware extent to which U.S. government already associated with assassination. If we are to at least cover up tracks, CIA personnel directly involved in assassination preparation must be withdrawn." (Station to HQS cable, 5/30/61)

Immediately following the assassination, all CIA personnel in the Dominican Republic were removed from the country and within a few days Consul General Dearborn was back in Washington. The State Department cabled the CIA station in the Dominican Republic to destroy all records concerning contacts with dissidents and any related matters, except not to destroy the contingency plans or the May 29, 1961 cable to Dearborn. (HQS to Station cable, 5/31/61.

C. Immediate Post-Assassination Period

The U.S. Consulate in the Dominican Republic was quick to dispatch its early reports that Trujillo had been assassinated, and the U.S. communications network transmitted the report to President Kennedy in Paris. The President's Press Secretary, Pierre Salinger, made the first public announcement of the assassination, preceeding by several hours release of the news in the Dominican Republic. Secretary of State Rusk testified that when he learned of Salinger's announcement he was most concerned. Rusk said that Trujillo's son Ramfis was also in Paris and he was afraid that Ramfis, upon first learning of his father's death from the press secretary to the President of the U.S., might try to retaliate against President Kennedy. (Rusk, 32, 33.)

What was TJ's reaction

looks bad

SCHNEIDER REPORT

		Page
I.	Summary	1
II.	The President's Initial General Instruction and Background	6
	A. September 15 White House Meeting	6
	B. Background: Tracks I and II	8
	C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project	15
III.	CIA's Implementation of Track II	17
	A. Evolution of CIA Strategy	17
	1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach	17
	2. Military Solution	18
	B. The Chile Task Force	19
	C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations	20
	D. The False Flag Base	26
	E. Chief of Station	27
IV.	CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup	29
	A. The Chilean Conspirators	29
	B. Contacts Prior to October 15	30
	C. October 15 Decision	34
	D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15	36
	E. The Killing of General Schneider	39
	F. Post October 22 Events	41
V.	CIA/White House Communication During Track II	43
	A. September	45
	B. October	46
	C. December	54
	D. Did Track II End?	54

SCHNEIDER REPORT

I. Summary

On September 4, 1970, Dr. Salvador Allende Gossens won a plurality in Chile's Presidential election.* Since no candidate had received a majority of the popular vote, the Chilean constitution required that a joint session of its Congress decide between the first and second place finishers. This constitutional requirement had, in the past, been pro-forma. The Congress had always selected the candidate who received highest popular vote. The date set for the Congressional joint session was October 24, 1970.

On September 15, 1970, President Richard Nixon informed CIA Director Richard Helms that an Allende regime in Chile would not be acceptable to the United States. The CIA was instructed by President Nixon to play a direct role in organizing a military coup d'etat in Chile to prevent Allende's accession to the presidency. according to Pres The Agency was to take this action without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense and without informing the U.S. Ambassador in Chile. While coup possibilities in general and other means of seeking to prevent Allende's accession to power were explored by the 40 Committee throughout this period, the 40 Committee was never informed of this direct CIA role. Nor did it ever approve that role. The only institution to which the Agency was to report, both for informational and approval purposes, was the White House.

Clark check

---

*Dr. Allende, a long-time Senator and founder of the Socialist Party in Chile, was a candidate of Popular Unity Coalition. The Coalition was made up of Communists, Socialists, Social Democrats, Radicals, and dissident Christian Democrats. Allende was a self-proclaimed Marxist and was making his fourth try for the presidency. His opponents were Radomire Tomic Romero, candidate of the ruling Christian Democratic Party, and Jorge Alessandri Rodriquez, candidate of the right-wing National Party. Dr. Allende won 36.3% of the popular vote; Alessandri was second with 35.3% of the vote. Dr. Allende's margin of victory was 39,000 votes out of a total of 3 million votes cast in the election. The incumbent President, Eduardo Frei Montalvo, a Christian Democrat, was ineligible for re-election. Chilean law prohibits Presidents from succeeding themselves.

too much

In practice, this meant that the CIA was to keep the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, informed of its activities.

Between October 5 and October 20, 1970, the CIA made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero (police) officials in Chile. Those Chileans who were inclined to stage a coup were given assurances of strong support at the highest levels of the U.S. Government, both before and after a coup.

One of the major obstacles faced by all the military conspirators in Chile was the strong opposition to a coup by the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, General Rene Schneider, who insisted the constitutional process be followed. As a result of his strong constitutional stand, the removal of General Schneider became a necessary ingredient in the coup plans of all the Chilean conspirators. Unable to have General Schneider retired or reassigned, the conspirators decided to kidnap him. An unsuccessful abduction attempt was made on October 19, 1970, by a group of Chilean military officers whom the CIA was actively supporting. A second kidnap attempt was made the following day, again unsuccessfully. In the early morning hours of October 22, 1970, machine guns and ammunition were passed by the CIA to the group that had failed on October 19. That same day General Schneider was mortally wounded in an attempted kidnap on his way to work. The attempted kidnap and the shooting was apparently conducted by conspirators other than those to whom the CIA had provided weapons earlier in the day.

Did they know -

A Chilean military court found that high-ranking military officers, both active and retired, conspired to bring about a military coup and to kidnap General Schneider. Several of the officers whom the CIA had contacted and encouraged in their coup conspiracy were convicted of conspiring to kidnap General Schneider. Those convicted of carrying out the actual kidnap attempt and the killing of General Schneider were associates of retired General Roberto Viaux, who had initially been thought by the CIA to be the best hope. However, later the CIA discouraged General Viaux because the Agency felt other officers, such as General Camilo Valenzuela, were not sufficiently involved. General Viaux was convicted by the military court and received a twenty-year prison sentence for being the "intellectal author" of the Schneider kidnap attempt. General Valenzuela was sentenced by the military court to three years in exile for taking part in the conspiracy to prevent Allende's assumption of office. The military court found that the two Generals had been in contact throughout the coup plotting.

The principal facts leading up to the death of General Schneider (all of which are discussed in more detail below) are as follows:

1. By the end of September 1970, it appeared that the only feasible way for the CIA to implement the Presidential order to prevent Allende from coming to power was to foment a coup d'etat.

2. All of the known coup plots developed within the Chilean military entailed the removal of General Schneider by one means or another.

3. United States officials continued to encourage and support Chilean plans for a coup after it became known that the first step would be to kidnap General Schneider.

4. Two unsuccessful kidnap attempts were made, one on October 19, the other on October 20. Following these attempts, and with knowledge of their failure, the CIA passed three submachine guns and ammunition to Chilean officers who still planned to kidnap General Schneider.

5. In a third kidnap attempt on October 22, apparently conducted by Chileans other than those to whom weapons had been supplied, General Schneider was shot and subsequently died. The guns used in the abortive kidnapping of General Schneider were, in all probability, not those supplied by the CIA to the conspirators. The Chilean military court which investigated the Schneider killing determined that Schneider had been murdered by handguns, although one machine gun was at the scene of the killing.*

6. While there is no question that the CIA received a direct instruction from the President on September 15th to attempt to foment a coup, the Committee received sharply conflicting testimony about whether the White House was kept informed of, and authorized, the coup efforts in Chile after October 15. On one side of the conflict is the testimony of Henry Kissinger and General Alexander Haig; on the other, that of CIA officials. Kissinger testified that the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile on October 15, 1970. After that date, Kissinger testified--and Haig agreed--that the White House neither knew of, nor specifically approved, CIA coup activities in Chile. CIA officials, on the other hand, have testified that their activities in Chile after October 15 were known to and

---

* The Committee has not been able to determine whether or not the machine gun at the scene of the Schneider killing was one of the three supplied by the CIA.

thus authorized by the White House.*

This conflict in testimony, which the Committee has been unable to resolve through its hearings or the documentary record, leaves unanswered the most serious question of whether the CIA was acting pursuant to higher authority (the CIA's view) or was pursuing coup activities in Chile without sufficient communication (the Kissinger/Haig view).

---

* The basic issue is whether or not the CIA informed the White House of its activities. In context, informing was tantamount to being authorized. No one who testified believed that the CIA was required to seek step-by-step authorization for its activities; rather the burden was on the White House to object if a line of activity being pursued by the CIA seemed unwise. Both Kissinger and Haig agreed that if the CIA had proposed a persuasive plan to them, it almost certainly would have been approved. The CIA did not believe it needed specific White House authorization to transfer weapons to the Chileans; in fact, CIA Deputy Director (Plans) Thomas Karamessines testified that he did not formally approve the transfer, but rather that in the context of the project it was clear that the Agency had the authority to transfer weapons and that it was clear to Karamessines' subordinates that he would approve their decision to do so. He believed he probably was informed before the weapons actually were sent.

TOP SECRET

II. The President's Initial General Instruction and Background

A. September 15 White House Meeting

On September 15, 1970, President Nixon met with his Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, CIA Director Richard Helms, and Attorney General John Mitchell at the White House. The topic was Chile. Handwritten notes taken by Director Helms at that meeting reflect both its tenor and the President's instructions:

> 1 in 10 chance perhaps, but save Chile!
> worth spending
> not concerned risks involved
> no involvement of Embassy
> $10,000,000 available, more if necessary
> full-time job--best men we have
> game plan
> make the economy scream
> 48 hours for plan of action

In his testimony before the Select Committee, Director Helms recalled coming away from the meeting on September 15 with:

> ...(the) impression...that the President came down very hard that he wanted something done, and he didn't much care how and that he was prepared to make money available....This was a pretty all-inclusive order....If I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the Oval Office, it was that day.* (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 6,10,11)

---

* Director Helms also testified that the September 15th meeting with President Nixon may have been triggered by the presence of Augustin Edwards, the publisher of the Santiago daily El Mercurio, in Washington. That morning, at the request of Donald Kendall, President of Pepsi Cola, Henry Kissinger and John Mitchell had met for breakfast with Kendall and Edwards. (Mitchell calendar) The topic of conversation was the political situation in Chile and the plight of El Mercurio and other anti-Allende forces. According to Mr. Helms:

> I recall that prior to this meeting (with the President) the editor of El Mercurio had come to Washington and I had been asked to go and talk to him at one of the hotels here, this having been arranged through Don Kendall, the head of the Pepsi Cola Company....I have this impression that the President called this meeting where I have my handwritten notes because of Edwards' presence in Washington and what he heard from Kendall about what Edwards was saying about conditions in Chile and what was happening there.
> (Helms testimony, July 15, pp. 4-5)

However, none of the CIA officers believed that assassination was within the guidelines Helms had been given.

> Senator Hart of Colorado. ...did the kind of carte blanche mandate you carried, the marshall's baton that you carried out in a knapsack, to stop Allende from assuming office, include physical elimination?
>
> Mr. Helms. Well, not in my mind, because when I became Director, I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director, and I had made that clear to my fellows, and I think they will tell you this.

The following day, September 16, Director Helms called a meeting at the CIA to discuss the Chilean situation. At this meeting, he related to his colleagues his understanding of the President's instructions:

> 2. The Director told the group that President Nixon had decided that an Allende regime in Chile was unacceptable to the United States. The President asked the Agency to prevent Allende from coming to power or to unseat him. The President authorized $10,000,000 for this purpose, if needed. Further, the Agency is to carry out this mission without coordination with the Departments of State or Defense.
> (Memorandum/Genesis of the Project, 16 Sept. 1970)

Henry Kissinger's recollection of the September 15 meeting with President Nixon is in accord with that of Richard Helms.* Although Dr. Kissinger did not recall the President's instructions to be as precise as those related by Director Helms, he did testify that:

> ...the primary thrust of the September 15th meeting was to urge Helms to do whatever he could to prevent Allende from being seated. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

***

---

* The documents, and the officials from whom the Committee has heard testimony, are in substantial agreement about what President Nixon authorized on September 15, namely CIA involvement in promoting a military coup d'etat in Chile. There is not, however, agreement about what was communicated between the CIA and the White House--and hence what was authorized by the latter--in the week between October 15 and the death of General Schneider, October 22. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report on the Schneider killing.

> It is clear that President Nixon wanted him (Helms) to encourage the Chilean military to cooperate or to take the initiative in preventing Allende from taking office. (Kissinger testimony, p. 12)

Operationally, the CIA set the President's instructions into motion on September 21. On that day two cables were sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago informing the CIA Chief of Station (COS) of his new directive:

> 3. Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Parliamentary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.
> (Hqs. to Stn. 236, 21 September 1970)
>
> ***
>
> B. (Track Two)--This is authority granted to CIA only, to work toward a military solution to problem. As part of authority we were explicitly told that 40 Committee, State, Ambassador and Embassy were not to be told of this Track Two nor involved in any matter. (Hqs. to Stn. 240, 21 September 1970)

B. Background: Tracks I and II

United States Government concern over an Allende regime in Chile did not begin with President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA.* For more than a year, Chile had been on the 40 Committee's agenda. At an April 15, 1969, meeting of the 303 Committee (the predecessor of the 40 Committee) the question arose as to whether anything should be done with regard to the September 1970 Presidential election in Chile. At that time, Director Helms pointed out that "an election operation will

---

* Covert U.S. Government involvement in large-scale political action programs in Chile began with the 1964 Presidential election. As in 1970, this was in response to the perceived threat of Salvadore Allende. Over $3 million was spent by the CIA in the 1964 effort.
(Colby testimony, July 14, 1975, p. 5)

TOP SECRET

not be effective unless an early enough start is made.* On March 25, 1970, the 40 Committee approved a joint Embassy/CIA proposal recommending that "spoiling" operations--propaganda and other activities--be undertaken by the CIA in an effort to prevent an election victory by Allende's Popular Unity (UP) Coalition. A total of $135,000 was authorized by the 40 Committee for this anti-Allende activity. On June 18, 1970, the U.S. Ambassador to Chile, Edward Korry, submitted a two-phase proposal to the Department of State and the CIA for review. The first phase involved an increase in support to the anti-Allende campaign. The second was a contingency plan to make "a $500,000 effort in Congress to persuade certain shifts in voting on 24 October 1970." Phase II was, stated simply, a proposal to bribe Chilean Congressmen to vote against Allende should he win a plurality in the September 4 election. On June 27, 1970, the 40 Committee increased funding for the anti-Allende "spoiling" operation to $390,000. A decision on Ambassador Korry's bribe proposal was deferred pending the results of the September 4 election.

The 40 Committee met twice between the time Allende received a plurality of the popular vote on September 4 and President Nixon issued his instruction to Director Helms on September 15.** At both these meetings the question of U.S. involvement in a military coup against Allende was raised. Kissinger stressed the importance of these meetings when he testified before the Select Committee:

What do we have then or no!

---

*This and other references to 40 Committee discussions and actions regarding Chile are contained in a memorandum provided to the Committee by the CIA entitled "Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election," dated October 9, 1970. On August 25, 1975, we subpoenaed all White House/National Security Council documents and records relating to the effort by the United States Government to prevent Salvadore Allende from assuming office. On September 4, the Committee received 46 documents from the White House relating to Chile covering the period September 5 to October 14, 1970.

**See Page 9a.

TOP SECRET

**Following the September 4 election, the CIA's Directorate of Intelligence circulated an intelligence community assessment of the impact of an Allende government on U.S. national interests. That assessment, dated September 7, 1970, stated:

> Regarding threats to U.S. interests, we conclude that:
>
> 1. The U.S. has no vital national interests within Chile. There would, however, be tangible economic losses.
>
> 2. The world military balance of power would not be significantly altered by an Allende government.
>
> 3. An Allende victory would, however, create considerable political and psychological costs:
>
>   a. Hemispheric cohesion would be threatened by the challenge that an Allende government would pose to the OAS, and by the reactions that it would create in other countries. We do not see, however, any likely threat to the peace of the region.
>
>   b. An Allende victory would represent a definite psychological set-back to the U.S. and a definite psychological advance for the Marxist idea. (Intelligence Memorandum/ "Situation Following the Chilean Presidential Election," CIA's Directorate of Intelligence, 7 September 1970)

> I think the meeting of September 15th has to be seen in the context of two previous meetings of the 40 Committee on September 8th and September 14th in which the 40 Committee was asked to look at the pros and cons and the problems and prospects of a Chilean military coup to be organized with United States assistance.
>
> (Kissinger testimony, p. 5)

According to the summary of the 40 Committee meeting on September 8, the following was discussed:

> ...all concerned realized that previous plans for a Phase II would have to be drastically redrawn.... The DCI made the point, however, that congressional action against Allende was not likely to succeed and that once Allende was in office the Chilean opposition to him would disintegrate and collapse rapidly. While not advocating a specific course of action, the Director further observed that a military golpe against Allende would have very little chance of success unless undertaken soon. Both the Chairman and the Attorney General supported this view....At the close of the...meeting the Chairman directed the Embassy to prepare a "cold-blooded assessment" of:
>
> 1) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved should a Chilean military coup be organized now with U.S. assistance, and
>
> 2) the pros and cons and problems and prospects involved in organizing an effective future Chilean opposition to Allende.
>
> (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Ambassador Korry responded to the 40 Committee's request for a "cold-blooded assessment" on September 12. He stated that "We /the Embassy/ believe it now clear that Chilean military will not, repeat not, move to prevent Allende's accession, barring unlikely situation of national chaos and widespread violence." The Ambassador went on to say that "Our own military people /are/ unanimous in rejecting possibility of meaningful military intervention in political situation." He concluded by stating: "What we are saying in this 'cold-blooded assessment' is that opportunities for further significant USG action with the Chilean military are nonexistent." (Memorandum/Ambassador's Response to Request for Analysis of Military Option in Present Chilean Situation, 12 September 1970)

The CIA's response was in the same vein. Viron Vaky, Kissinger's assistant for Latin American affairs on the NSC staff, summarized the CIA's "cold-blooded assessment" in a memo to his boss: "Military action is impossible; the military is incapable and unwilling to seize power. We have no capability to motivate or instigate a coup." (Memorandum for Dr. Kissinger/Chile--40 Committee Meeting, Monday--September 14, September 14, Viron P. Vaky)

On September 14, the 40 Committee met to discuss these reports and what action was to be taken:

> Particular attention was devoted to a CIA prepared review of political and military options in the Chilean electoral situation based on the Embassy and Station's "cold-blooded assessment." The Committee focused on the so-called "Rube Goldberg" gambit which would see Alessandri elected by the Congress on October 24th, resigning thereafter to leave Frei constitutionally free to run in a second election for the presidency.

> Ambassador Korry was asked to go directly to President Frei to see if he would be willing to commit himself to this line of action. A contingency of $250,000 was approved for "covert support of projects which Frei or his trusted team deem important." It was further agreed that a propaganda campaign be undertaken by the Agency to focus on the damage of an Allende takeover....
>
> (CIA Memorandum/Policy Decision Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

Following the September 14 Forty Committee meeting and President Nixon's September 15 instruction to the CIA, U.S. Government efforts to prevent Allende from assuming office proceeded on two tracks.* Track I comprised all covert activities approved by the 40 Committee, including the $250,000 contingency fund to bribe Chilean congressmen as well as propaganda and economic activities. These activities were designed to induce the opponents to Allende in Chile to prevent his assumption of power, either through political or military means. Track

---

*The terms Track I and Track II were known only to CIA and White House officials who were knowledgeable about the President's September 15 order to the CIA. The Committee sent letters to various senior officials inquiring if they were, in fact, not knowledgeable of the Track II activities. Those letters were sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, Deputy Secretary of Defense David Packard, Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Thomas Moorer, NSC Staff Member for Latin America Viron P. Vaky, Director of the State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research Ray S. Cline, and the Deputy Chief of Mission in Santiago Harry W. Shlaudeman. Thus far the Committee has received written responses from Messrs. Moorer, Johnson, Vaky, Shlaudeman and Cline. All except Cline have indicated that they had no knowledge of the Track II activity at the time; Cline indicated he heard of the activities in a general way, from his subordinate who handled 40 Committee work and from former associates at the CIA. In oral communications with Committee staff members, Secretaries Rogers and Laird have indicated they were unaware of Track II.

II activities in Chile were undertaken in response to President Nixon's September 15 order and were directed towards actively promoting and encouraging the Chilean military to move against Allende. In his testimony before the Committee, Kissinger stressed the links between Tracks I and II:

> ...There was work by all of the agencies to try to prevent Allende from being seated, and there was work by all of the agencies on the so-called Track I to encourage the military to move against Allende ...the difference between the September 15th meeting and what was being done in general within the government was that President Nixon was encouraging a more direct role for the CIA in actually organizing such a coup. (Kissinger testimony, p. 13)

Tracks I and II did, in fact, move together in the month after September 15. The authorization to Ambassador Korry, who was formally excluded from Track II, to encourage a military coup became broader and broader. In the 40 Committee meeting on September 14, he and other "appropriate members of the Embassy Mission" were authorized to intensify their contacts with Chilean military officers to assess their willingness to support the "Frei gambit"--a voluntary turn-over of power to the military by Frei, who would then have been eligible to run for President in new elections. (Memorandum/Policy Decisions Related to Our Covert Action Involvement in the September 1970 Chilean Presidential Election, 9 October 1970)

In a situation report to Dr. Kissinger and Assistant Secretary Charles Meyer on September 21, Ambassador Korry indicated that in order to make the Frei gambit work, "if necessary, General Schneider would have to be neutralized, by displacement if necessary."* (Korry to Meyer and Kissinger/Situation Report, 21 September 1970) In testifying, Kissinger felt the Korry report indicated "the degree to which Track I and Track II were merging, that is to say, that individuals on Track I were working on exactly the same problem as the CIA was working on Track II." (Kissinger testimony, p. 21)

Ambassador Korry's activites in Chile between September 4 and October 24 support Kissinger's view that the line separating Track I and Track II often became blurred. For example, the Ambassador was authorized to make his contacts in the Chilean military aware that if Allende were seated, the military could expect no further military assistance (MAP) from the United States. Later, in response to his own recommendation, Korry was authorized to inform the Chilean military that all MAP and military sales were being held in abeyance pending the outcome of the Congressional election on October 24. On October 7, Ambassador Korry received the following cable from Kissinger and Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson:

---

*In this same situation report, Ambassador Korry related a message that he had sent to President Frei through his Defense Minister indicating the economic pressures that would be brought to bear on Chile should Allende assume office.

> Frei should know that not a nut or bolt will be allowed to reach Chile under Allende. Once Allende comes to power we shall do all within our power to condemn Chile and the Chileans to utmost deprivation and poverty, a policy designed for a long time to come to accelerate the hard features of a Communist society in Chile. Hence, for Frei to believe that there will be much of an alternative to utter misery, such as seeing Chile muddle through, would be strictly illusory.

The use of economic instruments as levers on Frei and the Chilean military was a persistent subject of White House/CIA discussions and of instructions to the field. Helms' notes from the September 15 meeting with the President and Kissinger included the notation "make the economy scream." Economic leverage was the primary topic of a September 18 White House meeting involving Kissinger, Helms and Karamessines.

> 2. ...you are now authorized to inform discreetly the Chilean military through the channels available to you that if a successful effort is made to block Allende from taking office, we would reconsider the cuts we have thus far been forced to make in Chilean MAP and otherwise increase our presently programmed MAP for the Chilean Armed Forces.... If any steps the military should take should result in civil disorder, we would also be prepared promptly to deliver support and material that might be immediately required. (Hqs. to Stn. 075517, 7 October 1970)

The essential difference between Tracks I and II, as evidenced by instructions to Ambassador Korry during this period, was not that Track II was coup-oriented and Track I was not. Both had this objective in mind. The difference between the two tracks was, simply, that the CIA's direct contacts with the Chilean military, and its active promotion and support for a coup, were to be known only to a small group of individuals in the White House and the CIA. Kissinger testified that Track II matters were to be reported directly to the White House "for reasons of security." (Kissinger testimony, p. 14) Thomas Karamessines, the CIA's Deputy Director for Plans at the time and the principal CIA contact with the White House on Track II matters, testified on his understanding of why State, Defense, the 40 Committee and Ambassador Korry were excluded from Track II:

> That was not a decision that we made. But the best I can do is suggest that there was concern about two things. Number one, that there might be serious objections lodged, for example, by the State Department particularly if Track 2 were to be laid out at a Forty Committee meeting. And the only other thing I can contribute to that is that it was felt that the security of the activity would be better protected if knowledge of it were limited. (Karamessines testimony, p. 122)

TOP SE

C. CIA Views of Difficulty of Project

On one point the testimony of CIA officials who were involved in Track II is unanimous: they all said they thought Track II was unlikely to succeed. That view ran from the working levels of the Agency to the top. They all said they felt they were being asked to do the impossible, that the risks and potential costs of the project were too great. At the same time, they felt they had been given an explicit Presidential order, and they tried to execute that order.

A few excerpts from the testimony follow:

Richard Helms, CIA Director -

> ...my heart sank over this meeting, because...the possibility of bringing off something like this seemed to me at that time to be just as remote as anything could be. In practical terms, the Army was constitutionalist....And when you look here at the time frame in which the man was suddenly asking you to accomplish something, it seemed really almost inconceivable....
>
> What I came away from the meeting with the distinct impression that we were being asked to do almost the impossible and trying to indicate this was going to be pretty tough.... (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, pp. 6-7)

David Phillips, Chief, Chile Task Force -

> ...it is my feeling that the odds are unacceptable, it is something that is not going to work, and we are going to be burned if we get into it ...what are the chances of pulling off a coup successfully, or in any way stopping Allende from assuming the presidency?...we never even got to two chances out of 20. (Phillips testimony, p. 16)
>
> ...I assure you that those people that I was in touch with at the Agency just about universally said, my God, why are we given this assignment? (Phillips testimony, p. 53)

James Flannery, Deputy Chief, Western Hemisphere Division -

> There was just no question that we had to make this effort, no matter what the odds were. And I think that most people felt that the odds were just pretty long. (Flannery testimony, p. 20)

Further, CIA officials believed their judgment of the endeavor's difficulty was known to the White House. Helms commented on the September 15th meeting: "So realizing all of these things, I'm relatively certain that day that I pointed out this is going to be awfully tough." (Helms testimony, July 15, 1975, p. 16) Karamessines recalled pointing out to the President that "the Chilean military seemed to be disorganized and unwilling to do anything. And without their wanting to do something, there did not seem to be much hope." (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

III. CIA's Implementation of Track II

A. Evolution of CIA Strategy

The President's instruction to the CIA on September 15 to prevent Allende's assumption of power was given in the context of a broad U.S. Government effort to achieve that end. The September 15 instruction to the CIA involved from the beginning the promotion of a military coup d'etat in Chile. Although there was talk of a coup in Chilean military circles, there was little indication that it would actually take place without active U.S. encouragement and support.

> There was much talk among Chilean officers about the possibility of some kind of coup...but this was not the kind of talk that was being backed by, you know, serious organizational planning.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1963, p. 32)

1. The "Constitutional Coup" Approach

Although efforts to achieve a political solution to the Allende victory continued simultaneous with Track II, the Agency premised its activities on the assumption that the political avenue was a dead end. On September 21, CIA Headquarters cabled its Station in Santiago:

> Purpose of exercise is to prevent Allende assumption of power. Paramilitary legerdemain has been discarded. Military solution is objective.
> (Hqs. 236, Sept. 21, 1970, para. 3)

The initial strategy attempted to enlist President Frei in promoting a coup to perpetuate his presidency for six more years. The Agency decided to promise "help in any election which was an outgrowth of a successful military takeover." (Nov. 18, 1970 Helms memo to Kissinger) Under this plan Frei would invite the military to take over, dissolve the Congress, and proclaim a new election. A private U.S. citizen who had been a conduit for CIA funds to Frei's 1964 campaign was sent to see him with this message on September 24. (Task Force Log, September 23)

Thomas Karamessines, the Deputy Director for Plans, testified:

> So this was in a sense not Track II, but in a sense another aspect of a quiet and hopefully non-violent military coup....This was abandoned when the military were reluctant to push Frei publicly...and, number two, Frei was reluctant to leave on his own in the absence of pressure from the military....There was left as the only chance of success a straight military coup.
> (Karamessines testimony, Aug. 6, 1975, p. 6)

At the same time, the Station in Santiago reported:

> Strong reasons for thinking neither Frei nor Schneider will act. For that reason any scenario in which either has to play an active role now appears utterly unrealistic. Overtures to lower echelon officers (e.g., Valenzuela) can of course be made. This involves promoting Army split.
> (Stn. to Hqs. 424, September 23, 1970)

2. Military Solution

President Frei's failure even to attempt to persuade his own party convention on October 3-4 from reaching a compromise with Allende ended all hope of using him to prevent an Allende presidency. (November 18 memo, Helms to Kissinger, page 16) Thus, by the beginning of October, it was clear that a vehicle for a military solution would have to be found in the second echelon of Chilean officers, and that the top leadership of the Armed Services, particularly General Rene Schneider, constituted a stumbling block. (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970; Santiago 439, September 30, 1970) The Agency's task was to cause a coup in a highly unpromising situation and to overcome the formidable obstacles represented by Frei's inaction, Schneider's strong constitutionalism, and the absence of organization and enthusiasm among those officers who were interested in a coup.

A three-fold program was set into motion:

TOP SECRET

a. Collect intelligence on coup-minded officers;

b. Create a coup climate by propaganda, disinformation, and terrorist activities intended to provoke the left to give a pretext for a coup;*(Hqs. 611, October 7, 1970)

FN doesn't say c/ support of terrorist

c. Inform those coup-minded officers that the U.S. Government would give them full support in a coup short of direct U.S. military intervention. (Hqs. 762, October 14, 1970)

B. The Chile Task Force

Because of the highly sensitive nature of the operation, a special task force was created in the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division to manage it. The task force was placed under the daily direction of the Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas Karamessines, and a group of the Agency's most experienced and skilled operators were detailed to the task force.

---

*A cable sent from CIA Headquarters to Santiago on October 19 focused on creating an appropriate justification for a coup. The cable stated:

> 1. It still appears that Ref A coup has no pretext or justification that it can offer to make it acceptable in Chile or Latin America. It therefore would seem necessary to create one to bolster what will probably be their claim to a coup to save Chile from communism...You may wish include variety of themes in justification of coup to military for their use. These could include but are not limited to: A) Firm intel. that Cubans planned to reorganize all intelligence services along Soviet/Cuban mold thus creating structure for police state....B)Economic situation collapsing....C)By quick recognition of Cuba and Communist countries Allende assumed U.S. would cut off material assistance to Armed Forces thus weakening them as constitutional barriers. Would then empty armories to Communist Peoples Militia with task to run campaign of terror based on alleged labor and economic sabotage (Use some quotes from Allende on this.)
> 2. Station has written some excellent prop guidances. Using themes at hand and which best known to you we are now asking you to prepare intel report based on some well known facts and some fiction to justify coup, split opposition, and gain adherents for military group. With appropriate military contact can determine how to "discover" intel report which could even be planted during raids planned by Carabineros.
> 3. We urge you to get this idea and some concrete suggestions to plotters as soon as you can. Coup should have a justification to prosper.
>
> (Headquarters 882, 19 October 1970)

David A. Phillips, Chief of Station in Rio de Janeiro, was summoned back to Washington to head the operation. With the exception of the Division Chief, William Broe, his deputy James Flannery and the head of the Chile Branch, no other officers in the Division were aware of the task force's activities, not even those officers who normally had responsibility for Chile. The task force had a special communications channel to Santiago and Buenos Aires to compartment cable traffic about Track II. (November 18, 1970, Helms to Kissinger memo, page 3) Most of the significant operational decisions were made by Phillips, Broe and Karamessines, who met on a daily basis.

It should be noted that all those involved with the task force described the pressure from the White House as intense. Indeed, Karamessines has said that Kissinger "left no doubt in my mind that he was under the heaviest of pressure to get this accomplished, and he in turn was placing us under the heaviest of pressures to get it accomplished." (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, page 7) The Deputy Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, James Flannery, testified that pressure was "as tough as I ever saw it in my time there, extreme." (Flannery testimony, July 15, 1975, page 20) Broe testified that "I have never gone through a period as we did on the Chilean thing. I mean it was just constant, constant....Just continual pressure....It was coming from the White House." (Broe testimony, August 4, 1975, page 55)

C. The Use of the Army Attache and Interagency Relations

The CIA Station in Santiago had inadequate contacts within the Chilean military to carry out its task. However, the U.S. Army Attache in Santiago, Colonel Paul Wimert, knew the Chilean military

TOP SECRET

very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

> We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.
>
> (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

> ...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
>
> Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.

TOP SECRET

---

* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

TOP SECRET

very well due to his five years of service there and his broad personal contacts among the Chilean officers. Following a proposal by the Chief of Station, the CIA decided to enlist Colonel Wimert in collecting intelligence concerning the possibility of a coup and to use him as a channel to let the interested Chilean military know of U. S. support for a coup. Karamessines described this procedure for the Committee:

> We also needed contact with a wider segment of the military, the senior military which we had not maintained and did not have, but which we felt confident that our military representative in Chile had....And we got the approval of the DIA to enlist the cooperation of Colonel Wimert in our effort to procure intelligence.
> (Karamessines testimony, August 6, 1975, p. 6)

To obtain Wimert's services, CIA officials prepared a suggested message for the Director of DIA to send to the Army Attache in Santiago through CIA communications channels. Because the DIA Director, General Donald V. Bennett, was in Europe on official business, the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, General Cushman, invited DIA Deputy Director Lt. General Jammie M. Philpott to his office on September 28, 1970.* During that meeting, General Cushman requested the assistance of the Army Attache, and General Philpott signed a letter which authorized transmission of a message directing the Army Attache:

> ...to work closely with the CAS chief, or in his absence, his deputy, in contacting and advising the principal military figures who might play a decisive role in any move which might, eventually, deny the presidency to Allende.
>
> Do not, repeat not, advise the Ambassador or the Defense Attache of this message, or give them any indication of its portent. In the course of your routine activities, act in accordance with the Ambassador's instructions. Simultaneously, I wish--and now authorize you--to act in a concerted fashion with the CAS chief.

TOP SECRET

---

* General Bennett returned to the United States on the evening of October 10, 1970. General Philpott was Acting Director in Bennett's absence.

TOP SECRET

This message is for your eyes only, and should not be discussed with any person other than those CAS officers who will be knowledgeable. CAS will identify them. (Headquarters 380 to Santiago)

For this and all subsequent messages intended for the Army Attache, the secret CIA communications channel was used.

Both General Philpott and Thomas Karamessines testified that initially the Army Attache would be used only to "obtain or procure" intelligence on Chilean military officers.* (Philpott, p. 11; Karamessines, p. 6) The September 28, 1970 message to the Army Attache, however, did in fact trigger his deep involvement in the coup attempt. According to the Attache's testimony, he received day-to-day instructions from the Chief of Station, and on occasion, the COS would show him messages ostensibly from Generals Bennett and/or Philpott, directing him to take certain actions. The COS also transmitted messages from the Army Attache to these Generals.

which were signed?

General Bennett testified that he never had knowledge of Track II and that he never received any communication relating thereto, nor did he ever authorize the transmission of any messages to the Army Attache. General Philpott also testified that he had no recollection of anything connected with Track II after his initial meeting with General Cushman on September 28. (Philpott, p. 16)

U. S. Army Colonel Robert C. Roth, who in September and October 1970 was the Chief of the Human Resources Division, Director of Collection, DIA,

---

* In this connection it should be noted that when questioned about this letter, General Philpott testified that he recalled signing an authorization such as that contained in the first paragraph of Headquarters 380 but that he did not recall the authorizations and instructions in paragraphs two and three.

TOP SECRET

testified that he recalled working for Generals Bennett and Philpott on "a priority requirement to identify Chilean personalities who might be helpful in preventing the election of Allende as President of Chile." (Roth, Vol. I, p. 6) Though Roth recalls no mention of Track II as such, the goal of this mission is identical to that described in the message of September 28 bearing Philpott's signature.

Beginning on October 15, Roth kept a chronology of his activities connected with Chile. This chronology reflects that there was a meeting on October 21 regarding the preparation of biographic material on Chilean generals which focused on their willingness to participate in a military coup. Generals Bennett, Philpott, and a CIA representative attended. The chronology also shows that on October 21, Roth delivered a message to Mr. Broe to be sent by CIA channels.* A message was sent to Col. Wimert that same day, ostensibly from General Bennett, which authorized:

> FYI: Suspension temporarily imposed on MAP and FMS has been rescinded. This action does not repeat not imply change in our estimate of situation. On the contrary, it is intended to place us in a posture in which we can formally cut off assistance if Allende elected and situation develops as we anticipate. Request up date on situation. (Santiago 446; Ref: Headquarters 762) (Headquarters 934, 21 October 1970)

Roth testified that this DIA project ended on October 23 when he followed Philpott's instructions to deliver biographic information on Chilean figures to Mr. Broe at CIA. Philpott also instructed him that

---

* Roth believes that General Philpott directed him to deliver this message and also pressed him on several occasions to seek a response from Broe to an earlier message to Colonel Wimert. (Roth, Vol. II, p.)

"any further action on the subject would henceforth be the responsibility of the CIA and that DIA would perform normal support functions." (Roth, p. 8)*

Both Bennett and Philpott testified that the activities described by Roth were routine DIA activities. However, Colonel Roth testified:

> I believe my impression at the time, or my recollection, is that I was informed that there was concern at the highest U.S. Governmental level over the possible election of Allende, that DIA then had a priority responsibility of coming up with the identities of key Chilean personalities that would be helpful, and so forth. I have nothing specific as to the nature of the instructions or the channels through which they came.
>
> Q. It was your sense at the time that you were working on a project that if it had not been initiated by, at least had the attention of or concern of, the highest level?

---

* Roth's chronology also indicates that Philpott had asked that Broe be queried on two or three occasions regarding a report from Wimert and that Philpott instructed that only he (Philpott) would communicate with Cushman if the need arose. (Roth, p. 11) Roth also testified that Philpott advised him that communications with Wimert would be by CIA channels. (Roth, p. 41)

TOP SECRET

Colonel Roth. That was my impression at the time.

Q. You understand from your work in the Defense Department that the highest level of government usually indicated the President of the United States?

Colonel Roth. I would assume that.

The CIA produced copies of several messages which identify Generals Bennett and Philpott as either the sender or recipient. Among these documents is a message relating to Track II which bears Philpott's purported signature. (Undated message. ca. 14 October 1970) General Philpott admitted that the signature appears to be his but doubted that it was and he could not recall signing it, or having seen it. (Philpott, p.) CIA also produced messages of October 14 (Headquarters 762) and October 21 (Headquarters 934) conveying instructions from General Bennett to the Army Attache. General Bennett testified he did not authorize these messages:

> It is beyond the responsibilities which I had in the military assistance area. It goes beyond the responsibility which I had in terms that I would have to get the authority or the approval of the Secretary through the Chairman for covert action of this magnitude. This message would not have been signed by me. (Bennett testimony, p. 21)

According to Karamessines, only the White House had the authority to issue the directives contained in those messages (Karamessines testimony, p. 84)

The Department of Defense was unable to provide any documents bearing on the issue of Wimert's Track II instructions or responses. A DOD file search under the direction of General Daniel O. Graham, the present Director of DIA, produced no copies of communication documents for the September-October 1970 period. (Graham, p. 6) However, Roth testified that detailed memoranda for the record which he prepared on his activities are missing from the files. (Roth, Vol. II, p.)

CIA officials maintain that they acted faithfully in transmitting messages to Generals Bennett and/or Philpott and in never sending a message without proper authorization. Mr. Karamessines was particularly forceful in this regard:

> ...I can recall no instance in my experience at the Central Intelligence Agency in which a message was received for an individual, an officer of the government anywhere, in whatever department, which was not faithfully, directly, promptly and fully and accurately delivered to that officer, or to his duly authorized representative.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

> We may have played tricks overseas, but it stopped at the water's edge, and we didn't play tricks among ourselves or among our colleagues within the Agency or in other agencies.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 79)

> We could not remain in business for a day...if this had been the practice of the Agency. It would have been no time at all before we would have been found out, a single instance of the kind of thing you are suggesting might have taken place would have put us out of business.
> (Karamessines testimony, p. 80)

Dr. Kissinger denied he was ever informed of the Army Attache's role or that he authorized any messages to be sent to the Army Attache. (Kissinger testimony, p. 22)

The investigation to date has not resolved the conflict between the statements of the senior CIA, DIA and White House officials. There are four possibilities that could explain the conflict. First, Generals Bennett and Philpott were cognizant of Track II and communicated their general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility would be contrary to their sworn testimony. Second, General Bennett was not aware of Track II but General Philpott was and communicated general instructions to the Army Attache. This possibility is supported by Roth's testimony but would be contrary to Philpott's sworn testimony and his duty to keep General Bennett informed. Third, the CIA acted on its own, and, after receiving initial authority from General Philpott, co-opted and ordered

the Army Attache without further informing any member of the Department of Defense of the White House. This possibility would be contrary to the sworn testimony of David Phillips, William Broe, Thomas Karamessines, and William Colby. Supported by Roth in part Fourth, members of the White House staff authorized the CIA to convey orders to the Army Attache on the basis of high or highest government authority. Further, that the White House staff directed that the Army Attache's superiors in the Pentagon not be informed. This possibility would contradict the sworn testimony of Dr. Kissinger and General Alexander Haig.

D. The False Flag Base

In order to minimize the risks of making contact with the dissident Chilean officers, the task force decided in late September to set up a "False Flag Base," i.e., to send four staff officers to Chile posing as nationals of other countries to supplement Colonel Wimert's contacts with Chilean military officers.* Given the limitations of the Station's resources and Colonel Wimert's visibility, Headquarters felt the use of "False Flag Officers" was necessary because "We don't want to miss a chance." One of these officers posed as a Brazilian intelligence officer so that "any flap would be a Brazilian one." (Headquarters 363, September 27, 1970)

Cowett
disarm

---

*The use of "False Flag Officers" is not, according to David Phillips, "an unusual practice," either by the CIA or foreign intelligence services. (Phillips testimony, pp. 47-48)

The False Flaggers were compartmented from each other and reported separately on their contacts to a "deep cover" CIA officer in Santiago who in turn reported to the Station. According to the testimony of the Chief of Station, they received their instructions from Washington and not from him. (Chief of Station testimony (Felix), August 1, 1975, p. 27)

E. Chief of Station

Although most of the Station officers in Santiago did not know of Track II, the Chief and Deputy Chief of Station were knowledgeable and the Chief of Station initiated contacts on his own with Chilean officers. The COS has testified that he regarded Track II as unrealistic:

> I had left no doubt in the minds of my colleagues and superiors that I did not consider any kind of intervention in those constitutional processes desirable....And one of the reasons certainly for my last recall (to Washington) was to be read the riot act--which was done in a very pleasant, but very intelligible manner. Specifically, I was told at that time that the Agency was not too interested in continuously being told by me that certain proposals which had been made could not be executed, or would be counterproductive. (Chief of Station (Felix) testimony, August 1, 1975, p. 10)

The Chief of Station's objection to Track II did not go unnoticed. The following instruction to the COS was sent on October 7: "Report should not contain analysis and argumentation but simply report on action taken." (Headquarters 612, 7 October) Very simply, Headquarters wanted the Station to take orders quietly as was the Agency itself.

TOP SECRET

Three examples of the Chief of Station's reporting bear out his claim to have dissented:

> Bear in mind that parameter of action is exceedingly narrow and available options are quite limited and relatively simple.
> (Santiago 424, September 23, 1970)
>
> Feel necessary to caution against any false optimism. It is essential that we not become victims of our own propaganda. (Santiago 441, October 1, 1970)
>
> Urge you do not convey impression that Station has sure-fire method of halting, let alone triggering coup attempts. (Santiago 477, October 7, 1970, p.2)

IV. CIA Efforts to Promote a Coup

A. The Chilean Conspirators

Anti-Allende coup plotting in Chile centered around several key individuals. One of these was retired General Roberto Viaux, the General who had led the "Tacnazo" insurrection a year before.* Following the "Tacnazo" revolt, and his dismissal from the Army, Viaux retained the support of many non-commissioned and junior officers as well as being the recognized leader of several right-wing civilian groups. (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975)

Another individual around which plotting centered was General Camilo Valenzuela, Commander of the Santiago Garrison. General Valenzuela was in league with several other active duty officers, including Admiral Hugo Tirado, Navy Commander in Chief; General Vicente Huerta, Director General of the Carabinero (police) Corps; General Canales, Director of the Military Academy; and General Joaquin Garcia, second in command, Air Force. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, November 18, 1970) All of these officers, with the possible exception of Canales, were in contact with Viaux as well.**

---

*This revolt was engineered by Viaux ostensibly for the purposes of dramatizing the military's demand for higher pay, but was widely interpreted as an abortive coup.

**The record of meetings between Viaux and the active duty military officers is incomplete. The record does show, however, that Viaux met with General Huerta around October 7. (Chile Task Force Log, October 7). On October 12 Viaux met with General Valenzuela (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October). One cable from Santiago indicates that Admiral Tirado may have been a member of Viaux's inner circle of conspirators. (Station 545, 16 October 1970) At the very least, Tirado was in contact with Viaux.

Although a distinction can be made between the Viaux and Valenzuela groups, as CIA witnesses did throughout their testimony before the Committee, the principal distinction between the two was that the latter was led by active duty military officers. The two groups were in contact with each other. The record also indicates that they worked together in at least two of the three Schneider kidnap attempts.

There was considerable communication among the various plotting elements. As Thomas Karamessines testified:

> ...I might add here that it seemed that a good dozen or more, maybe 20 Chilean senior officers were privy to what was going on in addition to President Frei and they were all talking to one another exchanging views and trying to see how best to mount the kind of coup that they wanted to see take place. (Karamessines testimony, p. 10)

B. Contacts Prior to October 15

The CIA's initial task in Chile was to assess the potential within the Chilean military to stage a coup. It recognized quickly that anti-Allende currents did exist in the military and the Carabineros (police), but were immobilized by "the tradition of military respect for the Constitution" and "the public and private stance of General Schneider, Commander in Chief of the Army, who advocated strict adherence to the Constitution." (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 17) The Agency's task, then, was to overcome "the apolitical, constitutional-oriented inertia of the Chilean military." (Ibid, p. 2)

Since the very top of the Chilean military, embodied by General Schneider and his second-in-command, General Prat, were hostile to the idea of a coup against Allende, discreet approaches were made to the second level of general officers. They were to be informed that the U.S. Government would support a coup both before and after it took place.* (Headquarters to Station 611, 7 October 1970) This effort began in earnest on October 5 when Colonel Wimert informed both an Army General ("Station's priority contact") an an Air Force General of the pro-coup

---

*The military officers were told, for example, that should Allende be prevented from taking office, "The Chilean military will not be ostracized, but rather can continue to count on us for MAP support and maintenance of our close relationship." (Hqs. 075517, 7 October 1970)

[illegible]

U.S. policy. (Santiago 469, October 5; Santiago 473, October 6)* Three days later the Chief of Station told General Huerta, Commander of the Carabineros that "the U.S. Government favors a military solution and is willing to support it in any manner short of outright military intervention." (Task Force Log, 9 October) General Huerta informed the COS that there was no chance of a coup by the Chilean Army high command. (Task Force Log, 10 October)

On October 7, Colonel Wimert approached members of the War Academy in Santiago who in turn asked him to provide light weapons. This was Colonel Wimert's first contact with the Army Lt. Colonel to whom he would ultimately pass three submachine guns on October 22.** At this meeting, the Lt. Colonel told Colonel Wimert that he and his colleagues were

> trying to exert force on Frei to eliminate Gen. Schneider to either replace him, send him out of the country. They had even studied plans to kidnap him. Schneider is the main barrier to all plans for the military to take over the government to prevent an Allende presidency. (Santiago 483, 8 October)

---

*According to the CIA's wrap-up report on Track II, between October 5 and October 20, the CIA Station and the Army Attache--for the most part the latter--made 21 contacts with key military and Carabinero officials. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 8 November 1970)

**In his testimony, Colonel Wimert indicated that the Lt. Colonel was affiliated with General Canales. (Wimert testimony, p. 52) In a cable sent to Headquarters on October 18, in which the Lt. Colonel's request for three submachine guns was made, the Station indicated that Wimert believed the Army officer, and his companion, a Navy Captain, were in league with Admiral Tirado. (Station 562, October 18) At another point in his testimony, Wimert stated, "There was Valenzuela here and the Navy Captain and the Army Lt. Colonel and the Air Force General over here." (Wimert testimony, p. 107) The Committee has been unable to determine the exact affiliation of the Army Lt. Colonel. However, as previously stated, both General Canales and Admiral Tirado were affiliated with General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado was in contact with General Viaux.

The next day, October 8, Headquarters cabled the Station in response to the Wimert-Lt. Colonel meeting. Headquarters took note of Schneider's resistance to coup plans and stated:

> ...This would make it more important than ever to remove him and to bring this new state of events...anything we or Station can do to effect removal of Schneider? We know this rhetorical question, but wish inspire thought on both ends on this matter.
> (Hqs. 628, 8 October)

During the first week of intensive efforts chances of success looked unusually bleak. The Chile Task Force Log commented:

> President Frei and the highest levels of the armed forces unable to pull themselves together to block Allende. The Chilean military's tradition of non-intervention, Frei's reluctance to tarnish his historical image, General Schneider's firm constitutional stand, and most importantly, the lack of leadership within the government and military are working against a military takeover.
> (Task Force Log, 8 October)

The following day the Station made reference to the "rapid(ly) waning chances for success." (Santiago 487, 9 October) This pessimism was not dispelled by their simultaneous judgment: "Station has arrived at Viaux solution by process of elimination." (Santiago 504, 10 October) Three days later the Task Force agreed: "We continue to focus our attention on General Viaux who now appears to be the only military leader willing to block Allende." (Task Force Log, 13 October)

If Viaux was the CIA's only hope of staging a coup, things were bleak indeed. His own colleagues, Generals Huerta and Valenzuela described him as "a General without an army." (Santiago 495, 9 October) Yet in the first two weeks of October he came to be regarded as the best hope for carrying out the CIA's Track II mandate.

Although Colonel Wimert was instructed not to involve himself with Viaux because of the high risk involved (Santiago 461, 5 October), he served initially as a contact to Viaux through an Argentine military Attache. The Argentine reported on October 5 that Viaux wanted several hundred paralyzing gas grenades to launch a coup on October 9. (Santiago 476, 6 October) Headquarters turned down the request, concluding that a "mini-coup at this juncture would be counterproductive" and Viaux should postpone his plans, "while encouraging him in a suitable manner to maintain his posture so that he may join larger movement later if it materializes." (Headquarters 585, 6 October)

The primary purpose of the "False Flag Base" was to contact Viaux, and it very rapidly relieved Wimert and the Argentine Attache of that task. Viaux reiterated his demand for an air drop of weapons to the "False Flagger," and again the response was the same: reject the demand for arms, but encourage him to keep planning. In essence the Agency was buying time with Viaux: "We wish to encourage Viaux to expand and refine his coup planning. Gain some influence over his actions." (Headquarters 689, 10 October) To achieve this latter purpose, Headquarters authorized passing $20,000 in cash and a promise of $250,000 in life insurance to Viaux and his associates, as a demonstration of U.S. support. (Headquarters 729, 13 October)

On October 13, Headquarters again indicated its concern over Schneider by asking: "What is to keep Schneider from making statement in early hours which will freeze those military leaders who might otherwise join Viaux?" (Headquarters 729, 13 October) The Station's response later that same day was "Viaux intends to kidnap Generals Schneider and Prats within the next 48 hours in order to precipitate a coup." (Santiago 527,

13 October) This Viaux kidnapping of Schneider was reported by the Station "as part of a coup that included Valenzuela." (Station 529, 13 October)

At about this time the Station began to receive encouragement from its other contacts. On October 14, ten days before the Chilean Congress was to vote, the Task Force Log concluded:

> Now we are beginning to see signs of increasing coup activity from other military quarters, specifically, an Army General (name deleted), Admiral Tirado, the forces in Concepcion and Valdivis and perhaps even Frei and Ossa.
> (Task Force Log, 14 October)

C. October 15 Decision

To summarize, by October 15, General Viaux had advertised to his contact a desire to proceed with a coup, had indicated he would deal with the Schneider obstacle by kidnapping him, had met at least once with Generals Huerta and Valenzuela and had once postponed his coup plans.*

On October 15 Thomas Karamessines met Henry Kissinger and Alexander Haig at the White House to discuss the situation in Chile. According to the Agency's record of this meeting, Karamessines "provided a rundown on Viaux, the Canales meeting with Tirado, and, in some detail, the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." (Memorandum of Conversation/Kissinger, Karamessines, and Haig, 15 October 1970) A decision was made at the meeting "to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily:"

---

* The reason for Viaux postponing his coup plans was the subject of a cable from Santiago to Headquarters:

> We discount Viaux's statement that he had called off his coup attempt because of False Flag Officer's impending visit. Other reporting indicated Viaux probably not able or intending move this weekend. (Santiago 499, 10 October)

There is also reason to believe that General Valenzuela was instrumental in persuading Viaux to postpone. According to the Chile Task Force Log:

> Station reported that on 12 October General Valenzuela met with General Viaux and attempted to persuade him not to attempt a coup." (Chile Task Force Log, 14 October)

> It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence the message should state: "We have reviewed your plans and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities in the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support." (15 October Memorandum of Conversation, Kissinger, Karamessines, Haig)

The meeting concluded, according to the Agency's record, "on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply."*

The following day CIA Headquarters cabled the results of the White House meeting to the Station in Santiago:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup....We are to continue to generate maximum pressure toward this end utilizing every appropriate resource.
>
> 3. After the most careful consideration it was determined that a Viaux coup attempt carried out by him alone with the forces now at his disposal would fail. Thus it would be counterproductive to our Track Two objectives. It was decided that CIA get a message to Viaux warning him against precipitate action. (Headquarters 802, 16 October)

The message was supplemented by orders to "continue to encourage him (Viaux) to amplify his planning; encourage him to join forces with other coup planners." (Headquarters 802, 16 October) The message concluded: "There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune." (Ibid.)

---

* Secretary Kissinger's recollection of the October 15 meeting is not in accord with that of Mr. Karamessines or the cable (Headquarters 802) that was sent the following day to the Station in Santiago. This matter will be discussed in Part V of this report.

D. Coup Planning and Attempts After October 15

The decision to "de-fuse" General Viaux was passed to Viaux's father-in-law on October 17. The in-law responded that it did not matter because they had decided to proceed with the coup in any case. (Santiago 533, 17 October) At the final meeting of the CIA "False Flagger" and Viaux's father-in-law on October 18, the Agency was informed that the coup would proceed on October 22, "and that the abduction of General Schneider is first link in chain of events to come." (Santiago 568, 19 October) An "emergency channel" of communication with Viaux was maintained. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, page 21)

As previously stated, by mid-October things suddenly looked brighter for a coup being mounted by the high-level Chilean military contacts.* As a CIA overview statement in Track II stated:

> Coup possibilities afforded by the active duty military group led by General Valenzuela and Admiral Tirado had always seemed more promising than the capabilities of the Viaux group. These military officers had the ability and resources to act providing they decided to move and organized themselves accordingly.
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," July 15, 1975, p. 5)

By mid-October those military officers appeared to be moving in this direction.

On the evening of October 17, Colonel Wimert met with the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain. They requested 8 to 10 tear gas grenades, three 45-caliber machine guns and 500 rounds of ammunition. The Navy Captain said he had three machine guns himself "but can be identified by serial numbers as having been issued to him. Therefore unable to use them." (Santiago 562, 18 October) Colonel Wimert and the Chief of Station have testified that the officers wanted the machine guns for self-protection. The question, of course, is whether the arms were intended for use, or were used, in the kidnapping of General Schneider. The fact that the weapons were provided the Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain and that Viaux associates were convicted of the Schneider killing suggests that the guns were not involved.

---

*Two coup plotters, Generals Canales and Garin, made one last attempt to persuade General Schneider to change his anti-coup position on October 15. The Station reported that the meeting turned out to be a "complete fiasco. Schneider refused to listen to General Canales' eloquent presentation of Communist action in Chile...and adament in maintaining his non-involvement stance." (Santiago 548, 16 October)

The machine guns and ammunition were sent from Washington by diplomatic pouch on the morning of October 19, although Headquarters was puzzled about their purpose: "Will continue make effort provide them but find our credulity stretched by Navy Captain leading his troops with sterile guns. What is special purpose for these guns? We will try send them whether you can provide explanation or not." (Headquarters 854, 18 October) The first installment was delivered to the Army Lt. Colonel and the Navy Captain late in the evening of October 18 and consisted of the six tear gas grenades intended originally for Viaux.*

---

* As previously stated, after October 15 CIA efforts to promote a coup in Chile focussed on the active duty military officers--Valenzuela, et. al.--rather than Viaux. An example of this shift in focus was the decision to provide the Army Lt. Colonel and the Army Captain the tear gas grenades originally intended for Viaux. A cable from Santiago explained the purpose of this action:

> Station plans give six tear gas grenades to Colonel Wimert for delivery to Armed Forces officers (deletion) instead of having False Flag Officer deliver them to Viaux group. Our reasoning is that Wimert dealing with active duty officers. Also False Flagger leaving evening 18 October, and will not be replaced but Wimert will stay here. Hence important that Wimert credibility with Armed Forces officers be strengthened.
>
> (Santiago 562, 18 October)

That same day, General Valenzuela informed Colonel Wimert that he, General Huerta, Admiral Tirado and an Air Force General were prepared to sponsor a coup. (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970) Their plan was to begin with the kidnapping of General Schneider on the following evening, October 19, at a military dinner being given for Schneider,* after which Schneider would be flown to Argentina, Frei would resign and leave Chile, Admiral Tirado would head the military junta, and dissolve Congress. With respect to the kidnapping of Schneider, the cable reports:

> General Viaux knowledgeable of above operation but not directly involved. He has been sent to Vina to stay with prominent physician. Will be seen in public places during 19 and 20 October to demonstrate fact that above operation not his doing. Will be allowed to return to Santiago at end of week. Military will not admit involvement in Schneider's abduction which is to be blamed on leftists. (Santiago 566, 19 October)

The kidnapping of the evening of October 19 failed because General Schneider left in a private vehicle, rather than in his official car, and his police guard failed to be withdrawn, but the Army Lt.Colonel assured Colonel Wimert that another attempt would be made on October 20. (Santiago 582, 20 October) Colonel Wimert was authorized to pay Valenzuela $50,000 "which was the price agreed upon between the plotters and the unidentified team of abductors."

---

* The "False Flag Officer" who was in contact with Viaux at the time the Valenzuela plan was given to Colonel Wimert apparently understood that Viaux was involved in the October 19 attempt. He stated:

> Q. Were you told any of the details of how the (Viaux) kidnapping would be carried out?
>
> Mr. Sarno. They indicated it was going to be at some sort of a banquet which the General (Schneider) would be attending.
>
> (Sarno testimony, p. 37)

but Wimert insisted that the kidnapping be completed before he paid the money. (Task Force Log, 20 October) At the same time General Valenzuela assured Colonel Wimert that the military was now prepared to move. (Task Force Log, 20 October) The second abduction attempt on the 20th also failed and the Task Force concluded

> Since Valenzuela's group is apparently having considerable difficulty executing even the first step of its coup plan, the prospects for a coup succeeding or even occurring before 24 October now appears remote. (Task Force Log, 22 October)

E. The Killing of General Schneider

In the early morning hours of October 22 (2 am), Colonel Wimert delivered the three submachine guns with ammunition to the Army Lt. Colonel in an isolated section of Santiago.*

---

*Although Colonel Wimert's testimony and the cable traffic do not clearly establish the identity of the group to which the Lt. Colonel was affiliated (see page 31) two CIA statements on Track II tie the weapons, and therefore the Lt. Colonel, to the Valenzuela group:

> ...The only assistance requested by Valenzuela to set the plan /of October 19/ into motion through Schneider's abduction was several sub-machine guns, ammunition, a few tear gas grenades and gas masks (all of which were provided) plus $50,000 for expenses (which was to be passed upon demand.
> (CIA Report on Chilean Task Force Activities, 18 November 1970, p. 22)

> ...Three sub-machine guns, together with six gas cannisters and masks, were passed to the Valenzuela group at 2 am on 22 October. The reason why they still wanted the weapons was because there were two days remaining before the Congress decided the Presidential election and the Valenzuela group maintained some hope they could still carry out their plans.
> (CIA Briefing Paper, "Special Mandate from the President on Chile," p. 7, July 15, 1975)

At about 7 am that day the group that intended to kidnap General Schneider met to discuss last-minute instructions. According to the findings of the Chilean Military Court which investigated the Schneider killing, neither the Army Lt. Colonel nor the Navy Captain were there. Shortly after 8 am, General Schneider's car was intercepted, on his way to work, by the abductors and he was mortally wounded when he drew his handgun in self-defense. The Military Court determined that hand guns had been used to kill General Schneider, although it also found that one unloaded machine gun was at the scene of the killing.*

The first Station reports following the Schneider shooting said "Military Mission sources claim General Schneider machine gunned on way to work" (Santiago 587, 22 October) and "Assailants used grease guns." (Santiago 589, 22 October) The submachine guns had previously been described as "grease guns." Thus the initial reaction of the Station was that Schneider had been shot with the same kind of weapons delivered several hours earlier to the Army Lt. Colonel. Santiago then informed Headquarters "Station has instructed Col. Wimert to hand over $50,000 if Gen. Valenzuela requests " (Santiago 592, 22 October), thus indicating that the Station thought the kidnapping had been accomplished by Valenzuela's paid abductors. Later that day, the Station cabled Headquarters:

---

* The Military Court determined that those who participated in the shooting of General Schneider on October 22 were part of the Viaux-led conspiracy. The Court also found that this same group had participated in the October 19 and 20 kidnap attempts.

In June 1972 General Viaux was convicted for complicity in the plot culminating in the death of General Schneider. He received a 20-year prison sentence for being "author of the crime of kidnapping which resulted in serious injury to the victim," and a five-year exile for conspiring to cause a military coup. Also convicted on the latter charge were Generals Valenzuela and Tirado. They received sentences of three years in exile.

> Station unaware if assassination was premeditated or whether it constituted bungled abduction attempt. In any case, it important to bear in mind that move against Schneider was conceived by and executed at behest of senior Armed Forces officers. We know that General Valenzuela was involved. We also near certain that Admiral Tirado, Army Lt. Colonel and Navy Captain witting and involved. We have reason for believeing that General Viaux and numerous associates fully clued in, but cannot prove or disprove that execution or attempt against Schneider was entrusted to elements linked with Viaux. Important factor to bear in mind is that Armed Forces, and not retired officers or extreme rightests, set Schneider up for execution or abduction.... All we can say is that attempt against Schneic is affording Armed Forces one last opportunit to prevent Allende's election if they are wil to follow Valenzuela's scenario.
> (Santiago 598, 22 October)

F. Post October 22 Events

The shooting of General Schneider resulted immediate tion of martial law, the appointment of General Prats to as Commander in Chief, and the appointment of General Val uel of Santiago province. These measures, and others taken, Task Force to make the following initial judgment:

> With only 24 hours remaining before the Congre runoff, a coup climate exists in Chile....The on General Schneider has produced development closely follow Valenzuela's plan....Consequent plotters' positions have been enhanced.
> (Chile Task Force Log, 22 Octo

On October 23, Director Helms reviewed and discussed

> It was agreed...that a maximum effort has bee and that now only the Chileans themselves can successful coup. The Chileans have been guide point where a military solution is at least o them. (Task Force Log, 24 Octo

---

Although i

prediction of

an abduction a

constitutional

Dr. Allende wa

died the next

TOP SECRET

Although it was not immediately clear to CIA observers, the Station's prediction of October 9 that the shooting of Schneider (as a result of an abduction attempt) would "rally the Army firmly behind the flag of constitutionalism" was correct. (Santiago 495, 9 October) On October 24 Dr. Allende was confirmed by the Chilean Congress. General Schneider died the next day.

TOP SECRET

V. CIA/White House Communication During Track II

The testimony given to the Committee by Henry Kissinger and General Haig conflicts with that given by CIA officials.

Kissinger and Haig testified that on October 15, 1970, the White House stood down CIA efforts to promote a military coup d'etat in Chile. Both testified that after that date they were neither informed of, nor authorized, CIA Track II activities, including the kidnap plans of General Schneider and the passage of weapons to the military plotters.

By contrast, CIA officials testified that they operated before and after October 15 with the knowledge and approval of the White House.

The conflict pertains directly to the period after October 15, but it bears on the degree of communication between the White House and the CIA in the earlier period as well. For instance, Henry Kissinger testified that he was informed of no coup plan which began with the abduction of General Schneider. He was aware of General Viaux's plan--which he and Karamessines decided on October 15 to try to forestall--but did not know that it was to begin with Schneider's abduction.

CIA officials, especially Thomas Karamessines, stated that there was close consultation throughout Track II between the Agency and the White House. Karamessines testified that he met with Kissinger some six to ten times during the five weeks of Track II (Karamessines testimony, page 66); and that he kept Kissinger generally informed of developments. (Ibid., page 56) The Committee has records of two meetings between Karamessines and Kissinger and of one telephone conversation between Karamessines and Kissinger's deputy, General Alexander Haig. Karamessines' daily calendar indicates that three other meetings with General Haig took place--but does not establish with certainty that the topic was

A. September

TOP SECRET

September 18

Helms and Karamessines met with Kissinger at the White House. As Helms' notes of the September 15 meeting indicate, Kissinger wanted a plan within 48 hours. In the meeting on the 18th, according to CIA records, there was little discussion of a military coup. Rather the conversation focused on "what economic leverage could be exercised in the Chilean situation...." (Memorandum/Meeting with DDP, 18 September)

The efficacy of economic pressure continued to be a subject of concern during the last days of September. Apparently that pressure was viewed as another inducement to Frei to opt for the "Frei gambit."

September 21

The 40 Committee met. The Select Committee has no confirmation that Chile was on the agenda at this meeting. Karamessines' calendar confirms that he attended; presumably Kissinger, the 40 Committee chairman, also attended, although the Committee has not been able to review his calendar. All that can be said about this meeting--and the meetings of the Senior Review Group, which Kissinger also chaired--is that the meetings afforded Karamessines and Kissinger an opportunity to meet privately and discuss Track II if they desired. In all these instances save the 40 Committee meeting on September 22, the Committee has no evidence to confirm that such a private Kissinger/Karamessines meeting actually took place. That the CIA prepared a memorandum of conversation for the private meeting on the 22nd but has been able to find none for other meetings may provide some support for the argument that no other such private meetings occurred.

September 22

Kissinger asked Karamessines to stay behind after a 40 Committee meeting called to discuss Track I. The two men discussed Track II actions, especially the contacts with then-Chilean-President Frei. According to

TOP SECRET

CIA records of the meeting, Kissinger told Karamessines that "our handling of the problem during the earlier meeting had been perfect and he added we were doing fine and keep it up." (Memorandum for the Record/Chile, 22 September 1970, by Thomas Karamessines)

B. October

October 5

A cable sent to Santiago, released by Karamessines, requested a report on how the Station planned to contact the three Chilean Generals --Prats, Valenzuela and Huerta--named in a cable of September 30. (Headquarters 449) The October 5 cable indicated that the report was needed for a discussion with Kissinger on October 6. (Santiago 556, 5 October 1970) Karamessines presumed such a meeting had taken place, although he had no specific memory of it. (Karamessines testimony, pp. 69-70) His calendar for October 6 indicates that he attended a 40 Committee meeting on Chile. (Karamessines calendar) Kissinger chaired the 40 Committee.

October 6

The Station reported that General Viaux was "ready to launch golpe evening 9 October, or morning 10 October." (Santiago 472, 6 October 1970) In response, CIA Headquarters labeled the prospective coup one "with scant chance of success which will vitiate any further more serious action." The Station was directed to try to "stop ill-considered action at this time." (Headquarters 585, 6 October 1970)

Kissinger testified he had not been informed of the Viaux plan, supporting his recollection with the fact that the CIA memorandum of an October 10 conversation between Karamessines and Haig (see below) makes no mention of any previous plots. (Kissinger testimony, p. 24)

Similarly, Kissinger did not remember having been informed that the CIA had called off a coup it regarded as premature. He stated:

> My perception at that period was that if they had a coup they would come...back to us before triggering it...at no time during the period did they, in fact, tell us...that they had a coup that might be ready to go. And, indeed, they generally told us the opposite.
> (Kissinger testimony, pp. 25-26)

As Karamessines' calendar indicated, there was a 40 Committee meeting on October 6. He attended this meeting, along with Richard Helms and William Broe of the CIA. According to the minutes of that meeting, CIA efforts to promote a military coup in Chile were not discussed. However, in an exchange with Charles Meyer, who was then the State Department's Assistant Secretary for Latin American Affairs, Dr. Kissinger stressed the desire of "higher authority" (President Nixon) to prevent Allende's assumption of office. According to the minutes:

> Mr. Meyer pointed to the need to determine a post-Allende position such as proposed in NSSM 97. It was agreed that an early NSC meeting was desirable on that subject. Mr. Kissinger said this presumed total acceptance of a fait accompli and higher authority had no intention of conceding before the 24th; on the contrary, he wanted no stone left unturned. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 6 October 1970, 7 October 1970)

October 8

Karamessines met for lunch with General Haig. (Karamessines calendar)

In his testimony, Haig recalled being aware that the CIA was in touch with two differenct groups of military plotters. He believed there must have been another meeting in which the CIA informed him of its on-going contacts.

TOP SECRET

> It seems to me, although the records don't reflect it, that there was a meeting in September, a very brief one, in which I must have been told that there was a specific program going underway. That probably would have been by Henry (Kissinger) and perhaps with Karamessines there. I am not sure. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

October 10

Karamessines discussed the Chilean situation by telephone with General Haig. He indicated that the Station had "made direct contact with a number of the senior military officers, especially those who had been reportedly very activist-minded and had received pessimistic reactions from all." (Memorandum/FUBELT, by William Broe, 10 October 1970)

Haig recalled the telephone conversation with Karamessines on the 10th. His recollection accords with the CIA memorandum of conversation.

> I do know, and I know that from looking at the record this morning, that Karamessines made a telephone call to me in which he gave a progress report. I recall that. It was in effect a negative progress report, that they were just not coming up with it. (Haig testimony, p. 12)

meeting on the 15th (see below) to have discussed the results of the October 14th message. But the CIA record makes no mention of any such discussion. (Kissinger testimony, p. 53)

October 14

The 40 Committee met to discuss, among other topics, Chile. In addition to the 40 Committee principals (Kissinger, John Mitchell, David Packard, Alexis Johnson, Admiral Moorer), the meeting was attended by Karamessines, William Broe and General Robert Cushman of the CIA, Charles Meyer from State, Viron Vaky, and Ambassador Korry, who had returned to Washington from Santiago for a short period of consultation.

According to the minutes of that meeting, Kissinger asked Karamessines to give a rundown on the latest developments and present situation in Chile. Karamessines pointed out that "a coup climate does not presently exist." He noted that "the unpredictable General Viaux is the only individual seemingly ready to attempt a coup and...his chances of mounting a successful one were slight." Ambassador Korry agreed with Karamessines' assessment and stated that "as of now it seemed almost certain that Allende would be voted into office on October 24th." Kissinger then observed that "there presently appeared to be little the U.S. can do to influence the Chilean situation one way or another." Other participants at the meeting concurred. (Memorandum for the Record/Minutes of the Meeting of the 40 Committee, 14 October 1970, 16 October 1970)

October 15

Karamessines met with Kissinger and Haig at the White House to discuss Track II. According to the CIA memorandum of conversation, Karamessines gave a run-down on Viaux, Canales and Tirado and "the general situation in Chile from the coup-possibility viewpoint." It was concluded that Viaux did not have more than one chance in twenty--perhaps less--to launch a successful coup. Kissinger ticked off the list of negative repercussions from an unsuccessful coup. The CIA record of the meeting continues:

> 5. It was decided by those present that the Agency must get a message to Viaux warning him against any precipitate action. In essence our message was to state: "We have reviewed your plans, and based on your information and ours, we come to the conclusion that your plans for a coup at this time cannot succeed. Failing, they may reduce your capabilities for the future. Preserve your assets. We will stay in touch. The time will come when you with all your other friends can do something. You will continue to have our support."
>
> 6. After the decision to de-fuse the Viaux coup plot, at least temporarily, Dr. Kissinger instructed Mr. Karamessines to preserve Agency assets in Chile, working clandestinely and securely to maintain the capability for Agency operations against Allende in the future.
>
> 8. The meeting concluded on Dr. Kissinger's note that the Agency should continue keeping the pressure on every Allende weak spot in sight--now, after the 24th of October, after 5 November, and into the future until such time as new marching orders are given. Mr. Karamessines stated that the Agency would comply.
> (Memorandum of Conversation/Dr. Kissinger, Mr. Karamessines, Gen. Haig at the White House, 15 October 1970)

TOP SECRET

Kissinger, in his testimony before the Committee, regarded the CIA memorandum of conversation as substantially correct, although somewhat more detailed than he would have remembered. (Kissinger testimony, p. 52) He believed the Agency had been told to "stand down and preserve your assets."

Kissinger believed that the gist of the October 15th meeting as recorded in the CIA memorandum was incompatible with the order the CIA issued to its Station the next day, an order ostensibly based on the October 15th meeting. And, he noted, in writing its memorandum of the meeting of the 15th, the CIA had a "high incentive to preserve the maximum degree of authority." (Ibid., pp. 55-56) The October 16th order indicated that Track II had been reviewed at "high USG level" the previous day, and stated:

> 2. It is firm and continuing policy that Allende be overthrown by a coup. It would be much preferable to have this transpire prior to 24 October but efforts in this regard will continue vigorously beyond this date....
>
> 4. There is great and continuing interest in the activities of Tirado, Canales, Valenzuela et al and we wish them optimum good fortune.
> (Headquarters 802, 16 October 1970)

Kissinger recalled the October 15th conversation as "turning off the coup plans rather than giving a new order to do them." (Kissinger testimony, p. 56) Haig agreed in his testimony.

> The conclusions of that meeting were that we had better not do anything rather than something that was not going to succeed....My general feeling was, I left that meeting with the impression that there was nothing authorized."
> (Haig testimony, p. 13)

October 10-October 22 (approximate)

Karamessines and one or two others went with Kissinger to speak with the President, after a larger meeting. Karamessines believed this meeting took place between October 10 and 24. (Karamessines testimony, p. 89) According to Karamessines, the "President went out of his way to impress all of those there with his conviction that it was absolutely essential that the election of Mr. Allende to the presidency be thwarted."[*] As they were leaving the Oval Office, the President took Karamessines aside to reiterate the message. (Karamessines testimony, p. 8)

October 19

Station cabled Headquarters early in the morning, advising that the tear gas had been passed and outlining the Valenzuela coup plan, beginning with the kidnap of Schneider. In testimony before the Committee, Karamessines indicated he certainly would have reported the Valenzuela plan to Kissinger "very promptly, if for no other reason than that we didn't have all that much promising news to report to the White House...." (Karamessines testimony, p. 72)

> And as I say, if for no other reason we would have wanted to get this kind of hopeful report to the White House as soon as possible, and it would be my best estimate now that that is precisely what we did. (p. 72)

In the afternoon of the 19th, Karamessines met with General Haig for an hour at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) By then, Karamessines would have had in hand the cable outlining the Valenzuela plan, since the cable had arrived that morning. However, General Haig had no recollection of the meeting with Karamessines on the 19th. Nor did he believe he had been informed of the Valenzuela plan. "This is all very new to me. I hadn't seen any of this, and I was not familiar with this particular plan...or $50,000, or any of the characters that are described in here." (Haig testimony, pp. 38-39)

---

[*] If the meeting with the President occurred after October 15, that would lend credence to the testimony of CIA officials that they were not directed to end their coup efforts in the October 15th meeting. Unfortunately, the Committee has not had access to the daily calendars of President Nixon or Secretary Kissinger, which might pinpoint the date of the President's conversation with Karamessines. Those calendars, along with other White House documents bearing on Track II, have been subpoenaed.

Similarly, Kissinger testified that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan. He said he "was informed of nothing after October 15th...." (Kissinger testimony, p. 65) He indicated that, according to his daily calendar, he had no conversation with either Karamessines or Helms between the 15th and the 19th. (Ibid., p. 53) He indicated that he never knew that the CIA was in the process of passing guns and tear gas to Chilean military conspirators. He said "...there was no further meeting on that subject. In anybody's record, mine or theirs (the CIA's), none of the information from the 16th on was familiar to me." (Ibid., p. 62)

Kissinger further testified he did not know that the United States was dealing with Chilean officers who plotted a coup which involved the abduction of General Schneider:

> Senator Hart of Colorado. I am not sure that the record clearly shows you answer to the direct question of whether you knew or did not know that we were negotiating with military officers with regard to a plot that did involve the abduction of General Schneider.
>
> Secretary Kissinger. I said I did not know.
> (Kissinger testimony, p. 86)

Nor did General Haig believe he had been informed of any abduction plans before the fact.

Q. Were you aware during that period of time of the plans to kidnap General Schneider?

General Haig. I was aware after the fact....

Q. But you were never informed prior to his attempted abduction?

General Haig. I don't believe I was at all.

October 20

A cable to the Station indicated that "while awaiting word on whatever events may have occurred 19 October, please let us know what you can on interim basis....Headquarters must respond during morning 20 October to queries from high levels." (Headquarters 883, 20 October 1970) Karamessines testified that the references to "high levels" in the cable of the 20th meant White House officials, probably Kissinger. He felt quite certain that Kissinger would have been briefed in advance about Valenzuela's plan for the 19th and so would have been expected to ask what happened on the morning of the 20th. (Karamessines testimony, p. 73) In contrast, Kissinger interpreted that cable in precisely the opposite light. He felt it indicated that he had not been informed of the Valenzuela plan in advance. When news of the Schneider kidnap reached the White House, Kissinger believed he would have had "somebody pick up a telephone and say, 'What is this all about?'" (Kissinger transcript, p. 68)

October 22

Karamessines met with Haig at the White House. (Karamessines calendar) General Haig remembered that word of the shooting of Schneider came as "a great shock" to him, and he believed that Karamessines had told him about it in their meeting on the 22nd. He thought that Kissinger either was present at the meeting or that he, Haig, had gone immediately in to Kissinger's office to relate what Karamessines had told him. (Haig testimony, p. 36)

C. December

December 2

A memorandum, dated December 2, 1970, from Helms to Kissinger stated that Helms had given a recapitulation on Track II to Attorney General Mitchell, who would deliver it personally to Kissinger. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "sent to Kissinger via DCI (Helms)." (Helms memorandum for Kissinger, 2 December 1970) The report, which was dated November 18, 1970, contained a full account of CIA activities during Track II, including the several plans to kidnap Schneider and the passage of weapons to the Chilean conspirators. (Report on CIA Chilean Task Force Activities, 15 September to 3 November 1970, 18 November 1970)

In his testimony to the Committee, Kissinger did not recall receiving the report, although he doubted that he would have read such an "after action" report in any case. He testified that he could not find it in his files, in contrast to his finding a CIA report on Track I, dated November 19, 1970. Kissinger was puzzled by a number of aspects of the memorandum and report: why there were two reports, why the report of the 18th apparently was only called to his attention on the 2nd of December, and why it was to be delivered through Mitchell. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 71, 74)

D. Did Track II End?

The Committee also received conflicting testimony about whether or not Track II ever ended, formally or in fact. As noted above, Kissinger indicated that Track II was supposed to have ended, as far as he was concerned, on October 15. It was formally terminated, according to Kissinger, by a new Presidential marching order issued prior to the October 24 vote of the Chilean Congress.

The Committee does not have this new "marching order" in its possession. However, CIA officials from whom the Committee took testimony believed that there had been no such definitive end to Track II. It merely tapered off, to be replaced by a longer-term effort to effect a change of government in Chile. Karamessines' testimony was most explicit:

> Mr. Karamessines. I am sure that the seeds that were laid in that effort in 1970 had their impact in 1973. I do not have any question about that in my mind either. (Karamessines testimony, p. 26)
>
> ***
>
> Q. Was Track II ever formally ended? Was there a specific order ending it?
>
> Mr. Karamessines. As far as I was concerned, Track II was really never ended. What we were told to do in effect was, well, Allende is now President. So Track II, which sought to prevent him from becoming President, was technically out, it was done. But what we were told to do was to continue our efforts. Stay alert, and to do what we could to contribute to the eventual achievement of the objectives and purposes of Track II. That being the case, I don't think it is proper to say that Track II was ended.
>
> (Ibid., pp. 128-129)

When informed of Karamessines' testimony that Track II was never ended, Kissinger testified:

> The Chairman. Would you take issue with that, with the (Karamessines) testimony?
>
> Secretary Kissinger. Totally....It is clear that...after October 15th that there was no separate channel by the CIA to the White House and that all actions with respect to Chile were taken in the 40 Committee framework. There was no 40 Committee that authorized an approach to or contact with military people, no plots which I am familiar with, and all the covert operations in Chile after Allende's election by the Congress were directed towards maintaining the democratic opposition for the 1976 election. And that was the exclusive thrust, and if there was any further contact with military plotting, it was totally unauthorized and this is the first that I have heard of it. (Kissinger testimony, pp. 75-77)

Should put
in that
Trueheart or staff

(Draft--9/8/75)

A. Summary

South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, were assassinated during a coup by Vietnamese generals on November 2, 1963. Evidence before the Committee indicates that the United States Government offered encouragement for the coup, but neither desired nor was involved in the assassinations. Rather, Diem's assassination appears to have been a spontaneous act by Vietnamese generals, engendered by anger at Diem for refusing to resign or put himself in the custody of the leaders of the coup.

On one occasion, General Duong Van Minh ("Big Minh") outlined to a CIA officer the possible assassination of Nhu and another brother, Ngo Dinh Can, as one of three methods being considered for changing the government in the near future. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge and Deputy Chief of Mission William Trueheart were informed of this possibility by the Saigon Chief of Station, who recommended that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a bloodbath in Saigon or a protracted struggle which would rip the Army and the country asunder" (CIA cable SAIG 1447, Saigon Station to DCI, 10/5/63). Upon being informed, Director McCone sent two cables. The first stated "[w]e cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination", and the second directed that the recommendation be withdrawn because "we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefor" (CIA cable, DCI to Saigon 10/5/63); CIA cable DIR 73661, DCI to Saigon, 10/6/63).

B. The Abortive Coup of August 1963

On May 8, 1963, South Vietnamese troops in the City of Hue fired on Buddhists protesting against the Diem Government, killing nine and wounding fourteen. This incident triggered a nationwide Buddhist protest and a sharp loss of popular confidence in the Diem regime.*

On May 18, United States Ambassador Frederick E. Nolting met with Diem and outlined steps which the United States desired him to take to redress the Buddhist grievances and recapture public confidence. These steps included admitting responsibility for the Hue incident, compensating the victims, and reaffirming religious equality in the country. (Pentagon Papers, p.208) On June 3, Madame Nhu, the wife of Diem's brother, Nhu, publicly accused the Buddhists of being infiltrated with Communist agents; Truehart protested her remarks to Diem and threatened to disassociate the United States from any repressive measures against the Buddhists in the future (Pentagon Papers, p.308). Shortly thereafter, Madame Nhu commented on the self-immolation of Quang

---

* Senator Gravel Edition, The Pentagon Papers, The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam, pp. 207-208, Volume II, Beacon Press, Boston (hereinafter cited as Pentagon Papers). Former Public Affairs Officer of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, John Mecklin), in his book, Mission in Torment, An Intimate Account of the U.S. Role in Vietnam, Doubleday and Company, 1965, (hereinafter cited as Mecklin, at pages 158-60 described the vulnerability of the Buddhists to Communist infiltration during this period noting that it""offered a classic opportunity for a Communist sleeper ploy."

Duc and other Buddhist monks by stating that she would like to furnish mustard for the monks' barbecue. On June 12, Trueheart told Diem that Quang Duc's suicide had shocked the world and again warned that the United States would break with his government if he did not solve the Buddhist problem. (Pentagon Papers, p. 208.)

Lucien Conein, a CIA officer in Saigon,* testified that the Buddhist uprisings were the catalyst that ultimately brought down the Diem regime (Conein, pp. 42-44). These events led the United States to apply "direct, relentless, and tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States has seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government." (Mecklin, p. 169)

By July 4, 1963, Generals Minh, Don, Kim, and Khiem had agreed on the necessity for a coup.**

In his final meeting on August 14 with Ambassador Nolting, Diem agreed to make a public statement offering concessions to the Buddhists. This statement took the form of an interview with the columnist, Margurite Higgins, in which Diem asserted that his policy toward the Buddhists had always been conciliatory and asked for harmony and support of the government.

---

* Conein testified that he had known the Generals involved in the coup

> "for many years. Some of them I had known back even in World War II. Some of them were in powerful positions, and I was able to talk to them on a person to person basis, not as a government official." (Conein, p. 17.)

** Conein's After-Action Report stated that:

> "The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissention. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed." (Conein After-Action Report, p. 10.)

Shortly after midnight on August 21, 1963, Nhu ordered forces loyal to him to attack pagodas throughout Vietnam, arresting monks and sacking the sacred buildings. Over thirty monks were injured and 1,400 arrested. The American Embassy was taken by surprise and viewed the attacks as a shattering repudiation of Diem's promises to Nolting. (Pentagon Papers, p.210)*

On August 24, 1963, the State Department sent a cable (Deptel 243) to the new ambassador in Vietnam, Henry Cabot Lodge. The telegram was prepared by Roger Hilsman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, and Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman, and was approved by President Kennedy. (Pentagon Papers, p.235) Deptel 243 told Lodge to press Diem to take "prompt dramatic actions" to redress the grievances of the Buddhists.

> "We must at same time also tell key military leaders that US would find it impossible to continue support GVN (Vietnamese Government) militarily and economically unless above steps are taken immediately which we recognize requires removal of the Nhu's from the scene. We wish give Diem reasonable opportunity to remove Nhu's but if he remains obdurate, then we are prepared to accept the obvious implication that we can no longer support Diem. You may also tell appropriate military commanders we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism . . . . Concurrently with above, Ambassador and country teams should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how we might bring Diem's replacement if this should become necessary . . . ."

---

* Conein testified that the raids might have been timed to occur when no American Ambassador was in Vietnam (Nolting had left a few days before and his replacement, Lodge, had not yet arrived) (Conein, p.21).

In a cable on August 25, CIA Chief of Station John Richardson reported the result of a conference among himself, Lodge, Trueheart, General Harkins (Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV) and General Weede (Chief of Staff, MACV). They accepted Deptel 243 "as a basic decision from Washington and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions", (I.G., C, pp. 7-8) but believed that Diem would refuse to remove his brother from his position in the government.

Early in the morning of August 26, 1963, the Voice of America in South Vietnam placed the blame on Nhu for the August 21 raids and absolved the army. The broadcast also reported speculation that the United States contemplated suspending aid to the South Vietnamese Government (Pentagon Papers, p. 212).* Later on that same day, Lodge presented his credentials to Diem. CIA officers Conein and Spera were told to see Generals Khiem and Khanh, respectively, and to convey to them the substance of Deptel 243, but to remind them that "we cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose" (SAIG 0304, 8/26/63).

A message from the White House on August 29 authorized Harkins to confirm to the Vietnamese Generals that the United States would support a coup if it had a good chance of succeeding, but did not involve United States armed forces. Lodge was authorized to suspend United States aid at his discretion. (Deptel 272, 8/29/63.) A cable from the President to Lodge on the same day stated:

---

*In a cable to Harriman, Lodge complained that the VOA broadcast had "complicated our already difficult problem" by eliminating "the possibility of the generals' effort achieving surprise." Lodge further warned that "the US must not appear publicly in the matter, thus giving the 'kiss of death' to its friends" (Cable, Lodge to Harriman, 8/26/63).

> "I have approved all the messages you are receiving from others today, and I emphasize that everything in these messages has my full support. We will do all that we can to help you conclude this operations successfully . . . . Until the very moment of the go signal for the operation by the Generals, I must reserve a contingent right to change course and reverse previous instructions. While fully aware of your assessment of the consequences of such a reversal, I know from experience that failure is more destructive than an appearance of indecision. I would, of course, accept full responsibility for any such change as I must also bear the full responsibility for this operation and its consequences." (Cable, 8/29/63).

In a reply cable, Lodge stated:

> "1. I fully understand that you have the right and responsibility to change course at any time. Of course I will always respect that right.
>
> 2. To be successful, this operation must be essentially a Vietnamese affair with a momentum of its own. Should this happen you may not be able to control it, i.e., the "go signal" may be given by the generals." (Cable, Lodge to President, 8/30/63)

A cable from Saigon dated August 31, 1963, stated:

> "This particular coup is finished . . . . Generals did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces . . . . There is little doubt that GVN (South Vietnamese Government) aware US role and may have considerable detail . . . ." (SAIG 0499, 8/31/63)

Deptel 243 and the VOA broadcast set the tone for later relations between the United States representatives and the generals. Big Minh, who had initial doubts about the strength of American support, grew in confidence.

C. The November 1963 Coup

American dissatisfaction with the Diem regime became increasingly apparent. On September 8, AID Director David Bell, in a television interview, stated that Congress might cut aid to South Vietnam if the Diem government did not change its course

(Pentagon Papers, p. 214). Lodge suggested a study to determine the most effective methods of cutting aid to topple the regime (Pentagon Papers, p. 214). On September 12, with White House approval, Senator Church introduced a resolution in the Senate condemning the South Vietnamese Government for its repressive handling of the Buddhist problem and calling for an end to United States aid unless the oppressive measures were curtailed (Pentagon Papers, pp. 214-215).

In mid-September 1963, two proposals for dealing with Diem were considered by the Administration. The first contemplated increasingly severe pressure to bring Diem in line with American policy; the second involved acquiescing in Diem's actions, recognizing that Diem and Nhu were inseparable, and attempting to salvage as much as possible. It was decided to adopt the first proposal, and to send Secretary of Defense McNamara and General Taylor on a fact-finding mission to Vietnam. (Pentagon Papers, p. 215.)

On October 2, McNamara and Taylor returned to Washington and presented their findings to the National Security Council. Their report confirmed that the military effort was progressing favorably, but warned of the dangers inherent in the political turmoil and recommended bringing pressure against Diem. This pressure would include announcing the withdrawal of 1,000 American troops by the end of the year, ending support for the forces responsible for the pagoda raids, and continuing Lodge's policy of remaining aloof from the regime. The report recommended

against a coup, but suggested that alternative leadership should be identified and cultivated. The recommendations were promptly approved by the President. (Pentagon Papers, pp.215-216)

On October 3 Conein contacted Minh. Minh explained that a coup was being planned, and requested assurances of American support if it were successful. Minh outlined three courses of action, one of which was the assassination of Diem's brothers, Nhu and Can (Conein, p.25; cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).[*] The Acting Chief of the CIA Station, David R. Smith, cabled on October 5 that he had recommended to Lodge that "we do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or a protracted struggle" (Cable, Saigon to Director, 10/5/63).

Assass.

A cable from the Director, CIA to Saigon responded that:

> "(w)e certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of Diem. We believe engaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, et cetera. Consequently believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan."[**]

---

[*] The other courses of action were the encirclement of Saigon by various military units and direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist units.

[**] Colby, who was then Chief, Far Eastern Division, drafted this cable for McCone. Colby testified:

> "Q: So you were on notice as of that date that the Director personally opposed any involvement by the CIA in an assassination?
>
> "Colby: I certainly was." (Colby, p. 57)

McCone testified that he met privately with the President and the Attorney General, taking the position that "our role was to assemble all information on intelligence as to what was going on and to report it to the appropriate authorities, but to not attempt to direct it" (McCone, p. 62). He believed the United States should maintain a "hands off attitude" (McCone, p. 62). McCone testified:

> "I felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning Diem and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on Diem to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if Diem was removed we would have not one coup but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam and it might last several years and indeed it did." (McCone, pp. 62-63.)

McCone stated that he did not discuss assassination with the President, but rather "whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to". He left the meeting believing that the President agreed with his "hands off" recommendation (McCone, pp. 62-63). McCone cabled Smith on October 6:

> "McCone directs that you withdraw recommendation to ambassador (concerning assassination plan) under McCone instructions, as we cannot be in position actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore" (CIA to Saigon, DIR 73661, 10/6/63).

In response, the CIA Station in Saigon cabled headquarters:

> "Action taken as directed. In addition, since DCM Trueheart was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal of recommendation at McCone's instruction was also conveyed to Trueheart. Ambassador Lodge commented that he shares McCone's opinion." (Saigon to CIA, SAIG 1463, 10/7/63)

Conein, the CIA official who dealt directly with the Generals,* testified that he was first told of McCone's response to the assassination alternative by Ambassador Lodge around October 20 (Conein, p. 35). Conein testified (but did not so indicate in his detailed After-Action Report) that he then told General Don that the United States opposed assassination, and that the General responded, "alright, you don't like it, we won't talk about it anymore" (Conein, p. 36).

The United States increased pressure on Diem to mend his ways. On October 17, General Richard Stillwell (MACV J-3) informed Secretary Thuan that the United States was suspending aid to the special forces units responsible for the pagoda raids until they were transferred to the field and placed under Joint General Staff (JGS) command (Pentagon Papers, p. 217). On October 27, Lodge traveled to Dalat with Diem, but did not receive any commitment from Diem to comply with American requests (Pentagon Papers, p. 219).

On October 28, Conein met with General Don, who had received assurance from Lodge that Conein spoke for the United States. Don said that he would make the plans for the coup available to the Ambassador four hours before it took place, and suggested that Lodge not change his plans to go to the United States on October 31. (I.G., C, p. 37; Pentagon Papers, p. 219.)

---

* Conein described his role as follows:

> "My job was to convey the orders from my Ambassador and the instructions from my Ambassador to the people who were planning the coup, to monitor those individuals who were planning the coup, to get as much information so that our government would not be caught with their pants down" (Conein, pp. 38-39).

On October 30, Lodge reported to Washington that he was powerless to stop the coup, and that the matter was entirely in Vietnamese hands. General Harkins disagreed and cabled his opposition to the coup to General Taylor (Pentagon Papers, p. 220). A cable from Bundy to Lodge dated October 30 expressed White House concern and stated that "[w]e cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup" (Cable, Bundy to Lodge, 10/30/63). A subsequent cable on that same day from Washington instructed Lodge to intercede with the Generals to call off the coup if he did not believe it would succeed. The instructions prescribed "strict noninvolvement and somewhat less strict neutrality". (Pentagon Papers, p. 220.)

Late in the morning of November 1, the first units involved in the coup began to deploy around Saigon. The Embassy was given only four minutes' warning before the coup began (MACV cable to Joint Chiefs of Staff 8512, 11/1/63).. An aide to Don told Conein to bring all available money to the Joint General Staff headquarters. Conein brought 3 million piasters (Approximately $42,000) to the headquarters, which was given to Don to procure food for his troops and to pay death benefits to those killed in the coup (Conein, 6/20, p. 72).*

Conein was at the Joint General Staff Headquarters during most of the coup (I.G., C, pp. 41-42). At 1:40 p.m., the Generals proposed that Diem resign immediately, and guaranteed him and Nhu safe departure (Conein After-Action Report, p. 15). The palace was surrounded shortly afterwards, and at 4:30 p.m. the Generals announced the coup on the radio and demanded the resignation of Diem and Nhu. Diem called Lodge and inquired about the United States' position. Lodge responded that the United States did not yet have a view, and expressed concern for Diem's safety (Pentagon Papers, p. 221).

According to Conein's report, Minh told Nhu that if he and Diem did not resign within five minutes, the palace would be bombed. Minh then phoned Diem. Diem refused to talk with him and Minh ordered the bombing of the palace. Troops moved in on the palace, but Diem still refused to capitulate. Minh offered Diem a second chance to surrender half an hour later, telling him that if he refused he would be "blasted off of the earth". Shortly before nightfall an air assault was launched on the Presidential Guard barracks. (Conein After-Action Report, pp. 17-18.)

At 6:20 on the morning of November 2, Diem called General

---

* CIA had apparently considered passing money to the coup leaders in early October (Colby, 6/20, p. 21). On October 29, Lodge calbed that a request for funds should be anticipated (Lodge to State, No. 2040, 10/29/63; and 2063, 10/30/63). Conein received the money on October 24, and kept it in a safe in his house.

Don at the Joint General Staff headquarters and offered to surrender if he and Nhu were given safe conduct to an airport. Shortly afterwards, Diem offered to surrender unconditionally and ordered the Presidential Guard to cease firing. According to Conein, an escort for Diem appeared in front of the palace at 8:00 a.m., but Diem and Nhu were not present (Conein After-Action Report, p. 24).

At 10:30 a.m. the bodies of Diem and Nhu were reported to be at the Joint General Chiefs' headquarters. Conein declined to view the bodies because he feared that doing so might damage United States interests (Conein, p. 57).

The details of Diem's and Nhu's deaths are not known.*

---

* Conein specualted that Diem and Nhu escaped through a tunnel from the palace and fled to a Catholic Church in Chalon. He opined that an informant must have identified them and called the General Staff Headquarters (Conein After-Action Report, p. 23). Another CIA source states that Diem and Nhu had left the palace the previous evening with a Chinese businessman and arrived at the church at 8:00 on the morning of November 2. Ten minutes later they were picked up by soldiers and forced into an army vehicle (Cable, Saigon to State, No. 888). Minh originally told Conein that Diem and Nhu had committed suicide, but Conein doubted that Catholics would have taken their own lives in a church (Conein, p. 56). The Inspector General's Report states that on November 16, 1963, a field-grade officer of unknown reliability gave the CIA two photographs of the bodies of Diem and Nhu in which it appeared their hands were tied behind their backs (I.G., C, pp. 43-44). The source reported that Diem and Nhu had been shot and stabbed while being conveyed to the Joint General Staff headquarters.

None of the informed sources give any indication of direct or indirect involvement of the United States.*

---

* It must be noted that on October 30, 1963, Ambassador Lodge notified Washington that there might be a request by ked leaders for evacuation, and suggested Saipan as a point for evacuation (Saigon Station Cable No. 2036, 10/30/63). Conein was charged with obraining the airplane. Between 6:00 and 7:00 on the morning of November 2, Minh and Don asked Conein to procure an aircraft. Conein relayed the request to David Smith, Acting Chief of Station at the Embassy, who replied that it would not be possible to get an aircraft for the next twenty-four hours, since it would have to be flown from Guam. Conein testified that Smith told him that Diem could be flown only to a country that offered him asylum and that the plane could not land in any other country. There were no aircraft immediately available that had sufficient range to reach a potential country of asylum (Conein, p. 54).

R1440

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

IV. Findings and Conclusions 1

A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves . . . 2

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba 2

2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As A Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States 3

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider 3

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions 3A

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders . . . 4

6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts 5

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves. . 5

1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination 5

a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments. 6

b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them 8

TOP SECRET

Page

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents 10

C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authorization and Control 13

1. The Command and Control System for Assassinations Was Such That the Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization 14

2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized 15

a. Diem 15

b. Schneider 16

c. Trujillo 16

d. Lumumba 17

e. Castro 18

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permissible Course of Action 20

4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To: 26

(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations to Their Superiors; and 26

(b) The Failure of Superiors To Give Precise Orders Regarding The Nature of Permissible Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations . . 26

Page

(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions to Reveal The Plots To Their Superiors Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and Clarity 27

Castro 27

Trujillo 34

Schneider 36

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration. 37

Schneider 38

Lumumba 38

Castro 39

6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary 46

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial . . . 47

(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism" 48

(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions. 49

(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization". 50

(e) The Problems Connected With Creating New Covert Capabilities 50

TOP SECRET

Approved, Drafting Subcommittee,
10/8/75 (Lumumba sections open
to possible reconsideration)

IV. Findings and Conclusions

In evaluating the evidence and arriving at findings and conclusions, the Committee has been guided by the following standards. We believe these standards to be appropriate to the constitutional duty of a Congressional committee.

1. The Committee is not a court. Its primary role is not to determine individual guilt or innocence, but rather to draw upon the experiences of the past to better propose guidance for the future.

2. It is necessary to be cautious in reaching conclusions because of the amount of time that has passed since the events reviewed in this report, the inability of three Presidents and many other key figures to speak for themselves, the conflicting and ambiguous nature of much of the evidence, and the problems in assessing the weight to be given to particular documents and testimony.

3. The Committee has tried to be fair to the persons involved in the events under examination while at the same time responding to a need to understand the facts in sufficient detail to lay a basis for informed recommendations.

With these standards in mind, the Committee has arrived at the following findings and conclusions.

A. Findings Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. Officials of the United States Government Initiated Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro and Patrice Lumumba

The Committee finds that officials of the United States Government initiated and participated in plots to assassinate Patrice Lumumba and Fidel Castro.

The plot to kill Lumumba was conceived in the latter half of 1960 by officials of the United States Government, and quickly advanced to the point of sending poisons to the Congo to be used for the assassination.

The effort to assassinate Castro began in 1960 and continued until 1965. The plans to assassinate Castro using poison cigars, exploding seashells, and a contaminated diving suit did not advance beyond the laboratory phase. The plot involving underworld figures reached the stage of producing poison pills, establishing the contacts necessary to send them into Cuba, procuring potential assassins within Cuba, and, according to one witness, delivering the pills to the island itself. In the 1960 plot involving a Cuban pilot and in the AM/LASH episode from 1963-1965, the CIA gave active support and encouragement to Cubans whose intent to assassinate Castro was known, and provided the means for carrying out the assassination.

2. No Foreign Leaders Were Killed As a Result of Assassination Plots Initiated by Officials of the United States

The poisons intended for use against Patrice Lumumba were never administered to him, and there is no evidence that the United States was in any way involved in Lumumba's death at the hands of his Congolese enemies. The effort to assassinate Castro failed. Do we know how far they went?

3. American Officials Encouraged or Were Privy to Coup Plots Which Resulted in the Death of Trujillo, Diem, and Schneider

American officials clearly desired the overthrow of Trujillo, offered both encouragement and guns to local dissidents attempting his overthrow, and supplied them with pistols and rifles. Knew assass was desired

American officials offered encouragement to the Vietnamese generals who plotted Diem's overthrow, and a CIA official in Vietnam gave the generals money after the coup had begun. However, Diem's assassination was neither desired nor suggested by officials of the United States.

The record reveals that the United States officials offered encouragement to the Chilean dissidents who plotted the kidnapping of General Rene Schneider, but did not desire or encourage his death. Certain high officials did know that the dissidents planned to kidnap General Schneider.

TOP SECRET

NIWC processing
P's

As Director Colby testified before the Committee, the death of a foreign leader is a risk forseeable in any coup attempt. In the cases we have considered, the risk of death was known in varying degrees. It was widely known that the dissidents in the Dominican Republic intended to assassinate Trujillo; the contemplation of coup leaders to assassinate Nhu, President Diem's brother, was communicated to the upper levels of the United States Government; while the CIA and perhaps the White House knew that the coup leaders in Chile planned to kidnap General Schneider, it was not anticipated that he would be killed, although the possibility of his death should have been recognized as a forseeable risk of his kidnapping.

4. The Plots Occurred in a Cold War Atmosphere Perceived to be of Crisis Proportions

The Committee fully appreciates the importance of evaluating the assassination plots in the historical context within which they occurred. In the preface to this report, we described the perception, generally shared within the United States during the depths of the Cold War, that the country faced a monolithic enemy in Communism. That attitude helps explain the assassination plots which we have reviewed, although it does not justify them. Those involved nevertheless appeared to believe they were advancing the best interests of their country.

5. American Officials Had Exaggerated Notions About Their Ability to Control the Actions of Coup Leaders

Running throughout the cases considered in this report was the expectation of American officials that they could control the actions of dissident groups which they were supporting in foreign countries. Events demonstrated that the United States had no such power. This point is graphically demonstrated by cables exchanged shortly before the coup in Vietnam. Ambassador Lodge cabled Washington on October 30, 1963, that he was unable to halt a coup; a cable from Bundy in response stated that "We cannot accept conclusion that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup." The coup took place three days later.

Shortly after the experience of the Bay of Pigs, CIA headquarters requested operatives in the Dominican Republic to tell the dissidents to "turn off" the assassination attempt, because the United States was not prepared to "cope with the aftermath." The dissidents replied that the assassination was their affair and that it could not be turned off to suit the convenience of the United States Government.

6. CIA Officials Made Use of Known Underworld Figures in Assassination Efforts

Officials of the CIA made use of persons associated with the criminal underworld in attempting to achieve the assassination of Fidel Castro. These underworld figures were relied upon because it was believed that they had expertise and contacts that were not available to law-abiding citizens.

Foreign citizens with criminal backgrounds were also used by the CIA in two other cases that we have reviewed. In the development of the Executive Action capability, one foreign national with a criminal background was used to "spot" other members of the European underworld who might be used by the CIA for a variety of purposes, including assassination if the need should arise. In the Lumumba case, two men with criminal backgrounds were used as field operatives by CIA officers in a volatile political situation in the Congo.

B. Conclusions Concerning the Plots Themselves

1. The United States Should Not Engage in Assassination

We cannot condone the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy. Aside from pragmatic arguments against the use of assassination supplied to the Committee by witnesses with extensive experience in covert operations, we find that assassination violates moral precepts fundamental to our way of life.

In addition to considerations, there were several practical reasons advanced for not assassinating foreign leaders. These reasons are discussed in the section of this report recommending a statute making assassination a crime.

a. Distinction Between Targeted Assassinations Instigated by the United States and Support for Dissidents Seeking to Overthrow Local Governments

Two of the five principal cases investigated by the Committee involved plots to kill foreign leaders (Lumumba and Castro) that were instigated by American officials. Three of the cases (Trujillo, Diem, Schneider) involved killings in the course of coup attempts by local dissidents. These latter cases differed in the degree to which assassination was contemplated by the leaders of the coups and the degree to which United States officials motivated the coups.

The Committee concludes that targeted assassinations instigated by the United States must be prohibited.

Coups involve varying degrees of risk of assassination. The possibility of assassination in coup attempts raises questions concerning the propriety of United States involvement in coups, particularly in those where the assassination of a foreign leader is a likely prospect.

This country was created by violent revolt against a regime believed to be tyrannous, and our founding fathers (the local dissidents of that era) received aid from foreign countries. Given that history, we should not today rule out support for dissident groups seeking to overthrow tyrants. But passing beyond that principle, there remain serious questions: for example, whether the national interest of the United States is genuinely involved; whether any such support should be overt rather than covert; what tactics should be used; and how such actions should be authorized and controlled by the coordinate branches of government. The Committee believes that its recommendation on the question of covert actions in support of coups must await the Committee's final report which will be issued after a full review of covert action in general.

b. The Setting In Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Explains, But Does Not Justify Them

The Cold War setting in which the assassination plots took place does not change our view that assassination is unacceptable in our society. In addition to the moral and practical problems discussed elsewhere, we find two principal defects in any contention that the tenor of the period justified the assassination plots:

First, the assassination plots were not necessitated by imminent danger to the United States. Among the cases studied, Castro alone posed a threat to the United States, but then only during the period of the Cuban missile crisis. Plots against Castro's assassination ~~had been planned~~ had begun by the CIA long before that crisis, and was not advanced by policymakers as a possible course of action during the crisis.

Second, we reject absolutely any notion that the United States should justify its actions by the standards of totalitarians. Our standards must be higher, and this difference is what the struggle is all about. Of course, we must defend our democracy. But in defending it, we must resist undermining the very virtues we are defending.

Two documents which have been supplied to the Committee graphically demonstrate attitudes which can lead to tactics that erode and could ultimately destroy the very ideals we must defend.

The first was written in 1954 by a special committee formed to advise the President on covert activities. The United States may, it said, have to adopt tactics "more ruthless than [those] employed by the enemy" in order to meet the threat from hostile nations. The report concluded that "long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered."*

Although those proposals did not involve assassinations, the attitudes underlying them were, as Director Colby testified, indicative of the setting within which the assassination plots were conceived. (Colby, 6/4/75, p. 117)

---

* The full text of the passage is as follows:

> . . . another important requirement is an aggressive covert psychological, political, and paramilitary organization far more effective, more unique, and, if necessary, more ruthless than that employed by the enemy. No one should be permitted to stand in the way of the prompt, efficient, and secure accomplishment of this mission.
>
> The second consideration, it is now clear that we are facing an implacable enemy whose avowed objective is world domination by whatever means at whatever cost. There are no rules in such a game. Hitherto acceptable norms of human conduct do not apply. If the U. S. is to survive, long standing American concepts of American fair play must be reconsidered.

We do not think that traditional American notions of fair play need be abandoned when dealing with our adversaries. It may well be ourselves that we injure most if we adopt tactics "more ruthless than the enemy".

A second document which represents an attitude which we find improper was sent to the Congo in the fall of 1960 when the assassination of Patrice Lumumba was being considered. The chief of CIA's Africa Division recommended a particular agent -- WIROGUE -- because

> He is indeed aware of the precepts of right and wrong, but if he is given an assignment which may be morally wrong in the eyes of the world, but necessary because his case officer ordered him to carry it out, then it is right, and he will dutifully undertake appropriate action for its execution without pangs of conscience. In a word, he can rationalize all actions. (Memo dated / /60; Bissell Tr., 6/11/75, p.)

The Committee finds this philosophy is not in keeping with the ideals of our nation.

2. The United States Should Not Make Use of Underworld Figures for Their Criminal Talents

We conclude that agencies of the United States must not use underworld figures for their criminal talents* in carrying out their operations. In addition to the corrosive effect upon our government,* the use of underworld figures involves the following dangers:

---

*Pending our investigation of the use of informants by the FBI and other agencies, we reserve judgment on the use of known criminals as informants. We are concerned here only with the use of persons known to be actively engaged in criminal pursuits for their expertise in carrying out criminal acts.

a. The use of underworld figures for "dirty business" gives them the power to blackmail the government and to avoid prosecution, for past or future crimes. For example, the figures involved in the Castro assassination operation used their involvement with the CIA to avoid prosecution. The CIA also contemplated attempting to quash criminal charges against QJWIN in a foreign tribunal.

postpone
or
attempt

b. The use of persons experienced in criminal techniques and prone to criminal behavior increases the likelihood that criminal acts will occur. Agents in the field are necessarily given broad discretion. But the risk of improper activities is increased when persons of criminal background are used, particularly when they are selected precisely to take advantage of their criminal skills or contacts.

---

*The corrosive effect of dealing with underworld figures is graphically demonstrated by the fact that Attorney General Robert Kennedy, who had devoted much of his professional life to fighting organized crime, did not issue an order against cooperating with such persons when he learned in May 1961 that the CIA had made use of Sam Giancana in a sensitive operation in Cuba.

In May 1962, when the Attorney General learned that the operation had involved assassination, he did, according to a CIA witness, inform those briefing him that underworld figures should not be used before checking with him first, but failed to direct that they must never be so used.

c. There is the danger that the United States Government will become an unwitting accomplice to criminal acts and that criminal figures will take advantage of their association with the government to advance their own projects and interests.

d. There is a fundamental impropriety in selecting persons because they are skilled at performing deeds which the laws of our society forbid.

The use of underworld figures by the United States Government for their criminal skills raises moral problems comparable to those recognized by Justice Brandeis in a different context five decades ago:

> Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good or for ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the Government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to become a law unto himself. To declare that in the administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means -- to declare that the Government may commit crimes in order to secure the conviction of the private criminal -- would bring terrible retribution. Against this pernicious doctrine this Court should resolutely set its face. Olmstead v. U. S., 277 U.S. 439, 485 (1927)

- use this properly

C. Findings and Conclusions Relating to the Issues of Authorization and Control

In the introduction to this report, we set forth in summary form our major conclusions concerning whether the assassination plots were authorized. The ensuing discussion elaborates and explains those conclusions.

The Committee analyzed the question of authorization for the assassination activities from two perspectives. First, the Committee examined whether officials in policymaking positions authorized or were aware of the assassination activities. Second, the Committee inquired whether the officials responsible for the operational details of the plots perceived that assassination had the approval of their superiors, or at least was the type of activity that their superiors would not disapprove.

No doubt, the CIA's general efforts against the regimes discussed in this report were authorized at the highest levels of the government. But the record leaves serious doubt concerning whether assassination was authorized by the Administrations. Even if the plots were not expressly authorized, it does not follow that the Agency personnel believed they were acting improperly.

1. The Command and Control System for Assassinations Was Such That the Plots Could Have Been Undertaken Without Express Authorization

As emphasized throughout this report, we are unable to draw firm conclusions concerning responsibility for the assassination plots. Even after our long investigation, it is unclear whether the conflicting and inconclusive state of the evidence is due to the system of plausible denial and its attendant doctrines, or whether there were in fact serious shortcomings in the system of authorization which made it possible for assassination efforts to have been undertaken by agencies of the United States Government without express authority from officials outside of those agencies.

Our preeminent finding is that assassination could have been undertaken by an agency of the United States Government without it having been uncontrovertibly clear that there was explicit authorization from the highest level. The command and control system revealed by the record might have made it possible for the CIA to have engaged in assassination activities without express authorization by officials outside the Agency.

The ambiguity and imprecision in the record illustrates the dangers of a "plausible denial" system in which the precise level of authorization may be difficult to ascertain. While there is no evidence that the "plausible denial" system has succeeded in shielding decision makers in the cases considered in this report, the possibility that a system exists which might permit those responsible for authorizing major operations to escape responsibility is disturbing. Responsible government requires that public officials be held accountable for their decisions.

2. Findings Relating to the Level at Which the Plots Were Authorized

a. Diem

We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of Diem and his brother Nhu. Both the DCI and top State Department officials did know, however, that the death of Nhu at least at one point had been contemplated by the coup leaders. To the contrary, when the possibility that the coup leaders were considering assassination was brought to the attention of the DCI, he directed that the United States would have no part in such activity, and this information was relayed to the coup leaders.

b. Schneider

We find that neither the President nor any other official in the United States Government authorized the assassination of General Rene Schneider. The CIA, and perhaps the White House, did know that coup leaders contemplated kidnapping, which, as it turned out, resulted in Schneider's death.

but was the possibility of death raised

c. Trujillo

The Presidents and other senior officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations sought the overthrow of Trujillo and approved general actions to obtain that end.

The DCI and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs knew that the Dominican dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo, but the date at which the dissidents' intent to assassinate was communicated to higher levels of the government responsible for formulating policy is less clear. The record does establish that in the Spring of 1961 senior American officials, including the President, learned that the dissidents intended to assassinate Trujillo and that they desired machine guns for that purpose. The Special Group disapproved passage of those weapons and the President himself, in a telegram, reaffirmed that decision, indicating that the

United States "as [a] matter of general policy cannot condone assassination", although he did state that if the coup succeeded, the United States would support the plotters.

need whole statement

d. Lumumba

The chain of events revealed by the documents and testimony is strong enough to permit a reasonable inference that the assassination plot was authorized by the President. It is absolutely clear that Allen Dulles authorized the plot.

The juxtaposition of discussions concerning "disposing of" Lumumba and taking "straightforward action" against him at NSC and Special Group meetings with Dulles' cable to the Congo, Bissell's representation to Gottlieb about "highest authority", and the delivery of poison to the Congo can be read to support an inference that the President and the Special Group urged the assassination of Lumumba.

Robert Johnson's testimony that he understood the President to have ordered Lumumba's assassination at an NSC meeting does, as he said, offer a "clue" about Presidential authorization which, however, should be read in light of the uncertain record of the meetings Johnson attended and the contrary testimony of others in attendance at the meetings, including the President's national security advisors. The fact that both the Chief of Station and Gottlieb were under the impression that there was Presidential authorization for the assassination of Lumumba is not in itself direct evidence of such authorization because

this impression was derived solely from Gottlieb's meetings with Bissell and Tweedy. Neither Gottlieb nor the Chief of Station had first-hand knowledge of Allen Dulles' statements about Presidential authorization. Richard Bissell assumed that such authorization had been conveyed to him by Dulles, but Bissell had no specific recollection of any event when this occurred.

The evidence leads us to conclude that DDP Bissell and DCI Dulles knew about and authorized the plot to assassinate Lumumba. However, we are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence.

STD?)

e. Castro

There was no + sufficient evidence from which the Committee could conclude that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, or Johnson, their close advisors, or the Special Group authorized the assassination of Castro.

We find that the effort against Castro was clearly authorized through the level of DDP. It is not certain whether Allen Dulles knew about the plots, although Bissell and Edwards were of the opinion that he did, and the credibility of their beliefs is buttressed by the fact that Dulles knew about the Lumumba assassination plot, which was planned and attempted at the time of the early Castro plots. We can find no evidence that McCone was aware of the plots which occurred during his tenure. His DDP, Richard Helms, testified that he never discussed the subject with McCone and was never expressly authorized by anyone to assassinate Castro.

The only suggestion of express Presidential authorization for the plots against Castro was Richard Bissell's opinion that Dulles would have circumlocutiously informed Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy after the assassination had been planned and was underway. The assumptions underlying this opinion are too attenuated for the Committee to adopt it as a finding.

First, it assumes that Dulles himself knew of the plots, a matter which is not certain. Second, it assumes that Dulles went privately to the two Presidents--a course of action which Helms, who had far more covert action experience than Bissell, testified was precisely what the doctrine of plausible denial forbade CIA officials from doing. Third, it necessarily assumes that the Presidents would understand from a "circumlocutious" description that assassination was being discussed.

is that right

The chain of assumptions is far too speculative for the Committee to make findings inplicating Presidents who are not able to speak for themselves. Moreover, it is inconsistent with Bissell's other testimony that "formal and explicit" approval would be required for assassination,* and contrary to the testimony of all the Presidential advisors, the men closest to both Eisenhower and Kennedy.

---

* If the evidence concerning President Eisenhower's order to assassinate Lumumba is correct, it should be weighed against Bissell's testimony concerning circumlocutious briefings of the Presidents in the Castro case. First, the Lumumba case would imply that President Eisenhower and Dulles did discuss such matters bluntly and not circumlocutiously. Second, the Lumumba example indicates that the President would discuss such matters openly in an appropriate forum, and would not need to be approached privately. Third, it can be inferred from Bissell's testimony in the Castro case that if President Eisenhower had told Dulles that he approved of the plot, Dulles would not have told anyone else of that fact. Yet Gottlieb's testimony in the Lumumba case states that he had been told of Presidential authorization for assassination by Bissell, who in turn assumed he was told by Dulles.

Helms and McCone testified that the Presidents under which they served never asked them to consider assassination.

There was no evidence whatsoever that President Johnson knew about or authorized any assassination activity during his Presidency.

3. CIA Officials Involved in the Assassination Operations Perceived Assassination To Have Been A Permissible Course of Action

The CIA officials involved in the targeted assassination attempts testified that they had believed that their activities had been fully authorized.*

In the case of the Lumumba assassination operation, Richard Bissell testified that he had no direct recollection of authorization, but after having reviewed the cables and Special Group minutes, testified that authority must have flowed from Dulles through him to the subordinate levels in the Agency.

In the case of the assassination effort against Castro, Bissell and Sheffield Edwards testified they believed the operation involving underworld figures had been authorized by Dulles when they briefed him shortly after the plot had been initiated. William Harvey testified he believed that the plots "were completely authorized at every appropriate level within and beyond the Agency", although he had "no personal knowledge whatever of the individuals' identities, times, exact words, or channels through which such authority may have passed". Harvey stated that he had been told by Richard Bissell that the effort against Castro had been authorized "from the highest level", and that Harvey had discussed the plots with Richard Helms, his immediate superior. Helms testified that although he had never discussed assassination with his superiors, he believed:

---

* The lower level operatives, such as O'Connell and the AM/LASH case officers, are not discussed in this section, since they had clear orders from their immediate superiors.

> ". . . that in these actions we were taking against Cuba and against Fidel Castro's government in Cuba, that they were what we had been asked to do. . . . In other words we had been asked to get rid of Castro and . . . there were no limitations put on the means, and we felt we were acting well within the guidelines that we understood to be in play at this particular time.

The evidence points to a disturbing situation. Agency officials perceived the effort to assassinate Castro to have been within the parameters of permissible action, but Administration officials (including McCone) responsible for formulating policy were not aware of the effort and testified that they ~~expressly~~ did not authorize it. The explanation may lie in the fact that orders concerning overthrowing the Castro regime were stated in broad terms that were subject to differing interpretations by those responsible for carrying out those orders.

The various Presidents and their senior advisors strongly opposed the regimes of Castro and Trujillo, the accession to power of Allende, and the potential influence of Patrice Lumumba. Orders concerning action against those foreign leaders were given in vigorous language. For example, President Nixon's orders to prevent Allende from assuming power left Helms feeling that "if I ever carried a marshall's baton in my knapsack out of the oval office, it was that day." Similarly, General Lansdale described the Mongoose effort against Cuba as "a combat situation", and Attorney General Kennedy emphasized that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carries top priority". Helms testified that the pressure to "get rid of [Castro and the Castro regime]" was intense, and Bissell testified that he had been ordered to "get off your ass about Cuba".

It is possible that there was a failure of communication between policymakers and the agency personnel who were experienced in secret, and often violent, action. Although policymakers testified that assassination was not intended by such words as "get rid of Castro", some of their subordinates in the Agency testified that they perceived that assassination was desired and that they should proceed without troubling their superiors.

The 1967 Inspector General's Report on assassinations appropriately observed:

> The point is that of frequent resort to synechdoche -- the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as "disposing of Castro", which may be read in the narrow, literal sense of assassinating him, when it is intended that it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging the Castro regime. Reversing the coin, we find people speaking vaguely of "doing something about Castro" when it is clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing him. In a situation wherein those speaking may not have actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually meant, they should not be surprised if their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended.

Differing perceptions between superiors and their subordinates were graphically illustrated in the Castro context.* McCone, in a memorandum dated April 14, 1967, reflected as follows:

> Through the years the Cuban problem was discussed in terms such as "dispose of Castro", "remove Castro", "knock off Castro", etc., and this meant the overthrow of the Communist government in Cuba and the replacing of it with a democratic regime. Terms such as the above appear in many working papers, memoranda for the record, etc., and, as stated, all refer to a change in the Cuban government.

---

* "Senator Mathias: Let me draw an example from history. When Thomas A'Beckett was proving to be an annoyance, as Castro, the King said, 'who will rid me of this turbulent priest?'. He didn't say, 'go out and murder him'. He said, 'who will rid me of this man', and let it go at that.

"Mr. Helms: That is a warming reference to the problem.

"Senator Mathias: You feel that spans the generations and the centuries?

"Mr. Helms: I think it does, sir.

"Senator Mathias: And that is typical of the kind of thing which might be said, which might be taken by the

Helms, who had considerable experience as a covert operator, gave precisely the opposite meaning to the same words, interpreting them as conveying authority for assassination.

Helms repeatedly testified that he felt that explicit authorization was unnecessary for the assassination of Castro in the early 1960's, but he said he did not construe the intense pressure from President Nixon in 1970 as providing authority to assassinate anyone. As Helms testified, the difference was not that the pressure to prevent Allende from assuming office was any less than the pressure to remove the Castro regime, but rather that "I had already made up my mind that we weren't going to have any of that business when I was Director."

Certain CIA contemporaries of Helms who were subjected to similar pressures in the Castro case rejected the thesis that implicit authority to assassinate Castro derived from the strong language of the policymakers. Bissell testified that he had believed that "formal and explicit approval" would be required for assassination, and McManus testified

---

director or by anybody else as presidential authorization to go forward?

"Mr. Helms: That is right. But in answer to that, I realize that one sort of grows up in tradition of the time and I think that any of us would have found it very difficult to discuss assassinations with a President of the U.S. I just think we all had the feeling that we were hired out to keep those things out of the oval office."

that "it never occurred to me" that the vigorous words of the Attorney General could be taken as authorizing assassination. The differing perceptions may have resulted from their different backgrounds and training. Neither Bissell (an academician whose Agency career for the six years before he became DDP had been in the field of technology) nor McManus (who had concentrated on intelligence and staff work) were experienced in covert operations.*

The perception of certain Agency officials that assassination was within the range of permissible activity was reinforced by the continuing approval of violent covert actions against Cuba that were sanctioned at the Presidential level and by the failure of the successive administrations to make clear that assassination was not permissible. This point is one of the subjects considered in the next section.

---

* Of course, this analysis cannot be carried too far. In the Lumumba case, for example, Johnson and Dillon, who were Administration officials with no covert operation experience, construed remarks as urging or permitting assassination, while other persons who were not in the Agency did not so interpret them.

4. The Failure In Communication Between Agency Officials In Charge Of The Assassination Operations And Their Superiors In The Agency And In The Administration Was Due To:

(a) The Failure of Subordinates To Disclose The Operations To Their Superiors; and

(b) The Failure of Superiors to Give Precise Orders Regarding the Nature of Permissable Operations and to Make Clear That Assassination Was Precluded in the Climate of Violence Engendered by the Aggressive Covert Actions Sanctioned by the Administrations.

While we cannot find that officials responsible for making policy decisions knew about or authorized the assassination attempts (with the possible exception of the Lumumba case), Agency operatives at least through the level of DDP nevertheless perceived assassination to have been permissible. This failure in communication was inexcusable in light of the gravity of assassination. The Committee finds that the failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors was reprehensible, and that the reasons that they offered for having neglected to inform their superiors are unacceptable. The Committee further finds that Administration officials failed to be sufficiently precise in their directions to the Agency and that their attitude toward the possibility of assassination was ambiguous in the context of the violence of other activities that they did authorize. → 3) DIDN'T FOLLOW-UP SUFFICIENTLY

(a) Agency Officials Failed On Several Occasions To Reveal The Plots To Their Superiors, Or To Do So With Sufficient Detail and Clarity

Several of the cases considered in this report raise questions concerning whether officials of the CIA sufficiently informed their superiors in the Agency or officials outside the Agency about their activities.

Castro

The failure of Agency officials to inform their superiors of the assassination efforts against Castro is particularly troubling.

Richard Bissell testified that he and Sheffield Edwards told Allen Dulles only "circumlocutiously" and only after the project had begun about the operation which used members of the underworld. Both Bissell and his successor as DDP, Richard Helms, testified that they never discussed the operation with John McCone or any officials outside the CIA. The two officials directly responsible for the operation--Edwards and William Harvey--testified that they never discussed the operation with McCone or any Government official above the level of DDP. McCone testified that he was never consulted about the operation, and that Dulles never briefed him on its existence. On the basis of the testimony and documentary evidence before the Committee, it is uncertain whether Dulles

Should Harvey have told

was ever made aware of the true nature of the underworld operation, and virtually certain that it continued into McCone's term without his or the Administration's knowledge or approval.

On the occasions when Richard Bissell had the opportunity to inform his superiors about the assassination effort against Castro, he either failed to explicitly inform them or misled them.

Bissell testified that he and Edwards told Dulles and Cabell about the assassination operation using underworld figures, but that they did so "circumlocutiously", and then only after contact had been made with the underworld and a price had been offered for Castro's death.

Bissell further testified that he never raised the issue of assassination with officials of either the Eisenhower or Kennedy Administration. His reason was that since he was under Dulles in the chain of command, he would normally have had no duty to discuss the matter with the Presidents or other Administration officials, and that he assumed that Dulles would have circumlocutiously spoken with Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy about the operation. These reasons are insufficient. It was inexcusable to withhold such information from those responsible for formulating policy on the unverified assumption that they might have been circumlocutiously informed by Dulles, who himself had not been straight-forwardly told about the operation.*

The failure to either inform those officials or to make certain that they had been informed by Dulles was particularly reprehensible in light of the fact that there were many occasions on which Bissell should have informed them, and his failure to do so was misleading. In the first weeks of the Kennedy Administration, Bissell met with Bundy and discussed the development of an assassination capability within CIA--executive action. But Bissell did not mention that an actual assassination attempt was underway. Bissell appeared before the Taylor-Kennedy Board of Inquiry which was formed to report to the President on the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban situation, but testified that he did not inform the Commission of the assassination operation. As chief of the CIA directorate concerned with clandestine operations and the Bay of Pigs, Bissell frequently met with officials in the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations to discuss Cuban operations, and his advice was frequently sought. He [illegible] that did not tell them that the CIA had undertaken an effort to assassinate Castro, and did not ask if they favored proceeding with the effort. He was present at the meeting with Dulles and President Kennedy at which the new President was briefed on covert action in Cuba, but neither Dulles nor Bissell mentioned the assassination operation that was underway.

---

* Even assuming that Bissell correctly perceived that Dulles understood the nature of the operation, it was inexcusable for Bissell not to have briefed Dulles in plain language. Further, even if one accepts Bissell's assumption that Dulles told the Presidents, they would have been told too late, because Bissell "guessed" they would have been told that the operation "had been planned and was being attempted".

The failures to make forthright disclosures to policymakers continued during the time that Richard Helms was DDP. Helms' failure to inform McCone about the underworld operation when it was reactivated under Harvey and poison pills were sent to Cuba was a grave error in judgment, and Helms' excuses are unpersuasive. In May of 1962, the Attorney General was told that the CIA's involvement in an assassination plot had terminated with the Bay of Pigs. Not only did Edwards, who had briefed the Attorney General, know that the operation had not been terminated, but Helms did not inform the Attorney General that the operation was still active when he learned that the Attorney General had been misled. Helms did not inform McCone of the plot until August 1962, and did so then in a manner which indicated that the plot had been terminated before McCone became Director. Helms' denial that AM/LASH had been involved in an assassination attempt in response to Secretary of State Rusk's inquiries was, as Helms testified, "not truthful".

When Helms briefed President Johnson on the Castro plots, he apparently described the activities that had occurred during prior administrations but did not describe the AM/LASH operation which had continued until 1965. Helms also failed to inform the Warren Commission of the plots because the precise question was not asked. FN

Helms told the Committee that he had never raised the assassination operation with McCone or Kennedy Administration officials because he had assumed that the project had been previously authorized, and that the aggressive character of the Kennedy Administration's program against the Castro regime made assassination permissible even in the absence of an express instruction. He added that he had never been convinced that the operation would succeed, and that he would have told McCone about it if he had ever believed that it would "go anyplace".

Helms' reasons for not having told his superiors about the assassination effort are unacceptable; indeed, many of them were reasons why he should have sought express authority. As Helms himself testified, assassination was of a high order of sensitivity. Administration policymakers, supported by intelligence estimates furnished by the Agency, had emphasized on several occasions that successors to Castro might be worse than Castro himself. In addition, the Special Group Augmented required that plans for covert actions against Cuba be submitted in detail for its approval. Although the Administration was exerting intense pressure on the CIA to do something about Castro and the Castro regime, it was a serious error to have

Mc Cone / Dulles re Assass

undertaken so drastic an operation without obtaining full and equivocal permission.

William Harvey, the officer in charge of the CIA's attempt using underworld figures to assassinate Castro, testified that he never discussed the plot with McCone or officials of the Kennedy Administration because he believed that it had been fully authorized by the previous Director, because he was uncertain whether it had a chance of succeeding, and because he believed that it was Helms', not his, duty to inform higher authorities.

Nonetheless, the Committee believes there were occasions on which it was incumbent on Harvey to have disclosed the assassination operation. As head of Task Force W, the branch of the CIA responsible for covert operations in Cuba, Harvey reported directly to General Lansdale and the Special Group including McCone Augmented. The Special Group Augmented had made known that covert operations in Cuba should be first approved by it, both by explicit instruction and by its practice that particular operations be submitted in "nauseating detail". Yet Harvey did not inform either General Lansdale or the Special Group Augmented of the assassination operation, either when he was explicitly requested to report to McCone, General Taylor, and the Special Group on his activities in Miami in April 1962, or when the subject of assassination was raised in the August 1962 meeting and McCone voiced his disapproval.

The Committee finds that the reasons advanced for not having informed those responsible for formulating policy about the assassination operation were inadequate, misleading, and inconsistent. Some officials viewed assassination as too important and sensitive to discuss with superiors, while others considered it not sufficiently important. Harvey testified that it was premature to tell McCone about the underworld operation in April 1962, because it was not sufficiently advanced, but too late to tell him about it in August 1962, since by that time he had decided to terminate it. On other occasions, officials thought disclosure was someone else's responsibility; Bissell said he thought it was up to Dulles, Harvey believed it was up to Helms, but Helms remarked that Harvey "kept Phase II pretty much in his back pocket".

relationship
w/ point

The Committee concludes that the failure clearly to inform policymakers of the assassination effort against Castro was grossly improper. The Committee believes that it should be incumbent upon the DDP to report such a sensitive operation to his superior, the DCI, no matter how grave his doubts might be about the possible outcome of the operation. It follows that the DCI has the same duty to accurately inform his superiors.

Trujillo

In the Trujillo case there were several instances in which it appears that policymakers were not given sufficient information, or were not informed in a timely fashion.

At a meeting on December 29, 1960, Bissell presented a plan to the Special Group for supporting Dominican exile groups and local dissidents, and stated that the plan would not bring down the regime without "some decisive stroke against Trujillo himself". At a meeting on January 12, 1961, the Special Group authorized the passage of "limited supplies of small arms and other material" to Dominican dissidents under certain conditions. At this time, the fact that the dissidents had been contemplating the assassination of Trujillo had been known in the State Department at the level of the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, and by senior officials of the CIA, including the DCI. Yet the memorandum supplied to Under Secretary Merchant, which was said to have been the basis upon which the Special Group agreed to the "limited supply" of small arms, did not mention assassination. To the contrary, it spoke of "sabotage potential" and stated that there "would be no thought of toppling the [government] by any such minor measure [as the supplying of small arms]."

On February 17, 1961, Richard Bissell sent a memorandum on the Dominican Republic to McGeorge Bundy. Bissell knew that the dissidents planned to assassinate Trujillo, but his memorandum did not mention assassination. It indicated that the dissidents' "plan of action" included arms for 300 men. Those involved agreed that support of this nature suggested a non-targeted paramilitary plan, not an assassination.

The passage of the carbines was approved by CIA headquarters on March 31, 1961. The State Department was apparently unaware of this passage for several weeks. The pouching of the machine guns was not disclosed outside the CIA.

The State Department official from whom the CIA sought permission to pass the machine guns stated that on "cross examination" the CIA official conceded that the purpose was assassination. The CIA official then agreed the United States should have nothing to do with assassination plots "anywhere, anytime", even though the previous day he and Bissell had signed a draft cable permitting the passage of the machine guns for use in connection with a planned assassination.

Schneider

The issue here is not whether the objectives of the CIA were contrary to those of the Administration. It is clear that President Nixon desired to prevent Allende from assuming office, even if that required fomenting and supporting a coup in Chile. Nor did White House officials suggest that tactics employed (including as a first step to kidnapping General Schneider) would have been unacceptable as a matter principle. Rather, the issue posed is whether White House officials were consulted, and thus given an opportunity to weigh such matters as risk and likelihood of success, and to apply policy-making judgments to particular tactics. The record indicates that up to October 15 they were; after October 15 there is some doubt.

The documentary record with respect to the disputed post-October 15 period gives rise to conflicting inferences. On the one hand, Karamessines' calendar shows existence of at least one White House contact in the critical period prior to the kidnapping of General Schneider on October 22. However, the absence of any substantive memoranda in CIA files--when contrasted with several such memoranda describing contacts with the White House between September 15 and October 15--may suggest a lack of significant communication on the part of the CIA as well as a lack of careful supervision on the part of the White House.

The standards applied within the CIA itself suggest a view that action which the Committee believes called for top-level policy discussion and decision was thought of as permissible, without any further consultation, on the basis of the initial instruction to prevent Allende from assuming power. Machine guns were sent to Chile and delivered to military figures there on the authority of junior CIA officers without consultation even with the CIA officer in charge of the program. We find no suggestion of bad faith in the action of the junior officers. But it necessarily establishes that there was no advance permission from outside the CIA for the passage of machine guns. And it also suggests an attitude within the CIA toward consultation which was unduly lax. Further, this case demonstrated the problems inherent in giving an agency a "blank check" to engage in covert operations without specifying which actions are and are not permissible, and without adequately supervising and monitoring these activities once begun.

(b) On Occasion, Administration Officials Gave Vague Instructions to Subordinates and Failed to Make Sufficiently Clear That Assassination Should Be Excluded From Consideration.

While we cannot find that high Administration officials expressly approved of the assassination attempts, we have noted that certain agency officials nevertheless perceived assassination to have been authorized. Although those officials were remiss in not seeking express authorization for their activities, their superiors were also at fault for giving vague instructions and for not explicitly ruling out assassination. No written order prohibiting assassination was issued until 1972, and that order was an internal CIA directive issued by Director Helms.

maybe didn't rule it out

Schneider

As explained above, there is no evidence that assassination was ever proposed as a method of carrying out the Presidential order to prevent Allende from assuming office. The Committee believes, however, that the granting of carte blanche authority to the CIA by the Executive in this case may have contributed to the tragic and unintended death of General Schneider. This was also partially due to impositing an impractical task to be accomplished within an unreasonably short time. Apart from the question of whether any intervention was justified under the circumstances of this case, the committee believes that the Executive in any event should have defined the limits of permissible action.

Lumumba

We are unable to make a finding that President Eisenhower intentionally authorized an assassination effort against Lumumba because of the lack of absolute certainty in the evidence. However, it appears that the strong language used in discussions at the Special Group and NSC, as reflected in minutes of relevant meetings, led Dulles to believe that assassination was desired. The minutes contain language concerning the need to "dispose of" Lumumba, an "extremely strong feeling about the necessity for straight forward action", and a refusal to rule out any activity that might contribute to "getting rid of" Lumumba.

Castro

The effort to assassinate Fidel Castro took place in an atmosphere of extreme pressure by Eisenhower and Kennedy Administration officials to discredit and overthrow the Castro regime. Richard Helms recalled that:

> "I remember vividly [that the pressure] was very intense. And therefore, when you go into the record, you find a lot of nutty schemes there and those nutty schemes were borne of the intensity of the pressure. And we were quite frustrated."

Bissell recalled that:

> "During that entire period, the administration was extremely sensitive about the defeat that had been afflicted, as they felt, on the U.S. at the Bay of Pigs, and were pursuing every possible means of getting rid of Castro."

Another witness, Samuel Halpern, stated that sometime in the Fall of 1961 Bissell was

> "chewed out in the Cabinet Room in the White House by both the President and the Attorney General for, as he put it, sitting on his ass and not doing anything about getting rid of Castro and the Castro Regime."

General Lansdale informed the agencies cooperating in Operation

Mongoose that "you're in a combat situation where we have been given full command". Secretary of Defense McNamara confirmed that "we were hysterical about Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs and thereafter".

Many of the plans that were discussed and often approved contemplated violent action against Cuba. The operation which resulted in the Bay of Pigs was a major paramilitary onslaught that had the approval of the highest government officials, including the two Presidents. Thereafter, Attorney General Kennedy vehemently exhorted the Special Group Augmented that "a solution to the Cuban problem today carried top priority . . . no time, money, effort--or manpower is to be spared."* Subsequently, Operation Mongoose involved propaganda and sabotage operations aimed toward spurring a revolt of the Cuban people against Castro. Measures that were considered by the top policymakers included incapacitating sugar workers during harvest season by the use of chemicals; blowing up bridges and production plants; sabotaging merchandise in third countries--even those allied with the United States--prior to its delivery to Cuba; and arming insurgents on the island. Programs undertaken at the urging of the Administration included intensive efforts to recruit and arm dissidents within Cuba and raids on plants, mines, and harbors.

---

* The Attorney General himself took a personal interest in the recruitment and development of assets within Cuba, on occasion recommending Cubans to the CIA as possible recruits and meeting in Washington and Florida with Cuban exiles active in the covert war against the Castro government.

Discussions at the Special Group and NSC meetings might well have contributed to the perception of some CIA officials that assassination was a permissible tool in the effort to overthrow the Castro regime. At a Special Group meeting in November 1960, Under Secretary Merchant inquired whether any planning had been undertaken for "direct, positive action" against Che Guevarra, Raul and Fidel Castro. Cabell replied that such a capability did not exist, but might well have left the meeting with the impression that assassination was not out of bounds. One phase of Lansdale's plans, which was submitted to the Special Group in January 1962, aimed at inducing "open revolt and overthrow of the Communist regime", and included in the final phase an "attack on the cadre of the regime, including key leaders". The proposal stated that "this should be a 'Special Target" operation . . . . Gangster elements might provide the best recruitment potential against police. . ." Several minutes from Special Group meetings contain language such as "possible removal of Castro from the Cuban scene". Although Lansdale's proposal was shelved, the type of aggressive action contemplated was not ruled out.

On several occasions, the subject of assassination was discussed in the presence of senior Administration officials. While those officials never consented to actual assassination efforts, they also failed to indicate that assassination was impermissible as a matter of principle. did they believe it

In early 1961, McGeorge Bundy was informed of a CIA project described as the development of a capability to assassinate.* Bundy raised no objection and, according to Bissell, may have been more affirmative. Although Bissell stated that he did not infer authorization from Bundy's remarks for the underworld plot against Castro that was then underway, the fact that he believed that the development of an assassination capability had been approved by the White House (which he subsequently told to Harvey) may well have contributed to the general perception that assassination was not prohibited.

Documents indicate that in May 1962, Attorney General Kennedy was told that the CIA had sought to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs. According to the CIA officials present at the briefing, the Attorney General indicated his displeasure about the lack of consultation on the impropriety of the attempt itself.* There is no evidence that the Attorney General told the CIA that it must not engage in assassination plots.

---

* Bundy, who was National Security Advisor to the President, had an obligation to tell the President of such a grave matter, even though it was only a discussion of a capability to assassinate. His failure to do so was a serious error.

At a meeting of the Special Group Augmented in August 1962, well after the assassination efforts were underway, Robert McNamara is said to have raised the question of whether the assassination of Cuban leaders should be explored, and General Lansdale issued an action memorandum assigning the CIA the task of preparing contingency plans for the assassination of Cuban leaders. While McCone testified that he had immediately made it clear that assassination was not to be discussed or condoned, Harvey's testimony and documents which he wrote after the event indicate that Harvey may have been confused over whether McCone had objected to the use of assassination, or whether he was only concerned that the subject not be put in writing. In any event, McCone went no further. He issued no general order banning consideration of assassination within the Agency.

---

* Documents show that the Attorney General, Robert Kennedy, learned in May of 1961 that the CIA had used underworld figures in an operation against Cuba. The documentary record further reflects that the Attorney General was not told that the operation had involved assassination efforts until May of 1962, and that the operation was then described to him as having been terminated in May 1961. There is no evidence that the Attorney General suspected the true nature of the operation until that briefing, or that he learned that it had not in fact been terminated. While it is curious that the Attorney General would not have inquired further into the nature of the operation when he discovered that Sam Giancana had been involved in it, there is no evidence that he did.

One of the programs forwarded to General Lansdale by the Defense Department in the Mongoose program was entitled "Operation Bounty" and envisioned dropping leaflets in Cuba offering rewards for the assassination of Government leaders. Although the plan was vetoed by Lansdale, it indicates that persons in agencies other than the CIA perceived that assassination might be permissible.

While the ambivalence of Administration officials does not excuse the misleading conduct by Agency officials or justify their failure to seek explicit permission, it displayed an insufficient concern about assassination which may have contributed to the perception that assassination was an acceptable tactic in accomplishing the Government's general objectives.

With the exception of the tight guidelines issued by the Special Group Augmented concerning Operation Mongoose, precise limitations were never imposed on the CIA requiring prior permission for the details of other proposed covert operations against Cuba. No general policy banning assassination was promulgated until Helms' intra-agency order in 1972. In light of the number of times in which the subject of assassination arose, Administration officials were remiss in not explicitly forbidding such activity.

procedure not limitation

* * * * * *

The Committee notes that many of the occasions on which CIA officials should have informed their superiors of the assassination efforts but failed to do so, or did so in a misleading manner, were also occasions on which Administration officials paradoxically may have reinforced the perception that assassination was permissible.

For example, when Bissell spoke with Bundy about an executive action capability, Bissell failed to indicate that an actual assassination operation was underway, but Bundy failed to rule out assassination as a tactic.

In May of 1962 the Attorney General was misleadingly told about the effort to assassinate Castro prior to the Bay of Pigs, but not about the operation that was then going on. The Attorney General, however, did not state that assassination was improper.

When a senior administration official raised the question of whether assassination should be explored at a Special Group meeting, the assassination operation should have been revealed, but a firm written order against engaging in assassination should also have been issued by McCone if, as he testified, he had exhibited strong aversion to assassination.

6. Practices Current at the Time in Which the Assassination Plots Occurred Were Revealed by the Record to Create the Risk of Confusion, Rashness, and Irresponsibility in the Very Areas Where Clarity and Sober Judgment Was Most Necessary.

Various witnesses described elements of the system within which the assassination plots were conceived. The Committee is disturbed by the custom that permitted the most sensitive matters to be presented to the highest levels of Government with the least clarity. We find this disturbing, and view the following concepts as particularly dangerous:

(1) The extension of the doctrine of "plausible denial" beyond its intended purpose of hiding the involvement of the United States from other countries to an effort to shield higher officials from knowledge, and hence, responsibility for certain operations.

but conclusion to concept

(2) The use of circumlocution or euphemism to describe serious matters--such as assassination--when precise meanings ought to be made clear.

(3) The theory that general approval of broad covert action programs is sufficient to justify specific actions such as assassination or the passage of weapons.

(4) The theory that authority granted, or assumed to be granted, by one director or one administration could be presumed to continue without the necessity for reaffirming the authority with successor officials.

(5) The creation of capabilities without careful review and authorization by policymakers, and the risk that such capabilities might be used without further authorization.

(a) The Danger Inherent in Overextending the Doctrine of Plausible Denial

The original concept of plausible denial envisioned implementing covert actions in a manner calculated to conceal American involvement if the actions were exposed. The doctrine was at times a delusion and at times a snare. It was naive for policymakers to assume that sponsorship of actions as big as the Bay of Pigs invasion could be concealed. The Committee's inquiry into assassination and the public disclosures which preceded it demonstrate that when the United States resorted to cloak and dagger tactics, its hand was ultimately exposed. In addition, the likelihood of reckless action is substantially increased when policymakers believe that their decisions will never be revealed.

Whatever can be said in defense of the original purpose of plausible denial--a purpose which intends to conceal U.S. involvement from the outside world--the extension of the doctrine to the internal decision-making process of the Government is absurd. Any theory which, as a matter of doctrine, places elected officials on the periphery of the decision-making process is an invitation to error, an abdication of responsibility, and a perversion of democratic government.

doesn't necessarily

(b) The Dangers of Using "Circumlocution" and "Euphemism"

According to Richard Bissell, the extension of plausible denial to internal decisionmaking required the use of circumlocution and euphemism in speaking with Presidents and other senior officials.

Explaining this concept only heightens its absurdity. On the one hand, it assumes that senior officials should be shielded from the truth to enable them to deny knowledge if the truth comes out. On the other hand, the concept assumes that senior officials must be told enough, by way of double talk, to grasp the subject. As a consequence, the theory fails to accomplish its objective and only increases the risk of misunderstanding. Subordinate officials should describe their proposals in clear, precise, and brutally frank language; busy superiors are entitled to and should demand no less.

Euphemism may actually have been preferred--not because of plausible denial--but because the persons involved could not bring themselves to state in plain language what they intended to do and may have, in some instances, assumed, rightly or wrongly, that the listening superiors did not want the issue squarely placed before them. Assassinate, murder and kill are words many people do not want to speak or hear. They describe acts which should not even be proposed, let alone plotted. Failing to call dirty business by its rightful name may have increased the risk of dirty business being done.

(c) The Danger of Generalized Instructions.

Permitting specific acts to be taken on the basis of general approvals of broad strategies (e.g., keep Allende from assuming office, get rid of the Castro regime) blurs responsibility and accountability. Worse still, it increases the danger that subordinates may take steps which would have been disapproved if the policymakers had been informed. A further danger is that policymakers might intentionally use loose general instructions to evade responsibility for embarrassing activities.

In either event, we find that the gap between the general policy objectives and the specific actions undertaken to achieve them was far too wide.

It is important that policymakers review the manner in which their directives are implemented, particularly when the activities are sensitive, secret, and immune from public scrutiny.

(d) The Danger of "Floating Authorization"

One justification advanced by Richard Helms and William Harvey for not informing John McCone about the use of underworld figures to assassinate Fidel Castro was their assertion that the project had already been approved by McCone's predecessor, Allen Dulles, and that further authorization was unnecessary, at least until the operation had reached a more advanced stage.

Similarly, most of the actions taken in the Trujillo case during the early months of the Kennedy Administration were authorized by the Special Group on January 12, 1961, at the end of the Eisenhower Administration.

The idea that authority might continue from one administration or director to the next and that there is no duty to reaffirm authority with successors inhibits responsible decisionmaking. Circumstances may change or judgments differ. New officials should be given the opportunity to review significant programs.

(e) The Problems Connected with Creating New Covert Capabilities

The development of a new capability raises numerous problems. Having a capability to engage in certain covert activity increases the probability that it will occur, since the capability represents a tool that is available for use. There is the further danger that authorizing a capability may be misunderstood as authorizing its use without need for obtaining explicit authorization.

Of course, an assassination capability should never have been created in the first place.

Approved by
Drafting
Subcommittee
10/8/75
(with possible reservation
as to language of statute)

V. RECOMMENDATIONS

During our long investigation of assassination, a number of vital issues came into sharp focus.

Above all, stood the question of assassination. Our recommendations on other issues should await the completion of our continuing investigations and our final report. But we need no more information to convince us that a flat ban against assassination should be written into law.

We condemn assassination and reject it as an instrument of American policy. Surprisingly, at present there is no statute making it a crime to assassinate a foreign official outside the United States. Hence, for the reasons set forth below, the Committee recommends the prompt enactment of a statute making it a Federal crime to commit or attempt an assassination, or to conspire to do so.

A. General agreement that the United States must not engage in assassination. Our view that assassination has no place in America's arsenal is shared by the Administration.

President Ford, in the same statement in which he asked this Committee to deal with the assassination issue, stated:

> I am opposed to political assassination. This administration has not and will not use such means as instruments of national policy. Presidential Press Conference, June 9, 1975, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. II, No. 24, p. 611.

The witnesses we examined uniformly condemned assassination. They denounced it as immoral, described it as impractical, and reminded us that an open society, most of all, runs the risk of the assassination of its own leaders. As President Kennedy was reported to have said: "we can't get into that kind of thing, or we would all be targets." (Goodwin 7/18/75, p. 4)

The current CIA Director and his two predecessors testified emphatically that assassination should be banned. Thus, Colby said:

> With respect to assassination, my position is clear. I just think it is wrong. And I have said so and made it very clear to my subordinates. (5/21/75, p. 89)

Colby's predecessor, Helms, although himself involved in an earlier plot, said he had concluded assassination should be ruled out for both moral and practical reasons:

> As a result of my experiences through the years, when I became Director I had made up my mind that this option...of killing foreign leaders, was something that I did not want to happen on my watch. My reasons for this were these:
>
> There are not only moral reasons but there are also some other rather practical reasons.
>
> It is almost impossible in a democracy to keep anything like that secret.... Somebody would go to a Congressman, his Senator, he might go to a newspaper man, whatever the case may be, but it just is not a practical alternative, it seems to me, in our society.
>
> Then there is another consideration...if you are going to try by this kind of means to remove a foreign leader, then who is going to take his place running that country, and are you essentially better off as a matter of practice when it is over than you were before? And I can give you I think a very solid example of this which happened in Vietnam when President Diem was eliminated from the scene. We then had a revolving door of prime ministers after that for quite some period of tiem, during which the Vietnamese Government at a time in its history when it should have been strong was nothing but a caretaker government....In other words, that whole exercise turned out to the disadvantage of the United States.
>
> ...there is no sense in my sitting here with all the experience I have had and not sharing with the Committee my feelings this day. It isn't because I have lost my cool, or because I have lost my guts, it simply is because I don't think it is a viable option in the United States of America these days.
>
> Chairman Church. Doesn't it also follow, Mr. Helms -- I agree with what you have said fully -- but doesn't it also follow on the practical side, apart from the moral side, that since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large? I don't know to what extent the Russians

> involved themselves in political assassinations, but under their system they at least have a better prospect of keeping it concealed. Since we do like a free society and since these secrets are going to come out in due course, the revelation will then do serious injury to the good name and reputation of the United States.
>
> Would you agree with that?
>
> Mr. Helms. Yes, I would.
>
> The Chairman. And finally, if we were to reserve to ourselves the prerogative to assassinate foreign leaders, we may invite reciprocal action from foreign governments who assume that if it's our prerogative to do so, it is their prerogative as well, and that is another danger that we at least invite with this kind of action, wouldn't you agree?
>
> Mr. Helms. Yes, sir. (6/13/75, pp. 76-78)

Similarly, John McCone said he was opposed to assassinations because:

> I didn't think it was proper from the standpoint of the U.S. Government and the Central Intelligence Agency. (6/6/75, p. 15)

B. CIA Directives Banning Assassination. In 1972 and 1973, Helms and then Colby issued internal CIA orders banning assassination. In his order, Helms said:

> It has recently again been alleged in the press that CIA engages in assassination. As you are well aware, this is not the case, and Agency policy has long been clear on this issue. To underline it, however, I direct that no such activity or operation be undertaken, assisted or suggested by any of our personnel....(Memorandum, Helms to Deputy Directors, 3/6/72)

Colby, in one of a series of orders in August 1973 arising out of the Agency's own review of prior "questionable activity," issued an order which stated:

> CIA will not engage in assassination nor induce, assist or suggest to others that assassination be employed. (Memorandum, Colby to Deputy Directors, 8/29/73)

C. The need for a statute. Commendable and welcome as they are, these CIA directives are not sufficient. Administrations change, CIA directors change, and someday in the future what was tried in the past may once again become a temptation. Assassination plots did happen. It would be irresponsible for us not to do all that we can do to prevent their happening again. Laws express our society's values; they deter those who might be tempted and stiffen the will of those who want to resist.

The statute we recommend, which is printed as an appendix to this report, makes it a criminal offense for persons subject to the jurisdiction of the United States 1) to conspire, within or outside the United States, to assassinate a foreign official; 2) to attempt to assassinate a foreign official, or 3) to assassinate a foreign official.

Present law makes it a crime to kill, or to conspire to kill, a foreign official or foreign official guest while such a person is in the United States. 18 U.S.C. 1116; 18 U.S.C. 1117. However, there is no law which makes it a crime to assassinate, or to conspire or attempt to assassinate, a foreign official while such official is outside the United States. Our proposed statute is thus designed to close this gap in the law.

Subsection (a) of the proposed statute would punish conspiracies formed within the United States; subsection (b) punishes conspiracies outside of the United States. Subsection (b) is necessary to eliminate the loophole which would otherwise permit persons to simply leave the United States and conspire abroad. Subsections (c) and (d), respectively, make it an offense to attempt to kill or to kill a foreign official outside the United States.

Subsections (a) through (d) specifically apply to any "officer or employee of the United States" to make clear that the statute punishes conduct by U.S.

government personnel, as well as conduct by private citizens having no relation to the U.S. government. In addition, subsection (a), dealing with conspiracies within the United States, applies to "any other person," whether or not a United States citizen. Noncitizens who conspire within the United States to assassinate a foreign official clearly come within the jurisdiction of U.S. law. Subsections (b) through (d), which deal with conduct outside the United States, apply to U.S. citizens, and to officers or employees of the United States, whether or not they are citizens. Criminal liability for conduct outside the United States of persons who are not U.S. citizens or who do not hold a position as a officer or employee of the United States are matters for the law of the place where such conduct takes place.

The term "foreign official" is defined in subjection (d) (2). The definition makes it clear that the offense may be committed even though the official belongs to an insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or a non-governmental political party. Our investigation -- as well as the reality of international politics -- has shown that officials in such organizations are potential targets for assassination.*/

The offenses are limited to conduct aimed at such persons because of their official duties or status, or their political views, actions, or statements. Thus, for example, a conspiracy to kill or the killing of a foreign official, which is not politically motivated would not be punishable under this statute.

The definition of official in section (d) (2) also provides that such person must be an official of a foreign government or movement "with which the United States is not at war or against which the United States Armed Forces have not been introduced into hostilities or situations pursuant to the provisions of the War Powers Resolution." This definition makes it clear that, absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign officials is a criminal offense. /insert discussion of paramilitary aspect/

---

*/For example, Lumumba was not an official of the Congolese government at the time of the plots against his life, and Trujillo, though the dictator, held no official governmental position in the latter period of his regime.

* * * * *

In the course of our hearings, some witnesses, while strongly condemning assassination, asked whether, as a matter of theory, assassination should absolutely be ruled out in a time of truly unusual national emergency. Adolf Hitler was cited as an example. Of course, the cases with which we were concerned were not of that character.*/ In a grave emergency, the President has a limited power to act, not in violation of the law, but in accord with his own responsibilities under the Constitution to defend the Nation. As the Supreme Court has declared, the Constitution "is not a suicide pact." Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 160 (1963).

Abraham Lincoln, in an unprecedented emergency, claimed unprecedented power based on the need to preserve the nation:

> ...my oath to preserve the Constitution to the best of my ability, imposed upon me the duty of preserving, by every indispensable means, that government -- that nation -- of which that Constitution was the organic law. Was it possible to lose the nation, and yet preserve the Constitution? By general law life and limb must be protected; yet often a limb must be amputated to save a life; but a life is never wisely given to save a limb. I felt that measures, otherwise unconstitutional, might become lawful, by becoming indispensable to the preservation of the Constitution, through the preservation of the nation .... The Complete Works of Abraham Lincoln, Vol. X, pp. 65-66 (Nicolay and Hay, Eds. 1894).

---

*/Indeed, in the only situation of true national crisis -- the Cuban missile crisis -- assassination was not even considered.

Of course, whatever the extent of the President's own constitutional powers, it is a fundamental principle of our constitutional system that these powers are checked and limited by the Congress, including the Congress' power of impeachment. As a necessary corollary, any action taken by a President pursuant to his limited inherent powers and in apparent conflict with the law must be disclosed to the Congress. Only then may the Congress judge whether the action truly represented, in Lincoln's phrase, an "indispensable necessity" to the life of the Nation.

As Lincoln explained in submitting his extraordinary actions to the Congress for ratification: "In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours." (Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861).

Approved by Drafting
Subcommittee on 9/9/75

EPILOGUE

We do not believe that the acts which we have examined represent the real American character. They do not reflect the ideals which have given the people of this country and of the world hope for a better, fuller, fairer life. We regard the assassination plots as aberrations.

We must not adopt the tactics of the enemy. Means are as important as ends. Crisis makes it tempting to ignore the wise restraints that make men free. But each time we do so, each time the means we use are wrong, our inner strength, the strength which makes us free, is lessened.

Despite our distaste for what we have seen, we have great faith in this country. The story is sad, but this country has the strength to hear it and to learn from it. We must remain a people who confront our mistakes and resolve not to repeat them. If we do not, we will decline; but, if we do, our future will be worthy of the best of our past.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10178

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-83

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1975
PAGES : 161

SUBJECTS :
CASTRO, FIDEL
LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION
CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CC Box 73

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10178
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-83

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 00/00/75
PAGES : 161
SUBJECTS : LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

CIA

CASTRO, FIDEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CC Box 73

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

ON 3/31/77
BY BC

INTERVIEW WITH: Congo Chief of Station

REGARDING: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo.

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 20, 1975 - 12:30-3:30 p.m. - Room 608, Carroll Arms

PRESENT: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED:

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

EXECUTIVE SESSION: ____YES X NO

12

MEMORANDUM

TO: Files

FROM: Frederick Baron

DATE: August 20, 1975

SUBJECT: Interview with Congo Chief of Station: Lumumba Assassination Plan and Related Events in the Congo

Staff Members Present: Burton Wides, Rhett Dawson, Frederick Baron

The following is a summary of the contents of an interview conducted with a former CIA officer concerning a period (1960-1961) in which he was Chief of Station in the Congo. The interview was conducted from 12:30 p.m. to 3:30 p.m. today in Room 608 of the Carroll Arms Hotel.

At the request of the Chief of Station (COS), we agreed to take his testimony under alias. He will be referred to hereinafter as "COS".

COS GOES TO CONGO AND RECEIVES MESSENGER FROM HEADQUARTERS

COS said that he arrived in the Congo as Chief of Station in early July (probably the 10th or 11th) 1960. COS said that before he left Headquarters for the Congo he did not talk with either Richard Bissell (DDP) or Bronson Tweedy (Chief, Africa Division) about the prospect of assassinating Patrice Lumumba. Soon after arriving in the Congo, COS was asked to return to Headquarters in late July for briefings. He said there was no talk of assassination at those meetings, either.

11

After his return to the Congo, probably in early September, COS received a cable from Headquarters that said, in his words, "someone I would recognize would appear to give me instructions for a mission I would carry out." Soon thereafter Sidney Gottlieb arrived in the Congo to meet with COS. COS recognized Gottlieb from the Technical Services Division at the CIA, and it was made clear that Gottlieb was the messenger referred to in the cable.

Gottlieb and COS met in COS's new apartment. COS dated this meeting by the fact that he had moved into this apartment in early September, 1960 . COS said that Gottlieb informed him that lethal biological agents had been developed for the assassination of Lumumba. COS believes that Gottlieb brought a poison virus and probably two other lethal biological agents with him in his bag. But COS said it was possible that the biological weapons arrived shortly thereafter. COS said that Gottlieb also provided rubber gloves, a gauze mask, and probably a hypodermic syringe -- equipment for administering the poisonous substances. The poisonous substances were to be injected into food, drink, toothpaste, or anything else that Lumumba might ingest. COS did not remember the appearance of the biological agents themselves, but he did recall that there were approximately three different types of lethal substances provided to him.

COS said that he was "taken aback" by Gottlieb's assignment to him of the assassination of Lumumba. COS said that he was a junior Chief of Station, and he wanted to make sure to "pin down" the chain of authority for this assignment because "I had never

16

heard of anything like this." COS's best recollection was that he had the following interchange with Sidney Gottlieb:

COS:	Where did this brilliant idea come from?
Gottlieb:	The top.
COS:	Who at the top?
Gottlieb:	The Director has instructions from President Eisenhower.

COS said that he could not recall the exact language of the interchange, although this was his best recollection. He said Gottlieb made it clear that the President wanted to find a way to remove Lumumba from the scene. He said that when Gottlieb explained the source of authorization for the assassination plot, he made it clear that the President was the source. COS said it was possible that Gottlieb used a euphemism, but it was more likely that he mentioned either "President Eisenhower" or "the President." In response to a question from the staff to paraphrase again the import of Gottlieb's instruction to him, COS said that Gottlieb told him something to the effect that "I am giving you instructions on highest authority to assassinate Lumumba any way you can." COS said that Gottlieb did not insist that the assassination had to take place by means of the biological agents he was supplying.

COS said that this was not an exploration of the possibility of assassination or the establishment of a mere capability for assassination. "They were serious about it . . . it was clear that the policy decision to assassinate Lumumba had been made." COS said

9

he was not awaiting any further "go signal" in order to proceed with the assassination operation.

COS said that Gottlieb told him that there was to be no connection with the United States if the biological agents were to be employed. COS had an asset in the Congo that he considered for use as an intermediary in this project, although he never moved forward to make the asset knowledgeable of the project. COS said that, whether or not he used an intermediary to accomplish the assassination, Gottlieb made it clear that "I was to do it or find a way to do it."

COS asked Gottlieb when the lethal biological agents would lose their potency. Gottlieb said this would happen over a long period of time. COS said that he did not remember exactly what the substances looked like, nor whether Gottlieb brought it in his bag, and this would not be surprising because "in those days there were no customs checks in the Congo."

COS locked the virus in a safe at the Station to which only he had access. He remembers taking the virus from the safe sometime later -- probably after the arrest or death of Lumumba -- to dispose of it by burying it near the Congo River. COS said that he had no training in chemistry and felt ill-equipped to deal with poisons. COS asked Gottlieb if the poison left traces. Gottlieb told him that it left the traces of a normal disease.

COS said he was never subjected to great pressure to use the poison. COS added that, when he spoke with Gottlieb, "I don't

7

think I agreed to use it." Although he also said that he did not tell Gottlieb that he would refuse to use it.

COS said that even though Gottlieb had told him that clearance for the assassination of Lumumba had come from the President and the DCI, he wanted verification from Headquarters of an assignment of such magnitude. COS said: "I responded to Headquarters with a double-talk message, saying that I had met the messenger and requesting confirmation. I then received a cable containing double-talk confirmation, something like 'your assumption confirmed.'"

COS said "I never knew who was sending me these cables. They also said 'Director' and I sent my cables with a special slug. My cables were probably marked to 'Director" which is never actually seen by the DCI. COS thought that he destroyed his copy of cables on this subject on instructions contained in those cables. He said that only a single copy of the cables had existed at the Congo Station. COS said that he was instructed by Gottlieb that he was not to discuss this assassination mission even with his own deputy. COS said that he did not discuss the operation with Glenn Fields. He also said that he would not have discussed the operation with Dr. Lester Houck because Houck was removed as Branch Chief in early fall due to dissatisfaction with his performance.

COS said that he thought an assassination effort was "a bad idea, both morally and practically." However, COS said that he may not have expressed his grave concern to Gottlieb because he was so taken aback at receiving the assignment. COS thought that he told Gottlieb that he did not have a good means of access to Lumumba.

7

COS recalls raising the subject of assassination with Gottlieb on subsequent occasions outside the Congo only in the context of his (COS's) feeling: "Thank God I never had to use it."

COS did not remember if Gottlieb mentioned Richard Bissell as a source of authority or approval for the assassination operation. COS does not recall that anyone other than the President and the DCI were indicated as the source of authority for the assassination operation.

O'DONNELL IS DISPATCHED FROM HEADQUARTERS TO THE CONGO

COS recalled the fact that Justin O'Donnell arrived in the Congo from CIA Headquarters approximately in October of 1960. COS said that O'Donnell "came to eliminate Lumumba." COS did not recall whether O'Donnell recalled a conversation with Richard Bissell.

COS said that, in anticipating O'Donnell's arrival, he had the impression that O'Donnell was coming to aid in the removal of Lumumba. COS said, "I wondered if Headquarters thought I was dragging my feet and that I might be relieved."

COS said he did not remember discussing his meeting with Sidney Gottlieb with O'Donnell but he simply does not have a specific recollection. COS said he would not dispute O'Donnell's testimony that COS had made O'Donnell aware that a poison virus was in his safe. COS said that assassination was "not excluded" as one of the means of removing Lumumba that O'Donnell might use. But COS said that he was not certain that assassination was included as one of O'Donnell's tools. COS said that he may have discussed with O'Donnell a plan to snatch Lumumba from "protective custody." But he does not specifically remember this.

COS said that "O'Donnell did not seem to do anything most of the time, and I didn't take him very seriously. He spent a lot of time drinking." COS said that he was not aware of any action O'Donnell took to carry out an assassination or a "snatch" of Lumumba.

COS said that the assassination plan had struck him from the beginning as a bad idea, so he moved slowly on it. "I showed some action to Headquarters by sending cables, but never pushed it."

COS said that he asked O'Donnell to clear with him any major actions he was contemplating in the Congo. COS believes that O'Donnell was in the Congo from September until approximately Christmas.

LUMUMBA's ESCAPE

COS said that Lumumba's escape from "protective custody" was a surprise to him. He said that the CIA Station had nothing to do with it, although they investigated the incident.

COS said "I was in touch with many official Congolese about where Lumumba was and how he got out. But I did not get much good information. It was assumed that Lumumba was going to Stanleyville. The Congolese flew troops to points that he would have to pass on this route. I remember reviewing maps of these routes with the Congolese."

COS added, "I left the Congo for Rome because of the prospect that Lumumba might start an uprising against 'white devils.' But

5

when I arrived in Rome I read that Lumumba was captured. I learned from Mobutu and Casavubu that Lumumba would be imprisoned in Thysville.

COS MEETS WITH BISSELL, TWEEDY, AND KARAMESSINES IN ROME

In November 1960, while Lumumba was at large, COS flew to Rome to meet with Richard Bissell, Bronson Tweedy and Thomas Karamessines (then Chief of Station in Rome) for a briefing session on events in the Congo. The meeting took place at Karamessines' house. COS remembers a general discussion of events surrounding Lumumba's escape and of the situation in the Congo, but he does not recall any specific discussion of assassination. He said, "Perhaps we did discuss assassination, I simply don't recall. I was tired. I had flown all day. And I wasn't in favor of assassination."

BRONSON TWEEDY

COS assumed that Tweedy was knowledgeable of the assassination plan. However, he does not recall specifically discussing the plan with Tweedy prior to the delivery of the poison or while he was in possession of the poison. COS said, "I did talk with Bronson Tweedy much later about it to the effect that 'thank God nothing was ever done.'"

COS did not remember whether Tweedy came to the Congo before Lumumba's death. COS thought that he must have come later. COS said, however, that if Tweedy had come earlier he probably would have asked Tweedy about the assassination mission.

COS INFORMS DCI SCHLESINGER OF ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that in response to Schlesinger's request for reports on "questionable activities" within the Agency, COS met with him. COS said that he informed Schlesinger verbally that he had received instructions to try to assassinate Lumumba. COS said that he did not mention a poison virus to Schlesinger. COS said that Schlesinger did not make a response to this information. COS was unaware of any follow-up that was taken due to his briefing of Schlesinger.

OTHERS KNOWLEDGEABLE OF THE ASSASSINATION PLAN

COS said that he assumed that TWEEDY, BISSELL, and DULLES were witting of the assassination plan. COS said that he did have occasion to see ALLEN DULLES from time to time, but he does not remember discussing assassination in any form with DULLES.

COS said, "I might have mentioned the assassination plan to COLBY when he became Director." However, COS does not have any specific recollection of a conversation with COLBY.

COS does not think he informed RICHARD HELMS of the assassination plan.

COS said that he was never interviewed by the INSPECTOR GENERAL in 1967 in the preparation of the IG Report on Assassinations.

COS said that he never discussed the assassination plan with ARNOLD SILVER.

PROJECT ZRRIFLE AND AGENT QJWIN

COS said he never discussed the assassination plan with William Harvey (the Director of Project ZRRIFLE). COS said he never discussed assassination capabilities or assets with Harvey.

3

COS did not recall agent QJWIN. He did recall that O'Donnell may have brought an asset into the Congo to help him. He said, however, that based on our representation that QJWIN was in the Congo in the fall of 1960, he must have known of QJWIN's activities.

WIROGUE

COS does not remember the true name of agent WIROGUE nor why or how he came to the Congo. When his recollection was refreshed by seeing cable traffic, COS said that WIROGUE was a difficult man to handle. For a short time, WIROGUE became a major in the Congolese Army. COS said that he had wanted ROGUE to pull together a surveillance team. COS did not recall discussing WIROGUE with O'Donnell.

COS's only specific recollection is of being in WIROGUE's apartment and discussing an assassination squad. COS does not think that he mentioned the use of QJWIN in connection with this "execution squad." COS said that it was conceivable that he had approached WIROGUE with the idea of using him against Lumumba. But COS remembers he came to mistrust WIROGUE and felt that WIROGUE did not know what he was doing. COS also said it was unlikely that he would have sent the cable about WIROGUE's approach to QJWIN in ordinary CIA channels as he did if he thought this related to the actual assassination mission. Instead, it was merely evidence that WIROGUE was out of control.

MOVING LUMUMBA TO KATANGA

COS recalled that troops in Thysville mutinied while Lumumba was being held there. COS was in contact with various Congolese officials and discovered that Casavubu and Mobutu had decided to fly to Thysville to put down the munity. COS attempted to convince them not to go together. They did succeed in putting down the mutiny.

COS did not learn that Lumumba was to be moved to Katanga until after it happened. COS said his discussions with Mobutu about Mobutu's intentions for Lumumba left COS with the impression that Lumumba might be executed.

COS said that Jack Hasey was the Acting Base Chief in Elizabethville, and was succeeded by David Whipple, who became Base Chief in Katanga. COS also said that Ambassador Clare H. Timberlake worked closely with COS, but they never discussed with him the general question of assassination.

TESTIMONY UNDER ALIAS

At the outset of the interview, the Committee staff agreed to honor COS's request to testify under alias. COS, who is still in private enterprise in Zaire, said he would be in personal danger there if he were linked to this story. He said, "They might make me take the big high jump. I've been on the 'zap list' before."

AFFIDAVIT Dillon - Exhibit 1

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accordingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Committee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations.

During this entire period I have no recollection of any discussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

Dated this 21 day of May, 1975.

C. Douglas Dillon

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 21 day of May 1975.

Notary Public
District of Columbia

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE
555

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: William G. Miller
Fritz Schwarz
Curt Smothers
Bill Bader
Burt Wides
Rhett Dawson

FROM: Frederick Baron

RE: Douglas Dillon Interview

DATE: August 28, 1975

I spoke today by phone with Douglas Dillon, who was on vacation in Maine, concerning a paragraph in an affidavit he supplied to the Rockefeller Commission on May 21, 1975. The paragraph records Dillon's recollection that

> "On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone."

I explored the subject of this meeting generally with Mr. Dillon on the phone and set an appointment for him to review documents and testify on Tuesday, September 2, at 3:00 p.m. in Room G 308.

On the phone Dillon gave the following background information on the meeting at the Pentagon:

1. This was not a small meeting; eight or ten people attended. He did not think it was a meeting of a small body. He said it was not a Special Group meeting or NSC meeting. But he was clear that

as a high-level meeting due to the participants.

2. He believes the participants included the Secretary of
nse because Dillon's recollection is firm on the fact that
meeting took place in the office of the Secretary of Defense.
on did not remember whether Allen Dulles attended the meeting,
he said "top CIA people were present". Dillon said Richard
sell was probably present. Dillon does not recall a man named
rt Johnson, nor does he recall whether such a man was present
he meeting, but he said that we might be able to refresh his
llection by giving him more background on Robert Johnson.
did not mention on the phone the nature of Robert Johnson's
imony before the Committee; I simply asked if Johnson was
sent at the meeting.)

3. The mention of the subject of assassinating Lumumba was
in the general context, Dillon said, of Lumumba's visit to
United States, which had "convinced us that Lumumba was
hopathic, not in a well-balanced mental state. After his
t we wondered whether there was any way of changing the scenery
he Congo." Dillon said the subject was raised in the general
ext of "eliminating Lumumba", but the discussion did not
eed as far as mentioning means to be used.

4. Dillon said that the response of the "CIA representative"
"not necessarily a moral objection to assassination but was
in the sense of indicating that the CIA did not have that
of capacity".

Dillon did not recall who the CIA representative was who
the remark.

6

th Avenue
New York, N.Y. 10022

IX-C-2-g-W(Dill.

1975 SEP 26 PM
SELECT COMMITTEE
INTELLIGENCE ACTIV

September 23, 1975.

Dear Mr. Dawson:

I enclose herewith Mr. Dillon's signed and notarized affidavit.

Sincerely yours,

Dorothy de Borchgrave

Dorothy de Borchgrave

Mr. Rhett Dawson
Senate Select Committee
Room G-308
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

orig → admin
cy → blue
cy → Clark
cy → Dawson

IX-C-2-g-W(DILLON)

* ← This is indexed already into this file; the file cannot be found

State of New York)
SS:
County of New York)

C. Douglas Dillon, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of two pages prepared by Rhett Dawson, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 15, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

C. Douglas Dillon

Sworn to before me this 23rd day of September, 1975.

Cecilia A. Verdon
Notary Public

CECILIA A. VERDON
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 31-4095135
Qualified in New York County
Commission Expires March 30, 1977

STATEMENTS BY C. DOUGLAS DILLON TO RHETT DAWSON ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1975

I, C. Douglas Dillon, do wish to make the following statement.

1. On September 15, 1975 I was shown by Rhett Dawson, Counsel, Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, what he represented to me to be documents of the National Security Council of the below dates:

Exhibit 1. Minutes of the 451st Meeting
of the
National Security Council
held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
on Friday, July 5, 1960, 9:00-11:00 a.m.
(Approved by the President on July 19, 1960)

Exhibit 2. Memorandum of Discussion at the 452nd Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, July 21, 1960

Exhibit 3. Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Thursday, August 18, 1960

Exhibit 4. Minutes of the 456th Meeting
of the
National Security Council
held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
on Thursday, August 18, 1960, 9:00-11:00 a.m.
(Approved by the President on August 24, 1960)

Exhibit 5. Minutes of the 458th Meeting
of the
National Security Council
held in the Cabinet Room of The White House
on Wednesday, September 7, 1960, 2:30-4:30 p.m.
(Approved by the President on September 13, 1960

Exhibit 6. Memorandum of Discussion at the 460th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Wednesday, September 21, 1960

2. The documents shown to me do not in any way refresh my recollection beyond the statements contained therein as to events related to the Congo in the summer and early fall of 1960. I still do not have an independent recollection of any specific conversation regarding the assassination of Patrice Lumumba other than that described in my affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission and in my testimony before the Select Committee on September 2.

3. I was informed by Mr. Dawson that Mr. Robert Johnson has testified that he recollected a statement by President Eisenhower at an NSC meeting which he construed as being an order for the assassination of Lumumba. After seeing the documents listed above I am of the opinion that it is most likely that the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960 is the meeting referred to by Mr. Johnson. Although the record shows that I was present at that meeting I have no personal recollection of any such statement or order by the President.

4. I note that as to the Memorandum of Discussion at the 456th Meeting of the National Security Council, Thursday, August 18, 1960 (reference C, above) a page or pages immediately before the second page of the exhibit seem to be missing.

5. It is my understanding that the six exhibits noted above, will be appended to this affidavit for filing by the Select Committee.

Prepared by me on this 23rd day of September, 1975.

Rhett Dawson,
Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Government Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities

MEMORANDUM

To: The Files

From: Frederick D. Baron

Date: September 5, 1975

Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting (at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassinating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even on anyone's mind," he said.

Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but he has no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Department and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.

7

I read to him a quote from the Special Gropp minutes of September 8, 1960. Douglas was in attendance at this meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the discussion to which it related.

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter. Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

cc: Rhett Dawson
Burt Wides
Fritz Schwarz
Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm

MEMORANDUM

To: The Files

From: Frederick D. Baron

Date: September 5, 1975

Re: Interview with James Douglas on Lumumba Assassination Case.

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

I spoke by phone today with James Douglas, who was Deputy Secretary of Defense in the Eisenhower Administration from early December 1959 until January 21, 1961.

Mr. Douglas served under DOD Secretary Thomas Gates.

I interviewed Mr. Douglas because of a reference to him in Douglas Dillon's testimony (Dillon, p.19). Dillon said that in a phone conversation with Gates about the Pentagon meeting (at which Dillon said someone raised the question of assassinating Lumumba) Gates named James Douglas as a person likely to have attended such a meeting.

Never Heard Suggestion of Assassination

Mr. Douglas said that during his tenure in office, he never heard a suggestion of the assassination of Lumumba raised in his presence. "I never heard speculation that it was even on anyone's mind," he said.

Pentagon Meeting

Mr. Douglas does not recall a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960 (as recounted by Douglas Dillon) where the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised. Mr. Douglas says that it was possible that he attended such a meeting, but he has no recollection of it.

Special Group Meetings

Mr. Douglas attended Special Group meetings with some regularity. Frequently, however, these meetings were attended by Mr. Irwin, who was Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs during that period. Douglas said that Irwin was "more actively in contact with the State Department and the CIA during this time." (Irwin is now practicing law in New York.)

Mr. Douglas said that the question of assassination of Lumumba was not raised in his presence at a Special Group meeting.

7

I read to him a quote from the Special Group minutes of September 8, 1960. Douglas was in attendance at this meeting. Mr. Gordon Gray was quoted as saying that he hoped that CIA people were "fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss." Douglas had no independent recollection of this remark or the discussion to which it related.

Note:

I indicated to Mr. Douglas that it probably would not be necessary to call him to testify on the Lumumba matter. Mr. Douglas' phone numbers are: (617) 693-1353 (until September 29) and (312) 726-2452 (office in Chicago).

cc: Rhett Dawson
Burt Wides
Fritz Schwarz
Curt Smothers

FDB/dsm

IX-C-2-g-W(IRWIN) ICC

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

11 October 1975

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

Mr. John N. Irwin II
Patterson, Belknap and Webb
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Thank you for sending the rewritten version of your affidavit. All of the changes you have made are perfectly satisfactory and accurately reflect my understanding of the statements you made on September 22.

I am enclosing the statement with my signature so that you may proceed to sign and swear to it.

Due to the sensitivity of the subject matter, it would be appreciated if you will not retain a copy of the affidavit. A copy will remain on file at the Committee and accessible to you at any time.

I look forward to receiving the sworn statement. Once again many thanks for your cooperation and careful attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick Baron

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the
Chief Counsel

9

STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN II
TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Administration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. My current business address is c/o Patterson, Balknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10020.

1. On September 22, 1975 in my office I reviewed with Mr. Baron the following documents in an attempt to refresh my recollection on discussions that took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC Meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. These documents indicate that I attended all of these meetings except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, which Mr. Hadyn Williams of ISA attended. I also reviewed the affidavit of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize.

I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to the United States Government during the entire course of my government service. I do not recall ever hearing of the CIA adopting any assassination plan, nor do I recall ever hearing the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

3. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group Meeting of August 25, 1960 is sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination:

> It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion the language used in the Memorandum for the Record of the NSC Meeting of September 21, 1960 is sufficiently broad so it could be interpreted to cover a discussion of assassination:

7

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

However, I do not remember any such discussion, nor do I have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the substance of the NSC Meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have any recollection of such a report, nor do I have any other recollection of learning by another source of any of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.

6. It is possible that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do not remember if I were at this particular meeting; nor do I remember attending any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.

7. In answer to a question from Mr. Baron I said that in my opinion it would be improper for the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to undertake an assassination operation without an express directive from the President.

Prepared by me on this 9th day of October, 1975

Frederick D. Baron

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect
to Intelligence Activities

6

IX-C-2-g-w(J Irwin

SEL COM
File: ______________________

September 23, 1975

Mr. John N. Irwin II
Patterson, Bellknap & Webb
30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York 10020

Dear Mr. Irwin:

Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions or corrections in the statement. It would be appreciated if you would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the
Chief Counsel

Enclosure

FDB/do

bcc: Rhett Dawson
Fritz Schwarz

5

STATEMENTS OF JOHN N. IRWIN II
TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 22, 1975

Throughout 1960 and until the end of the Eisenhower Administration, I served as Assistant Secretary of Defense. My current business address is c/o Patterson, Bellknap & Webb, 30 Rockefeller Plaza, New York, New York.

1. On September 22, 1975 in my law office I reviewed the following documents to refresh my recollection on discussions that took place at certain governmental meetings: the Memorandum for the Record of the Special Group meetings of June 30, 1960 and August 25, 1960; the Memorandum for the Record of the National Security Meetings of July 21, 1960, August 18, 1960, and September 21, 1960; and the Record of Action of the NSC meetings of July 15, 1960 and September 7, 1960. As indicated in these documents, I attended all of these meetings except the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, where I was represented by Mr. Hadyn Williams. I also reviewed the affidavit of C. Douglas Dillon dated May 21, 1975 which refers, inter alia, to a meeting at the Pentagon in the summer of 1960.

2. Even after attempting to refresh my recollection by reviewing the above-mentioned documents, I still have no direct recollection of the discussions which they memorialize. I do not recall any discussion of any assassination plan connected to the United States government during the entire course of my

4

government service. I do not recall whether I ever heard of the CIA adopting any assassination plan; nor do I recall whether I ever heard the President make a statement that could be construed as an order for the assassination of Patrice Lumumba.

3. It is my opinion as a former member of the Special Group and as a participant in the meeting of August 25, 1960 that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

> It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

4. It is my opinion as a frequent participant in NSC meetings and as a participant in the meeting of September 21, 1960, that the following language from the Memorandum for the Record is broad enough to cover a discussion of assassination:

> Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

However, I do not remember any such discussion. I do not have any direct recollection of the substance of that meeting.

5. Although Hadyn Williams probably reported to me on the substance of the NSC meeting of August 18, 1960, I do not have

3

any recollection of such a report nor do I have any other recollection of learning by another source of any of the substance of the discussion at that meeting.

6. It is likely that I was present at the meeting at the Pentagon to which Mr. Dillon's affidavit refers. However, I do not remember if I was at this particular meeting; nor do I remember whether I was present at any meeting at the Pentagon where the question of assassinating Patrice Lumumba was raised.

7. It is my general opinion that it would be improper for the Director of Central Intelligence to undertake an assassination operation without an express directive from the President.

Prepared by me on this 22nd day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron,
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect to
Intelligence Activities

2

State of New York)
County of ________) SS:
)

JOHN N. IRWIN II, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of three pages prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 5, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

____
John N. Irwin II

Sworn to before me this ________
day of September, 1975.

____
Notary Public

1

IX-C-2-9 - W(Johnson)

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION WITH ROBERT JOHNSON

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF LUMUMBA

PARTICIPANTS: MR. JOHNSON AND MR. WILLIAM G. MILLER

DATE: JUNE 10, 1975

Mr. Robert Johnson who is now at the Overseas Development Council for the summer, telephone 234-8701, was a member of the National Security Council staff working on Asian affairs in the last two years of the Eisenhower Administration and the first year of the Kennedy Administration. He said that on occasion, when people were on vacation, he was assigned the task of taking notes at NSC meetings. In July or August of 1960, Mr. Johnson had the task of note taking. After a review of world events, by Director of CIA Dulles, which included a description of Mr. Lumumba's activities in Africa, Eisenhower turned to Dulles during the meeting in the full hearing of all those in attendance, and said something to the effect that Lumumba should be eliminated. According to Mr. Johnson, there was a stunned silence for about 15 seconds and the meeting continued. He said he wrote the notes and that if they still exist, they are probably in the Eisenhower Presidential papers. He said that notes generally in presidential papers, official documents of the NSC, remain with the NSC. He said that the impression at the time was one of great shock. He said he had heard of nothing like that since. He said it was uncharacteristic of Eisenhower to speak of anything of substance during NSC meetings, reserving judgment to private meetings. He does not remember exactly who was at the meeting beyond Herter and Dulles, and possibly James Lay, Gordon Gray and Robert Amory.

I asked if he would be willing to say this under sworn testimony. He said that having gone this far he would, but he cautioned that 15 years had passed and he could not vouch for the exact wording, although his memory of the impact of the meeting is firm.

Mr. Johnson called one hour after the meeting saying that upon reflection, he would prefer not to testify if at all possible unless it was absolutely essential. He fears retribution, saying that such testimonies in the past have blackballed people who were interested in working for the government. Again, he cited people who had testified for the right cause such as the Dodd case. He said he would testify if it were deemed to be absolutely necessary but he did cant to raise this question.

IX-C-2-g-OC

3-1

MEMORANDUM

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

To: The Files

From: Frederick D. Baron

Date: September 5, 1975

Re: Interview with Robert Johnson regarding the Lumumba Case.

I interviewed Robert Johnson by phone this afternoon to supplement the earlier interview (June 10, 1975) and examination (June 18, 1975) that the Committee conducted with him. At the beginning of the conversation I explained there were a number of questions raised by his interview and examination that needed to be answered on the record. Because it was inconvenient for him to make a trip to Washington in the near future and because of the limited amount of additional information he was able to provide, we agreed that I would memorialize the important points of our interview in the form of an affidavit to which Mr. Johnson would swear.

The following points are related as faithfully as possible in the manner in which Mr. Johnson made them:

1. I never heard of a CIA plot assassinate Lumumba with lethal biological substances.

2. To the best of my recollection, President Eisenhower turned toward Allen Dulles when he made the statement relating to Lumumba about which I have testified.

3. After the meeting at which I heard the statement by President Eisenhower which I described in my testimony on June 18, 1975, I must have consulted James Lay (Executive Secretary of the NSC) for advice on how to treat the President's statement in my memorandum of the meeting. Mr. Lay was meticulous about including in the record some form of reference to every major subject that was discussed at NSC meetings. So we probably included the President's statement in some form, but in what form I do not know. In general, these memoranda would be as complete as we could make them. Nevertheless, on something as sensitive as this, we may have decided to handle it with euphemism.

4. The NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 is probably not the meeting at which I heard the President's

statement in reference to Lumumba. Based on Mr. Baron's representation that I am not listed (either by name or position) among the participants in the memorandum of record, I am convinced that I heard the President's statement at a different meeting.

5. After hearing Mr. Baron read portions of the minutes of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1961 to me, I do have a recollection of some of the subject matter that was discussed at that meeting. This would not be unusual, however, because as a member of the NSC Planning Board I received a debriefing on the subject matter of each NSC meeting. I do not, however, have a recollection of the statement by Mr. Dulles as related in the minutes of the meeting: "Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."

3

IX-C-2-g- ~~Blue~~
W(LAY)

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY
TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and

revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance. Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted by me and my deputy, ~~as~~ if he attended, and circulated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly controlled distribution.

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities

State of Virginia)
) SS:
County of Page)

JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of two pages prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

James Lay
James Lay

Sworn to before me this 36 th
day of September, 1975.

Peggy B. Pettit
Notary Public
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 20, 1977

IX-C-2-9-W(Lay)

SEL COM
File: ____________________

September 23, 1975

Mr. James Lay
Route 2, Box 273-A
Stanley, Virginia 22851

Dear Mr. Lay:

Enclosed please find a copy of the statement I prepared as a result of our recent discussion.

Please feel free to make any additions or corrections in the statement. It would be appreciated if you would mail a sworn copy of your statement to me as soon as possible.

Thanks very much for your help in this matter.

Sincerely,

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the
Chief Counsel

Enclosure

bcc: Rhett Dawson
Fritz Schwarz

FDB/do

STATEMENTS BY JAMES LAY

TO FREDERICK D. BARON ON SEPTEMBER 8, 1975

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marian Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and

B/

revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the NSC minutes.

According to my recollection at this time, there was no fixed procedure for recording the discussions of these sensitive matters which were usually discussed in a very limited attendance. Some of these discussions were of a general nature which did not need to be recorded. Others were of such importance that a full record was drafted by me and my deputy, as he attended, and circulated by highly classified memorandum to each of the NSC members for approval. In some cases, only a record of the conclusions and decisions, if any, were similarly drafted and approved. As approved by the NSC members and finally the President, the record of these extremely sensitive matters were circulated on a very strictly controlled distribution.

Prepared by me on this 8th day of September, 1975.

Frederick D. Baron
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel
Senate Select Committee to Study
Governmental Operations With Respect
to Intelligence Activities

6

State of Virginia)
) SS:
County of ______________)

JAMES LAY, being duly sworn, deposes and says: I have read the attached statement consisting of two pages prepared by Frederick D. Baron, Counsel to the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, based upon my conversation with him on September 8, 1975, and I hereby adopt and ratify this statement which is true and correct to my direct knowledge.

____
James Lay

Sworn to before me this ______________
day of September, 1975.

____
Notary Public

5

September 9, 1975

Dear Mr. Baron:

I received your draft statement today. I'm afraid that it is difficult to record telephone statements in the way that the speaker used.

Therefore I am enclosing a redraft in which I have tried to clarify and in some cases correct my statements without undue modification. I hope that this will prove satisfactory to you.

I apologize for my handwritten transcription but we don't have any good stationery here in the mountains as we do at our Falls Church home.

I am also returning your draft statement.

Sincerely,
James A. Fay, Jr.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

DISTRIBTUION original + attachments = F Baron
cy + attachments = Research Center
cy no atts = blue
cy no atts = clerk

4

[redacted]

Statements by James S. Lay Jr.
To Frederick D. Baron on September 8, 1975

I was the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council throughout 1960. My summer address is Route 2, Box 273-A, Stanley, Virginia 22851.

1. I am unable, after all these years as Executive Secretary of the NSC and subsequently of the United States Intelligence Board, to recollect the substance of discussions relating to the Congo in NSC meetings during 1960. My principal function at NSC meetings was as the official recorder of the minutes of these meetings, and not as a policymaker. I cannot at this time recall the substance of any specific discussions or decisions relating to Patrice Lumumba in NSC meetings during this period.

2. I cannot recall whether there was any discussion of assassinating Lumumba at any NSC meetings.

3. I do not recall whether President Eisenhower ever made a

3

remark at an NSC meeting that could have been construed as an order to assassinate Lumumba.

4. I do not recollect whether any reference was made at any NSC meeting to an assassination plan or attempt in which the United States was engaged.

5. In 1960 Robert Johnson was a member of the NSC Staff as the notekeeper at NSC meetings in the absence of Deputy Executive Secretary Marion Boggs, who normally took the notes and prepared a first draft of the official NSC minutes subject to my review and revision for circulation to the NSC members for approval.

6. If extremely sensitive matters were discussed at an NSC meeting, it was sometimes the practice that the official NSC minutes would record only the general subject discussed without identifying the specially sensitive subject or the discussion. In highly sensitive cases, no reference to the subject would be made in the

NSC minutes.

7. After having Mr. Baron read to me the following portion of the memorandum of the NSC meeting of September 21, 1960, I still do not recollect the substance of the discussion that took place at that meeting:

(Quotation)

[illegible] Ctr.

STATEMENT BY "ROBERT MARANA"
TO FREDERICK BARON ON NOVEMBER 14, 1975

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

I am a current employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. My current address is c/o Review Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia.

1. In 1960, I was employed by the CIA and one of my responsibilities in the course of my employment was to serve as the case officer at Headquarters for an agent who operated under the cryptonym "WIROGUE." I read most of the cable traffic relating to WIROGUE until the point of the termination of his relationship with the Agency.

2. To the best of my knowledge, I participated in all training that WIROGUE received in preparation for his assignment to the Congo in 1960.

3. WIROGUE was not trained in medical immunization in my presence. I am not aware that he was provided with any such training.

4. I have no knowledge of any CIA plot to assassinate Patrice Lumumba. I have no knowledge that WIROGUE was ever connected to a plot to assassinate Lumumba, nor have I heard any hint or suggestion of such a connection.

5. I hereby affirm that "Robert Marana" is an alias which is registered at the CIA along with my true identity. My true signature is affixed to this affidavit. The Senate Select

2

Committee will receive a copy of this affidavit from which my true signature will be deleted. This statement will remain on file at the CIA and will be available for verification purposes for not less than five years.

Frederick D. Baron

Frederick D. Baron, Special Assistant
to the Chief Counsel, Senate Select
Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence
Activities

/

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BC

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

From: Gregory Treverton GF Treverton August ~~29, 1975~~

Subject: Kennedy Library Tape Recording of March 13, 1963
National Security Council Meeting

On this date, I listened to a portion of the tape of the March 13, 1963 meeting of the National Security Council (President present). I listened to it several times in order to check it against the Library transcript of that meeting.

The relevant portion of the statement by John McCone reads as follows:

"With respect to Cuba, the thinking in the Agency is... we have to first get rid of the Soviets'...troops, and as stated ((several words garbled)) and use every resource we have available--political, diplomatic, otherwise--to accomplish that. Once that is done, then we believe that the monolithic structure of the Castro regime can be broken up. Maybe we'll have to catalyze it a little bit. But we think that there are enough indicators of distress within the military and within his political organization so that once the Soviets are out some...military coup can be.. will be brought about which will remove the Castro government, and with a strong possibility of replacing that government with a government more favorable to our interests in the Western Hemisphere. Now, this is... there's a lot of ifs connected with that, but it seems to use, after having thought about this a good deal, that some such action as that is a more probably course of action that would be successful than to try to out..to envisage an uprising on the part of the population in the absence of the military...With the military and security forces on behalf of Castro, they can very easily frustrate and defeat any civilian uprising. I think, as time goes on, that our principal problem is going to be dealing with the future of Cuba and the future of Latin America. I think the problems of the Bay of Pigs and the October incident and the missiles will disappear, and more and more attention is going to be brought on the part of the people on the Hill...is going to be...is how we're going to dispose of this problem."

Then the President speaks.

#1

ORIGINAL

TOP SECRET

Vol. 1 OF 3

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

R1018

The United States Senate

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/1/77
ES

Report of Proceedings

Hearing held before

Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities

Tuesday, September 2, 1975

Washington, D. C.

(Stenotype Tape and Waste turned over
to the Committee for destruction)

WARD & PAUL
410 FIRST STREET, S. E.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20003

(202) 544-6000

TOP SECRET

CONTENTS

Testimony of:	Page
C. Douglas Dillon	2

Exhibits

Exhibit No. 1	
Exhibit No. 2	35
Exhibit No. 3	37
Exhibit No. 4	44
Exhibit No. 5	

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Tuesday, September 2, 1975

- - -

United States Senate,
Select Committee to Study Governmental
Operations with Respect to
Intelligence Activities,
Washington, D.C.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:00 o'clock p.m., in Room 608, Capitol Hill Hotel, Senator Gary W. Hart presiding.

Present: Senator Hart of Colorado (presiding).

Also present: Frederick Baron and Rhett Dawson, Professional Staff Members.

- - -

Mr. Baron. Would you state your name and address for the record, please?

Mr. Dillon. My name is C. Douglas Dillon. And my address is Far Hills, New Jersey.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, we have a few formalities that we must go through with every witness.

I want to know first of all if you are aware that you have the right to counsel here today?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am aware.

Mr. Baron. And are you aware that you may cease answering questions at any point to seek advice of counsel?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad you have so notified me.

Mr. Baron. And are you vuluntarily appearing here today without counsel?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I am.

Mr. Baron. Are you also aware that you have all of your constitutional rights intact here before the Committee, including your Fifth Amentment rights?

Mr. Dillon. I am glad to know that.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Dillon, could you please give the Committee a general idea of your position in the Government from, say, late 1959 until March of 1961?

Mr. Dillon. In late 1959 I was Under Secretary of State, which was the number two position in the State Department. And I continued in that position until 1961.

My duties as such were two-fold. One was the position as the First Deputy to the Secretary of State, and Acting Secretary in his absence from time to time, in which capacity I had to be fully aware at all times of moreorless everything that was in the ken of the State Department, so I could fill in for the Secretary of State as necessary. And in those days the Secretary was absent a good deal of the time, because there were travels abroad, and various reasons. I think I mentioned in my affidavit that I think I served as Acting Secretary at least a third of the time during that period.

My other duty, which was a more particular duty, was to be in charge of the economic side of our foreign policy, which included economic areas of the State Department, and also included oversight and general direction of the ICA, which was the name at that time of the Foreign Aid Agency. And I had the responsibility for Congressional relations of the Foreign Aid Program, and for getting the legislation passed each year, for not the detailed operation, there was a director of the ICA but I had the general oversight of it. And also a military program, which was not under the ICA, but which was run through the Defense Department, and I was the senior State Department official involved in that area.

So I had those two different functions. And for that reason the setup in this area of working with the CIA and on intelligence matters was somewhat different than it had been prior to that. Prior to my advent as Under Secretary the Under Secretary had always ahndled that. Mr. Herter, who was my immediate predecessor, handled it, and Mr. Hoover before. When I became Under Secretary I became so under a new law that had been passed in 1958, at which time I was promoted to Deputy Under Secretary to the new position, which was called Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, which was the number three job in the Department. That legislation provided that this third Under Secretary could either be an Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, as I was, or an Under Secretary for Political Affairs, the implication being that he would be the Under Secretary for Political Affairs if the Under Secretary, the number two fellow, handled the eocnomic area, which Mr. Herter did, not when I was first appointed as Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, but then when I became Under Secretary I took with me the economic responsibilities.

So The number three fellow was named Under Secretary for Political Affairs. It was Mr. Murphy first, and then Mr. Merchant. And they handled in each case all the details of the Special Group.

Mr. Barron. And the liaison with the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. And the liaison with the CIA. That was not handled at the Assistant Secretary level, a great deal of it was done at the Assistant Secretary level, but when it got above that, it went to the Under Secretary of Political Affairs. On the other hand, when things were really important, I was notified, because I had to know about them if an emergency came up whilte the Secretary was out of town. But that was not my particular problem.

Mr. Barron. So you would be kept notified of major developments in the Special Group by Mr. Murphy or Mr. Merchant?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, major developments.

And I do remember over that year of sitting in occasionally on meetings that I presume were on that. But they all dealt with economic assistance to the various political groups in different countries when they needed help.

Mr. Barron. Did you attend National Security meetings regularly?

Mr. Dillon. I attended National Security meetings quite regularly whenever I was in town, eith in --

(Off the record discussion)

Senator Hart. Mr. Dillon, do you swear that the testimony you are giving is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Dillon. I do.

Senator Hart. Just for the record, you also understand that all of the testimony you have given will be covered by the oath?

Mr. Dillon. That is correct.

Senator Hart. I am sure the Staff has advised you of your constitutional rights?

Mr. Dillon. They have.

Mr. Barron. Would you read back the witness' last answer?

(The witness' last answer was read.)

Mr. Dillon. Either in the capacity as Acting Secretary of State if the Secretary was out of town, or as one of the Assistants when he was in town because of the fact that I had overall supervision of the Foreign Aid, both military and economic programs, at that time, and therefore, it was important that I be fully aware of everything that went on at National Security meetings. And they took place as you know, at that time on a regular basis every Thursday, I think it was morning.

Mr. Baron. And where did they take place?

Mr. Dillon. In the Capitol Room at the White House.

Mr. Baron. Were you in a position as Under Secretary of State to be aware of every major CIA operation against a foreign leader or a foreign government?

Mr. Dillon. I think if there were any such things I would assume that I would have been aware of them.

Mr. Baron. Would you have also have been aware of any communications or orders running from the President to the Director of Central Intelligence?

Mr. Dillon. Only if they had been given in my presence and I had heard of them. I wouldn't necessarily be aware of them otherwise. If the President had wanted the State Department to be aware of it, -- and they usually did, there was pretty good coordination there, Gordon Gray was his Special Assistant and would keep everybody notified. But that wouldn't necessarily mean that we knew of every particular thing.

Mr. Baron. In what manner were you made aware of major CIA covert activities?

Mr. Dillon. I think if they were major they were all discussed at one time or another in the National Security Council, or they at least knew about them at that time, because the major activity that was just getting underway at that time was very much aware of the development of the capability to move against Cuba.

Mr. Baron. And what was the nature of your awareness of that development?

Mr. Dillon. We discussed it quite frequently. And it was the setting up of camps in Central America that trained Cuban exiles, and the development of plans for their use. They were rather general in nature, but of which I was aware of in some detail. But at that time we all knew that those plans would not be ready and the capability wouldn't be ready until sometime next year. So if a decision was to be made to use them, it would have come in the following Administration.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of the development of any CIA plans or efforts to assassinate Fidel Castro?

Mr. Dillon. No, not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you hear any discussion of that subject?

Mr. Dillon. None whatsoever.

Mr. Baron. So although you were aware of CIA covert activities against the Cuban regime, you were completely unaware of any assassination effort against Castro?

Mr. Dillon. The major activity was the building up of this capacity among the Cuban exiles, or supposed capacity, to invade Cuba and cause a change in regime.

Mr. Baron. Turning back to your position in the Government, isn't it true that shortly before the change of Administrations you resigned from the State Department in contemplation of resuming Government service in the Kennedy Administration as Secretary of the Treasury?

Mr. Dillon. Yes.

I might as well explain that in some detail, because it was an unusual situation.

That fall, I think it was in October, just prior to the election in early October, due to some mishap in London, the Bank of England failed to support the price of gold at a given moment, and it shot up from the support price of $35 an aounce to maybe $49 or $50. And there was great perturbation in the financial markets over this, the first time that it had happened since the thirties when the price had been set. And there began to be an outflow of gold from the US at the rate of over a $100 million a week, which seemed very big in those days. And it was very disturbing.

That continued through the election. And if anything, it intendsified after the election.

During the election, of course, as a member of the Republic Administration while the State Department was not involved in the election campaign, it was specifically exempt from having anything to do with it -- I was obviously a supporter of Vice President Nixon, who was seeking election at that time. Nevertheless, about two or three weeks after the election, about three weeks after the election, I received a telephone call one day in my office from Pierre Salinger, whom I did not know. And he told me on the telephon that Senator Kennedy -- whom I knew slightly, because he was on the Foreign Relations Committee -- would like to come and see me that night.

And I said, that was very foolish. I am at his disposal, I will go see him.

He said, that is not what the Senator said. He wants to come to see you.

And I said, very good. I will be home all night.

So Senator Kennedy did show up at 9 o'clock. And he told me that he was very concerned about this loss of gold and the lack of confidence in the financial stability of the US and the world. And he wanted to rectify this. And nobody trusted him because the campaign had been made on the basis that he was going to disrupt everything, and didn't have anything about finances.

And so what he wanted was to appoint someone whom he thought would carry weight around the world, and yet who was sympathetic to his idea of keeping the economy moving. And he had read some speeches I had made at one time or another in my economic capacity with the State Department which pretty much paralleled his thinking. And I had been quite contrary to Vice President Nixon's campaign on that issue where he talked about growthmanship and the path to push our growh. And I mentioned, I believe, in the Rockefeller Report that at that time that we had to grow at five percent a year if we wanted to produce and not have unemployment, and so forth.

And I had seen Kennedy's economic speech which he made in Philadelphia at the end of October, and I thought it was just great, there was nothing I could find wrong with it. Of course, nobody had read it and nobody paid any attention to it. And I don't think he had ever given it, but it had been released, he had been there and made a speech and said some of it. And it was very carefully prepared, and was quite dull an dry as a result. It was written largely or suggested largely, I found out later, by Professor Samuels, who was the Dean of all economists at that time. And I couldn't find anything wrong with that.

And he said he could not make any offer of this, and wasn't doing that, but he wanted me to think about this because he thought it was absolutely essential to safegard the currency and all that.

Well, this came as a great surprise to me. I had made all my plans to go back home.

To make a long story short, I talked to various people, including Bob Anderson, who was then Secretary of the Treasury. And he said I should do this. And quite a few people did. And also the President-elect was good enough to say if I did do this he would work with me, and I would be his top economic advisor, and if there were any differences in economic advice that he would side with the Treasury unless the thing was serious enought to lead to a parting of the ways. And one commitment that he wanted from me was that if there was that it would not be a silent parting of the ways. And that was a very easy thing for me to agree to.

And on or after I had come back from a final meeting of the OACD in Paris at which the Convention was signed, at which I had been a leading negotiator, early in December I had a call from him when I got back that morning saying that he wanted me to come over to his place, that he wanted to do this if I would agree.

So I went to President Eisenhower and told him of my meeting abroad and told him I was going to see Senator Kennedy -- which he didn't like very much. And I saw him. And we talked about certain financial things that might be a problem, which I told him about, which they turned out not to be.

And he then right away, that morning, much to my surprise, went out on the front stoop of the house in Georgetown and took me out there with Robert Kennedy, whom I had never met before

Dillon Exhibit 5 September 21, 1960

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Discussion at the 460th Meeting
of the National Security Council,
Wednesday, September 21, 1960

Present at the 460th NSC Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Acting Secretary of State (Dillon); the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director, Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization (Patterson). Also present at the Meeting and participating in the Council Actions below were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Attorney General (Items 1 and 2); the Secretary of Commerce (Items 1, 2 and 3); the Acting Secretary of the Interior (Bennett) (Items 1 and 2); Mr. Tom Killefer for the President, Export-Import Bank of Washington (Items 1 and 2); and the Chairman, Council on Foreign Economic Policy (Item 3). Also attending the Meeting were the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Special Assistants to the President for National Security Affairs and for Security Operations Coordination; Assistant Secretary of Defense John N. Irwin, II; Mr. Robert Packard for the Department of State; Mr. Knight McMahan, Central Intelligence Agency; the White House Staff Secretary; the Assistant White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the Meeting and the main points taken.

1. WESTERN EUROPEAN DEPENDENCE ON MIDDLE EAST PETROLEUM
(NSC Action No. 2080; Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated March 26, 1959, and June 28, 1960; NSC 6011; Memos for NSC, same subject, dated August 9 and 29, and September 19, 1960)

Mr. Gray introduced the subject to the Council. (A copy of Mr. Gray's Briefing Note is filed in the Minutes of the Meeting and another copy is attached to this Memorandum).

At the conclusion of Mr. Gray's presentation, the President said he had received the most glowing reports on the prospects for petroleum production in Libya. He had been told that the Libyan reserves exceeded even the Sahara reserves. He asked

TOP SECRET

untile that day, and announced both of us at once. So I was announced as of the middle of December as the future Secretary of the Treasury.

That rather limited my capacity in the State Department. But I did continue for two or three more weeks to wind things up and make a proper turnover.

And then I resigned from the State Department in January and continued that preparation for the new job.

And that is how that happened.

Mr. Baron. So you left the State Department -- you said earlier to me on January 2nd or 3rd?

Mr. Dillon. Or 4th or 5th, sometime in the first four or five or six days. And after that one thing I ought to make clear is that President Kennedy had a great interest in the authority of the Presidency in foreign policy. And I think he was under the impression that Secretary Dulles had probably dominated President Eisenhower in some asptects, which I don't think was an accuare description of what happened at all, but it was a generally held one at that time. So he wanted to take over this very much himself. And so he put in some new people there.

And we came to be very close, and worked very well together. And I had the greatest admiration for him.

He never at that time or later ever asked me anything about my experience at the State Department or any foreign policy thing, I was not used in any transitional sense at all.

Mr. Dawson. To include the Bay of Pigs plan?

Mr. Dillon. Totally. That was rather a surprise to me. And I think I might have been of some help to him if he had, because I had been aware of it right up through January, and in particular I was aware, at least that is my understanding at the time, that there was always an ultimate background in the use of our naval air if those people got in trouble. And I don't think that was ever made clear to President Kennedy. And that was too bad. And when it was made clear to him he reacted violently against it, and I rather doubt if he would have allowed the thing to be unleashed if he had known this much about it.

Senator Hart. Aside from the regular 54-12 meetings, did you have contact with the CIA in any other capacity on a routine basis?

Mr. Dillon. No, not on a routine basis.

Senator Hart. Occasional basis?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. Because, for instance, I went back -- when we were flying earlier, when we were flying US missions, for instance, they had to be cleared by the State Department, or the Defense Department, or by the CIA, and finally by the President. And that was all handled through Goodpastor, he was then a colonel, at the White House. So I did in that capacity a couple of times, as Acting Secretary, have to clear those things and talk with Allen Dulles about them. And so from time to time there were those moreorless informal contacts. But they were not routine and regular. They were generally on this basis of when I was Acting Secretary and they needed something from the State Department.

Senator Hart. I don't want to interrupt the flow of questions by the Staff on this sequence, but we may want to get some questions on your experience during the US situation on the Doctrine of "Plausible Deniability".

Mr. Dillon. That is something I feel I have a good deal to say about.

Senator Hart. You can proceed here sequentially.

Mr. Baron. Just one other question before we turn to your affidavit. And that is, you were indicating that when you joined the Kennedy Administration you were not consulted for advice on your State Department experience.

Mr. Dillon. Until the time of the missile crisis, when they got together a new, what we called an EXCOM, Executive Committee. At that time, whether it was the result of the Bay of Pigs thing, or just the fact that the President knew me better, and we had been working together for a longer time, he called me in right at the beginning, and I had a very active role in this period.

Mr. Baron. But at the beginning of the Kennedy Administration I take it you were not asked for advice on Congo affairs nor kept aware of the developments in the Congo?

affairs nor kept abreast of developments in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. No, nor any other foreign policy, except as it fell under the monetary area, with one exception. And this was economic entirely. That is, the President, because of my past experience in the handling of this matter, asked me, moreorless as a favor, because he didn't believe the Treasury should really handle this, but he asked me if I would head the US effort or set up the Alliance for Progress. And there was going to be a meeting down in Uruguay, Puntal del Este. And so I did do thta. And that was the only foreign policy job I did. And that was economic in nature.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now a copy of your affidavit to the Rockefeller Commission which concerns among other things a meeting that was held in the Pentagon where the Congo was discussed. First, let me ask you if that is a true copy of your affidavit?

Mr. Dillon. It so appears.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall this meeting where, as you have affirmed: "On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone."

Do you recall this meeting now?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I recall just what I said there. And I think probably should expand on that a little bit, because in looking at it it is not as clear as I would like it to be.

When I mentioned the assassination attempt it was not necessarily limited to -- or it might have been CIA personnel. It also included encouraging one of the many factions that might not like him there to take action on their own, with CIA encouragement.

Senator Hart. What kind of encouragement, material support, financial support?

Mr. Dillon. That, or moral support, if they did the US would recognize them if they became the head, and would help them.

Senator Hart. Was there any discussion that you can recall of the passage o- weapons?

Mr. Dillon. No, no detail like that. This was very brief, very general, and just turned off by the CIA people at that time.

Mr. Baron. So this mention of assassination could have included a CIA sponsored assassination attempt?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, yes.

Mr. Baron. And it was a more general reference --

Mr. Dillon. It was a very general way of getting somewhere. In one of those other papers something was said about getting rid of Lumumba. That was really moreorless the objective, not necessarily to have him leave the earth, but just to get him out of the Congo and away.

Mr. Baron. Your clear impression that the suggestion contemplated assassination as one means of getting rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. As a possibility.

Mr. Baron. And let's fill in some of the context of the meeting. Do you recall where this meeting took place?

Mr. Dillon. I think it took place in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

I may say that after you spoke on the telephone the other day I called Mr. Gates, who was Secretary of Defense at that time, and who was a friend of mine then, and has continued to be, and asked him if he had any recollection of this particular meeting. And he says he did not. But I do think it took place in his office. And I don't recall whether he was there or not. It could be that he wasn't even there. But I think it was in his own office that it took place.

Mr. Baron. When we spoke before you said that you thought he probably was in attendance. Is that still your feeling?

Mr. Dillon. Well, because it was in his office. I don't remember him being there or saying anything. All I remember is the location, and the fact that the subject came up, and the fact that there were a number of people there -- I don't remember who they were -- and the fact that the CIA people, whoever they were, were negative to any such action.

Mr. Baron. About how many people were in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. I would say five or six, because I saw them sitting around the desk, I would say five or six, or it could have been seven or eight, no more.

Mr. Baron. Was this the meeting of any official body?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. It was not a meeting note-taking type of meeting. It was not sitting around the table with somebody as the Chairman.

Senator Hart. It was ad hoc, in other words?

Mr. Dillon. It was ad hoc.

Senator Hart. Would you be able to characterize the nature of the CIA opposition? Was it vehement, violent, casual?

Mr. Dillon. No. It was just more orless silent, and "there is nothing we can do." It wasn't moral.

Senator Hart. There was no policy objection?

Mr. Dillon. It wasn't stated in that way. It was just saying, no, it is not a possible thing.

Mr. Baron. You mentioned on the phone to me that rather than a moral objection, as you have just said, it might have been

been an objection on the grounds that the CIA did not have the capability to perform such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. It could have been, it may have been just something that they couldn't do, and therefore there is no use talking about it.

Mr. Dawson. The subject matter of the meeting was probably something which the Secretary of Defense had a leading role in designing a policy for, right?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall the details of what was ahppening at that time in the Congo. But I do have a basic recollection that over this period of time it was a pretty difficult situation, with UN forces in there, and all sorts of troubles down in the southeastern part where the copper mines were, and trying to get people out so they wouldn't get killed. There was always contingency planning, whether we would have to use any of our forces for another evacuation or something else. So it was a very mixed up and sort of a hot situation at that time.

So certainly various people in the Defense Departmen would be interested. Mr. Gates, when I spoke to him, said that he personally had not given primary attention at any time to the Congo. He said it might have been Jim Douglas, who, as I mentioned to you there, was listed as attending one of those meetings. And I don't recall exactly what his title was at that time, but he had been, I think, Secretary of the Air

Force, and maybe still was at that time.

Mr. Baron. Was it a regular occurance to convene such meetings at the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. We had a very close relationship between the State Department and the Pentagon at that time. And it was not unusual, because of the fact that generally there would be a representative of the Joint Chiefs present, and they were both over there, and if for any reason it seemed reasonable, we would do that. Now, usually I think the man who was responsible would be this number three person in the State Department, he would go to the Pentagon for many of the meetings, the briefings and things like that which would be in the area of the Joint Chiefs, and so forth. He was there a great deal. I wasn't there in my capacity.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any idea why you were in attendance at this particular meeting?

Mr. Dillon. It might also have had something to do with the thing that I was talking with them about all the time, a totally different subject, which was military aid. That could well have been.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall any of the other participants at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by name.

On the telephone you asked me about Bissell, whether he might have been there. And I answered, in all probability he might have, because I knew him, in fact I have known him for many years, all my life. But when I was down here at that time I knew he had a high position in the CIA, and was in charge of all this sort of stuff, and he was at a number of meetings there, or even at the White House. He was an advisor to Mr. Dulles. So I say that is very likely.

Mr. Baron. By this sort of stuff would you mean covert actions?

Mr. Dillon. Covert actions or anything that was important enough in that general field to involve Mr. Dulles, The CIA, the President. He was a person there, one of the people that was talked to about it. There were three people. There were really at that time Allen Dulles, General Cabell, and Bissell.

Mr. Baron. Was it your general impression that this was a high level meeting -- a sufficiently high level meeting so that Allen Dulles might have been in attendance?

Mr. Dillon. He could have been.

Mr. Baron. And are there any other people who would have been likely candidates to have been in attendance at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I imagine there must have been some representative of the military there. But I don't know who it would have been. But there must have been someone else if the Secretary of Defense was there. Now, Erwin, since he didn't allow these things, he might have been there. That is just supposition.

Mr. Baron. And I believe you had said to me before that despite your absence of a clear recolleciton as to which CIA people were there, it was clear to you that some top level CIA people were there?

Mr. Dillon. Top enough, so that something like this could be raised and moreorless disposed of without even thinking of it any further.

Senator Hart. Let me insert a question, if I might. This is a philosophical question.

First of all, factually, in any of the dealings, formal or informal, that you ever had with President Eisenhower or President Kennedy, did the subject of assassination ever arise?

Mr. Dillon. As far as I know, as I recall, in dealing directly with either of them, no.

Senator Hart. I would invite your speculation at this point as a sub-Cabinet officer under President Eisenhower, and as a Cabinet Officer under President Kennedy, I think the Committee would be interested in your view as to the attitude of each of them toward this subject, that is to say, the elimination, violent elimination of foreign leaders?

Mr. Dillon. Well, that is a difficult thing to speculate on in a totally different atmosphere. But I think probably both of them would have approached it in a very pragmatic way, most likely, simply weighed the process and consequence rather than in a way that was primarily of a moral principle. That is what would probably have been their attitude in a few cases. Certainly the idea that this was going to be a policy of the US, generally both of them were very much opposed to it.

Senator Hart. Off the record just a second.

(Off the record discussion)

Mr. Baron. To return to the setting at the meeting at the Pentagon, I wonder if you could fill in the nature of the discussion that was taking place on the Congo before this prospect of assassination was raised at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recally recall it, except that it was bemoaning the general presence of Lumumba and the difficulty of working anything out with him, or the impossibility of working anything out with him, and the exploration of other possibilities.

Mr. Baron. Did you date this meeting by any particular event which took place?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. I dated it only because it must have taken place after, and presumably shortly after, Lumumba's visit to Washington, because the impression that was left was that it was very bad, that this was an individual whom it was impossible to deal with. And the feelings of the Government as a result of this sharpened very considerably at that time. I don't think it would have possibly have occurred before he came. We hoped to see him and see what we could do to come to better understanding with him.

Mr. Baron. Why did he strike you as being impossible to deal with in any way?

Mr. Dillon. Well, what I really recall was the impression he made rather than the individual things he said. When he was in the State Department meeting, either with me or with the Secretary in my presence, he spoke in a mannter that seemed almost messianic in quality. And he would never look you in the eye. He looked up at the sky. And a tremendous flow of words came out. He spoke in French, and he spoke it very fluently. And his words didn't ever have any relation to the particular things that we wanted to discuss. And it was just like ships passing in the night. You had a feeling that he was a person that was gripped by this fervor that I can only characterize as messianic. And he was just not a rational being.

Mr. Baron. When we talked earlier I believe you charaterized his personal power almost as psychotic, is that right?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. So that after he departed from the US you and others at a high level in the State Department were, extremely concerned about this man continuing in a position in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall who raised the question or the prospect of assassination of Lumumba at this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. I don't. It very likely could have come from somewhere, either from the State Department or possibly from the Defense Department in the international affairs areas, someone just throwing out this question. Now, I said the State Department. There was probably someone there besides myself. Because it wasn't usual to just be alone talking about this.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall whether this was raised as a question or as a suggestion?

Mr. Dillon. No, as a question.

Mr. Baron. And who was the CIA representative that you mentioned in your affidavit that responded as indicated that this was not within the capability of the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. That I don't recall. But I imagine it would have to have been either Allen Dulles, or possibly Cabell, but I think most likely Cabell.

Mr. Baron. We have a record of the fact that Lumumba met with Secretary Herter in Washington on the 27th of June 1960. Does that accord with your memory as to the probable date of this conversation? It would be shortly after Lumumba's visit.

Mr. Dillon. Shortly after his visit. And that must have been it. And the record that you had must have been the record of the meeting that I attended that I referred to earlier. The dates that were given in this affidavit were supplied to me on the basis that it was shortly after his visit. So they looked up when his visit was, and that is why they put this in. All I recall of the place and date is that when I saw him off at the airport it was very hot. So it must have been the summer, July or August.

Mr. Baron. Let me fill you in on a few other events that were happening from mid to late July, and ask you if this refreshes your recollection as to the sense of urgency that might have existed at a meeting such as the one you attended in reference to getting rid of Lumumba. It appears that on the 12th of July the US had sent a carrier, the Wasp, to the Congo, although we had refrained from sending troops to the Congo. Then on the 20th of July Ambassador Lodge indicated that it was the US position that the UN would be urged to do everything possible to keep Soviet troops out of the Congo.

Then on the 22nd of July Lumumba signed a 50-year contract with CINCO, a large American resources company. But that contract was disavowed by the finance minister of the Congo the following day, on the 26th of July -- I am sorry, it was disavowed on the 26th of July, which wasn't the following day. And it was in that setting that Lumumba then came to Washington.

While he was in Washington apparently Secretary Herter pledged aid to the Congo. And Mr. Detweiler, who was the

Head of the CIMCO Company that had this huge contract in the Congo, met with people at the State Department to discuss the situation as to whether the contract was going to be performed or not in the Congo.

Do you recall any of that background? And does that refresh your recollection about the urgency of the situation at that time?

Mr. Dillon. No. The only thing I recall is that there were -- which I think I mentioned maybe earlier in our informal conversations -- that there were talks at the time about the possibility of using US military force in one way or another -- I think the fact that the Wasp was ordered there fits right in with that sort of general recollection, that it was something that we were very worried about. And I don't remember this particular contract with this company. In fact, I don't think I have ever heard of CIMCO.

Mr. Baron. Did you have an independent recollection of the ordering of the Wasp to the Congo -- or to the shores of Africa?

Mr. Dillon. Not of that one particular thing. But I do remember that there was consideration of the use of military -- I think there was some talk about airlift capacities and things of that nature, too, at that time.

Mr. Baron. Again to refresh your recollection, I believe CIMCO, C-I-M-C-O, stands for the Congo International [illegible]

Management Corporation, which was a US corporation. And they had signed a resources development contract in the Congo.

Mr. Dillon. It must have been a company that was just formed for that purpose or soemthing, it sounds like.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall a visit from Ambassador Timberlake, who was at that time the US Ambassador to the Congo, to Washington shortly before your meeting at the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No. But it think it would have been normal, with Lumumba, who was then Prime Minister, coming here, and our concern about the situation, for the Ambassador to come back prior to Lumumba's visit or simultaneous with it, to brief the Department on the latest developments there. That was sort of standard operating practice. When the head of a government comes usually the Ambassador comes with him to do that.

Mr. Baron. Would it fit with your memory that the CIA Chief of Station and the US Ambassador had come back to Washington shortly before Lumumba's visit in preparation for his visit to report upon events in the Congo?

Mr. Dillon. It is not my memory, because I don't remember that. But what I can say is that that would have been standard practice, and I would have been surprised if they hadn't.

Mr. Baron. What kind of reports would you have been getting at that time from the CIA Chief of Station and the US Ambassador?

Mr. Dillon. Well, we would have been getting whatever reports the US Ambassador sent, the reports from the Chief of Station would go to the CIA, and we would not get those except in the edited form that the CIA would give them to us.

Mr. Baron. Did you receive urgings from the US Ambassador from the CIA as a result of their briefings from the Chief of Station in the Congo to undertake political action in the Congo toward removing Lumumba from a position of power due to reports that Lumumba was heavily influenced by the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. I do know that he was supposedly influenced by the Soviets. But my impression of seeing him was that he certainly wasn't controlled by them or anyone else, he was so far gone himself that nobody could rely on him as an individual. I don't recall any paticular urgins from the Ambassador, although I think they would have been natural, because this was a very difficult situation, and he was there, and if he had been not warning against something, that would have been very unusual.

Mr. Baron. Aside from the recent visit of Lumumba and the personal impression that he had made upon yourself and the Secretary of State, there were other reasons, were there not, to have a sense of urgency about removing him?

Mr. Dillon. There were all sorts of difficulties that I don't recall. But there were those problems down around the copper mines, and Katanga, there was a revolution down there of sorts, And there were many difficulties in the Congo at that time.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall anything else about the language that was used in raising the question of assassination at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I am sorry, I don't recall really anything but what is in the affidavit, but just the subject came up generally as a question, and it was turned off by the CIA.

Mr. Baron. Would the manner in which the question of assassinating Lumumba was raised at that meeting have served as sufficient authorization for the CIA to proceed to develop the capability to assassinate Lumumba after that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Well, I don't think they really needed any authorization to develop the capabilities if they didn't use them. And certainly it would not have been enough authorization by a long shot for them to start doing that. But I think they could have decided they wanted to develop the capability in this area irrespective of this, just by knowing the concern that everyone had about Lumumba in the area. That they could have done. They wouldn't have to tell anyone about that. That is just developing their own internal capability, and then they would have to come and get permission.

Mr. Baron. Would the same thing hold true for the development of a generalized assassination capability at the CIA -- that such a capability could be developed without specific authorization from authority outside the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would think so.

Mr. Baron. But it is clear to you that the discussion at the meeting at the Pentagon that you attended would not in itself have served as an authorization for an actual assassination effort against Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Not at all.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the phrase "Executive Action" during your entire tenure in Government?

Mr. Dillon. No. The first time I ever heard it, I was on the Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the CIA undertook a project which was run under the crytonum ZR RIFLE to develop the means for carrying off an assassination if required?

Mr. Dillon. No, I didn't.

Mr. Baron. And your first knowledge of any such project was during your service on the Rockefeller Commission?

Mr. Dillon. That is right.

Mr. Baron. Earlier today we discussed Robert Johnson, who was a member of the NSC Staff in the late fifties and serving until early 1962. Do you recall whether Robert Johnson participated in this meetingat the Pentagon?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I wouldn't think so, because I wouldn't think there was necessarily anyone from the National Security Staff. And as I said also earlier, I don't personally remember Mr. Johnson myself at all.

Mr. Baron. As I represented to you earlier, Mr. Johnson, in testimony before the Committee, indicated that he was present at a NSC meeting in his capacity as a notetaker, at which the President made a remark that clearly indicated to Mr. Johnson that he had ordered the assassination of Lumumba. And Mr. Johnson said there was a silence -- Mr. Johnson himself was shocked, but no one at the meeting reacted explicityly, and the meeting simply proceeded. He places this meeting in the summer of 1960, and said that it happened at some point before the coup in which Mobutu took power on Septemb er 14th of 1960. Were you present at such a meeting?

Mr. Dillon. If you mean was I present at a meeting where I recall the President ordering the assassination of Lumumba, I don't remember such a thing. But I think that I was probably present at most of the Security Council meetings at that time. It being in August I might have been away for a week possibly for a vacation, and I might have missed one. But otherwise I would have been there. It could have been in view of this feeling of everybody that Lumumba was very difficult if not impossible person to deal with, and was dangerous to the peace and safety of the world, that the President expressed himself, we will have to do whatever is necessary to get rid of him.

I don't know that I would have taken that as a clearcut order as Mr. Johnson apparently did. And I think perhaps others present may have interpreted it other ways. But I am pretty sure that if the President had said you go and get rid of him, shoot him or something -- I just can't conceive of him doing that. But I can conceive of him saying, let's take action and get this situation rectified, which is moreorless along the lines of the various memoranda you have shown me.

Mr. Baron. Did you ever hear the President make such a remark about Lumumba, let's get rid of him, or let's take action right away on this?

Mr. Dillon. I don't remember that. But certainly this was the general feeling of Government at that time, and it wouldn't have been if the President hadn't agreed with it.

Mr. Baron. So although you have no recollection of being present at the meeting that Robert Johnson recounts, you would find his testimony at least plausible?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. But I would think anything like this was not a direct order to have an assassination, but let's take some action to get rid of Lumumba, get him out of office.

Mr. Dawson. Would that be adequate, implicity authorization?

Mr. Dillon. It would have been up to the CIA as to what they thought. And they could have well thought that. That is an imponderable which runs through all of this, whether it is Lumumba or Castro. And you won't be able in the Castro area, or particularly in this area, to run it down, because the people aren't here anymore. But the person who really made that decision for the CIA was Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. I guess I was asking for your expert opinion on the command and control structure as to what adequate, implicit authorization would have been?

Mr. Dillon. I think that Allen Dulles would have been quite responsive to what he considered implicit authorization, because he felt very strongly that we should not involved the President directly in things of this nature. And he was perfectly willing to take the responsibility personally that maybe some of his successors wouldn't have been. And so I think that this is a perfectly plausible thing, knowing Allen Dulles.

Mr. Dawson. And you were aware that that was the way the system worked at that time?

Mr. Dillon. It was the way he worked; because he had a very strong feeling of protecting the President from getting too closely involved with anything that was unpleasant and of this nature.

Mr. Baron. So from your knowledge of Allen Dulles it is conceivable that he would have taken Presidential language such as, get rid of Lumumba, and translate it into an authorization for an assassination within the CIA?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. And the same thing with Castro, when that came along the following year. That is perfectly possible.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, I would like to show you a series of minutes from the Special Group and ask you if those refresh your recollection as to the attitude of the US toward the Congo in the summer and fall of 1960. The first, which we will call Exhibit 2, is dated 30 June 1960.

(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 2, for identification.)

Mr. Baron. And this document refers to the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Senate of the Congo, and recounts a report by General Cabell that the US assisted Ileo financially and "may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual."

Did you ever see these minutes at the time they were made?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think I ever did.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall having a report of this meeting from Mr. Merchant who would have been State Department representative at the meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall. I don't think I would have, because this wouldn't have seemed to me to be important enough to necessarily have been brought to my attention.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that Joseph Ileo was a significant figure in Congo politics?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall him at all now.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you, to refresh your recollection, that in September of 1960, after Lumumba was taken out of power by Kasavubu and Mobutu, he was replaced as Prime Minister of the Congo by Joseph Ileo.

Mr. Dillon. I didn't realize that.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any refreshed recollection now of the relationship between the US and Joseph Ileo?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Generally speaking, would you have been notified by Mr. Merchant or Gordon Gray about what transpired at a Special Group meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Not by Gordon Gray. That wasn't his job. But it would be by Mr. Merchant if it was considered to be something that was of enough importance that it might be something that I would have to act on or know about in my capacity as Acting Secretary of State, whenever that arose.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware that the US was supplying financial support or other kinds of support to "Moderate" polititions within the Congo who would be opponents of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Not in detail, but certainly the general fact that we would be doing that, yes.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now minutes from a Special Group meeting of 25 August 1960. Which we will marke Exhibit 3.

(The above referred to document was marked Exhibit No. 3 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. For the record, these minutes refer to a report by Thomas Parrott, who was the Secretary of the Special Group on CIA activity in relation to the Congo. Mr. Parrott outlines three CIA operations in the Congo which make use of trade unions in the Congo and include the prospect that a vote of no confidence in Lumumba would be arranged.

Following that report by Mr. Parrott there is a paragraph which describes the action of the Group as follows: "The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associate had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that [illegible] planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out 'consideration' of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba."

Do you recall receiving a report of that meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't, that particular meeting. But you would have to ask Mr. Gray about that. I don't know who they referred to as his associate they referred to as his associate, that is the key point. He worked for the President.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that we have testimony from Thomas Parrott, who took the minutes for this meeting and other Special Group meetings, that when he used the phrase "Mr. Gray's associate or Mr. Gray's friend," he was referring euphemistically to the President.

Mr. Dillon. That is what I would moreorless have assumed. But as long as you have that testimony, my assumption is probably correct. And it follows the same way, that Mr. Dulles said he would take any comments referred to seriously. And then he talks about those as instructions and the same thing. And it would seem to be that. And that must refer to the same meeting that your friend Mr. Johnson testified to, which I presume took place before this. They are talking about something that happened before this day, where he had said his associate had expressed strong feelings about the matter, and Mr. Dulles said he would take the comments referred to seriously.

Mr. Baron. So it is your impression that Mr. Dulles had heard comments by the President previous to this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Certainly.

Mr. Baron. Comments which called for "very straightforward action?"

Mr. Dillion. Yes, I think that is certainly what this said. So I think that whatever records there are of NSC meetings before that, that they may not have kept such records in detail. And that meeting -- if you can find any meeting that Mr. Johnson took the notes of just prior to that, that is probably the meeting.

Mr. Baron. So you would assume that the language used by the President, heard by Mr. Johnson, which indicated to Mr. Johnson that an assassination was at the least acceptable means of getting rid of Lumumba, is probably the language referred to here by Mr. Dulles?

Mr. Dillon. It would sound so, seems so.

Mr. Baron. And would you also assume, from your knowledge of Special Group meetings and the way the minutes were written up, that very straightforward action could be a euphemism for assassination?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wouldn't necessarily think that. It would just mean strong action to do something to get rid of Lumumba, it could be a revolution, it could be anything. I think it comes here that they would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular activity. I would think, if they were really going to mount something, they probably would have come back to the Group. But they might not have. And again, getting back to Mr. Dulles, I do not think he would have gone back to the President and said, now, I have got the capability to assassinate Lumumba, and I am going to do it next week if I have your permission, sir. He wouldn't have done that. Because where I particularly remember this, or get the feeling particularly strong, is dating back to something that Senator Hart mentioned, the U-2 incident. Allen Dulles' strong desire was to take the whole responsibility for that, and resign, and be fired in disgrace, publically, in order to protect the President. But the President totally refused to accept any such way of handling it.

Mr. Baron. So that says something not only about the character of Allen Dulles, but the character of the President?

Mr. Dillon. Of both, yes.

Mr. Baron. That the President would be inerested in taking responsibility for the orders that he had given?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. He was very strong that way. And Mr. Dulles was so strong in wanting to protect the President that he was willing to go out in disgrace, public disgrace after ten years or more of service to the Government, just to protect the President, although there was nothing that he had responsibility for, primary responsibility.

Mr. Baron. From your knowledge of Special Group meetings and minutes, it is your reading of this sentence that "it was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out consideration of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba"

-- you would read that sentence to indicate that an assassination was within the bounds of the kind of activity that might be used to get rid of Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I would.

Mr. Baron. And you were commenting before that Mr. Dulles might be expected by, say, some members of the Special Group, to return to the Special Group if an assassination were being mounted?

Mr. Dillon. Not only that, but anything being mounted, I mean whatever action to get rid of Lumumba, I think he would probably come back and say what we are doing.

Mr. Baron. But it is also your statement that, due to the mode of operating of Allen Dulles, and his character, it is quite conceivable that he wouldn't have returned to the Special Group with such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. That might be, although it is more likely that what he really said was that he wouldn't return to the President.

Mr. Baron. In order to protect the President?

Mr. Dillon. In order to protect the President. I think he had looked on other officials in the Government as quite different from the President, all of the, in other words, as expendable, and he probably would be less likely to go and do things totally on his own. And his whole idea was to protect the President as the public representative of the US from any bad publicity in connection with this or any other similar thing.

Mr. Baron. But based on the discussion at this meeting you would assume that the CIA would have the authority to proceed to mount an assassination effort against Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No, I said that they would certainly have the authority to plan. It is a close question whether this would be enough to actually go ahead with it. But certainly the way this thing worked, as far as I know, they didn't do anything just on their own. I think they would have checked back at least with the senior people in the State Department or the Defense Department.

Mr. Dawson. Would they have done that in such a way that it would be available to appear on the public record at any time?

Mr. Dillon. Maybe not. It might have just been a call from the Secretary of State, Mr. Herter, or possibly the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recollection --

Mr. Dillon. -- and Gordon Gray. I think they would have kept him notified, because he was sort of central in this thing, they wouldn't do anything without his at least knowing about it.

Mr. Baron. Did you have any independent recollection of being made aware of this Special Group meeting that we have been discussing before you saw the minutes today?

Mr. Dillon. No, I did not.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you now what we will marke as Exhibit 4, which is minutes of the Special Group of September 8, 1960, and point you toward the passage on the second page that refers to the Congo where Gordon Gray indicates that "there is top level feeling that vigorous action would not be a mistake."

(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 4 for identification.)

Mr. Baron. Do you have any independent recolleciton of being made aware of this meeting?

Mr. Dillon. No, I do not.

Mr. Baron. Is this consonant with your understanding of the policy at the highest levels of the American Government toward Lumumba at this time?

Mr. Dillon. It fits in with what I understood was the general policy that we were very concerned with.

Mr. Baron. Do you recall that at this period of time, in early September, Lumumba had just been deposed, and there was a struggle going on between Lumumba and Kasavubu for power which culminated in a coup on September 14th by Mobutu and on the 13th of September Lumumba entered the protective custody of the United Nations forces in Leopoldville, do you recall that chain of events?

Mr. Dillon. No. I knew that at some point there was a change in government. I don't recall the detail of it at this time.

Mr. Baron. Are you aware that in early September Soviet planes and Soviet trucks had gone to Stanleyville?

Mr. Dillon. If you tell me that is the case, I think it does refresh my memory, because I do know -- I do remember that we were very concerned about that sort of action by the Soviets.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware that Stanleyville was the stronghold of Lumumba and his supporters?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall that.

Mr. Baron. Dut you do recall that at that point there was concern at higher levels in the State Department over the connection between Lumumba and the Soviets?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, very much so.

Mr. Baron. Let me show you Exhibit 5, which is "minutes of the National Security Council meeting of September 21, 1960.

(The above referred to document was marked Dillon Exhibit No. 5 for identification.)

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I see now that I attended this as Acting Secretary of State, this particular meeting.

Mr. Baron. And do you recall the discussion reported in those minutes of affairs in the Congo, that there was the fear of Egyptian influence on the Congo situation on the part of Lumumba, and that there was some pressure being brought to reconcile Kasavutu and Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't recall any of the details of this meeting. I don't recall the meeting itslef. But it fits right in with the general feeling about the problem, the way you looked at the Congo problems.

Mr. Baron. The minutes refer to a visa application for Lumumba. Would that have been in connection with Lumumba's desire to come to the US to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Congo Government before the United Nations?

Mr. Dillon. It would certainly refer to his desire to come to the United Nations to get out of the Congo, where he had been deposed. Whether he cared much whether we recognized him as the legitimate representative or not I would doubt. I don't think he had much interest in what we recognized. But I think it does show that he wanted to get out. And this was a way of getting out.

And he also probably wanted to go to the UN and make a big complaint there.

Mr. Baron. The last paragraph of those minutes quote Mr. Dulles as saying: "The Soviet ships off the African Coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment, but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of."

Did Mr. Dulles make those remarks?

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall those particular remarks. But he could have. But again, there my own interpretation, "disposed of" wouldn't necessarily only be assassinated, it would be gotten out of the Congo to some place where he was neutralized and couldn't come back in, and you could be sure he was done with.

Mr. Baron. But assassination would have been one of the means of disposing of Lumumba, that would have been acceptable?

Mr. Dillon. I guess the word "disposed" could mean that. But that strikes me as rather surprising, because I would think once he was out of office, our concern would have been deescalated to some extent, it would have been more to find some way, which should have been perfectly possible, of getting him out, or locking him up, or anything.

Mr. Baron. Let me represent to you that the report of the United Nations investigation of the circumstances surrounding Lumumba's death, which was not reported until February of 1961, indicated that at this time, in late

September of 1960, Lumumba was in the custody of the United Nations troops, who were actually protecting him at his residence in Leopoldville, not restraining him from leaving, but there was a Congolese guard surrounding the UN troops who were prepared to arrest Lumumba if he did leave his residence.

Mr. Dillon. I think I recall that now, because it is rather unusual circumstances.

Mr. Baron. And then apparently in the middle of October the UN had refused to surrender Lumumba to the Congolese Army, who had come with an arrest warrant for Lumumba. Is it your understanding that during this period of time, even after Lumumba was in the protective custody of the United Nations, he was still considered a potential threat and volatile force in the Congo by the US?

Mr. Dillon. I would imagine so. And I would not be at all surprised if the then rulers or officials of the Congolese Government that succeeded Lumumba were concerned about it, because he had this tremendous ability to stir up a crowd or a group. And if he could have gotten out and started to talk to the battalion of the Congolese Army, he probably would have had them in the palm of his hand in five minutes.

Mr. Baron. We had testimony from a CIA officer, who said he had been dispatched to the Congo by CIA Headquarters for the purpose of trying to secure Lumumba's escape from UN custody, and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army, where the CIA officer's expectation was that Lumumba would receive a trial, and probably capital punishment at the hands of the Congolese Army. Does this mission of the CIA officer seem to conform to your own idea of US policy at that time toward Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think very much so.

Mr. Baron. Now, we also have testimony that the CIA Chief of Station in the Congo was visited by a representative from CIA Headquarters who supplied him with lethal biological agents and the equipment with which to administer these substances for the purpose of assassinating Lumumba, and that he, the Chief of Station, was charged with such a mission, which obviously he never carried out successfully. Have you ever heard any mention or even a hint of such an operation?

Mr. Dillon. No, I never have.

Mr. Baron. Would such an operation seem consonant with the kinds of discussions that had been recounted in those Special Group meetings?

Mr. Dillon. Well, to the extent particularly that one document you have showed me --

Mr. Baron. The August 23rd meeting?

Mr. Dillon. Yes -- if assassination is a real possibility, as that indicates, this would be a way to do it. But I never heard of it at the time, and I didn't realize that there was any such capacity for the use of biological things. I read about that and heard about it in the Rockefeller Commission with Castro, but not about this.

Mr. Dawson. Would you expect to be told about the operational detail?

Mr. Dillon. Not in detail. But I am rather surprised that it went this far and in my position I didn't know something about it. It may be that they felt that it was so tight that there was no need to tell anyone except the Secretary of State. I assume Secretary Herter would have known about it.

Mr. Baron. Would it be possible that the CIA would feel that the "plausible deniability" would have covered someone in your position?

Mr. Dillon. It could have, if they felt that they had a clearcut --

Mr. Baron. -- mandate to proceed with an assassination operation?

Mr. Dillon. It is possible. That is just supposition, but it is possible. It may not really have been Mr. Dulles' decision.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any connection between the CIA and the actual death of Patrice Lumumba?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Were you aware of any CIA sponsorship for the coup which brought Mobutu into firm control of the Government in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I would like to follow up on some of your statements about Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I think you made a very interesting and forthright observation, that he was very interested in keeping the President protected from things which may cause embarassment to him.

Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA, it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond personal personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known in mid-September of 1960?

Mr. Dillon. No, I was not aware of that.

Mr. Baron. And were you aware of any CIA plan to snatch Lumumba from UN protective custody and place him in the hands of the Congolese Army?

Mr. Dillon. No, I wasn't aware of that.

Mr. Dawson. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Baron has asked a lot of questions about some of the factual parts of this. And I would like to follow up on some of your statements about Director Dulles' willingness to protect the President. I think you made a very interesting and forthright observation, that he was very interested in keeping the President protected from things which may cause embarassment to him.

Mr. Dillon. Not personally, but that he though would cause great embarrassment to the nation as well as to just the Presidency, whereas if it was some individual, it is just because it is the terrible Mr. Dulles and the terrible CIA, it is not the nation. And the President is the nation. So that it was a fairly deep feeling which went beyond personality institutionally to the Presidency, which should not be involved in this sort of thing.

Mr. Dawson. Did you investigate what may have been the basis for your feeling, which is your current feeling, that that was his way of operation?

Mr. Dillon. I think that it was primarily -- I had known him well over his eight years in the Foreign Service, and also in the State Department. But it was highlighted because this experience in the U-2, in the first few days of this I was Acting Secretary of State, and I had to bear the brunt of a lot of that mix-up.

Mr. Dawson. Was Mr. Dulles generally a responsible individual in whom the President placed great trust?

Mr. Dillon. Very much so, great trust.

Mr. Dawson. In his relationship with the President do you believe that President Eisenhower was aware of Mr. Dulles' desire to protect him, President Eisenhower, from a great embarrassment?

Mr. Dillon. I would think so. Of course, the U-2 thing made him aware of that, because it was not only Mr. Dulles' view, but it was also the view of the State Department that this was the correct procedure, that the President should take whatever action was necessary either with Mr. Dulles or with senior officials in the State Department, and blame them for both, but not to accept the responsibility himself if nothing happened. And he disregarded our strong feelings on that.

Mr. Herter had just gotten back from a NATO meeting in Turkey, and he made a special trip out to Camp David to urge this on him, to warn him before he did assume responsibility himself. But to no avail. Hagerty was very strong for the President taking responsibility, because I think he had a little different view of this. I think he had a view that the press looked on the President as someone who was not in full charge of the State Department at time, and he thought this would contribute to that, which would be very bad for the President. So we were thinking of it more from the international aspect. We had the contrary feeling.

Mr. Baron. Did the President's trust in Allen Dulles diminish significantly after the U-2 affair.

Mr. Dillon. No, because there was nothing wrong with the U-2 affair, except that the President had authorized it specifically, it was flying on the day after he authorized it. The only bolix that came was in the after events, where this silly press release announcement was put out by NASA, I guess it was, that this plane had just been sort of flying around and got lost, or something like that. And we really had a very difficult time about that at the morning meeting where the news came to us, which was out in the Virginia hills. The President had a meeting of a restricted nature afterwards, including me and Allen Dulles, the Secretary of Defense, and Colonel Goodpastor.

And he put me in charge of handling the whole thing, and gave me the responsibility. And he wasn't fully briefed on all the cover stories or anything of this nature. And I went back to the State Department and was working diligently on this and talking to Mr. Dulles as to what we would say.

And the next thing we knew suddenly the President told Colonel Goodpastor to say that this was descended from the State Department.

And the next thing we knew the statement came out from the US from NASA which made no sense at all.

And of course what had happened was that Hagerty -- that had been the routine thing, and when it came up Hagerty was to refer the press to NASA, and NASA, if they were referred, had the cover story.

And Goodpastor -- I never quite found out what happened in the White House, whether Goodpastor didn't get to Hagerty or Hagerty didn't pay any attention to them, either way was more likely, because Hagerty was way senior to Goodpastor at that time, and they had done this, and he didn't know, he had been at that little meeting with the President, he didn't know that it was supposed to be in the State Department. And that got everything off upside down. So we were trying to explain how the US Government had put out this silly statement which bore no relation to the facts, when we knew the facts.

And of course at that time the Russians hadn't yet announced that they had the pilot or anything. But we knew that was likely, too. We knew that would happen. I think it followed electronically. And but it was because of this White House bolix that htis had happened.

Mr. Dawson. The basis for Dulles' willingness throughout this period to protect the President was also -- I guess there was some impact made upon his willingness after the U-2 crisis --

Mr. Dillon. We still felt strongly that that had been a mistake, because it put Khrushchev in a position where he felt he had to break off the talks in Paris with the President, and so forth, which we felt would not have been the case otherwise.

So this didn't change Mr. Dulles at all, it made him even stronger in wanting to protect the President, because he knew the President was difficult to protect.

Mr. Dawson. During the period following the U-2 crisis you saw Director Dulles brief the Government on intelligence operations?

Mr. Dillon. He did this at every National Security Council meeting. The format of the meetings were that the meeting would be called to order by the President, and then he would turn to Mr. Dulles for the intelligence briefing, which was the first item of business in all those meetings.

Mr. Dawson. On those occasions did Mr. Dulles attempt to tell the President enough where he would have some idea of what was going on, but not tell him directly what was happening?

Mr. Dillon. Most of the briefings were about intelligence, what other people were doing and what was happening. And it would only be exceptional when they would deal with what we were doing ourselves.

Mr. Dawson. Dealing with the latter, when Mr. Dulles wanted Presidential approval to mount an operation, how did he go about achieving that or gaining that approval?

Mr. Dillon. I don't really know. I do know in regard, to the U-2 flights, which had a very special procedure set up whereby a piece of paper had to be signed in each case by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, or Acting Secretary of Defense, and then taken to the President and approved by him before the flight could take place. And that was handled by General Goodpastor rather than through Mr. Gray.

Mr. Dawson. Did that change after the U-2 crisis?

Mr. Dillon. No, that was the procedure.

Mr. Dawson. He knew what he was approving very clearly?

Mr. Dillon. He had been right up to this time and that was the case with the U-2. After the U-2 crisis there weren't any more U-2 flights, and that procedure came to a sudden end.

Mr. Dawson. In other intelligence operations which you brought up which were required to be brought before the Special Group --

Mr. Dillon. I don't recall that there were any. But if it was needed, I don't know who would do it, but it would be through the person who would know the most about it. And that would be General Goodpastor, because he was very close to the President, although he was a relatively junior officer at that time, he was a young colonel -- I think he may have even been a major when he started there in the White House. But he was sort of Staff Secretary to the President on all those relations with the Pentagon and the CIA and the State Department. If you wanted to see the President on something important, it was generally through General Goodpastor rather than through Gordon Gray. And Gordon Gray handled most of the detailed mechanics of setting up meetings, and that sort of thing. He was not as much a personal assistant to the President. And that job was held by General Goodpastor.

Mr. Dawson. But in circumstances where the President was going to be made aware of attempts to overthrow a government, in front of a number of people like the Special Group of the National Security Council, were you privy to some of those occurances?

Mr. Dillon. I don't ever recall one.

Mr. Dawson. You don't recall instances where an attempt or discussion to overthrow a government or anything more sinister than an assassination was brought up?

Mr. Dillon. No, except the discussion of preparing a capacity to invade Cuba. That was considered. And we have the minutes on that. That was considered a number of times and reported a number of times.

Mr. Dawson. After an intelligence operation blows, in the sense that it is uncovered in connection with the Government of the US is found, are you aware that oftentimes a routine order goes out to estand down intelligence, to take positiveactions in that area, are you aware of that standard operating procedure?

Mr. Dillon. I don't quite understand what your question is there.

Mr. Dawson. After the U-2 crisis did we for a period of time stop agressive intelligence actions against the Soviet Union?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, I think that was natural.

Mr. Dawson. That was my question. That is a routine matter?

Mr. Dillon. That was a natural thing. Obviously we stopped the U-2 flights because we knew they had the capacity to shoot them down, and so it was no use doing it again. And I would imagine we probably eased off on the electronic flights along the coasts of the Soviet Union, and kept them further away, or disconinued them for awhile.

Mr. Dawson. Are you aware of a similar stand down order having been issued after Lumumba was captured?

Mr. Dillon. No.

Mr. Baron. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned earlier that you might have been away from Washington in August of 1960 when this Special Group meeting took place on August 25th, is that correct?

Mr. Dillon. Yes, there is a possibility, because August was the month, if one was going to take any time off in the summer, it was likely to be in August.

Mr. Dawson. It was best to take it off during August because of the miserable summers?

Mr. Dillon. Yes. And my family had a summer place where I had gone since childhood in Maine, and it was easy to get to. I do have enough recollection to know I was there a couple of times when I had to get back for a Security Council meeting and there were certain weather problems from the Coast of Maine. I recall one time, it could have been this year, or it could have been a year earlier. But I know I was there those summers for a few days. And it could have been in August.

Mr. Baron. In reference to the meeting at the Pentagon that was the subject of your affidavit, you mentioned to me before we began this testimony today that from what you have read recently, it is your impression that the remark of the CIA representative at that meeting which, as you have said, in effect turned off the suggestion of an assassination attempt against Lumumba, might have been made simply because the group was too large for such a discussion?

Mr. Dillon. It might have been -- I said that because of what I have learned since, and I have learned more today --

but they did try to develop such a capacity versus Castro. But as I have thought about it since we talked, I think that is less likely. I think it is more likely that it might have been the beginning of this whole idea on the CIA's part that they should develop such a capacity. And maybe they didn't have it then and went to work to develop it beginning in August.

Mr. Baron. So wittingly you have been present at the creation?

Mr. Dillon. The early stages, yes.

Mr. Baron. I have no further questions.

I would simply like to say that the Committee is extremely appreciateive of your coming here today. This is obviously a difficult and unpleasant subject to discuss. And you have been tremendously informative on it. So thank you very much.

Mr. Dillon. I wish I could be more so. But the details of what happened at that time, the day to day details, have really departed from my mind. It is only those few relatively unusual things that I still recall. And any way I can help I am glad to.

Mr. Baron. There may be one way you can help right now. I know that before we started today Bill Miller, the Staff Director of the Committee, indicated that the Committee would be interested in hearing you out at great length on policy recommendations in the intelligence field gathered both from your experience in the State Department and the Treasury Department, and also your recent service on the Rockefeller Commission. But I wondered specifically, in reference to the assassination area, where we faced the need to tie up our investigations as soon as possible, and perhaps make some recommendations as soon as possible, do you have any specific suggestions?

Mr. Dillon. No, I don't think so. I think that the record has shown that this is the type of thing that the US Government or any of its branches cannot and should not engage in. And I doubt very much that there will be any repitition of this sort of thing that took place in the early sixties, which I guess was predicated on the belief that something like that could be done in exceptional circumstances without its being surfaced and being connected with the US. And I think even those who believed that such action was morally proper and might have been in the best intersts of both the US and the world would think that the costs were too heavy if it was ever traced back to the US. And the record seems to show that it does get traced back. So I think that there will be a general agreement among those who are the type of people who would ordinarily think that such a thing should not be thought of as US Policy.

Mr. Baron. Are there any institutional changes that you would suggest to prevent the use of assassination as a tool of foreign policy?

Mr. Dillon. The only thing is, -- I don't know just what institutional changes are really necessary, but there should be the clarification that the Special Group, or whatever name it is given for the Committee, would have to approve any action by the CIA, whether it is assassination or military action or anything else, in writing. I think that would be fine. I think it is naivete to have the idea that the President has to approve anything like that. I tend to agree with Mr. Dulles that you should not get the President personally involved in details of operations that might be on the edge of what is right. I am not judging just about assassinations, but in any covert operation. The law now is that the President has to approve any covert operation. I think that the result now will be that there wouldn't be any. I think there may be times when we will need them, but not violent ones. I have in mind such things as financial help and such things as that. But I don't think the President ought personally to sign the checks.

Mr. Baron. Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 5:15 p.m., the Committee was adjcurned, subject to the call of the Chair.)

end lynch

AFFIDAVIT

Dillon Exhibit 1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA SS:

I, C. Douglas Dillon, being first duly sworn, do upon oath depose and state:

From June 1959 until early January 1961, I served as Under Secretary of State. During approximately 35-40 percent of that time, I served as Acting Secretary of State because of Secretary Herter's absence from Washington.

Secretary Herter, who preceded me as Under Secretary of State, had served as the State Department representative on the 54/12 Committee, a predecessor of the present Forty Committee. When I became Under Secretary, the President asked me to retain my earlier responsibilities for foreign economic policy. Accordingly, the Number 3 position in the Department of State was designated as Under Secretary for Political Affairs. Robert Murphy was appointed to this position and took over the State Department's responsibilities on the 54/12 Committee.

Because of the frequency of my service as Acting Secretary of State, I was kept regularly informed of important 54/12 Committee decisions. On occasion I met with the 54/12 Committee and participated in its deliberations.

During this entire period I have no recollection of any discussions or decisions looking toward the assassination of either Generalissimo Trujillo or Prime Minister Castro.

On one occasion in late July or early August of 1960, shortly after Patrice Lumumba's visit to Washington, I attended a meeting in the Pentagon at which the overall Congo problem was discussed. During the discussion, which covered a great variety of matters, my recollection is that a question regarding the possibility of an assassination attempt against Lumumba was briefly raised. The CIA representative indicated that the Agency did not undertake this sort of operation. This ended consideration of this subject. With this one exception I never heard any discussion of assassination attempts against anyone.

Dated this 21 day of May, 1975.

C. Douglas Dillon

C. Douglas Dillon

Subscribed and sworn to before me
this 21 day of May 1975.

Notary Public
District of Columbia

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Dillon Exhibit 2

30 June 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 30 June 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Gen. Cabell

3. Congo

Gen. Cabell mentioned briefly the fact of the election of Joseph Ileo to the Presidency of the Congo Senate, and the fact that we had assisted him financially. He indicated that we in no way intend to claim full credit for his election but, particularly in view of the very close contest, we might have had some effect; and in any case we may have secured some influence with this potentially useful individual.

√7. Cuba

In an informal conversation after Gen. Cabell's departure, Mr. Gray expressed the opinion that the U.S. has taken publicly about all that it can afford to take from the Castro government; that public opinion both here and abroad is probably beginning to feel that there is no limit as to how far this country can be pushed around; that this may encourage other small countries to take a similar tack; and that the longer we delay with effective economic and other action the harder we may make it for ourselves.

Mr. Merchant and Mr. Irwin agreed, with the stipulation that the United States should not take affirmative action until it is prepared to follow through on a substantial scale.

TaParrott

THOMAS A. PARROTT

Concur
CPC
DDCI
2 July 60

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

to insist on a more precise spelling out of individual or group views.

Mr. Parrott also said that Mr. Macy had raised a related point which Mr. Barnes and he had agreed had validity, and that Mr. Barnes had undertaken to assure Macy that it would be given adequate attention by the interagency planning group. This was a concern expressed as to planning for the support - fiscal and otherwise - of a new Cuban government immediately after a successful overturn of the present one. Mr. Merchant said that he agreed fully with the necessity for making contingency plans of this sort, and had in fact directed three weeks ago that State officials begin to draw them up.

TAParrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

know enough about the political attitudes of the members of the Frente, particularly as to basic freedoms, their attitude toward restoration of seized American property, etc. (In answer to this, Mr. Gray had pointed out that the Frente is composed of people who have broken with Castro, at least on the basic philosophies.)

In an attempt to clarify the situation with respect to the first point, Mr. Parrott told the Group about last Monday's meeting with Mr. Macy, at which Mr. Barnes had covered in considerable detail all aspects of the Cuban project. He said that he was at a loss to understand how Macy could have received the impression that CIA is not aware of dissident groups. He went on to say that in answer to Mr. Macy's question as to the outlook, Mr. Barnes had stated - and had developed at considerable length - the thesis that our view was one of limited optimism, and that he had explained in detail just why this is so; this explanation had included specific comments on the steps that have been, and are being, taken to identify such groups and to assess their apparent leaders. Mr. Parrott said further that the point had been made forcibly to Macy that it would be out of the question for CIA to attempt to mount an invasion of Cuba by itself, without the participation of large numbers of disaffected individuals within the country. V

On the second point, Mr. Dulles said that we do know a good deal about the basic political sympathies of Frente members, and cited as an example the position that had been taken as to the inclusion of certain ultra-conservative groups. He said that the Frente had issued a statement of its aims, which he summarized very broadly as being to preserve the principles of the revolution. He said that as to specific stands on restoration of U.S. property rights, etc., this was thought to be unwise because it would give the Frente the appearance of being a tool of the Americans. He agreed, however, that Mr. Stans' point was a valid one to bear in mind and said we would certainly do so. He added that he expects to lunch with Mr. Stans in the near future and would take that opportunity to discuss these matters further, as appropriate.

Mr. Parrott said that there was no disagreement that the political ideas of these individuals must be constantly assessed and must be clearly established before the operation actually comes off. He added, however, that it should be borne in mind that once these politically-screened individuals had issued their general statement of objectives, our primary operational task has been to hold the FRD together, and that at this particular stage it would not be practical

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

√4. Cuba

The DCI summarized the progress we have made in establishing contact with certain dissident groups within Cuba. In this connection he also noted the apparent fulfillment of a sabotage requirement which had been levied on one of these groups as a test of its capabilities (after this action had been cleared with the Special Group).

He also said that we hope to have a paramilitary force of approximately 500 people ready to operate by November. In answer to Mr. Irwin's question, he outlined two possible ways of initiating the tactical combat phase.

Mr. Gray then told the Group of a talk he had had with the Director of the Bureau of the Budget. The latter had told Mr. Gray that he had discussed the Cuban project with Mr. Macy and that as a result of this discussion he, Mr. Stans, had two reservations that he would like Gray to look into.

One of these had to do with the statement by Macy that in his discussion with CIA representatives in connection with the latest withdrawal from the Reserve, he had received "no evidence" that any effective resistance had been identified within Cuba. (Mr. Gray had answered that in the formal presentation last week, Mr. Dulles and Mr. Bissell had mentioned a number of such groups.)

The second point had to do with a feeling that we might not

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

outstanding intelligence, ability or drive, but that he is obviously well motivated. Mr. Irwin asked whether there might be other individuals of similar, although naturally lesser, stature in the church hierarchy who could be useful.

Mr. Merchant commented that the Catholic Church in Black Africa is not a very substantial force. Mr. Dulles concurred in this, but added that this would be something to keep in mind as appropriate.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE [illegible]

SECRET - EYES ONLY Dillon (a) Exhibit 3

E-3

25 August 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 25 August 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Gray, Irwin, Dulles

1. Congo

Mr. Parrott outlined broadly three (or as Mr. Dulles later described them "2 1/2") operational lines that we are following in mounting an anti-Lumumba campaign in the Congo. These included: operations through the chief advisor of the Christian Trade Unions; the planned attempt of a Socialist labor Senator to arrange a vote of no confidence in Lumumba; and a brand new contact with an alleged leader of certain independent labor groups. He emphasized that the latter had just come up and that we are now in the process of assessing the bona fides and capabilities of the individual.

The Group agreed that the action contemplated is very much in order. Mr. Gray commented, however, that his associates had expressed extremely strong feelings on the necessity for very straightforward action in this situation, and he wondered whether the plans as outlined were sufficient to accomplish this. Mr. Dulles replied that he had taken the comments referred to seriously and had every intention of proceeding as vigorously as the situation permits or requires, but added that he must necessarily put himself in a position of interpreting instructions of this kind within the bounds of necessity and capability. It was finally agreed that planning for the Congo would not necessarily rule out "consideration" of any particular kind of activity which might contribute to getting rid of Lumumba.

Mr. Irwin commented that certain individuals in Defense have given thought to the possibility of using high officials of the Catholic Church in Africa to promote the general objectives of the West. In this connection, he cited a preliminary assessment which had been made of the Negro Cardinal recently appointed by the Pope - the assessment being that the individual in question is a man of not

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

C2[illegible]0

THIS DOCUMENT IS
A SOURCE REFERENCE
IN CHRONOLOGICAL
PAPER NO. 220
—DO NOT DESTROY—

SECRET - EYES ONLY

✓4. Dominican Republic

Mr. Dulles inquired whether Mr. Merchant wanted to discuss the proposal to dispatch a letter to Trujillo suggesting that the latter retire from office. At Mr. Merchant's request, the DCI stated his opinion, which was to the effect that he had considerable reservation as to the efficacy or wisdom of such a letter. He said that it seemed to him much more useful to make a personal approach, which not only stood a chance of being more effective, but also could be denied. He pointed out that a personal approach had been attempted some time ago, but that the individual in question had not been able to carry it off. He suggested that the approach might best be made by an unofficial American, and that Mr. Pawley would be a better bet than the previous individual.

Mr. Merchant said that he realized his own name had been suggested, and that he was far from enthusiastic about the idea. He said further that he has a visceral feeling against asking a Chief of State to get out of office - either through the medium of a letter or personal contact - particularly when we do not know who might succeed him. Mr. Merchant conceded with good humor the validity of Mr. Gray's wry comment that Mr. Merchant's ethics and his pragmatism might be somewhat intertwined.

Mr. Gray said that he was entirely opposed to having any U.S. official sign such a letter. He thought that an unofficial letter might be a different matter.

The conclusion of the Group was that it would be worth the effort to get Mr. Pawley to attempt a direct approach to the Benefactor; it was noted that the chances of success are perhaps less than even, but that no great harm could result.

✓5. Congo

There was a brief discussion of developments in the Congo and the possibilities of effective action there. Mr. Gray said that he hoped that Agency people in the field are fully aware of the top-level feeling in Washington that vigorous action would not be amiss.

TAParrott
THOMAS A. PARROTT

SECRET - EYES ONLY

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Mr. Dulles said he believed a warrant had been issued for the arrest of Lumumba. Aside from Lumumba, Mobutu appears to be the only man in the Congo able to act with firmness. A recent attempt to assassinate Mobutu had failed. Mr. Dulles then reported that we had attempted to provide Mobutu with funds but that the guards protecting Mobutu had relieved our messenger of the funds. We cannot get funds to Mobutu because he does not have complete control over his guards. A new development has been Mobutu's creation of a council of advisers, most of whom are graduate students. The old ministers have been turned out of office and their offices have been taken over for the council, which is intended to carry on for a temporary period. Mr. Dulles reported that the USSR had suffered a severe blow to its prestige in the Congo. However, he had been surprised at the ease with which the Soviets were forced out of the Congo. He believed that the Soviet diplomats, after departing from the Congo, went to Accra but he did not know whether they had moved on toward the USSR. Mr. Gray asked whether the Soviets were really quitting the Congo. Secretary Dillon said the Soviet press has not yet admitted that the Soviets have quit the Congo. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet diplomats indicated to the press before leaving that they would be back. Secretary Dillon believed it was clear that the Soviets had not given up in the Congo. Mr. Dulles reported that the Soviet diplomats left the Congo so hurriedly that the Soviet markings which they painted over the Congo markings on their planes were still wet when they left. Mr. Dulles said the Soviet ships off the African coast were apparently awaiting a clarification of the situation. Mobutu appeared to be the effective power in the Congo for the moment but Lumumba was not yet disposed of and remained a grave danger as long as he was not disposed of.

Mr. Dulles observed that the situation in Laos was still confusing and that little progress had been made toward the settlement of the crisis during the past week. The threatening situation in Sam Neua Province, however, had been quieted as a result of the dispatch of Laotian parachute troops to that area. The situation remains troublesome because Pathet Lao and Viet Minh forces could intervene at any time. The problem of the conflicting governments in Laos is no nearer a settlement. The King has requested that General Ouane and General Phoumi call upon him. A skirmish between Phoumi's forces and Vientiane forces has been reported at Pak Sane, but little bloodshed resulted. Apparently, Phoumi has adopted tactics of carrying on a war of nerves against Vientiane. There has been firing across the Mekong River into the city and Phoumi apparently intends to starve out the government. Meanwhile, kept under continuing scrutiny by all interested departments and agencies to ensure that it serves the purposes of retarding the growth of the war potential of the Sino-Soviet Bloc and reducing its unity. Noted that, with respect to paragraph 11 of NSC 5704/3, U.S. export controls over such materials, equipment, technology and services as can be unilaterally controlled by the United States may be imposed not only to achieve a worthwhile adverse impact on the war potential of the European Soviet Bloc, but also to serve other U.S. policy objectives, especially with regard to technology and services.

NOTE: The action in b above, as approved by the President, subsequently transmitted to all holders of NSC 5704/3.

5. SIGNIFICANT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AFFECTING U.S. SECURITY

Mr. Dulles said he would first summarize developments in the Congo. Several African states were making frantic efforts to save Lumumba. An intercepted message between Egypt and Ghana indicates that Nasser is urging the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea to concentrate their forces in Leopoldville and bring pressure to bear for the maintenance of Lumumba as Prime Minister. Mr.Dulles remarked that the bulk of the UAR forces now in the Congo had been placed advisedly in north Equateur Province, while the Guinea forces were in the northern part of Leopoldville Province. Intercepted messages also indicated that Nasser had asked that a council be formed in Leopoldville consisting of the diplomatic representatives of the UAR, Ghana, and Guinea in that city. The UAR Ambassador to the Congo had been directed, in concert with the Ambassadors of Ghana, Guinea and Morocco to attempt to persuade Kasavubu to effect a reconciliation with Lumumba. On September 20 Kasavubu had announced that he had reached no agreement with Lumumba but the latter had later displayed a piece of paper purporting to be an agreement with Kasavubu.

Secretary Dillon reported that Lumumba had requested a visa for travel to New York as the representative of the Congo to the UN and had also requested a visa as an official of the Government of the Congo. We had denied both requests for visas. However, if Lumumba asked for a visa to visit the U.S. as a private citizen, we would have difficulty in turning him down.Mr.Dillon added that the Congo Government declares it will arrest Lumumba if he attempts to leave the country.

SECRET - EYES ONLY

Dillon Exhibit 4

8 September 1960

AWD/One

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 September 1960

PRESENT: Messrs. Merchant, Douglas, Gray, Dulles

✓ 1. Supply Drop to Cuban Dissidents

Mr. Parrott outlined the proposed supply drop to Cuban dissidents in the Escambray. After brief discussion, the Group approved the project as presented. Mr. Parrott asked whether approval could be granted at this time for continuing missions of a similar nature to this group or other bodies of dissidents. The Special Group agreed to this, with Mr. Dulles stating that the other members could be notified by telephone, without the necessity of convening a meeting.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

SECRET - EYES ONLY

-C-Z-h-G

3/31/77
6c

FIDEL CASTRO INTERVIEWED BY DAGENS NYHETER

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 3 Jul 75 pp 1, 12 LD

[Mats Holmberg interview with Cuban Prime Minister Castro: "'The United States No Longer Wants To Assassinate Me'"]

[Excerpts] Havana, 2 July--For a man who has for many years been on the CIA death list, Cuba's leader Fidel Castro looked remarkably unconcerned. He sat on a sofa in the Swedish Embassy a few hours before Olof Palme's departure from Cuba and when he was questioned about the CIA's repeated attempts to assassinate him, he raised both hands to the ceiling in a gesture of resignation:

"Good Lord," he said. "We have known all that for a long time. It seems a little ridiculous," Fidel said, "to hear today of disclosures of new assassination plans when here in Cuba we already knew of them.

"Yet what is now being disclosed in the United States is only a small part," he said. "We could describe a dozen similar assassination plans and we will also do so when the U.S. investigations are over."

But he did not believe that he ran the risk of being assassinated by the CIA any longer.

"If there are such plans today, we at least, do not know of then," he said. "I believe that the United States is no longer so interested in assassinating me--and I believe that it has accepted the Cuban revolution as a fact and that sooner or later it must come to an agreement with us.

"But no one can be absolutely certain," he said.

Raised Eyebrows

What Fidel Castro said while seated on the Swedish Embassy sofa will cause some eyebrows to be raised in many countries which Cuba has accepted as international allies.

One of the key phrases of Olof Palme's Latin American trip has been "a new economic world order." It is a term which embraces small countries' rights to control their natural resources, and in both the oil power, Venezuela, and the potential oil power, Mexico, Olof Palme's hosts have adopted the concept with enthusiasm.

When Fidel Castro explained his own skepticism concerning talk of "a new economic world order" after dinner at the Swedish Embassy, he did so in a violent attack on the world's oil-producing countries.

He believed that a new world order could not be created by the introduction of new privileges for a new group of countries.

The Poor Are Affected

"It is insufficient to demand that all countries have control over their own raw materials," he said. "All privileges are created at another's expense, and today it is not the industrialized countries which are affected by the oil countries' profits but the poor countries which do not have oil.

CEIVED FROM
JUL 14 1975
CIA

44

JUL 14 1975
CIA

"How can you compare cocoa and oil?" he asked. "What benefit is it to countries like Sri Lanka and Tanzania that all countries control their raw materials when all this means to them is that they must pay more for both oil and industrial goods?

"I am not speaking for myself," he explained. "We receive oil from the USSR on favorable terms. But if the oil countries demand solidarity from the Third World, they must concern themselves with the problems of the Third World. They are, as yet, reluctant to do this.

"Where has the oil revenue gone?" he asked, and he answered the question.

"It has been deposited in the economies of the industrial world and has been used for arms purchases. The industrialized countries will emerge from the economic crisis stronger than ever. It will be the developing countries which will be affected."

They Do Not Dare

Fidel Castro fell silent and he looked at the Swedish journalists with an expression of genuine alarm.

"Do you think I am speaking too severely?" he asked worriedly. "But you must understand that someone must talk about this. There is no one else who dares, since all are hoping for loans from the oil countries."

And he gave those who sat next to him a comforting slap on the back.

In various Latin American countries Latin America is described today as a changing continent, and in both Mexico and Venezuela Olof Palme listened to the revolutionary and anti-imperialist diatribes which are increasingly part of both these countries' official language.

Fidel Castro did not appear especially impressed by this change. He did not mention Mexico and Venezuela at all when he was asked about the prospects for social revolution in South America--but he did mention the military governments of Peru and Panama.

Better Than Nothing

"No path toward revolution can be ruled out," he said, "and we are watching the progressive regimes in Peru and Panama with great interest. It is meaningless to discuss whether an armed struggle is necessary for revolution--all that can be said is that a revolution must be based on real force, whether it be in Chile or Cuba."

He smiled sadly when asked for his opinion of the governments in Venezuela and Mexico, which, by their own assurances, are revolutionary, and he thought for a long time before answering: "It is better than nothing."

Someone asked if it is true that Cuba is receiving economic aid from the USSR in conflict with its own ideology and that it has its "stomach in Moscow and its head in Peking."

Fidel Castro was obviously upset by the question.

"It was not they who contrived the Cuban revolution," he said, "it was us. But the USSR helped us when no one else would, and we cannot forget that. We have not compromised with either the USSR or anyone else, and who else could have helped us? The United States?"

43

THE EVENING STAR (Washington), Monday, 9 September 1963, Four Star Edition, page B 4, Columns 4 - 5

"Goldwater's Toughness Challenged by Castro"

by Daniel Harker, AP Staff Writer

".... Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Mr. Castro said:

> 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.
>
> 'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.
>
> 'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's....'"

[From an impromptu interview given by Castro at a Brazilian Embassy reception this week.]

RECEI ROM
JUL 14 1975
CIA

TIME-PICAYUNE, New Orleans, Monday, 9 September 1963, page 7,
Columns 5 - 7

"Castro Blasts Raids on Cuba. Says U.S. Leaders Imperiled by Aid to Rebels."

This item was introduced by an editor's note referring to the fact that Castro had turned up at a Brazilian Embassy reception Saturday night (7 September) where he had submitted to an impromptu interview. Harker's account of the interview reached New York Sunday afternoon.

"Havana (AP) - Prime Minister Fidel Castro said Saturday night: 'U.S. leaders would be in danger if they helped in any attempt to do away with leaders of Cuba.'"

"Bitterly denouncing what he called recent U.S. prompted raids on Cuban territory, Castro said: 'We are prepared to fight them and answer in kind. U.S. leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe.'"

"....World affairs ... seemed to be entering a more peaceful climate a few days ago, but now this trend has changed with attacks."

"'The U.S. is always ready to negotiate and make promises which later it will not honor. This has happened to promises made during the October crisis. They have been broken as can be seen with new attacks.

'But I warn this is leading to a very dangerous situation that could lead to a worse crisis than October's....'"

RECEIVED FROM
JUL 14 1975
CIA

THE CIA IN CUBA: CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF CUBAN ALLEGATIONS

(1) Mid-1960, "La Cruz" counterrevolutionary group, Tauler Sague, a "ganster," and Cubria Ramos were infiltrated through Punta Hicacos zone in Matanzas Province for a plot against Castro and other terrorism and sabotage. TNT, revolvers, and automatic pistols, a high-powered rifle, and large quantities of ammunition were supplied by the CIA.

(2) March, 1961, various counterrevolutionary groups were trained and armed by the CIA, and infiltrated through the north of Havana, to assassinate Castro and support the Bay of Pigs invasion. Humberto Sori Marin and four other individuals were infiltrated to coordinate the activities of various counterrevolutionary groups directed by the CIA inside Cuba. Weaponry included automatic weapons, high-powered rifles with scopes, ammunition, and explosives.

(3) June, 1961, the "Frente Revolucionario Democratico" (FRD) met with individual infiltrated into Cuba with instructions for a plot against Castro. Jeeps with bazookas were placed in a garage at an intersection in Havana and a truck with grenades was placed in sports city. Plan was to ambush Castro and other leaders. Two participants -- Guillermo Caula Ferrer and Higinio Menendez -- said when arrested that the CIA was in charge, and that contact was maintained through Guantanamo and the Swiss Embassy.

In July, 1961, after Bay of Pigs, CIA worked to consolidate counterrevolutionary groups into the "Unidad Resistencia" (United Resistance) organization. Jose Pujals Mederos made an undercover visit to the United States to meet with CIA officers Jim Bender (or Boulding), Harold Bishop and Carl Hitch. There Mederos was appointed head of CIA operations in Cuba in place of the arrested Aldredo Izaguirre. Programs included "selfaggression" against Guantanimo to justify counter-attacks on other countries to provoke war against Cuba.

(4) July 26, 1961, through the infiltration of CIA agents Emilio Adolfo Rivero Caro (Brand), Adolfo Mendoza (Raul) and Jorge Garcia Rubio (Tony) and others, the United Resistance group developed a plot against Castro during the 26th of July celebration in Oriente Province.

(5) July 26, 1961, the same group planned another plot the same day against Castro during a rally at Revolution Square. Meetings were held at the Guantanamo Naval Base, where war material, including large quantities of small arms, was supplied by base commander Captain Carl E. Schenweias.

(6) Also in July, 1961, plotting against Castro was undertaken by representatives of "30 de Noviembre," "Movimento Revolucionario del Pueblo," and "Frente Revolucionario Democratico." The assassination attempt was to be carried out near the home of Celiz Sanchez Manduley in Vedado. CIA instructions came through contacts abroad with Tony Varona, Manuel Ray and Aureliano Sanchez Arango, and through Admiral Burke and CIA agents on Guantanamo. Weapons included explosives, mortars, high-powered rifles, and 30-caliber machine guns.

(7) September 13, 1961, the same groups listed in (6) above, in contact with the "Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria" (MRR), led by Juan Jose Martore Silva, made an attempt on the life of Dr. Carlos Rafael Rodriguez when he was returning from Matanzas to Havana. They worked with a CIA agent in Matanzas and a counterrevolutionary band there. Weapons included automatic handguns, machine guns, and a high-powered rifle with telescopic site.

(8) October 4, 1961, the MRR and "II Frente del Escambray," under CIA direction, agreed upon a plan for sabotage in Havana, timed to coincide with the return of Cuban President Osvaldo Torrado from Punta del Este. A bazooka was to be fired toward the President at the former presidential palace from a nearby apartment building, with the withdrawal covered by launching grenades against the public. Weapons recovered included automatic rifles and grenade launchers.

(9) In early 1962, with CIA instructions through Guantanamo, Jorge Luis Cuervo Calvo reorganized several groups into the "Union de Unidades Revolucionarias" (UDUR). A meeting was held to plan an uprising and discuss arrangements which had been made to receive equipment through Guantanamo. CIA was pressing both attempts against Castro and staged acts of agression against Guantanamo. Calvo outlined "Plan Z" -- a scheme to kill Foreign Minister Raul Roa, and then attack other Cuban leaders who would attend the burial. "The authors" of the plan are listed as Cay Hernandez and Cay Gispert and members of the DRE organization headed by Julio Hernandez Rojo, listed as a CIA agent infiltrated into Cuba. Weaponry included a double-barreled shotgun, explosives, grenades, and demolition timing devices, one labeled "Block Demolition, M5 A1."

In 1963 another consolidation of groups was carried out with CIA direction from abroad through agent Nino Diaz. The umbrella group was "Resistencia Civica Anticomunista" (RCA), and it incorporated the "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN), "Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionaria" (MRR), and "Agrupacion Montecristi," among others. The overall objective, as instructed by the CIA, was to create the impression of a strong internal resistance to Castro, and to inspire a decision for armed intervention at the meeting of OAS presidents. Again, instructions came through Guantanamo.

(10) March 13, 1963, the RCA initiated a plan to assassinate Castro from a house near the Univeristy of Havana, by firing a mortar. People arrested included Samuel Carballo Moreno, identified as a CIA agent. Attacks were to be made simultaneously on the Committees for the Defense of the Revolution and on National Revolutionary Militia sites. Bazookas, mortars and machine guns were taken.

(11) April 7, 1963, the RCA developed a plan involving sixteen men armed with pistols and fragmentation grenades, who were to attack Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Those arrested were Enrique Rodriguez Valdes (known as "Mulgado"), Ricardo Lopez Cabrera, Onorio Torres Perdomo, and Jorge Carlos Espinosa Escarles.

(12) July 26, 1963, the RCA grouping planned to assassinate the Minister of the Armed Forces, Raul Castro, at Revolution Square during the 26th of July celebration. Leading those groups involved in the plot was Ibrahim Machin Hernandez.

(13) September 28, 1963, another group was formed through a relationship with CIA agent Pierre Owen Diez de Ure, who was a French citizen living in Cuba. Their plan was to dynamite sewage pipes under the presidential palace. de Ure confessed that he had been working for and giving information to the CIA for a period of two years.

(14) March, 1964, a plan to assassinate Castro by Mario Salabarria Aguiar, a "gangster," who had contacts with the CIA through its agent Dr. Bernardo Milanes Lopez, who sought support in Spain from Tony Varona and Juan Bosch, listed as friends of Salabarria. The CIA gave Salabarria weapons and "great sums of money" for a scheme which involved installing a 30 or 50 caliber machine gun in a vehicle and waiting for Castro to pass by.

(15) Mid-1964, another plan to assassinate Castro was formulated by members of "Movimiento de Liberacion Nacional," part of the RCA block controlled by the CIA. The effort involved CIA agents Alberto and Ramon Grau Sierra, members of a network headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina, who attempted to poison Castro in 1965. The mid-1964 plan called for throwing grenades at Castro at the Latin American Stadium. Nine men were involved.

September, 1964, members of "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" (ELN) and "Frente Interno de Liberacion" (FIL), who had been engaged in intelligence for the CIA, began, under CIA instructions, to seek unification.

(16) One of the members of this group, Memesio Cubillas Perez, told Angel Miguel Arencibia Viran, Rolando Galdos Ranzola and others of a plot against Castro to occur at 11 St. Vedado.

(17) In early 1965, counterrevolutionaries Julio Omar Cruz Cecilia, Fermin Gonzalez Carballo and Giraldo Reynaldo Diego Solano -- members of an RCA sub-group known as "Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional" -- were working on a plot against Castro in Santiego de las Vegas. This plan was dropped in favor of a plan to hit Castro at the Latin American Stadium, with another group in a nearby building set up to fire machine guns into the crowd to create panic and facilitate the escape.

(18) In June, 1965, there was an arrest of the group headed by Ramon and Maria Leopoldina Grau Alsina (see (15) above), which was part of the "Rescate" and "Movimiento Anticommunista Revolucionario" (MAR) groups sponsored by the CIA. Maria Leopoldina Grau had received CIA instructions for poisoning Castro at the Havana Libre Hotel. Jesus Companioni Souza and Santos de la Caridad Perez Nunez, members of MAR, were to carry out the poisoning. When this attempt failed, another 500 capsule bottle of poison was sent by Tony Varona. Maria Alsina, also known as "Polita," also received weapons with silencers and special assassination projectiles from the CIA.

(19) In July of 1965, there was an arrest of a group which represented another CIA attempt to organize counterrevolutionaries, this time under the name "Unidad Resistencia." This group developed a plan to assassinate Castro with a Thompson submachine gun at Vita Nouva's restaurant, firing also at the Ministry of Interior across the street to create confusion and permit the escape. Equipment included weapons and communications gear.

(20) Also in 1965, there was an arrest of former Cuban commander Rolando Cubela Secades. Cubela was recruited during a trip to Madrid by CIA agents Manuel Artime, Jorge Robreno ("The Magician"), Luis Enrique Trasancos, and Carlos Tepedino. The planning also involved an official at the Cuban Embassy in Madrid, Jose Luis Gonzales Gallarreta, and Alberto Blanco (or "El Loco"). In Madrid, Artime promised boats, weapons and men for an invasion of Cuba within 72 hours to support the assassination of Castro. Before returning to Cuba, Cubela received from Gallarreta a rifle with a telescopic site and silencer.

(21) In mid-1965, two groups with CIA connections and contacts in the United States, the "Commandos L" and the "Movimiento 30 de Noviembre," planned to infiltrate Cuba. That effort was given up, and instead they fired from gunboats at the "scholarship zone" in Miramar and at the Riveria Hotel, in the direction of the presidential residence.

(22) In May, 1966, these same groups were infiltrated into the Monte Barreto zone in Havana with the mission of assassinating Castro. In the action Armando Romero Martinez and Sandalio Herminio Diaz Garcia were killed, and Antonio Cuesta Valle -- head of "Comandos L", and Eugenio Enrique Zaldivar Cardenas were arrested. These men had been trained in Puerto Rico by the CIA, and some had been involved in the bombardment of the "San Pascual," a merchant vessel anchored at the Caibarien Port in Las Villas Province.

(23) On March 17, 1967, three infiltrators from the United States -- Felix Asencio Crespo, Wilfredo Martinez Diaz, and Gustavo Areces Alvarez -- were arrested while attempting to land by Cayo Fragoso. Their planned activity was to assassinate Castro and conduct systematic sabotage to create the image of a popular uprising, to help counterrevolutionary groups in the United States get official backing. These people had been trained by the CIA through "M-30-11," "RECE," "Los Pinos Nuevos," "Comandos L," "Alpha-66," and other organizations. They had automatic rifles, boats, plastic explosives, and communications equipment.

(24) In 1971, a plan was prepared to assassinate Castro on a visit to Chile. The main protagonist was Jesus Dominquez Benitez, known as "The Islander," who had been arrested by the FBI in 1968 for promoting terrorist actions inside the United States. In 1970 he had participated in an unsuccessful attempt to infiltrate Cuba through Oriente Province and had sought refuge at Guantanamo, where he was arrested for bond violation. Nonetheless, he was free in 1971, to participate with the CIA, Chilean fascists, and Cuban counterrevolutionaries in a scheme to assassinate Castro using a gun concealed in a television camera. He obtained Venezuelan press credentials from Cuban exiles in that country. The plan was aborted. Those involved in the plot feared for their lives because the plan did not insure their escape.

###

29

CLOSING STATEMENT FROM CUBA DOCUMENT

We consider that the analysis of the informations we offer, the publicly known, and the ones that the American authorities possess and have not been published, allows us to affirm that the physical elimination of Cuban Revolutionary leaders, especially the Prime Minister Fidel Castro Ruz, has been a reiterated policy of the United States through its subversive agencies, making use of Cuban counterrevolutionaries, U.S. citizen and all kind of corrupted individuals, inside the country as well as abroad, without taking into consideration the victims that would result from these actions.

With this purpose, they have provided the participants with a great number of weapons, explosives, technical means of transportation and communication for the accomplishment of their plans.

These are some of the connoted and proved facts of the numerous subversive activities that the CIA has carried out aimed to the assassination of the leaders of the Revolutionary Government of Cuba.

THE WHITE HOUSE

TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE WASHINGTON
EYES ONLY

November 12, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Shipments of Contaminating Elements to Cuba

1. I refer to your interest in hearing more about the Fitzgerald operation which involves the current shipment of contaminating elements to Cuba and which is aimed at bringing about a breakdown of a substantial amount of Cuban machinery.

2. Attached is a copy of a memo which I believe you drafted for a meeting with the President on April 7, 1964. Item 5 would appear to cover the type of operation which Fitzgerald is now conducting.

I have not come across any minutes of the April 7 meeting. (As I recall it, you intentionally kept the attendance restricted and were the sole attendee from the NSC staff.) While I do not recognize the handwriting or the doodles on the attached memo, they indicate that Item 5 was approved. My own strong recollection of the fall-out ~~follow-up~~ from the meeting was that Items 1 through 5 were O.K. and that the only serious problems concerned Items 6 and 7.

3. I assume that you still want to hear a status report on the Fitzgerald operation at the Special Group meeting today and I will pass this word to both Des and Peter Jessup.

I think this operation is probably too far down the road to stop, if indeed we do want to stop it. In any event, you will be able to find this out, by some gentle questioning, when Des gives his status report.

GC
Gordon Chase

[illegible] but I'm sure it'll come out OK McB

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

Copy
Lyndon B Johnson Library

TOP SECRET

April 7, 1964

Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba

U. S. covert operations against the Castro regime have recently been reviewed in the Special Group (54/12), and a number of issues are presented which require discussion and decision at a higher level.

The present covert program is designed in support of a general policy of intense economic and political isolation of Castro, accompanied by methods short of war to get rid of the Castro regime. Parts of the program authorized in July 1963 have in fact been held up for various reasons, and it is now important to decide whether or not certain substantial and expensive activities should be (a) actively continued; (b) held in readiness; (c) reduced, or (d) abandoned.

Covert programs against Cuba fall into the following categories:

until ~~[illegible]~~ [illegible] [illegible] [illegible] what we get

1. Collection of intelligence, to include the infiltration and exfiltration of agents and covert supply of agent operations.
Recommendation: It is unanimously recommended that this program be continued.

yes

2. Covert propaganda aimed to encourage low-risk forms of active and passive resistance and to stimulate tension within the regime and between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.
Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued with regular review of their operational guidelines.

yes

3. Cooperation with other agencies in economic denial by selective economic action with respect to products critical to the Cuban economy.
Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.

yes

4. Attempts to identify and establish contact with potential dissident elements near the power centers of the regime.
Recommendation: It is recommended that this program be continued.

TOP SECRET

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

4

5. Indirect economic sabotage with a low level of visibility and detection. Programs of this sort involve possible overseas sabotage of Cuban ships and possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food).
Recommendation: It is recommended that these programs be continued.

6. CIA-controlled sabotage raiding apparatus in Florida which conducted five raids in the summer and fall of 1963, before authority for such raids was suspended for political reasons.
Recommendation: Opinion is divided on this issue and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments of different parties.

7. CIA-supported (but not directly controlled) autonomous Cuban exile groups operating from Central America. These groups will begin operations soon unless action is taken to try to stop them.
Recommendation: Again opinion is divided and it is recommended that higher authority hear the arguments.

①





Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

✓

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 4, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Special Group Meeting - Cuba

Here is some miscellaneous information with regard to your Special Group meeting this afternoon on Cuba.

1. Artime Cut-off - As you know, State is pressing to cut off Artime, largely because of his recent irresponsible activity. CIA opposes State on this one for the usual reasons. DOD, reportedly, will also take a somewhat reluctant line on cutting off Artime. Vance may express the view that a cutoff will drive Artime up the wall and that he will go off and do something that could cause us real trouble vis-a-vis our present conflict with the East. For example, he might go off and sink a Soviet ship. DOD would probably prefer that we phase him out slowly and keep a dialogue going over the course of the next few months. The advantage of this would be twofold - First, it would keep Artime quiet; second, his residual power to hurt us, when we finally do cut him off, will be reduced.

On this one, I am inclined towards the DOD view.

2. Pesticides - The CIA will probably propose a deal whereby we arrange to have diluted Cuban pesticides. State and DOD are both likely to oppose this one for such reasons as the following: First, it will mean going to the Dutch Government; it is questionable whether we want to bring up such a proposal with that government, especially if we think the odds are high that we will be turned down. Second, there is the moral issue of whether or not we should dilute pesticides which were given to the Cubans during the prisoner exchange. Third, it would be highly embarrassing if this one ever leaked out from one of the many bases that would have to be touched.

I don't like this one either.

3. Support to RECE - One question which will arise today is whether or not to start giving some low-risk support to RECE. While State and DOD, at the working levels, originally were in favor of it, they seem to have changed their position. One reason - some of the arguments which are spelled out in the

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

attached memo on the subject. Another reason - State does not want to compromise its position on Artime (i.e., If you give aid to RECE, how can you stop aid to Artime?).

State and DOD will probably propose that, in turning down RECE, we give them $17,000. The RECE people apparently had to tap a program fund of its small contributors to keep going administratively over the last couple months when Bosch cut them off; they want to return this money to the small contributors. Arguments in favor of giving them the money are: (a) it will lessen the shock of giving RECE a negative reply, (b) they will not look bad among the exiles (we don't want them to look bad because they are "good guys"), and (c) part of RECE's problem has not been their fault. We have not been able to give RECE as prompt an answer as we would have liked.

I continue to be in favor of not getting involved with RECE; I agree that $17,000 is a small price to pay for a kiss-off.

4. Keating Gimmick - Both DOD and State are cold to the idea of having Keating (I understand this now may be changed to Donovan) stir up trouble between the Soviets and the Cubans. DOD feels that such goings-on might be interpreted as some sort of Vietnam play. State feels that such a man wouldn't get received at a high level; also, there are other ways to do the job if it needs doing.

While I admire CIA's ingenuity and I sincerely think we should keep them invention-minded, I must say that this one sounds like a Rube Goldberg contraption. I am against it.

5. CIA's Paramilitary Capability - Both DOD and State will probably oppose CIA's proposal to drop its paramilitary capability. I agree with State and DOD that, with the present world situation as it stands, this is a good capability to keep on hand if we possibly can. I would agree to an abandonment of this capability only if it were demonstrated that we could crank it up again in a very short space of time.

GC
Gordon Chase

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

file

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

12 November 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Policy Toward Cuba

In the attached paper the JCS recommended to the SecDef that he forward the Army study entitled, "Square Dance" to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination as a basis for further consideration by the JCS.

In the course of preparing a Chairman's position on "Square Dance," I pointed out that the covert operations proposed would involve serious injury to Cuban civilians, and probably should not be elected without very serious provocation -- perhaps greater than that required to justify invasion. In addition, even if consistent with US values on "just" international behavior, it is highly unlikely that we could undertake such operations without having our role discovered and resulting in serious international liabilities. Finally, even if "Square Dance" were successfully implemented, there would be no guarantee that the Cuban government would change its position. More likely, Soviet aid and control would be increased.

As you are aware, Bill Smith participated in this study, though I understand he did not subscribe to all of its contents. I recommend, however, that the White House remain aloof from formal consideration of "Square Dance" at this stage. Then if the Coordinating Committee and the JCS should recommend action in accordance with study proposals, we can consider their recommendations without any precommitment.

I agree
McGB

RCB.

R. C. BOWMAN

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

21

TOP S(~~CRET~~ INFORMATIC
COVER SHEET

COPY NO. 2

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
TOP SECRET INFORMATION COVER SHEET

CONTROL NUMBER(S) Dec[illegible]on JCS 2304/244-1

The attached TOP SECRET information contains data the security aspect of which is paramount, and unauthorized disclosure of which would cause EXCEPTIONAL GRAVE DANGER TO THE NATION. Special care in the handling, custody, and storage of the attached information must be exercised in accordance with the security regulations. This cover sheet is NOT A RECEIPT but a record of persons who have read all or any part of the document(s) identified by number above.

Each person receiving the attached TOP SECRET information shall sign and fill in the information required below.

	NAME	DATE		REMARKS (Indicate portions and all of documents read)
		RECEIVED	RELEASED	
1	Ed R Bowman			
2				
3				
4				
5				
6				
7				
8				
9				
10				
11				
12				
13				
14				
15				
16				
17	SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:			
18	Destruction of this sheet is authorized one year from			
19	date of destruction of the document attached hereto.			
20				

SD FORM 194
1 JAN 54

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM ARE OBSOLETE.

(When attachments are removed, this form is unclassified)

TOP SECRET INFORMATION
COVER SHEET

645993

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

20

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

JCS 2304/244-1

30 October 1964

Pages 2 - 8, incl.

COPY NO. 2

DISTRIBUTION G

REPORT BY THE J-5
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
SQUARE DANCE (U)

Reference: JCS 2304/244

DECISION

1. At their meeting on 6 November 1964, after making amendments, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 12 of this report.

2. This Decision replaces page 2. Holders are requested to substitute the additional revised page 7, and revised white pages 3 and 5, incorporating the amendments, and to destroy the superseded pages in accordance with security regulations.

3. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, was forwarded as JCSM-942-64, dated 9 November 1964, to the Secretary of Defense.

4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of Title 10, US Code 141 (c) applied and were followed.

DISTRIBUTION:

Gen. Wheeler (C/JCS)
Gen. Johnson (CSA)
Adm. McDonald (CNO)
Gen. LeMay (CSAF)
Gen. Greene (CMC)
Gen. Palmer (DC/S, OPS)
Adm. Jackson (DCNO-P&P)
Gen. Blanchard (DS/S, R&O)
Gen. [illegible] (DC/S-R, [illegible])

Gen. Burchinal (D/JS)
Gen. Manhart (VD/JS)
Adm. Davis (DD/JS)
Adm. Mustin J-3)
Gen. Emrick (J-5)
Gen. Anthis (SACSA)
Gen. Carroll (DIA)
Col. [illegible] (S/JCS)
Capt. [illegible]

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

19

SQUARE DANCE (U)

THE PROBLEM

1. To respond to a memorandum* by the Chief of Staff, US Army, to consider a proposal that the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend to the President that the United States covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry.

FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM

2. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in responding** to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Cuban regime.

3. On 1 September 1964, the Chief of Staff, US Army, sent a memorandum*, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff forwarding a study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by covertly attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The Chief of Staff, US Army, recommended that the Joint Staff accomplish interagency coordination on the study proposals; and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff approve the study and forward it by memorandum to the President, informing him that the Joint Chiefs of Staff support the conclusions and recommendations of the study and consider that the outline program therein provides an adequate framework for the development of detailed supporting programs and plans for participating agencies.

4. On 2 October 1964, the Operations Deputies considered the recommendations of the Chief of Staff, US Army, and agreed to refer the matter to the Joint Staff for the preparation of a report.

---

* Attachment to JCS 2304/244
** Enclosure to JCS 2304/218-3

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

5. On 5 October 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were presented with a briefing on the study and discussed some of the issues of the proposed actions.

DISCUSSION

6. For discussion, see Appendix A.

CONCLUSIONS

7. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States.

8. The proposal to covertly attack the Cuban sugar industry is within existing or attainable capabilities and merits consideration by other appropriate governmental agencies as another option, in concert with other actions, for causing the collapse of the Castro regime.

9. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that there are possible political consequences which could result from proof of US involvement in a program such as that proposed.

10. The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs is the proper agency to accomplish the inter-agency coordination.

11. The study should be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for referral to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for comment and recommendation preliminary to submission to the President by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

RECOMMENDATIONS

12. It is recommended that:

a. The memorandum in the Enclosure, together with its Appendices A, B, and C, which reflects the above conclusions be forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

b. This paper NOT be forwarded to the commanders of unified or specified commands.

c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to NATO activities.

d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.

Action Officer: Captain J. O. Sherman, USN
J-5, Extension 78926

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

ENCLOSURE

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in responding to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba, stated that the President would be advised of any new and promising courses of action which could possibly bring pressure upon the Castro regime.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have completed a review of a study which examines world sugar economics and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry. The study proposes an outline program which would undermine Castro's economy, deprive him of convertible currency, and cause political instability in Cuba through covert attacks against Cuba's sugar industry coupled with US stabilization actions on the world sugar market. Basically, the proposal envisions a three- to six-year program, beginning with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated 1966 Cuban sugar production, by introducing aerially from off-shore, a sugar cane plant parasite, Bunga. Subsequently, the economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATIO

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

75

3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff continue to believe that the ultimate US objective toward Cuba must be to establish a government in Cuba that is acceptable to the United States. The concept of attacking the Cuban sugar industry by covert means would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime.

4. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize the possible political consequences from proof of the US involvement in such a program, they believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence. Additional discussion is provided in Appendix A hereto.

5. It is recommended that the attached draft memorandum (Appendix B) and study (Appendix C) be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for appropriate interagency coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

(Revised by Decision - 9 November 1964)

74

APPENDICES A, B, AND C

(6 pages)

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

13

APPENDIX A

CONSIDERATIONS OF A PROPOSAL TO ATTACK COVERTLY THE CUBAN SUGAR INDUSTRY

1. The ultimate success of the proposed program would depend, in part, upon the effectiveness of the economic controls for the stabilization of world sugar prices. It would serve no purpose to reduce Cuba's total annual production of sugar if a subsequent rise in the price of sugar could net the Castro regime the same amount of convertible currency as it had before the program was undertaken. The arguments and rationale in favor of the economic proposals in the study appear to have validity. However, world economics is a most complex subject and involves many variable factors. The important points on economic controls should be coordinated with appropriate agencies in the government having responsibility for such matters.

2. Assuming that success of the actions of the outline program can be achieved, it must be acknowledged that this would not assure the downfall of the Castro Government, or that if it did fall, a government friendly to the United States would be installed. Russia has too much at stake, politically, to allow an overthrow of a communist regime for economic reasons alone. Success of the proposed actions would, however, create serious difficulties for the Castro Government and would be an additional means of exerting pressure against that government.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

3. There are disadvantages to the program proposed by the study. The approval for implementation of such a concept would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy. There is the possibility of retaliation in the event of discovery. There is also an obvious political risk associated with this proposal. Should any credible evidence of US involvement ever be obtained, the political loss to the United States would be great. Quite apart from the propaganda impact of such discovery, the influence of the United States in international organizations such as the United Nations and the Organization of American States would be impaired seriously.

4. Nevertheless, it is the responsibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to keep the Secretary of Defense and the President apprised of the capabilities of the military establishment. The subject study presents measures which should be considered, and if found to be acceptable after coordination with appropriate government agencies it would represent another option for positive actions against the Castro regime.

5. NSAM 213[*] dated 8 January 1963, established a committee to coordinate the management of all aspects of US policy toward Cuba. The President looks to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for Cuban Affairs for the effective coordination of the execution of policy decisions and for timely recommendations on new courses of action. The subject study should be referred to this committee for the necessary coordination preliminary to reporting to the President.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

---

[*] Enclosure to JCS 2304/13

6. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have a responsibility to provide military advice to the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense. It is appropriate, therefore, that a matter such as the proposals under consideration, be sent to the Secretary of Defense with the recommendation that the study be forwarded to the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee for coordination and comment as a basis for consideration of further recommendations by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

(Revised by Decision - 9 November 1964)

10

APPENDIX B

DRAFT

MEMORANDUM FOR THE COORDINATOR, INTERDEPARTMENTAL
COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR CUBAN AFFAIRS

Subject: Cuban Actions (U)

1. On 21 March 1964, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the President that they would continue to review the problem of putting additional pressures on Castro and that the President would be advised if any new and promising courses of action were uncovered.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have forwarded a study on the feasibility of undermining the Castro regime by attacking the Cuban sugar industry. The study examines the world sugar market and the vulnerabilities of Cuba's sugar industry, and proposes a phased interagency program which would:

a. Initially reduce Cuban sugar production by approximately 30 per cent from the anticipated 1966 production level.

b. Expand US influence in the world sugar market by assignment of quotas and other actions to insulate the free market from the effects of Cuban sugar losses.

3. Apart from economic measures, the proposals made in the study are within existing or attainable military capabilities. Several actions are proposed. Key among these is the introduction into Cuba of Bunga, a plant parasite against sugar cane. It appears feasible to introduce gradually Bunga into Cuba and maintain a basis for plausibly disavowing US involvement.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING
AND DECLASSIFICATION

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

9

4. Mindful of the risks attending such actions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have reviewed the proposals of the study and believe that they offer an option for exerting new pressures against Castro. They believe that proposals related to the expansion of US influence over the world sugar market, the stabilization of the free market, and the covert introduction of Bunga into Cuba, merit serious consideration. Other forms of attack proposed in the study might be taken subsequently to exploit resulting economic and political turbulence.

5. The study is forwarded herewith with a request that the concept and actions proposed in the outline program of the study be coordinated by your committee with other governmental departments and agencies. Upon completion of your review and coordination, it is further requested that your comments be made available to the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

8

APPENDIX C

Army Report on

SQUARE DANCE (U)

(See Attachment to JCS 2304/244,
beginning on page 6 of the white attachment)

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

7

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

5 November 1964

COPY NO.__________

DISTRIBUTION G

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
HOLDERS OF JCS 2304/244-1
A Report by the J-5
on
SQUARE DANCE (U)

FIRST CORRIGENDUM

At the request of the originator, holders are requested to substitute the attached revised page 7, and destroy the superseded page in accordance with security regulations.

R. C. FORBES
J. E. MANSFIELD
Joint Secretariat

UNCLASSIFIED Without Attachment

TOP SECRET — SENSTIVE

1X - c - 2 - h

21 July 1975

INVENTORIED:
ON 3/31/77
BY BC

MEMORANDUM FOR SENIOR STAFF

SUBJECT: Inspection of Classified Documents at LBJ Library Related to Covert Actions Against Cuba

FROM: Loch Johnson

Among the many documents which I examined at the Johnson Library in Texas this past week is one that I find particularly alarming. I wish to draw it to your attention.

The document in question is from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, dated 30 October 1964. The subject is a proposed covert action against Cuba, with the code name SQUARE DANCE.

On 21 March 1964, the JCS responded to a Presidential request for new ideas relative to Cuba by advising the White House that any new promising courses of action to undermine the Castro regime would be brought to the President's attention. Apparently their first bright new idea was SQUARE DANCE, outlined in the 30 October document (attached). The proposal envisioned the destruction of the Cuban economy by introducing aerially from off-shore a sugar cane plant parasite called Bunga. The program would begin with a 30 per cent reduction of anticipated Cuban sugar production (see page 6) and within three-to-six years the ruination of the sugar industry would be achieved. "The economic and political disturbances caused by this attack could be exacerbated and exploited," continues the JCS memo, "by such measures as spreading hoof-and-mouth disease among draft animals, controlling rainfall by cloud seeding, mining canefields, burning cane, and directing other acts of conventional sabotage against the cane milling and transportation systems" (6, emphasis added). In sum, SQUARE DANCE "would furnish another option to the United States in bringing about the collapse of the Castro regime" (7).

In Appendix A of the SQUARE DANCE proposal, the memo notes that the approval for implementation of the program "would introduce a new dimension into cold war methods and would require a major change in national policy." Indeed it would—or at least one hopes we have not used such methods before! The proposal is nothing less than a variant of germ warfare which would have had serious consequences for the civilian population.

At this point we do not know what happened to the SQUARE DANCE concept. It may never have been implemented at all, even partially. (The covering memo written by Bowman, an NSC staffer, to Bundy suggests that the White House was skeptical toward the idea.) To me, though,

23

the mere writing of this kind of proposal is a reprehensible first step toward the worst kind of foreign policy mischief. I find it even more repugnant than contingency plans for assassination. These are not the kinds of recommendations which should filter up to the White House from the intelligence community. The agencies must have a better sense of what is acceptable policy, legally and morally. As in the Huston Plan, the White House was confronted here with a series of illegal and unethical options. The result of SQUARE DANCE would have been parasitic death for the major plant and animal life in Cuba. The feeble efforts of the CIA to direct assassination attempts against Castro pale by comparison with this Army proposal for covert action.

I believe SQUARE DANCE deserves our attention. If assassination is unacceptable, surely too is the widespread destruction of plant and animal life through covert germ warfare. Somehow (probably through hearings and restrictive legislation) the Congress must drive home the point that there are legal and moral limits to American foreign policy. These limits may not be easy to define, but we must try.

Note: On the third page of the second attachment (a "Memorandum for Discussion of Covert Program Against Cuba" written by Bundy) reference is made to "possible addition of contaminating elements to sensitive Cuban imports (not food)." The cover memo from Gordon Chase (NSC staffer) indicates that this proposal received Presidential backing.

22

I-C-2-h

ASSASSINATION ALLEGATIONS: Castro

Newspaper accounts report that prior to the April 17, 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu inlisted the aid of Sam Giancana and Johnny Roselli in organizing assassination attempts against Castro. The first attempt on Castro's life was on or about 3/13/61. The first attempt used poison and it was hoped that with Castro dead,the invasion planned and executed 3/17/61 would have a greater chance for success. There were five more attempts made on Castro's life after 3/17/61. The last was in late February or early March of 1963.

Allegations(from Newspaper sources):

1) The CIA either directly or through Robert Maheu enlisted Sam Giancana who enlisted Johnny Roselli to organize an assassination team directed at Fidel Castro.

2) Johnny Roselli headed several missions against Castro from late March or April 1961 through late February or March 1963.

3) That RFK learned of this CIA-Mafia plan and aborted it.

4) Roselli received poison capsules from the CIA which he gave to Cubans assigned the task of poisoning Castro

[4, con't.]

before the Bay of Pigs. One of the Cubans was related to one of Castro's cooks.

5) The assassination was intended to take place before the planned Bay of Pigs invasion in order to insure that CIA operation's success.

6) The CIA has extended services to Giancana which included a break-in of Comedian Dan Rowan's Las Vegas apartment.

7) Roselli worked under the direct supervision of CIA agents William Harvey and James O'Connell.

8) Individuals allegedly involved directly or indirectly with Cuban Refugees:

1. Roselli
2. Maheu
3. Hunt
4. Liddy
5. Giancana
6. James O'Connel
7. William Harvey

Questions:

1) Who was COS of JMV wave in Miami from 1960-1963?

2) Was there any positive effort among Cuban nationals to determine if there were any Castro intelligence agent information?

3) Did any contacts or agents within the Cuban refugees ever speak of or sequest an attempt to be made on Castro's life? If so, how was the situation handled?

4) In preparation for the Bay of Pigs was the assassination or neutralization of Castro seen as a desirable and positive step towards the success of the invasion?

5) Were any private raids against Cuba conducted by Cuban nationals?

6) Was the CIA aware passively or were such matters made known to the agency by the Cuban nationals in advance?

7) Did the CIA clear such actions?

8) Was the CIA aware of Roselli's actions?

9) Did the CIA through whatever means enlist the aid of Johnny Roselli?

10) At any time has the CIA been associated with Sam Giancana?

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10185

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-90

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : THE CONGO

DATE : 08/22/1975
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
CIA
MOBUTU
LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10185
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-90

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : THE CONGO
DATE : 08/22/75
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : LUMUMBA, PATRICE, ASSASSINATION

CIA

MOBUTU

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/19/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

R883 Secret/Sensitive Susan Pitts

INTERVIEW AND MEETING SUMMARY

ENTERED
ON 4/11/77
BY BC

INTERVIEW WITH: "Victor Hedgeman"

REGARDING: The Congo

DATE-TIME-LOCATION: August 22, 1975, S201, a.m./p.m.

PRESENT: Bill Bader

HAS OR SHOULD BE DIGESTED:

FOLLOW UP REQUIRED: SEE PAGE 5 -- POSSIBLE INTERVIEWEES

MATERIALS SUBMITTED BY INTERVIEWEE(S):

EXECUTIVE SESSION: ____YES __x__NO

SECRET

6

Interview and Meeting Summary - "Victor Hedgeman"
w/Bill Bader, August 22, 1975, S201

FILE:

After an extended tour with the United States Army and some education at San Diego State, Hedgeman went to Harvard where he studied in the Department of International Relations, working to a degree in political science. He didn't finish his degree but went after being recruited at Harvard into the OPC. He then became an NOC in Europe and for a number of years worked in Belgium, Luxembourg and France. His primary responsibility in Belgium was that of surveillance of Soviet operators in Europe. While in Brussels in 1959 he came to meet a good percentage of the Congolese who would be important in the Congo after independence: Ileo, Mobutu, and Adoula. In January of 1960 he became the first Chief of Station in the Congo; prior to that time the Agency had had merely a liaison service. In late July of 1960 Hedgeman returned to the United States with Ambassador Timberlake to press for a U.S. policy of political action in the Congo. Hedgeman's position was that the Soviets were moving large amounts of equipment and manpower into the Congo and that something had to be done to head it off. At the time he first went to the Congo he was the only man in the Station. A year later there were five or six and eventually the Station would reach upwards of twenty.Hedgeman mentioned that the relationships and staff that he built in the Congo persisted, and that when the Laotian operation started the group would move almost intact to Laos. Hedgeman believed that the Congo was vitally important to American interests, despite some criticism of that point from the State Department. He felt that the economic wealth of the Congo was important to the United States' future, and ;that it was equally important that the Congo remain a viable unit. He said that there was very strong resistance at the State level for political action involvement in the Congo. Fortunately the Congo operation became one of Allen Dulles' projects. At the beginning, with the approval of the Special Group, it was agreed that the CIA would begin to provide financial support for moderate Congolese politicians By August of 1960, however, Hedgeman and Timberlake were pushing for instructions that would allow them to pursue a course that would lead to a change in government. Hedgeman said that those close to Lumumba at that time were Soviet agents. The way that it was initially pursued was to the building of personnel assets investing in labor unions to help them with their propaganda, a lobbying campaign, direct payments to politicians.

The first major effort to rid the Congo of Lumumba came with a plan developed by Hedgeman to bribe enough members of the Senate in order to induce them to vote Lumumba out..This plan was to have taken place on the 7th of September, 1960. Hedgeman had arranged that the radio would be denied Lumumba after his defeat so that he would not be able to go on the radio to try to change the decision of the Senate. Unfortuneately and for reasons Hedgeman does not know to this day, Mobutu jumped the gun and threw Lumumba out. Lumumba in turn went

FILE:

to the Assembly and harangued them and got the vote and also got the vote in the Senate by bringing troops out and surrounding the Senate building. Hedgeman said that up to this point he had been thinking largely in parliamentary terms; that the way to rid the country of Lumumba was through the paramilitary method. After this experience of the 5th through the 7th, he decided more drastic and direct methods had to be employed. Hedgeman contends that the coup of Mobutu seized control was arranged and supported, and indeed, managed, by the Central Intelligence Agency. During the course of the interview Hedgeman spoke glowingly of Mobutu, who he feels is a man with good political judgment, a sense of history, and the capacity to be a Pan African leader. Mobutu was only twenty-nine at the time. Hedgeman says his most difficult time with Mobutu came in February of 1961 when the Kennedy administration decided that a federalized government, including all political factions was the only hope of averting civil war. Hedgeman was charged with going to Mobutu and telling him that the United States had decided to withdraw all support from him and that he would have to resign. He said Mobutu was utterly shocked by this and could not possibly believe the United States could believe that the Congo was ready for parliamentary government. He said Mobutu was so upset that he drew his gun and waved it in the direction of Hedgeman and said "If this happens, I will die," and, looking at Hedgeman, "so will others." Hedgeman said Mobutu only put his gun away when Hedgeman told him that he did not personally agree with the decision, that he was just carrying out orders like a good soldier.

FILE:

Hedgeman stressed that in this period, 1960-1961, the Congo was fraught with utter confusion; he sais that what they were running was a Scotch tape and baling-wire operation. As for paramilitary operations, Hedgeman said they began seriously in the end of 1962 with the arrival of a number of T-6's that he and Ed Gullion had asked for. He said that these aircraft were not intended to be used in combat, but only to reassure the Congolese that the United States was with them and provide them with a bit of black magic. Hedgeman professed that the paramilitary combat missions of 1963, in support of anti-rebel activities, were really quite minor affairs.

Some specifics. Hedgeman contended that he had no knowledge of the approval of funding of South African mercenaries and tribal leaders capable of resistance as approved by the 303 Committee. He also said, though, that he had important contact with Mike Hoare mercenaries, they gave no direct or indirect support to them. He also said there was ~~ne~~, repeat no, complicity or support on the part of the CIA in the ouster of Kasavubu by Mobutu in November of 1965.

Throughout the conversation, Hedgeman interspersed the most hair-raising tales of his and his daughter's brushes with death in their dealings with unruly mutinous Congolese, ranging from being placed before two different firing squads during one day and his evening as the selected victim of a hit contract given by the Union Miniere.

As for CIA employees who might testify well, should the Committee handle the Congo issue in executive session, Hedgeman recommended Edward Korn-Patterson, Bronson Tweedy, and Glen Fields.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10227

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-132

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : DAWSON, R.
TO :

TITLE : DIEM

DATE : 06/00/1975
PAGES : 157

SUBJECTS :
CIA
COLBY, WILLIAM
VIETNAM
KENNEDY, JOHN
DIEM, ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/05/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CC Box 133

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10227
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-132

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : DAWSON, R.
TO :
TITLE : DIEM
DATE : 06/00/75
PAGES : 157
SUBJECTS : VIETNAM

DIEM, ASSASSINATION

COLBY, WILLIAM

CIA

KENNEDY, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/20/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CC Box 133

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Bot 133

DIEM

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCone
Coloy
Kennedy, John F.
McNamarra
Lodge
Nhu
Hillsman
Tung
Diem

DATES:

11 Sept 63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiusly, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context, such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 21-22

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
MC CONE, JOHN
DIEM

DATES:
5 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓
TOP SECRET
Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: On or about October 5, 1963 when the telegram of October 5 and 6 were sent to Saigon, MC CONE was called over by PRESIDENT KENNEDY and met privately with PRESIDENT KENNEDY and the Attorney General, ROBERT F. KENNEDY, and took the position that the CIA should take a hands off position as far as the assassination of DIEM was concerned. MC CONE "felt that the President agreed with my position, despite the fact that he had great reservations concerning DIEM and his conduct. I urged him to try to bring all the pressure we could on DIEM to change his ways, to encourage more support throughout the country. My precise words to the President, and I remember them very clearly, was that Mr. President, if I was manager of a baseball team, I had one pitcher, I'd keep him in the box whether he was a good pitcher or not. By that I was saying that, if DIEM was removed we would have not one coup, but we would have a succession of coups and political disorder in Vietnam, and it might last several years as indeed it did. So it was for that reason that I felt there would be

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, Friday, June 6, 1975, McCone, Vol. 1, 2 of 5
pp. 62-32
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:
Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: more stability if DIEM could be persuaded to change his ways than remove him and hope that some group of generals could run the country better."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MC CONE, JOHN DIEM	5 Oct 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On October 5, 1963, MC CONE sent, to some locations, including SAIGON the following message: "Believe assassination discussions most careful handling. In general best line is no line so that it is clear that we are sticking to position of having no responsibility for actions of any of various contending Vietnamese groups. We certainly cannot be in the position of stimulating, approving, or supporting assassination, but on the other hand, we are in no way responsible for stopping every such threat of which we might receive even partial knowledge. We certainly would not favor assassination of DIEM. We believe in gaging ourselves by taking position on this matter opens door too easily for probes of our position re others, re support of regime, etc. Consequently, believe best approach is hands off. However, we naturally interested in intelligence on any such plan. This message has been cleared with State Department."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearing held before Senate Select Committee Intelligence, June 6, 1975, McCone, p. 60.
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MINH, GENERAL CONEIN NGO DINH CAN NGO DINH NHU	October 3-4 1963	✓DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: On October 3-4, 1963, CONEIN was asked to contact BIG MINH and did so by himsel at MINH's headquarters. "At that time, BIG MINH explained to me that they had had, that there was going to be a coup d'etat, that they didn't want this to be an American sponsored coup d'etat, they wanted to be assured of American backing, specifically in the part where it comes to military and economic aid after the coup had been successful." p. 24 "What the GENERAL meant, he actually did not want U.S. participation in the coup d'etat. He did not want the U.S. government to start the coup d'etat. He also outlined three general ideas, this was the first time that a leader had mentioned the possibility of assassination. This assassination was not of DIEM. This was -- if they could not do anything, it would be the elimination of NGO DINH CAN, who was the war lord in central Vietnam and NGO DINH NHU. At that time GENERAL MINH did say that one of the alternative means was to eliminate CAN and NHU and keep DIEM." That was one of the alternatives. p. 25

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CIA - Saigon Station VIETNAMESE GENERALS	31 Aug. 1963	DIEM ✓

TOP SECRE

OCCURRENCE:

In an August 31, 1963, CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0499), the following message appears:

"This particular coup is finished....GENERALS did not feel ready and did not have sufficient balance of forces....There is little doubt that GVN aware US role and may have considerable detail...." (15)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 15

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RICHARDSON
SPERA
CONEIN
MINH
KHIEM
TAYLOR
HARKINS
TRUEHEART
WEEDE, Gen. Richard G.
(Chief of Staff, MAC/V)
DEPTEL 243
DEPTEL 256
LODGE

DATES:

29 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM✓

TOP SECR

CARD 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

On August 29, 1963, the following report was listed within the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities as follows:

"At 0745 hours, RICHARDSON, SPERA and CONEIN, latter two of whom were scheduled to contact GENERALS MINH and KHIEM at 0815 same morning, were shown a message from GENERAL TAYLOR to GENERAL HARKINS stating aspects of Vietnam situation being reviewed at WHITE HOUSE and commenting that second thoughts were beginning in Washington. Faced with this information and given strictly limited time factors, RICHARDSON decided that the meeting with GENERALS MINH and KHIEM should not be postponed but that contacting officers would make this meeting a fact-finding mission without encouraging or discouraging GENERAL MINH.

"When SPERA and CONEIN returned from their meeting with KHIEM and MINH, (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECR

CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

we proceeded to TRUEHEART's office to make our report. The AMBASSADOR came in and RICHARDSON advised him of our meeting with GENERAL WEEDE, of TAYLOR's cable, and of the decisions which RICHARDSON had made as a result of the TAYLOR cable. LODGE was angry and expressed the view that RICHARDSON's decision had destroyed the possibilities of carrying out a coup. RICHARDSON expressed a firm dissenting opinion." (12)

SOURCE:

STAFF:

FILE:

ENTITIES:

TAYLOR, Maxwell
HARKINS, John
DEPTEL 243

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT Participation
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

DATES:
28 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The following telegram was sent from TAYLOR to HARKINS (JCS 3368-63) on August 28, 1963:

"Important WHITE HOUSE meeting on subject scheduled for 1200 28 August EDT, your views urgently needed on overall feasibility of operation contemplated....FYI State to Saigon 243 was prepared without DOD or JCS participation. Authorities are now having second thoughts." (11)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, Henry Cabot
DIEM

DATES:

26 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 26, 1963, AMBASSADOR LODGE presented his credentials to SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM. (8)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RICHARDSON, John
LODGE, Henry Cabot
CONEIN, CIA officer in Saigon
KHIEM
SPERA, CIA officer in Saigon
KHANH
DEPTEL 243

DATES:

26 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 26, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0304),

"RICHARDSON reports that the AMBASSADOR decided that the American official hand should not show in the operation. It was agreed that CONEIN would see KHIEM and that SPERA would see KHANH. CONEIN and SPERA were directed to convey the substance of DEPTEL 243, plus this comment: 'We cannot be of any help during initial action of assuming power of state. Entirely their own action, win or lose.'" (9)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RICHARDSON, John
LODGE, Henry Cabot
TRUEHART, William
HARKINS, Gen. Paul D. (Commander, MAC/V)
WEEDE, Gen.

DIEM
CIA

DATES:

25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRE

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1963, the following/CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0296) had the message below:

"RICHARDSON reports the results of a conference among AMBASSADOR LODGE, DCM TRUEHART, GENERAL HARKINS, GENERAL WEEDE, and RICHARDSON. The group agreed that giving DIEM an option had no chance of success. They accepted DEPTEL 243 [of 24 August] as a basic decision from Washingto and would proceed to do their best to carry out instructions. RICHARDSON gives headquarters his views on possible successor regimes." (7-8)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 7-8
Part C

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
HARRIMAN, Averell HILSMAN, Roger McCONE, John McNAMARA, Robert RUSK, Dean	KENNEDY, John F. TAYLOR, Maxwell (Mil. ass't to Pres.) GILPATRIC, Roswell	24-25 August 1963	DIEM ✓ TOP SECRET (CARD 1 of 4)

OCCURRENCE:

The I.G. REPORT of 1967 (CIA) contains the following description of the events of August 25, 1963, from a book by MARGUERITE HIGGINS: "The crucial act, with its overtones of Greek tragedy, opened with a cable. It was dispatched to Saigon late in the evening of August 24, 1963, a date made more significant because it was a Saturday. Washington usually empties on summer weekends or lapses into a somnolent mood as officials desperately seek relaxation.

"The telegram contained spectacular new instructions for the U.S. EMBASSY in SAIGON. It was drawn up at a meeting called by Under-secretary of State AVERELL HARRIMAN and ROGER HILSMAN, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs and head of the Vietnam task force. The President's senior advisers were, for the most part, out of town. CIA DIRECTOR JOHN McCONE was in California. DEFENSE SECRETARY ROBERT MCNAMARA was on vacation. (con't)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, pp. 5-6
PART C

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
(cont) HELMS, Richard DIEM NHU		Diem TOP SECRET (CARD 2 of 4)

OCCURRENCE:

SECRETARY OF STATE DEAN RUSK was attending a baseball game in New York. PRESIDENT KENNEDY was at Hyannis Port. GENERAL TAYLOR says he knew nothing of the meeting until it was over and the telegram long on its way.

". . . the cable proved historic. For the first time it gave the signal to 'unleash' the Vietnamese military, flashed a green light for the coup against DIEM of which the generals had been talking for so many years.

". . . the cable of August 24 was a radical revision of the previous philosophy of one war at a time. It envisaged the generals' making war on their own government, and with the implicit blessing of the United States.

"The substance of the cable was that the U.S. EMBASSY was to make an effort (con't.)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES: Diem

TOP SECRET

(CARD 3 of 4)

OCCURRENCE:

to persuade DIEM to fire his brother, release the Buddhist rebels, end press censorship, and restore other democratic liberties suspended under martial law. And if, as the cable anticipated, DIEM would not do these things, then the EMBASSY was to contact the VIETNAMESE GENERALS and tell them that the United States would no longer stand in the way of a revolt.

" . . . the controversial August 24 cable was dispatched from Washington Saturday evening after being cryptically summarized to PRESIDENT KENNEDY at the summer White House at Hyannis Port.

"The ACTING SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ROSWELL GILPATRIC . . . had the cable described to him over the telephone. MR. GILPATRIC says he was frankly surprised that such an (con't.)

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES: Diem

TOP SECRET

CARD 4 of 4

OCCURRENCE:

important set of instructions should be rushed out on a weekend. But he did not feel that he ought to veto the telegram since . . . it had the 'approval of the PRESIDENT.'

"In McCONE's absence, the cable was described, again cryptically, to RICHARD HELMS, DEPUTY DIRECTOR of the CIA, who also did not feel disposed to veto something 'approved by the PRESIDENT.'" (5-6)

CARD 4 of 4

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)
NHU
DIEM
DEPTEL 243

DATES:

24 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

CARD 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 243), on August 24, 1963, the following message appeared: "The DEPARTMENT informs the AMBASSADOR that the U.S. Government cannot tolerate a situation in which power lies in NHU's hands. If DIEM is unwilling to rid himself of NHU, then DIEM himself may have to go. The AMBASSADOR is authorized: (1) to inform the GVN that actions against BUDDHISTS must be redressed; (2) to tell key military leaders that the USG cannot support a DIEM regime that includes the NHU's and that 'we will give them direct support in any interim period of breakdown central government mechanism;' (3) to make statements in Saigon removing the military taint on the pagoda raids."

"The telegram includes the following statement: 'The AMBASSADOR and COUNTRY TEAM should urgently examine all possible alternative leadership and make detailed plans as to how (con't.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 4-5

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (con't from card 1)

we might bring about DIEM's replacement if this should become necessary. You will understand that we cannot from Washington give you detailed instructions as to how this operation should proceed, but you will also know we will back you to the hilt on actions you take to achieve our objectives.'" (4-5)

CARD 2 of 2

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Thich Tri Quang
Diem

DATES:
Aug. 21, 1963

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins states that the Xa Loi pagoda, based on her own experiences, was more a political command post than a holy place. It was the headquarters from which the militant Thich Tri Quang and others had run their political war against the Diem regime. According to Higgins, Thich Tri Quang told an Austrian journalist by the name of Denis Warner early in August that he hoped in the process "they would kill one or two of us."

Higgins goes on to note that the State Department regarded the actions against a dozen pagodas a betrayal of Diem's promise to reconciliate the Buddhists. (Page 181)

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins,
Harper and Rowe

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL TON THAT DINH, MILITARY GOVERNOR OF SAIGON, COMMANDER 3RD CORPS
CONEIN
Lodge, Henry C.
NGO DINH NHU
AMBASSADOR NOLTING

DATES:
21 August 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "On the night of the 21st of August, GENERAL TON THAT DINH, as military governor of Saigon and Commander of the 3rd Corps, has established a curfew. If I recall correctly, the curfew was to start about 7:00 or 8:00 o'clock at night. Anybody seen afte that time would be -- shot. And that night, elements -- later on, we didn't know at that time, later on proving to be elements of the special forces, which was praetorian guard of NGO DINH NHU and the police dressed in military uniforms attacked the pagodas in Saigon. What was very bad about this, Ambassador NOLTING had already been relieved and Ambassador LODGE was on his way to take over". p. 21

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Milting, Ambassador
Lodge, Ambassador
Diem
Thich Tri Quang

DATES:

Aug. 21, 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins claims that "...the raids by the Vietnamese Army and the pagodas took place five days after the departure of Ambassador Milting from Saigon, and a week before Henry Cabot Lodge was expected to arrive on his first tour of duty in Viet Nam." Higgins goes on to explain that Diem claimed that the reason that the raids were performed at this time was because: "It had become clear that Thich Tri Quang of Buddhist was that no intention of coming to any agreement with the government, irrespective of how many consessions were made. Since the raids would create an anti-Diem propaganda explosion, it would be less embarrassingto the United States if they took place when the new Ambassador was not present in ~~President of~~ Vietnam. For the same reason, great care was taken not to inform the United States of the pagoda plans. The reasoning was that Washington could be blamed for something about which it knew nothing." (page 183)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN, CIA officer (Saigon)
DON, General
DIEM

DATES:

8/21/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

"On August 21, 1963, at a meeting between CONEIN [an officer of the CIA Saigon station] and General DON, the latter asked for US ~~S.~~ government assurances of support ~~assurances of support~~ for moves against the DIEM regime." (3)

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C, p3.

FILE:

STAFF:

RD

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
GENERAL DON AMBASSADOR NOLTING CONEIN	July 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: On July 4, 1963, CONEIN received a message from DON, Commander of I Corps at the time, to meet with him in the Caravelle Hotel for a public meeting and the hotel was jammed packed. CONEIN states that: "It was at that time on the 4th of July that I had the first indication that something serious was being comtemplated, when GENERAL DON t me that if the Buddhist situation does not get settled, that the military are planning. I ported this fact, and I believe it was around the 8th or 9th of July, that more indications...." p. 20.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
EN. DUONG VAN MINH EN. TRAN VAN DON AJ. GEN. LE VAN KIM EN. TRAN THIEN KHIEM	7/63	DIEM ✓

TOP SEC

OCCURRENCE: The initial conscious decision and agreement amongst the coup principals occurred before July 4, 1963. ut this coup ttempt was borted but the ntention was bandoned soon fter the August p failed.

General Duong Van Minh has been the indisputable leader of the coup principals from the outset. General Tran Van Don has been General Minh's deputy and principal officer to contact subaltern officers and unit commanders. Major General Le Van Kim, probably the most intelligent of the conspirators, has been responsible for aligning nationalist opposition parties and for developing political planning. General Tran Thien Khiem's role was to issue necessary orders and to act as Chief of Staff to General Minh during the plotting and the actual coup.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM
GEN. MINH
NGO DINH NHU

DATES:

7/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

One of the main factors that affected the coup was the decision to eliminate or keep President Diem. The majority of the officers, including General Minh, desired President Diem to have honorable retirement from the political scene in South Vietnam and exile. As to Ngo Dinh Nhu and Ngo Dinh Can, there was never dissension. The attitude was that their deaths, along with Madame Ngo Dinh Nhu, would be welcomed.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Diem

DATES:

10 July 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In SNIE, 53-2-63, on 10 July "the situation in South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: "if -- as is likely -- Diem fails to carry out truly and promptly the commitment he has made to the Buddhists, disorders will probably flare again and the chances of coup or assassination attempts against him become even better. . . . We do not think . . . the Communists would necessarily profit if he were overthrown by some combination of his non-Communist opponents. A non-Communist successor regime might be initially less effective against the Viet Cong, but, given continued support from the U. S., could provide reasonably effective leadership for the government and the war effort." (1-2)

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, part C, 40 1-2

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
THICH TRI QUANG

DATES:
May 6, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: Diem on May 6, 1963 revived a regulation banning the public display of any religious flag--either the Buddhist or Catholic-- having any precedence over the National Vietnamese flag in public places or in public view. Higgins does not doubt that the Vietnamese government's decision to revive these flag regulations on May 6, 1963 made possible the Hue tragedy. Ironically, action by Diem has been generally viewed as anti-Buddhist. His May 6 circular had been provoked a few days earlier in Da Nang by the excessive use by Catholics of the flag of the vatican with the National Vietnamese flag on view being sometimes tattered and torn and few in number. (91)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN

MADAME NHU

DATES:
1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the catalyst that brought down the DIEM regime was their antagonism of the Buddhists. He explained that 80% of the Vietnamese people claimed to be Buddhists. And that DIEM led a Catholic regime and that this drove people, particularly in light of MADAME NHU's statements to the effect that she'd like to furnish some mustard at a bonzes barbecue, or something to that effect. This made people want to identify themselves against the regime and so they would go back to the pagodas. CONEIN did not know whether or not this became the principal reason for the United States wanting to get rid of the regime. pp. 42-44.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE:
July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
TRUEHEART, WILLIAM
MECKLIN, JOHN (Dir. USIA)
NOLTING, AMBASSADOR

DATES:
June 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE: Mecklin stated that the American position following the incident at Hue was to "urge Diem to repair all Buddhist grievances forthwith, to accept responsibility for the May 8 killings, and to indemnify the victims and apologize, perhaps by visiting Hue himself to do so." (Ambassador Nolting was on a Meditterranean vaction at the time.)

"According to Mecklin, William Trueheart, the Charge d'Affaires, applied on orders from Washington, 'direct,relentless, tablehammering pressure on Diem such as the United States had seldom before attempted with a sovereign friendly government...' In despair Trueheart in June resorted to a formal warning to Diem that if he continued repressive measures (police effort to prevent and disperse illegal demonstrations), the United States would be forced to disassociate itself publicly from such actions, as indeed we did two months later. The warning was a momentous step. It amounted to a direct official command from

(continued next card)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CARD TWO

DATES:

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (continuation)
the United States. Public disassociation could have disasterous results, encouraging the Buddhists, heartening the Viet Cong, strengthening the regimes foreign critics..." ' perhaps even stimulating the Vietnamese Army to try another coup''' (100)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row,

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CONEIN NHU, NGO DINH MADAME NHU CAN, NGO DINH	"Summer 1963"	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that the attacks in May in Hue followed up by an attack in Augus on the pagodas in Saigon consolidated the three or four different sects of the Buddhists by making them become a political entity which they had never been before. CONEIN stated that it had become obvious to people in the State Department, USAID and JUSPAU, as well as persons within the CIA and the country team generally, that the true power of the government at that time was not DIEM but rather NHU and CAN, as well as MADAME NHU, the chief of the womens' solidarity movement. DIEM was felt to be out of touch with reality and not getting the true facts as everything was being channeled through his brother, NHU. pp. 44-45

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CONEIN	"middle May 1963"	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said that the DIEM government started the Buddhist antagonism but could not understand their doing so. He gave his personal opinion as that "they had a chance to get out of it and get out of it very gracefully within the first two weeks after the 8th of May incident in HUE by meeting the demands of paying off the families of those people who were killed when the military attacked the pagodas in Hue. If this would have been done, I think that we would have been much better off....This was a turning point of the political situation....". pp. 41-42

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM
MAJOR GEN. TRAN VAN DON (sp.?)

DATES:

May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "Immediately after May 8, President Diem ordered a formal investigation of the Hue affairs. For this purpose he appointed a 3-man technical commission led by Major General Tran Van Don, the acting head of the army (General Don was considered a man of integrity by the Americans.)" The commission also included the Surgeon General of the Vietnamese Army and its Chief of Ordinance. After extensive interrogation of witnesses General Don's mission cited plastic charges as the cause of the deaths on May 8.

"At the time, nonetheless, Diem's regime claimed that plastic bombs caused the deaths was widely ridiculed.

"Unfortunately, no American officials were witness to the incidence. The American consul had been out of town but he tended to disbelieve the government's efforts to place ~~(continued)~~ the blame on Viet Cong plastics. He felt that the American supplied grenades were reponsible for the killings."(96)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

THICH TRI QUANG
NGUTEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)
MAJOR DANG SY (ASST. PROV. CHIEF)

DATES:

May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: Nguyen Van Bang later at the trial of Major Dang Sy said that "While we were inside, two loud explosions suddenly reverberated on the veranda. Then came the sounds of broken glass, gunshots, and exploding hand grenades." In the confusion Major Dang Sy heard the explosions also and in attempting to signal what he feared may be a Viet Cong attack fired three shots in the air. Unfortunately this was the prearranged signal authorizing his troops to use grenades to disperse the crowds. At least 15 of these grenades were throw and the explosions caused at least 8 dead at the radio station. (95) This statement though, appears to be in conflict with later medical evidence coming from the Interior Minister which found that none of the bodies of the dead had metal splinters in their organs, but rather the weapons expert said that the bombs were probably made of plastic and that "plastic is the arm of the Viet Cong guerilla." (95-96)

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
THICH TRI QUANG
NGUYEN VAN BANG (Province Chief)
MAJOR DANG SY (Asst. Province Chief)

DATES:
May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: According to Higgins on May 8, 1963 on the Buddhist birthday Thich Tri Quang, in the middle of a religious ceremony, began to give a vitriolic anti-government speech on the subject of the non-existent ban on Buddhist flags. About 8 pm Thich Tri Quang arrived at the radio station carrying in his hands a tape recording which he then made the demand upon the director of the station to play. He was refused. Thich Tri Quang proceeded to encourage an already active angry crowd which in the middle of this oration began to shout and press forward. The director of the station called up Nguyen Van Bang who soon arrived and attempted to appease Thich Tri Quang, but the latter would not listen. Nguyen Van Bang then asked for armored cars in hopes that this would fighten the crowd and prevent any violence to the radio station. Major Dang Sy then arrived with some armored cars and got some general orders to disperse the crowd. Police arrived and attempted to turn fire hoses on the crowd. (93-94)

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Trich Tri Quang
Diem

DATES:
May 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE: "No evidence can be adduced showing that before the Hue incident of May 8, 1963, there was a religious issue in Vietnam. If there had been, assuredly the critics of Diem's leadership would have trumpeted it to the world. Complaints of the critics of alleged religious repression made by Thich Tri Quant and his accomplices in a campaign of letters to the United Nations and prominent foreigners, had begun, but they represented no more than the early activity of determined propagandists.

Most hostile criticism toward Diem centered not on what he did but on his methods and techniques of governing."

SECRET

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Colby Ngo, Dinh Can Conein Nhu	10/63	Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Colby explained that a couple of weeks before the assassination the thought of assassination was not aimed at Diem but at Nhu and Can, Diem's two brothers who were considered the evil influence of the government. "The idea of removing Nhu from Vietnam was one that was discussed in great detail and a great deal of pressure was put on Diem to send his brother out of the country." "At one point I made a suggestion that perhaps I could convince him of the desirability of leaving the country for the benefit of his own, of the country itself. That I could go over and argue him into (it) That I think is the separable thing from the actual decision to shoot Diem. I think the decision to shoot Diem was a conscience decision taken by the Generals which came as a very new development during the coup, but let's face it, it is something you have to anticipate may taken place in an overthrow of a government." Pages 33-34

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
u, Ngo Dinh oncein nh	11/2/63	Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

oncein stated that at no point in the climatic days leading up to the assassina-
on was there a discussion of the killing of Diem. Further, there had never
en any discussion at any time about Diem himself being killed by anybody.
n fact, the generals and many people wanted Diem to be around but they could
t stand Nhu and Madame Nhu, Diem's wife. Page 64-66.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY, WILLIAM
MINH, GENERAL
NHUNG
CONEIN
Nhu

DATES:
1 November 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "Apparently the decision by several of the generals, the ones that were present, that he (DIEM) would be executed when they got him. They sent an officer, a small armored unit to pick him up after they found out where he was down in the other part of town. He and his brother were put in an armored personnel carrier with an officer, a young Vietnamese who was an aide to GENERAL MINH, head of the coup group, and they went into the armored personnel carrier and when the carrier arrived back at headquarters, the two were dead and had been shot several times. That officer, incidentally, and a rather bizarre aspect of this, was himself apparently executed when this junta of generals was overthrown about two months later. Somebody took that occasion to shoot him." pp. 18-19.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 18-19

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DIEM
THICH TRI QUANG

DATES:
May 7, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: The Diem circular to ban all religious flags reached Hue on May 7, 1963. Since the city was already bedecked with flags the Vietnamese Minister of Interior, Vui Van Long, arriving in Hue on the same date as the circular arrived went to the Buddhist leaders and explained that the flag regulation would not be enforced. "The leaders of the monks were very pleased," said Minister Long. "They listened to me and told me that I had given complete satisfaction to their desires." Quang was present during this exchange and joined in expressing satisfaction with the arrangement not to enforce the regulation. Some police in Hue did take down flags before the Province Chief could reverse the order to enforce the regulation. But the precipitating factor, according to Higgins was that Kuang sent a few monks around to tell the people to haul down the flags, even though he knew this was no longer required, thanks to the Interior Ministers actions. "The monks were told to tell the population that this was being done as a result of Diem's order to ban the Buddhist flag." (91-92)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
McCone Diem Nhu Kahn		DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In responce to a question as to whether McCone was aware of a suggestion to assassinate Mr. Diem and if he had sent a telegram in conjunction with that suggestion, McCone testified that he did not think it was Mr. Diem who was the target. He testified that "there was a proposal, one of a number of proposals, in connection with the difficult political situation that existed in South Vietnam, to dispose by assassination of Mr. Nhu and General Kanh.... when that was brought to my attention I ordered a telegram sent out to stand that down" (4) McCone testified that "The situation in Vietnam was unlike other situations. We were really at war there. My opposition was more on the basis of considered judgement that the action recommended by the station wouldn't in final analysis solve any problem.". (5).

SOURCE: McCone, June 6, 1975	STAFF: Gordon Rhea
FILE:	DATE: 6/27/75

1960-62

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LANSDALE
ALAN DULLES

DATES:
Mar 16, 1960

CATEGORIES:
MONGOOSE
SPECIAL GROUP
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On March 16, 1960 at the Special Group Meeting there was discussion of stepped up plans to use the base radio at Guentameo Bay to expand the stations listening audience. VIETNAM Mr. DULLES Referred to the worsening security situation in South Vietnam... and commented that this appears to be a situation where S. F. training might be in order. DULLES asked whether it would be "politically feasible for Col. LANSDALE to visit the area to assess the situation on the spot." DULLES also discussed briefly "the possibility of assisting the South Vietnam government to mount guerrila operationsin the north."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Minutes of Special Group Meeting March 16, 1960.

FILE:

STAFF:
KELLEY

DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lansdale
Dulles
Hare
Irwin

DATES:
May 12, 1960

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓
Special Group

OCCURRENCE:

On May 12, 1960, the Special Group discussed the subject of the invitation from President Diem for General Lansdale to visit Viet Nam. Mr. Hare said "that he assumed that the way in which Diem would like to use General Lansdale would not be acceptable to the U. S., but that some adjustments could no doubt be made. Mr. Dulles said that "Lansdale could be counted on to carry out whatever instructions he had in a manner least calculated to upset Diem."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Minutes of Special Group meeting May 12, 1960

FILE:

STAFF: Bob Kelley

DATE: June 29, 1975

ERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM NGO DINH NHU MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR-GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM, COLBY, HARKINS WESTMORELAND, GENERAL	1962	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "In 1962 COLBY assigned him to work with the MINISTER (THE INTERIOR OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM to be responsible for liaison between CIA and th MINISTER on a program called THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM. The idea for this program was that of NHU, the President's brother and counsellor, which was to establish security withi hamlets and villages in order ~~so~~ that the people could deny access of food and taxes to the VIET CONG. In this position, CONEIN was able to travel quite extensively under the auspic of the MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR, and to talk to the unit commanders down to and including small sections." p. 17. CONEIN. "This was done with the permission of GENERAL HARKINS an it was known to GENERAL WESTMORELAND when WESTMORELAND took over." p. 18.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
JFK laxwell Taylor	27 Sept 62	Special Group Augmented MOONGOOSE Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

aylor states that the Special Group and the Sepcial Group Augmented considered a proposal by IA for covert activities designed to harass the Democratic REpublic of Vietnam. This had een prepared in response to a request by the Sec.'s of State and Defense. ✓

aylor added that the Special Group asked that a more detailed operation plan be prepared. t was agreed that Defense make certain equipment and personnel available to CIA in support f this program. An elint flight designed to identify the North Vietnamese radar order of attle, so as to permit planning over flight routes was authorized. This will be flown out f Saigon , using the specially equipped aircraft available on Taiwan, but with the Chinese ir Force markings removed, and employing Chinese Nationalists pilots documented South Vietnamse citizens.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Maxwell Taylor's memorandum for the President, dated Sept 27, 1962. (00050)

FILE:

STAFF: PGW

DATE 6/29/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CONEIN	February 1962	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was th political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was unable, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:	STAFF:	
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein		R. DAWSON
FILE:	DATE:	30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN

DATES:
February 1962

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated: "In February of 1962, two air force pilots, Vietnamese Air Force pilots, attacked the presidential palace of NGO DINH DIEM. This was not the first indication there was something wrong, because if you will recall, in November of 1960, th was another attempted coup. At that time, in February, I was asked if I would go to the different military leaders which I knew and had known in the past, to find out what was th political pressure, what was the temperature, was there really some dissidence within the military ranks, was there really a basis for an uprising against NGO DINH DIEM? I was unable, at this time, to determine this fact. There was an isolated dissidence within the military structure. This was reported in February and March of 1962." pp. 16-17.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 30 June 1975

1963

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

~~DIEM~~

DATES:

1963

DIEM ✓ CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE: "Most manifestations of political oppostion," wrote Henderson, "were vigorously suppressed. Civil liberties remained an unfulfilled ideal. Elections were far from free and many of the devices used to stimulate popular support for the regime bore the the familiar stamp of modern totalitarian practice. No doubt these moves could be justified, at least to some extent, in terms of the overwhelming problems confronting Diem during his first few years in office and also the inexperience of Free Viet Nam's people with the forms and substance of democracy, but...Diem had still to prove that his professed devotion to the democratic cause represented anything more than a facade to disguise increasingly plain reality of stern dictatorship." (164-165)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NGO DINH CAN
MINISTER OF INTERIOR
CONEIN

DATES:

1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that: "On May 7, 1963,....."The MINISTER OF INTERIOR, myself a
his entourage flew to Hue in central Vietnam. While in Hue, it was on my aircraft that I
assigned to me for that day --- while in Hue, they had a very large meeting of different
military authorities and at that time I did not realize what was going on. They had met w
the President's brother, NGO DINH CAN who was considered the war lord, in a way, and some
decisions were made, of which I was not aware of (sic). We returned quite late the night
the 7th; though I wanted to stay, the MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR told me it would be impossi
I wanted to see the celebration of the birthday of Budda. I wanted to see burnt boats wit
the candles lit going down the perfumed river, but it was not to be. The next day there wa
an attack by the military forces on the Buddhists. At that time, the Buddhists as an ent
was not a political force and therefore thought of being, and when the attack on the Budd
came about, this was, in my estimation, one of the turning points in what was happening
Vietnam." p. 19

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, Henry CABOT
CONEIN

DATES:
1963

CATEGORIES:
DEIM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "....I worked for Ambassador LODGE. I reported to Ambassador LODGE and I received my instructions from Ambassador LODGE. They were cable instructions, he had a very good habit of not reading something. He would fold a piece of paper and what pertained to you for instructions, he would let you read that and that alone so that you didn't know who was sending it or where it came from. He just read that and he said those are the instructions, do you understand them? Yes, sir; allright, we'll carry them out." p. 23

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE: 20 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN

DATES:
1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

Conein stated that:

OCCURRENCE: "I had never, and even right up to the very end, I had never been asked for any resources whatsoever to help or to aid in the elimination of any individual." p. 25

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Dawson
National Security Council
State Dept

DATES: 1963

CATEGORIES: Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that the policy of the chain of command wanted a determination whether it be by the Security Council or by other authority is made to carry out that policy is normally transferred from the National Security Council to the ambassador. "The ambassador is the President's representative and has overall authority of all agencies in that country, and therefore, an important question like this (the Diem coup) would be passed to the ambassador tohandle". "Now, the other agencies in town would be informed of the policy directive that we might have additional communication as to the details as to how to implement them, which in this case (the Diem coup) were done through directive to our Station Chief to make sure he operated very directly and immediately under the control of the ambassador." Page 35.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Special Forces
Colby

DATES: 1963

CATEGORIES: Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that "the Special Forces first arrived in Vietname working for CIA in this country program of developing villages for their own defense. When it got to be as I remember 750 of them the question arose as to whether they should be transferred out of CIA into military control, and this was done during 1963; military took over responsibility for that program and I will have some more words to say about that at another time." Page 28-29.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20,1975, Colby

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
BUNDY, MC GEORGE, TAYLOR, MAXWELL BALL, GEORGE FORRESTAL, MICHAEL HILLSMAN, ROGER; AMBASSADOR NOLTING MC CONE, JOHN, MC NAMARA, ROBERT GILPATRIC, ROSWELL	1963	DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the persons typically in attendance in the conference room or situation room to discuss matters in Vietnam during 1963, MESSRS. BUNDY, BALL, FORRESTAL, HILLSMAN, MC CONE, MC NAMARA GILPATRIC, TAYLOR. p. 70 COLBY also stated that generally the Attorney General was generally not in attendance. If the meeting was to be with the President, then it would have been in the Cabinet room and then the Attorney General would have been there. pp. 70-71, The chairman of the meetings downstairs which President never attended would have been Mr. BUNDY. pp. 71-72 Mr. HARRIMAN would come so times, COLBY recalled, and Vice President JOHNSON would always attend the ones upstairs in the Cabinet room, but did not take a particularly active part. pp. 72 Ambassador NOLTING when he returned, after his replacement in Vietnam took a very active role opposing action against President DIEM to the extent that he was invited to participate. And his advice w not accepted. p. 73

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 1 July 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CONEIN	Summer and Fall 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "There were (sic) not one coup plan. There were several. The problem that wa facing the people that were making assessments of this was which one had the most likely chance of succeeding? We were at the point of no return. There was no chance of going back because there was going to be a coup. The best thing to do was to monitor and keep the U.S. government advised of who the principal players were, what their intentions were then and in the future. It was an impossible situation, and also during this time, it was getting down to the critical element. In October, the generals had to have assurances that I was speakin for the Ambassador. Several attempts were made to get these assurances, and it was practically impossible because of the security around the generals, who were already suspect...." p. 28

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Diem

DATES:
Summer 1963

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

"....Diem was not conforming to Western standards of democracy. And this was really the heart of the case against him. Implicit in their criticism was the assumption that Occidental style democracy was, in fact, the answer to Oriental Vietnam's problems. It was an assumption with which Ngo Dinh Diem disagreed on both practical and philosophical grounds."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: "Our Vietnam Nightmare", Marguerite Higgins, Harper & Row, 1965, p. 165

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Thich Tri Quang
McNamara
Diem

DATES:
Summer, 1963

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE: ~~Card 1~~

Higgins states in her book that, "Washington generated pressure on Diem for conciliation was based on the assumption that Thich Tri Quang's grievances concerning flags and such were what motivated his Budist protest movement. But it was evident that what Thich Tri Quang wanted was a pretext to see. His objective was not a solution, but nonetheless than Diem's head.

"Perhaps Diem might have had a better image in the United States if he had personally shown immediate public concern for the victims of the Hue tragedy. He then instantly order generous indemnification of the families who suffered losses, but this was never publicized. Perhaps he was too . So inwardly assured of his innocence was Diem that he did not of going through the trouble of proving it. He would certainly ~~(Continued on Card 2)~~ have pleased Madison Ave. boys at the Embassy by visiting a ___ or two but such strategy would scarcely have appeased Thich Tri Quang, whose target was not Diem's image but ___." (101

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, Harper and Rowe

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: July 3, 1975

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. HUYUH

DATES:

7/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

General Huynh Van Cao, Commanding General of IV Corps was never taken into the confidence of the coup principals. The participants preferred to work with Colonel Bui Huu Nhon, Commander of the 21st Division. With the 7th Division and the 9th Division, the conspirators dealt with regimental commanders and bypassed the division commanders. This tactic applied also to the Marine Brigade and the Airborne Brigade and, to a lesser extent, to the Armor Command.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DO CAO TRI
GEN. NGUYEN KHANH
GEN. TON THAT DINH
GEN. DON

DATES:

7/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Other general officers such as Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh were informed of the coup planning but did not actively participate in any of the actual planning. General Ton That Dinh, Commanding General of III Corps, was handled completely differently than any other officer. Division Commanders were contacted by General Don directly or were requested to appear at the Joint General Staff when their military situation permitted or when visiting Saigon.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10.

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

7/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

5a

CONTINUED ON ANOTHER CARD:

Only the elements of the Presidential Guard had been contacted and there were early defections during the fighting. The Ranger Command was not contacted since Ranger Units were assigned to individual corps and divisions. Those assigned to coup units were assumed to be loyal to that unit. The Air Force was 100 percent with the coup plotters with the exception

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page ten.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

5b

CONTINUED FROM FIRST CARD:

of its commanding officer, Colonel Huynh Huu Hien. The medical service, a non-combatant arm, was with the coup plotters. The navy, always considered faithful to President Diem, was to fall into the category of the Vietnamese Special Forces with its commander issuing the necessary orders under duress.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 11.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: 7/63

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Unfortunately, the officer, a Major (fnu) Thien (phonetic), who had the mission to escort Captain Ho Tan Quyen, Commanding Officer of the Naval Forces, killed the Captain prior to 1200 hours. This nearly upset the timing of the plan. Fortunately, he was driven directly to the Military Hospital and no one knew of his death except the coup principals and the doctors loyal to them.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Page 11.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: 7/63

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The Saigon Garrison troops, including support troops such as quartermaster, signal, engineers, etc., were contacted through individual commanders. Vietnamese Special Forces, because of its dubious role as the executive arm of the secret police, was never contacted but was always considered by the Generals as being completely loyal to President Diem.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 10-11.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/7

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NGO DINH NHU
CONEIN

DATES:
July 11, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "On July 11, 1963, NHU called the generals together for staff meeting and shocked them by telling them that he knew of some coup planning going on the generals. This scared the generals and other officers, needless to say, that NGO DINH NHU would be completely aware that there was some dissidence in the ranks." p. 20-21.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: 30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Krulik, Major General Victor H.
Kennedy, John F.
Mendenhall, Joseph, State
National Security Council

DATES:
8/63

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:
Higgins notes that Kennedy dispatched Krulik and Mendenhall to Viet Nam to make a tour of the country to determine the effect of the Buddhist crisis on the war against the Viet Cong. Returning to Washington, Krulik and Mendenhall each gave a different report on the effect. Higgins notes that Kennedy asked wryly, "Have you two fellows been in the same country?" Higgins goes on to note that this was indeed indicative of the American reaction to Vietnam generally. Krulik, Higgins points out, visited the theatre of war by going to all core areas as well as six divisional and some twenty-five regimental and battalion headquarters. But Mendenhall saw the theatre of the political intrigue, i.e., Hue in Saigon. These latter two areas was the only Viet Nam that Americans knew during that time, and it was the slightly Effett, volital society which was the haven of Viet Nam's chronically critical and bickering intellectuals. (Pages 104-105)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, Harper and Rowe

STAFF: Dawson
DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NHU, NGO DINH

CONEIN

DATES:

August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: The coup ...."aborted, because, one, they did not have necessary forces. I'm talking about the coup plotters, did not have the necessary forces to combat those loyal to the DIEM government, namely elements of the Marines, elements of the Rangers, presidential guard, and other units, and especially the Special Forces, which were the bes armed troops available. Also, they announced in the press that the CIA was paying to have a coup. This was a very shrewd and calculating move on any man on the quality NGO DINH NH who was a shrewd politician and also master of psychological warfare." pp. 22-23

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 20 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
VIETNAMESE SPECIAL FORCES
COLBY

DATES:

August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: "As part of the pressure on the government in the Augus period, in response to the fact that these SPECIAL FORCES with Vietnamese military and wit Vietnamese police had conducted the raid on pagodas, CIA was directed to suspend its assis ance to the SPECIAL FORCES. We did not suspend our assistance to the police or to the military who were involved in that, but CIA is an easy thing to turn off, turn on and off. The other programs are much more difficult to turn on and off. In a simple way, I think t has had a certain influence in what they did. I know it resulted in the transfer of sever units outside of Saigon when we said we would continue to support them." p. 78-79

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 1 July 1975

ERSONS/ENTITIES:

MADAME NHU
CONEIN

DATES:

August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN states that: "Just before August 21, 1963, there were periods the bonzes burned themselves and that there had been local press releases made by MADAME NHU that were sometimes not too well received by the Americans, and also antagonized the population." p. 21

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 31 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COMMODITY IMPORT PROGRAM
DIEM
COLBY, WILLIAM
NGO DINH NHU , CONEIN

DATES:

August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the United States sought to put pressure on President DIEM and the government, particularly to remove NGO DINH NHU from the country, to bring about certain changes of policy in August of 1963 that was thought necessary to improve the performance of the government of South Vietnam. Among these were the suspension of Public Law 480 aid the suspension of the commodity import program. And also through various contacts with dissident generals, the United States was requested whether it would stand aside if the generals ran their own coup, and they were given the response in general terms that, "Yes, we would stand aside, and yes, we would continue the aid program if a successor government took over and looked reasonably able to carry on the war. This can only be read as a green light to the generals. This message was passed through a CIA officer, but his creditentials were checked by the generals receiving this kind of a message, with the Ambassador and with the Chief of the Military Aid group in Saigon so that there was no question about what U.S. policy was, nor that the CIA officer was speaking for the Ambassador with his knowledge and consent."

SOURCE:

FILE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 10-11

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
DIEM COLBY, WILLIAM NOLTING LODGE, Henry Cabot	August 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified that during August, 1973 between the change of ambassadors from NOLTING to LODGE, that the government of South Vietnam took that period and raided Buddists pagodas and essentially sought to surpress the Buddihist dissidence. COLBY stated that DIEM went out and supressed this kind of active dissidence, justifying it in his mind and publicly as not accepting this kind of dissidence during a wartime situation, which that country was faced with. COLBY claimed that this suppression only served to adversely affect DIEM's image here in the United States and intensify the feeling of dissent within the educated class in Saigon and in the cities, weakened himself, rather than strengthen himself.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 8-9

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
DIEM NOLTING, AMBASSADOR RICHARDSON, JOHN	Aug. 7, 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: Higgins asked Diem in an interview on August 7, 1963 whether Diem thought the United States was plotting against him. Diem replied: "I do not think Ambassador Nolting is plotting against me. I do not think Richardson /of the CIA/ is plotting against me. I know there are American officials who are preparing the way in the event the decision is taken to try and get rid of me. I cannot forsee the future. And I cannot believe that America would turn against an ally under attack, engaged in a struggle for its very existence. But some people are crazy--and the world is crazy. Still, Miss Higgins, I hope that your government will take a realistic look at these young generals plotting to take my place. How much maturity or political understanding do they have--of their own country, let alone the world?" (169)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and

STAFF: Dawson, R.

PERSONS/ENTITIES: ~~DIEM,~~ LODGE, AMBASSADOR

DATES: Aug. 7, 1963

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

Card 1 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

During an interview by Higgins with DIEM on August 7, 1963 "...Diem sent an aide for document, which I later deduced to be a memorandum of a recent conversation with an American official."

"Your ambassador, " Diem resumed, "comes and tells me that it enhances my posture of the liberal image to permit demonstrations in the street by the Buddhists and the political opposition...I cannot seem to convinvce the embassy that this is Viet Nam--not the United States of America. We have had good reason to ban street demonstrations in the middle of a war, and the reason is that the Viet Cong are everywhere...what would happen if the Viet Cong should infiltrate the demonstration here in Saigon, toss a bomb, kills dozens of persons, including some American press? What would 'liberal opinion' say of me then? Would they believe my government when it said that the Viet Cong were responsible for the killings because only the Communists could profit from

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CARD TWO

DATES:

CATEGORIES: DIEM

Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: (continuation)

such an event? Consider what happened at Hue. These plastic bombs were throw by the Viet Cong...but whom did the Americans blame? They blamed me--the President of Viet Nam-- and the Vietnamese Army. Would they be any more charitable next time? This is not child's play; I am not inventing Viet Cong terror. Yet when I try to protect the people of this country--including the Americans--by good police work, keeping control in the streets, I am accused of persecuting the Buddhists!" (167)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: [Milting, Amb. Affair, Saigon Embassy] [Hilsman, Roger, Assistant Secretary of State] [Trueheart, William] [Mechlin, Director, USIA ~~Viet Nam~~

DATES: 8/14/63

CATEGORIES: Diem ✓

Card 1 of 2

CARD 1 OCCURRENCE: Higgins points out that on August 14, 1963, Hilsman, in a voice of America broadcast, declared that the Buddhist crisis was "beginning to affect the war effort." Higgins decided to check this story with the Saigon Embassy in approached Milting, who was at that time in conference with Trueheart and Mechlin. Milting told Higgins that "Our report shows that the Buddhist crisis is not having any impact at all--though, of course, it could if riots become severe enough to necessitate diverting front-line troups."

"We have made a special check," the Ambassador continued, " of the rumor that Buddhist and Catholics are eating apart an Army messes. Nothing to it. I don't know what Hilsman based this statement on. But he isn't basing it on anything that went out of his Embassy, the military mission, or the CIA." Mechlin suggested to Milting that perhaps he should not publicly deny Hilsman's comment as "Hilsman was, after all, Milting's boss." Higgins, returning to New York shortly thereafter, called Hilsman

(Continued on Card 2)

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins, Harper and Rowe

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: July 3, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

Card 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE: Card 2

to find out what was the basis for his broadcast. Hilsman conceded that in fact he had based his account upon the reports in the New York Times and other press dispatches out of Saigon. (page ~~104~~ 124-125).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Diem

DATES:

14 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In the Current Intelligence Memorandum (OCI 2339/63): "Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" the following quotation appeared: ". . . the coup reports and rumors which have arisen since the Buddhist crisis seem to reflect some serious coup plotting, but we have no firm evidence of advanced planning by any group to attempt to overthrow the regime . . ." (2).

SOURCE:

FILE: 1967 I.G. Report, part C, p. 2

Cage

STAFF: RD

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM
Ball, Undersecretary of State
Helms, Richard
Colby, Wm.

DATES:

8/21/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial law. At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control." (2)

SOURCE:

FILE: 1967 I.G. Report, Part C

Cage

STAFF: RD

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM

DATES:

8/21/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On 21 August 1963, the current intelligence memorandum (OCI 2341/63): "Coup Rumors in South Vietnam" stated that "additional reports of plotting against the DIEM government have been received. While there is no hard evidence of imminent action, the Buddhist issue continues to make the situation dangerous." (3)

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C, p. 3

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

RD

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN
DINH
NGO DINH NHU, GENERAL DON

DATES:

21 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

✓DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: "During the period between 21 August and the lifting of marshall law on 16 September, GENERAL DINH actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of the DIEM regime. DINH, on approximately 31 August had the audacity to inform both President DIEM and counsellor NHU that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himsel NHU's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a rest." During this period of time, DINH realized that he had been played for a dupe by DIEM. The generals would recognize this fact and GENERAL DON started playing on DINH's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and that, above all, should have been thanked by DIEM and NHU for saving the government.
pp. 12-13

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975 , Exhibit 1, Conein

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Diem	August 21, 1963	Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: ~~(card 1)~~

Higgins characterizes the raids ~~xxxXakoi~~ on the XaLoi and on August 21, 1963, as the turning point in American policy toward Viet Nam. She states that this crystalizes the feelings of a powerful action inside the Kennedy Administration that Diem had to be opposed.

" raised stories from Saigon scene that had all the inventiveness of an Oriental Ian Fleming. Soldiers in battle dress were wearing gasmasks "stormed" into shortly after midnight. A of bells, a blood-curdling scream shattered the spirits serenity. One eye witness professed to see two monks thrown twenty feet from a balcony. Extravagant rumors about the number of death and wounded spread like a wild malignancy.

"When the United Nations in Viet Nam investigated the rumors in charges
~~(Continue to Card 2)~~ 3 months later, he could find no evidence that anyone had been killed!

SOURCE: Our Vietnam Nightmare by Marguerite Higgins
Harper and Rowe

The —— investigators talked at length —— who had been present during the entire affair Xa Loi and elsewhere. (180-81)

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
DIEM Ball, Undersecretary of State ✓ Helms, Richard Colby, Wm.	8/21/63	Diem

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On 21 August 1963, South Vietnamese troops and police attacked the occupied Buddhist pagodas throughout the country. DIEM imposed nationwide martial law. At a presidential meeting on Vietnam on this same date, the participants from the CIA, including the DCI, DDP, and Chief of Far Eastern Division, it was pointed out that on notes taken by the Chief of the Far Eastern Division that "on the matter of possible alternate leadership in Vietnam, it was pointed out that there was no indication that DIEM was not in full control." (2)

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, Part C

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

RD

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: 21 AUG. thru 16 SEPT.

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

During the period between 21 August and the lifting of martial law on 16 September, General Dinh actually considered himself the hero of Vietnam and the savior of the Diem Regime.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: GENERAL DINH

DATES: 11/1/63 21 AUG. thru 16 SEPT. '63

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

~~His~~ Dinh's actions during this period as Military Governor did not endear him to the population or the other officers.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HIL~~L~~SMAN, Roger (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs)
CIA

DATES:

8/22/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

CARD 1 of 2

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63334), the following message appeared: "Ref dept. telegram in process. Reftel (which Hqs. not yet seen) states basic line to be taken and directs that it be pushed at all levels. Hil~~l~~sman requested Hqs. send companion telegram to station pointing out this is one technique to bring about surfacing of where and who real power is. Pressing this line could maximize possibility of obtaining US [illegible] objective. Even if it does not succeed, it can substantially assist in identification of alternate or successor leadership with necessary drive, abilities and ambition, to incorporate in our overall contingency planning and serve as focus of build-up program. Hqs. will comment ~~and~~ in

SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, Part C

FILE: Cage

STAFF: RD

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HILLSMAN, Roger (Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs)
CIA

DATES:

8/22/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem

CARD 2 of 2

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

CARD #2

further detail after seeing message, if necessary, but passes above at Hil~~l~~sman's request." (3)

SOURCE:
1967 I.G. Report, part C, p.3

FILE: Cage

STAFF: RD

DATE: 6/28/75

CIA
RICHARDSON, John (CIA station
chief in Saigon)
Saigon Embassy
DIEM

8/22/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 22, 1963, in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0208) Chief of Station RICHARDSON forwarded his personal views concerning alternate leadership: ". . . Recent events have made us feel that hope for civilian government to replace DIEM administration is unrealistic. The solution seems even more improbable than ever before. Would appear that we should have either DIEM or military junta. . . . View time factor have not coordinated this message with embassy but we have exchanged views fully on subject matter." (3-4)

SOURCE:

FILE: 1967 I.G. Report, part C, pp 3-4
Cage

STAFF: RD

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HILLSMAN, ROGER
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
CONEIN

DATES:
22 or 23 August
1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: LODGE arrived on 22 or 23 August. When he arrived he found that Saigon was a armed camp. "During this period of these attacks on the pagodas, there had been many contacts made by a lot of people to anybody who would listen to them talking about doing something about doing away with the existing regime, I had talked with different generals and the one in August -- I don't recall if it was the 23rd or 24th, we received a cable which later been known as the famous ROGER HILLSMAN cable which practically gave us the go-ahead that this type of thing could not continue." pp. 21-22

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

23 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "There was a lot of talk of coups. We met with generals on different occasio
I met with them, other people had also. We had met with colonels and junior officers. An
we anticipated that there would be some type of action taken in the latter part of August.
p. 22.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE: 30 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARRIMAN, W. Averrel (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs)
HELMS (Deputy Director for Plans, CIA)
RUSK, Dean (Secretary of State)
GILPATRICK, Roswell (Deputy Sec of Defense)

DATES:

8/24/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 24, 1963, in a telephone call from HARRIMAN to HELMS at 2000 hours, HARRIMAN outlined to HELMS the substance of what eventually turned out to be Deptel 243 to Saigon. In notes recorded by HELMS, in response to HELMS' query, "HARRIMAN confirmed that the thrust of the telegram contained an implicit pullout of American forces and support if the Nhus' were not ousted. HARRIMAN said the message had been cleared 'with Hyannisport', with the Secretary of State and with Mr. GILPATRICK."(4)

SOURCE:

1967 I.G. Report, part C, p. 4

FILE:

Cage

STAFF:

RD

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HILSMAN, Roger (Ass't. Sec.State for Far Eastern Aff -- FE)
LODGE, Henry Cabot (Amb. to SVN)

DATES:

25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 25, 1963, in a cable from HILSMAN to LODGE (personal), sent via CIA channels (DIR 63854), there appeared the following message:

"State cable sent separately represents agonizing at highest levels. Course outlined is dangerous but all agree that delaying clear cut US stand is even more dangerous. It won't be easy for you, but be assured we will back you all the way." (5)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 5
PART C

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CIA
LODGE, Henry Cabot

DATES:

25 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 63855), of August 25, 1963, the following message appeared:

"FYI CIA not consulted re cable being sent separately, which however cleared at highest levels. In circumstances believe CIA must fully accept directives of policy makers and seek ways accomplish objectives they seek. While have not seen exact text, understand it invites LODGE final judgment. . . . Danger in present course of action appears to be throwing away bird in hand before we adequately identified birds in bush, or songs they may sing. Thus suggest a real search for courses of action which might retain options in our hands at same time as taking positive stand rather than waiting for situation to clarify (at which point we probably unable to affect it.) This boils down to seeking some middle ground for at least interim period. . . ." (7)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7

STAFF: Dawson

ERSONS/ENTITIES:

CHARDSON, Saigon Chief of Station
ANH, General (SVN)
EM
ERA, CIA officer in Saigon

DATES:

25 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

CCURRENCE:

a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0291), the following message appears on August 25, 1963:

IEF OF STATION RICHARDSON reports that GENERAL KHANH requested an immediate meeting with ERA [an officer of the CIA Saigon Station]. At the meeting KHANH requested assurances that e U.S. Government would support the VIETNAMESE ARMY if it should move against the DIEM GIME." (7)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, p. 7
PART C

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CIA

DATES:

26 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 26, 1963, in a CIA document entitled "ONE Staff Memorandum, No. 60-63, Internal ONE Working Paper, CIA Distribution Only," the following statement appears:

"On balance, we believe the best hope for the preservation of US interests and attainment of US objectives in South Vietnam lies in the possibility of a coup d'etat by anti-Communist nationalists with sufficient military support to obviate prolonged civil war. Such a group might not prove able to salvage the situation and, indeed, might eventually prove no better than the present regime. Such a development would, however, enable the US and anti-Communist nationalist elements to make a fresh start unencumbered and unhampered by political errors of past years, months, and weeks. In such a fresh start, we believe, lies the only viable hope for the attainment of US interests and objectives in South Vietnam." (8)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 8

STAFF:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HELMS, Richard
CARTER, Gen. Marshall
NHU
DIEM
FELT, ADM. Harry D. (CINCPAC)
LODGE, Henry Cabot
KENNEDY, John F.
CIA
DEPTEL 243

DATES:

26 August 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 26, 1963, HELMS' record of a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam, is below. The other CIA participant was GENERAL MARSHALL CARTER, DDCI.

"The question was raised as to whether there had been such a significant change in the Vietnam situation that it really appeared desirable to dump the NHU's and possibly DIEM himself. Principal points discussed were: ADMIRAL FELT's concern over the dangers inherent in the current US action in South Vietnam; the fact that LODGE had not seen DIEM to discuss the future role of the NHU's; the meaning of the phrase 'give direct support to military commanders' in DEPTEL 243; the question of succession; and what would happen if the action taken over the weekend failed. The PRESIDENT asked for another session on August 27 with participants to present biographic data on key SVN personalities and a contingency plan for the succession." (8-9)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 8-9

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CIA
RICHARDSON, John
CONEIN
SPERA
KHANH
KHIEM
MINH

DATES:

26 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon on August 26, 1963 (SAIG 0330),

"RICHARDSON reports the results of the CONEIN/SPERA approaches to the generals. In essence, KHANH said he was not yet ready, and KHIEM said he would have to check with MINH." (9)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 9

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, John F.
HELMS (DD/P)
COLBY, William
CARTER
LODGE, Henry Cabot
HARKINS (MAC/V)
CIA
DEPTEL 243

DATES:

27 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 27, 1963, there was a Presidential Meeting on Vietnam. The record was taken by HELMS or by COLBY for the CIA, and the other CIA participants were CARTER and HELMS:

"The PRESIDENT stated that a coup should not be attempted unless it would be successful and asked whether we could turn back at this point. The PRESIDENT asked that the judgment of LODGE and HARKINS be sought on the prospects for victory or defeat of a coup. A cable was drafted asking if they still agreed with their concurrences to DEPTEL 243." (9-10)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, pp. 9-10

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

FILE:

DEPTEL 243
KENNEDY, John F.
LODGE, Henry Cabot
HARKINS, John (Commander, MAC/V)
DEPTEL 256

DATES:

27 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a State telegram to Saigon (DEPTEL 256), on August 27, 1963, the following message appeared:

"Examination of reports to date gives considerable hope but leaves unanswered questions. . . . Proceeding from the concept outlined in DEPTEL 243 as modified, now desire your prompt interim appraisal of present prospects. . . . Highest authority asks whether you and HARKINS, in light of developing situation, presently favor operation as currently planned by generals. We wish to give you all possible support in best available course but not to insist on any decision that developing evidence makes it wise to modify." (10)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DINH

COUNSELLER NHU

DATES:

31 August '63

11/1/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 12-13.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

ONS/ENTITIES:

RICHARDSON, John

DATES:

28 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

August 28, 1963, RICHARDSON reports in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0363) that:

ituation here has reached point of no return....Unless the generals are neutralized before
ing able to launch their operations, we believe they will act and that they have a good
ance to win....We all understand that the effort must succeed and that whatever needs to
done on our part must be done...." (10)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 10

ILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE HELMS, Richard HARKINS CIA KENNEDY, John F.	29 Aug. 1963	DIEM ✓ TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

At a NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam on August 29, 1963, with a record taken by DD/P HELMS, shows that

"The consensus was that HARKINS should confirm to the generals that the approaches from CIA were bona fide and represented the views of the US government. There was agreement that better information was needed on what the generals were in fact planning to do and whether it was militarily feasible. A telegram giving the sense of the meeting was drafted for PRESIDENTIAL approval." (12)

(Other CIA participants were not identified.) (12)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 12

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F. RUSK, Dean McNAMARA, Robert TAYLOR, Maxwell	BUNDY, McGeorge NSC Exec. Com. LODGE, Henry Cabot HARKINS, John	28 Aug. 1963	DIEM ✓ TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 28, 1963, the PRESIDENT met privately with RUSK, McNAMARA, TAYLOR, and McGEORGE BUNDY. He reported to the rest of the NSC EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE merely that three telegrams were being sent to Saigon: a personal message to LODGE from the PRESIDENT, a general message from the DEPARTMENT to the AMBASSADOR, and a telegram from TAYLOR to HARKINS. (11)

(This is reflected in notes taken by HELMS (DD/P) of the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE meeting on Vietnam. Other CIA participants are not identified.) (11)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 11

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JOHNSON, Lyndon B.
HELMS
CARTER
COLBY
RUSK
McNAMARA
BUNDY

DATES:

30 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On August 30, 1963, there was a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, with HELMS, CARTER, and COLBY participating. The record is provided by C/FE COLBY which shows that:

"RUSK referred to recent cable traffic and said that he was not even sure whom we were dealing with or what they were planning. McNAMARA pointed out that there was some question whether the generals ever did have a plan. BUNDY said he had re-read the earlier traffic and noted that they never said they did. GEN. CARTER said he believed that the general's coup was not likely at this stage and that in another week we will be approximately where we were before the attack on the Buddhist temples. BUNDY suggested we consider additional contingencies before the GROUP and whether the assumption that NHU is impossible is well founded." (13)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

JOHNSON, Lyndon B.
COLBY
RUSK
McNAMARA
LODGE
HARKINS
CARTER
HELMS

DATES:

31 Aug. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

At a VICE PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on August 31, 1963, a record by C/FE COLBY reflects that:

"RUSK suggested we look at precisely what in the Vietnam situation made us think of a coup and what might be done to improve conditions in Vietnam. McNAMARA suggested the first requirement was reestablishment of communication between LODGE and HARKINS. RUSK directed that a telegram be prepared for Saigon making suggestions as to what we might ask the GVN to do." (14)

DDCI CARTER and DD/P HELMS also participated.)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 14

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
ARKINS HIEM INH ODGE	31 Aug. 1963	DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

n August 31, 1963, in the Saigon Station's chronology of August 1963 coup activities, the ollowing report appears:

ENERAL HARKINS was authorized to meet with KHIEM to give KHIEM assurances of USG backing. HIEM showed a reluctance to talk and suggested that HARKINS meet with GENERAL MINH. KHIEM ommented that MINH had called off the planning and was working on other methods which KHIEM ould not describe. KHIEM further stated that the generals were not ready as they did not have nough forces under their control. HARKINS decided not to give KHIEM assurances which he had een authorized to impart. LODGE approved HARKINS' decision on 31 August after HARKINS reorted." (13)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C., p. 13

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
State Department McCone Defense Department	Fall 1963	Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that the "...in this situation we were having almost daily meetings with senior officials in the CIA, State Department, Defense Department and so forth, in the basement of the White House and there was no question that this was national policy and hammered out. ...at these meetings, these were the meetings at which Mr. McCone and I argued very strongly that we should not move against the Diem government we should continue to work with it." Page 36

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that "there was dissidence within the coup group, the people who were going to pull the coup and one general didn't like the other general. The best way I can describe it, if you had three Vietnamese generals sitting and talking to you, one genera would talk, walk out of the room to go to the "john", two would tell you, don't trust that one, and finally the one who had out-waited the other two, there would be one left, and he would say, don't trust those two." p. 31

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:

R. DAWSON

DATE:

July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COLBY

LODGE, HENRY CABOT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
STATE DEPARTMENT

DATES:

Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "I would say that the embassy's position, the political section and the ambassador, was much more sympathetic to the proposition that the war coul not successfully be conducted with President DIEM still in power without a major change in his style of operation. However, there is an additional factor, this which was the public pressure on the policy levels of our government in Washington, and the United States, and think this public pressure was felt particular by the people in the NATIONAL SECURITY COUN and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT." p. 61

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY General HARKINS
LODGE, H.C.
NSC

DATES:
Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: Mr. COLBY stated that: "The Defense Department was almost totally in a position th the wars in the countryside, that the countryside seems to be going along reasonably well, that this (DIEM's continuance in office) is an urban problem, urban political problem whic should not interfere with the main things going on. This was true of the Secretary and General HARKINS out there and the Joint Chiefs here and so forth". p. 62

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: R. Dawson

DATE: 1 July 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NHU
LODGE, H.C.
COLBY

DATES:
Fall 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated in response to a question as to whether there was any serious attempt to persuade DIEM to leave office voluntarily that: "There had certainly been discussions to have NHU leave Vietnam at various times". But, "there was almost no direct contact between our ambassador LODGE and President DIEM, very little contact." P. 66

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES: COLBY

NSC
STATE DEPARTMENT

DATES: Fall 1963

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that the public pressure that was brought upon or was felt by the NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL and by the people in the STATE DEPARTMENT was "one of distast for President DIEM." p. 61

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 1 July 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY
PRESIDENT KENNEDY
GENERAL KRULAK
MR. MENDELHAY

DATES: Fall 1963

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that: "The most dramatic way in which this was posed, this has been described publicly a number of times, was that at one time, particularly with the frustrating period the President (Kennedy) faced with these two strong positions, he sent two officers, one a General Krulak, who was an assistant to Secretary McNamara and a Mr. Mendelhay, who had formerly been the political counsellor in Saigon, to Saigon for about five days to make an assessment on the spot and they came back to the camera room, and one sat on one end of the room and one sat on the other and General Krulak first said he had b to 20 provinces and talked to 20 provinces and 30 military chiefs and all that sort of thi and the war business (was) going on basically and there were some problems, but the thing was that they seemed to have a strategy and they seemed to be moving along on it, then Mendelhay said he went to three cities and talked to lots of civil servants and political people, and all the rest of it and there was a general feeling that the cause hopeless because there was so much distaste for President DIEM and so much opposition, and the genera feeling that the war could not be won. And the President, of course, looked at them and

SOURCE: said, did you two fellows go to the same country? And the answer is they did. They looked at two different

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Dinh, Tonthat

Nhu, Ngo Dinh

DATES: 9/63

CATEGORIES: Diem ✓

TOP SECRE

OCCURRENCE:

Conein stated that Diem and Nhu did not understand Dinh's role as a double agent. Diem or Nhu had planned to have a Bravo I and a Bravo II that Diem and Nhu would have their own coup and go down to Vongtau as if they were escaping and there would immediately be a counter-coup to bring Diem--all instigated by Nhu back to power by popular acclamation. So on November 1 at 1 p.m. in the afternoon when troops were moving it was assumed by Diem and Nhu that this was part of Diem's plan to have a counter-coup. Page 66-68.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC, Conein, June 20, 1975

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN
DINH
GENERAL DON

HUAN, Commanding Officer, Military Academy at Delat

DATES: September 1963

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: DON promised DINH that he would personnaly speak to the President on DINH's behalf and that he would ask that DINH be granted the Ministry of Interior, while he, DON, would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. DINH believed that DON had his personal interest at heart and DON did in fact make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his government, but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for DIEM or NHU to accept. Deadlines were given. DINH was informed that the President would give hi the ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and DINH had not received what he thought was his proper recognition, GENERAL DON and other officers including HUAN continued to lend sympathy to DINH while DINH was still waiting for his ministerial post. p. 13

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein

STAFF: R DAWSON

DATE: June 30, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL MINH
KHIEM
LODGE, Henry CABOT
DON, GENERAL
CONEIN

DATES:
September 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "During the month of September, there was still more talk of coups, and at th time, the month of September, I had been told by Ambassador LODGE that I was to monitor co planning only....That I was to convey any messages. I had conveyed messages to BIG MINH on two occasions, GENERAL KHIEM on one occasion. I had met with GENERAL KHIEM and BIG MIN on another occasion. On several occasions, I had met with GENERAL DON and other military leaders." p. 23

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE: 20 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
RICHARDSON, John
DIEM
NHU
CIA
COL. TUNG

DATES:
2 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:
In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 0523), on September 2, 1963, the I.G. REPORT provides the following summary:

"RICHARDSON cabled a damage assessment. He concluded that DIEM and the NHU's are fully aware that the USG encouraged the GENERALS to attempt a coup and that CIA was the instrumentality of this encouragement. He judged there was an even possibility that all major programs could go forward as in the past. He listed as a major dilemma the Stations future relationships with COL. TUNG. He noted his dissatisfaction with TUNG as a GVN liaison vehicle through which to conduct PM programs, but noted that the GVN had offered no alternative. Unless we were willing to discontinue our NVN, Laos border, and cross-border programs, we must continue to work with TUNG. [NOTE: PM programs = paramilitary programs]

"The Times of Vietnam published charges that the CIA was plotting and financing a cou and was giving asylum to the chief anti-DIEM Buddhist leader. The story was picked up and widel played by the New York Daily News, the Chicago Tribune, Baltimore Sun, and other prominent newspapers." (15-16)

SOURCE:

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, John F.
HELMS
COLBY
RUSK
LODGE
DIEM
NHU
BUNDY
MADAME NHU

DATES:

6 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

At a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the following summary:

"RUSK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out the necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forthcoming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. RUSK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but expressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK commented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT replied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
ENNEDY, John F. EMS COLBY USK ODGE	DIEM NHU BUNDY MADAME NHU	6 Sept. 1963	DIEM ✓ TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

t a PRESIDENTIAL meeting on Vietnam, on September 6, 1963, HELMS and COLBY provide the fol- owing summary:

USK stressed the immediate need for direct contact between LODGE and DIEM. BUNDY pointed out he necessity of advising LODGE not to have a real show-down with DIEM over NHU at this forth- oming meeting, as one of LODGE's cables indicated he was headed very much in this direction. USK agreed to do this. The PRESIDENT agreed with the desirability of silencing MADAME NHU but xpressed some doubt that NHU's participation was as fatal as STATE seemed to say it was. RUSK omented that the COUNTRY TEAM had stated its feeling that NHU must go, to which the PRESIDENT eplied that they may have been operating under directives received from here." (16)

SOURCE: I.G. REPORT 1967, Part C, p. 16

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 28.6.75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:		DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Special Forces CIA Tung, Col. Bell, DAvid	CIA payments	8 Sept. 1963	DIEM TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On 8 September 1963 wire services in prominent newspapers carried a story that the Special Forces troops who raided the pagodas on the 21 August were still being paid secretly by CIA. This story was attributed to a highly reliable source in Washington and gave details of support to Col. Tung in the amount of $3,000,000 annually, and of payment of$250,000 on 3 September. The story was datelined in Washington and in Manila. David Bell warned in a television interview that the U.S. Congress might cut back aid to Vietnam unless the Diam government changed its policy.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) , p. 17

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Krulak ~~Crewlack~~, Victor Gen., Counterinsurgency Specialists Joint Chiefs of Staff
Rusk, Dean Sec. of State
McCone, John DCI
Mendenhall, Jos. A. UN Advisor Bureau Far Eastern Affairs
Kennedy, JohnF.
Richardson, John

DATES:

10 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

At a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with Carter and Colby in attendance, the following record by Colby is provided of the meeting of September 10, 1963. General Krulak ~~Grewlack~~ reported his findings in Vietnam. His conclusions were that the war was going ahead at an impressive pace and that the Vietcong war could be won if current U.S. military and socological programs are continued. Mendenhall, the State representative who accompanied ~~Cre~~Krulack, expressed the view that there was complete breakdown of the Siagon civilian government in the security situations in the provinces had deteriorated. The President asked where the two gentlemen had been insame country. Rusk suggested that the focus be on what happened in July and August that reversed the optimistic judgments in May and June. Mr. McCone talked from a personal telegram which he had received Richardson recommending against any cut in aid.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Diem
Richardson, Chief of Station CIA Siagon

DATES:

10 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 10 September 1963 in a cable from the CIA station in Siagon (SAIGO760) to Washington, the following quotation appears: "Am inclined to feel general officers will seek evolutionary accomodation with Diem, (if he permits them to do so) unless overall situation clearly deteriorates, there is breakdown of civil order or of governmental machinery, or unless war effort begins to go backward seriously (despite damages suffered since 8 May and 21 August am inclined to believe we should be able to resume successful prosecution of war in military and civil sections) do not align myself with the view that USG should suspend aid ".

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

STAFF:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Kennedy, John F. President
CIA

DATES:

10 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 10 September 1963, in an interview by Huntley and Brinkley, the President denied the charge that the CIA makes its own policy.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 19

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bundy,
Colby
McCone
McNamarra
Kennedy, President

DATES:

10 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: At a National Security Council executive meeting on Vietnam, with Carter and Colby participating for the CIA, Colby provided the following record: Bundy stressed the need to unify U.S. government posture, to coordinate press guidance and to control outgoing messages to Saigon. He emphasized the importance of following the President's guidance on this delicate problem, in spite of intensely differing views of what should be done and how, the risk, minimum objectives, and facts. McNamarra stated that his position was virouously against throwing out this government without seeing an alternative and that none appeared to exist. Mr. McCone commented that the problem was not so much the existance of an alternative as to how to put one into power. Bundy summarized the President's position as one in which we must express our reservations as to mistakes and misdeeds of Diem but not be a position where we can not deal with him further.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richardson, John
Weede, General
CIA Station Siagon

DATES:

11 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 CIA cable from Saigon (SAIGO797) Richardson reported that the country team attempted to agree on a six page summary cable to answer a cable from the department requesting views. The team was unable to agree even on the first three pages of the summary. Weede and Richardson dissented on the basis of the draft summary was too sweeping and too negative including definitively about the country on an inadequate basis of data. He said: "in some ways we seem to have reached the point in the official American community, where if you think we can win with the present government, you are simply not running in the right direction with the majority."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 20

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCone
Colby
Rusk
Bundy
Lodge
Nhu

DATES:

11 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: In a September 11, 1963 meeting of the National SEcurity Council Executive Committee meeting on Vietnam, the record taken by Colby (with McCone also being present for the CIA) the following appears: "Rusk said he believed that we were not likely to achieve an independent Vietnam unless we could eliminte Nhu. At the same time he was not willing to say that Diem should go, he aaw no alternative. Rusk commented that we should work with Lodge on Diem to take over the real leadership and become the real President. McCone suggested also the desirability of negotiating with Diem. Bundy read off a CIA suggestion for a process of negotiating with Nhu.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lodge, Ambassador Henry Cabot

DATES:

11 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a state telegram from Saigon (SAIG478) Lodge provided the following reflection on the situation: "My best estimate of the current situation in Vietnam is (a) that it is worsening rapidly; (b) the time has arrived for the U. S. to use what effective sanctions it has to bring about the fall of the existing government and the installation of another; and (c) that intensive study should be given by the best brains of the government to all the details, procedures and variants in conncection with suspension of aid."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 21

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McCone
Colby
Kennedy, John F.
McNamarra
Lodge

Nhu
Hillsman
Tung
Diem

DATES:

11 Sept 63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE: In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam with the CIA participants being McCone and Colby the record by Colby reflects that McNamarra pointed out that Lodge has little contact with Diem and has not been out of Saigon. Mr. McCone commented that he believed that we should move cautiosly, that we should talk seriously to Diem and that Lodge should be urged to visit the countryside to obtain a more realistic view of the effects of suspending aid. Mr. McCone also suggested that another approach be made to Nhu to seek his cooperation ina departure. The President asked whether we had carefully studied the detail effects of cuts in aid (as proposed in a paper prepared by Hillsman). It was evident that the effects had not been studies. The President asked DOD and CIA to analyze the Hillsman paper. He also asked that a telegram be sent to Lodge asking him to try to reduce the press leakage from Saigon and to establish some real contact with Diem. Any current plans for aid negotiation should be stalled, and the President should be well informed of any steps taken in this context, such as the instance involving CIA payment to Col Tung last week.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Shellman, Huntington Truehart, William, DCN Lodge, Henry Cabot Don, General	13 Sept 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon on 13 September 1963 (SAIG0890) Hungtington Shellman who visited Saigon reported his views of the situation in Vietnam. He included as part of his report the substance of a discussion with DCM Truehart: "The Ambassador is considering charging McVey with making the approach to SV military. He mentioned Gen. Don, to attempt to stimulate early coup action with appropriate U.S. assurances. I inquired had Ambassador made such a proposal to Washington and was told this was within Lodge's authority."

SOURCE: IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 22

FILE:

STAFF: DAWSON

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Halberstan, David McCone, John, DCI	15 Sept. 1963	DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their chief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathering.

SOURCE:

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Halberstan, David.
McCone, John, DCI
Saigon Station

DATES:

15 Sept. 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 15 September 1963, Halberstam stated that the chief of the Central Intelligence Agency favors all out support for the present regime but that almost all other members of his staff are embittered over the raids in the pagodas. They also feel their chief close association with Nhu while necessary, has severely damaged intelligence gathering.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 23

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Richardson, John
Diem

DATES:

16 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

STAFF:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Richardson, John
Diem

DATES:
16 Sept 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG0922) of 16 September 1963 Richardson replied to Washington's requestfor his judgment on the desirability and feasibility of certain ideas, as Washington was then in the course of constructing an agreed plan. He cabled: "We must go on trying to win the war with current administration for as long as it persists in power (we should not attempt publicly to achieve objectives with respect to GVN with probability of attainment is virtually nil) we cannot covertly tinker with or engineer coup unless general situation is reasonably perpitious and if we are unable to establish necessary working contact with Vietnamese leaders willing and able to do the job with necessary means. (Agree we should carefully explore and perhaps carefully experiment with graduated measures designed to pressure Diem, within context of persuading him to take steps needed. These measures would be more effeftive if they are limited to practical and acheivable objectives.)"

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Smith, David R.
CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963
Richardson, John Lodge
Dunn, Mike

DATES:
Sept 17, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported "Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?' "

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Smith, David R. CIA Acting Chief after 5 Oct 1963 Richardson, John Lodge Dunn, Mike Saigon Station	Sept 17, 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a memoranda for the record prepared by Helms on September 17, 1963, he reported "Smith (discuss with me) reports that Lodge wanted to get rid of Mr. John Richardson (Mike Dunn) had told Conein that Lodge was 'to get rid of Richardson'. (On one occasion Dunn asked Conein, 'do you think that Dave Smith can run the stations for a temporary period while a new station chief is being sent out here?' "

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
Lansdale, Major General Rusk, Dean McCone, John Lodge, Henry Cabot Richardson, John	Sept 19, 1963	DIEM ✓ TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced .... We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter....."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

STAFF:

Dawson

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lodge, Henry Cabot
Kennedy, John F.

DATES:

Sept. 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On September 19, 1963 in a state telegram from Saigon (544) Lodge stated to the President that "I agree that no good opportunity for action to remove the present government in the immediate future is apparent and that we should, therefore, do whatever we can as an interim measure pending such eventuality. Frankly, I see no opportunity at all for substantative changes."

SOURCE:

FILE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 24-25

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/25/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lansdale, Major General
McCone, John
Lodge, Henry Cabot
Richardson, John
Rusk, Dean
Saigon Station

DATES:

Sept 19, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a personal letter from McCone to Lodge it was stated that: "I was told by Dean Rusk that you proposed that Gen. Lansdale(replace Richardson as Chief of Station). I wish to emphasize the agency will reorient the Saigon station any practical way to meet your desires. Personnel, including the station chief can be replaced ... Lansdale would not be acceptable to the organization or to me personally... if the decision is to abandon all hope of working with the regime then Richardson probably should be replaced .... We have no current intelligence nor resulting estimate in hand which could lead us to conclude that the present regime can be disposed of, or that there exists a replacement regime which would be better. This is not however to say that a coup may occur even before you receive this letter....."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

STAFF:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
McCone CIA Subcommittee on House Armed Services	Sept. 23, 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:
On September 23, 1963, the McCone briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Armed Services. He told them that the agency was urging a slow cautious approach to the problem of ousting the Diem regime and that there appeared to be no replacement for the then current regime that was capable of running the government.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 25

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:
6/25/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
NHU DINH COLONEL TUNG CONEIN	October 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: DINH's desire to become a Minister was greater than his allegiance to President DIEM. He became the actual key to the success of the coup. His facile, and at times brilliant mind, was used to the general's advantage in that GENERAL DINH convinced President DIEM that he, General DINH, along with COLONEL TUNG, should be given blanket orders to be a counter-coup force. DINH also convinced TUNG to move four of his principal airborne companies on a bootless operation outside of Saigon on 29 and 30 October, so that these troops would not be present on 1 November. DINH is the Minister of Security in the provisional government. p. 13

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Exhibit 1, Conein

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CONEIN	October 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that he looked upon his job as conveying orders from his ambassador to the people that were planning the coup and to monitor those people who were planning the coup, and to get as much information so that our government would not be caught with their pants down. He did agree not to thwart the coup and in fact, to supply economic and military assistance if the coup succeeded, but did not conceive his objective the encouragement or the promotion of the coup, nor did he ever discuss the possibility of discouraging the coup. CONEIN stated that if the United States had now shown any interest or remained neutral in opposing DIEM, there would have been a coup anyway. pp. 38-41

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
DINH MINH DON COLONEL CO, Dinh's Deputy	Early October 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: When the ministerial post for DINH did not materialize by early October, the coup principals realized that they had DINH actively thinking against the regime. It is evident from statements during the series of meetings with GENERAL DON and GENERAL MINH during the month of October that they still did not trust DINH, but felt they had compromised him sufficiently with his troops, and, if necessary to eliminate DINH if he showed any sign of compromising the generals. DINH was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a day including CO, his deputy. p. 13

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
CONEIN COLBY, WILLIAM	October, 1963	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA officer (CONEIN) received a call on October 30 (1963) to come over and join the general staff and come to the meeting and essentially sat with them as they continued the operation from thereon. They didn't move to the decision to run the coup and he sat in the headquarters during most of the time. He went home at one point, etc."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 11-12

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Conein
Gen. Don
Gen. Duong Van Minh
Gen. Ton That Dinh
Ngo Dinh Nhu

DATES:
Oct. 2, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Conein/General Don meeting at NhaTrang with the following significant points: (a) General Duong Van Minh desired a private conversation with Conein; (b) General Ton That Dinh (Commanding General, III Corps) realized he had been duped by Diem Government during his tenure as Military Governor of Saigon between 21 August and 16 September 1963; (c) Generals, during the month of September 1963, submitted a request to President Diem to accord them positions in different ministries which they did not expect Diem to honor; (d) Don stated that

CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One. p. 4

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: CONTINUED FROM LAST CARD:

the Generals now have a plan; (e) prior to General Dinh's press conference of 29 August, an unidentified Vietnamese civilian told Counsellor Ngo Dinh Nhu that the Americans were contacting various Vietnamese in order to encourage a coup - Don was called by Nhu and shown a list prepared by Nhu naming Americans engaged in coup plotting; Conein's name was not on the list.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMBASSADOR LODGE
CONEIN
GEN. DUONG VAN MINH

DATES: 10/3/63

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Ambassador Lodge approved Conein's meeting with General Duong Van Minh

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, p.4.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McNamarra
Lodge
McCone
Richardson
Smith

DATES: Oct 3 - 4,1963

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"....it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". In a comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE
~~Dept. of State~~
MCNAMARRA
TAYLOR

DATES:

5 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534) it was stated as a fourth instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness" toward GPN.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

McNamarra
Lodge
McCone
Richardson
Smith

DATES:

Oct 3 - 4,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On October 3, Lodge wrote a personal letter to McCone stating that "I... agree with what I understand McNamarra said to you. The time has come for a new face, but I also think of Richardson as a devoted and a patriotic American..." On October 4, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon, (SAIG1397) the following report appeared:"....it is clear that Lodge wants a change in chief of station....departing Saigon 18 - 20 hours...". In a comment in the IG report it is noted that Richardson's departure was based on a headquarters request that he return to headquarters on TDY as soon as possible. Upon Richardson's departure his deputy David R. Smith, became acting chief of station."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 26

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LODGE Dept. of State MCNAMARRA TAYLOR	5 Oct 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 5 October 1963 in a states cable to Saigon (DEPTEL534)it was stated as a fourth instruction that the Ambassador should continue his policy of "cool correctness"toward GPN.

SOURCE:	STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA p. 30	DATE:
FILE:	

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
KENNEDY, JOHN F. LODGE, HENRY CABOT WHITEHOUSE	October 5, 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears: "...Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...."

SOURCE:	STAFF:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30	Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.
LODGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:

October 5, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In a White House cable to Saigon (CAP63560) of 5 Oct 1963, the following message appears: "...Presdient today approved recommendation that no initiative should be taken to give any active, covert encouragement to a coup. It should be urgent covert effort with closest security under broad guidance of Ambassador to identify and build contacts with possible alternative leadership as it appears...."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 30

STAFF:

Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Kennedy, John F.
Colby, William
Commodity Import Program
McCone

DATES:

Oct. 5, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 5 October there was a Presidential meeting on Vietnam. The only CIA participant was McCone. He provided the following record. The meeting was held to discuss matters that became the subject of DEPTEL 5/34 (See later entry of 5 October.) DCI said it was the opinion of CIA with the exception of Colby, Chief Fareast Division, that fiddling with the commodity import program as a political lever would be much more likely to create an economic crisis undermining the war effort than to scare Diem and Nhu into a more cooperative attitude, because it would seriously affect the confidence and planning of the Vietnamese business community and quickly engender inflationary measures at large of a more serious nature. It was the concensus of the meeting that some meaningful political movements had to be made but exactly what they should be was not determined.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27

STAFF:

Dawton

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SMITH, DAVID
CONEIN
LODGE
MINH

DATES:

Oct 5, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1447) of 5 October 1963, DAVE SMITH, the Acting Chief of Station cabled that he had discussed this latest CONEIN/MINH meeting with Ambassador LODGE and DCM\TRUEHART. SMITH reported that he had recommended to Ambassador LODGE that: "we do not set ourselves errovacably against the assassignation plot, since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon or protracted struggle which can rip the Army and the country asunder."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p.28

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Nhu, Ngo Dinh
CAn, Ngo Dinh
Diem
Minh, General
Conein
Lodge

DATES:

Oct 5, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On October 5, 1963 in a CIA Cable from Saigon (SAIG1445) it was stated that the meeting with Conein (approved by Ambassador in October) General Minh requested a statement of the U.S. Position with respect to a change in the GVN in the near future. He said he did not expect U.S.G. support of a coup effort but did need USG assurances that USG would not try to thwart his plans. He outlined three possible plans for the accomplishment of the change of government: (a) assassinationof Ngo Din Nhu and Ngo Dinh ~~Cin~~ CAN, keeping President Diem in office; (b) encirclement of Saigon by various military units; and (c) direct confrontation between military units involved in the coup and loyalist military units.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 27-28

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
DIEM, MC CONE, JOHN

DATES:
5 or 6 Oct. 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: MC CONE recalled a meeting with President KENNEDY and Attorney General ROBERT F. KENNEDY had with him on or about October 5 or 6, 1963. The Attorney General was "rather non-committal in the meeting. He and I walked downstairs together, and he said, John, are you sure you are right? And I said, I think I am and he said I'm rather surprised at the position you took. And I said, well, you didn't disagree with it..."(T) This discussion had nothing to do with assassinations. This was whether we should let the coup go or use our influences not to. Then interestingly enough, the President sent a series of messages to CABOT LODGE urging that he'd do all that he could to get DIEM to change his ways. CABOT LODGE's first attempt failed and then he was called -- CABOT LODGE was called by DIEM's office and DIEM said, you tell the President to tell me what he wants me to do and I'll do it. Unfortunately, the forces were surrounding the palace at that very moment and the coup was on. It was a kind of a dramatic little part of the history of that tragedy."

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 6, 1975, McCone, pp. 63-64

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
KAHN, CONEIN, LODGE, TRUHART, WM.
NGO DINH KAHN
SMITH, DAVID
COLBY, WILLIAM, MC CONE, JOHN

DATES:
5-7 Oct. 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY testified as to the events surrounding the cable from Saigon of 5 October 1963 which reads as follows: "We do not set ourselves irrevocably against the assassination plot since the other two alternatives mean either a blood bath in Saigon, or a protracted struggle which could rip the army and the country asunder." And the response on 6 October 1963 which COLBY wrote for MC CONE as follows: "MC CONE directs that you withdraw recommendation to Ambassador concerning assassination plan under MC CONE instructions as we cannot be in a position to actively condone such course of action thereby endangering our responsibility, therefore COLBY explained that this second message he drafted was to eliminate assassination as an alternative. COLBY stated that the assassination of DIEM's other brothers NHU and KAHN, NGO DINH KAHN, were to continue. A reply was sent on October 7 from Saigon in response to the MC CONE cable saying that action was taken as directed, meaning that the Ambassador had been so informed to withdraw the recommendation."

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 12-17

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MCCONE LODGE SMITH	Oct 6, 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR73661of 6 Oct) the following appears: "... MCCONE directs that you withdraw recommendations from Ambassador (concerning assassignation plan) under MCCONE instructions as we can not be inposition actively condoning such course of action and thereby engaging our responsibility therefore."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 28

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
TRUEHART LODGE MCCONE SMITH	Oct 7, 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a response to the CIA cable of Oct. 6, 1963, to Saigon, the station in Saigon responded (SAIG1463 7 Oct): "Action taken as directed." In addition since DCM TRUEHART was also present when original recommendation was made, specific withdrawal recommendation at MCCONE's instruction was also conveyed to TRUEHART. Ambassador LODGE commented that he shares MCCONE'S opinion."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 29

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BUNDY COLBY
JOHNSON
KILPATRICK
MCCONE

DATES:

10/8/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓
SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On October 8, 1963 at a special group meeting the DCI expressed concern that there was a lack of intelligence coverage during the period when "the U.S. was maintaining a posture of almost no official contact at top levels." They refer to the fact that NHU and DIEM are not being contacted by Americans. Mr. MCCONE also referred to "theorientation of (Saigon) station functions." Mr. BUNDY pointed out that"for Americans to resume top level contacts at this time would appear to represent a political rapprochement. Ambassador LODGE might feel that this was running counter to his policy." The Group gave its approval to the basis realignment of station functions. (The nature of such functions are not outlined.)

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct.17, 1963

FILE:

STAFF: Kelley

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Tung, Col.
Phillips, Rusus, AID
Colby, William
Richardson, John "Jocko"
Smith, David
Acting Chief of Station Siagon after 10/5/63
Aid to Diem Regime

DATES:

Oct 8, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On 8 September 1963, the CIA IG report reflects in a comment that the U.S. government publicly confirmed on Oct. 8, 1963 that aid had already been cut quitely and over a period of some months. Bill Colby, Jock Anderson and Dave Smith told us that the public announcement of the aid reduction was a signal to the general and that the reduction was planned with that in mind. It may be that the cut in aid was deliberately planned to spur the generals on, but if so, that intention did not find its way into the record. The nearest thing to it is in the record of a presidential meeting of 10 September 1963. The President asked Rufus Phillips of AID what specific actions Phillips recommended and he suggested "cutting aid to Colonel Tung which would be viewed by the generals with much enthusiasm as an indication of virgouous of American position. " In general, aid cuts were discussed in terms of bring pressure on Diem to make needed changes in his regime. However planned, or however looked upon by the U.S. administration, it is clear that the Vietnamese considered the official confirmation of aid cut as a clear token of their support of coup planning.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA), p. 17-18

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.
RICHARDSON, JOHN

DATES:

Oct. 9, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions."

SOURCE:

FILE: IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, HENRY CABOT
COLBY, WILLIAM
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

DATES:

Oct 9, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228) which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KENNEDY, JOHN F.
RICHARDSON, JOHN

DATES:

Oct. 9, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On October 9, 1963 Presidential newsconference the President stated that "I know that the transfer of JOHN RICHARDSON, who is a very dedicated public servant, has led to surmises but I can assure you flatly that the CIA has not carried out independent activities, but has operated under closecontrol of the Director of Central Intelligence operating under -- with the cooperation of the National Security Council and under my instructions."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, HENRY CABOT
MINH, GENERAL
DON, GENERAL
COLBY, WILLIAM
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

DATES:

Oct 10, 1963
Oct. 9,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

STAFF:

DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT COLBY, WILLIAM KENNEDY, JOHN F.	Oct 9, 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon of October 9, 1963, marked eyes only for Ambassador (DIR74228) which was originaed by WILLIAM COLBY thefollowing appears:"... while we do not wish to stimulate coup, we also do not wish to leave theimpression that U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime and if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, insuring popular support to win war and improving working relationships with U.S." The cable urges that the contact with MINH press for "detail information clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success." The text states that these "additional general thoughts" have been discussed with the President and that the cable had been cleared with high officials at White House, State and Defense."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT KENNEDY, JOHN F. MINH, GENERAL DON, GENERAL COLBY, WILLIAM	Oct 10, 1963 Oct. 9,1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

STAFF: DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMBASSADOR LODGE
GEN. MINH
GEN. DON

Oct. 10, '63

DIEM✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Ambassador Lodge instructs [illegible] not to initiate contact with General Minh or General Don, but if the Generals initiate contact, such contacts were authorized; in the course of meetings with Don or Minh, assurances were to be given that the USG will not thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, assuring popular support to win the war, and improving working relations with the United States.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, page 5.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ODGE, HENRY CABOT   KENNEDY, JOHN F.
INH, GENERAL
ON, GENERAL
OLBY, WILLIAM

DATES:

Oct 10, 1963
Oct. 9,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In a 10 October 1963 entry in the Saigon station's "history of the Vietnamese generals coup" it is noted that the Ambassador instruct the CIA not to initiate contact with General MINH or DON, but the generals initiate contact, such contact were authorized. In the course of meetings with MINH or DON, assurances were to be given as specified in DIR74228 of 9 October wherein COLBY had stated that the matter of MINH's plans be detailed clearly indicating that MINH's plans offer a high prospect of success. " While we do not wish to stimulate a coup we also do not wish to leave the impression that the U.S. would thwart a change of government or deny economic and military assistance to a new regime, if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness in military effort...."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 32 - 33

FILE:

STAFF:

DAWSON

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
MCCONE

DATES:

Oct 10,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that "we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines."

SOURCE:

IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Senate Foreign Relations Committee
MCCONE

DATES:

Oct 10,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

A briefing by MCCONE to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, it was noted that "we have not seen a successor government in the wings that we could say positively would be an improvement over DIEM. Therefore it has been our counsel to proceed cautionsly, otherwise the situation might flare up which might result in something of a civil war, and the Communists would come out the victor merely by sitting on the sidelines."

SOURCE:

IG Reprot 1967 (CIA) p. 33

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
GENERAL DON
DIR74228
LODGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:
Oct 23,1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the Generals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONEIN under instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek permission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's eyes only.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 33
FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Lt. Col. PHAM NGOC THAO

DATES:
Oct. 24, '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

A report was received at approximately 1230 hours that Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao was planning a coup scheduled for 1300 hours; the coup failed to materialize. Later, Thao admitted that the coup forces lacked transportation, otherwise the coup would have begun as reported.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit 1, page 7.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN
AMBASSADOR LODGE
DON

DATES:

10/23/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Conein asked why the generals had not spoken to Ambassador Lodge at the 18 October reception; Don stated that security would not permit an approach to the Ambassador since other members of the GVN were present; Don promised he would seek permission of the coup committee to give Conein their political plan for the Ambassador's eyes only and requested a meeting in downtown Saigon on 24 October.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 6.

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NEIN
NERAL DON
R74228
DGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:

Oct 23,1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

a October 23, 1963 entry into the Saigon stations, "History of the Vietnamese Generals up", it was noted that a meeting with CONEIN requested by General DON, DON said the nerals had decided to try to stage a coup within a week following 26 October. CONEIN der instructions passed the substance of DIR74228 to DON. DON promised he would seek rmission of the coup committee to give CONEIN their political plan for the Ambassador's es only.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ON
Conein

DATES:

Oct. 23, '63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

General Don requested Conein to meet him at JGS Headquarters; Don stated the general officers coup committee had decided to attempt to take advantage of the 26 October National Day in order to stage a coup within a week; a member of General Don's staff, Colonel Nguyen Khuong, had leaked to U.S. authorities that a coup was to occur on or about 27 October; Khuong's overtures to the Americans had reached the palace and as a result President Diem had ordered the 5th and 7th Divisions, which were key elements in the Saigon area for the coup, to go on extended operations outside Saigon;

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, p. 6.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ON
ONEIN
R. HUAN

DATES:

Oct. 23, '63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Don demanded to know the answers to previous questions with respect to the USG attitude toward a coup; Conein, under instructions, told Don that the USG would not thwart a change of government or deny economic or military assistance to a new regime if it appeared capable of increasing effectiveness of military effort, assuring popular support to win the war and improving working relations with the USG; Don confirmed that he had attempted to contact Conein through Mr. Huan;

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, p. 6

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GEN. MINH
DON
GEN. HARKINS

CONEIN

DATES:
10/18/63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Both Generals Minh and Don present at reception given by General Harkins as well as most other ARVN generals; though Ambassador talked with all generals, none mentioned Conein.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 6.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
11/1/63
~~10/21/63~~

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

13. In addition to the above maneuvering, Colonel Do Mau, (now Brigadier General), Chief of Military Security Service, played his role by issuing false military intelligence reports which went to President Diem. These reports started on or about 24 October and built up a picture of strong Viet Cong forces approaching Saigon for attack and permitted the Joint General Staff to issue appropriate orders, approved by the President, to move units favorable to the conspiracy to the outskirts of Saigon and also to move units, such as the Special Forces, away from Saigon.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 13-14.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Conein
Huan
Gen. Harkins
Ambassador Lodge

DATES:
Oct. 17, '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: Conein and Huan held meeting during which Huan confirmed the fact that he attempting to contact and had a message from the generals. At a reception to be given 18 October by General Harkins for Ambassador Lodge, one of the generals would approach the Ambassador and ask the latter to vouch for Conein; if the Ambassador confirms that Conein is speaking with the Ambassador's authority, he should be prepared for a future meeting outside Saigon; Huan was only passing a message and did not elaborate further.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, page 5-6.

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LAM NGOC HUAN
AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATES:
Oct. 16, '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Mr. Lam Ngoc Huan, Manager of Caravelle Hotel and former ARVN officer who was retired due to suspicions of involvement in November 1960 coup plot, approached an Embassy officer after a social event and stated he was trying to establish contact with a military officer designated by Ambassador Lodge to take part in confidential discussions. Huan claimed he was representing some Vietnamese generals and other officers who wanted to talk to an American military officer about the situation in South Vietnam.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One, Page 5.

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
MC NAMARA
NGU YEN QUANG
PHAM NGOC THAO

DATES:
12 October 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: When CONEIN was asked to explain the reference to Secretary MC NAMARA at p. 5, Exhibit 1, he stated that there were different elements contacting the same group, i.e., NGU YEN and THAO. But did not explain the reference to MC NAMARA. p. 29

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

J
AMBASSADOR LODGE
SECRETARY MACNAMARA

DATES:
Oct. 12, '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Captain Nguyen Quang Nguyen, Chief of Operations, Armor Command, stated he was contacted by two different coup groups during the week of 5-12 October; the second group was headed by Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao who claimed he talked with Ambassador Lodge and Secretary McNamara who had pledged support. When Captain Nguyen was non-committal, Lt. Colonel Thao offered money; Nguyen is still undecided which group he will support.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Corein, Exhibit One,

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DON

DATES:
Oct. 24, '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:
Conein and Don met at 1830 hours; (a) Don did not receive permission from the coup committee to turn over the political plan; (b) Don had been authorized to outline the political thinking of the coup committee - (1) the succeeding government would be civilian and no member of the coup committee would hold a senior position in the new government; (2) the new government would, as soon as possible, free non-communist political prisoners, hold free elections, and permit operation of opposition political parties except for the Viet Cong; (3) there will be complete freedom of religion and

CON'T ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit One, page 7.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
Oct. 24, '63

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION OF LAST CARD:
no favoritism or discrimination shown toward any creed; (4) the new government would be pro-West but not a pawn of the USG; (5) the new government would carry the war against the Viet Cong to a successful conclusion with Western, particularly USG, help; (c) Don said that Conein would be in close contact with coup headquarters to insure a close line of communication between the coup headquarters and the Ambassador; (d) Don stated that once the coup started, it would do no good for the USG to attempt to stop it; (e) Don was aware of coup plotting on the part of Lt. Colonel Pham Ngoc Thao; (f) the coup committee was in contact

CON'T ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: p 7 [illegible]

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES: | DATES: | CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: CONTINUATION OF LAST TWO CARDS:

with Thao, but Thao does not have the necessary force to carry out his plan; (g) The generals' coup committee had come to the conclusion that the entire Ngo family had to be eliminated from the political scene in South Vietnam; (h) A new meeting was scheduled for 28 October.

SOURCE: p. 7, cont.

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON
CONEIN
GEN. HARKINS

DATES:
10/24/63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: General Don's aide requested Conein to be at the VIP lounge at Saigon airport at 0615 hours; General Don told Conein that he had seen General Harkins the evening of 23 October and General Harkins informed him that the U.S. military would not thwart any plans of the generals; Don informed Conein that all plans were complete and had been checked and rechecked. The necessary military units were available and willing to join the coup; the would occur within the next week and in no case later than 2 November; Don requested a meeting that evening at a dentist's office in downtown Saigon.

207935

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit one
pages 6-7.

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 6/30/75

ERSONS/ENTITIES:
ODGE, HENRY CABOT
IARKINS
3UNDY, MC GEORGE
ENERAL DON
CONEIN

DATES:
October 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

)CCURRENCE: In a cable marked "eyes only" to LODGE and HARKINS from BUNDY dated October 24, CONEIN characterized this telegram as activating the disengagement between the U.S. government and DIEM. The text of that cable is as follows: "There may be danger. NHU attempting entrapment DON's approaches to CONEIN. Feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKIN can stand back from any non-essential involvement. It seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN." p. 33

TOP SECRET

OURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

BUNDY CONEIN
JOHNSON
KILPATRICK
MCCONE

DATES:

Oct. 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓
SPECIAL GROUP

OCCURRENCE:

On October 24, 1963 Mr. MCCONE had a special group meeting "expressed his fear that the top U.S. diplomatic and military officials in Saigon are becoming too involved in conversations between General DON and COEIN. Such involvement could destroy CONEIN usefullness and involve Ambassador LODGE and General HARKINS in operation difficult to deny." The Special Group authorized a message to LODGE and to HARKINS emphasizing a secure system of contacts with Genral DON and Vietnamese military and an assessment of DON's status and his future plans and the tightening of control over the DON/CONEIN meetings. The group agreed to firm up policy thinking re Vietnam before LODGE returns to Washington and hear Mr. LODGE's views on what courses of action should be taken.

SOURCE:

Minutes of Special Group Meeting Oct. 24, 1963

FILE:

TOP SECRET

STAFF:

Kelley

DATE:

6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

ODGE
UNDY
ON, GENERAL
ONEIN

DATES:

Oct. 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

n a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has een punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each eeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance xplicitly..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35

FILE:

STAFF:

DAWSON

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE
HARKINS
BUNDY
CONEIN
NHU

DATES:
Oct 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN."

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35
FILE:

STAFF:
DAWSON
DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
BRENT
CONEIN
CRITIC
JGS headquarters
STATION

DATES:
24 Oct 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: The IG Report notes that, "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles. On 24 October, headquarters had cabled the STATION: 'In future do not repeat not put message re coup plots or rumors in CRITIC channel. Rather you should slug them IMMEDIATE ATTENTION FOR BRENT.' As a consequence, the firse cabled reports from the STATION came in as regular CIA cables and were put onto the CRITIC network here at headquarters."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42

STAFF:
R. DAWSON
DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HANSEN, BUREAU OF BUDGET
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA
LODGE
RICHARDSON

DATES:

Oct 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at his initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the hill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment and with a high quality of performance. HANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting with LODGE, LODGE hadnot yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later. (This appears to be a record by the CIA of a source which it had in the Bureau of the Budget for finding out what Lodges thinking was at this time.)

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 34

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON, GENERAL
HARKINS, GENERAL
CONEIN,

DATES:

Oct. 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed by General HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON to outline its substance, which he did.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
LODGE
HARKINS
BUNDY
CONEIN
NHU

DATES:
Oct 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In an eyes only cable from CIA to Saigon for LODGE and HARKENS, from BUNDY the following message appears: "...there may be danger NHU attempting entrapment through DON's approaches to CONEIN...feel quite strongly that LODGE and HARKINS should stand back from any nonessential involvement...it seems wise to maintain close control over meetings between DON and CONEIN."

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35

FILE:

STAFF:
DAWSON

DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HANSEN, ~~BUREAU OF BUDGET~~
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF CIA
LODGE
RICHARDSON

DATES:
Oct 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

On October 24, 1963, there was a meeting between the executive director of CIA and KENNETH HANSEN, Bureau of the Budget, wherein HANSEN detailed charges made by LODGE at his initial meeting with LODGE. The memorandum for the record prepared by the Executive Director, details the following charges made by LODGE: 1. CIA was improperly dealing with NHU; 2. CIA was reluctant to turn over to the military its operation among the hill tribes; 3. CIA had inadequate penetrations of the GVN and the Buddist and was caught by surprise; 4. RICHARDSON had a palatial mansion and entertained government officials there; 5. the CIA station was too large and too visible; 6. CIA acted on its own initiative without coordination and without control either at the Ambassador or Washington. HANSEN said he later reported to LODGE that he thought LODGE's charges were erroneous. He said he was convinced that everything the CIA had ddone in Vietnam had been approved in Washington, coordinated with and carried out under the directions of the Ambassador, and had been carried out with good judgment and with a high quality of performance. HANSEN noted that at the time of his first meeting with LODGE, LODGE hadnot yet had a full breifing on what the Agency was doing. This took place a few days later. source which it had in the Bureau of the Budget

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON, GENERAL
HARKINS, GENERAL
CONEIN,

DATES:

Oct. 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In an entry of October 24, 1963 the Saigon's station "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup", it is noted that CONEIN held two meetings with General DON of 24 October. DON reported he had been informed by General HARKENS that the U. S. military would not thwart any coup plans. DON said the coup plans were complete; the necessary military units were available; and that the coup would occur no later than 2 November. The second meeting DON said the coup committee refused to turn over the political plan but authorized DON to outline its substance, which he did.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA),p. 35

FILE:

STAFF:

Dawson

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE
BUNDY
DON, GENERAL
CONEIN

DATES:

Oct. 24, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG1964) from LODGE to BUNDY it was noted that: "CAS has been punctilious in carrying out my instructions. I have personally approved each meeting between GENERAL DON AND CONEIN who has carried out my orders in each instance explicitly..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 35

STAFF:

DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE NHU
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
LODGE
DIEM

DATES:

Oct.25, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during period of political confusion; (7) civilians capable of running South Vietnam could not be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9) we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive steps to remove them and it is not clear that the succeeding government would be much better.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36

STAFF:

FILE:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MCCONE NHU
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
LODGE
DIEM

DATES:

Oct.25, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In an October 25, 1963 Presidential meeting on Vietnam, with the only participant from CIA being MCCONE, MCCONE's notes show that the President stated that the purpose of the meeting was to consider: (1) recent actions in South Vietnam with respect to coup planning and qualifications of the individuals reporting, and (2) our policy in Sout Vietnam as he wished to be assured there was unanimity within the government prior to the return of LODGE for consultations. MCCONE stated his views in detail. In sessance, he held: (1) DON might be managed by NHU; (2) CIA has not control and therefore could assume little responsibility; (3) DON could have a coup in the making and could pull it off; (4) we are handling a delicate situation in a non-professional manner; (5) successful coup would lead to confusion because generals would provide weak leadership; (6) one coup would be followed by another and the war might be lost during period of political confusion; (7) civilians capable of running South Vietnam could not be injected into the government and exercise effective control; (8) cannot discuss important political issues with DIEM because of the policy of "cool correct attitude; (9) we either have to work with DIEM and NHU or we have to take aggresive steps to remove them

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON, GENERAL
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
CONEIN

DATES:

Oct. 28, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador. LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37

FILE:

STAFF: DAWSON

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DON, GENERAL
LODGE, HENRY CABOT
CONEIN

DATES:

28 October 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN said "in the latter part of October, he was informed by DON to convey to LODGE that they were ready to have a coup and that CONEIN was to stay home and await further orders, and that the coup would be accomplished before November 2, 1963. LODGE, who was preparing to return home on the 31st of October, was requested through CONEIN by DON that LODGE not change his plans as it might be a signal to DIEM and NHU that something was going on. p. 48.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
STILWELL, GENERAL RICHARD
CONEIN
GENERAL DON
LODGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:
Latter part of October 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: In the latter part of October, CONEIN stated, the people in Washington figured that CONEIN was being set up as "patsy" and that this would be highly embarrassing for the U.S. government in case he was found out to have been set up. Therefore, the people in Washington made made recommendations that somebody more senior to him and with extensive military background should take over from him. When Washington then sent a message to Ambassador LODGE and recommended that a capable officer and a personal friend of CONEIN's, GENERAL STILWELL take over, GENERAL DON and the coup members said, no, we trust CONEIN, we don't want anybody else. pp. 31-32

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE:
July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON, GENERAL
LODGE, AMBASSADOR
CONEIN

DATES:
Oct. 28, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

The October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon stations "History of the Vietnamese Generals Coup" notes that: General DON asked LODGE if CONEIN was speaking for the Ambassador. LODGE replied in the affirmative. DON told the Ambassador that the U.S. government should not interfer with or try to stimulate a coup. The Ambassador agreed with DON.

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 36-37

STAFF:
DAWSON

DON, GENERAL
CONEIN
LODGE, HENRY CABOT

DATES:

Oct 28, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In an October 28, 1963 entry in the Saigon station "History of the Vietnames Generals Coup" it is noted that: CONEIN met with Genral DON for the last time before the coup was launched. DON confirmed he had talked with the Ambassador who had vouched for CONEIN. DON stated that he was leaving on 29 October to coordinate final plans. DON requested CONEIN to remain at home until 30 October -- until further notice. DON repeated that the Ambassador would have the plans before the coup began,,but when pressed on his previous commitment to make them available, 48 hours in advance, DON said that possiblythe hours would only be made available 4 hours in advance. DON said that nothing would be happening within the next 48 hours and that, if there was a good reason for the ambassador to change his planned 31 October departure, the Ambassador would be informed in time to make his own decision.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) P. 37

FILE:

STAFF:

DAWSON

DATE:

6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
GEN. DON
AMBAS. LODGE
GEN. DO CAO TRI
GEN. NGUYEN KHANH

DATES:
Oct. 28, '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Conein and General Don met at a dentist's office in downtown Saigon at 1845 hours. (a) Don confirmed that he had talked to Ambassador Lodge who had vouched for Conein; (b) Don stated that the generals' committee wished to avoid Americans' involvement in the coup and requested that other U.S. personnel stop talking to colonels and majors about any coup action; (c) Don was informed that Ambassador Lodge was scheduled to depart Saigon on or about 31 October; (d) Don was interested in the exact time the Ambassador intended to depart on 31 October, stating that he hoped the Ambassador would not change his schedule as a change might be

1a

CON'T ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., June 20, 1975, Conein, Exhibit one, page 8.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

suspected by the GVN; (f) Don stated that he was leaving on 30 October to coordinate final plans with Generals Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh; (g) Don requested Conein to remain at home from 30 October onward until further notice; (h) Conein questioned Don regarding General Ton That Dinh's participation in coup planning, Don stated that Dinh was not participating in the planning and that the coup committee sympathizers had General Dinh continuously surrounded and had instructions to eliminate Dinh if he showed any signs of compromising the coup; (i) Don, although admitting that he was not

11

CON'T FROM LAST CARD

SOURCE: p. 8, con't.

STAFF:

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

10

CONT. FROM LAST CARD

participating in the actual planning of the units that would participate in the coup, stated that from the meetings of the coup committee he knew of the following units: One-half of the Airborne Brigade, 2 Battalions of Marines, all of the Air Force with the exception of Colonel Huynh Huu Hien, the entire 5th, 7th, and 21st Divisions, half of the 23rd Division, and elements of the 9th Division. (j) The Command Post for the coup would be Joint General Staff Headquarters.

SOURCE: p. 8, con't.

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
inh hung, CAPT Conein hu, Ngo Dinh am, Col	11/2/63	Diem

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:
am was returning with Diem and Nhu and an aide of Diem to the headquarters in an armored personnel carrier when Minh in a separate column in radio communications with Lam's column found out that Diem and Nhu had been taken. onein states that Minh with his aide, crossed the column, halted it and hung stepped into the armored car and upon orders from Minh Nhung killed hem. The bodies were then taken directly to the General Staff Headquarters and later on in the afternoon they were later removed from the General Staff Headquarters to Clinique St. Paul.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 7/1/75

FILE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
LODGE, HENRY CABOT CONEIN	1 November 1963	DIEM

OCCURRENCE: On or about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon on November 1, 1963, there were communications between LODGE and DIEM. CONEIN was in both radio and telephonic contact with the Embassy, keeping them posted of the units, the personalities and what was transpiring. CONEIN was to convey, one of the first messages from the generals that the genera did not want any U.S. military officer or advisor with any of the attacking units. They d not want any American participation within the coup. p. 50

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF: E. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

RAN THIEN KHIEM
INH
RAN VAN DON

DATES:

2400 hours
Nov. 1, '63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Tran Thien Khiem is acting as Minh's Chief of Staff for Operations, but Tran Van Don is definitely the No. 2 in the generals' group. General Chieu is assisting General Khiem and is following military operations closely, assisted by several competent colonels and majors. ✓

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 21.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

Nov. 1, '63
2400 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho also has not been located. ✓

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 21.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NHU

DATES:
11/1/63
2140 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Troops moving to the palace area and covering the Zoo to insure that Diem and Nhu do not attempt to escape through a sewer tunnel exit in the Zoo area.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 19.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
11/1/63
2400 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Lt. Colonel Thao heading group designated to blow up the palace. 24 tanks from the Palace Guard which had joined the coup, and some of the armored vehicles from My Tho are forming into three columns. They will move in on the palace after the blast. The tanks are commanded by Major Lang, former Chief of Darlac Province.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 21.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

MINH
AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATES:

11/1/63
1925 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

1925 Minh informed that Ambassador Lodge will receive the generals after the coup is over.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 18.

FILE:

STAFF: DAWSON

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

11/1/63
2140 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Presidential Guard elements in the palace continue fighting

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Page 19.

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Vice President NGUYEN NGOC THO

DATES:
11/1/63
1545

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

1545 Pro-western civilian politicians at JGS with generals; will head new civil government. No military personnel in new government which should be established under civil control in two to three days. It is later revealed that Vice President Nguyen Ngoc Tho and Dai Viet leader Phan Huy Quat are the only ones thus far selected for the new government.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 16.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
NHU

DATES:
11/1/63
1645

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

1645 Generals call palace, talk with Counsellor Nhu. Generals mentioned above talked with Nhu, in addition to the following: B/General Nguyen Van La, Capital Military District; B/General Tran Ngoc Tam, Strategic Hamlet Program; B/General Tran Tu Oai, PsyWar; B/General Nguyen Giac Ngo, Assistant to Chief, Joint General Staff for Guerrillas; plus those under arrest at JGS and Colonel Thoung. Tung is forced at gun point to announce his capture. Air Force Commander Hien did not speak; may have been eliminated.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one,

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DUONG VAN MINH
TRAN VAN MINH
TRAN THIEN KHIEM

DATES:
11/1/63
1545 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

— Radio VTVN is under coup control; taped broadcast ready but the relay point had been blown.

The following generals are at JGS:

M/General Duong Van Minh, Military Advisor to the President
M/General Tran Van Minh, Permanent Secretary General, MND.
B/General Tran Thien Khiem, Chief of Staff, Joint General Staff.
B/General Le Van Kim, MND
M/General Nguyen Ngoc Le, Inspector, Self Defense Corps/Civil Guard
B/General Phan Xuan Chieu.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit 1, page 16.
FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. NGUYEN KHANH

DATES:
11/1/63
1545 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

The following are claimed also to be supporting the coup:

B/General Nguyen Khanh, Commanding General, II Corps
B/General Do Cao Tri, Commander, 1st Division

Bien Hoa and My Tho under coup control.

Joint General Staff preparing heavy air bombardment for the palace.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one page 16.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
Nov. 1, '63
1330 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

1330 Marines pour into Saigon from the direction of Bien Hoa; later indicated to be from Quang Trung Training Center.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 14.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COL. Le QUANG TUNG

DATES:
11/1/63
1400 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Colonel Le Quang Tung captured; directed to order Vietnamese Special Forces to cease fire; firing ceased at VNSF HQ.

Fighting at palace; about 200 troops observed.

35 armored cars moving toward the palace.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 14.

FILE:

STAFF: Diem

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY
LODGE, H.C.

DATES:
November 1, 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: When DIEM called LODGE directly preceding his death, COLBY states that the message that he saw of the summary of the conversation was that DIEM, "....said that he was going to require his officers to have filled their oaths of loyalty to the constitution, th Vietnamese constitution, in his office as president. He was very stiff about his position President." p. 67

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: 1 July 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN
DON, GENERAL
STATION (SAIGON)
JGS headquarters

DATES:
1 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: On November 1, 1963, "CONEIN went to JGS headquarters and remained at the command post throughout the struggle. Before leaving his home, CONEIN alerted the STATION by radio. Upon arriving at JGS headquarters, CONEIN was told by GENERAL DON that DON had tried unsuccessfully to reach CONEIN earlier by telephone. A later check revealed that CONEIN's telephone was out of order. CONEIN was told that he was to keep a telephone line open to the Ambassador. Because there was a CIA officer on the scene and in intimate contact with the coup principals, the STATION was able to report almost minute-by-minute progress of the coup."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 41-42
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN
COLBY, WILLIAM
DIEM
MIHN, GENERAL

DATES:

1 November 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY states that "When CONEIN was told by the generals, GENERAL MINH, that the NHU brothers, DIEM and NHU, had committed suicide, CONEIN thought it incredible on its face. This was because both brothers were very strong Catholics and CONEIN doubted that they would have done such a thing. According to COLBY, CONEIN was offered a chance to look at the bodies but turned it down. In trying to reconstruct the period of the assassination on November 1, COLBY reports that there was a telephone conversation between President DIEM and the generals. In fact there were several of them. President DIEM was very strongly rejecting the generals, calling them to discipline, and so forth, in the early stages. At a later stage, in the early morning of November 1, he called and indicated that he would surrender if he would be properly handled. The generals then sent somebody down to receive that surrender and found that President DIEM was not there. He'd actually gotten out through the back door of the palace and had gone down to another section of the city.

SOURCE: CONEIN was not in attendance.

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 17-19.

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN
CRITIC
JGS headquarters
STATION

DATES:

1 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: The IG Report makes the following statement: "The fact that CONEIN was at JGS headquarters is well known in official circles", and bolsters that notoriety by the following statement: '"The first cable (on the coup) was received at headquarters at 0117 hours, (November 1, 1963,) Washington time, and was filed on the CRITIC network at 0159. At 0256 hours, following receipt of the sixth non-CRITIC cable, headquarters instructed the STATION to put the coup reporting on the CRITIC network at the STATION. Sometime during the day of 1 November (the confirmation copy of the cable lacks a date/time stamp) headquarters cabled a warning to the STATION against including the names of CIA personnel in its CRITIC cables. CONEIN is identified by and as being at JGS headquarters in eleven CRITIC messages, seven of which were put into the CRITIC channel, without the name being deleted, here at headquarters."

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 42

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

CONEIN

DATES:
1 November 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: When the generals took over the PTT which controlled the communications, they left only the embassy lines open. The telephone terminals had been taken out prior to the coup and instead of leaving CONEIN's telephone into his home open, it had been disconnected P. 51

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE:
July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY, WILLIAM
Nhu

DATES:
1 November 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated that "The CIA had nothing to do with the assassination of President DIEM and Mr. NHU. The actual assassination was a shock and surprise to everyone in the United States government and when it was announced it was a matter of grave concern. In retrospect, one must realize that there was, however, considerable debate about encoura ing and supporting the generals in an overthrow of the DIEM regime, and that the record is very clear that the United States through itsoverall policy was in support of that overthr and, of course, I think it is fair to say that in launching a violent overthrow of a regime involved such as this, people are going to get hurt, and in this case, the leaders we killed in the process." pp. 19-20

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby, pp. 19-20

FILE:

STAFF:
R. DAWSON

DATE: 20 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
GENERAL DINH

DATES:
11/1/63
21 AUG. thru
16 SEPT. '63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Dinh's ~~His~~ actions during this period as Military Governor did not endear him to the population or the other officers.

SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
CONEIN

DATES:
1 November 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on several occasions, he warned the embassy that certain shellings were going to take place, or bombings by aircraft were going to take place at a certain time in order to alert American personnel who might be living around the area to watch out or stay under cover, because they would find 105's in the center of the city. There were no American casualities during this coup. The Vietnamese suffered about 100 dead. p. 51-52

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES: 11/1/63

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

8. There was a leak to the President prior to the actual coup being launched. Because of this, the President ordered the 41st Ranger Battalion to move into Saigon and to take the PTT and to surround the palace. This caused another stumbling block in the generals' plan. They were completely taken by surprise by this maneuver and had to negotiate with the commander of the battalion to withdraw his unit.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 11.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DINH

COUNSELLER NHU

DATES: 31 August '63
11/1/63

CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Dinh, on approximately 31 August, had the audacity to inform both President Diem and Counseller Nhu that he was their savior and requested a ministerial post for himself.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 12-13.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

GEN. MINH

11/1/63

DIEM✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE

The method used by the generals to neutralize opposition elements or doubtful officers was to hold a luncheon meeting for all general officers in the Saigon area (with the exception of General Ton That Dinh) and all commanders of separate units. Once every one of these officers had appeared at General Staff headquarters and were seated (with the exception of Captain Quyen who had been killed), General Minh announced that he and a group of officers were going to overthrow the government by force. At this time, a section of Military Police armed with sub-machine guns came into the room. General Minh asked for those officers who were willing to go along with the coup to stand up. He told them they would be 7a

CON'T. ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 11-12.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

CONT. OCCURRENCE

free to move around General Staff headquarters but were not to leave the command post. Those who did not join the coup were immediately placed under arrest and put under armed guard. Once the non-coup members had been taken away, General Minh ordered a tape recorder brought to the command post at which time he read the proclamation and objectives of the coup plotters which was recorded. He then asked each officer who had agreed to participate in the coup to speak his name into the tape recorder. Several tapes were made from the original and distributed in different parts of the city in pre-arranged hiding places so that in the event the coup failed, no officer could claim that he had not voluntarily participated in the coup. 7b

SOURCE: P. 12, LAST CARD CONTINUED

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

COL. KHANG✓

DATES:

11/1/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

8

OCCURRENCE:

Once the coup had started, Colonel Khang of the Marine Brigade and Colonel Lam of the Civil Guard decided to join the coup. Colonel Lam at this time recorded instructions on a tape recorder which was to be later broadcast to all Civil Guard units ordering them to cooperate with the Generals' Revolutionary Committee. Lt. Colonel Khang, Commander of the Marine Brigade telephoned his unit commanders not then participating in the coup and ordered them to support the coup. The command of the Air Force was given to Colonel Do Khac Mai vice Colonel Hien. The command of the 7th Division was given to Colonel Nguyen Van Co. Temporary command of the IV Corps

CON'T ON
NEXT CARD

SOURCE:
Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 12.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD

8b

was given to Colonel Bui Huu Nhon. Command of troops in Saigon was given to General Ton That Dinh. Under General Dinh's overall command were Saigon support troops, the Marine Brigade, the Airborne Brigade, 40 tanks from the Armor Command, the 5th and 7th Divisions, supported by the Air Force and the Thu Duc Officer's Training Base which joined the coup under the command of Colonel Lam Son.

SOURCE:
Page 12, con't.

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DINH
MINH
DON

DATES:
11/1/63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

When this did not materialize by early October, the coup principals realized that they had Dinh actively thinking against the regime. It is evident from statements during the series of meetings with General Don and General Minh during the month of October that they still did not trust Dinh but felt they had compromised him sufficiently to use his troops and, if necessary, to eliminate Dinh if he showed any sign of compromising the generals. Dinh was surrounded by officers who surveilled him 24 hours a day including Colonel Co, his deputy, now IV Corps Commander and newly elevated to Brigadier General.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 13.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
11/1/63
10/21/63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

h. In addition to the above maneuvering, Colonel Do Mau, (now Brigadier General), Chief of Military Security Service, played his role by issuing false military intelligence reports which went to President Diem. These reports started on or about 24 October and built up a picture of strong Viet Cong forces approaching Saigon for attack and permitted the Joint General Staff to issue appropriate orders, approved by the President, to move units favorable to the conspiracy to the outskirts of Saigon and also to move units, such as the Special Forces, away from Saigon.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, pages 13-14.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NGO DINH NHU

GEN. DON
GEN. DINH

DATES:
11/1/63

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Ngo Dinh Nhu's reaction was to order him to Dalat for a "rest". During this period of time, Dinh realized that he had been played for a dupe by Ngo Dinh Diem. The Generals recognized this fact and General Don started playing on General Dinh's vanity by telling him that he was a real hero and that he, above all, should have been thanked by Diem and Nhu for saving the government.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 13.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DON
CONEIN
AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATES:

Nov. 1, '63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

General Don stated to Conein that Don had tried to alert Conein at the latter's residence since before noon and no one answered. A later check revealed that Conein's telephone was out of order. Conein was told that he was to keep a telephone line open to Ambassador Lodge; Don informed Conein that Colonels Le Quang Tung (ARVN Special Forces Commander Huynh Huu Hien (Airforce Commander) and Colonel Cao Van Vien (Commander of the Airborne Brigade) were arrested; that Colonel Nhong Ngoc Lan (Commander of the Civil Guard) and Lt. Colonel Le Nguyen Khang 3

CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 9.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

CATEGORIES:

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

CONT FROM LAST CARD

(Commander of the Marine Brigade) were under guard and not yet declared and considered neutral. 3a
Colonel Tung was brought in under armed guard and forced at gunpoint to order a ceasefire between the Special Forces units adjacent to JGS headquarters and two platoons of the 5th Division. Once the cease fire had been declared between Special Forces and JGS, thirty-five armored personnel carriers loaded with troops in combat gear started moving toward Saigon proper.

SOURCE: p. 9, cont.

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NGO DINH NHU

COL. HUAN

GEN. DON

DATES:

11/1/63

TOP SECRET

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: CON'T ON NEXT CARD ALSO

9a

Don promised Dinh that he would personally speak to the President on Dinh's behalf and that he would ask that Dinh be granted the Ministry of Interior while he, Don, would ask for the Ministry of National Defense. Dinh believed that Don had his personal interests at heart and Don did, in fact, make such an appeal to the President to enlarge his government but made the proposal in such a way that it would have been impossible for Diem or Nhu to accept. Deadlines were given. Dinh was assured that the President would give him a ministerial post. After the deadlines had passed and Dinh had not received what he thought

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 13.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:

TOP SECRET

CATEGORIES:

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD:

9b

was his proper recognition, General Don and other officers, including Colonel Huan, Commanding Officer of the Military Academy at Dalat, continued to lend sympathy to Dinh. Still, Dinh was waiting for his ministerial post.

SOURCE: p., 13, Con't.

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Lansdale

Lodge Colby

DATES:

Afternoon
11/1/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that although he did not have the copy there was a telegram which recounts a call made from Diem to Lodge on the afternoon of the coup. Diem said that he was having trouble. "...an effort was being made against him by his Generals, and that he believed it essential to put this down. He urged that the U. S. consult General Lansdale and me (Colby) by name because we understood something about this situation. This was in the afternoon of the coup. The response, I believe, Ambassador Lodge did mention something about assistance in leaving the country." Pages 49-50.

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
HARKINS, LODGE, BUNDY, DON,

DATES:
30 Oct. 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: On 30 October 1963, LODGE replied to BUNDY's cable (DIR 79109) of the same date by CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2063): "........do not think we have the power to delay or discourage a coup. DON has made it clear many times that this is a Vietnamese affair......I believe we should continue our present position of keeping hands off but continue to monitor and press for more detailed information. CAS has been anaylzing forces for some time and it is their estimate that the generals have probably figured their chances pretty closely.......It does not seem sensible to have the military in charge of matter which is so profoundly political as a change of government....As to requests from the generals, they may well have need of funds at the last moment with which to buy off potential opposition. To the extent that these funds can be passed discreetly, I believe we should furnish them....If we were convinced that the coup was going to fail, we would of course do everything we could to stop it. HARKINS has read this and does not concur."

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report 1967, p. 39

FILE:

STAFF: R. Dawson

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
FELT, ADMIRAL CINCPAC Commander
CONEIN

DATES:
31 October 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that on or about October 31, 1963, FELT came to Vietnam and landed and had an interview with DIEM in the morning. p. 48

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: LODGE BUNDY	DATES: 30 Oct 1963	CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963 in a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG 2094) the following cable from LODGE (in its entirety) occurred: "Thanks for your sagacious instruction. Will carry out to best of my ability."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 40

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES: LODGE BUNDY (?)	DATES: 30 Oct 1963	CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: On October 30, 1963, in a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR 79407) the following quotation appeared: "....We do not accept as a basis for U.S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage coup....We cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention....U.S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side.... " (the IG Report here states without further showing the author of the above message that "the White House repeats its instructions on command of the country team after LODGE leaves." The inference can probably be drawn that the message although looked upon as a CIA cable to Saigon, it was undoubtedly emanating from the White House.)

SOURCE: CIA IG Report, 1967 p. 39

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SMITH, DAVID
HARKINS, GENERAL
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM
KENNEDY, ROBERT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MCCONE
HELMS
COLBY

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregmum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

HARKINS,
MINH
LODGE
BUNDY
DON
KENNEDY, JOHN F.

DATES:

Oct 30, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable to Saigon (DIR79109) of OCT 30, 1963, BUNDY wrote to LODGE saying that "...chances of action with or without our approval now so significant that we should urgently consider our attitude and contingency plans. We believe our attitude to coup group can still have decisive effect on itsdecision. ... We must have assurance balance of forces clearly favorable...CONEIN should express to DON that we do not find presently reveal plans to give clear prospect of quick results...we badly need some corroborative evidence of men or others directly involved....highest authority desires it clearly understood that after your departure HARKINS should participate in all coup contacts supervision and the event coup begins he become head of country team..."

SOURCE:

IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 39

STAFF:

Dawson

LODGE, AMBASSADOR
DIEM
NHU

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of IA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, it would appear hat a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by he USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU...Althoughthere ave no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must nticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:
6/27/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LODGE, AMBASSADOR
DIEM
NHU

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a CIA cable from Saigon (SAIG2040) of 29 October, sent through eyes only channels of CIA, LODGE gives his view on the seemingly imminent coup: "In summary, it would appear that a coup attempt by the generals group is imminent...and that no positiveaction by the USG can prevent a coup attempt short of informing DIEM and NHU...Althoughthere have no requests to date by the generals for materials or financial support, we must anticipate that such requests may be forthcoming..."

SOURCE:
IG Report 1967 (CIA) p. 38

FILE:

STAFF:
Dawson

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DON
AMBASSADOR LODGE

CONEIN

DATES:

10/28/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

General Don approached Ambassador Lodge at Dalat Airport on the occasion of the departure of President Diem and Ambassador Lodge for their return to Saigon and asked if Conein was speaking for the Ambassador; Ambassador Lodge replied in the affirmative; Don told the Ambassador the USG should not interfere or try to stimulate a coup; The Ambassador agreed, the USG wanted no satellites and the USG would not thwart an attempt.

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 7-8.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

SMITH, DAVID
HARKINS, GENERAL
TRUEHARD, WILLIAM
KENNEDY, ROBERT
KENNEDY, JOHN F.
MCCONE
HELMS
COLBY

DATES:

Oct. 29, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

In a Presidential meeting on Vietnam on October 29, 1963 with MCCONE, HELMS, AND COLBY in attendance. The following record by HELMS and COLBY shows that: it was suggested that in the Ambassador's absence, HARKINS, TRUEHART, and DAVID SMITH act as a committee to direct a coup operation. MCCONE countered with the view that SMITH should not be involved in such a policy making function, although he would be in a position to provide technical advise to HARKINS and TRUEHART as well as carry out their instructions in the operations field. The President stated that if the forces in Saigon were not clearly in favor of the coup we should discourage its launching. The Attorney General felt the U.S. was risking too much based on flimsy ev idence. The DCI stated his view that even a successful coup would create a period of interregnum, confusion which might only be solved by a second or third coup.

SOURCE:

STAFF:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. DON
GEN. DO CAO TRI
NGUYEN KHANH

DATES:

11/1/63

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

6a

OCCURRENCE:

5. Several days before the coup was to take place, General Don coordinated the final plan with Generals Do Cao Tri and Nguyen Khanh and with the Commanding Officer of the Military Academy at Dalat. The signal to start the coup was based on a previous decree issued by President Diem which stated that after 1 November there would be no siesta and there would be only a one-hour lunch period. By radio and telephone, the coup principals had issued instructions to coup participants that as of 1 November working hours would begin at 1330. Starting at 0730 hours 1 November the instructions were transmitted to units furthest away from Saigon, i.e., Hue, and in sufficient time so that the forces which were to attack Saigon

CON'T. ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 11.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

TOP SECRET

6b

OCCURRENCE:

CONTINUATION OF LAST CARD, p. 11.

would be in position at 1330 hours. One unit of the 7th Division received its instructions to move at 1330 hours but actually moved at 1335 hours. This also was one of the minor incidents which nearly upset the coup as there was fear that this would be detected by the forces loyal to Diem,

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

CONEIN

GEN. DUONG VAN MINH
GEN. TRAN VAN DON

TRAN THIEN KHIEM
TRAN VAN MINH (CON'T)

DATES:

Nov. 1, 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Conein was contacted by Captain Hoa, Aide de Camp to General Don, at 1315 hours stating that Conein was wanted immediately at General Staff Head-quarters. Since this was not within previous security arrangements for the next meeting, Conein questioned Hoa who said he was only carrying out instructions and stated that Conein should come in uniform to JGS and he then departed. While getting into uniform, the dentist whose office had been used for meetings appeared at Conein's home with confirmation of the message that Conein was to proceed immediately to JGS headquarters. He further stated that the coup was in progress. Conein alerted CAS

CONTINUED ON NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, Pages 8-9.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

CONT. FROM LAST CARD

Saigon via radio net using a pre-arranged voice code and proceeded to the War Room at JGS headquarters. Present were Generals Duong Van Minh, Tran Van Don, Phan Xuan Chieu, Tran Thien Khiem, Tran Van Minh, Nguyen Ngoc Le, Mai Huu Xuan, Le Van Kim, Tran Tu Oai, Nguyen Van La, Nguyen Giac Ngo, Tran Ngoc Tam, Le Van Nghiem; Colonels Do Mau, Nguyen Khuong, Duong Ngoc Lam; Majors Le Nguyen Khang, Do Khac Mai, and unidentified junior officers.

SOURCE: p. 9.

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

VICE PRESIDENT THO

DATES:

11/2/63
0310 hours

CATEGORIES: [redacted]

DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

0310 Vice President Tho at JGS

Palace is under heavy attack

SOURCE:

Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Page 22.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MINH NHUNG	2 November 1963	✓DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: CONEIN stated that around 6:30 or 6:40 on November 2, 1963, DIEM talked to MINH for the first time. DIEM asked MINH for full honors and MINH replied that he could not guarantee full honors, if and during the time that Vietamese were still killing one another. DIEM stated that he would order the cease fire at the palace and CONEIN recalls that this took place at about 7:50, November 2, 1963. CONEIN stated as follows: "At this stage, there were four armored cars and 113's an escort of military police proceeded immediately from the joint general staff headquarters toward GAI LONG PALACE. BIG MINH with his aide, CAPTAIN NHUNG got into a sedan and with MTS Corps, went out the back road from the general staff headquarters toward the back of the golf course and took a different road from the armored cars that went down Cong Le." p. 52-53

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein
FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON
DATE: July 1, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
MINH	11/2/63 ~~2420~~ hours 0020(?)	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

0020 Increasingly heavy attack on the palace. Minh has ordered that the palace be taken at any cost. 10 armored vehicles are counted from the Embassy roof. Approximately one company of foot soldiers moving up [illegible] toward the palace.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 23.
FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Don, General
Conein

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Conein stated at the time they were going to bring the press in for the ceremony on the capitulation of Diem, Don said "get the hell out we are bringing in the press." Page 74.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

STAFF: Dawson

FILE:

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

LAM, DUONG NGOC

NHU
XUAN
GENERAL MAI HUU

DATES:

~~on/or/about 10 November 1963~~
November 2, 1963

CATEGORIES:

✓ DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: XUAN and LAM receiving the message that DIEM and NHU had been spotted, took off with armored cars and went to the church. XUAN reported to the President, saluted, and told him to get into the armored car. NHU protested and asked for a sedan. DIEM and NHU were shoved into the car and were told by the commander of the column LAM, who was a little fat guy who wore a mustache and used to command the civil guard and not the individual who later became I-Corps commander, that the use of the armored car was for their physical protection. p. 59-60

SOURCE:

Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Conein

STAFF: R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Conein
Lodge, H.C.

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Conein stated he kept contact with the junta "until the day that the U. S. officially recognized the South Vietnamese government. There were several countries that recognized, and I was acting as the liaison officer for the ambassador to the junta during this period for approximately ten days or two weeks.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

FILE: p. 61

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Tuan Conein
Nhu

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Colby stated that another officer who had worked with Conein was apparently executed about that same time as Diem and Nhu were. Tuan had been head of the Special Forces and had worked very closely with Diem and Nhu and Conein and was executed by the Generals that morning. Page 27-28.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Minh
Nhu, Ngo Dinh
Conein

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Conein explained that although it was baffling as to why Diem left the palace to go to the church in Cholon, and although he did not know exactly how they got out the general assumption was that there were secret tunnels in the palace which was the former Governor General's Palace called Gailong Palace. The tunnel took them under and through the palace and the half block to City Hall. Page 63-64.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSC Conein, June 20, 1975

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 7/1/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Bang, Major   Minh
Phen, Ngoc   Conein
Tau   Nhu

DATES:

11/2/63

CATEGORIES:

Diem ✓

OCCURRENCE:

Bang was in the armored column and returned about an hour after Minh had left. Conein asked Bang (whom Conein had met in Hanoi in 1945) what his orders were. Bang stated the orders going through the palace was that we were not to fire unless we were fired upon and that they had not been found at that time. The expectation was and everybody assumed, that Minh and Nhu were at the palace.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, SSCI, Conein, 6/20/75

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES: CON'T ON NEXT CARD

Ky

DATES: 11/2/63
0310 hours

CATEGORIES: 1C
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: All general officers except Generals Ty, Van Thanh Cao, Huynh Van Cao, Thai Quang Hoang.

LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP: Colonels:
Lan Van Phat
Do Mau, Chief of Military Security Service
Nguyen Huu Co
Nguyen Van Chuan, J-4, JGS
Nguyen Khuong, Chief of Staff for Infantry
Tran Vinh Huyen
Bui Huu Nhon, CO, 21st Infantry Division
Duong Ngoc Lam, Director General, Civil Guard and Self Defense Corps

CON'T on NEXT CARD

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 22.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

TOP SECRET

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NGUYEN CAO KY

DATES:

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

OCCURRENCE: LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP:

LAST CARD CONT.

10c

Lt. Colonels:
Le Nguyen Khang, Commander, Marine Brigade
Do Khac Mai, Chief of Staff, Vietnamese Air Force ✓
Nguyen Cao Ky, CO, 1st Transport Sqdn Vietnamese Air Force

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

STAFF:

DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: LIST OF OFFICERS PARTICIPATING IN THE COUP: CONTINUATION FROM LAST CARD: 10c

Majors: Nguyen Dinh Tuan
Chuong Tan Cang
Majors: Vinh Loc
Nguyen Trung Truc

SOURCE:

FILE:

STAFF:

DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

NHU

DATES:

11/2/63
1330 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE:

Lt. Colonel Thao and Lt. Minh agreed that Diem and Nhu could have maintained telephone communications from the Cholon villa throughout the coup since lines ran from Gia Long Palace to Thu Duc and from Thu Duc to the Cholon villa.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, Pages 24 - 25.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DIEM
DON, GENERAL
MINH, GENERAL
CONEIN
JGS headquarters

DATES:

2 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: "According to one of CONEIN's reports, DIEM called GENERAL DON at 0650 hours 2 November and offered to surrender unconditionally. GENERAL MINH immediately ordered all telephones removed from rooms in their JGS command post area. This cut off all communicatio with the outside except for radios under MINH's control.

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

PERSONS/ENTITIES: NHU	DATES: Nov. 2, '63 1130 hours	CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

1130 Lt. Colonel Phan Ngoc Thao said that he and his forces entered Gia Long Palace during the early morning hours to escort Diem and Nhu to the JGS after their surrender. A search revealed they were not at the palace and had not been there during the coup. Thao reported back to the JGS. Villas in Saigon and Cholon known to be used by the Ngo family were searched.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 24. FILE:	STAFF: Dawson DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES: HU	DATES: 11/2/63 1330 hours	CATEGORIES: DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Officer in J-2, JGS, reported that Diem and Nhu and an orderly were caught and killed by Minh's personnel at a church in Cho Quan, Cholon. Captured with them was Captain Do Hui, a nephew of Do Mau, MSS Chief.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 25. FILE:	STAFF: Dawson DATE:

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

AMBASSADOR LODGE

DATES:

11/2/63
1000 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Ambassador Lodge cheered enroute to the Chancery.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 24.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

GEN. MAI HUU XUAN

NHU

DATES:

11/2/63
1130 hours

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

B/General Mai Huu Xuan led the detail which located Diem and Nhu at a villa on Phung Hung street in Cholon. Xuan returned to the JGS with their bodies. Cause of death at this time is unknown.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit one, page 24.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
NHU ✓	11/2/63 1000 hours	DIEM

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

1000 Diem and Nhu are reported at JGS. This is unconfirmed. There are also rumors that Diem and Nhu have escaped.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein Exhibit One, page 24.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
NHU	11/2/63 1000 hours	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

1000 Diem and Nhu are reported at JGS. This is unconfirmed. There are also rumors that Diem and Nhu have escaped.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein Exhibit One, page 24.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
Vice President THO

DATES:
11/2/63
0420 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Vice President Tho has accepted position as Prime Minister.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein, Exhibit One, page 23.

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson
DATE: 6/30/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

DATES:
11/2/63
1000 hours

CATEGORIES:
DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

Sporadic small arms fire continues.

SOURCE: Hearings, S.S.C.I., 6/20/75, Conein,

STAFF: Dawson

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
DON
CONEIN

DATES:
2 Nov 1963

CATEGORIES:
DIEM✓

OCCURRENCE: On 2 November 1963, GENERAL DON informed CONEIN that he needed money to pay the families of persons killed during the coup. CONEIN gave GENERAL DON an additional 1,750,000 piasters. One bundle of 250,000 piasters was overlooked and was found later in CONEIN's safe. (The IG Report goes on to note as follows: "The passing of these funds is obviously a very sensitive matter.")

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
CIA IG Report, 1967, pp. 40-41

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

1964 —

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

KHANH
MAJOR DANG SY

DATES:

Jan. 1964

CATEGORIES:

DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE:

TOP SECRET

At the trial of Dang Sy by the Khanh regime that succeeded that of the coup leaders temporary or provisional government, Khanh's prosecutor insisted that the deaths had been caused by American-supplied grenades of the type known as MKIII whose use had been ordered by Dang Sy, and the conviction by the military court was that the 8 deaths were caused by these concussion grenades. Higgins argues in her book that this conviction is contrary to the Pentagon's assessment of the MKIII grenade which found that at worst the effects of such a grenade are non-fatal. Nor does such a grenade have sufficient force to decapitate or mutilate persons, let alone bring down the ceilings, doors, and windows that were adjacent to the veranda of the radio station. (95-96) Higgins also states that: "The conviction of Major Dang Sy certainly throws no light on the matter one way or another. The trial was clearly rigged from the start." (96-97)

SOURCE:

Our Viet Nam Nightmare, Higgins, Harper and Row, 1965

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson, R.

DATE: July 2, 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:

Thich Tri Quang
McNamara
Diem

DATES:

Spring, 1965

CATEGORIES:

Diem

OCCURRENCE:

Higgins, in her book, quotes McNamara as stating in Spring of 1965 that: "Thich Tri Quang has made serious trouble for us before, and he will again. Perhaps the greatest mistake we made was when we gave Thich Tri Quang at the U. S. Embassy." (from September through November 1963) Page 103

TOP SECRET

SOURCE: *Our Vietnam Nightmare* by Marguerite Higgins,
Harper and Rowe

FILE:

STAFF: Dawson

DATE: July 3, 1975

Colby, Wm. E.
Breckinridge
Pearson, D.

DATES:
3/67

CATEGORIES:
Diem ✓
IX - C - 2 - b
Castro

OCCURRENCE:

Breckinridge actually put together the I.G. Reports and he did so in response to a March 1967 Drew Pearson column to the effect that the agency was involved with criminal syndicates to assassinate Castro. As a result of discussions caused by the Pearson column, staff members in the I.G.'s office were directed to put together reports on CIA involvement in the assassination of Castro, Trujillo, and Diem (50).

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:
SSCI; testimony of Wm. E. Colby, 6/4/75

FILE: Cage

STAFF: JFD

DATE: 6/28/75

PERSONS/ENTITIES:	DATES:	CATEGORIES:
IG REPORT CONEIN SPERA DON, GENERAL DIEM	31 May 1967	DIEM ✓

OCCURRENCE: In concluding, the IG Report makes the following observations: "To recap: (a) CIA was not in favor of the decision to abandon the DIEM regime, but faithfully carried out instructions. (2) CIA officers CONEIN and SPERA were the contacts with the coup generals, but only as approved and under instructions. (c) A CIA officer, CONEIN, was at the generals' command post throughout the fighting. (d) CONEIN furnished GENERAL DON about $65,000 to buy off opposition military units while the coup was in progress. (e) CIA had no hand in the assassinations and had no foreknowledge of them."

TOP SECRET

SOURCE:

CIA IG Report, 1967, p. 44

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 29 June 1975

PERSONS/ENTITIES:
COLBY

DATES:
1975

CATEGORIES:
DIEM

TOP SECRET

OCCURRENCE: COLBY stated in response to the difficulty for the United States once it has sought to accomplish objectives through foreign nationalists to control the actions of the foreign nationalists, that "Certainly the foreigner makes his own decisions at various ti the degree to which he is going to do one thing or the other. The U.S. cannot control it. The U. S. can assist them, the U.S. can counsel him and advise him, perhaps influence him, but the control, that is....when you are dealing with essentially another soverign, why t are limits to your degree of authority over them." p. 76

SOURCE:
Hearings, SSCI, June 20, 1975, Colby

FILE:

STAFF: R. DAWSON

DATE: 1 July 1975

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 7/7/2015

Agency Information

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10242

RECORD SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-147

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1975
PAGES : 690

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ORGANIZED CRIME
CIA
ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C; 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/31/2000

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : SSCIA
RECORD NUMBER : 157-10014-10242
RECORDS SERIES : MISCELLANEOUS RECORDS OF THE CHURCH COMMITTEE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 07-M-147

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 00/00/75
PAGES : 690
SUBJECTS : ORGANIZED CRIME

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

CIA

ASSASSINATION, KENNEDY, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/21/99
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CCBOX 441

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

N.Y. Daily

SUNDAY NEWS, APRIL 20, 1975

ECRETS OF THE CIA

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro

Its clandestine operations now undergoing a sometimes painful official scrutiny, the Central Intelligence Agency maintains, as always, a tight lip. But from interviews with the agents who hired out to do the CIA's clock-and-dagger work, News reporter Paul Meskil tells here for the first time of the intrigue that surfaced in the Cuban missile crisis, a confrontation that pushed the U.S. to the brink of war with the Soviet Union. First of a series.

By PAUL MESKIL



Marie Lorenz: spied on Fidel.

A BEAUTIFUL German-American girl scored an intelligence coup for the CIA by stealing secret papers from the Havana hotel suite she had shared with Fidel Castro.

Among the papers, she told The News, were maps showing the sites selected for Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

Curvy, black-haired Marie Lorenz, who lives quietly in New York, was the Mata Hari of the Caribbean cold war. She was one of the most glamorous members of a spy ring recruited for the Central Intelligence Agency by Frank Fiorini, a onetime triple agent who later became known to the American public as Watergate burglar Frank Sturgis.

Ms. Lorenz, Sturgis, other former espionage agents, Caribbean conspirators, and Cuban freedom fighters were interviewed for this series on CIA operations in the Caribbean and the Americas. Some of their clandestine activities are told here for the first time, and some are being investigated by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and Vice President Rockefeller's Commission on CIA Activities.

According to sources, the CIA was, to one degree or another, involved in:

- Efforts to assassinate foreign heads of state, including Castro of Cuba, Papa Doc Duvalier of Haiti and Rafael Trujillo of the Dominican Republic.
- Smashing a Castroite attempt to invade Panama and sabotage the Panama Canal.
- The explosion of a munitions ship in Havana harbor.
- A fantastic scheme to seize a Soviet ship and use it to obtain the release of the captured American spy ship Pueblo.
- Secret deals with American mobsters who had lost their multimillion-dollar Cuban gambling casinos.
- Armed raids on Cuba and many shipments of guerrilla fighters, weapons, explosives and other war materials to the island before and after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.

Marie Lorenz played a small but important role in the labyrinth of Caribbean conspiracies.

Her Cuban adventures began on a balmy evening in February 1959, when a launch flying the Cuban revolutionary flag pulled alongside the gleaming white luxury liner Berlin, anchored in Havana harbor on the next-to-last stop of a Caribbean cruise.

In the launch were 20 or so heavily armed Cubans, all wearing beards and rumpled olive-green fatigues. The liner's accommodation ladder was

(Continued on page [illegible])

Box 441

American Mata Hari Who Duped Castro



A chance meeting in Havana harbor aboard a cruise ship captained by her father brought Marie Lorenz and Fidel Castro together. It began a liaison destined to have international repercussions.

(Continued from page 2)

lowered and the *barbudos* (bearded men) swarmed aboard like pirates, grenades dangling from their belts and machine guns swinging from their shoulders.

Women in evening gowns screamed and ran for cover with their dinner-jacketed husbands, believing the ship was being raided by bandits. But other American tourists recognized the leader of the sinister-looking band as Fidel Castro, the new prime minister of Cuba, and they crowded around him for autographs.

"I'm a friend," he shouted, obviously enjoying the commotion he had caused. "I like Americans."

The Berlin's skipper, former German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz, invited the *barbudos* to stay for cocktails and dinner, and he introduced Castro to his vivacious 18-year-old daughter, Marie.

"My father spoke Spanish and he got along well with Castro," Marie told this reporter. "He took Castro and his men on a tour of the ship, then asked them to please leave their guns outside the dining room before they sat down for dinner.

"Castro said they didn't feel safe without guns, so my father allowed them to keep their pistols, but he made them leave the machine guns, automatic rifles and grenades in the smoking room."

Castro sat at the captain's table, between Lorenz and Marie. During the meal, he smiled frequently at Marie, and she was as impressed as any normal teenage girl would be by compliments from the flamboyant hero of the Cuban revolution.

She spoke German and English, which she had learned from her American mother. Castro said he needed a secretary who could write letters in these languages. Before the meal was over, he offered the job to Marie.

Took Offer As Joke

"He asked me to stay in Havana and work for him," she said. "My father and I both laughed. My father said I was going back to Germany to finish my education."

Castro promised to write to her, so she gave him two addresses—her parents' home in Bremen, Germany, and her brother's apartment in New York, where she planned to stay when the Caribbean cruise ended. She never expected to see or hear from Fidel again.

About two weeks later, two Cuban officers called on Marie in New York. They carried a message from Castro, saying he was in desperate need of an English-German translator. He had sent a Cubana Airlines plane to bring her back to Havana.

"I made a big mistake," Marie said. "I got on that plane."

During the flight to Havana, she tried to imagine her life in Castroland. She thought she would have a desk in the premier's secretarial pool and a small apartment of her own. She may even have dreamed of a romance with the tall, charismatic dictator. But her airborne illusions were shattered soon after the plane landed.

"I was very idealistic then," she said. "I was going on an adventure and to my first job. I was going to help the new government. Instead, I became Castro's plaything.

"I was driven from the airport to the Havana Hilton, where Fidel had taken over the 24th floor. For the next four months, I hardly ever got out of the Hilton. When I did get out, I was under guard. If I wanted to go down to the pool or coffee shop, two *barbudos* would go with me."

'I Was His Prisoner'

Asked to define her relationship with Castro during this period, Marie said: "I was his prisoner. I was trapped."

"Were you ever in love with Fidel?"

"No; never. How can you be in love when you're afraid, when you're treated like a piece of furniture, when you're sleeping with a live bazooka under the bed, when you're living in a room with guns on every table and cigar butts all over the floor?"

"My way of thinking was German," she continued. "Everything in my life had been very orderly, very neat, and clean. I never realized anyone, especially a prime minister, could be so disorganized. I thought he would have several offices, with desks, chairs and telephones. All he had, at this point, was a suite of rooms at the Hilton, where he lived and worked. I was kept in one of the rooms. The door to the hall was locked from the outside. *Barbudos* and visitors were in the next room, but the door between the rooms was kept locked.

"All I could do was read books, study Spanish, walk back and forth, listen to the radio or go on the balcony and look out over Havana. I was miserable. My father tried to find out what had happened to me. He contacted the American Embassy in Havana (Marie was born an American citizen) but nothing happened.

"The only clothes I had were what I brought with me from New York. I couldn't go out to buy anything. Fidel had me measured for a uniform so I would look like a member of the 26th of July Movement. An olive-green uniform with a lieutenant's star.

"That way, when I was allowed out under guard, he thought people would think I was of his officers. But almost every Havana housewife heard rumors that Castro was keeping a foreigner, an American girl, at the Hilton. I was becoming a problem to him.

"One day two *barbudos* came to the room while Fidel was out. They said they were there to help me. They took me on a 20-minute plane ride to the Isle of Pines. They showed me the beautiful black sand beach there and then drove me by jeep to this huge prison complex. They showed me a cell where dictator Fulgencio Batista had imprisoned Fidel and Raul (Fidel's brother) years before. I went into the cell to look at a bronze plaque on the wall. They shut the door and locked me in the cell. Then they went away.

She Wasn't Pampered

"I spent a week there, eating the same food as the other prisoners—blacks beans, rice, stale bread and coffee. As far as I know, I was the only woman there.

"Every morning we would hear the firing squads. As soon as it got light, the birds would start singing. Then the guns would go off. Then marching and quiet. Then breakfast and cell checks. The guards would check to see if you'd hanged yourself during the night or if you'd done something wrong in there where there was hardly room to turn around. It was horrible.

"After seven days, I was taken out and flown back to Havana."

Marie was never told why she was jailed. She now believes Castro had her locked up to make sure she didn't escape while he was out of the country visiting the United States and South America.

One night she was with Castro and his bodyguards in the lobby of the Riviera Hotel when a handsome, wavy-haired man approached her. He wore the olive-green rebel uniform and the insignia of a captain in the Cuban air force.

While Castro was conferring with his aides on the other side of the lobby, the captain mingled with the *barbudos* around Marie and whispered to her in English: "I know about you."

"Can you help me?" she responded. "Can you get me out of here?"

"Yes. I'm with the American Embassy. I'll get you out."

This was her introduction to Commandante Frank Fiorini (later known as Frank Sturgis), Castro confidant and hired agent for the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency.

Agrees to Spy on Fidel

For the next few weeks Frank kept in contact with her in person and through Castro officers who were working for him. Marie agreed to spy on Castro. She filched secret documents and reported Castro's conversations with important visitors overheard through the hotel walls. By now, she could read and speak Spanish fairly well.

"The suite was full of guns and papers," she said. "Fidel had papers strewn all over the tables, the floor, the bed, the dresser. He had one filing cabinet that was never locked. It was full of money, papers, documents, maps. I took papers out and slipped them to Frank. Fidel never missed them.

"Frank said, 'Get all the data you can,' and I did. I was a regular Mata Hari."

Then Marie became sick, and Frank arranged her escape. Two Cuban officers took her out of the hotel while Castro was away and put her on a Cubana Airlines flight to New York.

About that time, Frank also set up the escapes of two top Cuban air force officers, a project that forced him to leave Cuba. He moved his base of operations to Miami, but he kept in touch with his agents on the island and his CIA contacts in Havana and Washington.

When she recovered from her illness, Marie joined him in Florida and volunteered for a mission that meant certain death if she were caught.

Early in 1960, Castro went to



Sturgis says Sal Garcia source of Tarabocchia memo

Discovery of missile sites in Cuba provoked a cold-war showdown between then President John F. Kennedy and then Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev, a confrontation that had the world holding its breath.



CIA Sent Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

By PAUL MESKIL

Copyright New York News Inc. 1976

The Central Intelligence Agency sent a shapely Mata Hari to Cuba in 1960 to kill her former lover, Fidel Castro.

Details of this case were uncovered by The News and a Senate Intelligence Committee investigator who learned that a mystery woman had been involved in an assassination plot against the Cuban dictator.

It was the first of several CIA-sponsored attempts to execute Castro.

The mystery woman has now been identified by the committee and The News as Marie Lorenz, an attractive German-American brunette who shared Castro's Havana hotel suite for several months in 1959. When a committee investigator confronted her with evidence linking her to the assassination plot, she admitted that she had been recruited for the attempted hit.

Exclusive Account

Then, last week, she gave this reporter an exclusive account of a mission so secret that she never mentioned it to anyone for 16 years.

Ms. Lorenz, who now lives in New York, is the daughter of the late German Navy Capt. Heinrich Lorenz and his American wife. After World War II, Lorenz became skipper of the luxury liner Berlin. He took Marie along on a Caribbean cruise in February 1959, a month after Castro took over the Cuban government.

Castro boarded the Berlin in Havana harbor and dined with the captain and his vivacious teenage daughter. He later persuaded Marie to return to Havana to work as his personal interpreter. When she arrived she was installed in Castro's 24th-floor suite at the Havana Hilton. She soon realized she was a virtual prisoner.

Quizzed by FBI

Frank Fiorini, an American who had become a Cuban Revolutionary Army officer and a CIA agent, contacted her and persuaded her to photograph Castro's secret papers. He later helped her escape.

She left Havana in January

The Memo That Started It

On Dec. 11, 1959, Col. J. C. King, head of the CIA's Western Hemisphere Division, wrote a memorandum to CIA Director Allen Dulles, according to a Senate committee report. Noting that the "far left" regime in Cuba might encourage other Latin American countries to take action against U.S. interests he recommended that: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro. None of those close to Fidel, such as his brother Raul or his companion, Che Guevara, have the same mesmeric appeal to the masses. Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate a fall of the present government."

Dulles and Deputy Director of Plans Richard Bissell approved the recommendation and the CIA launched an assassination campaign against Castro that lasted at least five years. This is the exclusive story of the first try.

CIA Sent a Bedmate To Kill Castro in '60

(Continued from page 3)

1959, [illegible] York and entered [illegible] Hospital for treatment of a serious illness. Two FBI agents questioned her about conditions in Cuba. She later took part in various CIA [illegible] operations with [illegible] and Alex Rorke, a [illegible] adventurer who worked for both the CIA and the FBI.

On one of these missions she [illegible] to Havana and stole secret papers and documents from Castro's suite while he was away. About two months later, Rorke told her he had an important assignment that would enable her to do a tremendous service for this country."

He took her to the FBI offices at 201 E. 69th St. for a conference with the two agents who had questioned her previously, and a CIA official.

"I was asked about my attitude toward Castro," she said, "and whether I was willing to work since I could get in and out (of Castro's suite). I said, 'What kind of work?'"

Thought It Was a Joke

"Alex said, 'You could knock him off.' It would save everybody a lot of trouble.' I thought he was kidding, but they kept coming back to it and I realized they were serious.

"Alex said, 'Why don't you kill him?' I said, 'I don't know how, with all those men around him, and I don't know if it's in me to kill him.'

"Once, out of jealousy, I pointed a gun at him and Fidel didn't even blink. He said, 'You can't kill me.' I said, 'I'm not planning to. I'm just cleaning the gun.'"

Ms. Lorenz said there were several more meetings at which various ways of killing Castro were discussed.

"Finally they decided on poison. They said it would be easy to put poison in his food or drink. I said, 'What are you trying to tell me? To go down and kill him?'

"Alex said, 'It would change history.' I said, "Well, I don't want to die."

"They didn't tell me to do it or not to do it. They said if I went I'd be protected, but who could guarantee I'd get out?"

A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Fiorini gave her two capsules full of poison powder. She was told to sprinkle the powder in Castro's coffee.

"I guess the company (CIA) supplied them. Frank said it was a company operation."

Packing the olive-drab uniform that Castro had given her, designating her a lieutenant in the Revolutionary Army, Ms. Lorenz flew back to Havana on Cubana Airlines. Believing she might be searched at the airport, she hid the capsules in a jar of cold cream in her purse. When she arrived in Havana she checked into a tourist hotel, changed into her Fidelista uniform and went to the Hilton.

Cold-Cream Caper

"The lobby was full of reporters and other people trying to see Castro, but he wasn't there. One of his aides recognized me and took me up to Fidel's suite.

Entering the two-room suite, she saw that nothing had changed in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

She waited nervously in Castro's private room until he came in a few hours later. As soon as he smiled and hugged her, she knew he didn't suspect she had visited the suite a few months previously and stolen his secrets. And he certainly didn't suspect she had come back to kill him.

Do Not Disturb

"He asked why I left him and I said it was because I missed my mother and my home. He started talking about Cuba and the problems, the lack of money, the shortages. He talked a long time. He said he was expecting an important phone call, but he took the receiver off the hook and he shouted to the barbudos (bearded ones) in the next room: 'No me moleste (Don't bother me)'

"Finally he ordered food and coffee sent up. When it came, he fell asleep on the bed, in his fatigues and with a cigar in his mouth. I had no confidence left, but I knew this was the chance to do it.

"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

[illegible] I could get in and [illegible] suite). I said, '[illegible]?'"

Thought It Was a Joke

"Alex said, 'You could knock [illegible]. It would save everybody a lot of trouble.' I thought he was [illegible], but they kept coming back to it and I realized they were serious.

"Alex said, 'Why don't you kill him?' I said, 'I don't know how, with all those men around him, and I don't know if it's in me to kill him.'

"Once, out of jealousy, I pointed a gun at him and Fidel didn't even blink. He said, 'You can't kill me.' I said, 'I'm not planning to. I'm just cleaning the gun.'"

Ms. Lorenz said there were several more meetings at which various ways of killing Castro were discussed.

"Finally they decided on poison. They said it would be easy to put poison in his food or drink. I said, 'What are you trying to tell me? To go down and kill him?'

"Alex said, 'It would change history.' I said, "Well, I don't want to die.'

"They didn't tell me to do it or not to do it. They said if I went I'd be protected, but who could guarantee I'd get out?"

A Method Ready

Mrs. Lorenz said she finally agreed to go to Miami with Rorke for a meeting with Fiorini, who "said he had a way to do it."

She said she spent three weeks in a CIA "safe house" in Miami, seeing no one but Fiorini and Rorke. "They kept talking me into it. They said, 'You can do it. You're the only one who can do it.'"

Asked if she now believes she was brainwashed, she replied: "I guess so." She said they appealed to her patriotism and told her she "would get thousands, enough to retire," if she succeeded.

When she finally agreed to accept the assignment, she said, [illegible] in her absence. The sitting room was crowded with Castro's bearded, pistol-packing retainers. The bedroom was littered with papers, cigar butts and guns.

She waited nervously in Castro's private room until he came in a few hours later. As soon as he smiled and hugged her, she knew he didn't suspect she had visited the suite a few months previously and stolen his secrets. And he certainly didn't suspect she had come back to kill him.

Do Not Disturb

"He asked why I left him and I said it was because I missed my mother and my home. He started talking about Cuba and the problems, the lack of money, the shortages. He talked a long time. He said he was expecting an important phone call, but he took the receiver off the hook and he shouted to the barbudos (bearded ones) in the next room: 'No me moleste (Don't bother me)'

"Finally he ordered food and coffee sent up. When it came, he fell asleep on the bed, in his fatigues and with a cigar in his mouth. I had no confidence left, but I knew this was the chance to do it.

"I went into the bathroom and opened the jar of cold cream. I stuck my finger in it and the whole thing came out like yuck. I couldn't find the capsules. They had melted.

"It was like an omen.

"I couldn't just dump a glob of cold cream in his coffee, so I shut the jar and went back to the bedroom and I watched him sleeping. Finally I lay down on the bed beside him.

"I thought, 'To hell with it. Let history take its course.'

"Stupid, Stupid"

Frank and Alex met me when I flew to Miami next morning. They asked me what happened and I said the capsules melted. Frank was very upset. He said, 'Stupid, stupid, stupid. Why did you put them in the cold cream?' I said, 'Where else? It was the only place to think of where no one would find them.'"

Ms. Lorenz was not asked to try again.

"Would you have killed him if the capsules hadn't melted," the interviewer asked. "No," she replied. "Probably not."

Alex Rorke later disappeared on a mystery flight to Nicaragua. Frank Fiorini, now known as Frank Sturgis, continued to perform odd jobs for the CIA until his arrest in 1972 as one of the Watergate burglars.

Informed of Ms. Lorenz' account of the assassination attempt, he verified her story.

Soon after her murder mission failed, the CIA recruited Mafia mobsters — including John Roselli of Las Vegas, Sam Giancana of Chicago and Santo Trafficante of Tampa, Fla. — to kill Castro. But they were no more successful than the sexy Mata Hari.

Aria Floors Opera Singer

London, June 12 (UPI) — Don Giovanni reached for a high note at the Royal Opera House in London last night and fell through the floor.

He stuck there, in the person of singer Ruggero Raimondi, trapped to his waist and singing for dear life. Sir Geraint Evans and his other co-performers, still singing, tugged and pulled. Eventually Raimondi climbed out, unhurt but shaken with his word bent into a curve.

"They were magnificent," said critic Hilton Tims, who was in the audience. "They carried on without letting the incident upset their vocal equilibrium."

[illegible]
N.Y.'S WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER
EDITION
SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

2

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion was launched. When it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

Related Story Page A5

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvania

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

a Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Levien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there."

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Levine just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.



Marie Lorenz says she was told that maps she took from Castro's headquarters were factor in locating and photographing missile sites (above). Under pressure from U.S., Khrushchev ordered missiles removed and shipped back to Soviet Union (right).

Cienaga de Zapata, a vast swamp that he intended to convert to rice fields. As soon as he left Havana with his usual entourage, Marie received orders to return to the Cuban capital immediately. She boarded a regular Cubana Airlines flight, posing as an American tourist and carrying her Castro uniform and a loaded revolver in her overnight bag.

She arrived in Havana a few hours after Castro left town. Americans were still welcome there in those days, and Cuban customs officers seldom searched tourists' luggage.

"There was no trouble at the airport," Marie said. "I checked into a sleazy little hotel in downtown Havana, changed into my lieutenant's uniform and went direct to the Havana Hilton. By this time, Castro had a home on the outskirts of Havana, Casa Cojimar, but it was more convenient for him to keep his papers at the Hilton.

"He had Suite 2408 and the adjoining suites. I had the key to 2408. Nobody recognized me when I came into the hotel. I had changed my hair style and made my complexion darker than it is naturally. And I wore dark glasses. They (Castro's people) all wore dark glasses, even at night.

"A lot of people were loitering in the lobby, *barbudos* and everything. I just walked right through. Passing the desk was the main thing that bothered me because the desk clerks knew me. I had a snub-nosed .38 caliber Detective Special clipped to the inside of my waistband. Nobody seemed to notice me. I walked to the elevators and went up to the 24th floor.

Saw Her Opportunity

"Nobody was around. When Fidel left, they all left with him: his bodyguards, his advisers, whatever. When I had lived there, I was either all alone and everything was dead quiet, or else Fidel was there and there was a lot of noise and cigar smoke.

"I unlocked the door to Suite 2408, went inside and double-locked the door behind me. I felt pretty confident because I knew Fidel was at Cienaga de Zapata. When he left the suite, no one was to go in. Those were the orders.

"As usual, the suite was littered with papers and the filing cabinet was open. I couldn't grab everything. I took as much as I could and stuffed papers and maps into my uniform pockets and the [illegible] fil- ten, went back to the other hotel, changed into a dress and caught the next flight to Miami.

"Frank met me at the airport and I gave him all the papers. I never knew exactly what information they contained. I was told the stuff was good, it was fantastic, 'the United States government is very happy.' "

Among the papers were topographical maps of Cuba on which several sections of undeveloped land, miles away from any population center, had been marked with hand-drawn circles. The maps also had handwritten notations that Marie couldn't read because "they were in a foreign language—Czech, I think."

Her Find Was Valuable

Three years later, another intelligence agent told her the maps were "the original groundwork plans" for Soviet missile sites. The circled areas were the spots where Soviet missile bases were built in 1962, setting off the historic showdown between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev.

From information supplied by agents inside Cuba and Cuban refugees, and from aerial photos snapped from U-2 spy planes, the CIA was able to pinpoint all the missile bases on the island. But Marie believes her solo mission to Castro's lair gave the CIA its first inkling of what the Russians were plotting. She also believes Castro suspected she was the burglar who swiped his secrets. (The CIA has declined to comment on Marie's involvement.)

In March 1960, soon after she had completed this dangerous assignment, Marie received a mysterious telegram from Havana. Delivered to her brother's apartment at 311 W. [illegible] St., it said, "CALL 28607 (Castro's private number) LATE AT NIGHT. IT'S VERY IMPORTANT."

It was signed "Yanez," meaning Capt. Jesus Yanez Pelletier, one of Castro's closest aides. Marie's first impulse was to ignore the message, but curiosity overcame common sense. Without mentioning the telegram to her brother, she left the apartment around midnight to place a collect call to Havana from a phone booth on the corner.

As she stepped into the small vestibule between the outer and inner front doors to the apartment house, two men grabbed her. One of them was Yanez.

"They had guns," Marie recalled. "They were going to take me back to Cuba. Yanez said a plane was waiting at Idlewild Airport. They hit me in the face and tried to drag me out to a car.

"A person who lived in the building opened the door and saw me screaming and fighting. This person ran down toward Riverside Drive. The interruption distracted the Cubans enough so that I broke loose and ran. I heard one of them yell, 'Shoot! Shoot!' but they didn't. I ran up to Broadway and [illegible] a cop there.

"The Cubans took off. My face was all bloody. Thank God for that cop. He took me to the [illegible] and I told the detectives an [illegible] story of intrigue and fear. I told them who Yanez was and I gave them the name of a West Side hotel where Castro people stayed when they were in New York. The detectives went there and found Yanez, but they couldn't arrest him because he had diplomatic immunity. He had a diplomatic passport saying he was with the prime minister's office. They told him to get on his plane and return to Cuba."

When Yanez returned to Havana without Marie, Castro did what the New York cops couldn't do. Fidel sent him to prison.

Discussed Killing Castro

Asked if she and other members of Frank's spy ring had ever discussed killing Castro, Marie replied: "Sure. We all did. We were going to bomb him during one of his speeches. We were going to fly over and drop it right on top of him.

"We had the bomb, the plane, I was going to go along. Hit and run. We were all set, but it was called off. Somebody stopped it. That's all I know."

Marie said two American agents went to Cuba to assassinate Castro shortly before the Bay of Pigs invasion.

"I met them at a little white house we rented in the Cuban colony in Miami. I think it was on Flagler St. We would never stay in one place too long. We'd rent a house and move on. Anyway, it was at one of our meetings that they talked real heavy about going in and killing him.

"The two Americans went in, but they didn't get out. They grew beards, dressed like Castro soldiers. I heard they came very, very close to killing

Marie said she made three boat trips to Cuba, delivering guns and supplies to anti-Castro guerrillas. She worked with Frank and Alex Rorke, both of whom were contract employees of the CIA, meaning they were not listed on any federal payroll.

"There's really no contract," she explained. "Nothing is put down on paper. You just say you're doing this for the good of your country. I didn't handle the money end of it. We were given what we needed."

'Eduardo' Supplied Cash

When cash was needed, it came from a CIA man she knew only as Eduardo. He would meet Frank and Alex from time to time at a "safe house" in Miami.

"Eduardo was financing our thing," Marie said. "When we went to pick up the money, I waited in the car. I saw him when he opened the door of this little white house we used."

Years later, while reading about the Watergate break-in, Marie saw a newspaper photo of former CIA man E. Howard Hunt and immediately recognized him as the elusive "Eduardo." She also recognized a picture of Sturgis, whom she had known as Frank Fiorini.

Sturgis was one of the five burglars caught in Democratic National Committee headquarters at the Watergate complex on June 17, 1972. Four of the five—Sturgis, Bernard Barker, Eugenio Rolando Martinez and James W. McCord, then security chief for the Nixon reelection campaign committee—were former CIA employees.

Sturgis, Barker and Martinez had been active in preparations for the Bay of Pigs landing. So was Hunt, the fiction-writing mastermind of the Watergate burglary. And he referred to Sturgis, Barker and Martinez in court testimony as "some of my old CIA contacts."

Sturgis returned to Washington this month, nearly three years after his arrest there, to testify at secret staff sessions of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities. He won't discuss his testimony, but other sources said he was asked about CIA operations ranging from domestic spying to political murders.

(Tomorrow: Frank Fiorini Sturgis.

How an Invasion of the Canal Zone Was Foiled

By PAUL MESKIL

Third of a series

The Central Intelligence Agency once investigated Fidel Castro, ballerina Margot Fonteyn and actors John Wayne and Errol Flynn in connection with a bizarre invasion of Panama.

The colorful cast of this comic-opera conspiracy included three American adventurers, two of whom were working for the CIA. William Morgan and Alex Rorke, both former U.S. Army paratroopers, were on opposite sides of the Panama plot. And Frank Sturgis, a former Marine Raider, was in the middle.

Sturgis, born Frank Fiorini, was a gun runner and troop-trainer for Castro. Then he became security and intelligence chief of the Cuban Air Force, meanwhile serving as a secret agent of the CIA.

Morgan was a freelance conspirator, more interested in money than politics. A native of Toledo, Ohio, he went to Cuba in 1958 and became second in command of an independent rebel army in the Escambray Mountains. This non-Communist force helped Castro's guerrillas overthrow the Batista dictatorship and Castro made Morgan a major, highest rank in the revolutionary army.

The upset victory over Batista, and the spoils that went with it, encouraged Morgan to consider extending the revolution to other Latin lands. A few weeks after the Castro takeover in Havana, Morgan called at Capt. Frank Fiorini's office in Cuban Air Force headquarters.

Refused second spot

"Major Morgan spoke to me confidentially," Sturgis told The News. "He said he was preparing an invasion of Panama and the Canal Zone. He wanted me to be second-in-command of the expedition. I told him I was interested, but not in a leadership position.

"I said, 'Bill, you've got to be crazy.' The American government's got a military force there. You're willing to go against your own country?' He said, 'Well, the U.S. never did anything for me.'"

The American military strength in the Canal Zone at that time in 1959 totaled about 1,000 men, compared to 65,000 in World War II. Morgan figured a surprise attack by a few hundred Cubans, assisted by Panamanian leftists staging riots and other disorders, would be sufficient to capture or at least sabotage the vital canal.

"The conspirators planned to overthrow the Panamanian government and grab the Canal for propaganda and extortion reasons," Sturgis said.

"They were going to send a ship, loaded with explosives, through the canal locks. They were going to blow up and sink the ship somewhere near the locks, so that the gates and locks would be damaged and ship traffic would be stopped in both directions.

"Morgan figured it would tie up the canal for at least two months. He was all set to go. He had the men, guns, ships, planes, everything.

Showed planes, named names

"I contacted the American Embassy in Havana and notified the (CIA) agent in charge. I took Col. Nichols (Erickson Nichols, air attache at the embassy) to the air base and showed him the camouflaged planes that were to be used for the invasion, and I named all the people who were involved in the conspiracy."

Those names reportedly included Margot Fonteyn, superstar of London's Royal Ballet and dame commander of the Order of the British Empire (the equivalent of knighthood), and her rich, aristocratic husband, Roberto Arias, former Panamanian ambassador to Britain and son of a former president of Panama.

Dame Margot and her husband were in Cuba at the time. So was Ruben Miro, head of the Panamanian revolutionary movement. They allegedly conferred with Morgan at Cienfuegos, where he was military commander.

According to intelligence reports, the invasion was to take place while Castro was visiting the United States and Canada. A spearhead force of Cubans and Panamanians would land on the Caribbean coast of Panama. A second force of Panamanians would strike inland from the Pacific coast. Then the main invasion army would sail in from Cuba.

Police and National Guard posts were to be attacked. Rebel bands were to come [illegible] march on the Canal Zone and riot in Panama City to keep Panamanian police and U.S. troops occupied.



In Panama, part of the invasion team is quickly seized.

Photo by Rogelio Caparros

But Frank's reports to the CIA provided sufficient advance warning.

Castro left Cuba on April 14. Then Arias and his wife flew to Panama and rented the 42-foot motor launch Nola for $75 a day, saying they were going fishing. Five tough-looking men accompanied them.

Cache of arms

They reportedly sailed directly to a spot where a cache of arms — semi-automatic rifles, revolvers, machine guns, grenades and ammunition in waterproof containers — had been dropped in the Pacific Ocean, 15 miles outside the Panama Canal entrance. The shrimp boat Elaine had been standing by for the arms drop. It retrieved the weapons from the water and later transferred them to the Nola.

The "fishermen" aboard the Nola came ashore on the Pacific coast, near Santa Clara, and buried the guns and ammo on the beach. Dame Margot and her husband then resumed their cruise.

On April 18, after receiving a CIA report that an invasion ship had sailed from the Cuban port of Batabano (part of Morgan's military district in Las Villas Province), the Panamanian government ordered Arias' arrest. He heard the news on the Nola's radio, returned to the Santa Clara area and went into hiding on his family's ranch.

Before dawn next day, the Nola slipped into the Panama Canal with only the skipper and Dame Margot aboard. She went to the home of her sister-in-law, Senora Chela Arias. A few hours later, she was arrested. After 24 hours in jail, the prima ballerina was booted back to Britain. Meanwhile, Arias had taken refuge in the Brazilian Embassy in Panama City. He was later allowed to leave the country.

National guardsmen found the arms buried in the beach at Santa Clara. A second arms cache was discovered near a cottage owned by an American friend of the Arias family.

Late Friday night, April 24, a Cuban ship landed at Puerto Coronado on the Caribbean coast of Panama, about 60 miles northeast of the capital. In it were 85 armed men, Cubans and Panamanians, and a woman nurse.

Spearhead blunted

Three of the men drowned in the surf as they tried to beach the boat. The rest were quickly captured by Panama's National Guard. Three more Cuban ships had left the Cuban ports of Cienfuegos and Batabano with the main invasion force of about 400 men, mostly Cubans who had fought under Morgan. When Raul Castro learned that the spearhead had failed to penetrate Panama he called off the invasion and ordered the three follow-up ships back to Cuba.

Meanwhile, Panamanian officers discovered a blue canvas bag left behind by Dame Margot. Among the interesting items in it were a notebook containing a list of arms to be used in the two-pronged invasion, maps of Panama, a tide table and several letters which Panamanian authorities said proved Margot's involvement in the plot.

There was also a letter from film star John Wayne signed "Duke." It noted that Arias had received $5??,000 from Wayne's account between Nov. 19, 1957, and April 5, 1959.

Questioned by American agents, Wayne explained that he and Arias were partners in a shrimp-exporting business. "I don't deal in politics," he told [illegible] he knew nothing about the Panama plot.

Errol Flynn also was asked about his friendship with Arias. They had been seen together in Cuba, where Flynn was making a movie based on the Castro revolution. The screen swashbuckler said Arias wanted to hire Flynn's yacht, the ocean-going Zaca, for a trip to Panama. Suspecting what he had in mind, Flynn refused.

Some CIA agents believe Morgan would not have attempted the Panama invasion without Castro's consent. But Fidel insisted: "I had nothing to do with it."

When the spearhead force splashed ashore on a San Blas Indian reservation, the CIA had a man at the scene. He was Alexander Rorke Jr., a freelance journalist, photographer and intelligence agent.

Double doublecross

Son of a New York judge, Alex served as a paratrooper and intelligence specialist in World War II. In 1952, he married actress Jacqueline Billingsley, daughter of Stork Club owner Sherman Billingsley.

Frank Nelson, an American businessman in Cuba, was involved with Sturgis, Morgan and Rorke in various plots, including a double doublecross. Nelson, who now lives in New York and has just finished writing a book entitled "For a Million Dollars," told The News:

"I started the counter-revolution against Castro in 1959 because he arrested a close friend of mine. I went to see Frank Sturgis in Havana and asked if there was anything he could do to get my friend out of jail. He sent me to Morgan who was very close to Castro, but Morgan wasn't interested in anything but money.

"I found out that Castro was going to invade the Dominican Republic, so I went there and told Trujillo (Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo) about the invasion plans. I said he should beat Castro to the punch and invade Cuba, with Morgan's help.

"I told Trujillo, 'I think you can buy Morgan for a million dollars. Let him take his army back to the mountains and establish a base. Then you come in with your army and in a few days Castro is finished.'"

Trujillo approved the million-dollar deal and put up the cash to get it started. Nelson said he paid Morgan $400,000 down, plus $100,000 "for expenses." The remaining $500,000 was to be paid when the invasion of Cuba began.

Sturgis soon learned the details of this new plot and informed the CIA. When the agency pulled Sturgis out of Cuba in the summer of 1959, it sent Rorke in to find out what was happening.

Decoyed by Raul's wife

Nelson arranged a meeting between Rorke and Morgan. Soon after Rorke arrived in Havana, he phoned Morgan's home. A woman answered, identified herself as "Mrs. Morgan" and told Rorke to come on over. When he got there, he was arrested. The woman who answered the phone was Vilma Espin, Raul Castro's wife.

By this time, Morgan had told Fidel about the invasion plot. Without mentioning the million dollars, he said he had pretended to go along with Trujillo in order to set a trap.

In mid-August, Morgan sent an urgent radio message to the chief of Dominican military intelligence. He said he had seized Trinidad, on the south coast of Cuba, as an invasion beachhead. When a planeload of Dominican soldiers [illegible] it was surrounded by 1,000 Cuban troops led by Fidel Castro himself.

SECRETS OF THE CIA

The Dominicans were paraded before TV cameras on their way to jail. Castro denounced Trujillo and praised Morgan as a hero. Less than two years later, Morgan was executed by a Castro firing squad for a much less profitable plot.

What became of the $500,000 is not known. Neither Morgan's Cuban wife nor his American family ever saw a cent of it. Nor did Castro.

As soon as the Trujillo invasion collapsed, Alex Rorke was released from jail and deported from Cuba. But he returned many times by air and sea. For these clandestine trips, he used a twin-engine Beechcraft plane, a B-25 bomber and a 36-foot speedboat, the Violynn III. Sturgis accompanied him on many mysterious missions.

Assassins failed

On one occasion, Rorke reportedly landed an execution squad that tried but failed to kill Castro. Early in 1963, the Violynn III was detained in the Bahamas when it stopped to refuel on a run between the U.S. and Cuba. British intelligence agents questioned Rorke and the 17 Cuban raiders who were with him. Rorke told them the CIA had financed many trips of the Violynn III and "the United States government, through the Central Intelligence Agency, had advance knowledge of these trips."

Former CIA agents told The News this statement was true.

On April 25, 1963, Rorke and three other CIA contract agents flew over Havana in the Beechcraft and tried to bomb two oil refineries. The bombs missed their targets and caused little damage.

Five months later, Rorke went on his last mission. The 36-year-old adventurer and his partner, Geoffrey Sullivan, 28, of Waterbury, Conn., took off from Ft. Lauderdale, Fla., in a rented twin-engine Beechcraft on Sept. 24, 1963. Two Cubans accompanied them.

Rorke and Sullivan filed a flight plan indicating they were bound for Nicaragua, where they planned to start an air freight service. They made two fuel stops — at Cozumel Island off Mexico's Yucatan Peninsula and at Belize, British Honduras. When they left Belize, the plane disappeared.

That night, Sturgis received a report that the plane was overdue in Nicaragua. Frank immediately called the commander of naval intelligence in Miami. An air-sea search was launched by the Navy, Coast Guard and Air Force. A private search party was organized later by Rorke's Miami lawyer and personal friend, Ellis Rubin. But no trace of the missing Americans or their plane was ever found.

Forced onto boat

Some investigators believe the plane was sabotaged by Castro agents. Frank Nelson has another theory.

"When they stopped to refuel at Stanley Field near Belize, Alex spoke to an American commercial pilot, Floyd Park of Waco, Texas. Alex said they were headed for Tegucigalpa (capital of the Republic of Honduras). They took off in the direction of Tegucigalpa, but they never got there.

"Several months later, Park received information from a couple of Hondurans that two Americans answering the description of Rorke and Sullivan were forced to board a Cuban fishing boat that had pulled into shore in Honduras two weeks earlier with engine trouble. The fishing boat left immediately after the two Americans were put on board."

If these men were indeed Rorke and Sullivan, they never reached Cuba, investigators are certain of that. The two Cubans who left Florida with Rorke and Sullivan were still with them when they made the two fuel stops. According to reports received by both Nelson and Sturgis, one of those men was Eduardo Molina, a Cuban officer who supposedly turned against Castro and fled to the United States.

"Molina was seen in Havana a few months after he disappeared with Rorke and Sullivan on Cuban soil [illegible]," Nelson said. He believes Molina may have forced the Americans to land somewhere in Honduras, where they were delivered to Castro agents who kidnaped and killed them.

Our Havana Triple Spy Helped & Hurt Castro

By PAUL MESKIL

Second of a series

SECRETS OF THE CIA

"I was a spy," Frank Sturgis admits.

"I was involved in assassination plots and conspiracies to overthrow several foreign governments, including Cuba, Panama, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Haiti.

"I smuggled arms and men into Cuba — for Castro and against Castro. I broke into the intelligence files of the Cuban Army and Air Force. I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents.

"That's what spies do.

"I also broke into foreign consulates and business offices in Cuba, for the purpose of obtaining information, and into a import-export office in Caracas, Venezuela, that was a front for the KGB (Soviet Secret Service)."

Sturgis was a hired operative of the Central Intelligence Agency for at least a decade. Maybe he still is, though his cover was blown forever by the notoriety he received as a Watergate burglar. He constructed and controlled an espionage network in Cuba that is still functioning despite frantic efforts by Castro security forces and the KGB to destroy it.

Though he was only a bit player in the Watergate drama, Sturgis is a real-life James Bond whose exploits rival those of any fictional spy. Interviewed at the office of his Miami lawyer, Ellis Rubin, and at other places in New York and Florida, he candidly revealed many details of his colorful career as a war hero, secrets-stealer, gun-runner, guerrilla fighter and professional plotter.

Changed the subject

Asked if he had also been an assassin, he politely changed the subject. Some things he will not talk about.

A stocky, iron-jawed man who looks much younger than his 50 years, he was born Frank Angelo Fiorini in Norfolk, Va. He joined the U.S. Marine Corps at the start of World War II and fought through the Pacific with the famed First Raider Battalion. After the war, he served in the Air Force, Army and Navy Reserve.

He had the perfect training for a secret agent. The Marine Corps taught him judo, knife-fighting and jungle warfare techniques. The Air Force taught him to fly a plane and the Navy Reserve trained him to handle small, fast ships.

The Army completed this education. During a hitch in Germany, he was assigned to a security unit that handled top-secret reports from Allied intelligence agents all over Europe. This was his introduction to the dark world of espionage and intrigue.

In Berlin during the chilliest part of the cold war, he met his first real spy. She was a beautiful actress who also was an agent of Haganah, the secret army formed to defend the new state of Israel.

When he returned to civilian life, Frank became a Haganah courier — perhaps the only Roman Catholic in this group. In the 1950s, he went to Miami to visit an uncle who had married a Cuban exile. Her family was close to Carlos Prio, the Cuban president who was ousted in 1952 by a military coup led by Fulgencio Batista. Frank met Prio and other wealthy Cubans whose Miami mansions were hotbeds of anti-Batista intrigue. Some of them supplied financial support for a fiery young rebel, Fidel Castro, who was then living in Mexico.

In 1957, Prio asked Frank to "go to Cuba, join Castro's army and let me know what he's doing." Frank accepted

(Continued on page 14)



OUR TRIPLE-AGENT IN HAVANA



Frank Sturgis in Cuba: "I stole and photographed hundreds of secret documents."

(Continued from page 3)

A bit player in the Watergate drama, Sturgis was a real-life James Bond when he did his big jobs for the CIA

the assignment. He flew to Havana and with the help of a Cuban priest, he quickly located Castro's camp in the Sierra Maestra Mountains and volunteered his services.

"Fidel remembered me," he said. "We could understand each other. I spoke Italian, which is similar to Spanish, and he spoke some English. I offered to help train his troops, but he said, 'Frank, what I need is guns.'"

So Frank became a gun runner. With money supplied by the Castro underground in Florida, he purchased thousand of rifles and other weapons from International Armament Corp. (Interarmco) of Alexandria, Va., the world's largest dealer in surplus arms. He then set up an elaborate land-sea-air smuggling network to get the guns and ammunition into Cuba.

He Became Triple Agent

After several months as a double agent, working for Prio and Castro, Frank became a triple agent. This time, he was recruited for the game of intelligence by a major league scout, Park F. Woolam, the State Department official then in charge of the U.S. Consulate in Santiago de Cuba.

"We met at the Casa Grande Hotel in Santiago," Frank recalls. "Woolam knew who I was and what I was doing. He approached me or someone introduced us. We had several other meetings and he discussed my patriotism and so forth. I agreed to work with him.

"Later, when the revolution was over, I received orders to go to Havana. Woolam told me who to contact in the American Embassy there." His new contacts, Frank said, were CIA agents, one of whom was the embassy's military attache.

Castro immediately placed his most trusted officers in command of the Cuban military services. Major Pedro Diaz Lanz, a close friend of Frank's, became commander in chief of the Air Force and his brother, Marcos Diaz Lanz, became inspector general of that service.

Frank helped the Diaz Lanz brothers reorganize the Air Force and they made him their security and intelligence chief. He also became the officer in charge of inspecting and supervising all Cuban gambling casinos, which were owned and operated by American mobsters.

Frank said his CIA advisers "asked me to recruit reliable [illegible] the [illegible] in the military, in the presidential palace, in with Fidel. I recruited everyone I could, Americans and Cubans, to be undercover agents."

Max Gorman-Gonzales, a Miami businessman who took part in cloak-and-dagger operations against both Batista and Castro, has known and worked with Sturgis for many years. He says Sturgis was a CIA employee from 1959 to 1968. The CIA asked him to participate in assassination plots in Cuba and elsewhere. Sturgis introduced top Cuban military and political leaders to American agents at the U.S. Embassy in Havana. During these visits, a conspiracy to assassinate Castro and other Cuban leaders developed.

"Two attempts against Castro's life were made in the early part of 1959. Both failed. The assassins then waited for a green light from Frank Fiorini Sturgis. A third attempt was made in 1960."

This reporter asked Sturgis when the agency first began thinking about assassinating Castro.

"The first discussion of assassination with my (CIA) contacts was in February 1960," he replied. "I was making reports on all the communist activity in the military. I suggested that this would be a good time to assassinate Fidel. I said I would organize it and follow it through.

"I would arrange an important conference at Campo Libertad (Camp Liberty, the combined army air force base and headquarters formerly known as Camp Columbia). All the top commanders would come to the base in their jeeps and cars. I was going to station gunners on the roofs, set up a cross-fire. I would have wiped out Fidel, his brother Raul and all the top (pro-communist) military commanders in 30 seconds.

"I asked my contact in the Embassy to get a green light (official approval) on this. Whether this would have to come from the top level in Washington or a lower level, I don't know."

While they waited for the

Sturgis and his CIA contacts devised two alternate plots. One was to execute Castro in the second floor conference room at Air Force headquarters. As he and the other officers would not arrive at exactly the same time, it might be more practical to wait until they were all assembled around the conference table.

"The whole idea was to kill all of them at once. Unfortunately, if some of the anti-Communist officers were in there at the same time, they would have to go too. The lives of some of the anti-Communist commanders would have to be sacrificed in order to get Castro and his crew."

The third scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. "I had access to the prime minister's office," Sturgis said. "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy. I planned to go to Fidel's office with a briefcase full of explosives which I would leave there. When Fidel entered the office, a signal would be given and the bomb would be set off by an electronic device across the street."

The plotters waited several months for the green light from Washington, but it never came. "They couldn't make up their minds," Frank said of the unseen, unknown decision makers. "They couldn't decide what to do."

Asked for Green Light

But, according to former intelligence agents, the CIA later approved and bankrolled other plots to wipe out Castro. American adventurers, Cuban exiles, Mafia dons and high ranking Cuban officials played prominent parts in these conspiracies.

In June, 1959, Castro fired 25 top Air Force officers suspected of disloyalty, including the Diaz Lanz brothers. Pedro Diaz Lanz then resigned from the Air Force and denounced Castro as a

Almeida, ordered Pedro's arrest and the Diaz Lanz brothers went underground.

At this point, Frank was pulled out of Cuba. "I left Havana on June 30 and came to Miami to arrange the escapes of the Diaz Lanz brothers and their families. Pedro and his wife got out by sailboat; Marcos was picked up by a plane."

The brothers fled to Florida, told all they knew about the Castro regime and went to work for the CIA.

A few weeks after Frank's abrupt departure from Havana, he received word that Castro was sending an assassination team after him. Frank's informant supplied full descriptions of the three assassins, who were Mexican communists. The FBI posted a round-the-clock guard on Frank's Miami home and federal agents followed him wherever he went.

Tailed to Florida

Customs and Immigration officers were alerted. The Mexican gunmen were spotted when they crossed the border and were tailed to Florida, where they were arrested. Their car was confiscated and they were booted back to Mexico.

On Oct. 25, 1959, an American B-25 bomber swooped over Havana and dropped thousands of anti-Castro leaflets. Castro called this "bombing" raid a Cuban Pearl Harbor.

"Pedro Diaz Lanz was the pilot," Sturgis told the News. "I was the co-pilot. Marcos Diaz Lanz and another Cuban were with us. Cuban Air Force fighters came after us but they missed us and almost shot their own planes down. The big guns at the Navy station and the Cabana fortress opened up but the angle of the guns was such that they were firing from the heights into the city. At least 26 people were killed and wounded."

The leaflet bombardment was the first of many CIA-sponsored missions Sturgis made to Cuba by air and sea. "I made at least 125 air operations into Cuba," he said, "with the green light and without the green light (with and without official approval). And I made some 60 boat missions.

"I had four boats. They were financed by the agency. One was a converted Coast Guard cutter, 83 feet long, with twin 600 horsepower engines. It has a maximum speed of 20 knots. Another boat, the Cusa, was about the same size. I also had two 36-foot fiberglass boats with radar and other sophisticated equipment. They could carry 30 people and do 50 miles an hour.

-A Mission to Cuba: Tale of the Doomed Raiders

By PAUL MESKIL 4/24/75

Fifth of a series

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

On March 17, 1960, President Eisenhower authorized the CIA to form a guerrilla army of Cuban refugees and invade Cuba. Shortly thereafter, the CIA dispatched agent Frank Sturgis to Guatemala to confer with President Miguel Ydigoras about setting up training bases in that country.

This "secret" mission was quickly discovered and reported by the Guatemalan news media.

"I had planned to break into the Cuban Embassy while I was in Guatemala City," Sturgis told this reporter recently, "but the president suggested I leave the country because of all the publicity. The newspapers and TV reported I was a CIA agent and was trying to obtain bases for the Cuban invasion."

Over the next year, the CIA trained Cuban recruits in Guatemala, Panama, Puerto Rico and the United States. Sturgis, a marine combat veteran of World War II, trained about 50 Cubans in the Florida Everglades.

Sturgis was part of the agency's super-secret Operation 40, an infiltration and intelligence-gathering group that was to go into Cuba before the Bay of Pigs assault.

Some former CIA agents describe Operation 40 as an "assassination squad." Sturgis won't go that far.

"It was a top CIA project," he says. "Most of the men in it were Cubans who had been trained by the U.S. Army. I am not saying that Operation 40 had an assassination squad. There are reports that there was one, but I'm not saying so.

To Infiltrate

"The prime purpose was infiltration, not assassination. They (group members) were to infiltrate Cuba and contact anti-Castro military leaders, political leaders and underground people. And they could kill—if they had to, if it was really necessary."

Chief of Operation 40 was Jose Joaquin Sanjenis, a former Castro aide who defected and became a CIA agent. Two of his cousins also worked for the agency.

Early in 1961, the CIA learned that a group of Cuban military officers was plotting to overthrow Castro. The leader of this plot was Major Humberto Sori Marin, a former Havana lawyer who drafted the Castro penal code which made firing squad executions legal. Sori Marin had been adjutant general of Castro's army, presiding judge at the 1959 "war crimes" trial that sent hundreds of Batista loyalists to the firing squads, and Castro's first minister of agriculture. But by 1961 he had turned against the Castro regime.

His partners in the anti-Castro conspiracy included other Cuban army, navy and air force commanders, the chief of Castro's secret police, the deputy finance minister and the head of the Cuban Sugar Institute. They planned a military uprising during which Castro and his Communist advisers would be killed.

As soon as the CIA learned what they were up to, Operation 40 went into action. Agents slipped into Cuba, contacted the conspirators and asked them to time the military revolt to coincide with the Bay of Pigs invasion.

A month before the coordinated revolt-invasion was to start, a militia patrol was sent to the Miramar section of Havana to arrest a woman who had been overheard complaining about food shortages. As the militia jeep pulled up to her house, she ran out the [illegible] and

(Continued on page 64)



News photo by Robert Rosamilio

Nelson: a veteran conspirator.

TALE OF THE DOOMED RAIDERS

News photo

In one CIA plot to kill Castro, the rifle failed to fire.

Super-secret Operation 40 was stymied so many times by the alert Cubans that it began to sound like Catch 22

(Continued from page 5)

fled to the nearby home of a retired engineer and his wife.

The militiamen charged after her, entered the engineer's house and burst into a room where ten leaders of the military conspiracy were seated around a table littered with Havana street maps pinpointing the locations of key installations that were to be seized.

The militiamen were outranked and outnumbered. They hesitated, not sure what to do. Then informed sources said Sori Marin pulled his pistol. A short burst from a Czech-made submachine gun wounded him in the leg and persuaded him and his co-conspirators to surrender. They were hauled off to La Cabana Fortress for questioning.

Around this time, in March 1961, a noisy party was held in a small white bungalow in Miami's Cuban section. The bungalow was a CIA "safe house" and the party was a sendoff celebration for an Operation 40 squad—five Cubans and an American—that was about to invade Cuba.

Contact underground

The squad's mission was to contact the anti-Castro underground and create a diversion on the north coast, to make Castro think a guerrilla force was landing there. The diversionary action was to begin shortly before the real invasion on the south coast.

Most of the people at the Miami party were Cuban refugees. Among the Americans there were Frank Nelson, a former Havana businessman and a veteran Caribbean conspirator, and CIA contractors Frank Sturgis and Alex Rorke.

Nelson fell into conversation with young Angus McNair, lone American member of the Cuba-bound squad. Asked why he was going on such a dangerous mission, McNair replied: "Because Castro killed an American soldier, Bill Morgan."

(Morgan, a former U.S. Army paratrooper who attained the rank of major in Castro's army, was executed by a Castro firing squad on March 11, 1961.)

"About 20 people were at the party," Nelson recalled recently. "I asked McNair 'Aren't you afraid of a leak, with all these people knowing about your mission?' He said they were all friends and relatives of the Cubans who were going with him. He trusted them all. That was a fatal mistake."

The CIA raiders set off the following night from the Florida Keys in the 32-foot motor launch Mercury, loaded with automatic rifles, tommyguns, pistols, grenades and boxes of ammo. Their destination was an inlet of Cabanas Bay in Pinar del Rio Province, about 50 miles from Havana.

Reputed CIA agent

McNair, 25, of Coral Gables, Fla., was [illegible] for Sturgis. His orders were to contact Howard Anderson, 41, a reputed CIA agent who owned a chain of gas stations in Havana and commanded the American Legion post there.

Anderson had been in close touch with the Cuban military officers who were plotting an anti-Castro coup. After they were captured, he was instructed to determine if other Cuban officers were in on the plot and if they would attempt to carry it out. He was also to advise the CIA of the progress of the diversionary action to be launched by Operation 40 in Pinar del Rio.

Shortly after midnight on March 19, the Mercury scraped the sandy bottom of a small, palm-fringed cove. McNair and five Cubans sat perfectly still, lis[illegible]

Hearing none, they jumped into the waist-deep water and started to unload the boat.

Searchlights were turned on, blinding the invaders. Armed men spilled onto the beach and surrounded them. More than 100 soldiers and militiamen had been waiting for them to land. Someone, perhaps a Castro agent who was a guest at their going-away party, had talked.

Anderson was arrested the same night on his way to rendezvous with McNair. The two Americans died at dawn before a firing squad on April 19, two days after the Bay of Pigs invasion began.

Seven Cubans were executed with them, including Gilberto [illegible], one of the leaders of a spearhead [illegible] sent from Cuba to invade Panama in 1959. A former Castro aide, he defected after the Panama fiasco and went to work for the CIA.

Twelve more anti-Castro plotters were executed next day, April 20. Seven of them were shot in the bullet-pocked moat of La Cabana Fortress. Among them were Humberto Sori Marin, the man who legalized firing squads, and a mysterious American citizen who called himself Rafael Diaz Bencom and was employed by CIA. He reportedly served as liaison between Sori Marin's group and the agency.

Although the Bay of Pigs adventure was a disaster, the CIA plots continued and many invasion veterans continued to work for the agency. Some of them were assigned to the "spook ship" Rex, a 174-foot converted U.S. Navy patrol boat that made hundreds of clandestine voyages to Cuba.

Flying the Nicaraguan flag, the Rex operated out of West Palm Beach and Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. It carried the latest radar and sonar equipment, five cannons, several .30-caliber machineguns and two 20-foot speedboats.

Its skipper reportedly was Eugenio Rolando Martinez, a Miami real estate salesman and CIA agent who made more than 300 nocturnal runs to Cuba. (He was taken off the official CIA payroll in 1972, the day after he was caught in the Watergate break-in.)

On the night of July 21, 1963, one of the Rex speedboats deposited six men on a small island off Las Villas province. The invaders reportedly had been sent to kill Castro at a July 26 rally in Havana's Plaza de la Revolucion, but they never got there. They were picked up by a military patrol soon after they landed.

Men captured

On the night of Oct. 21, 1963, the Rex sent its twin speedboats ashore at the western tip of Cuba. The landing was observed by a militia patrol and the six men in the first boat were captured as soon as they hit the beach. The second launch was sunk by a Cuban gunboat as it raced back to the Rex.

Cannon fire from the Rex drove off the Cuban vessel. The men in the water were hauled aboard the spy ship. Next morning, a U.S. Navy submarine surfaced near the Rex off the Bahamas. Five Cubans—four dead, one wounded—reportedly were transferred to the sub, which then submerged and headed for Florida.

One month after this incident, President Kennedy was assassinated by Lee Harvey Oswald, who had visited the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City shortly before the murder and had joined the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee. President Johnson later told an aide, Leo Janos, that he thought the Kennedy assassination might have been a "retaliation" for the CIA-backed efforts to kill Castro.

These efforts continued after Kennedy's death.

Leader of students

In the fall of 1964, CIA agents in Paris made contact with Cuban Army Major Rolando Cubelas, a hero of the Castro revolution and a leader of the Cuban student organization. Two Cuban-born CIA employees, Luis Enrique Trenco and Carlos Tepedino, spoke with Cubelas and put him in touch with CIA agents working out of the American Embassy in Paris. The discussions continued a few days later in Madrid, where Cubelas met four more CIA agents. Cubelas had become disenchanted with the Castro regime and he eventually agreed to kill his former idol. On his return to Havana, he was given a high-powered sight.

Other plotters rented an apartment overlooking the building where the prime minister's office was located. Cubelas reportedly drew a bead on Castro one day in 1965. He lined up the cross hairs and squeezed the trigger, but the rifle failed to fire. Castro's secret police later got wind of the assassination attempt and arrested Cubelas and seven other plotters, all of whom were saved from the firing squad by a clemency appeal from Castro.

This may have been the last CIA-sponsored attempt to eradicate Castro. But other CIA activities kept the Caribbean caldron boiling.

Next: The plot to free the U.S.S. Pueblo

How U.S. Made Unholy Alliance With the Mafia

By PAUL MESKIL 4/23/75

Fourth of a series

N.Y. Daily News

SECRETS OF THE CIA

When Fidel Castro threw the American gangsters out of Cuba, they vowed to return—over his dead body.

Their determination to get rid of Castro was shared by many high-placed American officials and this common cause led eventually to an unholy alliance between the CIA and the mob. The strange story of CIA agents and Mafia mobsters plotting together against Castro was pieced together from interviews with police, federal agents, ex-agents and underworld sources.

Meyer Lansky, the crime syndicate's financial genius, and Santo Trafficante, Mafia boss of West Florida and Havana, got out of Cuba immediately after the hasty exit of their benefactor, dictator Fulgencio Batista. The overseers of their gambling casinos remained on the island, nervously waiting for the axe to fall.

"I was in touch with all the casino owners and operators in Havana," said Frank Sturgis, who was Castro's casino inspector during this period. "Fidel ordered me to close all the casinos for 10 days. The owners got the hint. They knew he was preparing to shut them down permanently, which he did.

"They were very, very mad. Those casinos were worth $100 million a year to the American crime syndicate. Every important mob boss in the United States had points (percentages) in the Cuban casinos. Each point was worth $30,000 to $100,000.

"Lansky and Trafficante were the top men in Cuban gambling. Lansky had direct business dealings with Batista. Trafficante had several casinos, including the Sans Souci."

Sans Souci partners

His Sans Souci partners included Norman Rothman of Miami Beach and the notorious Mannarino brothers, Gabriel and Sam, Mafia chiefs in Pittsburgh. Rothman and the Mannarinos tried to stop the Castro steamroller in 1958 by smuggling a planeload of arms — stolen from a National Guard armory in Ohio — to anti-Castro forces in Cuba.

According to police and federal sources, Rothman was high up in the Cuban crime syndicate and shared his rackets profits with Batista's brother-in-law, Gen. Robert Fernandez Miranda.

Rothman returned to Florida soon after the Castro coup and, with his Cuban partners, bought the [illegible] Hotel in Miami Beach, the [illegible] and

The hotel's most elegant suite, on the top floor overlooking the ocean, was made ready for Batista, but he chose the cooler climes of the Dominican Republic, Portugal and Madeira.

Sturgis was on friendly terms with several gambling racketeers, including Hyman Levine, a Lansky mobster who ran Havana's Comodoro casino. One evening, during a casual conversation, Levine observed that it "would be worth a million" to the syndicate to get rid of Castro. Sturgis didn't rise to this bait and Levine changed the subject.

It popped up again a few weeks later while Castro was in New York during a whirlwind tour of North and South America.

Fidel and his entourage stayed at the Statler-Hilton, where Sturgis registered under his real name and Cuban military rank, Capt. Frank Fiorini.

Frank was in his room one evening when he received a phone call from a detective captain on duty in the lobby as part of a heavy security detail. No

(Continued on page 42)



[illegible]

AN UNHOLY ALLIANCE: CIA AND THE MOB



Surrounded by his soldiers, Castro enters Havana in triumph after ousting the Batista government.

UPI Photo

Deprived of its Havana casinos, U.S. mob joined CIA in series of plots to kill Castro, using everything from poison to dynamite

(Continued from page 6)

visitors were allowed on the Castro floor without special permission.

"There's a guy here to see you," the cop reported. "He says he's your uncle."

"Send him up," Frank replied.

The short, pot-bellied man who arrived a few minutes later looked more like a godfather than an uncle. Frank recognized him as a member of the Havana gambling mob. Coming straight to the point, the hood offered Frank $100,000 to kill Castro.

"I'm not for hire," Frank said, ending the conversation.

When he returned to Havana a few days later, he reported the offer to his CIA contacts at the American Embassy.

Sturgis had no further contact with the gangster who approached him in New York, but someone in the intelligence hierarchy decided that the CIA and the syndicate should join forces against Castro. The go-between picked for this project reportedly was Norman Rothman.

"Rothman was in touch with several CIA agents," a former agent told The News. "They had many meetings concerning assassination plots aginst Castro."

Rothman, in turn, discussed the matter with his peers. Among those who took part in these secret parleys, reliable sources said, were Santo Trafficante of Tampa; Sam Mannarino of Pittsburgh; Salvatore (Sally Burns) Granello and Charles (Charlie the Blade) Tourine, both of New York, and John (Don Giovanni) Roselli of Las Vegas.

Granello, a member of the Vito Genovese crime family, had run casinos in Cuba and bossed a major bookmaking operation on Manhattan's East Side. Tourine, an associate of New Jersey mob chieftains Ruggerio (Richie the Boot) Boiardo and Gerardo (Jerry) Catena, also had operated Havana casinos.

Several suggestions were made for Castro's demise. One was to send for Gaspare Magaddino, a one-man Murder Inc. who killed more than 50 people in various parts of the world before he was blown away by a shotgun blast in Brooklyn in 1970. A Sicilian Mafioso, Magaddino had lived in South America and Cuba, where he [illegible] for Trafficante prior to the Castro coup. He knew Havana well and was a perfect choice for the assassination assignment, but he either declined or wasn't offered the contract.

The mob and the CIA finally gave it to Roselli, reputed Mafia boss of Las Vegas, federal sources said.

A dapper, gray-haired man who calls himself a Hollywood movie producer and is a benevolent patron of Vegas showgirls, Roselli reportedly was introduced to CIA agents in 1960 by a Howard Hughes executive who formerly worked for the FBI. Then, federal sources said, Roselli agreed to recruit a death squad to go to Cuba hunting Castro.

Money from CIA

The CIA was to supply money, weapons, and transportation.

Roselli flew to Miami in March, 1961, and held separate conferences with CIA agents and Trafficante on the Castro project.

Roselli volunteered to accompany CIA-financed missions to Cuba, the federal sources said. One of these expeditions reportedly landed an execution squad that attempted but failed to hit Castro. On another occasion, the crew of Roselli's launch fought a running gunfight with a Cuban patrol boat.

Columnist Jack Anderson reported that CIA agents gave Roselli some poison capsules which he passed along to a Cuban who was related to Castro's chef. The chef was to put the poison in Castro's food. The sources interviewed by the News confirmed that at least one attempt was made to poison Castro.

An American who was active in the anti-Castro underground in Cuba at the time said "enough poison to kill 10 people" was dumped in a glass of malted milk sent to Castro's suite in the Havana Hilton in 1961.

"Castro ordered a chocolate malt every afternoon and the same waiter always brought it to his room," he said. "When the waiter came in with the poisoned malt, he was shaking so he almost dropped the tray. "Castro said, '[illegible] you?' The waiter said, 'I don't know; maybe I got a fever.' Castro had him arrested and had the drink analyzed. Chemists found the poison right away."

In early 1961, a more elaborate assassination attempt was directed by a well-financed American who arrived in Havana soon after the Castro takeover and lived there until security police accused him of working for the CIA and plotting to murder Castro.

Working with anti-Castro Cuban military officers, the American planted several sticks of dynamite under the garage floor of a 20-story apartment building where a number of Castro aides and Communist-bloc diplomats lived with their families.

"Castro came to the apartment house every two weeks to see one of his adjutants," one of the plotters said. "He always arrived in the afternoon, on the same day of the week.

"He would drive in with his bodyguards and park his car in the space reserved for him. We timed his visits. It always took at least five minutes for him to get into the garage, out of the car and into the freight elevator that took him upstairs where he wanted to go.

"We had a line of four men. One would signal from a nearby roof when Castro's car started into the garage. The signal would be passed on. Then a couple of guys would hit the plunger of an electronic detonating device. The detonator was in a hotel near the apartment house.

"We would have blown him to dust.

"The night before it was to happen, the guys (the Cuban plotters) had a final meeting to go over the details. Nobody outside our group knew about the dynamite, but a friend of theirs in G-2 (Castro's intelligence service) found out about the meeting and reported it. The G-2 came looking for them.

"They were in an apartment miles away from the place where the dynamite was. The G-2 raided the meeting and everybody started [illegible]

One of the plotters, a young military officer named Jesus Casas, shot it out with the raiders and killed two of them before he was slain by a motorcycle cop. Three other conspirators, all rebel officers who had fought with Castro in the Sierra Maestra, were captured and taken to G-2 headquarters. They escaped a few hours later, with the help of friends in the intelligence service, and found refuge in the Uruguayan Embassy.

"Castro never found out about the dynamite," said the source who disclosed the plot to The News. "It's probably still there, under the garage floor."

Intelligence sources told this reporter that the CIA sent an execution squad into Oriente Province in November 1962 to ambush Castro near Santiago de Cuba as he drove to a memorial service for his fallen guerrillas.

Snipers hid along road

Snipers hid among trees and bushes lining the road to the cemetery where the service was to be held. On the morning of the scheduled ceremony, a motorcade of five jeeps approached the graveyard. The first jeep was full of soldiers. In the second jeep, a tall, bearded man sat next to the driver. He was wearing sunglasses and his fatigue cap was pulled down to his eyes.

Machineguns and rifles sprayed the second jeep with bullets, killing the driver and his passenger, who turned out to be Castro's [illegible] bodyguard, Capt. Alfredo [illegible]. The assassins escaped. So did Fidel, who had prudently taken another route to the cemetery.

The CIA plots against Castro began in 1960, during the Eisenhower administration and continued through the Kennedy and Johnson years, causing President Johnson to [illegible] to an aide that "we're running a damned Murder, Inc. in the Caribbean."

In 1967, the Immigration and Naturalization Service [illegible] deportation proceedings against Don Giovanni Roselli, claiming he was [illegible] to the country illegally from Italy.

In 1969, soon after President Nixon took office, government lawyers argued in court that Roselli should not be deported because he had performed unspecified "valuable services to the national security." Roselli was not deported.

'Frogmen' Blew Up a French Ship in Havana

By **PAUL MESKIL**

Last of 6 series

At 3:10 p.m. on March 4, 1960, a French munitions ship blew up in Havana harbor, killing at least 75 people and injuring more than 200.

The vessel, Le Couvre, exploded during the unloading of 76 tons of ammunition and grenades intended for Fidel Castro's military and police forces. Castro suspected sabotage, but couldn't prove it. The United States denied any involvement in the incident.

A former CIA agent told The News recently that Le Couvre was sabotaged by "CIA frogmen." He said an underwater demolition team slipped into the water at night and attached a bomb to the ship's hull, under the waterline. The bomb, a detonator and a timing device were in a waterproof container, he said.

The ex-agent added that the frogmen were Cubans working for the CIA. "It was definitely a CIA-connected thing," he said.

Another source said the bomb was supposed to go off around 3 a.m., when the waterfront was deserted, but something went wrong with the timer and the blast came 12 hours later, when the area was crowded with dock workers and harbor traffic.

Still another source, formerly connected with the CIA and other intelligence agencies in the Caribbean area, blamed the big blast on Gen. Rafael Trujillo, then dictator of the Dominican Republic.

Trujillo and his sinister intelligence chief, Johnny Abbes, had many conferences with CIA officials and secret agents. On one occasion in 1960, Trujillo offered CIA agents Frank Sturgis and Pedro Diaz Lanz, former chief of Castro's Air Force, $1 million to lead an invasion of Cuba from the Dominican Republic. Diaz Lanz declined, telling his CIA bosses that he didn't want to work for another dictator.

Plotting to kill Trujillo

While in the Dominican Republic to confer with Trujillo in 1961, Sturgis also contacted Dominican military officers who were plotting to kill Trujillo. The CIA agreed to give the plotters guns and ammunition.

"The guns arrived in boxes sent to a supermarket in Ciudad Trujillo (the Dominican capital, now called Santo Domingo)," said Frank Nelson, an American who worked with Trujillo in a plot to overthrow Castro. "The Dominican officers didn't need the guns. They already had enough stuff for a war. They needed the moral support of the U.S. government, and this was represented by the arms shipments."

The rebel officers assassinated Trujillo on May 30, 1961. Who [illegible]

SECRETS OF THE CIA

used the CIA guns has not been disclosed. But similar weapons figured in subsequent attempts to exterminate Francois (Papa Doc) Duvalier, the voodoo Hitler of Haiti.

On the night of Aug. 26, 1963, a converted B-25 bomber left Florida with an arms shipment for Gen. Leon Cantava, a former Haitian Army commander who was planning to invade his homeland from the Dominican Republic, which shares the island of Hispaniola with Haiti. The CIA plane swooped over a flare-lit field near the Dominican military airport of Dajabon.

Wooden crates rained down on parachutes. They contained mortars, bazookas, M-1 rifles, .30-caliber machine guns, M-3 Tommy guns, .45-caliber pistols, grenades and ammunition.

The weapons were distributed among 210 Haitian exiles who comprised Cantava's invasion army. They crossed Massacre River, borderline between Dominican Republic and Haiti, on night of Sept. 22. Late the following day, after a bloody battle with Haitian troops, Cantava led the remnants

(Continued on page 54)



Duvalier [illegible] CIA

PLOT TO RELEASE THE PUEBLO

(Continued from page 4)

of [illegible] and back across the river to the Dominican sanctuary.

A week later, a small group of Haitian refugees entered a U.S. Army Special Forces camp in North Carolina for training in guerrilla warfare. Most of the Haitians were in their early 20s and had attended college in the United States after serving in the U.S. Army or Air Force. All of them lived in New York City.

They had been hand picked by the CIA for what became one of the bravest and most pitiful invasions in the history of Caribbean carnage.

The invasion force consisted of only 13 men, eight of whom had been trained by the Green Berets. They belonged to an anti-Duvalier group called Jeune Haiti (Young Haiti). Nearly all of the unlucky 13 were the sons of Haitian military officers or officials who had been killed by Duvalier's thugs.

The leader, Gusle Villedrouin, was a former U.S. airman whose father, Haitian Army Col. Roger Villedrouin, was clubbed to death by Papa Doc's Tonton Macoutes.

They chartered a boat in Florida and landed in Haiti on Aug. 5, 1964, carrying a variety of weapons supplied by CIA agents. Although the invasion was doomed to failure before it began, the 13 young New Yorkers managed to hold off hundreds of Duvalier soldiers, militiamen and Tonton Macoutes.

They were killed one by one, and those who were left kept fighting. The last three invaders ran out of ammunition on Oct. 26, then threw stones at the troops who gunned them down. The heads of all 13 were cut off and sent to the presidential palace in Port-au-Prince.

Drops two gasoline drums

On May [illegible], 1968, a B-25 flew over Duvalier's palace and dropped two gasoline drums, one of which blew a hole in the street outside the Haitian White House. The other did not explode. The plane was piloted by an American who reportedly had done contract jobs for the CIA.

A much more imaginative, though no [illegible] CIA plot was simmering on another burner at this time. Its aim was the release of the USS Pueblo and her crew, captured by Communist North Korea in January 1968.

CIA [illegible] named the Pueblo project Operation Sword, but those who took part refer to it as "the Mexican [illegible]." It went from the planning stage to the recruiting stage in the summer of 1968, when a classified ad appeared in a Fort Lauderdale newspaper offering "adventure" and "high pay" to qualified applicants.

The ad was placed by Ray Sandstrom, a Fort Lauderdale lawyer who allegedly had worked for the CIA as a pilot. About 60 men answered the ad, and [illegible] letters to Sturgis, who was in charge of the operation.

Sturgis [illegible] appointed Max Gorman Gonzales, who had worked with him on previous missions, as security chief [illegible]. From the letters and personal interviews, Frank eventually [illegible] volunteers.

[illegible] had been in military service [illegible] recruits. "Three had been in World War II, two others served in Korea and Vietnam. Most were young, but one was in his late 40s and had a military pension. He said he had never accomplished much in life and had always wanted to go on some kind of an adventure, so Frank said, 'Well, if you stay sober we'll take you along.'"

The men were offered $10,000 for a completed assignment. They were told it was to be a commando raid into Cuba to free political prisoners from Castro's concentration camps."

To lend credence to this story, Sturgis displayed a map showing the locations of Cuban prisons and prison camps. He also had a list of prisoners who supposedly were to be freed.

None of the men, not even Gonzales, [illegible]

"The operation was planned months in advance," Sturgis said. "The CIA station in Miami was aware of it. So were several other federal agencies, including the FBI and Customs.

"The objective was not to raid Cuba but to rendezvous with another ship off the coast of Mexico and, with the assistance of this ship, seize a Russian vessel. We were to meet a Cuban vessel. I assume it was a Naval vessel, commanded by Cuban Navy officers who were disenchanted with Castro.

"The orders (for completing the operation) were aboard the Cuban ship. The captain also had a sailing schedule listing arrivals and departures of all Soviet and Communist bloc vessels in the Caribbean and the Gulf of Mexico. We hoped to grab a Soviet 'fishing trawler' that was actually a spy ship. [illegible] stopped by the Cuban vessel. The skipper of the Soviet ship probably would not be suspicious of a boarding party wearing Cuban Navy uniforms.

"We would then capture the ship. We were to take it to a point off the coast of Venezuela. The orders were not to go into any port but to stay off the coast. Certain officials in the Venezuelan government were aware of the plan. They would participate in negotiations for the release of the captive ship and its crew. A statement would be issued to the effect that we wanted to exchange the ship and crew for certain political prisoners in Cuba.

"But this was a ruse. Then we would go into the second phase of the operation, to dicker with the [illegible] and U.S.S. Pueblo, its captain and crew, who were still in confinement at this time.

"We were going to threaten to sink the Communist ship and kill all the hostages if any ship of any country came close. It was supposed to look like a pirate operation, organized by American mercenaries and anti-Castro Cubans."

In preparation for the trip to Mexico, guns, camping equipment, medicine, bandages, uniforms and other supplies were hidden in door panels, seats and a false trunk of a 1963 Falcon that was outfitted by the mechanics of a Miami garage owned by two CIA employes.

The volunteers were to provide their own transportation to Mexico and their own weapons and camping gear.

"The men had to get to the meeting place, Guadalajara, at their own expense," Gonzales said. "The contract didn't go into effect until they got there. How they got there was their business."

Running out of money

One of the recruits, Robert Curtis, later testified in a court case resulting from the operation: "When we got to Guadalajara, the hotel we were supposed to go to was torn down. We went across the street to Los Americanos (another hotel). We left the car parked out front where he (Sturgis) could see it. We waited three weeks, and we were running out of money . . so we went to a gun shop and sold my Japanese Nambu (automatic pistol) for about $30."

Frank and the rest of the gang eventually arrived and proceeded to a training camp Gonzales had set up in the mountains near the Guatemala border. It rained much of the time they were there, and they called their base Camp Mud.

After two weeks there, they moved to Camp Sand on the beach near the Yucatan fishing village of Progreso. They chartered the fishing boat Amigo, smuggled guns and ammo aboard, and set off to meet the Cuban vessel. But the charts they had obtained to guide them through the Gulf and Caribbean were [illegible] years old and, therefore, not completely accurate.

They cruised south along the Yucatan coast for four days, entered Central American waters and then ran aground on a reef two miles off Belize, capital of British Honduras.

"We threw a lot of gear over the side," Gonzales said. "We waited until the tide came in. Then everybody jumped into the water to help get her off the reef although there were sharks around. We didn't intend to go into Belize, but the propeller and shaft were bent, and there was a small leak. We were taking on water and needed repairs."

When the Amigo limped into port, flying no flag, police and customs officers boarded her. British Honduran authorities at first thought it was an invasion from Guatemala. Sturgis and his dirty dozen were questioned by British intelligence agents. Then, Sturgis spoke to the American consul, and, after a few phone calls to Mexico City and Washington, the consul told him not to worry. The Americans were released and flown back to Miami.

"We was supposed to get $1,500 a month plus a $10,000 bonus (on completion of the mission)," Curtis said later. "Well, all I seen was 40 or 50 bucks to get back home (from Miami)."

"Whatever it was, it was definitely a CIA operation," said Max Gonzales, a native New Yorker who is now in business in Miami. "Frank Sturgis was a CIA agent at the time and still may be. He was in contact with other CIA agents in Guadalajara and Mexico City. Frank never told me what our real mission [illegible]



Trujillo, dictator of the Dominican Republic, offered $1 million for a Cuban invasion.

In the Caribbean, the CIA got involved in dozens of schemes, including blowing up a French ship and killing Trujillo

IRCULATION—NOW MORE THAN 2 MILLION

U.S.News & WORLD REPORT®

THE UNITED STATES NEWS® WORLD REPORT®

$1.00 DECEMBER 6, 1976

AS CARTER "INVADES" WASHINGTON



Cuban Extremists in U.S.

A GROWING TERROR THREAT

HOW NEW TAX LAW HITS BUSINESSMEN

SPECIAL REPORT

Cuban Extremists in U.S. A GROWING TERROR THREAT



Out from Miami spreads a wave of violence. Terrorists' aim is to topple Castro, free Cuba. Nearly all Cuban refugees share this dream. But the acts of a few zealots create trouble for fellow exiles and for the U.S.

Reported from
MIAMI and WASHINGTON

Terrorism by radical Cuban refugees has become a thorny problem in the conduct of U.S. foreign policy and, in the view of some authorities, a potential threat to the lives of American leaders.

The terrorists' goal is to wrest control of Cuba away from its Communist dictator, Fidel Castro.

In pursuit of that goal, they have blazed a trail of violence from Miami across the Caribbean Sea, not only to Cuba but also to Mexico, Barbados, Jamaica and Panama—even across the South Atlantic to Argentina.

They have engaged in a series of bombings in the U.S. and abroad. They have carried out military-style attacks on Communist ships. They are strongly suspected of several killings.

A federal grand jury in Miami is investigating their activities and their leaders.

Now, as a new Administration prepares to take over in Washington, it is feared that the Cuban terrorists will step up their attacks in an effort to thwart any turn toward reconciliation with Castro.

Officials familiar with their operations warn that some of the Cuban extremists will stop at nothing, not even at assassinating members of the Carter Administration.

"The Cuban terrorists are the most highly trained assassins in the world today," says one U.S. official.

Many of the terrorists were trained by the Central Intelligence Agency in the days when this country was trying to overthrow Castro, or kill him.

The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee recently held hearings on the Cuban-terrorist threat. It heard this testimony from Lt. Thomas Lyons, head of a special antiterrorist squad of the Dade County public-safety department in Miami, where Cuban refugees are concentrated:

Dr. Orlando Bosch, an anti-Castro leader, is accused in plane bombing fatal to 73.

"The overwhelming majority of the Cubans in Miami are strongly anti-Castro. That's why they came to Miami in the first place. They are also law-abiding citizens who, with minor exceptions, manifest their opposition to Castro in legal ways.

"However, there are a small number of individuals whose hatred of Cuban Prime Minister Fidel Castro and Communism has led them to engage in extralegal actions and to violate the laws of the country which gave them sanctuary. These individuals use Dade County as a base for international terrorism . . . against governments allied with Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terrorist-type attacks. . . .

"Some Cuban groups purporting to be involved in terrorist-type attacks against the Cuban Government are no more or no less than outright criminals, feeding upon the Cuban population and diverting the collected funding for their own purposes."

Other investigators charge that the terrorists, to finance their crusade, have dealt in cocaine and prostitution and in extortion from wealthy fellow refugees.

The number of hard-core terrorists is small, officially estimated at fewer than 300. But their reach is wide. In this year alone they have either bragged about or been accused of such acts as:

- Machine-gun attacks on the high seas against vessels from Cuba and other Communist nations.
- Bombing a wide variety of targets in the United States, Latin America and Portugal.
- Planting a bomb that caused the crash of a Cubana Airlines plane near Barbados on October 6, with the loss of 73 lives.
- Possible involvement in the still-unsolved bomb death of

EXILES vs. CASTRO— *A Relentless Pursuit*

On Jan. 1, 1959, Fidel Castro took power and the first wave of refugees fled Cuba. A small number of the 600,000 exiles who settled in the U.S. have become extremists.

Highlights of events in those 18 years, some involving law-abiding exiles, others involving the extremists—

1961: A 1,300-man Cuban Brigade, armed and trained by the U.S. in Florida, Guatemala and Nicaragua, landed at the Bay of Pigs on Cuba's south shore. The invasion was a failure.

1962: Survivors of the Bay of Pigs were released by Castro after payment of a 53-million-dollar ransom in drugs, food, medical equipment and other supplies from "private contributions." President John F. Kennedy, in Miami, pledged to the Cuban exiles that the Brigade flag would one day fly over a liberated Cuba.

U.S. launched its secret "Operation Mongoose"—a plan to use Cuban exiles in paramilitary war against Castro while U.S. maintained an economic blockade to shake the island's economy. The attacks generally failed.

1964: Cuban extremists in New York City fired a mortar shell at United Nations as Cuba's Ché Guevara addressed the General Assembly.

1967: Cuban exile specialists and U.S.-trained Bolivian troops trapped and killed Guevara and some of his Communist guerrillas in Bolivia.

1968-72: Cuban-exile extremists bombed ships of nations considered to be friendly to Castro, terrorized other exiles to keep them in line.

1972: Cuban exiles trained by Central Intelligence Agency took part in Watergate break-in, later testified that they thought it would help their anti-Castro campaign.

1973: U.S. and Cuba signed agreement aimed at controlling hijacking of aircraft and piracy of ships at sea.

1974-76: Cuban extremists exploded more than 100 bombs in Miami area in two-year period, hitting offices of the FBI, a State attorney and the Miami police department.

Exile terrorists attacked airline offices and consulates of governments that have diplomatic relations with Castro. Bombings took place in Jamaica, Mexico, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Panama, other countries.

Fishing boats based in Cuba and Soviet cargo ships were attacked by high-speed motor launches manned by exile extremists.

Terror reached its peak with the bomb sabotage of a Cuban airliner and the death of 73 passengers and crew last October 6 near Barbados. Police seized Cuban exiles in Caracas, Venezuela, on suspicion of involvement in the sabotage. Castro canceled U.S.-Cuba hijacking agreement.

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[continued from preceding page]

a former Chilean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., on September 21.

- Kidnaping two Cuban officials in Argentina.
- Attempting to kidnap a Cuban consul in Mexico.

Who are these terrorists? What motivates them? How do they operate? And why are U.S. officials so concerned about what they may do in the future?

To answer such questions, Orr Kelly and Carl J. Migdail of the *U.S. News & World Report* staff dug deeply into the records, interviewed Cuban refugees who share the hopes though not the methods of the terrorists, and talked to law-enforcement officials who are trying to stem the violence.

BREEDING GROUND FOR TERRORISM

After Fidel Castro took over Cuba in 1959 and it became apparent that he intended to establish a Communist state, 800,000 Cubans "voted with their feet" and fled their homeland. Some 600,000 of them settled in the United States. They and their children now total 750,000. Most of them live in the Miami area.

The majority of these immigrants are law abiding. But Miami's "Little Havana" provides a culture in which the virus of violence can grow.

"In Miami," explains one refugee leader, "the Cubans keep their national identity, their heritage, traditions, hatreds—and their hopes of going back to their homeland. And they know they can't go back until Castro is gone. So they dream of toppling Castro. What is clearly unrealistic in other places in the United States seems very possible in the atmosphere in Miami."

In the early 1960s, the overthrow of Castro seemed to the Cubans in exile to be not only possible but almost inevitable. It was U.S. policy to drive him from power. There was an attempt to invade Cuba at the Bay of Pigs in 1961 with an army of Cuban exiles recruited and trained in secret by the CIA. The invaders were not given the air cover necessary for a successful attack, and the operation was a disaster. Only 180 of about 1,300 invaders escaped death or capture. The Cubans felt betrayed.

Then came other American moves against Castro. There was a secret "Operation Mongoose," which included efforts to assassinate the Cuban leader. The United States backed an economic blockade of Cuba in an attempt to prevent Castro from obtaining sorely needed supplies and equipment from abroad. Later, Cuban refugees were used to carry out secret operations not only in the Caribbean but also in other parts of Latin America—and even in Africa.

To many Cuban refugees, attacking Castro and Communism became a way of life.

Since then, however, American policy has failed to match in intensity the fierce anti-Castro passion of the more militant refugees. In recent years, prominent members of the U.S. Senate have visited Cuba. In 1973, Cuba made an agreement with the United States to curb the airplane hijackers who had been using Cuba as asylum. There were moves on both sides toward normalization of relations between Cuba and the U.S.

As their hopes of American action against Castro ebbed, some Cuban refugees turned to violence on their own. The box on this page gives the chronology of developments.

TERRORIST LEADERS AND TACTICS

Though their numbers are small, the 300 or fewer active terrorists have organized themselves into many groups. Slogans of one group chalked on the walls in "Little Havana" have barely begun to fade before they are replaced by the slogans and initials of yet another group. Among groups named in testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee are: Accion Cubana, or Cuban Action; Alpha 66, a name adopted when victory in 1966 seemed possible; FLNC, standing for Frente de Liberacion Nacional de Cuba, which means Cuban National Liberation Front, and Pragmatistas, which means what it sounds like—pragmatists.

A group calling itself Zero issued a "death list" of people marked for killing and, according to officials, several persons on the list soon died violent deaths.

Dade County's antiterrorist head, Lieutenant Lyons, says he has stopped trying to keep track of the groups and instead concentrates on trying to solve the crimes that they are suspected of having committed. He has no shortage of business. Here is a sample of the violence attributed to terrorists in the last two years:

- Since February, 1975, there have been at least seven assassination attempts directed against refugee leaders who were viewed as opponents of the terrorists' tactics. Three men were shot to death. One was killed by a bomb. Three other attempted killings failed, but a prominent radio broadcaster lost both legs below the knees when a bomb ripped his car apart.
- On Dec. 3-4, 1975, bombs blasted the Miami office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, a Social Security office, a State unemployment office, two post offices, a bank, a State attorney's office and the Miami police-department headquarters. A man accused of those bombings, and also the bombing of the Miami International Airport two months earlier, was acquitted recently in a federal court. He is to be tried again in a State court.
- A number of bombs have been exploded in New York. One blew out the window of the Venezuelan consulate on Fifth Avenue, across the street from St. Patrick's Cathedral.
- On Feb. 12, 1976, a Soviet freighter, the *Dzhordano Bruno*, was sitting motionless 35 miles off Cuba's north coast while its tanks were being cleaned. Suddenly a small boat raced close to the freighter and raked it with heavy machinegun fire. No one was injured.
- On April 6, 1976, two Cuban fishing boats were attacked and a fisherman was killed.
- On Sept. 21, 1976, in Washington, D.C., a bomb exploded in a car and killed Orlando Letelier, a former Chilean Ambassador to the U.S. under the Marxist regime of the late President Salvador Allende. Although the crime is officially unsolved, there have been persistent reports that the bomb was planted by Cuban terrorists as a "favor" to the secret police of the present anti-Communist Government in Chile.

NEW TERRORIST STRATEGY

Leaders of the terrorist bands are hard to identify. But one an has emerged as an apparent leader: Dr. Orlando Bosch, pediatrician. He was caught firing a bazooka at a Polish p in Miami harbor in 1968 and was sentenced to 10 years prison.

Dr. Bosch was released on parole after four years, but he ortedly returned to the movement. He is now under st in Venezuela, charged along with three other men in nection with the Cuban airliner bombing. Dr. Bosch is ribed as the leader of the group calling itself Accion ana.

June of this year, Dr. Bosch called a small group of his activists together in the Dominican Republic. They sharply divided on policy and strategy.

e wanted to avoid the risks of further attacks in the d States and to concentrate their efforts against Castro this country. Others held out for continuing their ies both here and abroad.

r a heated argument, a shaky agreement was reached to focus their efforts outside the U.S. To direct the activities, a new group was formed with the initials CORU, which stand for Coordinacion de Organizaciones Revolucionaires Unidas in Spanish or Co-ordinating Committee of United Revolutionary Organizations in English.



Automobile bombing that killed a Cuban refugee in Miami is one of many unsolved crimes attributed to anti-Castro terrorists.

American law-enforcement officials say that members of CORU have the backing of powerful forces, perhaps even the governments themselves, in some countries of Latin America. The terrorists are described as "at home" in Haiti, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Chile. They are well armed for terroristic acts, as shown in the box on page 32.

Since the June meeting, a new wave of terrorism has swept across the Caribbean and beyond. Bombs have damaged Cuban airline facilities in Barbados, Jamaica and Panama. Two Cuban officials were kidnaped in Argentina.

On July 23, three men who had flown from Miami carrying three coffee cans filled with plastic explosive attempted to kidnap Cuban Consul Daniel Ferrer Fernandez in Mérida, Mexico. He escaped, but a Cuban fisheries expert was killed.

The most serious act of terrorism came on October 6, when a Cubana Airlines DC-8 exploded in flight shortly after taking off from Barbados. The plane fell into the sea, killing 73 persons including members of the Cuban national fencing team.

In messages to news media, both CORU and El Condor, a group unheard of previously, claimed responsibility for the crash of the plane.

Dr. Bosch, who has traveled freely on documents apparently provided by officials of Governments friendly to the anti-Castro movement, was picked up in Venezuela and on November 2 was charged with homicide in connection with the plane crash. Three other men are similarly charged.

The arrests of Dr. Bosch and his cohorts, instead of reducing terrorist violence, may actually stimulate more violence. El Condor, in a message to the United Press International on November 19, said the four men held by the Venezuelans are innocent and warned that, if they are convicted, planes of the Venezuelan International Airways will be attacked. On the same day, CORU sent a message saying it would join with the Honduran Anti-Communist Alliance in attacks on three airlines that plan excursion flights to Havana.

Roberto Carballo, a militant leader of veterans of the Bay of Pigs invasion, denounced the threatened attacks. "It aids Castro by making all Cuban exiles look like mad bombers," Carballo said.

CRACKDOWN BY LAW OFFICERS

Since last spring, there has been a sharp reduction in terroristic violence in the Miami area. That may be as much due to a successful counterattack by law-enforcement agencies as to the policy that was adopted by CORU last June.

Early this year, an antiterrorist task force was organized

CUBAN EXTREMISTS

[*continued from preceding page*]

includes representatives from Dade County and Miami police, the U.S. Customs Service and the U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms. Although the Federal Bureau of Investigation is not formally a part of this task force, its agents work closely with it.

With co-operation from Cuban refugees who are sick of the terrorist violence, law officers have arrested a number of suspects. Police also have learned enough about other suspects so that their freedom to engage in new acts of violence can be limited even though there is not enough evidence to prosecute them.

A federal grand jury is interrogating witnesses who might have some knowledge of terror operations.

Efforts of law-enforcement officials to deal with the terrorist groups face formidable handicaps, however. The terrorists seem to know what police are doing. Lieutenant Lyons relates that one suspect "identified one of my officers who had never met him before, called him by name and told him what section he worked in and what his duties were."

Terrorists are protected by a web of old loyalties. Most of them worked at one time or another for the U.S. Government. Many have had several roles: members of the U.S. Army, CIA operatives and FBI informants. One refugee leader suggests that law-enforcement officials have not found the killers of Cubans "because they don't want to."

A further complication is the heavy infiltration of the terrorist movement by members of Castro's intelligence corps. They not only gather intelligence but sometimes act as *agents provocateurs*, instigating terrorist acts designed to discredit the refugees and influence American policy.

The Cuban Prime Minister has "surfaced" enough of such agents to reveal their pattern of operation. Early this year, for example, Manuel de Armas, a Cuban refugee who was named in Senate committee testimony as having been involved in terrorist activities in Miami, showed up in Havana. In an April 22 broadcast by Radio Havana, De Armas said that he had supplied the explosives used in the killing of a man named Rolando Masferrer and that a CIA agent had provided him with the explosives.

In a speech on October 15, Castro boasted of a double agent who Castro claimed had passed on coded instructions from the CIA. Said Castro: "From the very moment when he was recruited by the CIA and over a period of 10 years, the supposed agent has kept the Cuban Government fully informed of all his contacts with [the CIA] and of the equipment and instructions he has received."

Castro blamed the CIA for the airliner bombing and other acts of violence. "Who else but the CIA . . . can carry out these acts?" Castro asked.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has flatly denied U.S. involvement in the airliner bombing. He said: "I can state categorically that no official of the United States Government, nobody paid by the American Government, nobody in contact with the American Government has had anything to do with this crash of the airliner. We consider actions like this totally reprehensible."

The CIA declines to discuss Cuban refugee terrorism. Officials of other Government agencies say they seriously doubt that the CIA, after all the criticism it has received for some of its earlier activities, is still involved in operations against the Castro regime. However, the agency is described as providing very little help in combatting the terrorist groups. "We have absolutely no contact with the CIA," says Lieutenant Lyons. "I'd like to, but they don't talk to us." One reason for that attitude may be that laws bar the CIA from domestic law-enforcement activities.

Other laws, or the lack of them, also complicate the fight against the terrorists. U.S. agencies cannot become involved in investigations of terrorism outside the United States unless the crime involves violations of neutrality laws making it illegal to conspire in this country to commit crimes abroad or to export arms without a license.

Although shocked by the October 6 airliner bombing, U.S. officials reluctantly decided there was no authorization for the FBI to enter that case.

With such handicaps as these, law-enforcement officials say they can look forward to only limited success against the terrorists. Any real solution to the problem must come from within the Cuban refugee community—and investigators state that the co-operation they get there does not extend to cases of violence committed outside the U.S.

WHAT HAVE TERRORISTS GAINED?

As officials size up the effects of the terrorist campaign: The only tangible accomplishment has been to push Castro into renouncing the antihijacking treaty, thus discouraging efforts toward a diplomatic reconciliation between the United States and Cuba.

Despite all the terrorist plots and attacks, Castro remains firmly seated as head of a Communist regime in Cuba. And it appears to the refugees almost inevitable that the movement toward some kind of accommodation with Castro will be resumed by American policy makers. Throughout "Little Havana," the fear is widespread that Jimmy Carter, when he becomes President, will give new impetus to this movement, and that their homeland will never be liberated from Communist rule.

To both officials and Cuban refugee leaders, it seems inevitable that the terrorists will continue their attempts to keep the two countries apart by the only method they know—further acts of violence.

TERRORISTS' ARSENAL: PLANES TO CANNONS

One measure of the military equipment that is available to Cuban terrorists is provided by this partial inventory compiled by authorities:

- 10 or more high-speed motor launches about 30 feet long, with special fuel tanks for extra range
- A number of small, spotter aircraft
- Large-caliber recoilless rifles
- Missile-antitank weapons
- Wide assortment of smaller weapons
- Large quantities of C-4 explosives developed by the U.S. Army

A further measure comes from this tally of extremists' weapons confiscated by Miami law-enforcement officers so far in 1975-76:

- 1 20-mm cannon, with 100 rounds of explosive ammunition
- 498 submachine guns, 480 of them with silencers
- 82 explosive devices
- 3,265 pounds of dynamite and TNT
- 4 boxes of napalm
- 6 rifles
- 20 handguns
- Thousands of rounds of ammunition

Dat - Ch[illegible] Nelson Bunker Hunt
file as part of
Assassination records
This goes there!
-H

MEMORANDUM

TO: RECORD

FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD

SUBJECT: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT INFORMATION OF JANUARY 19, 1977

I called Larry Callahan at 2:00 p.m. to advise him that the Commiteee desired to interview Mr. Gene A. Boren, of the IRS, at the earliest available opportunity and requested his advice and assistance to accomplish this. Callahan was nervous about the Committee's eagerness to proceed in response to the memorandum for fear that we would be interfering with an on-going criminal investigation. He noted the FBI was looking into this and he would have to check with the Bureau to ascertain the feasibility of proceeding unilaterally. I told Callahan we did not want to interfere with a criminal investigation and that I did not feel that our interview of the IRS employee would fall into that category. Callahan referred to a possible obstruction of justice on the part of that employee in that the information had been withheld for approximately five years.

At 2:30 p.m. I received a telephone call from Paul Daly urging Committee restraint in unilaterally investigating subject matter. Daly noted the Bureau had just received this information and was intending to interview the IRS employee and other individuals in question today or tomorrow. Daly noted that he was disturbed that Callahan had brought the memo to the Committee's attention so promptly, as the Bureau had intended to brief the Committee at the conclusion of their investigation. Daly seemed most concerned that the IRS delay in bringing the matter to the Bureau's attention and assured us that the Bureau was desirous of cooperating fully. He noted the information had been furnished by Justice absent a specific inquiry from the Committee and that we were being unreasonable if we desired to pursue the matter further at this time. I asked Daly what information was available at the Bureau on Brading and Hunt. He said there was a large quantity of information available on both and that he felt he could pull that material which related to the assassination quickly, but would be reluctant to produce the information in its entirety. I told him to ascertain this afternoon what information could be produced immediately and he said that he would.

At 2:45 p.m. I talked again with Callahan who indicated that Daly would be calling. Callahan said he thought the Bureau was eager to redeem itself in this area and we should give them that opportunity. I told Callahan that I was concerned about the mutilation ~~utilization~~ of leads ~~leaks~~, a position which Callahan thinks is ridiculous. Callahan, however, did state that this information was not as old as it looks at the Bureau, to-wit: While the Justice received the IRS memo on December 30, 1976, considerable time went by before Attorney General Levi could address the issue of whether or not to entrust this matter to the Bureau. Approximately one week ago, Justice went to Jim Adams of the FBI with the request to look into the allegation and was surprised to find that Adams was already apprised of the situation and investigating, i.e., general indexes. Apparently, Adams had been in receipt of similar information in recent days.

Yesterday, in response to the Attorney General's request for information, Paul Daly hand carried to Callahan the Bureau's response (which is dated January 14) and today Callahan hand carried the package to us over Assistant Attorney General Uhlmann;s signature. Callahan advised that Daly was upset that the Committee had been so promptly advised for fear that we would interupt the Bureau's inquiry. Callahan apologized for the lack of responsiveness on the part of Justice and the Bureau but things are in disarray with Levi about to depart. I assured Callahan we did not desire to interfere in the investigation but desired to be promptly informed of any developments and that we would stay in touch with Paul Daly in that regard . Callahan promised to expedite any Committee requests as made.

Paul Daly called at 3:10 p.m. to advise that "the powers that be" at the Bureau were upset with the possibility that the Committee was considering going to Dallas and interfering with the investigation. He specifically that the Director be given an opportunity to talk with Inouye prior to any such action. I told Daly that it was merely the Committee's desire to go to Texas; I had heard no discussion of going regardless of the Bureau's position. Daly promised to pull together without the need for a written request, all available information on Brading for Committee review this afternoon, if at all possible.

CRS MAIN FILE COPY
JUL 23 1975 p.33

HE NEW YORK TIMES,

Hunt Sons Charge C.I.A. Used Agents To Embezzle Funds

F ~~CT100 Hunt~~

DALLAS, July 22 (UPI)—Two sons of H. L. Hunt, the late billionaire contending they were discriminated against because of their conservative views, charged today that the Central Intelligence Agency infiltrated the family oil empire and used secret agents to help embezzle more than $50-million from them.

The brothers, Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, said new Federal charges that they had tried to cover up a family wiretapping scheme were a further result of an attempt by the C.I.A. to discredit the Hunt oil empire. They said they held the C.I.A. responsible for earlier Federal charges that they had spied on aides of their father.

They said their refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use their overseas Hunt Oil Company affiliate for espionge had led to the Federal charges against them.

"After turning down the C.I.A., a massive embezzlement scheme involving loses of over $50-million from the Hunt Oil Company were uncovered," the brothers said in a news release. "An investigation disclosed that some of the Hunt employes involved in the scheme were secret Government agents."

Who?

Why?

A spokesman at C.I.A. headquarters outside Washington said, "Since it appears such a complicated matter, the agency's legal people would like time to find out what it is all about."

Does CIA ever deny?

A Federal grand jury yesterday charged the Hunt brothers, Percy Foreman of Houston, a criminal lawyer, three other attorneys and a retired Texas industrialist with obstruction of justice for allegedly trying to thwart the wiretap investigation.

1975 № 265-75 22 1975

U.S. Accused of Refusing to Investigate $50-Million 'Theft' at H.L. Hunt Concern

Sep. 22 — 51:1

By MARTIN WALDRON
Special to The New York Times

LUBBOCK, Tex., Sept. 21 — A member of the Hunt oil family says that its widely advertised H. L. H. food company lost $50-million to $60-million between 1960 and 1970 because of "stealing" by key company employes and that the Justice Department has refused for five years to investigate.

W

Thomas M. Hunt, a nephew of H. L. Hunt, the eccentric late oil billionaire, who used the radio program "Life Line" to advertise his food and drug products, said that the Justice Department was under pressure from the Central Intelligence Agency not to investigate the alleged thefts, and to prosecute two members of the Hunt family for wiretapping.

Thomas Hunt is production manager for H.L.H.'s parent company, the Hunt Oil Company, which is family owned. Mr. Hunt is a cousin of Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, who are on trial in Federal District Court here on wiretapping charges. Testimony in the case begins tomorrow.

Bunker Hunt has said his refusal to allow the C.I.A. to use his Middle-Eastern oil operations as a cover is the possible reason behind the Government's insistence on trying him and his brother on six-year-old wiretapping charges.

Refused Request

A C.I.A. memorandum dated Dec. 6, 1965, indicated that Bunker Hunt would be asked to allow the agency to use his company as a cover in the Middle East. The Hunts had an oil concession in Libya. Bunker Hunt said such a request was made to him in 1966 by the C.I.A., but that he refused to allow it because he did not want to alienate the Libyans.

The intelligence agency has declined to allow the Hunts to see nine of 12 items it has in its files on Bunker Hunt, saying in a letter dated April 3, 1975, that to release these items would imperil "intelligence sources and methods."

One of these items if revealed, the C.I.A. said, would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of the personal privacy of the individual volunteering information.

Thomas Hunt said that the family believed that this individual was one of the H.L.H. employes who organized the system under which the food company was stripped of huge sums of money.

The Justice Department refused to comment on the Hunt contentions.

However, department officials have signed affidavits that none of the evidence being presented in the wiretap trail came from the C.I.A.

Checking Losses

The Hunts say that the wiretap charges grew out of efforts by Herbert and Bunker Hunt to find out why H.L.H. was losing so much money. Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. losses in 1968 had reached $8-million a year, when a company projection had shown they should be making a profit.

Thomas Hunt's phone was one of those tapped by three private detectives hired by his cousins in November, 1969. The other phones were those of H. L. Hunt's private secretary, a Hunt oil company vice president and three lesser company officials.

Losses of H.L.H. were getting so massive in 1968 and 1969 that the Hunt Oil Company, which had been absorbing the losses, "was getting into a cash bind," Thomas Hunt said.

The wiretaps were discovered in January, 1970, and three private detectives were later convicted and sent to prison for short terms. The detectives, after being released, told a grand jury, under threats of contempt citations, that the Hunt brothers hired them, and the Hunts were indicted in February, 1973.

Thomas Hunt said that before his cousins resorted to hiring private detectives, they had become convinced that the company officials who ordinarily would have investigated thefts "were the chief thieves." An independent audit later proved this surmise to be correct, he said.

Every Operations

The thefts, he said, stretched from coast to coast and involved almost every operation of H.L.H.—purchases, sales and operations. Company payrolls were loaded with nonexistent employes and company officials got kickbacks on purchases and commissions on sales through dummy food brokerage companies, he said.

Thomas Whitaker, a former agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who now is chief security officer for the Hunt

Sep. 22 51:2

Oil Company, said that more than $5-million in thefts had been documented and many more were being investigated.

He and Thomas Hunt gave as an example of a typical operation the sale of an H.L.H. pecan crop from company groves near Tyler, Tex., and the subsequent purchase of a pecan processing plant at the same city.

"We had sold a pecan crop to a company in El Paso," Mr. Hunt said. "The we were told by one of the thieves that he had not realized that pecans were selling for so much and had agreed to sell them to somebody else for two cents a pound less."

Reports Commitment

Mr. Whitaker said that the same former employe negotiated the purchase of the pecan processing plant, committing H.L.H. to paying $180,000 for it.

"The plant had been shut down by the Food and Drug Administration, it was all rusty and has not been operated to this day," Mr. Whitaker said.

The previous owner of the pecan plant gave a deposition to Hunt Oil officials saying that he had paid cash kickbacks of more than $80,000 to three H.L.H. employes.

But the biggest source of income at H.L.H. expense, he said, was at least five dummy food brokerage corporations that were set up by H.L.H. employes to receive 3 per cent commissions on all H.L.H. sales.

After auditors had established the duplicity of H.L.H. executives in early 1970, "the whole scheme was laid out" to the F.B.I., Mr. Whitaker said.

In July, 1970, a claim of $442,873.19 was filed with the Fidelity and Casualty Company of New York by Hunt Oil, detailing allegations of thefts by employes whose honesty had been insured by Fidelity.

Sought Eastland Aid

After the private detectives were indicted in 1970, the Hunts made efforts to have the prosecution dropped through political connections, asking Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi and chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to intercede with the Justice Department.

One Hunt attorney said that the Hunts had been led to believe that if they would drop damage suits against former employes and settle the company's claim against the bonding company for $100,000, the case "would blow over." The suits were dropped and the settlement made with the bonding company.

Although an agreement was reached in Washington, it did not hold.

The three detectives were convicted and sent to prison, and after they testified before a special grand jury in 1973 in Dallas, the Hunts were indicted on the wiretapping charge in February of that year.

After the Hunts were charged, one of their attorneys, Philip Hirschkop of Alexandria, Va., asked the Federal courts to require the Justice Department to investigate the thefts from H.L.H.

Warned of Dismissal

In response to a statement from Federal District Judge H. O. Woodward in 1973 that he would dismiss cases against the Hunts "if some agency does not investigate," Hunt officials "once again laid out the whole situation to the F.B.I." and other Justice Department officials, Mr. Whitaker said.

Two former employes of H.L.H., John Curington and John H. Brown, were later indicted and were convicted last year for using the mails to defraud H.L.H. They were fined and placed on probation. A third former employe, Paul M. Rothermel, who had been chief of security for Hunt Oil Company, was given immunity from prosecution by the Government, but he was never called to testify at any trial.

The three men said that H. L. Hunt had given them permission to act as food brokers to sell H. L. H. products, a statement denied by the late billionaire.

Sep. 22 51:2

In an effort to show that the Hunts were being prosecuted because they refused to cooperate with the C.I.A., Mr. Hirschkop asked both the agency and the F.B.I. for any C.I.A. information they had on his clients.

Three Items

The three of 13 items that the C.I.A. would release to Mr. Hirschkop were a biography of Bunker Hunt, a copy of a memorandum that recommended that Bunker Hunt be asked to be "operational" and copies of attacks made on Bunker Hunt by Tripoli Radio.

Bunker Hunt said that in 1966 the C.I.A. asked him to

Sep. 22 51:3

allow him to use his Libyan oil operations as a cover for C.I.A. agents in the Middle East, but that he refused.

The December, 1965, memorandum on Bunker Hunt said that the C.I.A. had "had good cooperation . . . on our routine requests but have no way of judging possible reaction to operational requests. Our estimate is that we see no reason we should not make a cautious approach."

In pretrial hearings, the Hunts asked Judge Woodward to order the C.I.A. and other intelligence agencies to furnish information on the Hunts and on Mr. Curington, Mr. Rothermel and Mr. Brown.

Found No Relevance

Judge Woodward examined reports from the C.I.A. on Mr. Rothermel and on all three men from the National Security Council but ruled that they had no relevance to the wiretap case and he would not allow the Hunts to see the documents.

Thomas Hunt said that the State Department also had become involved, urging Bunker Hunt to pay $43-million still owed to the Libyan Government on the 1972 taxes. These taxes were withheld after Libya seized Mr. Hunt's oil interests in that nation in 1973.

Mr. Hunt said that this advice had been rejected.

Tripoli Radio said in June, 1973, that Bunker Hunt's half-share in an estimated 10 billion barrels of oil in a desert field in Libya had been seized because Mr. Hunt was "an adventurer and broker seeking gains and profits without carrying out any activity or bearing any risk."

"He did not even have a positive attitude toward the wishes of the people," the broadcast said.

Thomas Hunt said that the Hunt oil interests had been paying about $160-million in taxes to the Libyan Government before Mr. Hunt was ousted from the country.

Thomas Hunt said that H.L.H. Food Products Division of Hunt Oil Company had been reorganized and was now showing a profit.

Sep. 22 24:5

Saigon Students Tested On Ideas From Hanoi

SAIGON, South Vietnam, Sept. 21 (Agence France-Presse)—The first group of high school students to take final examinations since the Communists took over here had a choice yesterday of writing papers analyzing the thoughts of either Ho Chi Minh, the late North Vietnamese leader, or the current Premier, Pham Van Dong.

The first choice was an excerpt from Ho Chi Minh's "Call to the Nation" of July 17, 1966, when American bombers started attacking North Vietnam.

The other was a passage from Mr. Dong's speech when he presented his Government to the latest session of the North Vietnamese National Assembly.

osts down, deal with labor problems." ,amar's low-keyed personal style Steadman says Lamar has never given im a direct order in the 15 years of heir association) tends to make some eople think of him as a sort of a Mr. 'eepers with a yen to be a jock. "Acually," says Maxfield, "he's Clark Kent. He is a mild-mannered, meek, veryday guy. But when money needs o be committed, he goes into that little hone booth and comes out with an 'S' n his shirt."

ucky 11 trusts

The bedrock of Lamar's personal forune is the trust that his father set up or him in 1935 as part of a tax trategy planned with the aid of vetran Hunt attorney J. B. McEntire. At hat time, a trust was established for ach of the Hunt children. In 1958, the attern was repeated when the elder Iunt established trusts for each of the econd Mrs. Hunt's children, calling hem Loyal Trusts 1, 2, 3, and 4. Except or Hunt Oil Co., which went entirely Mrs. Hunt, H. L. Hunt left the bulk f his personal holdings to the Loyal rusts, whose beneficiaries are Ray Iunt, Ruth Jane Hunt, Mrs. Randall .. (Helen LaKelley) Kreiling, and Mrs. Iark A. (Swanee Grace) Meeks.

The size of these trusts is nknown, but one of the roblems facing the Hunt amily is how to commingle l separate fortunes (those f the 10 children plus the uth Ray Hunt Trust) to aximum advantage. Dallas riends of son-in-law Randy" Kreiling say the uestion is being debated armly within the family. lthough Kreiling's role in e Great Western United keover was relatively minor, it did demonstrate a illingness between the two bling groups to cooperate.

Lamar Hunt observes at, since the bulk of H. L. unt's estate was left to rs. Hunt, "it was a natural ing for Ray to be the person who looks after it." Laar adds: "It does not mean at Ray will run the busiess. He will be making an rderly transition, a change o whatever happens. He will ave the responsibility of aking decisions in relationhip to Dad's property, but ad's operation was much mpler."

There will be no move to take Hunt Oil public, Lamar says. "Our philosophy is not one of promotion of stock and promotion to the public," he says. "Each of us has his own interests. All of us operate in the oil business, sometimes together, sometimes as an independent oil operator. Hunt Oil, which was my Dad's company, will be run basically by employees of the company. We all will continue to operate out of the Hunt Oil office."

Maxfield, who has been observing the Hunts for nine years as Lamar's partner, believes that Hunt Oil and Placid Oil will carry on the monolithic base of the family fortune. "It's like a tree trunk, with each brother having his own branch," he says. "Oil is not an expression of the personality of the sons as it was of the old man. The expression of the brothers will be in the branches—Ray in real estate; Lamar sports; Bunker horses, commodities, and agriculture; Herbert in real estate, residential development, and commodities." And while the brothers are branching out, Maxfield believes, "they will run the oil companies collectively with a professional staff."

Stormy weather closes in

Meanwhile, a threatening cloud looms on the family's horizon. Not only is an oft-delayed trial ahead for Bunker and Herbert Hunt on the wiretapping charges, but there is also the threat of more indictments against them by a federal grand jury that has been sitting in Dallas for more than a year. The Hunts claim their wiretapping activities were aimed at uncovering suspected embezzlements from their father's food concern. In their only statement on the matter, over a year ago, they cited "extensive, unexplained losses" suffered by the company. "We only sought to protect our father and his property, as any others would have done," they said.

Shelly Katz

Ray Hunt (right) looks over his Dallas development.

But one of the wiretappers, Jon Joseph Kelly, says that the tapping was prompted by Bunker's and Herbert's suspicions that someone was trying to influence H. L. Hunt to leave the bulk of his estate to the second Mrs. Hunt and her children. Three of the wiretap victims back up Kelly's version.

Just two weeks ago, in their syndicated column, Jack Anderson and Les Whitten aired a recurring Dallas rumor that the grand jury is looking into an alleged "$50,000 to $60,000 payoff" from Bunker to the chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James O. Eastland of Mississippi, in return for Eastland's assistance in getting a parole for the other wiretapper, Houston private eye Patrick W. McCann III. Eastland wrote a letter on McCann's behalf, but Bunker has denied that there was any payoff.

The Dallas grand jury is said to be mulling the Eastland connection, as well as the circumstances surrounding the three-year lapse between the wiretappers' arrest and the indictment of Herbert and Bunker on Feb. 28, 1973. A Hunt family lawyer told *Dallas Morning News* investigative reporter Earl Golz that Bunker managed to strike a bargain with the Justice Dept. in which "there would be no prosecution of the Hunts if they performed certain actions; they performed the actions, but there was an indictment anyway."

The actions, reportedly made after 1972 meetings with former President Richard M. Nixon and former Attorney General Richard Kleindienst, included Bunker's providing Justice with a list of Al Fatah agents in the U. S. He had secured the list privately because he feared he was on the Al Fatah death list because of his Libyan holdings.

For the Hunts, the wiretapping episode has proved disastrous. Bunker and Herbert could receive prison sentences. And, more than anything else in the family's history, it has torn the tightly woven curtain of secrecy behind which the family has lived and worked for more than four decades. ■

1975 № 203-75- 03 1975

Film: Holmes Nostalgia

Jul 22 6 23:1

'Hound' on Bill With First-Rate Keaton

By RICHARD EDER

The first bit in a program of Sherlock Holmes nostalgia at the D. W. Griffith Theater is an old filmed interview with Sir Arthur Conan Doyle. Stout, mustached and affable, the 68-year-old author made it clear what some people had always suspected: it was Watson who invented Holmes. In any case, Sir Arthur was mainly interested in talking about psychic research.

People wanted to know what happened to the generation of young Englishmen who died in World War II, he said. "Are they dissipated into nothing," he inquired, patting his dog, "or are they still the grand fellows we used to know?"

It wasn't Sir Arthur's ghosts that made a success of haunting: it was his stories. "Sherlock Holmes" is on Broadway, tourists still go on forlorn searches up Baker Street, Gene Wilder is filming Holmes's younger brother in London and Lord Olivier will tackle Moriarty this fall.

The centerpiece of the Holmes's film program is the 1939 Darryl F. Zanuck production of "The Hound of the Baskervilles." It isn't a great picture. It isn't even a great mediocre picture, but it is a good mediocre picture, and perhaps they made better mediocre pictures in those days than they do now.

Dartmoor, the funereal setting for "The Hound," may be partly painted backdrop but they roll in enough studio fog to do "Wuthering Heights" twice. Basil Rathbone and Nigel Bruce play Holmes and Watson with comic exaggeration. It is a serious kind of comic exaggeration. It lets you watch it. It doesn't spoof itself: it doesn't wink at you and tell you that it's really just as sophisticated as you are and knows it is making a fool of itself down there on the screen.

The hound is just a large ugly dog, but it manages to be quite as frightening as the mechanical floor waxer in a white shark suit that plays the lead in "Jaws," and a lot less gory.

And then there are the phrases. "Mr. Holmes, you're the only man in all England who can help me." "I'm in mortal fear Sir Henry's life will be snuffed out." "They were the footprints of a gigantic Hound." "Watson, keep your eye on that hansom." "That's what I hate about his moor, there's always something strange." And, of course: "Oh Watson, the needle."

It's like the tunes—singable with a life of their own—that pop out of Gilbert and Sullivan.

Some of the audiences leaves after "The Hound," and the usher urges them back to their seats. He's right: the last picture in the program is a 45-minute Buster Keaton classic.

"Sherlock Junior" is not really a Sherlock Holmes picture. It is about a movie projectionist (Keaton) who wants to be a detective, courts a girl, is thrown out after a rival steals her father's watch and lays the blame on him, falls asleep while projecting a picture and dreams himself into the picture. There he becomes Sherlock Holmes, frustrates the scoundrels and wins the girl.

If it's not quite the masterpiece that "The General" or "The Navigator" is, it is still first-rate Keaton. That is, it is both disciplined and wild. The major part of the picture, where in his dream he literally walks down the aisle, climbs into the screen and joins the plot as Holmes, is full of marvelous chases, escapes and battles with exploding billiard balls.

But the quieter bits are even better. For example, he sweeps out the theater and finds in the debris two or three dollar bills that will allow him to buy candy for his girl. The customers return one by one to claim them. One is an old woman who comes up weeping. With agony he yields up the dollar bill to her. She takes it and yields her handkerchief to him.

Jul 22 232

The Casts

THE HOUND OF THE BASKERVILLES, directed by Sidney Lanfield; screenplay by Ernest Pascal, based on the story by Sir Arthur Conan Doyle; a 20th Century-Fox production, distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, 59th Street and Second Avenue. Running time: 80 minutes.

Sir Henry Baskerville .... Richard Greene
Sherlock Holmes .... Basil Rathbone
Beryl Stapleton .... Wendy Barrie
Dr. Watson .... Nigel Bruce
Dr. James Mortimer .... Lionel Atwill
Barryman .... John Carradine
John Stapleton .... Morton Lowry

and

SHERLOCK JR., directed by Buster Keaton; written by Jean Havez, Joseph Mitchell and Clyde Bruckman. Produced by Metro Pictures. Distributed by the Film Group, Inc. At the D. W. Griffith Theater, Second Avenue and 59th Street. Running time: 45 minutes. With: Mr. Keaton, Kathryn McGuire, Ward Crane, Joseph Keaton, Horace Morgan, Jane Connolly, Erwin Connelly, Ford West, George Davis, John Patrick and Ruth Holley.

'Invasion' of Island Is Laid to France; She Denies Charge

Jul 22 0 24

KAMPALA, Uganda, July 21 (AP) — A spokesman for the Organization of African Unity said today that French troops were invading the Indian Ocean island of Mayotte that the 46-nation group recognizes as part of the newly independent Comoro Republic.

[In Paris, an official spokesman issued a denial, saying, according to Reuters, that "there are no French troop movements or naval movements around Mayotte, which in any case is French."]

Peter Onu of Nigeria, who is assistant secretary general of the African Unity group, said at a news conference here that French warships had surrounded the Comoro island of Mayotte, where "troops are landing."

On July 6, the Comoro leadership declared the entire island group including Mayotte independent of France on the basis of a referendum last December in which 95 per cent voted for an end to colonial rule. On Mayotte, however, a two-thirds majority voted to retain a link to France, and residents there appealed to Paris to be allowed to break away from the other islands.

---

2 HUNTS INDICTED WITH 5 IN DALLAS

Jul 22 W 21:1

Foreman Among 7 Charged in Wiretap Inquiry

Special to The New York Times

DALLAS, July 21 — Nelson Bunker Hunt and W. Herbert Hunt, sons of the late oil billionaire H. L. Hunt, the Houston lawyer Percy Foreman and four other men were indicted by a Federal grand jury tonight on charges of obstructing justice and impeding an investigation into a wiretape case involving the Hunts.

An 18-member grand jury handed up the nine-count indictment in the court of Federal District Judge Robert W. Porter, ending an 18-month investigation. No one named in the indictment was present.

Named along with the Hunts and Mr. Foreman were Ralph Shank, the Hunt family's personal attorney; B. H. Timmins Jr., a former assistant United States Attorney here who is now in private practice; Edward J. Hudson, a Houston oilfield machinery company owner and close friend of the Hunts, and Charles Tessmer, a Dallas criminal lawyer.

Obstruction Charged

All seven men were alleged to have conspired to obstruct the investigation of the wiretapping case and the Hunt indictments. The investigation subsequently resulted in the indictment of the Hunt brothers for violations of Federal wiretapping laws. The indictment said the group attempted to influence potential witnesses in the earlier case through bribes and veiled threats of physical harm and death.

The Hunts were named in all but two of the counts, while Mr. Foreman was named in three of the counts.

The wiretapping case stems from the 1970 arrests of two Houston men, Jon Kelly and Patrick McCann, in Richardson, a Dallas suburb, and seizure of wiretapping equipment from their car.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Justice Department entered the investigation and Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann, along with a third man, W. J. Everett, were indicted for wiretap violations. Mr. Kelly and Mr. McCann were tried and found guilty and sentenced to three years in prison in 1972 for wiretapping the home phones of three Hunt employes. Mr. Everett pleaded nolo contendere and was placed on probation.

Trial in September

The Hunts were indicted last summer for their part in the wiretap case, and their trial is slated for September in Lubbock, Tex., where it was moved on a change of venue.

The indictments handed up today allege that the Hunts promised Mr. Kelly, Mr. McCann and Mr. Everett amounts ranging from $800 to $1,200 per month while in prison if they did not testify before a grand jury concerning the Hunts' involvement in the wiretapping case.

Jul 22 21:1

Two of the counts charge that Mr. Foreman accepted $100,000 in two $50,000 payments from Mr. Hudson to represent Mr. Kelly and Mr. Everett and to guarantee that neither man would testify before the Federal grand jury in Dallas in 1972.

Mr. Shank, the Hunt family attorney, was indicted on seven counts concerning the alleged bribes. Mr. Tessmer, a well-known Dallas lawyer, was indicted on four counts, including lying to the grand jury in August, 1974, and October, 1974, concerning the offer of a bribe to Mr. Kelly and whether or not he had ever been employed as a counsel for the Hunts. Mr. Hudson was named in three counts and Mr. Timmins in two counts, all involving transmittal of the bribe offers.

Judge Porter did not set any trial date, nor did he set any bail for any of the defendants.

---

20 Cambodians Gone From U.S. Navy Center

Jul 22 A 13:1

NEWPORT, R.I., July 21 (AP) — Twenty Cambodian naval officers, who received political asylum in the United States when their Government fell this spring, have left the naval training center here to start new lives.

Most have found work in Rhode Island even though the state has a 16 per cent unemployment rate. Others have left the state to stay with relatives or try to return to Cambodia.

The 20 officers graduated in a private ceremony at the naval training center on May 19, several weeks after Khmer Rouge insurgents toppled the regime of President Lon Nol.

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparantly has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparently welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

---

have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B"Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

— Michael Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

30 March 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 NW. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

We have received your request under the Freedom of Information Act for information pertaining to you. This is to advise you that as of 27 September 1975 the Privacy Act of 1974 took effect. This act and pertinent CIA regulations established requirements and procedures for access by individuals to information pertaining to them. CIA Regulations were published in the Federal Register on 28 August 1975 and may be found in Title 32 C.F.R. 1901.

Since the Privacy Act requires federal agencies to ensure that improper disclosure of personally identifiable information will not be made and further provides criminal penalties for improper disclosure, CIA Privacy Regulations, section 1901.13, sets forth the following requirements for identification of individuals making requests.

> An individual seeking access to or notification of the existence of records about himself shall provide in the letter of request his full name, address, date and place of birth together with a notarized statement swearing to or affirming his identity....If such individual is an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence, his or her alien registration number must be also provided.

Before we may begin processing your request, we must receive from you a notarized statement as explained above. The statement should verify that you are a U.S. citizen or an alien admitted for permanent residence. It is also requested that you provide any additional information concerning yourself which might facilitate our search of records. Unless you identify specific records you may be looking for, we will conduct a search of all Agency records that might contain information that pertains to you.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167
7 May 1976

Mr. Gene Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: Pre-freedom of information request
notice of charges

Dear Mr. Wilson:

Before exercising my right to a freedom of information request for copies of any and all available (in accordance with the declassification processes stipulated in Executive Order 11652 and its amendment of January 1974) files of records and documents, both computerized and manual apposite of me and my activities under my present and former names and pseudonyms, I hereby request the complete and final estimate of charges for search and duplication services.

As regards the charges for these services, two matters may be worthy of consideration. The first of them is that, given the proper access codes, the execution of a computer search is neither difficult nor costly. And the second is that in light of the controversial nature of my past, a waiver or reduction of charges may conduce to the furtherance of the public interest. I therefore respectfully request that these factors be considered in the making of a decision as to the cost of services.

In compliance with your request for identity verification (pursuant to provisions of the 1974 Privacy Act, section 552, subsections b and d) I hereby swear before a notary public as to my name and former names, my present address, my date as well as place of birth, and my citizenship. Thanking you for your cooperation, I am

Yours truly,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

a.k.a.: Frank Angelo Fiorino
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A.Fiorini
Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Sturgis
Frank Bonnelli
Frank Campbell

code names: Federini
Barbarossa
Samson

born 9 December 1924
in Norfolk, Va.

United States of American citizenship

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Uedene Wicks

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH OF RESIDENCES AND EMPLOYMENTS OF: Frank Sturgis
present address:
2515 N.W.122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

also known as: Frank Anthony Sturgis
Frank A. Sturgis
Frank Angelo Fiorini
Frank A. Fiorini
Frank Fiorini
Frank Angelo Fiorino

1924, Dec. 9	born in Norfolk, Va.
1930-1942	resided at 510 High Street , Germantown, Philadelphia, Pa.
1942-1945	U.S.Marine Corps Reserve (Paris Is., S.C.; Pacific theatre)
1945	honorable discharge -Klamouth Falls, Ore.
1945	Miami, Florida
c.1945-1948	Norfolk, Va. adrs: Bank St., etc. joined Norfolk Police Dept. attended William and Mary College also attended Virginia Polytechnic Institute c.1946-employed as manager of the Virginia Tavern on East Main Street c.1949-employed as owner and manager of The Whitehorse Tavern on East Main Street
c.1948	enlisted in the U.S. Naval Reserve at the Norfolk Naval Air Station
c.1949	honorable discharge
c.1949-1950	U.S. Merchant Marine travelling to and from Europe
c. 1950-1952	U.S. Army - stationed in Germany
c. 1952	honorable discharge
c. 1952-1954	owner-manager of Tophat Nightclub in Virginia, Beach, Va.
c. 1956-1961	Cuba(Sierra Maestra); Miami, Florida; Mexico; Venezuela; Costa Rica; Guatemala; Panama; Honduras; Bahama Is. 1958: contact with CIA at US Consulate-Santiago, Cuba 1959: contact with CIA at US Embassy-Havana,Cuba 1959: contact with FBI HQ - Washington,DC 1961-1970: Bay of Pigs CIA control officer Sam Jenis

CHRONOLOGICAL SKETCH - cont'd

1963	contact with FBI and CIA
1968	travel and business (operation sword) Mexico and Honduras
1968-1972	mechanic and salesman for the Pan-American Aluminum Corp. 185th St., Miami, Florida
June 17, 1972	adventure: Watergate Office Building
June-July 1972	moved to Washington, D.C. jail
January 8, 1973	Watergate trial: U.S. v. G. Gordon Liddy et al.
January 15, 1973	plea of guilty entered
c. May 1973	moved to Federal Prison Inst. in Danbury, Conn. then moved to Eglin Air Force Base thence moved to Dade County Jail
January 1974	released on appeal bond
1974	salesman for Heavy Equipment Company, Miami, Florida
1974-1975	salesmanager for Dodge Is. Repairs, Miami, Florida
1975	salesmanager for Continental Egg Corp., Miami, Florida
1974-1975	salesmanager for Miami Book Mfg. Company 4460 N.W. 37th Avenue Miami, Florida

Thank you,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared Frank Sturgis to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposed therein expressed.

Witness my hand and official seal this 19th day of May, A.D. 1976.

Notary Public, State of Florida
at Large

My commission expires NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 6 MAY 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 N.W. 122nd Street
Miami, FL 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This acknowledges receipt of your letter, dated 7 May, requesting access under the Privacy Act for information pertaining to you. There is no charge for processing Privacy Act requests.

We are therefore processing your request and will provide you with the results under the Privacy Act as soon as possible.

Sincerely,

Gene F. Wilson
Information and Privacy Coordinator

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 12, 1976

Mr. Frank Sturgis
2515 Northwest 122nd Street
Miami, Florida 33167

Dear Mr. Sturgis:

This is to acknowledge receipt by the FBI on March 23, 1976, of your Freedom of Information-Privacy Acts (FOIPA) request dated March 13, 1976.

Based on the limited information you provided, it is not possible to make an accurate search of our records. To insure an accurate search of our records, please furnish your complete name, date and place of birth, prior addresses, employments and any specific data that would permit us to locate the documents you seek.

An exceedingly heavy volume of FOIPA requests has been received these past few months. Additionally, court deadlines involving certain historical cases of considerable scope have been imposed upon the FBI. Despite successive expansions of our staff responsible for FOIPA matters, substantial delays in processing requests continue.

Since January 1, 1975, the FBI has received a total of 17,204 FOIPA requests. Of these, our present backlog is 6,782. In an effort to deal fairly with any request requiring the retrieval, processing and duplication of documents, each request is being handled in chronological order based on the date of receipt. Please be assured that your request is being handled as equitably as possible and that all documents which can be released will be made available at the earliest possible date.

Mr. Frank Sturgis

Prior to the processing or release of any documents which may pertain to you, it will be necessary for you to submit your notarized signature. This procedure is designed to insure that information concerning an individual is released only to that person.

Your patience and cooperation will be appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

CMKelley
Clarence M. Kelley
Director

FRANK STURGIS
2515 N.W. 122 STREET
MIAMI, FLORIDA 33167

May 3, 1976

The Honorable Clarence M. Kelley, Director
Office of the Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

RE: Freedom of Information Request

Dear Mr. Kelley:

Thank you for your recent letter in which you requested more specific information to help in the search, collection and duplication of records indicated in my recent freedom of information request. I am sending a chronological sketch of my residences and employments prefaced by a list of names under which I have been known. I hope this profile will aid the Bureau in its search for my records. Notarization of this letter and the sketch will attest to the verification of my identity.

Considering the voluminous quantity of material that may have to be read and screened, I would be pleased in the interest of fairness to afford the Justice Department whatever reasonable extension of time is needed to comply with my freedom of information request.

Thank you for your kind cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Frank Sturgis

Frank Sturgis
Encl/
FS:s

STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF DADE

Before me personally appeared FRANK STURGIS to me well known and known to me to be the person described in and who executed the foregoing instrument for the purposes therein expressed.

WITNESS my hand and official seal this 6th day of May, A.D., 1976.

Notary Public
State of Florida at Large
My commission expires

NOTARY PUBLIC STATE OF FLORIDA AT LARGE
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES AUGUST 22 1978
BONDED THRU GENERAL INSURANCE UNDERWRITERS

MEMORANDUM October 29, 1976

TO : Mike Madigan, Howard Liebengood, ✓ Mike Epstein

FROM : Rick Inderfurth

In case you missed the attached article on Russell Bufalino . . .

Attachment

The Washington Post

October 28, 1976

Reputed Crime Chief Accused of Extortion In Collecting a Debt

Associated Press

Russell Bufalino, a reputed organized crime leader, has been indicted on federal charges of conspiracy and extortion for using threats of violence in trying to collect a debt, the Justice Department announced yesterday.

Bufalino and three other men were named defendants in a sealed indictment returned by a federal grand jury in New York City Tuesday and unsealed yesterday.

Bufalino, 71, of Kingston, Pa., was identified by federal officials in 1973 as the head of one of five Cosa Nostra families operating in Pennsylvania. The Immigration Service has attempted for nearly 20 years to deport Bufalino to Sicily, saying he was born there and brought to the United States as an infant. He says he was born in this country.

Liebengood

ATTORNEY GENERAL LEVI
RE: RAPHAEL GENER

October 26, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO #R 5080

Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General of the
United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Dear Attorney General Levi:

As you know, the Intelligence Committee has taken testimony with regard to John Rosselli and the assassination plots directed against Fidel Castro. As part of the Committee's inquiry in this area, testimony has been received regarding an individual by the name of Raphael Gener. Committee staff have participated in a review of this testimony with representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. We are requesting that, upon the completion of this review of testimony, the Committee be provided access to all FBI materials relating to Mr. Gener.

We are hopeful that Committee staff and your representatives will be able to work out access to the appropriate files and materials in the same manner as we have in the past. We continue to appreciate your assistance in these matters.

Aloha,

Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman

Howard H. Baker, Jr.
Vice Chairman

MJM:mlh

Veciana/FBI notes
12/20/76

①

Memo SAC S Juan to Director 10/25/73

Informants on 4 occasions betw. ~~So~~ Aug and Oct, 73 advise SA Jerry Sellers AV severed Alpha 66 rel. several years earlier + was member of PRP but severed summer 1973 because lacked "revol. zeal."

Memo SAC Miami to Director 9/27/73 reference 3 inform. for LHM of 9/27/73 re the DR (Directorio Revolucionario) from Miami, Fla.

Veciana: DR planning terrorist activities in Paris in name of phony group "Accion Cuba". Jose Antonio Calatayud Rivera is Sec. Gen. - DR.

Aldo Serafin, Cristobal Mayo, Eulalia Armento resigned from DR Sept 16, 1973

Primivito Rodriguez-Rodriguez said attack on Paris Embassy initiated in office of Lesnik (Replica) + financed by Bosch + AV.

Alfred Soler Soler moving to Vz to plan kidnapping of Cuban officials for DR in import export business.

LHM Aug 30, 1973 re Barres

Barres advises FBI that AV and Serafin planned + executed Paris bombing that killed Juan Felipe De La Cruz in Aug 2, 1973.

②

In July, 73, AV advised Barres that he obtained 300 lbs of C-1 explosives in Texas (having been unable to obtain C-4) and tested it in the Everglades. AV said he had sent a man to Spain, France, Argentina & Peru to cause explosion at Cuban Embassies & create a "Black Sept." type organization

---

Spanish Trans. sent fr Madrid to Miami (Aug 30, 73) "Moralitos"

Ricardo Morales Navarette - Asked by Bureau to Bosch. Accused of death of Cubans in U.S. Participated in terrorist acts. Bosch group has sentenced to death

Miami SAC to Director Memo (8/2/73)

AV furnished 15 Bolivian & Venezuelan passports belonging to numerous individuals of interest to (Third Ag.)

7/16/73 SAC Miami to Director Memo

Acknowledges FBI contact w/ AV in Miami + thru Legat in Caracas + La Paz. FBI in contact because AV in PRP. Rec. an opportunist w/ delusions of grandeur. Wants to be in limelight regardless of cause

Correlation
Veciana Summary - 3/15/73

Francisco Vincente Gonzalez Tuero says he ~~and AV robbed the~~ robbed the Banco ~~Financiero~~ Financerio in Cuba in March, 61. AV planned the robbery. AV then sent message to Zenaida (LNU) 1174 SW 12th St. Miami requesting rifle grenades.

12/27/61 Conf. source advised FBI that AV planned most recent attempt on Castro's life.

1/7/63 Craig T. Sheldon raising money for AV + Alpha 66.

AV heavily funded by Julio Lobo.

1/30/64 AV advised? he had no personal knowledge of John Robert Kliniver, who was investigated re JFK assassination. Kliniver is James Edgar Wethington - with long criminal record. Claimed association w/ Cuban Freedom Fighters. (See reports # 62-109060 and # 62-109060-3083, p. G, 655.)

1/30/64 Veciana substantiated report of Eusebio Ojeda, Chief of Personnel SFNE

Veciana in Dallas in May 64 to visit Dallas SFNE Chapter

Vec. in contact w/ Somosa who promised him training bases in Nic.

The CIA advised that James G. Cogswell, who reportedly had high level contacts in society and US Navy in April, 1966, intro. AV to CIA reps. AV wanted 50,000 to organize group to assassinate CASTRO - CIA declined -

Veciana treasurer, administrator + spokesman for the unity group of Alpha 66, SFNE & MRP.

2/24/69 AV signed Doc. presented this date to Nixon to free Orlando Bosch.

Veciana lived at Savoy Hotel in Caracas,

Quitterez Silva was detained questioned and released after trying to enter Soviet Embassy in La Paz. Silva had AV's wifes name & address in his book.

GRIMALDI
AV established liaison w/ Legat in Bolivia thru the minerals attache at the US Embassy. AV furnished info. from Bolivian National Police files

(5)

Apr 30, 68 info from Augusto Pineda Gonzalez - Pineda came over on boat w/ AV. AV visited Pineda in June 68 and asked Pineda to receive 3 57mm recoiless rifles in Flor. somewhere outside Miami + deliver them to unspecified SFNE people in Miami. Would be used to attack Soviet ships. AV disgusted w/ US policy. AV tried Pineda to organize demonstrations and armed attacks to annoy US + create probs. AV convinced US protecting Castro.
AV would fund Pineda @ $3,000 to $5,000 per mo. Pineda to call Sara when organized. She would provide the $.

Co-Ordinator of Cuban Affairs of the Dept of State - G. Harry ~~[illegible]~~ Shuma furnished FBI info. on Veciana ~~[illegible]~~ based on his "~~personal~~ contacts w/ him" ~~the info [illegible] incorrect i.e. that AV no longer involved in anti~~ - Cas activite

Fresquet + Ray active in 1967 w/ Vecian

(6)

1974 - Enrique Nunez Alvarez and Elvio Rivera Limonta active in FLNC terrorist activities / Both in P. Rico.

MM 105-22094 at TAB Bufile #105-261797

NISO Charleston, SC
111th M.I. Group, Miami } receiving dissemination re PRP.

AV on 11/27/72 had reportedly told source that the US Embassy in La Paz helped him organize the Costa R. Convention

---

MRS. Frances Grant
~~Francis~~ - Spec. invitee on C. Rica Convention

Tony Santiago - on initiating Committee for C. Rica convention

---

Felipe Pazos - headed Banco Nacional in Cuba under Prio.

Israel Romero was Union City, N.J. repr. of MIRR during pd. Bosch involved in bombing activities. Romero once close to Bosch.

Arturo Villar - wealthy, San Juan, active

Ramon Font furnished explosive for French expl. Aug 3, 73 Hotel Oasis Avrainville, Fr.

Lesnick - longstanding Marxist.
Attacked Batista in radio broadcast
Continued Broadcasts after Castro - invented "Cuba-Si-Yanqui No"

For a # years in contact w/ hoodlum elements during Batista regime.
Took part in various assaults in Havanna during Batista.
Left Havanna year or two after Castro took power. Exile in Miami.
Despite fact - close friend of Fidel's in college.
AV funded "Replica".

LIEBENGOOD ROUTH NOTES FROM U. S. V. VECIANA, ET AL

DATE: December 1, 1976

Veciana was represented by Barry L. Garber, 1040 City National Bank Building, 25 West Flagler Street, Miami, Florida 33130 (305-377-4963)

Veciana became implicated as the result of a drug bust of one Augustine Barres, a/k/a/ Emidigio Augustine Barres Fangul ("Gus Barres"). The bust resulted from an search warrant of 23 July 73 for Barres' attache case at the Taft Hotel in New York. The police were acting on an informant tip to an undercover agent who arranged for a buy from Barres of seven kilograms of Cocaine at the Taft. The police understood that Barres was to be with a "female" courier. Barres advised DEA task force representative, Eugene W. Flynn, a detective sgt. with the NYPD, that he purchased the seven kilos from Antonio Veciana in Miami on July 21, 1973.

Barres owns a home in Puerto Rico and travels to New York every two weeks on business.

A co-defendant of Veciana's in the case was Ariel Pomares who is the President of Occidental Investment, a real estate firm owned by Barres, located at 1186 J. T. Pinero Avenue, Miami. Pomares is also involved with FRECA Imports in Puerto Rico. This is also a Barres enterprise.

The DEA Miami regional office cables that Veciana is the subject of INS File No. A12-490987 and that he claims to be a public accountant.

According to the Miami Herald of July 25, 1973, Barres was Assistant Secretary of Communications under Castro and later the general manager of the Havana Health Department. He fled Cuba in 1961 for asylum in Puerto Rico. He became a United States citizen in 1970.

A cable from Ivan Wurms, the Chief Investigator of the DEA Task Force to Durkin at DEA headquarters, Washington, states that Veciana was arrested without incident on 7/24/73 and signed a "consent to search" form. Miscellaneous papers and numerous

Liebengood Rough No~~e~~tes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al con't.

foreign passports belonging to several subjects were seized. Swiss bank account deposit slips were seized and are to be followed by IRS. Veciana claims to be an anti-Castro fund raiser. FBI confirms this.

A July, 1973 TWIX from DEA in New York to DEA headquarters Washington (attention: Daniel P. Casey, Acting Chief) referenced as subject: G1-73-X093 (presumably Veciana) and states "during debriefing of the defendant in New York on July 25, 1973, it was learned that Antonio Carlos Veciana, 811 North Southwest 30th Court, Miami is a member of an anti-Castro group which he has stated intends to blow up a number of Cuban properties and/or embassies in foreign nations, i.e., Spain, Mexico, Peru and France. Bombings originally scheduled for July now delayed until August."

Subpoena of August 14, 1973 exists for a telegram billed to Veciana at 649-1226 and sent to Barcelona, Spain on 5/26/73.

Barres implicates a Paraguyan diplomat formerly assigned to LaPaz, Bolivia and reassigned to Spain in the drug traffic. DEA is discretely checking his identity. A follow-up cable from DEA indicates that they have failed to identify the Paraguyan diplomat sent to Spain but do indicate that a Pedro P. Medina, a Paraguyan assigned to LaPaz, is believed to be involved in Cocaine smuggling.

Barres admitted that he was responsible for bringing Pomares, an employee of his, into illegal drug activity.

Veciana claimed to be without funds and destitute and was not fined. The U. S. Attorney was concerned that he posted a $100,000 bail immediately. However, after initial concern being shown in the file by the U. S. Attorney, the U. S. Attorney later writes the Judge that $80,000 of the $100,000 bond was furnished by Veciana's cousin, Dr. P~~ue~~ablo Zalduendo, a phycian from Detroit, Michigan. The remainder of the bail money was furnished by Veciana's uncle and other family members and friends who cashed insurance policies, closed children's savings accounts, etc. U. S. Attorney concluded that Veciana was possibly telling the truth when he advised the Court that he was destitute.

One Jose ~~Hosea~~ Lopez is a character reference for Barres on appeal.

Liebengood Rough Notes from U. S. v. Veciana, et al, con't.

Barres says he requested the government to give immunity to Veciana in order to destroy the traffic of Cocaine from Bolivia.

Barres studied at Columbia Military Academy in Columbia, Tennessee in 1951.

A taped transcript of Barres' debriefing by detectives Flynn and Scamardella on July 25, 1973 reveals the following: Barres got involved in drugs through his friend Veciana who was an officer of the International Development Bank in the U.S. Embassy in Bolivia. Some people think Veciana is with the CIA but Barres does not know. Barres dealt with Veciana regarding an attempt to kill Castro in Chile. He says Veciana did a good job of transferring everything into Chile (1970-1971). Barres gave Veciana $2,000 in support of this assassination effort. About this time Veciana said that drugs could be smuggled out of Bolivia through diplomatic pouch. Barres thought this was how Veciana had sent weapons into Chile. Barres advised that the head of Interpol in Bolivia gets a cut of drug money for protection on the Bolivian end and that a Secret Service Agent and two Paraguyan diplomats were also involved. They handled the transfer to Veciana in Miami Beach of the drugs from Bolivia.

Barres thought that the individual he was selling the drugs to in New York was a mafia type. It appears this is the individual who informed the police. He is known only as Tony in the transcript. The police were aware of his identity but did not desire Barres to discuss it.

Pomares' counsel, Gustavo Del Toro, urged the DEA in San Juan at the time of the arrest of Pomares to consider immunity for Pomares because Pomares possessed valuable information regarding international narcotic trafficing, including the implication of diplomats in places such as Bolivia, Paraguay and Nicaragua.

The file contains cancelled Veciana checks drawn on the account of Antonio Sira Veciana at the Fidelity National Bank, 5880 Byrd Road, Miami, Florida, in May and June, 1972, for $1,000 each, payable to the Swiss Bank Corporation for account EF558230. These checks were obtained through subpoena on Catherine Hune, Vice President and Cashier of the Fidelity National Bank in Miami.

In Veciana's appellate brief he references transfers of drugs through the government's "APO System". He indicates that the first transaction he was involved in took place in April, 1972.

Also involved is someone known as "the midget".

To Veciana file

MEMORANDUM TO: File

RE: Antonio Veciana

FROM: Tom Moore

DATE: Jan. 3, 1977

Telephoned Veciana to ask if he recalled any attempts on his life in late 1962 or 1963. He answered that there were three attempts on his life, but none in 1962 or 1963. The first attempt, he said, occurred in a stadium in Puerto Rico in 1967 when a bomb exploded approximately 20 meters away. He said he believed Puerto Rican communists were responsible for this attempt. The second attempt occurred in Bolivia in approximately 1970 when some men with weapons appeared at a home where he was supposed to be. He said a woman who owned the home called him to warn him. He said he thought this attempt was related to a revolution which was taking place at that time. The third attempt, he said, occurred in Caracas, Venezuela in 1971. He added that he had received information within the past three months that Castro wanted to kidnap him.

The only relevant incident in late 1962 or 1963 was that an Isobel Zarate began making inquiries about him in Miami. He said many people in the Cuban community informed the FBI she was a Castro spy and that she subsequently escaped to Cuba via Mexico.

~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~

✓ Maheu
Rosselli
Harvey
O'Connell

~~[illegible]~~ CASTRO
~~[illegible]~~ Karamessines
Helms
Hunt

KENNEDYS
ROWAN
HOOVER
LBJ

Warren Commission
- Commission holes
- Maheu contacts

(CI)

Lines of Inquiry
- What Castro doing in retaliatory vein.
- What was Castro intelligence capability.
- Look anti-Castro community – who replaced CIA in funding & co-ord. & why?
- Addit. mafia relationships w/ Exiles –
- pressure on mafia from Kennedy's Justice Department

CIA Evaluation of McGovern Information

Conf. Tom Moore

Ed Gr. - MM. - HK. - RZ. (ME)

Need full picture on Hunt

Cuban - Bahamas switch by mob after Castro (TRADEWINDS)

December

Miami Trip ↗ ~~[illegible]~~
Sturgis

Get Hunt, Sturgis, Barker, Martinez material

Miami police < organized crime section
Cuban exile section

Organizing our material > — Castro-Kennedy Assassination

district

Outline committee related material - New Register
+ file system] ' formalize files

Name: Card Index - name + reference →

Omit all but Impt. References

MAHEU
ROSSELLI
HARVEY
O'Connell
CASTRO
KARAMESSINES
HELMS
HUNT
KENNEDY
ROWAN
HOOVER
LBJ
~~Bundy~~
~~[illegible]~~
ALL ADMIN. OFFICIALS
KENNEDYS
HUNT

- Hughes
- Watergate material
-

~~Summary -~~
~~Requirements~~
~~Police Dunn~~
~~Briefing - [illegible]~~
~~& [illegible]~~
~~Procedure~~

Marita

Mark Sundi
431 - Kennedy office
4:00 PM

~~[illegible]~~

~~[illegible]~~
~~Church Committee~~

Coleman
Johnson City - Ramsey
February - ~~Justice Dept. Inst.~~ - 10 weeks
~~E. Tenn. State~~
~~BS - Cr. Justice~~
Masters - Sociology.

Perez Jiminez
- Kill Kennedy.

El Gato despises Fred
Sturgis

Allen Altman - Lawyer
<$2,600> - wants!
150 BROADWAY

- REPRESENTS HANK Mesick

MARITA GAVE TO Mesick

"The Cat"
"EL GATO" - Code name
- Pretense buying Nazi book.
- Assassinated Castro's double.
- 39-40 years old.
[5'11"/Blonde / German
Soldier of Fortune]
(very wealthy collector antiques)
Told Zongi.

Rolando Martinez
Orlando Bosch
Rolando Martinez

Last person
Mickey Rosselli - alive.

Shelly ~~[illegible]~~ Abend [in bus. in N.Y. He brought El Gato to Marita
theatrical agency cover

Son - 4 wks ago after Fag. threat
hospitalized

> no longer wants

> Father - double Nazi for US (FBI) — married Delaware mother
(Submarine)

> Derry Davis = State Dept.
or
Dept. Justice

> Gerstein bugged.

> Sturgis - HK theory

> - FBI down on Marita because of publication of citation by Meskill.

Soviets didn't react adversely to

plane tickets to Germany

CIA SuperSpy — Frank Sturgis
STAR
Sept 7, 1976

2 Israeli's targeted
Uncle Al - 1970

Lists
FBI
mt.

> Eduardo -

A Situational Report
on Surveillance + Control
in Modern Democratic
Society —
— Robert Yaffee —

Univ. of Waterloo Student Mag
June 16, 1972

— anti-personnel radar. fled to Canada.

accused of being agent

(Lynn Kirkpatrick)

Mike Ackerman — CIA / Miami > Lecturing.

CRC — Artime

Frank } $ from EHH
Alex R. } White house.

60-61 - Miami
✓
Frank assigned to General.

pb! { Frank O'Brien
Frank Lundquist } with Alex R. and F. St. when proposed Castro kill.

David W. Walters – Miami lawyer for Perez Jiminez - Marita

Has the $.

$50,800.00 to JFK in cash

Sturgis Call 12/3/76

Hank Mesnik - writer

won't

Marita Lorenz.

Atty: Allan Altman, Esq.
150 Broadway
NYC, NYC.

Has material

Tapes & documents - Louis Somosa.
KGB
- Bobby Baker
- Hoffa
- Sapid - threatens Killing Kennedy
Jiminez -

Call Marita

gave him everything

Pepe Alleman

trouble - Trafficante.

I. Carry-over from Church report

A. Relationship between agencies and Warren Commission

1. Warren Comm. staff has never been interviewed in depth. Many have not been interviewed at all. The Commission had particular staff assigned to (a) Cuba and (b) organized crime. They, especially, should be fully debriefed about everything that happened in their contacts with the agencies, their frustrations, unfulfilled leads, inability to get access, questionmarks, and what they knew, heard, or suspected about contacts at high-level between Commission members and top agency officials. This would include leads to additional documents, memoranda and people, and is especially important in the time-frame just before the Commission issued its report, i.e. as final drafts being written, when staff learned for the first time about Castro's threat. (Willens, staff director, said there were staff pushing hard to re-open this subject, but pressure of getting the report out prevailed.)

2. Look for all other memoranda of contacts between McCone and CIA re how to structure questions, etc.

3. We now know that Ruby was contacted svereal times by FBI to inform on ~~organized crime in Dallas area~~ ~~/~~"criminal element" in Dallas area. All we've seen is the cummary memo in which Warren Commission was so informed. Get each memorandum of contact between FBI agents and Ruby, i.e. underlying materials which "support" the summary memo.

B. The inter-agency committee which met to develop continegncy plans in the wake of Castro's threat.

1. Numerous documents were sought from FBI, CIA, Defense, State, etc., but never received by Church Committee before our final report was issued. Must follow-through, and then go deeper into it.

2. What else was known besides Castro's retaliation threat? What facts went into the assessment that Castro might retaliate against U.S. leaders in Latin America, but not U.S. leaders in the U.S.? Precisely what accounted for the/ original inclusion of a concern about retaliation in the U.S., but the subsequent deletion of that prospect? Who was responsible for the deletion, and what impact, if any, did that have on the later ~~of~~ withholding of info from the Warren Commission and on the agencies' failure to investigate retaliation?

3. We must find out exactly who was on this Committee at each meeting, get all back-up materials, and interview.

C. FBI involvement in ~~t~~ Bay of Pigs, Lansdale planning, etc.

1. As Church report was being completed, we were just beginning to learn about how deeply the FBI was apparently involved in U.S. anti-Castro action. Possibility here that ~~tHs~~ this could provide another clue in re FBI's original reluctance to investigate retaliation more fully. For instance we now know that FBI had learned about CIA's interest in using organized crime to kill Castro long before RFK toldx~~Hoopxx~~ Hoover about it (Hoover had professed surprise in 1963~~m~~, but there's some indication he may have already known). One FBI witness even told us that a high FBI official ~~a~~ had even proposed the plot idea "in jest". At a minimum, the paper record shows FBI wasx~~contacted~~ ~~toxprovidexCubanxintelli~~ informed about idea of using org. crime figures to provide Cuban intelligence and that, according to the paper record, FBI recommended against it. Trafficante has now claimed that FBI agents came to him seeking Cuban intelligence. This must be followed up, agents interviewed, and FBI memo's,etc., examined.

D. CIA files

I always had the impression that Jim Johnston felt there were more CIA documents which he hadn't seen. We must go over the itmes, one by one, with Johnston, to find out just where we stand on the question of whether or ~~o~~ not weve seen everything. Do any of us really fully understand the entire CIA filing system so as to know whether we've~~y~~ been shown everything, or indeed , whether they have even ~~as~~ g-ne looking for everything.? And how about the field office files, i.e. JMWAVE files in Miami, New Orleans and Mexico Coty files, DC local CIA station files, and FBI field office files?

II. Rosselli-organized crime-Trafficante-Cuba

A. Organized crime files

1. A full assessment of all travel, contacts, relationships, etc. of all major organized crime figures in and around the time of the assassination of JFK. This would include a review (with appropriate ~~pxiex~~xxxx system for pritecting privacy interests) of all microphone surveillance logs on organized crime figures during key months in 1963, e.g. Fred Black. Trafficante, Rosselli, Giancana, Las Vegas ~~xaxxoxox~~ casinos, etc. (Rosselli was ~~xexeyx~~ very defensive in his testimony about some comment he says he made on the phone to someone upon first learning that JFK had been killed; he indicated that he had been "coming out of a deep sleep and said someting about communists did it." Of c orse he now knows that that call may have been ~~ap~~ tapped and is trying to explain. No one had ever asked for

that log.

2. A new analysis of all the long distance toll calls of Jack Ruby in the days around Nov. 22. Warren Comm. records show he made calls to Chicago O.C. figure Barney Baker, and Teamster heavy Dusty Miller, plus others. Does the explanation for these calls really wash (i.e. Ruby's union troubles in re his nightclub). Has this whole ~~$0~~ subject been exhausted by Warren Comm. or not. Is there more (interviews, etc.) that should be done here?

3. Someone should literally live in Miami area for a month, immerse in the community, get to know the whole scorecard, (maybe hire a local Spanish-speaking cop with good local contacts). ~~0~~ More fully debrief Trafficante for his version of events and people. Follow up with contacts with all the Cubans involved. Has Miami pulled all the significant toll records for period of time around Rosselli's death (Cubans, O.C. figures, garage owner, etc.) and followed up.

4. A full tracking of what happened when Church reports were released, reactions, contacts, concerns, who were the key figures who actually got the reports and who did they speak to about the ~~xxxxxx~~ contents. Review our own mailing records, if exist, ~~a~~ showing who asked for reports. Local ~~xxxx~~ news ~~xxxx~~ media for leads in re reactions of the community. Travel records of O.C. and Cuban leaders in and around that time, as well as in and around time of Rosselli's death.

5. McWillie. Trafficante associate who invited Ruby to Cuba in 1959. McWillie later manages Las Vegas casino's & his contact with Ruby continues. Warren Comm. investigate inadequate on this subject.

5986

Marita file

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ

Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which frightened her. She claims to want her information in responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday, January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we have little to lose if we have time to listen to her.

H —

I think we should set up an interview at a time which won't conflict w/ hearings — may not be until later now.

M

HSL/dr

5986

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ

Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which frightened her. She claims to want her information in responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday, January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we have little to lose *if* we have time to listen to her.

Howard: I have no objections [redacted] to her coming down, but would be personally hesitant to invest any more of my own time unless she [redacted] can provide at least a specific adjenda of new information she will discuss.

One possible tactic is to tell her that we are extremely pressed for time and cannot subpena her until late February unless she give us specific areas that would allow us to show "our superiors" that talking to her should be given a ~~hghm~~ higher ~~pxe~~ priority [redacted] over other committee business.

HSL/dr

Tom

5986

MEMORANDUM

TO: MIKE MADIGAN
TOM MOORE
BILL MILLER
FROM: HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
DATE: DECEMBER 27, 1976

SUBJECT: MARITA LORENZ

Ms. Lorenz called this afternoon to express her desire to come to Washington and tell us "all the things held back on" in New York. Her desire to cooperate has been engendered by two events, i.e., Sturgis told the German press of her FBI spying on the head of the Soviet U.N. Mission and she had a chance encounter with the Soviet on December 26 which frightened her. She claims to want her information in responsible hands as soon as possible and requests we subpoena her (i.e. pay her way) here and make one night's accommodation for her. What do you think? I am to call her back on Monday, January 3 at 212-534-2412. My personal opinion is that we have little to lose *if* we have time to listen to her.

HSL/dr

MEMORANDUM

To: Mike Madigan

From: Ed Greissing

Date: Sept. 16, 1976

Subject: Review of CIA documents presented the SCI by Jack Anderson

The documents recently received by this Committee, from Jack Anderson, had previously been reviewed by the Church Committee staff. The documents appear to be a few of those requested for FOIA review by David Belin. It is my understanding, after these documents were declassified, David Belin furnished copies to both David Martin(AP) and Jack Anderson.

The Church Committee was permitted to review the entire Oswald 201 file, the AMLASH file, Garrison files and selected Office of Security files. The Committee primarily concerned itself with the early period of the investigation(November 1963 - October 1964), as it believed the information to be received from this time period to be more relevant in evaluating the performance of the intelligence agencies with respect to their investigation.

Dan Niescher, the Church Committee contact at the CIA,was the individual responsible for the declassification of documents relating to the assassination of President Kennedy. During this declassification process, Dan Niescher consulted the Committee staff to make sure that we were aware of certain documents.In addition, Mr. Kaleras had given the staff unlimited access to all files we believed necessary to conduct our investigation.

Yet, the possibility still remains that the staff was not shown everything. The CIA has maintained throughout that the Oswald 201 file was a complete compilation of the material related to the assassination of President Kennedy. However, information relating to who Lee Harvey Oswald was, and what he was doing are not included.in their files. The Oswald 201 does not attempt to question Oswald's connection with both pro-Gastro and anti-Castro groups or any of the AMLASH information. The most notable subject missing was information relating to CIA/U.S. Government attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

Dot To Rosselli file

H. L. telecon w/ LaBrecque
12/22/76

. . . .

No, I can't either confirm or deny it. We are prohibited at staff level from discussing any Committee business. I apologize for not being able to help you. You know the ground rules and they haven't changed. Right.

. . . .

I can't say. I don't know. You indicated that you . . .

. . . .

Are you still working Rosselli? You getting anywhere?

. . . .

You got a pretty good source on that? On the fact that they were having dinner together on many occasions before he was murdered?

. . . .

I just can't help you because of the ground rules. I'd like to have a copy of your piece, or two, for me and Inderfurth here. Just drop a copy in the mail and I'll appreciate it.

. . . .

You mean people like . . . Well, I think . . . people like Trafficante?

. . . .

Well, I can't discuss whether or not such a meeting took place. I can't tell you whether you're right or wrong.

. . . .

Now when you talk about Trafficante you don't need to be cautioned. You know them as well as I do.

. . . .

Well, as far as our rules are concerned, it wouldn't make any difference if Trafficante was here. It wouldn't make any difference in our ability to confirm or deny that.

. . . .

Miami Herald Dec. 24

Trafficante Made Secret Appearance At Senate Investigation, Sources Say

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Florida's reputed organized crime boss, Santos Trafficante of Tampa and Miami, made a secret, four-hour October appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee to answer questions about his role in a CIA assassination plot, investigation sources have disclosed.

Trafficante, 62, had not previously been questioned by the committee or its staff in the two-year-old investigation of CIA activities.

Of the three Mafia figures involved in the early 1960s plot to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro, only Trafficante is still alive. Both Sam Giancana and John Rosselli were murdered within the last 16 months.

The murders are unsolved.

INVESTIGATORS ALSO said that Trafficante had dinner with Rosselli at The Landings, a Fort Lauderdale restaurant, in mid-July, less than two weeks before Rosselli disappeared. Rosselli's body, stuffed in an oil drum, floated to the surface of Dumfoundling Bay the first week of August.

Trafficante reportedly has told police that the July dinner with Rosselli — as well as several other meetings previously at the Cordoba Restaurant in Miami, formerly owned by the husband of Rosselli's niece, according to police — were "friendly, social events with no business."

Investigators in recent weeks have centered their efforts on tracing the whereabouts of Trafficante's associates at the time of Rosselli's disappearance, a source said.

John Rosselli
... dined with Trafficante

Trafficante, who for about four years has maintained a home at 740 NE 155th St. in North Dade, could not be reached for comment.

Trafficante was identified as the head of a South Florida Mafia family in testimony in 1963 before a U.S. Senate subcommittee.

HIS ATTORNEY, Henry Gonzalez of Tampa, who accompanied Trafficante when he went to Washington, according to sources, would not comment on either the Senate appearance or Trafficante's past activities. When first asked about the Senate appearance, he said, "You realize you're treading on dangerous ground."

A committee source said that Trafficante had not been questioned previously by the committee because his role in the plot had been considered "secondary."

Interest was renewed in the plot after Rosselli's death. Investigators sought to determine whether the murders of the two men were connected in any way with their testimony or potential testimony before the committee.

GIANCANA, WHO was a Mafia boss in Chicago for many years, was killed in June 1975, at the same time Senate investigators were preparing to contact him. The gun used to kill Giancana, found discarded on a roadside several miles from Giancana's house a month after the murder, was traced to a Miami gunshop, but the trail stopped there.

Investigators said the gun was part of a shipment purchased in 1965 by the Tamiami Gun Shop, but there are no records to indicate where it went from there, according to investigators and gunshop owners.

Rosselli, whose most powerful Mafia days were reportedly in the 1950s and early 1960s in Las Vegas and Los Angeles, did appear before the committee at least three times in the 12 months before his death.

In Washington, the committee has kept a tight clamp on comment about the investigation, and only one member, Robert T. Stafford (R., Vt.), acknowledged the Trafficante session, saying "I was not present when the witness you speak of was in front of the committee."

Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii), the committee chairman who, along with Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) pressured for Justice Department and FBI involvement in the Rosselli murder case, said "I have never met Mr. Trafficante. That's as far as I'll go."

A PRIME interest of the committee has been possible links between the CIA Castro plotting and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Revelations of the Senate committee were a key factor in the creation of the new House of Representative investigation, which is taking a new look at the JFK murder.

Trafficante reportedly has told investigators that he first met Rosselli about 1956. It was in the early 1950s that Florida law-enforcement officials estimated that a Bolita opertion run by Trafficante and his brother netted $2 million annually.

Trafficante was a major gambling figure in pre-Castro Havana, where he ran a casino. In 1959, it was estimated that $1 million or $2 million was bet nightly in all the Mafia-run casinos in Havana. The gambling stopped when Castro took over in 1959.

Rosselli was the first of the three Mafia figures to be recruited by the CIA in 1960 in its plot to assassinate Castro.

IN A CIA memo quoted in an interim report of the committee a year ago, it was said that Trafficante's role was to "serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there."

Rosselli told his CIA liaison that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement might be able to accomplish the assassination." An internal CIA investigation in 1967 "suggests that this Cuban may have been receiving funds from Trafficante and other racketeers interested in securing 'gambling, prostitution and dope monopolies' in Cuba after the overthrow of Castro."

Roselli's Body Found in Floating Drum

[illegible] (UPI) — The body of [illegible], a key figure with [illegible] Chicago mobster Sam [illegible] in a CIA plot to assassinate Fidel Castro, [illegible] found in a chain[illegible] drum floating in [illegible] of Biscayne Bay.

[illegible] County officials said [illegible] had been asphyxiated. [illegible] Wright, chief deputy examiner would not say if Roselli died before or after his body was [illegible] gallon drum.

[illegible] Roselli, whose body [illegible] Sunday and identified yesterday, had been [illegible]. Wright would only confirm that there was a circular [illegible] on the lower abdomen.

Wright said Roselli, 71, had probably been dead since July [illegible] the day he reportedly left his sister's home in nearby Broward County to play golf. He said Roselli's killers tried hard to keep the disappearance [illegible].

[illegible] incredible amount of [illegible] trying to make sure the body was never found," Wright said. "The lengths to which they went to insure that the body would not be found clearly earmarks this as a true gangland-style killing."

Roselli testified last year before the Senate Intelligence Committee that he and Giancana had been recruited in 1961 by the CIA as part of a plot to [illegible] Castro. [illegible] the idea. He [illegible] Giancana were [illegible] paid $150,000 [illegible] according to the Senate report on the scheme. Roselli was the [illegible] man between Giancana and Cuban dissidents who [illegible] to carry out the [illegible].

Giancana was also [illegible] June 19, 1975, several days before his scheduled appearance, someone pumped [illegible] small-caliber bullets into him in what [illegible]

THE ACTUAL contact man for the Castro operation turned out to be Robert Maheu, one-time top aide to the late industrialist Howard Hughes, who served as a liaison between the CIA and the mobsters. Maheu, who has partially acknowledged his role in the affair, had split with Hughes long before the latter's death earlier this year.

Roselli and [illegible] were also reported to have been linked with Judith Campbell Exner, who said last year she had "a relationship" with the late President John F. Kennedy. [illegible] Mrs. Exner [illegible] in cash [illegible]

[illegible] Roselli's Washington attorney, Tom Wadden, became concerned about his client's life and contacted Sen. Howard H. Baker Jr. in an effort to secure more investigation of the case.

Baker was a member of the committee before which Roselli testified.

Wadden told Baker he felt certain Roselli had met with [illegible]

IN TURN, according to what Wadden told newsmen, Baker telephoned Committee Chairman Daniel Inouye, D-Hawaii, and FBI Director Clarence Kelley and urged that Roselli's disappearance be investigated.

Baker could not be reached for comment last night on the conversations with the attorney.

Two fishermen found the drum floating in Dumbfounding Bay, an arm of Biscayne Bay between North Miami and Miami Beach. Police said the fishermen, not publicly identified, called them after they spotted human limbs through the holes chopped in the barrel.

Authorities said that because of the currents, it was not known where the drum was thrown in the bay.

[illegible]

In Washington, [illegible] Inouye, chairman of the new permanent Senate Intelligence Committee, said yesterday that it would be premature to decide on a congressional investigation until more facts of the killing are known.

"As soon as we have more of the facts available, I will [illegible] to decide whether to investigate," he said.

ROSELLI WAS reported missing by his sister, with whom he had recently been living in Plantation, north of Miami. She said she last saw [illegible]

[illegible] the late 1950s and early [illegible]

Roselli was sent to Las Vegas, Nev., in the 1950s to [illegible] the mob's interests there but stayed under the control of the Chicago organization.

HE WENT to Los Angeles in the early 1960s and was [illegible]

[illegible] Castro [illegible]

[illegible] has told reporters [illegible] Roselli and Giancana at the request of CIA [illegible] James O'Connell. He said the two were chosen because of contacts they had made in Cuba during the pre-Castro years.

MAHEU SAID the plot was timed to coincide with the April 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion and was "always subject to a 'go' signal which, to my knowledge, never came."

Roselli told the Senate committee that he made several trips to Cuba in high-powered boats furnished by the CIA. He said the scheme included various plans to try to kill Castro by sniper fire, explosives and poison capsules.

Washington sources said last year that the CIA offered as much as $150,000 for the job. Roselli told the Senate panel that he turned any payment down for patriotic reasons, the [illegible]

[illegible] Page 1
8/9/76

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST *Monday, Jan. 18, 1971* B7

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

© 1971, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.

1975 Jack Anderson news release

Four and a half years ago, I broke a story that now is belatedly rocking Washington. I reported that the Central Intelligence Agency had recruited two Mafia figures, John Roselli and Sam Giancana, to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

I tracked down Roselli and questioned him about the story. He had nothing to say. He promised me, however, that he would give me his exclusive story if he should ever be free to talk.

Yesterday, John Roselli told his story -- first, to the Senate Intelligence Committee in secret session, then to me as he had promised four and a half years ago.

Roselli is a dapper, hawk-faced man with a thatch of white hair. He has been disciplined all his life to keep his mouth shut. His Mafia partner, Sam Giancana, was slain before Senate investigators could serve him with a subpoena.

So it was obviously painful for Roselli to talk. I promised I would make clear that he revealed no names, except for the CIA contacts whose identities the Senate already knew.

So here is Roselli's own account of a real-life "Mission Impossible" -- the attempt to kill Castro. It is a story of cash payments, poison pellets, high-powered rifles and powerboat dashes to Cuba.

The plot against Castro, Roselli said, began in 1960 -- when Dwight Eisenhower was President, Richard Nixon was Vice President and Allen Dulles was the CIA chief.

Roselli was recruited in Los Angeles, he said, by Robert Maheu, then an aide to billionaire Howard Hughes. Previously, Maheu had operated a CIA front in Washington.

According to Roselli, the murdered mobster, Sam Giancana, never became involved in the assassination plot. He knew about it; he may even have suggested a Cuban contact; nothing more.

Roselli identified the CIA project officer, in charge of the Castro assassination, as "Big Jim" O'Connell. Maheu put Roselli in contact with O'Connell, as Roselli remembers it, in New York City on September 14, 1960.

Thereafter, Roselli flew to Miami and recruited the assassination squads. At first, they plotted to poison Castro. Poison pellets were supplied by the CIA. They were delivered to the plotters in a Miami hotel room, according to Roselli, by Maheu. He dramatically opened his briefcase, revealing $10,000 in cash and the fatal pellets.

The money was distributed tothe Cuban plotters. Roselli swore he never took any money from the CIA, except for some incidental expenses. He paid the big expenses, he said, out of his own pocket.

The poison pills were supposed to take three days to work. Supposedly, this would give the poison time to work its way out of Castro's system before he died, and his death would be attributed to natural causes.

Roselli never found out what happened to the plotters or the pellets. But they tried again later with a stronger dose of poison. Not long afterward, reports reached them that Castro was desperately ill. Roselli doesn't know whether the illness was caused by the poison or a virus. But Castro survived, and the plotters apparently did not.

Toselli said he also picked up intelligence, which he submitted to the CIA both during the Bay of Pigs planning and the later Cuban missile crisis. After the Bay of Pigs, Roselli said, Maheu was cut out of the plot. Thereafter, Roselli reported to a CIA agent named William Harvey.

There were four more assassination attempts, the plotters were smuggled into Cuba with high-powered rifles. The last assassination squad, Roselli heard, made it to a Havana rooftop before they were caught.

This was around March 1, 1963. Then the project was abandoned. Roselli saw Harvey for the last time in June, 1963. Five months later, Lee Harvey Oswa gunned down President Kennedy in Dallas. Oswald had been active in the pro-Castro movement. Shortly before that dreadful day in Dallas, Oswald had made a mysterious trip to Mexico where he visited the Cuban embassy. The Warren Commission found no evidence, however, that Oswald was in the hire of Havana.

Yesterday, Roselli made no apology for his CIA role. U.S. authorities call him a mobster. He regards himself as a patriot.

THE WASHINGTON POST
L 1 Sunday, September 12, 1976

Roselli file

The Calculated Rise And Abrupt Descent Of Johnny Roselli

By Rudy Maxa

Until last month, Johnny Roselli lived comfortably with his sister and brother-in-law in a Miami suburb. A friend estimated he earned about $25,000 annually from a gift shop he owned in the lobby of Las Vegas' Frontier Hotel.

He shrugged last year when his attorney suggested he hire a bodyguard, after the murder of Chicago mobster Sam Giancana, his partner in CIA plots to kill Fidel Castro. If anybody wants to kill me at my age, the 71-year-old Roselli said, what difference does it make? So he played golf several times a week, sipped white wine with dinner, and—until somebody decided Johnny Roselli should wind up in an oil barrel in Miami's Dumfoundling Bay—considered employment in the new gambling casinos beginning to open in the oil-rich Middle East.

In the late 1920s Al Capone and his friends chose Miami as the chic spot for organized crime figures to buy a winter home. Just across a strip of ocean was Cuba, a gambling and vice mecca. The mobsters from the north were treated like visiting celebrities by Florida press and society, while some members of the local police force began developing a taste for the finer things in life.

In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000. One of the sheriff's deputies said he collected $50,000 in bribes in nine months spent as a bagman for Miami Beach gambling concessions. In 1948 a bookmaker's operation in Miami grossed $26 million. It was the kind of place that made a racketeer feel at home.

For the last two years, Johnny Roselli felt at home in Plantation, a bedroom suburb north of Miami that Roselli made his retirement haven because he had family there. His brother-in-law, a government missile expert, lives in a sprawling white home that
at first glance, resembles every othe
house in the neighborhood.

But it is different: the carefully cur
tained windows, the extra lock on th
front door, and spotlights on all side
of the house give it the look of a subu
ban fortress. Inside, the furniture i
pale blue Mediterranean, the carpet i
thick white.

Roselli's killers did not ambush th
house; Roselli went to them. He lef
Plantation at 1 p.m. on July 28 wearin
a golf shirt, his golf clubs in his ca
trunk. He told his sister he would b
home for dinner. That afternoon o
evening he was killed, probably by su
focation, perhaps after being torture
—early reports said his legs were br
ken. Heavily chained, Roselli wa
stuffed in a 55-gallon oildrum an
dumped into the ocean.

His brother-in-law found Roselli's si
ver-colored 1975 Chevrolet Impala se
eral days later, parked at the Miami I
ternational Airport.

Ten days after Roselli's disappea
ance something went wrong. The o
drum that was meant to keep his deat
a secret floated to the surface of Dun
foundling Bay, buoyed by the gases
Roselli's decaying body.

The holes in the side of the dru
and the placing of his Chevrolet at th
airport convinced investigators h
corpse was meant never to be disco
ered; history was supposed to recor
that dapper Johnny Roselli, facing d
portation proceedings that the gover
ment had threatened off and on f
years, decided to disappear on an ai
plane flight to who-knows-where.

"Cutting up and disposing of bodi
is not necessarily new to our depar
ment," says the man who is directi
the search for Roselli's killers. Lt. Ga
Minnium, head of the Dade Coun
homicide squad, is a well-muscled m
with an aquiline nose that separates
pair of hard blue eyes. On the pa
green wall of his bare office is a sm
card that reads "DYNAMITE—DON
SHAKE ME UP."

He and another police officer
count the solving of some of Da
County's more brutal murders wi

See ROSELLI, L4, Col. 1

ROSELLI, From L1

the enthusiasm of two football players recalling their favorite bowl games. The headless, handless body that floated into a Miami canal last month reminded Minnium of that other, similarly mutilated body that turned up last December. And who can forget the man who got angry with his roommate, sliced him up and tossed the parts along a highway?

As it turned out, Roselli's wasn't the first body to float into the annals of Miami crime in a drum, Minnium says. Ten years ago a lovers' quarrel resulted in a man stuffing his girl friend into a drum, filling it with cement and Aqua Velva shave lotion. The drum was found resting against a dike and justice was eventually done.

Minnium is not pleased by such violent antics.

"We don't appreciate people committing murder and dumping a body in our county, regardless of who the people are, but especially if it's organized crime," Minnium says.

His department handled 168 homicides last year and boasted an 85 per cent "clearance record." As of July, 1976, the percentage was even higher, standing at about 92 per cent.

If Charles Zatrepalek and Julio Ojeda have anything to say about it, Roselli's killing is not going to diminish those percentages. Both men are 28-year-old homicide detectives who vow with a schoolboy's sincerity tha they won't rest until Roselli's murde is solved. In the last four weeks, with the help of Washington agencies, Zatrepalek and Ojeda have reconstructed Roselli's life in hopes of understanding his death. For the third time in eight years of marriage, Zatrepalek worked out of town on his wedding anniversary; because of the "awesomeness" of this case, Ojeda spent his Labor Day holiday at work.

"Maybe 10 years from now," Ojeda says, "I want someone to look at my file and say, 'Hey, he talked to everybody.' And maybe he'll hear something and BANG! that's the arrest!"

That Johnny Roselli was destined to walk on the dark side of life never seemed in doubt. As a teen-ager in Boston, when his name was Filippo Sacco, Roselli was a runner for the numbers racket. He helped his stepfather burn down his home for the insurance money. He was arrested at age 22 for stealing about $25 from someone. Then he changed his name and left for Chicago.

It would be 40 years until, in the late 1960s, Johnny Roselli would see his mother again, though he sent money to his family through an intermediary in Chicago so his sisters could attend college.

By the late 1920s Al Capone was well established in Chicago. Newspapermen, politicians and cops were on the Capone payroll and a young man with Roselli's street savvy had little trouble finding suitable employment; he hired on as a rumrunner with the Capone gang. At age 26 Roselli was arrested for selling morphine to an undercover agent. He was acquitted because, after Roselli's arrest, no one could seem to find the arresting officer or informant in the case. They still haven't been found.

In the mid-1930s Roselli, by now a mature and charming man, lucky with

after a
work-a-day,
a velvety
junior jump! $58

A be-devilling shimmer-glimmer you, set for champagne or a great beat! One-piece cotton velveteen, ready to layer black or brown, 5-13. Come in, write or phone.

③

> ***"In the 1940s the sheriff of Dade County (which includes most of the Miami area) admitted to the Kefauver organized crime committee that, since he had become sheriff on an annual salary of $12,000 five years earlier, his personal fortune had increased from $2,500 to $70,000."***

women, friendly with men of money, moved to Los Angeles. He wore hand-tailored suits and, by all accounts, was easygoing, mild-mannered. He was married for a time to an actress, but they had no children. He became a close friend of Harry Cohn, the legendary head of Columbia Pictures. The two men sometimes vacationed together and Roselli always seemed to know how to place a bet should Cohn care to wager on a horse.

According to Bob Thomas' biography of Cohn, "King Cohn," the movie mogul once offered Roselli a job as a producer. (In his book, Thomas disguised Roselli's identity at Roselli's request.)

"What would you pay me?" Roselli asked Cohn.

"Five hundred dollars a week," Cohn said.

"I get that much from waitresses who take bets for me," Roselli is said to have replied.

Besides being a handy man with the placing of bets, Roselli purchased a 26 per cent interest in a Tijuana racetrack with $25,000 Cohn loaned him. Roselli paid him back promptly and included a check for 6 per cent interest; Cohn magnanimously tore up the interest check.

Roselli bought twin star rubies, had them set in rings and gave one to Cohn, who considered it a good luck charm until his death. Once, when Chicago mobster Willie Bioff moved to Hollywood and began making life miserable for movie studios by shaking down executives in return for labor peace, Roselli stepped in and saved Cohn from a lengthy strike.

When Cohn refused to pay tribute to Bioff and his union, Bioff tried to halt production at Columbia by calling a sudden strike. Desperate, Cohn called Roselli who marched into Bioff's office and confronted the hoodlum who sat behind his desk wearing a hat and coat, chomping on a cigar, a gun resting on the desk in front of him.

"Listen, Willie, I don't know what you're trying to prove but it isn't going to work," Roselli told him. "This is a spite thing and you're not going to get away with it. You meet with Cohn and get it settled."

Bioff backed down and called off his pickets. After he was sent to jail for extortion, Bioff cut a deal with the government and named Roselli as a Chicago mobster who had helped him shake down movie studios. Cohn testified on Roselli's behalf, but in 1943 Roselli was sentenced to 10 years in prison. When he got out he returned to Hollywood to make pictures of prison and gangster life. But publicity about a secret appearance before the Kefauver crime committee ruined his relationship with most studios. Even Cohn re fused to hire him—"The stockholders would scalp me," Cohn told a bitter Roselli.

It was during his years in the Los Angeles and Las Vegas areas that Roselli met the man who would make him a household name later in life. Robert Maheu, the ex-FBI agent who parlayed a Washington private eye business into a stormy career as Howard Hughes' man in Las Vegas, approached Roselli on behalf of the CIA in 1960.

(Another person Roselli met in that era who would later surface to talk of Roselli, Giancana and John F. Kennedy was a young party girl named Judith Campbell.)

Maheu and Roselli would later tell Frank Church's Senate Intelligence Committee the details of their plots to kill Castro. Maheu told investigators he had known Roselli since the late 1950s and, while he didn't know of his underworld connections, "it was certainly evident to me that (Roselli) was able to accomplish things in Las Vegas when nobody else seemed to get the same kind of attention."

Over dinner at the Brown Derby in Beverly Hills 16 years ago, Maheu explained to Roselli that his government needed his services. Roselli, who was born on July 4, 1905, was nothing if not patriotic. (Sam Giancana once said, "Just wave a flag and Johnny'll follow you to any canal.") Maheu recalled that

See ROSELLI, L5, Col. 1

⑤



Johnny Roselli 1975. upper ri and. countercle wise from upper l Fidel Castro in Sam Giancana in President John Kennedy in Dade County Po Lt. Gary Minni and the Flor home where Ros lived before death.

Photos by The Washington P
The Chicago Daily News, AP.

pealed to Harvey for help and Harvey recommended to the CIA that it try to prevent prosecution, but Roselli was convicted of violating interstate gambling laws. He went to jail, returning in 1974 to Plantation to do battle against government efforts to deport him.

In 1971 the CIA asked the Immigration and Naturalization Service to "forestall public disclosure of Roselli's past operational activity with the CIA" that might occur if deportation proceedings were pursued. The INS agreed to keep the CIA informed, but at his death, Roselli and his lawyers were still fighting deportation.

"Bob Maheu must be running scared —I thought about that just the other day: 'Jesus, what's Maheu thinking?' " said another of Roselli's brothers-in-law, Peter Cardillo of New Jersey.

The public doesn't know what Maheu is thinking, whether he worries if pro-Castro Cubans are exacting retribution for sins of 16 years ago. Maheu's secretary in Las Vegas says she doesn't know where her boss is or when he'll be returning to his office. He reportedly has some business interest in Egypt, a part of the world that seems to hold some fascination for the Castro plotters; Giancana kept an apartment in Beirut and, just before his death, told a friend he had some sort of deal brewing there. And Roselli longingly eyed the opening of gambling casinos in the land of the new oil millionaires.

In Tampa, Santos Trafficante, another of the original Maheu group, also refuses to talk with the press. But unlike the others, he did not testify before the Church committee so the public has no inkling of his thoughts on the Castro assassination attempts.

Whether Roselli's killing was one of retribution for a public or a private matter, Johnny Roselli was a testament to an era that has passed. His life, which would have remained largely unnoticed save for the Senate's CIA hearings, seemed straight from the pages of a Mafia novel: allegedly brought into the United States illegally at the turn of the century, Roselli clawed his way from the mean streets of Boston and Chicago to the relative glamor of Hollywood, Las Vegas and, finally, Miami. Along the way, a simple strain of patriotism—which impressed the CIA enough to mention it to the Church committee—put him in a rope-dancer's position of sometimes receiving, sometimes taking advantage of his knowledge of the darkest side of government.

While some have speculated that he was killed for talking too much to government investigators, Roselli was hardly a loudmouth in the league of a Joe Valachi, who sang for televised Senate hearings on the Mafia in 1963. Fourteen years ago Roselli confided in his lawyer, Washington attorney Edward Morgan, that he had been told by Cuban sources in Miami that John Kennedy's killing was ordered and arranged by Castro, but he lived with his secret.

The day after Roselli's body was scooped from its crude coffin, his brother-in-law in New Jersey, Peter Cardillo, told me: "Down deep, in a way, I probably hope it was connected with (the Castro affair). At least then Johnny, he would have died for a cause."

Roselli Probe

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure that federal agencies cooperate with local police.

The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.

"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and his testimony before the Committee."

HART SAID he also hoped to meet with local officials of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service, a [illegible]

Roselli, 71, organized crime figure who testified three times before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the past year about his recruitment by the CIA in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, was found dead two weeks ago, stuffed in an oil drum floating in Dumfoundling Bay.

Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no "evidence" indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

"I know of no plans whatsoever to have him come back," Hart said, "but that's not to say we wouldn't have called him back if some new facts arose.

"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication ... he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

THE MURDER of Roselli, who last testified in April, renewed Intelligence Committee interest in the death of Chicago organized crime leader Sam (Momo) Giancana. Giancana was shot to death in his home in June of 1975, just a [illegible] time when Intelligence Committee investigators were tracking him down.

Accompanying Hart Friday was Michael Madigan, a committee attorney who, in June of 1975, was preparing to interview Giancana about his involvement with Roselli in the Castro plot.

Giancana and Tampa organized crime figure Santo Trafficante played "accompanying roles" in the CIA-inspired Castro assassination plot, another committee staff member traveling with Hart said Friday.

The committee had also "considered" subpenaing Trafficante, the staff investigator said, but Trafficante was never called because the Committee considered Roselli's testimony the most important.

CHICAGO-AREA investigators concluded that Giancana's death was part of an internal gangland struggle.

Nevertheless, Hart told The Herald Friday that with Roselli's death, "troubling questions" about Giancana's murder linger. "The coincidences begin to string themselves together," said the 1972 presidential campaign manager for George McGovern.

Asked if he was satisfied with the conclusions of investigators that Giancana's death was not connected to his potential testimony before the committee, Hart said "there is the absence of any corroborating evidence which prevents

Turn to Page 28 Col. 4

284

Visits Local Officials

FROM PAGE 1B

us from moving beyond speculation."

Madigan said the widespread reports after Giancana's death that his appearance before the committee was imminent were not true. That further indicates, he agreed, that Giancana's death was not directly related to his past CIA association.

"WE FINALLY got Giancana's home number the day he was killed," Madigan said Friday. "We had some difficulty tracking him down in Houston (where Giancana had been in the hospital). It had been decided that I was going to interview him to see whether it would be worth it to call him as a witness. He had not been contacted yet and he had not been subpenaed," Madigan said.

Roselli, who had been subpenaed, did testify for the first time four days after Giancana was shot.

That committee was headed by Sen. Frank Church and has since been replaced by a newly formed committee headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii) and Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.). In its final report, that former committee strongly urged the new committee to continue the investigation of covert CIA activity as well as connections between the Castro assassination plot and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

HART SAID FRIDAY there are still unanswered questions about Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, particularly relating to the so-called "retaliation theory" — that Castro or pro-Castro agents had JFK killed because of the CIA attempts on Castro's life.

Hart interviewed Roselli twice as a member of the former committee and he is also a member of the new Intelligence Committee.

"Roselli was very candid but he did not volunteer information," Hart said.

Committee investigators said Friday they have found no link between Roselli and Eugene M. Carrafa, a Rockville, Md., antique auto dealer with reported organized crime connections who died under circumstances mysteriously coincidental to Roselli's death.

Carrafa, 37, was reported missing by his wife on July 28, the same day Roselli was last seen by his sister in Plantation with whom he had lived for three years.

Caraffa's body floated to the surface of New York Harbor off Staten Island on Aug. 4, his body wrapped in a padlocked chain and weighted by two 15-pound boat anchors. Police said he had been strangled. Roselli had been asphyxiated, possibly by strangling, according to investigators here.

New York City detectives said that Caraffa "knew Giancana" but they have not been able to pin down a motive in his death.

The Washington Star, quoting an unidentified FBI source, reported that Caraffa had met with Roselli in Chicago about two months ago.

Roselli Probe

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure that federal agencies cooperate with local police.

The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.

"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and his testimony before the Committee."

HART SAID he also hoped to meet with local officials of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Roselli, 71, organized crime figure who testified three times before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the past year about his recruitment by the CIA in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, was found dead two weeks ago, stuffed in an oil drum floating in Dumfoundling Bay.

Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no "evidence" indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

"I know of no plans whatsoever to have him come back," Hart said "but that's not to say we wouldn't have called him back if some new facts arose."

"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication ... he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

THE MURDER of Roselli, who last testified in April, renewed Intelligence Committee interest in the death of Chicago organized crime leader, Sam (Momo) Giancana. Giancana was shot to death in his home in June of 1975, just a ta time when Intelligence Committee investigators were tracking him down.

Accompanying Hart Friday was Michael Madigan, a committee attorney who, in June of 1975, was preparing to interview Giancana about his involvement with Roselli in the Castro plot.

Giancana and Tampa organized crime figure Santo Trafficante played "accompanying roles" in the CIA-inspired Castro assassination plot, another committee staff member traveling with Hart said Friday.

The committee had also "considered" subpenaing Trafficante, the staff investigator said, but Trafficante was never called because the Committee considered Roselli's testimony the most important.

CHICAGO-AREA investigators concluded that Giancana's death was part of an internal gangland struggle.

Nevertheless, Hart told The Herald Friday that with Roselli's death, "troubling questions" about Giancana's murder linger. "The coincidences begin to string themselves together," said the 1972 presidential campaign manager for George McGovern.

Asked if he was satisfied with the conclusions of investigators that Giancana's death was not connected to his potential testimony before the committee, Hart said "there is the absence of any corroborating evidence which prevents

Turn to Page 2B Col. 6

284

Visits Local Officials

FROM PAGE 1B

us from moving beyond speculation."

Madigan said the widespread reports after Giancana's death that his appearance before the committee was imminent were not true. That further indicates, he agreed, that Giancana's death was not directly related to his past CIA association.

"WE FINALLY got Giancana's home number the day he was killed," Madigan said Friday. "We had some difficulty tracking him down in Houston (where Giancana had been in the hospital). It had been decided that I was going to interview him to see whether it would be worth it to call him as a witness. He had not been contacted yet and he had not been subpenaed," Madigan said.

Roselli, who had been subpenaed, did testify for the first time four days after Giancana was shot.

That committee was headed by Sen. Frank Church and has since been replaced by a newly formed committee headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii) and Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.). In its final report, that former committee strongly urged the new committee to continue the investigation of covert CIA activity as well as connections between the Castro assassination plot and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

HART SAID FRIDAY there are still unanswered questions about Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, particularly relating to the so-called "retaliation theory" — that Castro or pro-Castro agents had JFK killed because of the CIA attempts on Castro's life.

Hart interviewed Roselli twice as a member of the former committee and he is also a member of the new Intelligence Committee.

"Roselli was very candid but he did not volunteer information," Hart said.

Committee investigators said Friday they have found no link between Roselli and Eugene M. Carrafa, a Rockville, Md., antique auto dealer with reported organized crime connections who died under circumstances mysteriously coincidental to Roselli's death.

Carrafa, 37, was reported missing by his wife on July 28, the same day Roselli was last seen by his sister in Plantation with whom he had lived for three years.

Caraffa's body floated to the surface of New York Harbor off Staten Island on Aug. 4, his body wrapped in a padlocked chain and weighted by two 15-pound boat anchors. Police said he had been strangled. Roselli had been asphyxiated, possibly by strangling, according to investigators here.

New York City detectives said that Caraffa "knew Giancana" but they have not been able to pin down a motive in his death.

The Washington Star, quoting an unidentified FBI source, reported that Caraffa had met with Roselli in Chicago about two months ago.

Roselli Probe

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

Sen. Gary Hart (D., Colo.) made an unannounced trip to Miami Friday for a private meeting with homicide detectives to underscore the strong interest of the Senate Select Intelligence Committee in the John Roselli murder investigation and to insure that federal agencies cooperate with local police.

The FBI was ordered into the case last week by Attorney General Edward Levi after pressure from the Senate committee.

"We're not here to solve the crime," Hart said, "we want to find out if there is any connection between (Roselli's) death and his testimony before the Committee.

HART SAID he also hoped to meet with local officials of the FBI and Immigration and Naturalization Service, [illegible]

Roselli, 71, organized crime figure who testified three times before the Senate Intelligence Committee in the past year about his recruitment by the CIA in a plot to kill Fidel Castro, was found dead two weeks ago, stuffed in an oil drum floating in Dumfoundling Bay.

Hart made it clear that the Intelligence Committee is concerned about the possibility that Roselli's death is connected to his testimony, although he did say there was no "evidence" indicating Roselli might have been killed to prevent him from talking about other CIA — organized crime pacts.

"I know of no plans whatsoever to have him come back," Hart said, "but that's not to say we wouldn't have called him back if some new facts arose."

"But it would be reaching to say we had some indication ... he had (not yet testified about) evidence important to us," Hart said.

284

THE MURDER of Roselli, who last testified in April, renewed Intelligence Committee interest in the death of Chicago organized crime leader Sam (Momo) Giancana. Giancana was shot to death in his home in June of 1975, just a ta time when Intelligence Committee investigators were tracking him down.

Accompanying Hart Friday was Michael Madigan, a committee attorney who, in June of 1975, was preparing to interview Giancana about his involvement with Roselli in the Castro plot.

Giancana and Tampa organized crime figure Santo Trafficante played "accompanying roles" in the CIA-inspired Castro assassination plot, another committee staff member traveling with Hart said Friday.

The committee had also "considered" subpenaing Trafficante, the staff investigator said, but Trafficante was never called because the Committee considered Roselli's testimony the most important.

CHICAGO-AREA investigators concluded that Giancana's death was part of an internal gangland struggle.

Nevertheless, Hart told The Herald Friday that with Roselli's death, "troubling questions" about Giancana's murder linger. "The coincidences begin to string themselves together," said the 1972 presidential campaign manager for George McGovern.

Asked if he was satisfied with the conclusions of investigators that Giancana's death was not connected to his potential testimony before the committee, Hart said "there is the absence of any corroborating evidence which prevents

Turn to Page 28 Col. 4

Visits Local Officials

FROM PAGE 1B

us from moving beyond speculation."

Madigan said the widespread reports after Giancana's death that his appearance before the committee was imminent were not true. That further indicates, he agreed, that Giancana's death was not directly related to his past CIA association.

"WE FINALLY got Giancana's home number the day he was killed," Madigan said Friday. "We had some difficulty tracking him down in Houston (where Giancana had been in the hospital). It had been decided that I was going to interview him to see whether it would be worth it to call him as a witness. He had not been contacted yet and he had not been subpenaed," Madigan said.

Roselli, who had been subpenaed, did testify for the first time four days after Giancana was shot.

That committee was headed by Sen. Frank Church and has since been replaced by a newly formed committee headed by Sen. Daniel Inouye (D., Hawaii) and Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.). In its final report, that former committee strongly urged the new committee to continue the investigation of covert CIA activity as well as connections between the Castro assassination plot and the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

HART SAID FRIDAY there are still unanswered questions about Lee Harvey Oswald's motive, particularly relating to the so-called "retaliation theory" — that Castro or pro-Castro agents had JFK killed because of the CIA attempts on Castro's life.

Hart interviewed Roselli twice as a member of the former committee and he is also a member of the new Intelligence Committee.

"Roselli was very candid but he did not volunteer information," Hart said.

Committee investigators said Friday they have found no link between Roselli and Eugene M. Carrafa, a Rockville, Md., antique auto dealer with reported organized crime connections who died under circumstances mysteriously coincidental to Roselli's death.

Carrafa, 37, was reported missing by his wife on July 28, the same day Roselli was last seen by his sister in Plantation with whom he had lived for three years.

Caraffa's body floated to the surface of New York Harbor off Staten Island on Aug. 4, his body wrapped in a padlocked chain and weighted by two 15-pound boat anchors. Police said he had been strangled. Roselli had been asphyxiated, possibly by strangling, according to investigators here.

New York City detectives said that Caraffa "knew Giancana" but they have not been able to pin down a motive in his death.

The Washington Star, quoting an unidentified FBI source, reported that Caraffa had met with Roselli in Chicago about two months ago.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Michael Madigan

August 13, 1976

I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli's testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and his attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that I would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity. During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion, stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying. He was worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his relatives with whom he was living in Florida. I cannot recall Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana's death), refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos Trafficante by name. In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.

It is my recollection that on at least one occasion, in the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Rosselli told the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying before the Committee. I am uncertain in my recollection as to whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview room or elsewhere.

Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his exact address in Florida for reasons of safety. It is also my recollection that Rosselli's demeanor was visibly affected whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus on Santos Trafficante.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Michael Madigan
August 13, 1976

I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli's testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and his attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that I would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity. During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion, stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying. He was worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his relatives with whom he was living in Florida. I cannot recall Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana's death), refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos Trafficante by name. In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.

It is my recollection that on at least one occasion, in the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Rosselli told the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying before the Committee. I am uncertain in my recollection as to whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview room or elsewhere.

Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his exact address in Florida for reasons of safety. It is also my recollection that Rosselli's demmanor was visibly affected whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus on Santos Trafficante.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Michael Madigan

August 13, 1976

I recently discussed with Agent Richard Taylor of the Federal Bureau of Investigation my recollections of pre-testimony interviews with Mr. John Rosselli prior to Rosselli's testifying under oath in June of 1975. It is my recollection that there were several meetings between myself, as counsel for the Committee, and Rosselli and his attorneys. Rosselli and his attorneys expressed on numerous occasions fear for the well-being of Rosselli. They insisted and the Committee agreed that I would conduct interviews prior to the sworn testimony at a location away from the Senate so as to avoid any publicity. During these interviews Rosselli, on more than one occasion, stated that he was taking a great risk in testifying. He was worried about retaliation and particularly worried about his relatives with whom he was living in Florida. I cannot recall Rosselli specifying exactly who he was most afraid of, but he declined to testify about Giancana (until after Giancana's death), refused to identify any of the Cubans who were involved in assassination plots, and was reluctant to mention Santos Trafficante by name. In fact, I cannot recall Rosselli ever mentioning Trafficante by name and only very vaguely responding to questions if the questioner used the name Trafficante.

It is my recollection that on at least one occasion, in the presence of Senator Howard H. Baker, Jr., Rosselli told the Senator that he, Rosselli, was concerned for his safety and his life and that he was risking his well-being by testifying before the Committee. I am uncertain in my recollection as to whether that conversation took place up in the Senate interview room or elsewhere.

Throughout his testimony Rosselli declined to give his exact address in Florida for reasons of safety. It is also my recollection that Rosselli's demeanor was visibly affected whenever testimony or interview focused or attempted to focus on Santos Trafficante.

MEMORANDUM

To: Rick Inderfurth
From: Mike Madigan
Date: August 13, 1976
Re: Miami Interviews

I spoke with Senator Hart today about setting up interviews in Miami for Friday, August 20, in the Rosselli matter. He will be calling you about these arrangements.

I will try to have a subpoena for Santos Trafficante signed by Senator Baker before he leaves for the convention. We, however must obtain the approval of all or a majority of the members of the Committee (under the Rules) to issue the subpoena. Therefore, I have asked Martha to poll members on two questions:

(1) Authority to issue a subpoena for Trafficante;

(2) Authority for Senator Hart to disclose to the Miami police investigators in the Rosselli case those portions of the classified Rosselli related transcripts which he deems relevant to the murder investigation.

In case we miss connections, the relevant people involved are:

(1) Bill Lynch -- head of the Justice Organized Crime Section, telephone number 739-3516 (he should help us locate Trafficante and perhaps have a

suggestion as to how best to serve him with a subpoena);

(2) Detectives Wolf and Zatrepallek -- Dade County Sheriff's Office, telephone number 305-547-7456 (they are the detectives investigating the Rosselli murder for the locals). (I have been putting them off about whether they can have access to the transcripts -- you need to talk to Bill Miller and Gary about this);

(3) Paul Daly -- you may have to go through him if we need the FBI to locate Trafficante.

By the time you return I will have taken preparatory steps to set up interviews with the Miami police people as well as begun an effort to locate Trafficante. After talking with Gary you will need to follow up and confirm all these next week as I will be in Kansas City from Monday through Thursday. I will be flying from Kansas City to Miami on Thursday night for the interviews on Friday. You can reach me through the numbers that either Bill Miller or Marie has. We need to talk at some point next week to confirm all this.

WX POST 8/12/76

The Washington Post

AN INDEPENDENT NEWSPAPER

Who Killed John Roselli?

WE'RE GOING TO tell you a little story now. Once there was a President who was murdered. His brother was murdered too. A long time after they died some very strange facts came to light. It turned out that while they were running the government, the government was trying to get two Mafia mobsters to arrange the murder of someone else—the head of a small, hostile neighbor state. It also turned out that one brother—the one who was President—apparently had a girlfriend who was the girlfriend as well of the mobsters. And one of the mobsters, whose nickname was Momo, was prominent on the list of criminals the President's brother was trying to put in jail. The story may sound complicated, but life is complicated, and the complications in this case got even more so. For when a committee of the Congress wanted the two mobsters to come and tell them something about all this, only one of them—the one named Johnny— came. The other one, Momo, was murdered in his house a week before they wanted him to testify. Johnny, however, told his story to one committee in the Congress and then came back—quietly—to tell some more things to another committee which was in fact looking into the murder of the President. Then Johnny went to Florida. Then no one could find him. Then some fishermen found him. Dead. In an oil drum.

But we haven't told you the strangest part of all yet, the part you're really not going to believe. It is that when the great national political community of solons, scribes, policemen, spies and managers of the general wellbeing heard about poor Johnny, they said: "Oh, my goodness." Some of them went farther, of course. They said: "Fancy that!" But most of them didn't say anything at all except: "Yawn."

Forgive us for lapsing into storybookese. We do it for a reason which is that the simple unadorned facts of the John and Robert Kennedy-Fidel Castro-CIA-Mafia-Momo Giancana-Johnny Roselli-Judith Exner-Church Committee-Schweiker Committee saga need to be put forward in stark outline for their magnitude to be understood. Is it really, as the sophisticated wisdom goes, "paranoid" on our part to brood about the suggestive and possibly monstrous interconnections between all these facts and to wonder why they are not the object of intense press and government scrutiny? What accounts for the general indifference in high places? What accounts for the eagerness with which we all seem to accept that familiar tipoff that we shall be hearing no more about the latest crime—i.e., the pronouncement that Mr. Roselli's dispatch to an oil drum and Beyond had "all the earmarks of a gangland slaying." Those are the good old "earmarks" we only hear about when it is next to certain that we shall hear nothing more.

The supposition of course is that the Gang which runs gangland has its reasons and its methods and that, disagreeable as these may be, they really lie outside the proper realm of public concern because they amount to a system of justice which 1) only affects those dumb enough to get involved in it in the first place and 2) tends only to punish those who have committed what the rest of us would regard as heinous crimes anyway. Not that these are things people say—they're things people can be expected to assume. But we think in this case the assumptions have even less validity than they would have on a clear day, which isn't much. And that is because if we know anything, we know that the Mafia operations in which Messers. Giancana and Roselli figured had become intertwined with the operations of the United States government. Never mind that the decisions of the early 1960s which made this so may rank among the most abominable decisions ever taken in the U.S. government. The plain fact is that, given the provocative and suggestive history of the two men, it is not possible for either Congress or the Executive Branch to look the other way or to complaisantly accept the earmarks-of-a-gangland-slaying bromide.

After Mr. Giancana was killed, the Church Committee inquired of the FBI whether its proposed meeting with him had figured in his murder. The FBI reported that it had no evidence to this effect. The then-director of the CIA, William Colby, felt obliged to state that the CIA had had nothing to do with the murder—and Mr. Colby likewise pronounced the other day that he was certain the CIA had not done in Mr. Roselli. The mere fact that the questions, to which these were meant to be the answers, had been raised tells us, anyway, that much more in the way of inquiry is wanted. The newly formed Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has now asked the Justice Department to make an investigation of Mr. Roselli's death. We think the Department should comply and that the investigation, despite FBI Director Clarence Kelley's disclaimer of jurisdiction, should have the Attorney General's personal attention. Such attention is needed because of the elaborate and not entirely reassuring history of relationships between the FBI and the CIA and the various participants in the whole sorry saga. We are not suggesting that any agency of government—or even any of those agency's fringe retainers —were the murderers. We are suggesting that there is an overlay of potentially embarrassing information sufficiently pervasive to keep an awful lot of people from wanting to have this thing aired. We also think that the Select Committee should reserve the right to pursue the matter. Congress, after all, can hardly be expected to sit idly by while its witnesses are being done in. Nor do we see how the public in general and the political establishment in particular can turn their attention away until we are all satisfied that a much greater effort has been made by the government—which means both the Executive Branch and the Congress—to discover what elements were at play in this series of appalling crimes and scandals.

The Data From M

DR. HAROLD KLEIN one of the scientists work- and our best theories

ROSSELLI CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

1955 Meets Maheu at insurance friend's home.

1960 Late July/early August. Maheu calls. Working for government. Recruit Rosselli only. Meet Brown Derby, L.A., for lunch. Long talk about project in Cuba. Rosselli wants verification.

2nd meeting, L.A., discuss further details, no discussion of specific techniques. Plan to meet in N.Y. for verification.

Sept. 14, 1960. First meeting in N.Y. at old Plaza Hotel. Rosselli introduced by Maheu to O'Connell. Rosselli "knew" O'Connell worked for the CIA. Rosselli agrees to work on Cuban project.

Sept. 25, 1960. Maheu and Rosselli travel to Miami to begin making contact with Cubans to be recruited for mission.

(Between Sept. 25 and the Bay of Pigs, a series of recruitments, meetings, and arrangements were made. The following is an outline of events that is not necessarily in chronological order.)

-- Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Trafficante. Meeting where Maheu is introduced to Giancana. Giancana was, according to Rosselli, to only be a "back up man." Rosselli states Giancana had nothing to do with the actual operation. Trafficante was used, according to Rosselli, as a translator.

-- Meeting with O'Connell, Maheu, Rosselli, ~~and two Admirals to~~ discuss the Cuban project.

-- Rosselli, in his contact with the Cubans, "invents" the cover story that he represents some Wall Street business interests who want to see Castro eliminated. Rosselli trusts Cubans he has recruited because they are part of the Bay of Pigs operation.

-- 1st attempt at assassination involved the use of pills. Maheu and Rosselli met with Cuban #1 and #2 (?). Maheu opened up his briefcase and gave the pills with instructions for their use to Cuban #1. Maheu also had $10,000 he gave the Cubans for doing the project. Rosselli did not know of the money. Rosselli states he received no remuneration for his work on the project, in fact, he paid out $800 for gas for a speed boat to deliver two or three man parties for guerrilla raids into Cuba.

-- Prior to Bay of Pigs there was no discussion of using guns to assassinate Castro.

-- Rosselli's cover name was "John Ralston."

-- At different times, Cuban #1, #2, or #3 would propose different projects. These would range from using plastic explosives to booby trapping Castro's desk. Rosselli would relay these on to Maheu, who, in turn, would contact the CIA. Most projects were vetoed, but the CIA did supply a short wave radio to the Cubans in Florida, to try and make contact with their people in Havana.

-- Eventually, Rosselli felt the project had failed. There was no specific point when it was announced. But, at sometime Rosselli assumed the project, for whatever reason, had not succeeded.

CHRONOLOGY
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)

DATE	EVENT OR ITEM	SOURCE (Where Necessary)
1959	Richard Bissel becomes DDP (head of Plans Directorate)	
October 1960	Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor to Giancana, and (b) done by Rosselli)	Date and Rosselli role from Government Opposition paper to Rosselli motion for reduction in sentence, 1971
1961 Feb.	Lumumba mysteriously killed during Congolese strife.	Wash.Post & Star contemporaneous accounts
	News reports of CIA consideration of Lumumba plot, but claim it was done by others,e.g. Belgians?	Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by Lardener and Greider Tab A
Early 1961	Attempts to kill Castro before Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli team	Jack Anderson 1967, 1971 and 1975 columns; Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961	Bay of Pigs Landing	
May 31, 1961	Trujillo assassinated; charge of U.S. involvement	Jack Anderson column (1/19/71) on Smathers coversation with JFK. Agee book (obviously suspect in some respects)
Rest of 1961 and 1962	Possibly ongoing efforts to Kill Castro by Rosselli team	last attempt by Rosselli team in 1963,infra.
Sometime in early 1960's	RFK quashes prosecution of Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap	Watergate memcons on Keeney and Wilson interviews
October 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for background reference)	
Early 1963	Rosselli training a team in Miami area	Wash. Post Greider/Lardener story,supra., states Army Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963	Rosselli's last effort to kill Castro	J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in 1963	RFK stopped further efforts	J. Anderson 1971 columns
November 1963	Diem killed in Saigon coup JFK told Smathers later he thought CIA involved	J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
	Colby head of DDP Far East Division at the time	articles on Colby
Early 1964	Howard Hunt and others from Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on another Castro assassination	reported by Tad Szulc in book on Howard Hunt (1974)

(more on Hunt Castro project)

	Assassination alleged to have been planned as part of a smaller invasion effortand preparations were allegedly made in Costa Rica	Szulc,supra
May 1965	Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when Dominican Republic strife broke out (scheme also allegedly involved McCord, Barker and Sturgis)	" "
May 1965 (or later)	As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ asked Helms if CIA had ever been involved in assassination (of a leader) and Helms said "no".	Katzenbach testimony to Senate Select Committ
1966	CIA poisoning plot ag'l Haitian Pres. Duvalier; bombing palace in '68	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1967	Rosselli indicted for alien law and interstate gambling crimes (Friars Club card game rigging)	Government Opposition to sentence reduction, supra.
March 3 1967	First Anderson column on Rosselli	We dont have, but Andersc referred to in Hersh NY Times story 3/10/75
	In response to Anderson story, RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman he shut it off;	Hersh story,supra
1968	CIA bombing Haitian palace	Anderson col., 4/7/75
1968	Rosselli sentenced to 5 years	Government Opposition,
Early 1969	Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for Justice Dept. Rosselli file	Keeney Watergate memcon
1970	Rosselli goes before grand jury under immunity re:Giancana	Government Opposition,sup
1971 Jan.18	First of three Anderson columns	
Jan.19	Maheu [redacted] (scheduled to go before grand jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls AG John Mitchell	Lenzner memo to SenErvin on Rosselli (and phone l
	Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties	" "
Jan. 27	Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson on Rosselli matter	" "
Feb.1	Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was involved in covert activity for CIA in early 1960's	" "
	Rosselli files motion for reduction in sentence, citing Anderson stories and presenting memorandum to Court	

CHRONOLOGY
(ALLEGATIONS AND REPORTS OF ANY U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN ASSASSINATIONS)

DATE	EVENT OR ITEM	SOURCE (Where Necessary)
1959	Richard Bissel becomes DDP (head of Plans Directorate)	
October 1960	Tap on Dan Rowan phone in Las Vegas (allegedly: (a) favor to Giancana, and (b) done by Rosselli)	Date and Rosselli role from Government Opposition paper to Rosselli motion for reduction in sentence, 1971
1961 Feb.	Lumumba mysteriously killed during Congolese strife.	Wash.Post & Star contemporaneous accounts
	News reports of CIA consideration of Lumumba plot, but claim it was done by others,e.g. Belgians?	Wash. Post 2/6/75 story by Lardener and Greider Tab A
Early 1961	Attempts to kill Castro before Bay of Pigs landing by Rosselli team	Jack Anderson 1967, 1971 and 1975 columns; Watergate Helms memcon
April 1961	Bay of Pigs Landing	
May 31, 1961	Trujillo assassinated; charge of U.S. involvement	Jack Anderson column (1/19/71) on Smathers coversation with JFK. Agee book (obviously suspect in some respects)
Rest of 1961 and 1962	Possibly ongoing efforts to Kill Castro by Rosselli team	last attempt by Rosselli team in 1963,infra.
Sometime in early 1960's	RFK quashes prosecution of Giancana for Rowan Las Vegas tap	Watergate memcons on Keeney and Wilson interviews
October 1962	Cuban Missile Crisis -(date for background reference)	
Early 1963	Rosselli training a team in Miami area	Wash. Post Greider/Lardener story,supra., states Army Ranger Capt Ayres saw him.
March 1963	Rosselli's last effort to kill Castro	J. Anderson 1971 columns
Sometime in 1963	RFK stopped further efforts	J. Anderson 1971 columns
November 1963	Diem killed in Saigon coup JFK told Smathers later he thought CIA involved	J. Anderson, 1/19/71 column
	Colby head of DDP Far East Division at the time	articles on Colby
Early 1964	Howard Hunt and others from Bay of Pigs effort begin plot on another Castro assassination	reported by Tad Szulc in book on Howard Hunt (1974)

(more on Hunt Castro project)

	Assassination alleged to have beenplanned as part of a smaller invasion effortand preparations were allegedly made in Costa Rica	Szulc,supra
May 1965	Hunt Castro scheme "aborted when Dominican Republic strife broke out (scheme also allegedly involved McCord, Barker and Sturgis)	" "
May 1965 (or later)	As Katzenbach/Helms/LBJ meeting on Domincan Republic ended, LBJ asked Helms if CIA had ever been involved in assassination (of a leader) and Helms said "no"	Katzenbach testimony to Senate Select Committ
1967	Rosselli indicted for alien law and interstate gambling crimes (Friars Club card game rigging)	Government Opposition to sentence reduction, supra.
March 3 1967	First Anderson column on Rosselli	We dont have, but Anderso referred to in Hersh NY Times story 3/10/75
	In response to Anderson story, RFK tells Walinsky and Edelman he shut it off;	Hersh story,supra
1968	Rosselli sentenced to 5 years	Government Opposition,
Early 1969	Asst. Atty Gen Wilson asks for Justice Dept. Rosselli file	Keeney Watergate memcon
1970	Rosselli goes before grand jury under immunity re:Giancana	Government Opposition,supr
1971 Jan.18	First of three Anderson columns	
Jan.19	Mayhu (scheduled to go before grand jury on Las Vegas skimming) calls AG John Mitchell	Lenzner memo to SenErvin on Rosselli (and phone lc
	Same day: Haldeman asks Dean to inquire into Hughes/O'Brien/Maheu ties	" "
Jan. 27	Maheu interviewed by Wilson and Peterson on Rosselli matter	" "
Feb.1	Caulfield to Dean memo that Maheu was involved in covert activity for CIA in early 1960's	" "
	Rosselli files motion for reduction in sentence, citing Anderson stories and presenting memorandum to Court	

1961 After the Bay of Pigs (April 1961)

Rosselli felt "sorry for the poor bastards left on the beach." ~~Rosselli felt indirectly responsible for their deaths since he had encouraged many of them to participate in the invasion.~~ Two or three weeks after the invasion, Rosselli was contacted in Los Angeles by O'Connell, a meeting was arranged for at the airport hotel in Miami. Rosselli went there and was introduced to Harvey. O'Connell said Harvey was now in charge of the Cuban project. Harvey told Rosselli he was to cease all contact with Maheu and Giancana. Further, Harvey stated that the government was still interested in using Rosselli for intelligence-gathering operations. Rosselli would report information from the Cubans to Harvey about personalities and events in Cuba. Rosselli would also relay on to his Cuban contacts requests for specific information from the CIA.

Sometime between the Bay of Pigs invasion and the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey gave Rosselli six poison capsules. Rosselli, in turn, gave them to his Cuban contacts who were to take them to Cuba, where another Cuban or Cubans would use them to assassinate Castro. Rosselli never learned the details of what happened, but the project obviously failed. At one point, Rosselli remembers hearing over the radio that Castro was very ill. A short time later, he recovered.

Sometime before the missile crisis, Rosselli arranged, pursuant to Cuban #1 request, for a van loaded with rifles and ammunition to be delivered in Florida. O'Connell and Rosselli watched the Cuban contact pick up the van and return it empty. Rosselli assumed that these guns were going to be used by the two or three-man raiding parties in Cuba to assassinate Castro and overthrow the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

Rowan Tap

Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the second was that there was a real intelligence value in that Maheu was afraid that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dubois or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were mad that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Rosselli arranged to have a man with a green carnation in his lapel meet and transfer the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers. Rosselli knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

Howard

See me

MEMORANDUM

To: Gary

From: Rick

Date: August 10, 1976

Subject: Roselli

First, some background information. Yesterday, August 9, Senators Inouye and Baker met with Directors Kelley and Bush to discuss Roselli's death. The FBI doesn't want to touch this with a ten-foot pole. At the meeting, Jim Adams told Inouye and Baker that the FBI had been told by Justice (Richard Thornburg) that it had no jurisdiction in this case. Levi had, apparently, not been consulted. Senators Baker and Inouye (especially Baker) requested Kelley to take this up directly with Levi. Today, a letter was sent to Levi, signed by Baker and Inouye, urging Justice to authorize FBI involvement. A copy of that letter is attached.

One other point about the meeting. George Bush was extremely upset about this case and the allegations that the CIA was involved in Roselli's death. He said that he would personally contact Levi to request that the Department grant jurisdiction to the FBI to investigate.

For your information, Roselli appeared before the Committee on four separate occasions to testify on three matters. He appeared on June 25 to discuss the plots against Castro; on September 20 and 22 to discuss the Campbell affair; and on April 25 to discuss the retaliation theory.

Now for current events. First, the two detectives in Miami handling the Roselli case are Detectives Zatrefralek and Wolf. They are with Dade County Homicide. Their numbers are 305-547-7456 and 547-7923. Madigan has already talked with Detective Wolf. Second, in light of the Inouye/Baker letter to Levi I did not ask the FBI about the current whereabouts of Santo Trafficante. I did, however, ask CIA. They have no information. Third, Baker and Liebengood are putting together a packet of information on Roselli, which will include CIA and Select Committee information and will get this to you tomorrow.

I think you already know this, but Senator Baker does want to launch an informal investigation into this matter. Roselli told him, when he appeared before the Committee, that he thought his life was in danger for testifying. Baker feels a moral obligation, therefore, to look into this.

I have attached the most recent articles on the Roselli death for you.

P.S. A couple of grizzly facts: Over the past few years there have been quite a few anti-Castro deaths in the Miami area. Car bombs and shootings have been the usual means of death. Second, we received a report today that another body was pulled up in the Hudson River. Another gangland slaying, complete with cement and chains.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: TO THE FILES

FROM: PATRICK SHEA AND MICHAEL MADIGAN

DATE: JUNE 21, 1975

SUBJECT: SUMMARY OF A MEE~~T~~TING WITH MR. JOHN ROSSELLI
BEGAN AT ~~1~~11:35 a.m., JUNE 21, 1975, IN ROOM 711 of the WATERGATE HOTEL

PRESENT AT THE SESSION: MR. MICHAEL MADIGAN, MR. PATRICK SHEA OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE STAFF, MR. ROSSELLI, MR. THOMAS WADDEN, MR. JAMES CANTILLON, MR. LESLIE SCHERR.

At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Madigan asked Mr. Rosselli if he felt a need for any protection. He stated, emphatically, "No," that he was able to take care of himself. Mr. Madigan made it clear that the Senate Select Committee could provide U.S. Marshalls for Mr. Rosselli during his stay in Washington. [illegible] This offer was rejected.

Mr. Rosselli stated that Giancan~~n~~a had no involvement, to his knowledge, with any of the attempted assassinations of Fidel Castro. Maheu did deal with higher authorities in government but stated that Rosselli was only the contact, Giancana has a backup man. Rosselli was very concerned about the adverse publicity in recent times, about the CIA and he thought it was unfortunate from the Agency's point of view that the Giancana name had been linked to the Agency.

Rosselli was upset by the harassment he had been under by the FBI. He pointed to the 1966 Frier Club incident as an example. He said in 1966 he had been approached by the FBI to provide information on inside basis about organized crime and when he had refused 18 months later he was indicted. Again, the first week in June of 1970, the FBI had offered him cooperation but he refused.

Rosselli first met Maheu twenty years ago. He was introduced through a life long friend who is dead now, named Spitzle, who was in the insurance business. This first meeting happened in Los Angeles, in 1955. Maheu, at the time, was running Maheu Associates in Washington, D.C. The meeting was only a social gathering. There was nothing specifically discussed about activities of the CIA.

At the meeting

In July or August, (1960) Maheu called Rosselli and stated that he was working for the government and had been specifically asked to recruit Rosselli. Maheu ~~xxx~~ stressed that it was to be Rosselli and no one else. They agreed to meet for lunch at the Brown Derby in Los Angeles. Maheu described the project as an intelligence operation involving Cuba. Maheu mentioned specifically Castro, Che Guevara, and Raoul Castro. It was Rosselli's feeling that Maheu had recruited him because of his known Cuban connections in Florida. These connections were unrelated to gambling. There was no money mentioned by Maheu to Rosselli for payment for services.

The alleged support of Wall Street business men had not been mentioned and was a cover invented by Rosselli later. At the end of their first meeting, they agreed to meet again at which time Maheu would verify to Rosselli that he was working for the government. This verification would be by introducing a government official ~~of higher authority~~ to Rosselli.

1st Phase ↓ Pre-Bay of Pigs ↓

The second meeting ~~xxx~~ occurred a week or ten days later. At this point, Rosselli was instructed to proceed to New York for an introduction to the government official. ~~He~~ At both the first and second meetings Maheu + Ros talked ~~asked~~ for an hour or more about ~~and~~ various aspects of the proposed ~~aspects of~~ projects, ~~were discussed but nothing was~~ mentioned of specific techniques.

There was no

Rosselli ~~second~~ went to NYC.

Rosselli remembered his arrival in New York: ~~xiting~~ coinciding with a visit ~~x~~ by Eisenhower, Castro, Nasser, and perhaps Krushev. He said it was noteworthy because New York was crawling with officials from all over the world. Rosselli paid his own fare from Los Angeles to New York and stayed at the old Plaza Hotel on Fifth Avenue and 57th Street. He was given the cover name, John Ralston.

[Khrushchev]

The meeting in New York took place in a hotel room. In attendance were Maheu, Rosselli and "big" Jim O'Connell, and two or three other people who did not explain why they were there. Jim O'Connell was introduced as a CIA official. Rosselli was unclear as to whether this was stated explicitly or whether through the whole context of discussions it became clear that he worked for the CIA. At this point, Rosselli was satisfied that Maheu was working for the government and, therefore, agreed to work ~~at~~ on the Cuban mission described at their first meeting. Rosselli was not sure as to the length of his stay in New York at this time. He did remember going to lunch with Maheu a number of times and talking about the particular projects. ?

After his stay in New York, he traveled to either Washington, D. C. or Florida. He was uncertain as to the exact location but he did remember there were series of meetings between himself and Maheu to discuss further plans ~~xx~~ about the attempted assassination. There was only one further meeting with O'Connell, involving these preliminary stages. At this point, he only discussed techniques of assassination with Maheu. Rosselli remembered staying in Maheu's Falls Church home(it had a tennis court)during his stays in Washington. There still had been no discussion of the cover story(that Rosselli was a private citizen representing a group of private businessmen from ~~the~~ New York.) //

When Rosselli reached Florida, he made his contacts with the Cubans and then arranged for the Cubans to meet with Maheu. He trusted the Cubans he came in contact with because they, according to themselves, were working on the Bay of Pigs operation, which had not occurred as of yet. There were times when they would stay at Arthur Godfrey's hotel, the Kenilworth Hotel, in Florida. At times he registered under the name Rollins. This was to allow him to maintain his cover while Maheu, still working for Hughes, was able to register under his own name, so that Hughes believed that he was doing his work. The operation went on in terms of Rosselli arranging meetings with his Cuban contacts and then having further discussions about specifics with Maheu. At times, O'Connell, from the CIA, would visit with Maheu and Rosselli. One time, before the 1960 election, O'Connell brought with him two Admirals, one of whom, Rosselli thinks, was retired. ① ??

At this point, Rosselli ~~also~~ was telling his Cuban contacts the cover story, namely that he represented private business interests in New York who were interested in seeing Castro done away with. The Cubans, at this point, had not met with Jim O'Connell, but had met with Maheu. Immediately after the Bay of Pigs, Maheu left and Rosselli only met once more with O'Connell. Then he also left for the West Coast. ~~The~~

The two attempts at assassination, both involved the use of pills. One attempt was before the Bay of Pigs and the other was sometime after. The first means was to use a capsule filled with a special poison that could be spilled into the food of Castro and cause him to die of poisoning that was not traceable and made his death look like a heart attack or by natural causes. Rosselli contacted a little Cuban whose relative was a chef for Castro. At this time, Cubans could still travel between Florida and Cuba. It was agreed that the CIA would manufacture the poison capsule. It would be turned over to O'Connell, to Maheu, to Rosselli, and then ~~from Rosselli~~ to the Cubans. ¶ Maheu brought the capsule to Florida to the Fontainebleu Hotel. The Cubans came ~~up~~ to the room, Maheu opened ~~up his brief case~~, with Rosselli and the Cubans present, and gave them capsule, plus $10,000 dollars. The money had come from the CIA and was considered partial payment for the job of assassinating Castro. At this meeting, Maheu described the method of using these capsules, making sure the Cubans understood ~~the Cubans understood~~ they could not be put in food that was boiled. ~~or other aspects of using these pills.~~ There was no discussions with the Cubans, at this meeting, about $250,000 dollars. That figure was used by Maheu after his first meeting with the Cubans~~,~~ to describe~~d~~ what the ~~x~~ CIA might put up to help the families of men injured or killed in this project should it fail ~~attempted assassination.~~ Rosselli thinks that the meeting with the money and capsules was after the election. ¶ The number one Cuban contact that Rosselli had would from time to time, make requests of Rosselli to be relayed on to the CIA for equipment. The CIA did provide, for instance, a short wave radio, which was supposed to be used by the Cubans in Florida to contact Cubans in Cuba about the success or failure of the poison pill mission. Rosselli was sure that the pills were sent to Cuba but he has received no explanation as to what happened.

#1

how many pills →

✓

Another project was for the Cubans to receive plastic explosives from the CIA and give them to frogmen on their side that in turn would place them on ships in Havana harbor and blow them up. The CIA refused to do this because of the ease with which plastic explosives could be traced back to the government agencies such as the CIA. Maheu did ~~dixxxxxx~~ discuss the use of cigars that would make Castro's hair drop off. ¶ According to Rosselli, Maheu thought this would have Castro lose his ability to govern the country. Another proposal was that there be a booby trapped desk. Each of these latter two projects were proposed by Cuban refugees who said they had people in positions vis a vis Castro who could achieve the assassination.

#2

✓ Prior to the Bay of Pigs, there was no discussion of guns. Rosselli claimed to have a better idea than Maheu, namely that with far fewer men than were involved in the Bay of Pigs, perhaps a hundred, they could land in Cuba and do the job successfully. Rosselli's Cuban contact at the time was traveling to New York and New Orleans for meetings. Rosselli was not sure about what the meetings were about but said that they were related to the overthrow of Castro. Another proposal put forward was to ✓ purchase a speed boat and use some ~~type of exploding seashell to kill Castro.~~

NO

The night before the Bay of Pigs Rosselli went to his number one Cuban's house and spoke with him. The Cuban contact said, "See you in Havana." Rosselli expressed serious reservation about the possibility of success for the operation. Rosselli left Florida right after the Bay of Pigs. His total time on this particular attempt at assassination in Florida was three or four months.

Rosselli felt sorry for "the poor bastards left on the beach." He felt indirectly responsible for having encouraged ~~them~~ many of them to participate in the operation. He went home and stayed in Las Vegas and Los Angeles for awhile. A few weeks after the Bay of Pigs, Rosselli was contacted by Maheu or O'Connell, he's not sure. He did meet with Jim O'Connell in Florida a few weeks later. They had arranged to have rooms at the Airport Hotel. Rosselli was not sure as to ~~what his name,~~ what name he registered under, but at this meeting in Florida he met a new CIA man, named Harvey. The first time he ~~Xxxxxx~~ met Harvey, Rosselli was told

Post-Bay of Pigs ↓

2d Phase

Harvey wanted to know all that Rosselli knew about Cuba ~~in~~ on an intelligence line. Harvey told him at ~~thextime~~ this meeting to have no further contact with~~xxx~~ Maheu and that he should not talk further with Giancana. He also said that he, Harvey, was in charge of the operation and ~~that Maheu should take, or~~ that Rosselli should take his orders from Harvey. At this point the original project, using pills, was considered defunct.

After this first meeting with Harvey, Rosselli again contacted his Cuban people. ~~He made several trips, that is,~~ Rosselli made several trips with Harvey in Florida, some down in the Keys to see what type of operations were continuing. One of the projects Harvey had Rosselli doing was verifying CIA reports by using Rosselli's own people who were in frequent contact with Cuba. The intelligence reports dealt both with personalities ~~in~~ with the Cuban hierarchy, as well as differentongoing operations. Rosselli paid his own bills ~~xxx~~ before the Bay of Pigs but after, Harvey would usually pick up the tab.

Harvey approached Rosselli with the proposed mission to try ~~it~~ for a second time to assassinate ~~Cuba[?]~~ Castro. Harvey said that the new ~~x~~pills would really work and were much stronger. Harvey gave Rosselli six pills, then Rosselli gave those six pills to his Cuban contact. There were no special instructions on how to handle the pills and his Cuban contact said that they would be passed into Cuba and used.

re-inforce →

At this time, Rosselli had no ongoing contact with Maheu, but may have run into him in Los Angeles. Maheu knew that Rosselli was still working on the Cuban project and that he, Maheu, was out. Rosselli never got any report back on what happened to the six pills but he assumed that they had been unsuccessful. He did hear a ~~xxxxx~~ report over a radio or TV station, that Fidel Castro was deathly ill, but then, shortly thereafter, he recovered.

but

Rosselli arranged for the CIA to supply a panel truck loaded with carbines for use by his Cuban contacts to make two or three-man~~ned~~ party raids into Cuba, hopefully assassinating Castro and overturning the government.

During the Cuban missile crisis, Rosselli was in Chicago. He contacted Harvey at Harvey's mother's home in Indianapolis and left his number in Chicago. Harvey then called him, told him to go to Washington, D.C. From Washington, D.C., Rosselli traveled to Florida where he stayed for the duration of the Cuban missile crisis. He, at times, would, through his Cuban contacts, attempt to verify the location of the Russian missiles in Cuba. Rosselli claimed that this had been successful. After the Cuban missile crisis, Harvey called Rosselli and told him to stop all contacts with any and all persons involved in past Cuban missions. Harvey never stated why the missions were being called off.

OK w/ '67 Rept

The only money that Rosselli ever put up was $800 to buy gas for the speedboat that would deliver the two or three-man teams to Cuba to do guerrilla operations. He stressed throughout the interview that he had never received any money and that besides this $800 he had never given any money for. His last contact with Harvey was in June of ~~19x4~~ 1963 ~~or shortly there before,~~ when Rosselli found out that Harvey was being transfered to Rome and he made a special trip to Washington to say goodby to him.

date of last trip

April ?
June ?
details

before or after the tap-details?

The Rowan tap; Rosselli said that he understood that Giancana had asked Maheu for a tap on ~~Rowan~~ Dan Rowan. Maheu gave Rosselli two stories. The first ① was that he was doing Giancana a favor and the ②second was that there was a real intelligence value in that ~~he was~~, Maheu was afraid, that Giancana or Rowan might be giving out intelligence information that would be of value to enemies of the United States. Rosselli had not heard of the names Dub[illegible] or Belotti or Fred Harrison. He admitted that Harvey had discussed the tap with him, but both Harvey and Rosselli were pissed off ~~at the~~ that the operation had gone on. Giancana obviously knew about the tap. Maheu did ask Rosselli to get bail money for the two tappers who were caught and thrown in jail. Maheu suggested that Rosselli could get a hotel to turn over the bail money. Finally, Mr. Rosselli arranged to have a man with (?) green carnation in his lapel meet with "Mr. Doakes" for a transfer of the bail money. He never received any of this money back. Rosselli claims that he did not know what type of tap went on. He admitted that he had been questioned by the FBI but he gave no answers and he knew that Maheu had been questioned by the FBI.

During his early contacts with Maheu in 1959 and '60, in setting up the Cuban operation, Maheu was setting up a guard system for different Hughes' operations, such as Hughes Aircraft or other corporate interests.

Rosselli can't remember whether he ever introduced Giancana as Mr. Sam Gold. He claims to have no business relationship with Giancana. Rosselli's only business interests was the ice machines in Las Vegas. He ran those by himself and had no contact with Giancana. When asked about Joe Santa ~~[illegible]~~, Trafficanto, Rosselli stated that he used him only as an interpreter but not as a contact for recruiting other Cubans for his mission.

Mr. Thomas Wadden, stated that he was receiving no fees ~~for his counsel,~~ for his representing Rosselli, now. The status of Mr. Cantillon or Mr. Scherr was not ~~un~~clear. There was discussion as to the Committee paying the expenses of Mr. Rosselli's transportation from Los Angeles and there was discussion as to the limits, if any, to be placed on the Committee's inquiry of Mr. Rosselli's contacts with the Cubans, how they had been developed, and what other operations did go on.

The informant was told that his offer is outside our jurisdiction, which he acknowledged. No commitments were made to him. At this time, we do not plan to further pursue the matter. Our relationship with him has been most carefully guarded and we would feel obligated to handle any recontact of him concerning this matter if such is desired.

1 - The Deputy Attorney General

REC[illegible] FROM
MAY [illegible] 1976
DOJ

Book V, p. 12-13

The cast of characters surrounding the seizure of anti-Castro hardware as outlined on these pages is particularly interesting. The raw material cited in the footnote is attached. Note reference to Briniuer and Oswald. Below that McLaney brothers and Victor Espinosa and Frank Sturgis. Not attached is a critical New Orleans field office memo to FBI headquarters linking Briniuer to the McClaney/Sturgis operation.

New Orleans
tion a photo-
Orleans, La.,
s given to a
record, given

do the same,

'idel Castro,
ht to invade
ates will do
right.
ny friend to

d this after
that conver-

n my friend
here and he
e Fair Play

horities, be-
nowledge of
front of Ed

Council of
friend and
tler all the
hat Oswald
Oswald had
Ve gave all
n, somebody
lebate.
day of the
the time of
Bill Stuckey
indicate to
hake hands
at Stuckey
believe that
to Oswald
to him as
t one Com-
ommunism,
hat I don't
ic way. I
Communist,
hat if any
something
me to me,
ve nothing
answered
the wrong
t moment.
debook for
will happen
y him per-

---

sonally as a traitor if he doing something wrong in the debate. When he saw the guidebook for Marines, he smiled to me, and he told me, "Well, listen, Carlos, don't try to do an invasion with that guidebook for Marines, because that is an old one and that will be a failure." That was his joke in that moment.

After that we went to the debate, and I think that you have the whole history of the debate, you have the transcription and everything, [so] that I don't have to go inside that, because that is subjective, not objective. You have the objective, and that is the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. That is right. We do have a transcript and we listened to it on the tape last night over at the television station too.

Mr. BRINGUIER. And there is something that I want to show you too. I told to you about the training camp that were across the Lake Pontchartrain.

Mr. LIEBELER. Yes.

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Producing newspaper.] At the beginning of August in the Diario Las Americas from Miami for September 4——

Mr. LIEBELER. For September 4, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right. [Indicating photograph.] This is the spy who was inside the training camp. The Christian Democratic Movement turned him over to the FBI, and the FBI was questioning him in Miami. The Christian Democratic Movement found a letter, according to this information, from this guy directed to Carlos Lechuga, former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and now Cuban Ambassador to the United Nations in New York. In that letter the spy, Fernando Fernandez, was warning Lechuga that they have to be alert from that date to August 8, and the day that Oswald came trying to infiltrate my organization was on August 5. This sounds for me strange in all this matter.

[Indicating.] Here is another interview from Fernandez here 3 days later.

Mr. LIEBELER. You are referring to a copy of the same newspaper but for the date of September 6, 1963, on the front page of which——

Mr. BRINGUIER. [Indicating.] Here. "Fernando Fernandez is in favor of coexistence with the Communist regime of Castro." That is the title in Spanish.

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me see if I can understand what you are saying. You say that Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Fernandez wrote a letter to Lechuga in Mexico.

Mr. LIEBELER. Lechuga is a member of the Castro government?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. He is now Ambassador to the United Nations?

Mr. BRINGUIER. In New York; right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Fernandez is the person who was the Castro spy who had infiltrated the training camp in Louisiana?

Mr. BRINGUIER. For the Christian Democratic Movement here in Louisiana.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now the Christian Democratic Movement is—what? Pro-Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Anti-Castro.

Mr. LIEBELER. It is an anti-Castro organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes; they were training Cubans over here to make a commando action against Castro, but they find out that there was a Castro spy inside the training camp, and they went back to Miami with the people and with him, and they turn him over to the FBI. I think that after that the leader for the Christian Democratic Movement—or that the FBI didn't found nothing, because was not against the law to spy inside an anti-Castro organization. It was against the law to spy inside the U.S. Government but not inside the anti-Castro organization. And my feeling—and this is the question that I am asking myself—in New Orleans we are about 900 miles from Miami. In Miami is where the headquarters of all the anti-Castro groups. I could not find any reason for Oswald to come to me and offer me his service to train Cubans in guerrilla warfare at the same moment when there was a secret anti-Castro training camp in New Orleans and a Castro spy was inside that training camp. That for me is—because, if he was willing to infiltrate one active organization, he will go directly to Miami and he will offer his service over there in Miami, but not in New Orleans where it is not publicly known that there was something going on at that moment. I believe that that was the only time here in New Orleans that there was something like that, and it was a coincidence. And there is another coincidence too for me, and that is that when Oswald left the city he went to Mexico, and the letter from Fernandez that was intercepted here was to Mexico too, and Oswald visit the Cuban consulate in Mexico, and the Fernandez letter was to the Cuban Ambassador to Mexico. For me, that is a big doubt.

Mr. LIEBELER. Go ahead.

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, after the debate, the same night of the debate, I went to the radio station here in New Orleans and the local papers and the United Press International office, and I gave a press release. If you want a copy, I could give you a copy. I gave a copy to the Secret Service.

The most interesting thing is the four things that I asked to the Secret Service of New Orleans. I think that this is the second one where I said, "Write to your Congressman asking for a full investigation of Mr. Lee H. Oswald, a confessed Marxist" [producing document]. And that was 3 months before the assassination.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you have another copy of this?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I have the original of that. You can have that.

Mr. LIEBELER. I have marked a copy of the press release distributed to the various communications media here in New Orleans, on August 16, 1963——

Mr. BRINGUIER. No, August 21.

Mr. LIEBELER. August 21, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 21, the night of the debate.

Mr. LIEBELER. I mark it as "Exhibit No. 3" to your deposition, and I have initialed it. Would you initial it?

[The witness complied.]

Mr. LIEBELER. Let me go over some of this testimony that you have just given to see if I understand. Mr. Fernandez wrote to Mr. Lechuga a letter in which Fernandez said that we—meaning the Castro people?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Yes.

Mr. LIEBELER. Must be on guard up until August 8?

Mr. BRINGUIER. August 8, that is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Of 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. You indicated that Oswald had come to your store or offices on August 5, 1963?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. Oswald came to you offering to assist in the military training of Cubans?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. At that time, there was, in fact, a training camp near New Orleans——

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. For the training of people for military action against Castro?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that was not public knowledge at that time?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. So you are tying this up in your mind by considering the possibility that Oswald was, in fact, a Castro agent?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And did know about the existence of this training camp, because Mr. Fernandez had already himself infiltrated that training camp?

Mr. BRINGUIER. That is right.

Mr. LIEBELER. And that Fernandez had told Oswald about the existence of this camp and had asked Oswald himself to try to infiltrate that camp for your organization?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Excuse me.

Mr. LIEBELER. Is that correct?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, the only thing that I don't believe is that Fernandez had told directly to Oswald. What I believe is that Fernandez had informed some people outside the United States, and these people had informed Oswald and had gave to Oswald the order to try to infiltrate the Cuban group here in New Orleans.

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernan
aware of approximately the time
fore, indicated to Lechuga that
discovered as an attempted infiltr
Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon?
Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand
lates to the fact that Fernandez
will be in danger,"—up until ab
anything to do with Oswald?
Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I th
on August 5 Oswald came to me
same period of time. Somethin
Orleans, that there was a secret
of the Fair Play for Cuba Comm
New Orleans. Those are the fac
not sure about. I just want to s
connection.
Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't see
handing out literature in the str
to infiltrate the anti-Castro move
Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that
after I told him that I don't ha
that here there is nothing, and t
went openly to do that before
he went openly to do that after he
Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of
in the pro-Castro movement and
information to Oswald—conducted
Mr. BRINGUIER. No.
Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have
as a result of your anti-Castro a
person as this, do you think you
Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardo
Mr. LIEBELER. If there were su
Castro movement who had been
would have had access to that i
find out about it?
Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is
have a lot of persons. There ar
who are anti-Castro. Even amo
agents here in the city and you
But there is something else: Th
is located in 117 Decatur Street,
the owner of the Havana Bar is
over there, gave the information
before—that Oswald went to the
lemonade. He was with one Mexi
drinking the lemonade, he start t
to be a Cuban capitalistic, and th
He was telling that that was too
moment, Oswald feel bad at that
out to the sidewalk to vomit outsi
the Havana Bar told me that the
the same one that one time the FBI
immediately because that was a pr
August 15 and August 30 was th
because I start to find out all thes
before, because before I did not
nothing of this before to me. B
the owner of the Havana Bar cam
cause he already saw one automo
one of them the one who had be

[illegible] a letter
[illegible] be sent to
[illegible] was to Mexico
Fernandez letter
g doubt.

of the debate, I
papers and the
If you want a

d to the Secret
e where I said,
of Mr. Lee H.
t was 3 months

istributed to the
ust 16, 1963——

tion, and I have

t you have just
Lechuga a letter

store or offices

ilitary training

camp near New

against Castro?

sidering the pos-

aining camp, be-
ing camp?

existence of this
t camp for your

that Fernandez
ez had informed
rmed Oswald and
oup here in New

Mr. LIEBELER. And Mr. Fernandez was, on this theory, aware of that and was aware of approximately the time Oswald would make this attempt, and, therefore, indicated to Lechuga that there would be some danger of Oswald being discovered as an attempted infiltrator?

Mr. BRINGUIER. I beg pardon? I don't understand the words.

Mr. LIEBELER. As I understand, part of the hypothesis here, the theory, relates to the fact that Fernandez said to Lechuga, "We must be careful, or we will be in danger,"—up until about August 8. Now does that statement have anything to do with Oswald?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Well, what I think is this: He send that letter to Lechuga, and on August 5 Oswald came to me offering his service to train Cubans, all in the same period of time. Something that never was happening here in New Orleans, that there was a secret anti-Castro training camp, and the chairman of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee trying to join the Cuban group here in New Orleans. Those are the facts. I don't want to tell something that I am not sure about. I just want to show you that tremendous coincidence or that connection.

Mr. LIEBELER. Now it doesn't seem likely, does it, that Oswald would go around handing out literature in the streets like he did if he was actually attempting to infiltrate the anti-Castro movement?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Remember that that was after I turned down his offer and after I told him that I don't have nothing to do with military activities and that here there is nothing, and that I turned down completely him. He didn't went openly to do that before the attempt to infiltrate the training camp; he went openly to do that after he was turned down.

Mr. LIEBELER. Do you know of any conceivable association between anybody in the pro-Castro movement and Oswald that could have acted as a source of information to Oswald—conducted the orders to him?

Mr. BRINGUIER. No.

Mr. LIEBELER. Would you have any way of obtaining information of that sort as a result of your anti-Castro activities and contacts? If there were such a person as this, do you think you would be likely to know about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. Beg your pardon?

Mr. LIEBELER. If there were such a person, that is to say, some agent of the Castro movement who had been working with Oswald, do you think that you would have had access to that information or you would have been likely to find out about it?

Mr. BRINGUIER. You see, that is a hard question, because here in the city you have a lot of persons. There are some who are pro-Castro, there are many who are anti-Castro. Even among the Cubans you could have some Castro agents here in the city and you could not have control of everybody.

But there is something else: The owner of the Havana Bar—the Havana Bar is located in 117 Decatur Street, just two door or three door from my store—the owner of the Havana Bar is a Cuban, and he and one of the employees over there, gave the information to me after Kennedy's assassination—not before—that Oswald went to the Havana Bar one time. He asked for some lemonade. He was with one Mexican at that moment, and when Oswald was drinking the lemonade, he start to say that, sure, the owner of that place had to be a Cuban capitalistic, and that he argue about the price of the lemonade. He was telling that that was too much for a lemonade, and he feel bad at that moment, Oswald feel bad at that moment—he had some vomits and he went out to the sidewalk to vomit outside on the sidewalk. These persons here from the Havana Bar told me that the guy, the Mexican, who was with Oswald, was the same one that one time the FBI told them that if they will see him, call them immediately because that was a pro-Communist. I remember that was between August 15 and August 30 was that period of time. I could not locate that because I start to find out all these things after the Kennedy assassination, not before, because before I did not found any connection. They did not told nothing of this before to me. Between the 15th and the 30th the brother of the owner of the Havana Bar came to my store asking me to call the FBI, because he already saw one automobile passing by the street with two Mexicans, one of them the one who had been with Oswald in the bar, and he told me

Fair Play for Cuba Committee materials on one uneventful occasion in Dallas sometime during the period April 6-24, 1963,[316] Oswald's first public identification with that cause was in New Orleans. There, in late May and early June of 1963, under the name Lee Osborne, he had printed a handbill headed in large letters "Hands Off Cuba," an application form for, and a membership card in, the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee.[317] He first distributed his handbills and other material uneventfully in the vicinity of the U.S.S. *Wasp*, which was berthed at the Dumaine Street wharf in New Orleans, on June 16, 1963.[318] He distributed literature in downtown New Orleans on August 9, 1963, and was arrested because of a dispute with three anti-Castro Cuban exiles, and again on August 16, 1963.[319] Following his arrest, he was interviewed by the police, and at his own request, by an agent of the FBI.[320] On August 17, 1963, he appeared briefly on a radio program [321] and on August 21, 1963, he debated over radio station WDSU, New Orleans, with Carlos Bringuier, one of the Cuban exiles who had been arrested with him on August 9.[322] Bringuier claimed that on August 5, 1963, Oswald had attempted to infiltrate an anti-Castro organization with which he was associated.[323]

While Oswald publicly engaged in the activities described above, his "organization" was a product of his imagination.[324] The imaginary president of the nonexistent chapter was named A. J. Hidell,[325] the name that Oswald used when he purchased the assassination weapon.[326] Marina Oswald said she signed that name, apparently chosen because it rhymed with "Fidel," [327] to her husband's membership card in the New Orleans chapter. She testified that he threatened to beat her if she did not do so.[328] The chapter had never been chartered by the national FPCC organization.[329] It appears to have been a solitary operation on Oswald's part in spite of his misstatements to the New Orleans police that it had 35 members, 5 of which were usually present at meetings which were held once a month.[330]

Oswald's Fair Play for Cuba activities may be viewed as a very shrewd political operation in which one man single handedly created publicity for his cause or for himself. It is also evidence of Oswald's reluctance to describe events accurately and of his need to present himself to others as well as to himself in a light more favorable than was justified by reality. This is suggested by his misleading and sometime untruthful statements in his letters to Mr. V. T. Lee, then national director of FPCC. In one of those letters, dated August 1, 1963, Oswald wrote that an office which he had previously claimed to have rented for FPCC activities had been "promply closed 3 days later for some obsure reasons by the renters, they said something about remodeling ect., I'm sure you understand." [331] He wrote that "thousands of circulars were distrubed" [332] and that he continued to receive inquiries through his post office box which he endeavored "to keep answering to the best of my ability." [333] In his letter to V. T. Lee, he stated that he was then alone in his efforts on behalf of FPCC, but he attributed his lack of support to an attack by Cuban exiles in a street demonstration and being "officialy cautioned" by the police, events which "robbed me of what support I had leaving me alone."[334]

In spite of those claims, the Commission has not been able to uncover any evidence that anyone ever attacked any street demonstration in which Oswald was involved, except for the Bringuier incident mentioned above, which occurred 8 days after Oswald wrote the above letter to V. T. Lee.[335] Bringuier, who seemed to be familiar with many anti-Castro activities in New Orleans, was not aware of any such incident.[336] Police reports also fail to reflect any activity on Oswald's part prior to August 9, 1963, except for the uneventful distribution of literature at the Dumaine Street wharf in June.[337] Furthermore, the general tenor of Oswald's next letter to V. T. Lee, in which he supported his report on the Bringuier incident with a copy of the charges made against him and a newspaper clipping reporting the event, suggests that his previous story of an attack by Cuban exiles was at least greatly exaggerated.[338] While the legend "FPCC 544 Camp St. NEW ORLEANS, LA." was stamped on some literature that Oswald had in his possession at the time of his arrest in New Orleans, extensive investigation was not able to connect Oswald with that address, although it did develop the fact that an anti-Castro organization had maintained offices there for a period ending early in 1962.[339] The Commission has not been able to find any other indication that Oswald had rented an office in New Orleans. In view of the limited amount of public activity on Oswald's part before August 9, 1963, there also seems to be no basis for his claim that he had distributed "thousands" of circulars, especially since he had claimed to have printed only 2,000 and actually had only 1,000 printed. In addition, there is no evidence that he received any substantial amount of materials from the national headquarters.[340]

In another letter to V. T. Lee, dated August 17, 1963, Oswald wrote that he had appeared on Mr. William Stuckey's 15-minute television program over WDSU-TV called "Latin American Focus" as a result of which he was "flooded with callers and invitations to debate's ect. as well as people interested in joining the F.P.C.C. New Orleans branch."[341] WDSU has no program of any kind called "Latin American Focus."[342] Stuckey had a radio program called "Latin Listening Post," on which Oswald was heard for less than 5 minutes on August 17, 1963.[343] It appears that Oswald had only one caller in response to all of his FPCC activities, an agent of Bringuier's attempting to learn more about the true nature of the alleged FPCC "organization" in New Orleans.[344]

Oswald's statements suggest that he hoped to be flooded with callers and invitations to debate. This would have made him a real center of attention as he must have been when he first arrived in the Soviet Union and as he was to some extent when he returned to the United States. The limited notoriety that Oswald received as a result of the street fracas and in the subsequent radio debate was apparently not enough to satisfy him. He exaggerated in his letters to V. T. Lee in an appar-

OSWALD DISTRIBUTING FAIR
ORLEANS, AUGUST 16, 1963 --
BILLS ON WHICH HE HAD ST

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 2966 A

HANDS OFF CUBA!
Join the Fair Play for Cuba Committee
NEW ORLEANS CHARTER MEMBER BRANCH
Free Literature, Lectures
LOCATION:
EVERYONE WELCOME!

GARNER DE

TO: NAME			
1. Mr. [illegible]	D.O.J.		
2.			
3.			
4.			

☐ SIGNATURE
☐ APPROVAL
☐ SEE ME
☐ RECOMMENDATION
☐ ANSWER OR ACKNOWLEDGE ON OR BEFORE ____________
☐ PREPARE REPLY FOR THE SIGNATURE OF ____________

☐ COMMENT
☐ NECESSARY ACTION
☐ NOTE AND RETURN
☐ CALL ME

☐ PER CONVERSATION
☐ AS REQUESTED
☐ NOTE AND FILE
☐ YOUR INFORMATION

REMARKS

Can you help us identify these loose pgs 35-37, pls.

Thank You

FROM: NAME	BUILDING, ROOM, EXT.	DATE
Geo. [illegible]		
for		
B D Bennett	6330 Main Justice	

RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

10/3/63
Robt J. Dwyer
Report

information concerning the Comandos Mambises or their spokesman, RAFAEL MARTINEZ PUPO, who made a statement in Guatemala claiming credit for the August 17, 1963 attack.

BOSCH stated that the MIRR will promote other attacks in the future, as opportunities and availability of equipment permit, without compromising the United States.

V. MISCELLANEOUS

On June 14, 1963, information was received that a group of Cuban exiles had a plan to bomb the Shell refinery in Cuba.

On June 19, 1963, United States Customs Agents seized a twin Beechcraft airplane on the outskirts of Miami, Florida, along with a quantity of explosives.

MIGUEL ALVAREZ, EVELIO ALPIZAR, RENE ESPINOSA, VICTOR ESPINOSA and CARLOS HERNANDEZ, along with American SAM BENTON, were involved and detained, but not arrested, by United States Customs Agents. It was ascertained that MICHAEL MC LANEY supplied the money and explosives for this operation. MC LANEY is well known as a former gambling concession operator in Havana, Cuba, and presently resides at Miami Beach, Florida.

On July 19, 1963, ACELO PEDROSO advised there was another plan to bomb Cuba, using bomb casings and dynamite located on the outskirts of New Orleans, Louisiana.

On July 31, 1963, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) at New Orleans, Louisiana, obtained a

NOV 1 1967
INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

[illegible] FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

INDEXED

search warrant and seized 2,400 pounds of dynamite and 20 bomb casings near Lacombe, Louisiana. This material was located on the property of WILLIAM J. MC LANEY, brother of MICHAEL J. MC LANEY, a Miami Beach gambler and former operator of a casino in the Nacional Hotel, Havana, Cuba.

Investigation determined that this dynamite was purchased at Collinsville, Illinois, by RICH LAUCHLI for VICTOR ESPINOSA, who was involved in the June 14, 1963 seizures at Miami. ESPINOSA transported the dynamite to New Orleans in a rented trailer. Also involved in this bomb plot were CARLOS HERNANDEZ, MIGUEL ALVAREZ and SAM BENTON, a Miami, Florida private detective.

MM T-3, who is personally acquainted with SAM BENTON and RICH LAUCHLI, advised that SAM BENTON has been involved, in the past, with Cuban revolutionary groups in plans to sink yachts to obtain insurance, arms deals and collection of funds for personal use.

MM T-3 advised on June 14, 1963, RICH ALBERT LAUCHLI of Collinsville, Illinois recently arrived in Miami, Florida in a Ford station wagon with a load of arms for sale. American adventurers and mercenaries, GERALD ATRICK HEMMING, JR., and FRANK ANTHONY STURGIS, took LAUCHLI around to meet the different Cuban exile leaders in Miami. LAUCHLI subsequently sold a .57 mm recoilless rifle to the SNFE, a Japanese machine gun to American mercenary BILL CARMAN, two automatic rifles and two French guns to RAMON FONT of Comandos L, and miscellaneous other equipment to other organizations.

MM T-3 explained that when LAUCHLI arrived in Miami in June of 1963, his station wagon contained .50 caliber

RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

machine guns, nine sub-machine guns, automatic rifles and a number of foreign-made weapons. LAUCHLI sold nearly all of these arms, and at reasonable prices.

MM T-3 explained that LAUCHLI is more interested in arms sales as a gun dealer, and has no emotional feeling about the Cuban exile cause of trying to overthrow the present Government in Cuba.

[illegible] ROOM
[illegible] 1976
DOJ

Book V, P. 5

There was no indication that the Castro assassination plots were brought to the Warren Commission's attention in anyway. "The subordinate officers at the FBI and the CIA who acted as liaison with the Warren Commission did not know of the CIA assassination attempts."

Book V, p. 5-6	The CIA investigation of the assassination did not divulge the AMLASH operation although these investigators, in retrospect, think this knowledge vital. "There is also evidence that CIA investigators requested name traces which should have made them aware of the AMLASH operation, but for some reason, they did not learn of that operation."

Book V, p. 10 FBI informant during missile crisis suggested that Castro could be assassinated through underworld channels inside Cuba and that the informant would fund this if U.S. government would assure such endeavor would not adversely effect the national security. See attached Hoover memo. We need to identify and interview informant.

TO : The Attorney General DATE: October 29, 1962

FROM : Director, FBI

SUBJECT: FIDEL CASTRO
INTERNAL SECURITY - CUBA

OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
RECEIVED
OCT 29 1962

We have an informant who furnishes data concerning criminal matters and who is close to high officials of the Teamsters Union. He has many contacts with hoodlum and gambling elements throughout the United States. He is most concerned that his relationship with the FBI not be revealed since he feels certain that, if his cooperation becomes known, he will be killed immediately.

On October 22, 1962, the informant volunteered to our Los Angeles, California, Office that he believes he could arrange to have Fidel Castro assassinated. He explained that some of his underworld acquaintances, such as Meyer Lansky, in the past have had close connections in Cuba whereby they were able to "buy" practically any Cuban official or to accomplish almost anything they wanted to do in Cuba. He believes some of these underworld figures still have channels inside Cuba through which the assassination of Castro could be successfully arranged.

[redacted] COULD IDENTIFY CONFIDENTIAL SOURCE He said that, in the event the United States Government is interested in having the attempt made, he would raise the necessary money and would want nothing from the Government except assurance that such an undertaking would in no way adversely affect the national security. He expressed confidence in his ability to accomplish this mission without any additional contact with Government representatives and with a minimum of contacts with private individuals.

RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

109-539

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
22
JAN 2 1963
RECORDS BRANCH
RECORDED
ATTORNEY GENERAL

Book V, p. 13 Intelligence files in mid-1963 documenting series of meetings among major leaders of anti-Castro movement. Such a report is attached. Attention to the cast of characters: i.e., Artime, Maceo, Somoza, Carlos Prio.

On August 23, 1963, ALFREDO BORJAS, Intelligence Chief of the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) anti-CASTRO organization of MANUEL ARTIME, advised that the MRR-Comandos of CARLOS BANDIN is a dissident group. BORJAS said that through his contacts in the latter organization, he had ascertained that only about five members of BANDIN's organization landed in Cuba at the time of the June 20, 1963 invasion hoax.

BORJAS said the CRC press releases were a publicity stunt which backfired and destroyed any credibility and activity the CRC may have had up to that time. When the press found out it was a hoax, ANTONIO MACEO and CARLOS BANDIN resigned, blaming the CRC for the scandal which they both helped to create.

II. THE SOMOZA PLAN

On July 16, 1963, MIGUEL GARCIA, in charge of public relations for the CRC, announced that LUIS SOMOZA, former President of Nicaragua, had recently been in Washington, D. C.; reportedly conferred with United States Government officials, and about ten days ago arrived in Miami, Florida.

GARCIA said that SOMOZA conducted a series of meetings, in which nearly all of the well-known Cuban exile political and action group leaders attended. At these meetings, SOMOZA claimed he had talked to all the Presidents of the Central American Republics, and these Presidents are willing to help Cuban exiles in the form of training camps, military equipment, and bases of operation from which to attack the present government of Cuba. SOMOZA indicated that his meetings with the

REC
MAY
DOJ

Presidents of the several Central American Republics and the leading figures among the Cuban exiles in Miami, New York and Washington, were known to have the sanction of the United States Government. On July 16, 1963, SOMOZA left Miami and returned to Nicaragua.

On July 15, 1963, the "Miami News" contained an article stating that there is growing speculation in Miami that Attorney General ROBERT KENNEDY is quietly backing certain Cuban exiles, such as MANUEL ARTIME BUESA and the so-called SOMOZA Plan. It is noted that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA is the head of the MRR, an anti-CASTRO organization.

On July 15, 1963, MM T-3, who has been active in Cuban revolutionary matters for the past five years, advised that the below-listed persons are some of the better-known Cuban exile leaders who met with SOMOZA during his recent visit to the United States:

SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, Comandos L

LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, Movimiento Democrata Cristiano (MDC)

ANTONIO VECIANA, Alpha 66

SIXTO MESA, MRR

JOSE MORELL ROMERO, Cuban Committee of Liberation

CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba

RECEIVED FR
MAY [illegible] 1976
DOJ

MANUEL ARTIME, MRR

EUSEBIO MUJAL, labor leader

JOSE BOSCH, Cuban industrialist

On July 26, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised he had talked with LUIS SOMOZA about four hours while SOMOZA was in Miami during the middle of July, 1963. ALVAREZ said that it is his opinion SOMOZA was acting as an intermediary between the United States Government and the Cuban exiles.

On August 20, 1963, ALVAREZ advised that nothing has yet developed concerning the SOMOZA plan; it is now not clear what SOMOZA is offering, or what the United States Government's position or attitude is in this matter. ALVAREZ said it is obvious SOMOZA cannot afford, either as a private individual or a representative of the Nicaraguan Government, to back such a military program by Cuban exiles, and will have to have the backing and support of the United States Government to go on with his plan.

On July 30, 1963, FERMIN FLEITES, member of the Executive Committee of the MDC, advised that about a week ago, a Nicaraguan Army officer visited the MDC Headquarters, and in the name of SOMOZA, offered camps, military equipment and bases in Nicaragua. This individual also offered to pay the expenses of moving the MDC operations to Nicaragua.

FLEITES explained that the MDC had taken no positive action concerning this matter, and had adopted a "wait and see" policy to ascertain what attitude the United States Government would take concerning this matter.

RECEIVED [illegible]
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

On August 7, 1963, MARIO DEL CANAL, Executive Secretary of Rescate Democratico Revolucionario, advised that when SOMOZA was in the United States during July of 1963, MANUEL ANTONIO DE VARONA, head of the Rescate Democratico Revolucionario (RDR), conferred with SOMOZA in Miami and New York. At the invitation of SOMOZA, VARONA left for Nicaragua on August 1, 1963, to again confer with SOMOZA, and is expected to return to Miami in about a week.

On September 10, 1963, CANAL advised that nothing definite had been established as a result of VARONA's visit to Nicaragua, and that the future of the proposed SOMOZA Plan is uncertain.

On August 13, 1963, LAUREANO BATISTA FALLA, military leader of the MDC, advised that he had recently returned from Nicaragua, where he had conferred with SOMOZA, who made no commitments or indicated any definite plan existed. SOMOZA showed great interest in the Cuban problem, but offered no positive help or aid in the way of arms or training camps.

BATISTA FALLA said that CARLOS PRIO SOCARRAS, former President of Cuba, was in Nicaragua at the same time, conferred with SOMOZA, but did not receive any offers of positive aid. BATISTA explained that PRIO had just previously returned from the Dominican Republic (DR), and although PRIO and JUAN BOSCH, President of the DR, had been friends for many years, PRIO was unable to obtain any military bases in the DR.

On August 22, 1963, RUBEN DE LEON, former Cuban Minister of Defense and Co-Ordinator of the anti-CASTRO

RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

organization Armed Forces of Cuba in Exile, stated that about a month ago, LUIS SOMOZA told EMILIO NUNEZ PORTUONDO, former Cuban delegate to the United Nations (UN), that he (SOMOZA) had talked to United States Attorney General (AG) ROBERT KENNEDY.

AG KENNEDY reportedly said it was necessary for SOMOZA to work out the Cuban problem and to unite Cuban exiles. SOMOZA recommended that MANUEL ARTIME BUESA be designated as the leader of the Cuban exiles.

DE LEON advised that there was later a meeting in Miami at the home of Nicaraguan Army Captain JOSE ALEGRETT between SOMOZA and a number of Cuban exile leaders. At this meeting, SOMOZA said there was a possibility of Nicaraguan support for the Cuban exile anti-CASTRO movement, but first the exiles would have to accept ARTIME as their leader. There was considerable opposition to this suggestion by the exile leaders attending the meeting.

On September 12, 1963, PAULINO SIERRA MARTINEZ, former attorney and textile mill operator in Cuba, advised he had recently visited Nicaragua and conferred with LUIS SOMOZA concerning help to Cuban exiles.

SIERRA said there are no training camps in Nicaragua or Central America for Cuban exiles, and all the proposed aid and backing has progressed no further than the talking stage. SIERRA said it seems to him that everyone is waiting for the United States Government to give the "green light".

On September 12, 1963, MM T-3 advised that nearly all top political leaders among Cuban exiles have conferred with SOMOZA and now agree that the SOMOZA Plan is too big for

RECEIVED
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

SOMOZA and the Central American Republics to put into effect without United States military and political support.

MM T-3 said that the different Cuban military and political leaders now feel that SOMOZA has not yet obtained a positive commitment from the United States Government, because after two and a half months of conferences, there are not any Cuban exile military training camps in Central America, and the SOMOZA Plan has not progressed beyond the talking stage.

III. ORGANIZATIONS

Comandos L

MM T-3 advised that Comandos L is one of the leading anti-CASTRO organizations and action groups. It is headed by SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO CUESTA and RAMON FONT. The organization maintains no office as such, but continues to use Post Office Box 66, Riverside Station, Miami, Florida, to collect money donations.

On July 29, 1963, SANTIAGO ALVAREZ RODRIGUEZ advised the organization has had no military activity since March of 1963. The leadership is now building the organization to increase membership, establish different sections, such as a Women's Section, a Publicity Section, and committees to raise funds. The organization recently put out a thirty-page booklet, setting forth the aims and purposes of the organization, along with information concerning previous military operations of the organization.

ALVAREZ admitted his group has two boats in the Miami River, which will be used in the future for military

RECEIVED FROM
MAY 7 1976
DOJ

Book V, p. 25	Helms directed Karamessinis and Angleton to fully cooperate with the desk officer, John Whitten, charged with investigating the assassination. On November 24, Mexico City cabled the names of known contacts of Soviet personnel in Mexico City and AMLASH's name (Rolando Cubela) was included on that list. Nonetheless neither Fitzgerald, Helms, Tom K or Angleton advised the desk officer of significance of this name.

Book V, p. 25	On November 23, 1963, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico Station to stop the planned arrest of Sylvia Duran. Karamessinis speculated that this was because CIA feared Cuba responsible for assassination.
p. 29	Headquarters equally concerned with Duran on November 27 and warned Mexico City station chief that U.S. Ambassador pushing Cuban theory too hard.

Book V, p. 27 AMLASH's case officer omitted reference to the poison pen in his November 25 contact report of his November 22 AMLASH meeting on instruction from Fitzgerald.

Book V, p. 28 "D" tells his story in Mexico City on November 25. On November 26, Mexico City cables details of "D" interrogation to CIA Headquarters. On December 1, CIA Headquarters cables Mexico City that the White House has been told that D's story is a fabrication.

Book V, p. 30 On December 1, 1963, CIA Headquarters cabled Mexico City that a sensitive source (   ) has advised that a Cubana airlines flight to Havana was delayed in Mexico City on November 22 to pick up a passenger who rode in the cockpit without going through customs. This cable was found in Mexico City file with no CIA headquarters record of follow-up being found.

Book V, p. 35 In December, 1963, Sullivan prepared a memo for Hoover's aid in briefing the President that stated that no evidence had been developed which would indicate Oswald's assassination was inspired or directed by Pro Castro organizations or by any foreign country.

Book V, p. 40-41	FBI Legat in Mexico City cabled FBI Headquarters on November 24 that U.S. Ambassador felt Cubans participated in assassination effort. "Bureau may desire to give consideration to polling all Cuban sources in US in effort to confirm or refute this theory." FBI Headquarter's supervisor determined this was not desirable and would only promote rumors.

Book V, P. 58 The CIA investigation reflected a Soviet orientation, with exhaustive studies of Oswald's activities in re Soviet Union. There is no corresponding CIA analysis of Oswald's contacts with pro and anti Castro groups in U.S.

Book V, p. 61-63

In December, 1963, the CIA learned that a Cuban American had crossed the border from Texas into Mexico, on November 23 and arrived in Mexico City on November 25. He stayed in a hotel until the evening of November 27, when he departed on a regularly scheduled Cubana airlines flight to Havana using a Cuban courtesy visa and an expired U.S. passport. He was the only passenger on the flight. In March, 1964 the Agency received a report from a source which alleged that the same Cuban American had received a permit to enter Mexico City on November 20 in Tampa, Florida. The same source said the Cuban American was somehow involved in the assassination.

The Agency did not follow up on this report other than to ask a Cuban defector about his knowledge of the Cuban American's activities. The FBI did investigate the reported unusual travel but did not fully report the results of their investigation to their Warren Commission. Their investigation showed that this individual had lived in Tampa and Key West and was pro-Castro. He had traveled to Cuba in May of 1962 and had a brother in the Cuban military who was studying in the Soviet Union. On November 17, 1963, the Cuban American was at a get-together at the home of a member of the Tampa chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. This was the same Fair Play for Cuba Committee that Oswald had possibly contacted in May of 1963.

Book V, p. 63-64	In March of 1964, the Warren Commission requested from Director Hoover information on certain pro-Castro and anti-Castro organizations which were active in the U.S. including the Fair Play for Cuba Committee, and Alpha 66, among others. The Bureau furnished less than a full and satisfactory response and did not disclose the fact that the CIA had operational interests in certain of the entities inquired about.

Book V, p. 65 The FBI reports on Alpha 66 furnished the Warren Commission noted the attack on the Soviet vessel in March of 1963 but did not detail that group's continued activity in planning and carrying out their military operations against Cuba. The FBI reports did not show that Alpha 66 had been involved with the New Orleans anti-Castro training camp.

Book V, p. 65 It is known that the CIA took an interest in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee with which Oswald was associated. According to Bureau documents, the Agency advised the Bureau that they were considering the use of disinformation that might embarass the Committee in areas where the Committee had support.

Book V, p. 72 In late July 1964, an FBI informant reported that the CIA was meeting with AMLASH for the purpose of assassinating Castro. Informant also reported that AMLASH was unhappy with the CIA's efforts and that Attorney General Kennedy had refused to support the plan but that the plan had not been completely put to rest. This information was not disseminated outside the Bureau at the request of the informant. But the Bureau notations indicate that the Bureau was looking into an underworld plot against Castro that might be coincidental with the AMLASH plan. The Bureau had first been informed of AMLASH-CIA meetings in October 1963. That information did not indicate assassination involvement.

Book V, p. 74-75

The AMLASH operation was insecure prior to the Fitzgerald meeting with AMLASH, a meeting that Fitzgerald was urged not to undertake by several in the Agency.

AMLASH

Book V, pp. 77-78	Individuals outside the CIA had been brought into the operation, and the Agency learned that one of these individuals was in clandestine contact with Cuban intelligence (Cable from European station to CIA Headquarters, 3/18/65).

Book V, p. 78 Victor Espinosa, a Cuban exile, involved in the transporting explosives to New Orleans in 1963, contacted INS with information about the AMLASH operation. This information was turned over to the FBI which informed the CIA. Both agencies interrogated Espinosa in June of 1965 and found that he knew that AMLASH and others were planning a coup which involved the assassination of Castro and that the CIA had been involved with AMLASH and others in the planning.

Espinosa and AMLASH were life-long friends but during the interrogation he gave no indication that he was aware of the 1963 AMLASH-CIA meetings. Espinosa's information noted in the 1967 IG Report suggests a link between the AMLASH operation and the CIA plots to assassinate Castro using underworld contacts. Therefore, Espinosa's information raised the possibility that underworld figures who were aware of the Harvey plots may have been aware of the AMLASH operation. CIA reaction to this interrogation was to terminate the operation immediately.

Book V, p. 79	CIA had FBI files on Espinosa detailing his involvement with anti-Castro exiles and underworld figures who were operating the guerrilla training camps in New Orleans in July 1963.

Book V, p. 79 In mid-1965 the CIA interrogated Tepedino, New York jeweler, who had been involved with the AMLASH operation from the beginning. The report concluded that the subject was deceptive during the interrogation and withheld pertinent information in one or more relevant areas. Tepedino lied in response to questions dealing with AMLASH's and his ties to Cuban intelligence. Tepedino stated that AMLASH had no plan to overthrow Castro. Tepedino stated AMLASH had strong connections with Cuban intelligence and was probably cooperating with it in various ways. Although AMLASH never mentioned these connections to his CIA case officers; Teledino stated that AMLASH had mentioned them to him and almost everyone else he had met.

Book V, p. 79	The FBI made the connection between Espinosa's 1963 activities and the fact that in 1965 he was knowledgeable of CIA involvement in plans to assassinate Castro. However, there is no evidence that either the CIA or FBI investigated this connection until 1967.

Book V, p. 79	Although the CIA had received information that AMLASH was a provocation there is no evidence that the CIA investigated the possibility of a connection between its fall 1963 meetings with AMLASH and the assassination of President Kennedy.

Book V, P. 80 A client of Morgan's had informed him that the United States had attempted to assassinate Castro in the early 1960's and that Castro had decided to retaliate. This information was passed to Drew Pearson who in turn attempted to have Chief Justice Warren look into it but he declined.

Book V, P. 81	Supervisory personnel assigned to the assassination investigation have uniformly testified they do not recall ever discussing or reviewing memoranda which touch upon Cuban involvement in the assassination or of Cuban retaliation for the CIA assassination plots.

Book V, p. 81	According to Secretary of State Rusk in his testimony before the Warren Commission, 6/10/64, he stated there was "very considerable concern" in Cuba immediately following the assassination as to whether Cuba would be held responsible for the assassination and what effect the assassination might have on Cuba's position and security.

Book V, p. 84 On March 21, 1967, WFO send Headquarters 10 copies of a blind memorandum which stated Castro employed assassination teams for the purpose of removing President Kennedy. Morgan's clients were also aware of the identity of individuals sent to the United States for that purpose. He understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey. The transmittal slip is attached to this memorandum.
Neither the President nor the Attorney General ordered a follow-up investigation after receiving this memo.

Book V, p. 92 In October, 1963, Soviet experts at FBI Headquarters were informed that Oswald had met with Vice Counsel Kostikov at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. Kostikov was a member of the KGB and believed to be with the KGB department that carried out assassinations and sabotage.

I, Frank Sturgis, have today personally delivered to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence the following materials:

1 Envelope - 2 cassettes
1 lg. manila envelope - secret codes

Date: 9-3-76

Frank Sturgis
Frank Sturgis

RECEIVED:

Pamela Crupi
For the Committee

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus
and Pedro
and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard,.which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No,That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nicknames...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nicknamed the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by herself or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when, did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know," FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were ________ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just, the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything, put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington,D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up,Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you realize what a bomb this is? This top KGB spy wants you?" And I said, "Well", I say "he's not really my type.", I said but again, the best interests of the country, but how far do you want me to go? And he said "all the way". I said what is all the way? He said, "You start with a Christmas card." Well the Christmas card was answered by Oleg going to Louis and saying, "I got Ilonka's Christmas card. Where is she living, Louis?" You know, so John talked me into calling the mission. I call up the mission, across from 19th precinct, and I said, "Oleg, this is Ilonka Marischa. Hello darling", you know, and this, this and this. And I said oh boy everything is wired and everything from the mission anyway. But he's top dog there. He is top dog in the mission. He has the say. He's a very important person in the Soviet mission. Anyway, John okays a telephone coil pickup that I have on my phone to a Soni tape recorder. We make a tape of this because John Kotter is sitting on pins and needles waiting for me to replay that tape on what Oleg tells me, you know? Oleg doubletalks but we get a message that we want to meet, you know? So they had some kind of a security council and we made a date and it was postponed. Oleg called up and apologized which I also have on tape. And each time the Bureau was very happy. We're gonna start a blossoming relationship here, you know, and end up with photographs and better something, which I don't think I would have gone all the way. But that's what their idea was so they can exchange at a later date.

FS: Blackmail?

ML: Well...

FS: Blackmail him / into giving them information (unintelligible).

ML: Say like they get one of our, one of our pilots, right? And if we don't get our pilot back they expose Oleg, right? Or make him...

FS: Be a double agent. Blackmail him...

ML: Be a double...

FS: into being a double agent.

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you, and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

INTERVIEW OF MARITA LORENZE
BY FRANK STURGIS, 9/2/76

Transcript of tapes provided the Select Committee on Intelligence by Frank Sturgis on September 3, 1976

Marita Lorenze (ML) -- Interviewed by Frank Sturgis on 9/2/76

Frank Sturgis (FS)

ML: Marita Lorenze

FS: You an American citizen?

ML: Yes.

FS: Were you born here?

ML: Born in Braemen, Germany on August 18, 1939 and my mother registered me at birth with the Consulate because she was stuck in the war over there, but I am an American citizen, not naturalized or anything. I was registered as an American citizen.

FS: How old were you when you came to the United States?

ML: I was about 12, came over on the U.S.S. Henry Gibbons, American troop transport, because my mother worked for the United States Army.

FS: Okay, now we're going to go ahead and jump. You went to Cuba what month and what year and on what ship?

ML: I met, I went, I took several trips with my father who was Commander of the oceanliner Berlin. I met Fidel...

FS: What was your father's full name?

ML: Commander Heinrich Frederick Lorenz.

FS: And how old was he?

ML: Approximately 50-something, 55, when I first, I went on several trips to Cuba before I met Fidel with, but I was a little girl.

FS: When's the first time you went to Cuba after Fidel took over the government on January 1, 1959?

ML: I met Fidel February 28, 1959, on one of my father's cruises where Fidel came aboard with several of his men. He said he saw the oceanliner from the Havana Hilton balcony and he took a launch with his Chief of the Navy, what's his name, I forgot, Castagna...

FS: Forget it, forget about it, we can go ahead. Who else was there besides the chief of the Cuban navy.

ML: Selia Sanchez, Haiti Santa Maria, Paco and Fidel and several of his armed guards.

FS: Okay now, what happened

ML: Castanyava...

FS: Castanyava

ML: Castanyava was the chief of the Navy.

FS: And Fidel offered you a job or something, can you go into that?

ML: Well he was very fond of everything German. He said he read and my father, you know, tried to pacify the tourists, the passengers on the ship because they were terrified. They thought they were being invaded. So I helped my father pacify the tourists and it was really a funny scene. Then I steered Fidel to my father's cabin and we went to dinner and Fidel started to play kneesies under the table. And this was February 28, 1959 on the cruise.

FS: And he offered you a job, right?

ML: Yes, after about 5 hours on board ship we went back up to my father's cabin and had drinks and exchanged gifts, and my father and Fidel seemed to get along very well. My father is diplomatic and they exchanged plaques and my father's silver ashtray and stuff like that. And he asked me, he asked my father if since I was bilingual if I could go, come back, return to Cuba to be his secretary since he was getting German mail and he did not speak German and he assured me that I would be safe and set up in an office, and blah, blah, blah, blah. And I had friends in Cuba anyway.

FS: How old were you then?

ML: Nineteen, nineteen years old.

FS: Did you get off the ship and stay there?

ML: No, I went back to New York. Fidel, on the bridge, asked me for my phone number and address in New York and said he would call me, and I just, I didn't believe it.

FS: When did he call you?

ML: The same day I arrived in New York. Because my father took off that night for Germany again and the phone ring, and it rang at 1 o'clock in the morning. I guess the previous...

FS: Well he went back to Germany with the ship, right? Where did you go?

ML: I was living with my brother in New York City. My brother was a translator for the United Nations and I was alone living in New York City going to the Merchantson Banker School.

FS: Well how did you get back to New York City from Havana?

ML: On my father's ship. It was the last stop on the cruise of about 5 or 6 stops.

FS: Oh, in other words the, in other words the ship left that night, left Havana that night...

ML: Yeah.

FS: went over to New York and then from New York went back to Europe, right?

ML: Yes. Yes. I thought about Fidel and he pointed out this is my Havana and I guess I was impressed. I was young, I don't know. And I thought that...

FS: He called, he called you, he knew just about what time you were going to arrive in New York and when you got there he called you, what, the same, the same day you got there?

ML: The same day our ship arrived, three days later. And I just picked up the phone and the Havana operator said one moment please, the Prime Minister is on the phone, on the line, and I heard some shouting and then I heard "hello".

FS: Did he speak Cuban or English to you?

ML: He spoke broken English in his hoarse voice. I guess he was giving a lot of speeches at that time. And he asked me, "Hello Marita, you think I don't call? I think about you very much and I call. I keep my word. I want to prove to you that one man's Cuban word I keep."

ML: (contd.) So, I was as surprised, I was very surprised.

FS: How long was it did you leave New York to go to Havana?

ML: Fidel said to me, I said is this really you Fidel, and he said yes. I am in Havana Hilton, you call me back in room 2408, and I said no, alright I believe you I said because how else would you have my number. He said "I want you come back. I think about you and I will send a plane, my plane, and you come back." And it was a joke really, I liked the Cocoa Glace, it's an ice cream in a cocoanut shell, and he had sent to my father's ship a case of it so I would have enough for the return trip home because, I don't know, I just talked about Havana, the island in general. So I, and I still didn't believe him that he would send the plane.

FS: Did he send the airplane?

ML: Yes.

FS: What kind of an airplane did he send?

ML: A Cubana airliner with...

FS: Four engines?

ML: Yes, with two men and two men came to the, my door. I was living at 344 West 87th Street at the time, on the second floor, and my brother was at a UN party and I was home alone studying. Oh no, in fact I was reading a Herbert L. Mathews article on Fidel Castro and Cuba when the doorbell rang, and it was Jesus and Pedro and they showed me identification. One came in military uniform, the other in civilian clothes. One smiled, one didn't. One said, "Are you ready?" And one said, "We go now. Fidel want very much to see you."

FS: (Laughter).

ML: And I said I didn't finish my homework yet. I was like in shock. I didn't know what to do. So they said they were staying in a hotel, that they would, the plane would leave tomorrow, please be ready. I, meanwhile I haven't even unpacked, you know, from the cruise. My

ML: (contd.) clothes were all laundered anyway from the ship and I hadn't even unpacked because I was worred about missing two days at school.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I went...

FS: Well these are incidentals anyway, so, what'd you do, you went to the airport? What airport did the airplane, was the airplane at?

ML: Uh, LaGuard, which is not Kennedy, it was at that time named something else. Idlewild, right?

FS: Idlewild, yeah.

ML: And...

FS: It was Idlewild airport, that's where they had the airplane, Cubana Airlines?

ML: Yeah, Cubana Airlines. Got on the plane...

FS: How many people where on the airplane?

ML: Me, a steward, a pilot and a co-pilot and the two guards.

FS: Ha, ha, had -- that's funny. Go ahead.

ML: So anyway, I met Fidel and that's when I got involved.

FS: This is more or less a background so they know her background.

ML: Yeah that's, that's out anyway.

(Unidentified voice: "Yeah, right.")

FS: I mean don't drag it out so much because the details of all this thing is...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Is yours, you know. Go over it lightly. So you went back to Havana, right?

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Havana you saw Fidel where? Cause we'll go over this lightly.

ML: I was in the...

FS: At the Hilton?

ML: I was driven by black limousine right to the Hilton.

FS: And that's where Fidel was staying at the Hilton, right?

ML: Yes, he was having an argument in his suite with Chez Raoul and some Americans.

FS: He was having some argument with some Americans. Do you know who the Americans were?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who were they?

ML: One lady attorney trying to promote something, Muriel...

FS: Oh this was more business or something like that?

ML: Yes business. Everybody was trying to promote this and that with Fidel.

FS: Yes, well that's immaterial.

ML: So then I was told to go in the room and wait and the door locked. And I was in there, in his suite, and Fidel came in and I missed him and he missed me and the rest is going to be in the book if I ever write it.

FS: You'll write it don't worry. Alright now...

ML: If I live.

FS: Do you know approximately when you met me?

ML: A couple months, or two months, or three months after that.

FS: No, That was very, I think you met me around what, April?

ML April, right.

FS: April of 1959, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And I believe we met at the Riviera Hotel in the lobby?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's where, when I saw...

ML: That's what I said, a couple months...

FS: Right.

ML: right after that.

FS: In April, right. And this is where we made contact and so forth and then we saw each other a few times after that...

ML: In the coffee shop.

FS: In the coffee shop and this is when you were recruited to go ahead and spy for the United States and so forth and, were you ever introduced or, to Colonel Nickels?

ML: Yes.

FS: Do you know who Colonel Nickels is, right. He was the Colonel who was military attache with the American Embassy in Havana, Cuba at that time, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Okay. Then you started your spy thing and so forth and so forth, alright?

ML: Um hum.

FS: We'll go ahead and jump a little bit and so forth. There were several meetings that Fidel had in the Hilton with some of the people of the staff. I was present at the meeting, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And, one of the time that Fidel was talking to the staff concerned the gambling casinos and American business interests in Cuba, right?

ML: Right.

FS: And it was stated that he was going to run all the racketeers out of...

ML: Out of Cuba.

FS: Cuba. All the American businesses were going to go ahead and be nationalized because it was Cuba and the Cuba for the Cubans.

ML: Right.

FS: And so forth. And then it was suggested about well you know the American government may not like it. You're gonna have all the American business interests put pressure on the State Department which would put pressure on him and that they would be up in arms and they would have the agents, they would send new agents into Cuba because the CIA at that time was very close, closely contacted, at least certain people in the CIA had contact with the 26th of July movement. As a matter of fact that they were exchanging information with Castro...

ML: Uh hum.

FS: which enabled him to outwit many of the other groups so really CIA helped Fidel quite a bit in this power struggle that was going on in Cuba at that time. So Fidel, with the help of CIA...

ML: Yes.

FS: got to be the ruler of Cuba. Now...

ML: I would, what about, where did Fidel get most of his guns from?

FS: Well, you know...

ML: To lead the revolution?

FS: Right, you know, so forth. That's a story which we won't have to go into and so forth because we just (unintelligible) briefly over it. And then there came a period of time where Fidel in all his popularity and so forth was, now Fidel with you - he made approaches to you, right, and so forth?

ML: Hmm.

FS: He told you he loved you and so forth.

ML: Yes.

FS: And he seduced you, right? And, which has been on record.

ML: Mm-Hmm.

FS: You know, and you liked him and you actually in liking him like a young girl thought for the future that here's a man that I, you admired, that you started to get an affection for him and so forth, and really you thought of marriage, right?

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: And in the process of being close with him, being as the man's intelligent, dynamic and so forth, he did force his attentions on you and naturally he seduced you. You didn't want to but it happened.

ML: Yes.

FS: And you had nobody to go to because, hey, you're in his Cuba, right?

ML: I was in his Cuba alright.

FS: Right, now also what we were getting in this Senate Intelligence Committee has got is the things that Fidel has stated against the United States government if they tried to interfere with the revolution and so forth when the new election time comes because at that time the President of the United States was Eisenhower and it looked like that the Democrats were going to win the election and he felt that if a new government, which was discussed among the top military people, if the new government came in and if they decided that they didn't like Fidel's policy, which Fidel was saying what he was going to do for Cuba on an international scale, that if the United States government decided to go and turn against him and put pressure on him he would do likewise to the United States government. And he was going to export his revolution in Latin America. These are the things that you heard...

ML: Yeah.

FS: A number of times I was present up there for the...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: in the Hilton with all the people. Now you left Cuba when?

ML: Sometime in September.

FS: In September of 1959 you came to the United States, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: And when you came back to the United States you saw me.

ML: Yes.

FS: And then arrangements were made for you to go back to Cuba and so forth...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: And this is what happened with the attempt and so forth.

ML: Right.

FS: Now when you went back to Cuba, when did you leave there the second time?

ML: When exactly towards the end of 1959, 1960.

FS: 1959?

ML: '60 - I'm not sure. I'm no good at dates and all that. I just know I went in and I took that stuff and I went out.

FS: Well then was it the early part of '60?

ML: Yeah.

FS: It had to be the early part of '60 and you came back to Miami, right?

ML: Right.

FS: You came back to Miami and you continued to go ahead and do some work

ML: With Alex.

FS: With Alex and myself here in South Florida. And then when did you cease doing some work at that time?

ML: Uh, in 19--, end of 1960.

FS: End of 1960. When did I tell you to make contact with Petty Humanez at his home. Do you know approximately what time that was?

ML: In 1960, 61.

FS: The end of 1960, or the early part of '61, was that then?

ML: About the time of the Bay of Pigs.

FS: Well, '61 was the Bay of Pigs, in April. '61. So it had to be before the Bay of Pigs.

ML: Before, before, yes it was.

FS: Yeah this is when Petty Humanez was exiled in Miami..

ML: Right.

FS: Beach on the island there, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and you were told by whom to go over to his home?

ML: You.

FS: You were told by me and you went there by yourself or with someone else?

ML: Should I name him?

FS: Yeah. Alex?

ML: Alex York.

FS: Alright, Alex went with you over to Petty Humanez' house, right. They had a gathering there with some Cubans, and so forth and so forth. Do you know who some of the Cubans who were at that gathering?

ML: Big Cubans.

FS: Well when you talk about big Cubans can you name some?

ML: Top Cubans in exile, Prios, Carlos Prios

FS: President, ex-President Carlos Prios.

ML: I don't know, there were so many, God.

FS: Alright, well that's, that's good enough. Anyway. Alright, that's when you first met Petty Humanez, alright.

ML: Yes.

FS: What was the idea of me sending you over there to meet Petty Humanez?

ML: Information gathering, to find out how he was sponsoring the Cuban exiles.

FS: Wasn't he suspected of supplying money and other goodies...

ML: Oh, yes.

FS: to groups, where at?

ML: In Miami and outside of Miami.

FS: And down in Texas, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Training camps in Texas?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, he was feeding money to them also in...

ML: Yeah.

FS: Texas, right? And this is to help overthrow Castro government, right?

ML: I would presume, yeah. I guess so.

FS: Now did you find out whether or not he was giving them this financial assistance?

ML: Yeah I saw him give money to some Cubans. I was with him at the time.

FS: Now you got very friendly with Petty Humanez, isn't that correct?

ML: I would say so.

FS: You would say so. As a matter of fact...

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: As a matter of fact a love affair developed...

ML: Yes.

FS: and so forth and so forth, alright.

ML: Yeah.

FS: We won't go into anything else. We'll go ahead and jump past that. Then we lost contact with you, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: And in losing contact with you we, well we mentioned sometime when they, the United States State Department sent Petty Humanez back to Venezuela, he went to prison, and you mentioned something about the family wanted to break him out and you wanted to see if I could do it and so forth. Alright, so we'll skip that. Anyway, I lost contact with you. When was the last time we lost contact, when was that?

ML: '64.

FS: 1964 or '63? '63 or '64 approximately, alright?

ML: After '64.

FS: It was around, approximately 1964.

ML: (unintelligible)

FS: And you what, came to New York?

ML: When the General went to jail.

FS: Yeah, you went to South America and then you came back to New York to live and so forth, right?

ML: Yeah.

FS: Then you remarried, rather you got married here in New York?

ML: Oh some time passed, I waited for the General but then I got married, right.

FS: Who did you marry? You're gonna say, you're gonna go ahead and say he worked at the building with you, and...

ML: Yeah, I guess I have to. Louis John Yurositz.

FS: Alright, now one time you and him did what at what building and the address?

ML: We were both federal informants for the FBI in New York.

FS: You worked as an, both of you worked as undercover agents for the FBI in New Yor, right?

ML: Me as a double because I had...

FS: You as a double agent. Now when did this start?

ML: He was the building manager at 250 East 87th Street in Manhattan. The building is owned by Glenwood Management, called the Newberry. The work started with the case agent in 1969.

FS: 1969. Who was the case agent's name, and what federal agents, you already told me. You already told me and they got it on record and this...

ML: They told me not to say anything.

FS: Well, honey, they got it on record and you're gonna go ahead and send this down there because Senator Baker knows who your case agent is, knows the CIA agent that you were in touch with.

ML: You know I keep remembering don't embarass the Bureau and...

FS: Honey, you're not embarassing the Bureau. What you're doing is giving this information to Senator Baker's Committee to turn over to the Justice Department in order for them to go ahead and say, hey - you worked as an agent for them, also as a double agent, you need protection for you and your kid, and if you don't go ahead and tell them the name of these here people how you gonna do it?

ML: Mmm.

FS: You know we get back to the same thing again. Yeah, you're looking for protection. So far the people you've worked with, so far this man Pucci who you saved his life, and saved another undercover agent's life whose working with the FBI. These people are powerful people yet they have done nothing with the problem that you have had right now with you, three times there's been an attempt on your life, isn't that correct? One time they almost threw you out of an 18 story building. Another time you got pistol-whipped. You did all this crap for these people here yet they will do nothing to go ahead at the present time, and this is on record in their own files and so forth, yet you cannot move them to give you or your children any protection. This piece of tape is going to go right to Senator Baker's office, it'll go to Howard Liebengood for him to listen to, to evaluate it and turn this tape over to the proper authorities which will be the Justice Department. You can call Howard Liebengood to see if he has received those codes from the Albanian Embassy from me. You can call him and find out, and also you can call him at the same time and let him know if a tape has been turned over to him. As a matter of fact when I get there Friday and leave this in his office I will instruct his people in the office to get a hold of you, because I'm gonna leave your phone number with Senator's Baker's people, with Senator Baker is on, has a Committee on Intelligence...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He's got the committee. It's a new Committee that has been formed on intelligence. See, now I am turning this information over to the proper authorities. See. And this information is not going to go to any newspaper or anybody...

ML: Okay, okay Frank. I have your word. It's just that I got a hang-up, you know I guess, with them working on practically all my adult life.

FS: Honey, I don't want to know everything you did in 6 years. I don't want to know everything you did because you can't...

ML: They were like a family, they were like a family at one time. Now when I need help they don't come through and they say it costs too much. It cost me a lot of nights in the garbage looking for Albanian stuff, cost me a lot of worry, cost me a lot of fear, threats.

FS: Alright so this is why...

ML: (Unintelligible)

FS: I want some stuff on this thing because if you make a story up then how are you gonna prove, for instance, you gonna go ahead...

ML: No I'm not making anything up. I wouldn't lie about it.

FS: No, no, honey, I'm just saying. If you're gonna go ahead and say, hey - I broke into 33, in an apartment building with 33 Soviet families, who did you work for -- well I worked for the FBI. They call the FBI, the FBI said we know nothing about it. Then you are a liar.

ML: No way am I going to be a liar.

FS: I'm just saying, they're going to say how we gonna protect this girl when she's lying to us because the FBI says no. But if you name names and say I worked with this man here, it's got my file, I worked over a six year period. God damn it - that, that Justice Department will say, hey baby we want to see you and we want to see your files on this girl. And baby they got to go and come up with it. And if they don't come up with it they're in trouble. They're in trouble. Now, how could they hide something when they are working for the same people who are their bosses, who are their bosses? They can tell you to go jump in a lake over here. But Washington, D. C. says - hey, I want to see something here. Why haven't you given this people protection if all this is true. But if they don't know, honey, how the hell are they gonna do anything?

ML: I guess if something happens somebody's gonna know, you know.

FS: Somebody has to know. Now at the beginning you and your husband, your husband was manager...

ML: __________ was the building manager of this building. And he...

FS: Is he still building manager of that building?

ML: Yes, but the way this ________________ going...

FS: Well, honey forget about it right at the present time because we're getting at the building and we're...

ML: Yes, yes.

FS: He still manages the building. Alright, now, how long has he been manager of this building?

ML: We raised this building, we

FS: In other words when was the first years...

ML: We were the very first tenants in this building. We moved in there before anybody moved in there. We were the first tenants. The first person to move in was the first Secretary to the Soviet Mission.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Mr. Vittikoff.

FS: And who was Mr. Vittikoff?

ML: He was the first Secretary to Malek, the Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

FS: Would you say a cesspool of spies which this cesspool of spies which is the Soviet

(end of side 1)

FS: ...where you and your husband worked where he was manager, you were the first people to live in that place?

ML: 250 East 87th Street, the Newberry, owned by Glenwood Management, which are crooked, and that's on the corner of 2nd Avenue, it's called the Newberry.

FS: Okay, now, who started to move in there?

ML: Our very first tenant was Mr. Ovinikoff, he was the First Secretary to Ambassador Malek at the United Nations. (unintelligible)

FS: Alright, go ahead, keep talking into there.

ML: And he's a little guy. He seemed like normal people, but I never really...

FS: Well how many people eventually moved in there besides this man?

ML: Oh well the first one was Mr. Ovinikoff, the second one I named The Stalker, the third one - I have nicknames...

FS: Wait a minute, wait a minute, wait a minute now. The second one who moved in there you called, you nicknamed the

ML: The Stalker.

FS: The Stalker. What was his real name?

ML: Because he, he was, he checked on the Russians. The Russians checked on the Russians. And if a woman, Soviet wife, got out of hand or went shopping by herself or did something out of the way she got pulled back and she was under house arrest.

FS: Alright, what was his name?

ML: Mr. Artimenko, Artimenko. I kept, then I...

FS: Who was the third one you gave a nickname to?

ML: I had nicknames for all of them.

FS: Yeah, but

ML: Moonface, The Stalker...

FS: Yeah.

ML: The Shadow. It was my own little thing of remembering until I memorized. We started out with the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, how many people were on the tenants' list?

ML: We had, the building consisted of 300 units, which 300 apartments, my husband had access to files. Each Soviet file read the same -- Permanent Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic resident, and I got interested. Then one day an agent came at 9 o'clock in the morning, and my husband had been previously working with Treasury and other agencies, including this agent which I'll name, that's Al Chestone.

FS: His first name was what?

ML: Albert, Albert Chestone.

FS: What agency was he with?

ML: The FBI.

FS: Special Agent, FBI?

ML: Yes, counterintelligence.

FS: Sector of the FBI

ML: Yes, political. And, my husband had known him previously working with the Polaris missile, Polaris missile thing. This was before I met my husband or married him. He did something with the Polaris missile thing. And my husband was paid by this same agent. Anyway, we, he came daily and we went over the tenants' list and we sort of dissected everybody in the building.

FS: Alright now, were you recruited by this agent?

ML: Yes, he said are you willing to work and I said, well, why not? He said it doesn't consist of much, a few burglaries (laughter)...

FS: In other words this agent...

ML: Information gather, get close to them, get friendly with them, and you take the woman's viewpoint, standpoint, and my husband...

FS: And they wanted you to do some burglaries, right?

ML: Well, I, yes.

FS: Alright now, these burglaries, did they consist of you and your husband doing the burglaries or you by yourself?

ML: Well my husband had the master keys.

FS: Right, alright.

ML: And...

FS: Well when you did these burglaries...

ML: We all did them together. They're were about 5, 6, 7 cars. One stationed in front of the Soviet Mission. Suppose, say like they were interested in one Soviet who they lost track of, who was supposed to be in Washington, D. C., and then they found him all of a sudden in our building because they had surveillance across the street. That's the first thing - they set up surveillance, a camera, high-power camera across the street. That we were pointed out to. That everybody who went in and out of the building was photographed.

FS: Including yourself and your husband?

ML: Oh yeah,me especially in the morning taking my son to school and everything...

FS: Right.

ML: But, and...

FS: Alright, now, getting back to the entries that you made into the apartments. Once you found out that the people were not in the apartments -- how did you find out they weren't in the apartments?

ML: Well, they would...

FS: Would you knock on the door or something?

ML: No.

FS: You saw them leave?

ML: No, no. They were assigned, first of all we were told that we wanted, they wanted to hit the apartment, the Bureau, and I would listen and my husband looked at me and I looked at him but it was still in the best interests of the country, and this was a very, very top KGB agent, a Soviet General, blah, blah, blah, he was interested...

FS: Do you know the man's name?

ML: Yes.

FS: This General?

ML: Yes.

FS: What was his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: What's his name?

ML: Oleg Likichev.

FS: Likichev. He's a top...

ML: KGB spy.

FS: Alright, and he lived in the building?

ML: Yes, with his wife and 5 year old son.

FS: Right.

ML: On the 10th floor.

FS: Alright, now you were advising them when they left the building. Naturally they had surveillance outside, they would know when he left...

ML: Well first we were told to get close to them, maybe friendly...

FS: Friendly.

ML: Very friendly. We exchanged gifts and we went to dinner, and we were invited to the U.N., and we exchanged...

FS: In other words you were being guided into doing certain things...

ML: No.

FS: This one particular FBI agent.

ML: This one particular agent told us daily what to do.

FS: Alright now did he give you a code name or a code, any particular code?

ML: My name, Mariuch.

FS: Mariuch was the name he gave, that he gave you, right?

ML: Mariuch.

FS: Alright, it sounds Italian. Mariuch is Italian.

ML: Well he...

FS: _________Maria.

ML: He is Italian, too.

FS: The agent?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, now, when,did you ever make an entry into this top KGB agent's apartment?

ML: This one particular, there were several. This wasn't the only one.

FS: Well, let's talk, let's talk about, the, general.

ML: Oleg was, in other words my husband and I discussed it and I said, "Louis, you know," FS: It could be very dangerous.

ML: Yeah, yeah, I said...

FS: You could get caught, you could be killed.

ML: I said suppose, you know, we're working in the precinct on a local level - that's breaking and entering, right? And my husband and I dis, you know we discussed it. Now, Uncle Al - as we started to call this...

FS: FBI agent?

ML: FBI agent, said "Look, he's a very bad person, we lost him and we found him and he's in the building and we want to get in the apartment. We feel he has, for national security reasons, we want to enter that apartment. Louis, will you cooperate?" You know? And my husband said, "Alright".

FS: Did he said he had to discuss it with you?

ML: They discussed it in front of me.

FS: I mean did your husband say he had, he would discuss it with you about...

ML: No, no, but he did, but he didn't ask me because I asked my husband later, I said, "Louis, if you refuse to do what Al tells us to do, me as a lookout and Louis opening the doors for them", Louis said, Louis is my husband, said "What do you want me to do, get subpoenaed? They'll subpoena me if I don't do it. So I'll go along with it."

FS: So it, it was agreed...

ML: It was agreed that he would do it.

FS: Alright, now what did your husband do. Did he open the door for the agents?

ML: Yes he did.

FS: Did he go in, for what, one agent, two agents?

ML: Two agents.

FS: Two agents. Was Uncle Al one of those agents?

ML: No he was not.

FS: Do you know the name of the two agents that made the entry?

ML: No I do not.

FS: Do not.

ML: They came on the specific morning when they had Oleg...

FS: You were _______ by Uncle Al that these two agents were coming?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, on a specific morning?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, and...

ML: They came as lumberjacks, one as a refrigeration repairman.

FS: Right.

ML: Refrigerator, refrigeration-air conditioning repairman.

FS: Alright, now you and your husband with these two agents went up to the 10th floor, right? You were stationed where you were going to be the lookout?

ML: In the...

FS: Hallway?

ML: Service entrance.

FS: In the service entrance. Your husband had the pass keys?

ML: Yes.

FS: He opened the door?

ML: Yes.

FS: The two agents went in?

ML: Yes.

FS: Did your husband go in?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: He stood at the door?

ML: He stood at the door.

FS: That is in case they'd come back he'd...

ML: Right.

FS: The fact that he is the manager of the building standing there with two repairman.

ML: But that he was assured, he was assured, right.

FS: That these two men were repairmen?

ML: That, that just in case something went wrong with the 5 cars assigned to this job that one car would radio that Oleg Likichev was leaving the Mission at this moment, he is getting into his car, he is on the way up 2nd Avenue to his residence.

FS: Right, and they...

ML: You've got approximately 7 to 8 minutes...

FS: Minutes to do what you gott do and get the hell out.

ML: Do, and get out.

FS: Okay.

ML: So, my husband stood in the door and I was in the staircase and they went in with a, a case that looks like a television repair case which had high power cameras.

FS: Right.

ML: And they, my husband was always annoyed because they were sloppy.

FS: (Laughter)

ML: The Soviets are very trained, they would leave a cigarette on an ashtray. If you knocked it over they know immediately someone was in the apartment.

FS: Now, when the agents, before your husband opened the door with the pass key, did the agents look the door over to see if there was any powder marks, tapes, hairs, or anything, or something leaning against the door to signify that possibly when the Cuban general, this, not Cuban general, this Russian general, who is a top KGB agent...

ML: Yes.

FS: wanted to see if somebody made an entry they would leave something on the door.

ML: Yes.

FS: They inspected the door, right? And they didn't find anything?

ML: Right.

FS: Right. So they opened the door. In other words, whatever they touched...

ML: But they made a mistake inside on one break-in and that...

FS: Alright, now, no let's not jump. We're, you were on this one particular thing.

ML: Alright.

FS: These people did go in, they did what they had to do with the cameras and so forth, evidently these were hidden...

ML: Yeah.

FS: cameras that they installed some place in there, right?

ML: No, it was microfilm.

FS: Well there were cameras...

ML: In the flour can...

Oh, you mean what the agents brought in?

FS: What the two agents brought in.

ML: Yes.

FS: Yeah, what did they bring in with them, what, in the general's...

ML: Cameras.

FS: They brought cameras...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: which were installed.

ML: Yeah.

FS: What else did they bring in?

ML: I don't know. They...

FS: Any listening devices, bugging devices?

ML: I would say so. I think...

FS: You don't know for sure, though?

ML: I'm not sure, my husband...

FS: No, but you do know about the cameras?

ML: Yes.

FS: Alright, but there is a possibility they brought bugging devices because it's logical they would bring bugging devices.

ML: I think sometimes, plenty of times they wanted to plant a bug.

FS: Sure.

ML: Especially in the television, the cable TV, the...

FS: Well they install that through the walls and so forth.

ML: No, in the, they'd hook it up to the master antenna for the cable TV.

FS: Oh, for the cable TV. Well, yeah, alright.

ML: That way they thought they could tune in to them transmitting.

FS: Yeah. Alright, now, how long did they stay in, to the General's apartment?

ML: In the apartment, approximately 10-15-20 minutes.

FS: Then they left, your husband closed the door, did he wipe his fingerprints off the door? Do you know?

ML: No, but my husband would usually put the edge of the rug back the way he found it.

FS: Right, in other, everything...

ML: It was turned over...

FS: had to be placed back the same way it was.

ML: And he would watch them and they were rough.

FS: Well, we'll forget about that part. We're not interested in...

ML: This worried my husband because this would...

FS: Yeah, it would make...

ML: They knew...

FS: Make them know there was an entry.

ML: Right.

FS: Okay, now, they did that, they left. Did, did, did the agents ever go back into that apartment again?

ML: No, one time.

FS: Just one time and they never went back into that...

ML: No...

FS: that particular apartment.

ML: they were satisfied.

FS: They were satisfied so evidently everything worked out alright. Even though...

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: your husband was on edge about the way the agents were...

ML: Oh yeah.

FS: Okay? Alright, so we'll forget that part. Now how about other entries. We'll get one at a time.

ML: The other entry that's outstanding is Soviet..

FS: Yeah, go ahead, keep talking.

ML: Very Americanized Soviet, handsome, married with a 10 year old daughter. I forget his name. I have them all at home. And, I nicknamed him "The Tennis Player" because he use to do a lot of jogging and play tennis every morning to make contacts with Americans, and try to recruit, I guess, gather information at the same time. He spoke English without an...

FS: (unintelligible)

ML: Fluently, without an accent, down to curses and slang and everything else. His wife...

FS: You got friendly with him also?

ML: No, he even suggested to take my husband to a massage parlor and he was way out, too much way out.

FS: In other words, ____________ play with girls?

ML: I had his, no, I was, well he was one of those.

FS: He liked to play?

ML: Yeah.

FS: He was a playboy.

ML: He was a playboy. That's, they use

FS: Which is very, yeah,

ML: They use, they used, he was also a top KGB, and his apartment, they did his apartment, too.

FS: What did they do?

ML: They broke in, they

FS: Well, now wait a minute.

ML: used my husband to break in. This a job I wasn't on but...

FS: Well, that not breaking in now. It's illegal entry..

ML: Entry.

FS: Right. In other words they used your husband and you also as a stakeout again?

ML: Yeah.

FS: On that particular one.

ML: Mm-hmm.

FS: He opened the door again. What floor did he have his apartment?

ML: I don't recall that. I'd have to get the tenants' list.

FS: Alright, it makes no difference. Alright, don't worry about that. But they made entry into his apartment.

ML: Yes.

FS: What did they do in his apartment?

ML: I guess they microfilmed and planted a device. Anyway, either way, whatever they did they did...

FS: With the corpor, cooperation of your husband?

ML: Cooperation of my husband...

FS: And yourself.

ML: And they did it sloppy because this particular Soviet, the tennis player, made a formal complaint to the 23rd Precinct, PIU investigation unit, where I was working.

FS: When you say PIU, what's PIU?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Prisoner or Police?

ML: Prisoner Investigation Unit.

FS: Was that a police unit?

ML: That's the 23rd precinct.

FS: Police.

ML: Right,police...

FS: Alright.

ML: department. I was working up there.

FS: Alright.

ML: Now I answered the phones.

FS: Oh, hm-mmm.

ML: You understand?

FS: Yeah.

ML: And this tennis player called up and demanded a detective. I was working up there and the detectives were hot on a homicide and I answered the phone and here it was the tennis player calling to make a formal complaint of breaking and entering his apartment. I had him on the phone.

FS: And he didn't know it was you.

ML: And I died, I tried to disguise my voice and he kept on talking and talking and talking and I couldn't disguise my voice. I was afraid he would know that I, it was me. I took the complaint in other words.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wrote up the 61.

FS: Go ahead. Now let me ask you this here.

ML: The 61 - complaint report.

FS: Alright, let me ask you this here. You say you were working for this police department in this precinct. What was your job with them?

ML: Auxiliary volunteer. Photos, translations, rape cases, interrogation.

FS: And at that time you were answering phone calls that were coming in?

ML: And typing, and doing other things but I don't really want to get those guys involved because they...

FS: No, I just wanted, wanted them to know what you were doing in the police department.

ML: I was an auxiliary sergeant.

FS: Answering the phones. Okay.

ML: Auxiliary is a volunteer police.

FS: Right, good enough. Now what other entries did you make with them. That's two -- that you specified.

ML: Two. The rest I didn't want to go along with because I was a little afraid so my...

FS: Things were getting a little hot for you.

ML: Yes, because we had too many Russians, we had the Albanians, we had the Red Chinese.

FS: All living in that building?

ML: All living in the same building. There was, it was comical. The Albanians wouldn't talk to the Russians, the Russians ignored the Albanians, the Red Chinese went down the service entrance and to avoid the Russians and the Al-, it was just,the Secret Service in the garage and in the front door. The narcotics peddlers coming out of the laundry room. It was, it was a merry-go-round.

FS: In other words,

ML: We had, in one day about four different agencies watching people.

FS: In and out of the building.

ML: And we didn't know if we were coming or going.

FS: Yeah.

ML: We lived on the second floor. We had a view of the street and we would signal to the, across the street surveillance apartment, apartment, you know. We'd see the cars pull up and the cars leave.

FS: Alright, now...

ML: My husband did most of, he'd been doing it.

FS: He'd been doing most of the end of the...

ML: Yes, because I felt I didn't want to get caught. I just didn't want to get caught because it was a heck of a chance because more than one Soviet family lived on one floor and if anyone of them walked out when my husband was opening the door to let those guys in my husband would have been dead.

FS: Alright, not only that I understand that you were getting very familiar with many of the families of...

ML: I was too friendly...

FS: these people.

ML: with the families.

FS: Right, so you didn't want to go ahead and

ML: They trusted me alone in their apartments. We had many discussions together, we exchanged medicine, I gave them medicine for one child who...

FS: At the same time you tried to get as much information out of them as you can being on that friendly basis.

ML: I was being on a very social...

FS: Right.

ML: natural basis.

FS: Right.

ML: And I became friendly with them.

FS: How long, how long...

ML: We even were paid money to throw a few parties.

FS: You were paid money...

ML: For the Soviets.

FS: You were given money by the...

ML: By the Justice Department.

FS: Yeah.

ML: To throw a few parties.

FS: So the agents could make surveillance.

ML: So they could make surveillance.

FS: And contact?

ML: And contact, and try to get them, loosen up, to loosen up...

FS: Well, booze can loosen a lot of people's mouths.

ML: Well it was mostly their vodka anyway they gave us. But, yeah they suggested the, using agents as waiters and bartenders and all that. And I said that wouldn't go. Soviet people are very trained. They smell anything like that. And I was very open with them. They'd leave from the countries and I would be the first to know. They would bring back gifts. They babysat my children, I babysat their children. We exchanged medicine and I just didn't want anything to go wrong.

FS: But your husband continued to work with the agency, right?

ML: Yes. We, we took, we ID'd photos. We watched for cars. We watched their movement. It was day and night.

FS: You did a lot of surveillance work on these people but you yourself, personally, wanted to try to keep out of the...

ML: Yeah.

FS: operation as far as...

ML: Break...

FS: entering into the apartments, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: How long did this last? Over a period of how long?

ML: 1969 to 1976.

FS: All these years?

ML: Yes.

FS: That's doing surveillance on these people.

ML: Yeah. We were...

FS: How about the Albanians now, tell me about the code.

ML: The Albanians, the Albanians we got very friendly with a Mr. Koyani, Ambassador to the Mission, the U.N., and the Albanians are not as elite as the Russians are. The Russians dry clean their own clothes, burn their own garbage, have no photos, personal things in the apartment. The Albanians are more, they allow their children to watch television. The Soviets don't. We convinced the Albanians who had a mission on their mission, which they blocked a complete fire exit was on the 21st floor of the Newberry. They lived in the apartments on the 20th floor and the 22nd floor. And they had about 30, 30 families who resided there and their mission was there. And we became very friendly with them because of one incident, especially my husband, took, went to see his mother and left me in charge of the building. That same day they had a so-called demonstration where the demonstrators had a 25-minute picketing right to picket. The demonstration turned into a bloody riot where they burned flags and everything and the Albanians came down. They all are armed. They're all armed, and they agitated the rioters out on the street. And I was alone with only my basic police training and my wits, really, and a panicking doorman and my kids. I was just alone. I, the first thing I looked out the window when I heard the shooting I called the Bureau and I said, "Get me Al Chestone fast." I said I don't have Louis here. I said I need help. I have a demonstration. I don't know what to do. And there were about 500 people throwing bricks, bottles, everything through the plate glass windows. Burning American flags and Albanian flags because of something that happened in Albania. Those that defected here started this demonstration. So then I, things got out of hand, the doorman was hurt with a brick. I saw blood, and the Albanian Ambassador and five top officials agitated these people from inside the lobby with fists. Very unprofessional-like.

FS: Yeah.

ML: So I physically pulled them by their coats and told them, "Get upstairs, get upstairs and get yourself back into the mission", because tenants were walking through the lobby and we were going to get hurt by flying glass and everything else. And I had no help. The police were outside of the line...

FS: Marita, what we're going into details is something that is a story.

ML: Oh, alright.

FS: So we'll go ahead and just bypass that.

ML: Anyway, the Albanians Al was interested into, and especially because they were admitting the Red Chinese into the United Nations, which they did. It was that speech, which I have the original copy of. Ambassador Rocco Nocco - sounds crazy, but that's his name, Rocco

Nocco, and they were, they were sloppier, and the agent Al Chestone told me convince them, you know, case 'em, keep going up and down the steps, what time they throw their garbage out. Garbage was the most valuable source of information for the Bureau, and that was...

FS: Garbage and trash.

ML: Trash. Chicken bones, codes, diapers, whatever, you know, and that was my job because I had the patience. Now the FBI supplied me with bandaids and gloves, flashlights, batteries and the whole thing, because I convinced the Albanians that the compacter, which was the disposal system in the building from 31 floors down -- in other words when they threw their garbage out that it would come out in brick form, block form, brick crushed, which in fact was not true.

FS: But they believed it?

ML: They believed it. They trusted us. Louis and I were the only ones allowed in the mission. We were the only ones.

FS: Now this mission is that building you were talking about.

ML: That's still there.

FS: Still there.

ML: Very much there. That's the code that you have.

FS: Right.

ML: So, I started, made it a every two hour routine to go after midnight when they put their garbage out in the hall, pick up the bags. Take them down to the service entrance and take the bags at home, take 'em home. And go through the orange peels and chicken bones and gather torn up letters, this was before they got smart and bought a shredder (unintelligible). And I would turn this garbage letter, in other words, I would past it together and give it to the Bureau and some of these letters turned out to be very valuable. Among them was one code, now...

FS: I would assume that these letters that were in code they would be classified material. Otherwise it wouldn't be in code.

ML: Very valuable, yes. The...

FS: And this was turned over to who?

ML: To Al Chestone. The first code I got, I just got on a hunch lucky. Because it was just at the time when the Red Chinese entered the United States, first came here. Mr. Huang Yua, and I met them. We met them first before anybody met them, Louis and I. And that same night the code came down at 3:00 in the morning and I just had a hunch and I got up and I said, "Louis I can't sleep, I'm going down and do some work. Give me the keys to the compacter room." So I went downstairs and I waited and sure enough around 3:30 these bags started to come down from the 21st floor.

FS: 3:30 in the morning?

ML: 3:30 in the morning because Al said watch them closely, because of the Red Chinese. And I shut the machine off and I got these, I got this code, I caught it in other words, but it...

ML: This is the code you turned over to me?

FS: This is the first code, the very first code, at the risk of having my hands chopped off because if I didn't shut that machine off in time I could have been hurt. But I got it. The first code was very valuable. It was sent to Washington.

(End of tape - side 2).

FS: ...these bags of stuff and if you hadn't have turned off the machine you would have got your hand either chopped up or cut off, and so forth. What did, were you saying about Al, Uncle Al?

ML: Uncle Al slept and I did the work, and by the time I got upstairs and took the orange peels and everything out of the garbage and separated the letters and every tiny little piece with tweezers and everything, put it all in a box, right down to every piece. I ruined my rugs and everything. And Uncle Al would come at 8:30, 9:00 in the morning and I would still be up separating the garbage and he'd be all fresh and ready for work and I had just come back from the garbage room. And...

FS: You stayed awake all night?

ML: Yeah, with the tweezers and I use to run out of skotch tape which was frustrating cause I couldn't stick these letters togethers without skotch tape, so he brought me a big box of skotch tape which was very kind of him. Then I would give it to him and he'd, he'd have coffee, tea and toast or whatever. And I'd say, "Now I want to go to sleep." And he'd say, "No, no, no, wait a minute. Mr. So-and-so, or Berzofsky, we want to get a line on Mr. Berzofsky.

FS: Who was Mr. Berzofsky?

ML: Berzofsky, the Second Secretary to the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republic.

FS: What was his first name, do you know?

ML: Mmmm, I forgot...

FS: That's alright, it don't matter.

ML: I forgot really. But we were very close to him. His wife was a surgeon in the Soviet mission and she was, she's, she's adorable. She's nice, she's sweet and she has a lovely daughter, Irene, who turned out to have liver cancer. She was a little girl when I first met her, like my daughter. My daugher played with her, they took piano lessons together, exchanged books, and the little girl, at sixteen, Irene was sent back to the Soviet Union with liver cancer. I got very close to the mother, the mother was heartbroken, the father was heartbroken. I guess like any mother and father when their only child turns out to have liver cancer. She's diagnosed as such in the Soviet Union and they asked me to get medicine, pain killers for Irene. I do so and pass along to them empirin and codine #4, which is a pain killer which they smuggled over to their daughter on ____________ with the permission of the FBI. We exchanged jewelry, clothes, and everything else. We were just one mother to another mother. Their little girl in trouble, mine not in trouble and it was little things like that that I would get very involved with. I don't know...

FS: Morita let me ask you this here, did the agents ever tell you to go out with any of the diplomats in the mission?

ML: Well, now we have to go back to Oleg, Oleg Likichev.

FS: And who is he again?

ML: He was the KGB spy that they lost and thought he, they thought he was still residing in Washington, the outside of Washington, D. C., in Virginia. He was supposed to have last been seen in Virginia somewhere and all of a sudden they picked him up in our building, as being in our building. They lost him and they were furious, the Bureau, and they wanted us very close to him. And he, we had a lot of evenings together we spent with him, dinners, and he came to us,

FS: In other words he asked you to go out, did he ask (unintelligible)

ML: Well, Oleg, Oleg, let's just say, I don't know if it was a game they were playing or if they were doubles or what. They talked a lot about the State of Washington, residing in the State of Washington. They also knew I had diamonds and he asked me, (unintelligible) "Can you get me diamonds?"

FS: What did he call you?

ML: Ilonka Marischa, Ilona Marita.

FS: Oh, that's in Russian?

ML: Yes. And we always exchanged Russian words and I know a few, enough to get by on. All of a sudden, you know, he was interested in diamonds. He had a fascination for diamonds. His wife, she was kind of sweet on my husband he was kind of sweet on me and I kept telling Uncle Al this thing is going to get out of hand. I said all of a sudden he wants diamonds, and Al, what do I do. Go ahead, talk to him about diamonds. So I said Oleg, what do you mean by diamonds? He said uncut stones for cash. I am a Soviet official, I cannot go into a jewelry store like you and buy them. I want diamonds. I'm willing to pay a hundred thousand dollars for them. I said, I said tell me why, Oleg. And he said, "Money, why does anybody want diamonds." I said it's a good enough reason. So I said, "Hey, Louis, what can we do for Oleg about his diamonds?" And Louis said we'll figure something out. And then Oleg said, this was at a dinner party up in their house. Hot diamonds, he wanted hot, uncut, raw diamonds. So he was serious, he was dead serious. He said he would buy them for cash.

FS: How serious was he? Did you ever get any for him?

ML: Well it got this far. We told Uncle Al the next morning. I said, "Uncle Al, I got a surprise for you. You're gonna have to come up with some hot diamonds. A hundred thousand dollars worth because I promised Oleg that I would get them for him since he can't buy them. Oleg wants diamonds." And I said if you can put two and two together maybe this guy will defect because he's talking about the State of Washington. I said but you have to be careful, I have to be careful, no? So Al said I'll get you the diamonds. You tell him to get the cash ready. So Uncle Al went to an underworld source and got the diamonds. Uncle Al made a boo-boo and Oleg, the day of the exchange I was supposed to make the sale in the apartment, Oleg was at a sports meeting in Washington, D.C. Uncle Al said, "I've got to give these diamonds back to the underworld or give them the cash." I said, "Listen, I told you tomorrow, not today, Al. Tomorrow, because Oleg told us he's going to this soccer meeting in Washington, D.C. Alright whatever the kind of meeting it is. He is in Washington, D. C." "Oh is he?" I said, "Yes, he is." Right. Anyway, Uncle Al started to panick because he was in my house with a hundred thousand dollars worth of uncut, hot diamonds.

FS: By himself?

ML: By himself, and I was supposed to get the cash from Oleg. Oleg said on a Thursday and Uncle Al came on a Wednesday and the whole thing...

FS: So what happened?

ML: fell through. Al said he had to give them back to the underworlds, to his source. So he took them back and then Oleg, you know, I had to talk my way out of it. It was just one of the flubs. But anyway after I left my husband Oleg kept asking for me, kept coming directly to the apartment and saying, "Louis, I don't believe you two split, you two go, she left. I don't believe it." And my husband said "yes, she did leave. It's her own problems, Oleg, you know, forget about it." And he said, "No, it's not possible. You must stay together. You must stay together." Anyway, he kept coming, about four times and asking my husband, until my husband made a joke of it and said Oleg wants to see you. I mean he's made it damn plain that he wants to see you. In other words if you're finished I'll take over. Where is she living? My husband tells him I'm living on 88th Street. Now I talked to my husband and I said what did you do that for? Tell him I'm living on 88th Street? You know, because I know he wants to go out with me. You can feel it, I can feel it, the, you know? So I call up, Uncle Al meantime is transferred to Newark, I get another case agent. Louis gets a case agent for the building and he works alone, without me. The other agent is John Kotter.

FS: With the FBI?

ML: FBI, 69th Street. I call up John Kotter. I said, "John, I hear your taking Al's place", and I meet him. Drop things, start things, drop things, different assignments, then we get to Oleg. I said look, Oleg is bothering Louis. He wants to go out with me. And John Kotter says, "Beautiful, that is a beautiful setup. Let's call him up." I said, "Hey, wait a minute. Either do this sophisticated, alright? First I'll send him a Christmas card and sign it Ilonka Marischa, you know? I'll put my phone number on the bottom, something you know? Or I'll happen to be there when he's going into the building, or I'll bump into him." I said you don't just call him up. You know that's going to be like a setup because I've been avoiding him. So, anyway, he tells, he outlines the whole thing. I said what have you got planned, John. And he says, "Do you

ML: Right.

FS: That's the idea.

ML: And I'm in the middle. So, anyway, I go, I go to the mission with my daughter, who was at the time 12 years old. My daughter, I guess, is a little use to my life. She's use to FBI all her life. She knows not to talk. She knows whether we look at her when to say something. I guess she's the closest thing to me now. She goes along. She's very cool and we both walked into the mission on the pretense that she had to do a project for school on the Soviet Union. She needed material. Now as soon as we walked into the mission everybody there I know because they reside in the building. And they all say, "Ilonka Marischa blah, blah, blah, blah." And I'm very friendly with them all. They all love my daughter. But we're there for other reasons. We're there to go to see Oleg. We gather, we gather the material, meanwhile I'm aware that every picture has an eye or every poster has a mirror or camera, you know? But my daugher's very cool and we're left alone in the room where the Soviet material is displayed. But I know we're being watched. She knows it too and she doesn't, she says, "Mommy, look, this is beautiful, beautiful." You know? Then I ask for Oleg to this very, very tough Soviet woman that said "What you want?", you know. I said "Oleg Likichev, please. I'd like to speak to him." And she called and he is still in the United Nations, he asks you to wait. I refused a wire or anything like that, but...

FS: What wire are you talking about?

ML: A wire on me.

FS: Oh.

ML: Because...

FS: That the agents (unintelligible)

ML: Yes, because Oleg I know likes me and if he sees me he would grab me and hug me and that's the Russian way...

FS: Yeah.

ML: And he'll feel that and I'm dead.

FS: Right.

ML: Right in the mission. That's not my proper there.

FS: Right.

ML: And I wouldn't risk it with my daughter. So, anyway, we waited. We were allowed the run of the place. We knew everyone there and...

FS: Like you say, eyes were watching you.

ML: Oh definitely, definitely, because that's how they test you when you walk in there. And you just don't get in there and have the run of the place, you're not left alone. But I know you're being watched.

FS: Sure.

ML: Anyway, there was this, it was, it was a legitimate excuse that Oleg was tied up in the United Nations because it was in the paper the next day, that it was some security council meeting. And I said "Please give this note to Mr. Likichev. Tell him thank you very much for the material. And best wishes to his wife, blah, blah, blah," and we left. Funny thing is the cop outside almost arrested us, a uniformed police officer.

FS: For what reason?

ML: He gave us a dirty look and made a very slurring, nasty remark when I left. But I hate to knock the police department because they're helping me now. But, I guess, he didn't know, you know?

FS: Yeah, he thought you were Russians.

ML: He thought I was a Russian.

FS: Or a Russian sympathizer.

ML: Right, especially going in with a child and I looked very...

FS: Yeah.

ML: American. Anyway, I got home and John Kotter was waiting in front of my door. I remember it was raining. He was reading. And I said, he said "Are you going to meet Oleg?" I said, "Now how the hell can I make a date with Oleg with my daughter?"

FS: Yeah.

ML: I said Oleg's in the United Nations. Why don't you tell me these things before that they're delayed at a security council meeting, you know, instead of me letting, letting me sit there. You know these are all the little things that use to annoy me...

FS: Yeah.

ML: that they have to screen things first before, you know - check things out, don't have to make a blunder like that. Anyway, I said I left Oleg a note. I said now you go home and I'm going to take it easy and they, we tried, and I said, "You know, John, you're just going to get me so involved with Oleg. I'm not going to end up in bed in a motel room upstate somewhere with Oleg so you can come in and take photographs. That's not my stick." I said I'll gather garbage, get license plates, tape, do everything else, but, I'll even take the mail, like I've been doing, but I'm not going to be caught in bed. I said that's too big a pawn for me and I'm not getting anything for it right now. They allowed me to take mail, steam it, photograph it and put it back. Some of that mail is now missing, which belongs to the Soviet people, which this perpetrator, perpetrator has and wants to blackmail me with and I asked the FBI to please help me with that.

FS: Who's the perpetrator?

ML: The perpetrator is Guiseppi Faisiano, aka Pionne, aka David Ring, who broke into my apartment and stole this tape with Oleg Likichev, these love conversations, the mail, and part of the Albanian code. He has those in his possession. He threatens my life with it. He threatens blackmail with me. He assaulted me. He pistol-whipped me and I asked the Bureau for help.

FS: Did he try to throw you out the 18 story build-, window?

ML: Yes.

FS: He did what?

ML: Yes, he tried to push me out the window.

FS: 18 stories?

ML: Yes, and I told him stay away, get back, because if anything happens to me there's letters with the Justice Department naming everything I know about you, and he stopped cold. He threatened to shoot my daughter in the back. He's threatening her right now with disgrace because she is the daughter of the, of a well-known man. Right now my main concern is the, these letters and the code and the tape and possibly other things, are in the hands of this Guiseppi Faisiano, and he wants money from me and he's probably right now at the building. He is casing the Soviets and he's going to try to go to the same people that he has on the letters to tell them that I was an informant for the FBI for revenge, for having him arrested on the assault charge with a gun. He also wants money. He wants to disgrace the FBI. He's blackmailing right now my husband, my ex-husband, for the master keys of the Newberry. My husband is calling me for help and I don't know what to do. I asked Frank to help me. I gave him the code because everybody refused. I was afraid to have any-, anywhere. I guess Frank helped me before in Cuba and I don't, I worked, he worked for me and I worked for him and I don't know where to go because, the only ones that are helping me now are the local police - in their lunch hours or when I'm too afraid to leave the house they buy me milk and fruit for the kids. And they'll take the children home when I get a threat on the phone or a box in the mailbox or get my back door shot at. I take my children and I put them in the 23rd precinct.

FS: They even, off duty...

ML: The off-duty police, police officers take my children home...

FS: And they spend time at the house?

ML: And they spend time at the house in their free time when they should be home with their families.

FS: Well you have saved the life of two people, right?

ML: I would think so.

FS: Well, you have.

ML: Yes.

FS: When, one of the, who are the two people you saved their lives?

ML: A federal narcotics informant...

FS: Undercover agent, right?

ML: Undercover agent Pino Cantanya, and Assistant Federal District Attorney Thomas A. Puccio from Brooklyn.

FS: And you saved their lives because a contract was being put out on them?

ML: Yes because I overheard and everything I said checked out.

FS: And even though you have saved their lives...

ML: I asked them please help me with this man, he has Soviet documents, he's hurt me, he's hurt my children, he almost shot my daughter. He, I asked them please help me because I gave you information for nothing and they said they promised to do something on this individual immigration-wise. So far he has threatened everybody around me. My physicians, my mother, my ex-husband, my children, my neighbors, my super.

FS: He's an illegal immigrant?

ML: He is. I would say he's an illegal alien.

FS: What's his full name, his real name?

ML: His arrest name, that he was arrested under was Guiseppi Faisaino. He has, he's also known as David Ring. He has a passport under this name. He's also known as Pinno, and he is a gunman. Never worked a day in his life, never paid taxes, he's a gambler, he's a stick-up man and I worked for the FBI on organized crime at the racetrack. Roosevelt Raceway, Yonkers, and...

FS: Any other agencies?

ML: Organized Crime Commission Bureau, OCCB.

FS: Ever worked with DEA? Drug Enforcement Agency?

ML: Yes I did.

FS: Who are the people you are in touch with?

ML: Two agents, Murphy and Shannon. This was...

FS: You know their full names?

ML: Well I have a day number and a night number and I did some work in the Newberry with my husband with them involving the Cuban narcotics connection in South America. I also worked with the organized crime, gambling.

FS: Now you've turned, you want me to turn this tape over to Senator Baker's committee to be turned over to the Justice Department, is that correct? Right?

ML: Yes.

FS: You want me turn the...

ML: Yes, I would like you, Frank, to turn this over just in case something happens to me because I don't know which way it's going to come.

FS: And you need some protection, right now, right?

ML: I need some type of help for my children, because of this man Pinno threatening to expose my dealings with the FBI and to the foreign press. I just caught up in this thing since 1959 and I've been with it up until last month, last week and I've just, and I need help. There is no help. I mean since last month and I don't want my children hurt. They've already been hurt.

FS: Alright, I promise to turn this tape and the code over to Senator Baker's committee, right?

ML: Yes.

FS: Who in turn will turn the information over to the proper officials in Washington, D. C.

ML: Yes. I don't mean to embarass the Bureau. I know how important it is but at this point I need help desparately for my kids. They're 6 and 14 and they don't deserve what they have to go through. The whole summer locked up, threatened and afraid, and my daughter of exposure.

FS: Did they every try to, to kidnap...

ML: Yes.

FS: the kids?

ML: They threatened to kidnap my children. They were once abducted by this man. I had no knowledge of it. On the last day of school and he, he will hurt them. He will hurt them - this man is sick. He's, he's on 10 valiums a day. He's unpredictable. He's vengeful.

FS: And his close association with top mobsters?

ML: Yes he has close associations...

(End of tape)

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
United States Senate
442 Russell Bldg.
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Inouye:

Enclosed you will find a copy of a letter from this office to Senator Mansfield expressing our concern over the rush of the Central Intelligence Agency to destroy large quantities of secret government documents. We believe the Select Committee on Intelligence should review with CIA Director Bush what specifically the Agency intends to destroy before doing so. It is likely that there are numerous memoranda and other documents which are of extreme importance to the committee, which are central to the committee's executing the Senate's mandate of comprehensive and complete oversight of executive intelligence agencies.

We urge that the Senators serving on the Intelligence Committee take whatever steps necessary to stop the destruction of materials by the Central Intelligence Agency until such time as the Committee can review the content and importance of that data.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

GC

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20505

22 June 1976

JUN 23 11 26 AM '76

Honorable Daniel Inouye, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am sending you a copy of my letters to Senators Mansfield and Scott extending the moratorium on the destruction of certain records until 10 December 1976. I do hope that this action and the procedures outlined in my letters are fully responsive to the interests of your Committee.

Sincerely,

GB

George Bush
Director

orig ⇒ WGM for Chair + return to files
✓cy → MJM + return to Research for files
cy → Blue/index
cy → Chron

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any records. The same will be done with respect to those routine administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21, were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution. I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select Committee.

It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 JUN 1976

Honorable Hugh Scott
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Scott:

In accordance with your letter of 10 June 1976, we have extended the period of the moratorium on the destruction of certain records which were the subject of your letter of 27 January 1975 in connection with S. Res. 21. The moratorium will expire on 10 December 1976.

In addition, before any such records are destroyed, we shall transmit to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence copies of the record schedules which are submitted to the National Archives and Record Service for their approval prior to the destruction of any records. The same will be done with respect to those routine administrative records which, although not involved under S. Res. 21, were withheld from routine destruction during the life of that Resolution. I am confident that suitable arrangements can be made for review of documents before they are destroyed if this is the desire of the Select Committee.

It is hoped that these arrangements are fully responsive to the wishes of you and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence as outlined to me in your letter of 9 June and Chairman Inouye's letter of 8 June to you.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

cc: Chairman Daniel Inouye

June 7, 1976

Honorable Michael J. Mansfield
United States Senate
133 Russell Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

George Bush's letter to Senator Hugh Scott, with a copy to you, of the 2nd of June is disturbingly ambiguous. In stating that the CIA now believes itself relieved of the responsibility of maintaining data "which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee," the Agency failed to make any effort to identify what materials were targeted for destruction and which weren't. Further, the next to last sentence of Mr. Bush's letter, "I trust you (Senator Scott) agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding," has led some observers in the Senate to conclude no destruction will take place until such confirmation has been given. This does not appear to be true. Neither the press office nor the legislative ~~consultant~~ counsel would confirm that destruction of data has not already occurred, or would not occur without acquisence from the Senate leadership. To the contrary, the legislative counsel's office informed this group that the "process" of destruction has already begun.

The action of the Central Intelligence Agency is wrong. The new Select Committee on Intelligence should have been consulted prior to the destruction of any materials which might be vital to the proper functioning of that committee and which in any case are within the legislative and oversight domain of that committee. Chairman Inouye and Vice-Chairman Baker, along with the membership of the Intelligence Committee should have the opportunity to review the data selected for destruction and to determine, in conjunction with the CIA, thepropriety of destroying or maintaining such data.

We urge you, Senator Mansfield, to take whatever steps necessary to immediately halt the unilateral act undertaken by the CIA of destroying possibly critical and irreplaceable government documents.

Sincerely yours,

James Humphreys

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

Copy for Senator Baker ✓

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

June 7, 1976

Honorable Daniel K. Inouye
Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

We have received a letter from the Honorable George Bush, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, relative to the destruction of papers and material which he has held for sometime relative to our request. Our action was taken to facilitate the inquiry being undertaken by your predecessor committee under the chairmanship of Senator Frank Church.

In view of the fact, as we assume, that all of Senator Church's committee records have been turned over to your permanent Select Committee, we would appreciate your advising us as to whether or not you want our original letter to stand and the papers and other materials to still be held. Could you give us the judgment of you and your Committee on this matter?

With best wishes, we are

Hugh Scott
HUGH SCOTT
REPUBLICAN LEADER

Mike Mansfield
MIKE MANSFIELD
MAJORITY LEADER

[illegible]

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

2 June 1976

Honorable Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

On 27 January 1975, following adoption of S. Res. 21 creating the Select Committee on Intelligence, you and Senator Hugh Scott requested that the Central Intelligence Agency "not destroy, remove from [its] possession or control, or otherwise dispose or permit the disposal of any records or documents which might have a bearing on the subjects under investigation, including but not limited to all records or documents pertaining in any way to the matters set out in section 2 of S. Res. 21."

In response to this request, the Agency placed in effect a complete moratorium on the destruction of records, including normal administrative records scheduled for routine destruction.

The purpose of this letter is to advise you that it is our intention to proceed with destruction of records, now that the Select Committee has completed its investigation and issued its final report. We have so advised Senator Church.

Along with the backlog of routine administrative records, the Agency will destroy records which were collected and maintained by the Agency and which were subject to investigation by the Rockefeller Commission and the Select Committee. The Agency is required to destroy much of this latter material by the Privacy Act of 1974 (P. L. 93-579) and by Executive Order 11905. Of course, all records destruction will be fully consistent with other applicable laws, Presidential directives, and the requirements of pending litigation and Justice Department investigations.

I trust you agree that this action is now necessary and appropriate, and I would appreciate your confirmation of this understanding.

I am sending a duplicate of this letter to Senator Hugh Scott.

Sincerely,

George Bush
Director

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRMAN
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHAIRMAN
PHILIP A. HART, MICH.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C.
GARY HART, COLO.
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 11, 1976

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Senator Mansfield has informed me that you did not receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing a copy for your information.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Pfeiffer

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11: 25
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

Long → Miller
Cys → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

January 8, 1976

Senator Mike Mansfield
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

Thank you for your letter of December 15th in which you state that you would contact Mr. Miller and ask him to respond to my request. I am sorry to bother you again but I have had no word from Mr. Miller. As you know, I feel that the matter is of sufficient importance that it deserves a reply or at least an acknowledgement of a receipt of my letter from Mr. Miller.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:kcm

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

SEL COMM
File: ____________________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment

SEL COMM
File: ________________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

COPY

February 11, 1976

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Senator Mansfield has informed me that you did not receive my letter to you of December 19, concerning the work of the Select Committee. I am therefore enclosing a copy for your information.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

bc: Senator Mike Mansfield

WM:mm

check w/ Ted Ralston

4. (- JMM) Met with Senator Frank Church regarding a letter he had written to Professor E. W. Pfeiffer of the University of Montana, stating that Senator Church had reliable information that Air America was responsible for defoliation operations in Cambodia. A copy of Senator Church's letter had been sent to the Director for comment by Professor Arthur H. Westing, Windham College in Vermont. I explained to the Senator we were much concerned over this allegation and the Director authorized me to deny it categorically. I added that while we were not prying into the identity of the Senator's source, we were curious as to whether this source's allegations were based on honest mistake or malice. If the former, I suggested the Senator might wish to straighten him out. Senator Church said he couldn't remember off hand where he learned this information but would check his files. He said he fully accepted our denial.

INTE[illegible]

[illegible] 1962.

[illegible] operations [illegible]

[illegible] in So[illegible] Forces. The [illegible] particular [illegible] operations [illegible]

Orig
cy
cy
cy
cy

SEL COMM
File:

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

Karl

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0229/2
27 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to requests about Agency involvement in Cambodia, the attached statement is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
Denial of CIA involvement in the
resistance and dissident activities
which occurred in Cambodia since the
fall of that country to Communists

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 27 1976
CIA

UNCLASSIFIED

The Central Intelligence Agency has not been involved in any way in the resistance and dissident activities which have occurred in Cambodia since the fall of that country to the Communists.

REC
FEB 27 1976
CIA

UNCLASSIFIED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Ralston

Review Staff: 76-0229/1
23 February 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Ralston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to your recent request about allegations of Agency involvement in Cambodia, please be advised that Mr. Ralston was given a copy of a 1971 letter from Senator Church to Professor Pfeiffer and a copy of a memorandum for the record reflecting a conversation between Senator Church and our Legislative Counsel about the specific allegation concerning the use of herbicides in Cambodia in 1969.

These memoranda were furnished Professor Pfeiffer in response to his FOIA request.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 24 1976
CIA

SEL COMM
File: ____________

December 19, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive the delay in replying to your inquiries. The press of business on the Select Committee has been excessive.

The Committee has indeed considered a number of problems concerning the role of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. For example, there was an executive session on CIA paramilitary operations in Laos. Staff members have also investigated several cases related to Vietnam.

Unfortunately, the Committee has been forced to set some limits to its inquiry. There are a vast number of important issues in the activities of the intelligence agencies. To do an effective job of presenting recommendations for legislation concerning the agencies, within the time allotted to the Committee, we have had to concentrate our attention on certain issues rather than others. The Committee has concluded that the use of herbicides will not be within the purview of its investigation.

A permanent committee for oversight of the intelligence agencies may be established to follow the Select Committee. In this case there would be new opportunities to pursue many of the lingering, unresolved issues which remain. The problem of use of herbicides in Indochina might also be considered within the jurisdictions of the Committees on Foreign Relations or Armed Services.

I regret that we simply do not have the time or resources to investigate the matter which understandably concerns you. This does not deny its importance. I hope one of the other committees may better be able to help you.

Sincerely,

William G. Miller
Staff Director

DB:bcm

MIKE MANSFIELD
MONTANA

United States Senate
Office of the Majority Leader
Washington, D.C. 20510

1975 DEC 18 AM 11:25
SENATE COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

December 15, 1975

Professor E. W. Pfeiffer
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

This will acknowledge your letter of December 2.

I will be glad to contact Mr. Miller again and ask him to respond to your request.

Must close now, but with best personal wishes, I am

Sincerely yours,

CC William G. Miller ✓

DMC

orig → Miller
✓ cy → Blum

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

December 2, 1975

Senator Mike Mansfield
U.S. Senate Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Senator Mansfield:

You may recall that some weeks ago you were kind enough to arrange a meeting between myself and Mr. William Miller, of the staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. You arranged this meeting for me so that I could present documents, which I showed you, relating to possible CIA illegal activities in Indochina. Specifically, as you know, I have long been interested in the problem of who carried out the massive defoliation raids against Cambodia, one year prior to the U.S. incursions into that country and during a time when, formally, there were normal relations between the United States and the Royal government of Cambodia. After talking with you about the matter, I met, for about one-half hour, with Mr. Miller and showed him the documents I showed you. He made some notes and assured me that the question of possible illegal activities of the CIA in Indochina, including Cambodia, was on the agenda of his committee. Sometime ago, I wrote Mr. Miller to find out when he expected the committee might look into Indochina. However, as has been the case since August, with respect to communications from this committee, I have as yet received no answer, not even an acknowledgement of receipt. I have just read in the press that the Senate Intelligence Committee expects again to look at Chile, Cuba, etc., but there is no indication of any interest in Indochina. I would greatly appreciate your help in learning whether, in fact, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence will look into possible illegal covert operations of U.S. intelligence agencies in Indochina. I would also appreciate your views as to what I should do to get an investigation of the massive clandestine herbicide attack on Cambodia (1969). This was a unique operation in technological history of foreign relations and as a biologist I am most interested and concerned to get the full story on this bizarre incident. If the Senate Select Committee will not ask obvious questions of the intelligence community, I would greatly appreciate your views on whom I should turn to, to ask these questions.

I want to thank you again for your help on my last trip to Washington. I regret that I have to keep bothering you about this matter, but I do hope you understand my concern, based on my personal observations in Indochina, that the facts about covert operations there be publically determined.

Sincerely yours,

E. W. Pfeiffer

Equal Opportunity in Education and Employment

United States Senate

Washington, D. C., December 15, *19* 75

Respectfully referred to

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
U. S. Senate

Correspondence from Professor E. W. Pfeiffer

I would appreciate your replying to Professor Pfeiffer directly.

Mike Mansfield *U. S. S.*

Form No. 3 16—45102-3 GPO

MISSOULIAN

THE MISSOULIAN P. O. BOX 1535 500 N. HIGGINS AVE. MISSOULA, MONTANA 59801 TEL. (406) 542-0311

Oct. 23, 1975

Mr. William G. Miller, Staff Director
Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations
With Respect to Intelligence Activities
Room 607, Capitol Hill Hotel
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Miller:

Recently I discussed with Dr. E. W. Pfeiffer, University of Montana zoologist, an incident in which he has had an abiding concern: the herbicide attack that occurred in eastern Cambodia in the spring of 1969.

As I understand it, from my talks with Dr. Pfeiffer and from my review of the correspondence he has received from various agencies, there is no doubt that the attack actually occurred, that it was large and significant, and that the nature of the chemicals and aircraft involved indicate that the U.S. had a direct role in carrying it out.

Yet it seems the State and Defense departments, the CIA and the "private" CIA-affiliate Air America have all denied in one way or another that they conducted the attack.

The obvious question is who did make the attack? Who ordered it, why was it ordered and under what authority? Dr. Pfeiffer has indicated your committee is looking into this matter and that the affair may ultimately be discussed in the course of Select Committee hearings at some point.

Is it possible for you to tell me the status of your inquiry? Would it be appropriate at this time for our newspaper to interview Dr. Pfeiffer and write a news story on the documents he has received, or would such a study benefit from new information your committee efforts may resurrect within the near future?

Thanks in advance for your interest. We have followed with great interest the Select Committee efforts to date.

Sincerely,

Don Schwennesen

Don Schwennesen
Environmental Writer

orig → For TF
cy → Blue
cy → Chron

Xref Pfeiffer

E

Western Montana's Leading Newspaper

100% Recycled Paper

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

1975 OCT 30 PM 2:22
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Oct. 27, 1975

Mr. William Miller
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Rm G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Bldg.
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Miller:

Through the good offices of Senator Mansfield, we met some weeks ago to discuss certain problems related to possible CIA activity in Cambodia. As you know, I am particularly interested in why the CIA cannot or will not find out who carried out the massive herbicide attack against Cambodia in the spring of 1969. The CIA has under the Freedom of Information Act provided me with some documents from my file which bear directly upon this strange episode and Senator Church's efforts to find out information for me. When we met you indicated that CIA activities in Indochina were to be investigated by the Select Committee. I would greatly appreciate knowing about when you think this subject will come up. I would also very much like to submit some of the documents I have received from the CIA and my personal testimony to the Committee. I believe that Professor A. Westing and myself were the last official guests of the Sihanouk regime before it was temporarily deposed.

I look forward to hearing from you on these matters.

Sincerely yours,

E.W.Pfeiffer
Professor

orig → WGM
cy → blue
cy → Cl Chan
cy → For T F [illegible] Cambodia expert

E

University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801
(406) 243-0211

Aug. 6, 1975

Mr. Paul Wallach
Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
Room G 308 Dirksen Building
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Mr. Wallach:

As decided in our phone conversation today, I am writing to you about a conversation I had last week in Paris with an official of the Royal Government of Cambodia. He informed me that CIA-directed activities hostile to his government are presently occurring in his country, and that these activities are being launched from bases in Thailand. I would greatly appreciate your assistance in finding out for me whether any agency of the U.S. Government is presently carrying out activities against the Royal Government of Cambodia.

I greatly appreciated the opportunity to talk with you in person recently, and thank you for your interest and help.

Sincerely yours,

E.W. Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology

orig → Wallach
cy → Blue Chron

EM

[illegible]
LEN B. JORDAN, IDAHO
PAUL J. FANNIN, ARIZ.
CLIFFORD P. HANSEN, WYO.
MARK O. HATFIELD, OREG.
TED STEVENS, ALASKA
HENRY BELLMON, OKLA.

JERRY T. VERKLER, STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

July 26, 1971

E. W. Pfeiffer
Professor of Zoology
University of Montana
Missoula, Montana 59801

Dear Professor Pfeiffer:

Please forgive my delay in replying to your last letter of March 29, 1971. Although the Department of State has offered to make the Seventh Air Force Study available to me at the Department, I frankly have not had the chance to get down and study it.

I have been told, however, that Air America was responsible for the Cambodian defoliation. My source was not the State Department, but rather an individual who is in a position to know the facts in this matter.

It would be most useful to have a full study of the extent and the effects of our defoliation program in Southeast Asia. Perhaps you and Arthur Westing and others could get together to make a proposal for a study of this nature.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Frank Church

Frank Church

Memorandum

MM 2/14/74

To: Terry Lenzner

From : Jim Moore

Subject: Robert Maheu - John Roselli -

Hereis a summary of what I have done on the Roselli-Maheu connection.

Yesterday I spoke with David Nissen, who prosecuted Roselli in 1968 for being an unregistered alien and for being involved with hidden owners in the Friar's Club case. Nissen never met Maheu or spoke with him. However, he did remember that stories about Maheu and Roselli being involved in anti-Castro plots did come to his attention when he was investigating and prosecuting Roselli. He couldn't remember the source of those stories, saying that his information came from many people, including Justice Department lawyers in Washington and the FBI. One story he heard was that Maheu tried to intervene in Washington, either through direct contacts in the FBI or at Justice or through Edward P. Morgan, to kill the Roselli prosecution on the basis that Roselli had helped the United States in Cuba. Maheu was reportedly an old CIA agent,. Nissen remembers hearing at some point that Roselli had gone to Cuba in an attempt to assasinate Castro.

Nissen said that there are extensive files on Roselli maintained by the FBI or the Department. Nissen had a vague recollection that the files contained a story about Maheu somehow being involved in a wiretap on Sam Giancona, for whom Roselli worked. Nissen also remembered information about a meeting between Maheu and Giancona regarding Cuba, but he couldn't remember any of the specifics.

When Roselli came up for sentencing, he was represented by Tom Wadden, who had been associated in some capacity with Edward Bennett Williams. Wadden filed a motion to reduce sentence and included with it two columns by Jack Anderson that recounted the story of Roselli and Maheu trying to assasinate Castro. Nissen thought the motion might also have included an affidavit from Edward P. Morgan. The government successfully resisted the motion on the grounds of fraud, since Wadden produced no witnesses or documentation to support his claim. I called the Federal Court in Los Angeles, and they have sent the motion for reduction of sentence, and attached papers to us. The Clerk there told me that in addition to the Anderson columns, the motion included affidavits from Anderson and Les Whitten vouching for the unnamed source of the columns.

Roselli is now in Florida so he can be reached, but, according to Nissen, Giancona is in exile somewhere in Mexico.

FRONTIER CASE

Nissen never heard about Maheu being questioned in Washington in lieu of the Grand Jury appearance. Nissen did not try the Frontier case, because he had been promoted to supervisory capacity. However, he seemed surprised that he had never heard of such a meeting. He gave me the names of three lawyers who handled the case after he gave up direct responsibility for it. My phone interview with the first of them, Jerry Ullman, is written up as a separate interview. The second Lawyer, John Hornbeck, has not yet returned my phone call. The third, Tom Kotoski, actually tried the case. He is now an assistant United States Attorney in Los Angeles and about to become head of the San Francisco Strike Force. He will be in Washington Thursday and Friday, February 14 and 15, and I have asked him to call me as soon as possible.

One final note - Nissen said that the Roselli file in the Justice Department contains many references to Maheu. He never, however, saw or heard about a file kept on Maheu himself.

Richard Crane, head of the Organized Crime office in Los Angeles, is also in town until the end of this week. He may know something about Maheu and Roselli, as well as about Dalitz coming back to the Desert Inn. He should call me this evening or tomorrow morning. Also, Mike DeFeo, head of the Kansas City Strike Force, will be in town tomorrow and Friday. He, according to Crane, might know something about the Dunes. In addition, Will Wilson mentioned the strike force man from Kansas City as the one who set up the Maheu interview at the Justice Department. I spoke with DeFeo today, and he will call me tomorrow to arrange a meeting time before he leaves town.



NAME : Sam GIANCANA

ALIASES : Sam Mooney, Sam Malone

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-16-08, Chicago, Ill.; 5'9", 175 lbs., hazel eyes, dark chestnut hair, fair complexion and medium build.

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED : Resides at 1147 Wenonah Ave. Oak Park, Ill. Frequents the Army Lounge, Norwood House, Villa Venice, all of Chicago, Illinois.

FAMILY BACKGROUND : Wife, Angeline DeTolve, died in 1954. Has three daughters, Annette, Bonita Lou and Francine. Mother deceased, father is Tony Giancana, and sisters are Mary, Josephine and Victoria. Sam's consort is Ladana Collins, 20 E. Delaware, Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES : Tony Accardo, Paul Ricco, Willie Baddone, Nicholas D'Amico, Sam Battaglia and Leonard Gianola, all of Chicago, Illinois.

CRIMINAL HISTORY : FBI #58437, Chicago PD #E-27465. Subject has record of 13 arrests dating from Sept. 1925, on such charges as murder, grand larceny, auto theft, burglary and liquor law violations with two felony convictions.

BUSINESS : Owns the Forest Lounge, the R & S Liquor Co., the Lohmar Dist. Co., Chicago, Ill., and has gambling interests and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba.

MODUS OPERANDI : A top ranking member of the Mafia in the State of Ill. and a director of the organization's activities in Chicago and vicinity.

NAME : Giovanni ROSELLI

ALIASES : John Roselli, John Russelli, John Kasselle, John Passelli

DESCRIPTION : Born 7-4-04 Chicago, Ill, 5'8", 171 lbs, brown-grey hair, blue eyes.

LOCALITIES FREQUENTED : Resides 1251 No. Crescent Hts., Hollywood, Cal. Frequents gambling casinos at Las Vegas where he has room at Tropicana Hotel. Travels frequently all parts U.S.

FAMILY BACKGROUND : Divorced from movie actress June Lang; father: Vincenzo; mother: Maria Russo (both deceased); cousin: Joseph Evangelista.

CRIMINAL ASSOCIATES : Dragna family, Philip Kastel, Harold Meltzer, Francisco Costiglia, Charles Fischetti, Louis Piscopo.

CRIMINAL HISTORY : FBI #3339986. L.A. Sheriff's Office #51247. Record dating from 1926 includes arrests for suspicion of robbery, vagrancy, interfering with trade, mail fraud & violation of parole.

BUSINESS : Vice-President Monte Prosser Productions and varied other interests.

MODUS OPERANDI : A top Mafia figure at Los Angeles and Las Vegas. Active in labor racketeering and control of gambling.

SAM J. ERVIN, JR., N.C., CHAIRMAN
HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN., VICE CHAIRMAN
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, GA.
DANIEL K. INOUYE, HAWAII
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, N. MEX.
EDWARD J. GURNEY, FLA.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.

SAMUEL DASH
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR
FRED D. THOMPSON
MINORITY COUNSEL
RUFUS L. EDMISTEN
DEPUTY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 60, 93D CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

MEMORANDUM
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

To: Senator Ervin

From: Terry Lenzner and Marc Lackritz

Subject: Relevance to S. Res. 60 of John Rosselli's testimony about his CIA activities

Summary:

John Rosselli and his attorney, Tom Wadden, object to testifying about Rosselli's involvement with Robert Maheu in a CIA-financed plot to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960's. The objection is based upon national security grounds as well as an assertion by Mr. Wadden that the material is not relevant to our inquiry under S. Res. 60.

Testimony of Mr. Rosselli about this matter is relevant and necessary to our investigation for a variety of reasons.

Facts:

During the last year of the Eisenhower Administration, the CIA apparently financed and organized a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. Among the participants in this plot were Robert Maheu and John Rosselli. Maheu had a public relations business at the time, and Rosselli was associated with some alleged organized crime figures (e.g. Sam Giancana) who had lost substantial gambling investments when Castro came to power. Apparently, the plot continued into the early 1960's even after the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, but it failed in attaining its objective of killing Castro.

Only a few officials in the government knew of the existence of the plot at that time.

Justice Department officials stumbled across this information about the plot as a result of their investigation into an illegal wiretap by Sam Giancana in the early 1960's.

gedly handsome gambler with contacts

Roselli, Harvey said he had a high —B

The sensitive information was brought to the attention of FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, and either he or then-Attorney General Robert Kennedy ordered the prosecution of Giancana dropped in order not to compromise national security considerations.

The information about the alleged assassination plot then lay dormant in a secret file in the Department of Justice until early 1969, when Assistant Attorney General Will Wilson requested the file from the Deputy Chief of the Organized Crime Section. The file was returned to Central Files shortly after it was taken out.

Assistant Attorney General Wilson next requested the secret Justice file in early 1971 in connection with his interview of Robert Maheu on January 27, 1971 (see attached chronology). This interview at the Department of Justice, in lieu of a grand jury appearance, was arranged by a telephone call to Attorney General Mitchell on January 19, 1971, only one day after Jack Anderson published his first column linking both Maheu and Rosselli to the CIA plot to kill Castro. (see attached)

However, the significance of Anderson's column on January 18, 1971, was that on the same day, Haldeman requested Dean to find out what he could about the Hughes - Maheu - O'Brien relationship.

In the follow-up memos from Caulfield to Dean on the Maheu-O'Brien link, Caulfield notes Maheu's prior "covert activities" for the CIA and advises Dean that a check into CIA, FBI, and IRS files on Robert Maheu is advisable to avoid a "counter-scandal."

In addition, Assistant Attorney General Wilson showed the sensitive "Castro file" to Attorney General Mitchell, in January, 1971, and discussed with him the political implications of the information. Following the on-the-record interview of Maheu on January 27, 1971, by Lynch, Wilson and Petersen, Maheu was interviewed privately by Wilson concerning his prior CIA activities with John Rosselli. Maheu was not forthcoming with information about the plot at that time. Attorney General Mitchell discussed the contents of the sensitive file with President Nixon, according to Wilson, who had advised him to do so.

Conclusion:

Therefore, the obsession of the Administration in keeping tabs on Larry O'Brien in 1971 and 1972 was in part motivated by a fear that Maheu would impart some of this sensitive information about the plot

gedly handsome gambler with contacts Roselli, Harvey said he had a high to O'Brien. Alternatively the objective was to discover if there was any information about the plot that might be damaging to the Democrats that O'Brien might possess from Maheu. And these concerns could have been a possible motivation for the break-in to the offices of the DNC and Larry O'Brien by four Cuban-Americans on June 17, 1972, especially since their directions were to photograph any documents relating to Cuban contributions or Cuban involvement in the 1972 Democratic campaign.

It is for these reasons that we wish to question John Rosselli about the nature and scope of his activities with Robert Maheu in the early 1960's.

gedly handsome gambler with contacts

Roselli, Harvey said he had a high

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS

Thanksgiving, 1970	Hughes leaves Las Vegas.
December 4, 1970	Maheu is fired.
January 18, 1971	Jack Anderson column published linking Mal and Rosselli to plot to kill Castro.
January 18, 1971	Haldeman sends memo to Dean requesting ir mation on O'Brien-Maheu-Hughes relationsl
January 19, 1971	Jack Anderson column appears with more det on Maheu's involvement in plot to assassin Castro.
January 19, 1971	Attorney General John Mitchell called Robert Maheu in Las Vegas at 5:12 p.m. and talked
January 25, 1971	Caulfield to Dean memo discussing Danner relationship with Maheu, O'Brien relationshi with Maheu, and request for investigation ir CIA, FBI, IRS files for information to avoid a "counter-scandal."
January 25, 1971	John Rosselli enters prison.
January 26, 1971	Dean to Haldeman memo on Maheu-O'Brien-Hughes relationship
January 27, 1971	Maheu interviewed at Department of Justice l A.A.G. Will Wilson, Henry Petersen and Bill Lynch, in lieu of an appearance before the Grand Jury. Interview is about "skimming" ir Las Vegas.
January 27, 1971	A.A.G. Wilson and Petersen meet with Mahei privately to discuss Maheu's prior CIA activi
February 1, 1971	Caulfield to Dean memo noting that Maheu wa involved in "covert activities" for the CIA in early 1960's.
February 12, 1971	Rosselli's attorney files a Motion to Reduce Sentence based on Rosselli's prior CIA activi

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban un-

years ago, in Indianapolis. Asked about Roselli, Harvey said he had a high regard for him.

equality —B of "incr

(VERIFICATION — 446, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF } ss.

I am the ____

____

in the above entitled action; I have read the foregoing ________________________

____

and know the contents thereof; and I certify that the same is true of my own knowledge, except as to those matters which are therein stated upon my information or belief, and as to those matters I believe it to be true.

____

____

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on ______________ *at* ______________, *California*
(date) *(place)*

____
Signature

(PROOF OF SERVICE BY MAIL -- 1013a, 2015.5 C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF Los Angeles } ss.

I am a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; I am over the age of eighteen years and not a party to the within entitled action; my business address is:

9601 Wilshire Blvd. Suite 400, Beverly Hills, California 90210

On June 25, *19*71, *I served the within* Notice of Motion For Reduction of Sentence (Rule 35 FRCP); Points and Authorities; Affidavits in Support Thereof

on the Plaintiff

in said action, by placing a true copy thereof enclosed in a sealed envelope with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at Beverly Hills, California

addressed as follows:

DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U.S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U.S. Courthouse
312 North Spring St.
Los Angeles, Calif. 90012

I certify (or declare), under penalty of perjury, that the foregoing is true and correct.*

Executed on June 25, 1971 *at* Beverly Hills, *California*
(date) *(place)*

Subscribed and sworn to before me this
25th day of June, 1971.

____
Signature
Myrna J. Weinstein

OFFICIAL SEAL
KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL
NOTARY PUBLIC - CALIFORNIA
LOS ANGELES COUNTY
My Commission Expires August 29, 1972

KATHRYN A. SCHEIBAL

*Both the verification and proof of service by mail forms, being signed under penalty of perjury, do not require notarization.

GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION

National Archives and Records Service

To all to [illegible]om these presents shall come, Greeting:

By v[illegible]tu[illegible] of the authority vested in me by the Administrator of General Services, I certify o[illegible] his [illegible]behalf, under the seal of the United States General Services Administration, that the [illegible]ach[illegible]d reproduction(s) is a true and correct copy of documents in his custody.

GSA [illegible] 68-13478

SIGNATURE

NAME GILBERT DORAME

DATE FEB 12 1974

TITLE Center Manager

NAME AND ADDRESS OF DEPOSITORY
General Services Administration (9NC-L)
Federal Records Center, NARS
4747 Eastern Avenue
Bell, CA 90201

R9 Overprint 33 (4-72)

GSA FORM APR 68 6791E

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant U. S. Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division
1200 U. S. Courthouse Building
312 North Spring Street
Los Angeles, California 90012
Tel: 688-2406

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

FILED

FEB 17 4 46 PM '71

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.

BY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI,
Defendant.

No. 1175-PH-CD

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

Plaintiff, United States of America, strongly opposes defendant's Motion to Reduce Sentence based upon the files and records in the case and the attached Memorandum.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT L. MEYER
United States Attorney

David R. Nissen
DAVID R. NISSEN
Assistant United States Attorney
Chief, Criminal Division

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
United States of America.

DRN:jt

FPI-LPC-5-67-150M-3124

MEMORANDUM

John Rosselli is actually Filippo Sacco, born July 4, 1905, in Italy of parents Vincenzo and Maria Sacco. Vincenzo Sacco came to the United States after the birth of Filippo, his oldest child, and in 1911, Mrs. Sacco and Filippo joined Vincenzo in the United States where they resided as aliens in East Boston.

Filippo Sacco completed the sixth grade in the public schools of East Boston and was discharged from school in 1917. By this time Filippo had two younger brothers and two younger sisters. In 1918, Vincenzo Sacco died. His wife Maria and the five children moved into the residence of Liberato Cianciulli and a daughter was born in 1920. In 1922, Maria and Cianciulli were married.

In 1922, Filippo had a job driving a horse-drawn milk wagon and was nicknamed "Milky". However, in addition to his legitimate occupation, Filippo had made connections with the criminal element in East Boston and was engaged in narcotic traffic with his headquarters in and around Maverick Square. On September 14, 1922, Filippo sold morphine to a government informant named Fisher while under surveillance by a narcotic agent. On September 19, 1922, Filippo arranged for a large sale from his "source" and was present and under agent surveillance when the morphine was delivered. On September 29, 1922, Filippo Sacco and his "source" were arrested by Federal narcotics agents. On October 18, 1922, the Federal Grand Jury in Boston indicted Sacco for the sale of narcotic drugs and two days later he was released on bail. While awaiting trial in the narcotics case, in Federal Court, Sacco was arrested and indicted in Massachusetts State Court for grand larceny and was released on bail on July 2, 1923.

In 1923, while he was on bail awaiting trial in the narcotics and larceny cases, Filippo Sacco jumped bail in both cases and disappeared from East Boston. The Government narcotics informant, Fisher, disappeared about the same time and Government sources believe that he may have been killed to prevent him from testifying. Because of his fugitive status, both indictments against Sacco were dropped.

After Sacco's flight from his home in 1923, he spent some time in New York and Chicago, and finally made his appearance in Los Angeles in 1924 under the fictitious name "John Roselli." Sources indicate that Sacco engaged in bootlegging and hijacking during this period and police records show he was frequently arrested on such charges as carrying concealed weapons, and suspicion of robbery.

After 1930, Sacco became associated with the Al Capone gang in Chicago and was also closely associated with organized crime in Los Angeles. Reliable sources relate that he was an executioner for the criminal organizations in both cities. In 1936, by demands and threats, Sacco forced his way into part ownership of "Nationwide News Service," a horseracing information service used by bookmakers across the country.

After prohibition was repealed, Sacco left the bootlegging business and associated himself with Columbia Picture Studios. As a close friend of Los Angeles underworld leader Jack Dragna, Sacco soon became known as a labor muscleman and racketeer for the movie studios. In 1943, Sacco was indicted on a charge of conspiracy to extort millions of dollars from movie producers and a labor union. Also indicted were union officials Browne and Bioff, and the following ranking members of the Chicago La Cosa Nostra family: Frank Nitto (aka Nitti), Louis Campagna, Paul DeLucia (aka Paul "the waiter" Ricia), Phil D'Andrea, Francis Manitote (aka Frank Diamond), and Charles "Cherry Nose"

Gioe. In 1944, Sacco and the Chicago defendants were convicted and all were sentenced to ten years in prison.

In 1947, Sacco and all his co-defendants were paroled immediately upon their becoming eligible therefor. There were indications that their release had been secured by bribery but admissible evidence sufficient for prosecution was not obtained. In July 1948, Sacco's parole was revoked because of his continued association with known criminals and he was imprisoned until November 1948, when his parole was reinstated. Shortly after Sacco's parole terminated in March 1954, William Bioff, a key Government witness at the extortion trial was murdered by the bombing of his vehicle. (The trial judge reportedly had warned the defendants that if anything happened to Bioff while they were on parole he would hold them responsible.) Two other co-defendants of Sacco have also been victims of gang slayings.

Upon his release from prison, Sacco returned to Los Angeles and again associated himself with a movie studio. Reliable sources report that this was a front and in fact, through his close association with Sam Giancana of Chicago, Sacco received the responsibility of overseeing the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld. Sacco immediately became a powerful figure in Las Vegas. He travels back and forth between Las Vegas and Los Angeles extensively and associates with the known Cosa Nostra members and major gamblers.

Rosselli appeared before the Kefauver Committee investigating organized crime and falsely testified concerning his association with underworld figures and even his own personal background.

During the period 1956-1958, Sacco was very active in the construction and pre-opening operation of the Tropicana Hotel, and Sacco received the lease to operate the gift shop. The

Nevada Gaming Control Board refused to allow the Tropicana to open as long as Sacco was associated with its operation, whereupon the hotel owners were forced to buy back the gift shop lease at a cost of $180,000, reportedly about thirty times the amount paid for the lease.

During the above period, Sacco also involved himself in the production of shows for the Tropicana, but again the Gaming Control Board refused to allow him to participate in any capacity and he sold his interest. Following his ouster from the Tropicana, Sacco sold ice machines to most of the Las Vegas hotels at prices far in excess of prices on the open market. Sacco has also received numerous "finders fees" from various Las Vegas hotels and casinos for which few if any services were performed.

In October 1960, Sacco and T. W. Richardson were involved in placing a wire tap on the telephone of comedian Dan Rowan in Las Vegas at the request of Chicago gangster Sam Giancana.

In May 1968, Sacco was convicted of failing to register as an alien and report his address annually. In the course of that trial, it was shown that birth records in Chicago, Illinois, had been forged in an effort to make it appear that Sacco had been born there as John Rosselli. Sacco has long been a close friend of Edward J. Barrett, County Clerk, Cook County, Illinois, in whose office the birth records for Chicago were kept.

Among Sacco's underworld associates are the following:

Al Capone - head of the Chicago underworld gang;

Charles F. Fischetti - a Capone lieutenant;

Micky Cohen - gambler and racketeer;

Jack Dragna - leader of the Cosa Nostra, Los Angeles, now deceased;

Benjamin "Bugsy" Siegel - member of Murder, Inc., murdered June 20, 1947;

Allen Smiley - gambler, bookmaker, racketeer;
Tony Accardo - ranking Cosa Nostra figure;
Momo Adams - ranking Cosa Nostra figure; and
Frank Costello - ranking Cosa Nostra figure.

Numerous prospective witnesses in the course of investigations concerning Sacco's criminal activities have expressed or displayed fear at the prospect of being called to testify against him, and a number of witnesses have refused to testify.

In the Friars Club trial, it was apparent that a number of witnesses deliberately perjured themselves in order to exonerate Sacco, including Friedman, Vinnie Donato, Lee Deer, and Nat Ross.

Defendant Sacco was convicted in the Friars Club case in December 1968 of interstate travel in aid of a racketeering enterprise and interstate transportation of fraudulently obtained securities. He was also convicted of making a false statement in his income tax return. Sacco has had a long practice of concealing the source and nature of his income. He was sentenced to five years in prison.

In view of Sacco's extensive criminal record extending back more than 40 years, as well as his membership and participation in the organized criminal syndicate known as Cosa Nostra, we strongly urge that defendant Sacco's sentence not be reduced for any reason whatsoever. He is a genuine menace to society and, in particular, to those witnesses who have testified against him.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE BY MAIL

I, JUNE S. TOKUYAMA, declare:

That I am a citizen of the United States and resident or employed in Los Angeles County, California; that my business address is Office of United States Attorney, United States Courthouse, 312 North Spring Street, Los Angeles, California 90012; that I am over the age of eighteen years, and am not a party to the above-entitled action;

That I am employed by the United States Attorney for the Central District of California who is a member of the Bar of the United States District Court for the Central District of California, at whose direction the service by mail described in this Certificate was made; that on February 17, 1971, I deposited in the United States mails in the United States Courthouse at 312 North Spring St., Los Angeles, California, in the above-entitled action, in an envelope bearing the requisite postage, a copy of

GOVERNMENT'S OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO REDUCE SENTENCE

addressed to

Adrian Marshall, Esq.
Attorney at Law
9601 Wilshire Blvd., Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

at his last known address, at which place there is a delivery service by United States mail.

This Certificate is executed on February 17, 1971, at Los Angeles, California.

I certify under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.

June S. Tokuyama
JUNE S. TOKUYAMA

USA-12c-240
(Rev. 10/19/67)

Memorandum

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden, 888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any informatio about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify about the matter. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's involvement with Maheu in 1960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to interview Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.)

John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantive discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

To : Terry Lenzner

From : Bob Muse

Subject: Interview of John Roselli

On Wednesday February 20, 1974, Scott Armstrong, Marc Lackritz and Bob Muse interviewed John Roselli at the office of Roselli's attorney, Tom Wadden, 888 17th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C., telephone 833-1440. Also present were Wadden's associates Bryan B. McMenamin and Leslie Scherr.

Wadden began the interview by noting that for the first time, he had discussed with Roselli the Maheu Cuban matter with which we were concerned; and found that it presented a great problem of national security. Accordingly he had tried to reach Senator Ervin, an old acquaintance, and see if he could persuade the Senator from allowing this interview to go forward. He did not get in touch with Ervin directly but talked to a staff member in Ervin's office, whom he would not identify. He further noted that Roselli was insistent upon not giving any informatior about his Cuban activities and would rather go to jail than be compelled to testify about the matter. Thus the interview was not productive insofar as Roselli's involvement with Maheu in 1960 was concerned. However Wadden did allow us to interview Roselli about his background and we reserved the right to have an executive session before a Senator where John Roselli might be compelled to testify about his involvement with Maheu in Cuba. (It should be noted that Wadden would not identify his privilege claim other than saying it related to national security.)

John Roselli presently resides with his sister and brother-in-law, a Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Daigle at 522 Southwest Temp Corner, Plantation, Florida 33314. His telephone number there is area 305 581-6585. He has been living in retirement with them since he left jail at the end of last summer. Prior to moving to Florida he had been in the federal prison for thirty-three months, having been convicted in the Friar's Club case, a conspiracy in which he was charged along with Maurice Friedman, Benjamin Teitlebaum, and Manuel Jacobs. (He noted that Hank Greenspun had no involvement either as a co-defendant or unindicted co-conspirator in that case.)

With regard to Bob Maheu, he met Maheu for the first time in the mid-50's in either Washington or California through a mutual acquaintance, Herman Spitzel. When questions were asked as to what his subsequent involvement with Maheu was, Roselli's attorney instructed him not to answer any questions on the ground of national security.

Roselli did however indicate how he and Maheu had made arrangements for Hughes to live at the Desert Inn when Hughes first arrived there in late 1966. He said that he had received a call from Maheu, who needed to make arrangements for Hughes to move to Las Vegas from Boston. According to Maheu, no one wanted to give Hughes any rooms. Roselli at the request of Maheu left his residence in Los Angeles and went up to Las Vegas and asked his acquaintance Ruby Kolod, who owned 13% of the Desert Inn, to accommodate Hughes and allow him to take two of the penthouses at the Desert Inn. At the time Maheu was in charge of security and responsible for seeing that Hughes arrived unnoticed in Las Vegas. Kolod acquiesced and told Roselli that the top floor of the Desert Inn would be available at the going rate, but that they would have to leave the hotel by New Years. When the New Years date was approaching, Maheu called and said that they had received notice from Kolod and were suppose to leave their premises. Roselli then convinced Kolod to allow them to stay. At the same time he told Maheu that Hughes should buy the Hotels and avoid any problems. Maheu responded that he was of the impression that Hughes didn't want to get involved in any of the gambling businesses and would not therefore want to purchase the hotel. It was at this point that Roselli conceived of the idea of trying to sell the hotel, and approached Kolod and asked if he would be willing to sell it. Kolod replied that if Roselli could make arrangements to sell it he would receive a finder's fee. Roselli then turned around and asked Maheu if he wanted to purchase it. Maheu responded that he would and Roselli turned the matter over to his attorney Ed Morgan who then handled the matter until the end. Roselli also instigated some talk about the possibility of purchasing the Sands and, while he did not negotiate it, received at a later date from Ed Morgan a check for $95,000 which represented his finder's fee for the sale of both the Desert Inn and the Sands.

Roselli noted that while Moe Dalitz was the owner of the Desert Inn, he did not negotiate with him because he found him less agreeable than Kolod. He said that he had some minor dealings with Dalitz but none of them related to matters concerning the Las Vegas hotel industry.

With regard to Ed Morgan, Roselli met him in the middle 50's. Since that time Morgan has represented him in different Las Vegas interests. He noted that Morgan did not represent him in his Friars' Club defense(~~but did arrange for Jim~~ Cantillion, a Los Angeles attorney to handle the matter). He said that he had no trouble with Morgan's handling of the Desert Inn finder's fee, since he trusted Morgan implicity. He noted that Morgan had arranged for John Roselli to be represent by Tom Wadden, his present attorney. This representation first began on the appeal from the Friar's Club.

Roselli indicated that his only present interest in Las Vegas concerns his holdings in the gift shop at the Frontier hotel. His involvement there started in 1967 when he had an arrangement with Mr. Friedman. This set-up did not work out and Roselli resigned as President of the gift shop. Thereafter he made an arrangement with a Mr. Breen whereby he would furnish Breen with money and indemnify him against any losses if Breen would run the gift shop. This arrangement has worked out fairly well and he continues to receive his share of the profits each year from the gift shop. He mentioned that it was his opinion that Breen had been poorly treated by the Hughes enterprises, since Hughes first purchased the Frontier. He recalls, at his last meeting with Maheu, asking Maheu to lend Breen $60,000 for the gift shop. Maheu said he would get back to him but never did. Ultimately a loan was arranged through Perry Thomas at the Valley Bank of Nevada.

Since 1967 Roselli has seen Maheu only once. And while he does not recall the date of that meeting he remembers that it was in Los Angeles before Maheu had terminated with Hughes. He recalls that Maheu was in Los Angeles at the time while his wife was having a foot operation, and that he called Roselli to have supper. Roselli has no recollection of the conversation that the two had at supper other than that they discussed, as noted above, the possibility of arranging a loan for Breen at the Frontier Hotel Gift Shop.

He said he has known Peter Maheu since the middle 1950's and that he went to Peter's wedding reception. His only involvement with Peter occurred whenever Robert Maheu wanted a message conveyed to Roselli. He recalls no ~~subsequent~~ substantive discussions with Peter Maheu.

He indicated he knew nothing about Larry O'Brien, Tony Hatsis, or Jack Cleveland. Similarly he has no recollection of ever having met Bebe Rebozo, and knows of the person only through newspaper articles.

With regard to his appearance before the Frontier Hotel grand jury in

Los Angeles, he remembers being represented by James Cantillon a Los Angeles attorney He remembers that this grand jury was convened sometime in the summer of 1970 and that his appearance took place before he went to jail, which was January 25, 1971. He has no recollection of David Nissen, the prosecutor, ever having made a comment about Maheu; nor did he question Roselli about his recollection of his involvement with Maheu in the Cuban undertaking. Roselli had very bad words about Nissen and mentioned that Nissen had once filed with Judge Gray an unsigned and undated statement discussing Roselli's background, which Roselli, and Wadden both said was very inaccurate.

Roselli has no recollection of being asked to be an informer by Nissen. Hedoes remember, however, being approached by two FBI agents in 1966 about the possibility of being an informer. This possibility is discussed in the court files.

Roselli recalls appearing four or five times before the Frontier Hotel grand jury. He answered questions extensively only on the first day and thereafter appeared at the request of Nissen and waited around. Wadden indicated that we should make a request of Judge Byrne or whoever else might have access to those grand jury minutes to get Roselli's testimony about the Frontier. Roselli does not recall having talked to Bob Maheu about his appearance before the grand jury. He said he had no recollection of Maheu appearing there but, after being advised by Wadden that Maheu's appearance was well noted in the paper, he said he may have read about it.

He said he has no recollection or knowledge of Bob Maheu ever making an application on Roselli's behalf for reduction of sentence.

With regard to political contributions, he has never had any discussions with Rebozo, or had any conversations with anyone about any contributions (of over $10,000) to a Presidential campaign. He has no recollection of the Teamsters making any substantial contributions to the Presidential Campaign. Similarly he has no knowledge of Terry Thomas making any contribution.

Rosselli has no recollection of ever discussing with Maheu any of Maheu's problems or contacts with the Administration. Specifically, he does not recall Maheu ever talking about Stans or any involvements Stans may have had with Thomas or Greenspun.

He knew nothing about any use of stolen stocks.

With regard to Jim Crosby, Jack Davis and Mary Carter Paoint Co. he knew nothing. Similarly he knew nothing about Jim Golden.

He had no knowledge of Bob Peliquin or Intertel's involvement at Paradise Island. Wadden chimed in by noting that he had been an old associate of Hundley and had gone to Paradise Island with Hundley about 7 years ago to look at the Paradise Island set-up.

Roselli has never talked with or met Jack Caulfield. Nor does he recall ever having any private individuals interview him while he was in jail. He recalls however, that three officers from the Immigration Department once visited him and told him about the detainer that was being held on him. Similarly, while he was in jail, the IRS interviewed him in Los Angeles about the finder's fee he received in the Frontier Hotel. The investigation may have related somewhat to Maheu, but, since it was so short, he does not recall what the discussion about Maheu concerned. He noted that no one has ever asked him about Danner, Rebozo or any members of the Administration.

With regard to Hank Greenspun, Roselli has known him since the 50's. The last time he met Greenspun was when he ran into Greenspun in Los Angeles shortly after he got out of prison, at which time they talked a few minutes. No questions were asked and there was no discussion with Greenspun about his involvement with Maheu. He noted that Greenspun has never questioned him about any matters.

He noted that he has never met Gordon Liddy, Howard Hunt or any of the Cuban Americans who were involved in the Watergate break-in. He said however that he has been Liddy once, and that was at Terminal Island when he was acting as a prison librarian. There were no discussions with Liddy. He is fairly certain he has never met Hunt with regard to any CIA involvement of his own. He also noted that he has never had any property or business dealings in Cuba.

The interview concluded with the serving of a subpoena upon Mr. Roselli and the decision to hold a further meeting under oath at a later date.

This is cover page of a 25 count indictment arising from Δ's use of the Friar's Club in Beverly Hills for illegal gambling activities..

FILED

DEC 21 1967

CLERK, U. S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
BY [illegible] DEPUTY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
v.
MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN;
MANUEL JACOBS (aka RICKY JACOBS);
VICTOR G. LANDS;
T. WARNER RICHARDSON,
FILIPPO SACCO (aka JOHN ROSSELLI);
BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM,
Defendants.

NO. 1432

INDICTMENT

[18 U.S.C. §371: Conspiracy; 18 U.S.C. §1952: Interstate Transportation in Aid of Racketeering; 18 U.S.C. §2314: Interstate Transportation of Funds Obtained by Fraud; 47 U.S.C. §502: Operating Uncertified Communication Device; 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1) Subscribing False Tax Return.]

The Grand Jury charges:

COUNT ONE

[18 USC §371]

Commencing prior to June 15, 1962, and continuing to the date of the return of this indictment, defendants MAURICE H. FRIEDMAN, MANUEL JACOBS (also known as RICKY JACOBS), VICTOR G. LANDS, T. WARNER RICHARDSON, FILIPPO SACCO (also known as JOHN ROSSELLI), BENJAMIN TEITELBAUM, and their unindicted co-conspirators Ernest S. Allen, Vernall Furlong (also known as William G. Douglas), Edwin Nathaniel Gebhard (also known as Pete Kelly, Pete Peterson, and George McFarland), Alfred Mathes, George E. Seach, and Albert Snyder agreed, confederated and conspired together to commit offenses against the United States as follows:

(a) To travel in interstate commerce and use facilities

DRN:mlm:mt

2

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Blvd.
Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272-9211

Attorneys for Defendant
Filippo Sacco, also known as
John Rosselli

FILED

JUN 28 9 31 AM '71

CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DIST. OF CALIF.
BY

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

7-6-71
2PM

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,

vs.

FILIPPO SACCO, also known as
JOHN ROSSELLI, et al,
Defendants

NO. 1432 - Criminal (WPG)

NOTICE OF MOTION FOR
REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
(RULE 35 FRCP); POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES; AFFIDAVITS
IN SUPPORT THEREOF

TO DAVID R. NISSEN, Chief, Criminal Division, United States Attorneys Office, Los Angeles, California:

PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that On July 6, 1971, at 2:00 o'clock P.M., or as soon thereafter as the matter can be heard, at the Courtroom of the Honorable William P. Gray, defendant, Filippo Sacco, also known as John Rosselli, will move the Court for a reduction of sentence entered in this case. Said motion will be based upon the grounds stated herein, the affidavits attached hereto, additional affidavits defendant proposes to file before the date of the hearing, oral testimony to be presented at the hearing, and all of the files, records, pleadings and other documents in this case.

Defendant was convicted of one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §371, one count of violation of 18 U.S.C. §1952, three counts of violation of 18 U.S.C. §2314 and one count of violation of 26 U.S.C. §7206 (1).

Defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment and a fine of $10,000.00 on Count One, two years to run consecutively to Count One and a fine of $10,000.00 for Count Six, and two years imprisonment to run concurrently with Count Six and a fine of $10,000.00 for each of Counts Sixteen, Seventeen and Eighteen of the Indictment, and one year imprisonment to run concurrently with Count One and a fine of $5,000.00 for Count Twenty-Two. The total imprisonment was five years and the total fine was $55,000.00.

On January 18th and 19th, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles by columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency of the United States Government as set forth in said articles. The affidavits of Jack Anderson and his assistant, Les Whitten, are attached hereto and included therewith are copies of the columns, set forth as Exhibits A and B. Exhibits A and B were published on the 18th and 19th of January, 1971. Attached as Exhibit C is a follow-up column which appeared on February 24, 1971, and Exhibits D and E which are copies of the office records of columnist Jack Anderson, which were released and published on April 18th and April 27th, 1971.

The undersigned is informed that at no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters set forth in Exhibits A and B of the attached affidavits brought to the Court's attention. It is the belief of the undersigned that had these matters been brought to the Court's attention they would have materially affected the sentence handed down by the Court in this case.

Defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion and to present the testimony of at least one witness at the hearing on July 6, 1971. The additional affidavits and/or testimony to be produced at the hearing may relate to the financial ability of defendant to pay the fine of $55,000.00 as well as the condition of defendant's health.

/ / / / / /

/ / / / / /

/ / / / / /

POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

1. Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
2. United States v. Ellenbogen (2nd Cir.) 390 F. 2d 537.

DATED: June 25, 1971.

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall
ADRIAN MARSHALL

Attorneys for Defendant,
Filippo Sacco, also known
as John Rosselli

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

JACK ANDERSON, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am a nationally syndicated columnist writing under my own by-line. For many years prior to the death of Mr. Drew Pearson, he and I wrote a column known as the "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I wrote the articles attached hereto as Exhibits A and B pertaining to certain activities performed by John Rosselli, the Defendant herein, on behalf of the United States Government.

3. The information contained in said articles was made available to me by persons employed by the United States Government who, in the past, have supplied me with accurate and truthful information as pertains to other subjects.

4. After receiving said basic information, my staff and I conducted an impartial and independent investigation regarding John Rosselli's activities as described in Exhibit A, which were performed at the behest of Agents of the United States Government.

5. The aforementioned investigation satisfied me that the facts set forth in Exhibit A are a truthful account of Mr. Rosselli's activities as described therein.

JACK ANDERSON

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Irene P. Jones
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE
AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

CITY OF WASHINGTON)
) ss.
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA)

LESLIE WHITTEN, being duly sworn, deposes and says the following:

1. I am employed as principal associate of nationally-syndicated columnist Jack Anderson, writer of "Washington Merry-Go-Round".

2. I worked on certain articles relating to John Rosselli, and services performed by him on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, an organ of the United States Federal Government.

3. As part of my investigation, I twice called William K. Harvey, a retired Central Intelligence Agency official, now of Indianapolis.

4. On my first call, in January, I asked Harvey if it were not true that he had personally intervened with the Justice Department in order to mitigate the government's prosecution of Rosselli on the basis that Rosselli had done a formidable service for his country. Harvey said "this is a long story . . . I don't think it ought to be printed." I asked him whether it was not true that he had a high regard for Rosselli. "I still do," he earnestly replied.

5. In pursuing the story further, I called Harvey again in Indianapolis in February and asked him whether he could comment on our story about Rosselli which by now has been published widely in the United States. He declined to comment. But

he twice reaffirmed his "high regard" for Rosselli. I advised him I was making an affidavit on Rosselli's behalf and he expressed concern for Rosselli, asked his present status and said he would "follow up" on Rosselli's behalf from his end.

6. Based on my part of the investigation, I am satisfied that the facts set down in Exhibit A, appended to the Affidavit of Jack Anderson, are a truthful account of Rosselli's activities on behalf of the United States.

Leslie Whitten
LESLIE WHITTEN

Sworn to before me this 17th day of June, 1971.

Jane P. Jones
NOTARY PUBLIC

My Commission expires March 31, 1975

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, }

being by me first duly sworn, deposes and says: that he is the

in the above entitled action; that he has read the foregoing

and knows the contents thereof; and that the same is true of own knowledge, except as to the matters which are therein stated upon information or belief, and as to those matters he believes it to be true.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of , 19

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

◆

Received copy of the within Notice of Motion, Motion for Reduction of Sentence and Request for Evidentiary Hearing, Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support thereof. 12th day of February 1971

Attorney for Plaintiff

Received copy of the within RECEIVED A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT THIS 12th DAY OF Feb. 1971 day of 19

U. S. ATTORNEY'S OFFICE
BY E. Gomez Attorney for

◆

(AFFIDAVIT OF SERVICE BY MAIL — 1013a, C. C. P.)

STATE OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, }

being first duly sworn says: That affiant is a citizen of the United States and a resident of the county aforesaid; that affiant is over the age of eighteen years and is not a party to the within above entitled action; that affiant's business residence address is:

that on the day of , 19 , affiant served the within

on the in said action, by placing a true copy thereof in an envelope addressed to the attorney of record for said at the residence office address of said attorney , as follows: *

and by then sealing said envelope and depositing the same, with postage thereon fully prepaid, in the United States mail at the city where is located the office of the attorney for the person by and for whom said service was made.

That there is a delivery service by United States mail at the place so addressed or ** there is a regular communication by mail between the place of mailing and the place so addressed. and

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

day of , 19

Notary Public in and for said County and State of California
(SEAL)

*Here quote from envelope name and address of addressee.
**When the letter is addressed to a post office other than where mailed from, strike out "and"; when addressed to the same city where mailed from, strike out "or."

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY
9601 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 400
Beverly Hills, California 90210

272 9211

Attorneys for Defendant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff, vs. FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, Defendant.	NO. 1175- PH MOTION FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE AND REQUEST FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING

Defendant FILIPPO SACCO, also known as JOHN ROSSELLI, by his attorneys, ADRIAN MARSHALL and WADDEN, WALL & RUDY, requests this Court to grant a hearing for the presentation of oral testimony and other evidence in support of defendant's Motion for Reduction of Sentence entered in this case. As grounds therefor defendant alleges:

1. Defendant was convicted of six counts of violation of Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1302 and 1306 (a) and Title 8 U.S.C. Sections 1305 and 1306 (b) and sentenced to six months on Count 1 and thirty days on Counts 2 through 6, all to run concurrently.

2. On January 18, 1971, the mandate was spread and defendant was ordered to surrender to the United States Marshal at noon on January 25, 1971, for direct delivery of defendant to Terminal Island for service of his sentence.

3. On January 18 and 19, 1971, there appeared in newspapers throughout the country nationally syndicated articles of columnist Jack Anderson alleging that defendant had assisted the Central Intelligence Agency in an

assassination attempt against Fidel Castro. Attached hereto as Exhibits A and B are Xerox copies of said publications.

4. At no time prior to the sentencing of defendant were the matters referred to in Exhibits A and B brought to the Court's attention.

5. At an evidentiary hearing, defendant will present oral testimony and other evidence in support of this motion related to the matters set forth in Jack Anderson's column which defendant feels will materially affect the Court's reconsideration of the sentence entered in this case.

6. On or before February 19, 1971, defendant proposes to file and serve additional affidavits in support of this written motion.

Dated: February 12, 1971

Respectfully submitted,

ADRIAN MARSHALL
WADDEN, WALL & RUDY

By Adrian Marshall

ADRIAN MARSHALL
Attorneys for Defendant.

Security Clearance information on Allen Spence

Date of application: 8/24/76
(10 working day delay —)
Date submitted to the Bureau: 9/8/76

5 people — none yet cleared

Expect Summary
Report this week
(will be told by
Dick Taylor this P.M.)

Tyler Abbe has custody of Personnel records

— in alien history
only clf intros
use of pills
unknown source — 4 mo. before
New Orleans
p67

Bob Miller
Physical Measurements
V

R4297

June 24, 1975 Testimony of John Rosselli before Committee
Senator Church presiding

p. 7-8 Los Angeles

Rosselli first met Maheu in approximately July, 1960, pursuant to a telephone call from Maheu. At their first meeting, Maheu told Rosselli that a high government official had requested that Maheu recruit Rosselli to "fight Communism 90 miles away from Florida" -- to recruit Cubans to assassinate Castro.

New York

p. 10-11 Rosselli had second meeting with Maheu and went to New York in September under the alias of John Rawlston [Castro was in New York at this time]. Rosselli met Jim O'Connell of CIA, plus "three others."

Florida

p. 12-15 O'Connell, Maheu and Rosselli met in Florida hotel approximately one week after New York. Rosselli introduced Giancana to Maheu. Also introduced X (Trafficante) to Maheu. Obtained permission from Maheu to bring Giancanainto project.

p. 17 Rosselli recruits Cuban #1, Rosselli's cover was as Wall Street businessman. Rosselli and Maheu agree on a $250,000 price tag for the job.

p. 20 O'Connell never met Cubans. Trafficante, Cubans and Maheu met. Maheu brought $10,000 and poison capsules.

p. 26 Rosselli told Giancana about CIA involvement to keep his mouth shut. Rosselli only had one discussion with Giancana.

p. 27 O'Connell called Rosselli after Bay of Pigs. Met in Florida not long after Bay of Pigs with William Harvey, O'Connell and Rosselli. Harvey told Rosselli that he wanted Rosselli to have nothing to do with Maheu and not to use Giancana connections.

p. 35 Rosselli indicates that pro-Castro people in Florida probably had inkling of assassination attempts.

p. 44 During Missle Crisis, Harvey asked Rosselli to see if "they" had any intelligence on us, on the missiles.

TOP SECRET

p. 68-70	FBI agents Hill and Dodge met with Rosselli and his lawyer, Cantillon. At this time Dodge informed Rosselli that the FBI was aware that he was not a U.S. citizen. Dodge indicated something about Nevada and some other secret organizations.
p. 71-75	Rosselli met with Sheffield Edwards in 1966 for some drinks and discussed his problems with the FBI.
p. 76-78	Rosselli received a telephone call from an FBI agent, Jack Barron in June of 1970. The agent informed Rosselli that his appeals can be reversed. He was told that his lawyers and friends can't do anything for him in Washington.
p. 79-80	Rosselli talked with Bill Harvey prior to his testimony before the Select Committee to see if Harvey had objections and Harvey only suggested that Rosselli protect those people whose lives and whose families might be jeopardized by his testimony.
p. 81	Rosselli stated he did not know the five so-called Watergate burglars -- Hunt, McCord, Barker, Martinez or Sturgis.
p. 82	Roselli had no doubt that the Cuban operation was on behalf of the CIA and not Mr. Hughes.
p. 84	Rosselli stated that his Cuban contacts were never informed that this was a CIA project, but that he represented a Wall Street business. In the period 1967-1968, Rosselli failed to register as an alien and faced criminal charges.
p. 85-87	Rosselli describes how he is brought into the operation -- Maheu's contact and O'Connell's satisfying him that they were government representatives.
p. 88	Rosselli stated that Sheffield Edwards was not overly concerned with the FBI's contacting Rosselli.
p. 89	Rossell's reason for not informing his sources that it was a CIA operation was because he believed he would be more successful doing what he was doing by representing big business.
p. 90	When the FBI contacted Rosselli in both 1966 and 1970 they hinted that they wanted Rosselli to provide information about United States gambling interests.

TOP SECRET

p. 44	After the Cuban Missile Crisis, the whole operation came to a halt and Rosselli said he was never in contact with the Cubans again.
p. 45-46	Rosselli met Harvey at Dulles Airport in Washington after the Missile Crisis, in June 1963, and had dinner with him in Washington that night.
p. 47	Rosselli mentions FBI had him under surveillance for several years.
p. 47	Roselli has two stories re Rowan wiretap from Maheu. Maheu told him he wanted Rosselli to get some bail money for two guys in Las Vegas who were in trouble and he had placed some taps in Rowan's room because 1) Maheu was doing Giancana a favor, and 2) Maheu had the authority to see if Giancana was leaking to his girlfriend.
p. 52	Rosselli arranged bail money for the two men who were caught tapping Rowan's room.
p. 52	Giancana laughed when Rosselli discussed tapping incident with him, but gave no clues to the reason for the tap.
p. 54-55	Rosselli met in New York with O'Connell and Harvey in April 1962.
p. 58	Rosselli states to the Committee that he felt the CIA came to him because he has contacts in Cuba.
p. 59	Rosselli states he took on "project" because it was the government; he was patriotic.
p. 61	Rosselli knew Trafficante before "operation" started.
p. 62	Rosselli maintained some contact with Maheu after Harvey took over.
p. 64	Rosselli still is social friends with Harvey.
p. 66	In April or May of 1966, Rosselli was stopped in the street by two FBI agents with note saying to meet him later. Rosselli referred them to his attorney, Mr. Cantillon

TOP SECRET

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

Howard--

In re your "battle plan" memo to Hart and Garn, I think you should consider possible wisdom of our Committee making some kind of very low-key anouncement that we're doing something. Purpose would be two-fold--to prevent getting wholly co-opted by new House Committee (and agencies making a claim that since House is doing it, they can ignore us---also to put House on notice there is specific area we have carved and will continue to carve out for ourselves). Most important, we must do something affirmative to insure that the sources out there come to us. If we say nothing, potentials which just go to House under assumption that that's the only thing going on.

Attached is the type of low-key someone could say in response to an inquiry (which I assume Spencer gets lots of).

Mike

JFK assassination study

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence is conducting a limited inquiry into certain leads which the Church Committee did not have time to finish checking out. The Committee is also ~~seeking to determine~~ continuing to explore the question of whether or Mr. Roselli's murder was related in any way to his ~~testimony~~ appearances before the church Committee.

Items Interest re Review of R 4881 documents (Requested by Rick)

> Need unsanitized copy 3 May 74 memo re Records Search by Logistics & access to all 2d element forwarded to the IG.

> Why did Houston tell Lyle Miller (per Miller's 14 Mar 75 memo) that only himself, Edw, Osb, Angleton & Rocca aware of details of Maheu, Giancana matter

SECRET ①

-1 file

SECRET - Cable 24 July 74

Response to Meier identifying Mehrige as a CIA officer w. Las Vegas Sun in July 1974

while not directly involved & admittedly unaware of all facts & ramifications ref a exposure it Atlanta base of opinion / termination at this stage, even if only temporary expedient, will have adverse effect on his loyalty to CIA. He might resent termination by CIA for something he not respons. for.

March '76 OS Memos to IG on Maheu & Hughes

June-1974
Security Officer Special Staff Projects asked OS to check records on James R. Phelan & Wallace Turner, both of interest in connection w/ a sensitive SPS activity. OS records show Phelan to be a witness in Clay Shaw trial. Phelan wrote several articles re Maheu's defamation suit w/ Hughes. Maheu thought to be source. Duckett recalled 2 receiving call from RAM in Dec. 1970 complaining that CIA embarked on a new Hughes project & had not gone thru him. (Maheu - Hughes fight reason for termin w/ RAMA)

Non OS/Sec. Doc's in Mehrige OS File
1 Feb 71 Memo from Eric I to DDP - discusses efforts to work out a satis. plan to terminate RAM from RAMA cover in a manner that avoids the need for a meeting w/ RAMA officials

X

Non OIS Docs) in RAM's file SECRET (2)

21 June 66 Houston to DDCI re Long Subcommittee and RAM: John Leon testified before Long Subcom. on Onassis case + subcom. staff undoubtedly knows Maheu used audio device.

Lyle Miller Memo For Record 14 March 1974
par. 8 Notes contact w/ L. Houston re Maheu/Giancana
Houston said the only Agency officials "aware of details were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca and himself."

Lyle Miller MFR 10 Oct 73
re meeting w/ Scott Armst. re his interview of 3 10/3/73 + interest in RAM assoc. w/ CIA.
"New Years Eve Party" - Wilkinson report critical of CIA.

5 page PELTIER memo 11/18/68 re "OBservations on Cover Company Personnel + Activities" (RAMA).

4 page 2 Apr 71 MFR of O'Connell + ? (CCS/LPGLOBE) meeting w/ Ed Mullen (Intertel) re RAMA/MM/CIA. (Juan Duran) [J. Duran Arias] $10,000 withdrawn

Rodiack int. 7 –Mueller/Interlex SECRET

14 MAY 62 TOP SECRET Edwards MFR – Re Balletti.

memo prepared for RFK following oral briefing.

"Rosselli and Maheu spent consid. time in Miami talking with the Courier. Giancana also present. Giancana put them in touch w/ a "Courier" who went back & forth to Havana. Courier said opn feasible

Edw. put in quotes

Jan 71 — All CIA contact w/ RAM cut off. because Hughes battle + unfav. publ. However – OS. notes that Helms had directed termin. of Maheu relat. as early as 1966. "flags" ignored

O'Connell MFR 1/5/71 – re: RAM

On 17 Nov. 70 – Maheu called O'Connell to say that Rosselli's lawyer advised that unless someone interceded on his behalf re deportation – Ros. was going to make complete expose of his activities w/ CIA'

4 Jan 71 – Maheu advised O'C – that his past Affilia. w/ CIA had no bearing on Hughes power struggle situation.

SECRET

④

Review STAFF FILE - Ed Proctor

2/15/72 OS memo to Colby re Rosselli

DCI ignored Rosselli exposure threat, taking calcul. risk as to exposure. [Sanitizes CIA officer's name for unknown reason]

X 5 June 75 — Subm. to Schwartz from Knoche - Elder for

Typewritten - fragmentary resume - Cubela.

SECRET

Bill Angeloni - used for dirty work - Surveil. by Maheu

Maheu file "Gaps".

Vol. 1 Nov63 - Dec. 73 - CCS 12419

3 June 71

Eric I to Sam Halpern

" The attached 2 memoranda contain the latest development in the Robert A. Maheu Associates (RAMA) "thriller". The second memorandum is self explanatory except you should know that - Robert ~~A. Ma~~ Mullen Assoc. is a longtime cooperator in the cover field, and Howard Hunt is now one of its Vice Presidents."

(No Attach.)

13 Apr 71 MFR by 5 (CCS / LPGLOBE)

re / meeting - / wondering how his name came up in Hughes Tool investig. of RAMA. Hennonen meeting w/ Mullen of interest to det. Hunt poisoned than it would have been had that decision been left to those who were profiting personally, psychologically, and politically from the Watergate [illegible].

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

HON. DAWSON MATHIS

OF GEORGIA

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Tuesday, August 3, 1976

Mr. MATHIS. Mr. Speaker, I note with great interest the news reports concerning the John F. Kennedy assassination material which my colleague from Virginia, Mr. DOWNING, made public yesterday. I ask unanimous consent that this article from this morning's Washington Post be inserted at this point in the RECORD. I agree fully with my colleague from Virginia that this information should be investigated properly, by a select committee of the House. If certain Cuban elements were in any way responsible for President Kennedy's death, let us determine that. If former President Nixon had been associated with such groups, and if the "White House tapes" do, in fact, refer to such an association, let us determine that. If the material released yesterday is not true, let us determine that.

Mr. Speaker, the time has come to settle these and many other disturbing questions about the Kennedy assassination. We have waited long enough. I am confident a majority of my colleagues would support the resolution to establish an investigating committee, if it came to the floor for a vote. I strongly urge the Committee on Rules to allow the House that opportunity.

AFFIDAVITS CLAIM 1960 NIXON TIE TO CUBAN PLOT

Rep. Thomas Downing (D-Va.) released sworn statements yesterday quoting an anti-Castro Cuban exile leader as claiming he had an agreement with then-Vice President Nixon in 1960 for "elimination" of leftist Cuban exiles after the Bay of Pigs invasion.

Downing said he had no way of validating the information and was in no position to vouch for its authenticity.

He said he released the statements only because they are sworn and part of a package of documents raising the possibility that President Kennedy was assassinated by right-wing Cuban exiles who felt betrayed because promises that they thought they had from Nixon had not been kept in the Bay of Pigs invasion.

The two sworn statements were made this month by Mario Kohly Jr., son of the late Cuban leader who claimed the agreement with Nixon, and Robert Morrow, an author who says he was a Central Intelligence Agency contract employee.

Morrow's statement says that the elder Kohly said the agreement was made on his pledge to have his 42,000 underground forces inside Cuba, as well as 300 to 400 guerrillas in the Escambray Mountains, support an invasion by CIA-trained Cuban exiles.

Kohly Jr. says in his sworn statement, "I was told that Vice President Nixon had agreed to the elimination of the leftist approved Cuban Revolutionary Front leaders at a time when the island would be invaded by the exile troops trained under the direction of the Central Intelligence Agency."

Earlier, [illegible] U.S. air cover for the Bay of Pigs invasion [illegible] foil. Kennedy stood in the way of a plan [illegible] to Castro Cuban leaders were prepared [illegible] full of [illegible] for [illegible] and [illegible], Morrow said.

DIRECT ELECTIONS FOR EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

HON. [illegible]

Oct 12 mtg

Cast char.
- MOB
- CIA
- FBI
- Cuban Exiles & Soldiers of Fortune
- Hughes

Chpr Plots

#1 | #2 | AMLASA | mob |

Ruby Connection >

Oswald Connection >

Allegations – catalogue

LBJ/JFK Library

1. Inventory – Review ⇒ Tom/Ed.
2. Ingesting
3. Timing & Nature of Public Statement
4. House areas of Interest

Hot leads

instant interviews

– Someone to work

– file system

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to ill the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an unknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely ended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of he President. This shows how garrulous McCone is. H

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a igment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, he source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we re still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either insane or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this. When will we learn? H

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of he Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he hought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and traighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all neans he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain onfidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. le has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" nd has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

CTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.

* SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 JcJ : HRT.

RL

Well handled

FBI

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. Mohr
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Mohr

DATE: December 12, 1963

FROM : C. D. DeLoach

Presidents Commission

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

I had a long talk this morning with Congressman Gerald R. (Gerry) Ford (R. - Michigan) in his office. He asked that I come up to see him. Upon arriving he told me he wanted to talk in the strictest of confidence. This was agreed to.

Ford told me he was somewhat disturbed about the manner in which Chief Justice Warren was carrying on his Chairmanship of the Presidential Commission. He explained that the first mistake that Warren made was his attempt to establish a "one man commission" by appointing a Chief Counsel, Warren Olney, that was his own protege. Ford stated that after the mention of Olney's name by the Chief Justice, at their first meeting, Allen Dulles, former Director of CIA, protested quite violently. Because of Dulles' protest, the other members told Warren that they would like to know more about Olney prior to giving their consent.

On the occasion of their second meeting, Ford and Hale Boggs joined with Dulles. Hale Boggs told Warren flatly that Olney would not be acceptable and that he (Boggs) would not work on the Commission with Olney. Warren put up a stiff argument but a compromise was made when the name of Lee Rankin was mentioned. Warren stated he knew Rankin and could work with him.

Ford told me that he was currently having problems inasmuch as the majority of the members of the Commission desired to go along with the recommendation made in Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach's letter to the Commission dated 12-9-63. In this letter, Katzenbach recommended that the Commission make an immediate press release pointing out that the FBI report clearly showed there was no international conspiracy or collusion and that Oswald was a loner. Ford stated he was a minority of one that did not want to give out any press release until the Commission had had a thorough opportunity to review and discuss the FBI report. (I noted that the report was on his desk at the time of our meeting.)

This is my view point too.

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Evans
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Jones

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED NEXT PAGE

REC 55

62-109090-

FEB 10 1978

CDD:saj

XEROX
DEC 30 1963

22 DEC 27 1963

JAN 3 1964

I told Ford in strict confidence that the Director concurred with his viewpoint. I mentioned that our investigation thus far had conclusively shown that Oswald operated by himself and that Ruby additionally was a loner. However, FBI investigation was still pending on a large number of rumors, speculation and gossip and it, therefore, would be quite unfair for the Commission to take a stand prior to ill the evidence being turned in. Ford stated this was his point entirely and that although he was a minority of one he intended to stick to his point.

Ford told me that John McCone, Director of CIA, had, approximately one week ago, gone up to his office and told him that CIA had uncovered some "startling information" in the Oswald case. McCone proceeded to tell Ford that a source of CIA's in Mexico had seen money exchange hands between Oswald and an inknown Cuban Negro. Ford stated this excited him greatly inasmuch as it definitely tended to show there was an international connection involved in the assassination of the President. This shows how worthless McCone is. H

I told Ford that apparently McCone had failed to follow up on this matter. I mentioned that CIA's source had recanted his story and had indicated that it was a figment of his imagination. However, to prove the unstable tendencies of this source, the source had later claimed that he was actually telling the truth. I pointed out that we were still checking some angles of this, however, the CIA source was obviously either insi[illegible]e or somewhat of a psychopathic liar. Ford stated he could certainly see this. When will we learn? H *

Ford indicated he would keep me thoroughly advised as to the activities of the Commission. He stated this would have to be on a confidential basis, however, he thought it should be done. He also asked if he could call me from time to time and straighten out questions in his mind concerning our investigation. I told him by all means he should do this. He reiterated that our relationship would, of course, remain confidential.

We have had excellent relations with Congressman Ford for many years. He has been given an autographed copy of the Director's book "A Study of Communism" and has been in touch with my office on numerous occasions in the past.

CTION:

Contact will be maintained with Congressman Ford.

* SEE MEMO Branigan to Sullivan 12-13-63 JcJ : HRT.

RL

Well handled

FEB .. 1964

FBI

My Turn

Donald E. Schulz



Kennedy and the Cuban Connection

Conspiracy theories are fashionable, sometimes even fruitful, as in the case of Watergate. So it is not surprising that recent revelations of the Senate Intelligence Committee have resurrected an old question: what connection, if any, did the Castro government have with the assassination of John F. Kennedy?

Current speculation is that the Cuban dictator, having learned of CIA plots against his life, decided to strike back, returning violence for violence, with consequences that are now history. Indeed, the recent report of the Schweiker-Hart task force, while finding no hard evidence to support this theory, did uncover some interesting new leads. More than that, it established that a CIA-FBI "cover-up" had deprived the Warren commission of vital information that prevented it from seriously exploring the possibility of Castro's involvement and that consequently "there is no longer any reason to have faith in its picture of the Kennedy assassination."

And so we may well have a reopening of the investigation. At last.

Given all this, it seems appropriate to examine the record of the period. A small but interesting body of published testimony and reminiscences describes and amply documents a little-known campaign of accommodation launched by Washington and Havana in the weeks preceding that fateful day in November 1963. Actually, the origins of this tentative and ultimately ill-fated rapprochement may be traced to the previous spring, when Castro, increasingly dependent on his Soviet sponsors, found himself obliged to embrace the banner of "peaceful coexistence" in order to obtain economic and military agreements needed to assure the continued development of his revolution. In practical terms, this meant the normalization of relations with the United States.

A MESSAGE FOR CASTRO

It was not until September 1963, however, that this campaign began to show results. At that time, William Attwood, an adviser to the U.S. delegation to the United Nations, told his superiors he had word that Castro wanted an accommodation. John Kennedy got the message and approved a "discreet contact" with the Cuban U.N. representative, Carlos Lechuga. Subsequently, communications were established and meetings held to discuss the prospect of negotiations.

By early November, Kennedy had decided to push toward an opening with Cuba in hopes of taking Castro out of the Soviet fold and erasing the memory of the Bay of Pigs. The Americans sought a meeting to draw up an agenda for later discussions. On Nov. 18, this message was transmitted to Havana. Shortly thereafter, Lechuga was instructed to set forth such a plan for U.S. consideration.

Even as these developments were unfolding, a second dialogue was taking place through an unofficial envoy—the French journalist Jean Daniel. On Oct. 24, Kennedy had received Daniel in the White House. The President, it seems, had learned of the Frenchman's forthcoming visit to Cuba and had decided to seize the occasion to send Castro a message. The essence of this communication was a strong hint that the United States would be willing to normalize relations *providing* certain conditions were met. What were those conditions? One, clearly, was an end to Castroite subversion. The U.S. had a special responsibility to contain Communist expansionism. As long as Havana continued to export revolution, the economic "blockade" of the island would remain in effect.

ACCOMMODATIONS

Beyond this, not much was definite. The American negotiating position had not yet been worked out. Even so, hints of possible Cuban participation in the Alliance for Progress and of the desire of the United States to see a decline in Soviet influence on the island suggested further avenues for discussion.

Bearing this message and an invitation to revisit the White House upon his return, Daniel set off for Cuba. There he found a remarkably receptive Fidel Castro. Indeed, during the course of a six-hour interview the *líder máximo* found occasion to praise the American President for his sincerity, realism and "good ideas": Kennedy might yet understand that there could be "coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas." Castro was convinced that normal relations could be restored "on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty." His country needed peace in order to concentrate on the socio-economic tasks of the revolution. The issue of subversion would not be an obstacle. Cubans would naturally "feel solidarity" with their revolutionary brethren in other lands. But ultimately, each nation would have to determine its own destiny, and "if they choose regimes other than ours, this is not our business."

This was two days prior to President Kennedy's death.

I mention these developments because they provide an important—and perhaps crucial—frame of reference for Congressional investigators and the public alike. They are not, of course, proof of innocence. But they are suggestive: would Castro have been so intent on coming to terms with a man he was conspiring to kill? One may seriously doubt it. In point of fact, the assassination would bring a quick end to Washington's interest in accommodation.

POSSIBLE SCENARIOS

Still, this is not to rule out the possibility of a "Cuban connection." Governments often behave in inconsistent and self-defeating ways. Indeed, even as the Kennedy Administration was taking these first covert steps toward rapprochement, the CIA was engaged in an attempt on Castro's life. If, due to a lack of political control and a prevailing atmosphere of cold-war hostility, U.S agents could be conducting such activities in direct conflict with Presidential policy, it is not difficult to imagine similar distortions on the Cuban side. Only a few weeks earlier, Castro had publicly denounced U.S.-sponsored assassinations and even threatened retaliation. Might not some overzealous security officials have taken this for tacit authority to set up a "program of elimination"?

But all this remains speculation. It is possible to envision any number of scenarios that *might* have led to the fatal events of Nov. 22. In lieu of hard evidence, however, it seems only fair to give Castro the same benefit of the doubt that Kennedy has been accorded—namely, that he be considered innocent until proved guilty. It is hoped that the investigations to come will proceed on the basis of that assumption.

Schulz, a Ph.D. candidate in political science at Ohio State University, is writing a book on the Cuban revolution.

Fonzi Mtg. Notes

9/20/76

[illegible]
305-861-7651

photos

Al Tarabochia memo | Ltr. Ruby-Castro
FBI got quest.

Ruby 62/63 in Havana to see antique dealer

Manolo Ray: Cubela — Artime someone in Artime circle tipped on Cubela

Crile Alleman/Trafficante -

CUSA — Conservatism
Black bordered ads

DEA
Sturgis / Jerry B. involved in case against Bernstein.

Larry Crafford — lived Carousel. — Myers lends $ to "How Hollywood makes movies" — Ruby called Myers to get people out of movies

Hemming too. (Keyes operation)

Marita Lorenz — puts Hunt w/ Sturgis early. Shortly after she got here. Knew Hunt as Eduardo.

Bernstein
Werbell
(Baird) Flood/Cuba

DEA

Paul Meskill — NY Daily News — 1975 — Series of Sturgis Lorenz pieces

Gibson
Traffic

Sylvia Odio — sure it was Oswald in Dallas late Sept when supposed to be in Mex.
Therefore Duran — asset.

imposter

(McQuilley Strawman)

Norman Rothman — Ruby's Cuba
Oswald Ferrie - Shaw - Lawrence Myers - Ruby) on Sturgis McKeown Hemming
Ruby Mob

vol 19 p. 477

Lorenz —

Sam Benton — offered crown deal to assassinate Castro at
funning house. Alex Roark / Sturgis /

— mining —

Naval Intell

Shamma —

[illegible]

Artime
— Trafficante — Norady Quality Foods

Gaillot — Cocaine
see Kessler Atty

Gill [Ross]
see Trianon Jewelry

Eduard Batam

TRICE Co. Realtors
(Rebozo)

Eduardo Buttari — Cuban for

Org. Cr.
Source

Artime:
Carlos Martin →
Dr Modesto Mora → Gerstein protection

McQuilley working for Rothman when Ruby in contact.

Trafficante

Sam Mannarino
Norm Rothman } Stolen Bonds

Norman Rothman — first approached Fiorini on assass.

mibter ← Rolando Martinez — Joe Merola ~~Merola~~
[illegible] (Gun runner)

1 1965 – Hunt straightening out Cubela compromise in Spain.

~~[illegible] – Jack Whitten~~

-Lansky-

2. McLaney

3. Fitz alias

4. Nosenko.

> Jack Whitten

Sanchez → transcript.

AMLASH file.

5. Alvarrado.

> 6. sensitive/reliable source

To ASSASSination file

CONFIDENTIAL

PART TWO: JIM BRADEN

One of the most incredible bodies of recent information concerning the alleged conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy is largely based on the investigative research done by Peter Noyes, a former CBS Producer and top investigative reporter.

Last year, Noyes published a book, Legacy of Doubt, which summed up many of his findings, and which generally outlines what Noyes believes was heavy Mafia involvement in the assassination. The Noyes book is almost entirely factual and is largely based on substantiated information such as police records provided by the FBI, the Los Angeles Police Department, the California Attorney General's Office, and Texas police officials.

Though the Noyes book (like most recent assassination books) did not sell well or receive much press attention, it has been regarded as a valuable contribution by most of author Noyes' fellow Warren Commission critics.

It can definitely be said that almost all of Noyes' findings, particularly with respect to his main character Jim Braden, have been factually substantiated and are solidly established by official police records.

Basically the Noyes book outlines the background of a mysterious man who was picked up by the police at the scene of President Kennedy's assassination just minutes after the shooting. The man was apprehended by a Dallas policeman who thought he was behaving suspiciously. The man, who identified himself under the false name of Jim Braden, was released shortly thereafter following brief questioning by the Dallas Sheriff's Office.

Author Noyes uncovered the story of Jim Braden and his true identity during five years of investigative research.

And it is Jim Braden's true identity and his ironic misfortune of being picked up at the scene of the assassination for "looking suspicious" that the Warren Commission critics now believe ranks with James McCord's mistake of leaving masking tape on the doors during the Watergate break-in as the ultimate fatal slip-ups in the two conspiracies.

For Jim Braden, whose true identity is Eugene Hale Brading, is a man with singularly awesome direct ties to the highest levels of the Mafia. Of all the Mafia figures connected to the syndicate's crucial security and enforcement activities of coercion, maiming, intra-syndicate assassination and outside murder contracting, Jim Braden appears to be an indispensable link - or leader - of organized crime's far flung network of "controlled violence" specialists and professional hit men.

Braden's involvement with the Mafia's highest echelon "enforcers" has spanned the continent from coast to coast and covers virtually every national crime syndicate jurisdiction. According to federal authorities working with the Justice Department's organized crime strike force units, and according to other high government sources cited by author Noyes, Jim Braden is now serving as personal courier for Meyer Lansky.

The importance of this mysterious man who was picked up under a false name across the street from the Texas Book Depository just moments after the shots were fired on November 22, 1963 cannot be overemphasized.

Though there were several innocent witnesses or bystanders in the area of the assassination who were also arrested or brought in for questioning by the Dallas police, all of whom were shortly released like Jim Braden, his presence there at that precise moment does in fact raise an incredible specter, and may indeed have been the monumental slip-up that critics of the Warren Commission now attest to.

Jim Braden's Arrest On November 22

Deputy C.L. Lewis was one of the first Dallas police officers on the scene at the Texas School Book Depository following the assassination.

Within just minutes after the deadly shots were fired, Deputy Lewis confronted a man across the street from the Book Depository, a man whom Lewis thought was "acting suspiciously."

Deputy Lewis questioned the man for several minutes before taking him to the Sheriff's office for further interrogation. The man identified himself as Jim Braden, and said that he was in the oil business in Beverly Hills, California. Deputy Lewis became even more suspicious over the way the man first tried to identify himself. Instead of producing his driver's license, the common means of identification, the man pulled out a gasoline credit card instead.

The man who identified himself as Jim Braden strongly protested when Deputy Lewis told him that he would have to take him in for further interrogation.

At the Sheriff's office, Jim Braden agreed to make a voluntary statement. Braden, then 48, told the police that he was in Dallas on oil business and had been there for two days. He said he was staying at the Cabana Motel, s short distance away from the scene of the assassination. Braden said he had been walking down the street by the Texas Book Depository at the time of the assassination and had been looking for a taxi cab. Jim Braden further stated that he was confronted by Deputy Lewis inside a building across the street from the Depository during an attempt to make a telephone call following the shooting.

Braden was shortly thereafter released by the Dallas Sheriff's office. Braden was not fingerprinted, nor was any check made of possible criminal records relating to him.

Two months later, in late January of 1964, Jim Braden was interviewed by two FBI agents at his office in Beverly Hills. The Warren Commission's investigation was then in full swing and witnesses to the assassination were being questioned by the FBI and other authorities. In his FBI interview, Braden gave the same account as he had given to the Dallas police on the day of the assassination. The FBI's official report on Braden's interrogation further stated that, "Braden has no information concerning the assassination and both Lee Harvey Oswald and Jack Ruby are unknown to him."

Jim Braden's True Identity Emerges

In early 1969, Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter whose book covers much of the information regarding Jim Braden, began investigating the mysterious California "oil man."

Noyes originally received a tip about Braden from a former FBI agent who was then aiding District Attorney Jim Garrison's investigation of the Kennedy assassination. The FBI man told Noyes of Braden's presence at the scene of the assassination at the time of the shooting.

Noyes soon found that Jim Braden was no longer at either of the addresses that he had given the Dallas police, and had left no forwarding addresses.

Noyes then had the California Department of Motor Vehicles run a check on the license number that Braden had given to the Dallas police at the Sheriff's office following the assassination. Motor Vehicles told Noyes that Braden's license (H751755) had been renewed by Braden in San Diego county in November of 1966. Braden has also listed new business and home addresses, which interestingly were over a hundred miles apart.

The Department of Motor Vehicles' records on Jim Braden also showed that "Jim Braden" was not really his original name. The license had actually been issued in the 1950's to Eugene Hale Brading, which is Braden's true identity.

On September 10, 1963, just ten weeks before the assassination, Eugene Hale Brading had notified the Department that he had legally changed his name to Jim Braden, and he requested a new license under that name. The license was granted.

Intrigued by the fact that Jim Braden was really a false identity assumed by Eugene Brading, investigator Noyes contacted the Intelligence Division of the California Attorney General's Office, and had a check run on the mysterious Brading.

Noyes was told that Eugene Hale Brading "is a real bad guy. He's got a long rap sheet and apparently has Mafia connections."

Noyes shortly thereafter obtained a copy of Eugene Brading's (Jim Braden's) police records.

The Brading "rap sheet" contained an incredible 35 seperate entries covering virtually every phase of criminal activity, including mail fraud, embezzlement, operating a gambling house in Miami, car theft, shop lifting, receiving stolen property, and selling wartime gas ration coupons on the black market.

Most of these arrests had been made under the name of Eugene Hale Brading, but the police dossier on him also showed a handful of other aliases, including Harry Eugene Bradley, Gene Brady, James Lee Cole, James Bradley Lee, and inevitably, Jim Braden.

"Jim Braden" was the last entry shown on Brading's records.

Incredibly, investigator Noyes found that due to the fact that the Dallas police had not fingerprinted Jim Braden or run a make on him, his true identity of Eugene Brading was never discovered by the FBI or the Warren Commission at the time of their investigation of the assassination. The Warren Commission had only routinely included Braden's short statement about being in Dallas on "oil business" in a police exhibit on witnesses contained in Warren Commission Hearing's Volume XIX. Jim Braden and his story had been accepted at face value.

Jim Braden (Eugene Brading) And The Mafia

Investigator Noyes began a thorough investigation of Braden based upon all available police records and documents.

What soon clearly emerged was a long record of involvement by Braden (Brading) with many of the most notorious Mafia leaders in the nation, a record of close association with key figures in the national crime syndicate.

Following a string of arrests in the 1940's, dating all the way back to his young adulthood, Eugene Brading had moved to El Paso, Texas, in 1950.

(BRADING AND PEREIRA)

In El Paso, Brading became closely associated with Victor Pereira, a man who was a close associate and confidante of several Mafia members. Brading and Pereira became involved in a number of schemes involving marriage to and embezzlement of wealthy widows.

In 1951, Brading and his close friend Pereira were arrested by the FBI in New York on a fugitive warrant issued in Texas. The two men were charged with embezzling over $50,000 from a wealthy widow whom Pereira had married shortly before fleeing with her money. Brading and Pereira were soon convicted of the charges and were each sentenced to 12 years in prison.

However, Brading and Pereira were out free during the three years of their appeals, and Brading was later paroled in 1959 after having served just five years of his sentence.

(BRADING AND THE SMALDONES)

During the three years of freedom under their appeals of the convictions, Brading and Pereira left Texas (following still another fleecing of another wealthy widow) and moved to Denver, Colorado.

In Denver, Brading became very closely associated with two leading Mafia bosses in the Rocky Mountain area, Clyde and Gene Smaldone.

The Smaldone brothers, who were also known as "Checkers and Flip Flop," were the Mafia leaders in charge of the syndicate's vending-machine market which stretched from the Rockies all the way to Chicago. Police records show that at one time, the Smaldones virtually controlled the entire Pueblo area of Colorado.

The Smaldone brothers were notorious for the brutal brand of violence they practiced in their operations. Brading (Braden) became involved in many transactions with the Smaldones and became a close personal friend. Several years later, after Brading finally went to jail for the embezzlement of the Texas widow, the Smaldone brothers regularly wrote to him in prison, seeking his advice on various financial matters.

(BRADING AND CLARK AND BAUMAN)

Brading and his friend Pereira later moved to Beverly Hills in California. Shortly thereafter, Brading inevitably came under investigation by the Los Angeles Police Department Intelligence Division's Mafia specialists.

In particular, the LAPD interest in Brading was focused on his close association in Beverly Hills with two "oil speculators" from Miami, Arthur Clark and Roger Bauman. Clark and Bauman were notorious Mafia figures with long police records.

Brading's friend Clark had been one of the top leaders of the famous Purple Gang of the Mafia, which had operated out of Detroit and Youngstown. The Los Angeles police had placed Clark and Bauman under tight surveillance and had compiled extensive information on their friendship with Brading.

In 1956, the Chief of Intelligence of the LAPD, Captain James Hamilton, sent a letter to the Crime Commission of Greater Miami seeking information about Clark, Bauman, and Brading.

Captain Hamilton, who was known as one of the foremost experts on the Mafia in the nation, asked the Miami Commission (which was conducting extensive investigations of the Mafia) to inform him as to the involvement of several associates of Clark and Bauman.

Among those named was Eugene Brading.

Captain Hamilton's letter stated:

> "This Department has under investigation Arthur Lewis Clark, Sr., FBI 3709258, and a Roger Bauman. These men are representing themselves as officials of the Sunbeam Oil Company, 212 Roosevelt Theater Building, Miami Beach, and both are spending money very lavishly."
>
> "Clark has been arrested several times and has been associated with many confidence men and hoodlums such as James Fratianno, Victor Pereira, Eugene Brading, Clarence Rhodes, Stephen Sambor and the Smaldone brothers of Denver."

As investigator Peter Noyes points out, the men listed with Brading in the letter, represent a virtual "Who's Who" of organized crime leaders between California and the Midwest.

(BRADING AND FRATIANNO)

Of these top Mafia men listed with Brading (Braden) perhaps the most important one is James Fratianno, also widely known as "Jimmie The Weasel." Fratianno was known as perhaps the Mafia's highest ranking executioner in the nation.

In 1959, in his testimony before the Rackets Committee of the California legislature, Captain Hamilton, the Chief of LAPD Intelligence, stated that,

> "We have long considered Fratianno to be the executioner for the Mafia on the West Coast."

Captain Hamilton told the Rackets Committee that his Intelligence Division had linked Jimmie Fratianno to at least sixteen Mafia executions.

Fratianno had once been arrested for the attempted assassination of Los Angeles Mafia head Mickey Cohen in 1949. Cohen had survived the bloody shooting which took the life of one of his lieutenants. Fratianno was later released due to insufficient evidence. Fratianno used the alibi that he had been at the home of Mafia associate Nick Licata the night of the shooting. Licata later became the new head of the Los Angeles Mafia, and, perhaps significantly, was later given control of the Mafia in Dallas, Texas.

Jimmie Fratianno was also suspected of complicity in the murders of two men in 1951. Two men who made the mistake of robbing the Mafia's Flamingo Hotel in Las Vegas were found dead in a parked car following the robbery. Both of their skulls had been shattered by bullets fired behind the ear, apparently in true Mafia fashion.

Fratianno had also been linked to the famous murder of Harry "Hooky" Rothman, who had been another close associate of Mickey Cohen, the Los Angeles Mafia head. Also, Fratianno was also linked to the disappearance of another top member of the Mickey Cohen gang, Frank Niccoli. Niccoli had mysteriously vanished following a late dinner at Fratianno's home one night.

Fratianno was also linked to the brutal murder of a businessman in northern California in 1952. Thomas Keen, a wealthy gambler, had apparantly welched on a $80,000 gambling debt that he owed the Mafia, and was blown to bits from a dynamite charge hidden under the hood of his car.

Fratianno later served a six year prison term (1954-1960) for extortion. In later years Fratianno became the central figure involved in LOOK magazine's "expose" of San Francisco Mayor Joseph Alioto's alleged Mafia connections. LOOK alleged that Fratianno had become a close friend of Mayor Alito and that the Mayor had arranged for Fratianno to receive loans of over $105,000 from a bank where Alioto served as Chairman of the Board. Alioto admitted that Fratianno was a "casual acquaintance" of his, but denied that he had used any influence in the loans. The Mayor also said that he had not known that the notorious Fratianno was a member of the Mafia.

(BRADING AND MELTZER)

While in Los Angeles, Brading (Jim Braden) also became connected with top Mafia leader Harold "Happy" Meltzer. The LAPD Intelligence Division had originally become aware of Brading's close relationship with Meltzer when Brading's name was found on Meltzer's Christmas card list. Meltzer was widely known as one of the most powerful Mafia leaders in the entire nation.

The U.S. Senate Rackets Committee identified Brading's friend Meltzer as a top Mafia boss in the areas of union racketeering and narcotics.

A report of the Senate Rackets Committee from 1964 states:

> "Meltzer now is reported to operate a large bookmaking and prostitution syndicate in California. A major figure in the organized underworld, he is known to all the important narcotics traffickers throughout the United States. He has also operated in Oklahoma, Texas, Baltimore, Miami, Las Vegas, Boston, and various areas of Canada, Cuba, Hong Kong, Japan, Hawaii, and the Philippines."

(BRADING AND THE SICAS)

In Los Angeles, Brading also became closely associated with yet another top Mafia operation. Brading became a close friend and associate of the notorious Sica brothers - Joe, Freddie, and George. The Sica brothers were particularly brutal syndicate members specializing in narcotics.

In 1950, the U.S. Attorney in Los Angeles accused Brading's friends, Joe and Freddie Sica, of heading the single largest narcotics ring in the United States.

The Sica brothers were shortly thereafter brought to trial. On the night before the trial opened, the government's star witness, an informant named Abe Davidian, was mysteriously shot to death in his mother's home in Fresno. The murder was never solved and the Sica brothers were soon released for lack of evidence.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To Jack Ruby

The same inadequate investigative work which led the Warren Commission to largely overlook Jack Ruby's solid Mafia involvement, appears also to have been responsible for the failure to uncover Jim Braden's true identity of Eugene Brading during the official investigation into the Kennedy assassination.

As shown in the previous account of Jack Ruby's very substantial ties to the Mafia, Ruby was particularly involved in the syndicate areas of gambling and narcotics.

But beyond the multiplicity of evidence which indicates that Jack Ruby and Jim Braden were both important Mafia figures operating in the same general areas, at the same general times, there is another single piece of evidence which places both Ruby and Braden at the same place on the day before the assassination.

Evidence indicates that both Jim Braden and Jack Ruby visited the Dallas offices of the H.L. Hunt Oil Company on the afternoon of November 21, 1963, just twenty four hours before the President was murdered. Obviously any link which places both Braden and Ruby in the same place at the same time on the day before the assassination does of course raise further significant questions about a possible relationship between the two men.

Jim Braden received permission from the U.S. Board of Parole in Los Angeles to make a trip to Dallas, Texas on November 18, 1963, four days before the assassination. Braden was required to report all of his travels to his Parole Board following his parole in 1959 for the embezzlement conviction.

On November 21, 1963, the day before the assassination, Jim Braden checked in with the U.S. Parole Office in Dallas. According to Roger Carroll, the Chief Parole Officer in Dallas, Braden (Brading) "advised that he planned to see Lamar Hunt and other oil speculators while here." Lamar Hunt is the son of H.L. Hunt, the famous right-wing oil billionaire.

Paul Rothermel, a former FBI agent who was Director of Security for the Hunt Oil Company in Dallas at that time, has recalled that he distinctly remembers Braden visiting the Hunt offices on November 21 in the company of three other men. Rothermel has stated that the office log for November 21 showed that Roger Bauman (Brading's old Mafia friend) and Morgan Brown and Duane Nowlin "and friend" visited the Hunt office on that afternoon. Rothermel states that Braden was definitely the "friend."

(Security chief Paul Rothermel was later fired by H.L. Hunt's sons after reports allegedly surfaced that Rothermel was "suspicious" of a possible Hunt connection to the assassination. Following his termination by the Hunts, Rothermel found that he was being illegally wiretapped. Rothermel filed suit against Lamar Hunt and another one of H.L. Hunt's sons, charging them with the wiretapping, and asking for several million dollars in damages. The suit, which has produced very damaging evidence against the Hunt brothers, is still in the courts.)

Also on November 21, the day before the assassination, according to a conclusion of the Warren Commission, Jack Ruby was also on his way to the H.L. Hunt offices in Dallas. The Warren Commission concluded that Jack Ruby drove a woman friend of his to the Hunt offices sometime that same afternoon. The woman, who had declined work in Ruby's nightclub as a stripper, drove with Ruby to the Hunt offices, apparantly in search of employment. This does coincide with Braden's visit to the same offices on that same afternoon.

The Warren Commission investigated several other possible links of Jack Ruby to the Hunts, including the still unexplained fact that Lamar Hunt's name was found inside one of Ruby's notebooks. But of these possible links, the Warren Commission concluded only that evidence did indicate that Ruby had driven to the Hunt offices on November 21.

Thus a possible Ruby-Braden connection on the day before the President's assassination does indeed arise.

Jim Braden: Possible Link To David Ferrie

Investigator Peter Noyes has turned up several pieces of information which indicate a possible connection between Jim Braden and the mysterious David Ferrie.

David Ferrie was the homosexual airline pilot and private investigator whom Jim Garrison accused of participating in the plot to assassinate President Kennedy. Six days after District Attorney Garrison's charges were made public, David Ferrie was found dead in his apartment in New Orleans. His mysterious death was finally ruled to have been a suicide.

David Ferrie has been a target of investigation by critics of the Warren Commission ever since the assassination. In fact the FBI and Secret Service both investigated a possible Ferrie role immediately after the assassination. It was widely rumored in New Orleans and Dallas that Ferrie was to have flown the alleged assassins out of the country following the assassination. The Warren Commission decided not to include the official Secret Service and FBI reports on Ferrie in the 26 Volumes of Hearings which were released after the Warren Report was issued. However, the Justice Department did finally release those reports to the National Archives in 1967 following Garrison's public accusations.

Author Noyes has since established that both Jim Braden and Davod Ferrie worked out of the same floor of offices in a building in New Orleans in the month or two immediately preceding the assassination.

This is particularly significant due to the fact that at that time the mysterious David Ferrie was employed as a private investigator by Carlos Marcello, the top Mafia kingpin. It is widely believed by most federal authorities that Carlos Marcello ranks with his close friend Meyer Lansky as one of the two single most powerful leaders of the Mafia's national and international crime syndicate. Carlos Marcello heads the Mafia empire centered in New Orleans, Louisiana, and controls most of the Mafia activity in the southern part of the United States.

In September and October of 1963, just weeks before the assassination, David Ferrie was working out of the offices of Carlos Marcello's criminal attorney, G. Wray Gill. Ferrie, who was doing investigative work on a perjury charge that his boss Marcello was then facing, worked out of Room 1707 in the Pere Marquette Building in New Orleans.

At this same time, in September and October of 1963, Jim Braden was operating out of Room 1701 in the Pere Marquette Building.

Braden was then commuting between New Orleans and Beverly Hills, with the approval of his Parole Board. Braden was working as a representative of his Mafia friend Roger Bauman, the oil speculator. Braden worked out of Room 1701, which was the office of his associate, Victor Main, Jr., an oil geologist. This was just a short way down the hall from David Ferrie in Room 1707.

Interestingly, in one visit to his Parole Office, Braden "mistakenly" told his Parole Officer that he was working out of Room 1706 - which would have been the room next door to Ferrie - instead of Room 1701.

Thus a possible Braden-Ferrie connection in the weeks just before the assassination does indeed arise in addition to the possible Braden-Ruby connection. Both connections definitely do seem to fall outside of or beyond the area which could reasonably be attributed to coincidence, chance, or circumstance.

Beyond several sets of information which tend to indicate that David Ferrie had some contact with Lee Oswald at various times, the critics of the Warren Commission have particularly focused on Ferrie's ties to Carlos Marcello and the Marcello Mafia empire.

In fact, in his interviews with the FBI and Secret Service after the assassination, Ferrie claimed that he was with Marcello at the very time of the assassination. Ferrie stated that he was in court with Marcello on the afternoon of November 22, which does appear to be true.

Carlos Marcello, along with Meyer Lansky, had become the central targets of the Justice Department's Organized Crime Division in the early 1960's, under the vigorous direction of Attorney General Robert Kennedy.

Marcello, known as "The Little Man," became one of Attorney General Kennedy's most fierce enemies during that period. Marcello once claimed that he had been kidnapped under orders of Robert Kennedy and the Justice Department.

Ed Reid, author of The Greenfelt Jungle and widely recognized as one of the most respected experts on the Mafia in the nation, has written that Carlos Marcello once threatened to have President Kennedy and his brother murdered. Reid has written that he was told of Marcello's threat by an informant who attended a secret meeting with Marcello in New Orleans in September of 1962.

According to Reid's informant, Marcello told his top lieutenants, "Don't worry about that little Bobby sonofabitch. He's going to be taken care of." The informant stated that Marcello said that President Kennedy himself would have to be killed first, and that his brother would then follow. The informant further stated that Marcello spoke of using some "nut" to do the killings.

Jim Braden: Author Peter Noyes And Judge Byrne

Peter Noyes, the investigative reporter who uncovered most of the material regarding Jim Braden (Eugene Brading), is a former classmate and close friend of Judge Matthew Byrne, Jr., the U.S. District Court Judge who presided over the Ellsberg Pentagon Papers trial last year.

As is now well known, Judge Byrne dismissed the case against Ellsberg after he was notified that the White House "Plumbers" had once burglarized the office of Ellsberg's psychiatrist.

A short time later, it became known that President Nixon had twice instructed John Ehrlichman to approach Judge Byrne during the course of the Ellsberg trial and offer him the position of Director of the FBI. This offer, which Judge Byrne refused, has been regarded as a potential act of bribery by some critics of President Nixon, and is currently under investigation by the Special Prosecutor's Office.

It has been widely assumed that Nixon's fervent interest in the outcome of the prosecution of Ellsberg may have been the motivation behind his approach to Judge Byrne.

Author Noyes has written of his friend Judge Byrne's involvement in his research on Jim Braden. In 1969, after Noyes had accumulated much of his information regarding the mysterious Braden, he took the information to his friend, Matt Byrne, who was then U.S. Attorney for southern California. Noyes had several talks with Byrne and has said that Byrne was very impressed by the substantive evidence which Noyes had gathered. During one of these meetings with Byrne and another FBI man whom Byrne had invited to attend, the FBI man told Noyes that the FBI had never before known that Jim Braden - the man arrested at the scene of the assassination in 1963 - was actually Eugene Brading. The FBI man said that the Bureau must have made a big mistake in not tracing down Braden's true identity and police record. The FBI man was nearly incredulous over Noyes' evidence on Braden.

Noyes meanwhile had discovered that Jim Braden had also been in Los Angeles on the night that Robert Kennedy was assassinated in early June of 1968.

Though Noyes couldn't find any significant information indicating any Braden connection to the second Kennedy murder, he and his friend Matt Byrne forwarded the information on Braden to the Special Unit of the LAPD which was investigating the RFK death.

The Special Unit of the LAPD, according to Noyes, discounted the information regarding the RFK assassination, but was indeed impressed by the Braden connection to the 1963 assassination. Noyes writes that Judge Byrne never heard anymore about it after he forwarded the information to the RFK investigators.

Later, Attorney General John Mitchell slected Byrne to be Executive Director for the Scranton Commission that investigated student unrest several years ago. Following his work for the Scranton Commission, U.S. Attorney Byrne was appointed U.S. District Court Judge by President Nixon, the position he held at the time of the Ellsberg trial.

Jim Braden: Where He Is Today

Immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy, Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) had an upturn in his personal finances.

Brading later reported a large increase in revenue from an oil well he had an interest in back in Louisiana. He reported the large increase in revenue from the well for the month of November 1963.

A month later, in December of 1963, Brading became a charter member of the exclusive (and very expensive) La Costa Country Club in southern California. Later that year, 1964, Brading and his old syndicate oil friend Roger Bauman established the "B And B Cattle Company." The company was set up in Chicago and was presumably named after them, "B And B," though neither of the two men are listed as corporate officers. It was also during this same period that Brading made a substantial investment in two lots in Coral Gables, Florida.

In 1965, Brading's lengthy parole was finally terminated. He soon bought a new home near the La Costa Country Club which he had joined, and he also bought a house for his parents in Santa Barbara.

And it is at the La Costa Country Club that the mysterious trail of Jim Braden, or Eugene Hale Brading, finally ends.

The La Costa Country Club, which Brading had joined as one of its 100 Charter members in January of 1964, is one of the more notorious Mafia properties in the nation.

The most powerful force behind La Costa is Moe Dalitz, one of Meyer Lansky's single closest associates. Moe Dalitz had been the leader of the early Mayfield Road Gang in Cleveland, and had been the founder of the actual Cleveland syndicate, one of the most powerful forces in the national crime syndicate.

Moe Dalitz had been one of the Mafia's biggest investors in Las Vegas, and it had been Dalitz who had personally helped set up the Howard Hughes empire in Las Vegas. Dalitz had sold much of his own holdings to Howard Hughes in the late 1960's.

The La Costa Country Club had become, under the direction of Moe Dalitz and Meyer Lansky, a key "watering hole" of the syndicate. La Costa was originally financed through a syndicate deal with James Hoffa of the Teamsters. One of the Teamsters Union's billion dollar Pension Funds was used in the financing of the project. La Costa became what is known in the Mafia as "open territory" - meaning that no single Mafia family controlled it. La Costa was open to all.

Intelligence authorities in southern California have long regarded La Costa as a prime hangout for the Mafia. Some officials have dubbed it "Apalachin West."

The syndicate had originally given Charter memberships in La Costa to a number of Hollywood celebrities, so as to soften the image of the plush resort. Among the members were Frank Sinatra, Bob Hope, and Bing Crosby.

Members of President Nixon's inner circle also became frequent guests as La Costa, which is just twenty miles away from San Clemente. Early in the Nixon Administration, in 1969, Los Angeles Police were astonished to find Murray Chotiner, one of the President's closest confidantes, living it up at La Costa while the President was in San Clemente.

In February of 1973, while President Nixon was at San Clemente, H.R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, Richard Moore, and John Dean held a series of meetings at La Costa to discuss the Watergate conspiracy, which was then beginning to unravel.

John Dean gave lengthy testimony during the Ervin Committee hearings regarding "the La Costa meetings." These meetings at La Costa have since emerged as perhaps the most crucial strategy sessions involved in the alleged cover-up of Watergate by the President's closest aides. Dean testified that the La Costa meetings took place over a period of two days, February 10 - 12, 1973. Dean testified that the sessions were held in a special villa at La Costa that was used by Haldeman.

It has been during this same period of time, in the last several years, that Eugene Brading (Jim Braden) has become one of the most important Mafia operatives at La Costa. According to numerous intelligence reports, from California, Nevada, and federal authorities, Brading is now suspected of being the personal courier for national crime syndicate boss Meyer Lansky.

The Nevada Gaming Board is continuing an investigation into Braden's alleged role as syndicate courier for "skimmed" gambling revenue from Las Vegas. Investigator Noyes was told by several high government officials that Jim Braden had indeed been identified as the personal courier for Meyer Lansky. One official disclosed that Braden was suspected of taking over $72 million out of the country for the syndicate. Another official said that was a "low estimate."

In the summer of 1971, Braden came under renewed investigation by California authorities following an incident at La Costa.

A janitor at La Costa opened Braden's golf locker to make a routine inspection. Out of the locker tumbled a bundle of well over $100,000 in cash.

Author Noyes was informed by one official that the bundle had contained at least $120,000 in cash, and another California official put the amount at closer to $200,000.

During questioning regarding the incident, Braden stated that he had received the money from an oil transaction, and that he had temporarily stored it in the locker. Later, one of the officials working on that particular investigation of Braden, told Noyes that Braden had also been given the use of two planes owned by Howard Hughes to fly Mafia gambling cash out of Nevada and the country.

At present, Eugene Brading, alias Jim Braden, is still operating out of La Costa.

(Braden is now living in Atlanta)

– Mike Ewing
Sen. Hughes office
June, 1974

RICHARD L. THORNBURGH
RE: JKF ASSASSINATION

January 21, 1977

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R. 6250

Honorable Richard L. Thornburgh
Acting Attorney General
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C.

Dear General Thornburgh:

The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence would most appreciate prompt access to Federal Bureau of Investigation material relating to Mr. Nelson Bunker Hunt and Mr. Eugene Brading, a/k/a Jim Braden.

Your assistance and cooperation with the Select Committee is most appreciated.

Aloha,

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Chairman

HSL/dr

cc: 1 - author file
1 - subject matter file
1 - William G. Miller
1 - Michael J. Madigan

DONALD F. MASSEY
RE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD

December 8, 1976

IN REPLY PLEASE
REFER TO R#5785

Mr. Donald F. Massey
Assistant Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C.

Dear Don:

As I mentioned briefly this afternoon, the Select Committee has expressed an interest in recent press accounts suggesting the existence of transcripts of Lee Harvey Oswald conversations in Mexico City. I would be pleased if you would advise as to the existence of such transcripts and their availability for review by the Senate Select Committee.

Thank you in advance for your attention to this request.

Sincerely,

HOWARD S. LIEBENGOOD
Minority Staff Director

HSL:dr

cc: 1 - Author File
1 - Subject File
1 - Minority Counsel
1 - Staff Director

I. Schulz
AM
rudeau
HA!
AT
TLE
MP!
Curtis

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission, to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot.

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."



DROPOUTS

By Howard Post


YOU SAY YOU HAVE RECURRING FANTASIES OF SPACE FLIGHT...
NOT PARTICULARLY...
-DO YOU DESIRE TO EXPERIENCE INTERPLANETARY TRAVEL?
JUST THE WEIGHTLESSNESS.

GASOLINE ALLEY

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

Howard [illegible]

THE WASHINGTON POST

September 12, 1976

Alton Frye

The JFK Assassination: Curiosity in Havana

An inquisitive American learns many things on a visit to Cuba. One of the most surprising is that high officials in Havana seem genuinely hopeful that the investigation of the Kennedy assassination will be reopened. They are convinced that there was a Cuban factor in the murder.

Conversations with senior officials of the Cuban government, including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, make clear that they have followed closely the disclosures by the Senate Intelligence Committee casting doubt upon the Warren Commission investigation. The Cubans are well aware that the doubts center on the failure of the CIA and the FBI to inform the Warren Commission of the several plots mounted by the CIA to kill Fidel Castro. Knowledge of these plots appears to have been withheld even from the FBI and CIA officials who were responsible for investigating the President's murder and for supporting the work of the Warren Commission. As a result, there was no special effort to explore the possible involvement of either the Cuban government or Cuban exiles in the assassination. Evidence developed by the Senate committee makes both hypotheses plausible—and a new inquiry imperative.

The situation is murkier and more perplexing than ever. Those who are resistant to conspiracy theories and who have been prepared—even eager —to believe that Lee Harvey Oswald acted alone can no longer rely on the Warren Commission report as an adequate prop for their predilections. The commission did not know that on Nov. 22, 1963, at about the very hour Oswald struck in Dallas, an agent of the Central Intelligence Agency was meeting with a ranking Cuban official (code-named AMLASH and recently identified as Rolando Cubela) to plan the murder of Castro. Simultaneously, in Cuba, a French reporter, Jean Daniel, was spending the day with Castro, conveying to the Cuban leader views expressed by President Kennedy in a brief interview at the White House on Oct. 24, persuading Castro that Kennedy wanted to explore ways to normalize relations. Thus, at the moment the President was killed, U.S. policy toward Cuba appeared to be moving not only on two tracks but in opposite directions, and movement on either track could have provoked violent response by one or another Cuban faction.

The writer is a senior fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations.

Perceptions inside the Cuban government responded to both tendencies in U.S. policy. There is good reason to suspect that the AMLASH operation involved a double agent, or at least a singularly inept one. Castro almost certainly knew of it. The CIA eventually concluded that the AMLASH activity was "insecure" and terminated it. Among other discoveries, within two days of the assassination it was known (but not to the Warren Commission) that AMLASH had been in contact with Soviet personnel in Mexico City, where Oswald had gone in September 1963 to visit both the Cuban and Soviet consulates. Whether these facts are significant or merely coincidental, one cannot tell. In retrospect, Cuban authorities note with some relief that Oswald was denied permission to visit Cuba, implying that, had his request been granted, the finger of suspicion would surely have pointed at Havana.

Perhaps more suggestive of a direct leak from AMLASH to Castro was the sequence of events on Sept. 7, 1963, when the CIA re-established contact with the Cuban conspirator for the first time since the preceding year. Late that evening, Prime Minister Castro called in Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker for an unexpected interview. Only three Western reporters were based in Havana at the time and their contact with Castro was quite limited. Evidently, the Cuban leader had a message he wished to get on the record through Harker. He charged that the United States was aiding terrorist plots in Cuba and warned U.S. leaders that "if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe."

This threat of reprisals seems less inflammatory and more understandable now that we know what Castro knew at the time, namely, that the United States was in fact stepping up its covert operations against Cuba during the summer and fall of 1963. Yet it seems an exception to the main lines of Cuban policy as it was then evolving.

For months afer the missile crisis of 1962, Castro had been displeased with the Soviets, and there are signs that he was interested in an opening to Washington. On Sept. 5, the Cubans quietly proposed talks with the Americans at the United Nations, and Kennedy soon responded with interest. Also, in early September the Time magazine bureau chief in Buenos Aires, Gavin Scott, travelling on a Canadian passport, spent two weeks in Cuba. Although key U.S. officials have no recollection of consulting with Scott on that occasion, the Cubans recall his questions and comments as hinting of American interest in a possible accommodation, much as they were later to interpret the discussions between Jean Daniel and Castro.

Then and now the Cubans' attitude toward Kennedy has been a compound of political antipathy and personal admiration. While critical of Kennedy's role in various counter-revolutionary efforts, Castro and his associates voice a warm, almost affectionate regard for the President's courage and realism. They

2

profess to have seen his death as a grave setback to more hopeful relations between the two countries. The John Kennedy of 1963 was not, in their judgment, the same man who was inaugurated in 1961, but a more mature, poised and forward-looking leader with whom they could have done business.

With this frame of reference, Cuban officials speculate that the real origin of the assassination lies in anti-Castro circles, with which Oswald also was in touch. They emphasize that assassination is incompatible with their own revolutionary doctrine and that they never contemplated it even against Batista, the previous Cuban ruler. And they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli, the Mafia figures who consorted with the CIA to kill Castro, surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder.

Castro has said publicly that he has no proof "counter-revolutionary elements" planned the assassination, but that is clearly the consensus in Havana. Further investigation may still be inconclusive, but, far from seeing it as an impediment to Cuban-American relations, the Castro regime welcomes such an inquiry. Their curiosity seems greater than their complicity.

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By **RON LaBRECQUE**
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representatives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that ... Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. "... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee, all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power, according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate. "I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.' "

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

Oswald 201 - 57 file folders - chron. arranged.
Ballen for access.

→ Ck. CIA files on John Wilson - Hudson.

CIA's first case officer allegedly compromised by "the Cuban girl" - Williamson (in 1967 IG report on assass.)

Steve Hunt — not in Security report which Rocca requested in 1967 when Rocca requested the Espinosa file, as result of Garrison investig.

June 65 - Swenson to Spain.

1961 - Fred Stewart - (1967 IG report) first recruited AMLASH in Mexico City.

FBI, Paul Daily, says the FBI informant who told them of AMLASH plot was not Tepedino. Bureau refuses to say who their source was. CIA says the informant was Tepedino.

Espinosa tied into dynamite via Sturgis
New Orleans / Miami.

Apr 6, 1965
← first date AMLASH compromised
per knowl. of CIA

Questions to be answered + notes of future from reading 1967 IG Report —

1) Who is QJWIN? what does he do? What are names of other principal agents and sub-agents required for ZRRifle activities?

- Dr. Edward "Manny Gunn" involved in Technical aspects of Operational planning. (asked to treat cigars w/ lethal material).

- Jake Esterline was head of Cuba task force in pre Bay of Pigs days.

Cornelius Roosevelt - Chief, TSD, during early plots.

Giancana nixed gangland slaying because use of weapons rendered escape and survival negligible.

The disaffected Cuban official Trafficante in touch w/ was Juan Orta, who had access to Castro.

Sid Gottlieb involved ~~w/ TSD~~ as Special Asst. to DDP during relevant time frame.

Orta lost position in Cuban govt. on 26 Jan. 1961 + took refuge in Venezuelan embassy on April 11, 1961 and became the responsibility of the Mexican Embassy when Venz. broke relations w/ Cuba in Nov. 1961. Castro refused a safe conduct pass until Oct. 1964 when allowed him to go to Mexico City. Orta arrived in Miami in Feb, 1965 (Coinc. fall from favor r/t cold feet killed first gangster attempt.)

Orta suggested a successor - who made several unsuccessful attempts.

2) Who was successor?

Trafficante – suggested Tony Varona (high in exile movement) – head of Democratic Revolutionary Front group, supported by CIA as part of larger Cuban opn.

Varona not satisfied w/ degree of CIA assistance.

21 Dec 60 – FBI gave CIA a memo on racketeers efforts to finance anti-Castro activities.

18 Jan 61 – Varona associated w/ above scheme. Hired Edw. Moss, D.C. public relations man as fund raiser and public relations advisor. Moss's mistress Julia Cellini, whose brothers owned 2 large Havana gambling casinos. Moss had been given Covert Security Clearance by CIA.

3.) Where are the orig. FBI reports?

4.) Edward K. Moss file

Esterline supposedly took "ineffective steps" to thwart Varona's involv. in mobster plan as he was one of five key figures in the Revolutionary Front & heavily involved in the approaching BofP plan.

5.) Who were other 4 leaders? What steps take take? Why ineffective?

Pill delivery: Roselli → O'Connell → Varona → ?

p.35 6). Who is Varona's son-in-law – closely involved w/ him during relevant time frame?

ZRRifle was covered as an FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop capability for entering safes and for kidnapping couriers).

7) Names of those in FI/D involved w/ ZRRifle.

QJWIN terminated by Luxembourg station – Apr. 1964

46 Gunn delivered poison pills to Harvey

47 Harvey says Rosselli in touch w/ Varona when Harvey arrived in Fla. O'Connell does not remember when Varona was re-activated for phase 2 efforts.

48 Giancana and Trafficante apparently not involved in phase 2. Rosselli dealing w/ a Cuban who spoke Italian named MACEO who went by the names Garcia-Gomez + Godoy / Varona + Varona's son-in-law.

50 – Shackley was never told who pills deliv. to or why. Only told surveillance in support of a HQ opn.

49 Harvey and Shackley deliv. arms + equip. to Rosselli for Varona.

52 Jan 63 – Rosselli agreed w/ Harvey that not much ~~would~~ was going to happen

52. Feb 63. Harvey left word for MACEO that it looked like the effort was over. Rosselli met w. Harvey in LA and agreed to close opn off "but that it would be unwise to attempt to precipitate a break between Rosselli + Varona" with Rosselli agreeing to reduce frequency of contact until there was none.

53 June 63 – Roselli visited Harvey in DC + went out to dinner – While dining Papich called Harvey + asked if he knew who his dinner guest was. Roselli under intensive surveillance. Papich said have to tell Hoover

plus Why did Edwds. Agency tell RFK that opns ceased w/ mob when in fact they still underway w/ mob at that moment

70 FBI interviewed Ed Morgan

72 Maheu met at least once w/ Vice Pres. Nixon in effort to aid Niarchos vis-a-vis Onassis.

73 Maheu hired someone to do tech. surveil. on Onassis

73 Gen. Counsel w/ Maheu's counsel, Ed Morgan, persuaded Sen. Long not to call him.

73 Sam Halpern was in on the contaminated diving suit scheme after Des Fitzgerald took over Cuban Task Force from Harvey in Jan. 63. Gottlieb of course also involved.

TMB A no CI files reviewed by IG in preparing report

78 March 61 - Jack Stewart met w/ Cubela in Mexico City. Stew. assigned to Mex. City knew Cubela casually from Havana days. Tepedino (AMWHIP-1), long time friend Cubela, arranged meeting to sound Cubela out on his views on Cuban situation. This meeting though inconclusive led to AMLASH.

80 March 61 - Miami asset reported that Cubela and Juan Orta (gangsters man in Cuba) wanted to defect.
CIA found 3 name links betw. Cubela and persons involved in gambling syndicate episodes — All nebulous

81 Aug. 61 Cubela sent message to Tepedino that Cubela wanted to talk with friend of Stewart's in Paris if possible. Sent thru Cubela's girl friend - airline hostess. Paris given OK to approach — no indic. he was ever contacted.

82 June 62 - Tepedino told FBI of Cubela's desire to defect. Bureau said would refer Cubela to CIA in Paris if he contacted Bureau's legal attache.

Tepedino contacted FBI because he upset w/ way CIA handled Cubelas "defection" attempt in Paris in 1961.

p 83. Aug '62 Wainwright from HQ met w/ Tep. + went to Helsinki for series of meetings w/ Cubela where defection plan turned to recruiting Cubela in place.

84 Aug 62 - Cubela met w/ Spanish speaking case officer in Paris later in Aug. after meeting in Stockholm on Aug 7-9. In Paris it was learned that Cubela told 4 Cuban assoc. of his meeting in Helsinki.

85 14-23 Aug 62 - Earle Williamson, Spanish speaking case officer from Madrid, met in Paris w/ Cubela, Tep., + Wainwright. On 18 Aug. HQ strongly agreed Cubela not to be given physical elimination mission.

Sept 63 Sanchez from HQ joins Wainwright, Tep. + Cubela in Brazil + becomes Cubela's case officer

16 Sept 63 Cubela (Paris) writes Tep. (NY) don't intend to see your friend ~~Sanchez~~ again

3 Oct 63 Sanchez arrives in Paris ANYWAY. Learned that French keeping Cubela under surveillance.

11 Oct 63 - Sanchez cables Cubela insistent on meeting senior US official, pref. RFK, for assurances.

29 Oct 63 Des using James Clark alias meets Cubela in Paris at home of Rod. Stent. Sanchez interp. Fitz said U.S. wanted no part in attempt on Castro's life.

14 Nov 63 Wainwright meets Tepedino in NY - Says Cubela pleased w/ Des meeting from policy standpoint but very unhappy at not being given tech. assistance.

19 Nov 63 Des approved telling Cubela he would be furnished cache inside Cuba.

p91-92 Docs of record in AMLASH file ~~and [illegible]~~ has gap here

Sam Halpern + ~~Gunn~~ Sanchez asked Gunn for assist. re ~~in high~~ means of assassination that would allow Cubela escape ~~powered rifle~~

20 Nov. Halp + Sanchez asked Gunn to rig poison pen for Sanchez next day.
Done

22 Nov Sanchez arrives Paris + mets Cubela late AM. Cubela accepts pen but doesn't think much of device.

Fitz called Sanchez after JFK ass. saying everything off. The cable not in file.

30 Aug 64 – Artime rec. info thru Madrid that dissidents in Castro regime wanted direct Artime contact

Why ✗ on 7 Oct 64 an Artime assoc. went to France to serve as intermediary w/ diss^dent^ group.

1964 – Agency conspiring to put Cubela + Artime together w/o each other knowing it.
Cubela ↓ wants weapon
Artime ↓ wants man inside Cuba

~~27~~ Dec 64 – Artime meets Cubela in Madrid

Feb 65 – Cubela gets silenced weapon from Artime's Secty in Madrid

March 65 – Madrid cable that lawyer Garcia-Bango arrived in Madrid w/ news that he was in contact w/ Cubela, long a close friend. G-B was jailed in 1962 for defending SANTOS TRAFFICANTE.

May June/65 Espinosa reported full knowledge of Cubela plans and of CIA complicity.

106 June 23 65 HQ sent cable to all stations directing termin. of contact w/ Cubela group.

p108 - March 66. Cubela arrested for counterrevol. activ. involving CIA. Cubela trial brought out contact w/ James Noel in Madrid.

p115 - July/Aug 1964 - CIA memos refer to a gangland effort to pay 150,000 to kill Castro & refer to FBI interv. of partic.

p120 - O'Connell met w/ Maheu post Drew P. article. He reported:

Rosselli steered to Morgan (separately from Maheu) by Greenspun.

Jim Garrison, Morgan & Roselli & perhaps Greenspun in touch w/ each other in Las Veg. in March.

p127 Ref to a Puerto Rican in Philippine custody who says he participated in Castro inspired assas. plot in Dallas. Bureau expected to wring him dry.

128 Varona became very embittered by B of P failure. Among most critical. Agency failure to support his exile group led to loss of income

Last known to be living hand to mouth as part time auto salesman.

130 "Maheu has good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative clt., Howd. Hughes."

7 Mar 66 - Cable to Rusk - Lies about ass. involv

GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson
Belmont
Mohr
DeLoach
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

FROM : A. Rosen

DATE: 12-10-64

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

1-Mr. Sullivan
(O.H. Bartlett)
1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Belmont
1-Mr. Rosen
1-Mr. Malley
1-Mr. Shroder
1-Mr. Rogge

BAROUTI

PURPOSE:

To advise you that an Agent of the Secret Service, when testifying before the President's Commission, denied making certain statements to FBI Agents which were subsequently reported to the Commission.

DETAILS:

In Volume II of the hearings before the President's Commission commencing on page 61 there appears the testimony of Roy H. Kellerman, Assistant Special Agent*, White House Detail, U. S. Secret Service on 3-9-64. *In Charge

Under questioning by a Commission member, Kellerman was asked about certain statements reportedly made by him on 11-22-63, to SA's Francis X. O Neill, Jr. and James W. Sibert, of our Baltimore Office, which appear in the 12-10-63 Dallas report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling (page 3, paragraph 4). SA's O'Neill and Sibert were under orders to be observers during the autopsy of President Kennedy at the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, which commenced on the evening of 11-22-63, to be of assistance to the Secret Service, and to look after the Bureau's interests.

Our Agents, in conversation with Kellerman, sometime during the evening of 11-22-63, learned of certain information, portions of which were reported as follows:

> "He advised he heard a shot and immediately turned around, looking past Governor Connally, who was seated directly in back of him, to the President. He observed the President slumped forward and heard him say, 'Get me to a hospital." Mr. Kellerman then heard Mrs. Kennedy say, 'Oh, no!', as the President leaned towards her. He immediately advised the driver to take the President to the nearest hospital."

REC

FEB 10 1976

FBI

HDRS. REC. UNIT

RDR:tmt
(8)

CONTINUED - OVER

A. Rosen to Mr. Belmont Memo
RE: PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

The Commission in questioning Kellerman made specific reference to the underscored portions of the above paragraph as it contradicts some of Kellerman's testimony. Kellerman claims he did not hear the President nor Mrs. Kennedy say these things and had never told our Agents that he had. In part of Kellerman's denial he stated "I don't know where they got those quotes."

OBSERVATIONS:

Kellerman is claiming our Agents furnished inaccurate accounts of a conversation with him. It is to be remembered that at the time this conversation with our Agents reportedly took place 11-22-63, Kellerman had been a security guard in the President's car and more than likely was upset and feeling remorse over the days episode. In his testimony before the Commission he endeavored to give the impression that he acted calmly and immediately took command, issuing logical instructions after the President was hit. The conversation reported by our Agents made it appear Kellerman reacted normally to the tragedy and not dramatically as indicated in his testimony, as he didn't order the driver to the hospital until after the President had so directed.

It is felt our Agents reported accurately what Kellerman told them on 11-22-63, and that Kellerman's testimony 3½ months later is the result of considered deliberation, on his part, to paint the most favorable picture possible, under the circumstances, for the Secret Service.

Consideration has been given to discussing this matter with Chief Rowley of Secret Service, however, since it is the word of our Agents against Kellerman's, it is not felt any good purpose would be served by this course of action.

RECOMMENDATION:

Affidavits are being obtained from our Agents Sibert and O'Neill attesting to the accuracy of their report and refuting Kellerman so that we will be in a position to show any future inquirer that we recognized this contradiction and did something about it.

[illegible]

OK

FBI

[illegible] 16

Research

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0298/1
11 March 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
  Operations With Respect To Intelligence
  Activities
Room G-308
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attn: Mr. Johnston

Dear Mr. Miller:

In response to a request dated 9 March 1976 about the Oswald file held by the Agency, the attached is forwarded for your information.

Sincerely,

Walt Elder
Walter Elder
Review Staff

Attachment:
  As stated

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL
1776-1976

Attachment to:
Review Staff: 76-0070/1

1. The following CIA Staff Employees, all of whom are now retired, participated in the preparation of DIR 86054 on 30 November 1963:

Originator: Mr. Louis Armstrong

Coordinators: Mr. John M. Whitten, Mr. William B. Tyng, Ms. Sue L. Darling

Authenticator: Mr. William B. Tyng ("for" Desmond FitzGerald)

Releasor: Mr. John M. Whitten ("for" J. C. King)

2. We believe that the Italian diplomat on the Cubana flight No. 465 on 22 November 1963 from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba, was Mario MAURI who was accompanied by his wife, Maria Antonieta MAURI. We have been unable to determine who transmitted the information contained in DIR 86054 to CIA and we have not been able to locate any documents relating to this matter in Latin America Division files or the Oswald files.

3. We have been unable to locate any documents which would indicate that there was a response to DIR 86054 from Mexico City.

4. Assuming there was no response to DIR 86054, the originating Headquarters component should have initiated follow-up action if a response was not received.

5. We have been unable to find any further information relating to DIR 86054 in Latin America Division files.

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 5 1976
CIA

6. We do not have a copy of the Cubana manifest for the 22 November 1963 flight from Mexico City to Havana, but we have determined that the following persons were on that flight:

NAME	NATIONALITY	OCCUPATION
Jakob ETT	Swiss	Diplomat
Hector LEMIEUX	Canadian	Unknown
Joseph POULIOT	Canadian	Unknown
Donald George CAMERON	Canadian	Unknown
William POULIS	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas Clark OSULD	Canadian	Unknown
Dungan MCPHERSON	Canadian	Unknown
Leo John DEST	Canadian	Unknown
Thomas MURPHY	Canadian	Unknown
Arthur EDMONDS	British	Unknown
James DISINOP	British	Unknown
Venancio OLIVAREZ Villaverde	Spanish	Unknown
Jose Luis CACHO y Barcha	Spanish	Unknown
David FLOR Lechago	Spanish	Unknown
Maria Antonieta MAURI	Italian	Unknown
Mario MAURI	Italian	Diplomat
Maarten Van DERPLAAT	Dutch	Diplomat

REC [illegible] ROM
FEB 5 1976
CIA

Attachment F

[illegible]
. U. ALEXIS JOHNSON

[illegible]

27 Nov 63
85471

IMMEDIATE

SUBJECT: REARREST OF SILVIA DURAN

THIS AGENCY'S STATION IN MEXICO WAS ADVISED ON 27 NOVEMBER THAT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES HAD REARRESTED SILVIA DURAN, MEXICAN NATIONAL EMPLOYEE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MEXICO, WHO HAD TALKED TO LEE OSWALD AT THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN LATE SEPTEMBER 1963. THE REASON FOR THE REARREST WAS THAT SILVIA DURAN WAS TRYING TO LEAVE MEXICO FOR CUBA.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON

Document Number 134-595
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

See follow documents in [redacted] on this subject.

I don't know what FBI did in Nov 63, but the [redacted] have been talking about this for a long time & she is said to be extremely bright.

Legal ~~Attache~~

~~1. LA Memo said they checked info [redacted] and found it unsubstantiated.~~

~~2. [redacted] asked me to send this cable.~~

~~3. We will try to confirm or refute [redacted] info and follow up.~~

She is also [illegible]

Document Number 12-528

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

Opposition Communists not mentioned in press reports of Warren Commission investigation

RECORD COPY

October 5, 1964

Mexican Communists who had contact with Oswald,
as has not appeared in Warren Commission write-ups in pres

[redacted] sat around recalling detail
of their having been in a group with Oswald here last fall
during the daysthat he was in Mexico.- The write-ups of the
Warren Commission report in the newspapers sparked this
discussion, and they apparently had never really sat around
determind to piece it all together, although all three were
deeply affected by Kennedy's assassination, seemed literally
to adore the Kennedy family image, still follow Robert Kenned
career with great interest and admiration.

The main points:

[redacted] Horacio is the husband of
SYLVIA DURAN, the Mexican girl who was arrested for questioni
about Oswald because she had been in touch with him at the Cu
embassy when he went there looking for a visa. (She is or w
also a ringleader at the Cuban-Mexican Institute on Tokio, I
remember).

While Oswald was here last fall the Duran cousins invited the
Source [redacted] to a "twist party" at the
home of Ruben Duran mid-week. A few Communists they knew
[redacted] and a number of people who struck th
as very peculiar at the time, were there. AND OSWALD WASTHERE
WITH TWO OTHERS BEATNIK LOOKING BOYS, ONE OF ~~[illegible]~~ WHOM WAS
VERY TALL AND ALL THREE OF WHOM THEY REMEMBER QUITE WELL.
When they began asking questions about the Americans, who
were standing together all evening and didn't dance at all,
they were shifted to another room. [redacted] However
they were intrigued because [redacted] said he didn't know
who they were, except that Sylvia Duran had brought them, and
none of the other guests made any attempt to approach them.
Also, when the [redacted] Source was so insistent about meeting them,
~~[illegible]~~ the Durans replied that the boys were leaving town
early the next morning. The next day, well along in the day,
Source [redacted], saw all thre
boys together on Insurgentes. In other words, they had not l
town. At the time, they remarked about ~~[illegible]~~ it.

As soon as Oswald's picture was printed in the newspapers
Source [redacted] clearly remembered him. And of course the arrest of
Sylvia Duran almost immediately afterward, underlined their
certainty.

They were so sickened [redacted] that they broke off their relations with theDurans.

Source [redacted] says that Lynn Duran and one of the Duran boys have made trips to Texas. And that most conspicuously they have all prospered this last year. Always poor before, they now have an expensive car each.

~~[illegible]~~ Horacio Duran works at El Dia newspaper.

His employment, finally

DATE 23 NOVEMBER 1963

3 6

TO

FROM DIRECTOR

CS COPY

CONF

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

INFO

XXX

TO FLASH INFO CITE DIR 84916

1. ARREST OF SILIVA DURAN IS EXTREMELY SERIOUS MATTER WHICH COULD PREJUDICE U.S. FREEDOM OF ACTION ON ENTIRE QUESTION OF CUBAN RESPONSIBILITY. WITH FULL REGARD FOR MEXICAN INTERESTS, REQUEST YOU ENSURE THAT HER ARREST IS KEPT ABSOLUTELY SECRET, THAT NO INFORMATION FROM HER IS PUBLISHED OR LEAKED, THAT AL L SUCH INFO IS CABLED TO US, AND THAT FACT OF HER ARREST AND HER STATEMENTS ARE NOT SPREAD TO LEFTIST OR DISLOYAL CIRCLES IN THE MEXICAN GOVERNMENT.

2. WE ARE TRYING TO GET MORE INFO ON OSWALD FROM FBI AND WILL ADVISE DIRECT OR THROUGH FBI MEXICO.

END OF MESSAGE

Document Number 37-[redacted]-529

for FOIA Review on APR 1975

23 Nov 63

CS COPY

THOMAS H. KARAMESSINES
ADDP
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ NO INDEX
DATE: 27 NOV. 1963
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

2	5
3	6

27 Nov 63 20 12z

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CS COPY

CONF:

INFO :

☐ DEFERRED
☐ ROUTINE
FLASH

TO FLASH

CITE DIR 85318

RE: (IN-69048)

1. THIS INSTRUCTION HAS BEEN COORDINATED WITH AND

2. MEXICAN AUTHORITIES SHOULD INTERROGATE SILVIA DURAN TO EXTENT NECESSARY CLARIFY OUTSTANDING POINTS WHICH BEEN RAISED YOUR CABLES LAST 48 HOURS. YOU MAY PROVIDE QUESTIONS TO MEXICAN INTERROGATORS BUT WE DO NOT REPEAT NOT WANT ANY AMERICANS TO CONFRONT SILVIA DURAN OR BE IN CONTACT WITH HER.

Document Number 158-610
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

3. ADVISE ASAP RESULTS INTERROGATION.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: Silvia Duran rearrested because she was attempting to leave Mexico for Cuba.

CS COPY

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ NO INDEX

☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

27 NOV. 1963

2		5	
3		6	

27 Nov 63 21 59 z

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

TO PRIORITY INFO CITE DIR 85371

11

FURTHER TO DIR-[illegible] 85318.* TO BE CERTAIN THERE IS NO MISUNDERSTANDING BETWEEN US, WE WANT TO INSURE THAT NEITHER SILVIA DURAN NOR CUBANS GET IMPRESSION THAT AMERICANS BEHIND HER REARREST. IN OTHER WORDS, WE WANT MEXICAN AUTHORITIES TO TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR WHOLE AFFAIR.

(END OF MESSAGE)

Comment: *Mexican authorities should interrogate Silvia Duran to extent necessary to clarify outstanding points which have been raised. MEXI may provide questions to Mexican interrogators, but Hqs. does not want any Americans to confront Duran or be in contact with her

Document Number 177-618

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

Richard Helms

RICHARD HELMS
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

7 - APR 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. J. Lee Rankin

SUBJECT : Actions of Silvia DURAN after her First Interrogation passed to the Warren Commission

1. Reference is made to the attachments to my memoranda dated 31 January 1964 and 21 February 1964, both of which report information on Silvia DURAN, a Mexican citizen employed at the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. Information on the actions of Silvia DURAN on her return to work at the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, following her first interrogation by the Mexican authorities, is attached to this memorandum. This item may be useful to the Commission in the evaluation of Mrs. DURAN's story.

2. The information contained in this attachment was obtained from sensitive sources. It therefore bears an appropriate sensitivity indicator.

(Signed) Richard Helms
Richard Helms
Deputy Director for Plans

Attachment

Document Number 643-273

for FOIA Review on JUN 1976

RECORD COPY

7 Apr 64

Attachment

Subject: Actions of Silvia DURAN, Mexican Citizen Employed by the Cuban Consulate, Following Her First Interrogation by the Mexican Authorities

1. A reliable and sensitive source, well informed on political personalities and events in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate in Mexico City, had stated that on her return to the Cuban Consulate on 25 November 1963, Silvia DURAN told her colleagues essentially the same story about her official acquaintance with Lee Harvey OSWALD that was published in the Mexico City press. This information, which seems to have been surreptitiously given to the press by certain Mexican authorities, indicated that according to DURAN, OSWALD had visited the Cuban and Soviet Consulates to obtain visas in order to visit these countries, and she had handled his case at the Cuban Consulate.

2. The only new item in the account that Silvia DURAN gave her colleagues was her claim that the Mexican police had threatened to extradite her to the United States for a confrontation with OSWALD. According to the source, Silvia DURAN, an intelligent and quick-witted woman, did not fear such a confrontation.

3. It should be noted that CIA does not know the precise origin of the suggested confrontation. The idea originated, in all probability, with the Mexican authorities involved in the interrogation of DURAN.

4. According to the same source, immediately after and since the assassination the personnel of the Cuban Embassy was shocked and puzzled - no expressions of pleasure at the assassination were heard, and there was little discussion of it. The gossip and official conversations in the Cuban Embassy and Consulate tend to confirm the impression that OSWALD visited the Embassy only to get a visa to visit or to transit the country.

Original & 3 - Addressee
2 - DDP
1
1
1
1

7 April 1964

Based on DIR 85670 dated 29 November 1963

Attachment D

ACTION

~~EM~~	AMEND	CLOSE

block letters.

luding maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the iden-
tate ... must be used. Write UNKNOWN for items you are unable

SECTION III:

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SECTION I

SENSITIVE NON-SENSITIVE	201 NO. /	1. SOURCE DOCUMENT /

NAME (Last) OSWALD, (First) LEE (Middle) HENRY (Title) SEX [✓ M] F

NAME VARIANT

TYPE NAME 2 (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

N.B.: HARVEY !

23/II/75

PHOTO 4. YES ✓ NO	BIRTH DATE 5. D 18 M 10 Y 39	COUNTRY OF BIRTH 6. USA	CITY OR TOWN OF BIRTH 7. New Orleans, La.	OTHER IDENTIFICATION 1. AGY 2. 3.

OCCUPATION/POSITION Radar operator, U.S. Marine Corps, ca 1960

OCC/POS. CODE NAVY D

SECTION II

CRYPTONYM	PSEUDONYM

SECTION III

COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE 10. USSR	ACTION DESK 11.	2ND COUNTRY INTEREST 12. /	3RD COUNTRY INTEREST 12A.

COMMENTS: cit; ?

Defected to the USSR in October 1959

Document Number 1-1E

for FOIA Review on APR

CS Copy

201-

PERMANENT CHARGE YES ✓ NO	✓ RESTRICTED FILE YES	SIGNATURE

FORM 831a
C-57

RECORD COPY

(38)

OSWALD, LEE HENRY

201

SEX M DOB 18 OCT 39
NEW ORLEANS, LA., USA
CIT ?
REF:
Δ USSR
RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS, AS OF 60.
DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 59.

Document Number 2-524
for FOIA Review on APR 1976

10 Oct 1963 ☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO : SEE BELOW

FROM: [illegible] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF:

INFO :

XX

CS COPY

0 OCT 63 2

R. ROUTINE

TO INFO

CITE DIR 748

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[redacted]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, IDENTIFIED AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

See Recall
his
description
of
the
individuals
in his
affidavit
of Aug
not
Oswald

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

10 Oct 63

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CON

INFO

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO

INFO

CITE DIR

CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATE TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATIC RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATIC IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASED ON [redacted] (IN 36017) [redacted]

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REP UCTIO Y OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFIC PROHIBI

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

Copy

DATE: 10 Oct 1963 ☐ NO INDEX ☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

XX

CS COPY

10 Oct 63 22

ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 7483

REF: (IN 36017)*

1. LEE OSWALD who contacted Soviet Embassy 1 OCT PROBABLY IDENTICAL LEE HENRY OSWALD BORN 18 OCT 1939, NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, FORMER RADAR OPERATOR IN UNITED STATES MARINES WHO DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCT 1959. OSWALD IS FIVE FEET TEN INCHES, ONE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE POUNDS, LIGHT BROWN WAVY HAIR, BLUE EYES.

2. ON 31 OCT 1959 HE ATTEMPTED TO RENOUNCE HIS UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP TO THE UNITED STATES EMB IN MOSCOW, INDICATING HE HAD APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. ON 13 FEB THE US EMB MOSCOW RECEIVED AN UNDATED LETTER FROM OSWALD POSTMARKED MINSK ON FIVE FEB 1961 IN WHICH SUBJ INDICATED HE DESIRED RETURN OF HIS US PPT AS WISHED TO RETURN TO USA IF "HE COULD COME TO SOME AGREEMENT CONCERNING THE DROPPING OF ANY LEGAL PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ME." ON 8 JULY ON HIS OWN INITIATIVE HE APPEARED AT THE EMB WITH HIS WIFE TO SEE ABOUT HIS RETURN TO STATES. SUBJ STATED THAT HE ACTUALLY HAD NEVER APPLIED FOR SOVIET CITIZENSHIP AND THAT HIS APPLICATION AT

10 Oct

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER — COORDINATING OFFICERS — AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No

CS COPY

Document Number 2-2 for FOIA Review on APR 1976

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO:

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO
INFO
CITE DIR 7483

THAT TIME HAD BEEN TO REMAIN IN USSR AND FOR TEMPORARY EXTENSION OF HIS TOURIST VISA PENDING OUTCOME OF HIS REQUEST. THIS APPLICATION, ACCORDING TO OSWALD, CONTAINED NO REF TO SOVIET CITIZENSHIP. OSWALD STATED THAT HAD BEEN EMPLOYED SINCE 13 JAN 1960 IN BELORUSSIAN RADIO AND TV FACTORY IN MINSK WHERE WORKED AS METAL WORKER IN RESEARCH SHOP. OSWALD WAS MARRIED ON 30 APRIL 1961 TO MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA A DENTAL TECHNICIAN BORN 17 JULY 1941 USSR. NO HDQS TRACES. HE ATTEMPTED ARRANGE FOR WIFE TO JOIN HIM IN MOSCOW SO SHE COULD APPEAR AT EMB FOR VISA INTERVIEW. HIS AMERICAN PPT WAS RETURNED TO HIM. US EMB MOSCOW STATED TWENTY MONTHS OF REALITIES OF LIFE IN SOVIET UNION HAD CLEARLY HAD MATURING EFFECT ON OSWALD.

3. LATEST HDQS INFO WAS REPORT DATED MAY 1962 SAYING STATE HAD DETERMINED OSWALD IS STILL US CITIZEN AND BOTH HE AND HIS SOVIET WIFE HAVE EXIT PERMITS AND DEPT STATE HAD GIVEN APPROVAL FOR THEIR TRAVEL WITH THEIR INFANT CHILD TO USA.

(CONTINUED)

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

ROUTING	
1	4
2	5
3	6

DEFERRED/
ROUTINE

PAGE THREE

TO INFO

CITE DIR 748

4. [redacted] SHOULD PASS INFO REF AND PARA ONE [redacted] LOCALLY. INFO PARAS TWO AND THREE ORIGINATES WITH [redacted]

5. [redacted] REF AND POSSIBLE IDENTIFICATION BEING DISSEMINATED [redacted] PLS KEEP HDQS ADVISED ON ANY FURTHER CONTACTS OR POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF OSWALD.

END OF MESSAGE

CMT: According to [redacted] REF ON 1 Oct, an American male [redacted] name Lee Oswald stated he at Sov Emb on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

16 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR : The Ambassador

FROM :

SUBJECT : Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy

°Ambassador notified

1. The following information was received

On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Vladimirovich KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request.

2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radio operator in the U. S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.

3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received.

Document Number 9-5

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

Orig - The Ambassador
The Minister
Counselor for Political Affairs
Regional Security Officer
cc - Legal Attache
cc - Naval Attache
cc - I & N S

RECORD COPY

OCT 1963 ☒ NO INDEX ☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

2			5
3			6

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CS COPY

OCT 63 19 10 Z

24 Oct 63

[redacted] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

ONF:

IFO :

XX

date shows - 23 Oct on run
should be 24 Oct

DEF

ROUTINE

INFO CITE DIR 77973

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

REFERENCE IS MADE TO CIA OUT TELETYPE NO. 74673, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1963, REGARDING POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SUBJECT IN MEXICO CITY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TWO COPIES OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPH YOU HAVE OF SUBJECT. WE WILL FORWARD THEM TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THE LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO CITY AND SUBJECT ARE THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: (IN 40357)

24 Oct 63

Document Number 10-6

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

CS COPY
COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

6 Copies of photo of Oswald Reproduced for use of legal Attache with Mexican police

Document Number 11-67

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

We made fifty (50) copies of each of these (which we got from Legal Attache) for Leg. Attache to use with Mexican Police —

RECORD COPY

Lee Harvey Oswald

Race White
Sex Male
DOB 18 October 1939
POB New Orleans, Louisiana
Height 5'.9"
Weight 140 Pounds
Hair Medium Brown
Eyes Blue Gray

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

June 9, 1964

BY COURIER SERVICE

Honorable J. Lee Rankin
General Counsel
The President's Commission
200 Maryland Avenue, Northeast
Washington, D. C. 20002

Dear Mr. Rankin:

Your letter of June 1, 1964, requesting summaries of FBI reports with regard to ten named persons and certain information regarding the contact by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn with Jack L. Ruby on March 11, 1959, is herewith acknowledged.

As you were advised by my letter of February 27, 1964, Jack Ruby was contacted by Special Agent Charles W. Flynn of the Dallas Office on March 11, 1959, in view of his position as a night club operator who might have knowledge of the criminal element in Dallas. The purpose of this contact was to determine whether or not Ruby did have such knowledge, and if so, if he would be willing to furnish information to this Bureau. Ruby was advised of the FBI's jurisdiction in criminal matters, and he expressed a willingness to furnish information. A personal description of Ruby was obtained by Special Agent Flynn on the occasion of this contact on March 11, 1959, but no information or other results were obtained. Between March 11, 1959, and October 2, 1959, Ruby was contacted on eight other occasions, but he furnished no information whatever and further contacts with him were discontinued.

The personal description of Ruby as obtained by Special Agent Flynn on March 11, 1959, did not in itself contain the remark "known Dallas criminal." This remark was added to the description by Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at the time when he was assisting in the preparation of the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963. Enclosed herewith is the affidavit of Special Agent Louis M. Kelley at Little Rock, Arkansas, dated June 4, 1964, setting forth his basis for adding the remark "known Dallas area criminal" to the description of Ruby as it appears in the report of Special Agent Manning C. Clements at Dallas dated November 30, 1963, and in the enclosure to my letter to you of April 7, 1964.

The summaries concerning the ten named individuals in your letter of June 1, 1964, are currently being prepared and will be forwarded to you promptly upon completion.

Sincerely yours,

J. Edgar Hoover

Enclosure

Little Rock, Arkansas
June 4, 1964

I, Louis M. Kelley, Special Agent, Federal Bureau of Investigation, after being duly sworn, depose as follows:

I arrived at Dallas, Texas, November 23, 1963, to assist in the investigation of the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy and related matters. On or about November 24, 1963, I was assigned to review all previously existing files and current information as to Jack L. Ruby and to prepare an insert based on such file review for inclusion in an investigative report. This insert was to include such physical description and biographical data as were available from the file review and from information developed on November 24, 1963. I had before me at the time I dictated the insert information which had been obtained on November 24, 1963, by other Special Agents of the FBI and from the Identification Division files of the Dallas Police Department. The Dallas Police Department records, under Dallas Police Department No. 22255, included information concerning arrests of Ruby dating from February 4, 1949, to March 14, 1963.

In dictating the physical description and biographical data concerning Ruby, I possibly included under the heading "Remarks," "Known Dallas area criminal," based on the fact I had before me Ruby's identification record from the Dallas Police Department, which listed several arrests in the Dallas area. This would have been the only thing on which such an observation could have been based.

LOUIS M. KELLEY

Sworn and subscribed to before me
this ___ day of June 1964.

Notary Public

My Commission Expires Jan. 22, 1965

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

FBI Withheld Data on JFK Slaying

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

POST 10/27 p. 62

The FBI withheld from the Warren Commission hundreds of documents about the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are raw FBI files, which the commission requested but never received. They contain no startling information that will overturn the commission's verdict, but they reveal intimately how the FBI handled its most important case.

In the margins of some suppressed memos, the late FBI chief, J. Edgar Hoover, scribbled caustic comments in blue ink. He was critical of almost everyone involved in the investigation, from Dallas police chief Jesse Curry to President Lyndon Johnson.

Confidential notes kept by one top FBI official, for example, quote Hoover as warning: "Johnson may become very dictatorial. We must keep our guard up."

Sources familiar with the suppressed documents say the contents were summarized and submitted to the Warren Commission. But there were some subtle, perhaps deliberate, omissions.

The documents show that Hoover brought pressure on his subordinates to rush out a preliminary report on the FBI investigation before the murdered President's brother, Robert F. Kennedy, returned to his desk as Attorney General.

The confidential notes quote Hoover as instructing his subordinates to get the report out of the Justice Department "before Bobby gets back."

Apparently, the FBI chief also feared Deputy Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach might tamper with the report before forwarding it to the Warren Commission. Hoover told his aides to alert President Johnson's majordomo, Walter Jenkins.

"Let Jenkins know after report is out of our hands," Hoover directed. "Let Jenkins know what Katzenbach is doing. Might cause long delay. Must not consider any alteration."

Thirteen days after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Hoover delivered a detailed report to Katzenbach naming Lee Harvey Oswald as the assassin. Katzenbach kept it four days before submitting it to the commission.

The crusty old G-man was furious at the Dallas police chief, meanwhile, for leaking the story that the FBI had investigated Oswald but had failed to alert the Secret Service.

"This is the lowest level in history of Bureau since I have been director," Hoover lamented, according to the confidential notes.

He contended that Oswald had never been seen with firearms, had written no hate letters against U.S. leaders. As a former defector, he also knew he was a marked man whom the FBI was watching.

"With that background," grumbled Hoover, "how could he be security risk? No indication of violence so far as our records show . . . Oswald could have hollered false arrest if we had arrested him."

The FBI chief commented that Chief Justice Earl Warren, who headed the commission, "would have been first one to holler" about Oswald's rights. Citing the criticism of the FBI, Hoover commented: "This is one of the rough ones."

He felt, therefore, that President Johnson should have endorsed the FBI report. "President should have backed up report," complained Hoover, "based on evidence gathered by the FBI."

In private remarks that were never intended to be repeated outside his inner circle, he made deprecating remarks not only about President Johnson but about Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.), who was then preparing to run against LBJ for the presidency.

"Goldwater has no sound advisers around him," Hoover noted. But his comment on Johnson was more deadly: "LBJ's speeches are dull."

The Warren Commission adopted a resolution, meanwhile, calling for "the raw materials upon which any reports given to the commission are based, together with all raw materials and reports relating to the work of the commission since the date of any and all earlier reports."

J. Lee Rankin, the general counsel, followed up with a "Dear Edgar" letter to the FBI chief requesting the full files "as promptly as possible." But they were never delivered.

A commission lawyer, remembering those days more than a decade ago, told us: "Nobody ever got the FBI's own files." In 1963-64, another staff member pointed out, the FBI "could do no wrong," so no one pressed too hard for their internal records.

Now 12 years after the Kennedy assassination, a fascinating story is still locked in FBI files awaiting a public reopening. We will tell part of the story in future columns. Sen. Richard Schweiker (R-Pa.), chairman of the Senate intelligence subcommittee investigating the assassination, is seeking the full story from the FBI.

Footnote: FBI spokesmen stoutly defended the FBI's findings and the thoroughness of the investigation. They conceded that "informative" and "deliberative" memos were not given to the commission. But "everything they needed was given them. They had all they wanted to make their findings."

(1975, United Feature Syndicate, Inc.)

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

Oswald-Agent Contact Covered Up

W Post 10/2088

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

The late J. Edgar Hoover, in his zeal to protect his beloved FBI, engineered a cover-up 12 years ago to keep the Warren Commission from learning about the ties between FBI agent James Hosty and assassin Lee Harvey Oswald.

The formidable Hoover, whose bulldog visage had become a national symbol of law and order, intervened personally when the Warren Commission began to zero in on Hosty.

Now, 12 years later, Hosty has admitted destroying a threatening note, which Oswald delivered to the FBI office in Dallas a few days before shooting President John F. Kennedy in November, 1963. The note threatened to blow up the FBI office and Dallas police headquarters if Hosty didn't stop bothering his wife.

The FBI should have notified the Secret Service that Oswald, a misfit who had threatened violence, was in the Dallas area. The Secret Service routinely would have checked his whereabouts during the presidential visit. This might have saved President Kennedy's life.

When the FBI learned that a suspect named Lee Harvey Oswald had been picked up, Hosty reminded his boss, Gordon Shanklin, that he had been handling the Oswald case. Shanklin telephoned the Dallas police and asked whether Hosty could participate in the interrogation.

Hosty later questioned Oswald at police headquarters. Oswald, who had been outwardly calm, suddenly became agitated. "I know you!" he shouted. "I know you! You're the one who accosted my wife twice!"

The incident passed, however, without any mention of the threatening letter. Hosty also confided to a friend on the Dallas police force, Lt. Jack Revill, that the FBI had a file on Oswald. Revill repeated the conversation to a superior who ordered him to put it in writing.

"Special Agent Hosty related to this officer..." Revill wrote, "that the Federal Bureau of Investigation was aware of the subject (Oswald) and that they had information that this subject was capable of committing the assassination of President Kennedy."

Hoover was furious when he learned of Hosty's loose talk. According to confidential notes taken at the time, the grizzled FBI chief complained that Hosty had "diarrhea of words." But the old man, nevertheless, sought to cover up the FBI's embarrassment.

On Dec. 23, 1963, the FBI gave the Warren Commission a summary of Oswald's notebook. The summary conveniently omitted the fact that Hosty's name, telephone and license tag had been in the notebook.

The commission found out about the omission and demanded an explanation. On Jan. 27, 1964, Hoover acknowledged that Hosty's name had been in the notebook.

The G-man also gave what purported to be a full account of the FBI's contacts with Oswald. The last contact, he reported, had been on Aug. 10, 1963. "We did not interview Oswald in Dallas, Texas, or in Irving, Texas, prior to the assassination of President Kennedy," Hoover added.

Interestingly, he used the word "our" to describe the last contact with the FBI. But on Feb. 6, in a sworn affidavit, Hoover changed the wording in a curious way. He swore that Oswald had no contact with FBI "agents" after Aug. 10, 1963.

It is now known, of course, that Oswald appeared at the FBI office in Dallas a few days before the assassination. At that time, just as Hoover said, he did not speak with any FBI "agents." But he spoke with an FBI receptionist, who passed on his threatening note to the agents.

It is imposisible to know whether the late FBI chief subtly switched the word "our" to "agents" in order to hide his knowledge of Oswald's violent threat.

But in a later letter to the Warren Commission, dated April 6, 1964, Hoover stated categorically: "I wish to emphasize that the facts available to the FBI concerning Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination did not indicate in any way that he was or would be a threat to President Kennedy."

The truth is, of course, that the FBI had received dramatic evidence less than a week before the assassination that Oswald was violence-prone.

On April 24, the Dallas Morning News reported Hosty had told the Dallas police lieutenant, Jack Revill, that the FBI knew Oswald was "capable" of assassinating the President.

Hoover immediately sent word to the Warren Commission that the story was "false" and followed up three days later with a personal letter delivered by courier.

"Special Agent Hosty unequivocally denies ever having made the statement as quoted in this article..." declared the FBI director.

"Special Agent Hosty points out that prior to the assassination of President John Fitzgerald Kennedy, he never had any information indicating potential violence on the part of Lee Harvey Oswald."

There's more to Hoover's great cover-up, which we'll report in a future column.

© United Feature Syndicate, Inc.

Washington Merry-Go-Round

By Drew Pearson

WASHINGTON — President Johnson is sitting on a political H-bomb — an unconfirmed report that Sen. Robert Kennedy, D-N.Y., may have approved an assassination plot which then possibly backfired [illegible] his late brother.

Top officials, queried by this lumn, agreed that a plot to ssassinate Cuban dictator del Castro was considered the highest levels of the ntral Intelligence Agency at e time Bobby was riding rd on the agency. The icials disagreed, however, er whether the plan was proved and implemented.

ne version claims that rworld figures actually re recruited to carry out plot. Another rumor has it three hired assassins re caught in Havana where [illegible] survivor is still posed to be languishing in on. These stories have nvestigated and dismissed by the FBI.

et the rumor persists, pported by people in a tion to know, that Castro became aware of an rican plot upon his life decided to retaliate nst President Kennedy.

is report may have started New Orleans's flamboyant rict Attorney Jim Garrison his investigation of the dy assassination, but rs believe he is following wrong trails.

For weeks after the tragedy, this column was told, Bobby was morose and refused to see people. Could he have been plagued by the terrible thought that he had helped put into motion forces that indirectly may have brought about his brother's martyrdom? Some insiders think so.

Blow for Blow

Note: Those who may be shocked that the CIA would consider stooping to a political assassination should be reminded of the ugly nature of what Secretary of State Dean Rusk has called "the back-alley struggle."

He has described it as "a tough struggle going on in the back alleys all over the world ... a never ending war ... no quarter asked and none given ... It's unpleasant, and no one likes it, but that is not a field which can be left entirely to the other side."

The blunt truth is that the subterranean world of espionage is harsh almost beyond belief. There have been times that the CIA has been forced to resort to the most extreme measures to protect the national security.

Some of the CIA's best operatives also have suddenly and mysteriously disappeared. No word will be heard of them for months, then a few grim details will leak out.

"We will learn that these people have been subjected to the most skillful, most fiendish tortures that man can possibly devise and that they have been reduced to animals or vegetables," Clark Clifford, head of the President's Foreign Intelligence Committee, told this column. "When they no longer can really be called

information has [illegible]ed from them, th[illegible] disposed of. It is [illegible] picture, but that [illegible] the game is played

We also play rough. The New York Times, in an exhaustive report on the CIA, quoted "one of the best-informed men in Washington on this subject" as saying: "When we catch one of them (a Soviet or other agent), it

[illegible] becomes [illegible] everything out [illegible] we do it wi[illegible] barred."

00778

This much can be verified:

c.

1. President Kennedy was [illegible] disillusioned with the [illegible] after the Bay of Pigs [illegible] that he swore [illegible] would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." [illegible] ordered a [illegible] tion by a group [illegible] Gen. Maxwell [illegible] President's [illegible] his brother [illegible] up calling [illegible] CIA.

d.

2. During [illegible] period, the CIA [illegible] Castro [illegible] the high levels [illegible] insiders, [illegible] Bobby, eager to avenge the Bay of Pigs fiasco, played a key role in the planning. Whether the assassination plot was ever actually put into effect is disputed.

Castro Reacts

e.

3. Some insiders are convinced Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. With characteristic fury, he is reported to have cooked up a counterplot against President Kennedy.

f.

4. Shortly after Kennedy was gunned down, the FBI handed President Johnson a memo reporting that Cuban leaders had hoped for Kennedy's death. The President showed it to Kennedy's top aide, Ted Sorensen, who thought the details were so ambiguous that he called the memo "meaningless."

g.

5. It is also known, of course, that Lee Oswald, the assassin, was active in the pro-Castro movement and traveled to Mexico seeking a Cuban visa a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Some sources consider Robert Kennedy's behavior after the assassination to be significant. He seemed to be tormented, they say, by more than the natural grief over the murder of his brother.

Author William Manchester, who got his information chiefly from Kennedy-controlled sources, portrays Bobby as a character of granite during those tragic days. But others had a different impression.

McGeorge Bundy, [illegible] top White House [illegible]

00779

Jack Anderson

W Post 7/27

Did the Castro Plot Backfire?

> *"Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert Kennedy was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother."*

The late Robert Kennedy was tormented by the terrible thought, according to intimates, that he may have helped trigger the assassination of his brother.

We raised this possibility in January 1971, when we first revealed that the CIA had plotted to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro. It has taken us 4½ years to get the rest of the story.

Loyal associates of Robert Kennedy, rushing to defend his memory, have sworn that he knew nothing about the assassination attempts and, contradictorily, that he put a stop to them. Both accounts are incorrect, according to sources with an intimate knowledge of the events.

Not only was he fully aware of the CIA's attempts to kill Castro, but after President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas, Robert was devastated by the possibility that the CIA plot may have backfired against his brother.

The preparations to knock off Castro began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs planning. President Kennedy, who inherited the fiasco, swore to friends afterward that he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds."

Instead, he appointed his brother, Robert, to oversee the CIA, with instructions to shake it up. Characteristically, Robert began investigating the undercover operations from top to bottom. His purpose was to prevent another Bay of Pigs.

He became fascinated, say our sources, with the CIA's covert activities. Eagerly, he pursued the details down through the lower-levels. As one source put it, "He was like a wide-eyed schoolboy."

In the process, he learned about the continuing effort to eliminate Castro, an operation known inside the CIA as the "executive action plan." In fact, Robert took a special interest in the activities against Castro. One insider, former Deputy Defense Secretary Roswell Gilpatric, told us the focus "on the Cuban situation" was intensified in 1961 at Robert Kennedy's "insistence."

The President eventually put Robert in charge of a counter-insurgency committee, called the Special Group, which concentrated upon harassing Castro. One member, former CIA chief John McCone, acknowledged that the group had "directed mischievous things against Castro like infiltrating saboteurs, blowing up bridges and carrying on general confusion."

McCone insisted, however, that "the group at no time gave any consideration to any assassination plot." We have established that the "executive action plan" was directed by William Harvey, the CIA operative whom we linked to the assassination plot in our original 1971 story. We have also learned that he reported to the late Desmond Fitzgerald in CIA headquarters. We have been unable, however, to identify the next link in the chain of command.

Nevertheless, wholly reliable sources insist that Robert Kennedy knew about the plot against Castro and did nothing to stop it. The intended target, Fidel Castro, also knew about it. One assassination squad reportedly was apprehended on a Havana roof top within range of Castro's movements, about March 1, 1963.

The Cuban premier, in an interview with Associated Press correspondent Daniel Harker the following September, warned that U.S. leaders would find themselves in danger if they attempted to do away with Cuban leaders.

"United States leaders should think that if they are aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders, they themselves will not be safe," Castro told Harker.

Two months later, President Kennedy was shot down in the streets of Dallas. The accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban embassy a few weeks earlier.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA director John McCone, who remained alone with Robert at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours. All others, including Robert's priest, were turned away. But McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the agonizing three hours.

Other sources say that Robert, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion for the next few days. Although he bottled up his feelings, they knew him and understood the circumstances well enough to realize he blamed himself for his brother's death. There was little doubt, they say, that he believed the CIA's attempts against Castro put into motion the forces that brought about his brother's martyrdom.

On January 18, 1971, we reported: "Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy."

It has now been disclosed that the Warren Commission was told nothing about the CIA's plot to kill Castro even though the late Allen Dulles, the CIA chief who initiated the plot, sat on the commission.

According to the final report, the commission investigated "literally dozens of allegations of a conspiratorial contact between Oswald and the Cuban government" but found no substance to any of them.

The Cuban premier himself, in an interview with Frank Mankiewicz and Kirby Jones, emphatically denied having anything to do with the Kennedy assassination.

"It is . . . very interesting that this man Oswald, who was involved in the assassination, traveled to Mexico a few months prior to the assassination and applied for a permit at the Cuban embassy to travel to Cuba, and he was not given the permit," said Castro.

"But I ask myself why would a man who commits such an act try to come here. Sometimes we ask ourselves if someone did not wish to involve Cuba in this, because I am under the impression that Kennedy's assassination was organized by reactionaries in the United States and that it was all a result of a conspiracy . . . We have never believed in carrying out this type of activity of assassination of adversaries."

© 1975. United Feature, Inc.

The Washington Post, 9/9/76

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

CIA Withheld Data in JFK Probe

After President John F. Kennedy was struck down on Nov. 22, 1963, the Central Intelligence Agency received evidence suggesting that Cuban Premier Fidel Castro arranged the assassination in retaliation for attempts on his life.

Yet sources privy to the secret discussions at the highest levels of the CIA during those hectic days now tell us that the CIA deliberately withheld the evidence from the Warren Commission investigating Kennedy's death.

Our sources cite two reasons for holding back this evidence. One was a resolve to cover up the secret that the CIA had enlisted Mafia mobsters to kill Castro.

There also was a legitimate concern that the Castro revelations might inflame the American people, whose grief could have turned into a terrible wrath that might have precipitated some rash action.

Only a few key people knew about the CIA plot to assassinate Castro. One was Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, who was his brother's personal watchdog over the CIA. It has now been established that Robert Kennedy was briefed on May 7, 1962, about the attempt to use underworld killers to knock off Castro.

Two days later, Robert Kennedy cautioned the CIA not to go ahead with the assassination without consulting him. Since Robert Kennedy rode herd on the CIA, it must be assumed that he was kept advised of subsequent assassination attempts. However, there is no documentary evidence of this.

Records now available show that Robert Kennedy informed FBI chief J. Edgar Hoover of the plot on May 10, 1962. Yet neither Kennedy nor Hoover later divulged this important information to the Warren Commission.

Of course, various CIA officials also knew about the assassination scheme. Not the least of them was the late CIA chief Allen W. Dulles, who approved the original plan. He later served on the Warren Commmission, yet he sat silently throughout the investigation without mentioning the Cuban angle.

Within hours of President Kennedy's death, the U.S. embassy cabled information from Mexico City suggesting that the Cubans may have been behind the assassination. Our sources say that the CIA developed similar information in Washington.

The first person to reach Robert Kennedy's side after the shooting was CIA Director John A. McCone, who remained alone with the Attorney General at his McLean, Va., home for nearly three hours.

McCone swore to us that Castro's name was never mentioned during the three hours. But CIA records show that the next day McCone not only mentioned Castro to the new President, Lyndon B. Johnson, but briefed him on the information from Mexico City.

Yet no one brought the Cuban connection to the attention of the Warren Commission. We were the first to get word of the anti-Castro plot to Chief Justice Earl Warren, the commission chairman, four years later.

We are now free to reveal our role in the drama. Two of our confidential sources, CIA agent William Harvey and mobster John Rosselli, are dead. A third source, attorney Edward P. Morgan, has waived the confidentiality we had promised him.

Morgan told us in January, 1967, about the CIA-Mafia assassination plot against Castro. He raised the possibility that the plot could have backfired against President Kennedy. There were suspicious circumstances, he pointed out, indicating that Castro may have learned of the attempts on his life and may have retaliated against Kennedy.

Morgan refused to identify his sources because it would have violated the attorney-client privilege. But he was an attorney of such stature that we didn't doubt his word. He had been chief inspector of the FBI. He had directed the historic congressional investigation of the Pearl Harbor bombing. Later, he ran the investigation into the excesses of the late Sen. Joseph McCarthy.

We got Morgan's permission to write a cautious story. We confirmed the general outlines from a CIA source. Then on March 3, 1967, we wrote that Robert Kennedy "may have approved an assassination plot, which then possibly backfired against his late brother."

The next day, according to records now available, Kennedy's secretary called for a copy of the May 7, 1962, memo, which summarized the briefing he had received on the assassination plot. ??

On March 7, 1967, we reported more details. "A reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro," we wrote, ". . . may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Behind John F. Kennedy's Murder

Mafia mobster John Roselli may have taken the secret of the John F. Kennedy assassination with him to his death. He was brutally murdered a few weeks ago, his backed-up body stuffed into an oil drum and dumped into Miami's Biscayne Bay.

Before he died, Roselli hinted to associates that he knew who had arranged President Kennedy's murder. It was the same conspirators, he suggested, whom he had recruited earlier to kill Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

By Roselli's cryptic account, Castro learned the identity of the underworld contacts in Havana who had been trying to knock him off. He believed, not altogether without basis, that President Kennedy was behind the plot.

The Cuban leader, as the supreme irony, decided to turn the tables and use the same crowd to arrange Kennedy's assassination, according to Roselli's scenario. To save their skins, the plotters lined up Lee Harvey Oswald to pull the trigger.

Roselli could never be pinned down on names or details. It was also difficult to assess whether he knew what he was talking about or whether he merely described what he thought might have happened. Certainly there is no real evidence to support Roselli's story. But there are enough curious circumstances to justify telling it. Here are the fascinating highlights.

The ruggedly handsome Roselli, a flamboyant mobster with underworld contacts in Havana, was recruited by the Central Intelligence Agency in 1960 to assassinate Castro. He had no authority, however, over the underworld elements in Havana.

They were under the loose control of Florida's Mafia chieftan, Santos Trafficante. His gambling enterprises in Havana had been closed down by Castro after the 1959 revolution. In fact, Trafficante had been lodged for a period in a Cuban jail, an indignity that didn't endear Castro to him.

After Trafficante made it back to his Florida haunts, he left part of his organization behind in Havana. Some of his henchmen even managed to develop contacts in Castro's inner circle. These were the people Roselli wanted to use to knock off Castro.

But Roselli didn't have the stature inside the Mafia to make the necessary arrangements with Trafficante. So Roselli called in his patron, the Chicago godfather Sam (Momo) Giancana, to deal with Trafficante.

As Roselli's associates tell it, he persuaded Giancana that it would be to their advantage to win the good will of the CIA. Convinced, Giancana flew down to Florida to make the preliminary arrangements.

Once Giancana and Trafficante set it up, Roselli used the Havana underworld to plot Castro's demise. At first, they tried to plant poison pills, supplied by the CIA, in Castro's food. The pills would have made it appear that he died of natural causes. When this failed, snipers were dispatched to a Havana rooftop. They were caught.

The word reached Roselli that some of the plotters had been tortured and that Castro had learned about the whole operation.

The CIA called off the Roselli operation in March, 1963, but recruited a Castro associate, Rolando Cubela, to murder Castro.

In an impromptu, three-hour interview with Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker, Castro indicated that he knew about the attempts on his life and warned that U.S. leaders also might not be safe. That was Sept. 7, 1963.

According to Roselli, Castro enlisted the same underworld elements whom he had caught plotting against him. They supposedly were Cubans from the old Trafficante organization. Working with Cuban intelligence, they allegedly lined up an ex-Marine sharpshooter, Lee Harvey Oswald, who had been active in the pro-Castro movement.

According to Roselli's version, Oswald may have shot Kennedy or may have acted as a decoy while others ambushed him from closer range. When Oswald was picked up, Roselli suggested, the underworld conspirators feared he would crack and disclose information that might lead to them. This almost certainly would have brought a massive U.S. crackdown on the Mafia.

So Jack Ruby was ordered to eliminate Oswald, making it appear as an act of reprisal against the President's killer. At least this is how Roselli explained the tragedy in Dallas.

Several key CIA officials believed that Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination.

It has also been established that Jack Ruby, indeed, had been in Cuba and had connections in the Havana underworld. One CIA cable, dated Nov. 28, 1963, reported that "an American gangster type named Ruby" had visited Trafficante in his Cuban prison.

?

DROPOUTS

By Howard Post


I SEE YOU'RE ENLARGING YOUR HUT, CHIEF... EXPANDING FAMILY?
NO, ALF...
—EXPANDING WAISTLINES.
9-7
POST

GASOLINE ALLEY

By Moores


Where's the truck the boss
The man got it started, Sarge!
Good! That saves me a trip to the city
I brought your iced tea, Mr. Turnip!
Thank you so

THE WASHINGTON POST Friday, August 27, 1976

Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Smudge Only Clue in Rosselli Case

It was a grisly end for John Rosselli, the dapper, debonair mobster about town, who had been a familiar figure in the glittering night spots of Hollywood, Las Vegas and Havana.

His killers shot or stabbed him in the stomach. The autopsy indicates they may have shot him and then dug out the bullet with a knife. Then they brutally hacked off his legs. It is possible that he was still alive when they stuffed his body into a 55-gallon drum.

They wrapped chains around the drum to weight it down and tossed it into Biscayne Bay. The autopsy suggests he may have died of asphyxiation inside the drum before it hit the water. The gases from the decomposing body floated the heavy container to the surface. It was discovered, with its nightmarish contents, 10 days after Rosselli had disappeared from his sister's home in Plantation, Fla.

The police withheld the gruesome details of his death while they searched for his killers. We began our own investigation, meanwhile, after an appeal from his associates.

We first encountered Johnny Rosselli more than five years ago. We were investigating his role in the Central Intelligence Agency's plot to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro.

The CIA case officer, William Harvey, told us that Rosselli had been the hero of the abortive adventure. Harvey broke his oath of secrecy because he thought it might help Rosselli, who was in trouble with the law. The CIA agent had nothing but praise for Rosselli's daring.

In the strictest of confidence, Rosselli himself confirmed that he had directed six assassination attempts against Castro. We protected his confidence, so he came to trust us. We were the only reporters he would talk to.

So when he vanished last month his associates came to us for help. We were suspicious, of course, that his disappearance was linked to the Castro caper. But our investigation has now produced evidence to the contrary.

We have learned, for example, that Rosselli was not the amiable, retired old duffer he pretended to be. He began in the big time as a bookkeeper for Chicago's notorious Al Capone and became a specialist in white-collar crimes. It's a profession, apparently, that he never gave up.

Competent sources say that, between rounds on the Florida golf courses, Rosselli was involved in stolen securities and financial swindles. His operations reportedly were resented by Santo Trafficante, who has been identified in Senate testimony as the Mafia chief in Florida.

Rosselli came to Florida from Las Vegas, where he allegedly represented the Chicago mob. Our sources say that he handled millions in illegal gambling money, which he forwarded to the Chicago underworld. There are reports that Chicago crime lord Tony Accardo felt he had been short-changed by Rosselli.

Still earlier, Rosselli spent time in the slammer, first, for extortion and, later, for a card swindle. Those who know him say he had developed a taste for the good life. He dressed in the latest styles, dined at the best restaurants and dated beautiful women. The thought of going back to prison, friends say, horrified him.

To avoid prison, he began to talk to the government as early as 1970. He gave information, according to our sources, which resulted in a grand jury confrontation for Tony Accardo. The surly mobster took the fifth. But Accardo grumbled to associates that he would pay back Rosselli some day.

Rosselli was also blamed for passing information to the government, which led to the conviction of Detroit mobster Anthony Zerilli. He is now serving a four-year sentence at Sandstone federal penitentiary for racketeering.

Perhaps the last straw was Rosselli's testimony in the Castro case. He identified two mobsters, the late Sam Giancana and Santo Trafficante, as being involved in the assassination attempts. It's no secret in the underworld that Trafficante detests publicity.

Our sources believe that the Mafia bosses finally became fed up with Rosselli. His execution would have required the approval of the top leaders, our sources say, because it was almost certain to bring the federal government into the case.

Who were the vicious killers? The only clue is a smudge spot on the window of Rosselli's car. One of his assailants probably had used a greasy hair pomade.

LRS - MAIN FILE COPY

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Tuesday, Feb. 23, 1971 B11

Castro Stalker Worked for the CIA

Jack Anderson

The mystery man whom the Central Intelligence Agency recruited to assassinate Cuba's Fidel Castro has been laid up in the sick ward of the Los Angeles County jail.

He is handsome, hawk-faced John Roselli, once a dashing figure around Hollywood and Las Vegas, now a gray, 66-year-old inmate with a respiratory ailment.

Confidential FBI files identify him as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli has admitted to friends that he was a rum runner during the Roaring Twenties. Operating along the East Coast, he learned how to evade Coast Guard cutters and police patrols.

His name later became linked with the biggest names in the Chicago and Los Angeles underworlds. He also developed contacts in the Cuban underworld before Castro took over the Havana gambling casinos.

He had the right background for a hush-hush mission that the CIA was planning in 1961. As part of the Bay of Pigs invasion, the CIA hoped to knock off Castro and leave Cuba leaderless.

Risks Neck

Roselli was recruited for the job by Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent, who admitted to us that he had handled undercover assignments for the CIA. He refused, however, to discuss the details. This is the same Maheu, incidentally, who is now involved in a legal battle over phantom billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Roselli was so flattered over being asked to perform a secret mission for the U.S. government that he paid all his expenses out of his own pocket and risked his neck to land the assassination teams on the Cuban coast.

In James Bond fashion, he held whispered meetings in Miami Beach hotels with Cubans willing to make an attempt on Castro's life. Once, he called on Chicago racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that Giancana had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba." However, the Chicago gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

Roselli made midnight dashes to Cuba with his hired assassins in twin powerboats. Once a Cuban patrol ship turned its guns on his darkened boat, tore a hole in the bottom and sank the boat. Roselli was fished out of the water by the other boat, which escaped into the shadows.

In earlier columns, we reported how the CIA furnished Roselli with deadly poison capsules which he tried through a relative of Castro's chef to plant in the dictator's food. Later, marksmen armed with high-powered Belgian rifles attempted to infiltrate close enough to gun Castro down.

All told, six assassination attempts were made, the last in the spring of 1963. Throughout this period, Roselli worked under the direct supervision of two secret CIA agents, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell.

Roselli's Reward

The FBI which got wind of the assassination plot, has tried to pump Roselli for information. But he was sworn to silence by the CIA, and up to this moment, he hasn't broken it.

Meanwhile, the Justice Department, as part of its crackdown on organized crime, tried to nail Roselli. The FBI discovered that his Chicago birth records had been forged, that his name was really Filippo Sacco and that he had come to this country from Italy as a child. He was convicted for failing to register as an alien.

He was also convicted for conspiracy to rig card games at Los Angeles' exclusive Friar's Club.

Of Roselli's two CIA associates, Harvey has now retired to Indianapolis and O'Connell is still on the CIA payroll. Both admitted to us a friendship with Roselli but refused to discuss their CIA activities. Harvey said he had a "high regard" for Roselli and called the Friar's Club case a "bum rap." Said Harvey: "The Friar's Club indictment is phony. Roselli had no more to do with that than I had."

Roselli's lawyers are now trying to get clemency for their client, citing our stories about his secret CIA service.

Firearms Fiasco

Under pressure from the firearms lobby, the Treasury Department has failed to enforce a vital section of the 1968 federal firearms act.

The law was passed after the murders of Sen. Robert Kennedy and Dr. Martin Luther King. It authorizes the Treasury Secretary to require full reports of all firearms and ammunition sales.

For the two years that the law has been in force, the Treasury Department has ignored this key provision. The gun industry has complained it would be a bookkeeping nightmare.

The federal government, which would have to compile all the sales data, has also been reluctant to spend the $100 million it would cost for computers and staff to maintain the firearms files.

© 1971, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.

PN US B

LRS - MAIN FILE COPY

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST *Tuesday, Jan. 19, 1971* D15

Castro Plot Raises Ugly Questions

By Jack Anderson

The plot to kill Cuban dictator Fidel Castro, hidden for 10 years from the public, raises some ugly questions that high officials would rather keep buried deep inside the Central Intelligence Agency.

1. Has the CIA tried to assassinate any other leaders? John McCone, who headed the CIA during the six attempts to knock off Castro, denied emphatically that the CIA has tried to kill anyone. But ex-Sen. George Smathers, one of John F. Kennedy's closest friends, told us the late President suspected that the CIA had arranged the shootings of the Dominican Republic's Rafael Trujillo in 1961 and South Vietnam's Ngo Dinh Diem in 1963.

2. Did President Kennedy personally sanction the plot against Castro? The preparations to assassinate the Cuban dictator began during the last months of the Eisenhower administration as part of the Bay of Pigs scheme. All six attempts, however, were made during 1961-63 when Mr. Kennedy occupied the White House. Smathers told us he once spoke to the late President about assassinating Castro. Mr. Kennedy merely rolled back his eyes, recalled Smathers, as if to indicate the idea was too wild to discuss. Subsequently, Mr. Kennedy told Smathers of his suspicion that the CIA may have been behind the Trujillo and Diem assassinations.

3. Did the late Robert Kennedy know about the assassination attempts? After the Bay of Pigs fiasco, President Kennedy swore to friends he would like "to splinter the CIA in a thousand pieces and scatter it to the winds." He put his brother, Robert, in charge of the CIA with instructions to shake it up. The CIA made five attempts on Castro's life after the Bay of Pigs while Robert Kennedy was riding herd on the agency.

4. Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? The late President was murdered nine months after the last assassination team was caught on a Havana rooftop with high-powered rifles. Presumably, they were subjected to fiendish tortures until they told all they knew. None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as oilmen seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

PLOT BACKFIRE?

Former associates recall that Robert Kennedy, deeply despondent, went into semi-seclusion after his brother's assassination. Could he have been tormented by more than natural grief? He certainly learned that the assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had traveled to Mexico to visit the Cuban Embassy a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas. Could Bob Kennedy have been plagued by the terrible thought that the CIA plot, which he must at least have condoned, put into motion forces that may have brought about his brother's martyrdom?

The last surviving brother, Sen. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass), could give us no insight. His brothers had never spoken to him about any assassination attempts against Castro, he said. He was aware, he volunteered, only that Sen. Smathers had talked to the late President about eliminating Castro.

Smathers told us that President Kennedy seemed "horrified" at the idea of political assassination. "I remember him saying," recalled Smathers, "that the CIA frequently did things he didn't know about, and he was unhappy about it. He complained that the CIA was almost autonomous.

"He told me he believed the CIA had arranged to have Diem and Trujillo bumped off. He was pretty well shocked about that. He thought it was a stupid thing to do, and he wanted to get control of what the CIA was doing."

But McCone, disagreeing vigorously, told us that "no plot was authorized or implemented" to assassinate Castro, Trujillo, Diem or anyone else.

"During those days of tension, there was a wide spectrum of plans ranging from one extreme to another," McCone admitted. "Whenever this subject (assassinating Castro) was brought up—and it was — it was rejected immediately on two grounds. First, it would not be condoned by anybody. Second, it wouldn't have achieved anything."

There was also talk in high places, McCone acknowledged, of supporting a coup to oust Diem. The former CIA director said he had argued against this at a secret session with both Kennedy brothers. He had contended that there was no one strong enough to take Diem's place and that a coup, therefore, would bring "political upheaval."

"I told the President and Bobby together," recalled McCone, "that if I were running a baseball team and had only one pitcher, I wouldn't take him out of the game."

The November, 1963, coup caught the United States completely by surprise, he said. While the plotters were moving on the palace, he said, then-Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge was visiting Diem. Adm. Ulysses Sharp, then our Pacific commander, had also been present, but had left early to go to the airport.

McCone said President Diem escaped through a tunnel but was caught in nearby Cholon and "shot in a station wagon."

© 1971, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.

PN 4 S.B

The Washington Merry-Go-Round THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, Jan. 18, 1971 B7

6 Attempts to Kill Castro Laid to CIA

By Jack Anderson

Locked in the darkest recesses of the Central Intelligence Agency is the story of six assassination attempts against Cuba's Fidel Castro.

For 10 years, only a few key people have known the terrible secret. They have sworn never to talk. Yet we have learned the details from sources whose credentials are beyond question.

We spoke to John McCone, who headed the CIA at the time of the assassination attempts. He acknowledged the idea had been discussed inside the CIA but insisted it had been "rejected immediately." He vigorously denied that the CIA had ever participated in any plot on Castro's life. Asked whether the attempts could have been made with his knowledge, he replied: "It could not have happened."

We have complete confidence, however, in our sources.

The plot to knock off Castro began as part of the Bay of Pigs operation. The intent was to eliminate the Cuban dictator before the motley invaders landed on the island. Their arrival was expected to touch off a general uprising, which the Communist militia would have had more trouble putting down without the charismatic Castro to lead them.

After the first attempt failed, five more assassination teams were sent to Cuba. The last team reportedly made it to a rooftop within shooting distance of Castro before they were apprehended. This happened around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who previously had agitated for Castro in New Orleans and had made a mysterious trip to the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

Among those privy to the CIA conspiracy, there is still a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro became aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and somehow recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

To set up the Castro assassination, the CIA enlisted Robert Maheu, a former FBI agent with shadowy contacts, who had handled other undercover assignments for the CIA out of his Washington public relations office. He later moved to Las Vegas to head up billionaire Howard Hughes' Nevada operations.

Maheu recruited John Roselli, a ruggedly handsome gambler with contacts in both the American and Cuban underworlds, to arrange the assassination. The dapper, hawk-faced Roselli, formerly married to movie actress June Lang, was a power in the movie industry until his conviction with racketeer Willie Bioff in a million-dollar Hollywood labor shakedown. The CIA assigned two of its most trusted operatives, William Harvey and James (Big Jim) O'Connell, to the hush-hush murder mission. Using phony names, they accompanied Roselli on trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams.

The full story reads like the script of a James Bond movie, complete with secret trysts at glittering Miami Beach hotels and midnight powerboat dashes to secret landing spots on the Cuban coast. Once, Roselli's boat was shot out from under him.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered before the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life.

© 1971, Bell-McClure Syndicate, Inc.

3/16/75

BY JACK ANDERSON
with Les Whitten

WASHINGTON—Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.

Anderson

Actually, we reported as far back as Jan. 18, 1971, that the CIA had arranged six assassination attempts against Castro in the early 1960s. Now that the story has been revived, it might be useful to recount the details.

The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli represented himself as an oil man seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings.

For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food. The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's glamorous Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered in time to rout the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life thereafter, using assassination teams equipped with high-powered rifles, explosives and two-way radios. Roselli personally made midnight powerboat dashes to deliver the teams at secret landing spots on the Cuban coast.

The assassination teams never got a shot at Castro, although the CIA learned that the last group reached a rooftop within range. This occurred around the last of February or first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, President Kennedy was gunned down in Dallas by Lee Harvey Oswald, a fanatic who had been active in the pro-Castro movement and had paid a mysterious call upon the Cuban embassy in Mexico City a few weeks before the dreadful day in Dallas.

Sources familiar with the CIA conspiracy can't shake a nagging suspicion—unsupported by the Warren Commission's findings—that Castro may have become aware of the U.S. plot upon his life and, therefore, may have recruited Oswald to retaliate against President Kennedy.

CRS [illegible] FILE COPY [illegible]

The Washington Merry-Go-Round

THE WASHINGTON POST Monday, March 10, 1975

CIA Plots Against Castro Recounte

By Jack Anderson and Les Whitten

Press accounts have identified Cuba's Fidel Castro as the target of an unsuccessful CIA assassination plot.

The headlines couldn't have come at a worse time for Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. He is in the thick of "most delicate negotiations," according to our White House sources, to restore some kind of diplomatic relationship with Cuba.

Actually, we reported as far back as Jan. 18, 1971, that the CIA had arranged six assassination attempts against Castro in the early 1960s. Now that the story has been revived, it might be useful to recount the details.

The plot began as part of the discredited Bay of Pigs operation. The strategy was to eliminate the Cuban leader before the CIA invasion force landed on the island. Without the charismatic Castro, it was thought, the defenders would become demoralized and disorganized.

To carry out the assassination, the CIA selected an underworld figure who could be disowned. He was hawk-faced John Roselli, identified in confidential FBI files as "a top Mafia figure" who watched over "the concealed interests in Las Vegas casinos of the Chicago underworld."

Roselli's CIA contacts were William Harvey and James O'Connell, who accompanied him on hush-hush trips to Miami to line up the assassination teams. No one else was told, however, of the CIA's role in the murder mission.

Roselli represented himself as an oilman seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings. The assassination weapons were also carefully selected from foreign makes, mostly Belgian, to prevent any link to the United States.

Each attempt to kill Castro was meticulously planned, like an episode from the TV drama "Mission Impossible." For the first try, the CIA furnished Roselli with special poison capsules to slip into Castro's food.

The poison was supposed to take three days to act. By the time Castro died, his system would throw off all traces of the poison, so he would appear to be the victim of a natural if mysterious ailment.

Roselli arranged with a Cuban, related to one of Castro's chefs, to plant the deadly pellets in the dictator's food. On March 13, 1961, Roselli delivered the capsules to his contact at Miami Beach's Fontainebleau Hotel.

A couple of weeks later, just about the right time for the plot to have been carried out, a report out of Havana said Castro was ill. But he recovered in time to rout the Bay of Pigs invasion on April 17, 1961.

Although both the murder plot and the invasion failed, the CIA continued trying to get rid of Castro. The Cuban who had sneaked the poison into Havana was never seen again. Therefore, the CIA, unsure whether the plotters had failed or the poison hadn't been strong enough, decided to try again with a more powerful dose.

Roselli arranged for triple-strength capsules to be slipped into Castro's food several weeks after the Bay of Pigs. But once again, the plot failed and the conspirators disappeared.

Four more attempts were made on Castro's life, thereafter using assassination teams equipped with high-powered rifles, explosives and two-way radios. Roselli personally made midnight powerboat dashes to deliver the teams at secret landing spots on the Cuban

The assassination never got a shot at Castr though the CIA learned th last group reached a ro within range. This occ around the last of Februa first of March, 1963.

Nine months later, Pres Kennedy was gunned dow Dallas by Lee Harvey Os a fanatic who had been act the pro-Castro movement had paid a mysterious call the Cuban Embassy in Me City a few weeks before dreadful day in Dallas

Sources familiar with the conspiracy can't shake a ging suspicion—unsupporte the Warren Commission's f ings—that Castro may have come aware of the U.S. upon his life and, theref may have recruited Oswal retaliate against President K nedy.

Footnote: Sources fam with the secret review of CIA's activities have now knowledged that Castro, as reported four years ago, marked for assassination by CIA. A CIA spokesman refu to comment.

©1975, United Feature Syndicate, Inc

8/24/76
N. York
Times

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

By Russell Baker

The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been murdered after discussing their C.I.A. enterprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced the incidents "gangland-style killings."

The phrase "gangland-style killing" has the cozy resonance of "home-style cooking," perhaps because both suggest the intimacy of hearth and fire with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack. These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm.

This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-style killings" has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that incessant failure may have dulled their appetite for the hunt.

Or, it may be because policemen believe the subjects of "gangland-style killings" aren't worth working overtime for. I don't know, and I certainly don't mean to impute either languor, timidity or indifference to America's homicide squads. I simply point out that once a murder has been called "gangland-style," apprehension of the perpetrator almost invariably fails to occur.

This raises the question whether "gangland-style" murders might possibly be catching among people who don't come from gangland. Consider the Roselli case. The body is found in the customary barrel, with the customary weights, in the customary water. It bears the customary bullet holes. Roselli's publicized standing in gangland seems to leave an open-and-shut case, which the police will quietly shut as soon as possible.

If you and I know this, reader, does it not follow that it is also known by, let us say, some hot-tempered waiter whom Roselli has been consistently undertipping for years?

If that waiter wanted to take his revenge and get away with it, is it not logical that he would do it "gangland-style," so the police could forget it, rather than by scalding Roselli to death in public with a tureen of lobster bisque?

This is not to suggest that the police ought to be giving Roselli's waiters the third degree, but merely to point out that gangland can have no monopoly on "gangland-style killing." Anybody with a barrel, some concrete and a capacious expanse of water can engage in it, just as readily as your corner greasy spoon can engage in "home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a victim who is a bona fide citizen of gangland. Obviously, a philandering husband cannot do in a loyal wife of 40 years "gangland-style" and expect the police not to lift an eyebrow. Unless the subject is the real gangland thing, it won't work.

The corollary of this fact is that gangland people are peculiarly vulnerable to "gangland-style" murder by devious non-ganglanders, who have no right to get away with it.

This must be infuriating to them. Imagine that you are an eminent statesman of gangland, and the vexation becomes manifest. You are entirely prepared to be sent off "gangland-style" by your colleagues. Those are the rules of the land.

Moreover, if they complete the job, you wouldn't dream of telling the police who did it, even if you could. That would violate the rules of the sportsmanship governing gangland. In gangland, good sports don't tell.

But to have some alien from the outer world—some straight-Jake cousin who wants his share of your will prematurely, some barber who hates your sideburns—to have somebody like this do the job on you and get away with it because it's done "gangland-style"—Ah, my friend, that must seem a cruel injustice.

OBSERVER

Such a bad egg as that you would surely betray to the cops. How infuriating it would be if they looked at the barrel, the concrete, the water, the bullet holes and closed the case with a quietly murmured, "Just another gangland-style killing."

You will have been the victim, not only of murder, but also of discrimination, for it is only your membership in gangland that prevents the police from extending themselves to bring your persecutor to justice.

I do not know how policemen feel about nonmembers of gangland killing gangland members "gangland-style," but my hunch is that they take a sterner view of it than they do of gangland men bumping off each other. The average cop probably thinks it is not the kind of thing decent people ought to be doing.

I know very well that gangland folks don't approve of it, and to make sure that there is no misunderstanding, I want to assure them that I haven't the heart to swat a fly, myself, and, what's more, I've never been any good with concrete.

Only a Ho-Hum Murder

8/24/76
N. York
Times

By Russell Baker

The gangsters Sam Giancana and John Roselli who were associated with the C.I.A. in a scheme to dispatch Fidel Castro have now both been murdered after discussing their C.I.A. enterprise with the United States Senate, and the police have pronounced the incidents "gangland-style killings."

The phrase "gangland-style killing" has the cozy resonance of "home-style cooking," perhaps because both suggest the intimacy of hearth and fire with nobody but us family gathered round and nobody else welcome, Jack. These family affairs are, of course, meddled into by the constabulary, but rarely with much enthusiasm.

This may be because police success at nabbing perpetrators of "gangland-style killings" has never been such as to get them into the world series of detection, with the result that incessant failure may have dulled their appetite for the hunt.

Or, it may be because policemen believe the subjects of "gangland-style killings" aren't worth working overtime for. I don't know, and I certainly don't mean to impute either languor, timidity or indifference to America's homicide squads. I simply point out that once a murder has been called "gangland-style," apprehension of the perpetrator almost invariably fails to occur.

This raises the question whether "gangland-style" murders might possibly be catching among people who don't come from gangland. Consider the Roselli case. The body is found in the customary barrel, with the customary weights, in the customary water. It bears the customary bullet holes. Roselli's publicized standing in gangland seems to leave an open-and-shut case, which the police will quietly shut as soon as possible.

If you and I know this, reader, does it not follow that it is also known by, let us say, some hot-tempered waiter whom Roselli has been consistently undertipping for years?

If that waiter wanted to take his revenge and get away with it, is it not logical that he would do it "gangland-style," so the police could forget it, rather than by scalding Roselli to death in public with a tureen of lobster bisque?

This is not to suggest that the police ought to be giving Roselli's waiters the third degree, but merely to point out that gangland can have no monopoly on "gangland-style killing." Anybody with a barrel, some concrete and a capacious expanse of water can engage in it, just as readily as your corner greasy spoon can engage in "home-style cooking."

The one special requirement is a victim who is a bona fide citizen of gangland. Obviously, a philandering husband cannot do in a loyal wife of 40 years "gangland-style" and expect the police not to lift an eyebrow. Unless the subject is the real gangland thing, it won't work.

The corollary of this fact is that gangland people are peculiarly vulnerable to "gangland-style" murder by devious non-ganglanders, who have no right to get away with it.

This must be infuriating to them. Imagine that you are an eminent statesman of gangland, and the vexation becomes manifest. You are entirely prepared to be sent off "gangland-style" by your colleagues. Those are the rules of the land.

Moreover, if they complete the job, you wouldn't dream of telling the police who did it, even if you could. That would violate the rules of the sportsmanship governing gangland. In gangland, good sports don't tell.

But to have some alien from the outer world—some straight-Jake cousin who wants his share of your will prematurely, some barber who hates your sideburns—to have somebody like this do the job on you and get away with it because it's done "gangland-style"—Ah, my friend, that must seem a cruel injustice.

OBSERVER

Such a bad egg as that you would surely betray to the cops. How infuriating it would be if they looked at the barrel, the concrete, the water, the bullet holes and closed the case with a quietly murmured, "Just another gangland-style killing."

You will have been the victim, not only of murder, but also of discrimination, for it is only your membership in gangland that prevents the police from extending themselves to bring your persecutor to justice.

I do not know how policemen feel about nonmembers of gangland killing gangland members "gangland-style," but my hunch is that they take a sterner view of it than they do of gangland men bumping off each other. The average cop probably thinks it is not the kind of thing decent people ought to be doing.

I know very well that gangland folks don't approve of it, and to make sure that there is no misunderstanding, I want to assure them that I haven't the heart to swat a fly, myself, and, what's more, I've never been any good with concrete.

New York Times
8/23/76

Terrorist Activities Charged to Cubans By Police in Miami

WASHINGTON, Aug. 22 (UPI)—Militant pro-Castro and anti-Castro groups in the Miami area are engaged in terrorist activities both in and outside the United States, according to testimony given before a Senate subcommittee and released today.

The testimony came last May before a Judiciary subcommittee on internal security headed by Senator James O. Eastland, Democrat of Mississippi. It said that as many as 50 Cuban groups of various shadings had been operating in Miami at any one time, many of them engaged in violent plots involving local actions and activities in Mexico, Central and South America and Cuba itself.

Lieut. Thomas Lyons, who has been with the Dade County Public Safety Department for more than nine years, and Raul J. Diaz, of the department's organized crime, terrorist and security unit, told of efforts to track down terrorist elements in the greater Miami area.

Lieutenant Lyons said most Cubans in the area were hard-working and industrious; but some individuals "use Dade County as a base for international terrorism against allied governments of Cuba, Cuban shipping, Communists, purported Communists and individuals who take a stand against their terroristic-type tactics."

During the last two years, Lieutenant Lyons said, there have been four homicides "with strong indicators on each that the motivations were political in nature and terroristic by design."

Mr. Diaz said that some Castro groups had infiltrated exile organizations and that there were plans to assassinate Latin-American diplomats and foreign ministers.

Lieutenant Lyons said his unit received information from a confidential source early this year that there would be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger during his February visit to Costa Rica.

The Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Secret Service were notified, he said. A well-known fugitive exile, Orlando Bosch, was jailed after illegally entering Costa Rica. There no incidents during the Kissinger visit.

He did not mention the Central Intelligence Agency's efforts to use Cuban exiles in Florida and American gangsters to kill Prime Minister Fidel Castro.

Two weeks ago, the body of an underworld figure, John Roselli was found stuffed in a chain-weighted, 55-gallon drum floating in a bay near Miami. Mr. Roselli had testified last year before the Senate Select Committee on Intellegence Activities that he and a Chicago gangster, Sam Giancana, were hired by the C.I.A. to recruit Cubans to kill Mr. Castro. Mr. Giancana was shot and killed by unknown persons last year just before he was testify before the Washington panel.

The Boston Globe Monday, August 23, 1976 19

JACK ANDERSON

Plot to kill Kissinger blocked

WASHINGTON — A reported plot to assassinate Secretary of State Henry Kissinger in Costa Rica six months ago was blocked by US and Costa Rican authorities four days before it was supposed to be carried out.

We have pieced together the story from secret testimony before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee and from interviews with Cuban exiles and US intelligence sources.

A Cuban terrorist named Orlando Bosch Avila was reported to be gunning for Kissinger. The attempt on the Secretary's life was expected, according to underground reports, during his visit to Costa Rica last February.

Shortly before Kissinger's arrival, Bosch slipped into Costa Rica on a false passport. But the FBI and Secret Service had been alerted. They traced Bosch's movements and notified the Costa Rican authorities. The suspected assassin was arrested and clapped into a tiny jail cell four days before Kissinger got to town.

The plot to kill Kissinger apparently grew out of his overtures to improve relations with Cuba's Fidel Castro back in 1972. This reportedly upset an anti-Castro terrorist band, known as Cuban Action, which Bosch headed.

We reported part of the story two years later after a lengthy investigation in Miami. In columns on Sept. 1 and Nov. 12, 1974, we warned that anti-Castro terrorists planned an "assassination ... against American congressmen and businessmen who supported a ... thaw." We noted that Kissinger had been in touch with Castro.

The first hint that Kissinger, himself, was one of the targets came later from Carlos Rivero Collado, son of the man elected to the presidency of Cuba in 1958. Rivero was active in the anti-Castro underground in Miami's little Havana. But he later re-defected to Cuba where he gave a fascinating interview.

"I have known privately since 1972," he said, "(about) the plan to assassinate the US Secretary of State." He said the plot had taken "certain form" by 1973 and had been "actualized" by 1974.

Then, in a reference to our 1974 columns, he added: "This fact which, I repeat, I've known privately, has been corroborated by the US journalist Jack Anderson."

Rivero named Bosch as one of the 18 anti-Castro l
ers who had conspired to kill US and other leaders pron
ing a Cuban-American detente. Bosch already had b
convicted in 1968 of shelling a Polish freighter with a
zooka while it was moored in Miami. He jumped Fede
parole and fled to Venezuela in 1974.

Months later, he was reported to be in Curacao, pr
tected by Chilean gunmen. He bragged, according to t
reports, of his "money, friends and protection."

Florida's Dade County Public Safety Department, be
cause of the huge Cuban population in Miami, has excellen
ties throughout Latin America. In early 1976, the county's
terrorist expert, Lt. Thomas Lynch, picked up some electrifying news.

He told the Senate Subcommittee about it in secret testimony. "We received information from confidential sources," he swore, "that there was going to be an attempt on the life of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger ... We passed the information on to the FBI, and they had also received the information, and we notified the Secret Service, as they have the protective duty for the Secretary of State."

The plot was linked to Kissinger's two-day stay in Costa Rica, and Bosch was picked up and questioned. He was held on a false passport charge until Kissinger was safely out of the country.

Bosch later insisted: "My only crime was entering the country with a false passport." Certainly, it was never proved in court that he hoped to knock off Kissinger. He is now at large somewhere in Latin America.

8/22/76
Washington
1 of 3

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern
Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

See ROSSELLI, A8, Col. 1

ROSSELLI, From A1

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

8/22/76 Washington Post
2 of 3

principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsiility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic

8/24/76
Washington Post
3 of 3

a pure invention, a serious risk established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots—Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 24, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter to the U. S. Department of Justice dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to certain material and delivery of other material maintained by the FBI.

Pursuant to request item numbered 17, we currently have one abstract covering the areas of inquiry available for review at FBI Headquarters by approved personnel of the Committee.

Pursuant to request item numbered 18, we were not able to locate a copy of a cable dated on or about November 28, 1963, from Director, FBI, to Director, CIA, regarding interrogation of witnesses concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City. We are, however, furnishing a copy of an FBI to CIA teletype dated November 27, 1963, captioned "Lee Harvey Oswald," which advises that the interrogation of Oswald between his arrest and murder had not extended to his travel to Mexico or his contacts with Soviet establishments. The teletype, classified "Secret," also contains details from an Oswald letter to the Soviet Embassy, Washington, D. C., which were obtained from a highly sensitive source.

SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE
ACTIVITIES (SSC)

We are also furnishing 3 Bureau memoranda in response to the latter part of request item 18 asking for all memoranda prepared between November 22, 1963, and December 30, 1963, which relate to the interrogation of witnesses concerning Oswald's trip to Mexico City, including his visits to the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 26 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum with SECRET enclosures prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Items 17 and 18 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E. Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓ orig + attls ⇒ admin
cy → Wallach
cy → Blue
Tissue ⇒ Chron

1976 FEB 27 AM 11:41
[illegible] ACTIVITIES

FILE RID RET. TO BRANCH ☐

SECRET

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DIRECTOR

FROM : MEXICO CITY

ACTION: WH 8 . (WH NOTIFIED AND COPY SLOTTED AT: 1535 25 NOV CJ)

INFO : DDP, CI, CI/CPS, FI, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

MICROFILMED
FEB 3 1964
DOC. MICRO. SER.

25 Nov 63 IN 67682

1P

SECRET 251954Z

IMMEDIATE DIR CITE MEXI 7060

REDCAP

CJO 092

REF MEXI 6868 (IN 60046)*

ACCORDING LIFIRE DIP COURIERS REF LEFT MEXI FOR CUBA 12 NOV VIA CUBANA 465, RETURNED MEXI 18 NOV VIA CUBANA. ACCORDING LIENVOY, THEY PROBABLY LEFT FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOV VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. ANANYEV (PHONETIC) OF SOV CONSULATE NEW YORK PHONED SOVEMB 23 NOV ASKING FOR INFO ON WHICH FLIGHT COURIERS TAKING. COMMENT: THIS ONLY INFREQUENTLY OCCURS. ASST CONSUL KOSTIKOV HANDLED THE CALL FROM NEW YORK.

SECRET

C/S COMMENT: * ALEKSEY PAPKOV AND VALENTIN PONOMAREV, SOV DIP COURIERS ARRIVED MEXI 10 NOV.

D-201-291579 (cc filed)

ROUTING	INITIAL
RID/AN	MJ
RID/MIS	MM
RID/PS	DB
RID/FI	
201-223333	

CROSS FILE COPY FOR
201- 289248
DO NOT DESTROY

SECRET

CN 1388 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

RI COPY

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED

RI COPY

Copy No.

I.1D

12-62

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTING

1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

ORIG : IDEN 4
UNIT : WH/3/Mexico
EXT : 5040
DATE : 26 Nov 63

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 200-5-5

29 Nov 63 15 23z

TO : FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
FROM: CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
CONF: WH 8
INFO : DDP, CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, SAS 8, VR

SIG CEN
DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO FBI INFO CITE DIR 85678

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SUBJECT: TRAVEL OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS

1. REFERENCE IS MADE TO YOUR TELETYPE OF 8 NOVEMBER 1963 CONCERNING THE TRAVEL TO MEXICO OF SOVIET DIPLOMATIC COURIERS VALENTI GERMANOVICH PONOMAREV AND ALEKSEY NIKOLAYEVICH POPKOV.

2. ACCORDING TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO CITY, PONOMAREV AND POPKOV LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR CUBA ON 12 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA 465 AND RETURNED TO MEXICO CITY ON 18 NOVEMBER VIA CUBANA.

3. A USUALLY RELIABLE AND SENSITIVE SOURCE REPORTED THAT THEY PROBABLY LEFT MEXICO CITY FOR NEW YORK ON 23 NOVEMBER VIA AERONAVES FLT 451. THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED THAT ONE "ANANYEV" (PHONETIC) OF THE SOVIET CONSULATE IN NEW YORK CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXI CITY ON 23 NOVEMBER AND REQUESTED INFORMATION ON WHICH FLIGHT THE COURIERS WERE TAKING. ASSISTANT CONSUL VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH KOSTIKO PROVIDED THE INFORMATION ON BEHALF OF THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CI

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

12-62

SECRET

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

	ROUTING		
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF:

INFO :

PAGE 2

See Sanitized File Number 14 / 41
For sterile copy of this document.

DEFERRED
ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 85076

4. "ANANYEV" IS PROBABLY IDENTIFIABLE WITH GEORGIY ANANYEVICH ANANYEV OF THE SOVIET MISSION TO THE UNITED NATIONS.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: MEXI 7060 (IN 67682)

SR/CI/K IDEN 58 [redacted]

C/WH/3 IDEN 4 [redacted]

RECEI... ROM
IDEN 13 [redacted]
CI/LIA JAN 23 1976
CIA
RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

IDEN 14 [redacted]
C/WH/R

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

SECRET

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

Cuba

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET - EYES ONLY

January 9, 1964

MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Sabotage against Castro

Three small-scale sabotage operations have been approved by the Special Group, but this recommendation is based on a routine continuation of broad policy guidance which I think you may wish to review. The three operations involved are:

(1) a commando sabotage operation against a coastal warehouse and pier;

(2) a sabotage attack against naval or patrol vessels in a harbor; and

(3) a sabotage operation against a fuel barge proceeding in coastal waters.

All of these operations would have been approved three months ago, and indeed one of them is a rescheduling of an operation aborted because of high seas. While it is always hard to predict the noise level in these matters, these operations seem comparable to the small attack on a Cuban naval patrol which occurred in late December which Castro promptly blamed on you (in fact it was an operation approved before November 22 and not cancelled thereafter because it seemed to fall within the guidance you expressed in your first review of the Cuban problem).

The policy question now is this: If we continue these even small sabotage operations, Castro will certainly know it. Equally, if we call them off, he will know it, and so will the Russians. We thus have an opportunity to choose.

I doubt if this choice should be made on momentum alone.

I therefore recommend a Cabinet-level review of the whole principle of covert sabotage against Cuba. I know that Rusk has never liked it and that McNamara thinks it does very little good. McCone and the CIA are for it, and so are most of the middle-level officers dealing with the Castro problem. I myself consider the matter extremely evenly balanced,

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

but before hearing full argument, my guess is that in your position I would stop sabotage attacks on the ground that they are illegal, ineffective, and damaging to our broader policy. I might then wish to make a little capital from this decision with the Soviet Union.

McG. B.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Tab 4

SECRET

MEMORANDUM

TO: Senator Hart (Colorado) and Senator Schweiker

FROM: Jim Johnston
Dan Dwyer
Ed Greissing

DATE: January 27, 1976

SUBJ: Connection Between Amlash Operation and Investigation of JFK Assassination

Background

The staff's memorandum of January 5, 1976, postulated that the Amlash operation might have had some effect on CIA's response to the investigation of President Kennedy's assassination. On January 9, 1976, the staff asked for access to the Amlash file at CIA; and after a delay which was not explained, the staff was permitted to review the file on January 23 and 26.

Summary of Amlash File

Amlash initially contacted by CIA in 1961 met occasionally with case officers through August 1962, at which time he was given instruction in secret writing and explosives. Interest in Amlash continued after the August meetings, but there was no further direct contact by CIA agents until mid-1963. Why there was a year lapse in contact with Amlash cannot be determined; the Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 undoubtedly made CIA cautious in dealing with Amlash.

In any event, DIR 48198* to Rome of 19 June 1963 states that Amwhip, a Cuban exile who assisted CIA, had sent a letter as part of an "activation effort to reluctant dragon." Presumably, Amlash was "reluctant dragon" and was, by this letter, asked to recontact CIA.

In late August, Amlash traveled with a large contingent of Cuban officials and athletes to Porto Alegre, Brazil. He cabled Amwhip about his arrival on August 29. This cable apparently was the signal that he was prepared to meet Amwhip in Porto Alegre.

Amwhip and two CIA case officers met with Amlash in Porto Alegre between September 5 and 8. The two case officers have testified to the Committee about their understanding of events at this series of meetings which they viewed essentially as a get acquainted session. CIA messages tell a different story. Porto Alegre 0704 to DIR of 7 September stated that Amlash told Amwhip he felt there were only two ways of getting rid of Castro. The first was an invasion by U.S. forces which Amlash knew was out of the question and the second was an "inside job." Amlash indicated he was awaiting a U.S. plan of action. He referred to the explosives demonstration CIA gave him a year earlier as "too cumbersome" for his purposes.

---

* DIRs are messages sent from Langley.

SECRET

At the conclusion of the meetings with Amlash, Headquarters cabled on 9 September that, based on what little feel Headquarters had, Amlash appeared hopeless as an intelligence performer and should be approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts. He should be urged to recruit a few trusted friends to assist him, initially in "FI and Ops reporting" and then progress to sabotage and more serious matters on an orderly basis. (DIR 67110 to Porto Alegre, JMWAVE and Rio.)

On 11 September, Porto Alegre 0708 to DIR summarized the intelligence information Amlash had given on Soviet units in Cuba, saying all IRBM and bombers had been removed. By this time Amlash had left Brazil apparently heading for a vacation in Europe.

A document in the file dated 16 September and marked OFPA 72775 appears to be a transcript of a conversation obtained by covert means. There is no indication as to where the conversation takes place, but it probably is in the Cuban Embassy in Paris.

> "Mary: I don't want to imagine things but this thing of Amlash.
>
> Moreno: It is either a tremendous secret or a top secret matter (unreadable) then the word "treason" or "reason").
>
> Betty: I believe it is a top secret matter."

By letters of September 14 and September 16, Amlash stayed in contact with Amwhip. Paris station apparently was picking up responsibility for Amlash at this time, since Paris 0706 to DIR dated 19 September asks for some background material on Amlash.

On 19 September, JMWAVE 4580 to DIR warns that Amlash is part of an anti-communist group in Cuba and details the membership of his group as well as a communist group. The message also notes that Fidel is allegedly aware of the two groups and acts as moderator between them in order to maintain cohesion in the Government of Cuba.

Nevertheless, Amwhip is asked to continue to work with Amlash and is assigned to accompany him around Europe. According to Paris 0934 to DIR dated 7 October, Amlash met with case officer O* on 5 October. Case officer O sat and listened permitting Amlash to get everything off his chest. Amlash seemed to be complaining about the low level espionage matters that had been discussed at the September meeting in Brazil, implying he had a more valuable role. Case officer O "provided necessary assurances his feelings not in fact true and that his case receiving consideration highest levels. (emphasis added)"" "With this problem which had undoubtedly been bothering Amlash considerably, off his chest, a much more relaxed Amlash departed restating his desire return Cuba to undertake 'the big job.'"

---

* The files do not accurately identify these case officers. [redacted] and [redacted], however, were the principal case officers.

On October 15, London 5224 to DIR states case officer O met with Amlash and Amwhip on 13 October. Although the case officer had been forewarned by Amwhip, he was not successful in discouraging Amlash's request for a high level meeting. "Amlash convinced that if such meet does not take place at this time it will be almost impossible come out again and we will be in same situation as last year with no definite decision. Also finds it difficult to believe why RFK who receives many Cubans would refuse to see a major" such as Amlash. The message notes the fact remains that Amlash does "have excellent entree to highest target level which believe we cannot afford overlook."

This message seemingly moved Headquarters to re-evaluate Amlash's role. DIR 75683 to London on 15 October directed case officer O to return headquarters soonest for discussions of all phases of the case.

The next meeting apparently took place on October 29. One case officer met Amlash holding himself out as the personal representative of RFK. He informed Amlash, according to a 13 November MFR, that the U.S. was prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-communist Cuban group which succeeded in neutralizing the present Cuban leadership and which assumed significant control to invite the U.S. to render assistance. He emphasized that U.S. support could come only after a successful coup. Amlash responded by saying that without Fidel, the military would break up into 4 or 5 groups and the regime would disintegrate. He also said he was satisfied with the policy discussion but desired to know what technical support he could get.

Since Amwhip was closer to Amlash than the case officers, he was asked about Amlash's reaction to the meeting. His reactions are summarized in Attachment A to Amwhip's Memo of Meeting dated 14 November. Amwhip said Amlash was still not pleased with support from U.S. government. While Amlash was satisfied on policy grounds, he was not at all happy with the fact that he still was not given the technical assistance for the operation plan as he saw it. Amlash could not understand why he was denied certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem, while, on the other hand, the U.S. gave much equipment and money to exile groups for their ineffective excursions against Cuban coastal targets. Amlash had accepted the fact he had to work with the CIA, but CIA might lose him if it continued to procrastinate. Amlash talked about going to the French terrorist organization, the OAS, but realized that was not feasible. The memorandum ends with what apparently is the author's conclusion: "It is hoped that he does realize that Havana must first be taken . . . or failing that, a truly sizeable piece of land (say, almost an entire province) which could be true rallying point."

SECRET

In a Memo for Record dated 19 November, one case officer summarized the actions to be taken at the next meeting with Amlash. Amlash was to be told the U.S. was prepared to give full support to Amlash's coup. He would be shown President Kennedy's speech in Miami of November 18 and told this reaffirmed support for Amlash's proposal. Headquarters had approved giving Amlash scopes and rifles and other equipment. The memo ended by stating that "C/SAS* requested written reports on Amlash operation be kept to a minimum."

Pari 1564 to DIR of 20 November indicated Amlash had been called on the night of November 20 and had agreed to postpone his return to Cuba in order to see case officer O "if it something interesting." The CIA officer said he could not assure it was interesting but that it was to be a meeting which Amlash had requested. (Obviously, CIA wanted to give Amlash the "technical support" he felt he had not been promised in the 29 October meeting.)

Case officer O flew from the U.S. so as to arrive in Paris on the morning of November 22 for this meeting.

Pari 1607 to DIR received at Langley at 6:25 a.m. on 23 November is the only message in Amlash's file reflecting the fact the meeting had taken place. It indicated that Amlash was anxious to return to Cuba and that case officer O was to arrive in Washington at 1810 that day.

The file contains no outgoing cable to Paris on November 23 or any other time telling Paris to break contact with Amlash.**

On 25 November, a contact report was prepared. There is reason to question the authenticity of this document which is three pages and reports the 22 November meeting with Amlash. The first two pages have dark type as though prepared on a typewriter with a new ribbon. The type on the third page is much lighter as though prepared on a typewriter with an old ribbon. It made no mention of the passing of a poison pen to Amlash.

On November 27, Pari 1669 to DIR reports information obtained in October possibly by clandestinely listening devices. A source complained bitterly about official (Cuban) visitors to Paris and how they denigrate the revolution. The source said she wished she had a concealed tape recorder to record these conversations. She named Amlash as one of these visitors.

---

* Desmond Fitzgerald

** In its 1967 report, the IG stated such a message had been sent but could not be found.

On 3 December, Headquarters furnished JMWAVE some details on the Amlash meeting including the fact that he had been promised "full U.S. support if he is successful in a real coup against the Castro regime." He was also promised arms which will have to be furnished through JMWAVE's operations.

A series of confusing cables passed between Headquarters and JMWAVE on December 6, 7, and 8. Apparently, Headquarters first gave JMWAVE authority to drop a cache of arms in Cuba. Then Headquarters called off the operation. In DIR 87615 of 7 December, it is noted "major top level Cuban/Caribbean policy review scheduled early next week which should provide basis for decision."

JMWAVE complained about the change in orders in a cable of 8 December. JMWAVE 8702 pointed out that one Headquarter's message indicated December infiltration operations were approved by higher authority but a second message indicated a scheduled operation should be delayed and not run in December.

Headquarters responded in DIR 87880. Headquarters procedure was to present infiltration operation plans to "higher authority" even though there is a reasonable chance operation may be postponed or delayed as was case with the scheduled operation. "This procedure will secure approval for the operation with only telephonic reconfirmation needed when previously relaxed operation finally mounted." Headquarters recommended delay until January after considering and equating objectives against risk factors for Amlash and others. "Believe by January, CIA should be in position better evaluate status of internal assets."

By Pari 1914 of 13 December, Paris reported that Amlash left Paris for Prague on November 27 but did not seek recontact with case officer. DIR 90966 to JMWAVE of 23 December reported that Havana radio on 2 December stated Amlash arrived Cuba on 1 December.

The last document in Amlash's file for the period ending December 1963, is a long report on Amlash, but it does not contain information relevant to the October-November activities. Nevertheless, in red pen on the cover page appears: "Dec 1963 Not to leave this office on Nestor's (Sanchez) orders." followed by initials that appear to be "GM."

One later document in the Amlash file contains more information about the November 22, 1963 meeting. That document, a rough draft of a biographical information sheet on Amlash (no final draft was found) appears to have been prepared in 1966 at the time of Amlash's arrest for a later plot against Castro. It states: "22 Nov. 63 Mr. Fitzgerald and Mr. Sanchez assured subject that this Agency would give him everything he needed (telescopic sight, silencer, all the money he wanted). The situation changed when Mr. Sanchez and Mr. Fitzgerald left the meeting to discover that President Kennedy had been assassinated. Because of this fact, plans with subject changed and it was decided that this

Agency could have no part in the assassination of a government leader (including Castro) and it would not aid subject in his attempt. This included the following. "We would not furnish the silencer, nor scope nor any money for direct assassination; furthermore, we would not lift a finger to help subject escape from Cuba should he assassinate Castro."

The same document states this message was communicated to Amlash in November 1964 by Mr. Sanchez.

Despite this decision, the CIA in fact continued to assist Amlash through a cut-out until Amlash's arrest in 1966.

Later documents on Amlash are also relevant to the September-November 1963 Amlash operation. Several such documents report information received to the effect that Fidel Castro had long been aware of Amlash's plots against him. For example, Amlash's one time Cuban mistress was believed to be working for Cuban intelligence and her brother was known to be with Cuban intelligence. Pari 8242 to DIR in December 1964 warns that Amlash's objective may be known to too many Cubans. And, one CIA informant reported in 1966 on one known double agent of Cuban intelligence working for CIA and said the CIA's Cuban operations had been penetrated at a high level by Cuban intelligence. He identified this latter individual only as one of the Cuban exiles who was knowledgeable of a number of the most important operations. Nevertheless, Amlash's file contains nothing to indicate any detailed analysis of these possible penetrations of the CIA's Amlash operation, although a cryptic handwritten note on at least one report rejects the suggestion that Amlash was himself reporting to Castro.

One other document bears on the testimony Amlash's case officers gave before the Select Committee to the effect that Amlash was given a poison pen for self-protection. That document reports that Amlash, and other Cuban officials in Paris in 1963, were carrying pistols for self-protection throughout their travel in Europe.

Finally, although the staff has not reviewed all possible CIA files to determine what other operations Castro might have been referring to in his September 7 statement, the Amlash file indicates that some coastal landings of supplies in August were the only other CIA operations conducted against Cuba in this time period.

Scenario for B-9

This doctrine is based on the proposition that the decision has been reached that the U.S. cannot live with a Castro/communist regime in Cuba which continues its present course of subversion and aggression in Latin America and that we are determined to take appropriate action to put an end to these acts.

1. In the Venezuelan arms cache case now before the OAS hold out for a "blank check" resolution. Settle for a 13 vote majority regardless of Mexican, Brazilian, or Chilean support.

2. If, despite 1. above, OAS waters down resolution, vote against the watered-down version.

3. If "blank check" resolution passed, proceed to 5. below.

4. If watered-down resolution passed over our protest, announce publicly that OAS no longer represents an adequate hemispheric safeguard and therefore that the United States must unilaterally declare (see 5. below).

5. Declare publicly that further aggression and subversion by Castro in Latin America would be intolerable to the United States and, in the event of a new act on the part of Castro of the nature and magnitude of the Venezuelan

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

arms cache, the U.S. will take such measures against the Castro/communist regime in Cuba as it deems appropriate in the circumstances.

6. Explain carefully through diplomatic channels to the Soviet Union that the United States finds the present behavior of the Castro/communist regime in Cuba intolerable, that Cuba's activities in Venezuela prove this to be so and that further acts of violence of comparable danger or potential danger on the part of Cuba will cause the U.S. to feel no longer bound by any inhibitions against invasion or other appropriate action. Urge the Soviet Union, in order to reduce tensions in the Caribbean and permit the U.S. to live peacefully with the Castro/communist regime in Cuba, to assure that Cuba is restrained from repeating its dangerous practices. Make it plain to the Soviet Union that further behavior of this sort by Castro will compel the U.S. to adopt drastic measures. Point out to the Soviet Union the physical vulnerability of Cuba as well as the effect a failure to resolve the Cuban problem will have on the traditional policy which the U.S. has pursued of not exerting pressures upon the Soviets' European satellites. Make it plain that the U.S. desires peace in the Caribbean and expects the Soviet Union to achieve good behavior on the part of Castro.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

7. Decide upon the type of action on the part of Castro which would trigger action on the part of the U.S. A rule of thumb could be: such action as would represent serious, realized or potential, danger to the stability of a Latin American state. By this criterion 20 Castro-trained men and four tons of arms introduced into northeast Brazil might not constitute a trigger, whereas the same effort by Castro in a Central American country might. The judgment can be unilateral and subjective on the part of the U.S.

8. Formulate a program for a post-Castro Cuba giving full weight to the real changes which have taken place there during the past five years and full recognition to the need for channeling Castro's unfinished revolution into constructive lines.

The above scenario should not be commenced unless it is recognized that, although these actions are primarily designed to deter Castro from his present course, he may very well persevere in his policy. Under such circumstances the U.S., having publicly embarked on the doctrine, cannot then withdraw from the consequences.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Probably feasible within OAS.	a. Does not attack principal problem of Castro's subversion in Latin America.
b. Surveillance completely legal and low noise level.	b. Castro may return to policy of non-shipment of arms.
	c. Probably will not result in apprehending arms carriers.
	d. Expensive.

6. In addition to actions in 3., 4. and 5. above, engage in soft sabotage operations by supporting "autonomous" exile groups and continue to encourage internal acts of sabotage by means of radio, press and leaflet campaigns.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Some economic advantages and limited encouragement to anti-Castro sentiment.	a. Results commensurate with limited skills of exile groups.
b. Deniability by U.S. as U.S. soil and personnel not used.	b. Though fact of U.S. support carefully guarded, Castro will blame U.S. anyway.
	c. Some noise level.

7. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5. and 6. above, engage in soft sabotage operations employing CIA-controlled Cuban groups against selected targets and at spaced intervals.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. More professional operations that are targetted and controlled.	a. Constant danger of proof of U.S. involvement.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

b. Improvement of morale among internal anti-Castro elements. Better domestic political position as result of increased noise level.	b. Continued exacerbation of Castro without chance of delivering a mortal blow.

8. In addition to actions in 3., 4., 5., 6. and 7. above, relax the present policy banning independent Cuban exile maritime raids and air strikes against Cuba from U.S. territory.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improvement of exile morale and internal resistance spirit.	a. General ineffectiveness against targets.
	b. Obvious employment of U.S. soil.
	c. Air strikes however ineffective begin to arouse Soviet response.

B. Can't Live with Castro

(It is assumed that maximum intelligence collection will be continued.)

1. Engage in CIA-controlled as well as "autonomous" covert sabotage actions against larger economic impact but higher risk targets such as Santiago refinery, Matanzas power plant, etc., employing Cuban personnel only.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. This essentially minimum plan evolved June 1963, but never permitted to develop, having some chance to overthrow Castro.	a. High risk of capture and exposure.
b. Measurable economic impact and strong encouragement to anti-Castro elements.	b. High noise level.
	c. Possibility of some Soviet response.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

2. Institute an economic denial program based upon the establishment of a "Proclaimed List" under the Trading with the Enemy Act together with all other feasible actions, overt and covert, to deny to Cuba items critical to its economy.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Considerable increase in Cuba's difficulty in procuring key imports.	a. Multiplication of U.S. problems with major allies including possible loss of allies' support of U.S. dollar.
b. U.S. obviously "doing something about Castro."	b. Loss of trade.
	c. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

3. Engage in sabotage operations as in B.1. above using not only Cuban but other nationalities including U.S. soldier of fortune teams.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Improved operations and greater economic damage.	a. Technical deniability only and very high noise level.
	b. Will not assure overthrow of Castro.

4. Engage in violent large-scale non-deniable sabotage activities, using U.S. service personnel where necessary, such as mining Cuban harbors, attacking Cuban shipping on the high seas and in the harbors using drone surface craft, sneak air attacks on key installations, etc.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Much more effective operations and real economic damage.	a. No deniability.
	b. Very high noise level.
	c. If does not result rapidly in fall of Castro, will result in Bay of Pigs type of criticism.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

5. U.S. unilateral close-in quarantine of Cuban shipping, ostensibly for the purpose of preventing export of arms to Latin America with the aim of humiliating and degrading Castro.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Proof of U.S. intention to stop Castro.	a. Will probably not catch contraband. b. If vigorously pursued against all Cuban shipping, may provoke Soviet response. c. Very expensive without assuring fall of Castro.

6. Cutoff of all communications (except radio) into and out of Cuba including a clandestine cutting of the Jamaica cable.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will at least for a period disrupt Cuba's diplomatic and economic offensive and hinder subversive efforts.	a. Considerable outcry from Europe and Latin America. b. Not fatal to Fidel.

7. A Presidential public declaration making clear that the U.S. considers the continued presence of the Castro regime as intolerable, barring any rapprochement with it and encouraging anti-Castro/communist dissident elements within the Cuban armed forces to carry out a coup.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Very effective inside Cuba and encouraging to Latin America.	Must be followed by some form of effective action.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

8. An official declaration that should Castro engage in certain specified proscribed actions the U.S. will in each instance destroy a major installation inside Cuba (the "Rostow Doctrine").

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. May force Castro to stop his subversive actions.	a. May provoke Soviet response either before or after retaliatory action taken.
b. Whether retaliation by the U.S. is required or not, it will have profound effect on anti-Castro morale.	b. Difficulty in pinning down clear-cut violations by Castro.
	c. Difficulty in avoiding civilian casualties.

9. Announce publicly and inform the Soviet Union through high level diplomatic channels that further subversion by Castro in Latin America is intolerable and that if Castro persists in his present course the United States will no longer feel bound by any inhibitions against invasion of Cuba and will take such measures as it deems appropriate. See Annex A.

Advantages	Disadvantages
a. Proper basis for future actions.	a. Difficulty of clear proof.
b. Possible deterrence of Castro.	b. Possible Soviet reactions.
c. Best method of minimizing Soviet reaction.	

10. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, impose a total blockade of Cuba.

Advantages	Disadvantages
The most effective method of bringing down Castro.	Possible Soviet reactions.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

11. After having established the appropriate basis for such action, invade Cuba.

Advantages	Disadvantages
Will bring down Castro.	a. Possible Soviet reaction.
	b. Probable heavy casualties on both sides.
	c. Increased difficulties in post-Castro Cuba.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

to a mimeo machine to prepare public material if you are going to operate. A good typewriter is essential and above all people that will carry out the million and one mechanical functions necessary to make it a going operation.

Note: when you contact people by mail we recommend that only first class be used and that no full name go on the return address on the outside of the envelope. You will notice how we work our's here on the national level. Many people will respond better with this type of protection against nutty neighbors and over curious postment. These may sound like small things to you, but I can assure you that we have gone through thi a thousand and more time the length and breadth of the country and have learned a great deal over the last three years through some bitter experience.

Naturally, I would like to communicate with you a great deal more concerning yourself so that we can get to know you and possibly be of some assistence to you as we get more information.

We hope to hear from you very soon in this regard and are looking forward to a good working relationship for the future. Please fell free to discuss this matter quite thoroughly with me.

Fraternally,

V. T. Lee

V. T. Lee,
National Director.

V.T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

4

21 February 1964

SPECTRUM OF COURSES OF ACTION WITH RESPECT TO CUBA

Accepting as valid the Attorney General's statement that there is no point in discussing courses of action with respect to Cuba until the fundamental decision is made as to whether or not it is possible for the United States to live with Castro, the following possible courses of action are listed under the headings "Can Live with Castro" and "Can't Live with Castro." Neither of these headings is absolute; the courses of action listed under each are indicative of degrees of acceptability of the Castro regime or conversely the urgency to overthrow it.

COURSES OF ACTION

A. Can Live with Castro

1. Negotiate a detente with Fidel looking towards full recognition of his regime and unlimited trade between the United States and Cuba. The negotiator of the detente would endeavor to secure from Castro commitments not to engage in subversive activities in Latin America and not to engage in polemics against the United States. He would also endeavor to reduce or eliminate, as a result of our concessions, Soviet presence in Cuba and reduce the Cuban military machine to one compatible with the requirements of a peaceful Latin American island republic.

No covert activities would be undertaken and intelligence operations would be of a nature compatible with our relations with a neutral power.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Advantages	Disadvantages
If the plan works, this would represent a satisfactory solution of the Cuban problem, especially if the Soviet presence could thereby be eliminated.	a. As plan almost sure not to work, it would have grave consequences throughout Latin America as well as serious domestic political repercussions.
	b. Even if plan ultimately successful there would be short term domestic political losses and short term weakening U.S. position in Latin America.

2. Do nothing. No specific efforts will be made to arrange a rapprochement with Fidel but we would remain receptive to any advances made by him. No covert operations would be undertaken and intelligence operations would not include black maritime operations into Cuba. It would be hoped that Fidel, recognizing the good faith and good will of the new Administration, would make his own advances leading towards a satisfactory detente.

Advantages	Disadvantages
As in 1. above.	a. As in 1. above but less short term domestic and Latin American losses.
	b. Even less chance of success.

3. The present level of intelligence operations, including U-2 overflights would be continued. Black maritime infiltrations and exfiltrations of agents and caches of intelligence gear would continue but no action operations would be conducted. We would be "keeping an eye on" Fidel both in Cuba and abroad but would be making no effort to hinder his internal development.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Maximum effort would be made to increase the countersubversion capabilities of Fidel's foreign target countries.

Advantages	Disadvantages
We would be maintaining a clean hands attitude towards Castro and our policy would be more compatible with that of our major allies.	a. Evidence of American inaction would be domestically assailable, would be quickly sensed by Latin American countries and would further demoralize the exile community. b. We would be in effect helping Castro to consolidate his position at home and establish his image abroad.

4. In addition to intelligence collection as in 3., we would engage in a "persuasive" economic denial program employing diplomatic efforts and the cooperation of U.S. corporations. Covert subtle sabotage against selected Cuban imports (e.g. contamination of lubricant additives).

Advantages	Disadvantages
A carefully targetted denial program with effective subtle sabotage is capable of at least disrupting the timing of Castro's economic efforts. It may have a measurable effect on Cuba's one domestic source of economic strength - sugar.	We will remain at odds with our allies on Cuba trade. We may delay but not prevent Castro's progress.

5. In addition to actions in 3. and 4. above, engage in surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft carrying Cuban arms shipments by means of bilateral agreements with individual countries in Latin America, such surveillance to be accomplished without the use of force in international waters and the use of force in national waters.

SECRET

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Exhibit No. 3 to
deposition of V.T. Lee
4/17/64 at New York,
N.Y. (Substituted
for copy on 5/14/64)
WDC
[illegible]

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

799 BROADWAY NEW YORK 3, N. Y. ORegon 4-8295

May 29, 1963

Lee H. Oswald
4907 L/C Magazine Street
New Orleans, Louisiana

Dear Friend:

Thank you for your prompt reply. Enclosed are your card and receipt, along with our thanks and welcome.

Your interest in helping to form an FPCC Chapter in New Orleans is gratefully received. I shall try to give you some basic information now so that you may have a better picture of what this entails.

For one thing, I am enclosing a copy of our Constitution and By-Laws for all Chapters and Student Councils. You will note that there is considerable autonomy for an organization our size. We try and let all Chapters operate according to the local requirements. Naturally, there a minimul regulations which must be met.

(All Chapters can receive literature in bulk at a discounted rate and resell at the retail price and use the proceeds for further Chapter activities.) Credit is extended and payment is not required with the order. We do expect payment within a reasonable period so that we may continue our end of the operation.

It would be hard to concieve of a chapter with as few members as seem to exist in the New Orleans area. I have just gone through our files and find that Lousiana seems somewhat restricted for Fair Play activities. However, with what is there perhaps you could build a larger group if a few people would undertake the disciplined responsibility of concrete organizational work.

We certainly are not at all adverse to a very small Chapter but certainly would expect that there would be at least twice the amount needed to conduct a legal executive board for the Chapter. Should this be reasonable we could readily issue a charter fo

V.T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3

No. 3 To
of V.T.L.
at New York
(Substituted
copy on 5/14/64)
WJL

29, 1963

receipt, along

Orleans is gratefully
so that you may have

and By-Laws for all
considerable autonomy
operate according to the
which must be met.
rate and resell at
activities.) Credit is
payment within a
operation.
few members as seem to exist
files and find that Lousiana
ever, with what is there
would undertake the disciplined

Chapter but certainly would
ded to conduct a legal executive
ld readily issue a charter for

No. 3

---

a New Orleans Chapter of FPCC. In fact, we would be very, very pleased to see this take place and would like to do everything possible to assist in bringing it about. We feel that the south-east is a very difficult area to work because of our lack of contacts. Our only southeastern Chapter right now is that in Tampa, Florida which I originally organized before coming up to work in the National Office.

I for one am convinced of the possibility of such an enterprise but know from experience that it is quite a problem and requires some sacrifice on the part of those involved.

You must realize that you will come under tremendous pressures with any attempt to do FPCC work in that area and that you will not be able to operate in the manner which is conventional here in the north-east. Even most of our big city Chapters have been forced to abandon the idea of operating an office in public. The national office here in New York is the only one in the country today and the New York City Chapter uses our office too so it is the only Chapter with an office. Most Chapters have discovered that it is easier to operate semi-privately out of a home and maintain a P.O. Box for all mailings and public notices. ((A P.O. Box is a must for any Chapter in the organization to guarnatee the continued contact with the national even if an individual should move or drop out.)) We do have a serious and often violent opposition and this proceedure helps prevent many unnecessary incidents which frighten away prospective supporters. I definitely would not recommend an office, at least not one that will be easily identifyable to the lunatic fringe in your community. Certainly, I would not recommend that you engage in one at the very beginning but wait and see how you can operate in the community through several public experiences.

We will be able to give you some assistence from here, but not much. It is up to the local Chapters to handle their own affairs. You shaould have at least access

V. T. Lee Exhibit 3

LEE (VINCENT T.) EXHIBIT No. 3—Continued

~~SECRET~~

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Deputy Director (Plans)
Cost of Cuban Operations
Fiscal Years 1960 - 1964

Fiscal Year	Support[a]	Covert[b] Collection	Covert Action[c]			Total
			PA/Prop[d]	Paramilitary[e]	Post-Invasion[f] Brigade Support	
1960	$319,534	$131,063	$1,677,161	$318,409	-	$2,446,167
1961	6,293,580	457,633	5,168,584	30,164,698	$1,627,824	43,712,319
1962	3,599,274	793,824[g]	6,444,098	2,975,635	4,176,000	17,988,831
1963	5,343,973	1,738,977[g]	5,786,797	5,038,880	3,899,830	21,808,457
1964 (est.)	5,030,000	1,767,500	3,520,000	9,317,500[h]	565,000	20,200,000
Total	20,586,361	4,888,997	22,596,640	47,815,122	10,268,654	106,155,774

---

a/ Support: Includes staff salaries, purchase of administrative equipment and supplies, rental of administrative properties and facilities, etc.

b/ Covert Collection: Includes foreign intelligence collection operations and counter-intelligence operations involving the use of classic agent operations, audio and other technical devices, use of third-country intelligence and security services, refugee debriefings, etc.

c/ Covert Action: Includes the broad field of psychological warfare and paramilitary activities encompassed by NSC 5412.

d/ PA/Prop: Includes political action and propaganda operations involving the use of newspapers, magazines, other publications, radio, television, etc.

e/ Paramilitary: Includes maritime operations, air operations, training, military hardware, the formation, development, and dispatch of groups in paramilitary operations.

f/ Brigade Support: Includes payments to dependents of Brigade 2506 wounded, missing, or killed in action, medical and rehabilitation costs of released Brigade members, direct payments to Brigade members, etc.

g/ Includes a total of $345,000 for the operation of the inter-Agency Caribbean Admissions Center at Opa Locka, Florida: $95,000 for fiscal year 1962 and $250,000 for fiscal year 1963.

h/ Includes $5,000,000 for support of autonomous Cuban groups under the covert program approved in June 1963.

15 December 1963

~~SECRET~~

Lyndon B. Johnson Library Copy

TAB C

ROUP 1
from automatio
'g and
.cation

This document con[illegible] of [illegible] pages
No. 7 of 9 Copies, Series A

3

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

About 1/25/64

See page 117.12

REVIEW OF CURRENT PROGRAM OF COVERT ACTION AGAINST CUBA

I. - The Current Situation in Cuba

During 1963 the situation in Cuba steadily worsened. The economy continued its decline and Castro was not able to halt the downward curve. Hurricane Flora intensified Cuba's economic problems. Disillusionment and apathy among the great majority of the population continued to grow, and enthusiasm was increasingly restricted to a hard core. As popular support waned, coercion and terror were employed more and more to maintain the regime's control. Castro's drive to convert Cuba into a standard communist prototype caused increasing disillusionment among his original followers. His stature in the eyes of many Cubans and Latin Americans suffered with the realization, in the aftermath of the October missile crisis, that Cuba had been a pawn and Castro a dupe of Soviet policy.

Despite extraordinary efforts, Castro has not been able to stop acts of defiance against his regime. Guerrilla activity, although scattered and uncoordinated, continues. Spontaneous acts of sabotage are common throughout the island. At great risk refugees still elude his security forces and sea patrols to escape from Cuba. In this atmosphere, externally mounted raids against Cuban targets have added to Castro's sense of frustration and helped sustain hope among the many Cubans disillusioned with his regime.

During 1963 Cuba's international situation seemed almost as bad as the domestic. Although chinks appeared in the wall, the U.S. policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba was holding up fairly well. Soviet-Cuban relations clearly were under strain. Castro scored no foreign policy victories to provide a much needed psychological boost. His major effort to stimulate Castro-type armed uprisings throughout Latin America failed to disrupt the Venezuelan elections of December and netted a potentially embarrassing exposure that Cuba had shipped arms clandestinely to Venezuela. These internal and international trends and developments brought Cuba to a low point during 1963.

Within the past few weeks, however, five developments have given the Castro regime an important political-psychological

lift

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

lift. They are:

1. The realization in the Cuban Government that the continuing high sugar prices in the world market have enabled Cuba to expand its convertible currency reserves from about $20 million to almost $100 million during the year.

2. The Soviet-Cuban trade protocol for 1964, signed on January 11, and the Khrushchevassurances of January 22, demonstrated a Soviet willingness to maintain its aid and trade program at a very substantial level and to support Cuban sugar prices. The protocol calls for Cuban-Soviet trade to increase by 22 per cent over 1963. Soviet exports, about 40 per cent of which will be on credit, will increase by at least 10 per cent.

3. The distinct possibility that the United States policy of economic and diplomatic isolation of Cuba may not be able to stand in the face of increasing pressures from Western countries to expand trade with Cuba, extending credit if necessary. The British bus deal, with payment spread over a five-year period, is an important political and psychological triumph for Castro. Its erosive effects on potential Cuban suppliers are already clear,

4. The recent rioting and violence in Panama, in which Castro had some hand, will inject new revolutionary fervor into Castroite activities. In addition, Panama and its aftermath will take the play away from the incident of the Venezuela arms cache.

5. The revolt in Zanzibar, in which Castro also had a hand, is bound to impress Latin America as well as other unstable areas with the length of Fidel's arm and the potency of his doctrine.

These

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

These recent developments have provided the upward political and psychological thrust Castro's regime badly needed. He now has a firmer base for his repeated claims that Cuba has survived the full brunt of a major United States effort-to destroy the Cuban revolution, claims likely to impress many Latin Americans as well as Cubans. In addition, Castro now has the possibility of producing some tangible evidence that his regime can restore forward momentum in the economy. Consequently, the general position of the Castro regime is much improved over that of three or four months ago.

II - Current U. S. Policy and Programs

The ultimate U.S. objective is the replacement of the present government in Cuba by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States.

To attain this objective, we are trying, by exerting maximum pressure through all means short of the use of military force, to create a degree of disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba which will (a) predispose elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the overthrow of the Castro/Communist group and the elimination of the Soviet presence in Cuba; (b) weaken the base for subversion in the Hemisphere; and (c) assist in convincing the Soviets that they are backing a losing and expensive horse.

In order to create the optimum situation just described, we have been carrying out a program of integrated, mutually reinforcing and mutually dependent courses of action. These comprise:

A. The economic, political and psychological isolation of Cuba from the free world

1. Denial of free-world markets and sources of supply to Cuba: We have undertaken a variety of overt and covert activities designed to reduce free-world trade with Cuba and, especially, to deny Cuba access to commodities critical to

its

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

economy. Proposals for expanding and intensifying these activities are now being presented. The execution of these additional measures depends basically on a decision to incur the considerable political costs and risks that are entailed.

2. The reduction of free-world shipping in the Cuba trade: We have maintained diplomatic pressure on free-world nations to reduce and eventually eliminate their ships in the Cuba trade. We have denied U.S. financed cargoes in U.S. ports to ships in the Cuba trade (NSAM 220, as amended). To the same general end, we have employed existing legislation, and the threat of additional legislation, restricting economic and military assistance to countries with ships in the Cuba trade.

3. The reduction of free world, and the containment of Soviet Bloc, air service to Cuba: We have maintained diplomatic pressures on free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air service to Cuba. We are invoking recent legislation denying assistance to countries whose ships and aircraft carry commodities to and from Cuba. In addition, we have exerted diplomatic pressures on free-world countries to deny their facilities to Soviet Bloc and Cuban airlines serving or trying to serve Cuba, or harass such airlines.

4. The limitation of free-world diplomatic relations with Cuba: As opportunity has offered, we have exerted pressure to persuade free-world countries to break diplomatic relations with Cuba or to prevent the establishment of such relations with Cuba.

5. Efforts to undermine the Castro image abroad and to frustrate Cuban attempts to enhance that image: By means of diplomatic, propaganda and covert measures we have endeavored to demonstrate the weakness, failures and betrayals of the Castro regime.

~~SECRET-SENSITIVE~~

B.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

B. Defense against Castro-Communist Subversion

1. Within Cuba: As indicated above, all our efforts to bring about disorganization, uncertainty and discontent in Cuba are intended to weaken the Cuban base for Castro/Communist subversion.

2. Outside Cuba:

a. Multilateral: We have sought, through the OAS, to obtain general Latin American recognition of the seriousness of the subversive threat and approval of recommendations of measures to limit travel to and from Cuba, and the transfer of funds and propaganda. At the present time, we intend to expand and intensify this effort through actions to be taken by the OAS on the basis of the Venezuelan complaint against Cuba. Beyond the activities in the OAS, we have made special efforts with the Central American countries and Panama to have them tighten controls on the activities and movement of subversives, to develop inland and inshore surveillance capabilities, to create effective intelligence organizations and to establish a system of intelligence exchange.

b. Bilateral: Through training, material assistance and exchange of intelligence, we have worked to improve the internal security capabilities of individual countries.

c. Unilateral: In addition to multilateral and bilateral measures, we have continued to maintain our surface patrols in the vicinity of Cuba, to improve our own communications systems and to develop our own intelligence capabilities against subversive activities.

C.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

C. The reduction and eventual elimination of the Soviet military presence in Cuba

We have maintained diplomatic pressure on the Soviets to continue troop withdrawals and we have warned the Soviets that we will not tolerate the use of Soviet forces in Cuba to suppress popular uprising.

D. The collection of intelligence

We have maintained and improved our overt and covert collection of intelligence to meet not only U.S. strategic requirements but also operational requirements connected with our covert activities within Cuba. We have maintained periodic high-level overflights supplemented on a few occasions by low-level flights. We have warned the Soviets and Cubans against interference with these flights.

E. Covert operations to weaken and undermine the Castro Regime

A detailed discussion of the covert elements of our program appears in Section III.

****

As stated above, all these courses of action interact and are interdependent. For example, our covert economic denial operations are designed to reinforce and be reinforced by our overt measures of economic pressure. Both types of activities directed against the economy are intended to aggravate existing economic difficulties and thus to increase the level of disaffection not only in the popular mass but particularly in the power centers of the regime. This disaffection enhances our ability to establish meaningful contact with figures in the military and other power centers and to develop intelligence sources. This disaffection is in turn intensified by the evidence of vulnerability to outside attacks provided by the success of covert sabotage and harassment activities.

By

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

By the same token, the failure or elimination of one of these mutually supporting courses of action jeopardizes the others and thus compromises the entire program.

Through 1963, these courses of action were having a measurable positive impact. We are now confronted, however, by a series of developments, described in Section I, which threaten to arrest or even reverse our forward movement. The situation is particularly acute with respect to the maintenance of our economic pressures. This fact makes this review of our covert operations particularly timely and important.

III. Concept of the Covert Action Program

The CIA covert action program aims at maintaining all feasible pressures on Cuba and at creating and exploiting situations in Cuba calculated to stimulate dissident elements within the regime, particularly in the armed forces, to carry out a coup. The objective of the coup would be to remove the Castro/Communists from the regime and to eliminate the entire Soviet presence from Cuba. Recognizing that the U.S. is engaged in a race against time with Cuba and its Soviet ally to obstruct the consolidation of Castro's regime at home and to prevent him from achieving his ambitions in Latin America, we set the time frame for this program at about eighteen months from June 1963.

As originally conceived and approved in June 1963, the covert action program was based on the assumption that U.S. policy precludes a military invasion or a full blockade of Cuba which could lead to a confrontation with the Soviet Union. In addition, the covert action program was and is predicated on the thesis that its chance of success would depend heavily on a sustained and intensive effort in other sectors, particularly the overt economic denial and political isolation programs, by all elements of the United States Government. Thus, the inter-action of the overt and covert effort against Cuba is regarded as a vital and irreplaceable factor if there is to be any hope of accomplishing the overall mission.

CIA's

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

CIA's integrated covert action program consists of the following interdependent courses of action:

1. Covert collection of intelligence to meet U.S. national security requirements and to support current and planned covert operations. It should be noted that clandestine maritime operations are an integral part of intelligence collection.

2. Propaganda actions to stimulate low-risk simple sabotage and other forms of active and passive resistance against the regime.

3. Economic denial actions in support of government-wide overt official U.S. economic isolation measures.

4. Exploitation and stimulation of disaffection in the Cuban armed forces and other power centers of the regime to encourage these elements to carry out a coup against the Castro/Communist factions. CIA is identifying, contacting and attempting to establish channels of communication with these individuals.

5. General sabotage and harassment as an economic weapon and as a stimulus to internal resistance. As an economic weapon, it is designed to supplement and support the overall economic denial program by damaging economically important installations and to add to Castro's economic problems by forcing him to divert money, manpower and resources from economic to internal security activities. As a stimulus to resistance, sabotage and physical harassment operations provide visible and dramatic evidence of the existence and capability of organized resistance against the regime. To the extent that these operations are successful, they also demonstrate to the Cuban population and elite groups the vulnerability of the regime to militant action. It is recognized that no single act of sabotage by itself can materially affect the economy or stimulate resistance, but we believe that the

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

that the cumulative psychological and political impact within Cuba of sustained sabotage operations is a necessary element in the accomplishment of our mission.

6. Support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban exile groups. These operations are intended to provide a deniable activity, a means of supplementing and expanding our covert capability and a means of taking advantage of untapped political and resistance resources of the exile community. The program now includes two autonomous groups whose credibility as to autonomy is strengthened by the facts that:

They are led by men whose prominence and status in the Cuban exile community makes plausible their access to funds, equipment and manpower quite independent of the U.S.;

Both are based in the Caribbean area outside of U.S. territory;

Both have natural, willing allies in power in several Latin American countries;

Both are Cuban and employ Cuban nationals exclusively;

Every item of financial and logistic support has been handled in a manner as to provide maximum protection against proof of CIA or U.S. participation.

The initial aim of these operations is to strengthen the will to resist by increasing the tempo of subversion and sabotage largely maintained until now by CIA; the eventual aim is to take the fight from the coastline to the interior of Cuba.

The disadvantage of our autonomous operations is that it is necessary to accept a lower order of efficiency and control than would be considered acceptable in CIA-run operations.

Of

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Of the foregoing inter-locking courses of action, items (1) and (2) are in train and no policy problems regarding them are expected. Item (3) is the subject of another paper which is being presented for concurrent consideration. Item (4) is the essence of our program and is dependent for its success on the results of all other overt and covert courses of action. Item (5) has been the subject of continual review since the inception of the program and is the primary subject of this paper. Consideration of Item (6) (autonomous operations) should take place with a discussion of sabotage and harassment (Item 5). These latter two items are discussed in more detail in Section V below.

IV. The Sabotage Program in Retrospect

We know of at least 80 acts of internal sabotage and 60 armed clashes between Cuban security forces and insurgents since 1 June. Insurgency and sabotage inside Cuba are not part of a coordinated program; they are acts of individual or small group defiance. They are stimulated by many factors, and no one factor can be assigned entire credit. Sabotage incidents, which include a high proportion of sugar cane burnings, have a tendency to be seasonal, a fact which further obscures statistical analysis. Although it is true that from a low point in sabotage incidents during the summer of 1963 there was a heavy increase during the fall (following the commencement of our raiding activity), we believe that clearer light is shed on the effects of our harassment program by the statements of witnesses of varying points of view within Cuba and by the acts of the Cuban regime itself.

Since 1 August 1963, five sabotage raids have been attempted.[1] All were successful. There was substantial damage to the target; all participants were safely recovered and the plausible deniability of the operations was not compromised.

The lack

---

[1] Annex I contains a brief review of these operations.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

The lack of proof of U.S. involvement did not prevent Castro from charging the CIA with responsibility. Indeed, almost every act of defiance against his regime has been credited to the Agency.

Castro's emotional reactions to real or rumored security threats point up his acute sensitivity to internal resistance and suggests that he feels his regime to be far from secure from external threats. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, has reacted to the sabotage raids with much less vigor and bluster than we anticipated. Their only sharp reaction, aside from the expected propaganda, followed a series of air raids during August and September sponsored by Cuban exile groups operating from Florida and for which the Agency had no responsibility. They did no real damage, but they did demonstrate that the Cuban air defense system could be breached, and they added substantially to the psychological impact of our first two raids.

The Agency sabotage raids produced some very specific results. For example, in the political and psychological realm, Canadian Ambassador Kidd reported in late August that the incidents that month, including the Santa Lucia and Casilda operations "disturbed the feeling of consolidation and tranquility which the Castro regime had succeeded in creating in recent months." He reported that the Cubans were uncertain and apprehensive over the possibility of a U.S. campaign of subversion and sabotage because of Cuba's vulnerability to such a campaign due to the "low ebb" of enthusiasm for the Castro regime among the people. He also stated that the raids had "raised hopes of those opposed to the regime" and that "dispirited opposition had received a fillip to its morale."

In a September report, Ambassador Kidd stated that the "most immediate effect of such attacks is the psychological blow dealt to the stability of the Castro regime with consequent boost in opposition." Low morale and dejection in the counterrevolutionary ranks of some months

ago,

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

ago, he said, "has given way to a wave of optimism that the Maximum Leader is no longer necessarily a permanent fixture." Ambassador Kidd also reported that Che Guevarra had indicated concern that the raids would divert much needed manpower and resources from the economic to the military sector.

On 4 September a reliable clandestine source in Cuba reported that the reaction of the average man on the street in Havana to the news of the attacks on Casilda and Santa Lucia was "astounding." Prior to the Cuban government's announcement of the raids, the average man on the street seemed apathetic, depressed and in a low state of morale. Following the announcement their mood changed to one of pleasure, joy, and hope. The observations of this source were reinforced by the statements of Cuban refugees who arrived in the U.S. shortly after the Cuban announcement of the raids.

A former Major in the Cuban Rebel Army who broke with Castro reported after his exfiltration from Cuba in January 1964 that the 23 December Siguanea raid which destroyed a P-6 patrol boat was a great boost to morale among disaffected Cubans.

A Cuban lawyer with extensive connections among Cuban government officials and in the Western community in Havana has just reported that the "morale effects of the recent sabotage operations are good among anti-regime segments of the population. Such acts, to them, indicate that the outside world is not forgetting the Cuban people, that the fight continues and suggests a possible prelude to some military action against Castro. Opposite morale effects are noted among the pro-regime segments who have tended to remain notably quiet about the regime after successful sabotage operations."

A Cuban communications technician employed by the Cuban government reported on 1 January that the "act of sabotage against the torpedo boat on the Isle of Pines was very successful in the opinion of the people and, for sure, public opinion needed something to stimulate it. What happened at La Siguanea had such an effect. Although at times failures are suffered which depress the people, they are anxious for something to happen."

The

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

The raids also had an impact on the Cuban military and security forces. Certain areas and ports were placed on special alert status. Forces are often rushed to defensive positions; ground, naval, and air patrols are frequently launched or intensified; and defensive positions in industrial or agricultural complexes are manned to meet the real or imagined threats. The raids interfere not only with routine military training but also with work on construction and agricultural projects which use military personnel. Raul Castro personally investigated the Siguanea incident.

In addition, Castro expanded his coast watching network from 46 observation posts at the end of June to 103 at the end of October. These posts have radio communications and are manned by 10 to 25 full-time personnel. In a further effort to seal Cuba's shores, at least 10 surface search radar stations have been established since June, and we have evidence tentatively identifying 7 more.

Castro's fear of rising dissidence and insurgency is reflected in his initiation of a wide variety of repressive measures. Many are bound to have adverse political, psychological or economic repercussions inside Cuba. He has conducted almost constant anti-insurgent operations involving units of up to 2,500 men. Air, naval and ground force elements have been put on special alert, either on a local or island-wide basis, on at least 36 occasions during 1963 as a result of rumored or actual maritime operations. Residents in areas of guerrilla activity have been forcibly relocated, and restrictions have been placed on transportation in suspect areas. In August 1963 a new internal security force, the Lucha Contra Piratas, was formed to attempt to cope with off-shore raiding parties. In September new training courses were initiated for command cadres of "popular defense units." The purpose of these units is to organize the people to defend themselves against enemy attack and to protect industrial centers and installations from sabotage.

Despite these measures to increase Cuba's defensive capability against raids, we have continued to improve our own infiltration techniques and are still able to penetrate

Cuba's

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Cuba's defenses with good regularity. Raiding operations of this sort, however, always present risk and we must assume that captured Cuban agents will reveal U.S. involvement as they have done in the past giving Castro the opportunity to make vociferous propaganda against U.S. aggression. In addition, although Khrushchev has not made Agency harassing raids the subject of special protest (as he did in the case of the exile air raids in August and September), a major step-up in the frequency or scale as, for instance, an attack on a major economic target such as Matanzas or Santiago, might bring about a Soviet protest. The chance of a physical retaliation by Castro as, for instance, an attack upon a U.S. installation in the Caribbean, although unlikely, cannot be entirely discounted.

If Castro is to be brought down without overt military action the main effort will have to come from inside Cuba. We believe that there is sufficient evidence to show that sabotage raids, despite the risk involved, are a necessary stimulus to internal action which will need to be continued for a considerable period to permit the tempo of internal acts to reach a point where it can become self-sustained.

V. Impact of Cessation of Sabotage Operations

Because of the visible and dramatic nature of sabotage operations, their cessation would soon be noted by all interested parties to and observers of U.S/Cuban relations. The cessation of these raids, however, disclaimable by the U.S. the raids themselves may be, would probably be interpreted in Latin America and certainly inside Cuba as a switch of U.S. policy from one of discreet encouragement and support of aggressive action against the Castro regime to one of "coexistence" and eventual accommodation with a Castro/Communist Cuba. Without constant and visible signs of offensive action against Cuba, a weakening process would be set in motion which could well lead the countries of Latin America to draw their own conclusions from these indicators and embark on accommodation policies of their own. Those governments in Latin America already threatened by Castroites in their own countries are likely to be subjected to even stronger domestic pressures.

As this

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

As this belief spreads, Western European and other free world countries eager to trade with Cuba will come to feel that they may safely ignore and evade, to an even greater extent than they do now, U.S. appeals for the economic and political isolation of Cuba. An important additional economic effect would be the release into normal economic activity of manpower and funds now tied up in defense against raids.

Finally, and most important, this development in time is bound to have a severe demoralizing effect on the internal resistance against Castro. The Cuban exile community and particularly its militant and articulate elements would be acutely sensitive to a cessation of raids and can be expected to react vociferously. Judging from past experience, we can expect a new surge of domestic political agitation on the part of the numerous Cuban exiles who have political connections within the U.S.

In the event that it is decided to terminate CIA-controlled sabotage and harassment operations, it cannot be assumed that the autonomous groups, despite the greater deniability of their actions, could take over entirely the mission of furnishing proof of visible resistance to Castro and inspiring internal elements to take the personal risks necessary to set a coup in motion. Autonomous groups are as yet untested in their capability to conduct successful sabotage and harassment operations on a sustained basis. It is unlikely that in the next months the autonomous groups will develop the ability to match CIA-controlled operations, either in quantity or quality.

If sabotage and harassment operations were to be terminated for the autonomous groups as well as for the Agency, its support to the autonomous groups must also be terminated completely as otherwise we would not be in a position to insure that they would discontinue raids and sabotage. Such termination would compound the effects of the cessation of our own raids, particularly in those areas in the Caribbean where the autonomous groups have been most active.

VI

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

VI. The Residual Program

In the event it is decided to abandon the core of the covert program, we will be obliged to fall back on essentially overt courses of action which are already operating but which can be refined and intensified, provided the political risks and costs are judged acceptable and we receive adequate cooperation from our allies.

A. Action against free-world economic ties with Cuba

Because of the recent erosion of our efforts in this sector and the clear intention of the Cubans and Soviets to expand Cuban economic relations with the free world, a series of recommendations to intensify this course of action has been made and is now being presented. The basic issue in the recommendations is our ability and willingness to incur the political costs and risks that heightened economic pressure would involve. Even if the recommendations are adopted completely, we could have no real assurance that our attempts to curtail Cuban-free world economic ties would be successful. On the other hand, if the actions and commitments included in the recommendations are not adopted, it is a near certainty that, under present circumstances, our economic pressures will be reduced to ineffectiveness. In any case, it must be clearly recognized that no amount of economic pressure can by itself bring down the Castro government, at least as long as the Soviets are prepared to subsidize the Cuban economy. The curtailment and disruption of Cuban economic ties with the free world can only contribute, and then only over time, to the creation of the optimum situation we are trying to develop. The effectiveness of this contribution would be at least sharply impaired by the relaxation of the pressure created by covert operations. Beyond these considerations, we can never have assurance that a foreign government cooperating in the economic program will not pull out and virtually collapse the program. Entire or even important reliance on economic pressure as a substitute for the covert program would be to deliver the fate of our policy into the uncertain hands of governments which do not share our convictions and sense of priority with respect to Cuba.

B. OAS ACTION

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

B. OAS Action

As a result of the Venezuelan charges against Cuba arising from the arms cache discovery, we have been considering a series of measures which we would seek in the OAS. It should be noted that the atmosphere for OAS adoption of strong measures has deteriorated as a result of the Panamanian crisis.

The measures which we have been studying include:

1. A break in diplomatic relations

The principal effects of this measure, which would mean action by five countries, including Brazil, Chile and Mexico, would be to provide rather dramatic evidence of Castro's isolation and to deny the Cuban regime subversive facilities offered by its remaining missions in Latin America. The measure would meet heavy resistance from Mexico, Chile and particularly Brazil.

2. A break in economic relations

Although this would have little practical effect economically, it would have some utility as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba.

3. A break in air and surface communications

Over time this would lead to a reduction in the Cuban ability to move subversives to and from Latin America. It would be useful as a means of moral pressure on other free-world countries having, or wishing to establish, air services with Cuba. On the negative side it would mean the temporary loss of intelligence facilities and would have an adverse effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an existing escape route for persons inside Cuba.

4.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

4. Approval for cooperative surveillance measures against movement of arms and men

The single most damaging OAS action to Castro would be an authorization for the use of force in connection with the movement of arms and men. The chances of getting a politically acceptable majority for such one was estimated to be less than even before the events in Panama and the prospects have diminished since then. Such OAS action would almost certainly dramatize the Cuban issue domestically and internationally. At the present time, it appears that the surveillance system which might be authorized by the OAS would involve the use of force only in the territorial waters of the countries for which the offending shipments are destined. Thus the question of OAS authorization for the use of force on the high seas will not arise.

5. Condemnation of the Castro regime

This would be a pro forma action, with only limited psychological force.

6. Reaffirmation of previous OAS measures on controlling Cuban-based and supported subversion

This would be of value as a means of reinforcing a general effort in this sector (see C below). It is, however, a purely defensive measure.

****

In sum, this series of OAS measures would certainly be helpful and would constitute important multilateral progress. The actions, however, are primarily psychological and defensive.

C. Increased efforts against subversion

We can probably increase and expand our multilateral, bilateral and unilateral efforts to increase the ability of Latin America to resist subversion. Such efforts are purely defensive and external to Cuba. No certain results can be guaranteed

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

guaranteed. In any case, if the Cuban base were to be strengthened by the relaxation of covert pressures or by the weakening of economic pressures, we will be fighting against increasing odds.

D. Increased psychological and propaganda efforts

We can intensify our measures in this sector, including major policy declarations on Cuba by the President and other senior officers of the Government. The efficacy of such efforts is entirely dependent, however, upon the substance behind them. A propaganda offensive would be productive only if there were credible evidence that our words were being accompanied by successful actions in other sectors.

VII. Conclusion

The residual program set out above is substantially weaker than the present program. Accordingly, the prospects for attaining our ultimate objective of replacing the Castro/Communist regime, which have been by no means certain even under the present program, would be very measurably diminished under the residual program. The elimination of the core of the present covert program, especially if accompanied by a rejection or failure of the proposed expanded means of economic pressure, would raise in sharp terms the question of the need to examine the two basic alternatives: the use of force or accommodation.

VIII. Recommendation

That the covert program be continued in at least its present form and scope.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

Annex I

The five sabotage raids run by CIA:

1. On 18 August the POL storage tanks at Casilda, Las Villas Province were attacked using 4.2 mortars. One tank car was destroyed and one storage tank breached, causing considerable fire damage.

2. On 19 August the sulphuric acid plant at Santa Lucia, Pinar del Rio Province was attacked. There was considerable fire damage and fuel lines were broken. We have reports that acid found its way into the turbines as a result of the raid causing additional damage.

3. On 30 September a lumbermill at Bahia de Maravi, Oriente Province, a minor installation of local economic importance, was 70 per cent destroyed by a raiding party.

4. On 21 October an underwater demolition team attacked a dredge in the harbor at La Isabela, Las Villas Province. The vessel was sunk.

5. On 23 December an underwater demolition team attacked a Cuban naval P-6 patrol boat in the Siguanea, Isle of Pines, naval base. The patrol boat was seriously damaged and may have sunk. Three Cuban naval personnel were killed and 13 others injured in the explosion.

Copy
Lyndon B. Johnson Library

tive." Second question: What does the American government expect to gain from the blockade? Is the economic isolation of Cuba a punishment or a political maneuver?

Kennedy's reply: "Are you suggesting that the political effectiveness of the blockade is uncertain [smile]? You will see when you go to Cuba whether it is or not. In any case, we can't let Communist subversion win in the other Latin American countries. Two dikes are needed to contain Soviet expansion: the blockade on the one hand, a tremendous effort toward progress on the other. This is the problem in a nutshell. Both battles are equally difficult." (Silence.) Then, a last comment: "The continuation of the blockade depends on the continuation of subversive activities."

The interview was over. I did not really wish to suggest anything, since I had never been to Cuba and, on the other hand, I had heard from all sides tales of the privations the Cuban people were suffering owing to their isolated economic situation. But I could see plainly that John Kennedy had doubts, and was seeking a way out.

That same evening I recounted this conversation in detail to an American colleague – an intimate friend of President Kennedy, through whom I had obtained this interview – and to the editor of *The New Republic.* Both my confidants, who knew the President a thousand times better than I, agreed that John F. Kennedy had never before expressed himself so specifically and with such feeling on his understanding of the first phase of the Castro revolution. They hesitated to draw any political conclusions from his remarks. However, they were not surprised at Kennedy's invitation to come and see him again when I returned from Cuba.

In effect, John Kennedy displayed two basic characteristics in his exercise of power: first, an overwhelming degree of empiricism and realism. A man without a particular doctrine, he reacted decisively to events, and only to events. Nothing but the shock of collision with a problem was sufficient to make him come to a decision, and because of this, his decisions were unpredictable. At that point he had a consuming need for information, and this need had increased a great deal since experience had taught him not to rely solely on official channels.

After this, I went to Havana.

Night Session

TAB M

In the "Pearl of the Antilles, rum-perfumed and steeped in triumphant sensuality," as Cuba is described in those American tourist folders still lying about in the hotels of Havana, I spent three closely packed and intensive weeks, but thinking all along that I would never get to meet with Fidel Castro. I talked with farmers, writers and painters, militants and counter-revolutionaries, ministers and ambassadors – but Fidel remained inaccessible. I had been warned: he was snowed under with work; as a result of the hurricane, the Cuban government had been obliged to revise its whole planning program; and then, above all, he no longer had any desire to receive any journalists, least of all Western newsmen. I had practically given up hope when, on the evening of what I thought was to be my departure date (the capricious plane which links Havana with Mexico happily did not leave the next day after all), Fidel came to my hotel. He had heard of my interview with the President. We went up to my room at 10 in the evening and did not leave until 4 in the following morning. Here, I shall only recount that part of that interview which constitutes a reply to John F. Kennedy's remarks.

Fidel listened with devouring and passionate interest: he pulled at his beard, yanked his parachutist's beret down over his eyes, adjusted his maqui tunic, all the while making me the target of a thousand malicious sparks cast by his deep-sunk, lively eyes. At one point I felt as though I were playing the role of that partner with whom he had as strong a desire to confer as to do battle; as though I myself were in a small way that intimate enemy in the White House whom Khrushchev described to Fidel as someone with whom "it is possible to talk." Three times he had me repeat certain remarks, particularly those in which Kennedy expressed his criticism of the Batista regime, those in which Kennedy showed his impatience with the comments attributed to General de Gaulle, and lastly those in which Kennedy accused Fidel of having almost caused a war fatal to all humanity.

When I stopped talking, I expected an explosion. Instead, I was treated to a lengthy silence and, at the end of that silence, to a calm, composed, often humorous, always thoughtful exposition. I don't know whether Fidel has changed, or whether these cartoons caricaturing him as a ranting madman which appear in the Western press perhaps correspond to a former reality. I only know that at no time during the two complete days I spent with him (and during which a great deal happened), did Castro abandon his composure and poise. Here too, I shall let Castro speak for himself, reserving only the possibility of correcting certain judgments on these two political leaders based on my own experiences in Cuba.

"I believe Kennedy is sincere," Fidel declared. "I also believe that today the expression of this sincerity could have political significance. I'll explain what I mean. I haven't forgotten that Kennedy centered his electoral campaign against Nixon on the theme of firmness toward Cuba. I have not forgotten the Machiavellian tactics and the equivocation, the attempts at invasion, the pressures, the blackmail, the organization of a counter-revolution, the blockade and, above everything, all the retaliatory measures which were imposed before, long before there was the pretext and alibi of Communism. But I feel that he inherited a difficult situation; I don't think a President of the United States is ever really free, and I believe Kennedy is at present feeling the impact of this lack of freedom. I also believe he now understands the extent to which he has been misled, especially, for example, on Cuban reaction at the time of the attempted Bay of Pigs invasion. I also think he is a realist; he is now registering that it is impossible to simply wave a wand and cause us, and the explosive situation throughout Latin America, to disappear.

Why the Missiles Were Installed

"There is one point on which I want to give you new information right away. I have refrained from doing this until now; but today an attempt is being made to frighten all mankind by propagating the idea that Cuba, and in particular I, might provoke a nuclear war, so I feel the world should know the true story of the missile emplacement.

"Six months before these missiles were installed in Cuba, we had received an accumulation of information warning us that a new invasion of the island was being prepared under sponsorship of the Central Intelligence Agency, whose administrators were humiliated by the Bay of Pigs disaster and by the spectacle of being ridiculed in the eyes of the world and berated in US government circles. We also knew that the Pentagon was vesting the CIA preparations with the mantle of its authority, but we had doubts as to the attitude of the President. There were those among our informants who even thought it would suffice to alert the President and give him cause for concern in order to arrest these preparations. Then one day Khrushchev's son-in-law, Adzhubei, came to pay us a visit before going on to Washington at the invitation of Kennedy's associates. Immediately upon arriving in Washington, Adzhubei had been received by the American Chief Executive, and their talk centered particularly on Cuba. A week after this interview, we received in Havana a copy of Adzhubei's report to Khrushchev. It was this report which triggered the whole situation.

"What did Kennedy say to Adzhubei? Now listen to this carefully, for it is very important: he had said that the new situation in Cuba was intolerable for the United States, that the American government *had decided it would not tolerate it any longer;* he had said that peaceful coexistence was seriously compromised by the fact that 'Soviet influences' in Cuba altered the balance of strength, was destroying the equilibrium agreed upon and [at this point Castro emphasized his statement by pronouncing each syllable separately] *Kennedy reminded the Russians that the United States had not intervened in Hungary,* which was obviously a way of demanding Russian non-intervention in the event of a possible invasion. To be sure, the actual word 'invasion' was not mentioned and Adzhubei, at the time, lacking any background information, could not draw the same conclusions as we did. But when we communicated to Khrushchev all our previous information, the Russians too began to interpret the Kennedy-Adzhubei conversation as we saw it and they went to the source of our information. By the end of a month, the Russian and Cuban governments had reached the *definite conviction* that an invasion might take place from one moment to the next. This is the truth.

"What was to be done? How could we prevent the invasion? We found that Khrushchev was concerned about the same things that were worrying us. He asked us what we wanted. We replied: *do whatever is needed to convince the United States that any attack on Cuba is the same as an attack on the Soviet Union.* And how to realize this objective? All our thinking and discussions revolved around this point. We thought of a proclamation, an alliance, conventional military aid. The Russians explained to us that their concern was twofold: first, they wanted to save the Cuban revolution (in other words, their socialist honor in the eyes of the world), and at the same time they wished to avoid a world conflict. They reasoned that if conventional military aid was the extent of their assistance, the United States might not hesitate to instigate an invasion, in which case Russia would retaliate and this would inevitably touch off a world war."

At this point I interrupted to ask how Cuba could have been absolutely certain of Soviet intervention. After all, I said, Stalin certainly "let down" Markos, the Chief of the Greek Communist Resistance, because such help would have conflicted with prevailing zones of influence.

"I know," Castro replied, "but the two situations cannot be compared." Then he continued:

"Russia was much too deeply committed to us. Moreover, since then we have had every proof of the immense solidarity of the Soviet people and its leaders. You can see for yourself how clearly this solidarity is manifest here. Then there is something else, specifically apropos of Stalin. When I was in the USSR and others, outside Russia, were reproaching Khrushchev for taking a more conciliatory stand than Stalin toward the capitalists, Khrushchev confided to me several examples, which I will not repeat to you, illustrating the prudence, even the abdication of Stalin. He told me – and I believe him – that Stalin would never have emplaced missiles in Cuba.

"It is true that it was said then by other factions that the real reason for installing the missiles was because certain internal problems were driving the Russians to use us to provoke the United States. I am here to tell you that the Russians didn't want and do not today want war. One only need visit them on their home territory, watch them at work, share their economic concerns, admire their intense efforts to raise the workers' standard of living, to understand right away that they are far, very far, from any idea of provocation or domination. However, Soviet Russia was confronted by two alternatives: an absolutely inevitable war (because of their commitments and their position in the socialist world), if the Cuban revolution was attacked; or the risk of a war if the United States, refusing to retreat before the missiles, would not give up the attempt to destroy Cuba. They chose socialist solidarity and the risk of war.

"Under these circumstances, how could we Cubans have refused to share the risks taken to save us? It was, in the final analysis, a question of honor, don't you agree? Don't you believe that honor plays a role in politics? You think we are romantics, don't you? Perhaps we are. And why not? In any event, we are militants. In a word, then, we agreed to the emplacement of the missiles. And I might add here that for us Cubans it didn't really make so much difference whether we died by conventional bombing or a hydrogen bomb. Nevertheless, we were ~~not~~ gambling with the peace of the world. The United States was the one to jeopardize the peace of mankind by using the threat of war to stifle revolutions.

"And so in June, 1962, my brother Raoul and Che Guevara went to Moscow to discuss ways and means of installing the missiles. The convoy arrived by sea in three weeks. The United States was able to find out that weapons were being shipped in, of course; but it took them two months to discover that these weapons were guided missiles. Two months . . . in other words, longer than we had calculated. Because, of course, we were seeking intimidation, not aggression."

Alliance for Progress

The conversation now turned to the Alliance for Progress. "In a way," Castro said, "it was a good idea, it marked progress of a sort. Even if it can be said that it was overdue, timid, conceived on the spur of the moment, under constraint . . . despite all that I am willing to agree that the idea in ~~itself~~ constituted an effort to adapt to the extraordinarily rapid course of events in Latin America. Such as, for example, what we read in the papers this morning – did you see the news? That Argentina is nationalizing the oil industry? The Argentine government! Do you realize what that means? This will cause more commotion on the New York stock exchange than Castroism! The Catholic and military conservatives of Argentina, the factions most closely linked with American interests! There is talk of nationalization of industries there, of agrarian reform there . . . well and good! If the Alliance for Progress provokes these developments, then it's not doing so badly; all these things are consonant with the aspirations of the people. I can look back to the days of Eisenhower, or rather of Nixon, and recall the furore which broke out when the United States and Cuba together decreed an agrarian reform which was to apply, mark this well, only to landowners of over 200,000 hectares! Yes, 200,000! Yet the reaction of the trusts was terrible at that time. Nowadays, in the other Latin American countries, because the Communist banner is used as a bogeyman, the reaction of the American trusts is shrewder. They are going to choose strawmen, so as to rule indirectly. But there will be difficulties.

"This is why Kennedy's good ideas aren't going to yield any results. It is very easy to understand and at this point he surely is aware of this because, as I told you, he is a realist. For years and years American policy – not the government, but the trusts and the Pentagon – has supported the Latin American oligarchies. All the prestige, the dollars, and the power was held by a class which Kennedy himself has described in speaking of Batista. Suddenly a President arrives on the scene who tries to support the interests of another class (which has no access to any of the levers of power) to give the various Latin American countries the impression that the United Sates no longer stands behind the dictators, and so there is no more need to start Castro-type revolutions. What happens then? The trusts see that their interests are being a little compromised (just barely, but still compromised); the Pentagon thinks the strategic bases are in danger; the powerful oligarchies in all the Latin American countries alert their American friends; they sabotage the new policy; and in short, Kennedy has everyone against him. The few liberal or allegedly liberal presidents who were chosen as instruments of the new policy are swept out of office, like Bosch in Santo Domingo, or else they are transformed. Betancourt, for example, was not a Batista; now he has become one.

"In view of all these things, how can the American government seriously believe that Cuban subversion is at the root of explosions taking place all over the South American continent? In Venezuela, for example, are you familiar with the situation there? Do you think the Venezuelans need us to understand what's going on in their country? Do you think we don't have enough problems of our own? Right now I ask only one thing: Leave us in peace to better our country's economic situation, to put our planning into effect, to educate our young *compañeros*. This doesn't mean we do not feel solidarity toward nations that are struggling and suffering, like the Venezuelan people. But it is up to those nations to decide what they want, and if they choose other regimes than ours, this isn't our business."

"We Have Always Lived with Danger"

I asked Fidel where is this all going to end? How will the situation develop? Even if the United States uses against you what you call the alibi of Communism, *it still remains true that you have chosen Communism,* that your economy and your security depend on the Soviet Union, and that even if you have no ulterior motives in this association, still the United States considers that you are part of an international strategy, that you constitute a Soviet base in a world where peace depends on mutual respect for a tacit division of zones of influence.

"I don't want to discuss our ties with the Soviet Union," Fidel Castro cut me short. "I find this indecent. We have none but feelings of fraternity and profound, total gratitude toward the USSR. The Russians are making extraordinary efforts on our behalf, efforts which sometimes cost them dear. But we have our own policies which are perhaps not always the same (we have proved this!) as those of the USSR. I refuse to dwell on this point, because asking me to say that I am not a pawn on the Soviet chessboard is something like asking a woman to shout aloud in the public square that she is not a prostitute.

"If the United States sees the problem as you have posed it, then you are right, there is no way out. But who is the loser in the last analysis? They have tried everything against us, everything, absolutely everything, and we are still alive and getting better day by day; we are still standing upright, and we plan to celebrate with greater festivities than usual, on January 1, 1964, the *fifth anniversary* of the Cuban Revolution! The United States' policy of isolating us economically is less effective with each passing day; we are increasing our trade with the rest of the world. Even with Spain! We have just sold a shipment of 300,000 tons of sugar to the Spaniards. Far from discouraging us, the blockade is maintaining the revolutionary atmosphere we need to stiffen the country's backbone. Are we in danger? We have always lived with danger. To say nothing of the fact that you have no idea how many friends one discovers in the world when one is persecuted by the United States. No, truly, for all these reasons, we are not suppliants, we ask nothing. I'll tell you something else: since the rupture and the blockade, we have forgotten the United States. We feel neither hatred nor resentment any more, we simply don't think about the US. When I think of the problems which diplomatic relations with the United States would pose! The Swiss Ambassador is representing the US at present. I prefer to do business with him than with 200 members of an Embassy among whom surely some spies would be spotted.

"I have just talked to you as a Cuban revolutionary. But I should also speak to you as a peace lover, and from this viewpoint I believe the United States is too important a country not to have an influence on world peace. I cannot help hoping, therefore, that a leader will come to the fore in North America (why not Kennedy, there are things in his favor!), who will be willing to brave unpopularity, fight the trusts, tell the truth and, most important, let the various nations act as they see fit. I ask nothing: neither dollars, nor assistance, nor diplomats, nor bankers, nor military men -- nothing but peace, and to be accepted as we are! We are socialists, the United States is a capitalist nation, the Latin American countries will choose what they want. All the same, at a time when the United States is selling wheat to the Russians, Canada is trading with China, de Gaulle respects Ben Bella, why should it be impossible to make the Americans understand that socialism leads, not to hostility toward them, but to coexistence? Why am I not Tito or Sekou Touré? Because the Russians have never done us any injury such as the Yugoslavians and the Guineans have complained of in the past, and because the Americans have never given us any of the benefits for which these two nations congratulate themselves today.

"As to this matter of fearing Soviet intentions in Latin America through Cuba's subversive activities, this is just attributing to others one's own desire to dominate. You said yourself just a little while ago that the Russians have had enough of their Cuban involvement. Economically this is obvious. This is why, speaking from a military viewpoint, it is better not to force nations to turn to the Russians for help. Really, it seems to me that a man like Kennedy is capable of seeing that it is not in the United States' interest to pursue a policy which can lead only to a stalemate. So far as we are concerned, everything can be restored to normalcy on the basis of mutual respect of sovereignty."

In conclusion, Fidel Castro said to me: "Since you are going to see Kennedy again, be an emissary of peace, despite everything. I want to make myself clear: I don't want anything, I don't expect anything, and as a revolutionary the present situation does not displease me. But as a man and as a statesman, it is my duty to indicate what the bases for understanding could be."

All this was said two days before President Kennedy's death.

©USA: The New Republic and Jean Daniel

TOP SECRET

January 19, 1964

MEMO to Boonstra, cc to COS from LEGAT; Subject: OSWALD - It is to be noted that the White House was in receipt of a paper entitled "Possible Psychological Motivations in the Assassination of Pres. Kennedy" written by Jose I. LASAGA of Miami, Fla. This speculative paper attempted to establish that the motivation of OSWALD in the assassination of Pres K was Fidel CASTRO or a CASTRO agent and that OSWALD was motivated during his trip to Mexi between 27 Sept and 2 Oct 63. The paper alleged that OSWALD held an extended interview with the Cuban Amb in Mexi whom he met in a restaurant on the outskirts of Mexi from which restaurant they both later left in the Amb's car for a talk without being overheard./ Source of this latter info was alleged to be Salvador DIAZ Verson. This individual was interviewed at Miami. He stated that while in Mexi 29-29 Nov 63 attending the Congress of the International Federation of Professional Newspaper Organizations, he was at the offices of the newspaper Excelsior on the night of 25 Nov 63. There he learned through the Mexi press that the Mexi gov had arrested one Silvia DURAN; that DURAN allegedly had OSWALD as a guest in her house during his visit to Mexi; and that DURAN placed OSWALD in contact with officials of the Cub Emb in Mexi. / DIAZ Verson went on to claim that he was d told by Dr. BORRELL Navarros, an exiled Cuban newspaperman employed by Excelsior, that OSWALD and DURAN on the day following OSWALD's arrival in Mexi went to a restaurant called the Caballo Blanco or possibly the Caballo Bayo where they met an official of the Cub Emb. DIAZ Verson claimed that he knows nothing about OSWALD and the Cub official leaving the restaurant together in a car. / It was ascertained that Dr. Eduardo BORRELL Navarro, a former Cuban Cabinet Minister who on occasion writes feature articles for the Mexi City Excelsior, currently resides at 1303 Homero St., Apart 501, Mexi. BORRELL Navarro was interviewed on 11 Jan at which time he furnished the following info; Salvador DIAZ Verson was in Mexi as claimed and discussed OSWALD with BORRELL and other Cuban exiles. DIAZ Verson also visited BORRELL in BORRELL's home. / BORRELL did not tell the story credited to him by DIAZ Verson concerning the visit to a Mexi City restaurant by OSWALD and Silvia DURAN. BORRELL had never heard this story or any similar story before. / BORRELL knew of no meeting between OSWALD and Cub Emb officials other than the meetings which occurred at the time OSWALD visited the Cub Con in Mexi. / BORRELL knew nothing concerning any visit by OSWALD to the home of DURAN. / It is to be noted that DURAN was questioned by Mexi authorities on 23 Nov 63. At that time she confirmed that OSWALD visited the Cub Emb in Mexi during the time he was in Mexi from 27 Sept to 2 Oct. She alleged that the purpose of his visits to the Cuban Emb was to obtain a Cuban visa. She stated she had given him a telephone number to use in calling her concerning the visa, but denied that he had ever visited in her home. / On 17 Jan 64 a source... advised that he had been unable to locate a Caballo Blano restaurant in Mexi, but stated there is a Caballo Bayo restaurant located on outskirts of Mexi. Source went to restaurant, showed photos of former Cub Con Eusebio AZCUE Lopez, who was in charge of Cub Con at the time of OSWALD's visit there, of Cub Amb HERNANDEZ Armas, of Silvia DURAN and of OSWALD to employees of restaurant and conducted extensive interviews of these employees. He was unable to find anyone among the employees who could recall any of the persons as having been at restaurant.

CIA

From CIA prepared chronology

TOP SECRET

BOX 4: MISCELLANEOUS

From the listing of files contained, nothing appeared likely to contain relevant information. Therefore, the files in this box were not examined.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

MC CONE PAPERS
NOVEMBER 24, 1961 - DECEMBER 31, 1964
REFERENCES TO CUBA ASSASSINATIONS, WARREN COMMISSION MATTERS

BOX 2: MEMORANDA FOR RECORD

File: November 29, 1961 - April 5, 1962

December 5, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 12.

December 27, 1961, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - "Lansdale operation" mentioned in paragraph 5.

January 22, 1962, Meeting with Attorney General Kennedy - Reference to a "Lansdale paper" to be discussed by the 5412 Committee plus Robert Kennedy.

April 5, 1962, Memos on Special Group/Mongoose Project - General discussion of possible military intervention in Cuba.

File: April 7, 1962 - August 21, 1962

(40) - April 10, 1962, phone call to Bundy explaining that Attorney General upset that Perrez was apparently telling people in Miami about his five meetings with the Attorney General. Cardona was to meet JFK that day.

(61) - July 3, 1962, meeting with Attorney General - included a short discussion of "Reuther plan" for labor operations apparently in Italy.

(86) - August 21, 1962, meeting with Rush, McNamara, Alexis Johnson, the Attorney General, Director of Central Intelligence, General Taylor, Lemnitzer, and M. Bundy - a general discussion of Cuban situation and possible courses of action if MRBM's are discovered in Cuba:

> "McNamara expressed strong feelings that we should take every possible aggressive action in the fields of intelligence, sabotage and guerrilla warfare, utilizing Cubans and do such other things as might be indicated to divide the Castro regime." (emphasis added)

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

File: August 24, 1962 - December 31, 1962

(97) - October 5, 1962, Meeting between DCI and Bundy: McCone wanted to be more activist toward Cuba - Bundy was more conservative. (No specifics)

(118) - December 17, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]
[Apparently not a meeting or phone call]
(Comments on Report on Missile Crisis, according to Elder)

(119) - December 18, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

(120) - December 19, 1962, DCI memo re Earman Report on Cuba [MISSING]

File: June 1, 1963 - February 9, 1963

(12) - January 21, 1963, phone call between DCI and Eisenhower (transcript) about Cuba. (No mention of assassination.)

File: February 9, 1963 - April 9, 1963

(36) - March 5, 1963, Memo of DCI discussion with Attorney General [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED] [According to Elder, dealt with wiretap of newsmen.]

(38) - March 7, 1963, Memo of conversation with Attorney General at Hickory Hill [No one to see without DCI permission] [DESTROYED]

(52) - March 30, 1963, DCI discussion with Eisenhower and Lundahl on "current status of Cuba" [DESTROYED]

File: April 15, 1963 - June 4, 1963

(68) - Memo of DCI on Cuban Policy: "Random thoughts developed by DCI on various aspects of the Cuban problem and the discussions at Standing Group prepared for use by representatives of DCI at meetings on this subject during his absence from the country," April 25, 1963, contains the following:

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

> "I agree with the ONE estimate that Castro's political position will improve within the next year (barring assassination)."

The context clearly indicates, however, that DCI is not proposing this.

(77) - DCI memo of May 18, 1963, on Haiti: contains this statement: "Apparently Duvalier, in the absence of assassination, will survive the efforts of internal opposition elements..." Context indicates DCI was not proposing or considering assassination.

(61) - April 15, 1963, Memo of meeting between Attorney General and Director of Central Intelligence about "Helms/ Angleton operation, Cuban sabotage proposals" [DESTROYED]

(62) - April 17, 1963, Meeting of DCI and Rusk about: "Helms/Angleton Project..." [DESTROYED]

File: June 5, 1963 - July 20, 1963

Nothing Relevant

File: July 23, 1963 - November 26, 1963

(133) - August 20, 1963, Luncheon with DCI, Colonel Grogan, Tom Ross of Chicago Sun Times [MISSING]

(138) - September 5, 1963, DCI and Bundy, "After Special Group" [MISSING]

(138) - September 7, 1963, DCI and Papich [MISSING]

(138) - September 12, 1963, DCI and J. Edgar Hoover at Justice Department [MISSING]

(158.5) - October 24, 1963, DCI/Robert F. Kennedy lunch at Kennedy's house [MISSING]

(168) - November 26, 1963, DCI and Bundy on message about Kennedy assassination [MISSING]

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

(168) - November 15, 1963, DCI and Rusk: Sukarno had said that British and CIA were plotting to kill him. Rusk asked if CIA had any information about a plot by British. DCI said no.

File: November 27, 1963 - December 31, 1963

[Entire contents of file missing.]

From titles, nothing here appears relevant.

File: January 1, 1964 - February 11, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: February 12, 1964 - April 5, 1964

[Entire contents of file missing.]

(25.5) - February 19, 1964, DCI and Fitzgerald: "White House Meeting - Situation Room - Re: Cuba" [DESTROYED]

(36.1) - March 14, 1964, Meeting of DCI, Bundy, Helms [DESTROYED]

(46) - April 5, 1964, Meeting of DCI and Rusk: "EYES ONLY - NO DISTRIBUTION - FSO Richard Fredericks; Carl Rowan; Republican Platform of 1960." [DESTROYED]

File: April 6, 1964 - July 8, 1964

(49) - April 16, 1964, Meeting with: DCI, Justice Warren, Senator Cooper, Stern, Rankin, Willens of subject: "Met in DCI's Office" [MISSING]

(58) - May 14, 1964, DCI, Rankin, Helms - Subject: "Warren Commission (accompanied by Mr. Helms). Helms saw commission transcript and returned it to the commission." "No MR expected" [MISSING]

(69) - June 12, 1964, DCI, Mr. and Mrs. Henry Luce: "Memos used at lunch re: Cuban article in TIME" - NO DISTRIBUTION - nothing on assassinations.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

File: July 8, 1964 - August 12, 1964

(No file under these dates.)

File: August 12, 1964 - September 10, 1964

Nothing relevant.

File: September 11, 1964 - October 31, 1964

(138) - October 15, 1964, DCI, Sam Papich - "NO DISTRIBUTION - discussion re Walter Jenkins' matter." [DESTROYED]

(143) - October 22, 1964, DCI, Robert Kennedy: "In Presidential Suite, NYC - Personal discussion EYES ONLY JAM - NO DISTRIBUTION" [DESTROYED]

File: November 1, 1964 - December 31, 1964

Nothing relevant.

BOX 8: MEMORANDA OF MEETINGS WITH THE PRESIDENT

File: October 25, 1961 - July 31, 1962

(B) - December 14, 1961, at a meeting with the President and General Taylor, DCI advised Kennedy that there were possible dangers that he might be the subject of an assassination attempt on his planned trip to Colombia and Venezuela, which the CIA could not guarantee the safety of.

(6) - February 11, 1962, at a meeting with the President, Bundy, and Taylor, DCI discussed efforts to convince one Charles Murphy not to write a certain article for Life magazine on some subject related to Cuba. Apparently, the article was revised to DCI's satisfaction and then published.

(12) - May 7, 1962, at a meeting with the President and Taylor, DCI discussed Operation Mongoose in some detail. No mention of assassinations.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

File: July 31, 1962 - November 29, 1962 [actually covering through Dec. 18, 1962]

(28) - July 20, 1962: At a meeting with the President, Taylor, and Alexis Johnson, Mongoose was discussed. No mention of assassination.

(52) - October 26, 1962: At a meeting of NSC Executive Committee, DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

(55) - October 30, 1962: "Memo to DDCI outlining Presidential Directive to CIA; no provocative actions by refugee groups; estop Alpha 66; stop Mongoose ops; no contact with Press." [MISSING]

(70) - November 29, 1962: At a meeting of the NSC Executive Committee (President absent), DCI discussed Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

File: January 1, 1963 - March 31, 1963

(7) - January 23, 1963 (4:30 p.m.): Meeting with President, DCI, and Helms." No memo present. Listing does not indicate whether or not memo was prepared, even though it generally indicates when memos were not prepared. Secretary's note of 1/27/72 (MB) notes: "No MR in file"

(8) - January 23, 1963 (4:45 p.m.): Meeting between DCI and President - missing memo; same situation as #(7) above.

(28) - March 25, 1963: In meeting with President, DCI "reviewed the requirements for telephonic and audio surveillance intelligence at selected embassies and foreign residences within the United States..." President suggested that the DCI talk with J. Edgar Hoover on this matter.

File: April 1, 1963 - July 1, 1963

(33) - April 16, 1963: In meeting with the President, DCI discussed two methods of dealing with Castro: (1) "Working on" Castro to turn him from Soviets; (2) Pressuring USSR to remove from Cuba and "then to bring about the downfall of Castro by means which could be developed after the removal of Soviet troops..." No mention of assassination.

01514 PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HO

(43) - May 27, 1963: In meeting of President, DCI, and others, policy towards covert operations against Haiti were discussed. No mention of assassination.

(50) - June 19, 1963: In meeting with the President and others, DCI discussed plans for covert operations against Cuba, including "external sabotage." Vague memo of record by Desmond FitzGerald, but no mention of assassination.

File: July 1, 1963 - November 12, 1963

(74) - November 12, 1963: At a meeting of the President, DCI, and others, "McCone emphasized that to a very considerable extent these [Cuban exile groups] are uncontrollable and forecast that once Artime was in business, we might expect some events to take place which were not exactly to our liking." (This was in a general discussion of covert actions against Cuba; no mention of assassination.)

File: November 23, 1963 - December 31, 1963

(1) November 23, 1963 (memo of November 25): DCI told Lyndon B. Johnson of information received from Mexico City. DCI later called Rusk to tell him of information from Mexico City: "...the holding of a Mexican employee of the Cuban embassy by Mexican officials for interrogation concerning Lee Oswald."

(4) November 25 and 26, 1963 (memo of November 26): In meetings with the President and the DCI, the President expressed "contempt" at Justice Department suggestion of independent investigation of John F. Kennedy's assassination. He instructed the DCI to insure CIA cooperation with the FBI report.

(4) November 29, 1963: In a meeting with DCI, Lyndon B. Johnson, McNamara, and Bundy, the DCI apparently gave latest developments in Mexico City investigation of Oswald. A list of "late developments" is in file, to be used for this purpose. (Obtain copy.)

File: January 1, 1964 - April 2, 1964

Nothing relevant.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

File: April 3, 1964 - May 20, 1964

(19) - April 7, 1964: Meeting of DCI, President, and others re Cuba Covert Action.
Here DCI advocates strong program to obtain overall objective set forth in a paper of June 8, 1963: "The ultimate objective of this policy would be to encourage dissident elements in the military and other power centers of the regime to bring about the eventual liquidation of the Castro/communist entourage and the elimination of the Soviet presence from Cuba." (emphasis added) [OBTAIN COPY]

File: May 21, 1964 - October 5, 1964

September 30, 1964: Meeting of "DCI; President; et al" to discuss "Warren Commission Report - (to set up Presidential Committee)" - No memo indicated to have been prepared.

File: October 6, 1964 - December 28, 1964

Nothing Relevant.

BOX 1: 303 COMMITTEE, COUNTERINSURGENCY, SPECIAL GROUP, CHRONO (1962)

File: 303 - January - December, 1963

Several sets of minutes have the following notations after paragraphs dealing with Cuban operations: "See special minutes for additional items." - No such "special minutes" appear to be contained in this file.* However, this same notation appeared in connection with other subjects.

This file contains several discussions of the Haitian problem. Although it's clear the participants would like to be rid of Duvalier, there is no mention of assassination.

Nothing else relevant.

File: January - December, 1964

Contains discussion of Haitian problem, and CIA agreed to "explore methods of dealing with the Duvalier problem in the immediate future." (May 12, 1964)

---

*Other than certain memoranda prepared by McCone.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

The minutes of the June 18, 1964, meeting (dated June 22, 1964) contained the following: [OBTAIN COPY] (signed by Peter Jessup)

"A paper was discussed on alleged plans which involve the underworld to assassinate certain Cuban leaders. Mr. McCone was somewhat skeptical of the reported plots and stated that he would like to go into the matter further. Others, including Mr. Bundy, felt that the United States was being put on notice and should do everything in its power to ascertain promptly the veracity of the reports and then undertake prevention. It was decided that Mr. Bundy would call the matter to the Attorney General's attention as a matter of law enforcement."

Mr. McCone's personal memorandum for the record on this meeting (dated) June 18, 1964, contains substantially the same information. [OBTAIN COPY] It refers to a June 10, 1964, CIA memorandum "reporting plans of Cuban exiles to assassinate leading Cuban government leaders." This memo apparently had been sent to Special Group members and the Attorney General. [OBTAIN COPY] McCone's memo contains the following:

"ACTION: Discuss with General Carter and Mr. Helms steps we should take to establish the credibility of the report; also communicate with the FBI through Mr. Papich. Also I should call the Attorney General personally."

The official minutes of the July 30, 1964, 303 Committee meeting (dated July 31, 1964) (referred to in 1967 IG report) contain no mention of assassination or even of Cuba. Mr. McCone's personal memorandum (dated July 31, 1964) had only the following reference to Cuba:

"Proposed infiltration/exfiltration operations into Cuba for August were approved and the July operations were noted."

File: Counterinsurgency - January - June, 1962

Nothing relevant.

01517 PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

BOX 7 - MISCELLANEOUS

Envelope - "Cuba Loose Ends"
Much information on Mongoose. No mention of assassination.

Envelope containing FBI report of October 16, 1963, entitled "Communism and the Negro Movement - A Current Analysis" - contains comments on Dr. King's personal life. Relayed by J. Edgar Hoover to McCone.

File: "Cuba - Background Material"

This file contains only material relating to the Cuban missile crisis. It contains no references to any assassinations.

File: "White House"

This file, covering 1962 and 1963, contains correspondence to, from, and of interest to the White House.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

BOX 5: MISCELLANEOUS

The file entitled "Cuba Package" does not appear to be in this box. The name of this file, however, appears on the page which purports to list the files in the box.

File: Cuba 1962

Nothing relevant to assassinations.

File: Cuba 1964

February 21, 1964, memorandum for the Director of Central Intelligence from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, Special Affairs Staff, entitled "Spectrum of Courses of Action with Respect to Cuba." This nine-page memorandum outlines many possible courses of action which the U.S. Government could take with respect to Fidel Castro even including measures as drastic as an actual invasion of the island by U.S. military forces. It, however, contains no mention or reference to possible assassination of Castro.

BOX 6: MISCELLANEOUS

File: Presidential Briefing, December 22, 1964

Nothing relevant to assassination.

File: "M" File

Nothing relevant to our subject of interest.

File: "D" File

This file contains papers dealing with the services of Allen Dulles as a consultant to the Agency after his retirement. There is no mention of the subject in which we are interested.

File: "W" File

Nothing relevant.

PROPERTY OF
01519 THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

When Castro Heard the News

TAB H

Havana

It was around 1:30 in the afternoon, Cuban time. We were having lunch in the living room of the modest summer residence which Fidel Castro owns on magnificent Varadero Beach, 120 kilometers from Havana. For at least the tenth time, I was questioning the Cuban leader on details of the negotiations with Russia before the missile installations last year. The telephone rang, a secretary in guerrilla garb announced that Mr. Dorticós, President of the Cuban Republic, had an urgent communication for the Prime Minister. Fidel picked up the phone and I heard him say: *"Como? Un atentado?"* ("What's that? An attempted assassination?") He then turned to us to say that Kennedy had just been struck down in Dallas. Then he went back to the telephone and exclaimed in a loud voice *"Herido? Muy gravemente"* ("Wounded? Very seriously?")

He came back, sat down, and repeated three times the words: *"Es una mala noticia."* ("This is bad news.") He remained silent for a moment, awaiting another call with further news. He remarked while we waited that there was an alarmingly sizable lunatic fringe in American society and that this deed could equally well have been the work of a madman or of a terrorist. Perhaps a Vietnamese? Or a member of the Ku Klux Klan? The second call came through: it was hoped they would be able to announce that the United States President was still alive, that there was hope of saving him. Fidel Castro's immediate reaction was: "If they can, he is already re-elected." He pronounced these words with satisfaction.

This sentence was a sequel to a conversation we had held on a previous evening and which had turned into an all-night session. To be precise, it lasted from 10 in the evening until 4 in the morning. A good part of the talk revolved about the impressions I recounted to him of an interview which President Kennedy granted me this last October 24, and about Fidel Castro's reactions to these impressions. During this nocturnal discussion, Castro had delivered himself of a relentless indictment of US policy, adding that in the recent past Washington had had ample opportunity to normalize its relations with Cuba, but that instead it had tolerated a CIA program of training, equipping and organizing a counter-revolution. He had told me that he wasn't in the least fearful of his life, since danger was his natural milieu, and if he were to become a victim of the United States this would simply enhance his radius of influence in Latin America as well as throughout the socialist world. He was speaking, he said, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace in both the American continents. To achieve this goal, a leader would have to arise in the United States capable of understanding the explosive realities of Latin America and of meeting them halfway. Then, suddenly, he had taken a less hostile tack: "Kennedy could still be this man. He still has the possibility of becoming, in the eyes of history, the greatest President of the United States, the leader who may at last understand that there can be coexistence between capitalists and socialists, even in the Americas. He would then be an even greater President than Lincoln. I know, for example, that for Khrushchev, Kennedy is a man you can talk with. I have gotten this impression from all my conversations with Khrushchev. Other leaders have assured me that to attain this goal, we must first await his re-election. Personally, I consider him responsible for everything, but I will say this: he has come to understand many things over the past few months; and then too, in the last analysis, I'm convinced that anyone else would be worse." Then Fidel had added with a broad and boyish grin: "If you see him again, you can tell him that I'm willing to declare Goldwater my friend if that will guarantee Kennedy's re-election!"

This conversation was held on November 19.

Now it was nearly 2 o'clock and we got up from the table and settled ourselves in front of a radio. Commandant Vallero, his physician, aide-de-camp, and intimate friend, was easily able to get the broadcasts from the NBC network in Miami. As the news came in, Vallero would translate it for Fidel: Kennedy wounded in the head; pursuit of the assassin; murder of a policeman; finally the fatal announcement: President Kennedy is dead. Then Fidel stood up and said to me: "Everything is changed. Everything is going to change. The United States occupies such a position in world affairs that the death of a President of that country affects millions of people in every corner of the globe. The cold war, relations with Russia, Latin America, Cuba, the Negro question . . . all will have to be rethought. I'll tell you one thing: at least Kennedy was an enemy to whom we had become accustomed. This is a serious matter, an extremely serious matter."

After the quarter-hour of silence observed by all the American radio stations, we once more tuned in on Miami; the silence had only been broken by a rebroadcasting of the American national anthem. Strange indeed was the impression made, on hearing this hymn ring out in the house of Fidel Castro, in the midst of a circle of worried faces. "Now," Fidel said, "they will have to find the assassin quickly, but very quickly, otherwise, you watch and see, I know them, they will try to put the blame on us for this thing. But tell me how many Presidents have been assassinated? Four! This is most disturbing! In Cuba, only one has been assassinated. You know, when we were hiding out in the Sierra there were some (not in my group, in another) who wanted to kill Batista. They thought they could do away with a regime by decapitating it. I have always been violently opposed to such methods. First of all from the viewpoint of political self-interest, because so far as Cuba is concerned, if Batista had been killed he would have been replaced by some military figure who would have tried to make the revolutionists pay for the martyrdom of the dictator. But I was also opposed to it on personal grounds; assassination is repellent to me."

The broadcasts were now resumed. One reporter felt he should mention the difficulty Mrs. Kennedy was having in getting rid of her bloodstained stockings. Fidel exploded: "What sort of a mind is this!" He repeated the remark several times: "What sort of a mind is this? There is a difference in our civilizations after all. Are you like this in Europe? For us Latin Americans, death is a sacred matter; not only does it mark the close of hostilities, but it also imposes decency, dignity, respect. There are even street urchins who behave like kings in the face of death. Incidentally, this reminds me of something else: if you write all those things I told you yesterday against Kennedy's policy, don't use his name now; speak instead of the policy of the United States government."

Toward 5 o'clock, Fidel Castro declared that since there was nothing we could do to alter the tragedy, we must try to put our time to good use in spite of it. He wanted to accompany me in person on a visit to a *granja de pueblo* (state farm), where he had been engaging in some experiments. His present obsession is agriculture. He reads nothing but agronomical studies and reports. He dwells lyrically on the soil, fertilizers, and the possibilities which will give Cuba enough sugar cane by 1970 to achieve economic independence.

"Didn't I Tell You"

We went by car, with the radio on. The Dallas police were now hot on the trail of the assassin. He is a Russian spy, says the news commentator. Five minutes later, correction: he is a spy married to a Russian. Fidel said: "There, didn't I tell you; it'll be my turn next." But not yet. The next word was: the assassin is a Marxist deserter. Then the word came through, in effect, that the assassin was a young man who was a member of the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee," that he was an admirer of Fidel Castro. Fidel declared: "If they had had proof, they would have said he was an agent, an accomplice, a hired killer. In saying simply that he is an admirer, this is just to try and make an association in people's minds between the name of Castro and the emotion awakened by the assassination. This is a publicity method, a propaganda device. It's terrible. But you know, I'm sure this will all soon blow over. There are too many competing policies in the United States for any single one to be able to impose itself universally for very long."

We arrived at the *granja de pueblo,* where the farmers welcomed Fidel. At that very moment, a speaker announced over the radio that it was now known that the assassin is a "pro-Castro Marxist." One commentator followed another; the remarks became increasingly emotional, increasingly aggressive. Fidel then excused himself: "We shall have to give up the visit to the farm." We went on toward Matanzas from where he could telephone President Dorticós. On the way he had questions: "Who is Lyndon Johnson? What is his reputation? What were his relations with Kennedy? With Khrushchev? What was his position at the time of the attempted invasion of Cuba?" Finally and most important of all: "What authority does he exercise over the CIA?" Then abruptly he looked at his watch, saw that it would be half an hour before we reached Matanzas and, practically on the spot, he dropped off to sleep.

After Matanzas, where he must have decreed a state of alert, we returned to Varadero for dinner. Quoting the words spoken to him by a woman shortly before, he said to me that it was an irony of history for the Cubans, in the situation to which they had been reduced by the blockade, to have to mourn the death of a President of the United States. "After all," he added, "there are perhaps some people in the world to whom this news is cause for rejoicing. The South Vietnamese guerrillas, for example, and also, I would imagine, Madame Nhu!"

I thought of the people of Cuba, accustomed to the sight of posters like the one depicting the Red Army with maquis superimposed in front, and the screaming captions "HALT, MR. KENNEDY! CUBA IS NOT ALONE. . . ." I thought of all those who had been led to associate their deprivations with the policies of President John F. Kennedy.

At dinner I was able to take up all my questions. What had motivated Castro to endanger the peace of the world with the missiles in Cuba? How dependent was Cuba on the Soviet Union? Is it not possible to envisage relations between Cuba and the United States along the same lines as those between Finland and the Russians? How was the transition made from the humanism of Sierra Maestra to the Marxism-Leninism of 1961? Fidel Castro, once more in top form, had an explanation for everything. Then he questioned me once more on Kennedy, and each time I eulogized the intellectual qualities of the assassinated President, I awakened the keenest interest in him.

The Cubans have lived with the United States in that cruel intimacy so familiar to me of the colonized with their colonizers. Nevertheless, it was an intimacy. In that very seductive city of Havana to which we returned in the evening, where the luminous signboards with Marxist slogans have replaced the Coca Cola and toothpaste billboards, in the midst of Soviet exhibits and Czechoslovakian trucks, a certain American emotion vibrated in the atmosphere, compounded of resentment, of concern, of anxiety, yet also, in spite of everything, of a mysterious almost imperceptible rapprochement. After all, this American President was able to reach accord with our Russian friends during his lifetime, said a young Cuban intellectual to me as I was taking my leave. It was almost as though he were apologizing for not rejoicing at the assassination.

JEAN DANIEL

ROMANS

"Robert Frost wrote 50 years ago, 'nothing is true except as a man or men adhere to it – to live for it, to spend themselves on it, to die for it.' We need this spirit even more than money or institutions or agreements."

– JOHN F. KENNEDY, November 18, 1963

By Saturday night, even the television seemed worn out by attempt and failure and ceased to comment and gave over to a succession of photographs of the columns and the windows and the corners of the White House and of the shadows of the great Lincoln head in Springfield and to a voice reciting "Oh, Captain, My Captain." It is to be, then, the grand style. But the ship has not weathered every storm; Mr. Kennedy is not Abraham Lincoln; not because he is more or less, but because he is a remembered physical presence and Mr. Lincoln an image of the plastic arts. One's own time is personal, not historical. Just how long will it be before many of us will want to read a book about the day Mr. Kennedy was shot?

The news of the President's assassination was given by a taxi driver to three gentlemen as they left a hotel on Arlington Street in Boston. They turned right around and hurried back inside to attend to their investments. Packed with students and businessmen a shuttle plane from Boston to Washington waited for permission to take off when the captain came on the intercom: "Folks, up here on the flight deck we've been listening to the news and the President is dead." There was only time to hear one woman say, "How dreadful" before three men went back to discussing plan specifications. A college student reading *Agamemnon* paid no visible attention. One of his notes read, "love-in-[illegible]e." The plane took off, the stewardess collected the money and started to serve drinks. Then the captain was back again. They had been listening to more news, that is trying to listen to news because their real job was to hear flight control. There had been a gun battle in Dallas; a patrolman was killed; the police had taken a man in a movie theater. Vice President Johnson was now the President. The talk of business went on through this, and stopped only when the captain again interrupted to say that the new President had been sworn in aboard an aircraft. A few laughed.

They ask too much of us when they ask us to act up to the grand style. We are not an emotionally affluent people. And yet some of us always complained that Mr. Kennedy did not seem quite emotionally committed enough. But now someone remembered with special affection a moment late in the 1960 campaign. Mr. Kennedy was in a motorcade and the Democratic governor who was with him said how wonderful it was to feel the love with which these crowds pressed forward to feel the touch of their candidate. "Oh, dry up," Mr. Kennedy said. It seemed now somehow a special grace in him that he used only the real in emotion and abstained from fabricating the expected. He had too much respect for the grand style to counterfeit it; how much truer to him might we have been if we had come down in scale and if the many of us who must have remembered the lines from *Cymbeline* had thought them proper to speak

"Fear no more the heat of the sun/Nor the furious
winter's rages.
Thou thy worldly task hast done/Home art thou

Flash from Dallas

Just as Secret Service men reacted instinctively, rushing to protect the presidential party, reporters reacted instinctively to get the news—sketchy as it was at first—to the world. United Press International's Merriman Smith, dean of the White House correspondents, describes on pages 32–33 his frantic rush to call the Dallas UPI bureau. Reproduced here is the result of Smith's first efforts—the actual Teletype copy that almost immediately clacked out of hundreds of UPI machines in newsrooms, radio and television stations, pressrooms, and business offices all over the world.

```
DETECTIVES WERE THERE AND THEY "ASKED HIM TO LOOK IN THERE (THE BRIFF-
CASE) FOR SOMETHING."
   THE CASE WAS OPENED AND AN ENVELOPE WAS FOUND CONTAINING 44 $100
BILLS, THE WITNESS SAID.  THE STATE HAD SAID IT WOULD PRODUCE THAT
PIECE OF EVIDENCE BUT IT HAD  NOT  LISTED IT AS ONE "OF THE SEVEN
LINKS."  THE DEFENSE HAS IMPLIED IT WILL TAKE THE LINE THAT CAROL'S
DEATH AFTER A SAVAGE BLUDGEONING AND STABBING IN HER HOME WAS THE
RESULT OF AN ATTEMPTED          MOREDA1234PCS
```

At 12:34 the Teletype was supplying copy on a Minneapolis murder trial.

```
UPI A7N DA
          PRECEDE KENNEDY
   DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--THREE SHOTS WERE FIRED AT PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S
MOTORCADE TODAY IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
                                 JT1234PCS..
```

The Dallas bureau, alerted by Smith over radiotelephone from the press car as it careered toward the hospital, sends out the first sparse news.

```
UPI A8N HX
2ND ADD 2ND LEAD  THOMPSON MINNEAPOLIST
BUOS HO
UPHOLD
DA IT YRS  NX
```

Minneapolis starts to add more details on the murder trial. The New York bureau, knowing that ace reporter Smith is covering the President's trip, tells all bureaus to "uphold"—get off the wire. "Dallas, it's yours."

```
UPI A8N AJ
DAY
  CORRECTE
BUOS UPHOLD--NX
```

Atlanta tries to interrupt, but is quickly squelched by the New York bureau.

```
UPI A8N DA
          URGENT
  1ST ADD SHOTS, DALLAS (A7N) XXX DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
  NO CASUALTIES WERE REPORTED.
  THE INCIDENT OCCURRED NEAR THE COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE ON MAIN
STREET, JUST EAST OF AN UNDERPASS LEADING TOWARD THE TRADE MART WHERE
THE PRESIDENT WAS TO MA

                    FLASH
```

The Dallas operator begins sending the rest of Smith's account from the press car.

```
FLASH

     KENNEDY SERIOUSLY WOUNDED
                               PERHAPS SERIOUSLY
   PERHAPS FATALLY BY ASSASSINS BULLET
                                 JT1239PCS
```

At the hospital, Smith sees the President's limp body in the car and races to a telephone. At 12:39, nine minutes after the shooting, the grave news flashes over the wire.

```
UPI 9N
BULLETIN
   1ST LEAD SHOOTING
   DALLAS, NOV. 22 (UPI)--PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND GOV. JOHN B. CONNALLY
OF TEXAS WERE CUTDOWN BY AN ASSASSIN'S BULLETS AS THEY TOURED
DOWNTOWN DALLAS IN AN OPEN AUTOMOBILE TODAY.
                                                   MOREJT1241PCS
```

Now reporter Smith is dictating a story ready for printing.

```
UPI A10N DA
         1ST ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING DALLAS (9N DALLAS XX TODAY.
   THE PRESIDENT, HIS LIMP BODY CRADLED IN THE ARMS OF HIS WIFE, WAS
RUSHED TO PARKLAND HOSPITAL.  THE GOVERNOR ALSO WAS TAKEN TO PARKLAND.
   CLINT HILL, A SECRET SERVICE AGENT ASSIGNED TO MRS. KENNEDY, SAID
 HE'S DEAD," AS THE PRESIDENT WAS LIFTED FROM THE REAR OF A WHITE HOUSE
.OURING CAR, THE FAMOUS "BUBBLETOP" FROM WASHINGTON. . HE WAS RUSHED
TO AN EMERGENCY ROOM IN THE HOSPITAL.
   OTHER WHITE HOUSE OFFICIALS WERE IN DOUBT AS THE CORRIDORS OF THE
HOSPITAL ERUPTED IN PANDEMONIUM.
   THE INCIDENT OCCURRED JUST EAST OF THE TRIPLE UNDERPASS FACING A
PARK IN DOWNTOWN DALLAS.
   REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
HEAR
MORE 144PES
```

Smith rolls on, swiftly and fluently, adding fresh details as "pandemonium" breaks out in the corridor outside his telephone niche.

```
UPI A11N DA
         2ND ADD 1ST LEAD SHOOTING (9N DALLAS) XXX DALLAS.
    REPORTERS ABOUT FIVE CAR LENGTHS BEHIND THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE
HEARD WHAT WOUNDED LIKE THREE BURST OF GUNFIRE.
   SECRET SERVICE AGENTS IN A FOLLOW-UP CAR QUICKLY UNLIMBERED THEIR
AUTOMATIC RIFLES.
   THE BUBBLE TOP OF THE PRESIDENT'S CAR WAS DOWN.
   THEY DREW THEIR PISTOLS, BUT THE DAMAGE WAS DONE.
   THE PRESIDENT WAS SLUMPED OVER IN THE BACKSEAT OF THE CAR FACE
DOWN.  CONNALLY LAY ON THE FLOOR OF THE REAR SEAT.
   IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT
MORE 145PES
```

Searching his mind for impressions of the shooting, Smith adds all he can remember to the story. The shaken wire operator stumbles in the second line.

```
UPI A12N DA

   IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO TELL AT ONCE WHERE KENNEDY WAS HIT, BUT BULLET
WOUNDS IN CONNALLY'S CHEST WERE PLAINLY VISIBLE, INDICATING THE GUNFIRE
MIGHT POSSIBLY HAVE COME FROM AN AUTOMATIC WEAPON.
   THERE WERE THREE LOUD BURSTS.
   DALLAS MOTORCYCLE OFFICERS ESCORTING THE PRESIDENT QUICKLY LEAPED
FROM THEIR BIKES AND RACED UP A GRASSY HILL.

    MORE 146PES


UPIA13N DA
```

As yet nothing is known of the sniper, what kind of weapon he used, or where the shots came from.

Ambassador Hernandez Armas apologizes with [illegible] Dorticos for [illegible] been late in calling him, but because of an interru[illegible] the line, he has not done so until now. He adds that "I spoke with this [illegible] did not add anything important to what I have already informed and which I [illegible] formally. And with respect to the concrete point which you asked me about, [illegible] that there was no offer of any kind". Dorticos: "no...I wasn't asking about an offer". Hernandez Armas: "ah, I had understood that with the confusion of the..." Dorticos: "no, I was refeering as to whether they had threatened her so that she would make a statement that the Consulate had ~~xxx~~ given money to the man...that American...understand?" Hernandez Armas: "ah, no, no, no, no, not at any moment". Dorticos: "nothing of that?" Hernandez Armas: "No, no, that nothing absolutely was given to her...rather they (enderezar - straightened out?) the interrogation...." Dorticos: "then we can go along ~~xxxx~~ the version of ~~xxxx~~ your information?" Hernandez Armas: "yes, Sr. Presidente, of course". Dorticos: "then nothing more of importance?" Hernandez Armas: "No, nothing important...~~xx~~ anyway, I am going to submit soon a draft of all the details, because there are other details of minor importance, and others of none at all, but contained in the statement.... and I have asked her to make me a ~~xxxxx~~ draft as prolific as possible And to submit it at the first opportunity".

" COPIES OF SPANISH LANGUAGE TRANSCRIPTS AND SOME ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS OF TELEPHONE CONVERSATIONS AS CONTAINED IN THE MEXICO CITY STATION FILES

Copy came
Burned —
Refer to Clark
Ext 281

11/26/63
1839

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 27, 1963

FROM : C. A. Evans

Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

John F

SUBJECT: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach telephoned at 10:50 a. m. He said he had just completed talking on the telephone with Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secretary of State. Johnson told Katzenbach that insofar as the investigation of this matter in Mexico is concerned, the State Department felt this should be coordinated and directed by the FBI. State took the position that the President's directive to the FBI extended to any activity outside of the United States, as well as within the country. Insofar as the Ambassador in Mexico is concerned, Johnson believed he should be kept informed of any pertinent developments but that the Ambassador should not be running the investigation.

As to current developments, Katzenbach said that the last thing he would want would be for the FBI to take Agents away from their investigative duties to prepare reports. He requested, however, that if there were any pertinent developments he be orally briefed.

I have done so & will continue.

With further reference to his conversation with Alexis Johnson, Katzenbach said he had been asked whether the State Department should make a formal inquiry of the Soviet Government for information concerning Oswald and his wife, particularly as to their activities in Russia. He asked that this question be considered by the Director, as Katzenbach felt his views most important.

In thinking about the matter himself, Katzenbach noted if we did not ask the Soviets for information there would be no answer should the question of Oswald's stay in Russia be raised, other than to admit we had made no inquiry. On the other hand, he observed that we could not place any reliance on anything the Soviets said.

UNRECORDED COPY FILED IN

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

REC-78 62-109060-1493

After conferring with Messrs. Belmont and Sullivan, the

1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan

CAE:vap (8)

RE[illegible] FROM FBI

XEROX FEB 27 1964

DEC 10 1963

25 DEC 9 1963

following recommendations are submitted with reference to the points raised by Mr. Katzenbach:

1. Insofar as making a formal approach to the Soviet Government, we believe this undesirable. Such a formal request from the United States will enable the Russians to put out an official statement entirely favorable to them. The United States will have to accept this, since it is in response to our formal request, and we won't be in a position to disprove it. The State Department has responsibility here and we should not dictate the position they are to take, but our views should be stated.

2. In connection with the investigation in Mexico, it is recommended Katzenbach be informed that the State Department and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) have jurisdiction in dealing with foreign governments and in getting investigative results and intelligence coverage abroad; that while we are cooperating fully with State and CIA in Mexico, the responsibility in this matter should rest with State and CIA.

If approved, Katzenbach will be so advised. — Done 2:25 pm
S. 11/27/63

O.K. The Ambassador in Mexico is acting like a Sherlock Holmes as indicated in the wires received this morning.

H

FEB 27 1976
FBI

HARVEY EX 1 R371
6/25/75
9kjs

~~SECRET~~

1

Project ZRRIFLE

1. Identification: The purpose of Project ZRRIFLE is to spot, develop, and use ~~foreign~~ agent assets for Division D ~~pos~~ operations. Agents will be spotted in several areas, including the United States, but ~~with posts~~ for operational security reasons will probably not be used in their countries of residence. Present developmental activity is being conducted in the WE and EE areas, but it is anticipated that this will be extended to other division areas. The project will be operated against third-country installations and personnel.

2. Objectives: The objective of this project is the procurement of ~~of~~ code and cipher materials and information concerning such materials, in accordance with requirements levied on the Clandestine Services, primarily by the National Security Agency. Since these requirements are subject to frequent revision, no listing of targets would be valid for the duration of the project. Specific operations will be mounted on the basis of need and opportunity. The project will be conducted by Division D with assistance from area divisions and stations as

3. ~~Background:~~

needed.

REC[illegible]
JUN 24 1975
CIA

3. Background: In response to the increasing requirements for the operational procurement of foreign code and cipher materials, Division D in 1960 began the spotting of agent assets as a developmental activity. During the same

Classified by 007789
Exempt from general declassification schedule of E.O. 11652 exemption schedule 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to
Criminal Sanctions.

~~SECRET~~

period requirements from NSA became more refined and in many respects more sensitive. Because most stations are not equipped to conduct this type of operation and because of the desirability of completely centralized control over this entire effort, it was determined that Division D, which is in closest touch with NSA on procurement requirements, could best conduct the activity. The ~~first~~ spotting activity has now advanced far enough to justify removing from the OOA category.

4. Operational assets:

(1) Personnel: QJWIN is under written contract as a principal agent, with the primary task of spotting agent candidates. QJwin was first contacted in 1958 through the Chief of the Luxembourg I.S. by the Chief of Station, Luxembourg, in connection with an illegal narcotics operation into the United States. For a period of a year and a half he was contacted sporadically by COS, Luxembourg, in behalf of the Bureau of Narcotics. Files of this Bureau reflect an excellent performance by QJwin. In ~~September~~ October 1960,

RECEIVED
JUN 24 1975
CIA

3

QJwin annual salary :	$7,200
Travel + ops expenses for QJwin + other agents & agent candidates:	2,000
Fees for services by and standby of agents and agent candidates :	2,000
Travel of staff employees engaged in Zrifle activity :	2,500
Hire of safehouses, automobiles and other operational expenses :	1,000
	$14,700

Pay for agents on completion of jobs?

REC
JUN 24 1975
CIA

4

1) Legal, ethical → morale, operational problems; political: non-attributability.

2) Our own experience (Bangkok) (+ effect on DDP) and experience w/KGB (Crossup, Bandera groups, Khokhlov) → require most professional, proven operationally competent, ruthless, stable, CE-experienced ops officers (few available), able to conduct patient search + w/guts to pull back if instinct or knowledge tells him he should, + w/proven high regard for operational security. Assessments are all-important.

3) Maximum security:

a. Kubark only (e.g., what does Siragusa now know?); no approach to other Govt. agencies.

b. Within Kubark, one focal point for control, search, tracing, case officering, etc. – DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. DCI officially advised?

c. Max. security cable commo for innocuous cables only; no restrictions on travel; possibility of one-man overseas (Europe) control base with own~~er~~ (non-Station) commo. Word of mouth + no bashfulness re trips.

d. No PA's, (except for search) or intermediaries; rigid case-officering, from start to finish.

e. No approach to officials of foreign govts.

f. No use of ~~amples~~ any agent who ever worked for a U.S. Govt. agency. Tracing by opposition would reveal.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

g. Use of already tested assets (e.g., Mankel) in the search.

h. Stand-by list of Kubarkers who can

5

pass as foreigners.

i. Pretext: Natuke(D) search; the established (e.g., Rome).
j. No discussions in stations. k. No "team" until ready to go, if at all.

4. Blackmail:

a. No American citizens or residents or people who ever obtained U.S. visa.

b. No chain of connections: strictly person to person; singleton ops.

c. No meeting any candidate in home territory.

d. Exclude organization e.g., Sicilians criminals, those w/record of arrests, those w/instability of purpose as criminals.

e. Staffers involved—selection.

5. Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Sovs or Czechs in case of blow.

6. Testing of nominees essential: re following directions, security, blackmail.

7. Former resistance personnel a possibility.

8. Use nobody who has never dealt w/criminals; otherwise will not be aware of pitfalls or consider factors such as freedom to travel, wanted lists, etc.

9. Should have phony 201 in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged + backdated. Should look like a CE file.

10. Possible use of staffers for the action.

11. Silverthorne.

Keeping of files.

~~RECEIVED FROM~~
~~JUN 24 1975~~
CIA

freedom to travel 6

Legal; operational + ethical→moral problems. Khokhlov case.

1) Maximum security → single pouch not secure enough. ± within Kubark only (e.g., how much does Siragusa now know?). Limitation on number code clerks for enciphering + deciphering. Guise of Lurid objective.

2) One focal point for search, control, tracing, case-officer + PA selection. Complete DDP authority in this focal point mandatory. Overseas one-man control base with own (non-Station) commo.

3) Every operation to be rigidly case-officered; no silk-shirt PA's.

Non-attributability:

4) No American citizens or American residents for direct action; possibly for approach to foreign elements. No criminal who tainted by use by another American agency. Use of

5) case officers who can pass as foreigners — and limited official reference.

5) No chain of connections permitting blackmail.

6) Don't meet any selectee in home territory.

7) Avoid discussion w/ foreign officials until all possibility of search through private citizens (e.g., Ofenin) has been examined.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

8) Planning should include provision for blaming Soviets (or Czechs) in case of blow. ∴ 4 above essential.

9) Exclude organization criminals, those with record of arrests, those who have engaged in several types of crime.

10) Corsicans recommended. Sicilians could lead to Mafia.

11) Former resistance personnel offer possibilities. (OSS archives.)

12) Period of testing, surveillance, etc. for each selectee.

13) ~~Any~~ All Kubark personnel involved should have some CE experience.

14) Silverthorne + stable in Paris.

15) What are limits on team or individuals ~~sel~~ selected? No "team" until ready to go.

16) ~~Fo~~ Danger of standbys.

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

~~SECRET~~

ied G — 25/1 — Exec Action

(— "The Magic button"

8

arcotics Bureau



"for a living" — RIS 201 cover.

Caution — Bankruptcy — no Stars

eyes — Jim A.

Not a TSD problem



/ Contradistinct from U-2 /

) Apply brakes

Last resort beyond last resort &

a confession of weakness. —

— El Benefactor → assumptions —

(Examples of 3 "wrong"

Framework of Sid's job: [illegible]

Exist R&D — Memo.

"Translating machines" — FLE

basic research project. —

phenomena — (6 months CB)

Commit — Fear

Anesthesia —

RECEIVED FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

26/1 — AS — Fanfani-DCI- Matter —

no file Review —

~~[illegible]~~ Never mention word assassination

1. Select proper officer to run —
2. Places & cover — Max of 2
3. Security Rules — B-WKH-AS-3
4. Limits — Sid — Reserve.
5. Last Resort — Brakes — Substitute — who next

~~SECRET~~

9

6. no other agencies (
7. no projects or papers
   except for cover.
8. Principal agent - QJ (Mankel)? -
   AF - Project Chief LCH -
   ticket 1500 - from NB -
   mask spot agn. - staff AF
   project - [illegible]
9. Disposal —
10. Targets who & where —
    Must know before
    we can spot —

    —
11. Case officering
12. Cover file - create & prove
    RIS or [illegible]. - non Sov
13. note dangers of RIS counter
    action & monitor if they
    are blamed -
    Fd J list — Remember

RECE[illegible] FROM
JUN 24 1975
CIA

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Otis Pike, Chairman
House Select Committee on Intelligence,
Rayburn House Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Congressman Pike:

Congratulations on your Committee's great service to the American electorate in removing some of the mask of secrecy from the domestic covert operations and funding of the CIA. Secrecy protected counterproductive and indefensible covert operations for twenty-seven years. The light of exposure and cleansing is now enhancing our country's security. The publishing of your excellent report over CIA and White House objections is an act of courage the electorate will soon appreciate.

Reliance, however, by any Congressional committee on handouts from the CIA itself, is like an investigative reporter compiling his story from government press releases. Neither is doing the job its employer paid it to do.

Finding the hidden CIA budgets for three or four times the billions of dollars admitted to the electorate is a commendable achievement. But what would your investigators have achieved if a law was already in force imposing criminal penalties upon CIA employees who leaked information to you? The CIA proposed secrecy law is a blackmail weapon.

Intelligence, money and secrecy combine to constitute autocratic power in our society. The Congress enjoys no intelligence service of its own. It enjoys no effective control over spending of funds hidden in the budgets of non-CIA departments and agencies. If it surrenders to the doctrine of secrecy it is powerless indeed. To strengthen Congress' power I offer you my own counterintelligence service in place. The sources have been carefully tested and accumulated since 1949.

The problem is not leaking intelligence out of Committee; it is leaking independent intelligence into it. Starting exactly one year ago today I launched penetration efforts with a 19 page report addressed to "Chairman and Members, Select Committees on Intelligence Operations. I hand delivered this report to every committee member's office. My wife Nancy recorded the date, hour and person delivered to.

On June 25, 1975 Edward Roeder III of your staff receipted for 103 pages of counterintelligence on CIA. This represented a distillation of a quarter century of intelligence gathering. CIA control of the Watergate breakin and coverup and CIA's investigation of my penetration of their secrets is covered. The application to the U.S. Attorney and three U. S. Special Prosecutors requesting investigation and prosecution of murder of American citizens within the U.S.A. is in your files. Nevertheless, none of this intelligence leaked to recognition or investigation within the executive departments or your Committee.

On July 30, 1975 Emily Shoketoff of your staff receipted for a one page notification distributed to chairman and members that Anne P. Commanduras, an employee of CIA's domestic assassination office, had been murdered in her apartment house swimming pool by CIA assassin Eugene Hale Brading.

I now enjoy the additional intelligence that Commanduras was executed with a CIA dart gun such as that displayed to news cameras by a member of the Senate Intelligence Committee. The intelligence weapon fires a sliver coated with shellfish toxin that kills within seconds, dissolves and leaves no mark. The CIA preserved their shellfish toxin supply in direct contravention of an order of the President. Your Committee filed this report without action along with over 200 additional counterintelligence. Is this secrecy that protects national security?

Congressman Pike, you have exposed $10 billion of CIA funding mostly hidden in another budget. Will you go for more? Then examine the State Department, Treasury Department, Justice Department, White House and Congress appropriations. All of these support personnel accepting orders for covert domestic operations from CIA.

You have uncovered CIA operations in the media. Investigate police departments throughout the nation funded by LEAA that are responsive to CIA orders. In the Fairfax County, Virginia, police department alone a CIA assassin has twice employed the badge of the department as cover to gain entrance to domiciles to perform executions.

I again commend your Committee for resisting the pressure for secrecy in publishing your report. I deplore your resistance to the leaking of intelligence into your Committee. The latter confines your Committee's intelligence to official and unofficial leaking channels of the CIA. Please concede that there are other citizens as concerned for the security of America as you are.

I respectfully request opportunity to confer with you, Congressman Pike, or with your capable, diligent and honest staff chief, A. Searle Field. I want to assist your Committee in recommending remedial legislation based upon 27 years of defining the problem.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

Encl: Letters to Senator
Abraham Ribicoff and to
Senator Frank Church.

REQUEST TO TESTIFY ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE DIVISION, CIA — PENETRATION OF NON-INTELLIGENCE BRANCHES OF GOV'T AND COUNTER-PENETRATION BY SOVIET KGB. — Ref

ABRAHAM RIBICOFF, CONN., CHAIRMAN
JOHN L. MC CLELLAN, ARK.
HENRY M. JACKSON, WASH.
EDMUND S. MUSKIE, MAINE
LEE METCALF, MONT.
JAMES B. ALLEN, ALA.
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.
SAM NUNN, GA.
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
CHARLES H. PERCY, ILL.
JACOB K. JAVITS, N.Y.
WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR., DEL.
BILL BROCK, TENN.
LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., CONN.

RICHARD A. WEGMAN
CHIEF COUNSEL AND STAFF DIRECTOR

United States Senate
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

March 8, 1976

Mr. Amos E. Heacock
~~4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708~~ 2334 Hill Rd.
~~Hyattsville, Maryland 20781~~ Falls Church, Va, 22043
Tel. (703) 534-3975

Dear Mr. Heacock:

Thank you for writing to me regarding your knowledge of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency. I understand that you have discussed these questions at length with members of the Committee staff.

On March 1 the Committee reported S. Res. 400 creating a Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities. The legislation which was before us concerned only the establishment of a new congressional committee; it did not involve revisions that would significantly modify the structure or the powers of the CIA itself. The Committee has not been authorized to hire additional staff personnel for the purpose of this legislation. Furthermore, we were under instructions from the Senate to report out a formal recommendation in the form of legislation by March 1.

I am, however, deeply concerned with the charges you have made because, if true, they represent grave examples of corruption and criminality. It is my hope and intent that the new committee created by the legislation we are considering, once it is established, will have the jurisdiction and the resources to explore the kind of issues which you raise.

I assure you that the entirety of the information you have submitted to my committee will be made available to the new Congressional oversight committee.

I am sure you understand the constraints on the Government Operations Committee which prevent us from undertaking the investigations you suggest, but I shall forward the material you submitted to the new committee as soon as it is established.

For your information, I am enclosing a copy of S. Res. 400 and a copy of the committee's report on this measure.

Sincerely,

Abe Ribicoff

Abe Ribicoff

Enclosures (2)

January 28, 1976

The Honorable Abraham Ribicoff, Chairman
Committee on Government Operations,
United States Senate
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Ribicoff:

Destiny has chosen you the second time in seven years to chair a committee with capability of establishing legislative remedies to prevent domestic and foreign assassinations, huge corruption within military supply streams, multi billion dollar currency manipulation and massive intervention of the CIA in domestic covert operations.

On or about March 6, 1969 you were the acting chairman of the Permanent Investigations Subcommittee that heard Cornelius Hawkridge, my witness, describe a multi billion dollar currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam. Carmine Bellino, staff investigator, prevented Hawkridge from also testifying about truck convoys of stolen military arms and supplies that he observed heading toward the Cambodia border. The "fence" for these stolen arms was the fabulous Soviet KGB agent Jacques Yang, described by staff in your hearings to be a mere Vietnamese commissary clerk. The organized crime vendors of the stolen goods reached into your Committee in Carmine Bellino to protect their lucrative racket. Hawkridge later wrote you a letter covering this deficiency in testimony. He pointed out the sale of arms generated funds used in currency manipulation.

I aided the crippled Hawkridge aboard his flight at Seattle. Your Committee provided an ambulance to meet him for it was less than two months since he survived an assassination attempt that killed his wife. The Soviet KGB let a contract with organized crime's CIA assassination facilities to kill them. The KGB considered Hawkridge a defector. William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, CIA alias William Harvey and double agent for KGB fingered Hawkridge and his wife Angela, a "baby sitter" agent for West German and CIA intelligence. In the contrived truck-car "accident" Hawkridge was crippled for life.

I met with CIA's Harvey as Boxley in November, 1968, in New Orleans pursuant to my counterintelligence investigations. Harvey, witness before the Senate Intelligence Committee, has admitted his role as organizer of the ZR/RIFLE Executive Action assassination capability and his contacts with John Rosselli and Sam Giancana of organized crime to implement that capability. Harvey incorrectly jumped to the conclusion for the KGB that Hawkridge was a cooperative source of much of my accurate counterintelligence on KGB.

Hawkridge had precipitated your investigation by appealing to a Treasury official. The official prevailed upon Senator John McClellan, then

Chairman of your Committee, to conduct it. He first exposed the famous "Prysumeen" account in a New York bank. It was used to convert South Vietnamese piasters to dollars, most of which ended up in three banks in the shiekdom of Dubai on the Persian Gulf.

My further investigation beyond the Committee probe, sabotaged by Bellino, established the dollars were used to requisition gold ingots from the U. S. Treasury at $35 per ounce. These were remelted to convenient "taels" or wafers of gold for black market trading for Indochina currencies again at huge discounts. The conspirators enjoyed government facilities for converting piasters to dollars at fantastically unrealistic official exchange rates. The exchange provided huge profits to conspirators and huge losses to the Treasury.

This inflation machine is still at work, though at a reduced rate since the end of the war in Southeast Asia. The entrepreneurs seek greener pastures where new wars destabilize currencies. Perhaps Angola? Hawkridge's real name is Cornel Solyom. His intelligence activities for a decade were traced in a 64 page report in the possession of the Senate and House Intelligence Committees and your Committee.

Senator Ribicoff, had the activities of CIA-Crime double agent Carmine Bellino and Hawkridge's testimony been exposed in the public record in 1969, the trauma for you, for your Committee, for the Congress and for the American electorate would have been mercifully softened. Bellino went on to become Chief Investigator for the Senate Watergate Committee. He covered up the sources of $1,050,000 of so-called political donor funds I have traced. He went on to instruct CIA agent Alexander Butterfield in the White House to reveal the existence of the President's tapes, thereby insuring his downfall.

A file of my letters to Senator Henry Jackson in 1969 were sent by him to your Committee. The intelligence was suppressed by Bellino. Although your Committee published eight volumes of hearings in this investigation, Hawkridge's vital testimony was deleted. My intelligence was disregarded.

The legislative remedies now being proposed to counter corruption of our intelligence services can only be made adequate by exposing to public view the depth of the problem of secrecy. I am alarmed at demands for secrecy to support CIA covert operations such as those that led our country into the most counterproductive covert operation in our nation's history -- the war in Vietnam. Did the secrecy imposed by Bellino within your Committee advance the security of the United States? Or did it insure the greatest humiliation of our foreign policy and our armed forces since the birth of our republic 200 years ago?

I am alarmed that criminal penalties are being proposed for public servants whose conscience impels them to notify Congress and the public of irresponsible actions of men infected with the arrogance of power. I

January 28, 1976

Ref: My letter 11/20/74
& encl. to Sen. Weicker
forwarded & acknowledged
your letter 4/7/75; your
acknowledgement data
5/5/75; my letter 7/11/75.

The Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate,
Russell Office Building,
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

I commend the diligent efforts of you, the members and the staff in producing and especially in publishing the Committee's report on "Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders."

Nevertheless, I must advise you that over 200 pages of counterintelligence on domestic and foreign assassinations of the CIA I have provided or made available to staff and members has been disregarded or deliberately withheld from members.

Consequently, as members are preparing to sign a final report, it is timely to list some of the disastrous errors of the interim report. The errors are the result of intentional misrepresentation and deceit of the Congress and the American electorate by the CIA, its directors and employees.

(1) The ZR/RIFLE Executive Action program begun in 1960, headed by William Harvey, was designed as a domestic assassination capability.

(2) Under the direct planning and implementation of Harvey, a number of domestic and foreign assassinations were executed.

(3) Harvey's real name is William S. Wood, alias William Boxley, alias W. J. Wood. His assassinations in USA I have already reported.

(4) Among foreign assassinations with participation by Wood's domestic team members on foreign duty are those of Lumumba and Trujillo.

(5) Orders passed by CIA for execution, rather than exiling or kidnapping, caused the deaths of Ngo Diem, Ngo Nhu and Rene Schneider.

(6) CIA gave the code name WJ/WIN to the organized crime assassination consultant employed to insure the killing of Patrice Lumumba. His real name is Michael Genovese, alias Victor Resignio, son of Vito Genovese, boss of bosses of the Mafia in Atlanta federal prison until he died. Genovese enjoyed assassination authority independent of CIA directors delegated by Meyer Lansky, boss of the American international crime syndicate then. Neither President Eisenhower nor President Kennedy conferred assassination authority upon CIA.

(7) Genovese, as Victor Resignio, directed an arms and supplies diversion and currency manipulation racket in South Vietnam in 1966-67 that cost the Treasury $51.8 billion, Executive Departments' total, not mine.

(8) Wood's crime team member that aided Genovese to assure Lumumba's death was code named WI/ROGUE. He is Frank Sturgis, Watergate burglar.

(9) Sheffield Edwards, witness produced by CIA as its Director of Security, was a spurious substitution to deceive the Committee and the American electorate. Recruited from organized crime, CIA coached him to appear as the Edwards or Colonel Edwards who directed the early alleged attempts to assassinate Fidel Castro.

The real Edwards who collaborated with organized crime's hit man John Rosselli, his boss Sam Giancana and Robert Maheu, agent of Howard Hughes, oil tool billionaire, was E. Howard Hunt, Watergate burglar. Edwards was Hunt's CIA name. The CIA poisoned Sheffield Edwards after his appearance to prevent his recall and possible exposure as a fraud.

(10) John Rosselli accepted assassination orders from mob leader Giancana who accepted orders in turn from Meyer Lansky.

(11) Committee witness Rosselli was the hit man who shot Giancana with a special assassination weapon developed by CIA. He led the kidnapping and execution of James Hoffa, one time Teamsters' president -- even as your hearings progressed.

(12) Witness Robert Mahue executed the orders of Howard Hughes in contacting Rosselli to implement a domestic assassination capability through organized crime. Hughes issued orders to assassinate Premier Ngo Diem through Richard G. Danner, alias Gil Danner.

Danner precipitated the Hughes order to bug Laurence O'Brien's telephone in the Watergate complex by being caught forwarding a $100,000 payment on President Nixon's San Clemente and Key Biscayne homes for Hughes to the President's friend, Bebe Rebozo. Hughes suspected a plot by defector Maheu and O'Brien to blow the election for Nixon. "Gil" Danner was manager of the International Club in Saigon, owned by the U. S. Embassy. He represented Hughes' interest in the $51.8 billion racket managed by Michael Genovese.

(13) CIA in 1949 established a Domestic Intelligence Division for covert action within the White House, the Executive Departments, Congress, political parties and the media.

(14) The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 was used as authorization for CIA to implement domestic covert actions through funding and personnel of domestic agencies of government. The Intelligence Directorate of CIA is cover for domestic covert actions in the agency itself.

I am sure you will agree that had your staff investigated and confirmed my counterintelligence during the year it has been available to you, the legislative remedies recommended by your preliminary report would have been found unacceptably weak by Committee, Congress and the American electorate. Please permit me to meet and serve you with counterintelligence input.

Respectfully submitted, Amos E. Heacock

Encl: Letters to Sen. Ribicoff & Rep. Pike

Amos E. Heacock, 4410 Oglethorpe, Hyattsville, 20781, telephone 864-5353.

am alarmed that no witness has pointed a finger of blame at the Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949. It is the Magna Charta of CIA's Domestic Intelligence Division. This act specifically provided cover for CIA. It effectively repealed CIA's restriction to foreign operations intended by Congress to prevent a police state.

The 1949 act authorized CIA to conceal huge portions of its budget and personnel within the budgets and personnel roster of domestic agencies of government. These especially include employees on Capitol Hill, in the White House, in the Department of Justice, in the Federal Aviation Administration and in the Civil Aeronautics Board. Until the act is repealed Congress will remain part of the problem, not part of the solution.

When Cornelius and Angela Hawkridge were hit by the CIA's domestic assassins on January 10, 1969 my anger overrode my caution. I wrote all fifteen members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee February 23, 1969. I demanded that Hawkridge be heard by the Senate. Although I received no replies, this forced Carmine Bellino's hand and Hawkridge was subpoenaed. The recipients referred some letters to your Committee.

Six months earlier my letter of August 14, 1968 to the Foreign Relations Committee enclosed a 606 page study entitled "Assassinations of the Industrial State." It concluded with the startling premise I am now prepared to prove to the Senate:

> "It is my firm prediction that when the Foreign Relations Committees get to the bottom of the CIA's conspiracy to usurp Congress' foreign policy authority they will also have solved the conspiracies behind the continuing assassinations of the industrial state."

I rely upon your fairness for opportunity to refute the claims of William Colby, Director of Central Intelligence, to testify and to aid your Committee to draft legislation that will effectively prevent abuses of power by the government's intelligence agencies.

As an Air Force officer before, during and after World War II, I am concerned, as I know you are, that our country's security will be protected. I will testify for more effective legitimate intelligence and counterintelligence services. Perhaps the most effective testimony I can give is that which will establish that the CIA has been thoroughly infiltrated and corrupted by double agents who owe their primary loyalty to the Soviet KGB.

Respectfully submitted,

Amos E. Heacock

Amos E. Heacock
4410 Oglethorpe, Apt. 708,
Hyattsville, Md. 20781
Telephone 864-5353

Encl: Letters to
Senator Frank Church
and Congressman
Otis Pike.

2/4/64 Memo King to Sanchez: Requirements for Amlash

① Latin Americans in guerilla training in Cuba?

(2) Number of training schools in Cuba?

(3) Are they training Africans, and if so, where?

(4) Training for officers in charge?

(5) Direction ~~for~~ of the training session

(6) Do they instruct foreigners and are the foreigners doing the training?

(7) Under whose auspices do they operate? how are they selected? What funds are used for the operations and how are they developed?

Staff Notes

1/6

P

- COPY -

(Original copy cannot be reproduced)

~~SECRET~~

FIELD INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY: Cuba

REPORT NO. HKH-1385

SUBJECT: Assassination of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico Solved

DATE OF INFO: 28-29 November 1956

DATE ACQUIRED: 29 November 1956

PLACE ACQUIRED: Habana

DATE OF REPORT: 30 November 1956

SOURCE, SOURCE EVALUATION, APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: Cuban government official (B)
Appraisal of Content: 3

1. Agents of the Servicio de Inteligencia Militar (SIM, Cuban Military Intelligence Service) are reported to have identified definitely the assassins of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, former chief of SIM killed on 28 October 1956 at the Montmartre nightclub. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents interrogated Dr. Armando CARDENAS Aranguren,[1] instructor of pathology at the University of Habana, and succeeded in obtaining an admission from CARDENAS that Juan Pedro CARBO Servia and Rolando CUBELAS Secades[2] had sought refuge at his house after the assassination of BLANCO Rico and had remained there approximately three or four days. CARDENAS stated during interrogation that CARBO had arrived at his house carrying a sub-machine gun. On the basis of CARDENAS' admissions, SIM officials are convinced that CARBO and CUBELAS were the ones who killed BLANCO Rico.

2. Implication of CARDENAS and CUBELAS resulted from the interception of a cable by SIM sent from Miami, Florida, by a friend of CUBELAS to Virginia SECADES,[3] mother of CUBELAS, in Habana. On 27 November 1956 Virginia SECADES was arrested by SIM and taken to SIM headquarters for questioning concerning her son's participation in the assassination of BLANCO Rico. SIM agents were unable to obtain any information from SECADES concerning her son's role in the killing but succeeded in learning that CARDENAS was a close friend of her son. On 29 November 1956 SIM agents picked up CARDENAS, who, under pressure, admitted that he was a homosexual, that CUBELAS was his intimate friend, and that he had hidden CUBELAS and CARBO in his home for about four days. These admissions were made at SIM headquarters in the presence of Colonel Irenaldo GARCIA Baez, deputy chief of SIM, Lt. Col. Marcelo TABERNILLA, who was wounded during the shooting of BLANCO Rico, and other high SIM officials.

3. Interrogation of CARDENAS failed to reveal the destination of CARBO and CUBELAS after they left the home of CARDENAS. On the basis of the intercepted cable, dated 23 November 1956, however, SIM officials believe that CARBO and CUBELAS fled to the United States by ship, since both possessed visas to the United States which were still valid.[4] CARBO and CUBELAS are believed to be in Miami at the present time.

FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA

~~SECRET~~

- COPY -

- COPY -

(Original copy cannot be reproduced)

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 2

DATE 30 November 1956

4. SIM has transmitted the results of interrogation of SECADES and CARDENAS to President Fulgencio BATISTA, but the latter's reaction to these new developments is not known. Further action by the Cuban authorities is complicated by the fact that the Government's main witness, CARDENAS, is of dubious reliability, because of his homosexuality. CARDENAS is also reported to be the doctor of the family of Santiago VERDEJA Neyra, Minister of Defense, who vouched for him when he was arrested by SIM.

Field Comments:

1. Office files contain no previous record of CARDENAS in connection with anti-BATISTA activities. A Dr. Armando CARDENAS was listed in Hoy (defunct newspaper of the Cuban Communist Party), issue of 22 April 1949, as one of the persons who sent greetings to the World Congress of Peace Partisans, scheduled to begin in Paris on 20 April 1949.

2. Both CARBO and CUBELAS have been the subjects in the past of denunciations and arrests by the Cuban authorities as a result of their anti-BATISTA activities. They were accused in August 1955 by Colonel Orlando PIEDRA, chief of the Department of Investigations, of having fled from the police from the site of an arms cache. In February 1956 CUBELAS was arrested and tried on charges of participating in student disorders, according to articles which appeared in local newspapers on 15 March 1956 and 1 April 1956. CARBO was denounced by the Cuban police as one of BLANCO Rico's killers immediately after the shooting incident at the Montmartre nightclub.

3. Office files contain no previous record of Virginia SECADES. Habana newspapers of 29 November 1956 carried an item in which the University of Habana Student Federation protested against the detention of Virginia SECADES by SIM.

4. Files of the Consular Section, United States Embassy, Habana, revealed that CARBO was issued a tourist visa on 3 June 1954 and that CUBELAS received a similar visa on 15 October 1954. The files do not indicate whether these visas were valid for a single entry or multiple entries, but they could still be valid, on the basis of the dates of issue.

5. Police officials announced immediately after the assassination of BLANCO Rico that they had information as to the identity of the two assassins, naming CARBO but not his accomplice, and that they were on the trail of the latter. The police have failed to find the killers, however, and reportedly, under pressure from President BATISTA and General Francisco TABERNILLA, Chief of Staff, Cuban Armed Forces, SIM and the police have been making desperate efforts to solve the BLANCO Rico killing. It is

FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA

- COPY -

(Original copy cannot be reproduced)

~~SECRET~~

REPORT NO: HKH-1385, Page 3

DATE 30 November 1956

possible that CARDENAS may have been forced by SIM interrogators to make statements implicating CARBO and CUBELAS which were not altogether true.

6. The local press and radio reported on 29 and 30 November 1956 that United States authorities were looking in New Orleans for two Cubans who were suspected of being the killers of BLANCO Rico. They were identified by name as Rolando CUBELAS Secades and Guillermo GARCIA Riestra. The latter, while a student at the University of Habana, was accused of having participated in an attempt against the life of Rolando MASFERRER in September 1949, according to office files.

7. Avance, Habana afternoon newspaper, published the official SIM version of CARDENAS' arrest on 30 November 1956; other newspapers carried it subsequently. It contained substantially the same information as reported above, but it also implicated among others, former president Carlos PRIO Socarras in the assassination of BLANCO Rico, alleging that PRIO had helped CARBO and CUBELAS to escape from Cuba.

RECEIVED FROM
AUG 15 1975
CIA

~~SECRET~~

- COPY -

0

~~SECRET~~

24

18 March 1965

L

8

MEMORANDUM:

SUBJECT: Proposal to Exploit L-1 and
Jose Rebellon in AN Operation

1. It is proposed that at the next meeting with U-25 we pass a message as follows:

> "A big comandante or capitan who used to be a leader of the university students opened a numbered (secret) account in Switzerland through Colombian Suarez (my successor). He was traveling in Europe at that time, roughly December 1964-January 1965. The deposit was in the amount of $10,000."

The message is purposely so phrased that it could apply to both L-1 and Jose Rebellon. Both are past presidents of the FEU (Federation of University Students), one is a comandante and the other a captain, and both were traveling in Europe in December 1964-January 1965.

2. Subject proposal has taken the following information into consideration.

Where?

L-1:

a. ~~The record:~~ The file shows that since April 1959 and repeatedly since then L-1 has threatened to eliminate CASTRO, but has not done so. He also was reportedly on the verge several times of defecting but never did. There are numerous reports of varying credibility that he has been and is a Castro agent. His character is such that he has been described in a report as "a probable thief, a possible user of narcotics, a homosexual or a friend of homosexuals," but also "an exceedingly brave man." Various reports indicate that he is a heavy drinker and a party lover. Thus a person ~~with such~~ traits could resonably be believed to be involved in irregular financial transactions.

recd 28 Aug 65
smc

~~SECRET~~

b. Favorable factors (from OPS standpoint): In the summer of 1962 L-1 gave WI-1 $500 in Helsinki to be deposited for L-1 in a European bank "for a rainy day." In March 1961 L-1 showed great sensitivity on the subject of bank accounts in Europe by Cuban officials, indicating that he might shoot any official so involved.

c. Conclusion: While it cannot be discounted that L-1 may be a Castro ~~agent, it may~~ be that he has been sincere ~~in~~ his dealings with CIA Resolution of doubts through an POLYGRAPH interview has been impossible since L-1 hit the ceiling when the matter was first mentioned.

Presumably CIA'S interest in L-1 is to see him carry out his mission to eliminate CASTRO The above proposal may actually stimulate the desired action. If L-1 is questioned by the regime in connection with this charge, and should the investigation involve a certain amount of harassment and unpleasantness, he might well reach the conclusion that the time to take matters into his own hands (which he has threatened to do for several years) has at last arrived.

and how is he going to get out of jail to do so?

If L-1 is a Castro agent and Castro should be aware of L-1 's relationship with CIA Castro might conclude that L-1 received the money from CIA banked it without reporting it, and was in fact working with CIA against Castro. (At the recent meetings in Paris L-1 asked us for $10,000. We did not give him this sum, though W-1 gave him $7,000.)

Which we had once told him he could have

If for any reason the regime should do away with L-1 , his alleged sympathizers in the Armed Forces might feel they must react at once to save their own skins. Given the tense political situation in Cuba today, this is not out of the question and certainly this proposal could split the regime more.

L-1 himself told B-1 that the last thing any of his friends would do would be to [illegible] him on this [illegible]

[illegible] FROM

~~SECRET~~

CIA

Jose Rebellon

Rebellon is a non-controversial good target for inclusion in this OPS play for the following reasons:

a. He is close to Castro, as well as to L-1, and has a Communist background.

b. He is familiar with the $80,000 account opened in a Swiss bank by Ambassador Carrillo in the fall of 1964. Rebellon has been authorized by Castro to draw on that fund for purchases related to Castro's pet projects. Castro might think that Rebellon had raided Castro's own official fund.

As with L-1, any action by the regime against Rebellon might widen splits in Cuba and bring about further political uneasiness and tensions in interpersonal relationships that we desire.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

10 February 1976

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Review Staff

ATTENTION: Mr. Walter Elder

VIA: SA/DDO

SUBJECT: SSC Request

REFERENCE: RS 76-0083/A (14 January 1976)

REC [illegible] ROM
FEB 11 1976
CIA

1. Re question number 1 of reference: Attachment "A" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City, Mexico, during the period 1 September 1963 through 31 December 1963 and who are still on duty. Attachment "B" contains the names of Agency personnel who were in Mexico City during this same period but are now retired or no longer on duty. It is understood that these attachments will be retained in the Headquarters building for use by the Committee Staff.

2. Re question number 3(a) of reference: For your background, the Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) was a Cuban student exile entity founded in September 1960 as an anti-Communist revolutionary organization dedicated to the overthrow of the Castro regime. The parent organization of the DRE was the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), a revolutionary organization of Cuban students opposed to the Batista regime which actively joined the Castro forces by organizing a guerrilla movement which contributed greatly to the collapse of the Batista regime. The Castro government, themselves of student origin, recognized the DR power and by-passed them politically by forming the new regime without their participation. The original DR became Communist controlled and directed. While the Agency had no role in the founding, the DRE was an entity used by the CIA as a unilateral asset in pursuing U.S. policy objectives. CIA support to the DRE ceased on 30 September 1966 and formally terminated on 1 January 1967. At that time DRE files were reviewed and material dealing with CIA support and operations were either destroyed or turned over the JMWAVE Station. The DRE was expected to continue as an organizational entity and continue its activities independent of CIA.

3. The DRE files of both Station JMWAVE and Headquarters that are available have been reviewed and Lee Harvey Oswald's name does not appear in these files. WAVE cable 8049 (in 66782) of 22 November 1963, states in the third sentence, "according AMSPELL files, Oswald", undoubtedly refers to the DRE files maintained in the DRE office in Miami, Florida.

E2 IMPDET
CL BY 009360

~~SECRET~~

These entity files were independent of the JMWAVE Station files. Had Station JMWAVE referred to its files in WAVE 8049 the cable would have been worded, "according AMSPELL Station files." The file of AMHINT-53, a former executive of the DRE, has also been reviewed and no reference to Oswald was found. The file number which appears on WAVE 8049 is no longer in use and the contents of this former file were transferred into Oswald's and other 201 files by the CI Staff. A tape of the radio debate cited in WAVE 8049 is included in the Oswald 201 held by the CI Staff.

4. Re question number 3(b) of reference: We have been unable to determine if Station JMWAVE was instructed to review its files for information on Oswald. For many years the CI Staff has been the focal point for the collation of any and all information concerning Oswald and if the JMWAVE files on any Cuban groups contained information on Oswald such information should be reflected in Oswald 201 file.

Richard S. Sampson
Chief
Latin America Division

Attachments:
A & B as stated

REC [illegible] ROM
FEB 11 1976
CIA

26/11/63
05:24

Hernandez Armas: "Listen, I have your confidential (report) 125, about the Sra. Duran case; and I want to ask you for some declarations on this; you can tell me in detail". He adds "listen...that's true...of blackmail, what you say here in the confidential (report), the Federals of that country wanted Sra. Silvia Duran to say something, that they had some interest in, and had offered some money to the American? (Oswald). Hernandez Armas replied that "no, no, nothing about money, no". Dorticos continued speaking, "and they tried to detain her, to oblige her to make a statement". Hernandez says that "she was detained, and was questioned with respect to this visit and the request for a visa, and then she said that she had requested the visa, had filled out the documents and the reply of our government had been negative, not granting the visa". Dorticos asked if "you spoke with her". Hernandez said that yes, "I could talk to her yesterday and I immediately sent the report". Dorticos: "understand? if all this is true,) better that it be known; if she is being DETAINED ~~[illegible]~~ by those people, better too." Hernandez: I was saying that she was detained Saturday afternoon, and freed in the early morning, and yesterday was when I found her and could talk with her, she referred me (? me refirió) and I took advantage of the fact that a plane was about to leave with our mail. Dorticos: yes, yes, you sent that, I already know what you sent...do you know what happened? that the paper that I have here, and don't tell me that ~~this~~ that is what happened? Hernandez: What I have just told you besides the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it that they asked you? Hernandez: They asked her concretely about whether she knew

[redacted]

[redacted]

this individual; if she had gone to the Consulate; if she had personal relations, and even if she had intimate relations with him...she denied all that, only....Dorticos: intimate relations with ~~her~~ him? Hernandez: Yes; she denied all that and said that it was a case like any other, of the many of the hundreds of cases that come to request visas at the Consulate, and if she remembered in detail of this case it was because this man had an incident with our Consul...he had an incident [illegible] in which our Consul AZCUE, rebuked him and practially threw him out of the Consulate. Dorticos: and why does she have BRUISES (hematomas), [illegible], did they treat her badly? Hernandez: well, yes, yes. Dorticos: what did they do to her? Hernandez: She has a few BRUISES [illegible] on the arms, because she says they squeezed her arms during the interrogation. Dorticos: what was it...as she told you about what was done. Hernandez: In this way, (Presidente): they went to her house and took her to the station, to the office of Federal Police and interrogated her to the extreme

REC'D FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

2.

I was telling you about. Dorticos: and the maltreatment, how was it? Hernandez: At the time of interrogation, trying to impress her so that she would tell all she had to say, that she knew, and then was when they took her by the arms and shook her. Dorticos: listen, Joaquin and did they aske her some other question about money? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely, it seems....Dorticos: did they try to get a statement from her? Hernandez: no, no, absolutely from what she told me, they limited themselves principally to try to find out what relations she had had and her husband with this individual. Dorticos: and they spoke of money? Hernandez: no, no, she has not told me anything about money, they did not talk to her about that, that is, she has not told me that they spoke to her about that. Dorticos: Mirabal ~~passed~~ SAID to a friend something about that. Hernandez: eeh? well, I asked her if there had been some interest, if they had questioned her on other points, if there had been something else, and she did not speak about that. Dorticos: At any rate, question her some more, investigate more and call me here. Hernandez: Good, Presidente, I will call you immediately.

FIDEL CASTRO SAYS HE KNEW OF OSWALD THREAT TO KILL JFK

By **COMER CLARK**

"Yes, I heard of Lee Harvey Oswald's plan to kill President Kennedy. It's possible that I could have saved him.

"I might have been able to — but I didn't. I never believed the plan would be put into effect."

These were the dramatic words spoken to me by Cuba's Prime Minister Fidel Castro in Havana on July 15.

"Lee Oswald came to the Cuban embassy in Mexico City twice," Castro went on. "The first time — I was told — he wanted to work for us.

Although millions of words have been written claiming that Fidel Castro was behind the Kennedy assassination, no newsman has been able to secure a personal interview with the Cuban prime minister for his views on the slaying of the U.S. President.

To shed more light on the most dramatic event of the 20th Century, The ENQUIRER sent Comer Clark to Havana for a face-to-face meeting with Castro.

And here, for readers of The ENQUIRER, is the exclusive story of the dramatic interview with Castro.

"He was asked to explain, but he wouldn't.

"He wouldn't go into details.

"The second time he said he wanted to 'free Cuba from American imperialism.'

"Then he said something like: 'Someone ought to shoot that President Kennedy.'

"Then Oswald said — and this was exactly how it was reported to me — 'Maybe I'll try to do it.'

"This was less than 2 months before the U.S. President was assassinated.

"The two visits occurred close together," Prime Minister Castro told me. "I didn't take them seriously."

My hard-won interview took place in the middle of a cheering, jostling mob on the sidewalk of La Rampa, the main "show street" of Cuba's capital, Havana.

Castro had arrived unexpectedly to inspect progress on the building of a Cuban pavilion, erected with those of other Communist countries to mark the July 26 celebration of Castro's rebellion against the Batista regime.

And also to mark the meeting in Havana of Castro's rebel Organization of Latin American Solidarity (OLAS) conference, due to open on July 31.

I had applied to the Cuban embassy in London during April-May for permission to go to Cuba to interview the island's prime minister.

Although a British subject does not need a visa to enter Cuba, approval by the Cubans for the entry [illegible] necessary.

Otherwise, the incoming visitor risks being turned away at Havana airport. The approval came at the end of June and was telephoned to me by Santiago Diaz, of the Cuban consulate in London, who deals with entry inquiries. Diaz told me that permission to visit Cuba had been "cleared" (though I was unable to learn what specific checks on my eligibility had been made).

REPORTER: Comer Clark's questions netted new facts.

There are only three legal ways to enter Cuba by air. From Mexico City, from Prague, Czechoslovakia, or from Madrid, Spain. So I flew to Madrid and entered Cuba by airliner on July 9.

In Havana, I immediately applied to the Ministry of External Relations for an appointment to see Prime Minister Castro.

In London, I'd been assured an interview would not be too difficult to obtain. But Senor Laurencio Cordoso, who dealt with foreign press queries was not quite as optimistic as that.

"You know, there are the annual celebrations of the rising against Batista," he said. "And then the meeting of the Organization of Latin American Solidarity.

PRIME MINISTER of Cuba, Fidel Castro, was addressing admiring crowd when ENQUIRER reporter drew surprising statements from him in unexpected rapid-fire interview.

"The Prime Minister is bound to be very busy. You will have to be patient."

While waiting for permission to interview the prime minister, I was taken on official visits to Cienfuegos Bay to watch the construction of a massive sugar processing and storage plant. And then I went to Trinidad, one of the oldest towns in Cuba.

I noticed that the windows of many Trinidad shops were barren of goods.

For example, in the former Woolworth store on the main street, the entire window facing the street was empty.

The only things that filled many otherwise empty windows were pictures and photographs of Fidel Castro and propaganda posters. Many shops are simply shut, because of a shortage of consumer goods.

Soviet help in construction schemes was obvious — particularly at Cienfuegos Bay. Some old American machines were still in use, but much of the new construction equipment was either Russian or Japanese.

Inspection tours, however, weren't what I had come for. I kept asking about the Castro interview — and kept being told I'd have to be patient.

Many early-bird delegates to the OLAS conference started to arrive now. Waiters, public servants and others began pinning on OLAS buttons. With all this activity, I began to feel my waiting and hoping

(Continued on next page)

Oct. 15, 1967

• • • It's Possible That I Could Have Saved Him, Says Fidel


OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UN

HIT CUBA HARD: President John F. Kennedy is shown in November 1962 as he told newsmen that Russia had agreed to remove weapons from Cuba.

DIDN'T HELP: Castro admitted he had heard of the assassination threat but gave vague reasons for not reporting it to the United Nations.

I [illegible] a restaurant on La Rampa, and was there on the evening of July 15 when there [illegible] the sudden sound of cheers in the street.

Many people hurried from the restaurant, and I hurried in the general direction of the crowd.

There were shouts of "Fidel! Fidel!"

Castro had, indeed, arrived.

Many of Castro's public appearances are made without prior warning. Partly, this seems to be for security reasons. But, also, because it is regarded as "in accordance with the spirit of the rebellion." Sudden, dramatic arrivals — spurning protocol.

I pushed into the cheering crowd as Castro, in his familiar "fatigue" uniform of olive green and a sweat-cap, acknowledged the cheers and looked admiringly at the [illegible] pavilion.

He spoke several times rapidly in Spanish. As I pushed through the mob toward him, [illegible] gripped me.

I had my Press card in my hand and waved it, saying (in English) that I'd like to see the prime minister when he could spare time to see me. I hoped some nearby official would be able to translate my request to Castro.

But apparently Castro himself heard my "foreign" voice above the background of the mob noise.

The bearded prime minister — who speaks and understands English well — turned around flamboyantly and, raising his arm, called to me in a friendly way: "Where do you come from, senor? Don't you think we're having a great celebration?"

I called out that I was a British newspaperman and had been trying to get an appointment to see him. Again, I waved my Press card.

"What's wrong with right now?" he asked in obvious good humor and plainly happy to be putting on a show for the crowd.

"Prime Minister," I said, "it's been suggested several times that there was some Cuban involvement or link with the assassination of American President Kennedy.

"Could you tell me if there is any truth at all in that?"

Castro looked straight at me, thought for a few seconds and then made the dramatic statement, quoted at the start of this article, that he'd had reports of Lee Oswald's visits to Cuba's Mexico City embassy but hadn't believed the threat serious.

LEE OSWALD
NOW LINKED TO CUBA

"How did you form this view?" I asked.

Castro replied: "Well, there were two calls in two weeks. I later learned he stayed at the embassy about 15 minutes each time. He gave the name Lee Oswald each time.

"The calls were reported to Havana, as a matter of course, under the authority of our ambassador in Mexico, Senor Joaquim Hernandez."

I asked: "Did the ambassador himself see Oswald?"

Castro replied: "No, he was seen by an aide. Just an aide."

He went on: "Let me be clear. I just didn't believe that he (Oswald) meant this. I thought that he must have been some sort of wild man. Or maybe after money.

"It seemed that to kill the head of a state was stupid. Just pointless. As far as Cuba was concerned, the policy of the American government would go on, anyway."

I asked Castro, frankly: "Did you have any thought of warning the American government about Oswald?"

Castro replied, spreading his hands: "We don't — didn't — have any relations with the American government, anyway.

"If I'd taken it seriously, I might have informed the United Nations or some other official agency about it. But who would have believed me? People would have said Oswald was just mad. Or that I'd gone mad."

He suddenly asked: "What is your name, anyway?" I told him.

"Well, Mr. Clark," said the Prime Minister, "I thought the visits might be something to do with the American CIA — whether anything eventually happened or not."

Cries from the crowd began to divert Castro's attention from me. I desperately asked if by "anything happened" he meant an assassination of President Kennedy.

"Well, it crossed my mind. But I didn't give much thought to it," he said.

"Then, too, after such a plot had been found out, we would be blamed — for something we had nothing to do with.

"It could have been used as an excuse for another invasion try. In any case, people would have tried to put it at my door."

Castro started to make his way to the edge of the sidewalk.

As he did so, he added: "I was not responsible for Kennedy's death. I will tell you that.

"I think he was killed by U.S. Fascists — right wing elements who disagreed with him."

Then he started speaking again in Spanish with those immediately around him, turned and said goodbye to the crowd, climbed into his car and was driven away.

It had been an unexpected and shocking interview under odd and difficult circumstances. If he could be taken at his word, Castro had shed new light on the Kennedy assassination mystery. I hoped to learn even more at the formal interview, which was still pending.

On July 17 I was telephoned at my hotel by Senor Cordoso, who had tried to arrange the formal interview.

Cordoso said: "I am glad you had the chance of meeting the Prime Minister. You were very fortunate."

I agreed and asked when my longer interview would be granted.

But Cordoso explained he'd been told by the Prime Minister's office that Castro would be heavily engaged with the anniversary celebrations and meetings with OLAS visitors.

"He has a lot of pressing engagements — those and other things," Cordoso said. "I can't see any chance of another personal interview at all in the near future."

This was the final decision, and I decided to make arrangements to leave Cuba. I flew to Mexico City, where I called at the high-walled Cuban embassy to see if I could learn more about Oswald's two visits there.

The grilled double gates were opened by a gatekeeper to allow in some official-looking diplomatic car.

I quickly showed him my Press credentials, and asked if I could see anyone of authority inside the embassy.

But the gatekeeper replied in halting English: "No, no Press. It is impossible."

The wall of silence had been lowered on the Oswald situation, except for that one revealing moment with Castro himself on the sidewalk in Havana.



INTRIGUE: Cuban Embassy in Mexico City was visited twice by Oswald before assassination.

RUSSIAN

mbassy of the USSR
S. A., Washington
Section
Reznichenko

wald, M. N.

nce and, therefore, by this
f replies (sic) to my appeals
the USSR and residence in
the expediting of this matter

fully,

O[illegible]d

—Continued



FROM: LEE H. OSWALD, P.O. BOX 6225, DALLAS, TEXAS
MARINA NICHILAYEVA OSWALD, SOVIET CITIZEN

TO: CONSULAR DIVISION
EMBASSY U.S.S.R.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
NOV. 9, 1963

6125

Dear sirs;

This is to inform you of recent events since my meetings with comrade Kostin in the Embassy Of the Soviet Union, Mexico City, Mexico.

I was unable to remain in Mexico indefinily because of my mexican visa restrictions which was for 15 days only. I could not take a chance on requesting a new visa unless I used my real name, so I returned to the United States.

I had not planned to contact the Soviet embassy in Mexico so they were unprepared, had I been able to reach the Soviet Embassy in Havana as planned, the embassy there would have had time to complete our business.

Of corse the Soviet embassy was not at fault, they were, as I say unprepared, the Cuban consulate was guilty of a gross breach of regulations, I am glad he has since been replaced.

The Federal Bureu of Investigation is not now interested in my activities in the progressive organization "Fair Play For Cuba Committee", of which I was secretary in New Orleans (state Louisiana) since I no longer reside in that state. However, the F.B.I. has visted us here in Dallas, Texas, on November 1st. Agent James P. Hasty warned me that if I engaged in F.P.C.C. activities in Texas the F.B.I. will again take an "interrest" in me.

This agent also "suggested" to Marina Nichilayeva that she could remain in the United States under F.B.I. "protection", that is, she could defect from the Soviet Union, of couse, I and my wife strongly protested these tactics by the notorious F.B.I..

Please inform us of the arrival of our Soviet entrance visa's as soon as they come.

Also, this is to inform you of the birth, on October 20, 1963 of a DAUGHTER, AUDREY MARINA RACHEL OSWALD in DALLAS, TEXAS, to my wife.

Respectfully,
L. H. Oswald

COMMISSION EXHIBIT 15

R2125 R

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jim Johnston, Paul Wallach

FROM: Dan Dwyer

DATE: January 21, 1976

SUBJ: CIA Briefing with Raymond Rocca Regarding Oswald

Early in our investigation of CIA's handling of the Oswald case, Raymond Rocca briefed Wallach, Dwyer and Greissing on November 11 and 13, 1975. Some of Rocco's comments merit consideration in light of our present knowledge of the case.

1. Opening of 201

Rocca explained that Oswald's 201 was opened by Betty Egerter from a list of American defectors 1958-1960 from the State Department.

2. Status of 201, 11/22/63

Rocca explained that on November 22, 1963 all documents in the Oswald 201 were originated by other agencies; Mexico City cable traffic was not included in the 201 because it was routed through a compartmentalized channel and therefore would not be circulated via the 201.

3. Oswald's Defection to USSR

With regard to Oswald's defection to the Soviet Union, Rocca said Oswald would have been of interest to the military and the FBI and that CIA was only interested in the "information" aspect of the case. Rocca could not cite any example of a U.S. citizen defecting on behalf of any interest of the U.S. government.

With regard to the "Hoover" memorandum of June 3, 1960 raising the possibility that an imposter could be using Oswald's birth certificate, Rocca believed Hoover would not have generated it. Rocca suggested someone at the Bureau who was familiar with Soviet technique of using birth certificates for illegals -- Larry McWilliams, Brannigan or Cregar -- would have authored the memo. (Rocca could never establish if, in fact, Oswald took his birth certificate with him to the Soviet Union.) Rocca commented that the Bureau memo, sent to State and ONI, should have been forwarded to CIA by State, but never was.

In Rocca's determination, Oswald was the only American defector who was allowed to stay in Russia following a suicide attempt. Rocca said that Oswald would have been subjected to one or two assessments by the KGB.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rocca referred to an SB study, directed by Lee Wigren and conducted by Virginia Valpi which compared the Oswald case to other U.S. defectors and their wives. SB concluded Oswald was not given special handling by the KGB. Rocca maintains Oswald was given special treatment. He believes Oswald's relationship with the "Red Cross" (from which Oswald received financial assistance) and the Red Cross' relationship with the KGB should be clarified.

Rocca also finds it peculiar that Marina married Oswald since Marina's uncle was KGB. Rocca said that Oswald was the only defector who married someone with a KGB connection of that kind. Rocca said that the CIA developed this information after the assassination.

Rocca described Minsk as "not an unsensitive section" of Russia and added that Oswald was the only American defector in Minsk, a white Russian area.

Rocca commented on Oswald's surprise visit to the American Embassy in Moscow by saying that "people don't do that kind of thing in Russia."

Rocca believes Oswald's Soviet diary is bona fide. Rocca admitted that although there are perceptible changes in the quality of Oswald's written material, Oswalds' mentality seemed conducive to periods of attention to thoroughness and detail.

4. Alleged Debriefing of Oswald

Rocca did not have any knowledge of an alleged debriefing of Oswald in New York City by the DCD. Rocca said that if a debriefing report existed, it would have been distributed in OO series (overt operations) of the DDI (now DDO). Rocca also noted that a debriefing report would not have been filed in the Oswald 201. Rocca noted that a Dr. Froyn (phonetic) supervised DDI records. Rocca also said that Traveler's Aid was a legitimate charitable organization which had no ties with the CIA.

5. Oswald and Mexico City

Rocca said that Chief, WH could clarify aspects of technical operations on Cuban and Soviet Embassies. Rocca said that David Phillips organized the technical surveillance.

Although the Cuban Embassy was officially closed on September 28, Rocca found nothing unusual about Oswald's visit there and meeting Silvi Duran, Cuban consulate employee.

Rocca emphasized that Oswald's activities in Mexico City were the responsibility of the FBI.

6. Possible Oswald-Cuban Connections

Rocca described document gaps in the materials that the Russian and Cuban governments forwarded to the WC via diplomatic channels. He described these areas as "open and relevant."

Rocca drew attention to Oswald's Marine duty in California in 1958. Basing most of his analysis on testimony of DelGado, Oswald's sergeant in California, Rocca maintained that Oswald had made contact with the Cubans at the Cuban Embassy in Los Angeles. Rocca said that DelGado had to release Oswald from guard duty because someone from Los Angeles reinitiated contact while Oswald was on duty.

Rocca placed specific emphasis on Castro's"impromptu "comments to Harker at the Brazilian Embassy in Havana on September 7, 1963. Rocca viewed Castro's comments as a "message" to American leaders and said it was a "very important signpost," Rocca added that the Mexico City Station brought Castro's comments to Headquarter's attention on 11/25/63. Rocca also viewed Castro's comments in terms of Oswald's possible perception of them, since New Orleans Times Picayune ran the Harker article on September 9, 1963. (This is the line Slawson adopted: could Oswald have read the piece?)

In regard to the Castro comments (unfortunately my notes are sketchy here) Rocca refers to a 10/24/63 cable, memo, or letter from "Des to Paris." He then refers to an 11/5/63 memo for the record and said "man never heard from again." Rocca should be asked to clarify these references.

Rocca briefly outlined Cuban-Russian relations in the early 1960s. he described 1961 as the "seed time" between Cuba and the USSR. Rocca said that following the missile crisis, the KGB and DGI began a "preliminary relationship." Rocca mentioned Srotoff (phonetic) and Alexiev (sic) as being KGB principals involved. Rocca said that when Castro visited Moscow in June-July 1963, Alexiev and Leonoff served as liaison between Kruschev and Castro. Rocca referred to an escalation of Alpha-66 activity (sporadic revolutionary attacks on Cuban ports, vessels, etc.) in July-August 1963. Rocca places Castro's "warning" of September 7, 1963 in the context of these activities.

Rocca said that Oswald's activities for the FPCC in New Orleans were apparently self-motivated. Rocca added, however, that V. T. Lee, national chairman of the FPCC, visited Cuba in 1964. Rocca noted that (fnu) Hernandez handled Lee's case and that Hernandez' office was next to Azcue's, who, according to Duran, argued with Oswald at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. According to Rocca, Hernandez was mentioned in penetration reports from Guatemala where Hernandez was running two DGI agents. Rocca outlined these relationships briefly to demonstrate DGI-FPCC connections. Rocca concluded that the Warren Commission should have paid more attention to the DGI. Rocca also mentioned that the CIA picked up a DGI defector named Mugg in April or May of 1964, who was handled by WH Division.

7. Oswald, New Orleans, Garrison Case

Rocca said that the CI/R and A stayed on top of the Garrison case and "summarized overt developments." Rocca identified the analyst for the Garrison material as Donald Pratt. Rocca said that by NSA intercepts and associated relationships, the CIA believed Garrison was operating (unwittingly) under KGB manipulation. (Rocca briefly described Soviet technique of misinformation. He recalled an interview that Drew Pearson had with Kruschev in Cairo in 1964 or 1965. Kruschev told Pearson that his "gut feeling" was that American right-wing extremists and capitalists were responsible for thePresident's assassination. Rocca said this typified KGB disinformation.)

Rocca characterized Oreste Pena's allegations as "absolute fabrication." Rocca said CIA files revealed that Clay Shaw was a contact of the DCD until 1956.

Rocca said that he was never informed in 1962 or 1963 about a revolutionary training camp around Lake Pontchartrain. He believes that the CIA did not know of its existence. Rocca said there is evidence that messages from the Lake Pontchartrain camp were going to a drop in Mexico City.

8. GPFLOOR Period

GPFLOOR was the crypt used to describe the investigation conducted by CIA following the President's assassination (11/23-1/12-15/63.) The Mexico City aspect of GPFLOOR was controlled by WH: J. C. King, Chief; Jack Whiten, Desk Chief, and Win Scott, COS, Mexico City. Rocca said that Whiten would report Mexico City developments to Helms who would then inform McCone.

9. End of GPFLOOR: Warren Commission

With the formation of the Warren Commission, the GPFLOOR period ended. Rocca explained that Helms served as the major liaison between the CIA and WC. Rocca served as chief of research for matters of interest to the WC -- mostly concerning Oswald's defection to Russia. Rocca's staff included: Thomas Hall, Arthur Dooley and Paul Hartman. Hall conducted research on Soviet service in DDO. Dooley followed all Bureau developments forwarded to CIA. Hartman was responsible for exploration of overt references and Soviet service." Additionally, Hartman researched DeMohrenschildt's relationship to the Oswalds.

Rocca reported his research staff's findings to Angleton; Rocca had no contact with Helms. Rocca explained that he had some liaison with Slawson of the WC staff. Rocca said that any negotiation between the CIA and WC was conducted by Helms, Dulles, and Rankin. Rocca said he had no knowledge of any CIA assassination attempts against Castro.

Rocca emphasized that the FBI was the investigative arm for the Warren Commission. Rocca said that Sam Papich, Dick O'Niell (sic) and Jim Hunt were the Bureau personnel involved with the WC.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Rocca said that additional research in CI was conducted by David Murphy and Bagley, Chief and Deputy Chief of CI/SB. Rocca said that Lee Wigren and Virginia Valpi were also involved in Soviet R&A.

10. Rockefeller Commission Inquiry

Rocca served as CIA liaison to the Rockefeller Commission in regard to Warren Commission allegations. Belin and Robert Olsen were involved in the investigation. Belin wanted Rocca to review documentation regarding the photo of the unidentified individual in Mexico City. Belin told Rocca that the Warren Commission was not clued in on Cuban emigreeissues and Operation MONGOOSE. Rocca developed the impression that the Rockefeller Commission was looking into CIA's operations aimed at Castro. Belin asked Rocca for the Castro comments of September 7, 1963. Belin was not aware of the statements during the Warren Commission. (Slawson, however, was but only at the conclusion of the WC.)

Rocca also said that Belin is writing another book on Oswald and the President's assassination.

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

FEB 24 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to the request in Item 15 of a letter dated January 14, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Michael E Shaheen

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination

✓ orig + att → admin
cy → Wallach
cy → Blue
Tissue → Chron

VI-C-5-D31

1976 FEB 27 AM 11:41
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 19, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated January 14, 1976, requesting access to various materials contained in FBI files.

Item 15 of referenced letter requested access to materials pertaining to FBI contacts or interviews of Loran Eugene Hall from January, 1963, through December, 1975. Material responsive to Item 15 has been assembled and is available for review by SSC Staff members in Room 4171, J. Edgar Hoover Building.

SSC Staff member Paul Wallach advised on February 10, 1976, that the portion of referenced request concerning Item 14 is withdrawn.

I then got a call from Bundy on October 2nd, and he said that -- Chase, I think his name was, Peter Chase, one of his assistants -- is the person to be in touch with, and to keep him apprised of all developments.

I later again got a word from Jean Daniel, the French correspondent who had come back from Havanna saying Cuba seemed ripe for a conversation. So this also came from another source, a Greek town planner named Doxiati,, who said that Castro was very much interested in some kind of normalization relation, but that Che Guevera and Raul were opposed.

October 21st, I got a call again from Bundy's office asking me what was new. I said, well the ball is now, in the Cuban's court.

On the 28th, I saw Lochuga again at the UN who said that Havanna didn't see exactly how a talk would be useful now, but he would be glad to maintain continuous contact with me anyway.

The 4th of November I briefed Stevenson on these developments and meanwhile, Miss Howard had been on the phone with Rene Valao who was Fidel Castro's aide at that point, and who was one of the so-called pro-Americans in the group and who suggested that I get in touch with him by telephone.

I then briefed Bundy on this on the 5th of November Bundy told me that the President was more in favor of pushing towards an opening toward Cuba than was the State Department, the idea being -- well, getting them out of the Soviet fold and perhaps wiping out the Bay of Pigs and maybe getting back into normal.

Chase then said Bundy wanted a chronological memo about the entire thing. I might say I have forgotten one point. When I first told Adlai Stevenson about this demarche or approach by the Cubans he said he liked it, but, and I quote, he said the CIA, unfortunately, is still in charge of Cuba. But he said -- he still offered to take it up with the White House.

Anyway, we're now on November 12th, and I went to Miss Howard's apartment where she said he had set up a phone call to Havanna with Valao. We never could get through the bad connections, but she had spoken to him before I arrived and he had suggested that I come to Marianao from Key West and talk directly with Fidel Castro, because they wanted to avoid going through Havanna.

Bundy called me the same day to say that the White House favored preliminary talks with Valao at the UN but not down in Cuba and told me to tell Valao this. I finally reached Valao on the telephone on November the 14th and delivered a message about his coming here. He said -- and that we wanted to discuss agenda.

He said he would send instructions to LaChuga and that he would -- or rather Castro, through him, to LaChuga, that they should discuss an agenda with me. He was very cordial on the telephone.

Atwood
7/10/75

TAB K p.9

we referred to our talk in '59 and he said another talk might be possible and useful at this time, and that was the first real indication. At this point, I said I'm no longer a private citizen but a government official and we agreed that the current situation was different, at the same time, things were a bit abnormal and he said the Cubans were very much annoyed at the exile rate, the CIA rate on Cuba, as well as the freezing of their assets.

The next step was my visit to Washington on September 24th when I came down to see Robert Kennedy who was then Attorney General. His position was -- I showed him the memoranda, which I had prepared on what had happened up to that point. He said that a trip to Cuba which is what LaChuga had suggested would be rather risky, said it was bound to leak and said it might result in some kind of Congressional investigation or something. Anyway, it might be a problem. But he did think the matter was worth pursuing through UN channels, and he would be talking to Averell Harriman and Bundy about it.

At that point, LaChuga said he would be making a very violently anti-American speech on November 7th and not to worry too much about it, so Stevenson asked me to help prepare a speech in reply. On the 27th of September, I saw Lochuga again, told him I could not accept any invitation to come to Cuba, but I would be glad to keep in touch with him and he could talk with anyone who wanted to come up and he said he would notify Havanna.

I reported this to Bundy on the 19th of November -- by the way, my call to Valao was the 18th -- he said that after their agenda had been received, the President wanted to see me at the White House and decide what to say and whether to go or what we should do next. That was the 19th of November, three days before the assassination.

On the 29th of November, LaChuga had seen Miss Howard and he wondered where things stood now. I passed the word to him that I didn't know, but that until we were told differently that we would continue our conversation.

On the 2nd of December he confirmed getting a letter from Valao and he wanted to know if things had changed again. He said he was authorized to talk to me in general terms.

I called the White House, Chase in this case, to say that the ball was now in our court.

On December 4th, LaChuga again looked me up at the UN, said he now had a letter directly from Castro approving the detailed talks and an agenda. Again, I informed Chase.

He said the decision would take some time now because all our policies were under review.

This went on. I kept seeing LaChuga and LaChuga would say he was waiting for an answer, and I kept saying well the door isn't closed, I just don't know.

On the 17th of December the President, this time President Johnson, came to the Waldorf to meet with the delegation at

Stevenson's apartment and told me that he had read my Cuban memo recapitulating the events or the discussions in the fall with interest and that was that. And I then was in Washington. Averell Harriman asked me about the Cuban project. I said I didn't know, that it was lying down in Chase's office in the White House and that he told me he'd get back to me after the holidays.

Well, that ended my diary in '63. I then went to Kenya as Ambassador in February of '64. However I do recall that some time in January I again called Chase and I said, well, if this thing is going to be continued I would suggest either John Case or someone on that mission. He said, well, it doesn't look as though it's going to be continued now because it's an election year, or whatever the reason was, and anyway we'll keep it in mind but that it was a dead issue.

The interesting thing, I think in terms of your investigation is that whatever was going on in terms of assassination plots, certainly there seemed to be two tracks, because it seems hard for me to believe that the Executive would be approving this type of negotiation while other covert operations were happening, although it could conceivably have happened.

The Chairman. If it did happen, what we are in search of is an explanation.

I think your testimony is helpful. Certain inferences can at least be drawn. But it is very helpful.

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

Research

MAR 8 1976

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

Transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation with an attachment which is responsive to a letter dated February 12, 1976, from Mr. Paul Wallach of your Committee's staff.

Sincerely,

Steven Blackhurst
STEVEN BLACKHURST
Assistant Special Counsel for
Intelligence Coordination

RECEIVED FROM
MAR 9 1976
FBI

CE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

62-116395

February 27, 1976

U. S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY
GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT
TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

Reference is made to SSC letter dated February 12, 1976, which requests delivery of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, which memorandum is contained in the "Official and Confidential Files" (O & C) and which was made available for access on February 12, 1976, to an SSC Staff Member.

A copy of Mr. Hoover's memorandum dated November 29, 1963, is attached in compliance with the above request. One excision has been made by reason of privacy.

Instant memorandum also serves to confirm a conversation on February 20, 1976, between Mr. Paul Wallach, SSC Staff Counsel, and Mr. Steven Blackhurst, Assistant Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Department of Justice, a pertinent portion of which conversation was relayed by Mr. Blackhurst to Special Agent Thomas J. McNiff. Mr. Blackhurst reported that during the above conversation Mr. Wallach gave assurances that should the SSC decide to use the attached memorandum or any portions thereof, the material used will not be identified as having been maintained in Mr. Hoover's O & C files.

In addition to the above, referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976, also requested delivery of all material in the O & C files pertaining to a number of specifically identified items relating to the Warren Commission and to this Bureau's investigations of both the Oswald matter and the assassination of President Kennedy. A thorough review of the special indices relating to material contained in the O & C files failed to indicate that any documents contained in these O & C files, other than the attached memorandum, would be responsive to the items listed in referenced SSC letter of February 12, 1976.

Enclosure

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Original

Page one

Document Routing Sheet

Date Received	Received From	Classification	R #
3/11/76	CIA	Confidential	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr. to Miller (attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/attach. 1 pg re: Oswald file

Copies to:	Date		Date

Original to:	Date	Filed:
Research	3/2	VI-C

Research

Document Routing Sheet

Page three

Date Received	**Received From**	**Classification**	**R #**
3/11/76	CIA	Confid	2762

Description: 3/11/76 ltr to Miller (Attn. Johnston) fm Elder w/ pg attach. re: Oswald file

Copies to:	**Date**		**Date**

Original to: Research

Date 3/12

Filed:

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Tolson ✓
Belmont ✓
Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad ✓
DeLoach ✓
Evans
Gale
Rosen ✓
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : Mr. Belmont

DATE: November 25, 1963

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: JACK RUBY;
LEE HARVEY OSWALD - VICTIM
CIVIL RIGHTS

At 9:20 A.M. this date an individual identifying himself only as Mr. Miller, 1125 14th Street, Northwest, contacted the Bureau and advised that he was a close friend of Ruby. In addition he identified Clint Murchison and Tommy Webb as being friends of Ruby. Miller declined to furnish additional information but agreed to interview. Washington Field Office was immediately advised and an Agent dispatched in order to get full details concerning the above.

Press vigorously. I would surmise it is Clint Murchison, Jr. not Sr.
H.

1 - Mr. DeLoach

HAS:cfs
(7)

REC- 25 44-24016-1170

EX-114

22 NOV 29 1963

FEB 6 1978

FBI This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

9 DEC 4 - 1963

~~TOP SECRET~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-XI-23

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS RELATING TO PLOTS TO ASSASSINATE CASTRO

On May 20, 1975, I reviewed one file of documents in the office of the Assistant Attorney General/Criminal Division. The file was about one-half inch thick, was marked "#82-46-5 - TOP SECRET." It contained documents relating to the October 31, 1960, wiretapping incident in Las Vegas.

The documents in this file indicated the following items of interest:

1. The IRS investigated Rosselli from December 1, 1962, to March 1, 1963.
2. IRS report attached to March 19, 1963, memo to Herbert J. Miller, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division, indicates Maheu told FBI that Rowan tap had been placed to determine whether McGuire had leaked any classified information she had obtained from Giancana.
3. Letter from Miller (Assistant Attorney General) to U.S. Attorney in Las Vegas of January 17, 1963, instructed that prosecution of Balletti should be dropped.
4. Memo for the Record, dated May 14, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications, by Sheffield Edwards of CIA - The file contained original of this memo outlining the full briefing which had been given Robert F. Kennedy on May 7, 1962. (We have a copy of this from CIA.)

RMC:clb

~~TOP SECRET~~

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02372

5. Memo to Attorney General, from Herbert J. Miller, of April 24, 1962, Subject: Arthur James Balletti - Wiretap Case - Sam Giancana - This memo recommends prosecution in this case would be against national interest. It contains no mention of assassination.

6. The file contained several memos to and from FBI Director and Miller of January, February, and March, 1962, re Las Vegas case. They did not mention assassination.

7. Other Department of Justice documents of December 1961, relating to possible prosecution were filed. They basically outlined facts of the Balletti matter.

8. FBI reports on Las Vegas incident, dated September 12, 1961, August 18, 1961, and July 28, 1961. The last one indicated Maheu installed bug to determine whether Giancana had leaked classified information to McGuire.

9. There follow several FBI reports on interview during 1961 of participants in the Las Vegas incident.

10. Memo from Director of FBI to Attorney General, of May 22, 1961, transmits the memo dated May 22, 1961, of an interview with Shef Edwards of May 3, 1961. [We have copy of the memo on this interview, dated May 22, 1961, Subject: "Arthur James Balletti, et al."]

11. FBI report (April 20, 1961) of interview with Maheu. It indicates Maheu said he ordered bug to determine if Giancana or McGuire were leaking information.

12. There follow many FBI documents in 1961 on investigation of details of preparation, etc., for Las Vegas affair.

13. Memo, dated November 22, 1960, to Assistant Attorney General (Criminal Division), from Director of FBI, Subject: Arthur James Balletti, Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications transmitted a report of an FBI agent at Salt Lake City dated November 10, 1960. The agent's report stated that Balletti was arrested on October 31, 1960, at the Riviera Hotel, Las Vegas. This report contains the details of the arrest. (This document is the last entry in this Criminal Division file on the Las Vegas Incident.)

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

14. Documents from late 1960's and early 1961 indicate Maheu did not implicate CIA initially but instead said he had been asked by a Los Angeles attorney to arrange investigative work in Las Vegas. Maheu declined to name the attorney.

Maheu first mentioned CIA connection in an FBI interview on April 18, 1961 [after the Bay of Pigs] (detailed in an agent report of April 20, 1961, transmitted by a memo to Assistant Attorney General on April 25, 1961). He said he was working with CIA and the Las Vegas bug was ordered to determine if Sam Giancana was leaking information. (Maheu did not tell FBI about nature of activities he undertook for CIA.)

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

to eliminate a break for big investors.

pected to improve the measure's image in the eyes of House liberals, who have been fearful that the committee might report out a "rich man's bill."

The crucial vote in the hairbreadth decision was understood to have been cast by Rep. Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich.), who was absent when the committee deadlocked 12 to 12.

Youngsters stand in front of the newly completed James W. Johnson School at 1420 S. Albany, and watch as the last of [illegible] mobile classrooms is moved away. Portable schoolrooms were moved to Delano School, 3937 W. Wilcox, where they'll be used until a new wing is completed there. In an interview Thursday Schools Supt. Benjamin C. Willis defended the flexibility of the mobile units, saying they are being requested in some areas in spite of protests directed against their use at 73d and Lowe. Stories and other pictures on Page 3. (Sun-Times Photo by Howard Lyon)

Chicago Sun-Times
16 August 1963

Helms #1

CIA Sought Giancana Help For Cuba Spying

By Sandy Smith

Sun-Times Correspondent

WASHINGTON—A fantastic tale of attempted Cuban espionage involving Chicago gang boss Momo Salvatore (Moe) Giancana and the Central Intelligence Agency was revealed Thursday to The Sun-Times.

EXCLUSIVE

It was a weird gangland spy case in which, government officials said, CIA agents contacted Giancana in an effort to obtain Cuban intelligence after the Fidel Castro regime came into power in 1959.

What the CIA accomplished—if anything—by negotiating with the 53-year-old Chicago rackets chief is one of many unexplained mysteries of the matter.

One thing, however, is certain:

For several months in late 1959 and early 1960, Giancana, a big shot on gangland's "Commission" and in its La Cosa Nostra murder-and-terror society, became what his fellow gangsters abhor and would act swiftly to exterminate—an agent for the U.S. government.

The CIA wasn't talking about the case here on Thursday.

But Justice Department sources expressed belief that Giancana never did any spying at all for the CIA.

Giancana, according to these sources, merely pretended to go along with the CIA in the hope that the Justice Department's drive to put him behind bars might be slowed—or at least affected—by his ruse of co-operation with another government agency.

If this was Giancana's motive, his scheme was a failure. For a probe by the Justice Department and Federal Bureau of Investigation of Giancana's crime syndicate in Chicago led directly to the exposure of the La Cosa Nostra ("our cause") brotherhood and the Commission.

With his connections in Cuba, Giancana declared he would be able to sneak intelligence out of the island for the CIA.

A high government source gave The Sun-Times this account of how Giancana stepped into the role of a government agent:

The CIA made its first contact with Giancana in 1959.

The Chicago gang boss then was embittered because the Commission, in traditional gang bipartisanship, had dollars backing both sides in the Cuban revolt.

The Commission was said to have given financial backing to Castro—only to have him shut down the gambling casinos.

And the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, reportedly fled Cuba with millions he received from Commission hoodlums.

In his dickering with the CIA, Giancana reputedly boasted that he had contac̣ts with

Turn to Page 2

Castro forces kidnap 19 refugees in the Bahamas while U.S. fliers watch helplessly, Page 2.

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OF

02376

that could not intervene under plan.

Reveal CIA Sought Giancana's Aid

Continued from Page 1

anti-Castro factions and was ready to use his contacts for the CIA.

Justice Department officials say now that Giancana was just talking. He might have had some "contacts," but he never produced anything of value for the CIA, the officials said.

The CIA was said to have dumped Giancana as a possible source of Cuban intelligence some time in 1960, long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April, 1961.

An equally bizarre episode months later gave the Justice Department its first clue to Giancana's negotiations with the CIA.

The figures in this incident were a male night-club entertainer and Giancana's girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, one of the singing McGuire sisters.

At the time, in Giancana's opinion, the entertainer was overly attentive to Miss McGuire.

At Las Vegas, Nev., in 1961, sheriff's police seized a prowler in the entertainer's hotel suite. For hours, the intruder refused to identify himself or say he was rifling the entertainer's rooms.

Persistent questioning by sheriff's deputies, according to federal authorities, led to an admission by the prowler that he was on the payroll of a private detective agency in Florida.

Florida authorities sought an explanation of the incident from the operator of the detective agency. At first, the operator refused to discuss the matter. Finally, however, he told investigators to get in touch with the CIA.

The inquiry then shifted from Florida to Washington and revealed Giancana's negotiations with CIA, it was disclosed.

Government sources reported Thursday that the private investigator's mission in the Las Vegas suite of the entertainer was another riddle of Giancana's caper with the CIA. Neither the CIA nor the Florida detective agency ever has offered an explanation of what the investigator was doing in the hotel suite, the sources said.

Sign First Trade Pact

DAR ES SALAAM, Tanganyika (AP) — Tanganyika and the Soviet Union have signed their first trade agreement. The African nation will exchange sisal, cotton, hides, skins, tobacco and coffee for Soviet metal, tools, vehicles, road equipment, cameras, fishing boats, planes and other things.

Fifth Buddhist Burns Self

HUE, South Viet Nam (AP) —A 71-year-old Buddhist monk burned himself to death in his ceremonial robes inside Hue's biggest pagoda early Friday.

He was the fifth to burn to death in the mounting Buddhist campaign against the South Vietnamese government of President Ngo Dinh Diem, a Roman Catholic.

His self-immolation in the courtyard of the Tu Dam pagoda brought immediate martial law to Hue, which lies 40 miles north of Saigon and is the ancient capital of Viet Nam.

He was the third to burn this week. A 17-year-old novice monk committed suicide Tuesday and a middle-age nun took her life in Ninh Hoa Thursday.

Reliable informants said the nun, Dieu Hien, set fire to herself in the market place of Ninh Hoa, a coastal village 200 miles northeast of Saigon. She was the first woman fire-suicide.

Informants at Ninh Hoa said government authorities had taken the nun's body in a move aimed at preventing a mass demonstration at her funeral.

They followed the same tactic with the body of a novice monk who immolated himself early Tuesday near the central Vietnamese religious center of Hue.

It had an opposite effect,

Tar-Feathers 'Torture' Bared As Hoax

LOS ANGELES (UPI) — A woman tarred and feathered and apparently left to die in a flaming house told a bizarre story Thursday that her "torture" actually was part of a hoax to stir up a racial incident.



owner of the house which was set afire, Henry Lewis, attempted to inspire a racial incident that would pressure his neighbors in a right-of-way dispute.

Officers said Mrs. Harwell and the Lewises were arrested

Mrs. Smith, a baby-sitter, admitted setting fire to the house, authorities said. She and the Lewis couple faced charges of arson and conspiracy, detectives said.

According to Mrs. Harwell,

INDEX TO

Milburn Akers	Column
Astro-Guide	John Dre
Business News 54-58	Editoria

JOB #____

Selected

See

C-XI-1

x # 6 of 10

iscellaneous John McCone Papers

hai Pilots

ateral used at NSC Exec. Committee Meeting 29 March 63

rge envelop of miscellaneous papers

riefing Memoranda-1962

esident Briefing 22 Dec 1964

I" File 1962

" File 1962

ile 1962

ar East Trip 2-14 June 1962

urcell Panel 1963 & 64

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02298

~~see~~ No

JOB #_ _

No✓

x 4 of 10

otes for DCI and Weekend Reading June-Dec 1963

riefing Memoranda 1962

tate Cables for DCI Raborn 1966

ask Force Report on Free Europe Committee and Radio Liberty Committee. 12 Mar 65

ol. I, II, III & IV of Annexes to Report to the PFIAB on Intelligence Community
ctivities relating to Cuban Arms Build-up. 14 April-14 Oct 1962.

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02299

ok

ER 72-13-431
Copies #9+10

2-8-72

Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan.

opy #1	retained in Executive Registry.
opy #2	Retained in O/IG. -RITTER 11-15-72
opy #3 thru #7	Records Center
opy #8	DDP retained.
opy #9	PPB Retained.
opy #10	D/DCI/NIPE retained.
opy #11	Records Center
opy #12	DDS&T retained.
opy #13 thru #16	Records Center
p: 17	PPB retained.
opy #18 thru#26	Records Center.

all, Executive Registry retired 19 copies of the Long-Range Plan.
so three bound books of Working Papers and one bound book of Working Plan Committee eeting minutes.
r. Bye destroyed all loose working papers.

David L. Bye
David L. Bye
Chief, Executive Registry

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02300

Job #___

OK

ox # 8 of 10

8-12/1 Meetings with the President-25 Oct 61-31 July 62	#1
8-12/1 Meetings with the President 31 July 62-29 Nov 62	#2
Meetings with the President 1 Jan 63-31 March 63	#1
Memoranda on Meetings with the President 1 Apr 63-1 July 63	#2
Meetings with the President 1 July 63 - 12 Nov 63	#3
Meetings with President Johnson 23 Nov 63 - 31 Dec 63	
Meetings with the President 1 Jan-2 April 1964	#1
Meetings with the President 1964 3 April-20 May	#2
Meetings with the President 21 May 64-5 Oct 64	#3
Meetings with the President 6 Oct 64	#4
eetings with the President Jan-28 April 65	#1

All

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02301

JOB # 72-B-431

OK

c # 1 of 10

All

3 Committee January-December 1963 ✓

3 Committee January-December 196~~3~~4 ✓

unter-Insurgency July-December 1962

unter-Insurgency January-June 1962

ecial Group CI-1965

ecial Group CI - 1964

rono 1962

Checked generally - nothing relating to Cuba

Spot checked.

✓

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02302

Job #___

OK

M

#2 of 10

complete

Memoranda for Record:

March-28 April 65

January-28 Feb 1965

November-31 Dec 64

11 Sept-31 Oct 64

April 64-8 July 64

July-11 Aug 64

12 Aug - 10 Sept 64

Jan-11 Feb 64

27 Nov-31 Dec 63

23 July 63-26 Nov 63

June 63-20 July 63

15 April - 4 June 63

Jan 63-9 Feb 63

Sept - 31 Dec 62

7 April 62-21 Aug 62

29 Nov 61-5 April 62

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02303

JOB #____

OK

N/ M

ox # 3 of 10

ietnam	August 1963
nam	September 1963
ietnam	October 1963
ietnam	November 1963
ietnam	December 1963
anuary	January 1964
ietnam	February 1964
ietnam	March 1964
ietnam	April 1964
ietnam	May 1964
ietnam	June 1964
ietnam	July 1964
ietnam	August 1964
Vietnam	September 1964
ietnam	November 1964
ietnam	January 1965
Vietnam	February 1965
ietnam	March 1965

LA-DCI Notes 1-2 June

DE TA Trip

ODIS---LOR----McCone Eyes Only

EFOLIATION

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

02304

JOB #____

x # 7 of 10

Selected see OK

NRO 1963 thru 1965 (also includes one 6 Sept 61 ltr to DCI frmDefense re Management of NRO)

CYPRUS 1964 material on Cyprus & the DCI trip in Sept 1964

Binder containing excerpts frm the National Security Act of 1947; the Organization of USIB; Summary of NSCID's & charts & regs on Organizaton of CIA.

Summary Reports Chiefs of Station, WH Division, presented at Conference-Panama(29 Jan-1 Feb 1962)

White House-1962 & 1963(containes correspondence to, from and of interest to the White House.)Also included autographed picture of the CIB wich appeared in the newspaper & compromised the code words. Autographed to McCone frm McGeo Bundy.

Duropean Trip-10 thru 17 February 1963 (John McCone/DCI)

Memoranda of Record on DCI Trip to Europe-17th thru 29 Sept 1964

moranda on DCI's European trip-January 1964

Panama Conference-29 Jan-2 Feb 1962.

Memos for the Reocrd EA/DCI for 1964 & 65

DCI's 1962 Far Eastern Trip

Caribbean Survey Group (1961 and 1962-mainly on Cuba)

DCI Letters of appreciation for hospitality extended him on his Far East Trip-1962

DCI's Disucssions with Government Officials during his European trip in 1964 also containes some background papers on trip.

nvelop containing FBI report on Dr. Martin Luther King. 18 Oct 1963

DCI Speech File (1962, 63 & 64)

Low-Level Reconnaissance of Cuba-1964

CUBA-Background Material-1962

02305

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

to DCI from DDCI-September 1962 on Cuba Situation

Job #____

Selected ✓ See

ox #5 of 10

ican Republic-1965

uba Package 7

xecutive Registry File "John McCone 1962

ommittee of Principals

aos 1962

uba 1964)

ook-Bay of Pigs

uclear Papers

cCone Speeches 7 June 63 - 25 May 64.

cCone Speeches 8 June 64 - 11 March 65

uba 1962)

ub Prisoner Exchange #1- Aug 62

ate Eyes only Cables

xecutive Registry DCI File 1963

epartment of Defense 1954 - 1964

02306

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

May 21, 1975

C-X1-22

MEMORANDUM

To: File

From: Mason Cargill MC

Subject: JUSTICE DEPARTMENT DOCUMENTS

On the afternoon of May 20, 1975, I briefly examined the Justice Department files on the Kennedy assassination, ranging from February 18, 1969, to January 28, 1971. According to Mr. Keeney and his secretary who has reviewed these files in detail, they contain no memo from any State Department employee who was in Mexico in 1963. Basically these files consist of letters from citizens, some referred from congressmen, and press clippings relating to the assassination.

Mr. Keeney's secretary referred me to several entries in these files respecting allegations by people who claimed to have been involved in the Kennedy assassination. One claimed to have been a CIA agent. There are also many letters from assassination "nuts." Other documents relate to court proceedings to force FBI agents to testify in the Clay Shaw trial in Louisiana.

One document is an FBI report, dated February 2, 1972, stating that one Richard von Kleist had contacted the FBI claiming he had information on the John F. Kennedy assassination. Kleist claimed certain people conspired in the Hotel Luna, Mexico City, in July, 1963. Kleist was not a State Department employee. He appeared to be a free-lance magazine writer.

MC:clb

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

C2356

that before looking at the FBI as to possible "leaks," he should carefully examine his own house. I told him I was quite thoroughly familiar with the way Guthman and Rosenthal dealt with the press and that as he well knew the wire service people stayed constantly in Guthman's private office. I told him it was quite obvious to me how the AP had learned that the report had been sent over to the Department.

Katzenbach reiterated that he had no complaints against the FBI. He stated again that the purpose of his call was to tell me about Senator Russell's feelings.

He added that he had another reason for calling and that was to determine if we could give him any ideas as to how Warren Olney could be dropped as Chief Counsel of the Presidential Commission. I told Katzenbach of our feelings concerning Olney. He stated that he was presently working through Congressman Hale Boggs and he thought he was going to be successful in getting Olney's name removed from consideration. He told me that Boggs was very sympathetic.

Katzenbach mentioned that Waggoner Carr, the Texas State Attorney General, would like very much to see the Director on Friday, 12-6-63. I asked him what for. He stated that Carr had no particular motive in mind other than to indicate to the press later on that he had discussed matters with the Director. I told him I could see no percentage in the Director's seeing Carr, that we were the investigative agency and that Carr's dealings should be with the Department and the Presidential Commission. Katzenbach indicated that the White House might think otherwise. He stated that the President was most anxious for Carr to be given attention in Washington inasmuch as Carr was running for office next year. I told Katzenbach I knew this, however, I still felt that the Director should not be injected into this matter. Katzenbach stated he would attempt to disuade Carr from seeing the Director, however, Carr was quite persistent.

ACTION:

In view of the close friendship which Carr obviously has with the President, the Director may desire to just shake hands with Carr without sitting down and discussing facts concerning our report.

If he calls I will see him.

RECEIVED FROM
FEB 13 1976
FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

~~SECRET~~

R. CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/550,097

ST 1. ATTEMPTS OF FIDEL CASTRO TO COUNTERACT COMMUNIST PLANS TO CONTROL CUBAN GOVERNMENT.
2. MILITARY CONSPIRACY TO OVERTHROW CASTRO.

DATE DISTR. 2 MAY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 23109

MARCH 1962

O. UNITED STATES (20 APRIL 1962)
AL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

1. FIDEL CASTRO CALLED ON A GROUP OF ARMY COMMANDERS ABOUT TWO WEEKS BEFORE E OUSTER OF ANIBAL ESCALANTE ON 26 MARCH 1962 AND TOLD THEM THAT THE COMMUNISTS RE TRYING TO TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT IN CUBA. THE ARMY OFFICERS CONTACTED BY STRO WERE ROLANDO CUBELA, JOSE MARIA DE LA AGUILERA, FELIPE GUERRA MATOS, JUAN [illegible], JORGE SERGUERA RIVERI, PEDRO MIRET PRIETO. CASTRO ASKED THEM TO BACK HIM UP, S HE INTENDED TO REGAIN FULL CONTROL OF THE SOCIALIST REVOLUTION, AND THEY AGREED.

CUBA

2. AT THE TIME OF ESCALANTE'S OUSTER CASTRO ALSO ORDERED THE TRANSFER OF A MMUNIST LEADER IN MATANZAS PROVINCE TO AN AGRICULTURAL CO-OPERATIVE IN ORIENTE OVINCE. (FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE COULD NOT REMEMBER THE NAME OF THE LEADER TRANSFERRED).

3. CASTRO ALSO ORDERED A COMPLETE INVESTIGATION OF FELIX TORRES, COMMUNIST LEADER LAS VILLAS PROVINCE. CASTRO TOLD THE ARMY COMMANDERS WITH WHOM HE TALKED THAT

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	FBI

INS CINCLANT EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

D FROM

UG 15 1975

CIA

~~SECRET~~

201-252234

"IF NECESSARY I WILL HAVE TORRES SHOT IN THE CENTRAL PARK OF SANTA CLARA".

4. CASTRO MADE IT CLEAR TO HIS ARMY CONFIDANTS THAT, ALTHOUGH HE WAS NOT DEVIATING FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR THE COMMUNIST PARTY LINE, HE WOULD ARRANGE IT SO THAT LAZARO PENA, BLAS ROCA, AND OTHER COMMUNISTS WOULD NOT BE OCCUPYING POSITIONS OF LEADERSHIP.

5. DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE ARMY LEADERS AGREED TO BACK UP CASTRO, THEY HAVE IN MIND A PLAN WHICH WILL INVOLVE THE ASSASSINATION OF FIDEL, RAUL CASTRO, AND CHE GUEVARA AT SOME PROPITIOUS MOMENT AND THE TAKE-OVER OF THE GOVERNMENT FOR THEMSELVES. THESE MEN ARE OF THE OPINION THAT SUCH A PLAN WILL SUCCEED, AS THEY ARE IN CHARGE OF THE REGULAR ARMY AND MILITIA TROOPS IN CUBA. THE ARMY LEADERS SAY THAT THEY ARE NOT COMMUNISTS, AND THEY REALIZE THAT NOT ONLY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION, BUT ALSO A LARGE MAJORITY OF THE ARMED FORCES OF CUBA, ARE FED UP WITH CASTRO AND THE COMMUNISTS.

6. (SOURCE COMMENT: SOURCE SAID THAT THE SABOTAGE CURRENTLY BEING CARRIED OUT IN THE CITY AND PROVINCE OF HABANA CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS GROUP OF ARMY LEADERS. HE BASED HIS OPINION IN PART ON THE FACT THAT DE LA LG ERA IS A LEADER OF THE BANK WORKERS' UNION, AND THE NEW CUBAN NATIONAL BANK BUILDING IN HABANA WAS THE RECENT OBJECT OF SABOTAGE BY BURNING.)

7. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

FROM

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NOFORN/LIMITED

CIA

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATE[S GOVERN]MENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Belmont
1 - Mr. Rose
1 - Mr. Malley
1 - Mr. Rogge
1 - Mr. McGowan
1 - Mr. Hines
1 - Mohr
1 - De Loach

Mohr
Casper
Callahan
Conrad
DeLoach
Evans
Gale
Rosen
Sullivan
Tavel
Trotter
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

TO : A. H. Belmont

DATE: February 26, 1964

FROM : A. Rosen

SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION
ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT

While at the offices of the President's Commission on other matters, J. Lee Rankin requested Malley to stop by his office. Mr. Rankin advised that he desired to make it known that the Bureau had been of tremendous help to the President's Commission, that an extremely large volume of work had been produced by the Bureau and that the Bureau had been most cooperative in handling all requests which had been made by the President's Commission.

He commented that recently there had been quite an increase in the number of requests and there was a possibility that there would be many more additional requests. Mr. Rankin stated this was not intended as a criticism of the Bureau's work but instead was the following through of the Commission's desire to complete the Commission's record and leave no unanswered questions.

In this regard, Mr. Rankin went on to say that the Bureau, in conducting its investigation, had an extremely difficult and enormous task to perform and that he as well as other members of the Commission staff had been amazed at the amount of detailed information which had been developed by the Bureau in its investigation. He commented that the Commission in performing its tasks was of necessity making a most minute study of the Bureau's work as well as that of other Government agencies with the idea of picking the investigation to pieces to the extreme degree so that wherever it was possible to clarify any item, this could be handled while the Commission was in existence.

Mr. Rankin advised that in connection with the letter which had just recently been transmitted to the Bureau requesting an explanation concerning information relative to Special Agent James P. Hosty's name being omitted from a report prepared in the Dallas Office (report of Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling dated 12/23/63), he wanted the Bureau to know the following:

Enclosure sent 2-27-64

REC- 53

62-109090-11

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Branigan
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Lenihan

1 - 62-109060
1 - 105-82555
1 - 44-24016

XEROX 1964

JRM:KUL:msd
(14)

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum A. Rosen to A. H. Belmont
Re: THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

The Commission had noted in reviewing the notebook in question that Agent Hosty's name appeared in the book along with the office telephone number and a license number. It had been noted that this information did not appear in the Dallas investigative report and members of the Commission wondered why this item did not appear. Mr. Rankin stated that prior to any question being raised concerning this item, the Bureau in one of its letters to the Commission (dated 1/27/64) set forth full information for the Commission's information explaining the appearance of Agent Hosty's name in the Oswald notebook. As a result of this information being furnished by the Bureau, the members of the Commission were fully aware that there had been no effort on the part of the Bureau not to make this information available. Mr. Rankin stated that after some discussion concerning this item, the members of the Commission directed Mr. Rankin to request the Bureau for an explanation so that the record of the Commission would show the exact circumstances by which this item was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63 by Special Agent Gemberling.

ACTION:

Attached is a letter to J. Lee Rankin setting forth the reasons why Agent Hosty's name was omitted from the Dallas report of 12/23/63. We are enclosing for the Commission affidavits from Special Agent Robert P. Gemberling and John T. Kesler wherein they set forth their explanations in handling the Hosty entry in Oswald's address book. Both affidavits are excellent and should satisfy the Commission that our handling of the Hosty entry was sound.

Rel

WCS

If there had been proper supervision here much of the correspondence from Commission requesting clarification & additional investigation would have been avoided. Notwithstanding Rankin's statements the entire affair is not one reflecting any credit to the Bureau or its Dallas administration. H

REC
FEB 1
FBI

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

Review Staff: 76-0412
13 May 1976

Mr. William G. Miller
Staff Director
Select Committee To Study Governmental
Operations With Respect To Intelligence
Activities
Dirksen Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510

Attention: Mr. E. Greissing

Dear Mr. Miller:

As requested by Mr. Greissing, transmitted herewith is a copy of a 1 May 1967 memorandum numbered 502 and captioned "Claimed Agency Affiliation by Conspiracy Case Figures". This document was recently released by the Agency in response to a Freedom of Information Act request.

Sincerely,

Seymour Bolten
Seymour R. Bolten
Chief, Review Staff

Attachment:
As Stated

RECEIVED [illegible]
MAY 14 1976

AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL 1776-1976

:: COS

T.:

STR COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: ~~P-3593~~
Silvia DURAN P-
~~LITEMPO/Prod~~

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
	ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029
NUMBER

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

[illegible]

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

'O.: COS

:T.:

:STP COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-8593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029
NUMBER

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

OUTGOING

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

O.: COS

T.:

ST? COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
LITEMPO/Prod

	DEFERRED		PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.	NUMBER
	ROUTINE	XX	OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS		

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029
NUMBER

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

: COS

T.:

STR COMMO
CHRONO (DUMMY)

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

DATE: 23 NOVEMBER 1963

FILE: P-3593
Silvia DURAN P-
~~LITEMPO/Prod~~

DEFERRED	PRIORITY	INITIALS	DTG.
ROUTINE	XX OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE	INITIALS	

NUMBER

TO IMMEDIATE DIR INFO. CITE MEXI 7029
NUMBER

KAPOK

REF: A DIR 84888
B. MEXI- 7025

1. SAW PHOTOS OF LEE OSWLAD ON TELEVISION NIGHT OF 22 NOV AND IT OBVIOUS PHOTOS SENT TO DALLAS WERE NOT IDEN WITH LEE OSWALD HELD DALLAS. DATES ARE AS GIVEN ON PHOTOS.

2. MEXI STATION REVIEWING ALL AVAILABLE PHOTOS PERSONS ENTERING SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

3. MEXI SUGGESTING TO LITEMPO 2 THAT SILVIA DURAN WHO MEXICAN EMPLOYEE AT CUBAN EMBASSY AND WHO PUT LEE OSWALD ON TELEPHONE FROM CUBAN EMBASSY TO TALK TO SOVIET EMBASSY ON 28 SEPT BE ARRESTED IMMEDIATELY AND HELD INCOMMUNICADO UNTIL SHE GIVES ALL DETAILS OF OSWALD KNOWN TO HER. (See Ref B)

4. LITEMPO 2 CAN SAY D.F.S. COVERAGE REVEALED CALL TO HIM IF HE NEEDS TO EXPLAIN.

END OF MSG

COORDINATING OFFICERS

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION

W.C.C.
RELEASING OFFICER

OUTGOING

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that evidently he had realized that the United States had taken [illegible] that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it; that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs) HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

RECEIVED FROM

JAN 28 1976

his friend commented that a Mexican had killed him, that evidently he had realized that the United States had taken [illegible] that it was all a joke, but they did not believe it until he told them to turn on the radio; that's what they did and they learned about it; that the last he had heard, a moment ago, was that that type is one OSWALD, that it is believed that this is the one, but he has not confessed anything... LUISA: But they already know that he speaks Russian and belongs to the Pro-Cuba Committee; that they already know that he wanted to nationalize himself, but he has not confessed. HF says she is right, adding that it could be that they tried to find some let's say solution from him, because...LUISA after asking him to wait a minute, asks him to go on. HF: We think that if it had been or had seemed...public or had been one of the segregationists or against integration who had killed Kennedy, then there was, let's say, the possibility that a sort of civil war would arise in the United States; that contradictions would be sharpened, the critical situation the country is going through, then we were commenting here, that they found a resolution in this type, no? More international; they will find it or it was true, who knows; let's see what happens. LUISA smiles and asks what will happen. HF: Who knows. LUISA: Imagine, one, two, three and now, that makes three (she laughs) HF: I think that it will be the topic of the day at that party of SILVIA's. LUISA: They suspended it because they could not go. HF asks why, and LUISA says "so that after they can say that we are observing the death of KENNEDY, then we spoke with SYLVIA and she agreed to suspend it and leave it until next week, but it will not coincide with the burial (she laughs)". HF: That has to be taken into account. LUISA: That it will be after the mourning and all of that nonsense.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 28 1976

3-

HF: Okay; he asks where she is going to stay now, and LUISA comments that now she plans to move tonight to the house of the doctor (female). HF asks if they know everything now, and LUISA says yes, but doesn't know how the thing is, or if they will have to stay in the embassy, however believes that today it will not be possible, because everyone has gone to the airport and the embassy has no car, however, possibly tomorrow morning instead of going to the study circle, she will move. HF: Then he will call her tomorrow. LUISA: To try the embassy or at the house, since if they will not stay at the embassy, she will go home where she will be at about 10. HF accepts.

Soviet Embassy.- 15-60-55.-
27 Sept 63.-

L34-M8.-T128-
0900-2114 hrs.

395- (1605) IN.- OV. - From the Cuban Consulate- Says that there is an American here who has requested a transit visa for Cuba because he is going to the USSR. OV. - Wants to know with whom he (American) spoke at the Soviet Embassy becuase she (OV) had sent him over to them thinking that if the Soviets approved the visa then the Cubans would give him one without anymore processing - only advising the Emmigration of Cuba. OV - wants to know with whom he (American) spoke since he himself doen't know either and he was told that there were no problems. IV. - asks that OV. wait a minute. 404— 410 OV is SILVIA DURAN of the Cuban Consulate and explains the same to the other IV. This one tells her to leave her name and number so ~~so~~ he can call her. SILVIA gives it to him along with the tel, num. 11-28-47.- Silvia says as a personal thing that she has moved and that she has not advised about her change of address and will not receive the Bulletin and she can advise them now. IV. asks that she call KOUKHARENKO in order to change the address, and then asks for the name of the Cultural Attache. SILVIA says it is TERESA PROENZA whose number is 14-13-26. IV. thanks her.-- 435--

EMBAJADA RUSA.- [illegible]-55.-
27 septiembre 63.-
[illegible]

395- Entrada.- MF del Consulado de Cuba, dice que esta allí

... un ciudadado Americano que fue a solicitar una visa para C en Tránsito porque va para la URSS y entonces quiere saber co quien habia hablado porque ella lo mandó con ellos de la Emba da rusa diciendole que si ellos le hacian o aceptaban la visa que entonces ellos los cubanos tambien se la daban sin mas - tramites nadamas avisando a Emigración en Cuba, y quiere sabe con quien habló porque el dice que no sabe tampoco con que - persona y que le dijeron que si que no tenia problema. HD le pide espere un momento. 40[illegible]-- 410-- MF es SILVIA DURAN del Consulado de Cuba y explica lo mismo a otro HD. Este le dice que le deje su telefono y su nombre para que despues le llame SILVIA se lo proporciona así como el telefono 11-28-47.- Y que aprovecha como cosa personal de que ella se cambio de domicili y no ha podido avisar para que le envien el boletin y que aho se la puede dar. HD le pide que llame a KOUKHARENKO para que de su cambio, y pide le de el nombre de la Consejero o Agrega Cultual. SILVIA dice que se llama TERESA PROENZA y le llaman al 14-13-26. HD que gracias.-- 435--

Attachment b:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1605 hours on 27 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy saying there was an America citizen at the Cuban Embassy requesting a Cuban visa in transit to the USSR. She was asked to leave her telephone number (11-28-47).

..3.-L35-M22.-

27 Sept

IV - inside voice.

OV - outside voice.

I

288- Out to 14-13-26.- (1625 hrs.)- (Cuban Embassy) IV. - asks the number of the Cuban Consul. OV. - It's --11-28-47.--- 294--

295- Out to 11-28-47.-(1626 hrs)- IV asks SILVIA if the American has been there. SILIVA: says yes, he is here now. IV.- According to the letters that he showed from the Consulate in Washington he wants to go to Russia to stay for a long time with his wife who is Russian. But we have not received the answer from Washington concerning his problem and considering the processing it will take 4 to 5 months. Without that permission of the USSR they have to request. and better still the visa can't be given here without asking Washington But according to this man, he belongs to an organization in favor of Cuba and he has said that the Cubans can't give him a visa without the Russian visa and I don't know what to do with him. I have to wait for the answer from Washington. SILVIA - We have to wait also because his problem is that he knows no one in Cuba and it's dificult to obtain a visa in these conditions. He expected to process the visa. He knew it would take long to process the Russian visa and would wait for it in Cuba and leave from there.for the USSR. IV. - The thing is that if his wife is now in Washington she will receive the visa for returing to Russia. She will receive the visa in Washington and having the visa she can sent it to any place for example here or any other place but right now she doesn't have it. SILVIA - Naturally, and we can't give him a letter of recommendation because we don't know if his visa will be approved. IV. - We will only give the visa according to indications (intructions) SILVIA. - Then that is what I will put in my plans. IV.- We can't give him a letter of recommendation either becuase we don't know him. Please pardon the bother. SILVIA .- No bother and thank you very much.--
--331--

EMBAJADA D[illegible] -
27 septiem[illegible]

[illegible] - [illegible] ID pregunta a [illegible] que
[illegible] que si, que allí [illegible]

295-

27 Sept 1963
1626 hrs

si ha ido allí ese americano [illegible] del consulado en -
ID que según las cartas que [illegible] para estar allá mucho tiempo
Washington el quiere ir a la [illegible] para estar allá mucho tiempo
con su esposa que es rusa, pero todavía no se ha recibido la
contestación de Washington [illegible] a su problema, pero eso
según los trámites ocupan un [illegible] cuatro o cinco meses pero sin
tener eso permiso de la URSS deben de preguntar y mas bien no
se lo puede depachar aquí el visado sin preguntarle a Washington
pero según este señor le mostró una carta en que es un miembro
de una organización en favor de Cuba y ha dicho que ellos los
Cubanos no pueden darle el visado sin el visado ruso y ahora
ID no sabe que hacer con el, porque deben de esperar la contes-
tación de Washington. SILVIA que ellos tambien, porque el pro-
blema de el, es que el no conoce a nadie en Cuba y entonces si
es asi es muy dificil que le den la visa, porque el pensaba
tramitar su visa, porque como el ya sabia que se iba a tardar
mucho en esperar el visado ruso en Cuba y ya de allá irse a
la URSS. ID que la cosa es que si su esposa está ahorita en
Washington va a recibir ahorita el visado o el permiso de la
URSS para regresar a la patria, ella va a recibir su visado en
Washington pero teniendo ese visado ella podrian comunicarle
a cualquier lugar ese permiso por ejemplo aqui o en cualquier
otra parte lo puede recibir, pero ahorita no las tienen. SILVIA
que claro y que tampoco se le puede dar una carta porque no
saben si su visa será aprovada. ID que ellos solo daran el visa
do según las indicaciones. SILVIA que entonces eso pondrá en su
planilla. ID que tampoco se le puede dar ninguna carta de ---
recomendación porque no se le conoce y que perdone por la ...
... molestia. SILVIA que no hay cuidado y que muchas gracias.---

--331--

Attachment c:

A telephone call to the Cuban Embassy made at
1626 hours on 27 September 1963 by an unidentified

28 Sept 1963

208- IN - OV. from the Cuban Consulate - says that there is an American there in the Consulate who had been at the Soviet Embassy. IV. Wait a minute. 213-- OV. Is SILVIA DURAN and speaks English with someone outside--and comments in Spanish that they installed a telephone for APARICIO and takes down the number as 14-12-99--- 230-- SILVIA informs (them) of the American and says she will call.-- 232--235-- OV.- speaks in Russian. IV.- speaks in English.-- BOTH CONTINUE IN ENGLISH.--244 --1151 hrs.-

208- X Entrada.- HF del consulado de Cuba, quien dice que alli en su consulado esta un [illegible] norteamericano que estuvo alli en la Embajada Rusa. HM que espere un momento. 233-- HF es SILVIA DURAN y habla INGLES con alguna persona fuera-- y come en español que le pusieron telefono a APARICIO y lo apunta qu es el 14-12-99-- 231-- SILVIA le dice sobre el ciudadano norteamericano y que les va a hablar.-- 232-- 235-- HF habla RUSO. HD le habla en INGLES.-- SIGUEN LOS DOS EN INGLES.--244 -- 1151 hrs.-

Lienvoy

26 SET. 1963

15 60 55

208. /Please see the Spanish transcription/. MO while waiting speaks in English to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak Russian? Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /MO takes the phone and says in broken Russia I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minu MI takes the phone and asks MO in English what does he want

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

?

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

RECEIVED FROM
JAN 23 1976
CIA

Lib:

50-5-10-

206- [illegible] dice que alli
[illegible] que estuvo alli
en su consul[illegible] [illegible] 23-- [illegible] -
en la [illegible] persona fuera-- y coment
SILVIA DURAN [illegible] y lo apunta que
[illegible] en español que [illegible] sobre el ciudadadano
es el 14-12-99---- [illegible]
5 6 0 55 norteamericano y [illegible] 232-- 255-- HF habla
RUSO. HO lo habla [illegible] INGLES.--- [illegible] LOS DOS EN INGLES.---244---
-- 1151 hrs.-

208. /Please see [illegible] Spanish [illegible]/. HO while waiting speaks in English to someone in the background: He said wait ..Do you speak [illegible] Yes. Why don't you talk to him?.. I don't know.. /HO takes the phone and says in broken Russian/ I was in your Embassy and spoke to your consul. Just a minute MI takes the phone and asks HO in English what does he want?

MO: /in Russian/ Please speak Russian.

MI: What else do you want?

MO: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address

MI: I know that.

MO: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it..

MI: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us, it not far from the Cuban Embassy.

MO: Well, I'll be there right away.

Attachment d:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy made at 1151 hours on 23 September 1963 by Silvia DURAN of the Cuban Embassy who puts on an unidentified norteamerican man who tells the Soviet that he was just at their Embassy and wants to give them his address. The Soviet tells him to return to the embassy with the address.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-69-57

1 October 63

L26-M26-T129

1031 - 2002

hours → man outside

man outside

45.

In at 1031, MO talks to MI, in broken Russian.

MO: Hellow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. They said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd like to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Please.

MI: Please write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Please.

RUSSIAN EMBASSY. 15-[illegible] 7

1 Octobor 63

45. In at 1031. MO talks to MI. in brokon Russian.

MO: Hollow. I was at your place last Saturday and I talked to your consul. Thoy said that thoy'd send a tolegram to Washington, and I wanted to ask you if there is anything new?

MI: I'd liko to ask you to call another phone number.

MO: Ploase.

MI: Ploase write it down; 15-60-55 and ask for a consul.

MO; Thank you.

MI: Ploase.

Attachment a:

A telephone call to the Soviet Military Attache at 1031 hours on 1 October 1963 by an unidentified man speaking broken Russian who asked about a telegram which they were to send to Washington. Unidentified man said he was at the Soviet Embassy "last Saturday". Soviet told him to call 15-60-55.

128. Out to 15-12-64 at 0955? OBYEDKOV talks to OBRUBOV.

OBY: VOLODYA, come here as fast as you can.

OBR: Alright.

135. (previously transcribed)

140. (previously transcribed)

Man outside

151. In at ~~148~~ (?) MO / the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/ speaks to OBYEDKOV.

D hrs

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your plac last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the nam of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they havenät received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothir has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

249. (previously transcribed)

RUSSIAN EMBASSY, 15-60-55

1 October 63

In at 1035 hours MO/the same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian/speaks to OBYEDKOV.

MO: Hello, this LEE OSWALD (phon) speaking. I was at your place last Saturday and spoke to a consul, and they said that they'd send a telegram to Washington, so I wanted to find out if you have anything new? But I don't remember the name of that consul.

OBY: KOSTIKOV. He is dark /hair or skin?/.

LEE: Yes. My name is OSWALD.

OBY: Just a minute I'll find out. They say that they haven't received anything yet.

LEE: Have they done anything?

OBY: Yes, they say that a request has been sent out, but nothing has been received as yet.

LEE: And what...? /OBY hangs up/.

Attachment f:

A telephone call to the Soviet Embassy at 1035 hours on 1 October 1963 by the same man who called previously (28 September 63) and spoke broken Russian. He said his name was Lee OSWALD and wanted to know if they had heard anything. Soviet said no.

TAB J

An Extract From Kennedy's Address to Press
Washington Post, Tuesday, November 19, 1963, p. A15

(AP) Nov. 18 -- The following is a text of President Kennedy's address tonight before the Inter-American Press Association:

* * *

"The genuine Cuban revolution -- because it was against the tyranny and corruption of the past -- had the support of many whose aims and concepts were noble.

"But that hope for freedom and progress was destroyed.

"The goals proclaimed in the Sierra Maestra were betrayed in Havana.

"It is important to restate what now divides Cuba from my country and from all the American countries: It is the fact that a small band of conspirators has stripped the Cuban people of their freedom and handed over the independence and sovereignty of the Cuban nation to forces beyond the hemisphere. They have made Cuba a victim of foreign imperialism, an instrument of the policy of others, a weapon in an effort dictated by external powers to subvert the other American republics. This, and this alone divides us. As long as this is true nothing is possible. Without it everything is possible.

Ready and Anxious

"Once this barrier is removed we will be ready and anxious to work with the Cuban people in pursuit of those progressive goals which, a few short years ago, stirred their hopes and the sympathy of many people throughout the entire hemisphere.

"No Cuban need feel trapped between dependence on the broken promises of foreign communism and the hostility of the rest of the hemisphere. For once Cuban sovereignty has been restored we will extend the hand of friendship and assistance to a Cuba whose political and economic institutions have been shaped by the will of the Cuban people."

* * *

TAB L

Unofficial Envoy

An Historic Report from Two Capitals

by Jean Daniel

A recent trip to the United States, followed by a journey to Cuba, made it possible for me to establish a "dialogue" between the late President Kennedy and Prime Minister Fidel Castro. Since my arrival in Mexico, where this article is being written, I have been asked whether the impressions I derived from these interviews could shed any light on the assassination of the President and on future relations between Lyndon B. Johnson and Castro.

Last week in these pages I answered the first question by describing the reactions of Fidel Castro, with whom I was visiting at the time, to John Kennedy's death. Here I shall explore the second question by reconstituting the Kennedy-Castro dialogue from the viewpoint of one who was a witness to it.

THE AUTHOR

President Kennedy received me at the White House on Thursday, October 24. My appointment had been scheduled for 5:30. I waited in the Cabinet Conference Room, and at 5:45 the President, following his usual custom, came to look for me himself so that he could escort me into his office. He apologized for the delay, not so much as a courtesy or to flatter me, but to explain the scheduling of his time, which seemed to be very strictly organized. As we passed through the small room where his secretary was working, we caught a glimpse of Mrs. Kennedy leaving by a French window on her way to the private garden of the White House. The President called her back to introduce me.

It was still Indian summer in Washington. The weather was very warm, and both the President and Mrs. Kennedy were very lightly dressed, thus enhancing the impression of youth, charm, and simplicity which was in rather surprising contrast to the solemnity of entering these august chambers. The President (athletic looking in his well-tailored suit, speaking with quick, abrupt gestures and a mobile expression but, at times, freezing up and becoming disconcertingly, almost, I would say, completely expressionless) invited me to be seated on the semi-circular sofa which was in the middle of his office. He sat in a rocking chair opposite the sofa. The interview was to last from 20 to 25 minutes, and it was interrupted only by a brief telephone call.

The President immediately asked me how the French situation was developing. After my reply, he spoke about General de Gaulle. He talked in a relaxed fashion, like someone who has at last found solace in indifference after having long been exasperated and fascinated. John Kennedy was a man who liked to get to the heart of a matter quickly, [illegible] make decisions even more rapidly. But this was not possible in dealing with de Gaulle, who is more difficult to handle than Khrushchev. One day, impatient at not understanding the General's reasoning and intent upon convincing him, Kennedy telephoned de Gaulle direct. All in vain. Oddly enough, however, since the recent visit of de Gaulle's foreign minister, Couve de Murville, to Washington Mr. Kennedy had ceased to be so deeply concerned about Franco-American relations. The truth is, he had *made up his mind* not to worry about them any more. According to him, it was a waste of time.

"Mr. Couve de Murville and I both verified that we didn't agree on anything," the President told me. "And we agreed that such total disagreement was hardly calculated to create a flourishing friendship between two great Western nations. I came to the conclusion that General de Gaulle's strategy, which is rather incomprehensible to me, requires a certain amount of tension with the United States. It would seem that only through this tension is it possible to restore to Europe the desire to think for itself and renounce its torpid dependence on American dollar aid and political guidance!"

President Kennedy went on to sum up, with conciseness and vigor, the points of disagreement between the United States and France. On the subject of Germany, nuclear policy, Europe, the idea of "independence," he told me what has since become public knowledge. He added, however, that France had a strange way of manifesting its independence, particularly, for example, on the subject of Vietnam and Cuba. It seemed ironic and irritating to him that the French Chief Executive was apparently bent on telling him how the United States should proceed, without assuming any risks himself. He told me that no one was more appreciative than he of advice, information, and even criticism; but that these were all the more valued if the friends proffering them were themselves committed to a program of action.

I then asked Mr. Kennedy what could be expected from General de Gaulle's proposed visit to the United States next February. He replied: "Absolutely nothing." But he followed this up immediately and with a broad grin, as though savoring in advance the pleasure of the impending meeting: "It will be exciting, just the same. General de Gaulle is an historic figure; he is decidely the strangest great man of our time."

Relations with Cuba

Taking the initiative at this point, I brought up the subject of Vietnam and Cuba, saying that the Gaullists were not the only ones in France who deplored certain mistaken US policies. I pointed out that the first time I had the opportunity of meeting John Kennedy, he was a Senator and had just made a resounding speech on the subject of Algeria. Had the ideas set forth in that speech been faithfully applied in Saigon and Havana? Here my notes are very specific, and I shall let the late President speak through them:

"We haven't enough time to talk about Vietnam, but I'd like to talk to you about Cuba. Incidentally, our conversation will be much more interesting when you return, because Ben Bradlee [of *Newsweek*] tells me you are on your way to Cuba now.

"Every now and then I read articles in the European press pointing out that we Americans were blind to what was happening in the Cuban situation. I have just learned that General de Gaulle himself regarded Communism in Cuba as nothing but the accidental and temporary form of a will to independence from the United States. Of course it is very easy to understand this 'will to independence' around President de Gaulle."

John Kennedy then mustered all his persuasive force. He punctuated each sentence with that brief, mechanical gesture which had become famous:

"I tell you this: we know perfectly what happened in Cuba, to the misfortune of all. From the beginning I personally followed the development of these events with mounting concern. There are few subjects to which I have devoted more painstaking attention. My conclusions go much further than the European analyses. Here is what I believe.

"I believe that there is no country in the world, including all the African regions, including any and all the countries under colonial domination, where economic colonization, humiliation and exploitation were worse than in Cuba, in part owing to my country's policies during the Batista regime. I believe that we created, built and manufactured the Castro movement out of whole cloth and without realizing it. I believe that the accumulation of these mistakes has jeopardized all of Latin America. The great aim of the Alliance for Progress is to reverse this unfortunate policy. This is one of the most, if not *the most*, important problems in American foreign policy. I can assure you that I have understood the Cubans. I approved the proclamation which Fidel Castro made in the Sierra Maestra, when he justifiably called for justice and especially yearned to rid Cuba of corruption. I will go even further: to some extent it is as though Batista was the incarnation of a number of sins on the part of the United States. Now we shall have to pay for those sins. In the matter of the Batista regime, I am in agreement with the first Cuban revolutionaries. That is perfectly clear."

After a silence during which he was able to note my surprise and my interest, the President continued: "But it is also clear that the problem has ceased to be a Cuban one, and has become international – that is, it has become a Soviet problem. I am the President of the United States and not a sociologist; I am the President of a free nation which has certain responsibilities in the Free World. I know that Castro betrayed the promises made in the Sierra Maestra, and that he has agreed to be a Soviet agent in Latin America. I know that through his fault – either his 'will to independence', his madness or Communism – the world was on the verge of nuclear war in October, 1962. The Russians understood this very well, at least after our reaction; but so far as Fidel Castro is concerned, I must say I don't know whether he realizes this, or even if he cares about it." A smile, then: "You can tell me whether he does when you come back. In any case, the nations of Latin America are not going to attain justice and progress that way, I mean through Communist subversion. They won't get there by going from economic oppression to a Marxist dictatorship which Castro himself denounced a few years ago. The United States now has the possibility of doing as much good in Latin America as it has done wrong in the past; I would even say that we alone have this power – on the essential condition that Communism does not take over there."

Mr. Kennedy then rose to indicate that the interview was over. I apologized for keeping him to ask two quick questions. The first: Could the United States tolerate economic collectivism? He answered: "What about Sekou Touré? And Tito? I received Marshal Tito three days ago; and our discussions were most posi-

Mike Madigan
Chron File

January 29, 1976

The Honorable Edward H. Levi
Attorney General
U. S. Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

As you may recall, in June of last year alleged organized crime leader Sam Giancana was killed. At that time, this Committee had taken steps to contact Mr. Giancana for the purpose of obtaining his testimony on our assassinations inquiry then under way. However, we had not yet succeeded in contacting Mr. Giancana or anyone on his behalf.

Shortly after Mr. Giancana's death, Mr. Michael T. Epstein of our staff met with Mr. William Lynch, Chief, Organized Crime Section, Department of Justice, and members of Mr. Lynch's staff to inform them of the Committee's actions taken to contact Mr. Giancana, and its interest with respect to determining whether there was any relationship between the Committee's desire to examine Mr. Giancana and his murder. Mr. Lynch informed Mr. Epstein at that time that there was no indication of any such relationship and assured him that in the event any such indication was discovered, the Committee would be immediately informed.

The Committee has received no further information from the Department about this matter since last June. For the purposes of completing our record on this subject, I would appreciate it if you would inform the Committee whether the Department has received any additional information about this subject since the above-described meeting.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

MM/do

MEMORANDUM

To: Files
From: Mike Madigan
Date: June 30, 1975
Subj: Committee Contact with Sam Giancana

To my knowledge the Committee's first contact with Sam Giancana occurred on June 9, 1974, when Patrick Shea of the Committee staff received a telephone communication from Robert Bennett, Assistant District Attorney, Houston, Texas. It is my information from talking to Mr. Shea that Mr. Bennett called the Committee to advise that Sam Giancana was admitted to the Methodist Hospital, which was located at 6515 Bertner Street in Houston, Texas. Mr. Bennett's information was that Giancana was admitted to Room 402 of the Hospital under the care of a Dr. Debakey. Mr. Bennett also advised that Giancana was there for a gall bladder removal operation. I believe, although I am not positive, that Bennett also advised that Giancana was then under surveillance. My recollection at this time is not clear as to whether Bennett advised as to which agency or organization had Giancana under surveillance, but my impression is that it was not the F.B.I.

At about the time of this communication from Bennett, I, as Committee Counsel, had been attempting to locate Mr. Giancana.

I had discussed his possible testimony before the Committee with Chief Counsel, Fritz Schwarz, and Staff Director, William Miller. It is my recollection that we agreed that I should attempt to contact Giancana for the purposes of interviewing him in order to determine whether he would have sufficient information to warrant an appearance before the Committee as a whole. It is my memory that we did decide that he was of sufficient importance to be interviewed by the Staff, i.e., for me to interview him.

During this same period of time, I discussed with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller whether we should consider issuing a subpoena for Mr. Giancana while he was in the hospital. I made this suggestion because of an impression I had that Giancana was difficult to locate. I should add that I see absolutely nothing prejudicial or improper or discourteous in the issuing of a subpoena, but rather regard a subpoena as a valid method of obtaining testimony before a Congressional Committee. In any event, my discussion with Messrs. Schwarz and Miller resulted in a decision to have me contact Mr. Giancana over the telephone and offer him an opportunity to appear before the Committee voluntarily and to have me interview him if he so agreed. If he did not agree, we would then take it before the Committee as to whether a subpoena should be issued for Mr. Giancana. Because of the events that followed we never reached the point of bringing before the Committee the question of whether Giancana should be subpoenaed to testify.

After the initial phone call from Bennett to Shea, I telephoned Bennett on two different occasions. My telephone contact with Bennett was for the purpose of our locating Giancana and a telephone number at which I could reach him. Bennett initially indicated to me, as described earlier in this memorandum, that Giancana was in the hospital. My recollection is that on my second telephone call with Bennett, he informed me that Giancana was now out of the hospital and staying at the Warwick Hotel. Finally, I recall calling the Methodist Hospital in Houston and asking to speak to Mr. Giancana. I recall that the hospital authorities indicated that they had no such person by that name in the hospital. I do not recall the precise date of this telephone communication to the hospital. It is my recollection that the name used by Giancana was Doc Brown. I am uncertain whether Bennett told me Giancana was using "Doc Brown" at both the hospital and the hotel, but I believe he said that the alias was used at the hospital. Bennett advised that Giancana had been visited by several relatives and gave me the names of a couple of persons who he thought were Giancana's sons-in-law. The only name I remember is that of Tisci.

In either the second or possibly a third conversation with Bennett, he told me that Giancana had now checked out of the hotel and was either on his way back to his home in Oak Park, Illinois, or with his daughter in California. He provided me with the telephone number of the daughter in California and suggested I obtain Giancana's home number from the information directory in Illinois.

The telephone conversations with Bennett occurred, to the best of my recollection, during the week of June 16, 1975. It is possible, however, that the first conversation occurred later in the week of June 9. It is my recollection that my second telephone conversation with Bennett occurred on Thursday June 19. In any event, I am certain that I attempted to contact Giancana by telephone on Thursday, June 19. I was unable to get anyone to answer the telephone in California and did not have an opportunity to attempt to obtain the Illinois number. I learned Friday, June 20 that Giancana had been shot and killed in his home in Oak Park, Illinois on the evening of June 19.

The Washington Post

August 22, 1976

Slain Mobster Claimed Cuban Link to JFK Death

By Ronald Kessler and Laurence Stern

Washington Post Staff Writers

Long before his recent murder, John Rosselli, the CIA's underworld recruit in attempts to kill Fidel Castro, had been privately claiming that agents of the Cuban premier, in retaliation, were involved in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Rosselli's belief in a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination was expressed through his attorney, Edward P. Morgan, to the FBI as long ago as March, 1967, and also in private conversations with a longtime associate of Rosselli who participated in meetings between Rosselli and the CIA.

An FBI "blind memorandum" on an interview with Morgan dated March 21, 1967, was included, without identification of the interviewee, in last June's Senate Intelligence Committee's report on the role of the intelligence community in the Kennedy assassination investigation.

Morgan told the FBI that Rosselli and another Morgan client had informed him that Castro became aware of CIA assassination conspiracies against him and "thereafter employed teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating Mr. Kennedy."

Because neither Morgan nor Rosselli was identified in the Senate report, the significance of that portion of the 106-page document was discounted at the time it was published in June, before Rosselli's disappearance and the subsequent discovery of his body in an oil drum in Florida waters. The Washington Post, however, has confirmed that Morgan and Rosselli were the sources of the testimony that suggested a Cuban role in the Kennedy murder.

Morgan's account, according to a summary of the FBI interview, was that Rosselli had reached his conclusion about a Cuban connection to the Kennedy assassination from "feedback" furnished by sources close to Castro who were involved in the CIA plots to assassinate the Cuban leader.

"His (Morgan's) clients were aware of the identity of some of the individuals who came to the United States for this purpose and he understood that two such individuals were now in the state of New Jersey," the FBI interview summary stated.

A long-time associate of Rosselli who was interviewed separately by The Washington Post, said there was no question in the slain mobster's mind that President Kennedy was killed on Castro's behalf in reprisal for the CIA schemes against the Cuban leader.

"He was positive; he was sure," said the associate, who knew Rosselli well and was in contact with him before Rosselli disappeared from his Florida home on July 28. The associate, who does not want to be identified publicly, is scheduled to be interviewed this week by Dade County, Fla., homicide detectives. He was a party to Rosselli's contacts in the early 1960s with CIA case officers overseeing the attempts to assassinate Castro.

Despite occasional speculation, the collective conclusion of all official U.S. government investigations into the Kennedy assassination—including the Warren Commission, the FBI and the CIA—has been that there was no evidence that implicated the Castro government or any of its agents.

However, the CIA's involvement in the schemes to assassinate Castro was not divulged to the Warren Commission, and knowledge of them was confined until 1967 to a small, elite circle of the U.S. intelligence community. President Johnson apparently first learned about the schemes only after a March 7, 1967, column by the late Drew Person, which prompted Johnson to order a CIA investigation of the highly sensitive episode.

Full details of the CIA-underworld collusion in the plots to kill Castro did not surface publicly until the publication last year of the Senate Intelligence Committee's assassination report and the ensuing report last June on the possible role of the intelligence agencies in the Kennedy assassination and investigation.

The body of Rosselli, who lived flamboyantly in a world of mobsters, politicians and playgirls, was found two weeks ago in an inverted oil drum weighted with chains but buoyed by gases from decomposition on the ocean's surface off the coast of Miami. The specific cause of death was determined by an autopsy to be asphyxiation.

Last year, an underworld colleague of Rosselli, Sam (Momo) Giancana, who also had been recruited by the CIA in the effort to kill Castro, was found shot to death in his Chicago home in what police described as a highly professional job by assailants who penetrated the mobster's personal security screen. Giancana was due to testify before the Senate Intelligence Committee shortly after his demise.

Neither murder has been solved.

The possibility that Rosselli's murder might have been related to his Senate testimony on the CIA schemes to kill Castro has brought the FBI into the investigation at the request of Attorney General Edward H. Levi.

The involvement of Rosselli, Giancana and other underworld figures—principally Santos Trafficante of Tampa, Fla., whose one-time Havana gambling enterprises fell hostage in 1959 to the Cuban revolution—in plots against Castro had been a closely held secret within the top echelons of the CIA and FBI until recently.

The tangled chronology of suppression and eventual disclosure, although detailed in the June report, has received little public attention. Rosselli's murder adds significance to those events.

Here is the sequence, pieced together from the testimony given to Senate intelligence investigators:

Columnist Drew Pearson went to the late Chief Justice of the United States Earl Warren late in January, 1967, and told him that a Washington lawyer had confided to him that one of his clients said the United States "had attempted to assassinate Fidel Castro in the early 1960s and Castro had decided to retaliate."

Warren declined Pearson's suggestion that he see the lawyer, who was Edward Morgan. Warren referred the matter to then Secret Service Director James J. Rowley, who on Feb. 13, 1967, wrote FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover, informing him of the allegations.

Hoover sent the Rowley letter to six senior bureau officials on an "eyes-only" basis. There is no record of FBI meetings or discussions of those allegations. At that point the sensitive letter bounced back and forth in the higher reaches of the FBI bureaucracy.

The job of responding to Rowley's letter was assigned to the supervisor of the FBI's General Investigative Division who was given responsibility for the overall assassination investigation in March 1964.

This official's job was complicated by the fact that he had never been informed of what Hoover and his closest circle of confidants in the FBI learned early in 1962—that the CIA was deeply involved in assassination attempts against Castro, and prominent American underworld figures, including Rosselli and Giancana, had been recruited for the attempts.

So on Feb. 15, 1967, the FBI official prepared a draft reply to the Rowley letter for his superiors saying "our investigation uncovered no evidence indicating Fidel Castro officials of the Cuban Government were involved with Lee Harvey Oswald in the assassination of President Kennedy. This bureau is not conducting any investigation regarding this matter." The FBI official added in later testimony that "everyone in the higher echelons read this . . ."

Drew Pearson went ahead and published a column on March 7, 1967, referring to reports that CIA schemes against Castro's life in 1963 "may have resulted in a counterplot by Castro to assassinate President Kennedy."

Ten days later, Marvin Watson, one of Lyndon Johnson's chief deputies, called FBI assistant director Cartha DeLoach with the message that "the President had instructed that the FBI interview (Morgan) concerning any knowledge he might have regarding the assassination of President Kennedy."

DeLoach told Watson that it appeared Morgan "did not want to be interviewed, and even if he was interviewed he would probably not divulge the identity of his sources . . ." Watson persisted, however.

"Under the circumstances," DeLoach concluded in a memo for the files, "it appears that we have no alternative but to interview (Morgan) and then furnish the results to Watson in blind memorandum form."

The interview was assigned to two agents from the FBI's General Investigative Division, which the Senate committee concluded was "puzzling" because it was the Domestic Intelligence Division which had been assigned responsibility for investigating possible foreign involvement in the assassination.

Neither agent was privy to the knowledge, confined to Hoover and his top aides, of the CIA's assassination plots against Castro. Both agents testified eight years later that they were "surprised" when Morgan alluded during the interview to U.S. attempts to assassinate Castro.

"These agents stated that they could not evaluate the lawyer's (Morgan's) allegations or question him in detail on them, since they had not been briefed on the CIA assassination efforts," the Senate committee observed.

On March 21, 1967, the FBI's Washington Field Office sent headquarters ten copies of a blind memorandum summarizing the interview with Morgan.

In a Senate Intelligence Committee summary of the FBI interview, Morgan was reported to have acknowledged that his clients were "on the fringe of the underworld" and that they faced "possible prosecution in a crime not related to the assassination . . ."

Morgan said his clients "were called upon by a governmental agency to assist in a project which was said to have the highest governmental approval. The project had as its purpose the assassination of Fidel Castro. Elaborate plans were made, including the infiltration of the Cuban Government and the placing of informants within key posts in Cuba."

Morgan also told the FBI, according to the summary, that Castro had employed "teams of individuals who were dispatched to the United States for the purpose of assassinating President Kennedy."

It was not clear then—nor is it today—why Morgan came forward at that time to bring Rosselli's story to the ears of the nation's highest law enforcement authorities.

It may be relevant that Rosselli had serious legal problems at the time.

In May, 1966, the FBI threatened to deport him for living in the United States under an assumed name unless he cooperated in an investigation of the Mafia (his true name was Filippo Saco). At the time, he reached a CIA contact from the anti-Castro conspiracy days, CIA security director Col. Sheffield Edwards, who informed the

FBI that Rosselli wanted to "keep square with the bureau" but was afraid that the mob might kill him for talking.

In 1967, after he was arrested for gambling fraud at the Friars Club in Beverly Hills, Rosselli approached his former CIA case officer, William Harvey, who sought unsuccessfully to intercede in the prosecution.

It was against this background that Morgan went, first to Drew Pearson, and then the FBI, with Rosselli's sensational allegations of CIA plotting against Castro and the Cuban counterespionage directed against President Kennedy.

Last April Rosselli told the Senate Intelligence Committee he had no recollection of either receiving information that Castro retaliated against President Kennedy or of having discussed it with Morgan. This meant either that Rosselli suffered a dramatic memory loss or that Morgan's statement to FBI agents nine years earlier was a pure invention, a serious risk for an established Washington lawyer.

No committee source could explain the discrepancy, and Morgan declined to confirm that Rosselli was the client in question or to discuss either his allegations against the Cuban government or his recent testimony.

The internal FBI memo on the 1967 interview with Morgan was sent to headquarters with a transmittal slip saying: "No further investigation is being conducted by the Washington field office unless it is advised to the contrary by the Bureau."

The Senate intelligence committee, in commenting on this position, said that "had the interviewing agents known of the CIA-underworld plots against Castro, they would have been aware that the lawyer had clients who had been active in the assassination plots."

On March 21, FBI headquarters forwarded the Washington field office memo to the White House, the attorney general and the Secret Service. It did not recommend any further investigation of Morgan's allegations.

On the evening of the following day, President Johnson called CIA Director Richard M. Helms to the White House. The next morning, March 23, Helms ordered the CIA inspector general to prepare a report on the CIA involvement in the assassination plots —Operation Mongoose—of which Helms had full knowledge at the time they were executed.

By May 22, Helms briefed President Johnson on the results. There is, however, no evidence that Helms briefed the President on the November, 1963, plot—one of eight major schemes on Castro's life from 1960 to 1965—to assassinate the Cuban leader through the employment of an agent with the cryptonymn AMLASH. His identity was revealed as Rolando Cubela, a 1961 CIA "recruit" with close access to Castro.

CIA operatives turned over assassination equipment to Cubela during a Paris meeting on November 22, 1963—the day President Kennedy was killed in Dallas. There has been subsequent speculation that the mercurial and talkative Cubela was either a double agent or being monitored by Cuban intelligence.

During the later days of his presidency, Mr. Johnson spoke cryptically of a "Caribbean Murder Incorporated" targeted against Fidel Castro. The inspiration for that statement undoubtedly was the CIA inspector general's report he ordered Helms to have prepared.

Within the past year, Rosselli and two of his co-conspirators in the Castro assassination schemes have died, Giancana at the hands of a professional hit man and Harvey as the result of a "massive heart attack" last June.

Mrs. William Harvey, the widow of the deceased CIA official, said she suspected no foul play in her husband's death. She did, however, tell The Washington Post that she received a call after Rosselli's disappearance in late July warning her that Cubans appeared to be attempting to wipe out all those who participated in the anti-Castro plots.

The call, she said, came from an old friend who was acquainted with Rosselli's sister, whose name is Edith Daigle. Mrs. Harvey said that Mrs. Daigle told the mutual acquaintance that the Rosselli family had received a telephone threat from unidentified Cubans prior to Rosselli's disappearance. She also said that Rosselli had gone to meet the Cubans in an effort to protect his family.

Mrs. Daigle could not be reached by The Washington Post. But another sister of Rosselli said she had heard of no such threats or warnings.

Harvey, who died at age 60 and whose exploits as a clandestine operator are both legendary and controversial within the agency, testified to the Senate Intelligence Committee. He had become Rosselli's case officer in Operation Mongoose and supplied the mobster with poison pills, explosives, detonators, rifles, handguns, radios and boat radar for transmission to anti-Castro Cuban agents. Harvey and Rosselli, a CIA superior testified to the Senate committee, "developed a close friendship."

Another CIA official who worked with Rosselli, James P. O'Connell, was asked if he knew whether the agency transmitted information to the mobster on possible Cuban involvement in the Kennedy assassination. He replied that he was out of the country at the time Kennedy was killed, and had no further comment.

Two months before the Kennedy assassination, Lee Harvey Oswald, who was identified by the Warren Commission as Kennedy's murderer, had traveled to Mexico City in an attempt to gain entry to Cuba. According to the Warren Commission, Oswald represented himself as the head of the New Orleans branch of the Fair Play for Cuba organization and a friend of the Cuban Revolution.

Some three months before Kennedy was killed, Castro told Associated Press reporter Daniel Harker that U.S. leaders aiding terrorist plans to eliminate Cuban leaders would themselves not be safe.

A U.S. government committee coordinating policy toward Cuba at the time agreed there is a strong liklihood that Castro would retaliate in some fashion. However, it concluded Castro would not risk a major confrontation with the U.S. by attacking U.S. leaders.

On the same day Kennedy was assassinated, a CIA officer met with a high-ranking Cuban official, who had said he would kill Castro, to tell him the U.S. would provide him with explosives and a poison pen device.

While the Senate Intelligence Committee said it found no evidence sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Kennedy assassination was part of a conspiracy, it also said U.S. agencies did not properly investigate the assassination or tell the Warren Commission about the CIA plots on Castro's life.

"There is no indication that the FBI or the CIA directed the interviewing of Cuban sources or sources within the Cuban exile community," the Senate committee said.

According to a former FBI official in charge of key aspects of the FBI's probe of the Kennedy murder, the FBI never satisfactorily determined what Oswald planned to do in Cuba or what he had done in Russia.

[illegible]
COUNTY'S WATCHFUL NEWSPAPER

[illegible] EDITION

SUNDAY, JUNE 1, 1975 Daily 10c—Sunday 25c 71st Year—Number 97

CIA, Mobsters Linked To Cuba Raid Plans

Newspaper Names 4 Mafia Figures

SACRAMENTO (AP) — The Central Intelligence Agency relied on four underworld mobsters for intelligence used in planning the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba, the Sacramento Bee said today.

The CIA's underworld informants, all former Havana casino bosses, had buried $750,000 in Cuba when they fled Fidel Castro. Therefore they had a stake in encouraging the United States to undertake the invasion to overthrow Castro, the Bee reported.

"The information they supplied to the CIA supposedly pinpointed troop and naval vessel positions," Bee investigative reporter Denny Walsh wrote in the Sunday edition.

"More importantly, perhaps, the mobsters also reported that many of the people of Havana were unsympathetic to Castro and would almost certainly rise up in support of a counter-revolutionary force once it had established a beachhead," Walsh continued.

2

In exchange for their help, the hoodlums had been promised they would be allowed to recover their buried cache unhindered, Walsh said.

He said the hoodlums had their own boat, with one CIA man aboard, standing off the Cuban shore when the Bay of Pigs invasion started. But when it became obvious that the invasion of 1,400 exiles was a failure, the mobster boat returned to Florida.

Walsh identified the source of his information as a former employe of the CIA. He did not identify the employe in the story, which carried a Las Vegas, Nev., dateline.

He quoted Lawrence R. Houston, described as the CIA official receiving the underworld information, as declining to confirm or deny the accounts.

Related Story Page A5

The Bee reported that Houston, retired general counsel of the CIA, said of the story:

"I do not recollect such a thing, but that doesn't mean it didn't happen. I won't deny it, but I don't remember anything like that. My memory is probably not as good as some. When you reflect on it, it is not an implausible situation, is it?"

The Bee said two of the four mobsters involved with the CIA in the Bay of Pigs are still alive.

It said one is Russell Bufalino, 71, described as a still-active northeastern Pennsylvania

(Please Turn To A2, Col. 5)

CIA-Mafia Link

(Continued From Page A1)

la Mafia boss who was convicted just before his hookup with the CIA of conspiring to obstruct justice in lying about the 1957 Mafia summit meeting at Apalachin, N.Y.

The newspaper said the other living informant is George Lovien, also known as George Lewis, who was described as an overseer and manager of Mafia gambling interests in pre-Castro Cuba. The Bee said he is reportedly living in Coral Gables, Fla.

The other two were James Plumeri, identified as a former Mafia hijacker, labor racketeer and garment district strongman, and Salvatore Granello, identified as a Mafia extortionist and gambler.

Plumeri and Granello were victims several years ago of unrelated gangland executions, Walsh wrote.

Here is the account of CIA-Mafia intrigue as described by Walsh from his unidentified former CIA source:

"During the pre-1959 regime of the former Cuban dictator, Fulgencio Batista, casino gambling flourished in the country under the direction and control of the U.S. organized crime underworld.

"The Castro revolution routed the mob along with Batista, and the Cuban premier's Communist government has never allowed the resumption of mob activities there."

The four former casino bosses "made periodic reports to the CIA until just before the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

"Between $45,000 and $50,000 was paid by the four gangsters to informants in Cuba for the information.

"The money came, at least in part, from a $750,000 cache wrapped in oilcloth and buried in the ground by Granello and Lovino just before their hasty departure from Cuba during the turbulent days of the Castro takeover.

"It was the rest of this money that Granello, Levine, Bufalino and Plumeri were assured they would be able to recover unhindered if the Castro government was toppled.

"They managed to get word to hoodlums inside Cuba who knew the whereabouts of the money to start buying strategic information. Other Cuban associates of the four gangsters were dispatched to the island from Florida on intelligence-gathering sorties."

Earlier published reports have said that in preparation for the Bay of Pigs invasion, CIA Director Allen Dulles relied heavily on reports which stressed the unpopularity of the Castro regime and the expectation, never realized, of massive rebellion at the time of a strike.

MEMORANDUM

TO: FRITZ AND BILL

FROM: MIKE EPSTEIN

DATE: JUNE 20, 1975

SUBJECT: GIANCANA

I expect that no one will write off the alleged Giancana murder as a "third-rate homicide," and that it will grow and grow and grow. It is clearly the most volatile media issue of the season.

Given the barest outlines of what allegedly happened, and taking them at face value, we have a responsibility to take action under 18 U.S. Code, Section 1505:

> Whoever ... by ... force ... endeavors to ... impede any witness ... in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by ... any committee of either House ... or
>
> Whoever ... by ... force ... obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to ... obstruct, or impede ... the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by ... any committee of either House ...
>
> Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

In short, if Giancana was a "witness" (which status he might have achieved by mere location contacts made by staff) and he was killed to prevent his appearance; or indeed even if he wasn't yet a "witness" but this was a "message" to all witnesses to keep quiet (e.g. Roselli and Maheu), there is a violation of law which we might have the responsibility to investigate.

Beyond what our responsibility is, it seems clear to me that most extreme possibilities of what might actually have happened dictate that we come up with a well-reasoned position and plan -- after careful, deliberate, intensive consideration of all avenues of approach, pitfalls, suspected motives, etc. Most important of all, it seems to me, is our acceptance of the fact that maybe we don't even have anyone on our staff with sufficient experience, sophistication, background, and investigative maturity to deal with this situation.

As a first step, I urge your decision to convene a planning session to decide what the second step will be.

I can't emphasize enough the need for well-thought-out planning here. Who knows where this will lead? And at a minimum, some months from now, Senator Church may be asked, "What did you do the day after you learned that Giancana had been killed?"

My stream of consciousness on kinds of things to consider would include: What our public statement on this should or should not be, security for other witnesses, immediate contact with other key witnesses (to reassure them), secrecy of witness lists and immunity applications, secrecy of place, time and even fact of interview, meetings with Justice organized crime section, Chicago strike force, local law enforcement people in Oak Park and Illinois, obtaining all FBI investigative reports (they're in it per tonight's Star), getting background on all law enforcement officials in Illinois who will be involved (whom do you trust?), is this a diversion which we're being sucked into, how do we avoid that (hire someone just for this), how do we show we care so other witnesses (known or unknown) won't dry up, etc. etc. etc.

NOTE: Mike can be reached after 6:45 tonight at (802) 863-2652.

MEMORANDUM:

TO: Mike Madigan
FROM: Ed Greissing
DATE: August 13, 1976
SUBJECT: Mention of Carlos Marcello in the 4/23/76 transcript of John Rosselli.

On April 23, 1976 during Mr. Rosselli's appearance before the Schweiker-Hart Subcommittee, we took the opportunity to question him about any information he might possess regarding the New Orleans Mafia Chieftan, Carlos Marcello.

Our interest in Marcello developed from 1) the allegation that Marcello was tangentially involved with both Clay Shaw and David Ferrie; the fact that Marcello was deported by Attorney General Robert Kennedy and that the assassination of President Kennedy was a possible retaliation,

In my telephone conversation with Jim Johnston, 8/13/76, he could think of no other reasons why we questioned Rosselli about Marcello. If you would like to talk to Jim about this matter, his telephone number is 780-6203.

Ref to Traff. as X

MEMORANDUM

To: Files

From: Mike Madigan

Date: June 23, 1975

Subj: Additional Roselli Questions

Inquire when in the discussions between Roselli and the CIA did any suggestion appear with regard to both Che Guevera and Rauol Castro, in addition to the discussions involving Fidel only.

Query whether Roselli has heard the term "ZRRIFLE" --- note Helms to Harvey memorandum of 12 February 1962, giving approval for use of unvouchered funds.

Harvey after how long Boyd/Page

I.G. Report references first delivery of the pills in early 1961. Second delivery of the pills in early 1962 -- inquire re: Roselli's date recollection.

Jake Esterline had possession of the cigars already treated with poison in March through August 1960 in Florida. Esterline apparently destroyed them before he left in June of 1961 -- Roselli's knowledge of Esterline or the cigars?

Roselli's knowledge of thallium salts operation to put in Castro's shoes when left outside hotel room on trip?

I.G. Report indicates First Phase from August 1960 through April 1961 and Second Phase from April 1962 through February 1963.

ok but no break

Q to R — H

Inspector General's Report states that Maheu was instructed to tell Roselli that Maheu represented businesses (Wall Street) who had interests in Cuba and who wanted to eliminate Castro and were willing to pay $150,000.

Roselli -- Trafficante's gambling interests in Cuba -- interest in killing Castro?

I.G. Report indicates "first meeting" to be 14 September 1960 in New York City, with Maheu, Roselli and O'Connell present.

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli introduced Maheu to Giancana and that Giancana was to arrange contacts with syndicate elements in Cuba -- meeting for Roselli/Maheu/Giancana meeting in Fountainbleu Hotel in Florida week of 25 September 1960. I. G. Report indicates that Giancana told Maheu that he had a man (Trafficante) to serve as a courier going back and forth between Miami and Cuba. R

R I.G. Report indicates conversation in Roselli's presence wherein Giancana tells Maheu that Giancana is opposed to the use of guns -- no chance of escape?

R Roselli named inside man in Cuba as Juan Orta -- then in Prime Minister's office in Havana.

I.G. Report indicates Dr. Gunn's notation of delivery of the first batch of pills to be 10 February 1961? Roselli timing?

R us before Bay of Pigs?
— how far

R

I.G. Report indicates that Roselli's man, Orta, had "easy access" to Castro, and that he was involved in a "rake-off on gambling profits."

I.G. Report has Roselli giving the pills to Trafficante, rather than directly to the Cuban? NO

Did Harvey actually tell Roselli to cut off the project slowly so as to avoid creating hard feelings on the part of the Cubans in the latter part of 1962? NO

R [illegible]?

I.G. Report in "Second Phase" indicates Roselli telling O'Connell that Trafficante knew a man high up in the Cuban exile movement who could take over the job from Orta. Report indicates this man's name is Varona, and that Trafficante probably knew Varona in his efforts to take over gambling once Castro was out.

Does Roselli know Edward Moss and the Cellini's offer of money to Varona to be used against Castro?

I.G. Report indicates that Trafficante told Varona that he (Trafficante) had clients who would pay big money to get rid of Castro -- Roselli's knowledge of this -- time frame March/April 1961 -- figures mentioned from various witnesses are (1) $50,000 (2) $25,000 (3) $10,00 plus $1,000 worth of communications equipment. NOTE: O'Connell's testimony of $50,000 being taken to Florida and put in a safe deposit box to be paid C.O.D. upon accomplishment of Castro mission.

I.G. Report has Harvey taking over in February 1961 but only of the "executive action capability." The Report indicates 15 November 1961 as date Harvey says Bissell told him to include Cuba in ZRRIFLE program, and to take over syndicate connection --- Roselli's knowledge of either of these dates? NOTE: Are ZRRIFLE and Castro assassination plans synonymous?

true w/o [illegible] - date [illegible]

I.G. Report gives 8 and 9 April 1962 in New York City as the meeting place for the first introduction of Harvey, O'Connell and Roselli. NOTE: O'Connell feels that Harvey met Roselli prior to this meeting -- meeting took place at -- Savoy Plaza/Savoy Hilton Hotel where Roselli stayed -- dinner at the Elk Room -- drinks at the Copacabana -- table across from Phyllis MacGuire with Dorothy Kilgallen and Liberace performing -- seats changed so that Roselli would not be seen by MacGuire -- Roselli's recollection?

R

well after first intro?

June of 1963 Harvey left for Rome.

April 18, 1962 -- Dr. Treichler's records showing delivery of four pills to "OC."

September 1961, last casino in Havana closed.

3d man?

I.G. Report references Roselli's having a man known as "Maceo" or "Garcia - Gomez" and "Goday". The report describes him as a Cuban who spoke Italian -- Roselli's recollection? -- time frame?

[illegible]

The I.G. Report has April 1962 as the time period for the delivery of the rental truck with the rifles, etc. -- Roselli's recollection of what was inside? -- Rifles with telescopic sites for assassination purposes? Communications equipment -- what type? NOTE: Roselli's recollection regarding joint surveillance by Harvey and Shackley in one car and O'Connell and Roselli in another car?

May 1962 I.G. Report indicates that Roselli reports to Harvey that the pills are in Cuba -- references to all calls to Roselli going to the Friars Club and Roselli's calls going to Harvey's home number -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1962 -- I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that Varona had sent a three-man team into Cuba and that the pills were "inside."

September 1962 -- I.G. Report references Roselli meeting Harvey in Miami on 7 and 11 September. Roselli tells Harvey that a second three-man team was sent in by Varona -- a team of militia to infiltrate Castro's bodyguard -- that the first team is already inside and safe? --- Roselli's recollection of facts?

January 1963. I.G. Report reference Roselli telling Harvey that "militia team" prepared for take-off -- and that they never did? -- Roselli's recollection?

June 1963. I.G. Report reference last meeting between Roselli and Harvey -- Roselli met by Harvey at Dulles Airport -- Roselli stayed at home of friend of Harvey's -- Harvey's home closed up per overseas trip -- Harvey called by FBI having seen Roselli/Harvey at restaurant -- FBI had Roselli under surveillance -- Roselli's recollection of facts? -- Time period?

I.G. Report indicates that Maheu put in contact with Giancana for tap through Roselli -- Roselli's advance knowledge?

* * *

O'Connell's Testimony

O'Connell's recollection is that Orta's man would not go through with it and that the pills were returned to O'Connell by Roselli. O'Connell's recollection then is that the second plan was a call from Roselli and Maheu indicating the use of a chef. The pills were sent down and again returned when this plot failed.

O'Connell is unclear which of the aforementioned schemes took place before the Bay of Pigs. He indicates, however, the use of Varona to be after the Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell has the first introduction of Roselli and Harvey as being in the Miami airport.

O'Connell's testimony is that he received a call from Maheu who said that Giancana was upset about Phyllis MacGuire seeing

Dan Rowan. Maheu said that he had been requested to place a tap for Giancana and that Giancana might "stop helping" on the assassination plot if this tap was not placed. O'Connell checked with Edwards and received the go-ahead. O'Connell indicates that Maheu was authorized to pay for DuBois out of the month given him on the assassination plan.

O'Connell states that he recalls November 1960 as the time period of the delivery of the pills for Roselli through Trafficante?

O'Connell recollection that "chef" incident after Bay of Pigs.

O'Connell states that Varona's price was $50,000 -- $10,000 worth of communications equipment in addition.

O'Connell introduced by Roselli to Varona as "Mr. Olds."

* * *

Harvey Testimony

Harvey places the fall of 1961 as the time period in which ZRRIFLE was to be applied to Cuba.

Harvey reference to pressure from the Kennedys to topple the Castro regime clandestinely and not by means of any attack. Roselli's hearsay knowledge of this?

Harvey states that he recalls firearms in the truck, possibly "sniper-scope rifles."

Harvey states that as soon as the missile crisis was over, i.e., late 1962, he indicated to Roselli that he wanted the project cut off, although gradually so as not to create hard feelings.

Roselli's knowledge of Greenspun's safe -- break-in in 1971 -- 1967 meeting between Greenspun, Garrison, Roselli, etc.?

I.G. Report reference to "air contamination" in early 1960 efforts -- Roselli hearsay knowledge?

E. B. Williams' knowledge re Maheu/Roselli/Greenspun meetings in 1967?

Roselli knowledge re Angell Luis Castillo (U.S. in 1968) and Jerry Henning (training of Cuban teams)?

Roselli knowledge of explosives along with guns valued at $5,000 -- U-Haul truck delivery -- surveillance by Chief JMWAVE?

Late 1962-Early 1963 -- Roselli knowledge of skin-diving suit implemented with poisons?

##

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

I am writing you today on behalf of the Select Committee about the recent death of Samuel Giancana. As you are no doubt aware, his name has been raised in the context of allegations concerning the Central Intelligence Agency's possible involvement in so-called political assassinations.

Based on information available to the Committee, it was obvious that he might be knowledgeable about the political assassination matter. Although Mr. Giancana had not actually been subpoenaed to testify by this Committee, he had been approached by members of the staff for a possible interview. Since this might involve violation of federal statutes pertaining to obstruction of a Congressional Committee investigation, the Select Committee is requesting that you instruct the Federal Bureau of Investigation to keep it fully informed of all information coming to the Bureau's attention pertaining to Mr. Giancana's death. In making this request, the Committee is not conceding its right to conduct its own investigation of this matter. However, it is acting in the spirit of cooperation on a question of mutual concern to the Executive and Legislative Branches of government.

specify?

?

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. Therefore, we request 24-hour-a-day protection by the United States Marshall Service for the following witnesses which the Committee has subpoenaed, intends to subpoena, has interviewed, or intends to interview:

(Alternative paragraph:

The Committee is also concerned about the safety of several other possible witnesses. We would like to discuss with members of your staff the necessity for special arrangements by the United States Marshall Service to ensure the safety of witnesses who have or might have to contact with the Committee pertaining to these matters.)

THE MAFIA ORGANIZATIO
TAMPA, FLORIDA AREA


NEW YORK
VINCENZO MANGANO
(MISSING SINCE 1951)
ALFONSO DIECIDUE
(DECEASED)
1947
NEW YORK
JOSEPH PROFACI
(DECEASED 1962)
SANTO TRAFFICANTE, SR.
(DECEASED 1954)
ELDER
2
SALVATORE SCAGLIONE
@ "SAM"
A 11
B 3,15
C
D 13
ELDER
3
GAETANO
@ "JOE
FBI # 1063
A
B 2,15
TOP MAN
A
B
C
D
1
4
FRANK DIECIDUE
FBI # 764739 B
A
B
C 9
D 2,5
7
ANGELO BEDAMI
FBI # 1849088
A 8,8,19
B
C
D 2,9
6
AUGUSTINE PRIMO LAZZARA
TAMPA PD # 41671
A
B 1,4,5,7
C 8
D 10,18
8
CIRO BEDAMI
FBI # 865273 A
A 7,9,19
B 6,9
C
D 2,11
9
JOE BEDAMI
FBI # 82699 A
A 7,8,19
B 8
C 4
D 2,11
10
PHILIP PIAZZA
FBI # 276873 G
COSTA LONGO
AMY"
459
C
D 2,18
18
DOMENICK FURCI
@ "NICK"
FBI # 318519 B
A
B 6
C
D 11
15
ANGIELO LO SC
@ "FANO"
FBI # 356473 B
B 2,8
C 10
D 18
NON MEMBER ASSOCIA

EXHIBIT No.

N THE

LEGEND

- **A** INTER - FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
- **B** CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
- **C** COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
- **D** CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
  - 1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1D SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
  - 2 GAMBLING
  - 3 SHYLOCKING
  - 4 LABOR RACKETEERING
  - 5 COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
  - 6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
  - 7 COUNTERFEITING
  - 8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
  - 9 BOOTLEGGING
  - 10 BRIBERY
  - 11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
  - 12 TAX EVASION
  - 13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
  - 14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
  - 15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
  - 16 HIJACKING
  - 17 CONTEMPT
  - 18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
- **00** CHART REFERENCE NUMBER


5
SAM CACCIATORE TRAFFICANTE
@"TOTO"
FBI #492471B
A 1 ,13,21 C
B 20, 19 D
12
NICK SCAGLIONE
FBI #2586844
A 17 C 1
B 17 D 2
13
HENRY TRAFFICANTE
FBI # 625515 B
A 1 ,5, 21 C
B 1 , 9 D 2,10
CENTRAL & EAST
COSTAL AR
STEFANO SCAGLIONE
@"STEVE"
FBI #285845 C
A 2 C 18
B D 2
17
ALFONSO SCAGLIONE
@"AL"
FBI #4091276
A 12 C 12
B 12 D 12
19
SALVATORE JOE LORENZO
@"SINGING SAM"
FBI #5136887
A 7,8,9 C
B 13, 1 D 2,17,11,12,18
20
JAMES GUIDA BRUNO
@"JIMMY"
FBI #2924250
A C
B 5 D 2
21
SAMUEL CACCIATORE
@"SAM"
A 1 ,5,13 C
B 1 ,6 D 2
AND EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATES
HARLAN BLACKBURN
Rudy Mach
Don Mach
Dan Fussel
Buddy Parron
Glen Brechen
Tommy Berry
Clifford Bell
Clyd
Jesse
Vasc
Matt
Mac
Julic
Hoy
Kat
Joe Wheeler
Max Reid
Mary Cardan
Phil Riffe
Ceci
Clay
"So
Geo
Ralp
Ben
Wm
Elvi

LEGEND

- A INTER-FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
- B CRIMINAL ACTIVITY RELATIONSHIPS
- C COMMERCIAL AND FINANCIAL RELATIONSHIPS
- D CRIMINAL ACTIVITIES
  - 1A CURRENTLY IN JAIL FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1B AWAITING TRIAL ON NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1C PREVIOUS CONVICTION FOR NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING
  - 1D SUSPECTED OF TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTICS
  - 2 GAMBLING
  - 3 SHYLOCKING
  - 4 LABOR RACKETEERING
  - 5 COIN MACHINE RACKETEERING
  - 6 EXTORTION, MAYHEM AND MURDERS
  - 7 COUNTERFEITING
  - 8 RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS
  - 9 BOOTLEGGING
  - 10 BRIBERY
  - 11 BURGLARY, ROBBERY AND LARCENY
  - 12 TAX EVASION
  - 13 AGGRAVATED ASSAULT
  - 14 VICE (PROSTITUTION)
  - 15 ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF WEAPONS
  - 16 HIJACKING
  - 17 CONTEMPT
  - 18 OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE
- 00 CHART REFERENCE NUMBER


SAM CACCIATORE TRAFFICANTE
@"TOTO"
FBI #492471B
A 1 ,13,21 C
B 20, 19 D
12
NICK SCAGLIONE
FBI #2585844
A 17 C 1
B 17 D 2
13
HENRY TRAFFICANTE
FBI # 625515B
A 1 ,5, 21 C
B 1 , 9 D 2,10
CENTRAL & EAST FLORIDA COSTAL AREA
17
ALFONSO SCAGLIONE
@"AL"
FBI #4091276
A 12 C 12
B 12 D 12
19
SALVATORE JOE LORENZO
@"SINGING SAM"
FBI #5136882
A 7,8,9 C
B 13, 1 D 2,17,11,12,18
20
JAMES GUIDA BRUNO
@"JIMMY"
FBI #2924250
A C
B 5 D 2
21
SAMUEL CACCIATORE
@"SAM"
A 1 ,5,13 C
B 1 ,6 D 2
EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATES
HARLAN BLACKBURN
Rudy Mach
Don Mach
Dan Fussel
Buddy Parron
Glen Brechen
Tommy Berry
Clifford Bell
Clyde P. Lee
Jesse Joyner
Vasco Joyner
Mathew Smith
Macon Tribue
Julio Ciphon
Hoy Anderson
Kat Bradshaw
Joe Wheeler
Max Reid
Mary Cardan
Phil Riffe
Cecil Merritt
Clayton Thomas
"Sonny" Brown
George Solomon
Ralph Strawder
Benny White
Wm. Harrell
Elvin Carroll

[illegible]

ORGANIZED CRIME AND ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTICS

HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE
EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
PURSUANT TO SENATE RESOLUTION 17, 88TH CONGRESS

PART 2

OCTOBER 10, 11, 15, AND 16, 1963

Printed for the use of the Committee on Government Operations

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. And then Sergeant de la Llana, will you identify yourself, please, sir?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Jack de la Llana, Tampa Police Department. I have been with the police department for 9 years, and attached to the homicide division for 4 years before starting the criminal intelligence unit of the Tampa Police Department.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you had previous police service?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. My first experience was 9 years ago, when I started first with the force.

The CHAIRMAN. Chief Brown, do you have a statement, a prepared statement?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, I do, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I have a copy of it before me, and I see it has several pages. Do you wish to read all of it?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would like to read it to the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, then, you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, I am Neil G. Brown, chief of the Police Department of the city of Tampa, Fla.

I have been a member of the Tampa Police Department for the past 16 years, and I have been chief of the department for the past 4 years. Prior to my appointment as chief, I served as inspector of detectives. I am a graduate of the National Police Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and a member of the Tampa Bay Area Chiefs of Police Association and of the International Association of Chiefs of Police.

With me here today is Sgt. Jack de la Llana who, at my direction, formed our department's first criminal intelligence unit in February of 1962, and has been its director since that time. Sergeant de la Llana also holds the important post of chairman of the Florida Intelligence Unit, a statewide agency which coordinates information amongst intelligence units in cities throughout the State of Florida.

In addition to Sergeant de la Llana, whose diligent work and knowledge of criminal operations has provided much of the foundation for my statement to you, I feel fortunate in being accompanied also by Sgt. William Branch of the intelligence division of the Orlando Police Department. Sergeant Branch is presently attending the National Academy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He has been a member of the Orlando Police Department since 1951, and a detective sergeant since 1956. He is particularly familiar with organized gambling operations in the central Florida area, and I believe his presentation of that situation will be of material value to this inquiry.

I feel privileged to be able to testify before you today. I believe that the facts I can present here about organized crime operations in Tampa will help you and the American public realize the seriousness of this problem, and our Nation's emergent need for further Federal legislation to combat an evil that has clearly expanded beyond the powers of municipal law enforcement to contain, suppress and eliminate it.

Tampa has a large and respected Italian population, who are considered in all respects to be an asset to our community. Unfortunately, a small percentage of this group of citizens have achieved geant de la Llana, will

Police Department. I
ars, and attached to the
he criminal intelligence

ice service?
s 9 years ago, when I

a statement, a prepared

, and I see it has several

it to the committee.
roceed.
the subcommittee, I am
nt of the city of Tampa,

Department for the past
ent for the past 4 years.
s inspector of detectives.
cademy of the Federal
Tampa Bay Area Chiefs
al Association of Chiefs

na who, at my direction,
ligence unit in February
t time. Sergeant de la
rman of the Florida In-
coordinates information
t the State of Florida.
diligent work and knowl-
ch of the foundation for
ng accompanied also by
ion of the Orlando Police
attending the National
igation. He has been a
ince 1951, and a detective
iliar with organized gam-
nd I believe his presenta-
e to this inquiry.
ore you today. I believe
nized crime operations in
lic realize the seriousness
need for further Federal
ly expanded beyond the
tain, suppress and elimi-

population, who are con-
our community. Unfor-
of citizens have achieved

---

a notoriety greatly disproportionate to their numbers, because of their continuous activity in criminal and racketeering enterprises. The people of our city refer to this group as "the Sicilian underworld" or "the Mafia."

Our growing concern with this criminal group was crystallized in 1956 when a Hillsborough County grand jury was empaneled in Tampa to investigate and determine the truth of allegations that the Mafia was then operating in Tampa. The pertinent part of that grand jury's report stated:

> * * * there are some individuals who believe that a Mafia or Black Hand exists and operates in this community, but they are in the minority. * * * The evidence presented, the volume of written material examined, and witnesses interviews point to the existence in this community of an organized crime element whose methods of operation are similar to the pattern of the Sicilian Mafia as we understand it. * * *

The CHAIRMAN. Chief, let me ask you, prior to this development before the grand jury, before the grand jury made this finding, were you the law enforcement officials or in the police department?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you suspicious that such an organization existed in your city?

Mr. BROWN. Oh, yes; law enforcement has been aware that this has been there.

The CHAIRMAN. There was something, you felt confident, but you were unable to bring it out in concrete proof; is that correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. So you had been trying to combat it without being able to get it out in the open?

Mr. BROWN. That is exactly right.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. Proceed.

Mr. BROWN (reading):

> * * * our records indicate that the vast majority of our unsolved crimes stem from underworld activity involving persons of Sicilian or Italian ancestry * * *

The CHAIRMAN. We had some startling information here the other day from the Chicago chief of police with respect to some 976 murders, gangland style, that had been committed over a period of years, and only 2 of them had been solved. That is, officially solved by court determination or court action.

Mr. BROWN. That is typical.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the ratio in your community, if you can give us some idea about it?

Mr. BROWN. I will bring that out in my statement, but it is just like Chicago.

The CHAIRMAN. Something along that line?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. That struck me as one of the most frightening developments of information that I have heard regarding crime. I just couldn't believe that 976 murders, and apparently just murder in the first-degree fashion, could be committed in an area like Metropolitan Chicago over a period of years, and only 2 of them could be solved. It thoroughly demonstrates to me the great menace and the danger of organized mobs committing crime.

You say: "Well, they probably killed each other pretty much." That may be true, but they kill each other because of the extortionate operations that they are engaged in, to the detriment of the public at large, and to the detriment of innocent people who can't help themselves. It focuses and emphasizes how serious this menace is.

Very well, you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Notwithstanding these findings, the grand jury concluded that there was no national or local Mafia in Tampa. I would like to submit as exhibit 1 a certified copy of the report of the grand jury dated March 30, 1956.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, this report of the grand jury will be received and it may be made exhibit No. 44, and exhibit 1 to this witness' testimony.

I may later direct it be printed, but as of now we will just let it be filed as an exhibit for reference.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 44" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BROWN. It seems likely to me that the grand jury failed to acknowledge without qualification the presence of the Mafia in Tampa because it sought a pattern of Mafia operations similar to the historical Sicilian tradition of primitive and direct extortion, rather than the sophisticated and polished control of rackets that now characterize that organization.

The CHAIRMAN. I take it from that last statement that you feel that they have considerably improved their technique.

Mr. BROWN. Very much so.

The CHAIRMAN. Of crime operations.

Mr. BROWN. Very much.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question, Chief, there?

As I understand what you have just testified relative to the grand jury's report, they acknowledged that there was some evidence of the existence of Sicilian Mafia in the community, but apparently felt that evidence was not conclusive; is that a correct summary?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct; yes, Senator. The Tampa Police Department, however, has long been aware that many criminals in our area have local reputations as Mafiosi. My staff and I have made a careful evaluation of those reputations, based upon personal knowledge, criminal records, surveillance reports, personal histories, familial relationships, statistical analyses, reports from confidential informants, information from Federal and local law-enforcement agencies, and other customary police intelligence sources.

It is our considered conclusion that the Mafia exists in Tampa, that it controls most illegal gambling in Tampa and central Florida, and that its members have interstate and international ties to other Mafia groups.

The organization of the Mafia in the Tampa area is best understood from a chart we have formulated which I submit to this subcommittee as our exhibit No. 2.

Senator MUSKIE. Before we get to that, Chief, may I ask another question? The grand jury to which you referred sat in 1956, am I correct?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. That is 7 years ago. Do you think you have accumulated additional evidence as to the existence of the Mafia in Tampa which would justify a new reference to the grand jury?

Mr. BROWN. Yes; I believe so.

Senator MUSKIE. Are you planning that?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. This chart may be received as exhibit No. 45 and we will direct it be printed in the record if it can be, as far as it can be. The title of it is "The Mafia Organization in the Tampa, Fla., Area."

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 45" for reference and faces this page.)

The CHAIRMAN. Would you say the operations of this organized group are not confined just to the city limits of Tampa, but they are in the area?

Mr. BROWN. By all means; the entire area.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. This chart is now a part of the record and, if you wish to comment about it, we will proceed with your statement.

Mr. BROWN. The chart is keyed to show only the criminal, business, and familial interrelationships and activities of the persons named, although other criteria figured in our categorization of these persons. Of course, this chart cannot be considered as a definitive "table of organization" of the Tampa Mafia, because it is but a simplified representation of an organization that is in a constant state of flux, and about which we know we still have many things to learn.

However, I believe it is completely accurate in showing that Santo Trafficante is the boss of this criminal group. Indeed, it is to Santo Trafficante that Tampa owes the dubious distinction of having been represented at the notorious crime convention at Apalachin, N.Y., in November 1957.

The CHAIRMAN. I notice you designate or refer to this group as the Mafia. Would you say that it is the same group that has been referred to by the famous witness, Joe Valachi?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; it is.

The CHAIRMAN. Whether he calls it Cosa Nostra or the Mafia makes no difference. This is the organized crime group to which you referred?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct, Senator; this is the group.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question there?

Under this group, there is another group which you describe as nonmember associates and employees. Is that intended to suggest that the people who are so described know nothing about the identity of their employers and the organization of which they are a part?

Mr. BROWN. Senator, that is a part of the insulation of the group. They have many employees, and as we go into the statement, to show how in this gambling operation the seller is non-Sicilian in most cases, and he reports to another member up the ladder, and so on up. Many of these people are nonmembers of the Mafia as it is.

Senator MUSKIE. Do they know they are engaged in criminal activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. They know they are a part of a criminal organization?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. But they are not members?

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.



Senator MUSKIE. What do they need to do to become members in the Tampa area?

Mr. BROWN. Well, I think I can clarify that later on in the statement, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. All right; you may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante, Jr., was born in Tampa on November 14, 1914. He was one of five brothers. He maintains residence today in Tampa and in Miami. He previously lived in Havana, Cuba, where he owned and operated gambling casinos under the Battista regime. When Fidel Castro took over, Trafficante's gambling operations were stopped. He was expelled from Cuba and returned to the United States. He inherited the control of the numbers racket in central Florida which his father, Santo Trafficante, Sr., who died in 1954, and he continues to head this operation.

Testimony in the 1958 hearings of the Senate Select Committee on Improper Activities in the Labor or Management Field identified Santo Trafficante, Jr., in the operation of the Sans Souci gambling casino in Havana. That testimony stated that Trafficante took over the Sans Souci from the Mannarino brothers in Pittsburgh, Pa. Gabriel Mannarino was a fellow delegate with Santo Trafficante, Jr., to the Apalachin crime convention in 1957.

Additional testimony named Trafficante, Jr., as the key figure in the Mafia in Tampa, stating, as the Tampa police had long known, that he succeeded his father as the major racketeer in the city.

Other information substantiated by our files reveals that Trafficante is an associate of such notorious criminals as Meyer Lansky, Joseph Bonanno, Sam Giancana, Aniello Dellacroce, Joseph Stassi, Sam Mannarino, Joseph Arcuri, and of Joseph Riccobono, also known as Staten Island Joe, who had been closely allied with the elder Trafficante, and was also discovered at the Apalachin meeting.

When Joseph Profaci's daughter Carmella married Anthony Tocco, son of Detroit mobster William "Black Bill" Tocco, in Brooklyn on June 4, 1955, one of the guests at the reception in the Hotel Commodore in New York was Santo Trafficante, Jr. Among those who also attended were 13 other persons who later attended the Apalachin conference, as well as other notorious Mafia figures, such as Frank Livorsi, Thomas and John Dioguardi, Tony and Albert Anastasia, and Thomas "Three Finger Brown" Lucchese.

There have been at least two known attempts on the life of Santo Trafficante: On January 2, 1953, he was shotgunned in a car on the streets of Tampa, receiving wounds in the arm. Later, in Cuba, four American mobsters who intended to kill Trafficante were told by Cuban police that they would have to do it on American soil.

Trafficante has been arrested in Tampa several times for investigation, because of our knowledge that he was deeply involved in gambling, even though we have not yet been able to obtain the quantum of proof necessary to a successful prosecution. He has also been picked up by the police for questioning about the gangland slayings of Rene Nunez, Angelo Giglio, and Joe Antinori.

Trafficante was a suspect in the Albert Anastasia murder on October 25, 1957, in New York because he had appeared in New York just before the murder. He was considered a likely suspect because there had been reports that Anastasia was then attempting to move

---

in on Traffi
the alias "B
on the night
after Anasta
The Depa
organization
fication of t
Apalachin c
of Tampa, F
Furthermo
out-of-town
of the Tampa
ficante is asso
Louis Coticel
quently seen
boarding a pl
Other know
Trafficante g
colo, and Ant
Mr. O'DON
nuity, so that
a statement w
the interest of
like to have it
Do you have
Mr. DE LA L
Mr. O'DONN
Mr. DE LA L
The CHAIRM
Mr. DE LA L
Brady, and his
to our attentio
record. I have
The CHAIRM
No. 46 for refer
(Document r
may be found in
The CHAIRMA
that you have m
Mr. DE LA LLA
The CHAIRMA
record, either at
statement of the
(The statemen

One of the clear
is reflected by the
as a courier for the
first came to the a
served him, in Tam
Diecidue, two of th
tacts made by Coti
tion about him whi

ne members in
on in the state-

a on November
residence today
Havana, Cuba,
r the Battista
ambling opera-
nd returned to
numbers racket
, Sr., who died

lect Committee
Field identified
Souci gambling
ante took over
Pittsburgh, Pa.
Trafficante, Jr.,

e key figure in
nd long known,
e city.
that Trafficante
Lansky, Joseph
tassi, Sam Man-
known as Staten
der Trafficante,

Anthony Tocco,
in Brooklyn on
the Hotel Com-
mong those who
d the Apalachin
. such as Frank
lbert Anastasia,

he life of Santo
in a car on the
r, in Cuba, four
e were told by
ican soil.
es for investiga-
nvolved in gam-
the quantum of
also been picked
slayings of Rene

murder on Oc-
ed in New York
suspect because
mpting to move

---

in on Trafficante's gambling operations in Cuba. Trafficante, using the alias "B. Hill," stayed with Anastasia in the latter's hotel suite, on the night of October 24, 1957, and moved out approximately 1 hour after Anastasia's murder in a nearby barber shop.

The Department's evaluation of Trafficante as the boss of the Mafia organization in Tampa was confirmed, of course, by the positive identification of the "Louis Santos of Havana, Cuba," apprehended at the Apalachin conference in November of 1957, as Santo Trafficante, Jr., of Tampa, Fla.

Furthermore, we have witnessed and documented many visits of out-of-town racketeers with Santo Trafficante and his fellow hoodlums of the Tampa area. These visitors give further indications that Trafficante is associated with Mafia members in other cities. For example, Louis Coticchia of Chicago, also known as Lou Brady, has been frequently seen visiting Trafficante and on one occasion they were seen boarding a plane together, heading for Miami.

Other known outside racketeers who have visited in Tampa with Trafficante gang members are John Joseph Vitale, Salvatore Lopiccolo, and Anthony Giardano, all known racketeers from St. Louis, Mo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. I think at the present time, in interest of continuity, so that the record will read properly, Sergeant de la Llana has a statement with regard to a courier operation within the Mafia. In the interest of time, I am not going to ask him to read it, but I would like to have it introduced in the record.

Do you have that?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, I do.

Mr. O'DONNELL. How many pages does it consist of?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is five pages.

The CHAIRMAN. Give a better description of it and tell us what it is.

Mr. DE LA LLANA. It is with reference to Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, and his visits to Tampa on various occasions, which first came to our attention on April 13, 1962. This subject has a long criminal record. I have an FBI record which I will also submit into evidence.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the FBI record be received and made exhibit No. 46 for reference.

(Document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 46" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now, your statement, is that a summary statement that you have made and prepared for the record?

Mr. DE LA LLANA. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well, it may be received and printed in the record, either at this point or immediately following the prepared statement of the witness now testifying.

(The statement referred to follows:)

STATEMENT OF SGT. JACK DE LA LLANA

One of the clear ties of the Trafficante organization with other criminal groups is reflected by the contacts with Trafficante made by a man who appears to act as a courier for the Mafia. Louis Coticchia, alias Lou Brady, FBI No. 1427493, first came to the attention of our Department on April 13, 1962, when we observed him, in Tampa, in the company of Augustine Primo Lazzara and Frank Diecidue, two of the men on our Mafia chart. Because of this and other contacts made by Coticchia, our intelligent unit developed the following information about him which I think is of interest to this committee in giving a profile of a hoodlum who is entrusted by the Mafia to act as a courier for them between the various groups.

Coticchia was born on February 25, 1920, in Cincinnati, Ohio. When he was arrested a couple of years ago, he gave as his occupation "industrial financier." He is presently reported to be interested in the operation of a company offering wired music in the Chicago area known as Symphonaire Sound Systems, Inc.

His criminal record shows that he was first arrested in 1936 in Ohio for robbery. In 1937 he was arrested in Miami, Fla., for investigation of a "shakedown." He was held for 4 days and released without charges. He was arrested again in Hot Springs, Ark., in 1938 for investigation and released with the understanding that he would leave the city.

In 1938, in Cleveland, Coticchia was arrested and charged with assault with intent to commit rape. He was convicted and received 1 to 15 years, of which he served 4 years, being released in 1941. He was arrested in 1942 in Los Angeles, Calif., on a warrant issued in Baltimore for grand theft. He was tried in Baltimore for receiving stolen goods and received 5 years in prison.

Coticchia was again arrested in Dallas, Tex., in 1961, by the U.S. marshals for violation of and for conspiring to violate the Federal Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, which case is still pending in the Southern District Court of New York. His last arrest known to us was on January 4, 1963, when he was arrested in Tampa for investigation of grand larceny. He was released due to insufficient evidence.

Coticchia worked as a "pit boss" in gambling casinos in Las Vegas, Nev., and Havana, Cuba. He was involved in a scandal in 1960 in which mobsters attempted to take over a nationwide bail bond business.

Coticchia has been in and out of Tampa since our first observation of him and on every occasion he is in direct contact with Trafficante and Diecidue. On December 31, 1962, he purchased a new automobile in Tampa, paying the dealer $3,625.95 in cash. He then registered the car under the name of Jane Campbell. He remained in Tampa several days and was in constant contact with Trafficante and Diecidue.

On January 4, 1963, Coticchia was arrested in Tampa on suspicion of grand larceny and at the time of his arrest he had $1,775 in cash on his person. He had papers on him that showed he had resided previously at the Aloha Motel in Miami under the name Luiz Paulino Bailey from Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. He also had a paper with a list of gambling equipment and the name "Empress Lines, Ltd., Nassau—via *Wappen Von Hamburg*—German boat loading pier No. 3."

An investigation revealed this equipment had been shipped airfreight from Las Vegas to Nassau and placed in a German vessel, the *Wappen Von Hamburg*, which sails between Nassau and Miami. This equipment included 50 one-arm bandits, or slot machines, and was valued in excess of $65,000. The information received was that this vessel was to travel between Miami and Nassau as a floating gambling casino.

After Coticchia's arrest in Tampa, the telephone calls were checked at the motel. It showed that he had made several calls to Trafficante, Diecidue, and other associates of Trafficante. He had also made a long-distance call to Sonny's Restaurant in Miami Beach, which is owned by Thomas Altamura, FBI No. 511563, a Mafia member and another associate of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

I would like to submit for the record Coticchia's FBI record, and a photograph of him taken by my department when he was arrested in Tampa on January 4, 1963.

Another example of the Trafficante group's connections with Mafia figures in other parts of the Nation is: John Joseph Vitale, FBI No. 793259, of St. Louis, Mo. Vitale is well known to the St. Louis Metropolitan Police Department, and is reputed to be the Mafia leader in that area. He has a record of 13 arrests and a conviction for violating the Harrison Narcotics Act for which he received a sentence of 7 years' imprisonment. He has been arrested as a fence and is believed to deal in anything in which there is a large percentage of profit.

Police authorities consider him among the most dangerous of Mafia principals in the St. Louis area, and he is known to have underworld connections throughout the country. He appeared twice before the Senate Rackets Committee (August 19, 1958, and February 11, 1959) and each time refused to answer any questions, invoking the fifth amendment.

On April 17, 1963, Vitale flew from St. Louis to Tampa, using the name "Jack Howard." He visited the Diecidues for 4 hours and then flew back to St. Louis urier for them between

i, Ohio. When he was
"industrial financier."
of a company offering
Sound Systems, Inc.
d in 1936 in Ohio for
vestigation of a "shake-
rges. He was arrested
eleased with the under-

rged with assault with
1 to 15 years, of which
d in 1942 in Los Angeles,
He was tried in Balti-
rison.
, by the U.S. marshals
Securities and Exchange
n District Court of New
1963, when he was ar-
He was released due to

in Las Vegas, Nev., and
in which mobsters at-

t observation of him and
ante and Diecidue. On
Tampa, paying the dealer
name of Jane Campbell.
t contact with Trafficante

pa on suspicion of grand
cash on his person. He
sly at the Aloha Motel in
de Janeiro, Brazil. He
and the name "Empress
erman boat loading pier

shipped airfreight from
he *Wappen Von Hamburg*,
ment included 50 one-arm
$65,000. The information
Miami and Nassau as a

calls were checked at the
Trafficante, Diecidue, and
ng-distance call to Sonny's
omas Altamura, FBI No.
Trafficante, Jr.
l record, and a photograph
ted in Tampa on January

tions with Mafia figures in
I No. 793259, of St. Louis,
n Police Department, and
has a record of 13 arrests
Act for which he received
arrested as a fence and is
percentage of profit.
ngerous of Mafia principals
world connections through-
Senate Rackets Committee
time refused to answer any

ampa, using the name "Jack
then flew back to St. Louis

---

using the same alias. We alerted the St. Louis police and upon Vitale's arrival there, he was interviewed by detectives of that city. He declared that he had traveled to Tampa to settle a debt of the Lombardo Produce Co., of St. Louis, Mo., to the Diecidue Bros. of Tampa.

To me it does not seem probable that Vitale would go to the expense and trouble of flying to Tampa and returning the same day in order to settle a debt between two produce companies with which he has no known connections. More significantly, his use of an alias to run this errand, too, points out his own doubts that he was engaged in a legitimate errand.

These two examples, Coticchia's and Vitale's, indicate to us the interstate connections of the Trafficante organization, and point up the need for attacking the Mafia group on a national basis.

Mr. O'DONNELL. All right, we will continue.

Mr. BROWN. Some of Trafficante's men shown here on our chart gave sworn testimony before the Hillsborough County solicitor in 1953 concerning gambling in Tampa. They admitted that they had long been engaged in illegal gambling activities. They were forced to testify or face jail terms for contempt of court, because they had been granted immunity from prosecution for such crimes. Among those who testified were Frank Diecidue, Augustine Primo Lazzara, Nick Scaglione, Henry Trafficante, and James C. Longo.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Are any of these individuals on the chart that you have introduced as exhibit 2?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, they are all on the chart.

Mr. O'DONNELL. Thank you.

Mr. BROWN. Santo Trafficante has himself been caught up in a typical Mafia technique of seeking to preserve and protect its illegal enterprises by the corruption of law enforcement and other public officials. This incident substantiated our intelligence that Trafficante was deeply involved in gambling operations, and it showed that he had major interests in gambling outside the city of Tampa.

The case was initiated in 1954 by a veteran St. Petersburg police officer, Detective Sgt. Harry Dietrich, who had obtained evidence of the operation of the Trafficante bolita ring. Bolita is a numbers racket of considerable importance in Florida, involving weekly payoffs based upon information taken from radio reports of the weekly Cuban lottery.

An attempt was made to bribe Sergeant Dietrich to ignore the operation of the ring. He was given a new car, a television set, some suits of clothing, and cash. Sergeant Dietrich accepted the bribes with the full knowledge and orders of his superiors, to whom he had immediately reported the initial bribery attempt.

As a result of his work, Santo Trafficante and his brother Henry were arrested. Both were charged with bribery and were convicted.

convicted

The CHAIRMAN. When did this occur?

Mr. BROWN. This was in 1954.

The CHAIRMAN. This is the same man that is now operating, and he is the boss?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Each received a prison sentence of 5 years. Santo Trafficante's conviction was later reversed in a higher court. His brother served his term and was recently released. Both brothers were subsequently indicted by the Federal Government for tax law violations.

criminal rec. ?

We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned or controlled by Santo Trafficante. He owns no real estate, nor any other property, real or personal. His house, automobile, and all his other possessions are held in the names of others. However, we do not believe him to be destitute, for his control of gambling in the central Florida area alone must net him huge amounts of money. His operations there show, also, a characteristic Mafia method of utilizing non-Sicilian associates where it serves its criminal objectives.

Sergeant Branch, who has for the past 7 years been investigating gambling and other organized criminal activities in the Orlando area, will describe the Mafia's control, through the Harlan Blackburn organization, of lottery operations in central Florida. We know of no legitimate businesses that are owned.

The CHAIRMAN. Sergeant Branch is here with you?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

On the lower right-hand side of our chart we have depicted that group of Trafficante associates.

Sergeant Branch will here testify about the Blackburn group.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony you are about to give before this subcommittee will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. BRANCH. I do.

TESTIMONY OF WILLIAM BRANCH

The CHAIRMAN. Will you identify yourself for the record?

Mr. BRANCH. I am a sergeant with the Orlando Police Department attached to the intelligence division, and I have been with them since 1951. I have been working in this type of work since 1956, with the cooperation of the Federal and State agencies in our area.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir, I do.

The CHAIRMAN. It appears to be four or five pages. Do you wish to read it?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

In the central Florida area the main gambling activity is known as bolita or Cuba. Bolita is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn daily. Cuba is a numbers lottery where the winning number is drawn weekly. Bettors can place bets on any number from 1 to 100 and receive a 60-to-1 return if they win. The Cuba winning number is the last two digits from the Cuban national lottery number which is five digits and is broadcast over a Havana radio station each Saturday shortly after 2 p.m.

The public is contacted by "peddlers" or "sellers," who receive a commission of 15 percent of their sales. "Pickup" men, who take the bets from the sellers to the "checkup houses," receive 20 percent of what they collect. Employees such as checkup men, adding machine operators, and supervisors above this position usually receive salaries for their duties.

Lottery operations in central Florida prior to 1948 were dominated first by Charlie Wall of Tampa and then by Sam Warren, an Orlando native. In that year Harlan Blackburn, FBI No. 1026922, a convicted felon, came into Orlando and began taking over bolita and Cuba gambling.

This man is on the chart also.

Blackburn was
he was convicted
served 4½ years
the Florida State
March 1956 for o
a 5-year prison se
Senator MUSKI
Mr. BRANCH. Y
Senator MUSKI
Mr. BRANCH. N
Senator MUSKI
Mr. BRANCH. H
yes, sir.
The CHAIRMAN.
Mr. BRANCH. N
He was then inc
conviction of cons
was most recently
Federal wagering
trial.
Blackburn supe
Florida gambling.
F. Lee, Cecil Merri
Don Mach, Dan F
and Clifford Bell;
Riffe; Clyde F. L
Macon Tribue, Ju
shaw; Cecil Merrit
Solomon; and Ra
and Elvin Carroll.
With the excepti
all of these persons
other crimes.
I have here copies
committee's record.
The CHAIRMAN.
reference only.
(The documents
erence and may be f
Mr. BRANCH. Th
operation for a num
of gross and net co
have secured from
from witnesses tha
gambling.
Senator MUSKIE.
Mr. BRANCH. I h
The lottery operat
County into all of
Georgia.
From 1948 until t
that Santo Traffican
visiting Orlando and
ducting the lottery.

and all his other possessions
, we do not believe him to be
e central Florida area alone
His operations there show,
lizing non-Sicilian associates

t 7 years been investigating
tivities in the Orlando area,
gh the Harlan Blackburn
ntral Florida. We know of

re with you?

chart we have depicted that

nt the Blackburn group.
ar that the testimony you are
will be the truth, the whole
you God?

IAM BRANCH

urself for the record?
e Orlando Police Department
d I have been with them since
e of work since 1956, with the
encies in our area.
red statement?

ur or five pages. Do you wish

gambling activity is known as
ottery where the winning num-
ers lottery where the winning
place bets on any number from
they win. The Cuba winning
Cuban national lottery number
ver a Havana radio station each

" or "sellers," who receive a com-
Pickup" men, who take the bets
es," receive 20 percent of what
up men, adding machine opera-
ion usually receive salaries for

la prior to 1948 were dominated
hen by Sam Warren, an Orlando
burn, FBI No. 1026922, a con-
l began taking over bolita and

Blackburn was born in Sand Lake, Fla., on April 13, 1919. In 1935, he was convicted of forging a U.S. Government check, for which he served 4½ years in prison. In 1943, he was sentenced to 2 years in the Florida State prison for cattle theft. He was again arrested in March 1956 for operating a lottery in Polk County, Fla., and received a 5-year prison sentence, but was released in 1959.

Senator MUSKIE. Did you say Mr. Blackburn was on the chart?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir. He is listed in the lower right-hand corner.

Senator MUSKIE. It is not on this chart?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; not on that one.

Senator MUSKIE. Blackburn is not a member of the Mafia, as such?

Mr. BRANCH. He is a subordinate that works under their direction; yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is he the same as Sam Warren?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; he is not. Sam Warren is dead.

He was then incarcerated for 60 days in Polk County for an earlier conviction of conspiracy to violate the lottery laws of Florida. He was most recently arrested on November 5, 1962, for failure to buy a Federal wagering tax stamp. He is presently out on bail awaiting trial.

Blackburn supervises the five lottery bankers who control central Florida gambling. These bankers are Rudy Mach, Joe Wheeler, Clyde F. Lee, Cecil Merritt, and Ralph Strawder. Mach has in his operation Don Mach, Dan Fussell, Buddy Parron, Glen Brechen, Tommy Berry, and Clifford Bell; Joe Wheeler has Max Reid, Mary Carden, and Phil Riffe; Clyde F. Lee has Jesse Joyner, Vasco Joyner, Mathew Smith, Macon Tribue, Julia Ciphon, Hoy Anderson, and Katherine Bradshaw; Cecil Merritt has Clayton Thomas, Sonny Brown, and George Solomon; and Ralph Strawder has Benny White, William Harrell, and Elvin Carroll.

With the exception of Carden, Riffe, Harrell, White, and Ciphon, all of these persons have criminal records and arrests for gambling and other crimes.

I have here copies of their FBI records and submit them for the subcommittee's record.

The CHAIRMAN. They may be received in bulk as exhibit No. 47 for reference only.

(The documents referred to were marked "Exhibit No. 47" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

Mr. BRANCH. These five exceptions have been connected with this operation for a number of years, however, and their names and amounts of gross and net collections appear in much of the evidence that we have secured from checkup houses. We have also sworn testimony from witnesses that these persons have been engaged in illegal gambling.

Senator MUSKIE. What is the size of their take?

Mr. BRANCH. I have that further along in my statement, sir.

The lottery operation of the Blackburn group extends from Orange County into all of central Florida and into the southern State of Georgia.

From 1948 until the latter part of 1953, our department established that Santo Trafficante, Jr., and his brother, Henry, personally were visiting Orlando and supervising the checkup houses that were conducting the lottery.

It has also been obvious to us that the Trafficante organization has controlled the Blackburn operation for at least the last 10 years. From our examination of seized records, and from the fact that in all raids on the checkup houses we have arrested persons having close family ties with the Trafficante organization who were acting as auditors for his interests. In addition, there has been heavy telephone toll traffic between the Trafficantes in Tampa and the Blackburn group in Orlando.

When Blackburn was arrested in 1953, a memorandum was found containing telephone numbers of Augustine Primo Lazzara, Salvatore J. Lorenzo, J. M. Cacciatore—uncle of Santo Trafficante, Jr.—and Santo Trafficante, Jr., and of the Nebraska and Flamingo Bars, both owned by the Trafficante family.

In 1957 a search of a gambling house in Orange County by a State officer, with the assistance of the Orlando Police, resulted in the arrest of several persons. One of these was Lorenzo and another person by the name of Leto, from Tampa. They both gave sworn statements at that time to the county solicitor that they were working for Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In November 1961, another raid was conducted by agents of the Internal Revenue Service in conjunction with the Orlando Police Department on a house in Orange County. There were six persons arrested, and among those were Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore. These two were cousins of Santo Trafficante, Jr.

In July 1963, a raid on a gambling house in Sanford, Fla., by the IRS agents, with the assistance of the Orlando Police Department, established that it was another operation of Harlan Blackburn's, supervised by Clyde Lee. In the records seized there was the phone number of Trafficante's cousin, John Favata Cacciatore, and the phone number of the printing establishment employing Stefano Scaglione, who is also on the chart.

During the past 12 years that we know of at least three murders that have been due to fights for control of lottery operations in the Orlando area.

The fantastic amount of money taken in by these lottery operations has been repeatedly established by our raids of these gambling houses. For example, the raid in 1957 in Orange County, where Frank Ferreri and Sam Lorenzo were arrested, disclosed that the house was doing a gross business of $100,000 per week.

Senator MUSKIE. What were they paying out?

Mr. BRANCH. The profit on this operation runs about 50 percent. The November 1961 raid in Orange County where Armando Rios and Sam Cacciatore, cousins of Santo Trafficante, were arrested revealed that operation was doing a conservatively estimated gross of $160,000 per week.

The CHAIRMAN. With the same ratio of half applying there?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. When you say "net profit," this means after deductions of the commission which totaled 35 percent?

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. And the prizes.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

The commission and also the prizes and what other operating expenses they may have such as automobiles, rent, telephone bills.

The latest
$250,000 per
From thos
The CHAIR
Mr. BRAN
Orlando. T
and auditors
From thes
heavily into
revenues are
nized crime.
Any addit
further restr
stantial blow
Senator M
was it dishon
Mr. BRANC
They don't
They stop at
The CHAIR
Mr. BRANC
The CHAIR
cannot get his
Mr. BRANC
Thank you,
The CHAIR
be afraid to p
All right, C
Stand by, S
Mr. BRANCH

TH

Mr. BROWN.
it is necessary
dates from the
1937 and 1945,
in on all illegal
city was referre
Senator MUS
papers?
Mr. BROWN.
During the 1
rackets to any g
M. Wall, starte
the illegal gam
Florida. He st
admitted to a H
ing from illegal
by entering int
The elder Tra
in 1904 and beca
of the missing
Tampa. He die
arrest for Santo
In 1952, Wall

e organization has
the last 10 years.
in the fact that in
ed persons having
n who were acting
as been heavy tele-
and the Blackburn

randum was found
no Lazzara, Salva-
rafficante, Jr.—and
lamingo Bars, both

County by a State
ce, resulted in the
zo and another per-
h gave sworn state-
y were working for

d by agents of the
the Orlando Police
re were six persons
nd Sam Cacciatore.

anford, Fla., by the
Police Department,
Harlan Blackburn's,
here was the phone
Cacciatore, and the
employing Stefano

least three murders
ry operations in the

se lottery operations
ese gambling houses.
where Frank Ferreri
the house was doing

ns about 50 percent.
here Armando Rios
te, were arrested re-
y estimated gross of

pplying there?

," this means after
ercent?

t other operating ex-
telephone bills.

The latest raid, in July of this year, indicated a gross revenue of $250,000 per week.

From those figures——

The CHAIRMAN. Where was that raid?

Mr. BRANCH. That was in Sanford, Fla., just 17 miles north of Orlando. These figures are established by the Internal Revenue agents and auditors.

From these figures, it is easy to see why the Mafia has moved so heavily into lottery gambling in central Florida and why gambling revenues are universally acknowledged to be the "lifeblood" of organized crime.

Any additional legislation that this subcommittee can promote to further restrict and inhibit gambling will, in our opinion, be a substantial blow to organized crime.

Senator MUSKIE. Did they actually pay off on those lotteries or was it dishonest in that respect, too?

Mr. BRANCH. Usually they pay off.

They don't pay off when we pull a raid on them or arrest them. They stop at that. But they are in operation the next week.

The CHAIRMAN. You mean they do not pay off for that day?

Mr. BRANCH. No, sir; they don't.

The CHAIRMAN. It is unfortunate for the fellow that won, who cannot get his winnings.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. If the law enforcement is pretty vigilant, I would be afraid to place a bet under those circumstances.

All right, Chief, if you will, you may proceed.

Stand by, Sergeant, as we may want to ask you some questions.

Mr. BRANCH. Yes, sir.

TESTIMONY OF NEIL G. BROWN—Resumed

Mr. BROWN. To understand the crime network Trafficante operates it is necessary to examine the modern era of crime in Tampa, which dates from the early 1920's. Its most violent episodes were between 1937 and 1945, when the Sicilian underworld was attempting to move in on all illegal gambling in Tampa. This period in the history of our city was referred to as "the era of blood."

Senator MUSKIE. Who coined that phrase, the gang or the newspapers?

Mr. BROWN. I think it was the newspapers, Senator.

During the 1920's, before the Sicilian underworld moved into the rackets to any great extent, one of our most notorious residents, Charles M. Wall, started his rise to become the acknowledged boss of most of the illegal gambling in the Tampa and central area of the State of Florida. He styled himself "dean of the underworld," and in 1953 he admitted to a Hillsborough County solicitor that he had made his living from illegal gambling. During 1945, Wall forfeited his leadership by entering into a partnership with Santo Trafficante, Sr.

The elder Trafficante was born in Sicily in 1886. He came to Tampa in 1904 and became a naturalized citizen in 1925. In 1950, he was one of the missing witnesses in the Kefauver crime hearings held in Tampa. He died on August 11, 1954. Police records do not show any arrest for Santo Trafficante, Sr.

In 1952, Wall declared that he was retiring, although he did not state what he was retiring from. In April 1955, Wall's body was found in his home. He had been brutally beaten and his throat had been slashed. We have never discovered who the murderers were, nor have we determined their motive. Perhaps Wall was murdered because the killers learned he had admitted that he was Trafficante's partner in illegal gambling, and that he disclosed confidential facts about the Mafia.

In 1960, Sergeant de la Llana obtained—from a confidential source of known reliability—an astounding report about the Mafia and its operation in Tampa. The report had been obtained from Charles Wall in 1945, approximately 6 months after Trafficante, Senior, had made himself a partner in Walls' gambling enterprises.

Wall declared that from 1920 through 1945 he controlled gambling in Tampa and in the Florida counties of Hillsborough, Pinellas, Pasco, Hernando, Polk, and Orange. His rival for control of the gambling rackets was the local Mafia organization. This was headed, he said, by Santo Trafficante, Sr., the Diecidue brothers, James Lumia, Ignacio Antinori and Salvatore Italiano. Antinori was murdered on October 22, 1940; Lumia was murdered on June 5, 1950; and Italiano fled to Mexico in 1951.

Wall admitted that he had good reasons for going along with Trafficante, Senior, in 1945; previously the Mafia group had made three attempts on his life; the first was in 1937 as Wall was leaving a bank on the main street in Tampa; the second try occurred as Wall was leaving the garage behind his house; the third, in 1940, happened a few blocks from his house. In the third attempt, a truck passed the automobile in which Wall was riding and then stopped abruptly in front of the car. James DeSimone and Nicola Impostato, FBI No. 2716692, each armed with a shotgun, stepped from the truck and fired at Wall and his chauffeur. Both escaped with slight injuries. DeSimone and Impostato were known Mafia killers from Kansas City, Mo. They were staying with the Antinori family at the time.

The CHAIRMAN. Is Wall still living?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; he was killed.

The CHAIRMAN. Later killed?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. These three attempts failed but later he was killed?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Wall declared that the Mafia tried to make the public believe that the organization no longer existed in this country and that Mafia members pointed to the end of terrorism among Italian groups as evidence that the Mafia was gone from the underworld scene. Wall believed, however, that the organization had merely changed its type of operation. He said that other racketeers had once used the Mafia to monopolize rackets in major American cities. They had educated the Mafia so well in the process that the Sicilians had taken over the rackets themselves. Wall stated that the Mafia learned to consider extortion from Italian businessmen a "nickel-and-dime" business. They had discovered that public officials could be corrupted by bribery and that they could organize to take over the major rackets in the United States.

Wall declared that the Mafia was not dying out, but "was bigger and better than ever." He said that his partner, the elder Trafficante, had told him that there were some 10,000 active Mafia members in the United States. Wall stated that the Mafia leader in Tampa was

---

ORGANIZ

Santo Traffica
of the organiz
tries of the wo
in the United
a sizable Sicili
by Joseph Prot
of the major l
Frank Costell
members of t
Luciano were f
According t
tinct groups, a
was that only
while America
Wall was told
"outer" to "inn
even though he
were not due to
can birth, but
of the proceeds
to keep the me
Senator Mus
inner circle, Chi
Mr. BROWN.
circle.
Below that—
Senator Musk
Mr. BROWN. I
be in the inner ci
The CHAIRMA
the Tampa area i
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMA
Mr. BROWN. N
The CHAIRMA
organization is se
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMAN
it, but who was
Mr. BROWN. T
The CHAIRMAN.
(At this point S
Mr. BROWN. W
from 1930 throug
ano, James Lum
Thomas, and Fra
leadership of Tra
Wall that Vincen
Diecidues but that
had Joseph Profac
Senator MUSKIE
Mr. BROWN. Ye
Senator MUSKIE
any point in this

955, Wall's body was
en and his throat had
e murderers were, nor
all was murdered be-
t he was Trafficante's
osed confidential facts

n a confidential source
at the Mafia and its op-
ed from Charles Wall
nte, Senior, had made
es.
he controlled gambling
rough, Pinellas, Pasco,
ontrol of the gambling
is was headed, he said,
, James Lumia, Ignacio
s murdered on October
50; and Italiano fled to

going along with Traffi-
oup had made three at-
l was leaving a bank on
red as Wall was leaving
, happened a few blocks
passed the automobile in
ptly in front of the car.
No. 2716692, each armed
d fired at Wall and his
DeSimone and Impo-
s City, Mo. They were

d but later he was killed?

e the public believe that
ntry and that Mafia mem-
talian groups as evidence
ld scene. Wall believed,
hanged its type of opera-
once used the Mafia to
They had educated the
had taken over the rackets
rned to consider extortion
ne" business. They had
upted by bribery and that
ckets in the United States
ying out, but "was bigger
ner, the elder Trafficante,
active Mafia members in
afia leader in Tampa was

Santo Trafficante, Sr., and that he was well informed on the activities of the organization in the United States, in Sicily, and in other countries of the world. Trafficante had told him, Wall said, that the Mafia in the United States was directed by a local board in every city having a sizable Sicilian population. There was a national board, headed by Joseph Profaci in New York City, which was composed of the heads of the major local boards. Trafficante is reported to have said that Frank Costello, Vincent Mangano, and Joe Massie were influential members of the national board, and that Frank Nitti and Lucky Luciano were former members.

According to Wall's account, the Mafia was composed of two distinct groups, an "inner circle" and an "outer circle." The general rule was that only natives of Sicily were admitted to the "inner circle," while American-born Italians were recruited into the "outer circle." Wall was told it was possible for a member to be transferred from "outer" to "inner" status when he performed an act of special merit, even though he had been born in the United States. The restrictions were not due to lack of trust by native Italians toward those of American birth, but because the "inner circle" usually took the major part of the proceeds of the Mafia's illegal activities and, therefore, preferred to keep the membership of the "inner circle" as small as possible.

Senator MUSKIE. Would you say that this chart represents the inner circle, Chief?

Mr. BROWN. At the very top portion, Senator, would be the inner circle.

Below that——

Senator MUSKIE. By the "top portion," do you mean——

Mr. BROWN. I would include in that that the three top men would be in the inner circle and those below that would be in the outer circle.

The CHAIRMAN. Those would only be in the inner circle so far as the Tampa area is concerned?

Mr. BROWN. That is right.

The CHAIRMAN. Not in the inner circle overall?

Mr. BROWN. No, sir; this is just in the inner circle in the Tampa area.

The CHAIRMAN. But that gives an indication of how the overall organization is set up.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. You may have it in here, but I may have missed it, but who was Wall talking to when he gave all this information?

Mr. BROWN. That was a confidential informant.

The CHAIRMAN. I see. Very well.

(At this point Senator Javits entered the hearing room.)

Mr. BROWN. Wall believed the influential Mafia members in Tampa from 1930 through 1945 were: Santo Trafficante, Sr., Salvatore Italiano, James Lumia, and the Diecidue family—Alfonso, Antonio, Thomas, and Frank. The Diecidues and their in-laws opposed the leadership of Trafficante in the Tampa organization. Trafficante told Wall that Vincent Mangano, of the national board, supported the Diecidues but that he, Trafficante, was able to stay in power because he had Joseph Profaci's friendship.

Senator MUSKIE. May I ask a question here?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

Senator MUSKIE. You refer to the national board. I do not recall any point in this hearing where there was this kind of a direct reference to a national organization in the Mafia. Was it referred to as such?

Mr. Brown. This is the information as Wall has reported that it consisted of a national board.

Senator Muskie. Do you know who he identified as members of the national board?

Mr. Brown. Well, Joe Profaci and Vincent Mangano were two of the members of the national board.

The Chairman. They are shown to be leaders of families, both of them.

Senator Muskie. But those same people are leaders of families in New York as testified by Valachi.

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. So it is your impression that the heads of the New York families made up a national board that had jurisdiction over Tampa, among other places?

Mr. Brown. That is correct; yes, sir.

Wall declared that there were approximately 40 members of the Mafia living in the Tampa area and he believed that Trafficante's share of proceeds of their gambling operation was being divided with other members of the Mafia.

Information in our files from another confidential source confirms Wall's statement. In addition it reveals that Antonio Diecidue made annual trips to Miami for the purpose of renting a house for Vincent Mangano, who came down from New York every year to spend 2 or 3 months in Miami. This source stated that many important members of the Mafia visited Mangano in Florida, but that Trafficante never appeared.

Senator Muskie. May I ask another question on the national board? Was it your impression that the national board members shared in the proceeds of the criminal activities in Tampa?

Mr. Brown. Yes, sir; they had a percentage.

Senator Muskie. Have you any idea what that percentage was?

Mr. Brown. No, sir; I have no idea.

The gray shadings on our chart depict the influence of each of these men. To me, it appears to be no small coincidence that in Tampa the Diecidue family lost stature from at least the early 1950's when Vincent Mangano disappeared; nor that Trafficante, Jr., the Profaci man, was in the immediate vicinity, when Albert Anastasia was murdered in 1957.

Sergeant de la Llana's intelligence unit has prepared summaries of the men in Trafficante's organization, along with a commentary of relevant facts about each of them. So that our information may be available not only to the subcommittee, but to all police units to whom your reports are so valuable, I wish to submit these summaries and commentary for the record, as our exhibit 3a through t; and exhibit 4.

The Chairman. The summary to which you have referred may be received as exhibit 48——

Mr. O'Donnell. Chief, as I understand it, these are summations, very brief summations, of the 19 individuals that are on the chart insofar as their criminal activity, their mode of business, their criminal history, et cetera; is that correct?

Mr. Brown. That is correct.

The Chairman. It may be received as exhibit No. 48.

(The docun
and may be f
The Chair
is it?
Mr. O'Don
little detail as
4, which will b
The Chairm
The summa
That is what
Mr. Brown.
The Chairm
exhibit 4, your
Mr. Brown.
The Chairm
Mr. Brown.
The Chairm
Exhibit 48 is
Mr. Brown.
The Chairm
on the chart?
Mr. Brown.
The Chairma
Mr. Brown.
The Chairma
(The documen
and may be foun
The Chairma
You may proc
Mr. Brown.
task to obtain ev
members, because
ways been reluct
their fear of Mafi
that the Mafia dc
the relative infre
successfully prose
We have categ
1928 to the prese
circumstances of
uses murder to dis
lators of its code
activities and goal
solved. A ratio
ticular murder wa
argument, althoug
the argument. It
though the killer a
In startling cont
an examination o
1962 shows that we
unsolved, a soluti
through 1962, all 8

as it referred to as
has reported that it
d as members of the
ingano were two of
of families, both of
aders of families in

he heads of the New
ad jurisdiction over

40 members of the
d that Trafficante's
s being divided with

tial source confirms
tonio Diecidue made
a house for Vincent
year to spend 2 or 3
important members
at Trafficante never

the national board?
members shared in
?

percentage was?

influence of each of
coincidence that in
least the early 1950's
Trafficante, Jr., the
en Albert Anastasia

pared summaries of
h a commentary of
information may be
police units to whom
these summaries and
ugh t; and exhibit 4.
ave referred may be

ese are summations,
hat are on the chart
business, their crim-

o. 48.

(The documents referred to marked "Exhibit No. 48" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. You make reference to another exhibit. What is it?

Mr. O'DONNELL. Will you explain the other exhibit? Go into a little detail as to the various murders that you have on your exhibit 4, which will be a different exhibit in our hearings.

The CHAIRMAN. Let the Chair get this straight first.

The summary that he referred to has been made exhibit 48.

That is what you referred to as "our exhibit 3a"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you say "through t; and exhibit 4." What is exhibit 4, your exhibit 4?

Mr. BROWN. Exhibit 4 is a brief summation on each of the subjects.

The CHAIRMAN. What is your exhibit 3?

Mr. BROWN. They are arrest records of each of the individuals.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well.

Exhibit 48 is the arrest records.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Your exhibit 4 is a brief summary of each person on the chart?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It is of his records and activities?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. It may be received as exhibit No. 49 for reference.

(The document referred to marked "Exhibit No. 49" for reference, and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

The CHAIRMAN. Now the record is straight.

You may proceed.

Mr. BROWN. Our department has always found it a most difficult task to obtain evidence sufficient for successful prosecution of Mafia members, because the witnesses who might offer such evidence have always been reluctant to do so. The paramount reason, of course, is their fear of Mafia reprisals, since it is common knowledge in Tampa that the Mafia does not hesitate to use murder for such reprisals and the relative infrequency with which such professional murders are successfully prosecuted.

We have categorized certain homicides in the Tampa area, from 1928 to the present, as "gangland slayings." An examination of the circumstances of some of these murders emphasizes how the Mafia uses murder to discipline its membership, to revenge itself against violators of its code and to otherwise eliminate opposition to its criminal activities and goals. Of the 23 homicides on the list, only 1 has been solved. A ratio of less than 5 percent of solution—and that particular murder was cleared up because it apparently resulted from an argument, although it is possible that the slayer deliberately provoked the argument. It was not, therefore, a typical gangland slaying, although the killer and the victim were both underworld figures.

In startling contrast to the number of unsolved gangland slayings, an examination of all other Tampa homicides from 1958 through 1962 shows that we have had 145 murders and that only 4 are presently unsolved, a solution ratio of better than 97 percent. From 1960 through 1962, all 83 homicides in our city were solved.

The CHAIRMAN. What period is covered by the 23 gangland slayings that you make reference to?

Mr. BROWN. From 1928 through the present day.

The CHAIRMAN. In a period of about 30 years.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. And you identify them as gangland slayings as distinguished from the usual homicide cases that you have?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On those, according to your testimony, it has been impossible—or you have been unsuccessful, at least, in solving any of them except the one that appeared so obvious, and it would not possibly come within the category of "gangland slayings"?

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. But you have included it as being the only one that was solved.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

Senator MUSKIE. What are the characteristics of the gangland slayings that makes it so difficult to solve them as contrasted with your excellent record in other homicides?

Mr. BROWN. Of course, primarily it is because of witnesses who are reluctant to give the law enforcement any information whatsoever. In some of our killings—I recall one where we had nine witnesses in the room and nobody actually saw the murder or knew anything was going on.

Senator MUSKIE. So this fact has a direct bearing upon the question of immunity statutes, for example.

Mr. BROWN. That is right. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. This, in other words, emphasizes the rigid discipline, the code of underworld law, that cannot be violated without suffering the penalty of death.

Mr. BROWN. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. In other words, the nine who were in the room when the murder was committed, possibly every one of them knew what happened.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; I would think so.

The CHAIRMAN. I would doubt that somebody did not know it. But, anyway, they know that the penalty for them talking would be death.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Even if they were inclined to, and I do not mean to say they were inclined to, even if one of them were inclined to talk, he knows what the penalty would be. And that makes it difficult. That is why you have the trouble in the gangland slayings, the silence, the threat, the intimidation of a death sentence, of their being executed by their underworld government if they talk.

Mr. BROWN. That is true.

Senator MUSKIE. Then, Chief, just to nail that point down, they seem to be more than concerned and clearly are more concerned for themselves and for their allies than they are about immunity against prosecution.

Mr. BROWN. Yes, sir; that is true. They are afraid for their lives.

The CHAIRMAN. Very well. You may proceed.

Mr. Br
pertinent
list as our
The Ch
(The dc
erence and
(At this
The Cha
Mr. Bro
Valachi's t
by violence
At least
in 1936 an
rectly attri
had given t
A third mu
cago, invol
illustrating
lates its rul
difficulty of
lining Atto
that purpose
The Carr
aspects relat
figure in the
the Mafia an
in Kansas Ci
Carramusa
eral narcotic
Impastato, P
Ventola, Pat
Fernice. Ta
ply for the K
in Tampa wa
had inherited
tinori. The e
a narcotics de
prosecuted su
cardinal Mafia
them at their
Chicago with
a new life unde
Three years
mobile, Carrar
Lumia, an ass
but was himsel
was the same N
to kill Charles V
In Tampa w
of my police col
recanting at tr
witnesses, beca
of this frustrat
ranking membe

23 gangland slayings

y.

gangland slayings as
hat you have?

testimony, it has been
least, in solving any
us, and it would not
slayings"?

being the only one

of the gangland slay-
contrasted with your

of witnesses who are
rmation whatsoever.
had nine witnesses in
r or knew anything

ing upon the question

sizes the rigid disci-
be violated without

ere in the room when
of them knew what

ly did not know it.
em talking would be

, and I do not mean
em were inclined to
And that makes it
e gangland slayings,
th sentence, of their
if they talk.

at point down, they
more concerned for
nt immunity against

afraid for their lives.
l.

Mr. Brown. I have had these gangland slayings listed, with a few pertinent comments about each, and submit to the subcommittee this list as our exhibit 5.

The Chairman. It may be received and be made exhibit No. 50.

(The document referred to was marked "Exhibit No. 50" for reference and may be found in the files of the subcommittee.)

(At this point Senator Javits withdrew from the hearing room.)

The Chairman. You may proceed.

Mr. Brown. With few exceptions, those murders well reflect Joseph Valachi's testimony that Mafia members do live by violence and die by violence.

At least two of the unsolved murders on our list—that of Gus Perez in 1936 and of Joe "Pelusa" Diaz in 1958—were, in my opinion, directly attributable to the Mafia's knowledge or belief that the victims had given to legal authorities evidence incriminating Mafia members. A third murder—of Carl Carramusa, in 1945—taking place in Chicago, involved some Tampa Mafiosi, and is of particular interest in illustrating the Mafia zeal for vengeance against a member who violates its rules. It is of further significance, too, in demonstrating the difficulty of protecting witnesses against the Mafia—and is underlining Attorney General Kennedy's request for additional funds for that purpose, which request I strongly endorse.

The Carramusa case developed in Kansas City, Mo., with certain aspects related to the Mafia organization in Tampa. The principal figure in the case was Carl Carramusa, known as a minor member of the Mafia and a front man for the Mafia's narcotics traffic operation in Kansas City.

Carramusa was indicted in 1942 for conspiring to violate the Federal narcotic laws. His codefendants were Joseph DeLuca, Nicola Impastato, Paul Antinori, Joe Antinori, Charles Gerrgimina, Louis Ventola, Patsy Ventola, Charles Tiabi, Samuel Pernice, and Fellipo Fernice. Tampa's Mafia organization was one of the sources of supply for the Kansas City group, and at that time the narcotics trade in Tampa was headed by Paul Antinori and Joseph Antinori, who had inherited the narcotics leadership from their father, Ignazio Antinori. The elder Antinori had been murdered a few years before in a narcotics deal. All of the defendants in the Kansas City case were prosecuted successfully, primarily because Carramusa violated the cardinal Mafia code of l'omerta, or silence, testifying openly against them at their trial. After the trial, Carramusa went into hiding in Chicago with his wife and family, changing his name and beginning a new life under new circumstances.

Three years later, in June of 1945, while he was seated in his automobile, Carramusa's head was blown off by a shotgun blast. James Lumia, an associate of the Antinoris, was a suspect in this killing, but was himself murdered at Tampa in June of 1950. A prime suspect was the same Nicola Impastato, who had some years before attempted to kill Charles Wall.

In Tampa we have suffered also the frustration I know that many of my police colleagues in other cities have experienced—the deliberate recanting at trial of the original statements of complaining or key witnesses, because of their fear of Mafia reprisal. A clear instance of this frustration of law enforcement effort involved three of the ranking members of the Tampa Mafia.

One day in 1953, one Joe Castellano went to the Italian Club in Tampa to play cards with a group of friends. During the course of the evening, he talked to Salvatore Scaglione privately. Scaglione asked Castellano if he wanted to make a profit on a "hot load" of whisky. Castellano said he was interested, and they agreed to meet later that night.

At the meeting, Scaglione was accompanied by Joe Mistretta and Angelo LoScalzo. Castellano got into the front seat of a car provided by the others, and the four men drove to a thickly wooded area outside of Tampa city limits. Castellano was then attacked with a hammer, being hit repeatedly on the head. He managed to get out of the car, although he was badly hurt. He broke loose from his elderly assailants and ran away. He stumbled into a nearby house and asked to be taken to the constable's house, where he gave a statement about the incident, naming the three as his assailants. He swore to the county solicitor that he had no idea why he was beaten. Scaglione, Mistretta, and LoScalzo were arrested and charged with assault with intent to murder.

Joe Castellano disappeared for a period of time. After he was found, the case went to trial. Castellano changed his story completely and testified that he had injured himself while hunting on the night of the attack. The predictable result, of course, was a verdict for the defendants of "not guilty."

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER FEDERAL LEGISLATION TO FIGHT ORGANIZED CRIME

I believe firmly that it is almost impossible for the Police Department of the City of Tampa, or any other municipality, to cope effectively with the activities of a national or international crime syndicate such as these hearings show exists in the United States. One of the main problems is that the most dedicated, well-trained, and well-staffed police force is almost always limited legally and financially to the territorial boundaries of its municipality. For example, the Tampa Police Department is obviously interested in and informed about the activities of Santo Trafficante. However, in the past the department was unable to do anything about Trafficante's operations in pre-Castro Cuba; it has no jurisdiction or control of his illegal affairs in Miami and elsewhere in central Florida. The department could only record that he attended the Apalachin meeting in November of 1957, but it could do nothing about this obvious evidence that he was a high-ranking member of a national crime syndicate.

In the light of our experience with the Mafia in our own city's underworld, I submit for this subcommittee's consideration some suggestions for Federal legislation which I believe would certainly help local law enforcement agencies to fight organized crime more effectively.

1. More ample funds must be obtained by local agencies to recruit high caliber police personnel and to retain superior personnel having the experience and capabilities to understand, investigate, and prosecute organized criminal conspiracies. Because of the demonstrated interstate nature of organized crime, Federal legislation similar to

The Miami Herald

September 19, 1976

Could Rosselli Have Linked Castro Plot to JFK Death?

By RON LaBRECQUE
Herald Staff Writer

In 1960, when the CIA was trying to set up a delicate attempt on the life of Fidel Castro, it turned to a man once described as "the biggest flag-waving SOB in the country" — West Coast underworld figure Johnny Rosselli.

Rosselli — a seemingly improbable conspirator in a government plot — got the "flag-waving" label from Salvatore (Momo) Giancana, then Chicago's top crime boss and a man Rosselli brought into that same plot.

Now both are dead, murdered in the past year, and investigators are wondering whether their plotting led to their deaths and whether the CIA plots against Castro — only recently made public and even kept from the Warren Commission — are vital clues to the John F. Kennedy assassination.

The deaths of Giancana, in June of 1975, and Rosselli, this summer, have aroused a renewed concern in Washington, where on Friday the House of Representives voted to reopen the investigation of the Kennedy murder.

REP. THOMAS N. Downing (D., Va.), who will be chairman of the panel, said he is "convinced" a conspiracy was involved in Kennedy's death.

Now, in the aftermath of the violent deaths of Giancana and Rosselli, the question arises of what role, if any, the Kennedy White House played in the early 1960s "deal" the CIA made with the two underworld figures to have Castro murdered.

Whether the Kennedy White House knew about about the CIA's plotting (Robert F. Kennedy found out after the contacts were ended), the CIA's use of the underworld seems ironic in retrospect.

Robert Kennedy's passionate efforts to disable organized crime are well documented.

IN 1960 when Robert Kennedy wrote about what he had learned of organized crime in America from his years as chief counsel to the Senate Rackets Committee, he too quoted Giancana to make a point.

He told about Giancana's interview at his local draft board at the outbreak of World War II, when he was asked what he did for a living.

"I steal," Giancana is said to have replied.

So Sam Giancana didn't go to war and years later would boast to Chicago reporter Sandy Smith that he stayed out of the Army — labeled unfit — by telling the truth.

"What's wrong with the syndicate?" Kennedy quoted Giancana. "Two or three of us get together on a business deal and everybody says it's a bad thing. Businessmen do it all the time and nobody squawks."

A Senate committee began studying the Kennedy questions more than a year ago as it looked at covert CIA activities.

IN AN addendum to the Senate Intelligence Committee's interim report last November, Sen. Howard Baker (R., Tenn.) said, "It is my personal view that on balance the likelihood that presidents (the report dealt with Dwight Eisenhower and Kennedy) knew of the (Castro) assassination plots is greater than the likelihood that they did not."

Just to trace Rosselli's history with the CIA is mind-boggling for the investigators. Yet, it is just one aspect of the search for his killer.

Johnny Rosselli — born on the fourth of July in Esperia, Italy, and 71 when he died — was not first and foremost a CIA operative.

His greater role as evidenced by two convictions, his associations and to some extent his own comments, was as an influential, if publicly lesser known, organized crime figure.

HIS ASSOCIATION with other identified underworld members was monitored by law enforcement agencies as recently as several weeks before his July 28 disappearance.

By all accounts, Rosselli was a charming man, dressing in expensive clothes, married for only two years in the early 1940s and known most of his life as one who easily attracted women.

He was an immigrant who told in a short autobiography written about 1967 that his "life of crime" began as a teenager in Boston, attempting arson for his stepfather and stealing $50 on his own. As he traveled west, finally to settle in California, his attention turned to bootlegging, gambling and dabbling in the movie business.

IT IS said that Rosselli guarded the West Coast gambling interests for Giancana's Chicago syndicate.

Why Rosselli was chosen by the CIA for a Castro plot in 1960 is unclear, although CIA officials have since testified that they wanted the kind of contacts in Cuba which organized crime had made during the pre-Castro days when Havana was a gamblers' haven.

Giancana was enlisted by Rosselli because he had influence with Florida's Santo Trafficante, considered the key underworld gambling figure in Havana.

The unraveling of CIA and underworld conspiracies, an awesome web spanning decades, is left to a team of nine in the Metro Homicide Division. It is a team now clearly consumed by the task which has been a full-time operation since Rosselli's body was pulled from Dumfoundling Bay on Aug. 7.

THAT THE Metro team is even involved is happenstance. Rosselli lived in Plantation, Broward County, with his sister and brother-in-law. It's just that his killers chose to dump his body in Dade.

While several detectives say their instincts lead them to conclude that the Rosselli murder was an internal underworld affair, all on the team are aware of the pressure on them to search each clue that leads back to the CIA-Castro affair.

With Rosselli's death this summer, the newly appointed Senate committee saw its list of knowledgeable witnesses further trimmed. Some of those witnesses have died violently and some from natural causes.

When Giancana was murdered in June of 1975, before he could even be questioned by the committee staff, authorities attributed it to an internal gangland struggle — even though the murderer is still unknown.

The death of Rosselli, who had appeared before the committee three times in the past year without immunity, caused greater concern on Capitol Hill.

THE SAME night Rosselli's body was identified — the legs hacked off and stuffed along with the body into an oil drum — Baker, vice chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, called for the FBI to get involved in the case. (Several days later, Attorney General Edward Levi ordered FBI involvement.)

It wasn't until several weeks later, however, that what was known to Baker became public knowledge.

A section of the former committee's April report told of a Washington attorney who in 1967 went to Supreme Court Chief Justice Earl Warren (chairman of the then-disbanded Warren Commission) to say that two of his clients believed they knew about Cuban agents in the United States who conspired in the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

THE INFORMATION eventually reached the FBI, but as the Senate committee concluded this year, the 1967 FBI probe was slipshod and incomplete.

One of the clients referred to in the report has since been identified as Rosselli. And it has since been learned that Rosselli was convinced he held a vital clue to the JFK murder.

"There was never the slightest doubt in John's mind that Castro was responsible for the assassination of Kennedy," said Edward P. Morgan, the attorney referred to in the report.

Morgan is an attorney of no mean stature in Washington. He served as chief counsel to the joint congressional committee which studied the Pearl Harbor attack, counsel to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and for seven years was chief inspector of the FBI.

ROSSELLI told Morgan about the CIA plot in 1967, when the Department of Justice was vigorously attempting to deport Rosselli for being an illegal alien.

Rosselli, Morgan said, "was certain that the people he (Rosselli) put around Castro in the CIA plot turned right around and killed Kennedy. The people he still knew (in 1967) did it."

Rosselli, according to Morgan, decided to talk about his CIA activity in hopes of decreasing the pressure from the FBI and Department of Naturalization and Immigration, both Justice Department agencies.

Several friends of Rosselli, including Morgan, say they are convinced the FBI tried to get Rosselli to become an organized crime informant by threatening to have him deported if he didn't cooperate.

IN 1961, through a bungled wiretap effort, the FBI became aware of Rosselli's CIA activities.

While Giancana and Rosselli were in Florida planning the operation, Giancana wanted to return to Las Vegas to check on his girl friend, Phyllis McGuire, whom he suspected of dating comedian Dan Rowan. To keep Giancana in Florida, it was agreed that a bug would be placed in her hotel room and her conversations monitored.

But the private detective they hired, with CIA money it has since been learned, was discovered and arrested. Eventually the police investigation led back to the Castro plotters.

Prosecution was avoided when the CIA intervened and said the "national interest" would be damaged if the plot information became public.

WHEN THE wiretap case was again to be investigated in 1966, this time by a Senate committee headed by the late Sen. Edward Long (D., Mo.), the CIA again stepped in to stop it.

Morgan was told about the pending investigation by Rosselli and Robert Mahue, a former FBI agent-turned Howard Hughes aide who was the CIA's initial link to Rosselli.

Mahue told Morgan that both he and Rosselli had been subpenaed to appear before the committee. Morgan said he called Lawrence Houston, the CIA general counsel. Houston went to Long and the investigation was dropped.

MORGAN SAID he knew, as the Senate committee recently emphasized as well, that all information about the CIA plots — which could have been the incentive for pro-Castro forces to kill Kennedy — had been kept from the Warren Commission.

"I was an admirer of Earl Warren," Morgan said. "(His) report said that . . . Oswald alone killed Kennedy. It kept bugging me after so gruesome a detail from Rosselli that the Chief Justice could put his name on a report which didn't assess the most significant piece of evidence bearing on the killing of Kennedy."

The information Morgan had was passed to Warren via columnist Drew Pearson, a mutual friend. Eventually, it reached the FBI, but, remarkably, even after direct orders from President Lyndon Johnson in the spring of 1967, investigation was not vigorously pursued.

THE SENATE Intelligence Committee compared that apparent inaction with a statement former FBI director J. Edgar Hoover made to the Warren Commission on May 5, 1964. Hoover said, "well, I can assure you so far as the FBI is concerned the case will be continued in an open classification for all time. That is, any information coming to us or any report coming to us from any source will be thoroughly investigated, so that we will be able to prove or disprove the allegation."

A Senate Committee staff member commented recently, "what is really happening is that the investigation which the FBI should have done in 1967 — and no one can come close to explaining why it wasn't — is actually being done now."

HART, AS have local investigators, has established three possible scenario's for Rosselli's death: his recent organized crime activity, retaliation for his Castro assassination efforts or the information he held concerning the JFK assassination.

"Maybe Rosselli's information was the vital nerve of the Kennedy assassination," a Senate source told The Herald.

High officials in the Cuban government also reportedly feel there was a "Cuban factor" in the JFK death, but they see it as a result of exile politics, according to a recent article by Alton Frye, a senior fellow of the Council Foreign Relations in Washington.

Frye wrote that he visited Havana recently and met with Cuban officials including Deputy Prime Minister Carlos Rafael Rodriguez. " ... they volunteer the suspicion that the recent murders of Sam Giancana and Johnny Rosselli ... surely have some connection with Cuban exile politics and the Kennedy murder," Frye wrote.

THERE HAVE been theories recently propounded to show why both pro and anti-Castro forces could have wanted to get JFK out of power in 1963.

On the one hand, there is the report of French journalist Jean Daniel, who was the bearer to Castro of an offer from JFK for calmer relations. Castro was reportedly agreeable. The report stated that Daniel later was lunching with Castro when word came that Kennedy had been shot. Daniel described the Cuban leader as genuinely shocked by the news.

It has since been learned that probably in the very hour JFK was shot, a one-time Castro supporter was receiving a poison pen device from a CIA agent in what was a long-running anti-Castro effort. That Cuban agent was code-named AM/LASH, and he has since been identified as Rolando Cuebala, now imprisoned in Cuba for his assassination plotting.

WHETHER JFK had knowledge of, or perhaps even approved, any of the assassination plots will probably never be known.

His closest advisers, who testified before the Senate Committee all said he had no knowledge of such plots and would never have approved of them.

The same month Rosselli was passing poison pills to his Cuban contact at a meeting at the Fontainebleau, March of 1961, former Florida Sen. George Smathers, a friend of Kennedy, said he and Kennedy discussed the ramifications of a Castro assassination.

Smathers has since said Kennedy rejected the idea and that the discussion was more of a "brain-picking" session.

AT LEAST one high-level CIA official did testify he believed the White House was being briefed on the plots but according to Richard Bissell, one of the officials who originally decided to use Rosselli, it was through the method of "plausible deniability."

That, according to the recent Senate report, "can also lead to the use of euphemism and circumlocution, which are designed to allow the President and other senior officials to deny knowledge of an operation should it be disclosed."

Another alleged link between the White House and the underworld plotters, first made public by the Senate Committee, has also been denied by virtually everyone involved. Judith Campbell Exner, the woman who claims to have been friend and lover to both Giancana and JFK, introduced to both by Frank Sinatra, was not a link in the Castro plotting, those close to both Giancana and Kennedy have said.

A MAN with access to Kennedy's closest advisers told The Herald recently, "The Giancana-Rosselli thing is unrelated to the Exner thing. I was there. Sure JFK knew her, but he was naive about those kinds of things."

?

There is documentation to show that on March 22, 1962, Hoover lunched privately with Kennedy and presumably gave him his first information linking Exner with the gangsters. The final recorded phone call between the White House and Exner was made only a few hours later.

Another possible link discussed in the Senate report shows that the same unidentified Cuban to whom Rosselli passed the poison pills prior to the Bay of Pigs operation in April of 1961, was among a group of Cuban exile leaders who met with JFK following the invasion fiasco.

Nevada

IT IS known that several of the Cubans with whom Rosselli worked have been identified, but investigators say that not all are known.

As a condition to his appearances before the Senate Committee in the past year, it was agreed that Rosselli "would not state the names or confirm the existence of those agents whom he knew about," Rosselli's attorney Leslie Scheer said.

The friends and acquaintances of Rosselli who could be contacted by The Herald all said they never heard the names of the Cuban agents.

But a committee source cautioned, "they (Cuban agents) read the committee's report, they know who's being referred to."

ANOTHER Rosselli attorney, Tom Wadden, a partner of Edward Bennett Williams, said, "Yes, I think he had more knowledge" than he testified to.

Searching Rosselli's more recent past for enemies also presents problems, investigators say.

The decline of John Rosselli appears to begin in the late 1960s. In 1967, he was convicted in a card-cheating scandal at the posh, celebrity-filled Friar's Club in Los Angeles where the influence of Sinatra had made him a member according to investigators.

Deportation pressures were also mounting at this time.

ROSSELLI entered prison on the conviction in 1970 where he would serve three years of a five-year sentence.

In 1971, he was brought to a federal grand jury in Los Angeles which was probing whether some indentified Detroit organized crime leaders conspired with the Emprise Corp. — a giant firm with nationwide race track and sporting event concessions — to hide financial interests in the Frontier Hotel in Las Vegas.

Rosselli, too, had an interest in the Frontier, which opened in 1967. He owned the gift shop concession along with a partner named Joe Breen. How Rosselli obtained the concession is unclear, but Breen said it gave Rosselli an income of about $60,000.

ROSSELLI at one time had been a major influence in Las Vegas. Several sources said that when the owners of the Desert Inn wanted Howard Hughes to move out of the penthouse — because his special needs were costly and putting some "high rollers" in would be more profitable — it was Rosselli who patched things up.

Hughes eventually bought the Desert Inn, as well as the Frontier.

What Rosselli told the federal grand jury about the Frontier in 1971 is unknown. Rosselli didn't testify later at the trial at which Anthony J. Zerilli and Michael Polizzi and the Emprise Corp., among others, were convicted.

ZERILLI and Polizzi are still in jail. In 1973, the House of Representatives Select Committee on Crime probed the influence of organized crime in sports — and one area they looked at was Emprise and the Frontier Hotel case.

At the time of the conviction, the federal prosecutor asked that Polizzi and Terilli be jailed immediately because monitored, wiretapped conversations showed that the two had talked about "murder, the killing of certain individuals."

An intimate associate of Rosselli, however, discounts the possibility that Rosselli's grand jury appearance could have led to his death. "They know Johnny didn't talk to the grand jury," the associate said.

JOE BREEN said Rosselli hadn't been to Las Vegas for nine years, that "he's never even seen the gift shop."

Since his prison release and move to Plantation, Rosselli wasn't trying to regain power, according to his friends. "He had no muscle," said an associate."I can't believe Rosselli was getting back into mob stuff."

But at the same time, many of the associates were surpised to learn about Rosselli's recent visits with alleged organized crime figures on the West Coast.

Several associates speculate that Rosselli wanted to get involved in casino gambling, preferably in the Middle East, and was looking for someone with money to back him.

"MY IMPRESSION was that he was broke," Morgan said. "He told me last year, 'I'm in bad financial straits.'"

Scheer said Rosselli's income included about $60,000 from the gift shop and about $3,500 in social security, most of which went for back fees to attorneys and for government fines.

One friend said that just before Giancana's death, Rosselli had accepted Giancana's offer of money. The friend was to act as the intermediary. "Let me figure out what my next (attorney's) tab will be," the friend quoted Rosselli as saying.

Rosselli is described as a man with a sense of humor who did little offending.

A California woman who had known Rosselli for about 40 years told The Herald, "If you were around him for 30 minutes you'd like him because he would regard you as a human being."

"If you had a headache he would either get you an aspirin or send someone to get one. I said something significant there — he would get it or he would send someone — he wasn't a pansy, but he wasn't a tough guy either."

SECRET

[redacted] delivered $10000 to O'C in Fla

— Richard Scully Cain
AKA / Richard Scalzetti) CIA says no rel.

used as under "contact clearance" since '63

Giancana driver ?

— Jan '59 fall of gambling
casinos

SECRET

1st Meet. [redacted]

~~1 surprised to be approached~~
~~by CIA~~

~~1 person in Cuba~~
~~business interests~~

~~Cover whatever to see him~~
~~- how~~
~~- where~~
~~- when~~

SECRET

Giancana file

(Meyer Lansky's gambling empire in Havana

Trafficante

- gaming casino under Batista
- father died in 54 – inherited rackets
- intimate of Carlos Marcello
- T introduced in circa Sept 60 as "Joe"
- 1st attempt T delivered poison pills to "agent who had access to Castro" = failure
- T suggested another candidate
- Sam nominated Juan Orta – Cuban receiving kickbacks from gambling interests still had access to Castro

T gave pills to

- Dr Anthony Varona Cuban exile

SECRET

Attorneys Briefing

T — met w/ Rosselli ~ July of this year

T calls he made — contacts — involve etc

Rptr — desc. — ~~heard~~ first — told about ? → concern over rpt in Fla?

followup interview after Rosselli i.e. Rosselli talking — T know etc

Dick — CIA memo — Bill Lynch

Who ar called after T got his call etc

T travels LA / Chicago etc — Name of LA guy perjury involving alleged contribution to political organization in return for impairment of Securities and Exchange Commission investigation and judicial proceedings were not entitled to continuance or change of venue on ground that, though pretrial publicity was nationwide, exposure varied in certain sections of the country. U. S. v. Mitchell, D.C.N.Y.1973, 372 F.Supp. 1239, appeal dismissed 485 F.2d 1290.

§ 1511. Obstruction of State or local law enforcement

(a) It shall be unlawful for two or more persons to conspire to obstruct the enforcement of the criminal laws of a State or political subdivision thereof, with the intent to facilitate an illegal gambling business if—

(1) one or more of such persons does any act to effect the object of such a conspiracy;

(2) one or more of such persons is an official or employee, elected, appointed, or otherwise, of such State or political subdivision; and

(3) one or more of such persons conducts, finances, manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an illegal gambling business.

(b) As used in this section—

(1) "illegal gambling business" means a gambling business which—

(i) is a violation of the law of a State or political subdivision in which it is conducted;

(ii) involves five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own all or part of such business; and

(iii) has been or remains in substantially continuous operation for a period in excess of thirty days or has a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day.

(2) "gambling" includes but is not limited to pool-selling, bookmaking, maintaining slot machines, roulette wheels, or dice tables, and conducting lotteries, policy, bolita or numbers games, or selling chances therein.

(3) "State" means any State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and any territory or possession of the United States.

(c) This section shall not apply to any bingo game, lottery, or similar game of chance conducted by an organization exempt from tax under paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended, if no part of the gross receipts derived from such activity inures to the benefit of any private shareholder, member, or employee of such organization, except as compensation for actual expenses incurred by him in the conduct of such activity.

(d) Whoever violates this section shall be punished by a fine of not more than $20,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.

Added Pub.L. 91–452, Title VIII, § 802(a), Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 936.

References in Text. Paragraph (3) of subsection (c) of section 501 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, referred to in subsec. (c), is classified to section 501(c)(3) of Title 26, Internal Revenue Code of 1954.

Congressional Statement of Findings. Section 801 of Pub.L. 91–452 provided that: "The Congress finds that illegal gambling involves widespread use of, and has an effect upon, interstate commerce and the facilities thereof."

Priority of State Laws. Section 811 of Pub.L. 91–452 provided that: "No provision of this title [enacting this section and section 1955 of this title, amending section 2516 of this title and enacting material set out as notes under this section and section 1955 of this title] indicates an intent on the part of the Congress to occupy the field in which such provision operates to the exclusion of the law of a State or possession, or a political subdivision of a State or possession, on the same subject matter, or to relieve any person of any obligation imposed by any law of any State or possession, or political subdivision of a State or possession."

Legislative History. For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 91–452, see 1970 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 4007.

Index to Notes

Admissibility of evidence 8
Constitutionality ½
Construction with other laws ¾
Definitions 1
Discovery and inspection 1c
Elements of offense 5
Evidence 2
Indictment 1a
Participants in business 3
Prejudice 6
Relevance of
Sentence 4
Severance 11
Sufficiency o

½. **Constitu**
This sectio
S. v. Crocke
Section 19
tion were
though they
ed by char
tions. U. S
477 F.2d 62
1403, certior
1064, 38 L.E
This sect
persons to
ment of cri
cal subdivis
cilitate ille
specified ci
powers gra
clause, U.S
infringe on
U.S.C.A.Con
process or
tally vague
S. v. Garr
1112.

1. **Definiti**
Definitio
ness" in t
ness which
who condu
is not
ground th
duces an
guity as
cluded in
Riehl, C.A

1a. **Indict**
Sheriff
fendant,
was prop
charging
an illegal
acy to co
1955 and
ett., C.A.G
Indictm
to obstru
of Louisi
making
spire to
laws of
thereof,
gambling
cumstanc
of this
grounds
state off
v. Garris
Indictr
with co
of crimi
of this
persons
ment of
subdivis
tate ille
ified ci
to time
section
of cont
dictmen
applicat
Use, i
spiracy
nal law
section
conspir
inal la
thereof,
gambli
cumsta
Conspi
Law E

Historical and Revision Notes

Reviser's Note. Based on Title 18, U.S.C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, c. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, c. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, c. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology. 80th Congress House Report No. 304.

References in Text. The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in the text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

1962 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

Legislative History: For legislative history and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see 1962 U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p. 2567.

Notes of Decisions

Generally 2
Constitutionality 1
Evidence 6
Indictment or information 5
Proceedings within section 3
Questions for jury 7
Witness within section 4

Library references

Obstructing Justice 🔑7, 21.
C.J.S. Obstructing Justice §§ 5, 22.

1. Constitutionality

Former section 241a of this title [now this section] providing that whoever "corruptly" endeavors to influence, intimidate or impede any witness in proceeding, etc. was not unconstitutional for failure to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt contrary to U.S.C.A.Const. Amends. 5 and 6. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

2. Generally

This section covers any activity which would influence or intimidate witness who might be called to testify and is not limited to witness who has been called to testify with defendant's knowledge. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

3. Proceedings within section

The submission to the Naturalization Service of an application to file a petition for naturalization cannot, in a legal sense, have pendency throughout the entire United States within meaning of this section creating a criminal offense against one who corruptly attempts to obstruct or impede the due and proper administration of law, under which such a proceeding is had before a department or agency of the United States. Taran v. U. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.

In prosecution for corruptly endeavoring to influence and impede due and proper administration of law in relation to a naturalization proceeding allegedly pending before Immigration Service, based on a false statement allegedly made in defendant's application for pardon regarding other arrests and convictions against him, naturalization proceeding was not pending in 1951 before the Service when the defendant made the application for pardon, nor when pardon was obtained by him, so as to authorize conviction, where at the time of charged offense the Service had no application in its hands, in that it regarded the naturalization application as not having been entitled to be submitted and returned it to defendant, and defendant subsequently submitted a new application in 1955 having no relation to what was done in 1951. Id.

"Proceeding" within this section includes any investigation which is directed by formal order of Securities and Exchange Commission and at which designated officer takes testimony under oath. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

---

4. Witn
One wl
able wit
and who
ness" th
defendant
when and
prosecuti
and corru
false and
ate Comn
S., C.A.C
denied 85
2d 795.

5. Indict
Indictm
lawfully,
corruptly
and corru
struct and
cise of po
cific acts,
and partia
from Senat
ion involve
sonable rel
quiry of
concealing
memorandu
which bore
matter of i
ficiently cl
section dea
juring witn
mittees. U.
187 F.Supp.

Indictmen
lawfully, wi
ruptly influ
corruptly e
and impede
power of inq
particularly
tially destro
Senate Select
voice or reco
lation to sub
ate Select Co
withholding
containing
reasonable r
inquiry, and
dismissed, or
judicata app
ment chargi
refusal to an
Select Commi

Indictment
lawfully, wil
ruptly influer
corruptly en
and impede

ision Notes

2 Amendment. Pub.L. 87-664 sub-
ted the catchline "Obstruction of
edings before departments, agen-
and committees" for "Influencing or
ing witness before agencies and
nittees" and punished the willful re-
il, concealment, destruction, mutila-
alteration or falsification of docu-
s which were the subject of a de-
d under the Antitrust Civil Process
if done with the intent to prevent
pliance with a civil investigative de-
d.

gislative History: For legislative his-
and purpose of Pub.L. 87-664, see
U.S.Code Cong. and Adm.News, p.

sions

e. have pendency throughout the en-
United States within meaning of this
ion creating a criminal offense
nst one who corruptly attempts to
ruct or impede the due and proper
inistration of law, under which such
oceeding is had before a department
gency of the United States. Taran
. S., C.A.Minn.1959, 266 F.2d 561.

prosecution for corruptly endeavor-
to influence and impede due and
er administration of law in relation
naturalization proceeding allegedly
ling before Immigration Service,
d on a false statement allegedly
e in defendant's application for par-
regarding other arrests and convic-
s against him, naturalization pro-
ing was not pending in 1951 before
Service when the defendant made
application for pardon, nor when
on was obtained by him, so as to
orize conviction, where at the time
harged offense the Service had no ap-
ation in its hands, in that it regard-
he naturalization application as not
ng been entitled to be submitted and
rned it to defendant, and defendant
sequently submitted a new applica-
in 1955 having no relation to what
done in 1951. Id.

Proceeding" within this section in-
des any investigation which is directed
formal order of Securities and Ex-
nge Commission and at which desig-
ed officer takes testimony under oath.
S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp.
certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380
912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied
S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

---

4. Witness within section

One whom defendant knew was probable witness before Senate Committee and who intended to testify was a "witness" though not under subpoena when defendant gave him false story to tell when and if he testified, for purposes of prosecutions for subornation of perjury and corruptly influencing witness to give false and perjurious information to Senate Committee investigators. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal.1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.

5. Indictment or information

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully, and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, sufficiently charged an offense under this section dealing with influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees. U. S. v. Presser, D.C.Ohio 1960, 187 F.Supp. 64.

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground that doctrine of res judicata applied because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee. Id.

Indictment charging that defendant unlawfully, wilfully and knowingly did corruptly influence, obstruct and impede and corruptly endeavor to influence, obstruct and impede due and proper exercise of power of inquiry by certain specific acts, particularly altering, defacing and partially destroying and withholding from Senate Select Committee certain union invoice or record, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry of Senate Select Committee, and concealing and withholding envelope and memorandum containing union's records, which bore reasonable relation to subject matter of inquiry, and relevant to it, would not be dismissed, on ground of double jeopardy, because of prior indictment charging defendant with unlawful refusal to answer question before Senate Select Committee, since same facts would not prove each case. Id.

An indictment for conspiracy to violate criminal code by subornation of perjury in proceeding before the Federal Petroleum Board was not subject to criticism that it was too vague, contradictory, duplicitous, uncertain and indefnite. U. S. v. Brumfield, D.C.La.1949, 85 F. Supp. 696.

6. Evidence

The "two witness rule" was not applicable in showing that defendant violated this section proscribing obstruction of justice by influencing witness to give false testimony and information to Senate Committee and its investigators, and testimony of one person alone was sufficient to convict. Stein v. U. S., C.A.Cal. 1964, 337 F.2d 14, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 889, 380 U.S. 907, 13 L.Ed.2d 795.

Testimony of one person alone is sufficient to convict defendant for obstructing justice in influencing witness to give false testimony to Senate Committee and to give false and perjurious information to committee investigators. Id.

Evidence sustained convictions under counts charging corruptly inducing witness to testify falsely and corruptly influencing him to give false and perjurious information to investigators of Senate Committee. Id.

7. Questions for jury

Whether defendant charged with obstruction of justice in Securities and Exchange Commission's investigation by inducing person to testify falsely that he had purchased certain securities through firm of which defendant was head and had resold securities to that firm knew that witness would be asked to testify under oath was jury question. U. S. v. Batten, D.C.D.C.1964, 226 F.Supp. 492, certiorari denied 85 S.Ct. 898, 380 U.S. 912, 13 L.Ed.2d 799, rehearing denied 85 S.Ct. 1557, 381 U.S. 930, 14 L.Ed.2d 688.

Amendments

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

Cross References

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months. or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

Legislative History

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

Cross References

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

Legislative History

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

References in Text

The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

Amendments

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

Cross References

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Section Referred to in Other Sections

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

Legislative History

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

Cross References

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90–578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87–664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91–452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91–452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87–664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

AMENDMENTS

1968—Pub. L. 90-578 substituted "United States magistrate" and "magistrate" for "United States commissioner" and "commissioner", in two instances, respectively.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of officers, jurors or witnesses, see section 201 et seq. of this title.

Influencing juror or witness as criminal contempt, see section 401 of this title.

Wire or oral communications, authorization for interception, to provide evidence of offenses under this section, see section 2516 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in sections 201, 1961, 2516 of this title.

§ 1504. Influencing juror by writing.

Whoever attempts to influence the action or decision of any grand or petit juror of any court of the United States upon any issue or matter pending before such juror, or before the jury of which he is a member, or pertaining to his duties, by writing or sending to him any written communication, in relation to such issue or matter, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both.

Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the communication of a request to appear before the grand jury. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 243 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 137, 35 Stat. 1113).

Last paragraph was added to remove the possibility that a proper request to appear before a grand jury might be construed as a technical violation of this section.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials and witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

Minor offenses tried by United States magistrates as excluding offenses punishable under this section, see section 3401 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 202 of this title.

§ 1505. Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees.

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication, endeavors to influence, intimidate, or impede any witness in any proceeding pending before any department or agency of the United States, or in connection with any inquiry or investigation being had by either House, or any committee of either House, or any joint committee of the Congress; or

Whoever injures any party or witness in his person or property on account of his attending or having attended such proceeding, inquiry, or investigation, or on account of his testifying or having testified to any matter pending therein; or

Whoever, with intent to avoid, evade, prevent, or obstruct compliance in whole or in part with any civil investigative demand duly and properly made under the Antitrust Civil Process Act or section 1968 of this title willfully removes from any place, conceals, destroys, mutilates, alters, or by other means falsifies any documentary material which is the subject of such demand; or

Whoever corruptly, or by threats or force, or by any threatening letter or communication influences, obstructs, or impedes or endeavors to influence, obstruct, or impede the due and proper administration of the law under which such proceeding is being had before such department or agency of the United States, or the due and proper exercise of the power of inquiry under which such inquiry or investigation is being had by either House, or any committee of either House or any joint committee of the Congress—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770; Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. 87-664, § 6(a), 76 Stat. 551; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. 91-452, title IX, § 903, 84 Stat. 947.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 241a (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 135a, as added Jan. 13, 1940, ch. 1, 54 Stat. 13; June 8, 1945, ch. 178, § 2, 59 Stat. 234).

Word "agency" was substituted for the words "independent establishment, board, commission" in two instances to eliminate any possible ambiguity as to scope of section. (See definitive section 6 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

REFERENCES IN TEXT

The Antitrust Civil Process Act, referred to in text, is classified to chapter 34 of Title 15, Commerce and Trade.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91-452 added reference to section 1968 of this title.

1962—Pub. L. 87-664 substituted the catchline "Obstruction of proceedings before departments, agencies, and committees" for "Influencing or injuring witness before agencies and committees" and punished the willful removal, concealment, destruction, mutilation, alteration or falsification of documents which were the subject of a demand under the Antitrust Civil Process Act if done with the intent to prevent compliance with a civil investigative demand.

CROSS REFERENCES

Bribery of public officials or witnesses, see section 201 of this title.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in section 203 of this title; title 12 section 1457.

§ 1506. Theft or alteration of record or process; false bail.

Whoever feloniously steals, takes away, alters, falsifies, or otherwise avoids any record, writ, process, or other proceeding, in any court of the United States, whereby any judgment is reversed, made void, or does not take effect; or

Whoever acknowledges, or procures to be acknowledged in any such court, any recognizance, bail, or judgment, in the name of any other person not privy or consenting to the same—

Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 770.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 233 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 127, 35 Stat. 1111).

The term of imprisonment was reduced from 7 to 5 years, to conform the punishment with like ones for similar offenses. (See section 1503 of this title.)

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

CROSS REFERENCES

Concealment, removal or destruction of records, see section 2071 of this title.

Embezzlement or theft of records, generally, see section 641 of this title.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10011-10101

RECORD SERIES : NSF

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 14

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : EXTRACT FROM PAPER SENT GEN. LANSDALE 29 AUGUST '62

DATE : 08/29/1962
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA : UPON AGENCY REVIEW

COMMENTS : NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(AUGMENTED):8/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-90-50

From
Bruce Cheever

17

SG Briefed
on 30 Aug

SECRET
SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

Extract from paper sent Gen. Lansdale 29 August 62

2. Through clandestine agent sources, we learned recently that a Western European merchant ship en route from Havana, Cuba, to Odessa, USSR, would be forced to dock at a Caribbean port and off-load temporarily part of its cargo in order to repair minor hull damage which resulted from an accidental grounding. It was ascertained that this vessel carried as cargo 80,000 two-hundred pound bags of Cuban raw sugar shipped to Odessa, USSR, for refining in the Soviet Union. In order to lighten the ship sufficiently to permit repairs, it was necessary to off-load and temporarily warehouse 14,000 of the two-hundred pound bags of sugar.

3. Through a clandestine operation which was not detected and is not traceable, we were able to contaminate 800 of these bags of sugar with a chemical used in the process of denaturing alcohol while the bags were in the warehouse and before they were reloaded on the vessel.

4. When this cargo of sugar is refined in the Soviet Union the contaminated bags will completely contaminate the entire shipment making the sugar unfit for human or animal consumption in any form. The contaminate we used will give the sugar an ineradicable, sickly bitter taste which no process will remove. The contaminate cannot be detected in the refining and although the contaminate is not in any sense dangerous to health, it is so strong to the taste that it ruins the taste of the consumer for any food or drink for a considerable time.

5. This successful contamination will spoil the entire cargo the value of which to the USSR is estimated at $350,000 to $400,000.

Additional Information

For your further information in connection with this operation, it was conpleted on 24 August 1962 in San Juan, Puerto Rico. The vessel involved was the British merchant ship STREATHAM HILL. The operation was successfully conducted without compromise and none of the personnel connected with the vessel are aware of the operation.

EYES ONLY
SECRET
SENSITIVE

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information

AGENCY :	NARA
RECORD NUMBER :	176-10011-10152
RECORD SERIES :	NSF
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	WH
FROM :	
TO :	THE RECORD
TITLE :	MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
DATE :	06/08/1961
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/08/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	UPON AGENCY REVIEW
COMMENTS :	NSF:M&M:SPECIAL GROUP(CI) MEETINGS:6/61-10/62:BOX 319:PENDING NLK-92-104

SEC SANITIZED VERSION NLK [illegible]

SECRET - EYES ONLY

6/22/61
Recd from
Mr. Bundy

8 June 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Special Group Meeting, 8 June 1961

PRESENT: Messrs. Bowles, Gilpatric, Bundy, Ralph Dungan, Dulles

Mr. Dungan, Special Assistant to the President, participated in the Special Group meeting for the first time.

1. Congo

Messrs. Bowles and Gilpatric agreed with the plan for the Congo. Mr. Bowles conditioned his approval on the acceptance of the three provisions set forth in the State Department internal memorandum dated 6 June 1961 (copy attached). Mr. Dulles indicated that these conditions were accepted by the Agency but he pointed out that the condition which proscribed the inclusion of Gizenga or his representative in the Leopoldville Government involved the danger of bringing in a representative of Moscow who would attempt to subvert and control the government. Mr. Bundy felt that he could not approve this program without reference to higher authority.

Note was made of the possibility that if Gizenga decided to participate in a new Leopoldville Government or Parliament, he had ample resources and a chance eventually to win control of the government.

2. Review of Political Action Projects

Mr. Bundy stated that because of the special sensitivity of programs involving covert support to political parties and leaders in friendly countries, higher authority wished to review them. Mr. Bundy proposed Thursday or Friday, June 15th or 16th, for this purpose.

Mr. Bowles suggested that we might ask to have a general policy enunciated regarding this subject. Other members of the Group

SECRET - EYES ONLY

suggested that a general policy statement might not be sufficiently flexible to take care of special situations which might arise.

Mr. Dulles noted that the pertinent NSC paper authorized programs such as that under discussion, but emphasized that he would only undertake this type of activity if it was fully supported by the Department of State and higher authority. He stated that he fully appreciated the sensitivity of this type of activity. Mr. Dulles said, however, that he felt the Special Group should have some latitude to make decisions on these matters within the general policy which might be laid down by higher authority without referral of each specific case for approval.

Mr. Bundy stated that he would like Mr. Dungan to work with our people in the preparation of the briefing to be given higher authority next week.

3. Release Procedures - Francis Gary Powers

Because of the contingency nature of this proposal and because of the crowded agenda, discussion of this matter was deferred to the next meeting.

4. STPOLLY Flight, Vietnam

This flight was approved with Chinat personnel. There was some discussion as to the desirability of having South Vietnamese conduct these missions but it was pointed out that they did not have the competence.

5. Covert Annex, Vietnam

This annex was approved. It was noted that a progress report had just been received and it was suggested that this report be distributed to members of the Group.

6. Covert Annex, Korea

Mr. Bundy reiterated the decision that covert annexes should not be processed through the NSC machinery. Because of the interest of higher authority in political action operations in friendly areas (see Item 2) and since this annex was written in rather broad terms, he would like to check it further.

7. TACKLE

Mr. Dulles stated that while he wanted to open discussion of this matter at this meeting, he did not expect a final decision to be made until the next meeting. Mr. Bundy noted the previous reservations of the State Department and the fact that this matter had been considered but not approved three times previously. Mr. Gilpatric supported the need for current information which TACKLE would produce and suggested the possible use of U.S. personnel for the TACKLE mission. Mr. Dulles stated his opinion that the use of American personnel would raise serious problems in the event of an accident. The use of well qualified Chinat crews, in his opinion, would mitigate the risks involved. It was agreed that the proposal would be resubmitted later.

8. Nicaragua

Mr. Dulles outlined the nature and value of the equipment remaining at Puerto Cabezas and of the need for negotiating with Somoza to effect its recovery. He indicated that some quid pro quo would probably be involved in achieving an agreement with Somoza. Mr. Bundy stated that this was a matter that should be negotiated between the Agency and the Department of State and need not be again referred to the Special Group.

9. Cuba

Mr. Dulles stated that he wanted to raise in a general way at this meeting the problem of the Agency's relations with the exile groups, the payment to dependents of the strike force and the publications which the Agency has been supporting. He emphasized that these involved a considerable amount of money and that the matter should be resolved at an early date. It was agreed that the Agency should discuss this matter with Deputy Assistant Secretary Morales-Carrion and submit a formal proposal to an early meeting of the Special Group.

10. Minutes of Special Group Meetings

Mr. Bundy requested that copies of the minutes of Special Group meetings be forwarded to members of the Group for approval and retention. Mr. Gilpatric noted the very close relationship between his office and the Agency and felt that he could obtain all the information he needed without receiving a copy of the minutes. Mr. Dulles suggested that because of the sensitivity of these records and because some of the references contained therein involved the use of pseudonyms, the need of the Group might be satisfied by having copies of the minutes of each meeting made available at the subsequent meeting for approval. Messrs. Bundy and Dungan agreed to the submission of the minutes for approval at a subsequent meeting but stated that they might have a need for a complete record immediately at hand to answer any questions put to them by higher authority.

THOMAS P. SCHREYER

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10085

RECORD SERIES : ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEWS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CITIZEN
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : ORAL HISTORY WITH EDWARD LANSDALE BY DENNIS O'BRIEN

DATE : 07/11/1970
PAGES : 123

SUBJECTS :
BAY OF PIGS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Not Marked
RESTRICTIONS : Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/05/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Pages 3-21 and 28-34 talk about the Bay of Pigs. Pages 96 and 98 have been sanitized.

SANITIZED NLK·99·41 12/00

Oral History Interview

with

EDWARD G. ~~Edwin B.~~ Lansdale

July 11, 1970
Alexandria, Virginia

By Dennis J. O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything like this is just simply with the question, when did you first meet President Kennedy, or Senator Kennedy, if you met him before he was President?

LANSDALE: I don't recall meeting him before he was President. The first meeting, I believe, was ~~I believe,~~ the first Saturday following the inauguration, whatever date that was. I was called into a meeting in the White House by [Robert S.] McNamara. It was a meeting, ~~on~~, actually, on a report that I had written for [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. It was sort of a I'm not sure that it was an NSC [National Security Council] meeting, but it was comparable to that with the personnel that were attending. There were several Secretaries: Defense, State, and his National Security people were there.

O'Brien: Could ~~Did~~ you have much contact with McNamara and [Roswell L.] Gilpatric, members of the incoming administration, before they actually assumed office?

LANSDALE: Just before, that is, a day or so before. I'd been in Vietnam for a brief visit and got back just before the inaugural, maybe two or three days, and at that time both McNamara and Gilpatric were in Defense getting briefed for their new jobs. I met them at that time. The outgoing Deputy Secretary of Defense asked me to start working with Gilpatric, and so I got to know Gilpatric rather than McNamara.

O'BRIEN: This is [James H.] Douglas.

LANSDALE: Douglas, Jim Douglas. ~~(James H. Douglas)~~

O'BRIEN: How is Douglas to work with, while you're with him? Is he a pretty sympathetic person?

LANSDALE: Yes, very much so, very much so. He was the one, actually, who wrote the orders and backstopped my visit to Vietnam, and backstopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as well as economic, military, and psychological, and everything else. This, frankly, took a consi[illegible]tanding on his part [illegible] that because my views weren't always popular in other parts of the government. I gathered that there was some opposition to my going out, and he insisted on it.

O'BRIEN: I'd like to come back to that. I wonder if we could go on to talk about one of the major problems, which is Cuba. When is the first time that you hear about the Bay of Pigs invasion? not the Bay of Pigs, but the plans?

LANSDALE: Sometime in the fall of ~~sixty~~ '60. I think ~~that~~ I heard of it about the first time that it was brought up to the ~~inter-~~ inner-policy group of the Eisenhower administration. I was the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, at the time, for Special Operations and used to accompany the Deputy Secretary, who was a member of the ~~inter-~~ inner-policy group, to most of the meetings that they had. When Allen Dulles ~~(Allen W. Dulles)~~ first raised the notion to ~~the Senate~~ this inner group. I was present at the meeting as an assistant.

O'BRIEN: What is the thinking about it at that time? What kind of operation is [illegible] it basically a guerrilla operation at this point?

LANSDALE: Initially, it was. Initially, it was very different ~~than~~ from the way it turned out. It was based on a premise that many people in Cuba were very unhappy with the [Fidel] Castro administration and the way it was turning away from the initial revolutionary objectives and the capture of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party, which surprised many of the supporters of Castro as a guerrilla and as ~~a~~ revolutionary action. So, the thought was to back a number of the Cubans who either had been supporters of Castro or were very unhappy, were still resident in Cuba, and to cause some overturn at the time. The change of plan towards the Bay of Pigs thing evolved fairly ~~fragilely~~ gradually, and apparently there was a planning group ~~and~~ in CIA [Central

Context

?

Intelligence Agency] who were working on this initial plan who started thinking in military invasion terms. I suspect that they were doing that because some of the Cuban military and military types, that is, very militant, k[illegible]as, were coming out of Cuba as refugees, and they suddenly saw a windfall of manpower and started thinking in other terms of use of them. But ~~this change was~~ the changed plan towards the Bay of Pigs thing, the way it was going, was well under way in the inner and circle thinking of CIA by December of '60, very definitely so.

O'BRIEN: Who were some of the inner circle people at this point do you recall? ~~P. (Pierre E.) Salinger, of course.~~

O'BRIEN: I imagine [Richard M.] Bissell was . . .

LANSDALE: Let's see. ~~um~~ Oh golly. Dick Bissell ~~(Richard M. Bissell)~~ was the overall chief of the group.

O'BRIEN: Tracy Barnes, was he in it at that time?

LANSDALE: Tracy was an assistant to him, but how far Tracy actually went in the ~~actual~~ detailed planning or anything . . . I have my doubts that he was. . . .

O'BRIEN: How about Broe, William Broe ? ~~[William V. Broe]~~

LANSDALE: He was one of a planning group who were planning the operation, but he wasn't ~~a~~ the chief, and I can't recall the guy's name offhand.

O'BRIEN: Oh well, maybe when you get the transcript back;
LANSDALE: Maybe so O'BRIEN:
you can. How about ~~from~~ some of the other
[illegible] came in in those days?
places [illegible] C.) Mann, I [illegible]

LANSDALE: Yes, but initially it was all CIA. They borrowed some military personnel to help with the planning ~~earlier,~~ early on, but they were people who had been attached to CIA for temporary duty on other matters, and they hadn't come in initially for this specific planning. In December, when the planning had obviously started coming in with a beach landing and so on, the way it turned out, I urged at that point to get military planning in on the thing. I was worrying about it.

¶ As a matter of fact, Allen Dulles brought his planners to a policy meeting, a policy group meeting, and they were explaining the concept. ~~and~~ My questioning was such that Allen Dulles pleaded with me not to spoil the plan at an early stage. I remember General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer was sitting ~~in~~ on the meeting -- ~~He~~ he was the chairman of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] at the time -- and he backed up my urging them to get some military planning in on that. After th[illegible]ent among our poli[illegible]ple of that, and then the JCS set up a special section to plan along with the ~~Central Intelligence~~ Agency on that. And who the hell headed that?

O'BRIEN: This is yet in the Eisenhower administration.

LANSDALE: This is all back in 1960. This was still in ~~the~~ an early planning stage~~s~~. This was before training or anything like that was put forward. When the JCS got into the act, I asked to be disassociated with the project. I was rather critical of the concept, and it ~~was~~ just looked too clumsy and overt, and a poor planned ~~feeling~~ doing.

O'BRIEN: A lot of people have knowledge of this, don't they, by the end of the Eisenhower administration throughout government?

LANSDALE: I don't know how widespread it was. There were key executives that were knowledgeable, there was a small group in the JCS that was knowledgeable, and there was a planning group at CIA, but I don't think it went beyond that. I don't know how far it was known, but I thought it was rather closely held.

O'BRIEN: You don't know whether the presidential candidates [illegible] at all, do you?

LANSDALE: Yes, they were. There was a very definite-- no, wait a minute. the candidates, no, I don't think they were. As a matter of fact, it was still in a rather nebulous stage ~~of~~ in this shifting over in ~~early~~ November. I think somebody told me, if I recall correctly, that the concept was in the form of a memo in CIA about August, so this would be well after the candidates had been nominated and so on. I imagine that it was just held ~~by~~ to two or three people inside the CIA at the time. ~~At least,~~ the rest of us certainly didn't know it. I forget exactly when I first heard it, but it would be possibly October, but it might have even been November by the time I heard about it. As I say, I heard about it when it was surfaced with the inner circle of our administration executives.

O'BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and with Bissell and some of these people about it.

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: What's their feeling? You already discussed D[illegible] asking you to sort of hold your criticism. . .

LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely felt the same way. Bissell was a very hard-working, intense person, almost high-strung type of an individual. He became rather impatient with my questioning of the changed concept when it took place. I thought initially that if they had the correct personnel and ~~it~~ they had a correct reading of dissent inside of Cuba, that was a fair chance to do something. My only concern at the time was: did ~~the~~ CIA have ~~the~~ Americans who could work with such a situation? I just didn't know of any, but I was assured that yes, there were such Americans. But I'm not certain that there were.

O'BRIEN: Did you question the kind of intelligence that was coming out about Cuba and the expected reaction of Cubans to an invasion and the reaction to Castro in general?

LANSDALE: Just in very general terms. I didn't have enough concrete and specific information myself that was separate from theirs. Most of the intelligence take at the time, available inside the U.S. government, was pretty colored with this dissatisfaction and statements of it. So, I had no real way of determining the accuracy or inaccuracy of it. Some of the adjectives used in describing this in briefings to us alerted me a little bit. It just sounded like too much of ~~like~~ a sales job on a viewpoint. I'd question that, whether that was an accurate thing, so this is about as far as I went.

O'BRIEN: How did ~~does~~ a guy like Douglas react? Do you recall?

LANSDALE: Well, he approved of the plan, so he and the others at the policy level approved of going ahead with it, and developing it. I was his advisor on this thing. (That was my staff job), and I told him to be certain to get the JCS to give it a real hard scrutiny and to come up with details of whether it could succeed or not. That was my last advisory role with him. I was taken off advising on the project after that, actually by my own request because I was apparently causing too much trouble and was [illegible] works of progress.

O'BRIEN: What's the reaction of the Joint Chiefs, people like Lemnitzer, towards this? Is there an institutional rivalry or bureaucratic rivalry here in their minds?

LANSDALE: Somewhat, somewhat. It was a little bit as though, well, somebody's going to be playing Boy Scouts, so this isn't really rivalry. They had a difficult time taking this really seriously. Later, I know, when the JCS got in and helped on the actual planning of this, they became much more serious on it because they had a share of it.

O'BRIEN: Well, do you get involved in the informing of McNamara and Gilpatric about this? Do you get any way of sensing what their reactions are on first being informed?

LANSDALE: No. They had apparently known by the time I met them, and I didn't get in on that. The one person who ~~has~~ would have a view of their reactions would probably be [William P.] Bill Bundy, ~~(William P. Bundy)~~ who I know at the time was discussing this with them.

O'BRIEN: Did you have [illegible] Bundy and his [illegible] at that point?

LANSDALE: Yes. This was a little out of Bundy's field. He was always trying to figure out what the chances were, the percentages of win or loss. He was a bit low. ~~and~~ I hadn't known the final plan on this thing, and Bundy did, and he asked me what I thought. I told him, "Well, if the JCS guarantees something, you can ~~take~~ maybe shade it 10 percent lower than that and go along with it. I'm not sure that they know a clandestine operation, but they'd sure know a military landing, whether it would succeed or not. Given some of the unknowns in this thing, why, shade it ~~I say that~~ by 10 percent and go along with the figure." Well, apparently they had given it a high chance of success, the JCS had, because Bundy said, "Well, you mean it's going to succeed then?" I said, "Well, I don't know." So I gathered that he felt it would succeed.

O'BRIEN: Well, then, you are pretty much out of touch with it until it actually comes off, from the point that you battle it. LANSDALE: That's Right. O'BRIEN: You didn't get in~~to~~ on any of the changes in the plans there at all?

LANSDALE: No. I left ~~at~~ around the first of September something--it w December, '60. I really didn't follow it from then on.

O'BRIEN: ~~Did~~ Does anyone come to you from the Agency or from State or ~~from~~ the White House, as far as that goes, and attempt to seek an independent judgement on your part, with your background and all, on succes

LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: How about the noise level on this? Obviously you're out of it, but is there much talk about it that is sort of filtering down in Defense ~~and~~ among the people that are around you that really have no need to know and direct involvement?

LANSDALE: I wasn't aware of it. There might have been, but I have no knowledge of that.

O'BRIEN: When ~~the thing,~~ the operation actually begins and the landing has taken place, do you come into it again at that point at any time?

LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: You do become involved in Cuban affairs at a later time.

LANSDALE: Later, yes.

O'BRIEN: When do you [illegible] do you have anything to do with the [Maxwell] Taylor committee, which makes the inquiry about it?

LANSDALE: I met with them once, and they weren't interested with the Bay of Pigs. They were interested in the decision-making process, ~~of~~ in the making ~~a~~ of policy, and asked me if I had any ideas on how better the President could be served in the policy decisions and arriving at them. The thing was, right at that moment, McNamara had previously asked me for the same thing, and I had come up with a proposal for him which he put to Kennedy. I just told them, ~~Well.~~ I had some ideas but I had given them to somebody else, and I was skeptical of the boss anyhow. ~~and~~ this was on putting together task forces. The Kennedy administration had eliminated a bureaucratic boondoggling thing

~~and~~ in-- what the hell was that called?

O'BRIEN: OCB? [Operations Coordinating Board].

LANSDALE: Yes, the OCB. I pointed out that the one good thing about it was that the principals met for lunch. ~~and~~ I said the rest of it's for the birds, but to get men in government who are talking to [illegible] who are held responsible by him for managing men, money, and material and so on, who can understand the problem well enough around the lunch table to have one secretary or deputy secretary, or under secretary say, "Well, we'll take care of that," and so on, was ~~is~~ a good way of doing business. ~~and~~ Then with the president's own National Security man sitting in on it, going back and telling him this is going to happen for these reasons, why, it was a good control mechanism.

So essentially all I told the Taylor people and told McNamara in my paper was that this function had been eliminated, along with cutting out a lot of dead wood, and there was some live wood in it, and how about restoring the live wood? This essentially was what my proposition was with the task force, of getting the people most concerned with something, who could operate for the president, and having them get together and help form the policy, get the president's approval, and they were the same ones who could then st[illegible] it immediately. [illegible] not to create another big bureaucratic thing.

And of course, after they first tried this, it rapidly started becoming a big bureaucratic thing. The task forces that were later set up were just big staffs sitting in different buildings. It was almost like OCB again, not quite, but it got out of hand. Anytime you go ~~try~~ to change the government around, it seems to come right back in form again and close ranks on ~~it.~~ you. O'BRIEN: Yes, we have a tendency of doin that. LANSDA But that was all that I did with the Taylor group. Incidentally, in that inquiry into the Cuban bit was the first time that I met [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy. For some reason or other, I didn't connect him personally with the pictures of him and so on, on T.V. and whatnot, and I wondered what the youngster was doing sitting in the meeting

← T.V. -

talking so much.

O'BRIEN: Was he pretty tough?

LANSDALE: Well, he wasn't tough. He was the most in~~e~~terested of anyone in the room there of what I would say on things and plague me with many questions.

O'BRIEN: How were his questions? Was he fairly naive about the problems?

LANSDALE: No~~r~~, this was on ~~problems~~ questions of how the government would operate at a decision level, and they weren't naive at all. He had a very good understanding. He was very much concerned about his brother's getting good service in the way of information and full details and ~~of~~ alternatives and so on, on a policy decision.

O'BRIEN: Well, ~~if you, you know,~~ in that period right after the Bay of Pigs--of course you had a lot of contacts and friendships in other places outside the Pentagon.

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: What kind of an impact ~~did~~ does the Bay of Pigs have, let's say over in the Agency, and State Department, and in Defense, and in the White House?

LANSDALE: It was a traumatic experience at top levels throughout ~~of~~ the government. I think it affected President Kennedy more than any other single thing. It was almost a taboo subject⊙if you were going in to do business and to get an approval on something you never even hinted ~~that~~ Cuba or the Cuban affair. It was such an intense~~ful~~ly sore subject among all of these people. I felt that almost all of the key executives in the administration must have dreamt about it at night or something, and during the daytime working hours they just didn't ~~even~~ want to even contemplate it. And yet they were honest enough people that they knew they had to face up and look at it and would do so, but it was an extremely emotional subject with them, very much so.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of the Agency, there's a number of programs and, of course, involvements in operations that they have. Do you see any shift in these, any attempt on the part of the Defense Department to move into some of these areas which they felt were traditionally theirs rather than the Agency. I guess what I'm trying to say is, can you see any decline in the ~~Agency~~ influence ~~in~~ of the Agency ~~in~~ on decisions?

LANSDALE: Yes, I think so. I'm not certain that it was the military as such. It might well have been the t[illegible] [illegible] like McNamara personally and his encouragement of some of the military who were somewhat interested but wouldn't really have expressed the interest unless they were directly asked. And there always had been some feeling of --unease~~,~~--I think would be the best word to describe it--among the military about any clandestine type of operations. They felt that once it got over into guerrilla type of operations or anything that would involve a military subject, ~~that~~ it would be far better to let the military establishment of the U.S. handle it.

¶ But that would be sort of a dinner-cocktail party type of a gambit on their part, rather than sitting and planning and so on of "We must grab some of ~~this~~ that." ~~E~~even though among themselves they talked that way. They didn't express it in terms of their attend~~e~~ance at policy councils or even in talks with people like the Secretary of Defense or the civilian, executive side of Defense.

On this, I think that McNamara himself probably started thinking initially that well, this was a military operation and just to be more efficient and effective, the military should take over such things. I imagine that he talked that way to some of the military people who ~~that~~ were seeing him from the JCS, ~~and~~ the Chiefs, and from the intelligence community, the military intelligence community. I know that DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] got its great start under McNamara, and I feel almost certain, I've got a strong hunch, that the Bay of Pigs and the misreading of the temper of the people in Cuba gave McNamara great impetus in setting that up initially.

So, ~~it~~ actually, it wasn't a military ambition to set up a rival intelligence agency to ~~[illegible]~~ CIA, though there had been tremendous rivalry between the military service intelligence agencies and ~~the~~ CIA and had been right along from the initiation of CIA originally. But this was sort of a business rivalry, and it was~~n't~~

sort of dealing with them, of categories of work, and where the boundary lines of who did what on the thing, ~~and~~ this is where their jealousies and emotions and everything would come up over almost nitpicking of boundary lines of who would do what. It wasn't a thing of "we'll do it all, and you go out of business"--that feeling hadn't come up--but after the Bay of Pigs, the DIA and its creation, a lot of the people in that who were civilian employees, Defense Department employees, had an idea, "We can do a better job than CIA," and in a much wider field than the service intelligence agencies ~~have~~ had done.

O'BRIEN: Are there enough skilled and competent people around, in the universities and the military, to staff all the intelligence agencies: the NSA [National Security Agency], DIA, CIA, and organizations? Are there enough people, or are these operations just simply too big at this point?

LANSDALE: They might be too big. The need to know things is a very elastic bit. I'm certain that the chief executive of the United States, in whose name these works are accomplished, would have no idea that he would ever desire to know some of the things that they're working on very hard. You discover whole buildings and all sorts of equipment busil~~l~~y accumulating facts and figures [illegible] would say, "I can't see [illegible] States ever needing to know some of that." ~~and~~ Yet he would hesitate, given the world today and the technological advances and everything, it's very hard to say what you need to know and what you don't. Given this sort of a gray shading of the end objectives on this thing, it's very difficult to say whether you've got too big an establishment or not.

O'BRIEN: Do you ever take this question up, or is this question ever raised in the administration by the civilian people in DOD [Department of Defense] or the White House, with you?

LANSDALE: Not with me. No. My theme on overseas operations was reiterated enough so that it was known by a number of people, and I ~~always~~ felt ~~that~~ it was always more efficient and effective to have a very small group working and to choose them with very great selectivity and go for a handful of highly qualified people rather than a large group of Americans charging overseas someplace. This went for intelligence as well as diplomatic and other economic work, and so on. I used to point out the embassies--for example, behind the Iron Curtain--that would get de~~ss~~cimated by

? → being TNT'd and so on. In Eastern Europe, for example, it would happen. ~~that~~ It would wind up with an ambassador and two or three people left in an embassy, and their work would increase in quality, and their representing U.S. interests would seem to improve tremendously when that would happen.

O'BRIEN: Does the fact that you get this reputation, mainly out of the writings of guys like [Eugene] Burdick and Graham Greene, does this affect you in any way in your relations with the bureaucracy?

LANSDALE: Yes. It made life rather difficult. With much of the work that I had to do in Washington, I came back from a lot of operations abroad and went up into policy-forming levels in

Washington almost immediately, and into facing people who were very sensitive on my presence abroad initially. Since I didn't just stick in a regular military category but would get over into their own subject matter, this made them very uncomfortable. ~~and~~ I can understand it while it happened, but it was carried to too great an emotional length.

At times I would suggest certain individuals be sent to look into a situation in a given country and would arrange their transportation and so on. ~~and~~ I would get backing throughout the U.S. government for this thing, and have an individual approved by the Secretary of State as well as Defense and up at the White House and so on, but would set up a means of communicating back so that we would get reports back. There would be times when these individuals would show up in a country, and the first time they sent a message to me, the ambassador would ask them kindly to leave the country, to get out of there, just because of my name. I ~~was~~ apparently was the enemy to some of these people. ¶ One of my assistants was traveling between Thailand and Saigon, and there was a coup going on in Saigon at the time. ~~and~~ his plane, which was Air France, put down--commercial flight--in Phnom Penh, in Cambodia, and the military attaché very kindly picked up this guy and several other Americans from the plane and found a place for them to stay until they could get another flight out of Phnom Penh. He asked this lad of mine where he'd worked, and he said, "In the Pentagon~~,~~"--he was a civilian employee--and he mentioned that he worked for me, and the attaché got all excited, called the ambassador, and he was given two hours to come out of the country. [Laughter] All he was doing was looking for a place to sleep at night. so it became very emotional and very silly, and detrimental to the U.S. ¶ For example, once in Indonesia, in meeting our folks around the embassy in Djakarta, I had spotted an assistant army attaché, who was the one American, along with one of the economic mission guys--there were two Americans--who were not only best known by the Indonesians but were respected, and there was an affection there. ~~and~~ I ~~have~~ had told the ambassador at the time, afterwards, "Make real use of these people. The Indonesians believe them, and there's some antipathy towards the U.S., but they make an exception ~~to~~ of these two. ~~and~~ They're just invaluable. But the army man was extremely close to the general staff of the Indonesian Army. I went on some visits to members at their homes of the Indonesian General Staff, and this lad who was tall and blond--a Nordic type, if you will--would go in, and the small brown Indonesians ~~would~~ and their families would welcome him like a long lost uncle or brother or something. The children would run up and jump in his arms and climb all over him, and he was Uncle something to them.

So later, when the Soviets start moving in SAM [surface-to-air missile] missile sites into Indonesia and the U.S. needed to know what sort of antiaircraft armaments were going in, our embassy couldn't get the answers to it

I suggested that we get the State-Defense sponsorship and send this one fellow who ~~is~~ was a lieutenant-colonel over and just let him stay a week or so. He'd go right in and talk to his old friends, and they'd probably tell him what the Soviets were up to. He arrived there; the Indonesian general staff took him out and showed him these ~~sights~~ sites and asked him what he thought of them and so on the first day he was there. That night he got back, and he wrote out a radio message, and asked the ambassador to send it to me, at which point our ambassador told him to leave the country.

O'BRIEN: Now, this was [Howard P.] Jones?

LANSDALE: That was Jones, yes. And he said, "Well, let me put that in the message." so I ~~just~~ asked the Department of State, ~~to~~ "please let Jones know that you're sponsoring this guy, too, and there might be some more things that he finds out that you need to know as much as we do." So they told Jones to just ~~to~~ sit back and let him do that.

We have some wonderful Americans, and this was what I was trying to do: ~~was~~ to find out which Americans have not only our interests at heart but were enough interested in foreign countries to be able to understand and have empathy, [illegible] really would be serving the best interests of other countries in things. I'd far rather see one man get in on something like that than send a whole team in with all sorts of things and sort of aggravate a situation rather than do something rather simple.

O'BRIEN: Almost sensitivity training . . . .

LANSDALE: ~~LANSDALE:~~ Incidentally, along these lines, I've got a good story for your account.

O'BRIEN: Great.

LANSDALE: About the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara came back from a meeting at the White House one day and asked me to provide the means for President Kennedy to talk to the Cuban people on TV. How the hell did I know how to do that? He told me ~~that~~ he wanted to do it within the next twenty-four hours. Well, it didn't happen. I suspected ~~that~~ it would take longer than that; I don't know how you intrude on a T.V. station's broadcasting and get the people in the country to ~~go~~ immediately go to their T.V. sets and watch a program. I called scientists in from all over the U.S., who were electronic whizzes on this type of a subject, and our intelligence people and everybody else I could think of to get some information together on ~~in~~ a real crash basis. CIA couldn't give me details, ~~on~~ technical details,~~--~~on any of the T.V. stations in Havan~~n~~a~~h~~ and elsewhere.

¶ One of the Defense civilian scientists--and I can't think of his name offhand; it was an East European name--left the room and came back ten minutes later and provided all the technical information, to the great amazement of everybody there. And I said, "Where the hell did you get that?"~~,~~ and he said, "Well, I went out to the corridor in the Pentagon~~,~~ (where we were having the meeting), went in one of the phone booths there, and I called a friend of mine down in Havana who operates a T.V. station and asked him. He gave me all this ~~the~~ dope, and I just wrote it down." So this is the way we got the information for it.

The intrusion of the T.V. space never took place, but we got the means together and some airborne T.V. transmitters. It was developed finally by the Navy, and the project--I had ~~'ve~~ asked that it be ~~it to~~ put on a sort of sled so that it could be picked up and changed over from one aircraft to another, or used elsewhere--later when we started the T.V. broadcasts in Vietnam, this Navy equipment that was initially intended to let President Kennedy talk to the Cubans, in '62, I guess that was, was the broadcast equipment that was used from the air--flying in ~~the~~ aircraft--in Saigon, done ~~down~~ to initiate T.V. broadcasting ~~broadcasts~~ in Saigon in 1965.

?

O'BRIEN: Why didn't it come off?

LANSDALE: It took us too long to figure out ways of getting in on the theme and finding a channel and finding a way of getting people to ~~that~~ do that.

It took us t~~o~~en, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed.

O'BRIEN: Well how do you come back into. . . . well, ~~maybe,~~ perhaps we ought to pursue this whole business of counterinsurgency first. It sort of becomes the thing with the Kennedy administration, doesn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: How do you see that? I was in the Marine Corps in the late ~~50's~~ fifties, and there was a good deal of guerrilla and counterguerrilla training that was going on, and it becomes a part of the new administration. Who are the princip~~le~~al proponents of this, outside of yourself? Do you have any conversations, say, with Bobby-- well, you don't really see Bobby until after April. But do you have any conversations with the president, let's say, meeting with him . . . .

LANSDALE: No, no, I didn't. I don't know who talked to him about this. When he came in office, this was already one of his themes. Where he picked that up originally, I don't know. I was rather surprised--he seemed to have seen copies of lectures and other things that I~~'ve~~ had given on the subject, ~~But,~~ who had passed those to him and who had talked to him about it, I just don't know.

O BRIEN: Let's say, let's take a person like Max Taylor. Do you have anything in the way of conversations with Max Taylor in the late fifties?

LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: How about the rest of the Joint Chiefs?

LANSDALE: No. Taylor was opposed to this type of thing. He did quite a considerable switch, see? He was about the last person I would have ever picked to have headed up something the way Kennedy asked him to do it.

O BRIEN: That's what I was wondering about, Taylor's role in this whole thing. He is opposed.

LANSDALE: Well, he was the one that, ~~--~~in the very early formation of the Special Forces in the Army--he was Chief of Staff of the Army at the time,~~--~~ ~~and~~ took one look at these American troops in green berets and said, "Take that God damn silly headgear off," or "Take that--that's it." No green berets, and he really got tough on ~~ruled the out of~~ the thing. He wasn't too happy with a special unit of that nature. But at the time, it was . . . . He went along with the concept that it was only a wartime outfit,~~--~~that somebody would have to go and jump in and work with guerrillas.

Again, this is a rivalry type of a thing, so there wouldn't be another OSS [Office of Strategic Services] ~~there'd~~ or be a CIA or something doing it, but this, after all, is part of the modern military function, so let's make it military. So he went that far on the thing. But that was a concept--you ~~'d~~ would have a regular force fighting battle, and someplace back of the enemy lines, you'd want to blow up bridges and gather information and so on to support your tactical forces, so ~~well~~ why not have somebody in working and fomenting trouble back there for the enemy, but connected with the forces?

Now the concept of people's warfare --Mao [Tse-Tung] ~~now~~ is pushed; we've seen it ~~them~~ in Vietnam and elsewhere -- really wasn't something that he or others understood at all, that almost ? all of us would be ~~speak see guerrilla or~~ counter-guerrilla, and that people like special forces might well, having learned guerrilla operations, ~~would then~~ be qualified to start coping with them and would understand the importance of political basis for operations and political goals and behavior and the psychological part of the operations.

This really wasn't in any of their thinking because, as witnessed in Korea, we went and sort of had a small World War II in Korea. And in Vietnam later, we went in, again with Taylor as the ambassador, but having quite a bit of an advisory role with ~~our~~ the military commanders out there, and influence with them, and were ~~was~~ fighting another Korea in Vietnam more or less. There were ~~was~~ some changes in tactics, but it was more use of helicopters just for vertical envelopment ~~rather than just~~ instead of moving guys along the ground to start with the thing.

O'BRIEN: Why don't they come to an understanding? ~~[barking]~~

~~LANSDALE: I'm sure that's going to make a good broadcast for you, a good tape. . .~~

~~O'BRIEN: A diversion at least.~~

LANSDALE: I'm completely baffled by that. I just don't know.

O'BRIEN: Don't they read?

LANSDALE: They speak the words, and particularly when they were talking with President Kennedy, they picked up the words and enthusiasm and responded, but would show by what they did that they didn't understand what they were saying. It's something that, of course, I have been trying to do something about all along. I've never understood what it was. . . .

I've always felt that I was too inarticulate or hadn't found a way of doing things for myself, but there have been so many other exponents of this thing--not just Americans, but of many countries, who have written rather good books on the subject and on parts of it--that you'd surely think by now that we Americans would produce top leaders with some understanding of something that Mao ~~[Tse-tung]~~ and [Vo Nguyen] Giap and others have got~~ten~~ in every page down ~~through~~ to the rank and file to understand.

O BRIEN: Well, in the formation of the CI [counterinsurgency] group--it was designed, as I understand it, primarily as a kind of educational group for top-level administration people--when do you first come into that group?

LANSDALE: I was never really part of that group. I was working with a smaller group of executives, of which Taylor was a part.

O'BRIEN: This is Mongoose, isn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes. This was a national security group of top executives close to the president, with the undersecretary of State, and the deputy secretary of Defense, and so on, and the national security advisor. ~~and~~ Taylor sat in on those meetings after he got his CI group going. But in forming the CI group ini~~a~~tially, Taylor was starting to do some studies for Kennedy, and Kennedy had asked me to help him. So I put my staff in the Pentagon at Taylor's disposal.

Initially, in Kennedy's presence, I offered to put together a study for Taylor on resources in the United States and among our allies for such things--not allies as much as friends of the United States in many countries--and this was done with ~~some~~ CIA and some of the military services and the intelligence part of State. They had a little working group, and we had several sessions in my office and put together some rough first papers for Taylor to start his thinking for the president. Then when Taylor ~~started~~ formed his group, I wasn't invited in on it, and I didn't attend.

O'BRIEN: Sure. W[illegible] wonder [illegible] got any insight. . . . As [illegible] stand it, right after the formation of that group, and early--it was in May or June--they dispatched some teams to go around Latin America to survey the ability of various nations to respond to Castro-type guerrilla activity.

LANSDALE: Yes, yes.

O'BRIEN: Did you get involved in the planning of that at all or any of the fallout of that?

LANSDALE: Just peripherally on both. I forget the details on that. I had been worrying about places like Col~~u~~ombia and several other Latin American countries close to the Panama Canal and had urged that this be looked into, on some of the specific things that were being done there. I ~~'ve~~ had encouraged ~~that~~ the Col~~u~~ombians to start civic action in dealing with some of the dissident areas and so on. All I had done was, not planning as much as coming in with sort of a shopping list of what people might look for, and individuals in these countries they might talk to to get information on what was happening.

O'BRIEN: Well, are you in Colombia in the Kennedy administration at all as . . .

LANSDALE: No. No, the most I did was--I went to Venezuela ~~and~~ during the Kennedy administration, and Bolivia. No, by that time folks were highly sensitive about my showing up in foreign countries--that is, Americans, not foreigners--and I really wasn't permitted, or I was stopped really at policy levels from going back into Vietnam or the Philippines or anyplace in Asia. I begged to be permitted to go down and take a look in Latin America, and Gilpatric was the one that told me the decision had been made....

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

O BRIEN: Outside of Venezuela, did you get to any other countries?

LANSDALE: Well, Bolivia. In Bolivia, I was interested in particularly the Bolivian Air Force's work of setting up a public school system over in the eastern slopes of the Andes--down in the jungles and in the very sparse settlements. They were really the one governmental group that could get around places. They were very enthusiastically setting up one-room school houses down there, and flying in teachers and bringing some education in there, which I thought was a great project, and was encouraging them. Then, While I was in Bolivia, I got involved with the resettlement of indians from the Altiplano over onto the eastern slopes into some new communities, in which the whole Bolivian government was involved. ~~and~~ the U.S. Economic Mission was working with them, and the Bolivian military was supporting it with trucks and with some people going in. But, this was a very exciting, agricultural-community-type of a project of moving people out where they'd have an economic chance at life, and also a chance to own land. It was changing the social structure considerably for the very lowest class in Bolivia, and with the armed forces doing it. This, again, was the very first visit.

In Venezu~~a~~ela, I had come up with some ways of safeguarding our own interests in Venezu~~a~~ela~~--~~(which are not only oil production, but we have steel mills down there and a number of things)~~--~~but I did this as much for the Venezu~~a~~elan Defense Ministry as I did for the United States at the time. They were concerned.

O'BRIEN: What are your relations with the people involved in the school in Panama which spreads a lot of this ~~civic~~ gospel of civic action among the military? Are your relations with those people pretty good?

LANSDALE: It was. They had picked up a lot of my material from earlier times, in the form of ~~memo[illegible]~~ lectures and memos that I had written on these subjects. Wh~~i~~en they set up the school, I talked with them on the program of instruction that they were going to ~~give~~ give. The first adoption of any of these principles was in

Guatemala, and it worked very well there for a time. The Latin Americans became quite enthusiastic, though again jealousies come in. They thought the Guatemalans were boasting too much about it. So when I was told that problem, I said, "Well, get them to emulate and try and beat them and get a healthy rivalry going," which is what happened actually.

O'BRIEN: I suspect [Fulton] Freeman is there as ambassador in Colombia when you're there--no, Freeman was in Colombia.

LANSDALE: Yes, he was in Colombia.

O'BRIEN: I can't think of the guy who was in Venezuela that was ambassador.

LANSDALE: ~~Uh,~~ he was from Arizona and was a journalist.

O'BRIEN: Not [Maurice M.] Bernbaum. LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: Well, how is he to deal with, and do you get a chance to see [Romulo] Betancourt or any of the political leaders?

LANSDALE: Yes, I saw political leaders there. I had five days in Venezuela, and I think I got two hours' sleep all the time I was there. I found our ambassador there [C. Allan Stewart] at the time very open-minded and very good to work with. I wrote a report, coming back from Venezu~~a~~ela afterward, and submitted it by the time I got to Washington. It went up to President Kennedy as well as Dean Rusk, and some of Rusk's staff immediately wired the ambassador. ~~and~~ It was one of these, "You don't want to buy this, do you," and they said I'd come out with a report on Venezu~~a~~ela, and here were the main points of my recommendations and ~~some~~ findings. "He was just there five days. He couldn't possible have found out enough to come to these conclusions, isn't that right?" Bless his heart, the ambassador came back and said, in effect, "I'm amazed that he found out that much, and the recommendations are sound, and we'd discussed this before he left, and we're working with them already."

You don't have to be in a place long. For example, we had a ~~pretty~~ very large American community down there who themselves were practically government: U.S. Steel and all our big oil companies and so on. There was very little relationship between the American business community and the U.S. Embassy. ~~and~~ I had urged that they meet maybe once a week or once a month--the key American executives and the Ambassador and several members of his staff and have lunch together rather frequently and discuss mutual problems because the U.S. firms down there had very large security staffs. (They were very close to the police type of forces, the constabulary down there) and ~~that~~ the embassy would be very well informed from this, as well as passing some ~~of this~~ information back to these people, and everybody would gain by it. Well, this doesn't take very long to. . . . In talking to the vice president in charge of U.S. Steel operations down there, you'd ~~and~~ say, "One thing you would change if you had the power--what would it be?" and he'd tell you something like this, ~~you know,~~ so ~~uh,~~ it was rather easy to come up with ~~this~~ that thing.

O'BRIEN: Did you find them fairly knowledgeable and enlightened about some of the things that you were very . . .

LANSDALE: Very much so, very much so.

O'BRIEN: Like rural economic development and agricultural development.

LANSDALE: Particularly the oil companies, and I was surprised. Standard [Oil Company] ~~of New Jersey~~ showed me what it was doing because the rigs out in Lake Maracaibo were getting blown up, and their pipelines were getting blown up, by saboteurs coming in who were really expert. I found out later that they were affiliated with communists in Col~~u~~ombia and had come on over. They were really experts at explosives, and they weren't the student type of revolutionaries and so on, who also were present in Venezuela.

But in seeing what they were doing, it went far beyond a company paternalism type of a thing for employees. ~~that~~ They started credit systems with farm groups and housing projects for people living in the vicinity of their plants-- ~~employees~~ --not their employees so much, who also gained a great deal out of this. And then U.S. Steel, in pushing its developments way down to the south. . . . [Interruption] ~~He~~ probably wouldn't do it; he'd chew the wire in two here.

O'BRIEN: Oh my God. It's a wonder he hasn't electricuted himself. [Laughter]

LANSDALE: Yeah. It's not yours, it's some of mine.

O'BRIEN: Well, I'm not worried about that. Wires, these sort of wires can be replaced. I'm not sure about yours.

LANSDALE: Worse than rats.

O'BRIEN: Well, he's a spirited animal and ~~he~~ you can't help admiring that.

LANSDALE: Yeah. ¶ Well, one of the stories on Kennedy I'd like to put in was: On my reports from Vietnam in the very early days of,--just before he was inaugurated, and he read it apparently right after the inaugural--one of the reports was a little side piece that I did on a village in South Vietnam inhabited by some Chinese refugees that President [~~Ngu Dunh~~ Ngo Dinh] Diem had located down in the midst of a communist-held territory, and I was very impressed by them, ~~and~~ just as an example of what humans will do in such a situation, I'd written it up and turned in a separate report on it.

And about the ~~a~~. . . . It was still January, '61, about ten days after the inaugural, my telephone in the Pentagon rang, and this voice that sounded like ~~President~~ Kennedy's told me it was President Kennedy talking, and he had read this report of mine and wanted me to have it published in the Saturday Evening Post. I was at the time wondering which joker in the Pentagon ~~, you know,~~ was imitating this Harvard, Massachusetts accent and was putting me on, so ~~and~~ I said, "Yes, yes, yes." I then had my secretary check over at the White House, and sure enough, it had been President Kennedy, so I had to then go ahead ~~—~~ I'd promised to do it, ~~and~~ figuring out I didn't know how to get something in the Saturday Evening Post, but quickly found out how, and they published this thing afterwards as a report that the President wanted published in their magazine.

O'BRIEN: ~~Well that. . . .~~ You had taken, ~~--~~of course, you'd had that interest in Vietnam and Laos. . . . You talked to a lot of people, as I understand, about Laos and Vietnam ~~and~~ in the incoming administration. Did you have any intent or purpose in mind outside of just explaining the way that it was?

LANSDALE: That was principally my intent. The first meeting I had with McNamara, all he wanted to do was to have me tell him about Vietnam, and this was essentially what most of the incoming administrative officials, ~~--~~when they'd talk to me, ~~--~~would want me to do-- explain what was happening and what the situation was. This essentially was how and why I felt on these subjects, but my thesis right along on this was to help the people in the countries to help themselves rather than to go in and do things for them. It was mostly on the nuts and bolts of ~~on~~ how you go about doing this, and the individuals you'd pick to do it, and how you'd select them, and please let's have highest quality and fewer people doing these things.

O'BRIEN: Well, you have some successes and failures in--I guess mostly failures in the last of the Eisenhower administration.~~--~~I'm thinking in terms of Laos. Laos is the immediate problem in 1961. How do you respond to some of these people who are in policy-making positions at that time? I'd like to get your feeling for them.~~--~~People like [Walt~~h~~er~~s~~] Robertson,~~--~~in the State Department, ~~--people~~ ~~Robertson~~ and [J. Graham] Parsons; John Irwin in ~~the~~ Defense; and on the Agency side, people like [Desmond] Fitzgerald. How do they see . . . .

LANSDALE: You have named a group of people, all of whom are friends of mine, and we were very friendly, and I had worked with a number of them for enough years so that we more or less understood each other and could take shortcuts in conversations and so on. All of those you named always in talks ~~and talked~~ with me expressed similar beliefs to mine, so it was very easy in talking to them, and there were others in the

Eisenhower administration. Now this wasn't true throughout the administration at all, but there was a considerable group of people who were in various executive slots just down the second and third level who had been through the . . . [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: Well, Laos, as I understand it, is, with the impact of the aid that's gone ~~going~~ in there, ~~that--~~ it really does in some ways tear up the economy of the country. Now, how do you look on the training of the Laotian army in late 1960--~~or~~ of '59, '60--some of the activities of the Agency in Laos, as well as the army and through the PEO [Programs Evaluation Office] office and things like this? Is this the kind of thing that you envision in terms of--I hate to use the term "nation building"--helping a country to help itself, in helping people to help themselves?

LANSDALE: Yes, as long as in the modern world the leaders of the country will think in terms of as large a military establishment as they can afford in a country. And they do this without any advice from anybody. This is just a natural, self-preservation type of an impulse on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this. Then let's make the military establishment serve the country in a much bigger way than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It's usually the organization that is nationwide, and there might not be any other organization that's nationwide in the country, such as agriculture. Even the administrative structure that usually comes under the Department or Ministry of the Interior won't really have the manpower, the communications, and so forth, that the military forces do.

So, given that, why not then get the military to start doing constructive things around and making full use of the manpower that you have anyhow. Have them be good military men as the very first requisite of this, but, given that, then there's still energy and personnel and equip. involved in that who have a lot of man-hours left over that could do other things. ~~and~~ Essentially, this is what I was trying to get the American advisory missions to do--not only the military advisory missions, but when other agencies would get in and be working on these things, to themselves become interested in the military doing such things, and aiding and abetting, including economic~~s~~ projects and educational work and so on.

O'BRIEN: Well, in this Laotian deterioration that takes place, ~~you know~~ the competing people there--Phoumi [Nosavan] ~~[Vongbichit]~~ and Souvanna~~h~~ Phouma and all--how do you read that in 1960 just prior to the administration coming in? ~~Do you. . . .~~ How do you see Phoumi; how do you see Souvanna~~h~~ Phouma, as people? First of all, have you met them at any time? ~~. . .~~

LANSDALE: Yes, yes, yes, I didn't know them well at all. I'd met them ~~at,~~ usually at formal gatherings of one kind or another. The main thing that I saw in Laos in the way of political stability actually stemmed out of the king of Laos~~;~~. This was the only unifying political force that existed there in the minds of all of the various Lao leaders whom I'd met. So when the others started splitting and opposing one another, I had ~~already~~ always felt that our best bet was to turn to the king and force him ~~to~~--or, not force, but to encourage him into taking the leadership role that would be the one thing acceptable to all these leaders. Instead of that, we were starting to become ~~parts in~~ partisan ourselves there and playing off one guy against another, and Americans aren't good at that game. We have many Americans who think they are, but this, I think, is a little too foreign to our nature. ~~and~~ We fell in love with the factions and people, and so forth, almost unconscious of the fact that we were doing that. The paratroop leader there . . .

O'BRIEN: Kong Le?

LANSDALE: ...Yes, ~~Yeah,~~ who kicked over a revolt, had spent the night before his coup with a group of American friends, and there wasn't a damn one of them that knew that he was going to have a coup in the morning. This type of a thing, I just found inconceivable. People get nervous and sort of absent-minded about what's happening at the time when they're planning an action like that the next morning, and somebody there among the Americans should have been sensitive enough to have said, "Well, aren't you feeling well?" or something, ~~you know,~~ and had gotten some feeling on it. But this sort of getting in bed with people socially and saying, "He's a good fellow," and "he's all right," and "he's my friend," and excusing everything is a common blindness, and this had worried me in Laos quite a bit.

O'BRIEN: Well, I get the impression from a reading of this period that there really is some lack of coordination in the various efforts that are there; ~~--an~~ in other words, the ambassador is not completely privy to what the Agency is doing, and the Agency is not completely privy to what DOD is doing through the PEO office. Do you get that feeling? Maybe in regard to the Parsons-Irwin-[John F.] Reilly mission that goes out there, do you get any feeling over that at all?

LANDSALE: Yes, I'm trying to recall. . . . We hit a crisis at that point, and the group that went out--Parsons was on home leave, and we had a meeting in the Pentagon in the secretary of Defense's office, and there were a mob of people there. ~~--~~ There were--I can't quite recall now what prompted the meeting, but it ~~there~~ was a crisis of some sort in Laos. And the JCS gave a briefing, that's right, as part of the thing, and it was on the Pathet Lao positioning, and they suddenly discovered ~~that~~ there were passes over the mountains that had some importance to the Ho Chi Minh trail, and this great discovery was being lectured on at this meeting.

~~And~~ at the time, the Secretary of Defense--I ~~[illegible]~~ think, I wonder, that might have been [Thomas S.] Gates, Jr. ~~[Jr.]~~ at the time, ~~--~~might have been, but whoever it was--asked if I had a comment to make, and I said, "Take a look at that map that the JCS was showing us of Pathet Lao and the other situations on the thing," and I said, "it should tell everybody here just one thing. You've got an ambassador who~~se~~ is on home leave here. ~~--~~ he doesn't belong here; ~~--~~he belongs out in Vientiane right this moment. ~~and~~ the rest of you who are asking questions ought to have people out there with him who would tell you immediately and take a first-hand look." ~~And the a.~~ I remember Irwin was picked right on the spot to go immediately, and he said to me on the side, "You and your big mouth." ~~you know."~~ [Laughter]

O'BRIEN: Well, did you get involved in any of the meetings on Laos after the Kennedy administration comes in, and some of the jockeying that goes around?

LANSDALE: Some of them, yes. I can't quite recall which meetings they were at the time. I was in on some of the questions of the support of the Meos, ~~Maos,~~ the guerrilla forces.

O'BRIEN: Well, what ~~how~~ did you see in terms of a strategy for the area? ~~There's a,~~ as I read it, there seems to be some various strategies that are proposed; one is ~~a, you know,~~ going down the full road behind Phoumi and supporting Phoumi, and another is the panhandle strategy--I've never been able to quite understand what the panhandle strategy was--if that ~~you know,~~ rings a bell.

LANSDALE: ~~Hmm,--yeah--well,--hmm,~~ my memory isn't too good on this thing. There was some talk at the time, ~~--~~there's high country across the Bolovens Plateau and so forth down in the south, and there was talk at the time of that being the dominant area, and what we should do was to make use of that and the high ground in Vietnam and so on, across into Thailand, and ensure that that ~~state~~ stayed in noncommunist hands.

O'BRIEN: Well, there's also suggested in the Laotian crisis as early as 1961, the use of strategic bombing on supply routes, and even, as I understand it, to Hanoi, as early as that, and interdicting ~~in addicting~~ some of the supply lines, as well as the suggestion that subsequently in 1962 does become a reality the dropping of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] plan five, as I understand it was called. How did you feel about the Laotian crisis at that point, in terms of a strategy or a direction ~~at~~ which should work?

LANSDALE: Well, I had wanted the Laotians to defend their own country, and I was all for the work with the Meos ~~Maoists~~ and so on of doing it. Once it left that and started involving ~~us~~ Vietnamese or us, on bombing or anything else, I felt that the cost of saving some real estate would be too high to ever engage in, and other works. And on the bombing, I felt that as long as you had all of the means of communication with the people ~~means~~ in the hands of communist leaders such as in North Vietnam and then Hanoi where this was pushing, that anything overt such as aerial bombing that would then permit them to use that as a unifying force psychologically with the people would be dead wrong.

?

I used to remind them of what [Winston] Churchill had done with the German bombing of Britain, ~~and~~ just on radio with the people. And here were leaders with complete access to radio and working with the people, and it would have a reverse effect as far as trying to stop the ambitions and aims and so forth of the North Vietnamese, who were, after all, the guys organizing the Pathet Lao and pushing on into the area.

¶ I felt that more could be done with the armed forces of Laos themselves in making them more able to stand up for themselves and defend their country. But if it couldn't, I couldn't see an intervention of any sort in there. Morally, we'd have been on a moral ground then to turn around and start using some international moral pressure, through the press and so forth, to sort of shame the North Vietnamese out of their attempts. I'm a great believer in exposing things to bring such pressure.

O'BRIEN: Well, how do you see the relationship of Vietnam and Laos at that point, or do you?

LANSDALE: Oh, yes. The passes and the Ho Chi Minh trail in bringing things down was one of the key things on this. But again, there was even talk at the time of taking Vietnamese troops in there, ~~and~~ ~~—~~secretly, ~~—~~and using them up to try and stop that, and I was opposed to that. I didn't want to see intervention like that from the outside.

O'BRIEN: Well, when does some of the covert activity, in terms of the use of some of the Montagnards ~~yards~~ in interdicting those supply lines in Laos ~~, you know,~~ from Vietnam, start? Is that going on in the late Eisenhower administration, or does it begin in the Kennedy administration?

LANSDALE: I think it was the Kennedy administration. There had been a little of it, or there had been talk of it, in the Eisenhower administration. There had been thoughts along that line by the top Vietnamese leaders in 1955, '56. ~~and~~ I remember President Diem's brother, ~~went to~~ his older brother, went into Laos in ~~are~~ about '55 or maybe '56, and had come up with a scheme very similar to that at the time. He had talked about the mountain people of Laos being akin to the mountain people of Vietnam, and wouldn't it be good to get some of our mountain people in with them, and together they could be trained.

O'BRIEN: Yes, well, you're in Vietnam in the middle of the fifties, and then you go back in 1960 in the late Eisenhower administration. What's changed, or has anything?

LANSDALE: Oh, a great deal. Excuse me. [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: What changes do you find?

LANSDALE: Well, the main change was in a growing isolation from reality of the constituency of the President of Vietnam. a repression of, you might say, a loyal opposition or a noncommunist opposition to ~~them~~ him in political terms. ~~a~~ There were professionally some among the military that ~~was~~ were taking the Vietnamese military apart from their people more than it had been when I had left, because I had gotten them working very closely with the people on a number of ~~people on~~ projects.

and a growing isolation of the American embassy in particular, but including some of the American agencies, from the Vietnamese officialdom, and taking a very strange form of concentrating on gossip essentially--gossip as much as fact--about ~~oh, what the hell's the word I'm trying to think of, of~~ misdeeds

?

and so forth by Vietnamese public officials or people connected with the regime in Vietnam. so that the information-gathering process of the United States there was devoting an exorbitant amount of time on sort of nit-picking on the people that were in power. In The relationships, such as the ambassador with the president of the country, the ambassador would go into details of malfeasance in office and so forth, or mishandling of funds by the Vietnamese on an internal matter, and the president would have to correct him and say, "you don't have all the facts," and the ambassador would say, "Yes, I do, too." This to me was very poor. I felt that we had some Americans who ~~that~~ were close enough to the top officials of the Vietnamese (who weren't present in the country always), who should be brought there and told, "Look, we understand these guys are doing something wrong.

Can you go in and get them to start doing things right, as a friend of theirs?" rather than going in ~~and~~ trying to scold them and something and getting the backs up of people, and they'd figure, "Well, these damn nosey Americans only got half the facts, and since they don't understand us that well, the hell with them. We aren't going to do what they want." I just felt that we weren't playing a very wise ballgame there at the time, on the American side. I also felt that Diem was paying too much attention to similar types of his own people, his intelligence people, who, in turn, were ~~in turn~~ telling him what the Americans were doing too damn much, or were bringing in alarming news about his own subjects--and particularly political oppositionists--and, I suspect, manufacturing cases against them so that they could take actions. ~~and~~ he, in turn, was getting too much secondhand from people, and this tended to isolate him more, since his main intelligence officer was his brother, [Ngo Dinh] Nhu, who was an ambitious person, too. I felt that it was a poor arrangement on the Vietnamese side.

I personally urged Diem at the time to get in touch with some of his opposition, ~~and~~ at which point he asked me where I had been at certain times of the day during my visit there. And I said, "I was talking to your opposition, and I'm not going to tell you who it was or where I was, but just the mere fact that you know that shows that you were having me trailed around. ~~and~~ You know I'm a friend of your country's, and I'm trying to help all of you succeed here, and you happen to be the elected leader, and you jolly well better start reflecting what your people desire. ~~and~~ If you~~d~~ spend your time and money and efforts and so forth watching

a guy like me, I'm sure you're doing a lot more for someone else you really suspect." ~~and--~~

O BRIEN: How would he react to something like this?

LANSDALE: Listen, I was told by a number of people that I was about the only one that really ever talked to him in this manner, and he would listen. ~~and~~ at the time, one of the people most critical of him was his vice-president, and I went over and saw the vice-president, whose name was [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho, and Tho immediately started telling me that the president had spies all over his office and in his staff. ~~and~~ as he was telling me this, one of the clerks was serving us tea, and I said, "Is this guy one of the president's spies?" and he said, "Probably, I think so." [Laughter] Maybe he'll go back and report this one. I said to him, "When was the last time you two talked to each other?" Well, it had

secondhand from people, and this tended to isolate him more, since his main intelligence officer was his brother, [Ngo Dinh] Nhu, who was an ambitious person, too. I felt that it was a poor arrangement on the Vietnamese side.

¶ I personally urged Diem at the time to get in touch with some of his opposition, ~~and--~~at which point he asked me where I had been at certain times of the day during my visit there. and I said, "I was talking to your opposition, and I'm not going to tell you who it was or where I was, but just the mere fact that you know that shows that you were having me trailed around. ~~and~~ you know I'm a friend of your country's, and I'm trying to help all of you succeed here, and you happen to be the elected leader, and you jolly well better start reflecting what your people desire. ~~and~~ if you~~'d~~ spend your time and money and efforts and so forth watching a guy like me, I'm sure you're doing a lot more for someone else you really suspect." ~~and---~~

O BRIEN: How would he react to something like this?

LANSDALE: Listen, I was told by a number of people that I was about the only one that really ever talked to him in this manner, and he would listen. ~~and~~ At the time, one of the people most critical of him was his vice-president, and I went over and saw the vice-president, whose name was [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho, and Tho immediately started telling me that the president had spies all over his office and in his staff. ~~and~~ As he was telling me this, one of the clerks was serving us tea, and I said, "Is this guy one of the president's spies?" And he said, "Probably, I think so." [Laughter] Maybe he'll go back and report this one. I said to him, "When was the last time you two talked to each other?" Well, it had

been months. ¶ so I went back to Diem, and I jumped him. I said, "You've got a vice-president who you've made responsible for all the economic development of the country, and I know that you consider that very important. You haven't talked to him for a long time," and I forced him to tell me when ~~you'd~~ he'd done it last. so I said, "Well, pick up the telephone and call him over here your first free time, and you sit down and have a long talk with him." So he did it. He picked up the phone, and I got the two of them together again. He was really out of touch. ¶ He promised me at the time to get in touch with some of ~~the~~ his political opposition. he swore up and down he wasn't oppressing anyone. and I said, "Well, You don't know what your own police are doing, then," and I gave him the list of names of people who were in prison, who had been arrested at midnight and pulled out of their homes and so on. and he promised to look into their cases immediately and do something about it. And I said, "I've gotten this from people who are in the opposition to you, but I don't know ~~if~~ whether you've ever gotten any reports." He said he'd never heard of these cases, and I think he was telling the truth. He had no reason to dissemble with me at all on these things.

O'BRIEN: Well, why is this? Is it the development of an independent bureaucracy, or is ~~there a~~ it the degree of U.S. influence on, let's say, the intelligence, ~~knew~~ Nhu. . . .

LANSDALE: There was probably some. . . . I think by that time the Vietnamese intelligence was way beyond any control by U.S. intelligence, who initially had been helping it, and Diem's brother Nhu was really--really had the bit in his teeth and was his own man. And I suspect, initially, he was really trying to serve his brother, and he was doing it by trying to get the goods on everybody working for his brother throughout the government and anybody opposed to his brother. ~~and~~ the intelligence people, picking it up, discovered that if they brought in bad news about some guy that the brother didn't like, he'd pay them and believe it. So I'm sure that there was a lot of manufactured evidence in the intelligence take that was coming in. ~~and~~ I don't think the Americans were screening any of that type of information because it went right into the palace, and there was a big room behind the president's office that had many files and was the main personnel dossier type of file place.

O'BRIEN: Well, you're critical of the MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] operation there. What's wrong with it, in the late fifties? ~~50's?~~

LANSDALE: Well, I felt that MAAG under "hanging" Sam [[Samuel T.] Williams in the late fifties ~~50's~~ was an unusually well-run American military operation. There were some unusual things being done that made it so. One of them, was one of the best ideas I've ever bumped into.

¶General Williams brought over the chief of staff of the Vietnamese army whenever the American advisors--who at that time were out in the countryside, but ~~were~~ ~~a~~ at fairly high levels, and were running training camps more than advising on operations or anything.--But when they would come in once a month for a weekend in Saigon, Williams would get the Vietnamese Chief of Staff to come in and talk to them. The Vietnamese Chief of Staff at that time was General [Tran Van] Don. Don was quite diplomatic, but had a way of being candid in his remarks and not having them hurt too much when they were told. He would leave out names and so on, but he would tell these Americans what their Vietnamese counterparts in the Vietnamese army and so forth thought of them, and their work, and their advice, and the reactions throughout the armed forces to them. This was the one part of the monthly gatherings with Americans around that everybody would stop dozing off or thinking of something else and would sit up and pay attention because they were the subject of the talk, of course. This was a very healthy thing. . .

O'BRIEN: Yes, I can ~~feel~~ see where it ~~____~~ would be.

LANSDALE: . . . ~~be~~cause even though it was tough diplomatically, the most sordid truth, ~~would~~ the hardest fact~~s~~, would come out in first. ~~the. . . .~~ And then Williams himself had been in Vietnam a long enough time by then--I forget how long; it may be three years at the time, four years--so that when he moved around the Vietnamese army, it wasn't only just the top staff officers and commanders who would be with him, but I noticed in a visit I made there--I think it was '59--that sergeants and junior lieutenants and so on would come up and talk to him. And I'd moved in close enough to eavesdrop on some of the conversations, and these were personal problems, family problems, and financial problems and so forth that individuals had. ~~and~~ This was a very unusual relationship for an American to have.

¶ And since the American was also running our advisory effort throughout, ~~too,~~ I just figured that this constant feeding and contact with the echelons of Vietnamese military that were down below the big wheels was again a very healthy influence that was constantly at work with him. So that he would know very well what was going on in places.

¶ Some of these problems--personal problems--would actually involve the military work that was going forward, people griping that something was wrong and so on. ~~and~~ They were doing this out of a friendship, and ~~he~~ was not to tell on their bosses or anything, but usually personal worries and concern that wastage or something going wrong would ~~ef~~affect them. Later they moved in an educator--a military educator--[Paul D.] Harkins, and. . .

O'BRIEN: Well, [Lt. Gen. Lionel C.] McGarr comes in there before that, doesn't he?

LANSDALE: McGarr. It was McGarr, yes, you're right. It was before Harkins. McGarr. And McGarr built up a staff to work on counter-insurgency and probably put together the best staff studies on counter-insurgency ~~than~~ that any American military men have ever done.

O'BRIEN: Is that right?

LANSDALE: He got American military men who had been guerrilla leaders in the Philippines, for example, in World War II, and in Burma and so on, and in Europe, and switched most of his work over into compiling "How to Do it" manuals, but I've never seen the finished products. I saw them working on it at the time, and all I know is they had tremendous stacks of papers with the results of their typed-out work and were putting it together.

¶ And the interpretation of this ~~was~~ apparently was to start increasing staff and American military personnel to handle whatever ~~whatever~~ was coming up out of this whole process. The feeling was ~~was~~ that there should be closer American supervision of what was happening out in units, ~~Eunice,~~ which meant ~~well~~ you'd put down your Americans at lower echelons and then get a separate reporting system on back, feeding in the research process of the Americans initially more than anything else.

¶ It wasn't for control; it was just for information that would go into fields of study. ~~and~~ this ~~lead~~ led to a proliferation of an American military presence that was intended sort of for the education of Americans, I think, more than anything else, but of course didn't work out that way. You put some red-blooded American boys in uniform out someplace, and they're going to start doing other things as well. In collecting information, they couldn't help but tell a guy, "Well, look, if you didn't do it this way and did it the other way, it would work better," and so on. It~~s~~ was a very human thing that started working. ~~and~~ as this happened, then we started building up our advisory effort more and more.

O'BRIEN: Well, in the meantime, while this is going on, the insurgency's building up, isn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: Just what is the condition of the countryside that's different from when you're there in the middle fifties ~~50s~~ and when you go back in 1960?

LANSDALE: Oh, there were guerrilla operations by an enemy, which there hadn't been in the period from Geneva on up to the time I left in the end of '56. You could drive roads at night and so forth and not be worrying about guerrillas. There were isolated incidents of violence, but they were very minor--it would be about what you'd expect in any country with the crime rate going~~--~~. The fact that former Viet~~nam-~~minh guerrillas were the guys pulling the trigger didn't matter too much as far as the overall crime rate went. It was in a nature of minor terrorism that was going on.

By my next visits later in the ~~'50's,~~ fifties, there were areas of guerrilla bands at work, with roads that were unsafe and so on, ~~in~~ and areas that were unsafe, with great problems of police posts being attacked and with their families being wiped out in small massacre type of things, though the type and degree of violence had increased a great deal.

By the end of '60--when I got there ~~in~~ at Christmas of '60--there were fair-size enemy, Vietcong units operating and dominating areas~~/~~. It had escalated considerably by then.

O'BRIEN: Is this terrorism campaign on the local officials as serious as some of the people have written? ~~about it?~~

LANSDALE: Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: Do you ever get an~~y~~ feeling about the number of people? I've heard all kinds of estimates.

LANSDALE: No, I've got [Stephen T.] Hosmer's study there on that, and I haven't read it yet. I just got that from him. I imagine he's got a figure in there. The last figure I remember on it was--in about '66 ~~was about~~ around forty thousand ~~40,000~~ or something . . . .

O'BRIEN: Forty thousand. That many?

LANSDALE: Yes. These were officials, ~~--~~not their families or anything. But these were village officials, and district officials, and sort of federal government officials.

O BRIEN: Well, what do you see happening as a result of this in terms of the ability of Diem to just simply govern in those years? Is ~~the value~~ his ability to govern deteriorating?

LANSDALE: Yes. In some ways it was. Initially, he was unwilling to delegate any authority at all in the things and ~~he~~ had the tendency to try and do everything himself. If the problem came up in agriculture, he would be the guy to do all the paper work and the deciding rather than his Minister of Agriculture and so on. He had gotten over that to a very large extent later. so he had learned to be more the administrator and executive later on, as far as putting some authority in the hands of others.

¶ But at the same time, he also seemed to have lost some of his critical faculty, ~~of~~ in some of the things that were going wrong, of not being able to see it. He was getting around the country and visiting, but not as much anymore because of the security problems. He had been shot at several times, so that he had a larger and larger security guard around him all the time, which meant that when he went in and talked to people, they were very much aware of plain clothes policemen, secret service types, all around him, and others, that were screening out people. so that the dialogue between the president and the people became thinner and thinner, and less and less meaningful. ¶ So while he was on paper becoming a better executive, he was, in terms of being the national leader, ~~was~~ being less effective all the time because he had no means of measuring what was true and what wasn't~~;~~, what was worth doing and wasn't, and what would ~~was~~ work and what wouldn't. ~~wasn't.~~ It was a considerable impairment of his critical faculty. ¶ This was one of the reasons I was urging him to start dialogues with his political opposition~~;~~, even if it started at opposite poles and just led to tremendous emotional clashes. ~~that~~ there would be some means for dialogue to take place that would have been useful to him, particularly if he had invited them into a meal or something, and had some way of dampening ~~fattening~~ the most emotional irritations that would take place, just out of ~~how the~~ people being ~~seemed~~ polite at the time, so the content of what they would have ~~had~~ to say would be something that he wasn't getting at elsewise.

O'BRIEN: Yes, well, as I understand it, the V.C. [Viet Cong] make a great deal of headway in those years on the basis of the land system.

LANSDALE: That was one of them.

O'BRIEN: Well, what. . . . As I understand it, there's some rub between the U.S. in this regard and Diem about putting through some land reform which would cure some of the rural cultural problems that the French had sort of created, as I understand, from ~~you know~~ the Vietnamese moving into the country. . .

LANSDALE: Yes, yes.

O'BRIEN: Well, how do you see that? Are you pushing him for this sort of thing at that point?

LANSDALE: Yes. Actually, he had ~~we have~~ some very sound land reform measures on the books and had issued decrees on them that were good. As usual, the diff~~o~~iculty ~~is~~, when you get a piece of legislation or something, is then implementing it correctly, and I was pushing him mostly on implementing his measures.

¶ Now the land reform worke~~r~~ that Diem approved and used as the basis for his decrees came from Wolf Ladejinsky, and Wolf, ~~was,~~ when he left U.S. employment, was actually employed by Diem as his advisor on that ~~the~~ subject, and Wolf was getting over and having breakfast with Diem quite a bit. Wolf is a very articulate, personable type of a guy, and there was a great deal of affectionate friendship between the two men. so that Wolf, who is a champion of reforms and of helping the man on the land, had full access to this guy and had a way of doing things.

¶ And I felt that the main thing that needed doing was demonstrating to President Diem, who was sympathetic towards this, of where things weren't going right and changing some of the inner workings of ~~the~~ this thing, instead of just faulting him on intent. And his intent was very sound, very good. I think he was ignorant of some of these things going wrong.

I felt that we should have borne down on the matters in which he was ignorant and tried to get some changes there and make these things work, because certainly landlords and others were circumventing the law of the land that Diem thought was operating. Or when he circumvented it, he was doing it for good reasons of his own, which was again open to education by somebody of him.

But he was moving in people whom he could trust--who were refugees--into farm communities and distributing land to them for security reasons and political reasons and so on, and then dictating what they would grow and so on. Because he'd just figure, well, in the national economy, we need this type of fiber grown or this type of crop or something, and the land will produce it up there, and so they should do that. So he was only circumventing the law sort of for the greater good, in his own mind, ~~in~~ his own extent.

O'BRIEN: This centralization brings about a reaction, though, doesn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes.

TAPE II SIDE I

LANSDALE: You asked about the falling out between Ladejinsky and Diem. I know there was something of that nature, but just what it consisted of, or why, I don't know. I remember that the American ambassador . . .

O'BRIEN: ~~It~~ This would have been [Elbridge] Durbrow?

LANSDALE: . . . Durbrow was mindful of the fact that Ladejinsky was having breakfast with Diem and was close to him, and, in a rather general way, had asked Ladejinsky to bring up thoughts of corruption in the government and subjects beyond anything like land reform. And I suspect that Ladejinsky had started getting very political in his talk, as a result of this, with Diem, and that Diem had resented it.

¶ But beyond this, there was a very deep affection between the two. When I was there in '59 or '60, Ladejinsky had wanted to go someplace, ~~--~~ and I forget where it was. . . . I know one of the places was Indonesia, but there was another country he wanted to go to, and Diem hadn't wanted him to go, and had ~~he~~ suggested that he attend a conference--I think in Latin America. ~~and~~ Finally, they had agreed between the two of them, and Ladejinsky had gone on to do these other things. ~~that~~ He had taken sort of a sabbatical leave to do that.

¶ But this was a very personal thing between two men, and it was two friends, rather than a president and his consultant working. I know Ladejinsky is very sentimental about

Diem as a man, and I know that Diem reciprocated this very much. There was a point where the rational thought would end, and the feelings of affection and so forth would come over, and say, "Well, even if that is true and everything, I still like the guy, and I want to help him," and so on. And this existed between the two. So, they might have differed on some things and perhaps on carrying out land reform exactly the way that Wolf wanted, but the two men kept seeing each other all the time, and he had ample opportunity to work on that.

O'BRIEN: ~~Well, sir~~ The suggestion that's ~~sis~~ made sometimes is that the Vietnamese military ha~~s~~d not been trained for the kind of war and the kind of insurgency that they did encounter in 1960-61, --they had not been properly trained for that before. Is there any validity in this at all?

LANSDALE: Oh yes, sure. They were being trained actually to meet the challenge that the Vietnamese and American top officials foresaw, and they were thinking ~~that this~~ a--and incidentally, the French General [Paul] Ely before he left was thinking the same way--just in terms of contingency planning. They saw a lot of artillery and armor being given the North Vietnamese army. So, ~~being~~ given that information, they saw any attack or military trouble in Vietnam as consisting of divisions of North Vietnamese with a lot of artillery and armor coming across the border. So they built up an army to meet the foreseeable thing that was happening, that they thought might happen.

Instead of this, of course, it was more of the same old story again. ~~and~~ There were many of the officers in the Vietnamese armed forces who had formerly been guerrillas themselves, who had formerly had been Viet ~~men~~ Minh in the old days of fighting the French, who had broken with the communists and wanted no part of the communists and were very sincere, patriotic nationalists. But since they had had ~~and~~ this former affiliation and had taken their basic military training with the enemy, so to speak, they never quite had the same stature among their fellow officers in the Vietnamese army, for example, as graduates of the Vietnamese Military Academy and the others coming right out of high school and so on.

So as a result, the officers corps who were knowledgeable ~~about~~ of how to counter what was happening were kept at fairly junior grades, and in the late fifties ~~'50's~~ the highest any of them got that I ever knew about was the rank of Major. ~~and~~ they had to take orders from Colonels and so forth who had served under the French in very much the same type of a conventional military organization as the Americans had put up and were advocating. And these junior types who wanted to do different things were simply too junior to do it and were unable to convince anyone of the need.

The initial meeting of the threat was thought more to be a police problem than an army problem, and there was a lot of work on trying to equip and train the national police to cope with it. ~~and~~ we Americans did that through our economic mission and through--Michigan State University had a group helping on administration there. They recruited some very good police officials from the U.S. who were quite used to dealing with urban crime problems in the U.S. ¶ Well, you can't take a man who is very good at precinct work in Detroit, Michigan, or Birmingham, Alabama, or something, and move him out to an Asian country where his problem is: What do you do when a company of guerrillas comes in and ambushes your police station? A completely foreign type of a thing, so that we had police advisors who ~~that~~ were insisting on all policemen being armored with nothing more than, say, a 38-caliber revolver, with the policemen saying, "Yes, ~~Yeah,~~ but people are shooting at us with rifles, and we need rifles or something like that to shoot back at them, or how about sub-machine guns or some--we need more fire power." Well, it was foreign to them. ¶ So there was a mixup on a number of things on this coping with the insurgency that was growing, ~~--~~not only the conventional formation of the Vietnamese army but of a conventional urban police formation of the police. And yet, throughout the system~~s~~ there, there were many individuals who knew better, and who knew how to cope with it, and who were continually begging, "Give us a chance to do it some other way."

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of these people we were talking about a little earlier--the late Eisenhower people, like Fitzgerald~~,~~ and Irwin~~,~~ and Parsons--do they conceive of the kind of insurgency that's developing in South Vietnam at that point, or are they . . . ?

LANSDALE: Fairly well. Fairly well. They were more aware of, or had more understanding of, the needs than did some of the folks that were coming in sort of brand new to the problem or who had been steeped in a far more conventional approach to the problem, as were some of our military leaders at the time. But, as I remarked earlier, these were personal friends of mine, and when I'd talk to them and tell them my views, there was always sympathy for them, so I might have mistaken that for understanding and so on. ~~and~~ Even that was rare enough so that I felt that. . . . [Interruption]

~~EVANS~~
O'BRIEN: How long is the manuscript?

LANSDALE: Ho ho. I went through first. ~~--~~The publishers wanted me to tell all; ~~an~~ in other words, just write as much as I could for later editing. ~~and~~ They said this is the way people do it. So I wound up with really three ~~of really~~ very long books, and since I was writing one not too long book, why I wound up with a tremendously long manuscript. ~~And~~ I urged ~~then~~ them that I could cut it down to two books, and we could publish it as two different things, and the subject matter would have permitted me. They still want just one book, so I am now going back with editor's notes and with my own notes and trying to. . . . I ~~'d~~ had started off initially with a cut-and-paste job, but I discovered I couldn't do that and retain the proper narrative and ~~entries~~ interest on the thing. ~~but~~ I wound up having to rewrite almost of all of it, and recast it, and retell it in a somewhat different form. I'm about half-way through with that, but it'll be a fair-size book even so.

O'BRIEN: ~~Well~~ That's good. Mainly on the Philippines and the early period in Vietnam?

LANSDALE: Umhmm.

O'BRIEN: Good, you know that's really . . .

LANSDALE: Well, there's ~~really~~ one big period in Vietnam that isn't known too well, and most historians have passed over it, and the ones who haven't have been championing a cause, and their work is quite suspect. Some of the French were sort of agents ~~en~~ provocateurs at the time, and they are more or less justifying what they did~~,~~ and leaving out important parts of it.

O'BRIEN: How about the French journalist [Jean] Lacouture? What do you think of his work? Is it Lacouture that's done the thing on Ho [Chi Minh]?

LANSDALE: ~~Yeah,~~ Yes, I'm trying to remember. I think that's who it was. Well, most of the French writings about Ho and some of the explanations in official documents of the French, trying to explain him and so on, by friends, I found very interesting. ~~and~~ I had no way of judg~~s~~ing really on it. ~~—~~there was a tremendous sympathy and so forth being expressed, and then a very strong attempt to work out an accommodation with him afterwards, ~~with him,~~ by the French. And again, a highly emotional sensitivity to any interference with ~~was~~ what they were trying to do, and they saw almost anything as interference.

So~~,~~ what is written by them, I read mindful of their sensitivities at the time and what they're trying to prevent anybody ever believing that would be opposite at all, or something different at least. ~~and~~ it was just amazing. The French press was screaming that I was starting World War III in Vietnam in '55 . . .

O'BRIEN: Mind if I get this on tape--well, it is on tape, I'm sorry. I didn't realize it was going.

LANSDALE: . . . simply because I think there was a feeling by the French colonialists in Indochina~~,~~ of not wanting to give up the French presence there.

and it's a human, understandable type of a thing. They had been there and associated there, and some of them had spent their entire lives there, and here they were having to give up something; ~~and~~ Swiss journalist once explained it to me: It was like a man giving up his mistress and seeing some ~~big~~ guy in a big car driving by in the street, and even though he'd given ~~him~~ her up, he'd just say, well, he hates that guy because he got the mistress allegedly with material means such as an automobile and maybe a fur coat and so on, and he isn't the man that the former guy was.

¶ So some of this feeling was very prevalent there. and for some reason or other, I happened to suddenly become the focal point of it, through my name or something, ~~or other~~ so that they went to great lenghts of charging me with all sorts of things that I was doing: I was out buying up the loyalties of ~~set~~ sect ~~courses~~ forces with millions of dollars, and things that would be ? hard to prove that I wasn't, mind you, except ~~that~~ to say, "Look, I didn't have a million dollars to buy anything with." And they'd say, "Well, the U.S. government did, and you were a secret agent for them," and so on. It was very hard to disprove some of their talk and say, "Well, that just isn't so." Except once in a while they'd get really wild and claim I was down--I walked in on a briefing, for example, with French officers telling some American visitors from Washington ~~that~~ about how at that very moment I was down trying to buy off a sect leader, and very naively, with a suitcase full of money. ~~and~~ I didn't know but the guy was going to ambush me and take all the money and not do whatever I was going to plan to do. And at that moment, I just asked him, I said, "Well, please keep on with your briefing. I want to know whe~~n~~ther the guy killed me or not." It was ~~C~~crazy. Now these were very responsible French officials talking that way and the fact that I'd be miles away from the scene of some of these things never stopped the damn circulation of these stories. I don't know how you ever stop that stuff.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah,~~ Yes, well how about people like Bernard Fall, and Patty ~~Hury~~ [P.J.] Honey and their writings? Are they . . .

LANSDALE: Well, they're very sound, very sound. Fall's background, as was Honey's, was out of intelligence or information collection units ~~and~~ in their different countries. Fall's initial writings were all out of a French army historical section, and I had to tell him one time I had read some of his work originally by the original author. But it was a detailed military history of operations that he'd delved into. ~~and~~ I don't know, I doubt that it was intentional plagiarism on his part. He was probably rushing through, getting a book published for academic credits and so on. And Honey the same way with British intelligence, who were quite active in Indochina during the French days. But it was--some of the stories and happenings and everything were just almost incredible. ~~The--~~

Some of the French journalists were politically partisan. They had connections either with the Communist Party or sympathies with them of some sort. And Ho had been one of the founders of the French Communist Party, so that there was always a cultural or comradeship feeling of some sort there. ~~and~~ When the

Americans started showing up on the scene, there was this very paternalistic feeling of "Well, these are our people, these Vietnamese or Khmer or Lao, and you keep your cotton-picking fingers off of them" type of a thing that went to very great lengths--volatile emotions erupting on this type of a thing.

I remember one of the journalists, John Beret, published a newspaper in Saigon and wrote a lot of the early propaganda for individuals in the French army. They ~~and~~ had sort adventurer types among them. He then went to Pnohm Penh, where he started a weekly newspaper and started also writing speeches for [Norodom] Sihanouk. And the next thing I knew, Sihanouk was accusing me of plotting to murder him or assassinate him. ~~and~~ I hadn't ~~even~~ been near Cambodia, and I hadn't even thought of Sihanouk when this happened. The governor of Siem Reap, who had been very close to Sihanouk before--and Siem Reap is where Angkor Wak and the historical ruins are--suddenly died, and the story started seeping out a little bit with Sihanouk charging that this governor, whose name was Dap Chhuon, and I were in a conspiracy to murder him and take over the government of Cambodia. And it didn't do any good that I had never met Chhuon and never had any dealings with him, and Cambodia was way outside my bailiwick. But this is the story that's gone on and on and on.

O'BRIEN: Well, there was a little bit of truth to that, wasn't there? ~~,~~ Some involvement of CIA. . . .

LANSDALE: Dap Chhuon? Yes. ~~Yeah.~~ Well, he was a national leader and actually had formed the political groupings initially that supported Sihanouk and gave him his political power. ~~—~~ He was the organizer; he was the chief political lieutenant of Sihanouk. And then apparently, he felt that Sihanouk was going sour, and he wanted to get the government back into reflecting more the will of the people. How far he got, I don't know. But this was really something that was foreign to me at the time.

¶ I got sent back into Cambodia afterwards, from Washington, with ~~,~~ various military assistance groups~~,~~ or economic groups or ~~of~~ presidential commissions~~,~~

and so on. ~~and~~ each time they'd have Pnohm Penh on the thing, I'd just say, "~~We'd~~ Well, you had better check the embassy there." Back would come word that, No, Sihanouk was afraid that if I were a member of the party, I would be going in to murder him.

I actually went in one time, and the chief of police of Pnohm Penh met our party--along with the foreign minister and so on--at planeside when we came down. ~~and~~ the Chief of Police walked right next to me, and he said, "I'm your liaison man from now on." ~~and~~ I said, "You're keeping an eye on me, I know. it's all right. I'm not going to murder your boss; I have no idea of doing that." [Laughter] That is strange.

And then Sihanouk made a movie--about '65, '66--in which he played the Commander in ~~of~~ Khmer Royal Naval Intelligence foiling a great American spy, who happened to have my name, and was a role played by some ~~prince man~~ Frenchman who was visiting there. and I was out to overthrow the kingdom. but, of course, our boy hero thwarted the ugly American and won the girl, who was the daughter of the Brazilian ambassador or something. Some French gal played the role. I've been trying to get a print of that or some way of seeing that movie. ~~--~~I'd love to see it, you know. It sounds great and. . . . [Laughter]

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah~~ Yes, I hadn't heard about that. Well, that does hit on something, though, in regard to Southeast Asia. As I understand, in that Dap Chhuon incident, ~~that~~ there was an Agency involvement with him, through a guy by the name of [illegible]?, and the Agency does seem to have a kind of free hand in some of these Southeast Asian nations. ~~and~~ I'm thinking of the [ALLEN L.] Pope situation in Indonesia as well. Can you see any ~~breaks~~ brakes put on them as a result of the change of administrations? ~~--~~How do you react to this sort of activity?

LANSDALE: Well, most of the things that they did that had political consequences of any major size at all, ~~--~~and certainly a thing with Dap Chhuon and also the Pope thing, are only undertaken by the Agency after approval up at topside. So as far as brakes are concerned, they've had them from the beginning. However, the objectives and the intent are approved, and not, again, the means of doing it--the nuts and bolts--which are supposedly overseen by an ambassador.

And when we get down to the level of a country where these things are happening, then I think much depends on the individuals: the ambassador and the station chief, and how they get along, and again, mostly on the. . . . Well, no, it isn't either; it's a fifty-fifty proposition. We have ambassadors who don't want to know or ~~who~~ are opposed to all such things, and if an order comes down to do it, they very unwillingly tell the guy to go ahead, but watch it now, not too far.

A station chief, then, with orders to do some things, will have told the ambassador he is ~~isn't~~ going to do this. But he starts getting in things, and he figures ~~that~~ if he goes back and tells the ambassador what's happening, that he's not going to get any understanding and will probably get an order prohibiting him from ~~for~~ doing something. And he won't be able to explain, "Well, if I stop doing this, then this other thing won't work, and Washington wants us to have this happen." The ambassador will just say, "No, I don't see it that way. Don't do it." So I'm sure there are things ~~that are~~ happening that aren't told for this--for operational reasons. and again, it's a judg~~e~~ment of an individual on that thing. It's not a policy type of a thing from the Agency.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. Do you find any--in the time that you're there in the middle fifties as well as when you go back in '60, '61, and later involvement in Vietnam--do you find differences between the embassies, ~~--~~between the U.S. embassy in, particularly, Pnohm Penh and Saigon?

LANSDALE: I didn't notice that. It might have existed, and I wouldn't have even known that.

O'BRIEN: Well, there's some feeling among people involved with Cambodian relations ~~at~~ during that time, as I understand it, that somehow there's an involvement on the part of the South Vietnamese in some of the groups like the . . . .

LANSDALE: Oh, ~~yeah.~~ yes. I remember, Both the South Vietnamese and the Thai were playing around with groups inside Cambodia, or with exile groups that wanted to go back in Cambodia, and so on. And I'm not certain that the Americans from either Thailand or South Vietnam were fully aware of what all was going on. And I'm not certain that the Americans or the Cambodian government people inside Cambodia knew what was going on, and were tending to exaggerate some of this. Things get blown up out of all proportion in this. But, just the fact that there was antipathy and it would take this form of expression, among others that were going on. . . .

I don't know which people would rather go in and take over and run Cambodia;—the Thai's or the South Vietnamese. It's about a toss up which one ~~was~~ looked down more on the Khmers than the other.

And Diem used to follow the predictions of the royal fortune-teller in Pnohm Penh to Sihanouk. Apparently, they were spending a lot of intelligence money to find out, you know, what's happened in each other's sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was, mind you, I don't know.

O'BRIEN: Well, do you find--again, in passing on to the task force--and the formation of that Vietnam task force in the early part of the Kennedy administration--do you find ~~the~~ a sensitivity on the part of the people, the political appointees, to what's going on in South Vietnam? Are you able to explain what you're telling me right now about South Vietnam to these people?

LANSDALE: ~~Uh,~~ only partially. They were as bemused by the mechanics of getting decisions in Washington as they were with the problem that they were employing the mechanics to solve. It was all sort of new to them, and they wanted to do a good job, but in order to do it, they were suddenly working with these instruments, you see, that were foreign to them here. I think that the princip~~les~~als in the administration were not entirely aware of these people they were dealing with in Washington. I recall, at the time, some surprise

¶ Rusk was violently opposed in the department over where he was by some people. ~~and~~ I noticed at times that he wasn't aware that he was turning around and asking a guy who, minutes before Rusk had come in to him, ~~was~~ among his comrades in the Department called him, ~~just,~~ "This stupid jerk," and so on, which I felt was disloyal--behind the guy's back, you know. I was always urging them to speak up in front of people and so on, and they wouldn't do it. And the same damn thing was true of ~~against~~ some of the military against McNamara, for example.

¶ Well, the McNamaras and the Rusks and their unders and deputies, and so on, types of people, and assistant secretaries, were trying to cope with people that they instinctively felt were ~~instinctively~~ opposing and foot-dragging and so on, and trying to get that working. So that to get them working on a given problem was really the thing that they were concerned with. ~~and~~

¶ You'd suddenly say, "Well, we're going to talk about Laos," or Vietnam or Israel or something. "Yes, yes, yes. What have you got in this paper?" you know. And they were watching to see: "Well, ~~it is just I've~~ has this guy really done his homework," and "Is he going to ~~and is it gonna~~ come up with something or not?" rather than what is the real problem here, and how would I solve it if I weren't sitting in this room in this particular group, and so on. So there was a. . . .

So then, working on this type of a thing which I saw very much in the task force on Vietnam--Gilpatric, I know, was shocked at the reactions of some of the foreign service people that came in at a rank of ambassador and so on, that were sort of the staff assistants on the assistant secretary and undersecretary level.

? They would start a meeting at night. ~~in fact,~~ I was asked to be sort of--I forget what the title was--executive officer or something of it, and they asked me to chair the meetings. Well, I'd no sooner open it than these guys would be passionately explaining why I shouldn't be sitting in the chair of the meeting, see?

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah~~ Yes.

LANSDALE: I think it shocked some of the Kennedy administration people. It suddenly revealed a feud and so on, ~~and~~ I hadn't said it, and I personally didn't care that much, you know. I'd say, "Have you got all the hate out of your system now? Let's go on with the meeting," see. This, of course, would activate it more, but I would say, "Well look, we really do have some problems here we've got to get to, and if you want, I'll meet you afterwards and ~~we can~~ have lunch or something, and you can spoil my lunch by telling me what a heel I am or something. But we've got work to do." So then, Gilpatric or somebody would tell me afterwards, "Do you think we better take you off?" "Well, yeah. If it's going to ~~effect~~ get the work done, it's better ~~to~~ take me off. It's no fun for me to sit up and chair something under conditions like this," so . . .

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Were you ever approached with the job as ambassador to Vietnam?

LANSDALE: Yes. Yes. ~~Yeah. Yeah.~~

O'BRIEN: Who was pushing that?

LANSDALE: I don't know. I heard about it ~~this~~ the first Saturday after the inaugural--I think that's it. It was very early in the administration. McNamara asked me to come down to the White House and meet him there, and I thought it was to brief him on something. ~~And~~ I was working on a number of intelligence matters in Defense at the time. ~~and~~ I showed up, and he asked me to just wait outside, and they were meeting in the Cabinet room. ~~and~~ As I said, it was essentially an NSC group.

And after a bit, they asked me to come on in and they had me sit opposite the president. And he looked at me, and he said, "Did Dean [Rusk] tell you, I want you to be ambassador to Vietnam?" I said, "No, he didn't mention that." Well, he hadn't at all. ~~and~~ There was a long, painful silence, and I figured, "Well, ~~Gee,~~ maybe he's asking me if I want to be, or would I accept the job." So I finally said, "Well, it would be a great honor," and that was the last I ever heard of it. But, I heard all sorts of rumors that, ~~they use~~ are usual for Washington. ~~and things~~ It seems afterwards that Dean Rusk was very much opposed to it, and opposed on the ground that I was a military man and they didn't want military people in on the situation.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes.

LANSDALE: And then later I ~~had~~ met one of Rusk's staff officers at the time, and he was telling me that Rusk was figuring, you know, if ~~that~~ he could get me a job some other place or a promotion or something to get me out of the way at the time. I apparently ~~I~~ had become sort of a target for a lot of gossip and rumors and so on at the time.

But after that, then, they asked me--Kennedy asked me pretty point blank--about Ambassador Durbrow, and I said, "Well, after what you just asked me and so forth, I'm a little hesitant, but you're the President and you need the truth. So I'll just tell you right now, I think he's a very ill man. His judgement's impaired by his physical condition. He's a fine professional Foreign Service officer and could be used someplace, but don't keep him on in Vietnam anymore. He's sick, he's on his back a lot of the time, and you need someone very alert, ~~wh-- then~~--whoever it is. And pull him out." And they got--Rusk and everything, you know--"You're off your subject, boy." But I said, "Well, Durby's an old friend of mine, and I like the guy. ~~and~~ I saw a lot of him when I was in Vietnam on this brief visit. ~~and~~ I think it's a shame that the guy's kept on there because he was quite ill, in bad shape."

And Durby never forgave me for it; it got right back to him that I had sacked him and so on because he was withdrawn after that. But this certainly didn't hurt his career at all, in any way, ~~and~~ even though State put him on a make-work job after that. But he held the rank of ambassador which is as high as you can get in the foreign service. And he was ill; he really was.

O'BRIEN: Well, how does [Frederick E.] Nolting come into this . . .

LANSDALE: Well, Nolting came in, ~~as the~~ apparently, as the foreign service's rebuttal to my going on out of there. I remember both McNamara and Gilpatric asked me about him, and I didn't know him. I said, "Well, I'd just go on what I have heard from other foreign service officers who respect him very much." So finally, Nolting was-- a meeting was arranged with Nolting, and I liked him very much when I talked ~~with~~ to him. He asked me if I would give him some briefings on Vietnam, which I did do. And when I wound up the end of that, I was asked again by McNamara, who said he was going to tell Kennedy. and I said, "Well, this looks like a very good man, and I think it's a sound appointment."

I didn't want to be ambassador. Jesus. During the Eisenhower administration, they wanted to make me ambassador ~~of~~ to the Philippines, and I begged them not to. I think that's one of the world's worst jobs. You're stuck where you can't do what your job is supposed to be, and I knew they were going to put me in places where I'd be up against Communist political leaders of some sort, working the other side. And of course, you aren't in that position, but allegedly you are. ~~and~~ you'd ~~re going to~~ have people running circles around you, ~~if~~ and you'd know it and couldn't lift a little finger to stop them. ~~And~~ this isn't my idea of a good spot to be in. You just get belabored over that.

O'BRIEN ~~LANSDALE~~: Well, did Nolting ever try to get you back to ~~Vietnam,~~ Vietnam in an advisory position?

LANSDALE: I think so. There were a number of attempts by the Vietnamese themselves, and unfortunately, some of them were couched in terms of wanting me to come out as ambassador, by the Vietnamese. but Nolting and I had very friendly relations, and I think he had proposed that I come on out several times. But these things would usually only come to me sort of second or third hand. ~~and~~ A one time apparently President Kennedy had said something to the JCS because suddenly my relations with the Chiefs went down to less than zero and sub-zero. ~~and~~ I finally asked General [Curtis E.] Lemay of the Air Force, because I'm an Air Force officer, what the trouble was. And he said, "You and your ambitions to have four stars." I said, "What's this again?" Apparently Kennedy had said something to the Chiefs of, what would they think of my being given four stars and being put in charge of operations in Vietnam?

And I didn't know about it, and they took it that I was pushing myself for it. I said again, "That isn't something I'd want to do." So this was about the time that--no, maybe General [William Westmoreland] Westy was coming in about then. It was around that time.

O'BRIEN: Well, the task force really forms up the instructions for Nolting, doesn't it? . . .

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: . . . for the next few years. Just what kind of recommendations come out of that task force?

LANSDALE: Well, I was only in on the very original one, which was to undertake some things such as changing the specific types of things to meet a situation in there. One of them was: we would get a political section that would work out better relations with the Vietnamese government, a political section in our embassy, and that the Foreign Service would go and search through their own personnel for people with some real political savvy to get in to guide, rather than control or belabor or have confrontations with the Vietnamese government to carry out essentially political reforms, and getting some of the just criticism of the opposition considered in the governing body.

Another thing was on the police, of getting police training done so that they could cope with meeting enemy units, rather than doing urban police work. In this, I was begging them to at least get to a state constabulary level as far as American advisors were concerned. And I wasn't certain that the U.S. Army's military police could cope with it, but maybe they could get a team of them in. ~~and~~ Then I was pointing out that there were constabulary officers and officers from other countries, including South America and the old Philippine constabulary, who knew the law-and-order conditions--quite similar to Vietnam--and bring them in if they wanted to go international. I was trying to get them to get very realistic ~~and~~ in solving problems by changing the quality and the approach that we had.

We drew up an original draft that went to the President, out of meetings that lasted about ten days, at which point, at Rusk's insistence, the task force went over to State and became a general, regular body there. They then proceeded to rewrite our original ~~and~~ instructions and drafts and everything, ~~and~~ both McNamara and Gilpatric said, ~~-~~ coming back from the White House, ~~-~~ "Ed, you had better not get in there." I said, "If I can help in any way, I will." They said, "Well, right for the time being, you'd better not go near that group, see?" ~~so~~

I actually didn't get in to some of their policy formulation, again in a fairly early period, on the thrust of things in Vietnam, except for some of the Defense people who were over there. I would talk to them on what was being proposed and going on, but this was sort of second and third echelon type of a thing, pulling back out of it.

? did or didn't

But, initially, I was actually trying to get a quality U.S. representation in Vietnam, and actually smaller again than it was at the time, and to pick a few key things, and to concentrate on that, and really to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Well, between this time and the time of the Taylor-[Walt W.] Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . . .

LANSDALE: ~~Uh,~~ No. Off and on I was, but again with second- and third-echelon type of problems. I was seeing Gilpatric every day and working very closely with him, so that a lot of times, as things would come up, he would discuss them with me. But again, I was trying to explain who certain people were that were named, their backgrounds, and their qualities, and certain events and places, and going to maps with him and describing terrain, and so on, and what the situation really meant that was making the problem. So I was fairly well out of it.

As a matter of fact, I was working with some visiting Burmese on their concept of defense of a country, and ~~they~~ they brought me in with the Israeli who had had a mission helping them with their defense problems in Burma. And the Israeli then had ~~then~~ turned around to their Defense minister and some of the others, and invited me to take a look at ~~their~~ defense system in Israel.

I was quite enthusiastic about going and had everything arranged and was to leave on a Saturday, when about on a Wednesday or Thursday, I was asked to go to Vietnam with the other mission and stuff; ~~and~~ Unfortunately I had to cancel out everything and never got in to see what I'd wanted to see there.

O'BRIEN: Well, you end up working on border--actually, the ~~seating~~ sealing of the border, then, don't you, on ~~the~~ that Taylor-Rostow thing?

LANSDALE: Yes. Yes.

O'BRIEN: What about that preoccupation? Where does that idea come from? Is that Rostow's?

LANSDALE: Well, Taylor was the one that charged me with it. Taylor said, "Well, you folks"--this is ~~a~~ the flight which started--"Will each of you write down some of the things that you think we should look into and what you might like to look into." So I gave him a list of about twenty things that I'd like to look into, none of them being this, of course.

I suggested some other subjects for other people on the thing and gave it to ~~them, and~~ him. he called me back, and said that it was a very interesting list ~~that~~ I had given him, and would I please work on building a defense on the border. And I said, "~~Well~~ what sort of a defense?" He said, "Well, a system of fortifications or a wire like the Iron Curtain in Europe." I said, "Good God, you aren't going to do that, are you?" And he said, "Well, look into it." So that was supposedly all I was ~~supposed~~ to do, and of course, I got called in on other things immediately.

But I wasn't even invited along to go in and see Diem with him. I said, "Look, these are old friends of mine. If you'd like, why I'll do anything I can. you can hit them high, and I'll hit them low if you want. We can get some things done that way." He said, "Well, you aren't on our protocol list, so you don't attend any of these calls on the President."

We landed in Saigon, and the people from the presidency were there and met us. ~~and~~ Taylor and Rostow were over talking with reporters who were interviewing them plane side, and these people from the presidency said, "President Diem wants you to come to dinner tonight." and I said, "Well, I better check with a on my boss on this thing." Taylor was busy, but I grabbed Rostow who wasn't talking at the moment and told him, and he said, "Go ahead." So I said, "Well, I wasn't even on the protocol," and everything. I don't care about going up to these protocol meetings anyhow. ~~but~~ I went in and saw Diem, whose question was, "What's this mission doing here? What are you all up to?" I said, "Why don't you wait, and they'll be in here to have a meeting with you tomorrow, and you'll find out." And then it became very personal. We just started talking over -- ~~his~~ two old friends ~~with him~~, and I had dinner with him. And he brought his nephew in to join us--Nhu's boy, oldest boy--who had a new toy missile, like a rocket with a launcher. and I was trying to explain to this youngster who was squatting on the floor next to his uncle, ~~--~~ the President, ~~--~~ who was busily eating dinner, I said, "You don't point this at him." ~~--~~ I didn't know how big a spring this thing had on it, whether it would take his head off or not. ~~[Laughter]~~ I ~~told~~ taught him to shoot it up into the ventilating fan in the ceiling. We spent dinner, actually, taking parachutes and things out of the ventilating fans, and the kid and I were climbing up a ladder to get these things out of the thing in the palace. This was very different from an official protocol meeting.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. How is Diem at that point?

LANSDALE: He was a very changed man. It was the first time in our talks with each other. . . . When I met him at the palace that night, his brother Nhu came in for the first time and sat next to him. and when I'd aske~~d~~ Diem a question, his brother would answer it. and I'd have to tell him I wasn't asking him the question; I was asking his brother. A very strange relationship at the time. ~~and~~ I found that he was a talker--Diem was--and he was very clear and concise in his statements and had too big a grasp of details ~~in~~ of whatever subject he was talking about. It'd go on for hours--details on it, which fascinated me but used to bore other people. But he did know his country, and its history, which he would give at the drop of a hat. This evening in '61, seeing him, he was very hesitant in his talk and hadn't--it was something physical as well as a mental hazard or something, I felt.

O'BRIEN: Any evidence of ~~Did he go into~~ that later?

LANSDALE: No. There was a--mentally, people were telling me that his brother had taken over in the year following ~~this--~~ just a dominance on the thing. But this was a man that wasn't as sure of himself as he had been when I had seen him less than a year before. And there had been one assassination attempt only, but the big one had taken place before I saw him in January or December of '60--the attack on the palace and so on. So it hadn't been an outside, physical happening like that that had caused the change.

O'BRIEN: Was he a spiritualist at all?

LANSDALE: No, no. He wasn't superstitious. He was a very rational sort of a person--pragmatic.

O'BRIEN: Well, when you get back, you talk to President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone, as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here?

LANSDALE: Well, this was--when I came back, I met the President. I went in with Taylor and Rostow--all of us did who were out on the mission--and he thanked us all very much. And as we were leaving, he asked me to stay behind and talk to him. ~~and~~ That was when he asked me to perform this other service for him, which was initially to think about it, and if I came up with some ideas, why to put them down, ~~or~~--briefly, ~~--~~ on paper and give them to him. ¶ And I said, "Well, do you want me to forget about Vietnam for the time being, because I haven't written my report yet about Vietnam." He said, "Yes, this other takes priority over it." So I didn't even finish writing my reports on what I had seen in Vietnam at the time. I went immediately into this other work.

O'BRIEN: Well, about that time, there's at least some thinking in terms of memos that are going to the President about the only way to save Vietnam is with a rather substantial commitment of U.S. troops. Is that. . . .

LANSDALE: Yes, there was some. Now where. . . . Hmm, there was some, and I can't remember just where it was coming from. This was one of the things, new that Diem asked me when I saw him. He asked me if he should ask for U.S. troops, and I said, "Do you need them?" He said, "I asked you a question," and I said, "Well, I'm asking you a very legitimate question on this thing," ~~and~~ I said, "Are you ready to admit that you have so lost control of your situation that you can't cope with it here?" And I said, "You'd have to do that before you ever turn around and ask for American troops in here." And he said, "No, we can still handle things, and you've answered my question," so apparently he didn't ask.

There ~~have~~ had been some conversations, I'm sure, going on ~~I'm sure~~ with some of the Americans before that. That would be my guess on this thing because he didn't say, "What do you think of," or ~~Is there~~ "Is there anything," or "should I ask?" which was sort of like somebody had recommended this at some point, and I don't think it would have been completely in ~~the~~ a Vietnamese context.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah,~~ do you get any of this thinking when you get back? Any contingency planning or thinking about the building up of troop levels to a more substantial level, ~~--~~maybe linked with the settling of the Laotian question first?

LANSDALE: There might have been, and I might have known some of it. I can't recall now of any. it's someplace in the back of my head that there were some things like that going on. I turned around, just took time off completely from other things and concentrated on this other problem for a time afterwards. Actually, through December of that year, I was sort of holed up and working on some things. ¶ My staff would get in and out of some of these other things, and I used to shove them in to take my place in meetings and so on. ~~and~~ I could ~~can~~ only then just get very quick briefings on them, but they were essentially supporting whatever McNamara and Gilpatric were doing. so I'd just have them go in and report directly and work with them directly.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. Who were the people who were on your staff at that point?

LANSDALE: Well, let's see. One of them was Sam Wilson, who's ~~whose~~ now a brigadier general in the Army. Jack Bowles was a Navy Captain who went down to serve with the JCS afterwards and is now with Standard Oil and working out of Singapore. And I had five or six people like that at the time, but those were my two princip~~le~~al ones.

Bowell ?

O'BRIEN: Well, this is about ready to run out, and we've covered ~~a~~ quite a bit.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 5/5/2016

Agency Information

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10168 [Dup 176-10030-10085]

RECORD SERIES : ORAL HISTORY

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : ORAL HISTORY INTERVIEW WITH EDWARD G. LANSDALE

DATE : 07/11/1970
PAGES : 124

SUBJECTS :
VIETNAM, CUBA-BAY OF PIGS

DOCUMENT TYPE : TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION : Not Marked
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/26/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : sanitized version

SANITIZED NLK·99·41 12/00

Oral History Interview

with

EDWARD G. ~~Edwin B.~~ Lansdale

July 11, 1970
Alexandria, Virginia

By Dennis J. O'Brien

For the John F. Kennedy Library

O'BRIEN: I think a logical place to begin in anything like this is just simply with the question, when did you first meet President Kennedy, or Senator Kennedy, if you met him before he was President?

LANSDALE: I don't recall meeting him before he was President. The first meeting, I believe, was ~~I believe,~~ the first Saturday following the inauguration, whatever date that was. I was called into a meeting in the White House by [Robert S.] McNamara. It was a meeting, on, actually, on a report that I had written for [Dwight D.] Eisenhower. It was sort of a— I'm not sure that it was an NSC [National Security Council] meeting, but it was comparable to that with the personnel that were attending. There were several secretaries: Defense, State, and his National Security people were there.

O'Brien: Could ~~Did~~ you have much contact with McNamara and [Roswell L.] Gilpatric, members of the incoming administration, before they actually assumed office?

LANSDALE: Just before, that is, a day or so before. I'd been in Vietnam for a brief visit and got back just before the inaugural, maybe two or three days, and at that time both McNamara and Gilpatric were in Defense getting briefed for their new jobs. I met them at that time. The outgoing deputy secretary of defense asked me to start working with Gilpatric, and so I got to know Gilpatric rather than McNamara.

O'BRIEN: This is [James H.] Douglas.

LANSDALE: Douglas, Jim Douglas. ~~(James H. Douglas)~~

O'BRIEN: How is Douglas to work with, while you're with him? Is he a pretty sympathetic person?

LANSDALE: Yes, very much so, very much so. He was the one, actually, who wrote the orders and backstopped my visit to Vietnam, and backstopped it principally so that I could take a look at some of the political factors as well as economic, military, and psychological, and everything else. This, frankly, took a consi[illegible]standing on his part [illegible] that because my views weren't always popular in other parts of the government. I gathered that there was some opposition to my going out, and he insisted on it.

O'BRIEN: I'd like to come back to that. I wonder if we could go on to talk about one of the major problems, which is Cuba. When is the first time that you hear about the Bay of Pigs invasion? not the Bay of Pigs, but the plans.

LANSDALE: Sometime in the fall of ~~sixty~~ '60. I think ~~that~~ I heard of it about the first time that it was brought up to the ~~inter~~ inner policy group of the Eisenhower administration. I was the Deputy Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, at the time, for Special Operations and used to accompany the Deputy Secretary, who was a member of the ~~inter~~ inner policy group, to most of the meetings that they had. When Allen Dulles ~~(Allen W. Dulles)~~ first raised the notion to this ~~the~~ inner ~~Senate~~ group. I was present at the meeting as an assistant.

O'BRIEN: What is the thinking about it at that time? What kind of operation is [illegible] is it basically a guerrilla operation at this point?

LANSDALE: Initially, it was. Initially, it was very different from ~~than~~ the way it turned out. It was based on a premise that many people in Cuba were very unhappy with the [Fidel] Castro administration and the way it was turning away from the initial revolutionary objectives and the capture of the revolutionary movement by the Communist Party, which surprised many of the supporters of Castro as a guerrilla and as ~~a~~ revolutionary action. So ~~,~~ the thought was to back a number of the Cubans who either had been supporters of Castro or were very unhappy, were still resident in Cuba, and to cause some overturn at the time. The change of plan towards the Bay of Pigs thing evolved fairly gradually, ~~fragilely~~ and apparently there was a planning group in ~~and~~ CIA [Central

Context

?

Intelligence Agency] who were working on this initial plan who started thinking in military invasion terms. I suspect that they were doing that because some of the Cuban military-and military types, that is, very militant, kr[illegible]ble [illegible]llas, were coming out of Cuba as refugees, and they suddenly saw a windfall of manpower and started thinking in other terms of use of them. But, ~~this change was~~ the changed plan towards the Bay of Pigs thing, the way it was going, was well under way in the inner circle and thinking of CIA by December of '60, very definitely so.

O'BRIEN: Who were some of the inner circle people at this point, do you recall? ~~(Pierre E.) Salinger, of course.~~

LANSDALE: Let's see, ~~um,~~ Oh golly. O'BRIEN: I imagine [Richard M.] Bissell was.... LANSDALE: Dick Bissell ~~(Richard M. Bissell)~~ was the overall chief of the group.

O'BRIEN: Tracy Barnes, was he in it at that time?

LANSDALE: Tracy was an assistant to him, but how far Tracy actually went in the detailed ~~actual~~ planning or anything... I have my doubts that he was. . .

O'BRIEN: How about Broe, William Broe? ~~(William V. Broe)~~

LANSDALE: He was one of a planning group who were planning the operation, but he wasn't ~~a~~ the chief, and I can't recall the guy's name offhand.

O'BRIEN: Oh well, maybe when you get the transcript back; you can. LANSDALE: Maybe so. O'BRIEN: How about ~~from~~ some of the other places [illegible] days? [illegible] C.] Mann, I sup[illegible]

LANSDALE: Yes, but initially it was all CIA. They borrowed some military personnel to help with the planning ~~earlier,~~ early on, but they were people who had been attached to CIA for temporary duty on other matters, and they hadn't come in initially for this specific planning. In December, when the planning had obviously started coming in with a beach landing and so on, the way it turned out, I urged at that point to get military planning in on the thing. I was worrying about it. ¶ As a matter of fact, Allen Dulles brought his planners to a policy meeting, a policy group meeting, and they were explaining the concept. ~~and~~ my questioning was such that Allen Dulles pleaded with me not to spoil the plan at an early stage. I remember General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer was sitting in on the meeting-- ~~He~~ he was the chairman of the JCS [Joint Chiefs of Staff] at the time-- and he backed up my urging them to get some military planning in on that. After th[illegible]ent among our pol[illegible]ple of that, and then the JCS set up a special section to plan along with the ~~Central-Intelligence~~ Agency on that. And who the hell headed that?

O'BRIEN: This is yet in the Eisenhower administration.

LANSDALE: This is all back in 1960. This was still in ~~the~~ an early planning stages. This was before training or anything like that was put forward. When the JCS got into the act, I asked to be disassociated with the project. I was rather critical of the concept, and it ~~was~~ just looked too clumsy and overt and a poor-planned ~~feeling~~ doing.

O'BRIEN: A lot of people have knowledge of this, don't they, by the end of the Eisenhower administration throughout government?

LANSDALE: I don't know how widespread it was. There were key executives that were knowledgeable, there was a small group in the JCS that was knowledgeable, and there was a planning group at CIA, but I don't think it went beyond that. I don't know how far it was known, but I thought it was rather closely held.

O'BRIEN: You don't know whether the presidential candidates [illegible] at all, do you?

LANSDALE: Ye[illegible]ey were. There was a very definite -- no, wait a minute. the candidates, no, I don't think they were. As a matter of fact, it was still in a rather nebulous stage ~~of~~ in this shifting over in ~~early~~ November. I think somebody told me, if I recall correctly, that the concept was in the form of a memo in CIA about August, so this would be well after the candidates had been nominated and so on. I imagine that it was just held ~~by~~ to two or three people inside the CIA at the time. ~~At least,~~ the rest of us certainly didn't know it. I forget exactly when I first heard it, but it would be possibly October, but it might have even been November by the time I heard about it. As I say, I heard about it when it was surfaced with the inner circle of our administration executives.

O'BRIEN: Well, I suppose you had some conversations with Dulles and with Bissell and some of these people about it.

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: What's their feeling? You already discussed D[illegible] asking you to sort of hold your criticism. . .

LANSDALE: Well, Bissell definitely felt the same way. Bissell was a very hard-working, intense person, almost high-strung type of an individual. He became rather impatient with my questioning of the changed concept when it took place. I thought initially that if they had the correct personnel, and ~~if~~ they had a correct reading of dissent inside of Cuba, that was a fair chance to do something. My only concern at the time was: did ~~the~~ CIA have ~~the~~ Americans who could work with such a situation? I just didn't know of any, but I was assured that yes, there were such Americans. But I'm not certain that there were.

O'BRIEN: Did you question the kind of intelligence that was coming out about Cuba and the expected reaction of Cubans to an invasion, and the reaction to Castro in general?

LANSDALE: Just in very general terms. I didn't have enough concrete and specific information myself that was separate from theirs. Most of the intelligence take at the time, available inside the U.S. government, was pretty colored with this dissatisfaction and statements of it. So I had no real way of determining the accuracy or inaccuracy of it. Some of the adjectives used in describing this in briefings to us alerted me a little bit. It just sounded like too much of ~~like~~ a sales job on a viewpoint. I'd question that, whether that was an accurate thing, so this is about as far as I went.

O'BRIEN: How did ~~does~~ a guy like Douglas react? Do you recall?

LANSDALE: Well, he approved of the plan, so he and the others at the policy level approved of going ahead with it and developing it. I was his advisor on this thing (that was my staff job), and I told him to be certain to get the JCS to give it a real hard scrutiny and to come up with details of whether it could succeed or not. That was my last advisory role with him. I was taken off advising on the project after that, actually by my own request because I was apparently causing too much trouble and was [illegible] works of progress.

O'BRIEN: What's the reaction of the Joint Chiefs, people like Lemnitzer, towards this? Is there an institutional rivalry or bureaucratic rivalry here in their minds?

LANSDALE: Somewhat, somewhat. It was a little bit as though, well, somebody's going to be playing Boy Scouts, so this isn't really rivalry. They had a difficult time taking this really seriously. Later, I know, when the JCS got in and helped on the actual planning of this, they became much more serious on it because they had a share of it.

O'BRIEN: Well, do you get involved in the informing of McNamara and Gilpatric about this? Do you get any way of sensing what their reactions are on first being informed?

LANSDALE: No. They had apparently known by the time I met them, and I didn't get in on that. The one person who would have ~~has~~ a view of their reactions would probably be [William P.] Bill Bundy, ~~(William P. Bundy)~~ who I know at the time was discussing this with them.-

O'BRIEN: Did you have [illegible] Bundy and his [illegible] at that point?

LANSDALE: Yes. This was a little out of Bundy's field. He was always trying to figure out what the chances were, the percentages of win or loss. He was a bit low. ~~and~~ I hadn't known the final plan on this thing, and Bundy did, and he asked me what I thought. I told him, "well, if the JCS guarantees something, you can ~~take~~ maybe shade it 10 percent lower than that and go along with it. I'm not sure that they know a clandestine operation, but they'd sure know a military landing, whether it would succeed or not. Given some of the unknowns in this thing, ~~I say that~~ why, shade it by 10 percent and go along with the figure." Well, apparently they had given it a high chance of success, the JCS had, because Bundy said, "Well, you mean it's going to succeed then?" I said, "Well, I don't know." So I gathered that he felt it would succeed.

O'BRIEN: Well, then, you are pretty much out of touch with it until it actually comes off, from the point that you battle it. LANSDALE: That's Right. O'BRIEN: You didn't get in ~~to~~ on any of the changes in the plans there at all?

LANSDALE: No. I left ~~at~~ around the first of September something--it wa December, '60. I really didn't follow it from then on.

O'BRIEN: ~~Did~~ Does anyone come to you from the Agency, or from State, or ~~from~~ the White House, as far as that goes, and attempt to seek an independent judgement on your part, with your background and all, on succes

LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: How about the noise level on this? Obviously you're out of it, but is there much talk about it that is sort of filtering down in Defense ~~and~~ among the people that are around you that really have no need to know and direct involvement?

LANSDALE: I wasn't aware of it. There might have been, but I have no knowledge of that.

O'BRIEN: When ~~the thing,~~ the operation, actually begins and the landing has taken place, do you come into it again at that point at any time?

LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: You do become involved in Cuban affairs at a later time.

LANSDALE: Later, yes.

O'BRIEN: When do you [illegible] do you have anything [illegible] with the [Maxwell] Taylor committee, which makes the inquiry about it?

LANSDALE: I met with them once, and they weren't interested with the Bay of Pigs. They were interested in the decision-making process, ~~of~~ in the making ~~a~~ of policy, and asked me if I had any ideas on how better the President could be served in the policy decisions and arriving at them. The thing was, right at that moment, McNamara had previously asked me for the same thing, and I had come up with a proposal for him which he put to Kennedy. I just told them, "~~Well.~~ I had some ideas but I had given them to somebody else, and I was skeptical of the boss anyhow." ~~and~~ This was on putting together task forces. The Kennedy administration had eliminated a bureaucratic boon-doggling thing

~~and,~~ in-- what the hell was that called? ¶

O'BRIEN: OCB? [Operations Coordinating Board].

LANSDALE: Yes, the OCB. I pointed out that the one good thing about it was that the principals met for lunch. ~~and~~ I said the rest of it's for the birds, but to get men in government who are talking to [illegible] who are held responsible by him for managing men, money, and material and so on, who can understand the problem well enough around the lunch table to have one secretary or deputy secretary, or under secretary say, "Well, we'll take care of that," and so on, was ~~is~~ a good way of doing business. ~~and~~ Then with the president's own National Security man sitting in on it, going back and telling him this is going to happen for these reasons, why, it was a good control mechanism. ¶ So essentially all I told the Taylor people and told McNamara in my paper was that this function had been eliminated, along with cutting out a lot of dead wood, and there was some live wood in it, and how about restoring the live wood? This essentially was what my proposition was with the task force, of getting the people most concerned with something, who could operate for the president, and having them get together and help form the policy, get the president's approval, and they were the same ones who could then st[illegible] immediately. [illegible] not to create another big bureaucratic thing.

And of course, after they first tried this, it rapidly started becoming a big bureaucratic thing. The task forces that were later set up were just big staffs sitting in different buildings. It was almost like OCB again, not quite, but it got out of hand. Anytime you go ~~try~~ to change the government around, it seems to come right back in form again and close ranks on ~~it.~~ you. O'BRIEN: Yes, we have a tendency of doing that. LANSDALE: But that was all that I did with the Taylor group. Incidentally, in that inquiry into the Cuban bit was the first time that I met [Robert F.] Bobby Kennedy. For some reason or other, I didn't connect him personally with the pictures of him and so on, on T.V. and whatnot, and I wondered what the youngster was doing sitting in the meeting ← T.V.

talking so much.

O'BRIEN: Was he pretty tough?

LANSDALE: Well, he wasn't tough. He was the most interested of anyone in the room there of what I would say on things and plague me with many questions.

O'BRIEN: How were his questions? Was he fairly naive about the problems?

LANSDALE: No, this was on ~~problems~~ questions of how the government would operate at a decision level, and they weren't naive at all. He had a very good understanding. He was very much concerned about his brother's getting good service in the way of information and full details and ~~of~~ alternatives and so on, on a policy decision.

O'BRIEN: Well, ~~if you, you know,~~ in that period right after the Bay of Pigs--of course you had a lot of contacts and friendships in other places outside the Pentagon. LANSDALE: Yes. O'BRIEN: What kind of an impact ~~did~~ does the Bay of Pigs have, let's say over in the Agency, and State Department, and in Defense, and in the White House?

LANSDALE: It was a traumatic experience at top levels throughout ~~of~~ the government. I think it affected President Kennedy more than any other single thing. It was almost a taboo subject if you were going in to do business and to get an approval on something you never even hinted ~~that~~ Cuba or the Cuban affair. It was such an intense~~ful~~ly sore subject among all of these people. I felt that almost all of the key executives in the administration must have dreamt about it at night or something, and during the daytime working hours they just didn't ~~even~~ want to even contemplate it. And yet they were honest enough people that they knew they had to face up and look at it and would do so, but it was an extremely emotional subject with them, very much so.

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of the Agency, there's a number of programs and, of course, involvements in operations that they have. Do you see any shift in these, any attempt on the part of the Defense Department to move into some of these areas which they felt were traditionally theirs rather than the Agency. I guess what I'm trying to say is, can you see any decline in the ~~Agency~~ influence of ~~in~~ the Agency on ~~in~~ decisions?

LANSDALE: Yes, I think so. I'm not certain that it was the military as such. It might well have been the t[illegible] like McNamara personally and his encouragement of some of the military who were somewhat interested but wouldn't really have expressed the interest unless they were directly asked. and there always had been some feeling of --unease--I think would be the best word to describe it--among the military about any clandestine type of operations. They felt that once it got over into guerrilla type of operations or anything that would involve a military subject, ~~that~~ it would be far better to let the military establishment of the U.S. handle it. ¶ But that would be sort of a dinner-cocktail party type of a gambit on their part, rather than sitting and planning and so on of "We must grab some of that ~~this~~." ~~E~~even though among themselves they talked that way. They didn't express it in terms of their attendance at policy councils or even in talks with people like the Secretary of Defense or the civilian, executive side of Defense. ¶ On this, I think that McNamara himself probably started thinking initially that, well, this was a military operation and just to be more efficient and effective, the military should take over such things. I imagine that he talked that way to some of the military people ~~that~~ who were seeing him from the JCS, ~~and~~ the Chiefs, and from the intelligence community, the military intelligence community. I know that DIA [Defense Intelligence Agency] got its great start under McNamara, and I feel almost certain, I've got a strong hunch, that the Bay of Pigs and the misreading of the temper of the people in Cuba gave McNamara great impetus in setting that up initially.

¶ So, ~~it~~ actually, it wasn't a military ambition to set up a rival intelligence agency to ~~the~~ CIA, though there had been tremendous rivalry between the military service intelligence agencies and ~~the~~ CIA and had been right along from the initiation of CIA originally. But this was sort of a business rivalry, and it was~~n't~~

sort of dealing with them, of categories of work, and where the boundary lines of who did what on the thing. ~~and~~ This is where their jealousies and emotions and everything would come up over almost nitpicking of boundary lines of who would do what. It wasn't a thing of "We'll do it all, and you go out of business"--that feeling hadn't come up--but ~~[illegible]~~ after the Bay of Pigs, the DIA and its creation, a lot of the people in that who were civilian employees, Defense Department employees, had an idea, "We can do a better job than CIA," and in a much wider field than the service intelligence agencies ~~have~~ had done.

O'BRIEN: Are there enough skilled and competent people around, in the universities and the military, to staff all the intelligence agencies: the NSA [National Security Agency], DIA, CIA, and organizations? Are there enough people, or are these operations just simply too big at this point?

LANSDALE: ~~Indeed~~ They might be too big. The need to know things is a very elastic bit. I'm certain that the chief executive of the United States, in whose name these works are accomplished, would have no idea that he would ever desire to know some of the things that they're working on very hard. You discover whole buildings and all sorts of equipment busily accumulating facts [illegible] figures, [illegible] would say, "I can't see [illegible] States ever needing to know some of that." ~~and~~ Yet he would hesitate, given the world today and the technological advances and everything, it's very hard to say what you need to know and what you don't. Given this sort of a gray shading of the end objectives on this thing, it's very difficult to say whether you've got too big an establishment or not.

O'BRIEN: Do you ever take this question up, or is this question ever raised in the administration by the civilian people in DOD [Department of Defense] or the White House, with you?

LANSDALE: Not with me. No. My theme on overseas operations was reiterated enough so that it was known by a number of people, and I ~~always~~ felt ~~that~~ it was always more efficient and effective to have a very small group working and to choose them with very great selectivity and go for a handful of highly qualified people rather than a large group of Americans charging overseas someplace. This went for intelligence as well as diplomatic and other economic work, and so on. I used to point out the embassies--for example, behind the Iron Curtain--that would get de~~ss~~cimated by

? → being TNT'd and so on. in Eastern Europe, for example, it would happen. ~~that~~ It would wind up with an ambassador and two or three people left in an embassy, and their work would increase in quality, and their representing U.S. interests would seem to improve tremendously when that would happen.

O'BRIEN: Does the fact that you get this reputation, mainly out of the writings of guys like [Eugene] Burdick and Graham Greene, does this affect you in any way in your relations with the bureaucracy?

LANSDALE: Yes. It made life rather difficult. With much of the work that I had to do in Washington, I came back from a lot of operations abroad and went up into policy-forming levels in

Washington almost immediately, and into facing people who were very sensitive on my presence abroad initially. Since I didn't just stick in a regular military category but would get over into their own subject matter, this made them very uncomfortable. ~~and~~ I can understand it while it happened, but it was carried to too great an emotional length.

¶ At times I would suggest certain individuals be sent to look into a situation in a given country and would arrange their transportation and so on. ~~and~~ I would get backing throughout the U.S. government for this thing and have an individual approved by the Secretary of State as well as Defense and up at the White House and so on, but would set up a means of communicating back so that we would get reports back. There would be times when these individuals would show up in a country, and the first time they sent a message to me, the ambassador would ask them kindly to leave the country, to get out of there, just because of my name. I ~~was.~~ apparently was the enemy to some of these people. ¶ One of my assistants was traveling between Thailand and Saigon, and there was a coup going on in Saigon at the time. ~~and~~ his plane, which was Air France, put down--commercial flight--in Phnom Penh, in Cambodia, and the military attaché very kindly picked up this guy and several other Americans from the plane and found a place for them to stay until they could get another flight out of Phnom Penh. He asked this lad of mine where he'd worked, and he said, "In the Pentagon,"--he was a civilian employee--and he mentioned that he worked for me, and the attaché got all excited, called the ambassador, and he was given two hours to come out of the country. [Laughter] All he was doing was looking for a place to sleep at night. so it became very emotional and very silly, and detrimental to the U.S. ¶ For example, once in Indonesia, in meeting our folks around the embassy in Djakarta, I had spotted an assistant army attaché, who was the one American, along with one of the economic mission guys--there were two Americans--who were not only best known by the Indonesians but were respected, and there was an affection there. ~~and~~ I ~~have~~ had told the ambassador at the time, afterwards, "make real use of these people~~;~~. the Indonesians believe them, and there's some antipathy towards the U.S., but they make an exception of ~~to~~ these two. ~~and~~ they're just invaluable. ~~--~~but the army man was extremely close to the general staff of the Indonesian army. I went on some visits to members at their homes of the Indonesian General staff, and this lad who was tall and blond--a Nordic type, if you will--would go in, and the small brown Indonesians ~~would~~ and their families would ~~--~~welcome him like a long lost uncle~~,~~ or brother or something. The children would run up and jump in his arms and climb all over him, and he was Uncle ~~"~~something~~"~~ to them.

So later, when the Soviets start moving in SAM~~s~~ [surface-to-air missile] missile sites into Indonesia and the U.S. needed to know what sort of antiaircraft armaments were going in~~,~~. our embassy couldn't get the answers to it~~--~~.

I suggested that we get the State-Defense sponsorship and send this one fellow who was ~~is~~ a lieutenant-colonel over and just let him stay a week or so. He'd go right in and talk to his old friends, and they'd probably tell him what the Soviets were up to. He arrived there. the Indonesian general staff took him out and showed him these sites ~~sights~~ and asked him what he thought of them and so on the first day he was there. That night he got back, and he wrote out a radio message and asked the ambassador to send it to me, at which point our ambassador told him to leave the country.

O'BRIEN: Now, this was [Howard P.] Jones?

LANSDALE: That was Jones, yes. And he said, "Well, let me put that in the message." so I ~~just~~ asked the Department of State, ~~to~~ "please let Jones know that you're sponsoring this guy, too, and there might be some more things that he finds out that you need to know as much as we do." So they told Jones to just ~~to~~ sit back and let him do that.

We have some wonderful Americans, and this was what I was trying to do; ~~was~~ to find out which Americans have not only our interests at heart but were enough interested in foreign countries to be able to understand and have empathy [illegible] really would be serving the best interests of other countries in things. I'd far rather see one man get in on something like that than send a whole team in with all sorts of things, and sort of aggravate a situation rather than do something rather simple.

O'BRIEN: Almost sensitivity training . . . .

LANSDALE: ~~LANSDALE:~~ Incidentally, along these lines, I've got a good story for your account.

O'BRIEN: Great.

LANSDALE: About the time of the Cuban Missile Crisis, McNamara came back from a meeting at the White House one day and asked me to provide the means for President Kennedy to talk to the Cuban people on T.V. How the hell did I know how to do that? He told me ~~that~~ he wanted to do it within the next twenty-four hours. Well, it didn't happen. I suspected ~~that~~ it would take longer than that; I don't know how you intrude on a T.V. station's broadcasting and get the people in the country to ~~go~~ immediately go to their T.V. sets and watch a program. I called scientists in from all over the U.S., who were electronic whizzes on this type of a subject, and our intelligence people and everybody else I could think of to get some information together on ~~in~~ a real crash basis. CIA couldn't give me details, ~~on~~ technical details, ~~--~~on any of the T.V. stations in Havan~~n~~a~~h~~ and elsewhere.

One of the Defense civilian scientists--and I can't think of his name offhand; it was an East European name--left the room and came back ten minutes later and provided all the technical information, to the great amazement of everybody there. And I said, "Where the hell did you get that?" and he said, "Well, I went out to the corridor in the Pentagon (where we were having the meeting), went in one of the phone booths there, and I called a friend of mine down in Havana who operates a T~~.~~V~~.~~ station and asked him. He gave me all ~~the~~ this dope, and I just wrote it down." So this is the way we got the information for it.

¶ The intrusion of the T~~.~~V~~.~~ space never took place, but we got the means together and some airborne T~~.~~V~~.~~ transmitters. It was developed finally by the Navy, and the project--I ~~'ve~~ had asked ~~it to~~ that it be put on a sort of sled so that it could be picked up and changed over from one aircraft to another, or used elsewhere. ~~—~~ Later when we started the T~~.~~V~~.~~ broadcasts in Vietnam, this Navy equipment that was initially intended to let President Kennedy talk to the Cubans, in '62, I guess that was, was the broadcast equipment that was used from the air--flying in ~~the~~ aircraft--in Saigon, ~~down~~ done to initiate T~~.~~V~~.~~ broadcast~~s~~ing in Saigon in 1965. ?

O'BRIEN: Why didn't it come off?

LANSDALE: It took us too long to figure out ways of getting in on the theme and finding a channel and finding a way of getting people ~~that~~ to do that.

It took us ten, twelve days to do it, and the time for them to do it had passed over, and the Russians stood down in the interim, so the need had passed.

O'BRIEN: Well how do you come back into. . . . well, ~~maybe,~~ perhaps we ought to pursue this whole business of counterinsurgency first. It sort of becomes the thing with the Kennedy administration, doesn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: How do you see that? I was in the Marine Corps in the late ~~50's~~ fifties, and there was a good deal of guerrilla and counterguerrilla training that was going on, and it becomes a part of the new administration. Who are the principal proponents of this, outside of yourself? Do you have any conversations, say, with Bobby--well, you don't really see Bobby until after April. But do you have any conversations with the president, let's say, meeting with him . . . .

LANSDALE: No, no, I didn't. I don't know who talked to him about this. When he came in office, this was already one of his themes. Where he picked that up originally, I don't know. I was rather surprised--he seemed to have seen copies of lectures and other things that I had ~~ve~~ given on the subject, ~~But,~~ who had passed those to him and who had talked to him about it, I just don't know.

O BRIEN: Let's say, let's take a person like Max Taylor. Do you have anything in the way of conversations with Max Taylor in the late fifties?

LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: How about the rest of the Joint Chiefs?

LANSDALE: No. Taylor was opposed to this type of thing. He did quite a considerable switch, see? He was about the last person I would have ever picked to have headed up something the way Kennedy asked him to do it.

O BRIEN: That's what I was wondering about, Taylor's role in this whole thing. He is opposed.

LANSDALE: Well, he was the one that, ~~-~~ in the very early formation of the Special Forces in the Army--he was Chief of Staff of the Army at the time--~~and~~ took one look at these American troops in green berets and said, "Take that God damn silly headgear off," or "Take that--that's it." No green berets, and he really got tough on ~~ruled the _______ out of~~ the thing. He wasn't too happy with a special unit of that nature. But at the time, it was . . . . He went along with the concept that it was only a wartime outfit, that somebody would have to go and jump in and work with guerrillas.

Again, this is a rivalry type of a thing, so there wouldn't be another OSS [Office of Strategic Services] or ~~--there'd~~ be a CIA or something doing it, but this, after all, is part of the modern military function, so let's make it military. So he went that far on the thing. But that was a concept--~~t~~you would ~~'d~~ have a regular force fighting battle, and someplace back of the enemy lines, you'd want to blow up bridges and gather information and so on to support your tactical force so ~~well~~ why not have somebody in working and fomenting trouble back there for the enemy, but connected with the forces? Now the concept of people's warfare --Mao [Tse-Tung] ~~now~~ is pushed; We've seen it ~~them~~ in Vietnam and elsewhere-- Really wasn't something that he or others understood at all, that almost

?

all of us would be ~~speak see guerrilla or~~ counter-guerrilla, and that people like special forces might well, having learned guerrilla operations, ~~would then~~ be qualified to start coping with them and would understand the importance of political basis for operations and political goals and behavior and the psychological part of the operations.

This really wasn't in any of their thinking because, as witnessed in Korea, we went and sort of had a small World War II in Korea. And in Vietnam later, we went in, ~~-~~again with Taylor as the ambassador, but having quite a bit of an advisory role with the ~~our~~ military commanders out there, and influence with them, and were ~~was~~ fighting another Korea in Vietnam more or less. There were ~~was~~ some changes in tactics, but it was more use of helicopters just for vertical envelopment ~~rather than just~~ instead of moving guys along the ground to start with the thing.

O'BRIEN: Why don't they come to an understanding? ~~[barking]~~

~~LANSDALE: I'm sure that's going to make a good broadcast for you, a good tape. . .~~

~~O'BRIEN: A diversion at least.~~

LANSDALE: I'm completely baffled by that. I just don't know.

O'BRIEN: Don't they read?

LANSDALE: They speak the words, and particularly when they were talking with President Kennedy, they picked up the words and enthusiasm and responded, but would show by what they did that they didn't understand what they were saying. It's something that, of course, I have been trying to do something about all along. I've never understood what it was?. . . I've always felt that I was too inarticulate or hadn't found a way of doing things for myself, but there have been so many other exponents of this thing--not just Americans, but of many countries, who have written rather good books on the subject and on parts of it--that you'd surely think by now that we Americans would produce top leaders with some understanding of something that Mao ~~[Tse-tung]~~ and [Vo Nguyen] Giap and others have got~~ten~~ in every page down to ~~through~~ the rank and file to understand.

?

O BRIEN: Well, in the formation of the CI [counterinsurgency] group--it was designed, as I understand it, primarily as a kind of educational group for top-level administration people--when do you first come into that group?

LANSDALE: I was never really part of that group. I was working with a smaller group of executives, of which Taylor was a part.

O'BRIEN: This is Mongoose, isn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes. This was a national security group of top executives close to the president, with the undersecretary of State, and the deputy secretary of Defense, and so on, and the national security advisor. ~~and~~ Taylor sat in on those meetings after he got his CI group going. But in forming the CI group iniatially, Taylor was starting to do some studies for Kennedy, and Kennedy had asked me to help him. So I put my staff in the Pentagon at Taylor's disposal.

¶ Initially, in Kennedy's presence, I offered to put together a study for Taylor on resources in the United States and among our allies for such things--not allies as much as friends of the United States in many countries--and this was done with ~~some~~ CIA and some of the military services and the intelligence part of State. They had a little working group, and we had several sessions in my office and put together some rough first papers for Taylor to start his thinking for the president. Then when Taylor ~~started~~ formed his group, I wasn't invited in on it, and I didn't attend.

O'BRIEN: Sure. Well, I wonder if you got any insight. . . . As I understand it, right after the formation of that group, and early--it was in May or June--they dispatched some teams to go around Latin America to survey the ability of various nations to respond to Castro-type guerrilla activity.

LANSDALE: Yes, yes.

O'BRIEN: Did you get involved in the planning of that at all or any of the fallout of that?

LANSDALE: Just peripherally on both. I forget the details on that. I had been worrying about places like Col~~u~~ombia and several other Latin American countries close to the Panama Canal and had urged that this be looked into, on some of the specific things that were being done there. I~~'ve~~ had encouraged ~~that~~ the Col~~u~~ombians to start civic action in dealing with some of the dissident areas and so on. All I had done was, not planning as much as coming in with sort of a shopping list of what people might look for, and individuals in these countries they might talk to to get information on what was happening.

O'BRIEN: Well, are you in Colombia in the Kennedy administration at all as . . . .

LANSDALE: No. No, the most I did was--I went to Venezuela ~~and~~ during the Kennedy administration, and Bolivia. No, by that time folks were highly sensitive about my showing up in foreign countries--that is, Americans, not foreigners--and I really wasn't permitted, or I was stopped really at policy levels from going back into Vietnam or the Phil~~l~~ippines~~,~~ or anyplace in Asia. I begged to be permitted to go down and take a look in Latin America, and Gilpatric was the one that told me the decision had been made....

BEGIN SIDE II TAPE I

O BRIEN: Outside of Venezuela, ~~D~~did you get to any other countries?

LANSDALE: Well, Bolivia. In Bolivia, I was interested in particularly the Bolivian Air Force's work of setting up a public school system over in the eastern slopes of the Andes--down in the jungles and in the very sparse settlements. They were really the one governmental group that could get around places. They were very enthusiastically setting up one-room school houses down there, and flying in teachers and bringing some education in there, which I thought was a great project, and was encouraging them. ¶ Then, While I was in Bolivia, I got involved with the resettlement of indians from the Altiplano over onto the eastern slopes into some new communities, in which the whole Bolivian government was involved. ~~and~~ the U.S. Economic Mission was working with them, and the Bolivian military was supporting it with trucks and with some people going in. But, this was a very exciting, agricultural-community-type of a project of moving people out where they'd have an economic chance at life, and also a chance to own land. It was changing the social structure considerably for the very lowest class in Bolivia, and with the armed forces doing it. This, again, was the very first visit.

In Venezu~~a~~ela, I had come up with some ways of safeguarding our own interests in Venezu~~a~~ela ~~—~~(which are not only oil production, but we have steel mills down there and a number of things~~—~~) but I did this as much for the Venezu~~a~~elan Defense Ministry as I did for the United States at the time. They were concerned.

O'BRIEN: What are your relations with the people involved in the school in Panama which spreads a lot of this ~~civic~~ gospel of civic action among the military? Are your relations with those people pretty good?

LANSDALE: It was. They had picked up a lot of my material from earlier times, in the form of ~~memorand~~ lectures and memos that I had written on these subjects. Wh~~i~~en they set up the school, I talked with them on the program of instruction that they were going to ~~give~~ give. The first adoption of any of these principles was in

Guatemala, and it worked very well there for a time. The Latin Americans became quite enthusiastic, though again jealousies come in. They thought the Guatemalans were boasting too much about it. So~~,~~ when I was told that problem, I said, "Well, get them to emulate and try and beat them and get a healthy rivalry going," which is what happened actually.

O'BRIEN: I suspect [Fulton] Freeman is there as ambassador in Col~~u~~ombia when you're there--no, Freeman was in Col~~u~~ombia.

LANSDALE: Yes, he was in Col~~u~~ombia.

O'BRIEN: I can't think of the guy who was in Venezu~~a~~ela that was ambassador.

LANSDALE: ~~Uh,~~ he was from Arizona and was a journalist.

O'BRIEN: Not [Maurice M.] Bernbaum. LANSDALE: No.

O'BRIEN: Well, how is he to deal with, and do you get a chance to see [Romulo] Betancourt or any of the political leaders?

LANSDALE: Yes, I saw political leaders there. I had five days in Venezu~~a~~ela, and I think I got two hours' sleep all the time I was there. I found our ambassador there [C. Allan Stewart] at the time very open-minded and very good to work with. I wrote a report, coming back from Venezuela afterward, and submitted it by the time I got to Washington. It went up to President Kennedy as well as Dean Rusk, and some of Rusk's staff immediately wired the ambassador. ~~and~~ It was one of these: "You don't want to buy this, do you," and they said I'd come out with a report on Venezuela, and here were the main points of my recommendations and ~~some~~ findings. "He was just there five days. He couldn't possible have found out enough to come to these conclusions, isn't that right?" Bless his heart, the ambassador came back and said, in effect, "I'm amazed that he found out that much, and the recommendations are sound, and we'd discussed this before he left, and we're working with them already."

You don't have to be in a place long. For example, we had a ~~pretty~~ very large American community down there who themselves were practically government: U.S. Steel and all our big oil companies and so on. There was very little relationship between the American business community and the U.S. Embassy, ~~and~~ I had urged that they meet maybe once a week or once a month--the key American executives and the Ambassador and several members of his staff and have lunch together rather frequently and discuss mutual problems because the U.S. firms down there had very large security staffs. They were very close to the police type of forces, the constabulary down there, and ~~that~~ the embassy would be very well informed from this, as well as passing some ~~of this~~ information back to these people, and everybody would gain by it. Well, this doesn't take very long to. . . . In talking to the vice president in charge of U.S. Steel operations down there, you'd ~~and~~ say, "One thing you would change if you had the power--what would it be?" and he'd tell you something like this, ~~you know,~~ so, ~~uh,~~ it was rather easy to come up with ~~this~~ that thing.

O'BRIEN: Did you find them fairly knowledgeable and enlightened about some of the things that you were very . . .

LANSDALE: Very much so, very much so.~~--~~

O'BRIEN: Like rural economic development~~,~~ and agricultural development.~~--~~

LANSDALE: Particularly the oil companies, and I was surprised. Standard [Oil Company] ~~of New Jersey~~ showed me what it was doing because the rigs out in Lake Maracaibo were getting blown up,~~--~~ and their pipelines were getting blown up,~~--~~ by saboteurs coming in who were really expert. I found out later that they were affiliated with communists in Col~~u~~ombia and had come on over.~~--~~ they were really experts at explosives, and they weren't the student type of revolutionaries and so on, who also were present in Venezuela.

But~~,~~ in seeing what they were doing, it went far beyond a company paternalism type of a thing for employees. ~~that~~ They started credit systems with farm groups and housing projects for people living in the vicinity of their ~~employees--~~ plants--not the~~ir~~ employees so much, who also gained a great deal out of this. And then U.S. Steel, in pushing its developments way down to the south. . . . [Interruption] He probably wouldn't do it; he'd chew the wire in two here.

O'BRIEN: Oh my God. It's a wonder he hasn't electricuted himself. [Laughter]

LANSDALE: Yeah. It's not yours, it's some of mine.

O'BRIEN: Well, I'm not worried about that. Wires, these sort of wires can be replaced. I'm not sure about yours.

LANSDALE: Worse than rats.

O'BRIEN: Well, he's a spirited animal and ~~he~~ you can't help admiring that.

LANSDALE: Yeah. ¶ Well, one of the stories on Kennedy I'd like to put in was: On my reports from Vietnam in the very early days of--just before he was inaugurated, and he read it apparently right after the inaugural--one of the reports was a little side piece that I did on a village in South Vietnam inhabited by some Chinese refugees that President [~~Ngu Dunh~~ Ngo Dinh] Diem had located down in the midst of a communist-held territory, and I was very impressed by them, ~~and~~ just as an example of what humans will do in such a situation, I'd written it up and turned in a separate report on it.

¶ And about the ~~a~~. . . . It was still January, '61, about ten days after the inaugural, my telephone in the Pentagon rang, and this voice that sounded like ~~Presidents~~ Kennedy's told me it was President Kennedy talking, and he had read this report of mine and wanted me to have it published in the Saturday Evening Post. I was at the time wondering which joker in the Pentagon ~~, you know,~~ was imitating this Harvard, Massachusetts accent and was putting me on, ~~and~~ so I said, "Yes, yes, yes." I then had my secretary check over at the White House, and sure enough, it had been President Kennedy, so I had to then go ahead ~~—~~ I'd promised to do it, ~~and~~ figuring out I didn't know how to get something in the Saturday Evening Post, but quickly found out how, and they published this thing afterwards as a report that the President wanted published in their magazine.

O'BRIEN: ~~Well that. . . .~~ You had taken, ~~--~~of course, you'd had that interest in Vietnam and Laos. . . . You talked to a lot of people, as I understand, about Laos and Vietnam ~~and~~ in the incoming administration. Did you have any intent or purpose in mind outside of just explaining the way that it was?

LANSDALE: That was principally my intent. The first meeting I had with McNamara, all he wanted to do was to have me tell him about Vietnam, and this was essentially what most of the incoming administrative officials, ~~--~~when they'd talk to me, ~~--~~would want me to do-- explain what was happening and what the situation was. This essentially was how and why I felt on these subjects, but my thesis right along on this was to help the people in the countries to help themselves rather than to go in and do things for them. It was mostly on the nuts and bolts ~~on~~ of how you go about doing this, and the individuals you'd pick to do it, and how you'd select them, and please let's have highest quality and fewer people doing these things.

O'BRIEN: Well, you have some successes and failures in--I guess mostly failures in the last of the Eisenhower administration--I'm thinking in terms of Laos. Laos is the immediate problem in 1961. How do you respond to some of these people who are in policy-making positions at that time? I'd like to get your feeling for them--people like [Walthers] Robertson--in the State department ~~--people Robertson~~ and [J. Graham] Parsons; John Irwin in ~~the~~ Defense; and on the Agency side, people like [Desmond] Fitzgerald. How do they see . . .

LANSDALE: You have named a group of people, all of whom are friends of mine, and we were very friendly, and I had worked with a number of them for enough years so that we more or less understood each other and could take shortcuts in conversations and so on. All of those you named always in talks ~~and talked~~ with me expressed similar beliefs to mine, so it was very easy in talking to them, and there were others in the

Eisenhower administration. Now this wasn't true throughout the administration at all, but there was a considerable group of people who were in various executive slots just down the second and third level who had been through the . . . [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: Well, Laos, as I understand it, is, with the impact of the aid that's gone ~~going~~ in there, ~~that~~ it really does in some ways tear up the economy of the country. Now, how do you look on the training of the Laotian army in late 1960--~~er~~ or '59, '60--some of the activities of the Agency in Laos, as well as the army and through the PEO [Programs Evaluation Office] office and things like this? Is this the kind of thing that you envision in terms of--I hate to use the term "nation building"--helping a country to help itself, in helping people to help themselves?

LANSDALE: Yes, as long as in the modern world the leaders of the country will think in terms of as large a military establishment as they can afford in a country. And they do this without any advice from anybody. This is just a natural, self-preservation type of an impulse on their part. Then my thought is: They will be doing this. Then let's make the military establishment serve the country in a much bigger way than merely toting guns around and guarding borders. It's usually the organization that is nationwide, and there might not be any other organization that's nationwide in the country, such as agriculture, even the administrative structure that usually comes under the department or ministry of the Interior won't really have the manpower, the communications, and so forth, that the military forces do.

So, given that, why not then get the military to start doing constructive things around and making full use of the manpower that you have anyhow. Have them be good military men as the very first requisite of this, but, given that, then there's still energy and personnel and so forth involved in that who have a lot of man-hours left over that could do other things. ~~and~~ essentially, this is what I was trying to get the American advisory missions to do--not only the military advisory missions, but when other agencies would get in and be working on these things, to themselves become interested in the military doing such things, and aiding and abetting, including economic~~s~~ projects and educational work and so on.

O'BRIEN: Well, in this Laotian deterioration that takes place, ~~you know~~ the competing people there--Phoumi ~~[Vongbichit]~~ [Nosavan] and Souvanna~~h~~ Phouma and all--how do you read that in 1960 just prior to the administration coming in? ~~Do you~~ How do you see Phoumi; how do you see Souvanna~~h~~ Phouma, as people? First of all, have you met them at any time?

LANSDALE: Yes, yes, yes, I didn't know them well at all. I'd met them ~~at~~, usually at formal gatherings of one kind or another. The main thing that I saw in Laos in the way of political stability actually stemmed out of the king of Laos~~;~~ this was the only unifying political force that existed there in the minds of all of the various Lao leaders whom I'd met. So when the others started splitting and opposing one another, I had always ~~already~~ felt that our best bet was to turn to the king and force him ~~to~~--or, not force, but to encourage him to taking the leadership role that would be the one thing acceptable to all these leaders. Instead of that, we were starting to become ~~parts in~~ partisan ourselves there and playing off one guy against another, and Americans aren't good at that game. We have many Americans who think they are, but this, I think, is a little too foreign to our nature. ~~and~~ we fell in love with the factions and people and so forth, almost unconscious of the fact that we were doing that. The paratroop leader there . . .

O'BRIEN: Kong Le?

LANSDALE: ...Yes, ~~Yeah,~~ who kicked over a revolt, had spent the night before his coup with a group of American friends, and there wasn't a damn one of them that knew that he was going to have a coup in the morning. This type of a thing, I just found inconceivable. People get nervous and sort of absent-minded about what's happening at the time when they're planning an action like that the next morning, and somebody there among the Americans should have been sensitive enough to have said, "Well, aren't you feeling well?" or something, ~~you know,~~ and had gotten some feeling on it. But this sort of getting in bed with people socially and saying, "He's a good fellow," and "he's all right," and "he's my friend," and excusing everything is a common blindness, and this had worried me in Laos quite a bit.

O'BRIEN: Well, I get the impression from a reading of this period that there really is some lack of coordination in the various efforts that are there; ~~--~~in other words, the ambassador is not completely privy to what the Agency is doing, and the Agency is not completely privy to what DOD is doing through the PEO office. Do you get that feeling? Maybe in regard to the Parsons-Irwin-[John F.] Reilly mission that goes out there, do you get any feeling over that at all?

LANDSALE: Yes, I'm trying to recall. . . . We hit a crisis at that point, and the group that went out--Parsons was on home leave, and we had a meeting in the Pentagon in the secretary of Defense's office, and there were a mob of people there. ~~--~~ There were,--I can't quite recall now what prompted the meeting, but it ~~there~~ was a crisis of some sort in Laos. And the JCS gave a briefing, that's right, as part of the thing, and it was on the Pathet Lao positioning, and they suddenly discovered ~~that~~ there were passes over the mountains that had some importance to the Ho Chi Minh trail, and this great discovery was being lectured on at this meeting.

~~And~~ at the time, the Secretary of Defense--I ~~[illegible]~~ think, I wonder, that might have been [Thomas, Jr.] Gates ~~[Jr.]~~ at the time, ~~--~~might have been, but whoever it was--asked if I had a comment to make, and I said, "Take a look at that map that the JCS was showing us of Pathet Lao and the other situations on the thing," and I said, "it should tell everybody here just one thing. You've got an ambassador who~~'s~~ is on home leave here. he doesn't belong here, ~~--~~he belongs out in Vientiane right this moment. ~~and~~ the rest of you who are asking questions ought to have people out there with him who would tell you immediately and take a first-hand look." ~~And the a. . . . .~~ I remember Irwin was picked right on the spot to go immediately, and he said to me on the side, "You and your big mouth." ~~you know."~~ [Laughter]

O'BRIEN: Well, did you get involved in any of the meetings on Laos after the Kennedy administration comes in, and some of the jockeying that goes around?

LANSDALE: Some of them, yes. I can't quite recall which meetings they were at the time. I was in on some of the questions of the support of the Meos, ~~Maos,~~ the guerrilla forces.

O'BRIEN: Well, what ~~how~~ did you see in terms of a strategy for the area? ~~There is a,~~ as I read it, there seems to be some various strategies that are proposed; one is ~~a, you know,~~ going down the full road behind Phoumi and supporting Phoumi, and another is the panhandle strategy--I've never been able to quite understand what the panhandle strategy was--if that ~~you know,~~ rings a bell.

LANSDALE: ~~Hmm, yeah well, hmm,~~ my memory isn't too good on this thing. There was some talk at the time--there's high country across the Bolovens Plateau and so forth down in the south, and there was talk at the time--of that being the dominant area, and what we should do was to make use of that and the high ground in Vietnam and so on, across into Thailand, and ensure that that ~~state~~ stayed in noncommunist hands.

O'BRIEN: Well, there's also suggested in the Laotian crisis as early as 1961, the use of strategic bombing on supply routes, and even, as I understand it, to Hanoi, as early as that, and interdicting ~~in addicting~~ some of the supply lines, as well as the suggestion--that subsequently in 1962 does become a reality--the dropping of the SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Organization] plan five, as I understand it was called. How did you feel about the Laotian crisis at that point, in terms of a strategy or a direction ~~at~~ which should work?

LANSDALE: Well, I had wanted the Laotians to defend their own country, and I was all for the work with the Meos ~~Maoists~~ and so on of doing it. Once it left that and started involving ~~us~~ Vietnamese or us, on bombing or anything else, I felt that the cost of saving some real estate would be too high to ever engage in, and other works. And on the bombing, I felt that as long as you had all of the means of communication with the people ~~means~~ in the hands of communist leaders such as in North Vietnam and then Hanoi where this was pushing, that anything overt such as aerial bombing that would then permit them to use that as a unifying force psychologically with the people would be dead wrong.

?

I used to remind them of what [Winston] Churchill had done with the German bombing of Britain, ~~and~~ just on radio with the people. And here were leaders with complete access to radio and working with the people, and it would have a reverse effect as far as trying to stop the ambitions and aims and so forth of the North Vietnamese, who were, after all, the guys organizing the Pathet Lao and pushing on into the area.

¶ I felt that more could be done with the armed forces of Laos themselves in making them more able to stand up for themselves and defend their country. But if it couldn't, I couldn't see an intervention of any sort in there. Morally, we'd have been on a moral ground then to turn around and start using some international moral pressure, through the press and so forth, to sort of shame the North Vietnamese out of their attempts. I'm a great believer in exposing things to bring such pressure.

O'BRIEN: Well, how do you see the relationship of Vietnam and Laos at that point, or do you?

LANSDALE: Oh, yes. The passes and the Ho Chi Minh trail in bringing things down was one of the key things on this. But again, there was even talk at the time of taking Vietnamese troops in there, ~~and~~ secretly, ~~—~~and using them up to try and stop that, and I was opposed to that. I didn't want to see intervention like that from the outside.

O'BRIEN: Well, when does some of the covert activity, in terms of the use of some of the Montagnards ~~yards-~~ in interdicting those supply lines in Laos ~~you know~~ from Vietnam, start? Is that going on in the late Eisenhower administration, or does it begin in the Kennedy administration?

LANSDALE: I think it was the Kennedy administration. There had been a little of it, or there had been talk of it, in the Eisenhower administration. There had been thoughts along that line by the top Vietnamese leaders in 1955, '56. ~~and~~ I remember President Diem's brother, ~~went to~~ his older brother, went into Laos in ~~and~~ about '55 or maybe '56, and had come up with a scheme very similar to that at the time. He had talked about the mountain people of Laos being akin to the mountain people of Vietnam, and wouldn't it be good to get some of our mountain people in with them, and together they could be trained.

O'BRIEN: Yes, well, you're in Vietnam in the middle of the fifties, and then you go back in 1960 in the late Eisenhower administration. What's changed, or has anything?

LANSDALE: Oh, a great deal. Excuse me. [Interruption]

O'BRIEN: What changes do you find?

LANSDALE: Well, the main change was in a growing isolation from reality of the constituency of the President of Vietnam, a repression of, you might say, a loyal opposition or a noncommunist opposition to him ~~them~~ in political terms. ~~a~~ There were professionally some among the military that were ~~was~~ taking the Vietnamese military apart from their people more than it had been when I had left, because I had gotten them working very closely with the people on a number of ~~people on~~ projects. ?

¶ and a growing isolation of the American embassy in particular, but including some of the American agencies, from the Vietnamese officialdom, and taking a very strange form of concentrating on gossip essentially--gossip as much as fact--about ~~oh, what the hell's the word I'm trying to think of, of~~ misdeeds and so forth by Vietnamese public officials or people connected with the regime in Vietnam. So that the information-gathering process of the United States there was devoting an exorbitant amount of time on sort of nit-picking on the people that were in power. In The relationships, such as the ambassador with the president of the country, the ambassador would go into details of malfeasance in office and so forth, or mishandling of funds by the Vietnamese on an internal matter, and the president would have to correct him and say, "You don't have all the facts," and the ambassador would say, "Yes, I do, too." This to me was very poor. I felt that we had some Americans ~~that~~ who were close enough to the top officials of the Vietnamese (who weren't present in the country always), who should be brought there and told, "Look, we understand these guys are doing something wrong.

Can you go in and get them to start doing things right, as a friend of theirs?" Rather than going in ~~and~~ trying to scold them and something and getting the backs up of people, and they'd figure, "Well, these damn nosey Americans only got half the facts, and since they don't understand us that well, the hell with them. We aren't going to do what they want." I just felt that we weren't playing a very wise ballgame there at the time, on the American side.

I also felt that Diem was paying too much attention to similar types of his own people, his intelligence people, who, in turn, were ~~in turn~~ telling him what the Americans were doing too damn much, or were bringing in alarming news about his own subjects--and particularly political oppositionists--and, I suspect, manufacturing cases against them so that they could take actions. ~~and~~ He, in turn, was getting too much secondhand from people, and this tended to isolate him more. Since his main intelligence officer was his brother, [Ngo Dinh] Nhu, who was an ambitious person, too. I felt that it was a poor arrangement on the Vietnamese side.

I personally urged Diem at the time to get in touch with some of his opposition, ~~and.~~ at which point he asked me where I had been at certain times of the day during my visit there. And I said, "I was talking to your opposition, and I'm not going to tell you who it was or where I was, but just the mere fact that you know that shows that you were having me trailed around. ~~and~~ You know I'm a friend of your country's, and I'm trying to help all of you succeed here, and you happen to be the elected leader, and you jolly well better start reflecting what your people desire. ~~and~~ If you ~~a~~ spend your time and money and efforts and so forth watching

a guy like me, I'm sure you're doing a lot more for someone else you really suspect." ~~and--~~

O BRIEN: How would he react to something like this?

LANSDALE: Listen, I was told by a number of people that I was about the only one that really ever talked to him in this manner, and he would listen. ~~and~~ at the time, one of the people most critical of him was his vice-president, and I went over and saw the vice-president, whose name was [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho, and Tho immediately started telling me that the president had spies all over his office and in his staff. ~~and~~ as he was telling me this, one of the clerks was serving us tea, and I said, "Is this guy one of the president's spies?" and he said, "Probably, I think so." [Laughter] Maybe he'll go back and report this one. I said to him, "When was the last time you two talked to each other?" Well, it had

secondhand from people, and this tended to isolate him more. Since his main intelligence officer was his brother, [Ngo Dinh] Nhu, who was an ambitious person, too. I felt that it was a poor arrangement on the Vietnamese side.

I personally urged Diem at the time to get in touch with some of his opposition, ~~and--~~at which point he asked me where I had been at certain times of the day during my visit there. And I said, "I was talking to your opposition, and I'm not going to tell you who it was or where I was, but just the mere fact that you know that shows that you were having me trailed around. ~~and~~ You know I'm a friend of your country's, and I'm trying to help all of you succeed here, and you happen to be the elected leader, and you jolly well better start reflecting what your people desire. ~~and~~ If you~~d~~ spend your time and money and efforts and so forth watching

a guy like me, I'm sure you're doing a lot more for someone else you really suspect." ~~and--~~

O BRIEN: How would he react to something like this?

LANSDALE: Listen, I was told by a number of people that I was about the only one that really ever talked to him in this manner, and he would listen. ~~and~~ at the time, one of the people most critical of him was his vice-president, and I went over and saw the vice-president, whose name was [Nguyen Ngoc] Tho, and Tho immediately started telling me that the president had spies all over his office and in his staff. ~~and~~ as he was telling me this, one of the clerks was serving us tea, and I said, "Is this guy one of the president's spies?" and he said, "Probably, I think so." [Laughter] Maybe he'll go back and report this one. I said to him, "When was the last time you two talked to each other?" Well, it had

been months. so I went back to Diem, and I jumped him. I said, "You've got a vice-president who you've made responsible for all the economic development of the country, and I know that you consider that very important. You haven't talked to him for a long time," and I forced him to tell me when he'd ~~you'd~~ done it last. so I said, "Well, pick up the telephone and call him over here your first free time, and you sit down and have a long talk with him." So he did it. He picked up the phone, and I got the two of them together again. He was really out of touch.

He promised me at the time to get in touch with some of ~~the~~ his political opposition. he swore up and down he wasn't oppressing anyone. and I said, "Well, you don't know what your own police are doing, then," and I gave him the list of names of people who were in prison, who had been arrested at midnight and pulled out of their homes and so on. and he promised to look into their cases immediately and do something about it. And I said, "I've gotten this from people who are in the opposition to you, but I don't know ~~is~~ whether you've ever gotten any reports." He said he'd never heard of these cases, and I think he was telling the truth. He had no reason to dissemble with me at all on these things.

O'BRIEN: Well, why is this? Is it the development of an independent bureaucracy, or is it the ~~there a~~ degree of U.S. influence on, let's say, the intelligence, Nhu ~~knew~~ . . . .

LANSDALE: There was probably some. . . . I think by that time the Vietnamese intelligence was way beyond any control by U.S. intelligence, who initially had been helping it, and Diem's brother Nhu was really--really had the bit in his teeth and was his own man. And I suspect, initially, he was really trying to serve his brother, and he was doing it by trying to get the goods on everybody working for his brother throughout, the government and anybody opposed to his brother. ~~and~~ the intelligence people, picking it up, discovered that if they brought in bad news about some guy that the brother didn't like, he'd pay them and believe it. So I'm sure that there was a lot of manufactured evidence in the intelligence take that was coming in. ~~and~~ I don't think the Americans were screening any of that type of information because it went right into the palace, and there was a big room behind the president's office that had many files and was the main personnel dossier type of file place.

O'BRIEN: Well, you're critical of the MAAG [Military Assistance Advisory Group] operation there. What's wrong with it, in the late fifties? ~~'50's?~~

LANSDALE: Well, I felt that MAAG under "hanging" Sam [Samuel T.] Williams in the late fifties ~~'50's~~ was an unusually well-run American military operation. There were some unusual things being done that made it so. One of them was one of the best ideas I've ever bumped into.

General Williams brought over the chief of staff of the Vietnamese army whenever the American advisors--who at that time were out in the countryside, but ~~were~~ ~~ta~~ at fairly high levels, and were running training camps more than advising on operations or anything--but when they would come in once a month for a weekend in Saigon, Williams would get the Vietnamese chief of staff to come in and talk to them. The Vietnamese chief of staff at that time was General [Tran Van] Don. Don was quite diplomatic, but had a way of being candid in his remarks and not having them hurt too much when they were told. He would leave out names and so on, but he would tell these Americans what their Vietnamese counterparts in the Vietnamese army and so forth thought of them, and their work, and their advice, and the reactions throughout the armed forces to them. This was the one part of the monthly gatherings with Americans around that everybody would stop dozing off or thinking of something else and would sit up and pay attention because they were the subject of the talk, of course. This was a very healthy thing. . .

O'BRIEN: Yes, I can ~~feel~~ see where it would be.

LANSDALE: . . . ~~be~~cause even though it was tough diplomatically, the most sordid truth, ~~would~~ the hardest fact~~s,~~ would come out in first. ~~the.~~ And then Williams himself had been in Vietnam a long enough time by then--I forget how long; it may be three years at the time, four years--so that when he moved around the Vietnamese army, it wasn't only just the top staff officers and commanders who would be with him, but I noticed in a visit I made there--I think it was '59--that sergeants and junior lieutenants and so on would come up and talk to him. And I'd moved in close enough to eavesdrop on some of the conversations, and these were personal problems, family problems, and financial problems and so forth that individuals had. ~~and~~ This was a very unusual relationship for an American to have.

And since the American was also running our advisory effort throughout, ~~too,~~ I just figured that this constant feeding and contact with the echelons of Vietnamese military that were down below the big wheels was again a very healthy influence that was constantly at work with him. So that he would know very well what was going on in places.

Some of these problems--personal problems--would actually involve the military work that was going forward, people griping that something was wrong and so on. ~~and~~ They were doing this out of a friendship, and ~~he~~ it was not to tell on their bosses or anything, but usually personal worries and concern that wastage or something going wrong would affect them. Later they moved in an educator--a military educator--[Paul D.] Harkins, and. . . .

O'BRIEN: Well, [Lt. Gen. Lionel C.] McGarr comes in there before that, doesn't he?

LANSDALE: McGarr. It was McGarr, yes, you're right. It was before Harkins. McGarr. And McGarr built up a staff to work on counterinsurgency and probably put together the best staff studies on counterinsurgency ~~than~~ that any American military men have ever done.

O'BRIEN: Is that right?

LANSDALE: He got American military men who had been guerrilla leaders in the Philippines, for example, in World War II, and in Burma and so on, and in Europe, and switched most of his work over into compiling "How to Do it" manuals, but I've never seen the finished products. I saw them working on it at the time, and all I know is they had tremendous stacks of papers with the results of their typed-out work and were putting it together.

¶ And the interpretation of this ~~was~~ apparently was to start increasing staff and American military personnel to handle whatever ~~whatever~~ was coming up out of this whole process. The feeling was ~~was~~ that there should be closer American supervision of what was happening out in units, ~~Eunice,~~ which meant ~~well~~ you'd put down your Americans at lower echelons and then get a separate reporting system on back, feeding in the research process of the Americans initially more than anything else.

¶ It wasn't for control; it was just for information that would go into fields of study. ~~and~~ This ~~lead~~ led to a proliferation of an American military presence that was intended sort of for the education of Americans, I think, more than anything else, but of course didn't work out that way. You put some red-blooded American boys in uniform out someplace, and they're going to start doing other things as well. In collecting information, they couldn't help but tell a guy, "Well, look, if you didn't do it this way and did it the other way, it would work better," and so on. It~~'s~~ was a very human thing that started working. ~~and~~ As this happened, then we started building up our advisory effort more and more.

O'BRIEN: Well, in the meantime, while this is going on, the insurgency's building up, isn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: Just what is the condition of the countryside that's different from when you're there in the middle fifties ~~'50's~~ and when you go back in ~~____~~ 1960?

LANSDALE: Oh, there were guerrilla operations by an enemy, which there hadn't been in the period from Geneva on up to the time I left in the end of '56. You could drive roads at night and so forth and not be worrying about guerrillas. There were isolated incidents of violence, but they were very minor--it would be about what you'd expect in any country with the crime rate going~~--~~. The fact that former Viet~~nam~~minh guerrillas were the guys pulling the trigger didn't matter too much as far as the overall crime rate went. It was in a nature of minor terrorism that was going on.

¶ By my next visits later in the fifties ~~50's~~, there were areas of guerrilla bands at work, with roads that were unsafe and so on, ~~in~~ and areas that were unsafe, with great problems of police posts being attacked and with their families being wiped out in small massacre type of things, though the type and degree of violence had increased a great deal.

¶ By the end of '60--when I got there at ~~in~~ Christmas of '60--there were fair-size enemy, Vietcong units operating and dominating areas~~;~~. It had escalated considerably by then.

O'BRIEN: Is this terrorism campaign on the local officials as serious as some of the people have written? ~~about it?~~

LANSDALE: Oh, yes.

O'BRIEN: Do you ever get any feeling about the number of people? I've heard all kinds of estimates.

LANSDALE: No, I've got [Stephen T.] Hosmer's study there on that, and I haven't read it yet. I just got that from him. I imagine he's got a figure in there. The last figure I remember on it was--in about '66 ~~was about~~ around forty thousand ~~40,000~~ or something . . .,

O'BRIEN: Forty thousand. That many?

LANSDALE: Yes. These were officials, ~~—~~not their families or anything. But these were village officials~~,~~ and district officials~~,~~ and sort of federal government officials.

O BRIEN: Well, what do you see happening as a result of this in terms of the ability of Diem to just simply govern in those years? Is ~~the value~~ his ability to govern deteriorating?

LANSDALE: Yes. In some ways it was. Initially, he was unwilling to delegate any authority at all in the things and ~~he~~ had the tendency to try and do everything himself. If the problem came up in agriculture, he would be the guy to do all the paper work and the deciding rather than his Minister of Agriculture and so on. He had gotten over that to a very large extent later. So he had learned to be more the administrator and executive later on, as far as putting some authority in the hands of others.

But at the same time, he also seemed to have lost some of his critical faculty, ~~of~~ in some of the things that were going wrong, of not being able to see it. He was getting around the country and visiting, but not as much anymore because of the security problems. He had been shot at several times, so that he had a larger and larger security guard around him all the time, which meant that when he went in and talked to people, they were very much aware of plain clothes policemen, secret service types, all around him, and others, that were screening out people. so that the dialogue between the president and the people became thinner and thinner, and less and less meaningful. ¶ So while he was on paper becoming a better executive, he was, in terms of being the national leader, ~~was~~ being less effective all the time because he had no means of measuring what was true and what wasn't~~;~~, what was worth doing and wasn't, and what would ~~was~~ work and what wouldn't. ~~wasn't.~~ It was a considerable impairment of his critical faculty. ¶ This was one of the reasons I was urging him to start dialogues with his political opposition~~—~~, even if it started at opposite poles and just led to tremendous emotional clashes. ~~that~~ there would be some means for dialogue to take place that would have been useful to him, particularly if he had invited them into a meal or something, and had some way of dampening ~~fattening~~ the most emotional irritations that would take place, just out of ~~how the~~ people being ~~seemed~~ polite at the time, so the content of what they would have ~~had~~ to say would be something that he wasn't getting at elsewise.

O'BRIEN: Yes, well, as I understand it, the V.C. [Viet Cong] make a great deal of headway in those years on the basis of the land system.

LANSDALE: That was one of them.

O'BRIEN: Well, what. . . . As I understand it, there's some rub between the U.S. in this regard and Diem about putting through some land reform which would cure some of the rural cultural problems that the French had sort of created, as I understand, from ~~you know~~ the Vietnamese moving into the country. . .

LANSDALE: Yes, yes.

O'BRIEN: Well, how do you see that? Are you pushing him for this sort of thing at that point?

LANSDALE: Yes. Actually, he had ~~we have~~ some very sound land reform measures on the books and had issued decrees on them that were good. As usual, the difficulty ~~is~~, when you get a piece of legislation or something, is then implementing it correctly, and I was pushing him mostly on implementing his measures.

Now the land reform work~~er~~ that Diem approved and used as the basis for his decrees came from Wolf Ladejinsky, and Wolf, ~~was,~~ when he left U.S. employment, was actually employed by Diem as his advisor on ~~the~~ that subject, and Wolf was getting over and having breakfast with Diem quite a bit. Wolf is a very articulate, personable type of a guy, and there was a great deal of affectionate friendship between the two men. So that Wolf, who is a champion of reforms and of helping the man on the land, had full access to this guy and had a way of doing things.

And I felt that the main thing that needed doing was demonstrating to President Diem, who was sympathetic towards this, of where things weren't going right and changing some of the inner workings of ~~the~~ this thing, instead of just faulting him on intent. And his intent was very sound, very good. I think he was ignorant of some of these things going wrong.

¶ I felt that we should have borne down on the matters in which he was ignorant and tried to get some changes there and make these things work, because certainly landlords and others were circumventing the law of the land that Diem thought was operating. Or when he circumvented it, he was doing it for good reasons of his own, which was again open to education by somebody of him.

¶ But he was moving in people whom he could trust--who were refugees--into farm communities and distributing land to them for security reasons and political reasons and so on, and then dictating what they would grow and so on. Because he'd just figure, well, in the national economy, we need this type of fiber grown or this type of crop or something, and the land will produce it up there, and so they should do that. So~~,~~ he was only circumventing the law sort of for the greater good, in his own mind, ~~in~~ his own extent.

O'BRIEN: This centralization brings about a reaction, though, doesn't it?

LANSDALE: Yes.

TAPE II SIDE I

LANSDALE: You asked about the falling out between Ladejinsky and Diem. I know there was something of that nature, but just what it consisted of, or why, I don't know. I remember that the American ambassador . . .

O'BRIEN: ~~It~~ This would have been [Elbridge] Durbrow?

LANSDALE: . . . Durbrow was mindful of the fact that Ladejinsky was having breakfast with Diem and was close to him, and, in a rather general way, had asked Ladejinsky to bring up thoughts of corruption~~;~~ in the government and subjects beyond anything like land reform. And I suspect that Ladejinsky had started getting very political in his talk, as a result of this, with Diem, and that Diem had resented it.

But beyond this, there was a very deep affection between the two. When I was there in '59 or '60, Ladejinsky had wanted to go someplace~~--~~, and I forget where it was. . . . I know one of the places was Indonesia, but there was another country he wanted to go to, and Diem hadn't wanted him to go, and ~~he~~ had suggested that he attend a conference--I think in Latin America~~and~~. Finally, they had agreed between the two of them, and Ladejinsky had gone on to do these other things. ~~that~~ He had taken sort of a sabbatical leave to do that.

But this was a very personal thing between two men, and it was two friends, rather than a president and his consultant working. I know Ladejinsky is very sentimental about

Diem as a man, and I know that Diem reciprocated this very much. There was a point where the rational thought would end, and the feelings of affection and so forth would come over, and say, "Well, even if that is true and everything, I still like the guy, and I want to help him," and so on. and this existed between the two. So they might have differed on some things and perhaps on carrying out land reform exactly the way that Wolf wanted, but the two men kept seeing each other all the time, and he had ample opportunity to work on that.

O'BRIEN: ~~Well, and~~ the suggestion that's ~~sis~~ made sometimes is that the Vietnamese military had not been trained for the kind of war and the kind of insurgency that they did encounter in 1960-61 --they had not been properly trained for that before. Is there any validity in this at all?

LANSDALE: Oh yes, sure. They were being trained actually to meet the challenge that the Vietnamese and American top officials foresaw, and they were thinking ~~that this~~ a--and incidentally, the French General [Paul] Ely before he left was thinking the same way--just in terms of contingency planning. they saw a lot of artillery and armor being given the North Vietnamese army. So, ~~being~~ given that information, they saw any attack or military trouble in Vietnam as consisting of divisions of North Vietnamese with a lot of artillery and armor coming across the border. So they built up an army to meet the foreseeable thing that was happenings, that they thought might happen.

Instead of this, of course, it was more of the same old story again. ~~and~~ there were many of the officers in the Vietnamese armed forces who had formerly been guerrillas themselves, who had formerly had been Viet ~~men~~ Minh in the old days of fighting the French, who had broken with the Communists and wanted no part of the Communists and were very sincere, patriotic Nationalists. But since they had had ~~and~~ this former affiliation and had taken their basic military training with the enemy, so to speak, they never quite had the same stature among their fellow officers in the Vietnamese army, for example, as graduates of the Vietnamese Military Academy and the others coming right out of high school and so on. ¶ So as a result, the officers corps who were knowledgeable ~~about~~ of how to counter what was happening were kept at fairly junior grades, and in the late fifties ~~'50's~~ the highest any of them got that I ever knew about was the rank of Major. ~~and~~ they had to take orders from Colonels and so forth who had served under the French in very much the same type of a conventional military organization as the Americans had put up and were advocating. And these junior types who wanted to do different things were simply too junior to do it and were unable to convince anyone of the need. ¶ The initial meeting of the threat was thought more to be a police problem than an army problem, and there was a lot of work on trying to equip and train the national police to cope with it. ~~and~~ we Americans did that through our economic mission and through Michigan State University had a group helping on administration there. They recruited some very good police officials from the U.S. who were quite used to dealing with urban crime problems in the U.S.

Well, you can't take a man who is very good at precinct work in Detroit, Michigan, or B~~u~~irmingham, Alabama, or something, and move him out to an Asian country where his problem is: What do you do when a company of guerrillas comes in and ambushes your police station? A completely foreign type of a thing. so that we had police advisors ~~that~~ who were insisting on all policemen being arm~~or~~ed with nothing more than, say, a 38-caliber revolver, with the policemen saying, "~~Yeah,~~ Yes, but people are shooting at us with rifles, and we need rifles or something like that to shoot back at them, or how about sub-machine guns or some--we need more fire power." Well, it was foreign to them. ¶ So there was a mixup on a number of things on this coping with the insurgency that was growing, not only the conventional formation of the Vietnamese army but of a conventional urban police formation of the police. And yet, throughout the systems there, there were many individuals who knew better, and who knew how to cope with it, and who were continually begging, "Give us a chance to do it some other way."

O'BRIEN: Well, in terms of these people we were talking about a little earlier--the late Eisenhower people, like Fitzgerald and Irwin and Parsons--Do they conceive of the kind of insurgency that's developing in South Vietnam at that point, or are they . . .

LANSDALE: Fairly well. Fairly well. They were more aware of, or had more understanding of, the needs than did some of the folks that were coming in sort of brand new to the problem or who had been steeped in a far more conventional approach to the problem, as were some of our military leaders at the time. But, as I remarked earlier, these were personal friends of mine, and when I'd talk to them and tell them my views, there was always sympathy for them, so I might have mistaken that for understanding and so on, ~~and~~ even that was rare enough so that I felt that. . . . [Interruption]

~~LANS~~
O'BRIEN: How long is the manuscript?

LANSDALE: Ho ho. I went through first,--the publishers wanted me to tell all; in other words, just write as much as I could for later editing, and they said this is the way people do it. So I wound up with really three ~~of really~~ very long books, and since I was writing one not too long book, why I wound up with a tremendously long manuscript. ~~And~~ I urged ~~then~~ them that I could cut it down to two books, and we could publish it as two different things, and the subject matter would have permitted me. They still want just one book, so I am now going back with editor's notes and with my own notes and trying to. . . . I~~'d~~ had started off initially with a cut-and-paste job, but I discovered I couldn't do that and retain the proper narrative and ~~entries~~ interest on the thing, ~~but~~ I wound up having to rewrite almost of all of it, and recast it, and retell it in a somewhat different form. I'm about half-way through with that, but it'll be a fair-size book even so.

O'BRIEN: ~~Well~~ that's good—mainly on the Philippines and the early period in Vietnam?

LANSDALE: Umhmm.

O'BRIEN: Good, you know that's really . . .

LANSDALE: Well, there's ~~really~~ one big period in Vietnam that isn't known too well, and most historians have passed over it, and the ones who haven't have been championing a cause, and their work is quite suspect. Some of the French were sort of agents ~~en~~ provocateurs at the time, and they are more or less justifying what they did, and leaving out important parts of it.

O'BRIEN: How about the French journalist [Jean] Lacouture? What do you think of his work? Is it Lacouture that's done the thing on Ho [Chi Minh]?

LANSDALE: ~~Yeah,~~ Yes, I'm trying to remember. I think that's who it was. Well, most of the French writings about Ho and some of the explanations in official documents of the French, trying to explain him and so on, by friends, I found very interesting. ~~and~~ I had no way of judg~~g~~ing really on it. There was a tremendous sympathy and so forth being expressed, and then a very strong attempt to work out an accommodation with him afterwards, ~~with him,~~ by the French. And again, a highly emotional sensitivity to any interference, with ~~was~~ what they were trying to do, and they saw almost anything as interference.

So, what is written by them, I read mindful of their sensitivities at the time and what they're trying to prevent anybody ever believing that would be opposite at all, or something different at least. ~~and~~ It was just amazing. The French press was screaming that I was starting World War III in Vietnam in '55 . . .

O'BRIEN: Mind if I get this on tape--well, it is on tape, I'm sorry. I didn't realize it was going.

LANSDALE: . . . simply because I think there was a feeling by the French colonialists in Indochina of not wanting to give up the French presence there.

and it's a human, understandable type of a thing. They had been there and associated there, and some of them had spent their entire lives there, and here they were having to give up something. ~~and~~ a Swiss journalist once explained it to me: It was like a man giving up his mistress and seeing some ~~big~~ guy in a big car driving by in the street. and even though he'd given ~~him~~ her up, he'd just say, well, he hates that guy because he got the mistress allegedly with material means such as an automobile and maybe a fur coat and so on, and he isn't the man that the former guy was.

So some of this feeling was very prevalent there. and for some reason or other, I happened to suddenly become the focal point of it, through my name or something, ~~or other~~ so that they went to great lenghts of charging me with all sorts of things that I was doing: I was out buying up the loyalties of ~~set courses~~ sect forces with millions of dollars, and things that would be hard to prove that I wasn't, mind you, except ~~that~~ to say, "Look, I didn't have a million dollars to buy anything with." And they'd ?

say, "Well, the U.S. government did, and you were a secret agent for them," and so on. It was very hard to disprove some of their talk and say, "Well, that just isn't so."

Except once in a while they'd get really wild and claim I was down--I walked in on a briefing, for example, with French officers telling some American visitors from Washington about how ~~[illegible]~~ at that very moment I was down trying to buy off a sect leader, and very naively, with a suitcase full of money. ~~and~~ I didn't know but the guy was going to ambush me and take all the money and not do whatever I was going to plan to do. And at that moment, I just asked him, I said, "Well, please keep on with your briefing. I want to know whether the guy killed me or not." It was ~~C~~crazy. Now these were very responsible French officials talking that way and the fact that I'd be miles away from the scene of some of these things never stopped the damn circulation of these stories. I don't know how you ever stop that stuff.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah,~~ Yes, well how about people like Bernard Fall, and Patty ~~Huny~~ [P.J.] Honey and their writings? Are they . . .

LANSDALE: Well, they're very sound, very sound. Fall's background, as was Honey's, was out of intelligence or information collection units, ~~and~~ in their different countries. Fall's initial writings were all out of a French army historical section, and I had to tell him one time I~~'d~~ had read some of his work originally by the original author. But, it was a detailed military history of operations that he'd delved into. ~~and~~ I don't know, I doubt that it was intentional plagiarism on his part. He was probably rushing through, getting a book published, for academic credits and so on. And Honey, the same way with British intelligence, who were quite active in Indochina during the French days. But it was, --some of the stories and happenings and everything were just almost incredible. ~~The ------~~ Some of the French journalists were politically partisan. They had connections either with the Communist Party or sympathies with them of some sort. And Ho had been one of the founders of the French Communist Party, so that there was always a cultural or comradeship feeling of some sort there. ~~and~~ When the

Americans started showing up on the scene, there was this very paternalistic feeling of, "Well, these are our people,--these Vietnamese, or Khmer, or Lao, and you keep your cotton-picking fingers off of them" type of a thing that went to very great lengths -- volatile emotions erupting on this type of a thing.

I remember one of the journalists, John Beret, published a newspaper in Saigon and wrote a lot of the early propaganda for individuals in the French army. They ~~and~~ had sort adventurer types among them. He then went to Pnohm Penh, where he started a weekly newspaper and started also writing speeches for [Norodom] Sihanouk. And the next thing I knew, Sihanouk was accusing me of plotting to murder him or assassinate him. ~~and~~ I hadn't ~~even~~ been near Cambodia, and I hadn't even thought of Sihanouk when this happened. The governor of Siem Reap, who had been very close to Sihanouk before--and Siem Reap is where Angkor Wak and the historical ruins are--suddenly died, and the story started seeping out a little bit with Sihanouk charging that this governor, whose name was Dap Chhuon, and I were in a conspiracy to murder him and take over the government of Cambodia. And it didn't do any good that I had never met Chhuon and never had any dealings with him, and Cambodia was way outside my bailiwick. But this is the story that's gone on and on and on.

O'BRIEN: Well, there was a little bit of truth to that, wasn't there? ~~--~~ Some involvement of CIA. . . .

LANSDALE: Dap Chhuon? Yes. ~~Yeah.~~ Well, he was a national leader and actually had formed the political groupings initially that supported Sihanouk and gave him his political power. ~~--~~ He was the organizer; he was the chief political lieutenant of Sihanouk. And then apparently, he felt that Sihanouk was going sour, and he wanted to get the government back into reflecting more the will of the people. How far he got, I don't know. But this was really something that was foreign to me at the time.

I got sent back into Cambodia afterwards, from Washington, with ~~a~~ various military assistance groups, or economic groups ~~of~~ or presidential commissions, and so on. ~~and~~ each time they'd have Pnohm Penh on the thing, I'd just say, "~~We'd~~ Well, you had better check the embassy there." Back would come word that, ¶ No, Sihanouk was afraid that if I were a member of the party, I would be going in to murder him. ¶ I actually went in one time, and the chief of police of Pnohm Penh met our party--along with the foreign minister and so on--at planeside when we came down. ~~and~~ the Chief of Police walked right next to me, and he said, "I'm your liaison man from now on." ~~and~~ I said, "You're keeping an eye on me, I know. it's all right. I'm not going to murder your boss; I have no idea of doing that." [Laughter] That is strange. ¶ And then Sihanouk made a movie--about '65, '66--in which he played the commander in ~~of~~ Khmer Royal Naval Intelligence foiling a great American spy, who happened to have my name, and was a role played by some ~~prince~~ Frenchman ~~man~~ who was visiting there. and I was out to overthrow the kingdom. but, of course, our boy hero thwarted the ugly American and won the girl, who was the daughter of the Brazilian ambassador or something. Some French gal played the role. I've been trying to get a print of that or some way of seeing that movie. I'd love to see it, you know. It sounds great and. . . . [Laughter]

O'BRIEN: Yes, ~~Yeah~~, I hadn't heard about that. Well, that does hit on something, though, in regard to Southeast Asia. As I understand, in that Dap Chhuon incident, ~~that~~ there was an Agency involvement with him, through a guy by the name of [illegible], and the Agency does seem to have a kind of free hand in some of these Southeast Asian nations. ~~and~~ I'm thinking of the [ALLEN L.] Pope situation in Indonesia as well. Can you see any brakes ~~breaks~~ put on them as a result of the change of administrations? How do you react to this sort of activity?

LANSDALE: Well, most of the things that they did that had political consequences of any major size at all--and certainly a thing with Dap Chhuon and also the Pope thing--are only undertaken by the Agency after approval up at topside. So as far as brakes are concerned, they've had them from the beginning. However, the objectives and the intent are approved, and not, again, the means of doing it--the nuts and bolts--which are supposedly overseen by an ambassador.

And when we get down to the level of a country where these things are happening, then I think much depends on the individuals: the ambassador and the station chief, and how they get along, and again, mostly on the. . . . Well, no, it isn't either; it's a fifty-fifty proposition. We have ambassadors who don't want to know or ~~who~~ are opposed to all such things, and if an order comes down to do it, they very unwillingly tell the guy to go ahead, but watch it now, not too far.

A station chief, then, with orders to do some things, will have told the ambassador he is ~~isn't~~ going to do this. But he starts getting in things, and he figures, ~~that~~ if he goes back and tells the ambassador what's happening, that he's not going to get any understanding and will probably get an order prohibiting him from ~~for~~ doing something. And he won't be able to explain, "Well, if I stop doing this, then this other thing won't work, and Washington wants us to have this happen." The ambassador will just say, "No, I don't see it that way. Don't do it." So I'm sure there are things ~~that are~~ happening that aren't told for this--for operational reasons. And again, it's a judg~~e~~ment of an individual on that thing. It's not a policy type of a thing from the Agency.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. Do you find any--in the time that you're there in the middle fifties as well as when you go back in '60, '61, and later involvement in Vietnam--do you find differences between the embassies, ~~--~~between the U.S. embassy in, particularly, Pnohm Penh and Saigon?

LANSDALE: I didn't notice that. It might have existed, and I wouldn't have even known that.

O'BRIEN: Well, there's some feeling among people involved with Cambodian relations ~~at~~ during that time, as I understand it, that somehow there's an involvement on the part of the South Vietnamese in some of the groups like the . . . .

LANSDALE: Oh, ~~yeah.~~ yes. I remember Both the South Vietnamese and the Thai were playing around with groups inside Cambodia, or with exile groups that wanted to go back in Cambodia, and so on. and I'm not certain that the Americans from either Thailand or South Vietnam were fully aware of what all was going on. And I'm not certain that the Americans or the Cambodian government people inside Cambodia knew what was going on, and were tending to exaggerate some of this. Things get blown up out of all proportion in this. But, just the fact that there was antipathy and it would take this form of expression, among others that were going on. . . .

I don't know which people would rather go in and take over and run Cambodia--the Thai's or the South Vietnamese. it's about a toss up which one looked ~~was~~ down more on the Khmers than the other.

And Diem used to follow the predictions of the royal fortune-teller in Pnohm Penh to Sihanouk. Apparently, they were spending a lot of intelligence money to find out, you know, what's happened in each other's sessions and what he was telling the guy. Then how useful this was, mind you, I don't know.

O'BRIEN: Well, do you find--again, in passing on to the task force--and the formation of that Vietnam task force in the early part of the Kennedy administration--do you find ~~the~~ a sensitivity on the part of the people, the political appointees, to what's going on in South Vietnam? Are you able to explain what you're telling me right now about South Vietnam to these people?

LANSDALE: ~~Uh,~~ only partially. They were as bemused by the mechanics of getting decisions in Washington as they were with the problem that they were employing the mechanics to solve. It was all sort of new to them, and they wanted to do a good job, but in order to do it, they were suddenly working with these instruments, you see, that were foreign to them here. I think that the princip~~les~~als in the administration were not entirely aware of these people they were dealing with in Washington. I recall, at the time, some surprise.

¶ Rusk was violently opposed in the department over where he was by some people, and I noticed at times that he wasn't aware that he was turning around and asking a guy who, minutes before Rusk had come in to him, ~~was~~ among his comrades in the Department called him, ~~just~~ "This stupid jerk," and so on, which I felt was disloyal--behind the guy's back, you know. I was always urging them to speak up in front of people and so on, and they wouldn't do it. And the same damn thing was true of ~~against~~ some of the military against McNamara, for example.

Well, the McNamaras and the Rusks and their unders and deputies, and so on, types of people, and assistant secretaries, were trying to cope with people that they instinctively felt were ~~instinctively~~ opposing and foot-dragging and so on, and trying to get that working. So that to get them working on a given problem was really the thing that they were concerned with. ~~and~~

You'd suddenly say, "Well, we're going to talk about Laos," or Vietnam or Israel or something. "Yes, yes, yes. What have you got in this paper?" you know. And they were watching to see: "Well, has this guy a ~~it's just I've~~ really done his homework" and "Is he going to ~~and is it gonna~~ come up with something or not?" rather than what is the real problem here, and how would I solve it if I weren't sitting in this room in this particular group, and so on. So there was a. . . .

So then, working on this type of a thing which I saw very much in the task force on Vietnam--Gilpatric, I know, was shocked at the reactions of some of the foreign service people that came in at a rank of ambassador and so on, that were sort of the staff assistants on the assistant secretary and undersecretary level.

? They would start a meeting at night. ~~--in fact,~~ I was asked to be sort of--I forget what the title was--executive officer or something of it, and they asked me to chair the meetings. Well, I'd no sooner open it than these guys would be passionately explaining why I shouldn't be sitting in the chair of the meeting, see?

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah~~ Yes.

LANSDALE: I think it shocked some of the Kennedy administration people. It suddenly revealed a feud and so on, ~~and~~ I hadn't said it, and I personally didn't care that much, you know. I'd say, "Have you got all the hate out of your system now? Let's go on with the meeting," see. This, of course, would activate it more, but I would say, "Well look, we really do have some problems here we've got to get to, and if you want, I'll meet you afterwards and ~~we can~~ have lunch or something, and you can spoil my lunch by telling me what a heel I am or something. But we've got work to do."

So then, Gilpatric or somebody would tell me afterwards, "Do you think we better take you off?" "Well, yeah. If it's going to ~~effect~~ get the work done, ~~it's~~ better ~~to~~ take me off. It's no fun for me to sit up and chair something under conditions like this," so . . .

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Were you ever approached with the job as ambassador to Vietnam?

LANSDALE: ~~Yeah.—Yeah.~~ Yes, Yes.

O'BRIEN: Who was pushing that?

LANSDALE: I don't know. I heard about it the ~~this~~ first Saturday after the inaugural--I think that's it. It was very early in the administration. McNamara asked me to come down to the White House and meet him there, and I thought it was to brief him on something. And I was working on a number of intelligence matters in Defense at the time, ~~and~~ I showed up, and he asked me to just wait outside, and they were meeting in the Cabinet room, ~~and~~ as I said, it was essentially an NSC group. And after a bit, they asked me to come on in, and they had me sit opposite the president. And he looked at me, and he said, "Did Dean [Rusk] tell you, I want you to be ambassador to Vietnam?" I said, "No, he didn't mention that." Well, he hadn't at all, ~~and~~ there was a long, painful silence, and I figured, "Well, ~~Gee,~~ maybe he's asking me if I want to be, or would I accept the job." So I finally said, "Well, it would be a great honor," and that was the last I ever heard of it. But, I heard all sorts of rumors that are usual ~~they use~~ for Washington, It said ~~and things~~ afterwards that Dean Rusk was very much opposed to it, and opposed on the ground that I was a military man and they didn't want military people in on the situation.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes.

LANSDALE: And then later I ~~had~~ met one of Rusk's staff officers at the time, and he was telling me that Rusk was figuring, you know, if ~~that~~ he could get me a job some other place or a promotion or something to get me out of the way at the time~~--~~. I apparently ~~I~~ had become sort of a target for a lot of gossip and rumors and so on at the time.

But after that, then, they asked me--Kennedy asked me pretty point blank--about Ambassador Durbrow, and I said, "Well, after what you just asked me and so forth, I'm a little hesitant, but you're the President and you need the truth. So I'll just tell you right now, I think he's a very ill man~~;~~. His judgement's impaired by his physical condition~~;~~. He's a fine professional Foreign Service officer and could be used someplace, but don't keep him on in Vietnam anymore. He's sick~~;~~, he's on his back a lot of the time, and you need someone very alert, ~~whether~~--whoever it is. And pull him out." And they got--Rusk and everything, you know--"You're off your subject, boy." But I said, "Well, Durby's an old friend of mine, and I like the guy. ~~and~~ I saw a lot of him when I was in Vietnam on this brief visit. ~~and~~ I think it's a shame that the guy's kept on there because he was quite ill, in bad shape."

And Durby never forgave me for it. It got right back to him that I had sacked him and so on because he was withdrawn after that. But this certainly didn't hurt his career at all, in any way, ~~and~~ even though State put him on a make-work job after that. But he held the rank of ambassador which is as high as you can get in the Foreign Service. And he was ill; he really was.

O'BRIEN: Well, how does [Frederick E.] Nolting come into this . . .

LANSDALE: Well, Nolting came in, ~~as the~~ apparently, as the Foreign Service's rebuttal to my going on out of there. I remember both McNamara and Gilpatric asked me about him, and I didn't know him. I said, "Well, I'd just go on what I have heard from other Foreign Service officers who respect him very much." So finally, Nolting was--a meeting was arranged with Nolting, and I liked him very much when I talked ~~with~~ to him. He asked me if I would give him some briefings on Vietnam, which I did do. And when I wound up the end of that, I was asked again by McNamara, who said he was going to tell Kennedy. And I said, "Well, this looks like a very good man, and I think it's a sound appointment."

I didn't want to be ambassador. Jesus. During the Eisenhower Administration, they wanted to make me ambassador ~~of~~ to the Philippines, and I begged them not to. I think that's one of the world's worst jobs. You're stuck where you can't do what your job is supposed to be, and I knew they were going to put me in places where I'd be up against Communist political leaders of some sort, working the other side. And of course, you aren't in that position, but allegedly you are. ~~and~~ You'd ~~re going to~~ have people running circles around you, ~~if~~ and you'd know it and couldn't lift a little finger to stop them. ~~And~~ This isn't my idea of a good spot to be in. You just get belabored over that.

O'BRIEN ~~LANSDALE~~: Well, did Nolting ever try to get you back to Vietnam in an advisory position?

LANSDALE: I think so. There were a number of attempts by the Vietnamese themselves, and unfortunately, some of them were couched in terms of wanting me to come out as ambassador, by the Vietnamese. but Nolting and I had very friendly relations, and I think he had proposed that I come on out several times. But these things would usually only come to me sort of second or third hand. ~~and~~ One time apparently President Kennedy had said something to the JCS because suddenly my relations with the Chiefs went down to less than zero and subzero. ~~and~~ I finally asked General [Curtis E.] Lemay of the Air Force, because I'm an Air Force officer, what the trouble was. And he said, "You and your ambitions to have four stars." I said, "What's this again?" Apparently Kennedy had said something to the Chiefs of, what would they think of my being given four stars and being put in charge of operations in Vietnam?

And I didn't know about it, and they took it that I was pushing myself for it. I said again, "that isn't something I'd want to do." So this was about the time that--no, maybe General [William Westmoreland] Westy was coming in about then? it was around that time.

O'BRIEN: Well, the task force really forms up the instructions for Nolting, doesn't it?...

LANSDALE: Yes.

O'BRIEN: . . . for the next few years. Just what kind of recommendations come out of that task force?

LANSDALE: Well, I was only in on the very original one, which was to undertake some things such as changing the specific types of things to meet a situation in there. One of them was: we would get a political section that would work out better relations with the Vietnamese government, a political section in our embassy, and that the foreign service would go and search through their own personnel for people with some real political savvy to get in to guide, rather than control or belabor or have confrontations with the Vietnamese government to carry out essentially political reforms, and getting some of the just criticism of the opposition considered in the governing body.

Another thing was on the police, of getting police training done so that they could cope with meeting enemy units, rather than doing urban police work. In this, I was begging them to at least get to a state constabulary level as far as American advisors were concerned. and I wasn't certain that the U.S. Army's military police could cope with it, but maybe they could get a team of them in. ~~and~~ then I was pointing out that there were constabulary officers and officers from other countries, including South America and the old Philippine constabulary, who knew the law-and-order conditions--quite similar to Vietnam--and bring them in if they wanted to go international. I was trying to get them to get very realistic ~~and~~ in solving problems by changing the quality and the approach that we had.

We drew up an original draft that went to the President, out of meetings that lasted about ten days, at which point, at Rusk's insistence, the task force went over to State and became a general, regular body there. They then proceeded to rewrite our original ~~and~~ instructions and drafts and everything, ~~and~~ both McNamara and Gilpatric said,~~--~~coming back from the White House,~~--~~"Ed, you had better not get in there." I said, "If I can help in any way, I will." They said, "Well, right for the time being, you'd better not go near that group, see." ~~so~~

I actually didn't get in to some of their policy formulation, again in a fairly early period, on the thrust of things in Vietnam, except for some of the Defense people who were over there. I would talk to them on what was being proposed and going on, but this was sort of second and third echelon type of a thing, pulling back out of it.

But~~,~~ initially, I was actually trying to get a quality U.S. representation in Vietnam, and actually smaller again than it was at the time, and to pick a few key things, and to concentrate on that, and really

?

? did or didn't

to get the Vietnamese coping with their own problems more effectively than they were doing.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Well, between this time and the time of the Taylor-[W.W.] Rostow mission, are you involved in Vietnam on a kind of regular basis or . . . .

LANSDALE: ~~Uh,~~ no. Off and on I was, but again with second- and third-echelon type of problems. I was seeing Gilpatric every day and working very closely with him, so that a lot of times, as things would come up, he would discuss them with me. But again, I was trying to explain who certain people were that were named, their backgrounds, and their qualities, and certain events and places, and going to maps with him and describing terrain, and so on, and what the situation really meant that was making the problem. So I was fairly well out of it.

As a matter of fact, I was working with some visiting Burmese on their concept of defense of a country, and ~~they~~ they brought me in with the Israeli who had had a mission helping them with their defense problems in Burma. And the Israeli they had ~~then~~ turned around to their defense minister and some of the others, and invited me to take a look at ~~their~~ defense system in Israel.

I was quite enthusiastic about going and had everything arranged and was to leave on a Saturday, when about on a Wednesday or Thursday, I was asked to go to Vietnam with the other mission and stuff; ~~and~~ Unfortunately I had to cancel out everything and never got in to see what I wanted to see there.

O'BRIEN: Well, you end up working on border--actually, the ~~seating~~ sealing of the border, then, don't you, on ~~the~~ that Taylor-Rostow thing?

LANSDALE: Yes. Yes.

O'BRIEN: What about that preoccupation? Where does that idea come from? Is that Rostow's?

LANSDALE: Well, Taylor was the one that charged me with it. Taylor said, "Well, you folks,"--this is ~~a~~ the flight which started--"Will each of you write down some of the things that you think we should look into and what you might like to look into." So I gave him a list of about twenty things that I'd like to look into, none of them being this, of course.

I suggested some other subjects for other people on the thing and gave it to ~~them,~~ him. ~~and~~ he called me back and said that it was a very interesting list ~~that~~ I had given him, and would I please work on building a defense on the border. And I said, "~~Well~~ what sort of a defense?" He said, "Well, a system of fortifications or a wire like the Iron Curtain in Europe." I said, "Good God, you aren't going to do that, are you?" And he said, "Well, look into it." So that was supposedly all I was ~~supposed~~ to do, and of course, I got called in on other things immediately.

But I wasn't even invited along to go in and see Diem with him. I said, "Look, these are old friends of mine. If you'd like, why I'll do anything I can. you can hit them high, and I'll hit them low if you want. We can get some things done that way." He said, "Well, you aren't on our protocol list, so you don't attend any of these calls on the President."

We landed in Saigon, and the people from the presidency were there and met us. ~~and~~ Taylor and Rostow were over talking with reporters who were interviewing them plane side, and these people from the presidency said, "President Diem wants you to come to dinner tonight." and I said, "Well, I better check with a on my boss on this thing." Taylor was busy, but I grabbed Rostow who wasn't talking at the moment and told him, and he said, "Go ahead." So I said, "Well, I wasn't even on the protocol" and everything. I don't care about going up to these protocol meetings anyhow. ~~tht~~ I went in and saw Diem, whose question was, "What's this mission doing here? What are you all up to?" I said, "Why don't you wait, and they'll be in here to have a meeting with you tomorrow, and you'll find out." And then it became very personal. We just started talking over ~~his~~ two old friends ~~with him~~, and I had dinner with him.

And he brought his nephew in to join us--Nhu's boy, oldest boy--who had a new toy missile, like a rocket with a launcher. and I was trying to explain to this youngster who was squatting on the floor next to his uncle, the President, who was busily eating dinner--I said, "you don't point this at him." I didn't know how big a spring this thing had on it, whether it would take his head off or not. ~~[Laughter]~~ I ~~told~~ taught him to shoot it up into the ventilating fan in the ceiling. We spent dinner, actually, taking parachutes and things out of the ventilating fans, and the kid and I were climbing up a ladder to get these things out of the thing in the palace. This was very different from an official protocol meeting.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. How is Diem at that point?

LANSDALE: He was a very changed man. It was the first time in our talks with each other. . . . When I met him at the palace that night, his brother Nhu came in for the first time and sat next to him. And when I'd asked Diem a question, his brother would answer it. And I'd have to tell him I wasn't asking him the question; I was asking his brother. A very strange relationship at the time. ~~and~~ I found that he was a talker--Diem was--and he was very clear and concise in his statements and had too big a grasp of details ~~in~~ of whatever subject he was talking about. It'd go on for hours--details on it, which fascinated me but used to bore other people. But he did know his country, and its history, which he would give at the drop of a hat. This evening in '61, seeing him, he was very hesitant in his talk and hadn't--it was something physical as well as a mental hazard or something, I felt.

O'BRIEN: Any evidence of ~~Did he go into~~ that later?

LANSDALE: No. There was--mentally, people were telling me that his brother had taken over in the year following. ~~this--~~ just a dominance on the thing. But this was a man that wasn't as sure of himself as he had been when I had seen him less than a year before. And there had been one assassination attempt only, but the big one had taken place before I saw him in January or December of '60--the attack on the palace and so on. So it hadn't been an outside, physical happening like that that had caused the change.

O'BRIEN: Was he a spiritualist at all?

LANSDALE: No, no. He wasn't superstitious. He was a very rational sort of a person--pragmatic.

O'BRIEN: Well, when you get back, you talk to President Kennedy and Robert Kennedy, and John McCone, as I understand, in a rather private meeting. What happened here?

LANSDALE: Well, this was--when I came back, I met the President. I went in with Taylor and Rostow--all of us did who were out on the mission--and he thanked us all very much, and as we were leaving, he asked me to stay behind and talk to him, ~~and~~ that was when he asked me to perform this other service for him, which was initially to think about it, and if I came up with some ideas, why to put them down, ~~ch--~~briefly,~~--~~ on paper and give them to him. And I said, "Well, do you want me to forget about Vietnam for the time being, because I haven't written my report yet about Vietnam." He said, "Yes, this other takes priority over it," so I didn't even finish writing my reports on what I had seen in Vietnam at the time. I went immediately into this other work.

O'BRIEN: Well, about that time, there's at least some thinking in terms of memos that are going to the President about the only way to save Vietnam is with a rather substantial commit~~g~~ment of U.S. troops. Is that . . . .

LANSDALE: Yes, there was some. Now where. . . . Hmm, there was some, and I can't remember just where it was coming from. This was one of the things new that Diem asked me when I saw him. He asked me if he should ask for U.S. troops, and I said, "Do you need them?" He said, "I asked you a question," and I said, "Well, I'm asking you a very legitimate question on this thing." ~~and~~ I said, "Are you ready to admit that you have so lost control of your situation that you can't cope with it here?" And I said, "You'd have to do that before you ever turn around and ask for American troops in here." And he said, "No, we can still handle things, and you've answered my question," so apparently he didn't ask.

There ~~have~~ had been some conversations, I'm sure, going on ~~I'm sure~~ with some of the Americans before that. That would be my guess on this thing because he didn't say, "What do you think of," or ~~Is there~~ anything, or "should I ask?" which was sort of like somebody had recommended this at some point, and I don't think it would have been completely in ~~the~~ a Vietnamese context.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah,~~ do you get any of this thinking when you get back? Any contingency planning or thinking about the building up of troop levels to a more substantial level, ~~--~~maybe linked with the settling of the Laotian question first?

LANSDALE: There might have been, and I might have known some of it. I can't recall now of any. it's someplace in the back of my head that there were some things like that going on. I turned around, just took time off completely from other things and concentrated on this other problem for a time afterwards. Actually, through December of that year, I was sort of holed up and working on some things. ¶ My staff would get in and out of some of these other things, and I used to shove them in to take my place in meetings and so on. ~~and~~ I could ~~can~~ only then just get very quick briefings on them, but they were essentially supporting whatever McNamara and Gilpatric were doing. so I'd just have them go in and report directly and work with them directly.

O'BRIEN: ~~Yeah.~~ Yes. Who were the people who were on your staff at that point?

LANSDALE: Well, let's see. One of them was Sam Wilson, who's now a brigadier general in the Army. Jack Bowles was a Navy Captain who went down to serve with the JCS afterwards and is now with Standard Oil and working out of Singapore. And I had five or six people like that at the time, but those were my two princip~~le~~al ones.

Bowell ?

O'BRIEN: Well, this is about ready to run out, and we've covered ~~a~~ quite a bit.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10030-10422
RECORD SERIES : Sorensen Papers
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :
FROM : Schlesinger, Jr.
TO : President Kennedy
TITLE : Memo to President CIA Reorganization
DATE : 6/30/1961
PAGES : 15
SUBJECTS : CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE : Memoranda
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 8/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Sorensen Papers: Classified Subject Files 1961-64 Box 47, CIA, Document 1a.

SEE SANITIZED
VERSION
NLK-84-149
&
ARRB/C.C. 9/02

1a

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognise today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganised, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate, and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

---

*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, Nov. 6, 13, 1954).

1a

conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

1. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accompli; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

1a

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

1a

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidise newspapers, politicians and organisations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

1a

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassments when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassment to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

1a

2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

---

*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.

1a

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolise contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support: and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia: "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people: it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

1a

5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be

SECRET

1a

enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

IV. Operations and intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

1a

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL

1a

that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

1a

PHOTOCOPIED BY THE KENNEDY LIBRARY DUE TO THE DETERIORATION OF THE ORIGINAL.

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10145
RECORD SERIES : Church Committee
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : Schlessinger, Jr.
TO : Kennedy, John F
TITLE : CIA Reorganization
DATE : 6/30/1961
PAGES : 15
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE : Paper, Textual
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 2/14/2001
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

SANITIZED NLK-11-261a 5/12

CIA

6

June 30, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: CIA Reorganization

I submit the following views as one who worked in OSS during the war and served as a periodic CIA consultant in the years since.

On balance, CIA's record has probably been very good. In the nature of clandestine operations, the triumphs of an intelligence agency are unknown*; all the public hears about (or should hear about) are its errors. But, again in the nature of the case, an agency dedicated to clandestine activity can afford damned few visible errors. The important thing to recognize today, in my judgment, is that the CIA, as at present named and constituted, has about used up its quota. Its margin for future error is practically non-existent. One more CIA debacle will shake faith considerably in US policy, at home as well as abroad. And, until CIA is visibly reorganized, it will (as in the Algerian instance) be widely blamed for developments of which it is wholly innocent.

The argument of this memorandum is that CIA's trouble can be traced to the autonomy with which the agency has been permitted to operate; and that this autonomy is due to three main causes: (1) an inadequate doctrine of clandestine operations; (2) an inadequate conception of the relationship between operations and policy; (3) an inadequate

---

*Or should be -- a gross and repeated CIA failing has been its occasional readiness to succumb to the temptations of favorable publicity. The Guatemalan and Iranian operations were almost nullified by the flood of self-congratulatory publicity which followed them (e.g., the articles by Richard and Gladys Harkness, "The Mysterious Doings of CIA," Saturday Evening Post, Oct. 30, NN. 6, 13, 1954).

6

conception of the relationship between operations and intelligence. The memorandum also suggests ways in which some of these problems can perhaps be alleviated.

I. CIA Autonomy

CIA conducts three main forms of secret work: clandestine intelligence collection; covert political operations; and paramilitary activities. It carries on these functions with relative autonomy. The reasons for the autonomy are historical.

When CIA began, the State Department, still thinking too much in terms of its traditional missions in foreign affairs, looked on this new venture with suspicion and renounced the opportunity to seize firm control of CIA operations. It did not, for example, try to establish any effective system of clearance for CIA activities; and some ambassadors frankly preferred not to know what CIA was up to in their countries. After 1953 the fact that the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence were brothers further confirmed CIA's independence from supervision by State Department desks.

In the meantime, CIA grew in size and power. During the fifties it began in some areas to outstrip the State Department in the quality of its personnel. Partly because CIA paid higher salaries and even more perhaps because Allen Dulles gave his people courageous protection against McCarthyite attacks, CIA was able to attract and hold a large number of able and independent-minded men. The more it added brilliant activists to its staff, the more momentum its operations developed, and the greater role it played in the initiation of policy.

By the time that State had begun to be fully aware of the problems created by an active and autonomous CIA, it had long since missed the chance to establish its own ultimate authority. While State retained a nominal supervision over covert political operations, this was to some degree offset by CIA's tendency to present a proposed operation almost as a fait accompli; State never had title to control overt clandestine intelligence collection; and it had lost ground in such areas as overt political reporting and even in the maintenance of overt diplomatic contacts.

For its part, CIA had developed a whole series of functions paralleling already existing functions of the State Department, and of the Defense Department as well. Today it has its own political desks and military staffs; it has in effect its own foreign service; it has (or has had) its own combat forces; it even has its own air force. Its annual budget is about __ times that of the State Department. The contemporary CIA possesses many of the characteristics of a state within a state.

II. Doctrine

Though CIA's autonomy developed for historical reasons, it has been able to endure because there is no doctrine governing our conduct of clandestine operations. The problem of doctrine for CIA is the extent to which its various clandestine missions are compatible with a free and open society.

It is idle to argue that, because the Communists can do such-and-such, we are free to do it too. Communism is a creed nurtured in conspiracy; and the whole point of Communist social and political organization is to make conspiracy effective. If 'fighting fire with fire' means contracting the freedoms traditionally enjoyed by Americans in order to give more freedom to CIA, no one seriously wishes to do that. Yet I do not feel that we have tried rigorously to think through the limits which the maintenance of an open society places on secret activity. Until this is done, CIA's role will not be clearly defined and understood. The problem which must be faced is: what sort of secret activity is consistent with the preservation of a free social order?

We must begin, I believe, by accepting the fact that the United States will continue to be a nation in which politicians will ask questions and make speeches, reporters will dig out stories, newspapers will publish editorials, individuals, driven by promptings of conscience, will blurt out things harmful to the state, and so on. We do not wish to change these things and could not do so without violating the essence of our society. These things make up the framework in which CIA must operate. In short, they constitute the problem; and, as General Marshall used to say, "There's no point in fighting the problem."

There follows from this, I would think, the conclusion that secret activities are permissible so long as they do not corrupt the principles and practices of our society, and that they cease to be permissible when their effect is to corrupt these principles and practices.

Each form of secret activity presents its own problem. Clandestine intelligence collection has been a traditional function of the national state. Its rules and usages are fairly well established. In the main, espionage, if conducted with discretion, should present no great problem. However, when conducted with an open checkbook and a broad mandate, even espionage can begin to push against the limits of secret activity in an open society. I consider later, for example, the question of the Controlled American Source (CAS) and whether the overdoing of CAS is not beginning to harm other activities of the government.

Covert political operations present a trickier problem. Occasions arise when it is necessary to subsidize newspapers, politicians and organizations in other countries. But corruption of the political life of another nation is not a responsibility to be lightly assumed. I wonder whether CIA has not done too much of this for the joy of it. Paramilitary activities create an even more difficult problem, if only because the problems of concealment are so much more difficult.

In general, I would suggest that any secret operation whose success is dependent on the suppression of news, on lying to Congressmen and journalists and on the deception of the electorate should be undertaken only when the crisis is so considerable that the gains really seem to outweigh the disadvantages. This suggests that the size of the proposed operation may be of crucial importance. Small operations can be done with a minimum of accompanying corruption. The greater the visibility of the operation, the more its success depends on thwarting the impulses and denying the values of an open society, the riskier it becomes, and the more urgent it is that an overwhelming case be made for its necessity.

In short, when confronted with a proposed operation, we must not only ask whether the operation is technically feasible in its own terms; we must ask whether its success requires our open society to be in any serious way false to its own principles.

III. Operations and Policy

Clandestine activities should be assessed not only in the context of their relationship to an open society but also in the context of their relationship to United States foreign policy.

CIA operations have not been held effectively subordinate to U.S. foreign policy.

1. Clandestine intelligence collection is, by charter, free from State Department control. This fact exposes American foreign policy to a multitude of embarrassements when CIA is discovered recruiting agents or developing sources in a friendly country. The recent Singapore case, when CIA, without notice to the Consul General, tried to subvert a member of the Special Branch of the Singapore Police provides an instructive example. After complications of ludicrous complexity, including an attempt to subject the recruit to a lie-detector test, it turned out that the recruit had long since informed his superiors of the CIA approach and was leading CIA into a trap which, when sprung, produced considerable embarrassement to relations between the US and the Singapore government. There have been troubles of a comparable sort in Pakistan and in Japan (where a group of Chinese Nationals were smuggled into Sasebo to work in a CIA-NSA operation).

CIA has said that, in such cases, neither the Embassy nor the Department in Washington is normally informed of this type of operation. In short, no one knows how many potential problems for US foreign policy -- and how much potential friction with friendly states -- are being created at this moment by CIA clandestine intelligence operations. Surely there is an argument for permitting State to decide whether the advantage to be gained by the operation (e.g., the information derivable from an agent within the Special Branch of the Singapore Police) outweighs the risk (e.g., exasperating the local government and shaking its confidence both in our purposes and in our sense). Clandestine intelligence operations should plainly be cleared both with the Department of State and (save for exceptional instances and on agreement of the Secretary of State) with the local U.S. Ambassador.

2. Covert political operations technically require State Department clearance. In practice, however, CIA has often been able to seize the initiative in ways which reduce State's role almost to that of a rubber stamp.

This has been partly the consequence of the superior drive and activism of CIA personnel, especially as compared with the diffidence of State Department personnel. For example, when men come to CIA with the assignment of developing covert political campaigns or organizing coups or preparing for paramilitary warfare, these men naturally fall to work with ingenuity and zeal; they probably feel that they are not earning their pay unless, say, they organize as many coups as possible. The concept of 'contingency planning' has legitimatized the concrete preparation of operations still presumably in a hypothetical stage; people did not at first notice that 'contingency planning,' when carried to the stage of recruitment and training of personnel, creates a vested interest which often transforms contingencies into apparent necessities. Thus, if a group is assembled and revved up on a contingency basis, then the failure to carry the project through (it is argued) will invite the disappointment and alienation of the group; so the pressure increases to follow through on what had started as a pure speculation. This was a central factor, of course, in the Cuban decision -- the fact that disbandment of the Cuban force in Guatemala just seemed to create too many problems and embarrassments. Having entered into relations with personalities in foreign lands, CIA has sometimes seemed to feel that we must thereafter do pretty much what they want -- or else they will blow security or even go over to the Communists. This approach has made us on occasion the prisoners of our own agents.*

---

*We become prisoners of our agents in another sense too. The Cuban episode leaves the strong impression that CIA is not able to control its own low-level operatives. While the CIA people in Washington are men of exceptionally high quality, the men attracted to field jobs are sometimes tough and even vicious people motivated by drives of their own and not necessarily in political or even moral sympathy with the purposes of the operation. Such actions as locking up the Revolutionary Council, such enterprises as Operation 40 in Miami where CIA agents reportedly trained Cubans in methods of torture, such episodes as the detention and third degree reportedly administered to Dr. Rodolfo Nodal Tarafa and 16 other democratic Cubans this February -- all these suggest that things go on under CIA sponsorship with which CIA in Washington is only dimly acquainted.

It has meant too that the State Department, often apprised of an operation only in its later stages, is under great pressure to endorse the operation as already mounted because of the alleged evil consequences of exercising a veto. I well remember Tom Mann's remark the day the decision was made to go ahead on Cuba: "I would never have favored initiating this operation; but, since it has gone as far as it has, I do not think we can risk calling it off." Moreover, at a time when there is increasing premium on activism, State, when it questions CIA operations or initiatives, casts itself in a prissy, sissy, negative role. The advocate of clandestine activities seems 'tough' and realistic; the opponent has to invoke such intangibles as the reputation of the United States, world public opinion, "What do we say in the United Nations?", etc., and seems hopelessly idealistic, legalistic and 'soft.'

The result of CIA's initiative in covert political operations has been to create situations which have forced policy on the State Department. This was not the original idea behind CIA. As Allen Dulles wrote in his 1947 memorandum to the Senate Armed Services Committee, "The Central Intelligence Agency should have nothing to do with policy." Yet, in the years since, CIA has, in effect, 'made' policy in many parts of the world. A number of governments still in power know that they have even been targets of CIA attempts at overthrow -- not a state of mind calculated to stimulate friendly feelings toward the United States. Indonesia, of course, is a prime example.

This experience suggests that the present system by which CIA notifies State of a projected covert operation is inadequate to protect US interests. There must be some means by which State can be informed of such operations at an early enough stage to affect the conception and preliminary planning of the operation. Otherwise CIA will continue to confront State with propositions having potential impact on foreign policy but at too late a point to subject that impact to reasonable control.

3. The Controlled American Source (CAS) represents a particular aspect of CIA's encroachment on policy-making functions. CIA today has nearly as many people under official cover overseas as State -- 3900 to 3700. About 1500 of these are under State Department cover

(the other 2200 are presumably under military or other non-State official cover). Originally the use of State Department cover for CIA personnel was supposed to be strictly limited and temporary. The Dulles-Correa-Jackson report stated in 1948, "The CIA should not use State Department cover as a simple answer to all its problems, but should proceed to develop its own outside cover and eventually in this way and through increased efficiency of its overseas personnel, find a way to temper its demands upon the State Department." Nonetheless CIA has steadily increased its requisitions for official cover.

There are several reasons why CIA has abandoned its original intention of developing systems of private cover. It is easier to arrange cover through State; it is less expensive; it is quicker; it facilitates the security of operations as well as of communications; it insures a pleasanter life for the CIA people. But the effect is to further the CIA encroachment on the traditional functions of State.

In some missions, I understand, CAS personnel outnumbers regular State Department personnel. In the American Embassy in Vienna, out of 20 persons listed in the October 1960 Foreign Service List as being in the Political Section, 16 are CAS personnel; of the 31 officers listed as engaging in reporting activities, over half are CAS. Of the 13 officers listed in the Political Section in our Embassy in Chile, 11 are CAS. On the day of President Kennedy's Inauguration 47 percent of the political officers serving in United States Embassies were CAS. Sometimes the CIA mission chief has been in the country longer, has more money at his disposal, wields more influence (and is abler) than the Ambassador. Often he has direct access to the local Prime Minister. Sometimes (as during a critical period in Laos) he pursues a different policy from that of the Ambassador. Also he is generally well known locally as the CIA representative.

In the Paris Embassy today, there are 128 CIA people. CIA in Paris has long since begun to move into areas of political reporting normally occupied by State. The CIA men doing overt internal political reporting outnumber those in the Embassy's political section by 10-2. CIA has even sought to monopolize contact with certain French political personalities, among them the President of the National Assembly. CIA occupies the top floor of the Paris Embassy, a fact well known locally; and on

6

the night of the Generals' revolt in Algeria, passers-by noted with amusement that the top floor was ablaze with lights. (I am informed that Ambassador Gavin was able to secure entrance that night to the CIA offices only with difficulty.)

CIA is apparently now firmly committed to the CAS approach as a permanent solution for its problems. It is pressing to have CIA people given the rank of Counselor. Before State loses control of more and more of its presumed overseas personnel, and before CAS becomes permanently integrated into the Foreign Service, it would seem important (a) to assure every ambassador the firm control over the local CAS station nominally promised in the NSC Directive of January 19, 1961, and (b) to review the current CAS situation with an eye to a steady reduction of CAS personnel.

4. Paramilitary warfare, I gather, is regarded in some quarters as a purely technical matter, easily detachable from policy and therefore a proper function of the Department of Defense. Yet there is almost no CIA function more peculiarly dependent on the political context than paramilitary warfare.

There are several reasons for this. For one thing, a paramilitary operation is in its nature a large and attributable operation and thereby, as suggested above, clashes with the presuppositions of our open society. (These considerations need not apply, however, to the training of, say, the South Vietnamese in guerrilla tactics or to the support of already existing guerrilla activities.) For another, the moral and political price of direct paramilitary failure is acute for us. Communists, when they stimulate paramilitary activity, are doing what the world expects from them; when we do it, we appear to betray our own professed principles and therefore cannot afford to compound delinquency by defeat. Moreover, as the recent Algerian episode showed, once we convince the world that we are committed to a paramilitary endeavor, we will be blamed for all sorts of things. And, as the recent tractors-for-prisoners episode showed, when we do send men to possible death, we cannot lightly write them off and close the books. The Communists, on the other hand, have no scruples about liquidating a losing show.

Moreover, guerrilla warfare is fought, much more than military men ordinarily realize, in an ideological context. The guerrilla succeeds when his program enlists grassroots support; and it is very difficult indeed to beat him when the countryside is with him. Van Mook told General Marshall in 1946 not to worry about the guerrillas in Indonesia; "we are sending 50,000 men out there and will clean the situation up in the three months." Marshall, who had had experience fighting guerrillas in the Philippines, replied, "It won't be so easy. You will find that they will bleed you to death." Cyprus and Algeria illustrate the difficulty of overcoming guerrilla resistance through sheer weight of military force.

Serious guerrilla movements have been defeated only three times since the end of the Second World War: in Greece, because Tito's defection closed the northern border; in the Philippines; and in Malaya. In the last two cases the guerrilla resistance ended because of the combination of political and military countermeasures. The struggle in Malaya, as Field Marshal Templer understood (and said), was for the minds and hearts of the people; it therefore involved not only paramilitary operations but a vast educational program, organization of trade unions, political reform and an offer of national independence. If the guerrilla's power lies in his revolutionary program, the answer lies in part in meeting the needs which enable the guerrilla to rouse the countryside. "Without a political goal," wrote Mao Tse-tung, "guerrilla warfare must fail, as it must if its political objectives do not coincide with the aspirations of the people and if their sympathy, cooperation and assistance cannot be gained." He added, "Do we want the support of the masses? If we do, we must go among the masses; arouse them to activity; concern ourselves with their weal and woe."

For these reasons, paramilitary warfare cannot be considered as primarily a military weapon. It is primarily a political weapon and must therefore be subjected to close and careful political oversight. It probably should be retained in a reconstituted CIA rather than transferred to Defense.

5. How to Establish Policy Control? Here I wonder whether the British experience might not be of value. The notable feature of the British intelligence system is the determination to keep clandestine activity under strict Foreign Office control. This control is achieved in a number of ways:

a) Secret Intelligence Service (MI-6) itself operates under the direction of the Joint Intelligence Committee, which has a Foreign Office chairman (until recently Sir Patrick Dean, who is now the British representative at the UN) and which includes the Service Intelligence directors and representatives of the Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office as well as the Chief of SIS.

b) basic political warfare directives are originated, not by SIS, but by the Information Research Department in the Foreign Office, often in consultation with an interdepartmental Working Group on International Communist Fronts, and under the ultimate control of the Superintending Under-Secretary of the Permanent Under-Secretary's Department in the Foreign Office.

c) SIS covert political action campaigns must not only conform to Foreign Office directives but must be cleared with the appropriate Foreign Office geographical desks.

d) working groups under IRD chairmanship govern operations in special areas, such as, for example, Sino-Soviet relations or the World Youth Festival.

e) a Foreign Office Staff Liaison Officer sits next to the SIS Chief, and Foreign Office officials serve tours of duty in SIS sections.

All these devices might be adapted for use by the State Department. Organizationally, this would mean that the intelligence agency would retain operational autonomy but that its operations would be at all points subject to State Department clearance -- a clearance to be enforced by directives, by State Department chairmanship of working groups, and by the infiltration of State Department personnel into the intelligence agency.

Obviously this set-up would not succeed, however, unless the State Department itself were prepared to overcome its inbred habits of diffusion, negativism and delay and to take a firm and purposeful grip on the situation.

IV. Operations and Intelligence

The relationship between operations and intelligence raises particularly perplexing questions. 'Intelligence' includes two separable activities: clandestine collection; and research, analysis and evaluation. The first deals with that small portion of raw intelligence procured by secret means (Mr. Dulles estimated in 1947 that "a proper analysis of the intelligence obtainable by . . . overt, normal, and aboveboard means would supply us with over 80 percent, I should estimate, of the information required for the guidance of our national policy"); the second involves the collation and interpretation of all forms of intelligence, however obtained and the production of estimates.

Under the British system, clandestine collection is entrusted to the Secret Intelligence Service. The research, analysis and estimating function is located in the Foreign Office Research Department.

Under the American system, CIA has responsibility for both clandestine collection and research and analysis. The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research also has research and analysis responsibilities; but, in practice, CIA has established control over the machinery for producing national estimates in such a way as to reduce State's contribution to submitting its views to CIA for acceptance or rejection. In other words, where in Great Britain the Foreign Office plays the coordinating role in the intelligence field, in the United States that role has been assumed by CIA.

The argument against incorporating the research and estimate function in State was made by Dulles in 1947: "For the proper judging of the situation in any foreign country it is important that information should be processed by an agency whose duty it is to weigh facts, and to draw conclusions from those facts, without having either the facts or the conclusions warped by the inevitable and even proper prejudices of the men whose duty it is to determine policy and who, having once determined a policy, are too likely to be blind to any facts which might tend to prove the policy to be faulty."

Precisely the same argument can be used with equal effect against the incorporation of the research and estimate function in CIA -- i.e., if intelligence is too closely connected with operations, then those committed to a particular operation will tend to select out the intelligence which validates the operation.

Obviously both arguments conclude in a case for the establishment of a fairly independent research and estimate group. But, if the R&E group is too independent, one runs into the opposite danger: that is, that neither policy nor operations will be subjected to adequate intelligence checks.

The trouble with the Cuban operation, for example, was not that intelligence and operations were combined, but precisely that the Cuban operation evaded systematic intelligence judgment. The intelligence branch (DDI) of CIA was never informed of the existence of the Cuban operation. The Office of National Estimates was never asked to comment on the assumption, for example, that discontent had reached the point in Cuba where a successful landing operation would provoke uprisings behind the lines and defections from the Militia. In December and February, the Office of National Estimates produced general appraisals of the Cuban situation, but these were wholly independent of the Cuban operation. I gather that, if its opinion had been invited, DDI would have given quite a different estimate of the state of opinion in Cuba from that on which the operation was based. There existed, in short, the ridiculous situation that knowledge of the Cuban operation, flaunted in Miami bars by any number of low-level agents in the operations branch of CIA, was denied to even the top officials of the intelligence branch. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State knew even less about the Cuban operation.

The problem, then, is to have an R&E group sufficiently independent of both policy and operations to resist the pressure to make the case for vested ideas and interests -- yet sufficiently close to be able to subject projected operations or policies to the most intense and searching scrutiny.

Where could this group be located? If the CIA were to become subordinate to State, as MI-6 is to the Foreign Office, then the R&E function might be vested in a coordinate subagency, somewhat independent of both State and CIA, yet closely connected with both in day-to-day operations. The R&E subagency would receive intelligence from CIA and from State, as well as from the services and, of course, from public sources. It would represent, in effect, a fusion of CIA/DDI and State/Intelligence and Research. It might also take over certain of the service functions now confided to CIA -- photographic interpretation, biographical data, foreign broadcast monitoring, overt collection, maps, etc. There might be in addition a Joint Intelligence Board with representatives from all the intelligence agencies and with a State Department or White House chairman.

V. Conclusion.

The argument of this memorandum implies a fairly drastic rearrangement of our present intelligence set-up. It also implies the capacity of the State Department to assume command of the situation and to do so in an effective and purposeful way. If the State Department as at present staffed is not capable of assuming effective command, this is not, in my judgment, an argument against a rational reorganization of intelligence. It is an argument for a drastic overhaul of the State Department.

6

The structure which would meet the criteria suggested in this memorandum would be as follows:

1) The State Department would be granted general clearance authority over all clandestine activity. This might be effectuated on the British model by the appointment of a Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence, who would act for the Secretary in these matters and who might serve as chairman of a Joint Intelligence Board.

2) The Joint Intelligence Board would include representatives from all elements in the intelligence community and also from the White House.

3) The operating branches of the present CIA would be reconstituted under some blameless title (the National Information Service). This new agency would be charged with responsibility for clandestine collection, for covert political operations and for paramilitary activities. It would submit projects to the Deputy Undersecretary of State for Intelligence for clearance. In general, the agency would bear somewhat the same relationship to State as the Disarmament Administration and ICA presently do.

4) A second semi-independent agency would be set up, again bearing a blameless title (the Foreign Research Agency), coordinate with the operations agency. This agency would be charged with responsibility for collation and interpretation. It would include CIA/DDI, the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in State, and the various service functions now carried on by CIA (photographic interpretation, biographical files, foreign broadcast monitoring, scientific intelligence, maps, overt collection, etc.). It might well be located in the CIA building in McLean.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

cc: The Attorney General
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Dungan

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10033-10151
RECORD SERIES : Church Committee
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : Bissell
TO : Bundy, McGeorge
TITLE : Briefing Paper/Dominican Republic
DATE : 2/17/1961
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE : Paper, Textual
CLASSIFICATION : Declassified
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 3/28/2001
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. UNDY

Per your request.

RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR.

17 February 1961

(DATE)

O. 10.101 JAN 1952 (47)

SANITIZED NLK·98·84 5/04

BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

I. Situation

Following the break in diplomatic relations in August 1960 U.S./Dominican relations have worsened steadily, and the anti-U. S. sentiment of the GODR was brought sharply into focus by the appearance of pickets outside our consulate on 5 January in protest against the OAS vote to extend trade sanctions against the Dominican Republic. The pickets bore signs condemning the interventionist policy of the U. S. and calling for the expulsion of Consul General Dearborn, whom they labeled a spy. The Dominican radio and press continued to censure President Eisenhower as being responsible for the present state of affairs, while maintaining a reserve concerning President Kennedy, apparently adopting a "wait and see" attitude, although it has previously expressed some reservations regarding the President's choice of advisers on Latin America.

On 26 January the GODR ordered the expulsion of U. S. Vice Consul James A. McNamara on the ground that he was making derogatory remarks about the country; however, it is probable that this expulsion was in retaliation and anger over the belief that the U. S. had provided information to Venezuela on Trujillo's efforts to overthrow or assassinate President Batencourt.

It is thought by some informed observers that the outcome of the sugar legislation which comes up for renewal in the U. S. Congress in March 1961 will be all-important to the future of U. S./Dominican relations. Some say that the Trujillo government cannot last another six months if they do not get their share of the Cuban windfall sugar; and rumors are circulating in Ciudad Trujillo that if they are deprived of the windfall the GODR plans to expropriate American properties and terminate U. S. consular relations.

II Operational Summary

A. General It will be recalled that on 24 January 1961 the Special Group authorized the Agency to provide dissident exiled Dominican groups with limited arms and equipment provided their delivery to elements within the Dominican Republic was effected by Dominicans. Immediately following this decision we indicated to witting leaders of the VRD (BETANCOURT - FIGUERES - ORNES Group) and the FCR (Internal Dissident Group withwhom DEARBORN is in touch) that we were prepared to provide them a limited supply of arms and equipment provided they developed the capability to introduce same into the Dominican Republic.

On 27 January Station Caracas was authorized to inform President BETANCOURT the U. S. is now providing financial support and technical guidance to VRD activities directed by Horacio ORNES,

2a

specifically for ship repairs, recruiting and training crews, locating sites and facilities for future PM activities, strengthening the political organization of the VRD and propaganda. On 30 January Station Caracas was authorized to inform BETANCOURT that Headquarters was prepared to consider providing arms and equipment to any bona fide resistance element with whom adequate contact can be established. BETANCOURT was to be encouraged to recommend any new individuals or groups he considered useful to further objectives of the project. Station Caracas reported that President BETANCOURT was gratified to receive the above information.

In Headquarters contact with FCR exiled leaders, they disclosed their plan of action which they felt could be implemented if they were provided with arms for 300 men, explosives, and remote control detonation devices. They also claimed to have a small boat infil-exfil capability. On the other hand the VRD, while claiming no internal organization, claimed a sea and air capability and are the chosen instruments of President BETANCOURT and Jose FIGUERES.

B. Frente Civica Revolucionaria (FCR)

(1) We have recently been in touch with key exiled leaders of the FCR and they have expressed a willingness to assemble a small cadre in Puerto Rico. It is contemplated that they will develop maritime capability, be in touch with their internal counterparts through W/T facilities, and develop plans for implementing the internal group's plan of action. In view of their reluctance to deal directly with the ORNES Group (VRD) and in the interests of security we plan to keep them compartmented for the time being.

(2) Through our Station in Ciudad Trujillo we are attempting to ascertain the details of the FCR's plan of action and develop a stay-behind communication capability.

C. Vanguardia Revolucionaria Dominicana (VRD)

(1) We are actively supporting the VRD (the ORNES group) in repairing and outfitting their yacht so as to develop an arms delivery capability. It is estimated that it will take from 45 to 60 days to complete this work. Additional time may be needed to recruit and train a crew.

(2) Support is also being given to the VRD's propaganda and organizational activities. A program is being developed with the hope that the VRD can develop their own contacts and sources of information within the Dominican Republic.

D. Possibility of Developing a Boycott Capability

(1) During the summer of 1960 WH Division made use of Fernando MUNIZ Silva, Dominican exile in Puerto Rico and at the time head of the

2a

Syndicate of Free Dominican Labor in Exile (SLTDE), to organize picketing activities in San Juan against Ships carrying cargo to or from the Dominican Republic. The picketing had some success and showed promise of becoming a threat to the Dominican economy, but was finally broken up by the International Longshoremens Association (ILA), at least one officer of which was reportedly in the pay of Trujillo.

(2) Inasmuch as the ILA has recently abrogated its contract with the Dominican unions under pressure from George Meany it is felt that now would be a good time to consider resumption of picketing activities in San Juan, in the hope that such action might spark similar activities in other ports. Trujillo has demonstrated an awareness of the importance of smooth labor relations in foreign ports and it is felt that a blow at this time from international labor would do much to bring the dictator to his knees.

(3) It should be noted that the Department of State last summer disapproved any approach to U. S. unions on this subject. WHD feels that perhaps this announced policy should now be reviewed in the light of more recent developments and an attempt be made, through covert channels if necessary, to build up an international shipping boycott against the GODR.

III Conclusions

(1) In many respects initial talks with FCR and VRD leaders reveal that they over-estimate their own capabilities. Neither has an immediate capability to introduce arms into the area or a firm plan of action.

(2) That we have indicated to both organizations our willingness to help has been a boost to their morale and has also precipitated a noticeable withdrawal from earlier claims of "all we need is arms and a little help and we can do the job".

(3) Recent reports on internal conditions in the Dominican Republic clearly point out that the country is rapidly approaching a stage of complete economic paralysis, a situation that has created feelings of tension and desperation, not only among the opposition elements but within the ranks of the Trujillo clique itself. While sources within the middle class express fears of eventual liquidation of that class by the dictator and his son Ramfis, it is not likely that Trujillo will move until he lears of the outcome in late March 1961 of congressional action on the windfall sugar quota. If such action is favorable to Trujillo, it is probable that he will continue to rule uneasily for an indefinite period unless material outside pressure is brought to bear

against him. If, however, his windfall is taken from him, it is the firm opinion of this Division that a violent reaction on his part will shortly thereafter be felt which will end either with the liquidation of Trujillo and his cohorts or with a complete roll-up of the internal opposition. While the organization of delivery capabilities described elsewhere in this memorandum is proceeding according to schedule, it is now feared that these capabilities will not be ready for use until the appropriate time, i.e., prior to 1 April, has passed and until there may no longer exist internal assets with which to deal. WH Division, therefore, recommends that consideration be given to the immediate use of sea capabilities now employed by WH/4 to cache the requested arms and other material on land areas contiguous to the Dominican coast from whence, as informed FCR elements claim they can do, infiltration of the arms can be carried out by members of the internal FCR by the use of fishing vessels.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10023
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Withdrawal of United Nations Troops
DATE : 8/00/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Congo Cables; restriction information innacurate/missing; box 1

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-01-194/

SECRET

UTF 1470

CIA INFORMATION REPORT

PAGE 1

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

Congo

COUNTRY UNITED NATIONS/CONGO

SUBJECT WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS FROM THE CONGO

DOI AUGUST 1963

PADA NEW YORK, 7 AUGUST 1963

APPR 3

SOURCE MEDIUM LEVEL LATIN AMERICAN OFFICIAL /F/ WITH CLOSE CONTACTS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT

SECRET UTF-1470

DEFINITE PLANS ARE BEING MADE FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF UNITED NATIONS TROOPS IN THE CONGO AT THE END OF 1963 DESPITE CONGOLESE PREMIER CYRILLE ADOULA,S PLEAS TO THE CONTRARY. THE ONLY WAY OF COUNTERACTING THE WITHDRAWAL WOULD BE TO FIND A NEW METHOD OF FINANCING THE CONGO OPERATION. UNDER SUCH A PLAN, THE IDEAL WOULD BE THE MAINTENANCE OF 40-50 PERCENT STRENGTH. ALTHOUGH THERE IS TALK IN THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARIAT OF FUNDING METHODS, THE ABILITY OF THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO ACCEPT SUCH OUTSIDE FUNDS WOULD BE SUBJECT TO DEBATE.

FIELD DISSEM U.S. MISSION

UTF-1470 8 AUGUST 1963

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE (HUGHES)9	AD/NE (MATTHIAS	AD/CI	DD/I	EXO

SECRET

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10027
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers
DATE : 4/23/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 38: Cuba 4/21/63-4/30/63. Box 1.

1-7

SECRET

file Cuba

sanitized version

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

OCI No. 1427/63 (NLK-73-198)

23 April 1963

ARRB 7/96

Fidel Castro's Coming Visit to Moscow and Algiers

1. The initial report on Fidel Castro's forthcoming visit to Moscow came from a usually reliable source with excellent contacts in Cuban government circles who obtained the information from a Cuban government official who has been an intimate acquaintance for many years and who has excellent high-level contacts throughout the Cuban leadership. The usually reliable source obtained the information on 25 March. The report was disseminated to the intelligence community on 27 March and reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin dated 29 March.

2. The substance of the report was that, despite his strong criticism of the Soviet Union, particularly concerning its actions during the missile crisis, Fidel Castro is not blinded to the need for Cuba to maintain good diplomatic relations with the entire "socialist camp." Castro was planning, according to the report, to go to Moscow for the May Day celebrations. He was planning, however, to remain in Moscow only three days. It was his intention, according to the report, to tell Khrushchev, in effect, that the USSR must assist Cuba but must at the same time understand that Castro does not intend to be a "docile satellite."

3. Information from the same source and sub-source was disseminated to the intelligence community on 30 March indicating that Castro was intending to visit Algeria on the same trip that took him to Moscow. This was reported in the Current Intelligence Bulletin on 1 April.

4. The substance of the second report was that Castro "plans to visit Algeria in connection with" the visit to Moscow and that Algeria and the USSR are the only two countries he was planning to visit on that trip. The Algerian visit was planned in view of the "special relationship" that is said to exist between Castro and Ben Bella and also between Castro and Algerian Defense Minister Boumedienne.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10051
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 8/10/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1

SANITIZED NLK·01·048·4·3·3 Ss

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuban exiles

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA NICARAGUA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/556,052

SUBJECT POSSIBLE ESTABLISHMENT OF A CUBAN EXILE BASE IN NICARAGUA

DATE DISTR. 10 AUGUST 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 24 JULY 1963

REFERENCES TDCS-3/555,529

IN 97132

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (9 AUGUST 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 35,970

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL-KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING ROMANI."

1. IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION ON 24 JULY 63, SALVADOR ROMANI, REPRESENTATIVE IN VENEZUELA OF CUBAN EXILE ORGANIZATION COMANDO UNIFICADO DE LA LIBERACION EN CUBA (UNITED COMMAND OF CUBAN LIBERATION - CULC), CLAIMED THAT A SMALL NUMBER CUBAN EXILES HAD ALREADY MOVED FROM MIAMI TO NICARAGUA. IN EXILE CIRCLES IT IS BELIEVED THIS ACTION REFLECTS A PREVIOUS AGREEMENT BETWEEN PRESIDENT SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA AND MANUEL ARTIME, SECRETARY GENERAL OF EXILE GROUP MOVIMIENTO DE RECUPERACION REVOLUCIONARIA (MOVEMENT OF REVOLUTIONARY RECOVERY - MRR). ROMANI DID NOT KNOW DETAILS OF AGREEMENT. IF IT ENTAILS ESTABLISHMENT OF A LARGE-SCALE EXILE MILITARY BASE IN NICARAGUA,

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA NIC AID USIA OCI ONE OCR ORR OO EXO

STATE/DIR FBI TREASURY I&NS COAST GUARD

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

OTHER EXILE GROUPS WILL AWAIT REACTION OF UNITED STATES BEFORE DECIDING THEIR OWN COURSE OF ACTION.

2. NUCLEUS OF SUCH A BASE WOULD BE DRAWN FROM THREE TO FOUR THOUSAND EXILES WHO, ACCORDING TO ROMANI, HAVE PREVIOUSLY RECEIVED MILATARY TRAINING FROM MEMBERS OF U.S. ARMED FORCES. ROMANI CLAIMED U.S. POLICY IS TO FERMENT INTERNAL RESISTANCE IN CUBA AND TO STRENGTHEN THE RESISTANCE BY INFILTRATION OF TRAINED COMMANDO GROUPS OF EXILES. FOR THIS REASON THE U.S. CONTINUES TO GIVE TACIT SUPPORT FOR TRAINING OF EXILE MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS.

3. ROMANI MADE FOLLOWING REVIEW OF POLICIES OF PRINCIPAL EXILE PARTIES:

(A) CULC IS CONCENTRATING ON DISSEMINATION OF ANTI-CASTRO PROPAGANDA IN CUBA TO PREPARE GROUND FOR INSURRECTION. IT FAVORS INFILTRATION OF SMALL MILITARY GROUPS BUT REJECTS A GENERAL INVASION.

(B) JURE (JUNTA REVOLUCIONARIA), LED BY MANUEL RAY, CONSIDERS THE PRINCIPLE REQUIREMENT IS TO SECURE SUPPORT OF DISCONTENTED ELEMENTS IN CUBAN MILITIA AND ARMED FORCES.

(C) ALLIANCE OF MRP (MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR), SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, SUPPORTS CONTINUATION OF HIT-AND-RUN RAIDS ON CUBAN MAINLAND IN ORDER TO MAINTAIN MORALE OF RESISTANCE FORCES IN CUBA.

(D) SEVERAL GROUPS, INCLUDING UMC (UNIDADES MILITARES CUBANAS), CLC (COMANDOS LIBRES DE CUBA) AND A SECTION OF MRR CONSIDER THAT ONLY A GENERAL INVASION WILL OVERTHROW THE CUBAN REGIME.

(E) FUR (FRENTE UNIDO REVOLUCIONARIO), LED BY AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO, IS WORKING PRIMARILY TO OBTAIN AGREEMENT OF LATIN AMERICAN GOVTS FOR COORDINATED POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10052
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 6/28/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 48: Cuban Subjects: Exiles information report. Box 1

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Cuban - [illegible]

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

BUNDY-SMITH
~~BELK~~
CHASE
DINGEMAN
DUNGAN
FELDMAN
FORRESTAL
HIRSCH
JOHNSON
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
[illegible]
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH
WIESNER

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA

SUBJECT CUBAN EXILE PLANS

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/551,866

DATE DISTR. 28 JUNE 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 69082

DATE OF INFO. MID-JUNE 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (27 JUNE 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL 3566

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS "WELL KNOWN AND EXPERIENCED IN REPORTING, PROBABLY RELIABLE, QUOTING THE PERSONS MENTIONED".

1. AMAURY FRAGINALS ALONSO, ONE OF THE LEADERS IN THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE MOVIMIENTO REVOLUCIONARIO POPULAR (POPULAR REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT - MRP), THE SECOND FRONT OF ESCAMBRAY AND ALPHA 66, CLAIMED IN CONFIDENTIAL DISCUSSION DURING A VISIT TO VENEZUELA IN MID JUNE 63 THAT THE ALLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO ATTACK THE CUBAN MAINLAND. AT THE SAME TIME, PLANS ARE GOING AHEAD TO LAUNCH PLAN OMEGA. FRAGINALS SAID THAT PLAN OMEGA HAS THREE STAGES: (A) REORGANIZATION AND ARMING OF GUERRILLA GROUPS THROUGHOUT CUBA WHICH WILL BE LED BY LOCAL MEN WHO KNOW THEIR AREA;

(B) INCESSANT GUERRILLA ATTACKS AGAINST RUSSIAN BASES, THE CUBAN

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR	FBI	I&NS	TREASURY														

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

ARMY AND THE MILITIA. THE PURPOSE OF THESE WILL BE TO CAUSE MATERIAL DAMAGE TO THE CUBAN ARMED FORCES, UNDERMINE THEIR MORALE AND RAISE THE MORALE OF THE CIVILIAN POPULATION IN PREPARATION FOR AN INSURRECTION; (C) COORDINATION AND CONTROL OF A GENERAL INSURRECTION.

2. FRAGINALS REMARKED THAT THE REORGANIZATION OF GUERRILLA GROUPS IS PROGRESSING SATISFACTORILY BUT THAT THERE IS AN INSUFFICIENCY OF FUNDS. HE REVEALED THAT THE ALLIANCE IS RECEIVING BLUE-PRINTS, FROM INSIDE CUBA, OF MAJOR PLANTS. THEY INCLUDE INFORMATION ABOUT THEIR FUNCTIONS, SHIFTS, AS WELL AS THE NUMBER AND DEPLOYMENT OF GUARDS. THE BLUE PRINTS ARE TRANSMITTED BY COURIER OR LETTER AND WILL BE USED FOR PLAN OMEGA.

3. FRAGINALS DESCRIBED THE LATEST ADHERENT TO THE ALLIANCE, THE FRENTE ANTI-COMMUNISTA DE LIBERACION (ANTI-COMMUNIST LIBERATION FRONT - FAL), AS A CLANDESTINE GROUP WITHIN THE CUBAN ARMY. HE REFUSED TO GIVE FIGURES BUT ALLEGED THAT THE GROUP WAS EXPANDING AND WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN THE "FORTHCOMING WAR" IN CUBA. HE CONFIRMED THE ALLIANCE'S DETERMINATION TO WAGE WAR ON FIDEL CASTRO'S REGIME, EVEN AT THE RISK OF PRECIPITATING A NUCLEAR CONFLICT.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10058
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO : Director, CIA
TITLE : Activities of Cuban Trained Peruvian Guerrillas
DATE : 4/11/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 51: Cuba, Subjects intelligence material 6/63-7/63. Box 1

Sanitized
NLK-01-051-7-4-5

(4)

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

EYES ONLY

11 April 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT: Activities of Cuban-Trained Peruvian Guerrillas

1. The information in this memorandum comes from an extremely sensitive source who is currently a member of a group of Cuban-trained Peruvian guerrillas. No other dissemination has been made of the reports he has provided, in order to protect him and to insure that a channel is kept open to him. The information is being forwarded in this restricted manner at this time to furnish an insight into the extent of Cuban efforts to assist Latin American revolutionary movements. The Agency directed asset is working inside a network which is now assisting Cuban-trained Latin Americans to re-enter their own countries illegally, and to join with leftist revolutionary groups to overthrow the established governments.

2. The Agency asset was a member of a group of more than 70 Peruvians trained in Cuba from June until December 1962. His contingent traveled in small groups by way of Mexico. He received his first special assignment when he was appointed to stay behind in Mexico temporarily and to act as a clandestine contact with a Cuban Embassy official there. The Cuban gave him instructions and funds, and he directed the later groups which transited Mexico.

3. The Peruvian group was ostensibly in Cuba only to attend the July celebrations. According to our agent, some of the members themselves did not know in advance they were to be given training. The Cubans set the Peruvians up as self-contained units in secret training sites in Habana, where they were given political indoctrination and weapons. Later they were moved to rural hill areas for guerrilla training. The agent has described in detail these secret training sites, giving address of the houses and the locations of the guerrilla areas.

4. The agent was removed from his group for several weeks to undergo special training in secret communications techniques, in preparation for his current assignment.

5. At present, the agent acts as coordinator, helping the Peruvians to return illegally to Peru. He is in correspondence with

SECRET

persons in numerous points of entry in Latin America and with contacts in several European capitals who assist the group on their clandestine return. Although many left Peru openly on valid papers, they are coming back illegally. Some have false documentation from other countries, primarily from Colombia; some have Peruvian passports issued in the names of persons now deceased; some are crossing the borders from neighboring countries clandestinely without showing any papers; and some go by small boats to isolated areas.

6. The agent is a member of the Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (MIR) of Peru which now plans to join with other leftist revolutionary groups to bring about a coup before the elections scheduled for June 1963. The agent knows of some 200 Peruvians who have received Cuban training, only a small percentage of whom are actually Communist Party members.

7. Approximately 300 persons have been named by the agent as being connected with the ring helping the Peruvians to reinfiltrate secretly. Attempts are being made to learn whether some of these, particularly those used as "Co-ordinators" or "Correspondence points" in Europe and the United States, are also connected with the illegal return of Cuban-trained guerrillas to other countries.

8. Paris has emerged as the center of the network. Groups of ten arrive weekly from Cuba to be sent on to various Latin American countries for eventual re-entry into Peru. The man in charge of the Peruvians is headquartered in Paris. From there, he has been directing the travel, sending instructions to his scattered subordinates, and receiving reports and information from contacts throughout the world, and handling funds.

9. Correspondence between members of the group is by cable and by letter. The security of communications is protected by several alternate systems of code and secret writing. Each of the trainees has been assigned a number, and letter and number designations are given to hotels and pensions. In cable correspondence, the ring uses these numbers to indicate which persons are traveling and where they may be reached. The content of the messages appears to relate to business matters, covering shipment dates and invoice numbers for example. Letter correspondence contains secret writing with relatively sophiscated systems, interspaced between lines of innocuous friendly or business letters. A dictionary is used for coded messages in either cables or letters, with page and word number referring to clandestine key words.

10. The ring takes great precautions to prevent tracing of the addressees. One of the important links is a woman whose Paris home has entrances on two different streets. She and her husband use the principal street address for their normal lives, but the back street address for the receipt of clandestine correspondence.

11. In this Cuban-sponsored subversive operation, routes of travel are planned to escape easy detection of the fact that a person has left his home, been trained, and has returned to his country. Most of the travel has been by way of Mexico and thence to Cuba, since it was possible to escape detection of the travel. The Cubans issued loose leaf inserts for the travelers' passports, rather than stamping a record of the travel in the document itself. The Mexican Government has recently begun measures to control this travel, but a large number have managed to enter and leave Cuba for Mexico without detection. Some of the travel to Cuba is by way of the Dutch and British West Indies.

12. Many of the returning trainees go through Paris and Prague. From Paris, the travelers fan out to a number of different Latin American countries, from which they attempt clandestine re-entry into Peru. Ecuador, Colombia and Brazil have been used extensively as Latin American entry points as the travelers leave Paris.

13. The agent reports that money for this extensive travel program has been deposited in Swiss banks by the Chinese Communists, via Cuba. MIR trainees were told not to ask for aid from the Soviets to avoid straining relations with China, "since it is backing them". Our asset was responsible for the safekeeping of approximately $15,000 when he arrived in Paris. The money had been parceled out among a number of trainees during the trip, and they handed it to the Paris coordinator there. Our asset was given $1,000 when he left Paris, which he was to use for documentation when he was ready to re-enter Peru. He reported that the cost of the travel of his group from Peru to Cuba was approximately $25,000, and that this money was brought to a local leader from Paris by courier before the trip.

14. The MIR plans to establish a cover importing company representing a French firm which exports cheap agricultural equipment. The branch in Peru will serve as a cover for activities involving the travel of MIR members and the transfer of funds. It will also be a clearing house for information and instructions. When the current group of trainees is back in Peru, another group will be sent out, and funded through the cover firm. The agent reports that

the next group will number approximately 100 men and that they will receive instructions in Algeria, North Vietnam, Laos, and China. The top leader of the Peruvian group has told his lieutenants that he will soon go to Algeria to start arrangements for this training.

15. The MIR has planned four fronts in Peru in its proposed revolution. One is in the south with headquarters in Cusco, another is in the central region in the Sierra, a third is in Lima, and the fourth is in northern Peru. The agent has named the leaders in charge of each of the four fronts.

16. Our asset makes frequent reference to internal disputes in the MIR between the old line Communists and those referred to as Trotskyites. The MIR leaders in Cuba felt that some of their own groups had joined with the Trotskyites and they discussed this problem with Fidel Castro. Castro promised not to let the so-called Trotskyites return to Peru until the others were already in place and in command of the several fronts. Some of the avowed Trotskyites were among the first to be sent back, however, and the MIR leaders are highly incensed. The leaders fear that the Trotskyites will endanger the movement, and they have been especially disturbed to find that two Cuban officers, who are known to be Trotskyites, had accompanied them from Cuba.

17. The Agency asset had first estimated that it would take at least two months for all of the Peruvians to return. The re-entry program had fallen approximately a month behind schedule because of unexpected problems of transferring funds and obtaining documents. Moreover, a Communist group in one of the neighboring countries which was to help them began to charge exorbitant amounts for its assistance. The Peruvians were obliged to wait until additional money was brought to them by courier.

18. The agent also estimated that at least another month or two would be required to complete plans for the revolution after all of the trainees were back. The leaders of the trainees complained that the MIR had not made adequate plans to receive the groups and had not developed its revolutionary plans soundly.

19. Recently, however, the operation has been increasing in tempo. The leaders of the MIR have been putting additional pressures on our asset and on others in the chain to speed up re-entry. A number of the trainees have spread out to small neighboring towns, ready to cross the border into Peru clandestinely. False documentation of these nearby countries is also being procured to assist others to cross into Peru "legally".

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10065
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Draft Briefing Notes: Funding
DATE : 2/18/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 59: Cuba Subjects, Cuban Subversion, 2/18/1963. Box 1

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy ~~to ascertain and hard to~~ document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and

5

arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala.

5

E. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know

5

that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the

Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups, burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10073
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR :
FROM : Johnson
TO : Rostow
TITLE : Meeting of Vietnam Task Force June 19 1961
DATE : 6/20/1961
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 193: Vietnam General 6/19/1961-6/30/1961. Box 1

2 SECRET

Sanitized
NLK-75-26
NLK 02-31c, 1/03

June 20, 1961

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROSTOW

SUBJECT: Meeting of the Task Force on Viet Nam on June 19, 1961

Intelligence Briefing

Among the interesting items reported in the intelligence briefing was a response from Embassy Saigon on the Cambodian border problem. Embassy Saigon did not agree with the view of Embassy Phnom Penh that this is an insignificant problem. At present, Saigon reports, Cambodia is used primarily as a safe haven by guerrillas in Viet Nam rather than as an area from which operations are mounted. The Embassy provided specific information on VC activity in Cambodia which, it suggested, should be shown to Sihanouk. There was also a report that the Indian member of the ICC has stated in the ICC that that body should investigate subversion. This was said to have caused the Polish member to ask for a recess of the ICC in order to permit him to prepare a reply. (This report, if confirmed, is in line with an earlier TDCS indicating that instructions along these lines had gone to the Indian member of the ICC.)

It was also reported that on Friday there may have been a clash between Pathet Lao and South Vietnamese forces just inside Laos on the highway connecting Laos and South Viet Nam. (South Vietnamese forces have been in this area for some time.) The following table on operations for May was also presented.

	Killed	Captured	Surrendered	Deserted
Viet Cong	824	30	37	none
GVN	240	158	none	41

The Local Currency Costs Problem

Mr. Cottrell reported on the current status of the problem of meeting the local currency costs of the 20,000 man increase. A message has been sent to Saigon requesting the Embassy to undertake negotiations with the GVN and offering three alternatives in descending order of preference:

a. The U. S. would commit $5.1 million equivalent in piasters, provided the GVN proceeds without delay with mobilization and meets the balance of the local currency costs from its own resources.

SECRET

b. If the proposal under a above is not adequate to obtain GVN agreement, we would offer an additional $4.85 million in piasters. This is estimated to be sufficient to cover local currency costs in 1961 of the call-up of the additional 20,000 men.

c. If neither of the above proposals proves acceptable, the U. S. would offer an additional $4.55 million in assistance in 1961 which, if the GVN would accept a dollar/piaster rate of 73, would be sufficient to meet the piaster cost for 1961.

As of yesterday afternoon, no reaction had been obtained from Saigon. In a long conversation with Ben Wood, the Deputy Director of the Task Force, Thuan was told before he left the U. S. of our offer under a above. On the basis of this offer, he indicated that he would send instructions to Saigon to initiate the call-up of the 20,000 men, even in the absence of a final agreement. This problem, therefore, seems on its way toward solution.

The Situation in Laos in Relationship to South Viet Nam

A large part of the meeting was devoted to discussion of a draft memorandum that Cottrell read to the Task Force containing his ideas with respect to the situation in Laos and what should be done about it. You are generally familiar with his ideas as a result of your conversation yesterday with him. I did not attempt to take detailed notes on the memorandum, but his proposal runs along the following lines.

Cottrell does not believe that any arrangement to create a neutral Laos will be viable. He does not believe that we should withdraw in favor of the French in Laos. The French cannot be depended upon to do a good job and the reestablishment of their presence will be deeply resented throughout the former Indo-Chinese states. The military situation in Laos is alarming. The Pathet Lao are now posing a serious threat in southern Laos. Cottrell proposes that we seize upon some plausible excuse to break off the Geneva Conference. The failure of the ICC to stabilize the situation would provide such an excuse. He would then introduce Thai special forces and "hunter-killer" forces now being trained in South Viet Nam into southern Laos in an effort to clean out the Pathet Lao "infection" there. In the discussion of his proposal, the question was raised as to whether the introduction of U. S. forces would not be necessary. Cottrell acknowledged that this was a real possibility and emphasized the importance of our not letting our friends in Southeast Asia down by refusing to use force if that should prove necessary.

Members of the Task Force were asked for their reactions to the paper. There was a rather surprising degree of agreement that something along this line must be done or it will be virtually impossible to deal with the situation in South Viet Nam. (There was no State Department representative present at the time except Cottrell himself.) The ICA member and the representative of Jack Bell's office did raise questions as to whether political and economic action by the Diem regime was not a more important precondition to solution in Viet Nam than military action in Laos.

I made the following points about the proposal: First, I observed that this would seem to me to raise important questions of policy which had been considered and decided in the past at the highest levels of government. I indicated that I would be unable to take a personal stand on the issues raised. I expressed some surprise about the apparent unanimity of view that, unless we undertake military action in Laos, it would be virtually impossible to deal effectively with the situation in Viet Nam. I said that, while I could see no objection to the Viet Nam Task Force raising these questions, it seemed to me that they should be raised much more clearly in the context of the Viet Nam problem. That is, the proposed memorandum should make clear why the present situation in Laos will make it difficult, if not impossible, to carry out an effective program against the Viet Cong in Viet Nam. Cottrell agreed to take account of this suggestion (with which there seemed to be some agreement in the Task Force).

I ~~sympathize with~~ understand some of the feeling of frustration which has prompted Cottrell to produce his memorandum. I specifically share his doubts with respect to getting the French back into Laos. (I had thought that this proposal had been dropped as a result of adverse reaction from various sectors.) The Cottrell proposals, however, raise very directly the question of U. S. military intervention in Laos. It seems to me inconceivable that his objective could be achieved without such intervention. The proposals also would have the effect, it seems to me, of merging the war in Laos with the war in Viet Nam. I do not think that this would be a good idea.

I think that there is a serious question as to whether the situation in Laos is not deteriorating so ~~seriously~~ that any likely political solution will ~~not~~ leave it as a serious source of infiltration into both Viet Nam and Thailand. But I wonder whether this question cannot be better reviewed in the context of contingency planning for Laos itself. In this connection, I do feel that the military contingency plan that we have seen for Laos is based upon too narrow a contingency -- i. e., a clear failure to achieve a cease fire or the breaking of a cease fire by the Communists. We need to plan against the possibility that the Geneva Conference will be prolonged indefinitely and that meanwhile the PL will take over Southern Laos piece by piece and bit by bit as it appears to be doing. I wonder whether you want to check again with Alexis Johnson on the status of contingency planning? I wonder whether it isn't about time to have the NSC and the President review the Laos situation?

Other Matters

I raised the question as to the next step in consideration of Diem's proposal for a 100,000 man increase in GVN forces. I was told that the matter was being studied in Defense. It was the view of the DoD representative that the possibility of such an increase was academic until some time in 1963 because it would take until then to raise the 20,000 men already authorized and the 30,000 currently under consideration. (The 30,000 would be a part of the 100,000 since Diem was using a 170,000 man base.)

I also raised the question of whether food supplies were being cut off by the Viet Cong (as suggested to you by a Vietnamese.) I was told that the only current evidence of Viet Cong action in this area was the recent seizure of seven barges carrying sugar. However, it was also stated that the GVN has given this fear as an explanation for reduction in rice exports. That is, the GVN has withheld rice from international markets because of a fear that the rice may be needed in Viet Nam if the VC should begin to cut food supply lines. Thus it may be related to the argument about GVN foreign exchange ~~revenues~~ reserves.

There seemed to be no great concern in the Task Force with this as a current real problem. Following the meeting I talked to the ICA representative about whether it would be desirable to build up Vietnamese rice stocks to relieve them of their fear that rice supplies may be cut off and thus to permit them to sell more of their rice abroad. He indicated that politically it was very difficult to justify export of rice to Viet Nam which was itself a rice exporter.

(Today I talked with Jack King of CIA (ONE) about this question. He had not made a specific study of it, of course. It was his impression that, while there was some VC interference with rice movements, the problem was not one of independently serious proportions. That is, it was a reflection of the general VC problem which was serious, but not in itself a cause for alarm. It was also his impression that GVN exports of rice had been surprisingly well maintained.)

Finally, I raised the question of what planning was being done to internationalize the border problem. In response Cottrell simply referred to his plan for dealing with the situation in Laos. Today I talked with Bob Cleveland in State about the same point. He referred to the arrangements that are being made for a meeting of MAAG and USOM Chiefs of countries in the area sometime in July at which the border problem, among others, will be discussed. He also referred to the fact that Ben Wood is currently working on a counter insurgency plan to cover all of Southeast Asia. Defense had earlier been asked to prepare such a plan but had failed to do so. (I find a great inertia, apparently rooted in a basic lack of sympathy, whenever I attempt to raise the question of finding some means to involve the international community in the border question. Neither Cottrell nor the State Department representatives seem very much interested. Have you ever discussed this question with Alexis Johnson? I think it might be useful to do so.)

Following the meeting I followed up with Cottrell on the conversation you had had with him in the morning, asking him whether he didn't think it would be desirable to send General Taylor to South Viet Nam to consider the request for a 100,000 man increase and also to make sure that our military activities in South Viet Nam were really being reoriented. He reacted negatively to this proposal, taking the view that it was undesirable to continue sending missions out to inspect the work of people in the field. In a later conversation with someone else in State I got a much more favorable reaction to this idea. The more I think about it the more I am convinced that it would be highly desirable. I very much share your uneasy feeling about the situation.

RJ

Robert H. Johnson

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10078
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Opposition in Khanh Hoa Province
DATE : 9/13/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RETAIN OR DESTROY
FILE

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,229

SUBJECT
1. OPPOSITION IN KHANH HOA PROVINCE TO ARMING MOUNTAIN TRIBESMEN AND TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM
2. CONFLICT AMONG PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES

DATE DISTR. 13 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. LATE AUGUST 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7923

✓SMITH-BUNDY
_DUNGAN
_KAYSEN
IN _KILDUFF
_PETERSEN
_SCHLESINGER
_TAYLOR
BELK
FORRESTAL
_JOHNSON
_KLEIN
_KOMER
_RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEDIUM-LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR.

1. ON 29 AUGUST 1962 BUI BO, GENERAL SECRETARY, KHANH HOA PROVINCE COUNCIL, GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR (CVTC), AND MEMBER OF THE PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE, REPORTED TO CVTC HEADQUARTERS THAT KHANH HOA PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES ARE STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE AMERICAN POLICY OF ECONOMIC AID, TRAINING, AND ARMS FOR THE TRIBAL PEOPLE. THESE AUTHORITIES FEAR THAT THE TRIBESMEN MAY INDISCRIMATELY KILL INNOCENT VIETNAMESE, ESPECIALLY IN CASES WHERE THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS MINGLE WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE.

2. BO ALSO SAID THAT THE PEOPLE IN THE PROVINCE ARE OPPOSED TO THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, BECAUSE THEY ARE REQUIRED TO

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

PROVIDE TOO MUCH WORK, MATERIAL, AND MONEY. THIS OPPOSITION HAS BECOME SO STRONG THAT PROVINCIAL AUTHORITIES HAVE ISSUED ORDERS FORBIDDING ADDITIONAL DEMANDS FOR LABOR, MATERIAL, OR CASH.

3. BO REPORTED CONFLICT BETWEEN COMPETING FACTIONS IN THE PROVINCE, WHICH THE PROVINCE CHIEF, MAJOR LE TAP, IS UNABLE TO HANDLE. THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR SECURITY, BA (FNU), A CLOSE ASSOCIATE OF BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, IS MORE INFLUENTIAL THAN TAP. TRUONG DINH CAC, WHO HOLDS THE POSITION OF DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ECONOMIC MATTERS, A POSITION NOT NORMALLY FOUND IN PROVINCIAL ORGANIZATIONS, IS THE REAL POWER IN THE PROVINCE. CAC WAS ASSIGNED TO THE PROVINCE BY NGO DINH CAN, BROTHER OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND POLITICAL LEADER OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE OF BRINGING ALL MAJOR PROVINCIAL ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES UNDER THE CONTROL OF CAN AND HIS FACTION IN THE CAN LAO PARTY. BO DESCRIBED THE DEPUTY PROVINCE CHIEF FOR ADMINISTRATION, YANG (FNU), AS A GOOD MAN BUT COMPLETELY LACKING IN AUTHORITY.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10079
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Possible severence of Cambodian
DATE : 9/17/1962
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 9/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RETAIN OR DESTROY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CAMBODIA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/522,837

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SEVERANCE OF CAMBODIAN-SOUTH VIETNAMESE DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

DATE DISTR. 17 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. MID-SEPTEMBER 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7943

~~__SMITH BUNDY~~
__DUNGAN
__KAYSEN
__[illegible] 29561
__PETERSEN
__SCHLESINGER
~~__TAYLOR~~
~~__BELK~~
~~__FORRESTAL~~
__JOHNSON
__KLEIN
__KOMER
__RASKIN
__SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT ~~IS TENTATIVE.~~

SOURCE A SENIOR OFFICIAL (B) IN THE GENERAL CONFEDERATION OF VIETNAMESE LABOR

1. LE VAN DONG, FORMER MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE, SAID ON 14 SEPTEMBER 1962 THAT HE HAS BEEN ADVISED BY A RELIABLE SOURCE IN CAMBODIA THAT THE ROYAL CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT /RKG/ IS PLANNING TO SEVER RELATIONS WITH SOUTH VIETNAM. THE DECISION IS TO BE FORMALIZED AT A CABINET MEETING ON EITHER 19 OR 20 SEPTEMBER, AT WHICH TIME THE RKG MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE WILL REQUEST THE SEVERANCE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

FORM 5-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-2

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10085
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Vietnamese Communist Analysis of Efforts
DATE : 6/13/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

RETAIN OR DESTR

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

~~SMITH~~.BUNI
DUNGAN
GILDNER
KAYSEN
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGE
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/513,760

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF INCREASED US MILITARY AID TO GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 13 JUNE 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 5 MAY 1962

REFERENCES FILE IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (20 MAY 1962)

APPRAISAL IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THIS IS AN ACCURATE TRANSLATION OF A GENUINE COMMUNIST DOCUMENT

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7504

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL (C) IN THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, FROM A SOURCE DESCRIBED AS HEAD OF AN INTELLIGENCE NET REPORTING DIRECTLY TO THE DEPUTY MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.

Bundy

1. SET FORTH BELOW IS A TRANSLATION OF AN ANALYSIS OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) AS VIEWED BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). THE AUTHOR OF THE ANALYSIS, WHICH WAS WRITTEN IN EARLY MAY 1962, IS A VC COMPANY COMMANDER IN BA XUYEN PROVINCE.

2. THE REVOLUTION IN SVN IS PASSING NOW INTO THE PREPARATORY PHASE FOR A GENERAL OFFENSIVE TO LIBERATE IT (SVN) AND SET UP A PEOPLE'S UNION DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT, BUT AMERICAN INTERVENTION HAS POSTPONED THAT PHASE. THE US' HALF SUCCESS IS DUE TO USE OF COUNTERGUERRILLA TACTICS, BUT MOPPING UP OPERATIONS WILL LEAD TO DEFEAT BECAUSE (INDISCRIMINATE) KILLINGS WILL PUSH THE PEOPLE TOWARD THE REVOLUTIONARY PARTY. IN THE FUTURE THE FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF SVN, WITH

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA
VTF													EXO		

ITS HIGH-SACRIFICE SPIRIT AND ITS HATE-AMERICA IDEALS, WILL GET 90 PERCENT SUPPORT FROM THE PEOPLE. ON THE MILITARY SIDE, THE US HAS USED ULTRA-MODERN MECHANIZED WEAPONS TO DESTROY ARMED UNITS BY TACTICS OF AREA PACIFICATION. THUS HARRASSED, THE VC ARE NEVER SECURE. THEIR POLICIES MUST NOW AIM AT THE INTERNAL SITUATION AND AT UPHOLDING THE HARDSHIP-BEARING SPIRIT. MEANWHILE, VC ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS DO NOT YET EXIST, BUT THE PEOPLE HAVE BEEN INSPIRED BY THE REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT OF THE PARTY. ECONOMICALLY, VC AGRARIAN REFORMS HAVE SOLVED THE LAND PROBLEM FOR THE PEASANTS AND NOW CONSTITUTE THE FOOD SOURCE FOR THE TROOPS AND CADRES.(SOURCE COMMENT. "VC AGRARIAN REFORMS" REFER TO THE DE FACTO LAND EXPROPRIATIONS CONDUCTED BY THE VIET MINH DURING THE 1945-54 WAR.) FOREST AND SEA RESOURCES ARE STILL SECONDARY AND BRING IN ONLY SOME SUPPORT IN THE FORM OF TAXES. THE VC ARE MEETING GREAT DIFFICULTIES AT THE PRESENT TIME, BUT THE SVN PROBLEM WILL BE SOLVED BY INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND INTERNAL MILITARY MEASURES, I.E. STRONG ATTACKS. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE SOLUTION THROUGH "INTERNATIONAL POLITICS" REFERS TO THE BELIEF THAT, IF THE VC CAN MAINTAIN THE PRESENT RELATIVE STALEMATE LONG ENOUGH, THE US WILL TIRE OF THE STRUGGLE AND SEEK SOME KIND OF NEUTRALIST SOLUTION.)

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10086
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Views...Possible Coup D'Etat
DATE : 6/15/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 6/62. Box 2

1.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/513,973
SUBJECT	VIEWS OF COLONEL TON THAT XUNG ON THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT	DATE DISTR.	15 JUNE 1962
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY JUNE 1962	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 JUNE 1962)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-7484

~~SMITH BUNDY~~
_ DUNGAN
_ GILDNER
_ KAYSEN
_ PETERSEN
_ SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
____
_ BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
_ KOMER
_ RASKIN

RETAIN OR DESTROY

FILE

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM COLONEL TON THAT XUNG.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT XUNG HOLDS THE VIEWS STATED; HOWEVER, THE CONTENTS OF THE STATEMENTS ARE CONSIDERED POSSIBLY TRUE.

1. COLONEL TON THAT XUNG, COMMANDER OF THE RANGER COMMAND, DURING A 3 JUNE 1962 LUNCHEON MEETING WITH TON THAT CHU, CHIEF OF PLEIKU PROVINCE, SAID THAT THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM WERE GETTING TIRED OF THE PRESENT SITUATION AND THAT SOME ACTION WAS GOING TO BE TAKEN TO CHANGE IT. THIS TIME, HOWEVER, THE PLANS WERE NOT GOING TO BE COMMUNICATED TO THE AMERICANS BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES, A BASICALLY LAW-ABIDING NATION, IS OPPOSED TO UNLAWFUL ACTS. SINCE A COUP D'ETAT IS CONSIDERED BY AMERICAN OFFICIALS TO BE AN UNLAWFUL PROCESS, THE US IS FORCED TO DISCOURAGE SUCH ACTIONS, AND THEREFORE, THE AMERICANS WILL NOT BE NOTIFIED OF ANY FUTURE ACTIVITY ON THE PART OF THE VIETNAMESE TO UPSET THE CURRENT REGIME UNTIL THE ACTION IS ACCOMPLISHED.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	AID
VTF												EXO			

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10087
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Vietnam Communist Activities
DATE : 8/23/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Vietnam, 8/62. Box 2

[illegible] 196·6·1·0

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FILE

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/520,365

SUBJECT VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST ACTIVITIES IN THE SAIGON AREA

DATE DISTR. 23 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. JUNE-JULY 1962

RETAIN OR DESTROY

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7843

~~SMITH~~-BUNDY
~~DUNGAN~~
~~HANSEN~~
__KILDUFF
__PETERSEN
__SCHLESINGER
IN 10297
__BELK
__FORRESTAL
__JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
__RASKIN
__SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM MILITARY SERVICE WHICH RECEIVED THE ITEMS SEPARATELY FROM OTHER OFFICIAL SERVICES.

1. DURING THE LATTER HALF OF JUNE 1962 MORE THAN FIVE HUNDRED UNARMED VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) ENTERED THE SAIGON AREA AND WERE LIVING IN THE HOMES OF FELLOW VC IN THE FOURTH AND EIGHT DISTRICTS OF SAIGON. (FIELD COMMENT. THE ULTIMATE SOURCE OF THIS INFORMATION MAY BE THE SAME AS THAT OF FVS-7681 (TDCS-3/517,156) WHICH REPORTED THAT BETWEEN THREE AND FIVE HUNDRED VC TERRORISTS AND SABOTAGE AGENTS HAD BEEN INFILTRATED INTO THE CAPITAL AREA.)

2. THE VC DISTRICT COMMITTEE FOR GO VAP (N 10-49, E 106-40) SENT AN ARMED PLATOON TO THE CITY TO OPERATE AS SPECIAL OPERATIONS CELLS.

3. A VC CADRE, AFTER TAKING A TRAINING COURSE IN LOC THUAN, TAY NINH PROVINCE, WAS SENT TO SAIGON TO SET UP A BASE AMONG LABORERS

TO BE USED FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS.

4. FORTY VC GUERRILLAS BETWEEN 14 AND 16 YEARS OF AGE HAD COME TO SAIGON TO CONDUCT SABOTAGE AND KIDNAPPINGS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND U.S. PERSONNEL.

5. AN UNCONFIRMED REPORT SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG DINH HAD BEEN APPOINTED COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ARMY IN ORDER TO LAUNCH A LARGE-SCALE ATTACK DURING THE VC FALL AND WINTER CAMPAIGN. (FIELD COMMENT. POSSIBLY MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN TRONG VINH, DEPUTY OF NGHE AN PROVINCE TO THE SECOND NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OF THE PEOPLES GOVERNMENT OF NORTH VIETNAM, IS MEANT.)

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10088
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Indication of Planning
DATE : 11/20/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 11/62. Box 2

Sanitized via [illegible] 1/15 NK. VI. 177. 1. 2. 2   9

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/NORTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/528,813 FILE

SUBJECT INDICATION OF PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 20 NOVEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. LATE OCTOBER 1962

REFERENCES IN

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (2 NOVEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8188

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) IN THE DIRECTORATE GENERAL OF INFORMATION; FROM A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F) IN THE MINISTRY FOR CIVIC ACTION.

1. ON 20 OCTOBER 1962 MINISTER FOR CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU TOLD THREE OF HIS ASSISTANTS THAT HE HAD BEEN DIRECTED TO ASSIST IN PLANNING FOR THE REOCCUPATION OF NORTH VIETNAM. THE PLANNING WOULD PROGRESS THROUGH MANY STAGES, BUT THE THREE ASSISTANTS WERE FIRST TO DRAFT A QUESTIONNAIRE THAT WAS TO BE FILLED OUT BY SELECTED PEOPLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM. IN ADDITION TO THIS FORM, PEOPLE WHO FORMERLY LIVED IN NORTH VIETNAM WOULD BE REQUIRED TO COMPLETE A SECOND QUESTIONNAIRE, WHICH WAS TO PROVIDE INFORMATION ON ALL ACQUAINTANCES STILL KNOWN TO BE IN NORTH VIETNAM. THE DRAFT QUESTIONNAIRE WAS LATTER SUBMITTED TO HIEU.

2. FIELD COMMENT. FVS-8137, TDCS-3/527,406, REPORTED, IN PARAGRAPH 3, NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENT AT THE 5 OCTOBER MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS THAT THE SELF-DEFENSE CORPS MUST BECOME PART OF A

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L   NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	F	O
STATE/DIR																		

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

REARMED POPULACE, WHICH WOULD CARRY THE BATTLE FORWARD INTO LAOS, CAMBODIA, AND NORTH VIETNAM. FVS-7934, TDCS-3/522,275, REPORTED THAT NHU, COMMENTING ON HIS 17 AUGUST REMARKS AT QUI NHON ABOUT A "MARCH TO THE NORTH" ASSERTED THAT THIS DID NOT IMPLY A MILITARY MARCH, BUT WAS HIS CONCEPT THAT THE SUCCESS OF THE SOCIAL, ECONOMIC, AND POLITICAL REVOLUTION IN SOUTH VIETNAM WOULD BE AN ATTRACTION FOR THE PEOPLE IN THE NORTH AND WOULD GRADUALLY UNDERMINE THE COMMUNIST DICTATORSHIP THERE. PARAGRAPH 4 OF FVS-7867, CS-3/522,559, REPORTING A NEW VERSION OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY TO TIE IN THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WITH THE FLIGHT OF THE MOUNTAIN PEOPLE FROM THE HIGH PLATEAU OF CENTRAL VIETNAM, STATED THAT THE THIRD EPOCH OF VIETNAMESE HISTORY WAS OCCURRING, AND THAT THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE WERE NOW RETURNING TOWARD THE NORTH THROUGH THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC ARPAC PACFLT PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10094
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Ngo Dinh Nhu's Statement on Withdrawal of
DATE : 4/20/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

✓ Bundy ✓

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/544,531

SUBJECT NGO DINH NHU'S STATEMENTS ON WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID

DATE DISTR. 20 APRIL 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. LATE MARCH-EARLY APRIL 1963

REFERENCES IN 21850

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AND 12 APRIL 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE PARAGRAPH 7

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8804

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARAS 1 & 3: AMEDIUM LEVEL OFFICIAL (C) OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE.
PARAS 2 &4: A FIELD GRADE OFFICER (F) OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE.

---

1. AT THE 5 APRIL MEETING OF THE INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS, NGO DINH NHU MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS CONCERNING AMERICAN FOREIGN AID:

A. THE AMERICANS HAVE STATED THAT THEY ARE GOING TO REVISE THEIR POLICY ON FOREIGN AID TO SOUTH VIETNAM; WE WILL REVISE OUR POLICY ON RECEIVING SUCH AID. WE MUST MARCH TOWARD THE ULTIMATE OBJECTIVE OF TERMINATING AMERICAN AID AND THE PEOPLE SHOULD LEARN TO DO WITHOUT SUCH ASSISTANCE.

B. AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE PLACED IN THE FOLLOWING CATE-

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

GORIES OF PRIORITY. FIRST, AID WHICH WE MUST CONTINUE TO RECEIVE INDEFINITELY, SPECIFICALLY THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION; WE WILL NOT SEEK A REDUCTION IN THIS CATEGORY, NOR WILL WE REQUEST AN INCREASE. SECOND AID WHICH CAN BE EVENTUALLY PHASED OUT. THIRD, AID WHICH CAN BE TEMINATED IMMEDIATELY.

C. ALL SHOULD BE INSTRUCTED ON THE ABOVE LIST OF PRIORITIES BUT IT SHOULD ALSO BE MADE CLEAR THAT THIS POLICY IS NOT INTENDED TO BE ANTIFOREIGN. FOREIGN AID WILL PROVIDE WITH THE MEANS OF PRODUCTION SO THAT WE CAN EVENTUALLY DO WITHOUT CONSUMER GOODS ASSISTANCE. WHETHER WE LIKE IT OR NOT, FOREIGN AID WILL CEASE SOONER OR LATER, AND SO WE MUST STRIVE TO BECOME SELF-SUFFICIENT. MEANWHILE WE MUST MAKE PROPER USE OF THE AID WE RECEIVE.

2. DURING THE LAST WEEK OF MARCH 1963 THE MINISTRY OF INTERIOR ON ORDERS FROM NHU, ISSUED TO ALL PROVINCE CHIEFS INSTRUCTIONS TO ENCOURAGE PEOPLE TO START PRODUCING WEAPONS, LAND MINES AND AMMUNITION IN HOME WORK SHOPS WITH THE AIM OF ATTAINING A DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY.

3. ON ABOUT 5 APRIL PHAM DUC TIEN, CHIEF OF CIVIC ACTION IN PHUOC TUY PROVINCE, ATTENDED A CONFERENCE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS IN BINH TUY PROVINCE AT WHICH NGO DINH NHU SAID THAT THERE WERE TOO MANY AMERICAN ADVISORS IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND THAT BOTH THE NUMBER OF THESE ADVISORS AND THE AMOUNT OF AMERICAN AID SHOULD BE REDUCED.

4. AT A MEETING OF VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS ON 10

APRIL 1963, VNAF COMMANDER COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN SAID THAT NHU HAD INSTRUCTED HIGH-RANKING GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) OFFICIALS AT A 5 APRIL MEETING TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID; NHU SAID THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS USING AID AS A MEANS OF PRESSURING THE GVN AND WAS IMPINGING ON GVN SOVEREIGNTY. AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE USE OF AMERICAN AID TO PRESSURE A RECIPIENT COUNTRY, HIEN CITED THE CUTOFF OF DELIVERIES OF GASOLINE TO THE ROYAL THAI AIR FORCE WHEN THE THAI GOVERNMENT REFUSED TO AGREE TO SOME (UNSPECIFIED) POINT; HIEN SAID THAT THE DELIVERY OF GASOLINE RECOMMENCED ONLY AFTER STRONG THAI GOVERNMENT PROTESTATIONS. (FIELD COMMENT. PRESUMABLY HIEN REFERS TO THE REDUCTION AND EVENTUAL TERMINATION BY THE END OF FISCAL YEAR 1965 OF U.S. SUPPORT OF MILITARY AID PROGRAM POL AND MEDICAL SUPPLIES TO THE THAI GOVERNMENT.)

5. AFTER THE MEETING SEVERAL VNAF OFFICERS, INCLUDING MAJOR DANG DINH LINH, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR MATERIAL, MAJOR TRAN DO CUNG, ASSISTANT TO THE CHIEF OF STAFF, AND CAPTAIN HA DUONG DOAN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR BUDGET AND FINANCE, AGREED THAT THE VNAF WOULD BE UNABLE TO CONTINUE OPERATIONS WITHOUT AMERICAN SUPPORT AND THAT, IN FACT, ANY WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN SUPPORT WOULD RESULT IN COLLAPSE OF THE REGIME.

6. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FIELD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

7. APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 3 AND THAT INSTRUCTIONS WERE ISSUED AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 2. IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT NHU MADE THE STATEMENTS IN PARAGRAPHS 4 AND 5 CONCERNING THE UNITED STATES USING AID TO PRESSURE THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT HE TOLD GVN OFFICIALS TO PREPARE FOR A COMPLETE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN AID. THE REACTION OF THE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICERS TO HIEN'S VERSION OF NHU'S STATEMENTS IS PROBABLY TRUE.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10095
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 4/22/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET *(When Filled In)*

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCSDB-3/654,285
SUBJECT	INDICATIONS OF GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM PLAN TO REQUEST REDUCTION OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL IN VIETNAM	DATE DISTR.	22 APRIL 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-APRIL 1963	REFERENCES	IN 22329
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (18 APRIL 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8806

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (F), WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR IT IS POSSIBLY TRUE THAT BOTH DIEM AND NHU HAVE BECOME AT LEAST PARTIALLY UPSET OVER CERTAIN AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND OVER THE LARGE NUMBER OF AMERICAN PERSONNEL CURRENTLY IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

1. BY MID-APRIL 1963 A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF TENSION HAD DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT OVER OPERATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM. BOTH DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU WERE CONCERNED OVER RECENT "INFRINGEMENTS" OF VIETNAMESE SOVEREIGNTY. MAAG WAS CITED AS A VIOLATOR IN THIS CONNECTION, BUT THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES WERE SINGLED OUT AS THE MAIN IRRITANT. DIEM IS ALLOWING ADDITIONAL TIME FOR FURTHER BLUNDERS AND, AFTER BUILDING UP A STRONG CASE, HE PLANS TO CONFRONT AMBASSADOR NOLTING AND USMACV CHIEF GENERAL HARKINS WITH IRREFUTABLE EVIDENCE OF U.S. RESPONSIBILITY, DEMANDING A REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF U.S.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/NO DISSEM ABROAD

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[redacted]	[redacted]	OCI	ONE	OCR	[redacted]	[redacted]	[redacted]	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

SANITIZED NLK.01.197.6.6.3 1/15

PERSONNEL IN SOUTH VIETNAM ON THE BASIS THAT THE FORCE IS TOO LARGE AND UNMANAGEABLE.

2. SOME VIETNAMESE INVOLVED IN CLOSE WORKING RELATIONSHIPS WITH AMERICANS WERE BEING QUESTIONED IN DETAIL BY PRESIDENCY STAFF MEMBERS AS TO U.S. ACTIVITIES. SOME OF THE INDIVIDUALS QUESTIONED HAD INDICATED TO THE PRESIDENCY THAT THE U.S. MILITARY, AND PARTICULARLY THE U.S. SPECIAL FORCES, ALTHOUGH GENERALLY WELL MOTIVATED, DID NOT SEEM TO UNDERSTAND THE NECESSITY FOR COORDINATING THEIR ACTIVITIES WITH APPROPRIATE VIETNAMESE AUTHORITIES.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), MAAG (GENERAL TIMMES), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10097
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 4/25/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

[illegible]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/544,961
SUBJECT	VIET CONG CONCENTRATION ON TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY IN THE CAPITAL AREA	DATE DISTR.	25 APRIL 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY APRIL 1963	REFERENCES	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 APRIL 1963)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8792

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM INTELLIGENCE SERVICE; FROM SOURCES DESCRIBED AS VIET CONG PENETRATIONS.

— 1. IN EARLY APRIL 1963, WARD-LEVEL OFFICIALS IN THE VIET CONG (VC) SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE WERE INFORMED THAT TERRORIST AND MILITARY SUBVERSION ACTIVITY WOULD BE INCREASED. THE AREA TERRORIST ORGANIZATION WOULD OPERATE UNDER DISTRICT ORGANIZATIONS, WHEREAS PREVIOUSLY IT HAD BEEN DIRECTLY AND SOLELY RESPONSIBLE TO THE SPECIAL ZONE COMMITTEE. EVERY DISTRICT MUST DEVELOP ONE OR TWO TERRORIST GROUPS CONSISTING OF THREE CELLS EACH. OPERATIONS OF THESE GROUPS WOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO THEIR OWN DISTRICTS BUT COULD BE EXPANDED THROUGHOUT THE ENTIRE ZONE, AS OPPORTUNITIES AROSE. AMERICANS WERE TO BE THE PRIMARY TARGETS OF ALL OPERATIONS.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	DD/I
STATE/DIR																	EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

SANITIZED NLK · 01 · 197 · 6 · 8 · 1 1/15

2. VC COUNTERPROPAGANDA PERSONNEL OF THE SAIGON-CHOLON-GIA DINH SPECIAL ZONE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUSPEND ALL ACTIVITY AND AWAIT TRANSFER ORDERS. THEY UNDERSTAND THAT MANY WOULD BE TRANSFERRED INTO MILITARY SUBVERSION ORGANIZATIONS IN THE AREA.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV AID MAAG USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10098
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 5/18/1963
PAGES : ~~5~~ 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

[illegible] NLK-81-327 5

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

3 Vietnam

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,672

SUBJECT PLANS FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM BY THE REFORMED VNQDD

DATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. EARLY MAY 1963

REFERENCES IN 41761

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (13 MAY 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 8959

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NEWSPAPERMAN (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE VNQDD IS BEING REFORMED; ITS CAPABILITIES IN CENTRAL VIETNAM CANNOT BE JUDGED.

1. SHORTLY AFTER THE 8 MAY 1963 INCIDENT IN HUE, NGUYEN VAN LUC RECEIVED A PLAN FOR A COUP D'ETAT IN CENTRAL VIETNAM FROM THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CENTRAL VIETNAM THOAT XAC PHONG TRAO (TXPT). (SOURCE COMMENT.. TXPT DOES NOT TRANSLATE MEANINGFULLY INTO ENGLISH. THOAT HAS THE CONNOTATION OF GOING OUT IN MIND AND SPIRIT; XAC MEANS BODY, I.E., PHYSICALLY; PHONG TRAO MEANS MOVEMENT THUS, THE MOVEMENT OF MIND, SPIRIT, AND BODY MIGHT BE ONE TRANSLATION; A BETTER ONE WOULD BE VNQDD.) THE TXPT HAS BEEN DEVELOPING SINCE 1958 FROM THE / VIETNAM QUOC DAN DANG (VNQDD) VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST PARTY), PARTICULARLY THOSE ELEMENTS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM,

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OSI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK. 01. 197. 6. 10. 8

THE VNQDD STRONGHOLD. THE TXPT, ALTHOUGH COMPOSED ENTIRELY OF FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS, WAS ESTABLISHED ESSENTIALLY AS A BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION AND HAS BEEN LEGALLY ENGAGED IN CIVIC AND SOCIAL ACTIVITIES SINCE ITS FORMATION. CLANDESTINE POLITICAL ORGANIZATION HAS PROCEEDED FOR THE PURPOSE OF DEVELOPING NEW, YOUNGER LEADERS, AND OF DENYING THE OLDER PASSIVE TENETS OF BUDDHISM AS WELL AS THE OLDER LEADERS OF THE VNQDD, THE ULTIMATE INTENT BEING A REVITALIZED REVOLUTIONARY SPIRIT. (FIELD COMMENT. LUC IS THE FATHER AND ACCOMPLICE OF NGUYEN VAN CU, ONE OF THE TWO PILOTS WHO BOMBED THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE ON 27 FEBRUARY 1962.)

2. THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE REMINDED LUC THAT THE ORGANIZATION WAS IN A POSITION TO HANDLE A COUP ACTION IN CENTRAL VIETNAM EFFECTIVELY, POINTING OUT THAT THOSE MILITARY UNITS NOT CONTROLLED COULD BE NEUTRALIZED AND THAT THE AIR BASE AT DA NANG COULD BE CONTROLLED THROUGH THE AIR FORCE. THE COMMITTEE STATED THAT, AFTER THE ANTI-BUDDHIST ACTIONS OF THE GOVERNMENT, THE PEOPLE WERE READY FOR AN UPRISING. BY TAKING NGO DINH CAN AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC INTO CUSTODY AND BY GAINING MILITARY CONTROL OVER THUA THIEN AND QUANG NAM PROVINCES, SUCCESS COULD BE ASSURED IN CENTRAL VIETNAM. THIS WOULD PLACE THE TXPT IN A POSITION OF USING PRESIDENT DIEM'S TACTICS OF NEGOTIATIONS AGAINST HIM, I.E., HAVING GAINED CONTROL OVER CENTRAL VIIETNAM , THEY WOULD OFFER TO NEGOTIATE WITH DIEM

AND , AT THE SAME TIME, THEY WOULD BE MOUNTING A COUP AGAINST THE REGIME IN SAIGON, WHICH WOULD TAKE PLACE NO LATER THAN THREE DAYS AFTER THE ONE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM.

3. LUC SENT A TRUSTED FOLLOWER, ONE VIET , TO SAIGON TO DISCUSS THE PLAN WITH AN OPPOSITIONIST SYMPATHIZER AND GET HIS VIEWPOINT. VIET WAS ADVISED TO TELL LUC THAT ANY SUCH ACTION WAS PRECIPITATE AND DANGEROUS. ALTHOUGH IT WAS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE FORMER VNQDD MEMBERS IN CENTRAL VIETNAM HAD THE POWER CLAIMED, A COUP THERE, WITHOUT SIMULTANEOUS ACTION IN SAIGON, WOULD LEAVE A VACUUM WHICH THE VIET CONG (VC) COULD IMMEDIATELY USE TO THEIR OWN ADVANTAGE. VC REACTION PROBABLY WOULD TAKE THE FORM OF GAINING CONTROL OF ALL AREAS NOT EFFECTIVELY CONTROLLED BY THE COUP GROUP, WITH THE ULTIMATE POSSIBILITY OF PARTITIONING CENTRAL VIETNAM, OF BEING IN A POSITION TO FORM A REVOLUTIONARY GOVERNMENT, AND FINALLY, OF BEING ABLE TO CALL FOR NEGOTIATIONS THEMSELVES. ACCORDING TO VIET, THIS FOLLOWED LUC'S THINKING, PARTICULARLY BECAUSE HIS FOLLOWERS WERE NOT IN A POSITION TO ACT IN THE SOUTHERN PART OF THE COUNTRY. VIET THOUGHT THAT LUC WOULD INSTRUCT THE TXPT CENTRAL COMMITTEE IN CENTRAL VIETNAM TO TAKE NO ACTION AT THIS TIME, AND THAT LUC'S ADVICE WOULD BE ACCEPTED.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV USOM MAAG USIS CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10099
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Central Intelligence Agency Information Report
DATE : 5/18/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 4/63-5/63. Box 2

NLK-81-307 + upheld 6-1-84

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/547,646

SUBJECT APPREHENSIONS OF VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL IN SINGAPORE REGARDING RECENT EVENTS IN VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 18 MAY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 17 MAY 1963

REFERENCES IN 41548

PLACE & DATE ACQ. SINGAPORE (17 MAY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FSS 12881

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B) FROM VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG.

APPR: CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG HAS BEEN AN ARDENT AND DEVOTED SUPPORTER OF THE PRESIDENTAND OF NGO DINH NHU'S CAN LAO PARTY. HE IS A CATHOLIC AND A FRIEND AND SUPPORTER OF DR. TUYEN. THIS REPORT IS BELIEVED TO REFLECT ACCURATELY HIS VIEWS WHICH ARE FELT TO BE REASONABLY OBJECTIVE AS WELL AS SINCERE.

1. SUMMARY. VIETNAMESE CONSUL GENERAL TRAN KIM PHUONG CONSIDERS THAT THE COMBINATION OF THREE UNWISE POLITICAL ACTS IN THE PAST MONTH MAY ULTIMATELY PROVE FATAL TO THE REGIME OF PRESIDENT NGU DINH DIEM DESPITE ITS GAINS IN THE MILITARY STRUGGLE AGAINST THE VIET COMMUNISTS (VC). THESE THREE ACTS WERE: DISMISSAL OF HUYNH VAN LANG OF THE OFFICE OF EXCHANGES FROM HIS POSITION OF POWER IN THE SOUTHERN FACTION OF THE CAN LAO (REVOLUTIONARY WORKER'S) PARTY; THE DENIGRATION AND REMOVAL FROM POWER AND AUTHORITY OF DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, DIRECTOR OF SEPES:; AND MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE HUE INCIDENT ON BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY 8 MAY IN WHICH BUDDHIST PARADERS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK-01-197-6-9-0

WERE KILLED BY THE CIVIL GUARD. EACH OF THESE SEPARATE ACTS HAS SERVED TO WEAKEN THE MOTIVATION OF DIFFERENT SEGMENTS OF VIETNAMESE AND TO FURTHER NARROW , POSSIBLY TO A FATAL DEGREE, THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE REGIME.

2. CONSUL GENERAL PHUONG FEARED THAT TUYEN'S DISMISSAL IN PARTICULAR WOULD CAUSE CONSIDERABLE INSECURITY AMONG LOYAL SUPPORTERS AND PUBLIC SERVANTS OF THE REGIME WHO KNOW DR. TUYEN'S RECORD OF LOYAL SERVICE TO THE PRESIDENT AND ESPECIALLY TO HIS BROTHER, PRESIDENTIAL COUNSELOR NGO DINH NHU. THESE OFFICIALS CAN CERTAINLY QUESTION WHETHER ANYONE'S POSITION IN THE REGIME IS SAFE IF TUYEN COULD FALL FROM FAVOR. PHUONG STATED THAT SEVERAL FRIENDS OF HIS WITH LONG RECORDS OF SERVICE TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AND TO THE PRESIDENTIAL FAMILY HAVE ALREADY WRITTEN TO HIM DESPONDENTLY ALONG THESE LINES. TUYEN HAD A BAD REPUTATION WITH MANY OFFICERS IN THE VIETNAMESE ARMY AND BUREAUCRACY AS THE HATCHETMAN AND TROUBLESHOOTER FOR NGO DINH NHU BUT NO ONE DOUBTED HIS DEVOTION TO NHU. YET NHU HAS STRIPPED HIM OF ALL REAL AUTHORITY SUPPOSEDLY BECAUSE OF A SILLY WOMEN'S TIFF BETWEEN MADAME NHU AND MADAME TUYEN. ANY OBJECTIVE GVN OFFICIAL MIGHT QUESTION THE FRIVOLITY, INGRATITUDE AND LACK OF PERSPECTIVE OF A REGIME THAT ACTS THUS.

3. FURTHERMORE TUYEN WAS ONE OF THE FEW REMAINING GVN OFFICIALS IN HIGH POSITION RESPECTED BY OPPOSITION LEADERS AND VIETNAMESE

INTELLECTUALS PARTICULARLY THOSE FROM NORTH VIETNAM. THOSE WHO DID NOT LIKE HIM AT LEAST TRUSTED HIS FAIRNESS AND BASIC EMPATHY WHEREAS THEY NEITHER TRUSTED NOR LIKED NHU EVEN THOUGH NHU HIMSELF WAS AN INTELLECTUAL.

4. WITHIN THE CAN LAO PARTY, WHICH IS STILL ONE OF THE SECRET MAINSPRINGS OF SUPPORT IN VIETNAM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND THE NGO FAMILY, THE PARALLEL REMOVAL FROM AUTHORITY OF HUYNH VAN LANG HAS OCCASIONED SIMILAR DOUBTS AMONG THE PARTY'S RANK -AND-FILE. AS IN TUYEN'S CASE, CAN LAO MEMBERS CAN QUESTION WHAT VALUE IS LOYALTY AND SERVICE IF A MAN LIKE LANG CAN LOSE HIS POST.

5. THE EVEN MORE SERIOUS MISTAKE WHICH MAY NARROW THE BASE OF SUPPORT FOR THE GVN TO A FATAL DEGREE WAS THE SHOOTING OF BUDDHIST PARADERS AT HUE ON THE OCCASION OF BUDDHA'S BIRTHDAY. THE HUE REGIME OF CENTRAL VIETNAM COUNSELOR NGO DINH CAN HAS ALWAYS OPERATED LIKE AN AUTONOMOUS POLICE STATE AND HAS BEEN NOTORIOUS FOR ITS FAVORITISM TOWARD CATHOLICS, BELYING PRESIDENT DIEM'S EARLIER REPUTATION FOR RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE. MANY VIETNAMESE CATHOLICS FEAR THAT THE GVN'S INCREASING PRO-CATHOLIC BENT WILL BE HARMFUL TO THE CHURCH AS WELL AS TO THE REGIME. CERTAINLY THE STUPID SUPPRESSION OF BUDDHIST RELIGIOUS FLAGS AT HUE ON 8 MAY (ON PRETEXT THAT THEY MIGHT BE CONSTRUED AS CONNECTED TO VC COMMEMORATION OF THE DIEN BIEN PHU VICTORY)

AND CONSEQUENT FATALITIES WILL AROUSE THE ANTAGONISM OF PREDOMINANTLY

BUDDHIST VIETNAM AGAINST BOTH THE REGIME AND THE CATHOLICS.

6. FROM REPORTS REACHING HIM PHUONG FOUND IT PARTICULARLY SIGNIFICANT THAT WHEN CENTRAL VIETNAM AUTHORITIES ORDERED POLICE TO EXECUTE THE DIRECTIVE BANNING FLAGS, INITIALY THE POLICE MERELY RESTATED THE ORDER BUT WOULD NOT RIP DOWN ANY BUDDHIST FLAGS. FINALLY SEVERAL CATHOLIC POLICE DID SO, BUT SOME BUDDHIST POLICEMEN REFUSED, SAYING THAT BUDDHIST FLAGS SHOULD BE PERMITTED JUST AS CATHOLIC FLAGS ARE FLOWN ON SAINTS DAYS. SUCH DEFIANCE OF ORDERS AT HUE IS QUITE RARE, PHUONG SAID.

7. THE CROWNING INSULT TO BUDDHISTS WHICH WILL FURTHER ENFLAME THEM AND ALSO REVIVE THE OUTCRY AGAINST NGO FAMILY RULE WAS THE NEWS OF HUE ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC'S PLAN THAT THE PRESIDENT ASK BUDDHIST ASSOCIATIONS ELSEWHERE IN VIETNAM TO CONDEMN THE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE AND DISORDER OF THE HUE BUDDHISTS. ARCHBISHOP THUC REPORTEDLY WENT TO SAIGON TO DEMAND THIS. THE VC COULD NOT HAVE A BETTER PROPAGANDA WEAPON IF THEY HAD LAUNCHED THE INCIDENT AND DIRECTED THUC'S REACTION THEMSELVES.

8. BY SUCH ACTS THE REGIME IS DESTROYING CONFIDENCE AND LOYAL MOTIVATION OF PUBLIC SERVANTS, INTELLECTUALS, PARTY SUPPORTERS, AND THE MASS OF NON-CATHOLIC PEASANTRY IN ITS MOST CRUCIAL TIME. IF THIS CONTINUES ONLY SYCOPHANTS AND XENOPHOBES WILL PREDOMINATE IN THE GVN AND ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS PEOPLE, BUREAU-

CRACY, ARMY AND FRIENDLY ALLIES WILL DETERIORATE IN A WELTER OF PETTY JEALOUSIES, FEUDS, AND PREJUDICES.

9. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (CONGEN ONLY) CINCPAC PACAF PACFLT ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10102
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 3/19/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2

Sanitized via both RACS 11/15 23

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM/CHINA (TAIWAN)

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/540,863

FILE

SUBJECT DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DIEM AND VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG OF NATIONALIST CHINA

DATE DISTR. 19 MARCH 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 4-9 MARCH 1963

REFERENCES IN 89258

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5-12 MARCH 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-8661

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT, A CHINESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS IN THE CHINESE COMMUNITY, AND A MEMBER (F) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC ESTABLISHMENT IN SAIGON.

APPR. IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT LENGTHY DISCUSSIONS OCCURRED BETWEEN THE TWO LEADERS AND POSSIBLY TRUE THAT THE SUBJECTS INDICATED WERE COVERED.

1. DURING THE VISIT OF NATIONALIST CHINA'S (CHINAT) VICE PRESIDENT CHEN CHENG TO SOUTH VIETNAM FROM 4 TO 9 MARCH 1963, HE AND PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM CONVERSED IN EXCESS OF TWENTY HOURS, CHIEFLY IN PRIVATE WITH ONLY AN INTERPRETER PRESENT. THE SERIOUS NATURE OF THE CONVERSATIONS WAS EVIDENCED BY THE EXPRESSIONS ON THE FACES OF THE TWO MEN FOLLOWING THEIR VARIOUS CONVERSATIONS. THE CONTENTS OF THE CONVERSATIONS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN DISCUSSED WITH THE ADVISORS OF EITHER PARTICIPANT.

2. CHEN DELAYED HIS SCHEDULED DEPARTURE FROM SAIGON FOR 24 HOURS TO PERMIT HIM TO TRAVEL WITH DIEM TO DALAT, WHERE, EXCEPT FOR A BRIEF

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK·01·197·5·5·5

VISIT TO THE MILITARY SCHOOL, THE ENTIRE TIME WAS DEVOTED TO PRIVATE TALKS. MEMBERS OF THE CHEN ENTOURAGE WERE NOT NOTIFIED UNTIL THE LAST MOMENT OF THE REVISED SCHEDULE NOR WERE THEY GIVEN ANY INDICATION AS TO THE CONTENT OF THE DISCUSSIONS.

3. MEMBERS OF THE CHINAT DELEGATION AND OF THE CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY SPECULATED THAT THE TWO MAIN TOPICS OF CONVERSATION WERE GREATLY INCREASED CHINAT MILITARY SUPPORT FOR SOUTH VIETNAM, AND THE USE OF SOUTH VIETNAM AS A BASE FOR CHINAT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST THE CHINA MAINLAND. CHEN IS BELIEVED TO HAVE OFFERED DIEM UNRESTRICTED MILITARY TRAINING AND TECHNICAL SUPPORT, PLUS UP TO ONE DIVISION OF COMBAT TROOPS TO FIGHT IN VIETNAMESE ARMY UNIFORMS. CHEN IS ALSO THOUGHT TO HAVE ASKED DIEM TO CEASE DRAFTING OVERSEAS CHINESE IN VIETNAM, WHICH IS CAUSING THE CHINATS EMBARASSMENT, I.E., DEMONSTRATIONS BY THESE LOCAL CHINESE AGAINST THE CHINAT EMBASSY IN SAIGON AND APPEALS TO THE CHINAT AMBASSADOR. CHEN PROBABLY ASKED DIEM TO PUBLICLY SUPPORT THE CHINAT MAINLAND COUNTERATTACK THEME AND TO GRANT AIRFIELD AND COASTAL BASES FOR CHINAT MILITARY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE SOUTHERN AND WESTERN PORTIONS OF CHINA. OTHER LIKELY TOPICS OF CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE TWO MEN WERE THE CONDUCTING OF JOINT OPERATIONS INTO NORTH VIETNAM AND LAOS, THE MATTER OF THAILAND'S MOVEMENT TOWARDS NEUTRALITY, AND JOINT EFFORTS TO UNSEAT CAMBODIA'S SIHANOUK, WHOM THE CHINATS FEEL IS A LACKEY OF

PEIPING. CONCENSUS AMONG THE CHINAT COMMUNITY AND CHEN'S DELEGATION WAS THAT SOME ACCORD WAS REACHED BY THE TWO LEADERS, AS CHEN WAS IN EXCELLENT SPIRITS AT THE CONCLUSION OF HIS VISIT.

4. ALTHOUGH SOMEWHAT SLOW IN GETTING STARTED, THE VISIT DID RESULT IN BRINGING THE TWO GOVERNMENTS CLOSER TOGETHER, PARTICULARLY THE COUNTERPARTS OF THE TWO COUNTRIES. THE VISIT ALSO SERVED A USEFUL PURPOSE IN EFFECTIVELY IMPRESSING THE LOCAL CHINESE POPULATION, WHICH TURNED OUT MORE OR LESS SPONTANEOUSLY IN AN ESTIMATED ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND ALONG THE ROUTE TO THE AIRPORT TO CHEER CHEN WHEN HE DEPARTED. THE APPARENTLY GENUINE ENTHUSIASM OF THE USUALLY APATHETIC VIETNAMESE CHINESE CAME AS A SURPRISE EVEN TO THE LOCAL CHINAT DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10103
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 3/20/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam, 2/63-3/63. Box 2

VERSION
NLK-81-325

6

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

FILE

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/541,020
SUBJECT	THE SEEKING OF AMERICAN SUPPORT FOR THE OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME	DATE DISTR.	20 MARCH 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-MARCH 1963	REFERENCES	IN 89614
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 MARCH 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-8662

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C), WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AT THE PRESIDENCY.

APPR THIS REPORT IS TYPICAL OF VIEWS HELD BY CERTAIN OPPOSITIONISTS, INCLUDING THOSE IN THE FELLOW-TRAVELLING CATEGORY. COMMENTS OF THIS NATURE HAVE ALSO BEEN MADE BY GOVERNMENT PROVOKERS SEEKING TO PROVOKE AMERICAN REACTION. THE LINE THAT DIEM IS ACCEPTABLE, BUT THAT HIS FAMILY, ADMINISTRATION, AND PROGRAMS ARE NOT, IS ALSO CHARACTERISTIC OF VARIOUS OPPOSITION ELEMENTS AS WELL AS SOME SEGMENTS OF THE LEFT. THE ESTIMATE CONTAINED HEREIN ON A NUMBER OF SUBJECTS, INCLUDING THE APPRAISAL THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM OR TO AMERICAN OBJECTIVES, IS NOT ACCEPTED.

1. AMERICAN AID IS ESSENTIAL TO AN OVERTHROW OF THE DIEM REGIME, ACCORDING TO THE STATEMENTS MADE BY TWO REPRESENTATIVES OF A COMMITTEE OF NATIONALIST ANTI-COMMUNIST POLITICAL OPPOSITIONISTS IN MID-MARCH 1963, IN THE PRESENCE OF AN OFFICIAL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), WHO MAY ALSO BE A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE. THE COMMITTEE IS ENGAGED IN A STUDY OF THE PRESENT SITUATION IN SOUTH VIETNAM AND MAKING PLANS FOR ITS IMPROVEMENT. ALTHOUGH SEPES' CHIEF TRAN KIM TUYEN IS NOT A MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE, BECAUSE OF HIS POSITION, HE HAS PROVIDED CERTAIN SUPPORT FROM TIME TO TIME.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

SANITIZED NLK-01-197-5-7-3

THE TWO REPRESENTATIVES INDICATED THAT, IF AMERICAN AID IS NOT FORTHCOMING, OTHER SOURCES WILL BE CONTACTED. IF THE AMERICANS HELP THE NATIONALIST CAUSE OF THE OPPOSITIONISTS, THEY WILL HAVE SOME MEASURE OF CONTROL OVER THE RESULTS; OTHERWISE, THEY WILL HAVE NONE. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS 8654, TDCS-3/540,447, REPORTED AN EARLIER DISCUSSION BY THESE INDIVIDUALS.)

2. ACCORDING TO THESE OPPOSITIONISTS, THE COUNTRY HAS REACHED A COMPLETE IMPASSE AND SOMETHING MUST HAPPEN SOON. IF DIEM SHOULD DIE SUDDENLY, THE RESULT WOULD BE CHAOS, OUT OF WHICH THE COMMUNISTS WOULD EMERGE AS THE ONLY BENEFICIARIES. DIEM REMAINS IN POWER ONLY AS THE RESULT OF AMERICAN MILITARY SUPPORT, WITHOUT WHICH HE WOULD BE COMPLETELY LOST. THE DIEM GOVERNMENT IS WORSE THAN IMPOSSIBLE. THERE ARE A NUMBER OF GROUPS IN THE COUNTRY, SUCH AS THE HOA HAO AND THE CAO DAI, THAT ARE COMPLETELY OPPOSED TO COMMUNISM BUT CANNOT POSSIBLY SUPPORT THE PRESENT REGIME, WHEREAS THEY COULD SUPPORT SOME OTHER NATIONALIST TYPE OF GOVERNMENT. PRESIDENT DIEM IS PERSONALLY A DECENT AND HONORABLE MAN, BUT NGO DINH NHU AND HIS WIFE MUST BE ELIMINATED; WITHOUT THEM, IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO RE-ORIENT DIEM.

3. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM IS HIGHLY DANGEROUS BECAUSE, ALTHOUGH THE AMERICANS AND THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM ARE EITHER

UNAWARE OF OR UNWILLING TO FACE IT, THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS ARE HEAVILY INFILTRATED WITH VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC), WHOSE PRESENCE WILL MAKE ITSELF KNOWN IN DUE COURSE. THE REPUBLICAN YOUTH MOVEMENT IS ONLY A LONG SERIES OF MEETINGS AND IS COMPLETELY LACKING IN DEPTH AS AN ORGANIZATION; IT IS A SUPERFICIAL VENEER, GOING THROUGH VARIOUS FRUITLESS MOTIONS. THE PRINCIPAL CRITERION FOR SELECTION OF PROVINCIAL AND DISTRICT LEADERS IS PERSONAL OBEDIENCE TO THE REGIME; COMPETENCE IS ONLY AN AFTERTHOUGHT.

4. IF THE SITUATION CONTINUES IN ITS PRESENT VEIN, THERE WILL BE A RENEWED VC OFFENSIVE ON A LARGER SCALE SOON AFTER THE ONSET OF THE RAINY SEASON, WHEN BAD WEATHER REDUCES THE EFFECTIVENESS OF HELICOPTERS AND AIR CAPABILITY IN GENERAL. THIS WILL BEGIN NEAR THE SAIGON AREA, AND, AT THE SAME TIME THE VC WITHIN THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS WILL GO INTO ACTION.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION 2ND AIR DIVISION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10104
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 6/19/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 197: Vietnam,6/63. Box 2

SANITIZED VIA [illegible] 1/15 S 11

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Viet - Nam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS - 3/550,953

SUBJECT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WHITE PAPER ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE AND AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 19 JUNE 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 12-17 JUNE 1963

REFERENCES IN 62883

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JUNE 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9171

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH CONTACTS IN PRESS AND POLITICAL CIRCLES.

—

1. ON 17 JUNE 1963 GENE GREGORY OF THE TIMES OF VIETNAM SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RETUNED FROM DALAT WHERE HE HAD SPENT FIVE DAYS WORKING ON A WHITE PAPER SETTING FORTH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM POSITON NOT ONLY ON THE BUDDHIST ISSUE BUT ALSO ON THE ENTIRE QUESTION OF AMERICAN PRESENCE AND POLICY IN SOUTH VIETNAM. GREGORY SAID THAT MADAME NGO DINH NHU HAD ASKED HIM TO PREPARE THE PAPER AND, IN FACT, HE LIVED IN THE NHU VILLA IN DALAT WHILE HE WORKED ON IT.

2. GREGORY SAID THAT ONE OF THE PRINCIPAL POINTS WHICH MADAME

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SANITIZED NLK·01·197·7·2·6

FORM 5-62 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-

NHU SUGGESTED BE INCLUDED IN THE PAPER WAS A COMPARISON OF SOUTH VIETNAM WITH THE UNITED STATES WHERE GANGSTERISM AND RACE RIOTS EXISTED, THE CONCLUSION BEING THAT THE DIEM REGIME WAS NOT REALLY TOO BAD AFTER ALL.

3. GREGORY STATED THAT THE WHITE PAPER CONSISTED OF OVER TWENTY PAGES, WAS NOT FOR LOCAL CONSUMPTION, BUT WILL BE DISTRIBUTED INTERNATIONALLY, DIRECTED PRIMARILY AT THE UNITED STATES BUT POSSIBLY ALSO FRANCE AND ENGLAND.

4. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10113
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 7/12/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

S. Vietnam 50

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-81-269; NLK-89-15+
DOWNGRADED

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS DB-3/655,517
SUBJECT	COUP D'ETAT PLAN OF NGO DINH NHU	DATE DISTR.	12 JULY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	11-12 JULY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 78592
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (12 JULY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS 9305

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A GENERAL OFFICER (B) WHO EITHER ATTENDED THE MEETING OR WHO ACQUIRED THE INFORMATION FROM AN OFFICER WHO ATTENDED THE MEETING.

APPRAISAL: NGO DINH NHU IS PROBABLY PLANNING A COUP; HOWEVER, THE TIMING OF THE COUP ATTEMPT AND THE GENERALS WHO ARE SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED ARE UNKNOWN.

1. (SUMMARY: NGO DINH NHU PROPOSED TO ARMY GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THEY STAGE A COUP D'ETAT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THIS COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT AND THE ARMY SHOULD TURN OVER CONTROL TO CIVILIANS ON THE NEXT DAY.)

2. NGO DINH NHU TOLD A GROUP OF GENERAL OFFICERS ON 11 JULY 1963 THAT THE GOVERNMENT WAS MAKING NO PROGRESS IN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIET CONG OR IN OTHER PROGRAMS AND THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST PROVIDE THE ACTION REQUIRED. THE GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE BEEN CONTINUALLY HUMILIATED IN THE EYES OF THE PEOPLE AND IN ORDER TO REGAIN POPULAR RESPECT THEY MUST ENGINEER A COUP D'ETAT.

CONFIDENTIAL
~~SECRET~~
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	[illegible]	[illegible]	OCI	ONE	OCR	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE TO: DIRNSA (PROD WO)
STATE (RCI) (FOR HUGHES)
JCS
CNO (OP 922 Y 1)

AFSSO
DIA/CIIC
NIC
DFI/ACSI

WHITE HOUSE
SIT ROOM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

NHU SAID THAT HE WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY, NHU SAID THAT THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST SUPPORT HIM.

3. NHU SAID THAT HE WAS NOT IN ACCORD WITH THE PRESIDENT OR WITH THE ADMINISTRATION IN GENERAL. ALTHOUGH MANY PROBLEMS HAVE BEEN HANDED TO HIM, HE HAS HAD NO REAL POWER TO FORCE THE PRESIDENT OR OTHERS TO MAKE DECISIONS OR TO TAKE NECESSARY ACTION. ONLY WITHIN THE PAST YEAR, IN FACT, HAS HE HAD ANY OFFICIAL POSITION, I.E., DIRECTOR OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.

4. NHU SAID THAT THE ARRIVAL OF A NEW U.S. AMBASSADOR WOULD BRING ABOUT CHANGES AND THAT FAST ACTION WAS NECESSARY; IMMEDIATE DECISIONS MUST BE REACHED IF THE COUP IS TO OCCUR. THIS WAS THE ONLY CHANCE FOR SUCCESS. THE ARMY MUST SEIZE THE TROUBLE-MAKERS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE BUDDHIST MOVEMENT MUST BE QUELLED. NHU QUALIFIED THIS STATEMENT BY ADDING THAT HE DID NOT MEAN THE BUDDHISTS PER SE BUT THE FIVE RINGLEADERS, WHO WERE TO BLAME BECAUSE THEY HAD USED THEIR RELIGION TO FURTHER THEIR OWN AMBITIONS AND DESIGNS.

5. NHU CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT THE COUP MUST BE STAGED OVERNIGHT; IT MUST BE LIGHTNING FAST AND PROBABLY ALL THAT WOULD BE NEEDED WOULD BE A SHOW OF FORCE. ON THE FOLLOWING DAY, THE GENERAL OFFICERS MUST TURN THE GOVERNMENT OVER TO CIVILIAN CONTROL. IN RESPONSE TO A STATEMENT FROM MAJOR GENERAL NGUYEN NGOC LE, CHIEF OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, THAT SUCH AN ACTION REQUIRED

MAJOR DECISIONS AND A PLAN, NHU SAID THAT HE AND HIS WIFE AND THE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD HAVE THE REQUIRED PLAN. NHU COMMENTED THAT HE REALIZED THAT HIS WIFE WAS NOT LIKED BY MANY PEOPLE BUT THAT SHE HAD TRIED TO HELP IN THE FIGHT FOR VIETNAM AND THAT SHE HERSELF REALIZED THAT SHE HAD MANY SHORTCOMINGS.

6. GENERAL LE THEN SAID TO NHU: "YOU SAY THAT YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT THE PEOPLE SAY THAT YOU ARE CONCERNED WITH ALL DECISIONS MADE". NHU REPEATED HIS COMMENTS ON LACK OF POWER, FAILURE TO HAVE HIS ADVICE ACCEPTED, AND HIS LACK OF OFFICIAL POSITION IN THE GOVERNMENT.

7. GENERAL LE COMMENTED ON 12 JULY THAT ALTHOUGH NHU MIGHT BE WILLING TO OVERTHROW THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, LE THOUGHT THAT THEY SHOULD PROCEED WITHOUT NHU, ADDING THAT ALL THAT THE NHUS WANTED TO DO WAS TO SAVE THEMSELVES. (SOURCE COMMENT: ALL OF THE NHU CHILDREN HAVE BEEN BROUGHT INTO SAIGON AND WERE UNDER HEAVY GUARD. THE NHUS ALSO HAVE AN ESCAPE PLAN.)

8. BRIGADIER GENERAL PHAM XUAN CHIEU SAID ON 12 JULY THAT ANY COUP D'ETAT ACTION MUST BE TAKEN IMMEDIATELY AND THAT ALL GENERAL OFFICERS SHOULD COOPERATE.

9. COLONEL LE QUAN VIEN SAID ON 12 JULY THAT HE HAD NOT ATTENDED THE 11 JULY MEETING BUT WAS AWARE THAT SOMETHING WAS GOING ON, ADDING THAT NHU AGREED WITH DIEM THAT SOME CHANGES SHOULD BE MAD

(13)
50

BE MADE BEFORE AMBASSADOR DESIGNATE LODGE ARRIVED; NHU, HOWEVER, WANTED TO GO FURTHER AND HAVE A COUP D'ETAT WITHOUT DELAY. VIEN SAID THAT THE FOLLOWING GENERAL OFFICERS WERE LEADERS IN THE COUP PLANNING GROUP: BRIGADIER GENERAL TON THAT DINH, COMMANDING GENERAL, III CORPS; COLONEL HUYNH VAN CAO, COMMANDER, IV CORPS; BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA, COMMANDER, CAPITAL AREA; AND BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS. VIEN MENTIONED ANOTHER GROUP THAT WOULD SUPPORT A COUP PLACING VICE PRESIDENT THO IN TEMPORARY CONTROL AS INCLUDING MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT; BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDER OF THE ARMY; AND TWO OTHERS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

20

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10115
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 7/16/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

NLK-82-74 + NLK-87-15 + DOWNGRADED

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL
~~SECRET~~
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM -- BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/655,558

SUBJECT STATUS OF COUP D'ETAT PLANS OF TRAN KIM TUYEN'S GROUP

DATE DISTR. 16 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 15 JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 80366

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9309

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

—

1. ON 15 JULY 1963 AN INDIVIDUAL ASSOCIATED WITH THE COUP D'ETAT GROUP HEADED BY DR. TRAN KIM TUYEN, CURRENTLY AN ADVISOR AT THE PRESIDENCY, SAID THAT THEIR NATIONALIST, ANTI-COMMUNIST COUP WOULD OCCUR "SOON." HOWEVER, AS THE VIET CONG WERE REPORTEDLY PLANNING TO INTENSIFY THEIR ACTIVITIES DURING THE WEEK PRIOR TO THE ANNIVERSARY OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, 20 JULY, THE COUP WOULD NOT BE STAGED UNTIL AFTER THAT DATE. THE COUP WOULD BE DIRECTED AGAINST PRESIDENT DIEM AS WELL AS THE NGO DINH NHUS AND THE GROUP PLANNED TO ESTABLISH A CONSTITUTIONAL

CONFIDENTIAL
~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM -- BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CIB

STATE/INR DIA ARMY/ACSI NAVY AIR JCS SECDEF NSA USIA OCI ONE OCR EXO

STATE/DIR

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20

SANITIZED NLK. 89.15

57 (16)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET (When Filled In) NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLY

TDCSDB-3/655,558

IN 80366

PAGE 2

REGIME BEHIND VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9286 (TDCSDB-3/655,471), FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, REPORTED DETAILS OF TUYEN'S PLAN AND THAT HE WANTED TO MOVE BEFORE THE END OF JULY.)

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM BACKGROUND USE ONLY

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10116
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 7/17/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

NLK-82-74 + NLK-89-15

61

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S. Vietnam

(17)

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/553,724
SUBJECT	POSSIBLE CHANGE IN GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF APPOINTMENT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE	DATE DISTR.	17 JULY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	MID-JULY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 80437
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (15 JULY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-9314

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL VIETNAMESE SECURITY OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS.

APPR IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM HAS RECALLED SOME OF ITS FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES; HOWEVER, WHETHER THE REASON IS TO DEFINE A NEW FOREIGN POLICY IN LIGHT OF AMBASSADOR LODGE'S APPOINTMENT IS UNKNOWN. SEE HEADQUARTERS COMMENT, PARAGRAPH 2.

1. BY MID-JULY 1963 PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM WAS CONSIDERABLY DISTURBED OVER THE DESIGNATION OF HENRY CABOT LODGE, JR. AS AMBASSADOR TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN). THE APPOINTMENT SUGGESTED TO THE PRESIDENT THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANNED TO WIELD A "BIG STICK," AND THE GVN RECALLED A NUMBER OF ITS DIPLOMATS FOR CONSULTATION. AMONG THEM WERE THE REPRESENTATIVES IN KUALA LUMPUR AND SINGAPORE, NEW DELHI, DJAKARTA, TOKYO, RANGOON, AND SENEGAL AND SEVERAL OTHER AFRICAN NATIONS. THE REPRESENTATIVES WERE RECALLED OSTENSIBLY SO THAT THEY COULD ATTEND A SEMINAR ON THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM WHICH WOULD ENABLE THEM TO EXPLAIN THE PROGRAM ABROAD; HOWEVER, THE GVN ACTUALLY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EX
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(17)

WANTED TO DISCUSS ITS POSITION IN REGARD TO THE BUDDHIST SITUATION AND TO ATTEMPT TO DEFINE A NEW GVN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE LIGHT OF THE LODGE APPOINTMENT.

2. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. TDCS-3/552,830 REPORTED THAT BUU HOI, GVN AMBASSADOR TO THE IVORY COAST, MOROCCO, NIGERIA, UPPER VOLTA, AND SENEGAL WAS EXPECTED IN SAIGON ON 15 JULY. CS-3/533,307 REPORTED THAT NGO DINH NHU HAD STATED AT AN INTERMINISTERIAL COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC HAMLETS' MEETING THAT THE MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS HAD FAILED TO ENROLL HIS PERSONNEL IN THE COURSE AT THE THI NGHE STRATEGIC HAMLET CENTER, AND THAT IF NECESSARY, THE MINISTER SHOULD RECALL HIS PERSONNEL FROM EMBASSIES ABROAD IN ORDER TO MEET THIS REQUIREMENT.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG AID USIA 2ND AIR DIVISION 9TH FIELD STATION CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10117
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 7/18/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 198: Vietnam,7/1/1963-7/20/63. Box 2

SEE SANITIZED VERSION + DOWNGRADED NLK-84-15

(18) 65

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

~~SECRET~~ (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

S. Vietnam

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/655,605

SUBJECT MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH COMMENTS ON THE CURRENT SITUATION AND ON THE NEED FOR A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 18 JULY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 13-16 JULY 1963

REFERENCES IN 82003

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (17 JULY 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-9322

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM A UNITED STATES ARMY FIELD-GRADE OFFICER; FROM GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.

APPR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH PROBABLY HOLDS THESE VIEWS AND MADE THESE [illegible] IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISGRUNTLED WITH THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM SINCE 1960, AND EVEN THOUGH HE HAS NOT SO EXPRESSED HIMSELF PREVIOUSLY TO SOURCE (SEE PARA. 2.B).

1. SUMMARY. ON 16 JULY 1963 MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO PRESIDENT DIEM, CRITICIZED THE PRESIDENT, SAID THAT HE LACKED THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND ADVOCATED A CHANGE IN THE REGIME, BUT ASSERTED THAT NGO DINH NHU COULD NOT TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT. HE ALSO SAID THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WOULD REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 1ST DIVISION.

2. GENERAL MINH MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS:

A. PRESIDENT DIEM HAS CHANGED SO COMPLETELY THAT IT IS NO LONGER POSSIBLE TO REASON WITH HIM. IN THE EARLY DAYS HE HAD THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE AND WAS VERY POPULAR THROUGHOUT SOUTH VIETNAM.

CONFIDENTIAL ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

OIB

GROUP 1 Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

IT WAS A SIMPLE MATTER AT THAT TIME TO GAIN THE SUPPORT OF THE PEASANTS FOR THE VARIOUS PROGRAMS OF THE GOVERNMENT. THEN HE BEGAN SCREENING HIMSELF IN AND BY 1959 HE HAD LOST COMPLETE TOUCH WITH THE PEOPLE. THAT MAY HAVE BEEN THE TIME TO HAVE CHANGED THE GOVERNMENT. AFTER 1960 DIEM CHANGED COMPLETELY, BECOMING CONVINCED THAT HE WAS OPERATING UNDER A MANDATE FROM HEAVEN. THIS WAS APPARENT IN HIS REMARKS ON 7 JULY WHEN HE SAID THAT THE COUNTRY WAS GUIDED BY "INTUITIVE WISDOM."

B. THE BUDDHIST ISSUE IS AN ILLUSTRATION OF DIEM'S IRRATIONAL ATTITUDE. DIEM TOLD MINH ON 13 JULY THAT THE BINH XUYEN, THE HOA HAO, AND THE CAO DAI WERE ALL STRONGER THAN THE BUDDHISTS. THEY HAD REGULAR ARMED TROOPS BUT THE GOVERNMENT WAS STILL ABLE TO DEFEAT THEM, SO WHY CANNOT THE GOVERNMENT ALSO DEFEAT THE MONKS, WHO HAVE NEITHER ARMS NOR MILITARY ORGANIZATION? MINH WAS UNABLE TO CONVINCE THE PRESIDENT THAT THE SITUATIONS WERE NOT THE SAME BECAUSE OF THE RIGID STAND DIEM HAS TAKEN WITH REGARD TO THE BUDDHISTS. (SOURCE COMMENT. THIS IS THE FIRST TIME MINH HAS MADE SUCH STRONG STATEMENTS AGAINST DIEM.)

C. THE BUDDHIST PROBLEM IS FAR FROM SETTLED. IT IS BECOMING WORSE AND UNLESS THE GOVERNMENT CHANGES ITS POLICY THERE WILL BE ADDITIONAL BUDDHIST SELF-IMMOLATIONS.

D. THERE MUST BE A CHANGE IN THE GOVERNMENT. SOUTH VIETNAM

(18)

IS LIKE A YOUNG TREE; IT HAS FIRM ROOTS AND IS GROWING BUT IT MUST HAVE A PROPER ATMOSPHERE SO THAT ITS LEAVES, I.E., THE PEOPLE, CAN BREATHE. THIS IS LACKING IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

E. NGO DINH NHU CAN NEVER TAKE OVER THE GOVERNMENT; SHOULD HE SUCCEED, IT WOULD PROVE THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) ARE RIGHT IN CLAIMING THAT THE VC ARE THE ONLY ONES WHO REALLY FIGHT FOR THE PEOPLE. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE ARMY, AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN KIM, MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, ARE MINH'S CLOSE FRIENDS.)

VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD MINH ON 15 JULY THAT IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN AN AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE BUDDHISTS AND THE GOVERNMENT BECAUSE THE SELF PRIDE OF CERTAIN KEY INDIVIDUALS, I.E., THE NHUS AND ARCHBISHOP NGO DINH THUC, HAD BECOME INVOLVED. THO HAS BEEN WANTING TO RESIGN BUT WAS NOT EVEN PERMITTED TO SUBMIT A LETTER OF RESIGNATION; HE STILL INTENDS TO GO THROUGH WITH IT, HOWEVER. (FIELD COMMENT: FVS-9243, (TDCS-3/552,503,) REPORTED THAT DIEM HAD REFUSED TO ACCEPT THO'S WRITTEN RESIGNATION, SUBMITTED ON 1 JULY. FVS-9256, TDCS-3/552,565, REPORTED THO'S STATEMENT THAT HE WANTED TO RESIGN BUT WAS UNCERTAIN AS TO THE TIMING.)

G. IF THE MILITARY PRESSURE AGAINST THE VC CAN BE CONTINUED AT THE PRESENT RATE FOR A YEAR, THE ARMY CAN DISRUPT THE VC ARMED

INSURGENTS. THE WINNING OF THE WAR AGAINST THE VC IS NOT SIMPLY A MILITARY PROBLEM, HOWEVER, BUT ONE THAT REQUIRES THE SUPPORT OF THE PEOPLE, AND THIS IS LACKING.

H. NO TROUBLE IS ANTICIPATED FROM THE VC ON THE 20 JULY ANNIVERSARY OF THE SIGNING OF THE GENEVA ACCORDS, ~~BUT THE~~ STUDENTS MIGHT CAUSE TROUBLE BECAUSE OF THE SUICIDE OF OPPOSITIONIST NGUYEN TUONG TAM.

I. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF THE 1ST INFANTRY DIVISION FOR THE TIME BEING AND BRIGADIER GENERAL LE VAN NGHIEM WILL REMAIN IN COMMAND OF I CORPS, WHICH PLACES NGHIEM IN AN IMPOSSIBLE POSITION AS THE TWO MEN DO NOT GET ALONG WELL WITH EACH OTHER. TRI'S PROMOTION WAS DESERVED BECAUSE HE IS A VERY STRONG FIGHTER. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9302, (TDCSDB-3/655,512), REPORTED NHU'S STATEMENT THAT TRI HAD BEEN PROMOTED AND NAMED COMMANDER OF I CORPS. FVS-9267, (TDCS-3/552,485), REPORTED NGHIEM'S STATEMNT OF HIS DESIRE TO RESIGN FROM THE ARMY.)

3. FIELD DISSEM STATE (AMBASSADOR NOLTING), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10129
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 9/17/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/17/1963-9/21/63. Box 2

Exempted [illegible] 7/12

v Bundy ②

SECRET

TO : WASHINGTON HONOLULU

FROM : SAIGON 0966, 17 SEPTEMBER 1963

1. AFTER MAKING AND BREAKING FOUR APPOINTMENTS WITH CAS OFFICER, GEN TRAN TU OAI SENT MESSAGE ON 5 SEPT VIA LE TRUNG THANH THAT HE CONSIDERED IT BEST IN PRESENT CLIMATE THAT CAS OFFICER NOT COME TO GEN OAI'S HQS OWING HEAVY SURVEILLANCE. TRANSPARENCY THIS EXCUSE INDICATED BY ASSURANCES THAT GEN OAI THOUGHT IT PERFECTLY IN ORDER TO CONTINUE VISIT HIS HQS SO-CALLED CLANDESTINE ENCLOSURE, GATE TO WHICH NOT MORE THAN FIFTY FEET FROM MAIN GATE. ONE SURVEILLANCE WOULD COVER BOTH.

2. IN HOUR CONVERSATION THANH AND CAS OFFICER WENT OVER VARIOUS SUBJECTS, FIRST BEING ARTICLE ON CAS IN VIETNAM TIMES, AND CAS OFFICER ASKED THANH TO GIVE GEN OAI FULL ACCOUNT OF CONVERSATION. CAS OFFICER POINTED OUT THAT LIKE MOST EXPOSES THIS WAS MISHMASH OF FACT AND FANCY, THAT TO EXTENT IT WAS ACCURATE THE WRITER DISCUSSED JOINT PROJECTS WHICH HAD BEEN APPROVED BY U.S. AND GVN, IN MOST CASED BY COUNSELLOR NHU HIMSELF. IT WOULD THEREFORE BE HEIGHT OF ILLOGIC FOR U.S. TO SPEND LARGE SUMS AND EFFORTS ON BEHALF GOVERNMENT WHICH WE SIMULTANEOUSLY ATTEMPTING OVERTHROW. CAS OFFICER TOLD THANH TO TELL OAI THAT IN SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES CAS HAD NO CHOICE BUT REVIEW ALL PROJECTS.

3. THANH BROUGHT VARIOUS MESSAGES ON WHICH OAI ASKED FOR CAS OFFICER'S OPINION. FIRST WAS QUERY WHETHER CAS OFFICER AGREED WITH GEN OAI THAT PRES KENNEDY ERRED IN STATING GVN OUT OF TOUCH WITH PEOPLE AND ALSO THAT BUDDHISTS BEING REPRESSED. CAS OFFICER SAID HE DISAGREED WITH OAI ON BOTH COUNTS AND CONCURRED

SECRET

COMPLETELY WITH PRES KENNEDY, CITING IN BOTH CASES EARLIER AND FAIRLY DETAILED CONVERSATIONS WITH OAI, WHO HAD SPOKEN STRONGLY AGAINST GVN FOR HANDLING OF BUDDHISTS AND ALSO DENOUNCED DIEM AND NHU BY NAME FOR MOUTHING THEORIES WHICH WERE MEANINGLESS TO POPULATION, WHO OAI SAID HAD LOST 150,000 KILLED IN PAST TEN YEARS. IT DISAPPOINTING TO SEE SUCH CRAVEN, OBVIOUSLY PARTY-LINE CHANGE OF HEART ON PART OF SENIOR AND INTELLIGENT OFFICER, AND NOT SURPRISING HE EMBARRASSED DELIVER SUCH OPINIONS PERSONALLY. STATION HAS HAD NO FURTHER CONTACT WITH GEN OAI'S OFFICER SINCE 5 SEPTEMBER.

4. APART FROM FOREGOING, STATION IS TAKING GOOD LOOK AT GEN OAI'S OPS FOR ANOTHER REASON, NAMELY POSSIBLE DOUBLE PAYMENT BY MACV AND STATION FOR SOME OF SAME PROJECTS. MACV IS CURRENTLY BUDGETING ABOUT 140,000,000 PIASTERS ANNUALLY FOR THIS OP, SUM WHICH VASTLY SURPASSES OUR HELP. UNFORTUNATELY MACV SIMPLY HANDS OUT MONEY AND REQUIRES NO ACCOUNTINGS WHATEVER. GEN OAI'S HAS ALWAYS PROVIDED DETAILED ACCOUNTINGS TO STATION PER OUR SPECIFICATIONS, BUT THEY COULD OBVIOUSLY BE MEANINGLESS SINCE OPS SUBSIDIZED BY MACV CANNOT BE CHECKED. REQUEST HQS RESERVE JUDGMENT UNTIL STATION AND MACV HAVE HAD CHANCE TO PIN DOWN. NEXT STEPS INCLUDE CONSULTATION WITH MACV (NOTE: THIS HANDLED WITH MAJOR JAMES RICHARDSON, WHO HAS FULL CAS CLEARANCE), FOLLOWED BY JOINT MEETING WITH GEN OAI'S HQS AND REQUEST FOR EXPLANATIONS WHERE NECESSARY. REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DUPLICATION CAN BE PROVED, STATION AND MACV HAVE TENTATIVELY AND INFORMALLY CONCLUDED THAT BEST GENERAL GROUND RULES WILL BE FOR MACV TO

SUPPORT GEN OAI'S ACTIVITIES DIRECTED AT SVN TARGETS (EXCEPT BLACK RADIO), CAS TO SUPPORT ONLY PROJECTS TARGETED AT DRV. ALTHOUGH THIS SOLUTION MAY BE TOO PAT BECAUSE OF POSSIBLE INJUNCTIONS RE USING DOD MONEY AGAINST CIVILIAN TARGET, AT LEAST THIS PROBLEM HAS NOT ARISEN YET. EFFECT OF THIS TYPE ARRANGEMENT WILL BE FOR STATION TO CONCENTRATE ON LEAFLETS AND BLACK RADIOS (WHETHER TARGETED AT NORTH OR SOUTH), MACV ON ALL ELSE. STATION WILL ADVISE SOONEST, PROBABLY WITHIN WEEK.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10131
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 9/19/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/17/1963-9/21/63. Box 2

VERSION NLK-82-60
NLK-02-32c, 1/03 6

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS DB-3/656,739
SUBJECT	GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH PLANS TO MAKE HIS FINAL DECISION SOON ON ANY ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME	**DATE DISTR.**	19 SEPTEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	15 - 16 SEPTEMBER 1963	**REFERENCES**	IN 22714
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (16 - 17 SEPTEMBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	FVS - 9660

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A COMPANY-GRADE OFFICER (F) ON THE STAFF OF GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH.

APPR KHANH MAY STILL BE THINKING ABOUT ANTI-GOVERNMENT ACTION, BUT WITHOUT ASSURANCES FROM THE UNITED STATES OF SUPPORT, HE WILL PROBABLY NOT INITIATE ANY ACTION. NEVERTHELESS, THE POSSIBILITY OF HIS MOUNTING A COUP D'ETAT CANNOT BE COMPLETELY DISCOUNTED SINCE AN INDIVIDUAL CONNECTED WITH THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP HAS SAID THAT KHANH MIGHT TAKE ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, AND SINCE KHANH'S NAME HAS BEEN MENTIONED AS ONE OF A NUMBER OF ALLEGEDLY DISSIDENT GENERALS.

1. ON 15 SEPTEMBER 1963 BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, II CORPS COMMANDER, SAID THAT HE WOULD DECIDE IN A DAY OR TWO WHETHER OR NOT TO PROCEED WITH PLANNING ACTION AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. (FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS-9634, TDCSDB-3/656,637, FOR PREVIOUS REPORT ON KHANH'S PLANNING.) HE REMARKED THAT IF HIS DECISION WERE NEGATIVE, HE WOULD CEASE ALL PLANNING AND NOT REVIVE THE PROJECT. ON 16 SEPTEMBER KHANH SAID THAT HE HAD CHANGED HIS MIND AND WOULD MULL OVER THE SITUATION FOR ANOTHER WEEK BEFORE GIVING HIS FINAL DECISION. KHANH PLANNED TO RETURN TO THE II CORPS AREA ON 18

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CIB

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXXXXXXXXXX
STATE/DIR														EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

66

SEPTEMBER.

2. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF. PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10134
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 9/21/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/17/1963-9/21/63. Box 2

VERSION NLK-82-140 10
(10)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,771

SUBJECT PHAM NGOC THAO AND TUYEN GROUP READY TO LAUNCH COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 21 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 24185

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (18-19 SEPTEMBER 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9674

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONALIST (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN LEGAL AND POLITICAL CIRCLES WITH PARAGRAPH 1 FROM DUONG AND WITH PARAGRAPH 2 FROM LINH.

APPRAISAL: PLANS BY THE TUYEN GROUP TO LAUNCH A COUP D'ETAT ARE PROBABLY CONTINUING, BUT THE PRECISE TIMING AND CAPABILITY ARE DIFFICULT TO DETERMINE.

1. THE MOVE TO OUST THE NGO FAMILY FROM POWER WAS SCHEDULED FOR THE WEEK BEGINNING 22 SEPTEMBER 1963, ACCORDING TO NGUYEN HUU DUONG, GOVERNMENT ATTORNEY IN THE SAIGON MUNICIPAL COURTS AND MEMBER OF THE TRAN KIM TUYEN COUP GROUP. DUONG SAID ON 19 SEPTEMBER THAT LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU AND MEMBER OF BOTH THE TUYEN GROUP AND THE GROUP LED BY HUYNH VAN LANG, ECONOMICS PROFESSOR AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, HAD GIVEN HIM THIS INFORMATION. THAO HAD ALSO TOLD DUONG THAT GENERALS DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT, AND LE VAN KIM OF THE MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, WERE INVOLVED IN THE PLANS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CIB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC			OCI	ONE	OCR					EXO
STATE/DIR																		

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 4-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

(15-2

2. BRIGADIER GENERAL NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL, II CORPS, WOULD MOVE ON HUE AT THE SAME TIME THAT THAO LAUNCHED HIS MOVE IN SAIGON, ACCORDING TO A STATEMENT BY LIEUTENANT NGUYEN NGOC LINH, KHANH'S AIDE, ON 18 SEPTEMBER. LINH ALSO SAID THAT THAO WAS READY TO MOVE WITHIN A WEEK TO OVERTHROW DIEM.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10135
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 10/4/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2

[illegible] 1/15

2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Bundy

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/560,871

SUBJECT PLANNED SUICIDE OF AMBASSADOR BUU HOI'S MOTHER, DIEU HUE

DATE DISTR. 4 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 3 OCTOBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 32958

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (3 OCTOBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9731

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE BUSINESSMAN (F) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG BUDDHISTS.

APPR: EARLIER ALLEGED INTENTIONS OF DIEU HUE TO COMMIT SUICIDE IN SUPPORT OF THE BUDDHIST CAUSE WERE WIDELY PUBLICIZED. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT SHE MIGHT DO SO.

1. BY 3 OCTOBER 1963 THE BUDDHIST NUN, DIEU HUE, MOTHER OF BUU HOI, VIETNAMESE SCIENTIST, AMBASSADOR TO SEVERAL AFRICAN COUNTRIES AND CURRENTLY THE GOVERNMNT OF VITNAM (GVN) OBSERVER AT THE UNITED NATIONS (UN), AD DECIDED TO COMMIT SUICIDE, PROBABLY ON 5 OCTOBER. THREATWAS TIMED FOR IMPACT ON THE UN BUT WAS NOT TO BE BY BURNING.

2. DIEU HUE HAD PREPARED A LETTER DENOUNCING HER SON AND CLIMING THAT BUDDHISM WAS STILL BEING PERSECUTED IN VIETNAM, COPIES OF WHICH WERE TO BE DISTRIBUTED TO THE FORIEGN PRESS AND TO THE "CLANDESTINE" OPPOSITION BY HER COMPANION AND ATTENDANT, A

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IMMEDIATE TO: STATE (RCI)(FOR HUGHES: PLS PASS TO MR. HILSMAN)

FORM 4-63 1Ka OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS, (15-20)

(2)

YOUNGER NUN.

3. JUST PRIOR TO THE SUICIDE, THE COMPANION PLANNED TO DELIVER A COPY OF THE LETTER TO THE U. S. EMBASSY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE AND TO SEEK ASYLUM THERE. SHE BELIVED HER LIFE WOULD BE IN DANGER AS THE GVN WOULD KNOW THAT ONLY SHE COULD HAVE DISTRIBUTED THE LETTER.

4. THICH THIEN HOA, PRESIDENT OF THE PRO-GVN UNION COMMITTEE FOR THE DEFENSE OF PURE BUDDHISM AND MOST OF THE OTHER MONKS AND NUNS AT THE AN QUANG PAGODA, WHERE DIEU HUE AND HER COMPANION RESIDE, WERE UNAWARE OF THE SUICIDE PLAN.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD. STA. 2ND AIR DIV. CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10137
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 10/8/1963
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63. Box 2

SEE SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-82-55 + [illegible]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,133

SUBJECT SITUATION APPRAISAL AS OF 5 OCTOBER 1963

DATE DISTR. 8 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO.

REFERENCES IN 33775

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (5 OCTOBER 1963)

APPRAISAL COMMENTARY

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE STAFF OFFICERS OF THIS ORGANIZATION.

1. THIS IS A FIELD APPRAISAL OF THE CURRENT SITUATION. IT IS NOT AN OFFICIAL JUDGEMENT BY THIS AGENCY OR ANY COMPONENT. IT REPRESENTS THE OBSERVATIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS OF STAFF OFFICERS BASED ON INFORMATION AVAILABLE TO THEM AT THE TIME OF ITS PREPARATION. PREPARED FOR INTERNAL USE AS A GUIDE TO THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT, THIS COMMENTARY IS DISSEMINATED IN THE BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE USEFUL TO OTHER AGENCIES IN ASSESSING THE SITUATION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES.

2. THE MOST STRIKING FEATURE OF THE INTELLIGENCE REPORTS FOR THE WEEK OF 29 SEPTEMBER-5 OCTOBER 1963 HAS BEEN A GREATER DEPTH OF REPORTING ON COUP PLOTTING, PROVIDING INFORMATION IN CONSIDERABLE DETAIL AS TO THE PERSONALITIES INVOLVED AND THEIR ALLOTTED ROLES. STILL LACKING, HOWEVER, IS SOLID INFORMATION AS TO THE COHESIVENESS OF VARIOUS GROUPS REPORTED READY TO LAUNCH A COUP AND TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY/CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	[illegible]	OCI	ONE	OCR	[illegible]	XX
STATE/DIR															

EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

THE EXTENT TO WHICH THEY ENJOY FIRM LEADERSHIP AT THE TOP OF THE ICEBERG OF WHICH WE ARE STILL GETTING ONLY TANGENTIAL GLIMPSES.

3. THE GENERALS MEANWHILE ARE NOW PRESSING PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM FOR A REPLY TO THE DEMANDS MADE SEVERAL WEEKS AGO DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE MARTIAL LAW PHASE. AS DESCRIBED BY GENERAL TRAN VAN DON, THE LIST OF DEMANDS ARE QUITE EXTENSIVE, INCLUDING THE ASSIGNMENT OF MILITARY MEN TO THE POSTS OF MINISTERS OF DEFENSE, INTERIOR, CIVIC ACTION AND EDUCATION. THEY ALSO ASKED FOR CONTROL OF THE SAIGON/CHOLON POLICE AND THE PLACEMENT OF THE CAPITAL REGION UNDER A PERMANENT MILITARY GOVERNORSHIP. DON SAYS THAT HE AND HIS FELLOW GENERAL OFFICERS DO NOT EXPECT DIEM TO ACCEDE TO THIS PACKAGE OF PROPOSALS, ACCEPTANCE OF WHICH WOULD INDEED AMOUNT TO A VIRTUAL SURRENDER ON THE PART OF DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU. THE LATTER WILL PROBABLY GO PART WAY, HOWEVER, IN MEETING THE DESIRES OF THE MILITARY IN AN EFFORT TO DETER THE LATTER FROM ATTEMPTING AN EARLY COUP. THEIR TACTIC IS LIKELY TO BE ONE OF SEEKING TO ENMESH THE GENERALS IN TIME-CONSUMING NEGOTIATIONS RELATED TO THE PROSPECTIVE REVAMPING OF THE GOVERNMENT WITH A VIEW TOWARD GAINING TIME IN WHICH TO MONITOR AND BREAK UP ANY COUP COMBINATION WHICH MAY BE DEVELOPING. THE OUTCOME OF MANEUVERING BETWEEN DIEM AND NHU AND THE MILITARY DURING THE COMING FEW WEEKS, OR POSSIBLY EVEN DAYS, IS LIKELY TO BE OF DECISIVE IMPORTANCE TO FUTURE COURSE OF EVENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

4. DESPITE THE IMPRESSION OF THE RETURN TO NORMALITY THAT IS BEING FOSTERED BY THE REGIME, THE ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON CONTINUES TO BE PERVADED TO A CONSIDERABLE DEGREE BY FEAR AND UNCERTAINTY. ARRESTS REPORTEDLY ARE CONTINUING, AS WELL AS

SEARCHES OF PRIVATE HOMES BY THE SECURITY FORCES.

5. THERE ARE SCATTERED INDICATIONS THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) IS PLANNING TO SPRING SOME SURPRISES ON THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY CELEBRATIONS. NHU, FOR EXAMPLE, IS REPORTED TO HAVE TOLD THE GENERALS THAT IN A FEW WEEKS HE WOULD UNDERTAKE AN UNSPECIFIED ACTION OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL NATURE WHICH NEITHER "THE WEALTHY NOR THE AMERICANS WOULD LIKE." WE ALSO HAVE A REPORT THAT SWEEPING CHANGES IN THE POLICE AND CIVIL INTELLIGENCE COMPLEX WILL OCCUR. MORE FRIVOLOUS BUT PERHAPS SUGGESTIVE OF THE DESIRE BY THE REGIME TO EASE THE CURRENT ATMOSPHERE IN SAIGON ARE THE RUMORS THAT THE BAN ON DANCING WILL BE LIFTED. NATIONAL DAY WOULD BE THE LOGICAL TIME FOR DIEM TO ANNOUNCE REVAMPING OF HIS GOVERNMENT, PROVIDED THIS DELICATE OPERATION CAN BE COMPLETED IN TIME.

6. A STRIKING THING ABOUT THE ELECTIONS WAS THE FACT THAT THEY WENT OFF VIRTUALLY WITHOUT INCIDENT, EITHER IN SAIGON OR IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. THERE HAD BEEN SEVERAL INDICATIONS THAT THE VIET CONG (VC) INTENDED DISRUPTION AS A COMPANION TACTIC TO THEIR PROPAGANDA CALL FOR THE BOYCOTT OF THE ELECTIONS. NEITHER DURING THE ELECTIONS, NOR DURING THE PRECEDING BUDDHIST CRISIS, DID THE COMMUNISTS SEEM ABLE TO CAPITALIZE ON THEIR IMMEDIATE OPPORTUNITIES. ESPECIALLY LACKING WAS THE EXERCISE OF THEIR MUCH VAUNTED CAPABILITIES FOR TERRORISM, RAISING SOME QUESTION IN OUR MINDS AS TO WHETHER VC ABILITY TO USE TERRORISM IN CITIES WAS AS GREAT AS WE HAD BEEN LED TO BELIEVE. IT WAS VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE TO MEASURE THE SUCCESS OF THE VC BOYCOTT APPEAL SINCE THE GVN IN MANY AREAS MORE OR LESS FORCED THE ELECTORATE TO VOTE AND IN AREAS WHERE ITS CONTROL WAS NOT THAT STRONG, THE REGIME ALMOST CERTAINLY FALSIFIED THE PERCENTAGES OF THE VOTE.

7. ONE INDICATION OF THE REGIME'S INCREASED CONFIDENCE THAT IT HAS THE SITUATION UNDER CONTROL IS THE FACT THAT COLONEL TUNG HAS RELEASED TWO COMPANIES OF SPECIAL FORCES TROOPS FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.

8. ALTHOUGH MOMENTARILY QUIESCENT BECAUSE OF THE HEAVY GVN SECURITY CONTROLS, THE STUDENTS CONTINUE THEIR ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITIES AND ARE DEVELOPING PLANS FOR FURTHER ACTION AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. THERE APPEARS TO BE CONSIDERABLE DIVISION OF OPINION AMONG THE VARIOUS STUDENT GROUPS, SOME OF WHICH EXISTED PRIOR TO THE BUDDHIST CRISIS AND SOME HAVE SINCE EMERGED. REPORTING RECEIVED TO DATE WOULD INDICATE THAT THE VC HAVE NOT YET MADE SIGNIFICANT INROADS INTO THE STUDENT MOVEMENT, ALTHOUGH THIS IS OF COURSE AN INCREASING POSSIBILITY IF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE STUDENTS AND THE GVN LONG REMAIN IN THEIR PRESENT UNSATISFACTORY STATE. IN PARTICULAR, WE HAVE LITTLE EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE THESIS THAT THE STUDENTS ARE FLEEING/TO THE COUNTRYSIDE TO JOIN THE VC ALTHOUGH SOME REPORTEDLY DID LEAVE SAIGON AND HUE TO AVOID ARREST DURING THE PERIOD OF THE GOVERNMENT CRACKDOWN.

9. A REPORT FROM A VIETNAMESE TRADE UNION OFFICIAL PROVIDES ADDITIONAL BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE NHU-MANELI MEETING IN EARLY SEPTEMBER AND ON THE GENERAL SUBJECT OF POSSIBLE GVN-DRV RAPPROCHEMENT. ACCORDING TO INFORMATION RECEIVED BY THE SOURCE FROM A FRENCH EMBASSY OFFICER, HO CHI MINH HAD AT ONE TIME INDICATED TO A FORMER FRENCH REPRESENTATIVE IN NORTH VIETNAM HIS DISCOURAGEMENT OVER CASUALTIES SUSTAINED IN THE WAR IN THE SOUTH, HIS DISTASTE FOR THE CHINESE PRESENCE IN THE DRV, AND HIS RESTIVENESS OVER SOVIET "INTERFERENCE" OF AN UNSPECIFIED NATURE. LALOUETTE WAS REPORTED TO HAVE PASSED THIS ON TO NHU WHO,

ACCORDING TO THE FRENCH, LEAKED IT TO JOSEPH ALSOP, THUS BETRAYING THE CONFIDENTIAL FRENCH CONVERSATION WITH HO. THE FRENCH ALLEGEDLY FEEL THIS PUT LALOUETTE IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION; HENCE, HIS FAILURE TO RETURN TO SAIGON. IT IS DIFFICULT TO BELIEVE THAT THE FRENCH REALLY CONSIDER NHU'S "INDISCRETION" AS SERIOUS, AS THEY LET ON. SOURCE CLAIMS, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT MANELI TOLD NHU PRRCTICALLY THE SAME STORY ABOUT HO'S PREOCCUPATIONS.

10. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR, DCM), USMACV (HARKINS), CINCPAC, PACFLT, PACAF, ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10138
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO : Dirnsa
TITLE :
DATE : 10/9/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

SFI010 ...... 1963 OCT 9 15 33

2 FORRESTAL
—JOHNSON
—KLEIN
—KOMER
—PARROTT
—SCHLESINGER
—PRESS OFFICE
—FILE

OO ESF
DE ESI 09/1520Z OCT
O 091448Z ZYH
FM CIA
TO DIRNSA
STATE RCI (HUGHES)
JCS
CNO (OP922Y1)
AFSSO USAF
DIA/CIIC
NIC
DFI/ACSI
WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM
ZEM

17702

SECRET NOFORN

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM NO SIDDEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY
COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM
SUBJECT PLANS OF GOVERNMENT TO ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR LODGE, OTHER HIGH EMBASSY OFFICIALS, AND THICH TRI QUANG, AND BURN THE CHANCERY
DATE OF INFO. 8 OCTOBER 1963
PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (8OCTOBER 1963)
APPRISAL SEE BELOW
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,149
DATE DISTR. 9 OCTOBER 1963
PRECEDENCE PRIORITY
RIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9753

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEDIUM LEVEL GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS AMONG GOVERNMENT LEADERS.

ITS REPRESENTATIVES. STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS, EITHER GVN-SPONSORED OR INDEPENDENTLY ORGANIZED, MAY TAKE PLACE. THE OTHER ASPECTS OF THIS REPORT ARE VIEWED WITH SKEPTICISM.

1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN DUY BACH, CHIEF OF THE POLITICAL BUREAU, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES), SAID THAT GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AUGHORITIES WERE PLANNING TO ALLOW A STUDENT DEMONSTRATION IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY UNDER COVER OF WHICH ABOUT 100 GVN AGENTS WOULD ATTACK THE EMBASSY AND ASSASSINATE AMBASSADOR HENRY CABOT LODGE AND OTHER HIGH-RANKING EMBASSY OFFICIALS AFTER WHICH THE CHANCERY WOULD BE SET AFIRE.

2. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 BACH SAID THAT EARLIER ON THE SAME DAY A DELEGATION OF STUDENTS HAD INFORMED HIM THAT THEY WERE ORGANIZING A DEMONSTRATION WHICH THEY HOPED WOULD TAKE PLACE IN FRONT OF THE AMERICAN EMBASSY CHANCERY WITHIN "THE NEXT FEW DAYS" DURING OFFICE HOURS AND PROBABLY IN THE MORNING. THE STUDENTS PLANNED TO PRESENT A STATEMENT TO AMBASSADOR LODGE PROTESTING THE REPRESSION OF STUDENTS AND OTHER YOUNG PEOPLE BY THE GVN. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-9749, (NOT YET RECEIVED), FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, REPORTED THE ARREST OF 130 SAIGON STUDENTS ON THE NIGHT OF 7 OCTOBER BY SPECIAL POLICE.) THE STUDENTS ALSO TOLD BACK (AND BACH SAID THAT HE HAD CONFIRMATION FROM OTHER UNIDENTIFIED SOURCES) THAT NGO DINH NHU, MINISTER OF CIVIC ACTION NGO TRONG HIEU, AND COMMANDER

OF EMBASSY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS MELVIN L. MANFULL, AND SPECIAL ASSISTANTS MESSRS. FREDERICK W. FLOTT AND JOHN M. DUNN, AS WELL AS THICH TRI QUANG, BUDDHIST LEADER CURRENTLY LIVING IN THE CHANCERY. THE GVN AGENTSWOULD THEN BURN THE CHANCERY.

3. BACH REMARKED THAT NORMALLY THE GVN PERMITTED NO DEMONSTRATIONS BUT, BECAUSE OF THE PLANNED INFILTRATION OF GVN AGENTS, THE GVN WOULD ALLOW THIS PARTICULAR (PORTION GARBLED - BEING SERVICED)(X) DEMONSTRATION BUT THEY WERE CONFIDENT THAT THEY COULD CONTROL THE SITUATION.

4. (FIELD COMMENT. AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED ON 8 OCTOBER THAT A NUMBER OF POLICE WERE GOING TO MASQUERADE AS STUDENTS AND DEMONSTRATE IN FRONT OF THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION SERVICE BUILDING.)

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE), USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS), CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

6. (X) HEADQUARTERS COMMENTAC MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

SCP-1

5000

SECRET NOFORN

1963 OCT 9 11 34

RECEIVED

NNNN

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10139
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 10/15/1963
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,10/6/1963-10/14/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

Sanitized via [illegible] 1/15 (15)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Brady

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/562,014
SUBJECT	RECOMMENDATION BY CABINET OFFICERS THAT NHU BE MADE PRIME MINISTER	DATE DISTR.	15 OCTOBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	EARLY OCTOBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 39851
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (8 OCTOBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	FIELD REPORT NO.	FVS-9764

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A WESTERN BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH GOOD CONTACTS IN VIETNAMESE POLITICAL CIRCLES, FROM CUONG.

APPRAISAL: THE CABINET OFFICERS MAY HAVE MADE SUCH A RECOMMENDATION.

1. SUMMARY. ON 8 OCTOBER 1963 NGUYEN HOANG CUONG, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMIC COUNCIL, SAID THAT ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT NGUYEN NGOC THO TOLD HIM THAT AT A MEETING OF CABINET OFFICERS IN EARLY OCTOBER IT WAS DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NGO DINH NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER. CUONG SAID THAT THIS PROPOSAL WOULD REQUIRE A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WHICH WOULD BE VOTED BY THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

2. ON 5 OCTOBER VICE PRESIDENT THO TOLD CUONG THAT IN EARLY OCTOBER HE HAD CALLED A MEETING OF ALL CABINET MEMBERS TO

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL **NO FOREIGN DISSEM**

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	~~OBI~~	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DISCUSS THE STATUS OF NGO DINH NHU IN THE GOVERNMENT. THO SAID THAT THE CABINET DECIDED TO RECOMMEND TO PRESIDENT DIEM THAT NHU BE APPOINTED PRIME MINISTER, REASONING THAT IF THE PRESIDENT DID NOT INTEND TO REDUCE NHU'S INFLUENCE IN GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, THE LATTER'S APPOINTMENT TO AN OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT POST WOULD AT LEAST MAKE HIM ACCOUNTABLE FOR HIS ACTIONS.

2. ON 8 OCTOBER CUONG SAID THAT IF THE PRESIDENT ACCEPTED THIS SUGGESTION, A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT WOULD BE REQUIRED BUT THAT THIS WOULD POSE NO PROBLEM AS THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WOULD VOTE THE CHANGE WITHOUT DIFFICULTY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACV MAAG USOM USIS 9TH FLD STA 2ND AIR DIV CINPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10142
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 9/24/1963
PAGES : ~~3~~ 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

Sanitized via RAC [illegible] ④ 4

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

✓ Bundy

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	**REPORT NO.**	TDCS DB-3/656,830
SUBJECT	HUYNH VAN LANG COUP MOVE TIMING	**DATE DISTR.**	24 SEPTEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	24 SEPTEMBER 1963	**REFERENCES**	IN 25834
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (24 SEPTEMBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	FVS-9691

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF HUYNH VAN LANG, FROM LANG.

APPRAISAL: THERE HAVE BEEN MANY REPORTS INDICATING THAT A COUP IS BEING PLANNED AND SOME OF THE INFORMATION HEREIN AGREES WITH THAT IN OTHER REPORTS. CLAIMS OF SUPPORT INDICATED HEREIN CANNOT BE ACCURATELY APPRAISED AT THIS TIME, NOR CAN THE ACTUAL TIMING OF THE COUP.

1. SUMMARY. HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY, SAID ON 24 AUGUST 1963 THAT HIS COUP GROUP WAS GOING TO LAUNCH A COUP BEFORE 5 OCTOBER AND PROBABLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER BECAUSE TROOPS WILL BE IN SAIGON AT THAT TIME. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES GENERALS TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, NGUYEN KHANH, COMMANDING GENERAL OF II CORPS, AND DUONG VAN MINH, MILITARY ADVISOR TO THE PRESIDENT. EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO REDUCE THE POSSIBILITY OF EXTENSIVE BLOODSHED. LANG CLAIMS TO HAVE SIX DIVISIONS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD
BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CIB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	[illegible]	[illegible]	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT **TELEGRAM**

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

PLUS AIRBORNE, MARINE, AND ARMOR ELEMENTS READY TO PARTICIPATE IN THE COUP. BRIGADIER GENERAL DO CAO TRI IS ALSO WORKING WITH THE GROUP.

2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS ON THE STATUS OF THE COUP:

A. IT IS TO BE INITIATED BEFORE 5 OCTOBER, POSSIBLY ON 26 OR 28 SEPTEMBER. TROOPS WILL BE BROUGHT INTO SAIGON ON 26 SEPTEMBER FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY ELECTION. MILITARY UNITS WILL REHEARSE ON 28 SEPTEMBER FOR THE 26 OCTOBER NATIONAL DAY PARADE, AND THESE TROOPS WILL REMAIN UNTIL 5 OCTOBER. GENERAL KHIEM WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE THAT THE TROOPS BROUGHT TO SAIGON WOULD BE THOSE WHO WOULD SUPPORT A COUP.

B. NO COUP HAS BEEN INITIATED AS YET BECAUSE EVERY EFFORT IS BEING TAKEN TO ENSURE THAT IT BE RELATIVELY BLOODLESS. LONE ATTEMPT WAS CANCELLED AT THE POINT OF EXECUTION BECAUSE IT WAS THOUGHT THAT FURTHER PREPARATION WOULD PREVENT BLOODSHED.

C. A MAJOR PROBLEM IS THE LACK OF SUITABLE EXPLOSIVES TO BLAST A CONCRETE BUNKER WHERE PRESIDENT DIEM IS EXPECTED TO HIDE. THE ONLY OPENING TO THE BUNKER, OTHER THAN A HEAVY DOOR, IS THE VENTILATION SYSTEM AND THE COUP GROUP HESITATES TO USE FLAME THROWERS OR POISON GAS BECAUSE THEY PREFER TO TAKE DIEM ALIVE.

D. THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE NOW INCLUDES LANG AND GENERALS KHIEM, KHANH, AND DUONG VAN MINH. GENERAL TRI HAS AGREED TO JOIN

THE COUP ATTEMPT. COLONEL BUI DINH DAM, SEVENTH DIVISION COMMANDER, IS BELIEVED READY TO SUPPORT THE COUP BUT HAD NOT BEEN CONTACTED. COLONEL NGUYEN HUU HANH, CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE IV CORPS, WHO IS A COUP GROUP MEMBER, BELIEVES THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV CORPS COMMANDER, WOULD SUPPORT THE COUP BUT OTHER GROUP MEMBERS ARE NOT CONVINCED.

E. GENERAL KHIEM WILL COMMAND THE COUP FORCES. MAJOR LAM TRANG THO, FORMER SECOND ARMOR SQUADRON COMMANDER AND NOW WITH THE JOINT GENERAL STAFF, WILL COMMAND ARMOR UNITS, INCLUDING SOME ELEMENTS OF HIS OLD SQUADRON PLUS THE FIRST TANK COMPANY AND THE FIFTH MECHANIZED RIFLE COMPANY OF THE FIRST ARMOR SQUADRON.

F. THREE BATTALIONS OF THE AIRBORNE BRIGADE UNDER A MAJOR WILL JOIN ARMOR UNITS IN THE SHOCK FORCE.

G. THE THIRD MARINE BATTALION UNDER CAPTAIN MAHVIET BANG WILL SERVE AS A BLOCKING FORCE TO PREVENT REINFORCEMENT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL PALACE BY THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD.

H. LIEUTENANT COLONAL PHAM NGOC THAO, STRATEGIC HAMLET INSPECTOR FOR NGO DINH NHU, WILL NOT COMMAND THE SHOCK TROOPS BUT WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT MILITARY FUNCTION DURING THE COUP.

I. LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN DINH PHAT, KIEN PHONG PROVINCE CHIEF, WILL COME TO SAIGON AND ALSO HAVE AN IMPORTANT ROLE.

J. MAJOR NGUYEN VAN TU, COMMANDER OF THE EIGHTH REGIMENT, FIFTH DIVISION, WILL SUPPORT THE COUP WITH HIS FORCES. ALSO INVOLVED IS THE FIFTH RECONNAISSANCE COMPANY OF THE FIFTH DIVISION.

K. GENERAL KHANH WILL COMMAND SIX DIVISIONS, ASSISTED BY GENERAL TRI. THESE DIVISIONS INCLUDE THE FIRST, SECOND, TWENTY-SECOND, TWENTY-FIFTH, TWENTY-THIRD, AND THE NINTH. ACCORDING TO KHANH, COLONEL BUI DZINH, NINTH DIVISION COMMANBER, IS NOT IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM BUT WILL SUPPORT HIM IN THE COUP.

L. TIMING FOR THE COUP WILL PROBABLY BE 1000 HOURS, 1400 HOURS, OR 0500 HOURS, SO THAT FAVORABLE UNITS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL GUARD WILL BE ON DUTY. THESE HOURS ALSO FALL BETWEEN THE NORMAL HOURS FOR CHANGING THE GUARD.

M. ARRIVAL OF HIGH-LEVEL UNITED STATES DEFENSE DEPARTMENT OFFICIALS DISCOURAGED THE COUP GROUP WHICH IS RELUCTANT TO PROCEED WITH THEM PRESENT IN SAIGON. THE GROUP HAS EVEN SPECULATED THE ARRIVAL OF THESE INDIVIDUALS MIGHT SIGNIFY THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS PREPARING A COUP OF ITS OWN; ARTICLES IN THE VIETNAM PRESS WERE CITED AS EVIDENCE OF THIS POSSIBILITY.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACAF ARPAC PACFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10143
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 9/24/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

Sanitized via RACS 1/15   NLK-82-56

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/656,842

SUBJECT 1. NGO DINH NHU INTENTION TO DEAL WITH VC
2. ATTEMPTS OF PHAM NGOC THAO TO ARRANGE AIR FORCE SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 24 SEPTEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9-20 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 26062

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (22 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9684

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A FIELD GRADE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE OFFICER (F).

APPR: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THAO HAS PLANNED A COUP AND HAS SOUGHT VNAF SUPPORT AS REPORTED. THE SUBSTANCE OG THAO'S TALKS WITH DIEM AND NHU CONCERNING NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG AND NHU'S PLANS FOR MAJOR CHANGES IN THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY CANNOT BE ACCURATELY JUDGED. IT IS DOUBTFUL THAT NHU WOULD MAKE A DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS ALTHOUGH THAO IS APPARENTLY CONVINCED THAT NHU IS CONSIDERING SUCH ACTION. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT AMBASSADOR LODGE TALKED WITH THAO

1. SUMMARY. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, ASSIGNED TO THE PRESIDENCY AS AN INSPECTOR FOR THE STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM, SAID THAT HE HAD TALKED SEPARATELY WITH PRESIDENT DIEM AND NGO DINH NHU ABOUT NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VIET CONG (VC) AND THAT NHU HAD ADMITTED THAT HE WAS "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT NHU WAS PLANNING MAJOR CHANGES TO MAKE THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO THE ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST NATIONS. THAO HAS SOLICITED VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) SUPPORT FOR A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

CONFIDENTIAL NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

C.I.B.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXX	XXXX	XXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

⑤ 5

THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLANS TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.

2. THAO SAID THAT DURING THE WEEK 9-15 SEPTEMBER PRESIDENT DIEM SUMMONED HIM AND ASKED HIM HOW HE, DIEM, WAS REGARDED BY THE PEOPLE. THAO REPLIED THAT THE PRESIDENT WAS STILL PERSONALLY POPULAR BUT THAT THE PEOPLE DISLIKED NHU BECAUSE THEY BELIEVED THAT NHU WAS IN CONTACT WITH THE VC. THAO SAID THAT DIEM WAS ANGERED AND DEMANDED TO KNOW WHO HAD TOLD THAO THIS INFORMATION. THAO REPLIED THAT THIS OPINION WAS COMMONLY HELD BY CIVIL SERVANTS, THE GENERAL PUBLIC, AND THE AMERICANS.

3. ON 16 SEPTEMBER NHU SUMMONED THAO AND ASKED HIM WHY HE HAD TOLD THE PRESIDENT OF NHU'S CONTACTS WITH THE VC. THAO BELIEVED THAT NHU HIMSELF HAD TOLD AMERICAN AMBASSADOR LODGE AND THAT LODGE HAD SUBSEQUENTLY INFORMED THAO. NHU CALMED DOWN AND LATER IN THE INTERVIEW ADMITTED THAT HE HAD BEEN "CONSIDERING DEALING WITH THE COMMUNISTS." THAO CLAIMED THAT HE TOLD NHU THAT NHU DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE COMMUNISTS AND THAT HE WOULD BE PLAYING A DANGEROUS GAME IN DEALING WITH THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. AMBASSADOR LODGE HAS NEVER MET THAO.)

4. THAO SAID THAT NHU PLANNED TO MAKE MAJOR CHANGES DURING THE COMING MONTHS, INCLUDING THE NATIONALIZATION OF BANKS AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISES, WHICH THAO SAID, WOULD MAKE SOUTH VIETNAM'S ECONOMY MORE SIMILAR TO ECONOMIES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES. (FIELD

COMMENT. THAO DID NOT STATE THE SOURCE OF HIS INFORMATION CONCERNING NHU'S PLANS.) ACCORDING TO THAO, NHU'S CONTACT WITH THE COMMUNISTS WAS VIA THE POLISH DELEGATION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONTROL COMMISSION. THAO SAID THAT NHU'S PLAN TO DEAL WITH THE COMMUNISTS MUST BE FORESTALLED.

5. ON 20 SEPTEMBER 1963 THAO SPOKE TO A RANKING VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICER CONCERNING THE POSSIBILITY OF THE VNAF SUPPORTING A COUP D'ETAT AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. THAO SAID THAT:

A. THE VNAF WOULD NOT BE INVOLVED IN ANY FIGHTING BECAUSE RESISTANCE BY GOVERNMENT FORCES WOULD BE OVERCOME IN THREE HOURS.

B. THE COUP LEADERS WANTED THE VNAF TO HINDER OR STOP THE FORCES OF BRIGADIER GENERAL HUYNH VAN CAO, IV CORPS COMMANDER FROM ASSISTING FORCES LOYAL TO THE DIEM REGIME.

6. THAO WANTED VNAF SUPPORT TO STOP CAO ALTHOUGH HE BELIEVED THAT CAO MIGHT NOT NOW SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AS STRONGLY AS IN THE PAST. HE GAVE THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR THIS JUDGEMENT:

A. CAO DID NOT ESTABLISH MARTIAL LAW IN THE IV CORPS AFTER THE PROCLAMATION ESTABLISHING MARTIAL LAW IN THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY ON 21 AUGUST.

B. RECENTLY, CAO HAS KEPT HIS TROOPS HEAVILY COMMITTED IN OPERATIONS AGAINST THE VC.

C. CAO APPEARED TO BE REMAINING ALOOF FROM EVENTS IN SAIGON.

D. CAO HAS MADE REPEATED REQUESTS TO THAO TO VISIT HIM AND

HAS OFFERED HIS PRIVATE AIRCRAFT TO THAO FOR SUCH A VISIT.

7. THE VNAF OFFICER WHOM THAO APPROACHED REPLIED THAT COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER, WAS COMPLETELY LOYAL TO THE REGIME AND, PARTICULARLY, TO NGO DINH NHU. HE ALSO TOLD THAO THAT IT WAS VERY DIFFICULT TO PREDICT WHAT ACTION VNAF OFFICERS WOULD TAKE IN THE EVENT OF A COUP. THAO REPLIED THAT IF HIEN FAILED TO COOPERATE, HE COULD EASILY BE KILLED.

8. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10149
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Report
DATE : 10/2/1963
PAGES : 6
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 200: Vietnam,9/22/63-10/6/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/657,031

SUBJECT FURTHER PLANNING OF LANG COUP GROUP

DATE DISTR. 2 OCTOBER 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 26-30 SEPTEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 31379

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (30 SEPTEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 9725

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CLOSE ASSOCIATE (C) OF LANG, FROM LANG.

APPR: LANG MAY BE MAKING COUP PLANS AS REPORTEDBUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH OTHER INDIVIDUALS NAMED MAY BE INVOLVED CANNOT BE JUDGED. GENERAL TY PROBABLY HAS SUPPORTED THE GENERALS' DEMANDS ON PRESIDENT DIEM. THE MEETING OF DIEM WITH THE TROOP COMMANDERS POSSIBLY TOOK PLACE AS REPORTED. LANG PROBABLY HOLDS THE VIEWS CITED.

1. SUMMARY. ON 30 SEPTEMBER 1963 HUYNH VAN LANG, PROFESSOR OF ECONOMICS AT SAIGON UNIVERSITY SAID THAT LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, CHIEF, JOINT GENERAL STAFF (JGS), HAD REINFORCED THE GENERALS' DEMANDS FOR GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS BUT THAT SOME GENERALS WERE CONVINCED THAT THE COUP SHOULD TAKE PLACE REGARDLESS OF WHETHER DIEM INITIATES REFORMS. BRIGADIER GENERAL TRAN THIEN KHIEM, CHIEF OF STAFF, JGS, WAS CONCERNED ABOUT VIET CONG MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON. HE AND OTHER GENERALS WANTED TO BE ASSURED OF UNITED STATES SUPPORT IN THE EVENT THAT A COUP SUCCEEDED. COLONEL DO MAU, CHIEF, MILITARY SECURITY

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD BACKGROUND USE ONLY

CIB

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	XXXX	XXXX	XXXXX	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

SERVICE, HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VIETNAMESE AIR FORCE (VNAF) OFFICERS TO ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. THE COUP PLOTTERS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT PRESIDENT DIEM'S MEETINGS WITH ARMY OFFICERS DURING WHICH THE LATTER RECEIVED GIFTS OF MONEY. LANG'S PLAN FOR REORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT FOLLOWING THE COUP HAS BEEN ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE BY THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND HE HAS STARTED SELECTING MEMBERS OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT. LANG HAS ADVISED POSTPONING THE COUP UNTIL HIS GOVERNMENTAL PLANNING HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

2. LANG MADE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENTS ABOUT MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS:

A. LIEUTENANT GENERAL LE VAN TY, RECENTLY RETURNED FROM THE UNITED STATES, MET WITH OTHER GENERALS ON 26 OR 27 SEPTEMBER AND THEN SAW PRESIDENT DIEM TO URGE GOVERNMENTAL REFORMS, INCLUDING THE APPOINTMENT OF GENERALS TO THE MINISTRIES OF NATIONAL DEFENSE AND INTERIOR.

B. GENERAL KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS WERE BECOMING CONVINCED THAT REFORMS ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT AND THAT THE ENTIRE NGO FAMILY HAD TO BE REMOVED FROM OFFICE.

C. KHIEM WAS CONCERNED ABOUT INCREASED VIET CONG (VC) MILITARY ACTIVITY NEAR SAIGON AND THE COUP PLOTTERS FEARED POSSIBLE VC EXPLOITATION OF AN ATTEMPTED COUP D'ETAT.

D. KHIEM AND OTHER GENERALS DID NOT WISH TO ATTEMPT A COUP UNTIL IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE UNITED STATES WOULD SUPPORT THEM IF THEIR COUP SUCCEEDED.

E. COLONEL DO MAU, WORKING THROUGH LIEUTENANT COLONELS NGUYEN CAO KY, 1ST TRANSPORT GROUP COMMANDER AND DO KHAC MAI, VNAF CHIEF OF STAFF, HAS INDEPENDENTLY ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE VNAF OFFICERS TO MOUNT A COUP AND ATTACK GIA LONG PALACE. LANG'S GROUP BELIEVED THAT MAU WAS TOO INDISCREET BUT PLANNED TO CAPITALIZE ON THE SITUATION IF THE VNAF DID BEGIN A COUP. (FIELD COMMENT. IT HAS BEEN REPORTED THAT MAI AND MAU WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT NO ACTION HAS BEEN TAKEN AGAINST THE REGIME.)

F. GENERAL KHIEM CLAIMED THAT HELICOPTER UNITS WERE INCLUDED IN THE LANG COUP GROUP.

G. PRESIDENT DIEM RECENTLY SUMMONED MILITARY OFFICERS, WITH THE RANK OF CAPTAIN AND ABOVE, WHO COMMANDED TROOP UNITS IN AND NEAR SAIGON AND GAVE THEM SUMS OF MONEY RANGING FROM 30,000 TO 100,000 PIASTERS. THE MONEY OSTENSIBLY WAS SEIZED FROM THE VC. COLONEL NGUYEN VAN THIEN, VIETNAMESE ARMOR COMMANDER, RECEIVED 100,000 PIASTERS, WHICH APPARENTLY HAS CAUSED HIM TO RENEW HIS ALLEGIANCE TO DIEM. SOME JUNIOR OFFICERS COUNTED ON TO SUPPORT THE COUP HAD BEEN IMPRESSED BY THEIR MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT, BUT OTHERS WERE NOT AND HAVE JOINED THE COUP GROUP.

(FIELD COMMENT. SEE FVS 9712 (TDCS-3/560,375) FOR THAO'S STATEMENT T THAT NHU HAD GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO MILITARY OFFICRS.)

H. DIEM HAS GIVEN LARGE SUMS OF MONEY TO COLONEL HUYNH HUU HIEN, VNAF COMMANDER. ACCORIDNG TO GENERAL KHIEM, DIEM HAS GIVEN HIEN ORDERS TO USE THE VNAF FOR COUNTERCOUP ACTION AND FOR EVACUATION OF THE PRESIDENT IF NECESSARY.

I. DIEM OFFERED LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, INSPECTOR OF STRATEGIC HAMLETS, THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE WHILE NHU OFFERED HIM COMMAND OF THE SPECIAL FORCES. THAO, HOWEVER, HAS NOT WAVERED IN HIS SUPPORT OF THE COUP.

3. LANG SAID THAT HE HAS URGED DELAY IN MOUNTING THE COUP UNTIL HE HAS COMPLETED HIS PLANS FOR THE NEW GOVERNMENT SO THAT THERE WOULD BE NO VOID FOR THE VC TO EXPLOIT. HE SAID THAT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE HAS ACCEPTED IN PRINCIPLE HIS IDEAS CONCERNING ORGANIZATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT. (FIELD COMMENT: IN LANG'S PROPOSED GOVERNMENT THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE WOULD REPLACE PRESIDENT DIEM. THE TERM MINISTER WOULD BE USED INSTEAD OF COORDINATING SECRETARY OF STATE AND MINISTER OF SECURITY AND MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS WOULD BE ADDED TO THE GOVERNMENTAL STRUCTURE, WHICH WOULD NOT DIFFER DRASTICALLY FROM THE PRESENT ONE.) LANG HAS SELECTED

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS AS MEMBERS OF A SHADOW CABINET:

A. GENERAL KHIEM, MINISTER OF SECURITY

B. VO VAN HIEN, CURRENTLY A SAIGON LAWYER, MINISTER OF JUSTICE.

C. LANG, EITHER MINISTER OF ECONOMY OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR FINANCE.

D. NGUYEN TON HOAN, PROMIENT OPPOSITION LEADER IN EXILE, MINISTER OF CULTURAL AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS.

E. NGUYEN THAI, OPPOSITION LEADER IN THE UNITED STATES, EITHER MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS OR DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR CIVIC ACTION.

F. MAJOR GENERAL TRAN VAN MINH, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR DEFENSE.

G. NGUYEN HUY NGHIA, GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) AMBASSADOR TO TOKYO, DEPUTY MINISTER OF SECURITY FOR INTERIOR.

H. NGUYEN HUU CHAU, FORMER MINISTER OF INTERIOR UNDER DIEM CURRENTLY IN EXILE, DEPUTY MINISTER OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS.

I. AU TRUONG THANH, PROFESSIONAL ECONOMIST, DEPUTY MINISTER OF ECONOMY FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS.

J. LIEUTENANT COLONEL PHAM NGOC THAO, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF NATIONAL POLICE.

LANG HAS CONTACTED ALL OF THE ABOVE EXCEPT NGHIA, CHAU AND HOA. HE HAS SENT A CATHOLIC PRIEST TO PARIS TO CONTACT CHAU AND WAS PLANNING TO CONTACT THE OTHERS EVENTUALLY.

4. LANG SAID THAT HE WAS STRONGLY OPPOSED TO THE INCLUSION OF TRAN KIM TUYEN, RECENTLY ASSIGNED AS GVN CONSUL GENERAL TO CAIRO, IN THE NEW GOVERNMENT. NEVERTHELESS, THAO HAS ASSURED TUYEN'S SUPPORTERS IN SAIGON THAT TUYEN WILL BE A MEMBER OF THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR SUPPORT FOR THE COUP.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE (AMBASSADOR LODGE) USMACV (GENERAL HARKINS) CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10173
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : Bundy
TO : Lodge
TITLE :
DATE : 10/30/1963
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 201: Vietnam,10/29/63-10/31/63, CIA Reports. Box 2

10b 10a

CAS 79407

October 30, 1963

SEE SANITIZED
VERSION NLK-03-330
+ DOWNGRADED TO
SECRET

~~TOP~~ SECRET

EYES ONLY FOR AMBASSADOR LODGE

FROM McG. Bundy, White House

1. Our reading your thoughtful 2063 leads us to believe a significant difference of shading may exist on one crucial point (see next para) and on one or two lesser matters easily clarified.

2. We do not accept as a basis for U. S. policy that we have no power to delay or discourage a coup. In your paragraph 12 you say that if you were convinced that the coup was going to fail you would of course do everything you could to stop it. We believe that on this same basis you should take action to persuade coup leaders to stop or delay any operation which, in your best judgment, does not clearly give high prospect of success. We have never considered any betrayal of generals to Diem, and our 79109 explicitly rejected that course. We recognize the danger of appearing hostile to generals, but we believe that our own position should be on as firm ground as possible, hence we cannot limit ourselves to proposition implied in your message that only conviction of certain failure justifies intervention. We believe that your standard for intervention should be that stated above.

3. Therefore, if you should conclude that there is not clearly a high prospect of success, you should communicate this doubt to generals in a way calculated to persuade them to desist at least until chances are

better. In such a communication you should use the weight of U. S. best advice and explicitly reject any implication that we oppose the effort of the generals because of preference for present regime. We recognize need to bear in mind generals' interpretation of U. S. role in 1960 coup attempt, and your agent should maintain clear distinction between strong and honest advice given as a friend and any opposition to their objectives.

~~if [illegible] request [illegible] and~~

~~4. With respect to money for coup group you are authorized to [illegible] guarantees make such clandestine disbursements as you consider secure and effective from available CAS piasters.~~

4 ~~5~~. We continue to be deeply interested in up-to-the-minute assessment of prospects and are sending this before reply to our CAS 79126. We want continuous exchange latest assessments on this topic.

5. ~~6~~. To clarify our intent, paragraph 7 of our 79109 is rescinded and we restate our desires as follows:

a. While you are in Saigon you will be chief of country team in all circumstances and our only instruction is that we are sure it will help to have Harkins fully informed at all stages and to use advice from both him and Smith in framing guidance for coup contacts and assessment. We continue to be concerned that neither Conein nor any other reporting source is getting the clarity we would like with respect to alignment of forces and level of determination among generals.

b. When you leave Saigon and before there is a coup, Truehart will be chief of the country team. Our only modification of existing procedures is that in this circumstance we wish all instruction to Conein to be conducted in immediate consultation with Harkins and Smith so that all three know what is said to Conein. Any disagreement among the three on such instructions should be reported to Washington and held for our resolution, when time permits.

c. If you have left and a coup occurs, we believe that emergency situation requires, pending your return, that direction of country team be vested in most senior officer with experience of military decisions, and that officer in our view is Harkins. We do not repeat not intend that this switch in final responsibility should be publicized in any way, and Harkins will of course be guided in basic posture by our instructions, which follow in paragraph 7. Thus we do not believe that this switch will have the effect suggested in your paragraph 8.

6. This paragraph contains our present standing instructions for U. S. posture in the event of a coup.

a. U. S. authorities will reject appeals for direct intervention from either side, and U. S. -controlled aircraft and other resources will not be committed between the battle lines or in support of either side, without authorization from Washington.

b. In event of indecisive contest, U. S. authorities may in their discretion agree to perform any acts agreeable to both sides, (ob) 10a

such as removal of key personalities or relay of information. In such actions, however, U. S. authorities will strenuously avoid appearance of pressure on either side. It is not in the interest of USG to be or appear to be either instrument of existing government or instrument of coup.

c. In the event of imminent or actual failure of coup, U. S. authorities may afford asylum in their discretion to those to whom there is any express or implied obligation of this sort. We believe however that in such a case it would be in our interest and probably in interest of those seeking asylum that they seek protection of other Embassies in addition to our own. This point should be made strongly if need arises.

d. But once a coup under responsible leadership has begun, and within these restrictions, it is in the interest of the U. S. Government that it should succeed.

7. We have your message about return to Washington and ~~if announcement has not already been made,~~ we suggest that ~~it~~ all public comment be kept as low-key and quiet as possible, and we also urge that if possible you keep open the exact time of your departure. We are strongly sensitive to great disadvantage of having you out of Saigon if this should turn out to be a week of decision, and if it can be avoided we would prefer not to see you pinned to a fixed hour of departure now.

#####

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10036-10179
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Status Report on Southeast Asia
DATE : 7/11/1962
PAGES : 10
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 203: Vietnam Status 7/11/63. Box 1

1a

SEE SANITIZED VERSION NLK-81-235

[illegible]

SECRET

STATUS REPORT
ON
SOUTHEAST ASIA

JULY 11, 1962

PREPARED BY:

TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SECRET

VIET-NAM

Current Overall Evaluation

The general trend appears slightly favorable, with the GVN continuing to improve its military, and to a limited extent, its political and economic position. Basic problems are being eroded but quick and decisive action is rare. There were no major breakthroughs or important victories and none appear likely in the immediate future. The Viet Cong show no weakening in strength or determination despite reportedly heavy losses.

On the military side, Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen continued well. Viet Cong casualties were up and their activities down (there is an unconfirmed news report that a major battle took place July 3, however, in which the VC defeated a regular army battalion). This may be due to reorganization and weather rather than GVN successes. The GVN took several good but minor steps to increase popular support for the war effort, and several rural social and economic programs moved ahead significantly. On the international front, there were some favorable responses to our efforts to set up an aid coordinating group of donor nations. Economic conditions improved somewhat, with stable prices, credit a little less tight, consumer goods sales and tax collections up, and rice deliveries continued good.

Fearing that the prospective Laos settlement will facilitate Viet Cong activities and that it may presage a U. S. move to neutralize Viet-Nam itself, the GVN has made difficulties at Geneva over several issues and threatens to boycott the conference. President Kennedy has sent Diem a personal letter stressing the importance we attach to a Laos settlement and our determination to continue to help Viet-Nam defend itself. There is no response as yet.

Progress on Action Program

1. VC Activity

Viet Cong activity continued at a relatively low level, with armed attacks falling to the lowest point over a year, 60, for the period 20-27 June and rising only slightly to 75 for the period June 27 - July 4. The lack of VC aggressiveness is likely due to the rainy season and their efforts to regroup in order to counter the improved mobility and performance of the GVN forces. Observing that this appears to be a period of VC reorganization and assimilation of recent infiltrators, COMUSMACV reports indications that VC units which previously operated as separate platoons and companies are now being formed into battalions. Infiltration evidently continues, but good intelligence is scarce. MACV J-2 estimates infiltration in May at 800-1,000 and 800 for the first three weeks of June, but this information is unconfirmed and there are no reports of infiltration since.

In spite of reduced VC activity, VC casualties were high and included some main force personnel. For the period 20-27 June the VC suffered a reported increase of casualties of almost 25 per cent over the previous reporting period. Killed in action for the two week period were 865 VC and 141 friendly forces.

Reports continue to indicate a critical VC shortage of medical supplies. Unconfirmed reports raise the possibility that the VC are attaining an anti-aircraft capability.

(Following items are keyed to the Viet-Nam draft action program of July 3)

2. Strengthen popular support. The GVN took several steps to generate more popular support in the last two weeks. These include the July 7 release of 794 prisoners in connection with the celebration of the "double seven" holiday (anniversary of Diem's coming to power), a stepped-up drive to root out low-level corruption and abuse of power by GVN officials, and a Presidentially proposed amendment to the Constitution permitting the questioning of Cabinet Ministers both by Committees of the National Assembly and by the National Assembly in plenary session. The prisoners released may include leading oppositionist Phan Quang Dan, who has been in prison since his participation in the attempted 1960 coup. We have urged the last item on Diem in the past in an effort to increase the powers and prestige of the National Assembly.

Another favorable development is increased emphasis on working with and for the people in the current training program for strategic hamlet cadres. Ngo dinh Nhu (President's brother in charge of the strategic hamlet program) is concerned that the program win genuine popular support. He favors the election of hamlet officials by secret ballot instead of by customary show of hands. This is now being done in some hamlets.

4. Seek International Support

(a) Cambodian Relations. The GVN replied mildly to the Cambodian note concerning the ARVN border incursions of June 16, but did not apologize or offer indemnities. The note insists that all precautions were taken to avoid crossing the poorly marked frontier, admits that in spite of these precautions the frontier may have been violated, points out that any such inadvertent crossing was not motivated by hostility toward Cambodia, denies the arrest of or harm to Cambodian inhabitants, and proposes a mixed border control committee to study frontier incidents and provide for future border cooperation.

Another source of GVN-RKG friction, disputed coastal islands, was the subject of an exchange of notes which threatened to stir up further trouble between Cambodia and Viet-Nam.

(b) Third Country Aid. The United States has suggested a Saigon, and possibly a later Washington meeting of donor country representatives to coordinate aid to Viet-Nam. The intention is to stimulate more third country aid if possible, and to make sure that current third country contributions are being effectively applied. To date, Australia and New Zealand have indicated willingness to participate in such meetings, Germany will take part in informal Saigon meetings but would not attend any formal Washington gathering, and the Japanese are "proceeding with caution" because of the expressed fear that too close identification with the U.S. will open up Japanese technicians in Viet-Nam to Viet Cong reprisals. Canada has declined to participate because of its membership on the ICC. The Belgians, French, Italians and the UK have not yet responded.

Negotiations for the integration of Australian trainers into our MAAG appear near completion. The GVN has indicated its willingness to receive a New Zealand medical team at any time and the details are being worked out with Wellington and Saigon.

10. Military Civic Action

The 31st Engineer Battalion assisted the local population at Cheo Reo in Pleiku Province in the construction of a Buddhist temple. In addition to the 150,000 copies of a news sheet distributed weekly by soldiers to the local civilian population, 35,000 copies of the sheet were also air dropped.

12. Develop and Implement Mutually Agreed Plans

Operations Binh Minh and Hai Yen. Saigon reports both clear-and-hold operations continuing to make progress without serious VC reaction. Increased contact with the VC is reported in the Hai Yen area, however, as the military move into VC territory.

Hamlet Councils have been elected in the Hai Yen area, but the Embassy notes a serious problem in the fact that a hamlet Council member receives only 300 piasters (about $4.00) per month for what is theoretically a full time job. In Operation Binh Minh, an effort will be made to induce the people to move voluntarily into the fourth village to be set up there. The plan calls for extensive propaganda and explanations in advance of the move establishment of military control over the area so that the people will be free to move voluntarily, and up to 15 days to accomplish the move itself (previous regrouping actions allowed only a very short period for the physical move)

Montagnards. Latest information developed as a result of joint surveys indicates the Montagnard situation is more a long term problem than an emergency. There has in fact been a movement of some 17,000 Montagnard as a reaction to VC pressures, and this movement will probably continue, particularly if the GVN provides adequate food and security.

Almost all Montagnard refugees are at least temporarily resettled and receiving minimum food, shelter and security.

The Embassy comments that while this information somewhat reduces the urgency of the problem, it does not change the problem's magnitude or importance. Difficulties stemming from the absence of a well directed, national Montagnard relief program, limited relief resources, and the Vietnamese prejudice against the Montagnard continue. But the principal and most encouraging aspect is the fact that the Montagnard have fled the VC pressures and more may do so.

Strategic Hamlet Program. The second ten day training course for 490 strategic hamlet cadres was inaugurated by Ngo dinh Nhu in Saigon July 2.

Future Plans. According to CAS, General Dinh's plan for the pacification of Binh Dinh province has been approved by Diem and will soon be presented to the Embassy. The First Corps Commander is also reportedly developing plans for two provinces in his area; these plans are said to stem from the U.S. interest and support for Hai Yen.

15. Provide Increased Technical Assistance.

Village Radios. As of July 4, 817 of the planned 2500 village radios were installed and operating. Tests of radios for use on trains were started.

Defoliation. The Embassy has proposed a test of the effectiveness of defoliants against VC food patches in the mountainous area of Operation Hai Yen. Governor Harriman opposes the use of defoliants on food crops because of the effect on Asian opinion. Decision and action will be delayed until the Governor's return from Geneva.

20. Integrate Economic Measures with Counterinsurgency Effort.

Agricultural Extension. A pilot training program for agricultural efforts associated with counterinsurgency plans opened July 3 in Qui Nhon. One hundred farmers will study farming and stock raising methods for one month, including the use of fertilizers and pesticides.

Provincial Hospitals. Construction of four of the 25 planned hospital surgical suites began on schedule.

Anti-Rat Program. The USOM-supported rat destruction campaign was carried out in ten northern provinces June 12-22, resulting in the destruction of an estimated 15-20 million rats or 20,000 per village.

25. Publicize the War Within Viet-Nam and Internationally.

Viet-Nam Photo Service. USIS Saigon is sending out a weekly packet of photos designed to enlist third country interest and support for the GVN war effort. Eight posts have reported favorably on the effort, indicating no difficulty in placing the photos in leading newspapers.

28. Establish Network of USIS Sub-posts.

The GVN has agreed to the establishment of virtually any number of USIS sub-posts throughout the country. Negotiations on locations and physical arrangements are underway.

1a

THAILAND

Current Situation Evaluation

The RTG has accepted the International Court decision awarding the disputed Phra Viharn Temple to Cambodia. Thai delegates attended the Geneva Conference on Laos, which reconvened on July 2, but the RTG has not yet announced its intention to attend the next meeting of the SEATO Council of Representatives in mid-July.

On July 2 the US began the redeployment of 1,000 Marines from the Third Marine Expeditionary Brigade at Udorn. Possible Thai concern over this move was lessened by our informing them at the same time of a US-financed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand (see below).

On June 29 police arrested one suspected Communist in Chiengrai and one in Lampang, both in the North of Thailand. The Thai press reports that subversive documents were confiscated at both locations. According to unconfirmed reports these documents originated from a Communist propaganda ring operating out of Northeastern Burma.

Progress on Action Program

1. Improved Logistic Facilities

We have outlined to the RTG our proposed program to improve logistic facilities in Thailand. The program would consist mainly of a POL pipeline to Korat in the northeast, rolling stock, airfield improvement, storage areas, and prepositioning of heavy military engineeringequipment. The Thai have agreed to the proposal in principle although Sarit reserved his decision on our request that the RTG provide the right-of-way for the pipeline and in-country transportation.

2. Internal Security Plan

We have instructed Embassy Bangkok to cable summaries of those portions of the plan which will not have been pouched in time to reach the Department by July 11. This will permit consideration of the basic components of the entire plan during Secretary McNamara's forthcoming trip to Honolulu.

1a

LAOS

Current Situation Evaluation

The principal remaining issues before the Geneva Conference, including SEATO, having been resolved, it is anticipated that the new Accords may be signed next week. There is nevertheless one serious stumbling block, which endangers the satisfactory conclusion of the Conference, i.e., the possible refusal of the GVN to sign. The GVN's position stems from its belief that so many concessions have been made to the Communists that the security of SVN is gravely threatened. We are, however, hopeful that Diem will still be persuaded that we have achieved the best obtainable compromise for Laos and that we stand firm on our commitments to SVN.

Progress on Action Program

There has been little progress on our action program. We are concentrating at present on the following problems:

1. Economic Assistance. Elaboration of our future aid to Laos awaits the visit of Souvanna Phouma to Washington, tentatively scheduled for July 25-27. In the meantime, we seek to spread the burden of providing Souvanna with the material assistance he requires by enlisting contributions from other Free World nations.

2. RLG Diplomatic Relations. The RLG's decision to recognize 5 bloc countries and accept an exchange of Ambassadors poses a major problem with respect to the GVN, GRC, Federal Republic of Germany and the ROK. Further action by the RLG is deferred until Souvanna's return to Laos. In the interim we are attempting to assist the pro-Western countries involved in establishing or maintaining satisfactory representation in Laos.

3. ICC. We have asked our Geneva delegation to request the ICC to prepare a detailed budget and list of equipment needs so that we will be prepared to meet quickly our share of the requirements. With regard to the essential heavy equipment - helicopters and light aircraft - we are taking steps to make it immediately available to the ICC.

4. MAAG Withdrawal. With the signing of the Accords, we will seek Canadian cooperation in utilizing to the full the 75-day period for the withdrawal of foreign military personnel. This will give us the maximum possible opportunity to determine whether the DRV is abiding by its commitments and whether the Soviets as Co-Chairman are carrying out their undertaking.

1a

BURMA

Current Situation Evaluation

The internal situation remains unstable. This fact was highlighted by incidents on July 7 and 8 when student demonstrations led by pro-Communist organizations were ruthlessly repressed by the police and army. These incidents could well lead to increased public disaffection with the Ne Win regime and to a rift between the regime and the opportunistic leftist groups who have, heretofore, been its only outspoken civilian political supporters.

Internal security conditions are apparently continuing to deteriorate, though not dramatically. A special Government amnesty offer expired June 30 without producing significant response from the insurgents.

Progress on Action Program

1. Political

It has been confirmed that Brigadier Tin Pe of the Union Revolutionary Council will come to Washington for medical treatment as planned probably in late July, although precise dates have not been determined.

2. Economic (AID)

No new developments.

3. Military

a. The Burmese are ready formally to accept the FY 1962 military "sales" program. State and DOD have agreed to accelerate deliveries of M2 carbines as requested by the Burmese, to the extent production facilities permit, in order to contribute to planned post-monsoon counter-insurgency operations. This action will also, hopefully, earn some political credit for the United States.

b. Embassy Rangoon has confirmed that United States training for Burmese officers will be continued under the FY 1962 program. 117 prospective students have been processed for the coming year.

CAMBODIA

Current Situation Evaluation

Cambodia's differences with neighboring Thailand and South Viet-Nam continue, but they have so far not significantly affected the presently generally satisfactory relations between the United States and Cambodia. Thai moves concerning Preah Vihear temple are being watched closely, and it appears likely that if the announced decision to respect the World Court's award is not implemented by September the matter may be brought by Cambodia to the attention of the UNGA. The dispute between Cambodia and Viet-Nam over the ownership of islands off the Cambodian shore has come to the fore again, with the GVN rejecting a Cambodian protest against Vietnamese naval movements near them on the grounds that they belong to Viet-Nam. Organization of a new Cabinet has been postponed pending religious rites celebrating the World Court decision. New evidence of anti-Sihanouk plotting in Bangkok has developed.

Progress on Action Program

1. RKG-GVN Border Commission (Pol. 8). The GVN reply to the RKG's protest against the June 16 border violations is not entirely satisfactory, but Phnom Penh believes it may allow progress on the border commission proposal and has raised this possibility with the Foreign Ministry.

2. Force Increase (Mil. 1). The initial reaction of the RKG to approval of the request for a force increase of 3,184, for MAP support only, is one of disappointment that military budget support was not included.

3. New Aircraft (Mil. 5). Four T-28 aircraft, first increment of sixteen, have arrived in Cambodia. Formal turnover awaits the arrival of Ambassador Sprouse.

4. Highway Repairs (Econ. 9). Invitations to bid have been sent out, and the repair contract is scheduled to be awarded by August 15. Contractors would be scheduled to commence work November 1, under the proposed contract.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10120
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files: Robert W. Komer
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA Information Telegram
DATE : 12/00/1963
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 430: Kennedy, Reactions to Death Miscellaneous, 11/22/63-6/18/64. Box 5

TELEGRAM IN ORMATION REP RT TELEGRAM

75

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET *(When Filled In)*

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	SOVIET BLOC / YUGOSLAVIA	REPORT NO.	TDCS-3/566,658
SUBJECT	COMMENTS OF YUGOSLAV AND BLOC DIPLOMATS ON THE PROBABLE EFFECT OF KENNEDY ASSASSINATION ON EAST-WEST RELATIONS	DATE DISTR.	6 DECEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	25-29 NOVEMBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 74578
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	GREECE, ATHENS (28 NOVEMBER, 2 DECEMBER 1963)		
APPRAISAL	2 (THAT STATEMENTS ARE ACCURATELY REPORTED)	FIELD REPORT NO.	EKA 4230

__[illegible]
__ALEXANDER
__BELK
__BRUBECK
__CHASE
__DINGEMAN
__DUNGAN
__ECKEL
__FORRESTAL
__JOHNSON
__KILDUFF
~~__KLEIN~~
~~__SCHLESINGER~~
__SMITH, WM. Y.

Kennedy admin

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A GREEK POLITICAL OBSERVER (B) WITH CONTACTS AMONG BLOC DIPLOMATS IN ATHENS, FROM THE DIPLOMATS MENTIONED BELOW.

FOLLOWING ARE EXAMPLES OF (PORTION GARBLED-BEING SERVICED)* BEING TAKEN BY SOVBLOC AND YUGOSLAV DIPLOMATS IN GREEK CIRCLES:

1. ON 25 NOVEMBER 63, YUGOSLAV AMBASSADOR TO GREECE PEKO DAPCEVIC EXPRESSED HOPE THAT ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY WOULD NOT CHANGE THE INTERNATIONAL ATMOSPHERE, ADDING THAT HE IS CERTAIN SOVIET UNION IS WELL DISPOSED TO CONTINUE FRIENDLY CONTACTS WITH WEST. DAPCEVIC SAID THERE HAS BEEN "A GREAT PSYCHOLOGICAL CHANGE" ON PART OF SOVIET PEOPLE IN PAST FEW YEARS FROM EARLIER ATTITUDE THAT ALL AMERICANS AND PARTICULARLY AMERICAN GOVERNMENT ARE WAR MONGERS TO CURRENT THINKING THAT AMERICANS, LIKE SOVIETS,

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR		OO	EX
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DEC - 6 1963

REALLY WANT PEACE. ZENITH OF THIS CHANGE CAME WHEN UNITED STATES ANNOUNCED IT WAS WILLING TO SELL WHEAT TO SOVIET UNION. ACCORDING TO DAPCEVIC, THIS ANNOUNCEMENT MADE TREMENDOUS IMPACT ON SOVIET PEOPLE AND THEIR FEELING IS NOW SO FAVORABLE TOWARD AMERICANS THAT EVEN IF SOVIET LEADERSHIP WANTED TO REVERSE THIS FEELING, IT COULD NOT EASILY DO SO.

2. ON 26 NOVEMBER, CZECH FIRST SECRETARY VAKLAV SVESTKA STATED THAT CZECH EMBASSY IN ATHENS HAD NOT YET RECEIVED REACTION OF PRAGUE TO THE ASSASSINATION, BUT FEELING OF CZECH EMBASSY PEOPLE IN ATHENS WAS THAT U S POLICY WOULD NOT CHANGE MATERIALLY. SVESTKA EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT ASSASSINATION WILL HAVE DELAYING ACTION ON IMPROVED EAST-WEST RELATIONS; UNDER KENNEDY THINGS WERE MOVING QUICKLY TOWARDS UNDERSTANDING, AND CHANGE OF PRESIDENT NOW WILL OF NECESSITY SLOW DOWN THE COURSE OF EVENTS BECAUSE "PERSONAL FACTOR" IS NOW MISSING. KENNEDY HAD DEVELOPED CONTACTS WITH SOVIET LEADERSHIP AND ACHIEVED ACCEPTANCE OF SOVBLOC (PORTION GARBLED)*POPULATIONS AS PEACE LOVING MAN; JOHNSON HAS TO ESTABLISH THIS FOR HIMSELF NOW, AND IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME.

3. ON 29 NOVEMBER, SOVIET FIRST SECRETARY VITALIY NOVIKOV STATED THAT SOVIETS DO NOT EXPECT IMMEDIATE CHANGE IN US FOREIGN POLICY BECAUSE WITH ONLY ONE YEAR BEFORE ELECTIONS JOHNSON AS NON-ELECTED PRESIDENT IS NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE BASIC KENNEDY

POLICIES. SOVIETS ARE ANXIOUS, HOWEVER, OVER FUTURE EAST-WEST RELATIONS. ASSASSINATION CLEARLY SHOWS RADICAL RIGHT-WING ELEMENTS ARE STRONG, HAVE SUPPORTERS IN LOCAL POLICE AND POLITICAL CIRCLES AND ARE WILLING TO FIGHT FOR THEIR IDEALS. IT ALSO REVEALS, NOVIKOV SAID, STRENGTH OF REACTION IN AMERICA TO KENNEDY POLICIES SOVIET PEOPLE FEAR THAT RIGHT-WING WILL BE DOMINANT.

4. ON 29 NOVEMBER, RUMANIAN AMBASSADOR MIRCEA BALANESCU SAID HE WAS CERTAIN THERE WOULD BE NO CHANGE IN BLOC POLICY VIS-A-VIS WEST AND ANY INCREASE IN TENSION WOULD BE RESULT OF CHANGED AMERICAN POLICY.

5. FIELD DISSEM STATE ARMY NAVY AIR EUCOM CINCNELM CINCSOUTH (PERSONAL).

6. *HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTIONS WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF THEY MATERIALLY AFFECT THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10440
RECORD SERIES : Personal Papers of Richard Goodwin
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re:
DATE : 9/3/1961
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Goodwin Papers: Cuba, Meetings on Refugees, Box 4. Box 7.

NLK-77-004, 10.2.2 (Goodwin

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

2

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY	BRAZIL CHINA CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/485,732
SUBJECT	OFFER OF SUPPLIES AND MEN TO THE GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL BY THE GOVERNMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND CUBA	DATE DISTR.	3 SEPTEMBER 1961
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	WEEK OF 27 AUGUST 1961	REFERENCES	IN 23204
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	BRAZIL, RIO DE JANEIRO (2 SEPTEMBER 1961)		
APPRAISAL	3	FIELD REPORT NO.	HBR 2529

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A BRAZILIAN PROFESSOR (C) WITH GOOD CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST STUDENT LEADERS.

1. DURING THE WEEK OF 27 AUGUST PARTY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE TUNG OF COMMUNIST CHINA AND PREMIER FIDEL CASTRO OF CUBA BOTH OFFERED MATERIAL SUPPORT, INCLUDING QUOTE VOLUNTEERS UNQUOTE, TO LEONEL BRIZOLA, GOVERNOR OF RIO GRANDE DO SUL, WHO WAS LEADING THE STRUGGLE IN BRAZIL TO ASSURE THE SUCCESSION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF VICE PRESIDENT JOAO GOULART UPON THE RESIGNATION OF PRESIDENT JANIO QUADROS. BRIZOLA DID NOT ACCEPT THE OFFER, ALTHOUGH HE APPRECIATED THE MORAL SUPPORT, BECAUSE HE DID NOT WISH TO QUOTE CREATE AN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIR UNQUOTE OF BRAZIL'S POLITICAL CRISIS. (FIELD COMMENT: BRIZOLA OBVIOUSLY WAS AFRAID THAT IF THE OFFERS WERE ACCEPTED THE UNITED STATES MIGHT INTERVENE. THE OFFER OF AID BY CASTRO LEAKED

SECRET CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	EXO	FBI

I&NS TREASURY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

TO THE PRESS; THAT OF MAO DID NOT).

2. 2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, FBI, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCARIB. CINCLANT

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10452
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/1/1962
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

EXEMPT NLK-75-14 2

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

RETAIN OR DESTROY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	SOUTH VIETNAM	**REPORT NO.**	**TDCS** DB-3/650,938
SUBJECT	WARNING TO PRESIDENT DIEM OF A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT ON NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962	**DATE DISTR.**	1 AUGUST 1962
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	1 AUGUST 1962	**REFERENCES**	IN
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VIETNAM, SAIGON (1 AUGUST 1962)		
APPRAISAL	SEE BELOW	**FIELD REPORT NO.**	

~~SMITH BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS ~~TENTATIVE~~.

SOURCE PARAS. 2-4: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU.
PARAS. 5-8: AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, FROM MAJOR LONG.
PARA. 9: AN OFFICER OF THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (C), WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

1. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. ALTHOUGH THE COUP D'ETAT DESCRIBED IN THIS REPORT DID NOT OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962, THIS REPORT IS BEING DISSEMINATED SINCE IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE INDIVIDUALS INVOLVED MIGHT EVOLVE A PLAN FOR A FUTURE COUP AGAINST THE DIEM REGIME. SEE FIELD APPRAISAL IN PARAS. 10 THROUGH 14.

2. ON 1 AUGUST 1962 LIEUTENANT COLONEL NGUYEN VAN CHAU, CHIEF OF THE ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (ARVN) PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE SERVICE, STATED AT APPROXIMATELY 2100 HOURS THAT HE HAD BEEN INFORMED THAT PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM HAD BEEN WARNED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF A COUP D'ETAT OCCURING ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST 1962. (SOURCE COMMENT. CHAU DID NOT NAME THE INDIVIDUAL FROM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	~~USIA~~	OCI	ONE	~~OCR~~	~~ORR~~	~~OO~~	DIA	CIB

VTF
EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

IN

WHOM HE RECEIVED THE INFORMATION.)

3. CHAU ADDED THAT THE COUP WAS ALLEGEDLY BEING PLANNED BY A GROUP OF SENIOR ARVN OFFICERS LED BY ARVN CHIEF OF FIELD COMMAND MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH. CHAU ALSO STATED THAT HE BELIEVED THAT BRIGADIER GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, CHIEF OF THE QUANG TRUNG TRAINING CENTER, MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU INDICATED THAT XUAN'S INVOLVEMENT WAS INFERENTIAL AND NOT EXPLICIT.

4. CHAU COMMENTED WITHOUT FURTHER EXPLANATION THAT THE FRENCH MIGHT ALSO BE INVOLVED. CHAU CONJECTURED THAT NOT MORE THAN TWO ARVN BATTALIONS WERE INVOLVED. HE DID NOT EXPLAIN THE BASIS OF HIS CONJECTURE.

5. AT APPROXIMATELY 2200 HOURS ON 1 AUGUST, MAJOR LONG, CHIEF OF THE CAPITAL REGION MILITARY SECURITY SERVICE (MSS) STATED THAT A CENTRAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS OFFICER OF THE GIA DINH PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT HAD INTERCEPTED ON 1 AUGUST A VIETNAMESE COMMUNIST (VC) RADIO MESSAGE IN PLAIN TEXT ADDRESSED TO THE VC SAIGON/CHOLON ZONE COMMITTEE INSTRUCTING ALL VC MILITARY UNITS TO BE PREPARED FOR AN UPRISING AT MIDNIGHT ON 1 AUGUST. (SOURCE COMMENT: MAJOR LONG DID NOT IDENTIFY THE ORIGINATOR OF THE MESSAGE.) (HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: TDCS-3/518,127 REPORTED THAT ON 23 JULY 1962 THE VC IN THE SAIGON AREA WERE ORDERED TO CEASE ALL TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AND TO PREPARE FOR A POSSIBLE COUP D'ETAT.)

6. MAJOR LONG ADDED THAT GENERAL XUAN HAD INFORMED THE VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT ON 25 JULY 1962 THAT HIS INTELLIGENCE SECTION HAD INTERCEPTED A VC DOCUMENT INSTRUCTING VC PERSONNEL TO BE READY FOR AN UPRISING IN ABOUT ONE

WEEK. (SOURCE COMMENT. MAJOR LONG DID NOT KNOW THE ORIGINATOR OR THE ADDRESSEE OF THE INTERCEPTED DOCUMENT, NOR DID HE STATE TO WHICH VIETNAMESE GOVERNMENT AGENCY GENERAL XUAN HAD REPORTED.)

7. MAJOR LONG ALSO REVEALED THAT AN MSS AGENT PENETRATION OF THE VC OF UNTESTED RELIABILITY HAD REPORTED ON 1 AUGUST THAT HIS VC SUPERIOR IN CHAU HIEP (THIRTY KILOMETERS WEST OF SAIGON) HAD INSTRUCTED HIM ON 31 JULY TO BE ALERT FOR A COUP, AND TO MEET HIS VC SUPERIOR IN SAIGON FOUR HOURS AFTER THE COUP BEGAN.

8. MAJOR LONG ALSO STATED THAT A HAND GRENADE HAD EXPLODED IN THE GO VAP AREA OF SAIGON ON THE NIGHT OF 1 AUGUST INJURING SEVEN VIETNAMESE WOMEN AND CHILDREN. (SOURCE COMMENT. THE RELEVANCE OF THE EXPLOSION TO A COUP ATTEMPT IS NOT CLEAR, BUT MAJOR LONG BELIEVED THAT THE EVENTS MIGHT BE CONNECTED.)

9. THE PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE (SEPES) INTERCEPTED CODED RADIO MESSAGES ON 1 AUGUST ON UNUSUAL FREQUENCIES. THE TEXT OF THE MESSAGES WHEN DECODED WERE IN VIETNAMESE AND FRENCH, AND STATED THAT A COUP WOULD OCCUR ON THE NIGHT OF 1-2 AUGUST. ARVN UNITS HAVE BEEN ALERTED IN THE SAIGON AREA.

10. FIELD COMMENT. CHAU IS CONSIDERED TO BE A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, WHO HAS PREVIOUSLY STATED THAT OF ALL THE ARVN OFFICERS, GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH WAS THE MOST LIKELY TO LEAD A COUP ATTEMPT. GENERAL MINH HAS BEEN A VOCAL CRITIC OF THE DIEM REGIME INSOFAR AS DIEM'S EFFICACY AGAINST THE VC IS CONCERNED. GENERAL MAI HUU XUAN, FREQUENTLY RUMORED TO BE A MEMBER OF VARIOUS COUP GROUPS,

IS KNOWN TO HAVE BEEN DISSATISFIED WITH HIS PRESENT ASSIGNMENT AND TO HAVE HARBORED RESENTMENTS AGAINST DIEM FOR ALLEGED SLIGHTS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT DIEM PROMOTED HIM FROM COLONEL TO BRIGADIER GENERAL SEVERAL YEARS AGO. MAJOR LONG HAS EXHIBITED PROFESSIONAL COMPETENCE IN HIS PRESENT POSITION.

11. FIELD COMMENT. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT ALL OF THE INFORMATION PROCEEDED FROM A SINGLE SOURCE OR FROM TWO SOURCES AND THE VARIATION IN DETAIL WAS IN THE ORAL ACCOUNTS OF DIFFERENT SOURCES. THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATION (CIO) WAS UNAWARE OF ANY POSSIBLE COUP SHORTLY AFTER MIDNIGHT ON 1-2 AUGUST. HOWEVER, AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE NORMAL PRESIDENTIAL GUARD HAD ALREADY BEEN REINFORCED AND POLICE CHECK POINTS ALSO SEEMED TO HAVE BEEN REINFORCED. GIVEN THE ADVANCE ALERT BY THE GVN MILITARY AND SECURITY ELEMENTS, IT IS PROBABLE THAT ANY INTENDED COUP WOULD BE ABORTIVE.

12. FIELD COMMENT. AT 0200 ON 2 AUGUST, SAIGON WAS QUIET AND THERE WERE NO SIGNS APPARENT OF ANY COUP ATTEMPT, EXCEPT FOR THE ALERT OF SOME OF THE GVN ELEMENTS STATED IN PARA. 11.

13. FIELD COMMENT. THE INTERCEPT OF A PLAIN TEXT VC RADIO MESSAGE REFERRED TO IN PARA. FIVE IS NOT CONVINCING, AND RAISES THE POSSIBILITY THAT THE VC MIGHT BE ENGAGED IN A CONFUSION MANEUVER. SEPES CAPABILITY TO INTERCEPT AND DECODE A MESSAGE IN THE SAME DAY, AS REPORTED IN PARA. NINE, IS QUESTIONABLE.

14. FIELD DISSEM. STATE CINCPAC ARPAC PACAF PAFLT.

END OF MESSAGE

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10453
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Views
DATE : 8/14/1962
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 8/1/62-8/14/62. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Vietnam

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

FILE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

RETAIN OR DES

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCSDB-3/651,039

SUBJECT VIEWS OF BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, ON A NEUTRALIST SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM

DATE DISTR. 14 AUGUST 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. EARLY AUGUST 1962

REFERENCES IN 43629

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (7 AUGUST 1962)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS-7782

~~SMITH-BUN~~
_DUNGAN
_KAYSEN
_KILDUFF
_PETERSEN
_SCHLESING
_~~TAYLOR~~
_BELK
_~~FORRESTA~~
JOHNSON
_KOMER

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN INDEPENDENT VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST (C) WITH EXTENSIVE CONTACTS, FROM ANOTHER VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST.

APPR. ALTHOUGH IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE STATEMENTS SET FORTH IN THE REPORT WERE MADE AS INDICATED, IT IS CONSIDERED DOUBTFUL THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER ACTUALLY HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM.

1. BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, H.A.F. HOHLER, TOLD A VIETNAMESE JOURNALIST ON 2 AUGUST 1962 THAT HE HAD BEEN READING SOME OF THE JOURNALIST'S ARTICLES AND WAS PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN A LATE JUNE ARTICLE ON THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS AND THE SOVIETS OVER NORTH VIETNAM. AFTER DISCUSSING THESE DIFFERENCES AT LENGTH, THE AMBASSADOR STATED HIS BELIEF THAT A THIRD FORCE IN VIETNAM IS NOT ONLY POSSIBLE, BUT ACTUALLY EXISTS, AND THAT SUCH A THIRD FORCE IN NORTH VIETNAM, COMBINED WITH NEUTRALIST ELEMENTS IN SOUTH VIETNAM, IS THE ONLY HOPE FOR VIETNAM. HOHLER EMPHASIZED THAT THE ONLY SOLUTION FOR SOUTH VIETNAM IS A NEUTRALIST COALITION SIMILAR TO

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

C/B

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	AID	DIA	EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

THAT WORKED OUT FOR LAOS. THE AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE AMERICANS ARE NOT TRAINED IN GUERILLA WARFARE AND CAN NOT WIN THE WAR AGAINST THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC) IN SOUTH VIETNAM.

2. THE CONVERSATION TOOK PLACE AT THE HOME OF PETER ROBERTS, INFORMATION OFFICER AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, WHERE ROBERTS ARRANGED A MEETING BETWEEN THE JOURNALIST AND AMBASSADOR HOHLER. THE JOURNALIST HAS KNOWN ROBERTS FOR SOME TIME THROUGH PRESS CONFERENCES AND SOCIAL AFFAIRS AMONG JOURNALISTS. HE WAS SURPRISED TO LEARN THAT ROBERTS HAD ARRANGED THE MEETING AT THE REQUEST OF THE AMBASSADOR, WHO HAD EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO TALK WITH HIM.

3. NEITHER THE JOURNALIST NOR ROBERTS HAD MUCH OPPORTUNITY TO STATE THEIR VIEWS DURING THE CONVERSATION. THE JOURNALIST ASSURED THE AMBASSADOR THAT, FAR FROM BEING NEUTRALIST MINDED, HE FEARS NEUTRALISM FOR SOUTH VIETNAM MORE THAN ANY OTHER SOLUTION SINCE HE BELIEVES NEUTRALISM TO BE NO MORE THAN A MAJOR STEP TOWARD ULTIMATE TAKEOVER AND CONTROL BY THE COMMUNISTS. ROBERTS POINTEDLY DISAGREED WITH AMBASSADOR HOHLER'S STATEMENT THAT THERE IS NO CHANCE OF WINNING THE WAR IN SOUTH VIETNAM, INDICATING THAT IT IS MUCH TOO EARLY TO MAKE SUCH A BLUNT STATEMENT, ALLUDING TO THE HUGE EFFORT UNDER WAY AND THE GAINS ALREADY APPARENT. ROBERTS DID SAY, HOWEVER, THAT THE SURFACING OF THE OPERATIONS IN NORTH VIETNAM CAT[illegible] NGHE AN AND HOA BINH SHOULD DEMONSTRATE TO THE AMERICANS AND TO THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM THE FUTILITY OF SUCH OPERATIONS.

ROBERTS ALSO COMMENTED THAT HE WAS SURPRISED AT THE FAILURE OF THE VC TO REACT EARLIER IN THE PROPAGANDA FIELD TO OBVIOUSLY EXPLOITABLE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM AND THE AMERICANS.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE THINKS THE ARTICLE THAT CAUGHT THE INTEREST OF AMBASSADOR HOHLER MAY HAVE BEEN ONE DATELINED SAIGON, 29 JUNE 1962, APPEARING IN AN EARLY JULY ISSUE OF THE PHILIPPINE HERALD, ENTITLED "INTRA-PARTY RIFT IN RED NORTH VIETNAM - MOSCOW HAS AN EDGE ON PEIPING?" THE JOURNALIST SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD READ OUT OF THE CONTEXT AND MISINTERPRETED VARIOUS STATEMENTS IN THE ARTICLE TO WHICH HE REFERRED, WHICH LED HIM TO CONSIDER THE JOURNALIST A NEUTRALIST. THE STATEMENTS BELIEVED INVOLVED, WHICH APPEAR IN LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE ARTICLE, ARE AS FOLLOWS: "STUDENTS OF COMMUNIST NORTH VIETNAM HERE WERE OF AGREEMENT THAT THE REPORTED GAINS - AT LEAST FOR THE TIME BEING - BY THE PRO-SOVIET GROUP, WILL EXERT A TEMPERATE INFLUENCE ON THE COURSE OF EVENTS. UNLESS THE SCALES ARE TURNED BY PEIPING IN FAVOR OF ITS PUPPETS AND IF THE FREE WORLD KNOWS HOW TO CASH IN ON THE RED DISPUTE, THE CHANCES WERE NOT DISMISSED OF A LONGER TRUCE IN TOTTERING LAOS, AND EVEN OF A POLITICAL SOLUTION TO EMBATTLED VIETNAM."

5. (FIELD COMMENT: IN A LATE JULY CONVERSATION WITH AN AMERICAN OBSERVER, THE COUNSELLOR OF THE BRITISH EMBASSY IN SAIGON, R. A. BURROWS, ATTACKED THE DIEM GOVERNMENT, STATING THAT

THERE COULD BE NO HOPE OF PROGRESS AGAINST THE VC UNLESS DIEM WERE REMOVED. IN CRITICIZING THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE DIEM REGIME, BURROWS APPLIED STANDARDS OF CRITICISM THAT EVEN THE MOST ADVANCED WESTERN DEMOCRACY WOULD FAIL TO MEET. DURING THE SAME CONVERSATION, COLONEL HENRY LEE, MILITARY ATTACHE TO THE BRITISH EMBASSY, EXPRESSED HIS OPINION THAT THE WAR AGAINST THE VC WAS NOT PROCEEDING FAVORABLY FROM THE WESTERN POINT OF VIEW. HE APPEARED CRITICAL OF DIEM AND SEEMED INCLINED TOWARD A MILITARY JUNTA, POSSIBLY UNDER MAJOR GENERAL DUONG VAN MINH.)

6. (FIELD COMMENT. US AMBASSADOR TO SOUTH VIETNAM, FREDERICK E. NOLTING, COMMENTED ON 8 AUGUST THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAS NEVER GIVEN THE SLIGHTEST INDICATION THAT HE HOLDS THE VIEWS ATTRIBUTED TO HIM IN THIS REPORT. ON 8 AUGUST, AMBASSADOR HOHLER TOOK A COMPLETELY CONTRARY LINE IN A DISCUSSION WITH AMBASSADOR NOLTING, EXPRESSING OPTIMISM REGARDING THE PROSPECTS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM. AMBASSADOR NOLTING SAID THAT HE BELIEVED THAT THE INFORMATION SHOULD BE TREATED WITH GREAT RESERVE, AND WITH THE POSSIBLILITY IN MIND THAT IT MAY REPRESENT A DELIBERATE ATTEMPT TO CREATE MISTRUST BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND GREAT BRITAIN.)

7. (FIELD COMMENT. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, TOLD AN AMERICAN OBSERVER

ON 8 AUGUST THAT, WHILE HE CONSIDERS FRENCH POLICY BOTH IN PARIS AND IN SAIGON TO HAVE AS ITS OBJECTIVE THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM AND SOUTHEAST ASIA, HE FEELS THAT THE BRITISH HAVE A CONTRARY POLICY MORE SIMILAR TO THAT OF THE US. NHU SAID THAT HE HAS HAD NO INDICATIONS THAT CAUSE HIM CONCERN WITH RESPECT TO THE BRITISH ROLE IN SOUTH VIETNAM, AND INITIATED THE COMMENT THAT AMBASSADOR HOHLER HAD SAID TO HIM RECENTLY THAT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SOUTH VIETNAM OR THE NEUTRALIZATION OF SOUTH VIETNAM WAS "UNTHINKABLE.")

8. FIELD DISSEM: STATE (AMBASSADOR ONLY), CINCPAC PACFLT PACAF ARPAC.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10454
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report
DATE : 9/25/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 196: Countries, Vietnam, General 9/22/62-9/27/62. Box 6.

Upheld via RAC 1/15 13

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

RETAIN OR DESTROY

FILE

CONFIDENTIAL
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM CHINA (TAIWAN) LAOS

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/523,453

SUBJECT PROPOSED JOINT CHINESE NATIONALIST-SOUTH VIETNAMESE INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS

DATE DISTR. 25 SEPTEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES

IN [illegible]

DATE OF INFO. MID SEPTEMBER 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (21 SEPTEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7977

✓ ~~SMITH-BUNDY~~
DUNGAN
KAYSEN
KILDUFF
PETERSEN
SCHLESINGER
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
~~FORRESTAL~~
JOHNSON
KLEIN
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL MEMBER (B) OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN SAIGON, WHO IS BELIEVED TO REPORT WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OR APPROVAL OF HIS GOVERNMENT.

1. IN MID-SEPTEMBER 1962, TRAN KIM TUYEN, CHIEF, PRESIDENTIAL SECURITY SERVICE, PROPOSED TO HUANG TIEN-MAI, CHIEF OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST NATIONAL SECURITY BUREAU INTELLIGENCE STATION IN SAIGON, THAT SOUTH VIETNAM AND NATIONALIST CHINA CONDUCT JOINT INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN LAOS. TUYEN CLAIMED THAT THE DETERIORATING SITUATION IN LAOS, AND THE STRONG POSSIBILITY THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM WOULD BREAK RELATIONS WITH LAOS, NECESSITATED IMMEDIATE CONSIDERATION OF SUCH A PROPOSAL. TUYEN TOLD HUANG THAT HE ENVISIONED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STATIONS ON THE BORDER BETWEEN LAOS AND SOUTH VIETNAM, AS WELL AS IN LAOS, TO SUPPORT JOINT VIETNAMESE/NATIONALIST CHINESE AGENT OPERATIONS.

CONFIDENTIAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

2. HUANG CONCURRED IN PRINCIPLE, BUT ADVISED TUYEN THAT HE HAD TO OBTAIN THE APPROVAL OF THE CHINESE NATIONALIST GOVERNMENT BEFORE ENTERING INTO DETAILED NEGOTIATIONS. ON 19 SEPTEMBER HUANG TELEGRAPHED HIS HEADQUARTERS IN TAIPEI, OUTLINING TUYEN'S PROPOSAL, AND REQUESTING EARLY APPROVAL.

3. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR USMACE USOM MAAG CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF 9TH FIELD STATION.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10460
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Task Force Status Report
DATE : 0/00/1963
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 332 R & S, Southeast Asia Task Force Reports 4/11-6/13/63. Box 6.

[illegible] 77C

(16)

COPY 1 OF 10

STATUS REPORT
OF THE
TASK FORCE SOUTHEAST ASIA

COVERT ANNEX - HIGHLIGHTS

CAMBODIA

A CIA source in the Chinese Nationalist diplomatic mission in Saigon has reported GRC plans to assist dissident Cambodian leader Son Ngoc Thanh in a political action campaign against the Sihanouk government. The GRC is also exploring Thanh's capability for penetrating the Cambodian government and the feasibility of assassinating Sihanouk.

NORTH VIETNAM

Over 700,000 CIA-designed leaflets were dropped into the Haiphong/Lay Kay areas in April. The objective of this operation, in addition to familiarizing the DRV population with the anti-communism symbol on the leaflets, is to create a diversion within North Vietnam proper which may dissipate DRV security strengths in response to psywar and deception activities, and thus lessen DRV capability for action in South Vietnam.

SOUTH VIETNAM

A two-month Civic Action Ministry training course for 229 montagnard cadres was completed in April. The first priority of these graduates, in direct satisfaction of requirements levied by General Rosson during his visit, is formation of fixed teams for use at Special Forces camps. Included in the course were 45 Vietnamese civic action cadre, all tribal dialect speakers, who will serve as team chiefs.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10491
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Appeal to President Kennedy
DATE : 1/24/1962
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

FILE

COUNTRY CAMBODIA/SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/499,631

SUBJECT APPEAL TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY BY SOUTH VIETNAMESE REBEL OFFICERS IN PHNOM PENH

DATE DISTR. 24 JANUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN -15274

DATE OF INFO. 20 JANUARY 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CAMBODIA, PHNOM PENH (20 JANUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. FDP 1560

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B); FROM MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU. [redacted]

1. ON 20 JANUARY 1962 MAJOR PHAM VAN LIEU, FORMER COMMANDER OF THE SOUTH VIETNAM (SVN) MARINE CORPS AND MEMBER OF A GROUP OF SVN REBEL OFFICERS IN PROTECTIVE CUSTORY BY THE CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT, PRESENTED A PROPOSAL FROM HIS GROUP TO THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN PHNOM PENH ADDRESSED TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY WITH A COVER LETTER TO AMBASSADOR TRIMBLE. THIS PROPOSAL SIGNED BY THEIR LEADER COLONEL NGUYEN CHANH THAI AND OTHER OFFICERS IN THE GROUP, CONTAINED A LIST OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE DIEM GOVERNMENT'S CORRUPT AND INEFFICIENT METHODS OF OPPOSING THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC). IT SUGGESTED THAT PRESIDENT KENNEDY REAPPRAISE THE US POLICY TOWARD THE DIEM GOVERNMENT AND UNSEAT AND REPLACE IT WITH A GOVERNMENT TRULY REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SVN PEOPLE. THE PROPOSAL WAS PRESENTED IN TWO COPIES, EACH ONE HAVING ONE ENGLISH, FRENCH AND A VIETNAMESE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	~~AID~~ DI

(EXO)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

LANGUAGE VERSION.

2. MAJOR LIEU TOLD AN EMBASSY OFFICER THAT "COMPETENT CAMBODIAN AUTHORITIES" WERE PLANNING TO RELEASE HIS GROUP FROM CUSTODY BY THE END OF JANUARY. HE SAID PRINCE SIHANOUK HAD APPROVED, AND THAT A CAMBODIAN GOVERNMENT SECURITY SERVICE WAS OBTAINING DOCUMENTATION FOR THE GROUP. WHEN ASKED WHAT THEIR PLANS WERE AFTER THEY WERE RELEASED, MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT THEY WERE STILL HOPING FOR ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES AND WOULD AT LEAST LIKE TO MAINTAIN CONTACT WITH US EMBASSY OFFICERS.

3. SINCE NOTHING COULD BE DONE TO REMEDY THE SITUATION IN SVN UNTIL DIEM WAS ELIMINATED, THEY WOULD FIGHT DIEM FIRST AND THE VC SECOND.

4. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT. SEE CS-3/486,609 AND FDP 1168/TDCS-3/473,682 IN WHICH MAJOR LIEU SAID THAT HIS GROUP WAS CONSIDERING JOINING THE SOUTH VIETNAM LIBERATION ORGANIZATION.

5. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, CINCPAC, PACFLT, ARPAC, PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10493
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Comments
DATE : 1/28/1962
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : National Security Files, Box 195: Countries, Vietnam, General 11/13/61-11/31/61. Box 6.

EXEMPT NLK-81-213

46 29

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

FILE

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/500,097

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF TRAN VAN LY ON THE DESIRABILITY, PROBLEMS AND CONSEQUENCES OF A COUP D'ETAT

DATE DISTR. 28 JANUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 18750

DATE OF INFO. 25 JANUARY 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (26 JANUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. FVS 7006

~~BUNDY~~
TAYLOR
KAYSEN
BELK
R. JOHNSON
KOMER
[illegible]
[illegible]
GOODNER
DUNGAN

RETAIN OR DESTROY

THIS IS **UNEVALUATED** INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A VIETNAMESE NATIONAL ARMY OFFICER (C) WORKING AT THE GENERAL STAFF HEADQUARTERS, FROM TRAN VAN LY.

1. ON 25 JANUARY 1962, TRAN VAN LY, OPPOSITION LEADER IMPRISONED FROM NOVEMBER 1960 TO FEBRUARY 1961 FOLLOWING THE ATTEMPTED COUP OF 1960, SAID THAT CERTAIN GENERAL OFFICERS HAVE CONSULTED WITH HIM ON THE POSSIBILITY OF ATTEMPTING A COUP D'ETAT. (FIELD COMMENT. (TDCS-3/500,042) FVS-6999 BY THE SAME SOURCE REPORTED HIM AS POLITICAL ADVISOR TO GENERAL NGHIEM.) SUCH A COUP WOULD BE TO PREVENT THE COUNTRY FROM FALLING INTO THE HANDS OF THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS (VC).

2. LY SAID THAT HE WAS IN AGREEMENT WITH THESE GENERALS IN PRINCIPLE ON THE NECESSITY FOR A COUP D'ETAT, BUT WAS WORRIED BOTH ABOUT THE METHOD TO BE EMPLOYED AND THE CONSEQUENCES. LY WAS AWARE THAT CERTAIN POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS WISHED TO MOUNT A

CONFIDENTIAL CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS **NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL**

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	DIA	EXO

VTF AID

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

(76)

29

A COUP WITH THE SUPPORT OF MILITARY ELEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE GROUPS WERE TOO DIVIDED TO BE SUCCESSFUL. LY BELIEVED THE ONLY SUCCESSFUL COUP WOULD BE ONE MOUNTED BY THE ARMY ITSELF. (FIELD COMMENT. TRAN VAN LY WAS A MEMBER OF THE "CARAVELLE" OPPOSITION GROUP. ACCORDING TO THE SOURCE OF FVS-5908 (cs-3/474,755) HE WAS MOVING TOWARD A NEUTRALIST POSITION IN 1960 AND WAS DISAPPOINTED OVER CONTINUED SUPPORT TO DIEM BY THE U.S. A BRITISH OFFICIAL SERVICE REPORTED THAT, WHEN HE WAS RELEASED FROM PRISON ON 8 FEBRUARY 1961, HE WAS FORCED TO SIGN A DECLARATION OF LOYALTY TO SOUTH VIETNAMESE PRESIDENT DIEM.)

3. SPEAKING IN GENERAL TERMS, LY SAID THAT IN SETTING UP SUCH A COUP TWO THINGS WERE IMPORTANT: TO AVOID BLOODSHED, AND TO ORGANIZE AS SMALL A FORCE AS POSSIBLE IN ORDER NOT TO ALLOW THE PLAN OF ACTION TO BE EXPLOITED BY THE VC. LY'S SOLUTION WOULD BE TO HAVE THE GENERAL OFFICERS DECLARE THE WHOLE OF SOUTH VIETNAM TO BE IN A STATE OF SEIGE. THE TROOPS WOULD THEN BE FORBIDDEN TO MOVE WITHOUT AN EXPRESS ORDER FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE AND ALL ROADS LEADING TO SAIGON WOULD BE GUARDED.

4. IN CASE THE COUP WERE SUCCESSFUL, A REVOLUTIONARY COMMITTEE OF THREE GENERAL OFFICERS WOULD DIRECT EVERYDAY GOVERNMENT BUSINESS WITH THE HELP OF TECHNICAL ADVISORS AND OF ALL THE SECRETARIES OF STATE, WHO WOULD HAVE REMAINED AT THEIR POSTS. DURING THIS PERIOD THE PEOPLE WOULD BE ABLE TO CHOOSE THE HEAD OF THE STATE.

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LY TALKED TO SOURCE IN GENERAL TERMS. IT IS NOT KNOWN WHETHER THIS WAS BECAUSE OF RETICENCE ON LY'S PART IN RESPECT TO SOURCE, OR WHETHER LY IS NOT IN FACT INVOLVED IN THE ALLEGED PLANNING OF GENERAL NGHIEM.)

6. FIELD DISEM. STATE MAAG USOM CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10037-10494
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Information Report Re: Strategic Hamlets
DATE : 2/20/1962
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 2/62, Box 195. Box 8.

[illegible]

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Hillsman asked that this be called to your attention
BKS

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

COUNTRY SOUTH VIETNAM

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/502,553

SUBJECT STRATEGIC HAMLETS

DATE DISTR. 20 FEBRUARY 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

FILE

DATE OF INFO. MID-FEBRUARY 1962

FIELD NO. FVS-7075 IN 30145

RETAIN OR DESTROY

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VIETNAM, SAIGON (14 FEBRUARY 1962)

APPRAISAL IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT NHU'S VIEWS ARE AS EXPRESSED, AND THAT LUONG CORRECTLY REPEATED NHU'S STATEMENTS.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN AMERICAN OBSERVER (B), WITH PARAS. 1-3 FROM NGO DINH NHU, AND PARA. 4 FROM BUI VAN LUONG.

1. NGO DINH NHU, BROTHER AND POLITICAL ADVISOR OF PRESIDENT NGO DINH DIEM, STATED ON 14 FEBRUARY 1962 THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD BE MORE THAN A METHOD OF AFFORDING DEFENSE FOR THE POPULATION OF VIETNAM, IT WOULD BE A BASIC STRATEGY FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF VIETNAM. HE STATED THAT A COMMON COMPLAINT IN VIETNAM WAS THE WEAKNESS OF ITS CADRES, WHO FAILED TO TURN THE GOVERNMENT'S REVOLUTIONARY PROGRAM INTO REALITY. HE STATED, HOWEVER, THAT THE COMPLAINT WAS ONLY PARTIALLY TRUE, AS THE OTHER ASPECT HAD BEEN THE INABILITY OF THE CADRE TO OPERATE IN THE CONDITION OF INSECURITY IN THE COUNTRYSIDE. IT WAS NECESSARY FOR THE GOVERNMENT TO SO ORGANIZE THE SITUATION THAT THE CADRE COULD BE PLACED IN THE AREA OF HIS WORK AND AFFORDED THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND FACILITIES FOR THE WORK. THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE BOTH OF THESE.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L NOFORN/CONTINUED CONTROL

STATE	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OO	AID	DIA
VTF															

ADDED: EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SMITH-BUN
DUNGAN
GILDNER
KAYSEN
PETERSEN
SCHLESING
~~TAYLOR~~
BELK
FORRESTAL
KOMER
RASKIN
SAUNDERS

2. THE PROGRAM AS PLANNED BY NHU HAD THREE MAIN ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD MAKE IT PARTICULARLY APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM.

A. IT WAS FIRST OF ALL TRADITIONAL, RESTING UPON THE BASIC UNIT OF VIETNAMESE SOCIETY. THUS IT CAPITALIZED UPON THE INGRAINED HABITS OF THE POPULATION.

B. THE SECOND ASPECT WAS THAT IT WOULD AFFORD THE MEANS TO MODERNIZE VIETNAMESE LIFE. NHU STATED THAT IT WAS LESS A PROBLEM OF RAISING THE STANDARD OF LIVING THAN OF CHANGING THE MODE OF LIVING. HE SAID THAT IF ATTENTION WAS GIVEN TO INSERTING NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO THE ORDINARY PEASANT'S EXISTENCE, IT WOULD INEVITABLY BRING SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES IN HIS ORIENTATION. NHU COMPARED THE RESULT OF THE INSERTION OF SMALL AUTOMOBILES, WASHING MACHINES, ETC., INTO THE LIFE OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING CLASS WHICH HE CLAIMED HAD DISRUPTED COMMUNIST INFLUENCE OVER THIS CLASS. AS A RESULT, NHU SAID, MOST EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES OPPOSED MODERNIZATION. HE STATED THAT THE ASIAN COMMUNIST PARTIES WERE LESS INTELLIGENT IN THEIR APPROACH, AS THEY ADVOCATED MODERNIZATION OF ASIAN LIFE WITHOUT REALIZING THAT IT WOULD INEVITABLY REDUCE THEIR OWN ORGANIZATIONAL POWER. NHU STATED THAT A STUDY OF STEPS APPROPRIATE FOR VIETNAM ALONG THIS LINE SHOULD BE MADE AND A CONSCIOUS EFFORT DEVOTED TO INSERTING THESE NEW MODES OF LIFE INTO VIETNAM. AS AN EXAMPLE, HE CITED THE EFFECT OF DISTRIBUTING BICYCLES WITH MICROMOTORS, THUS MAKING THE PEASANT MOBILE AND CHANGING HIS MODE OF LIFE. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET, HE REITERATED, WOULD AFFORD THE NECESSARY PROTECTION AND ECONOMIC BASE FOR SUCH A MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

C. THE THIRD ELEMENT, NHU SAID, WOULD BE DEMOCRATIZATION. HE DEFINED IT AS THE APPLICATION OF LAW AND ORDER TO RURAL LIFE. HE STATED THAT AT PRESENT THE PEASANTS WERE EXPOSED TO ILLEGALITY BY THE VIETNAMESE COMMUNISTS AND BY GOVERNMENT OF VIETNAM (GVN) ELEMENTS, BOTH MILITARY AND CIVIL. THIS WAS IN PART A RESULT OF THE DISPERSION OF THE POPULATION AND ITS INABILITY TO ASSUME ITS OWN GOVERNANCE. AS AN INDUCEMENT TO FORM A STRATEGIC HAMLET, NHU SAID THE POPULATION SHOULD BE ASSURED THAT THE HAMLET WOULD BE GUARANTEED THE FULL APPLICATION OF LAW BY ITS OWN AUTHORITIES, THUS MOVING IT TOWARD A SYSTEM OF DEMOCRATIZATION APPROPRIATE TO THE COMMUNITY. HOWEVER, IT WOULD HAVE LITTLE OR NOTHING TO DO WITH CHANGES OF THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD BROUGHT OUT IN A RECENT TALK TO GVN OFFICIALS THAT ONE COULD CHANGE THE GOVERNMENT IN SAIGON 35 TIMES WITH NO EFFECT UPON THE REAL SITUATION IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, BUT THAT THE APPLICATION OF THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' SYSTEM WOULD DEFINITELY AFFECT THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF THE COUNTRYSIDE IN A WAY WHICH TOUCHED THE POPULATION ITSELF. THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WOULD ALSO, ACCORDING TO NHU, AFFORD A BASIS FOR THE BUILDING OF INSTITUTIONS IN VIETNAM TO GIVE ADDITIONAL STABILITY, E.G., COOPERATIVES, MEDICAL SERVICES, EDUCATION, WOMENS' MOVEMENTS, YOUTH MOVEMENTS, ETC.

3. NHU STATED THAT HE HAD DISCUSSED THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' CONCEPTS WITH A GROUP OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS RECENTLY, AND HAD MADE ONE VERY STRONG ADDITIONAL POINT TO THEM. (FIELD COMMENT. FVS-7034, TDCS-3/501,110 GAVE AN ACCOUNT, FROM A FAIRLY RELIABLE SOURCE, OF NHU'S REMARKS AT THE MEETING.) HE STATED THAT HE

WAS AWARE THAT THERE WAS MUCH DISCONTENT AMONG THE VARIOUS LEVELS OF THE GOVERNMENT, WHICH, HE SAID, STEMMED FROM THE GOVERNMENT'S APPROACH TO THE JOB. ANY LOCAL OFFICIAL WHO FACED A PROBLEM MADE A REQUEST TO HIS NEXT HIGHER AUTHORITY FOR ASSISTANCE AND WAS DISCONTENTED IF THE ASSISTANCE WAS INADEQUATE. THE NEXT LEVEL REQUESTED THE CHIEF OF PROVINCE, WHO REQUESTED ASSISTANCE FROM THE MINISTRY, AND HAD THE SAME REACTION. THE MINISTER MADE THE REQUEST OF THE PRESIDENT AND WAS DISCONTENTED AT INADEQUATE SUPPORT. THEORETICALLY, THE PRESIDENT SHOULD MAKE REQUESTS OF THE AMERICANS AND BE DISCONTENTED WITH THE AMERICANS FOR LACK OF ADEQUATE SUPPORT. NHU STATED THAT THE ENTIRE PROCESS WAS INFANTILE, AND A CHILDISH WAY OF DEPENDENCE UPON A SUPERIOR TO SOLVE ONE'S PROBLEMS. HE STATED THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO DEVELOP A MATURITY IN THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE SO THAT THEY WOULD TAKE THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR SOLVING THEIR OWN PROBLEMS, UTILIZING SUCH ASSISTANCE AS WAS GIVEN THEM, BUT NOT ATTEMPTING TO SHIFT RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM. HE STATED THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLET WAS THE WAY TO INTRODUCE THE PROCESS OF BEGINNING MATURITY TO THE VIETNAMESE PEOPLE AND THE GOVERNMENT. NHU SAID THAT THE OFFICIALS WERE MUCH AMUSED AT THE DESCRIPTION OF THE DISCONTENT AND FOUND MUCH VALIDITY IN HIS STATEMENT OF HOW TO OVERCOME IT. HE SAID, HOWEVER, THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO KEEP REPEATING THE LESSON, AS OTHERWISE THE OLD HABITS OF DEPENDENCE UPON POWERS ABOVE WOULD RETURN AND THE WHOLE VICIOUS CYCLE OF DISCONTENT WOULD START AGAIN.

4. MINISTER OF INTERIOR BUI VAN LUONG, IN A SEPARATE CONVERSATION ON 13 FEBRUARY, STATED THAT NHU HAD GIVEN INSTRUCTIONS THAT THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' PROGRAM BE CONDUCTED UNDER THE FULL CONTROL OF THE NEW INTERMINISTERIAL COMMISSION. HE SAID THAT NHU HAD SPECIFICALLY STATED THAT THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT WISH A REPETITION OF THE ERRORS MADE IN THE INITIATION OF THE AGROVILLE PROGRAM. NHU EMPHASIZED THE NECESSITY OF EXPLAINING TO THE POPULATION WHAT IT WAS BEING ASKED TO DO AND OF FOLLOWING VERY STRICT RULES, FOR INSTANCE, THAT THE POPULATION BE ASKED TO ASSIST ONLY IN ITS OWN LOCALITY AND NOT BE REQUIRED TO WORK ON DISTANT AREAS. HE ALSO STATED THAT THE PROVINCE CHIEFS WERE INSTRUCTED NOT TO LAUNCH OFF IN ALL DIRECTIONS, CREATING STRATEGIC HAMLETS ACCORDING TO THEIR OWN IDEAS, BUT TO FOLLOW THE PROGRAM AND PATTERN TO BE ESTABLISHED BY THE STRATEGIC HAMLETS' COMMITTEE.

5. FIELD DISSEM. STATE ARMY NAVY AIR MAAG AID CINCPAC PACFLT ARPAC PACAF.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY : NARA
RECORD NUMBER : 176-10038-10032
RECORD SERIES : National Security Files
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

ORIGINATOR : DOS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : Embtel 660 (Saigon) Re: Task Force on Vietnam
DATE : 11/16/1961
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS :
DOCUMENT TYPE :
CLASSIFICATION :
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS :
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 9/10/2000
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : NSF: Countries: Vietnam, General, 11/16/61-11/17/61, box 195. Box 8

SANITIZED VERSION
NLK-75-92
3

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

SECRET

43
Action
FE

Info
SS
G
SP
L
H
SO
EUR
AID
PX
IOP
INR
CIA
OSD
ARMY
AIR
NAVY
O
A
DC

RMR

Control: 9439
Rec'd: NOV. 16, 1961
3:50 a.m.

019

FROM: SAIGON

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 660, NOVEMBER 16, 11 AM

ACTION DEPARTMENT 660, INFORMATION CINCPAC POLAD 268

LIMIT DISTRIBUTION

TASK FORCE VN

REF: EMBTEL 627

1. OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPLOITATION OF NEW MANAGEMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE AND SECURITY SERVICE (COLONEL NGUYEN VAN Y VICE GENERAL NGUYEN VAN LA) FALL INTO TWO GENERAL FIELDS, INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL POLICE. BOTH CAS AND USOM HAVE FOR CONSIDERABLE TIME BEEN STYMIED BUT WITH CHANGE BELIEVE REAL PROGRESS CAN BE MADE. THIS WILL REQUIRE WORKING OUT OF DETAILED PROGRAMS FOR ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, TRAINING, ETC., AND ADDITIONAL U.S. PERSONNEL FOR NECESSARY LIAISON AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT.

2. CAS HAS ALREADY PROPOSED TO ITS HEADQUARTERS DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION SERVICE, TO SERVE AS "SPECIAL BRANCH" OF SURETE, WHOSE CHARTER AT PRESENT COVERS BOTH SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AND ORDINARY INVESTIGATIONS. THIS "SPECIAL BRANCH" WOULD HAVE REPRESENTATIVES AT PROVINCE LEVELS AND BE MANAGED THROUGH REGIONAL DIRECTORATES. AT EACH REGIONAL DIRECTORATE, CAS WOULD PROPOSE ASSIGN AT LEAST ONE CAS OFFICER TO MAINTAIN CLOSE LIAISON AND COLLABORATION. CONCEPT WOULD BE FULL INTEGRATION HIS EFFORT INTO VIETNAMESE EFFORT. THIS WOULD REQUIRE FOLLOWING CAS COMMITMENT:

A. CAS OFFICERS FOR DIRECTORATES AT HUE, NHA TRANG, BAN ME THUOT, BIEN HOA, SAIGON/CHOLON, AND CAN THO, AS WELL AS ALREADY

EXISTING PERSONNEL FOR LIAISON AT NATIONAL LEVEL. PERSONNEL WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY NECESSARY INTERPRETERS, COMMUNICATIONS, ETC.

B. PROVISION OF INTELLIGENCE AND COMMUNIST PARTY PENETRATION TRAINING TO VIETNAMESE OFFICER PERSONNEL OF NEW SPECIAL BRANCH, TAKEN FROM EXPERIENCED SURETE OFFICERS.

C. FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE TO GIVE PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCH OFFICERS FUNDS TO OPERATE AGENT NETWORKS IN PROVINCES. EXACT SUM NOT YET DETERMINED BUT WILL BE SEEN TO BE SUBSTANTIAL BY MULTIPLYING NUMBER OF PROVINCES (38) BY REASONABLE MONTHLY SUM FOR EACH PROVINCIAL REPRESENTATIVE TO ENABLE HIM HIRE AGENTS AND PAY OTHER OPERATIONAL EXPENSES.

3. USOM EQUALLY DETERMINED PROSECUTE POTENTIAL FOR GREATER COLLABORATION FOR DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICE STRUCTURE WITH REGULAR INVESTIGATORY FUNCTIONS OF SURETE, TO PROVIDE ENFORCEMENT MECHANISM ON EFFECTIVE NATIONAL BASIS TO BOLSTER GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY THROUGHOUT COUNTRY, AND THUS CONTRIBUTE TO CONTRBUTION CRIME -- DISORDER, OVERT COMMUNIST ACTION, ETC. THIS WOULD COMPRISE OVER-ALL DEVELOPMENT USOM POLICE, SURETE AND RELATED INTERNAL SECURITY SERVICES TO INCLUDE:

A. CONSOLIDATION OF CIVIL POLICE FUNCTIONS UNDER THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INTERIOR.

B. A DELINEATION OF FUNCTIONS AS THEY PERTAIN TO THE SEPARATE ELEMENTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICES.

C. THE ADOPTION OF A REALISTIC TRAINING PROGRAM, GEARED TO AN APPROPRIATE PROGRAM OF COMMODITY PROCUREMENT.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF AN EFFECTIVE PUBLIC SAFETY SERVICE. USOM ENVISIONS DEVELOPMENT BASED UPON MUTUAL AGREEMENT AND UPON RECIPIENTS'S ABILITY TO ABSORB INTRODUCTION OF NEW CONCEPTS.

4. THIS BEING MADE TASK FORCE MATTER DUE MY CONVICTION IT IS SUBSTANTIAL WE MOVE FORWARD IN BOTH ABOVE FIELDS TO MAXIMUM DEGREE POSSIBLE, TAKING FULL ADVANTAGE OF WHAT APPARENTLY

SECRET

IS REAL NEW BREAK IN SITUATION. URGE FULLEST SUPPORT FROM TASK FORCE LEVEL AND ABOVE OF THESE SUGGESTIONS FOR ACTIVITY BY CAS AND USOM, AND SUPPORT IN WASHINGTON FOR NECESSARY PERSONNEL AND BUDGET ADDITIONS WHICH MAY BE INVOLVED.

NOLTING

MM

SECRET

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10060

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. I, BOX 32

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/18/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/02/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #158

S

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

158

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY

(When Filled In)

COUNTRY	CUBA	REPORT NO.	TDCSDB-3/658,582
SUBJECT	CUBAN GOVERNMENT POLICY TOWARDS PRESIDENT JOHNSON'S ADMINISTRATION	DATE DISTR.	18 DECEMBER 1963
		PRECEDENCE	ROUTINE
DATE OF INFO.	LATE NOVEMBER 1963	REFERENCES	IN 82930
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	16 DECEMBER 1963		
APPRAISAL		FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A HIGH-LEVEL CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN WESTERN EUROPE WHO HAS BEEN A FAIRLY RELIABLE REPORTER OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC INFORMATION.

1. FIDEL CASTRO WAS VERY UPSET OVER THE CHANGE IN THE UNITED STATES ADMINISTRATION BROUGHT ABOUT BY PRESIDENT KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. THE TOP CUBAN LEADERSHIP WAS SURE PRESIDENT KENNEDY WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA AND THEY WERE CONVINCED THAT THE POLICY OF HIS ADMINISTRATION FOR ECONOMIC BLOCKADE AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION AGAINST CUBA WOULD NOT OVERTHROW THE RÉGIME.

2. THE PRESENT POLICY OF THE CUBAN GOVT., ON ORDERS FROM CASTRO, IS NOT TO ATTACK PRESIDENT JOHNSON IN PUBLIC OR DO ANYTHING TO IRRITATE HIM. ACCORDING TO CUBAN GOVT. LEADERS, CASTRO WANTS TO WAIT AND SEE WHAT PRESIDENT JOHNSON SAYS AND DOES ABOUT CUBA,

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/ BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	XXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	XXX FBI
STATE/DIR	REPCINCLANT	I&NS	TREASURY													

EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

AND GIVE HIM AN OPPORTUNITY TO IMPROVE, IF HE FEELS SO INCLINED, RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES.

FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

(END OF MESSAGE)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10061

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/13/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/02/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #170

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

170

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/658,469

SUBJECT ALERT STATUS OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AS RESULT OF THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 13 DECEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9 DECEMBER 1963

REFERENCES IN 79459

PLACE & DATE ACQ. 9 DECEMBER 1963

APPRAISAL

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A SENIOR CUBAN DIPLOMAT WHO IS AN ASTUTE OBSERVER AND HAS DEMONSTRATED MATURITY, DISCERNMENT, AND RELIABILITY IN HIS PAST REPORTING.

1. ABOUT 2 DAYS AFTER THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY, CUBAN DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS ABROAD BEGAN TO RECEIVE A SERIES OF MESSAGES PLACING THEM ON A SPECIAL ALERT STATUS. THESE MESSAGES WERE OBVIOUSLY DUE TO APPREHENSION BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT THAT THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY MIGHT LEAD TO HOSTILE ACTIVITY DIRECTED AGAINST THE MISSIONS. THE DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS, AMONG OTHER THINGS, WERE EXHORTED TO EXERCISE EXTREME VIGILANCE, TO MOUNT A NIGHT-AND-DAY WATCH OF MISSION PREMISES, TO BE CERTAIN THAT THERE WERE "NO COMPROMISING

—BUNDY-SMITH
—ALEXANDER
—BELK
—BRUBECK
—CHASE
—DINGEMAN
—DUNGAN
—ISRAEL
—FORRESTAL
—JOHNSON
—KILDUFF
—KLEIN
—KOMER
—SAUNDERS
—SCHLESINGER
—SMITH, WM. Y.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/
CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXXXXXXX	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR	REPCINCLANT	INS														EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

DOCUMENTS ON THE PREMISES," AND TO BE ON GUARD AGAINST HOSTILE PROVOCATIONS.

2. ONE CHIEF OF MISSION, WHO, FOLLOWING HIS USUAL PRACTICE, REQUESTED BY TELEPHONE PERMISSION TO ACCEPT A LONG-STANDING INVITATION TO VISIT A COUNTRY FRIENDLY TO CUBA, WAS TOLD THAT HE MUST FORMALLY SUBMIT HIS REQUEST BY CABLE. HE DID SO ON 29 NOVEMBER, BUT IT WAS NOT UNTIL 6 DECEMBER THAT HE RECEIVED THE AUTHORITY TO QUIT HIS POST.

3. AS OF 9 DECEMBER THERE HAD BEEN NO INDICATION FROM HAVANA THAT THE ALERT ORDER WAS TO BE CONSIDERED REVOKED.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10063

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/24/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/13/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #188

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

188

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY URUGUAY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,829

SUBJECT CUBAN PRECAUTIONS FOLLOWING ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 24 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67186

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (23 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2414

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A URUGUAYAN POLICE OFFICIAL (B).

DY-SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK
~~BRUBECK~~
CHASE
DINGEMAN
~~DUNGAN~~
~~ECKEL~~
FORRESTAL
N
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.

1. RICARDO GUTTIEREZ TORRENS, THIRD SECRETARY AND CIS/ (CUBAN INTELLIGENCE SERVICE) CHIEF OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO, TELEPHONED THE MONTEVIDEO POLICE AT 1710 HOURS (MONTEVIDEO TIME) ON 22 NOVEMBER TO REQUEST EXTRA POLICE PROTECTION FOR THE CUBAN EMBASSY. GUTTIEREZ SAID THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED REPORTS THAT A MOB WAS PLANNING TO STONE THE EMBASSY. (FIELD COMMENT: THE NEWS OF PRES. KENNEDYS ASSASSINATION WAS RECEIVED IN MONTEVIDEO AT APPROXIMATELY 1600 HOURS, MONTEVIDEO TIME).

2. THE POLICE FURNISHED EXTRA PROTECTION TO BOTH THE CUBAN EMBASSY AND TO THE SOVIET LEGATION, ALTHOUGH THE LATTER HAD

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	XXX	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 10-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

MADE NO REQUEST. AS OF 1600 HOURS 23 NOVEMBER THERE HAVE BEEN NO DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST EITHER DIPLOMATIC INSTALLATION. (FIELD COMMENT: THE POPULACE OF MONTEVIDEO HAS BEEN PROFOUNDLY SHOCKED AND GRIEF STRICKEN OVER PRES KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION. A SPONTANEOUS CROWD ESTIMATED BY PRESS TO COMPRISE 3000 PERSONS MARCHED TO AMERICAN EMBASSY RESIDENCE EVENING OF 22 NOVEMBER TO EXPRESS THEIR SORROW).

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCSO.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10064

RECORD SERIES : NSF, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, TDCS, VOL. 1, BOX 32

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/23/1963
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/13/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #190

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

190

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/565,826

SUBJECT COMMENTS OF CUBAN OFFICIALS ON THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY

DATE DISTR. 23 NOVEMBER 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 22 NOVEMBER 1963

REFERENCES

PLACE & DATE ACQ. CHILE, SANTIAGO (22 NOVEMBER 1963)

APPRAISAL SEE BELOW

FIELD REPORT NO.

BUNDY/SMITH
ALEXANDER
BELK
~~BRUBECK~~
~~CHASE~~ 147
DINGEMAN
~~DUNGAN~~
~~ECKEL~~
FORRESTAL
JOHNSON
KILDUFF
KLEIN
KOMER
SAUNDERS
SCHLESINGER
SMITH, WM. Y.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A CHILEAN WHO HAS A GOOD KNOWLEDGE OF ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO ACQUIRED THROUGH PROLONGED ASSOCIATION WITH THE OFFICIALS OF THE EMBASSY. HE IS AN ACCURATE, RELIABLE REPORTER.

APPRAISAL: IT IS PROBABLY TRUE THAT THE REMARKS WERE MADE AS REPORTED.

1. THE FOLLOWING ARE REMARKS MADE BY OFFICIALS OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO REGARDING THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY:

A. ON 22 NOVEMBER JOSE TOHA, VICE PRESIDENT OF THE CHILEAN CUBAN CULTURAL INSTITUTE AND DIRECTOR OF THE PRO-CASTRO LEFTIST PRESS ULTIMA HORA, INFORMED PEDRO MARTINEZ PIREZ, CHARGE OF THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO, THAT KENNEDY HAD BEEN ASSASSINATED. TOHA SAID "ESTE ASUNTO DE KENNEDY SE ESTA PONIENDO COLOR DE HORMIGAS" (POSSIBLY MEANS ASSASSINATION OF KENNEDY LOOKS LIKE IT COULD HAVE SERIOUS REPERCUSSIONS). MARTINEZ COMMENTED THAT HE HEARD THAT THE PERSON ARRESTED WAS PRESIDENT OF A FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE AND THAT IF THE YANKEES OR CIA ASSASSINATED KENNEDY TO RESUME THE ASSAULT ON CUBA, THEN A THIRD WORLD WAR

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	~~OBI~~	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR																	

I&NS TREASURY REPCINCLANT Exd

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 1-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

WOULD START. HE SAID THINGS ARE VERY CLEAR AND THERE IS NO DOUBT THAT THEY HAVE ASSASSINATED HIM, THE CONTRADICTIONS ARE WELL DEFINED AND THE MOMENT WAS VERY SPECIAL, LIKE THAT OF THE MAINE. MARTINEZ SAID THE UNITED STATES IS NOW IN THE MOST DIFFICULT POSITION OF THE PAST SEVERAL YEARS IN LATIN AMERICA, THE WORLD, GOULART, ARGENTINE PETROLEUM, PERUVIAN LANDS, CHILEAN MINES AND IN GENERAL ALL OVER LATIN AMERICA. TOHA SAID HE WAS VERY WORRIED AFTER READING THE CABLE TRAFFIC. MARTINEZ ADDED THAT IF THE USA IS THINKING OF INVADING CUBA THEN THEY MUST HAVE EVERYTHING ALL PREPARED AND ALL THE STRATEGY READY AND THEREFORE THE ALARM MUST BE GIVEN SO THAT CUBA CAN BE PREPARED.

B. THE CUBAN CONSUL AT VALPARAISO CALLED THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN SANTIAGO TO DETERMINE POLICY IN THE MATTER OF FLYING THE FLAG AT HALF MAST. THE REPLY WAS THAT THERE ARE NO DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE USA AND THAT NO OFFICIAL WORD HAD YET BEEN RECEIVED FROM CUBA, SO THEREFORE NOTHING SHOULD BE DONE. (FIELD COMMENT: THIS IS AGAINST PROTOCOL BECAUSE THE CHILEAN GOVERNMENT HAS DECREED OFFICIAL MOURNING INCLUDING FLYING FLAGS AT HALF MAST.)

C. MARTINEZ REFUSED TO MAKE FURTHER STATEMENTS PREFERRING TO WAIT FOR OFFICIAL WORD FROM HABANA. SEVERAL TIMES HE DENIED THAT THE ASSASSIN WAS INVOLVED IN THE FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE INSISTING THAT THIS PERSON IS ONLY A SUSPECT AND THAT EXTREME RIGHTISTS OR SEGREGATIONISTS ARE TO BLAME. MARTINEZ SAID HE BELIEVED THAT THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT WOULD TRY TO PUT THE BLAME ON CUBA.

2. FIELD DISSEM: CINCSO CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10305

RECORD SERIES : VP SECURITY FILE, CUBA, MISC. PAPERS, 5/61 & 11-12/62, BOX 9

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/27/1963
PAGES : 44

SUBJECTS :
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #2

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Memorandum

CUBAN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

27 March 1963

THIS MATERIAL CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, USC, SECTIONS 793 AND 794, THE TRANSMISSION OR REVELATION OF WHICH IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW.

27 March 1963

CUBAN TRAINING OF LATIN AMERICAN SUBVERSIVES

SUMMARY . . . . .Page 1

DISCUSSION

A. Recruitment of Trainees 2
B. Travel. 2
C. Numbers of Trainees 4
D. Training. 5
E. Subsequent Employment and Countermeasures 6
F. Purpose and Propaganda. 7

ATTACHMENTS

Argentina 8
Bolivia 10
Brazil. 12
Chile .14
Colombia. 15
Costa Rica. 17
Dominican Republic. 18
Ecuador 20
El Salvador 22
Guatemala 23
Haiti .25
Honduras. 26
Mexico. 28
Nicaragua 30
Panama. 32
Paraguay. 34
Peru. .35
Uruguay 37
Venezuela 38
Others. 41

OCI No. 0515/63

27 March 1963

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Training of Latin American Subversives

SUMMARY

1. We estimate that at least 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans have received guerrilla training or political indoctrination in Cuba.

2. We have recorded the travel of 5,059 Latin Americans to Cuba in 1962, and reporting to date indicates that at least another 417 went during the first two months of 1963.

3. Field replies to a survey estimate that there were about 11,000 arrests in Latin America during the past 15 months for terrorism, sabotage, guerrilla activity, or other subversive activity. Only a small percentage of those arrested, however, were brought to trial; almost all were released after varying periods of detention.

4. Current efforts to improve and exploit reporting on travel to Cuba had not made themselves felt during the reporting period. The security services of Latin American countries accordingly were unable, with isolated individual exceptions, to establish Cuban direction, instigation or training of arrested subversives.

5. Incidence of guerrilla, terrorist, and sabotage activity at present is highest in Venezuela, Peru, and--in the form of largely non-political banditry--Colombia. There is sporadic guerrilla activity in and around Nicaragua and Guatemala, and a guerrilla potential in Ecuador and Brazil.

DISCUSSION

A. Recruitment of Trainees

1. Candidates for subversive training in Cuba are selected by the leftist organizations sponsoring such activity in their homeland. These organizations are not always Communist, particularly in countries where the regular Communist leadership is less militant than other extremist groups. One training group of Argentines included Peronists, Trotskyites, and Vanguard Socialists. A Peruvian group has sent to Cuba for extended guerrilla training youths who are not members of any organizations but have expressed leftist ideas.

2. In countries where there is Cuban diplomatic representation, candidates are screened by the embassy's G-2 officer. We have no information on how approval is granted in countries which have no diplomatic relations with Cuba.

B. Travel

1. There is a concerted effort to conceal or obscure the amount of travel to Cuba, the identities of the travelers, and the length of their stay. Documents are falsified and such devices as detachable visas, circuitous travel, and some surreptitious border crossing are used.

2. Since the October crisis, the only Western Hemisphere access to Cuba by scheduled airline has been through Mexico. Throughout the reporting period Mexican authorities have been photographing passports of travelers arriving from or leaving for Cuba, and relaying the information to interested OAS members. In some cases the travelers themselves have been photographed.

3. Cuban embassies, however, have been issuing visas on separate sheets of paper to avoid any record of Cuban travel in the passport. In addition, since some passports are fraudulent, the Mexican report of Cuban travel may neither reach the correct country nor permit identification. At this agency's suggestion, Mexican travel control authorities late in February began stamping passports to show arrival from or departure for Cuba. While this effectively counters the device of the detachable visa in the

case of legitimate passports, most Latin American countries have inadequate personnel and administrative machinery to scrutinize the passports of returning travelers.

4. Travel control in Mexico City logged 4,912 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, and 969 in the first two months of 1963. (These figures do not cover access by other routes prior to the quarantine in 1962, and include Cubans as well as all other nationalities. Accordingly they do not correlate with totals for legal and illegal travel to Cuba derived from available reporting in the individual Latin American countries. It should also be noted that a "legal" traveler in Mexican reporting may be listed as an illegal traveler by his homeland, either because he had no authorization to visit Cuba, or because of fraudulent documentation.)

5. Anniversary celebrations, goodwill tours, and international conferences afford pretexts for travel to Cuba ostensibly unconnected with subversive training. Identities of trainees are usually protected by pseudonyms, at least during actual training, and the guerrilla candidate may return to his Havana hotel every few days to maintain a fiction of sightseeing. There have also been reports that trainees have for cover purposes attributed extended stays in Cuba to detention by Cuban police.

6. Prior to the October crisis, there was some direct travel to Cuba from Central American countries, and occasional Cubana charter flights, but the main jump-off points were Mexico City, Curacao, and Trinidad. A Canadian non-scheduled airline has operated a few flights between Canada and Havana, carrying both personnel and cargo. Cuban freighters call fairly regularly at Mexican ports, and some Latin American trainees could reach Cuba aboard Cuban ships picking up rice in British Guiana. There is small ship traffic, of unknown but limited extent, between Cuba and neighboring islands.

7. Soviet and Czech airlines continue transatlantic service to Cuba, and Iberian airlines on 11 February announced resumption of a schedule of two flights a month to Havana via the Azores. Aeroflot has occasionally sought and received permission

to land at Recife, Brazil, en route to Havana, and may have picked up some passengers

8. Controlled sources who have undergone guerrilla training, and a comparison of inbound and outbound travelers identified by travel controls make it clear that at least in the case of guerrilla trainees one leg of the travel is often by way of bloc countries and Western Europe. We know of Latin Americans given Cuban training who appear on no travel controls, suggesting that travel in both directions was either by way of the bloc or completely surreptitious.

9. A center providing funds and forged passports for travel to Cuba is known to exist in Montevideo, Uruguay. The Cubans are known to provide forged passports for some of the returning trainees. One group of Argentines returning through Prague and Western Europe was furnished with both Cuban and Ecuadorean passports, to be surrendered in Montevideo prior to re-entering Argentina.

C. Numbers of Trainees

1. Our estimate that 1,500 to 2,000 Latin Americans have received subversive training in Cuba is derived from a combination of travel information, debriefing of controlled sources who have taken training, penetrations of sponsoring organizations, and in a few cases from the records of cooperating Latin American security services.

2. Monitoring of travel into Cuba gives some indication of how many have stayed long enough to receive training, but does not permit differentiation between military training and political indoctrination. We cannot establish a hard total or be certain about length of visit because of travel via the bloc. Forged documentation obscures an accurate nationality breakdown of the travelers.

3. The hardest figures on guerrilla trainees by nationality are obtained from established and reliable sources who have access to such information through sponsoring organizations and in a number of cases have themselves taken such training in Cuba. We do not, however, have enough such sources to provide independently a comprehensive total of Latin America. Only a few of the local Latin American security services have adequate assets for contributing such information.

D. Training

1. The scope of training varies with the time available. One agent who participated in a four-week course in mid-1961 received basic training covering cross-country movement of guerrillas, use and maintenance of weapons, and basic guerrilla tactics. Another clandestine source who spent nearly six months in Cuba in 1962 devoted more than 10 weeks of training to weaponry, communications, the fortification of defense positions, combat tactics, general strategy, map-reading, security, and sabotage. Both men reported considerable time devoted to political indoctrination and physical conditioning.

2. One controlled agent reported that his entire group was required to fill out an extensive questionnaire aimed at developing targets in the homeland for sabotage, subversion of military and police, illegal entry and movement, operation of dummy business concerns to cover clandestine operations, and possible zones for air-drops.

3. Extensive use is made of Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare. The trainees also use a handbook by Alberto Bayo, former colonel in the Spanish Republican air force who trained the original guerrilla group with which Castro invaded the Sierra Maestra. Thousands of copies of these books, in Spanish or in Portuguese, have been printed or mimeographed and are circulating in Latin America. Some have been specifically revised for individual countries.

4. We also have reports of related courses of instruction, lasting as much as six to eight months, in such fields as espionage, psychological warfare, political action, agent communications, and military medicine. Some of the trainees are women.

5. Most of the instructors of the guerrilla warfare courses are Cuban. There are some reports of Spanish instructors. Del Bayo himself is too old to participate actively, but apparently has an "emeritus" connection. General Enrique Lister has been reported to be associated with guerrilla training. There have been a number of reports, without hard confirmation, that Soviet and satellite instructors handle some of the more sophisticated training in such matters as sabotage and espionage.

6. Reports of trainees indicate that weapons training is confined to weapons they will be able to obtain, maintain, and replenish in their own countries. We have reliable and corroborative reports that trainees and sponsoring leaders alike have been told Cuba does not intend to supply appreciable quantities of weapons because a guerrilla must be self-sustaining. It should be noted that while Cuba does supply some funds, guerrilla handbooks also suggest that bank robberies make guerrillas self-sufficient in this respect. Leftist militants have in fact resorted to robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina

E. Subsequent Employment and Countermeasures

1. Clandestine reporting has established a number of incidents of sabotage, terrorism, guerrilla activity and other subversive action in which individuals known to have received training in Cuba have participated. The clearest cases involved the establishment of local guerrilla training camps by Ecuadoreans and Brazilians returning from training in Cuba. In each case, however, our evidence of the guerrilla training in Cuba comes from clandestine sources, there is no legal evidence of such Cuban instruction, and there has been no move to prosecute. All 48 arrested in Ecuador were released after short detention. Two individuals arrested in connection with the Peasant League training activities in Brazil are still known to be detained.

2. The records maintained by Latin American security services are inadequate and far from standardized, so that it has been difficult to establish a statistical approach to arrests for all types of subversive activities. Available reporting indicates at least 11,000 such arrests since 1 January 1962, but a survey shows that most of these arrests amounted to little more than detention and some interrogation. There were relatively few trials and convictions, probably not exceeding five per cent of arrests.

3. Some of those arrested were released for lack of evidence. In other cases, for example in Ecuador, Brazil, and in Peru until last January, there has been little evidence of any inclination on the part of the government to prosecute. In cases where trials have taken place, the local security services have frequently

been unable to establish any Cuban connection, as in the case of the 139 guerrillas tried in Venezuela last fall.

4. In the absence of a comprehensive statistical approach, information on arrests, trials, and the involvement of Cuban trainees in subversive activities is given in the individual country reports attached to this memorandum.

F. Purpose and Propaganda

1. Fidel Castro stated in July 1960: "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been taking the line in public that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance need be exported. In private, they have been offering training and financial and technical assistance to Latin American revolutionaries. While Cuba's economic dependence on the USSR restrains a wholehearted endorsement of the more militant Peiping attitude, Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart insist both in public speeches and in private remarks to visiting Communists that "Socialism" can be brought about in Latin America only by force.

2. Direction and support by propaganda is on a massive scale. The work of Radio Havana and of the Prensa Latina news service is backed up by bulk mail and even air freight shipments. Postal and customs authorities in Panama, for instance, are destroying a monthly average of 12 tons of Cuban propaganda which is entering or being sent through Panama. Costa Rica averaged 10 tons in 1962.

3. Radio Havana's international service, started in May 1961, now leads all Latin American international services in program hours. It broadcasts a weekly total of 188 hours of propaganda in languages including Spanish, Portuguese, Haitian Creole, English, French, and Arabic. This includes 108-1/2 hours in Spanish to the Americas, 7 hours in Portuguese, 7 hours in Haitian, and 17-1/2 hours in English to the Western Hemisphere. It also originates black broadcasts on occasions such as the disorders in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, and makes transmitters available to Latin American exile groups.

Attached annexes discuss Cuban training of Latin American subversives on a country-by-country basis.

27 March 1963

ARGENTINA

1. About 500 Argentines are estimated to have traveled illegally to Cuba for training in subversive activities. One training group alone, given guerrilla warfare training over a six-month period in 1962, varied in number from 34 to 50. For the past four months departures from Argentina for Cuba have averaged 35-40 a month. Argentine intelligence says 80 of the 500 are known to have received guerrilla training; the number is probably considerably higher.

2. The federal district around Buenos Aires records no arrests for guerrilla activity. There were 155 arrests and three convictions for sabotage in 1962, and 14 arrests, but no convictions, to date in 1963. Records on terrorist activity show 468 cases, 60 arrests, and 27 convictions in 1962; 121 cases, two arrests and two convictions in 1963. Argentine police also list 628 arrests in 1962 and 1963 on the broader charge of "subversive activity."

3. Altogether police files show 1,285 incidents of sabotage or terrorism, of which 425 were committed by unknown persons. Police have no evidence that any of those arrested or convicted are known to have received training in Cuba.

4. None of the individuals known to have received extensive Cuban training hold influential positions, but the following individuals in position of influence have traveled to Cuba and may have received some training:

Fanny Edelman, former secretary-general of the Argentine Communist women's organization UMA, presently assigned to foreign liaison of the Argentine Communist Party.

Maria Josefa de Mastroberti, prominent member of the Cuban Solidarity Committee for Argentina.

Osaias Leon Schujman, director of the Federation of Communist Youth, national deputy for the Argentine

Communist Party, reportedly a supplier of false passports for travel to Cuba.

Jorge Francisco Timossi, former Argentine representative for Prensa Latina.

Hector Villalon, prominent Peronist close to Peron.

5. Argentine guerrilla training units in Cuba have been mixed, including Peronists, Communists, and Vanguard Socialists. There are indications that the most active recruitment is carried on by the Argentine Communist Party and by the Communist-influenced left wing of the Peronist movement, under the direction of John William Cooke in Cuba. His wife, Alicia Cooke, lives in Montevideo, Uruguay, which is the principal center providing funds and forged documentation for the recruits.

6. An Argentine taking a six-month course received training in weapons, marksmanship, explosives, ballistics, communications, strategy, tactics, sanitation, closed and open order drill, and construction of defenses. Weapons used included Mauser and Garand rifles, Brownings, Thompson submachineguns, bazookas, 81-mm mortars, and a 57-mm recoilless cannon.

27 March 1963

BOLIVIA

1. About 500 Bolivians traveled legally to Cuba in 1962, and 25 in the first two months of 1963. There have been no arrests of pro-Cuban agitators for sabotage, terrorist, guerrilla, or other subversive activities in Bolivia to date.

2. We can identify by name 214 of the travelers to Cuba. The individuals who killed a number of anti-Communists during a pro-Cuban demonstration on 26 October 1962 were identified as having visited Cuba. Six of these agitators were indicted but released when government investigators placed the blame for the incident on anti-Communists.

3. Otherwise there have been no known incidents which might be attributed to Cuban training.

4. Zenon Barrientos Manani, a national deputy belonging to the Bolivian Communist Party (PCB), since his return from Cuba has been reported without confirmation to be organizing guerrilla forces among Bolivian peasants. The same untested source said Barrientos was active in supplying weapons to Peruvian guerrillas and had aided Peruvian guerrilla leader Hugo Blanco during a reported Bolivian visit by Blanco.

5. Other Bolivians in positions of influence who have been in Cuba long enough to receive training include:

Daniel Saravia Quiroz, secretary-general of the Bolivian Labor Confederation (COB). (Saravia, however, is reported to have changed his beliefs since his travel to England.)

Baldomero Castel, COB leader.

Oscar Salas, mine leader.

Oscar Sanjines, leader of the Cochabamba Labor Federation.

Ofelia Altamirano de Sabrabi, factory workers' leader.

Student and youth leaders Andres Soliz Rada, Dulfredo Rua, Walter Quisbert Barrios, and Alberto de la Barra.

PCB leading members Mario Manje and Hilario Claure.

Alcides Monasterios, national deputy of the left-wing sector of the governing National Revolutionary Movement (MNR).

6. In January 1963, there were 60 Bolivian scholarship students in Cuba who had attended compulsory 20-day courses of military instruction. The Cuban charge in Bolivia reportedly said last month that Cuba expected to give more than 80 scholarships to Bolivians in 1963.

7. The Bolivian government in June 1961, published documents purporting to prove that left extremists had been corresponding with the Cuban Embassy in an effort to obtain arms and instruction for pro-Castro "combat groups." While Bolivia has had extensive paramilitary formations ever since the MNR defeated the armed forces and seized control, and while the extreme left of the MNR in particular has strong militia units, we know of no paramilitary formations linked directly with Cuban subversion.

8. We assume, however, that some proportion of the 500 legal travelers received indoctrination while in Cuba.

27 March 1963

BRAZIL

1. Approximately 400 Brazilian nationals traveled legally to Cuba in 1962, and another 24 the first two months of 1963. A total of about 50 Brazilians are believed to have received specific guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, starting with a contigent of 12 men in July-August 1961. We know of 19 Brazilian specifically. A defecting Cuban army officer who claims to have run a base for guerrilla training reports that 37 Brazilians took courses there at a time which does not coincide with the 19 cases in our records.

2. At least four of the guerrilla trainees in the original contingent of 12 were connected with the guerrilla training camps of the Brazilian Peasant Leagues, exposed by the Varig air crash documents. At least six such camps were established, and each was to have 30 men and at least one leader trained in Cuba. Only one of the Cuban trainees is known to have been arrested. Altogether there were only three arrests, although 24 additional warrants were issued.

3. All of the Brazilians we can identify as guerrilla trainees have come from the regular or the dissident Communist party or the Marxist-oriented Peasant Leagues of Francisco Juliao. Trainees sent by the Leagues were in some cases also members of the regular Communist party.

4. Brazilians in positions of influence known to have received training in Cuba include:

Clodomir dos Santos Morais, number two man in the Peasant Leagues, and principal agent in setting up the training camps; still in custody.

Joaquim Ferreira, Pedro Motta Barros, Rivadiva Braz de Oliveira, and Amaro Luiz de Carvalho, Peasant League leaders. (Ferreira, a lawyer, is a former economist for SUDENE, development agency for the impoverished northeast. Barros and de Oliveira are also student leaders, and Barros is a Communist Party youth leader.)

Florentino Alcantara de Moraes, Pernambuco state leader of the regular Communist Party of Brazil.

Carlos Danielli, Angel Arroyo, Mauricio Grabois, and Joao Amazonas, leaders of the dissident Communist Party.

27 March 1963

CHILE

1. There were 551 legal travelers from Chile to Cuba in 1962, and another 110 in the first two months of 1963. (Anniversary celebrations tend to make travel in January higher than the monthly average.) In addition, field reports show about 400 illegal travelers in 1962, under a definition which lists nationals of one country who obtain their Cuban visas in a third country as "illegal."

2. We have no hard clandestine evidence of Chilean guerrilla trainees. A defecting Cuban army lieutenant has told reporters that a base he commanded gave 19 Chileans guerrilla training in late 1961. Since neither travel to Cuba nor the large Communist party is illegal in Chile, a Chilean national has little reason, other than the intention to take subversive training, to conceal travel to Cuba. On this basis it would appear to be a safe assumption that more than half of the illegal travelers probably received military or political indoctrination.

3. The only known arrests in the past 15 months for subversive activity took place in October 1962, when five members of the Progressive Socialist Movement (MSP) were arrested following an explosion while they were assembling bombs in a downtown Santiago apartment. Four of the five were released after three days; the fifth, whose hand had been blown off, was given a jail sentence. The bombs were to have been used against the U.S. embassy.

4. Julio Stuardo, leader of the MSP and one of those arrested, had traveled to Cuba, but is not known to have received any particular training. He had been photographed prior to the bombing incident with Cuban embassy officials believed to be intelligence officers.

5. There are no Chileans in positions of influence who are known to have received training in Cuba. However leftist Senator Salvador Allende, the probable FRAP candidate in the next presidential election, has made numerous visits to Cuba.

27 March 1963

COLOMBIA

1. We have record of about 400 Colombians who traveled to Cuba legally during the past year, and no record of any illegal travel. Approximately 100 appear on manifests via Curacao, and 65 via Mexico City. Travel information on the remaining 235 is based on agent reports and liaison.

2. Of these 400, 37 are reported to have received training in guerrilla warfare, one in counterintelligence, and one attended a staff or cadre school.

3. Most of those selected for training are members of either the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR) or the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). Both are made up of revolutionaries, dissident Communists, and recruits from the ranks of labor, students, and the unemployed lower classes. Both receive Cuban financial support, and are attempting--without appreciable success to date--to coordinate operations with the bandit gangs terrorizing the violence areas of Colombia.

4. Two guerrilla leaders imprisoned in 1961--Eddie Aristizabal of MOEC and Tulio Bayer--and one killed in 1961--Antonio Larotta of MOEC--were reported to have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba. Larotta's training was in 1959.

5. Colombian army statistics (which the U.S. army attaché considers on the high side because of the statistical procedures used) list 2,582 rural bandits captured and 1,029 individuals detained on suspicion of involvement in rural banditry in 1962, and 300 captured and 134 detained in the first two months of 1963. The Colombian army has no statistics on subsequent trials, but on the basis of past experience it is estimated that about two percent of all those arrested and detained--i.e., about 80 persons--were convicted and sentenced. The bandits are not considered guerrillas in a political sense, although some Cuban propaganda has been found on dead bandits. There were 388 bandits killed in rural areas in 1962, and 89 in 1963.

6. According to official records, there were 13 terrorist attempts in Colombia during 1962, in the course of which nine terrorists were captured, and one was killed. Three of those captured--all members of FUAR--were convicted. One of the three, Alvaro Santiago Paz of Cali, is known to have traveled to Cuba. To date in 1963 there have been 15 terrorist attempts, including eight in Bogota. There have been 16 captured and one killed in Bogota preparing or attempting terrorist acts. One terrorist, identified as a FUAR member, was convicted in Cali. One terrorist, not yet identified, was captured in Medellin.

7. Santiago is the only captured subversive known to have been in Cuba. Three leading members of MOEC--Aristizabal, mentioned above; Pedro Abella; and Fabio Molino--are known to have received training in Cuba.

27 March 1963

COSTA RICA

1. A total of 216 Costa Ricans visited Cuba in 1962. As many as 30 probably received paramilitary training.

2. In February, 1963, 21 Costa Ricans returned from visits of four to six months. It has been reliably established that nine of them were trained as instructors in guerrilla warfare, and one was trained as an organizer and instructor for militia training. The length of stay suggests that the remaining 11 also received paramilitary instruction. Three other Costa Ricans, including one woman, known to have gone to Cuba for such training are not yet reported to have returned to Costa Rica.

3. Two Costa Rican Communist leaders are reported independently by fairly reliable sources to have stated that guerrilla warfare training camps are to be established in Costa Rica. The purely Costa Rican aspect makes this a new development; guerrilla activity in Costa Rica hitherto has centered in the relatively wild and lightly policed northeastern frontier area, and has been targeted against Nicaragua.

4. There have been no arrests for sabotage, terrorism, or guerrilla activity in Costa Rica. About 50 have been temporarily detained for subversive activity, and one individual was arrested and jailed for one year. (This does not include about 30 suspected subversives detained during President Kennedy's visit.)

5. Nineteen of the 30 Costa Ricans believed to have received guerrilla training in Cuba are known by name. Of the 19, the only ones in positions of influence are Oscar Morera Madrigal, San Jose physician, and Modesto Ruiz Ruiz, leader of the Communist labor union in the banana zone.

27 March 1963

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

1. The Dominican Republic in 1962 and 1963 arrested 120 persons for sabotage, terrorism, or other subversive activity. Of these, 45 were held for an appreciable time, tried, or sentenced. This includes 33 who were deported. Of these, three are known or believed to have received training in Cuba.

2. There were 15 incidents in all, five of which are considered to have been inspired by Cuban trainees. The remainder were caused by people not believed to have had any Cuban training.

3. There is no hard evidence of legal or illegal travel from the Dominican Republic to Cuba since 1 January 1962, although some of the deportees may have returned from Europe to Cuba. The best available estimate is that about 25 Dominicans may have gone to Cuba illegally. We have an unconfirmed report that three Dominicans went to Cuba for guerrilla training, and 12 others are believed to have stayed long enough for appreciable training or indoctrination.

4. Individuals in positions of influence, known or believed to have received training in Cuba, include:

Juan Ducoudray Mansfield of the Dominican Communist party.

Rafael Faxas Canto of the leftist 14th of June group.

Gustavo Machado Baez, director of the Agrarian Reform Institute (rumored to have been trained in Cuba, but we have no previous traces.)

Labor leaders Jose Estrella and Jacobo Armach.

Student leader Luis Gomex Perez.

Tomas Parmenio Erickson Alvarez, a leader of the pro-Communist MPD party.

Andres Ramos Peguero, MPD, recently sentenced to 30 years in prison

27 March 1963

ECUADOR

1. In 1962 there were an estimated 208 legal travelers from Ecuador to Cuba, including 50 who went for sports events. As of December, about 80 members of Communist and Communist-front youth groups had been in Cuba since June undergoing guerrilla training.

2. Travel reports showed 40 to 60 Ecuadoreans entering Cuba through Mexico in the first two months of 1963.

3. At least 15 Ecuadoreans trained in Cuba are known to have engaged in paramilitary activities of a training nature following their return.

4. Army forces in April 1962 rounded up 48 members of URJE, a Communist-front youth group, at a training camp 50 miles west of Quito. Seven of those arrested had been trained in Cuba. None of the 48 was tried, and none was held for more than six weeks. This was the group whose leaders the Communists subsequently expelled from URJE amid published charges that they had wasted $44,000 in Cuban funds.

5. Including the 48 URJE guerrillas, there have been an estimated 75 arrests in 1962 and 1963 for guerrilla and terrorist activity, distribution of Communist propaganda, and painting of Communist slogans on walls. All of the propagandists were released after several days of detention.

6. There have been three known terrorist attempts, including the bombing of a theater and a radio station. Most of the participants are identified in clandestine reporting. They include several who have probably had training in Cuba.

7. Ecuadoreans in positions of influence who have had training in Cuba include URJE leaders Mario Vera Arrata, Jefferson Quevedo, Enrique Medina, Carlos Alvardo Loor, and Milton Mejia; and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, secretary-general of the Ecuadorean Communist Youth (JCE) and JCE leader Ketty Romoleroux.

8. We estimate that there are at present about 200 men in paramilitary units. Four corroborative reports establish that the regular Communist Party of Ecuador is forming a paramilitary command of 10 squads of 10 men each scattered throughout the country.

9. Cuban travel does not show in Ecuadorean passports, and is primarily by way of Mexico. There are seven recorded cases of travel via Prague, and two via Paris.

27 March 1963

EL SALVADOR

1. Approximately 100 Salvadorans traveled to Cuba in 1962, and eight more have gone in 1963. Most of them attended party meetings or celebrations for one or two weeks. About 20 continued to Bloc countries. There is no evidence that any received guerrilla training or extensive political indoctrination.

2. Since passage of a new law in September, 1962, Salvadoran authorities have been arresting returning Salvadorans suspected of having gone to Cuba. Several now are in jail awaiting trial. Almost all Salvadoran travel to Cuba is through Mexico with detachable Cuban visa. A number of Salvadorans have remained in Cuba because of the police crackdown in El Salvador.

3. There are no known paramilitary units or related activity.

4. There have been 196 recorded arrests since the beginning of 1962 for terrorist or subversive activities. None of those arrested has been convicted or even tried, but 66 were held for an appreciable time--about 15 for as long as nine months. We believe that three of those arrested had had some type of training in Cuba. There is no record of any arrests for guerrilla or sabotage activity.

5. Records show a total of 25 subversion incidents: eight by unknown persons; three involving individuals believed to have received training in Cuba; and 14 involving persons not believed or known to have had any Cuban training.

6. Other than two prominent Communist labor leaders, Luis Felipe Cativo and Jose Delfino Perez, Cuban trainees are not known to have any positions of influence in El Salvador.

27 March 1963

GUATEMALA

1. There were about 80 illegal travelers from Guatemala to Cuba in 1962, of whom we believe 20 to 30 received training in guerrilla and sabotage techniques. Identified trainees have remained in hiding since their return. Guatemalan Communists have contingency plans for paramilitary operations, but have been waiting for other elements to create a favorable opportunity for such action.

2. Cuba in the past has furnished funds for illicit purchase of weapons by non-Communist elements, such as the "13 November" movement of ex-Lieutenant Yon Sosa, which has sporadically undertaken unsuccessful military operations against Guatemalan army garrisons. The Cubans have cited the greater militancy of non-Communist groups in explaining such funding operations to the Guatemalan Communists.

3. Cuba gives asylum to former Guatemalan President Arbenz and other leading members of his regime, and affords them propaganda facilities.

4. Arrest statistics in Guatemala are inconclusive because of the waves of detentions during periods of tension. During nearly daily disturbances in January-March 1962 in which an estimated 40 were killed, for example, about 1,000 were arrested under state of siege. A few were exiled to El Salvador, but most of those arrested were released after several days.

5. Similarly, there were a number of arrests on charges of terrorism or subversion during the first half of 1962, but no trials. Communists inspired and controlled most of the street disturbances, but the mobs were made up of all anti-regime elements, and no known incidents can be attributed to the individuals trained in Cuba. Numerous copies of Che Guevara's handbook for guerrillas were passed out early in 1962 to serve as a "do-it-yourself" handbook on sabotage and terrorism.

6. There have been an estimated 60 incidents, ranging from the almost daily explosion of homemade bombs in some periods to the assassination of the judicial police chief, dynamiting of a water reservoir, and sabotage of a gasoline storage tank. The government has attributed almost all such acts to "Castro-Communists." Cuban trainees were very probably involved, but there is no good evidence of identity.

7. On 12 March 1962 Guatemalan troops encountered a group of 20 Communist guerrillas near Salama, and killed 18. Members of this group may possibly have been trained in Cuba. On 27 March 1962 the army captured 10 guerrillas infiltrated from Mexico, where they had been organized and supplied by Guatemalan Communist exiles with the knowledge of the Cuban embassy. This group was held for military court martial, and there has been no further word of disposition.

8. Five Communists arrested in early December in the act of posting propaganda were released after several days of detention. On 14 February 1963, 13 Communists, including two members of the central committee, were arrested on charges of subversion and planning an insurrection, and are still held. Several of these had traveled to Cuba, but there is no evidence of any training.

9. The reported leader of the Guatemalans known to have received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba, Ricardo Ramirez de Leon, returned to Guatemala alone on 17 April 1962 and went underground. He was most recently reported scouting the Salama area for possible arms cache sites. The Guatemalan Communists recently formed a "military commission," divided into secret cells, to direct insurrectional activity, possibly due to begin in June or July.

27 March 1963

HAITI

1. There is no firm evidence on legal or illegal travel from Haiti to Cuba. The traffic, if any, is probably small. We believe there is clandestine movement by small boat between the two countries.

2. More than 50,000 Haitians live in eastern Cuba, concentrated around Santiago. Most are employed as cane field laborers.

3. Exile sources claim that 400 of these workers have been trained for subversive activities and that some of the trainees have already returned to Haiti. We have no supporting evidence, however, have detected no returning trainees, and know of no pro-Castro paramilitary groups in Haiti.

4. There are two clandestine Communist parties in Haiti. The leader of one of them, Rene Depestre, is in Cuba and reportedly works on Cuban propaganda beamed at Haiti.

5. The only known incident involving Communists was an attempted demonstration at the U.S. Embassy on 31 October. Advance warning from a clandestine source within the Communist party, who said the instructions for the demonstration came from Cuba, enabled police to forestall the incident. Several of the youths involved may have been detained briefly by the police.

6. No Haitian occupying any position of influence is known to have received any training in Cuba.

27 March 1963

HONDURAS

1. There were 92 legal travelers from Honduras to Cuba in 1962 and 21 to date in 1963. Twelve travelers continued to Soviet bloc countries. Most of the travel to Cuba was for one or two weeks, precluding any extensive paramilitary training, but a definite correlation can be established between the return of Hondurans from Cuban visits and the intensity of propaganda and labor agitation. Honduran exiles in Cuba carry on a virulent propaganda campaign over Radio Havana, calling for revolution.

2. There are no known Honduran paramilitary formations, and other Central American Communists are known to have criticized the Honduran Communist Party for lack of militancy. The PCH obtained a series of 16 different military manuals in October, 1962, including manuals on the use of the carbine, explosives, and demolition techniques.

3. As in the case of Costa Rica, there are guerrilla units of Nicaraguan exiles based in thinly patrolled Honduran frontier areas, receiving support from Cuba and raiding sporadically into Nicaragua in the hope of sparking a mass uprising. One group under Carlos Fonseca Amador has about 40 men.

4. Since 1 January 1962, there have been only two arrests for subversive activity in Honduras. Neither man is known to have received training in Cuba, and both were released after short detention without trail. Three other individuals have been charged with subversive activity but no action was taken.

5. Hondurans in leading organizational positions known or believed to have received training in Cuba include:

Labor: Manuel Noe Rodriguez Reyes, Floresmila Castro, Luis Banegas Izaguirre, Sebastian Suazo Lopez, Jesus Otavio Hernandez, Darios Hector Toledo, Regina de Lainez, Anibal Moradelo, Felex Vanencia, Ramon Sabillon Orellana, and Guadalupe Reyes.

Students: Randolfo Espinsosa Mourra, Rolando Orellano Cruz, Oscar Duron, Ulises Ekonomo Torres, Carlos Falck Contreras, Jorge Arturo Reina Idiaquez, Leonidas Velasquez Funes, and Rodil Rivera Rodil.

Communist Party: Dionisio Bejarano Ramos, Luis Manuel Zuniga, Agapito Robledo Castro, Rigoberto Padilla Rush, Feliciano Protillo Lara, Gustavo Andara Bulnes, Sebastian Suazo Lopez, Longino Becerra, Mario Sosa Navarro, Luis Andres Pineda Villalabos, and Rodolfo Aguiluz Berlioz.

Women: Antonia Suazo Bulnes, Gladas Tablada Ortiz, Rosa Suarez de Moncada, Diana Maria Gomez, and Constanza HH. Caballero.

Education: Medardo Mejia Paniagua and Mariano Mendez Avila.

27 March 1963

MEXICO

1. Mexican nationals traveling to Cuba totaled 238 in 1962 and 157 in the first two months of 1963.

2. A fairly reliable source reported in mid-1962 that about 150 Mexicans were receiving guerrilla training at Minas del Frio, Cuba. A defecting Cuban Army lieutenant told the press in Brazil that 70 Mexicans were trained at his base at San Julian in late 1961. These reports are regarded with reserve, however, particularly in the light of our knowledge that Cuba does not wish to damage its relations with Mexico as long as Mexico City is the principal Cuban "window" to Latin America.

3. Arrests for subversive activities have not been numerous. In the most recent case, six professors and two students at the University of Morelia were arrested for participation in Fidelista protests over the dismissal of the University's Communist rector. One teacher, a Guatemalan Communist militant who visited Havana for 17 days in 1961, is still imprisoned and will probably be deported. Another professor had probably visited Cuba.

4. A Nicaraguan Communist was deported in January and an Argentine Communist newsman in November 1962 for pro-Castro activities. Two Cubans were arrested on arrival in February 1962 and deported as agitators.

5. Mexican government agents on 24 May 1962 killed Ruben Jaramillo, Mexican Communist and guerrilla fighter, at Morelos, and subsequently arrested one of his guerrilla associates, Jorge Martinez Rosillo, who had been a friend of Raul Castro since the Castros' training period in Mexico. Jaramillo had been invited to Cuba in 1961, but there is no record of his travel; Martinez Rosillo was in Havana for 20 days in 1961.

6. Communist factions have touched off numerous disturbances at the national university in Mexico City and provincial universities. Anti-Communist

students charge that direction, material, and financial support for these disturbances is channeled through students who have received training in agitation while visiting Cuba as "athletes." More than 50 Mexican students attended the Latin American University Games in Cuba last October.

7. Mexican authorities continue to confiscate large amounts of propaganda from travelers returning from Cuba. For example, three students at Morelia attempted to bring 100 kilograms of propaganda material into Mexico on 31 August 1962.

8. Mexicans who have visited Cuba and probably received training or directives include more than 30 prominent writers, teachers, and leftist party leaders.

27 March 1963

NICARAGUA

1. About 75 Nicaraguans have traveled to Cuba during the past 18 months. Nicaraguan security authorities list 22 as known to have received guerrilla warfare training there.

2. Of the 22, eight were arreated when they returned to Nicaragua to carry on anti-Somoza activities. Two have been sentenced to prison and the other six were released after interrogation.

3. Cuba has dealt with, financed, and supported a succession of Nicaraguan exile movements, but Guevara recently told visiting Central American Communists that none of these had developed a satisfactory level of popular support. Nicaraguan exiles maintain small guerrilla bands across the borders in both Costa Rica and Honduras, making sporadic incurions, but to date they have evoked no internal support and have been effectively rounded up or driven back by the Nicaraguan National Guard.

4. Eight Nicaraguans were tried in June, 1962, for conducting terrorist training. They were caught while studying the manufacture of bombs under an instructor trained in Cuba. Nicaraguan authorities seized arms, ammunition, explosives, and 700 pounds of propaganda. A Nicaraguan found with an arms cache in April 1962 reportedly told interrogators the arms had come from Cuba. A Nicaraguan who had gone to Cuba in mid-1962, ostensibly for a surgical operation, was caught shortly after his return with supplies of explosives intended for terrorist bombings.

5. Altogether there have been five major subversive incidents in Nicaragua since 1 January 1962, four of which involved individuals known or believed to have received training in Cuba. Perpetrators of the fifth incident are unknown. A total of 41 persons were arrested. Nineteen were held for an appreciable time, and 14 were tried and sentenced. Seven of the total 41 are known or believed to have been trained in Cuba.

6. A number of minor incursions into Nicaragua, mainly from the Honduran border, have been mounted by the Cuban-supported, Communist-dominated National Liberation Front (FLN). At least nine of the FLN members engaged in these raids are known or believed to have had Cuban training.

7. Influential Nicaraguans known to believed to have received indoctrination and training in Cuba include:

Carlos Adan Perez Bermudez, Eligio Alvarez Montalvan, and Reinaldo Viquez Ruiz, leaders of both the Nicaraguan Communist Party (PSN) and the Communist-front Republican Mobilization (MR).

Francisco Rolando Alvarado Lopez, (PSN) leader of the Communist labor front. (In custody)

Ricardo Francisco Osejo Zeledon, Orlando Quinones Torres, and Guillermo Andres Baltodano Serrano, youth front leaders influential among students.

Juan Jose Lorio Garcia, PSN central committee member.

Adrian Sanchez Sancho, Communist labor leader (still in Cuba.)

Abdul Sirker Urroz, PSN leader (believed still in Cuba.)

FLN leaders Marco Antonio Melendez Delgado (in custody,) Socrates Noel Flores Vivas, Ivan Sanchez Arguello, Orlando Quant Quintana, and German Pomares Ordonez.

8. Agapito Fernandez Garcia, a federal deputy of the Nicaraguan Conservative Party, was in Cuba for 10 days during the January anniversary celebration and may have received some form or instruction or indoctrination.

27 March 1963

PANAMA

1. Panama lists 56 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962 and two thus far in 1963. Altogether, however, 64 Panamanians are identified, on the basis of their political backgrounds and known length of stay in Cuba, as probably having gone to Cuba for either political indoctrination or guerrilla training. Of these 64, 38 almost certainly received guerrilla training.

2. Eighteen guerrilla trainees returned to Panama in February, 1963, after stays of four to six months. Six were detained briefly by the Panamanian security service, and the 12 others who returned a few days later were not arrested.

3. Training for Panamanians apparently started at least as far back as 1961. A guerrilla trainee from another country, attending a course with five Panamanians in July, 1961, was told by Cuban instructors that the Panamanians were being given more rigorous training than other nationals because they had special sabotage assignments in the Canal Zone.

4. We have, however, no indication of any paramilitary groups, activity, or training in Panama.

5. Panamanian security authorities maintain no statistics on subversive incidents, and many are not reported to central authority. There have been a considerable number of minor incidents, mainly by unknown perpetrators. Other than continuing sabotage activity against the United Fruit Company installations in Chirique Province, the most spectacular incident was the brief declaration of revolt last August by Manuel Jose Hurtado, a former Panamanian major, and 16 adherents. Hurtado, a strong anti-Communist, was motivated by personal problems.

6. Since 1 January 1962, there have been about 67 individuals arrested, some of them repeatedly, for subversive activities. Of this group, eight are known

to have received training in Cuba. Some of the arrests were made to forestall subversive activity.

7. Panamanians in positions of influence known to have received training in Cuba include:

Narcisco Cubas Perez and Cesar Jose Dubois, leaders of the Vanguardia de Accion Nacional (VAN) which hopes to take part in 1964 elections.

Peasant leaders Leovilgildo Barrias de Garcia and Leonidas Alveo.

Leftist student activists Rolando Ernesto Carrasquilla, Jose Modesto Herrera, and Herminio Garrido.

Eliseo de la Hoz, Communist student leader.

Labor leaders Lacides Ceballos, Andres Galvan, Inocencio Garibaldi, Victor Manuel Lombardo, Jack White, and Jose del Carmen Serracin, the latter a leader of Chiriqui Province banana workers.

Jorge Pena and Felix Gonzalez, Communist leaders among the San Blas Indians.

Ezequiel Rios, municipal leader of La Chorrera.

8. In addition, the following are believed to have received training or guidance in Cuba:

Thelma King, national assembly deputy, who boasts of close personal friendship with Fidel Castro and has visited Cuba five times in the past year.

Senior VAN leader Jorge Enrique Turner Morales.

Miguel Porcell and Ruperto Luther Thomas, Communist leaders at the national level.

Alvaro Menendez Franco, member of the municipal council of Panama.

27 March 1963

PARAGUAY

1. About 60 Paraguayan nationals traveled to Cuba in 1962. It is estimated that over the past two years as many as 120 have been in Cuba long enough to receive appreciable political or military training. The preponderance of Paraguayan nationals visiting Cuba are political exiles living in Uruguay, Argentina, and Brazil.

2. The Paraguayan Government forbids its nationals to visit Cuba, but cannot control travelers who visit neighboring countries which have Cuban missions and then proceed illegally to Cuba.

3. There are no reports that paramilitary trainees are active inside Paraguay. There is considerable evidence that some returnees have joined exile formations waiting on the Paraguayan border for a favorable occasion for incursions.

4. Since January, 1962, at least 1,000 persons have been arrested for guerrilla, sabotage, terrorist or other subversive activity, but only an estimated 140 were held for any appreciable length of time. We know of only one scheduled for trial, and none of those arrested is known to have received training in Cuba.

5. Most of the arrests have stemmed from about 10 major incidents, of which two involved sabotage and terrorism, one guerrilla activity, and the remainder subversion. There is a rumor that the unknown individual who placed a bomb in an Incarnacion bank had been trained in Cuba. Perpetrators of the other incidents have been identified, and none is known or believed to have received any training in Cuba.

6. Federico Tatter and Anibal Garcete were reported to have returned from Cuba in late 1962, Tatter to take over military direction of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), and Garcete to organize cane workers. We know of no other Cuban trainees who may be in positions of influence among Paraguayans.

27 March 1963

PERU

1. At least 181 Peruvians visited Cuba in 1962 on visits long enough to permit indoctrination, and according to an agent who participated, more than 150 of them were given guerrilla training. Following the training, 90 of these were designated by Peruvian leftist militant leaders as members of the "Peruvian National Liberation Army."

2. Over the past two years more than 235 Peruvians have been identified as travelers to Cuba. Last December two top Peruvian Communists said that over the past year the militant Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR) had sent 200 to 300 Peruvians to Cuba, in groups of 12 to 15, for guerrilla training.

3. An estimated total of some 5,000 persons have taken part in acts of sabotage, terrorism, assaults on police outposts, bank robberies, land invasions, destruction of haciendas, strike violence, and riots. The ruling junta in January launched a major round-up and arrested 729 Communists and leftists, of whom we estimate that 50 to 100 may have been trained in Cuba. There are still 209 in jail, of whom only one is a known Cuban guerrilla trainee. The junta has announced a series of mass trials to be held in Lima and provincial centers, charging the violence was part of a Soviet-Cuban conspiracy to make Peru a Communist state. In the course of the violence there have been 18 killed, including four police, and 165 wounded.

4. Out of a total of 137 recorded acts of violence, 49 were clearly sponsored or controlled by Communist elements. Three Cuban nationals and four Peruvians trained in Cuba were identified among leaders of the striking miners who caused damage estimated at $4,000,000 to the Cerro de Pasco smelter at La Oroya in December. The Cubans have not been apprehended.

5. The violence in the Quillabamba-Cuzco-Puno area is attributed to the Indian and peasant guerrillas of Hugo Blanco. Local officials estimate Blanco's force at 2,000, but this is probably an exaggeration. Blanco and his lieutenants are not known to be Cuban-trained or Cuban-supplied.

6. Some of the 158 guerrillas known to have been trained in Cuba have been in hiding and inactive ever since the January round-up, and others are known to be waiting outside the country. The MIR leader, Luis de la Puente Uceda, was believed to be in Cuba and now is in Europe.

7. Guerrilla groups have sporadically attacked police stations for weapons, and robbed banks for funds. MIR members teamed with common criminals in April 1962 in a $100,000 bank robbery in a suburb of Lima, dividing the proceeds 50-50. Part of the loot is believed to have reached Hugo Blanco. MIR has brought in from Cuba a reported 5,000 copies of a special miniature edition of Alberto Bayo's guerrilla handbook. There is also a manual on guerrilla operations based on Bayo's and Guevara's books but written specifically for Peru.

8. Peruvian police in March 1962 broke up a small guerrilla training operation and determined that among those arrested, one was a former resident of Cuba, another had received Cuban training in clandestine operations, and a third, caught with radio equipment, admitted having used it to communicate with Cuba. The local guerrilla candidates were issued kits including rifles of Czech manufacture. All of those arrested were soon released, but some were re-arrested in the January round-up.

9. Prominent Peruvians who may have received indoctrination on visits to Cuba include nine student and youth leaders including two presidents of student organizations; seven leading journalists; three labor union leaders; and nine former members of parliament.

27 March 1963

URUGUAY

1. There were about 115 legal travelers to Cuba from Uruguay in 1962, and an additional 20-25 in January 1963. About 25, mainly Paraguayan exiles resident in Uruguay, are believed to have traveled illegally.

2. Probably no significant portion of the Uruguayan travelers went for guerrilla warfare training. Cuba apparently wants to preserve Montevideo, which is host to the most extensive Communist diplomatic missions in all South America, as a gateway and base of operations, as in the case of Mexico.

3. Cuban subversion activity oriented toward Uruguay appears to consist largely of developing and maintaining enough political action and propaganda assets to counter any Uruguayan inclination to oust or restrict the activities of Cuban and Bloc missions.

4. The only arrests for sabotage occurred during the recent electricity and telephone strike, which arose from worker grievances and had no Cuban connection. All of those arrested were released within a week.

27 March 1963

VENEZUELA

1. We have no acceptable figure on Venezuelan travel to Cuba. Liaison services maintain no records, and have no such capability.

2. Reports from travel control points show 128 Venezuelan nationals traveling to Cuba, but only 48 returning. The names of most of those returning do not appear on the lists of those who went to Cuba. In the few cases where round-trip travel can be established, the stay was generally short. We must conclude that Venezuelans who went to Cuba for training traveled at least one way, and in some known instances both, clandestinely.

3. On the basis of usually reliable agent reports, we believe that more than 200 Venezuelans received guerrilla warfare training in Cuba in 1962. Castro has made it plain that he assigns the first priority for revolution to Venezuela.

4. At present there are probably about 100 men involved in the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) paramilitary command attempting to terrorize the Federal District of Caracas. Sources in both the PCV and the Government of Venezuela estimate there are another 300 guerrillas in the field, although we know of no more than 150, in small units of about 20 men, who are under coordinated PCV command. Including terrorist groups of university students and paramilitary party formations in Maracaibo and other large cities, the total number involved in violence probably does not exceed 600. Only seven known to be engaged in these operational are known to have been in Cuba long enough for training.

5. The PCV, however, in the first months of 1963 has proven itself capable of implementing the terrorist and sabotage operations which last October it could only plan. Organization and coordination have improved, and sabotage has reached a level of sophistication in technique and materials which implies either the presence of outside experts or else a highly advanced stage of training.

6. The guerrillas committed themselves to field operations prematurely in 1962 and, denied support or sympathy by the peasantry who are strongly pro-Betancourt, were rounded up or dispersed. A total of 139 were tried by special military courts last fall following the Puerto Cabello and Carupano revolts. More than 110 were given substantial prison sentences. Four at the most are believed to have been in Cuba long enough to receive training.

7. Altogether there have been an estimated 1,000 to 1,500 arrests since the beginning of 1962, but there have been no trials or jail sentences other than those of the guerrillas mentioned above. All others were held for varying lengths of time, most of them for less than 90 days. Most of those arrested have been released either for lack of evidence, or by civil judges who are generally either inefficient or open to corruption. Possibly 50 of those arrested may have received some training in Cuba, but government interrogators have so far been unable to obtain any admission of Cuban training, and no travel records are maintained which would give leads for such interrogation.

8. The number of incidents leading to arrests are estimated at 250. The principal incidents have been the uprisings of the Puerto Cabello and Carupano garrisons; the October/November sabotage of the Lake Maracaibo oilfields; the hijacking of the freighter Anzoategui in February and the earlier theft of five French paintings from the Museum of Fine Arts; burning of the Sears-Roebuck warehouse and dynamiting of highway bridges in February; pipeline sabotage in March; the recent capture of two PCV paramilitary groups; a bank robbery in February by men wearing the armband of the Communist "Armed Forces of National Liberation" (FALN); and the indiscriminate shooting in Caracas in January and February in the wave of terrorism designed to deter Betancourt's visit to Washington.

9. The majority of the Communist-directed incidents have been carried out by members of the PCV paramilitary groups who in general have not themselves had Cuban training, but are trained and directed by instructors who have in turn been trained in Cuba and in some cases in Communist China.

10. Voice radio transmitters in Caracas and in outlying cities have been heard in conversation with a voice transmitter in Cuba.

11. Principal personalities known or believed to have received training in Cuba include:

Members of the PCV central committee: Guillermo Garcia Ponce, Rafael E. Martinez, Radames Larrazabal, Alonso Ojeda Olaechea, Douglas Bravo, German Lairet, and Joaquin Araujo Ortega.

Other political leaders: Simon Saiez Merida, Americo Martin, Romulo Henriquez, Jr., and Domingo Alberto Rangel of the extremist Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR); Fabricio Ojeda, Jose Vincente Rangel, and Victor Jose Ochoa of the URD.

Labor leaders: Cesar Millan, Horacio Scott Power, Hector Marcano Coello, Laureno Torrealba, Helo Cruz Villegas, and Vicente Pinate.

Student leaders: Alfredo Maneiro, Freddy Munoz, Jose Rafael Tenorio, Alcides Villalba, Jose Linares, Hector Rodriguez Bauz, and Julio Escalona.

Educators: Hector Mujica, Fruto Vivas, Humberto Cuenca, and Jose Vincente Scorza.

27 March 1963

OTHERS

1. There have been about 40 legal travelers from British Guiana to Cuba. Some Latin American travelers could be carried without much chance of detection on Cuban freighters hauling rice. Local papers and opposition parties have charged that some of the students sent to Cuba did not have proper academic qualifications for their studies, implying their travel, was for other purposes. There are no reliable reports, however, that any Guianese have received subversive training in Cuba. Any Cuban training for British Guianese would presumably be designed to support rather than subvert the government of Premier Cheddi Jagan. There have been no arrests for subversive activity, and no incidents of terrorism, sabotage, or subversion. There have been riots, but not Cuban-connnected.

2. Jamaica sent 593 legal travelers to Cuba in 1962, probably accounted for largely by the 20-25,000 Jamaicans resident in Cuba. There is no evidence of guerrilla training for any Jamaicans, and there have been no arrests for guerrilla, sabotage, or terrorist activity. Subversion is confined largely to public oratory defying the Jamaican authorities. A British Guianese Communist studying in Jamaica, who is believed to have received training in Cuba, instigated a demonstration in front of the U.S. Embassy in October, 1962, by six members of the "Friends of Cuba Committee;" one Communist was arrested, fined, and released as a result for "obstructing traffic." Two university instructors and two other teachers are believed to have received indoctrination in Cuba.

3. Surinam and Trinidad report no subversive incidents, no arrests, and no evidence of Cuban subversive training for any of their nationals. Trinidad listed two legal travelers in Cuba in 1962.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10001-10445

RECORD SERIES : NSF, JOHN MCCONE MEMORANDA, MTGS. 6 JAN. 64-2 APR. 64, BOX 1

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : MCCONE, JOHN
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 02/21/1964
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS :
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #12

10

12

20 February 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting with the President - 20 February 1964 - Alone

1. I advised the President of my willingness to go with him and to meet early in the day with General Eisenhower if he thought this would be constructive. He said he felt General Eisenhower might feel he was being high-pressured and that he intended merely to advise him of the plan to surface the OXCART and exchange formalities. He would then tell him he was ordering me to go out and brief him in the next week or two and I should make my own arrangements.

2. I told the President we had a very sensitive effective operation working in Mexico City jointly with President Mateos which involved telephone surveillance and was being done in a most careful manner with his knowledge and with the assistance of a few of his trusted officials. This had resulted in a very intimate relationship between our station chief, Mr. Win Scott and the President. Ambassador Mann knew of this from Scott, as did certain selected people in State Department. However President Mateos did not know of Mann's knowledge of the operation and looked upon the operation as an intimate arrangement between himself and the CIA station. I mentioned that Mateos had been best man at Win Scott's recent wedding. I said the President should not mention this but I wanted him to know about it if it was raised by President Mateos.

3. I told President Johnson that we continued our interrogation of Nosenko; our counterintelligence people were inclined to feel he was a plant but had not made up their minds. President said he thought he was probably legitimate and would give us some good information. I said I hoped this was true - that we certainly were taking advantage of everything that he did give us; that we were working closely with the FBI, however we could only conclude at the moment that the Soviet's performance and action were so different from any other defector case that our suspicions had been aroused. The President asked to be kept informed.

4. The President then raised the question of Spain, suggesting I might return to Spain to talk again to Franco. He said he was in a very difficult situation because of announcement of the cut-off of aid to Britain, France and Yugoslavia which he did not know about until he read it in the paper, and that he was beside himself because he wanted to give aid of $31 million to Spain but had the greatest difficulty in the justification.

I told the President it was my impression from information gained from clandestine sources that Franco had made some moves to curtail trade with Cuba after my visit with him but that the Spanish companies were endeavoring to circumvent his orders by various surreptitious methods. The President asked that I study the matter carefully and speak to him about it next week.

ACTION: I have asked Mr. O'Ryan to contact Noel and I am asking Mr. Ball to contact Ambassador Woodward to determine whether the Spanish had taken any actions which they have announced or might communicate to us which would indicate an intention on their part to curtail or restrict shipping or trade with Cuba.

5. The President then said he wanted to do everything possible to get me out of the cloak and dagger business. That he was tired of a situation that had been built up that every time my name or CIA's name was mentioned, it was associated with a dirty trick. He asked if our economic studies had stood up and I said yes, they had, and that they were reconfirmed and supported by an exhaustive article in TIME Magazine. The President seemed pleased at this, expressed satisfaction in CIA's operations but was most emphatic in his feelings that we should get away from the cloak and dagger image and expressed a determination to bring this about by statements he would make from time to time.

JAM/mfb

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10002-10012

RECORD SERIES : NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 02/18/1963
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED

DOCUMENT TYPE : DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

File
Cuba

2

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introductory Statement

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is encouraging and supporting the efforts of Communists to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

A. Analysis indicates that the immediate threat stems less from the subversive efforts of traditional Communist movements than from Cuban support of any and all active revolutionary and terrorist movements.

B. These distinctions are not precise. In some countries, Castro's original success has spurred the established Communist movement to action, and he supports it. In others, the old-time Communists may even oppose radical action at this time, and Castro works with more active and more militant revolutionists.

C. In any event, we know of only two countries--Mexico and Uruguay--where Castro appears inclined for the time being to forego inciting violence, and this only because he wants a favorable climate for his operations into other countries.

II. Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities.

A. Cuban support takes many different forms. We have occasional evidence of direct participation by Cuban nationals, as in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. While we have not been able to come up with the kind of airtight proof a court would require that weapons move directly from Cuba to these same groups, we do know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most logically would come from Cuba.

B. But by and large, our evidence shows that Cuba is not now attempting a large program of physical support for Latin American revolutionaries. It is, rather, concentrating on supplying the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance they require.

C. In essence, Castro tells would-be revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

D. So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it will flourish.

III. Before going into more detailed evidence of Cuban subversion in Latin America, I should note that Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution.

A. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women.

1. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January.

2. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party ((a veteran party member and leader of the FALN)), says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

B. This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist group in Venezuela, the MIR. The result has been the creation of the FALN, or Armed Forces of National Liberation.

1. The FALN is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These have also been designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington.

2. I do not wish to minimize the violence in Venezuela. The sabotage is the work of

experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out after ten at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion of both our people and the embassy that this is not a threat to government control. It is one thing for a group of young men to race down a dark street firing a machinegun from a speeding car. It is quite a different matter to stand up to the armed forces, or seize and hold government buildings.

3. We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. I shall explain in more detail later how we arrive at our figures on guerrilla trainees. Our best estimate now is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962.

   a. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration.

b. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10016
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, UNARRANGED FILES, LA/CUBAN SUBVERSION, BOX 5
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	02/18/1963
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE :	DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1A
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	

6

DRAFT BRIEFING NOTES 18 February 1963

FUNDING

I. Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash.

A. A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

B. A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

C. Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the URJE (Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth). The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, but there was no other evidence at the time of any Cuban involvement. The URJE, however, was a Communist-front group whose leaders had thrown off the discipline of the regular Communist party, and this January the Communists managed to have a URJE convention, run by Young Communists, expel the leaders. They were accused, according to published accounts, of having wasted $44,000 supplied by Cuba for guerrilla activities. One of our reliable sources in the Communist Party ((a regional Communist leader in contact with the Cuban chargé in Chile, and a member of the PCE inquiry commission)) has informed us that the next-to-last Cuban chargé in Quito blamed the fiasco on the fact that his successor had passed the money to the URJE without coordinating with the regular Communist party.

D. A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala.

E. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reaches Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

F. Just last month, one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. Interestingly enough, the Brazilians believe that the money Cuba had been providing for the camps actually came from Communist China. Since the exposure of the Varig documents--and probably since the guerrillas first reached the Cuban embassy in Rio with their complaints about mismanagement, confusion, and corruption--the Cubans have apparently stopped financing this operation, but the evidence shows it is still limping along. The man with the suitcase full of ammunition said that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

II. The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communists have staged waves of bank robberies in Venezuela, Peru, and Argentina.

A. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. Some of the participants have been caught and are being tried in the mass trials of more than 200 Communists just starting in Peru. We know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley.

B. Just last week a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

C. Argentine police last July raided a Buenos Aires warehouse and found evidence that it had been the headquarters for a gang of terrorists--apparently working with both the Peronists and the

Communists--responsible for a wave of hold-ups, burglaries, and attacks on police posts designed to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10069
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, COUNTRY FILE, MEXICO, LOPEZ MATEOS VISIT, BOX 61
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	STATE
FROM :	DEAN RUSK
TO :	THE PRESIDENT
TITLE :	
DATE :	02/18/1964
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #9

999

9

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

Lopez Mateos Visit

Bundy

Orig to Dungan

SECRET

FEB 1 8 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Your Meeting with President Lopez Mateos

We do not expect to make any major political decisions but want to give new emphasis to the friendly relations which exist between Mexico and the United States. These relations are now at an all-time high. Mexico felt it had a real friend in President Kennedy. They feel the same relationship exists with you but want to be reassured. A warm Texas handshake and abrazo when you greet Lopez Mateos at Los Angeles would symbolize the continuance of that relationship.

We want to stress the identity of interests of our two countries and our ability to work out in the "spirit of El Chamizal" any problems that may arise between us.

Despite the informal atmosphere of the visit, we should give scrupulous attention to Mexico's extreme sensitivity on sovereign equality and Mexico's strong desire to avoid any appearance of subservience to the United States.

Lopez Mateos speaks for the Mexican Government and no important decision is made without his approval. He has followed an "independent" foreign policy but knows that good relations with us, especially in the economic sphere, are essential to his country. At times his foreign policy has been too independent--for example on Cuba and in commercial and cultural relations with Communist China.

But

SECRET

GROUP 2
Exempted from

But when fundamental issues are at stake we have usually found him understanding and willing to be helpful--controlling travel of Castro agents, non-recognition of Red China, offering help on Panama.

Lopez Mateos has chosen his successor, Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz, who will take office in December 1964 after elections in July. Power is therefore drifting toward Diaz Ordaz.

Enclosed is a paper on points which it is suggested you raise at the meeting, and those which it is believed Lopez Mateos will raise.

/s/ Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Paper on points to be
raised at the meeting

MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES

1. General Information and Hemisphere Relations

We desire to continue close working relations with Mexico both within and outside the OAS and the UN.

We hope Mexico will continue to use its key political and geographic position to help control Castro/Communism. Mexico is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation and we have carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican control measures.

Mexico has offered its assistance on Panama. Mexico is not aware of the role of President Orlich of Costa Rica in mediation efforts and we do not desire that this come to Mexico's attention. We welcome Mexico's assistance within an OAS context.

2. Red China

The coming visit of De Gaulle to Mexico and Brazil in March has prompted speculation that these two countries are about to recognize Red China. Lopez Mateos has given us secret assurances, through CIA channels, that he has no intention of recognizing Red China. We do not desire to raise this issue, but if Lopez Mateos raises it, we should let him know we are aware of his assurances.

3. Mexico's Role in the Alliance for Progress

Mexico's participation in the Alliance is essential to its success. Mexico has played a leading role in IA-ECOSOC and has named the Director General of the Bank of Mexico as its representative to CIAP. It has cooperated with us in providing extensive training facilities for Latin American technicians. We want to encourage Mexico to make a greater

contribution

contribution. Mexico is making renewed efforts to promote private enterprise and we also want to encourage Mexico along this line. We should continue to cooperate with Mexico in maintaining financial stability and promoting economic development.

4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande

There remain several tracts on the Rio Grande over which sovereignty is in dispute. We desire to have the International Boundary and Water Commission study these problems and recommend a solution.

5. Control of Narcotics

Mexico and the United States are cooperating in controlling the importation of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States. We should strengthen this cooperation in the mutual interest of both countries. We hope therefore that Mexico will agree to periodic meetings of the highest law enforcement officers of the two countries.

6. Desalinization Plant at Tijuana

An appraisal report by Interior shows that this is the most economical way to supply water to Tijuana. We are prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study if Mexico desires and will share the cost.

MAJOR POINTS LOPEZ MATEOS IS EXPECTED TO RAISE

1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado

The Mexican President wants a reaffirmation of President Kennedy's commitment "to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time" of the salinity problem. We can agree but should avoid any commitment on timing. If Lopez Mateos raises the related problem of the

groundwater

groundwater recovery program at Yuma, we agree that the Boundary Commission should study the problem. Farmers in the lower Rio Grande Valley are seriously concerned about saline drainage discharged into the river by Mexico and want the Boundary Commission to achieve an early solution to this problem.

2. Bracero Program

The Mexican Government is privately seriously disturbed about the termination of this program. Congressional opposition to it is strong and we cannot commit ourselves to continue the program. We are looking into the problem to see if anything can be done to help Mexico. One possibility is an expanded community development program in Mexico through private channels (P.L.480 foodstuffs through U. S. voluntary agencies) if Mexico is interested.

3. Mexico's Concern about U. S. Trade Policies

Mexico is concerned about United States restrictions or threatened restrictions on textiles, lead, zinc and meat and other products and United States cotton policies which it claims hurt Mexican cotton exports to the world market. We recognize that we are natural markets for each other. We desire to expand trade, promote competition and develop markets. We want to maintain or expand the present level of access to each other's market but we would not be able to guarantee Mexico its present share of our market in each commodity or a share in increased consumption.

4. Chamizal Settlement

Lopez Mateos wants to be recorded in history as the man who returned the Mexican flag to the Chamizal. He wants a ceremony at the Presidential level at El Paso-Ciudad Juarez before December 1964 to symbolize the Chamizal settlement. We should only agree to consult later in the year on an appropriate ceremony and a possible date.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/26/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10070
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, COUNTRY FILE, MEXICO, LOPEZ MATEOS VISIT, BOX 61
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	STATE
FROM :	DEAN RUSK
TO :	THE PRESIDENT
TITLE :	
DATE :	02/18/1964
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	NEED SUBJECT ASSIGNED
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	04/21/1998
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #10

60

SECRET
JLM - PBM/1
February 18, 1964

10

4

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT [illegible]

Subject: Your Meeting with President Lopez Mateos

We do not expect to make any major political decisions but want to give new emphasis to the friendly relations which exsist between Mexico and the United States. These relations are now at an all-time high. Mexico felt it had a real friend in President Kennedy. They feel the same relationship exsists with you but want to be reassured. A warm Texas handshake and abrazo when you greet Lopez Mateos at Los Angeles would symbolize the continuance of that relationship.

We want to stress the identity of interests of our two countries and our ability to work out in the "spirit of El Chamizal" any problems that may arise between us.

Despite the informal atmosphere of the visit, we should give scrupulous attention to Mexico's extreme sensitivity on sovereign equality and Mexico's strong desire to avoid any appearance of subservience to the United States

Lopez Mateos speaks for the Mexican Government and no important decision is made without his approval. He has followed an "independent" foreign policy but knows that good relations with us, especially in the economic sphere, are essential to his country. At times his foreign policy has been too independent--for example on Cuba and in commercial and cultural relations with Communist China. But when fundamental issues are at stake we have usually found him understanding and willing to be helpful--controlling travel of Castro agents, non-recognition of Red China, offering help on Panama.

Lopez Mateos has chosen his successor, Gustavo DIAZ Ordaz, who will take office in December 1964 after elections in July. Power is therefore drifting toward Diaz Ordaz.

SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
by: Robert M. Sayre

Enclosed is a paper on points which it is suggested you raise at the meeting, and those which it is believed Lopez Mateos will raise.

Dean Rusk

Enclosure:

Paper on points to be
raised at meeting.

SECRET

MAJOR POINTS OF INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES

1. General Information and Hemisphere Relations

We desire to continue close working relations with Mexico both within and outside the OAS and the UN.

We hope Mexico will continue to use its key political and geographic position to help control Castro Communism. Mexico is very sensitive about publicizing its cooperation and we have carefully avoided any public comment on Mexican control measures.

Mexico has offered its assistance on Panama. Mexico is not aware of the role of President Orlich of Costa Rica in mediation efforts and we do not desire that this come to Mexico's attention. We welcome Mexico's assistance within an OAS context.

2. Red China

The coming visit of De Gaulle to Mexico and Brazil in March has prompted speculation that these two countries are about to recognize Red China. Lopez Mateos has given us secret assurances, through CIA channels, that he has no intention of recognizing Red China. We do not desire to raise this issue, but if Lopez Mateos raises it, we should let him know we are aware of his assurances.

3. Mexico's Role in the Alliance for Progress

Mexico's participation in the Alliance is essential to its success. Mexico has played a leading role in IA-ECOSOC and has named the Director General of the Bank of Mexico as its representative to CIAP. It has cooperated with us in providing extensive training facilities for Latin American technicians. We want to encourage Mexico to make a greater contribution. Mexico is making renewed efforts to promote private enterprise and we also want to encourage Mexico along this line. We should continue to cooperate with Mexico in maintaining financial stability and promoting economic development.

SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robert M Sayre (MCM)

4. Disputed Tracts on Rio Grande

There remain several tracts on the Rio Grande over which sovereignty is in dispute. We desire to have the International Boundary and Water Commission study these problems and recommend a solution.

5. Control of Narcotics

Mexico and the United States are cooperating in controlling the importation of narcotics and dangerous drugs into the United States. We should strengthen this cooperation in the mutual interest of both countries. We hope therefore that Mexico will agree to periodic meetings of the highest law enforcement officers of the two countries.

6. Desalinization Plant at Tijuana

An appraisal report by Interior shows that this is the most economical way to supply water to Tijuana. We are prepared to go ahead with a feasibility study if Mexico desire and will share the cost.

MAJOR POINTS LOPEZ MATEOS IS EXPECTED TO RAISE

1. Salinity Problem on Lower Colorado

The Mexican President wants a reaffirmation of President Kennedy's commitment "to reach a permanent and effective solution at the earliest possible time" of the salinity problem. We can agree but should avoid any commitment on timing. If Lopez Mateos raises the related problem of the groundwater recovery program at Yuma, we agree that the Boundary Commission should study the problem. Farmers in the lower Rio Grande Valley are seriously concerned about saline drainage discharged to the river by Mexico and want the Boundary Commission to achieve an early solution to this problem.

SECRET
Group 2
Exempted from automatic downgrading
By Robert M. Sayre ([illegible])

2. Bracero Program

The Mexican Government is privately seriously disturbed about the termination of this program. Congressional oppostion to it is strong and we cannot commit ourselves to continue the program. We are looking into the problem to see if anything can be done to help Mexico. One possibility is an expanded community development program in Mexico through private channels (P.L. 480 foodstuffs through U.S. voluntary agencies) if Mexico is interested.

3. Mexico's Concern about U.S. Trade Policies

Mexico is concerned about United States restrictions or threatened restrictions on textiles, lead, zinc and meat and other products and United States cotton policies which it claims hurt Mexican cotton exports to the world market. We recognize that we are natural markets for each other. We desire to expand trade, promote competition and develop markets. We want to maintain or expand the present level of access to each other's market but we would not be able to guarantee Mexico its present share of our market in each commodity or a share in increased consumption.

4. Chamizal Settlement

Lopez Mateos wants to be recorded in history as the man who returned the Mexican flag to the Chamizal. He wants a ceremony at the Presidential level at El Paso-Ciudad Juarez before December 1964 to symbolize the Chamizal settlement. We should only agree to consult later in the year on an appropriate ceremony and a possible date.

Drafted by: ARA:MEX:RMSayre	Cleared by: ARA - Mr. Mann Interior - Mr. Carr Mr. Lanning Labor - Mr. Goodwin Treasury - Mr. Giordano E - Mr. Johnson FE - Mr. Green L - Mr. Kearney

S/S-S Hawthorne Mills, Room 7239A, Ext. 6958

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 12/12/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10092
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE FILE, CODEWORD MATERIAL, VOL. 1, BOX 6
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/26/1963
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #28

ROUTING

TO	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS

FROM NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-082/93 B]

COPY 3 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

TOP SECRET

Cia- Codeword Mat.

11|26 28
2

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS CODE WORD MATERIAL

WARNING

This document contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code, Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798. The law prohibits its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person, as well as its use in any manner prejudicial to the safety or interest of the United States or for the benefit of any foreign government to the detriment of the United States.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

It is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC DOWNGRADING AND DECLASSIFICATION

TOP SECRET

BRAZILIAN AMBASSADOR ASSESSES JOHNSON ADMINISTRATION

FR WASHINGTON: BRAZILIAN EMBASSY 26 NOV 63
TO RIO DE JANEIRO: FOREIGN MINISTRY URGENT 825
(TWO-PART MESSAGE COMPLETE)
NR. 825.
CONFIDENTIAL.

THE PERSONALITY AND POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON, AS WELL AS THE CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BROUGHT HIM TO POWER, SEEM TO INDICATE THAT AMERICAN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICIES, UNDER THE NEW ADMINISTRATION, WILL PROBABLY ADHERE TO THE FOLLOWING BASIC DIRECTIVES:

1. IN THE SHORT RUN, AS A NATURAL RESULT OF THE MOMENTUM OF A STRONG ADMINISTRATION, SUCH AS THAT OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY, NO PROFOUND CHANGES ARE EXPECTED, ESPECIALLY IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY (PRESIDENT JOHNSON HAS ALREADY STATED THAT HE WILL FOLLOW THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY):

2. IN THE LONGER RUN, HOWEVER, ONE CAN FORESEE:

A) IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY, WITH THE PREDOMINANCE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT OVER THE WHITE HOUSE "STAFF" (WHICH REFLECTED THE STRONG

PERSONALITY OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND HIS MARKED INTEREST IN INTERNATIONAL POLICY), THERE PROBABLY WILL BE:

I) NO SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE FROM THE KENNEDY LINE IN RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION; THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL TEND TOWARD A WAIT-AND-SEE ATTITUDE;

II) IN THE FIELD OF RELATIONS WITH WESTERN EUROPE, OR MORE PRECISELY WITH FRANCE, A LESS RIGID ATTITUDE AND ONE OF GREATER ACCEPTANCE OF THE FRENCH POSITION, WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF MAINTAINING A UNITED WESTERN FRONT VIS-A-VIS THE POSSIBILITY OF A POLITICAL OFFENSIVE BY THE KREMLIN:

III) IN RELATIONS WITH LATIN AMERICA, THE INTERVIEW WHICH PRESIDENT JOHNSON WILL HAVE THIS AFTERNOON WITH THE FOREIGN MINISTER WILL CERTAINLY BE MORE ENLIGHTENING THAN ANY PREDICTION MADE AT THIS TIME;

B) IN THE FIELD OF DOMESTIC POLICY, THERE WILL POSSIBLY BE AN IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE WITHIN THE LINE OF "COMPROMISE"; THE NEW PRESIDENT, MUCH MORE THE CONSERVATIVE THAN THE INNOVATOR, WITH INTIMATE CONNECTIONS WITH THE CONGRESS, AND A SOUTHERNER, WILL HAVE MORE FACILITY IN GAINING APPROVAL OF THE

BIG BILLS ("CIVIL RIGHTS," "FISCAL REFORM," "MEDICAL AID," "AID TO THE AGED," ETC.) PRECISELY BECAUSE HE WILL ACCEPT MORE CONSERVATIVE FORMULAS OF COMPROMISE; THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WILL ALSO TEND TO BE MORE CONSERVATIVE WITH REGARD TO GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION IN THE ECONOMY; HOWEVER, RADICAL CHANGES CANNOT BE EXPECTED, SINCE JOHNSON WILL ALSO FACE THE PRESSURE OF THE MORE LIBERAL WING OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY, AND ANY MORE PRONOUNCED SPLIT WITHIN THE PARTY WOULD BE FATAL TO THE HOPES FOR VICTORY IN NEXT YEAR'S ELECTION.

ROBERTO CAMPOS

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10096
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE :	11/25/1963
PAGES :	11
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #3

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-083/93 B]

COPY 2 OF

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

3

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

25 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist forces kept up their high post-coup level of activity over the weekend.

b. The most significant action was an attack early yesterday morning against a US special forces training camp some 30 miles from Saigon.

c. When the smoke cleared after a sharp fight, four US soldiers were missing and at least 35 South Vietnamese were dead.

d. Late yesterday morning, the Viet Cong shot down two aircraft supporting a government operation in the extreme south, and damaged twelve more. Two more Americans are missing in this action.

e. Back in Saigon, the new regime's troubles with the ambitious General Ton That Dinh continue.

f. He is still angling to get control of the important strategic hamlet program and has yet to give up command of the Third Corps, which the generals assigned to another of their number earlier in the month. This corps is of particular significance in that it surrounds Saigon.


BURMA
CAMBODIA
South Vietnam
South China Sea
Manila
PHILIPPINES
THAILAND
MALAYSIA
BRUNEI
Sabah
Sarawak
MALAYSIA
Celebes Sea
Kuala Lumpur
SINGAPORE
RIAU ISLANDS
SUMATRA
BORNEO
CELEBES
INDONESIA
Java Sea
Djakarta
Banda Sea
JAVA
TIMOR
INDIAN OCEAN
AUSTRALIA
MALAYSIA
CONFIDENTIAL
0
MILES
1000
631124
34176

2. Indonesia-Malaysia

a. Sukarno is beefing up the subversive aspects of his confrontation campaign against Malaysia.

b. Intercepted Indonesian messages indicate that regular army units will shortly begin infiltration operations across the border into Sarawak and Sabah.

c. Seven thousand regular army troops in Indonesian Borneo, the messages show, are getting an intensified course in guerrilla tactics. This training is to be completed next month.

d. Other messages speak of the arrival, beginning today, of a battalion of regulars from West Java. (INTERCERPTS throughout)

3. Venezuela

a. The weekend was marred only by sporadic and minor acts of terrorism in several cities. Government security forces have the situation generally under control.

b. The Venezuelan Air Force is stepping up its efforts to track down and destroy intruder aircraft. The Venezuelans are convinced that planes have been ferrying supplies to pro-Castro guerrillas in the mountains of the northwest.

(Cont'd)


VENEZUELA
630919 5
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA (U.K.)
CARIBBEAN SEA
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
La Asunción
Carúpano
Caracas
Los Teques
Maracay
Valencia
San Felipe
Barcelona
Puerto La Cruz
Cumaná
Caripito
Maturín
Tucupita
El Tigre
Puerto Ordaz
El Calvario
San Juan de los Morros
San Carlos
Barquisimeto
Guanare
Barinas
Mérida
Trujillo
San Lorenzo
Encontrados
Cúcuta
Maracaibo
Cabimas
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
COLOMBIA
San Fernando de Apure
Puerto Ayacucho
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BRAZIL
BRAZIL
BR. GUIANA

c. The Betancourt government has scheduled a press conference tomorrow to break the story that a three-ton cache of Cuban arms has been unearthed. A formal accusation against Cuba is to be made before the Organization of American States a week from today.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. Iraq

a. The air of tension in Baghdad dissipated somewhat after the government lifted the curfew and once again permitted private vehicles on the streets.

b. Neither the city nor its new rulers are, however, at ease. Troops are still very much in evidence.

c. The new regime apparently is not convinced that the hard core of the Baath Party and its paramilitary supporters have been put down for good.

5. Syria

a. We have information that a showdown between the moderate and extremist factions of the ruling Baath Party in Syria is fast approaching.

(Cont'd)

b. A clandestine source identifies Prime Minister Hafiz as the leading figure on the side of moderation. General Umran heads the doctrinaire extremists.

c. It was a split along the same lines that brought about the Baath Party's fall from power in Iraq.

6. Italy

a. Premier-designate Moro expects that the program for a "center-left" coalition government will be approved today by the four parties involved.

b. Details of the foreign policy planks are not yet available, but they were drafted with the thought that the death of President Kennedy makes it more important for Italy to play an active role within the Western alliance.

c. After the program has been approved, the final selection of a cabinet can be undertaken. This could take the rest of the week.


JORDAN
IRAQ
KUWAIT
KUWAIT
NEUTRAL ZONE
CAIRO
U A R (EGYPT)
Aswan
Ras Banas
Yenbo
Medina
SAUDI ARABIA
RIYADH
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
RED SEA
Khamis Mushait
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Boundary undefined
SANA
Marib
Al Hudaydah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ADEN
ETHIOPIA
GULF OF ADEN
0 STATUTE MILES 400
630801 3
SAUDI ARABIA
Abha
Zahran
Najran
Qizan
Sadah
Major road
Other road or track
0 STATUTE MILES 100
UNCLASSIFIED
Harad
Maydi
Wadi al Jawf
Abs
Hajjah
Umran
KAMARAN (U.K.)
Raudha
Marib
SANA
Sirwah
Jihannah
Harib
Al Hudaydah
RED SEA
Ibb
Qatabah
Al Bayda
TAIZZ
Ad Dali
Mocha
ADEN PROTECTORATE
ETHIOPIA
FRENCH SOMALILAND
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN

YEMEN

7. UAR-Yemen-Egypt

a. The Saudis told our embassy in Jidda yesterday that a Saudi village near the Yemeni border was attacked Thursday by Egyptian aircraft.

b. It was the second time this month that Yemeni-based Egyptian aircraft have struck across the border into Saudi Arabia.

c. As in the previous cases, the Saudis have lodged a formal complaint with the UN Observation Mission.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

NOTES

A. **Oswald** Press stories to the effect that Lee Harvey Oswald recently visited Mexico City are true, according to our information. Oswald visited both the Cuban and the Soviet embassies on 28 September. He was trying, we are told, to arrange for visas so that he could travel to the USSR via Havana. He returned to the US on 3 October.

B. **Brazil** A new round of military promotions and reassignments will be made public today. The present instability of the Brazilian political scene is reflected in the numerous reports of coup plots which this event has precipitated.

C. **USSR** At last report the three Soviet range instrumentation ships were dead in the water 500 miles south of Johnston Island, roughly the same position they occupied for last year's extended range ICBM shots. No announcement closing this area of the Pacific to shipping has been made and there is no activity as yet at the Tyuratam missile test center, but we look for some action in the next few days. (INTERCEPTS)

D. **Algeria** We have a report from a good clandestine source that a group of army officers is plotting with Defense Minister Boumedienne to overthrow Ben Bella. A growing estrangement between the two has been apparent for some time, but this is the first good indication that Boumedienne is making common cause with those who wish to turn Ben Bella out of office.

(Cont'd)

E. Australia - Communist China Peiping has signed contracts for just over one million tons of Australian grain to be delivered early next year. We had been expecting the Chinese Communists to enter the market, since they had another mediocre grain crop this year. Peiping has been buying close to five million tons of grain for the past several years.

F. Congo We hear that the Soviet Embassy in Leopoldville had booked 75 places on a flight to Brussels last Saturday. There is still no information on whether any Soviet Embassy officials have actually departed, however.

G. Berlin There was no new harassment of Allied access routes to Berlin over the weekend. A total of 16 flares were fired last evening near Tempelhof Airfield, but we connect these with Communist efforts to prevent escapes from East Berlin. East German police were observed stringing barbed wire in the same area a short time later.

H. Laos The neutralists claim to have made significant gains in their limited offensive in the Vang Vieng area. They have not, however, been able to dislodge the Pathet Lao from positions within artillery range of the town's airport.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10097
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE :	11/26/1963
PAGES :	11
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #4

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-084/93B]

COPY 2 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

4

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Iraq-Syria

a. The shaky new accommodation between the two countries following the recent coup in Iraq has been threatened by Syria's action in granting asylum to Ali Saleh Saadi, the exiled leader of the extremist wing of the Iraqi Baath.

b. Saadi had arrived in Syria unannounced following a brief stay in Madrid. On Friday, Iraq sent a message asking Syria to expel him on grounds that sheltering him was a breach of agreement.

c. Both regimes continue to be troubled with internal dissension with affairs in one deeply tangled with those in the other.

d. In Syria, as we mentioned yesterday, the Baathist regime is split between moderates who desire a broadening of the government's power base, and a doctrinaire faction which wants to keep all control of the government in Baathist hands.

e. In Iraq, the pull is more away from the Baathists. Two ministers have threatened to resign unless the government adopts an openly pro-Egyptian policy. Nevertheless the government feels secure enough to ease up on curfew and transport restrictions imposed since the coup.

(Cont'd)


MEKONG
Luang Prabang
13
Nam Khan
Muong Khao
Muong Kheung
Ban Song Hoc
Lat Bouak
Ban Ban
7
PLATEAU DU TRAN NINH
Muong Soui
Nong Pet
Phou Keng
Khang Khay
Phong Savan
Nong Het
Phou Khoun
7
Muong Phanh
PLAINE DES JARRES
Dong Danh
Lat Houang
Xieng Khouang
NORTH VIETNAM
4
Muong Kassy
Ban Ta Viang
Tha Thom
Vang Vieng
Nam Ngum
L A O S
Ban Namone
Nam Lik
Nam Nhiep
Ban Hin Heup
13
Pak Sane
13
THAILAND
Nam Ngum
SECRET
LAOS
Area of main map
MEKONG
MEKONG
Road
Track or trail
VIENTIANE
THAILAND
Nong Khai
0
10
20
30
40
STATUTE MILES
34247
631125 2

f. Iraq has announced that the military union with Syria remains in force, and that a new commander of the joint armies will be announced soon.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Laos

a. Intercepted neutralist messages on Sunday reported that government forces had finally secured Vang Vieng and its airfield, long held by the Pathet Lao. They also told of the capture of Ban Namone farther south on Route 13.

b. The neutralist, rightist Lao Army, and Meo tribal guerrilla forces hope to sustain their coordinated clearing action until remaining Pathet Lao pockets in this area north of Vientiane are cleared.

c. Such operations in Laos have often been followed by a Communist riposte. We have a few indicators that something could be up on the Communist side, but these are so far very tenuous indeed.

d. One such indicator is a stand down in the last two weeks on the Hanoi-controlled military communications net in Laos which could

(Cont'd)

point to a change in the disposition or strength of Communist forces. Other enemy nets are normal.

e. There are also unconfirmed reports of North Vietnamese troop reinforcements in the Plaine des Jarres.
(INTERCEPTS)

3. South Vietnam

a. According to press reports, Viet Cong attacks on Sunday wiped out two of the government's strategic hamlets in the central highlands about 250 miles north of Saigon.

b. More than 1,000 inhabitants in the hamlets--who are minority tribesmen--are missing and possibly have fled into the mountains. They abandoned a significant quantity of weapons to the Viet Cong.

c. These attacks not only suggest continued erosion of the government's programs to win over tribal support, but also signal that stepped-up Viet Cong pressure against the new regime is spreading to the north.

(Cont'd)

22 OCTOBER 1963 ICBM FIRING FROM PLESETSK


PLESETSK
ICBM IMPACT AREA
TYURATAM ICBM TEST RANGEHEAD
U S S R
TOP SECRET DINAR
631027
ARCTIC OCEAN
BARENTS SEA
KARA SEA
LAPTEV SEA
EAST SIBERIAN SEA
BERING SEA
BLACK SEA
ARAL SEA
Lake Baikal
Lake Balkhash
MOSCOW
Archangel
Kotlas
Vologda
Vorkuta
Salekhard
Dikson
Noril'sk
Igarka
Verkhoyansk
Yakutsk
Magadan
Klyuchi
Petropavlovsk
Anadyr
Providenya
Sverdlovsk
Chelyabinsk
Omsk
Tomsk
Novosibirsk
Krasnoyarsk
Irkutsk
Ulan Ude
Chita
Komsomol'sk
Khabarovsk
Vladivostok
Kapustin Yar
Tyuratam
Kzyl Orda
Karaganda
Semipalatinsk
Tashkent
Frunze
Alma Ata
Samarkand
Bukhara
Dushanbe
Fergana
Leningrad
Kiev
Minsk
Odessa
Kazan'
Kuybyshev
Gor'kiy
Perm
Ufa
Orenburg
Kustanay
Tselinograd
Pavlodar
Barnaul
Kemerovo
Abakan
Kyzyl
Bratsk
Aldan
Khanty Mansiysk
MONGOLIA
CHINA
IRAN
AFGHANISTAN
PAKISTAN
TURKEY
FINLAND
SWEDEN
NORWAY
POLAND
ALASKA
JAPAN
KOREA
KABUL
RAWALPINDI
ULAN BATOR
TEHERAN
Arctic Circle
NAUTICAL MILES
Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government

32609 8-62

d. This Communist effort is aimed at discrediting the post-Diem regime before the new leadership is able to get its feet on the ground and capture the loyalty and respect of people in the provinces.

e. Although the Viet Cong still continues to draw its main strength from local recruiting, a steady stream of cadre and training personnel continues to make its way to the south from North Vietnam along the Laotian border.

f. We are now reasonably sure that at least 784 persons infiltrated from the north during 1963 and the actual total may be much higher.

4. USSR

a. There have been no further developments in Soviet preparations for a series of extended range ICBM shots to the Pacific.

b. We probably should have had by now an announcement closing an area roughly 500 miles south of Johnston Island to shipping. We suspect the Soviets may have delayed it in order not to appear to be rattling rockets immediately after President Kennedy's death.

(Cont'd)

c. The USSR may repeat last year's performance of multiple firings from a prototype operational complex at Tyuratam. Three such launchings were attempted at five-minute intervals in May 1963; two succeeded.

d. We also do not rule out the possibility of firings from operational sites as opposed to the test center at Tyuratam. We observed the first such firing on 22 October from the Plesetsk site, roughly 400 miles northeast of Moscow. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

5. USSR-Berlin

a. Embassy Bonn feels that the Soviet Union may be seeking at least a temporary modus vivendi on the autobahn without prejudicing its juridical position, which can be used to cause difficulties there in the future.

b. The embassy bases this on the Soviet replies to the Western notification to the USSR on 29 October regarding harmonized convoy procedures--two oral statements on 16 November and a note of 21 November.

(Cont'd)

c. The Soviet note was designed to make a record, showing that the USSR exercises "control" of the autobahn and that the recent incidents resulted from US refusal to comply with "existing procedures."

d. On the other hand, the Soviet procedures described in the oral replies seem to reflect actual Allied practices, though there is enough ambiguity to afford the USSR flexibility in any future actions.

6. Brazil

a. The danger of an immediate coup against the Goulart regime has receded with the reported decision of Second Army Commander General Bevilaqua not to join the coup plotters.

b. Bevilaqua, who has been something of a storm center, may have been asked to hand over his command today as part of a series of reassignments made by President Goulart to keep the military off balance.

c. On the other side of the coin, there is widespread belief that Goulart himself will at some time resort to a coup to establish an authoritarian regime.

(Cont'd)

d. As one example Raneiri Mazzilli, President of the Chamber of Deputies and next in line for the presidency, told Ambassador Gordon on Saturday that he profoundly mistrusts Goulart's intentions and intends to maintain the strictest congressional vigilance.

e. Our station in Brazil believes that Goulart is living in a dream world. He seems either out of touch with reality or very poorly informed. Public opinion is not with him and the tradition that political power should only be transferred constitutionally is very strong in the army, coup reports notwithstanding.

f. The biggest danger from this quarter is that the opposition may resort to some illegal act, giving Goulart the excuse to take over.

NOTES

A. Ethiopia-Congo Haile Selassie has acceded to our ambassador's request and is rescinding his earlier decision to withdraw the 1,743-man Ethiopian contingent from the UN force in the Congo.

B. Communist China - Africa The Guinean ambassador in Peiping has it unofficially that Premier Chou En-lai will leave in mid-December for a tour of some Afro-Asian countries. He is to stop first in Egypt and then visit several other African countries including Guinea, Ghana, and Mali. Chou would be the highest ranking Chinese leader ever to visit Africa. (INTERCEPTS)

C. Indonesia-Philippines Two good sources have reported that President Sukarno plans to go to Manila this Thursday to confer with Philippine President Macapagal. No reasons have been advanced for the visit. Our chargé guesses that it is an Indonesian move to head off Philippine recognition of Malaysia.

D. Venezuela The terrorists have struck again, this time firing six US-owned oil and gas pipelines near the northeastern city of Puerto la Cruz. The elections are still on for Sunday, and we look for a maximum effort from the pro-Castro terrorist organization.

E. Congo We now have word that 49 members of the Soviet Embassy, including dependents, left Leopoldville on Saturday aboard a Sabena flight for Brussels. They are expected to book onward passage for Moscow. It is reported that the Congolese will allow one Russian without diplomatic status to stay to look after Soviet property.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10098
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE :	11/27/1963
PAGES :	16
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #5

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-085/93 B]

COPY 2 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

______ ______ ______ ______

______ ______ ______ ______

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

5

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

27 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET


SECRET
HAVANA
ISLE OF PINES
Nipe Bay
U.S. Naval Base
CUBA
● SAM SITE
0
100
NAUTICAL MILES
63 11.26 6

1. Cuba

a. Cuban tents are now beginning to appear at a number of the SAM sites--further evidence that training of Cubans in operation of SAM equipment has begun as scheduled.

b. High-altitude photography taken this past weekend shows these tents at six SAM sites in western Cuba. These sites are in addition to those at which we noted the presence of Cuban interpreters as we reported on Saturday.

c. This training should be completed by next May or June.

d. Just before the training started, we noted a series of moves involving the relocation of eight of the SAM sites.

e. The purpose, it appears, was to shift the mission of the system from an area defense of the island as a whole to point defense of specific targets, particularly Havana. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

2. Syria-Iraq

a. Syrian leaders have acceded to pressure from Iraq and have expelled Iraqi Baathist extremist Ali Saadi. He has gone to Athens

PARTY STRENGTHS IN TURKISH ELECTIONS

(by % of total vote)



631125 C

b. This is an earnest of the desire of moderate Baathist leaders in Damascus to preserve workable relations with Iraq, partly as a counterbalance to Cairo and partly to preserve what remains of Baathist influence in Baghdad.

c. Intercepts show at least some Syrian troops will remain in Iraq at the request of Iraqi officials.

d. Preparations had been under way for these forces to withdraw; retention of at least some in Iraq is another sign that both regimes hope to preserve something of the relations they once had. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Turkey

a. Prime Minister Inonu's coalition government is about to collapse.

b. It has long been shaky. Last week it was dealt a severe setback when the opposition Justice Party, heir of the Menderes regime, emerged from local elections as the country's majority party.

(Cont'd)

MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AGRICULTURE



1963-? Fertilizer program.

1963 Wheat purchases.

1962-63 Program to plow up and plant fallow lands.

1962 Livestock product prices raised.

1961-62 Administrative reorganizations.

1958 Machine-tractor stations abolished.

1957-58 Program to "catch up" with US in meat and milk output.

1955-56 Corn program.

1954-56 New Lands program.

1953-55 Procurement prices raised.

SOVIET GRAIN PRODUCTION

(million metric tons)

	ALL GRAINS		WHEAT ALONE	
	Soviet Official	US Estimate	Soviet Official	US Estimate
1958	141	125	77	63
1959	126	100	69	55
1960	134	100	64	46
1961	137	115	67	55
1962	148	115	71	57
1963	---	100-110	--	42-46

631021 2B

CONFIDENTIAL

c. Now the Peasant Party, one of the three in the coalition, has voted to pull out, and probably will do so as soon as Inonu gets back from Washington. Another partner, the Turkey Party, has wanted to pull out, and apparently has stayed in only because of pressure from the military.

d. A new coalition is at least a theoretical possibility, with a number of independents taking the place of the Peasant Party, but Inonu probably would not be prime minister.

e. The military are working for an all-party coalition. This way, they feel, they could keep tabs on the Justice Party, but the Justice Party is not likely to buy this arrangement.

f. As matters now stand, the military would take over the government itself before it would let the Justice Party form one.

4. USSR wheat

a. Soviet President Brezhnev has told the Iranian prime minister that the decision to buy wheat abroad was taken to avoid lowering reserves, which he has described as ample for one or two years. We think the situation is more serious than that.

(Cont'd)

b. This year's harvest was clearly very bad. The weight of evidence suggests that Soviet grain stockpiles have been far drawn down this year and are not sufficient to protect the country from another poor harvest.

c. Our estimate is that total grain production each year since 1958 has been well below that year's level of 125 million tons, while the population has continued to grow.

d. We have seen from intercepts signs of extensive slaughtering in anticipation of fodder shortages during the winter. This runs counter to Khrushchev's oft-stated plan to build up the livestock industry.

e. We have also noted that the extensive wheat purchases weaken the USSR's gold reserves at a time when it hopes to expand its imports of machinery for a huge chemical fertilizer program.

f. In addition, we have seen signs of stringent measures to protect the grain supply, accompanied by public discontent in some areas over the absence of bread.

(Cont'd)

5. Communist China - Argentina

a. Peiping last week contracted for some 300,000 tons of wheat (cost about $20,000,000) from Argentina.

b. This adds to the 1,000,000 tons just contracted for with Australia, but is still far below the 5,000,000 tons the Chinese have normally imported in recent years. Additional suppliers will be hard to find.

c. A large sale, apparently involving some $56,000,000 worth of meat, is apparently also being arranged. This is interesting, not only for the sizeable foreign exchange outlay, but also for the concern it shows for improving the diet of the mainland's urban population.

d. The same caloric value could be obtained from grains at a fraction of this cost. (INTERCEPTS throughout)

6. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President and party boss Novotny has gone to Moscow, evidently for economic talks, judging by the composition of his delegation.

b. Novotny's background of Stalinist excesses have put him on the wrong side of Khrushchev. They also have given rise to control problems, particularly in the fractious Slovak party where pressures for liberalization have made their mark.

c. Party problems and Novotny's leadership may thus also come under review.

d. A curious sign of the times is the fact that, although President Novotny is in Moscow, the presidential flag has remained up at the official residence. It might simply have been an oversight, but the symbolism will not be lost to the people in Prague.

7. Cambodia

a. Cambodia, as expected, has asked the Geneva co-chairman to call the Geneva conference participants together (in Djakarta) to discuss measures "to ensure the internationally guaranteed and controlled neutralization of Cambodia."

(Cont'd)


Khamis Moshait
SAUDI ARABIA
Majonna
Husainiya
W. Najran
Qab
Salwa
Dhahran
Rijlal
DEMILITARIZED ZONE
Masliya
Sabya
Qizan
Al Muwassam
Maydi
Sa'dah
Suq Anan
Sh. Nil
Sharaf Kharab
Malaha
Washha
Hamir
Raydah
Qidar
Hajjah
Zuhrah
KAMARAN
(U.K.)
Salif
Rawdah
Marib
Sirwah
Jihannah
SANA
San'a
Jum'ah
Harib
Manakha
YEMEN
Bayhan
Al Hudaydah
Beihan al Qasab
RED
SEA
Bal Faqih
Dhamar
Zabid
Mocha
Rijah
Lahej
ADEN
GULF OF ADEN
Fajarah
ETHIOPIA
FR.
SOM.
0
25
50 MILES
SYRIA
LEB.
JORDAN
IRAQ
Cairo
U.A.R.
(EGYPT)
Ras Banas
SAUDI
Riyadh
Red
Sea
Jidda
Mecca
Taif
ARABIA
SUDAN
Khartoum
Sana
YEMEN
ADEN P.
SOM.
ETHIOPIA
Addis Ababa

13 SEPTEMBER 1963

33905

b. Last year when this came up, the French were inclined to go along with some such idea.

c. They have indicated to us that they still feel Sihanouk should not be turned down, and Sihanouk is obviously hopeful that they will exert pressure on us and the British.

d. Sihanouk seems to be hoping for at least a rump session attended by conferees who are willing to do his bidding.

8. Egypt-Yemen

a. An Egyptain military message reporting to Cairo on operations in Yemen this past weekend indicated that poison gas (referred to as "ghurab" in Egyptian military traffic) was used against royalist tribesmen in the northwest.

b. This is the first time we have noted its employment since last summer, although another intercept shows that the Egyptian command has continued to authorize its use.

(Cont'd)

c. It is basically a tear gas, but in such highly concentrated form that it has caused the death of a number of Yemenis.
(INTERCEPTS throughout)

9. Congo

a. Opposition leftist Congolese exiles, operating from Brazzaville across the river, are reported to be plotting to assassinate Congolese Premier Adoula and some of his ministers.

b. It is supposed to happen sometime after 8 December.

c. Meanwhile, agents are being infiltrated with money to buy off opposition to a takeover immediately thereafter by radical nationalist Gbenye.

d. Adoula's government already knows that this group of left-wing subversives, which now numbers about 50, is being helped by the Communist bloc.

e. It operates fairly freely in the loose circumstances which now obtain in Brazzaville. Its activities may soon become a serious source of friction between the two countries.

NOTES

A. South Korea With 85 percent of the vote in, Pak Chong-hui's Democratic Republican Party has already won an absolute majority in the National Assembly elections held yesterday.

B. Venezuela The country's three major presidential candidates were the targets of unsuccessful assassination attempts yesterday as Communist-led terrorists moved into the final week of desperate attempt to wreck next Sunday's elections. A US Embassy official was also the intended recipient of a "Christmas package" containing a bomb. Yesterday a US rubber warehouse was set afire and destroyed by terrorists.

C. Indonesia-Philippines We have what is about as sure a sign as we can get that Sukarno will be going to Manila as reported yesterday. A reliable source tells us Sukarno has sent advance word to two of his favorite Philippine girl friends that he will be arriving on 28 November.

D. Indonesia-Malaysia Indonesian-inspired press reports yesterday claimed a British military plane was shot down near the North Borneo border. British Intelligence tells us the story is concocted; no aircraft are reported missing.

E. Cuba The alert in the Cuban military which we noted immediately after President Kennedy's death has been lifted. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

F. Cambodia Cambodia is cutting its diplomatic representation abroad to a bare minimum as an austerity measure following curtailment of US aid. Sihanouk announced last week that this would be done, saying that missions in Communist countries would not be affected since those countries "protect" Cambodia. Curiously enough, among the missions being closed down are those in New Delhi and Rangoon. (Includes (INTERCEPTS)

G. USSR-US Pravda this morning reports on Gromyko's talks with President Johnson, giving top play to Senator Fulbright's remarks about the desirability of a meeting between the President and Khrushchev.

DOCUMENTS OF INTEREST

I. De Gaulle on NATO strategy.

II. Common Market official appraises President Johnson. (Sensitive INTERCEPT)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY : LBJ
RECORD NUMBER : 177-10002-10101

RECORD SERIES : NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

DATE : 11/28/1963
PAGES : 14

SUBJECTS :
INTELLIGENCE REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 12/12/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : DOC. #6

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-088/93 B]

COPY 2 OF

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

6

✓

President
Read
during Briefing
by McCone
BKS

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

28 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET


VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
34168 10-63
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO
(Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA
(U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
of Spain
COLOMBIA
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
Amuay
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
Ule
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
ZULIA
CARACAS
La Guaira
Valencia
Maracay
Carupano
Mene Grande
Quiriquire
Maturín
Tucupita
Cucuta
Ciudad Bolívar
Río Orinoco
Río Apure
Río Arauca
Río Meta
Río Caroní
Río Caura
Río Negro
Río Uraricoera
Río Branco
BRITISH GUIANA
BR. GUIANA
BRAZIL
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2

1. Venezuela

a. The country's six presidential candidates have swung into the home stretch of their campaigns. So have the terrorists, who are still trying hard to sabotage next Sunday's vote.

b. There is little doubt that the terrorist effort has all-out Cuban support. Castro looks on Venezuela as his prime target in Latin America and would do everything in his power to prevent President Betancourt from finishing his term.

c. So far, the terrorists have tried to intimidate the candidates by harassing political rallies, bombing their party headquarters in various cities, and threatening them with assassination. They have tried to scare voters from the polls by creating a general atmosphere of lawlessness. Kidnappings, like the one yesterday morning of Colonel Chenault, are part of the pattern.

d. The government counterattack is under the personal direction of Betancourt, who is as determined to finish out his term and turn over power to a freely-elected successor as Castro is to prevent this.

(Cont'd)

e. Yesterday it was announced that the carrying of firearms by anyone outside the security forces was forbidden until the elections are over.

f. Some 3,000 reservists have been called up to protect the polls. Leaves are being cancelled and all security forces are maintaining a high state of alert.

2. South Vietnam

a. We now have a fuller account from official US sources of the Viet Cong attack on two mountain villages mentioned in Tuesday's Checklist.

b. This account makes it clear that the earlier press versions, which spoke of 1,000 missing villagers, were highly colored.

c. Our present information is that the attack, in company strength, was successfully repulsed. The Viet Cong suffered some 30 casualties; government losses were six killed, three wounded and 39 missing.

(Cont'd)

d. As is usual in these cases, the villagers began to trickle back once the Viet Cong left.

e. This episode aside, we see a number of indications that the Communists will try to sustain the higher level of military activity they have kept up since the coup.

f. The Communist radio has called for more attacks in an effort to destroy strategic hamlets and "develop" Viet Cong forces. In support of this, Viet Cong communications traffic has been unusually heavy and has involved a large volume of high priority traffic and special alert patterns. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

3. Israel

a. We have some reason to believe that the Israelis are developing a surface-to-surface missile of their own.

b. A reliable clandestine source says that an Israeli representative is trying to buy US stable platforms for the inertial guidance system of a missile with a range of 300-350 miles. He wanted delivery in six to twelve months. There have been several earlier reports that

(Cont'd)

Israel is buying missile components in the US and England.

c. We think this missile program is independent of another Israeli venture: Tel Aviv's contract with a French firm, Marcel Dassault, for the development of a system which will be able to deliver a 1,600-pound warhead to a maximum range of 300 miles.

4. USSR-India

a. Moscow has promised the Indians to ship the equipment for one surface-to-air (SAM) training site early next month.

b. The Soviets had agreed to provide eight SAM sites. The rest will probably not be sent until the Indians have learned to handle the equipment about a year from now.

c. As we noted last Sunday, there are some Indians who have doubts about the Soviet willingness to live up to the letter of their military aid agreements with New Delhi.

(Cont'd)

d. They call into question especially the contract for the Soviets to set up in India a facility to assemble MIG fighters--an enterprise which has appeared somewhat impractical from the beginning.

e. We do note, however, that Soviet aircraft specialists working on the project were still in New Delhi in early November. (INTERCEPTS)

5. Burma

a. Ne Win has followed up his action in breaking off talks with the Burmese Communists by arresting over 700 of their number.

b. Ne Win had been trying to lure the faction-ridden Communists into a "national front." However, he found the demands of the Communist negotiators, some of whom had only just returned from long exile in Peiping, to be impossible.

c. This will probably lead to renewed fighting between the army and Communist guerrillas in the hills.

d. More trouble can also be expected from the rebellious ethnic minorities like the Karens and the

(Cont'd)


South Vietnam
NORTH VIETNAM
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
VIETNAM
CAMB.
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
LAOS
THAILAND
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Mekong
PHNOM PENH
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
Quang Ngai
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
Phuoc Vinh
SAIGON
Phan Thiet
SOUTH CHINA SEA
Chau Phu
Cho Lon
My Tho
Vung Tau
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
0 STATUTE MILES 150
34235

Kachins, whose demands for greater autonomy have been rejected in Rangoon.

e. US officials on the spot doubt that the army, hobbled by poor leadership and its many political responsibilities, will be any more effective in dealing with the problem this time than in past anti-insurgency campaigns.

6. Cambodia

a. Sihanouk has signed an accord setting up regular air service between Cambodia and Communist China. A similar agreement with Hanoi is in the works.

b. These lines are significant largely as gestures by Peiping and Hanoi to bolster Sihanouk's sense of importance. Neither would be a paying proposition commercially and both could flounder before the first paying passenger enplanes unless rights to overfly Laos can be obtained. (Includes INTERCEPTS)

7. Greece

a. It looks more and more as if Papandreou, who squeaked through to a narrow upset victory over ex-premier Karamanlis in the 3 November elections, will not be able to form a government.

(Cont'd)

b. His party does not have a parliamentary majority, so he needs support from either Karamanlis' party on the right or from the Communists. The military has apparently been pressing Karamanlis to withhold that support. He does not need much urging.

c. The military has also let it be known that it would consider Papandreou's acceptance of Communist support as sufficient reason for a coup d'etat.

d. In addition to this military string-pulling, the royal family is also meddling--not for the first time. Should Papandreou fail to form a government, the palace intends to pass the mandate to Karamanlis, believing that he too would fail.

e. This would then open the way, the palace calculates, for a compromise premier more amenable to palace influence.

8. Brazil

a. President Goulart and his opponents are keeping political tensions in Brazil high.

(Cont'd)

b. Comments by Goulart, that "social disaster" is sure if his program is not passed soon, have drawn sharp rejoinders from moderate and conservative figures and have fed rightist coup plotting.

c. Strains are also growing in the military following the arrest of a young officer who refused last month to execute an order to arrest Governor Lacerda, a leading conservative spokesman and likely presidential candidate.

NOTES

A. USSR Simultaneous activity this morning on the Tyuratam missile test range, satellite tracking nets and Soviet space support ships in the Atlantic probably represented an attempt to launch an unmanned earth satellite. The launch apparently failed on the pad or was cancelled at the last moment. It may be tried again soon. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Rumania-US Rumanian officials are about to award a US firm, Ferguson and Company of Cleveland, Ohio, a $32 million contract to help build the huge Galati steel plant. The Rumanians are pressing ahead with this project in the face of Soviet efforts to discourage it in various ways, most importantly by refusing to underwrite the scheme to any substantial degree.

C. Turkey The New Turkey Party has followed the Peasant Party in withdrawing from the present three-party coalition government. This means that the coalition has to all intents and purposes collapsed, even though no formal action will be taken until Prime Minister Inonu returns from Washington this weekend.

D. Thailand The Thai doctors attending Sarit now admit for the first time that the Prime Minister is in critical condition. Our doctor agrees with this prognosis. US officials in Bangkok believe that the most likely successor would be Thanom Kittikachorn, now deputy prime minister and minister of defense. Thanom is not likely to last long, however, since he is neither a strong personality nor a figure of great weight in the military hierarchy.

(Cont'd)


MELILLA
TUNISIA
MOROCCO
ALGERIA
LIBYA
UAR
(EGYPT)
SPANISH SAHARA
MAURITANIA
MALI
NIGER
CHAD
SUDAN
GAMBIA
SENEGAL
PORT. GUINEA
GUINEA
UPPER VOLTA
DAHOMEY
NIGERIA
SIERRA LEONE
LIBERIA
IVORY COAST
TOGO
GHANA
FR. SOMAL.
ETHIOPIA
SOMALI REPUBLIC
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC
CAMEROON
RIO MUNI
GABON
CONGO
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
UGANDA
KENYA
RUDOLF
VICTORIA
RWANDA
BURUNDI
RWANDA BURUNDI
ZANZIBAR
TANGANYIKA
L. TANGANYIKA
CABINDA
ANGOLA
NYASA
FED. OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND
MOZAMBIQUE
MALAGASY REPUBLIC
SOUTH-WEST AFRICA
BECHUANALAND
SWAZILAND
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
BASUTOLAND

E. Indonesia-Philippines A Philippine foreign office man states that everything was set, as we noted yesterday, for Sukarno to visit Manila today. This official says, however, that the visit was postponed as a result of Macapagal's decision to attend President Kennedy's funeral.

F. Indonesia Djakarta is giving every indication that it will hold up final action on the long-pending oil contracts with US companies in an attempt to smoke us out on the question of US aid policy toward Indonesia.

G. Rwanda-Burundi Tribal refugees from Rwanda, now in Burundi, seem bent on making trouble between the two countries. Some 3,000 of their number were reported yesterday to be moving toward the frontier. They have little military capability, but blood could flow and require UN intervention.

H. USSR-Congo As a further token of the withdrawal of Soviet diplomats we have noted that the Soviet diplomatic communications link between Moscow and Leopoldville was shut down last Saturday. (INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10102
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE :	11/30/1963
PAGES :	11
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #8

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

	ACTION		DIRECT REPLY		PREPARE REPLY
	APPROVAL		DISPATCH		RECOMMENDATION
	COMMENT		FILE		RETURN
	CONCURRENCE		INFORMATION		SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-089/93 B]

COPY 2 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

Ret'd from
Mrs Roberts
12/10/63

8

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

30 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. Venezuela

a. Election campaigning ended at midnight, but boosters for the several candidates continued to mill about streets of Caracas in defiance of terrorist threats to shoot anyone who ventured out for the next three days.

b. The terrorists, it seems, were all but drowned out by the carnival air.

c. The FALN, meanwhile, is trying to bargain off Colonel Chenault for as high a price as it can, demanding variously release of all its comrades, of all women detained by the government, and of the six hijackers who have been returned from Trinidad to custody in Venezuela.

2. Sino-Soviet dispute

a. The Chinese Communists will have nothing to do with the idea of bilateral talks with the Soviets under present circumstances.

b. Chinese party Secretary General Teng Hsiao-ping, one of the select few in Peiping's ruling circle, recently told a group of visiting Latin Americans that such a meeting could accomplish nothing.

(Cont'd)

c. Teng put the issue of another meeting of world Communist parties even deeper into limbo by saying that Peiping would be in favor only when assured of the support of a majority of the world parties.

d. Moscow, for its part, has apparently stopped thinking about another gathering of world Communist party representatives.

e. The feelers it put out after the conclusion of the test-ban treaty were received coldly by some of the fraternal parties. They felt such a meeting could only make matters worse with the Chinese.

f. Indeed, Peiping saw this to be Moscow's purpose, and when the idea failed to take hold, the Chinese took it to be a setback for Khrushchev personally.

g. Their reaction to Khrushchev's subsequent call for a cessation of open argument was to press the offensive, and this they have been doing in roundly abusive terms since.

(Cont'd)


TOP SECRET DINAR
6 SEPTEMBER 1963
33881
Area of Main Map
USSR
Sea of Okhotsk
Bering Sea
Komsomolsk
CHINA
Tatar Strait
Vladivostok
JAPAN
KAMCHATKA PENINSULA
Klyuchi Impact Area
BERING SEA
SEA OF OKHOTSK
250 NM
Second Track
Launch Position 8 April
KOMANDORSKIYE IS.
285 NM
First Track
Impact Point
Petropavlovsk
Approximate Launch Positions - 27 June & 27 August
Ballistic Missile Submarines in the Petropavlovsk area
6 "G"-Class
3 "Z"-Conversions
56
52
60
152
156
160
164
168

Submarine Ballistic Missile Launches in the Soviet Far East



"G"-Class Submarine

h. The forthcoming Afro-Asian visits by Chou En-lai and Chen Yi have awakened suspicions that the Chinese are in hot pursuit of a second Bandung-type conference--a more rewarding enterprise from their point of view.

3. USSR

a. Yesterday and on Thursday, we detected what we believe to have been operational training launches of standard 350 nautical mile submarine-based ballistic missiles.

b. Two and possibly four missiles were fired from submarines based in the Petropavlovsk area to the impact area at Klyuchi.

c. Seven similar instances have been detected previously this year, and there may have been others. (INTERCEPTS)

4. Kenya - Communist Bloc

a. The Soviet Bloc will soon gain an important propaganda outlet in Nairobi, communications hub for East Africa.

b. Plans are for a state-controlled news agency to be set up by the Kenyan government when it

(Cont'd)

achieves independence on 12 December. This will fall under the jurisdiction of communications minister Oneko, who has well developed contacts within the Soviet Bloc.

c. TASS has already agreed to equip the new agency, and Kenyan requests for further financial and techincal help are being discussed in Prague and Moscow.

d. Kenyan journalists have been training in Prague and, on return, will find ready employment in the new agency.

5. Czechoslovakia-USSR

a. Czech President Novotny returned from Moscow on Thursday after signing a renewal (for another 20 years) of the treaty of friendship and mutual assistance.

b. He apparently got little else out of Khrushchev. The final communique was conspicuously cool.

c. There were no Soviet concessions, nor were there the usual references to Czech "progress" or to public support for Novotny's leadership.

6. South Vietnam

a. The first suicide by burning to occur under the new regime was witnessed today by bystanders at a crowded intersection in Saigon where a young girl went up in flames.

b. A note she left behind said she was protesting the war of Vietnamese against Vietnamese. At the intersection are three villas which house the ICC delegations.

c. There were no Buddhist overtones.

d. Some think the Viet Cong encouraged her, but if they did, they did not write her script. They would have said it is the Americans who are fighting the Vietnamese.


South Vietnam
ARMY CORPS BOUNDARIES
CHINA
BURMA
LAOS
THAI.
VIETNAM
CAMB.
PHILIPPINES
MALAYA
SARAWAK
INDONESIA
NORTH VIETNAM
Quang Tri
Hue
Da Nang
Quang Nam
I Corps
LAOS
Quang Ngai
THAILAND
II Corps
Kontum
Pleiku
An Khe
Qui Nhon
Song Cau
Cheo Reo
Tuy Hoa
CAMBODIA
TONLE SAP
Ban Me Thuot
Nha Trang
III Corps
Da Lat
Loc Ninh
Tay Ninh
Phan Rang
PHNOM PENH
Mekong
Phuoc Vinh
SOUTH
Phan Thiet
CHINA SEA
Chau Phu
SAIGON
Cho Lon
Capital Military District
My Tho
Vung Tau
IV Corps
Isle de Phu Quoc
Rach Gia
Can Tho
GULF OF SIAM
Quan Long (Ca Mau)
Bac Lieu
SECRET
0
STATUTE MILES
150
33752

NOTES

A. **South Vietnam** Plans are now afoot to shuffle South Vietnam's Corps commanders so that General Khanh, considered by General Harkins to be the best of the lot, will take over in the crucial delta (IV Corps) area. General Dinh, the ambitious Minister of Security, is still resisting pressure to relinquish command of the III Corps area, and is not involved in the current shuffle.

B. **Cuba-USSR** There are about 8,000 Soviets in Cuba, 5,000 of these military, according to a bloc official in close touch with Soviets in Havana. The figures are close to our own estimate of 4,000 to 7,000. Some withdrawals continue.

C. **Cambodia-Vietnam** Sihanouk seems to feel that cutting off his nose to spite his face was not enough. Now he says he will formally recognize North Vietnam if the US does not silence the Khmer Serei radio. South Vietnam will cut Cambodia's primary access to international markets via the Mekong river if he does. (INTERCEPT)

D. **Indonesia-Cambodia** Sukarno apparently plans to go to Cambodia on an official visit following his trip to Manila. The Cambodian ambassador in Djakarta has advised Phnom Penh that Sukarno plans to leave for Manila on 6 December and directly from there for Phnom Penh on the 10th. He will stay three days. (INTERCEPT)

(Cont'd)

E. Coal and Steel Community Coal and Steel community members at their next meeting on Monday will probably vote to raise community steel tariffs by an average of nine percent. This would bring the tariffs of each member into line with Italy's, the highest in the community. Only the Dutch oppose the idea.

F. British Guiana - Cuba GIMPEX, trading arm and source of funds for Jagan's party, has worked out a deal to supply the country's major electric utility next year with fuel oil from Cuba. Texaco and Esso have been the traditional suppliers.

G. Brazil-US A press report from Rio cites "well informed sources" to the effect that Goulart plans soon to invite Mrs. Kennedy to visit Brazil so that Brazil can pay her the honors which it had planned to render the late President.

H. Cuba-Morocco A three-man Cuban delegation is on its way to Morocco to try to patch up relations broken by Morocco because of Cuba's assistance to the Algerians in their border war. (INTERCEPTS)

DOCUMENT OF INTEREST

The effect in France of the President's death.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10103
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, INTELLIGENCE BRIEFINGS, 11/23/63-12/5/63, BOX 1
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST
DATE :	11/23/1963
PAGES :	15
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/12/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #1

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

ROUTING

TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback / LBJ Library	1/14/15

CONTROL NO. [SC-NLJ-063/95 B]

COPY 2 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to those approved for the following specific activities:

______ ______ ______ ______

______ ______ ______ ______

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET
(Security Classification)

1

THE PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE CHECKLIST

ISSUED BY THE
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

23 NOVEMBER 1963
TOP SECRET

1. South Vietnam

a. Vietnamese Communist efforts to discredit the new Saigon regime stayed in high gear this week.

b. The number of armed attacks was off from the high of the previous week but still some 50% above the year's weekly average.

c. These attacks have been, for the most part, small-scale efforts directed against the government's paramilitary forces in the villages. They have been designed more for their psychological impact than for immediate military gain.

d. A high volume of messages on Viet Cong military and political communications nets indicates a probable continuation of this effort.

e. The new government is responding by stepping up its own military operations. It is also setting about the hard job of revamping the Diem government apparatus and harnessing broader popular support for the war effort.

f. The generals have been dealing fairly effectively with

(Cont'd)


VENEZUELA
Selected railroad
0 50 100 200 Miles
0 50 100 200 Kilometers
630730
CARIBBEAN SEA
CURAÇAO (Neth.)
BONAIRE
GRENADA (U.K.)
TOBAGO
TRINIDAD
Port of Spain
COLOMBIA
BRITISH GUIANA
BRAZIL
GOLFO DE VENEZUELA
LAGO DE MARACAIBO
Amuay
El Cardón
Coro
Maracaibo
Cabimas
San Lorenzo
Trujillo
Encontrados
Mérida
Barinas
Guanare
Barquisimeto
San Felipe
Valencia
Maracay
CARACAS
Los Teques
San Carlos
San Juan de los Morros
El Calvario
Barcelona
La Asunción
Carúpano
Cumaná
Caripito
Maturín
El Tigre
Tucupita
Puerto Ordaz
Cúcuta
San Fernando de Apure
Puerto Ayacucho
Río Apure
Río Arauca
Río Meta
Río Orinoco
Río Caura
Río Caroní
Río Uraricoera
Río Negro
Río Branco
72
70
68
66
64
62
60
12
10
8
6
4
2

their new responsibilities. There are, however, a few signs of dissension within this group and between it and civilian politicians.

g. One of the more ambitious and troublesome figures is the able but opportunistic General Ton That Dinh, the new Minister of Security. He has been travelling about the country spreading the idea that the coup was largely his doing and seems bent on developing his own independent base of power. He is a man to watch.

h. The new regime has also embarked on a purge of high military officers who sided with Diem during the Buddhist crisis and failed to get on the right side soon enough. (INTERCEPTS)

2. Venezuela

a. The death toll from the terrorist outburst in Caracas last Tuesday and Wednesday now stands at about 30.

b. This is the high water mark thus far in the campaign of the Castro-supported Communist extremists to disrupt the national elections a week from tomorrow.

(Cont'd)

c. The Betancourt government has struck back hard. Its new unified command over the security forces, set up at US urging, passed this initial test with flying colors.

d. At least 500 extremists were arrested and the round-up is still going on. Their removal will hamper the Communist drive against elections in major cities like Caracas.

e. We now expect the elections to be held on schedule, a considerable achievement under the circumstances. The elections will be followed, however, by a Communist effort to prevent the March inauguration of the victor.

f. The rub here is that none of the presidential candidates commands President Betancourt's considerable assets for dealing successfully with the harsh realities of Venezuelan politics. The constitution prevents Betancourt from succeeding himself.

g. In the background, as always, looms the military, which could intervene if the president-elect shows signs of being soft on communism.



CUBA

Surface-to-Air Missile (SAM) Sites

HAVANA
HAVANA EAST
Mariel
Artemisa
Santiago de las Vegas
Remedios
SAN JULIAN
(Training site)
Isle of Pines
Holguin
Santiago de Cuba
U.S. Naval Base
▲ New site
● Unchanged site
Estimated range
0
50
100
NAUTICAL MILES

34095

11 OCTOBER 1963

SECRET

3. USSR-Cuba

a. In the past week we intercepted Cuban military messages which show that Cuban interpreters are now posted at several surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites on the island.

b. We think this means that on-site training of Cubans has begun on schedule. Field training is to last six months, after which the SAM system may be turned over to Castro.

c. In the past month some 1,500 Soviets arrived in Cuba. Most of these were probably SAM experts, sent to monitor the training.

d. Prior to their coming, we had detected no more than a few hundred Soviet military personnel entering Cuba since the October crisis last year.

e. We estimate that at least 15,000, and probably closer to 18,000, have been withdrawn in the intervening 13 months, leaving, very roughly, 4,000 to 7,000. Those remaining are for the most part advisors whose main functions are to train and supervise Cubans in the use of weapons turned over to them.

(Cont'd)

COMMUNICATION ROUTES BETWEEN WEST GERMANY AND BERLIN


Kiel
Stralsund
Hamburg
Buechen
Schwanheide
Lauenburg
Horst
Prenzlau
Neuruppin
Bremen
SOVIET
POLAND
Wittenberge
Liebenwalde
Havel
Wriezen
Limit of Polish Administration
Stendal
Rathenow
WEST BERLIN
EAST BERLIN
Mittelland Canal
Vorsfelde
Oebisfelde
Hannover
Helmstedt
Marienborn
ZONE
Magdeburg
Jueterbog
Cottbus
Dessau
Elbe
FEDERAL
Walkenried
Ellrich
Halle
Kassel
REPUBLIC
Herleshausen
Wartha
Hoenebach
Gerstungen
OF GERMANY
Probstzella
Juchhoeh
Ludwigstadt
Gutenfuerst
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
Frankfurt
Toepen
Hof
Main
Railroad
Autobahn
Road
Canal
Air Corridor
Control Points for Allied Traffic:
▲ Soviet
▲ Allied
Interzonal Border Crossing Points:
△ East
△ West
STATUTE MILES
0
KILOMETERS
100
32166

UNCLASSIFIED

Boundaries are not necessarily those

f. All Soviet weapons introduced into Cuba last year have been withdrawn or turned over to the Cubans. The only significant exception is the SAM system.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

4. Berlin

a. We have had an indication that Soviet harassment of Allied access routes to West Berlin will shift this weekend to the air corridors.

b. The Soviet man at the Berlin air traffic control center told the Allied representatives yesterday that Soviet transports would be using the air corridors for brief flights during the next five weekends.

c. Moscow has tried on a number of past occasions to assert its right to restrict Allied use of the air corridors. In early 1962, the Soviets attempted to reserve "blocks" of air space for their own use. They have since demanded that Western flights stay between stipulated altitudes, that we file flight plans in advance and provide prior notice of border-crossing times.

(Cont'd)

d. This sort of harassment stopped in the spring of 1962 when Soviet leaders became convinced that the US was interested in a serious discussion of a Berlin settlement. Moscow may hope that the threat of more of this sort of harassment will jog the US into talks on Berlin.

5. Iraq-Syria-UAR

a. It now appears that President Arif's role in last Monday's coup in Baghdad may have been virtually that of a bystander.

b. According to our latest information, Arif was wakened early that morning and given five minutes to join up. Tahir Yahya, now prime minister, was reportedly the organizer.

c. Whatever Arif's role may have been, the coup was primarily an effort by the Iraqi Army to curtail the activities of the extreme wing of the Baath Party. The Baath is an Arab nationalist political organization, active throughout the Arab world, which has been ruling Iraq and Syria.

(Cont'd)

d. The coup group has not thrown all Baathists out of the government; there are party members in the new cabinet.

e. Syrian Baathists have welcomed this retention of their Iraqi brothers. Their attitude springs from the recognition that the Baath in Syria cannot stay afloat without support from Iraq. Even so, we hear talk of coup plotting in Damascus.

f. The reaction of Nasir's Egypt, which passionately desires to see the Baath go under, has been exactly the opposite. Cairo has been backing off its all-out support for the coup ever since the new cabinet was announced.
(Includes INTERCEPTS)

SOVIET EXTENDED RANGE IMPACT AREAS


TYURATAM
USSR
ARCTIC OCEAN
CANADA
UNITED STATES
MONGOLIA
CHINA
VLADIVOSTOK
SEA OF OKHOTSK
Petropavlovsk
BERING SEA
SEA OF JAPAN
KOREA
TSUSHIMA STRAIT
JAPAN
APPROX. 4900 NM
APPROX. 6500 NM
NORTHERN IMPACT AREA
Midway Islands
HAWAIIAN ISLANDS
Johnston Island
PACIFIC OCEAN
SOUTHERN IMPACT AREA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
AUSTRALIA
60
40
20
160
180
160
140
120

TOP SECRET
DINAR

33741

NOTES

A. USSR New activity involving Soviet range instrumentation ships in the Pacific appears to be forthcoming. Three instrumentation ships left Petropavlovsk 12 days ago and are apparently headed for the more distant Pacific impact area, 6,500 miles from Tyuratam. We are looking for extended range ICBM tests but we do not exclude a space event. There has so far been no announcement closing the area. (INTERCEPTS)

B. Congo-USSR Soviet embassy personnel have not yet left Leopoldville, but their departure is expected momentarily. They were ordered out of the country after the Congolese turned up good documentary evidence of their complicity in anti-government plots. One of the items taken off a Soviet diplomat the other day was a letter from an anti-Adoula leader now in Brazzaville asking for funds and arms to overthrow the Leopoldville government.

C. Britain The Labor Party scored again in the Dundee West by-election Thursday, increasing its 1959 majority of 719 to a thumping 4,955. Heartened by this, Labor is now pushing for general elections at once. Prime Minister Home is not likely to accede.

D. Ecuador The military junta which has run Ecuador since July may be about to come unstuck. We have a report that one of the less savory members of the group, air force Colonel Freiles, will try to take over full control this weekend. We are not sure of the reliability of this report, but Freiles is known to have been making motions in this direction.

(Cont'd)

SOVIET EARTH SATELLITE VEHICLES - COSMOS SERIES

1962 - 1963

SECRET

1962

	APPROXIMATE TIME OF LAUNCH (GMT)	LAUNCH SITE	PERIOD (MINUTES)	APOGEE (N.M.)	PERIGEE (N.M.)	ORBITAL INCLINATION	STATUS
Cosmos 1 (Sputnik 13)	12:00:00 (EST.) 16 Mar '62	Kapustin Yar	96.35	529	117	49°	Decayed 25 May '62
Cosmos 2 (Sputnik 14)	1715:18 6 Apr '62	Kapustin Yar	102.5	842	115	49°	Decayed 19-20 Aug '63
Cosmos 3 (Sputnik 15)	0400:12 24 Apr '62	Kapustin Yar	93.8	389	124	49°	Decayed 17 Oct.'62
Cosmos 4 * (Sputnik 16)	1002:56 26 Apr '62	Tyuratam	90.6	178	161	65°	Recovered 29 Apr 62
Cosmos 5 (Sputnik 17)	0259:49 28 May '62	Kapustin Yar	102.75	865	110	49°	Decayed 2 May '63
Cosmos 6 (Sputnik 18)	1600:00 (EST.) 30 June '62	Kapustin Yar	90.6	194	148	49°	Decayed 8 Sept '62
Cosmos 7 * (Sputnik 19)	0918:30 28 July '62	Tyuratam	90.1	199	113	65°	Recovered 1 Aug '62
Cosmos 8 (Sputnik 22)	0500:00 (EST.) 18 Aug '62	Kapustin Yar	92.93	326	138	49°	Decayed 17 Aug '63
Cosmos 9 * (Sputnik 26)	0940:00 27 Sept '62	Tyuratam	90.9	191	163	65°	Recovered 1 Oct '62
Cosmos 10 (Sputnik 27)	0900:01 (EST.) 17 Oct '62	Tyuratam	90.2	205	113	65°	Recovered 21 Oct '62
Cosmos 11 (Sputnik 28)	0655:00 (EST.) 20 Oct '62	Kapustin Yar	96.1	497	132	49°	Decayed 6 June '63
Cosmos 12 (Sputnik 32)	0924:40 22 Dec '62	Tyuratam	90.45	243	114	65°	Recovered 30 Dec '62

1963

Cosmos 13 (Sputnik 34)	0830:00 21 Mar '63	Tyuratam	89.77	182	111	64° 58"	Recovered 29 Mar '63
Cosmos 14 (Sputnik 36)	1059:59 13 Apr '63	Kapustin Yar	92.1	276	143	48° 57"	Decayed 29 Aug '63
Cosmos 15 * (Sputnik 37)	0829:58 22 Apr '63	Tyuratam	89.77	200	93	65°	Recovered 27 April '63
Cosmos 16 (Sputnik 38)	0850:00 (EST.) 28 Apr. '63	Tyuratam	90.4	218	112	65° 01"	Recovered 5 May '63
Cosmos 17 (Sputnik 39)	0300:00 (EST.) 22 May '63	Kapustin Yar	94.8	425	140	49°	In orbit, silent since 31 May'63
Cosmos 18 (Sputnik 40)	1034:07 24 May '63	Tyuratam	89.44	163	113	65° 01"	Recovered 2 June '63
Cosmos 19 (Sputnik 43)	0600:00 (EST.) 6 Aug '63	Kapustin Yar	92.2	280	146	49°	In orbit, transmitting
Cosmos 20 (Sputnik 44)	0929:58 18 Oct '63	Tyuratam	89.55	168	111	65°	Recovered 26 Oct '63
Failure	24 Oct '63	Kapustin Yar	-	-	-	-	-
Cosmos 21 (Sputnik 46)	0623:39 11 Nov '63	Tyuratam	88.5	124	105	64° 50"	Decayed 14 Nov '63
Cosmos 22 (Sputnik 47)	1034:25 16 Nov '63	Tyuratam	90.3	211	111	64°56"	Recovered 22 Nov '63

E. Thailand Prime Minister Sarit, who suffers from an incurable liver disease, is failing. Doctors attending him, including one of our own, give him no more than six months more. Sarit has attempted to arrange for an orderly succession when he does go. The chances of this are not good; Thai politicians and military figures are already jostling one another for position.

F. USSR Cosmos 22, launched a week ago, was recovered yesterday. It is the eleventh unmanned satellite to be recovered. All recoverable satellites have been launched from Tyuratam, the main Soviet missile test center, and recovered after three to ten days aloft. A series of non-recoverable satellites has been fired from Kapustin Yar.
(See Chart)
(INTERCEPTS)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/6/2018

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10105
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW
DATE :	09/13/1968
PAGES :	11
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/06/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #57

ROUTING			
TO:	NAME AND ADDRESS	DATE	INITIALS
1	James Mathis, Spec. Access, NARA	1/14/15	
2			
3			
4			

☐	ACTION	☐	DIRECT REPLY	☐	PREPARE REPLY
☐	APPROVAL	☐	DISPATCH	☐	RECOMMENDATION
☐	COMMENT	☐	FILE	☐	RETURN
☐	CONCURRENCE	☐	INFORMATION	☐	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:

FROM: NAME, ADDRESS, AND PHONE NO.	DATE
Jennifer Cuddeback, LBJ Library	1/14/15

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

CONTROL NO. SC No. 00787/68B [B]

COPY 3 OF ______

Handle Via

COMINT

Channels

Access to this document will be restricted to
those approved for the following specific activities:

______ ______ ______ ______

______ ______ ______ ______

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

TOP SECRET

(Security Classification)

Top Secret 57

No Foreign Dissem

[redacted]

60

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

The Developing Soviet Submarine Force

Special Report

WEEKLY REVIEW

Top Secret

1

Handle via Comint Channels

13 September 1968
SC No.00787/68B

SPECIAL REPORTS are supplements to the Current Intelligence Weeklies issued by the Office of Current Intelligence. The Special Reports are published separately to permit more comprehensive treatment of a subject. They are prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, the Office of Economic Research, the Office of Strategic Research, and the Directorate of Science and Technology. Special Reports are coordinated as appropriate among the Directorates of CIA but, except for the normal substantive exchange with other agencies at the working level, have not been coordinated outside CIA unless specifically indicated.

WARNING

The SPECIAL REPORT contains classified information affecting the national security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, US Code Title 18, Sections 793, 794, and 798.

THIS DOCUMENT MUST BE KEPT IN COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE CHANNELS AT ALL TIMES

The SPECIAL REPORT is to be seen only by US personnel especially indoctrinated and authorized to receive COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE information; its security must be maintained in accordance with COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE REGULATIONS.

No action is to be taken on any COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE which may be contained herein, regardless of the advantages to be gained, unless such action is first approved by the Director of Central Intelligence.

DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

The SPECIAL REPORT MUST NOT BE RELEASED TO FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS and must be handled within the framework of specific dissemination control provisions of DCID 1/7.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

THE DEVELOPING SOVIET SUBMARINE FORCE

The Soviet naval leadership, commanding the world's largest submarine fleet, is undertaking a program to increase the operational capabilities of the force. Four new classes of submarines–three torpedo-attack classes and a new Polaris-type missile-firing submarine–are in production, and several older classes are being improved and reconditioned. In addition, since the early 1960s the range, number, and duration of open ocean patrols by Soviet submarines have been generally increasing.

Fleet Modernization

The new Polaris-type submarine--designated the Y-class--carries 16 SS-N-6 ballistic missiles with ranges of some 1,500 miles. These 425-foot-long submarines are currently being built at Severodvinsk in the Soviet Northern Fleet area. The first units should be operational soon and 40 or more could be in service by the mid-1970s.

Two new classes of nuclear-powered attack submarines are also being built--one at Leningrad shipyard and the other at Gorkiy. At least one of these classes probably was specifically designed to engage enemy submarines. A third class of attack submarine is under construction in the Soviet Far East; its means of propulsion is not yet known.

In addition to these new construction programs, the Soviets are reconditioning many of their older classes of submarines. There are no indications that the Soviets intend to introduce a new class of cruise-missile submarine, however, and construction of these submarines is apparently ending as the Soviets approach their desired force level for these anticarrier units.

Operational Implications

Strategic targets in the middle of the US are beyond reach of the 650-mile SS-N-5 carried on the older ballistic-missile submarines, but are within range of the SS-N-6 carried on the Y-class. By the mid-1970s, Soviet ballistic-missile submarines may present a strategic threat comparable to that of the US Polaris fleet and be able to operate with less risk of detection than earlier classes of Soviet missile submarines.

The introduction of the new classes of attack submarines suggests that the Soviets are attempting to come to grips with the Polaris threat. The Soviets apparently are counting on their submarines to help blunt that threat by attempting to destroy Polaris submarines before they can launch their missiles.

Soviet ballistic-missile submarines frequently patrol within range of US Polaris bases and could destroy a number of Polaris submarines by attacking these bases. The new Soviet attack submarines may be able to locate and destroy a few Polaris submarines in confined waters through which those submarines frequently must pass, such as the Irish Sea or the Sicilian Straits. Combined operations with new Soviet surface ships, such as the Moskva-class helicopter carriers and Kresta- and Kashin-class guided-missile ships, will provide some antisubmarine capability in the ocean approaches

The Soviet Submarine Force


Kaliningrad
Severomorsk
Sevastopol
Vladivostok
• Fleet Headquarters

	Northern Fleet	Baltic Fleet	Black Sea Fleet	Pacific Fleet
Nuclear-powered				
Ballistic missile	9	0	0	1
Cruise missile	16	0	0	17
Attack	14	0	0	4
Diesel-powered				
Ballistic missile	18	1	1	8
Cruise missile	11	3	5	6
Attack	91	64	32	65

BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES



Y-CLASS

Nuclear powered
Carries 16 SS-N-6 missiles in hull
425 feet long
Now being deployed

H-CLASS

Nuclear powered
Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail
380 feet long
9 in service



G-CLASS

Diesel powered
Carries three SS-N-4 or SS-N-5 missiles in sail
320 feet long
22 in service

Z-CONVERSION CLASS

Diesel powered
Carries two SS-N-4 missiles in sail
295 feet long
6 in service

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

91849 8-68 CIA

CLASSES OF SOVIET SUBMARINES

Nuclear Powered		Diesel Powered	
Ballistic Missile	Y	Ballistic Missile	G
	H		Z Conversion
Cruise Missile	E-1	Cruise Missile	J
	E-11		W Conversion
Attack	N	Attack	F
	V		Z
	C		R
One New Class "B"			W

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA

91870 8-68 CIA

to the USSR and in the Mediterranean.

Deployment Patterns

Soviet submarines are assigned to each of the four fleets--Northern, Pacific, Baltic, and Black Sea. Because of the restricted exits from the Baltic and Black Seas, however, most of the missile-equipped units and all of the nuclear-powered units are based in ice-free ports of the Kola Peninsula (Northern Fleet) and in the Pacific Fleet.

The Soviets are apparently trying to reduce the disproportion between the two major fleets--the Northern and the Pacific. Although the Northern Fleet still holds the favored position, several nuclear submarines have been transferred under the polar ice to the Pacific and a number of modern diesel units have joined the Northern Sea Route convoy in past summers.

The Baltic Fleet is responsible for protecting Soviet coastal waters and for furnishing diesel submarines for patrols off the US Polaris base at Holy Loch. Moscow has also begun sending Baltic Fleet submarines to the Mediterranean to take some of the strain off the Northern Fleet, which has been furnishing most of the units operating there. There are no nuclear submarines in the Baltic, and the few cruise-missile units there operate in coastal waters.

The Montreux Convention of 1936 places severe limitations on the passage of Soviet submarines through the Turkish Straits. Black Sea - based submarines can pass into the Mediterranean only if they are headed for another fleet area for repairs. For this reason, only older diesel units are based in the Black Sea. Once in the Mediterranean, however, these units operate there for about 60 days on their way to and from Baltic shipyards.

Patrol Activity

Most of the increase in the level of Soviet submarine operations during the past year is attributable to the stationing of a force of six to ten submarines--mostly diesel attack units--in the Mediterranean since

June 1967; at least one nuclear unit is usually included in the force. There was an overall increase of nearly 20 percent in the number of Soviet submarine patrols beyond local fleet operating areas in 1967, but if the trend noted so far this year continues, fewer submarines will deploy in 1968. Patrols this year have been of longer duration, however, thereby resulting in more submarine time at sea.

No confirmed patrols by H-class ballistic-missile units have been noted since late 1966, and there have beenperiods during the past year when no Soviet ballistic-missile submarines have been on patrol in either the Atlantic or Pacific. The G-class is the only such submarine now being used for mid-ocean patrols.

Conversion and overhaul of first-generation ballistic-


Soviet Submarine Deployments 1965-1968

Number of deployed units, not including routine interfleet transfers or fleet exercise participants.

91946 9-68 CIA

TOP SECRET TRINE
NO FOREIGN DISSEM
RELEASABLE TO UK AND CANADA

missile submarines and the reassignment of their crews to new Y-class units have probably been at least partly responsible for the decline in ballistic-missile submarine activity. In addition, the loss of a G-class submarine in the Pacific in mid-March apparently resulted in a three-month standdown in patrols by these units. That incident probably caused the Soviets to implement new safety measures. Moreover, as the Soviets prepare to deploy new Y-class submarines, they may be reassessing the military value of sending their diesel-powered units into the mid-Atlantic and mid-Pacific patrol areas.

Until mid-1967, E-class cruise-missile submarines conducted regular patrols in the Atlantic. Since June 1967, patrol activity in the Atlantic has diminished; however, a series of single E-class units has been almost continuously present in the Mediterranean. Some of the submarines on recent patrols have also engaged in other activities such as hydroacoustic research and support of naval training maneuvers. J-class diesel-powered cruise-missile submarines apparently have been used primarily for peripheral defense. In late 1966, the first of these units to venture into the Mediterranean broke down and limped back to its base in the Northern Fleet. Some of the older W-class units are equipped to launch cruise missiles, but these, too, operate only near Soviet shores and probably are being retired from service.

Recent patrols by diesel attack submarines in the Mediterranean have been extended to as long as six months through the use of Arab and Yugoslav ports for upkeep, reprovisioning, and crew recreation. Previous patrols by Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean had lasted less than two months.

Last year, a submarine support group operated for nearly six months off the west coast of Africa in a program to study the feasibility of submarine operations from a floating base. The group consisted of a submarine tender and a missile supply ship, and was assisted briefly by a survey vessel and two intelligence collection ships. Several other ships provided logistic support. Four submarines participated in the group's operations. One of these--a nuclear-powered unit--was away from home waters for more than six months.

Once the new ballistic-missile submarines go on patrol, the Soviets may make greater use of such floating support bases on the high seas. Floating base ships would be vulnerable in

Soviet Submarine-Launched Missiles



TOP SECRET TRINE

	US DESIGNATION	IOC	OPERATIONAL RANGE	WARHEAD WEIGHT	REMARKS
CRUISE MISSILE	SS-N-3	1961	250 NM	1,000-2,000 lbs.	Carried by E-I and E-II-class nuclear submarines and by J-class diesel units. A few W-class diesel torpedo attack submarines were modified to carry this missile. Surface launched.
BALLISTIC MISSILES	SS-N-4	1960	300 NM	About 2,200 lbs	Carried by most G-class diesel submarines and by some H-class nuclear units. A few Z-class diesel torpedo attack submarines were modified to carry this missile. Surface launched.
	SS-N-5	1963	650 NM	1,600-2,400 lbs	Carried by most H-class nuclear submarines and by some G-class diesel units. Underwater launched.
	SS-N-6	Probably 1968	1,500 NM	700-1,700 lbs	Probably intended for the new Y-class nuclear submarines. These 16-tube Polaris-type units first went into service in mid-1968.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

wartime, but ballistic-missile submarines operating from such bases south of the Azores, for example, could remain on-station off the US coast longer than could units deployed from the Kola area. Cruise-missile and attack submarines would also profit from mid-ocean bases, reducing the number of long transits to and from patrol areas.

The USSR recently has achieved several technological advances in submarine support. New and more powerful radio transmitters serving submarines on distant patrols are now in operation in the USSR. A navigation satellite system currently being tested may permit Soviet submarines to determine their positions with greater accuracy even in the most unfavorable weather and sea conditions. Hydroacoustic research ships have conducted surveys in the past few years in areas of the Atlantic and Pacific where the Soviets might hope to detect Polaris submarines and in the Canary Island Basin and Philippine Sea where they may intend to operate their own submarines. (TOP SECRET TRINE NO FOREIGN DISSEM EXCEPT UK AND CANADA)

* * *

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

Agency Information

AGENCY :	LBJ
RECORD NUMBER :	177-10002-10105
RECORD SERIES :	NSF, CF, USSR, VOL. 21, BOX 226
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	SPECIAL REPORT--WEEKLY REVIEW
DATE :	09/13/1968
PAGES :	11
SUBJECTS :	INTELLIGENCE REPORT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted; Mandatory Review Material
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/06/1994
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	DOC. #57

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/31/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10091

RECORD SERIES : SCHWARZER-MANFREDI FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : S-M (IV-W)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM C. STURBITTS

DATE : 04/16/1975
PAGES : 113

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
CIA
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CUBAN EXILES
FERRIE, DAVID
STURGIS, FRANK
HUNT, E. HOWARD
MIAMI
NEW ORLEANS
SHAW, CLAY
STURBITTS, WILLIAM C.
GARRISON, JIM

DOCUMENT TYPE : DEPOSITION
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/13/2001

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Unknown whether name is releasable.

CONTENTS

Deposition of	Examination by Counsel For the Commission
William C. Sturbitts	2
(AFTERNOON SESSION Page 58)	
William C. Sturbitts (Resumed)	58

178-10002-10091

178-10002-10215

178-10002-10279

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

P R O C E E D I N G S

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants, basically.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet,such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us,which

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q. And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of ~~thing~~. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent'

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. That is Fiedl Castro?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly t Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relation ship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relation- ship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cubàn diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhatta -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the hell-out of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10185

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : A-I(G) CIA CORRES--ASSASSINATIONS (2)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : MURRAY, WILLIAM J.
TO : INSPECTOR GENERAL

TITLE : QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITIES

DATE : 01/17/1975
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/03/1995

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Attachments: 1781000210186, 187, 188.

1375-0224

17 January 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Inspector General

VIA : Deputy Director for Operations

SUBJECT : Questionable Activities

1. In 1960 the writer developed and recruited Jose Raul Martinez Nunez (201-281382), a Cuban national and a ranking Cubana Airline pilot.

2. Mr. Martinez requested an emergency meeting on 18 July 1960 to advise that he was the likely choice to pilot a chartered Cubana Airline flight from Havana, Cuba to Prague to pick up Raul Castro Ruz and his official party. On 20 July Mr. Martinez reported that the flight to Prague was scheduled for 21 July and that he would definitely pilot the aircraft. Headquarters and appropriate field stations along the flight route were advised of the flight schedule; requirements were requested.

3. On the morning of 21 July Headquarters sent a TOP SECRET RYBAT OPERATIONAL IMMEDIATE cable (DIRECTOR 40923 OUT 98941, 21 July 1960) to the Havana Station advising that "possible removal of top three leaders is receiving serious consideration at Headquarters" and requested the Station at its option to contact Mr. Martinez and determine his willingness to cooperate in arranging an accident during the return trip from Prague. The cable said that Headquarters would be willing to offer a payment after successful completion of $10,000.00 or a reasonable amount in excess of that.

4. Mr. James Noel, COS Havana, instructed the writer to meet with Mr. Martinez and make known our interests. The writer contacted Mr. Martinez and arranged an emergency meeting which took place in Mr. Martinez' personal vehicle while driving to the airport. Mr. Martinez said he would take a calculated risk but limited the possibilities which could pass as an accident. At one point Mr. Martinez asked for assurance that in event of his death the U.S. Government would see that his two sons were given a College education. This assurance was given orally. On returning to the Station the writer was advised that an OPIM cable (DIRECTOR 40965 OUT 99096, 21 July 1960) had been received at the Station directing the Station to disregard the earlier instructions.

5. Mr. Martinez was debriefed by the writer after his return from Prague. He reported that he had no opportunity to arrange an accident such as we had discussed prior to his departure. I do not recall telling Mr. Martinez that the original instructions had been changed and I am inclined to believe I made no reference to the new instructions which had been received

- after -

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

after Mr. Martinez' departure from Havana.

6. Mr. Martinez defected in early December 1960. I saw him once in early 1961 in Miami, Florida where he had taken up residence. I do not know if any other Station officers were knowledgeable of this incident although it is probable that Mr. Arthur Avignon, DCOS (now retired and living in the Washington area) may have read the pertinent cables.

William J. Murray

William J. Murray
C/LA/Narcotics

Attached:

(1) DIRECTOR 40923, 21 July 1960 TOP SECRET
(2) DIRECTOR 40965, 21 July 1960 TOP SECRET
(3) HAVA 5396 (IN 28071), 22 July 1960 SECRET

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

JFK Assassination System Date: 8/31/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10215

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DEPOSITION OF (A CIA EMPLOYEE)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/16/1975
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :

ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
CUBAN EXILES
FITZGERALD, DESMOND
STURGIS, FRANK
HUNT, E. HOWARD
KENNEDY, ROBERT F.
ORGANIZED CRIME
ROSELLI, JOHNNY
STURBITTS, WILLIAM
GIANCANA, SAM

DOCUMENT TYPE : DEPOSITION
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/13/2001

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Selected pages from deposition. Full document is number 1781000210091.

CONTENTS

Deposition of	Examination by Counsel For the Commission
William C. Sturbitts	2
(AFTERNOON SESSION Page 58)	
William C. Sturbitts (Resumed)	58

178-10002-10091

178-10002-10215

178-10002-10279

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

PROCEEDINGS

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen,in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

SECRET

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants, basically.

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet,such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us,which

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of para-military activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And ~~some~~ CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment, we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q. Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q. Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q. Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q. Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q. And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q. How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent?

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. That is Fiedl Castrc?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Would you know if that were the case?

A . No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this,which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhatta -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the sell-out of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

- - -

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

JFK Assassination System Date: 8/31/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10002-10279

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : A-I(J) CORRESPONDENCE--ASSASSINATIONS

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : DEPOSITION OF WILLIAM STURBITTS

DATE : 04/16/1975
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
STURBITTS, WILLIAM
FITZGERALD, DESMOND
KENNEDY, ROBERT
CUBAN EXILES

DOCUMENT TYPE : DEPOSITION
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/13/2001

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Selected pages from deposition. Full document is number 1781000210091.

CONTENTS

Deposition of	Examination by Counsel For the Commission
William C. Sturbitts	2
(AFTERNOON SESSION Page 58)	
William C. Sturbitts (Resumed)	58

178-10002-10091

178-10002-10215

178-10002-10279

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION

ON CIA ACTIVITIES

- - -

Langley, Virginia

Wednesday, April 16, 1975

Deposition of WILLIAM C. STURBITTS, called for examination by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, the witness being duly sworn by Thomas C. Hogan, a Notary Public in and for the State of Virginia, in the offices of the Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, at 9:50 o'clock a.m., on Wednesday, April 16, 1975, the proceedings being taken down in stenotype by Ruth G. McClenning, and transcribed under her direction.

APPEARANCES:

On behalf of the Commission:

GEORGE MANFREDI, ESQ.,

ROBERT B. OLSEN, ESQ.

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

PROCEEDINGS

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, will you state your full name for the record?

A William C. Sturbitts.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, do you recall when we spoke some weeks ago you signed a document entitled, "Advice and Waiver"?

A Right.

Q You understand that document is still in effect?

A Sure.

Q Mr. Sturbitts, by whom are you currently employed?

A You mean the Agency or --

Q That is right.

A Central Intelligence Agency.

Q And what is your current position with the Agency?

A I am a Special Assistant, Latin America, for Economic Intelligence Collection and Operations.

Q And would you briefly review for me the history of

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

your employment with the Agency?

A When I first came in I was in the Intelligence Directorate for approximately ten years and I was put on special detail, special indefinite detail, in the Deputy Director, Plans, which is now the Directorate of Operations.

Q What year were you put on that detail?

A I guess it was 1964, January, I believe.

Q And what did that detail involve?

A Cuban operations, economic warfare.

Q And how long were you on that detail?

A I was in the Cuban operations for nine years.

Q Between 1964 and 1973?

A (Nods in affirmative.)

Q And in 1973 did you assume your current position?

A Yes, January.

Q Now, while you were on special detail -- to the DOD?

A Yes.

Q Were you stationed in Washington?

A Yes.

Q And did you commute with some frequency to Miami?

A Yes.

Q Were your activities in Miami in any way connected with the operations of the Miami Station?

A In some way. My responsibilities were worldwide. I took temporary duty predominantly in Europe, and then Miami.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Most of my operations were run out of Europe.

Q Run out of --

A Europe. Some were run out of Miami but the big ones were run out of Europe.

Q Well, in the course of your activities with respect to Cuba did you have occasion to become familiar with the operations of the Miami base?

A Yes.

Q And the situation in the Cuban community in Miami?

A Yes, sir.

Q During the nine years you were with DDO's Cuban operations, who was -- who were the chiefs of the Miami Station?

A I think in 1963 Ted Shackley was the Chief and he was followed by -- I can't think of his name. I should know it. Well, I will come back to that.

Then, the next Chief of Station was Paul Henze.

Q What years was he Chief?

A I think Paul was there about a year and a half. He left in 1968 when we reduced the size of the Station. Let's say Henze was there from 1966 to 1968. And then Jake Esterline. He was Chief of Station from 1968 to 1973.

Q Now, what was the formal title of the group to which you were assigned for the 9-year period?

A Well, when I first came in it was known as the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Special Activities Staff. It was headed by Desmond Fitzgerald. And then, I believe after that it became the Cuban Operations Group.

Q Now, was this a special group within the DDO or was it attached to one of the area divisions?

A No. Following the Bay of Pigs, they created a thing called Task Force W which was headed by Bill Harvey. And that -- when Harvey left, he went to Chief of Station, Rome, and Fitzgerald took over, it became Special Activities Staff. It wasn't attached to anything except -- it reported to the Deputy Director, Plans.

Q And that was Mr. Karamessines?

A Yes. Well, it was Helms at that time back when it was first created. Helms was DDP at that time.

Q And Task Force W was created immediately after the Bay of Pigs?

A Well, not immediately. I think sometime around -- in the Bay of Pigs was in April. I think this was created in September, something like that, 1961.

Q And that subsequently became the Special Activities Staff?

A Special Activities Staff and consequently became the Cuban Operations Group. As the Cuban Operations Group it went back into the Western Hemisphere Division.

Q And what was the date of that reorganization?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A Well, let's see. I would say that was probably around 1965 because Fitzgerald then became Chief, W.H., and then later DDP.

Q Now, Mr.Harvey -- do you recall what position Mr. Harvey held after he left Task Force W?

A Yes. He was Chief of Station, Rome.

Q And is he still with the Agency?

A Oh, no. He retired a long time ago.

Q Do you know where he lives at the present time?

A Frankly, I don't. I have an idea where he lives. He went to work for a friend of mine who had a law firm. Harvey is a lawyer.

Q Indianapolis area?

A Yes, some place around there. It is in the midwest, Indiana.

Q What was the role that was assigned to Task Force W?

A It was the overall Cuban operations.

Q Did the Miami -- when was the Miami Station established?

A Well, I think they had a forward operatio-s base down there about 1960 which was small, in Coral Gables.

Q This was, then, prior to the Bay of Pigs?

A Oh, yes.

Q Now, in addition to Task Force W, was the Miami

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Station running any operations against Cuba?

A You mean prior to the Bay of Pigs?

Q Yes.

A I really don't know. It was a small -- it was a forward base and it was more or less as I recall, a support type thing.

Q Well, after the Bay of Pigs when Task Force W was established, did it have sole responsibility for Cuban operations?

A Yes.

Q Or was that shared with the Miami base, Miami Station?

A No. The Miami Station was under Task Force W.

Q All right. Would that also be true of the Special Activities Staff, the Cuban Operations Group?

A Right, except that at the present time the Station has no Cuban operations.

Q I understand that. When were Cuban operations terminated?

A At the Station? Let's see. Sternfield went down there in 1972. It was during fiscal year '72. I think it was in early 1973. It was a gradual reduction.

Q And have those operations been terminated entirely or are they now run out of the Washington area?

A All Cuban operations are run out of Washington.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

There are no more paramilitary operations, that type of thing.

Q But there are some Cuban operations being run out of the Washington area?

A Right.

Q Is that correct?

A Right. Worldwide.

Q Mr.Sturbitts, in the last couple of weeks you may have seen some allegations in the press about possible assassination attempts that have been mounted or alleged assassination attempts that have been mounted --

A Right.

Q -- against Fidel Castro. In the course of your activities with respect to Cuba, did you ever learn of any such attempts?

A Well, let me answer it this way. I wouldn't say attempts. I know there was discussion. "Attempts" is too strong a word.

Q Well, can you place in time your first knowledge of any such discussions?

A Well, the first knowledge I had of any discussions, I was on TDY and this was October,November, 1963, with Fitzgerald in Paris. And I knew that he was going to meet -- let me put it another way. I had overheard that discussions were going on with a member of Castro's military but that he wanted, as I recall, he wanted some British -- I mean Belgian rifles and

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

a telescopic sight.

Q Who wanted them?

A This military guy that was in Fidel's -- I think at one time he was a commandante. Now, I knew that was going on. I didn't participate in it because I was there for another reason. And I know that subsequent to that time that Fitzgerald met with him again and as I recall, as the personal representative of the Attorney General, Bobby Kennedy.

I provided all those files. There are 19 volumes that we gave to your people. But I don't know who was reviewing them. I think Belin was going to do it himself.

Q Yes. He is. He is doing it himself.

You said there were 19 volumes of documents with respect to this.

A 19 files, manila.

Q All having to do with possible assassination?

A All having to do with this whole time period and -- can we go off the record for a minute?

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q The first knowledge of such conversations that you had, I take it you obtained on a trip to Europe with Mr. Fitzgerald?

A I simply overheard it, that is right.

Q And who were the parties to the conversation you over-

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

heard?

A A fellow named Nestor Sanchez.

Q And Mr. Fitzgerald?

A Yes, and I really can't recall some of the other people. We were -- we had just moved the Station at that time, in Paris, out of the Embassy into the old Rothschild Palace and we felt that it was probably bugged, so all conversations took place -- we walked around the garden and tyat type of thing, and, you know, I was walking with somebody, somebody was in front of me, and you just overhear conversations.

Q This was in Paris?

A Yes.

Q I see.

Mr. Sanchez -- was he a member of the military?

A No. Mr. Sanchez was in the Special Activities Staff. He was stationed in Washington. And he was in contact with Cuban military-type.

Q Was it your understanding that the Agency had received instructions with respect to this activity from another component of the Government?

A Well, let me put it this way. I don't know whether they received instructions. I have to assume, and I am pretty positive, that this was a result of a Special Group decision. And at this time you have to remember that Bobby Kennedy was overseeing this deal, presumably for his brother, and he was

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

part of that Special Group. He called the meetings, he presided, he did a number of things.

Q Were there any other occasions that you can recall in which the possibility or the subject of assassination of Fidel Castro was discussed?

A No, not really.

Q You referred to this as the first occasion.

A This is the first --

Q Was there a second?

A -- the first time I knew about it or even heard it discussed.

Q Well, prior to the investigation that is currently underway -- I am referring now to our Commission's investigation -- were there any other occasions in which this subject came to your attention after this discussion in the garden in Paris?

A The only other thing that came to my attention was that the decision was made not to provide him with this sight that he wanted. Whether that is right or wrong, I don't know, but that is what I was told.

Q When did you learn that?

A Oh, I would assume in -- must have been early 1964, around February, something like that.

Q Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Mr. Sturbitts, are you familiar with a gentleman by the name of Frank Sturgis?

A Indeed.

Q Is your familiarity based on what you have read in the press?

A No. It is what is contained in the files.

Q Have you caused a search to be made of CIA files, particularly the files of the Western Hemisphere Division, in an attempt to determine whether Mr. Sturgis ever had any connection with the Agency?

A I have.

Q What were the results of that search?

A Absolutely no connection, never has been.

Q When we talk about connection, are we talking about an employment relationship?

A That is what I am speaking of.

Q Was Mr.Sturgis ever an independent contractor of the Agency?

A No.

Q Was he ever a contract employee?

A No.

Q Was he ever a regular employee of the Agency?

A No.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Was he ever hired to do any piecework for the Agency?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated in any type of paramilitary or other operation against Cuba?

A On his own behalf he did, not on behalf of this Agency.

Q How did you learn of those operations?

A Through the newspaper. And through FBI reports.

Q Now, are these recent FBI reports?

A Oh, no. These go back -- I know at one time, the thing that comes to mind, I think he made a leaflet drop over Cuba and this was subsequently reported in the press and by the Bureau office in Miami.

Q Do you know who financed his activities?

A I have no idea.

Q Is it possible that Mr. Sturgis' activities were indirectly financed by the Agency through --

A I don't see how. Frank Sturgis is a soldier of fortune; has been. He has constantly tried to associate himself with the Agency. When I went through his file they wanted me to classify the file and the way I classified it was "don't destroy it, he is an intelligence nuisance."

Q Off the record.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Have you caused the Agency records with respect to Mr. Sturgis to be assembled in any one location?

A Yes. Ihave custody of them.

Q And what is the volume of that material?

A As I recall, there are five volumes. Your Committee called for them the other day after the article in the paper, I guess it was last Saturday. They called for them Monday and they returned them Monday afternoon.

Q Do you know who examined those files?

A No, I don't.

Q You indicated a moment ago that Mr. Sturgis contacts the DCD office in Miami with some frequency, is that correct?

A Well, not great frequency but he does with tidbits of so-called information.

Q Is this information limited to narcotics, alleged narcotics traffic?

A Recently it has been.

Q Has Mr. Sturgis been encouraged by the DCD office in Miami?

A Mr. Sturgis has been told by the DCD office in Miami to take his information to the Drug Enforcement Agency or the FBI.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q Do you know whether or not they consider him an established contact?

A No manner.

Q Do they have any -- do they periodically seek to collect information from Mr. Sturgis?

A I can't speak to that but the records that we have don't reflect anything like that. Before they would contact somebody in that context, knowing that there is a 201 file on Sturgis, they would have to coordinate with the Latin American Division before they did anything since we do hold the file.

Q Would you briefly explain what a 201 file is?

A A 201 file is a personnel file. It consists of any information relating to an individual appearing in the press as a result of other agency reporting and that type of thing.

Q Personnel or personality file?

A Personality file, I should say. Excuse me.

Q Do you know whether or not there is any connection or relationship between Eugenio Martinez and Mr. Sturgis?

A Well, I will say this. Obviously, they do know each other. They have to know each other from their days in Cuba.

Q Do you know whether or not Mr. Sturgis ever participated with Martinez in raids against Cuba?

A No. As I recall, we employed Martinez around 1961,

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

I guess, and he was in our maritime activities. He was a boat captain eventually. And he did participate in infiltrations and exfiltrations and perhaps one or two raids, hit and run, sabotage-type actions against Cuba. Sturgis never engaged in any of these things. He never did it for us nor did he ever do it on any of our boats, planes, or -- anything that belongs to the Agency.

Q When Martinez would run such an operation or captain a boat on such an operation, would he be charged with putting together his own crew?

A No. He had an assigned crew and every boat had a Case Officer operating either out of the -- probably out of the Miami Station. Sometimes I would assume that we did have some people in the Key West base. But he, Martinez, would receive his instructions and briefings from his Case Officer.

Q So it is likely that he could have brought Sturgis along on any of these operations?

A Absolutely unlikely. Oh, the guy whose name I was trying to think of, Chief of Station, John Dimmer.

Q And that would be for a period of time between Shackley and Henze?

A Yes.

Q 1964 to 1966?

A Something like that.

Q Would you describe briefly for me the nature of the

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

activities conducted by the Special Activities Staff during your -- and subsequently the Cuban Operations Group during your 9-year tenure with those groups.

A Well, there was -- it was an across-the-board intelligence operation consisting of collection of foreign positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary activities, covert action, economic activities. That is about the breadth of the thing.

Q Now, these were all conducted through the DDO?

A Right.

Q Now, let's speak for a moment about the paramilitary operations. Were these operations run out of southern Florida?

A Right.

Q And in particular out of the Miami Station?

A Yes.

Q Were there any other CIA facilities in that area of the country that participated in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Were there any southern harbors other than Miami that were used in these activities?

A Well, we had activities down in the Keys also. As I said, we did have a Key West base.

Q Were there any other bases in that area of the country that were utilized in these operations?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, not that I would call a base. We did have training facilities for the UDT teams.

Q What is a UDT team?

A Underwater demolition.

Q Where were those bases located?

A I frankly don't know. They were down along the Keys, along that long peninsula going down there. There were a number of sites. I really can't recall them.

Q Were there any other sites within the United States in which paramilitary training was conducted, for people participating in these activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Where were these people trained?

A What do you mean?

Q Well, Cubans who participated in these activities.

A We trained them at these places we had in the Keys. Now, there also -- some of them were brought up here and trained at the Domestic Training Station.

Q Where is that located?

A That is down in Virginia.

Q Were any CIA personnel actually involved in these raids?

A Occasionally, I would think that -- you have got to understand at this time that we had a great many contract employees, independent contractors and this type of thing.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Most of the paramilitary operations and the training was conducted by the Special Operations Group which is another entity of the --

Q DDO?

A DDO.

Q Now, the facilities that we have been talking about, training facilities, were manned, then, by the Special Operations Group, or at least supervised by the Special Operations Group, is that correct?

A Well, supervised, yes, and I would think that probably some of the training was given by their people. The Domestic Training Station is under the Office of Training and -- but I would think that in the paramilitary field that the SOG would probably staff the training facility with their people who have the expertise in paramilitary operations.

Q Now, were the people that were being trained at these facilities basically Cuban refugees?

A Yes.

Q And at the outset I take it not many of those people were American citizens?

A No.

Q Or had become American citizens.

A I would assume a great many have.

Q By this time.

A By this time, yes.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q At the present time, how large is that Cuban community in Miami? Do you have any idea?

A Well, it is extremely large. I would think it is probably -- I was trying to think. I would say up towards a military people.

Q You spoke about paramilitary operations and covert action. How do you distinguish between those two categories of activities?

A Well, actually one can fall into the other. The paramilitary could fall into covert action but in those days we did distinguish somewhat. A lot of the covert action was media placement. We had a number of operations at -- legal-type operations, harassment operations. For instance, Fidel seized a great many art treasures and in particular he had a Napoleonic collection which was supposed to be the finest in the world that he sold to dealers in Europe. He had paintings that were immensely valuable that he tried to have auctioned in London and the London auctioneer would not accept them because he obviously didn't have clear title to them. He was -- they were stolen, in the eyes of the auctioneer. He was forced to auction them in Toronto, Canada.

We ran legal operations, got the owners and had them hire attorneys and bring them to court and this type of thing.

He seized these race horses. He tried to peddle them in Europe and up in Canada. We ran opposition against that

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

type of thing.

Q These were what you considered to be covert operations?

A Yes, covert action.

Q Now, this is what you were referring to, legal-type operations?

A Yes.

Q You used legal process to harass Castro.

A Yes.

Q What other types of harassment activities did you run that would fall under this covert action category?

A Well --

Q Would economic warfare be --

A That was sort of something separate unto itself. This was -- the economic warfare aspect of this thing was a decision of the Special Group to enforce an economic blockade.

Q What special group is that?

A It is now called the Forty Committee.

Q Is that 302 Committee?

A Well, it was a 302 at one time, too. First of all, it was called the Special Group, CI, Counterinsurgency. Then it went to the 302 and then it had another name in between there and now it is the Forty Committee.

Q All right. We will return to that a little bit later, but what other types of harassment were you running against Castro --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003
Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A This is what I was trying to think of.

Q -- that would be considered covert action?

A Well, as I say, a lot of propaganda, press placement, media placement. It has been so long ago I really don't remember. I know we had a number of things going against him. We used suasion, moral suasion, otherwise. We did some extra-legal things. We tried to get to his sources of supply, particularly when they were countries that we had treaties with, NATO countries, Canada, this type of thing.

Q Let's talk about each of those in turn. You said you used moral suasion. What kind of activities are you referring to?

A Well, in the moral suasion field we -- actually, we were the catalyst in this whole thing and we had the legal activities, the legal -- well, I don't know how you would phrase it, but we operated under the Cuban access control regulations of the Treasury Department, the Trading with the Enemy Act, and we also used the facilities of the Department of Commerce, the Export Control people.

I guess as you are aware, Cuban industry was totally U.S.-oriented. As parts began wearing out and this type of thing, Castro had his little people there running around trying to place orders with subsidiaries of U.S. companies. Where we would find this out through all-source intelligence, we or the Treasury people or the Commerce people would go to the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

executives of these American companies and ask them to tell their foreign subsidiaries not to provide the spare parts and the other things that Castro might need. We had the Department of Commerce -- we identified 600 of the major U.S. companies that could provide spare parts for Cuban industry. We had the Department of Commerce send letters to those 600 manufacturers and ask them to cooperate with them in denying any spare parts to the Cubans. This was a fairly concentrated effort to really isolate them.

Q All right. And that is what you were referring to as moral suasion?

A Yes.

Q Anything else in that category?

A Not really. None that I can think of.

Q Did you make the same kind of efforts with foreign companies?

A At one point we did but it was absolutely useless, the point in case being the Leyland buses. We pulled all stops to stop that sale. The British Government turned us down flat.

Q Now, did you attempt to reach any other sources of supply?

A Well, we also had what we call a preemptive purchasing program. If there was a single source of supply for a particular item we would go in and buy it to deny the Cubans

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

the market.

Q Would that then be re-sold somewhere on the domestic --

A Yes.

Q -- domestic market?

A No. It would be re-sold abroad.

Q In all cases?

A The cases that I was associated with, it was all sold abroad.

Q What kind of purchases were made?

A Well, we purchased at one point -- we purchased some Bright Stock in Antwerp.

Q What?

A Bright Stock.

Q What is that?

A Heavy, heavy oil, and since Cuba -- 85 percent of her energy comes from oil, this was considered a critical commodity. Bright Stock can be -- oh, it is almost like tar, melted tar, and it can be cut into additives, lubricants, this type of thing, and this was critical to the Cuban economy. So we had an oil firm purchase this Bright Stock from a dealer for which we reimbursed the guy and the Bright Stock was eventually sold in Africa.

Q Do you know of any sales of such materials that were made within the United States? Resales, I should say.

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q In addition to preemptive buying were there any other actions taken by this group with respect to sources of supply to Cuba?

A Well, we did provide through third country agents who got orders for Cuban goods, in collusion with the Commerce Department, and I would assume the Special Group, we had replacement parts manufactured that were substandard.

Q And you had them sold through foreign companies?

A Well, we had our agents get the Cuban orders all over Europe. Then they would come back and, as a matter of fact, the former Secretary of Commerce, who is on your Committee, Des. and I met him and he gave us the go-ahead to do this.

Q Mr. Dillon?

A No. He was Secretary of the Treasury.

Q But --

A But you must remember that these American --

Q Mr. Connors?

A Yes. But you must remember these American manufacturers, well, their places were nationalized and they were only too happy to work with us. And actually, it was a cash deal, bona fide business. These things were transshipped through two or three countries, finally wound up in Havana.

Q You referred to some extra-legal activities.

A Yes. That is what I was trying to think of, what we did. I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

our activities but I just can't think -- I remember this was on one of our activities but I just can't remember what the extra-legal was. I just can't remember what it was. I know it was one of the parts of the program.

Q This was illegal activities? Is that what you are referring to?

A Well, I wouldn't say they were illegal, but they weren't exactly legal, I don't think. Perhaps they were in a gray area some place.

Q Well, whose laws are we talking about, international law, the laws of the United States?

A I would have to go back and review the thing. I really can't remember this. I would have to go to the files.

Q Where could we find that kind of thing in the files?

A I would think probably down in the Records Center some place.

Q Would it be possible to obtain that material some time during the lunch hour?

A No. It is forty miles away.

Q Well, is there some place in the building where you could refresh your memory?

A Not to my knowledge. All that stuff has been shipped. This is talking 11 years ago, 12 years ago. All that material has been retired.

Q What category of activity would we be talking about

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

when we refer to extra-legal activities?

A This is what I was trying to think of and I can't think of what it was. I know extra-legal activities was one parts of the program that we were involved in.

I might have a chart in my safe downstairs that might tell me what that is.

Q Well, let's make a note of that and we will have to come back to that.

A All right.

Q Who else would be knowledgeable about extra-legal activities that were run against Castro?

A Well, the people that would be knowledgeable are probably retired and I was running the program. So I ran the economic program.

Q Well, these are activities that were run in connection with the economic program?

A Yes.

Q We talked about media placement during this nine-year period. To what are you referring when you refer to media placement?

A Well, stories or news items that perhaps our propaganda people wrote. We had them placed in newspapers and magazines throughout the world.

Q Would this also include broadcasts over radio stations?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Oh, yes. Radio is a very big part of it.

Q Now, were any of these newspapers or magazines published within the United States?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q These were essentially foreign publications?

A Yes.

Q Were any of them published in the Cuban community in Miami?

A No. The intent was to get world opinion against Castro. You don't do that by publishing in the United States.

Q What about the radio broadcasts? How were those handled?

A Are you speaking of Radio Swan now?

Q Well, I am unfamiliar with how many radio stations were involved. Was there more than one radio station?

A No. We only had the one radio station but we did contract time with Florida stations, a station in New York.

Q For broadcasts to what areas?

A For broadcasts to Havana.

Q And the station in New York, was that received also -- was that also broadcasting to various areas of the United States?

A I have no idea. I don't know whether they used a particular frequency to get this out or whether they did it on short-wave or what they did.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q But the intention was to reach Cuba.

A Reach Cuba.

Q You referred to a station in New York, referred to as Swan. Were there others?

A There were a couple in Miami that I recall. Not in Miami. I think there was one -- yes, there was one in Miami, I think, and one down in Key West that they used.

Q Where was Radio Swan located?

A On Swan Island.

Q Where is Swan Island?

A Swan Island is a little glob around Honduras.

Q As far as you can recall, were there any other radio stations in the United States that were utilized to broadcast propaganda materials toward Cuba?

A Well, there conceivably could have been, not that I recall right now.

Q Do you recall any attempts by the Agency or groups affiliated with the Agency to raise money from the American public to support those propaganda activities?

A No. As far as I know, Radio Swan and this type of thing was fully subsidized by the Agency.

Q Do you recall the advertising campaigns that were run in connection with Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty?

A Oh, yes.

Q Was anything of that nature done in connection with

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Cuban propaganda?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q And that would include both the publications and the radio?

A Right.

Q Let's talk about economic warfare for a couple of moments. Could you describe for me briefly the type of economic activities that were conducted against Castro?

A Well, first of all, we wanted to denigrate the regime, his credit worthiness, and this type of thing. We worked very closely with the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs in the State Department and, well, for instance, in those days, I guess it was back in 1964, the price of sugar had jumped from about a penny a pound to 13 cents a pound, something like that, and we couldn't understand why. So we kept -- Fidel kept saying that he had such a poor crop and this type of thing and we just couldn't figure out why he had such a poor crop because some of our own island assets told us they were out there cutting this cane like mad and the mills were working 24 hours a day, this type of thing. So subsequently, we found out that he was lying and he was storing the raw cane in the schools, any place. He had no storage facilities and put it any place he could.

So in cooperation with a couple of sugar brokers in New York, we surfaced this fact and the price of sugar took a

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

real tumble and all of a sudden then Cuba started exporting.

It was this type of thing that obviously he was trying to build up the world price because he didn't have any money, he was so short on his exchange, and obviously we didn't want him to get the exchange. So it was those types of activities.

Q Was the assistance of any U.S. businessmen or U.S. companies enlisted in that effort?

A Oh, yes.

Q In what manner did you use U.S. companies and businessmen?

A Well, we simply used them as the experts. A great many -- the sugar industry in Cuba was controlled by the American community, by American bankers, and obviously they lost everything when they had to pull out. Sugar is the lifeline of Cuba as far as any exchange, foreign exchange, this type of thing, and it was naturally our Number 1 target. So it was only natural that we would go to the American businessmen.

Q What kind of assistance did you seek or obtain from these businessmen?

A Well, we simply talked with them about why -- you know, the market conditions were, why the price was rising, if we could find out that Fidel has plenty of sugar, what would happen to the market price. This type of thing.

Q They were used as consultants,basically.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A They were used as consultants, basically, yes.

Q We have spoken about the investment American business had in Cuba. Did it ever come to your attention that American organized crime --

A No.

Q -- had considerable investment in Cuba?

A No. Well, everybody knew that the Mafia was in Cuba. I mean, all the casinos and this type of thing.

Q The casinos were run --

A I knew that long before. When I was in the Air Force during the war, I used to fly into Havana on weekends and this type of thing.

Q I understand that. It was fairly well known.

A It was a criminal element.

Q The Mafia was involved with the casinos in Havana.

A Right.

Q Do you know of any attempts by the Agency to enlist the support or assistance of any crime figures in any manner whatsoever in the Agency's efforts against the Cuban regime?

A No.

Q Have you ever heard of Mr.Roselli?

A Oh, yes.

Q When was the first time you heard of Mr. Roselli?

A Well, I guess it was -- it seems to me it was either Drew Pearson or Jack Anderson had an article on him a number

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

of years ago.

Q Was that the first time you heard of the man's name?

A Yes, as I recall.

Q Is that also true of Sam Giancana?

A No. I have heard that name but I don't know where.

Q In connection with --

A Not in connection with the Agency, no.

Q In connection with the casinos or --

A No.

Q -- gambling interests in Cuba?

A No.

Q You know of no instance in which organized crime figures were used as consultants by the Agency?

A Only what I read in the paper. I had no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Q Do you know of any offers of assistance from figures of that type --

A No.

Q -- who were interested in getting back into cuba?

A No.

Q We were talking about economic warfare. We have talked about attempts to keep the price of sugar low. What other types of economic activities were conducted against Castro's Cuba?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, we used all-source information to find out what his commercial dealings were. When we would see -- well, for instance, the Nicaro Nickel Mine which is a source owned by the General Services Administration, finally got back into production and nickel, of course, and still is -- was in short supply. We had a French firm, Societe le Nickel, who was buying almost the entire output of the Nicaro mines. And this French firm ex ported to the United States. So we went to the Treasury Department and to the Foreign Assets Control people and said, isn't there something we can do to stop these le Nickel exports coming into the United States? So they looked into the thing and indeed they did.

Q Who owned the mine?

A The U.S. Government owned it when Castro took it over.

Q I see.

A General Services Administration. And it was leased out for operation. But the ownership rested with the Government.

So the Treasury simply made the French provide a Certificate of Origin for the nickel that went in -- they export a lot of metal that contains nickel, silverware, knives and forks, this type of thing, and -- you know, stainless steel, and since nickel is used as a hardening agent we simply -- Treasury simply said you can't import any more into this

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

country until we have a Certificate of Origin. As a matter of fact, there was a boat that was pulling into the dock in New York and they wouldn't let it unload. They just turned it around. Eventually, over a period of months, le Nickel found other sources and export privileges to the United States were restored.

You know, it is -- you just -- any time you raise or lower a tariff you have economic warfare. It is that simple.

Q Were there any other instances that you can recall of economic warfare in which you enlisted the support of American business firms?

A I know we were in touch with a great many American business firms. We enlisted everybody's support that we could.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q When we broke for a moment we were discussing other instances where the Agency has enlisted the support of American business in economic warfare against Cuba. Can you think of any other such instances?

A Oh, certainly. The Cubans were having an awful time with their Maritime fleet, such as it was. These boats were powered with Nordberg engines. We simply went to the Nordberg people and told them -- asked them to cooperate with us, which

they said they would. They notified their manufacturer's representatives around the world if they got any orders from the Cubans they were to be refused. This type of thing.

We did the same thing with --

Q Let's just stop for a second. Now, was Nordberg compensated in any way for cooperation with the Agency?

A No.

Q Were they compensated for the loss of business involved in that activity?

A No. No.

Q I take it, you received similar cooperation from other companies.

A Oh, a great many other companies, yes.

Q Did any American companies refuse to cooperate in that manner?

A No. Not a one.

Q Were there any legal sanctions threatened against any companies?

A No. No.

Q Were there any sanctions that could have been brought to bear upon those companies had they chosen to trade with Cuba?

A Well, in the first place, they couldn't trade with Cuba. They couldn't get export licenses from this country anyway. Then, under the Foreign Assets Control Act of the

Treasury Department you have the extra-territorialty clause in there where a subsidiary of an American company cannot -- foreign subsidiary of an American company cannot trade with the country that is designated and Cuba was a designated country. And all the businessmen were well aware of this. Nobody tried to twist their arm.

Q Other than insuring that these companies refused to accept orders from Cuba, which I take it you feel they were legally constrained from doing, what other types of support did you receive from American business?

A Well, if American business -- sometimes they would receive correspondence, particularly, say, from -- well, they received it from Cuba asking for publications and this type of thing. They would normally forward all this type of thing to the Commerce Department and the Treasury Department, or in some instances they might call me and I would just give them a Post Office box to send the correspondence to.

Q Any other types of support solicited or received by the Agency from American business?

A No. Not that I can recall. There just wasn't one firm we approached, and God knows we approached I don't know how many, that wasn't extremely cooperative. As a matter of fact, a lot of them, you know, thought we weren't doing enough, that we ought to do a little more than we were doing, the government wasn't really pushing Cuba the way it should, but

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

outside of that, nothing. There wasn't any problem of cooperation. There wasn't any arm-twisting. It was all voluntary.

Q Did you identify yourself as CIA --

A Yes.

Q -- in dealings with these companies?

A Indeed, I do and we went to the top level, even the Board Chairman or the president. No problem at all.

Q Let's talk about paramilitary operations. We started but didn't really discuss that in any depth.

What kind of paramilitary operations were run against Cuba by the CIA?

A Maritime operations.

Q Is that the extent of it?

A That is the extent of it.

Q Were there any aerial operations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Leaflet drops?

A No.

Q Bombing?

A No. Of course, you had the over-flights. As far as I am concerned that is the only aerial activity.

Q That was run by another directorate, wasn't it?

A Yes.

Q Aerial photography, and so forth.

A Yes. They run a flight when you ask them. It has to

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

be requested and that is about it.

Q And those were run out of the United States?

A Oh, yes.

Q Can you think of anything, any other type of paramilitary activity other than maritime operations.

A No. I really can't, no.

Q Am I correct that those operations were manned by CIA contract employees?

A Right.

Q Which would include Cuban refugees.

A Right.

Q And some CIA officers?

A Right.

Q Any other branches of the services, Armed Services, involved? This, of course, is posted Bay of Pigs.

A Yes. No, not to my knowledge. You have got to remember that probably down at our Domestic Training Station we probably have people on detail from other -- from the military branches in the Government, but other than that I don't think that -- of course, during the Bay of Pigs operation we also had people detailed into the Agency.

Q Now, the training of persons involved in maritime operations, I take it, was conducted in part within the United States and in part outside of the United States. Is that correct?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A I would think probably the major portion of it was conducted within the United States.

Q The Keys would be considered within the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q Or were there any locations where it was conducted outside the United States?

A Following the Bay of Pigs,I don't think so. Not to my knowledge. I just don't know, I just don't recall but I don't think that -- I think all the training was done domestically.

Q Now, what kinds of operations are included within this category of maritime operations?

A Well, the infiltration operations, infiltrating agents into Cuba, exfiltrating agents, hit and run sabotage raids. That is about the extent of it.

Q Now, when did these operations commence? Was it shortly after the Bay of Pigs?

A I would -- I think these operations were probably at their height during the period about 1963 through, say, 1967. The program was terminated in 1968, I think in December 1968, something like that.

Q Why was the program terminated?

A First of all, it was too expensive. It wasn't providing enough intelligence and it simply wasn't -- economically,

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

it wasn't feasible to continue these things. The agents were getting wrapped up. We were -- we just felt that the return wasn't sufficient for what the investment was.

Q You say the agents were getting wrapped up.

A Yes.

Q What do you mean by that?

A When we infiltrated an agent, Cubans would identify him and capture him.

Q These various types of paramilitary operations that were conducted by the Agency I trust were approved by the Forty Committee?

A Every operation received a specific approval from the Forty Committee.

Q In advance?

A In advance.

Q Now, what was the procedure for submitting -- for initiating such an operation?

A Well, normally in the case of an infil or an exfil. or perhaps we wanted to lay down the cache.

Q You are referring to a cache of arms.

A A cache of anything, replay of radio, batteries, whatever they might need. If we decided that we should have one of these operations and the request would go from here over to the, I guess to the White House and then the Forty Committee at its weekly meeting -- they used to meet very

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

frequently -- they would either approve the operation or say no. These operations had to be planned well in advance because the tides had to be right, the moon had to be in the proper phase for communications and this type of thing. And these things, all these were coordinated with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Navy, the Coast Guard, the FBI. If we were exiltrating people, the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Every Government agency or enforcement agency or military agency that had any involvement whatsoever, and the entire thing was coordinated.

Q Do you know of any such paramilitary operations that were run unbeknownst to the Forty Committee?

A No.

Q What kind of volume of operations are we talking about?

A You are not talking about a very big volume of operations because of the planning that had to go into these things. I would say that probably at the height of the thing they may be running three or four a month. No more than that.

Q You have heard Eugenio Martinez refer to having run 300 operations.

A I have seen that.

Q Is that inaccurate?

A Well, it all depends on what is in his mind. He may have considered some of the training exercises as opera-

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

tions. Obviously, these guys trained. In order to run one of these operations, you know, you would have to have a mother ship in place and rubber boats and the UDT people to go in to see if there were mines and this type of thing on the shore before you go. So he may have considered that all these training exercises were operations but no way did he ever participate in any three or 400 active operations into Cuba.

Q Now, from what specific locations were these operations launched?

A They were mostly launched from the Keys.

Q Any other locations?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Now, would you describe for me the kind of hit and run sabotage operations that were conducted?

A Well, we conducted one hit and run sabotage against the Texaco refinery.

Q What used to be the Texaco refinery?

A What used to be the Texaco refinery.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

THE WITNESS: These things, a great amount of planning went into these things. We did have a model of the refinery. We agonized over the best approach to the refinery and this type of thing to do the most effective damage. This was run. It was successful, as I recall, not totally successful but it was

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

a successful operation. By that, I mean they didn't do as much damage as they wanted to because they had to get out because the Cuban defense came after them. It was that type of operation that we did.

As I recall, another time we took a team in to burn some cane fields. Really, the classical operations that we did in the maritime activities were the infiltrations and exfiltrations.

Q Were any CIA operations run out of Guantanamo?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Was it impractical to use the base there for --

A Well, the base is so surrounded and has been that I think if a guy went through that fence you would carry him back. He wouldn't walk.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other categories of sabotage run out of the Keys other than what you have just described?

A Well, we did lay down a cache, if you will, sabotage kits to be used by our own island agents. They contained sugar to dump into gas tanks and metal fragments to put down crank cases. Things of this nature.

One of our main objects was to, of course, sabotage

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

all the oil. We did that with a big operation. We made our own oil, substandard. Additives, I should say, not oil. We contracted with an American firm for that. And we shipped it in through third countries in Europe. It did hit the target.

The thing we wanted to get at was the oil and the automotive machinery on the island. We knew it was breaking down and if we could get a complete breakdown we would have everything at a standstill because in those days the automotive equipment wasn't coming in that rapidly from Europe because Castro didn't hve the money to buy it and they weren't going to extend the credit.

The railroad system was in total disaster. The Soviets had such a long logistics line, supply line, plus the fact that the Cubans didn't like the Soviet equipment because they were used to good American equipment. And these were principal targets that we were trying to get to.

Q In your experience at the Agency can you think of any other analogus or similar paramilitary operations run from a base in the United States?

A No.

Q I know there has been some paramilitary training in the United States.

A Oh, yes.

Q In connection with other operations.

A Oh, sure.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q But do you know of any paramilitary operations that were actually run out of the United States?

A No.

Q As far as you know, then, this is a totally unique situation.

A As far as I am concerned, it is, yes.

Q Now, how large a Navy was actually organized in Miami? On a previous occasion you described this to me as the third largest Navy in the Caribbean.

A That is right.

Q What kind of equipment did these people have?

A Well, we had -- honestly, everything from a canoe up to three to 500 foot mother ship. We had Boston whalers, rubber boats. We had a number of craft in, say, the 27 to 45 foot length. And they looked like real tubs. They were painted and they looked like they wouldn't even float but they had the fastest engines in them. They could outrun anything. They were extremely well armed. We had our underwater demolition teams. We had a pretty good Navy.

Q Did these craft operate under non-official cover in the Miami area?

A Yes.

Q Were there a variety of covers or was there one firm?

A No. Variety.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Fishing companies?

A Well, fishing companies, Geodetic Survey, marine supply. In all, I think during the period that the station and these other entities were under commercial cover, or non-official cover, I think we had 100 so cover companies.

Q Did any of these companies actually engage in any legitimate commercial activities?

A Not to my knowledge, no.

Q None of them -- were any of them in competition with firms in that area?

A These are probably what we would call devised facilities. They were probably registered with the State of Florida and they paid taxes and this type of thing, but if one was blown or became known, we just crossed that out of existence and started up a new one.

Q What did Eugenio Martinez do when he wasn't running these operations?

A Well, he was down -- this is one of the reasons, as I told you before, we brought him back and put him under that contract, that retainer, because of the years that he spent under such strict operational discipline down in the Keys. Obviously, he didn't stay down there all the time. He came back -- he might come back once a month, or something like that, to see his family, perhaps once every two weeks if he got some time off.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q I see. So some of these boats and personnel were actually stationed full-time in the Keys.

A Oh, yes. Oh, sure.

Q Were there any operations run out of the United States which involved destruction of crops or poisoning of sugar or anything of that sort?

A What did you have in mind specifically? You mean the Puerto Rican thing?

A Well, that is one of the things I had in mind. Would you describe that for me?

A Well, this is, I guess you could term it a target of opportunity. This was where a vessel was carrying Cuban sugar to the Soviet Union and I forget exactly now what happened to it but I know that it got a hole below the waterline, or something, and had to put into Puerto Rico for repairs.

In order to repair it, I guess, and get it in the drydock or wherever it was, they had to remove the sugar and put it in the warehouse and at that time I guess somebody came up with a plan to try to widen the rift between -- there was a rift at that time between the Soviets and Cubans and to put a harmless substance into the sugar that would make it acid, sour tasting, and it wouldn't harm the sugar or the individual, and some of this was done. And then when it leaked, of course, we had to get rid of it and we had a sugar firm buy it back from the Soviets.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q Bought it back from the Soviets?

A Yes.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q Are there any other operations in which crops were -- were there attempts to destroy crops in Cuba?

A No. No.

Q Place foreign substances in Cuban products?

A In Cuban products?

Q Yes.

A No. Not that I recall. You see, Cuba really -- in those days the only thing, Cuba was exporting sugar and nickel. The agriculture sector of the economy was in absolutely total chaos. God, they didn't have any citrus, they didn't have anything, and the poor people in Cuba were literally starving. There just wasn't anything to eat. And Fidel was going around with this big plan -- of course, there were a number of experimental cattle ranches in Cuba. King Ranch had one there. I forget -- several other European and American companies that had experimental cattle ranches there and they were experimenting with the, you know, cross-breeding and this type of thing.

Fidel was preoccupied with this. He went up to Canada and paid $100,000 for a bull and -- so he just put it

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

on an old Cuban Airways airplane. The damn airplane few too high and the bull became sterile by the time he landed in Cuba. No thought given to, you know, pressurizing the cabin and keeping the temperature at a certain point and this type of thing. So he was helping us all along the line and this here again, we generate propaganda, incompetence and this type of thing.

But as far as sabotaging any Cuban product, no, we didn't go into that. Our object was to enforce the blockade and cut off his sources of supply.

Q When was the Miami Station established?

A As a station?

Q Yes.

A I think in September 1961.

Q And that was several years before you became involved in Cuban matters?

A Yes.

Q Do you know of any other facilities of that nature within the United States, Agency facilities?

A You mean, targeted against the opposition?

Q Yes.

A A station as such?

Q Yes.

A No. You have some communications facilities that you really call stations because here again, they are not

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

directed towards any domestic activity. They are in support of overseas communications.

Q Of course, we have FR bases and DCD offices and Office of Security officers, and so forth.

A Right.

Q But I am talking about actual stations.

A Operating stations, no.

Q This is the only such station in the United States as far as you know, is that correct?

A Right.

Q And was this station established to deal primarily with Cuban activities?

A Yes.

Q Cuban-related matters?

A With Cuba, period.

Q Did it have, when it was established, any other responsibilities with respect to Western Hemisphere activities?

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Entirely limited, then, to Cuban activities?

A Yes, and in support of Cuban activity and other countries in the Hemisphere.

Q When you joined the group dealing with Cuban activities, what was the size or the number of personnel attached to that Station?

A To that Station? Well, the Station had probably a couple

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

couple hundred staffers there, full-time employees of the Agency, plus I don't know how many contract employees, independent contractors, probably another 200 minimum. It was obviously the largest installation we had. I think at its height it had over 500 people in it.

Q Full-time Agency people?

A No, no.

Q Combination of contract and --

A And full-time, yes. A regular employee we call a staff employee.

Q Now, would Martinez have been one of those contract people?

A Yes.

Q Even though he was located down in the Keys?

A Oh, yes.

Q And what kind of facilities did the Station have in Miami? Physical facilities.

A Well, they were located on the south campus of the University of Florida, I mean, the University of Miami, at the old Richmond Naval Air Station. It was a self-contained unit. It was pretty well off the beaten path, in fact, damn well off the beaten path. It was about four miles from the Dixie Highway inland. We had our own guard force.

Q Official cover?

A No. Non-official.

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Q Non-official cover. What was the cover?

A It was a commercial cover. It was called -- the first one was called Zenith Corporation and it was set up with a President and Vice President, normal corporate setup.

Q Engaging in any business?

A No.

Q Now, in a community of that type, Cuban community, how long could a non-official cover last?

A Well, obviously it didn't, but it was research activities. Funded -- it is a giant mechanism when you put one of these things in for the funding and this type of thing, for your ostensible customers, establishing bank accounts.

Q Yes, I understand.

A So it was a research activity and the only people that ever paid any attention to the place were the newspapers. You know, somebody would make an inquiry, you know, we can't accept any work, we are loaded with Government contracts and this type of thing, and it held up reasonably well. And out of this one thing, of course, then we were running these innumerable other covers with different activities. The guard force, of course, were like -- well, they wore uniforms, similar to the Pinkerton people and this type of thing. And I think that there was -- in the later days at that site I think the Department of Agriculture had offices in there and some other Government agencies, in other buildings, of course.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q And this particular Station, then, was under the supervision of the group we have been discussing?

A Yes. They were staffed within the Cuban Operations.

Q When did the Western Hemisphere Division resume responsibilities for the Miami Station?

A Well, when Des. Fitzgerald left as Chief of the Special Activities Staff and became Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, he brought it back into the Division.

Q Is there presently a Miami Station?

A Oh, yes.

Q And how large is it at the present time?

A Well, since we -- I think when we closed down the Cuban Operations, I don't know how large it is at the present time because we are in one of these periods where we are reassigning people, but I think by the end of this fiscal year there are going to be between 11 and 14 people.

Q When you joined the group in 1963, what functions were being performed by the Miami Station?

A Well, all the classical intelligence functions. I think I have lined them out at one time -- collection of positive intelligence, counterintelligence, paramilitary, this type of thing. Covert action.

Q This is the list of things you gave me earlier in the deposition?

A Yes.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Which of these activities, if any of them were actually being conducted within the Cuban community in Miami?

A Well, the collection of foreign positive and probably counterintelligence.

Q So the Agency was conducting counterintelligence activities in the Miami area?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you give me an example of the kinds of counterintelligence activities that the Agency would be conducting in that area or was conducting in the area at that time?

A Well, we had a number of joint operations, as I recall, with the Bureau. We had identified a Castro agent that came in by small boat and when she was -- she came in with a number of other people. When she hit the -- they had a reception center up in Opa Loca that was really a HEW operation. The Domestic Contact Division office had people out there and we did, too. Our people from the DDO were under Immigration and Naturalization Service cover. When the HEW people did the preliminary interrogation of these people they had to fill out forms, where were you born, this type of thing, biographic-type thing. These forms would be passed to our people who would look at the forms and based on previous experience or what they might have been doing, and they felt that perhaps they might have some information of intelligence value, they would reinterrogate them.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

It was in this manner that this gal came to our knowledge. We surveilled her for a long time and determined that obviously she was receiving messages and she was sending messages. So along with the Bureau we put a surveillance on her and we obtained a van with DF equipment in it and indeed, she went on the air in the morning at 5:00 o'clock or 4:30 or whatever it was, and the direction finder found it was being beamed toward Cuba, this type of thing, and that was oen of the examples of the CI activities we were involved in.

Q Were there many activities of that type?

A Not really. You have got to remember that the Bureau's Cuban squad was fairly small. I mean, it was a large squad in terms of FBI squads. It had 36 people on it, something like that, but 36 people trying to follow a couple of hundred thousand Cubans around, you know, it is pretty negative. This was one of the reasons that obviously from -- in those days when we had formed these revolutionary fronts which were being run by the Cuban exiles, they were reporting to Case Officers and they would report on things in the community, of people they thought were suspect and this type of thing. These leads in turn were then given to the Bureau and it was to this extent that we got ourselves involved in CI activity.

Q Would it be fair to say that the involvement in CI

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

activities in that area was primarily a function of the overwhelming number of these people and the Bureau's inability to properly staff the thing?

A Yes, yes. You have got to remember, too, that a lot of the people on that Cuban squad were in the legal section of the Embassy in Havana. You know, the FBI overseas is known as Legal Attaches, obviously working out of the Embassy the same as our Station was, and a lot of our Station officers from Havana were down in Miami at that time. So there was a relationship there that had gone over a period of years between the Agency and the Bureau.

MR.MANFREDI: We will reconvene at 1:00 o'clock.

(Whereupon, at 11:45 o'clock a.m., the taking of the deposition was recessed, to reconvene at 1:00 p.m., this same day.)

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

AFTERNOON SESSION

Thereupon,

WILLIAM C. STURBITTS,

called as a witness by Counsel for the Commission on CIA Activities, and having been first duly sworn by the Notary Public, was examined and testified as follows:

EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL FOR THE COMMISSION (Cont'd)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. When we recessed for lunch you were talking about the Miami Station . Do I understand that the Miami Station was the largest CIA station in the world?

A. The largest CIA station in the world.

Q. At its height?

A. Nothing comes anyplace close to it.

Q. I wonder if you could describe briefly for the record what the AMOTS were.

A. Well, the AMOTS were Cuban a Cuban intelligence organization in exile. We full intended -- this was part of the overall contingency plan that US Government had. Should Castro ever be overthrown, these people would be the nucleus to go into Cuba and form a new Ministry of the Interior.

Q. Now, Ministry of the Interior, is that a euphemism for Security Agency?

A. Well, in most countries of the world the Ministry of Interior, unlike ours, is the security force, internal and

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. And these people were Cuban exiles?

A. Cuban exiles.

Q. How large an outfit were the AMOTS?

A. Well, at one time -- I can give you the exact figures but I know it well exceeded over 100, probably closer to --

Q. Go ahead.

A. Probably closer to 150, something like that.

Q. Now, would that 150 persons be included within the three to 500 who made up the Miami Station?

A. No.

Q. That was over and above the personnel of the Miami Station?

A. Right.

Q. These people were fulltime CIA employes, weren't they?

A. Right. WEll, let me -- these people really were -- they were being subsidized by the Agency. They were employed by two cover companies, the largest of which was called Latin American Social and Economic Research. Then we had another smaller group that did the interrogating and they were under another cover, commercial cover, -- I just don't recall what it was. But these peop.e ostensibly were employees of these wholly owned proprietaries of the Agency. They were duly constituted, incorporated, paid taxes, all this type of thing.

Q. The salaries of these people, although paid indirectly, were paid by the CIA?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. That is right.

Q. And was training provided them by the Agency?

Q. Oh, yes.

A. You said the smaller group of the two groups that made up the AMOTS conducted the interrogations, is that correct?

A. Right.

Q. When you speak of interrogations, are you referring to debriefings?

A. I am referring to debriefings of newly arrived exiles or perhaps exiles that had been in the country whom during their time here had acquired new information.

Q. How were those -- how and where were those debriefings conducted?

A. Well, normally the debriefings were conducted at Opa Loca.

Q. That is the Air Base?

A. That is the old Air Base there but that is where the reception center was for all the Cuban refugees coming in.

Sometimes if there was going to be a lengthy debriefing, we had a residence which we rented and the interior was changed into small rooms like this where you could bring people in, sit them down, under controlled conditions, and debrief them without any interference and this type of thing.

Q. For how long a period did these debriefings go on?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. You mean in terms of years?

Q. Yes.

A. Well, I would think that I would probably say from about 1962, and I think the debriefings as such, of course -- we relied principally on the airlift for the people coming out and when the airlift was cut off, which Castro did -- cut off about, I guess about 1970 or '71, in that timeframe --

Q. I see.

A. -- that stopped the flow of the refugees, so we just terminated that part of the activity.

Q. Well, in addition to debriefing refugees that came in in the airlift, did the smaller group of AMOTS have any other intelligence gathering functions --

A. No.

Q. In the community?

A. Well, I can't give you a real yes or no to that. I would suppose that there is an outside possibility they could have been used to debrief people within the community, within the Cuban community, but we had in the organization -- all these people were Cuban with the exception of we had what we call an On-Site Case Officer, who was a fulltime staff employee and he had a couple of assistants, including a secretary. These people were directly under his control. Though the organization as it was set up, they had their own chief and this type of thing, but the chief took his instructions from the On-Site Case Officer.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Of course, if these people went out and did something on their own, they could do things we were not aware of, obviously. You can't -- you know what they are doing during their eight or ten hours that they are going to work everyday but once they leave, we don't know what they are up to.

Q. Did they have CIA credentials?

A. No sir, because they were proprietary hires of this commercial cover.

Q. Did CIA levy any intelligence requirements upon these people other than in their duties -- in their debriefing capacity, I should say?

A. No. When -- there were -- obviously there was a standard debriefing form that covered questions of intelligence interest or a battle, you know, anything -- economic questions, morale, and this type of thing. When these questions -- when these people were cebriefed and the debriefer wrote up the report, it would be sent from the AMOTS over to the Station. If the debriefing report contained something of positive intelligence, of that nature, the Case Officer -- well, not the Case Officer but a staffer in the Station may or may not jot down some additional requirements and ask that that person be recontacted and asked specific questions.

Q. Now, in addition to debriefing, what else did this smaller broup of AMOTS do for the Agency in the Miami area?

A. This was their prime purpose.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. How large was that particular group?

A. Oh, there were only about, I would say at the outside, I think there were about five debriefers with the support people which would be secretaries, translators, strictly administrative types. I don't think there were more than probably 12 or 15 in that group, if there were that many.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

Q. Before we move on to further discussion of the AMOTS could you briefly describe for me what role the CIA plays in resettling Cuban emigres?

A. CIA doesn't resettle Cuban emigres.

Q. What Agency is charged with that responsibility?

A. Health, Education and Welfare.

Q. Does CIA play any role in that process?

A. We may assist if we are asked but the idea of the whole airlift was having relatives here for somebody to claim you when you came in so you wouldn't become a ward of the State of the Government, and normally when these refugees came in, they were processed through the Center and then they had a place down on Biscayne Boulevard they called Freedom House and this was, of course, all run by HEW, and they -- if need be and they had to stay overnight or stay several days, HEW would put them up and care for them in Freedom House.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Then as soon as they could, of course, they would move them to the areas where they wanted to resettle them, where the relatives were, this type of thing, and we had nothing to do with that whatsoever.

Q. Turning back to the AMOTS, and to the larger of the two groups, what was the name of that group again?

A. SASER, Latin American Social and Economic Research.

Q. We can call them LASER for short?

A. Really, they are both -- the only reason we separated the two groups was for security because we had one group housed over here and the smaller group was over here. Obviously we couldn't bring these refugees into the larger establishment, so that is why we took the smaller establishment to preserve some cover.

Q. Okay. What activities was the larger group engaged in?

A. WEll, the larger group was engaged in the collection of intelligence. They compiled dossiers on the principals inside Cuba. They carded -- they kept card files on every refugee that came through the reception center. They provided -- they did do economic and social reporting. They put out a monthly newsletter based on the information they collected.

The information these people collected as opposed to the information we collected, ther's was all unclassified. That came from -- all the information they had came from human sources

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

or overt publications. We subscribed -- well, the proprietary subscribed to a number, a great many newspapers, periodicals, Spanish language type things.

Q. Well, they were doing clandestine collections as well, weren't they?

A. I don't know if you could call it clandestine. What did you have in mind?

Q. Well, would they run agents in the community?

A. Well, yes, there were penetrations of the Cuban community, yes.

Q. And that is clandestine collection, isn't it?

A. WEll, I call that human resources.

Q. All right. Where are these files now?

A. They are in the Headquarters here. A great many of them were really destroyed. It got to be rather comic. We went down there several years ago just looking through the files to see what kind of shape they were in and they had such great information for intelligence value in there as a picture of a gal who might be the daughter of a Cuban refugee who just won a swimming meet. It got rather ridiculous. So we purged those files and took out that material, you know, which just didn't have any pertinancy at all.

Q. How are the files organized? You indicated before that there is a card, index card for each Cuban refugee?

A. Right.

Q. Are there soft cover files as well?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Yes.

Q. For each Cuban refugee?

A. No. Not for each Cuban refugee. I think, as I recall, those card files were up in the milli-ns and I forget, we had I guess the manilla files, probably went into the tens of thousands, I would think.

Q. Now, is there any way to determine from those files which of those exiles have become United States citizens?

A. No way.

Q. Has there been any effort to make such a determination?

A. We made an effort at one time but this -- you can become nationalized out in California and your record of nationalization wouldn't be reflected here in Washington for two years. That is how far they are behind.

Q. So I take it --

A. So there is no central index you can go to. I mean, there is a central index you can go to but it is not current.

Q. I take it, then, that there is a possibility that the CIA has some files in Miami or here in Langley on Cubans who are now American citizens?

A. Absolutely true.

Q. Now, are any of those files likely to contain derogatory information about the individuals involved?

A. Well, no. One of the things these people do, of

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

course, we had targets for recruitment. It could range from anything from a first mate, a captain or chief engineer of a Cuban maritime vessel to Fidel. When we targeted these people as possible recruitments, for possible recruitment,we would ask that all the information on that individual be assembled so that we could do a complete target study -- habits, you know, everything right down the line. In case of some of the more important ones, of course, we had psychological studies prepared where we had enough information. But this is one of the things these people did. If we said we want everything you have on the first mate of the -- one of the Cuban ships, then they would start looking through the papers or anything else to come up with anything they could on what the guy's current activities are, his background, his life habits, this type of thing.

Q. Well, the AMOTS were going to be the intelligence service of Cuba?

A. Right.

Q. And they obviously were going to perform some function in addition to recruitment of agents?

A. Right.

Q. I take it they were trained in counterintelligence, gathering of positive intelligence, recruitment and all of the traditional skills, is that correct?

A. That is about right.

Q. So I trust that they had files that were amassed for

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

purposes other than recruitment?

A. Well --

Q. For example, let me ask you this. Were any of these files on Cubans who were suspected or thought to be a possible internal security problem?

A. No. No. They didn't keep those types of files. We would simply task them with through your sources what do you have on so and so. They would not be told the reason why we wanted the information on anybody.

Q. Well, I guess with several million fiels or several million cards and tens of thousands of files it is difficult to make generalizations about the kind of information that is in those files?

A. Well, that is right.

Q. So I guess I won't ask you to do so, but I want to ask you this. I trust that there is the possibility that some of these files do contain what you in the trade refer to as derogatory information?

A. I would assume so.

Q. And that so much of them may -- some of the subjects of those files may now be American citizens?

A. Right.

Q. And finally I take it that no effort has been made to study that particular situation?

A. WEll, we did make an effort to do it at one time.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

You know, we have a traveler program where when Cubans travel, whether they are on an island or perhaps other places, their names turn up on manifests and this type of thing. Well, these are put into a machine system. What we did when these cards were all transferred back here in Miami, we did go through them at random and pick out cards and then try to match it up with what the machine system had to see if there was updated information in the machine system that would show that this guy had become a naturalized citizen, and it didn't work out. So --

Q. Excuse me, off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I want to straighten out confusion in my own mind where these files presently reside. The cards I take it are presently here in Washington?

A. The cards and what is left of the files.

Q. That is the soft cover files?

A. Yes.

Q. And --

A. I assume they are either here or down at the Records Center.

Q. And where is the computer system?

A. You mean our machine system? We have --

Q. The machine here that you tried to match up with the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

information on the cards?

A. Right down on the third floor.

Q. That is not the hydro system?

A. Oh, no, no.

Q. This is a separate --

A. This is a complete -- only the Latin American Division uses this particular system.

Q. What kind of records -- strike that.

The AMOTS are still in existence, aren't they?

A. No.

Q. I thought they were going out in June.

A. Well, okay. They are on the books until June.

Q. I see.

A. But they have all been let go. They were let go -- they were all given six months termination bonuses and told to go find a job.

Q. Do they have any facilities, physical facilities, in Miami at this time?

A. no.

Q. So there are no records in Miami?

A. No. No. We brought all those records back here.

Q. Did the AMOTS have law enforcement responsibilities in the Miami community?

A. No. No.

Q. Any affiliation with law enforcement groups?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What else did they do, this larger group of AMOTS that was not doing debriefings?

A. Well, when they were trained in trade craft we would send them to other countries, in Europe and within the Hemisphere to train some of the local services in those countries. They served as safe housekeepers in other countries. They served in listening posts where we had audio --

Q. Foreign listening posts?

A. Oh, yes, foreign.

Q. Any domestic listening posts?

A. No, no.

Q. Any domestic surveillances conducted by these people?

A. I would assume -- this I cannot answer because I reall don't know. I know that they did a great number of things but to my knowledge there wasn't any domestic surveillance conducted by them.

Now, if it was conducted, and if it is a matter of record, I don't know where it could be.

Q. What intelligence gathering activities did they conduct in the Cuban community in Miami?

A. One of the big problems we had was within that Cuban community, as I said earlier, were some of the militant anti-Castro groups and this just drove the FBI and the Coast Guard and Customs and in general the law enforcement US. Government

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

agencies in Miami plus the State government enforcement agencies up the wall and, of course, I guess it was around -- the Government allowed a lot of this to go on for awhile but I guess about 1965 or 1964 they got a little tired of it and they started to tighten up.

I am sure the AMOTS were in part responsible for proposing alerting us and in turn we alerted the enforcement agencies when there was going to be a raid against Cuba by one of these militant groups. A number of times raids were aborted, picked up by the Coast Guard or Florida Coastal Patrol or the Bureau, this type of thing.

Q. These people were arrested?

A. Oh, yes.

Q. Prosecuted?

A. Not really.

Q. Any of them American citizens?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. This would be Alpha 66 type groups?

A. I don't know whether this guy -- well, you know, they are still after this Masferrer and this guy Donestevez. I don't know if they ever did get him in jail but they had him up on so many charges and he was a Cuban exile that made it big here. He was a boat manufacturer, small boats, but whether he ever served any time or not I don't know. I know he was convicted but he was always walking around Miami when I was there. So

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

I truthfully don't know whether any of these people ever went to jaul or not.

Q Other than identifying operations by militant anti-Castro groups, what other intelligence gathering did the AMOTS engage in?

A. Well, of course, there was a counterintelligence -- I wouldn't call it a project but a counterintelligence. interest at that time because we knew that they were infiltrating agents.

Q Cubans were?

A. The Cuban Government. They couldn't do it very well on the airlift because, as I said before, the aged, infirm, and young, but they did infiltrate them by small boat. And I don't -- well, we had knowledge that this was on and we did try to identify those people whom we thought would be suspect.

Q Was that done in cooperation with the Bureau?

A. With the Bureau, yes.

Q Because of their manpower limitations you folks were in a better position to do it?

A. Yes, and language-wise, too. That is always a big factor.

Q And this was conducted through the AMOTS?

A. Yes.

Q How substantial was the counterintelligence operation in the community?

A. WEll, it wasn't that big. They identified not what I

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

would call a great number of suspect infiltrees, but they did come up with a few promising ones and ones it turned over to the Bureau, of course, we have no idea what the hell ever happens to it because, you know, you just -- unless you personally know the guy in the Bureau that is handling the case, you might as well forget it. You have got too many other things to do.

Q. What other positive intelligence gathering activities were they engaging in?

A. Well, as I told you, one part of them were engaged in electronic intercept.

Q. Where was that done?

A. Down in Florda, down in Homestead.

Q. This is Southeast of Homestead?

A. Yes.

Q. What ere they intercepting?

A. Well, originally they were set up to assist with the commo. for the infiltration.

As we phased down the maritime activities, they were made available to intercept Cuban communications. NSA tasks them with the frequencies they wanted covered and the Cuban Communications nets they wanted covered, such as the border guards. Another important one was the sugar network. We had the border guards, sugar, transportation, maritime. I think there was an interior network they covered too. But all electronic intercept coverage is dictated by NSA.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Now, since they belong to us we could levy ceratin requirements on them if we wanted to, which we did very infrequently because the common interests, -- we have a common interest in what NSA has an interest in and unless there were one particular operation going that they wanted to cover exactly what the Cubans were doing, then we would task our people with that.

For instance, we knew a Cuban vessel was taking arms into Africa and our operators saw the thing leave Havana and then there was absolute silence. So nobody knew where the thing was. But we knew arms were being loaded and we finally located the boat in an African port, I mean the intercept operators did, when it came back on the air. And this is the type of thing. As a matter of fact, they were unloading arms in Algiers. And 200 Cuban troops.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Were the communications they were intercepting exclusively foreign communications?

A. Exclusively foreign communications.

Q. Were they intercepting any communications, one terminus of which was the United States?

A. No.

Q. These were basically Cuban Government communications?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Right.

Q. On the Island?

A. Right.

Q. Or between the Island and other locations?

A. Yes.

Q. But not between the Island and the United States?

A. No. Let's go off the record on that.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. To your knowledge were the AMOTS engaging in the intercept of any communications, either that facility or elsewhere, in the Miami area or in the southern part of the country?

A. No.

Q. Of other communications?

A. No.

Q. Is that their only intercept facility?

A. (Nods affirmative)

Q. Do you know of your own personal knowledge -- strike that. Do you have any knowledge of any wiretaps, surveillances, breakins or activities of thqt type other than what we have discussed --

A. No sir.

-- that were conducted by the AMOTS?

A. No sir. I want to go off the record a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I understand that a study of the history of the AMOTS has been prepared by one of your members.

A. That is right.

Q. What is his name?

A. I think it is Joaquin -- I can't remember the last name. The poor guy is dead now anyway. Well, I will just have to get that for you.

Q. What is the title of the study?

A. The title of the study -- it is part of the historical series of the Miami Station and I think it is just entitled "The AMOT Organization."

Q. What is the historical series of the Miami Station?

A. It was done when Paul Hennessey was down there. What we try to do as we go along, from year to year, is set aside what is considered to be some of the more siginificant things the station might do or that might occur in the station personnel-wise, this type of thing, and then these things are written.

Q. I see.

A. At intervening periods of time.

Q. When was this particular report prepared, the AMOTS?

A. I think it was preAared in 1967 or '68.

Q. It is a fairly lengthy document, isn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. And purports to be a fairly complete history of the

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

activities of the AMOTS?

A. It starts back in 1959 when we first started using this gent..

Q. First started using what?

A. First started using, I forget what his name was.

Q. I see. Is it a chronological study of their activities?

A. Yes.

Q. And you have a copy of that in your custody?

A. Yes.

Q. I would like to see that document. And we will try and obtain it through Hank Knoche's office.

A. Okay.

Q. Excuse me just for a minute.

(Off the record discussion)

MR. MANFREDI: On the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI: I wonder if you would -- let me ask you this. There have been some allegations in the press that prominent newsmen in the Miami area have in the past been agents of the CIA.

Mr. Olsen just came into the office and I asked him to join us because some of your involvement in Cuban activities in the Agency in the Miami area touch peripherally on some of the things had has been charged with investigating, so I am going to turn the examination over to him for whatever time he needs.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from Gerald Ford Library

MR. OLSEN: Thank you, George.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Can you begin, since I have not been in on the beginning of the interview here, can you start off, Mr. Sturbitts, by giving me about a one or two minute resume of what your contacts were with the Cuban elements in Florida and elsewhere withing this country on behalf of the Agency?

A. Well, I was a member of the Special Activities Staff which was in effect the Cuban task force at Headquarters and the Miami Station functioned under the Special Activities Staff in a variety of intelligence collection and operations.

Q. Who was the head of the Special Activities Staff?

A. Desmond Fitzgerald.

Q. And who was his immediate superior?

A. Dick Bissell. Excuse me. No. At that time it was Dick Helms. He was the DEP.

Q. Deputy Director for Plans?

A. Deptuty Director for Plans.

Q. What period of time are we talking about now?

A. We are talking in the period of 1963 to 1965.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. So you were not involved in this Special Activities Group during the 1959 to '61 period?

A. No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. Or the period leading up to the Bay of Pigs?

A. No.

Q. And you were not involved in this program at all during the same time that E. Howard Hunt was involved in it?

A. No.

Q. Do you know what the position was Mr. Hunt occupied in connection with the Cuban operations of the Agency during the period of 1959 to '61?

A. To my recollection, Howard Hunt was on the Covert Action Staff dealing in propaganda.

Q. Was this propaganda directed to the Cuban people in this country?

A. No. Cuban people abroad.

Q. And what was his connection with the planning for the Bay of Pigs?

A. I would have to review the record to really answer that. I don't know.

Q. Didn't he spend an awful lot of time in the Miami area?

A. He commuted quite a bit.

Q. Between Washington and --

A. Washington and Miami.

Q. -- and Miami. During the period of 1960 and early '61?

A. Right.

Q. Mr. Hunt has stated in his interviews and in his

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000
WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

published materials that he was the person who was in charge of organizing a political unit among Cubans in this country which would constitute the Cuban government in exile. Do you recall where that was?

A. That could be quite true.

Q. Have you reviewed, Mr. Sturbitts, the Agency's entire files relating in any way to the Cuban operations and particularly with reference to whether they reflect any contacts between the Agency and Frank Sturgis?

A. Yes.

Q. Or Frank Fiorini?

A. There is no relationship.

Q. Is it your testimony that the records and files of the Agency reveal no official or unofficial contact of any nature with Frank Sturgis?

A. To my knowledge that is true.

Q. I take it from that that you are emphatic in your testimony that he was never an employee of the Agency?

A. Extremely emphatic.

Q. And you are also equally emphatic to the effect that he was never a contract agent of the Agency?

A. Exactly.

Q. Do you know whether he ever served in the capacity of being an informer or informant to the Agency?

A. It is possible that he could have been a source.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q. YOu mean a source of --

A. Source of information of another agent. Another agency agent.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reflect any matter?

A. To my knowledge I don't recall anything like that but it is entirely possible that that could have happened without being a matter of record.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any instance whatever in which Frank Sturgis was ever asked to undertake any kind of an operation or activity on behalf of the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, nothing.

Q. Do the files of the Agency reveal any evidence whatever that Frank Sturgis was ever paid anything directly or indirectly by the Agency?

A. To my knowledge, no.

Q. Now, when you say "to my knowledge, no", in answer to some of these questions, do I understand that to mean that you are giving us the full benefit of your knowledge on the basis of a full review of the Agency's records and files?

A. On Frank Sturgis, yes.

Q. Okay. During the period of time that you were with the Special Activities Group from 1963 to '66, first of all, can you tell us when that began in 1963?

A. When the Special Activities Group --

Q. No. When your contact with the Special Activities

WARD & PAUL
410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Group began?

A. It began -- well, it began around June of '63.

Q. Now, with particular reference to the last half of 1963, including whatever period in June '63 may not have been involved, were there a great many Cubans in the southern United States who were active in revolutionary fronts that were being sponsored by the Agency?

A. Wellm you mean Agency sponsored fronts?

Q. Yes.

A. The Agency subsidized these fronts in an effort to have unity rather than these split factions, split anti-Castro factions. Obviously the leaders of the fronts knew that the CIA was subsidizing. Supposedly the people that joined these fronts did not know they were being subsidized by the Agency or the U.S. Government.

Q. But when you say "supposedly," does the fact appear to be otherwise?

A. WEll, based on my experience with the Cubans and this type of thing, and their penchant to talk, I would think that it wouldn't take long for knowledge of any subsidy to surface itself.

Q. Was it your opinion and impression at that time, Mr. Sturbitts, that a great many Cubans considered themselves to be involved in the CIA organizations?

A. Yes.

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. And again with particular reference to the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. Was there also Cuban activity of this sort elsewhere in the United States? I am asking now particularly with reference to New Orleans.

A. There was some Cuban presence in New Orleans. I am really not familiar with what happened in New Orleans that was sort of a sideshow to Miami.

Q. But the same is -- it is possible that some of the same Cuban organizations which were being sponsored or funded by the Agency also had activities or operations in New Orleans?

A. I don't know if I can answer that, whether they had the same functions. I know that some funding arrangement for subsidizing the organizations in Miami was carried out through New Orleans.

Q. Well, can you be more specific about what you mean by that?

A. Well, in other words, to fund these organizations we were subsidizing there had to be some ostensible source of income for them to continue what they were doing. A great number -- well, not a great number, but a number of select people were -- well, they were selected and then they were talked to, to pose as trustees, if you would, or directors or whatever you might have of some of these organizations in order

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

to get the funding through to the organizations.

These people were normally prominent people and --

Q. And did they get funded by the Agency, then, through the mdeium of prominent and well-to-do people?

A. These well-to-do people ostensibly would call a friend of theirs that had been made trustee of another type of activity and say, you know, we are trying to assist these Cubans in this type of thing. Could your organization give us any money, and the guy on the other end would say, sure, we can probably lend you $25,000 or something like that, or donate $25,000. This is the way the funding went into the fronts.

Q. And was some of that funding arranged through people in New Orleans?

A. I would think so. I believe so.

Q. Were any of the people in New Orleans through whom that funding operation was effected people who turned out to be involved in the investigations conducted by Jim Garrison?

A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. How about David Ferrie? Was he ever connected with the Agency in any manner at all in providing funds or assistance to Cubans or Cuban groups?

A. I couldn't say. I am just not familiar with -- we had a great many people that did this.

Q. How about Clay Shaw? Was Clay Shaw ever used as a funding source?

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544 6000

A. This I do not know either.

Q. Pardon?

A. This I don't know.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Where would that information be available?

A. Well, we have a guy that used to work with me who was down in New Orleans at that time. He would probably know.

Q. Is he in the building?

A. Yes.

Q. What is his name?

A. Bill Kent.

Q. Bill Kent'

A. Yes.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Who is Bill Kent with now? Which department?

A. He is still with the DDO.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Western Hemisphere Division?

A. No. He is on one of the staffs. He is on the -- I think Career Management Group Staff.

Q. Is he officed near you?

A. No. He is down in the basement.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. Do the Agency files reveal who the intermediaries were that were used to provide funds to the --

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Oh, yes.

Q. -- to the Cuban movements?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you know whehter -- do you know the identity of any of them in New Orleans?

A. No. No. Totally unfamiliar with anything that took llace in New Orleans.

Q. I take it that Frank Sturgis was never an intermediary for providing funds to the Cuban fronts?

A. The files that I have don't reflect it.

Q. I think we covered this already just a few minutes ago but let me make sure that we have got it on the record.

I understood you to say that it was your impression in 1963 that large numbers of Cuban exiles, Cuban people in the southern United States, talked about and believed that they were involved in the CIA sponsored activities. Is that true?

A. That is right.

Q. Was it also your understanding and your impression that there was a good deal of talk among this Cuban element in the southern United States about plans or prospects for the assassination of Fidel Castro?

A. I would say no. I don't think there was -- you have got to remember that these people were embittered. They lost their homeland, their possessions, they lost everything and they blamed it all on one man.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. That is Fiedl Castrc?

A. That is right, and they would probably verbally do anything they could to get rid of him.

Q. Was there a lot of talk about killing Castro among these Cubans?

A. I would say among the Cuban exiles there probably was a lot of talk about that.

Q. Did you participate yourself in the overhearing of such conversations?

A. No.

Q. Was this a matter of something that was reported to you?

A. Well, it was -- I really don't remember what the source of it was but I know in my discussions with people at the Station and from my visits down there and that type of thing that this subject always came up. What were they going to do with Fidel? How are they going to get rid of him and this type of thing. I don't mean the Agency people. This is what the Cuban exile community was discussing.

Q. Yes. Do you know what Howard Hunt was doing for the Agency in 1963?

A. Well, it seems to me he was here at Headquarters in '63 and I think he was assigned to the European Division of the DDP.

Q. This is your best recollection --

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. Yes.

Q. -- at the moment. Is it possible that he was with Domestic Operations Division in the field of proprietaries engaged --

A. I guess you are right, yes. I believe he was there.

Q. Did you personally know Howard Hunt?

A. No.

Q. Never met him?

A. I met him. That is all. I can't say I know him.

Q. You would not have known anything about his whereabouts on any particular day, then. Is that true?

A. Can we go off the record?

(Off the record discussion.)

THE WITNESS: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. I would like to have it on the record.

A. Do you have a particular day?

Q. No. I am just asking you if your acquanitance with Hunt was such that you would have known of his whereabouts on any particular day.

A. No.

Q. Was it very infrequently that you ever saw him?

A. Oh, I would see him in the halls, this type of thing, but -- bump into him perhaps downtown on the street.

Q. But you would have no occasion for knowing from one

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

day to the next where he was?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever conducted any kind of inquiry on behalf of the Agency as to where he was on November 22, 1963?

A. Yes.

Q. And when did you conduct that inquiry?

A. I have done it twice that I recall and the most recent one was I guess -- I am just trying to think. Well, it wasn't too long ago because we did have an inquiry and we obtained the time and the attendance records from the Office of Finance which showed that Howard Hunt was on sick leave on that day.

Q. Was this just fairly recently?

A. Yes.

Q. I understood from what files I have seen, Mr. Sturbitts, that the only records that were available from the Office of Finance showed that he had had nine hours of sick leave during the two-week pay period ending the 23rd of November but that the records were not available as to how much sick leave or annual leave had been taken on any particular day.

A. Well --

Q. Am I mistaken?

A. As I recall, he was in a duty status one day and a sick leave status the next day and back to duty the next day. I would have to check that with my Budget and Fiscal Officer. He is the chap that got that for me.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q. Can you check that for us?

A. Sure.

Q. And give us the results of that?

A. Yes.

Q. Because this is much more detailed information than I have been previouly aware is available in the files of the Agency.

A. All right. I will do that.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Do you want to make a note of that?

A. Let me have a piece of paper.

Q. YOu might also want Mr. Sturbitts' phone number which is 351-5106.

THE WITNESS: That was 22 November, right?

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. That is the day.

A. 1963.

Q. In response to whose inquiry was that investigation made?

A. I don't know. I would have to look that up, too. I don't recall exactly who asked for it. I don't know whether -- I will just have to check that. I don't know who it was.

Q. And the date? Do you have any idea when you made the inquiry?

A. No. But Ican find out from the B and F guy, hopefully.

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

Q. You said there was a previous inquiry?

A. Yes. The previous inquiry came from Archie Roosevelt who is now retired and was at that particular time the Chief of European Division.

Q. When was that inquiry received?

A. That was about a year ago, I guess.

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. About the first time these photographs began to be circulated?

A. Yes.

Q. About the bums in Dallas?

A. Yes, and actually I think this -- Archie's inquiry came from some magazine or newspaper man in Europe. Archie was Chief of Station, London, for a long time and he apparently made a lot of acquaintances over there among the media.

Q. This is something you are relating to Der Sterm Magazine?

A. That is right.

Q. And did I understand you to say thqt in checking with the Office of Finance that it was positively ascertained that Hunt was on sick leave on November 22nd?

A. Well, I will have to check that. That is the way I understood it but I did get this through our Budget people who have the contact with the Office of Finance.

Q. And that he was on annual leave the day before?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A. No. He was on a duty status the day before, on sick leave, and then on duty status the following day.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. Was there any effort to determine what Mr. Hunt's previous pattern with respect to sick days had been?

A. (Nods in negative)

BY MR. OLSEN:

Q. November 22, 1963, was a Friday. When you say that records reveal that he was on a duty status the next day --

A. It was a Friday. Then I was mistaken.

Q. Does that mean he was on duty the following Monday or on the next day, Saturday?

A. No. On the following Monday. I didn't realize the 22nd was a Friday.

Q. Will you check that thing for us and give us a brief memo together with whatever supporting -- copies of supporting documents you can find?

A. Okay.

Q. As promptly as possible on this question.

I think that covers the subject matter.

MR. MANFREDI: I can give you another moment if you want. Can you think of anything else?

MR. OLSEN: I think that is all.

MR. MANFREDI: Okay. Off the record.

(Off the record discussion)

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q. I am sorry for the interruption but over the long I think probably I saved you some time.

We are talking about newspaper editors when we were inte rupted -- or when I invited the interruption. I guess I ough to be fair.

Is it not a fact that the Agency had some relationship w some prominent newspaper officials in the Miami area?

A. Yes.

Q. And what was the nature of that relationship?

A. Traditionally the Chief of Station maintained the relationship with officials of the Miami Herald, particularly Latin American editor, as well as relationships with staff members of it, I think it is the Miami News and stringers for the other newspapers and periodicals stationed in Miami.

Q. What was the purpose of those relationships?

A. I really couldn't say what the prupose of the relationship was. I mean, the same reason that we establish a relationship with the press in this town. There were certain things tha might come to the attention of the press involving true names and incidents that we felt should perhaps not be surfaced at any particular time.

Q. Do you have any knowledge of use of the press in Miami for propaganda purposes?

A. No. No.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Would you know if that were the case?

A No. I really wouldn't know, but the relationship was a two-way street. It wasn't simply that we assisted these people as well as they were assigint us.

Q What assistance would you render for members of the press in Miami?

A Well, in the case of the Latin American editor we would put him in contact with the Chiefs of Stations of areas he periodically visited and the Chiefs of Stations would give him background briefings and this type of thing on the developments within a given country.

Q Was that done evenhandedly for various newspapers?

A Predominantly, I would say probably the Miami Herald received probably a little more attention than the other papers, principally because it was a large paper and their Latin American editor traveled a great deal throughout the Hemisphere.

Q Was he also used as a source?

A No.

Q Do newspapermen in Washington, D.C., receive similar briefings?

A Yes.

Q We talked with Mr.Olsen for a short period of time about fronts, revolutionary fronts. How large were these organizations?

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, the membership varied. As I said, we were principally interested in the leadership of the organizations. Once the organization was established and the leadership took over, then they would take care of enlisting the, I guess, getting membership from the Cuban exile community to join.

Q What were their functions, the fronts?

A Well, it was to bring some unity out of this chaotic thing of the splinter groups and get -- as I said, it was a political organization in exile.

Q Did they conduct any operations?

A No, not that I know of.

Q Just like a political party?

A Like a political party.

Q How many of these fronts were there?

A There were several of them. I really don't remember the names of them. The FRD was one. The Revolutionary Democratic Front. I guess that was probably the biggest one. And there were some others.

Q The RDF?

A FRD.

Q I see.

A Front Revolutionary Democratic. It is the Democratic Revolutionary Front.

Q All right. Are these groups still in existence?

A I would think not. I really don't know.

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q Is there a CIA station in Puerto Rico?

A No. There was but there isn't any more. There hasn't been one there for years.

Q When was it disbanded?

A I think the station was established around 1958 and -- perhaps it was established before that. I think it went out of existence in 1958.

Q Do you know why it went out of existence?

A No, I don't. I don't have any idea.

Q Do you know what function it was performing?

A (Nods in negative.)

Q You mentioned earlier that Bernard Barker worked in the Cuban community for the CIA?

A He worked with these fronts, too.

Q Was he performing any intelligence function in the community?

A Intelligence functions. Well --

Q Was he collecting information?

A Sure. If he got information that he thought was worthwhile he would pass it on.

Q Now, would he have been considered one of the three or 500 persons employed or assigned to the Miami Station?

A Yes. He was a contract employee.

Q And were intelligence requirements levied on such contract employees?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Normally, the requirements are pretty standard, or they were at that time. But here again, you always have ad hoc type things that pop up from time to time, and have to be surfaced.

Q Some of these contract employees were, then, in the business of collecting intelligence information in the Cuban communities in Miami.

A Right.

Q Now, I think we finished with the AMOTS but can you think of any other functions performed by the AMOTS that we have not discussed in the course of the afternoon?

A No, not really. No.

Q I think you previously described them for me as the eyes and ears into the Cuban community.

A Right.

Q And they actually had a physical facility in Miami which was their headquarters, did they not?

A Exactly.

Q And there was a CIA Case Officer who managed to supervise that facility.

A Yes.

Q Now, what has happened to the AMOTS?

A The AMOTS were gradually phased down and will go out of existence -- the AMOTS are out of existence, aren't they? Isn't it the AMDUKES or -- these are the radio people.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Q And the AMDUKES are the AMOTS?

A The AMDUKES are AMOTS but they are radio people.

Q They are the ones that conducted the intercept for NSA?

A Yes. The only reason we use two different names is that in each of these things in those days we had to have a project which had to be renewed every year to get the funding.

Q So AMDUKE and AMOT --

A Synonymous.

Q -- are cryptonyms?

A Yes.

Q Do the initials stand for anything other than --

A No. Just pick them out. If you want to encrypt somebody you just call downstairs and they give you a crypt. You don't have anything to do with it. The AM happened at that particular time to be the Cuban diograph.

Q Now, turning to the Miami Station's involvement for assistance to the Secret Service in connection with the political conventions in 1968 and 1972, would you briefly describe for me the nature of the assistance provided by the Agency to the Secret Service?

A At the request of the Secret Service we conducted name traces on individuals whom the Secret Service wanted traced. These includedthe employees of all hotels in Miami

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Beach where any convention activities were to take place, employees of catering services, limosine service, employees in -- what do they call it, the Civic Center in Miami. It is a big auditorium down there. I forget what they call it. Foreign news people and media, television, radio people.

Q Were these people on whom name traces were requested all foreign nationals?

A All foreign nationals.

Q Was there any check made to determine whether any of them were American citizens?

A We levied on the Secret Service as a requirement that they have identified these people by nationality before we would run a name trace. Inadvertently, at one time they did submit a list, a rather long list of American citizens which we promptly sent back to them and told them we could not trace.

Q And this practice was followed both in 1968 and 1972?

A That is right.

Q And where were these names traced?

A They were traced back here and also in Miami. The Miami Station did their name check and we did our name check here. In the case of Cubans, probably the Miami Station had more information on the Cubans than we would have back here.

Q But the names were traced through Agency files?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Through Agency files.

Q Was Secret Service receiving cooperation from FBI on this as well?

A Oh, yes.

Q And in effect, they were getting an all-Agency name check --

A Right.

Q -- on people who might pose a security threat --

A Yes.

Q -- to a candidate?

A Well, they were just trying to determine who might be a security threat.

Q That is right. Potential threat.

A Yes.

Q For what political parties -- strike that.

In 1968 was this service provided for both political conventions?

A Both political conventions.

Q Were they both held in Miami that year?

A No. I guess it was in 1972 they were both held there. I think it was just the Democratic in 1968.

Q These requests did come from the Secret Service rather than --

A From the Secret Service and it was -- the Director of the Secret Service came to the DCI and asked him for

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

support.

Q Do you still maintain the records with respect to that tracing activity?

A I have all the names that have been traced.

Q And they are on little cards down in your files?

A Yes.

Q Why have those records been maintained? Is there any reason those records have been maintained?

A Well, because we were told to maintain them when the Watergate thing broke.

Q I see.

A And since then nobody will destroy anything.

Q OK. Are you aware of any picketing at various places in the country that has been conducted by Cuban groups?

A I was not aware of it until I was told of it. I still don't know whether this was a spontaneous action on the part of these people or whether they were instructed to do it. I tried to run that down and I have been unable to.

Q At what locations has it been reported that pickets were located?

A Airline offices in New York, Miami. I think another place. I forget where it was.

Q Have you in fact been able to verify that these persons were Cubans?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Well, it is a matter of record in the AMOT history that this indeed did take place. Now, what I have been trying to determine is whether the On-Site Case Officer authorized this, which I fully doubt.

Q Who was the On-Site Case Officer?

A At that time it was a fellow by the name of Tony Sforza.

Q Is he still alive?

A Yes, he is down in Miami. But I just do not know whether this was a unilateral action on the part of the AMOTS against the countries that were then trading with Cuba, notably Spain and Great Britain and France.

Q Other than this incident which we -- strike that.

What kind of an investigation have you conducted?

A I have talked to people, which is really all you can do. There is no other way you can do it.

Q You have been unable to determine who, if anyone, authorized this activity? Have you been able to identify any of the persons who participated in the picketing?

A No.

Q With what frequency did this activity occur?

A I don't have any idea. I only know of one instance.

Q This was in New York City?

A New York City and Miami.

Q Do you know of any organized political activity that

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

the AMOTS engaged in?

A To my knowledge, they didn't engage in any.

Q Any political activity.

Do you know of any other activities that they have conducted within this country, they or any of their members have conducted within this country that we have not already discussed this afternoon?

A No.

Q Any political activities? Any operations?

A No. Not really. Of course, we have used certain select individuals to what we call hand-hold defectors, Cuban defectors. In other words, live with them until they are resettled and this type of thing. And this is another activity they engaged in. But other than that, I can't think of anything else.

Q Do you know of any criminal activities that have been attribited to --

A I have heard of some allegations which have never been proven.

Q What are the allegations?

A The allegations concern break-ins and surveillances and this type of thing.

Q Have those allegations been made with any frequency?

A Well, I forget who it was. It was during the

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Watergate trial. Some of these allegations that came out and I think they were carried in the Anderson column but we made file checks and this type of thing. One particular activity was supposed to have been carried out in Rockefeller Center in New York and it turns out it was taken out of context. It was a training mission and -- training exercise. These guys were being trained in surveillance in New York and they were simply asked to go into a branch of the Manhatta -- Chase Manhattan and to come back out and then they were supposed to diagram the layout of the bank. And this to some of them meant casing the bank when in fact it was just a memory exercise.

Q With what frequency were those kinds of training exercises conducted?

A Well, whenever there was an -- whenever it was felt that these people, selected individuals, were to be trained in trade craft.

Q And did their trade craft training include such things as surveillance?

A Sure.

Q And break-ins?

A No. Not break-ins. Nor surreptitious entry. As I said, in the case of this particular thing, it was misinterpreted as casing the bank. These exercises were given -- they could have walked into your office, your outer office and

SECRET

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

said -- the instructor could have said two hours later tell me what is in that outer office? What is the layout of it? This is just for observation.

Q You stated earlier none of those allegations have been proven. Have any of them been proved to your satisfaction?

A No. Ithink we disproved them to my satisfaction.

Q I take it you do not believe they took place other than the training exercise?

A Oh, no. No. I don't believe they did.

Q Do you know of any instances where members of that group have broken in, made any other type of illegal entry in this country?

A No.

Q Have you ever been present at any discussions of the legality or illegality of maintaining stations like the Miami Station within this country?

A Legality? No.

Q How about the propriety?

A Well, to my knowledge, that really never came up. No one to my knowledge, has ever questioned the legality or the propriety of having the Station.

Q There have been some allegations in the press and elsewhere about possible misuse of Cuban exiles, members of that community, by the CIA. Are you aware of those?

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

bh 13

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

A No.

Q We received some correspondence and I have seen some articles that suggest that the Cuban community is sort of a resource that is occasionally tapped by the CIA for various operations in this country.

A You mean this country?

Q Yes. Picketing was one example. There were also some other examples of unusual activities. Do you have any knowledge of use by the CIA of Cuban nationals or exiles for any type of operation within this country?

A No.

Q Do you know whether or not the Agency has provided any financial support for Cuban businessmen in this country?

A No. Not to my knowledge.

Q Other than the maintenance of cover?

A No.

Q Establishment of businesses?

A No.

Q No?

A No.

Q In the course of our discussions today we discussed the AMOTS, the AMDUKES, various political front groups, revolutionary front groups. Are there any other emigre, Cuban emigre groups in the Miami area which have been supported by the Agency, either financially or otherwise?

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Not to my knowledge.

Q Are you familiar with the appendix that was attached to Mr. Colby?s statement?

A Yes.

Q Did you have some role in drafting that?

A You mean the Miami Station thing?

Q Appendix J, entitled, "The Miami Station".

A Yes.

Q You wrote it?

A Yes.

Q It has a familiar ring about it. There are references to indigenous organizations, emigre organizations. Are there any others other than the ones we have been discussing?

A Not to my knowledge. There are, you know, if you want to call it an organization, we did, you know, subsidize the hellout of Juanita Castro.

Q Yes, I am familiar with that.

A You are familiar with all that and that is by the board now, too.

Q She was doing --

A Propaganda.

Q -- propaganda broadcasts.

A Yes.

Q Do you have any personal knowledge of what kind of intelligence-gathering activities are conducted in the Miami area now by the Miami Station?

A There are no domestic activities at all in the Miami Station. All Cuban activities have been moved back here to Headquarters. The Miami Station now is completely and solely involved in the intelligence in the Caribbean.

Q Does the Miami Station -- I beg your pardon -- does the Headquarters component that now handles the Cuban situation in Miami run any agents in the Cuban community?

A No. Well, let me explain that to you. We do have a career agent who has been with us for a good many years in Miami and we do use him to contact relatives of Cubans who are still in Cuba. I mean, relatives who are in the U.S. who have relatives in Cuba.

Now, this is done principally with the idea of a recruitment target, determine weaknesses or strengths, this type of thing. He does contact these people all over the United States. If we come across an individual that looks like he might be recruitable, or perhaps we could even double him, we will, after we make our preliminary assessment, and we find out where relatives and these types of people are, we will ask this career agent or instruct him to go contact these people, be it New York, New Jersey, Chicago, or whatever.

Q So you use Cuban, now citizens or aliens in this country, as access agents.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Right.

Q Just like foreign associates would do.

A Exactly.

Q Are there any more people like Bernard Barker who are contract employees of the Agency who still work in the Miami-Cuban community?

A No. None.

Q That entire apparatus has been --

A Has been dismantled.

Q -- dismantled. What is the current size of the Miami Station?

A I really don't know but it runs between 11 and 14, as far as I know. I think it will be 11 by the next fiscal year.

MR. MANFREDI: Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

MR.MANFREDI: Let's go back on the record.

BY MR. MANFREDI:

Q There are presently no Cuban Ops being conducted out of Miami?

A No. All Cuban Ops. are being conducted out of Headquarters.

Q And even from the Headquarters location there are no paramilitary operations?

A No.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

Phone (Area 202) 544-6000

WARD & PAUL

410 First Street, S.E., Washington, D.C. 20003

Q No covert -- well, there is some propaganda activity being conducted still?

A On a very small scale, and the covert action facility that we had, the radio, taped program, is being terminated by 30 June. So for all practical purposes, it is terminated now.

Q The Miami Station is under official cover.

A Yes.

Q And it has been decreased to how many people?

A Between 11 and 14.

Q And it has absolutely no responsibilities with respect to Cuba?

A Absolutely none.

Q And its responsibilities are entirely directed to other Latin American countries?

A To Caribbean countries.

Q Caribbean countries. And I trust that there are other Agency stations in the Caribbean?

A Yes.

Q Well, I have no further questions, Mr. Sturbitts. If you have anything you would like to add you are welcome to do so.

A No, I have nothing.

Q I want to thank you on behalf of myself and the Commission for your cooperation.

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

A Sure.

Q I am sorry we had to take so much of your time.

A That is all right.

Q Thank you again.

(Whereupon, at 3:35 o'clock p.m., the taking of the deposition was concluded.)

- - -

Photocopy from
Gerald Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10003-10001
RECORD SERIES :	ASSASSINATION FILE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	ASSASSINATION MATERIALS--MISC. ROCK/CIA (9)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD, SPECIAL GROUP MEETING 20 SEPTEMBER 1962
DATE :	09/20/1962
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES CIA CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/15/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS ;	

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD OF SPECIAL GROUP MEETING OF

20 SEPTEMBER 1962

There was discussion of FIRE FLY. Its use over Kamchatka was disapproved. General Carter raised the possibility of using it against Cuba, and State appeared enthusiastic. (General Carter does not feel that any operations which DD/R has been considering have been prejudiced by this discussion.)

There was some discussion of the balloon operation over Cuba, but action was deferred until next week. In the meantime, State is most anxious that it be arranged for the exiles to do this and that they not come running back to Miami immediately. The question was also raised as to whether the exiles could still obtain helium.

The next ambassadorial counter-insurgency team will go to Africa. The chairman will be Carl Hummelsine. We are to drum up a candidate.

In presenting the North Vietnam plan next week, CIA is to include the requirement for an overflight to gather radar information. In connection with the whole North Vietnam operation, State seems determined to have no overflights over Laos and no involvement of Chinese Nationalist aircraft or personnel except possibly Chinese pilots in sterile aircraft with South Vietnam credentials. State plans to balance very carefully the risks versus the potential gains. DD/I is to prepare the same sort of assessment on the North Vietnam operation as on Tibet.

The Air Libya item was approved as presented.

The support to the Apra Party in Peru approved as presented.

On Tibet, to be acted on next week, Secretary Rusk is absolutely firm on getting the Indians cranked in.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

SECRET

General Carter briefed the meeting on the provision of the security advice to the President of Colombia.

General Carter read the CIA memo on CINCARIB communications problems. The meeting expressed delighted surprise at our capability. We are now a full-fledged member of the State-Defense group which is considering this problem.

On Nicaragua, a memo is to be prepared for the Acting DCI describing the degree of Cuban involvement, particularly in the shipment of arms to Nicaragua by way of Honduras. This memo will also cover Communist infiltration of student and labor and a discription of CIA activities in these same fields.

There was a long discussion of the role of USIB in recommending countries to be placed on the counter-insurgency list. Full account to be gotten from Tom Parrott.

There was discussion of the Southeast Asia status report, concentrating on strategic hamlets, the Montagnards, and the bad press situation in Saigon.

General Carter called attention to the memoranda on the North Vietnam presence in Laos. The question came up as to whether there was an SNIE in the works on this. This subject is to be kept current, especially in view of the 6 October deadline.

State and Defense announced that they had now sent the counter-insurgency doctrine papers to everyone in the field.

There was a suggestion that it was time for a progress report on the South Vietnam intelligence capability.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Date: 8/27/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :	ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10003-10016
RECORD SERIES :	ASSASSINATION FILE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	ASSASSINATION MATERIALS--MISC. ROCK/CIA (10)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP, 30 AUGUST 1962
DATE :	08/30/1962
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	CUBA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/15/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

30 August 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group, 30 August 1962

PRESENT: General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Carter, General Lemnitzer, and Mr. Bundy

Colonel Steakley was present for Items 1-3.

Mr. [illegible]ford Herbert was present for Items 4-6.

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

1. Reconnaissance

A. DOD Peripheral Flights

The peripheral flights were approved as presented. It was noted that LOLLY would involve only a single aircraft as opposed to the previous two plane flights in this area. As to LUCETTE and MICHELE, it was pointed out that these flights would not be flown while the Soviet nuclear test prohibited zone was still in effect. In response to a question from Mr. Johnson as to why these flights were 40 rather than 50 miles off the coast, Colonel Steakley said that the distance selected was a variable, depending on the purpose of the flight and other conditions.

B. Laos

General Taylor asked if anyone cared to reopen this matter. Mr. Gilpatric presented the Defense position. In view of the Soviet transport aircraft stand down and the indications that the Communists were at least going through the motions of carrying out the agreement, Defense was in favor of not reopening the matter until the 75 day withdrawal period was over and an evaluation had been made of the degree of Communist compliance. General Lemnitzer, while willing to take the risk of waiting, said he would like to make it clear that from the military point of view it was most important that we have good information on Communist activities. These flights are our prime source of hard information. The consensus of the Group was that this subject would not be reopened until after the 75 day withdrawal period was over.

C. Overflights of South Laos

(1) Colonel Steakley pointed out that there was one problem in connection with a flat prohibition on photo flights over Laos. At present, RF-101's based in Thailand must overfly the southern panhandle

[redacted]

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

enroute to execute missions in South Vietnam. He proposed that the general policy be modified to permit high altitude overflights (35,000 feet) to and from South Vietnam, by planes based in Thailand. It was brought out that the average activity level was about two missions about every three days. There was agreement that photo reconnaissance in general against guerrilla targets was difficult but that this made it all the more important to do all that we can. These flights are essentially covert, as current agreements preclude the filing of flight plans for photo aircraft. Mr. Johnson said that the Department was willing to go along with this activity, but felt that the matter had to be reviewed by higher authority due to his very explicit previous instructions to the contrary. The Group's decision to approve this specific exception to the prohibition against photo flights over Laos was later reported to higher authority.

(2) In discussing the matter above, the desirability of redeploying the aircraft to South Vietnam was mentioned. This matter was referred to Defense for further examination. It was also recognized that the South Vietnamese might well be given some indigenous capability for photo reconnaissance. It was also suggested that possible Laos overflights, after the 75 day period had elapsed, might well be put in the standard overflight category rather than being handled as a separate item.

D. The ELINT flights from Thailand were discussed and approved with the understanding that they would use the specific routes indicated.

E. The Agency's monthly forecast was reviewed and noted. All of the flights contained therein had been previously approved. General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba.

F. The destroyer surveillance mission DESOTO was discussed and approved. It was pointed out that the ship generally operates 20 miles offshore, but closes to 12 miles under certain conditions. The Group requested that they be informed if any of the various ELINT operations picked up unusual indications.

G. The Group reviewed certain submarine activities and approved them as presented.

2. Resupply of the Meos

General Carter raised the question of exactly how approval should be obtained for arms and ammunition resupply missions to the Meos. It was agreed that this was a matter for consultation between the Department of State and CIA, and need not be referred to the Group for decision.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

3. Soviet Signal Intelligence Ships

The Group considered an outline plan for "communication" with Communist crews. The general consensus was that this plan did not fall within the purview of the Special Group. It was referred back to JCS for further development. The matter will be discussed at a State-JCS meeting to be held in the near future. Mr. Gilpatric also expressed interest in seeing a more detailed development of the concept. Mr. Bundy pointed out that we should be careful where such activities are pursued. Generally speaking, they should be limited to the high seas or international air space. General Carter raised the point that this concept should not be stretched to include defection operations on land. This is a highly skilled operation which requires special attention and control. The Group took no particular position for or against the concept in referring it back to Defense.

4. Chile

The Group reviewed the two Agency papers. Mr. Johnson stressed the necessity for concealing U.S. participation in this operation and also expressed some concern about the possibility of the Radicals pulling out prematurely and bringing the government down. The Agency mentioned the desirability of policy-level conversations with suitable Chileans so that they would be aware of the future political arrangements which it is felt would be to the common interests of Chile and the United States. The Group approved the recommendation in paragraph 5 on page 7.

5. Dominican Republic

The Group noted this paper. General Carter urged the Department of State to continue to press the interim government on the desirability of holding early elections.

6. Panama

Mr. Johnson said that State concurred in the general thrust of this paper, but would like to limit the continuation of the program to a three-month period during which time it would be reviewed in detail by State and CIA. The Group approved the proposal with this reservation.

7. General Lemnitzer stated that Mr. McCone had called him and posed a possible requirement for low-level photography of critical Cuban targets. General Lemnitzer said that from the military point of view this was feasible, utilizing either RF-101 or F8U aircraft flown by U.S. pilots from various bases or carriers in the Caribbean area. The

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

EYES ONLY

use of Cuban pilots would involve a delay of some months due to the precise training required. General Carter pointed out that we are accused daily of overflights in any case and that the possibility of Cuban protests should not dissuade us from making these flights if they are necessary. It was pointed out that other types of photography, while useful in pinpointing critical targets, does not give sufficient detail for precise identification of certain types of equipment. After some discussion, the Group agreed to take cognizance of this matter and requested that it be reopened at an appropriate time when specific targets and information needs could be identified.

8. It was agreed that the Agency would present a paper concerning Action Against North Vietnam at next week's meeting.

* * * *

General Taylor did not have an opportunity to review these minutes prior to his departure.

GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

Julian J. Ewell
Colonel, USA

Distribution
- Mr. Johnson
- Mr. Gilpatric
- General Carter
- General Taylor

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : KISS/SCOW
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10003-10090

RECORD SERIES : CHURCH COM.

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 7506462 (2)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : NSC
FROM :
TO : RECORD

TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED) ON MONGOOSE, 9/6/62

DATE : 09/06/1962
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Attached to 178100031006 9. Unmarked but probably TOP SECRET.

approved by Mr. Bundy [illegible]

~~DRAFT~~ MONGOOSE Minutes - 9/6/62
TAP/mm

Lee [illegible]

178-10003-10090
178-10004-10264

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Minutes of Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on Operation MONGOOSE, 6 September 1962

PRESENT: Mr. McGeorge Bundy; the Attorney General; Mr. Martin; Mr. William Bundy, General Decker, General Lansdale and General Harris; General Carter; Mr. Murrow

1. Sabotage Operation

General Carter reported that information should be available by Sunday as to the success of this previously-approved operation. Mr. Bundy requested that the White House be informed as soon as the information is obtained.

2. General Lansdale commented in general on his paper of August 31st. He noted that some of the operational representatives had questioned whether this was responsive to the changed situation engendered by the issuance of NSAM 181, but said that this plan had been prepared within the framework of the previously-approved guidelines (those of August 16). Mr. Bundy noted that most of the paperwork in response to NSAM 181 has been done and the President's statement of Tuesday night had clarified the situation to a considerable degree. He thus felt that the approach taken in the August 31st paper was satisfactory.

3. The following specific comments were then made on Activities listed in the paper: (It should be noted that final approval was not given to the paper at this meeting.)

a. Mr. Martin said that number 20 (balloons) was tricky and that he thought a very careful look should be taken when a specific proposal

UNMARKED
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

is prepared. After considerable discussion, it was agreed that details should be presented to the Group, to include the content of the leaflets which would be dropped, and specifics as to the method and place of launching, the technical details of the release of leaflets, etc., etc.

b. Mr. Martin felt that number 25 ("discovery" of caches of arms) involves an important aspect of timing. He said, and the Group agreed, that any such action should be coordinated with U.S. objectives toward Cuba rather than confusing it with activities in connection with a third country. Mr. Bundy emphasized that any such undertaking should be done with the idea of providing a pretext for further action.

c. In answer to the Chairman's question, Mr. Murrow, supported by State, said that Radio Swan (number 23) should be continued even though it is not entirely effective. This led into a discussion of the possibilities of intrusion into radio and TV channels in Cuba. Mr. Murrow explained the far-reaching reactions that the Cubans could mount against U.S. radio stations, and said that he felt on balance it would not be profitable to provoke this kind of electronic warfare. The Group asked, however, that a detailed paper on the pros and cons of such intrusions, to include the legal aspects involved, be prepared.

d. At General Carter's suggestion, number 21 (propaganda directed at Bloc personnel in Cuba) was assigned to USIA and CIA, rather than just to the latter.

e. On number 28 (sabotage of assets outside of Cuba), the purpose was changed from crippling to harrassing Cuban commerce.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

h. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.

Pertinent background

4. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

failures by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless they could be completely covered up.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatio to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

He mentioned as examples what the U.S. response should be in the event of a revolt and whether or not a naval blockade should be mounted. The Group agreed that such planning, in addition to the military continger plans already prepared, must be pursued.

Although recognizing that this type of activity is not within the MONGOOSE framework, Mr. Bundy ~~felt~~ suggested that General Lansdale's group, particularly the State representative, ~~could~~ might do the initial exploration of possibilities for later consideration by the Special Group, the Secretary of State and higher authority. On the other hand, General Carter felt strongly that if General Lansdale and his associates were given the responsibility for developing the spectrum of possible decisions of this kind, it would inevitably detract from the time available for MONGOOSE operations. This matter was left open for further consideration at a meeting next week.

cc - Gen Lansdale - destroyed 4/8/63 - mm

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	KISS/SCOW
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10003-10176
RECORD SERIES :	CHURCH COM.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	7602957 (9)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	FBI
FROM :	KELLEY, CLARENCE
TO :	DAVIS, JEANNE W.
TITLE :	SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS
DATE :	06/07/1976
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	CHURCH COMMITTEE DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM. FBI
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/19/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Attached to 1781000310175.

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

June 7, 1976

178-10003-10176

BY LIAISON

Ms. Jeanne W. Davis
Staff Secretary
National Security Council
Washington, D. C.

RE: SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE REQUEST FOR LBJ LIBRARY DOCUMENTS

Dear Ms. Davis:

Reference is made to your letter dated May 25, 1976, captioned as above.

This is to confirm the conversation on May 26, 1976, between my liaison representative Robert L. Moore and Mr. Steven L. Skancke of the National Security Council (NSC) Staff. Your letter requested the views of the FBI as to whether documents enclosed with your letter, which were classified by or concerned the FBI, could be made available to the Senate Select Committee (SSC) Staff on a classified basis or made available for access on NSC premises. Mr. Moore advised Mr. Skancke that the following documents could be made available for delivery to the SSC Staff:

1. FBI Current Intelligence Analysis dated November 27, 1963, classified "Secret," (3 pages).
2. John Edgar Hoover letter to Honorable Marvin Watson dated December 2, 1966, classified "Top Secret," (1 page).

SECRET

Classified by 2996
Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

3. John Edgar Hoover letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall dated January 3, 1968, classified "Secret," (1 page).

4. FBI Letterhead Memorandum (LHM) captioned "Training of Negroes in Cuba" dated January 3, 1968, classified "Secret," (2 pages).

5. John Edgar Hoover letter to Honorable Bill D. Moyers dated January 11, 1965, classified "Secret," (1 page).

6. John Edgar Hoover letter to Mrs. Mildred Stegall dated November 3, 1967, classified "Secret," (1 page).

7. John Edgar Hoover letter to Honorable Marvin Watson dated June 7, 1965, classified "Secret," (1 page).

Mr. Moore further advised Mr. Skancke that the following documents could be made available to the SSC Staff with appropriate deletions:

1. FBI LHM captioned "Alleged Cuban Plot to Assassinate Governor Roberto Sanchez Vilella of Puerto Rico," classified "Secret," (1 page). The words "inside Cuba" appearing on the second line of the first paragraph to be deleted.

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

Ms. Jeanne W. Davis

2. White House memorandum addressed to "Mr. President" signed "Marvin" dated November 6, 1967, unclassified (1 page). The words "18 Cuban-trained double agents against the Cubans" appearing in the second sentence of the last paragraph to be deleted.

3. FBI LHM captioned "Training of Negroes in Cuba" dated November 3, 1967, classified "Secret," (2 pages). The words "18 Cuban-trained intelligence agents as double agents or potential double agents against the Cubans" appearing in the third sentence of the last paragraph, page 2, to be deleted.

4. FBI LHM captioned "Plans to Assassinate Cuban Leaders," classified "Secret," (2 pages), dated June 4, 1965, with the word "Williamson" appearing on lines 3, 6 and 9 in the first full paragraph on page 2 to be deleted.

Mr. Skancke was also advised that the FBI LHM captioned "Reaction of Soviet and Communist Party Officials to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy" dated December 1, 1966, classified "Top Secret," (6 pages), should not be delivered but could be made available to the SSC Staff for review on NSC premises. The White House memorandum prepared by "WJ:yb" dated November 24, 1963, was classified "Secret" on May 25, 1976,

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

(3 pages), by FBI Classification Officer 2996, Exempt from GDS, Categories 2 and 3, Date of Declassification Indefinite. This document should not be delivered but could be made available for review by the SSC Staff on NSC premises.

Sincerely yours,

CM Kelley

Clarence M. Kelley
Director

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : DUVAL78-67
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10003-10311

RECORD SERIES : ACCESSION 78-67 (UNPROCESSED)

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CIA HISTORIES

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : CIA "HISTORIES": BREAKDOWN OF CERTAIN ITEMS REQUESTED...

DATE : 03/00/1975
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM.

DOCUMENT TYPE : LIST
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/27/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : No author or date given, presumably Church Committee document request.

(50)

178-10003-10311

CIA "HISTORIES": BREAKDOWN OF CERTAIN ITEMS REQUESTED AND ITEMS NOT REQUESTED

Note: This analysis excludes histories of a purely internal, organizational or administrative nature (such as "CIA Recruitment, 1947-71") and histories of other matters covering essentially the entire period of the CIA (such as "Major Policy Authorization for the Conduct of Covert Paramilitary Activities by CIA, 1948-1966.") It focuses instead on activities or operations -- particularly specific covert or clandestine actions -- and similar matters which are within the Senate Select Committee's stated area of interest and generally attributed to one particular Presidential Administration.

I. Items of significance relating to the period of the Eisenhower and Nixon Administrations

A. Histories requested

1. Monitoring the 1970 Middle East Cease Fire: The Intelligence Role (TS/TKH) (DDI-2)

2. Intelligence Support for President-Elect Richard N. Nixon (TS/SI) (OCI-2)

3. Covert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary Government, 1957-1958 (two volumes) (053)

4. Operations within the Surete Nationale of the Government of South Vietnam, May 1955 - December 1956 (063)

5. The Covert Action Program in France, 1948-1960 (121) (but note that the time period covered by the history begins in the Truman Administration)

6. Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran, November 1952 - August 1953, (208) (but note that the time period covered by the history begins in the Truman Administration)

[redacted]

UNMARKED NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

B. Histories not requested

1. Logistics Support for Operations in Cuba, March 1960 - October 1961 (OL-7) (but note that the time period covered by the history begins in the Kennedy Administration)

2. Problems of Support for Operations in Laos, June 1970 - May 1971 (support memoir) (MS-9)

3. History of the Hungarian Refugee Exploitation Program, December 1956 - June 1958 (DCS-4)

4. Contacts with Ethiopian Dissidents and the 1960 Coups, 1958-1966 (173) (but note that this history also covers the time periods of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations)

II. Items of Significance Relating to the period of the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations

A. Histories requested

1. The 1967 Crisis in Covert Action Operations; The Ramparts Exposure (196) and The 1967 Reappraisal and Readjustment in Covert Action Operations; the Katzenbach Committee Report (354) (two separate but very closely related histories)

2. Counterinsurgency Operations in the Congo (Kinshasa), 1963-1967 (three volumes) (117) (Also requested was a related history -- "Stanleyville Base Personnel Activities During Crisis," August to 24 November 1964 (109) -- (personal memoir of the experiences of an agent held hostage during that period).

3. The Chilean Election Operation of 1964 -- A Case History, 1961-1964 (two volumes) (001)

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

4. Success in Ceylon, 1965, 1960-1965 (TS) (061) (but note that the time period covered by this history begins in the Eisenhower Administration)

5. Funding Covert Operations, 1960-1964 (TS) (015) (but note that the time period covered by this history begins in the Eisenhower Administration)

6. Harassment of CUTAL (The Communist Sponsored Latin American Labor Front), December 1961 - July 1964 (TS) (019)

7. Air Proprietary Program, 1960-1969 (030) (but note that the time period covered by this report begins in the Eisenhower Administration and ends in the Nixon Administration)

B. Histories not requested

1. History of Vietnamese Generals' Coup of 1-2, November 1963- Saigon Station Log & Analysis (TS) (009) and The Vietnam Coup d 'Etat of November 1963 and its Aftermath (0057) (two separate but closely related histories)

2. Vietnam History, The National Interrogation Center (NIC) (Vietnamese), November 1961 - August 1965 (two volumes) (029)

3. Operational Program Against North Vietnam, 1960-1964 (036) (but note that the time period covered by this history begins in the Eisenhower Administration)

4. Experimental Deception and Harassment Operations in Vietnam, February and March 1966 (112)

5. Logistics Support for Operations in Vietnam, July 1962 - December 1966 (OL-8)

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

6. Aspects of the Air and Ground War in Laos, 1965-1967 (160)

7. Logistics Support for Operations in Laos, March 1961 - June 1968 (OL-9)

8. Impressions of Operations at Long Thieng, Laos, May 1962 - March 1964 (005)

9. History of Cuban Refugee Exploitation (Caribbean Admission Center -- CAC), March 1962 - December 1966 (DCS-1)

10. Cuban Missile Crisis - Phase I, 29 August - 16 October 1962 (NPIC-1)

11. The Asia Foundation -- Review of Basic Principles and Priorities, 1963-1965 (Projected) (017)

12. American Friends of the Middle East, Inc., July 1957 - January 1963 (011) (but note that the time period covered by this history also includes the Eisenhower Administration)

13. History of Project WUATLAS, A Covert Action Project Using Proprietary Low Cost Housing Activities, 1960-1968 (032) (but note that this history also includes the last year of the Eisenhower Administration)

14. History of an Air Proprietary Activity in East Africa, 1963-1968 (206) and History of an Air Proprietary Activity in West Africa, 1960-1968 (217) (two separate but related histories; note that the time period covered in the second history includes the last year of the Eisenhower Administration)

15. A Project for the Procurement of Intelligence Material Through Commercial Channels, 1960-1967 (207) (note that the time period

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

covered by this history includes the last year of the Eisenhower Administration)

16. History of a Proprietary Investment Project, Covert Economic Action Phase, 1960-1963 (262) (note that the time period covered by this history includes the last year of the Eisenhower Administration)

17. Newspaper Operations in Lusaka, Zambia, March 1963 - August 1965 (115)

18. An Academic Cover Operation in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, October 1965 - November 1966 (116)

19. A Staff Agent Under Commercial Cover in Tanzania, February 1966 - November 1967 (212)

20. Trade Union Council of South Africa, 1962-1967 (164)

21. The Ethiopian Labor Movement, 1961-1968 (226)

22. The Atassi Case, 1963 - February 1965 (184) (Near East Division) (apparently an operation in Syria)

23. Domestic and Area-Wide Operations (WH/6), August 1963 - 30 June 1967 (172) (Western Hemisphere Division)

24. Emergency Supply Operations During the Dominican Republic Crisis, 29 April - 4 June 1965 (OL-4)

25. A Tour at the White House, 1967-1969 (OCI-3)

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

III. Misellaneous "histories" which were not requested but which -- considering the Senate Select Committee's Charter and stated areas of interest -- are in the nature of "glaring omissions"

1. Staff relations with the Department of State and with Ambassadors, 1957-1967 (TS) (213)

2. War Planning in the Clandestine Services, 1948-1965 (TS) (152)

3. The Evolution of Ground Paramilitary Activities at the Staff Level, October 1949 - September 1955 (163) (and a supplemental history covering 1955-1971 (183) (three volumes)

4. Development of Paramilitary Contingency Cadres, 1948-1971 (two volumes) (336)

5. Operations in Mozambique, 1942-1969 (178)

6. The Secret War in Korea, June 1950 - June 1952 (052)

7. CIA and Korea, 1946-1965 (283)

8. The Psychological Services Staff of the Office of Medical Services, 1951-1966 (OMS-4)

9. Military Secrets in an Open Society: The Yale Report (MS-10)

10. History of the Defector Program, April 1946 - December 1966 (DCS-2)

11. History of Operation LINCOLN, 13 February 1959 - October 1964 (DCS-3) (apparently involving the Cubans)

12. Record of Paramilitary Action Against the Castro Government of Cuba, 17 March 1960 - May 1961 (105)

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

13. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Presenting the Photographic Evidence Abroad (MS-7)

14. The Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962: Second Presentation to DeGaulle (MS-8)

PHOTOCOPY FROM THE GERALD R. FORD LIBPARY

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : WILDEROTTE
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10003-10453

RECORD SERIES : CIA

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : CIA (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : SSCIA
FROM : CHURCH, FRANK
TO : COLBY, WILLIAM E.

TITLE :

DATE : 06/26/1975
PAGES : 25

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CHURCH COMMITTEE
CIA
DOCUMENT REQUEST, CHURCH COM.

DOCUMENT TYPE : LETTER
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Includes three attachments.

FRANK CHURCH, IDAHO, CHAIRM[illegible]
JOHN G. TOWER, TEXAS, VICE CHA[illegible]

PHILIP A. HART, MICH. HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
WALTER F. MONDALE, MINN. BARRY GOLDWATER, ARIZ.
WALTER D. HUDDLESTON, KY. CHARLES MCC. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
ROBERT MORGAN, N.C. RICHARD S. SCHWEIKER, PA.
GARY HART, COLO.

WILLIAM G. MILLER, STAFF DIRECTOR
FREDERICK A. O. SCHWARZ, JR., CHIEF COUNSEL
CURTIS R. SMOTHERS, MINORITY COUNSEL

United States Senate
SELECT COMMITTEE TO
STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH
RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
(PURSUANT TO S. RES. 21, 94TH CONGRESS)
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

22

178-10003-10453

June 26, 1975

Mr. William E. Colby
Director of Central Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Colby:

On May 27 and June 2, the Senate Select Committee informed the Central Intelligence Agency of the Committee's plans for examining the field of foreign intelligence and the subject of covert action. In the area of the domestic activities of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Select Committee intends to address a wide range of issues, including the domestic aspects of CIA's foreign operations. The Committee intends to approach the issues of the CIA's domestic activities with a broad perspective, realizing, as I am sure you agree, that the threats to United States security and the need to protect sources and methods of intelligence, as well as CIA installations and personnel, cross our national borders.

Basically, the subjects of investigation fall into the following five headings:

1. Counterintelligence activities at home and those counterintelligence activities abroad which involve American citizens, including activities undertaken pursuant to the Director's authority to protect intelligence sources and methods.

2. Foreign intelligence activities at home and those foreign intelligence activities abroad which involved American citizens.

3. The domestic operations of the CIA undertaken in support of activities abroad.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

4. Relationships between other organizations, public and private, and the CIA.

5. The use of CIA personnel, funds, or facilities for purposes unrelated to its intelligence missions.

Within these broad subjects of investigation, the Committee will examine "questionable activities" by the CIA. These activities are those where there exist, in the words of the agreed upon Outline for Inquiry Procedures, "specific allegations of Agency or Executive Branch abuses or other controversial specific matters where there is reason to believe improprieties may have occurred". The following categories are believed by the Committee to be among those in which questionable activities have taken place: mail openings; electronic surveillance; equipment testing within the United States; surreptitious entries; penetration of dissident groups; use of cover and false documentation; security investigations, including those initiated as a result of or in connection with news leaks; use of polygraphs; political misuse of the CIA; assistance provided CIA by other agencies or private companies and CIA's assistance to them; CIA management of its investments; CIA use of proprietaries, notional organizations and devised facilities; CIA experiments with drugs on unwitting U. S. citizens; CIA detention of individuals within the United States.

In regard to each questionable activity chosen for study, the Select Committee will examine the nature of the activity and will attempt to evaluate the results. The Committee will also look at the CIA's authority to undertake the activity, the relationship between the activity and the CIA's missions, the internal mechanisms for initiation and review, and the external mechanisms for control of such activities.

Though the initial focus will be on the specific questionable activity, the Select Committee's inquiry is designed to reach fundamental issues which bear directly on the adequacy of the administrative organization and procedures of the CIA, and the legislation presently controlling the Agency. Among the major issues which the Committee will address are:

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

1. What is the legal authority for CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States? What is the legal authority for CIA actions directed at U. S. citizens abroad? Should the authority be clarified or revised?

2. What limitations are placed on CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States by the Constitution and laws of the United States? What limitations are placed on CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities directed at U. S. citizens abroad by the Constitutions and laws of the United States? Should the limitations be clarified or revised?

3. What have been the purposes and aims of CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? How were these objectives set? Were they appropriate? Should they be modified?

4. What is the origin and purpose of the charge to the Director, Central Intelligence, to protect intelligence sources and methods? What actions have been taken pursuant to it? Were those actions appropriate? Should the charge be clarified or revised? Should the DCI be provided with additional authority in order to carry out the charge?

5. What is the origin and purpose of the prohibition on CIA in respect to police and law enforcement powers, and internal security functions? Has this prohibition interferred with the DCI's charge to protect intelligence sources and methods? To what extent has this prohibition interferred with other duties and missions of the CIA? Should the prohibition be clarified or revised?

6. What have been or are now the methods and techniques of intelligence gathering and counterintelligence operations used by the CIA in the United States or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? What is the legal authority

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

for the use of each such technique? How was the use of each such technique authorized, reviewed, and controlled, internally and externally? What was the effectiveness of each such technique in achieving the missions of the CIA? Were any of these techniques used for any purpose other than one related to the CIA's lawful missions? Under what conditions and through what procedures should these methods and techniques be used in the future?

7. What kinds of files have been maintained on U. S. citizens and organizations? What information was retained and for what reasons? Under what conditions and through what procedures should such material be collected or retained?

8. What was the nature of the threats which triggered CIA intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the United States or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? What was the basis for the CIA's estimates of the threats?

9. How are the intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the CIA within the U. S. or directed at U. S. citizens abroad organized and coordinated with other agencies of government? What have been the practices and procedures for liaison, exchange of information, joint operation and mutual support between the CIA and other governmental bodies? To what extent did CIA coordination and cooperation with other government agencies result in questionable activities by the CIA; to what extent did the failure to cooperate or coordinate activities result in questionable activities by the CIA? How did the cooperation or coordination of activities with other governmental agencies relate to the prohibition on the CIA's exercise of police and law enforcement powers or internal security functions? Should the procedures and practices involving other governmental agencies be clarified or revised?

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

June 26, 1975

10. Have governmental officials outside the CIA sought and obtained the CIA's assistance for political purposes or personal advantage? To what extent have private organizations or individuals enjoyed special treatment or influence because of their involvement with CIA activities or their knowledge of such activities? What measures have been or should be taken to ensure that the CIA is not misused in such ways?

11. What have been the procedures and mechanisms within the CIA for initiating, reviewing, reporting, and controlling CIA intelligence or counterintelligence activities within the U. S. or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? How might these procedures be improved? What are the procedures and mechanisms external to the CIA for oversight of the CIA's intelligence and counterintelligence activities within the U. S. or directed at U. S. citizens abroad? How might these mechanisms and procedures be improved?

The annexed notifications set forth requests for additional documents and the names of persons the Committee presently desires to interview. In some cases the occupant of a position is not known to the Committee and the Committee requests that the CIA provide the name of the individual. In any case, where the individual is no longer with the Agency, the Committee requests that the CIA provide the individual's last known address. Finally, the notifications indicate the names of the staff members who, in addition to the Committee's senior staff, will be working in these areas.

The Committee, in the course of the next few months, will undertake other subjects for investigation as its work proceeds and will notify you as appropriate.

We look forward to your cooperation in these matters.

Sincerely yours,

Frank Church
Chairman

John Tower
Vice Chairman

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

ATTACHMENT I.

DOCUMENTS REQUESTED FOR STAFF REVIEW

This attachment lists files and other documentary materials which the Select Committee hereby requests be made available for staff review.

In the first instance, all of the specified material will be reviewed in unsanitized form by staff at CIA headquarters. The Committee will continue to select particular documents to be transmitted to the Committee's offices in Washington to be used in preparing for hearings and the Committee's report.

In order to expedite production of the requested materials we have indicated, where known to the Committee, offices within the CIA which would be appropriate starting points to search for the materials. This effort to expedite matters does not limit the CIA's responsibility to search for such materials throughout the Agency, using as appropriate, lists and indices of CIA projects and programs.

This request calls for "all files" of various programs or projects, and "all files" regarding particular incidents or entities. Requests for "all files" are intended by the Committee to include all subject, correspondence chronological

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

and all other files or unfiled documentary materials in the office, or storage repositories, of the organizational unit which managed the program or project in question.

The requests also include all such files in the offices or storage repositories of the responsible Division Director, Office Director, and Directorate Deputy Director, in the DCI office, and in any other part of the Agency which had significant involvement or connection with the program.

Where the Committee requests "documents" or "documentary materials", those terms are defined as all correspondence, memoranda, notes, working papers, buck slips and routing slips, studies, reports, charts, films, tapes, and all other writings, printings, typings, or drafts, and copies or reproductions.

When files for a specific project or program are requested under the best known designation of that project or program, the request includes files of any earlier or later versions of that project. Thus, the request for Project MHCHAOS would also comprehend files for the antecedent MHALPHA and MHPASHA projects and for the subsequent MHVAPOR.

When any files, portions thereof, or particular documentary materials are no longer available, the Committee

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

requests that they be specified with an accompanying explanation of when and under what circumstances they were destroyed. If no information regarding their destruction is available, please specify the earliest time, and under what circumstances, CIA first became aware the items were missing.

We expect that staff representatives of the Committee and of CIA will expedite compliance with these requests, and indicate priorities for production through preliminary review of this notification and discussion of the files involved. It would also be helpful if CIA identifies those persons within each Directorate and Division or Office who are actually in charge of reviewing and assembling material, so that Committee staff can also discuss these requests with them and resolve rapidly any questions or difficulties which might arise.

We also expect that a good deal of this material will be readily available in view of the reviews already done by CIA in this area over the past two years. As soon as some portions of any requests are available for review, the Committee staff should be notified in order that they may begin their inspection while the remainder is being assembled.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

Finally, it should be noted that this document request does not supersede any earlier requests for material in this area which are still outstanding. If CIA staff encounters overlap in responding to this and earlier requests, the Committee staff should be promptly notified.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

FILES

The following files are requested. In order to expedite their location, the Committee has indicated offices which appear to be the best starting point for a search. This does not limit, nor supersede the general guideline that all files throughout the CIA relating to a project be procured. If projects herein identified are not CIA projects, but are identifiable as projects of other agencies with which CIA had some connection, the request is for all CIA files regarding such projects.

In the first instance, all of the specified material will be reviewed in unsanitized form by staff at CIA headquarters. The Committee will continue to select particular documents to be transmitted to the Committee's offices in Washington to be used in preparing for hearings and the Committee's report.

I. All files regarding the following projects, incicents or entities:

1. OXBRAKE
2. SRPOINTER, HTLINGUAL, SRWESTPOINTER, and MKSOURDOUGH (SR and FE, CI and OS)
3. MPLODESTAR (including all files for MPTROTKA and MPCHAUVINISM as well as any other files regarding the institution or operation of notional organizations by CIA or other organization for similar or related purposes [FE])
4. DESTRY (WE)
5. AMCRAFT, AMBADUCT and RIVAL MIAMI (WH)
6. MHCHAOS (CI, FE, FRD, OS)
7. HYDRA (CI or OS)

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

8. MHDOZEN (CI, OF)

9. LPMEDLEY

10. All files relating to CIA participation in the Intelligence Evaluation Committee (CI)

11. All files reflecting or relating to breaking and entry, surreptitious entry or technical surveillance done by or for the Foreign Resource Division (DODS)

12. Foreign Resources Division, New York Base, files on projects or other activity relating to United Nations and United Nations personnel (1964-1965, 1968, 1972)

    [Select Committee Staff are available to examine New York base files presently retained in New York City at that facility]

13. FRD New York Base chronological files (1969,1971 and 1972)

14. FRD Washington Base chronological files (1969, 1971 and 1972)

15. All files, or other documents, including those prepared for the DCI or his assistants, regarding the New York Times article by Seymour Hersh of December 29, 1974.

16. All files regarding technical coverage by United States Government agencies of the Israeli Embassy in Washington, D.C. and of the Chilean Embassy and Chilean U. N. Mission Offices in New York City and private residences of Chilean diplomats in America (FI/Staff D, OC, WH, CI, TSD)

17. All files on International telephone link intercepts (FI/D, OC, TSD)

18. All Technical Services Division files regarding support of CONUS (domestic) intelligence operations by the Department of Defense

19. All files regarding the use of "false documentation" prepared or provided by CIA which involved its use for purposes other than identification, e.g., to discredit, harrass or otherwise affect adversely the person identified in the false documentation. This request covers such use of "false documentation" whether used by CIA or other agencies and whether such use was contemplated or authorized by CIA. The request does not include use of such documentation in foreign operations against non-U. S. citizens. (Cover Staff, TSD)

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

20. All files regarding the testing of mind or behavior influencing drugs on unsuspecting subjects, and any records pertaining to the destruction of materials on the subject.

21. All indices regarding the testing of the effects of radiation, electric shock, harassment substances (1950-1975), as well as the testing of drugs on volunteers (1950-1975)

22. All TSD files regarding the training of personnel from other government agencies in techniques of sabotage, surreptitious entry, electronic surveillance.

23. The following Office of Security projects or programs:

SALVAGE	SUNDANCE
MERRIMAC	PINEAPPLE
RESISTANCE	BUTANE
SPYDER	REDFACE I (and any subsequent REDFACE projects)
SIESTA	CELOTEX I and CELOTEX II
WUDOOR	MUDHEN
DMUREC	PARAGON
MOCKINGBIRD	TWO-FOLD

24. All files relating to the proposal, and subsequent efforts to modify or implement the program described as "PROJECT 1" in the Rockefeller Commission Report (p.137)

25. All files of the Security Research Staff Chief and all Chronological Files of the Security Research Staff (1967-1973)

26. Chronological files of Target analysis group, Special Activities Division (1967-1973)

27. All files of the Technical Surveillance Unit, Washington Field Office Office of Security (1968-1973)

28. Chronological files Special Electronic Operations Branch and all files of the Chief of the Special Electronic Operations Branch, Special Programs Division, Office of Communications (1967-1973)

29. Chronological files, Chief of the Special Programs Division, Office of Communications (1967-1973)

30. [illegible] (OC)

31. WUGRAVEL (OC)

32. ORKID (OC)

33. ROSE (OC)

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

34. Any additional files on any incidents of technical surveillance, technical penetration, surreptitious entry, breaking and entering, by the CIA directly or in cooperation with another organization, public or private.

Directorate for Intelligence

35. Domestic Contact Service file and Office of Legislative Counsel file on Spring 1972 meeting of Lee Freeman, Esq. and Vernon Sando, head of Chicago Office, DCS and any additional files on inquiry regarding such meeting by Senator Edward Kennedy

36. Domestic Contact Service file on collection of overseas telephone call slips from telephone company

37. DCS assessment of U.S. citizens suitability for assistance to or use by CIA

Office of General Counsel

38. MHMUTUAL and WHBRINEY (OGC, OF) 1960-1973. The request does not include documentation of particular financial transactions, actuarial studies or technical data on the investment program.

Directorate for Science and Technology

39. LONGSHAFT, TAMPER and RIVERBOAT (ORD)

40. 1967 Test of laser probe for recording, in San Francisco (ORD)

41. UP CLOSE (ORD)

42. OFTEN (ORD)

43. SALVAGE

44. DRUGGS

45. SANCA

46. PROFILES

47. MHBOUND

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

II. All CIA files, including without limitation any 201, Office of Personnel, Office of Security or Executive Registry files, on the following individuals:

1. Richard J. Lavoie (ITT)
2. Adm. Ellery W. Stone (ITT)
3. Robert Vesco
4. Juan Trippe (PanAm)
5. Harold Geneen (ITT)
6. Robert Peloquin (Intertel)
7. James O. Golden (formerly Intertel)
8. M. Salvatore Giancana
9. John Roselli (or "John Ralston")
10. Santos Trafficante
11. Robert Merritt
12. G. Gordon Liddy
13. Howard Hunt
14. James McCord
15. Bernard Barker
16. Eugenio Martinez
17. Felipe De Diego
18. Reynoldo Pico
19. Frank Fiorini (or Frank Sturgis)
20. Ramon Gonzales
21. Max Gonzales
22. Virgino Gonzalez
23. Manuel Artime

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

24. Daniel Ellsberg
25. Andrew St. George
26. Jack Anderson (including without limitation Office of Security file or 201 file #349691 or 349696)
27. Justice William O. Douglas
28. Seymour Hersh
29. Neil Sheehan
30. Howard Hughes
31. Lee Pennington

[Where cross reference or other notations in any file indicate that a file concerning any of the above persons is kept under a different name, such files are also to be made available.]

III. All CIA files, including without limitation, any Central Cover, Commercial Cover Group or Executive Registry files on the following organizations:

1. ITT
2. Gulf Oil Corporation
3. Hughes Tool Corporation, Summa Corp, and related entities
4. International Intelligence Inc. ("Intertel")
5. Wackenhut Corporation
6. Dector Corporation
7. Pan American Airways
8. U.S.R.&D. Corporation

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

IV. All files regarding the following projects, incidents or entities discussed in the so-called "Family Jewels - 694 pages," the responses to Director Schlesinger's request for reports on questionable activities: [Page references in parentheses are to the pagination of the "694 pages" as received by the Select Committee from CIA.]

1. CIA contact of three persons involved with CIA field support group regarding the Watergate Special Prosecutor Task Force inquiry (p.52-53)
2. CIA payment of money to the Department of Justice (p.76)
3. Involvement of CIA through Identity 36 in labor organization internal dispute (Elder memorandum, p. 457 ff. Item 7)
4. Domestic Contact Service activity (deleted) (p.184, Item 11)
5. FBIS supply of translators to FBI for sensitive Washington Project (o.202)
6. Program which Carl Duckett wanted to "scrub down" before its inclusion in OTS response to DCI (p. 213)
7. TSD (OTS) program (deleted) (p. 215)
8. Projects or incidents involving TSD furnishing assistance, equipment or guidance to FBI (p.221 ff.)
9. Office of Research and Development microwave intercept test (involving Identity 130 system (p.238 ff. para. B)
10. Telephone intrusion study (p.238 ff. para. C)
11. Test of intercept system for Identity 93 communication links (p. 238 ff. para. H.)
12. Surveillance of Minneapolis and Kansas City (p. 256 ff. Item 6)
13. Surveillance of foreign code clerk (p. 426)

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

14. Electronic surveillance of Identities 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, and 65 (p.426)

15. Arrangements between CIA and State Department Passport Office for CIA to obtain alias passports (p. 487-488)

16. Operation against Identity 95, including related entry operation against Ifentity 126 (p. 456 ff. Item 3)

17. American business offer of money to be used in Panamanian elections (Elder Memorandum, p. 456 ff. Item 6)

18. Provision of alias documentation to Department of Justice for use by witness against Jim Garrison (p. 484-485)

19. Deleted item regarding non-agency cooperator and operational tool (p. 486)

20. Provision of CIA funds to FBI (p.582)

21. Proprietary in Falls Church, Virginia (p.29)

22. CIA furnishing of funds to defer the expenses of President Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia (pp 71-74)

23. CIA payment of funds to the Department of Justice (p.76)

24. CIA privision of funds to defer the expenses for the Cambodian speech responses (p.77)

25. Provision of information to the SEC regarding organized crime (p.541)

26. Files regarding the proprietary used to buy electronic surveillance equipment (p.107)

27. TSD provision of assistance to FBI (p.109-116)

28. Office of Security Special Support Operation (p.109-116)

29. Sensitive ORD Projects (p. 163-164)

[The above requests may involve some overlap among the items in the "Family Jewels" or between them and other elements of this request, which overlap the Committee is not now in a position to determine. Where that occurs, this overlap should simply be called to the attention of the Committee Staff.]

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

IV. The following specific documents are also requested:

1. All documentation of the destruction of files on "49 personalities" which had been compiled by the Special Operations Group/CI

2. The indices to the Domestic Assets Inventory kept by the FRD

3. All responses by the Foreign Resources Division to the request of Director Schlesinger for information on "questionable activities" including any "follow-up" responses to Director Schlesinger, Director Colby or the IG.

   All employee responses or memoranda of conversations with employees both from within FRD and elsewhere in the CIA, and all other memoranda, notes, or other documents and materials used by FRD in preparing any of the responses to DCI or used in preparing any related briefings of the DCI or his assistants.

4. May 29, 1973 memorandum from Chief, Covert Intercept Branch, Division D, FI Staff to the Inspector General (TS-Eyes Only-Control SC 06611/73)

5. All other responses by Division D to the request of Director Schlesinger for information on "questionable activities," including any "follow-up" responses to Director Schlesinger, Director Colby or the IG

   All employee responses or memoranda of conversations with employees both from within Division D and elsewhere in CIA, and all other memoranda notes or other documents and materials used by Division D in preparing any of the responses to DCI or in preparing any related briefings of DCI or his assistants.

6. Western Hemisphere Division's list of Cuban refugee organizations in which CIA had interests (Page B-17, Tab 15 of CIA notebook on domestic activities prepared in response to Part IV of Committee March 12 document request.)

7. May 15, 1973 memorandum by Harry B. Fisher to DD M & S on "irregular activities."

8. All Inspector General memoranda to DCI regarding "questionable activities," "Family Jewels" or similar matters subsequent to the IG Report of May 21, 1973.

9. All Office of Security Watch Office tapes and transcriptions thereof for the period June 16 to June 22, 1972.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

10. All correspondence, memoranda or other documents prepared within or received by CIA in connection with the 1965 order of President Johnson barring wiretapping and electronic eavesdropping by federal personnel.

11. Appointment calendars of Richard Helms and Robert Cushman 1969-1973.

12. Reports by Jack Bauman December 1971-January 1972 on meetings with Howard Hunt.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

II. CIA PERSONNEL TO BE INTERVIEWED OR DEPOSED

The following list indicates the CIA personnel the Committee has thus far decided to interview, or depose.* Where known, specific persons are identified. In all other cases, the position or program responsibility and pertinent years are provided so that CIA can identify the appropriate persons; if the person is no longer with the Agency, the Agency should provide the last known addresses.

A. Directorate of Operations

1. DDO AREA

William Nelson, Tom Karamessines, David Blee, Cord Meyer

Executive Assistant to DDO (1966-1972)
Director of Missions and Program Staff (inception - 1972)

2. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STAFF

Donovan Pratt, Jane Ronan, Newton Miller, John Hodden, Brick O'Neal

Executive Assistant to CH/CI (1966-1972)
Chief, Police Group (1967-1972)

Special Operations Group:

Richard Ober, Jason Horn

Deputy Chief (1967-1973)
Secretary to Chief and Deputy Chief
Branch Operations Officer
All "Case Officers"

---

* Individuals are listed under the office in which they worked during the period in question. Organizational entities are identified as they existed in those periods.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

CI Personnel handling Projects:

SRPOINTER
HTLINGUAL
SRWESTPOINTER
MKSOURDOUGH

3. OPERATIONS STAFF

Seymour Bolten

4. FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STAFF

Chief and Deputy Chief/FI (1967-1973)

Division (of Staff) D:

Carelton Swift, Warren L. Dean, Frederick Griffin, Robert Halverson, Gerald Fallon, Frank Hoose.

Chief and Deputy Chief/D; Deputy for Plans and Policy/D (1967-1973)

5. CENTRAL COVER STAFF

Eric Eisenstadt

Chief and Deputy Chief (1965-1975)
Chief, Corporate Cover Branch (1965-1975)

6. COVERT ACTION STAFF

Chief and Deputy Chief (1965-1973)

7. FAR EAST DIVISION

Chief (1968)
Domestic Operations Branch (1967-1973)
Branch Chiefs and Project Officers for:

(a) MPLODESTAR (and MPCHAUVINISM and MPTROIKA, if separate project officers);
(b) "PROJECT 1" as described by the Rockefeller Commission Report (p. 137);
(c) Mail opening involving Far East correspondence (1967-1973)

8. WESTERN EUROPE DIVISION

Officers involved in queries of stations on Robert Vesco and IOS matters and in communications to Swiss authorities regarding Vesco's detention

Principal liaison officer with CI/SOG (1967-1973)

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

9. AFRICAN DIVISION

Principal liaison officer with CI/SOG (1967-1973)

10. DOMESTIC OPERATIONS DIVISION (now FOREIGN RESOURCES DIVISION)

Gordon Jorgenson, John Shaffer, Seymour Russell, Walter O'Brien, Stanley Gaines, Robert T. Cassidy, Joseph Bulik, Maurice Sovern, John Markham, Lydia Kenney

Chief (1964-1973)
Deputy Chief, Chief Intelligence Operations Group; Chiefs Branch I and Branch II; Chief Special Projects Staff (1967-1973)
Chief Commercial Management; Chief Commercial Operations (1964-1971)
Base Chiefs New York, Miami, Chicago, San Francisco, Boston, Los Angeles, and Washington (1964-1973)
All supervisory personnel, New York Base (1968-1973)

11. WESTERN HEMISPHERE DIVISION

William Broe, J. D. Esterline, Bruce Cheever, Ted Shackley, Lawrence Sternfeld, Paul Holliwell

Chief and Deputy Chief/WH (1965-1973)
Chief, Cuban Operations (1965-1973)
Chief, Cuban Operations Group, Miami Operations Branch
Chief, Miami Station (JMWAVE) (1963-1973)
Chile Desk Officer, Headquarters (1971-1972)

12. SOVIET BLOC DIVISION

Chief, U. S. Operations Branch (1967-1973)
Project Officer and Branch Chief on SRPOINTER, HTLINGUAL

13. TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION (now OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICES, DDS&T

Carl Duckett, John McMahon, Everett O'Neal, Paul Kater, Norm Jackson, John Ward, Bruce O'Dell

Chief, Deputy Chief and Deputy Chief for Operations/TSD (1965-1973)
Chief Audio Branch; CH/Training Branch; and CH/Special Devices Branch (1967-1973)

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

TSD Officers in charge of training and in charge of technical assistance for:

(a) Penetration of locks and other security barriers in connection with surreptitious entry;
(b) Electronic, other technical, or photographic surveillance (1967-1973)

B. Directorate of Management and Services

1. OFFICE OF SECURITY

Charles Kane, Edward Sayle, Louis Vasaly, Cecil Tighe, Arthur Sheridan, Victor White, John B. Cryer, Jack Bauman, William Curtin, Walter Richardson, Frank Favorini, James McCabe, Edmund Kilppa, Joseph Langea, J. K. Hutchinson, Ralph Orcutt, John J. Sullivan, Frederick Evans, Lawrence Howe, Robert Robinson, David Hanlon, Wallace Geiman, Meredith Flook, Jack Turton, George R. Brewer, George Swegman

Project Officer in Office of Security and Project Officer at Anderson Associates for PROJECT MERRIMAC:
Office representatives involved in proposal of "PROJECT 1" referred to in the Rockefeller Commission Report (p. 137);
Project Officer for PROJECT RESISTANCE.

2. OFFICE OF COMMUNICATIONS

Richard Scott, Lloyd Harnage, Florend Kindell, Daniel Wakeman, James Fisher, F. G. Israelson, John Coffey, Arthur Reinhardt, Paul Rinaldo

3. OFFICE OF FINANCE

Warren D. Magnuson, Thomas Yale

Director (1965-1975)
Director, Monetary Division (1965-1975)
Director, Proprietary Systems and Accounts Division (1965-1975)

C. Directorate of Intelligence

1. OFFICE OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH

Officers tasking other CIA offices for queries on Robert Vesco and IOS

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

5

2. DOMESTIC CONTACT SERVICE

Vernon Sando

DCS Director;
Chief of New York Office, DCS (1967-1973)

D. Directorate of Science and Technology

Robert Chapman, Sayre Stevens, James Kirsch, John McMahon

E. DCI Area

1. OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL

John Warner
John K. Greaney

2. OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL

John Maury
George Carey

3. INSPECTOR GENERAL AND REVIEW STAFF

Donald Chamberlain, Scott Breckenridge, William Broe

4. OTHER

Seymour Bolten
John Clarke

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

III.

The following staff members along with the senior staff of the Committee are presently working on this aspect of the Select Committee's inquiry:

Burton Wides
Michael Madigan
Elliot Maxwell
Howard Liebengood
Paul Wallach
Joseph diGenova
John Peterson

If other persons begin to work in this area, appropriate notification will take place.

Photocopy from the Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10004-10053
RECORD SERIES :	ASSASSINATION FILE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	DCI PRESENTATION TO THE PFIAB, 7 DECEMBER 1962
DATE :	12/10/1962
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES PFIAB OPERATION MONGOOSE MC CONE, JOHN CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/03/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	

TOP SECRET [illegible]

178-10004-10053

10 December 1962

[illegible] THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE see page 3

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD.

SUBJECT: DCI Presentation to the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board, 7 December 1962

1. After concluding the discussion on Cuba, the Director told the Board that he wanted to report on the status of OXCART. He noted that we were on schedule with the aircraft, and that five would be completed by the end of December. He said that one had reached MACH 2.16 at 60,000 feet. There had been some trouble with the J-58 engines, but all problems were soluble. He said the progress on the aircraft was running ahead of that on the engines, and noted that we had had 75 hours in the air with 18 hours on the J-58 engine. He said he had been in direct contact with Mr. Horner to insure that the project was receiving top priority. Dr. Killian asked if Pratt and Whitney had their first team in and the DCI said yes, but one of the problems was that Hamilton Standard didn't have access to everything in Pratt and Whitney unless Horner paved the way.

2. Dr. Baker asked if there had been a solution to the fuel pump problem and the DCI commented that he believed a solution was being reached. Dr. Killian noted that Bendix was working on an alternative fuel pump. The DCI concluded by saying that while the radar cross section was not as small as we had hoped for, it was being worked on.

SCI

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

TOP SECRET [illegible]

BYE 3750-6.
~~KS#[illegible]~~9.

3. Mr. McCone then turned to the budget and noted that some difficulties had arisen in this connection and in the over all field of coordination. He reminded the Board that they had wanted him to review the budgets of the whole intelligence community, and noted that the military intelligence budget was 90% of the over all effort. He said that he had discussed this with Secretary McNamara. Dr. Killian reiterated that he thought the DCI should review the whole intelligence budget. The DCI noted that intelligence in Defense was going through a transitional period with the development of DIA and other changes. General Doolittle expressed surprise that CIA was only 10% of the intelligence budget. The DCI pointed out that Defense was spending $3,844,000,000 on intelligence and CIA only $363,000,000. This was an increase from $2,250,000,000 in the past, but Defense had put all reconnaissance of the Navy and Air Force into its intelligence budget. He said he did not believe this was correct, and thought it should be deleted.

4. Turning to the CIA budget, the Director said he had instructed the Agency to keep at the level of last year--this was about $50,000,000 less than what had been asked for by the various departments. He said he thought the Agency had worked hard to keep the budget down, and noted that there had to be additional funds for operations against Cuba. There was an increase in NPIC, and as a result the budget was $425,000,000 versus $405,000,000. The Bureau of the Budget had cut this to $381,000,000 and taken $20,000,000 for Cuban operations to charge to the Reserve. The DCI said he found this unacceptable, and thought the contingency should be pure. At this point

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Mr. Clifford said he had run across the phrase, MONGOOSE, on several occasions, and asked what this involved. The DCI then explained briefly the MONGOOSE project and how it was set up. He said that after his discussion with the President and Attorney General last fall, it had been decided to utilize all resources to unseat Castro. He went on to mention some of the activities of the project. Mr. McCone then said he did not favor continuing sabotage and guerilla operations. He noted that he was very disturbed about the future and felt that there might be a confrontation within the next few days, and that the Russians might light up the SAM's. He said he had no way of explaining why the SAM sites were being left there. Dr. Langer asked if it might not be for fear of an invasion; the Director said he did not think so because our military forces could eliminate the SAM sites without much trouble.

5. Mr. McCone then said he wanted to discuss the NRO agreement. He said that it had not worked, and the Director of NRO feels that he must have fiscal control over CIA projects and review programs progressively week by week and month by month. The DCI said this was wrong because the appropriation was to CIA and was approved by a different committee of Congress to whom we were responsible. He noted that CIA could handle the project more clandestinely. He had discussed this matter with the Secretary of Defense but had reached no agreement. Defense is withholding $140,000,000 and asking CIA to fill out certain forms before they will advance the money. The Director said that such a decision cannot be made retro-

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 4/17/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10054

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM : KIRKPATRICK, LYMAN
TO : RECORD

TITLE : MEETING OF THE DCI WITH PBIAB, FRIDAY, DECEMBER 28, 0930 A.M.

DATE : 12/28/1962
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS
PFIAB
MC CONE, JOHN
OPERATION MONGOOSE
CUBAN EXILES

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 09/09/2016

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Dec
27 28
1962

CONFIDENTIAL

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27 - 28, 1962

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		December 27th
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Review of Board's Draft Interim Report to the President
3.	10:00 - 12:45	Review of Draft Report on Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup (Received from DCI on December 26, 1962)
4.	12:45	Depart for Lunch
5.	1:00 - 2:30	Lunch - The Hay-Adams Hotel (Guests of Dr. Langer)
6.	2:30 - 3:30	Review of the World Situation ~~Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA~~ [illegible]
7.	3:30 - End of Day	Resume Review of Report on Cuban Arms Buildup
8.	7:30 p.m.	Dinner at Residence of Mr. John McCone (3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.) (attended by all Bd. members except Land, Baker, [illegible])
		December 28th
9.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
10.	9:30 - 1:00	Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup with the Following Key Intelligence Community Officials:

- a. 9:30-10:30 ✓ Mr. John McCone
- b. 10:30-11:00 ✓ Lt. General M. Carter, Deputy Director, CIA
- c. 11:15 / 12:00 11:00-~~11:30~~ ✓ Lt. General G. Blake, Director, NSA
- d. 12:00 / 12:35 ~~11:30-12:00~~ ✓ Mr. Thomas Hughes, Deputy Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of Stat
- e. 12:35-1:30 12:00-1:00 ✓ Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director, DIA

CONFIDENTIAL

(December 28th - Continued)

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	1:00 - 2:30 2:30 —(3:45)—	Lunch - Room 21, Executive Office Building McGeorge Bundy + Tom Parrott
12.	2:30 - 3:30	~~Status of Implementation of Prior-Board Recommendations~~ ~~Mr. Russell Ash~~
13.	3:30 - END	Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of Report to the President.

TOP SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document contains information
[illegible] IDEALIST, CORONA
OXCART

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962

The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelligence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the discussions which the Board would have on the following day with heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.

Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr. McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelligence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that the Board is going into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting.

---

* Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

TOP SECRET

Handle Via COMINT-TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels Only

Handle via BYEMAN Control System

24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intelligence on Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the present time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is conducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board. The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypothetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sanitized version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of the Congress.

Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to intelligence handling.

On the question of availability of Special Group records for purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that certainly the Board should examine such records and that they could be obtained from Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that the Board is the only group which can have this kind of access). ✓

As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that the Board should include in its review discussions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report.

Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.

With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One other matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.

(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:

USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute, and an open break in party relations is most likely near.

USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.

USSR/Berlin: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin, and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.

The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was taking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations under way.

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cuba crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any interference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave -- and Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur, it will be necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption of low-level flights.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes, it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba. He would like to see a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of British, French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney, Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the "African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer.

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. McCone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules. [redacted]

Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base -- Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy decision was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guantanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr. McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently added two more positions there

Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.

With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U. S. missile superiority.

Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10056

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : MISC. ROCKEFELLER COM. AND CIA FILES (9)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO : DIRECTOR, CIA

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 11/14/1962
PAGES : 33

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
CUBA
CIA
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/04/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

MONGOOSE - YAKAS S, 12-1

178-10004-10056

14 November 1962

SCI

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : CIA Handling of the Soviet Build-up in Cuba, 1 July - 16 October 1962

CONTAINS SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION

A. The Background

1. The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the spring of 1962, and preparations within the USSR must have been under way from that time on. There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, particularly reconnaissance and survey work. The only indication of these operations which has so far been found is a single intercepted personal message on 11 April to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not judged solid or important enough to warrant inclusion by itself in current intelligence publications.

2. Thus, until the first evidence of the deployment began to come in late in July, Washington had no warning of the USSR's intention. Intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focussing during July on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in Castro's assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in the "Escalante affair." This attitude was reflected in reporting on the visit of Raul Castro to Moscow early in the month. The President's Intelligence Checklist, which will normally be used in this memorandum as the record of CIA reporting to the President, Secretaries of State and Defense, General Taylor, and McGeorge Bundy, reported on 4 July that Raul was "probably seeking more Soviet military aid and, specifically, more advanced equipment such as the MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR is already providing to Indonesia, Egypt, and Iraq." The Checklist of 19 July, however, noted that Raul had left Moscow without the usual publicity and communiqué, and surmised that this was "a pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive." (The Central Intelligence Bulletin, whenever coordination permitted, carried material generally similar to the content of the Checklist.)

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

3. The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62, The Situation and Prospects in Cuba, passed by USIB on 1 August 1962, as the intelligence foundation for MONGOOSE. This estimate stated that:

a. "By force of circumstances, the USSR is becoming ever more deeply committed to preserve and strengthen the Castro regime. The USSR, however, has avoided any formal commitment to protect and defend the regime in all contingencies."

b. "We believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba Bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate."

c. "The Soviets...would almost certainly never intend to hazard their own safety for Cuba's sake," but "have sought to create the impression that Cuba was under the protection of their missile power..."

d. "We believe that the Bloc will continue to limit its military assistance to Cuba /to defensive weapons7. Such a policy would not preclude the provision of more advanced jet fighters, surface-to-air missiles, and modern radars, or even the provision of a token number of IL-28 jet light bombers..."

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

B. The Soviet Operation Begins

4. During the last two weeks of July, Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel for the build-up made their first voyages to Cuban ports, the first arriving in the period 26-29 July. Knowledge of some of these movements reached CIA through routine intelligence coverage of Soviet shipping before the ships reached Cuba. No particular significance is normally attached to such voyages. However, evidence gradually accumulated that the "behavior pattern" of these ships was similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that even greater security measures than usual were in effect, that a number of the ships were coming from Baltic rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships, and finally that there was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward Cuba on an unprecedented scale.

5. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use. Commenting on an NSA report that certain Soviet ships were en route to Cuba which had declared for other destinations, this paper stated on 1 August that "at lease some, if not all, of the ships involved probably are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba." This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's comment on the same information, i.e., that it tended to corroborate a report by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana (earlier intercepted by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war materiel.

6. CIA was also in disagreement with DIA over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting difficulties in coordination of the Central Intelligence Bulletin held up publication from 3 August to 9 August of the first item on the Cuban build-up in that publication. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily Intelligence Summary said that "The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba..." There were further difficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photography on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to Washington.

7. The Checklist reported the accumulating information fully to the President. On 4 August, it stated that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such a delivery would not be far short of the total amount of arms delivered in the first half of 1962." On 9 August, it said "Soviet shipments to Cuba have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some 32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe there are any combat troops among them."

8. The DCI on 8 August briefed the Republican Policy Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians. Two days later, at a MONGOOSE meeting, he again stressed the importance of this intelligence and raised questions as to what purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and materiel. He said that the United States must face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify because of US missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey.

9. Soviet operations in August involved primarily the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast defense missile positions. By the middle of August CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled and fragmentary, enabled analysts to pinpoint areas of construction and identify some of the equipment coming in. On 18 August, the Checklist reported "There are grounds for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be connected with the beginning of construction of surface-to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that the shipments have included quantities of electronic, transportation and construction equipment, some of it similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the arriving Soviets are construction personnel..." There were further Checklist items along the same line on 23 and 28 August.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

C. The July Overflight Program

10. On 10 July, General Taylor, motivated primarily by the extensive use of aerial reconnaissance in following Chinese Communist military activities in Fukien, had asked the DCI for a comprehensive review of aerial photography activities. The end-product of this exercise was a series of memoranda dated approximately 16 July from the DD/I to the DCI. The one on Cuba recommended that U-2 flights over Cuba be continued at their current level of two a month. It cited inter alia in justification that earlier missions over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false," and that "our most important need is for any evidence of the deployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba." This proposal was approved by the Special Group on 19 July and later by the President.

11. The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized for August was flown on 5 August, probably just too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment entering the island at that time. The second mission was originally scheduled for 8 August but cancelled because of weather. The next day the Special Group gave the DCI discretion to fly the second August mission "whenever the immediate situation with regard to Soviet materiel justified it." COMOR reaffirmed its requirement for the second mission on 13 August. The mission was again scheduled for the period beginning on the 19th, held up for 9 days by weather and eventually flown on 29 August. (See Para 19)

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY THE WHITE HOUSE

D. Promulgation of NSAM 181 and the Response

12. On 21 August the DCI attended a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office at which were also present Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, Generals Taylor and Lemnitzer, and McGeorge Bundy. He told this group that information available since 10 August indicated the extent of Soviet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installations or missile sites, probably ground-to-air. The DCI again raised the possibility that the Soviets would locate MRBMs in Cuba, and there developed a discussion of possible US courses of action in case they did so. It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would discuss the situation with the President on 23 August.

13. At the meeting of the 23rd, a number of actions were decided upon to deal with what was agreed to be a critical problem for the United States. These actions were formalized in NSAM 181. (In addition, the President asked for a continuing analysis of the number and types of Bloc personnel and equipment in Cuba). Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet military development in Cuba, including the probable establishment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore the President had taken action on the intelligence received. There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being installed--in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route from the USSR--but the possibility had been discussed by the President and his advisors.

14. The paragraphs of NSAM 181 applicable to CIA dealt with: a) release of information, b) MONGOOSE, and c) "An analysis [which] should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the US." The first two subjects are outside the scope of this memorandum; the third exists as a memorandum dated 31 August prepared largely by McGeorge Bundy and the DD/I. This paper, which had the benefit of preliminary results of the 29 August U-2 mission, concluded that the introduction of surface-to-air missiles was the "most probable present Soviet missile activity," and that such missiles would be a serious threat to aerial reconnaissance, but not to "determined US attack." It stated that "surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear warheads would constitute a very significant military

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

threat to the continental US." The memorandum concluded that introduction of any missiles "will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm."

15. In a memorandum of 27 August, General Carter reported to Mr. Bundy what actions CIA was taking in response to NSAM 181. He named the officers responsible for the three items mentioned above and listed the following additional measures:

a. Task Force W was to look into the possibility of removing restrictions on mounting clandestine operations out of Guantanamo.

b. The Board of National Estimates was to establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc personnel entering Cuba, quantity and types of Bloc equipment and its probable use, and all construction, particularly missile sites.

c. The Board was also to assess the physical and psychological dangers to the US and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba. (The two Board actions, which were later synthesized in the paper which eventually appeared on 19 September as SNIE 85-3, had already been set in motion by the DD/I, in a memo to the AD/NE of 24 August).

d. CIA was to begin immediately publishing a daily paper on Cuba, including current intelligence, estimative assessments and coverage of the press, to be distributed to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor, and Robert Kennedy. (This paper, the Cuban Highlights memorandum, was issued by CIA beginning 27 August, using a philosophy and format similar to the Checklist. A few additional officials were later added to its distribution. It was discontinued on 19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban reporting in regular intelligence publications).

e. CIA would arrange intelligence collection overflights "as frequently as the situation demands." (The results of this action make up the central theme of this paper.)

f. Task Force W was to prepare a plan of operations for MONGOOSE B Plus.

16. The minutes of USIB show that at its next meeting, 29 August, Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military buildup in Cuba, to be submitted to USIB at its next regular meeting.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Presumably Mr. Hilsman was also acting in response to NSAM 181. In any case, the paper he requested and the Board memorandum already requested by the DD/I were combined. Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly overtaken by the photography which became available after 29 August. At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write it were deferred until the new information could be digested. This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19 September. Its substance will be discussed later. (See Paras. 26-29)

17. Also at the 29 August USIB meeting, two other pertinent subjects were discussed. First, General Carter and Mr. Cline raised the question of more rapid delivery from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships (see para. 6). Second, General Carter informed the Board that he had two days earlier asked General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using RF-101 or F8U aircraft and that Lemnitzer had replied that something "could be dug up." The conversation with Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction telephoned from out of town by the DCI, who was concerned over the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather. (The DCI departed Washington on leave on 23 August, went first to the West Coast, left the country on 30 August for the Riviera, and returned to Washington on 23 September.) On 30 August Lemnitzer told the Special Group of this discussion with General Carter. The Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and reopen it "when specific targets and information needs could be identified."

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

E. Hard Intelligence on the Build-Up (Defensive Phase)

18. During the last week in August, CIA continued to follow the progress of the Soviet build-up, using shipping information, communications intelligence, and agent and refugee sources. The Checklist of 29 August reported that:

> "There is no sign of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.
>
> "By latest count, there have during the past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships under Communist charter.
>
> "We note that deliveries of industrial equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary items are being made largely on chartered Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear."

19. The first hard evidence on what the Soviets were up to in Cuba was provided by photography of the 29 August mission. The President was told, in the Checklist of 31 August that:

> "Preliminary information from the 30 /sic/ August U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half of the island. Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000 Bloc troops. We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that construction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence of additional sites can probably be assumed.
>
> "The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet tanks for some time, but this is our first indication that they now have boats of this type. They appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated range of 35 nautical miles."

After further analysis this information appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September. On the 4th and 5th, General Carter briefed a number of congressional leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. In a White House statement, also of 4 September, the President publicly confirmed the presence of SA-2s and KOMAR-class boats.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

20. The 29 August mission had confirmed the establishment of a missile defense of Western Cuba. The first mission for September (of the two which had been authorized as a routine matter by the Special Group on 19 July; see para 10) was flown on schedule on 5 September and revealed similar defenses in Las Villas Province. In retrospect, it can be seen that the two groups of SA-2 sites surrounded the areas in which MRBM and IRBM site construction was planned. Photography of these areas in the 29 August and 5 September missions, however, gave no recognizable evidence that any such construction was then under way (although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material at Guanajay Site 1 on 29 August). In fact, there was probably no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at the time (see discussion in paras. 36-39).

21. More detailed readout of the 29 August mission had, by about 6 September, led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site--possibly surface-to-surface--at Banes, on the northeastern coast. General Carter so informed the President and the Secretaries of State and Defense on 6 September. No equivalent of such a weapon had been identified in the USSR in earlier U-2 photography. Lacking such background, further information and study were necessary to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles. Programs for both were set in motion.

22. COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State, on 9 September reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes. The next day, General Carter in a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requested "necessary actions, (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance" against the cruise-missile site at Banes. At the Special Group meeting of 14 September, a JCS representative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba; however, the Secretary of Defense was recorded as not wanting the operation considered further until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September (see paras 24-25). Meanwhile, further analysis of the 5 September photography had resulted in a CIA study dated 14 September which concluded definitively that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile. A fully checked-out item appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 18 September.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

23. One additional item was picked up by the 5 September mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield, along with several others still in crates. This was not reported by CIA in the Checklist, but was reported in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 8 September. Actually, these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs) had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received in Washington for several weeks. Upon the arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 27 September--with DIA withholding concurrence (see para. 6)--that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

F. The New Overflight Program

24. The results of the 29 August and 5 September missions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites, led to a full review of the overflight program for Cuba. This took place in the White House on 10 September. Among those present were Mr. Rusk, Mr. Robert Kennedy, Mr. McGeorge Bundy, General Carter, and General Lansdale. The decisions of this meeting are crucial to the record, and some discussion of the atmosphere in which they were taken is required. There were three major factors:

a. On 30 August, a SAC U-2 had overflown Sakhalin Island. The USSR had protested on 4 September, the US had acknowledged the overflight, and the incident has received major play in the world press. This had been followed on 8 September by the loss of Mission GRC-127 over Communist China, accompanied by even greater publicity. As a result, most of the participants were--to varying degrees--reluctant to chance another U-2 incident at this time. This meant that they were naturally hesitant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s might be operational.

b. Second, there is no record that the MRBM problem was discussed. The hard intelligence gathered so far on the Soviet build-up (the Banes problem was still up in the air), was not such as to produce a sense of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required. The establishment of SA-2s and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in the NIE of 1 August and their probable arrival had been fully reported during the intervening period. Hence confirmation came not as a shock, but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately. (It may even have served to relax the sense of urgency generated by the President's decisions of 23 August, the known usually being less alarming than the unknown.) The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the rest of Cuba, from which the full story of what the USSR had put into the island could be developed. They felt no immediate need for re-coverage of the areas covered by the two previous missions.

c. Finally, the participants were operating in the atmosphere of the time. The Cubans had been claiming that U.S. invasion was imminent. The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

on Berlin and hinting at a confrontation late in the year, thus creating the impression that a Berlin crisis would not come until after the US election. In fact, the USSR in its statement of the following day (11 September) on Cuba stated this explicitly. There were vague hints of Khrushchev's intent to attend the UNGA in New York. Khrushchev appears now to have been throwing up a diplomatic smoke-screen behind which to carry out the deployment of strategic forces into Cuba, but those present at the meeting of 10 September did not have the benefit of this hindsight. Furthermore, they must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Administration in the election campaign then beginning.

25. At the meeting, the Secretary of State objected to the CIA proposal for two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the 29 August and 5 September missions. He insisted, instead, that coverage of the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory. To meet his wishes, the program was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peripheral. One overflight was to be over the Isle of Pines and the other over the part of Cuba east of 77° West to cover Guantanamo and Banes. One peripheral flight was to cover the north coast of eastern Cuba, the other the south coast. The overflights would be quick "in-and-out" operations, while all four were to be designed for maximum safety. (There is apparently no written record that a decision was made not to fly over known SA-2 sites, but in obtaining approval for the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that they did not do so.) Later the DCI negotiated with the Department of State permission to extend the Isle of Pines mission over the Bay of Pigs area of Cuba proper. The President approved this program, authorizing three flights in September in addition to the one remaining of the normal September allocation (Special Group action of 19 July). Thus, the record shows that the President authorized everything the Special Group requested.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

G. SNIE 85-3-62

26. The lack of urgency expressed in these decisions was also reflected in the deliberations over and the content of SNIE 85-3-62, The Military Build-up in Cuba, passed by USIB on 19 September. This estimate, which was generated by the issuance of NSAM 181, must be viewed as a symptom of the state of mind in the Intelligence Community and in Washington generally during the first half of September. There were no dissents and no major disagreements in preparation of the final draft. Its key findings are as follows:

a. "We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it and consequently that the main purpose of the military build-up in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose."

b. "The Soviets themselves are probably still uncertain about their future military program for Cuba. Indeed they probably intend to test US and Latin American reactions as they go along."

c. "As the build-up continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defensive in purpose but of a more 'offensive' character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short-range surface-to-surface missiles...."

d. "However, they are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue."

e. "The establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the US would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far...However, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Soviet strategic posture and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of deploying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy."

f. "Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles."

g. "The establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory...The Soviets might think that the political effect of defying the US by stationing Soviet nuclear striking power in so menacing a position would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it. However, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous US reaction."

h.. "Although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action....'

27. In commenting on these statements it must first be recognized that the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error. It should also be recognized that the community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment; deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was without precedent. Further, while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba in the period 7-15 September, (see para. 37) the first reports from ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 19 September; there was no evidence available that MRBMs were on the way. What the estimate failed to do, however, was to give adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel. The community was still thinking in terms of the rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid programs for the UAR, Iraq, and Indonesia (and indeed for Cuba in the 1960-62 period) when there was already good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern.

28. Moreover, the Indonesian program too had broken the pattern only a month before, when the USSR showed itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk for the

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests. The original contracts for Indonesia had been roughly similar to those for the UAR and Iraq. They included 14 SA-2 sites, 12 KOMARs, 26 TU-16s (12 equipped with air-to-surface missiles) and 12 submarines, all to be manned by Indonesians and to be delivered at a pace consonant with the required training of personnel. However, as the crisis over West New Guinea approached its climax of August, Soviet eagerness to embroil the Indonesians in open warfare with the Dutch led them to accelerate delivery schedules and to permit the use of Soviet personnel to operate some of the weapons being provided. Six submarines manned by Soviet crews actually conducted war patrols under nominal Indonesian command. Thus by mid-August the USSR had shown itself willing to take some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States, albeit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cuban venture.

29. For the record, there is no evidence that the existence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later decisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argument against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimative process and provides a check on the continuing validity of standing estimates.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

H. Views of the DCI

30. The only available record of dissent from the judgments made in Washington during the first half of September, both estimative and operational, is that of the DCI himself, who, although vacationing on the Riviera, was kept informed by CIA cable. On 7 September, he cabled General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast US and possibly Caribbean areas." On 10 September, the DCI again cabled "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba...appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest Board of National Estimates study motives...." (The Board's response is in effect contained in SNIE 85-3.)

31. On 13 September and again on 16 September the DCI repeated these premonitions. In the latter cable he added "Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative." Finally, on 20 September, the DCI expressed reservations on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3, which had been cabled to him, saying "as an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position." These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.

32. As a result of the DCI's pressure there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs.) On 19 September, at USIB, General Carter stated his desire to use RF-101s over Cuba. He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

Group, adding that "we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached." The Special Group at its next meeting approved consideration of the use of FIREFLY and COMOR forwarded to USIB on 27 September a program for its use. (No FIREFLY missions have yet been attempted.)

33. Another attempt during this period to get additional coverage was the programming of KEYHOLE Mission 9045 (29 September - 2 October) to photograph Cuba. The results were unsatisfactory, largely because of cloud cover.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

I. CIA Reporting during September

34. The progressive uncovering of the Soviet program in Cuba was reported in detail by CIA current intelligence. Pertinent samples from the Checklist are:

a. "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at 12, but the likelihood that others are under construction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations." (14 September)

b. "A message intercepted yesterday on a net serving Soviet forces in Germany called for 'volunteers for the protection of Cuba.' We are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another intercept referring to the isolation of 'volunteers.' If valid, they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating further." (15 September)

c. "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on the scene to about 4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey Province." (18 September)

d. "The interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational.

"The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved." (19 September)

e. "Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen anything like it before.

"The move may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better answer." (21 September)

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

f. "Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were carrying military hardware.

"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's city limits is out of bounds except by special permission." (27 September)

35. During this period General Carter, at the President's instructions, briefed General Eisenhower on the Cuban situation on 10 September. On 12 September he briefed the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees. Although out of time sequence, it should also be noted here, because the information presented was essentially more of the same, that the DCI again briefed General Eisenhower on 3 October and Congressman Cannon on 9 October.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

J. The Soviet Offensive Deployment

36. At this point, it is necessary to retrace a few steps in time and discuss what was actually going on in Cuba. Examination of information now available makes it possible to outline with a fair degree of confidence a time-table of the Soviet program which is generally consistent from site to site. This begins with the construction of SAM defenses, first in the west around San Cristobal and Guanajay, then in central Cuba around Sagua la Grande and Remedios, finally in the rest of the island. Next, in each case, comes the eviction of local inhabitants at each site, road improvement, and the establishment of restricted construction areas. Finally comes the arrival of equipment at each site according to what appears a carefully prepared schedule. Apparently, no recognizable missile equipment was moved to the MRBM sites and no major construction was begun at the IRBM sites until at least two weeks after the last U-2 overflight of the area and until the US had publicly acknowledged the presence of SA-2 sites in Cuba.

37. The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR on the ship Omsk, which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September. A second shipment followed on the Poltava which arrived on 15 September. This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night, with the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the earliest date at which photography might have detected the first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal.

38. Construction equipment and material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August, minor activity of an indefinite type was noted there in the 29 August photography, and major construction had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that shipments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction of a fixed site). It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site.

39. The sites in Las Villas Province were established on a slightly later, but similar, time scale. Equipment for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites was probably landed at Casilda, on the south coast. The most likely ship to have carried the large items is the Kimovsk, which docked

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

there on 22 September. This equipment must have moved to the site during the last week of September, and was probably detectable from photography after 1 October. The Remedios IRBM site construction was parallel to the Guanajay schedule, but also about two weeks behind. Photography of 5 September was negative, but road improvement began shortly thereafter, and a flow of construction material from the port of Isabela, on the north coast, began. The estimated date for the beginning of major construction is about 1 October. Again the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

K. The Targeting of San Cristobal

40. Although the sites themselves were closed to ground observation, the movement of equipment to them from the ports was in fact seen by CIA agents and by a number of individuals who later fled to the US. The agents reported this information as soon as they were able, but in most cases had to depend on secret writing for communication. Hence, there was a lag of several days at least before their information became available. Refugee reports were delayed considerably longer for other, and uncontrollable, reasons--the time of the individual's decision to leave Cuba, his discovery of means for doing so, and his delivery to an interrogation center. Many of the reports so received dealt with unidentifiable construction activity. Many of them, because of the time-lags noted above, did not arrive in Washington until after 14 October, and some are still coming in.

41. Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested. This represents a considerable technical achievement. To understand why, it is again necessary to back-track in time. Since the moment of Castro's triumphal march into Havana, the Intelligence Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile installations in Cuba. There were several hundred such reports, claiming the presence of everything from small arms to ICBMs, before August 1960, i.e., before the USSR had supplied Cuba with any weapons at all. More specifically, CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports (this does not include press items) on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 Jan 1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion.

42. On 15 February 1962 an interagency interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence collected from them. It was manned by trained bilingual interrogators from the armed services and CIA. The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity received in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equipment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation. (Such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited in para 9).

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

43. For the better part of two years, CIA had been checking information obtained from refugee, defector, and agent sources with NPIC whenever it was apparent that the information was of a kind that could be verified or negated by aerial reconnaissance. In May 1962, NPIC began publishing a series of formal listings (Photographic Evaluation of Information on Cuba) in which these reports were evaluated in the light of photographic coverage. In the 7 issues of this publication between 31 May and 5 October NPIC examined 138 raw reports referred to it for comment. Of this total, only three cited missile activity which could not be linked directly to the SA-2 and cruise missile deployments. NPIC's evidence negated those three.

44. When the first indications of build-up began to come in in August, these procedures were further tightened. CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC. (This instruction was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to later restrictions; (see para 50). Between 14 August and mid-October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding.

45. On 20 August, the COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first comprehensive card file system for Cuban targets. An example of its procedures is the handling of targets in the Sagua La Grande area. Based on refugee reporting, the COMOR Targeting Working Group on 27 August pinpointed four farms in this area as suspect missile sites. Readout of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there, and the target card was changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that knowledge that this site was in the area could have led analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received.

46. By September, the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed. During the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors report that their output represented only the small publishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF

proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive missiles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site.

47. This process took about three weeks, from the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card. The two reports from Opa Locka which triggered it were:

a. An observation in Havana on 12 September of a convoy carrying long canvas-covered objects which the source identified under interrogation as resembling SS-4s. This report, which was disseminated by CIA on 21 September, contained sufficient accurate detail to alert intelligence analysts.

b. An observation on 17 September of a convoy moving toward the San Cristobal area. This information, received on 27 September, dovetailed in many respects with the earlier report.

48. The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage. This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight (see para 63). It read as follows: "Collateral reports indicate the existence of a restricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4 Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the following four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); and Las Pozos (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible surface missile construction, with particular attention to SS-4 Shyster."

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

49. Another report, too general to be used in the process described above, is nevertheless of interest as the first good information distributed on the Soviet offensive build-up. On 20 September, CIA disseminated an agent report that Castro's personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, had said on 9 September "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air, and we have a radar system which covers, sector by sector, all of the Cuban air space and (beyond) as far as Florida. There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets."

[illegible] OF
THE [illegible]

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

L. Limitations on Publications

50. At some point, probably just after 27 September, an item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written because there was an injunction not to do so. By the time that hard information began to come in early in September, the USIB principals had become acutely conscious of the distinction publicly made by the President between offensive and defensive weapons in Cuba. Aware that they were dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that "leakage" of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false, would seriously limit the President's freedom of action in dealing with what might become a major international crisis, they had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such information. Analysis would continue and senior policy officials would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intelligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals. These instructions were first issued orally, and later (on 11 October) formalized by USIB in the "PSALM" system (X-Ray Funnel for SIGINT). The key passages in USIB's order were: "Such information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisers to the President have a need to know," and "There is no intent hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic process."

51. It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration (Para 44) had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on reporting in late September and October if the other ban had not been in effect is difficult to determine.

52. These restrictions did not apply to the *Checklist*, but the *Checklist* writers drew for their Cuban information largely on the *Cuban Daily Summary*, a compendium of reporting on Cuba published by CIA. Since the *Summary* was affected by the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting the *Checklist* off from information on offensive weapons.

53. Moreover, neither the *Checklist* group, nor any other current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President and his advisors more than a month earlier (See Para 13). In other words the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

time and bureaucratic process that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3, which held that establishment of such a base was most improbable. (See, however, para 29)

54. It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the potential political impact of the reports they were receiving; this would not have influenced them against publication, but would have made them want to be doubly sure, especially on a subject with a history reaching back to Our Man in Havana. In addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the COMOR-Special Group organization responsible for collection and the intelligence components responsible for analysis. Few, if any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had IDEALIST clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had requested would not be soon forthcoming, and they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.

55. Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunction against publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary, which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite possible--but by no means certain--that they would then have been picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they would have survived the coordination process for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have learned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal slightly more than a week before he apparently did.

56. In sum the CIA analysts believed they had done their duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic coverage, but no word of their concern over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at its meeting on 9 October, when (see para. 63) it ordered a U-2 mission which covered the area.

57. The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correlation of reports and the Special Group meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was designed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back into the early history of U-2 operations over the USSR. They were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnaissance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact, after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

M. Progress of the September Overflight Program

58. While the MRBM and IRBM deployment continued and the first good ground reports began to filter out of Cuba, the four-flight reconnaissance program approved on 10 September was being pushed forward. Unfortunately, this program was seriously delayed by bad weather. Not until 26 September could the first successful mission be flown, over Banes and Guantanamo. (A mission was flown on 17 September but its targets were completely cloud-covered.) On 27 and 28 September the weather was bad again, but on the 29th the Isle of Pines - Bay of Pigs mission was successfully flown. The weather again turned bad until 5 October, when the south coast peripheral mission was accomplished. The next day, the north coast peripheral mission aborted, but was successfully completed on 7 October.

59. Thus, completion of the September program took 26 days, from 12 September--the earliest date on which missions approved on the 10th could have been flown--through 7 October. On 20 of these days weather was bad over the areas not yet overflown (the criterion for launch was a forecast of less than 25 percent cloud cover). On four days successful missions were flown. On one day a mission was launched but aborted, and one day was used to alert a mission which was launched the following day. Availability of aircraft was not a limiting factor.

60. These missions accomplished their purpose, i.e., they established almost completely the location of SA-2 sites on the island. They did not--and, since they were designed to avoid SAM-defended areas, could not--detect the ballistic missile deployments then under way. The combined effect of the Special Group decision of 10 September and the weather conditions of the period following was to delay consideration of what reconnaissance activities should next be undertaken over Cuba until early October.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF
THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

N. The Special Group Decision of 9 October

61. By late September the delays in accomplishing the four-flight program, coupled with a mass of evidence that the Soviet build-up was continuing, had generated a greatly increased sense of urgency in Washington. It should again be noted, however, that high-level consideration of the possibility that MRBMs might be deployed to Cuba had always been in terms of Soviet action after the SA-2 defense was fully operational. There is no documentary evidence of action directed toward the overflight of SAM-defended areas until the Special Group (Augmented) meeting of 4 October. At this meeting the DCI pointed out that U-2 flights were now (before the last two missions of the 10 September program) restricted by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of Cuba. According to the minutes of this meeting "it was questioned [by the DCI] whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational." The Group then ordered the NRO to prepare an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba for presentation at the Group's meeting of 9 October.

62. On 6 October, COMOR provided to the NRO a memorandum entitled "Intelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba" for use in this presentation. Para A1. of this paper stated that "there is now a pressing and continuing need for up-to-date intelligence on the progress of the Soviet arms build-up in Cuba. The very highest levels of the government are dependent upon this intelligence to assist in making policy decisions of immediate and vital concern to the nation." Para A2., commenting on the absence of coverage of western Cuba since 29 August, included the statement that "Ground observers have, in several recent instances, reported sightings of what they believe to be Soviet MRBMs in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or denied by photo coverage." Attached to the memorandum were a number of target lists, on which the area previously targeted around San Cristobal appears, together with recommendations for attack of particular targets by satellite, U-2, oblique, FIREFLY, or F8U-1P/RF-101 photography. (USIB, considering this paper on 6 October, recommended to the Special Group full coverage of two of these lists which did not specifically include San Cristobal, but which by its nature would have covered that area and the other ballistic missile sites as well.)

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

PROPERTY OF THE WHITE HOUSE OFFICE

63. At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's first recommendation was "A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal (see Para 48). The operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection aircraft off the coast, also was designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly operational. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible. NRO's second recommendation was therefore conditional: "If there is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2 sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits." (There were also certain other recommendations for low level, oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)

64. The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recommended to the President that he approve it. The President gave his approval--presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time--and the mission was immediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, from 10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was transferred to SAC. There is no reason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the primary mission was accomplished.

65. After this mission had been approved, but before it had been flown, CIA received on 10 October Navy photographs taken two weeks earlier of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba. These photographs showed clearly identifiable IL-28 crates, which later showed up in U-2 photography of 17 October--along with a number of others which must have come in on unphotographed ships--at San Julian airfield in the western tip of the island. The information appeared in the Checklist of 11 October.

66. During this interim period, the DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittee of House Appropriations on 10 October on the build-up, including the IL-28s. He also commented on MRBMs essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice (para 30), adding that there were many experts who did not believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he differed with them. He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in the next day or so. General

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

Carter said much the same thing to Senator Saltonstall the following day (11 October). In reply to Saltonstall's question about Senator Keating's charges of known MRBM sites in Cuba, General Carter said that there were refugee reports but no hard evidence, and that CIA hoped to photograph the areas in the next day or so. General Carter also briefed Senator Stennis on 15 October (before the photography of the previous day was available), again along the same lines.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

O. Notification of the President

67. By this time, photography from the 14 October mission had arrived in Washington and readout had begun. The Director, NPIC, contacted the DD/I in the early evening of the 15th to inform him that a possible MRBM site had been identified in the San Cristobal area. The DD/I notified General Carter (the DCI being out of town). General Carter told him he would notify General Taylor and General Carroll of DIA at dinner, and McGeorge Bundy if he was present. As the readout progressed during the evening the information became firmer and the DD/I decided not to wait until morning to notify White House and State Department officials. About 2200 he passed the information to Mr. Bundy and Mr. Hilsman, who notified the Secretary of State. The following morning (16 October) General Carter and the DD/I briefed Bundy in detail and General Carter at 1100 briefed the President.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System Date: 8/27/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : WILDEROTTE
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10087

RECORD SERIES : ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ASSASSINATION-RELATED MATERIALS (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : CARL, OFFICE OF THE DD/S&T
TO : BUCHEN, PHILIP

TITLE : [Restricted]

DATE : 07/10/1975
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :

CIA
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CLANDESTINE OPERATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/06/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Transmittal memo and 15-page report.

DATE: 10 July 1975

[redacted]

(24)

Office of the DD/S&T

178-10004-10087

TO: Mr. Phillip Buchen

SUBJECT: Attached Report

CURRENT INFO

REMARKS:

Phil:

Attached is the interim report on the problem you and I have discussed recently. I stress the term interim since we have received new information from Defense as recently as yesterday and have not exhausted our own search for information within CIA.

Recognizing your concern that the investigation be conducted with the participation of some outside person or group -- and also the fact that we were unable to find a satisfactory solution -- let me briefly outline the approach I followed.

I stressed objectivity and tried to assure that no persons who were potentially a party to the activities in question had any opportunity to destroy information or material which might be related.

My Associate Deputy Director, Dr. Sayre Stevens, was the prime investigator with technical advice from Dr. Tom Nevison, an MD with an outstanding research background but hired by

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

CIA only a couple of years ago and could not possibly have had any prior knowledge or involvement. Additionally, I used personnel from my own staff to assure that compilation of inventory, etc. was done in presence of people representing me, who again could have had no prior involvement.

As I noted earlier, we are continuing our investigation internally as well as jointly with DOD. We will keep you informed.

Carl

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

SUMMARY REPORT ON CIA INVESTIGATION OF MKNAOMI

Project Discovery.

The initial identification of the relationship between the CIA and the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick as a possible questionable activity requiring further investigation occurred in late April of this year. It resulted from information provided by a CIA officer not directly associated with the project in response to the repetitive appeals of the DCI that all past activities which might now be considered questionable be brought to the attention of Agency management. As a result of the information provided by him and by two other officers identified as having some awareness of the project, it became clear that further investigation of the matter was in order. The three identified the project at Fort Detrick as having involved the development of BW and possibly CW agents and associated dissemination systems that were suitable for clandestine use against human targets. They moreover identified letha agents as among those involved in the project.

Concern about these assertions was heightened because the A/DDS&T had noted in a recent review of the 1963 IG Survey of the Technical Services Division (TSD) that approximately $90,000 in that current fiscal year was spent at Fort Detrick "for the maintenance of a BW capability". This statement appeared so important that a quick check was made to determine its significance. In response to questions about the activity, the cognizant officer in TSD -- now the Office of Technical Service (OTS) -- reported that a small effort had been carried on at Fort Detrick, but that it related to the development of incapacitants and BW/CW

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

detection and did not carry the serious implications of the IG's report. It had in any event been terminated some years ago. The A/DDS&T was satisfied with this response. When new and more disturbing information about the nature of the Fort Detrick activity emerged, however, the words of the IG Survey tended to give it credibility. Thus, late in April 1975 a search was begun for any records or other information available on the project. Difficulties were immediately encountered because the project cryptonym could not be identified. The search for records of fund transfers to Fort Detrick did ultimately produce information in that regard, however, and checks by the Office of Security on one of the individuals identified as having been involved in Fort Detrick activities did provide the MKNAOMI cryptonym. This enabled OTS to recall the proper files from Records Center; two MKNAOMI files were retrieved. Some additional information was also produced from the Office of Logistics files. This collection of material largely confirmed the nature of the project as reported by the informants and identified ? a number of people involved in the activity. Additional cause for concern resulted from the association of several of these people with specific assassinati plans as revealed in the IG's report on that activity.

A major concern after the discovery of the records involved the disposition of a stockpile of BW agents and toxins maintained by Fort Detrick for possible Agency use. It was not known whether or not these materials had been destroyed along with the Army's BW stockpiles in response to Presidential Directives of November 1969 and February 1970. An unsigned memo raising the question of the disposition of Agency materials maintained by Fort Detrick posed the option of having it stored in a commercial laboratory. It was the impression of those in OTS who were familiar with the project that the material had in fact been destroyed but no records confirming it could be found. In an attempt to find such confirmation, laboratory storage facilities in OTS were searched and in the course of that search about 11 grams of shellfish toxin and 6 mg of cobra venom -- but none of the other materials -- were discovered.

Subsequent to the decision in late April that a full investigation of the Ft. Detrick project was needed, all information uncovered was passed to the DCI, to staff members of the Rockefeller Commission and to the White House staff handling Intelligence Community investigation matters. In June, Senator Church was informed by Rod Hills of the White House that a sensitive activity was under investigation.

Sources of Information.

This summary report on the activity is based upon an investigation utilizing: (1) the files and documents uncovered as a result of the initial search which are limited and contain only a small number of Agency-originated documents; (2) the material found in OTS storage which includes the shellfish toxin and several pieces of delivery hardware; (3) interviews voluntarily given by current Agency employees who had some knowledge of the project and by a number of retired employees indicated by the records as having been more deeply involved at stages of particular interest. (Included in the latter category are Tom Karamessines, Cornelius Roosevelt, Ray Treichler, and Nathan Gordon); (4) information contained in the IG's Report on assassination planning and (5) information developed by a DOD investigation initiated as a result of conversations with the White House about the matter; this information was only recently received and has not been widely incorporated in this report, however.

Special Operations Division of Fort Detrick.

The Agency association with Fort Detrick involved the Special Operations Division (SOD) of that facility. This Division was apparently responsible for

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

developing special applications for BW agents and toxins. The principal customer of its activities appears to have been the U.S. Army Special Forces. Its concern was both with the development of suitable agents and delivery mechanisms for special use in paramilitary situations. These applications clearly included one-on-one situations in which clandestine delivery was a concern. Both standard BW agents and biologically derived toxins were investigated by the Division. Discussions with former Fort Detrick employees indicates that SOD was first established as a distinct, highly secure activity within Fort Detrick in about 1948, though no records going back that far have been found. The Division was abolished in 1970 or 1971 as the Fort Detrick operation was terminated.

CIA Relationships with SOD.

The CIA relationship with SOD was formally established in May 1952 through a memorandum of agreement with the Army Chief Chemical Officer for the performance of certain research and development in the laboratory facilities of the Special Operations Division of the Army Biological Laboratory at Fort Detrick. The animus for establishing this relationship seems to have been a belief in OTS that the special capabilities of the Fort Detrick group and its access to biological materials of all sorts provided the Agency with expertise and capabilities which were appropriate to its function and not otherwise available. Discussions indicate that the perception of the requirement for such capabilities was tied to earlier OSS experience. Initial funding was at the $200,000 a year level which grew to a high point in FY 1958 of $390,000 and then dwindled to $75,000 a year in the late 1960's. Though there appear to be some gaps in available funding records, total Agency funding in the period from FY 1953 through FY 1970 is

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

estimated to have been somewhat more than $3 million. These funds were apparently used to generally augment the level of effort undertaken by SOD. Agency requirements for specific R&D were not levied in any programmatic way, but rather the Agency identified particular work being done by SOD as part of its program supporting the Army Special Forces as being of interest and then levied requirements for the customizing of such developments for Agency use. Through the course of years, Agency objectives in the project became better defined. Thus a project approval memo of 1967 identifies the four functional categories of project activity:

a. Maintenance of a stockpile of incapacitating and lethal agents in readiness for operational use;

b. Maintenance, assessment and evaluation of a designated balance of biological and chemical disseminating systems for operational readiness;

c. Adaptation and testing of a non-discernible microbioinoculator (a dart device suitable for the clandestine and imperceptible inoculation with BW/CW agents) to determine compatibility with various materials and to assure that the microbioinoculator cannot be identified structurally or easily detected upon a detailed autopsy; and

d. Provide technical support and consultation on request to meet ad hoc requirements related to offensive and defensive BW/CW.

In the later years the activities dwindled to the point of simply maintaining a stockpile of agents and delivery systems for possible Agency use.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Project Management within CIA.

From its outset the project was characterized by a compartmentation that was extreme even by CIA standards. Only two or three Agency officers at any given time were cleared for access to Fort Detrick activities. This work was managed first within the Biology Branch and later in the Chemistry Branch of TSD. Because of the sensitivity of the activity, queries by operations officers as to the availability of materials and delivery systems of the type being developed at Fort Detrick were automatically turned away by TSD unless initial approval for contact had been given by the Deputy Director for Plans. Even when this was the case, the Chief of TSD often referred the operations officer directly to one of the cleared officers dealing with Fort Detrick and was never informed as to the nature of the discussions. This method of procedure has been confirmed both through interviews and by the IG report on assassination planning. No written records were kept. Though some CIA-originated documents have been found in the project files, it is clear that only a very limited documentation of activities took place. No records on such things as material control, receipt, delivery, destruction, etc. can be found. No documents relating to any possible operational use of the material have been found. The files as they exist are quite different from those normally maintained in the course of a typical CIA R&D project. As noted above, funding to the project was provided simply on the basis of augmenting the level of effort established by Army funding. There appears to have been no relation of funding to specific tasking, nor can any strict accounting of funds on the basis of effort expended in the Agency's behalf be found. Project officers with whom discussions were held stated that the funding was simply provided to maintain the availability to the Agency of the capabilities

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

of SOD. Finally, there is little evidence of much specific program definition on the part of the Agency. Though occasional specific requests for material or for investigations relating to the solution of a hypothetically posed operational problem can be found, the Agency with one or two exceptions through the years appears to have ridden on a program generated internally by SOD largely on the basis of Special Forces requirements. There are one or two exceptions which will be discussed below.

Activities of Peculiar CIA Interest.

Though discussions with people associated with the project reflect an overriding interest in incapacitants, particularly in later years, available records make it clear that CIA interests included maintaining a stockpile of lethal materials and delivery systems. The evidence indicates that the Agency relied upon the use of specific BW agents and toxins being investigated as a normal part of the Army's BW program. However, directions were given to investigate such matters as agent stability over varying periods of time, the suitability of specific agents for preparation in dry form, the development of dart coatings, and the preparation of materials in a form suitable for dusting of clothes, pillows, etc.

Primary Agency interest seemed to relate to the development of dissemination equipment to be used with a standard set of agents kept on the shelf. A number of such dissemination devices appear to be peculiarly suited for the type of clandesti use one might associate with Agency operations. Some of these were included among hardware stored for the Agency at Edgewood Arsenal subsequent to the closure of SOD: attache cases rigged to disseminate an agent into the air, a cigarette

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

case rigged to disseminate an agent when lighted, a fountain pen dart launcher, an engine head bolt designed to release an agent when heated, a fluorescent light starter to activate the light and then release an agent, etc. Available records do not indicate whether or not all these were developed specifically for the CIA, though the DOD investigation has identified the head bolt device as falling into such a category. The easy association of this equipment with specific Agency requirements because of its nature is apt to be misleading, however. At a meeting in June 1952, at the very outset of the Agency's association with SOD when CIA representatives stated they as yet had no specific requirements, a list of SOD priorities for work on dissemination devices was provided. This dissemination list included such things as cigarettes, chewing gum, cigarette lighters, wrist watches, fountain pens, rings, etc. Presumably work on these devices was already underway in response to Army Special Forces requirements. Nevertheless, the Agency clearly showed an interest in such devices and levied requirements for the special preparation of some.

One development peculiarly associated with the CIA was the "microbioinoculato which was an extremely small dart device which could be fired through clothing to penetrate the skin so as to inoculate him with an agent of some sort without the target's perception of being hit. An added fillip to this development was the requirement that no indications of the use of such a device be discernable in the course of autopsy. A large amount of Agency attention was given to the problem of incapacitating guard dogs. Much of the equipment delivered to the Agency and some of the testing undertaken by it involved a dart delivery system carrying dog incapacitants, and an antidote used subsequently to restore the dog

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

to normal activity. Though most of the dart launchers used in these developments were developed for the Army, the Agency did request the development of a small hand-held dart launcher for its peculiar needs.

Clearly a lot of work was done on human incapacitation. OTS apparently received continuing requests for safe, effective and rapidly acting, incapacitating devices. Much work was done in trying to use the dart system for such purposes, but real success was never actually achieved. Since larger amounts of appropriate agent are required to incapacitate a human than to kill him, no scheme was developed for introducing sufficient amounts through the use of darts. Attempts were made to solve this problem increasing the area of the darts available for coating and for making a dart which would dissolve in tissue which could thereby introduce more material into the system. Work on this project was underway when the association with SOD ended and Edgewood Arsenal endeavored to complete the project using unexpended Fort Detrick funds. Success was not achieved, however. One reason for the preoccupation of those involved in the project with the incapacitant problem may well have been the substantially greater difficulty of solving it when compared to developing lethal mechanisms.

Substantial work was also done for the Agency in the development of spoilants for agricultural products, biological materials for the contamination of petroleum stores, and agents for use in the destruction of electronics, optical systems, structural materials, etc. At times in the history of the project, requirements for such materials as these were apparently very high on the Agency's list.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Shellfish Toxin.

By the late 1960's, a stockpile of some 15 to 20 different BW agents and toxins was maintained on a regular basis by SOD for possible Agency use. The supply included such agents as food poisons, infectious viruses, lethal botulinum toxin, paralytic shellfish toxin, snake (krait) venon, Microsporeum gypseum which produces severe skin disease, etc. Varying amounts of these materials ranging from 100 grams to 100 milligrams were maintained.

As noted above, with the Presidential Order requiring the destruction of Army BW and toxin stockpiles, the question was raised as to the disposition of Agency materials. Though specific accounting for each agent on the list is not on hand, DOD indicates that, with the likely exception of the shellfish toxin, all of these materials were in fact destroyed by SOD personnel.

The shellfish toxin -- along with 8 milligrams of cobra venom -- was found by David Boston, currently Chief of the Chemistry Branch, in Vault B10 in the basement of South Building which houses OTS. This vault is a lightly used laboratory area and historically associated with the Biology and Chemistry Branches of OTS. It has been regularly used for the storage of dangerous materials of various types. In past years, the combination to the vault had been available only to the Chief and Deputy Chief of the Chemistry Branch and their secretary. More recently, the combination had been given to other members of the Chemistry Branch as well. With the discovery of the material on 20 May, however, the combination was changed and is now available only to the Chief of the Chemistry Branch, his secretary, and OTS security officers. On 13 June the vault was put under 24-hour guard.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

The freezer in which the toxin was found is located under one of the work benches in the laboratory. The Fort Detrick material was the only thing in the freezer and was in two one-gallon cans along with several smaller containers. There were no labels on the gallon cans, but on top of each was a folded piece of paper with pertinent information about the contents. This information provided the types and amounts of material and the date on which it was put into storage. The shellfish toxin was, according to this information, put into the freezer in February 1970, and the cobra venom, in February 1961. The shellfish toxin was packaged in several different forms including two individual doses in tablet form.

The discovery of the material was a result of repeated attempts by Boston to determine what disposition had been made of Agency BW materials held by Fort Detrick. In making one more check on this, he called Nate Gordon, a former Chief of the Chemistry Branch, who retired in September 1972, and asked him if he knew what the disposition had been. Gordon stated that he thought that perhaps some of the shellfish toxin might not have been destroyed and was in storage in OTS. In following up on this lead, Boston found the material in the freezer.

Though hard to understand, such material could in fact be stored for so long without anyone being aware of it. The laboratory is no longer used for the type of work for which it was originally built and had become a disordered storage facility. There have been no requirements for use of the freezer in the intervening years and it is indeed possible that no occasion arose to investigate the contents of the freezer. There have been no reported functioning difficulties with the freezer during this entire period.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

After finding the shellfish toxin in the vault, a complete inventory was taken. A large number of dangerous chemicals or drugs of various types were found. These materials relate to a number of past programs of TSD, including the drug project, the development of harassment materials for crowd control or meeting disruption, crop contamination programs, etc. Small amounts of several other lethal preparations were found. Two of these are known to have been obtained by the Agency for testing at Fort Detrick. Nothing is known about three others. Also found were a number of L-Pills issued to agents, and formerly to U-2 pilots, for suicide purposes in the event of capture.

Boston contended that he had no recollection of the shellfish toxin having been obtained from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory. On 30 June, discussions were held with Dr. Gordon in an interview at which Boston was also presen Gordon stated that the toxin had in fact been called back from Fort Detrick and stored in the laboratory on the basis of his own decision which resulted from conversations with Boston. It was their belief that the cost and difficulty of isolating the shellfish toxin were so great that it simply made no sense to have it destroyed. Apparently no one, including the Chief of TSD, was told of this decision or the fact that the material had been delivered by Fort Detrick. As Gordon recalled, this took place prior to his being told by the Chief of TSD to inform Fort Detrick that destruction of the material on the inventory list should take place. Boston who was present during this discussion took no issue with Gordon's account. Neither could recall precisely how the material was delivered to OTS, but the DOD investigation indicates that it was delivered to Boston by someone from Fort Detrick.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Gordon was certain that the shellfish toxin in storage in OTS is the same toxin as that listed on the inventory. There is, however, a discrepancy between the amount in storage as calculated from the labels and the amount shown on the inventory. Since the material in storage is in several different forms and complete reliance is placed upon labeling, however, no real discrepancy may actually exist.

Discussions with Karamessines have established that he and Helms were aware of the disposition question and that a clear decision had been made that the Agency stockpile should be destroyed by the Army and that, in accordance with Presidential Directives, the CIA should get completely out of the BW business.

The explanation given by Gordon as to how the shellfish toxin came to be in Agency storage is fully consistent with other available information. He stated that the material was always handled with extreme care. Undoubtedly it was simply transferred from one freezer to another and in his view was continuall under adequate control. He is certain that nothing was done with it subsequent to its delivery and prior to his departure from the Agency in 1972. Boston has given assurance that it was untouched subsequent to that.

After the discovery of the material, OTS was told to investigate ways in which they could safely dispose of it with full documentation. Edgewood Arsenal was contacted and arrangements were made to deliver the material to Edgewood for disposal on 11 June 1975. The disposal was to be witnessed by a representative from the IG's office. On the day prior to the scheduled delivery, these arrangements were cancelled, however, because the DD/S&T wished to consider further ways of insuring that the destruction of the material could not be later

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

misinterpreted. Upon informing Edgewood Arsenal of this decision, Boston was told that while Edgewood would dispose of chemical material for the CIA, it would not do so in the case of biological materials since that was not consistent with the mission of the arsenal. No further efforts toward the disposal of the material have taken place, and it remains under guard in the OTS vault.

Operational Uses of MKNAOMI Material.

There is no record associating the project with actual operations. Discussions with those involved in the project indicate that hand-launchers with darts loaded with dog incapacitant may have been delivered for use in S.E. Asia. They also indicate that some of the material or crop spoilants may have been employed. While no direct connections to assassination planning have been found, there are some disturbing similarities between the agents being investigated at Fort Detrick and some of the reported schemes for incapacitating or assassinating Castro. For example, botulinum pills were reportedly provided in February 1961 and again in April 1962 for use against Castro. Such pills were made for the Agency at Fort Detrick and the record shows the delivery of some in the same time period as the 1962 attempt. Another scheme in 1960 involved the treatment of cigars with botulinum toxin; the comparable treatment of cigarettes is reported in MKNAOMI files. Consideration was given to the administration of shellfish toxin with a pin device in late 1960. Both the toxin and pin delivery devices were developed at Fort Detrick. The diving suit scheme in 1963 involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus which would produce madura foot, a serious, non-specific, skin disease. Work

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

on fungal agents generally compatible with such an approach was underway at Fort Detrick shortly before this scheme was hatched and the agent was prepared at Agency direction in a form suitable for application to clothing, pillow cases, and so on. Tuberculosis germs with which the breathing apparatus of the suit were to be contaminated were available at Fort Detrick though not included in Agency stocks. Finally, the general presence of BW agents or toxins in all of these plans suggests the strong influence of work carried on at Fort Detrick.

None of the interviews undertaken in the course of this investigation provide information about specific support to operations which may have involved assassination. Roosevelt, who was Chief of TSD from 1960-1962, believed that discussions involving assassination took place but claimed to know few of the details and was skeptical as to the seriousness of such discussions. Treichler, Chief of the Biology Branch during this period, denied ever having received requests for such support or providing it, but these assertions appear incompatible with information he earlier provided to the IG's office during its investigation of assassination attempts. Treichler may constitute a connection between the MKNAOMI project and the assassination plots involving Castro. He was the officer responsible for MKNAOMI during this period. The records show his giving direction in specific terms to the preparation of materials at Fort Detrick matching those mentioned in the assassination schemes. Finally, the IG's report indicates that he delivered such material to other elements of the Agency. Beyond the Castro schemes, no suggestion can be found that any of these materials or devices was ever considered for use for lethal purposes.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	CHENEY
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10004-10115
RECORD SERIES :	GENERAL SUBJECT FILE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	INTELLIGENCE--REPORT BY JAMES J. ANGLETON

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	CIA
FROM :	ANGLETON, JAMES
TO :	ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
TITLE :	REPORT TO PRES. COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE U.S.
DATE :	00/00/1975
PAGES :	37
SUBJECTS :	ANGLETON, JAMES CONSPIRACY THEORIES, USSR NOSENKO, YURI OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/09/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	See pages 5-7. Does not include attachments.

178-10004-10115

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission:

In accordance with the Commission's request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique of the counterintelligence function in the Agency. We welcome the Commission's interest in this matter because it will be the first review of U.S. counterintelligence at such a responsible level in Government. In any event, it is urged that authoritative attention, beyond the life of the Commission, be given to the scope and role of counterintelligence in the Intelligence Community. This action is imperative because the current leadership is almost totally uninformed and inexperienced in the specialty of counterintelligence, and its authority for changes is being permitted to go unchallenged. The result is reflected in the failure to maintain continuity in this function. We believe

CLASSIFIED BY 054519
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), [✓ (2)] (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
Date Impossible to Determine
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

that unless there are some enforceable guidelines set forth by a higher authority, the conduct of effective counterintelligence by the Government will be lost for years to come.

Counterintelligence is traditionally a vital plate in the shield of national security. It also protects the security and well-being of our Allies who have access to our sensitive intelligence by virtue of identity of interests or because of formal arrangements and pacts such as NATO. There are also useful confidential interservice agreements whereby certain foreign intelligence services conduct unilateral or joint operations with our field stations, and the standard of their security is of continuing concern. In lower key, it is also in the interest of CIA to aid the security services of the remaining non-Communist countries where any friendly elements exist.

Although we have been charged primarily with our view on CIA counterintelligence as such, we have included, as perspective requires, the security and counterintelligence interrelationship of other agencies and departments. Unlike the collection and evaluation of positive intelligence, there has not been organized in Government, and particularly in the Intelligence Community, any machinery to produce an end-product which might be described to be national as distinguished from departmental counterintelligence. Very little is logical regarding this subject, unless one views the historical framework of the function, in terms of the special,

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

if not privileged, position of the FBI who had dominated the Intelligence Community as it relates to counterintelligence. Director Hoover refused to submit his views or policies to the scrutiny of the Intelligence Community where any problem remotely impinged on the interests and/or jurisdiction of the FBI. This unassailable stance estopped any and all attempts to bring the Bureau to account in any interagency board of equals charged with counterintelligence oversight, including the very effective President's Foreign Intelligence Board (PFIAB) who were thoroughly apprised of the facts, given their continuity and authority within the Community. What emerged was a loose ad hoc liaison of third parties, but never a meeting of chiefs with Mr. Hoover to hammer out basic issues relating to internal security and counterintelligence. This was the state of affairs until the appointment of Mr. Gray; counterintelligence as a function of Government - with few exceptions - was frozen by Mr. Hoover. Mr. Gray's tenure was marred by the turbulence of Watergate, and it was only with the appointment of Mr. Kelley that a new era opened up. Unfortunately, nothing of consequence has been tabled with Mr. Kelley on the outstanding issues.

Unlike the producers of positive intelligence, those engaged in counterintelligence are the primary consumers of their own product, and the counterintelligence product is less perishable than that of positive intelligence. We have attempted to remedy this omission over the years on an ad hoc basis by distilling intelligence from counterintelligence operations,

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

and we have concluded that ad hoc arrangements are inadequate for satisfying those who have a need for the counterintelligence end-product. As to the recipients, they should include selected officials who are involved in the estimating process as well as policy makers up to the Cabinet level. This has not been the case in the past, and as a result of this void, there has existed a conflict of views at both the policy and estimating levels regarding intentions, capabilities and the peculiar political dynamics of the Soviet Bloc. Experience would indicate that the basis differences in interpretation and evaluation are seemingly unbridgeable. What is required as soon as possible is an authoritative forum with access to all-source information in which differences may be joined and adjudicated.

We believe that the result would give the guidelines and targets for political action follow-up and would have a significant impact on interdepartmental policies which are not unrelated to the Soviet Bloc realities which we have uncovered in counterintelligence.

Specifically, reference is made to cases which involve a determination regarding the bona fides of Soviet defectors and Bloc sources whose positive information is given the broadest dissemination even though the source is suspect. From the beginning it has been defectors who have given us the most vivid appreciation of the clandestine activities of the Soviet Bloc. It is through defectors that one gains

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

knowledge regarding the identities and use of penetration agents and agents of influence who are, in turn, the kingpins of Soviet strategic deception.

An example of recent vintage which illustrates the range of confusion is Mr. McCone's response on television to a question that certain information was not turned over to the Warren Commission because the source was the KGB defector, Nosenko, whose bona fides at the time were not fully established. After having asserted that much effort always is devoted to the problems of bona fides, Mr. McCone related that he had been informed that the Agency's position now regarding Nosenko, as a result of a painstaking examination, was that he is bonafide. Astounded by this statement, the undersigned called the Agency officer who was the former executive assistant to Mr. McCone for clarification. He opined that Mr. McCone could not remember everything but that he would look into the matter. As of this writing there has been complete silence as to the identity of the Agency's spokesman.

To understand the significance of this anonymous bestowal of bona fides requires some further explanation of the Nosenko case. Several thousand man-hours have been expended in interviewing Nosenko and analyzing his information. While there were those somewhat removed from the case who accepted his bona fides, a contrary view was registered by the following: the Chief of the Soviet Division (who is now the Director's National Intelligence Officer for Soviet Production); the then

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Deputy Chief of the Soviet Division, even though he was the first contact of Nosenko's in the field; and his chief associates in the Division. In favor of Nosenko's bona fides have been the Office of Security and certain other members of the Soviet Division. The most persuasive detractor of Nosenko has been the KGB defector, Golitsyn. He is regarded to be the most knowledgeable KGB defector to come our way. After a lengthy analysis, he concluded that Nosenko was a dispatched agent provocateur. His views are also shared independently by another Soviet Intelligence Officer who defected to the Agency. The Counterintelligence Staff arrived at the same conclusion. The question of bona fides is unresolved. It has been permitted to fester without any authoritative conclusion because it is an interagency problem affecting other Soviet Bloc cases which are controlled elsewhere in the Community. Nosenko's information revolves around the following subject matters:

1. President Kennedy's Assassination: Nosenko's story is that while he was in the KGB's internal intelligence, he read the case file on Oswald. Given the timing of his defection, shortly after the assassination, his account - not borne out by the initial polygraph - may be viewed as exonerating the Soviets of any complicity with Oswald, thus

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

supporting the flimsy documentation on Oswald handed over to the U.S. Government by the USSR. This would also tend to disavow any relationship between the USSR and Cuba in clandestine activity.

2. Penetrations: With one or more exceptions, he stated that there were no penetrations of the U.S. Government. This assertion flew in the face of the overview which Golitsyn gave to us regarding Soviet Bloc penetration of Western services and strategic deception.

3. Order of Battle of the KGB at Home and Abroad: There are many instances where Nosenko's information contradicts Golitsyn's.

We have concluded on the basis of present evidence that Nosenko was dispatched to the West to mutilate the counterintelligence leads which had been revealed by Golitsyn. As to his observations regarding Oswald, it was the Soviets who have pushed the deception theme to the effect that Oswald was an instrument of the military - industrial complex of the eastern United States. This thought was first raised by Khrushchev in Cairo in an unusual interview which he had with an American journalist. It has since been pursued by the Soviets through various channels, mainly KGB, and it is now common currency in Soviet newspapers and other media.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

The Nosenko case goes to the quick of the counterintelligence problem facing not only the FBI and the Agency but all Western Intelligence and Security Services, many of whom have received information derived from Nosenko. It is evident that as presently organized, the Intelligence Community is incapable of correlating intelligence production with the product and analysis of counterintelligence information.

Given the inability of the Intelligence Community to come to grips with the problems raised by counterintelligence, it is suggested that the only solution to the very unsatisfactory situation today would be the appointment of an ombundsman who would be authorized to act directly on behalf of the National Security Council on serious interagency problems which have a direct bearing on the plans and capabilities of the Communist Bloc and involve the more sensitive operations of counterintelligence. Alternatively, consideration could be given to the responsibilities of the Chairman of PFIAB, which might be enlarged to satisfy this need.

As Attachment A, I submit a letter and attachment which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 31 January 1975. Given the march of events and the uncertainties involved, in addition to the responsibilities of his high office, it is understandable, perhaps, that the Secretary has not wished to become entangled in disputations on this subject matter as long as the Agency and its various Directors are being subjected to investigation. Nevertheless, in our view, the

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

issues involving Soviet strategic disinformation and our defense posture go to the heart of national security insofar as they relate to estimates affecting the world balance of power. Additionally, we believe it to be most misleading for one to assume that estimates derived from technical collection alone justify the negotiation of finite disarmament and other treaties with the Soviet Bloc governments unless there is corresponding high-level covert intelligence production which supplements and confirms the findings of technical collection.

This view argues against the philosophy now being aired with Olympian aplomb that technical coverage alone is a substitute for clandestine sources or that it gives a reliable data base which justifies a super power to bargain away its strength. (Attachment B sets forth the views of Mr. Paul Nitze and his first-hand impression of the SALT talks. Of particular interest is his description of the atmospherics: [a] the peculiar role of the KGB among Soviet negotiators, and [b] how an uninformed U.S. representation learned from the Soviet delegation of changes in the U.S. negotiating positions arrived at in Washington. The KGB attempted similar ploys during the Johnson Administration with a former high official of President Kennedy's on the Vietnam issue.)

If there be validity to the information derived from Golitsyn, then it would follow that detente and estimates

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

derived therefrom are misleading with regard to the events in Portugal, Vietnam and other areas where we are in competition with the Soviets and the Bloc. A more accurate picture could be obtained if the structure of the Intelligence Community, in its processing of information, were less concerned with public or overt data regarding the Soviet Bloc intentions, such as the reporting of Ambassadors and other representatives, and instead give full faith and credit to secret information from bona fide sources who are or were within the Soviet Bloc system and whose warnings regarding disinformation have been universally ignored. To repeat, it is the opinion of these sources that the bulk of information available to the West through Soviet Bloc contacts, regarding the strategy and aims of the Eastern Bloc, is, on the whole, spurious and represents little more than coordinated handouts which advance the interests of Soviet Bloc strategic disinformation at many levels of communications.

The remainder of this report represents the status, as of March 1975, of U.S. counterintelligence, primarily within the CIA, but also, as the perspective requires, at the national level. The discussion consists of four parts;

The authority under which CIA conducts counterintelligence activities.

The nature of those activities.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

A summary of critical developments in the history of U.S. counterintelligence from 1945 to 1975.

Recommendations which we respectfully urge the Commission to submit to the President for his consideration.

I. THE AUTHORITY

The current version of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, U.S. Espionage and Counter-intelligence Activities Abroad, effective 17 February 1972, is the charter for the conduct of foreign clandestine activities by CIA and by the other members of the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence community. NSCID/5 defines counterintelligence as " ... that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information and installations against espionage, sabotage and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording and disseminating information concerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals, groups or organizations conducting such activity."

As defined, counterintelligence consists of two parts, security and counterespionage. Security is essentially the

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

static defenses erected against the clandestine activities of adversaries of the U.S., whereas counterespionage is aggressive activity of engaging the adversary clandestinely.

NSCID/5 stipulates that the Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake specified actions in order to ensure centralized direction of all clandestine activities within the scope of the Directive. It also charges CIA with primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities abroad and permits other departments and agencies to conduct such foreign clandestine activities as are supplementary or are necessary to their security. Departmental counterintelligence is brought together through two Director of Central Intelligence Directives, one which requires coordination in advance with CIA on clandestine counterintelligence operations abroad, and the other which stipulates that CIA shall serve as a central repository of foreign counterintelligence data to the Intelligence Community.

The flow of authority is from the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Operations to the central counterintelligence unit of CIA or to an area division to provide whatever assistance the Director may require to discharge his obligations under NSCID/5 and its assignment to him of responsibility for the protection of methods and sources or under other laws, orders and directives. The immediate mandate of the counterintelligence component, however, is derived from

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

those responsibilities assigned directly to CIA (and thus chiefly from paragraphs 1b, 3b, 3c, 3d and 9 of NSCID/5, the chief provisos of which have been noted above).

In our view the DCI is not exercising under NSCID/5 responsible centralized direction of counterintelligence clandestine activity. As indicated to the Commission in verbal testimony, the current Director has spent less than four to five hours with the Counterintelligence Staff from the moment he became the Deputy Director for Operations until the present. His knowledge of the activity during the period when he was Chief of the Far East Division was one of failure and is reflected in an Inspector General's report of the period. This and some of his communications to the field are a matter of record in the FE Division. Instead of exercising leadership in resolving the serious problems of penetration and disinformation, which are of prime importance to the security of the country, under his aegis there has been a decentralization and mutilation within the Agency and, therefore, within the Community of high-level counterintelligence activity. We believe that substantial changes are needed and that these changes should be effected with and through an understanding of our counterintelligence mission, capabilities and needs. In setting forth our collective views on these matters, we do so, drawing on our professional experience as to what needs to be set right and how it may be done. The primary cause of the present vulnerability of our national security is the inadequate attention and serious lack of understanding of the counterintelligence function.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

II. THE NATURE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

The counterintelligence unit of the CIA bears a direct responsibility for the security of all Agency espionage and counterintelligence operations conducted abroad. It is also directly responsible for identifying and containing or controlling hostile clandestine activity through such operations as the following:

- The identification of adversary personnel, regardless of citizenship or location abroad.
- The penetration of foreign services.
- The handling and utilization of certain intelligence and counterintelligence defectors from foreign services.
- The management of double agent operations.
- The detection, analysis and nullification of hostile deception operations, including disinformation.
- Counterintelligence analysis and operations directed against adversary propaganda, defamation, forgeries and other covert activities.
- The exploitation of communications intelligence in furtherance of counterintelligence objectives.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

- The conduct of liaison abroad with foreign counterintelligence and security services and with foreign services generally about counterintelligence matters.

- The conduct of domestic counterintelligence liaison to ensure the necessary sharing of information and coordination of action.

- The maintenance of its own records and the managerial supervision of CIA's central repository of records to ensure that the foreign counterintelligence in these holdings is collated, analyzed and made available to others in the Intelligence Community on a need-to-know basis.

III. A SUMMARY OF THE COUNTERINTELLIGENCE HISTORY OF CIA

After the Second World War, except for a few stations abroad, centralized U.S. counterintelligence practically disappeared. By October 1945, when O.S.S. was liquidated, its counterintelligence branch, X-2, had become a widespread net of overseas stations staffed by some 650 counterintelligence specialists. Starting nearly from scratch, X-2 had created and developed a thoroughly professional U.S. counterintelligence capability in a very short time because it served a leadership that understood and respected

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

the counterintelligence function and conferred upon it the necessary measure of authority, autonomy and the essential secrecy required for the conduct of this activity. To better understand the need for reform, it is believed that a short historical presentation is essential. What is here submitted is based on voluminous files and documentation which record the shaky progress of counterintelligence as practiced by the U.S. Government following World War II until the present.

After October 1945 the concept of counterintelligence as a separate and equal function withered away. On 17 October of that year Brigadier General John A. Magruder, then the director of the Strategic Services Unit (a short-lived inheritor of O.S.S.), stated in a memorandum to Mr. John J. McCloy that the valuable O.S.S. liaison relationships abroad were deteriorating because foreign services were uncertain as to whether the United States would have a central intelligence service. General Magruder was an honorable and conscientious custodian of O.S.S.

Although CIA was established in 1947, and although the first version of NSCID/5, promulgated in December 1947, charged the Director of Central Intelligence with the conduct of all organized federal counterespionage operations overseas, the new Agency did not have a central counterintelligence unit of mechanism through which it could meet its counterintelligence responsibilities.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

On 1 January 1949 a report was submitted to the National Security Council at its request by men whom it had appointed to a Survey Group: Messrs. Allen W. Dulles (chairman), William H. Jackson and Mathias F. Correa. As one who had played a key role in the Office of Strategic Services, Mr. Dulles was familiar with the wartime role and performance of X-2. He understood its record and mission which were succinctly stated in the War Report: Office of Strategic Services.[1] The opening paragraph of this official account of X-2 reads as follows: "Counterespionage is a distinct and independent intelligence function. It embraces not only the protection of the intelligence interests of the government it serves, but, by control and manipulation of the intelligence operations of other nations, it performs a dynamic function in discerning their plans and intentions, as well as in deceiving them. An effective counterespionage organization is therefore an intelligence instrument of vital importance to national security."[2]

The Dulles Committee made recommendations designed to strengthen CIA and its counterintelligence capability. The

---

[1] Vol. I, Washington Organization, History Project, Strategic Services Unit, Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, War Department, Washington, D. C., July 1949.

[2] Ibid., p. 189.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

1949 report is infused with an understanding of problems and principles that have remained much the same for the past quarter of a century. The following two brief quotations are illustrative: " ... We ... propose that the branches of the Central Intelligence Agency which are directly engaged in clandestine actitivities, such as secret intelligence [espionage], counterintelligence, secret operations and the like, be given a great measure of autonomy as to internal administration, the control of their operations and the selection of personnel." The report also stated, "It seems apparent that the present counterespionage staff of the Office of Special Operations should be materially strengthened and more intensive counterespionage work promoted."

Until the end of 1954, however, counterintelligence remained structurally and in other respects subordinate to the collection of positive intelligence. In August 1950 there was a counterintelligence sub-unit called Staff C, but it had a total strength of twenty-three. The Soviet Intelligence Branch of Staff C consisted of three people. The result was a dispersion of the counterintelligence function among the area branches and a degradation of the work to such lowest common denominators as name tracing, maintenance of counterintelligence files and the like.

A notice of 20 December 1954 announced the formation of a new, senior counterintelligence element, the Counterintelligence Staff. For the first time CIA had elevated the

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

counterintelligence function, as a Staff function, to full parity with espionage and covert activities. One of the first undertakings of the Counterintelligence Staff was to determine who was doing counterintelligence work, what they were doing and under what circumstances. This survey was launched in 1955 and completed in 1956. It established that except for the Counterintelligence Staff itself, the Operational Directorate had only 133 full-time counterintelligence officers, about 6 per cent of its total non-clerical strength. The average grade of these officers was GS-09, and their average Agency experience was five years. Only one in four had had either basic or advanced training in counterintelligence.

From the end of 1954 until April 1973, the apex of its development, the Counterintelligence Staff grew in numbers, skills and responsibilities. By the latter date its personnel strength, as I noted in my earlier report to the Commission, consisted of 130 officers and seventy-two assistants and clerical personnel. This total of 202 still constituted only 3.7 per cent of the total Directorate of Operations strength of 5,662. As a result CIA could not meet its counterintelligence responsibilities adequately even at this peak of on-board counterintelligence strength. It is our view that the Operations Directorate ought to devote no less than 10 per cent of its manpower to counterintelligence and that no less than half of its

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

counterintelligence personnel should be allocated to the counterintelligence unit in Headquarters. This 10 per cent, comprising 566 officer and clerical employees, would still fall considerably short of our counterintelligence strength in the fall of 1945 when O.S.S. was dissolved.

The Counterintelligence Staff was nevertheless able to work effectively against its major targets. The scope of this paper prohibits an adequate resume, but there is an indication of the results achieved in the fact that during the years 1961 through 1963 eight major Soviet penetrations of American and foreign liaison intelligence services were uncovered and that six of the eight exposures resulted directly from CIA's counterintelligence work. Fifteen Soviet agents were arrested, as well as more than twenty others who were working clandestinely for one or another of the East European services.

In August 1973 as a result of the change in leadership in the Agency, there was put in motion a series of baffling administrative and functional changes which ignored the state of the art; the need for resolving many inter-Agency problems in counterintelligence, and, particularly, the need to work out with the FBI in depth a number of conflicts concerning the bona fides of sources; the handling of defectors; and authoritative research and analysis pertinent to these differences.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

The strength of CIA's counterintelligence unit was cut almost in half - to eighty-nine; and by December 1974 the on-board strength of our counterintelligence personnel, officer and clerical, was down to seventy-seven, a total comprising 1.7 per cent of Operations Directorate strength. This abrupt reduction in force was accompanied by the transfer of four interlocking staff elements (International Communism, Operational Approvals, Police and Counterintelligence Liaison) to other jurisdictions. I do not know of any reasons concerning the performance of the Counterintelligence Staff or the scope of hostile clandestine intelligence action against the U.S. which would justify this drastic reduction and weakening.

With regard to the FBI it is a fact that for some years prior to the death of Mr. Hoover, there were sharp differences between the FBI and the Counterintelligence Staff regarding the bona fides of Soviet intelligence personnel who represented perhaps the prime sources of information in relation to Soviet Bloc activity in the U.S., penetration in the Government and the order of battle of the Soviet presence.

CIA was fortunate to acquire a KGB defector in December 1961 who had spent many years at a very high level of Soviet security acquiring the most sensitive information in the full knowledge that when the time was propitious, he would defect to the West and impart his information. By way of simplification, it should be noted that this individual

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

was responsible for the breaking of many espionage cases in the West, but equally important he divulged Soviet plans, strategy and organization effected in 1959 by the KGB under the auspices of the Central Committee which in turn mapped out in partnership with other services of the Bloc a program of action whose principal targets were the isolation of the U.S. as the "Main Enemy" and the ultimate change in the balance of military power in favor of the Soviet Bloc.

During the later tenure of Mr. Hoover, which was fraught with difficulties between the FBI and members of the Senate, and included other changes hampering or limiting the FBI's ability to conduct internal security operations, the hard issues of disagreement were never dealt with on an agency-to-agency basis. To the contrary, as the Commission is well aware, there was eventually a breakdown in liaison across the board between departments and agencies of the Government with the FBI (with the exception of the White House). Further, the internal disputes within the Bureau challenging Mr. Hoover's leadership were extremely detrimental to any objective consideration concerning the national security, and consequently years were lost in pursuing the national counterintelligence objective. During this period, in our view, national estimates and evaluations were formulated in concrete establishment of detentist philosophy which marked the real state of Soviet Bloc subversion in the secret war.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

By way of explanation, we can illustrate the ineffectual coordination with a case involving a long-term Soviet penetration in the Agency. A very important staff agent was unmasked by virtue of information supplied by the aforementioned defector, but in the process the FBI officially took the position that the candidate who was submitted by the Agency was not the Soviet agent in question, and by memorandum they proposed that we submit all of the data to the Department of Defense on grounds that the penetration agent was more likely a past or present asset of the military. Subsequently, a high-level source confirmed our original identification, which in turn was accepted by the FBI. The case is illustrative of the inability within this Government to resolve interagency differences in all of those sensitive fields affecting penetration.

The result of the 1973 changes was a decentralization of counterintelligence, a retrogression to the inadequacies of the period 1949 to 1955. Now, as then, counterintelligence in CIA lacks the necessary specialists and the requisite interaction at the Agency's highest levels. Some of the present grave problems are not new, but the recent changes have greatly magnified them. Among our present weaknesses are the following:

- An almost total failure against Soviet illegals (intelligence officers under deep, non-official cover). At

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

present CIA is not conducting a single operation against a Soviet illegal.

- An incapacity to pursue unresolved outstanding leads. We estimate that there are some fifteen hard-core leads to known or probable penetrations by adversary services into U.S. or Allied services; that there are about one hundred leads meriting immediate study, analysis, investigation and exploitation; and that there are no less than one thousand that merit pursuit. All of them are now dormant.

- An inability to deal effectively with the twin problems of devising and carrying out strategic U.S. deception operations and of nullifying adversary deception. This serious weakness is not imbedded in CIA alone, and it did not result from the restructuring of Agency counterintelligence. The U.S. lacks a single, duly mandated, centralized authority for dealing with deception. Those few individuals and groups in the U.S. Government, chiefly in the military services, who are concerned with strategic

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

deception lack ready or frequent access to the policy level. They attempt to frame deception plans in ignorance of new policies, and they can obtain top-level review of their plans only on an ad hoc basis. The remedy is not to abandon deception and counter-deception but to elevate these functions. Should the Government do so, however, CIA would now lack the required expertise.

- A dwindling cadre. A substantial core of experienced counterintelligence specialists is the first preequisite for an effective counterintelligence program. Only a few are left today. The problem results not solely from the drastic reduction in force in 1973 but also from a philosophy and system that have made it almost impossible to replace either the numbers of the skills of those lost through attrition. In the Operational Directorate it is the Area Divisions that are linked by a command line to top CIA management in Headquarters and to all 147 Agency stations overseas. The Divisions select

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

young intelligence officers soon after the completion of their initial training, at the outset of their careers. They send many of them abroad, direct their work through Chiefs of Stations and Bases and bring them back in accordance with the personnel needs of Headquarters and the Field. The result is a system of rotation that benefits both the Agency and the employee. In contrast, the counterintelligence unit in Headquarters has no representative of its own overseas. To secure competent replacements, it must try to intervene in the normal progress of careers, to persuade officers and Divisions that higher interests require a change of their plans and to convince the officers that they should choose careers in counterintelligence even though their career advancement is in fact likely to be impeded by this choice. In brief, CIA has no system for developing counterintelligence career officers; sending them abroad on a rotational basis to acquire, through a series of tours, the necessary experience as specialists; and providing them with the same incentives and career prospects as those of their peers in the Area Divisions.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

- An accelerating decline in the quality of our counterintelligence liaison relationships abroad. Here too there is a parallel with the problems that beset us in the past and that gave cause to General Magruder to express his concern in 1945.

Most of CIA's liaison overseas is carried out with counterintelligence and security services because only a minority of nations maintain foreign espionage organizations, whereas nearly all have internal security services. Italy is typical. It has a few intelligence officers overseas, but 99 per cent of its strength is at home. The major Italian intelligence service is the Defense Intelligence Agency (SID). The SID draws its counterintelligence from the *Carabinieri* (a semi-military organization with a network of posts spread throughout the country) and from all of the military services. The service has a vast array of domestic sources that number in the high thousands and range from the *portieri* who tend apartments throughout Italy to high dignitaries of the church and state. The chief of the SID has

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

direct access to the Minister of Defense, and some service chiefs have also had the benefit of immediate access to the president of the republic. Through its liaision with the SID the CIA greatly augments its own resources at scant cost. The same pattern obtains, in varying degrees, in all of the countries (more than one hundred) and most of the services (more than three hundred) with which CIA maintains liaison relationships.

Counterintelligence liaison requires close and expert attention. It is built upon mutual interest; but through training, persuasion and other means the skillful liaison officer expands the shared basis and thus directs or redirects the enormous counterintelligence resources of the non-Communist world against targets of primary importance to the U.S.

In return for this vast strengthening of our defense, our Allies look to us for several advantages: for example, a buttressing of their frequently meager capabilities in research and analysis. They must also be confident that we can give a full measure of

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

protection to secrets shared with us. And they look to us for leadership. At times we have disappointed them.

An instance of this occurred in September 1971, when the British expelled ninety to 105 Soviet intelligence officers from their country in a single action. They had noted a relentless buildup of the Soviet clandestine force in their midst. MI 5, the British counterintelligence service, found that the fifteen intelligence officers whom it had identified in the U.K. in 1950 had grown by 1970 to more than 120. The PNG action was carried out despite some qualms. The Soviets made only a token retaliation. The Belgians followed the British lead, though on a smaller scale and without publicity. A number of liaison services expected the U.S. to make a similar move, and the FBI and CIA joined in recommending such action here. But no initiative was undertaken.

Now the fabric of our counterintelligence liaison relationships shows some fraying because of clamor in the American press and a consequent change of atmosphere. Our partners are no longer sure that we can act decisively

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

in concert with them or even keep their secrets. To weather the crisis, CIA needs a strengthened counterintelligence cadre in its Headquarters, one able to give full support and judicious guidance to liaison officers abroad.

- A mounting inability to cope with the growing menace of hostile clandestine activity. The sudden reduction in CIA's central counterintelligence capacity took place at a time when the intelligence services of the Soviet Bloc, about twenty-five in all, have increased immeasureably their total presence abroad and their operational initiatives, particularly in respect to strategic deception and penetration. The Soviet capability in economic and industrial espionage has always been a very real danger to the U.S. and remains so. For this reason I included a summary of the Armand J. Hammer case in my earlier report, and I resubmit it with this paper (Attachment C). A second illustration is the case of General Yevgenni Petrovich Pitrovanov, also attached (Attachment D). Our estimate of total Soviet intelligence

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

strength abroad in January 1975 was ca. 3,900, of whom 332 were stationed in the U.S. Soviet official presence in the U.S. and other countries has grown more rapidly in recent years than has the corresponding number of identified operatives, although we feel confident that the ratio of about 40 per cent has not changed, or not at least to the advantage of the West.

As my previous report stated, Director Kelley has warned of a growing imbalance between our adversaries and the forces at his disposal. We believe that there has been a severe decline in the effectiveness of U.S. counterintelligence both domestically and abroad. Something of the aggressiveness of the hostile services is shown in their persistent attempts to recruit Americans abroad for such clandestine purposes as penetration. During the period 1965 through mid - 1972, there was a total of 2,150 such incidents (an incident being an outright attempt to recruit or an overture clearly intended to lead to recruitment). Thus, in an average year, 287 Americans overseas are approached by

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

adversary services with intent to harm. It would be unrealistic not to expect the KGB and other clandestine Communist services to recognize that the present is a time of disarray in U.S. counterintelligence and to seek to exploit this advantage to the hilt.

- Inadequate information about the intelligence and security services of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, especially the latter. We have a large body of counterintelligence about the USSR, and it has been entered into computer programs. Our machines programs about the services of Poland, Hungary, East Germany, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania and Yugoslavia are, in contrast, non-existent or moribund. They have been allowed to slide because of the pressures of keeping up with services as large and virulent as the KGB and the GRU. The USSR itself has not made this mistake. It orchestrates large-scale clandestine operations against the West, assigning roles to the apparatuses of the Warsaw Pact states and to Cuba in accordance with their capabilities. These Soviet allies are extensions of the Soviet capacity to wage underground warfare, and therefore we need to know

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

them intimately and to keep our knowledge current. Our performance falls too short.

- A lack of communication and interaction between the Director of Central Intelligence and CIA's counterintelligence unit. The present Director lacks counterintelligence experience. He has asked for, and received, only one two-hour briefing on the subject. Most of his predecessors, in contrast, were vitally concerned. Through briefings and through operational participation they acquired a real familiarity with the wide spectrum of counterintelligence and the problems that it inevitably engenders. The present Director of Central Intelligence, on the other hand, has managed CIA's affairs without consulting me or other highly experienced counterintelligence officers about Agency operations, programs or priorities. Those now designated to succeed us cannot, with the best will in the world, make a sudden leap that will carry them across decades of intensive, daily experience acquired by those who already have left the Agency and those who are unquestionably leaving in the not-too-distant future. Thus counterintelligence is left with a growing threat, undiminished responsibilities, a sharp reduction in capabilities and no effective access to the Agency's top managerial level on substantive issues.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following recommendations are presented for the consideration of the Commission with the sole intent of revitalizing national counterintelligence and enabling it to discharge its assigned responsibilities in furtherance of national security. To this end we propose the following changes:

1. That the Operational Directorate of CIA assign not less than one-tenth of its component to counterintelligence.
2. That of this total about half be assigned to a central counterintelligence unit in Headquarters and that the remaining half be divided among the various Area Divisions and branches in Headquarters and selected Agency stations abroad.
3. That CIA provide this cadre with counterintelligence training in depth.
4. That selected counterintelligence personnel be rotated through Headquarters and field assisgnments of growing responsibility in accordance with career plans that afford them opportunities for advancement which equal those of their Agency colleagues.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

5. That counterintelligence designees abroad work under the nominal command of Chiefs of Stations but that they engage in counterintelligence work full time and that they have privacy channels of communications with the Headquarters counterintelligence unit which will ensure that access to their sensitive information remains on a compartmented, need-to-know basis.

6. That close operational liaison between the FBI and the counterintelligence unit be fostered, and that direct, operational, domestic liaison with other U.S. departments and agencies by the counterintelligence unit be maintained to whatever extent the national interest requires.

7. That the U.S. establish a single central organ to formulate policy for national strategic deception and to deal with adversary deception, specifically including disinformation. Further, that this body have the necessary access to policy-creating levels of the U.S. Government and that it have the necessary measure of jurisdiction over Governmental components engaged in deception and counterdeception.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious augmentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common adversary, and the expansion of the cadre of counterintelligence liaison officers abroad.

9. That CIA undertake a more vigorous program to obtain further data about the intelligence and counterintelligence services of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, so that our knowledge of them becomes fully comparable with our knowledge of the Soviet services, and that these increased holdings be placed in machine records as rapidly as their size warrants.

10. That the U.S., and especially the FBI and the CIA, intensify counteringelligence work against Soviet and other illegals.

11. That within the expanded counterintelligence unit in CIA headquarters a defector section be created and that this section be responsible for supervising the operational handling and continuing debriefing of designated defectors, both abroad and in the U.S.,

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

the latter responsibility to be assigned in agreement with the FBI and other affected departments and agencies.

12. That the chief of the counterintelligence unit have direct and frequent access to the Director of Central Intelligence and other Deputy Directors and members of the Intelligence Community engaged in security and counterintelligence to ensure that counterintelligence considerations are given due weight in the formulation of policy and that counterintelligence capabilities are fully utilized in defending CIA and other U.S. departments and agencies against clandestine activity, including penetration operations, carried out by our adversaries.

James Angleton

James Angleton

Attachments: as stated

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Date: 8/27/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : DAVIS
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10148

RECORD SERIES : GENERAL SUBJECT FILE

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : INTEL. INVESTIGATIONS--MISC. B, OCT.1975 (3)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : RATLIFF, ROB ROY
TO : SCOWCROFT, BRENT

TITLE : JUSTICE DEPARTMENT REQUEST FOR MAIL INFORMATION

DATE : 10/14/1975
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :

OPERATION MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/09/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : No attachments.

SECRET
EYES ONLY

178-10004-10148

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

OUTSIDE SYSTEM
INFORMATION

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachments

14 October 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: ROB ROY RATLIFF

SUBJECT: Justice Department Request for Mail Information

Jeanne Davis transmitted to me a request from the Department of Justice to survey 40 Committee and predecessor group files to determine any information of a list of subjects focused on operations involving mail. She asked that I transmit my findings directly to you.

I assume that Justice is interested in illegal use of the mails. As I understand CIA's admitted activity in this field, it was an intelligence collection operation and therefore would not be subject to review by the 40 Committee or its predecessors. We find no record that mail intercept operations were discussed by the 40 Committee or predecessors; however, there are references to mail operations in Committee records.

Jeanne Davis said Justice wanted material on "any use of mail techniques." These are representative items:

TAB A--Reports which indicate general mailings of propaganda and related material. There is nothing sinister in this--you put a book or pamphlet in an envelope, address it, put on postage and drop it in the mail.

TAB B--Letters were test mailed inside a denied area to see if they come out, or individuals mailed spontaneous letters to CIA-supported enterprises. Again, there is nothing unusual about this--regular use of the mail system.

TAB C--Special covert operations which make use of the mails, including:

C-1--A forged letter mailed in Prague to a Czech leader.

C-2--Mailing of black letters, primarily from third countries. However (see page 5 of 9 May 1972 item), some of these letters may have been inserted into the mail system ostensibly as having originated in the denied area.

CLASSIFIED BY Signer
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 11652
EXEMPTION CATEGORY [illegible]
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
[illegible]
(effective date or event, if any)

TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE Attachments

SECRET
EYES ONLY

PHOTO COPY
FROM
GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

C-3--Some covert operations using the mail may have been designed to represent that the item was originally mailed in a denied area. In other words, you want the recipient to believe that his letter came from the Chinese Communists so you make it appear as if it had been mailed from China. Note that the last item in this group (17 and 10 January 1972) refers to "letter-insert mechanisms." I can find no elaboration of what this means, but it might represent intercept of the mail, surreptitious opening of a letter and the insert of some additional material.

C-4--National Intelligence Estimates and other reports of intelligence may refer to information, some part of which was gleaned from mail intercepts. On the basis of protecting sources and methods these would not normally be identified in a document. However if the question were asked at a meeting, the source might be orally identified as a mail intercept (or SIGINT or whatever).

C-5--This category represents probable entry into the international mail system to support a covert operation. The first item shows DOD sending letters ostensibly from groups in North Vietnam to other countries. The second shows CIA fabricating and mailing 700 letters "ostensibly from Peking." The third shows CIA fabricating Democratic Republic of Vietnam greeting cards and mailing them.

In each of the C-5 cases, operational information was probably gleaned from a mail intercept operation which would enable one to fabricate the paper, envelopes, writing and addressing styles, even counterfeit postage stamps and cachets, all with the aim of giving the appearance that the letter originated from a denied area. The material might then be inserted into the international mail system (e.g., you know that mail from Communist China transits Panama for onward distribution to Latin America; through liaison or independent contacts you insert your bundles in the sack from Peking and then it is given routine onward distribution through the regular mail system).

C-6--Here are two cases where the Committee was informed that mail intercepts were the source of information used in support of covert operations.

With regard to MONGOOSE files--which Mrs. Davis said Justice also wanted us to check--I find only the references at TAB D which suggest the possibility that mail intercept operations were a part of the response to intense pressures for more "hard" information on what was going on in Cuba.

PHOTO COPY FROM GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

Mrs. Davis also said that Justice made reference to Walt Rostow's recollection of a general survey of all "intelligence programs country by country" made by the 303 Committee. I assume he means the general beginning-of-a-new-President's-term roundup (similar to the ones given Mr. Nixon and Mr. Ford). We find references to covert action reviews, but these appear to have been oral and we find nothing in writing, and no references to mail operations.

In summary, we have made a review of our files, with special reference to the general index of minutes and the country files deemed most likely to include references to "any use of mail techniques." Representative findings are cited above. We find no record of "illegal" mail operations being a subject of discussion or consideration within the 40 Committee and predecessor organizations (December 1958 to the present). However, there is evidence that the Committee was informed that mail intercept operations were conducted (TAB C-6).

Please advise if any additional material or presentation is desired.

Attachments
  TABs A-D

PHOTO COPY FROM GERALD R. FORD LIBRARY

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : KISS/SCOW
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10314

RECORD SERIES : SCOWCROFT MEMCONS, HANDWRITTEN

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : OCTOBER 1975

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : WH
FROM : SCOWCROFT, BRENT
TO : [Restricted]

TITLE : P/INTELLIGENCE MTG 13 OCT 75

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88608
Date: 03-18-2025

DATE : 10/13/1975
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :

FORD, GERALD R.
KISSINGER, HENRY A.
COLBY, WILLIAM E.
CIA
CHURCH COMMITTEE
SCOWCROFT, BRENT
ASSASSINATIONS, FOREIGN LEADERS
BUCHEN, PHILIP

DOCUMENT TYPE : NOTES
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/12/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Participants: Ford, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Levi, Lynn, Colby, Buchen, Marsh, Rumsfeld, Scowcroft, Raoul-Duval. Handwritten notes. For typed transcript see ID# 1781000410302.

P/ Intelligence Wrty (K, Schles, Lynn, Buchen, Marsh, Rumsfeld) 13 Oct 75

(Wrty underway)

S (Argued that Atty Genl should not oppose ~~the~~ NSA surveillance.

P In c case of tele. taps for a particular embassy you sign each one. For NSA, you would sign a general one that it is w/in c law

L Yes, but I think it should be periodically reviewed

S Question is whether Atty Genl should rule on surveillance directed at Sov Embassy. Also an issue of atty genl ruling on overseas surveillance.

C The technology is advancing so fast that phone calls could be routed overseas for call bet. Wash + Rich.

L 2nd circuit has held that overhearing an Am. abroad is a violation.

R I would think Pres would want Atty Genl involved in periodic review so ~~p~~ he would know what might come up in c papers.

S The articles in c paper today result from Presidentially directed ops.

K What is in c paper today results from us dumping vast quantities of material on c Cmtes. The paper has just said we have broken c Egyptian code — it has been blown. I think rather than just say c law is fixed we should try to educate c courts to c realities of c world + our natl security needs.

L On c contrary, c courts are moving, but in c wrong direction. We maybe need a statute but we have to be careful about our practices as we prepare our case

P I think trying to get a statute would be a disaster

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

in todays environment. Maybe a statute in a year or so, but now will just have to use guidelines.

K Does Ed want to appear today NSA ops.

L I think we have to have some guidelines, perhaps as % of incidental US traffic overheard.

S ~~Ed~~ We can work out guidelines. I am worried about the Atty Genl being the biggest intel officer for these purposes.

P Lets have State, Def, CIA draw up guidelines and then review it w/ Atty Genl.

B Church is ready on assassination report. They will let us review the document for security & sensitivity, but not on the merits of the case. We don't want to get you in position of resp. for the report. They won't let us edit it or approve it.

P I gave ~~it~~ the material on basis they would handle it as carefully as we have

Sc. If they publish a report at all it is irresponsible.

K If these things get put out, senior officials will stop speaking frankly and foreign govts will wonder about their ability to work w/ us confidentially.

P I think this is a more highly sensitive area than any we have had.

C Any document which officially shows US involvement in assassination is a FP disaster

P I have assumed they had the right to publish any of this.

L There is no legal way we can prevent it.

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

P I don't know what the letter of transmittal was, but I said they had to handle these certain documents as we had – and we released none.

M Once they have a document, the speech & debate clause means there is no way we can prevent its release.

K The new element in these investigations is the turning over of documents. During McCarthy, etc, there was testimony, but it did not involve all documents involved.

(More discussion on this general point)

P ~~B~~ The Cmte was warned on certain data

B We agreed that we would object to any report but that we would review ~~[illegible]~~ the document for the most damaging quotations. It was apparent that we couldn't get a vote in the cmte not to publish a report.

M The cmte has requested us to pass on a series of quotations. We refused to do that except in context

P I think we should review it and then say it is not in natl interest to release it at all.

Sc We can send any letter we want following the review.

P I think we should review w/a tough eye and then say the document shouldn't be released, but if they determined, then some areas are more damaging than others.

K I think we have a profound const. issue which I think we have to face + establish some fences around this issue as the courts have established themselves their opinions.

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

B. All we are fighting is official confirmation of material which is already widely known. This is not a good issue on which to go to court.

P. I don't want to be any part of their publishing material like this. If they want to do that, it is their resp.

B. That is position we have taken.

P. We have to say very strongly we oppose any effort, but that there are some more damaging than others.

M. Let's get to the other issues ?

C. Church is reviewing a lot of areas previously covered w/a view to making them public — for sensationalism. They also want to go into sensitive covert ops. One of these is Greece, w/a possible threat to Kara; Congo, w/ threat to Mobutu, Laos, Indonesia, Chile.

Pike wants to get into Portugal & Angola. We I think have turned off Portugal. We ~~[illegible]~~ briefed Pike & McClory on Angola. I think we [illegible] but he has 2 questions — was a decision making really seriously done. The other is ~~[illegible]~~ does Angola meet a qualification of essential to nat'l security.

P. I think we're in a valid position that they should stay away from current opns.

K. If any Cmte has a right to question a Pres' certification, we are in another hopeless situation. ?

C. The second prob is that of names. They have asked

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

for the records of our relation of Pan Am, Gulf, ITT & . If we acknowledge relationship, we will kill these companies & our ability to place agents & get coop. We would propose revealing to the Cmte only areas where there may be a question of improprieties.

K. We will have a monumental job getting any company to coop w/us in the future.

C. True, but if an allegation of impropriety, we can't very well defend that.

M. H. (More discussion of the Angolan issue)
Harry, you are next.

K. There is one ~~issue~~ apparently pending to State — permitting junior personnel to testify as to policy recommendations. The dangers are that juniors would use this to get at their seniors who overruled them or the Cmte to ~~[illegible]~~ harass them for decisions they made. To do otherwise would wreck the F.S. This to me is a question of absolute principle. It is like the Cmte against people who can't defend themselves.

L. Before we get into this on emotion, I think we should go thru the Boyatt letter & remove those parts which do contain names or policy. The Cmte has a strong special charter & I think it is wrong to deceive ourselves. If it is going into litigation, I think we should see if we cannot sanitize the document.

K. The basic point of the dissent memo was to prove the embassy in Athens had a predilection for the junta & thus didn't ~~[illegible]~~ listen to the desk officers.

Sc. Seems to me you are denying there is a principle involved — that is, the right of junior officers to get

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

to c Secy w/o fear of being exposed.

L. You have a strong public position now, but I think it will wither when the letter becomes known, because 90% of c document is a recitation of fact.

Lynn: The question is not one of import - it is wrong import to let it happen - but what is c legal handle on it. There I think we are weak.

S. State is dif. To the Interior, where c bureaus in alliance w/ Cong can stymie c Secy.

K. I am concerned about c integrity of c FS. It took us 15 yrs. to recover from McCarthy

P. If Boyatt was up there testifying what happened day by day, what would you say?

K. I'd have no prob.

L. ~~[illegible]~~ There is no doubt State & Def have preferred position, but I trying to preserve it for you & that memo is a lousy one on which to do it.

P. There are 2 issues: one is the sanctity of c dissent channel & ~~someone~~ c other is testifying as to c fact. Harry says c letter is acceptable. W/o having read c memo, I would say we strengthen our case if we cut out extraneous material in c memo.

L. I think it is suicide to imagine this case into what you want it to be. When c document gets printed in c paper I think you will wonder whether this is c one on which to make our case.

M ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ Thing which worries me is possibility that Boyatt

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

might agree to release

P From lawyer's point of view, what do you recommend

L Review of the document to excise policy & sensitive matter & give the cmte what is left, if there is resistance in the cmte, then we are in a strong position to defend the issue

K What is your position about junior officers testifying on opinions

L That's tough - Don't know how you can hold to it.

R You have to defend that on political not legal ground.

P I think we have a defensible position if we send the asst secy & the junior officer up w/ a division of testimony.

M I agree w/ Henry's position ~~[illegible]~~ w/ respect to oversight cmtes. But this is a special cmte & circumstance

P I think we want a confrontation where the law & w/ the public we can win. We ought to find a case which will give us both of those. How we handle this case ~~has~~ might to fall w/in those parameters. On witnesses I think we are on the right track & should stand. On the memo, I think we should take a look at it.

K 200 FSO's have written letters, as have 10 retired people like George Kennan, etc.

P Let's see if we can separate the fact from opinion

K Except then you violate the dissent principle. Many dissents are ~~base~~ based on the ~~[illegible]~~ assertion that the Secy doesn't know the facts.
(over)

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

[illegible] How about responding to the demand by providing a summary of it?

L Might work.

K That I would do only in context of saying these are all the contrary views expressed to me.

P Let's look at all three options & see where we go.

K If I am ordered to do it I'll do it, but I think this is a profound issue of foreign policy & the foreign service. We are acceding to a [illegible] principle & arguing only on fact.

P But one thing is that if you get a bad case & lose it you have done the worst possible ~~most~~ damage

K That is true.

P I think we can confront them & win if we have the right case—

R I think we are better off on a political confrontation than a legal one w/ these cmtes.

SECRET

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/31/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10396

RECORD SERIES : BAKER-WEIDNER FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : B-W VII-K

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ROCK
FROM : WEIDNER, JOHN
TO : FILE

TITLE : INTERVIEW WITH JOHN STEIN

DATE : 03/18/1975
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
- CIA
- NOSENKO, YURI
- STEIN, JOHN
- SECRET SERVICE
- OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/13/2001

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Includes "Advice and Waiver" statement.

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

March 18, 1975

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

SECRET - SENSITIVE

178-10004-10396

MEMORANDUM FOR: File

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Interview with John Stein

I interviewed Mr. Stein in his office at the CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia on March 18, 1975. The interview commenced at 11:10 a.m. and continued until approximately 1:20 p.m. No one else was present. At the outset of the interview, Mr. Stein signed an Advice and Waiver which is annexed hereto.

Mr. Stein, along with several other Deputies, were assigned to an Ad Hoc Committee to review various alleged domestic activities of the CIA. Stein's particular area was the counter-intelligence staff, except for the activities of that staff relating to the CI/SO project and to the mail intercept project.

Stein said that, after his review, he concluded that the job of the CI staff was essentially to "horse" the FBI into doing something. In fact, according to Stein, once you eliminate CI/SO and the mail intercept project from the CI staff, their activities were benign insofar as the scope of this Commission's scope of inquiry was concerned. He said that, unless you conclude that keeping records relating to Americans, per se, is improper, the CI staff files contained little of interest.

(a) Action-oriented Matters

I asked Stein whether he had found any evidence of domestic breaking and entering directed by the CI staff. Stein said that he had found no such activities, with one possible exception. Stein stated that, if such activities seemed appropriate, the CI staff would inform the Bureau

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

which would accomplish the activities. This was because, if anything were discovered by virtue of the action which would lead to a prosecution, the action should be taken by the FBI, since the Department of Justice would have responsibility for the prosecution.

The only possible exception to the absence of any "breaking and entering" by the CI staff was the Tofti case. Tofti was a long term employee of the Agency, who put his house up for rent. Coincidently, another Agency employee went to look at the house for possible rental. In the course of so doing, the second employee found that there were quite a number of classified documents on the third floor of the house. The employee then reported what he found to the Agency, which sent personnel over to recover the documents. (The documents related to world-wide proprietaries of the Agency with which Tofti had been involved. Ultimately, Tofti explained that he intended to write a book about these matters and that was why the records were in his home.) The Agency undoubtedly did not have time to advise the Bureau much in advance (if at all) of the Agency's effort to recover the subject documents. Stein also noted that this incident did not, in fact, involve "breaking and entering" since the house was already opened to allow prospective renters to examine it.

Stein said that he had found no instances of physical surveillance done by the CI staff, although the staff would probably have been aware of surveillance accomplished by other agency components or by the Bureau. Stein cited as an example an instance where a female Agency employee was found to be living with a man who could well have been working for a foreign Government. The Office of Security, therefore, put a surveillance on her hous for approximately three weeks. Discussions were also had with an informant within the Agency concerning this employee. (Files on this case would be maintained by the Office of Security).

Stein found no evidence of any electronic surveillance or telephone taps accomplished domestically by the CI staff. The staff had no personnel who could actually take any action. The staff, in this regard, would have had an advisory capacity, if it participated at all. The CI staff would simply advise the Bureau or other components of the Agency such as the Office of Security or the Office of Technical Services. In such instances the CI staff would not hold the file, except perhaps a memorandum relating to the particular case, but Stein found no such memoranda.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

As a digression, Stein commented that, to the extent that CI staff may have gotten into "gray" areas, this may well have been as a result of an effort to restrict knowledge of a particular incident to the smallest possible number of people. Thus, rather than going to the Bureau, where control over the dissimilation of the subject information would not be possible, the staff might go to another Agency component such as the Office of Security. Similarly, where an investigation proved fruitless, continued maintenance of relevant files by the CI staff, rather than by the Agency or the Bureau generally, constituted part of an effort to avoid prejudicing the particular subject of the investigation.

Another general area mentioned by Stein was that involving the use by CI staff of people having an historical relationship with the staff. These persons would be used against clearly foreign targets in the United States. As an example, Stein said that such persons might be used to obtain access to codes or the like in this country.

Stein mentioned the allegations relating to the reported breaking and entering into the Chilian Embassy. I told him that we had already reviewed this instance, and, therefore, there was no need for him to review it any detail.

(b) Files on Americans.

The major source of files on Americans maintained by CI staff was the "American Targets Program" (ATP). This program involved information received by CI staff from Agency sources, from the State Department, and from the Military. Information might also be received from the FBI. The purpose of ATP was to collate all contacts between any American and any foreign intelligence officers, particularly those from the USSR. The concept of the program was that all such contacts would be reported to CI staff, which would index them for future reference.

Stein noted that, although the State Department actually had a formal regulation requiring that all contacts with Soviets be reported, it was extremely difficult to convince State officers so to report. Stein spent a substantial amount of time overseas under State cover. He said that, as a result of that experience, he knows that State officers are reluctant to report this kind of information. (A State officer probably will not achieve promotion by his contact with Soviet personnel.) As a result of this reluctance, the information obtained by the CI staff generally originated with the State Department's Office of Security.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

The ATP program for filing was simply that when a name was reported to CI staff, it was mechanically processed by personnel who exercised no judgment in recording the name. The names of both the Soviet and the American people involved in the contact would be recorded. As a result of this process, the ATP file index was able to develop a great deal of information on Soviet contacts with Americans. If, as a result of information obtained, CI staff had reason to believe that a prticular person had been recruited by the Soviets, that information would be forwarded to the Office of Security for the Agency, if any Agency officer were involved, or to FBI, if an American outside the Agency was involved.

Stein explained that this program was conducted by CI staff instead of by the FBI or State, because the program might well contain information which would be relevant to CIA purposes, but not relevant to the purposes of the other Agencies. Thus, the files might well contain information concerning known KGB Agents. That information, in turn could have derived from a sensitive source, the identity of which CIA would not want to have revealed. Accordingly, the information was stored by the Agency rather than the other possible Governmental components. Information relevant to those components, however, was made available to them from the ATP project.

The information utilized by ATP could have been derived,as noted, from reports of other Governmental components or from information provided by any American. This would be information provided voluntarily, either by a person actually having a contact with a foreign intelligence officer or by persons with knowledge that someone else had had such a contact. The information could be particularly useful, not only to the CIA, but to other Governmental components. For example, the State Department's Office of Security might report that a State officer had had a contact over a long period with a Soviet. The CI staff could check all its information on that Soviet and confirm whether they had reason to believe that the Soviet was in fact an agent.

Another source of files on Americans held by CI staff might be the product of code-breaking by NSA. Thus, in reading codes, names of Americans may appear. Some of these may be innocuous, and some may be spies. In any event, all these names are also indexed, although the index is separate from ATP, because of the sensitivity of the NSA program as well as the information derived therefrom.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

The information plugged into the indexing system will not become an actual file until there is some reason for opening a file on a particular person. At that point (for example, a file search requested by another Agency) all information relating to a particular person will be collated in one place. This, in turn will be developed into a separate file (a personality file). If the information on a particular person is requested by a CIA field office, the collation process would occur and the field would be told how the particular person had come to the attention of the Agency in the first instance and would also be told any derogatory information which the field station would want to know.

Other CI files derived from on-going cases. Part of these files emanate from information provided to the Agency by defectors. For example, one element of this information is designated "Soviet leads." This is because the CI staff learned from a defector that all Soviet women employed in the United States Embassy in the USSR during a certain period were Soviet agents. Some of these women, in turn, married Americans, and, as a result, now live in the United States. The FBI is advised of the identity of all these women. The CI staff, under official cover, occasionally goes out to interview these women, in an effort to convince them to reveal what they know about KGB operations. The effort was first to determine whether the women continue to be KGB agents, and, if not, to gather information from them. The general modus operandi would be to tell the women that we know that at one time they were KGB agents and, while we did not intend to take any action against them, to request them to reveal information that they may have learned at that time concerning KGB operations. Generally, the women would agree to do so. If they did not, the contract would, at least temporarily, be dropped. These women are, in short, used as "defectors who did not defect".

Other examples of going cases are: a journalist who had private contact with George Blake, a former KGB agent in England; an American who was tied into the Able case (in this instance, the actions are taken by the Bureau, but guidance is given by CI staff); and a journalist who the KGB, on three occasions, attempted unsuccessfully to recruit.*

Other files may relate to actions begun because of some kind of counter-intelligence implication in a particular situation. In these instances CI would maintain the files because of the particular sensitivity of the matter, even though action may be taken by another Agency component.

---

*Stein noted that the decision as to whether to utilize someone as a double agent is made by the CIA. If the decision is affirmative, the double agent would be handled by t Agency (if he is abroad) or by the FBI (if he is in this country). The only exceptions to this pattern would be where the double Agent is in the United States for only a brief tim or where he has a special relationship with a particular CIA officer.

Other files are maintained concerning the Soviet Embassy. CIA's position on this matter is that this is a State case which the Agency is running on behalf of State.

There is also a file on Vesco held by the CI Staff. The Agency became involved in this situation because John Dean of the White House called and stated that President Nixon's brother had obtained a job with IOS. He wanted to know what IOS was all about. CIA, in fact, had a file on IOS, because it was known that the Soviets had been attempting to penetrate that institution as a vehicle for getting agents into this country or at least allowing them to learn of economic matters relating to the United States. Stein said that, at one point, Vesco's lawyer called to say that he wanted to have an account of everything which had been said about Vesco over South American radio channels. The Agency refused this request, stating that it was beyond its charter.

(c) Defectors

There are four sorts of defectors handled by the CI Staff. The first group are those under low level cover which are being used to scan Soviet publications and to extract anything relating to Soviet intelligence which they, in light of their expertise, may recognize. The second group of defectors are those with "talents". This group are former KGB agents who, as a result, have special knowledge. They may be used from time to time to go and talk with (either in the United States or abroad) USSR citizens. Another sort of defector is one from Czechoslovakia. This particular person is highly knowledgable in Maxist-Leninist matters. Accordingly, he is used to write propaganda which is disseminated abroad. The last category of defectors are those who are no longer in regular contact with the agent. These particular persons are seen from time to time for some particular reason which could simply be an administrative matter concerning their pensions, etc.

The CI Staff also maintains a file on defectors from America to some other country (such as the Soviet Union, Cuba and others). These names are recorded because the persons involved may eventually end up in the United States once again or in some country other than the Soviet Bloc. This would not necessarily mean that that person is a spy, but it does mean that he would be of counter-intelligence interest. At approximately the time of the Kennedy assassination the Secret Service and the FBI became particularly interested in potential defectors from

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

the United States. (Recall that Oswald had had connections with Russia). This was an operation which the CIA did not particularly want to undertake. Nonetheless the Agency did trace the names which the Bureau and Secret Service provided in this regard. The number of these names was perhaps 2,000 including crackpots who may have as an off hand comment, suggested that they intended to defect to, for example, Russia. The CIA attempted to turn the program over to the Secret Service for the Bureau, but th would not take it. The CIA ultimately stopped the project and cleared all the files out. This would have been approximately three years ago. Stein noted that although the files had been eliminated, it was possible that some of the names provided to the Agency had made it into the Central Agency files, and would not have been eliminated therefrom.

I briefly discussed the NOSENKO Case with Stein. Nosenko had defected to the United States and was admitted to this country as a "parolee". That is, the Immigration and Naturalization Bureau have a quota of persons which the Agency can bring into the country without regular immigration papers. These persons are the responsibility of the Agency. There was some initial doubt, as to whether, in fact, Nosenko had been sent to the United States by the KGB. Information obtained from another defector tended to confirm this suspicion. The question then was what to do with Nosenko. It was decided for a variety of reasons, that it would be unwise to attempt to deport him; as a result, he was kept in the United States in isolation. After several years it was determined that Nosenko was, in fact, not an attempted double agent. He was thereafter rehabilitated and now lives happily in the United States. Although the CI had an interest in this case, it was actually run by the Office of Security.

As one aspect of the Agency's duty to help in services of common concern to all Governmental agencies, the CIA recorded in computer form at the request of the FAA, all information relating to hijackers. Stein thinks that this was probably because the CIA had the only equipment which could handle the needed material in the proper fashion. The information so provided would, for example, include names of all those who were on board hijacked planes. Approximately two years ago the CIA tried to give this program to the FAA. That Agency, however, would not accept the program, and, therefore it was terminated by CIA.

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

ADVICE AND WAIVER

Place Langley Va

Date 3/18/74

Time 11:10 Am

Before you make any statement to, or answer any questions from, the Commission or its investigators, you should understand that you have the right to remain silent. If you choose to answer, anything you say can be used against you in court.

You may consult a lawyer for advice before any questions are put, and you may have a lawyer with you during questioning. If you cannot afford a lawyer, one will be appointed for you before questioning if you wish. If you decide to answer questions without a lawyer present, you still have the right to stop answering at any time; or you may defer your answer until you talk to a lawyer.

WAIVER

I have read and understand the foregoing advice. I am willing to make a statement and answer questions ~~/ with /~~ / without / a lawyer at this time. No promises or threats have been made to me, and no pressure or coercion of any kind has been used against me.

Signed

Witness:

Witness:

Witness:

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 8/27/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 178-10004-10416

RECORD SERIES : TESTIMONY SERIES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : COLBY STATEMENT--APPENDICES

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : THE MIAMI STATION

DATE : 01/13/1975
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :

BAY OF PIGS
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CIA
PERIODICAL, RAMPARTS
MIAMI, FL
CUBAN EXILES

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/06/1995

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Appendix J to Statement of William Colby to Rockefeller Commission, 13 January 1975.

Appendix J

THE MIAMI STATION

In March 1960, President Eisenhower approved the project later to become known as the Bay of Pigs. In April 1960 a Western Hemisphere Division Forward Operations Base (FOB) was established in South Miami, Florida, for the purpose of coordinating all support, training, and preparatory activities for operations against Cuba. The FOB simultaneously supported our busy Havana Station which was operating under difficult circumstances, including inhibiting surveillance of our officers by Castro security services. After the Station was closed in Havana when US diplomatic relations were broken with Castro's government in January 1961, it was envisioned that selected personnel assigned to the Miami Base would, upon the overthrow of the Castro government, become a nucleus to reopen the Havana Station. During the Bay of Pigs landing, the FOB provided support for the operation.

In September 1961, the Miami Station was established at a new location, replacing the FOB. About 300 persons were assigned to the Station at one time; Headquarters responsibility was in an autonomous group until 1965, when the Western Hemisphere Division resumed charge.

Utilizing former Cuban assets in Havana who had fled to the United States, indigenous Cuban organizations were formed to continue the overt struggle against the Castro government. In addition, a Cuban Intelligence Organization in exile was formed to collect information on the activities of militant autonomous Cuban exile groups in the United States who were not affiliated with the US Government effort against the Cuban regime. The Cuban intelligence organization in exile participated in a number of activities including the issuance of anti-Castro publications, maintaining relations with anti-Castro governments and groups in the Caribbean and Latin American countries, and debriefing Cuban exiles arriving in the United States for positive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence to identify Cuban agents being infiltrated into the United States via the Cuban Freedom Flights and small boats. Allied with this effort was an electronic intercept capability directed at Cuban government communications which was manned by indigenous Cuban exiles. Close working relations were maintained with US Government agencies in the Miami area such as the FBI, INS, Coast Guard, Customs, Navy, Air Force, etc., to coordinate activities. A small support base was established in Key West.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

During the period 1962-66 the Miami Station engaged in classical intelligence operations directed against the Cuban regime. Radio Americas was established and broadcast daily from Swan Island in the Caribbean. Psychological, economic, and political activities were undertaken in an effort to undermine confidence in the Castro government and underscore the Soviet presence and total Cuban dependence on the USSR. Maritime operations were also undertaken. Among other missions, Cubans who desired to escape from the Cuban mainland were assisted.

In late 1966 a substantial cutback in the pace of operations began and a reorganization of the Station was undertaken as a result of a review by higher authority (303 Committee). Many cover entities were terminated and personnel reassigned. Increased emphasis on the collection of intelligence and counterintelligence through operations in other foreign areas, limitation on maritime activities, and consolidation of written and radio output achieved considerable savings in money and manpower.

In early 1968 it became apparent that as a result of sustained operational activity in the Miami area over a period of years the cover of the Miami Station had eroded to a point that the security of our operations was increasingly jeopardized. This erosion was more significant following the ***Ramparts*** exposure of CIA operations and the possibility that the location of our Station on property leased from the University of Miami might be especially embarrassing to the University. At the same time, it became apparent that activities would have to be reduced drastically for policy, budgetary, and operational reasons. It was decided to deactivate the Miami Station and replace it with a smaller Station which would be better able to respond to current needs. Security had deteriorated seriously at the large Station (then 150 persons) which was under commercial cover near Homestead; the new Station of about 50 persons had good official cover on a government-controlled area in a run-down part of Miami Beach. It was felt, also, that the new Station could facilitate adjustments in the objectives and targets of Miami-based operations and enable the new Station to reduce our dependence on those Cuban exiles who were no longer in tune with current or future needs.

In August 1968 the new, smaller Miami Station was activated, and during the ensuing months the maritime activities were terminated; a new and much smaller media operation was activated, and intelligence collection was expanded to include the Bahamas and Lesser Antillies. Increased emphasis was given to third-country Cuban operations (agent recruitment and technical operations against Cuban Embassies abroad) under the guidance of the new Station. The Cuban emigre organizations supported by the Station were drastically reduced and activities were

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

phased down. In 1974, responsibility for the residue Cuban operations was transferred to Headquarters and the remaining Cuban emigre organizations were terminated.

Currently, some 20 staff personnel in the Miami Station are engaged in collecting foreign positive intelligence and counterintelligence in those areas of the Caribbean that are of strategic importance to US policymakers and in which unfriendly overt or covert actions would be inimical to US interests. (For Support Activities in the Miami area, see the attachment.)

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

Support Activities
in the Miami Area

Communications

Prior to 1968.

From the late 1950s through 1968, CIA communications activities in the Miami area supported DDO covert action against the Cuban government. The CIA radio station transmitted and received enciphered messages to and from agents at sea or in Cuba.

A radio intercept facility also monitored Cuban and other selected foreign radio signals. Apart from Cuban operations, some high frequency Morse and teletype messages were exchanged between the Miami radio base station and selected CIA field stations in Latin America. In 1964 the CIA Latin American area electronic equipment repair facility was relocated from Panama to the Richmond Naval Air Station.

Miami-based CIA communications personnel were responsible to the DDO for training staff and agent personnel and for equipping teams and boats with the means of maintaining communications during operations directed against Cuba.

Liaison was conducted with the FCC, the FBI, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

Other non-communications liaison existed between the Miami communications facilities and various organizations: the Miami Beach Police, the University of Miami, and the Coast Guard/GSA.

From 1968 to Present.

The focus was on communicating with CIA agents in-place on the island of Cuba or in Latin America. Communications links were established with foreign police authorities in several countries during this period.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

During the 1968 Republican National Convention, secure electronic circuitry was installed between the Fountainbleu Hotel and CIA Langley Headquarters. The circuit was patched through the Langley facility to the CIA communications radio station at the Richmond Naval Air Station. Provisions were made to provide the Secret Service with name trace information on foreign nationals on a timely basis during the 1968 Republican National Convention and the 1972 Democratic and Republican National Conventions. In the latter instance, requests were made by Secret Service Headquarters to CIA Headquarters and communicated to CIA/DDO, Miami, for action.

In 1969 the CIA Latin American Communications Activity (AMCA) Headquarters was relocated from Washington, D.C., to Miami. This activity provides the operational, technical, and management support to the Diplomatic Telecommunications Service and CIA covert operations throughout Latin America. AMCA Headquarters also took over all CIA communications facilities and responsibilities in the Miami area.

All CIA monitoring activities ceased in 1972. The Richmond Naval Air Station radio base station ceased operation in early 1972. In May 1974 the special DDO contract facility that monitored Cuban communications, located in Homestead, Florida, was closed. At the same time, the secure communications circuitry between the DDO cover office responsible for name traces was also terminated.

Liaison was conducted with the FCC, the GSA, and the Army for purposes of cover and with the Armed Forces Courier Service.

Although very little communications support for Cuban operations was provided after 1968, on one occasion an anti-Castro group was given support in the form of radio signal plans and technical guidance on how to best install radios in small boats.

The Burns Detective Agency was contracted to provide security service and operated CIA-owned radios as part of their security posture. Cover for the Naval Air Station communications facility continued to be provided by the Army for cover.

Contact with the Miami police did occur after 1968 as the result of using an office in a Miami police station for three months to train a Surinam

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

National Police Officer in high frequency communications. No communications instructions were provided to the Miami police.

Finance

The First National Bank of Miami has been used by the Monetary Division to provide the Office of Finance with essential services in support of operations. These included: purchasing foreign currencies; purchasing bank cashier's checks; establishing bank accounts, both commercial and individual; providing letters of credit; initiating and receiving bank transfers, and placing of home mortgages in one or two instances where the individual's cover precluded the normal credit investigations.

Medical Services

"Bay of Pigs" Project.

The Project Medical Advisor made two TDY trips to Miami prior to the Bay of Pigs to discuss medical training plans with Cuban medical personnel.

A four-man evaluation team from OMS made at least two TDY trips to the Miami area to medically evaluate Cubans as cadre personnel for the invasion brigade.

The Assessment and Evaluation Staff (A&ES) sent teams to Miami during the same period for psychological evaluations.

A Medical Technician from the OMS was also temporarily assigned to Miami for first aid and medical training for the project activities in the Miami area.

Post-Invasion.

A Medical Technician from OMS was assigned PCS to JMWAVE in Miami from September 1963 to June 1966.

During this same period the A&ES (by then part of the OMS) would, on request, occasionally send a psychologist to Miami for psychological evaluation for these continuing WH operational activities.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

OMS support of the type mentioned above was phased out about 1964. Since that time, OMS relationship to any Agency activity in Miami has been rare.

Since 1960, OMS has continuously had an average of three independent contractors in the Miami area who function as professional consultants to OMS.

Personnel

The Office of Personnel conducts or has conducted normal personnel activities including: recruiting, position surveys, and contract preparation. Correspondence is carried out with personnel in the Miami area relative to: retirement benefits, insurance, disability and casualty claims, and the shipment of employee household effects and automobiles.

Security

In July 1968 the Office of Security established a field office in Miami to run investigations and provide liaison and operational support to the DDO Station, Miami. Prior to 1968, such support was physically integrated into the DDO activity.

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

JFK Assassination System Date: 8/27/201

Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY :	ROCKCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	178-10004-10420
RECORD SERIES :	
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION FILES INVENTORY

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	ROCK
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	INVENTORY OF ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION FILES
DATE :	06/00/1975
PAGES :	263
SUBJECTS :	ROCKEFELLER COMMISSION
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/16/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Inventory of files showing file codes and contents of codes.

178-10004-10420

Documents Reviewed by CIA Personnel Dec 2, 1977

Form of Document	Correspondents or Title	Date
Letter and attached "adendum"	E.H. Knoche to Robert Olsen	13 May 1975
Letter and attached "comments"	E.H. Knoche to Robert Olsen	7 May 1975
Letter and attached report on memo	Letter: E.H. Knoche to Robert Olsen "Memorandum by Paul Hoch Concerning CIA Activities and the Warren Commission Investigation"	29 Apr 1975 n.d.
Report	Fitness report on individual	26 May 1964
Routing Sheet and attached memo	Routing and record sheet (18 March 1964) and attached memo: "Meeting with the Warren Commission on 12 March 1964"	
Memo	Acting Chief, Special Operations Group to Deputy Chief, Operations Staff	24 Apr 1975
Dispatch	Subj: Countering Criticism of the Warren Report	1 Apr 1975
Cover note and transmitted material	"NPIC Analysis of Zapruder Filming of John F. Kennedy Assassination" (handwritten notes)	n.d.
Memo	"Constitutional and Legal Basis for So-called Court Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency"	17 Jan 1962
Memo	To Director, CIA, "Legal Basis for Cold-War Activities"	15 Jan 1962
Letter	E.H. Knoche to David W. Belin	13 May 1975

This document contains
Confidential and Secret
Classified Information

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

ORGANIZATION OF THE FILES OF THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

The files have been left in the same basic organization as they were maintained by the lawyers during the investigation. The most helpful information in finding specific documents in the files is, therefore, an understanding of what areas were investigated by each team of lawyers.

Belin-Gray-Greene Files (B-G-G). The files of the executive director and his two special assistants are of a general nature, focusing on no particular portion of the investigation.

Schwarzer-Manfredi Files (S-M). This team was responsible for Chapters 14, 15 and 18 of the Report, on Watergate, domestic activities of the Directorate of Operations and CIA file systems.

Baker-Weidner Files. This team was responsible for Chapters 9, 10 and 11 and the federal portion of 17 of the Report, on mail intercepts, inter-agency domestic intelligence evaluation, CHAOS and CIA aid to other federal agencies.

Olsen-Roethe Files. (O-R). This team was responsible for Chapters 12, 13, 16 and 19 and the state and local portion of 17, on the Office of Security, the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Kennedy assassination and CIA assistance to state and local agencies.

Gellhorn-Cargill-Hardy Files (G-C-H). This team was responsible for Parts II and III of the Report, on the legal authority for the CIA and its internal and external controls.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Originals *

Copies *

Compartmented Files

[Doc. removed by Belin] No JFK ✓ B-GG (II-G) # A - CIA Correspondence (COMINT-TOP SECRET)

No JFK ✓ B-G-G (IV-B) - CIA Relations with Howard Hughes (BYEMAN-SECRET)

No JFK ✓ B-G-G (IV-C) - Assessment of Intelligence Leaks (BYEMAN-TOP SECRET)

No JFK ✓ B-G-G (IV-Q) - CIA Organizational History in Brief (BYEMAN-SECRET)

No JFK ✓ B-G-G (IV-R) - Development and Testing of Intelligence Related Equipment (COMINT-SECRET)

No JFK ✓ S/M (I-K) - Manfredi Request of 21 April (COMINT-SECRET)

No JFK ✓ B-W (IV-F) #F&G - Assistance to Other Agencies (BYEMAN TK - TOP SECRET)

No JFK ✓ O/R (II-A) - Incidental U.S. Communications Intercept (COMINT-SECRET)

No JFK ✓ O/R (II-B) - LONGSHAFT (COMINT-SECRET)

No JFK ✓ contains a little on Cuba - O/R (IV-TT) #B, D, E, L, Q & T - Surveillance of Newsmen (TK - COMINT - TOP SECRET)

No JFK ✓ G-C-H (IV - F) - NSC-NSCID'S (BYEMAN - COMINT - TOP SECRET)

No JFK ✓ contains Cuba G-C-H (IV-J) - CIA Briefings to Congress (BYEMAN - TOP SECRET)

* All folders are
in Codeword safe
(# 2, Drawer 1)

~~** No compartmented files~~
~~were found in the copies.~~
~~[place markers were copied]~~

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

ASSASSINATION FILES

I. First Delivery

A. Belin Request of 8 April 1975 — Mongoose Documents (TOP SECRET AND SECRET)

B. CIA Connections with Organized Crime (One Memo — SECRET)

C. What Could Castro Have Known (SECRET) (One Memo)

D. Review of Dulles Chrono Re Kennedy Assassination

E. Sturgis Deposition (SECRET)

F. Project TAMA (SECRET)

? G. CIA - Correspondence — Assassination (CLASSIFIED)

H. CIA Relationship with Robert A. Mahea (SECRET)

I. Interviews re Assassinations (CLASSIFIED)

J. Correspondence — Assassinations (CLASSIFIED)

K. Misc. Materials — Assassination Attempt (CLASSIFIED)

L. Edward G. Lansdale Deposition (TOP SECRET)

II. Second Delivery

A. Chron — Assassination (CLASSIFIED)

B. Trujillo I Originals (CLASSIFIED)

C. Gray Request of April 22 re Regulations Concerning Shipment of Firearms, Etc. (SECRET)

D. Gray Request of May 12 for Documents from Dominican Historical Papers Files (Trujillo II Originals) (CLASSIFIED)

E. Edward G. Lansdale Deposition (TOP SECRET) (Same as IL)

F. Deposition of L. Fletcher Prouty (SECRET)

G. Affidavits (Lemnitzer and Dillon)

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Assassination Materials (Cont.)

III. Third Delivery

A. Miscellaneous (SECRET)

B. Castro Speeches

C. Interview Tapes

Copies have been processed with no rearrangement. Spot check reveals discrepancies between the two sets (in both directions)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Belin-Gray-Greene Files

I. Commission Meetings

(Each file contains access list, agenda and minutes)
A Brief Summary

A. January 13

B. January 20

C. January 27

D. February 3

E. February 10

F. February 17

G. February 24

H. March 3

I. March 10

J. March 17

K. March 24

L. March 31

M. April 7

N. April 14

JFK Material re Investigation - X-rays etc.

O. April 21

P. April 28

Q. May 5-6
R. May 12-13

S. May 19, 20, 3, 21

T. May 27

U. June 2

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-G-G Files (Cont.)

II. General Files

* A. Access List

Reference to opening un-classified JFK Testimony - Letter Not Classified. B. Chron File — June 1975

C. Chron File - May 1975

Letters to Mark Lane & Others re/ JFK D. Chron File - April 1975

Letters to Public re/ JFK work. E. Chron File - March 1975

Letter to Public F. Chron File - Jan 15 - Feb 28, 1975

Two passing references to JFK Ass. G. CIA Correspondence - May 1975 (one Memo umbra)

Letters to Belin from CIA H. CIA Correspondence - April 1975

I. CIA Correspondence - March 1975

Very small part of one memo. J. CIA correspondence - February 1975

Letter re/ Oswald / seems to be out of place. K. CIA Correspondence - January 1975

* L. Classification

M. Correspondence - May 1975

Letter from Mark Lane & others re/ shooting of JFK also memo re/ scope of investigation by V.P. Council N. Correspondence - April 1975

O. Correspondence - Jan-Mar 1975

P. Correspondence - Commissioners

[✓] Q. Colby Statements

R. Family Jewels

Reference to JFK in outline S. Final Report

References to JFK T. Guidelines for Investigation

U. Informants (Various witness lists)

[✓] V. Interviews

---

*No copies made.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-G-G Files (Cont.)

II. General Files

W. Knoche Meetings

X. Memos to the File (Classified)

Y. Memoranda to the Commission

Memo for including JFK [illegible] findings —

Good Memo on what recommendations comm. should make.

Z. Memoranda from the Staff

AA. Memoranda to Legal Staff

BB. Organization Charts (of the Commission)

* CC. Notary Public Information

DD. Press (Conference Transcripts)

EE. Questions for Witnesses (Classified)

* FF. Receipts

* GG. Receipts for Transcripts

* HH. Secrecy Agreements

* II. Staff Meeting Minutes (CONFIDENTIAL)

* JJ. Statement of Understanding

KK. Subpoena Powers

LL. Timetables

MM. Waivers

NN. Access to Presidential Libraries

OO. CIA and Other Agencies

---

*No copies made.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-G-G Files (Cont.)

III. Persons Appearing Before the Commission
(waivers included)

Interview that makes reference to knowledge abt assassination

A. Admiral George Anderson

B. James Angleton

C. Richard Bissell

D. David W. Blee

E. George R. Brewer

F. Robert D. Brown

Memorandum of question

G. McGeorge Bundy

H. Donald Chamberlain

Remarks at a meeting Rock. Comm

I. Clark Clifford

J. William Cotter

K. William E. Colby

L. Patrick J. Coyne

M. William O. Cregar

N. Arnold Donahue

O. Norman Dorsen

P. C. Donald Dudley

Q. Richard Helms

R. Jason Horn

S. Lawrence R. Houston

T. Erich Isenstead

U. Thomas J. Karamessines

V. Clarence M. Kelley

W. Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

III. Persons Appearing Before the Commission (Cont.)

Questions
X. Henry A. Kissinger

Y. Richard E. Kuh

Z. Charles K. Marcules

AA. Lee M. Martin

BB. John A. McCone

CC Scott Miler

DD. Richard Ober

EE. Walter O'Brien

FF. Howard Olborn

GG. Sam Papich

HH. Charles F. Phlean

II. Admiral William F. Raborn

JJ. George Rocca

KK. Edward Sayle

LL. James R. Schlesinger

MM. Gordon M. Stewart

NN. Michael Tanes

OO. Ralph O. True

Outline of Questions PP. John Warner

QQ. Alan P. White

RR. Laurence K. White

Memorandum of interview

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-G-G Files (Cont.)

IV. Miscellaneous

A. Official Secrets Act

B. CIA Relationships with Howard Hughes Organization (SECRET - BYEMAN)

C. Assessment of Intelligence Leaks. (TOP SECRET - BYEMAN)

D. FBI Report: Intelligence Activities Within the U.S. by Foreign Governments (SECRET)

E. Project TAMA (One Memo and Four Tabs - All SECRET)

F. Soviet Use of Kidnapping (SECRET)

G. Project JMMOVE (Two SECRET Memos)

H. The Killiam Case (SECRET)

I. Nosenko (SECRET)

J. Miscellaneous (L) (Some SECRET)

K. Background Material on Oswald and Warren Commission (Some SECRET)

L. 15 April Belin Request for Info on Psychological Stress Evaluation

* M. National Intelligence Daily

N. Documents Circulated

O. CIA Summaries

* P. Loaned Documents (SECRET)

Q. CIA Organization History in Brief (SECRET - BYEMAN)

R. Development and Testing of Intelligence-Related Equipment - Overhead Photography Support to Other Government Agencies (SECRET - COMINT)

S. Papers Re Cuba

T. Withholding of Evidence From the Warren Commission (SECRET)

U. Materials from Eva Daughtrey (SECRET)

---

*No copies made.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

~~B~~-G-G Files (Cont.)

IV. Miscellaneous (Cont.)

- * V. Administrative Matters
- * W. Applicants I
- * X. Applicants II
- * Y. Applicants III
- * Z. Interview with Judd McIlvaine

Phone interview relating to
JFK Ass. - TV. personal
From Houston TX

---

* No copies made.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

SCHWARZER-MANFREDI FILES

I. CIA Furnished Materials

A. OGC Memorandum (2/27/73) on Telephone Intercept Operations (SECRET)

B. Folder on LPMEDLEY, Rental of Office Space for NSA (SECRET-SENSITIVE)

C. Folder on Cover and Commercial Staff (Non-Official Cover) (SECRET)

D. CIA Support to the Secret Service (1972 Democratic Convention) (2 Memos, 1 of which is CONFIDENTIAL)

E. Cover and Commercial Staff Cover Support Provided Within the United States (SECRET)

F. Master Keys for Foreign Hotels (SECRET-SENSITIVE)

G. White House Support (1 Memo & 3 Tabs - CONFIDENTIAL)

H. Meetings Between E. Howard Hunt and TSD Representatives - July 23, 1971 (CONFIDENTIAL)

I. HM NIECE (2 Memos - SECRET)

J. Alleged Break-in at HEW Offices, Miami (William Ledee) (2 SECRET & 1 CONFIDENTIAL Memos)

K. Eleven Memos on Telephone Intercept for NSA (All are classified, 4 are COMINT)

L. History of FR Division (seven instructions or notices outlining the function of FRD) (8 Memos - SECRET)

M. Three notes from Helms' Chronological Files (All 3 are SECRET)

N. Report of the Working Group on Contacts with American Business Firms (1972) (5 Memos - 4 of which are SECRET)

O. CIA Relation to U.S. Citizens Allegedly Involved in Narcotics Trafficking Abroad (Summary and four tabs) SECRET

P. Narcotics Programs (Memo w/6 Tabs) (All SECRET)

Q. DCD Support to Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 13-14, 1975 (One memo - SECRET)

R. Puerto Rico (Two memos, SECRET)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SCHWARZER-MANFREDI FILES

S. DDO Instructions (SECRET)

  1. Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals (SECRET)

  2. Statement of Functions Cover and Commercial Staff SECRET

T. Procedures for Obtaining Alias Documents and Disguises (Forms and instructions - 4 SECRET; 2 CONFIDENTIAL)

U. CIA Proprietaries (5 Memos - SECRET)

V. CIA Files (17 Memos & Documents - 2 SECRET; 11 CONFIDENTIAL)

W. DDO Officers (SECRET)

X. DCD (Interviews) - Manfredi 20 Mar 75 Memo - SECRET (See list of documents at beginning of Tabs)

Y. Impact of Publicity and Investigations on DCD - 8 Apr 75 - (One Memo - CONFIDENTIAL)

Z. Case 56300 (One Memo, SECRET)

AA. Manfredi Request of April 2 for 10 DCD Memos SECRET

BB. DCD Documents (Miscellaneous - (18 Documents — 12 of which are SECRET)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M FILES

II. Interviews

A. George Critton (Cover and Commercial Staff) (Notes, CONFIDENTIAL)

B. Stanley H. Gaines (FRD) (Typed memo and notes, SECRET

C. Jackson Horton, (DCD) (Notes - SECRET)

D. E. Howard Hunt (Memo and notes, not classified)

E. Joel Keyes, CCS, (Notes, CONFIDENTIAL)

F. William Koehler, CCS (Notes, CONFIDENTIAL)

G. Walter O'Brien, FRD (Typed memo, TOP SECRET; notes, SECRET)

H. Robert S. Pritchard

  1. Miscellaneous Correspondence

  2. CIA Memo on Pritchard (SECRET)

  3. Notes on Pritchard 201 File (SECRET)

  4. Miscellaneous Publications on Pritchard

I. Edward Ryan, Division D (Notes and memo, TOP SECRET)

Cuba
Bay-of-Pigs

J. William Sturbitts, Miami Station (Notes, SECRET)

K. Watts and Stetson (Notes - SECRET)

L. Terrell J. Bringhurst, DCD (Notes, SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M Files

Interviews (Cont.)

M. Seymour Bolten (Memo, CONFIDENTIAL)

N. James Ludlum (Memo and notes, CONFIDENTIAL)

O. Robert F. Bennett (Signed affidavit)

P. Charles Colson (Miscellaneous background information, not classified)

Q. Erich Isenstead (Summary of testimony and notes, SECRET)

R. Thomas H. Karamessines (Outline of Testimony — TOP SECRET, Addendum to Testimony, and five CIA memos, all but one classified)

S. Karl Wagner-Robert Cushman

1. Wagner Affidavit
2. Two memos on Cushman-Erlichman July 7, 1971 conversation
3. Cushman Watergate Testimony (SECRET)
4. Three memos on and transcript of July 22, 1971, Hunt-Cushman conversation (all but first memo SECRET)

T. Richard Helms (Notes, SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M Files

III. Miscellaneous Files

A. References (Watergate) (1 Memo - SECRET and 2 unclassified lists)

B. Waivers (23)

C. Draft Report on Office of General Counsel, dated 11 April 1975

D. Schwarzer Chronological File

E. Manfredi Chronological File (15 Memos; 3 of which are SECRET)

Memo of Conversation
Last page first Doc.

F. Miscellaneous Handwritten Notes

G. Miscellaneous Office Files

Memo to record
Re/exam of Helms
records

H. Miscellaneous documents (6 Memos - 2 of which are SECRET and 1 CONFIDENTIAL)

I. Helms' Document Inspection (11 Memos - 3 of which are SECRET and 1 CONFIDENTIAL)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M Files

IV. Depositions

A. David Henry Blee (Top Secret)

B. Seymour R. Bolten (Secret)

C. Peter Brown (Top Secret)

D. George A. Carver, Jr. (Secret)

E. William E. Colby (Two Vols.) (I - Top Secret; II - Secret)

F. Charles Colson (Secret)

G. Gen. Robert E. Cushman (Secret)

H. Peter D. Dyke (Secret)

I. John Erlichman (Top Secret)

J. Ramon Estabon Gonzales (Secret)

K. William J. Hood (Top Secret)

L. J. R. Horton (Secret)

M. John Pierce Kennedy (Top Secret)

N. Richard Arthur Krueger (Secret)

O. Martin Lukoskie (Secret)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M Files

IV. Depositions (Cont.)

P. Dr. Bernard M. Malloy (Secret)

Q. William E. Nelson (Secret)

R. Francis A. O'Malley (Secret)

S. Dr. Robert S. Pritchard

T. Edward Ryan (Top Secret)

U. L. M. Sternfield (Secret)

V. Shirley Ann Stetson & Albert H. Watts, Jr. (Secret)

Castro-Cuba Hint re JFK

W. William C. Sturbitts (Secret)

X. Karl Wagner (Secret)

Y. General Vernon Walters (Secret)

Z. Lawrence K. White (Secret)

Hearings before Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities

AA. Eugeno Rolando Martinez, Dec. 10, 1973 (Confidential)

BB. Howard Hunt, Dec. 17, 1973 (Confidential)

CC. Hunt (cont.), Dec. 18, 1973 (Confidential)

All kinds of Ass assination talk, mostly Castro + Cuba-reference to JFK →

DD. Richard Helms deposition (Top Secret)

EE. Richard Helms deposition (Top Secret)

↑ JFK - Warren Comm. Questions

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M Files

V. Watergate Documents

Vol. I - Hunt (54 documents)

Vol. II - Mullen & Co. (13 documents)

Vol III - Ellsberg Profile (11 documents)

Vol IV - Miami Station (9 documents)

A. Senator Baker Report

B. Watergate Investigation Correspondence (55 Memos and documents - 4 of which are SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Baker-Weidner Files

I. Depositions

A. Robert D. Brown, Jr. (TOP SECRET)

B. Bob Finch (SECRET)

C. E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr. (SECRET)

(with six exhibits)

D. William J. Hood (TOP SECRET)

E. George T. Kalaris (TOP SECRET)

F. Thomas Karamessines (TOP SECRET)

G. N. Scott Miler (TOP SECRET)

H. Richard Ober (Two Volumes, both TOP SECRET)

I. J. Edward Day, Lawrence O'Brien, Winton M. Blount, House Committee on the Post Office and Civil Service, May 7, 1975.

II. Miscellaneous Files

A. General Correspondence
(13 Memos - 1 of which is SECRET)

B. Howard Hunt Correspondence
(10 Memos).

C. Files Shown to Commission
(Two memos (one is SECRET)

D. Gregory P. Tschebtarioff
Correspondence and one SECRET Memo to File

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W Files

III. Robert Vesco

A. Vesco I
(16 Memos - 8 of which are SECRET)

B. Vesco II

Memo for the Commission (SECRET)

C. Vesco III
(5 Memos - 4 of which are CONFIDENTIAL)

IV. Other Federal Agencies

A. Weidner Request of May 12, 1975
Twelve memos (All but items 5, 6, and 12 CLASSIFIED)
(See list in folder)

B. Weidner Request of March 31, 1975
Four memos or letters (All but item 1 CLASSIFIED)
(See list in folder)

C. Agency Employees Detailed to White House and Federal Agencies, 1963-1975
(7 Memos - 1 SECRET; the others are Admin - Internal Use Only)

D. Project TWOFOLD
(15 Memos - 6 of which are SECRET)

E. International Police Services
(17 Memos, 13 of which are SECRET)

F. Agency Assistance to Other Agencies (Notebook)
Seven Tabs (See Table of Contents)
(Tabs D and E are SECRET, Tabs F and G are
BYEMAN, Tabs A, B and C are Admin-Internal Use Only).

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W Files

V. Intelligence Community Coordination

A. Richard Ober - IDIU/IEC
(11 Memos - 3 TOP SECRET; 4 SECRET; 2 CONFIDENTIAL)

B. James Angleton
(One memo for the file and two sets of notes (all SECRET)

C. Weidner Request of May 16, 1975
Copies of Angleton Notes (Admin - Internal Use Only)

D. Weidner Request of April 23, 1975
16 documents (All by #'s 8 and 16 classified)

E. Weidner Request of May 16, 1975
Two documents (#1 not classified, #2 CONFIDENTIAL)

F. IDIU, IEC, etc.
(18 Memos - 1 TOP SECRET; 10 SECRET; 2 CONFIDENTIAL)

G. PFIAB's IEC Request
(One memo, CONFIDENTIAL)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W Files

VI. Mail Intercepts

A. Robert Crowley Affidavit (SECRET)

B. Interview Summary - James H. Kelly, Jr. (SECRET)

C. Interview Summary - June Elliott (SECRET)

D - Interview Summary - Russell F. Miller (SECRET)

E - Affidavit of Jerry L. Shinn (SECRET)

F - Interview Summary - James J. Angleton (SECRET)

X G - Baker April 18, 1975, Request - HT LINGUAL
Four documents (1 TOP SECRET; 3 SECRET)

H - Weidner Request of May 13, 1975
(7 documents - 5 of which are SECRET)

X I. MK SOURDOUGH, March 18, 1975 Request
(12 Documents - 9 of which are SECRET)

J. Project SRINDIAN
(6 Documents - 3 SECRET)

K. Project SETTER
(One Summary - SECRET - and two tabs - unclassified)

L. Project WESTPOINTER
(7 Memos - 4 of which are SECRET)

M. Baker Request for New York Mail Intercept Items
March 25, 1975
(68 Documents - 51 of which are SECRET)

N. Mail Intercept
(40 Documents of which 31 are SECRET)

O. Identifying People Telephoning Communist Countries Summary
and one Tab (both SECRET)

P. Legal Memos and Materials (all unclassified)

Q. Winton Blount (Memo to file, interview summary and telegram)

R. 1969 Inspector General Survey (TOP SECRET)
and Memo to the file (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W Files

VII. Operation CHAOS

A. William Hood (Two interview summaries, both SECRET)

B. Raymond Rocca (Interview Summary, Interview Outline and Memo for the Record, all CLASSIFIED)

C. N. Scott Miler (Three interview summaries and one biography, all CLASSIFIED; two diagrams, CONFIDENTIAL).

D. Robert Brown (Interview Summary and Biography, both SECRET)

E. LODESTAR Interview (One memo, SECRET)

F. George Kalaris (Interview, SECRET)

G. Richard Ober (Correspondence, Waivers, Proposed Questions (SECRET), Notes (SECRET)

H. Ober Group — MAG Comments

1. Three interview summaries (SECRET)
2. One document (SECRET)
3. Ten tabbed documents (all SECRET)

I. Alan White (Interview, SECRET)

J. Charles Marcules (Interview and Interview Summary, both SECRET)

October 60
JFK-Oswald
During [illegible]

K. John Stein (Interview Summary, SECRET)

L. MPLODESTAR (Summary and one tab, both SECRET)

M. March 14, 1975 Document Request (54 items - CLASSIFIED)

N. Weidner Request for 13 items, dated March 17, 1975 (All CLASSIFIED)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W Files

O. Project MERRIMAC.. Request for TUFLOWER
Six documents (all CLASSIFIED)

P. MP LODESTAR, Eight Documents (all SECRET)

Q. March 24, 1975, Request "New Left"
One Document (SECRET)

R. Weidner Request of March 24, 1975, for 15 items from
Helms Chronological Files (26 Memos - 18 of which are SECRET)

S. Weidner March 25 Request for 6 Items
Five documents (all but #5 unclassified)

T. Baker Request of April 24, 1975 (MH CHAOS)
Fifteen Reports (all classified)

U. Domestic Dissident Groups
Thirty-One Documents (classified)

V. International Terrorism Group
Interview with Alan P. White (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

OLSEN/ROETHE FILES

ORI

I. INTERVIEWS

- A. Ainslie, Neil (SECRET)
- B. Ainslie, Dempsey and Little
  (Affidavit plus three exhibits) (SECRET)
- C. Barber, Wilda (plus correspondence
- D. Burns, Don (SECRET)
- E. Beverly, John O. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
- F. Blake, John F. (with waiver and chart) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
- G. Boston, David (SECRET)
- H. Brandwein, David (with map) (SECRET)
- I. Brewer, George R. (affidavit, interview summary, and corrections to Commission transcript) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
- J. Briggman, Sgt. John F. (plus police memo) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
- K. Cole, Thomas L. (plus 6 exhibits) (CONFIDENTIAL)
- L. Connors, Donald O. (plus waiver) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
- M. Cregar, William O. (plus testimony outline) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)
- N. Cuccherini, Thomas J. (CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE)
- O. Cullinane, Maurice J. (plus affidavit and exhibit) (CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

P. Duckett, Carl E. (plus misc. related papers) (SECRET)

Q. Dudley, Donald (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

R. Durrer, William L. (affidavit plus waiver) (CONFIDENTIAL)

S. Evans, Benjamin (plus waiver) SECRET/SENSITIVE)

T. Foran, William (affidavit plus waiver) (CONFIDENTIAL)

U. Gambino, Robert (CONFIDENTIAL)

V. Gaynor, Paul (plus one document) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

W. Gornick, Mary Margaret

X. Gregory, Schoenman, Groden, and Jaffe (several summaries, miscellaneous documents plus correspondence) (One CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE)

Y. Harter, Earl M. (Two summaries, affidavit, waiver, plus untitled document) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

Z. Hartman, Thadeus Lee (plus affidavit and waiver) (CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE)

AA. Hunt, E. Howard (Interview Summaries plus correspondence and miscellaneous documents and notes) (Some SECRET)

BB. Janney, Fred (CONFIDENTIAL)

CC. Johnson, William H. (plus waiver and affidavit) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

DD. Kelley, Clarence M. (Interview plus miscellaneous documents) (CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE and SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

EE. Kuh, Richard E. (2 Interview summaries plus 5 related documents) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

FF. Marchetti, Victor (2 'phone call summaries plus 2 letters)

GG. Martin, Larry (plus waiver) (CONFIDENTIAL)

HH. Martin, Lee M. (2 summaries plus outline)

Castro II. Osborn, Howard (5 Interview and 'phone call summaries plus miscellaneous documents and conversation) (TOP SECRET)

JJ. Papich, Samuel (Iterations of summary, affidavit, waiver, plus miscellaneous documents) (Some SECRET)

KK. Phelan, Charles F. (plus waiver) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

LL. Proctor, Edward (Summary, notes, and DDI pamphlet) (SECRET)

MM. Sayle, Edward F. (Summary plus addendum) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

NN. Schwartz, Leon F. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

[✓] OO. Sturgis, Frank (Interview plus numerous miscellaneous documents)

PP. Sutter, George (affidavit plus waiver) (CONFIDENTIAL)

QQ. Sydorko, Mike (plus waiver) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

RR. TAMM, Edward (CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE)

SS. Tietjen, John R. (Summary of Telephone Interview) (CONFIDENTIAL)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

TT. True, Ralph (Interview plus 3 related documents) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

UU. Vasaly, Louis W. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

VV. Wannall, W. Raymond (Interview plus 3 documents) SECRET/SENSITIVE)

WW. Wilson, Jerry (plus affidavit and waiver) (CONFIDENTIAL)

XX. Chapman, E. Forrest

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

II. DIRECTORATE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

A. Incidental U.S. Communications Intercept (SECRET - COMINT)

B. LONGSHAFT (SECRET - COMINT)

C. Influencing Human Behavior (SECRET)

D. Influencing Human Behavior - Behavioral Drugs and Testing

E. Roethe Oral Request for DDS&T material (Several Documents) (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

F. Science and Technology (Some SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

III. DEPOSITIONS

A. Schoenman, Ralph; Groden, Robert; Groden, Christine; Jaffee, Stephen; Gregory, Dick (plus exhibits) (2 volumes, March 26 and 27)

√ B. Marchetti, Victor (TOP SECRET)

√ C. Sturgis, Frank; Navarro, Wilfrado (TOP SECRET)

√ D. Sturgis, Frank; Navarro, Wilfrado (TOP SECRET) (Transcript of taped deposition)

E. Lattimer, John K. (plus exhibits)

F. Wecht, Cyril H. (plus exhibits)

G. McMeekin, R.; Olivier, Alfred; Spitz, Weiner; Hodges, Fred.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

IV. OFFICE OF SECURITY

A. Files Material (Security Files) (Some SECRET) (10 documents)

B. CIA Relation with FBI (2 documents plus notes) (SECRET)

C. Working Papers (5 Miscellaneous documents - some SECRET)

D. FBI material (Some SECRET)

E. Roethe Letter Request - 23 May 1975 (8 documents relating to Office of Security and Science and Technology (TOP SECRET and SECRET)

F. Project MERRIMAC (8 documents) (Some SECRET)

G. Alleged Illegal Domestic Activities (Richard V. Allen) (SECRET)

H. Alleged Illegal Domestic Activities (State Police - General, SF #78195)

Vols. I and II (SECRET)

I. Alleged Illegal Domestic Activities (Dissident Activity, Jan. 1966 - Jan 1973)

J. Project MORTAL, et al. (SECRET)

K. Security Vulnerabilities Index (CONFIDENTIAL)

L. Agency Training of Police (SECRET)

Box 18

M. Projects JETTISON and MAGNET (SECRET) (5 documents) (SECRET)

N. Surveillance on Behalf of Metropolitan Police Department (CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

O. Protective Measures Taken During CIA Facilities Construction (SECRET)

P. Polygraph Connection with County Sheriff's Office - Polygraph Support Related to Leaks of Classified Information (7 documents) (SECRET)

Q. Project KITTEN (8 documents) (SECRET)

R. SOVIET DEFECTOR (7 documents) (SECRET)

S. Project RESISTANCE (SECRET/CONFIDENTIAL)

T. CASE #240303 (Investigation of NSA employee) (9 documents) (SECRET)

U. Project ZULU (29 documents) (SECRET)

V. Project PIXIE (CONFIDENTIAL)

W. Project BUTANE

X. Project REDFACE (SECRET)

Y. Project SIESTA (SECRET)

Z. Project PARAGON (SECRET)

AA. Project BOOTS (CONFIDENTIAL)

BB. Operation PINEAPPLE (SECRET)

CC. CASE #218 (Investigation of CIA employee) (8 documents) (SECRET)

Box 18

Box 19

DD. Project PYRAMID (SECRET) (11 documents)

EE. CIA Support to FBI in Operations Against Foreign Intelligence Targets in U. S. (SECRET/SENSITIVE)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

FF. Project MOCKINGBIRD
(8 documents) (SECRET)

GG. Project MUDHEN (3 documents) (SECRET)

HH. Project CELOTEX I
(6 documents) (SECRET)

II. Surveillance Activity (Philip Agee and
Project DISCREET) (SECRET)

JJ. Relationship with Police (4 documents)
(CONFIDENTIAL)

KK. Surveillance, Wiretap, and Entry
(Some SECRET)

LL. Relations with Local Police (Some SECRET)

MM. Draft Legislation (Secrecy Act)

NN. Review of Tax Returns (Some SECRET)

OO. Liaison with Local Police (Some SECRET)

PP. Domestic Surveillance
Master Summary - Update - 12 May 1975 (SECRET)
(Tabs A,B, and C missing)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

9-A

QQ. Summary of Domestic Surveillance

RR. Helms' Picture

SS. Summary of Telephone Taps (SECRET)

TT. Surveillance of Newsmen
(Some TOP SECRET - TALENT
KEYHOLE - COMINT)

19

20

UU. MERRIMAC - RESISTANCE - CANDLE (SECRET)

VV. Civil Disturbances - U.S. 1967-1972

WW. Dissident Organizations - Office of Security (SECRE

XX. Project Probe (SECRET)

YY. Project Octonal, Citation, and Candle (SECRET)

Bx 20

ZZ. Project MERRIMAC (SECRET)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

V. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

Removed
[illegible]?

A. FBI Lab Report (Hunt and Sturgis Photos)

B. Kennedy Assassination - Miscellaneous Notes

C. Kennedy Assassination - Panel of Medical Consultant

D. FBI Material re Kennedy assassination

E. NPIC Analysis of Zapruder
Filming of John F. Kennedy assassination (CONFIDENTIAL)

F. Kennedy Assassination - Paul Hoch letter re Warren Commission (Some SECRET)

G. Kennedy Assassination - Medical and Scientific articles

H. Kennedy Assassination - General Correspondence

I. Requests for Information - FBI, Justice

J. Selected Documents Relating to Allegations Concerning the Assassination of President Kennedy (11 documents)

K. Lattimer, John

L. Wecht, Cyril H.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

VI. MISCELLANEOUS

A. Olsen Miscellaneous

B. CIA Organization & Personnel (Some SECRET)

C. Requests for Information - CIA

D. Miscellaneous (Some TOP SECRET)

E. Crank Mail & 'Phone Calls

F. Jennings, Melvin

G. Miscellaneous Interview Notes (Some SECRET)

H. Olsen/Roethe Bibliography

I. Directorate of Administration Organization (SECRET)

J. Agents Manual

Ex 21

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Gellhorn-Cargill-Hardy Files

By 22

I. Legislative History

A. CIA Statutes

1. Misc. Notes
2. Statutes

B. Miller on Legislative History (SECRET)

C. 1947 Act Debates

1. Debates
2. Misc. Notes

D. 1947 Act Hearings

1. Hearings
2. Excerpt from Vandenberg Statement

E. 1947 Legislative History Memos

Two memos, outline, and comparison of charters

F. Executive Order (1946)

1. Five memos from JCS Files in U.S. Archives
2. Notes
3. Truman Memoirs

G. Library of Congress Legislative History

H. 1947 Act Reports
Five reports and 8 bills

I. Senate Armed Service Committee Materials

1. Correspondence
2. Minutes
3. Two letters

J. 1949 CIA Act

Reports, public law and bills

K. 1949 Act Hearings

Hillenkoetter Statement (SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

Bx 22 L. Legislative History Memorandum — 1949 Act

23 M. 1949 Act Hearings

N. Hughes Amendment

Public Law, bills and report

O. Economy Act
Statutes

P. CIA Firing Authority
Two cases

Q. Overseas Differentials and Allowances Act
Public Law and two reports

R. 1953 Amendment (1947 Act)
Law, reports, hearings, bills and debate

S. 1956 Congressional Debates and Report
(on a Joint CIA Committee)

T. 1966 Congressional Debates and Report
(on a Joint Committee on Intelligence)

U. S. 2224 — Sen. Cooper and Giving Intelligence
to Congress. Bill and comments-

V. Covert Activities and Law

1. Letter from CIA and two 1962 memos (all SECRET) [✓] X
2. 1975 CIA OGC Opinion

W. Subsequent Legislation (on CIA)
(Library of Congress compilation 1972)

X. Congress' 1975 Investigation
(S. Res. 21)

Y. CIA Funding
Three Articles

Z. Heine v Raus
Four cases and one article

AA. Holtzman Amendment

1. CIA Memo (SECRET)
2. OGC Opinion

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

BB. FBI Materials

1. From CFR
2. Two drafts of NSCID #9

CC. Congressional Oversight
Three Articles (one CONFIDENTIAL)

DD. CIA Comments on Legislation
(A CIA compilation)

Box 3

EE. Sources and Methods
One Memo

2

II. CIA — General

A. Walter Pforzheimer Interview

[illegible] — B. Clark Clifford Interview

C. CIA General Articles

1. Glossary of Intelligence Terms (SECRET)
2. Four articles
3. NYC Bar Assoc. Suggested Questions
4. Library of Congress on U.S. Intelligence Community

D. CIA U.S. Activities List

E. CIA Offices

1. Missions and Functions of Components (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. Organization Charts (SECRET)
3. Officers (SECRET)

F. Correspondence with CIA
(Receipts)

G. Hoover Commission
Three Reports

H. CIA Funds to Voluntary Organizations
Official Statement

I. Suits Against CIA

1. Two Marchetti Cases
2. Article on Jarvinen Case (CONFIDENTIAL)
3. Harrington Complaint
4. DOJ List

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

J. Special Prosecutor
Federal Register and Memo

K. Colby
Three congressional statements

L. McCone
Hearings on Nomination as DCI

M. Defense Department Documents
Various Directives and Budget excerpt

N. Foreigners in U.S.
FBI Reports (SECRET)

O. Vienna Treaty

P. Kissinger
Two sets of Questions

III. Internal Controls

A. Inspector General
Three Interviews (All SECRET)

B. Office of General Counsel

Questions About Assassination —

1. Two Interviews (SECRET)
2. Memo on OGC Opinions (SECRET)
3. CIA Paper on OGC (SECRET)

C. Office of Legislative Counsel
Two interviews (CONFIDENTIAL) and Waivers

D. Office of Training
Interview (CONFIDENTIAL) and Waiver

E. Office of Finance
Three interviews (Two SECRET and one CONFIDENTIAL) and Waivers

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

F. Plans Staff

1. Interview (SECRET)
2. Waiver
3. Memo to File
4. Four DDO Documents (All SECRET)

G. Office of Personnel
Interview (CONFIDENTIAL) and Waivers

H. Audit Office

1. Two Interviews (CLASSIFIED) and Waiver

Question on Assassinations

I. Internal Regulations
Three memos to the File (All classified)

J. Comptroller
Interview (CONFIDENTIAL)

K. M.A.G.
Two Interviews (CONFIDENTIAL) and Waivers

[✓] L. Col. White
Interview (SECRET) and Waiver [comm classified]

Bx24 M. Use and Control of Disguise and Alias Documents
One Memo from CIA (SECRET)

N. Selected CIA Regulations, Notices and Handbooks
(All CLASSIFIED)

O. OGC Opinions
One Memo (SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

P. Authority to Investigate Agency Personnel
Nine CIA Memos (Classified)

Q. Authority of Director to Protect Sources & Methods
22 CIA Memos (Classified)

R. Authority of the Director in Use of Classified Funds
23 CIA Memos (Classified)

S. Arrangements with Other Government Agencies
17 CIA Memos (Classified)

T. Advice on Activities of a Domestic Nature
14 CIA Memos (Classified)

U. Appendices C and E of the Katzenbach Report [✓]

1. Coordination and Policy Approval of Covert Operations (SECRET)
2. Procedures Imposed on CIA Projects to Prevent Misuse of Funds SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

IV. External Controls

Question re Assassinations

A. PFIAB
   Two interviews (SECRET) and Executive Order

B. Recommendations
   Four Draft Recommendations

C. Congress/GAO

1. Memo on Office of Legislative Counsel
2. Jurisdiction of House Govt Operations Comm.
3. Organization Chart
4. Members of Congressional Committees
5. Senate Debates on Supervision of the CIA
6. 1971 Joint Committee Resolution and Bill
7. CIA Legislation 93d Congress
8. Nixon Memo
9. GAO Letter to Proxmire

D. Intelligence Community Staff

1. Wilson Interview (SECRET) and Biographies
2. Organization Chart
3. Staff Efforts List
4. Two USIB Memos (both SECRET)

E. OMB Oversight

1. Three interviews and Summary (all CLASSIFIED)
2. CIA Memo on U.S. budget (SECRET)
3. Two OMB Memos (both CLASSIFIED)

F. NSC/NSCID's

1. NSCID's 1 through 8 (all CLASSIFIED, one BYEMAN)
2. 1971 Nixon Memo (TOP SECRET/BYEMAN)
3. All prior NSCID's and relevant NSC Directives (see list in file) (TOP SECRET/CODEWORD)
4. DCI Directives Memo (SECRET)

G. Miscellaneous

1. "40 Committee" Members
2. Nixon 1971 Directive
3. Non-Statutory Organizations with Influence over CIA (TOP SECRET)
4. Current Research Assignment
5. Comptroller General Decision

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

H. Previous CIA Reports
Two memos (one TOP SECRET)

I. Selected DCID's (Notebook) (all CLASSIFIED)

J. CIA Briefings to Congress

1. Memo to File
2. CIA Memo (SECRET)
3. CIA Compilation (BYEMAN)

Bx 25

V. Funds Investigation

Bx 26

A. W. H. Travel

1. Paragraph for Chapter 13
2. Interview (CONFIDENTIAL)
3. Notes on Family Jewels (SECRET)
4. Waiver

B. Urban Affairs Research Committee
CIA Documents (one page SECRET)

VI. National Security and Individual Rights

Bx 26 is mostly
Public Documents
that lay the groundrules for
the investigation + possible
illegal activities

A. Legal Memo (and Outline)

B. Inherent National Security Powers
Misc. Cases and articles

C. Wiretaps I
Statute, Cases, DOJ Memo and Congressional Record

D. Wiretaps II
Misc. Articles

E. Surveillance
Misc. Cases and Articles

F. Access to IRS Data

1. Memorandum
2. Administrative Conference Collection of Regulations, Statutes, Executive Orders, Proposed bill and Domestic Council Paper

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

G. Mail Opening Statutes
Memo and Statutes

H. Bank Records
Memo and Misc. Cases and Articles

I. Privacy
Misc. Articles, Cases, Domestic Council Committee
on Right of Privacy Papers and Colby Statement

J. Criminal Statutes
Memo and Statutes

K. Remedies
Case and Article

L. Espionage Act
Misc. Cases and Statutes

M. Classification
Misc. Cases, Articles and Executive Orders

N. New Espionage Statute
Proposed CIA Statute and Correspondence

O. Biological-Chemical Warfare Policy
Memo and House Hearings Excerpt

P. Murphy Commission I
Four Working Papers

Bx 26

Q. Murphy Commission II
Intelligence Draft Report

R. Harris Paper
Draft for Murphy Commission

Bx 27

S. Murphy Commission III
Six Working Papers

T. Privacy Panel I
Plans, Papers and Correspondence

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

G-C-H Files

VII. Miscellaneous Files

A. Gellhorn Memos
Misc. memoranda and correspondence

B. Advisory Committee Act
Memo, Act and Regulations

C. U.S. Activities to Support Foreign Covert Operations (Seven Memos) Includes a memo relating to the scope of the Committees investigation including Assassinations.

D. Liaison with the FBI
CIA Memos (10 Memos-- 8 SECRET)

E. Correspondence

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

COLBY STATEMENTS

Bx 27

Bx 28

A. To Commission: Jan. 13, 1975

B. To Commission: Corrected, Jan. 15, 1975

C. Summary and Analysis of Colby Report to President

D. Appendices to Jan. 13, 1975 Statement

all

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Bx 28

CLAPPER FILES

C-A	Letters: Form Responses
C-B	Letters: Form Responses
C-C	Letters: Form Responses
C-D	Letters: Form Responses
C-E	Letters: Form Responses
C-F	Letters: Form Responses
C-G	Letters: Form Responses
C-H	Letters: Form Responses
C-I	Letters: Form Responses
C-J	Letters: Form Responses
C-K	Letters Replied to By Pagnotta
C-L	Special Letters in Reply
C-M	Letters Answered by V.P. Counsel
C-N	Letters Referred by Congress
C-O	Letters Handled by Baker
C-P	Letters: Replies Not Necessary
C-Q	Letters from Persons who Wish to be Interviewed or with Information
C-R	Letters: Baker Form Reponse
C-S	Letters: No Replies Sent
C-T	Letters: No Replies Sent
C-U	Letters: No Replies Sent

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

INDEX

(Chronological)

General Question about FBI-CIA Assassination

COLBY, William E.	January 13, 1975	I	(2-89)
SCHLESINGER, James	January 13, 1975	I	(90-154
HELMS, Richard	January 13, 1975	I	(155-19
COYNE, Pat	January 20, 1975	II	(194-22
McCONE, John	January 20, 1975	II	(226-263
HELMS, Richard	January 20, 1975	II	(264-306
COLBY, William E.	January 27, 1975	III	(308-402
OBER, Richard	January 27, 1975	III	(403-468
KIRKPATRICK, Lyman	February 3, 1975	IV	(471-565
OBER, Richard	February 3, 1975	IV	(566-616
RABORN, William F.,Jr.,(Adm)	February 10, 1975	V	(618-662)
ANGLETON, James	February 10, 1975	V	(663-741)
OSBORN, Howard	February 17, 1975	VI	(743-871)
ROCCA, Raymond G.	February 17, 1975	VI	(872-908)
MILER, Newton	February 17, 1975	VI	(909-942)
BREWER, George R.	February 18, 1975	VII	(1119-11
O'BRIEN, Walter	February 18, 1975	VII	(1068-11
KARAMESSINES, Thomas H.	February 24, 1975	VII	(947-106
ISENSTEAD, Erich	March 3, 1975	VIII	(1179-12
SAYLE, Edward	March 3, 1975	VIII	(1248-12
DUDLEY, C. Donald	March 3, 1975	VIII	(1275-13
PHELAN, Charles	March 3, 1975	VIII	(1318-13
KUH, Richard E.	March 3, 1975	VIII	(1340-13
MARTIN, Lee M.	March 3, 1975	VIII	(1371-13
HORN, Jason	March 10, 1975	IX	(1397-14

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

WHITE, Alan P.	March 10, 1975	IX	(1480-1528)
MARCULES, C.	March 10, 1975	IX	(1529-1567)
CLIFFORD, Clark	March 17, 1975	X	(1569-1646)
HOUSTON, Lawrence	March 17, 1975	X	(1647-1707)
PAPICH, Sam	March 24, 1975	XI	(1709-1778)
CREGAR, William	March 24, 1975	XI	(1779-1798)
KELLEY, Clarence	March 24, 1975	XI	(1799-1830)
BLEE, David	March 31, 1975	XIII	(1956-1990)
BRIM, Orville J., Jr.	March 31, 1975	XII	(1837-1857)
MILLER, Arthur R.	March 31, 1975	XII	(1858-1883)
ALSTYNE, William W.	March 31, 1975	XII	(1884-1914)
BLOUSTEIN, Edward	March 31, 1975	XII	(1915-1955)
WHITE, Lawrence	April 7, 1975	XIV	(2031-2080)
BUNDY, McGeorge	April 7, 1975	XIV	(1992-2031)
CHAMBERLAIN, Donald F.	April 14, 1975	XVI	(2127-2163)
WARNER, John S.	April 14, 1975	XVI	(2164-2188)
RUSK, Dean	April 21, 1975	XVII	(2190-2261)
GRAY, Grodon	April 21, 1975	XVII	(2262-2294)
✓ BISSELL, Richard M., Jr.	April 21, 1975	XVII	(2295-2351)
O'NEILL, Paul	April 21, 1975	XVII	(2352-2364)
DONOHUE, Arnold E.	April 21, 1975	XVII	(2365-2396)
✓ HELMS, Richard	April 28, 1975	XVIII	(2399-2519)
COLBY, William E.	April 28, 1975	XVIII	(2520-2633)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

✓ McCONE, John A.	May 5, 1975	XIX	(2-23)
KISSINGER, Henry	May 5, 1975	XIX	(24-76)
✓ McCONE, John A.	May 5, 1975	XIX	(76-112)
SCHLESINGER, James R.	May 5, 1975	XIX	(113-168)
ROSTOW, Walt	May 5, 1975	XIX	(169-202)
ANDERSON, George W. (Admiral)	May 12, 1975	XX	(2838-2874)
COTTER, William	May 12, 1975	XX	(2875-2923)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - 1 COMINT Memo Pulled out and stored separately.

B - Ltr from Knoche to Belin with attachments - 21 May 75 (Attachments -SECRET)

C - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 13 May 75 SECRET

D - Ltr from Knoche to Belin w/attachment. - Ltr dtd 12 May 75

E - Memo for Mr. Belin from Knoche - 7 May 75 SECRET

F - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 3 June 75 SECRET

G - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 3 June 75 with attachment SECRET

H - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 17 May 75 (with attachment - SECRET)

I - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 14 May 75

J - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 7 May 75

K - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 May 75 w/attachment

L - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 7 May 75 w/attachment

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

BGG (II-H)

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 28 Apr 75 - w/attachments SECRET

B - Ltr from Knoche to Mr. Belin - 25 Apr 75 SECRET w/attachments.

C - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Apr 75 w/attachments.

D - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 23 Apr 75 w/attachment SECRET

E - Ltr from Knoche to Gray w/attachment - 18 Apr 75 SECRET

F - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 17 Apr 75 w/attachments

G - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 15 Apr 75 SECRET

H - Ltr from Knoche to Gray - 9 Apr 75

I - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 8 Apr 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 28 Mar 75 SECRET

B - Ltr from Colby to Rockefeller w/attachment - 27 Mar 75 SECRET

C - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 25 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

D - Names, addresses and phone numbers called in by Knoche's office - 3/20/75

E - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 20 Mar 75 w/attachment.

F - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Mar 75 w/attachments which are SECRET

G - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 19 Mar 75

H - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 17 Mar 75 w/attachments which are SECRET

I - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 13 Mar 75 w/attachment.

J - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 13 Mar 75 w/attachments

K - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 12 Mar 75

L - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 13 Mar 75

M - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 13 Mar 75 with Attachments

N - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 5 March 75 w/attachments SECRET

O - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 4 Mar 75 w/attachment

P - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 28 Feb 75 w/attachment

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75 w/attachment (SECRET)

B - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75 with attachments which are SECRET

C - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 19 Feb 75 w/attachments SECRET

D - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75 w/attachments which are SECRET

E - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 28 Feb 75 w/attachment

F - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 21 Feb 75 w/attachment which is SECRET

G - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 28 Feb 75 w/attachment

H - Ltr from Knoche to Belin (Draft - undated) - 2/25/75 in pencil - w/attachments CONFIDENTIAL

I - Ltr from Knoche to Belin w/attachment - 24 Feb 75

J - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 19 Feb 75 w/attachments

K - Memo from Knoche to Belin - 15 Feb 75 w/attachment which is SECRET

L - Routing Slip from John S. Warner to Mr. Knoche - 27 Feb 75 w/attachments

M - Routing Slip from Warner to Knoche - 2/27/75 w/attachment.

N - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 25 Feb 75

O - Memo for Mr. Belin from Marie Eckstein (Secy to Mr. Knoche) - 21 Feb 75 w/attachment which is SECRET (Chart)

P - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 20 Feb 75 w/attachment.

Q - Pencil note from "Hank" to "David" - 2/19/75

R - Clippings from the Star and Memo from Blee - 6 Feb 75 w/attachment

S - Ltr from Colby to Rockefeller - 13 Feb 75

T - Memo to Belin, etc - from Ron Greene - Subj: CIA Summaries, 11 Feb 75 w/attachments which are SECRET

U - Ltr from Colby to Belin, 11 Feb 75 w/attachment

V - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 10 Feb 75 w/attachment

W - CIA Suggestions for Modifications of Commission Staff Draft of "names" Guidelines - 2/10/75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

X - Revised Attachment to Colby Letter, CIA, 2/10/75

Y - Memo for the File - Subj: Meeting with Mr. Knoche and Mr. Warner - Feb 6, 1975 (s/Ronald Greene)

Z - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 Feb 75 w/attachments.

AA - Ltr from Kane to Belin - 6 Feb 75 w/attachment CONFIDENTIAL

BB - Ltr from Colby to Rockefeller - 5 Feb 75

CC - Memo for the File w/by Gray - Subj: Jan 31, 1975 meeting with Mr. Knoche an
Warner - dtd 3 Feb 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Jan 75 w/attachment

B - Ltr from Knoche to Greene - 24 January 1975 w/Attachment

C - Ltr from Knoche to Greene - 23 Jan 75 w/Attachments.

D - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 22 Jan 75 w/attachments which are SECRET

E - Memo from Knoche to Greene - 22 Jan 75 w/attachments.

F - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 17 Jan 75

G - Ltr from Knoche to Greene - 17 Jan 75

H - Memo for Mr. Belin ; from Ronald Greene - 16 Jan 75

I - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 16 Jan 75

J - Ltr from Knoche to Greene - 15 Jan 75

K - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 14 Jan 75

L - Memo for Mr. Greene from Knoche w/attachment which is SECRET

M - Ltr from J. Lee Rankin, General Counsel to Helms - 3 July 64 -
w/attachments.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo for Commission from the President - 19 Feb 75

B - Memo to Mr. Manfredi from Ruth E. Johnson - 29 Apr 75

C - Info on classification stamp (Auth. Exec Order 11652)

D - Info on classification stamp

E - Classification - BYE

F - Classification TALENT-KEYHOLE-COMINT and others

G - Memo to File from Ruth E. Johnson - 25 Apr 75 w/attachments.

H - HR 10-23 - Nat'l Security Info - Classification,
Declassification and Access - 13 June 1972

I - Memo to Mason Cargill from Ruth E. Johnson - 28 Apr 75

J - Memo for NSC Staff - Subj: New Classification and Declassification
Procedures - 1 Aug 72

K - Memo for Belin from Gray - 14 Mar 75

L - Memo to Legal Staff from Gray - 12 Mar 75 w/attachment

M - Ltr from Belin to Brown - 30 Jan 75

N - Memo from Wm. L. Brown Exec Dir, Interagency
Classification Review Committee, - 8 Jan 1974

O - Memo - Subj: Amendment No. 2 to Feb 27, 1973, Ltr of Instructions re:
Quarterly Reports to the Interagency Classification Review Committee (ICRC).
14 June 1974

P - Interagency Classification Review Committee - Letter of Instructions - dtd
27 Feb 73 w/attachments.

Q - Ltr from Wm. L. Brown to Mr. Belin - 17 Jan 75

R - Ltr from Belin to Wm. Brown - 25 Feb 75 w/attachment

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

BGG (II-M)

A - Ltr from Belin to Mrs. Willie J. Hardy - 18 June 75 w/attachment.

B - Ltr from Lyle L. Miller to Mr. Belin - 5 June 75

C - Memo for Monty Gray - from Hugh Morrow - 2 June 75

D - Ltr from McNamara to Belin - 30 May 75

E - Ltr from Griswold to Belin - 29 May 75

F - Ltr from Wallison to Belin - 9 May 75 w/attachment

G - Ltr from Buchen to Belin - 6 May 75 w/attachment.

H - Ltr from Betty S. Murphy to Belin - 1 May 75

I - Ltr from Jacobs to Gray - 15 May 75

J -Historical Materials in the John F. Kennedy Library

K - Historical Materials in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library - Apr 75

L - National Security Files - McGeorge Bundy - 1961-1963 (The J.F. Kennedy Libra
June 1974

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Belin to Mark Lane - 30 Apr 75 w/attachments

B - Ltr from Arthur F. Sampson to Honorable Philip W. Buchen - 28 Apr 75

C - Memo for Belin from Casselman - 24 Apr 75

D - Ltr from Paul E. Welch, Dir, Editorial Services (TIME) - to Mr. Belin dtd 22 Apr 75 w/attachments

E - Ltr from Guccione to The President - 10 Mar 75

F - Ltr from Kelley to Rockefeller - 18 Apr 75

G - Memo for the Vice President from Wallison - 1 May 75 CONFIDENTIAL

H - Ltr from Belin to Griswold - 18 Apr 75 w/attachment.

I - Memo to Mr. Schwarzer from Belin - 9 Apr 75 w/attachment

J - Ltr from Fensterwald to Belin - 7 Apr 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

GMG (II-O)

A - Ltr from Editor of Congressional Staff Directory to Mr. Belin
10 Mar 75

B - Ltr from Kelley to Mr. Belin - 26 Feb 75

C - Ltr from Greene to Belin - 3 Mar 75

D - Ltr from Belin to Gray - 28 Feb 75 w/attachment

E - Ltr from Belin to John Pickering - 28 Feb 75 w/attachment

F - Ltr from Ernest W. Lefever to Mr. Belin - 26 Feb 75 w/attachment

G - Ltr from E. Drexel Godfrey, Jr. to Belin - 25 Feb 75

H - Ltr from Belin to Starring - 25 Feb 75 w/attachment.

I - Ltr from Belin to Professor Kirkpatrick - 25 Feb 75
w/attachment

J - Ltr from Belin to Congressman Jeffords - 20 Feb 75 w/attachment

K - Ltr from Parsons to Camejo - 7 Feb 75 w/attachment

L - Ltr from Belin to Gray - 20 Feb 75 w/attachment.

M - Ltr from Belin to Sen. Marchi - 13 Feb 75 w/attachment.

N - Memo from Belin to Gellhorn - 13 Feb 75 w/attachment

O - Ltr from Belin to Stone - 12 Feb 75 w/attachment.

P - Memo for Belin from Weidner - 12 Feb 75 w/attachments

Q - M/R signed by Belin about call from Mr. Lander. 6 Feb 75

R - Ltr from Sid Ballis to Rockefeller - 20 Jan 75

S - Ltr from Douglas W. Metz to Belin - 16 Jan 75 w/attachment.

T - Ltr from Pawley (former Amb. to Peru and Brazil) to the President dtd 6 Jan
w/news clipping attached.

U - Memo from Wallison to Belin - 16 Jan 75 w/attachments.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Gen Lemnitzer to Mr. Belin - 27 Feb 1975
w/attached newspaper clipping.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

GMG (II-Q)

A-Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 Mar 75 w/attachments.

B - Memo to The Staff from Belin - Subj: Colby Statement - 3 Apr 75 w/attachment
SECRET

C - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 31 Mar 75 w/attachments

D - Material to be Supplied to the Senate Select Committee by the CIA
SECRET (Draft - 4/23/75)

E - Dir. Colby's Public Senate Testimony on Domestic Operations.

F - Memo from Gray to Baker, Olsen and Schwarzer - 20 Feb 75 w/attachments.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Jan 75 w/attachments which are SECRET

B - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 22 Jan 75 w/attachments.

C - Memo for Colby from William V. Broe, Insp. General - 21 May 73
Subj: Potential Flap Activities w/attachments SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo for The Legal Staff from Marvin Gray - Subj: The Final Report - dtd 14 Mar 75.

B - Tentative Draft of Outline of Report of Commission.

C - Memo for Staff - From Gellhorn - Subj: Outline of Final Report dtd 10 Mar 75. w/attachment.

D - Tentative Draft of Outline of Report of Commission

E - Outline of Report of Commission

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo from Buchen to Belin - 24 Mar 75 w/attachment.

B - Memo to Belin from Wallison - 9 May 75

C - Memo from Mr. Marion Johnson, U.S. Archives - 3/19/75

D - Memo for File - Subj: Meeting w/Mr. Knoche and Mr. Warner - 6 Feb 75 s/Ronald Greene

E - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 Feb 75

F - Ltr from Colby to Rockefeller - 5 Feb 75

G - M/R - unsigned - 2/13/74 about reassignment of portions of the investigation.

H - Memo to Buchen from Max Friedersdorf - 1/22/75

I - Memo for Friedersdorf from Leppert - Subj: Subpoena Power for Presidential Commission on CIA. - 21 Jan 75

J - Memo for Belin and Wallison from Buchen - 31 Jan 75 w/attachment.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo from Lloyd A. Free - "Potential Informants" - 6 Jan 74
CONFIDENTIAL

B - Potential Witnesses (Outside CIA) - List dated 3/11/75 CONFIDENTIAL

C - Commission Witnesses; dates and list (Apr 7 - May 19)

D - Potential Witnesses (outside CIA) (Belin's copy - marked in pencil)

E - Memo to the Legal Staff - from Gray - 11 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

BGG (11-X)

(- Memo to The Legal Staff; From Gray - Subj: The 693-page file - 12 Mar 75

B - M/R - Subj: Check of Executive Registry Files - 4 Apr 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE w/attachment

C - Memo for the File - from Gray - Subj: Review of IG File on Office of Security - 21 Feb 75 SECRET

D - Memo for the File from Gray - 4 Mar 75 SECRET

E - Memo for the File from Gray - Subj: Questionable Activities Reported by OJCS 17 Mar 75

F - Memo for the File from Gray - 8 Apr 75 w/attached ink notes.

on

G - Memo for the File from Gray - Subj: Agency Materials Concerning Robert A. Maheu - 8 Apr 75

on -

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-G-G (II-Y)

A - Memo to Belin from Clapper - 29 May 75

B - Memo for the Commission - from Mr. Gray - 24 May 75

C - Memo for the Commission - From Mr. Gray - 2 June 75

D - Memo for the Commissioners - from Weidner - 30 May 75

E - Memo to Members of the Commission - from Belin - Subj: Scope of Commission Investigation — 7 Mar 75

F - Memo to The Commission - from Belin - Subj: Chapter Drafts - 16 May 75

G - Memo - List of President-s Foreign Intell. Advisory Board w/attachments.

H - Memo of Discussion w/Commission on the Organization of the Govt for the Conduct of Foreign Policy 5/6/75

I - Memo for the Commission - from Belin - Subj: Final Report - Classification and Printing - 5 May 75

J - Memo to The Commission from Belin - Subj: Oversight Commission - 2 May 75 w/attachment.

K - Memo to the Commission - from Belin - Subj: Chapter Drafts; dtd 23 Apr 75

L - Memo to Members of the Commission - from Belin - Subj: Commission Meeting Schedule and Witnesses - 9 Apr 75 w/attachment.

M - Memo to the Commission - from Gellhorn - Subj: Right to Privacy - dtd 26 Mar 75 w/attachments.

N - CIA Operations in the U.S. from FBI - 7 Feb 66 SECRET

O - Memo for the Commission - from Belin - Subj: Release of Info to Dept of Justice - 21 Mar 75

P - Memo for the Commission - from Belin - Subj: Proposed Timetable. - 21 Mar 7
w/attachments.

Q - Memo for The Commission - Subj: Jurisdiction of the Commission - 10 Mar 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

BGG (II-2)

A - Memo to Belin from Clapper - Subj: Public Affairs Considerations in Deleting Assassination Findings - 29 May 75

B - Memo to Belin from Clapper - 22 May 75 w/attachment

C - Memo for Belin; from Olsen - 27 May 75 w/attachment.

D - Memo to Belin from Clapper - Subj: Public Affairs Considerations in Report 2 May 75 w/attachment.

E - Memo to Staff from Clapper - Subj: Charges Against CIA by Press - 2 May 75 w/attachment.

F - Memo to Belin from Tim - 4/29/75

G - Memo to Belin - Subj: Witnesses we Told We'd Talk to Again - by "Tim" 4/25/75

H - Memo to Belin - Subj: Watergate Materials - 24 Mar 75

I - Memo to Belin - Subj: Interview of Mr. Nixon - by Schwarzer - 24 Mar 75

J - Memo for Belin; from Olsen - Subj: Polygraph Examinations of Selected CIA Officials and Former Officials - 20 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

K - Memo to Belin from O'Leary - Subj: Watergate Documents - 17 Mar 75

L - Memo to Belin from Clapper - Subj: Production of Final Report - 13 Mar 75; w/attachment.

M - Memo to Belin from Gray - 12 Mar 75

N - Memo to Belin from Schwarzer and Gellhorn - Subj: Substantiation of Final Report - 6 Mar 75

O - Memo for Mr. Belin from Schwarzer and Manfredi - 4 Mar 75

P - Memo to Belin from Baker and Weidner - Subj: Timetable - 28 Feb 75

Q - Memo for All Staff Attorneys - from Roethe - 18 Feb 75 w/attachment.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

BGG (II-AA)

A - Memo to Schwarzer ; From Belin - Subj: CIA File on Senator Humphrey. 14 May 75

B - Memo to Olsen from Belin - Subj: Mark Lane Correspondence - 14 May 75

C - Memo to Schwarzer; from Belin - Subj: Access to Presidential Materials of th Nixon Administration — May 14, 1975

D - Memo to Schwarzer from Belin - Subj: Investigation of Specific Areas - 14 May 75.

E - Memo to Olsen from Belin, Subj: Hoch Correspondence - 14 May 75.

F - Memo to the Staff; from Belin; Subj: Suggestions on Possible Recommendations 5 May 75.

G - Memo to Messrs. Schwarzer and Manfredi ; from Mr. Belin Subj: Testimony before the Commission - 2 May 75.

H - Memo to Gellhorn - from Belin - Subj: Proposed Legislation by CIA - 25 Apr 75

I - Memo to Weidner; from Belin - Subj: Matters Concerning the Assassination Of Pres. Kennedy, beyond Purported Evidence of Alleged CIA Participation in It. - dtd 21 Apr 75 w/attachment.

J - Memo to Olsen from Belin - Subj: Proposed Scope of our Investigation into Assassination of President Kennedy - 18 Apr 75 - w/attachment which is CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

K - Memo to Schwarzer ; from Belin - Subj: Ltr from Sen. Cannon - 9 Apr 75.

L - Memo to Gray; from Belin - Subj: "Treaty" between FBI and CIA 8 Apr 75

M - Memo from Belin to Clapper - Subj: Photographs - 26 Mar 75

N - Memo to Messrs. Baker and Weidner from Belin - Postmasters General. - 26 Mar 75

O - Memo to Members of the Staff - from Belin - Subj: Meetings of Commissioners dtd 26 Mar 75.

P - Memo for Belin; From Baker - Subj: Mar 31, 1975 Witnesses - 24 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

Q - Commission on CIA Activities Within the U.S. - Memo to The Staff - from Belin, Subj: Requests for Info or Assistance from FBI - 3/12/75 w/attachment.

R - Memo for Belin; from Baker - Subj: Dr. R.E. Hummel - 5 Mar 75.

S - Memo to Gray from Belin - 28 Feb 75 w/attachment.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

T - Memo to Baker and Weidner from Belin - 27 Feb 75

U - Memo to Gray ; From Belin - 24 Feb 75

V - Memo to Gellhorn; from Belin - 24 Feb 75

W - Memo to Gray; from Belin - 20 Feb 75

X - Memo to Gray from Belin - 20 Feb 75

Y - Memo to Gray from Belin - 20 Feb 75

Z - Memo to Members of the Staff - from Belin - 18 Feb 75

AA - Memo from Schwarzer and Manfredi to Belin - 14 Feb 75

BB - Memo to Gellhorn from Belin - 13 Feb 75

CC - Memo to Baker, Weidner and Gellhorn from Belin - 13 Feb 75

DD - Memo to Baker and Weidner from Belin - 13 Feb 75

EE - Memo to Baker, Weidner ; from Belin - 13 Feb 75

FF - Memo to Weidner from Belin - 13 Feb 75

GG - Memo to Gray; from Belin - 13 Feb 75

HH - Memo to Manfredi - from Belin - 12 Feb 75

II - Memo to Gellhorn from Belin - 12 Feb 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo to Gray from Cargill - 31 Mar 75 w/attachment which is SECRET

B - Memo to Gray from Clapper - Subj: Possible Lead - 13 Mar 75

C - Memo for Gray from Calvin E. Davis, CIA - 7 Mar 75 SECRET

D - Memo to Gray - 3/6/75 w/attachment of list of Attorneys General of the U.S. 1950 to the present.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-G-G (II-OO)

A - Ltr from Chairman, CAB to Mr. Belin - 13 May 75 (SECRET) w/attachment

B - Ltr from Ray Garrett, Jr. (Securities and Exchange Commission) to Mr. Belin - 5 May 75

C - Ltr from Harold R. Tyler, Jr., Deputy Attorney General to Mr. Belin, 16 May 75

D - Ltr from Chas. A. Tobin, FTC, to Mr. Belin, 23 June 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-11 (I-D)

A. Memo for Dir of CI from James Angleton, dated 7 Apr 72
CONFIDENTIAL

B. Memo to CIA from James J. Rowley , dated 30 Mar 72
(Unclas.)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible]
5-M (I-G)

Summary Financial Support to the White House (CONFIDENTIAL)

with 3 Tabs:

1. Memo to Associate Deputy Dir for Admin. from Deputy Dir of Finance - 5 Feb 75.
2. Info - Office of Logistics Supply & Procurement for the White House Communications Activity.
3. Memo for Record - on Misc. Security Support to the White House dtd 28 Jan 1975. CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SM (I-I)

A. HM NIECE (SECRET)

B. Memo - Subj: Dir of Ops Activities Involving Foreign Students in the U.S. - 7 Feb 75 (SECRET)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SM (I-J)

A. Memo of Visit to Mr. William Ledee - 1 June 64 (CONFIDENTIAL)

B. Memo for Record, Subj: William Ledee - 29 Apr 75 (SECRET)

C. Memo for the Record - Subj: Alleged Break-in at HEW Offices, Miami.
1 May 75 (SECRET)

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A. DDO Instruction No. 1-14 - Organization and Functions Foreign Resources Div. - 6 Feb 74 SECRET

B. Clandestine Service Instruction 1-14 - 15 Mar 72 SECRET

C. Clandestine Services Instruction 1-14 - 17 Oct 68 SECRET

D. Clandestine Services Notice 50-24 - WUENTREE PROGRAM - 22 Dec 66 SECRET

E. Clandestine Services Notice No. 1-589 - 16 Mar 64 SECRET

F. Memo for Distribution from C. Tracy Barnes 15Feb63 SECRET

G. Clandestine Services Instruction No. 1-14 - 11 Feb 63 SECRET

H. Clandestine Services Notice No. 1-470 - 20 Mar 62 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M(I-M)

Notes from Helms' Chronological Files:

A. Chairman Mehon - 29 Nov 72 SECRET

B. Meeting with President and John Ehrlichman - 1100 - Oct 8, 1971 SECRET

C. Col Robert Shultz, undated SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-17 (I-N)

A. Memo for Executive Dir-Comptroller , Subj: Report of the Working Group on Contacts with American Business Firms (1972) SECRET

B. Memo from Edward W. Proctor - 18 Apr 72 SECRET

C. Memo from Colby - 11 Apr 72 SECRET

D. Memo from John W. Coffey - 18 Apr 72

E. Memo from Colby - 10 July 72 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Memo - U.S. Citizens Allegedly Involved in Narcotics Trafficking Abroad - SECRET

With Tabs -

A. Memo for Deputy Dir, DD/P, DD/I, DD/S - Subj: The Heroin Problem, signed by Helms - 25 Oct 69 UNCLASSIFIED

B. Terms of Reference (Oct 71) for The Intelligence Subcommittee of the Working Group of the CCINC. SECRET

C. Telegram from State 230669 - Dec 71 - SECRET

D. Telegram to Asuncion, Bogota, Brasilia, Buenos Aires, Caracas, et al (Book Message)- 24 Oct 73 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-7 (I-P)

Ltr from Mr. Manfredi to Mr. Knoche - 17 Mar 75

TABS -

1. Dispatch 9299 from Chief, WOMACE/MHABYSS SECRET
2. Dispatch 9894, 9 Dec 74 SECRET
3. Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - 5 Aug 71 SECRET
4. Memo for Dir of CI - from Bronson Tweedy - 4 Apr 72 SECRET
5. Memo - Subj: Request for Traces - 16 Mar 73 - SECRET
6. Memo for Deputy Dir for Ops - Subj: CIA Narcotics Activities Having Domestic Implications - 7 May 73 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-11 (I-2)

A. Memo for Mr. Knoche from Donald F. Chamberlain, Subj: The Puerto Rican Station - 13 May 75 SECRET

B. Memo for Mr. Knoche , Subj: Puerto Rico - 30 Apr 75 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-11 (I-5)

A. Clandestine Services Instruction 50-10 - 26 Aug 67 SECRET

B. Restrictions on Operational Use of Certain Categories of Individuals
4 Sept 73 SECRET

C. Statement of Functions Cover and Commercial Staff - 31 Aug 73 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-7
(I-T)

1. OTS Memo Receipt (CONFIDENTIAL)
2. Procedures for Obtaining Alias Documents and Disguises 16 Apr 75 CONFIDENTIAL
3. Procedures from D01-240-4, 25 Nov 74 signed by Wm. Nelson SECRET
4. U.S. Document Request Form SECRET
5. Clandestine Service Inst. 240-4 - 23 Aug 72 - SECRET
6. Clandestine Services Inst. 220-7, 12 May 59 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M (I-4)

1. Colby letter to Rockefeller dated 19 Mar 1975. SECRET
2. Briefing Paper on CIA Proprietaries - March 1975 SECRET
3. Memorandum of Law — Legal Authority to Dispose of a Proprietary - January 1974 SECRET
4. Regulations and Handbooks on Administration of Proprietaries (SECRET)
5. Handwritten Note - "Operation of Proprietaries - John Morrison, Deputy General Counsel". ~~(No classification marked on pages)~~ (SECRET)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M
(I-V)

1. Memo from Hardy to Schwarzer - 9 Apr 75
2. Memo to File from Cargill - 11 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL
3. Memo to File from Hardy - 9 Apr 75
4. Criteria for DDO Maintenance of Info on U.S. Citizens - CONFIDENTIAL
5. Review of 201 File on U.S. Citizen CONFIDENTIAL
6. Memo - All Unit Supervisors, IP/Analysis Section - 13 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL
7. Memo, 3 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL
8. Criteria for Indexing - 19 July 1967 - SECRET (Clandestine Services Handbook No 70-1-1
9. Clandestine Services Instr. 1-6 - 10 Jan 61 CONFIDENTIAL
10. Memo for Chief, Info Services Gp - 10 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL
11. Memo to All Services Staff Supervisory Personnel -31 Jan 75
12. Disposition of Documents from Closed 201 Files on U.S. Citizens - 26 Dec 74 CONFIDENTIAL
13. Memo - Retention of "Destroyed" Documents - 4 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL
14. CIA File Categories Containing the Names of US Citizens or Organizations. SECRET
15. File Categories Containing Names of US Citizens and Organizations. SECRET
16. Main Index Search Response CONFIDENTIAL
17. Archives Reference CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible] (I-X)
S-M

ATTACHMENTS

1. 23 March 1971 DCD Memorandum, Subject: New Case 56300 - Foreign Involvement in US Radical Activities. Secret/Sensitive

2. 22 March 1971 Memorandum from Chief, Special Operations Group, Subject: Foreign Involvement in US Radical Activities. Secret/Sensitive

3. 19 December 1969 DCD Memorandum, Subject: Case 52722. Secret/Sensitive Eyes Only

4. 28 March 1969 DCD Memorandum, Subject: New Case 52722 - Activities of US Black Militants. Secret/Sensitive

5. 4 June 1973 DCD Memorandum, Subject: US Radical Activities with attachments 00-A(S)-322/15375-73 and 00-A(S)-322/14926-73. Secret/Sensitive

6. DCD Teletype, Contacts/New York 19864 dated 8 May 1973. Secret/Sensitive

7. 21 June 1972 Memorandum for the Executive Director-Comptroller, Subject: Report of the Working Group on Contacts with American Business Firms (Ref DDI 1852-72). Secret

8. DCID 2/3 Effective 25 July 1963 and 21 March 1961 and DCID 2/8 Effective 25 July 1963. Secret

9. 23 July 1974 DCD Operations Memorandum No. 192-74, Subject: Expansion of DCD-FBI Relationship. Secret

10. 25 November 1974 DCD Memorandum, Subject: DCD-FBI Relationship. Secret

11. DCD document, Subject: Fact Sheet on Coordinations for Operational Use of Members of US Companies: Period 1 August 1973 to 31 December 1974. Confidential

12. 17-page untitled, undated DCD summary of DCD records on contacts with members of the 94th Congress. Confidential

CLASSIFIED BY 054581
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSIFICATION
SCHEDULE OF E. O. 11652, EXEMPTION CATEGORY:
§ 5B(1), (2), (3) or (4) (circle one or more)
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED ON
DATE IMPOSSIBLE TO DETERMINE
(unless impossible, insert date or event)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

13. 29 April 1970 DCS Memorandum, Subject: New Case 54643 - Drug Abuse. Secret

14. Pages 35 and 36 of DCS R 330-30, 1 June 1971. Confidential

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

5-1M (I-AA)

1. Case 52722/Officers Briefed - 3 Feb 70 SECRET/SENSITIVE
2. Expansion of Black Panther Activities - 19 Feb 70 SECRET -EYES ONL
3. Case 52722 - Status - 6 Apr 70 SECRET/SENSITIVE
4. Young Socialist Alliance
5. Possible Sources of Black Panther Funds - 17 Sept 70 SECRET
6. Cullen/Left-wing Dissident and Possible Revolutionary - 16 Dec 70 SECRET
7. Case 52722 - 6 Jan 71 SECRET
8. Memo for Record - 25 Jan 71 meeting in CI Staff - 4 Feb 71 SECRET
9. Case Summary - Foreign Involvement in US Radical Activities 31 May 73 SECRET
10. Memo for Chiefs, All Field Offices - Case 52722 - SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL entire

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A. Memo for Chiefs, All Field Offices - Case 52722 (Draft) SECRET

B. Memo to Acting Chief, Detroit Field Office - Case 52722 - SECRET/SENSITIVE

C. Memo to Dir, Domestic Contact Service, Subj: Case 52722 - 3 Feb 70 SECRET

D. Memo for Chiefs, All Field Offices - DCD - FBI Relationship - 25Nov74 SEC

E. Memo for Operational Support Staff, DCS - Subj: NY State Police Reporting - 2 Nov 70 SECRET/SENSITIVE

F. Memo to Dir, Domestic Contact Service - Case 52,722 - 19 Oct 70 SECRET

G. Routing and Record Sheet to CI/SO - ATTN: CIA officer - SECRET/SENSITIVE

H. Memo to Acting Chief, Detroit Field Office - SECRET/SENSITIVE

I. Memo - Discussions with a CIA officer - 20 May 70 - SECRET/SENSITIVE

J. Memo for the Record - Subj: Case 52722 - 20 May 70 SECRET/SENSITIVE

K. Memo - Subj: Discussions with DCS/OSS - 23 June 70

L. Routing Slip - Undated, unsigned.

M. Routing and Record Sheet - Case 52722 - 8 June 70

N. Memo - Talk with Ed Watts

O. Agenda for ..... DCS Base Chiefs

P. Routing and Record Sheet SECRET/SENSITIVE

Q. Memo - Meeting with DCS Hqs' Officers - 9 July 1970

R. Routing and Record Sheet - CI/SO - dtd 20 July 1970 SECRET/SENSITIVE

entire

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-M (III-A)

A. References - Section 1 SECRET

B. Names of Witnesses (All CIA) - In ink.

C. List of Witnesses -(Chapters 10, 11 and 14) - Typed

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SCHWARZER CHRON FILE

(III - D)

A. Memo to the Commission and Staff - 9 Apr 75

B. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. Ira Lowe - 4 Apr 75

C. Ltr from Schwarzer to H. J. Miller, Esq. - 1 Apr 75

D. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. Anthony A. Lapham - 1 Apr 75

E. Memo to Messrs. Belin, Baker, Gellhorn, and Olsen, Subj: Chapters 10 and 11 - 1 Apr 75

F. Ltr from Belin to Honorable Philip W. Buchen - 31 Mar 75

G. Memo for Mr. Knoche - Subj: Request for Documents - 7 Mar 75

H. Memo to Mr. Belin - Substantiation of Final Report - 6 Mar 75

I. Ltr from Schwarzer to Honorable Howard Cannon, US Senate - 6 Mar 75

J. Memo to Mr. Belin from Schwarzer - 4 Mar 75

K. Memo for Mr. Belin s/Schwarzer and Manfredi - 4 Mar 75

L. Memo for Mr. Knoche - Subj: Request for Additional Material - 3 Mar 75

M. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. Carl E. Rizer - 3 Mar 75

N. Ltr to Mr. Schwarzer from Carl E. Rizer - 25 Feb 75

O. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. William A. Carroll, Dir, Continuing Education of the Bar - 25 Feb 75

P. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. M. Laurence Popofsky - 25 Feb 75

Q. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. Robert Mainhardt - 25 Feb 75

R. Ltr from Schwarzer to Mr. Gordon M. Weber - 25 Feb 75

S. Memo for the File - Subj: Clandestine Service Resulations, now Directorate of Ops Instructions - 21 Feb 75

T. Memo for Mr. Knoche - Request for Documents - 20 Feb 75

U. Ltr from Mr. Knoche to Mr. Schwarzer - 11 Mar 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

5-17 (III-

Manfredi Chron Files

A. Memo from Ruth Johnson to Mr. Manfredi - 29 Apr 75 on Classification of Documents

B. Memo to Mr. Knoche from Manfredi - 21 Apr 75 SECRET

C. Memo from Johnson to Manfredi on Classification of Document - 25 Apr 75

D. Memo to File - 10 Apr 75

E. Memo for Mr. Knoche - Request for Documents - 9 Apr 75

F. Ltr from Manfredi to Knoche - 2 Apr 75 SECRET

G. Pencil list of Memos and Reports, which has been xeroxed.

H. Ltr from Manfredi to Pritchard - 25 Mar 75

I. Ltr from Manfredi to Knoche - 17 Mar 75 -SECRET

J. Ltr from Manfredi to Knoche - Request for Documents - 13 Mar 75.

K. Memo to the File - Subj: Telephone Conversation with Steve Stelzner from Manfredi - 12 Mar 75.

L. Ltr Manfredi to Pritchard - 28 Feb 75

M. Memo to Belin, Baker, Olsen, Roethe, Weidner from Manfredi - 28 Feb 75.

N. Ltr from Pritchard to Schwarzer - 20 Feb 75.

O. Memo for Messrs. Baker and Weidner - Subj: Ober Project - 21 Feb 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-17
(III-G)

A. Ltr from Knoche to Schwarzer - 21 May 75.

B. Memo from Belin to Gray - 20 Feb 75

C. Memo from Belin to Gray - 24 Feb 75

D. Affidavit relating to CIA domestic spying - Ltr to Mr. Rockefeller, 21Jan75
From Paul D. Rademacher

E. Memo from Belin to Schwarzer and Manfredi - 2 May 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo for the File - Subj: Clandestine Service Regulations, now Directorate of Operations Instructions - 21 Feb 75.

B - Memo for Dir. of CI - Subj: CIA Surveillance Activities Within the U.S. - 15 May 1975 SECRET

C - M/R - Subj: Conversation with Mr. Spiro Agnew on 5 Apr 74. - 13 Apr 74 CONFIDENTIAL EYES ONLY

D.-Ink card - re William O'Connell

E - Memo for Schwarzer from Horton - "The 'Laundering' of Money Via Mexico" 10 Mar 75 SECRET

F - Draft of "B. Name Trace Procedure".

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

(III - I) ✓

A - Memo for Record - Subj: Executive Registry - 21 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

B - Memo for the Record - Subj: Examination of a Portion of the Records of Richard Helms - 19 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

C - Office Routing Slip "Well done". - 17 May 72

D - Ltr from Rose Mary Woods to Mr. Helms - 12 May 72.

E - Memo for Mr. Helms - Subj: Special Briefing (Aug 14) - 10 Aug 72 ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL/PERSONAL

F - Memo on The July 4th Movement - 9 June 65

G - Memo for Moyers from Helms - 9 June 65

✓ H - Addendum to 20 Nov 63 Memo for the Record by Helms on Cuban Arms Cache in Venezuela [comm classified]

I - Pencil Notes on Yellow paper.

J - Pencil notes on white lined paper.

K - M/R - Subj: Spot check of Executive Registry files - 27 Mar 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

(V - Vol 1)

A. Ltr from Helms to Milliken, 16 Mar 70

B. Telephone Call to Gen Cushman from Ehrlichman, 7 July 71

C. Excerpt from the Morning Meeting of 8 July 71 of Gen. Cushman'
Report on His Conversation with Ehrlichman

D. Transcript - DDCI and Mr. Howard Hunt - 22 July 71 (SECRET)

E. Misc. Memos on H. Hunt sent to DCI from DDCI (ALL SECRET)

F. Diary Notes by Exec Director-Comptroller - 22 Sept 71
(SECRET-EYES ONLY)

G. Memo from Colson to Haldeman - 25 June 71 (CONFIDENTIAL)

H. Memo from Krogh to Ehrlichman, 30 July 71

I. Memo from Krogh to Ehrlichman, 12 Aug 71

J. Memo from Krogh to Ehrlichman, 20 Aug 71

K. Memo from Krogh/Young to Ehrlichman, 20 Sept 71

L. Memo from Colson to Ehrlichman, 24 Sept 71 (EYES ONLY)

M Dairy Notes, Acting Exec Director-Comptroller on Vietnam
Papers, 8 Oct 71 (SECRET-EYESONLY)

N Morning Meeting of 19 June 1972 (SECRET SENSITIVE)

O. Memo for Deputy Director from Helms, Subj: Watergate Affair
28 June 1972 (SECRET - EYES ONLY)

P. Memo for Record, signed by Gen Walters - 28 June 1972

Q. Memo for Record, signed by Gen Walters - re meeting
with Pat Gray - 28 June 1972

R. Memo for Record, signed by Gen Walters - meeting with John Dea
28 June 72

S. Memo for Record, signed by Gen Walters - meeting with John Dea
29 June 72

T. Memo for Record, signed by Gen Walters - meeting with Dean.
29 June 72

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

U. Memorandum for Record, signed by Gen Walters, re phone call from Pat Gray. 5 July 72

V. Memo for Record by Gen Walters, re visit with Pat Gray. 6 July 72

W. Memo from Gen Walters, for The Acting Director, FBI, Subj: Info Provided the FBI regarding the Watergate Incident. 6 July 72

X. Memo for Record re phone call from Agent Parham. 18 Aug 72

Y. Memo for Record, signed by F. N. Evans. 19 Aug 72

Z. Memo for Record, re telephone inquiry from Spec. Agent Parham. 21 Aug 72

a. Memo for Record signed by Hollis H. Whitaker - 21 Aug 72

b. Memo for Record signed by F. N. Evans - 25 Aug 72

c. Memo for Record signed by S. L. Kuhn - 25 Aug 72

d. Memo for Record signed by H. H. Whitaker - 29 Aug 72

e. Memo for Record by Helms, Subj: Meeting with Mr. Gray on 18 Oct 72. 19 Oct 72 (SECRET)

f. Memo for Record by Lawrence R. Houston, dated 24 Oct 72 (EYES ONLY-SECRET)

g. Memo for Record by John S. Warner, 27 Nov 72 (SECRET - EYES ONLY)

h. Memo for Record by Colby. 18 Dec 72 (SECRET)

i. Telephone Conversation between Colby and Dean on 20 Dec 72.

j. Receipt for envelope. 3 Jan 73

k. Ltr from Mike Mansfield to Helms, 16 Jan 73

l. Memo of Conversation on Feb 21, 1973 by Gen Walters. 11 May 73

m. Affidavit - Cleo L. Gephart - 8 May 73 (SECRET)

N. Affidavit - Leslie L. Rhodes - 8 May 73 (SECRET)

o. Affidavit - Stephen C. Greenwood - 9 May 73 (SECRET)

p. Affidavit - Ronald F. James - 11 May 73 (SECRET)

q. Affidavit - Karl Wagner (undated)

r. Affidavit (Marked SECRET) - with no name. - Signed "Karl Wagner" -18May73

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

s. Memo for Record - Subj"Mr. Edward" File - 22 May 74 (SECRET)

t. Memo for Record, Subj: Meeting with Chief EEAB/Pers - 19 June 73

u. Note by Karl Wagner - 12 July 73

v. Response of Helms to Inquiries from Sen Symington and Rept Nedzi regarding Helms' Memo of 28 June 72 to Gen Walters and Related Matters. 4 Nov 73

w. Memo for Honorable Stuart Symington from Colby - 6 Nov 73

x. Memo for Leg. Counsel from Osborn - 11 Dec 73

y. Memo by Rob Roy

z. Memo for the Record re Mrs. Evelyn DePue - 22 Jan 74

aa. Memo for Record - by F. N. Evans and L. J. Howe on interview of Frank A. O'Malley - 21 Feb 74

bb. Memo for Dir of CIA by Howard J. Osborn. 22 Feb 74 (SECRET-EYES ONLY)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible]

A - Defense Against Soviet Medical Interrogation and Espionage Techniques SECRET

B - Organization of a Special Defense Interrogation Program SECRET

C - Cable AD/SI - 10 Feb 51 SECRET

D - Memo for Asst Dir, SI - Progress on BLUEBIRD - 9 July 51 SECRET EYES ONLY

E - Memo for Mr. Alberti from George G. Bull - 20 Aug 51 SECRET

F - Chart

G - Drug List

H - An Analysis of Confessions in Russian Trials

I - Memo to Dr. Gottlieb - 27 May 55 CONFIDENTIAL

J - BLUEBIRD OPERATION - 23 May 51 TOP SECRET

K - CIA Cable to Chief of Mission, Mexico - 17 Dec 52 SECRET

L - Memo for Mr. Dulles - Subj: Exploitation of Prisoners of War Returnees - 30 1953 - TOP SECRET

M - Memo to Chief, Security Research Staff - from Chief, Tech. Branch - 11 May 5 SECRET

N - Memo to Chief, Security Research Staff from Chief, Tech. Br. - 8 June 53 SECRET

O - Memo to Chief, Security Research Staff - from Chief, Tech. Br. - 30 July 53 SECRET

P - Memo to Chief, Security Research Staff from Chief, Tech Br - 15 July 53 SECRET

Q - Memo to Chief, Security Research Staff from Chief, Tech Br - 16 Nov 53 SECRET

R - Agenda - ARTICHOKE MEETING - 19 Nov 53 SECRET

S - Memo for Asst Dir, OSI - 21 Nov 52 SECRET

T - Memo for Asst Dir, OSI - 26 Nov 52 SECRET

U - Memo to Chief, Security Research Staff from Chief, Tech. Br. - 13 Apr 53 SECRET

V - Conversation with Gibbons - 14 Dec 53

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible]

(V - Vol. II)

INDEX

A. Memo for Record by Martin J. Lukoskie, Subj: Association of Robert R. Mullen & Co with the Hughes Tool Co. 30 Apr 71 SECRET

B. Memo for Record by Martin Lukoskie, on comments of Robert F. Bennett concerning Robert Maheu and Exposure to Howard Hughes Co. by Maheu of his Alleged Aid to the Agency on Bay of Pigs Operation - 2 June 1971 SECRET

C. Contact Report - to obtain amendment to Ltr of Agreement 18 Nov 71 SECRET

D. Contact Report - to discuss a cover arrangement. 15 Feb 72 SECRET

E. Contact Report - to discuss letter received by company. 15 Feb 72 SECRET

F. Contact Report - to discuss cover arrangement. 27 Apr 72 SECRET

G. Contact Report - to discussion of cover arrangement. 6 June 72 SECRET

H. Contact Report - re appearance of Robert R. Mullen & Co. Exec., Robert F. Bennett, before the Grand Jury. - 11 July 72 SECRET

I. Memo for Record handwritten by Lukoskie, 10 July 72, re Meeting with Robert Bennett and his comments concerning Hunt, Caddy and the Watergate. (SECRET EYES ONLY)

J. Memo for Record by Lukoskie re Meeting with Lptout re withdrawal of Flitsch from Cover. 24 July 72 SECRET

K. Draft of a ltr "Dear Art" - Unsigned.No date.

L. Memo for Deputy Dir of Plans from Erich W. Isenstead. 1 Mar 73 SECRET

M. Wrap up of the Agency's Assn with Robert R. Mullen and Co. Undated. SECRE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-7 (Vol. III)

A. Copy of Ltr to David Young from Howard J. Osborn, 11 Aug 71

B. Memo for the Record by Malloy on Meeting with Mr. David Young, 13 Aug 71
SECRET

C. Memo for Dir of CIA, Coffey to Helms. 9 Nov 71 SECRET - EYES ONLY

D. Ltr from Helms to Young. 9 Nov 71

E. Affidavit - Charles A. Bohrer - 9 May 73

F. Affidavit - Bernard M. Malloy - 9 May 73.

G. Affidavit - John R. Tietjen - 9 May 73.

H. Affidavit - No name

I. Memo for Acting General Counsel - re phone call from Mr. Greaney.
3 Aug 73 ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

J. Affidavit - Jerrold M. Post 15 May 73

K. Affidavit - John W. Coffey - 24 May 73 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

S-17
(V-Vol I

INDEX

A. Memo for Record - Gervenot. Project AMABDUCT. 19 Nov 71 SECRET

B. Memo for Chief, TYPIC, signed by A. R. Ponchay - 17 Mar 72 SECRET

C. Ltr from Ponchay to "Joel" - 17 Mar 72

D. Ltr from Nebecker to "Anthony" - 27 Mar 72

E. Activities of Howard Hunt and Dr. Artime in Miami and Nicaragua 5 Apr 72

F. Memo for COS, Subj: References to Howard Hunt - 19 June 72 SECRET

G. Ltr addressed "Dear Friend" - 20 June 72, unsigned SECRET

H. Cable from Nebecker 21 June 72 SECRET

I. Memorandum re Mr. Eugenio R. Martinez - 11 July 73 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

3.

aa. M/R - Subj: Mrs. Evelyn De Pue - 22 Jan 74

bb. Description of Contents of File of Stenographic Notes on General Cushman's Telephone Conversation

cc. Ink notes - "Examination of Files in Inspector General's Office - 3/6"

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

a. Memo to Mr. Knoche from Mr. Schwarzer - Subj: Witnesses - 1 Apr 75

b. Ltr from Belin to Miller - 31 Mar 75

c. Memo from Schwarzer to Belin - 24 Mar 75

d. Memo from Schwarzer to Belin - 24 Mar 75

e. Ltr from Belin to Honorable Howard Cannon - 21 Mar 75

f. Ltr from Schwarzer to Honorable Howard Cannon - 6 Mar 75

g. Memo for Mr. O'Leary - Request for Documents - 3 Mar 75

h. Ltr from Colby to Sen. Baker - 11 Feb 75

i. A receipt signed by John Dean - 3-17-75

j. Ltr from Schwarzer to Dean -13 Mar 75

k. List of Documents to be requested.

l. Memo for Mr. O'Leary - Subj: Request for Documents - 3 Mar 75

m. Memo from O'Leary to Belin - 5 Mar 75

n. Ltr from Sen. Church to Sen Baker - 3 Mar 75

o. Ltr from Sen Church to Mr. Murrphy.

p. Memo from Schwarzer to Lyle Miller - 21 Feb 75

q. Ltr from Colby to Gen. Scowcroft - 18 Feb 75

r. M/R - Retention of Documents by Mr. John D. Ehrlichman - 19 Dec 72

s. Document Receipt from John D. Ehrlichman - 1 Oct 71

t. Identification of documents held by the President as of 15 Dec 72.

u. Memo - Colby to Belin - 11 Feb 75.

v. Ltr from Colby to Sen. Baker - 11 Feb 75

w. Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 Feb 75

x. List of Documents. (Dated 2-6-75)

y. Ltr from Schwarzer to Dean - 10 Feb 75

z. M/R - Interview of Peter Ferguson - 18 Jan 74 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

(V-B)

A. Prior Hearings and Testimony re CIA Involvement in Watergate

B. Receipt returned to E. Henry Knoche, 27 June 75 (not signed)

C. List of materials CIA furnished the Commission - 6 Feb 75

D. Receipt of materials returned to E. Henry Knoche on 27 June 75

E. Agency copies of the transcripts before the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities SECRET SENSITIVE

F. Material provided to Mr. Schwarzer - 14 Mar 75. SECRET SENSITIVE

G. Documentation Receipt SECRET/SENSITIVE

H. Receipt for sealed boxed (three) for Mr. Knoche - s/27 May 75.

I. Ltr to Mr. Schwarzer from Lyle Miller, 4 Mar 75

J. Ltr to Mr. Belin from E. H. Knoche - 19 Feb 75

K. Memo from Belin to Schwarzer - 14 May 75

L. Ltr from Miller to Buchen - 5 May 1975

M. Ltr from Buchen to Belin - 6 May 75

N. Principal References

O. Ltr from Belin to Arthur Sampson - 22 Apr 75

P. Ltr from Belin to Miller - 22 Apr 75

Q. Ltr from Belin to Buchen - 22 Apr 75

R. Ltr from Belin to Howard Cannon - 11 Apr 75

S. Memo from Belin to Schwarzer - 9 Apr 75

T. Ltr from Cannon to Belin - 3 Apr 75

U. Ltr from Schwarzer to Ira Lowe - 9 Apr 75

V. Ltr from Lapham to Schwarzer - 8 Apr 75

W. Ltr from Schwarzer to Stelzer - 8 Apr 75

X. Ltr from Schwarzer to Miller - 1 Apr 75

Y. Executive Order 11828 - Establishing a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States. - 4 Jan 75

Z. Ltr from Schwarzer to Lapham - 1 Apr 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

9/R II(D)

A - Memo from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75

B - Influencing Human Behavior CONFIDENTIAL

C - Behavioral Drugs, and Testing - 11 Feb 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

0/R II(F)

- Memo for Mr. Gray from Tim Hardy - Undated

B - Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 11 Mar 75

C - Dir. of Science & Technology - 2/18/75 from Gray

D - Memo for Gellhorn and Roethe/- 27 Feb 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

E - Memo from Knoche to Belin - 4 Mar 75

F - Memo for Knoche from Seltzer - 3 Mar 75 SECRET

G - Memo for Knoche from Seltzer - 3 Mar 75 SECRET

H - Memo from Knoche to Clapper - 15 Apr 75

I - Memo for Deputy Dir. for Science and Tech. - Subj: Prevention of Smuggling on OEL Aircraft - 7 Apr 75 SECRET

J - Pencil note about Mindszenty.

K - Routing Slip to Roethe from Alan Brody - 23 May 75 w/attached sample contract.

L - Pencil notes.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R-IV(A)

OFFICE OF SECURITY - FILES MATERIAL

A. Administrative Files (undated) SECRET

B. Open Literature Files on Dissidence and Terrorism - UNCLASSIFIE

B. Glossary of Office of Security File Holdings Containing Information on U.S. Citizens and Companies - SECRET

C. Glossary of Office of Security File Holdings Containing Information on U.S. Citizens & Companies (Exhibit A) - SECRET

D. CIA Library Open Literature File on Dissidence and Terrorism - ADM USE ONLY - 24 Jan 75

E. Care and Use of Official Data - CONFIDENTIAL - 14 Nov 69

F. Types of U.S. Citizens Who Might be the Subject of a Security File - SECRET - Undated

G. Retention and Disposition of Security Files and Records - SECRET - Undated

H. Description of Central Intelligence Agency Polygraph Files - SECRET - Undated

I. Glossary of Office of Security File Holdings Containing Information on U.S. Citizens and Companies - SECRET - Undated

J. DDA Glossary of Files Containing U.S. Citizens and Companies

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

W - File: MKULTRA/1744/G Project & Budget SECRET

X - Equipment Evaluation Tests Against Uncontrolled Targets (Attachment A) SECRET

Y - Memo for Acting Dir, OTS - 6 Jan 75 SECRET

Z - Destruction Lists 68-746

a - Memo for Inspector General - Subj: MKULTRA - 6 Jan 75 SECRET eyes only

b - Memo - Subj: Influencing Human Behavior - 7 Jan 75 SECRET

c - Memo for COP - Subj: MKULTRA - 10 Jan 75 CONFIDENTIAL

d - Memo for Inspector General - 13 Jan 75 SECRET

e - Memo for The Inspector General - Project POPANIC - 14 Jan 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

f - M/R - SUBJ: MKULTRA - 17 Jan 75 SECRET

g - Memo - Subj: First Quarter, FY 72 Activity Management Report - 17 Dec 71

h - Memo for Dir of R&D - Subj: Summary of Project OFTEN Clinical Tests at Edgewood - 29 May 73 SECRET

i - Memo for Dir of CI - 22 May 74 SECRET

j - Records Retirement Request - Project Files - 1965 to 1973 SECRET

k - Memo for Inspector General - 9 Jan 75 SECRET

l - Activities Discussed with Dept of Justice - 13 Jan 75 SECRET

m.- M/R - Subj: Trip Report/Edgewood Arsenal - 12 Feb 75 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R-IV(C)

OFFICE OF SECURITY - WORKING PAPERS

A. Contacts with Watergate Figures - Undated - SECRET ✓

B. Support - Undated - SECRET

C. CIA Activity in the United States - Feb 15, 1975 - UNCLASSIFIED

D. Executive Registry - 21 Mar 75 - SECRET SENSITIVE

E. Working Papers File - 20 Mar 75 - UNCLASSIFIED

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

U/R

A. Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 22 Apr 75 SECRET

B. National Security Council Intell. Dir. No. 9, 31 Mar 75 SECRET

C. Memo from Knoche to Roethe - 19 Mar 75

D. Operations Memo No. 192-74 - 23 July 74 - Expansion of DCD-FBI Relationship SECRET

E. Cable - Book Dispatch 9335 - 22 Feb 74 SECRET

Attachment to

F. Cable - Book Dispatch 9335/- 22 Feb 74 SECRET

G. Embassies - Pencil notes

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV(D)

A. Ltr from O'Connor to Belin - 22 May 75

B. U.S. Department of Justice Memo - 29 Apr 75

C. Office of the Attorney General - Memo for Dir, FBI - 14 Sept 67

D. Memo to Dir, FBI from Attorney General - 6 Jan 71

E. Memo to Dir, FBI from John Doar - 15 Sept 67

F. Memo to Dir, FBI from Asst Attorney Gen - 7 Mar 68

G. Memo to Dir, FBI - 25 July 68 CONFIDENTIAL

H. Memo to Dir, FBI - 9 Aug 62

I. Memo to Dir, FBI - 13 Sept 68

J. Memo to Dir, FBI - 20 Nov 68

K. Memo to Dir, FBI - 22 Nov 68

L. Memo to Dir, FBI - 27 Nov 68

M. Memo to Dir, FBI - 9 Dec 68

N. Memo to Dir, FBI - 18 Jan 69

O. Memo to Dir, FBI - 18 Feb 69

P. Memo to Dir, FBI - 3 Mar 69

Q. Memo to Dir, FBI - Campus Disorders - 7 May 69

R. Memo to Dir, FBI - 6 May 69

S. Memo to Dir, FBI - 18 Jun 69

T. Memo to Dir, FBI - 11 June 69

U. Memo to Dir, FBI - June ?

V. Memo to Dir, FBI - Black Panther Party - 18 Sept 69

W. Memo to Dir, FBI - Armadillo May Day Tribe Meetings -- Apr 71

X. Memo to Dir, FBI - "Revolution and Education" by Cleaver - 28 Nov 69

Y. Memo to Dir, FBI - Jan 70

Z. Memo to Dir, FBI, "Weathermen" Riots in Seattle, Wash - Feb 17 70, dtd Feb 19, 1970

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV (E)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Behavioral Activities Branch (TOP SECRET)

B. Memo for Insp. General from Kane - 30 Jan 75 SECRET

C. Memo re civilian employee of U.S. Army Chemical Corps who committed suicide - dtd 29 Jan 75 SECRET

D. M/R - Conversation with CIA employee - 1 Dec 53 SECRET

E. M/R - Subj: Suicide of subject - 28 Nov 53 EYES ONLY

F. Memo for Ins. Gen. - 4 Jan 54 SECRET

G. Memo for Chief, Tech. Services Staff from Allen Dulles, Subj: Unwitting Application of LSD - 10 Feb 54 SECRET

H. Memo to Chief, Tech Ops from Dulles - 10 Feb 54 SECRET

I. Memo to Chief, Chemical Div, from Dulles - 10 Feb 54 SECRET

J. A 29 Jan 75 Memo re civ. employee of U.S. Army Chem. Corps. CONFIDENTIAL

K. DDO Instr. 240-4 - 25 Nov 74 -- Alias U.S. Documentation SECRET

L. Memo for Insp. Gen. from Kane - 26 Mar 75 SECRET

M. St Probe No. 279 809/ Phase II No. 6

N. St. Probe No. 279/ 809/Phase II No. 5

O. St Probe No. 279 809/Phase II No. 3

P. Memo to Deputy Chief, Support Div. undated - Purchase Of Office Equipment.

Q. Memo to Deputy Chief, Support Div. undated - Operational Camera and Lens.

R. Memo from Joseph F. Langan - 1 July 63 SECRET

S. St Probe No. 279 809/Phase II No. II

T. St Probe No. 279 809/ Phase II No. 1

U. St Probe No. 279 809/8

V. St Probe - No. 279 809/V

W. Memo from Langan - 3 Jan 63

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted] [redacted]

O/R-IV(F)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Project Merrimack - 26 Sept 67.

B. Identification - Project Merrimac. CONFIDENTIAL

C. Memo dates - Meeting Dates, etc.

D. Memo for Dir. of Security - 7 Apr 67

E. Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 2 Mar 67 SECRET

F. Contact Report No. 24

G. Memo to Chief, Spec. Activities Div - 8 May 67

H. Memo to Chief, Spec. Projects Div - 16 May 67

I. Memo to Dir of Ops, Home Office - 10 Aug 67

J. Tab 3 (1 page only)

K. FBI Checks on Members of the News Media - 7 Aug 68

L. Memo for the Record - Subj: Iden 26 Passport Iden 27 Iden 28
23 Oct 1967 SECRET EYES ONLY

M. Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 11 Oct 67

N. Project Merrimack - File No. 504 991 - 24 Apr 67 SECRET

O. M/R - Subj: Iden 44 and Iden 45 Merrimack Operations
31 Jan 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

P. M/R - 4 Sept 68 SECRET

Q. Memo for DD/IOS - 27 Mar 68

R. Iden 50 - Double Space Memo - SECRET EYES ONLY

S. To General Manager, Arlington - SUBJ: MERRIMACK - Sept 18, 1968

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[redacted] [redacted]

0/2-IV (G)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Memo for Insp. General - 11 Apr 75 SECRET

B. M/R - Subj: Richard Vincent Allen # 133130 - 14 Nov 68 SECRET

C. Memo for Chief, CI Staff - 23 Aug 68 SECRET

D. Memo for Chief, Office of Security/OSD - Subj: Request for Appropriate Clearance for Richard Vincent ALLEN - 27 Mar 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

E. Memo for Chief, Office of Security/OSD - 27 Mar 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

F. Official Routing Slip to Mr. Breckinridge - 5 May 75

G. Memo for Insp. General (Subj: Alleged Illegal Domestic Activities - Richard V. Allen) - 11 Apr 75 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[redacted] [redacted]

O/R - IV (~~G~~ H)

A - Memo from CIA from Sheffield Edwards re Arthur M. Thurston - no date. CONFIDENTIAL

B.- Addresses for State Police CONFIDENTIAL

C - Memo to Security Officer, CIA - 8 Mar 51 SECRET

D - M/R - Subj: Police Assistance Program - 15 Mar 51 SECRET

E - Memo to Chief, Special Security Div - 27 Nov 51 CONFIDENTIAL

F - Memo to Chief, Special Security Div. - 21 Mar 51 CONFIDENTIAL

G - Memo for Record by David H. Chirstensen - 2 Apr 51 SECRET

H - Memo for Record - 19 Apr 51 SECRET

I - Memo for Record - SPIA Project - 9 Apr 51 SECRET

J - Memo for Col Edwards - 5 May 51 CONFIDENTIAL

K.-Memo to Chief, Ops - SSD - 19 Oct 51

L.- Memo to File - 1953 - CONFIDENTIAL

M - Memo for Chief, Investigative Branch - 22 Aug 55 SECRET

N - Memo to Dir of Security - 15 Sept 54 SECRET

O - Memo for Chief, Correspondents and Records Br - 5 Dec 56 SECRET

P - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 14 Dec 56 - SECRET

Q - Participating State Police Organization - List SECRET

R - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 3 July 57 - SECRET

S - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 12 Dec 57 SECRET

T - List of Participating State Police Organizations SECRET

U - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 3 Dec 58 SECRET

V - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 9 Dec 59 SECRET

W - Memo - Subj: State Police Assistance Program - 6 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV(F)

Ltr from Olsen to Knoche - 30 Apr 75

Highlights of Civil Disturbances and Other Disorders in U.S. (1967-1972)

"Dissident Activity - Jan 1966 through Jan 73"

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV (-)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. M/R - Subj: Defector - 18 Feb 75 SECRET

B - Memo for Deputy Chief, Security Research Staff, OS - 1 Nov 71 SECRET

C - M/R - Subj: #49287 - 27 Oct 71 SECRET

D - Subj: (?) and IDEN 2 (Soviet Defector) - 20 Oct 71 SECRET

E - Memo for Deputy Dir for Support - 17 Nov 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

F - Surveillance Van SECRET

G - Memo for Neil Ainslie, OIG - 13 May 75 CONFIDENTIAL

H - Letter from Knoche to Roethe - 16 May 75 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

0/R - IV (L)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Memo for General Counsel from Dir of Security - 4 Apr 75
SECRET

B. Memo for Inspector General, Subj: Equipment Loaned to Police Departments and Other U.S. Govt Agencies - 22 Apr 74 CONFIDENTIAL

C. Training Afforded Police in Surreptitious Entry and Electronic Surveillance

D. Memo for Deputy Dir, Ops, Adm, Science & Tech. - Subj: Agency Training of Police - OGC 75-1199 - 31 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

E. Memo - 28 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

F. Memo for Deputy Dir, Ops; Admin; Science & Tech.
Subj: Agency Training of Police - 1 Apr 75

G. To TSD/COP ; From C/TSD/TB - 10 June 69

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible] CONFIDENTI

A - Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 14 May 75 SECRET

B - M/R - Subj: Projects JETTISON and MAGNET - 1 May 75 SECRET

C - Project JETTISON -SECRET EYES ONLY

D - Project MAGNET - SECRET EYES ONLY

E.- Memo for Dir of Security - Subj: Questionable Activities - 4 Oct 73
SECRET EYES ONLY

F - Memo - Subj: Projects SIESTA, BUTANE, REDFACE SECRET EYES ONLY

G - Memo - Subj: Project MOCKINGBIRD, Project CELOTEX I and
CELOTEX II - SECRET - EYES ONLY

H - Memo for Acting Chief, Security Support Div - 23 Aug 73 SECRET EYES ON

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV (P)

A - Polygraph Support Related to Leaks of Classified Information.
SECRET

B - Memo for Dir. of Security - 21 Feb 70 SECRET

C - Policy of the Central Intelligence Agency Regarding the Use of the Polygraph in Operational Cases. SECRET

D - Polygraph Connection with Iden 1 County Sheriff's Office SECRET

E - DD/S&T Project Action SECRET

F - Request to Procurement Div for Services

G - Memo for Deputy Dir for Science and Technology - ORD-2792-66

H - Research Proposal

I - Work Statement

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

012-IV(a)

CONFIDENTIAL

A - Project KITTEN - CONFIDENTIAL

B - M/R - Subj: Support to Iden 1. - 15 Sept 72 SECRET

C - Cable Re Iden 9 - 15 Sept 72 SECRET

D - Ltr from Gentile to Osborn - 25 Sept 72 CONFIDENTIAL

E - Routing and Record Sheet from Osborn - 4 Oct 72 SECRET

F - Memo for Mr. Gentile from Osborn - 3 Oct 72 SECRET

G - Ltr from Gentile to Osborn - Oct 3, 1972 SECRET

H - Ltr from ? to Iden 32 - 15 Dec 72

I - Memo for Iden 32 - 15 Dec 72

J - Memo - Project Kitten - 18 Mar 74

K - Memo for Hqs - 8 Aug 73

L - Memo for Exec Secy, CIA Management Cmt - Subj: Protective Security for Iden 1's Children - 6 Jun 72 SECRET SENSITIVE

M - Tab 7 - stating personnel assigned to Project Kitten are listed (no list attached).

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[redacted] O/R-IV(R) [redacted]

A - Soviet Defector SECRET

B - M/R - Discussion with Deputy Attorney General on Iden 1 Case - 2 Apr 64
SECRET EYES ONLY

C - Memo for Dir, Security - 3 Apr 64 SECRET

D - Memo - Subj: Iden 1 - Jan 75

E - Memo from Dept of Justice to Mr. Helms - 20 Oct 69 SECRET

F - Ltr to Mr. Raymond Farrell - Justice, Subj: Iden 1 - 9 Oct 69 SECRET

G - Ltr from Bartos to Deputy Dir of Security - 24 July 69 SECRET

H - Ltr to Mr. Farrell - 18 Jul 69 - SECRET

I - Memo to Mr. Bundy - 11 Feb 54 - TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

J - Memo for U.S. Intell Board Members - 12 Feb 61 TOP SECRET EYES ONLY

K - Memo for Acting Chief, Support Branch - 12 May 64

L - Memo for Spec Agent in Charge - 10 July 64

M - Memo for Hqs from Iden 16 - 1 July 64

N - Emergency Instructions

O - Memo for Record - 5 Aug 67 SECRET

P. Memo on Briefing of Key Cong. Contacts on Iden 1 Case SECRET EYES ONLY

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/K IV (2)

IDENTIAL

A - Routing and Record Sheet - 6 Apr 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

B - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - Subj: Project MERRIMACK dtd 6 Apr 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

C - Project Resistance - CONFIDENTIAL

D - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - Subj: Project RESISTANCE - 8 Jan 71

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

0/K-14(1)

CONFIDENTIAL

A - M/R - Subj: Iden 1 # 3709 - 4 Feb 75 SECRET

B - CIA Official Routing Slip - To Iden 6 - 12/13/61 SECRET attaching
Memo for Chief, SRS - Subj: Iden 1 - 12 Dec 61 SECRET EYES ONLY

C - Report of Investigation - 28 Apr 61

D - Memo for Chief, Investigative Div, Subj: Iden 1 - 26 Apr 61

E - Memo for Chief, Investigative Div, 26 Apr 61

F - Report of Investigation - 17 Feb 61

G - Memo on Case No. 240303 - 17 Feb 61

H - Memo on Iden 4

I - Memo for Chief of Ops, DD/P - Subj: Iden 1 - 23 July 61
SECRET EYES ONLY

J - Routing Slip to DC/SRS - 11 Feb 66 SECRET

[illegible] - Memo - Interesting Cases - Spec. Activities Ops Br, SRS
Re - Iden 1 -- 11 Feb 66 SECRET

[illegible]NFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

A. - Project ZULU SECRET

B - Transmittal Slip - 25 Aug 64 EYES ONLY

C - Memo for General Carter - 25 Aug 64 SECRET

D - Routing Slip to DD/S - 9 Nov 64 EYES ONLY

E - Memo for Acting Dir of CI - 5 Nov 64 SECRET

F.- Routing Slip to Deputy Dir for Support - 16 Sept 64 SECRET

G - Routing Slip to Dir of Security - 24 Sept 64 SECRET

H - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 23 Dec 64 SECRET

I - Memo for the File - Subj: Iden 1 - dtd 11 Feb 65 SECRET

J - Memo to Iden 3 - Feb 65

K.- Memo for Dep Chief, OSD - Subj: Iden 1 - 12 Feb 65 SECRET

L - Memo for Dir of Security - 29 Sept 64 SECRET

M - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 15 Feb 65 SECRET

N - Tabs K thru P - detailed account of daily surveillance activities.

O - Memo to Chief, Support Div - Removal of Tech Devices - 20 Apr 65

P - Memo for File - Subj: Iden 1 - 31 Mar 65 SECRET

Q - Report of Investigation - 12 May 65

R - Memo - 12 May 65

S - M/R - Subj: Iden 1 SECRET

T - M/R - 30 Apr 65

U - M/R - 9 Apr 65

V - Memo to Iden 101 - 13 Apr 65

W - M/R 4 June 65 SECRET

X - Memo for Dir of Security - 22 July 65 SECRET

Y - Memo to Iden 101 - 23 Aug 65

Z - Routing Slip to D/S Undated

a - Memo for Dir of Security - 1952 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from G R Ford Library

[redacted]

O/R - IV (W)

CI [redacted]

CONFIDENTIAL

A - Project BUTANE

B - Official Routing Slip - to Director - 16 Mar 72

C - Memo to DCI from AMT.

D - Memo for The Director - 16 Mar 72.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R IV (X)

CONFIDENTIAL

A - Project REDFACE I (SECRET)

B - M/R - REDFACE II - 2 Apr 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

C - Memo for Inspector General - Subj: REDFACE I - 3 Jan 75 SECRET

D - GSA - Space Assignment Record

E - REDFACE I - Undated SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

ok IV(1)

A - Project SIESTA (SECRET)

B - Project SIESTA - Logs for Phase I

C - Cable to SAC WFO from HDQS - Subj: Iden 1 - 22 Feb 71 EYES ONLY

D - Memo to Iden 1 from Iden 5 - 7 Jan 75

E - M/R - Iden 1 - 17 Mar 70

F - M/R - 22 Apr 70 SECRET

G - Routing Slip - To C/SAOB/SRS - 9 Jun 70 SECRET

H - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 9 June 70 SECRET

I - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 9 June 70 SECRET

J - Routing Slip to C/SAOS/SRS

K - M/R - 17 July 70 SECRET

L - Memo for The Director, FBI - 4 Aug 70 SECRET

M - Memo to Director, CIA - 14 Aug 70 SECRET

N - Cable to SAC WFO from HDQS - 21 Jan 71 SAC/EYES ONLY

O - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 2 Jan 75 SECRET

P - Memo for Deputy Chief, Security Analysis Gp - 2 Jan 75 SECRET

Q - Memo for The Director, FBI - undated - SECRET

R - Routing Slip - DD/PSI - 9/21-73

S - Memo to DD/PSI - 21 Sept 73 SECRET

T - Memo for Chief, Clearance Div - 19 Sept 73 SECRET

U - Routing Slip to Chief, OSD - 13 Apr

V - Memo - Subj: SIESTA - # 521366 -- 13 Apr 71 SECRET

W - Cable to SACWFO

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV(2)

CONFIDENTIAL

A - Project PARAGON SECRET

B - Project PARAGON (Amendment to the Operation) CONFIDENTIAL

C - M/R - 14 Jun 71 SECRET SENSITIVE

D - M/R - Iden 9 - 16 Jun 71 SECRET

E - Memo for Dir of Security - 13 July 71 SECRET SENSITIVE

F - Memo - Subj: Iden 6; Iden 7, Undated SECRET SENSITIVE

G - M/R - PARAGON Case - 24 Aug 72 SECRET

H - Memo for The Acting Dir, FBI - 18 Aug 72 SECRET

I - M/R - 28 Aug 72 SECRET

J - Routing and Record Slip - 1 Feb 73 SECRET

K - Cy of Document Receipt - 5 Feb 73 Stamped SECRET

L - Memo for The Acting Dir, FBI - from Osborn - 2 Feb 73 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

u/r

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Operation BOOTS (CONFIDENTIAL)

B. Routing and Record Sheet to DD/S from Osborn - SECRET

C. Memo for Exec. Dir-Comptroller - 19 Feb 66 SECRET EYES ONLY

D. M/R - 20 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

E. Memo-for Dir. of Security - 13 Nov 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

F. Routing Slip - 7 Nov 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

G. Memo for Hqs - Subj: Iden 53 - 15 Nov 67

H - Memo to Iden 20 - Subj: Info Concerning Mail Matter OFFICIAL USE

I. Memo to The Record, undated - SECRET EYES ONLY

J. Memo for the Record - 30 Jan 68

K. Memo for Dir. of Security - 26 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

L. Memo for The Record - 23 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

M. Memo for Dir. of Security - 6 Dec 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

N. Routing and Record Sheet - 25 July 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

O. M/R - Subj: Boots - Phase II - 6/11/68

P. Iden 42, Iden 43, Iden 16, Iden 32, and Iden 44 6/27
Handwritten page.

Q. Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 18 Feb 69

R. Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 30 Apr 69 SECRET

S. M/R - Subj: Iden 1 - 31 Dec 68 CONFIDENTIAL

T. Interview Report - Iden 1

U. Memo for Special Agent in Charge, Wash. Field Office, Subj:
Iden 1 - 10 July 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[redacted] [redacted]

O/R-IV (B3)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Operation PINEAPPLE (SECRET)

B. Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 23 Oct 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

C. M/R - 26 Aug 71 SECRET

D - Memo for Dir of Personnel - Subj: Iden 1 - 16 Aug 71 SECRET

E - Routing and Record Sheet - from Iden 15 - Subj Iden 1

F - Operation PINEAPPLE - Oct 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

G - Memo for Chief, Personnel Security Div - 9 Dec 69 - CONFIDENTIAL

H - Memo for the File - 27 Mar 69 SECRET

I - Special Clearance and/or Billet Approval - 21 July 67

J Report of Investigation - 28 Aug 69 - PRIORITY

K - Cable - To SAC SFFC - 26 June 69

L - Memo - 23 Apr 69 with General Info - At Washington, D.C. and vicinity. Subj: Iden 1.

M - Support Branch Report - Subj: Iden 1 - 2 Apr 69

N - Routing and Record Sheet - from Iden 42 - Subj: Iden 1 - 9/24/69

O - Memo to Chief, Physical Security Div/OS - 22 Aug 69 CONFIDENTIAL

P - Memo for Chief, Personnel Security Div - Subj: Iden 1 Request for Firearms/FAA Credential

Q - Operation PINEAPPLE. CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R-1V(CCY

CONFIDENTIAL

A - Memo for Record - Subj: Iden 1 - 3 Feb 75 SECRET

B - Report of Investigation - 5 Jan 60

C - Report of Investigation - 22 Dec 59

D - Report of Investigation - 21 July 1960

E - Memo for Chief, Investigative Div - 27 Jan 60

F - Report of Investigation - 16 Nov 59

G - Memo for Chief, Security Support Div. - 19 July 60. SECRET

H - Memo - 25 July 1960 - SECRET

I - Memo for Chief, Postal Inspector - 22 July 1960

J - Memo for Special Agent in Charge, San Francisco Field Office,
3 Feb 1961

K - Memo for Spec. Agent in Charge, San Francisco Field Office, 8 Feb 61

L - Cable to SAC SFFO - from Chief Invest Div

M - Memo for Iden 29 - 24 Aug 59 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[redacted]

O/R-IV (DD)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Project PYRAMID (SECRET)

B. M/R - Subj: Iden 1 - 29 July 68 SECRET

C. Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 17 Sept 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

D - M/R - Subj: Offense - 16 Oct 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

E - Routing and Record Sheet - to DDS/IOS - 28 May 69.

F - Memo for Dir of Security - 28 May 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

G - Memo for Dir of General Intelligence - 14 July 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

H - Memo for Dir of General Intell. - SECRET EYES ONLY

I - Routing and Record Slip - to Exec Dir-Comptroller

J - Memo for Dir of Central Intell. - 8 Sept 1971 SECRET EYES ONLY

K - Memo - Subj: Iden 2 SECRET

L - Memo - Subj: Project Pyramid - -8 June 197 ??

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

0/R - 1W(PP)

CONFIDENTIAL

A. Project MOCKINGBIRD (SECRET)

B. Listing of Project Mockingbird - Background, etc. SECRET EYES ONLY

C. Transmittel Slip - 1 Nov 61 to Mr. Bannerman

D. Memo - Subj: Salient Facts Concerning an Article by Iden 1 - 29 Nov 61 SECRET

E. Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 6 Nov 61 SECRET

F. M/R - Subj: Articles by Iden 1 and Iden 2 - SECRET

G. M/R - Article by Iden 1 and Iden 2 - 29 Dec 61 SECRET EYES ONLY

H. Memo for Dir of CI SECRET

I. M/R - Subj: Iden 2 - 26 Feb 62 SECRET

J. Memo for Dir of Security - Subj: Iden 50, White House - 3 Nov 64 SECRET EYES ONLY.

K. Memo - Subj: Iden 50 SECRET EYES ONLY

L. M/R - Subj: Mockingbird - 24 May 63.

M. Memo for Dir of CI ; from Bannerman - 30 Mar 64 - SECRET EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R - IV (GG)

SECRET

A. Project MUDHEN SECRET

B. Memo for The Director from Osborn - 27 Apr 72

C. Memo - Subj: Iden 11 SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/Z IV (HH)

A. Project CELOTEX I SECRET

B. Note about Memo for Dir of Security to the DCI, dtd 12 Feb 71

C. Routing Slip to C/SB/OSD - 10/4/71

D. Memo for Record - 7 Feb 71 SECRET

E. Memo for The Director - 27 June 72

F - Memo from Office of Security, Dept of State to "Oz" - 6/23/72

G - Memo to State - Mr. Gentile - 23 June 72 Official Use Only

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

0/2 IV (II)

A. Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 May 75 SECRET

B. M/R - Subj: AGEE, Philip Burnett Franklin # 133 368 - 25 Mar 75 SECRET

C. Memo for Asst Deputy Dir of Security (PS) - 5 June 72 SECRET

D. Routing Slip - To Asst DDS/PS - 6/6/72

E. Memo for The Acting Dir, FBI - 8 June 72 SECRET

F. M/R - 1 Apr 75 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible] KK

A - Pencil or ink statements

B - 444 Federal Reporter, 2d Series - July 17, 1946

C - The Record of the Assn. of the Bar of the City of New York December 1974

D - Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 5 Apr 75

E - Ltr fr Knoche to Belin - 21 Mar 75 SECRET

F - Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 8 Apr 75

G - Memo for DD/PSI from Meehan with attached pencil notes

H - Ltr from Keeney to Kline - Re: U.S. v. Ehrlichman - 9 May 75

I - National Security Council Intell. Dir. No. 1 - SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 23 Apr 75 SECRET

B - Memo for Knoche from Inspector General - 22 Apr 75 SECRET

C - Pencil Note

D - M/R - Subj: Check of Executive Registry Files - 4 Apr 75, s/Clapper
SECRET/SENSITIVE

E - M/R - Subj: Spot check of Executive Registry files - 27 Mar 75 s/Clapper

F - Memo for Ermal P. Geiss - 18 May 1966 SECRET

G - Memo for Roethe - 31 Mar 75

H - Memo - Subj: Holtzman Amendment to the IEAA SECRET EYES ONLY

I - Memo to Inspector General - 8/6/73

J - Memo for Colby - 30 July 73

K - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 18 Mar 75

L - Memo - Subj: State Police Assistance Program - 6 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

M - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 18 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

N - Pencil notes.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - [illegible]

O/Z IV (MH

B - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 23 Apr 75

C - Ltr from Colby to Lynn - 1 Apr 75

D - Routing and Record Sheet - 28 Mar 75.

E - Ltr from Colby to Saxbe - 24 Apr 74

F - Ltr from Colby to Saxbe - 17 Sep 74

G - A Bill to Amend the National Security Act of 1947 - 4 Mar 75

H - Ltr from Maroney to Morrison - Mar 27, 1975

I - Ltr from Colby to Saxbe - 22 Jan 74

J - Ltr from Colby to Ash - 14 Jan 74

K - Ltr from Colby to Lynn - 23 Apr 75

L - A Bill, To amend the National Security Act of 1947 -

M - Sectional Analysis and Explanation

N - Changes in Existing Law - National Security Act of 1947

O - Ltr from Colby to Rockefeller - Undated

P - Ltr from Colby to Albert - Undated

Q - Cost Analysis

R - 94th Congress - S.1 - 15 Jan 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CIZ IV 106.

A - Memo from Knoche to Roethe - 2 May 75

B - Memo for Dir. of Security - 16 Jan 70 SECRET

C - Routing Slip to ADDS/IDS and others - 1/22 SECRET

D - Transmittal Slip - to Chief, OSD - 20 Jan 70 CONFIDENTIAL

E - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - Undated SECRET

F - Memo for Dir of Security - 30 Apr 70 CONFIDENTIAL

G - Participants in Police Liaison Seminar - 16-17 May 70 CONFIDENTIAL

H - Memo for Hqs - 22 July 70 ADMINISTRATIVE

I - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 26 May 70 CONFIDENTIAL

J - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 21 Aug 70 SECRET

K - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 31 July 70 SECRET

L - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 27 Aug 70 CONFIDENTIAL

M - Routing Slip to Acting Dir of Security - 27 Aug 70 SECRET

N - Memo for Acting Dir of Security - 27 Aug 70 SECRET

O - Cable to SAC WFO - from HDQS - 12 Aug 70 CONFIDENTIAL

P - Memo for Hqs - 16 Sept 70 CONFIDENTIAL

Q - Cable to SAC WFO - Subj: Liaison with Municipal Agencies - 19 Mar 71 CONFIDENTIAL

R - Cable to SAC CFO - Subj: Trace Metal Detection Technique 18 Jan 72 CONFIDENTIAL

S - Cable to HDQS - 12 Aug 70 CONFIDENTIAL

T - Cable to SAC LAFO - 12 Aug 70 CONFIDENTIAL

U - Cable to SAC WFO - 1 Sept 70 CONFIDENTIAL

V - Memo for Special Agent in Charge 1 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

W - # 556-005-013 GENERAL At San Juan, Puerto Rico CONFIDENTIAL

X - Cable to Hdqs - 9 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

Y - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 1 Apr 71 SECRET

Z - Memo for The Honorable John Mitchell - (Draft) CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

a. Memo for Dir. of Security - 1 Apr 71 SECRET

b. Memo for Dir of Security - 6 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

c. Ltr from Osborn to Purdy - 6 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

d. Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 6 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

e. Memo for Hqs - 19 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

f. Report of Investigation - 19 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL
at Washington, D.C.

g. # 556 005 - 019 / — 19 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

h. Cable to Hdqs from SAC NYFO - 20 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

i. # 556 005 - 019 at Los Angeles, Calif - 29 Apr 71 CONFIDENTIAL

j. Transmittal Slip - 5/7/71 CONFIDENTIAL

k. Memo for Hqs - L.A. Field Office - 5 May 71 CONFIDENTIAL

l. Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div CONFIDENTIAL

m. Cable to Hdqs - 27 May 71 CONFIDENTIAL

n. Report of Investigation - 12 May 71 CONFIDENTIAL

o. # 556-005-020 General at Washington, D.C. - dtd 12 May 71 CONFIDENTI

p. Memo for Chief, Support Br, OSD - 21 May 71 SECRET

q. Cable to SAC WFO - 19 Aug 71 CONFIDENTIAL

r. Cable to SACNYFO - 25 Aug 71 CONFIDENTIAL

s. Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 14 Oct 71 CONFIDENTIAL

t. Memo for Dr. Hansen - 9 Dec 71 SECRET

u. Routing Slip to Mr. Iden -1 28 Oct

v. Routing Slip to C/SRS - 10/22/71 CONFIDENTIAL

w. Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 18 Oct 71 CONFIDENTIAL

x. Memo for Hqs - 9 Nov 71 CONFIDENTIAL

y. Memo for Hqs - 9 Nov 71 CONFIDENTIAL

z. Memo for Dir of Security - from Gaynor - 5 Nov 71 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

aa. Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 9 Nov 71 SECRET

bb. Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 23 Nov 71 SECRET

cc. Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 14 Jan 72 SECRET

dd. Cable to SAC LAFO CONFIDENTIAL

ee. Cable to Hqs - 15 Feb 72 CONFIDENTIAL

ff. Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 27 Jan 72 CONFIDENTIAL

gg. Memo for Hqs - Miami Field Office - 24 Feb 72 CONFIDENTIAL

hh. Cable to SAC MFO - 30 Mar 72 CONFIDENTIAL

ii. Cable to SACWFO - 3 Feb 72 CONFIDENTIAL

jj. M/R - 9 Feb 72 CONFIDENTIAL

kk. Memo for Hqs - Boston Field Office - 20 Mar 72 CONFIDENTIAL

ll. Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 3 Feb 72 SECRET

mm. Memo for Dir of Security - 16 Feb 72 SECRET

nn. Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 17 Apr 72 SECRET

oo. Memo for Special Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office -
Undated CONFIDENTIAL

pp. Memo for Hqs fr N.Y. Field Office - 17 Oct 72 CONFIDENTIAL

qq. Memo for Hqs - fr Wash Field Office - 6 Feb 73 CONFIDENTIAL

rr. Cable to Hdqs - from SACWFO - 22 Feb 73 CONFIDENTIAL

ss. Cable to SACWFO - 10 Nov 72 CONFIDENTIAL

tt. Routing Slip to D/S - 27 Jul 72 CONFIDENTIAL

uu. Memo for Hqs - L.A. Field Office - 28 July 72 CONFIDENTIAL

vv. M/R - dtd 13 Dec 72 CONFIDENTIAL

ww. M/R - 13 Dec 72 CONFIDENTIAL

xx. Memo for Deputy Dir for Support - Subj: Blocked License Plates - Flori
dtd 20 Dec 72 CONFIDENTIAL

yy. M/R - Subj: Fla. Blocked License Plates from Coffey - 12 Jan 73

zz. Memo for Chief, OSD - 6 Feb 73 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AA. - Cable - 14 Feb 73 CONFIDENTIAL

BB - Cable - 28 Feb 73 CONFIDENTIAL

CC - # 556 005-072 - General at San Francisco, Calif. CONFIDENTIAL

DD - Cable - 26 Mar 73 CONFIDENTIAL

EE - Cable to SAC/WFO (no date listed) CONFIDENTIAL

FF - Cable - 12 Apr 73 CONFIDENTIAL

GG - Routing Slip - to Dir of Security - 5 Mar 73 - SECRET

HH - Memo for Dir of Security - 5 Mar 73 SECRET

II - Ltr to Schlesinger from Comptroller General - 30 May 73 - CONFIDENTIA

JJ - # 556 005-052 General - At Washington, D.C. and vicinity -
dated 22 May 72. CONFIDENTIAL

KK - Memo for Hqs from Klipa - re Retirement of Mr. Herman S. Cole
- dtd 7 Feb 72. CONFIDENTIAL

LL - Routing Slip - To DD/IOS - 7/17/72 CONFIDENTIAL

MM - Operational Photography Course - 7/17/72 CONFIDENTIAL

NN - Surveillance Training Course - 7/24/72 CONFIDENTIAL

OO - M/R - 8 Aug 72 CONFIDENTIAL

PP - Memo for Acting Dir of Security - 10 July 72 CONFIDENTIAL

QQ - Cable to SAC WFO - 11 July 72 CONFIDENTIAL

RR - Cable - 14 July 72 CONFIDENTIAL

SS - Memo for Mr. Earl Harter - 19 May 72

TT - Memo for Dir of Security - 25 Apr 72 CONFIDENTIAL

UU - Memo for Dir of Security - 30 May 72 SECRET

VV - Routing Slip - To Identity - 1 CONFIDENTIAL

WW - Montgomery County Students CONFIDENTIAL

XX - Prince George's County (Locks & Picks) etc. CONFIDENTIAL

YY - Fairfax County (Locks & Picks) etc. CONFIDENTIAL

ZZ - Arlington County (Locks & Picks) CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Aa - Metropolitan Police Department (Locks & Picks) etc. CONFIDENTIAL

Bb - M/R - Police Locksmithing Course - 29 June 72 SECRET

Cc - ~~Memo~~ Memo for Dir of Security - Police Liaison Locksmithing Training - 5 June 72 CONFIDENTIAL

Dd - Memo for Acting Dir of Security - 15 Aug 72 SECRET

Ee - Ltr from Keogh to Colby - Aug 10, 1973

Ff - Training Schedule - Oct to Dec 68 CONFIDENTIAL

Gg - Project POLE CONFIDENTIAL (Gen. Audio Briefing)

Hh - Special Training Schedule CONFIDENTIAL

Ii - POLE - (Photographic Training) CONFIDENTIAL

Jj - Project POLE (Surreptitious Entry Planning) CONFIDENTIAL

Kk - Training Schedule - 1968 CONFIDENTIAL

Ll - Memo for Chief/SSD/PSI - 12 Dec 73 CONFIDENTIAL

Mm - Memo for AC/SSD - Identity - 1 - 12/14/73 CONFIDENTIAL

Nn - Support to Metropolitan Police Dept during Demonstrations CONFIDENTIA

Oo - Cable to Hdqs from SAC CFO - 7 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Pp - Cable to Hqs - 7 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Qq - Cable to Hdqs - 6 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Rr - Memo for Hqs - 6 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Ss - Cable to Hqs - 5 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Tt - Cable to Hdqs - 6 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Uu - Cable from Hqs to SAC RFO - CONFIDENTIAL

Vv - Memo for Chief SRS - 9 Feb 70 SECRET

Ww - M/R - Borrowing of Equipment from Federal Agencies - 5 Feb 74 CONFIDENT

Xx - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 11 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

Yy - Equipment Lists and To Whom Loaned - CONFIDENTIAL

Zz - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Br - 28 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AAA - Memo for DD/PTOS - 13 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

BBB - Memo for Dir of Security - 15 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

CCC - Equipment Furnished Police Departments CONFIDENTIAL

DDD - Equipment Furnished Other U.S. Govt Agencies CONFIDENTIAL

EEE - Memo for DD/PTOS - 13 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

FFF - Memo for Hqs - Subj: WFO Police Contacts - 1 Mar 74 CONFIDENTIAL

GGG - M/R - 28 Feb 74 SECRET

HHH - M/R - Identity-1 - 13 Mar 74 SECRET

III - List - Police Liaison CONFIDENTIAL

JJJ - Memo for Deputy Dir. of Security - 12 Dec 73 SECRET

KKK - Lists of Equipment Loan CONFIDENTIAL

LLL - Memo for Deputy Dir. for Support - 8 Feb 73 CONFIDENTIAL

MMM - Memo for Deputy Dir for Admin. - 23 Sept 74

NNN - Relationship with Police - 21 Jan 75 CONFIDENTIAL

OOO - Ltr from Maury to Koch - 29 Jan 73 CONFIDENTIAL

PPP - Memo for Legislative Counsel - Police Training CONFIDENTIAL

QQQ - Memo for Dir. of Security - 15 Feb 74 CONFIDENTIAL

RRR - Equipment Furnished Police Departments CONFIDENTIAL

SSS - Lists of Equipment CONFIDENTIAL

TTT - Memo for Deputy Dir. for PSI - CONFIDENTIAL

UUU - Memo for Inspector General - 14 Feb 75 SECRET

VVV - Relationship with Police CONFIDENTIAL

WWW - Surveillance on Behalf of the Metropolitan Police Department
CONFIDENTIAL

XXX - Memo for Inspector General CONFIDENTIAL

YYY - Relationship with Police CONFIDENTIAL

ZZZ - Memo for Deputy Dir. for Administration SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AAAA - Memo for Deputy Director for Admin. - SECRET

BBBB - Memo for Deputy Dir. for Management and Services
Subj: Soviet Bloc Div Request for Training Assistance Involving Police Participation. SECRET EYES ONLY

CCCC - Scenario Identity - 1 Exercise SECRET EYES ONLY

DDDD - Project Identify - 1 CONFIDENTIAL

EEEE - Memo on Project Identity-1 fr Chief,SSD to DDS/PSI - 10 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

FFFF - Memo for Dir of Central Intell. - 18 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

GGGG - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - Use of Police Badges Project IDENTITY-1 10 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

HHHH - Memo - IDENTITY-1 from IDENTITY-2 CONFIDENTIAL

IIII - Training Afforded Police in Surreptitious Entry and Electronic Surveillance CONFIDENTIAL

JJJJ - Cable to Hdqs from SAC SFFO - 3 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

KKKK - Cable to Hdqs from SACLAFO - 4 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Domestic Surveillance Master Summary - 13 May 75 SECRET

B - M/R - Domestic Surveillance Master Summary - 12 May 75 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

01Z III (99)

A - Ltr from Knoche to Olsen - 8 May 75 SECRET

B - Summary and Analysis of Domestic Surveillance 8 May 75 SECRET

C - Selected Analysis of Domestic Surveillance Cases
SECRET/SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo from Knoche to Koethe - 5 Apr 75 O/K IV (11)

B - Surveillances of Jack Anderson and Michael Getler - TOP SECRET COMINT

C - Memo for Members of the Security Committee from Sherry - 7 Mar 72 SECRET

D - Memo for Chairman, Security Committee, USIB - 3 Mar 72 COMINT

E - Report of Security Committee Working Group on Subj: Recent Public Disclosures of Classified Information by Mr. Jack Anderson - 29 Feb 72 COMINT

F - Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - 22 Dec 71 SECRET

G - Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - 27 Dec 71 SECRET

H - Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - 4 Jan 72 SECRET

I - Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - 29 Jan 74 - SECRET

J - Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - date not legible - SECRET

K - Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans - 11 Jan 72 SECRET

L - DDI Report of Leak of Intell. Info. to the Public Info. Media. - SC No. 02800/71 - TOP SECRET COMINT

M - Memo for Record - 7 Feb 71 SECRET

N - Quotes of Anderson Articles - Dated 17, 21, 24, 28 Dec 71 SECRET

O - Quotes of Anderson Article - Dated 19 Dec 71 SECRET

P - Quotes of Anderson Article - Dated 4 Jan 72 SECRET

Q - Quotes of Anderson Article - Dated 10 Jan 72 - TOP SECRET COMINT

R - Jack Anderson Reads from Secret CIA Cables to White House "Brandt-Pompidou Meeting" 11 Jan 72 SECRET

S - Quotes of Anderson Article - 14 Jan 72 SECRET

T - Quotes of Anderson Article - 18 Jan 72 TOP SECRET COMINT

U - Quotes of Anderson Article - 23 Jan 72 SECRET

V - Routing Slip to Deputy Dir for Admin. - 20 Mar 75 20 Mar 75

5 Feb 71

W - Getler Article/and Source SECRET

X - Getler article - 7 Feb 71 - TOP SECRET

Y - Getler article of 22 Apr 71 TOP SECRET

Z - Getler article - 23 Apr 71 - TOP SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

a - Getler article of 17 June 71 TOP SECRET

b - Getler article of 9 Aug 71 TOP SECRET

c - Getler article - 5 Aug 71 ADMINISTRATIVE MATERIAL USE ONLY

d - Getler article - 6 Aug 71 - SECRET

e - Getler article - 23 Nov 71 SECRET

f - Routing Slip to Ch Ef Staff - 4/30

g - M/R - Jack Anderson article 30 Apr 71 SECRET

h - Memo for Asst to the Director 1 F 08 Hqs - 17 May 71

i - Minutes of One Hundred Thirty-sixth Meeting, US Intell Board Security Committee - 5 Jan 72 SECRET

j - Routing Slip to C/ES - 10 Jan 72 from Sherry - 1/7/72

k - M/R - "Anderson Papers" - 6 Jan 72 SECRET

l - Routing Slip - to Dir of Security - 11 Jan 72

m - Memo for Dir of Security - 10 Jan 72 SECRET

n - Memo for Dir of Security - 10 Jan 72 SECRET

o - Transmittal Slip - 14 Jan 72

p - Memo for CIA Member, Security Committee - 14 Jan 72 SECRET

q - Routing Slip - To - C/ES - 18 Jan 72

r - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 18 Jan 72 SECRET

s - Routing Slip to AC/SSC - 1/21/72

t - Memo for CIA Member, Security Committee - 21 Jan 72 SECRET

u - Routing Slip - To - C/ES - 31 Jan 72

v - Memo for Dir of Central Intelligence - 31 Jan 72 SECRET

w - Anderson article - The Subcontinent: U.S. Tug of War and other clippings from Washington Post

x - M/R - 2 Feb 72 SECRET

y - Memo for Chairman, Security Committee Working Gp on Anderson Leaks - 3 Feb 72 SECRET

z - Memo for CIA Member - 24 Feb 72 CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AA - Memo for CIA Member - 24 Feb 72 CONFIDENTIAL

BB - Memo - 8 Mar 72 TCS-34208-72 SECRET

CC - Memo for Mr. Brody - 21 Mar 75 SECRET

DD - Dir of Central Intell. Dir No. 1/11 - SECRET

EE - Memo for Holders of USIB-D-9.2/35 TOP SECRET

FF - Minutes of One Hundred Twenty-Seventh Meeting SECRET

GG - Memo to File - Surveillance of Newsmen by Roethe - 14 Mar 75

HH - Memo for Mr. Clapper from Jack Mitchell -

II - Paper on Nuclear Threat - Dec 10, 1971

JJ - Paper on India-Pakistan War - 13 Dec 71

KK - Article on Paul Who? 13 Dec 71

LL - Kissinger's Role - 13 Dec 71

MM - Release for 16 Dec 71

NN - Release for 19 Dec 71

OO - Release for 20 Dec 71

PP - Release for Dec 30, 1971

QQ - Release for Dec 31, 1971

RR - Release for 1 Jan 72

SS - Release for Jan 3, 1972

TT - Release for Jan 14, 1972 SECRET SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R IV (uu)

A - Ltr from Knoche to Roethe - 16 May 75

B - Memo for DD/IOS - 27 Mar 68 SECRET

C - Memo for Dir of Security - Undated SECRET EYES ONLY

D - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 10 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

E - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 5 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

F - Memo for Dir of Central Intell. - 8 Jan 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

G - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div. - 3 June 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

H - M/R - dtd 13 Jan 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

I - Memo for Dir of Security - 2 May 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

J - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 8 May 68 SECRET

K - Memo for Director of Security - 9 Mar 68 SECRET

L - Memo for Dir, Central Intell. - 16 Feb 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

M - Memo for Dir. of Security - undated - SECRET EYES ONLY

N - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 10 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

O - Memo for Dir. of Security - 14 Aug 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

P - Memo for Dir. of Security - 2 Mar 67 SECRET

Q - Memo for Dir of Security - 20 Feb 67 SECRET

R - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security (Investigations & Operational Support) -- 20 May 66 SECRET

S - A Project Outline Proposal for a Covert Security Support Activity. 8 Feb 62 SECRET

T - A Proposal for Developing a Deep Cover Investigative and Support Capability for OS/IOS - 16 Nov 60 SECRET

U - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security (Investigations and Operational Support) 22 Mar 65 SECRET

V - A Study - Security Probes and Penetrations in Non-Staff Components of PO Unclassified.

W - Special Information Report - 11 Mar 71 SECRET

X - Memo to Chief, CI/OA - 15 Feb 59 - SECRET

Y - Part of a Secret Document - pages 46, 47, 51, 52, 55, 57, and App F (Resumes of Demonstrations During Fiscal Year 1967 (p. 113, 155, and App I SE

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Z - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - from Hqs - Undated - Subj: Project RESISTANCE # 533 989 I-SB

a - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 17 Dec 70

b - Memo for Special Agent in Charge Miami Field Office - 29 Oct 70 ADMINISTRATIVE

c - Memo for Hqs - from Miami Field Office - 19 Oct 70

d - Cable to Dir, FBI - 20 Mar 70 SECRET (No. 079112)

e - Cable to Dir, CIA 003 - from Dir, FBI - 3-25-70 SECRET

f - Cable to SAC CFO - 17 June 69

g - Memo for Special Agent in Charge Los Angeles Field Office - 11 July 1968 ADMINISTRATIVE

h - M/R - Subj: Project Resistance - 8 Dec 67 SECRET

i - Ltr to Chief, - 10/5/70 - (Attachment "E").

j - Memo to General Manager, Arlington - 15 Aug 68

k - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 5 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

l - Schedule of Projected Expenses for PROJECT CANDLE SECRET EYES ONLY

m - Memo for General Manager, Arlington - 14 Sept 67

n - Memo for Dir. of Security - 12 Sept 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

o - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security (IOS) - 11 Aug 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

P - Memo for General Manager, Arlington - 19 Apr 67 SECRET

q - Memo for General Manager, Arlington - 29 June 67 SECRET

r - Memo for Dir of Security - SECRET

s - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 2 Mar 67 SECRET

t - Memo for General Manager, Arlington - 24 Feb 67 SECRET

u - Memo to Dir of Ops, Home Office - 21 Feb 68 SECRET

v - Memo to Dir of Ops, Home Office - 8 Jan 68 SECRET

w - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div. 27 Dec 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

x - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div. - 15 Nov 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

y - Reply to message - 1967 Oct 19 - ITT World Communications Inc. SECRET EYES ON

z - Project MERRIMACK - 26 Sept 67

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

[illegible] - Memo for General Manager, Arlington - 8 May 67 SECRET

3

BB - M/R - Project MERRIMACK - 24 Apr 67 SECRET

CC - Memo to General Manager, Arlington - Sept 18, 1968 SECRET

DD - Memo to Regional Manager for Physical & Technical Security - East Coast Regional Office - 18 Sept 68

EE - M/R - FBI Checks on Members of the News Media - 7 Aug 68

FF - Routing and Record Sheet - To: Chief, SAD - 6 Aug 68 EYES ONLY SECRET

GG - Memo - PROJECT MERRIMACK - Special Report - 6 Aug 68

HH - Routing and Record Sheet - to DDS/IOS - 23 July 68 SECRET EYES ONLY with attached, undated and unaddressed Memo (00042)

II - Memo re problems of Resurrection City (No. 00043)

JJ - Routing Slip to Chief, SGD - 2 June 68 (00044)

KK - Memo re telephonic call on 24 Jun 68 (No. 00045)

LL - Memo - dtd 21 June 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

MM - Memo - dtd 19 June 68 (No. 00047)

NN - Memo dtd 6/17 - Zerox of written Memo - (No. 00048)

OO - Routing Sheet - To - Chief, SAD - 7 June 68 -- SECRET EYES ONLY

PP - Memo re telephonic call on 7 June 68 (00050)

qq - Memo dtd 7 June 68 (00051) - SECRET EYES ONLY

rr - M/R - (00052) - 24 May 68

ss - Memo dtd 24 May 68 - SECRET EYES ONLY (00053)

tt - Memo for Special Agent in Charge, Wash. Field Office - 21 May 68 (00054)

uu - M/R - Subj: Wash. Ethical Society - 6 Jan 70 SECRET

vv - Routing and Record Sheet - From Chief, SAC to DDS/IOS - 18 Dec 68 SECRET

ww - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 18 Dec 68 SECRET EYES ONLY w/attachment on Washington Ethical Society.

xx - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 12 May 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

yy - Routing Slip - 18 Oct (00123) w/Memo 17 July 68 (#454 082 233) - General at Washington, D.C. on 17 July 68.

zz - Memo to Chief, Special Activities Div, 8 Aug 66

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AAA - Memo to Dir of Ops - 8 Aug 69

BBB - Memo for Chief, Investigations Div - 7 May 69 SECRET

CCC - Memo for Hqs - from N.Y. Field Office - 11 Apr 69 SECRET

DDD - Memo to Regional Manager, West Coast Regional Office - 11 Feb 69
SECRET

EEE - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 30 July 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

FFF - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 5 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

GGG - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 31 Aug 66 - SECRET

HHH - Memo for Chief, Operational Support Div - Undated (00196 SECRET

III - Routing Sheet to Chief, A&TS, Trng. Br - 29 June 66 SECRET

JJJ - Memo for Dir of Training - 28 June 66 - SECRET

KKK - Memo for Chief, MHBOUND/Arlington - 22 July 66 SECRET

LLL - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 20 May 66 SECRET

MMM - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 4 Mar 66 SECRET EYES ONLY

NNN - Routing Sheet to ADDS/IOS from Acting Chief, SAD - 28 Aug 67 SECRET

OOO - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 28 Aug 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

PPP - Routing Sheet - to Chief/SAD - From SAD - 8 Aug 67 SECRET

QQQ - Memo for Chief, SR Staff - 8 Aug 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

RRR - Routing Slip - To Chief, SADB - 4/1/67 SECRET

SSS - M/R - 10 Apr 67 SECRET

TTT - Instruction applicable from 8 thru 15 Apr - (00343) SECRET

UUU - Memo to All Security Duty Officers - Date unreadable - Subj: Special
Instruction re possible calls on ME 8 0676 during Period 8 thru 15 April 1967.

VVV - Routing Slip from Acting Chief, SAD - 5/15/67 SECRET

WWW - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 12 May 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

XXX - Routing Sheet from AC/Special Ops Br - 19 Oct 67 SECRET

YYY - Memo for Chief, Sp. Activities Div - 20 Oct 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

ZZZ - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 16 Oct 67 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AAAA - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 16 Oct 67 SECRET

BBBB - Cable for Mr. Gaynor - 6 Oct 67 SECRET

CCCC - Routing Sheet to DDS/IOS - SECRET EYES ONLY

DDDD - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 25 Sept 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

EEEE - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 25 Sept 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

FFFF - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 20 Sept 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

GGGG - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 20 Sept 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

HHHH - Memo re Operation Merrimack - Flash Report - dtd 20 Sept 67 SECRET

IIII - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 6 June 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

JJJJ - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 13 Apr 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

KKKK - Record Sheet - from Acting Chief, SAD - 13 Apr 67 SECRET

LLLL - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 13 Apr 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

MMMM - Memo for Chief, Security Research Staff - 11 Apr 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

NNNN - Routing and Record Sheet - to Chief, SRS - 11 Apr 67 SECRET

OOOO - Memo for All Employees of SAD - 23 Sept 69 SECRET

PPPP - Routing Slip - to D/S - 16 Jul 1973

QQQQ - Memo for Acting Deputy Dir of Security for Investigations and Operational Support - 13 July 73 SECRET

RRRR - CI/CE Branch, OSD Holdings - undated SECRET

SSSS - Memo for Special Agent in Charge, NY Field Office, 28 June 73 SECRET

TTTT - M/R - 26 June 1973

UUUU - Routing and Record Sheet - from Chief, SAD to DDS/IOS - 9 Aug 68 SECRET E
ONI

VVVV - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 9 Aug 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

WWWW - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - Subj: Operation RESISTANCE
533 989 I SAD. - 19 June 68 SECRET

XXXX - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div, Subj: RESISTANCE - 13 May 68 SECRE

YYYY 8 Routing Slip - 8 May ?? from (name not legible)
ZZZZ - Memo for Chief, Special Activities Div - 8 May 68 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AAAA - Routing and Record Sheet - from Chief, SAD and Ed Sayle, SRS - 26 Apr 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

BBBBB - Memo for Dir. of Security - 2 May 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

CCCCC - Memo from Osborn - 3 May 68 with attached Operation Resistance recommendations SECRET EYES ONLY

DDDDD - Memo for Deputy Dir for Support - Subj: FBI Monograph: "The New Left: Road to Anarchy" 17 Jan 68 SECRET

EEEEE - Memo for Deputy Dir for Support - Subj: Student Protest Movement 11 Jan 68 SECRET

FFFFF - Cable to SAC SFFO - Subj: PROJECT RESISTANCE - 11 Dec 67 SECRET

GGGGG - M/R - 8 Dec 67 SECRET

HHHHH - Memo for Special Agent in Charge, Washington Field Office - 21 May 68

IIIII - Memo for Hqs from L.A. Field Office - 23 May 68

JJJJJ - Memo for Spec Agent in Charge, Boston Field Office - 4 Sept 69 SECRET

KKKK - Situation Information Report - Calendar of Tentatively Scheduled Activities - 22 May 70 SECRET

LLLLL - Situation Information Report - 8 May 70 SECRET

MMMMM - Situation Information Report - 27 March 1970 SECRET

NNNNN - Situation Information Report - 13 Mar 70 SECRET

OOOOO - Calendar of Tentatively Scheduled Activities - Memo dtd 13 Mar 70 SECRET

PPPPP - Situation Information Report - 13 Feb 70 SECRET

QQQQQ - Routing Sheet - from DD/IOS/OSD - 10 Sept 70 SECRET

RRRRR - Special Information Report - 10 Sept 70 SECRET

SSSSS - Special Information Report - 18 Aug 70 SECRET

TTTTT - Special Information Report - 20 July 70 SECRET

UUUUU - Situation Information Report - 18 June 70 SECRET

VVVVV - Memo for Dir. of Security - 25 Jun 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

WWWW - Routing and Record Sheet - to Acting DDS/IOS - 26 Feb 71 SECRET

XXXXX - Memo for Dir. of Security - 1 Mar 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

YYYYY - Operation Two Fold - SECRET EYES ONLY

ZZZZZ - Memo for Acting Deputy Dir of Security - 29 Oct 65 SECRET

Photocopy from G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

bbbbb - Memo for Chief, Ops Support Div - 10 June 65 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

ccccc - Memo to Chief/Operational Support Div. - 30 Apr 65

ddddd - Memo to Chief/Operational Support Div - 26 Apr 65

eeeee - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security (IOS) - 18 Dec 64 SECRET

fffff - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 29 Sept 64 SECRET

ggggg - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 13 Aug 64 SECRET

hhhhh - Routing Slip - 21 May (hard to read) (00586)

iiiii - Memo for The Record - Subj: Project MHBOUND - Draft - 20 May 64 SECRET

jjjjj - Memo for Dir of Security - 31 Mar 64 SECRET

kkkkk - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 9 Aug 68 SECRET EYES ONLY

lllll - Cable to Hdqs from SAC CFO - 11 Mar 68

mmmmm - Memo from Univ of Michigan - 6 Mar (00617)

nnnnn - Memo for SAC/LAFO - 29 Feb 68

ooooo - Case No. 80 164 General - At Poughkeepsie, N.Y. - 7 Mar 68

ppppp - Case No. 80 164 - 24 Jan 68 General: At Pittsfield, Mass.

qqqqq - Operational Support for Recruitment - 24 Jan 68

rrrrr - General Info at Boulder, Colo - 2 Nov 67

sssss - General Info at Portland and Eugene, Oregon - 23 Oct 67

ttttt - Synopsis at State College, Pa. - 26 Oct 67

uuuuu - General Info at State College, Pa. - 23 Oct 67

vvvvv - M/R - Student Protests - Univ of Colo - 25 Oct 67 CONFIDENTIAL

wwwww - Memo to Chief, OP/RD - 23 Oct 67, Univ of Minn. - CONFIDENTIAL

xxxxx - Memo from George Henry, Buildings Manager of B-3 Federal Bldg in Minneapolis, Minn. 12 Oct 67

yyyyy - Memo for Chief, Recruitment Div - 7 Nov 67 CONFIDENTIAL

zzzzz - Memo for Deputy Dir for Support - Univ of Wis - 6 Nov 67 ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

AAAaa - Case No. 80 164 - General at Boston, Mass.

BBbb - Page 2 of Rex E. Greaves Memo - ADMIN. INTERNAL USE ONLY

CCCcc - Memo for Hqs from Chicago Field Office - 13 Dec 67 SECRET

DDDdd - Memo for Hqs from Chicago Field Office - 15 Dec 67 SECRET

EEEee - Memo for Hqs - from L.A. Field Office - 5 Feb 68 SECRET

FFFff - M/R - Operational Support for Recruitment - 10 Jan 68 SECRET

GGGgg - Synopsis - 6 Feb 68 SECRET

HHHhh - General Info at Rochester, N.Y. on 30 and 31 Jan 68 SECRET

IIIii - Synopsis at Wellsville, N.Y. - 23 Feb 68 SECRET

JJJjj - General Info at Wellsville, N.Y. on 20 Feb 68 SECRET

KKKkk - Synopsis at Syracuse, N.Y. - 23 Feb 68 SECRET

LLLll - General Info at Syracuse, N.Y. on 21 and 22 Feb 68

MMMmm - Synopsis at Ithaca, N.Y. 23 Feb 68 SECRET

NNNnn - General Info at Ithaca, N.Y. on 15 and 16 Feb 68 SECRET

OOOoo - Info at Portland and Corvallis, Oregon on 9 Feb 68 dtd 23 Feb 68

PPPpp - Gen Info at Philadelphia, Pa. and vicinity - 21 Feb 68 SECRET

QQQqq - General Info at Rochester, N.Y. on 13 Feb 68 SECRET

RRRrr - Memo for Hqs from Chicago Field Office - 13 Mar 68 SECRET

SSSss - Synopsis at Lancaster, Pa. - 2 Mar 68 SECRET

TTTtt - Gen Info at Schwenksville, Pa. - 11 Mar 68 SECRET

UUUuu - General Info at Lancaster, Pa. and Vicinity - 2 Mar 68 SECRET

VVVvv - Info at Philadelphia, Pa. - 2 Mar 68 SECRET

WWWww - Case No. 80 164 - Gen Info at State College, Pa. - 1 Feb 68 SECRET

XXXxx - Operational Support for Recruitment - 15 Jan 70 SECRET

YYYyy - Routing Sheet - To: DD/S - 29 Jan 69 SECRET

ZZZzz - Memo for Deputy Dir for Support - 29 Jan 69 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

from
Aa- Routing and Record Sheet to D/Security -/Chief, Recruitment Div, 10 Dec 68
CONFIDENTIAL

Bb- Recruitment report on Harry L. Russell SECRET

Cc- Recruitment report on James W. Gurll - SECRET

Dd - Recruitment Report on Charles J. Minich SECRET

Ee - Recruitment report on Thomas L. Culhane SECRET

Ff - Recruitment Report on Charles J. Minich SECRET

Gg - Memo for Deputy Dir of Security - 24 Mar 70 SECRET

Hh - Cable which is unreadable - 00688

Ii - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 30 Sep 68 ADMINISTRATIVE

Jj - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 11 Jul 68

Kk - Memo for Special Agent in Charge - 11 July 68

Ll - Memo for Chief, MPS/BG - 2 Apr 71 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O|Z
IV (VV)

A - Preface

B - Threats to Agency Installations and Personnel.

C - Highlights of Civil Disturbances and Other Disorders in U.S. 1967-1972

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/Z IV (c)

A - Memo from Spitz to Olsen - 25 APR 75

B - Ltr from Olsen to Lindenberg - 2 Jun 75

C - Ltr from Olsen to Col McMeekin - 2 June 75

D - Ltr from Olsen to Hodges - 2 June 75

E - Ltr from Olsen to Olivier - 2 June 75

F - Ltr from Olsen to Spitz

G - Ltr from McMeekin to Olsen - 25 Apr 75

H - Ltr from Spitz to Olsen - 24 Apr 75

I - Ltr from Spitz to Olsen - 30 Apr 75

J - Statement by Richard Lindenberg, M-D. - 9 May 75

K - Statement byFred Jenner Hodges, III, M.D.

L - Ltr from Olivier to Olsen - 12 May 75

M - Memo for File from Olsen - 19 Apr 75

N - Ltr from Olsen to Multi-Addressees - 19 Apr 75

O - Receipt No. 2431 - 13 May 75

P - Ltr from Lindenberg to Olsen - 9 May 75

Q - Statistics on Dr. Richard Lindenberg

R - Ltr from Olivier to Olsen - 22 Apr 75

S - Statistics on Dr. Werner U. Spitz, M.D.

T - Ltr from Dr. Hansen to Mr. Olsen - 16 Apr 75

U - Cy of Ltr from Olsen to Col Hansen - 15 Apr 75

V - Panel of Consultants Meeting - 18 Apr 75

W - Ltr from Olsen to Multi-Addressee - 19 Apr 75

X - Statistics for Robert R. McMeekin, M.D.

Y - Memo for File - from Olsen - 19 Apr 75

Z - Routing Slip from Marion M. Johnson - 3/19/75 to Mr. Belin.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Selected Documents Relating to Allegations Concerning the Assassination of President Kennedy

Tab No.	Document
1.	Report of FBI Laboratory re Dallas "derelicts" and alleged assassins on grassy knoll
2.	Report of FBI Laboratory re Hunt and Sturgis photos and photos of "derelicts"
3.	File Memo of Robert B. Olsen re selection of panel of experts
4.	Report of Dr. Robert R. McMeekin
5.	Report of Dr. Werner U. Spitz (and supplemental report)
6.	Report of Dr. Richard Lindenberg
7.	Report of Dr. Fred J. Hodges, III
8.	Report of Dr. Alfred G. Olivier
9.	1968 (Ramsey Clark) Panel Review
10.	Article by Dr. Cyril H. Wecht and Robert P. Smith, *3 Forensic Science* (1974)
11.	Article by Dr. John K. Lattimer, *Resident and Staff Physician*, May 1972

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/Z V (4)

A - Ltr from Cyril H. Wecht, M.D., J.D. to Olsen - May 9, 1975 w/ attached booklet on The Medical Evidence in the Assassination of Pres. Kennedy and slides.

B - Ltr from Olsen to Wecht - 2 June 75

C - Ltr from Olsen to Wecht - 6 May 75

D - An Advice and Waiver s/Wecht - 7 May 75

E - Articles from Pittsburgh Press - 8 Oct. 72

F - Ltr from Olsen to Wecht - 3 May 75

G - Ltr from Wecht to Olsen - 28 Apr 75

H - Memo for File from Olsen - 15 Apr 75

I - Memo for File from Olsen - 19 Apr 75

J - Pencil notes - 25 Apr 75

K - Ink notes May 7 or 8

L - Memo for File from Olsen - 19 Apr 75

M - Ltr from Olsen to Wecht - 15 Apr 75

N - Ink notes - 4-15-75

O - Memo for File from Olsen - 15 Apr 75

P - Ltr from Wecht to Olsen - April 10, 1975

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R VI (A)

A - Memo for All Staff Attorneys, from Roethe - 18 Feb 75

B - Memo for the File - from Gray - 21 Feb 75 SECRET

C - Outline - Hearings on Privacy and Related Civil Liberties.

D - Outline - Background Paper

E - Ink notes. (On white paper)

F - Telephone Memo - 2/5/75

G - Ink notes. (On yellow paper)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/R VI (B)

A - Office of Technical Service - SECRET

B - Office of Deputy Dir for Science & Technology - SECRET

C - Office of the Deputy Dir for Administration - CONFIDENTIAL

D - Office of Training Missions - CONFIDENTIAL

E - Office of Logistics Mission CONFIDENTIAL

F - Office of Communications Missions CONFIDENTIAL

G - Office of Deputy Director for Operations - List of Personnel SECRET

H - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75 w/Pre-1973 Organization Charts attached. SECRET

I - Memo from Knoche to Greene - 11 Feb 75 w/attached missions and functions of the Agency. (ADMIN. - Internal Use Only)

J - Office of Deputy Dir of Intell - 6 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

K - Foreign Broadcast Information Service - 6 Feb 75 CONFIDENTIAL

L - Overseas Area Divisions - SECRET

M - Foreign Resources Div. SECRET

N - Domestic Collection Div. SECRET

O - Division D SECRET

P - Counter Intell. Operations SECRET

Q - Operations Staff - 17 Feb 75 SECRET

R - Services Staff SECRET

S - Cover and Commercial Staff SECRET

T - Plans Staff SECRET

U - Memo to All Lawyers of The Commission - From Tim Hardy - Subj: CIA Internal Regulations - 21 Mar 75

V - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 14 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

W - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75

X - Names of Personnel in Office of the Deputy Director for Personnel SECRET

Y - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75 w/attached Office of Security Chart; Counterintelligence Staff Chart SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/K VI (C)

A - Memo to Roethe from Ruth E. Johnson - Subj: Classification of
Documents - 24 Apr 75

B - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 23 May 75 SECRET

C - Ltr from Olsen to Knoche - 30 Apr 75

D - Memo for Mr. Knoche from Roethe - 23 Apr 75 SECRET-SENSITIVE

E - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 22 Apr 75 CONFIDENTIAL

F - Ltr from Olsen to Knoche - 18 Apr 75

G - Ltr from Hoch to Shannon - 4 Apr 75

H - CIA Activities and the Warren Commission Investigation Summary by
Paul L. Hoch - 24 Mar 75

I - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 2 Apr 75

J - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 25 Mar 75 SECRET

K - Memo for Requests for Information File - 20 Mar 75 from Roethe

L - Memo to File - Re: Surveillance of Newsmen - by Roethe - 14 Mar 75

M - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 14 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL/SENSITIVE

N - Ltr from Roethe to Knoche - 18 Feb 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

O - Ltr to Colby from Belin - 30 Jan 75 SECRET

P - Memo for Whomever needs to know - from Dene - 9 Apr 75
re James A. Wilderotter.

Q - Ltr from Olsen to Gregory - 25 Feb 75

R - Ltr from Olsen to Marchetti - 24 Feb 75

S - Memo to the Staff from Mr. Belin - Subj; Requests for Information or
Assistance from FBI. (Undated)

T - Ltr from FBI Director - to Mr. Belin - 26 Feb 75

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

II (D)

B - Memo from Knoche to Olsen - 16 May 75

C - Memo for Belin from Olsen - 20 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

D - Ltr from Knoche to Olsen - 17 Mar 75

E - Memo for File from Roethe - 23 May 75 TOP SECRET

F - Ltr from Knoche to Gray - 15 Mar 75 SECRET

G - Memo for Dir of Security - Subj: Activities with Flap Potential -
dtd 7 Jan 74 from Donald F. Chamberlain, Ins. General SECRET

H - Memo for Ins. General - 29 Oct 73 SECRET

I - Memo for Deputy Dir for Management & Services - 24 Oct 73 SECRET-EYES ONLY

J - Ltr from Knoche to Olsen - 25 Mar 75 CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

0/Z
VI (F)

A - Ltr from Olsen to Jennings - 24 Feb 75

B - Ltr from Jennings to Hon. Nelson A. Rockefeller - 13 Feb 75 with attached copies of 3 pages of Jennings' 1 May 73 ltr.

C - Ltr from Cong. Richard L. Ottinger to Mr. Melvin Jennings - 10 June 1969

D - Ltr from Ottinger to Jennings - 25 July 69

E - Ltr from Ottinger to Jennings - 2 Oct 69

F - Ltr from Olsen to Jennings - 10 Feb 75

G - Ltr from Jennings to Rockefeller - Undated

H - Page 4 of statement by Mr. Melvin N. Jennings

I - One page of Ink notes

J - Small note signed by Donna - with Jennings phone number

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

O/K VI (G)

A - Ink notes - Marked SECRET

B - Ink notes - Jack M. Bauman, Chief, SAD of OS CONFIDENTIAL

C - Pencil notes - Basic Proposal to Coordinate Intell after Pearl Harbor
CONFIDENTIAL

D - Other pencil notes - not classified.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

INDEX
(Cont'd)

CONFIDENTIAL

21. Interview - Robert Brown in the Office of Alan White, Feb 25, 1975
22. Summary - Minaret File in ITG, Mar 12, 1975
23. Interview - Charles K. Marcules, Mar 11, 1975
24. Summary of DCD's intelligence gathering activities in support of the Ober Project, Mar 21, 1975 - 5 documents reBlack Mil & Radical Ac
25. Interview - Addendum to Edward Sayle, Feb 27, 1975
26. MHCHAOS Activities - Martin H. Tatom - Interview, Mar 1, 1975
27. Minaret Interview - Thomas K. Latimer, Mar 21, 1975
28. "Restless Youth" Feb 25, 1975
29. Interview - Roderick Sweet
30. Interview - Milan C. Miskovsky, April 18, 1975
31. Interview - David Ginsburg, April 18, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A-I (A)

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 23 Apr 75 SECRET

B - Memo for William Harvey, CIA from B/Gen Lansdale - 13 Aug 62
TOP SECRET-NOFORN MONGOOSE

C - Memo for Deputy Director (Plans) from Harvey - 14 Aug 62 SECRET SENSITIVE
w/attachment.

D - NSAM No. 181 - 23 Aug 62 TOP SECRET & SENSITIVE

E - Memo of MONGOOSE Meeting held on Thurs, 4 Oct 62 SECRET-EYES ONLY

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SECRET

A-I (B)

A- Memo from Knoche to Belin - 7 Mar 75

B- Memo - CIA Connections with Organized Crime SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A-I (C)

A - Memo from Knoche to Belin - 29 Apr 75

B - Memo "What Could Castro Have Known?" - 24 Apr 75

SECRET/SENSITIVE

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - I (D)

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 8 May 75 CONFIDENTIAL

B - M/R - Subj: Review of Personal Papers of Mr. Dulles s/Joseph Seltzer

C - Telephone Items from Diary of Mr. Dulles - Nov 63 to July 64

D - Ltr to Dulles from Sherman Hoar - Nov 5, 1963

E - Annex to Nov 29, 1963 Diary

F - Memo for Mr. Angleton - Subj: Ltr from Mr. Jose Colon - 6 Dec 63 w/Encl.

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A – Ltr from Knoche to Gray – 21 May 72 SECRET

B – Memo for Inspector General from Elder – 21 May 75 SECRET

C – Ltr from Knoche to Gray – 20 May 75 w/attached Memo for Ins. General, dtd 6 May 75 w/Attachments SECRET

D – Memo for Inspector General – 20 May 75 from Elder SECRET

E – Routing Sheet from Insp. General – 8 May 75

F – M/R – Subj: Memo for the Ins. Gen. from Mr. Knoche, dated 2 May 75 – 19 May 75 SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 30 May 75 SECRET

B - A list of Letters and Meanings SECRET

C - M/R - Subj: First Meeting of Branch 4 Task Force, 9 Mar 60 SECRET EYES ON

D - Cable 47910 - 29 Aug 60 SECRET

E - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 30 May 75 SECRET
w/attachments

F - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 27 May 75 w/attachment - SECRET

G - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 23 May 75 SECRET-SENSITIVE

H - Killing of Agents - Summary of Allegations - 21 May 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

I - Memo for Deputy Dir for Intell. - 16 May 75 SECRET

J - M/R - from Frank A. Daly - 15 May 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

K - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 13 May 75 SECRET
w/attachment

L - M/R - AMB Research of DPD Files Related to Cuban Operations - 15 May 75
SECRET/SENSITIVE

M - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 12 May 75 w/Attachment.
CONFIDENTIAL

N - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 6 May 75 SECRET
w/ attachment TOP SECRET

O - Ltr from Knoche to Cargill - 2 May 75 w/attachments SECRET

P - M/R - 7 Apr 64 SECRET
w/attachments.

Q - Ltr from Knoche to Gray - 2 May 75 w/attachments SECRET

R - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 1 May 75 w/attachments SECRET

S - Memo to Belin from Cargill - 1 May 75 TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

T - Memo to File from Cargill - 22 Apr 75 SECRET-SENSITIVE
w/attachments

U - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 30 Apr 75 w/Attachment SECRET

V - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 29 Apr 75 w/attachments SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SECRET

A-I (G)

W - Routing Sheet - Memo for Ins. Gen. - 17 Jan 75 TOP SECRET w/attachments

X - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 25 Apr 75 SECRET
w/attachments

Y - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 24 Apr 75 SECRET

Z - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 22 Apr 75

AA - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 23 Apr 75

BB - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 22 Apr 75

CC - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 22 Apr 75 w/Attachment SECRET

DD - Ltr from Knoche to Cargill - 21 Apr 75 SECRET

EE - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 18 Apr 75

FF - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 15 Apr 75

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SECRET

A-I (H)

A - Ltr from Knoche to Gray - 21 Apr 75   SECRET SENSITIVE

B - CIA Relationship w/Robert A. Maheu   SECRET

C - Memo to Chief, FBW; From Chief, FBT - 10 Feb 48   SECRET

D - Memo to Director, Ciudad Trujillo - 10 Oct 57   SECRET

E - Cable to Chief, WHD - 13 Oct 57 w/attachment   SECRET

F - Memo to Chief of Station, Ciudad Trujillo - 7 Nov 56   SECRET

G - Memo - Subj: Robert Maheu - Foreign Head of State
SECRET

H - CCS Contact Report - 21 Aug 63   SECRET

I - Ltr to Mr. Maheu fr CIA - Undated   SECRET
w/attachments

J - Cable Message to Immediate UH/Miami -- 57695L - 19 July 74   SECRET

K - Memo for Director of CI - 20 Jan 71
w/attachments   SECRET

L - Special Projects Staff Matter   SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A – Sworn statement by McGeorge Bundy – 25 Apr 75

B – Memo to Belin – from Cargill – 19 May 75 SECRET
Subj: Luis Angel Castillo

C – Ltr from Belin to Col Edwards – 30 Apr 75 w/attachments.

D – Waiver by Walter Elder – 16 Apr 75 w/attachment

E – Memo for the Files, Subj: Operation Mongoose: Interview with Roswell Leavitt Gilpatrick – 3 June 75 SECRET-SENSITIVE
s/Harold Baker

F – Memo for File – from Cargill – Subj: Phone Interview with Richard Goodwin – 11 June 1975 TOP SECRET

G – Memo to File from Cargill – Subj: John Gordon – 29 May 75

H – Ltr from Belin to Dr. Gunn – 10 June 75 w/attachment.

I – Ltr from Belin to William K. Harvey – 1 May 75 w/attachment.

J – Ink notes on Kennedy Assasination dtd 18 Apr 75

K – Ltr from Belin to McNamara – 2 May 75 w/attachments.

L – Memo to the File from Belin – Subj: Interview w/Secretary Robert McNamara – dtd 15 Apr 75

M – Memo for File – from Cargill – Subj: Phone Interview w/Robert Murphy dtd 11 June 75 TOP SECRET

N – Ltr from Belin to O'Connell – 10 June 75 w/attachments.

O – M/R – from Gray – Subj: Conversation with L. Fletcher Prouty dtd 11 June 1975 w/attached notes in ink.

P – Memo for File – from Cargill – Subj: Phone Interview w/Roy Richard Rubot
11 June 1975 TOP SECRET

Q – M/R – from Gray – Subj: Conversation with Former Secretary of State Dean Rush – 11 June 75 w/attachment

R – Ltr from Belin to Sanchez – 10 June 75

S – Memo to File – from Belin – Subj: Interview with Mr. Nestor Sanchez – 1
1975

T – Memo for File from Olsen – Subj: Interview with Frank Sturgis, April 3 and 4, 1975 (Memo dtd 23 Apr 75)

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

U - M/R - from Belin, Subj: Interview with General Maxwell Taylor ; undated
V - M/R from Gray - Subj: Conversation with Will Wilson - 11 June 75 w/attachment.

W - Ltr from Belin to Wilson - 10 June 75 w/attachment.

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A-I (J)

A - Memo to Belin ; from Clapper - Subj: Public Affairs Considerations in Deleting Assassination Findings - 29 May 75

B - Ltr to Belin from NSC - 30 May 75 SECRET/EYES ONLY w/attachments.

C - Memo to Gray from Belin - Subj: Investigation of Alleged Assassination Plans - 30 May 75 w/attachment.

D - Ltr from Belin to Morton R. Galane Esq - 28 May 75

E - Ltr from Belin to Jeanne Davis, Staff Secy, NSC - 22 May 75 w/attachments

F - Memo for File ; from Mason Cargill - Subj: Justice Dept Documents Relating to Plots to Assassinate Castro - 21 May 75 - TOP SECRET.

G - Memo for File - from Cargill - 21 May 75 SECRET

H - Memo for File - from Cargill - 21 May 75 CONFIDENTIAL

I - Ltr from Belin to Deputy Attorney General - 20 May 75 w/attachment.

J - Ltr from Gray to McAfee (State) - 16 May 75 w/attachment

K - Memo to File; from Cargill - 15 May 75 w/attachments.

L - Memo for File - from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Wymberley B. Coerr - 13 May 75

M - Memo for File - from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Joseph S. Farland - 13 May 75.

N - Memo for File - from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Col J.C. King - 12 May 75

O - Memo for File - from Gray - Subj: Interview w/T. C. Achilles - 12 May 75

P - Memo for File - from Gray - 30 Apr 75

Q - Memo for File - from Gray - 26 Apr 75

R - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 12 May 75 w/attachment.

S - Ltr from NSC to Belin - 9 May 75 CONFIDENTIAL - TOP SECRET w/attachments.

T - Ltr from Belin to Wilson - 8 May 75 w/attachment.

U - Memo to Belin; from Cargill - 1 May 75 TOP Secret - SENSITIVE w/attachments.

V - Ltr from Belin to Attorney General - 1 May 75

W - Ltr from Dean Rusk to Belin - 28 Apr 75 w/attachment.

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

X - Double spaced pages 8 - 11 of SECRET document

Y - Ltr from Belin to Kissinger - 30 Apr 75

Z - Ltr from Belin to Griffin - 25 Apr 75 w/attachment

AA - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 24 Apr 75

BB - Ltr from Belin to Bundy - 18 Apr 75 w/attachments

CC - Ltr from Belin to Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis, Exec. Secy, NSC - 17 Apr 75

DD - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 15 Apr 75

EE - Memo for File - from Gray - 8 Apr 75

FF - Ltr from Belin to Bundy - 8 Apr 75

GG - Memo for McGeorge Bundy - from Belin - 4 Apr 75

HH - Ltr from Buchen to Belin - 31 Mar 75

II - Memo for Belin; from Gray - Subj: Jurisdiction of the Commission; dtd 14 Mar 75

JJ - Memo for Belin ; from Gray - 14 Mar 75

KK - Ltr from Buchen to Belin - 31 Mar 75

LL - Memo for the Commission - 10 Mar 75 - SECRET/SENSITIVE

MM - Memo to Members of the Commission from Belin - 10 Mar 75

NN - Memo to Belin from Gellhorn - 8 Mar 75

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Box # 6 of 10 Misc. John McCone Papers

B - Box 4 of 10 - Notes for DCI and Weekend Reading - June-Dec1963

C - Disposition of CIA Long-Range Plan by David L. Bye - 2/8/72

D - Box 8 of 10

E - Box 1 of 10 (J_B # 72-B-431)

F - Box 2 of 10

G - Box 3 of 10

H - Box 7 of 10

I - Box 5 of 10

J - Ltr from Knoche to Belin - 4 June 75 w/attachment.

K - M/R - Subj: Arthur James Balletti et al - Unauthorized Publication or Use of Communications - TOP SECRET-EYES ONLY w/attachment

L - Ltr from McCone to The Director - 14 Apr 67 SECRET/SENSITIVE

M - Memo for The Dir, FBI Subj: Report of Telephone Contact by "Johnny" ROSELLI - 27 May 66 TOP SECRET

N - Memo for Deputy Dir of CI - 24 June 66 SECRET EYES ONLY

O - Memo for The Dir, FBI - 18 May 66 TOP SECRET

P - Memo for The Dir, FBI fr CIA - 18 May 66 TOP SECRET

Q - M/R - Subj: Meeting at the White House 7 Apr 64 - w/attachments SECRET

R - M/R - from Stanley J. Grogan - 16 Aug 63

S - Ink note from Mason to Mr. Belin

T - Memo to W. C. Sullivan from Wannall - 6 Mar 67 w/attachment.

U - Memo to The Attorney General, from Dir, FBI - 6 Mar 67 TOP SECRET

V - Memo to Arthur J. Balletti, et al - 22 May 61 TOP SECRET

W - Memo for Mr. Bundy - Subj: 303 Committee Cuban Review - 18 June 64 SECRET EYES ONLY

X - Memo to File - from Cargill - 21 May 75

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SECRET

Y - Memo to File from Cargill - Subj - Justice Dept Documents
dtd 21 May 75 CONFIDENTIAL
w/attachments

Z - Newspaper article on CIA South Giancana Help for Cuba Spying - 16 Aug 6

AA - Memo to Belin - from Cargill - 1 May 75 w/attachments
TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Belin to the Vice President - 6 June 1975

B - Memo to Messrs. Cargill and Hardy from Belin - Subj: Recorded Interviews. - 6 June 1975

C - Memo to Gray from Belin - 30 May 75 w/attachment.

D - Memo to Belin from Clapper - 29 May 75

E - Ltr from Belin to Galane - 28 May 75

F - Ltr from Belin to Davis - 22 May 75

G - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 23 May 75 SECRET-SENSITIVE

H - The Dominican Republic - Summary and Conclusion (5/22/75

I - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 7 May 75

J - Ltr from Gray to McAfee - 16 May 75 w/attachment

K - Memo for the Dept of State - from Belin - 15 May 75 w/attachments.

L - Memo for Office of Sec/Def from Belin - 15 May 75 w/attachment

M - Memo from Belin to CIA - 15 May 75 w/attachment.

N - Memo for DIA from Belin - 15 May 75 w/attachment.

O - Memo for NSC from Belin - 15 May 75 w/attachment.

P - Ltr from Gray to Knoche - 12 May 75 w/attachment.

Q - Memo for File from Gray - Subj: Interview with Joseph S. Farland -

13 May 75

R - Memo for the File from Gray - Subj: Interview with Wymberley B. Coerr 13 May 75

S - Memo for File from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Col J.C. King - 12 May 75

T - Memo for File from Gray - Subj: Interview w/T.C. Achilles - 12 May 75

U - The Dominican Republic - Summary and Conclusion (5/9/75)

V - Ltr from Belin to Wilson - 8 May 75 w/attachment

W - Ltr from Belin to McNamara - 2 May 75 w/attachment

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

X - Ltr from Belin to Attorney General - 1 May 75

Y - Ltr from Belin to Harvey - 1 May 75 w/attachment

Z - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 15 Apr 75

AA - Memo for File from Gray - 30 Apr 75

BB - Ltr from Belin to Col Sheffield Edwards - 30 Apr 75 w/attachments

CC - Ltr from Belin to Kissinger - 30 Apr 75

DD - Memo for File - From Gray - 26 Apr 75

EE - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 24 Apr 75 SECRET

FF - Ltr from Wilson to Belin - 23 Apr 75

GG - Memo to Weidner from Belin - 21 Apr 75

HH - Ltr from Belin to Bundy - 18 Apr 75 w/attachments

II - Ltr from Belin to Mrs. Jeanne W. David - 17 Apr 75

JJ - Ltr from Belin to Knoche - 15 Apr 75

KK - Memo to the File from Belin - 8 Apr 75

LL - Memo for File - from Gray - 8 Apr 75

MM - Memo for McGeorge Bundy from Belin - 4 Apr 75

NN - Memo for Capt John Howe, USN - from Belin - 2 Apr 75 w/attachments

OO - Ltr from Buchen to Belin - 31 Mar 75

PP - Memo to Members of the Commission from Belin - 10 Mar 75

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Memo for File - from Gray - Subj: Interview with Joseph S. Farland
13 May 75

B - Memo for the File from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Wymberley B. Coerr
13 May 75

C - Memo for the File from Gray - Subj: Interview w/T.C. Achilles
12 May 75

D - Memo for the File from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Col J.C. King - 12 May

E - Memo for File - from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Hubert L. Didier
30 Apr 75

F - Memo for File from Gray - 26 Apr 75 w/attachment

G - Memo for Record - from Gray - Subj: Interview w/Henry Dearborn
11 June 1975 w/attachments.

H - Ink notes "files from LA/CAR/DPH file on Dominican Historical Papers."

I - Ink notes - "D/S TS File 739.00 - 60 & 61"

J - Ink notes - 4/9/75

K - Ltr from Hyland to Gray - (recd 6/2/75) - SECRET w/attachments (TOP SEC
(attachments not with ltr)

L - Memo for Mr. Merchant - from Wells - 29 Dec 60 SECRET EYES ONLY
w/attachment.

M - Memo for Mr. Merchant - 12 Jan 61 SECRET EYES ONLY

N - Memo for Mr. Merchant - 19 Jan 61 SECRET EYES ONLY

O - M/R - Subj: Record and Related Policy Decisions on Passing Arms
to Dominican Dissidents. - 7 June 61 SECRET

P - Memo to Under Secy for Political Affairs - 12 Jan 61 SECRET EYES ONL
w/attachment

Q - Cable from Trujillo to State - 2924 - Mar 4, 1961 SECRET

R - Cable from Trujillo to State - BO2649 - 23 Mar 61 SECRET

S - Memo to Mr. Mann - Subj: Second Meeting on Dominican Republic -
31 Mar 61 SECRET

T - Draft Memo SECRET

U - Dominican Republic - Contingency - SECRET

V - One page document SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

W - Cable to Dir from Trujillo - 16 May 61 SECRET

X - For Dearborn from State - 16 May 61 SECRET

Y - Memo for Mr. Bowles from Scott - 19 May 61 SECRET w/attachment

Z - Cable to Dir from Trujillo - 21 May 61 SECRET

AA - Memo to Mr. Bowles - from Achilles - 24 May 61 SECRET w/attachment

BB - Cable for Dearborn from Department - SECRET

CC - Memo for Sliffman - 29 May 61 w/attachment TOP SECRET

DD - Memo for Sliffman - 29 May 61 w/attachment TOP SECRET

EE - Memo for Files - Subj: Report of Point Raised at Meeting with Vice President. 1 June 61 SECRET

FF - Ltr from Dearborn to Mann - 27 Oct 60 EYES ONLY OFFICIAL - INFORMAL SECRET

GG - Memo of Conversation - Participants - Herbert and Berle - 3 May 61 TOP SECRET

HH - Memo from Knoche to Gray - 16 May 75 w/attachment CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Knoche to Gray - 30 Apr 75

B - Requirements 1 - 4 SECRET

C - Clandestine Service Instr. 110-3 17 July 72 SECRET

D - HHB 110-1 Dispatches - 30 Sept 63 SECRET

E - Logistics - Shipment of Govt Property - SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A-II (D)

A - Memo from Knoche to Gray - 17 May 75 SECRET

B - M/R - 20 June 62 SECRET EYES ONLY

C - Cable 32127 - 29 Mar 61 SECRET

D - Cable IN 20613 - 17 Mar 61 SECRET

E - Memo for Chief, WH Div - 28 June 60 w/attachment SECRET

F - Memo - Subj: CIA Covert Activities, Dominican Republic
13 May 61 SECRET
w/attachment

G - M/R - Subj: Conference with Source 1 and Source 2 - 13 Feb 61 SECRET

H - Cable No. IN 46419 - 16 Feb 61 SECRET
w/attachments.

I - Cable 27062 - 27 Feb 61 SECRET

J - Cable to Dir; from Trujillo - IN 13655 SECRET

K - Cable to Trujillo from Dir - 28454 - 7 Mar 61 SECRET

L - Message from COS, Trujillo to Dept of State - 14 Mar 61 SECRET

M - Cable to Trujillo - from Dir. - 16 Mar 61 - OUT 8453 SECRET

N - Ltr to State from Trujillo - 16 Mar 61 SECRET

O - Cable to Dir, from Trujillo - 17 Mar 61 _N 20040 SECRET

P - Cable to Dir, from Trujillo - IN 21455 - Mar 20, 1961 SECRET

Q - Cable to Trujillo from Dir - ~~17~~ 20 Mar 61 - 30572 SECRET

R - Cable to Trujillo from Dir - 30613 SECRET

S - Cable to Dir from Trujillo - IN 22780 - SECRET

T - Cable to Trujillo from Dir. - 25 Mar 61 31569 SECRET

U - Cable to Trujillo from Dir - 32773 - SECRET

V - Cable to Trujillo from Dir 33380 SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

W - Cable to Dir from Trujillo - IN 32047 - 7 Apr 61 SECRET

X - Cable to Trujillo from Dir. - 5 Apr 61 - 33380 SECRET

Y - Cable to Trujillo ; from Director - 1 May 61 - 37737 SECRET

Z - Cable to Trujillo from Director (Not sent) SECRET

AA - Cable from Dir to Trujillo - 8 May 61 38761 SECRET

BB - Cable to Trujillo from Dir - 29 May 61 - 42443 TOP SECRET

CC - Cable to Dir from Trujillo - IN 17836 - SECRET

DD - Cable to Dir; from Trujillo - IN 17835 SECRET

EE - Cable from Dir to Trujillo - OUT 61475 - 42832 - SECRET

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SECRET

A-II (G)

A - Affidavit signed by Gen. Lemnitzer - 14 May 1975

B - Affidavit signed by C. Douglas Dillon on 21 May 75

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A - Ltr from Sheffield Edwards to Mr. Belin - 5/7/75

B - Memo for the Record - from Gray - Subj: Research Notes on Trujillo Matte
11 June 75 w/ ink notes.

C - Ink notes - 6/11-75 SECRET

D - Memo for File from Gray - 8 Apr 75 w/attachments

E - Memo by the Dept of Justice - 29 May 75 w/attachments.
CONFIDENTIAL

F - Memo for the File by Cargill - 30 Apr 75 TOP SECRET - SENSITIVE

G - Memo for the Record by Gray - 11 June 75 w/attachment

H - Memo for the File from Belin - Subj: Conference w/McGeorge Bundy, Apr 8,
1975 - dtd 8 Apr 75

I - Ltr from Belin to Gen Taylor - 10 June 1975

J - The Dominican Republic - Summary and Conclusion - 5/13/75

K - Mongoose Documents TOP SECRET SENSITIVE - EYES ONLY

L - Memo to the File - from Belin - Subj: Interview with Gen. Maxwell
Taylor (as corrected by Gen. Taylor)

M - Ltr from Gunn to Belin - 18 June 75 w/attached copy of telephone
interview with Dr. Edward Gunn (as corrected by Dr. Gunn).

N - Ltr from James P. O'Connell to Belin - 20 June 75 w/attached
Interview with O'Connell as corrected by him.

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A (III - C)

Interview Tapes

A - McGeorge Bundy, April 8, 1975 (with Mr. Belin)

B - O'Connell

C - Dr. Edward Dunn

D - Will Wilson - 5/15/75

E - Mr. Sanchez

F - Colonel She-field Edwards - w/Belin - April 9, 1975

G - William K. Harvey - 4/10/75

H - Robert McNamara and General Taylor

I - McIlvain (duplicate)

SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W (II-

A. Memo from Mr. Baker to Mr. Belin - 28 Feb 75

B. Ltr from Baker to Louis Preovolos - 18 Feb 75

C. Memo for Alan P. White - 26 Feb 75

D. Memo for Belin from Weidner - Subj: Corres. from Mrs. Jeanne M. Roberts - 12 Feb 75

E. Memo from Knoche to Baker - 6 Mar 75

F. Memo from Knoche to Belin - 24 Feb 75

G. Memo from Knoche to Baker - 28 Feb 75

H. Memo from Knoche to Weidner - 16 Apr 75

I. Memo from Knoche to Baker - 15 Apr 75

J. Memo from Knoche to Baker - 19 Mar 75

K. Memo from Baker to Knoche - 16 Apr 75

L. Ltr from Baker to Knoche - 24 Apr 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE

M. Receipts: No. Q284383 (6 Mar 75), ~~and~~ Q552037 (4/16/75) and Q 552035 (4/15/75).

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

(II-B)

A. Ltr from William A. Snyder, Jr. to Mr. Clapper - Re: E. Howard Hunt, Jr. - 6 May 75

B. Memo from Knoche to Olsen - 12 Mar 75

C. Ltr from Clapper to Mr. Howard St. John Hunt - 25 Apr 75

D. Memo from Clapper to Olsen - Subj: Phone Interview w/James A. Hunt dtd 3 Apr 75.

E. Ltr from Clapper to Hunt - 24 Apr 75

F. Ltr from Clapper to Ms. Lisa Hunt - 10 Mar 75

G. Ltr from E. Howard Hunt to Mrs. Ashmore - 11 Mar 75

H. Affidavit of Mary Trayner

I. Ltr from James A. Hunt to Mr. Clapper - 1 May 75

J. Statement by Kevan T. Hunt for the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Domestic Activities - 11 Mar 75.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W
(III-A)

A. Memo for Inspector General from Paul V. Walsh - 3 Mar 75

1. A 28 Jan 75 Memo - Vesco and IOS by Paul V. Walsh (ADDI) SECRET
2. Memo - Subj: Dir. Activities Related to Robert Vesco - 25 Feb 75 SECRET SENSITIVE
3. Memo for Record - Robert L. Vesco and Investors Overseas, Ltd. (IOS) 25 Apr 73 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
4. Memo for Associate Deputy Dir for Intelligence - Subj: SEC Request for Materials on Vesco (s/Don Peterson).
5. Draft Ltr from Peterson to Mr. von Stein - 15 May 73
6. Ltr to Mr. Knoche - Re: SEC v. Robert L. Vesco et al. - 4 Apr 73.
7. Memo for Deputy Dir/FBIS - Subj: Securities and Exchange Commission Request for Press Translations Re: Robert L. Vesco - 5 June 1973

B. Memo by Walsh - Vesco and IOS - 28 Jan 75

1. M/R - Subj: Robert L. Vesco and Investors Overseas, Ltd. (IOS) - 25 Apr 73 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
2. A partial listing of Individuals Involved in OER Research on the Vesco-IOS Case SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
3. Memo for D/OER, signed "Anne" - 20 Oct 72
4. Memo for Deputy Dir for Intelligence, Subj: Memo for the DCI, dtd 10 Oct 72 SECRET SENSITIVE
5. Transmittal Slip - 25 Apr 73
6. Memo for Associate Deputy Dir for Intel. s/ Walter J. McDonald - 25 Apr 73 - SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY
7. Intelligence Memo - CIA No. 7202 - Oct 72 SECRET SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

IDENTIAL

(III - C.)

Memo from Knoche to Gray - 4 Apr 75 with attachments: (CONFIDENTIAL)

A. Memo for Exec Officer, DCD from Deputy Chief, USSR-EE Br, DCD, Subj: Closed Case 59073 - 8 Apr 74 CONFIDENTIAL

B. Cable 161752Z Oct 72 CONFIDENTIAL

C. Memo - Vesco resigns as Officer and Director - Sept 27, 1972

D. Cable No. 2091, 13 Oct 72 - Subj: New Case 59073 CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

Walt

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-1786 2:30
5-16

May 12, 1975

SECRET - SENSITIVE

B-W
(IV-A)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide copies of the following materials, all of which are located in files maintained by OTS:

1. Memorandum dated 15 May 1973 from Sidney Gottlieb, C/TSD to DDS&T and DDO, re "Proposed Procedures for Handling U.S. Requirements."

2. Memorandum dated 12 September 1972 from C/CI to C/TSD/Training, re "Locks and Picks Training for Department of Commerce Employees."

3. Memorandum dated 12 December 1972 from DC/TSD/TB to C/CI, re "Training for Two Members of the Department of Commerce."

4. Memorandum for the Record dated 2 May 1975 by Chief, OTS/BAB, re "Graphological Analysis for the Secret Service."

5. Letter dated 18 March 1975 from W. E. Colby to the Postmaster General concerning mail openings.

6. Letter dated March 5, 1975 from the Postmaster General to William E. Colby concerning mail openings.

7. Memorandum for the Record dated 9 January 1974 by OTS/COP/TB, re "HTLINGUAL."

8. Memorandum dated 10 March 1971 for DC/TSD from TSD/CCG/CRB, re "Future of HTLINGUAL Project."

CLASSIFIED BY David W. B
EXEMPT FROM GENERAL DECLASSI
SCHEDULE OF EXECUTIVE ORDER
EXEMPTION CATEGORY § 5B (1), (2),
AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
Impossible to Determine
(effective date or event, if a

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SECRET - SENSITIVE

9. Memorandum dated 30 January 1974 from John D. Morrison, Jr. to Inspector General, re "HN 7-11, Continuing Support to Other Federal Agencies."

10. Memorandum dated 14 December 1973 from DDO to Inspector General re "HN 7-11, Continuing Support to Other Federal Agencies."

11. Memorandum dated 29 January 1975 from D/OTS to Inspector General, re "Questionable Activities Question."

12. Memorandum dated 8 March 1974 from DDO to Chiefs of Divisions and Staffs re "Alias U.S. Driver Licenses."

I would appreciate your forwarding copies of these materials to me at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

March 31, 1975

SECRET - SENSITIVE

B-W
(IV-B)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director

FROM : James B. Weidner

SUBJECT : Request for Files

Please provide copies of the following materials to the undersigned. These materials are contained in a file labeled "DCI Chrono Helms - 1970":

1. Letter dated 14 January 1970 from Richard Helms to Hon. Melvin R. Laird concerning security clearances. (one page)
2. Memo dated 14 January 1970 from Howard J. Osborn to DCI re. Security Clearance Procedures for Congressional Staff Members, plus enclosure (4 pages)
3. Letter dated 20 March 1970 from Richard Helms to Hon. J. Edgar Hoover. (5 pages)
4. Memo dated 6 July 1970 from Richard Helms to Tom C. Huston enclosing "Black Radicalism in the Caribbean". (one page)

I would appreciate your forwarding these materials to me at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

James B. Weidner
JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W
(IV-C)

A. Agency Employees Detailed to the White House and Federal Govt Agencies, 1963-1975 SECRET

B. Mr. James Barnum (Description) ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

C. Political Aspects of Chester Cooper's Assignment to the NSC Staff ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

D. Memo re CIA Ops Center staff at White House Situation Room ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

E. Memo for Senior Duty Officers, WHSR from Mr. James Fazio - 4 June 74 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

F. Memo for Asst Duty Officers, WHSR , from Mr. Fazio - 4 June 74 ADMINISTRATIVE - INTERNAL USE ONLY

G. Personnel Strengths and Salaries at various agencies. ADMIN. - INTERNAL USE ONLY

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

D-W
(IV-D)

A. Memo to File from Harold A. Baker - 10 May 75 SECRET

B. Project TWOFOLD - Info on SECRET

C. Official Routing Slip - 30 Sep 71 to The Director

D. Ltr from Mitchell to Helms - Undated.

E. M/R - Subject: Additional Operational Support to Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) - 11 Jan 72.

F. Memo for Dir. of CI - 2 Feb 71 signed by Osborn SECRET

G. Memo for Dir of CI - from Osborn - 6 Jan 71. SECRET EYES ONLY

H. Memo for Deputy Dir of Security, IOS - 2 Feb 71 SECRET

I. Memo for Bill Colby - 29 May 73

J. Routing Slip from Osborn to Exec Sec - 25 May 73

K. Memo for Exec Secy, Subj: Project TWO FOLD - 29 May 73
SECRET

L. Official Routing Slip - To Dir of Security from John S. Warner, 7/17/73

M. Ltr from Colby to Mr. John R. Bartels - 17 July 73.

N. M/R - Subj: Drug Enforcement Administration - from John S. Warner 25 July 73.

O. One page typed - stating"list of Agency personnel who were witting of the operation" - but no list attached.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(IV - E)

A. Memo from Knoche to Baker - 6 May 75 SECRET

B. M/R from Baker - 21 Apr 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE

C. M/R from Mr. Baker - 21 Apr 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE

D. M/R from Mr. Baker - 23 Apr 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE

E. Advice and Waiver signed by Edward V. O' Connor - 21 Apr 75

F. Statement of Edward V. O'Connor

G. Legislative History

H. Ltr from Baker to Knoche - 24 Apr 75 - SECRET - SENSITIVE

I. M/R - Subj: Purchase of Firearms and Police Materiel through CI Proprietary ENGAGE - 16 Aug 72 SECRET

J. Memo for Chief, Special Operations Gp - 12 July 73 SECRET

K. Ltr from President, National Police Service to Mr. Goin - 1 Oct 73

L. Routing Slip fr Chief, SOG/GB/PLS to C/SOG/GB - 6 Sept 73 SECRET

M. Memo for Chief, Ground Br, Subj: Briefing of ENGAGE - 6 Sept 73 SECRET

N. Official Routing Slip (most of which is illegible)

O. Routing Slip to AC/Services Staff - 27 Jul 73 SECRET

P. Memo for Associate Deputy Dir for Ops - 26 Jul 73 - SECRET

Q. Note for Mr. Nelson - 27 July 73 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

D-W
(IV-F)

CONFIDENTIAL

TABLE OF CONTENTS

A. The History of Headquarters Notices 7-11 and 7-13

B. Headquarters Notice 7-11, 30 August 1973, Agency Assistance to U.S. Federal, State, and Local Government Components

C. Headquarters Notice 7-13, 25 April 1974, Agency Assistance to U.S. Federal, State, and Local Government Components

D. Memorandum from Donald F.Chamberlain, CIA Inspector General to Director of Central Intelligence dated 12 February 1974, Subject: Directorate Responses to HN 7-11—Continuing Support to Other Federal Agencies

E. Memorandum from Donald F. Chamberlain, CIA Inspector General to Director of Central Intelligence dated 12 February 1974 Subject: Discontinued Agency Assistance to U.S. Federal, State, and Local Government Components

F. Memorandum from W. E. Colby, Director to CIA General Counsel and Inspector General dated 5 June 1974, Subject: Agency Assistance to U.S. Federal, State, and Local Government Components (HN 7-11) (BYE 076-74, Series B 2/2)

G. Memorandum from Donald F. Chamberlain, CIA Inspector General to CIA Deputy Directors dated 13 June 1974, Subject: Agency Assistance to U.S. Federal, State and Local Government Components (HN 7-11)--DCI's Review (BYE-112112-74 6/8)

CONFIDENTIAL

13 February 1975

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

A. Memo for Phillip E. Areeda, Counsel to the President dtd 30 Dec 74
SECRET

B. Memo to John Doar from The Attorney General - Creation of Interdivision Information Unit -- Dec 18, 19?

C. Memo for Kevin T. Maroney, Subj: Establishment of a departmental intelligence unit in relation to civil disorders. Nov 9, 77
CONFIDENTIAL

D. Memo for the Attorney General - Sept 27, 1967.From John Doar CONFIDENTIAL

E. Memo to Ramsey Clark, Attorney General - 6 Dec 67 SECRET

F. Special Report of Interagency Committee on Intelligence - June 1970
✓TOP SECRET COMINT

G. Memo for Richard Helms - Subj: Domestic Intelligence, 23 July 70
✓TOP SECRET COMINT

H. Memo for The Attorney General from John Dean - 18 Sept 70 ✓TOP SECRET

I. M/R - Disposition of Nonrecord Material - 16 Mar 74 - - SECRET
SENSITIVE EYES ON

J. Statement by Rafalko re Disposition of Nonrecord Material, dated 16 Mar 74 - Signed by Mr. Frank Rafalko - 18 Mar 74 SECRET SENSITIVE
EYES ONLY

K. Memo - Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff with Chart.

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

April 23, 1975

B-W
(V - D)

SECRET - SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide copies of the following materials to the undersigned. All of these materials are now held by DDO/OPS/ITG:

1. Memorandum for the Record by Lawrence R. Houston, dated 12 December 1967 re "Roger W. Wilkins, Department of Justice, plus annexed Official Routing Slip. (4 pages)

(Item 1 is located in a file labeled "Policy Review, Sept. 1970")

2. Memo dated 14 Dec 1972 from Richard Ober to Executive Director - Comptroller re "MHCHAOS Survey of European Division Field Station, August - September 1972", plus annexed memo dated 5 Dec 1972 re the same subject. (5 pages)

R 2

(Item 2 is located in a file labeled "IG/EUR Review - Fall '72")

3. Routing and Record Sheet dated 14 May 1973 from Richard Ober to Mr. Evans, O/DCI, plus annexed memorandum entitled "Intelligence Evaluation Committee and Staff."

2?

(Item 3 is located in a file labeled "Briefing Papers - CI/SO")

4. "Memorandum for the IEC Members" from John F. Doherty re " Request for Intelligence Estimates", dated February 9, 1971 plus attachment (2 pages).

5. Memo for the Record dated 5 April 1971 by Richard Ober re "Meeting with Robert Mardian..." (2 pages)

(Item 5 is contained in "IEC Chrono - April-May 1971")

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

6. Memo for the Record dated 4 August 1971 by Richard Ober re "IES Meeting, 4 August 1971" (2 pages)

(Item 6 is contained in "IEC Chrono - August-December 1971)

7. Letter dated March 29, 1972 from Bernard A. Wills to Richard Ober, plus attached copy of a memo from George W. Anderson Jr. to Mr. Wills dated March 21, 1972 (2 pages)

(Item 7 is contained in the "IEC Chrono Jan 72 - March 72)

8. Memo dated 18 May 1973 from Richard Ober to James Angleton re "Information relating to the Report Inter-Agency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), plus attached memorandum of Tom Charles Huston dated July 9, 1970

(Item 8 is contained in a file labeled "Returned from Mr. Angleton")

9. Notes of Meeting held on 9 June 1970 of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence - Domestic (Established by the President, June 5, 1970) (3 pages)

10. Notes of Meeting of the USIB Subcommittee on Domestic Intelligence held on 9 June 1970 (3 pages)

11. Minutes of First Meeting of Interagency Committee in Intelligence - Working Subcommittee dated June 10, 1970 (3 pages)

(Items 9-11 are contained in a file labeled "ICI/Chrono - Interagency Committee in Intelligence (Ad Hoc) - June 1970)"

12. A Routing and Record Sheet dated 17 Sept. 1970 from Chief CI to DDP concerning "1200 meeting with DCI in preparation for AG luncheon", plus the annexed papers entitled "Evaluation and Collection of Domestic Intelligence," "Gaps In Coverage," and a Memorandum dated July 9, 1970 from T. C. Huston to Richard Helms (9 pages)

13. Typewritten notes of a meeting held in September 17, 1970. These notes are untitled but are dated 17 Sept 1970 and begin with the word "Mechanism". (3 pages)

14. Memo dated 16 Sept 1970 re "Options" (one page)

(Items 12-14 are contained in a file labeled DCI 17 Sept Luncheon (1970))

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

15. Memorandum for the Record dated 30 May 1969 by Richard Ober re "Second Meeting with Assistant Attorney General Jarris Leonard" (7 pages)

16. Draft Memo for the Record re "Briefing on Department of Justice (Civil Discorders) Machine System" (3 pages)

(Items 15 and 16 are contained in a file labeled
"Justice Dept. LSN - ROOWLY 14 May 1969")

I would appreciate your furnishing these materials at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

May 16, 1975

SECRET - SENSITIVE

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

INSPECTOR GENERAL
75-1715

B-W
II
(~~II~~-E)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide copies of the following materials to the undersigned:

1. Letter dated September 15, 1965 from John F. Doberty, Chairman, Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, to William F. Raborn (2 pages, plus one page Enclosure).

2. Letter dated 11 October 1965 from Lawrence C. Houston to John F. Doberty, Chairman, ICIS.

Items 1 and 2 are located in a file labeled "ICIS Justice 1961-1965"

I would appreciate your furnishing these materials to me at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

James B. Weidner
JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

Classified by David Belin
Exempt from general
declassification schedule of E.O. 11652
exemption category 5B (1), (2), (3)
Automatically declassified on
Date Impossible to Determine

SECRET - SENSITIVE

B-W (K-F)
(a)

INDEX

A. Memo for File from Baker - 16 Mar 74 SECRET - SENSITIVE

B. Memo from Mardian - 10 Feb 71 SECRET - EYES ONLY

C. Memo for IEC Members from Doherty - 8 Feb 71

D. Procedures for the Agencies Contribution to IEC Estimates SECRET

E. Intell. Evaluation Committee Studies Proposed, in preparation, and Issued (Feb 71 - Apr 73) - 15 May 73 SECRET SENSITIVE

F. Contributions by CIA to Intell. Evaluation Committee SECRET

G. Memo about Meeting in Justice Department 19 May 69. SECRET

H. Routing and Record Sheet to Mr. Osborn - 30 July 1969.

I. Memo from Mitchell to Kleindienst - 22 July 1969 CONFIDENTIAL

J. District of Columbia Civil Disturbance and Demonstration Team

K. Memo for Mr. Angleton from Richard Ober - Liaison with Dept of Justice. 19 Sep 70 SECRET SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-w (K ~~CIB~~-F)
(b)

INDEX

1. Meeting with Richard Ober, Robert W. Kiley and Jarvis Leonard discussing cooperation of student unrest and to establish a point of contact between the Justice Department and CIA, dtd 21 May 69

2. Memo for Mr. Angleton concerning Liasion with Department of Justice, dtd 19 Sep 70 SECRET SENSITIVE

3. Inter-division Information Unit (IDIU), dtd 6 Feb 75 SECRET

4. Memo to Richard G. Kleindieust from John N. Mitchell - Establishment of Departmental Disturbance Group, dtd 22 Jul 69 CONFIDENTIAL

5. Interview Summary - Sam J. Papich, Albuquerque, New Mexico, dtd 5 Mar 75 TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE

6. Inter-divisional Information Unit (IDIU), dtd 6 Feb 75

7. Intelligence Evaluation Committee and the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, dtd 6 Feb 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

D-W
(VI-G)

A. Memo from Knoche to Weidner - 21 May 1975 SECRET

B. Memo for Knoche from Chamberlain - Subj: WESTPOINTER - 20 May 75
SECRET

C. Document Receipt - 5/21/75

D. Memo from Knoche to Weidner - 27 Mar 75

E. Memo for Knoche from Weidner - 18 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

F. Memo for Chief, Far East Div - 13 Sept 71 SECRET/SENSITIVE

G. Memo for Record, 20 Feb 75 - SECRET

H. Chronology of Authority for HKSOURDOUGH (from TSD Diary) SECRET

I. Memo for Chief, East Asia Div. - date not legible - but looks like 8 Jun
SECRET SENSITIVE

J. Memo for Chief, Tech. Services Div - 17 Aug 71 SECRET SENSITIVE

K. Memo for Associate Deputy Dir. of Ops. - 15 Jan 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

L. SOURDOUGH CAPSULE SUMMARY - 15 Oct 71

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

B-W
(VI-H)

A. Memo for the Record - Inspection of the Office of Security - 21 Aug 61
SECRET

B. Memo for Deputy Director (Support) - 21 Feb 62 SECRET

C. Memo for Acting Inspector General from White - 9 Mar 62 SECRET

D. Inspector General's Survey of the Office of Security - Annex II
TS 172838 - TOP SECRET

Photocopy from
G R.Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(VI - I)

A. Memo for Mr. Knoche from Weidner - Request for Files - 13 May 75
SECRET - SENSITIVE

B. Memo from Knoche to Weidner - 3 June 75

C. Memo for Chief, East Asia Div, Operation MKSOURDOUGH, 6 June 73
SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

D. Memo for the Files - signed CIA Officer - Subj: Meeting with Deputy Chief Postal Inspector on Chicom Mail Survey — 15 Sept 69
SECRET

E. Memo to File - Subj: Survey of Chicom Airmail to U.S. - 26 Aug 69
SECRET

F. Partly handwritten - partly typed - Oct 69 - May 70 - Chron log of activities .

G. Memo for Record - Subj: Summary of Feb 70 San Francisco Mail Intercept Operation SECRET SENSITIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(VI-J)

A. PROJECT SRINDIAN - Identification, etc. SECRET

B. M/R - Project POINTER - 1 June 1967 SECRET - EYES ONLY

C. Memo for Special Agent in Charge, Manhattan Field Office - 10 Jun 67

D. M/R - Project SPINDIAN - 30 Jun 67 SECRET

E. Cable message - To HDQST from SAC NYFO - 23 Sept 68

F. Cable message to SACNYFO - from HDQS - 20 Sept 68

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(VI-K)

A - Project SETTER (Reference SRPOINTER) SECRET

B - Memo for Deputy Dir. of Security - 9 Oct 57.

C - Statement that "under Tab 2 is a list of 16 personnel from the CIA, Customs and Post Office who were witting of the operation" - but no list attached.

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(VI-L)

A- Project WESTPOINTER - SECRET

B- Memo for Deputy Dir. of Security - 24 Dec 74 - SECRET

C -Memo for Chief, East Asia Div - 6 June 73 SECRET SENSITIVE EYES ONLY

D -Official Routing Slip - to Dir of Sec. 7 Jun 73

E -Transmittal Slip to Mr. Osborne - 7 June 73

F -M/R - from Iden 15 - 19 Oct 71 SECRET

F -Project Westpointer

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(VI-M)

A - Memo from Knoche to Baker - 10 Apr 75

B - New York Mail Intercept Program (1952-1973) SECRET

C - Briefs on Cases Handled Since the 1950s - 28 Feb 75 SECRET

D - M/R - Approximate Statistics on CI Staff Project HTLINGUAL Material - 23 Jan 75 SECRET EYES ONLY

E - Ernest Tsikerdanos - duly sworn - 10 Apr 75.

F - Memo to Chief, Special Security Div - Subj: Russian Mail Survey - 13 June 5
SECRET

G - M/R - Conversation with Personnel of PO - 14 July 52.

H - Memo to Security Officer/CIA - 1 July 52 - SECRET

I - Memo for Chief/FI - 31 Mar 53

J - Memo for Deputy Dir, Plans - 30 Sept 52 SECRET

K - Ltr fr Carey to Garner - 6 Nov 52 - SECRET

L - Case No. 77826 - 18 Dec 52 SECRET

M - Memo for Chief, ILS - 13 July 53 SECRET EYES ONLY

N - Memo to Chief, SR/6 - 26 July 55 - SECRET

O - Memo for Chief, I&S - Subj: Intelligence Value of SR Pointer -23 Sept 53
SECRET

P - Memo for Chief of Operations - 23 Dec 53 SECRET

Q - Non-CIA Personnel Witting of Certain Aspects of Project HTLINGUAL

R - M/R - HTLINGUAL - Witting PO Officials - 21 Mar 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

S - Memo to Dir of CI - 4 Jan 54 SECRET EYES ONLY

T - Official Routing Slip to Mr. Helms - 12 Jan 54 SECRET EYES ONLY

U - Memo for Dir, CI - 12 Jan 54 SECRET

V - Memo for Dir of Security - 17 May 54 EYES ONLY

W - Memo for Chief of Ops - 21 Nov 55 SECRET

X - Memo for Chief, Counter Intell Staff - 4 Nov 55 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

y - Project Cryptonym or Subj: HTLINGUAL - 7 Nov 55-SECRET

z - Budget Data - SECRET

a - Memo for Dir of CI - May 56

b- Memo to Deputy Chief, CI Staff - 24 Apr 57 SECRET

c - Memo for File - 30 Apr 57 SECRET

d - Memo for Dir, FBI Attn: Mr. Papich - 6 Feb 58 SECRET

e - Memo for Chief of Ops, DD/P - 27 Jan 61 EYES ALONE

f - Memo for Acting Deputy Dir (Plans) .

g - C/CI/Project's Note - Aug 71.

h.- Memo for Deputy Chief, CI - 16 Feb 61 SECRET

i - Memo for Chief, CI Staff - 11 Hanuary 62 - SECRET

j - Memo for Dir, Office of Security - 1 Feb 62 - SECRET EYES ALONE

k - Memo for Deputy Dir (Support) from Edwards - 20 Dec 62 SECRET

l - Reply from office of DC/OS/IDS.

m - Memo for Chief, EE Div - 26 Sept 63 - SECRET

n - Memo for Files - 23 Apr 65 SECRET/EYES ONLY

o - Memo To - CI/Project Analysts - 30 June 65 SECRET/EYES ONLY

p - Dispatch - to Chief of Certain Stations and Bases - 7 Apr 65 SECRET

q - Memo for Sam Papich - 16 Sept 65 SECRET

r - M/R - 8 Apr 69 SECRET

s - Ltr to Mr. Cotter from Mr. Stone - 13 Jan 71

t - M/R - 19 May 71

u - Memo to Chief, CI/Project - 7 June 71 SECRET/EYES ONLY

v - Memo for DC/CI and EXO/CI - 7 June 71 SECRET/EYES ONLY

w - Memo from Chief, CI/Project - 3 June 71 SECRET/EYES ONLY

x - M/R - 3 June 71 SECRET/EYES ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

y - M/R - 22 Dec 71 SECRET-EYES ONLY

z - Official Routing Slip to DD/P from Colby - 20 Feb 73

aa - M/R - from Colby - 15 Feb 73 SECRET SENSITIVE

bb - Talking Paper - 14 Feb 73 - SECRET SENSITIVE

cc - M/R - Visit to Hqs- 16 Feb 73

dd - Memo for CI/EXO - 19 June 73 SECRET/EYES ONLY

ee - Memo to C/CI/Proj - 16 Mar 73 EYES ONLY

ff - Memo from J. Edgar Hoover to Dir, CIA - 10 Mar 72 SECRET

gg - Contents on the FBI's Updated Statement of Requirements for
CI/Project - 14 Mar 72 SECRET/EYES ONLY

hh - CIA Official Routing Slip ~~0~~- 27 Oct 66

ii - Memo for C/CI/Project - from Richard Ober - 15 Feb 72 SECRET EYES ONLY

jj - M/R - 4 Mar 70 SECRET - EYES ONLY

kk - M/R - Value of HTLINGUAL Operation - 29 Mar 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

ll - Random Examples of Production. SECRET

mm - M/R - CI Staff Project Holdings - 15 Jan 75 SECRET EYES ONLY

nn - M/R - Data on CI Staff Project Raw Material - 17 Jan 75 SECRET

oo - Memo for Mr. Knoche from Kalaris - 27 Mar 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE

pp - Memo for Mr. Knoche - from Harold Baker - 25 Mar 75 SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

INDEX

B-W
(VI-N)
(a)

1. Interview - William Cotter - Mail Intercept, dtd 14 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIV
2. Memo summarizing the New York Mail Intercept Program (1952-1973), dtd 13 Ma SECRET SENSITIVE
3. Mail Intercept Operations, undated SECRET
4. CIA Mail Intercept Operation in Honolulu, dated 21 Feb 75 SECRET
5. SRPOINTER, undated SECRET
6. Memo - New York Mail Intercept Records, 19 Mar 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE
7. Index to Domestic Surveillance Master Summary - undated
8. Rutgers Law Review - Notes: Wiretapping & Elec Surveillance Crime Control Act of 1968
9. Correspondence between Postmaster General and Director Colby, 5 & 13 Mar 7
10. Memo - Interview w/Russell F. Miller, 14 Mar 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE
11. Memo - Interview w/James H. Kelly, Jr., 17 Mar 75 SECRET/SENSITIVE
12. Memo - Interview of June Elliott, 17 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE
13. Interview w/Robert T. Crowley, 18 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE
14. Memo - Interview w/Jerry L. Shinn, 24 Mar 75 SECRET SENSITIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-W
(XI-N)
(b)

A. Memo to Chief, Special Security Div - 13 June 52 SECRET

B. M/R - Subj: Contact with PO Dept - 11 June 52 SECRET

C. Memo to Chief, SR/6 - 26 July 55 - SECRET EYES ONLY

D. Memo for Dir of CI - 4 May 56 - SECRET

E. Memo to Chief, CI Staff, 19 Jun 1959 SECRET EYES ONLY

F. Memo to Security Officer/CIA - 1 July 52 SECRET

G. Memo to Post Office Dept - 6 Nov 52 SECRET

H. Case No. 77826 - 18 Dec 52

I. Memo for Dir of Security - 17 May 54 - SECRET EYES ONLY

J. Memo for Deputy Chief, CI - from Helms - 16 Feb 61 SECRET

K. M/R - Subj: DCI's Meeting Concerning HTLINGUAL - 19 May 71 SECRET EYES ON

L. M/R - 22 July 71 SECRET EYES ONLY

M. M/R - 3 June 71 SECRET/EYES ONLY

N. Memo to Dir of CI - 4 Jan 54 SECRET EYES ONLY

O. Memo for Chief, I&S - 23 Sept 53 SECRET

P. Memo for Chief of Ops/DDP - 23 Dec 53 SECRET EYES ONLY

Q. Memo for Chief of Ops - 21 Nov 55 SECRET

R. Memo for Chief, Counter Intell Staff - 4 Nov 55

S. M/R - Visit to Hqs - 16 Feb 73

T. Memo for Chief of Ops, DD/P - 27 Jan 51 - SECRET EYES ALONE

U. M/R - Approx. Statistics on CI Staff Project SECRET SENSITIVE

V - Memo - 7 June 71 SECRET/EYES ONLY

W. Memo for Hqs - 19 Dec 67

X. Official Routing Slip - 8/16/57 EYES ONLY

Y. M/R - 16 Aug 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

Z - Memo for Chief, EE Div - 26 Sept 63 SECRET

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

22 March 1975

B-W
(VII-M)

Mr. James B. Weidner
Counsel
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States

Dear Mr. Weidner:

Enclosed are responses to your 54-item request of 14 March 1975. Each document is numbered to correspond with the numbers listed in your request.

We have not included the documents cited in your #7, #9, #10, #13, #14, #15, #18, #20, #21, #22, #48 and #50. All are included in the nine official MHCHAOS exhibits already in your possession. We have, per your request, included here the routing sheet mentioned in #9 and the transmittal slip mentioned in #50.

A response to your #30 will be provided soon.

We recognize that the copies of documents related to #44 are generally illegible and we will remedy this soon.

Please note that the document cited in your #2 and #53 is one and the same memo.

Faithfully yours,

EHKnoche

E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

Enclosures: a/s

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

1 75-131
David W. Belin,
Executive Director

March 14, 1975

SECRET - SENSITIVE

B-W
(VII-M)

Hand delivered
by Mr Weidner
to Mr Eckstein
17 Mar 75 100/
me

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide to the undersigned copies of the following materials. All materials are now maintained in the area occupied by the International Terrorism Group.

1. Memo, dated 6 December 1972 to Chief CI Staff, from T. H. Karamessines re Specific Conditions Relative to Servicing of Requests from Other U. S. Agencies for Investigative Action on American Citizens Overseas (2 pages).

2. Memo for the Record dated 5 December 1972 by Richard Ober (2 pages).

3. Memo dated 9 November 1972 to the Executive Director - Comptroller from William V. Broe re "MHCHAOS" (3 pages, plus cover sheet).

4. Memo for the Record re "Meeting with the DCI, 15 March 1971" (1 page)

5. Memo for the Record re "Log on FBI Collection Abroad with Reference to Internal Security Matters (3 pages)

6. Memo for the Record dated 13 January 1971 by Richard Ober re "Initial Contact with Immigration and Naturalization Service (1 page).

7. Memo dated 6 September 1969 from Richard Helms to DDP, DDI, DDS and DDS&T (2 pages).

8. Draft Entitled "DDP Staff Meeting 10 September 1969" signed Raymond G. Rocca (2 pages)

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

entire

9. Memo dated 15 August 1967 from T. H. Karamessines, DDP, to Chief CI Staff re "Overseas Coverage of Subversive Student and Other Related Activities." (2 pages, plus routing sheet).

(Items 1-9 are contained in a file labeled "Charter MHCHAOS").

10. Briefing papers (for Mr. Colby) entitled "Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff" dated 1 June 1972. - Only Points I-III are requested (15 pages).

11. Untitled summary dated 7 June 1973, the first words of which are: "#1. FBI documents (memorandums, reports and letters)...."(3 pages).

(Items 10-11 are contained in a file labeled "Briefing of Mr. Nelson - 7 June, 1973)

12. A memo dated 25 March 1974 from the Acting Chief, ITG to the Chief, Coordination and Community Affairs Branch, Intelligence Group (Only pages 1, 7, and 8 are requested.)

13. A Routing and Record Sheet dated 5 March 1974 from Richard Ober to AC/OPS, DDO, DCI, plus the attachments thereto (13 pages).

(Items 12-13 are contained in a file labeled "MHCHAOS History (Eyes Only Richard Ober)").

14. Cable of 3 July 1972 to London (Director #285741) (3 pages).

15. A memo dated 5 August 1971 to Chief FE/OPS from Richard Ober, Chief CI/SO re "Briefing of OMB Team." (one page).

16. A memo for the Record dated 5 August 1971 from Richard Ober re "Briefing of OMB Team" (one page).

17. A memo for the Record dated 27 July 1971 from Richard Ober re Office of Management and Budget Survey (two pages).

(Items 14-17 are contained in a file labeled "MHCHAOS Policy (Operational Liaison) Vol. II")).

18. Cable dated 23 March 1970 to Director, FBI (Director #019112) (one page).

19. Memo for the Record May 29, 1969 by Richard Ober re "Procedures for Restricting Handling of RYBAT MHCHAOS Traffic" (2 pages.).

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

2 pages, both front and back).

21. Book cable dated 4 July 1968 (Director #13667) (5 pages)

22. Book cable dated 2 November 1967 (Director #49260) (5 pages)

(Items 18-22 are contained in a file labeled "MHCHAOS Policy (Operational & Liaison) V.I.")

23. Memo of 15 March 1968 to DDP from Joseph W. Smith, Acting Chief Far East Division re "Authorization for Operations in the New Left in the United States. (3 pages)

24. Memo of 3 April 1968 to the DC/CI from Richard Ober re "FE Division Memorandum on Operations.." (2 pages)

25. Memo of 4 April 1968 to the DDP from James R. Hunt re Memorandum for the DDP from Acting Chief FE Division..." (4 pages).

(Items 23-25 are contained in a file labeled "DDP Correspondence - 1968").

26. Memo of 2 June 1970 for the DDP from Richard Ober (2 pages - please provide a copy of the original, which shows handwriting.

27. Memo of 9 June 1970 to DDP from Richard Ober, plus the handwritten note also dated 9 June 1970 attached to the memo. (2 pages).

28. Memo of 27 July 1970 to DDP from Richard Ober re "MHCIDER" (2 pages - we do not need the 3 x 5 card attached to the memo).

29. Memo for the Record dated 19 October 1970 by Richard Ober re Committee on Kidnapping (1 page).

(Item 26-29 are contained in a file labeled "DDP Correspondence - 1970")

30. "Meeting Agenda for 15 April (water soluble paper)" (one page - copy both sides).

31. Memo dated 17 April 1971 re "MHYIELD Movement to WDC (one page)

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

(Items 30-32 are contained in an operations
Vol. III)

33. Memo dated 2 November 1970 to "Operational Support Staff, DCS" from Richard Ober re New York State Police Reporting (one page).

34. Memo dated 19 October 1970 from Chief, Syracuse Office to Director, Domestic Contact Service re "Case No. 52,722" (2 pages).

35. Routing and Record Sheet dated 8 June 1970 from DCS/Operational Support Staff to C/CI/SO re Case 52722, plus a memorandum for the record, and an "Official Routing Slip" annexed to the Sheet (6 pages)

36. A Memo dated 9 July 1970 re "Meeting with DCS Headquarters' Officers" (4 pages).

37. Memo dated 23 June 1970 re "Discussion with DCS/OSS" (1 page)

38. Memo dated 20 May 1970 re "Discussion with Earl Walker" (1 page).

(Items 33 - 38 are contained in an operations file labeled "DCS Hqs")

39. Routing and Record Sheet dated July 20, 1970 to CI/SO Attn: Horn, from Shirley Stetson plus an attached memorandum to the Acting Chief, Detroit Field Office (2 pages).

40. Routing and Record Sheet dated 6 July 1970 to CI/SO Attn: Mr. Horn from Shirley Stetson, plus 2 attachments (3 pages)

41. Routing and Record Sheet dated 13 July 1970 to Shirley Stetson from DC/CI/SO plus attachment (2 pages).

(Items 39-41 are contained in an operations file labeled "DCS Detroit")

42. "Agenda for Discussion with DCS Base Chief "(undated but probably October 1970) (2 pages).

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

44. Memo dated 19 December 1969 to "Chiefs, All Field Offices" from "Director, Domestic Contact Service (OSS)" (3 pages).

[Items 42-44 are contained in a file labeled "DCS Briefing Papers"]

45. Memo for the Record dated 20 November 1967 by Richard Ober re "Demonstration Techniques. (3 pages)

46. Memo dated 17 November 1967 to the Director, FBI from James Angleton re "International Connections of the U. S. Peace Movement" (2 pages).

47. Memo for the Record dated 3 November 1967 by Richard Ober re "International Connections of the United States Peace Movement - Daily Progress Report (3 November 1967)" (5 pages)

48. Memo for the Record dated 1 November 1967 by Richard Ober re: International Connections of the United States Peace Movement - Meeting with Rex Godfrey, Director OCI on 1 November" (2 pages)

49. Routing and Record Sheet dated 1 November 1967 from CI/OP/Ober to C/CI, plus attached Memorandum for "Chief CI Staff" dated 1 November 1967 from Richard Ober. (3 pages).

50. Routing and Record Sheet dated 31 October 1967 from DDP/CI/Ober to C/CI, plus attached Memo for the Record dated 31 October 1967 by Richard Ober re "International Connection of the United States Peace Movement," and an attached Transmittal Slip dated 1 Nov 1967 from R. Ober to Mr. Angleton (5 pages).

51. Memo dated 15 December 1967 to "Chief RID" from Richard Ober re "Demonstrations and Protests" (1 page).

[Items 45-51 are contained in a file labeled "MHPASHA: Headquarters Correspondence"]

52. Memo for DCI dated 9 August 1968 from R. Ober re "Liaison with the National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence (2 pages

[Item 52 is contained in a file labeled "DCI Correspondence - 1969"]

53. Memo for the Record dated 5 December 1972 re "Meeting with the Director on MHCHAOS, 5 December 1972" by R. Ober (2 pages).

[Items 53 is contained in a file labeled "DCI Correspondence - 1972"]

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

by President Nixon Mentioning
(1 page).

(Item 54 is contained in a file labeled "DCI Correspondence - 1973")

I would appreciate receiving copies of these materials at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

SENSITIVE

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Executive Registry
75-1341/1

March 17, 1975

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

Ad Hoc Staff
75-147

B-W
(VII-N)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide to the undersigned copies of the following materials, all of which are located in files maintained by the Far East Division, DDO:

1. Memo for the Record dated 7 February 1972 by Earl Hyde re "Operational Meetings with MPTROIKA-8" (5 pages).

2. Memo for the Record dated 20 March 1972 by Earl Hyde re "Contact Meetings with MPTROIKA-8" (5 pages).

(Items 1-2 are contained in a file labeled "MPTROIKA/8 Vol. II")

3. Memo for the Record dated 17 February 1971 by E. Hyde re "Charles T. W_____ Civic Building" (2 pages).
[illegible]

4. Memo for the Record dated 22 March 1971 by E. Hyde re "Contact Meeting with Charles T. W_____ (2 pages).

5. Memo for the Record dated 31 March 1971 by E. Hyde re "Contact Meeting with Charles T. W_____ plus attachment (6 pages).

6. Memo for the Record dated 22 April 1971 by "Oscar A. Speicher" re "Contact Meeting with Charles T. W_____ (3 pages).

(Item 3-6 are contained in a file labeled "MPTROIKA/4 Vol II")

7. Memo for C/DDP/NSP from William E. Nelson re "Proposed Operation Against an Asian Communist Party", plus a Routing

SECRET
SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

and Record Sheet and an Official Routing Slip attached thereto (7 pages).

(Item 7 is contained in a file labeled "MPTROIKA/2 and MPTROIKA/3 Vol I")

8. Memo for the Record dated 28 April 1970 by "Oscar A Speicher" re "Employment Briefing for Rex N. Augustinium (F) and Frank V. Dunderville (M)" (3 pages).

9. Memo for the Record dated 3 August 1970 by E. Hyde re "Contact with Frank V. Dunderville (P)" (2 pages).

(Items 8-9 are contained in a file labeled "MPTROIKA/2 and MPTROIKA/ Vol III")

10. Undated Memo labeled "Subject: MPLODESTAR", bearing the type-written notation at the bottom: "The covering memorandum for this item was signed by Colby on or about 5 September 1973." (1 page).

11. Memo dated 10 May 1971 to ADDP re "Project Renewal and Amendment Requests - Project LODESTAR" (2 pages plus pages 1-3, 8 and 9 of the attachment to this memo.)

12. Memo for ADDP dated (at the end) 31 Jan 1972 re "Renewal Request for Project LODESTAR" (2 pages plus pages 1-5, 18, 19 of the attachment).

13. Memo dated 31 January 1973 from William E. Nelson to ADDP re "Renewal Request for Project LODESTAR" (2 pages, plus pages 1-5 of the attachment).

(Items 10-13 are contained in a file labeled "MPLODESTAR - Project RENEWALS")

I would appreciate your furnishing these copies at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

James B. Weidner

JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

SECRET

SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

Washington, DC 20500

[illegible]on A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

16

March 18, 1975

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Delivered by hand to EHK at noon, 3/2
HW

B-W
(VII-0)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide the undersigned copies of the following materials. These materials are contained in a file labeled "Resistance/Merrimak" located in the area occupied by the Office of Security:

1. Undated memorandum, the first words of which are: "Attached is a copy of a memorandum which UNO prepared..." (2 pages).

2. Undated memo for Director, FBI, from James Angleton, for the DDP, re "Request for Assistance in Acquiring Assets for the Collection of Intelligence on North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front." (3 pages).

3. Routing and Record Sheet dated 23 January 1968, from Chief SAD (Room 4E28) to DDS/IOS (Room 4E70), plus the memoranda attached thereto (13 pages).

4. Routing and Record Sheet, the first date of which is 20 February 1968 to the DC/CI, etc., plus the attachment (8 pages).

5. Memo dated 8 March 1968 to Director of Security from Charles W. Kane, re "Proposed Joint Effort of Far East Division and Office of Security in acquiring Assets in the "Peace" and "Black Power" movements in the United States." (2 pages).

6. Memo of 13 March 1968 to Director of Security from Victor R. White re "Operations Merrimack - Candle - St probe," plus attachments

SECRET - SENSITIVE

Photocopy from
G R Ford Library

sides of the first page (which bears handwriting,
(9 pages).

I would appreciate your furnishing these copies at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

COMMISSION ON
Washington, DC 20500

March 18, 1975

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Directo

B-W
(VII - P)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner entire

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide to the undersigned copies of the following materials, all of which are located in files maintained in the DDO/ITG area:

✓ 1. "Log 1 Sept. 67" - handwritten notes (8 pages - both sides).

✓ 2. "Log 3 Oct 67, Tues" - handwritten notes (4 pages - both sides)

(Items 1-2 are located in looseleaf notebooks (black binding) containing handwritten notes of Richard Ober.

✓ 3. Log for 14 April '70 - handwritten notes (4 pages).

(Item 3 is contained in a folder labeled "April 1970". This encompasses daily longhand notes written by Richard Ober on yellow legal paper).

✓ 4. Routing and Record Sheet dated 7 April 1970 from C/CI Special Operation Richard Ober to C/FE/OPS, plus the Official Routing Slip and Draft attached thereto. These materials bear handwriting in green ink (20 pages).

✓ 5. Official Routing Slip dated 9 April 1970, from George T. Kalaris to SA/ADDP plus the first three pages of the draft attached thereto (4 pages).

✓ 6. Undated draft (on yellow paper), the first words of which are: "Several aspects of this project directly concern. . ." (one page).

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

E 2 IMPDET CL BY 06/705

✓ 7. Undated draft (on white paper), the first words of which are: "Project is approved with the following provision. . ." (one page).

✓ 8. Memo for the Record dated 15 April 1970 by Donald P. Gregg re "Meeting with ADDP on Project MPLODESTAR" (2 pages).

(Items 4-8 are contained in a file labeled "Eyes Only JH & RO - Includes MPLODESTAR; MPDIALECTIC; MPTROIKA; MPSTRUGGLE").

I would appreciate your furnishing these copies to me at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

B-W
(VII-R)

entire

A. Ltr to Mr. Weidner from Mr. Knoche - 6 May 75

B. Ltr from Weidner to Knoche - 23 Apr 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE

C. Memo from Knoche to Weidner - 2 Apr 75

D. Document Receipt - Apr 75

E. Memo for Mr. Knoche from Weidner - 24 Mar 75 SECRET - SENSITIVE

F. Memo for Deputy Dir for Plans/Intell and Security, Subj: 21 Oct Demonstration - from Helms - 26 Sept 67 SECRET

R G. Memo for The President - 5 Jan 68 For Official Use Only - Sensitive

H. Student Dissent and Its Techniques in the US - 5 Jan 68 For Official Use Only - Sensitive

R I. Memo for The President from Helms - 17 Jan 68 SECRET/SENSITIVE

J. Memo from Helms to Watson - 24 Jan 68 with attached Memo for the President - 24 Jan 68 SECRET/SENSITIVE

K. Memo for the President from Helms - 4 Sept 68 SECRET/SENSITIVE

L. Memo for Mr. Kissinger from Helms - Student Unrest; dtd 18 Feb 69 SECRET

M. Notes (Herbert Ithin) - undated SECRET/SENSITIVE

N. Notes for meeting with AG on 25 July 69 SECRET/SENSITIVE

O. Memo for The Director/ s/RK - 4 Sept 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

P. Memo for Deputy Director/Plans/Intell/Support/Science and Technology; 6 Sep 69 SECRET EYES ONLY

Q. Memo for The Deputy Dir, DDp; DD/I; DD/S - Subj: The Heroin Problem - 25 Oct 69 (from Helms) SECRET

R. Notes from 24 Oct '69 Meeting on the Heroin Problem SECRET

S. Some penciled notes - which have been zeroxed - SECRET

T. Memo for Mr. Kent Crane from Helms - 20 May 70 SECRET/SENSITIVE

U. Memo to DCI - from C/CI Mr. Ober - 20 May 70 SECRET EYES ONLY

V. Memo for Mr. Karamessines from Helms - 30 Oct 69 SECRET

W. M/R - Subj: Discussion with Attorney General Mitchell on Domestic Intelligence - from Helms - 28 July 70 SECRET/SENSITIVE

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy
from
Gerald R. Ford Library

X. Memo for The Vice President from Helms - 2 Sep 70.

Y. Memo for The President from Helms - 15 Nov 67 SECRET EYES ONLY

Z. Memo to The President from Helms - 15 Nov 67

R

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

8 April 1975

B-W
(VII-5)

Mr. James B. Weidner
Counsel
Commission on CIA Activities
Within the United States

Entire

Dear Mr. Weidner:

Attached in response to your 6-item memo of 25 March, are the papers you requested.

With regard to Tab 3, you will note there are copies of two memoranda dated 28 September 1967 from the Assistant Attorney General to the CIA General Counsel.

You received your answer to your question #6 at an earlier date.

Faithfully yours,

E H Knoche

E. H. Knoche
Assistant to the Director

Attachment: a/s

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES
Washington, DC 20500

Nelson A. Rockefeller,
Chairman
John T. Connor
C. Douglas Dillon
Erwin N. Griswold
Lane Kirkland
Lyman L. Lemnitzer
Ronald Reagan
Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.

David W. Belin,
Executive Director

March 25, 1975

SECRET - SENSITIVE

B-W
(VII-5)

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. E. H. Knoche, Assistant to the Director

FROM: James B. Weidner

SUBJECT: Request for Files

Please provide copies of the following documents to the undersigned. Items 1-5 are in files maintained by the Deputy Chief of the East Asia Division. I understand that a copy of Item 6 is in the files of the ADDP or of the DDO/ITG.

1. Letter dated August 4, 1967 from Fred W. Vinson, Jr., Assistant Attorney General to Richard Helms re a SNCC official.
2. Letter dated 7 August, 1967 from Richard Helms to Fred W. Vinson, Jr.
3. Letter dated September 28, 1967 from J. Walter Yeagley, Assistant Attorney General to Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, CIA.
4. Letter dated September 21, 1967 from J. Walter Yeagley to Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, CIA.
5. Memo dated 14 August, 1967 from Lawrence R. Houston, General Counsel, to Chief, Special Intelligence Staff, DDS&T re Stokley Carmichael.
6. U. S. Government Memorandum dated August 22, 1967 from D. J. Brennan, Jr., to W. C. Sullivan re "Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Interest in U. S. Radical Situation" (one page).

I would appreciate your furnishing these materials to me at the earliest feasible time. Thanks.

James B. Weidner
JAMES B. WEIDNER
Counsel

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

B-w
VII-u

INDEX

1. Interview - Jason Horn - MHCHAOS Activities, Mar 7 1975
2. CI/SO Files Containing FBI Reports and a Volume of Special Channel Sensitive Material of Agency Origin, Feb 12, 1975
3. Memo on Conversations Conducted by Harold A. Baker and James B. Weidner at CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia, with Ray Rocca, George Kalaris, George Weisz and Alan P. White, Feb 24, 1975
4. Interview - Diana Heflin, Cable Duty Secretary, Feb 25, 1975
5. ITG File Review of 1,700 Personality Files, Jan 14, 1975
6. Interview - David H. Blee - CHAOS Operation, Feb 26, 1975
7. Chart - Operations Directorate
8. Review of Sensitive (MCHAOS) Personality Files, Jan 15, 1975
9. History of ITG's File Review - undated
10. Charles K. Marcules, Robert D. Brown, Jr., Alan P. White, Michael Tanes, and Jason Horn - undated
11. Domestic Dissident Groups - Draft - undated
12. Interview - Ray S. Klein - Domestic Dissident Group, Mar 13, 1975
13. Memo - MHCHAOS Activities - Checking thru Name Index - Files, Mar 4, 1975
14. Interview - Clarence M. Kelly - CHAOS Activities, Mar 12, 1975
15. Interview - Mr. Alan White, Feb 24, 1975
16. N. Scott Miler - Background Info, Jan 28, 1975
17. Conference with Various Members of the Far East Division of the DDO on March 3, 1975 at CIA Hqs: Theodore Shackley, Rbt D. Brown, Edward Juchniewicz, Andrew Ness and John Mason & 2 other members of the Dept.
18. Interview - George T. Kalaris - Far East Division, Feb 27, 1975
19. Interview = William Hood, Feb 26, 1975
20. Interview - William J. Hood, Former Exec Officer to the Chief of CI OPS, Feb 20, 1975

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

G-C-H (III F)

A. E2 IMPDET CL BY 013511 SECRET

B. DDO NOTICE No. 1-1166 - 5 July 73 from Colby SECRET

C. DDO Notice - Draft - 11 Mar 75 SECRET

D. DDO Notice No. 230 - 11 Mar 75 SECRET

E. Memo from Tim Hardy - Interview with Gordon B. Mason - 31 Mar 75

F. Advice and Waiver dtd 27 Mar 75 - signed by Gordon Mason

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

April 22, 1975

G-C-H
(III-N)

Mr. E. Henry Knoche
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Knoche:

The Commission would like copies of the following documents:

Regulations

(1) HR-5 Publications
(2) HR-230 Plans, Programs and Projects
(3) HR-1 Organization
(4) HR-18 Training
(5) HR-31 Audit

Handbooks

(1) HHB 7-1 Handbook of Required Regulatory Reading
(2) HHB 30-1 Procedures for Financial Administration

Notices

(1) HN 7-10 Management Advisory Group (March, 1975)

Bulletins

(1) Headquarters Bulletin 337 (December, 1972)

Sincerely,

Timothy S. Hardy

TSH:clb
(2)

1 - Addressee
1 - Chron

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

(II-I)

DCID No. 1/9(New Series)	Effective 26 Oct 61)	#298
DCID No. 1/9 (New Series)	Effective 17 Dec 1958)	#202
DCID no. $1/11^1$ (	Effective Aug 23 1974	#307
DCID 1/11(New Series)	Effective 23 April 1965	#333
DCID 1/11(New Series)	Effective 24 March 59	#263
DCID no. 1/12 (New Series)	Effective 23 Dec 64)	#368
DCID no 1/14 (New Series)	Effective 1 July 1968	#354
DCID no 1/14(New Series)	Approved 23 June 67	#331
DCID no 1/17	Effective 5 June 1974	#289
DCID no 2/2	Effective 23 April 65	#320
DCID no 2/2 (New Series)	Effective 26 June 1959	#263
DCID no 2/2 (New Series)	Effective 21 April 1958	#308
DCID no 2/3 (New Series)	Effective 25 July 1963)	#340
DCID no 2/3(New Series)	Effective 21 March 1961	#313
DCID no 2/3(New Series)	Effective 26 June 1959	#211
DCID no 2/3 (New Series)	Effective 6 May 1958	#181
DCID no 7/1	(10/1/53; Secret)	#28
DCID no 2/8 (New Series)	Effective 25 July 63	#344
DCID no 2/8(New Series)	Effective 21 March 61	#335
DCID no 4/1 (New Series)	Revised 23 April 65	#427
DCID no 4/1(New Series)	Revised 7 June 1960	#394
DCID no 4/1(New Series)	Effective 26 June 1959	#320

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

CONFIDENTIAL

DCID no 4/1 (New Series)		Effective 29 April 1958	#328
DCID 14/1		(7/17/50;Secret)	Cy # CIA/TSR #1
DCID no 4/3(New Series)		Effective 26 June 1959	#593
DCID no 4/3 (New Series)		Effective 29 April 1958	#364
DCID no 5/1 (New Series)		Effective 8 Dec 1959	#1332
DCID 5/1		11 January 1955; Secret	#428
DCID no 5/3 (New Series)		Effective 8 Dec 1959	#1054
DCID no 5/4 (New Series)		Effective 8 Dec 1959	#1050
DCID no 7/1 (New Series)		Effective 25 July 1963	#1040
DCID no. 7/1 (New Series	ANNEX A	Effective 20 Aug 1970	#1095
DCID no 7/1 (New Series	ANNEX A	Effective 16 May 1967	#935
DCID no 7/1(New Series)	ANNEX B	Effective 16 May 1967	#952
DCID no 7/1(New Series)		Effective 7 Dec 1961	#1177
DCID No 7/1(New Series)		Effective 26 June 1959	#1246
DCID no 1/8 (New Series)		Effective 29 April 1958	#189

CONFIDENTIAL

Photocopy from Gerald R. Ford Library

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY   HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER   180-10060-10436
    RECORD SERIES   STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question, (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual

Number of Postponements: 10

Postponements All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers

Reason for Board Action The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest

Substitute Language SSN

Date of Next Review 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10436

RECORDS SERIES :
SSTAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/01/76
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINSTRATION
HAMILTON, GERALD P

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251-88-1541	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 956 of 95th Congress
3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ____
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only
Office Code __________
Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of __________________________
ID __________________________
Benefits __________________________
Payroll __________________________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251-88-1541	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$45,900.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 956 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 11, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of __________________

ID __________________

Benefits __________________

Payroll __________________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251-88-1541	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Deputy Chief Researcher	$27,800

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress
3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 1, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only
Office Code ________
Monthly Annuity $________00 as of ________
ID ________
Benefits ________
Payroll ________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251-88-1541	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Deputy Chief Researcher	26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	5/6/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251 88 1541	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ____________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code _______

Monthly Annuity $_______00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251 86 1541	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 865 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date April 29 , 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Gerald P. Hamilton	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251-88-1541	☐ Appointment XX ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$14,760.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 11 of 95 Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	1/2/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251 [illegible] 1541	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$15,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 11 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code ________

Monthly Annuity $________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251 06 1041	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Researcher	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 1540 of 94th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gerald P. Hamilton	December 1, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
251 3[illegible] 15[illegible]1	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Researcher	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 1540 of 94th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

hand carried to FB 11/30/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date November 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Gerald P. Hamilton
Signature of Employee

Jan 10, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10438
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10438

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/11/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HARDWAY, DAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dan L. Hardway	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263-17-0952	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 956 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b) prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date January 2 , 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member District and State)

____
(If appropriate signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED __________________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of __________________________

ID _________________________

Benefits _________________________

Payroll _________________________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dan L. Hardway	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263-17-0952	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,800.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 956 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date October 10, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ________________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dan L. Hardway	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263-17-0352	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dan L. Hardway	7/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263 17 0952	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date July 11, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

FO
7/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U S House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Danny L Hardway
Signature of Employee

7/12/77
Date

MEMORANDUM

JULY 7, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth

FROM: Donovan Gay

RE: New Research Employees

Please be advised that on Monday, July 11, 1977, four researchers will be reporting to duty. The four new employees for the Research/Document Unit are: Thomas Mark Flanagan, Jr.; Edwin Juan Lopez; Dan L. Hardway, and Leslie Wizelman.

All four will be joining our staff as Researchers, and are to be compensated at the rate of $12,000 per annum.

The above has been authorized per the instructions of Bob Blakey.

Thank you.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10439
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10439

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/01/77
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HAUSMAN, ALAN B.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 19, 1979

District Unemployment Compensation Board
6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20001

Gentlemen:

The Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives, officially terminated at noontime, Wednesday, January 3, 1979.

In connection therewith, the below listed staff member will terminate his services with the U. S. House of Representatives at the close of business on January 20, 1979.

It is hoped that by furnishing the following information, the processing of his application for unemployment benefits will be facilitated.

Alan B. Hausman 129-38-7823

Salary:

6/1/77 - 7/31/77	$28,000.00
8/1/77 - 2/28/78	30,000.00
3/1/78 - 1/20/79	32,000.00

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth

THOMAS HOWARTH
Deputy Staff Director
and Budget Officer

TH:ht

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Alan B. Hausman	1/1/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-38-7823	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$32,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code____________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID __________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll __________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Alan B. Hausman	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-38-7823	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$42,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits ________________

Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Alan B. Hausman	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-38-7823	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$32,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Alan B. Hausman	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-38-7823	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Alan B. Hausman	6/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129 38 7823	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$28,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 19______ ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/2

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Alan B. Hausman
Signature of Employee

6/2/77
Date

December 27, 1976
MEMORANDUM FROM: Sprague
FOR: File on future appointments (Billie)

RE: Alan Hausman, Esq.

2 Spoke to Mr. Hausman. Offered him position as staff counsel with salary of $28,000 per year conditioned upon the new House recreating the committee and secondly appropriating the necessary funding. Upon those contingencies occurring, he can have the job.

He accepted on that basis.

BILLIE: Sprague said he wanted an index on future appointments for resumes.

No references?
Was interviewed — Lehman (NY) (writes) Sprague. Res
current salary 34,000

→ References — [illegible] — [illegible]
[illegible]
Floyd Abrams
Dick Schwartz
Call — 4/12-77

Lehman wants.

Ron Weiss —
[illegible]
Lehman — Keith

Floyd Abrams:
4-12-77

129 38 7823

5/17/77

MEMORANDUM

TO: Bob Lehner

FROM: Tom Lambeth

I discussed the employment of Alan Bruce Hausman with the Chairman this morning, and he gave his approval for Mr. Hausman to be hired at a salary of $28,000, effective June 1, 1977.

The Chairman does want it to be clear that this approval is an exception to the moratorium which the Committee has imposed on the hiring of staff at this level.

eb

May 18, 1977

Mr. Alan B. Hausman
400 Argyle Road
Brooklyn, New York 11218

Dear Mr. Hausman:

It is with great pleasure that I welcome you to our staff and request that you rpport for duty as staff counsel on June 1, 1977. As has been previously discussed with you, your salary will be $28,000 per annum. Please let me know if June 1 is a convenient date for you. I look forward to meeting with you.

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes, M.C.
Chairman

LS:RJL:ek

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10440
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10440

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/21/76
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HESS, JACQUELINE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220-48-5696	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ____________
Office Code__________	Benefits ____________
Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________	Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220-48-5696	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$29,300.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ______

ID ______

Benefits ______

Payroll ______

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	11/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220-48-5696	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Deputy Chief Researcher	$27,800

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director GRB 11-7-77
Date: November 7, 1977
Re: Salary Adjustment - one year anniversary

Adjust the salaries of the following individuals as indicated effective November 1, 1977

Employee	Present Salary	7.05% Increase	New Salary
Akers	$24,000	$1,700	$25,700 ✓
Blackmer	24,000	1,700	25,700 ✓
Gay	36,000	2,500	38,500 ✓
Hess	26,000	1,800	27,800 ✓
McPherson	16,000	1,100	17,100 ✓
Orr, Patricia	17,500	1,200	18,700 ✓

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220-48-5696	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Researcher	26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________If applicable, Level______Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	5/6/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220 48 5696	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Jacqueline Hess	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220 48 5696	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220-48-5696	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$14,760.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220 48 5696	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$15,600.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________________________, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220 40 5595	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment and title change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Researcher	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL A[redacted]

(Please Use Typewri[redacted] or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

([redacted]res, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action: 6689

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jacqueline Hess	October 21, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
220-48-5696	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Assistant Chief Researcher Q/03	$20,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) 555 56

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

10 28 76 PM 12:01
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 26, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:
Acting Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

SB ID
Done HB

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Jacqueline Hess
Signature of Employee

January 10, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10441
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10441

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/03/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HINDLE, LOUISE M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :

Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Louis H. Hindle	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-58-7593	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ (Specify Date))
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Office Manager - Kennedy Subcommittee	$17,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, , 19 78

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Louis H. Hindle	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-58-7593	☐ Appointment X☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Louis H. Hindle	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-58-7593	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Louis H. Hindle	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 58 7593	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Louis H. Hindle	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 53 7593	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Clerk	$9,100

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

handcarried to FO
1/3/77 am by
S. Bonifer
R W Martin

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 31, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Louis H. Hindle	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 58 7593	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$9,100.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________, 19_____ ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related TO ANYONE EMPLOYED BY ANY CURRENT MEMBER OF CONG.

I am related by the following relationship ____________

____________ 2/10/77
Signature of Employee Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10442
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 18

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10442

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HITCHCOCK, CORNISH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HITCHCOCK, C.F.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　　Level　　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																															
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June	X	X	X			X	X																								
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	/	/							
Feb.	/	/							
Mar.	/	/							
Apr.	/	/							
May	/	/					5	5	
June	0	0	5	5	5	0	0	5	
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

Terminated June 7, 1977

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　　Date

Approved: ______________ Clerk of the House　　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

15 [illegible]

[illegible] Kind not explored sufficient

9:30 - 12/28 interview

Single - free to travel

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Sprague

FROM: Bob Lehner

13,2

DATE: December 23, 1976

Staff Counsel/MLK
15,000
1/1

SUBJECT: Cornish F. Hitchcock

Mr. Hitchcock is a very bright young man. He graduated from the Georgetown University Law Center in May, 1975. He then clerked for a Connecticut Supreme Court judge for a year. He did part-time work for Representative McKinney and is now working with a small Washington, D.C. law firm making $200 a week.

I was impressed with his willingness to work hard and his ability to fend off pointed questions.

I recommend we take him.

RJL

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Left message to have Cornish F. Hitchcock to call me...his office said it would be Tuesday a.m.

11-1-4

3

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Answer for Rich
Give to Counsels

12/7/76

Vivian:

please note and pass on to Feeney.

— Thanks,

Donovan

HITCHCOCK

STEWART B. McKINNEY
4TH DISTRICT, CONNECTICUT

504 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

COMMITTEES:
BANKING, CURRENCY
AND HOUSING
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

TELEPHONE: (202) 225-5541

DEC 6 1976

ATTORNEY

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

DISTRICT OFFICES:
FEDERAL BUILDING
LAFAYETTE BOULEVARD
BRIDGEPORT, CONNECTICUT 06603
TELEPHONE: (203) 384-2286

500 SUMMER STREET
STAMFORD, CONNECTICUT 06901
TELEPHONE: (203) 357-8277

NORWALK, CONNECTICUT
TELEPHONE: (203) 866-6469

December 2, 1976

CK 12/7

Select Committee on Assassinations
Room 3342
Attention: Richard Feeney

Dear Rick:

Con Hitchcock is very interested in working on the committee's legal staff. I had hoped to convince him to work on my staff, but he declined. I recommend him very highly. His work is superior and he has a reputation as a tireless worker.

I would hope an interview could be arranged for Monday, December 6. Thanks for your assistance.

Sincerely,

Stew

Stewart B. McKinney, M.C.

SBM:mm
enc.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cornish F. Hitchcock	6/7/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042 40 0959	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 7, 1977 ________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

June 16, 1977

Mr. Cornish F. Hitchcock
1552 33rd Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Dear Con:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

JUN 3 1977

1552 33rd Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20007
2 June 1977

Hon. Louis Stokes
Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
2455 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby resign from the staff of the Select Committee, effective the close of business on 7 June 1977.

Very truly yours,

Cornish F. Hitchcock

Cornish F. Hitchcock

cc: Thomas Lambeth,
Acting Director

RECEIVED
1977 JUN -6 PM 2:44
U.S. HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

1552 33rd Street, NW
Washington, D.C. 20007
2 June 1977

Hon. Louis Stokes
Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
2455 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby resign from the staff of the Select Committee, effective the close of business on 7 June 1977.

Very truly yours,

Cornish F. Hitchcock

Cornish F. Hitchcock

cc: Thomas Lambeth,
Acting Director

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Lambeth

FROM: Robert J. Lehner

DATE: May 26, 1977

SUBJECT: Con Hitchcock

This is to request a salary adjustment from $15,000 to $20,000 per year for Con Hitchcock. Mr. Hitchcock was hired in December at a salary of $15,000. The thought of the then Staff Director and Chief Counsel was that after members of the staff were working here for a period of time and we were able to evaluate their work, salary adjustments would be made. Unfortunately those salary adjustments were never made because of the delay in reconstituting and re-budgeting the Committee.

Mr. Hitchcock graduated from Law School in 1975. The only other attorney on the King Task Force that graduated that year was Sheila Jackson Lee. Her salary is $23,000 per year.

Mr. Hitchcock has demonstrated a quick ability to assimilate factual situations, gives insightful legal analysis of those situations and writes cogently in these areas. He is a definite asset to our team and one of the brightest people we have on the staff.

I had recommended to Al Lewis this same adjustment. Mr. Lewis agreed and was prepared to make that recommendation to the Committee.

For the above reasons, I hereby recommend Mr. Hitchcock's salary adjustment be made forthwith.

RJL:ek

RJL

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cornish F. Hitchcock	6/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042 40 0959	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 1, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/2

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cornish F. Hitchcock	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042 40 0959	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cornish F. Hitchcock	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042 40 0959	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cornish F. Hitchcock	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042 40 0959	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional. 95th

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of [illegible]th Congress.

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cornish F. Hitchcock	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042 40 0959	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Signature of Employee HITCHCOCK

10 January 1977
Date

DEC 6 1976

RESUME

(CON)
Cornish F. Hitchcock

Local Address:
[redacted] 1767 SWANN ST, NW
Washington, D.C. 200[redacted]09
Telephone: (202) [redacted] 234-5686

Born: August 20, 1951
Marital Status: Single
Military Status: Ineligible

Bar memberships: Admitted to Connecticut and Second Circuit bars, October 1975.
Application for membership in District of Columbia bar pending.

EMPLOYMENT

Nov. 76 to present: Law firm of William A. Dobrovir, 2005 L St, NW, Wash, DC 20036 785-8919 $200/week

September 1976 to November 1976	in re-election campaign of Representative Stewart B. McKinney (R-Conn.), Fairfield, Conn.
June 1975 to July 1976 $13,000	Law clerk to Justice John P. Cotter, Supreme Court of Connecticut, Hartford, Conn. Duties included legal research and writing and service as secretary to the state wiretap panel.
September 1974 to May 1975	Part-time law clerk in public interest law firm of William A. Dobrovir and Associates, Washington, D.C.
September 1973 to September 1974	Part-time legislative aide to Rep. Stewart B. McKinney, Washington, D.C.
June 1973 to September 1973	Research assistant for American Judicature Society, Chicago, Ill. Researched, wrote and edited articles for Society magazine and compiled "Selected Readings: Judicial Selection and Tenure."
Summers 1970 through 1972	Editor, The Chicago Maroon (student newspaper), Chicago, Ill.

EDUCATION

August 1972 to May 1975	GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY LAW CENTER, WASHINGTON, D.C. J.D. received in May 1975. Graduated in top third of class. General courses of study pursued, with emphasis on litigation, constitutional law and antitrust. Appellate litigation clinical seminar: Only student to argue three cases in D.C. Circuit, including United States v. Agurs, 510 F.2d 1249, reh. en banc denied, 520 F.2d 82 (1975), rev'd., 96 S. Ct. 2392 (1976). Also participated in writing United States v. Hall, 525 F.2d 857 (D.C. Cir. 1976).

	Research assistant to Professor Richard H. Chused in case of United States v. Johnson, decided sub nom., United States v. Bridgeman, 523 F.2d 1099 (D.C. Cir. 1975). Law club teaching fellow: taught legal research and writing principles to seminar of first year law students.
September 1968 to June 1972	THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, CHICAGO, ILLINOIS B.A. received in June 1972. Graduated in top third of class with major in history, especially American and British. Editor-in-chief, The Chicago Maroon (student newspaper). Recipient of Murray Alumni Award for contributions to extracurricular life. Member, senior men's honorary society. Member, faculty-student advisory committees.
September 1964 to June 1968	THE HOTCHKISS SCHOOL, LAKEVILLE, CONNECTICUT Graduated in June 1968. Ranked in top quarter of class, received school prize and academic prizes in classics.

REFERENCES AVAILABLE UPON REQUEST

WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C. CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3341 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 10, 1976

The Honorable Stewart B. McKinney
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. McKinney:

Thank you for your letter of December 2, 1976 and the accompanying resume of Mr. Cornish F. Hitchock.

I have given Mr. Hitchock's resume to the Deputy Chief Counsels and have told them of your interest. I am sure they will be in touch with him soon and I am hopeful that they will offer him a position.

With warm regards, I am

Sincerely,

RICHARD J. FEENEY

RJF/st

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10444
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10444

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/19/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HORNBECK, JOHN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

HORNBECK, John
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 9-19-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	3

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					0	4	
Feb.																																1	1					1	5	
Mar.																																1	1					2	6	
Apr.																																1	1					3	7	
May																																1	1					4	8	
June																																1	1					5	9	
July					☒	☒	☒			☒	☒																							5	9	5		0	9	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/11/78

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
⧄ = 0.5 day leave without pay
☒ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.) Date

Chief's Signature Date

Approved: Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
John W. Hornbeck	7/11/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194-30-5931	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ________
ID ________
Benefits ________
Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action.

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
John W. Hornbeck	9/19/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194 30 5931	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	$34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee. Authority—H Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 19, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED.______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 9/23
via / Hornbeck

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ____________________

John W.
Signature of Employee

9-20-77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

FROM: Charlie Mathews
Special Counsel J.CM

DATE: September 19, 1977

RE: John W. Hornbeck

194·30·5931

This is to advise you that John Hornbeck has accepted a position on the John F. Kennedy Task Force, effective September 19, 1977, at an annual salary of $34,000.

Please extend every possible assistance to Mr. Hornbeck.

Staff Counsel / JFK

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
      RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10445
      RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10445

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/01/76
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
HOWARTH, THOMAS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015-18-1386	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Budget Officer	$41,200

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

_______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

_______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

_______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $_________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action.

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015-18-1385	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$43,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res.956__of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only	ID ______________________
Office Code___________	Benefits ______________________
Monthly Annuity $___________00 as of ______________________	Payroll______________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised August 1 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015-18-1386	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Deputy Staff Director & Budget Officer	

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number ______ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date November 13, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED: ______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ______

Monthly Annuity $ ______.00 as of ______

ID ______

Benefits ______

Payroll ______

(Revised August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015-18-1386	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Budget Officer	38,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee. Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee. Authority—H Res. 465 of 95th Congress
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED: ______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ______

Monthly Annuity $ ______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action·

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	5/29/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015 18 1386	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee. Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2 ☑ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress.

3 ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015 18 1386	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee. Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H. Res 465 of 95th Congress

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED.________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015-18-1386	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,450.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee. Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 11 of 95 Congress
3. ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________ 00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action.

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015 19 1380	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$19,500.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee. Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2 ☐ Special or Select Committee. Authority—H Res 11 of 95th Congress

3. ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date________________, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action.

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Howarth	12/1/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
015 1S 1386	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Budget Officer	$30,000 –

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 1540 of 94th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 1, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship __________

Thomas Howarth
Signature of Employee

January 25. 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10447
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements. All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10447

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/27/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
ISRAEL, MAURICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

November 15, 1978

United States House of Representatives
Select Committee on Assassinations
Personnel Office
Washington, D. C.

Re: Maurice Israel
SSN: 128-20-8996

Dear Sirs:

The above-named individual has stated on an employment application to the City of New York that he was employed by you from June, 1977 to March, 1978 and an Investigator.

Would you kindly confirm this information in the space provided on this letter and return it to me at your earliest convenience. Thank you for your cooperation.

Very truly yours,

Stanley N. Lupkin
Commissioner

By: ____________________
Mildred Houston
Director, Background
Investigation Section

The above information is correct: YES (X) NO ( ) see remarks.
Employment was terminated voluntarily: YES (X) NO ( ) see remarks.

Remarks: ____________________

Thomas Howarth
Signature
Dep. Staff Director

11-20-78
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Maurice Israel	3/8/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
128-20-8996	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 7, 19 78

__________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

__________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

__________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN (Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ______________
Office Code__________	Benefits ______________
Monthly Annuity $_________.00 as of ______________	Payroll ______________

(Revised August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.CM

DATE: 7 March 1978

RE: Termination

Please be advised that effective Friday, March 3, 1978, Maurice Israel will be terminated from the Committee payroll.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

Termination Effective 3/8/78

ICM:j

ISRAEL, Sonny
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　　Level　　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
6-27-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	6

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.									S																							1	1	2	7		1	2	6	
Feb.			S																													1	1	3	7		1	3	6	
Mar.						X	X	X																																
Apr.																																								
May																																								
June																																								
July																																								
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 3/8/78

7

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
⧄S = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
⧄A = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
⧄U = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
⧄ = 0.5 day leave without pay
☒ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　　Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House　　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action.

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Maurice Israel	6/27/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
128 20 8996	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee· Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress
3. ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C 3110(b); prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date June 28, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED._______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

ISRAEL

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

Maurice Israel
Signature of Employee

6/29/77
Date

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

July 8, 1977

Finance Office
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

To whom it may concern:

Please note changes of address for these Committee employees:

Maurice Israel (128 20 8996)
2601 South Glebe Road, Apt. 2600-1A
Arlington, VA 22206

Burton A. Chardak (194 18 8264)
120 South Reynolds
Apartment L-509
Alexandria, VA 22304

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Rebecca W. Martin

Rebecca W. Martin
Chief Clerk

rwm

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10449
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements. All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10449

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/01/77
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
JACKSON, MARGO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Margo E. Jackson	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
437-92-5320	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED: _________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ___________________________

ID ___________________________

Benefits ___________________________

Payroll ___________________________

(Revised August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Margo E. Jackson	6/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
437-92-5320	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 7, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Margo E. Jackson	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
437-92-5320	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Document Clerk	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 1, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

eb

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $_________.00 as of ______________

ID ______________

Benefits ______________

Payroll ______________

(Revised August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Margo E. Jackson	8/2/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
437-92-5320	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Document Clerk	12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res. 465 of 95th Congress
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only·

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Margo E. Jackson	6/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
437 92 5320	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	$10,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1. ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H Res 465 of 95th Congress
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date June 1, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

FO 6/2

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Margo E. Jackson
Signature of Employee

June 1, 1977
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth
FROM: Steve Fallis
DATE: May 25, 1977
RE: Employment of Margo Jackson and Budget Assistant

We have received approval to hire a staff assistant for the Budget Office and Margo Jackson as a document clerk for research. Please notify Donovan re Jackson and get starting date. I believe she is available immediately. Please see accompanying papers.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Lambeth

FROM: Steve Fallis

DATE: May 23, 1977

RE: Employment of Margo Jackson OK

Research has interviewed and wishes to hire Margo Jackson for the position of document clerk. She is available immediately. I have spoken to Ms. Jackson and find her suitable. I have offered her a position for $10,000 per year subject to approval by the Chairman. I have attached her resume. Please notify me when the Chairman approves her appointment.

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO:
Donovan

☑ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—
Margo Jackson

OF (Organization)
re: Jim Harper

☑ PLEASE CALL → PHONE NO. CODE/EXT. 331-2457

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

Working # 526-7023
Rome

* Jane Godfrey has resume

RECEIVED BY	DATE	TIME

STANDARD FORM 63
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11 6

GPO : 1969—c48—16—80341-1 332-389

63-108

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO:
Donovan

☒ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—
Margo Jackson

OF (Organization)

☐ PLEASE CALL ⟶ PHONE NO. CODE/EXT.

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE

331-2439

MR.

RECEIVED BY Mary	DATE 5-18	TIME 1:45

STANDARD FORM 63
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6
GPO : 1969—o48—16—80341-1 332-389
63-108

RESUME ROUTING FORM

JACKSON

Secretary

Received 4/22/77 Logged by ____________

☐ Congressional Referral ____________ ☑ Self ☐ Other ____________

Comments on Referral ____________

Abstracted by dlm Date 4/27/77

Acknowledged by dlm Date 4/27/77

Staff Component Review by ____________ Date ____________

Recommended Action: ☐ File ☐ Interview ☐ Hold ☐ Refer ____________

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT Interviewer ____________ Suggested date ____________ Suggested time ____________

Confirmed date ____________ Confirmed time ____________ by ____________

REQUEST FOR REFERENCES ☐ Hold for ____________ Date Notified ____________

INSTRUCTIONS

Donovan OK $10,000/year
qit

SPRAGUE INTERVIEW REQUEST By ____________ Suggested date ____________ Suggested time ____________

Confirmed date ____________ Confirmed time ____________ by ____________

LETTER OF NOTIFICATION by ____________ ☐ Acceptance/Date of employment ____________
☐ Rejection

M E M O R A N D U M

May 26, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth
Budget Officer

FROM: Donovan L. Gay
Chief Researcher

RE: Margo Jackson

Please be advised that pursuant to the approval by Chairman Stokes, Ms. Margo Jackson is to join the Research/Document Unit as a Document Clerk on June 1, 1977.

She shall report directly to me.

Thank you.

mcp

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10450
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10450

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/27/76
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
JENKINS, NANCY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy S. Jenkins	3/4/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
216 40 9950	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 222 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 16, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

to FO, Ins Mail
3/21

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action.

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy S. Jenkins	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
216-40-9950	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,332.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee. Authority—H Res 11 of 95 Congress
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date 2-28-77, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Nancy S. Jenkins	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
210 40 9950	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,920.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1 ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 11 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date__________________________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED __________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy S. Jenkins	December 27, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
216 40 9950	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$16,800.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee. Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee. Authority—H Res 1540 of 94th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________ 00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Nancy S. Jenkins
Signature of Employee

1-10-77
Date

Tim - [illegible]

16, or Dec. 27, 1976

RESUME

Nancy S. Jenkins
7001 Leebrad Street
Springfield, Virginia 22151

Office: (202) 225-4261
Home: (703) 941-6899

Age: 32
Birthplace: Washington, D.C.
Marital Status: Legally separated (no children)

Skills: Shorthand 120 wpm Typing 65 wpm

EDUCATION: High school graduate; graduate of the Washington School for Secretaries.

EXPERIENCE: May 27, 1962 - Present - Office of Congressman Thomas N. Downing, First District of Virginia.

My entire working experience has been in Congressman Downing's office and has fallen into two major categories:

April 1969 - Present - Caseworker - Duties include dealing with all constituents' problems relating to military service, retired military and veterans; requires a thorough knowledge of all military personnel procedures. Primary emphasis is personal counseling for constituents who have problems which they feel they are unable to resolve through normal channels. This position demands a strong, unemotional and patient disposition and the ability to impose reality upon constituents who are undergoing problems ranging from fairly routine ones to severe mental and emotional conditions. This counseling is primarily telephonic but often personal interviews are required. Also, handle U.S. Military Academy appointments; requires selecting all Congressman's nominees to the four major service academies. Compose all correspondence required to execute the functions of this position.

May 27, 1962 - April 1969 - Composed correspondence dealing with numerous facets of constituent inquiries concerning legislation, federal agencies, government publications, casework and academies. General office duties including dictation, typing and filing. Acquired a thorough working knowledge of all aspects of a Congressional office.

Nancy S. Jenkins

REFERENCES: Honorable Thomas N. Downing
U.S. House of Representatives
Room 2135 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4261

E. M. (Tiny) Hutton
Administrative Assistant
Office of Hon. Thomas N.Downing
Room 2135 Rayburn Building
Washington,D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4261

Norman L. Dobyns
Vice President
Cutler-Hammer
1660 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-3311
(former Administrative Assistant to Congressman Downing)

Maj. Gen. Ralph J. Maglione, Jr.
Director, Legislative Liaison
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330
(202) OX 7-8153

COUNTIES
ACCOMACK
CHARLES CITY
ESSEX
GLOUCESTER
JAMES CITY
KING GEORGE
KING AND QUEEN
KING WILLIAM
LANCASTER
MATHEWS
MIDDLESEX
NEW KENT
NORTHAMPTON
NORTHUMBERLAND
RICHMOND
WESTMORELAND
YORK

CITIES
HAMPTON
NEWPORT NEWS
POQUOSON
WILLIAMSBURG

E. M. TINY HUTTON
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

THOMAS N. DOWNING
1ST DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEES
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

OFFICES
1 COURT STREET
HAMPTON, VA 23669
722-2886

2135 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D C 20515
(202) 225-4261

December 7, 1976

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

As you probably know, I am retiring at the end of the 94th Congress after spending eighteen years in the House. For the entire period of my service I have been blessed by having a wonderful staff to assist me. I am making whatever effort I can to assist them in obtaining employment on the Hill.

One of the finest people on my staff is Nancy S. Jenkins. She has been with me continuously for the past fourteen years. She now handles all military and veterans casework and makes my nominations to the U.S. Military Academies, but she has such a varied experience that she can handle almost any matter that comes up in a Congressional office. I have no hesitancy whatsoever in enthusiastically endorsing her for your consideration if you should have a vacancy in your office. She is an outstanding young lady whose intelligence, dedication and loyalty are unquestioned. Nancy is extremely congenial, affable and has the ability to promote and foster constituent appeal for her Congressman.

If you or your assistant should decide to interview her, please call my office, x54261; and if you desire any further information about her, please do not hesitate to contact me. My home number in Newport News, Virginia is 804 596-2188.

Sincerely,

Thomas N. Downing

RESUME

Nancy S. Jenkins
7001 Leebrad Street
Springfield, Virginia 22151

Office: (202) 225-4261
Home: (703) 941-6899

Age: 32
Birthplace: Washington, D.C.
Marital Status: Legally separated (no children)

Skills: Shorthand 120 wpm Typing 65 wpm

EDUCATION: High school graduate; graduate of the Washington School for Secretaries.

EXPERIENCE: May 27, 1962 - Present - Office of Congressman Thomas N. Downing, First District of Virginia.

My entire working experience has been in Congressman Downing's office and has fallen into two major categories:

April 1969 - Present - Caseworker - Duties include dealing with all constituents' problems relating to military service, retired military and veterans; requires a thorough knowledge of all military personnel procedures. Primary emphasis is personal counseling for constituents who have problems which they feel they are unable to resolve through normal channels. This position demands a strong, unemotional and patient disposition and the ability to impose reality upon constituents who are undergoing problems ranging from fairly routine ones to severe mental and emotional conditions. This counseling is primarily telephonic but often personal interviews are required. Also, handle U.S. Military Academy appointments; require selecting all Congressman's nominees to the four major service academies. Compose all correspondence required to execute the functions of this position.

May 27, 1962 - April 1969 - Composed correspondence dealing with numerous facets of constituent inquiries concerning legislation, federal agencies, government publications, casework and academies. General office duties including dictation, typing and filing. Acquired a thorough working knowledge of all aspects of a Congressional office.

RESUME

Nancy S. Jenkins
7001 Leebrad Street
Springfield, Virginia 22151

Office: (202) 225-4261
Home: (703) 941-6899

Age: 32
Birthplace: Washington, D.C.
Marital Status: Legally separated (no children)

Skills: Shorthand 120 wpm Typing 65 wpm

EDUCATION: High school graduate; graduate of the Washington School for Secretaries.

EXPERIENCE: May 27, 1962 - Present - Office of Congressman Thomas N. Downing, First District of Virginia.

My entire working experience has been in Congressman Downing's office and has fallen into two major categories:

April 1969 - Present - Caseworker - Duties include dealing with all constituents' problems relating to military service, retired military and veterans; requires a thorough knowledge of all military personnel procedures. Primary emphasis is personal counseling for constituents who have problems which they feel they are unable to resolve through normal channels. This position demands a strong, unemotional and patient disposition and the ability to impose reality upon constituents who are undergoing problems ranging from fairly routine ones to severe mental and emotional conditions. This counseling is primarily telephonic but often personal interviews are required. Also, handle U.S. Military Academy appointments; requires selecting all Congressman's nominees to the four major service academies. Compose all correspondence required to execute the functions of this position.

May 27, 1962 - April 1969 - Composed correspondence dealing with numerous facets of constituent inquiries concerning legislation, federal agencies, government publications, casework and academies. General office duties including dictation, typing and filing. Acquired a thorough working knowledge of all aspects of a Congressional office.

Nancy S. Jenkins

REFERENCES: Honorable Thomas N. Downing
U.S. House of Representatives
Room 2135 Rayburn Building
Washington, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4261

E. M. (Tiny) Hutton
Administrative Assistant
Office of Hon. Thomas N.Downing
Room 2135 Rayburn Building
Washington,D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4261

Norman L. Dobyns
Vice President
Cutler-Hammer
1660 L Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 466-3311
(former Administrative Assistant to Congressman Downing)

Maj. Gen. Ralph J. Maglione, Jr.
Director, Legislative Liaison
Department of the Air Force
Washington, D.C. 20330
(202) OX 7-8153

COUNTIES
ACCOMACK
CHARLES CITY
ESSEX
GLOUCESTER
JAMES CITY
KING GEORGE
KING AND QUEEN
KING WILLIAM
LANCASTER
MATHEWS
MIDDLESEX
NEW KENT
NORTHAMPTON
NORTHUMBERLAND
RICHMOND
WESTMORELAND
YORK
CITIES
HAMPTON
NEWPORT NEWS
POQUOSON
WILLIAMSBURG

E. M. TINY HUTTON
ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT

THOMAS N. DOWNING
1ST DISTRICT, VIRGINIA

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COMMITTEES
MERCHANT MARINE AND FISHERIES
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

OFFICES
1 COURT STREET
HAMPTON, VA 23669
722-2886

2135 RAYBURN BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D C 20515
(202) 225-4261

December 7, 1976

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

As you probably know, I am retiring at the end of the 94th Congress after spending eighteen years in the House. For the entire period of my service I have been blessed by having a wonderful staff to assist me. I am making whatever effort I can to assist them in obtaining employment on the Hill.

One of the finest people on my staff is Nancy S. Jenkins. She has been with me continuously for the past fourteen years. She now handles all military and veterans casework and makes my nominations to the U.S. Military Academies, but she has such a varied experience that she can handle almost any matter that comes up in a Congressional office. I have no hesitancy whatsoever in enthusiastically endorsing her for your consideration if you should have a vacancy in your office. She is an outstanding young lady whose intelligence, dedication and loyalty are unquestioned. Nancy is extremely congenial, affable and has the ability to promote and foster constituent appeal for her Congressman.

If you or your assistant should decide to interview her, please call my office, x54261; and if you desire any further information about her, please do not hesitate to contact me. My home number in Newport News, Virginia is 804 596-2188.

Sincerely,

Thomas N. Downing

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10451
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10451

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/06/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
JOHNSON, ERNESTINE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ernestine G. Johnson	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
223-38-6743	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ernestine G. Johnson	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
223-38-6743	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$25,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ____________________
Office Code__________	Benefits ____________________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________	Payroll____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ernestine G. Johnson	9/6/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
223 38 6743	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Blakey

FROM: Edward M. Evans EME

DATE: September 6, 1977

SUBJECT: Ernestine G. Johnson

O.K.
GRB
9-6-77

Ms. Johnson has agreed to take a position with us as Staff Investigator assigned to the Martin Luther King, Jr. Task Force.

She will start September 6, 1977 at $24,000.

EME:ek

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Ernestine J. Johnson
Signature of Employee

9/6/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10452
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 10

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10452

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
JOHNSON, GENE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371-40-1135	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ______

ID ______

Benefits ______

Payroll ______

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371-40-1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ____) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Deputy Chief Counsel	$44,500

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ____ If applicable, Level ____ Step ____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 1978 ____ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

____ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ____

Monthly Annuity $ ____.00 as of ____

ID ____

Benefits ____

Payroll ____

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	February 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371-40-1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Deputy Chief Counsel	$42,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date February 16, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel ICM

DATE: February 13, 1978

RE: Mr. Gene Johnson

This is to inform you that effective February 10, 1978, Mr. Gene Johnson has been promoted from Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel/King Investigation to Deputy Chief Counsel. His starting salary will be $42,500.00 effective February 1, 1978.

If you have any questions, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371-40-1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel	$36,400

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371-40-1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel	34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	6/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371 40 1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$32,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371 40 1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371-40-1135	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$19,680.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371 40 1135	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$25,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date___________________________________, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gene R. Johnson	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
371 40 1135	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Assistant Chief Counsel-King	$32,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related X

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Gene R. Johnson
Signature of Employee

1-10-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10453
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10453

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PARYOLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/29/77
PAGES : 51

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
JOHNSON, LILLIAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M

DATE: December 19, 1977

RE: Lillian Johnson

This memorandum is to inform you that Lillian Johnson is on administrative leave from December 9, 1977 until January 9, 1978. She should continue on the payroll for that period of time plus any additional vacation that she has not yet taken.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me.

3 days annual leave

Terminate January 12. 1978

T Howarth

ICM:jl

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

Lillian B. Johnson
Signature of Employee

8/31/77
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lillian B. Johnson	8/29/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577 56 7465	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 31, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 8/31

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

RESUME ROUTING FORM

JFK

Johnson Lillian

Secretarial

$13,500

Received 8-10-77 Logged by nps

☐ Congressional Referral ______ ☒ Self ☐ Other ______

Comments on Referral ______

Abstracted by nps Date 8-10-77

Acknowledged by ______ Date ______

Staff Component Review by ______ Date ______

Recommended Action: ☐ File ☐ Interview ☐ Hold ☐ Refer ______

REQUEST FOR APPOINTMENT

Interviewer Hutton/Matthews Klein

Suggested date ______

Suggested time ______

Confirmed date ______ Confirmed time ______ by ______

REQUEST FOR REFERENCES

☐ Hold for ______ Date Notified ______

INSTRUCTIONS

Hired as of 8-29-77 JFK Task

FINAL INTERVIEW REQUEST

By ______

Suggested date ______

Suggested time ______

Confirmed date ______ Confirmed time ______ by ______

LETTER OF NOTIFICATION by ______

☐ Acceptance/Date of employment ______

☐ Rejection

RESUME

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875
(301) 772-3341(H)
(202) 755-6808(O)

Position Desired - Administrative Assistant/Secretarial

Experience - District of Columbia

5/77 - Present	Department of Housing and Urban Development 451 7th Street, S.W. Clerk-typist
12/76 - 2/77	1977 Presidential Inaugural Committee 2nd & "T" Streets, S.W. Administrative Assistant/Site Coordinator
9/76 - 11/76	Congressional Budget Office 2nd & "D" Streets, S.W. Secretary
7/76 - 9/76	Stuart Temporaries, Inc. 1120 -19th Street, N.W. Secretary
8/74 - 9/75	Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn 18th & "H" Streets, N.W. Legal Secretary
11/73 - 8/74	Temporaries, Inc., 1015 18th Street, N.W. Secretary
5/13 - 6/14	Longworth House Office Building, N.J. & "C" Streets, S.E. Secretary
1/73 - 8/73	Model Inner Cities Community Organization 9th & "U" Streets, N.W. Executive Secretary
3/70 - 3/71	American Association of Junior Colleges One Dupont Circle, N.W. Secretary
2/68 - 1/70	Harbridge House, Inc. 2100 "M" Street, N.W. Support Secretary
5/67 - 1/68	Tabulating Research & Development Agency 14th & "K" Streets, N.W. Secretary
5/66 - 5/67	Georgetown University, 37th & "O" Streets, N.W. Clerk-typist

Education:

1/72 - 7/47	Strayer College, 13th & "G" Streets, N.W. Studied Court & Conference Reporting, Stenotype, Legal reporting and advanced vocabulary
9/63 - 6/64	Johnson's Business School, 14th & N.Y. Avenue, N.W. Secretarial Course
9/59 - 6/62	Graduate of Dunbar High School, 1st & "N" Streets, N.W. Commercial Courses
Skills:	Stenotypist 100 - 140 wpm. Typist 75 - 80 Seeking opportunity for career professional position willing to start as trainee, willing to travel occasionall
Personal:	Divorced One daughter age 8 years.

1977 Inaugural Committee

February 7, 1977

Dear Ms. Johnson:

President Carter and Vice President Mondale have asked us to express their sincere appreciation to you for your most commendable efforts in support of the 1977 Inauguration.

The Inauguration of the President of the United States is a moment in history that serves as a vehicle to communicate to the world the commitment and spirit of the New Administration.

It is with this in mind that I forward this letter to you as a member of the Inaugural Security and Credential Committee. You displayed the highest degree of professionalism and dedication in many important tasks.

You were always willing and ready to work long hours, above and beyond the normal work day. You volunteered your services for almost anything asked of you.

Throughout the planning and implementation period, you were faced with an everchanging list of requirements. Your dedication to duty, understanding of the difficulties faced by the Inaugural Committee, and cooperative attitude are indicative of a true professional. Your overall manner of performance was truly outstanding.

If we had the power today, each of you would receive a tangible medal of citation for the highest award of Volunteer Action. Possessing only words, we say again, thank you for all the service given so unselfishly.

Sincerely,

Frank Wilson, Director
Security & Credentials Committee

Donald Brock

Donald Brock, Deputy Chief
In Charge of Internal Security

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON

served with distinction on behalf of the
Armed Forces of the United States
at the Inauguration of

Jimmy Carter

on the twentieth day of January,
one thousand, nine-hundred seventy-seven
in Washington, District of Columbia

Vicki Rogers

Bardyl R. Tirana Vicki Rogers

Co-Chairpersons

1977 Inaugural Committee

Robert G. Yerks

Major General USA

Chairman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1977

To Lillian Johnson

I deeply appreciate your dedicated and untiring work on the 1977 inauguration. The inaugural program was a great success, open to all of our citizens. This would not have been possible without the unselfish help, cheerful spirit and long hours freely given by volunteers such as you.

You have helped to set an example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Miss Lillian Johnson
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875

Your assistance with the 1977 Inauguration meant a great deal to me personally. More importantly, it was a great example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other.

Jimmy Carter

Life Experience: Inauguration of President and Vice President of the United States, 1977 Presidential Inaugural Committee, Washington, D.C.

Competency Statement	Position Descriptors

As Site Coordinator & Administrative Assistant of the Inaugural Committee's Security & Credential division, I have:

A. Acquired knowledge as to how legislative priorities are set

B. Held high level administrative responsibility in operating the office

C. Supervised productivity, flow of work and overall operations of our office with top United States Secret Service officials and congressional members.

D. Through the concept of creative office leadership I have assisted in planning, organizing and controlling the operations of presidential security

E. Utilize techniques to help maintain good employee relations through effective supervision, delegation, evaluating, training, and thorough communications with USSS.

F. Arranged and made contacts with top USSS agents, presidential advance team, and congressional members for indepth security conferences.

AMENDMENT TO PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT

OMB
APPROVED 50-R0048

IMPORTANT: Read these instructions carefully before completing this form.

This form may be used to update your Personal Qualifications Statement provided you have had no more than three additional positions since the statement being updated was completed. Agencies are required to accept a previously completed Personal Qualifications Statement as current when this form is attached. Before completing this form, review carefully your answers to all items on the statement being updated. Use typewriter if available. Otherwise write or print legibly in dark ink.

1. NAME *(Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any)* ☐ MR. ☐ MISS ☐ MRS. AND ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code)*

JOHNSON, Lillian Barbara Killens
7516 Forest Road
Hyattsville, Maryland 20875

2. DATE OF THIS STATEMENT: May 17, 1977

3. BIRTH DATE *(month, day, year)*: December 6, 1943

4. KIND OF POSITION YOU ARE FILING FOR *(Or title and number of announcement)*: Security Assistant 15-21 (77)A

5. REASON FOR SUBMISSION *(Check One)*

☐ To update Personal Qualifications Statement in my Official Personal Folder
☐ To update Personal Qualifications Statement on file with you
☒ To update attached Personal Qualifications Statement
☐ As requested

6. LOWEST PAY OR GRADE YOU WILL ACCEPT: PAY $ per or GRADE 7

7. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back. Account for periods of unemployment in separate blocks in order)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No *(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities.)*

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM May 9, 1977 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF POSITION: Clerk-typist

IF FEDERAL SERVICE, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY GRADE: 5

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ 179. PER week; FINAL $ PER

AVG. HRS. PER WEEK: 40

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: CITY: Washington, STATE: D.C.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED: 0

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Housing & Urban Develop

NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Charles Field

NAME OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, etc.)* AND ADDRESS *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)
Washington, D.C. 20410

AREA CODE AND PHONE NO. IF KNOWN:

REASON FOR WANTING TO LEAVE: Seeking position involving more responsibility and opportunity

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Prepare in final form a variety of materials including correspondence, staff studies, technical papers, memoranda and issue papers which include the use of terminology that is highly specialized. Responsible for maintenance of subject matter files for the staff. (Even though this job description does not indicate), I have taken dictation and transcribed it for the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Housing and Urban Development. Perform all secretarial duties.

FOR AGENCY USE *(skill codes, etc.)*

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF POSITION

IF FEDERAL SERVICE, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY GRADE

SALARY OR EARNINGS: STARTING $ PER; FINAL $ PER

AVG. HRS. PER WEEK

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT: CITY: STATE:

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

NAME OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, etc.)* AND ADDRESS *(including ZIP Code, if known)*

AREA CODE AND PHONE NO. IF KNOWN

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FOR AGENCY USE *(skill codes, etc.)*

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Standard Form 172, January 1972
U.S. Civil Service Commission
172-102

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF POSITION	IF FEDERAL SERVICE, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY GRADE

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER	AVG. HRS. PER WEEK	PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT CITY: STATE:	NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED	KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR AREA CODE AND PHONE NO. IF KNOWN	NAME OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, etc.)* AND ADDRESS *(including ZIP Code, if known)*

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FOR AGENCY USE *(skill codes, etc.)*

8. Space for explaining other changes or additions to the qualifications statement being updated. If *any* answer to an item on the qualifications statement being updated is incorrect or incomplete as of the date of this amendment, identify the item by number and explain. *(Check one)* ☐ Other changes or additions listed below ☐ No other changes or additions.

ITEM NO.	If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on EACH sheet your name, position *(or title and number of announcement)* filing for, and date of the qualifications statement being updated. Attach all sheets to this form.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me on this form update my Personal Qualifications Statement completed 5/17/72 *(month, year)* and are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE *(Sign in ink)* Lillian B. Johnson

Lillian B. Johnson

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW

GPO : 1972 O - 453-449

1A. Kind of position *(job)* you are filing for *(or title of announcement)* Administrative Asst.,

B. Announcement No.

C. Options for which you wish to be considered *(if listed in announcement)*
Legislative Aide

D. Primary place(s) you wish to be employed
Washington, D.C., Metropolitan area

2. Home phone *(including Area Code)*
772-3341 (301)

3. Office phone *(including Area Code)*
775-5860

4. Name *(Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any)* ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address *(Number, Street, City, State and ZIP Code)*

JOHNSON, Lillian Barbara Killens
7516 Forest Road
Hyattsville, Maryland 20875

5. Legal or voting residence *(State)*
District of Columbia

6. Height without shoes
5 Feet 7½ Inches

7. Weight
135 lbs

8. Birthplace *(City and State, or foreign country)*
District of Columbia

9. Birth date *(Month, day, year)*
12/6/43

10. Social Security Account Number
577 | 56 | 7465

11. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government as a civilian, give your last classification series, grade, and job title.
GS-318-5 Clerk-typist

Dates of service in that grade
From May 9, 1977 To Present time

12. If you are currently on a list of eligibles for appointment to a Federal position, give the name of the announcement, the name of the office maintaining the list, the date on your notice of rating, and your rating.

Stenographer and Typist
United States Civil Service Commission
Federal Register
April 25, 1977 — Typist 4 — Steno 5

13. Lowest pay or grade you will accept

PAY		GRADE
$ per yr.	OR	5

14. When will you be available?
upon notification

15. Will you accept temporary employment for:
(Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.)

	YES	NO
___1 month or less?		X
___1 to 4 months?		X
___4 to 12 months?	X	~~X~~

16. Where will you accept a job?

	YES	NO
___Washington, D.C.	X	
___Any place in the United States.		
___Outside of the United States.		

___Only in *(specify)*: metro area

17. Will you accept less than full
(Less than 40 hours per week) ☐

18. Are you willing to travel? *(Ch*

NO	SOM
	X

19. VETERAN PREFERENCE. Answer all parts. If a part does not apply to you, answer "No."

A. Have you ever served on active duty in the United States military service? *(Exclude tours of active duty for training as a reservist or Guardsman.)*

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed services under other than honorable conditions? (You may omit any such discharge changed to honorable by a Discharge Review Board or similar authority.)..........
If "Yes," give details in Item 37.

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on active duty in the armed forces?..........
If "Yes," you will be required to furnish records to support your claim at the time you are appointed.

D. Do you claim 10-point preference?..........
If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Claim for 10-point Veteran Preference," together with the pro in that form
TYPE: ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow

E. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service *(Enter "N/A" if not applicable)*

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Num
N/A			

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLO
FOR USE OF EXAMINING OFFICE ONL

☐ Appor.
☐ Nonappor.

Material
☐ Submitted
☐ Returned

Entered Register:

Notations:

Form Reviewed:

Form Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Au Rati
			☐ 5 points *(Tent.)*	
			☐ 10 Points Comp. Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Points	
			☐ Disal.	
Initials and Date			☐ Being Investigated	

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICE
Preference has been verified through proof that the s under honorable conditions, and other proof as required
☐ 5-Pt. ☐ 10-Pt. Comp. Disab. ☐ 10-Pt.

Signature and Title

Agency

Da

☐ Refer for medical action

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Standard Form 171
May 1975 U.S. Civil Service C
171-105

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No
("A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

1

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 12/30/76 To PRESENT TIME

Exact title of position Security-Credls. Site Coordinator/Secretary

If Federal service, civilian or military grade

Salary or earnings Starting $ 150.00 per wk Present $ same per

Avg. hrs. per week 50

Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.

Number and kind of employees supervised several-100 volunteers

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* 1977 Inaugural Comte

Name of immediate supervisor Frank Wilson, Director

Area Code and phone No. if known 202/472-4350

Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*
1977 Inaugural Committee, 2nd & "D" Streets, S.
Washington, D.C. 20024

Reason for wanting to leave Job is terminating on 1/31/77

Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments Instructing several sub-committees within the Inaugural Committee on procedure and preparation of security clearance forms. Processing and preparing S.C. forms for security pick-up. Communication by phone on a very large scale with Secret Service, White House and many other agencies for Inauguration. Worked with the director preparing and designing security credentials. Sat-in on meetings w/ Security & Press Personnel, took dictation and kept minutes. Operated the Command Post at Visitors Center. Typed letter, memorandums, etc., Presently working on After Action Report. Served as central point of information concerning activities of the office.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

2

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 9/76 To 11/76

Exact title of position Secretary/Personnel Asst.

If Federal service, civilian or military grade

Salary or earnings Starting $ 10,096. per yr. Final $ same per

Avg. hrs. per week 40

Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.

Number and kind of employees supervised none

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* Federal

Name of immediate supervisor Carl McCarden/Alicia McPhee

Area Code and phone No. if known 202/225-6666

Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*
Congressional Budget Office
2nd & "D" Streets, S.W.

Reason for leaving Temporary position

Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments - Secretary in Budget Analysis Division, Human Resourc and Personnel Office. Worked with several Analyst. Typed up proposals, budget reports, general correspondence and telephone communications. Operated the Vydec Computer in all divisions.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

3

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 7/76 To 9/76

Exact title of position Secretary/Legal Asst.

If Federal service, civilian or military grade Temporary Agency

Salary or earnings Starting $ 4.75 per hr. Final $ same per

Avg. hrs. per week 180.

Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.

Number and kind of employees supervised none

Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* secretarial agency

Name of immediate supervisor Ms. Susan Heuser

Area Code and phone No. if known

Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*
Stuart Temporaries, Inc.
1120 -19th Street, N.W.

Reason for leaving Temporary placement agency.

Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments Worked on several legal assignments on short-term. Secretary to attorneys. Performed general secretarial duties, typing drafts, briefs, other correspondence, and telephone communication.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

20. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back. Account for periods of unemployment in separate blocks in order.)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No
(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

4

Dates of employment *(month, year)* 9/75
From 8/74 To PRESENT TIME
Exact title of position: Legal Secretary
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 10,500 per Yr. Present $ same per
Avg. hrs. per week: 37-½
Place of employment: City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Law Firm
Name of immediate supervisor: JoAnna McAtee
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn
1815 "H" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for wanting to leave: laid off
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Legal Secretary to several attorneys in the firm, in areas of litigation, real estate, tax, labor, Federal Communications-took dictation, wrote letters of general correspondence, kept records, typed briefs, proposals, etc. Telephone communications with clients and other firms, etc.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)* 1/72-6/74

(THE NEXT THREE JOBS LISTED BELOW WERE COURSE RELATED WHILE ATTENDING STRAYER COLLEGE)

5

Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From 11/73 To 8/74
Exact title of position: Secretary
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 4.50 per hr. Final $ per
Avg. hrs. per week: 20
Place of employment: City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Secretarial Service
Name of immediate supervisor: Clara, Bob
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Temporaries, Inc., 1015 -18th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: temporary job
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Gained experienced in working with many law firms in the area as Legal, Executive, Statistical and Technical Secretary on short-term assignments.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

6

Dates of employment *(month, year)*
From 4/73 To 6/73
Exact title of position: Transcriber
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 3.50 per hr. Final $ per
Avg. hrs. per week: 20
Place of employment: City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Reporting Agency
Name of immediate supervisor: Doris Hoover
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Hoover Reporting Agency
3rd & Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: Course related - for experience mostly.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Transcriber of reporters notes from courtroom hearings.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No
(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

7

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 9/73 To PRESENT TIME 7/74
Exact title of position: Student reporter
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings Starting $ 0 per
Present $ per
Avg. hrs. per week: 15
Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Reporting Agency
Name of immediate supervisor: Bernie Richards
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
BGH Reporting Agency
24th & Penn. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for wanting to leave: Course related - for experience only.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments:
Sat-in on public hearings and took minutes of hearings and observed courtroom procedures. Transcribed notes.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

8

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 5/13/74 To 6/14/74
Exact title of position: Legal Secretary
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings Starting $ 4.50 per hr.
Final $ same per
Avg. hrs. per week: 37-½
Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Congressional Office
Name of immediate supervisor: Marilyn Shapiro
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman
Longworth House Office Bldg., 3rd & C Sts. S.E.
Reason for leaving: Temporary position
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Worked with research group on impeachment of Pres. Richard M. Nixon, wrote letters to constituency around the country, handled phones, took dictation and transcribed.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

9

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 3/70 To 3/71
Exact title of position: Secretary
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings Starting $ 6,500 per yr.
Final $ 7,000 per
Avg. hrs. per week: 37-½
Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Educational Asso.
Name of immediate supervisor: Dr. John Mallan
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
American Association of Junior Colleges
One Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: Moved to N.Y.C.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Secretary to Director of Veteran Programs, kept records, arranged for travel and conferences, handled phones, typed general correspondence.

For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS, USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEET
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

20. EXPERIENCE (Start with your PRESENT position

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment?.................. ☐ Yes ☐ No
(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

10 Dates of employment (month, year) 1/70 From 2/68 To PRESENT TIME		Exact title of position Secretary		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 6.000 per yr. Present $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 37-½	Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 2	Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) Management Consultants

Name of immediate supervisor: Layle Luckett
Area Code and phone No. if known
Name of employer (firm, organization, etc.) and address (including ZIP Code, if known): Harbridge House, Inc.
2100 "M" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for wanting to leave: Due to illness, Hepatitis
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Secretary to four management consultants, wrote letters of general correspondence, kept records, arranged for conferences and travel, typed gov't. proposals, traveled occasionally.

For agency use (skill codes, etc.)

11 Dates of employment (month, year) From 5/67 To 1/68		Exact title of position Secretary		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 8500 per yr. Final $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 37-½	Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 2	Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) Employment Agency

Name of immediate supervisor: Joyce Sarsfield
Area Code and phone No. if known
Name of employer (firm, organization, etc.) and address (including ZIP Code, if known): Tabulating Research and Development Agency
14th & "K" Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: Company went bankrupt
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Secretary to two job counselors. Typed up resumes for system analyst and programmers, filed records, typed general correspondenc

For agency use (skill codes, etc.)

12 Dates of employment (month, year) From 4/66 To 5/67		Exact title of position Clerk-typist		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 4200 per yr. Final $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 40	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 0	Kind of business or organization (manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.) University

Name of immediate supervisor: Nadine Flack
Area Code and phone No. if known
Name of employer (firm, organization, etc.) and address (including ZIP Code, if known): Georgetown University, 37th & "O" Sts., N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: resigned for higher paying position.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: typed letters of general correspondence and filed student records, arranged for student loans, registered students.

For agency use (skill codes, etc.)

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS • SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

• ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

21 A. Special qualifications and skills *(skills with machines; patents or inventions; your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested); your public speaking and publications experience; membership in professional or scientific societies; etc.)*

Operate Vydec Computer
Most IBM typewriters, Selectric II, Standard Electric, Executive, etc.
Operate Court Reporters model—Stenotype machine for dictation
Operate the stenorette, IBM Dictaphones & others
10 key adding & calculator machines

B. Kind of License or Certificate *(For example, pilot, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.)*	C. State or other licensing authority	D. Year of first license or certificate	E. Year of latest license or certificate	F. Approximate numbe of words per minute: Typing	Shorthand
	D.C. Drivers permit			75-80	120-14

22. A. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months?

YES	MONTH/YEAR	NO	HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
:	6/62		12

B. Name and location *(city and State)* of last high school attended
Dunbar High School, 1st & "N" Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

C. Name and location *(city, State, and ZIP Code if known)* of college or university. *(If you expect to graduate within 9 months, give MONTH and year you expect degree.)*	Dates attended		Years Completed		No. of credits compl.		Type of degree *(B.A., etc.)*	Year of degree
	From	To	Day	Night	Semester hours	Quarter hours		
Strayer College	1/72	7/74	2	2	18	9	Special	
13th & "G" Streets, N.W.							student	

D. Chief undergraduate college subjects	No. of credits compl.		E. Chief graduate college subjects	No. of credits compl	
	Semester hours	Quarter hours		Semester hours	Quarter hours

F. Major field of study at highest level of college work
Court & Conference Reporting

G. Other schools or training *(for example, trade, vocational, armed forces, or business)*. Give for each the name and location *(city, State, and ZIP Code if known)* of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Johnson's Business School, 14th & N.Y., Avenue, N.W. 1964
Secretarial Course, typing, speedwriting, clerical

23. HONORS, AWARDS, AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED
1977 Inaugural Committee
Certificate of Appreciation
White House letter
Jury Duty Certificate

24. LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ENGLISH

List the languages and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper columns	Reading			Speaking			Understanding			Writing		
	Excl	Good	Fair	Excl	Good	Fair	Excl	Good	Fair	Excl	Good	Fai
none												

25. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 20, EXPERIENCE.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State and ZIP Code)*	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Rev. Robert Harrison	New Samaritan Baptist Church 6th & Maryland Avenue, N.E.	Minister
Ellis Mayo	Manpower Office 6th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.	Job counselor
Maureen Plummer	National Center on Black Aged 1730 "M" Street, N.W.	Comptroller

ANSWER ITEMS 26 THROUGH 36 BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER COLUMN	Yes	No
26. Are you a citizen of the United States? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen:	X	
Before answering these questions read Items 27 and 28 in the attached instructions. 27. Are you now a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any subdivision of the Communist Party, U.S.A.?		X
28. (a) Are you now, or within the last ten years have you been, a member of any organization, or group of persons including but not limited to the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any subdivision of the Communist Party, U.S.A., which during the period of your membership you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence, or any unlawful means?		X
28. (b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such membership, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence, or any unlawful means?		X
29. If your answer to 27 or 28(a) above is in the affirmative state the names of such organizations and the dates of your membership in each in item 37.		
30. Within the last five years have you been fired from any job for any reason?		X
31. Within the last five years have you quit a job after being notified that you would be fired?		X
If your answer to 30 or 31 above is "Yes," give details in Item 37. Show the name and address (including ZIP Code) of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with your answers in Item 20, EXPERIENCE.		
32. Have you ever been convicted of an offense against the law or forfeited collateral, or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (You may omit: (1) traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less; and (2) any offense committed before your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in a juvenile court or under a Youth Offender law.)		X
33. While in the military service were you ever convicted by general court-martial?		n/a
If your answer to 32 or 33 is "Yes," give details in Item 37. Show for each offense: (1) date; (2) charge; (3) place; (4) court; and (5) action taken.		
34. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity or as a member of the Armed Forces any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (See Items 34 and 35 in the attached instruction sheet.)		X
35. Do you live with, or within the past 12 months have you lived with, any of these relatives who are employed in a civilian capacity?		X
If your answer to 34 is "Yes," give in Item 37 for such relatives: (1) full name; (2) present address (including ZIP Code); (3) relationship; (4) department, agency, or branch of the Armed Forces. If your answer to 35 is "Yes," also give the kind of appointment held by the relative(s) you live with or have lived with within the past 12 months.		
36. Do you receive or do you have a pending application for retirement or retainer pay, pension, or other compensation based upon military, Federal civilian, or District of Columbia Government service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 37.*		X

Your Statement cannot be processed until you have answered all questions, including Items 26 through 36 above. Be sure you have placed an "X" to the left of EVERY marker (◀) above, either in the "Yes" or the "No" column.

37. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on EACH sheet your name, birth date, and *announcement or position* title. Attach all sheets to this Statement at the top of Page 3.

ATTENTION — THIS STATEMENT MUST BE SIGNED

Read the following paragraph carefully before signing this Statement

A false answer to any question in this Statement may be grounds for not employing you, or for dismissing you after you begin work, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All the information you give will be considered in reviewing your Statement and is subject to investigation. A false answer to Items 27 or 28 could deprive you of your right to an annuity when you reach retirement age in addition to the penalties described above.

CERTIFICATION	SIGNATURE *(Sign in ink)*	DATE SIGNED
I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this Statement are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.	Lillian E. Johnson	May 17, 1977

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

NOTICE OF RATING

APPLICANT MUST FILL IN ALL BLANKS IN THIS SECTION ONLY

TITLE OF EXAMINATION	PLACE OF EXAMINATION	DATE OF TEST
Stenographer and Typist	Washington, D.C.	April 25, 1977

NAME AND ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State and ZIP Code*)

Lillian B. Johnson
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875

This is not a notice of appointment. It is a record of your rating. It is important that you keep it.

PERIOD OF CONSIDERATION FROM ISSUE DATE

☐ 6 MONTHS ☐ 12 MONTHS
☒ 3 years
SEE REVERSE SIDE

☑ You are ELIGIBLE for the following grade(s):

CLERK—TYPIST	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER	CLERK-DICTATING MACHINE TRANSCRIBER	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER (TRAINEE)	YOUR NUMERICAL RATING IS
☐ GS-2 ☐ GS-3 ☑ GS-4	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4 ☑ GS-5	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4	☐ GS-2	82.0

AMOUNT OF VETEPAN PREFERENCE INCLUDED IN YOUR RATING: 5-PTS ☐ 10-PTS ☐

☐ You are INELIGIBLE for the following grade(s):

CLERK-TYPIST	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER	CLERK-DICTATING MACHINE TRANSCRIBER	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER (TRAINEE)
☐ GS-2 ☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4 ☐ GS-5	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4	☐ GS-2

REASON FOR INELIGIBILITY:

☐ You did not earn a passing score for the grade(s), checked ineligible, therefore no numerical rating is assigned for them.
☐ You did not pass the typing performance test.
☐ You did not pass the stenography performance test.
☐ Your lowest acceptable salary is higher than that of the position in which you qualify.
☐ Your qualifications statement does not show that you meet the minimum experience or education required for the grade(s) checked ineligible.
☐ You failed to reply to official correspondence.
☐

FOR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION USE ONLY

TEST SCORES

I	GENERAL TEST (CLERICAL PLUS VERBAL)	102
II	TYPING	64/6
III	DICTATION	119
IV	CLERICAL	61
V	VERBAL	41

SEE OTHER SIDE FOR EXPLANATION OF SCORES

THE ITEMS CHECKED BELOW APPLY TO YOU:

☐ You passed the general tests. If you recompete, you need retake only the typing part (and dictating part if you apply for stenographer) of the test. You must also present this notice and a Personal Qualifications Statement, Standard Form 171.
☐ You failed the stenography test only. If you recompete, you need retake only that test. You must also present this notice and a Personal Qualifications Statement, S.F. 171.
☐ You may not enter on duty until completion of required education is shown.
☐ Your qualifications statement is attached in case you wish to apply for a different position.

DATE OF ISSUE	ISSUING OFFICE	
April 25, 1977	#99	United States Civil Service Commission 1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20415

BE SURE TO READ THE IMPORTANT MESSAGES ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM

Part I

CSC FORM 4008-C
OCTOBER 1973

Superior Court
# of the District of Columbia

Certificate of Appreciation

LILLIAN B. JOHNSON, *having served with distinction as a juror in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia during the month of* JANUARY *19*75, *is presented this certificate of appreciation for significant community service by the Judges of the Court on behalf of the grateful citizens of the District of Columbia.*

Harold H. Greene

CHIEF JUDGE

Arnold Malech

EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 16, 1977

TO: BECKY

FROM: NANCY

RE: LILLIAN JOHNSON

Thought you would want a copy of her resume. She will be starting 8-29-77.

Your assistance with the 1977 Inauguration meant a great deal to me personally. More importantly, it was a great example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other.

Jimmy Carter

RESUME

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875
(301) 772-3341(H)
(202) 755-6808(O)

Position Desired - Administrative Assistant/Secretarial

Experience - District of Columbia

5/77 - Present	Department of Housing and Urban Development 451 7th Street, S.W. Clerk-typist
12/76 - 2/77	1977 Presidential Inaugural Committee 2nd & "T" Streets, S.W. Administrative Assistant/Site Coordinator
9/76 - 11/76	Congressional Budget Office 2nd & "D" Streets, S.W. Secretary
7/76 - 9/76	Stuart Temporaries, Inc. 1120 -19th Street, N.W. Secretary
8/74 - 9/75	Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn 18th & "H" Streets, N.W. Legal Secretary
11/73 - 8/74	Temporaries, Inc., 1015 18th Street, N.W. Secretary
5/13 - 6/14	Longworth House Office Building, N.J. & "C" Streets, S.E. Secretary
1/73 - 8/73	Model Inner Cities Community Organization 9th & "U" Streets, N.W. Executive Secretary
3/70 - 3/71	American Association of Junior Colleges One Dupont Circle, N.W. Secretary
2/68 - 1/70	Harbridge House, Inc. 2100 "M" Street, N.W. Support Secretary
5/67 - 1/68	Tabulating Research & Development Agency 14th & "K" Streets, N.W. Secretary
5/66 - 5/67	Georgetown University, 37th & "O" Streets, N.W. Clerk-typist

Education:

1/72 - 7/47	Strayer College, 13th & "G" Streets, N.W. Studied Court & Conference Reporting, Stenotype, Legal reporting and advanced vocabulary
9/63 - 6/64	Johnson's Business School, 14th & N.Y. Avenue, N.W. Secretarial Course
9/59 - 6/62	Graduate of Dunbar High School, 1st & "N" Streets, N.W. Commercial Courses
Skills:	Stenotypist 100 - 140 wpm. Typist 75 - 80
	Seeking opportunity for career professional position willing to start as trainee, willing to travel occasionally
Personal:	Divorced
	One daughter age 8 years.

RESUME

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875
(301) 772-3341(H)
(202) 755-6808(O)

Position Desired - Administrative Assistant/Secretarial

Experience - District of Columbia

5/77 - Present	Department of Housing and Urban Development 451 7th Street, S.W. Clerk-typist
12/76 - 2/77	1977 Presidential Inaugural Committee 2nd & "T" Streets, S.W. Administrative Assistant/Site Coordinator
9/76 - 11/76	Congressional Budget Office 2nd & "D" Streets, S.W. Secretary
7/76 - 9/76	Stuart Temporaries, Inc. 1120 -19th Street, N.W. Secretary
8/74 - 9/75	Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn 18th & "H" Streets, N.W. Legal Secretary
11/73 - 8/74	Temporaries, Inc., 1015 18th Street, N.W. Secretary
5/13 - 6/14	Longworth House Office Building, N.J. & "C" Streets, S.E. Secretary
1/73 - 8/73	Model Inner Cities Community Organization 9th & "U" Streets, N.W. Executive Secretary
3/70 - 3/71	American Association of Junior Colleges One Dupont Circle, N.W. Secretary
2/68 - 1/70	Harbridge House, Inc. 2100 "M" Street, N.W. Support Secretary
5/67 - 1/68	Tabulating Research & Development Agency 14th & "K" Streets, N.W. Secretary
5/66 - 5/67	Georgetown University, 37th & "O" Streets, N.W. Clerk-typist

Education:

1/72 - 7/47	Strayer College, 13th & "G" Streets, N.W. Studied Court & Conference Reporting, Stenotype, Legal reporting and advanced vocabulary
9/63 - 6/64	Johnson's Business School, 14th & N.Y. Avenue, N.W. Secretarial Course
9/59 - 6/62	Graduate of Dunbar High School, 1st & "N" Streets, N.W. Commercial Courses
Skills:	Stenotypist 100 - 140 wpm. Typist 75 - 80
	Seeking opportunity for career professional position willing to start as trainee, willing to travel occasional
Personal:	Divorced
	One daughter age 8 years.

1977 Inaugural Committee

February 7, 1977

Dear Ms. Johnson:

President Carter and Vice President Mondale have asked us to express their sincere appreciation to you for your most commendable efforts in support of the 1977 Inauguration.

The Inauguration of the President of the United States is a moment in history that serves as a vehicle to communicate to the world the commitment and spirit of the New Administration.

It is with this in mind that I forward this letter to you as a member of the Inaugural Security and Credential Committee. You displayed the highest degree of professionalism and dedication in many important tasks.

You were always willing and ready to work long hours, above and beyond the normal work day. You volunteered your services for almost anything asked of you.

Throughout the planning and implementation period, you were faced with an everchanging list of requirements. Your dedication to duty, understanding of the difficulties faced by the Inaugural Committee, and cooperative attitude are indicative of a true professional. Your overall manner of performance was truly outstanding.

If we had the power today, each of you would receive a tangible medal of citation for the highest award of Volunteer Action. Possessing only words, we say again, thank you for all the service given so unselfishly.

Sincerely,

Frank Wilson, Director
Security & Credentials Committee

Donald Brock

Donald Brock, Deputy Chief
In Charge of Internal Security

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON

served with distinction on behalf of the
Armed Forces of the United States
at the Inauguration of

Jimmy Carter

on the twentieth day of January,
one thousand, nine-hundred seventy-seven
in Washington, District of Columbia

Bardyl R. Tirana   Vicki Rogers

Bardyl R. Tirana   Vicki Rogers

Co-Chairpersons

1977 Inaugural Committee

Robert G. Yerks

Major General USA

Chairman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1977

To Lillian Johnson

I deeply appreciate your dedicated and untiring work on the 1977 inauguration. The inaugural program was a great success, open to all of our citizens. This would not have been possible without the unselfish help, cheerful spirit and long hours freely given by volunteers such as you.

You have helped to set an example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Miss Lillian Johnson
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875

Your assistance with the 1977 Inauguration meant a great deal to me personally. More importantly, it was a great example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other.

Jimmy Carter

Life Experience: Inauguration of President and Vice President of the United States, 1977 Presidential Inaugural Committee, Washington, D.C.

Competency Statement | Position Descriptors

As Site Coordinator &
Administrative Assistant
of the Inaugural Committee's
Security & Credential division,
I have:

A. Acquired knowledge as to how legislative priorities are set

B. Held high level administrative responsibility in operating the office

C. Supervised productivity, flow of work and overall operations of our office with top United States Secret Service officials and congressional members.

D. Through the concept of creative office leadership I have assisted in planning, organizing and controlling the operations of presidential security

E. Utilize techniques to help maintain good employee relations through effective supervision, delegation, evaluating, training, and thorough communications with USSS.

F. Arranged and made contacts with top USSS agents, presidential advance team, and congressional members for indepth security conferences.

AMENDMENT TO PERSONAL QUALIFICATIONS STATEMENT

OMB
APPROVED 50-R0048

IMPORTANT: Read these instructions carefully before completing this form.

This form may be used to update your Personal Qualifications Statement provided you have had no more than three additional positions since the statement being updated was completed. Agencies are required to accept a previously completed Personal Qualifications Statement as current when this form is attached. Before completing this form, review carefully your answers to all items on the statement being updated. Use typewriter if available. Otherwise write or print legibly in dark ink.

1. NAME *(Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any)* ☐ MR. ☐ MISS ☐ MRS. AND ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code)*

JOHNSON, Lillian Barbara Killens
7516 Forest Road
Hyattsville, Maryland 20875

2. DATE OF THIS STATEMENT: May 17, 1977

3. BIRTH DATE *(month, day, year)*: December 6, 1943

4. KIND OF POSITION YOU ARE FILING FOR *(Or title and number of announcement)*: Security Assistant 15-21 (77)A

5. REASON FOR SUBMISSION *(Check One)*

- ☐ To update Personal Qualifications Statement in my Official Personal Folder
- ☐ To update Personal Qualifications Statement on file with you
- ☒ To update attached Personal Qualifications Statement
- ☐ As requested

6. LOWEST PAY OR GRADE YOU WILL ACCEPT
PAY $ per or GRADE 7

7. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back. Account for periods of unemployment in separate blocks in order)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No *(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities.)*

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM May 9, 1977 TO PRESENT TIME

EXACT TITLE OF POSITION: Clerk-typist

IF FEDERAL SERVICE, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY GRADE: 5

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ 179. PER week FINAL $ PER

AVG. HRS. PER WEEK: 40

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT CITY: Washington, STATE: D.C.

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED: 0

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Housing & Urban Developm

NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR: Charles Field

AREA CODE AND PHONE NO. IF KNOWN:

NAME OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, etc.)* AND ADDRESS *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Department of Housing & Urban Development (HUD)
Washington, D.C. 20410

REASON FOR WANTING TO LEAVE: Seeking position involving more responsibility and opportunity

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS: Prepare in final form a variety of materials including correspondence, staff studies, technical papers, memoranda and issue papers which include the use of terminology that is highly specialized. Responsible for maintenance of subject matter files for the staff. (Even though this job description does not indicate), I have taken dictation and transcribed it for the Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for Housing and Urban Development. Perform all secretarial duties.

FOR AGENCY USE *(skill codes, etc.)*

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM TO

EXACT TITLE OF POSITION

IF FEDERAL SERVICE, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY GRADE

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER

AVG. HRS. PER WEEK

PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT CITY: STATE:

NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED

KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

AREA CODE AND PHONE NO. IF KNOWN

NAME OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, etc.)* AND ADDRESS *(including ZIP Code, if known)*

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FOR AGENCY USE *(skill codes, etc.)*

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Standard Form 172, January 1972
U.S. Civil Service Commission
172-102

DATES OF EMPLOYMENT *(month, year)* FROM TO	EXACT TITLE OF POSITION	IF FEDERAL SERVICE, CIVILIAN OR MILITARY GRADE

SALARY OR EARNINGS STARTING $ PER FINAL $ PER	AVG. HRS. PER WEEK	PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT CITY: STATE:	NUMBER AND KIND OF EMPLOYEES SUPERVISED	KIND OF BUSINESS OR ORGANIZATION *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*

NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR

AREA CODE AND PHONE NO. IF KNOWN

NAME OF EMPLOYER *(firm, organization, etc.)* AND ADDRESS *(including ZIP Code, if known)*

REASON FOR LEAVING

DESCRIPTION OF DUTIES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND ACCOMPLISHMENTS

FOR AGENCY USE *(skill codes, etc.)*

8. Space for explaining other changes or additions to the qualifications statement being updated. If *any* answer to an item on the qualifications statement being updated is incorrect or incomplete as of the date of this amendment, identify the item by number and explain. *(Check one)* ☐ Other changes or additions listed below ☐ No other changes or additions.

ITEM NO.	If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on EACH sheet your name, position *(or title and number of announcement)* filing for, and date of the qualifications statement being updated. Attach all sheets to this form.

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that the statements made by me on this form update my Personal Qualifications Statement completed 5/17/72 *(month, year)* and are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE *(Sign in ink)* Lillian B. Johnson

Lillian B. Johnson

FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM IS PUNISHABLE BY LAW

GPO : 1972 O - 453-449

1A. Kind of position *(job)* you are filing for *(or title of announcement)* Administrative Asst.,

B. Announcement No.

C. Options for which you wish to be considered *(if listed in announcement)*
Legislative Aide

D. Primary place(s) you wish to be employed
Washington, D.C., Metropolitan area

2. Home phone *(including Area Code)* 772-3341 (301)

3. Office phone *(including Area Code)* 775-5860

4. Name *(Last) (First) (Middle) (Maiden, if any)* ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address *(Number, Street, City, State and ZIP Code)*

JOHNSON, Lillian Barbara Killens
7516 Forest Road
Hyattsville, Maryland 20875

5. Legal or voting residence *(State)*
District of Columbia

6. Height without shoes 5 Feet 7½ Inches

7. Weight 135 lbs

8. Birthplace *(City and State, or foreign country)*
District of Columbia

9. Birth date *(Month, day, year)* 12/6/43

10. Social Security Account Number 577 | 56 | 7465

11. If you have ever been employed by the Federal Government as a civilian, give your last classification series, grade, and job title.
GS-318-5 Clerk-typist
Dates of service in that grade
From May 9, 1977 To Present time

12. If you are currently on a list of eligibles for appointment to a Federal position, give the name of the announcement, the name of the office maintaining the list, the date on your notice of rating, and your rating.

Stenographer and Typist
United States Civil Service Commission
Federal Register
April 25, 1977 — Typist 4 — Steno 5

13. Lowest pay or grade you will accept

PAY		GRADE
$ per yr.	OR	5

14. When will you be available? upon notification

15. Will you accept temporary employment for:
(Acceptance or refusal of temporary employment will not affect your consideration for other appointments.)

	YES	NO
___1 month or less?		X
___1 to 4 months?		X
___4 to 12 months?	X	~~X~~

16. Where will you accept a job?

	YES	NO
___Washington, D.C.	X	
___Any place in the United States.		
___Outside of the United States.		
___Only in *(specify)*: metro area		

17. Will you accept less than full ti
(Less than 40 hours per week) ☐ Ye

18. Are you willing to travel? *(Check*

NO	SOME
	X

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS BLOC
FOR USE OF EXAMINING OFFICE ONLY

☐ Appor. ☐ Nonappor.
Material ☐ Submitted ☐ Returned
Entered Register:
Notations:
Form Reviewed:
Form Approved:

Option	Grade	Earned Rating	Preference	Aug. Ratin
			☐ 5 points *(Tent.)*	
			☐ 10 Points Comp.Dis.	
			☐ Other 10 Points	
			☐ Disal.	
Initials and Date			☐ Being Investigated	

THIS SPACE FOR USE OF APPOINTING OFFICER
Preference has been verified through proof that the sep under honorable conditions, and other proof as required.
☐ 5-Pt. ☐ 10-Pt. Comp. Disab. ☐ 10-Pt. O

Signature and Title

Agency
Date

☐ Refer for medical action

19. VETERAN PREFERENCE. Answer all parts. If a part does not apply to you, answer "No."

A. Have you ever served on active duty in the United States military service? *(Exclude tours of active duty for training as a reservist or Guardsman.)*

B. Have you ever been discharged from the armed services under other than honorable conditions? (You may omit any such discharge changed to honorable by a Discharge Review Board or similar authority.) . . . .
If "Yes," give details in Item 37.

C. Do you claim 5-point preference based on active duty in the armed forces? . . . .
If "Yes," you will be required to furnish records to support your claim at the time you are appointed.

D. Do you claim 10-point preference? . . . .
If "Yes," check type of preference claimed and complete and attach Standard Form 15, "Claim for 10-point Veteran Preference," together with the proof in that form
TYPE: ☐ Compensable disability ☐ Disability ☐ Wife ☐ Widow ☐

E. List Dates, Branch, and Serial or Service Number of All Active Service *(Enter "N/A" if not applicable)*

From	To	Branch of Service	Serial or Service Numb
N/A			

THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

Standard Form 171
May 1975 U.S. Civil Service Co
171-105

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No
(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

1

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 12/30/76 To PRESENT TIME		Exact title of position Security-Credls. Site Coordinator/Secretary	If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 150.00 per wk Present $ same per	Avg. hrs. per week 50	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised several-100 volunteers	Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* 1977 Inaugural Comte

Name of immediate supervisor Frank Wilson, Director
Area Code and phone No. if known 202/472-4350
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)* 1977 Inaugural Committee, 2nd & "D" Streets, S.W
Washington, D.C. 20024
Reason for wanting to leave Job is terminating on 1/31/77
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments Instructing several sub-committees within the Inaugural Committee on procedure and preparation of security clearance forms. Processing and preparing S.C. forms for security pick-up. Communication by phone on a very large scale with Secret Service, White House and many other agencies for Inauguration. Worked with the director preparing and designing security credentials. Sat-in on meetings w/ Security & Press Personnel, took dictation and kept minutes. Operated the Command Post at Visitors Center. Typed letter, memorandums, etc., Presently working on After Action Report. Served as central point of information concerning activities of the office.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

2

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 9/76 To 11/76		Exact title of position Secretary/Personnel Asst.		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 10,096. per yr. Final $ same per	Avg. hrs. per week 40	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised none	Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* Federal

Name of immediate supervisor Carl McCarden/Alicia McPhee
Area Code and phone No. if known 202/225-6666
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)* Congressional Budget Office
2nd & "D" Streets, S.W.
Reason for leaving Temporary position
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments - Secretary in Budget Analysis Division, Human Resource and Personnel Office. Worked with several Analyst. Typed up proposals, budget reports, general correspondence and telephone communications. Operated the Vydec Computer in all divisions.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

3

Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 7/76 To 9/76		Exact title of position Secretary/Legal Asst.		If Federal service, civilian or military grade Temporary Agency
Salary or earnings Starting $ 4.75 per hr. Final $ same per	Avg. hrs. per week 180.	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised none	Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* secretarial agency

Name of immediate supervisor Ms. Susan Heuser
Area Code and phone No. if known
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)* Stuart Temporaries, Inc.
1120 -19th Street, N.W.
Reason for leaving Temporary placement agency.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments Worked on several legal assignments on short-term. Secretary to attorneys. Performed general secretarial duties, typing drafts, briefs, other correspondence, and telephone communication.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

20. EXPERIENCE *(Start with your PRESENT position and work back. Account for periods of unemployment in separate blocks in order.)*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No
(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

4
Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 8/74 To PRESENT TIME 9/75
Exact title of position: Legal Secretary
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 10,500 per Yr. Present $ same per
Avg. hrs. per week: 37-½
Place of employment: City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Law Firm
Name of immediate supervisor: JoAnna McAtee
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Arent, Fox, Kintner, Plotkin & Kahn
1815 "H" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for wanting to leave: laid off
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Legal Secretary to several attorneys in the firm, in areas of litigation, real estate, tax, labor, Federal Communications-took dictation, wrote letters of general correspondence, kept records, typed briefs, proposals, etc. Telephone communications with clients and other firms, etc.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)* 1/72-6/74

(THE NEXT THREE JOBS LISTED BELOW WERE COURSE RELATED WHILE ATTENDING STRAYER COLLEGE)

5
Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 11/73 To 8/74
Exact title of position: Secretary
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 4.50 per hr. Final $ per
Avg. hrs. per week: 20
Place of employment: City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Secretarial Service
Name of immediate supervisor: Clara, Bob
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Temporaries, Inc., 1015 -18th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: temporary job
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Gained experienced in working with many law firms in the area as Legal, Executive, Statistical and Technical Secretary on short-term assignments.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

6
Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 4/73 To 6/73
Exact title of position: Transcriber
If Federal service, civilian or military grade:
Salary or earnings: Starting $ 3.50 per hr. Final $ per
Avg. hrs. per week: 20
Place of employment: City: Washington State: D.C.
Number and kind of employees supervised: 0
Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)*: Reporting Agency
Name of immediate supervisor: Doris Hoover
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Hoover Reporting Agency
3rd & Mass. Ave., N.E., Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: Course related - for experience mostly.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Transcriber of reporters notes from courtroom hearings.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☐ Yes ☐ No
(A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.)

7 Dates of employment *(month, year)* 7/74 From 9/73 To PRESENT TIME		Exact title of position Student reporter		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 0 per Present $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 15	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 0	Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* Reporting Agency

Name of immediate supervisor: Bernie Richards
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
BGH Reporting Agency
24th & Penn. Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for wanting to leave: Course related - for experience only.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments:
Sat-in on public hearings and took minutes of hearings and observed courtroom procedures. Transcribed notes.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

8 Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 5/13/74 To 6/14/74		Exact title of position Legal Secretary		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 4.50 per hr. Final $ same per	Avg. hrs. per week 37-½	Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 0	Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* Congressional Office

Name of immediate supervisor: Marilyn Shapiro
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
Congresswoman Elizabeth Holtzman
Longworth House Office Bldg., 3rd & C Sts. S.E.
Reason for leaving: Temporary position
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Worked with research group on impeachment of Pres. Richard M. Nixon, wrote letters to constituency around the country, handled phones, took dictation and transcribed.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

9 Dates of employment *(month, year)* From 3/70 To 3/71		Exact title of position Secretary		If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 6,500 per yr. Final $ 7,000 per	Avg. hrs. per week 37-½	Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 0	Kind of business or organization *(manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.)* Educational Asso.

Name of immediate supervisor: Dr. John Mallan
Area Code and phone No. if known:
Name of employer *(firm, organization, etc.)* and address *(including ZIP Code, if known)*:
American Association of Junior Colleges
One Dupont Circle, N.W., Washington, D.C.
Reason for leaving: Moved to N.Y.C.
Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments: Secretary to Director of Veteran Programs, kept records, arranged for travel and conferences, handled phones, typed general correspondence.
For agency use *(skill codes, etc.)*

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

20. EXPERIENCE (*Start with your PRESENT position and work back. Account for periods of unemployment*

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment?.................. ☐ Yes ☐ No
(*A "No" will not affect your consideration for employment opportunities except for HEARING EXAMINER positions.*)

10	Dates of employment (*month, year*) 1/70 From 2/68 To PRESENT TIME		Exact title of position Secretary	If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 6.000 per yr. Present $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 37-½	Place of employment City: Washington, State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 2	Kind of business or organization (*manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.*) Management Consultants

Name of immediate supervisor: Layle Luckett

Area Code and phone No. if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Harbridge House, Inc.
2100 "M" Street, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Reason for wanting to leave Due to illness, Hepatitis

Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments Secretary to four management consultants, wrote letters of general correspondence, kept records, arranged for conferences and travel, typed gov't. proposals, traveled occasionally.

For agency use (*skill codes, etc.*)

11	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/67 To 1/68		Exact title of position Secretary	If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 8500 per yr. Final $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 37-½	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 2	Kind of business or organization (*manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.*) Employment Agency

Name of immediate supervisor: Joyce Sarsfield

Area Code and phone No. if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Tabulating Research and Development Agency
14th & "K" Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Reason for leaving Company went bankrupt

Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments Secretary to two job counselors. Typed up resumes for system analyst and programmers, filed records, typed general correspondenc

For agency use (*skill codes, etc.*)

12	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/66 To 5/67		Exact title of position Clerk-typist	If Federal service, civilian or military grade
Salary or earnings Starting $ 4200 per yr. Final $ per	Avg. hrs. per week 40	Place of employment City: Washington State: D.C.	Number and kind of employees supervised 0	Kind of business or organization (*manufacturing, accounting, insurance, etc.*) University

Name of immediate supervisor: Nadine Flack

Area Code and phone No. if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Georgetown University, 37th & "O" Sts., N.W.
Washington, D.C.

Reason for leaving resigned for higher paying position.

Description of duties, responsibilities, and accomplishments typed letters of general correspondence and filed student records, arranged for student loans, registered students.

For agency use (*skill codes, etc.*)

IF YOU NEED ADDITIONAL EXPERIENCE BLOCKS USE STANDARD FORM 171-A OR BLANK SHEETS
SEE INSTRUCTION SHEET

• ANSWER ALL QUESTIONS CORRECTLY AND FULLY

21 A. Special qualifications and skills *(skills with machines; patents or inventions; your most important publications (do not submit copies unless requested); your public speaking and publications experience; membership in professional or scientific societies; etc.)*

Operate Vydec Computer
Most IBM typewriters, Selectric II, Standard Electric, Executive, etc.
Operate Court Reporters model--Stenotype machine for dictation
Operate the stenorette, IBM Dictaphones & others
10 key adding & calculator machines

B. Kind of License or Certificate *(For example, pilot, registered nurse, lawyer, radio operator, C.P.A., etc.)*	C. State or other licensing authority	D. Year of first license or certificate	E. Year of latest license or certificate	F. Approximate number of words per minute: Typing	Shorthand
	D.C. Drivers permit			75-80	120-14

22. A. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months?

YES	MONTH/YEAR	NO	HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
X	6/62		12

B. Name and location *(city and State)* of last high school attended
Dunbar High School, 1st & "N" Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C.

C. Name and location *(city, State, and ZIP Code if known)* of college or university. *(If you expect to graduate within 9 months, give MONTH and year you expect degree.)*	Dates attended		Years Completed		No. of credits compl.		Type of degree *(B.A., etc.)*	Year of degree
	From	To	Day	Night	Semester hours	Quarter hours		
Strayer College	1/72	7/74	2	2	18	9	Special	
13th & "G" Streets, N.W.							student	

D. Chief undergraduate college subjects	No. of credits compl. Semester hours	Quarter hours	E. Chief graduate college subjects	No. of credits compl. Semester hours	Quarter hours

F. Major field of study at highest level of college work
Court & Conference Reporting

G. Other schools or training *(for example, trade, vocational, armed forces, or business)*. Give for each the name and location *(city, State, and ZIP Code if known)* of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.

Johnson's Business School, 14th & N.Y., Avenue, N.W. 1964
Secretarial Course, typing, speedwriting, clerical

23. HONORS, AWARDS, AND FELLOWSHIPS RECEIVED
1977 Inaugural Committee
Certificate of Appreciation
White House letter
Jury Duty Certificate

24. LANGUAGES OTHER THAN ENGLISH

List the languages and indicate your knowledge of each by placing "X" in proper columns	Reading			Speaking			Understanding			Writing		
	Excl	Good	Fair	Excl	Good	Fair	Excl	Good	Fair	Excl	Good	Fair
none												

25. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do not repeat names of supervisors listed under Item 20, EXPERIENCE.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS *(Number, Street, City, State and ZIP Code)*	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Rev. Robert Harrison	New Samaritan Baptist Church 6th & Maryland Avenue, N.E.	Minister
Ellis Mayo	Manpower Office 6th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.	Job counselor
Maureen Plummer	National Center on Black Aged 1730 "M" Street, N.W.	Comptroller

ANSWER ITEMS 26 THROUGH 36 BY PLACING AN "X" IN THE PROPER COLUMN	Yes	No	
26. Are you a citizen of the United States? If "No," give country of which you are a citizen:	X		◄
Before answering these questions read Items 27 and 28 in the attached instructions. 27. Are you now a member of the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any subdivision of the Communist Party, U.S.A.?		X	◄
28. (a) Are you now, or within the last ten years have you been, a member of any organization, or group of persons including but not limited to the Communist Party, U.S.A., or any subdivision of the Communist Party, U.S.A., which during the period of your membership you knew was advocating or teaching that the government of the United States or any political subdivision thereof should be overthrown or overturned by force, violence, or any unlawful means?		X	◄
28. (b) If your answer to (a) is in the affirmative, did you, during the period of such membership, have the specific intent to further the aims of such organization or group of persons to overthrow or overturn the government of the United States or any state or any political subdivision thereof by force, violence, or any unlawful means?		X	◄
29. If your answer to 27 or 28(a) above is in the affirmative state the names of such organizations and the dates of your membership in each in item 37.			
30. Within the last five years have you been fired from any job for any reason?		X	◄
31. Within the last five years have you quit a job after being notified that you would be fired? *If your answer to 30 or 31 above is "Yes," give details in Item 37. Show the name and address (including ZIP Code) of employer, approximate date, and reasons in each case. This information should agree with your answers in Item 20, EXPERIENCE.*		X	◄
32. Have you ever been convicted of an offense against the law or forfeited collateral, or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (You may omit: (1) traffic violations for which you paid a fine of $30.00 or less; and (2) any offense committed before your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in a juvenile court or under a Youth Offender law.)		X	◄
33. While in the military service were you ever convicted by general court-martial? *If your answer to 32 or 33 is "Yes," give details in Item 37. Show for each offense: (1) date; (2) charge; (3) place; (4) court; and (5) action taken.*		n/a	◄
34. Does the United States Government employ in a civilian capacity or as a member of the Armed Forces any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (See Items 34 and 35 in the attached instruction sheet.)		X	◄
35. Do you live with, or within the past 12 months have you lived with, any of these relatives who are employed in a civilian capacity? *If your answer to 34 is "Yes," give in Item 37 for such relatives: (1) full name; (2) present address (including ZIP Code); (3) relationship; (4) department, agency, or branch of the Armed Forces. If your answer to 35 is "Yes," also give the kind of appointment held by the relative(s) you live with or have lived with within the past 12 months.*		X	◄
36. Do you receive or do you have a pending application for retirement or retainer pay, pension, or other compensation based upon military, Federal civilian, or District of Columbia Government service? *If your answer is "Yes," give details in Item 37.*		X	◄

Your Statement cannot be processed until you have answered all questions, including Items 26 through 36 above. Be sure you have placed an "X" to the left of EVERY marker (◄) above, either in the "Yes" or the "No" column.

37. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	

If more space is required, use full sheets of paper approximately the same size as this page. Write on EACH sheet your name, birth date, and *announcement or position* title. Attach all sheets to this Statement at the top of Page 3.

ATTENTION — THIS STATEMENT MUST BE SIGNED

Read the following paragraph carefully before signing this Statement

A false answer to any question in this Statement may be grounds for not employing you, or for dismissing you after you begin work, and may be punishable by fine or imprisonment (U.S. Code, Title 18, Sec. 1001). All statements are subject to investigation, including a check of your fingerprints, police records, and former employers. All the information you give will be considered in reviewing your Statement and is subject to investigation. A false answer to items 27 or 28 could deprive you of your right to an annuity when you reach retirement age in addition to the penalties described above.

CERTIFICATION	SIGNATURE *(Sign in ink)*	DATE SIGNED
I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this Statement are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.	Lillian E. Johnson	May 17, 1977

UNITED STATES CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

NOTICE OF RATING

APPLICANT MUST FILL IN ALL BLANKS IN THIS SECTION ONLY

TITLE OF EXAMINATION	PLACE OF EXAMINATION	DATE OF TEST
Stenographer and Typist	Washington, D.C.	April 25, 1977

NAME AND ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State and ZIP Code*)

Lillian B. Johnson
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875

This is not a notice of appointment. It is a record of your rating. It is important that you keep it.

PERIOD OF CONSIDERATION FROM ISSUE DATE

☐ 6 MONTHS ☐ 12 MONTHS

☒ 3 years

SEE REVERSE SIDE

☑ You are ELIGIBLE for the following grade(s):

CLERK—TYPIST	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER	CLERK-DICTATING MACHINE TRANSCRIBER	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER (TRAINEE)	YOUR NUMERICAL RATING IS
☐ GS-2 ☐ GS-3 ☑ GS-4	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4 ☑ GS-5	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4	☐ GS-2	82.0

AMOUNT OF VETEPAN PREFERENCE INCLUDED IN YOUR RATING: 5-PTS ☐ 10-PTS ☐

☐ You are INELIGIBLE for the following grade(s):

CLERK-TYPIST	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER	CLERK-DICTATING MACHINE TRANSCRIBER	CLERK-STENOGRAPHER (TRAINEE)
☐ GS-2 ☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4 ☐ GS-5	☐ GS-3 ☐ GS-4	☐ GS-2

REASON FOR INELIGIBILITY:

- ☐ You did not earn a passing score for the grade(s), checked ineligible, therefore no numerical rating is assigned for them.
- ☐ You did not pass the typing performance test.
- ☐ You did not pass the stenography performance test.
- ☐ Your lowest acceptable salary is higher than that of the position in which you qualify.
- ☐ Your qualifications statement does not show that you meet the minimum experience or education required for the grade(s) checked ineligible.
- ☐ You failed to reply to official correspondence.
- ☐

FOR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION USE ONLY

TEST SCORES

I	GENERAL TEST (CLERICAL PLUS VERBAL)	102
II	TYPING	64/6
III	DICTATION	119
IV	CLERICAL	61
V	VERBAL	41

SEE OTHER SIDE FOR EXPLANATION OF SCORES

THE ITEMS CHECKED BELOW APPLY TO YOU:

- ☐ You passed the general tests. If you recompete, you need retake only the typing part (and dictating part if you apply for stenographer) of the test. You must also present this notice and a Personal Qualifications Statement, Standard Form 171.
- ☐ You failed the stenography test only. If you recompete, you need retake only that test. You must also present this notice and a Personal Qualifications Statement, S.F. 171.
- ☐ You may not enter on duty until completion of required education is shown.
- ☐ Your qualifications statement is attached in case you wish to apply for a different position.

DATE OF ISSUE	ISSUING OFFICE
April 25, 1977	#99 United States Civil Service Commission 1900 E Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20415

BE SURE TO READ THE IMPORTANT MESSAGES ON THE BACK OF THIS FORM

Part I

CSC FORM 4008-C
OCTOBER 1973

Superior Court
# of the District of Columbia

Certificate of Appreciation

LILLIAN B. JOHNSON, *having served with distinction as a juror in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia during the month of* JANUARY *19*75, *is presented this certificate of appreciation for significant community service by the Judges of the Court on behalf of the grateful citizens of the District of Columbia.*

Harold H. Greene

CHIEF JUDGE

Arnold M. Malech

EXECUTIVE OFFICER,
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS

1977 Inaugural Committee

February 7, 1977

Dear Ms. Johnson:

President Carter and Vice President Mondale have asked us to express their sincere appreciation to you for your most commendable efforts in support of the 1977 Inauguration.

The Inauguration of the President of the United States is a moment in history that serves as a vehicle to communicate to the world the commitment and spirit of the New Administration.

It is with this in mind that I forward this letter to you as a member of the Inaugural Security and Credential Committee. You displayed the highest degree of professionalism and dedication in many important tasks.

You were always willing and ready to work long hours, above and beyond the normal work day. You volunteered your services for almost anything asked of you.

Throughout the planning and implementation period, you were faced with an everchanging list of requirements. Your dedication to duty, understanding of the difficulties faced by the Inaugural Committee, and cooperative attitude are indicative of a true professional. Your overall manner of performance was truly outstanding.

If we had the power today, each of you would receive a tangible medal of citation for the highest award of Volunteer Action. Possessing only words, we say again, thank you for all the service given so unselfishly.

Sincerely,

Frank

Frank Wilson, Director
Security & Credentials Committee

Donald Brock

Donald Brock, Deputy Chief
In Charge of Internal Security

INAUGURATION OF PRESIDENT AND VICE PRESIDENT

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON

served with distinction on behalf of the
Armed Forces of the United States
at the Inauguration of

Jimmy Carter

on the twentieth day of January,
one thousand, nine-hundred seventy-seven
in Washington, District of Columbia

Vicki Rogers

Bardyl R. Tirana **Vicki Rogers**

Co-Chairpersons

1977 Inaugural Committee

Robert G. Yerks

Major General USA

Chairman

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1977

To Lillian Johnson

I deeply appreciate your dedicated and untiring work on the 1977 inauguration. The inaugural program was a great success, open to all of our citizens. This would not have been possible without the unselfish help, cheerful spirit and long hours freely given by volunteers such as you.

You have helped to set an example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Miss Lillian Johnson
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875

Your assistance with the 1977 Inauguration meant a great deal to me personally. More importantly, it was a great example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other.

Jimmy Carter

1977 Inaugural Committee

February 7, 1977

Dear Ms. Johnson:

President Carter and Vice President Mondale have asked us to express their sincere appreciation to you for your most commendable efforts in support of the 1977 Inauguration.

The Inauguration of the President of the United States is a moment in history that serves as a vehicle to communicate to the world the commitment and spirit of the New Administration.

It is with this in mind that I forward this letter to you as a member of the Inaugural Security and Credential Committee. You displayed the highest degree of professionalism and dedication in many important tasks.

You were always willing and ready to work long hours, above and beyond the normal work day. You volunteered your services for almost anything asked of you.

Throughout the planning and implementation period, you were faced with an everchanging list of requirements. Your dedication to duty, understanding of the difficulties faced by the Inaugural Committee, and cooperative attitude are indicative of a true professional. Your overall manner of performance was truly outstanding.

If we had the power today, each of you would receive a tangible medal of citation for the highest award of Volunteer Action. Possessing only words, we say again, thank you for all the service given so unselfishly.

Sincerely,

Frank

Frank Wilson, Director
Security & Credentials Committee

Donald Brock

Donald Brock, Deputy Chief
In Charge of Internal Security

LILLIAN BARBARA JOHNSON

served with distinction on behalf of the
Armed Forces of the United States
at the Inauguration of

Jimmy Carter

on the twentieth day of January,
one thousand, nine-hundred seventy-seven
in Washington, District of Columbia

Bardyl R. Tirana Vicki Rogers

Bardyl R. Tirana **Vicki Rogers** **Robert G. Yerks**

Co-Chairpersons *Major General USA*

1977 Inaugural Committee *Chairman*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 3, 1977

To Lillian Johnson

I deeply appreciate your dedicated and untiring work on the 1977 inauguration. The inaugural program was a great success, open to all of our citizens. This would not have been possible without the unselfish help, cheerful spirit and long hours freely given by volunteers such as you.

You have helped to set an example of what we Americans can accomplish by sharing our talents and energies with each other. Many thanks.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

Miss Lillian Johnson
7516 Forest Road
Landover, Maryland 20875

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lillian B. Johnson	January 12, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577-56-7465	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lillian B. Johnson	January 12, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577-56-7465	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10454
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10454

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORD

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/06/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
JONES, DIANA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

JONES, Diana
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number   Level   Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
6-6-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years   Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
0	2

Month	DAY OF MONTH 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	USED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	EMPLOYEE INITIALS
Jan.					A				S	S	S	S	S																			1	1	1	3		5	1	2	
Feb.																																1	1	2	1			2	1	
Mar.										S																						1	1	3	0		1	3	1	
Apr.						A	A			A	S																					1	1	4	0			4	0	
May																																								
June																																								
July																																								
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 5/31/78

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨/ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature   Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature   Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House   Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Diana N. Jones	5/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578-58-2498	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

*If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 4, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: May 4, 1978

RE: Termination

Please be advised that effective Friday, April 28, 1978, Mrs. Diana Jones resigned from the Committee staff.

Her effective termination date will be May 31, 1978, and will include any annual or sick leave she is entitled to.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Diana N. Jones	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578-58-2498	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ____________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Secretary	$16,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ____________
Office Code ________	Benefits ____________
Monthly Annuity $ ________.00 as of ____________	Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Diana N. Jones	6/6/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578 58 2498	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

6 -8 77 PM 3:21
[illegible]

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 6/6, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: CHAIRMAN STOKES

FROM: TOM LAMBETH

DATE: June 7, 1977

RE: Diana Jones

OK

I recommend approval of the attached which will bring the size of the clerical staff of the King unit up to that of the Kennedy unit.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Lambeth

FROM: Robert J. Lehner

DATE: June 2, 1977

SUBJECT: Diana Jones

I recommend that Diana Jones be employed as a secretary in the King Unit at $12,000 annual salary, effective June 6, 1977.

Robert J Lehner

EMH:ek

OK TL

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Deana K. Jones
Signature of Employee

Oct. 14, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10455
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10455

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
KELLY, FRANCIS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Francis J. Kelly	March 31, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 24 2085	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 433 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 4, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

To FO
4/[illegible]/77
21

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Francis J. Kelly	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082-24-2085	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,450.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19______

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
Chairman (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Francis J. Kelly	1-3-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 24 2085	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$19,500.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

____ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Francis J. Kelly	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
002 24 2035	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Director of Security	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976 ________________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

F. J. KELLY

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related X

I am related by the following relationship ______________

F. J. Kelly
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

FRANCIS J. KELLY, 6621 BILLINGS DRIVE, ANNANDALE, VA 22003
PHONE: 703-354-0384

OBJECTIVE:

Security Director for a governmental, professional or commercial organization.

SUMMARY OF QUALIFICATIONS:

Experience and training in security, personnel, administration, terrorism and Congressional liaison.

U.S. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS:

Director of Security

U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE:

Assistant Director of Security

INSTRUCTOR:

National and International Security, world terrorism, foreign relations and multi-national corporations.

CONGRESSIONAL LIAISON:

U.S. Marine Corps representative to the U.S. House of Representatives. Maintained an office in the Rayburn House Office Building and acted as point of contact for all members for a period of three years 1971-1974.

SECURITY MANAGEMENT:

Served as Classified Material Control Officer for domestic organization, itinerant instructional teams and overseas installations, Served as Provost Marshal, Security Officer, Investigating Officer for major domestic and overseas nuclear and non-nuclear installations. Initiated security control procedures and supervised worldwide administrative and operational security measures for classified material.

MANAGEMENT TRAINING AND PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION:

Supervised world wide administrative and operational performance of 15 separate areas of responsibility. Developed, directed and conducted formal security training programs.

EDUCATION:

Fordham University, Economics, B.S. 1955.

George Washington University, Business Administration and Management Courses, 1966-1968.

Command and Staff College, Quantico, Virginia, 1969-1970.

Foreign Affairs Executive Seminar, Department of State, 1975.

PERSONAL DATA:

Married, two children (ages 13 and 7), age 44, voluntarily completed military service as a Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10457
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10457

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PARYOLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/26/76
PAGES : 16

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
KIEL, JOSEPH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

RECEIVED
1977 AUG -1 AM 10: 44
U.S. HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

LAW OFFICES
JOSEPH KIEL, CHARTERED
SUITE 406 EQUITABLE-TOWSON BUILDING
401 WASHINGTON AVENUE
TOWSON, MARYLAND 21204
(301) 823-4954

July 28, 1977

Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
3342 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D C 20515

Gentlemen:

For several weeks in November 1976, I worked with the Committee in the capacity of attorney. It occurred to me recently that for the periods I was on the payroll, deductions were made for federal retirement; however, at the time of my leaving I failed to execute the necessary forms to withdraw those contributions.

At your convenience, I would appreciate receiving from you the necessary application to withdraw the contributions made by me to the retirement fund. Please return the necessary application to me at the letterhead address. Thank you.

Sincerely,

Joseph Kiel

Joseph Kiel

JK/mz

forwarded form
8/9/77

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joseph Kiel	November 15, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

handcarried to FO
11/23/76.
nwm

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Pleas[redacted]
or Ballpoint Pen)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

[redacted] or changes
on this form must be initialed by the
authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

6689

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joseph (NMN) Kiel	October 26, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214-38-6637	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff counsel 01711	$30,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

4667

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff–☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority–H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

10 28 76 PM 12: 01
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 26, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

4.5,

LAW OFFICES
JOSEPH KIEL, CHARTERED
SUITE 406 EQUITABLE-TOWSON BUILDING
401 WASHINGTON AVENUE
TOWSON, MARYLAND 21204
(301) 823-4954

rec'd 10/19/76

October 18, 1976

Richard Sprague, Esq.
Select Committee on Assinations
Office of Rep. Thomas N. Downing
2135 Rayburn Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Sprague:

At the suggestion of Robert Ozer, I am enclosing a copy of my current resume. I am looking forward to meeting with you on Tuesday.

Sincerely,

Joseph Kiel

JOSEPH KIEL

JK/k

RESUME

JOSEPH KIEL
3 Chesham Court
Cockeysville, Maryland 21030
(301) 823-4954

I. PERSONAL

- A. Age 35
- B. Married, two children

II. EDUCATION

A. Graduated Robert E. Lee Junior High School in June 1954.

B. Graduated Baltimore City College in June 1957.

C. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1964 with Bachelor of Science Degree in Transportation.

1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 4 in a graduating class of 309.
2. Received senior year scholarship grant from Del-Mar-Va Traffic Club for study at the University of Baltimore.
3. Received the Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity Award.
4. Received the Transportation Honor Award from the Traffic Club of Baltimore.
5. Member Beta Alpha Honorary Scholarship Society.

D. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1967 with Degree of Bachelor of Law.

1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 3 in a graduating class of 138. Grade Index of 2.65 out of possible 3.00.
2. Received Emerson R. Hofsommer, Jr. Memorial Award for highest scholastic average of Sigma Delta Kappa Intercollegiate Law Fraternity.
3. Member Heuisler Honor Society.

E. Attended United States Department of Justice Organized Crime Training Conference, University of Oklahoma, March 1970.

III. PROFESSIONAL

A. Passed February 1968 Maryland Bar Examination - Grade 232½.

B. Admitted to practice in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

C. Member of the Federal Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of Baltimore City.

D. Selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men in America for 1973.

IV. EXPERIENCE

A. Approximately three years' experience with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in capacity of Senior Transportation Assistant.

B. From July 1968 to November 1970, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City.

  1. Duties included (a) general prosecutorial responsibilities in preparation and trial of criminal cases; (b) specialized prosecutorial duties in the field of organized crime and official corruption.

C. From November 1970 to March 1975, Special Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States Department of Justice.

  1. Duties included (a) review and prosecutorial analysis of reports of all Federal investigative agencies dealing with racketeering and "sensitive" subjects in the District of Maryland; (b) selection of appropriate racketeering and "sensitive" targets for Strike Force handling; (c) direction of investigative efforts and procedures including electronic interception and eavesdropping, search and seizure, protection of endangered witnesses, witness immunization, and Grand Jury case development; (d) preparation and trial of racketeering cases in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including preparation and drafting of indictments, pleadings, motions, briefs, etc.

D. From March 1975 to present, counsel to the Board of Education for Baltimore County through the Office of Law and general practice through Joseph Kiel, Chartered.

  1. Experience includes (a) preparation and trial of matters before administrative agencies; (b) employer defense in labor arbitration proceedings; (c) handling investigation and complaints of federal regulatory agencies such as HEW, EEOC, and Department of Labor;(d) defense of civil rights actions alleging deprivation of free speech and discrimination in employment; (e) diversified general practice including contract, tort, domestic, testamentary, criminal and appellate matters.

RESUME

JOSEPH KIEL
3 Chesham Court
Cockeysville, Maryland 21030
(301) 823-4954

I. PERSONAL

A. Age 35
B. Married, two children

II. EDUCATION

A. Graduated Robert E. Lee Junior High School in June 1954.
B. Graduated Baltimore City College in June 1957.
C. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1964 with Bachelor of Science Degree in Transportation.

   1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 4 in a graduating class of 309.

   2. Received senior year scholarship grant from Del-Mar-Va Traffic Club for study at the University of Baltimore.

   3. Received the Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity Award.

   4. Received the Transportation Honor Award from the Traffic Club of Baltimore.

   5. Member Beta Alpha Honorary Scholarship Society.

D. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1967 with Degree of Bachelor of Law.

   1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 3 in a graduating class of 138. Grade Index of 2.65 out of possible 3.00.

   2. Received Emerson R. Hofsommer, Jr. Memorial Award for highest scholastic average of Sigma Delta Kappa Intercollegiate Law Fraternity.

   3. Member Heuisler Honor Society.

E. Attended United States Department of Justice Organized Crime Training Conference, University of Oklahoma, March 1970.

III. PROFESSIONAL

A. Passed February 1968 Maryland Bar Examination - Grade 232½.

B. Admitted to practice in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

C. Member of the Federal Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of Baltimore City.

D. Selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men in America for 1973.

IV. EXPERIENCE

A. Approximately three years' experience with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in capacity of Senior Transportation Assistant.

B. From July 1968 to November 1970, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City.

1. Duties included (a) general prosecutorial responsibilities in preparation and trial of criminal cases; (b) specialized prosecutorial duties in the field of organized crime and official corruption.

C. From November 1970 to March 1975, Special Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States Department of Justice.

1. Duties included (a) review and prosecutorial analysis of reports of all Federal investigative agencies dealing with racketeering and "sensitive" subjects in the District of Maryland; (b) selection of appropriate racketeering and "sensitive" targets for Strike Force handling; (c) direction of investigative efforts and procedures including electronic interception and eavesdropping, search and seizure, protection of endangered witnesses, witness immunization, and Grand Jury case development; (d) preparation and trial of racketeering cases in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including preparation and drafting of indictments, pleadings, motions, briefs, etc.

D. From March 1975 to present, counsel to the Board of Education for Baltimore County through the Office of Law and general practice through Joseph Kiel, Chartered.

1. Experience includes (a) preparation and trial of matters before administrative agencies; (b) employer defense in labor arbitration proceedings; (c) handling investigation and complaints of federal regulatory agencies such as HEW, EEOC, and Department of Labor;(d) defense of civil rights actions alleging deprivation of free speech and discrimination in employment; (e) diversified general practice including contract, tort, domestic, testamentary, criminal and appellate matters.

RESUME

JOSEPH KIEL
3 Chesham Court
Cockeysville, Maryland 21030
(301) 823-4954

I. PERSONAL

- A. Age 35
- B. Married, two children

II. EDUCATION

- A. Graduated Robert E. Lee Junior High School in June 1954.
- B. Graduated Baltimore City College in June 1957.
- C. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1964 with Bachelor of Science Degree in Transportation.
  1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 4 in a graduating class of 309.
  2. Received senior year scholarship grant from Del-Mar-Va Traffic Club for study at the University of Baltimore.
  3. Received the Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity Award.
  4. Received the Transportation Honor Award from the Traffic Club of Baltimore.
  5. Member Beta Alpha Honorary Scholarship Society.
- D. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1967 with Degree of Bachelor of Law.
  1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 3 in a graduating class of 138. Grade Index of 2.65 out of possible 3.00.
  2. Received Emerson R. Hofsommer, Jr. Memorial Award for highest scholastic average of Sigma Delta Kappa Intercollegiate Law Fraternity.
  3. Member Heuisler Honor Society.
- E. Attended United States Department of Justice Organized Crime Training Conference, University of Oklahoma, March 1970.

III. PROFESSIONAL

A. Passed February 1968 Maryland Bar Examination - Grade 232½.

B. Admitted to practice in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

C. Member of the Federal Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of Baltimore City.

D. Selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men in America for 1973.

IV. EXPERIENCE

A. Approximately three years' experience with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in capacity of Senior Transportation Assistant.

B. From July 1968 to November 1970, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City.

   1. Duties included (a) general prosecutorial responsibilities in preparation and trial of criminal cases; (b) specialized prosecutorial duties in the field of organized crime and official corruption.

C. From November 1970 to March 1975, Special Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States Department of Justice.

   1. Duties included (a) review and prosecutorial analysis of reports of all Federal investigative agencies dealing with racketeering and "sensitive" subjects in the District of Maryland; (b) selection of appropriate racketeering and "sensitive" targets for Strike Force handling; (c) direction of investigative efforts and procedures including electronic interception and eavesdropping, search and seizure, protection of endangered witnesses, witness immunization, and Grand Jury case development; (d) preparation and trial of racketeering cases in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including preparation and drafting of indictments, pleadings, motions, briefs, etc.

D. From March 1975 to present, counsel to the Board of Education for Baltimore County through the Office of Law and general practice through Joseph Kiel, Chartered.

   1. Experience includes (a) preparation and trial of matters before administrative agencies; (b) employer defense in labor arbitration proceedings; (c) handling investigation and complaints of federal regulatory agencies such as HEW, EEOC, and Department of Labor;(d) defense of civil rights actions alleging deprivation of free speech and discrimination in employment; (e) diversified general practice including contract, tort, domestic, testamentary, criminal and appellate matters.

RESUME

JOSEPH KIEL
3 Chesham Court
Cockeysville, Maryland 21030
(301) 823-4954

I. PERSONAL

A. Age 35
B. Married, two children

II. EDUCATION

A. Graduated Robert E. Lee Junior High School in June 1954.
B. Graduated Baltimore City College in June 1957.
C. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1964 with Bachelor of Science Degree in Transportation.

1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 4 in a graduating class of 309.

2. Received senior year scholarship grant from Del-Mar-Va Traffic Club for study at the University of Baltimore.

3. Received the Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity Award.

4. Received the Transportation Honor Award from the Traffic Club of Baltimore.

5. Member Beta Alpha Honorary Scholarship Society.

D. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1967 with Degree of Bachelor of Law.

1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 3 in a graduating class of 138. Grade Index of 2.65 out of possible 3.00.

2. Received Emerson R. Hofsommer, Jr. Memorial Award for highest scholastic average of Sigma Delta Kappa Intercollegiate Law Fraternity.

3. Member Heuisler Honor Society.

E. Attended United States Department of Justice Organized Crime Training Conference, University of Oklahoma, March 1970.

III. PROFESSIONAL

A. Passed February 1968 Maryland Bar Examination - Grade 232½.

B. Admitted to practice in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

C. Member of the Federal Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of Baltimore City.

D. Selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men in America for 1973.

IV. EXPERIENCE

A. Approximately three years' experience with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in capacity of Senior Transportation Assistant.

B. From July 1968 to November 1970, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City.

1. Duties included (a) general prosecutorial responsibilities in preparation and trial of criminal cases; (b) specialized prosecutorial duties in the field of organized crime and official corruption.

C. From November 1970 to March 1975, Special Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States Department of Justice.

1. Duties included (a) review and prosecutorial analysis of reports of all Federal investigative agencies dealing with racketeering and "sensitive" subjects in the District of Maryland; (b) selection of appropriate racketeering and "sensitive" targets for Strike Force handling; (c) direction of investigative efforts and procedures including electronic interception and eavesdropping, search and seizure, protection of endangered witnesses, witness immunization, and Grand Jury case development; (d) preparation and trial of racketeering cases in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including preparation and drafting of indictments, pleadings, motions, briefs, etc.

D. From March 1975 to present, counsel to the Board of Education for Baltimore County through the Office of Law and general practice through Joseph Kiel, Chartered.

1. Experience includes (a) preparation and trial of matters before administrative agencies; (b) employer defense in labor arbitration proceedings; (c) handling investigation and complaints of federal regulatory agencies such as HEW, EEOC, and Department of Labor;(d) defense of civil rights actions alleging deprivation of free speech and discrimination in employment; (e) diversified general practice including contract, tort, domestic, testamentary, criminal and appellate matters.

RESUME

JOSEPH KIEL
3 Chesham Court
Cockeysville, Maryland 21030
(301) 823-4954

I. PERSONAL

A. Age 35
B. Married, two children

II. EDUCATION

A. Graduated Robert E. Lee Junior High School in June 1954.
B. Graduated Baltimore City College in June 1957.
C. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1964 with Bachelor of Science Degree in Transportation.

1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 4 in a graduating class of 309.

2. Received senior year scholarship grant from Del-Mar-Va Traffic Club for study at the University of Baltimore.

3. Received the Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity Award.

4. Received the Transportation Honor Award from the Traffic Club of Baltimore.

5. Member Beta Alpha Honorary Scholarship Society.

D. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1967 with Degree of Bachelor of Law.

1. Graduated magna cum laude - No. 3 in a graduating class of 138. Grade Index of 2.65 out of possible 3.00.

2. Received Emerson R. Hofsommer, Jr. Memorial Award for highest scholastic average of Sigma Delta Kappa Intercollegiate Law Fraternity.

3. Member Heuisler Honor Society.

E. Attended United States Department of Justice Organized Crime Training Conference, University of Oklahoma, March 1970.

III. PROFESSIONAL

A. Passed February 1968 Maryland Bar Examination - Grade 232½.

B. Admitted to practice in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

C. Member of the Federal Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of Baltimore City.

D. Selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men in America for 1973.

IV. EXPERIENCE

A. Approximately three years' experience with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in capacity of Senior Transportation Assistant.

B. From July 1968 to November 1970, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City.

1. Duties included (a) general prosecutorial responsibilities in preparation and trial of criminal cases; (b) specialized prosecutorial duties in the field of organized crime and official corruption.

C. From November 1970 to March 1975, Special Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States Department of Justice.

1. Duties included (a) review and prosecutorial analysis of reports of all Federal investigative agencies dealing with racketeering and "sensitive" subjects in the District of Maryland; (b) selection of appropriate racketeering and "sensitive" targets for Strike Force handling; (c) direction of investigative efforts and procedures including electronic interception and eavesdropping, search and seizure, protection of endangered witnesses, witness immunization, and Grand Jury case development; (d) preparation and trial of racketeering cases in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including preparation and drafting of indictments, pleadings, motions, briefs, etc.

D. From March 1975 to present, counsel to the Board of Education for Baltimore County through the Office of Law and general practice through Joseph Kiel, Chartered.

1. Experience includes (a) preparation and trial of matters before administrative agencies; (b) employer defense in labor arbitration proceedings; (c) handling investigation and complaints of federal regulatory agencies such as HEW, EEOC, and Department of Labor;(d) defense of civil rights actions alleging deprivation of free speech and discrimination in employment; (e) diversified general practice including contract, tort, domestic, testamentary, criminal and appellate matters.

RESUME

JOSEPH KIEL
3 Chesham Court
Cockeysville, Maryland 21030
(301) 823-4954

I. PERSONAL

- A. Age 35
- B. Married, two children

II. EDUCATION

- A. Graduated Robert E. Lee Junior High School in June 1954.
- B. Graduated Baltimore City College in June 1957.
- C. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1964 with Bachelor of Science Degree in Transportation.
    - 1. Graduated *magna cum laude* - No. 4 in a graduating class of 309.
    - 2. Received senior year scholarship grant from Del-Mar-Va Traffic Club for study at the University of Baltimore.
    - 3. Received the Delta Nu Alpha Transportation Fraternity Award.
    - 4. Received the Transportation Honor Award from the Traffic Club of Baltimore.
    - 5. Member Beta Alpha Honorary Scholarship Society.
- D. Graduated University of Baltimore in June 1967 with Degree of Bachelor of Law.
    - 1. Graduated *magna cum laude* - No. 3 in a graduating class of 138. Grade Index of 2.65 out of possible 3.00.
    - 2. Received Emerson R. Hofsommer, Jr. Memorial Award for highest scholastic average of Sigma Delta Kappa Intercollegiate Law Fraternity.
    - 3. Member Heuisler Honor Society.
- E. Attended United States Department of Justice Organized Crime Training Conference, University of Oklahoma, March 1970.

III. PROFESSIONAL

A. Passed February 1968 Maryland Bar Examination - Grade 232½.

B. Admitted to practice in the Court of Appeals of Maryland and the United States District Court for the District of Maryland.

C. Member of the Federal Bar Association, Maryland State Bar Association, and The Bar Association of Baltimore City.

D. Selected as one of the Outstanding Young Men in America for 1973.

IV. EXPERIENCE

A. Approximately three years' experience with the Bethlehem Steel Corporation in capacity of Senior Transportation Assistant.

B. From July 1968 to November 1970, Assistant State's Attorney for Baltimore City.

   1. Duties included (a) general prosecutorial responsibilities in preparation and trial of criminal cases; (b) specialized prosecutorial duties in the field of organized crime and official corruption.

C. From November 1970 to March 1975, Special Attorney, Organized Crime and Racketeering Section, United States Department of Justice.

   1. Duties included (a) review and prosecutorial analysis of reports of all Federal investigative agencies dealing with racketeering and "sensitive" subjects in the District of Maryland; (b) selection of appropriate racketeering and "sensitive" targets for Strike Force handling; (c) direction of investigative efforts and procedures including electronic interception and eavesdropping, search and seizure, protection of endangered witnesses, witness immunization, and Grand Jury case development; (d) preparation and trial of racketeering cases in New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, including preparation and drafting of indictments, pleadings, motions, briefs, etc.

D. From March 1975 to present, counsel to the Board of Education for Baltimore County through the Office of Law and general practice through Joseph Kiel, Chartered.

   1. Experience includes (a) preparation and trial of matters before administrative agencies; (b) employer defense in labor arbitration proceedings; (c) handling investigation and complaints of federal regulatory agencies such as HEW, EEOC, and Department of Labor;(d) defense of civil rights actions alleging deprivation of free speech and discrimination in employment; (e) diversified general practice including contract, tort, domestic, testamentary, criminal and appellate matters.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10458
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10458

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/29/76
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
KILKER, ELIZABETH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FO

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Kilker	3/17/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161-38-7640	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 3/7, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________

ID ______________

Benefits ______________

Payroll ______________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: 7 March 1978

RE: Termination

Please be advised that effective Friday, March 3, 1978, Elizabeth Kilker will be terminated from the Committee payroll.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

Termination Effective 3/17/78

ICM:j

KILKER, Beth
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT: 11-29-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years ...... Months ......

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
9	11

DAY OF MONTH

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.									S	S	S																				
Feb.															X									S							
Mar.						X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X														
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	10	12		3	10	9	
Feb.	1	1	11	10	1	1	10	9	
Mar.									
Apr.									
May									
June									
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

Terminated 3-17-78

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨/ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature — Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature — Date

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth A. Kilker	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161-38-7640	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ (Specify Date))
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$17,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth A. Kilker	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161 38 7640	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth A. Kilker	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161 38 7640	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$33,600

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Elizabeth A. Kilker	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161-38-7640	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19______

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related XX

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Elizabeth A Kilher
Signature of Employee

February 10, 1977
Date

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth A. Kilker	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161 38 7640	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Anne Wilker	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161 3[illegible] 7640	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$16,050

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Anne Kilker	11/29/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
161 38 7640	x☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

handcarried to
FO 11/30/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: _______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship __________

Elizabeth A. Kilker
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10459
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10459

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
KLEIN, KENNETH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 19, 1979

District Unemployment Compensation Board
6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20001

Gentlemen:

The Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives, officially terminated at noontime, Wednesday, January 3, 1979.

In connection therewith, the below listed staff member will terminate his services with the U. S. House of Representatives at the close of business on January 31, 1979.

It is hoped that by furnishing the following information, the processing of his application for unemployment benefits will be facilitated.

Kenneth D. Klein 068-38-5091

Salary:

1/1/77 - 7/31/77	$30,000.00
8/1/77 - 11/30/77	34,000.00
12/1/77 - 12/31/78	36,400.00
1/1/79 - 1/31/79	38,400.00

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth

THOMAS HOWARTH
Deputy Staff Director
and Budget Officer

TH:ht

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth D. Klein	January 1, 1979
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
068-38-5091	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$38,400.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth D. Klein	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
068-38-5091	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$36,400

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth D. Klein	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
068-38-5091	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth D. Klein	5/29/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
068 38 5091	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth D. Klein	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
068 38 5091	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth D. Klein	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
068-38-5091	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,450.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B . Gonzalez

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Kenneth D. Klein	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
056 38 5091	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
StafffCounsel	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 23, 1976 ____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓ ______________

I am related by the following relationship ______________

______________ Signature of Employee

Feb 10, 1977 Date

Assassination Records Review Board Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10460
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : NSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10460

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/08/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
KREIDMAN, MELVIN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

KREIDMAN, Mel
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　Level　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1 2	2

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 11-8-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years　Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

DAY OF MONTH

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Accrued This Month Annual Leave	Accrued This Month Sick Leave	Available This Month Annual Leave	Available This Month Sick Leave	Used This Month Annual Leave	Used This Month Sick Leave	Balance at Close of Month Annual Leave	Balance at Close of Month Sick Leave	Employee Initials
Jan.									S	S	S																					1	1	2	3		3	2	0	
Feb.																																1	1					3	1	
Mar.																																1	1					4	2	
Apr.																																1	1					5	3	
May																									X	X				X	X	1	1	6	4			6	4	
June	X	X												Administrative																										
July																																								
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 6/30/78

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　Date　Chief's Signature　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Approved: Clerk of the House　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Melvin Kreidman	June 30, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
074-30-3065	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 5, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title-If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ____________________
Office Code__________	Benefits ____________________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________	Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director 5-24-78

DATE: May 24, 1978

Mel Kreidman will be on administrative leave from now through June 30, 1978. He will not be with the Committee after that time.

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

May 23, 1978

Congressman Robert Edgar
117 Cannon HOB
Washington, D.C.

Dear Congressman Edgar:

On your recent trip to Canada, Mel Kreidman did not realize that under the House Rules, we cannot reimburse him for expenses paid for another.

Consequently, we prepared a voucher for $75.00 in your name for the expenses paid by Kreidman.

When you receive the check, you should endorse it over to Kreidman so that he will be reimbursed.

Have your office give me a call if you have any questions.

Sincerely,

Tom

Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

TH:ow

Check received and forwarded to Kreidman 6/2/78

T Howarth

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Signature of Employee

Nov 14, 1977
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Melvin Kreidman	November 8, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
074-30-3065	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	$34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 15, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: Charlie Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.
DATE: October 3, 1977
RE: Mr. Melvin Kreidman

Mr. Melvin Kreidman has accepted the position of Senior Staff Attorney with the Martin Luther King Task Force. His effective starting date will be ~~October 17,~~ Nov. 8 1977, and his starting salary will be $34,000.00 per annum.

Mr. Kreidman graduated from Cornell Law School in 1963 and since 1967 has served in the New York County District Attorney's Office. He is currently Assistant District Attorney, Homocide Bureau, in that office.

Your full co-operation in familiarizing Mr. Kreidman with staff procedures and welcoming him aboard will be appreciated.

ICM:jl

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10462
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10462

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LARKIN, JOYCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

○ **U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES** ○
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233-92-1962	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$23,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233-92-1962	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

_______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

_______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

_______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233-92-1962	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$16,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233-92-1962	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233 92 1962	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233 92 1962	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233 92 1962	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date______________________________, 1977

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joyce Ann Larkin	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
233 32 1902	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

hand carried to PO
1/3/77 am

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 31, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Joyce A. Larkin
Signature of Employee

1-10-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10463
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 19

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 15

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10463

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/12/76
PAGES : 29

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LARSON, BILLIE GAY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Billie Gay Larson	3/6/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
529 60 6414	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 16, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ______

Monthly Annuity $ ______.00

to FO, Ins Mail
3/21

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 2, 1977

Richard A. Sprague
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sprague:

As we discussed today, I have accepted a position in the Office of the Speaker of the House effective Monday, March 7.

I would like to convey to you my personal admiration and feel we are very fortunate to have a person of your caliber in the service of the Congress.

Your continued leadership of the investigations is absolutely vital and I wish you every success.

Respectfully,

Billie Gay Larson

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Billie Gay Larson	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
529-60-6414	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____ ______________________________

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Billie Gay Larson	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
529 60 6414	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977 ____________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Billie Gay Larson	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
329 60 3414	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Billie Gay Larson	12/1/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
529 60 6414	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 2, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AU [redacted] **FORM**
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

C✓

[redacted]ns, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

6689

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Billie Gay Larson	October 12, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
529-60-6414	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title 01433	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

pr 686.11

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

10 15 76 AM 8:45
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 14, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $________.00

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

A.S.

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related X

I am related by the following relationship ______

Signature of Employee

January 10, 1977
Date

March 4, 1977

Ms. Billie Gay Larson
514 Sixth Street, S.W.
Apt. A
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Billie:

Although I am sorry to see you leave this staff, I fully understand the reasons and think the position that has been offered you in the office of the Speaker of the House is wonderful and on your behalf I am most happy to see you move into that position.

I do want to thank you for all of your efforts on our behalf. You have not only performed your job exceedingly well, but you have been a great help to me personally in many of your comments and suggestions. Beyond that, I have admired you as a person and have enjoyed the feeling of closeness and friendship with you.

Best of wishes to you. I remain

Sincerely yours,

Richard A. Sprague
Chief Counsel and Director

RAS:elb

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 2, 1977

Richard A. Sprague
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sprague:

As we discussed today, I have accepted a position in the Office of the Speaker of the House effective Monday, March 7.

I would like to convey to you my personal admiration and feel we are very fortunate to have a person of your caliber in the service of the Congress.

Your continued leadership of the investigations is absolutely vital and I wish you every success.

Respectfully,

Billie

Billie Gay Larson

Congress of the United States
Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906 ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*)
read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)?	X	
(*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)		

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam Federal Building San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block
Retested 9-27-76
TEST RESULTS
TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST
(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)
SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST -5
OTHER TEST SCORES:
VERIFIED BY: APW DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75

Exact title of position Supervisor

Annual Salary Starting $ 650. mo. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73

Exact title of position Executive Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 600. mo. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Celestial Arts Publising
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 435. mo. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving moved from Utah to California

Description of work Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 385. mo. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Billie Jo Larson

DATE SIGNED 9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congress of the United States
Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906 ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*)
read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam
	Federal Building
	San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block

Retested 9-27-76

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST -5

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: APW DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:

JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitu·· ·or this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75	Exact title of position Supervisor	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 650. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor: Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work: Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73	Exact title of position Executive Secretary	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 600. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor: Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Celestial Arts Publishing
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving: moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work: Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71	Exact title of position Legal Secretary	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 435. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor: Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving: moved from Utah to California

Description of work: Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69	Exact title of position Legal Secretary	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 385. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor: Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving: end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work: Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION	SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*)	DATE SIGNED
I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.		9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congreſs of the United States

Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Cod* 202-225-2906
ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*) read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam
	Federal Building
	San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block
Retested 9-27-76
TEST RESULTS
TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST
(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)
SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST
-5
OTHER TEST SCORES:
VERIFIED BY: APW DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75

Exact title of position Supervisor

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 650. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73

Exact title of position Executive Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 600. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Celestial Arts Publising
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 435. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving moved from Utah to California

Description of work Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne
Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 385. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Billie Jo Larson

DATE SIGNED 9/13/76

Congress of the United States

Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906
ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED Semester	CREDITS COMPLETED Quarter	C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED Semester	CREDITS COMPLETED Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*) read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam
	Federal Building
	San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block

Retested 9-27-76

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST -5

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: APW [illegible] DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75

Exact title of position Supervisor

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 650. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73

Exact title of position Executive Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 600. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Celestial Arts Publising
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 435. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving moved from Utah to California

Description of work Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 385. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Larson

DATE SIGNED 9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congreſs of the United States
Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049
3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906 ASK FOR MARILYN
4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk
5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer
6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No
7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No
8. When will you be available? 9-20-76
9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44
11. Home State Utah
12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches
13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No
14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000
15. Number of dependents other than self 0
16. Weight 110
17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414
18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*) read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam
	Federal Building
	San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block

Retested 9-27-76

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST -5

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: APW / [illegible] DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:

JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75

Exact title of position: Supervisor

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 650. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor: Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work: Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73

Exact title of position: Executive Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 600. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor: Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Celestial Arts Publishing
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving: moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work: Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71

Exact title of position: Legal Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 435. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor: Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving: moved from Utah to California

Description of work: Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne
Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69

Exact title of position: Legal Secretary

Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 385. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor: Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Reason for leaving: end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work: Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES. List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION	SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*)	DATE SIGNED
I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.	Billie G. Larson	9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congreſs of the United States

Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906
~~ASK FOR MARILYN~~

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*)
read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam Federal Building San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block

Retested 9-27-76

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST -5

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: APW /[illegible] DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:

JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75

Exact title of position Supervisor

Annual Salary Starting $ 650. mo. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73

Exact title of position Executive Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 600. mo. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Celestial Arts Publising
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 435. mo. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving moved from Utah to California

Description of work Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne
Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 385. mo. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES: List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION
I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Billie [illegible] Larson

DATE SIGNED 9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congreſs of the United States

Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906
ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	Courses Studied		Credits Completed		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	Credits Completed		C. Chief graduate college subjects	Credits Completed	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*)
read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam Federal Building San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block

Retested 9-27-76

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST -5

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: APW DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS: JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1.
Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75
Exact title of position Supervisor
Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 650. Present $ 810.
Name of immediate supervisor Tom Edwards
Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/934-1400
Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA
May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No
Reason for wanting to leave
Description of work Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2.
Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73
Exact title of position Executive Secretary
Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 600. Leaving $ 625.
Name of immediate supervisor Harold Kramer, President
Area Code and Phone No., if known 415/692-4500
Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Celestial Arts Publishing
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA
Reason for leaving moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)
Description of work Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3.
Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71
Exact title of position Legal Secretary
Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 435. Leaving $ 500.
Name of immediate supervisor Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)
Area Code and Phone No., if known
Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Reason for leaving moved from Utah to California
Description of work Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne
Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4.
Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69
Exact title of position Legal Secretary
Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 385. Leaving $ 425.
Name of immediate supervisor Attorney General Phil L. Hansen
Area Code and Phone No., if known
Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah
Reason for leaving end of Mr. Hansen's term of office
Description of work Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES: List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Billie G. Larson

DATE SIGNED 9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congress of the United States
Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906 ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*)
read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	X	

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam
	Federal Building
	San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block
Retested
9-27-76
TEST RESULTS
TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST
(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)
SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST
-5
OTHER TEST SCORES:
VERIFIED BY: APW /BF DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75

Exact title of position: Supervisor

Annual Salary Starting $ 650. mo. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor: Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work: Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73

Exact title of position: Executive Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 600. mo. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor: Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Celestial Arts Publising
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving: moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work: Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71

Exact title of position: Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 435. mo. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor: Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving: moved from Utah to California

Description of work: Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne
Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4. Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69

Exact title of position: Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 385. mo. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor: Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Reason for leaving: end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work: Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES: List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Billie Larson

DATE SIGNED 9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Congreſs of the United States

Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)
Larson, Billie Gay
514 Sixth St. SE Apt. A
Washington, D. C. 20003

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 202-547-3049

3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) 202-225-2906
ASK FOR MARILYN

4. Kind of job you are applying for: secretarial, research, clerk

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

8. When will you be available? 9-20-76

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 5-19-44

11. Home State Utah

12. Height 5 Feet 6 Inches

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $ 13,000

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 110

17. Social Security Number 529-60-6414

18. Skills
☒ Typing 75 wpm. ☒ Shorthand 80 wpm.
(*To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.*)
☐ Office equipment (specify)
☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(*State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.*)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
1964

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes 5/62 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify) debate, journalism, drama

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Supervisory Development Seminar
Foremost Insurance Company (one week seminar, spring '75)
Grand Rapids, Michigan

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
University of Utah	hist.	phil.		190	2.7		62	69	BS	'69

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED		C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED	
	Semester	Quarter		Semester	Quarter

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded scholarship to University of Utah based on academic achievement and extracurricular activities. Current membership in Sierra Club and Common Cause.

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*)
read some French and Spanish

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: NA Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		X
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		X
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)?	X	
(*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)	▨	▨

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	27
1	Nancy L. Larson
2	sister
3	Office of Guam
	Federal Building
	San Francisco, CA

Do Not Write In This Block

Retested
9-27-76

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 71 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(78 W.P.M., 7 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: 80 W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST
-5

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: APW / [illegible] DATE: 9/13/76

MAILING ADDRESS:
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A résumé is not a substitute for this form and will not be made a part of the application, if more than 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 3/75 To ~~PRESENT TIME~~ 6/75	Exact title of position Supervisor	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 650. Present $ 810.

Name of immediate supervisor: Tom Edwards

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/934-1400

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Foremost Insurance Company
100 Wiget Lane
Walnut Creek, CA

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave

Description of work: Directed contract and licensing activities between Co. and its agents in 12 western states. Developed new filing and record keeping systems; wrote department manual. Supervised 5.

2.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 5/72 To 2/73	Exact title of position Executive Secretary	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 600. Leaving $ 625.

Name of immediate supervisor: Harold Kramer, President

Area Code and Phone No., if known: 415/692-4500

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Celestial Arts Publising
231 Adrian Road
Walnut Creek, CA

Reason for leaving: moved from San Bruno to Moraga (approx. 35 miles from office)

Description of work: Handled all correspondence for President/owner. Responsible for distribution of new products and product info. to national mktg. staff. Reviewed material submitted for pub. consideration.

3.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 4/70 To 6/71	Exact title of position Legal Secretary	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 435. Leaving $ 500.

Name of immediate supervisor: Sanford M. Stoddard (deceased)

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Fabian & Clendenin (law firm)
800 Continental Bank Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving: moved from Utah to California

Description of work: Prepared legal documents and correspondence for senior partne Responsible for ordering all office supplies used by staff of 22.

4.	Dates of employment (*month, year*) From 1/65 To 1.69	Exact title of position Legal Secretary	Annual Salary mo. Starting $ 385. Leaving $ 425.

Name of immediate supervisor: Attorney General Phil L. Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*):
Office of the Attorney General
Salt Lake City, Utah

Reason for leaving: end of Mr. Hansen's term of office

Description of work: Assigned primarily to criminal division for preparation of pleadings, briefs and correspondence. Also substituted for receptioni and on telephone desk.

31. REFERENCES: List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	BUSINESS OR OCCUPATION
Byron L. Fisher, Esq.	Fabian & Clendenin (see 3. above)	Attorney
David Hinds	763 Sixth Ave. Redwood City, CA 94163	publishing
Robert L. Hartesty	601 Colorado Street Austin, TX 78701	Asso. Deputy Chancellor, U. Texas, Austin

CERTIFICATION	SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*)	DATE SIGNED
I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and in any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.		9/13/76

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976 O - 70-986

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10464
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10464

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/01/76
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LAWSON, BELFORD III

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford L. Lawson III	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$27,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

__________________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

__________________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

__________________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford L. Lawson III	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9975	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits ________________

Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford L. Lawson III	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$25,700

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford L. Lawson III	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford L. Lawson III	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 58 9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford L. Lawson III	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 58 9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$42,400

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
[illegible] Belford L. Lawson, III	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$12,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford V. Lawson, III	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 58 9975	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Belford V. Lawson, III	12/1/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 53 9975	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff counsel	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 9, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓ BV.L.III

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Belford V. Lawson, III
Signature of Employee

January 10, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10465
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10465

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/01/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LAZIN, TERRY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

The Plaza Apt.
18th & Parkway
Phila., Pa. 19103
May 25, 1977

Honorable Louis Stokes
Chairman
House Selectcommittee
on Assinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am writing in order to clarify the present situation regarding the receipt of back pay, which in my case had accrued from January 1, 1977 until April 11, 1977.

On that date in April, I visited your office to inform you that my husband had received the Republican Party endorsement in Philadelphia's race for District Attorney, and that I would be returning to Philadelphia to join him in his effort to win that election. However, during that same conversation, I expressed concerns of the timing of my departure, for fear that if I left my position as Staff Counsel prior to the Committee receiving its funding, I might not receive my back pay.

In response to my concerns, you offered me your personal "moral commitment" that I could leave and your full assurance that the 35% which had been deducted from my salary for more than three months, would definitely be forwarded to me upon the Committee receiving its funding from the house.

It has now come to my attention through Bob Lehner and Tom Howarth that I will not be receiving more than $800.00 of those monies owed me.

While I would never consider asking for anything to which I am not entitled, I respectfully submit that I do deserve to receive that for which I worked during that 3-1/2 month period.

I remain confident that this matter will be reconciled in accordance with our previous conversation. If there are any problems in this regard, please do not hesitate to notify me.

I extend my best wishes and hope that all is going well with the Committee.

Sincerely,

Terry W. Lazin

Terry W. Lazin

TL:bmb.

June 27, 1977

Mrs. Terry W. Lazin
The Plaza Apartments
18th and Parkway
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

Dear Mrs. Lazin:

I am sorry that there is a misunderstanding relative to my position on your back salary. I have consistently held that any employee would receive back salary if such could be worked out before the employee terminated services with the Committee.

You were paid the maximum salary possible for the eleven days you worked in April. Unfortunately, your termination date of April 11th precluded you from receiving the full amount you would have been entitled to if you had stayed with the Committee longer.

The Rules of the House prohibit paying salary to anyone not actually employed by the House. Furthermore, keeping you on the payroll after your termination while you were actively working in your husband's political campaign could prove very embarrassing to the Committee.

You did fine staff work with the Committee and if you decide to return at some future date we shall be happy to give you every consideration.

Sincerely,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS/thw

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Terry W. Lazin	4/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
149 38 9108	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Terry W. Lazin	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
149 38 9108	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Terry W. Lazin	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
149-38-9108	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$12,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Terry W. Lazin	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
149 38 9108	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$13,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Terry W. Lazin	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
149 38 9108	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Terry W. Hazen
Signature of Employee

1-10-77
Date

TERRY W. LAZIN

The Plaza
18th and The Parkway
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103
(215) LO3-1417

Date of Birth: August 1, 1952

Marital Status: Married

EDUCATIONAL BACKGROUND

Law School: Temple University School of Law, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Degree: Juris Doctor, May, 1976.

Activities: President of the Freshman Class of 1976; Student Bar Association Representative; Co-Chairman Committee to Evaluate Grading Procedures; Barrister Association; Women's Law Caucus.

College: University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.

Degree: Bachelor of Arts, 1973; Criminology Major under the supervision of Marvin Wolfgang (Graduated in 3 years).

Honors: Graduated Magna Cum Laude
3.63 grade average; 4.0 = A
Dean's List (6 out of 6 semesters)
Kite and Key Society

EMPLOYMENT

August, 1976	Attorney: PAUL R. ANAPOL, Attorneys at Law, 1515 Locust Street, Sixth Floor, Philadelphia, Penna.
Summer, 1975	Summer Associate: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, United States Department of Justice, Wilmington, Delaware.
Summer, 1974	Summer Associate: SEGAL, APPEL and NATALI, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania
Summer, 1973	Summer Associate: UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS OFFICE, United States Department of Justice, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
September, 1972 to January, 1973	Legal Assistant: COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Summer, 1972	Legal Assistant: COMMUNITY LEGAL SERVICES, Asbury Park, New Jersey.
Summer, 1971	Legal Assistant: THE HONORABLE LEO WEINSTEIN, Monmouth County Courthouse, Freehold, New Jersey.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10467
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10467

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LEE, SHEILA JACKSON

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LEE, Sheila Jackson
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
9	12

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.				☒	☒	☒																									
Feb.						✓	✓	✓	✓	✓			✓	✓																	
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	10	13	3		7	10	
Feb.									
Mar.									
Apr.									
May									
June									
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

╱ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S╱ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S╱S = 1.0 day sick leave
A╱ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A╱A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U╱ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U╱U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨╱ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

Terminated 2/14/78

CERTIFIED CORRECT: Term. 2/3/78 plus 7 days annual leave

Employee's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	2/28/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093-42-2090	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$25,700

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date February 23, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel ICM
DATE: February 14, 1978
RE: Ms. Shelia Jackson Lee

Effective Friday, February 3, 1978, Ms. Shelia Jackson Lee will be terminated from the Committee payroll.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

Plus 7 days annual leave
2/14/78

ICM:j

Changed to 2/28/78 per ICM because Lee did some Committee work after she left.
Howarth

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093-42-2090	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$25,700

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Sheila Jackson Lee	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093-42-2090	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	5/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093 42 2090	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$23,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093 42 2090	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093-42-2090	☐ Appointment ☒ XX Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$14,145.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____ ______________________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093 42 2090	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$14,950.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date______________________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheila Jackson Lee	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
093 42 2090	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel-Legal Unit	$23,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code_______

Monthly Annuity $_______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Sheila Jackson Lee
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10468
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 14
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 10

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10468

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/06/76
PAGES : 16

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LEHNER, ROBERT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LEHNER, Robert
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　Level　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
12	13

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-6-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years　Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.												☒	☒			☒	☒	☒	☒	☒											
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	13	14	7		6	14	
Feb.									
Mar.									
Apr.									
May									
June									
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨/ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

Terminated 2/28/78

CERTIFIED CORRECT: Includes 6 days annual leave and balance adm. leave

Employee's Signature　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 19, 1978

U. S. Department of Justice
Personnel Room 6248
10th & Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attention: Susan Reneer

Personnel Office:

In resonse to your telephone inquiry, we are verifying the following information on Robert J. Lehner.

Appointed: December 6, 1976

Teminated: February 28, 1978

Salary: $45,500.00

Sincerely yours,

Thomas Howarth
THOMAS HOWARTH
Budget Officer

TH:ht

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	February 28, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071-28-5111	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ____________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ____________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date February 16, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $ ________ .00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M

DATE: February 14, 1978

RE: Mr. Robert Lehner

Effective Tuesday, February 28, 1978, Robert Lehner will be terminated from the Committee payroll.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071-28-5111	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Deputy Chief Counsel	$45,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071-28-5111	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Counsel	42,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071 28 5111	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 14, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

H A Comm.
7/15/77

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—80—199

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071 28 5111	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$36,000

7 -8 77 PM 3:07
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman Frank Thompson
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071 28 5111	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	% $36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $_______.00

P 11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071 28 5111	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071-28-5111	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$22,140.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert J. Lehner	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071 28 5111	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$23,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Robert Joseph Lehner	12/6/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
071 28 5111	X☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Deputy Chief Counsel	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 2, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Robert J. Lehner
Signature of Employee

January 24 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10470
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10470

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/11/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Beth Anne Lichtenfels	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042-52-4602	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Document Control Clerk	$14,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 256 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title-If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Beth Anne Lichtenfels
Signature of Employee

Oct. 11, 1977
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: Charlie Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.
DATE: October 5, 1977
RE: Ms. Beth Anne Lichtenfels

Ms. Beth Anne Lichtenfels has accepted the position of Document Control Clerk with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her effective starting date will be October ~~7~~ 11, 1977, and her starting salary will be $12,000.00.

Your full co-operation will be appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Lichtenfels with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Beth Anne Lichtenfels	October 11, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042-52-4602	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Control Clerk	$12,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below:)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 11, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

OFFICIAL SUPERIOR'S REPORT OF TRAUMATIC INJURY

21. Department or Agency
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

22. Bureau or Office
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

23. Name and Address of Reporting Office *(No., street, city, state, Zip Code)*
HOUSE ANNEX #2 3rd AND D STREET, WASHINGTON, D.C.

24. Regular Work Day
Begins ☒ AM ☐ PM Ends ☐ AM ☒ PM

25. Number of Hours Worked Per Day
8

26. Circle Days Paid Per Week
S [✓ M] [✓ T] [✓ W] [✓ T] [✓ F] S

27. Date and Hour of Injury *(mo., day, year)*
7/19/78 ☐ AM ☒ PM

28. Date Reporting Office Received Notice of Injury *(mo., day, year)*
7/19/78

29. Date and Hour Stopped Work *(mo., day, year)*

30. If Pay Has Been Terminated, Give Date *(mo., day, year)*
—

31. 45 Day Period Begins *(mo., day, year)*
—

32. Pay Rate When Employee Stopped Work
—
$ ______ per ______

33. Date and Hour Employee Returned to Work *(mo., day, year)*
7/19/78 ☐ AM ☒ PM

34. Name of Supervisor At Time of Injury
T. Howarth

35. Was Employee In Performance of Duty At The Time of Injury? ☒ Yes, ☐ No. If No, Furnish A Detailed Explanation Or A Copy of Employing Agency's Investigation Report.

36. Was Injury Caused By Willful Misconduct, Intoxication or Intent To Injure Self or Another?
☐ Yes ☒ No. If Yes, Furnish Detailed Report.

37. Was Injury Caused By Third Party? ☐ Yes ☒ No. If Yes, Furnish Name and Address of Party Responsible.

38. Date Employee First Obtained Medical Care for The Injury *(mo., day, year)*
7/19/78

39. Name and Address of Physician First Providing Medical Care
SUBURBAN HOSPITAL EMERGENCY ROOM
BETHESDA, MARYLAND

40. Do Medical Reports Show Employee is Disabled For Work?
☐ Yes ☒ No

41. Does Your Knowledge of The Facts About This Injury Agree With The Statements of The Employee And/Or Witness?
☒ Yes ☐ No. If No, Furnish A Detailed Explanation.

42. Does The Employing Agency Controvert Continuation of Pay? ☐ Yes ☒ No. If Yes, Give Full Explanation For Basis of Controversion (See Item 6 of Instruction Sheet). Attach Additional Sheets If More Space Is Needed.

43. Signature of Supervisor
Thomas Howarth

44. Title and Office Phone Number
Budget Officer 225-298.

45. Date *(mo., day, year)*
7-27-78

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION PROGRAMS

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE'S NOTICE OF TRAUMATIC INJURY AND CLAIM FOR CONTINUATION OF PAY/COMPENSATION

1. Name of Injured Employee *(Last, first, middle)*: LICHTENFELS, BETH ANNE

2. Date of Birth: 1/5/55

3. ☐ Male ☒ Female

4. Social Security Number: 042-52-4602

5. Employee's Home Mailing Address *(No., street, city, state, zip code)*: 4401 EAST WEST HGWY, BETHESDA, MD. APT 300

6. Home Telephone
Area Code: 301
Number: 654-7184

7. Name and Address of Employing Agency:
House SELECT COMM. ON ASSASSINATIONS
3rd AND D STREET, S.W.
WASHINGTON, D.C.

8. Place Where Injury Occurred *(e.g., 2nd floor, Main Post Office Bldg., 12th & Pine)*:
2nd AND C STREET
WASHINGTON, D.C.

9. Date and Hour of Injury *(mo., day, year)*: 7/17/78 ☐ AM ☒ PM

10. Date of This Notice *(mo., day, year)*: 7/27/78

11. Dependents
Wife/Husband ☐
Children Under 18 Years Old ☐

12. Employee's Occupation: Doc. Clerk

13. Cause of Injury *(Describe how and why the injury occurred)*:
Fall was caused by faulty shoe strap which broke and tripped injured employee

14. Nature of Injury *(Identify the part of the body injured, e.g., fractured left leg, etc.)*:
Partially separated right shoulder torn rotating cuff, torn and bruised tendons, ligaments and muscles. Skin burn to right shoulder

15. If This Notice and Claim Was Not Filed With The Employing Agency Within 2 Working Days After The Injury, Explain The Reason For The Delay.

16. I certify that the injury described above was sustained in performance of duty as an employee of the United States Government and that it was not caused by my willful misconduct, intent to injure myself or another person, nor by my intoxication. I hereby claim medical treatment, if needed, and the following, as checked below, while disabled for work:

☐ a. Sick and/or annual leave

☐ b. Continuation of regular pay not to exceed 45 days and compensation for wage loss if disability for work continues beyond 45 days (If my claim is denied, I understand that the continuation of my regular pay shall be charged to sick or annual leave, or be deemed an overpayment within the meaning of 5 USC 5584).

Beth A. Lichtenfels
Signature of Employee or Person Acting on His/Her Behalf

17. Statement of Witness *(Describe what you saw, heard or know about this injury)*

18. Witness' Signature

19. Witness' Address

20. Date Signed *(mo., day, year)*

Form CA-1
Rev. Nov. 1974

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 25, 1978

Office of Workers' Compensation Programs
Special Claims Unit
711 - 14th Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20211

Dear Sirs:

We are forwarding herewith Form CA-1 for Beth C. Lichtenfels an employee of this Committee. We apologize for the late filing but we mis-read the instructions.

While Miss Lichtenfels did not require sick or annual leave and the Committee did not controvert continuation of pay, she did require medical treatment.

In the meantime, we filed her Form CA-1 in her personnel file.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas Howarth
THOMAS HOWARTH
Budget Officer

TH:ht

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10471
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10471

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/18/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LINDLEY, ROBIN DAVID

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Memorandum

Do we have the money to do this?

GB 12-4-78

To: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
From: Robin Lindley
Date: November 24, 1978
Re: Request for Salary Increase

I would greatly appreciate a wage increase. As you are aware, my responsibilities with the Committee have changed dramatically in the past few months. Not only have I assisted with *ad hoc* writing projects such as narrations and staff reports that have been used in public session hearings, but I am also responsible for writing and editing a substantial part of the final report of the King Task Force.

My background uniquely complements my present duties with the editorial staff. In support of this salary request, it may be useful to reacquaint you with my experience. Following my graduation from the University of Washington School of Law in 1974, I worked for two years as a full-time Instructor of Law. In that capacity, I taught a legal research, writing, and analysis course, and had the opportunity to critically examine hundreds of pieces of student work. I also developed a seminar in writing about law for persons without a legal background, an effort to encourage students to humanize and demystify their own legal writing, as well as review possible examples of this sort of writing, such as legal journalism. In addition, I am familiar with historical research and writing. I received my Bachelor of Arts degree in history (with distinction), with an emphasis in United States and modern European history, and while attending law school, I organized and taught a course concerning the role of violence in American history that was presented in the Department of General and Interdisciplinary Studies at the University of Washington.

I have worked diligently for this Committee since October 1977. As a research attorney, I did my best to research issues thoroughly and accurately, to analyze and cogently synthesize relevant material, and to present the fruits of my efforts in a clear and concise manner. I also endeavored to see that this information was used effectively in connection with the King investigation, despite some obstacles posed by staff regimentation. Furthermore, I have acted as a *de facto* staff counsel, notably with the King investigation in England, as well as in the day-to-day dealings with agencies and witnesses.

Consequently, based upon my work with the Committee and my unique experience, I submit this request for a salary increase. Specifically, I ask that my wages be raised from the present level of $18,000 per year to $24,000 per year.

I look forward to my continued work with Dick and the other members of the editorial staff. I find my duties gratifying, at times exhilarating, and always challenging, and I do believe that I am uniquely qualified to make a significant contribution to our final report.

Thank you for your kind consideration. I would greatly appreciate a reply to this request.

(Copy to Dick Billings)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robin David Lindley	1/1/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
534-50-0480	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☒ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$24,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robin David Lindley	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
534-50-0480	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$19,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ______

ID ______
Benefits ______
Payroll ______

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robin David Lindley	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
534-50-0480	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$18,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977 ________________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb ________________________________
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ____________________
Office Code__________	Benefits ____________________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________	Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M

DATE: October 18, 1977

RE: Mr. Robin David Lindley

Mr. Robin D. Lindley has accepted the position of Researcher with the Martin Luther King Task Force. His effective starting date will be October 18, 1977, and his starting salary will be $15,000.00.

Your co-operation in familiarizing Mr. Lindley with staff procedures will be appreciated.

ICM:jl

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robin David Lindley	October 18, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
534-50-0480	☒ Appointment
Employing Office or Committee	☐ Salary Adjustment
Assassinations	☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 18, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Robin D Lindley
Signature of Employee

18 October 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10472
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10472

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/15/76
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LOCKE, RALPH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOCKE, Ralph
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
10	13

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 11-15-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																							A									1	1					11	14	
Feb.						☒	☒	☒	☒	☒																						1	1	12	15	5		7	15	
Mar.																																1	1					8	16	
Apr.																																1	1					9	17	
May																																1	1					10	18	
June	☒	☒			☒	☒	☒	☒																								1	1	11	19	6		5	19	
July																								☒	☒	☒	☒	☒			☒	1	1	6	20	6		0	20	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/15/78

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature — Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature — Date

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ralph C. Locke	7/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017-36-1972	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ralph C. Locke	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017-36-1972	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$18,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Ralph C. Locke	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017 36 1972	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ralph C. Locke	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017 36 1972	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related to any Member of Congress.

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Ralph C. Locke
Signature of Employee

2/10/77
Date

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ralph C. Locke	~~[illegible]~~ 1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017 36 1972	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date__________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ralph C. Locke	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017 36 1972	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ralph C. Locke	November 15, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
017 36 1972	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

Handcarried to FO 11/22/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Ralph C. Locke
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10473
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10473

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/11/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
LOPEZ, EDWIN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Edwin J. Lopez	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
087-48-2165	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Edwin J. Lopdz	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
087-48-2165	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,800.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Edwin J. Lopez	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
087-48-2165	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Edwin J. Lopez	7/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
007 48 2165	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 11, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO
7/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Edwin J. Lopez
Signature of Employee

7/11/77
Date

MEMORANDUM

JULY 7, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth

FROM: Donovan Gay

RE: New Research Employees

Please be advised that on Monday, July 11, 1977, four researchers will be reporting to duty. The four new employees for the Research/Document Unit are: Thomas Mark Flanagan, Jr.; Edwin Juan Lopez; Dan L. Hardway, and Leslie Wizelman.

All four will be joining our staff as Researchers, and are to be compensated at the rate of $12,000 per annum.

The above has been authorized per the instructions of Bob Blakey.

Thank you.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10475
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 17
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10475

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/08/76
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MARTIN, REBECCA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MARTIN, R. W.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 11-8-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
2	2

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					3	3	
Feb.																																1	1					4	4	
Mar.																																1	1					5	5	
Apr.																																1	1					6	6	
May																																1	1					7	7	
June																																1	1					8	8	
July																																1	1					9	9	
Aug.															X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X						1	1	10	10	10		0	10	
Sept.																											X					1	1	1	11	1		0	11	
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 9/30/77

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature — Date — Chief's Signature — Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present	U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations Chief Clerk
August 1974 to November 1976	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology Assistant Chief Clerk Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).
November 1973 to August 1974	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics Minority staff Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.
January 1972 to November 1973	The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho Legal Secretary Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.
May 1969 to January 1972	The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho Secretary Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.
June 1967 to May 1969	Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho Claims Clerk Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present
U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations
Chief Clerk

August 1974 to November 1976
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology
Assistant Chief Clerk
Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).

November 1973 to August 1974
U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics
Minority staff
Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.

January 1972 to November 1973
The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho
Legal Secretary
Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.

May 1969 to January 1972
The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho
Secretary
Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.

June 1967 to May 1969
Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho
Claims Clerk
Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present	U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations Chief Clerk
August 1974 to November 1976	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology Assistant Chief Clerk Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).
November 1973 to August 1974	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics Minority staff Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.
January 1972 to November 1973	The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho Legal Secretary Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.
May 1969 to January 1972	The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho Secretary Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.
June 1967 to May 1969	Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho Claims Clerk Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present	U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations Chief Clerk
August 1974 to November 1976	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology Assistant Chief Clerk Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).
November 1973 to August 1974	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics Minority staff Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.
January 1972 to November 1973	The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho Legal Secretary Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.
May 1969 to January 1972	The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho Secretary Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.
June 1967 to May 1969	Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho Claims Clerk Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present

U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations
Chief Clerk

August 1974 to November 1976

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology
Assistant Chief Clerk
Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).

November 1973 to August 1974

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics
Minority staff
Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.

January 1972 to November 1973

The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho
Legal Secretary
Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.

May 1969 to January 1972

The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho
Secretary
Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.

June 1967 to May 1969

Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho
Claims Clerk
Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present

U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations
Chief Clerk

August 1974 to November 1976

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology
Assistant Chief Clerk
Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).

November 1973 to August 1974

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics
Minority staff
Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.

January 1972 to November 1973

The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho
Legal Secretary
Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.

May 1969 to January 1972

The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho
Secretary
Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.

June 1967 to May 1969

Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho
Claims Clerk
Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present

U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations
Chief Clerk

August 1974 to November 1976

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology
Assistant Chief Clerk
Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).

November 1973 to August 1974

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics
Minority staff
Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.

January 1972 to November 1973

The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho
Legal Secretary
Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.

May 1969 to January 1972

The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho
Secretary
Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.

June 1967 to May 1969

Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho
Claims Clerk
Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.

EDUCATION

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.

Boise State College, Boise, Idaho
Two years, English emphasis.

Boise High School, Boise, Idaho
Graduated May, 1967.

PERSONAL

Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas.
Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

REBECCA WHEELER MARTIN
101 So. Whiting Street
Alexandria, VA 22304
Telephone 703/370-2258

EXPERIENCE

November 1976 to Present	U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations Chief Clerk
August 1974 to November 1976	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Technology Assistant Chief Clerk Duties: Budget preparation; funding resolution preparation; Clerk of the House six-month salary report; monthly report to House Administration Committee; new employee payroll enrollment; Committee minutes; assist in travel and voucher work; legislative calendar and connected legislative work (through use of House Information Systems computer systems, Aquarius and MITS).
November 1973 to August 1974	U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Science & Astronautics Minority staff Duties: Clerical support for minority staff.
January 1972 to November 1973	The Idaho First National Bank, Legal Department, Boise, Idaho Legal Secretary Duties: General secretarial duties in a law office; maintaining docket and files; preparing agenda and resolutions for monthly board of directors' meetings.
May 1969 to January 1972	The Idaho First National Bank, Personnel Department, Boise, Idaho Secretary Duties: Payroll work; computing statistical reports, charting results of surveys and reports.
June 1967 to May 1969	Justad Insurance Center, Boise, Idaho Claims Clerk Duties: Assist policyholders with filing health and accident claims across the counter and through written correspondence.
EDUCATION	Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia Attending part-time for own interest--mathematics and history.
	Boise State College, Boise, Idaho Two years, English emphasis.
	Boise High School, Boise, Idaho Graduated May, 1967.
PERSONAL	Born August 13, 1949, Hardtner, Kansas. Married (John Byron Martin); no children.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca W. Martin	September 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518-56-7099	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 14, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca W. Martin	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518-56-7099	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Chief Clerk	22,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca W. Martin	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518 56 7099	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca Wheeler Martin	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518 56 7099	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$42,400

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca W. Martin	2/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518-56-7099	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$12,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2/28, 19 87

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca Wheeler Martin	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518 56 7099	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment x ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$13,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca Wheeler Martin	11/8/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
518 56 7099	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment; complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Chief Clerk	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Rebecca Wheeler Martin
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10477
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10477

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/03/77
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MATHEWS, I. CHARLES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

Previous Editions Obsolete

FHA FORM NO. 2004-G Rev. 5/75
VA FORM NO. 26-8497 Rev. 5/75

VETERANS ADMINISTRATION
and
U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
FEDERAL HOUSING ADMINISTRATION

FORM APPROVED
OMB NO. 63-R1288

REQUEST FOR VERIFICATION OF EMPLOYMENT

INSTRUCTIONS: Lender – Complete Items 1 through 6. Have applicant complete Items 7 and 8. Forward the completed form directly to the employer named in Item 1.
Employer – Complete Items 9A through 15 and return form directly to lender named in Item 2.

PART I REQUEST

1. TO: (Name and Address of Employer):
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

2. FROM: (Name and Address of Lender):
Society for Savings
31 Pratt St.
Hartford, Connecticut 06101

3. Signature of Lender:

4. Title of Lender:

5. Date:

6. HUD-FHA or VA Number:

I certify that this verification has been sent directly to the employer and has not passed through the hands of the applicant or any other interested party.

I have applied for a mortgage loan and stated that I am employed by you. My signature below authorizes verification of this information.

7. Name and Address of Applicant:
Isiah C. Mathews

8. Employee's Identification Number:

Signature of applicant

PART II VERIFICATION

9A. Is applicant now employed by you?
☐ Yes ☒ No Term. 12/31/78

9B. Present Base Pay is $ 30,000.00
This amount is paid:
☐ Annually ☐ Hourly
☒ Monthly ☐ Other (Specify)
☐ Weekly

9C. EARNINGS LAST 12 MONTHS
Amount $ 29,333.33
Basic Earnings $
Normal Hours worked per Week: 40
Overtime Earnings $
☐ Regular
☐ Temporary
Other Income $
☐ Regular
☐ Temporary

10A. Position or Job Title:
Special Counsel

10B. Length of Applicant's employment:
8/3/77 to 12/31/78

10C. Probability of continued employment:
Committee terminated

10D. Date Applicant left:
12/31/78

10E. Reason for leaving:
Committee terminated

11. TO BE COMPLETED BY MILITARY PERSONNEL ONLY.

Pay Grade:	
Base Pay	$
Rations	$
Flight or Hazard	$
Clothing	$
Quarters	$
Pro-Pay	$
Overseas or Combat	$

12. REMARKS:

13. Signature of Employer:
Thomas Howarth

14. Title of Employer:
Deputy Staff Director
and Budget Officer

15. Date:
1/17/79

749-159-000

RETURN DIRECTLY TO LENDER

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Isiah Charles Mathews
013-34-3361

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
I. Charles Mathews	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
013-34-3361	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $_________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
I. Charles Mathews	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
013-34-3361	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Special Counsel	$30,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits______________________

Payroll______________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
I. Charles Mathews	10/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
013-34-3361	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Special Counsel	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 14, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
I. Charles Mathews	8/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
013 34 3361	X☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Special Counsel	$19,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 3, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

49 School St.

MGIC **Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation**

a subsidiary of MGIC Investment Corporation

Telephone 414/347-6500

Request for Verification of Employment

LENDER – Complete Items 1 thru 7. Have applicant complete Item 8. Forward directly to employer named in Item 1.
EMPLOYER – Please complete Items 9 thru 16 and return directly to lender named in Item 2.

PART I — REQUEST

1. To *(Name and address of employer)*

Select House Committee On Assassinations
3369 House Annex #2
Washington, D.C. 20515

2. From *(Name and address of lender)*

1st American Bank for Savings
572 Columbia Road
Dorchester, Mass. 02125

3. Signature of Lender

4. Title: Mortgage Officer

5. Date

6. Lender's I.D. Number *(Optional)*

I have applied for a mortgage loan and stated that I am now or was formerly employed by you. My signature below authorizes verification of this information.

7. Name and Address of Applicant: Isiah C. Mathews 4827 S. 8th Rd. Arlington, Va.

8. Signature of Applicant: Isiah C. Mathews

PART II — VERIFICATION

EMPLOYMENT DATA

9A. Is Applicant Now Employed By You? ☒ YES ☐ NO *(If "No," complete Items 9c and 9d.)*

9B. How Long Has Applicant Been Employed By You? *(If Military, enter total service)* 8-3-77

9C. Date Applicant Left: Still employed

9D. Reason For Leaving: —

10. Present Position: Special Counsel

11. Probability of Continued Employment: Yes

PAY DATA

12A. Base Pay *(Enter amount and check period)* $ #30,000.00
☒ ANNUAL ☐ HOURLY
☐ MONTHLY ☐ OTHER
☐ WEEKLY *(Specify)*

12B. Earnings Last 12 Months 11-1-77 to 10/31/78

Type	Amount
Base Pay	$ 28,666.67
Overtime	$ —
Commissions	$ —
Bonus	$ —

12C. To Be Completed for Military Personnel Only

Pay Grade

Type	Monthly Amount
Base Pay	$
Rations	$
Flight or Hazard	$
Clothing	$
Quarters	$
Pro Pay	$
Overseas Or Combat	$

13. Remarks

The above information is provided in strict confidence in response to your request.

14. Signature of Employer: Thomas Howarth

15. Title: Budget Officer

16. Date: 10-31-78

The information on this form is Confidential. It is to be transmitted directly to the lender, without passing through the hands of the applicant or any other party.

MEMORANDUM

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director GRB 10-14-77

Date: October 14, 1977

Re: Salary Adjustments

This is your authorization to increase the salaries of the below listed employees to the amounts indicated effective October 1, 1977:

Michael C. Eberhardt	$34,000
Marjorie A. Eagle	14,500
I. Charles Mathews	26,000

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

[illegible] C. Matthews
Signature of Employee

Aug. 3, 1977
Date

June 29, 1977

Mr. Isiah C. Mathews
21 Pearl Street
Danbury, Connecticut 06810

Dear Mr. Mathews:

Mr. Blakey asked that I send you the enclosed forms to be completed by you prior to your employment with the Select Committee on Assassinations. Instructions have been attached to the forms, and if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

We look forward to meeting you.

Very truly yours,

Elizabeth Berning
Administzative Assistant to
G. Robert Blakey

EB
Enclosures

Isiah C. Mathews

21 Pearl Street
Danbury, Connecticut 06810

Will begin work around end of July or 1st of August

$19,500 subject to subsequent judgment

Will be Special Assistant to Blakey

Counsel

Please send all forms, etc. needed to begin employment and obtain security clearance.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10478
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10478

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/11/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MATTHEWS, LEODIS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leodis C. Matthews	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
526-74-9097	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leodis C. Matthews	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
526-74-9097	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$31,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leodis C. Matthews	October 11, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
526-74-9097	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$30,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 11, 1977 ______________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Signature of Employee

October 11, 1977
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel ICM
DATE: September 28, 1977
RE: Mr. Leodis (Lee) Matthews

Mr. Leodis (Lee) Matthews has accepted the position of Senior Staff Attorney with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. His effective starting date will be October 11, 1977, and his starting salary will be $30,000.00 per annum.

Mr. Matthews graduated from Northwestern School of Law in 1973 and since that time has served in the Multnomah County (Portland, Oregon) District Attorney's Office. He is currently Senior Deputy District Attorney with that office.

Your full co-operation is expected in familiarizing Mr. Matthews with staff procedures and welcoming him aboard.

ICM:jl

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10480
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 13
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10480

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/13/76
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MCCRAY, DENISE L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

To Becky

Date 7-12 Time 10:52

WHILE YOU WERE OUT

M Denise McCray

of

Phone

Area Code Number Extension

TELEPHONED	☐	PLEASE CALL	☐
CALLED TO SEE YOU	☐	WILL CALL AGAIN	☐
WANTS TO SEE YOU	☐	URGENT	☐

RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐

Message new address:
3332 Curtis Dr.
Apt. # 104
Hillcrest Heights, Md.
20023

Operator

EFFICIENCY® LINE NO. 4725 AN **AMPAD** PRODUCT

June 16, 1977

Mrs. Denise L. McCray
2515 R Street, S.E.
Apt. 327
Washington, D.C. 20020

Dear Denise:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
OBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

May 4, 1977

Mr. Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting Chief Counsel
and Staff Director
Select Committee on Assassinations

Dear Al:

I herewith submit my resignation from the Select Committee effective May 15, 1977.

I have not lost my convictions about this investigation which brought me here to work last December. However, personal and financial obligations have made it necessary for me to obtain more secure employment.

I wish the Committee all success in the future and I sincerely hope that it is never again plagued with the problems it has previously faced.

Sincerely,

Denise

Denise L. McCray

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Denise
426-6593
Library of Congress

May 5, 1977

Mrs. Denise L. McCray
Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Denise:

I was very sorry to receive your letter of resignation, but I understand your reasons.

We will miss you here, for you were certainly one of our most conscientious and efficient members of the staff.

Good luck in all your future endeavors.

Sincerely,

Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting Chief Counsel and Director

ABL:elb

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Denise Louise McCray	5/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577 72 8453	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☑ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Denise Louise McCray	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577 72 8453	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Denise Louise McCray	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577 72 8453	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Please consider this verification that Denise L. McCray began employment, permanent full-time status, with the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations December 13, 1976, and is so currently employed.

Rebecca Wheeler Martin
Chief Clerk

February 8, 1977

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) Denise L. McCray	**Effective Date** 1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number 577 72 8453	**Type of Action** ☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 1977

________________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Denise L. McCray	12/13/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
577 72 3453	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

handcarried to FO 12/16/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Denise L. McCray
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

RESUME

Most skilled – 2 weeks – 12,=
15 / 10,720 — –

NAME: Denise L. McCray -

ADDRESS: 2515 R Street, S.E. #327
Washington, D.C. 20020

TELEPHONE: 584-9560 (Home)
426-5821 (Work)

DATE OF BIRTH: January 30, 1954

EDUCATION: Anacostia High School
16th & R Streets, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20020

Graduated: June 1972 (Cum Laude)

Virginia Union University
Richmond, Va. 23220

(Completed one year, [30 semester hours], Business Administration major)

HONORS AND AWARDS:

National Honor Society, January, 1971
Graduated #7 in Senior Class (1972)
Scholastic Honor Roll (High School, 1969-1972)

SKILLS & MACHINES OPERATED:

Typing: 70 wpm
Dictaphone Transcriber
Lexitron Videotype Machine
IBM/ATS Computer Terminal
Xerox 4500 Copier (Authorized Key Operator)
Xerox 4000 Copier
Adding Machine
Calculator

WORK EXPERIENCE:

Library of Congress - Congressional Research Service
Government Division --

Information Assistant - Assistant Division Secretary,
August 4, 1975 to Present

In this position I am responsible for performing the duties of the Administrative Secretary in her absence. I also perform duties assigned by the Administrative Secretary designed to expedite her work. I type reports (legal and technical in nature) with responsibility for accuracy and consistency and for adherence to established editorial form; I receive inquiry slips requesting research information and forward to appropriate section head for assignment; I receive and direct phone calls to appropriate persons, and receive and route incoming mail. As assistant supervisor for 9 editorial assistants, I am also responsible for orientating new clerical staff members. I operate as alternate Time and Attendance clerk. Supervisor: Mrs. Linda Bailey

Library of Congress - Congressional Research Service
Government Division Editorial Assistant 4/74 - 8/3/75

I was responsible for editorial review of material (research studies, articles, speeches, committee reports); determining proper format and typing rough drafts into final form. I made revisions and corrections (minor) in format and grammer of researched material. I operated the Lexitron Videotype machine; IBM/ATS; Xerox 4500 machines and performed related clerical duties as necessary. Supervisor: Mrs. Linda Bailey

Library of Congress - Loan Division - Charge Records
Section - Library Technician January 1974 - April 1974

In this position I charged books internally to Library staff and to Congressional Offices; filed charge slips; and discharged returned books (internal and Congressional). Temporary position. Supervisor: Mrs. A. Kolarick

Virginia Union University - Financial Aid Office
Clerk Typist (Work Study Position)

I assisted the Director of Financial Aid and his Secretary in the processing of financial aid papers for students. This involved typing and filing and related clerical duties. I held this postion from January 1973 - May 1973 and August 1973 to December 1973. Supervisor: Mr. Philip Brunson

Library of Congress - Equal Opportunity Office
Secretarial Assistant - Dictaphone Transcriber
July 1973 to August 1973

I was responsible for the typing of testimony from tapes for rough and final copy. Filing and carrying out of EO procedures (complaints). I answered phones and fulfilled the duties of the EO Secretary in her absence. (This was only a two secretary office and therefore I filled in for the Secretary quite often). I also handled mail and appointments for the Director. (Temporary position)
Supervisor: Thomas Brackeen

Associate Mortgage Company - 1715 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. - Tax Clerk May 1973 - July 1973

In this position I handled all mortgage foreclosures for County's in Georgia, Florida and South Carolina. I also did light typing and filing.

Library of Congress - Procurement and Supply Division
Clerk Typist - October 1972 - December 1972

I was responsible for typing supply orders for materials procured from other government agencies and private industry. I also handled purchase orders and assisted in paying invoices. During the absence of the Division Secretary I filled in as Secretary to the Chief and also worked as Alternate Time and Attendance Clerk.
Supervisor: Mr. Earl Matlock

Department of Transportation - National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration Clerk-Typist (Summer Aid)
June 1972 - September 1972

I assisted the Division Secretary in any assigned duties. My major duties were typing and filing. I also answered phones and acted as receptionist in the Secretary's absence.

Department of the Navy - Naval Reconnaissance and
Technical Support Center Supply Clerk - Summer Aid
June 1971 to September 1971

I worked as an assistaant supply clerk responsible for filling orders for other sections of the Center. I also was responsible for ordering supplies from GSA for the center; inventory; paying invoices; and shipping and receiving duties.

Department of the Navy - Naval Reconnaissance and
Technical Support Center Summer Aid
June 1970 to August 1970

I worked as an assistant carrying out assigned duties in the supply office of the center. Light typing and filing were involved.

REFERENCES:

Mrs. Linda Bailey - RPA
Government Division - CRS
Library of Congress
426-5834

Mr. Kenneth Gray - Chief
Government Division - CRS
Library of Congress
426-5834
[Temporarily assigned to Select Committee to Study the Committee System, 401 Senate Courts - 224-1848 (Assignment Terminates 3/1/77)]

Mr. Steven Langone
Specialist in Indian Affairs
Government Division - CRS
Library of Congress
426-5834

Mrs. Mattie Coleman - Teacher
3905 Que Street, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20020

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10481
   RECORD SERIES : sSTAFF PAYROLl RECORD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10481

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROL RECORD

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/01/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MCDONALD, JAMES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James McDonald	10/2/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
047-34-7188	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 2, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date 5/2/78

To: Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☑ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law

sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ______________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ______________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

James I McDonald
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: May 4, 1978

RE: Mr. James McDonald

Please be advised that effective Monday, May 1, 1978, Mr. James McDonald has accepted the position of Senior Staff Counsel with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. His effective starting salary will be $38,000.00 per annum and he will remain on the Committee payroll until on or about October 15, 1978.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James McDonald	5/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
047-34-7156	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Senior Staff Counsel	38,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 1, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10482
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10482

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 02/22/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MCHARGH, KENNETH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth S. McHargh	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
301-46-2531	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title-If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________
ID ______________________
Benefits ______________________
Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth S. McHargh	2/22/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
301-46-2531	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Attorney	$27,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2/22, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

Kenneth S. McHugh
Signature of Employee

2/22/78
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I. C. M.

DATE: February 14, 1978

RE: Mr. Kenneth S. McHargh

22

This memorandum is to advise you that effective February 21, 1978, Mr. Kenneth S. McHargh has accepted the position of Staff Attorney with the Martin Luther King Task Force. His effective starting salary will be $27,000.00.

Your full cooperation will be greatly appreciated in familiarizing Ken with staff procedures and welcoming him aboard.

301-46-2531

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10483
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10483

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/01/76
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MCPHERSON, VIVIAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

McPHERSON, Vivian
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number | Level | Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
10-1-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years | Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
5	11

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.				X	X	X				S	S	S	S																		
Feb.																											S				
Mar.						S	S	S	S	S																					
Apr.																			S	S	S			S							
May																															
June																			A			S							X	X	
July					X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X																	
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 7/15/78

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	8	12	3	4	5	8	
Feb.	1	1	6	9		1	6	8	
Mar.	1	1	7	9		5	7	4	
Apr.	1	1	8	5		4	8	1	
May	1	1					9	2	
June	1	1	10	3	2	1	8	2	
July					8		0	2	
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨/ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature | Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature | Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House | Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian L. McPherson	7/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240-66-7674	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian L. McPherson	11/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240-66-7674	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$17,100

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Date: November 7, 1977
Re: Salary Adjustment - one year anniversary

GRB
11-7-77

Adjust the salaries of the following individuals as indicated effective November 1, 1977

Employee	Present Salary	7.05% Increase	New Salary
Akers	$24,000	$1,700	$25,700 ✓
Blackmer	24,000	1,700	25,700 ✓
Gay	36,000	2,500	38,500 ✓
Hess	26,000	1,800	27,800 ✓
McPherson	16,000	1,100	17,100 ✓
Orr, Patricia	17,500	1,200	18,700 ✓

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian L. McPherson	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240 66 7674	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian L. McPherson	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240 66 7674	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$33,600

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian L. McPherson	2/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240-66-7674	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2/28, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian Leigh McPherson	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240 66 7674	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment x ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee n	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2. x ☐ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Vivian L. McPherson	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240 66 7674	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Executive Assistant	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Vivian L. McPherson	12/1/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240 66 7674	☐ Appointment Title change ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Executive Assistant	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 2, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FO[illegible]

(Please [illegible] or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

9/75
[illegible]ections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

6689

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Vivian Leigh McPherson	October 1, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
240-66-7674	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title 00399	**Gross Annual Salary**
Clerk	$14,000.00

1166.67

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

10 -7 76 PM 4: 11
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 1, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: Frank Thompson
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

ID

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

JD

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

A.S

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Signature of Employee

1-10-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10484
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10484

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/15/77
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MILLER, DAWNE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dawne C. Miller	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214-42-6489	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________ (Specify Date))
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$23,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dawne C. Miller	9/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214 42 6489	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Administrative Assistant	$21,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 19, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 9/22

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Dawne C. Miller
Signature of Employee

9-16-77
Date

Howarth

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: Charlie Mathews, Special Counsel J.C.M
DATE: September 19, 1977
RE: Mrs. Dawne C. Miller

Effective September 15, 1977, Mrs. Dawne C. Miller has accepted the position of Administrative Assistant/Personal Secretary to G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director, Select Committee on Assassinations. Mrs. Miller's starting salary will be $21,500.00.

Your co-operation and assistance to her will be greatly appreciated.

ICM:jl

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10486
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 21

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

eleased under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC
107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10486

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/23/76
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MORDANA, SARI

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MORDANA, S. ✓
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 11-23-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	1

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Accrued This Month Annual Leave	Accrued This Month Sick Leave	Available This Month Annual Leave	Available This Month Sick Leave	Used This Month Annual Leave	Used This Month Sick Leave	Balance at Close of Month Annual Leave	Balance at Close of Month Sick Leave	Employee Initials
Jan.																																1	1					2	2	
Feb.																																1	1					3	3	
Mar.																																1	1					4	4	
Apr.																																1	1					5	5	
May																																1	1					6	6	
June																																1	1					7	7	
July											X			A	A			A	A	A	A	A			A	A	A					1	1	8	8	1		7	8	
Aug.																														X	X	1	1	8	9	[illegible]		8	9	
Sept.	X					X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X																			8	9	8		0	9	
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 9/15/77

▱	= 0.5 day annual leave
☒	= 1.0 day annual leave
S/	= 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S	= 1.0 day sick leave
A/	= 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A	= 1.0 day administrative leave
U/	= 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U	= 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩	= 0.5 day leave without pay
▨	= 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date Chief's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Approved: Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 8-25-77

DATE: August 25, 1977

RE: Resignations of Fallis, Brown and Mordana

Steve Fallis has resigned effective Monday, September 12, 1977. (Last day of work Sept. 1 Th) pay thru 9/12

Claire Brown has resigned effective Tuesday, September 20, 1977 (Last day of work pay thru) 9/20

Sari Mordana has resigned effective Monday, September 12, 1977 (Last day of work ?) pay thru - 9/15

The above dated are the last dates through which, including vacation, they should be paid.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 8-25-77

DATE: August 25, 1977

RE: Resignations of Fallis, Brown and Mordana

Steve Fallis has resigned effective Monday, September 12, 1977. (Last day of work Sept. 1 st) pay thru 9/12

Claire Brown has resigned effective Tuesday, September 20, 1977 (Last day of work pay thru) 9/20

Sari Mordana has resigned effective Monday, September 12, 1977 (Last day of work ?) pay thru 9/15

The above dated are the last dates through which, including vacation, they should be paid.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sari Mordana	9/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102 30 2631	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Law Assistant	$19,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sari Mordana	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102-30-2631	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Law Assistant	19,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sari Mordana	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102 30 2631	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sari Mordana	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102 30 2631	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sari Mordana	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102 30 2631	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

ROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sari Mordana	November 23, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
~~134 18 5264~~ 102 30 2631	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Law Assistant	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

- handcarried to FO 11/22/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 1976 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

- phoned Sheryl in FO re SS#. OK - don't need new form.
102 30 2631

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am elated by the following relationship __________

Kari J Mordana
Signature of Employee

1/24/77
Date

SARI MORDANA

303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Legal

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

SARI MORDANA
303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

15,000

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

October 26, 1976

Miss Sari Mordana
303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021

Dear Miss Mordana:

Thank you for your letter of October 19, 1976. Although my schedule is kind of filled at the moment, I would be able to see you on Monday, November 1, in my office in Philadelphia at 4:30 P.M. I am sorry to make it so late in the day, but I have to be in Washington, Pa. earlier that day; and I am in Washington, D.C. the rest of this week.

Would you be good enough to let my secretary know whether you will be able to come in for this appointment. Her name is Miss Shenk.

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD A. SPRAGUE

RAS:fs

October 19, 1976

Richard A. Sprague, Esq.
1622 Locust Street
Phil., Pa. 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

I was so intrigued by your selection as Chief Counsel and Staff Director of the Select Committee on Assassinations that I had to write to you. I am an extremely bright and capable graduate of Columbia Law School (May 1976) who happens to be one of your cousin Ziporah Mordana's daughters, and one of Debora Horowitz's granddaughters.

I hope you will forgive me for thus invoking kinship, but I am so eager to work with you that I am tempted to use any and all reasonable means to help achieve that objective. "Uncle" Louis heartily agreed that I should acquaint you with my existence, and gave me your address.

My educational background includes being a Stone Scholar and "VG" student at Columbia Law School, and a Phi Beta Kappa at Barnard College (undergraduate division of Columbia University). While in law school, I persuaded the Columbia Graduate School of Journalism to admit me to some of its professional workshops (in reporting, writing, editing, etc.), and completed half the Master's Program in Journalism.

My professional legal experience has involved a great deal of litigation practice, from doing research and discovery, to writing complaints, interrogatories, pre-trial memoranda and appellate briefs, in areas ranging from anti-trust to customs seizures.

My most challenging employment has been with the American Civil Liberties Union, where I have been working since the Summer of 1975. In my capacity as law clerk to the Legal Director, I was given the responsibility for handling the pre-trial litigation (with occasional assistance) of a bipartite class suit involving domestic intelligence activities—so far successfully—and was assigned to work on a case with Ramsey Clark (writing the successful brief in his challenge to a district court gag order).

Given my interests and abilities, it would be an incredible opportunity for me to assist in any way with your investigation. Should you have any use for a very sharp thinker and tenacious researcher, I hope you will consider me. me. And if there is any further information you would like to have, I would be happy to send it, and delighted to bring it to you.

Very truly yours,

Sari Mordana

P.S. In case you have no idea who your cousin Ziporah is, you might ask your mother if she remembers "Zipsy" Horowitz from Vienna.

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION

22 East 40th Street New York, New York 10016 (212) 725-1222

October 29, 1976

Richard A. Sprague, Esq.
David Berger, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

Sari Mordana has told me of her interest in working on the legal staff you are assembling as Chief Counsel to the Select Committee on Assassinations. I am writing this letter to recommend Miss Mordana for such a position.

Miss Mordana has worked as my law clerk for over a year, and I am highly impressed with her ability. She is extremely bright and capable, and her superior work has made a significant contribution to the cases on which she has assisted. She has a great deal of initiative in taking on responsibility, and has handled the legal research and writing in several phases of complex litigation with a minimum of supervision, and a high degree of professionalism.

In addition to her practical legal ability, she is articulate in the law, and her writing is of an extremely high caliber. As to her personal qualities, she is an unusually alert and hard-working individual, who delights in tackling a difficult project, and pursuing it to a successful resolution.

Edward J. Ennis, Chairperson, Board of Directors • Ramsey Clark, Chairperson, National Advisory Council
Aryeh Neier, Executive Director • Alan Reitman, Associate Director • Melvin L. Wulf, Legal Director
Joanna Komoska, Membership Director • John H.F. Shattuck, Jr., Director, Washington D.C. Office

BOARD OF DIRECTORS

CHAIRPERSON
Edward J. Ennis

VICE CHAIRPERSONS
Samuel Hendel
Rolland O'Hare
Harriet F. Pilpel
Barbara Scott Preiskel
Marvin Schachter

TREASURER
Donald Hackel

Sheldon Ackley
Mary E. Bane
Michaele Snyder Battles
Jewel Bellush
Ralph S. Brown, Jr.
Ronald H. Brown
Bob Campbell
David Carliner
Lynn S. Castner
Ramsey Clark
John W. Cleland
Carl Cohen
Irving Cohen
Mary Coleman
Katherine Collard
Gilbert Cranberg
Patt Derian
Clinton Devaux
Louisa Dixon
Ronald Elberger
Lolis Elie
Richard Y. Feder
Irwin Feinberg
Edgar Feingold
Ellen Feingold
Monroe H. Freedman
Joan Garfinkel Glantz
Franklyn S. Haiman
Margie Pitts Hames
David G. Hanlon
Brook Hart
John Hay
Lawrence Herman
Philip Hirschkop
Steve Hobart
Jeannette Hopkins
David B. Isbell

GENERAL COUNSEL
Norman Dorsen
Osmond K. Fraenkel
Ruth Bader Ginsburg

CORPORATE SECRETARY
Frank Askin

Thomas M. Kerr, Jr.
Edward King
Ralph Knowles
Arthur Kobler
Sarah Lasker
Jim Lawing
Shepard Lee
Audrey Leonard
Emanuel Margolis
Paul R. Meyer
Jerry Muskrat
Grace Olivarez
Gilda Parella
Harriet F. Pilpel
Frances Fox Piven
Suzy Post
Franklin Poul
John Reed
William F. Reynard
Joseph Rhodes, Jr.
Suzanne Rhodes
Judith Rogers
Catherine Roraback
Ben Roth
Arlie Schardt
Katherine Sebo
Faith Seidenberg
George Slaff
Lawrence Speiser
John M. Swomley, Jr.
Nadine Taub
William Van Alstyne
Robert Wagstaff
Hanna Weston
Ann Widditsch
Tasia Young
Richard Zacks

BOARD MEMBER EMERITUS
Morris Ernst

NATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL

CHAIRPERSON
Ramsey Clark

VICE CHAIRPERSONS
Harry S. Ashmore
Alan Barth
John Conyers
Frances Farenthold
Lois G. Forer
Aileen C. Hernandez
M. Maury Maverick
Karl Menninger
Morris Rubin

Sadie Alexander
Charles Ares
Roger N. Baldwin
Robert Bierstedt
Algernon D. Black
Julian Bond
Irving Brant
Yvonne Braithwaite Burke
Catherine Cater
Henry Caudill
Stuart Chase
Shirley Chisholm
John Chrystal
Henry Steele Commager
Giovanni Costigan
Vern Countryman
Nanette Dembitz
Irving Dilliard
James P. Dixon
Melvyn Douglas
Robert F. Drinan
Ronnie Dugger
Mrs. Henry E. I. duPont
Thomas Emerson
Luther H. Evans
Alvin I. Fine
Walter T. Fischer
Jefferson Fordham
Erich Fromm
Ralph F. Fuchs
Lewis Galantiere
Harold Gibbons
Thomas P. Gill
Albert Gore
Fannie Lou Hamer
La Donna Harris
Philip Hart
Wilma Scott Heide
Aaron Henry
John Hersey
Ruth Holmberg
Mordecai W. Johnson
Vernon Jordan, Jr.
James Kerney, Jr.
Benjamin H. Kizer
Milton R. Konvitz
William M. Kunstler
Burt Lancaster
Norman Lear
Max Lerner
John Lofton
Carey McWilliams
Wesley H. Maurer
Benjamin E. Mays
Emil Mazey
Mrs. Alexander Meiklejohn
Ariel Melchior
Sylvan Meyer
Maya Miller
Patsy Mink
Frank C. Newman
Louise Noun
James G. Patton
Channing Phillips
Lillian Roberts
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
John Seigenthaler
Edward J. Sparkling
Oscar H. Steiner
Dorothy Taylor
Raymond S. Uno
Howard Whiteside
William Wirtz
Stephen J. Wright

Her acute and inquisitive mind has been an asset to my staff, and I believe she would be an asset to yours.

Sincerely,

Melvin L. Wulf
Legal Director

MLW/alf

MARTIN LIPTON
HERBERT M. WACHTELL
LEONARD M. ROSEN
GEORGE A. KATZ
BERNARD MINDICH
THEODORE GEWERTZ
BERNARD W. NUSSBAUM
BERTRAM M. KANTOR
WILLIAM C. STERLING, JR.
RICHARD D. KATCHER
JAMES H. FOGELSON
DOUGLAS S. LIEBHAFSKY
PETER D. McKENNA
LAURENCE D. CHERKIS
STEVEN M. BARNA
CHARLES T. MEDERRICK
LAWRENCE LEDERMAN
CHAIM J. FORTGANG
MICHAEL W. SCHWARTZ
ALLAN A. MARTIN
DENIS F. CRONIN
ERICA H. STEINBERGER
HAROLD S. HANDELSMAN
H. NEIL BRODER
STANLEY M. GORINSON
ALAN D. HANDLER
PETER C. HEIN
HAROLD S. NOVIKOFF
MARC H. ROSENBAUM

WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ
299 PARK AVENUE
NEW YORK, N.Y. 10017

M. CARR FERGUSON, JR.
LAWRENCE P. KING
OF COUNSEL

TELEPHONE: 371-9200
AREA CODE 212

CABLE ADDRESS
"TELLROSE NEW YORK"

TELEX: WU: 127829

October 29, 1976

Richard A. Sprague, Esq.
David Berger, P.A.
Attorneys at Law
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

I understand that Sari Mordana is applying for a position on the legal staff which you are gathering as Special Counsel to the select congressional committee which will be investigating the assassinations of Martin Luther King, Jr. and John F. Kennedy. This letter is being written to recommend Miss Mordana for such a position.

I am a member of the adjunct faculty at Columbia Law School. Each spring I teach a seminar on trial practice and, this year, Miss Mordana was one of the 18 students in my class. The seminar requires substantial participation by each student in simulated courtroom events and in the critiques which follow. As a result, I believe I am able to make an informed judgment respecting Miss Mordana's ability and personality. I found her extremely bright and hard-working. But just as important I found that she had an intangible quality which unfortunately few law students possess -- a spark which ignites when she is working on a project she enjoys. This facet of her personality made her a very effective advocate. She could marshal facts and present them in a manner which attracted attention and was convincing.

Having recently been part of a congressional inquiry myself, as an associate of John Doar, I recognize the difficulties involved in the task you are undertaking and the importance of obtaining top-flight help. I believe Miss Mordana would be an asset to your staff.

I wish you well.

Sincerely,

BWN:jr

SARI MORDANA

303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

SARI MORDANA

303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

SARI MORDANA

303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

SARI MORDANA

303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

SARI MORDANA

303 East 71st Street
New York, N.Y. 10021
(212) 988-6032

Age: 25 years old
Status: Single

Education

Columbia School of Law

Degree received—May 1976
Stone Scholar, VG average; Research in Constitutional Litigation
Columbia Graduate School of Journalism (1974-1976)—completed half the Master's Program in Print and Broadcast Journalism
LSAT—751

Barnard College

Degree received—June 1972
Phi Beta Kappa, Magna Cum Laude, Honors in English Literature
Research projects in the Origins of Urban Ghettoes and the Psycho-linguistics of Propaganda
Columbia Graduate School of the Arts (1971-1972)—Documentary Filmmaking (Graduate Film Division)
Language—French

Experience

American Civil Liberties Union, Legal Department

Law Clerk to Legal Director—responsible for legal research and writing in all phases of constitutional litigation, and served as Legal Assistant to Ramsey Clark on a First Amendment contempt case
June 1975 to the present

CBS, Inc., Law Department

Discovery phase (document production, interrogatory response) of two anti-trust suits involving alleged monopolization of program production and film distribution by CBS, Inc.
May 1974 to August 1974

Non-legal—Downe Communications, Inc.
Editing and design of advertising copy and layouts for Ladies' Home Journal and other accounts
January 1973 to August 1973

Recommendations upon request.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10489
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10489

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/01/77
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MORTON, CECELIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MORTON, C. T.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT: 6-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE: Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																								
Feb.																																								
Mar.																																								
Apr.																																								
May																																						0	0	
June																																1	1					1	1	
July																																1	1					2	2	
Aug.				X	X																													2	2	2		0	2	
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 8/5/77

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

166.59
555.56 722.28

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cecelia T. Morton	9/5/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578 66 0125	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cecelia T. Morton	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578-66-0125	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code_______

Monthly Annuity $_______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cecelia T. Morton	6/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578 66 0125	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$11,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 6/2

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

CECELIA MORTON

REFERRED BY REP. JOHN BURTON -
CURRENTLY MAKING $10,400 -
WOULD COME AT SLIGHT
INCREASE - $10,500 - $11,000

I RECOMMEND HIRING HER
AS TYPIST.

[redacted]

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth and Becky Martin

FROM: Steve Fallis

DATE: May 13, 1977

RE: Secretaries

1. Eileen Copeland has been hired as a secretary and will begin work on Monday, May 16, 1977. Her salary will be $11,000 per year and she will be temporarily assigned to the Legal Unit.

209 46 4088

2. Nancy Schultz has been hired as a secretary, to begin work on Monday, May 23, 1977, at a salary of $12,000 per year. She is to be assigned to the Administrative Unit.

3. Cecilia Morton has been hired as a secretary and will begin work on June 1, 1977. Her salary will be $11,000 per year. She will be assigned to the Kennedy Unit.

The resumes for Ms. Copeland, Ms. Morton and Ms. Schultz accompany the copy of this memorandum to Becky Martin.

jg

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Celia Marton
Signature of Employee

6-2-77
Date

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

TO: Congressman Louis Stokes

FROM: Cecelia T. Morton

SUBJECT: Resignation

DATE: July 27, 1977

Please accept this as my resignation as of today's date to terminate August 5, 1977.

I am sorry for the short visit but I have been offered security and a more substantial job and better opportunities and wish to express my regret, for I have accepted this position.

I shall not forget the experience of working for the Committee and wish everyone the best of luck in trying to solve these cases.

Sincerely,

Cecelia Morton

RESUME

Cecelia Morton

Cecelia T. Morton
1240 46th Street S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20019
(202) 575-2571 off

Date of Birth: 8-13-49

No. of Dependents: 1

Marital Status: Married

Employment Record

April 1972 - Present

Rural Housing Alliance, 1346 Connecticut Ave.
N. W. Washington, D. C. 20036 (202) 659-1680
Immediate Supervisor: David Raphael
Title: Assistant Director

Position: Secretary
Reason for Leaving: Need new Challenges

Job Description:

Responsible for assisting Director in carrying out duties pertaining to fund-raising activities and special projects. Interviewing applicants for various secretarial positions. Responsible for review of items published in Federal Register. Prepare summaries of all rules and notices of regulations pertaining to rural issues. Responsible for maintenance of library, publications, and materials, periodic review of system of coding and filing. (Volume approximately 4,000 items)

Also served as Membership and Subscription Secretary which duties included: processing applications for members, day-to-day contact with mailing houses. Maintaining supply of materials for publications. Assisting with the organization of new publications, layout work.

At one time served as Information Director/ Research Secretary, some duties included: preparation and layout work for the monthly newsletter (RHA Reporter) for printers, making travel arrangements, coordinating all local and national newsclippings dealing with housing issues, responding to members inquiries. Typing press releases, speeches, statements, and other correspondence.

(more)

Employment Record (Cont'd)

September 1969 - April 1972

Riggs National Bank, 1510 H Street N.W.,
Washington, D. C. 20005 (202) 624-2630
Immediate Supervisor: Linda Porter

Position: Clerk-Typist
Reason for Leaving: Need for sufficient salary; better opportunities for advancement

Job Description:

Transferring stocks and bonds, light bookkeeping, correcting computer print-out sheets and balancing companies records, answering phones, various mailing jobs.

Part-time high school - September 1969

Chemical Bank, 277 Park Avenue, New York,
New York
Immediate Supervisor: Ken Barrington
Title: Trust Officer

Position: Clerk-Typist
Reason for Leaving: Left city to move to Wash., D.C.

Job Description:

Crediting checking accounts, issuing series E savings bonds, ordering checkbooks, typing loan contracts, receptionist duties, general office work.

Education

Charles Evans Hughes High School, West 18th Street, New York, New York, graduated June 1967.

Armstrong Adult Education Night School, 1st & P Streets N.W. Washington D. C. Received certificate 1971 in keypunching.

References

Mr. David Raphael, Asst. Director, Rural Housing Alliance, 1346 Connecticut Avenue N.W, Washington, D. C. 20036 (202) 659-1680

Ms. Mary Lansing, Admin. Ass't to Rep. John Burton, 1714 Longworth Bldg., Washington, D. C. (202) 225-5161

Mrs. Claire Earle, 9562 Landbreeze Row, Columbia, Md. (301) 596-6753

MEMO MAY 9 1977 from Celia Morton

To Mr. Hutton Date 5-6-77 Time

Hello,

I really appreciate you taking time with me Today. Enclosed is the verification. I hope to hear from you soon.

C.M.

11 AM
WED 5/11

☐ Reply ☐ Initial and return ☐ See me

JACK BROOKS, TEX., CHAIRMAN
ROBERT N. GIAIMO, CONN.
JAMES G. O'HARA, MICH.
JAMES C. CLEVELAND, N.H.
JOHN M. ASHBROOK, OHIO

LEE METCALF, MONT.,
VICE CHAIRMAN
MIKE GRAVEL, ALASKA
LAWTON CHILES, FLA.
JESSE A. HELMS, N.C.
PETE V. DOMENICI, N. MEX.

Congress of the United States
JOINT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MAY 9 1977

Date 5/6/77

Listed below is the result of a test administered by the Placement Office to Cecelia Morton on Friday, May 6, 1977, 1977.

Typing:

76 wpm on a 5-minute test

(81 wpm with 5 errors)

Anne Wilander
Placement Officer

Starting June 1, 1977

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10490
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 13

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10490

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/27/76
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MORTON, RITA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

June 16, 1977

Mrs. Rita L. Morton
5056 Silver Hill Court
Apt. 202
Suitland, Maryland 20028

Dear Rita:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

April 25, 1977

Mr. Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Lewis:

This letter is to inform you of my resignation from the Select Committee on Assassinations effective April 30, 1977.

Sincerely
Rita L. Morton
Rita L. Morton

cc: Robert K. Tanenbaum, JFK Task Force

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rita LaVerne Morton	4/30/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 64 6855	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 2, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Becky

April 27, 1977

Mrs. Rita L. Morton
Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Rita:

As I told you personally, I was very disappointed to receive your letter of resignation, but I understand your reasons.

I enjoyed working with you and compliment you on the excellent job you did for the Committee. I trust you will stop and visit us when you are in the vicinity.

With all best wishes for your future,

Sincerely,

Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting Chief Counsel and Director

ABL:elb

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rita L. Morton	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 64 6855	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Please consider this verification that Rita LaVerne Morton began employment, permanent full-time status, with the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations December 27, 1976, and is so currently employed.

Rebecca Wheeler Martin
Chief Clerk

February 8, 1977

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rita L. Morton	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
[illegible] 579 64 6855	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rita L. Morton	12/27/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 64 5655	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related to any Member of Congress

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Rita Marton ____________________ 1/10/77 ____________________
Signature of Employee Date

RECOMMENDED BY CONGRESSWOMAN BOGGS MORTON
SEC
10-6

RESUME

Rita LaVerne Morton
5056 Silver Hill Court
Apt. 202
Suitland, Maryland 20028
736-5834
Office - 225-1776

Date of Birth: 8/3/48
Place of Birth: Washington, D.C.

EDUCATION

Calvin Coolidge High School - Graduated, June 1966
Strayer Business College - Business Course, February 1967

EMPLOYMENT

Secretary/Staff Assistant - U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Arrangements for Commemoration of the Bicentennial, Chaired by Congresswoman Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs - March 1976 -

Responsibilities: Typing of Committee reports and final copy for a variety of Committee publications. Worked closely with Members of Congress and Staff Director in coordinating Committee informational services and special events. Assisted in planning Committee meetings and development of minutes. Operated all office equipment including Gestner, Mag Card II, xerox and teletype. Special skills include shorthand/Dictaphone.

Executive Secretary to Executive Director - Health Manpower Development Corporation - October 1974 to September 1975

Responsibilities: Typing of all correspondence for the Executive Director, scheduled daily appointments, conferences, and travel itinerary. Also responsible for production typing on the Sperry/Remington Word Processing Machine.

Administrative Assistant to Project Director, Poly Drug Abuse Project, National Medical Association, Inc. - May to August 1974

Responsibilities: Typing of all documents, handled all administrative tasks and attended regular project meetings.

Office Manager/Administrative Assistant - Advisory and Learning Exchange - January 1972 to March 1973

Responsibilities: Included typing of monthly calendar of workshops and seminars, scheduled meetings for large groups, responsible for all staff requests, and complete management of a small non-profit educational organization.

Secretary - Urban Institute - November 1968 to January 1972

Responsibilities: Typed drafts and final reports for three project directors on research staff and other secretarial duties.

Secretary/Administrative Assistant - Urban America, Inc. - June 1967 - November 1968

Responsibilities: Typed all reports for Assistant Directors on Housing Staff, scheduled conferences, and travel itinerary. Promoted to Administrative Assistant with control over secretarial staff.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

Kelly Services, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1973-1975
Tele Sec, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1975-1976
Institute for Services to Education, 2001 S Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., 1974-1976

REFERENCES

Wallace O. Green
Staff Director
Joint Committee on the Bicentennial
U. S. Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-1776

Ms. Bea Smith
Institute for Services to Education
2001 S Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20009
232-9000

Mrs. Karen Butler
Health Manpower Development Corporation
1990 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
872-1355

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 10, 1976

To: Mr. Sprague

From: Sue

Re: Rita Morton

Mr. Gay has interviewed Rita and recommends her. Joan Thornell, who worked with us on the Joint Committee as a consultant for one of our Bicentennial projects, also recommends Rita. I would recommend her to be a Typist/Secretary for her skills are excellent.

Dick —
Presently @ $11,500
Last day would be 12/20
at her present job.
Recommend -

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
COMMITTEE ON BANKING, CURRENCY AND HOUSING

MEMORANDUM

November 30, 1976

DEC 1 1976

Dear Donovan,

Attached is the resume of a Ms. Rita L. Morton who presently is Secretary/Staff Assistant to the Joint Committee on Arrangements for Commemoration of the Bicentennial.

I highly recommend her for a secretarial position and would appreciate any consideration you may give her.

If you have any questions, don't hesitate to call me.

Thanks,

Tommy Gaines

RESUME

Interviewed Rey 12/6/76
Typist

Rita LaVerne Morton
5056 Silver Hill Court
Apt. 202
Suitland, Maryland 20028
736-5834

Date of Birth: 8/3/48
Place of Birth: Washington, D.C.

Re: Thornell

EDUCATION

Calvin Coolidge High School - Graduated, June 1966
Strayer Business College - Business Course, February 1967

EMPLOYMENT

Secretary/Staff Assistant - U.S. Congress, Joint Committee on Arrangements for Commemoration of the Bicentennial, Chaired by Congresswoman Lindy (Mrs. Hale) Boggs - March 1976 -

Responsibilities: Typing of Committee reports and final copy for a variety of Committee publications. Worked closely with Members of Congress and Staff Director in coordinating Committee informational services and special events. Assisted in planning Committee meetings and development of minutes. Operated all office equipment including Gestner, Mag Card II, xerox and teletype. Special skills include shorthand/Dictaphone.

Executive Secretary to Executive Director - Health Manpower Development Corporation - October 1974 to September 1975

Responsibilities: Typing of all correspondence for the Executive Director, scheduled daily appointments, conferences, and travel itinerary. Also responsible for production typing on the Sperry/Remington Word Processing Machine.

Administrative Assistant to Project Director, Poly Drug Abuse Project, National Medical Association, Inc. - May to August 1974

Responsibilities: Typing of all documents, handled all administrative tasks and attended regular project meetings.

Office Manager/Administrative Assistant - Advisory and Learning Exchange - January 1972 to March 1973

Responsibilities: Included typing of monthly calendar of workshops and seminars, scheduled meetings for large groups, responsible for all staff requests, and complete management of a small non-profit educational organization.

Secretary - Urban Institute - November 1968 to January 1972

Responsibilities: Typed drafts and final reports for three project directors on research staff and other secretarial duties.

Secretary/Administrative Assistant - Urban America, Inc. - June 1967 - November 1968

Responsibilities: Typed all reports for Assistant Directors on Housing Staff, scheduled conferences, and travel itinerary. Promoted to Administrative Assistant with control over secretarial staff.

TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT

Kelly Services, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1973-1975
Tele Sec, Inc., Washington, D. C., 1975-1976
Institute for Services to Education, 2001 S Street, N.W., Washington, D. C., 1974-1976

REFERENCES

Wallace O. Green
Staff Director
Joint Committee on the Bicentennial
U. S. Congress
Washington, D.C. 20515
225-1776

Ms. Bea Smith
Institute for Services
to Education
2001 S Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20009
232-9000

Mrs. Karen Butler
Health Manpower Development Corporation
1990 M Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20036
872-1355

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10491
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10491

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PARYOLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/05/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
MOSLEY, BARBARA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Barbara L. Mosley	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
177-42-4376	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Barbara L. Mosley	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
177-42-4376	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,800.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $_________.00 as of __________________

ID __________________

Benefits __________________

Payroll __________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Barbara L. Mosley	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
177-42-4376	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Typist-Secretary	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Barbara L. Mosley	July 5, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
177 42 4376	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Typist-Secretary?	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 5, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 7/7

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

177 42 4376

Mosley
July 5

M E M O R A N D U M

June 15, 1977

TO: Tom Lambeth
Acting Staff Director

ok
JW

FROM: Donovan L. Gay
Chief Researcher

RE: Ms. Barbara L. Mosley OK

Please be advised that Ms. Barbara Mosley, resume attached, has been interviewed by Gerald Hamilton, Jackie Hess and myself for the position as secretary/typist assigned to the MLK Research Task Force.

Ms. Mosley certainly qualifies for this position, and we all agree that she is the mature individual for whom we are searching to fill this spot. She has been employed on Capitol Hill for some time and surely knows the many ins-and-outs.

I strongly recommend that Ms. Mosley be hired at $12,000 per annum and report for duty on Tuesday, ~~June 21, 1977.~~

July 5

Tom, I certainly appreciate your consideration on this matter. Thank you.

OK - TL

mcp

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______

Barbara Mosley
Signature of Employee

10/14/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10492
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10492

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/27/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
NORRIS, ELIZABETH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth M. Norris	November 30, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
237-90-5178	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth M. Norris	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
237-90-5178	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$16,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID __________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll__________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth M. Brown	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
237-90-5178	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Assistant	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth M. Brown	September 27, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
237 90 5178	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Assistant	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 27, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

To: G. Robert Blakey
From: Tom Howarth
Date: September 27, 1977
Re: Hiring of Staff Assistant

I recommend that we hire Elizabeth Brown as the second staff assistant in the Budget Office at an annual salary of $13,000.00 starting September 27, 1977.

Elizabeth M. Brown

3134 Q. Street, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20007
Telephone: h - 333-2105
o - 225-6565

EXPERIENCE

October 1974 - Present	Staff of U. S. Representative Jack Brooks, Washington, D. C. Handle all aspects of case work in the areas of military, Social Security and veterans affairs. Correspond with constituents in regards to general and specific inquiries, which often necessitates contact with various government agencies and Congressional Committees in order to obtain needed information. Correspond with constituents concerning legislative inquiries. Assist in reviewing and assigning all outgoing mail. Responsible for various facets of the procedure involved with the nomination of service academy applicants. Performed duties of receptionist and appointment secretary on a full time basis, and presently perform these duties as needed. Temporarily assumed duties and responsibilities of office manager.
Sept. 1973 - Dec. 1973	Learning Foundations, Inc., Wilmington, N. C. Part-time math tutor for grades one through twelve.
Feb. 1973 - June 1973	Wonder Shop, Wilmington, N. C. Part-time sales clerk.

EDUCATION

1972 - 1974	University of North Carolina Wilmington, N. C. 28401 Degree: Bachelor of Arts in Mathematics
1970 - 1972	Peace College Raleigh, N. C.

BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

Born:	March 12, 1952, Wilmington, N. C.
Appearance:	Height: 5'5" Weight: 114 lbs Health: Excellent
Hobbies:	Water sports, tennis, needle point, and reading.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

Elizabeth M. Brown
Signature of Employee

9-27-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10493
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10493

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/27/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
OPPENBERG, GALE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gale Lynn Oppenberg	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-36-3080	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$19,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gale Lynn Oppenberg	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-36-3038	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________
ID __________
Benefits __________
Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gale Lynn Oppenberg	December 27, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
129-36-3030	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Research Attorney	$18,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1977

Louis Stokes
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ____________________
Office Code__________	Benefits ____________________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________	Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.CM

DATE: December 22, 1977

RE: Ms. Gale Lynn Oppenberg

This memorandum is to advise you that Ms. Gale Lynn Oppenberg has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the Select Committee on Assassinations.

Her effective starting date will be Tuesday, December 27, 1977, and her starting salary will be $18,000.00.

Your full cooperation will be greatly appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Oppenberg with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

Gale Lynn Oppenberg
Signature of Employee

12/27/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10494
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 13
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 11

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10494

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/21/76
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
ORR, PATRICIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-66-2714	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Patricia M. Orr	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-66-2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$19,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID __________________

Benefits __________________

Payroll __________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	11/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-66-2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Senior Researcher	$18,700

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Date: November 7, 1977
Re: Salary Adjustment - one year anniversary

GRB
11-7-77

Adjust the salaries of the following individuals as indicated effective November 1, 1977

Employee	Present Salary	7.05% Increase	New Salary
Akers	$24,000	$1,700	$25,700 ✓
Blackmer	24,000	1,700	25,700 ✓
Gay	36,000	2,500	38,500 ✓
Hess	26,000	1,800	27,800 ✓
McPherson	16,000	1,100	17,100 ✓
Orr, Patricia	17,500	1,200	18,700 ✓

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-66-2714	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Senior Researcher	17,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 66 2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 66 2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$33,600

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-66-2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Patricia M. Orr	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 66 2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 66 2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment and title change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Special Assistant to the Chief Counsel and Director	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	November 22, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 66 2714	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

handcarried to FO 11/22/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION F[illegible]1

(Plea[redacted] or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

[redacted], or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

6689

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia M. Orr	October 21, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-66-2714	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher 01414	$9,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.) (pr) 250.00

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

10 28 76 PM 12: 01
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 26, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

JDS
Done

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

A.S.

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Patricia L. Orr
Signature of Employee

1/10/76
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10495
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10495

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/16/76
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
ORR, PHOEBE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Phoebe Curtis Orr	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-64-3205	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$17,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Pheobe Curtis Orr	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-64-3205	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Researcher	$16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits ________________

Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Pheobe Curtis Orr	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-64-3205	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Phoebe Curtis Orr	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 64 3205	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$11,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Phoebe Curtis Orr	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 64 3205	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Phoebe C. Orr	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 64 3205	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date______________________________, 19 77

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Phoebe Curtis Orr	12/16/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 64 3295	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document/Research	$11,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Phoebe C. Orr
Signature of Employee

Jan. 24, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10498
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 1

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10498

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/26/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
PARISI, LOUIS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 11, 1978

Major Raymond J. Brennan
Administrative Officer
New Jersey Division of State Police
P. O. Box 7068
West Trenton, N. J. 08625

Dear Major Brennan:

This is to officially notify you that the services of Detective Sergeant Louis Parisi with the Select Committee on Assassinations will terminate at the close of business on Friday, December 22, 1978.

Your letter to me of October 4, 1978 billed the Committee for Mr. Parisi's services through September 22, 1978.

At your earliest convenience, kindly bill the Committee for the period September 23 through December 22, 1978.

I'm sure that the New Jersey State Police will hear from Chairman Stokes concerning Mr. Parisi's valuable contribution to the Committee. In the meantime, I wish to thank you for your cooperation.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas Howarth

Thomas Howarth
Deputy Staff Director
and Budget Officer

TH:ht

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Louis Parisi	September 26, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
070 34 8584	X☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Investigator	$7,236

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

9 28 77 [illegible]

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 26, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

April 18, 1978

The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I have approved a salary increase of $1,980.00 per year effective April 1, 1978 for Louis Parisi, a staff investigator for the Select Committee.

As Mr. Parisi's basic salary and benefits are paid by the New Jersey State Police, his additional salary from the House is paid in the form of a monthly expense allowance per prior agreement with your staff and the Clerk of the House. This was to avoid Mr. Parisi from earning retirement benefits from both the Federal Government and the State of New Jersey.

Accordingly, Mr. Parisi's monthly expense allowance will increase from $625.00 to $790.00 effective April 1, 1978.

Sincerely,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS/thw

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel, Staff Director
DATE: April, 11, 1978
RE: Salary Adjustments

Please increase the salaries of Louis Parisi and Ida Jane Ross seven percent (7%) effective April 1, 1978.

September 27, 1977

The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
H-326 Capitol
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The Select Committee on Assassinations has hired Mr. Louis Parisi as a staff investigator at an annual salary of $28,000.

In order to protect Mr. Parisi's pension and other benefits with the New Jersey State Police, he will be carried on the State's payroll while he is assigned to the Select Committee.

New Jersey will bill the Committee at an annual rate of $20,764 so that Mr. Parisi's stipend from The House of Representatives will be $7,236.

Mr. Parisi will be working full time for the Select Committee and will perform only those duties assigned by the Committee.

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

cc: Finance Office
LS/th

SS. 070-348
8584

MEMORANDUM

TO: Professor Blakey

FROM: Edward M. Evans EE
Chief Investigator, MLK

DATE: September 22, 1977

O.K.
GRB
9-22-77

SUBJECT: Louis Parisi, Investigator, MLK

Mr. Parisi has agreed to take a position with us as Staff Investigator assigned to the Martin Luther King, Jr. Task Force.

He will start September 26, 1977 at $28,000.

Annual to New Jersey State Police 20,764

Salary - House of Rep. $7.236 annual

EME:ek

~~9/23/77~~

Hold until we know the amount we have to reimburse the New Jersey State Police - somewhere around $20.000. The balance will be his Congressional salary.

JH

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

10/26/77

Parisi is to be a member of the staff as of 9/26/77, but his salary will not be included on our payroll. He will be reimbursed by voucher each month to cover his salary. (Per Tom Howarth.)

eb

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

Signature of Employee

9-26-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10499
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10060-10499

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/01/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
PONDER, MARY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/04/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Elizabeth Ponder	3/9/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
452-74-2381	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☑ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 7, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: 7 March 1978

RE: Termination

Please be advised that effective Friday, March 3, 1978, Mary E. Ponder will be terminated from the Committee payroll.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

Termination Effective 3/9/78

ICM:j

PONDER, Mary
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
2	9

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.									S																						
Feb.																															
Mar.						☒	☒	☒	☒																						
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 3/9/78

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	3	10		1	3	9	
Feb.	1	1	4	10			4	10	
Mar.									
Apr.									
May									
June									
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date Chief's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Approved: Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Elizabeth Ponder	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
452-74-2381	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Elizabeth Ponder	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
452 74 2381	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Elizabeth Ponder	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
452 74 2381	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary E. C. Ponder	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
452 74 2381	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary E. C. Ponder	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
452 74 2301	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Administrative Assistant	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related to any Member of Congress.

I am related by the following relationship ________________

Mary E. Ponder
Signature of Employee

Jan. 10, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER	180-10068-10298
RECORD SERIES	STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3

Reason for Board Action The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question, (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual

Number of Postponements: 1

Postponements All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers

Reason for Board Action The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest

Substitute Language SSN

Date of Next Review

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10298

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/25/78
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
ADRINE, RONALD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ronald Adrine	6/5/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
302-46-7079	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$27,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U S House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee Authority—H Res 956 of 95th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 USC 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date June 5, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00 as of __________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel

DATE: June 2, 1978

RE: Mr. Ronald Adrine

Please be advised that effective Monday, June 5, 1978, Mr. Ronald Adrine has accepted the position of Staff Counsel with the Select Committee. His effective starting salary will be $27,000.00 per annum.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience. (It has not been determined which task force Mr. Adrine will be assigned to)

ICM:j

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date May 25, 1978

To: Assassinations Comm.
(Employing Authority)

☒ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ____________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ____________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Ronald B Adrine
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY   HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER   180-10068-10300
    RECORD SERIES   STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 16

Reason for Board Action The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question, (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual

Number of Postponements: 1

Postponements All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers

Reason for Board Action The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest

Substitute Language SSN

Date of Next Review 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10300

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/12/76
PAGES : 29

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
AMATO, CAROLYN HANSEN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Resume included. Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Plea[redacted]
or Ballpoint Pen)

U S HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D C 20515

[redacted] corrections or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives

6687

I hereby authorize the following payroll action

JND

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Carole Hansen (Amato)	12 ~~13~~ October 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
257-56-9440	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information)

Position Title C 1433	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$16,000

844.44 pr

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below)

1 ☐ Standing Committee Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional

2 ☒ Special or Select Committee Authority—H Res 1540 of 94th Congress

3 ☐ Joint Committee

10 15 76 AM 8:45
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U S C 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives

Date October 14, 19 76

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration

APPROVED ______________________
Chairman Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________00

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (for official personnel folder)

15

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone 931-3669   Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941   Health: Excellent   Marital Status. Married

EDUCATION

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed 100 wpm   Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine.
I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents, military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone 931-3669 Office Phone 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA

Date of Birth June 12, 1941 Health Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits. I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate· dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail, Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES· Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly-radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence, took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

AMATO
COMMITTEE STAFF

1 October 7, 1976

Honorable Dawson Mathis
236 Cannon House Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Dawson:

Thanks so much for your letter endorseing Carole Amato for a position on the House Select Committee on Assassinations. Your interest in the formulation of the committee staff is appreciated.

Dawson, as you may be aware, owing to Carole's great qualifications, she has been selected to join the staff of the committee.

Again, thanks so much for your interest, and with kind regards.

Sincerely,

Thomas N. Downing
Chairman, Select Committee
on Assassinations

vm

AMATO

DAWSON MATHIS
2ND DISTRICT GEORGIA

OFFICE ADDRESS
236 CANNON HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING
WASHINGTON, D C 20515
TEL (CODE 202) 225-3631

DISTRICT OFFICE
CITY-COUNTY GOVERNMENT BUILDING
225 PINE AVENUE
ALBANY GEORGIA 31701
TEL (CODE 912) 439-8067

Congreſs of the United States
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

COUNTIES

BAKER
BERRIEN
BROOKS
CALHOUN
CLAY
COLQUITT
COOK
CRISP
DECATUR
DOUGHERTY
EARLY
GRADY
LANIER
LEE

LOWNDES
MILLER
MITCHELL
QUITMAN
RANDOLPH
SEMINOLE
STEWART
TERRELL
THOMAS
TIFT
TURNER
WEBSTER
WORTH

September 30, 1976

Honorable Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
2135 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C.

✓

Dear Tom:

I am pleased to have the opportunity to recommend Carole Hansen Amato for a position on the Select Committee on Assassinations.

I have known Carole since I came to Congress in 1971. She was a member of Congressman John Davis' staff for seven years and was highly valued by him. Since that time she has held an executive position with Congressman Carroll Hubbard and presently works as the legislative secretary to Congressman Bob Jones.

During her nine years on Capitol Hill, Carole has repeatedly proven herself as a reliable and competent worker. She has shown excellent abilities as executive secretary, press assistant and in a legislative capacity. I recommend her highly.

If you should need additional information about Carole, please let me know.

With best regards, I am

Sincerely,

Dawson Mathis, M. C.

DM:lr2

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.

Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967

Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President
National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers,
1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.

Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963

Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C.
DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.

July 1960 - Feb. 1962

Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and
2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va.
DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.

May 1959 - July 1960

Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck
Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia.
DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.

Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975 Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.

Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975 Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.

Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine.
I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669   Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941   Health: Excellent   Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm   Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine.
I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.

Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967

Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President
National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers,
1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C.
DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.

Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963

Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the
National Rural Electric Cooperative Association,
2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C.
DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.

July 1960 - Feb. 1962

Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and
2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va.
DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.

May 1959 - July 1960

Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck
Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia.
DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

RESUME

Carolyn (Carole) V. Hansen Amato
4201 South 31st Street, Apartment 317
Arlington, Virginia 22206

Home Phone: 931-3669 Office Phone: 225-4801

PERSONAL DATA:

Date of Birth: June 12, 1941 Health: Excellent Marital Status: Married

EDUCATION:

Graduated from Athens High School, Athens, Georgia - Commercial Course

Stenotype Institute of Washington, D. C.
Attained 150 words per minute on the stenotype machine.

Northern Virginia Community College, Alexandria, Virginia.
Studied English, American Government and journalism, and earned 12 credits.
I plan to take additional writing courses in the fall.

SKILLS:

Typing Speed: 100 wpm Shorthand Speed: 110 wpm

Office equipment that I can operate: dictaphone, adding machine, hand addressograph machine, mimeograph machine, PBX, IBM Mag Card machine. I have also kept a set of books for a trade association for five years.

EXPERIENCE:

May 15, 1975 - Present	Assistant Legislative Aide to Congressman Bob Jones, Ala. DUTIES: Answer all of the legislative mail, including research, compose and type letters in final form. Prepare daily legislative summary for Congressman Jones. Also write press releases of grant announcements.
Jan. 3 - May 15, 1975	Executive Assistant to Congressman Carroll Hubbard, Ky. DUTIES: Handled all project work for the First District of Kentucky, which included U. S. Army Corps of Engineers projects, water and sewer projects, community projects, etc. researched, composed and typed responses to constituents' mail; dealt with state, local and federal government officials in person, over the phone and by mail; Congressman Hubbard was Chairman of the 94th Democratic Freshman Class, and I was in charge of all the work for that group, which included keeping the members posted on subjects of interest to them, setting up meetings, arranging for meeting rooms, press coverage, briefings and meetings with government officials and others. Out of a staff of 11, I was one of three people who had "Capitol Hill" experience and was responsible for helping to set up the office. I set up the complete filing system for the office.
Nov. 1967 - Jan. 2, 1975	Press Secretary to Congressman John W. Davis, Ga. DUTIES: Wrote weekly newspaper column; interviewed Congressman Davis for the weekly radio tape(this was Mr. Davis' and my favorite part of the week), duplicated

	the tape and distributed it to all radio stations in the Seventh District; wrote and recorded grant announcements in my voice to be broadcast on the radio; wrote and edited statements for presentation to House and Senate Committees; responsible for contact with newspaper, radio and T. V. reporters; read District newspapers and clipped to maintain a knowledge of events in the District.
Feb. 1963 - Nov. 1967	Secretary to Mr. John Marshall, Executive Vice President National Association of Dairy Equipment Manufacturers, 1012 14th Street, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Opened and sorted the mail; compiled and typed industry statistical reports; took dictation; answered correspondence; kept two sets of books (we operated two trade associations); arranged for membership meetings throughout the country; made appointments and travel arrangements for Mr. Marshall; and handled purchasing for office supplies and equipment.
Feb. 1962 - Feb. 1963	Promotional Secretary for Mr. Leland M. Biggs at the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association, 2000 Florida Avenue, N. W., Washington, D. C. DUTIES: Correspondence; typed news releases; took dictation; operated a dictaphone machine for material which the management consultants in the department had dictated for manuals; promoted seminars and workshops available to members of the association, designed art work and brochures; handled registration and fees; typed manuals and acted as hostess for these seminars and workshops; corresponded regularly with the members; and maintained mailing list of the membership.
July 1960 - Feb. 1962	Legal Secretary for Capt. Paul A. A. St. Amour and 2nd Lt. Richard Keshin, U. S. Marine Corps, Quantico, Va. DUTIES: Transcribed military court martials; typed briefs, wills and other legal documents; military correspondence; took dictation concerning military investigations.
May 1959 - July 1960	Secretary for Mr. Robert Morgan, Manager, Ryder Truck Lines, 860 King Street, Athens, Georgia. DUTIES: Typed statistical reports and waybills; took dictation; correspondence; operated long-line communication system connecting our office with the home office in Florida to report the day's operation.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10303
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10303

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINSTRATION
BARROW, GUILIA M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

June 16, 1977

Mrs. Guilia M. Barrow
509 Kentucky Avenue, S.E.
Washington, D.C. 20003

Dear Guilia:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

May 3, 1977

Mr. Al Lewis
Acting Staff Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D. C.   20515

Dear Mr. Lewis:

I regret to inform you that May 15th, 1977, will have to be my termination day as an employee on your committee.

I have conveyed my situation and reasons behind my decision to Joan Thornell but would be glad to talk with you if you would like.

I wish you the greatest of luck both for this committee and all your own personal endeavors.

Sincerely,

Giulia Mainieri Barrow

May 6, 1977

Mrs. Giulia Mainieri Barrow
Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Giulia:

Receipt of your letter of resignation, effective May 15, is acknowledged.

I was disappointed to hear your decision, but understand your reasons. I enjoyed getting to know you and appreciate your assistance during the past several months.

With all best wishes for the future,

Sincerely,

Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting Chief Counsel and Director

ABL:elb

May 6, 1977

Mrs. Giulia Mainieri Barrow
Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Giulia:

Receipt of your letter of resignation, effective May 15, is acknowledged.

I was disappointed to hear your decision, but understand your reasons. I enjoyed getting to know you and appreciate your assistance during the past several months.

With all best wishes for the future,

Sincerely,

Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.
Acting Chief Counsel and Director

ABL:elb

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Giulia M. Barrow	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
145 46 6759	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

_______________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Giulia M. Barrow	5/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
145 46 6859	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Giulia M. Barrow	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
145 46 6759	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Giulia M. Barros	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
145 46 6759	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Giulia M. Barrow	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
145 46 6759	X☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Mr. Sprague:

Edith, Rick, and I have interviewed Giulia (Julie) Mainieri and we all recommend her pending your final approval.

Present salary $12,800.00.

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Julia M. Barrow
Signature of Employee

January 10, 1976
Date

RESUME

Giulia Pat Mainieri - Barrow - Mrs.
509 Kentucky Avenue, S. E.
Washington, D. C.
202-546-4912

CAPITOL HILL EXPERIENCE:

January - July, 1971--Glenn M. Anderson of California

Joined staff as secretary to the administrative assistant, Harry Anderson. Stayed here only six months because I did not find the work challenging and was losing my skills because I was not using them enough. Salary was approximately $6,800 to $7,400.

September, 1971 - September, 1975--Office of the Legislative Counsel

Was member of the secretarial pool taking a great deal of shorthand and typing from 25-30 attorneys. This job was extremely demanding but was also excellent experience. I left a bit reluctantly to go to school.

December, 1975 - November, 1976--Richard F. Vander Veen of Michigan

Became member of this staff on a part-time basis. My duties involved typing letters composed by entire staff except administrative assistant. Here again, as in the Counsel, I had responsibility for a great deal of typing, but less shorthand than before. I learned how to work two kinds of automatic typewriters and was responsible for using them for large-volume mailings. Left staff after this seat turned over after election. Salary approximately $6,500 for a twenty hour week.

PRIOR TO HILL EXPERIENCE:

March, 1970 - January, 1971--Shering Pharmaceutical Company

Secretary for two product managers, John Moser and Toby Madison. Had many different responsibilities: filing, typing, shorthand, telephone calling and answering, making reservations for overseas trips and in-country trips, and greating business clients. Enjoyed this job greatly. Salary approximately $6,400.

Personal Information:
Date of birth--October 26, 1950--Houston, Texas
Marital Status--Married, no children
Health--Excellent

References:

Honorable Richard F. Vander Veen — Tele: 202-225-3831
1232 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Tom Quimby, Administrative Assistant for Mr. Vander Veen
1232 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515 — Tele: 202-225-3831

Bill Wilson
Staff Director for the Office of the Legislative Counsel
136 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515 — Tele: 202-225-6060

Sec'y

MAINIERI

RESUME

DEC 27

DEC 27 1976

DEC 27 1976

Giulia Pat ~~Mainieri~~ Barrow
509 Kentucky Avenue, S. E.
Washington, D. C.
202-546-4912

CAPITOL HILL EXPERIENCE:

January - July, 1971--Glenn M. Anderson of California

Joined staff as secretary to the administrative assistant, Harry Anderson. Stayed here only six months because I did not find the work challenging and was losing my skills because I was not using them enough. Salary was approximately $6,800 to $7,400.

September, 1971 - September, 1975--Office of the Legislative Counsel

Was member of the secretarial pool taking a great deal of shorthand and typing from 25-30 attorneys. This job was extremely demanding but was also excellent experience. I left a bit reluctantly to go to school.

December, 1975 - November, 1976--Richard F. Vander Veen of Michigan

Became member of this staff on a part-time basis. My duties involved typing letters composed by entire staff except administrative assistant. Here again, as in the Counsel, I had responsibility for a great deal of typing, but less shorthand than before. I learned how to work two kinds of automatic typewriters and was responsible for using them for large-volume mailings. Left staff after this seat turned over after election. Salary approximately $6,500 for a twenty hour week.

PRIOR TO HILL EXPERIENCE:

March, 1970 - January, 1971--Shering Pharmaceutical Company

Secretary for two product managers, John Moser and Toby Madison. Had many different responsibilities: filing, typing, shorthand, telephone calling and answering, making reservations for overseas trips and in-country trips, and greating business clients. Enjoyed this job greatly. Salary approximately $6,400.

Personal Information: Date of birth--October 26, 1950--Houston, Texas
Marital Status--Married, no children
Health--Excellent

References: Honorable Richard F. Vander Veen Tele: 202-225-3831
1232 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515

Tom Quimby, Administrative Assistant for Mr. Vander Veen
1232 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-3831

Bill Wilson
Staff Director for the Office of the Legislative Counsel
136 Cannon House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515 Tele: 202-225-6060

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10305
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10305

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/08/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BEESON, PETER G.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Peter C. Beeson	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
046-36-4592	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☒ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Ass't Deputy Chief Counsel	$36,400.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ______________

ID ______________

Benefits ______________

Payroll ______________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Peter C. Beeson	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
046 36 4592	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$30,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________

ID ______________

Benefits ______________

Payroll ______________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Peter G. Beeson	[illegible]77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
046 36 4592	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$28,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 15, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Peter C. Beeser
Signature of Employee

8-8-77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Robert Blakey

FROM: Robert Lehner

DATE: July 19, 1977

RE: Applicant Peter G. Beeson

Mr. Beeson is an intelligent, articulate young man who evinced great interest in working with us. He has some knowledge of the King case and possesses an open mind as to its resolution. He has tried some Narcotic Conspiracy cases for the Justice Department and has filed appellate briefs. He would be a welcomed addition to our team.

His present salary is $20,00. He states as of March 15, 1978 he would expect to make $25,000 under a GS-13 rating and therefore requests $25,000 with us. He will be available to start with us in the next two weeks.

I recommend we take him.

RJL

$28,000 ✓

Aug. 8th

July 12, 1977

Professor G. Robert Blakey
House Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
20515

Dear Professor Blakey:

I am sending the resume which you requested, along with a suggested salary of $25,000, (in line with the level which I would automatically reach with the Justice Department in the relatively near future).

The litigation experience reflected on the resume is almost complete; it omits only a second case in Puerto Rico (conspiracy) currently in pre-trial stages, an Atlanta conspiracy case I am preparing to indict, and a brief just completed for an appeal to the Ninth Circuit. The job has provided me with a varied and respectable amount of litigation and appeal experience, in addition to the more routine matters (immunities, witness protections, indictment dismissals, Title III wiretap authorizations, solicitor general memos etc.) handled on a daily basis by the various sections within the Criminal Division.

The job which you have described obviously presents an exciting and unique opportunity. Further, I would consider it an honor to work with you on the investigation. I expect I would be able to start work with you within a month, or sooner, should an offer be extended. I look forward to hearing from you in the near future.

Sincerely,

Peter

Peter Beeson

[illegible]

[illegible]

RECEIVED

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10306
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10306

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BERK, CHARLES M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) Charles Michael Berk	**Effective Date** 12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number 290-50-4529	**Type of Action** ☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Charles Michael Berk	March 15, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
290-50-4529	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Senior Researcher	$18,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_______Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 15, 1978 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ________________
Office Code__________	Benefits ________________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________	Payroll________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: G. Robert Blakey

GRB
3-15-78

DATE: 15 March 1978

RE: Mr. Charles M. Berk

Please be advised that effective Tuesday, March 14, 1978, Mr. Charles M. Berk has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the Select Committee on Assassinations.

His effective starting salary will be $18,000.00.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

GRB:j

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date 03/14/78

To: Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☒ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Charles M. Berk
(Employee)

3 15 78 PM 4:33
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

GPO 16-78695-3

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10307
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10307

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/22/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BERLOW, LISA M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lisa M. Berlow	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
327-46-4790	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 256 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lisa M. Berlow	7/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
327-46-4790	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business___________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable; Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 88

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID ___________________________

Benefits ___________________________

Payroll___________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lisa M. Berlow	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
327-46-4790	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ________

Monthly Annuity $ ________ .00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lisa M. Berlow	6/22/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
327 46 4790	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 28, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Berlow

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

L Berlow
Signature of Employee

June 29, 1977
Date

Berlow

12,000

MEMORANDUM

327 46 4790

TO: Louis Stokes, Chairman

FROM: Tom Lambeth, Acting Director

ok
JW

DATE: June 14, 1977

I would recommend approval of the attached request that Lisa M. Berlow be hired. At the moment, there are four (4) vacancies on the research staff.

OK

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10308
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 10

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10308

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 13

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BERNING, ELIZABETH L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	1/1/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-46-4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$24,900.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________
Benefits __________
Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-46-4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$33,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-45-4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Chief Clerk	$23,600

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	October 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-46-4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Chief Clerk	$22,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 14, 1977 ,~~19~~

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 10-14-77

RE: Elizabeth Berning

This is to advise that effective October 1, 1977, Elizabeth Berning will become Chief Clerk at an annual salary of $22,000.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-46-4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$21,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 46 4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 46 4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$33,600

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-46-4548	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 46 4543	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

Please consider this verification that Elizabeth L. Berning began employment, permanent full-time status, with the House of Representatives Select Committee on Assassinations January 1, 1977.

/s/ Rebecca W. Martin
Rebecca Wheeler Martin
Chief Clerk

January 31, 1977

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth L. Berning	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Elizabeth Berning
Signature of Employee

1-10-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10309
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 1

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10309

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/06/78
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
HSAC, ADMINISTRATION
BILLINGS, RICHARD NEWCOMBE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Richard Newcombe Billings	March 6, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
139-24-4355	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Editorial Chidf	$30,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 13, 1978

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________
ID ____________________
Benefits ____________________
Payroll____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Signature of Employee

March 6, 1978
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel

DATE: 9 March 1978

RE: Mr. Dick Billings

This is to advise you that effective Monday, March 6, 1978, Mr. Dick Billings has accepted the position of Editorial Chief with the Select Commiteee. His effective starting salary will be $30,000.00.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please feel free to contact me.

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10310
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 15

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 13

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10310

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/02/76
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BLACKMEN, S. JONATHAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
s Jonathan Blackmer	1/2/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$27,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	5/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$25,700

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 1, 19 78

_______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

_______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

_______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code___________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________
ID ____________________
Benefits ____________________
Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	April 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$13,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 22, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Committee on House Administration

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	April 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$13,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 22, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________
ID ________________________
Benefits ________________________
Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	11/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	$25,700

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 7, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director GRB
Date: November 7, 1977 11-7-77
Re: Salary Adjustment - one year anniversary

Adjust the salaries of the following individuals as indicated effective November 1, 1977

Employee	Present Salary	7.05% Increase	New Salary
Akers	$24,000	$1,700	$25,700 ✓
Blackmer	24,000	1,700	25,700 ✓
Gay	36,000	2,500	38,500 ✓
Hess	26,000	1,800	27,800 ✓
McPherson	16,000	1,100	17,100 ✓
Orr, Patricia	17,500	1,200	18,700 ✓

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243 74 5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243 74 5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$38,200

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$11,070.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____ ________________________________

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$11,700.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
S. Jonathan Blackmer	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243 74 3787	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	[illegible]

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Ple [illegible]) U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES [illegible] ns, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)
or Ballpoint Pen)
Washington, D.C. 20515

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action: 6689

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sidney Jonathan Cole Blackmer	November 2, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-74-5787	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff counsel	$15,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

11 -5 76 AM 9:47
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

11 -5 76 AM 9:31
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 2, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

ID made
HB

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related to any current Member of Congress by consanguinity or law.

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

S. Jonathan C. Blackmer
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10311
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10311

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/17/77
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BLAKEY, G. ROBERT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
George Robert Blakey	7/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-48-4536	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Chief Counsel and Director	$47,500.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical, or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 24, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 7/7

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
George Robert Blakey	6/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
243-48-4536	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Chief Counsel and Director	$27,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 24, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________

____

G Robert Blakey
Signature of Employee

6-25-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10312
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review:

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10312

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/27/76
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BOLAND, COLLEEN T.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BOLAND, C. T.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　　Level　　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-27-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years　　Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																															
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June																	X			X/S											
July																															
Aug.																			X			X	X	X	X	X			X/S	S	S
Sept.	S	S				S	S	S	A			A	A	A	A	A															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 9/~~15~~16/77

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1					1	1	
Feb.	1	1					2	2	
Mar.	1	1					3	3	
Apr.	1	1					4	4	
May	1	1					5	5	
June	1	1	6	6	1½	½	4½	5½	
July	1	1					5½	6½	
Aug.	1	1	6½	7½	6½	2½	0	5	
Sept.	—	—	0	5		5	0	0	
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◪ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　　Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House　　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Colleen T. Boland	9/16/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 52 9164	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 16, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FO 9/21

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

GRB 8-19-77

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director

DATE: August 19, 1977

RE: Colleen Boland and Kevin Walsh

This Memorandum is written to inform you that Ms. Boland and Mr. Walsh's employment with the Select Committee will be terminated effective September 15, 1977. Ms. Boland and Mr. Walsh will be on administrative leave until that time.

The administrative leave should equal their accrued vacation plus such remaining time between now and September 15th.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 9-15-77
DATE: September 15, 1977

Effective Friday, September 16, 1977, at 5:00 p.m., Colleen Boland and Kevin Walsh will be terminated from the Committee payroll.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

GRB:jl

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Colleen T. Boland	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215-52-9164	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Colleen T. Boland	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 52 9164	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Colleen T. Boland	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 52 9164	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$22,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Colleen T. Boland	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 52 9164	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date__________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
____
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Colleen T. Boland	XXX 12/27/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
215 52 9164	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 16, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Dow[illegible]g, Chairman

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship __________

Colleen T Boland
Signature of Employee

Feb 10, 77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Colleen Y Boland
Signature of Employee

____
Date

COLLEEN T. BOLAND

3529 O Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(202) 338-6536

Age: 26
Health: Excellent
Marital Status: Single

PROFESSIONAL OBJECTIVE: *Seeking a career where my administrative, research and writing skills can be adapted to the fullest extent for future growth.*

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

9/75 - 7/76 *Royal Embassy of Saudi Arabia* *Washington, D.C.*
Saudi Arabian Information Office
Primary responsibilities were to open the Information Office which provided social, cultural, political, economic and commercial information relating to Saudi Arabia, to private citizens, the press, businessmen, members of Congress and officials of government agencies. Compiled a working card catalogue and index for a research library on the history of Saudi Arabia. Coordinated scheduling procedures for visiting foreign dignitaries. Assisted with the publication of a monthly magazine on Saudi Arabia. As required, assisted Ambassador Alireza in administrative matters and research.

11/73 - 1/75 *Representative John Dellenback (R-Oregon)* *Washington, D.C.*
In addition to general administrative and secretarial responsibilities, answered constituent inquiries on legislative and administrative matters within the Federal Government.

1/73 - 10/73 *The Washington Clinic* *Chevy Chase, Md.*
Medical Assistant to Dr. James Shaper.
Responsible for managing the office and assisting the physician with minor surgery.

EDUCATION:

9/68 - 5/72 *Maryville College* *St. Louis, Missouri*
B.A. Degree in English and History
Dean's List
Midwestern Sailing Society
Volunteer work with under-privileged *9/68 - 5/69*

9/64 - 6/68 *Stone Ridge Country Day School* *Bethesda, Md.*

OTHER: *Language: French*

REFERENCES: *Available on request*

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10313
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10313

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/13/76
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BONIFER, SHERL L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheryl Lynn Bonifer	3/4/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
228 82 4715	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 16, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

- to FO, Ins Mail
3/27

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheryl Lynn Bonifer	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
228 52 4715	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Sheryl Lynn Bonifer	12/13/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
228 82 4715	x☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

handcarried to FO 12/16/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Sheryl L. Bonifer
Signature of Employee

January 10, 1977
Date

SHERYL LYNN BONIFER
1521 Colonial Drive, #T-1
Woodbridge, Virginia 22192
225-6515

OBJECTIVE: Seeking employment that would enable me to fully utilize my potential and would offer responsibility and challenge.

EDUCATION: The Washington School for Secretaries
Washington, D. C.

1974-1975 Attended the Washington School for Secretaries full-time for one year. Studied all aspects of secretarial duties, including shorthand, legal terminology, research techniques, bookkeeping, accounting, business law, office management, and business correspondence.

Graduated with academic honors.

1969-1973 Hayfield Secondary School
Alexandria, Virginia

Graduated in upper 25 percent of class.

EXPERIENCE: Office of Finance
U. S. House of Representatives

1975-present Was employed by the Office of Finance in August, 1975. Duties at that time included handling payroll for approximately 90 Members of Congress. In less than one year, I was promoted to one of only three supervisory positions in the payroll section. I am currently in charge of all payroll matters pertaining to all House Committees, which involves furnishing information on current funding resolutions, providing accurate records of Committee allowances, and distributing monthly records of expenditures for approval by the Chairman of each Committee. In addition, I am responsible for the prompt payment of all federal leases of office space and computer leasing invoices for Members. I am in charge of maintaining complete records of the Lyndon Baines Johnson Intern Program, an allowance furnished each Member of Congress for the employment of two additional employees each year. I also was involved in a complete transition of payroll information from one computer system to the current Financial Management System.

Sh. Hand 100
Typing 65

EMPLOYMENT:

Previous

Worked temporarily for an association from the mid-west organizing and setting up a new branch office in the Washington area. Duties included interviewing for personnel, ordering furniture and supplies, setting up the filing system, and handling all secretarial duties.

ADDITIONAL:

Born and raised in Alexandria, Virginia. Recently married and in excellent health. In addition to my secretarial skills, I enjoy working with people and am very dependable. I am willing to accept responsibility and am a quick and efficient worker.

References will be furnished upon request.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10314
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10314

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/25/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BRADY, SURELL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Surrell Brady	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
556-78-1139	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ____) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ____ If applicable, Level ____ Step ____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ____

Monthly Annuity $ ____ .00 as of ____

ID ____

Benefits ____

Payroll ____

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Surrell Brady	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
556-78-1139	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Staff Counsel	$30,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Surell Brady	October 25, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
556-78-1139	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	$28,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 31, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk I.C.M.

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel

DATE: October 26, 1977

RE: Ms. Surell Brady

Ms. Surell Brady has accepted the position of Staff Counsel with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her effective starting date was October 25, 1977, and her starting salary $28,000.00.

Your full co-operation will be appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Brady with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Susan Brady
Signature of Employee

26 OCT. 77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10315
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10315

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/15/78
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BRIGGS, YVONNE W.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Yvonne Briggs	November 20, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-52-9427	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 21, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ______________________
Office Code___________	Benefits ______________________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________	Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Yvonne Briggs	6/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9427	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 13, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits ________________

Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Yvonne W. Briggs	March 15, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9427	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below:)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$15,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 13, 1978 , 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits____________________

Payroll____________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: June 7, 1978

RE: Yvonne Briggs, Salary Adjustment

Please adjust the salary of Yvonne Briggs to $16,000.00 per annum, effective June 1, 1978. This salary adjustment is in compliance with her promotion to Secretary/Deputy Chief Counsel.

See me about this memo.

ICM

ICM:j

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.CM

DATE: March 1, 1978

RE: Ms. Yvonne W. Briggs

Please be advised that effective Wednesday, March 15, 1978, Ms. Yvonne W. Briggs will join the SCA staff as a Secretary with the Martin Luther King Task Force. Her effective starting salary will be $15,000.00.

ICM:j

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

Yvonne W. Briggs
Signature of Employee

March 7, 1978
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10317
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10317

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/29/76
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BROWN, CLAIRE, L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BROWN, C. L.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　　Level　　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 12-29-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years　　Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																															
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.	A					A	A	A	X			X	X	X	X	X			X	X											
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 9/20/77

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Sick Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Annual Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Sick Leave	USED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	USED THIS MONTH Sick Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Annual Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Sick Leave	EMPLOYEE INITIALS
Jan.	1	1					1	1	
Feb.	1	1					2	2	
Mar.	1	1					3	3	
Apr.	1	1					4	4	
May	1	1					5	5	
June	1	1					6	6	
July	1	1					7	7	
Aug.	1	1					8	8	
Sept.			8	8	8		0	8	
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　　Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House　　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

CLAIRE L. BROWN
5021 Seminary Road, #1104
Alexandria, Virginia 22311

(703) 379-1379

Voting Residence: Georgia

CAREER OBJECTIVE

To develop and improve communication, understanding, programming, and/or policy between the Federal Government and State and local agencies and associations.

EXPERIENCE SUMMARY

- Extensive experience evaluating and interpreting Federal education legislation and regulations to determine the impact on State and local educational agencies.
- Congressional and Executive liaison to Senate, House, and education associations responsible for analyzing and evaluating legislation and Federal regulations.
- Related experience in curriculum planning and educational research and in library and education programming on the local, State, and Federal level.
- Reviewed with education association executives, the impact of pending legislation on their interest group.
- Five years experience as a public school librarian and teacher.

EDUCATION

Henry Grady High School, Atlanta, Georgia, 1965.
B.S., Ohio State University, 1969. (Education)
M.S., Boston University, 1970. (Library Science) (Audio-Visual Education)

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

PROGRAM ASSISTANT, Office of Libraries and Learning Resources, U.S. Office of Ed., Washington, D.C. Researched and analyzed completion reports, compiled statistical information, and wrote a comprehensive national summary of public library construction from Federal funds. (1976)

LIBRARIAN, Office of Career Education, U.S. Office of Education, Wash., D.C. Implemented a resource center of available career education materials from all over the U.S. Wrote annotated bibliographies of specialized materials on women and on the mentally and physically handicapped. (1976)

CONSULTANT, D.A. Lewis Associates, Inc., Clinton, Maryland. Researched, wrote, and developed contract proposals in response to U.S. Gov't. R.F.P.'s, particularly in library and Indian education programs. (1976)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT, Committee for Full Funding of Education Programs, Washington, D.C. Served as principal personal assistant to the Exec. Dir. and worked with him in all phases of the operation. Worked as liaison with Executive and Legislative branches of government for other groups interested in educational funding (public schools, universities, libraries, handicapped, etc.) to coordinate an effort for full funding of education programs on a Federal level. Initiated legislative communications (phone & letter) to inform members and association executives of pending bills. Attended hearings and meetings, reviewed and analyzed Congressional Records and Federal Registers, and managed the financial records of the Committee. Collected and organized bills, reports, and background materials on pending education appropriations and budget legislation. (1975)

LANDLORD-TENANT INVESTIGATOR, City of Alexandria, Alexandria, Virginia. Served as liaison between landlords and tenants in disputes, and as an authority on Virginia housing regulations. Achieved recognition for outstanding negotiations between a tenant and the Virginia Power Co. (VEPCO). Resolved problems dealing with rent increases, utility bills, and the absence of landlord-tenant contract-provided services. (1975)

STAFF ASSISTANT, Senator Herman Talmadge (Ga.), Washington, D.C. Helped to edit the final volume of the Watergate Report, and assisted with bookkeeping concerns on the Watergate Committee. Drafted legislative correspondence for the Senate Agriculture Committee in response to constituent requests. (1974)

ASSISTANT LEGISLATIVE AIDE & CASEWORKER, Congressman Gus Yatron (Pa.), Wash., D.C. Investigated and responded to constituent concerns in legislation, and to their problems with social security and black lung disability benefits. (1974)

SCHOOL LIBRARIAN, DeKalb County School System, Decatur, Georgia. Achieved recognition both locally and system-wide for implementing the "open-library" concept in media centers. Responsible for all reference, acquisitions, cataloging, and processing of materials. Member of curriculum planning committees for all subjects, grades 1-7 and planned course curriculum content for library training. Supervised, managed, and trained a large staff, analyzed school and community needs, and held budget conferences with administrators. Designed and implemented all policies within the library, prepared bibliographies, and conducted special research projects for the principal and led seminars for librarians. (1970-1974)

GRADUATE ASSISTANT, to the Associate Dean for Undergraduate Studies, School of Education, Boston University, Boston, Mass. Collected and organized statistical data used in evaluating various programs at the University, drafted and edited documents, and served as coordinator for public relations activities in relation to the University's centennial celebration. (1969-1970)

TEACHER, Columbus Public School System, Columbus, Ohio. Taught all subjects in the inner-city to low-income 2nd/3rd graders. Worked with different Federal low-income programs and officials, including ESEA, Title I, and Headstart. (1969)

ASSOCIATIONS AND HONORS

Georgia Association of Educators
American Library Association
Pi Lambda Theta, National Education Honor Society
Dean's List
Alumni Associations of Ohio State and Boston Universities
Member and active participant in the Smithsonian Institute and the Kennedy Center

HOBBIES AND INTERESTS

Travel, Current Events, Photography, Guitar, and Reading

References upon request

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

August 23, 1977

G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations
3342 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Professor Blakey:

Pursuant to our conversation of yesterday, August 22, 1977, and my subsequent conversation with Donovan L. Gay, Chief Researcher, of August 23, 1977, I hereby tender my resignation with the House Select Committee on Assassinations effective September 20, 1977.

I have enjoyed my work at the Committee and I hope that my research as well as that of others will aid in finding the truth and in bringing a satisfying end to these investigations.

Sincerely

Claire L. Brown

Claire L. Brown

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Claire L. Brown 9	9/20/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
258 72 6151	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Claire L. Brown	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
258 72 6151	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code____________

Monthly Annuity $____________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Claire L. Brown	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
258 72 6151	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Claire L. Brown	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
258 72 6151	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date_________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

DUCB 146
Rev. 8/71

724
364

Sent to Kevin
memo. S.S.#

DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD

MAIL CLAIM

S. S. No. Claimant's Name

PART ONE

1. I claim unemployment insurance benefits for the calendar week which began Sunday, Dec. 26, 1976 and ended Saturday, Jan. 1, 1977

For the calendar week shown above:

a. I was available for and actively seeking work (✓) Yes ( ) No
b. I was physically able to work (✓) Yes ( ) No
c. I claimed or was receiving education, training or subsistence allowance from the Veterans Administration ( ) Yes (✓) No
d. I claimed or was receiving unemployment insurance benefits under another Federal or State Law ( ) Yes (✓) No
e. I claimed or was receiving a retirement pension or annuity ( ) Yes (✓) No
f. I was totally unemployed ( ) Yes (✓) No
(If your answer to item (f) is "Yes," do not complete item (g) below.)
g. I worked (✓) full time ( ) part time and earned, before deductions, $83.33

2. This claim is filed by mail because:

☑ a. I became employed. Date of employment Dec. 29, 1976
Employer's Name U.S. House of Representatives, House Select Committee on Assassinations
Employer's Address 3342 H.O.B. #2, Washington, D.C. 20515

☐ b. Other than employment. Reason

IMPORTANT: If you started to work during the calendar week claimed in item 1, you must have your employer complete Part Two below.

I certify the above statements are true. I am aware that the law imposes penalties for false statements made in connection with this claim.

Claire L. Brown
Claimant's Signature

5021 Seminary Rd. #1104 Alexandria, Va. 22311
Address

1/27/77
Date

PART TWO

LOW EARNINGS REPORT—To be completed by the employer and delivered to the claimant at his request.

1. During the CALENDAR WEEK beginning SUNDAY Dec. 26, 1976 and ending SATURDAY Jan. 1, 1977 (NOT your payroll week, if different), this employee worked ☒ FULL TIME ☐ PART TIME
2. His *gross earnings payable before deductions*, which include tips, cash value of meals, lodgings, and all other remuneration for that week were $83.33.
3. If separated, enter date Explain reason for separation
4. Employer's Name and Address U.S. House of Representatives, Select Committee on Assassinations
Washington, D.C. 20515

Rebecca Whiteley Martin
(Signature of authorized official) 2720

Jan. 27, 1977
(Date)

Rebecca W. Martin
(Person who may be contacted)

225-2980
(Phone No.)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Claire L. Brown	December 29, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$15,[illegible]

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code___________
Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Claire L. Brown
Signature of Employee

Jan. 10, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10318
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10318

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/15/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BROWN, WILLIAM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BROWN, William
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 8-15-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
4	4

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					5	5	
Feb.																																1	1					6	6	
Mar.																																1	1					7	7	
Apr.																																1	1					8	8	
May																																1	1					9	9	
June									X																				X	X		1	1	10	10	3		9	10	
July					X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X																		1	1	8	11	8		0	11	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/15/78

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨/ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.) — Date — Chief's Signature — Date

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
William Brown	7/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
098-20-3132	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00 as of ______________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
William Brown	8/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
098 20 3182	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations Committee	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Investigator	$24,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_______Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 16,1977, 19_____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Professor G. Robert Blakey

FROM: Cliff Fenton

DATE: August 15, 1977

RE: Recommendations for employment - William Brown

It is recommended that Mr. William Brown be hired immediately to the position of Senior Investigator at a salary of $24,000 per annum. Having obtained the highest rank of Detective First Grade in the New York City Police Department, Detective Bureau, his experience has been extensive in all areas of criminal investigation.

Mr. Brown's long range of experience will be beneficial to our investigation and will be an asset to the JFK Task Force.

O.K.
8-15-77

APPROVED: ______________________________
Kenneth D. Klein
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

William [illegible]
Signature of Employee

8/13/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10319
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10319

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/15/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BURAS, ROBERT C. JR.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 16, 1978

Dear Bob:

As you probably know, because the Committee is winding down, the decision has been made to terminate L. J.'s services as of October 31.

I'm sure that you are wondering how you stand salary-wise with the Committee because of the duplicate salary payments from the New Orleans Police Department.

The following are my calculations of how you stand.

You were hired August 15, 1977 at an annual salary of $24,000.00 and taken off the payroll February 28, 1978. Your W-2 statement for 1977 gave a salary of $16,637.46 from the New Orleans Police Department. The monthly amount would be $1,386.46 ($16,637.46 ÷ 12). Prorating this amount would give $9,058.21 while on the payroll of the Committee ($1,386.46 per month for the period August 15, 1977 to February 28, 1978).

You have been due $613.54 per month from the Committee since March 1, 1978 (the difference between your Committee salary of $2,000.00 per month and $1,386.46). Dividing $613.54 into $9,058.21 (the overpayment referred to above) would carry you almost 15 months or until June 1, 1979.

According to the affidavit from your payroll supervisor, your base pay during the period you have been with the Committee is $1,273.00 per month. If we use this lower figure instead of the $1,386.46 which I got by dividing the amount on your W-2 by 12 and I went through the same calculations as above, the overpayment would carry you about 11½ months or until February 15, 1979.

Either way, the duplicate payment by the New Orleans Police Department for the period August 15, 1977 to February 28, 1978 is more than enough to carry you through December 31, 1978 without any further payments from the Committee.

Please give me a call if you have any questions or dispute any of my figures.

Sincerely yours,

Tom

THOMAS HOWARTH
Budget Officer

TH:ht

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS

DEPARTMENT OF POLICE

P. O. Box 51480
New Orleans, La. 70151

"to protect and to serve"

ERNEST "DUTCH" MORIAL
MAYOR

CLARENCE B. GIARRUSSO
SUPERINTENDENT

June 6, 1978

During the period of August 15, 1977 through December 31,1977, Lieutenant Robert Buras, Jr. earned a base pay of $1273.00.

Respestfully Submitted,

Sgt. Albert Lawless

SGT. ALBERT C. LAWLESS
Commander, Payroll Division

ACL/da

An Equal Opportunity Employer

CITY OF NEW ORLEANS. 72-6000969W
DIRECTOR OF FINANCE 69-0720265 001
ROOM 3W02 CITY HALL St. 360704009
NEW OREANS, LA. 70112

Type or print EMPLOYER'S name, address, ZIP code and Federal identifying number

Wage and Tax Statement 1977

State form number	**Copy C** For employee's records	
City form number	Employer's State identifying number	

Employee's social security number	1 Federal income tax withheld	2 Wages, tips, and other compensation	3 FICA employee tax withheld	4 Total FICA wages
[illegible]-7116	2,849.64	15,[illegible]		

Type or print Employee's name, address, and ZIP code below.

1422-1-A1

ROBERT BURAS JR.
1032 CENTER ST
ARABI LA 70032

5 Was employee covered by a qualified pension plan, etc.?	6	7
8 State or local tax withheld 176.29	9 State or local wages	10 State or locality LA.
11 City or local tax withheld	12 City or local wages	13 City or locality
UNIF. 1200.00 COMP. 566.00		

Form **W—2** This information is being furnished to the Internal Revenue Service. APPROVED I.R.S. Department of the Treasury—Internal Revenue service 13-2678063

#1-2,849.64 #2-16,637.86

Sorry about the weak copy!

Bob Buras

Oct. 30, 1978

Dear Tom:

I recieved your letter of Oct. 16, 1978 and agree with your last figures which indicate my base pay as $1,273.00 per month. The W-2 form includes overtime and uniform allowances that are not subject to Committee Consideration. This still leaves me paid until Feb. 15, 1979. This is not accurate due to insufficient data given to you.

The following will explain my present position.

The City of New Orleans allows employees to accrue annual leave at the rate of 21 days per year (1 3/4 per month). This annual leave can be accumulated for a maximim of 90 days and be carried from one year to the next. In 1977 I ended the year with 102 days of which 12 days was dropped from the rolls due to committee employment. These are all working days, for each five totaled I recieve 2 days off, similar to a week end. In 1978 I will lose 21 days (working) from the rolls. This is 33 working days or 6 weeks and 3 days (33 ÷ 5= 6 X 7 + 3 =45).

The 33 days from the City amounts to $1,937.66 at $7.34 per hour. This amount does not take into account the number of weeks nor the 14 days annual leave that the committee would allow. The total consecutive days would be 45 + 14 = 59. This would be one day short of two months at $2,000.00 per month from the Committee. You can see that this could get into an accountant problem.

I am suggesting that the Committee not pay me anything further in salary but that I be given the above stated time off. I would like to be off from Nov. 15 thru Dec 31. 1978. I would still be avialable to get needed information to help write the report (if the Committee continues my phone service)

I am not an accountant and would rather not get into the dollars and cents involved. The time off would be a practical solution in my opinion.

I will talk with you and Cliff further about this matter.

Sincerely In Christ

Robert Buras
Staff Investigator

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert P. Buras, Jr.	2/28/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-48-7116	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 379 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 7, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert P. Buras, Jr.	8/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438 48 7116	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations Committee	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff – ☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority – H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 16, 1977, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Professor G. Robert Blakey

FROM: Cliff Fenton

DATE: August 15, 1977

RE: Recommendation for employment - Robert P. Buras, Jr.

It is recommended that Robert P. Buras, Jr. be hired for appointment to the position of Senior Investigator at a salary of $24,000 per annum effective this date. Even though his homicide investigatory experience is limited, his experiences in law enforcement would be beneficial to our investigation.

Mr. Buras, who is a Lieutenant, has been with the New Orleans Police Department for eighteen (18) years. He appeared to be a loyal and committed person and showed a strong desire to join the JFK Task Force. He is presently in New Orleans, Louisiana and will be stationed thereat.

APPROVED: Kenneth D. Klein
Kenneth D. Klein
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel

O.K.
GRB
8-15-77

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10320
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10320

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/22/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
BURFORD, JUDITH R.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

BURFORD, Judith
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
6-22-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
2	6

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																S															
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.												S																			
May																			X											X	X
June	X	X																					S								
July					X	X	X	X	X			S																			
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 7/15/78

Month	Accrued This Month		Available This Month		Used This Month		Balance at Close of Month		Employee Initials
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	3	7		1	3	6	
Feb.	1	1					4	7	
Mar.	1	1					5	8	
Apr.	1	1				1	6	8	
May	1	1	7	9	3		4	9	
June	1	1	5	10	2	1	3	9	
July	1	1	4	10	4	2	0	7	
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.) Date

Chief's Signature Date

Approved: Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Judith R. Burford	7/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
414-98-4025	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________________

ID __________________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Judith R. Burford	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
414-98-4025	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Document Clerk	$14,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Judith R. Burford	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
414-98-4025	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Judith R. Burford	6/22/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
414 98 4025	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Document Clerk	$10,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 28, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

June 27, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth
Budget Officer

FROM: Donovan L. Gay
Chief Researcher

Donovan L. Gay (mcp)

RE: Judith Burford - Document Clerk

Effective today, June 27, 1977, Ms. Judith Burford is now on board as a member of the Research/Document Unit.

Ms. Burford has received the approval of Chairman Stokes and the authorization of Mr. Blakey.

She will be working in the capacity as Document Clerk for the King Research Team at a salary of $10,000 per annum.

BURFORD

MEMORANDUM

June 16, 1977

TO: Tom Lambeth
Acting Staff Director

FROM: Donovan L. Gay
Chief Researcher
Donovan Gay (mcp)

RE: Judith Burford - Document Clerk

Simply to advise you that Ms. Judith Burford has been interviewed by Gerald Hamilton, Jackie Hess, Steve Fallis, Tiny Hutton, and myself for the position of Document Clerk for the Research/Document Unit-MLK Task Force.

Ms. Burford qualifies for this position and it is unanimously agreed that she come on board on Tuesday, June 21, 1977, at a salary of $10,000. Additionally, Ms. Burford comes highly recommended by Congressman Harold Ford.

Thank you for your attention to this recommendation.

mcp

OK

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Judith [illegible]
Signature of Employee

June 28, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10321
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10321

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORD

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/18/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Oliver J. Champion	8/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
086-46-9505	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 14, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID _________________________

Benefits _______________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Oliver J. Champion	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
086-46-9505	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Clerical Assistant	$12,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Oliver J. Champion	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
086-46-9506	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Clerical Assistant	$11,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Oliver J. Champion	8/18/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
086-46-9506	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerical Assistant	$9,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 22, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

Oliver J. Champion
Signature of Employee

Aug. 18, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10322
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 14

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10322

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/29/76
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
CHARDAK, BURTON A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

CHARDAK, B.A. ✓
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number | Level | Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
11-29-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	1

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					2	2	
Feb.																																1	1					3	3	
Mar.																																1	1					4	4	
Apr.																																1	1					5	5	
May																																1	1					6	6	
June																				A												1	1	76	76	1		67	7	
July															A						X	X			X	X	X	X	X			1	1	7	8	7		0	8	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/31/77

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature ________ Date ________
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature ________ Date ________

Approved: ________ Clerk of the House ________ Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Burton A. Chardak	7/31/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194 13 8264	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Public Information Officer	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

To: Thomas Howarth
From: Bob Blakey GRB
Date: July 11, 1977 7-11-77
Re: Terminations

The Public Information Office is being abolished, therefore, the services of Burt Chardak and Ty Roberts will no longer be needed.

Please schedule their termination for July 31, 1977 including any accumulated vacation.

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

July 8, 1977

Finance Office
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

To whom it may concern:

Please note changes of address for these Committee employees:

Maurice Israel (128 20 8996)
2601 South Glebe Road, Apt. 2600-1A
Arlington, VA 22206

Burton A. Chardak (194 18 8264)
120 South Reynolds
Apartment L-509
Alexandria, VA 22304

Thank you.

Sincerely,

Rebecca W. Martin

Rebecca W. Martin
Chief Clerk

rwm

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Burton A. Chardak	6/26/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194 18 8264	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Burton A. Chardak	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194 18 8264	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Burton A. Chardak	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194-18-8264	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$20,910.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Burton A. Chardak	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194 18 8264	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$22,100.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________________________, 19 77 ________________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Burton A. Chardak	11/29/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
194 10 8264	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Public Information Officer	$34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

- hand carried to
FO 11/30/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓ ________________

I am related by the following relationship ________________

Burton A. Chardak
Signature of Employee

Jan 10, 1977
Date

The Evening and Sunday Bulletin
30TH AND MARKET STREETS PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101
Serving the Greater Philadelphia and South Jersey Area

RESUME

Burton A. Chardak
620 Hermit st.,
Phila., Penna. 19128
Telephone: IV 3-5411

Birth date and place: Jan. 12, 1925, Phila., Pa.

Marital status: Married with three children (one married and living in San Francisco, one studying at Temple Abroad in Rome, one in the last year of high school.)

Ability to relocate: House is sold with settlement in June. I could move to Washington within two weeks, family would follow in June.

Education: Bachelor of Science degree with major in journalism and minor in economics, Temple University, February, 1951; master of arts degree in economics, Temple, June, 1955. Six months of general college work at Kutztown State Teachers College while in service; several courses in economics of Latin America while at Mexico City College and several noncredit courses in statistics at Temple. Thesis was on The Business Cycle and Unemployment.

Service: Two years, ten months, Army Air Corps. Honorable discharge.

Work record: Editor of both Suburban Press and Mount Airy Hearld from February, 1951, to April, 1952.

Evening and Sunday Bulletin from April, 1952, to present in various capacities: Started in financial department as clerk and reporter. After three years transferred to city desk as police reporter, night rewrite and general assignment. Later assigned to courts and district attorney's office. Then was reporter at large, making own assignments.

The Evening and Sunday Bulletin

30TH AND MARKET STREETS PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101

Serving the Greater Philadelphia and South Jersey Area

Next, I was assigned to Harrisburg to cover the State Legislature for a year and a half, worked on a team investigating political payoffs and contributions . Then became "idea man"

for about a year. My best idea was to go to Europe and cover the American troops during peacetime. Then I asked for and got an assignment to Vietnam where I wrote a series of articles just as the United States was getting heavily involved. Also wrote a series about the peace-keeping forces in Cyprus.

Assigned as an assistant city editor to the copy desk, filling in as deputy city editor. Headed a Bulletin investigative reporting team that "broke" the FHA scandal in Philadelphia and resulted in a federal grand jury.

Was sent to a city editor's seminar at American Press Institute, then at Columbia University, and a short while later was appointed deputy city editor, in charge of assigning most news stories. In that capacity I also helped train young writers and reporters. Then assigned to the national desk, which handles Washington, national and international news. Started a weekly column called World in Conflict.

Outside the Bulletin, I did some freelance work. Most

notably I was Philadelphia area correspondent for Time and Fortune in 1957, worked part time at the N. Y. Daily News in

1968, wrote a number of articles for Philadelphia magainze.

Honors and awards: First prize for court reporting from the Pennsylvania Newspaper Publishers Association; National Certificate of Merit, Amvets, 1965, for the Vietnam series. Served as treasurer,

Pen and Pencil club and vice president and director, Phila. Press Association.

The Evening and Sunday Bulletin

30TH AND MARKET STREETS PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101

Serving the Greater Philadelphia and South Jersey Area

34

November 18, 1976

Dear Dick:

I've been following the progress of the House Select Committee on Assassinations and its chief counsel as well as newspaper and wire service stories permit.

I gather, at least from a Newhouse News Service report, that the committee unanimously has agreed to support your request for a staff of 170 but that the actual funding will not follow until after January 1.

If that's the case, and you can use me now, I'd like to come to Washington and get involved as early as possible. I think I can be more effective in the role of press liaison officer if I arrive on the scene before the great bulk of the staff.

I have received a formal letter from Bulletin management confirming an extended leave of absence. But this does not preclude a short-term leave. Even if Congress ultimately refuses to fund the investigations fully and they are cut short, I feel I could return to the Bulletin without loss of face or funds. The experience of working for even a few weeks or months with the committee would be worth the effort.

Also, even though I would move to Washington immediately, Shirley and Sharon would remain in Philadelphia to June 30. I , therefore, would not get involved with a long-term lease until the summer. So, if the investigations are terminated early, there would be little financial hardship on my part.

The Evening and Sunday Bulletin
30TH AND MARKET STREETS PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101
Serving the Greater Philadelphia and South Jersey Area

I understand that you are extremely busy at this point, preparing a budget and interviewing prospective staff members. But I would appreciate a call at your convenience.

I am somewhat anxious since several of the AP stories mention "a spokesman for Sprague." I recall that you mentioned a temporary press secretary, aide to Rep. Thomas N. Downing. My concern is that he may become permanent.

Best regards,

Burt Chardak

Burt

The Evening and Sunday Bulletin
30TH AND MARKET STREETS PHILADELPHIA, PA. 19101
Serving the Greater Philadelphia and South Jersey Area

Oct. 28, 1976

Dear Dick:

Here is my resume.

I'm also happy to tell you that The Bulletin has granted me an extended leave of absence. In fact, management, I am told, was "thrilled" with the idea.

The leave was granted in record time. This was a surprise. I thought it would take weeks of negotiation. That's why I went ahead and requested it now instead of waiting.

Of course, I explained in writing to The Bulletin that if for some reason the House does not provide sufficient funds for the dual investigation, the deal is off.

Now that The Bulletin has been apprised of the situation, I feel very little notice is required. This means I could start as your press secretary soon after things are worked out with the House committee.

I hope that is soon. I am anxious to get involved as early as possible.

Meanwhile, I'm reading extensively in the Kennedy-King literature. I'm also meeting with an old friend, the press officer for the Federal Energy Administration here, to get some ideas about dealing with the media from the other side of the fence.

I will be in Washington, Monday and Tuesday, Nov. 8 and 9, to attend information seminars with my daughter, Sharon, at the three universities. As I told you, she plans to go to Georgetown, American or George Washington.

If it's all right with you, I'd like to stop into the temporary offices of the House Select Committee on Assassinations when I'm down there.

Meanwhile, best regards,

Burt

B. A. Chaddak
120 S. Reynolds
L-509
Alexandria Va
22304

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10324
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10324

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/29/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
COLLINS, WENDY S.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 5, 1978

The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Effective December 1, 1978, the official duty station of Ms. Wendy Collins has been changed from Washington, D. C. to Pittsford, Vermont. This change will remain in effect through the balance of the 95th Congress.

Sincerely,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:th

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Wendy S. Collins	December 20, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
024-44-5163	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 150 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978, 19_____

_______________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

_______________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

_______________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________

ID ______________

Benefits ______________

Payroll ______________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Wendy S. Collins	December 29, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
024-44-5163	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Research Attorney	$18,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

ab

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of _____________________________

ID _______________________

Benefits _______________________

Payroll _______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ball-point pen to make legible copies.

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM
(Read instructions on back of page 3.)

New Carrier's Control No. 22933820

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

Old Carrier's Control No.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Collins Wendy S
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 03 DAY 22 YEAR 53
3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? Yes ☐ 1 No ☒ 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET): 1630 Hobart St, N.W.
(CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE): WASHington D.C. 20009
5. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER: 024-44-5163
6. SEX: MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☒ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT. ALSO SEE BACK OF PAGES 2 AND 3.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for Self Only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for Self and Family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: Blue Cross/Blue Shield Service Benefit Plan
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): HIGH
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 1 0 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) **DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.**

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2 WHICHEVER APPLIES:

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM. ☐
2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

If you elect to cancel be sure to read "Cancellation of Enrollment" on back of page 3.

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR REGISTRATION.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE.

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN
2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. (See table on back of page 2 for proper number.)
3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Wendy S Collins
(YOUR SIGNATURE. DO NOT PRINT)

Aug 5, 1978
(DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or wilful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both. (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

U.S. House of Representatives
Office of Finance, Washington, D.C. 20515

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO. 00004832
5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

2809-115-01

Page 1 — To Payroll Office

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
November 1972

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ball-point pen to make legible copies.

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

(Read instructions on back of page 3.)

New Carrier's Control No. 22933820

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

Old Carrier's Control No

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Collins Wendy S
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 03 DAY 22 YEAR 53
3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? Yes ☐ 1 No ☑ 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET): 1630 Hobart St, N.W
(CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE): WASHington D.C. 20009
5. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER: 024-44-5763
6. SEX: MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☑ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT. ALSO SEE BACK OF PAGES 2 AND 3.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for Self Only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for Self and Family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN: Blue Cross/Blue Shield Service Benefit Plan
OPTION (HIGH OR LOW): HIGH
ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER: 1 0 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) **DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.**

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2 WHICHEVER APPLIES.

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM ☐
2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW: ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

If you elect to cancel be sure to read "Cancellation of Enrollment" on back of page 3.

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR REGISTRATION.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE.

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN
2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. (See table on back of page 2 for proper number.)
3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Wendy S Collins
(YOUR SIGNATURE - DO NOT PRINT)

Aug 5, 1978
(DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or wilful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

U.S. House of Representatives
Office of Finance, Washington, D.C. 20515

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO. 00004832
5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

Page 2 — To Insurance Carrier

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil Service Commission

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ball-point pen to make legible copies.

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM

FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM

(Read instructions on back of page 3.)

New Carrier's Control No. 22933820

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

Old Carrier's Control No.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): Collin, Wendy S

2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH 03 DAY 22 YEAR 53

3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? Yes ☐ 1 No ☒ 2

4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET): 1630 Hobart St, N.W

(CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE): Washington D.C 20009

5. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER: [illegible]

6. SEX MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☒ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT. ALSO SEE BACK OF PAGES 2 AND 3.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for Self Only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for Self and Family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
Blue Cross/Blue Shield Service Benefit Plan	HIGH	1 0 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) **DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.**

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2 WHICHEVER APPLIES:

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM. ☐

2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number

If you elect to cancel be sure to read "Cancellation of Enrollment" on back of page 3.

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR REGISTRATION.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE.

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN

2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. (See table on back of page 2 for proper number.)

3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE. MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

Wendy S Collin — Aug 5, 1978

(YOUR SIGNATURE- DO NOT PRINT) (DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or wilful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE

U.S. House of Representatives
Office of Finance, Washington, D.C. 20515

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE

3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION

4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO. 00001832

5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

Page 3 — For Official Personnel Folder

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1

If typewriter is not available, bear down with ball-point pen to make legible copies.

HEALTH BENEFITS REGISTRATION FORM
FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM
(Read instructions on back of page 3.)

New Carrier's Control No. 22933820

Best image possible.

TO EMPLOYING OFFICE: SHOW OLD CARRIER'S CONTROL NUMBER ONLY IF ELECTION IS TO CANCEL ENROLLMENT OR TO CHANGE OPTIONS OR TYPE OF ENROLLMENT IN THE SAME PLAN.

Old Carrier's Control No.

PART A

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

1. NAME (LAST) (FIRST) (MIDDLE INITIAL): C[illegible] [illegible] S
2. DATE OF BIRTH (Use numbers): MONTH [illegible] DAY 22 YEAR [illegible]
3. ARE YOU NOW MARRIED? Yes ☐ 1 No ☒ 2
4. YOUR MAILING ADDRESS (NUMBER AND STREET): [illegible] St. NW
(CITY) (STATE) (ZIP CODE): [illegible]
5. SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER: [illegible]
6. SEX MALE ☐ 1 FEMALE ☒ 2

IMPORTANT

IT IS ILLEGAL FOR AN EMPLOYEE OR A MEMBER OF HIS FAMILY TO BE COVERED UNDER MORE THAN ONE ENROLLMENT. IF YOU ARE ALREADY COVERED THROUGH THE FAMILY ENROLLMENT OF ANOTHER FEDERAL OR DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA EMPLOYEE OR ANNUITANT YOU MUST REGISTER NOT TO ENROLL OR THE OTHER ENROLLMENT MUST BE CANCELED OR CHANGED TO SELF ONLY. SIMILARLY, IF A FAMILY MEMBER LISTED BY YOU IN PART B IS COVERED THROUGH HIS (OR HER) OWN ENROLLMENT, YOU CANNOT ELECT A FAMILY ENROLLMENT UNLESS THE FAMILY MEMBER CANCELS HIS (OR HER) ENROLLMENT. ALSO SEE BACK OF PAGES 2 AND 3.

PART B

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH TO ENROLL OR CHANGE YOUR ENROLLMENT IN A HEALTH BENEFITS PLAN.

If enrollment is for Self Only, answer item 1. If enrollment is for Self and Family, also answer item 2.

IF YOU ARE CHANGING YOUR ENROLLMENT ALSO FILL IN PART D.

1. I elect to enroll in a health benefits plan as shown below. I authorize deductions from my salary, compensation, or annuity to cover my share of the cost of the enrollment. (Copy the information requested below from back page of brochure of the plan you select.)

NAME OF PLAN	OPTION (HIGH OR LOW)	ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER
[illegible]	Hi[illegible]	1 | 0 | 1

2. In space below list all eligible family members without exception: List your wife or husband first, then your unmarried children under age 22, including (a) legally adopted children and (b) stepchildren, foster children, and illegitimate children who live with you in a regular parent-child relationship. Include also any unmarried child over 22 who became disabled before age 22 and who, because of the disability, is incapable of self-support. (Attach a doctor's certificate for a disabled child age 22 or over, if one is not already on file.) **DO NOT LIST PARENTS OR OTHERS WHO ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FAMILY MEMBERS. THEY WILL NOT RECEIVE BENEFITS, EVEN IF THEY ARE DEPENDENT ON YOU AND ARE LISTED.**

NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)	NAMES OF FAMILY MEMBERS	DATE OF BIRTH (Month, Day, Year)
Wife or Husband	1		6
	2		7
	3		8
	4		9
	5		10

PART C

FILL IN THIS PART IF YOU WISH NOT TO ENROLL OR IF YOU WISH TO CANCEL YOUR ENROLLMENT.

PLACE AN "X" IN ITEM 1 OR 2 WHICHEVER APPLIES:

1. I ELECT NOT TO ENROLL IN A PLAN UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES HEALTH BENEFITS PROGRAM. ☐
2. I ELECT TO CANCEL MY PRESENT ENROLLMENT UNDER THE CODE NUMBER SHOWN BELOW: ☐

Present Enrollment Code Number:

If you elect to cancel be sure to read "Cancellation of Enrollment" on back of page 3.

PART D

FILL IN THIS PART, AS WELL AS PART B, TO CHANGE YOUR REGISTRATION.

ANSWER ITEMS 1, 2, AND 3 TO SHOW ENROLLMENT CODE BEING CHANGED AND ELIGIBILITY FOR CHANGE.

1. ENROLLMENT CODE NUMBER OF PRESENT PLAN:
2. NUMBER OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE (See table on back of page 2 for proper number.):
3. DATE OF EVENT WHICH PERMITS CHANGE: MONTH DAY YEAR

PART E

ALL WHO REGISTER MUST FILL IN THIS PART.

(YOUR SIGNATURE- DO NOT PRINT)

Aug 5 - 78
(DATE)

WARNING.—Any intentional false statement in this application or wilful misrepresentation relative thereto is a violation of the law punishable by a fine of not more than $10,000 or imprisonment of not more than 5 years, or both (18 U.S.C. 1001.)

PART F

TO BE COMPLETED BY AGENCY

1. NAME AND ADDRESS (INCLUDING ZIP CODE) OF EMPLOYING OFFICE:
U.S. House of Representatives
Office of Finance, Washington, D.C. [illegible]

(SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED AGENCY OFFICIAL)

2. DATE RECEIVED IN EMPLOYING OFFICE:
3. EFFECTIVE DATE OF ELECTION:
4. PAYROLL OFFICE NO.: [illegible]
5. SF 2811 REPORT NO.:

REMARKS

FOR USE ONLY BY AGENCY.

2809-115-01

Page 4 — To Enrollee

Standard Form No. 2809
U.S. Civil Service Commission
FPM Supplement 890-1
November 1972

PAYROLL INFORMATION FORM AND PERSONNEL AFFIDAVIT

PLEASE USE TYPEWRITER OR PRINT IN INK

CODE:
Finance Office Use Only

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Name Collins, Wendy Susan (Last—First—Middle)

Employing Office U.S. House Select Committee on Assassinations

Social Security No. 024-44-5163

Date of birth 03-22-53 (Month—Day—Year)

ADDRESSES

Mailing address for withholding tax statement:

1630 Hobart St, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20009

Mailing address for payroll check (Bank, home, [✓ office], etc.):

Select Committee on Assassinations
House Annex #2 - RM
WASH, D.C. 20515

FINANCE OFFICE USE ONLY
Bank Code:

Bank Account No.
(Do not insert Bank Account Number unless check is to be mailed to a bank)

PREVIOUS FEDERAL CIVILIAN SERVICE

☐ House of Representatives—Office of Select Committee on Assassinations

Separation date of last service July 31, 78

☐ Other Federal Departments (including Senate and Architect)

Agency

Separation date of last service

☐ Name (if different from present signature)

While employed as above I was covered by:

Federal Employees' Health Insurance: ☑ enrolled; ☐ not enrolled; ☐ excluded.

Federal Employees' Life Insurance: ☐ optional; ☐ regular; ☑ waived; ☐ excluded.

ELECTION OF RETIREMENT COVERAGE

Coverage under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act is extended to employees of the House of Representatives on a voluntary basis. Once you have elected this coverage and retirement deductions have been withheld, such deductions cannot be discontinued so long as you are continuously employed under the Act.

Check the appropriate box to the right:

I elect coverage under the provisions of the Civil Service Retirement Act and request that deductions begin at the earliest possible date. (If you have had previous Federal or Military service, please submit dates, Agencies and Military Serial Number on a separate sheet.) YES ☑

I do not wish to elect coverage under the Retirement Act at this time. NO ☐

(Note: Legislative employees are not covered by the Social Security Act.)

Wendy S. Collins
(Signature)

(Over)

16—82058-1

District of Columbia ~~(or State of)~~ ss:

I do solemnly swear (or affirm)—

(1) That ☑ I am a citizen of the United States;
☐ if in the service on the date of enactment of the latest General Government Matters Appropriation Act, and being eligible for citizenship, I had theretofore filed a declaration of intention to become a citizen;
☐ I owe allegiance to the United States;
☐ I am an alien from Poland or the Baltic countries lawfully admitted to the United States for permanent residence;
☐ I am a citizen of the Republic of the Philippines;
☐ I am a national of a country allied with the United States in the current defense effort;

(2) That my acceptance and holding of office or employment with the U.S. House of Representatives does not or (if this affidavit is executed by me prior to my acceptance of such office or employment) will not constitute a violation of the first section of the Act of August 9, 1955 (5 U.S.C. 7311), which reads as follows:

> No person shall accept or hold office or employment in the Government of the United States or any agency thereof, including wholly owned Government corporations, who—
> (1) advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the United States;
> (2) is a member of an organization that advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government in the United States, knowing that such organization so advocates;
> (3) participates in any strike or asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or such agency; or
> (4) is a member of an organization of Government employees that asserts the right to strike against the Government of the United States or such agencies, knowing that such organization asserts such right;

(3) That I ☐ am ☒ am not receiving a pension, annuity, or retired pay from the United States Government (if so, please furnish source and claim number);

(Name and location of administering agency) (Claim number)

(4) That this Payroll Information Form and Personnel Affidavit is complete, true, and correct;

(5) That I will support and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I take this obligation freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and that I will well and faithfully discharge the duties of the office on which I am about to enter; So help me God.

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

Wendy S Collins
(Signature of employee)

31st day of July, 1978

Elizabeth L. Berney
Notary Public.

~~State of~~ District of Columbia

NOTARY SEAL

My commission expires 9-15-82

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—82058-1

U.S. House of Representatives
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
OFFICE OF FINANCE

IMPORTANT NOTICE TO EMPLOYEE

Newly employed personnel must execute the attached combined PAYROLL INFORMATION FORM and PERSONNEL AFFIDAVIT properly and submit them to the Office of Finance, where a Notary Public is on duty to perform this service without charge. DO NOT SIGN PERSONNEL AFFIDAVIT UNTIL BEFORE A NOTARY.

Currently employed personnel wishing to make changes in their records need only complete the pertinent section of the PAYROLL INFORMATION FORM, indicate their employing office, and affix their signature. Please be certain that information is legible enough for the Finance Office to identify the individual making the change.

DETACH AND RETAIN THIS NOTICE

Salary payments are made by check monthly and mailed to the address designated on the Payroll Information Form. Checks are disbursed from the Office of Finance to normally reach the addressee on the last working day of each month.

For additional information, contact the Office of Finance, 263 Cannon Office Building, Telephone Extension 56515 or 57064.

EMPLOYEE BENEFITS

RETIREMENT: An employee of the House of Representatives is eligible to join the Federal Civil Service Retirement System. Participation is voluntary, and action to elect retirement coverage may be initiated at any time by completing the appropriate section of the Payroll Information Form. Once an election is filed and the normal deduction of 7½ percent of the gross salary commences, the employee cannot discontinue deductions so long as he is continuously employed. (Note: Legislative employees are not covered by the Social Security Act.)

LIFE INSURANCE: An employee is automatically covered under the Federal Employees' Group Life Insurance Act unless he waives or subsequently cancels such coverage by filing the required waiver form with the Office of Finance. The insurance coverage is $10,000; or an amount equal to the gross annual salary, rounded to the next higher thousand dollars (if the salary is not a multiple of a thousand dollars), plus an additional two thousand dollars; whichever is the greater. Additional optional insurance coverage in the amount of $10,000 is also available.

HEALTH BENEFITS: The Federal Employees' Health Benefits Program is available on a voluntary basis with costs partly financed by the Government. Within 31 days after the effective date of appointment, every employee must register to enroll in a plan or not to enroll. Future opportunities to enroll or to change the type of enrollment are shown in the enclosed pamphlet. Also enclosed is the necessary registration form, Standard Form 2809.

U.S. SAVINGS BONDS: Monthly deductions for bonds in regular bond denominations may be authorized. Authorization cards are available in the Finance Office.

WORK INJURY BENEFITS: An employee injured or incurring disease as a result of performance of duty is entitled to medical care and monetary benefits under the provisions of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act. In instances where such injury or disease is fatal, the employee's family is entitled to monetary benefits. The Compensation Act is administered by the Bureau of Employees' Compensation, U.S. Department of Labor. Forms for filing notices of injury and claims for compensation are available in the Office of Finance or from any Postmaster.

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION: An employee may under certain circumstances be entitled to unemployment compensation if discharged or otherwise separated from his employment. The compensation is usually payable by the State (including the District of Columbia) in which the employee had his last service. However, a claim for benefits may be filed in the local office nearest the employee's residence. If an employee is discharged for misconduct, quits voluntarily without good cause, or refuses a suitable job without good cause, then there is a period of disqualification which varies from State to State. The amount of payments and period of time payable also varies from State to State.

16—82058-1

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel

DATE: December 19, 1977

RE: Ms. Wendy Collins

Please be advised that Ms. Wendy Collins has accepted the position of Senior Attorney Researcher with the Select Committee on Assassinations. Her effective starting date will be December 29, 1977 and her starting salary will be $18,000.00.

Your full cooperation will be appreciated in familiarizing her with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Wendy S Collins
Signature of Employee

29 Dec 77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10325
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

eleased under the John F.
ennedy Assassination
ecords Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
ase#:NW 88326 Date:
025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10325

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/15/76
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
CONNOR, LINDA M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

THOMAS N. DOWNING, VA., CHAIRMAN

HENRY B. GONZALEZ, TEX.
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
LOUIS STOKES, OHIO
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
BURT L. TALCOTT, CALIF.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3341 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 18, 1977

Mr. Richard A. Sprague
Chief Counsel and Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations

Dear Mr. Sprague:

I am herewith submitting my resignation as of March 20, 1977. I intend to work this weekend to complete my assignment prior to joining a Congressional staff on March 21, 1977.

I have enjoyed working with you and wish you and the Committee success.

Sincerely,

Linda M. Connor

Linda M. Connor

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Linda Mae Connor	3/26/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231 53 8079	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations Committee	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 21, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

to FO 3/24/77

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Linda Mae Connor	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231-58-8079	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$12,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Linda Mae Connor	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
[illegible] 231 58 3079	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$13,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________________________, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Linda Mae Connor	12/15/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231 58 8079	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Editor/Historian	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

handcarried to FO 12/16/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976 ____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not elated ✓

I am elated by the following relationship ______________

Linda Mae Connor
signature of Employee

1/17/77
Date

RÉSUMÉ

Linda Mae Connor
4206 N. Washington Boulevard
Arlington, Virginia 22201
Office: (202) 225-4261
Home: (703) 525-8417

Age: 32
Birthplace: Hampton, Virginia
Marital Status: Legally separated (no children)

Skills: Type - 65 wpm Shorthand - 120 wpm

Education: Hampton High School (summa cum laude) - 1962
Univeristy of Maryland (magna cum laude) - 1973
B.A. in English (earned degree in evenings while employed full-time)
George Mason University - currently enrolled in M.A. program in English (anticipate degree in 1977)

Experience: July 5, 1967 - Present - Office of Congressman Thomas N. Downing, First District of Virginia

January 1973 - Present - Legislative Assistant to Congressman Thomas N. Downing of the First District of Virginia. Have responsibility for all legislative matters in the Congressman's office. Act as liaison for the Congressman for his committees which are Merchant Marine and Fisheries and Science and Technology. Review all legislative proposals and advise the Congressman of his District's interests. Meet with all lobbyists for the Congressman, explain his views on issues and summarize and transmit interest groups' positions to him. Formulate statements of positions, respond to all constituents' legislative inquiries. Issue news releases to media for legislative matters. Compose statements for House Floor and committee testimony; draft legislative speeches; correct committee hearing transcripts. Accompany or represent the Congressman at various professional and social functions involving his committee assignments and District interests. Supervise legislative personnel.

January 1970 - January 1973 - Worked directly for Congressman Downing on special projects and assisted all others in accomplishing the tasks of the office. Worked with the Administrative

Assistant on political matters. Have a thorough working knowledge of all aspects of a Congressional office, including office accounts, casework, governmental relations, special interests of Congressional District, etc.

June 1968 - January 1970 - Personal secretary to Congressman Downing's Administrative Assistant. Duties included political aspects of a Congressional office which involved campaigning in the District. Set up political files. Work involved all governmental installations in the District, primarily military.

July 1967 - June 1968 - During this first year in the Congressman's office, handled routine Congressional mail and constituent services. Acquired a general, overall knowledge of the operation of a Congressional office.

June 1966 - June 1967 - Employed by the Special Assistan to the Chief of Staff for Data Processing Systems, U. S. Army, Pentagon. Secretarial position for seven action officers. Duties included correspondence, dictation, typing, filing, and required detailed knowledge of Army correspondence and security procedures and regulations. The office had responsibility for data processing systems for budgetary and financial management programs. Secret clearance.

August 1962 - June 1966 - Employed by the Comptroller, USCONARC, Fort Monroe, Virginia. In addition to secretarial duties, I was Coordinator for the Cost Reduction Program for all installations and commands within the Continental United States for Data Processing Systems. This project had previously been the primary assignment of a GS-12. For handling the program I was awarded a Sustained Superior Performance Award.

References:	Congressman Thomas N. Downing	(202) 225-4261 - Office (804) 596-2188 - Home
	E. M. (Tiny) Hutton	(202) 225-4261

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10326
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10326

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
CONZELMAN, JAMES K.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-86-9756	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date Januagy 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________
ID ______________________
Benefits ______________________
Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-86-9756	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________(Specify Date))
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

________________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-86-9756	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438 86 9756	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438 86 9756	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$22,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
435 86 9756	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James K. Conzelman	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
S Researcher	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 22, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ________________

Jim Conzelman
Signature of Employee

1/17/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10327
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10327

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/03/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
COOPER, CYNTHIA S.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cynthia S. Cooper	December 2, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263-08-0234	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cynthia S. Cooper	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263-08-0234	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Document Control Clerk	$14,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 955 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits____________________

Payroll____________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Cynthia Sue Cooper	October 3, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
263-08-0234	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Control Clerk	$12,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 11, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: Charlie Mathews, Special Counsel J.C.M.
DATE: October 3, 1977
RE: Ms. Cindy Cooper

Ms. Cindy Cooper has accepted the position of Document Control Clerk with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her effective starting date will be October 3, 1977, and her starting salary will be $12,000.00 per annum.

Your full co-operation will be appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Cooper with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Cynthia Sue Cooper
Signature of Employee

10-3-77 cc
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10328
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10328

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/01/77
PAGES : 5

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
CORNWELL, GARY T.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gary T. Cornwell	January 1, 1979
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
460-74-1179	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$44,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gary T. Cornwell	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
460-74-1179	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$47,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 13, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gary T. Cornwell	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
460-74-1179	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Deputy Chief Counsel	$44,500.

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 1978 ________________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gary T. Cornwell	9/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
460 74 1179	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Counsel	$42,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Gary Cornwell
Signature of Employee

9/1/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10332
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

eleased under the John F.
ennedy Assassination
ecords Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
ase#:NW 88326 Date:
025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10332

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/27/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
DAY, CLARENCE J.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DAY, Clarence
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number | Level | Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD
1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT: 6-27-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE: .... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
6	6

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Accrued This Month Annual Leave	Accrued This Month Sick Leave	Available This Month Annual Leave	Available This Month Sick Leave	Used This Month Annual Leave	Used This Month Sick Leave	Balance at Close of Month Annual Leave	Balance at Close of Month Sick Leave	Employee Initials
Jan.																																1	1					7	7	
Feb.																																1	1					8	8	
Mar.																																1	1					9	9	
Apr.																																1	1					10	10	
May																																1	1					11	11	
June																											X	X	X	X		1	1	12		4		8	12	
July					X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X																		1	1	8	12	8		0	13	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/15/78

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.) | Date | Chief's Signature | Date

Approved: Clerk of the House | Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen).

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clarence J. Day	7/16/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
229-26-8374	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_____________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUISSSTOKES, CHAIRMAN
____
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: _________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll _____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clarence J. Day	6/27/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
229 26 8374	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 28, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

DAY

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Signature of Employee

6-29-77
Date

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Tom

I checked with Tanenbaum on Clarence Day and recommend #24.000 salary

Tom H.

DAY
6/27/77

MEMORANDUM

ok

TO: Louis Stokes, Chairman

FROM: Tom Lambeth, Acting Director TL

DATE: June 14, 1977

I recommend approval of Bob Tanenbaum's request that Clarence Day be hired for his task force. The hiring of Day will bring the number of investigators on the JFK task force to four (4).

effective 6/27/77 OK

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM LAMBETH
FROM: KENNETH D. KLEIN
DATE: JUNE 14, 1977
RE: CLARENCE DAY - INVESTIGATOR

It is my recommendation that Clarence Day be hired as an investigator for the JFK Task Force. His resume is very impressive and his long career as a law enforcement officer certainly qualifies him to be an investigator for this Committee.

Equally important were his reactions to the questions I posed to him. He came across as an intelligent man who is well versed in the law as it applies to the rights of individuals, and he impressed me as a man who would be a valuable member of our task force. — Fenton + Moriarty concur — RT

APPROVED: ____________________
Robert K. Tanenbaum

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10334
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 13

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10334

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/16/77
PAGES : 16

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
DINNEEN, EILEEN G.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 21, 1978

Hohorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
U.S.House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

For

Dear Mr. Chairman:

One of the Committee's employees, Eileen G. Dinneen, used her annual and sick leave in July, 1978 for maternity reasons.

Upon her return to work on August 1, 1978, she elected to work 25% of her time at 25% of her previous salary.

On September 1, 1978, the amount was raised in both instances to 50%. And then on December 1, 1978, she returned to full-time status to assist the Committee on the final report.

While the action on December 1, 1978 was duly approved, through some error the Committee's budget officer was not informed. Consequently, no payroll authorization form was processed to increase her salary.

I am now enclosing a payroll aothorization form to correct this error by increasing her salary to the proper amount of $16,100.00.

I would appreciate your approving this new authorization so that Mrs. Dinneen will receive the additional amount due her in the December, 1978 supplemental payroll.

Sent
Duplicate
12/21/78

Cordially,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:th

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—O—93-027

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen G. Dinneen	12-1-78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives) the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☒ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 21, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

ORIGINAL — To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen G. Dinneen	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 986 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 21, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen G. Dinneen	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

LOUIS STOKES
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen G. Dinneen	9/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$8,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen G. Dinneen	8/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$4,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 10, 1978

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

________________________ (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen G. Dinneen	6/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 7, 19 78

________________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________________ (Title - If Member, District and State)

________________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

________________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen Copeland	9/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462 88 1832	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen Copeland	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462-88-1832	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	13,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Eileen Gail Copeland	5/16/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
462 88 1832	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$11,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 16, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

taken to FO with other papers by EGC 5/17.

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Copeland

MEMORANDUM

AUGUST 23, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth

FROM: Donovan L. Gay

RE: Eileen Copeland

Pleaes be advised that effective today's date, August 23, 1977, Eileen G. Copeland is transferred from the clerical position she currently holds with the Kennedy Task Force, to a research position with the Kennedy Research/Document Unit.

Her salary is to be at $15,000 per annum.

Thank you.

↑

September 1, 1977

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM LAMBETH
FROM: ROBERT K. TANENBAUM
DATE: May 27, 1977
RE: SECRETARY FOR JFK TASK FORCE

On May 26, 1977, Ken Klein, Cliff Fenton and I interviewed Ilene Copeland.

This memorandum is to formally request that she be assigned as a secretary to the Kennedy Task Force as of Tuesday, May 31, 1977.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Eileen Copeland
Signature of Employee

5/26/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
         AGENCY : HSCA
  RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10335
  RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10335

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/01/78
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
DI PAOLO, PAUL A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. DiPaolo	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
354-42-1661	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. DiPaolo	August 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
354-42-1661	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Research Attorney	$26,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits____________

Payroll____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer ✓
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel

DATE: August 1, 1978

RE: Mr. Paul A. DiPaolo

Please be advised that Mr. Paul A. DiPaolo has joined the Select Committee staff as a Research Attorney. Mr. DiPaolo's primary responsibility will be to assist in the preparation of the final report.

His effective starting date will be August 1, 1978, and his starting salary will be $26,000.00 per annum.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10336
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10336

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/30/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
DOWNEY, JANE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane L. Downey	3/6/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
454-52-5820	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Rep. Harold S. Sawyer	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Assistant	9,984.72

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res._____of_____Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date_______February 13_____________, 1979

Harold S Sawyer
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Harold S. Sawyer
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

5th District - Michigan
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

ORIGINAL — To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane L. Downey	3/1/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
454-52-5820	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Rep. Harold S. Sawyer	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Assistant	45,576.60

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res._____of_____Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date_____February 13_____, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Harold S. Sawyer
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

5th District - Michigan
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

ORIGINAL — To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)
Jane L. Downey

Employee Social Security Number
454-52-5820

Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee
Rep. Harold S. Sawyer

Effective Date
2/1/79

Type of Action
☒ Appointment
☐ Salary Adjustment
☐ Title Change
☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________)
Specify Date

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Staff Assistant	9,984.72

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res._____of_____Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment o relatives.

Date______February 13__________, 1979___

Harold S Sawyer
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Harold S. Sawyer
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

5th District - Michigan
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, mu be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________
ID ______________________
Benefits ______________________
Payroll ______________________

(Revised, August 1,

ORIGINAL — To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane L. Downey	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
454-52-5820	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$18,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane L. Downey	December 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
454-52-5820	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1977

Louis Stokes
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ______

ID ______

Benefits ______

Payroll ______

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

Jane Reid Downey
Signature of Employee

12-30-77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: December 21, 1977

RE: Ms. Jane Downey

This memorandum is to advise you that Ms. Jane L. Downey has accepted the position of Secretary with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her starting date will be December ~~28~~ 30, 1977, and her starting salary will be $15,000.00.

Your cooperation will be greatly appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Downey with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10337
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10337

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/14/78
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
DOYLE, KEVIN SEAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

DOYLE, K. S. ✓
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number   Level   Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-14-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					1	1	
Feb.																																1	1					2	2	
Mar.																																1	1					3	3	
Apr.																																1	1					4	4	
May																																1	1					5	5	
June						X	X	X	X	X			S							S				S								1	1	6	6	5	3	1	3	
July					X																	A										1	1	2	4	1	0	1	4	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 8/16/77

[/] = 0.5 day annual leave
[X] = 1.0 day annual leave
[S/] = 0.5 day sick leave
[S] or [S/S] = 1.0 day sick leave
[A/] = 0.5 day administrative leave
[A] or [A/A] = 1.0 day administrative leave
[U/] = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
[U] or [U/U] = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
■ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)   Date   Chief's Signature   Date

Approved: ______________________ Clerk of the House   Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kevin Sean Doyle	8/16/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
077 48 6826	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations Committee	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information:)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Clerical Assistant	$9,500.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below:)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 17,1977 , 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Kevin Sean Doyle	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
077-48-6826	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerical Assistant	9,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, C
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

— mailed 4/22/77

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment Standards Administration
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

DUTY STATUS REPORT

PART A — SUPERVISOR

1. NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE MEDICAL FACILITY OR PHYSICIAN AUTHORIZED TO PROVIDE MEDICAL SERVICES
Richard Smith

31-56-49   3-24-77

2. EMPLOYEE'S NAME (Last, first, middle) [illegible] OWCP 7-23-55 M 26	3. DATE OF INJURY (Mo., day, year) 3/24/77	4. OCCUPATION Clerical Assistant	5. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 077 48 6826

6. DESCRIPTION OF INJURY
right ankle twisted

PART B — PHYSICIAN

7. IS THE EMPLOYEE ABLE TO PERFORM HIS/HER REGULAR WORK?
☑ YES ☐ NO IF YES, GIVE DATE ABLE TO RESUME WORK.

8. IS THE EMPLOYEE ABLE TO PERFORM LIGHT WORK? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF YES, DESCRIBE BRIEFLY THE PHYSICAL LIMITATIONS WHICH ARE DUE TO THE INJURY.

9. IF THE EMPLOYEE IS FIT FOR NEITHER FULL OR LIGHT DUTY, GIVE A BRIEF REPORT AND PROGNOSIS

10. REMARKS
Excess walking may remain painful for a couple of days

11. SIGNATURE Richard C S RICHARD SMITH, M.D.	12. PROFESSIONAL DEGREE MD	13. DATE (Mo., day, year) Mar 24, 1977

PART C — SUPERVISOR

14. SEND A COPY OF THIS REPORT TO:

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
Employment Standards Administration
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

15. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING AGENCY, WHICH IS TO RECEIVE THE ORIGINAL REPORT.

Select Committee on Assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Form CA-17
Nov. 1974

—mailed 4/22/77

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION

FEDERAL EMPLOYEE'S NOTICE OF INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

1. NAME OF INJURED EMPLOYEE *(Last, first, middle)*: Doyle Kevin Sean

2. DATE OF BIRTH *(Mo., day, year)*: 7/23/55

3. ☒ MALE ☐ FEMALE

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 077-48-6826

5. HOME MAILING ADDRESS *(Number, street, city, state, zip code)*: 224 N. Wakefield, Arl., Va. 22203

6. HOME TELEPHONE AREA CODE ——— NUMBER ———

7. NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYING ESTABLISHMENT *(Name, number, street, city, state, zip code)*: Select Comm. Assass

8. PLACE WHERE INJURY OCCURRED *(e.g., 2nd floor, building 402, Andrews Air Force Base)*: 3rd Floor 3337 HOB #2

9. DATE AND HOUR OF INJURY *(Mo., day, year)*: 3/24/77 1:00 ☐ AM ☒ PM

10. DATE OF THIS NOTICE *(Mo., day, year)*: 3/24/77

11. OCCUPATION: Clerical Assistant

12. CAUSE OF INJURY *(Describe how and why injury ocurred)*: Caught foot on hole in carpet and twisted ankle

13. NATURE OF INJURY *(Name part of body affected—fractured left leg, bruised right thumb, etc.)*: right ankle hurt + has lump

14. NAMES OF WITNESSES TO INJURY *(If none, so state)*: NONE

15. IF THIS NOTICE WAS NOT GIVEN WITHIN 48 HOURS AFTER THE INJURY, EXPLAIN REASON FOR DELAY. IF EARLIER NOTICE WAS GIVEN VERBAL OR WRITTEN, STATE WHEN AND TO WHOM.

I certify that the injury described above was sustained in the performance of my duties as an employee of the U.S. Government and that it was not caused by my willful misconduct, intention to bring about the injury or death of myself, or another, nor by my intoxication. I hereby make claim for compensation and medical treatment to which I may be entitled by reason of this injury.

16. SIGNATURE OF INJURED EMPLOYEE OR PERSON ACTING ON HIS BEHALF: Kevin Sean Doyle

17. STATEMENT OF WITNESS: DESCRIBE WHAT YOU SAW, HEARD OR KNOW ABOUT THIS INJURY

18. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

19. DATE *(Mo., day, year)*

CA-1 & 2
Rev. May, 1973

OFFICIAL SUPERIOR'S REPORT OF INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

20. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY HOUSE OF REP

21. BUREAU OR OFFICE S.C. on ASSASS

22. NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS OF REPORTING OFFICE (Name, number, street, city, state, zip code)

23. DATE REPORTING OFFICE RECEIVED NOTICE OF INJURY (Mo., day, year) 3/24/77 ☐ VERBAL ☐ WRITTEN

24. NAME OF SUPERVISOR IN CHARGE WHEN INJURY OCCURRED DONOVAN GAY

25. NAME AND TITLE OF PERSON TO WHOM NOTICE FIRST GIVEN Bob MORRISON DEP DIRECTOR OF SE

26. DATE AND HOUR OF INJURY (Mo., day, year) 3/24/77 100 ☐ AM ☒ PM

27. CIRCLE DAY OF WEEK WHEN INJURY OCCURRED S M T W [✓ T] F S

28. HOUR REGULAR WORK BEGINS 900 ☒ AM ☐ PM

29. HOUR REGULAR WORK ENDS 600 ☐ AM ☒ PM

30. NUMBER HOURS WORKED PER DAY 9

31. CIRCLE DAYS PAID PER WEEK S [✓ M] [✓ T] [✓ W] [✓ T] [✓ F] S

32. DATE AND HOUR STOPPED WORK (Mo., day, year) ☐ AM ☐ PM

33. DATE AND HOUR PAY STOPPED (Mo., day, year) ☐ AM ☐ PM

34. DATE AND HOUR RETURNED TO WORK (Mo., day, year) ☐ AM ☐ PM

35. INCLUSIVE DATES EMPLOYEE RECEIVED PAY FOR THE PERIOD HE DID NOT WORK (Mo., day, year)

ANNUAL LEAVE		SICK LEAVE		OTHER	
FROM	TO	FROM	TO	FROM	TO
FROM	TO	FROM	TO	FROM	TO
FROM	TO	FROM	TO	FROM	TO

36. WAS THE EMPLOYEE ENGAGED IN HIS USUAL OCCUPATION AT THE TIME THE INJURY OCCURRED? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, FURNISH DETAILED EXPLANATION

37. WAS THE EMPLOYEE IN PERFORMANCE OF DUTY AT TIME OF INJURY? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, FURNISH DETAILED EXPLANATION OR A COPY OF THE EMPLOYING ESTABLISHMENT'S INVESTIGATION REPORT

38. WAS THE INJURY CAUSED BY WILLFUL MISCONDUCT, INTOXICATION OR INTENT TO BRING ABOUT INJURY TO SELF OR ANOTHER? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES, FURNISH DETAILED EXPLANATION

39. WAS THE INJURY CAUSED BY A THIRD PARTY? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF YES, FURNISH NAME AND ADDRESS OF RESPONSIBLE PARTY

40. DATE EMPLOYEE FIRST OBTAINED MEDICAL CARE FOR THE INJURY (Mo., day, year) 3/24/77

41. NAME AND ADDRESS OF FIRST ATTENDING PHYSICIAN

42. DOES YOUR KNOWLEDGE OF THE FACTS ABOUT THIS INJURY AGREE WITH THE STATEMENTS OF THE EMPLOYEE AND/OR WITNESS? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF NO, FURNISH DETAILED EXPLANATION

3/24/77

43. SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL SUPERIOR Donovan Gay

44. TITLE CHIEF RESEARCHER

45. DATE (Mo., day, year) 3/24/77

CA-1 & 2
Rev. May, 1973

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' NOTICE OF INJURY *OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE,* CA-1 & 2

IMPORTANT: Employee and official superior should read all of the following instructions before the page is removed.

Items 1 through 16 of this form should be completed by the injured employee or by someone acting on his behalf, whenever an injury is sustained in the performance of duty. The term injury includes occupational disease caused by the employment. The form should be given to the employee's official superior within 48 hours following the injury. The official superior is that individual having responsible supervision over the employee.

In instances of a recurrence of disability resulting from an injury previously reported on form CA-1 & 2, the official superior should complete and submit form CA-2a.

The official superior will complete the "Receipt of Notice of Injury" at the bottom of this page, tear off the page, and give it to the employee. The official superior will also be responsible for obtaining the statement of a witness *(if any)*, signature, and date, in items 17, 18 and 19 on the front of the form.

A brief description of benefits provided by the Federal Employees' Compensation Act is given on the back of this page.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR COMPLETING OFFICIAL SUPERIOR'S REPORT OF INJURY *OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE,* CA-1 & 2

The back of form CA-1 & 2 should be completed by the employee's official superior. The form should be sent immediately to the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation servicing the employing establishment if:

1. The injury causes disability for the employee's usual work beyond the shift it occurred, or
2. It appears that the injury will result in prolonged treatment, permanent disability or serious disfigurement of the head, face or neck, or
3. It appears that the injury will result in a charge for medical or other related expense.

If none of the above occurs or appear likely to occur, the form should be filed in the employee's official personnel file after the official superior completes the "Receipt of Notice of Injury' and gives it to the employee.

When additional information is required to explain or clarify any point, attach supplemental statements to the form. The form should then be sent to the appropriate office of the Bureau. For further information, see the regulations governing the administration of the Federal Employees' Compensation Act (Code of Federal Regulations Title 20 Chapter 1).

RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF INJURY

THIS ACKNOWLEDGES RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF INJURY SUSTAINED BY Kevin Sean Doyle *(Name of injured employee)*

WHICH OCCURRED ON 3/24/77 *(Mo., day, year)* AT 3337 HOB #2 *(Location)*

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL SUPERIOR	TITLE	DATE *(Mo., day, year)*
Dennis L Day	CHIEF RESEARCHER	3/24/77 3/24/77

CA-1 & 2
Rev. May, 1973

OFFICIAL SUPERIOR'S REPORT OF INJURY OR OCCUPATIONAL DISEASE

20. DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY House	21. BUREAU OR OFFICE

	18. SIGNATURE OF WITNESS	19. DATE *(Mo., day, year)*

CA-1 & 2

Rev. May, 1973

DISABILITY BENEFITS FOR EMPLOYEES UNDER THE FEDERAL EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT

The Federal Employees' Compensation Act administered by the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation (OFEC) provides the following basic disability benefits for employment related injuries or occupational diseases:

1. Full medical care.
2. Payment of compensation for wage loss.
3. Payment of compensation for permanent impairment of certain members or functions of the body (such as loss or loss of use of an arm, loss of hearing, etc.) or for serious disfigurement of the head, face or neck.
4. Vocational rehabilitation and related services where necessary.

Medical care must be obtained from United States medical officers and hospitals when available and practicable. Otherwise, from any duly qualified private physician or hospital of the employee's choice. Qualified physicians may be used only if U.S. or designated medical facilities are not available, or if an emergency exists.

Compensation is paid by check sent to the employee's home mailing address. Compensation for wage loss is payable only for periods when an employee is in a non-pay status. The first three days in a non-pay status are waiting days and no compensation is paid for these days unless the period of disability exceeds 21 days or the employee has suffered a permanent disability. Compensation is generally paid at the rate of 2/3 of an employee's salary if he has no dependents, or 3/4 of his salary if he has one or more dependents.

Compensation is not paid automatically—an employee or someone acting on his behalf must claim it by filing OFEC form CA-4. This form may be obtained from the employing establishment or the OFEC. In practically all cases medical reports are required before compensation may be paid, therefore arrangements should be made to have medical reports submitted to the OFEC at the earliest possible date.

If an employee stops work as a result of an employment related injury or occupational disease, he may:

1. Use sick and/or annual leave, or
2. Receive compensation from the OFEC.

Before compensation may be paid, the OFEC must receive form CA-1 & 2; form CA-4; and medical evidence concerning the nature and causal relationship of the injury. Medical reports must cover initial examination and the employee's condition at the time claim for compensation is filed. In addition, if a case involves some complication or conflicting information, it may be necessary to obtain supplemental information.

An employee or someone acting on his behalf must complete the front of the form CA-1 & 2 and file it within one year after the injury or disease occurs. However, under certain circumstances, the OFEC may waive the one-year requirement if the front of the CA-1 & 2 is completed and the form filed within five years.

If an employee is in doubt about his compensation benefits, he may write to the Office of Federal Employees' Compensation servicing the employing establishment. (Obtain the address of the OFEC office from the employing establishment).

☆ GPO : 1973—O—499-070

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Kevin Sean Doyle	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
077 48 6826	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
XXXXX Clerical Assistant	$9,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kevin Sean Doyle	12/14/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
077 48 6326	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Messenger	$9,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Kevin Sean Doyle
Signature of Employee

1/7/77
Date

RESUME OF

KEVIN SEAN DOYLE

Present Address:	224 N. Wakefield Drive Arlington, Virginia 22203
Date of Birth:	July 23, 1955
Marital Status:	Single
Sex:	Male Height: 6'2" Weight: 190 lbs.
Health:	Excellent
Telephone:	Office - 225-4624

EDUCATION

9/75 - 6/76	SUNY at Buffalo
1/75 - 6/75	University of Iowa (Writers' Workshop)
9/73 - 10/73	State University of N.Y. at Buffalo (SUNY) year leave of absence
9/67 - 6/73	Nichols School (Grades 7-12)

WORK EXPERIENCE

8/75 - 10/75	Dog Census Bureau (City of Buffalo) Census Taker (left because we counted all dogs)
6/75 - 8/75	Mayor's Summer Youth Program City of Buffalo Stockroom Supervisor (terminated-seasonal job)
1/74 - 5/74	Bartender in bars owned by Dennis Brinkworth Buffalo, New York (left to travel abroad)
8/73 - 12/73	Doyle, Diebold, Bermingham, Gorman, & Brown (law firm - left to find another job)
6/73 - 8/73	Laborer, Buffalo Sewer Authority (seasonal job)

RESUME
Kevin Sean Doyle
Page Two

SPECIAL INTERESTS

Writing, photography, music (guitar, piano), cinema

REFERENCES

Furnished upon requests

RESUME OF

KEVIN SEAN DOYLE

Present Address: 224 N. Wakefield Drive
Arlington, Virginia 22203

Date of Birth: July 23, 1955

Marital Status: Single

Sex: Male Height: 6'2" Weight: 190 lbs.

Health: Excellent

Telephone: Office - 225-4624

EDUCATION

9/75 - 6/76	SUNY at Buffalo
1/75 - 6/75	University of Iowa (Writers' Workshop)
9/73 - 10/73	State University of N.Y. at Buffalo (SUNY) year leave of absence
9/67 - 6/73	Nichols School (Grades 7-12)

WORK EXPERIENCE

8/75 - 10/75	Dog Census Bureau (City of Buffalo) Census Taker (left because we counted all dogs)
6/75 - 8/75	Mayor's Summer Youth Program City of Buffalo Stockroom Supervisor (terminated-seasonal job)
1/74 - 5/74	Bartender in bars owned by Dennis Brinkworth Buffalo, New York (left to travel abroad)
8/73 - 12/73	Doyle, Diebold, Bermingham, Gorman, & Brown (law firm - left to find another job)
6/73 - 8/73	Laborer, Buffalo Sewer Authority (seasonal job)

SPECIAL INTERESTS

Writing, photography, music (guitar, piano), cinema

REFERENCES

Furnished upon requests

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10339
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10339

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/19/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
EBERHARDT, MICHAEL C.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Michael C. Eberhardt	November 10, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
324-40-6284	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 13, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FO

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Michael C. Eberhardt	February 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
324-40-6284	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel	$36,400.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date February 16, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Michael C. Eberhardt	10/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
324-40-6284	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	$34,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 14, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Michael C. Eberhardt	9/19/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
3~~2~~34-40-6284	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$32,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 19, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 9/22

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel ICM

DATE: February 13, 1978

RE: Mr. Michael C. Eberhardt

This is to inform you that Michael C. Eberhardt, Senior Counsel, Martin Luther King Task Force has been promoted to Assistant Deputy Chief Counsel/King Investigation. His starting salary will be $36,400.00, effective February 1, 1978.

If you have any questions, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

MEMORANDUM

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 10-14-77

Date: October 14, 1977

Re: Salary Adjustments

This is your authorization to increase the salaries of the below listed employees to the amounts indicated effective October 1, 1977:

Michael C. Eberhardt	$34,000
Marjorie A. Eagle	14,500
I. Charles Mathews	26,000

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.)

Michael C. Eberhardt
Signature of Employee

Sept 20, 1977
Date

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

FROM: Charlie Mathews V.CM
Special Counsel

DATE: September 19, 1977

RE: Michael C. Eberhardt

This is to advise you that Michael C. Eberhardt has accepted a position as Staff Counsel on the Martin Luther King Task Force, effective September 19, 1977, at an annual salary of $32,000.

Please extend every possible assistance to Mr. Eberhardt.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10341
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10341

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/01/77
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
EMANUEL, CARYL M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

January 30, 1079

District Unemployment Compensation Board
6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, D. C. 20001

Gentlemen:

The Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives, officially terminated at noontime, Wednesday, January 3, 1979.

In connection therewith, the below listed staff member will terminate her services with the U. S. House of Representatives at the close of business on January 31, 1979.

It is hoped that by furnishing the following information, the processing of her application for unemployment benefits will be facilitated.

Caryl M. Emanuel - SS No. 108-30-7723

Salary:

6/1/77 - 7/31/77	$10,850.00
8/1/77 - 2/28/78	14,000.00
3/1/78 - 1/31/79	16,000.00

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth

Thomas Howarth
Deputy Staff Director
and Budget Officer

TH:ht

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Caryl M. Emanuel	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
108-30-7723	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$16,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ______________

ID ______________

Benefits ______________

Payroll______________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Caryl M. Emanuel	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
103 30 7723	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Caryl M. Emanuel	6/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
108 30 7723	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$10,850

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 6/2

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________

Cayl M. Emanuel
Signature of Employee

6/2/77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth ✓ and Becky Martin

FROM: Steve Fallis SF

DATE: May 18, 1977

RE: Employment of Caryl M. Emanuel

Ms. Caryl M. Emanuel has been hired as a secretary, to begin work on June 1, 1977. Her annual salary will be $14,000 and she is to be assigned to the Legal Unit.

Her resume is attached to Becky Martin's copy of this memorandum for the personnel files.

$14,000 x 75% = $10,500.00

June + July

jg

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth and Becky Martin ✓

FROM: Steve Fallis

DATE: May 18, 1977

RE: Employment of Caryl M. Emanuel

Ms. Caryl M. Emanuel has been hired as a secretary, to begin work on June 1, 1977. Her annual salary will be $14,000 and she is to be assigned to the Legal Unit.

Her resume is attached to Becky Martin's copy of this memorandum for the personnel files.

jg

MEMORANDUM

TO: Jim Wolf

FROM: Tom Lambeth

I discussed the employment of Caryl M. Emanuel with the chairman this morning, and he gave his approval to her being hired immediately.

eb

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chairman Louis Stokes

FROM: Tom Lambeth, Acting Director

DATE: May 16, 1977

RE: Employment of Caryl M. Emanuel

Miss Emanuel has been interviewed by Jim Wolf and Tiny Hutton. She has experience as a legal secretary and Jim tells me that such experience is essential to his work. She has the possibility of employment at several other places and it is very important to let her know as soon as possible if we are hiring her. Her proposed salary is $14,000 which is the amount provided in the budget for this position.

eb

Emmanuel

June	$ 1.166.67
July 11/20 working days	641.67
	$ 1,808.34
Two month average	$ 904.17
Annualized	$ 10.850.00
June + July - annual	$ 10.850.00
~~monthly~~	
August 1	$ 14.000.00

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10343
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 3

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 1

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10343

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/13/78
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
EWING, MICHAEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) Michael Ewing	**Effective Date** 3/13/78
Employee Social Security Number 527-96-7881	**Type of Action** ☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Senior Researcher	$18,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

__________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

__________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

__________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID __________________________

Benefits __________________________

Payroll __________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

Signature of Employee

March 13, 1978
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel G.R./I.C.M.

DATE: 13 March 1978

RE: Mr. Michael Ewing

Please be advised that effective Monday, March 13, 1978, Mr. Michael Ewing has accepted the position of Senior Researcher with the John F. Kennedy Task Force/HSCA. His effective starting salary will be $18,000.00.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10344
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 10

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10344

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/30/76
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
FACTER, JEFFREY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

FACTER, Jeffrey
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number   Level   Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD
1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 12-30-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
6	12

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																															
Feb.																															
Mar.																					☒	☒	☒	☒			☒	☒	☒	☒	☒
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 4/1

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual. Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1					7	13	
Feb.	1	1					8	14	
Mar.	1	1	9	15	9		0	15	
Apr.									
May									
June									
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)   Date   Chief's Signature   Date

Approved: Clerk of the House   Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Jeffrey Facter
Signature of Employee

1/24/77
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffrey Facter	April 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341-44-6951	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffray Facter	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
361-44-6951	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$27,800

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Jeffrey Factor	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341-44-6951	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_______Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffrey Facter	5/9/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341 44 6951	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$25,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code___________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

KD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffrey Facter	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341 44 6951	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffrey Facter	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341-44-6951	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$15,375.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffrey Facter	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341 44 6951	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$16,250.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date______________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code:__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jeffrey Facter	December 30, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
341 44 6951	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel-Legal Unit	$25,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10345
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 17

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10345

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/07/76
PAGES : 32

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
FALLIS, STEPHEN J.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

FALLIS, S.J. ✓
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	1

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 12-7-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					1	1	
Feb.																																1	1					2	2	
Mar.																																1	1					3	3	
Apr.																																1	1					4	4	
May																																1	1					5	5	
June																																1	1					6	6	
July	X										X			S											X							1	1	7	7	3	1	4	6	
Aug.																						X										1	1	5	7	1		4	7	
Sept.						A	X	X	X			X																						4	7	4		0	7	
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 9/12/77

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.) Date
Chief's Signature Date

Approved: Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 8-25-77

DATE: August 25, 1977

RE: Resignations of Fallis, Brown and Mordana

Steve Fallis has resigned effective Monday, September 12, 1977. (Last day of work Sept. 1 Th) pay thru 9/12

Claire Brown has resigned effective Tuesday, September 20, 1977. (Last day of work pay thru 9/20)

Sari Mordana has resigned effective Monday, September 12, 1977 (Last day of work ?) pay thru 9/15

The above dated are the last dates through which, including vacation, they should be paid.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen J. Fallis	9/12/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Counsel	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—80—199

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen James Fallis	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

7-8 77 PM 3:06
H of R, FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman Frank Thompson
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

ORIGINAL — To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

OLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen James Fallis	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD 7/1

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Stephen James Fallis	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 14, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

H A Comm.
7/15/77

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen James Fallis	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen James Fallis	2/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$22,140.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2/28/77, 19_____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code:__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen J. Fallis	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$23,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Stephen J. Fallis	12/7/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
132 34 5625	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Deputy Chief Counsel	$35,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

Fallis hand carried 12/10/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 7, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ________________

Stephen D. Fallis 1-10-77

Signature of Employee Date

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
    Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers - Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency - Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers - Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency - Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
    Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers -
Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency -
Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

✓ Mon – or Fri aft.   10/22/76 – 2PM

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
October 12, 1976
212-689-1272 (Home telephone)
212-466-1250 (Business telephone)

31,500 Pres't
[illegible] to abot 36,000.

Richard Sprague, Esq.
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

Thank you for calling me about a position as your deputy on the staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I anticipate that I will find the Committee's work interesting and challenging.

I have prepared and enclosed a resume for your consideration. I believe that you will find that I am well qualified for the position by virtue of my background and experience.

I look forward to meeting you personally to further discuss the position and work of the Committee.

Very truly yours,

Stephen J. Fallis

Stephen J. Fallis

Enclosure

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
    Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers - Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency - Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau (April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers -
Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency -
Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers - Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency - Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
    Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers -
Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency -
Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern
    Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers -
Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency -
Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

STEPHEN J. FALLIS

333 East 23rd Street
Apartment #2B
New York, New York 10010
Phone (212) 689-1272

Born: November 7, 1942
Married, one child

Education

Harvard Law School, LLB, June 1967

Columbia College, A.B., June 1964

Legal Employment

Office of the Special State Prosecutor
2 World Trade Center, New York, N. Y. (Nov. 1972 to present)

Bureau Chief, Brooklyn-Staten Island Legal Bureau(April 1975 to Pres
Bureau Chief, Allegations Bureau (June 1974 - April 1975)
Staff Attorney, Manhattan Bureau (November 1972 to June 1974)

The Office of the Special State Prosecutor was created in September 1972 to investigate allegations of corruption in the New York City Criminal Justice System. As Brooklyn-Staten Island Bureau Chief, I supervise all investigations and trials of corruption cases in those counties.

New York County District Attorneys Office
155 Leonard Street, New York, N. Y.

Assistant District Attorney (September 1967 to November 1972)
Assigned to Homicide Bureau (March 1969 to November 1972)

While assigned to the Homicide Bureau I investigated, presented to the Grand Jury and prosecuted numerous Homicide cases in New York County.

Bar Admissions

New York State, Second Department - December 1967
United States District Court for the Southern and Eastern Districts of New York
United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit

Lectures and Speeches

New York University Institute of Continuing Professional Education for Law Enforcement Officers -
Topic: The States Witness - Technique in Effectively Testifying as a Witness for the Prosecution (March 1974)

National Institute on Crime and Delinquency -
Topic: The Issue of Official Corruption in Enforcement and Corrections (June 1974)

New York Police Department Advocate Seminar on Advocacy and Trial Technique - Topic: Grand Jury Minutes and Their Use (January 1975)

While a member of the Homicide Bureau of the District Attorney's Office I lectured Forensic Units of the Police Department on evidence gathering, and preservation and trial techniques.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10346
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 15

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10346

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/08/77
PAGES : 18

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
FARMER, JOHN J. JR.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : OPEN IN FULL
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

John J. Farmer, Jr.
1001 R'ville Pike, #1819
Rockville, Md.
20852

Tom Howarth
Select Committee on Assassinations
3331 House Annex # 2

Oct. 20, 1977

Dear Tom:

Here, without further delay or adue, is my repayment of the overpayment. You will note that it is made out to the U.S. Treasury or the Committee. This is due to the fact that I never recieved your note of September 15, so I was not sure who this was to be made out to. You may instruct those fine fellows at the Payroll Department, however, that I had an exquisitely fine time with my unexpected 'manna from bureaucratic heaven'.

Also, I wish you would advise Donovan to advise Blakey's office that I am still waiting breathlessly for their letter of recommendation. Please tell him (them) that I will not be able to obtain credit for my arduous labors of the summer until I recieve some sort of recommendation.

Thus, with all the sincerety due the occasion, I am,

Sincerely,

John J. Farmer Jr.

John J. Farmer, Jr.

P.S. Say hello to Kevin Walsh and Edwin Lopez for me. Tell Edwin that I am now a lifetime member of the "Reggie Jackson for Messiah" fan club.

September 20, 1977

Mr. John Farmer
1001 Rockville Pike #1819
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Dear John:

In reference to my letter of September 15, 1977, the House Finance Office informs me that in settling your overpayment, they will adjust various withholdings, that were made from your salary.

Accordingly, the amount of the check that you send to us should be $199.38 instead of $220.00.

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

TH:ow
cc: Finance Office

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 15, 1977

Mr. John Farmer
1001 Rockville Pike, #1819
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear John:

Through an oversight, the Research Unit failed to notify the Budget Office that you had terminated your services with the Select Committee. As a consequence, you were overpaid for the month of August.

As I understand the facts, you worked through Friday, August 12 and that Mr. Gay gave you vacation through Friday, August 19. Therefore, you were overpaid for the period August 20-31, 1977 which amounts to a gross salary of $220.00.

If you agree with the facts, I must request from you in the name of the House of Representatives, the return of House funds in the amount of $220.00. The check should be made payable to the U. S. Treasury and sent to me in care of the Committee.

If you dispute the facts, kindly get in touch with me as soon as possible so that we can settle the matter.

Kind regards and good luck in your classes at school.

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

TH:nps
cc: Finance Office

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—80—199

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
John J. Farmer, Jr.	8/31/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231 86 6887	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Clerk	$7,200

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

9 15 77 PM 3:23
H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

ORIGINAL – To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

M E M O R A N D U M

September 14, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth
✓Becky Martin
Tiny Hutton

FROM: Donovan L. Gay

RE: John Farmer

Early August, 1977, John Farmer, The Committee's summer intern, informed me that he would be registering for classes on August 26, 1977, and would like some time off commencing August 15, 1977, so he could vacation with his family for two weeks.

Based on the countless hours he devoted, and on John's overall performance, which was exceptional, I took it upon myself to grant him the week of August 14, 1977 to accommodate his vacation plans. Therefore, he should have been taken off our payroll ending August 20, 1977.

However, I erred in failing to notify you earlier on the above, as I thought I had already done. Therefore, John Farmer was in fact paid for the remainder of the month of August, 1977.

Should there be additional questions on this matter, please contact me immediately. Furthermore, I can assure you that in the future, you will be notified immediately with regard to personnel changes.

Thank you.

mcp

First National Bank
OF MARYLAND

No. 741366

7-11/520

October 20, 19 77

PAY TO THE ORDER OF ***** U. S. Treasury or Select Committee on Assassin#ations **** $ 199.38

FIRST NAT'L [illegible] $199 AND 38 CTS DOLLARS

Remitter: John J. Farmer

Sandra Y. Burdick
AUTHORIZED SIGNATURE

CASHIER'S CHECK

⑈0741366⑈ ⑆0520⑉0011⑆ 02⑉2120 2⑈

FNB 9046 (5/75)

No. 741366

DATE	DESCRIPTION	AMOUNT
10/20/77	U. S. Treasury or Select Committee on Assassindations Remitter: John J. Farmer	$199.38

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF MARYLAND

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

John

9-26-77

Farmer =

new termination papers =

19th August

take to Finance

Betty Burkholder

56514

per Pam Haworth

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
John J. Farmer, Jr.	August 19, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231 86 6887	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment X☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerk	$7,200

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 27, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

September 20, 1977

Mr. John Farmer
1001 Rockville Pike #1819
Rockville, Maryland 20852

Dear John:

In reference to my letter of September 15, 1977, the House Finance Office informs me that in settling your overpayment, they will adjust various withholdings, that were made from your salary.

Accordingly, the amount of the check that you send to us should be $199.38 instead of $220.00.

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

TH:ow
cc: Finance Office

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 15, 1977

Mr. John Farmer
1001 Rockville Pike, #1819
Rockville, MD 20852

Dear John:

Through an oversight, the Research Unit failed to notify the Budget Office that you had terminated your services with the Select Committee. As a consequence, you were overpaid for the month of August.

As I understand the facts, you worked through Friday, August 12 and that Mr. Gay gave you vacation through Friday, August 19. Therefore, you were overpaid for the period August 20-31, 1977 which amounts to a gross salary of $220.00.

If you agree with the facts, I must request from you in the name of the House of Representatives, the return of House funds in the amount of $220.00. The check should be made payable to the U. S. Treasury and sent to me in care of the Committee.

If you dispute the facts, kindly get in touch with me as soon as possible so that we can settle the matter.

Kind regards and good luck in your classes at school.

Sincerely,

Thomas Howarth
Budget Officer

TH:nps
cc: Finance Office

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

MEMORANDUM

September 14, 1977

TO: ✓Tom Howarth
Becky Martin
Tiny Hutton

FROM: Donovan L. Gay

RE: John Farmer

Early August, 1977, John Farmer, The Committee's summer intern, informed me that he would be registering for classes on August 26, 1977, and would like some time off commencing August 15, 1977, so he could vacation with his family for two weeks.

Based on the countless hours he devoted, and on John's overall performance, which was exceptional, I took it upon myself to grant him the week of August 14, 1977 to accommodate his vacation plans. Therefore, he should have been taken off our payroll ending August 20, 1977.

However, I erred in failing to notify you earlier on the above, as I thought I had already done. Therefore, John Farmer was in fact paid for the remainder of the month of August, 1977.

Should there be additional questions on this matter, please contact me immediately. Furthermore, I can assure you that in the future, you will be notified immediately with regard to personnel changes.

Thank you.

mcp

MEMORANDUM

June 7, 1977

TO: Tom Lambeth
Acting Staff Director

FROM: Donovan L. Gay
Chief Researcher

RE: John Farmer, Jr.

I recommend that John Farmer, Jr. be employed as a part-time intern at a monthly salary of $300.00 effective June 8, 1977.

MEMORANDUM

TO: BUDGET OFFICER

FROM: DEPUTY DIRECTOR

DATE: JULY 19, 1977

RE: JOHN J. FARMER, JR.

The Chief Counsel and Director has today approved a change in work schedule and salary for John J. Farmer, Jr. Effective July 20, 1977, he will work a full day instead of a half day at a base annual salary of $7200.00 instead of $3600.00

CC: CHIEF RESEARCHER

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
John J. Farmer, Jr.	7/20/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231 86 6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerk	$7,200

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 19, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
John J. Farmer, Jr.	6/8/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
231 86 6887	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Clerk	$3,600

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

6-8-77 PM 3:

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

R. FINANC

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 8, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

John G. Farmer, Jr.
Signature of Employee

6/9/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10347
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10347

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/21/77
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
FEELEY, ELIZABETH C.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth C. Feeley	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
207-46-8088	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Document Clerk	$14,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level_______Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b); prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title-If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits ________________

Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth C. Feeley	November 21, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
207-46-8088	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Document Clerk	$12,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $ __________ .00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: November 17, 1977

RE: Elizabeth Feeley

This is to advise you that Elizabeth Feeley has accepted a position as document clerk on the Martin Luther King Task Force, effective November 21, 1977, at an annual salary of $12,000.

Please extend every possible assistance to Ms. Feeley.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Elizabeth C. Feeley
Signature of Employee

11/21/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10349
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 10

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10349

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/13/76
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
FENTON, CLIFFORD A. JR.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082-22-5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_____________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$40,600.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date Decmeber 11, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00 as of _____________________________

ID _________________________

Benefits _________________________

Payroll _________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082-22-5909	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change X☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date: January 2, 1979

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082-22-5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Chief Investigator	$38,500

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977, 19__

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082-22-5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Chief Investigator	36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_____________If applicable, Level_______Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code_________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	5/29/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 22 5909	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 22 5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082-22-5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,450.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 22 5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$19,500.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 19 77 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Signature of Employee

2-10-77
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 22 5909	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Chief Investigator	$30,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976 ________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.	12/13/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
082 22 5909	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Chief Investigator-Kennedy	$26000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10350
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10350

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/11/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
FLANNAGAN, MARK T.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mark T. Flanagan	January 1, 1979
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214-60-6734	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mark T. Flanagan	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214-60-6734	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,800.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)
LOUIS STOKES

(Type or print name and title of above official)

(Title - If Member, District and State)
Chairman

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
T. Mark Flanagan	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214-60-6734	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977 ____________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

____________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb

____________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________
ID ____________________
Benefits ____________________
Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
T. Mark Flanagan	7/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
214 60 6734	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 11, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FD
7/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

T. Mark Flanagan, Jr.
Signature of Employee

7/11/77
Date

MEMORANDUM

JULY 7, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth

FROM: Donovan Gay D

RE: New Research Employees

Please be advised that on Monday, July 11, 1977, four researchers will be reporting to duty. The four new employees for the Research/Document Unit are: Thomas Mark Flanagan, Jr.; Edwin Juan Lopez; Dan L. Hardway, and Leslie Wizelman.

All four will be joining our staff as Researchers, and are to be compensated at the rate of $12,000 per annum.

The above has been authorized per the instructions of Bob Blakey.

Thank you.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10352
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 13

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10352

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/13/76
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
GANNON, THOMAS M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

GANNON, THOMAS M.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number | Level | Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD
1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-13-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	DAY OF MONTH																													
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																															
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June													X	X	X	X	X														
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1					1	1	
Feb.	1	1					2	2	
Mar.	1	1					3	3	
Apr.	1	1					4	4	
May	1	1					5	5	
June	0	0	5	5	5	0	0	5	
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

Terminated June 17, 1977

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature | Date | Chief's Signature | Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Approved: Clerk of the House | Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

June 16, 1977

Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.
Jesuit Community
Georgetown University
37th and O Streets, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007

Dear Tom:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

June 3, 1977

Mr. Thomas Lambeth
Acting Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Lambeth:

I hereby resign from the staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations, effective two weeks from today, at the close of business on Friday, June 17, 1977.

Very truly yours,

Thomas M. Gannon, SJ.

Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.

TMG:eb

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Gannon, SJ	6/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
180 30 1309	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 14, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

June 6, 1977

Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Tom:

This is to acknowledge receipt and acceptance of your letter of June 3, 1977, resigning from the staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations effective on the close of business on Friday, June 17, 1977.

I regret that we will be losing you, but wish you the best of luck in your new position.

Sincerely,

Thomas Lambeth,
Acting Director

TL:eb

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Gannon, SJ	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
180 30 1309	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $ __________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas M. Gannon, SJ	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
180 30 1309	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$42,400

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas M. Gannon	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
180-30-1309	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$12,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28=77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas M. Gannon	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
180 30 1309	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$13,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas M. Gannon	12/13/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
180 30 1309	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$20,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

-handcarried to FO 12/16/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Thomas M. Gavin.
Signature of Employee

January 17, 1977
Date

Resume of: [redacted] [redacted]

THOMAS M. GANNON, S.J.

Local Address:
4520 Chester Avenue
Philadelphia, Pa. 19143
Phone: 215-387-9048

Personal Data:
Born Philadelphia, Pa., August 31, 1938
Entered Society of Jesus, August 14, 1960
Ordained to Roman Catholic Priesthood, June 6, 1970
Admitted to Bar of New York State, March 3, 1975

Legal Education:
New York University School of Law
J.D., June 1974
New York University Law Review--
Staff Member, 1972-1973; Associate Editor, 1973-1974
Publications: Comment, "Constitutional Law -- Fourth Amendment--Evidence Obtained by Illegal Search and Seizure is Inadmissible in Civil Tax Proceeding--Government Has Burden of Going Forward With Untainted Evidence to Support Deficiency Notice," 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 197 (1973)--See attached reprint
Annual Survey of American Law--Invitation extended, declined
Review of Law and Social Change--Invitation extended, declined
Participation in Moot Court Competition, 1st year
Academic Record--See attached transcript

Pre-Legal Education:
University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana
B.A., magna cum laude, June 1960. Major, History
Fordham University, Bronx, N.Y.
Ph.L. (licentiate), cum laude, June 1964. Major, Philosophy
Fordham University, Bronx, N.Y.
M.A., February 1966. Major, American Literature
Woodstock College, New York, N.Y.
B.D., honors, June 1970. Major, Theology

Employment:
Special Master, fall 1976 In re Japanese Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation, M.D.L. 189, c/o 15613 U.S. Courthouse, Philadelphia, Pa 19106

Law Clerk to the Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., United States District Judge, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1974--present.
15613 U. S. Court House
Philadelphia, Pa. 19106

Employment (cont.)

Associate Editor, America Magazine, 1969-1974,
Contributing Editor, 1974-present.
Executive Editor, Catholic Mind magazine, 1969-1971
106 West 56th Street
New York, N. Y. 10019

Coordinator, Ad Hoc Committee on Disposition of Woodstock College Library, summer 1973. (The committee negotiated with the State University of New York at Stony Brook, Yale Divinity School, Georgetown University, Catholic University, and Fordham University for eventual disposition of the 150,000 volume library.)
Woodstock College
New York, N. Y.

Research Assistant, summer 1972
Office of General Counsel
United States Catholic Conference
1312 Massachusetts Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20005

Secretary, Board of Trustees, 1971-1973
St. Joseph's Preparatory School
Philadelphia, Pa.

Chaplain, summer 1970
Georgetown University Hospital
Washington, D. C. 20007

Secretary, Advisory Committee, Maryland Province of Society of Jesus, 1967-1969. (The committee coordinated planning for the personnel--700 men--and institutions--five colleges and universities, six senior high schools--of the Maryland Province.)
5704 Roland Avenue
Baltimore, Md. 21210

Instructor, Theology, spring 1969
Mt. St. Agnes College
Baltimore, Md.

Instructor, English, 1968-1969
McKinley Technical High School
Washington, D. C.

Instructor, Latin and English, 1964-1967;
Moderator, Yearbook, 1964-1967;
Moderator, Film Seminar, 1965-1967
Member, Academic Council, 1966-1967;
Assistant Coach, Junior Varsity Football Team, 1966
Loyola High School
Towson, Md.

Employment (continued)

Assistant Chaplain, 1961-1962
Berks County Prison
Reading, Pa.

Laborer/Clerk/Assembly Line Worker, summers 1957 through 1960
Ford Motor Company
Chester, Pa. and Pennsauken, N.J.

Apprentice Electrician, summers 1955 and 1956
H. B. Frazer Company
Philadelphia, Pa.

References:

Honorable A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr.
United States District Judge
United States District Court
Eastern District of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, Pa.

Professor Norman Dorsen
New York University School of Law
New York, N. Y.

Professor Charles Lyon
New York University School of Law
New York, N. Y.

S. Stephen Rosenfeld, Esq.
Chief, Government Bureau
Office of the Attorney General
Boston, Mass.
(on leave as Associate Professor of Law
New York University School of Law
New York, N. Y.)

Richard A. Givens, Esquire
New York Regional Director
Federal Trade Commission
New York, N. Y.

FERDINAND FARMER RESIDENCE
4520 Chester Avenue
Philadelphia, Pa. 19143

~~215-386-2824~~ (215) 387-9048

November 29, 1976

Richard A. Sprague, Esq.
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, Pa. 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

When we talked the other week, you asked that I write to you to state formally my interest in working on the staff of the House Select Committee on Assassinations, and to tell you when I would be ready to go to work.

As I told you during the interview, I am extremely interested in working as a member of the committee's staff. I look forward with enthusiasm to such an opportunity.

I spoke with Judge Higginbotham last week, and it appears that my duties in connection with my appointment as a special master will be essentially over within the next two weeks. I have also inquired about living arrangements in Washington, D.C. While nothing is definite yet, I am confident that I can find a room in one of the Jesuit communities there--most probably at Georgetown University--within the next two weeks as well. As a result, I can assure you that I will be ready to go to work in Washington, D.C., on Monday, December 13, 1976.

One last item--in accordance with your suggestion, I have been doing some background reading on the scope of the investigatory powers of Congressional committees.

Thanks again for taking time out of your busy schedule to see me. With every best wish, I am

Sincerely yours,

Tom Gannon.

Thomas M. Gannon, S.J.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10355
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10355

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/06/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
GIANGRASSO, DOMINICK K.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Dominick K. Giangrasso	October 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219-40-9759	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 14, 1977 ______________________________

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 10-13-77
DATE: October 13, 1977
RE: Mr. Dominick K. Giangrasso

In reference to my previous memorandum dated October 4, 1977 on Dominick K. Giangrasso, this is to inform you that he has been granted administrative leave through October 31, 1977, which will be the date of his termination.

GRB:jl
Attachment

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 10-4-77

SUBJECT: Dominick K. Giangrasso

DATE: October 4, 1977

Mr. Giangrasso has resigned from the Committee Staff for personal reasons. His resignation is effective as of today.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dominick K. Giangrasso	9/6/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
219 40 9759	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 15, 19 77 ________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

O.K.
GRB
8-24-77

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Blakey

FROM: Edward M. Evans

DATE: August 24, 1977

SUBJECT: Dominick Kevin Giangrasso - Investigator

Mr. Giangrasso has agreed to take a position with us as Staff Investigator assigned to the Martin Luther King, Jr. Task Force.

He will start September 6, 1977 at $24,000.

EME:ek

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☐ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________

____

D.K. Giangrasso
Signature of Employee

6 Sept. 1977
Date

EVANS

RECEIVED
1977 AUG -8 PM 2:58
U.S. HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

RESUME

Dominick Kevin Giangrasso
7902 Wallace Road
Baltimore, Maryland 21222
(301) 285-2826

PERSONAL

Born: October 26, 1942 - Baltimore, Maryland
Health: Excellent ; last physical taken
Appearance : Height 6' 4"; Weight 188 lbs.
Marital Status: Married - Lorraine M. nee Novak
Date of Birth Sept. 11, 1942

Three Children - Dominick Anthony - June 6, 1967
Lisa Ann November 24, 1968
Derek Joseph February 11, 1974

Religious Affiliation Roman Catholic

EDUCATION

Baltimore Public School system until 12th grade
High School equivalency received July, 1967

At present, I have earned 45 credits towards an Associate of Arts Degree in Criminal Justice at Essex Community College, Baltimore County, Md.

EXPERIENCE

January 10, 1964 sworn into the Baltimore City Police Department - finishing 3rd in standing of 27 graduates. Thereafter assigned to the Southeastern District in uniform patrol that covered high crime areas. During this assignment I handled all types of felony and misdemeanor investigations and arrests.

December 1967 transferred to the Criminal Investigation Division and assigned to the Vice Control Unit. In this capacity was assigned to undercover work in the areas of prostitution and gambling violations. While in this assignment, I kept a low profile and learned to develop sources of select confidential information.

In May 1968 was promoted to Detective Patrolman and re-assigned to the Crimes Against Persons Unit - Homicide Squad, which is my present assignment. While in this division, I have personally investigated in the excess of 225 homidices and have been actively involved with another 150 homicide investigations. I have also conducted hundreds of investigations into the areas of questionable death, suicide, serious assault, kidnapping, armed robbery, extortion, threats of death and hostage situations. For a period of about four years, have also investigated numerous sex related offenses such as rape, perverted practices, etc.

As a result of these investigations, I have testified in the Municipal Court, Criminal Court Supreme Bench, and the Grand Jury systems in the City of Baltimore and State of Maryland. On most occasions, the Court recognizes me as an expert in the field of homicides and related death investigations.

During my assignment in the Homicide Squad, I have acted in the capacity of field supervisor for about 3 1/2 years, supervising 5 to 7 investigators and their assignments. Have also had the experience of acting undercover while with the unit and on two occasions I was hired as a paid assassin. During these operations I worked with several forms of electronic equipment and became familiar with it.

I am acutely aware of how to search crime scenes; recover and preserve evidence; examine bodies; interrogate suspects; locate and interview possible witnesses; take full and formal affadavits and all other areas of homicide investigations. I furthermore have written and have been named the affiant on numerous search warrants and seizure orders.

It has been my duty on occasion to travel into other states and jurisdictions and take custody of fugitives from justice and return them to this city to be criminally charged.

During my tenure as a law enforcement officer, I have handled numerous line-ups, surveillances, and details for the protection of suspects, informants and co-operative witnesses.

I have a full training background in the area of handguns, shotguns, rifle and tear gas devices.

TRAINING

Have completed the "Francis Lee Glasner" Homicide Seminar, held at the Medical Examiners Office, Baltimore, Maryland, under the direct supervision of Dr. Russell Fisher.

Have also attended and completed a "Federal Bureau of Investigation" seminar on "Homicide and Sex Mutilation", held in Washington, D. C.

Furthermore, I have conducted and attended numerous training classes and procedure lectures held by the Baltimore City Police Department.

COMMENDATIONS

Since becoming a member of the Baltimore City Police Department in January 1964, I have been awarded the following commendations and citations:

Two Commendation Ribbons
Three Bronze Star Medals of Valor
Six Letters of Commendation
One Certificate of Achievement from
the American Legion

I have recently been recommended by my superior officers for the Department's Medal of Honor for my actions during a sniper incident and the killing of a police officer.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10357
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10357

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/30/76
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
GOFREY, JANE E.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialized by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane E. Godfrey	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119-36-4041	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$23,400.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane E. Godfrey	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119-36-4041	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00 as of ___________________________

ID ___________________________

Benefits ___________________________

Payroll ___________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane E. Godfrey	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119-36-4041	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Office Manager	$17,100

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane E. Godfrey	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119-36-4041	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane E. Godfrey	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119 36 4041	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
N Jane E. Godfrey	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119 36 4041	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane Elizabeth Godfrey	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119 36 4041	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date__________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jane Elizabeth Godfrey	December 30, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
119 36 4041	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$14,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 23, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Jane E. Godfrey
Signature of Employee

10 January 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10359
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10359

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/07/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
GOLDEN, PAUL T.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul T. Golden	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
033-40-0589	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $_______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul T. Golden	8/7/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
033-40-0589	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Xerox/Messenger	$11,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 9, 19 78

__________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

__________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

__________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

__________________________ (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID __________________

Benefits __________________

Payroll __________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ____________________

Paul T Golden
Signature of Employee

8/7/78
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer ✓
ELizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M

DATE: August 9, 1978

RE: Paul T. Golden

Please be advised that Mr. Paul T. Golden has joined the HSCA staff as a Xerox/Messenger.

Mr. Golden's starting date will be August 7, 1978, and his starting salary will be $11,500.00.

Please contact me if you have any questions concerning this matter.

033-40-0589

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10361
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10361

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/28/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
GRANT, KENNETH G.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth G. Grant	8/23/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
099 20 0966	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 31, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO
8/31

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Aug. 23rd

Ken Grant

what is his status?

Tom – Lehner
Howarth –

Louis Stokes

Louis Stokes

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Forwarding Address:

Mr. Kenneth G. Grant
855 Pepperidge Road
Westbury, New York 11590

Aug. check mailed 9/6 to above address.
nwm

Congress of the United States
Committee on International Relations
House of Representatives

Kenneth G. Grant

099.20.0966

$24,000

Staff Investigator / JFK

1/28/77

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Kenneth G. Grant	July 28, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
099 20 0966	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 29, 19 77 ______________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Left at H. Adm. Comm.
7/29/77

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ XX I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Kenneth G. Grant
Signature of Employee

July 28, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10362
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10362

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/12/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
GREEN, CHARLOTTE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) Charlotte Green	**Effective Date** 7/31/78
Employee Social Security Number 148-52-9861	**Type of Action** ☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 10, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Charlotte Green	5/12/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
148-52-9861	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Summer Intern	$6240.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 22, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID __________________________

Benefits _______________________

Payroll_________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date May 12, 1978

To: House Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☑ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law

sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ______________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ______________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Charlotte A. Green
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.CM

DATE: May 22, 1978

RE: Charlotte Green

Please be advised that effective Friday, May 12, 1978, Ms. Charlotte Green joined the Committee staff as a summer intern. Her effective starting salary will be $6240.00 per annum.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10363
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10068-10363

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINSTRATION
GRIMES, MARY SUSAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/07/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box #:1.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212-56-6718	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212-56-6718	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$4,200.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date Nov 2

To: Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☒ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Mary Susan Grimes
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

DUCB 113
Rev. 9/78

DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD

LOW EARNINGS REPORT—To be completed by the employer and delivered to the claimant at his request.

Employee's Social Security No. 212-56-6718 Name Mary Susan Grimes

1. During the CALENDAR WEEK beginning SUNDAY October 22 and ending SATURDAY October 28 (NOT your payroll week, if different), this employee worked ☐ FULL TIME ☒ PART TIME

2. His *gross earnings payable before deductions*, which include tips, cash value of meals, lodgings, and all other remuneration for that week were $ 63.64.

3. Original employment date Oct 18 Last day worked October 25 and Reason for separation employee works one day a week until ~~end of December~~

4. Employer's Name and Address Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S House of Representatives

Thomas Howarth October 25, 1978 Tom Howarth 2252980
(Signature of authorized official) J-55701 (Date) (Person who may be contacted) (Phone No.)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE USE ONLY

☐ LER accepted as an Additional Claim (Earnings exceed eligibility amount.),

Date of Claim ________ Office Representative ____________

DUCB 113
Rev. 9/78

DISTRICT UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION BOARD

LOW EARNINGS REPORT—To be completed by the employer and delivered to the claimant at his request.

Employee's Social Security No. 212-56-6718 Name Mary Susan Grimes

1. During the CALENDAR WEEK beginning SUNDAY October 15 and ending SATURDAY October 21 (NOT your payroll week, if different), this employee worked ☐ FULL TIME ☒ PART TIME

2. His *gross earnings payable before deductions*, which include tips, cash value of meals, lodgings, and all other remuneration for that week were $ 63.64.

3. Original employment date Oct 18 Last day worked Oct 18 and Reason for separation employee works one day a week until end of DECEMBER

4. Employer's Name and Address Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives

Thomas Howarth October 18, 1978 Tom Howarth 225-2980
(Signature of authorized official) J-55701 (Date) (Person who may be contacted) (Phone No.)

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

OFFICE USE ONLY

☐ LER accepted as an Additional Claim (Earnings exceed eligibility amount.),

Date of Claim ________ Office Representative ____________

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	9/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212-56-6718	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 14, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212 56 6718	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$21,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212 56 6718	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$44,600

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212-56-6718	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$12,915.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Mary Susan Grimes	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212 56 6718	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,650.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date__________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mary Susan Grimes	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
212 56 6718	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$21,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Mary Susan Grimm
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10143
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10143

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/01/78
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
RESNICK, GINA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

RESNICK, Gina
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number   Level   Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
6-13-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
6	3

Month	DAY OF MONTH 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	USED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	EMPLOYEE INITIALS
Jan.									S	S		S																				1	1	7	4		3	7	1	
Feb.								S													X											1	1	8	2	1	1	7	1	
Mar.																																1	1					8	2	
Apr.			X	X	X																											1	1	9	3	3	0	6	3	
May								X	X	X	X	X																				1	1	7	4	5		2	4	
June																												X	X	X		1	1	3	5	3		0	5	
July																																								
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated June 30, 1978

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)   Date   Chief's Signature   Date

Approved: Clerk of the House   Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Gina I. Resnick	June 30, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
147-40-4845	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 21, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gina I. Resnick	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
147-40-4845	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Document Clerk	$14,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level_______Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title–If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gina I. Resnick	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
147-40-4845	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Gina I. Resnick	6/13/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
147 40 4845	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	$10,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 13, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

147.40.4845

M E M O R A N D U M

JUNE 6, 1977

TO: Louis Stokes
CHAIRMAN

FROM: Tom Lambeth
Acting Staff Director

OK

RE: Gina Resnick, document clerk

Please be advised that Ms. Gina I. Resnick, applicant for a document clerk position, has been interviewed by Mr. Gerald P. Hamilton, Deputy Chief Researcher,MLK, Mr. Donovan L. Gay, Chief Researcher, and by Mr. Stephen J. Fallis, Deputy Chief Counsel. All three have recommended that Ms. Resnick be hired in this capacity at $10,000. per annum.

Ms. Resnick received her MLS from the University of Michigan, December 1976, and served as Reference Assistant with the University's document collection for their Public Health Library. She also was employed with the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, and while working with documents, she had the opportunity to research and write published Congressional hearings and reports concerning the Intelligence Community.

If it meets your approval, we would like to have Ms. Resnick report to our Committee on Monday, June 13, 1977.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

Gina Q Bosnick
Signature of Employee

6/14/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10144
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10144

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/06/78
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
RIFE, REBECCA A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca A. Rife	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
192-34-0781	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Rebecca A. Rife	3/6/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
192-34-0781	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	13,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 3/6, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

Rebecca A. Rife
Signature of Employee

March 6, 1978
Date

1 — P.M —

Congreſs of the United States

Employment Information Form

1. Name (*Last, First, Middle*) and Address (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*) ☐ Mr. ☒ Miss ☐ Mrs.
Rife, Rebecca Anne
125 South Reynolds St., Apt. J-410
Alexandria, Va. 22304

2. Home phone (*including Area Code*) 370-6755 Friend
3. Other phone (*including Area Code*) Judy Sullivan 697-1173 Leave messages

4. Kind of job you are applying for: Secretarial/Staff Assistant

5. Term of Employment: ☒ Full Time ☐ Summer

6. Will you accept temporary employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

7. Will you accept part-time employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

8. When will you be available? Immediately

9. Are you presently employed by the U.S. Senate, the U.S. House of Representatives, or other office of the Congress? ☐ Yes ☒ No

10. Birth date (*Month, Day, Year*) 11/11/42

11. Home State Pennsylvania

12. Height Feet 5 Inches 6½

13. Are you a United States citizen? ☒ Yes ☐ No

14. Lowest acceptable annual salary in specific figures $10,500

15. Number of dependents other than self 0

16. Weight 125

17. Social Security Number 192-34-0781

18. Skills

☒ Typing 75-80 wpm. ☒ Shorthand @85-90 wpm.
(To be considered for positions involving typing or shorthand, applicants must undergo tests actually administered either by the Placement Office or by the U.S. Civil Service Commission. If the latter is used, attach Notice of Rating dated within the past 12 months.)

☐ Office equipment (specify)

☐ Computer: ☐ Terminal Operator, ☐ Programmer, ☐ Systems Analyst
(State expertise with specific systems, languages, and components.)

19. List eligible ratings attained on U.S. Civil Service Commission examinations, titles of examinations and dates of ratings.
Have been a G.S. 8 Social Worker. On Mid-Level Register and Clerk-Typist Register

20. Did you graduate from high school, or will you graduate within the next nine months? ☒ Yes June 1960 MONTH/YEAR ☐ No HIGHEST GRADE COMPLETED
Course emphasis: ☒ Academic, ☐ Business, ☐ Other (specify)

21. Training schools attended (*for example, business, vocational, armed forces, or trade*). Give for each the name and location of school, dates attended, subjects studied, number of classroom hours of instruction per week, certificates, and any other pertinent data.
Waynesboro Business School, Waynesboro, Pennsylvania - Attended during high school and studied typing and speed-writing.

22. A. Name and location (*City and State*) of colleges or universities attended.	COURSES STUDIED		CREDITS COMPLETED		Grade-Point Average on 4.0 Scale	Rank in Class	Dates Attended		Type of Degree	Year of Degree
	Major	Minor	Semester	Quarter			From	To		
Chatham College, Pgh., Pennsylvania	Psyc/Soc.				3.2	Upper ½		1960-64	B.A.	

B. Chief undergraduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED Semester	Quarter	C. Chief graduate college subjects	CREDITS COMPLETED Semester	Quarter
Strong liberal arts					
Many survey courses (including political science)					
Psychology/sociology major					

D. Special achievements and awards. (*Provide all scholastic achievements and honors and show participation in extracurricular, civic, community and similar activities, and in professional and scientific societies.*)
Awarded full college scholarship from Fairchild Aircraft Corporation Hagerstown, Maryland

23. Other languages. (*Show proficiency in speaking, writing, and reading.*) Some French

24. Dates of military service, if any. From: To:
Branch: N.A. Rank: Serial No.:

Answer the following questions. (*If you answer "Yes" to any of these questions, give all pertinent details in Item 28.*)	YES	NO
25. Have you been convicted of any offense against the law or forfeited collateral or are you now under charges for any offense against the law? (*Omit all traffic violations and any offense committed prior to your 21st birthday which was finally adjudicated in juvenile court or under a Youth Offender Law.*)		
26. While in the military service, were you convicted by general court-martial or discharged under other than honorable conditions?		
27. Does the U.S. Government employ in a civilian capacity any relative of yours (by blood or marriage)? (*If your answer is "Yes," list in Item 28 for each relative: [1] full name; [2] relationship; and [3] department, agency, or office.*)		

28. Space for detailed answers. Indicate Item number to which answers apply.

Item No.	

Do Not Write In This Block

TEST RESULTS

TYPING: 77 W.P.M. ON A 5 MINUTE TEST

(81 W.P.M., 4 ERRORS)

SHORTHAND: ______ W.P.M. ON A 3 MINUTE TEST

OTHER TEST SCORES:

VERIFIED BY: DATE:

MAILING ADDRESS

SELECT COMMITTEE ON CONGRESSIONAL OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF PLACEMENT AND OFFICE MANAGEMENT

Describe Employment Experience On This Form. (A resume is not a substitute for this form. Any resume submitted should be limited to 2 pages.)

29. PART-TIME And SUMMER Employment During The Last Three Years.

Name of Employer	Dates	Salary	Position and Duties

Worked for Sen. Gary Hart for a month in 1975 when one of his secretarie was on vacation. Worked in office of Cong. Stanley Lundine for a month when he won special election in 1976. Typed invitations to a luncheon fo Dem. Nat'l. Comm. Dinner Comm.

30. FULL-TIME Employment. (*List Most Recent Experience First.*)

1\.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From August 1976 To ~~XXXXXXXX~~ December 1977

Exact title of position Secretary (temp. position)

Annual Salary Starting $ 10,800 Present $ 11,500

Name of immediate supervisor Fred Hansen

Area Code and Phone No., if known 254-5232

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
ACTION, 806 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
Washington, D.C.

May inquiry be made of your present employer regarding your character, qualifications, and record of employment? ☒ Yes ☐ No

Reason for wanting to leave Temporary position ended. Seeking permanent employment.

Description of work Performed clerical duties: typing, sorting mail, answering phones, answered telephone inquiries, composed own correspondence at times. Helped coordinate office during reorganization.

2\.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From Jan.-March 1975

Exact title of position Secretary (?)

Annual Salary Starting $ 8500 Leaving $ 8500

Name of immediate supervisor Mr. Bill Wise

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Birch Bayh for President in '76, K St.N.W.
Washington, D.C. (Call Sen. Bayh's office

Reason for leaving Campaign folded.

Description of work Worked for press secretary, typed press releases and correspondence, mailed press releases to national mailing list; maintained press release files and national mailing list; answered routine calls from pres stayed on to write thank-you notes and help with financial report.

3\.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From Apr. 1974 To Jan. 1975

Exact title of position Legal Secretary

Annual Salary Starting $ 8,000 Leaving $ 8,000

Name of immediate supervisor Mr. Andrew Pepsin

Area Code and Phone No., if known 833-9800

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Wilkinson, Cragun and Barker, 1735 New
York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C.

Reason for leaving Change fields; boring, no room for advancement in legal fielc

Description of work Typed legal briefs and correspondence, helped librarian prepare summaries of Federal Register, relieved receptionist.

4\.

Dates of employment (*month, year*) From Nov. 1972 To March 1974

Exact title of position Senate Majority Press Office, Harrisburg, Pa.

Annual Salary Starting $ 6800 Leaving $ 7200

Name of immediate supervisor Mr. Vince Carocci

Area Code and Phone No., if known

Name of employer (*firm, organization, etc.*) and address (*including ZIP Code, if known*)
Senate Majority Press Office, Main Capitol
Harrisburg, Penna.

Reason for leaving Turned down a promotion to return to Washington.

Description of work Handled personal secretarial duties; edited, typed and mailed press releases for Dem. state senators; did research. Set up a new filin system for newspaper clippings. Wrote a 100 page summary of a review of Pa.'s Public Employees Relations law

31. REFERENCES: List three persons who are NOT related to you and who have definite knowledge of your qualifications and fitness for the position for which you are applying. Do NOT repeat names of supervisors listed under Items 29 and 30.

FULL NAME	PRESENT BUSINESS OR HOME ADDRESS (*Number, Street, City, State, and ZIP Code*)	TELEPHONE NUMBER
Mr. Theron Bell	ACTION Administrator, 806 Connecticut Av., NW	
Ms. Jan Fernengel	Marketing Rep. Alexandria, Va.	765-0826
Louis and Sandra Kushner,	Esq. Dunmoyle Place, Pittsburgh, Pa.	412/661-0128

CERTIFICATION

I CERTIFY that all of the statements made in this form and any attachment are true, complete, and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief, and are made in good faith.

SIGNATURE (*Sign in ink*) Rebecca A. Rife

DATE SIGNED February 14, 1978

GPO : 1977 O - 91-004

Rebecca Anne Rife
125 South Reynolds Street, J-410
Alexandria, Virginia 22304
(703)370-6755

WORK HISTORY

July 1976-December 1977. ACTION, 806 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Secretary to the Director of the Peace Corps Placement Office. Performed secretarial duties, aided in coordinating office activities during a period of reorganization.

January-April 1976. Birch Bayh for President in '76, 1735 K Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Worked for Senator Bayh's press secretary during his presidential campaign. Typed personal correspondence, typed and mailed press releases to national mailing list, maintained growing lists of persons to receive information, maintained files, answered inquiries mainly from the press regarding the Senator's schedule and stands on issues. Stayed on at request after campaign ended to write thank you notes and to help prepare Federal Election Campaign Report.

1975. Traveled to Europe and worked for Olsten Temporaries and Potomac Temporaries while searching for permanent employment. Also found temporary positions on my own initiative in the offices of Senator Gary Hart and WETA, the public television station in Arlington, Va., and Lord and Taylor's. Performed secretarial duties and sometimes administrative functions. I value this experience as I learned to adapt quickly to all kinds of working situations and in general broadened my knowledge.

April 1974-January 1975. Legal Secretary, Wilkinson, Cragun and Barker, 1735 New York Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. Typed legal briefs and correspondence, helped librarian prepare summaries of Federal Register, and relieved receptionist.

November 1972-March 1974. Secretary to Vince Carocci, Senate Majority Press Officer, Capitol, Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. Handled personal secretarial duties for the director and five other persons in the office; edited, typed and mailed press releases for all the Democratic state senators; did some research. Was in constant contact with state legislators and members of the press. Set up a new filing system for newspaper clippings. Wrote a hundred page summary of a review of Pennsylvania's Public Employees Relations Law. Turned down a promotion to return to Washington.

Fall of 1972. Office manager during the 1972 Presidential campaign of the Democratic Headquarters in Waynesboro, Pennsylvania (my home town). Recruited and coordinated office and field staff (approximately 60 people), managed the budget, purchased office supplies and decorated the office. Met with local candidates, attended meetings and rallies with them. Planned campaign strategy with county political ledders. Liaison person with the national campaign headquarters.

1967-1972. Caseworker at the D.C. Welfare Department, Adoption Section, 101 E Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Counseled unwed mothers who applied for adoption services, placed their infants for adoption. Had extensive contact with other referral social agencies. Prepared adoption reports. Left social work to change fields.

1964-1967. Caseaid at Family and Children's Service, 327 Fifth Avenue, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Placed pre-adoptive infants in foster homes, counseled foster mothers in their care and prepared evaluations of the infants and foster homes. Supervised some adoptive placements.

Summer of 1963. Employed as a summer intern at Franklin County Children's Aid Society, Miller Street, Chambersburg, Pennsylvania. Observed and aided the social workers, did some counseling, interviewed and evaluated foster parent applicants. Worked with the director of the agency in a public relations effort: contacted and visited county residents, particularly leading citizens, to make them more aware of the agency and its functions and to locate prospective foster parents. Left to return to senior year of college.

EDUCATION

1970-1971. Took courses through the U.S. Department of Agriculture Graduate School in free lance writing, urban affairs and duties of Capitol Hill Assistants.

1964. Awarded a B.A. in Psychology/Sociology from Chatham College, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Strong liberal arts background. Awarded full college scholarship.

1960. Graduated from Waynesboro Area Senior High School, Waynesboro, Pennsylvania. Academic course.

1957-1958. Studied typing and speed-writing during summers at the Waynesboro Business College, Waynesboro, Pennsylvania.

References available upon request.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: March 1, 1978

RE: Ms. Rebecca A. Rife

Please be advised that effective Monday, March 6, 1978, Ms. Rebecca Rife has accepted the position of Secretary with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her effective starting salary will be $13,500.00.

ICM:j

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10145
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10145

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/03/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
RISINGER, MARTIN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Marlin Risinger	12/27/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Document Clerk	$10,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Marlin Risinger	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438 68 2917	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	$10,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Marlin Risinger III	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-68-2917	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Marlin Risinger III	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-68-2917	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Researcher	$16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number____________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Marlin Risinger III	January 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-68-2917	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 4, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________
ID ________________________
Benefits________________________
Payroll________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Marlin Risinger III	7/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
438-68-2917	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ XX Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

RISINGER, Marlin
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-27-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
4	12

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					5	13	
Feb.								S																								1	1	6	14		1	6	13	
Mar.																																1	1					7	14	
Apr.																								S								1	1	8	15		1	8	14	
May																																1	1					9	15	
June																																1	1					10	11	
July														X			X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X			X	1	1	12	12	12		0	12	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated July 31, 1978

╱ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S╱ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A╱ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U╱ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

7

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Martin Rosinger, III
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel ICM

DATE: January 4, 1978

RE: Marlin Risinger, Salary Adjustment

Please adjust the salary of Marlin Risinger to $15,000 per annum, effective January 1, 1978.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10146
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10146

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/03/77
PAGES : 14

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
ROBERTS, ANTOINETTE M.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ROBERTS, A. ✓
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number
Level
Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-22-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years
Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.																															
Feb.																															
Mar.																															
Apr.																															
May																															
June																															
July																					X	X			X	X	X	X	X		
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1					1	1	
Feb.	1	1					2	2	
Mar.	1	1					3	3	
Apr.	1	1					4	4	
May	1	1					5	5	
June	1	1					6	6	
July	1	1	7	7	7	0	0	7	
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

Terminated 7/31/77

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)
Date
Chief's Signature
Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House
Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette Morris Roberts	7/31/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
348 28 0439	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment X☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette Morris Roberts	4/30/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 28 0439	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

F05/12

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette Morris Roberts	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 28 0439	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette Morris Roberts	5/5/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 28 0439	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$16,200

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/12

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette Morris Roberts	6/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 28 0439	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 25, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette M. Roberts	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 28 0439	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date__________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Antoinette M. Roberts	12/22/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
[illegible] 0439	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 13, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓X

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Antoinette M. Robert
Signature of Employee

Jan. 10, 1977
Date

RESUME

Antoinette M. "Ty" Roberts
(Mrs. Walter W.)

5402 Tuscarawas Road
Bethesda, MD. 20016
Home telephone: (301) 229-4269

POSITION OBJECTIVES; Editor/Writer. Public Relations. Administration

SUMMARY: Journalism-Broadcasting; Congressional liaison; research; administration. Experience dealing with Congress, governmental agencies; journalist (radio-TV, political magazine, free lance writer; social services consulting firms (Dept. of Labor, OEO, HEW, EPA); Administration.

PUBLIC RELATIONS: Control Data Corporation, 6003 Executive Blvd., Rockville, MD. Wrote and placed articles in daily newspapers, weekly and monthly trade and general magazines on computer usage.Coordinated Washington Region CDC Public Relations. 1974

MEDIA RESEARCH:Common Cause, 2030 M Street, N.W. Compiled a media profile of all Congressional Districts throughout the Common Cause network; researched and wrote same for newspaper, radio and TV stations to serve as a guide manual to local Common Cause chapters.
November 1972 - April 1973

FEATURE REPORTER: Public Affairs News, 1625 Mass. Ave., N.W. Conducted radio interviews with individuals prominent in government or private industry on topics of general public interest for broadcast over independent radio stations across the country.
February 1972 - Nov. 1972

RESEARCH ASSISTANT: WAPORA, Inc. 6900 Wisconsin Ave., N.W. Assisted in researching and preparing proposals to prospective government and private clients for environmental pollution studies.
Jan. - Feb. 1972 (contract)

RESEARCH EDITOR: Organization of American States, 1725 Eye Street, N.W. Researched and edited special report for the OAS on Barbados, W.I.
Jan. - March, 1972 (contract)

MEDIA ASSISTANT: Volt Information Services, Inc. Researched and wrote information on specific ICAP programs of Indian Community Action Programs for the Office of Economic Opportunity, Indian Division.
February - July, 1971. (contract)

1968 - 1970

FREE LANCE REPORTER: Resided in Barbados,West Indies with my husband who was working for the United Nations Development Programe. While there I was Special Correspondent for the TORONTO TELEGRAM (Canada); also wrote for the local Barbados newspaper (ADVOCATE NEWS) and appeared on interview panel shows of the CARIBBEAN BROADCASTING CO.

ASSISTANT PUBLIC RELATIONS DIRECTOR: Established administrative and Public Relations project for READING IS FUN-DAMENTAL, a project funded by the Ford Foundation. Duties included publicity, answering information inquiries and establishing an information clearinghouse for the program.
August 1968 - December 1968

NOV 17 1976

PUBLICITY ORGANIZER: Was invited by former Project Director of University Research Corp. (see below) to join him as a temporary contractor to establish a program for the SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. in San Francisco, Calif. where SDC was starting a western office. Coordinated a conference on the New Careers development concept for regional representatives of the Dept. of Labor and for the new SDC west coast personnal-consultants.
June 1968 - August 1968

EDITORIAL DIRECTOR: to Project Director of the New Careers Development Program of UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORP. (5530 Wisconsin Ave.) Was responsible for all administrative and public relations details of the program; this included writing and editing a newsletter; establishing a mailing list and the formation of an information clearinghous
March 1967 - June 1968

FEATURE EDITOR: WASHINGTON WORLD magasine (53 D Street, S.E.) Jointly with the Editor selected topics and authors to write articles; coordinated and directed production of the magazine; wrote feature articles. Accredited to the Senate Periodical Press Gallery
March, 1965 - November 1966

CONGRESSIONAL NEWS CONSULTANT: Before and during the inauguration of former President Lyndon B. Johnson, was hired by TAFT BROADCASTING CO. to assist their news team by arranging radio and TV interviews with Congressional delegations.
October 1964 - Feb. 1965.

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT: Covered Congress for all radio stations of STORER BROADCASTIN CO., WASHINGTON NEWS BUREAU (1725 K Street, N.W.) on a local and a national level; interviewed Congressmen and Senators; rewrote wire copy for daily broadcast. Accredited to: White House, Dept. of State, Senate and House Radio-TV Correspondents Galleries.
Sept. 1962 - September, 1964.

REPORTER/NEWS EDITOR: Covered Congress for 15 client radio stations for DEADLINE WASHINGTON (120 C St., N.E.) Was responsible for reporting Congressional Committee hearings and editing tapes of same for immediate broadcast.
Sept. 1961 - Sept. 1962.

NEWS PRODUCTION ASSISTANT: Productinn Assistant for a daily news broadcast for WESTINGHOUSE BROADCASTING COMPANY, WASHINGTON NEWS BUREAU (1625 K St.,N.W.) Duties required operating tape equipment,editing news materials; contacting Congressional delegations and processing news inquiries from Group W stations.
October 1957 - Sept. 1961.

EDUCATION; Attended High Schools in Vienna, Austria; Fountainbleau, France and Hamilton, Bermuda. Graduated Norwalk High, Norwalk, Conn. - 1953. COLLEGE: University of Connecticut - 1953-1955; major-History; George Washington Univ. - 1955-1957. University of West Indies Barbados, 1969-1970-Caribbean History.

OFFICE SKILLS - typing 80 wpm. shorthand 80 wpm. familiar with all office duplicating machines and tape recording machines.

Hold GS 10 - 11 rating.
Excellent health. Married - no children
Born: Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 17, 1935
Social Security Number 048-28-0439
References submitted upon request

Press

Roberts

1 y an

Adm
11-24

November 15, 1976

Mr. Richard A. Sprague
Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
3341 House Annex
Washington, D.C. 20515

NOV 1

Ack: admin.

Dear Mr. Sprague:

I would like to be considered for a staff position either on the full committee or the two subcommittees that you intend to set up to probe the Kennedy and King assissinations. Enclosed is my resume. I would hope that my knowledge of the Hill and the working press would prove helpful.

I am available for an interview at your convenience.

Sincerely,

Ty Roberts

Ty Roberts (Mrs. Walter W.)
5402 Tuscarawas Road
Bethesda, MD. 20016

(301) 229-4269

RESUME

Antoinette M. "Ty" Roberts
(Mrs. Walter W.)

5402 Tuscarawas Road
Bethesda, MD. 20016
(301) 229-4269

POSITION OBJECTIVES: Editor/Writer. Public Relations. Administration

SUMMARY; Journalism-Broadcasting; Congressional liaison; research; administration. Experience dealing with Congress, government agencies; jorunalist (radio-TV, political magazine, free lance writer); social services consulting firms.

EDITORIAL CONSULTANT: Fraser/Ruder & Finn, 1800 K St., N.W. Directed research, compiled and edited a directory on consumer related problems within the public and private sectors of the economy. This was a short term contract. July-Sept. 1976.

ASSISTANT PARADE DIRECTOR: Happy Birthday, U.S.A., 736 Jackson Place, N.W., Responsible for contacting banks, marching units and other participants for the July 4th Bicentennial Parade. March.-June, 1976.

PUBLIC RELATIONS COORDINATOR: Washington Metropolitan Operation Sail,Ltd. 3319 Rowland Place, N.W., Coordinated media contacts, embassy and Congressional liaison for all participants in OPSail, the tall ships which participated in the Washington leg os the Bicentennial regetta. February-July, 1976.

PUBLIC RELATIONS ASSISTANT: Control Data Corporation, 6003 Executive Blvd. Rockville, MD. Wrote and placed articles in daily newspapers, weekly and monthly trade and general magazines on computer usage. Coordinated Washington Region CDC Public Relations. 1974.

MEDIA RESEARCH: Common Cause, 2030 M Street, N.W. Compiled a media profile of all Congressional Districts throughout the Common Cause network; researche and wrote same for newspaper, radio and TV statations to serve as a guide manual to local Common Cause chapters. Nov. 1972 - April 1973.

FEATURE REPORTER: Public Affairs News, 1625 Mass. Ave., N.W. Conducted radio interviews with individuals prominent in government or private industry on topics of general public interest for broadcast over independent radio stations across the country. Feb. 1972 - Nov. 1972

RESEARCH ASSISTANT: WAPORA, Inc. 6900 Wisconsin Ave., N.W., Assisted in researching and preparing proposals to prospective government and private clients for environmental pollution studies. Jan. - Feb. 1972 (contract)

RESEARCH EDITOR: Organization of American States, 1725 Eye Street, N.W. Researched and edited special report for the OAS on Barbados, W.I. Jan. - March, 1972 (contract)

MEDIA ASSISTANT: Volt Information Services, Inc. Researched and wrote data on specific ICAP programs of Indian Community Action Programs for the Office
Opportunity, Indian Division, Feb. - July, 1971. (contract)

1968 - 1960 FREE LANCE REPORTER: Reside in Barbados, W.I. with my husband who was working for the United Nations Development Program. While there I was Special Correspondent for the TORONTO TELEGRAM and also wrote for the local Barbados newspaper (ADVOCATE NEWS) and appeared on interview panel shows of the Caribbean Broadcasting Co.

PUBLICITY ORGANIZER: Was invited by Former Project Director of University Research Corp. (see below) to join him as a temporary contractor to establish a program for the SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT CORP. in San Francisco, Calif. where SDC was starting a western office. Coordinated a conference on the New Careers development concept for regional representatives of the Dept. of Labor. June 1968 - August 1968.

EDITORIAL DIRECTOR: to Project Director of the New Careers Development Program of UNIVERSITY RESEARCH CORP. 5530 Wisconsin Ave., N.W. Was responsible for all administrative and public relations details of the progra this included writing and editing a newsletter; establishing a mail list and the formation of an information clearinghouse. March 1967-June 1968.

FEATURE EDITOR: WASHINGTON WORLD Magazine., 53 D St.,S.E. Jointly with the Editor selected topics and authors to write articles; coordinated and directed production of the magazine; wrote feature articles. Accredited to the Senate Periodical Press Gallery. March,1965-November 1966.

CONGRESSIONAL NEWS CONSULTANT: Before and during the inauguration of President Lyndon B. Johnson, was hired by TAFT BROADCASTING CO. to assist their Ohio news team by arranging radio and TV interviews with Congressional delegations. October 1964 - Feb. 1965.

WASHINGTON CORRESPONDENT: Storer Broadcasting Co., Washington News Bureau, 1725 K Street, N.W. Covered Congress for all Storer radio and TV stations on a local and a national level; interviewed Congressmen and Senators; rewrote wire copy for daily broadcast. Accredited to: White House; Dept. of State, Senate and House Radio-TV Correspondents Galleries. Sept. 1962 - Sept. 1964.

REPORTER/NEWS EDITOR: Covered Congress for 15 client radio stations for DEADLINE WASHINGTON, 120 C St.,N.E. Was responsible for reporting Congressional Committee hearings and editing tapes for same for immediate broadcast. Sept. 1961 - Sept. 1962.

NEWS PRODUCTION ASSISTANT: Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Washington News Bureau, 1625 K Street, N.W. Duties required operating tape equipment, editing news materials, contacting Congressional delegations and processing news inquiries from Group W stations. October 1957 - Sept. 1961.

EDUCATION: Attended High Schools in Vienna, Austria; Fountainbleau France and Hamilton, Bermuda. Graduated Norwalk High School, Norwalk, Conn. 1953. COLLEGE: University of Connecticut - 1953-55: major-History. George Washington Univ. 1955-57. University of West Indies, Barbados, 1969-70.

Born: Grand Rapids, Michigan April 17, 1935
Excellent health, Married - no children

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10148
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 15

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10148

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 16

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
ROSEN, MERETE MUFF

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______

Merite Quiff Rosen
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Merete Juff Rosen	January 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 54 4432	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$13,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 23, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Merete Muff Rosen	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 58 4432	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Merete Muff Rosen	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 58 4432	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$22,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration:

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Merete Muff Rosen	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048 58 4432	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Merete Muff Rosen	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048-58-4432	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

To: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
From: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Staff Director
Date: November 7, 1977
Re: Salary Adjustment - M. Muff Rosen

11-7-77

Adjust the salary of M. Muff Rosen November 1, 1977, from $15,000 to $18,000.✓

As indicated earlier, Ms. Rosen will be leaving the Committee which is now set for November 30, 1977.

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Merete Muff Rosen	11/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048-58-4432	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Researcher	$18,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director GRB 10-14-77

DATE: October 14, 1977

SUBJECT: Resignations

This memorandum is to inform you that Muff Rosen is on administrative leave from now until November ~~14~~ 30th, 1977. She should continue on the payroll for that period of time plus any additional vacation that she has not yet taken.

11/23/77 TH

This memorandum is also to inform you that Alice Hamlin is on administrative leave between now and November 14. It is my understanding that she does not have any additional vacation time. Consequently, she should remain on the payroll through November 14.

ok 11/14/77 TH

ROSEN, M. M.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
–	–

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					1	1	
Feb.																																1	1					2	2	
Mar.																																1	1					3	3	
Apr.																																1	1					4	4	
May																																1	1					5	5	
June																													X	X		1	1	6	6	2		4	6	
July																																1	1					5	7	
Aug.																																1	1					6	8	
Sept.													A	A								A										1	1					7	9	
Oct.														A	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	–	–							
Nov.	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—		A	X	X	X	X			X	X	X		X			X	X	X		–	–							
Dec.																																								

Terminated 11/~~3~~30/77

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
■ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Merete Muff Rosen	November 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
048-58-4432	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 5, 1977 ______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

3. (A) DO YOU HAVE ANY REASON TO QUESTION THIS PERSON'S LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO

If your answer is "YES," please give full details under ITEM 6.

4. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, IS THIS PERSON RELIABLE, HONEST, TRUSTWORTHY, AND OF GOOD CHARACTER? ☒ YES ☐ NO

If your answer is "NO," please explain fully:

5. TO YOUR KNOWLEDGE, HAS THIS PERSON EVER BEEN FIRED FROM ANY JOB FOR ANY REASON, OR QUIT A JOB AFTER BEING NOTIFIED THAT HE/SHE WOULD BE FIRED? ☐ YES ☐ NO

See 6. Below

If your answer is "YES," please give:

(A) NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER (Including ZIP Code if known):

(B) REASON THIS PERSON QUIT OR WAS FIRED:

6. PLEASE FURNISH ANY OTHER INFORMATION YOU MAY WISH TO OFFER CONCERNING THIS PERSON'S QUALIFICATIONS, CHARACTER, CONDUCT, AND GENERAL FITNESS FOR THIS POSITION.

Merete Muff Rosen was a very competent, faithful and loyal worker. Because of her foreign birth and parentage, we could not secure security clearance for her from the FBI and CIA which was a prerequisite for working with the Committee. No inference as to her character or loyalty should be drawn from this.

7. ☐ Please do not disclose my identity to the person identified on the front of this form.

If more space is needed for your answers, please continue on a separate sheet of paper.

PLEASE SIGN YOUR NAME BELOW

2-6-79	Thomas Howarth / Thomas Howarth	Deputy Staff Director- Select Committee on Assassinations
(DATE)	(SIGNATURE)	(OCCUPATION OR TITLE)

Optional Form 49 Back (Rev. 11-75)
GPO : 1976 OF—240-457 (44-1)

OPTIONAL FORM 49 (Rev. 11-75)
Prescribed by
U.S. Civil Service Commission
F.P.M. Chapter 736
5049-106

Office of Personnel Management
NACI CENTER
Boyers, PA 16019

INQUIRY FOR UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT USE ONLY

Personnel Office
House Select Committee
On Assassinations
US House of Rep.
Washington, D.C. 20515

The person identified below has been appointed to or is an applicant for the position shown. To help us determine whether this person is loyal, trustworthy, and of good character, we ask that you answer all questions on the front and back of this form as fully and specifically as you can. The information you provide, including your identity, will be disclosed to the person identified below if he or she should so request, unless you indicate in item 7 on the reverse side of this form that you do not wish your identity to be disclosed.

Please use this form when replying or show the case number if you reply by letter. A postage-free envelope is enclosed for your reply.
Please reply promptly.

1. A. FULL NAME (LAST, FIRST, MIDDLE): Rosen, Merete Muff
B. OTHER NAMES USED: Thomsen - NEE

1/26/79
MA 1979 28816

2. ARMED SERVICES SERIAL NO., AND DATES AND BRANCH OF SERVICE: N/A
3. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 048-58-4432
4. DATE AND PLACE (CITY, STATE) OF BIRTH: Feb. 13, 1946 Copenhagen, DK
5. POSITION: Director, Governmental relations
6. AGENCY NAME AND ADDRESS: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, Wash. D.C. 20581

No. and Street Address — City and State — ZIP Code

ent 2229 Bancroft Place, N.W. Washington D.C. 20008
'78 3515 Martha Custis Drive, Alexandria, Va.22302
'77 1519 Kingman Place, NW, Washington, D.C. 20005
75 3108 M St. NW, Washington D.C. 20007
73 100 Waranoke Road, Manchester Conn.
Shop of Elia Tabib, Shemlan, Lebanon
2 Beit Resass, East Jerusalem, Israel
70 Beit Husaini, East Jerusalem, Israel

OTHER IDENTIFYING NUMBERS

DATES OF CLAIMED EMPLOYMENT: 1/77 - 12/77
9. (CHECK ONE)
KIND OF POSITION HELD
BRANCH OR PLANT AT WHICH EMPLOYED

TO BE COMPLETED BY ADDRESSEE ON THIS INQUIRY

1. HOW LONG HAVE YOU KNOWN THIS PERSON? 2 YEARS 2 MONTHS

2. IN WHAT CAPACITY WERE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH THIS PERSON? ☒ EMPLOYER • ☐ SUPERVISOR • ☐ CO-WORKER ☐ FRIEND ☐ OTHER (Specify)

• If you were the employer or supervisor, complete the following: (A, B, C, D, E, and F)

(A) TITLE OF THIS PERSON'S POSITION: Researcher
(B) DATE EMPLOYED: January 1, 1977
(C) DATE SEPARATED: November 30, 1977
(D) REASON FOR LEAVING: See remarks - No.6
(E) IF DISCHARGED FOR CAUSE, WAS EMPLOYEE NOTIFIED OF REASON? ☒ YES ☐ NO
(F) IS THIS PERSON ELIGIBLE FOR REHIRE? (If "NO," briefly, why not) ☐ YES ☒ NO
Select Committee on Assassinations has terminated

(CONTINUE ON REVERSE SIDE)

Please Call me - 5-8050

Sue -

Please Give this individual your considera-tion for a position as Support Staff. She has work in Responsible positions in the past and I Highly Recom-mend Her for a position -

Billy

Rosen

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

Donovan recommends.

lmc
12/23

Sue – Attention

Merete Muff Rosen
1519 Kingman Place, N.W.
Washington D.C. 20005
Telephone: (202) 483-6470

Age: 30, Married
No childern

Interviewed by
Hess / HAMILTON

wants to work for King

13,000 to 15,000 on
new [illegible]

presently employed
with the Presidential
Transition office

She is being NATURALIZED
as a U.S. citizen

*RESEARCH capacity position

EDUCATION:

1975 B.A. (cum laude) Georgetown University School of Foreign Service
Major: government and economics
Minor: Arabic

1972-73 American University of Beirut
Major: Middle East History

1971-72 American College in Jerusalem
Major: history

1963-65 "Interiorarkitektskolen" (Interior Design School) Copenhagen, Denmark.

LANQUAGE SKILLS: Fluent in Danish, Swedish, Norwegian and English. Good in German, Arabic and Hebrew.

WORK EXPERIENCE: 1969-72 Hebrew Union College, Biblical and Archaeological School, Jerusalem, Israel

DUTIES:

Archaeology - Full time member of publication staff. During digging season I worked as architect, surveyer and draftsman at site "Tel Gezer". I also organized and trained many volunteers to assist in the excavation which gave them a clearer sense of purpose and utilized their labour economically efficient.

Report preparation, editing - During the off seasons I edited supervisors' reports, assisted in writing the official excavation reports and put together architectual plans for publication. After additional research I also redrew objects and burials for publication.

1970-71 American School of Oriental Research Jerusalem, Israel

Translator - My duties were similar to those described above, but in additio I often served as a translator between

will start interning
by 2nd week in January

1-1-78

1-3-77

the local authorities and the excavation staff at "Tel Hezi". I assisted and mediated in such difficulties as where to dig so as not to interfere too much with local daily life and to solve problems of getting water and staff to opereate the camp.

1967-69 Architects Ingerslev & Nielsen, Copenhagen, Denmark.
Designer - I drew up plans and successfully implemented the decoration of a hospital and a old age home in Denmark. I was fully in charge of making sure that all the proper transactions took place for the work to be completed and coordinated the work of 50 workers and professionals.

Fall 1976 Carter-Mondale Presidential Campaign, Mondale Office. Major responsibility: wrote daily press summaries of nine major newspapers for Mondale plane and Atlanta office. (Reference attached).

TRAVELS: I lived 5 years in Israel and 1 year in Lebannon. I traveled frequently throughout the Middle East.

INTERESTS:
1. International relations in the field of Middle East economics and politics, foreign student community, inter-cultural communication
2. Contemporary visual arts (design, textiles etc.
3. House renovation, fine arts, reading.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10150
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10150

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
RUDDEN, MIRIAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

RUDDER, M.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					1	1	
Feb.																																1	1					2	2	
Mar.																																1	1					3	3	
Apr.																																1	1					4	4	
May																															S	1	1	5	5		1	5	4	
June			S																								S	S				1	1	6	5		3	6	2	
July																																1	1					7	3	
Aug.																																1	1					8	4	
Sept.	X	X				X	X	X	X			X	X	A	—															A								—	—	
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 9/30/77

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Miriam Rudder	September 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578 80 2773	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Mail/Document Clerk	$9,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 27, 1977 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

September 20, 1977

O.K. J.CM

TO: Tom Howarth

FROM: Donovan L. Gay D

RE: Miriam Rudder

Please be advised that pursuant to Chairman Stokes' instructions, Ms. Miriam Rudder will be on the payroll of the Select Committee on Assassinations through the last payday for September, 1977.

Should there be any questions, please feel free to ask.

Thank you.

mcp

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Miriam Rudder	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578-80-2773	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Mail/Document Clerk	9,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Miriam Rudder	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578 80 2773	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Mail/Document Clerk	$7,500.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level_______Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Miriam Rudder	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
57[illegible] 60 2773	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerk	$7,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______

Miriam Rudder
Signature of Employee

1/24/77
Date

378 80 2773

$1500

Dick:

While the attached resume of Ms. Miriam Rudder does not reflect experience related to office duties, I know her well and certainly trust her. Therefore, I strongly recommend that she be hired for me to train as a mail clerk working along with Patricia Price. Again, as I indicated above, the most important thing to me in this instance is that I have the utmost trust in Miriam.

Your consideration in this matter is greatly appreciated.

DONOVAN D

Limited technical skills.
Must go to school on Tuesday and Thursday nights from 8 - 10 P.M.
No security problems -
No FBI, CIA or Sec Service.
Could start tomorrow
Would like to make no less than $8,000
Very pleasant - conscientious.

Recommend,

RESUME

Miriam Rudder
4927 Fitch Place, N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20019
559-3716 or 699-5653
8/356 date of birth
Single

EDUCATION

Western High School, 1974

Prince Georges Community College
BA, 1978

OTHER EXPERIENCE

Water Safety Instructor
First Aid Instructor

CLERICAL

Typing 50wpm

JOB EXPERIENCE

Capitol East Natorium, present, Water Safety Instructor. Responsibilities include safety and health of patrons. Instruct classes of all age groups and levels. Perform instructions of special classes.

Riggs-LaSalle Swimming Pool 5/76 - 9/76
(summer employment)

Howard University 6/76- 8/76 Water Safety Instructor- Supervisor, teaching and working with inner-city and under priviledged children.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10152
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10152

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/25/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SCHLICHTMANN, JAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SCHLICHTMANN, Jan
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　Level　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
8-25-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years　Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
4	4

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Accrued This Month Annual Leave	Accrued This Month Sick Leave	Available This Month Annual Leave	Available This Month Sick Leave	Used This Month Annual Leave	Used This Month Sick Leave	Balance at Close of Month Annual Leave	Balance at Close of Month Sick Leave	Employee Initials
Jan.																																1	1					5	5	
Feb.																					A	A	A	A								1	1					6	6	
Mar.																																1	1					7	7	
Apr.																	X	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	7	7	8		0	8	
May																																								
June																																								
July																																								
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 4/26/78

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨/ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)　Date　Chief's Signature　Date

Approved: Clerk of the House　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jan Richard Schlichtmann	4/26/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
029-38-8530	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$25,700

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 3/18, 19 78

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN (Title - If Member, District and State)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jan Richard Schlichtmann	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
029-38-8530	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Law Assistant	$25,700

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date___March 14_________________, 1978___ ______________________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

______________________________________ ___LOUIS STOKES___________________________
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member) (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______________________________________ ___Chairman_______________________________
(Type or print name and title of above official) (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00 as of ____________________________

ID _________________________

Benefits _____________________

Payroll______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialized by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Jan Richard Schlichtmann	8/25/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
029 38 8530	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Law Assistant	$19,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 25, 1977 ____________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Signature of Employee

8/25/77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: T. Howarth, Budget Officer

GRB 8-25-77

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director

DATE: August 25, 1977

RE: Mr. Jan Schlichtmann

This is to inform you that Mr. Jan Schlichtmann has accepted the position of Law Assistant/Legal Unit with the Committee staff. Mr. Schlichtmann's effective starting date will be August 25, 1977, starting salary will be $19,500.

Your co-operation in familiarizing him with the operation of the staff will be greatly appreciated.

jl

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10153
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10153

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 05/23/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SCHULTZ, NANCY P.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialized by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy P. Schultz	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
209-46-4088	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits________________

Payroll________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy P. Schultz	November 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
209-46-4088	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
	$16,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 13, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy P. Schultz	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
209-46-4088	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Secretary	$15,500

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID ________________
Office Code__________	Benefits ________________
Monthly Annuity $_________.00 as of ________________	Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy P. Schultz	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
209-46-4088	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Seceetary	14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Nancy P. Schultz	5/23/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
209 46 4088	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Secretary	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 23, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

handcarried to FO 5/24/77

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

Nancy P. Schultz
Signature of Employee

5-25-77
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth and Becky Martin

FROM: Steve Fallis

DATE: May 13, 1977

RE: Secretaries

1. Eileen Copeland has been hired as a secretary and will begin work on Monday, May 16, 1977. Her salary will be $11,000 per year and she will be temporarily assigned to the Legal Unit.

2. Nancy Schultz has been hired as a secretary, to begin work on Monday, May 23, 1977, at a salary of $12,000 per year. She is to be assigned to the Administrative Unit.

3. Cecilia Morton has been hired as a secretary and will begin work on June 1, 1977. Her salary will be $11,000 per year. She will be assigned to the Kennedy Unit.

The resumes for Ms. Copeland, Ms. Morton and Ms. Schultz accompany the copy of this memorandum to Becky Martin.

jg

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10154
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10154

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/11/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SELLECK, ELIZABETH K.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

December 15, 1978

File No: A25-146626
Date of Injury: May 25, 1978
SSN: 531-50-7701

Ms. Elizabeth K. Selleck
4201 Cathedral Avenue
Washington, DC. 20016

We need additional information to make a determination regarding the claim you submitted for the injury indicated above. Please furnish the information requested in the items checked below and on the reverse of this form. Use a separate sheet of paper numbering the answers to correspond with the question numbers.

☒ 1. The Federal Employees' Compensation Act requires an injured employee to give written notice of injury to his/her supervisor within 30 days. State why this injury was not reported to your supervisor within that time.

☒ 2. Describe in detail exactly how the injury occurred. (For example, if you fell, state how far you fell, how you landed, etc. If lifting was the cause of injury, describe the object handled, its weight, what you did with it, etc.).

☒ 3. Give the names of any persons who witnessed your injury or had immediate knowledge of it.

Sincerely,

John Petty Jr

JOHN PETTY, JR.
Supervisory Claims Examiner

Select Comm. on Assassinations
House of Representatives
HOB #2
Washington, DC. 20515

Include your address, ZIP code, and file number on all correspondence

Ltr. CA-1011
June 1975

☒ 4. State the immediate effects of the injury and what you did immediately thereafter.

☒ 5. Was any other injury sustained, either on or off duty, between the date of injury and the date it was first reported to (a) your supervisor and (b) to a doctor? If so, describe:

☒ 6. State the exact reason why you delayed seeking medical attention; also give the name and address of the doctor you first consulted and the date you were first examined for this injury:

☒ 7. Describe (a) your condition between the date of the injury and the date you first received medical attention, and (b) the nature and frequency of any home treatment:

☒ 8. Did you have any similar disability or symptoms before the injury? If so, describe the prior condition. Give the names and addresses of the physicians who treated you and the approximate dates you were treated:

☒ 9. Did you ever file a claim for workers' compensation benefits from any source? If so, give the date and nature of the injury, the name and address of the office where the claim was filed, and describe the benefits (if any) which you received:

☒ 10. Arrange for submission of a medical report on the enclosed Form CA-20 from the private physician who examined you as a result of this injury.

☐ 11.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR
EMPLOYMENT STANDARDS ADMINISTRATION
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs

December 15, 1978

File No.: A25-146626
Date of Injury: May 25, 1978
Employee: Selleck Elizabeth K.

Noncontroverted ☐ Controverted ☐

Select Com. on Assassinations
House of Representatives
HOB #2
Washington, DC. 20515

We have received Form CA-1 reporting an injury and your agency's response to the evidence submitted. It has been determined that:

☐ 1. The facts of the injury and employment support the employee's contention that he/she was a Federal employee who sustained a traumatic disabling injury in the performance of duty. You should, therefore, continue his/her pay for the period of disability not to exceed 45 days.

☒ 2. The information of record is insufficient to make a decision on the case; however, you should continue the employee's pay without interruption. Additional information is required as noted on the reverse of this letter.

☐ 3.

Sincerely,

John Petty Jr

JOHN PETTY, JR.
Supervisory Claims Examiner

Ms. Elizabeth K. Selleck
4201 Cathedral Avenue
Washington, DC. 20016

Include your address, ZIP code, and file number on all correspondence

Ltr. CA-1038
Rev. Apr. 1977

SELLECK, Elizabeth
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT: 7-11-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE: Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	5

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Accrued This Month Annual Leave	Accrued This Month Sick Leave	Available This Month Annual Leave	Available This Month Sick Leave	Used This Month Annual Leave	Used This Month Sick Leave	Balance at Close of Month Annual Leave	Balance at Close of Month Sick Leave	Employee Initials
Jan.				X	X	X																										1	1	2	6	3		1	6	
Feb.																	X															1	1	0	7	1		1	7	
Mar.																																1	1					0	8	
Apr.																																1	1					1	9	
May																																1	1					2	10	
June																																1	1					3	11	
July											X	X	X	X																		1	1	4	12			0	12	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7-15-78

2

╱ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S╱ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A╱ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U╱ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨╱ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature (If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.) — Date — Chief's Signature — Date

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

7-19-78

Tom:

I need a form CA-1 (Federal Employee's Notice of Traumatic Injury) to file a claim under Workmen's Compensation for a cut on my hand that I suffered on the job in May. Could you mail one to me please.

Thanks,

Liz Gillick

4201 Cathedral
Ave. NW #218-W
Washington, DC
20016

RECEIVED
1978 JUL 21
U.S. HOUSE SELECT
COMMITTEE

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth K. Selleck	7/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
531-50-7701	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

________________________ (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________

ID ________________

Benefits ________________

Payroll ________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth K. Selleck	7/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
531 50 7791	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Investigator	$16,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 11, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO
7/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Signature of Employee

7/11/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10155
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10155

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/21/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SHAPIRO, HOWARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Howard Louis Shapiro	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
114-44-4360	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Howard Louis Shapiro	3-21-78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
114-44-4360	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher Attorney	$18,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 23, 1978

________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN (Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: 22 March 1978

RE: Mr. Howard Shapiro

Please be advised that effective March 21, 1978, Mr. Howard Shapiro has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the John F. Kennedy Task Force, HSCA. His effective starting salary will be $18,000.00.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date 3/23/78

To: House Select Comm. on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☑ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepson
- stepdaughter
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ______________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ______________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Howard L. Shapiro
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

Shapiro

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10157
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10157

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/30/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SMITH, BEVERLY A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Beverly Ann Smith	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
235-94-3124	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Beverly Ann Smith	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
235-96-3124	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$13,000.00

*If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 13, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

October 13, 1978

Mr. Chairman:

We missed one. Beverly Ann Smith has been with the Committee a few days short of a year without any salary increase.

JEM
091
10/13/78

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Beverly Ann Smith	October ~~24~~ 30 LB, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
235-94-3124	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerk Typist	$11,500.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 31, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Howarth

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.
DATE: October 21, 1977
RE: Ms. Beverly A. Smith

Ms. Beverly A. Smith has accepted the position of Clerk Typist with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her effective starting date will be October 31, 1977, and her starting salary will be $11,500.00.

Your full co-operation will be appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Smith with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Beverly Ann Smith
Signature of Employee

10/31/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10158
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10158

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 03/13/78
PAGES : 4

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SMITH, CONSTANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last) Constance Smith	**Effective Date** 12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number 578-68-0385	**Type of Action** ☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Constance Smith	March 13, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
578-68-0385	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	13,500.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 879 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 13, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.CM.

DATE: March 1, 1978

RE: Ms. Constance (Connie) Smith

Please be advised that effective Monday, March 13, 1978, Ms. Constance Smith has accepted the position of Secretary with the John F. Kennedy Task Force. Her effective starting salary will be $13,500.00

ICM:j

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date March 13, 1978

To: Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☑ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepson
- stepdaughter
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ______________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ______________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Constance C. Smith
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10159
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 7

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10159

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/03/77
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Johanna Lynn Smith	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528-64-5299	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Johanna Lynn Smith	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528-64-5299	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Johanna Lynn Smith	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528-64-5299	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Document Clerk	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

__________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

__________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

eb

__________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Johanna Lynn Smith	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528-64-5299	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Johanna Lynn Smith	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528 64 5299	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	$10,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Johanna Lynn Smith	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528 64 5299	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	$10,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 17, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Johanna Lynn Smith	11/11/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
528 64 5299	X☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Document clerk	$8,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 11, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Johanna Lynn Smith
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10160
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10160

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/07/76
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SPRAGUE, RICHARD A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Three copies of resume. Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Richard A. Sprague	3/30/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
402 30 6486	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 30, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $_______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Richard A. Sprague	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
402-30-6486	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$24,354.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Richard A. Sprague	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
402 30 6486	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment X ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$25,740.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Committee on House Administration

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______

Rich A Sprague
Signature of Employee

2-9-77
Date

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Richard A. Sprague	11/15/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
432 30 6456	☐ Appointment title change ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Chief Counsel and Director	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1557 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 2, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

-blank F

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Pl[redacted] or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

([redacted]ons, or changes n this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

6689

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Richard A. Sprague	October 7, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
402-30-6486	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title 02274	**Gross Annual Salary**
Acting Counsel and Director	$39,600.00

2640.00 pr

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff–☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority–H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

10 -7 76 PM 4:18

H of R. FINANCE OFFICE

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 7, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: Frank Thompson
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

TD

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

50

A.S.

RICHARD A SPRAGUE
ACTING COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Presently of Counsel to David Berger, P. A., Attorneys at Law, 1622 Locust Street, Philadelphia, engaged principally in private practice and trial counsel in major national and international litigation, i.e. anti-trust and corporate trial work; and serving as Special Prosecutor for various District Attorneys in the U.S.

Formerly the First Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pa., from June 1966 until December, 1974. After appointment to the District Attorney's Office in 1958, served as Chief Assistant District Attorney-Chief of the Prosecution Division, Chief of the Trial Division and Chief of the Homicide Division. Represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as Prosecuting Attorney in more than 10,000 criminal trials, including hundreds of murder cases, more than sixty of which were first degree murder cases, and obtained the death penalty more than 20 times.

Served as Special Prosecutor for Washington County, Pa. for the prosecution of the Yablonski murder cases. Also served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States for the federal prosecution of W. A. "Tony" Boyle.

Acted as Special Prosecutor for Delaware County, Pa. from 1971 to 1974 to investigate allegations of governmental corruption.

Prior to joining the District Attorney's Office, served as a Voluntary Defender in the Defender Association of Philadelphia for more than 1 1/2 years.

Lecturer on Trial Tactics in Criminal Trials and Lecturer on Criminal Law Procedures at Temple University Law School, Philadelphia.

Faculty member, American Trial Lawyers Association.

ORGANIZATIONS:

Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the U.S.

Member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and American Bar Association.

Member of the Philadelphia Bar Association; from 1971 to 1974, member of Board of Governors; formerly Vice-Chairman of Committee on Criminal Law and member of numerous committees and sub-committees.

Formerly Treasurer of Philadelphia Regional Planning Council of the Governor's Justice Commission.

MILITARY SERVICE:

Served in the United States Navy, Submarine Service, during World War II.

EDUCATION:

LL.B. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

B.S. from Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.

Attended Lafayette High School, Lexington, Kentucky.

Born in Baltimore, Maryland, September 22, 1925

RICHARD A SPRAGUE
ACTING COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Presently of Counsel to David Berger, P. A., Attorneys at Law, 1622 Locust Street, Philadelphia, engaged principally in private practice and trial counsel in major national and international litigation, i.e. anti-trust and corporate trial work; and serving as Special Prosecutor for various District Attorneys in the U.S.

Formerly the First Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pa., from June 1966 until December, 1974. After appointment to the District Attorney's Office in 1958, served as Chief Assistant District Attorney-Chief of the Prosecution Division, Chief of the Trial Division and Chief of the Homicide Division. Represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as Prosecuting Attorney in more than 10,000 criminal trials, including hundreds of murder cases, more than sixty of which were first degree murder cases, and obtained the death penalty more than 20 times.

Served as Special Prosecutor for Washington County, Pa. for the prosecution of the Yablonski murder cases. Also served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States for the federal prosecution of W. A. "Tony" Boyle.

Acted as Special Prosecutor for Delaware County, Pa. from 1971 to 1974 to investigate allegations of governmental corruption.

Prior to joining the District Attorney's Office, served as a Voluntary Defender in the Defender Association of Philadelphia for more than 1 1/2 years.

Lecturer on Trial Tactics in Criminal Trials and Lecturer on Criminal Law Procedures at Temple University Law School, Philadelphia.

Faculty member, American Trial Lawyers Association.

ORGANIZATIONS:

Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the U.S.

Member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and American Bar Association.

Member of the Philadelphia Bar Association; from 1971 to 1974, member of Board of Governors; formerly Vice-Chairman of Committee on Criminal Law and member of numerous committees and sub-committees.

Formerly Treasurer of Philadelphia Regional Planning Council of the Governor's Justice Commission.

MILITARY SERVICE:

Served in the United States Navy, Submarine Service, during World War II.

EDUCATION:

LL.B. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

B.S. from Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.

Attended Lafayette High School, Lexington, Kentucky.

Born in Baltimore, Maryland, September 22, 1925

RICHARD A SPRAGUE

ACTING COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR
HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

Presently of Counsel to David Berger, P. A., Attorneys at Law, 1622 Locust Street, Philadelphia, engaged principally in private practice and trial counsel in major national and international litigation, i.e. anti-trust and corporate trial work; and serving as Special Prosecutor for various District Attorneys in the U.S.

Formerly the First Assistant District Attorney of Philadelphia County, Pa., from June 1966 until December, 1974. After appointment to the District Attorney's Office in 1958, served as Chief Assistant District Attorney-Chief of the Prosecution Division, Chief of the Trial Division and Chief of the Homicide Division. Represented the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania as Prosecuting Attorney in more than 10,000 criminal trials, including hundreds of murder cases, more than sixty of which were first degree murder cases, and obtained the death penalty more than 20 times.

Served as Special Prosecutor for Washington County, Pa. for the prosecution of the Yablonski murder cases. Also served as Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States for the federal prosecution of W. A. "Tony" Boyle.

Acted as Special Prosecutor for Delaware County, Pa. from 1971 to 1974 to investigate allegations of governmental corruption.

Prior to joining the District Attorney's Office, served as a Voluntary Defender in the Defender Association of Philadelphia for more than 1 1/2 years.

Lecturer on Trial Tactics in Criminal Trials and Lecturer on Criminal Law Procedures at Temple University Law School, Philadelphia.

Faculty member, American Trial Lawyers Association.

ORGANIZATIONS:

Member of the Bar of the Supreme Court of the U.S.

Member of the Pennsylvania Bar Association, and American Bar Association.

Member of the Philadelphia Bar Association; from 1971 to 1974, member of Board of Governors; formerly Vice-Chairman of Committee on Criminal Law and member of numerous committees and sub-committees.

Formerly Treasurer of Philadelphia Regional Planning Council of the Governor's Justice Commission.

MILITARY SERVICE:

Served in the United States Navy, Submarine Service, during World War II.

EDUCATION:

LL.B. from the University of Pennsylvania Law School.

B.S. from Temple University, Philadelphia, Pa.

Attended Lafayette High School, Lexington, Kentucky.

Born in Baltimore, Maryland, September 22, 1925

local substation

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

① Richard A. Sprague 402 30 6486
② THE PHILADELPHIAN
2401 Pennsylvania Avenue
③ Apartment 21 A2
④ Philadelphia, PA
19130

$ 2222.00 gross
$ 1608.66 net

MEMORANDUM OF CALL

TO: Becky

☑ YOU WERE CALLED BY— ☐ YOU WERE VISITED BY—

Kathy Hutton

OF (Organization) Finance office —

☐ PLEASE CALL ⟶ PHONE NO. CODE/EXT.

☐ WILL CALL AGAIN ☐ IS WAITING TO SEE YOU

☐ RETURNED YOUR CALL ☐ WISHES AN APPOINTMENT

MESSAGE has Sprague.
changed Mr S's
address in the
computer —

RECEIVED BY Ross. DATE 2-14 TIME 11:35

STANDARD FORM 63
REVISED AUGUST 1967
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

GPO : 1969—O48—16—80341-1 332-389

63-108

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

THE PHILADELPHIAN
Apt 21 A-2
19130

$2002 gross
$1,485.25 net

2,222.
1,608.66

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10161
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10161

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 08/01/77
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
SWENDSEN, LANCE W.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lance W. Svendsen	1/1/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
264-98-4680	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$13,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lance W. Svendsen	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
264-98-4680	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$18,100.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID __________
Office Code________	Benefits __________
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________	Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lance W. Svendsen	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
264-98-4680	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$13,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lance W. Svendsen	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
264-98-4680	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________ (Specify Date))
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Clerical Assistant	$12,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________
ID ______________________
Benefits ______________________
Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lance M. Svendsen	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
264-98-4580	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☒ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Clerical Assistant	$11,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

______ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

______ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes (Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

______ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman (Title - If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ______

Monthly Annuity $ ______.00 as of ______

ID ______

Benefits ______

Payroll ______

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Lance H. Svendsen	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
264 98 4680	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Xerox/Messenger	$9,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Signature of Employee

8/2/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10162
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 16

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10162

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/06/76
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
TANENBAUM, ROBERT K.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Three copies of resume. Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TANENBAUM, R.K. ✓
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number
Level
Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
12-6-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years
Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
1	1

Month	DAY OF MONTH																														ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					2	2	
Feb.																																1	1					3	3	
Mar.																																1	1					4	4	
Apr.																																1	1					5	5	
May																																1	1					6	6	
June																																1	1					7	7	
July																									X	X	X	X	X			1	1	8	8	5	0	3	8	
Aug.	X	X	X																													—	—	3	8	3	0	0	8	
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 8/3/77

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)
Date
Chief's Signature
Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House
Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

SCO A

32

NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS

FRANK THOMPSON, JR., N.J., CHAIRMAN

JOHN H. DENT, PA.
LUCIEN N. NEDZI, MICH.
JOHN BRADEMAS, IND.
AUGUSTUS F. HAWKINS, CALIF.
FRANK ANNUNZIO, ILL.
JOSEPH M. GAYDOS, PA.
ED JONES, TENN.
ROBERT H. MOLLOHAN, W. VA.
LIONEL VAN DEERLIN, CALIF.
JOSEPH G. MINISH, N.J.
MENDEL J. DAVIS, S.C.
CHARLES ROSE, N.C.
JOHN L. BURTON, CALIF.
EDWARD W. PATTISON, N.Y.
LEON E. PANETTA, CALIF.
JOSEPH S. AMMERMAN, PA.

WILLIAM L. DICKINSON, ALA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JAMES C. CLEVELAND, N.H.
CHARLES E. WIGGINS, CALIF.
J. HERBERT BURKE, FLA.
BILL FRENZEL, MINN.
DAVE STOCKMAN, MICH.
ROBERT E. BADHAM, CALIF.

WILLIAM G. PHILLIPS, STAFF DIRECTOR
ROBERT E. MOSS, GENERAL COUNSEL

Congreſs of the United States
House of Repreſentatives
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION
SUITE H-326, U.S. CAPITOL
Washington, D.C. 20515

OCT 11 1977

October 5, 1977

Honorable Louis Stokes
Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
3331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Lou:

This is in reply to your letter of September 26, 1977, requesting that Mr. Robert K. Tanenbaum former deputy chief counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations, due to an administrative error that was an oversight, be retroactively paid $300.00.

The Committee on House Administration is pleased to approve your request and by copy of this letter is so informing the Clerk of the House.

With kind regards,

Cordially,

Frank Thompson, Jr.

FT:rmc

Honorable Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr.

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 26, 1977

The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am requesting that you consider authorizing a retroactive pay adjustment for a former deputy chief counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Robert K. Tanenbaum. Mr. Tanenbaum's employment with the Committee was erroneously terminated at the close of business July 31--three days prior to the date he actually left the Committee. This administrative error was an oversight, which went unnoticed until after the August pay period when he notified the Committee that he had not received a paycheck for August 1 through 3. His annual rate of pay was $36,000; therefore, the amount I am requesting he be retroactively paid is $300.

Mr. Tanenbaum was a valuable employee, well thought of by the Committee. I regret the error and am hopeful that you will grant this request providing Mr. Tanenbaum the pay he has earned. If there is anything further I can provide, please do not hesitate to let me know. Your attention to this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:rwm

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 26, 1977

The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am requesting that you consider authorizing a retroactive pay adjustment for a former deputy chief counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Robert K. Tanenbaum. Mr. Tanenbaum's employment with the Committee was erroneously terminated at the close of business July 31--three days prior to the date he actually left the Committee. This administrative error was an oversight, which went unnoticed until after the August pay period when he notified the Committee that he had not received a paycheck for August 1 through 3. His annual rate of pay was $36,000; therefore, the amount I am requesting he be retroactively paid is $300.

Mr. Tanenbaum was a valuable employee, well thought of by the Committee. I regret the error and am hopeful that you will grant this request providing Mr. Tanenbaum the pay he has earned. If there is anything further I can provide, please do not hesitate to let me know. Your attention to this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:rwm

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

September 26, 1977

The Honorable Frank Thompson, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on House Administration
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I am requesting that you consider authorizing a retroactive pay adjustment for a former deputy chief counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Robert K. Tanenbaum. Mr. Tanenbaum's employment with the Committee was erroneously terminated at the close of business July 31--three days prior to the date he actually left the Committee. This administrative error was an oversight, which went unnoticed until after the August pay period when he notified the Committee that he had not received a paycheck for August 1 through 3. His annual rate of pay was $36,000; therefore, the amount I am requesting he be retroactively paid is $300.

Mr. Tanenbaum was a valuable employee, well thought of by the Committee. I regret the error and am hopeful that you will grant this request providing Mr. Tanenbaum the pay he has earned. If there is anything further I can provide, please do not hesitate to let me know. Your attention to this matter is very much appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:rwm

Howarth

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

July 20, 1977

Mr. Robert H. Smith
Director of Personnel
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Dear Mr. Smith:

Mr. Robert K. Tanenbaum commenced employment with the Select Committee on Assassinations on December 6, 1976 at a salary of $36,000 annually. He served as Deputy Chief Counsel in charge of the John F. Kennedy Task Force.

Had Mr. Tanenbaum elected to remain in that capacity with the Committee, he would have received a salary adjustment to $42,500 per annum effective August 1, 1977.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and
Director

GRB/ijr

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert K. Tanenbaum	7/31/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
127 32 4970	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Deputy Chief Counsel	

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert K. Tanenbaum	7/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
127 32 4970	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 6, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FO 7/7

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robett K. Tanenbaum	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
127 32 4970	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert K. Tanenbaum	[illegible] 2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
127-32-4970	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$22,140.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____ ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert Karl Tanenbaum	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
127 32 4970	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$2 $23,400.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Robert Karl Tenenbaum	12/6/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
127 32 4970	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Deputy Chief Counsel	$36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 2, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Signature of Employee

Jan. 10, 1977
Date

10/29/76 - 2pm

DISTRICT ATTORNEY
OF THE
COUNTY OF NEW YORK
155 LEONARD STREET
NEW YORK, N. Y. 10013
RE 2-7300

1664

ROBERT M. MORGENTHAU
District Attorney

Neighborhood Complaint Offices:
Harlem Branch
55 West 125 Street
New York, N. Y. 10027
(212) 831-8661
West Side Branch
2112 Broadway
New York, N. Y. 10023
(212) 595-0760

October 26, 1976

Richard Sprague, Esq.
1622 Locust Street
Philadelphia, PA 19103

Dear Mr. Sprague:

I have enclosed herewith a copy of my resume. I look forward to meeting and speaking with you in the near future.

Sincerely,

Robert Tanenbaum

Robert Tanenbaum
Trial Bureau Chief

Resume

Robert Karl Tanenbaum
210 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
December 17, 1942
Married - Patricia Tyre Tanenbaum
Child - Rachael Katherine
Office Phone: (212) 732-7300

New York County District Attorney's Office
August 5, 1968 to present - appointed by District Attorney Frank Hogan and Robert M. Morgenthau

1. Bureau Chief of Supreme Court Trial Bureau May 3, 1976 to present.

2. Bureau Chief of Criminal Courts Bureau May 1975 to May 3, 1976.

3. In charge of training of legal staff of District Attorney's Office May 1975 to present.

4. Deputy Bureau Chief Homicide Bureau August 1973 to May 1975
   - (a) Senior Trial Assistant Homicide Bureau
   - (b) General supervision and presentation of several hundred homicide cases before the grand jury

Major Trials and Investigations:

1. Investigation, Trial, and Conviction of three self-proclaimed members of the Black Liberation Army for the double murders of two New York City Police Officers Joseph Piagentini and Waverly Jones that occurred on 5-21-71 at the site of Colon al Park housing project, adjacent to the Polo Grounds. Jury Verdict: April 10, 1975 Sentence: May 12, 1975

2. Directed Grand Jury investigation into the death of Joseph Gallo which occurred on April 7, 1972.

   The following indictments were handed up by the Grand Jury: Vincent Aloi, reputed acting head of Columbo Crime Family, for the crime of perjury in the first degree.
   Peter Diapolous, reputed bodyguard of Joseph Gallo, for the crime of possession of a weapon.
   Joseph Gorgone for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
   Phillip Gambino for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
   John Arcaro for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.

Alphonse Indelicato for the crime of perjury in the first degree.
Dominick Trinchera for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
Jerry Langella for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
Vic Orena for the crime of perjury in the first degree.

Dispositions:

1. Peter Diapolous - conducted trial resulting in conviction 9-28-72.
2. Vincent Aloi - conducted trial resulting in conviction 6-26-73.
3. Joseph Gorgone - pleaded guilty.
4. Phillip Gambino - pleaded guilty.
5. John Arcaro - pleaded guilty.
6. Jerry Langella - pleaded guilty.
7. Dominick Trinchera - pleaded guilty.
8. Vic Orena - pleaded guilty.

3. Trial and Conviction of Robert Bongiovi, reputed bodyguard of Joe Gallo, for the gangland murder of Samuel Wuyak that occurred on 3-11-73 inside the Broadway Pub at 133 West 45th Street. Jury Verdict: May 10, 1973.

4. Trial and Conviction of Fritz Montalalou for the revenge double murder of East Village folk singer's wife, Marilyn Mackey and her 9 year old son, Shaw Mackey, that occurred on 5-10-72. Jury Verdict: December 20, 1973.

5. Trial and Conviction of Hosie Turner for the felony murder of Roberta Herbert that occurred at 1:00 p.m. in front of 494 Hudson Street on 8-8-73 in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan. Jury Verdict: October 25, 1974.

6. Investigation and Conviction (after extensive pre-trial hearings defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment - Murder) of Charles Yukl for the ligature strangulation of Karin Schlegel who answered an advertisement placed by the defendant in Show Business newspaper seeking young actresses for movie appearances. Pleaded Guilty: April 20, 1976

7. Investigation and Grand Jury Presentation of the case involving five self-proclaimed Croatian Nationalists for the bomb blast death of Police Officer Brian Murray that occurred on September 11, 1976.

Public Activities: Organizer and Coordinator of District Attorney's Office Staff and volunteers during District Attorney Frank Hogan Primary Campaign '73.

Lecturer:

1. National College of District Attorneys, Houston, Texas, April 1976 - Voir Dire + Opening Statement

2. New York State District Attorney's Association June 1976 - Eye-witness Identification + Line-up Procedures.

3. New York City Homicide Investigators Course conducted by the Detectives Bureau and New York City Robbery School conducted by the Chief of Detectives Office - citywide seminar for detectives assigned to homicide and robbery squads.

Law School:

University of California, Berkeley
Boalt Hall School of Law
Juris Doctor, 1968
Activities: Head Tutoring Program for Disadvantaged University Entrants
Attorney General of Student Body
Ass't Varsity Basketball Coach, University of California, Berkeley

Tyre & Kamins
Century City
Beverly Hills, Calif.
Corporate Law - summer '67

College:

University of California, Berkeley
Bachelor of Arts, 1965
Activities: President Class '65
California Club (25 member organization representing each campus of the Univ. of California selected by Univ. Pres. Clark Kerr)
Honor Student Society
Varsity Debate Team
Freshman Basketball

High School:

New Rochelle High School
Captain Basketball Team
Scholarships: Appointment U.S. Naval Academy, Stanford, Columbia, University of California, Berkeley

Resume

Robert Karl Tanenbaum
210 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
December 17, 1942
Married - Patricia Tyre Tanenbaum
Child - Rachael Katherine
Office Phone: (212) 732-7300

New York County District Attorney's Office
August 5, 1968 to present - appointed by District Attorney Frank Hogan and Robert M. Morgenthau

1. Bureau Chief of Supreme Court Trial Bureau May 3, 1976 to present.
2. Bureau Chief of Criminal Courts Bureau May 1975 to May 3, 1976.
3. In charge of training of legal staff of District Attorney's Office May 1975 to present.
4. Deputy Bureau Chief Homicide Bureau August 1973 to May 1975
   - (a) Senior Trial Assistant Homicide Bureau
   - (b) General supervision and presentation of several hundred homicide cases before the grand jury

Major Trials and Investigations:

1. Investigation, Trial, and Conviction of three self-proclaimed members of the Black Liberation Army for the double murders of two New York City Police Officers Joseph Piagentini and Waverly Jones that occurred on 5-21-71 at the site of Colon al Park housing project, adjacent to the Polo Grounds. Jury Verdict: April 10, 1975 Sentence: May 12, 1975
2. Directed Grand Jury investigation into the death of Joseph Gallo which occurred on April 7, 1972.

   The following indictments were handed up by the Grand Jury: Vincent Aloi, reputed acting head of Columbo Crime Family, for the crime of perjury in the first degree.
   Peter Diapolous, reputed bodyguard of Joseph Gallo, for the crime of possession of a weapon.
   Joseph Gorgone for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
   Phillip Gambino for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
   John Arcaro for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.

Alphonse Indelicato for the crime of perjury in the first degree.
Dominick Trinchera for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
Jerry Langella for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
Vic Orena for the crime of perjury in the first degree.

Dispositions:

1. Peter Diapolous - conducted trial resulting in conviction 9-28-72.
2. Vincent Aloi - conducted trial resulting in conviction 6-26-73.
3. Joseph Gorgone - pleaded guilty.
4. Phillip Gambino - pleaded guilty.
5. John Arcaro - pleaded guilty.
6. Jerry Langella - pleaded guilty.
7. Dominick Trinchera - pleaded guilty.
8. Vic Orena - pleaded guilty.

3. Trial and Conviction of Robert Bongiovi, reputed bodyguard of Joe Gallo, for the gangland murder of Samuel Wuyak that occurred on 3-11-73 inside the Broadway Pub at 133 West 45th Street. Jury Verdict: May 10, 1973.

4. Trial and Conviction of Fritz Montalalou for the revenge double murder of East Village folk singer's wife, Marilyn Mackey and her 9 year old son, Shaw Mackey, that occurred on 5-10-72. Jury Verdict: December 20, 1973.

5. Trial and Conviction of Hosie Turner for the felony murder of Roberta Herbert that occurred at 1:00 p.m. in front of 494 Hudson Street on 8-8-73 in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan. Jury Verdict: October 25, 1974.

6. Investigation and Conviction (after extensive pre-trial hearings defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment - Murder) of Charles Yukl for the ligature strangulation of Karin Schlegel who answered an advertisement placed by the defendant in Show Business newspaper seeking young actresses for movie appearances. Pleaded Guilty: April 20, 1976

7. Investigation and Grand Jury Presentation of the case involving five self-proclaimed Croatian Nationalists for the bomb blast death of Police Officer Brian Murray that occurred on September 11, 1976.

Public Activities: Organizer and Coordinator of District Attorney's Office Staff and volunteers during District Attorney Frank Hogan Primary Campaign '73.

Lecturer:

1. National College of District Attorneys, Houston, Texas, April 1976 - Voir Dire + Opening Statement

2. New York State District Attorney's Association June 1976 - Eye-witness Identification + Line-up Procedures.

3. New York City Homicide Investigators Course conducted by the Detectives Bureau and New York City Robbery School conducted by the Chief of Detectives Office - citywide seminar for detectives assigned to homicide and robbery squads.

Law School:

University of California, Berkeley
Boalt Hall School of Law
Juris Doctor, 1968
Activities: Head Tutoring Program for Disadvantaged University Entrants
Attorney General of Student Body
Ass't Varsity Basketball Coach, University of California, Berkeley

Tyre & Kamins
Century City
Beverly Hills, Calif.
Corporate Law - summer '67

College:

University of California, Berkeley
Bachelor of Arts, 1965
Activities: President Class '65
California Club (25 member organization representing each campus of the Univ. of California selected by Univ. Pres. Clark Kerr)
Honor Student Society
Varsity Debate Team
Freshman Basketball

High School:

New Rochelle High School
Captain Basketball Team
Scholarships: Appointment U.S. Naval Academy, Stanford, Columbia, University of California, Berkeley

Resume

Robert Karl Tanenbaum
210 East 68th Street
New York, New York 10021
December 17, 1942
Married - Patricia Tyre Tanenbaum
Child - Rachael Katherine
Office Phone: (212) 732-7300

New York County District Attorney's Office
August 5, 1968 to present - appointed by District Attorney Frank Hogan and Robert M. Morgenthau

1. Bureau Chief of Supreme Court Trial Bureau
   May 3, 1976 to present.
2. Bureau Chief of Criminal Courts Bureau
   May 1975 to May 3, 1976.
3. In charge of training of legal staff of District Attorney's Office May 1975 to present.
4. Deputy Bureau Chief Homicide Bureau
   August 1973 to May 1975
   - (a) Senior Trial Assistant Homicide Bureau
   - (b) General supervision and presentation of several hundred homicide cases before the grand jury

Major Trials and Investigations:

1. Investigation, Trial, and Conviction of three self-proclaimed members of the Black Liberation Army for the double murders of two New York City Police Officers Joseph Piagentini and Waverly Jones that occurred on 5-21-71 at the site of Colonial Park housing project, adjacent to the Polo Grounds. Jury Verdict: April 10, 1975 Sentence: May 12, 1975
2. Directed Grand Jury investigation into the death of Joseph Gallo which occurred on April 7, 1972.

   The following indictments were handed up by the Grand Jury: Vincent Aloi, reputed acting head of Columbo Crime Family, for the crime of perjury in the first degree.
   Peter Diapolous, reputed bodyguard of Joseph Gallo, for the crime of possession of a weapon.
   Joseph Gorgone for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
   Phillip Gambino for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
   John Arcaro for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.

Alphonse Indelicato for the crime of perjury in the first degree.
Dominick Trinchera for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
Jerry Langella for the crime of criminal contempt in the first degree.
Vic Orena for the crime of perjury in the first degree.

Dispositions:

1. Peter Diapolous - conducted trial resulting in conviction 9-28-72.
2. Vincent Aloi - conducted trial resulting in conviction 6-26-73.
3. Joseph Gorgone - pleaded guilty.
4. Phillip Gambino - pleaded guilty.
5. John Arcaro - pleaded guilty.
6. Jerry Langella - pleaded guilty.
7. Dominick Trinchera - pleaded guilty.
8. Vic Orena - pleaded guilty.

3. Trial and Conviction of Robert Bongiovi, reputed bodyguard of Joe Gallo, for the gangland murder of Samuel Wuyak that occurred on 3-11-73 inside the Broadway Pub at 133 West 45th Street. Jury Verdict: May 10, 1973.

4. Trial and Conviction of Fritz Montalalou for the revenge double murder of East Village folk singer's wife, Marilyn Mackey and her 9 year old son, Shaw Mackey, that occurred on 5-10-72. Jury Verdict: December 20, 1973.

5. Trial and Conviction of Hosie Turner for the felony murder of Roberta Herbert that occurred at 1:00 p.m. in front of 494 Hudson Street on 8-8-73 in the Greenwich Village section of Manhattan. Jury Verdict: October 25, 1974.

6. Investigation and Conviction (after extensive pre-trial hearings defendant pleaded guilty to the indictment - Murder) of Charles Yukl for the ligature strangulation of Karin Schlegel who answered an advertisement placed by the defendant in Show Business newspaper seeking young actresses for movie appearances. Pleaded Guilty: April 20, 1976

7. Investigation and Grand Jury Presentation of the case involving five self-proclaimed Croatian Nationalists for the bomb blast death of Police Officer Brian Murray that occurred on September 11, 1976.

Public Activities: Organizer and Coordinator of District Attorney's Office Staff and volunteers during District Attorney Frank Hogan Primary Campaign '73.

Lecturer:

1. National College of District Attorneys, Houston, Texas, April 1976 - Voir Dire + Opening Statement

2. New York State District Attorney's Association June 1976 - Eye-witness Identification + Line-up Procedures.

3. New York City Homicide Investigators Course conducted by the Detectives Bureau and New York City Robbery School conducted by the Chief of Detectives Office - citywide seminar for detectives assigned to homicide and robbery squads.

Law School: University of California, Berkeley
Boalt Hall School of Law
Juris Doctor, 1968
Activities: Head Tutoring Program for Disadvantaged University Entrants
Attorney General of Student Body
Ass't Varsity Basketball Coach, University of California, Berkeley

Tyre & Kamins
Century City
Beverly Hills, Calif.
Corporate Law - summer '67

College: University of California, Berkeley
Bachelor of Arts, 1965
Activities: President Class '65
California Club (25 member organization representing each campus of the Univ. of California selected by Univ. Pres. Clark Kerr)
Honor Student Society
Varsity Debate Team
Freshman Basketball

High School: New Rochelle High School
Captain Basketball Team
Scholarships: Appointment U.S. Naval Academy, Stanford, Columbia, University of California, Berkeley

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10163
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 11

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 9

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10163

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 11

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TAYLOR, Ann

Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years .... Months ....

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
6	11

Month	DAY OF MONTH 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Sick Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Annual Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Sick Leave	USED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	USED THIS MONTH Sick Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Annual Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Sick Leave	EMPLOYEE INITIALS
Jan.																S											S					1	1	7	12		2	7	10	
Feb.																											X	X				1	1	8	11	2		6	11	
Mar.																																1	1					7	12	
Apr.																																1	1					8	13	
May																																1	1					9	14	
June		X														A			A			/A	/A					A		X		1	1	10	15	2		8	15	
July					X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X																						8		0	15	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/15/78

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
■ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature — Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature — Date

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	July 15, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036-34-9137	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 28, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code____________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ____________________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll _______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	July 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036-34-9187	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$19,300

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 28, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	June 30, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036-34-9187	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036-34-9187	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Researcher	$19,300

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036-34-9187	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Senior Researcher	18,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036 34 9187	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$17,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036 34 9187	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$36,100

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
036-34-9187	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,455.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration:

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Furnald Taylor	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$17,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1976

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________

Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10164
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 18

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10164

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/08/76
PAGES : 24

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
THORNELL, JOAN TALBERT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

July 11, 1977

Mrs. Joan Thornell
Special Assistant to the Treasurer
Office of the Treasurer of the
United States
Washington, D.C. 20220

Dear Mrs. Thornell:

I am sorry you feel that you were not treated fairly upon termination of your services with the Committee.

When I received your letter, I asked Tom Howarth to give me a memorandum outlining the terms of your settlement. Enclosed is a copy.

I am sure that after you read the memorandum, you will agree that the Committee was more than fair, especially in light of the fact there was no official leave policy at the time and thus, no obligation to pay any terminating compensation at all.

As to your main area of concern, the one-day break in service, Mr. Howarth's memorandum points out that such a break has no effect whatsoever on the transfer of your benefits.

I wish you every success in your new position with the Administration.

Sincerely,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS/thj
cc: Honorable Walker E. Fauntroy, M.C.

MEMORANDUM

TO: CHAIRMAN STOKES

FROM: THOMAS HOWARTH
BUDGET OFFICER

DATE: JUNE 14, 1977

RE: JOAN T. THORNELL, LETTER RE LEAVE

Mrs. Thornell left at the close of business on Friday, May 13, 1977. As the Committee had no leave policy at that time, she made her termination effective Sunday, May 15, 1977, at my suggestion, so that she would receive two days extra in pay.

Mrs. Thornell began employment November 8, 1976 and left May 13, 1977. Under the Clerk of the House's leave policy, she would be entitled to 5 days, no credit being given for a fraction of a month when hired or a fraction of a month when terminated.

The Clerk's policy further states there are no provisions to permit reimbursement to an employee upon termination for any accumulation of leave. However, to the extent possible and practicable, every effort should be made to consider such accumulation when submitting a recommendation for termination.

Twelve Committee Staff Members with a total of 42 days accumulated leave who have terminated, including one who terminated the same day as Mrs. Thornell, were given no credit for their leave because the Committee had no policy at that time.

This fact and the fact that Mrs. Thornell was paid for six days past May 13, in my opinion, discredits Mrs. Thornell claim to "the punitive nature of the decision." The facts clearly show that Mrs. Thornell was given special consideration.

For the record, Acting Chief Counsel Al Lewis was paid for no accumulated leave. After Mr. Lewis left the Committee, he was kept on the payroll long enough to recover his back salary which I understand was the Committee's request. (Mrs. Thornell had already recovered her back salary.)

As to Mrs. Thornell's break in service, I have been told by the Finance Office that such a break has no effect whatsoever on the transfer of her benefits.

cc: Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy, M.C.

MAY 31 1977

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 1789

THE TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

May 27, 1977

Hon Louis B. Stokes
Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Chairman Stokes:

The circumstances of my departure from the Committee staff have saddened me because of the following:

On May 6, 1977, in writing (enclosed) I advised the then-Acting Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Alvin B. Lewis, Jr., of my intention to leave the staff as of May 15, 1977 plus whatever vacation time I had accrued since my date of entry to service, November 8, 1976.

Since there was no formal leave policy established by the Committee at the date of my notice and since I was aware of leave being extended to the Acting Chief Counsel who was also leaving service at about the same time, I began making inquiries about my own accrued leave.

On Thursday, May 12, Thomas Howarth, the Budget Officer, advised me verbally that he had not yet cleared with you the rate of leave to be extended to me in days accrued per month, but he thought that a rate of one day per month was going to be approved. On that basis, he calculated that I would be allowed 5 1/2 or 6 days of leave.

When I began a new appointment with a Federal agency on Monday, May 23, I called Mr. Howarth from the new personnel office to establish my date of termination in order to comply with the Federal law which prohibits Federal employees from receiving payment from more than one Federal source at a time. In other words, I was attempting to clear the date of May 23 as a starting date for the new employment.

At that time, Mr. Howarth advised that I had been terminated on May 19, based on a calculation of leave beginning May 14 for a total of 6 days -- which included counting weekend days in the leave period. At the time of our initial conversation, however, I was not advised that weekend days would be counted in the calculation of the leave period.

He further advised that since the House payroll system is based on a 30-day month, for purposes of calculating a termination date he counted weekend days, whereas a vacationing employee who would be returning to work after vacation would not have weekend days counted. (I checked with the Committee on House Administration and learned that though each Committee establishes its own leave policy, it is unusual to penalize a terminating employee by counting in weekend days.)

Inasmuch as there was no written leave policy I had no way of anticipating his method of calculating leave. And because of the punitive nature of the decision I have suffered a break in service which may affect seriously my transfer of benefits from the House of Representatives to my new employment. Had I been aware of his method of calculating leave, my dates of departure from the Committee, obviously, would have been different.

I hope that you will review the calculation of my date of departure and act swiftly to rectify the situation to allow my termination date from the Committee to be set at Friday, May 20, 1977, which would reflect 5 working days leave from the Committee.

I have already acted to begin employment at the Department of the Treasury as of May 23. I gladly forfeit the 6th vacation day which would have been May 23.

Thank you in advance for your kind attention to this matter and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Joan

Joan Talbert Thornell
Special Assistant to the
Treasurer-Designate

cc: Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy, M.C.

Enclosure

June 16, 1977

Mrs. Joan Talbert Thornell
3175 Apple Road, N.E.
Washington, DC. 20018

Dear Joan:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the Staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

May 6, 1977

MEMORANDUM

To : Alvin B. Lewis, Jr.

From : Joan Talbert Thornell

It has been my pleasure to serve as your Special Assistant for Administrative Projects. Your recent assignments in the areas of affirmative action and staff review are nearing completion.

I will be leaving the staff of the Select Committee on Assassinations as of May 15, 1977 (plus any vacation time that may have accrued to me since November, 1976).

I wish you all the best in your new undertakings and I have appreciated your sensitivity during a difficult time.

Thanks.

MEMORANDUM

TO: CHAIRMAN STOKES

FROM: THOMAS HOWARTH
BUDGET OFFICER

DATE: JUNE 14, 1977

RE: JOAN T. THORNELL, LETTER RE LEAVE

Mrs. Thornell left at the close of business on Friday, May 13, 1977. As the Committee had no leave policy at that time, she made her termination effective Sunday, May 15, 1977, at my suggestion, so that she would receive two days extra in pay.

Mrs. Thornell began employment November 8, 1976 and left May 13, 1977. Under the Clerk of the House's leave policy, she would be entitled to 5 days, no credit being given for a fraction of a month when hired or a fraction of a month when terminated.

The Clerk's policy further states there are no provisions to permit reimbursement to an employee upon termination for any accumulation of leave. However, to the extent possible and practicable, every effort should be made to consider such accumulation when submitting a recommendation for termination.

Twelve Committee Staff Members with a total of 42 days accumulated leave who have terminated, including one who terminated the same day as Mrs. Thornell, were given no credit for their leave because the Committee had no policy at that time.

This fact and the fact that Mrs. Thornell was paid for six days past May 13, in my opinion, discredits Mrs. Thornell claim to "the punitive nature of the decision." The facts clearly show that Mrs. Thornell was given special consideration.

For the record, Acting Chief Counsel Al Lewis was paid for no accumulated leave. After Mr. Lewis left the Committee, he was kept on the payroll long enough to recover his back salary which I understand was the Committee's request. (Mrs. Thornell had already recovered her back salary.)

As to Mrs. Thornell's break in service, I have been told by the Finance Office that such a break has no effect whatsoever on the transfer of her benefits.

cc: Honorable Walter E. Fauntroy, M.C.

MAY 31 1977

THE DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY 1789

THE TREASURER OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

May 27, 1977

Hon Louis B. Stokes
Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Chairman Stokes:

The circumstances of my departure from the Committee staff have saddened me because of the following:

On May 6, 1977, in writing (enclosed) I advised the then-Acting Chief Counsel and Staff Director, Alvin B. Lewis, Jr., of my intention to leave the staff as of May 15, 1977 plus whatever vacation time I had accrued since my date of entry to service, November 8, 1976.

Since there was no formal leave policy established by the Committee at the date of my notice and since I was aware of leave being extended to the Acting Chief Counsel who was also leaving service at about the same time, I began making inquiries about my own accrued leave.

On Thursday, May 12, Thomas Howarth, the Budget Officer, advised me verbally that he had not yet cleared with you the rate of leave to be extended to me in days accrued per month, but he thought that a rate of one day per month was going to be approved. On that basis, he calculated that I would be allowed 5 1/2 or 6 days of leave.

When I began a new appointment with a Federal agency on Monday, May 23, I called Mr. Howarth from the new personnel office to establish my date of termination in order to comply with the Federal law which prohibits Federal employees from receiving payment from more than one Federal source at a time. In other words, I was attempting to clear the date of May 23 as a starting date for the new employment.

At that time, Mr. Howarth advised that I had been terminated on May 19, based on a calculation of leave beginning May 14 for a total of 6 days -- which included counting weekend days in the leave period. At the time of our initial conversation, however, I was not advised that weekend days would be counted in the calculation of the leave period.

He further advised that since the House payroll system is based on a 30-day month, for purposes of calculating a termination date he counted weekend days, whereas a vacationing employee who would be returning to work after vacation would not have weekend days counted. (I checked with the Committee on House Administration and learned that though each Committee establishes its own leave policy, it is unusual to penalize a terminating employee by counting in weekend days.)

Inasmuch as there was no written leave policy I had no way of anticipating his method of calculating leave. And because of the punitive nature of the decision I have suffered a break in service which may affect seriously my transfer of benefits from the House of Representatives to my new employment. Had I been aware of his method of calculating leave, my dates of departure from the Committee, obviously, would have been different.

I hope that you will review the calculation of my date of departure and act swiftly to rectify the situation to allow my termination date from the Committee to be set at Friday, May 20, 1977, which would reflect 5 working days leave from the Committee.

I have already acted to begin employment at the Department of the Treasury as of May 23. I gladly forfeit the 6th vacation day which would have been May 23.

Thank you in advance for your kind attention to this matter and I look forward to hearing from you soon.

Sincerely,

Joan

Joan Talbert Thornell
Special Assistant to the
Treasurer-Designate

cc: Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy, M.C.

Enclosure

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joan Talbert Thornell	5/19/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 16, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1977—80—199

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Joan Talbert Thornell	5/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

5/1 - 8 - 1055.56.
~~5/9~~ ~~416.67~~
5/9 -15 486.11
1541.67

5 11 77 PM 2:58
H. R. FINANCE OFFICE

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. ~~3110(b)~~, prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:
(Chairman, Committee on House Administration)

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joan Talbert Thornell	5/15/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joan Talbert Thornell	5/9/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$25,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________ May 10, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joan Talbert Thornell	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Joan Talbert Thornell	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-54-1505	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$15,375.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level_______ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28--77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Joan Talbert Thornell	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$16,250.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date ________________________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code __________

Monthly Annuity $ __________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Joan Talbert Thornell	11/8/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579 54 1505	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Special Assistant	$25,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1557 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1976 ______________________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Jean Talbert Thornell
Signature of Employee

January 11, 1977
Date

JOAN TALBERT THORNELL

25
8 Nov

122 Sixth Street, S. E.
Washington, D. C. 20003
543 - 7785

579·54·1505

EDUCATION & TRAINING

Valedictory, 1956, Dunbar High School; Washington, D.C.
A.B., Psychology, 1960, George Washington University; Washington, D.C.
Professional Training in Dance Therapy, 1958-61, St. Elizabeths Hospital

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Chronological)

6/76 - 8/76	Editorial and Research Consultant to the Joint Committee on Arrangements for Commemoration of the Bicentennial for its dual project (publication and exhibit for U.S. Capitol), "Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1976"
9/75 - 6/76	Fundraising Consultant for The Black Student Fund -- a scholarship and service organization to increase black enrollment in independent schools in the Washington metropolitan area.
10/75 - 2/76	Planning Consultant to the National Council of Organizations for Children and Youth for their first national conference
4/73 - 2/75	Assistant to the President for Special Projects The National Urban Coalition M. Carl Holman, President Planning national and local conferences and meetings, awards events and other special projects; designing public relations strategy; liaison with the Chairman, Walter N. Rothschild, Jr.
11/72 - 2/73	Consultant, Office of Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. Researching formation of new House Committee on the District of Columbia; arranging ceremony to cite Congressman Diggs' appointment as Chairman by House Speaker Carl Albert.
8/72 - 10/72	Consultant to McGovern/Shriver Campaign Establishing representative membership on the Issue Task Forces of the national campaign staff; coordinating Education Task Force; Marian Wright Edelman, Chairwoman.
7/72 and Runoff 9/72	Assistant to the Campaign Director for the Successful Mayoral Campaign of Hon. A.J. Cooper, Prichard, Alabama Coordinating volunteers; establishing telephone bank, day care center, and car pool operations for voter registration and election.

1/72 - 10/72
Staff Director
The National Black Political Convention, Inc.
Administrative follow-up to the Gary Convention; publication of "The National Black Political Agenda"

2/72 - 4/72
Fellow, The Joint Center for Political Studies, serving as Staff Coordinator, Platform Committee of The National Black Political Convention, Gary, Indiana. Platform Commitee Chairman, Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy (Del, D.C.)

9/71 - 1/72
Staff Director
Hon. D'Army Bailey and Hon. Ira Simmons
City Council, Berkeley California
Coordinating staff of researchers and clerical workers; supervision of three staff members and fifty volunteers.

1/71 - 6/71
Director, District Office of
Hon. Willie L. Brown, Jr.
State Assemblyman and Chairman, Ways and Means Committee
San Francisco, California
Liaison with Sacremento office; administration of district office with four employees and over 100 volunteers.

3/70 - 12/70
Consultant, Self-employed. New York City
Speech writing, editing and research; program planning, development and evaluation.
Manager for Cecil P. Taylor, pianist and composer.

1/69 - 3/70
New York Urban Coalition
2. Special Assistant to the Executive Vice President for Education and Manpower, Lincoln O. Lynch
    Staff supervision (8 employees), research, speech writing and publication design
1. Assistant to the Executive Director, Coalition JOBS, William Kaufmann. Conference coordination and staff supervision (52 employees).

1/68 - 11/68
Volunteer Community Work
New Haven, Connecticut
Chairman, Black Women of Greater New Haven
Board of Directors, Black Coalition of New Haven
Executive Committee, Board of Directors, Community Housing, Inc., non-profit housing development corporation
Board of Directors, Yale Upward Bound
Board of Directors, Perspectives -- program for high school students

4/67 - 12/67
Director, Harvard-Yale-Columbia Intensive Summer Studies Program; New Haven, Connecticut
Program purpose: to recruit, select, train and place students from predominantly Black southern colleges in the graduate programs of the three cooperating universities and other graduate schools. Staff of four; faculty of fifty; 150 students.

10/65 - 1/67	The White House, Washington, D. C. 2. Executive Assistant to the Chairman The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service Hon. Burke Marshall, Chairman Liaison with commission members; arrangements for all commission meetings; coordination of publication of commission report. 1. White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights" Special Assistant to the Director/Senior Staff Associate Planning and implementation of the civil rights conference; assisting in the drafting and editing of the final report.
4/65 - 10/65	Personal Secretary to the Director Peace Corps and Office of Economic Opportunity Hon. R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.
1/65 - 4/65	Administrative Assistant to the Inspector General/OEO William F. Haddad, Associate Director/Inspector General
11/63 - 1/65	Maternity Leave
9/62 - 11/63	Administrative Assistant to the Associate Director for Plannin Evaluation and Research, Peace Corps. William F. Haddad
4/62 - 9/62	Dance Therapist, St. Elizabeths Hospital Conducting dance therapy sessions with schizophrenic patients; participating in diagnostic and treatment-planning staff meetings.
7/61 - 4/62	Selection Officer Peace Corps Member of initial group which set standards for selection of Peace Corps Volunteers.
6/60 - 6/61	Assistant to the Casting Director David Merrick Productions New York City Arranging audition schedules; replacement casting for children's roles in Gypsy, Take Me Along, and Carnival; production assistant for Becket, A Taste of Honey and Do Re Mi. Reviewing off-Broadway plays for audition candidates; manuscript review of new novels and new plays for the largest Broadway production office.

REFERENCES

M. Carl Holman
President
The National Urban Coalition
1201 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C.
331-2447

Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the District of Columbia
House of Representatives
2208 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515
225-2261

Hon. Richard G. Hatcher
Mayor
City Hall
401 Broadway
Gary, Indiana
219/944-6700

Hon. A. J. Cooper
Mayor
City Hall
Prichard, Alabama

Hon. Lisle C. Carter
Chancellor
Atlanta University Center
594 University Place, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30314
414/522-8980

Edward C. Sylvester, Jr.
Staff Director
Committee on the District of Columbia
House of Representatives
1310 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515
225-4457

Kingman Brewster, Jr.
President
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
203/787-3131

Burke Marshall
Assistant Dean
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
203/787-3131

Walter N. Rothschild, Jr.
Chairman
The National Urban Coalition
521 Fifth Avenue
Suite 3701
New York, New York 10017
212/862-2928

R. Sargent Shriver, Jr., Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shirver
& Kampleman
Suite 1000
Watergate 600 Building
600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20037
965-9400

Roger Wilkins
Editorial Board
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York
212/556-1234

Recommended By Congresswoman Boggs THORNELL

Research

JOAN TALBERT THORNELL

122 Sixth Street, S. E.
Washington, D. C. 20003
543 - 7785

lettersent
10/7

EDUCATION & TRAINING

Valedictory, 1956, Dunbar High School; Washington, D.C.
A.B., Psychology, 1960, George Washington University; Washington, D.C.
Professional Training in Dance Therapy, 1958-61, St. Elizabeths Hospital

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Chronological)

6/76 - 8/76	Editorial and Research Consultant to the Joint Committee on Arrangements for Commemoration of the Bicentennial for its dual project (publication and exhibit for U.S. Capitol), "Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1976"
9/75 - 6/76	Fundraising Consultant for The Black Student Fund -- a scholarship and service organization to increase black enrollment in independent schools in the Washington metropolitan area.
10/75 - 2/76	Planning Consultant to the National Council of Organizations for Children and Youth for their first national conference
4/73 - 2/75	Assistant to the President for Special Projects The National Urban Coalition M. Carl Holman, President Planning national and local conferences and meetings, awards events and other special projects; designing public relations strategy; liaison with the Chairman, Walter N. Rothschild, Jr.
11/72 - 2/73	Consultant, Office of Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. Researching formation of new House Committee on the District of Columbia; arranging ceremony to cite Congressman Diggs' appointment as Chairman by House Speaker Carl Albert.
8/72 - 10/72	Consultant to McGovern/Shriver Campaign Establishing representative membership on the Issue Task Forces of the national campaign staff; coordinating Education Task Force; Marian Wright Edelman, Chairwoman.
7/72 and Runoff 9/72	Assistant to the Campaign Director for the Successful Mayoral Campaign of Hon. A.J. Cooper, Prichard, Alabama Coordinating volunteers; establishing telephone bank, day care center, and car pool operations for voter registration and election.

4/72 - 10/72	Staff Director The National Black Political Convention, Inc. Administrative follow-up to the Gary Convention; publication of "The National Black Political Agenda"
2/72 - 4/72	Fellow, The Joint Center for Political Studies, serving as Staff Coordinator, Platform Committee of The National Black Political Convention, Gary, Indiana. Platform Commitee Chairman, Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy (Del, D.C.)
9/71 - 1/72	Staff Director Hon. D'Army Bailey and Hon. Ira Simmons City Council, Berkeley California Coordinating staff of researchers and clerical workers; supervision of three staff members and fifty volunteers.
1/71 - 6/71	Director, District Office of Hon. Willie L. Brown, Jr. State Assemblyman and Chairman, Ways and Means Committee San Francisco, California Liaison with Sacremento office; administration of district office with four employees and over 100 volunteers.
3/70 - 12/70	Consultant, Self-employed. New York City Speech writing, editing and research; program planning, development and evaluation. Manager for Cecil P. Taylor, pianist and composer.
1/69 - 3/70	New York Urban Coalition 2. Special Assistant to the Executive Vice President for Education and Manpower, Lincoln O. Lynch Staff supervision (8 employees), research, speech writing and publication design 1. Assistant to the Executive Director, Coalition JOBS, William Kaufmann. Conference coordination and staff supervision (52 employees).
1/68 - 11/68	Volunteer Community Work New Haven, Connecticut Chairman, Black Women of Greater New Haven Board of Directors, Black Coalition of New Haven Executive Committee, Board of Directors, Community Housing Inc., non-profit housing development corporation Board of Directors, Yale Upward Bound Board of Directors, Perspectives -- program for high school students
4/67 - 12/67	Director, Harvard-Yale-Columbia Intensive Summer Studies Program; New Haven, Connecticut Program purpose: to recruit, select, train and place students from predominantly Black southern colleges in the graduate programs of the three cooperating universities and other graduate schools. Staff of four; faculty of fifty; 150 students.

10/65 - 1/67	The White House, Washington, D. C. 2. Executive Assistant to the Chairman The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service Hon. Burke Marshall, Chairman Liaison with commission members; arrangements for all commission meetings; coordination of publication of commission report. 1. White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights" Special Assistant to the Director/Senior Staff Associate Planning and implementation of the civil rights conference; assisting in the drafting and editing of the final report.
4/65 - 10/65	Personal Secretary to the Director Peace Corps and Office of Economic Opportunity Hon. R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.
1/65 - 4/65	Administrative Assistant to the Inspector General/OEO William F. Haddad, Associate Director/Inspector General
11/63 - 1/65	Maternity Leave
9/62 - 11/63	Administrative Assistant to the Associate Director for Planni Evaluation and Research, Peace Corps. William F. Haddad
4/62 - 9/62	Dance Therapist, St. Elizabeths Hospital Conducting dance therapy sessions with schizophrenic patients; participating in diagnostic and treatment-planning staff meetings.
7/61 - 4/62	Selection Officer Peace Corps Member of initial group which set standards for selection of Peace Corps Volunteers.
6/60 - 6/61	Assistant to the Casting Director David Merrick Productions New York City Arranging audition schedules; replacement casting for children's roles in Gypsy, Take Me Along, and Carnival; production assistant for Becket, A Taste of Honey and Do Re Mi. Reviewing off-Broadway plays for audition candidates; manuscript review of new novels and new plays for the largest Broadway production office.

REFERENCES

M. Carl Holman
President
The National Urban Coalition
1201 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C.
331-2447

Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the District of Columbia
House of Representatives
2208 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515
225-2261

Hon. Richard G. Hatcher
Mayor
City Hall
401 Broadway
Gary, Indiana
219/944-6700

Hon. A. J. Cooper
Mayor
City Hall
Prichard, Alabama

Hon. Lisle C. Carter
Chancellor
Atlanta University Center
594 University Place, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30314
414/522-8980

Edward C. Sylvester, Jr.
Staff Director
Committee on the District of Columbia
House of Representatives
1310 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515
225-4457

Kingman Brewster, Jr.
President
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
203/787-3131

Burke Marshall
Assistant Dean
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
203/787-3131

Walter N. Rothschild, Jr.
Chairman
The National Urban Coalition
521 Fifth Avenue
Suite 3701
New York, New York 10017
212/862-2928

R. Sargent Shriver, Jr., Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shirver
& Kampleman
Suite 1000
Watergate 600 Building
600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20037
965-9400

Roger Wilkins
Editorial Board
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York
212/556-1234

JOAN TALBERT THORNELL

122 Sixth Street, S. E.
Washington, D. C. 20003
543 - 7785

EDUCATION & TRAINING

Valedictory, 1956, Dunbar High School; Washington, D.C.
A.B., Psychology, 1960, George Washington University; Washington, D.C.
Professional Training in Dance Therapy, 1958-61, St. Elizabeths Hospital

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE (Chronological)

6/76 - 8/76	Editorial and Research Consultant to the Joint Committee on Arrangements for Commemoration of the Bicentennial for its dual project (publication and exhibit for U.S. Capitol), "Black Americans in Congress, 1870-1976"
9/75 - 6/76	Fundraising Consultant for The Black Student Fund -- a scholarship and service organization to increase black enrollment in independent schools in the Washington metropolitan area.
10/75 - 2/76	Planning Consultant to the National Council of Organizations for Children and Youth for their first national conference
4/73 - 2/75	Assistant to the President for Special Projects The National Urban Coalition M. Carl Holman, President Planning national and local conferences and meetings, awards events and other special projects; designing public relations strategy; liaison with the Chairman, Walter N. Rothschild, Jr.
11/72 - 2/73	Consultant, Office of Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. Researching formation of new House Committee on the District of Columbia; arranging ceremony to cite Congressman Diggs' appointment as Chairman by House Speaker Carl Albert.
8/72 - 10/72	Consultant to McGovern/Shriver Campaign Establishing representative membership on the Issue Task Forces of the national campaign staff; coordinating Education Task Force; Marian Wright Edelman, Chairwoman.
7/72 and Runoff 9/72	Assistant to the Campaign Director for the Successful Mayoral Campaign of Hon. A.J. Cooper, Prichard, Alabama Coordinating volunteers; establishing telephone bank, day care center, and car pool operations for voter registration and election.

1/72 - 10/72	Staff Director The National Black Political Convention, Inc. Administrative follow-up to the Gary Convention; publication of "The National Black Political Agenda"
2/72 - 4/72	Fellow, The Joint Center for Political Studies, serving as Staff Coordinator, Platform Committee of The National Black Political Convention, Gary, Indiana. Platform Commitee Chairman, Hon. Walter E. Fauntroy (Del, D.C.)
9/71 - 1/72	Staff Director Hon. D'Army Bailey and Hon. Ira Simmons City Council, Berkeley California Coordinating staff of researchers and clerical workers; supervision of three staff members and fifty volunteers.
1/71 - 6/71	Director, District Office of Hon. Willie L. Brown, Jr. State Assemblyman and Chairman, Ways and Means Committee San Francisco, California Liaison with Sacremento office; administration of district office with four employees and over 100 volunteers.
3/70 - 12/70	Consultant, Self-employed. New York City Speech writing, editing and research; program planning, development and evaluation. Manager for Cecil P. Taylor, pianist and composer.
1/69 - 3/70	New York Urban Coalition 2. Special Assistant to the Executive Vice President for Education and Manpower, Lincoln O. Lynch Staff supervision (8 employees), research, speech writing and publication design 1. Assistant to the Executive Director, Coalition JOBS, William Kaufmann. Conference coordination and staff supervision (52 employees).
1/68 - 11/68	Volunteer Community Work New Haven, Connecticut Chairman, Black Women of Greater New Haven Board of Directors, Black Coalition of New Haven Executive Committee, Board of Directors, Community Housing, Inc., non-profit housing development corporation Board of Directors, Yale Upward Bound Board of Directors, Perspectives -- program for high school students
4/67 - 12/67	Director, Harvard-Yale-Columbia Intensive Summer Studies Program; New Haven, Connecticut Program purpose: to recruit, select, train and place students from predominantly Black southern colleges in the graduate programs of the three cooperating universities and other graduate schools. Staff of four; faculty of fifty; 150 students.

10/65 - 1/67
The White House, Washington, D. C.
2. Executive Assistant to the Chairman
The National Advisory Commission on Selective Service
Hon. Burke Marshall, Chairman
Liaison with commission members; arrangements for all commission meetings; coordination of publication of commission report.
1. White House Conference "To Fulfill These Rights"
Special Assistant to the Director/Senior Staff Associate
Planning and implementation of the civil rights conference; assisting in the drafting and editing of the final report.

4/65 - 10/65
Personal Secretary to the Director
Peace Corps and Office of Economic Opportunity
Hon. R. Sargent Shriver, Jr.

1/65 - 4/65
Administrative Assistant to the Inspector General/OEO
William F. Haddad, Associate Director/Inspector General

11/63 - 1/65
Maternity Leave

9/62 - 11/63
Administrative Assistant to the Associate Director for Plannin
Evaluation and Research, Peace Corps. William F. Haddad

4/62 - 9/62
Dance Therapist, St. Elizabeths Hospital
Conducting dance therapy sessions with schizophrenic patients; participating in diagnostic and treatment-planning staff meetings.

7/61 - 4/62
Selection Officer
Peace Corps
Member of initial group which set standards for selection of Peace Corps Volunteers.

6/60 - 6/61
Assistant to the Casting Director
David Merrick Productions
New York City
Arranging audition schedules; replacement casting for children's roles in Gypsy, Take Me Along, and Carnival; production assistant for Becket, A Taste of Honey and Do Re Mi. Reviewing off-Broadway plays for audition candidates; manuscript review of new novels and new plays for the largest Broadway production office.

REFERENCES

M. Carl Holman
President
The National Urban Coalition
1201 Connecticut Avenue, N. W.
Suite 400
Washington, D. C.
331-2447

Hon. Charles C. Diggs, Jr.
Chairman
Committee on the District of Columbia
House of Representatives
2208 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515
225-2261

Hon. Richard G. Hatcher
Mayor
City Hall
401 Broadway
Gary, Indiana
219/944-6700

Hon. A. J. Cooper
Mayor
City Hall
Prichard, Alabama

Hon. Lisle C. Carter
Chancellor
Atlanta University Center
594 University Place, N. W.
Atlanta, Georgia 30314
414/522-8980

Edward C. Sylvester, Jr.
Staff Director
Committee on the District of Columbia
House of Representatives
1310 Longworth House Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20515
225-4457

Kingman Brewster, Jr.
President
Yale University
New Haven, Connecticut
203/787-3131

Burke Marshall
Assistant Dean
Yale University Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
203/787-3131

Walter N. Rothschild, Jr.
Chairman
The National Urban Coalition
521 Fifth Avenue
Suite 3701
New York, New York 10017
212/862-2928

R. Sargent Shriver, Jr., Esq.
Fried, Frank, Harris, Shirver
& Kampleman
Suite 1000
Watergate 600 Building
600 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20037
965-9400

Roger Wilkins
Editorial Board
The New York Times
229 West 43rd Street
New York, New York
212/556-1234

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10166
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10166

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/17/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

TRIPLETT, Bill
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number Level Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR	
Annual Leave	Sick Leave
5	5

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 7-17-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Accrued This Month Annual Leave	Accrued This Month Sick Leave	Available This Month Annual Leave	Available This Month Sick Leave	Used This Month Annual Leave	Used This Month Sick Leave	Balance at Close of Month Annual Leave	Balance at Close of Month Sick Leave	Employee Initials
Jan.																																1	1					6	6	
Feb.																																1	1					7	7	
Mar.																																1	1					8	8	
Apr.																																1	1					9	9	
May																																1	1					10	10	
June																											☒	☒	☒	☒		1	1			4		7	11	
July					☒	☒	☒			☒	☒	☒	☒	☒																		1	1	8	12	8		0	12	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/15/78

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▩ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
William K. Triplett	7/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
550-50-7581	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☑ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Linda Shay

376-3702

Life 100 reg. & optional

Blue Cross high option

family — 102

R20643786

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

William K. Triplett
Signature of Employee

JULY 18, 1977
Date

JFK

July

DELSA
GONZALES
TRIPLETT

MEMORANDUM

TO: Chairman Stokes

FROM: Tom Lambeth

DATE: June 17, 1977

new counsel will be aboard on monday. I would like to talk with him

The attached three recommendations for the employment of investigators represent Tanenbaum's effort to get his task force moving strongly. If these three are hired there will remain twelve vacancies for investigators on the Kennedy task force.

OK

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

TO: TOM LAMBETH
FROM: KENNETH D. KLEIN
DATE: JUNE 16, 1977
RE: BILL TRIPLETT

It is my recommendation that Bill Triplett be hired as a staff counsel. I interviewed him approximately 5 months ago and he is far superior to almost all of the applicants I have interviewed. His legal background is excellent for our purposes. He has experience as a prosecutor, a defense lawyer and as an investigator. He impressed me as being intelligent, well spoken and as having an easy going manner.

He desires to leave his present position with LEAA due to the lack of challenge. I am certain that this Committee would be gaining a productive member by hiring Mr. Triplett.

Recommend be hired as senior staff counsel @ 30,00

APPROVED: Robert Tanenbaum
ROBERT K. TANENBAUM

OK TL

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
        AGENCY : HSCA
 RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10169
 RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 2

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 1

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10169

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 11/03/78
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
WATRISS, HELEN WHITNEY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Helen Whitney Watriss	November 3, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
027-38-2968	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Assistant Editor	$27,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 8, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________
ID ______________________
Benefits ______________________
Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date 11/8/78

To: Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☒ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law

sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ______________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ______________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Helen Whitney Watriss
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

11 16 78 AM 8:44
FINANCE

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10170
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10170

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/30/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
WELBURN, BRENDA L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Brenda L. Welburn	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102-40-6872	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ______) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ______

ID ______

Benefits ______

Payroll ______

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialized by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Brenda L. Welburn	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102-40-6872	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Brenda L. Welburn	December 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102-40-6872	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

eb (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Brenda L. Welburn	December 30, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
102-40-6872	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 30, 1977

Louis Stokes
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:
Office Code__________
Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________
ID ____________________
Benefits ____________________
Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Committee on House Administration

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk ✓

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: December 30, 1977

RE: Ms. Brenda Welburn

This memorandum is to advise you that Ms. Brenda Welburn as accepted the position of Researcher with the Select Committee. Her effective starting date is December 30, 1977, and her starting salary, $15,000.00.

Your cooperation will be appreciated in familiarizing Ms. Welburn with staff procedures and welcoming her aboard.

ICM:jl

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.)

Brenda Lilienthal Wellburn
Signature of Employee

12/30/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10171
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 5

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10171

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/13/77
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
WILANDER, ANNE PAUL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3369 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 28, 1978

District Unemployment Compensation Board
6th Street and Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20001

Gentlemen:

Mrs. Anne Paul Wilander is one of the staff members from the Select Committee on Assassinations who is being terminated as of December 31, 1978, per copy of attached letter.

To protect Mrs. Wilander's medical benefits until she secures employment, she is being restored to the Committee's payroll on January 1, 1979 at the minimum salary of $100.00 per month allowed under the Rules of the House.

While she will work two days per month to earn the $100.00, she is technically unemployed.

When she applies for unemployment benefits, the Clerk of the House will probably respond to your inquiry that she is still employed but at a reduced salary.

I wanted you to know what the facts are about her continued employment so that nothing would interfere with her application for unemployment benefits in case she is not able to secure new employment.

Sincerely yours,

Thomas Howarth

Thomas Howarth
Deputy Staff Director
and Budget Officer

TH:ht

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Lambeth OK

FROM: Steve Fallis, Deputy Chief Counsel

DATE: May 23, 1977

RE: Hiring of Staff Assistant for Budget Office

Please have the Chairman approve the hiring of Mrs. Wilander as a Staff Assistant for the Budget Office. (See attached memo and resume.)

Attachments - 2

OK

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Anne Paul Wilander	January 1, 1979
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
247-78-3852	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$1200.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Anne Paul Wilander	7/1/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
247-78-3852	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$17,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

________ (Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Anne Paul Wilander	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
247-78-3852	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Assistant	$16,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

eb

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Anne Paul Hilander	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
247-78-3852	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Assistant	14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Anne Paul Wilander	6/13/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
247 78 3852	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Assistant	$13,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 13, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Check with Tom.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tiny Hutton Approved

FROM: Tom Howarth

DATE: May 20, 1977

RE: Hiring of Staff Assistant for Budget Office

I would like to hire Mrs. Anne Paul Wilander as a staff assistant in the Budget Office. She will be a voucher clerk and will be trained to handle all vouchering and accounting procedures.

This position is scheduled at $14,000 in the Committee's salary budget. I am recommending that Mrs. Wilander be hired at $13,000 and raised to $14,000 on October 1, 1977, if she works out satisfactorily.

If approval can be obtained by the early part of next week, Mrs. Wilander can report for work on Monday, June 13. She is presently employed by the Select Committee on Congressional Operations and wishes to give such Committee three weeks notice.

A copy of her resume is attached.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.
(Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Anne P. Welander
Signature of Employee

June 13, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10173
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 6

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10173

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 07/11/77
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
WIZELMAN, LESLIE H.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leslie H. Wizelman	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
171-38-3757	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☑ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialized by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leslie H. Wizelman	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
171-38-3757	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,800.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

________________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

________________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

________________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leslie H. Wizelman	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
171-38-3757	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ________ If applicable, Level ________ Step ________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ________

Monthly Annuity $ ________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Leslie H. Wizelman	7/11/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
171 38 3757	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Researcher	$12,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 11, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO
7/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

JULY 7, 1977

TO: Tom Howarth

FROM: Donovan Gay

RE: New Research Employees

Please be advised that on Monday, July 11, 1977, four researchers will be reporting to duty. The four new employees for the Research/Document Unit are: Thomas Mark Flanagan, Jr.; Edwin Juan Lopez; Dan L. Hardway, and Leslie Wizelman.

All four will be joining our staff as Researchers, and are to be compensated at the rate of $12,000 per annum.

The above has been authorized per the instructions of Bob Blakey.

Thank you.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________________

____

Leslie H. Wizelman
Signature of Employee

7/12/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10174
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

eleased under the John F.
ennedy Assassination
ecords Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
ase#:NW 88326 Date:
025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10174

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/28/76
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Ann Wolf	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
383-52-5221	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

________________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

________________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

________________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Ann Wolf	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
383-52-5221	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$22,700.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Ann Wolf	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
383-52-5221	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Researcher	$16,100

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

_______________________________ (Signature of Authorizing Official)

_______________________________ (If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

_______________________________ (Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00 as of ______________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Ann Wolf	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
383-52-5221	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Document Clerk	15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Ann Wolf	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
383 52 5221	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document Clerk	$10,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date___________________________________, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

ORIGINAL - To Finance Office (For official personnel folder)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Elizabeth Ann Wolf	December 23, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
333 52 5221	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Document/Researcher	$10,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 23, 19 76

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not elated ✓

I am elated by the following relationship ____________

Elizabeth Wolf
nature of Employee

January 17, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10175
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 9

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 8

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10175

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/20/76
PAGES : 9

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
WOLF, JAMES LERER

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	1/1/79
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057-40-6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$40,600.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:	ID __________
Office Code________	Benefits __________
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________	Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057-40-6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Deputy Chief Counsel, Legal Unit	$38,500

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057-40-6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Staff Counsel	36,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	5/24/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057 40 6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$29,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration.

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057 40 6887	☐ Appointment ☑ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$47,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057-40-6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$17,835.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level_____ Step_____

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James L. Wolf	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057 40 6887	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$18,850.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date____________, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
James Lerer Wolf	12/29/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
057 40 6837	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel-Legal Unit	$29,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 15, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ________________

James L. Wolf
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10176
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10070-10176

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 01/01/77
PAGES : 10

SUBJECTS :
HSCA; ADMINISTRATION
ZENNIK, PAUL A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/16/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 3.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ZEVNIK, P.A.
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　Level　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1977
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 1-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
Years　Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
—	—

Month	DAY OF MONTH 1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	ACCRUED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	AVAILABLE THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	USED THIS MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH Annual Leave	Sick Leave	EMPLOYEE INITIALS
Jan.																																1	1					1	1	
Feb.																																1	1					2	2	
Mar.																																1	1					3	3	
Apr.																																1	1					4	4	
May																																1	1					5	5	
June													X	X	X	X	X															–	–	5	5	5	0	0	5	
July																																								
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated June 17, 1977

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
◩ = 0.5 day leave without pay
■ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. Zevnik	6/17/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
415 84 5593	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 14, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO
6/15

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. Zevnik	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
415 84 5593	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$22,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

FD 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. Zevnik	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
415 84 5593	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$46,700

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. Zevnik	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
415-84-5593	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$13,530.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19_____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. Zeynik	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
415 84 5593	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$14,300.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Paul A. Zevnik	January 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
416 34 5593	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel-Kennedy	$22,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level__________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 23, 1976 ______________________________

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related X

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Paul A Zeinik
Signature of Employee

1/26/1977
Date

ATTORNEY

ZEVNIK
ack. 12/20/76
dlm

PAUL A. ZEVNIK

Lionel B-22
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 498-3610

Born: November 2, 1950
Ashland, Wisconsin

EDUCATION

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1973-1976)

J.D. cum laude awarded June, 1976.

Upper Round Ames Moot Court Competition, Semifinalist; Mark DeWolfe Howe Award (1974); Charles Warren Fellowship (1974-1975); Freshman Proctor and Adviser, Harvard College; Consultant to Professor Alan Dershowitz (Harvard Law School) in preparing law review articles.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1968-1973, 1976)

A.B. magna cum laude (History) awarded June, 1972.

A.M. (American History) awarded June, 1972.

Ph.D. (American Legal History) candidate.

Granted Sophomore Standing upon entering Harvard College (1968); George Dillaway Prize for "Highest Honor in Modern History"(1972); *Atlantic* Monthly Writing Contest, First Prize (1968); Harvard College Scholarships (1968-1972); California Rhodes Scholarship Competition, Finalist (1972); Varsity Soccer Team; Freshman Baseball Team; Freshman Soccer Team; News Editor, Harvard *Independent*.

PHILLIPS EXETER ACADEMY (1965-1968)

PERTINENT WORK EXPERIENCE

Fellow at the JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES of MIT and Harvard University (1976).

Instructor at HARVARD UNIVERSITY: have conceived and taught seven separate courses in the Departments of GOVERNMENT, HISTORY AND EXPOSITORY WRITING (1972-1976).

Associate in the law firm of PAUL, HASTINGS & JANOFSKY, Los Angeles, California (1975).

Assistant to the Financial Vice-President, Harvard University: responsible for reviewing the budget and preparing the ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1974).

Intern to Congressman Henry Gonzalez.

MEMBER

California Bar

District of Columbia Bar (pending)

REFERENCES

Arthur R. Miller (Harvard Law School)
Alan Dershowitz (Harvard Law School)
Morton Horwitz (Harvard Law School)

Carl Albert (Washington, D.C.)

LANGUAGES

French, Spanish

PAUL A. ZEVNIK

Lionel B-22
Harvard University
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02138
(617) 498-3610

Born: November 2, 1950
Ashland, Wisconsin

EDUCATION

HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (1973-1976)

J.D. *cum laude* awarded June, 1976.

Upper Round Ames Moot Court Competition, Semifinalist; Mark DeWolfe Howe Award (1974); Charles Warren Fellowship (1974-1975); Freshman Proctor and Adviser, Harvard College; Consultant to Professor Alan Dershowitz (Harvard Law School) in preparing law review articles.

HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1968-1973, 1976)

A.B. *magna cum laude* (History) awarded June, 1972.

A.M. (American History) awarded June, 1972.

Ph.D. (American Legal History) candidate.

Granted Sophomore Standing upon entering Harvard College (1968); George Dillaway Prize for "Highest Honor in Modern History"(1972); *Atlantic* Monthly Writing Contest, First Prize (1968); Harvard College Scholarships (1968-1972); California Rhodes Scholarship Competition, Finalist (1972); Varsity Soccer Team; Freshman Baseball Team; Freshman Soccer Team; News Editor, Harvard *Independent*.

PHILLIPS EXETER ACADEMY (1965-1968)

PERTINENT WORK EXPERIENCE

Fellow at the JOINT CENTER FOR URBAN STUDIES of MIT and Harvard University (1976).

Instructor at HARVARD UNIVERSITY: have conceived and taught seven separate courses in the Departments of GOVERNMENT, HISTORY AND EXPOSITORY WRITING (1972-1976).

Associate in the law firm of PAUL, HASTINGS & JANOFSKY, Los Angeles, California (1975).

Assistant to the Financial Vice-President, Harvard University: responsible for reviewing the budget and preparing the ANNUAL FINANCIAL REPORT OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY (1974).

Intern to Congressman Henry Gonzalez.

MEMBER

California Bar

District of Columbia Bar (pending)

REFERENCES

Arthur R. Miller (Harvard Law School)
Alan Dershowitz (Harvard Law School)
Morton Horwitz (Harvard Law School)

Carl Albert (Washington, D.C.)

LANGUAGES

French, Spanish

ZEVNIK

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

12/21/76

Interviewed by
R. Tanenbaum

Here!

12-21 1:30

~~STEVE FALLIS~~

THIS YOUNG MAN TALKED WITH SOMEONE YESTERDAY (HE DOESN'T REMEMBER WHO) WHO TOLD HIM TO DROP BY AND TALK WITH SOMEONE REGARDING POSSIBLE EMPLOYMENT SINCE HE PLANS TO LEAVE WASHINGTON ON THURSDAY. BOB LEHNER SUGGESTED THAT YOU MIGHT WANT TO TALK WITH HIM.

(He is the dark haired young man seated (by the officer's desk)

22, am – Kenney

1-1-76

Staff Count

December 20, 1976

Richard Sprague
Select Committee on Assasinations
House Annex II
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Sprague:

Gail Beagle suggested that I contact you concerning employment possibilities with the Select Committee. I am seeking a legal position on the Committee staff, and would like very much to speak with you concerning those possibilities. I am a Harvard Law School graduate and a member of the bar. Before going to law school, I was an intern with Congressman Gonzalez. In addition, I have graduate degrees and considerable experience (including teaching at Harvard) in modern American history, a facet which might be of interest to the Committee.

In Washington, a reference can be provided by former Speaker Carl Albert, who knows me well. He would be happy to respond to a request for information concerning my abilities.

I shall be in Washington through Friday, and hope to see you during that time if it is in any way possible.

Sincerely,

Paul Zevnik

Paul Zevnik

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10071-10000
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 7

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 4

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date:08/20/93
Page:1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10071-10000

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/16/76
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
PRICE, PATRICIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

June 16, 1977

Miss Patricia Price
4605 Mayhunt Court
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

Dear Pat:

I want you to know how much the Committee and I appreciate your service and how much we regret that you will no longer be a member of the staff.

You have our best wishes always.

Sincerely yours,

Louis Stokes
Chairman

LS:tle

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

May 16, 1977

The Honorable Louis Stokes, Chairman
Select Committee on Assassinations

Dear Mr. Chairman:

I hereby tender my resignation effective as of May 31, 1977, inclusive.

I have very much enjoyed working with the Committee staff and its Members, and wish you and the Committee success in your endeavors.

With best wishes, I am

Yours sincerely,

Patricia Price

Patricia Price

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia Lynn Price	5/31/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
228 98 6892	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 31, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia Lynn Price	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
228 98 6892	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Mail/Document Clerk	$6,500.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.

2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 222 of 95th Congress.

3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date_________________________________, 19_____

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_____________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Patricia Lynn Price	12/16/76
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
228 98 6892	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Clerk	$6,500

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 16, 1976 ______________________________

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman

(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations

(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________

Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related X

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Patricia Lynn Price
Signature of Employee

1/10/77
Date

12-16-76
6,500

RESUME

NAME: PATRICIA LYNN PRICE

ADDRESS: 4605 MAYHUNT COURT
ALEXANDRIA, VIRGINIA 22312

PHONE: 941-2183

DOB: January 25, 1959

POB: Washington, D.C.

SSN: 228-98-6892

FATHER: Herbert C. Price

MOTHER: Dorothy J. Price

GRADUATED FROM : Thomas Jefferson High School
Fairfax County, Virginia
June 1976

SUMMER EMPLOYEE: U.S. Capitol Guide Force
From June to Sept. 30, 1976

PRESENT EMPLOYEE: UPS & DOWNS
Dress Shop
Springfield Mall
Springfield, Virginia
From November 1976 to present

Position Applied For: Assassination Committee Receptionist.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
     RECORD NUMBER : 180-10071-10001
     RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 12

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 11

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM

IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10071-10001

RECORDS SERIES :
STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 12/01/76
PAGES : 12

SUBJECTS :
HSCA, ADMINISTRATION
PURDY, DONALD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : U
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : P
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/03/93

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS :
Box 2.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211-38-9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$43,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of __________________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211-38-9707	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 1979

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll __________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211-38-9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$30,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211-38-9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business______________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$25,700

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211-38-9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 2, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211 38 9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$18,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211 38 9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$38,200

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	2-1-77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211-38-9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$11,070.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date 2-28-77, 19____

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration.

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211 38 9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$11,700.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step_______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________________________, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	1/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211 30 9707	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$ 18,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________If applicable, Level_________Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 29, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Donald A. Purdy, Jr.	December 1, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
211 38 9707	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$15,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

hand carried to FO 11/22/76

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number ______ If applicable, Level ______ Step ______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED: ______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code ______

Monthly Annuity $______.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related X

I am related by the following relationship ______________

Donald A. Purdy, Jr. 1/10/77

Signature of Employee Date

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/1/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10071-10459

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 010088

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : MORIARTY, JOHN
TO : FENTON, CLIFFORD

TITLE :

DATE : 07/20/1978
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :

BERTUCCI, MARY C.

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/18/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 186.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88326 Date: 2025

MEMORANDUM

TO: Clifford Fenton
Chief Investigator-JFK

FROM: John Moriarty JJM
Staff Investigator-JFK

010088

DATE: July 20, 1978

RE: Mary Ceciliadell Bertucci

This lady placed a call to our Committee at 2:30 p.m. on July 18, 1978, seeking Mr. Bill Brown, and spoke to me when advised the former would no longer be available.

She advised she and her husband had been interviewed on past occasions by Brown and it was imperative these reports be modified regarding "the reward." Previously she had indicated she wasn't concerned with the one hundred thousand dollars, but she's since reconsidered and has decided to accept this recompense.

I checked the files and reviewed 5117 (2/7/78), 7196 (4/14/78), and 7255 (4/18/78) submitted by Bill Brown and found she reiterated the essential story. Today's notes added the following data:

1. Maiden name Tinner; DOB, 9/28/43; SS #439-60-9743.
2. John Fitzgerald Kennedy was her first cousin. (It was due to circumstances that they never met.)
3. Judge Garrison is her attorney of record.
4. She's currently confined to "Parker 3 West" of De Paul Hospital in New Orleans, with 11 of the 15 days' confinement to go.

None of these four items verified at this time.

am

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/2/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10072-10186
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	010313

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
FROM :	
TO :	HESS, JACQUELINE.
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/31/1978
PAGES :	64
SUBJECTS :	OSWALD, MARINA; FINANCES, INCOME TAXES. OSWALD, LEE; PRE-RUSSIAN PERIOD, MILITARY SERVICE, COURT-MAR
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT.
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/10/1996
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Includes insurance forms, death certificate, & military documents of Oswald. Box 189.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21235

REFER TO: IPO-4-5-1

JUL 28 1978

010313

Ms. Jackie Hess
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 House Office Building, Annex 2
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Ms. Hess:

This is in response to Mr. Blakey's May 15, 1978, request for access to all files and documents concerning or referring to Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald. The following documents are enclosed:

1. Form SS-5, Application for Social Security Account Number, completed by Lee Harvey Oswald.
2. Form SS-5, Application for Social Security Account Number, completed by Marina Oswald.
3. Numident showing name changes for Marina Oswald.
4. Form OA-C5, Application for Survivors Insurance Benefits, completed by Marina Oswald.
5. Certificate of Death issued by the City of Dallas for Lee Harvey Oswald.
6. Marriage certificate (and translation) for Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova.
7. Birth certificate (and translation) for Marina Nikolaevna.
8. Birth certificate (and translation) showing child born to Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Nikolaevna Oswald.
9. OA-C704, Certification of Contents of Document(s) or Record(s), re birth of child to Lee H. Oswald and Marina Nikolaevna Prusakova.

10. Form OA-C654, Certification By Uniformed Services, for Lee Harvey Oswald.
11. Letter dated 7/25/63 from the Department of the Navy to Lee Harvey Oswald.
12. Form DD-214, Armed Forces of the United States Report of Transfer or Discharge, for Lee Harvey Oswald.
13. Undesirable Discharge from the Armed Forces of the United States, issued to Lee Harvey Oswald.
14. Forms OA-C668, Claimant's Report to Social Security Administration, completed by Marina Oswald on 3/27/64 and 5/1/65.
15. Form OA-C669, Claimant's Report About Work to the Social Security Administration, completed by Marina Oswald on 10/8/64.
16. Form SSA-1425, Reporting Card, completed by Marina Porter on 5/4/66.
17. Forms OA-C777, Annual Report of Earnings, completed by Marina Oswald for 1964 and 1965.
18. Form OAC-1001, Statement of Employer, completed by Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Inc.
19. Form OAC-1001, Statement of Employer, completed by Texas School Book Depository.
20. Form OAC-1001, Statement of Employer, completed by William B. Reily, Company, Inc.
21. OAC-5002, Report of Contact, re contact with Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Inc.
22. OAC-5002, Report of Contact, re earnings under Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Inc.
23. Copies of three pages of the Warren Commission Report re employment of Lee Harvey Oswald prior to service in the Marine Corps.
24. Form OA-C790, Request for E/R Action.
25. Memorandum dated 6/3/65, re remarriage of Marina Oswald.
26. Forms SSA-L735 sent to Marina Porter and completed by Mrs. Porter.

27. Forms OA-C107, Determination of Resumption of Award.

28. Forms OA-C528b, Determination of Termination of Entitlement or Suspension of Payments Based on Supporting Evidence on File.

29. Forms OA-C610, Payee, Address Change, or Hold Check Request.

30. Form OA-C526, Benefit Summary.

31. Form OA-C101, Determination of Award.

32. Form OA-C589, receipt for check.

33. Form OA-C596, 1965 Conversion of Benefit Rates.

34. Form AC-512, Appointment of Representative, completed by Marina N. Oswald and James H. Martin.

35. Form OAC-5002, Report of Contact, with James H. Martin.

36. Form OAC-5002, Report of Contact, re Lee Harvey Oswald's death.

The above-mentioned documents are being sent to you in their entirety. We have withheld only the records of wage and self-employment income maintained under the direction of 42 U.S.C. 405(c)(2). This record is created on the basis of tax return information received from the Internal Revenue Service. Under 26 U.S.C. 6103, this information is given to the Social Security Administration for the administration of the Social Security Act and redisclosure is prohibited. You may request this information directly from the Internal Revenue Service.

I understand that the Dallas Region has already sent you the local folder on Lee Harvey Oswald. We are also checking with the National Archives to determine if it may have further social security records on Lee Harvey Oswald or Marina Oswald. To date, we have found no records under the aliases you provided. We will contact you if further documents are located.

Sincerely yours,

Robert P. Bynum

Robert P. Bynum
Associate Commissioner
for Program Operations

Enclosures

Form SS-5
TREASURY DEPARTMENT
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
(Revised 7-46)

APPLICATION FOR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER

REQUIRED UNDER THE FEDERAL INSURANCE CONTRIBUTIONS ACT
READ INSTRUCTIONS ON BACK BEFORE FILLING IN FORM

433-54-3937
DO NOT WRITE IN THE ABOVE SPACE

FILL IN EACH ITEM. **PRINT** IN BLACK OR DARK BLUE **INK** OR USE TYPEWRITER FOR ALL ITEMS EXCEPT SIGNATURE. IF THE INFORMATION CALLED FOR IN ANY ITEM IS NOT KNOWN, WRITE "UNKNOWN."

1 PRINT NAME YOU GAVE YOUR PRESENT EMPLOYER, OR IF UNEMPLOYED, THE NAME YOU WILL USE WHEN EMPLOYED — FIRST NAME: LEE — MIDDLE NAME. (IF YOU HAVE NO MIDDLE NAME OR INITIAL, DRAW A LINE ——): HARVEY — LAST NAME: OSWAld

2 MAILING ADDRESS (NO. AND ST., P. O. BOX, OR RFD) (CITY) (ZONE) (STATE): 126 EXCHANGE ST. N.O., LA.

3 PRINT FULL NAME GIVEN YOU AT BIRTH: LEE HARVEY Oswald

4 AGE ON LAST BIRTHDAY: 15

5 DATE OF BIRTH (MONTH) (DAY) (YEAR): OCT. 18, 1939

6 PLACE OF BIRTH (CITY) (COUNTY) (STATE): NEW ORLEANS LA.

7 FATHER'S FULL NAME, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER LIVING OR DEAD: ROBERT LEE OSWAld

8 MOTHER'S FULL NAME BEFORE EVER MARRIED, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER LIVING OR DEAD: MARGRET CLEVIERY

9 (MARK (X) WHICH) SEX: MALE ☒ FEMALE ☐

10 COLOR OR RACE (MARK (X) WHICH) (IF OTHER, SPECIFY): WHITE ☒ NEGRO ☐ OTHER ☐

11 HAVE YOU EVER BEFORE APPLIED FOR OR HAD A SOCIAL SECURITY OR RAILROAD RETIREMENT NUMBER? (MARK (X) WHICH) YES ☐ NO ☒ DON'T KNOW ☐

IF ANSWER IS "YES" PRINT THE STATE IN WHICH YOU FIRST APPLIED AND WHEN — STATE — DATE

ALSO PRINT YOUR ACCOUNT NUMBER IF YOU KNOW IT — ACCOUNT NUMBER

DAO NO
RECORD

12 BUSINESS NAME OF EMPLOYER. IF UNEMPLOYED, WRITE "UNEMPLOYED"

EMPLOYER'S ADDRESS (No. AND STREET) (CITY) (ZONE) (STATE)

13 TODAY'S DATE: 1/6/55

14 WRITE YOUR NAME AS USUALLY WRITTEN (DO NOT PRINT): Lee H. Oswald

DO NOT WRITE IN THIS SPACE

16—5528-7

RETURN COMPLETED APPLICATION TO NEAREST SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION FIELD OFFICE

[illegible]

MARINA NICHOLAEVNA O[illegible]ALD

MARINA NICHOLAEVNA PRUSAKOVA

7/17 [illegible]

ARCHANGELL, RUSSIA

[illegible] VASILYEVNA [illegible]

NICOLAI / [illegible]

(Account Number)

629 [illegible] LINE RD. RICHARDSON TEX.

5-12-64

Mrs. Marina [illegible]

```
OFFICIAL RECORD FOR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER  467 82 4034  PRINTED ON 071978

          FORM 1 APPL/CYCLE 08  64 ENTRY 0              REF# 65163940518

NAME LINE MARINA           NICHOLAEVNA     OSWALD                       243

SIGNATURE                                                        CODE  S
BIRTH DATE 0717941                                             SEX 2 RACE 1

MOTHER CLAUDIA     V PROOSAKOVA        FATHER  NICHOLAI       UNKNOWN
BIRTHPLACE  ARCHANGEL     UR*


REQ BY BR 032 SEC    UNIT    CLERK 00827 DATE 195        PAGE  1 OF   3
```

```
OFFICIAL RECORD FOR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER  467 82 4034  PRINTED ON 071978

     DO IRS FORM 2 APPL/CYCLE 121175 ENTRY 2            REF# 75165960637

NAME LINE MARINA           NIKOLAEVNA      PORTER                       636
2ND NAME  MARINA        NIKOLAEVNA    OSWALD                            243

SIGNATURE                                                        CODE  S
BIRTH DATE 0717941                                             SEX 2 RACE 0

MOTHER KLAVDIA       PROOSAKOVA        FATHER  ALEXANDR       MEDVEDEV
BIRTHPLACE  ARCHANGEL     UR*


REQ BY BR 032 SEC    UNIT    CLERK 00827 DATE 195        PAGE  2 OF   3
```

```
OFFICIAL RECORD FOR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER  467 82 4034  PRINTED ON 071978

     DO COO FORM 8 APPL/CYCLE 011976 ENTRY 2            REF# 76010006538

NAME LINE M                N               PORTER                       636
2ND NAME  MARINA        NIC           OSWALD                            243

SIGNATURE                                                        CODE  D
BIRTH DATE 0717941                                             SEX 2 RACE 0



REQ BY BR 032 SEC    UNIT    CLERK 00827 DATE 195        PAGE  3 OF   3
```

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance

DALLAS, TEXAS
JAN 9 1964

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 72-R094.11.

APPLICATION FOR SURVIVORS INSURANCE BENEFITS *

(Do not write in this space)
Dallas DO JAN 9 '64
Received
JEL

All items on this form requiring an answer must be answered or marked "Unknown."

NOTICE.—Whoever (a) makes or causes to be made any false statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining the right to or the amount of any benefit, or in determining an individual's disability, under Title II of the Social Security Act, or (b) who, having received a payment for the use and benefit of another person, knowingly and willfully uses such payment for other than the person for whom it is received, is subject, under the Social Security Act, to a fine of not more than $1,000 or 1 year's imprisonment, or both.

Lee Harvey Oswald (Name of deceased wage earner or self-employed person) 433-54-3937 (Social security account number)

I, Marina N. Oswald (Full name of applicant), hereby apply for all insurance benefits payable to me under Title II of the Social Security Act, as amended, and to the children listed in item 14 below.

1. When was the deceased born? Month 10 Day 19 Year 39

2. In what State or foreign country did the deceased have his fixed, permanent home when he died? Texas

3. (a) Did the deceased ever serve in the military or naval service of the United States? ☒ Yes ☐ No
   If "Yes," answer (b).

   (b) Was the deceased in active service after September 7, 1939, and before January 1, 1957? ☒ Yes ☐ No
   If "Yes," answer (c) and (d).

   (c) Give dates of service during the period specified in (b) above 10/24/56 – 9/11/59

   (d) Has anyone (including the deceased) received, or does anyone expect to receive, from any Federal agency other than the Social Security Administration, a benefit based on the employment, military service, disability, or death of the deceased? ☐ Yes ☒ No

   If "Yes," name such person(s)

   List all such agencies

4. Did the deceased work in the railroad industry at any time on or after January 1, 1937? ☐ Yes ☒ No

5. Give the names and addresses of the deceased's employers during the 12 months before his death; if the deceased worked in agricultural employment, give this information for the year of death and the year before. (If self-employed, write "Self-employed.")

	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	WORK BEGAN		WORK ENDED	
		Month	Year	Month	Year
1.	Jaggers-Chiles Stovall-522 Browder, Dallas	10	62	4	63
2.	Wm. B. Reily Co. Inc. 640 Magazine, New Orleans, La	5	63	7	63

cont.

6. If the deceased was self-employed last year or the year before, give:

Year	*Kind of Trade or Business*	*Amount of Net Earnings*
		☐ Less than $400 $400 or more ☐
		☐ Less than $400 $400 or more ☐

7. About how much did the deceased earn from employment and self-employment during the year in which he died? $ 2600.00

8. Give the following information about each marriage of the deceased, including his marriage to you.

DATE AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE(S)			TO WHOM MARRIED	HOW MARRIAGE ENDED	MARRIAGE ENDED	
Month, Day, Year	City	State			Date	Place
4/30/61	Minsk, Belo	Russia	Marina N. Proosakova	his death	11/24/63	Dallas Tex

9. What was your maiden name? Marina Nickolaevna Proosakova

10. When and where were you born? 7/17/41 (Month, day, and year) Severo Dvinsk, Russia (State or foreign country)

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

---

* This may also be considered an application for survivors benefits under Section 5 of the Railroad Retirement Act and for Veterans Administration payments under Title 38 USC., Veterans Benefits, Chapter 13 (which is, as such, an application for other types of death benefits under Title 38).

Form OA-C5

11. Indicate by (✓) whether your marriage to the deceased was performed by:

Clergyman or authorized public official ☒, or Other ☐ (Explain)

12. Were you married before your marriage to the deceased? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the following information about each of your previous marriages.

Date and Place of Marriage(s)			To Whom Married	How Marriage Ended	Marriage Ended	
Month, Day, Year	City	State			Date	Place

13. (*a*) Were you and the deceased living together at the same address when the deceased died? ☒ Yes ☐ No

(*b*) If either you or the deceased was away from home (whether or not temporarily) when the deceased died, give the following: which of you was away; date last home; reason absence began; reason you were apart at time of death; if hospitalized, name of hospital and nature of confinement He was last at home 11/22/63 when he left to go to work. We were not separated by marital difficulties; he was in police custody until his death.

14. Was the deceased survived by any unmarried children (including stepchildren, adopted, and illegitimate children): (*a*) who were under 18 years of age when he died; or (*b*) who were 18 years of age or older, with a disability that began before age 18? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If your answer is "No," leave out the next questions and continue with question 21.

If your answer to question 14 is "Yes," give the following information about each such child.

(If uncertain as to name, date of birth, or whereabouts of any of these children, explain under "Remarks" on last page.) Show relationship to you and the deceased by placing (✓) in the proper column.

Full Name of Child	Date of Birth			Relationship to Deceased				Relationship to You	
	Month	Day	Year	Legitimate	Adopted	Stepchild	Illegitimate	Natural or Adopted	Stepchild
June Lee Oswald	2	15	62	X				X	
Audrey Marina Rachel Oswald	10	20	63	X				X	

(If you are not filing this application on behalf of any child listed above, give under "Remarks" on last page the name of each such child and the reason(s) for not filing. If a child of the deceased is born after this application is filed, notify your office of the Social Security Administration promptly, as such child may receive benefits.)

15. Has any child listed in item 14 ever been adopted by anyone other than the deceased? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the name of child, by whom adopted, and when

16. (*a*) Were all the children listed in item 14 living with the deceased at time of death? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If "No," and the deceased was the FATHER or ADOPTING FATHER who died before September 1960, answer (b).

(*b*) Which of the children listed in item 14 were living with their STEPFATHER when the deceased died?

17. Are all the children listed in item 14 now living with you? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If "No," give the following information about each child not living with you now.

Full Name of Child Not Living With You	Person With Whom Child Now Lives	
	Name and Address	Relationship to Child

18. Has a child listed in item 14 lived with you in every month since your husband's death? ☒ Yes ☐ No

If "No," list the months in which no such child lived with you

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

19. Do you understand that all payments made to you on behalf of a child must be spent or saved for his use and benefit, and do you agree to so apply the benefits? ☒ Yes ☐ No

20. Do you agree to notify the Social Security Administration promptly when you no longer have responsibility for the welfare and care of any child for whom you are filing this application? ☒ Yes ☐ No

21. Have you or any children listed in item 14 married since the death of the deceased? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give name of person who married and date of marriage

22. Have you or any children listed in item 14 ever had a social security account number? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the following information for each person having a number.

Name of Person as Shown on Social Security Card	Social Security Account Number

23. Have you or any children listed in item 14 ever filed an application for social security benefits before? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the name and account number of the person on whose earnings record such previous claim was based.

(Name of wage-earner or self-employed person)

(Social security account number)

Answer questions 24 and 25 only if you are within 3 months of age 62 or older.

24. Were you in the active military or naval service of the United States after September 7, 1939, and before January 1, 1957? ☐ Yes ☐ No

25. Did you work in the railroad industry at any time on or after January 1, 1937? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Deductions are made from the benefits (other than disability benefits) of any person under age 72 who earns more than $100 a month in employment or renders substantial services in self-employment, and has earnings in excess of $1,200 for the taxable year.* This applies to all employment and self-employment, whether or not covered by the Social Security Act.

26. (*a*) Are you or any of the children for whom you are filing now earning more than $100 a month in employment or rendering substantial services in self-employment? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the name of each such person

(*b*) Do you expect your total earnings or the total earnings of any child for whom you are filing to exceed $1,200 this year (count all earnings beginning with the first month of this year)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the name of each such person and the amount of his expected earnings. If "No," continue with question 27.

Person	Expected Earnings
	$
	$

(*c*) Did every person listed in (*b*) earn more than $100 a month in employment or render substantial service in self-employment in all months of this year (counting the present month)? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If "No," give the name of each person and the months of this year in which the person did not earn more than $100 a month in employment *and* *did not render substantial services in self-employment. If any such person was self-employed, show the number of hours he devoted to self-employment opposite each month listed—if none, show "None."*

Person	Months

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

---

* The yearly period referred to in this and subsequent items is the same 12-month period used in figuring income taxes. If you or any of the children use a fiscal year (one that does not end on December 31), enter here the name of such person and the month the fiscal year ends

Answer item 27 only if the deceased died before this year.

27. Did you or any child for whom you are filing earn more than $1,200 last year? . . . . ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," give the name of each such person, show his total earnings, and list the months of last year in which the person did not earn $100 a month in employment and did not render substantial services in self-employment. If any such person was self-employed, show the number of hours he devoted to self-employment opposite each month listed—if none, show "None." (Do not list any month before the month the deceased died.)

PERSON	EARNINGS	MONTHS
	$	
	$	

An annual report of earnings must be filed with the Social Security Administration within 3 months and 15 days after the end of any year in which you, while under age 72 at least one full month of that year, or any child for whom you are filing, earned more than $1,200. Also, your benefit is not payable for any month you do not have in your care a child of the deceased entitled to a child's benefit unless you are receiving benefits because you are a widow age 62 or over.

FAILURE TO REPORT THESE EVENTS MAY RESULT IN THE LOSS OF ADDITIONAL MONTHLY BENEFITS.

28. Do you agree to file the annual report of earnings when required? . . . . ☒ Yes ☐ No

29. Do you agree to notify the Social Security Administration promptly if you do not have an entitled child of the deceased in your care? . . . . ☒ Yes ☐ No

A widow's entitlement to benefits ends with *the month before the month* in which: (*a*) she remarries, with certain exceptions (however, all marriages must be reported); or (*b*) she is under age 62 and no child of the deceased is entitled to child's insurance benefits.

A child's entitlement to benefits ends with *the month before the month* in which the child: (*a*) attains age 18 (unless the child has a physical or mental impairment which began before age 18, is expected to be long-lasting, and prevents any substantial gainful activity); (*b*) dies; (*c*) marries, with certain exceptions where the child is disabled (however, all marriages must be reported); or (*d*) is legally adopted (unless the adoption is by the child's stepparent, grandparent, aunt, or uncle after the death of the parent on whose record the child's claim is based).

If the child is age 18 or over and is receiving benefits as a disabled child, his entitlement to benefits also ends with the second month after the month in which his disability ceases.

30. Do you agree to notify the Social Security Administration promptly if any of these events occur and to return promptly any check for benefits received by you if you or any of the children are not entitled to it? . . . . ☒ Yes ☐ No

REMARKS: (This space may be used for explaining any answers to the questions. If you need more space, attach a separate sheet.)

3. Texas School Book Depository 411 Elm, Dallas Tex 10/63 – 11/6

Knowing that anyone making a false statement or representation of a material fact for use in determining the right to or the amount of Federal old-age, survivors, or disability insurance benefits or in determining an individual's disability, commits a crime punishable under Federal law, I certify that the above statements are true.

If this application has been signed by mark (X), two witnesses who know the applicant must sign below, giving their full addresses.

1. .... (Name)

.... (Street and number)

.... (City) (Zone number) (State)

2. .... (Name)

.... (Street and number)

.... (City) (Zone number) (State)

Signature of applicant (*Write in ink*):

Sign Here ➧ Marina N. Oswald
(First name) (Middle initial) (Last name)

PO Box 1407
(Street and number)

Grand Prairie Tex 75050
(City) (Zone number) (State)

Telephone number at which I can be reached:

~~DA7-6569~~ DA 7-0188
(If none, write "None.")

Date:

X ....
(Month) (Day) (Year)

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1961 OF—588338

STATE OF TEXAS

CERTIFICATE OF DEATH

STATE FILE NO.

TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH — BUREAU OF VITAL STATISTICS

1. PLACE OF DEATH a. COUNTY Dallas
2. USUAL RESIDENCE (Where deceased lived. If institution: residence before admission) a. STATE Texas b. COUNTY Dallas

b. CITY OR TOWN (If outside city limits, give precinct no.) Dallas
c. LENGTH OF STAY in 1 b. 13 Mo.
c. CITY OR TOWN (If outside city limits, give precinct no.) Dallas

d. NAME OF (If not in hospital, give street address) HOSPITAL OR INSTITUTION Parkland Hospital
d. STREET ADDRESS (If rural, give location) 1026 N. Beckley

e. IS PLACE OF DEATH INSIDE CITY LIMITS? YES ☒ NO ☐
e. IS RESIDENCE INSIDE CITY LIMITS? YES ☒ NO ☐
f. IS RESIDENCE ON A FARM? YES ☐ NO ☒

3. NAME OF DECEASED (Type or print) (a) First Lee (b) Middle Harvey (c) Last Oswald
4. DATE OF DEATH November 24, 1963

5. SEX Male
6. COLOR OR RACE White
7. Married ☒ Never Married ☐ Widowed ☐ Divorced ☐
8. DATE OF BIRTH October 19, 1939
9. AGE (In years last birthday) 24
IF UNDER 1 YEAR Months Days
IF UNDER 24 HRS. Hours Minutes

10a. USUAL OCCUPATION (Give kind of work done during most of working life, even if retired) Laborer
10b. KIND OF BUSINESS OR INDUSTRY Printing, Book, Metal Sheet
11. BIRTHPLACE (State or foreign country) New Orleans, La
12. CITIZEN OF WHAT COUNTRY? USA

13. FATHER'S NAME Robert Edward Lee Oswald
14. MOTHER'S MAIDEN NAME Margeruite Claverie

15. WAS DECEASED EVER IN U.S. ARMED FORCES? (Yes, no, or unknown) Yes (If yes, give war or dates of service) 10-1956 9-1959
16. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 433-54-3937
17. INFORMANT Robert L Oswald

MEDICAL CERTIFICATION

18. CAUSE OF DEATH [Enter only one cause per line for (a), (b), and (c).]

PART I. DEATH WAS CAUSED BY:

IMMEDIATE CAUSE (a) Hemorrhage, secondary to
Conditions, if any, which gave rise to above cause (a), stating the underlying cause last. DUE TO (b) a gunshot wound of the chest.
DUE TO (c)

INTERVAL BETWEEN ONSET AND DEATH approx 45 minutes

PART II. OTHER SIGNIFICANT CONDITIONS CONTRIBUTING TO DEATH BUT NOT RELATED TO THE TERMINAL DISEASE CONDITION GIVEN IN PART I(a)

19. WAS AUTOPSY PERFORMED? YES ☒ NO ☐

20a. ACCIDENT ☐ SUICIDE ☐ HOMICIDE ☒

20b. DESCRIBE HOW INJURY OCCURRED. (Enter nature of injury in Part I or Part II of Item 18.) Deceased shot at close range while officers were in process of transferring him from city to county jail.

20c. TIME OF INJURY Hour 1125 ~~a.m.~~ p.m. Month 11 Day 24 Year 63

20d. INJURY OCCURRED WHILE AT WORK ☐ NOT WHILE AT WORK ☒
20e. PLACE OF INJURY (e.g., in or about home, farm, factory, street, office building, etc.) City Hall
20f. CITY, TOWN, OR LOCATION Dallas COUNTY Dallas STATE Texas

21. I hereby certify that I ~~attended the deceased from~~ held inquest, 19 to on 11-24-63 and last ~~saw the deceased alive~~ on , 19 . Death occurred at 12:45 P m. on the date stated above, and to the best of my knowledge, from the causes stated.

22a. SIGNATURE Pierce McBride (Degree or title) J.P.
22b. ADDRESS 310 Courthouse
22c. DATE SIGNED 12-5-63

23a. BURIAL, CREMATION, REMOVAL (Specify) XXXXXXX REMOVAL
23b. DATE November 25, 1963
23c. NAME OF CEMETERY OR CREMATORY Rose Hill Burial Park

23d. LOCATION (City, town, or county) Fort Worth (State) Texas
24. FUNERAL DIRECTOR'S SIGNATURE #3775 Miller Funeral Home, Ft Worth, Texas

25a. REGISTRAR'S FILE NO. 6717
25b. DATE REC'D BY LOCAL REGISTRAR DEC 6 1963
25c. REGISTRAR'S SIGNATURE J. W. Bass BY Maurine Larmon ACTING REGISTRAR

VS-112 REV. 1/58

DALLAS, TEXAS Jan. 2, 1964

I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A TRUE COPY OF DEATH

CERTIFICATE OF ONE Lee Harvey Oswald

AS IS RECORDED IN THIS OFFICE IN THE CITY OF DALLAS,

COUNTY OF DALLAS, STATE OF TEXAS.

J. W. Bass

BY

ACTING REGISTRAR - VITAL STATISTICS
DALLAS, TEXAS

TRANSLATION

NAME OF INSURED INDIVIDUAL

SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER 433-54-3937

TRANSLATING OFFICE

Social Security Administration

A. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

(Complete only if document is sent to another office for translation.)

1. DATE: 1/23/64
2. LANGUAGE OF DOCUMENT: RUSSIAN
3. PERSON(S) FOR WHOM PROOF SUBMITTED: *(If married woman give maiden name)*
4. FACT(S) TO BE PROVED:
5. ALLEGED DATE EVENT IN ITEM A-4 OCCURRED:

B. TRANSLATION

(To be filled out by official translator)

1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: Marriage Certificate
2. DATE EVENT RECORDED, IF SHOWN: 4/30/61
3. DATE DOCUMENT ISSUED: 4/30/61
4. TITLE OF OFFICER EXECUTING DOCUMENT: Bureau Manager (Chief)
5. NAME OF ISSUING AGENCY: Bureau of Registration of Citizens Statistics, Minsk, Dist Lenin

6. Does this document appear to be genuine and unaltered, and to have been made at the time purported? . . . . ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. Is Foreign Service post verification stamp shown on document . . . . ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. Describe and explain any irregularities in document:

9. The document, which is in the __________ language, contains the following pertinent information:

Citizen: Oswald, Lee Harvey, born 10/18/39 in New Orleans

and

Citizen: Prycanova, Marina Nikolaevna, born July 17, 1941 in Molotovsk, Dist. Arkhangelsk

were married on April 30, 1961

Reg. No. 415 Cert. No. 332281

REQUESTING OFFICE:

Social Security Administration

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED TRANSLATOR George Kotishen

TITLE Cl Auth Tr

DATE 1/23/64

Marriage Certificate

СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО О БРАКЕ

Грамадзянін
Гражданин Освальд
(прозвішча — фамилия)

Ли Харвей
(імя і імя па бацьку — имя и отчество)

1939 года нараджэння 18 X
года рождения

гор. Новый Орлеан
(месца нараджэння — место рождения)

І грамадзянка
и гражданка Прусакова
(прозвішча — фамилия)

Марина Николаевна
(імя і імя па бацьку — имя и отчество)

1941 года нараджэння 17 VII
года рождения

гор. Молотовск
(месца нараджэння — место рождения)

Архангельской

уступілі ў шлюб 30 апреля 1961 г.
вступили в брак (прапісам год, месяц і чысло)

тысяча девятьсот
(прописью год, месяц и число)

шестьдесят первого

года

аб чым у кнізе запісаў актаў грамадзянскага стану аб шлюбе
о чем в книге записей актов гражданского состояния о браке

1961 года апреля месяца 30 числа
года месяца числа

зроблен адпаведны запіс за
произведена соответствующая запись за № 475

Пасля рэгістрацыі шлюбу прысвоены прозвішчы:
После регистрации брака присвоены фамилии:

мужу Освальд

жонцы
жене Освальд

Месца рэгістрацыі гор. Минск
Место регистрации (назва і месцазнаходжанне бюро ЗАГС)

ЗАГС Ленинского
(наименование и местонахождение бюро ЗАГС)

района

Дата выдачы
Дата выдачи 30 апреля 1961 г.

I-ПЯ № 332281

Загадчык бюро запісаў актаў грамадзянскага стану
Заведующий бюро записей актов гражданского состояния



The original document, of which this is a photocopy, appears to be genuine and unaltered and to have been made at the time purported.

Signature______________________________

Date______________ Title____________________

This is a true copy of a document held as evidence by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and examination of the original document by the F.B.I. Laboratory discloses no evidence of alteration.

Wallace R. Heitman
Special Agent FBI
Dallas, Texas

Белорусский ф.
Гознак. 1959.

Белорусская ССР – Беларуская ССР

СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО О БРАКЕ

TRANSLATION

NAME OF INSURED INDIVIDUAL

SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER
433-54-3937

TRANSLATING OFFICE
Social Security Administration

A. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE
(Complete only if document is sent to another office for translation.)

1. DATE: 1/23/64
2. LANGUAGE OF DOCUMENT: RUSSIAN
3. PERSON(S) FOR WHOM PROOF SUBMITTED: *(If married woman give maiden name)*
4. FACT(S) TO BE PROVED:
5. ALLEGED DATE EVENT IN ITEM A-4 OCCURRED:

B. TRANSLATION
(To be filled out by official translator)

1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: Birth Certificate
2. DATE EVENT RECORDED, IF SHOWN: 8/14/41
3. DATE DOCUMENT ISSUED: 7/14/61
4. TITLE OF OFFICER EXECUTING DOCUMENT:
5. NAME OF ISSUING AGENCY: Illegible*

6. Does this document appear to be genuine and unaltered, and to have been made at the time purported? . . . . . ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. Is Foreign Service post verification stamp shown on document . . . . . ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. Describe and explain any irregularities in document:

9. The document, which is in the ____________ language, contains the following pertinent information:

Name: Prycanova, Marina Mkolaevna was born (Mo. Illegible) 17, 1941 (month appears to be July or June)

Place of Birth: (City Illegible), District Arkhangelsk, RSFSR

Father: (Illegible)

Mother: (")

Reg. No. 1285 Cert No. (Illegible)

REQUESTING OFFICE:
* Document shows official Soviet ZACS bureau stamp.
Social Security Administration

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED TRANSLATOR
Geo. Kotislion

TITLE
Cl Auth Tr

DATE
1/23/64

GPO : 1962 O - 648770

Marina's
Birth Certificate

Гр.

[illegible]

ро[illegible]

национальность

М:

мест[illegible]

р[illegible]

респу[illegible]

о чем в [illegible]

о рожд[illegible]

14 числа произведена соответствующая запись

з 1235

TRANSLATION

NAME OF INSURED INDIVIDUAL

SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NUMBER 433-54-3937

TRANSLATING OFFICE
Social Security Administration

A. REQUEST FOR ASSISTANCE

(Complete only if document is sent to another office for translation.)

1. DATE: 1/23/64
2. LANGUAGE OF DOCUMENT: Russian
3. PERSON(S) FOR WHOM PROOF SUBMITTED: *(If married woman give maiden name)*
4. FACT(S) TO BE PROVED: D/B
5. ALLEGED DATE EVENT IN ITEM A-4 OCCURRED:

B. TRANSLATION

(To be filled out by official translator)

1. TYPE OF DOCUMENT: Birth Certificate
2. DATE EVENT RECORDED, IF SHOWN: 2/25/62
3. DATE DOCUMENT ISSUED: 2/25/62
4. TITLE OF OFFICER EXECUTING DOCUMENT: Bureau manager (chief)
5. NAME OF ISSUING AGENCY: Bureau of Registration of Citizen's Statistics Minsk, Dist. Lenin

6. Does this document appear to be genuine and unaltered, and to have been made at the time purported? . . . . . ☐ YES ☐ NO

7. Is Foreign Service post verification stamp shown on document . . . . . ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. Describe and explain any irregularities in document:

9. The document, which is in the ______ language, contains the following pertinent information:

Family name: OSWALD
First Name: June
Patronymic: Lee
Born: February 15, 1962
Place of Birth: Minsk, White Russian SSR
Reg. No. 208

FATHER'S NAME: OSWALD, LEE HARVEY
FATHER'S NATIONALITY: American
MOTHER'S NAME: OSWALD, Marina NIKOLAEVNA
MOTHER'S NATIONALITY: RUSSIAN

(over)

REQUESTING OFFICE:
Social Security Administration

SIGNATURE OF AUTHORIZED TRANSLATOR George [illegible]

TITLE [illegible]

DATE 1/23/64

FORM OA-C533 (3-62)

GPO : 1962 O - 648770

Place of Registration; Minsk, District Lenin
Office of Registration
Certificate No. 123610

June Lee Birth Certificate

433-54-3937

ПАСВЕДЧАННЕ АБ НАРАДЖЭННІ

СВИДЕТЕЛЬСТВО О РОЖДЕНИИ

Гр. Освальд

Гр. (прозвішча — фамилия)

Джун Ли

(імя і імя па бацьку — имя и отчество)

нарадзіўся(лася) родился(лась) 15. II. 1962 г.

(прапісам і лічбамі год, месяц і число — прописью и цифрами год, месяц и число)

пятнадцатого февраля тысяча девятьсот шестьдесят второго года

Месца нараджэння дзіцяці: горад, сяло / Место рождения ребенка: город, село Минск

раён / район

вобласць, область БССР

аб чым у кнізе запісаў актаў грамадзянскага стану аб нараджэнні / о чем в книге записей актов гражданского состояния о рождении

1962 года февраля месяца 25 числа

зроблен адпаведны запіс за / произведена соответствующая запись за № 208.

БАЦЬКІ:
РОДИТЕЛИ:

Бацька / Отец Освальд

(прозвішча — фамилия)

Ли Харвей

(імя і імя па бацьку — имя и отчество)

нацыянальнасць / национальность американец

Маці / Мать Освальд

(прозвішча — фамилия)

Марина Николаевна

(імя і імя па бацьку — имя и отчество)

нацыянальнасць / национальность русская

Месца рэгістрацыі / Место регистрации г. Минск

(назва і месцазнаходжанне бюро ЗАГС — наименование и местонахождение бюро ЗАГС)

Бюро ЗАГС Ленинского р-на

Дата выдачы / Дата выдачи 25. февраля 1962 г.

М. П.

IV-ПЯ № 123610

Загадчык бюро запісаў актаў грамадзянскага стану / Заведующий бюро записей актов гражданского состояния

3

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
BUREAU OF OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE

CERTIFICATION OF CONTENTS OF DOCUMENT(S) OR RECORD(S)

(This form must be executed by an authorized employee of the Social Security Administration)

Name of wage earner or self-employed person: Lee Harvey Oswald

Social security account number: 433-54-3937

Every item in a block must be filled out with exact excerpts from the paper certified or the item must be marked "not shown." If the date on which an entry was made in a family record is "not shown," indicate under "Remarks" any allegation as to when the document or record was established. CROSS OUT ALL UNUSED SPACES.

A. AGE (OR RELATIONSHIP) OF:

1. Name of Person as Shown on Evidence: Audrey Marina Rachel Oswald
Born: 10/20/63
Age: ns
Birthday at Which Age Shown: ☐ Last ☐ Nearest ☐ Next ☑ Not Given
Date Recorded: ns
Name of Father: Lee H. Oswald ☐ Not Shown
Age: ns
Name of Mother: Marina Nichalaevna Prossakova ☐ Not Shown
Age: ns
Person Having Custody, Relationship to Applicant, and Address: ☑ Applicant
Nature of Evidence: Cert. of Birth Reg.
Name and Address of Issuing Agency (If certifying from a Bible, give date of publication): BVS, Dallas, Tex
☐ Custodian
Document No.: 19133

2. Name of Person as Shown on Evidence:
Born:
Age:
Birthday at Which Age Shown: ☐ Last ☐ Nearest ☐ Next ☐ Not Given
Date Recorded:
Name of Father: ☐ Not Shown
Age:
Name of Mother: ☐ Not Shown
Age:
Person Having Custody, Relationship to Applicant, and Address: ☐ Applicant
Nature of Evidence:
Name and Address of Issuing Agency (If certifying from a Bible, give date of publication):
☐ Custodian
Document No.:

3. Name of Person as Shown on Evidence:
Born:
Age:
Birthday at Which Age Shown: ☐ Last ☐ Nearest ☐ Next ☐ Not Given
Date Recorded:
Name of Father: ☐ Not Shown
Age:
Name of Mother: ☐ Not Shown
Age:
Person Having Custody, Relationship to Applicant, and Address: ☐ Applicant
Nature of Evidence:
Name and Address of Issuing Agency (If certifying from a Bible, give date of publication):
☐ Custodian
Document No.:

4. Name of Person as Shown on Evidence:
Born:
Age:
Birthday at Which Age Shown: ☐ Last ☐ Nearest ☐ Next ☐ Not Given
Date Recorded:
Name of Father: ☐ Not Shown
Age:
Name of Mother: ☐ Not Shown
Age:
Person Having Custody, Relationship to Applicant, and Address: ☐ Applicant
Nature of Evidence:
Name and Address of Issuing Agency (If certifying from a Bible, give date of publication):
☐ Custodian
Document No.:

B. MARRIAGE OF:

Name of Husband as Shown on Evidence:
No. of Previous Marriages (1, 2, etc.): ☐ Not Shown
Born:
Age:
Birthday at Which Age Shown: ☐ Last ☐ Nearest ☐ Next ☐ Not Given

Name of Wife as Shown on Evidence:
No. of Previous Marriages (1, 2, etc.): ☐ Not Shown
Born:
Age:
Birthday at Which Age Shown: ☐ Last ☐ Nearest ☐ Next ☐ Not Given

Nature of Evidence: ☐ Marriage Certificate
Place of Marriage:
Person Having Custody, Relationship to Applicant, and Address: ☐ Applicant
Date of Marriage:
Name and Address of Issuing Agency (If certifying from a Bible, give date of publication):
☐ Custodian
Document No.:

Form OA-C704
(6-62)

(OVER)

DEPARTMENT OF HEA UCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRA
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivo

CERTIFICATION BY UNIFORMED SERVICES

The information requested below is for use in connection with a claim for social security benefits based at least in part on active service in the armed forces after September 7, 1939.

~~Mxxxxxx~~ Thomas C. Parrott TCP Date 1/24/64
Director

FROM: Social Security Administration
Division of Claims Policy
Entitlement Branch, Room 645
Baltimore, Md. 21235

PART I—TO BE COMPLETED BY SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME Oswald, Lee Harvey	DATE OF BIRTH 10/19/39	DATE OF DEATH 11/24/63	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 433-54-3937
BRANCH OF SERVICE Marine Corps RATE OR RANK SERIAL NO. 1653230	DATE(S) OF ENTRY INTO SERVICE 10/24/56	DATE(S) OF SEPARATION 9/11/59	PLACE(S) OF SEPARATION

Part II ☒ . . . Part III ☐ below to be completed by the service department

REMARKS:

PART II—SERVICE DEPT. CERTIFICATION ABOUT ACTIVE SERVICE AFTER SEPTEMBER 7, 1939.

1. DATE(S) OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE
24Oct56 ;

2. DATE(S) OF SEPARATION FROM ACTIVE SERVICE
11Sep59

4. *If period of service was less than 90 days,* WAS INDIVIDUAL DISCHARGED OR RELEASED FROM ACTIVE SERVICE AS RESULT OF INJURY OR DISABILITY INCURRED OR AGGRAVATED IN SERVICE IN LINE OF DUTY?

☐ YES ☐ NO

5. IF A PERIOD OF SERVICE HAD AN ENTRY DATE AFTER 12/31/46 AND BEFORE 12/16/50, BY WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING WAS ENTRY EFFECTED?

☐ INDUCTED ☐ CALLED FROM INACTIVE SERVICE ☐ ENLISTED
☐ RE-ENLISTED ☐ COMMISSIONED

3. CHARACTER OF SEPARATION(S) * (*If Bad Condu ICATE IF GIVEN AS A RESULT OF A General* COURT MARTIAL)

Honorable

*IF CHARACTER OF SEPARATION WAS NOT *Honorable, Under Honorable Conditions, Dishonorable,* NOR *Bad Conduct* AS A RESULT OF A *General* COURT MARTIAL, CHECK REASON FOR SEPARATION BELOW:

a. ☐ DESERTION.
b. ☐ RESIGNATION FOR THE GOOD OF THE SERVICE (*Officers Only*).
c. ☐ CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR WHO REFUSED TO WEAR THE UNIFORM OR OTHERWISE TO COMPLY WITH LAWFUL ORDERS OF COMPETENT MILITARY AUTHORITY.
d. ☐ CONVICTION BY A CIVIL COURT FOR TREASON, SABOTAGE, ESPIONAGE, MURDER, RAPE, ARSON, BURGLARY, ROBBERY, KIDNAPPING, ASSAULT WITH INTENT TO KILL, ASSAULT WITH A DANGEROUS WEAPON, OR OF AN ATTEMPT TO COMMIT ANY OF THESE CRIMES.
e. ☐ NONE OF THE ABOVE.

PART III—SERVICE DEPT. CERTIFICATION ABOUT RETIRED OR RETAINER PAY (See instructions on reverse side)

IF THE VETERAN WAS NEVER RETIRED or TRANSFERRED TO THE FLEET RESERVE, check this box. . . . ☐
Sign and return the form without answering items 1, 2 and 3 below.

1. (a) Was this veteran an enlisted member of the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard and retired after September 15, 1940, and before October 1, 1949, because of disability? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
   (b) Was this veteran ever retired or transferred to the Fleet Naval (or Marine Corps) Reserve after September 15, 1940, for any reason other than disability which is the proximate result of the performance of active duty? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
   If answer to 1 (a) or 1 (b) is "Yes," answer (c) and (d).
   (c) Was active service after September 15, 1940, and before July 25, 1947, used to establish eligibility to receive retirement or retainer pay? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
   (d) Was active service after July 24, 1947, and before January 1, 1957, used to establish eligibility to receive retirement or retainer pay? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
2. (a) Has the retirement (or retainer) pay of this individual ever been fixed under a formula which includes a multiple of active service? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
   If answer is "Yes," answer (b) and (c).
   (b) Was this multiple increased because of active service occurring after September 15, 1940, and before July 25, 1947? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
   (c) Was this multiple increase because of active service occurring after July 24, 1947, and before January 1, 1957? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
3. Did the veteran have active duty or active duty for training after December 31, 1956? . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

REMARKS BY CERTIFYING AGENCY:

Served in an inactive status in the Marine Corps Reserve from 12Sep59 to 13Sep60 when dischargbd as Undesirable.

☐ CONTINUED ON REVERSE SIDE

ORGANIZATION Records Service Section
Hq. U: .S. Marine Coprs

DATE 27Jan64

SIGNATURE W C Keene

RANK OR TITLE Head of Section

Form OA-C654
(2-61)

INSTRUCTIONS

This form requests information to permit the Social Security Administration to determine whether the veteran had active military or naval service during World War II (September 16, 1940--July 24, 1947) or post- World War II (July 25, 1947--December 31, 1956) for which military service wage credits may be granted.

The duplicate copy of this form should be kept in the veteran's military file. If there is ever a subsequent change made in the service or retirement record which affects the information furnished on this form, the Social Security Administration should be advised accordingly.

PART I—The items identifying the veteran are completed by the requesting Social Security Administration office shown in the upper right corner of the form. That office will also check block(s) after "Part II" and/or "Part III" to show the type of information being requested.

items in Part II are to be com-

A-5951 Lee Harvey

Telecom. with Marine Corps 1/24/64 and attached OA-C654 completed 1/27/64.

Attached OA-C654 reflects DWE's honorable active service 10/24/56 - 9/11/59 which confirms telecom. with Marine Corps (W. C. Keene, Record Service Section, Hdqs. Marine Corps, Washington, D.C.) on 1/24/64. The DWE's discharge as Undesirable was from his inactive status in the Marine Corps Reserve from 9/12/59 to 9/13/60, which discharge did not affect the character of separation from earlier service.

MS wage credits for 10/56 - 12/56 are not precluded by type of discharge from later period of service. See CM 1823.

LBenning
Lorene B. Benning
Claims Policy Examiner

Hiss Act does not apply since military service is not required for insured status and benefits were computed based on non-military service in 1962 and 1963.

Walter D. Rabenstein
Claims Policy Examiner

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
NAVY DISCHARGE REVIEW BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

IN REPLY REFER TO
EXOS:QB(33)
JAP:gjo

JUL 25 1963

Mr. Lee H. Oswald
P. O. Box 30061
New Orleans, La.

Dear Mr. Oswald:

The review of your discharge has been completed in accordance with the regulations governing the procedures of this Board. Careful consideration was given to the evidence presented in your behalf as well as that contained in your official records. The Secretary of the Navy has reviewed the proceedings of the Board.

It is the decision that no change, correction or modification is warranted in your discharge.

250

Sincerely yours,

D. W. Bowman

D. W. BOWMAN
Captain, USN
President
Navy Discharge Review Board

Encls: Original Discharge Certificate.
Two (2) letters dated 31 Jan 1962, 13 Nov 1961.
Information on Reenlistment

Service Discharge

LEGEND: Insert N/A to the items below which are not applicable.

PERSONAL DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME: OSWALD, Leo Harvey
2. SERVICE NUMBER: 1653230
3a. GRADE, RATE OR RANK: PFC (E-2)
b. DATE OF RANK (Day, Month, Year): 1Mar59
4. DEPARTMENT, COMPONENT AND BRANCH OR CLASS: USMC
5. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country): New Orleans, Louisiana
6. DATE OF BIRTH: DAY 18 MONTH Oct YEAR 39
7a. RACE: Caucasian
b. SEX: Male
c. COLOR HAIR: Brown
d. COLOR EYES: Grey
e. HEIGHT: 71"
f. WEIGHT: 150
8. U.S. CITIZEN: ☒ YES ☐ NO
9. MARITAL STATUS: Single
10a. HIGHEST CIVILIAN EDUCATION LEVEL ATTAINED: High School - 1
b. MAJOR COURSE OR FIELD: Academic

TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE DATA

11a. TYPE OF TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE: Transferred to Marine Corps Reserve
b. STATION OR INSTALLATION AT WHICH EFFECTED: H&HS, MCAS, El Toro, (Santa Ana), California
c. REASON AND AUTHORITY: 226-Dependency. Par 10273 MARCORMAN & MCO 1900.2B & CG 3dMAW's 5th End of 31Aug59
d. EFFECTIVE DATE: DAY 11 MONTH Sep YEAR 59
12. LAST DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND MAJOR COMMAND: MACS-9, MWHG, 3dMAW, [illegible]FMFPac, MCAS, ElToro(SantaAna)California
13a. CHARACTER OF SERVICE: HONORABLE
b. TYPE OF CERTIFICATE ISSUED: DD-217-MC

SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA

14. SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER: N/A
15. SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BOARD NUMBER, CITY, COUNTY AND STATE: N/A
16. DATE INDUCTED: DAY MONTH N/A YEAR

17. DISTRICT OR AREA COMMAND TO WHICH RESERVIST TRANSFERRED: MARTC NAS, Glenview, Illinois
18. TERMINAL DATE OF RESERVE OBLIGATION: DAY 8 MONTH Dec YEAR 62
19. CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE OTHER THAN BY INDUCTION
a. SOURCE OF ENTRY: ☒ ENLISTED (First Enlistment) ☐ ENLISTED (Prior Service) ☐ REENLISTED ☐ OTHER:
b. TERM OF SERVICE (Years): 3
c. DATE OF ENTRY: DAY 24 MONTH Oct YEAR 56
20. PRIOR REGULAR ENLISTMENTS: NONE
21. GRADE, RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE: Private
22. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE (City and State): Dallas, Texas
23. HOME OF RECORD AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE (Street, RFD, City, County and State): 4936 Collinwood Street, Fort Worth, Tarrant, Texas
25a. SPECIALTY NUMBER AND TITLE: 6741: AvnElectronic Operator
b. RELATED CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND D. O. T. NUMBER: Radio Operator 0-61.30

SERVICE DATA

24. STATEMENT OF SERVICE		YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
a. CREDITABLE FOR BASIC PAY PURPOSES	(1) NET SERVICE THIS PERIOD	2	9	3
	(2) OTHER SERVICE	0	0	0
	(3) TOTAL (Line (1) + line (2))	2	9	3
b. TOTAL ACTIVE SERVICE		2	9	3
c. FOREIGN AND/OR SEA SERVICE		1	2	[illegible]

26. DECORATIONS, MEDALS, BADGES, COMMENDATIONS, CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN RIBBONS AWARDED OR AUTHORIZED: NONE
27. WOUNDS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES (Place and date, if known): NONE
...AND/OR POST-GRADUATE COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED
28. OTHER

8 | DEC | 62 | ☐ OTHER

20. PRIOR REGULAR ENLISTMENTS: NONE

21. GRADE, RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE: Private

22. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE (City and State): Dallas, Texas

23. HOME OF RECORD AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE (Street, RFD, City, County and State):
4936 Collinwood Street
Fort Worth, Tarrant, Texas

25a. SPECIALTY NUMBER AND TITLE: 6741: AvnElectronic Operator

b. RELATED CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND D. O. T. NUMBER: Radio Operator 0-61.30

24.	STATEMENT OF SERVICE	YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
a. CREDITABLE FOR BASIC PAY PURPOSES	(1) NET SERVICE THIS PERIOD	2	9	3
	(2) OTHER SERVICE	0	0	0
	(3) TOTAL (Line (1) + line (2))	2	9	3
b. TOTAL ACTIVE SERVICE		2	9	3
c. FOREIGN AND/OR SEA SERVICE		1	2	[illegible]

26. DECORATIONS, MEDALS, BADGES, COMMENDATIONS, CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN RIBBONS AWARDED OR AUTHORIZED: NONE

27. WOUNDS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES (Place and date, if known): NONE

28. SERVICE SCHOOLS OR COLLEGES, COLLEGE TRAINING, COURSES AND/OR POST-GRADUATE COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED

SCHOOL OR COURSE a	DATES (From - To) b	MAJOR COURSES c
Jacksonville, Florida	18Mar57-3May57	AvnFundamentalCl"P"Scol
Biloxi, Mississippi	[illegible]May57 19Jun57	AC[illegible]OperCrse

29. OTHER SERVICE TRAINING COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED: USAFI GED HSLow

VA DATA

30a. GOVERNMENT LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE: ☐ YES ☒ NO

b. AMOUNT OF ALLOTMENT: N/A

c. MONTH ALLOTMENT DISCONTINUED: N/A

31a. VA BENEFITS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED FOR (Specify type): NONE

b. VA CLAIM NUMBER: C- N/A

AUTHENTICATION

32. REMARKS:
Lump sum leave settlement due but not settled
Mileage paid: $91.56
Recommended for Reenlistment.
Time lost current active duty: Forty-five (45) days
Periods in a non-pay status: From 29Jun58 to 12Aug58
Good Conduct Medal period commences 27Jun58 (1st Award)
Total payment on separation: $132.30 (9/11/59)

33. PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES AFTER TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE (Street, RFD, City, County and State):
3124 W. 5th Street,
Fort Worth, Tarrant, Texas

34. SIGNATURE OF PERSON BEING TRANSFERRED OR DISCHARGED: Lee Harvey Oswald

35a. TYPED NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER: A.G.AYERS Jr,1stLt USMCR Ass't OIC SepSec

b. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO SIGN:

DD FORM 1 NOV 55 214 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 52 WHICH IS OBSOLETE

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
REPORT OF TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE

433-54-3937

UNDESIRABLE DISCHARGE

FROM THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT

PRIVATE FIRST CLASS LEE HARVEY OSWALD 1653230

WAS DISCHARGED FROM THE

UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

ON THE 13th DAY OF SEPTEMBER 1960

AS UNDESIRABLE

M G Letscher

M. G. LETSCHER, FIRST LIEUTENANT, USMC

DD 256 MC

16—82083-3

ity for discharge ____________________

at ____________________ on the ____________ day of

____________________, 19___, to serve ___ years

s service ____________________

____

____

eld on discharge ____________________

(Date of [illegible])

y occupational specialty ____________________ ww

(sea, foreign, battles, engagements, expeditions) ____________________

____

____

____

number ____________________

ation ____________________

f discharge ____________________

y that the above is correct according to the service records.

____

. NAS, GLENVIEW, ILL. 26 Sep 60 ____________________

non-delivery of Discharge

(address unkown) ____________________

By direction

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 16—63063-3

257

Form OA-C591
(8-58)

UNIT DESTINATION	
☐ ADJ	☐ COR
☑ CC	☐ CR
☐ CL	☐ DR

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE ASSIGN

(Mail and Distribution Subunit)

Referred to

Received by

Searcher

Final disposition

Remarks:

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
BUREAU OF OLD-AGE AND SURVIVORS INSURANCE

Form Approved
Budget Bureau
No. 72-R597.1

CLAIMANT'S REPORT TO SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

PRINT NAME OF PERSON ABOUT WHOM REPORT IS MADE
Marina Oswald

SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM NUMBER
433-54-3937 E, C1,2

Fill in Only the Item(s) being reported.

1. CHANGE OF ADDRESS. (Fill in new address at bottom.)
Check if change is for: ☑ more than 6 months ☐ 6 months or less
To avoid delay in receipt of checks you should also file a regular change of address notice with your local post office.

2. MARRIAGE
Show new name
Enter date of marriage

3. DEATH
Enter date of death

4. DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE (of spouse beneficiary from insured individual)
Enter date decree final

5. CHILD OR OTHER CLAIMANT LEFT YOUR CARE
Enter date child left your care

6. CHILD LEGALLY ADOPTED BY
Enter date of adoption
☐ Stepparent ☐ Grandparent ☐ Aunt ☐ Uncle ☐ Other

7. WORK OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES:
I was employed or self-employed outside the United States beginning with the month of
Month and Year

SIGNATURE of person making this report
Marina Oswald.

Date signed
March 27, 1964.

P.O. Box or Street
629 Belt Line

City Zone No. State
Richardson, Tex. 75080

FORM OA-C668 (10-62)

GPO : 1962 OF—663532

Form OA-C591
(2-64)

UNIT DES

☐ PES
☑ CC
☐ CAS

INCOMING CORRESPONDEN

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

Form Approved.
Budget Bureau
No. 72-R597.2

CLAIMANT'S REPORT TO SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

PRINT NAME OF PERSON OR PERSONS ABOUT WHOM REPORT IS MADE

MARINA N. OSWALD

SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM NUMBER(S)

433-54-3937-E

Fill in Only the Item(s) being reported.

1. CHANGE OF ADDRESS. (Fill in new address at bottom.)
Check if change is for: ☒ more than 6 months ☐ 6 months or less
To avoid delay in receipt of checks you should also file a regular change of address notice with your local post office.

2. MARRIAGE .... Show New Name	Enter date of marriage
3. DEATH OF (Show Name)	Enter date of death
4. DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE (of spouse beneficiary from insured individual)..........................	Enter date decree final
5. CHILD OR OTHER CLAIMANT LEFT YOUR CARE..............................	Enter date child left your care
Show Given Name(s) of Person(s) Who Left:	
6. GOING OUTSIDE THE U.S. Name of country to which going	Date of departure from U.S.A.
Given Name(s) of Person(s) Going	
7. CHILD LEGALLY ADOPTED .... Show Given Name(s) of Child(ren)	Enter date of adoption

BY ☐ Stepparent ☐ Grandparent ☐ Aunt ☐ Uncle ☐ Other

SIGNATURE of person making this report

x Mrs. Marina Oswald

P.O. Box or Street

1245 DONNA DRIVE

City State Zip Code

RICHARDSON, TEXAS 75080

~~Enter name of county~~, if any, in which you live

DALLAS COUNTY

Date Signed

5-1-65

FORM OA-C 668 (6-63)

* GPO : 1963 OF—696-004

Form OA-C669
(11-60)

Form Approved.
Budget Bureau No. 72-R598

CLAIMANT'S REPORT ABOUT WORK TO SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

PRINT NAME OF PERSON ABOUT WHOM REPORT IS MADE
MARINA N. OSWALD

SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM NUMBER
433-54-3937-E

Fill in Only the item being reported.

REPORT HERE IF YOU WORK

and expect to earn more than $1,200 during this taxable year.

I am working for wages of more than $100 (or rendering substantial services in self-employment) beginning with the month of. . → Month & Year: 9-64

Fill in both boxes

I estimate that my total earnings for this taxable year will be. . . . → Amount: $ 5,000

Your estimate will be used to schedule benefit payments to you during the year. At the end of the year an annual report of actual earnings is required, at which time adjustments, as necessary, will be made.

REPORT HERE IF YOU STOP WORKING

for wages of more than $100 a month (or rendering substantial services in self-employment).

The last month I worked for wages of more than $100 (or rendered substantial services in self-employment) was . . . . → Month & Year:

REPORT HERE TO REVISE AN ESTIMATE

of earnings you previously gave for this taxable year.

I estimate that my total earnings for this taxable year will be . → Amount*: $

*If $1,200 or less, show "$1,200 or less"

Your benefit payments will be rescheduled in line with the changes in your work activity reported above.

SIGNATURE of person making this report: Mrs. Marina Oswald
Date signed: Oct. 8, 1964.

P.O. Box or street: 629 BELT LINE ROAD

City: RICHARDSON, Zone No.: 75080 State: TEXAS

GPO : 1960 O—572939

10.15.64

559

(2-64)

☐ PES	☐ COR
☐ CC	☐ RECON
☐ CAS	☐ REC

INCOMING CORRESPONDENCE ASSIGNMENT RECORI

(MAIL AND DISTRIBUTION S

Referred to ....

Received by ....

Searcher ....

Final disposition ....

REMARKS: ....

nit ....

ate ....

osition ....

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTI

Form Approved.
Budget Bureau
No. 72-R597.3

REPORTING CARD

PRINT NAME OF PERSON OR PERSONS ABOUT WHOM REPORT IS MADE

MARINA N. PorTer

ENTER SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM ~~NUMBER IN~~ THIS SPACE

433 54 3937

Check or fill in ONLY the information being reported.

1. ☒ CHANGE OF ADDRESS (Print new address at bottom)
Check if change is for: ☐ More than 6 mos. ☐ 6 mos. or less

2. ☐ WORKING AND WILL EARN OVER $1,500 THIS YEAR:
I am working for wages of more than $125 a month (or rendering substantial services in self-employment) beginning with the month of ...... → MONTH AND YEAR
Fill in both boxes
I estimate that my total earnings for this taxable year will be ...... → AMOUNT $

3. ☐ STOPPING WORK:
The last month I worked for wages of more than $125 (or rendered substantial services in self-employment) was .... → MONTH AND YEAR

4. ☒ SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN ESTIMATE:
I estimate that my total earnings for this taxable year will be .... → AMOUNT $ 0

NOTE: The work of beneficiaries who were over age 72 when the year began need not be reported.

5. ☐ DEATH .... → ENTER DATE OF DEATH

6. ☐ GOING OUTSIDE THE U.S.
Name of country to which going
DATE GOING
DATE EXPECT TO RETURN

7. ☐ MARRIAGE
Place of marriage (City, County & State)
DATE OF MARRIAGE

8. ☐ DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT. → DATE DECREE FINAL

9. ☐ CHILD LEGALLY ADOPTED BY
☐ Stepparent ☐ Brother or Sister
☐ Aunt or Uncle ☐ Grandparent
☐ Other
ENTER DATE OF ADOPTION

10. ☐ CHILD OR OTHER CLAIMANT LEFT YOUR CARE .... → ENTER DATE HE LEFT YOUR CARE

SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING THIS REPORT
Mrs. Marina N. Porter

NUMBER AND STREET, P.O. BOX, OR ROUTE
6448 DunsTan Lane

CITY: DALLas
STATE: Texas
ZIP CODE: 75214

DATE SIGNED: 5-4-66
TELEPHONE NUMBER, IF ANY: EM 8 2177

ENTER NAME OF COUNTY, IF ANY, IN WHICH YOU LIVE
DALLas

FORM SSA-1425 (12-65) KC

433-54-3937 E

C

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

ANNUAL REPORT OF EARNINGS - 1964

Please read enclosed INSTRUCTION leaflet carefully.

Form Approved
Budget Bureau
No. 72-R524.9
App. Exp. 12-31-66

NOTICE: Whoever makes a false statement in connection with this report is liable to a penalty.

PRINT NAME AND ADDRESS BELOW IF NOT ALREADY SHOWN, THEN ANSWER QUESTIONS ON OTHER SIDE.

MARIANA N OSWA[illegible]D
629 BELT LINE RD
RICHARDSON TEX
75080

Please do not bend, pin or tear this card.

4. Answer only if you answered item 2d on other side. Show what work you did in connection with your business during each month for which you made an entry in item 2d. (Also explain if ownership of your business changed.)

MONTHS	HOURS OF WORK	WHAT WORK DID YOU DO?
		ER 07 /
		2/27/65
SEPT	457	WRITER
OCT	457	"
NOV	457	"
DEC	457	"

EAC HIP 720

FORM OA-C777 (12-64) DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE—SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

1. WERE YOU AN EMPLOYEE IN 1964?

☐ YES If "yes" complete a & b

☒ NO

a. Show amount of wages earned from January 1, 1964 through December 31, 1964 (gross wages before payroll deductions) . . . . $

b. Place "X" in box for each month, if any, in which you did NOT earn more than $100.

JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

2. WERE YOU SELF-EMPLOYED IN 1964?

☒ YES If "yes" complete a, b, c & d

☐ NO

a. Show 1964 total receipts (farmers show gross profits) . . . . $ 40,935.05

b. Show 1964 net earnings (or loss) (if a loss, write "L" after the amount) . . . . $ 10,502.06

c. State kind of trade or business 9999

d. Place "X" in box for each month, if any, in which you believe you did NOT render substantial services in your business and complete item 4 on the other side.

JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

3. DO YOU EXPECT TO EARN OVER $1,200 in 1965?

☒ YES If "yes" complete a & b

☐ NO

a. Show your expected total earnings for 1965. . . . . $ 5,000.00

b. Are you now EITHER working for wages of over $100 a month OR ren[illegible]g substantial services in self-employment? ☒ YES ☐ NO

DATE AND SIGN HERE

DATE

SIGNATURE X Mrs Marina N Oswald

SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM NUMBER 435 54-3937 E

EAC HIP 720 BACK

Form OAC-5002
(1-54)

REPORT OF CONTACT

(USE INK OR TYPEWRITER)

OFFICE: Dallas, Tex.

DATE: 1-10-64

W/E OR S/E PERSON: Lee Harvey Oswald

A/N: 433-54-3937

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED: Mr. Geo. R. Clower - Office Mgr. - Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall Inc. RI-1-5501

CONTACT MADE: IN PERSON ☐ TELEPHONE ☒

PLACE OF CONTACT: Dallas

I asked Mr. Clower to look at his copy of his 941 for 12/62. He did so and reported that he showed #727.81.

It is obvious that ~~the~~ the #636.50 appearing on the 794 for 1962 was another Employer and therefore 1962 is one of the high years.

The reason the #727.81 did not get on the wage record is because the Jaggars Corporation used an inaccurate account number. They showed 433-54-3739 instead of 433-54-3937.

1/27/64 Jaggars Corp did report for Oswald for 12/62, 3/63, + 6/63 as they say, under wrong number. The employer reports show same amounts as on 1001.

E. J. O'Brien, Br. Chief, Policy [illegible] Division

CONTACT MADE BY Jess C. Carter (SIGNATURE) Asst. Mgr. (TITLE)

(FOR CONTINUATION OF THIS REPORT, TURN PAGE. KEEP MARGINAL SPACE AT RIGHT FOR BINDING)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1958 O - 486513

43[illegible]54-3937 E T

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

ANNUAL REPORT OF EARNINGS - 1965

Form Approved
Budget Bureau
No. 72-R524.9
App. Exp. 12-31-66

Please read enclosed INSTRUCTION leaflet carefully.

NOTICE: Whoever makes a false statement in connection with this report is liable to a penalty.

PRINT NAME AND ADDRESS BELOW IF NOT ALREADY SHOWN, THEN ANSWER QUESTIONS ON OTHER SIDE.

MARINA N [illegible]ALD
1245 DONNA DR
RICHARDSON TEX
75080

Please do not bend, pin or tear this card.

4. Answer only if you answered item 2d on other side. Show what work you did in connection with your business during each month for which you made an entry in item 2d. (Also explain if ownership of your business changed.)

MONTHS	HOURS OF WORK	WHAT WORK DID YOU DO?
Jan		[illegible]
Feb		"
June		"
July		"

L. Brueck F 1984 4/23/66
PH/07
J Franklin E-30-13
4/25/66

EAC H1P 2569

FORM OA-C[illegible] DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE—[illegible]

1. YOU AN EMPLOYEE IN 1965?

☐ YES If "yes" complete a & b

☒ NO

a. Show amount of wages earned from January 1, 1965 through December 31, 1965 (gross wages before payroll deductions) . . . . $

b. Place "X" in box for each month, if any, in which you did NOT earn more than $100.

JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

2. WERE YOU SELF-EMPLOYED IN 1965?

☒ YES If "yes" complete a, b, c & d

☐ NO

a. Show 1965 total receipts from self employment (farmers show gross profits). . . $ 5130.24

b. Show 1965 net earnings (or loss) from self-employment (if a loss, write "L" after the amount) . . . . $ 5130.24

c. State kind of trade or business writer

d. Place "X" in box for each month, if any, in which you believe you did NOT render substantial services in your business and complete item 4 on the other side.

JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC
		X	X	X			X	X			
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12

3. DO YOU EXPECT TO EARN OVER $1,500 IN 1966?

☐ YES If "yes" complete a & b

☐ NO

a. Show your expected total earnings for 1966. . . . . $ 0

b. Are you now EITHER working for wages of over $125 a month OR rendering substantial services in self-employment? ☐ YES ☒ NO

DA ND SI RE	DATE	SIGNATURE	SOCIAL SECURITY CLAIM NUMBER
→	4-5-66	Mrs. Marina N. Porter	467 82 4034

EAC H1P 2569 BACK

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 72-R247.12

In replying, Address: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
3716 Rawlins St. P. O. Box 6556
Dallas, Texas 75219
Telephone RI 9-2885 RI 9-2991 Date 1/10/64

We have received an application for social security benefits based upon the wages paid to the individual named below. We need a statement of wages to process this claim. Your cooperation in promptly filling out and returning this statement will be appreciated. An envelope requiring no postage is enclosed for your use. (The filing of an application does not necessarily mean that a currently employed wage earner plans to quit working.)

JAGGARS-CHILES-STOVALL, INC.
522 S. BROWDER ST.
DALLAS TEXAS ~~75201~~ 75222

J E Dickenson
District Manager.

Enclosure.

STATEMENT OF EMPLOYER

This is to certify that wages in the amounts shown have been PAID during the calendar year(s) to—

1. LEE HARVEY OSWALD (Name of wage earner) 433-54-3937 (Social security account number)

Include the value of all remuneration before withholding of tax whether paid in cash or kind (but for services performed in a private home as a domestic, or in work not in the course of the employer's trade or business, show only the cash amount paid). If no wages were paid in the periods checked below, write "None"; if the amounts are unknown, write "Unknown." If you believe any of the amounts shown are not wages or any of the employment is not covered under the Social Security Act, outline your reasons under "Remarks" on the back of this form.

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

2. PERIOD	WAGES PAID YEAR 1962	WAGES PAID YEAR 1963	WAGES PAID YEAR 19	WAGES PAID YEAR 19
January 1-March 31, inclusive	$ none	$ 945.69	$	$
April 1-June 30, inclusive	$ none	$ 121.67	$	$
July 1-September 30, inclusive	$ none	$ none	$	$
October 1-December 31, inclusive	$ 727.81	$ none	$	$

In item 3 below use specific terms such as file clerk, traveling or city salesman, maid, plumber, attorney, etc. In item 7 use specific terms such as radio manufacturing, wholesale drugs, retail grocery store, physician's office, private home, etc.

3. EMPLOYEE'S OCCUPATION Camera Dept.	7. NATURE OF BUSINESS Typography
4. BUSINESS NAME OF EMPLOYER (*Type or print*) Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Inc.	8. WRITTEN SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYER OR AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE OF FIRM D L Malone
5. STREET ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER 522 Browder St.	9. TITLE OF PERSON SIGNING ABOVE Secretary-Treasurer
6. CITY STATE Dallas, Texas	10. EMPLOYER'S FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION NO. 75 0359250
	11. DATE THIS STATEMENT FILLED OUT 1-10-64

Form OAC-1001 (9-62)

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 72–R247.12

In replying, Address: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
3716 Rawlins St. P. O. Box 6556
Dallas, Texas 75219
RI 9-2885
Telephone RI 9-2991 Date 1/10/64

We have received an application for social security benefits based upon the wages paid to the individual named below. We need a statement of wages to process this claim. Your cooperation in promptly filling out and returning this statement will be appreciated. An envelope requiring no postage is enclosed for your use. (The filing of an application does not necessarily mean that a currently employed wage earner plans to quit working.)

TEXAS SCHOOL BOOK
DEPOSITORY
ELM AT HOUSTON
DALLAS, TEXAS

J E Dickenson
District Manager.

Enclosure.

STATEMENT OF EMPLOYER

This is to certify that wages in the amounts shown have been PAID during the calendar year(s) to—

1. LEE HARVEY OSWALD (Name of wage earner) 433-54-3937 (Social security account number)

Include the value of all remuneration before withholding of tax whether paid in cash or kind (but for services performed in a private home as a domestic, or in work not in the course of the employer's trade or business, show only the cash amount paid). If no wages were paid in the periods checked below, write "None"; if the amounts are unknown, write "Unknown." If you believe any of the amounts shown are not wages or any of the employment is not covered under the Social Security Act, outline your reasons under "Remarks" on the back of this form.

2. PERIOD	WAGES PAID YEAR 1963	WAGES PAID YEAR 19	WAGES PAID YEAR 19	WAGES PAID YEAR 19
January 1–March 31, inclusive	$ NONE	$	$	$
April 1–June 30, inclusive	$ NONE	$	$	$
July 1–September 30, inclusive	$ NONE	$	$	$
October 1–December 31, inclusive	$ 261.68 ✓	$	$	$

In item 3 below use specific terms such as file clerk, traveling or city salesman, maid, plumber, attorney, etc. In item 7 use specific terms such as radio manufacturing, wholesale drugs, retail grocery store, physician's office, private home, etc.

3. EMPLOYEE'S OCCUPATION: Order Clerk
7. NATURE OF BUSINESS: Text Books
4. BUSINESS NAME OF EMPLOYER (*Type or print*): Texas School Book Depository
8. WRITTEN SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYER OR AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE OF FIRM: O. V. Campbell
5. STREET ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER: Elm at Houston Sts.
9. TITLE OF PERSON SIGNING ABOVE: Vice President
6. CITY Dallas 2, STATE Texas
10. EMPLOYER'S FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION NO.: C75-0491330
11. DATE THIS STATEMENT FILLED OUT: 1-10-64

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance

Form approved.
Budget Bureau No. 72–R247.12

In replying, Address: SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
701 Loyola Avenue
New Orleans, La. 70113
Telephone 527-2551 Date 1/10/64

We have received an application for social security benefits based upon the wages paid to the individual named below. We need a statement of wages to process this claim. Your cooperation in promptly filling out and returning this statement will be appreciated. An envelope requiring no postage is enclosed for your use. (The filing of an application does not necessarily mean that a currently employed wage earner plans to quit working.)

William B. Reily Co., Inc
640 Magazine St
New Orleans La

Martha A McSteen
(Mrs.) Martha A. McSteen
District Manager.

Enclosure.

STATEMENT OF EMPLOYER

This is to certify that wages in the amounts shown have been PAID during the calendar year(s) to—

1. Lee H. Oswald (Name of wage earner) 433-54-3937 (Social security account number)

Include the value of all remuneration before withholding of tax whether paid in cash or kind (but for services performed in a private home as a domestic, or in work not in the course of the employer's trade or business, show only the cash amount paid). If no wages were paid in the periods checked below, write "None"; if the amounts are unknown, write "Unknown." If you believe any of the amounts shown are not wages or any of the employment is not covered under the Social Security Act, outline your reasons under "Remarks" on the back of this form.

2. PERIOD	WAGES PAID YEAR 1963	WAGES PAID YEAR 19	WAGES PAID YEAR 19	WAGES PAID YEAR 19
January 1–March 31, inclusive	$ —	$	$	$
April 1–June 30, inclusive	$ 422.25	$	$	$
July 1–September 30, inclusive	$ 191.25 ✓	$	$	$
October 1–December 31, inclusive	$ —	$	$	$

PLEASE DO NOT WRITE IN MARGIN

In item 3 below use specific terms such as file clerk, traveling or city salesman, maid, plumber, attorney, etc. In item 7 use specific terms such as radio manufacturing, wholesale drugs, retail grocery store, physician's office, private home, etc.

3. EMPLOYEE'S OCCUPATION oiler in plant	7. NATURE OF BUSINESS Coffee Roasters
4. BUSINESS NAME OF EMPLOYER (*Type or print*) Wm B. REILY Co, Inc	8. WRITTEN SIGNATURE OF EMPLOYER OR AUTHORIZED EMPLOYEE OF FIRM V J Schlendwein · Controller
5. STREET ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER 640 Magazine St	9. TITLE OF PERSON SIGNING ABOVE
6. CITY STATE [illegible] leans La 70130	10. EMPLOYER'S FEDERAL IDENTIFICATION NO. — 11. DATE THIS STATEMENT FILLED OUT 1/10/64

Wage Earner Lee H. Oswald A/N 433-54-3937

Understanding that this statement is for the use of the Social Security Administration in the administration of the Social Security Act, Title II, I hereby certify that the following information is correct:

(1) Were the wages shown on the attached statement of employer reported to the Director of Internal Revenue?

✓ Yes ___ No

(2) If wages were reported, please give date(s) reported and under what employer's name the report(s) was made:

Same, on regular Return

(3) If the wages were not reported, please give reason for failure to report:

1/10/64
Date

Controller
Signature

Attachment to Form OAC-1001
NOLA-7/63

Form OA-C589

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
10-14-64

Always give Claim No. when writing about your claim: 433-54-3937-E

nowledged of the following:

DESCRIPTION OF REMITTANCE	AMOUNT	SCHEDULE NO.
sonal check dated 10-6-64	37.50	OCT 15 1964 74

Forwarded by:

Mrs. Marina Oswald
629 Belt Line Road
Richardson, Texas 75080

ACKNOWLEDGED
OCT 15 1964
LL

Previous balance $
Current remittance $
Current balance $
Next date for payment

Form OAC-5002
(1-54)

REPORT OF CONTACT

(USE INK OR TYPEWRITER)

OFFICE: Dallas, Texas

DATE: 1/16/64

W/E OR S/E PERSON: Lee Harvey Oswald

A/N: 433-54-3937

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED:

CONTACT MADE: IN PERSON ☐ TELEPHONE ☐

PLACE OF CONTACT:

We have requested scouting of the w/e's unposted 12/62 earnings from Jaggars-Chiles-Stovall, Inc. We have a 1001 showing w/e's correct earnings for this period, & we have also verified that these earnings were reported under an incorrect A/N. We are forwarding claim for adjudication without waiting for the scouting which we have requested. As soon as it is received, we will forward it to PC for association with w/e's file. We presume that these earnings will be located through scouting. However, if not, we will prepare 7010's. Results of this development will be forwarded for association with w/e's file. We will also ~~check~~ scout ~~on~~ 3/63 + 6/63 earnings from this er since they are also pre-lag. (over)

CONTACT MADE BY D. Lynde (SIGNATURE) Claims Rep. (TITLE)

(FOR CONTINUATION OF THIS REPORT, TURN PAGE. KEEP MARGINAL SPACE AT RIGHT FOR BINDING)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 043 - 674592



MILITARY OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTIES

DATE	PRIMARY MOS	ADDITIONAL MOS	TITLE OF MOS	AUTHORITY
25Jun57	6741	- - - -	AvnElectronicsOper ✓	CMC Spd ltr DFJ-nad-12 of 27May57

EDUCATION

CIVILIAN

TYPE SCHOOL	MAJOR SUBJECT	NUMBER YEARS	GRAD. YES	GRAD. NO	YEAR LEFT SCHOOL
GRAMMAR SCHOOL		8	X		195
HIGH SCHOOL	Acad	1		X	195
COLLEGE—UNIVERSITY					
TRADE—BUSINESS					

MILITARY

SCHOOL ATTENDED AND COURSE	NUMBER WKS.	YEAR COMPLETED	INCOMPLETE
✓ AvnFundScol JAX	6	1957	
✓ AC&WOperCrse Keesler AFB	6	1957	

CIVILIAN OCCUPATIONS

JOB TITLE (Main occupation) Office Boy

DOT NO. 1-23.02

YEARS EXPERIENCE 4/12

DUTIES PERFORMED Performed various clerical duties such as distributing mail, delivering messages & answering telephone. Helped file records & operated ditto, letter opening & sealing machines.

JOB TITLE (Secondary occupation)

DOT NO.

YEARS EXPERIENCE

DUTIES PERFORMED

TESTING AND SPECIAL QUALIFICATIONS

FOREIGN LANGUAGE

LANGUAGE	FORM	COMPREHENSION UNDERSTANDS	COMPREHENSION READS	COMPREHENSION WRITES	RATING TOTAL SCORE	RATING ADJ RATING	DATE
✓ Russian	DA AGO PRT-157	-5 (p)	4 (P)	3(P)	2(P)		25Feb59

OPERATES (Name of machine, vehicle, equipment, etc.)

CLASSIFICATION, APTITUDE, AND TRADE TESTS

TITLE	FORM	DATE	GRADE—SCORE	AUTHENTICATION (Name and rank)
GCT	3a		III-105	Trans from old page
RV	3a		II-125	
AC	3a		III-108	
AR	3a		III-90	
PA	3a		III-94	
RCT	SR-2	30Oct56	III-92	1stLt

PREFERENCE OF DUTY Aircraft Maintenance and Repair

RECOMMENDED DUTY ASSIGNMENT Aircraft Maintenance and Repair

REMARKS AND MISCELLANEOUS QUALIFICATIONS

~~1. Completed HS level GEDT~~

23Mar59 sat passed USAFI HS GED PT. 1-46, 2-57, 3-55, 4-58, 5-52

NAME (Last)	(First)	(Middle)	SERVICE NO.
OSWALD	Lee	Harvey	1653230

Folsom Exhibit No. 1—Continued (p. 7)

e. The Marine has no firm offer of employment he has indicated that his former employer will entertain offering employment with a suitable salary to provide the necessary support of his mother.

3. In evaluation of all facts available, it is the opinion of the Board that Private First Class OSWALD meets the requirements of paragraph 10273 MCM for release from active duty.

4. The Board recommends that Private First Class Lee H. OSWALD be released from active duty with the Marine Corps for reasons of dependency.

B. J. Kozak
B. J. KOZAK
Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. Marine Corps

Folsom Exhibit No. 1—Continued (p. 80)

10:GCK:wdp
26 Aug 1959

THIRD ENDORSEMENT on Pfc OSWALD's ltr of 17 Aug 1959

From: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing
To: Senior Member, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing Hardship/Dependency Discharge Board.

Subj: Dependency Discharge; request for; case of Private First Class Lee H. OSWALD 1653230/6741 USMC

Ref: (b) Para 10273 MarCorMan
(c) CG 3d MAW ltr to LtCol KOZAK 10:RH:dln of 30 Jul 1959

1. Delivered.

2. In accordance with the provisions of subparagraph 9c of reference (b), you will convene the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing Hardship/Dependency Discharge Board, as designated by reference (c), as soon as practicable for the purpose of considering the subject case.

3. The recommendations of the Board will be returned to this Headquarters by endorsement hereon as expeditiously as possible.

W. A. CLCMAN, JR.
By direction

Folsom Exhibit No. 1—Continued (p. 81)

50:EJK:mwh
1910
AUG 28 1959

FOURTH ENDORSEMENT on Pfc OSWALD's ltr of 17 Aug 1959

From: Senior Member, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing Hardship or
Dependency Discharge Board
To: Commanding General, 3d Marine Aircraft Wing

Subj: Discharge by reason of dependency; request for case of
Private First Class Lee H. OSWALD 1653230/6741 USMC

1. Guided by the provisions of reference (a) and in compliance with Third Endorsement hereto, the Hardship or Dependency Discharge Board met at 1530, 27 August 1959 to consider the case of Private First Class Lee H. OSWALD 1653230/6741 USMC. The Marine had submitted an official request for a dependency discharge in accordance with reference (a). The following members were present:

Lieutenant Colonel Bolish J. KOZAK 07108 USMC (MWHG-3)
Major George E. MC CLANE 016430/7335 USMC (MAG-36)
Major Eugene T. CARD 035129/7304 USMC (MWHG-3)

2. Upon examination of the basic request, supporting enclosures and Service Record, Private First Class Lee H. OSWALD was interviewed by the Board. The following facts were then considered:

a. Private First Class Lee H. OSWALD, not married, on his initial three (3) year enlistment in the Marine Corps is obligated to serve on active duty until 7 December 1959.

b. The Marine submitted his request for a dependency discharge in order that he may provide physical and financial assistance to his invalid mother residing in Fort Worth, Texas.

c. The home situation of Private First Class OSWALD has been aggravated subsequent to his enlistment date through incapacitation of his mother as a result of an industrial accident. The mother is no longer gainfully employed due to her physical condition and has no source of income. The presence of her son, Private First Class OSWALD, is required for physical and financial assistance.

d. One son, married and residing in Fort Worth is unable to provide either financial or physical assistance to the Marines mother due to his marital responsibilities and the inability of the two families to maintain a common home. Another son, married, with the U. S. Air Force on active duty in Japan, cannot furnish financial support.

FOLSOM EXHIBIT No. 1—Continued (p. 79)

REQUEST FOR E/R ACTION

PAYMENT CENTER ☐ PLEASE ADVISE CURRENT DISTRICT OFFICE OF CLAIMS STATUS (PREPARE OA-C556) ☑ PRIOR CERTIFICATION (SEE OVER)

DISTRICT OFFICE	CODE	REQUEST DATE	TYPE ACTION	BLOCK NUMBER	ACCOUNT NUMBER
DALLAS TEX	814	01 17 64	B-SOA	G 74962	433-54-3937

NAME OF A/N HOLDER	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	P	DATE OF APPL.	TYPE CLAIM	DATE OF DEATH
OSWALD, LEE H	M	10 19 39		01 09 64	D	11 24 63

MULTIPLE A/N	MULTIPLE A/N	MILITARY SERVICE FROM	MILITARY SERVICE THRU	V	DATE OF ONSET	MO. ELECT.	R R SERVICE

LAG INFORMATION FURNISHED BY DISTRICT OFFICE

TYPE	PERIOD	AMOUNT	EIN	TYPE	PERIOD	AMOUNT	EIN
		LAG NP					

FAMILY COMPOSITION	PRIOR CERTIFICATION	FORM 805
		S

AUXILIARY OR SURVIVOR DATA

SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	P	MO. ELECT.	SEP CHK

DED. DATA

REMARKS

IDENTIFYING INFORMATION -- ACCOUNT NUMBER UNKNOWN

FN

MN

PB

ER

FORM OA-C790 (IDP) 1-62

SS-5 REMOVED BY

6087 0120 64 DATE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-107

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

CONFIDENTIAL - ADMINISTRATIVE

TO : Kansas City Payment Center

DATE: June 3, 1965

FROM : Jess C. Carter, Assistant Manager
Dallas, Texas

SUBJECT: Lee Harvey Oswald - A/N 433 54 3937

Our newspaper has reported the re-marriage of the wage earner's widow. Since the language barrier is still a problem with her it is possible she will overlook making a proper report. Reportedly the marriage took place on Tuesday June 1, 1965.

Jess C. Carter

(2) 510's, 101, 526
R681
V Daugherty L02
6/7/65

Buy U.S. Savings Bonds Regularly on the Payroll Savings Plan

NR DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

NR OFFICE

3716 Rawlins Street
P.O. Box 6556
Dallas, Texas 75219

[illegible] Rec'd [illegible] Office [illegible]
11/8/67
Lee H. Oswald

WAGE EARNER:
When writing about your claim always give Claim No.
433-54-3937 C

Mrs. Marina Porter
733 Scottsdale
Richardson Tx 75080

This will acknowledge your inquiry regarding the check(s) for the month(s) of July 1969 to be rec in Aug

The Treasury Department desires that each person promptly receive the amount due him but wishes to avoid unnecessary expense in record searching which results in many instances in finding the check was correctly paid. On a notice, such as you have furnished us, the Treasury Department must necessarily search its payment records from the date of issuance of the check until the date that a substitute check will be issued. Because of the large volume of payments, the searching operation entails a heavy expense for each item. Accordingly, it is requested that you fill out the questionnaire on the reverse of this notice and RETURN IT IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE. UNLESS THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS RETURNED NO FURTHER ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

If you receive the check before hearing from the Treasury Department you should notify the social security district office shown above. ~~You may use the enclosed post card to notify us.~~ After sending in this notification, you may cash the check.

Upon receipt of this questionnaire, action if necessary, will be taken by the Treasury Department to place a stop payment on the check and to refer the case to the United States Secret Service for investigation and clearance so a duplicate check can be sent to you. The Treasury Department will get in touch with you if it needs further information.

Sincerely yours,

District Manager

DALLAS, TEXAS
AUG 19 1969
71014
SSA [illegible]

Enclosures:
Envelope
Post ~~Card OA-C1247~~

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

Check Number	Date	Amount

FORM SSA-L795 (10-66)
(FORMERLY OA-CL735)

Form Approved.
Budget Bureau No. 72-R417.7

A PROMPT REPLY WILL EXPEDITE ACTION

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Have you received the check described on the other side of this sheet? ☐ Yes ☑ No

If your answer is "Yes" destroy this form; fill out and mail the enclosed post card.

2. If your answer is "No," have you asked your local post office about the check? (If your answer is "No," this should be done.) ☑ Yes ☐ No
3. If you recently changed your mailing address, have you tried to find out whether the check is being held there for you at your old address or was returned to the post office? (If your answer is "No," this should be done.) ☑ Yes ☐ No
4. Have you any information which you think might assist the Treasury Department in locating the check? (If your answer is "Yes," please give such information under "Remarks.") ☐ Yes ☑ No
5. Is it possible that you received the check and cashed it, thinking it was issued for another purpose? (If your answer is "Yes," please explain under "Remarks.") ☐ Yes ☑ No
6. If this check was illegally cashed, you will be entitled to payment of the amount of the check; however, another check in place of it will not be issued until the case has been fully investigated by the United States Secret Service. As it may be necessary to contact you for further information, please furnish on the line below the address at which you may be reached during the daytime, if such place is different from your residence.

Same as Residence
(Number and Street) (City, State and ZIP Code)

7. If the check was mailed to a different address than shown below, please furnish that address.

(Number and Street) (City, State and ZIP Code)

8. After reviewing all circumstances, I/we wish to make formal claim to the Treasury Department for stoppage of payment of this check and the issuance of a substitute check. Yes
9. REMARKS *(State any other facts which may aid in locating the check):*

If this questionnaire has been signed by mark (X), two witnesses who know the person must sign below, giving their full addresses.	SIGNATURE OF PAYEE OR CLAIMANT Mrs. Kenneth Parker.
1. NAME	
ADDRESS *(Street number, City, State and ZIP Code)*	SIGNATURE OF CO-PAYEE *(Both husband and wife must sign if co-payees of a combined check)*
2. NAME	RESIDENCE NUMBER AND STREET 733 Scottsdale Dr
ADDRESS *(Street number, City, State and ZIP Code)*	CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE Richardson Tex
	DATE *(Mo., Day, and Year)* Aug 12, 1969
	TELEPHONE NUMBER AD 1-0720

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1966 O—238-966

3651

NO ZIP RECORD

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

OFFICE
3716 Rawlins Street
P.O. Box 6556
Dallas, Texas 75219

WAGE EARNER: Lee Oswald
When writing about your claim always give Claim No. 467-82-4034

DALLAS DO JUL 19 1969

Mrs. Porter
733 Scottsdale
Richardson, Tex 75080

2w

This will acknowledge your inquiry regarding the check(s) for the month(s) of June 1969

The Treasury Department desires that each person promptly receive the amount due him but wishes to avoid unnecessary expense in record searching which results in many instances in finding the check was correctly paid. On a notice, such as you have furnished us, the Treasury Department must necessarily search its payment records from the date of issuance of the check until the date that a substitute check will be issued. Because of the large volume of payments, the searching operation entails a heavy expense for each item. Accordingly, it is requested that you fill out the questionnaire on the reverse of this notice and RETURN IT IN THE ENCLOSED ENVELOPE. UNLESS THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS RETURNED NO FURTHER ACTION WILL BE TAKEN.

DELAYED PAYMENT AS SSA-555
PROCESS AS SSA-555

If you receive the check before hearing from the Treasury Department you should notify the social security district office shown above. ~~You may use the enclosed post card to notify us~~. After sending in this notification, you may cash the check.

Upon receipt of this questionnaire, action if necessary, will be taken by the Treasury Department to place a stop payment on the check and to refer the case to the United States Secret Service for investigation and clearance so a duplicate check can be sent to you. The Treasury Department will get in touch with you if it needs further information.

Sincerely yours,

Clarence M Vaden
District Manager

7/69 V

Enclosures:
Envelope
~~Post Card OA-C1247~~

DO NOT WRITE BELOW THIS LINE

Check Number	Date	Amount
75080	7/3/69	

FORM SSA-L735 (10-66)
(FORMERLY OA-CL735)

Form Approved
Budget Bureau No. 72-R417.7

A PROMPT REPLY WILL EXPEDITE ACTION

QUESTIONNAIRE

1. Have you received the check described on the other side of this sheet? ☐ Yes ☒ No

If your answer is "Yes" destroy this form; fill out and mail the enclosed post card.

2. If your answer is "No," have you asked your local post office about the check? (If your answer is "No," this should be done.) ☒ Yes ☐ No

3. If you recently changed your mailing address, have you tried to find out whether the check is being held there for you at your old address or was returned to the post office? (If your answer is "No," this should be done.) ☐ Yes ☒ No

4. Have you any information which you think might assist the Treasury Department in locating the check? (If your answer is "Yes," please give such information under "Remarks.") ☐ Yes ☒ No

5. Is it possible that you received the check and cashed it, thinking it was issued for another purpose? (If your answer is "Yes," please explain under "Remarks.") ☐ Yes ☒ No

6. If this check was illegally cashed, you will be entitled to payment of the amount of the check; however, another check in place of it will not be issued until the case has been fully investigated by the United States Secret Service. As it may be necessary to contact you for further information, please furnish on the line below the address at which you may be reached during the daytime, if such place is different from your residence.

733 Scottsdale dr. — Richardson, Texas 75080
(Number and Street) — (City, State and ZIP Code)

AUG 4 12 35 PM '69
NO ANSWER NEEDED
ACT. ANS'D
DIVISION

7. If the check was mailed to a different address than shown below, please furnish that address.

(Number and Street) — (City, State and ZIP Code)

8. After reviewing all circumstances, I/we wish to make formal claim to the Treasury Department for stoppage of payment of this check and the issuance of a substitute check.

9. REMARKS (*State any other facts which may aid in locating the check*):

None

If this questionnaire has been signed by mark (X), two witnesses who know the person must sign below, giving their full addresses.

1. NAME

ADDRESS (*Street number, City, State and ZIP Code*)

2. NAME

ADDRESS (*Street number, City, State and ZIP Code*)

SIGNATURE OF PAYEE OR CLAIMANT
Mrs. Kenneth Porter

SIGNATURE OF CO-PAYEE (*Both husband and wife must sign if co-payees of a combined check*)

733 Scottsdale dr.
RESIDENCE NUMBER AND STREET

Richardson, Texas, 75080
CITY, STATE AND ZIP CODE

DATE (*Mo., Day, and Year*) July 18, 1969
TELEPHONE NUMBER AD-1-0720

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967 O - 265-973

Form OA-C107 (5-64)
Form Approved by Comptroller General, U.S.
January 28, 1955

DETERMINATION OF RESUMPTION OF AWARD

Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare
Social Security Administration

DISTRICT OFFICE
3716 RAWLINS ST,
DALLAS, TEX OK

ACCOUNT NUMBER
433-54-2937

THE FOLLOWING DETERMINATION IS BASED ON SUPPORTING EVIDENCE ON FILE AND CERTIFICATION OF PAYMENT IS RECOMMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

NAME AND ADDRESS
MARINA N. PORTER
1245 DONNA DR.
RICHARDSON, TX 75080

FOR MINOR CHILDREN OF

FOR

GUARDIAN OF

☐ 1. TEMPORARY DEDUCTIONS ______ EMPLOYED ______

☒ 2. PERMANENT DEDUCTIONS "E" EMPLOYED 1/65 - 2/65 F.A.

TOTAL EARNINGS $ 5130.40 TOTAL EXCESS EARNINGS $ 3680 CHARGEABLE EXCESS EARNINGS $ 160 TOTAL MONTHLY BENEFIT(S) $ 40.30

☐ 3. ______ EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE U. S. ______

☐ 4. MOTHER HAS A CHILD IN HER CARE BEGINNING ______

☐ 5. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ABOVE PERSON IS NOW THE PROPER PAYEE.

☐ 6. AGE 65, RECOMP. ______

☐ 7. TO CORRECT NAME OR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO.

☐ 8. NEW ADDRESS

☐ 9. ATTAINED AGE 72 ______

☐ 10. TO COMBINE A & B BENEFITS

☒ 11. OTHER "E" - TERM - 6/65 REMARRIAGE 202 (T) EXC.

☒ ONE CHECK ONLY ☒ ☐ AWARD ☐ ADJUSTMENT ☐ SUPP L/S ☐ CONDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT ☐ FOLDER REFERENCE

BENEFICIARY NOTICE:
S87 (5130.24) (-) (34.50) (34.50) R45 (40.30) (1/65 - 2/65)

PMT. IDEN. CODE	BEN. IDEN. CODE	MONTHLY BENEFIT		ACCRUED BENEFIT			DEDUCTIONS					NET AMOUNT DUE
		BEGIN. DATE	MONTHLY RATE	PERIOD		AMOUNT	EFFECTIVE		AMOUNT	R F D	W I C	
				FROM	TO		FROM	TO				
E	/		33.40				1/65	5/65	167.00			
E	/		40.30	1/65	2/65	80.60					2	
E	/		40.30	3/65	5/65	120.90						34.50

REMARKS
PIA 76.00

ABS-C35
SC-3

A-6J 41KC MAY

PREPARED BY-EXAMINER K. Brunk F198 II
DATE 4/23/66
APPROVED BY-REVIEWER D. Franklin E-30-13
DATE 4/25/66

Form OA-C107 (2-64)
Form Approved by Comptroller General, U.S.
January 28, 1955

DETERMINATION OF RESUMPTION OF AWARD

Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare
Social Security Administration

DISTRICT OFFICE
3716 Rawlins St.
Dallas, Tex. 75219

CLAIM NUMBER
433-54-3937

THE FOLLOWING DETERMINATION IS BASED ON SUPPORTING EVIDENCE ON FILE AND CERTIFICATION OF PAYMENT IS RECOMMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

NAME AND ADDRESS
Marina N. Oswald
629 Belt Line Rd.
Richardson, Tex. 75080

FOR MINOR CHILDREN OF

FOR

GUARDIAN OF

☒ 1. TEMPORARY DEDUCTIONS E EMPLOYED 9/64 ON (Partial)

☐ 2. PERMANENT DEDUCTIONS ______ EMPLOYED ______

TOTAL EARNINGS $ ______ TOTAL EXCESS EARNINGS $ ______ CHARGEABLE EXCESS EARNINGS $ ______ TOTAL MONTHLY BENEFITS ______

☐ 3. ______ EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE U. S. ______

☐ 4. MOTHER HAS A CHILD IN HER CARE BEGINNING ______

☐ 5. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ABOVE PERSON IS NOW THE PROPER PAYEE.

☐ 6. AGE 65, RECOMP. ______

☐ 7. TO CORRECT NAME OR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO.

☒ 8. NEW ADDRESS

☐ 9. ATTAINED AGE 72 ______

☐ 10. TO COMBINE A & B BENEFITS

☐ 11. OTHER ______

____ 202 (T) EXC ____

☐ ONE CHECK ONLY ☐ A- ☐ AWARD ☒ ADJUSTMENT ☐ SUPP L/S ☐ CONDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT ☐ FOLDER REFERENCE

BENEFICIARY NOTICE:
"S"

PMT. IDEN. CODE	BEN. IDEN. CODE	MONTHLY BENEFIT		ACCRUED BENEFIT			DEDUCTIONS					NET AMOUNT DUE
		BEGIN. DATE	MONTHLY RATE	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	AMOUNT	EFFECTIVE FROM	EFFECTIVE TO	AMOUNT	RFD	WIC	
E			37.60				9/64	9/64	37.60			
E			37.50	AA	37.50							
E		10/64	31.40	9/64	9/64	31.40					2	31.30

REMARKS
PIA 71.00
MAX. 106.60
E 31.40
C2 37.60 C1-37.60

AA-Excess refund received on
Schedule #74, dtd. 10/15/64

3-CC 35KC OCT

PREPARED BY-EXAMINER R E De Graffenried
DATE 10-16-64
APPROVED BY-REVIEWER W. C. Laux
DATE 10/16/64

Form OA-C107 (5-64)
Form Approved by Comptroller General, U.S.
January 28, 1955

DETERMINATION OF RESUMPTION OF AWARD

Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare
Social Security Administration

DISTRICT OFFICE

ACCOUNT NUMBER 433-54-3937E

THE FOLLOWING DETERMINATION IS BASED ON SUPPORTING EVIDENCE ON FILE AND CERTIFICATION OF PAYMENT IS RECOMMENDED AS FOLLOWS:

NAME AND ADDRESS MARINA N. OSWALD

FOR MINOR CHILDREN OF

FOR

GUARDIAN OF

☒ 1. TEMPORARY DEDUCTIONS E EMPLOYED 1/65 ON (PARTIAL)

☒ 2. PERMANENT DEDUCTIONS E EMPLOYED 9/64- 12/64 (PARTIAL)

TOTAL EARNINGS $ 9999.00 TOTAL EXCESS EARNINGS $ 8549.00 RGEABLE CESS EARNINGS $ 24.80 TOTAL MONTHLY BENEFIT(S) $ 37.60

☐ 3. ______ EMPLOYED OUTSIDE THE U. S. ______ ☐ 4. MOTHER HAS A CHILD IN HER CARE BEGINNING ______

☐ 5. IT HAS BEEN DETERMINED THAT THE ABOVE PERSON IS NOW THE PROPER PAYEE. ☐ 6. AGE 65, RECOMP. ______ ☐ 7. TO CORRECT NAME OR SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO. ☐ 8. NEW ADDRESS

☐ 9. ATTAINED AGE 72 ______ ☐ 10. TO COMBINE A & B BENEFITS ☐ 11. OTHER ______ ______ 202 (T) EXC ______

☐ ONE CHECK ONLY ☐ A- ☐ AWARD ☐ ADJUSTMENT ☐ SUPP L/S ☐ CONDITIONAL ADJUSTMENT ☒ FOLDER REFERENCE

BENEFICIARY NOTICE: NLN

PMT. IDEN. CODE	BEN. IDEN. CODE	MONTHLY BENEFIT		ACCRUED BENEFIT			DEDUCTIONS					NET AMOUNT DUE
		BEGIN. DATE	MONTHLY RATE	PERIOD		AMOUNT	EFFECTIVE		AMOUNT	R F D	W I C	
				FROM	TO		FROM	TO				

REMARKS
PIA 71.00

PREPARED BY EXAMINER Wilks 202 DATE 2/27/65 APPROVED BY-REVIEWER RNBurks C065 DATE 2/27/65

FORM OA-C528b (4-64) KC

DISTRICT OFFICE

DETERMINATION OF TERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENT OR SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS

BASED ON SUPPORTING EVIDENCE ON FILE

CLAIM NO. 433-54-3937-E

PIC E

W. E.

ADJMT. CODING

DATE 6/7/65

CR. BLOCK NO. 0208 JUN '65 KC

Marina N. Oswald

DATE OF BIRTH

PAYEE FILE

DIARY FILE

INITIALS

CLC 45	MONTHLY RATE 31.40	SHOULD HAVE BEEN (SHOULD BE) STOPPED 6/65	
SPA	LAST SCHED. NO. 9A	TREASURY REQUESTED TO DISCONTINUE PAYMENT 6/65	CROSS-REF. ACCOUNT NO.

☐ 0. Investigation pending determ. of cont. disability
☐ 1. Worked outside the United States
☐ 2. Worked and expects net earnings to exceed $1200
☐ 3. OAIB worked and expects net earnings to exceed $1200
☐ 4. Failure to have a child entitled to benefits in your care
☐ 5. OAIB worked outside the United States
☐ 7. Refused VR Services
☐ 8. Payee not determined
☐ 9.

mjb 6/7/65
(Clerk) (Date) (Reviewer) (Date)

☐ 0. Benefits payable by some other agency
☐ 1. Death of beneficiary
☐ 2. Dependent terminated due to death of insured individual
☒ 3. ~~Divorce Marriage~~ Remarriage
☐ 4C. Attained age 18 and not disabled
☐ 4. Child attained age 18 and not disabled
☐ 5. Beneficiary entitled to other benefits
☐ 6C. Child no longer disabled
☐ 9.
☐ 6. Death Marriage of child
☐ 7C. Adoption
☐ 7. Adoption of child
☐ 8H. DIB no longer disabled
☐ 8. Mother terminated-Child no longer disabled
☐ X. DIB attained age 65
☐ R. Claim withdrawn

FORM OA-C528b (4-64) KC

DISTRICT OFFICE

DETERMINATION OF TERMINATION OF ENTITLEMENT OR SUSPENSION OF PAYMENTS BASED ON SUPPORTING EVIDENCE ON FILE

CLAIM NO. 433-54-3937

PIC E

W. E.

ADJMT. CODING A9

DATE 10/16/64

CR. BLOCK NO. W-0 4 02 OCT '64 KC

Marina N. Oswald

DATE OF BIRTH

PAYEE FILE

DIARY FILE

INITIALS Bea D

CLC 45	MONTHLY RATE 37.60	SHOULD HAVE BEEN (SHOULD BE) STOPPED	
SPA	LAST SCHED. NO. 9A	TREASURY REQUESTED TO DISCONTINUE PAYMENT 10/64	CROSS-REF. ACCOUNT NO.

☐ 0. Investigation pending determ. of cont. disability
☐ 1. Worked outside the United States
☐ 2. Worked and expects net earnings to exceed $1200
☐ 3. OAIB worked and expects net earnings to exceed $1200
☐ 4. Failure to have a child entitled to benefits in your care
☐ 5. OAIB worked outside the United States
☐ 7. Refused VR Services
☐ 8. Payee not determined
☐ 9.

red (Clerk) W. C. L. (Date) (Reviewer) 10/16/64. (Date)

☐ 0. Benefits payable by some other agency
☐ 1. Death of beneficiary
☐ 2. Dependent terminated due to death of insured individual
☐ 3. Divorce Marriage Remarriage
☐ 4C. Attained age 18 and not disabled
☐ 4. Child attained age 18 and not disabled
☐ 5. Beneficiary entitled to other benefits
☐ 6C. Child no longer disabled
☐ 9.
☐ 6. Death Marriage of child
☐ 7C. Adoption
☐ 7. Adoption of child
☐ 8H. DIB no longer disabled
☐ 8. Mother terminated-Child no longer disabled
☐ X. DIB attained age 65
☐ R. Claim withdrawn

$

PREVIOUS DISTRICT OFFICE

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
PAYEE, ADDRESS CHANGE, OR HOLD CHECK REQUEST

NEW DISTRICT OFFICE

DATE 5/10/65			WAGE EARNER	PIC E
FLOA	LLOA	MBA 03140	SPA	CLAIM NO.
TR FILE CODE 9A	CLC 45	S & C CODE 45390A		

Marina N Oswald 433 54 3937 E
1245 Donna Dr
Richardson Tex 75080

xx ☐ ADDRESS CHANGE
☐ HOLD CK DATED
☒ PAYEE CHANGE
REPLACE CK DATED
DRAWN PAYABLE TO 6/3/65

Mariana N Oswald

FORM OA-C610 (2-64)
mvj

FILE COPY

DEPARTMENT OF

HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE

SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

PAYEE, ADDRESS CHANGE, OR HOLD CHECK REQUEST

PREVIOUS DISTRICT OFFICE

NEW DISTRICT OFFICE
~~3716 RAWLINS ST~~
~~DALLAS TEX 75219~~

DATE 05/05/65 06

WAGE EARNER

PIC

CLAIM NO.

FLOA	LLOA	MBA	SPA
2	3	03140	MARINA

TR FILE CODE	CLC	S & C CODE
9A	45	45390 A

433 54 3937 E

~~MARIANA~~ N OSWALD
1245 DONNA DR
RICHARDSON TEX 75080

☐ ADDRESS CHANGE

☐ HOLD CK DATED

☒ PAYEE CHANGE

REPLACE CK DATED
DRAWN PAYABLE TO

MARIANA N OSWALD

CK REDIRECTED

Reject 5/6/65 ll

FORM OA-C610B (6-64)

FILE COPY

US DISTRICT OFFICE	DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION PAYEE, ADDRESS CHANGE, OR HOLD CHECK REQUEST		NEW DISTRICT OFFICE
4-3-64	WAGE EARNER	PIC E	CLAIM NO.

	LLOA 4	MBA 03760
CODE A	CLC	S & C CODE 45390

Marina N Oswald 433 54 3937 E
629 Belt Line
Richardson Tex 75080

DRESS CHANGE
LD CK DATED ____________
EE CHANGE
PLACE CK DATED
AWN PAYABLE TO ____________

$

A-C610 (6-63)

FILE COPY

Form OA-C526 (1-61)

BENEFIT SUMMARY

Form approved by
Comptroller General, U. S., October 25, 1950

Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
Social Security Administration
Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance

CLASS OF ACTION

ACCOUNT NUMBER 433-54-3937

PMT. IDEN. CODE	BEN. IDEN. CODE	MONTHLY BENEFIT		ACCRUED BENEFIT			DEDUCTIONS					NET AMOUNT DUE
				PERIOD			EFFECTIVE					
		BEGIN. DATE	MONTHLY RATE	FROM	TO	AMOUNT	FROM	TO	AMOUNT	RFD	WIC	
E		2/64	37.60	11/63	1/64	112.80						
E			213.00	LS.		213.00						325.80
ci		2/64	75.20	11/63	1/64	225.60						225.60

REMARKS

ci ②

157 P 74KC FEB

CLERK	DATE	REVIEWER	DATE
F. Cordiel	2/3/64		2-3-64

☆ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962-666121

Form OA-C-101 Determination of Award

Form approved by Comptroller General, U. S.
January 23, 1958

1. INSURED INDIVIDUAL Lee H Oswald	RACE	W: X	N	O	DATE OF BIRTH 10/19/39	DATE OF DEATH 11/24/63	DATE CLAIM FILED

2. REQUIRED QTRS. 6	HAS AT LEAST 6	CURRENT QTRS.	3. First Base Yr. Or Starting Date 1951	LAST BASE YR. OR CLOSING DATE 1963	4. LUMP SUM AMOUNT 213.00
5. TOTAL EARNINGS 3306.85		DISABILITY PERIOD EXCLUDED	ELAPSED YRS. OR YRS. DROPPED 61-62	DIVISOR 24	INCREMENTS	PRIMARY AMOUNT 71.00

6. SYMBOL	NAME	DATE OF BIRTH	DATE CLAIM FILED	ORIGINAL BENEFIT	ANY OTHER BENEFITS	ADJUSTED BENEFIT	RELATIVE'S ACCT. NUMBER (IF ANY)
G1		7/17/41	1/9/64				
E		"	"	53.30		37.60	[illegible]
C2	June L	2/15/62	"	53.30		37.60	
C1	Audrey M	10/20/63	"	53.30		37.60	

8. REIMBURSABLE F. H. EXPENSES ARE	PAID AS FOLLOWS	REMAINS UNPAID	7. MAXIMUM PAYABLE 112.80

11. REMARKS

3716 Rawlins St
Dallas Tex 75219

D.O. CODE 814

157 P74KC FEB

HF — /

12. CERTIFICATION OF PAYMENT Symbol	Name and address of payee as claimant or as representative of the claimant	DATE OF ENTITLEMENT TO MONTHLY BENEFITS	MONTHLY BENEFIT	LUMP-SUM DEATH PAYMENT
E	Marina N Oswald	11/63	37.60	213.00
-63	Bx 1407			
	Grand Prairie Tex 75050			
C	Marina N Oswald for minor children of L H Oswald	11/63	75.20	
	Same			

Pursuant to lawfully delegated authority, I certify that, on application by or on behalf of the claimant(s) named above as payee(s) and the supporting evidence forwarded herewith, the foregoing statements are my determination of fact and decisions as to the benefit(s) to be paid as indicated.

By D. Lynde (Claims Representative)

Date 1/16/64

I certify that pursuant to lawfully delegated authority I have verified the above statements with the supporting evidence on file in this office; that I have computed all amounts and that same are correct as shown; and that all indicated benefit(s) are in accordance with the provisions of Title II of the Social Security Act as amended.

Approved G. L. Dunn (Claims Authorizer)

Date 2/3/64

☆GPO 1962-636576

ACCOUNT NUMBER	1958 PIA	1965 PIA	FAMILY MAXIMUM	REMARKS	TRANSCRIP
433 54 3937	71.00	76.00	114.00 T	A	09/65R

BENEFICIARY'S NAME			PIC	BIC	LAF	RETROACTIVE AMOUNT PAID	NEW MONTHLY RATE
OSWALD	AUDREY	M	C1	C1	C	24.60	57.00
01 37.60	01 37.60	01	37.60	01	37.60	01 37.60	01 53.30
PD 2.70	PD 2.70	PD	2.70	PD	2.70	PD 2.70	PD 3.70
40.30	40.30		40.30		40.30	40.30	57.00
01 53.30	01 53.30						
PD 3.70	PD 3.70						
57.00	57.00						
OSWALD	JUNE	L	C1	C2	C	24.60	57.00
01 37.60	01 37.60	01	37.60	01	37.60	01 37.60	01 53.30
PD 2.70	PD 2.70	PD	2.70	PD	2.70	PD 2.70	PD 3.70
40.30	40.30		40.30		40.30	40.30	57.00
01 53.30	01 53.30						
PD 3.70	PD 3.70						
57.00	57.00						
			TOTAL PAYMENT AMOUNT			49.20	114.00
OSWALD	MARINA	N	E	E	T3	10.00	33.40
21 31.40	21 31.40	21	31.40	21	31.40	21 31.40	T 0 31.40
PD 2.00	PD 2.00	PD	2.00	PD	2.00	PD 2.00	NP 2.00
33.40	33.40		33.40		33.40	33.40	33.40

R F D / W I C / B P D / OLD MBA INCREASE NEW MBA	R F D / W I C / B P D / OLD MBA INCREASE NEW MBA	R F D / W I C / B P D / OLD MBA INCREASE NEW MBA	R F D / W I C / B P D / OLD MBA INCREASE NEW MBA	R F D / W I C / B P D / OLD MBA INCREASE NEW MBA	R F D / W I C / B P D / OLD MBA INCREASE NEW MBA

FORM OA-C596 (5-65)

1965 CONVERSION OF BENEFIT RATES

DEPARTMENT OF
HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

APPOINTMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE

I appoint James H Martin (Name of representative) to act as my representative with respect to my claim under the Social Security Act, based on the earnings record of

Lee Harvey Oswald (Name of wage earner or self-employed individual), 433-54-3937 (Social security account number)

The above-named representative is authorized to obtain from the Administration information concerning my claim; and it is understood that any notice or request sent to him shall have the same force and effect as if sent to me.

Mrs. Marina N Oswald
(Signature)

P. O. Box 1407
(Address)

Grand Prairie, Texas

Jan 10, 1964
(Date)

ACCEPTANCE OF APPOINTMENT

I accept the above appointment. I am a person in good standing in my community and I am able to assist and advise the above party in this case.

I am Business advisor
(Union representative, relative, etc.)

James H Martin
(Signature)

1611 Farrar St.
(Address)

Dallas, Texas

Jan 10, 1964
(Date)

(SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR REGULATIONS AS TO FEES OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR SERVICES TO A PARTY AND INFORMATION ON CONFLICT OF INTEREST)

Form AC-512
(3-60)

Form OAC-5002
(1-54)

REPORT OF CONTACT

(USE INK OR TYPEWRITER)

OFFICE: Dallas, Tex.

DATE: 1-10-64

A/N 433-54-3937

W/E OR S/E PERSON Lee Harvey Oswald

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED: Mr. James H. Martin - Business Manager for Mrs. L. H. Oswald.

CONTACT MADE: IN PERSON ☒ TELEPHONE ☐

PLACE OF CONTACT: Dallas

I discussed the amount of earnings for 1963 with Mr. Martin. He said our 1001's were correct. He stated the $2600.00 shown on the application form was simply a very liberal "guess".

I feel that we can accept the 1001 total for 1963 without hesitancy.

CONTACT MADE BY Jess D. Carter (SIGNATURE) Asst. Mgr. (TITLE)

(FOR CONTINUATION OF THIS REPORT. TURN PAGE. KEEP MARGINAL SPACE AT RIGHT FOR BINDING)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1958 O -486513

Form OAC-5002
(1-54)

REPORT OF CONTACT

(USE INK OR TYPEWRITER)

OFFICE:

DATE:

W/E OR S/E PERSON

A/N

NAME AND ADDRESS OF PERSON(S) CONTACTED:

= Transmittal =

CONTACT MADE:

IN PERSON ☐ TELEPHONE ☐

PLACE OF CONTACT:

Since there were several million witnesses to the shooting which resulted in Lee H. Oswald's death, we feel it is not necessary to obtain a statement from authorities showing Mrs. Oswald was not involved.

CONTACT MADE BY Carter (SIGNATURE) Asst. Mgr. (TITLE)

(FOR CONTINUATION OF THIS REPORT, TURN PAGE. KEEP MARGINAL SPACE AT RIGHT FOR BINDING)

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1958 O.-486513

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/1/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10073-10093
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	004876

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	RUBY, SAMUEL
FROM :	RUBY, SAMUEL
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/24/1978
PAGES :	118
SUBJECTS :	RUBY, SAM RUBY, JACK, BACKGROUND, ASSOCIATES AND RELATIVES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	OTHER TEXTUAL
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/25/1995
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	W/cover letter. Box #:102.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

16250 Bircher Ave.
Granada Hills, Ca.
91344

Jan. 24, 1978

004876

Mr Donald A. Purdy, Jr.

I have had xerox's made of my tax returns and am enclosing the copies for the years 1967 to 1976.

I and my wife have looked in the various places where we normally keep our important papers and we could not find the tax returns for the years 1962 to 1966

We have moved four times since we left Dallas in 1966. It is possible that we disposed of them in the process of moving from one place to another. We probably never anticipated any further use for them.

Should there be any other documents that I have in my possession and you are in need of them during the course of your investigation I will be happy to mail them to you.

Sincerely Yours
Samuel D. Ruby

Form **5329**

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Return for Individual Retirement Savings Arrangement

(Under Sections 408 or 409 of the Internal Revenue Code)

▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1976

Only This Side of Form is Open to Public Inspection

If you have established a retirement savings arrangement you must complete Part I and Part II and attach this form to your individual income tax return, Form 1040. In addition: **(1)** if you claim a deduction on your Form 1040 for contributions to your retirement savings arrangement, complete Part III; **(2)** if you have made contributions in excess of your allowable limitation for this year or prior years, complete Part IV; **(3)** if you are not yet age 59½ when you receive a distribution from your retirement savings arrangement which is not due to a disability, a rollover contribution to another plan or retirement savings arrangement, or the transfer of an amount to a former spouse under a divorce decree, you must complete Part V; **(4)** if you are 70½ or older on the last day of the year, see instructions to determine if you are required to complete Part VI.

Name
SAMUEL D RUBY

Address (Number and street)
16250 BIRCHER ST

City or town, State and ZIP code
GRANADA HILLS CA

If you are not required to file a Form 1040 check here . . . . ☐

Part I Individual and Retirement Savings Information

1 Type of individual retirement savings arrangement:

- (a) ☐ Individual retirement account
- (b) ☐ Individual retirement annuity
- (c) ☐ Individual retirement bonds

2 Were you during any part of the year an active participant in a qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, including a qualified Keogh (HR 10) plan, or were you covered under a section 403(b) annuity or custodial account or under a government retirement plan other than the Social Security or Railroad Retirement Acts? (Volunteer firemen and military reservists see specific instructions for line 2) . . . . ☐ Yes ☒ No

If "Yes," you are not allowed a deduction for your 1976 contributions to your individual retirement arrangement.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. If prepared by a person other than the taxpayer, this declaration is based on all information of which the preparer has any knowledge.

Your signature .... Date ....

Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) ....

95-2941449
Preparer's identification number (see General Instruction B)

Date ....

13717 VANOWEN St VAN Nuys CA 91405
Preparer's address and ZIP code

Form **5329**

This Page Is Not Open to Public Inspection

Part II **Attach Copy B of Form 5498 here ▷**

Your Social Security Number . . . . ▷ 322-12-7997

3 If filed by surviving spouse or beneficiary of an individual who created this retirement savings arrangement **check here** ▶ ☐ and enter name and social security number of individual for whom the arrangement was established ▶ ....

4 Indicate your age as of the end of the year (If you checked item 3 do not complete this item):
(a) ☐ Under age 59½
(b) ☐ Age 59½ to 70½
(c) ☐ Over age 70½ (if you check item (c) complete Part VI below)

5 (a) If, during the year, you received a distribution of your entire account from a qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan, because either (i) you terminated employment or (ii) your employer terminated the plan, and you transferred (rolled over) such distribution to your arrangement, check here . . . . ☐

(b) If you checked (a) did you transfer the entire amount of the distribution (less any amounts you contributed to the qualified plan—see instructions) to your arrangement within 60 days of receipt of such distribution (or 12/31/76 if (a)(ii) applies and you received such distribution prior to 11/2/76)? . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

(c) If (b) was "Yes," complete lines (i) through (iii) below:

	Month	Day	Year
(i) Date of transfer to arrangement			
(ii) Date distribution was made to you from the plan			

(iii) Name of trustee or insurance company to which the transfer was made (If bonds were purchased state "Bonds") ▶..............

(d) *(i)* If within one taxable year, you received a distribution of your entire account from your employer's qualified pension, profit-sharing or stock bonus plan because the plan was terminated by your employer did you:
(A) receive such amount on or after July 4, 1974 but prior to January 1, 1976,
(B) transfer such amount, reduced by the amount of the income tax paid on the distribution on your 1974 or 1975 income tax return, to an arrangement and
(C) file a claim for refund of such tax paid? (Check "Yes" only if (A), (B) and (C) ALL apply.) . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

(ii) If (d)(i) is "Yes," and you have received such refund or credit for such tax paid enter:

	Month	Day	Year
(A) Date refund or credit received			
(B) Date refund or amount of credit was contributed to your retirement savings arrangement . .			

Note: *See Definition C in the Instructions concerning rollover contributions.*

	Month	Day	Year
6 If, during the year, you transferred any funds from one retirement savings arrangement to another retirement savings arrangement, enter the date of transfer here			

Caution: *Such a transfer may be a taxable distribution.*

7 If, during the tax year covered by this form, you have entered into a prohibited transaction under section 4975 or borrowed any amount from your retirement savings arrangement or pledged any part of your arrangement as security for a loan, check here . . . . ☐

Note: *See instructions for the tax consequences of such transactions.*

Part III Computation of Allowable Deduction

(If you have entered into a prohibited transaction under section 4975, do not complete Part III or Part IV for the retirement savings arrangement with which you entered into such prohibited transaction.)

8 Wages, tips and other compensation from Form 1040 (if a joint return do not include compensation of spouse) (See definition B in the instructions for the meaning of compensation.)	
9 15% of line 8 or $1,500, whichever is lesser (if you are 70½ or over or answered "Yes" to line 2, enter zero)	
10 Amount paid by you or on your behalf under all your retirement savings arrangements (do **not include** any amounts which were considered as "rollover contributions," see lines 5 and 6, or the purchase price of any individual retirement bonds redeemed within 12 months of their date of purchase (see instructions) **or life insurance portion of your endowment premium as reported on Form 5498 box 6)**	-0-
11 Allowable deduction, lesser of line 9 or line 10 (enter here and on Form 1040, line 40a) . . . . ▶	-0-

Part IV Tax on Excess Contributions

12 Tax on excess contributions (see Part IV of the Specific Instructions if Part III, line 10 exceeds line 11). Enter tax from worksheet here and on Form 1040, line 61 . . . . ▶	

Part V Tax on Premature Distributions

13 Tax on premature distributions (see Part V of the Specific Instructions if you received a distribution from your retirement savings arrangement before you have attained age 59½). Enter tax from worksheet here and on Form 1040, line 57. . . . . ▶	

Part VI Tax on Undistributed Retirement Accounts and Annuities

(See Instructions before completing this Part.)

14 Tax based on current year distribution method, see worksheet in Instructions	
15 Tax based on aggregate distribution methods, see worksheet in Instructions	
16 Tax due, lesser of line 14 or 15, enter here and on Form 1040, in your total for line 62. On the dotted line to the left of the line 62 entry space write "4974 tax," and show the amount . . . . ▶	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976—O-218-176 E.I. 13-2687299

Form **1040** Department of the Treasury—Internal Revenue Service

U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1976

This space for IRS use only

For the year January 1–December 31, 1976, or other taxable year beginning , 1976 ending , 19 .

Please print or type

Name (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL + PHYLLIS
Last name: Ruby
Your social security number: 322 12 7997
Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
For Privacy Act Notification, see page 5 of Instructions.
Spouse's social security no.: 349 18 1420
City, town or post office, State and ZIP code: GRANADA HILLS CA
Occupation: Yours ▷ S/E
Spouse's ▷ S/E

Filing Status

1 ☐ Single (Check only ONE box)
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separately. If spouse is also filing give spouse's social security number in designated space above and enter full name here ▷
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household. See page 7 of instructions to see if you qualify ▷
5 ☐ Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died ▷ 19). See page 7 of Instructions.

Exemptions

6a Regular ☐ Yourself ☐ Spouse — Enter number of boxes checked ▷ 2
b First names of your dependent children who lived with you ELISA, THOMAS — Enter number ▷ 2
c Number of other dependents (from line 7) ▷
d Total (add lines 6a, b, and c) ▷ 4
e Age 65 or older . ☐ Yourself ☐ Spouse
Blind . . . . ☐ Yourself ☐ Spouse — Enter number of boxes checked ▷
f TOTAL (add lines 6d and e) ▷ 4

7 Other dependents:

(a) Name	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year, write B or D.	(d) Did dependent have income of $750 or more?	(e) Amount furnished for dependent's support: By YOU. If 100% write ALL.	By OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

8 Presidential Election Campaign Fund ▷ Do you wish to designate $1 of your taxes for this fund? ☐ Yes ☐ No
If joint return, does your spouse wish to designate $1? ☐ Yes ☐ No
Note: If you check the "Yes" box(es) it will not increase your tax or reduce your refund.

Income

9	Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation (Attach Forms W-2. If unavailable, see page 6 of Instructions.)	9	-0-
10a	Dividends (See pages 9 and 16 of Instructions) ...., 10b less exclusion ...., Balance ▷ (If gross dividends and other distributions are over $400, list in Part I of Schedule B.)	10c	-0-
11	Interest income. {If $400 or less, enter total without listing in Schedule B / If over $400, enter total and list in Part II of Schedule B}	11	5195
12	Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 37)	12	2546
13	Total (add lines 9, 10c, 11 and 12)	13	7741
14	Adjustments to income (such as moving expense, etc. from line 42)	14	-0-
15a	Subtract line 14 from line 13	15a	7741
b	Disability income exclusion (sick pay) (attach Form 2440)	15b	-0-
c	**Adjusted gross income.** Subtract line 15b from line 15a, then complete Part III on back. (If less than $8,000, see page 2 of Instructions on "Earned Income Credit.")	15c	7741

Please attach Copy B of Forms W-2 here

Tax, Payments and Credits

16	Tax, check if from: ☒ Tax Table ☐ Schedule G ☐ Tax Rate Schedule X, Y or Z ☐ Form 2555 OR ☐ Schedule D ☐ Form 4726	16	0
17a	Multiply $35.00 by the number of exemptions on line 6d 17a 140		
b	Enter 2% of line 47 but not more than $180 ($90 if box 3 is checked) 17b — Enter larger of a or b (If box on line 3 is checked see page 10 of Instructions)	17c	140
18	Balance. Subtract line 17c from line 16 and enter difference (but not less than zero)	18	0
19	Credits (from line 54)	19	
20	Balance. Subtract line 19 from line 18 and enter difference (but not less than zero)	20	0
21	Other taxes (from line 62)	21	280
22	Total (add lines 20 and 21)	22	280
23a	Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2, or W-2P to front) 23a		
b	1976 estimated tax payments (include amount allowed as credit from 1975 return) 23b 602		
c	Earned income credit (from page 2 of Instructions) 23c		
d	Amount paid with Form 4868 23d		
e	Other payments (from line 66) 23e		
24	**TOTAL** (add lines 23a through e) ▷	24	602

Pay amount on line 25 in full with this return. Write social security number on check or money order and make payable to Internal Revenue Service.

Due or Refund

25	If line 22 is larger than line 24, enter **BALANCE DUE IRS** ▷ (Check here ▷ ☐, if Form 2210 or Form 2210F is attached. See page 10 of instructions.)	25	
26	If line 24 is larger than line 22, enter amount **OVERPAID** ▷	26	322
27	Amount of line 26 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU** ▷	27	222
28	Amount of line 26 to be credited on 1977 estimated tax ▷ 28 100		

Please attach Check or Money Order here

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.

Sign here

▷ Your signature Date
▷ Preparer's signature (and employer's name, if any) Date
▷ Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)
▷ 95-2941449 Identifying number (see instructions) Address (and ZIP code)

218-052-2

Part I Income other than Wages, Dividends and Interest

29	Business income or (loss) (attach Schedule C)	29	3546
30a	Net gain or (loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D)	30a	(1000)
b	50% of capital gain distributions (not reported on Schedule D—see page 10 of Instructions)	30b	
31	Net gain or (loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Form 4797)	31	
32a	Pensions, annuities, rents, royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E)	32a	
b	Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E—see page 10 of Instructions)	32b	
33	Farm income or (loss) (attach Schedule F)	33	
34	State income tax refunds (does not apply if refund is for year in which you took the standard deduction—others see page 10 of Instructions)	34	
35	Alimony received	35	
36	Other (state nature and source—see page 11 of Instructions) ▶	36	
37	**Total** (add lines 29 through 36). **Enter here and on line 12** ▶	37	2546

Part II Adjustments to Income

38	Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	38	
39	Employee business expense (attach Form 2106)	39	
40a	Payments to an individual retirement arrangement from attached Form 5329, Part III	40a	
b	Payments to a Keogh (H.R. 10) retirement plan	40b	
41	Forfeited interest penalty for premature withdrawal (see page 12 of Instructions)	41	
42	**Total** (add lines 38 through 41). **Enter here and on line 14** ▶	42	

Part III Tax Computation

43	Adjusted gross income (from line 15c). If you have unearned income and can be claimed as a dependent on your parent's return, check here ▶ ☐ and see page 9 of Instructions	43	7741
44a	If you itemize deductions, check here ▶ ☐, and enter total from Schedule A, line 40, and attach Schedule A		
b	Standard deduction—If you do not itemize deductions, check here ▶ ☐, and: If you checked the box on line 2 or 5, enter the greater of $2,100 OR 16% of line 43—but not more than $2,800 1 or 4, enter the greater of $1,700 OR 16% of line 43—but not more than $2,400 3, enter the greater of $1,050 OR 16% of line 43—but not more than $1,400	44	5686
45	Subtract line 44 from line 43 and enter difference (but not less than zero)	45	2055
46	Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 6f by $750	46	3000
47	Taxable income. Subtract line 46 from line 45 and enter difference (but not less than zero)	47	-0-

- If line 47 is $20,000 or less and you did not average your income on Schedule G, or figure your tax on Form 2555, Exemption of Income Earned Abroad, find your tax in Tax Table. Enter tax on line 16 and check appropriate box.
- If line 47 is more than $20,000, figure your tax on the amount on line 47 by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, Z, or if applicable, the alternative tax from Schedule D, income averaging from Schedule G, tax from Form 2555 or maximum tax from Form 4726. Enter tax on line 16 and check appropriate box.

Part IV Credits

48	Credit for the elderly (attach Schedules R & RP)	48	
49	Credit for child care expenses (attach Form 2441)	49	
50	Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	50	
51	Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	51	
52	Contributions to candidates for public office credit (see page 12 of Instructions)	52	
53	Work Incentive (WIN) Credit (attach Form 4874)	53	
54	**Total** (add lines 48 through 53). **Enter here and on line 19** ▶	54	

Part V Other Taxes

55	Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255)	55	
56	Minimum tax. Check here ▶ ☐, and attach Form 4625	56	
57	Tax on premature distributions from attached Form 5329, Part V	57	
58	Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE)	58	280
59	Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137)	59	
60	Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W-2)	60	
61	Excess contribution tax from attached Form 5329, Part IV	61	
62	**Total** (add lines 55 through 61). **Enter here and on line 21** ▶	62	280

Part VI Other Payments

63	Excess FICA, RRTA, or FICA/RRTA tax withheld (two or more employers—see page 13 of Instructions)	63	
64	Credit for Federal tax on special fuels, nonhighway gasoline and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	64	
65	Credit from a Regulated Investment Company (attach Form 2439)	65	
66	**Total** (add lines 63 through 65). **Enter here and on line 23e** ▶	66	

☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976—O-218-052

Schedules A&B—Itemized Deductions AND Dividend and Interest Income

(Form 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

1976

▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedules A and B (Form 1040).

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: S+P. Ruby

Your social security number: 322 12 7997

Schedule A—Itemized Deductions (Schedule B on back)

Medical and Dental Expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) (See page 13 of Instructions.)

1	**One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care. (Be sure to include in line 10 below)**	
2	Medicine and drugs	
3	Enter 1% of line 15c, Form 1040	
4	Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	
5	Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	
6	Enter other medical and dental expenses:	
a	Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.	
b	Hospitals	
c	Other (itemize—include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, etc.) ▶ SCH	
7	Total (add lines 4 through 6c)	
8	Enter 3% of line 15c, Form 1040	
9	Subtract line 8 from line 7 (if less than zero, enter zero)	
10	**Total (add lines 1 and 9).** Enter here and on line 34 ▶	1941

Taxes (See page 13 of Instructions.)

11	State and local income	
12	Real estate	
13	State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)	
14	General sales (see sales tax tables)	
15	Personal property	
16	Other (itemize) ▶ SCH	
17	**Total (add lines 11 through 16).** Enter here and on line 35 ▶	1128

Interest Expense (See page 14 of Instructions.)

18	Home mortgage	
19	Other (itemize) ▶ SCH	
20	**Total (add lines 18 and 19).** Enter here and on line 36 ▶	2517

Contributions (See page 15 of Instructions for examples.)

21 a	Cash contributions for which you have receipts, cancelled checks or other written evidence	
b	Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts. ▶ SCH	
22	Other than cash (see page 15 of instructions for required statement)	
23	Carryover from prior years	
24	**Total contributions (add lines 21a through 23).** Enter here and on line 37 ▶	100

Casualty or Theft Loss(es) (See page 15 of Instructions.)

Note: *If you had* **more than one loss,** *omit lines 25 through 28 and see page 15 of Instructions for guidance.*

25	Loss before insurance reimbursement	
26	Insurance reimbursement	
27	Subtract line 26 from line 25. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	
28	Enter $100 or amount on line 27, whichever is smaller	
29	**Casualty or theft loss (subtract line 28 from line 27).** Enter here and on line 38 ▶	0

Miscellaneous Deductions (See page 15 of Instructions.)

30	Alimony paid	
31	Union dues	
32	Other (itemize) ▶	
33	**Total (add lines 30 through 32).** Enter here and on line 39 ▶	0

Summary of Itemized Deductions

A

34	Total medical and dental—line 10	1941
35	Total taxes—line 17	1128
36	Total interest—line 20	2517
37	Total contributions—line 24	100
38	Casualty or theft loss(es)—line 29	0
39	Total miscellaneous—line 33	0
40	**Total deductions (add lines 34 through 39).** Enter here and on Form 1040, line 44 ▶	5686

218-054-1

Schedule B—Dividend and Interest Income

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040 (Do not enter name and social security number if shown on other side): S+P RUDY

Your social security number: 322 12 7997

Part I Dividend Income

Note: *If gross dividends (including capital gain distributions) and other distributions on stock are $400 or less, do not complete this part. But enter gross dividends less the sum of capital gain distributions and non-taxable distributions, if any, on Form 1040, line 10a (see note below).*

1 Gross dividends (including capital gain distributions) and other distributions on stock. (List payers and amounts—write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, or jointly)

2 Total of line 1

3 Capital gain distributions (see page 16 of Instructions. Enter here and on Schedule D, line 7). See note below

4 Nontaxable distributions (see page 16 of Instructions)

5 Total (add lines 3 and 4)

6 Dividends before exclusion (subtract line 5 from line 2). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 10a

Part II Interest Income

Note: *If interest is $400 or less, do not complete this part. But enter amount of interest received on Form 1040, line 11.*

7 Interest includes earnings from savings and loan associations, mutual savings banks, cooperative banks, and credit unions as well as interest on bank deposits, bonds, tax refunds, etc. Interest also includes original issue discount on bonds and other evidences of indebtedness (see page 16 of Instructions). (List payers and amounts)

NOTE ON WOODLEY BISTRO	4959
UAL	17
TRANSWORLD	11
✓ ✓	191
WORLD	17

8 Total interest income. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 11: 5195

Note: *If you received capital gain distributions and do not need Schedule D to report any other gains or losses or to compute the alternative tax, do not file that schedule. Instead, enter 50 percent of capital gain distributions on Form 1040, line 30b.*

B

Part III Foreign Accounts and Foreign Trusts

1 Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)? ☐ Yes ☑ No

If "Yes," attach Form 4683 (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

2 Were you the grantor of, or transferor to, a foreign trust during any taxable year, which foreign trust was in being during the current taxable year, whether or not you have any beneficial interest in such trust? ☐ Yes ☑ No

If "Yes," attach Form 4683 (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976—O-218-054

SCHEDULE C
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Profit or (Loss) From Business or Profession

(Sole Proprietorship)
Partnerships, Joint Ventures, etc., Must File Form 1065.
▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedule C (Form 1040).

1976

Name of proprietor S&P Ruby
Social security number 322 12 7997

A Principal business activity (see Schedule C Instructions) ▶ SERVICE ; product ▶ SNACK BAR
B Business name ▶ WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP **C** Employer identification number ▶ 95-2651578
D Business address (number and street) ▶ 16055 VENTURA BLVD
City, State and ZIP code ▶ ENCINO CA 91316

C

		Yes	No
E	Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☐ Cash (2) ☒ Accrual (3) ☐ Other ▶		
F	Were you required to file Form W–3 or Form 1096 for 1976 (see Schedule C Instructions)?	X	
	If "Yes," where filed ▶	▨	▨
G	Was an Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 941, filed for this business for any quarter in 1976?	X	
H	Method of inventory valuation ▶ .... Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? (If "Yes," attach explanation)		X

			Line	Amount
Income	1	Gross receipts or sales $........ Less: returns and allowances $........ Balance ▶	1	
	2	Less: Cost of goods sold and/or operations (Schedule C–1, line 8)	2	
	3	Gross profit	3	
	4	Other income (attach schedule)	4	
	5	**Total income** (add lines 3 and 4)	5	
Deductions	6	Depreciation (explain in Schedule C–3)	6	
	7	Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C–2)	7	
	8	Rent on business property	8	
	9	Repairs (explain in Schedule C–2)	9	
	10	Salaries and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C–1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	10	
	11	Insurance	11	
	12	Legal and professional fees	12	
	13	Commissions	13	
	14	Amortization (attach statement)	14	
	15	(a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Schedule C Instructions)	15(a)	
		(b) Employee benefit programs (see Schedule C Instructions)	(b)	
	16	Interest on business indebtedness	16	
	17	Bad debts arising from sales or services	17	
	18	Depletion	18	
	19	Other business expenses (specify):		
		(a)		
		(b)		
		(c)		
		(d)		
		(e)		
		(f)		
		(g)		
		(h)		
		(i)		
		(j)		
		(k) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(j)) SCH	19(k)	
	20	**Total deductions** (add lines 6 through 19(k))	20	
	21	Net profit or (loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 29. **ALSO** enter on Schedule SE, line 5(a)	21	3546

SCHEDULE C–1.—Cost of Goods Sold and/or Operations (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 2)

		Line	Amount
1	Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)	1	
2	Purchases $........ Less: cost of items withdrawn for personal use $........ Balance ▶	2	
3	Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)	3	
4	Materials and supplies	4	
5	Other costs (attach schedule)	5	
6	Total of lines 1 through 5	6	
7	Less: Inventory at end of year	7	
8	Cost of goods sold and/or operations. Enter here and on line 2 above	8	

Did you claim a deduction for expenses of an office in your home? ☐ Yes ☐ No

218-055-1

9

SCHEDULE C–2.—Explanation of Lines 7 and 9

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE C–3.—Depreciation (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 6)

If you need more space, use Form 4562.

a. Description of property	b. Date acquired	c. Cost or other basis	d. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	e. Method of computing depreciation	f. Life or rate	g. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below) →						
2 Other depreciation:						
			SCH			106
3 Totals						
4 Less amount of depreciation claimed in Schedule C–1, page 1						
5 Balance—Enter here and on page 1, line 6						106

SCHEDULE C–4.—Expense Account Information (See Schedule C Instructions for Schedule C–4)

Enter information with regard to yourself and your five highest paid employees. In determining the five highest paid employees, expense account allowances must be added to their salaries and wages. However, the information need not be submitted for any employee for whom the combined amount is less than $25,000, or for yourself if your expense account allowance plus line 21, page 1, is less than $25,000.

Name	Expense account	Salaries and Wages
Owner		▨
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(3) Employees' families at conventions or meetings? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(4) Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W-2? ☐ Yes ☐ No

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1976—O-218-055

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Gains and Losses

(Examples of property to be reported on this Schedule are gains and losses on stocks, bonds, and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.)
▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040).

1976

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: S+P Ruby

Social security number: 322 12 7997

D

Part I Short-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held Not More Than 6 Months

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (Mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (Mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted (see Instruction F) and expense of sale	f. Gain or (loss) (d less e)
1					

2 Enter your share of net short-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	2	
3 Enter net gain or (loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3	
4 Short-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction I)	4	(741)
5 Net short-term gain or (loss), combine lines 3 and 4	5	(741)

Part II Long-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held More Than 6 Months

a. Kind of property and description	b. Date acquired	c. Date sold	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis	f. Gain or (loss)
6					
INSTALLMENT SALE					5355

7 Capital gain distributions	7	
8 Enter gain, if applicable, from Form 4797, line 4(a)(1) (see Instruction A)	8	
9 Enter your share of net long-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	9	
10 Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	10	
11 Net gain or (loss), combine lines 6 through 10	11	
12 Long-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction I)	12	(5839)
13 Net long-term gain or (loss), combine lines 11 and 12	13	(484)

Part III Summary of Parts I and II *(If You Have Capital Loss Carryovers From Years Beginning Before 1970, Do Not Complete This Part. See Form 4798, Parts III, IV and V.)*

14 Combine lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain or (loss) here	14	
15 **If line 14 shows a gain—** a Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part IV for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13	15a	
b Subtract line 15a from line 14. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 30a	15b	
16 **If line 14 shows a loss—** a Enter one of the following amounts: *(i)* If line 5 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of line 14; *(ii)* If line 13 is zero or a net gain, enter line 14; or, *(iii)* If line 5 and line 13 are net losses, enter amount on line 5 added to 50% of amount on line 13	16a	
b Enter here and enter as a (loss) on Form 1040, line 30a, the smallest of: *(i)* The amount on line 16a; *(ii)* $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return); or, *(iii)* Taxable income, as adjusted (see Instruction J) SEE 4798	16b	(1000)

218-056-1

Part IV Computation of Alternative Tax (See Instruction S to See if the Alternative Tax Will Benefit You)

17 Enter amount from Form 1040, line 47 17

18 Enter amount from line 15a (or Form 4798, Part IV, line 8(a)) 18

19 Subtract line 18 from line 17 (if line 18 exceeds line 17, do not complete the rest of this part. The Alternative Tax will not benefit you) 19

Note: *If line 18 does not exceed $25,000 ($12,500 if married filing separately), omit lines 20 through 23 and enter zero on line 24.*

20 Enter $25,000 ($12,500 if married filing separately) 20

21 Add lines 19 and 20 21

22 Tax on amount on line 17* 22

23 Tax on amount on line 21* 23

24 Subtract line 23 from line 22 24

25 Tax on amount on line 19* 25

26 Enter 50% of line 18 but not more than $12,500 ($6,250 if married filing separately) 26

27 Alternative Tax—add lines 24, 25, and 26. If smaller than the tax figured on the amount on Form 1040, line 47, enter this alternative tax on Form 1040, line 16. Also check the Schedule D box on Form 1040, line 16 27

*If the amount on which the tax is to be computed is $20,000 or less use the Tax Table; if more than $20,000 use Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z.

Note: Enter your capital loss carryovers from 1976 to 1977:	Pre-1970	Post-1969
Short-term (from Form 4798, Part II or Part V)	0	0
Long-term (from Form 4798, Part II or Part V)	7958	484

SCHEDULE SE (Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE. ▶ Attach to Form 1040.
▶ See Instructions for Schedule SE (Form 1040).

1976

- If you had wages, including tips, of $15,300 or more that were subject to social security or railroad retirement taxes, do not fill in this schedule (unless you are eligible for the Earned Income Credit). See Instructions.
- If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD) SAM RUBY

Social security number of self-employed person ▶ 322 12 7997

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶

- If you have only farm income complete Parts I and III.
- If you have only nonfarm income complete Parts II and III.
- If you have both farm and nonfarm income complete Parts I, II, and III.

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

You may elect to compute your net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD, line 3, instead of using the Regular Method, line 2, if your gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. However, lines 1 and 2 must be completed even if you elect to use the FARM OPTIONAL METHOD.

REGULAR METHOD 1 Net profit or (loss) from: a Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 72 (accrual method)	1a		
b Farm partnerships	1b		
2 Net earnings from farm self-employment (add lines 1a and b)	2		
FARM OPTIONAL METHOD 3 If gross profits from farming ¹ are: a Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits b More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, Enter $1,600	3		
4 Enter here and on line 12a, the amount on line 2, or line 3 if you elect the farm optional method	4		

¹ Gross profits from farming are the total gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 70 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profits from farm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 14) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from NONFARM Self-Employment

REGULAR METHOD 5 Net profit or (loss) from: a Schedule C, line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	5a	3546	
b Partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)	5b		
c Service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. (Include rental value of parsonage or rental allowance furnished.) If you filed Form 4361, check here ▶ ☐ and enter zero on this line	5c		
d Service with a foreign government or international organization	5d		
e Other (See Form 1040 instructions for line 36.) Specify ▶	5e		
6 Total (add lines 5a through e)	6	3546	
7 Enter adjustments if any (attach statement)	7		
8 Adjusted net earnings or (loss) from nonfarm self-employment (line 6, as adjusted by line 7)	8	3546	

If line 8 is $1,600 or more **OR** if you do not elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method, omit lines 9 through 11 and enter amount from line 8 on line 12b, Part III.

Note: *You may use the nonfarm optional method (line 9 through line 11) only if line 8 is less than $1,600 and less than two-thirds of your gross nonfarm profits,² and you had actual net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more for at least 2 of the 3 following years: 1973, 1974, and 1975. The nonfarm optional method can only be used for 5 taxable years.*

SE

NONFARM OPTIONAL METHOD 9 a Maximum amount reportable, under both optional methods combined (farm and nonfarm)	9a	$1,600	00
b Enter amount from line 3. (If you did not elect to use the farm optional method, enter zero)	9b		
c Balance (subtract line 9b from line 9a)	9c		
10 Enter two-thirds of gross nonfarm profits ² or $1,600, whichever is smaller	10		
11 Enter here and on line 12b, the amount on line 9c or line 10, whichever is smaller	11		

² Gross profits from nonfarm business are the total of the gross profits from Schedule C, line 3, plus the distributive share of gross profits from nonfarm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 14) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE. Also, include gross profits from services reported on line 5c, d, and e, as adjusted by line 7.

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

12 Net earnings or (loss): a From farming (from line 4)	12a		
b From nonfarm (from line 8, or line 11 if you elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method)	12b	3546	
13 Total net earnings or (loss) from self-employment reported on line 12. **(If line 13 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of schedule.)**	13	3546	
14 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security or railroad retirement taxes for 1976 is	14	$15,300	00
15 a Total "FICA" wages and "RRTA" compensation 15a			
b Unreported tips subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9 or to RRTA 15b			
c Total of lines 15a and b	15c		
16 Balance (subtract line 15c from line 14)	16		
17 Self-employment income—line 13 or 16, whichever is smaller	17	3546	
18 Self-employment tax. (If line 17 is $15,300.00, enter $1,208.70; if less, multiply the amount on line 17 by .079.) Enter here and on Form 1040, line 58	18	280	

218-060-1

Form **4798**

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Loss Carryover

(Computations of Capital Loss Carryovers and Summary of Capital Gains and Losses if Pre-1970 Capital Losses are Carried to 1976.)

▶ **Attach to Form 1040.**

1976

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040 S.+P Ruby

Social Security Number 32212 7997

Note: *Complete Only Page 1 of This Form to Compute Your Capital Loss Carryover if Your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), lines 4(a) and 12(a), DO NOT SHOW A LOSS.*

Part I Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers to 1976 (Complete this part if the amount on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 16(a), is larger than the loss deducted on your 1975 Form 1040, line 29a.)

Section A.—Short-term Capital Loss Carryover

1 Enter loss shown on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 6—then go to line 7	1		
2 Enter gain shown on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	2		
3 Reduce any loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2	3		
4 Enter amount shown on your 1975 Form 1040, line 29a	4		
5 Enter smaller of line 3 or 4	5		
6 Excess of amount on line 3 over amount on line 5	6		

Note: *The amount on line 6 is your short-term capital loss carryover from 1975 to 1976 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4.*

Section B.—Long-term Capital Loss Carryover

7 Line 4 less line 5 (Note: If you ignored lines 2 through 6, enter amount from your 1975 Form 1040, line 29a)	7		
8 Enter loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 9 through 12	8		
9 Enter gain shown on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	9		
10 Reduce any loss on line 8 to the extent of any gain on line 9	10		
11 Multiply amount on line 7 by 2	11		
12 Excess of amount on line 10 over amount on line 11	12		

Note: *The amount on line 12 is your long-term capital loss carryover from 1975 to 1976 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12.*

Part II Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers from 1976 to 1977 (Complete this part if the amount on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 16a, is larger than the loss deducted on your 1976 Form 1040, line 30a.)

Section A.—Short-term Capital Loss Carryover

1 Enter loss shown on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 6—then go to line 7	1		
2 Enter gain shown on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	2		
3 Reduce any loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2	3		
4 Enter amount shown on your 1976 Form 1040, line 30a	4		
5 Enter smaller of line 3 or 4	5		
6 Excess of amount on line 3 over amount on line 5	6		

Note: *The amount on line 6 is your short-term capital loss carryover from 1976 to 1977 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount in the space provided on page 2 of your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040).*

Section B.—Long-term Capital Loss Carryover

7 Line 4 less line 5 (Note: If you ignored lines 2 through 6, enter amount from your 1976 Form 1040, line 30a)	7		
8 Enter loss from your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 9 through 12	8		
9 Enter gain shown on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	9		
10 Reduce any loss on line 8 to the extent of any gain on line 9	10		
11 Multiply amount on line 7 by 2	11		
12 Excess of amount on line 10 over amount on line 11	12		

Note: *The amount on line 12 is your long-term capital loss carryover from 1976 to 1977 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount in the space provided on page 2 of your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040).*

Do Not Complete the Rest of This Form if You Do Not Have a Pre-1970 Capital Loss Carryover to 1976 (See Instruction A).

Instructions

A. Who Should File.—If your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), lines 4(a) and 12(a) show a loss: (1) use Part III, below, to determine your capital loss carryover to 1976; (2) complete your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), lines 1 through 13 to report capital gains and losses for the current year and any post-1969 capital loss carryovers; and (3) complete Part IV to figure your net capital gain or (loss) for 1976 and the capital loss limitation if necessary. Use Part V to figure capital loss carryover from 1976 to 1977 for pre-1970 losses or a combination of pre-1970 and post-1969 losses.

B. Part IV, Line 19 or 33.—If there is a gain and a loss on the lines mentioned in the instructions for Part IV, line 19 or 33, enter the gain reduced by the amount of the loss. If the loss exceeds the gain enter a zero. If there is a gain and no loss, just enter the gain.

C. Part IV, Line 22 or 36.—If there is a loss and a gain on the lines mentioned in the instructions for Part IV, line 22 or 36, enter the loss reduced by the amount of the gain. If the gain exceeds the loss enter a zero. If there is a loss and no gain, just enter the loss.

D. Married Taxpayers Filing Separate Returns.—If you are married and filing a separate return the limitation for Part IV, lines 9(b)(ii) and 27(b) is $500, increased by amounts attributable to pre-1970 short-term capital loss components, but the combined total may not exceed $1,000. If there is a loss in Part IV, line 2, complete Part IV, Section E. If there is a loss in Part IV, line 5, complete Part IV, Section D, lines 14 through 22 (assuming all the lines in Section D were not otherwise required to be completed) ignoring the note under line 14.

E. Additional Information.—For information about capital assets, investment interest expense deduction adjustment, alternative tax, etc., see the Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040).

Part III **Pre-1970 and Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers to 1976** (Complete this part if the amount on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 16(a) or line 33, is larger than the loss deducted on your 1975 Form 1040, line 29a.)

1 Enter loss shown on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 20—then go to line 21			1	(1741)
2 Enter gain shown on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss enter a zero			2	-0-
3 Reduce loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2			3	(1741)
Note: *If line 4(a) on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040) is blank, IGNORE lines 4 through 11, enter a zero on line 12—then go to line 13.*				
4 Combine lines 3 and 11 on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040). Enter the gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero **Note:** *If line 4 is zero IGNORE lines 5 through 11, enter on line 12 the loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a)—then go to line 13.*	4	5105		
5 Enter any gain from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 3	5	-0-		
6 Enter smaller of line 4 or 5	6	-0-		
7 Enter excess of gain on line 4 over line 6	7	5105		
8 Enter loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(a); otherwise, enter a zero	8	(13322		
9 Reduce any gain on line 7 to the extent of any loss on line 8	9	0		
10 Enter loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a); otherwise enter a zero	10	0		
11 Add the gains on lines 6 and 9	11	0		
12 Reduce the loss on line 10 to the extent of any gain on line 11			12	0
13 Pre-1970 short-term capital loss (Enter smaller of line 3 or 12)			13	(1741)
14 Short-term capital loss attributable to years beginning after 1969 (excess of line 3 over line 13)			14	0
15 Enter any loss from line 13, above	15	(1741)		
16 Enter loss deducted on your 1975 Form 1040, line 29a	16	1000		
17 Pre-1970 short-term loss carryover to 1976 (excess of line 15 over line 16—if line 15 does not exceed line 16, enter zero). Enter here and in Part IV, line 2			17	(741)
18 Enter any loss from line 14, above	18	0		
19 Enter excess of line 16 over line 15—if line 16 does not exceed line 15, enter zero	19	0		
20 Post-1969 short-term loss carryover to 1976 (excess of line 18 over line 19—if line 18 does not exceed line 19, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4			20	0
21 If you were required to complete Part IV of your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), enter any loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 30; otherwise, enter zero	21	8217		
22 Enter excess of line 19 over line 18—if line 19 does not exceed line 18, enter zero. (**Note:** *If you ignored lines 2 through 20 above, enter amount from your 1975 Form 1040, line 29a*)	22	0		
23 Pre-1970 long-term loss carryover to 1976 (excess of line 21 over line 22—if line 21 does not exceed line 22, enter zero). Enter here and in Part IV, line 5			23	(8217)
24 If you were required to complete Part IV of your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), enter any loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 31. However, if Part IV was not required, enter any loss from your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13	24	5839		
25 Enter excess of line 22 over line 21 0 × 2 (If line 22 does not exceed line 21, enter zero.)	25	0		
26 Post-1969 long-term loss carryover to 1976 (excess of line 24 over line 25—if line 24 does not exceed line 25, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12			26	(5839)

Part IV Capital Gains and Losses

Section A.—Short-term Capital Gains and Losses

1 Amount from 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5	1	(741)
2 Amount from Part III, line 17	2	( )
3 Net short-term gain or (loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3	(741)

Section B.—Long-term Capital Gains and Losses

4 Amount from 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13	4	(484)
5 Amount from Part III, line 23	5	(8217)
6 Net long-term gain or (loss), combine lines 4 and 5	6	(8701)

Section C.—Summary of Sections A and B

7 Combine lines 3 and 6 and enter the net gain or (loss) here	7	(9442)
8 If line 7 shows a gain—		
(a) Enter 50% of line 6 or 50% of line 7, whichever is smaller (see Schedule D (Form 1040), Part IV, for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 6	8(a)	
(b) Subtract line 8(a) from line 7. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 30a	(b)	
9 If line 7 shows a loss— If losses are shown on BOTH lines 5 and 6, omit lines 9(a) and (b) and go to Section D. Otherwise,		
(a) Enter one of the following amounts: (i) If line 3 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of line 7; (ii) If line 6 is zero or a net gain, enter amount from line 7; or (iii) If line 3 and line 6 are net losses, enter amount on line 3 added to 50% of amount on line 6	9(a)	
(b) Enter here and enter as a (loss) on Form 1040, line 30a, the smallest of: (i) The amount on line 9(a); (ii) $1,000 (married taxpayers filing separate returns see Instruction D); or (iii) Taxable Income, as adjusted (see Instruction J in Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040))	(b)	(1000)

Section D.—Capital Loss Limitation—Where Losses Are Shown on Both Lines 5 AND 6 of Part IV

10 Enter loss from line 3; if line 3 is zero or a gain, enter a zero			10	
11 Enter loss from line 6			11	
12 Enter gain, if any, from line 3; if line 3 is zero or a loss, enter a zero			12	
13 Reduce loss on line 11 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 12			13	
14 Combine amounts on 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), lines 3 and 11 and if gain, enter gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero	14			
Note: *If the entry on line 14 is zero, OMIT lines 15 through 21 and enter on line 22 the loss shown on line 5.*				
15 Enter gain, if any, from 1976 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 11	15			
16 Enter smaller of amount on line 14 or line 15	16			
17 Enter excess of gain on line 14 over amount on line 16	17			
18 Enter loss from line 2; if line 2 is blank, enter a zero	18			
19 Reduce gain, if any, on line 17 to the extent of loss, if any, on line 18 (see Instruction B)	19			
20 Enter loss from line 5	20			
21 Add the gain(s) on line(s) 16 and 19	21			
22 Reduce the loss on line 20 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 21 (see Instruction C)			22	
23 Enter smaller of amount on line 22 or line 13 (if line 22 is zero, enter a zero)			23	
24 Subtract amount on line 23 from the loss on line 13			24	
25 Enter 50% of the amount on line 24			25	
26 Add lines 10, 23, and 25			26	
27 Enter here and enter as a (loss) on Form 1040, line 30a, the smallest of: (a) Amount on line 26; (b) $1,000 (Married taxpayers filing separate returns see Instruction D); or (c) Taxable Income, as adjusted (see Instruction J in Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040))			27	( )

218-162-1

NAME S+P Ruby CALENDAR YEAR 1976

ADDRESS SOC. SEC. NO. 322-12-7997

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		1405
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		548
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES		2023
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.		232
9		1791
I +:½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.		150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▷	1941	1941
TAXES		
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME		0
12 REAL ESTATE		924
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		134
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		22
16 SALES TAX AUTO		0
17 TOTAL TAXES ▷	1128	1128
INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)		
18 MORTGAGE		2482
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS		35
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▷	2517	2517

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21a CASH CONTRIBUTIONS		
21b PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		100
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▷	100	100
CASUALTY OR THEFT (LOSS(ES)		
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▷	0	0
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS		
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
AUTO USE/DAMAGE		
INVEST.COUNSEL & PUBS.(Sched)		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
33 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▷	0	0

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
34 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
35 TOTAL TAXES (From Line 17)		
36 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
37 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
38 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line 29)		
39 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 33)		
40 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 44 ▷	5686	5686

REMARKS

Form 101

NAME S&P. Ruby

I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. 322-12-7997

CALENDAR YEAR 1976

FISCAL YEAR ENDING

19

ADDRESS

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME

EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		15947.
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	0	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	8856	
LABOR		
TOTAL	8856	
INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	2400	6456
GROSS PROFIT		9491.
GROSS INCOME		9491
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	208.	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE	900	
BAD DEBTS		
CASH SHORT		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE ATTACHED)	106.	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS		
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	637.	
INTEREST	419.	
JANITOR SERVICE		
LAUNDRY		
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	50.	
MAINTENANCE		
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE		
RENT	1608.	
REPAIRS	13	
SALARIES AND WAGES		
SALARIES OFFICERS		
SUPPLIES	1551	
TAXES AND LICENSES	284.	
TAXES - PAYROLL		
TELEPHONE	169.	
TRAVEL		
UTILITIES		
		5945
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) - FEDERAL RETURN		3546
NET PROFIT OR LOSS) - STATE RETURN (SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.)		

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. FORM 104
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE

NAME S+P Ruby

ADDRESS

I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. 322-12-7997

CALENDAR YEAR 19 76

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 19

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION / AMORTIZATION

KIND OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED MO YR	COST OR OTHER BASIS	SPEC 20% DEP		DEPRECIABLE BASIS	DEP ALLOWED PRIOR YEARS	REMAINING COST	METHOD	RATE(%) OR LIFE (YRS)	DEPRECIATION FOR THIS YEAR
EQUIP	6/77	2112			2112	0	2112	S.L.	10 YR	106
GOODWILL		13200								
TOTALS										

Add 20% Additional Depreciation on Items Purchased THIS Year.

TOTAL DEPRECIATION THIS YEAR 106

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. FORM NO 102A

SCHEDULE

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby I.D. or SOC. SEC. NO. 322-12-7997 Calendar Yr. 1975
F/Y/E 19

GAINS ON INSTALLMENT SALES

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY Coffee Shop

DATE ACQUIRED 2/1/74 DATE SOLD 9/12/75

TYPE OF ASSET:	CAPITAL	SEC. 1245	SEC. 1250
1. SELLING PRICE: CASH	$	$20148	$
2. NOTES		48152	
3. MORTGAGE TRANSFERRED			
4. OTHER			
5. GROSS SALES PRICE (1+2+3+4)		68300	
6. COST OR BASIS	$	$45228	$
7. LESS ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION			
8. PRIOR TO 1-1-62			
9. PRIOR TO 1-1-64			
10. AFTER 12-31-61		2313	
11. ST. LINE AFTER 12-31-63			
12. EXCESS OVER S/L 1-64/12-69			
13. EXCESS OVER S/L AFTER 12-31-69			
14. ADJUSTED BASIS (6-7 THRU 13)		42915	
15. EXPENSES OF SALE		238	
16. TOTAL ADJUSTED BASIS (14 + 15)		43153	
17. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT (5 - 16)	$		
18. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT - ORDINARY		$2313	$
19. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT - OTHER		$22834	$
20. CONTRACT PRICE (1 + 2 + 4)	$	$683072	$
21. GROSS PROFIT %	%	36.82%	%
22. PAYMENTS RECEIVED YEAR OF SALE			
23. CASH (1)		20148	
24. PRINCIPAL COLLECTIONS		-0-	
25. EXCESS MORTGAGE OVER BASIS		-0-	
26. OTHER (4)		-0-	
27. TOTAL PAYMENTS (23 THRU 26)		20148	
28. RECOGNIZED GAIN			
29. RECOGNIZED GAIN - ORDINARY		2313	
30. RECOGNIZED GAIN - OTHER		5105	

TAX-ABLE YR.	TOTAL PAYMENTS	LESS INT. (TO PT. 2. SEC. 3)	ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1245		ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1250		CAPITAL GAIN	
			REPORTED	BALANCE	REPORTED	BALANCE	REPORTED	BALANCE
1975	20148	NONE	7418	15416				
1976	19503	4959	5355	10061				

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. FORM 96

SCHEDULE

RESIDENT

540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR

1976

PLACE PREADDRESSED LABEL HERE, if available. (Correct name and address, if necessary)
Enter social security number(s) only if incorrect or not shown on label.

Check One: ☒ Calendar Year ☐ Fiscal Year Ending ______ 1977

FOR PRIVACY NOTIFICATION SEE PAGE 2 OF INSTRUCTIONS

NAME (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: Ruby
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CA

Your Social Security Number: 322 12 7997
Spouse's Social Security Number: 349 18 1420
OCCUPATION Yours: S/E
OCCUPATION Spouse's: S/E

FILING STATUS (Check Only One)

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Separate return of married person—Enter spouse's social security number and full name here ______
4 ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ______
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died 197__)

EXEMPTION CREDITS

6 Personal { If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 / If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50 }	6	50	00
7 Dependents — Do not list the person who qualifies you as head of household. ELISA THOMAS Total Number 2 × $8	7	16	00
8 Blind (see instructions) Number of blind exemptions ______ × $8	8		00
9 Total exemption credits (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20	9	66	00

10 **Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** { Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to face of this return. If unavailable, see instructions, Page 10 }	10	0
11 **Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	11	0
12 **Interest.** Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	12	5195
13 **Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 48)	13	2546
14 **Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	7741
15 **Adjustments to income** (from line 55)	15	0
16 **Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14)	16	7741

○ **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under $15,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.**

○ **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $15,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**

17 **Deductions: Itemized** (from line 63) **OR STANDARD** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked)	17	5686
18 **Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19	18	2055
19 **Tax from** (check one) ☐ Tax Table ☒ Tax Rate Schedule ☐ Income Averaging Schedule (G or G-1)	19	23
20 **Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	66
21 **Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	-0-
22 **Other credits** (from line 68—Including Special Low Income Tax Credit)	22	
23 **Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	-0-
24 **Other taxes** (from line 71)	24	
25 **Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-
26 **Total California income tax withheld** (attach W-2 or W-2P to face of this return)	26	0
27 **Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1976, complete Part 1 on page 2	27	0
28 **1976 California estimated tax payments**	28	
29 **Excess California SDI tax withheld** (see instructions)	29	
30 **Total Credits.**	30	-0-
31 If line 25 is larger than line 30, enter BALANCE DUE. If it is equal to line 30, enter zero. Mail return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95867 — PAY IN FULL →	31	-0-
32 If line 25 is smaller than line 30, enter amount OVERPAID	32	-0-
33 Amount of line 32 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU.** Allow at least six weeks. Mail return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, P.O. BOX 13-540, SACRAMENTO, CA 95813 →	33	-0-
34 Amount of line 32 to be credited on your 1977 ESTIMATED TAX	34	

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A
R

If you do **NOT** want State income tax forms and instructions mailed to you next year, check here ☐ *See Instructions, Page 9*

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.

SIGN HERE ▷ Your signature ______ Date ______
▷ Spouse's signature (if filing joint return) ______ Date ______

▷ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) 95 2141449 ______ Date ______
Address (and Zip code) ______

Write social security number on check or money order. ATTACH HERE ▷ ◁ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE

PART I – Renter's Credit – All questions must be answered

35	Did you, on March 1, 1976, live in rented property which was your principal residence?	☐ Yes	☑ No	If no, you may not claim this credit
36	Was the property you rented exempt from property tax?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, you may not claim this credit
37	Did you live with any other person who claimed you as a dependent for income tax purposes?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, you may not claim this credit
38	Did you or your spouse claim the homeowners' property tax exemption or receive public assistance?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, see page 3 of instructions

PART II – Other Income

39	Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C(540))	○	39	3546
40	Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D(540))	○	40	(1000)
41	Net gain (or loss) from supplemental schedule of gains and losses (attach Schedule D-1(540))	○	41	
42	Pensions and annuities (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	○	42	
43	Rents and royalties (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	○	43	
44	Partnerships (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	○	44	
45	Estates and trusts (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	○	45	
46	Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F(540))	○	46	
47	Miscellaneous income			
	(a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E(540)) 47a			
	(b) Alimony 47b			
	(c) Other (state nature and source) 47c			
	Enter total of lines 47(a), 47(b), and 47(c)	○	47	
48	Total (add lines 39 thru 47). Enter here and on line 13.		48	2546

PART III – Adjustments to Income

49	"Sick pay," if included in line 10 (see instructions - attach Form FTB 3805T)	○	49	
50	Moving expenses (see instructions - attach Form FTB 3805U)	○	50	
51	Employee business expenses (See instructions - attach Form FTB 3805N)	○	51	
52	Military exclusion (see instructions)	○	52	
53(a)	Payments to an individual retirement arrangement (attach FTB 3805P) 53a			
(b)	Payments to a Keogh (H.R. 10) retirement plan 53b			
(c)	Payments to a self-employed "Defined Benefit Plan" 53c			
	Enter total of lines 53(a), 53(b), and 53(c)	○	53	
54	Forfeited interest penalty (see instructions)	○	54	
55	Total adjustments (add lines 49 thru 54). Enter here and on line 15		55	

PART IV – Itemized Deductions

○ **Attach Schedule A(540) and enter sub-totals on lines 56 thru 62, below**

56	Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 10)	○	56	1941
57	Total taxes (from Schedule A(540), line 17)	○	57	1128
58	Total interest expense (from Schedule A(540), line 20)	○	58	2517
59	Total contributions (from Schedule A(540), line 24)	○	59	100
60	Total casualty loss (from Schedule A(540), line 29)	○	60	0
61	Total miscellaneous deductions (from Schedule A(540), line 33)	○	61	0
62	Total child care and adoption expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 37)	○	62	0
63	Total itemized deductions (add lines 56 thru 62). Enter here and on line 17		63	5686

PART V – Other Credits – SEE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH CREDIT CLAIMED BELOW

64	"Other State" net income tax credit (attach copy of other state return and Schedule S(540))	○	64	
65	Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R(540))	○	65	
66	Special low income tax credit (see special instructions)	○	66	
67	Solar energy tax credit (see special instructions)	○	67	
68	**TOTAL** (add lines 64 thru 67). Enter here and on line 22		68	

PART VI – Other Taxes

69	Tax on preference income (see instructions - attach Schedule P(540)	69	
70	Tax on premature distributions from attached Form FTB 3805P	70	
71	Total (add lines 69 and 70) enter here and on line 24	71	

PART VII – Reconciliation to Federal Return – If adjusted gross income on Federal Return is different from line 16, page 1, explain below.

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
1976
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 S+P Ruby

Social Security Number 322|72|7997

A

USE ONLY IF YOU DO NOT USE THE TAX TABLE OR TAKE THE STANDARD DEDUCTION

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care		
2. Medicine and drugs		
3. Enter 1% of line 16, Form 540		
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1		
6. Other medical and dental expenses:		
(a) Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.		
(b) Hospitals		
(c) Other (itemize) SCH		
7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)		
8. Enter 3% of line 16, Form 540		
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, line 56)		1941

Taxes

11. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)		
12. Real estate		
13. State and local gasoline		
14. General Sales		
15. Personal property (Boat and Aircraft)		
16. Other (itemize) SCH		
17. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 11 thru 16. Enter here and on Form 540, line 57)		1128

Interest Expense

18. Home mortgage		
19. Other (itemize) SCH		
20. **Total**—(Add lines 18 and 19. Enter here and on Form 540, line 58)		2517

Contributions

21(a). Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.		
(b). Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts SCH		
22. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement		
23. Carryover from 1974 & subsequent years – See instructions		
24. **Total**— (Add lines 21a thru 23. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, line 59)		100

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)

NOTE: If you had **more than one loss,** omit lines 25 through 28—See instructions for guidance

25. Loss before insurance reimbursement		
26. Insurance reimbursement		
27. Subtract line 26 from line 25, Enter difference (If less than zero, enter zero)		
28. Enter $100 or amount on line 27, whichever is smaller		
29. Casualty or theft loss (subtract line 28 from line 27. Enter here and on Form 540, line 60)		0

Miscellaneous Deductions

30. Alimony paid to:		
31. Employment Education Expense		
32. Union dues		
Other (itemize)		
33. **Total** (Add lines 30 through 32. Enter here and on Form 540, line 61)		0

Child Care and Adoption Expense

34. Child care expenses – Attach Form 3805X		
35. Total adoption expense		
Less 3% of line 16, Form 540		
36. Net adoption expenses – See instructions for maximum limitations		
37. Total child care and adoption expenses (add lines 34 and 36. Enter here and on Form 540, line 62)		0

SCHEDULE
B
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
DIVIDEND AND INTEREST INCOME
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
1976
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 S+P Ruby

Social Security Number 322-12-7997

B

PART I—DIVIDEND INCOME

Line 1—Gross Dividends and Other Distributions on Stock—If gross dividends and other distributions (including capital gain dividends) on stock were **$400 or less,** do not complete this part; but enter gross dividends (including capital gain distributions), less nontaxable portion, if any, on Form 540, page 1. Do NOT deduct the $100 federal exclusion.

"Capital gain dividends" are treated as ordinary dividends for State income tax purposes and **not** as capital gains as permitted under the federal law.

1. Gross dividends and other distributions on stock—List payers and amounts—Write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, jointly.	
2. Total dividends	
3. Nontaxable distributions	
4. Taxable dividends—Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter here and on line 11, form 540	

PART II—INTEREST INCOME

Interest on bonds, debentures, loans, notes, tax refunds and all types of savings accounts including banks, credit unions and postal savings is taxable.

Interest on the following obligations is exempt from tax:

(a) Bonds and other obligations (other than tax refunds) of the United States, the District of Columbia and territories of the United States. (Interest on Philippine Islands obligations issued on or after March 24, 1934 is not exempt.)

(b) Bonds (but not other obligations) of California and its political subdivisions issued after November 4, 1902.

(c) Interest on bonds of Alaska and Hawaii issued prior to their achieving statehood.

Note: If total taxable interest income was **$400 or less,** do not complete this part; but enter the total amount of interest received on Form 540, page 1.

1. Interest income—List payers and amounts	
NOTE ON WOODLEY BISTRO	4959
UAL	17
TRANS WORLD	11
✓ ✓	191
WORLD	17
2. Total interest income. Enter here and on line 12, Form 540	5195

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
1976
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR S + P. Ruby

Social Security Number 322-12-7997

A. Name and Address of Business
WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP, 16055 VENTURA BLVD ENCINO CA.

B. Federal Employer I.D. No. 95-2651578

C. Principal business activity (i.e., retail–hardware; wholesale–tobacco; services–legal; etc.) SERVICE - SNACK BAR

D. Indicate method of accounting: ☐ cash; ☒ accrual; ☐ other

E. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☒ YES ☐ NO

F. Method of inventory valuation ▶ COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?
☐ YES ☐ NO If "Yes," attach explanation.

C

		Balance ▶
1 Gross receipts, sales, or fees $ .... Less returns and allowances $		
2 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)		
3 Purchases $ .... Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $		
4 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5 Materials and supplies		
6 Other costs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
7 **Total of lines 2 thru 6**		
8 Inventory at end of this year		
9 Cost of goods sold (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10 Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
11 Other income (attach schedule)		
12 **Total income** (add lines 10 and 11)		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
13 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-1 or attach Schedule)		
14 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
15 Rent on business property		
16 Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
17 Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
18 Insurance		
19 Legal and professional fees		
20 Commissions		
21 Amortization (attach statement)		
22 Retirement plans, etc. (other than your share, see instructions)		
23 Interest on business indebtedness		
24 Bad debts arising from sales or services (Not applicable if reporting on cash basis)		
25 Depletion (attach schedule)		
26 Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
27 **Total of lines 13 thru 26**		
28 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 27 from line 12), Enter here and on Page 2, Form 540 or 540NR	Sch	3546

Schedule C-1 Depreciation Claimed on line 13.

Group and guideline class or description of property	Date Acquired	Cost or other basis	Depreciation allowed (or allowable) in prior years	Method of computing depreciation	Life or Rate	Depreciation for this year
			Sch			106

Schedule C-2 Explanation of Lines 6, 14, 16, and 26.

LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT	LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT

(Rev. 1975)

SCHEDULE F ON REVERSE

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1976
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR S&P Ruby

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

D

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (If not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1.					
2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 17, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)					
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries					
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3					

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

a. Kind of property and description	b. Date acquired	c. Date sold	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis	f. Gain or loss
5. INSTALLMENT SALE					5355
6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 19, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)					
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries					
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7 (If gain, see 540 instructions, line 24a (Preference Income))					5355

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

a. Kind of property and description	b. Date acquired	c. Date sold	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis	f. Gain or loss
9.					
10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 21, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)					
11. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries					
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11 (If gain, see 540 instructions, line 24a (Preference Income))					

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4	-0-	
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8	3481	
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12 1975	-0-	
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach computation)	(15042)	
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16		(1561)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR		
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of: (a) amount on lines 17; (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or (c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return)		(1000)

Form **1040** US **Department of the Treasury—Internal Revenue Service**
Individual Income Tax Return
1975

For the year January 1–December 31, 1975, or other taxable year beginning .... 1975, ending .... 19...

Name (If joint return, give first names and initials of both) SAMUEL & PHYLLIS — Last name RUBY

Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route) 16250 BIRCHER ST

City, town or post office, State and ZIP code GRANADA HILLS CA

Your social security number 322 12 7997

Spouse's social security no. 349 18 1420

Occupation — Yours ► S/E — Spouse's ► S/E

For Privacy Act Notification, see page 2 of Instructions.

For IRS use only

Requested by Census Bureau for Revenue Sharing

A In what city, town, village, etc., do you live? LOS ANGELES

B Do you live within the legal limits of the city, town, etc.? ☒ Yes ☐ No ☐ Don't know

C In what county and State do you live? County LOS ANGELES State CA

D In what township do you live? (See page 4.)

Filing Status

1 ☐ Single (check only ONE box)

2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)

3 ☐ Married filing separately. If spouse is also filing give spouse's social security number in designated space above and enter full name here

4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household (See page 5 of Instructions) ►

5 ☐ Qualifying widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died ► 19). See page 5 of Instructions.

Exemptions

6a Regular ☒ Yourself ☒ Spouse — Enter number of boxes checked ► 2

b First names of your dependent children who lived with you ELISA THOMAS — Enter number ► 2

c Number of other dependents (from line 27) ►

d Total (add lines 6a, b, and c) ► 4

e Age 65 or over ☐ Yourself ☐ Spouse — Blind ☐ Yourself ☐ Spouse — Enter number of boxes checked ►

7 Total (add lines 6d and e) ► 4

8 **Presidential Election Campaign Fund** ► Do you wish to designate $1 of your taxes for this fund? ☐ Yes ☐ No — If joint return, does your spouse wish to designate $1? ☐ Yes ☐ No

Note: If you check the "Yes" box(es) it will not increase your tax or reduce your refund.

Income

9	Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation (Attach Forms W-2. If unavailable, see page 3 of Instructions.)	9	-0-
10a	Dividends (See pages 7 and 14 of Instructions) $ 17, 10b Less exclusion $ 17, Balance ►	10c	-0-
	(If gross dividends and other distributions are over $400, list in Part I of Schedule B.)		
11	Interest income. [If $400 or less, enter total without listing in Schedule B; If over $400, enter total and list in Part II of Schedule B]	11	95
12	Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 36)	12	8872
13	Total (add lines 9, 10c, 11, and 12)	13	8967
14	Adjustments to income (such as "sick pay," moving expenses, etc. from line 42)	14	375
15	Subtract line 14 from line 13 (Adjusted Gross Income) (If less than $8,000, see page 8 of Instructions on "Earned Income Credit.")	15	8592

- If you do not itemize deductions and line 15 is under $15,000, find tax in Tables and enter on line 16a.
- If you itemize deductions or line 15 is $15,000 or more, go to line 43 to figure tax.
- **CAUTION.** If you have unearned income and can be claimed as a dependent on your parent's return, check here ► ☐ and see page 7 of Instructions.

Tax, Payments and Credits

16a	Tax, check if from: ☐ Tax Tables ☒ Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z ☐ Schedule D ☐ Schedule G OR ☐ Form 4726	16a	-0-
b	Credit for personal exemptions (multiply line 6d by $30)	b	120
c	Balance (subtract line 16b from line 16a)	c	-0-
17	Credits (from line 54)	17	
18	Balance (subtract line 17 from line 16c)	18	-0-
19	Other taxes (from line 63)	19	598
20	Total (add lines 18 and 19)	20	598

21a	Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2 or W-2P to front)	21a	-0-
b	1975 estimated tax payments (include amount allowed as credit from 1974 return)	b	800
c	Earned income credit	c	
d	Amount paid with Form 4868	d	
e	Other payments (from line 67)	e	

Pay amount on line 23 in full with this return. Write social security number on check or money order and make payable to Internal Revenue Service.

22	Total (add lines 21a through e)	22	800

Balance Due or Refund

23	If line 20 is larger than line 22, enter BALANCE DUE IRS ► (Check here ► ☐, if Form 2210, Form 2210F, or statement is attached. See page 8 of Instructions.)	23	
24	If line 22 is larger than line 20, enter amount OVERPAID ►	24	202
25	Amount of line 24 to be REFUNDED TO YOU ►	25	202
26	Amount of line 24 to be credited on 1976 estimated tax. ►	26	

If all of overpayment (line 24) is to be refunded (line 25), make no entry on line 26.

Please attach Copy B of Forms W-2 here

Please attach Check or Money Order here

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.

Sign here

► Your signature — Date

► Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

► Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) — Date

367-34-8729

Address (and ZIP Code)

16—82510—1

Other Dependents

(a) NAME	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year, write B or D.	(d) Did dependent have income of $750 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write ALL.	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

27 Total number of dependents listed in column (a). Enter here and on line 6c ▶

Part I Income other than Wages, Dividends, and Interest

28 Business income or (loss) (attach Schedule C)	28	7559	
29a Net gain or (loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D)	29a	(1000)	
29b 50% of capital gain distributions (not reported on Schedule D—see page 9 of Instructions)	29b		
30 Net gain or (loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Form 4797)	30	2313	
31a Pensions, annuities, rents, royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E)	31a		
31b Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E—see page 9 of Instructions)	31b		
32 Farm income or (loss) (attach Schedule F)	32		
33 State income tax refunds (does not apply if refund is for year in which you took the standard deduction—others see page 9 of Instructions)	33		
34 Alimony received	34		
35 Other (state nature and source—See page 9 of Instructions) ▶	35		
36 **Total** (add lines 28 through 35). Enter here and on line 12 ▶	36	8872	

Part II Adjustments to Income

37 "Sick pay." (attach Form 2440 or other required statement)	37		
38 Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	38		
39 Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or statement)	39		
40a Payments to a Keogh (H.R. 10) retirement plan	40a		
40b Payments to an individual retirement arrangement from attached Form 5329, Part III	40b	375	
41 Forfeited interest penalty for premature withdrawal—see page 10 of Instructions	41		
42 **Total** (add lines 37 through 41). Enter here and on line 14 ▶	42	375	

Part III Tax Computation (Do not use this part if you use the Tax Tables to find your tax.)

43 Adjusted gross income (from line 15)	43	8592	
44 (a) If you itemize deductions, check here ▶ ☐ and enter total from Schedule A, line 41 and attach Schedule A (b) If you do not itemize deductions and line 15 is $15,000 or more, check here ▶ ☐ and: If box on line 2 or 5 is checked, enter 16% of line 15 but not more than $2,600; if box on line 1 or 4 is checked, enter $2,300; if box on line 3 is checked, enter $1,300	44	5735	
45 Subtract line 44 from line 43	45	2857	
46 Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 7, by $750	46	3000	
47 **Taxable income.** Subtract line 46 from line 45	47	—0—	

(Figure your tax on the amount on line 47 by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z, or if applicable, the alternative tax from Schedule D, income averaging from Schedule G, or maximum tax from Form 4726.) Enter tax on line 16a.

Part IV Credits

48 Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R)	48		
49 Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	49		
50 Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	50		
51 Contributions to candidates for public office credit—see page 10 of Instructions	51		
52 Work Incentive (WIN) credit (attach Form 4874)	52		
53 Purchase of new principal residence credit (attach Form 5405)	53		
54 Total (add lines 48 through 53). Enter here and on line 17 ▶	54		

Part V Other Taxes

55 Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255) NOT USED	55	—0—	
56 Tax from recomputing prior-year Work Incentive (WIN) credit (attach Schedule)	56		
57 Minimum tax. Check here ▶ ☐, if Form 4625 is attached	57		
58 Tax on premature distributions from attached Form 5329, Part V	58		
59 Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE) (H) 408 (W) 190	59	598	
60 Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137)	60		
61 Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W–2)	61		
62 Excess contribution tax from attached Form 5329, Part IV	62		
63 **Total** (add lines 55 through 62). Enter here and on line 19 ▶	63	598	

Part VI Other Payments

64 Excess FICA, RRTA, or FICA/RRTA tax withheld (two or more employers—see page 10 of Instructions)	64		
65 Credit for Federal tax on special fuels, nonhighway gasoline and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	65		
66 Credit from a Regulated Investment Company (attach Form 2439)	66		
67 **Total** (add lines 64 through 66). Enter here and on line 21e ▶	67		

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975—O-575-050

Schedules A&B—Itemized Deductions AND Dividend and Interest Income

(Form 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

► Attach to Form 1040. ► See Instructions for Schedules A and B (Form 1040).

1975

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Your social security number: 322 12 7997

Schedule A—Itemized Deductions (Schedule B on back)

Medical and Dental Expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) (See page 11 of Instructions.)

1	**One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care. (Be sure to include in line 10 below)**	
2	Medicine and drugs	
3	Enter 1% of line 15, Form 1040	
4	Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	
5	Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	
6	Enter other medical and dental expenses:	
a	Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.	
b	Hospitals	
c	Other (itemize—include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, etc.) ► SCH	
7	Total (add lines 4 through 6c)	
8	Enter 3% of line 15, Form 1040	
9	Subtract line 8 from line 7 (if less than zero, enter zero)	
10	**Total (add lines 1 and 9).** Enter here and on line 35 ►	1521

Taxes (See page 11 of Instructions.)

11	State and local income	
12	Real estate	
13	State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)	
14	General sales (see sales tax tables)	
15	Personal property	
16	Other (itemize) ► SCH	
17	**Total (add lines 11 through 16).** Enter here and on line 36 ►	1207

Interest Expense (See page 12 of Instructions.)

18	Home mortgage	
19	Other (itemize) ► SCH	
20	**Total (add lines 18 and 19).** Enter here and on line 37 ►	2857

Contributions (See page 12 of Instructions for examples.)

21 a	Cash contributions for which you have receipts, cancelled checks or other written evidence	
b	Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts. ► SCH	
22	Other than cash (see page 12 of instructions for required statement)	
23	Carryover from prior years	
24	**Total contributions (add lines 21a through 23).** Enter here and on line 38 ►	150

Casualty or Theft Loss(es) (See page 13 of Instructions.)
Note: *If you had* **more than one loss,** *omit lines 25 through 28 and see page 13 of Instructions for guidance.*

25	Loss before insurance reimbursement	
26	Insurance reimbursement	
27	Subtract line 26 from line 25. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	
28	Enter $100 or amount on line 27, whichever is smaller	
29	**Casualty or theft loss (subtract line 28 from line 27).** Enter here and on line 39 ►	

Miscellaneous Deductions (See page 13 of Instructions.)

30	Alimony paid	
31	Union dues	
32	Expenses for child and dependent care services (attach Form 2441)	
33	Other (itemize) ►	
34	**Total (add lines 30 through 33).** Enter here and on line 40 ►	

Summary of Itemized Deductions **A**

35	Total medical and dental—line 10	1521
36	Total taxes—line 17	1207
37	Total interest—line 20	2857
38	Total contributions—line 24	150
39	Casualty or theft loss(es)—line 29	
40	Total miscellaneous—line 34	
41	**Total deductions (add lines 35 through 40).** Enter here and on Form 1040, line 44 ►	5735

16—82507-1

SCHEDULE C
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Profit or (Loss) From Business or Profession

(Sole Proprietorship)
Partnerships, Joint Ventures, etc., Must File Form 1065.
► Attach to Form 1040. ► See Instructions for Schedule C (Form 1040).

1975

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY
Social security number 322 12 2997

A Principal business activity (see Schedule C Instructions) ► SERVICE product ► SNACK BAR
B Business name ► WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEESHOP Employer identification number ► 95-2651578
D Business address (number and street) ► 16055 VENTURA BLVD
City, State and ZIP code ► ENCINO CA 91316

C

E Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☐ Cash (2) ☒ Accrual (3) ☐ Other ►

		Yes	No
F	Were you required to file Form W-3 or Form 1096 for 1975? (see Schedule C Instructions)	✓	
	If "Yes," where filed ►	▨	▨
G	Was an Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 941, filed for this business for any quarter in 1975?	✓	
H	Method of inventory valuation ► Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? (If "Yes," attach explanation)		✓

Income

1	Gross receipts or sales $ Less: returns and allowances $ **Balance ►**	1	
2	Less: Cost of goods sold and/or operations (Schedule C-1, line 8)	2	
3	Gross profit	3	
4	Other income (attach schedule)	4	
5	**Total income** (add lines 3 and 4)	5	

Deductions

6	Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-3)	6	
7	Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2)	7	
8	Rent on business property	8	
9	Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2)	9	
10	Salaries and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	10	
11	Insurance	11	
12	Legal and professional fees	12	
13	Commissions	13	
14	Amortization (attach statement)	14	
15	(a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Schedule C Instructions)	15(a)	
	(b) Employee benefit programs (see Schedule C Instructions)	(b)	
16	Interest on business indebtedness	16	
17	Bad debts arising from sales or services	17	
18	Depletion	18	
19	Other business expenses (specify):		

(a)		
(b)		
(c)		
(d)		
(e)		
(f)	(H)	5159
(g)	SCH	
(h)		
(i)	(W)	2400
(j)		

	(k) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(j))	19(k)	
20	**Total deductions** (add lines 6 through 19(k)) TOTAL	20	
21	Net profit or (loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 28. **ALSO** enter on Schedule SE, line 5(a)	21	7559

SCHEDULE C-1.—Cost of Goods Sold and/or Operations (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 2)

1	Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)	1	
2	Purchases $ Less: cost of items withdrawn for personal use $ **Balance ►**	2	
3	Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)	3	
4	Materials and supplies	4	
5	Other costs (attach schedule)	5	
6	Total of lines 1 through 5	6	
7	Less: Inventory at end of year	7	
8	Cost of goods sold and/or operations. Enter here and on line 2 above	8	

16—82517-1

SCHEDULE C–2.—Explanation of Lines 7 and 9

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE C–3.—Depreciation (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 6) If you need more space, you may use Form 4562.

Note: If depreciation is computed by using the Class Life (ADR) System for assets placed in service after December 31, 1970, or the Guideline Class Life System for assets placed in service before January 1, 1971, you must file Form 4832 (Class Life (ADR) System) or Form 5006 (Guideline Class Life System). Except as otherwise expressly provided in income tax regulations sections 1.167(a)–11(b)(5)(vi) and 1.167(a)–12, the provisions of Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 are not applicable for taxable years ending after December 31, 1970. (See Publication 534.)

Check box if you made an election this taxable year to use ☐ Class Life (ADR) System and/or ☐ Guideline Class Life System.

a. Group and guideline class or description of property	b. Date acquired	c. Cost or other basis	d. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	e. Method of computing depreciation	f. Life or rate	g. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below) →						
2 Depreciation from Form 4832	(See Note above)		▨	▨	▨	
3 Depreciation from Form 5006			▨	▨	▨	
4 Other depreciation:						
Buildings						
Furniture and fixtures						
Transportation equipment						
Machinery and other equipment						
Other (specify)						
5 Totals			SCH			
6 Less amount of depreciation claimed in Schedule C–1, page 1						
7 Balance—Enter here and on page 1, line 6						974

SCHEDULE C–4.—Expense Account Information (See Schedule C Instructions for Schedule C–4)

Enter information with regard to yourself and your five highest paid employees. In determining the five highest paid employees, expense account allowances must be added to their salaries and wages. However, the information need not be submitted for any employee for whom the combined amount is less than $25,000, or for yourself if your expense account allowance plus line 21, page 1, is less than $25,000.

Name	Expense account	Salaries and Wages
Owner		▨
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(3) Employees' families at conventions or meetings? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(4) Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W–2? ☐ Yes ☒ No

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975—O 575-053 16—82517-1

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Gains and Losses

(Examples of property to be reported on this Schedule are gains and losses on stocks, bonds, and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.)
► Attach to Form 1040. ► See Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040).

1975

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social security number: 322 12 7997

D

Part I Short-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held Not More Than 6 Months

	a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (Mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (Mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted (see instruction F) and expense of sale	f. Gain or (loss) (d less e)
1						

2	Enter your share of net short-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	2	
3	Enter net gain or (loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3	
4(a)	Short-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction I)	4(a)	( )
(b)	Short-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction I)	(b)	(1741)
5	Net short-term gain or (loss), combine lines 3, 4(a) and (b)	5	(1741)

Part II Long-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held More Than 6 Months

	a. Kind of property and description	b. Date acquired	c. Date sold	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis	f. Gain or (loss)
6						

7	Capital gain distributions	7	
8	Enter gain, if applicable, from Form 4797, line 4(a)(1) (see Instruction A)	8	5105
9	Enter your share of net long-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	9	
10	Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	10	
11	Net gain or (loss), combine lines 6 through 10	11	5105
12(a)	Long-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction I)	12(a)	(13322)
(b)	Long-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction I)	(b)	(5839)
13	Net long-term gain or (loss), combine lines 11, 12(a) and (b)	13	(14056)

Part III Summary of Parts I and II

14	Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain or (loss) here	14	(15797)
15	**If line 14 shows a gain—** (a) Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part VI for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13	15(a)	
	(b) Subtract line 15(a) from line 14. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 29a	(b)	
16	**If line 14 shows a loss—** ► If losses are shown on BOTH lines 12(a) and 13, omit lines 16(a) and (b) and go to Part IV (see Instruction J). ► Otherwise, (a) Enter one of the following amounts: (i) If amount on line 5 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of amount on line 14; (ii) If amount on line 13 is zero or a net gain, enter amount on line 14; or, (iii) If amounts on line 5 and line 13 are net losses, enter amount on line 5 added to 50% of amount on line 13	16(a)	
	(b) Enter here and enter as a (loss) on Form 1040, line 29a, the smallest of: (i) The amount on line 16(a); (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—if a loss is shown on line 4(a) or 12(a), see instruction N for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or, (iii) Taxable income, as adjusted (see Instruction M)	(b)	(1000)

16—82511-1

Part IV Capital Loss Limitation—Where Losses Are Shown on Both Lines 12(a) AND 13

17 Enter loss from line 5; if line 5 is zero or a gain, enter a zero			17	(1741)
18 Enter loss from line 13			18	(14056)
19 Enter gain, if any, from line 5; if line 5 is zero or a loss, enter a zero			19	-0-
20 Reduce loss on line 18 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 19			20	(14056)
21 Combine lines 3 and 11 and if gain, enter gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero	21	5105		
Note: If the entry on line 21 is zero, OMIT lines 22 through 28, and enter on line 29 the loss shown on line 12(a).				
22 Enter gain, if any, from line 11	22	5105		
23 Enter smaller of amount on line 21 or line 22	23	5105		
24 Enter excess of gain on line 21 over amount on line 23	24	-0-		
25 Enter loss from line 4(a); if line 4(a) is blank, enter a zero	25	-0-		
26 Reduce gain, if any, on line 24 to the extent of loss, if any, on line 25 (see Instruction K)	26	-0-		
27 Enter loss from line 12(a)	27	(13322)		
28 Add the gain(s) on line(s) 23 and 26	28	5105		
29 Reduce the loss on line 27 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 28 (see Instruction L)			29	(8217)
30 Enter smaller of amount on line 29 or line 20 (if line 29 is zero, enter a zero)			30	(8217)
31 Subtract amount on line 30 from the loss on line 20			31	(5839)
32 Enter 50% of the amount on line 31			32	(2920)
33 Add lines 17, 30, and 32			33	(12878)
34 Enter here and enter as a (loss) on Form 1040, line 29a, the smallest of: (a) Amount on line 33; (b) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—see Instruction N for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or, (c) Taxable Income, as adjusted (see Instruction M)			34	(1000)

Part V Complete Part V if You are Married Filing a Separate Return and Losses are Shown on Lines 4(a) and 14 (See Instruction N)

35 Combine lines 3 and 11 and if gain, enter gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero	35	
Note: *If the entry on line 35 is zero, OMIT lines 36 through 42, and enter on line 43 the loss shown on line 4(a).*		
36 Enter gain, if any, from line 3	36	
37 Enter smaller of amount on line 35 or line 36	37	
38 Enter excess of gain on line 35 over amount on line 37	38	
39 Enter loss from line 12(a); if line 12(a) is blank, enter a zero	39	
40 Reduce the gain, if any, on line 38 to the extent of the loss, if any, on line 39 (see Instruction K)	40	
41 Enter loss from line 4(a)	41	
42 Add the gain(s) on line(s) 37 and 40	42	
43 Reduce the loss on line 41 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 42 (see Instruction L)	43	

Part VI Computation of Alternative Tax (See Instruction W to See if the Alternative Tax Will Benefit You)

44 Enter amount from Form 1040, line 47	44	
45 Enter amount from line 15(a)	45	
46 Subtract amount on line 45 from amount on line 44 (but not less than zero)	46	
47 Enter smaller of amount on line 13 or line 14 **If line 47 does not exceed $50,000 ($25,000 if married filing separately), check here ▶ ☐ and omit lines 48 through 54.**	47	
48 Enter your share of certain long-term gains from partnerships, fiduciaries, and small business corporations referred to as "certain subsection (d) gains" (see Instruction W)	48	
49 Enter amount from line 48 or $50,000 ($25,000 if married filing separately), whichever is larger **If line 49 is equal to or greater than line 47, check here ▶ ☐ and omit lines 50 through 54.**	49	
50 Multiply amount on line 49 by 50%	50	
51 Add amounts on lines 46 and 50	51	
52 Tax on line 44 or 45, whichever is greater (use Tax Rate Schedule in instructions)	52	
53 Tax on the amount on line 51 (use Tax Rate Schedule in instructions)	53	
54 Subtract amount on line 53 from amount on line 52	54	
55 Tax on the amount on line 46 (use Tax Rate Schedule in instructions)	55	
56 If the block on line 47 or 49 is checked, enter 50% of line 45; otherwise enter 25% of line 49	56	
57 Alternative Tax—add amounts on lines 54 (if applicable), 55, and 56. If smaller than the tax figured on the amount on Form 1040, line 47, enter this alternative tax on Form 1040, line 16a	57	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975—O-575-054

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE. ▶ Attach to Form 1040.
▶ See Earned Income Credit Instructions on page 8 and Instructions for Schedule SE (Form 1040).

1975

- If you had wages, including tips, of $14,100 or more that were subject to social security or railroad retirement taxes, do not fill in this schedule unless you are eligible for the Earned Income Credit. See Instructions.
- If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD): SAMUEL RUBY
Social security number of self-employed person ▶ 322 12 7997
Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶ SNACKBAR

- If you have only farm income complete Parts I and III.
- If you have only nonfarm income complete Parts II and III.
- If you have both farm and nonfarm income complete Parts I, II, and III.

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

You may elect to compute your net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD, line 3, instead of using the Regular Method, line 2, if your gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. However, lines 1 and 2 must be completed even if you elect to use the FARM OPTIONAL METHOD.

REGULAR METHOD 1 Net profit or (loss) from:	(a) Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 74 (accrual method)	—	
	(b) Farm partnerships		
2	Net earnings from farm self-employment (add lines 1(a) and (b))		
FARM OPTIONAL METHOD 3 If gross profits from farming [1] are:	(a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits		
	(b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600		
4	Enter here and on line 12(a), the amount on line 2, or line 3 if you elect the farm optional method		

[1] Gross profits from farming are the total gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 72 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profits from farm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 14) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from NONFARM Self-Employment

REGULAR METHOD 5 Net profit or (loss) from:	(a) Schedule C, line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	5159	
	(b) Partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)		
	(c) Service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. (Include rental value of parsonage or rental allowance furnished.) If you filed Form 4361, check here ▶ ☐ and enter zero on this line		
	(d) Service with a foreign government or international organization		
	(e) Other (See Form 1040 instructions for line 35.) Specify ▶		
6	Total (add lines 5(a) through (e))	5159	
7	Enter adjustments if any (attach statement)		
8	Adjusted net earnings or (loss) from nonfarm self-employment (line 6, as adjusted by line 7)	5159	

If line 8 is $1,600 or more OR if you do not elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method, omit lines 9 through 11 and enter amount from line 8 on line 12(b), Part III.

Note: *You may use the nonfarm optional method (line 9 through line 11) only if line 8 is less than $1,600 and less than two-thirds of your gross nonfarm profits,[2] and you had actual net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more for at least 2 of the 3 following years: 1972, 1973, and 1974. The nonfarm optional method can only be used for 5 taxable years.*

SE

NONFARM OPTIONAL METHOD

9	(a) Maximum amount reportable, under both optional methods combined (farm and nonfarm)	$1,600	00
	(b) Enter amount from line 3. (If you did not elect to use the farm optional method, enter zero.)		
	(c) Balance (subtract line 9(b) from line 9(a))		
10	Enter two-thirds of gross nonfarm profits [2] or $1,600, whichever is smaller		
11	Enter here and on line 12(b), the amount on line 9(c) or line 10, whichever is smaller		

[2] Gross profits from nonfarm business are the total of the gross profits from Schedule C, line 3; plus the distributive share of gross profits from nonfarm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 14) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE. Also, include gross profits from services reported on lines 5(c), (d), and (e), as adjusted by line 7.

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

12	Net earnings or (loss): (a) From farming (from line 4)		
	(b) From nonfarm (from line 8, or line 11 if you elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method)	5159	
13	Total net earnings or (loss) from self-employment reported on line 12. (**If Line 13 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of schedule.**)	5159	
14	The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security or railroad retirement taxes for 1975 is	$14,100	00
15	(a) Total "FICA" wages and "RRTA" compensation		
	(b) Unreported tips subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9 or to RRTA		
	(c) Total of lines 15(a) and (b)	-0-	
16	Balance (subtract line 15(c) from line 14)	14100	
17	Self-employment income—line 13 or 16, whichever is smaller	5159	
18	Self-employment tax. (If line 17 is $14,100.00, enter $1,113.90; if less, multiply the amount on line 17 by .079.) Enter here and on Form 1040, line 59	408	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975—O-575-058

16—82518-3

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE. ▶ Attach to Form 1040.
▶ See Earned Income Credit Instructions on page 8 and Instructions for Schedule SE (Form 1040).

1975

- If you had wages, including tips, of $14,100 or more that were subject to social security or railroad retirement taxes, do not fill in this schedule unless you are eligible for the Earned Income Credit. See Instructions.
- If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD) PHYLLIS RUBY

Social security number of self-employed person ▶ 349 18 1920

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶ SNACK BAR

- If you have only farm income complete Parts I and III.
- If you have only nonfarm income complete Parts II and III.
- If you have both farm and nonfarm income complete Parts I, II, and III.

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

You may elect to compute your net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD, line 3, instead of using the Regular Method, line 2, if your gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. However, lines 1 and 2 must be completed even if you elect to use the FARM OPTIONAL METHOD.

REGULAR METHOD 1 Net profit or (loss) from: (a) Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 74 (accrual method)		
(b) Farm partnerships		
2 Net earnings from farm self-employment (add lines 1(a) and (b))		
FARM OPTIONAL METHOD 3 If gross profits from farming [1] are: (a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits		
(b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600		
4 Enter here and on line 12(a), the amount on line 2, or line 3 if you elect the farm optional method		

[1] Gross profits from farming are the total gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 72 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profits from farm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 14) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from NONFARM Self-Employment

REGULAR METHOD 5 Net profit or (loss) from: (a) Schedule C, line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	2400	
(b) Partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)		
(c) Service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. (Include rental value of parsonage or rental allowance furnished.) If you filed Form 4361, check here ▶ ☐ and enter zero on this line		
(d) Service with a foreign government or international organization		
(e) Other (See Form 1040 instructions for line 35.) Specify ▶		
6 Total (add lines 5(a) through (e))	2400	
7 Enter adjustments if any (attach statement)		
8 Adjusted net earnings or (loss) from nonfarm self-employment (line 6, as adjusted by line 7)	2400	

If line 8 is $1,600 or more OR if you do not elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method, omit lines 9 through 11 and enter amount from line 8 on line 12(b), Part III.

Note: *You may use the nonfarm optional method (line 9 through line 11) only if line 8 is less than $1,600 and less than two-thirds of your gross nonfarm profits,[2] and you had actual net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more for at least 2 of the 3 following years: 1972, 1973, and 1974. The nonfarm optional method can only be used for 5 taxable years.*

SE

NONFARM OPTIONAL METHOD 9 (a) Maximum amount reportable, under both optional methods combined (farm and nonfarm)	$1,600	00
(b) Enter amount from line 3. (If you did not elect to use the farm optional method, enter zero.)		
(c) Balance (subtract line 9(b) from line 9(a))		
10 Enter two-thirds of gross nonfarm profits [2] or $1,600, whichever is smaller		
11 Enter here and on line 12(b), the amount on line 9(c) or line 10, whichever is smaller		

[2] Gross profits from nonfarm business are the total of the gross profits from Schedule C, line 3, plus the distributive share of gross profits from nonfarm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 14) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE. Also, include gross profits from services reported on lines 5(c), (d), and (e), as adjusted by line 7.

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

12 Net earnings or (loss): (a) From farming (from line 4)			
(b) From nonfarm (from line 8, or line 11 if you elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method)		2400	
13 Total net earnings or (loss) from self-employment reported on line 12. **(If Line 13 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of schedule.)**		2400	
14 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security or railroad retirement taxes for 1975 is		$14,100	00
15 (a) Total "FICA" wages and "RRTA" compensation			
(b) Unreported tips subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9 or to RRTA			
(c) Total of lines 15(a) and (b)		-0-	
16 Balance (subtract line 15(c) from line 14)		14100	
17 Self-employment income—line 13 or 16, whichever is smaller		2400	
18 Self-employment tax. (If line 17 is $14,100.00, enter $1,113.90; if less, multiply the amount on line 17 by .079.) Enter here and on Form 1040, line 59		190	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975—O-575-058

10—82518-3

Form **4797**

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses

Sales, Exchanges and Involuntary Conversions under Sections 1231, 1245, 1250, 1251, and 1252

To be filed with Form 1040, 1041, 1065, 1120, etc.—See Separate Instructions

1975

Name(s) as shown on return: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Identifying number: 322-12-7997

Part I Sales or Exchanges of Property Used in Trade or Business, and Involuntary Conversions (Section 1231)

SECTION A.—Involuntary Conversions Due to Casualty and Theft (See Instruction E)

	a. Kind of property (if necessary, attach additional descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain or (loss) (d plus e less f)
1							

2 Combine the amounts on line 1. Enter here, and on the appropriate line as follows . . . .

(a) For all except partnership returns:

(1) If line 2 is zero or a gain, enter such amount in column g, line 3.

(2) If line 2 is a loss, enter the loss on line 5.

(b) For partnership returns: Enter the amount shown on line 2 above, on Schedule K (Form 1065), line 6.

SECTION B.—Sales or Exchanges of Property Used in Trade or Business and Certain Involuntary Conversions (Not Reportable in Section A) (See Instruction E)

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.
3	LINE 22						5105

4 Combine the amounts on line 3. Enter here, and on the appropriate line as follows 5105

(a) For all except partnership returns:

(1) If line 4 is a gain, enter such gain as a long-term capital gain on Schedule D (Form 1040, 1120, etc.) that is being filed. See instruction E.

(2) If line 4 is zero or a loss, enter such amount on line 6.

(b) For partnership returns: Enter the amount shown on line 4 above, on Schedule K (Form 1065), line 7.

Part II Ordinary Gains and Losses

	a. Kind of property (if necessary, attach additional descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain or (loss) (d plus e less f)
5	Amount, if any, from line 2(a)(2)						
6	Amount, if any, from line 4(a)(2)						
7	Gain, if any, from page 2, line 21						2313.
8							

9 Combine amounts on lines 5 through 8. Enter here, and on the appropriate line as follows . . . . 2313.

(a) For all except individual returns: Enter the gain or (loss) shown on line 9, on the line provided for on the return (Form 1120, etc.) being filed. See instruction F for specific line reference.

(b) For individual returns:

(1) If the gain or (loss) on line 9, includes losses which are to be treated as an itemized deduction on Schedule A (Form 1040) (see instruction F), enter the total of such loss(es) here and include on Schedule A (Form 1040), line 29—identify as "loss from Form 4797, line 9(b)(1)" . . . . 2313.

(2) Redetermine the gain or (loss) on line 9, excluding the loss (if any) entered on line 9(b)(1). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 30

16—82504-1

Form **4797** (1975)

Part III Gain From Disposition of Property Under Sections 1245, 1250, 1251, 1252—Assets Held More than Six Months (See Separate Instructions)

Disregard lines 18 and 19 if there are no dispositions of farm property or farmland, or if this form is filed by a partnership.

10 Description of sections 1245, 1250, 1251, and 1252 property:	Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	Date sold (mo., day, yr.)
(A) WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEESHOP	2/1/74	9/2/75
(B)		
(C)		
(D)		
(E)		

Relate lines 10(A) through 10(E) to these columns ► ► ► ►	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)	Property (E)
11 Gross sales price	INSTALLMENT SALE				
12 Cost or other basis and expense of sale					
13 Depreciation allowed (or allowable)					
14 Adjusted basis, line 12 less line 13					
15 Total gain, line 11 less line 14					
16 If section 1245 property:					
(a) Depreciation allowed (or allowable) after applicable date (see instructions)					
(b) Enter smaller of line 15 or 16(a)					
17 If section 1250 property:					
(a) Enter additional depreciation after 12/31/63 and before 1/1/70					
(b) Enter additional depreciation after 12/31/69					
(c) Enter smaller of line 15 or 17(b)					
(d) Line 17(c) times applicable percentage (see instruction G.4)					
(e) Enter any excess of line 15 over line 17(b)					
(f) Enter smaller of line 17(a) or 17(e)					
(g) Line 17(f) times applicable percentage (see instruction G.4)					
(h) Add lines 17(d) and 17(g)					
18 If section 1251 property:					
(a) If farmland, enter soil, water, and land clearing expenses for current year and the four preceding years					
(b) If farm property other than land, subtract line 16(b) from line 15; OR, if farmland, enter smaller of line 15 or 18(a) (see instruction G.5)					
(c) Excess deductions account (see instruction G.5)					
(d) Enter smaller of line 18(b) or 18(c)					
19 If section 1252 property:					
(a) Enter soil, water, and land clearing expenses made after 12/31/69					
(b) Enter amount from line 18(d), if none enter a zero					
(c) Enter any excess of line 19(a) over line 19(b)					
(d) Line 19(c) times applicable percentage (see instruction G.5)					
(e) Line 15 less line 19(b)					
(f) Enter smaller of line 19(d) or 19(e)					

Summary of Part III Gains (Complete Property columns (A) through (E) through line 19(f) before going to line 20)

20 Total gains for all properties (add columns (A) through (E), line 15)	7418
21 Add columns (A) through (E), lines 16(b), 17(h), 18(d), and 19(f). Enter here and on line 7	2313
22 Subtract line 21 from line 20. Enter here and in appropriate Section in Part I (see instructions E and G.2)	5105

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1975—O-575-158

Form **4798**
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Loss Carryover

▶ (From 1974 to 1975)
▶ Attach to Form 1040.

1975

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel & Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number: 322 12 7997

A. Who Should File.—You will need to complete either Part I or Part II of this form if you have a capital loss to carry over to 1975.

You will have a capital loss to carry to 1975 if the amount on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 16(a), or line 33, is **LARGER THAN** the loss deducted on your 1974 Form 1040, line 29.

B. How to Compute Carryover.—If you have a capital loss carryover, complete either Part I or Part II of this form, but do not complete both.

1. Complete only Part I if lines 4(a) and 12(a) on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040) **DO NOT SHOW A LOSS.**

2. Complete only Part II if either (or both) line 4(a) or line 12(a) on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040) shows a loss.

Part I Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers

Section A.—Short-term Capital Loss Carryover

1	Enter loss shown on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 6—then go to line 7	1	
2	Enter gain shown on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	2	
3	Reduce any loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2	3	
4	Enter amount shown on your 1974 Form 1040, line 29	4	
5	Enter smaller of line 3 or 4	5	
6	Excess of amount on line 3 over amount on line 5	6	

Note: *The amount on line 6 is your short-term capital loss carryover from 1974 to 1975 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(b).*

Section B.—Long-term Capital Loss Carryover

7	Line 4 less line 5 (Note: If you ignored lines 2 through 6, enter amount from your 1974 Form 1040, line 29)	7	—0—
8	Enter loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 9 through 12	8	
9	Enter gain shown on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	9	
10	Reduce any loss on line 8 to the extent of any gain on line 9	10	
11	Multiply amount on line 7 by 2	11	
12	Excess of amount on line 10 over amount on line 11	12	

Note: *The amount on line 12 is your long-term capital loss carryover from 1974 to 1975 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(b).*

Part II Pre-1970 and Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers

Section A.—Short-term Capital Losses Identified

1	Enter loss shown on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 20—then go to line 21			1	(2741)
2	Enter gain shown on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss enter a zero			2	-0-
3	Reduce loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2			3	(2741)
	Note: *If line 4(a) on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040) is blank, IGNORE lines 4 through 11, enter a zero on line 12—then go to line 13.*				
4	Combine lines 3 and 11 on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040). Enter the gain; or if zero or a loss, enter a zero	4	(-0-)		
	Note: *If line 4 is zero IGNORE lines 5 through 11, enter on line 12 the loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a)—then go to line 13.*				
5	Enter any gain from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 3	5	-0-		
6	Enter smaller of line 4 or 5	6	-0-		
7	Enter excess of gain on line 4 over line 6	7	-0-		
8	Enter loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(a); otherwise, enter a zero	8	(13322)		
9	Reduce any gain on line 7 to the extent of any loss on line 8	9	(13322)		
10	Enter loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a); otherwise enter a zero	10	-0-		
11	Add the gains on lines 6 and 9	11	-0-		
12	Reduce the loss on line 10 to the extent of any gain on line 11			12	—
13	Pre-1970 short-term capital loss (Enter smaller of line 3 or 12)			13	-0-
14	Short-term capital loss attributable to years beginning after 1969 (excess of line 3 over line 13)			14	(2741)

Section B.—Computation of Capital Loss Carryovers to 1975

15	Enter any loss from line 13, above	15	-0-		
16	Enter loss deducted on your 1974 Form 1040, line 29	16	1000		
17	Loss carryover to 1975 (excess of line 15 over line 16—if line 15 does not exceed line 16, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a)			17	1000
18	Enter any loss from line 14, above	18	(2741)		
19	Enter excess of line 16 over line 15—if line 16 does not exceed line 15, enter zero	19	1000		
20	Loss carryover to 1975 (excess of line 18 over line 19—if line 18 does not exceed line 19, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(b)			20	(1741)
21	If you were required to complete Part IV of your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), enter any loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 30; otherwise, enter zero	21	(13322)		
22	Enter excess of line 19 over line 18—if line 19 does not exceed line 18, enter zero. (**Note:** *If you ignored lines 2 through 20 above, enter amount from your 1974 Form 1040, line 29.*)	22	-0-		
23	Loss carryover to 1975 (excess of line 21 over line 22—if line 21 does not exceed line 22, enter zero). Enter here and on 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(a)			23	(13322)
24	If you were required to complete Part IV of your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), enter any loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 31. However, if Part IV was not required, enter any loss from your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13	24	(5839)		
25	Enter excess of line 22 over line 21 .... x 2 (if line 22 does not exceed line 21, enter zero.)	25	-0-		
26	Loss carryover to 1975 (excess of line 24 over line 25—if line 24 does not exceed line 25, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1975 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(b)			26	(5839)

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY CALENDAR YEAR 19 75

ADDRESS 322-12-7997 SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		682
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		877
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES	1629	1629
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.	270	258
9	1359	1371
I +:½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.	150	150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▶	1509	1521
TAXES		
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME	-0-	~~8~~
12 REAL ESTATE		932
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		205
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		22
16 SALES TAX AUTO		-0-
17 TOTAL TAXES ▶	1207	1207
INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)		
18 MORTGAGE		2519
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS MISC		50
TRANSWORLD		186
SBA		7
FEDCO		100
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▶	2857	2857

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21a CASH CONTRIBUTIONS		
21b PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		150
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▶	150	150
CASUALTY OR THEFT (LOSS(ES)		
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▶		
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS		
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
33 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
AUTO USE/DAMAGE		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS.(Sched		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▶		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (From LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▶	5723	5735

REMARKS

PSI Professional Stationers, Inc.
7340 Laurel Canyon Boulevard
North Hollywood, California 91605

Form 101

SCHEDULE

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. ______ CALENDAR YEAR 19 75

ADDRESS 322-12-7997 FISCAL YEAR ENDING

______ 19___

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		48924
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	800	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	24031.	
TOTAL	24831	
LESS INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	-0-	24831
GROSS PROFIT		24093
GROSS INCOME		24093
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	99	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE	1800	
BAD DEBTS		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE BELOW)	974	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS	126	
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	285	
INTEREST	1107	
JANITOR AND HAULING		
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	150	
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE		
RENT	4151	
REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE	625	
SALARIES AND WAGES	5632	
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	240	
TAXES PAYROLL	575	
TELEPHONE AND UTILITIES	168	
LINEN	158	
CONTRACT LABOR	444	
		16534
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) FEDERAL RETURN		7559
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) STATE RETURN - SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.	(H) 5159 (W) 2400	

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION

NO.	KIND AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED	METH.	YEARS OR %	COST OR OTHER BASIS		PRIOR DEPREC.	DEPRECIATION THIS YEAR
	EQUIPMENT	2/1/74	S.L	7YR	10228		1339	974
	GOODWILL	2/1/74			35000		-0-	-0-

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC FORM 104A
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE ______

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. or SOC. SEC. NO. ____ Calendar Yr: 1975
F/Y/E 19__

GAINS ON INSTALLMENT SALES

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY COFFEE SHOP
DATE ACQUIRED 2/1/74 DATE SOLD 9/2/75

TYPE OF ASSET :	CAPITAL	SEC. 1245	SEC. 1250
1. SELLING PRICE: CASH	$	$20148	$
2. NOTES		48152	
3. MORTGAGE TRANSFERRED			
4. OTHER			
5. GROSS SALES PRICE (1+2+3+4)		68300	
6. COST OR BASIS	$	$45228	$
7. LESS ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION			
8. PRIOR TO 1-1-62			
9. PRIOR TO 1-1-64			
10. AFTER 12-31-61		2313	
11. ST. LINE AFTER 12-31-63			
12. EXCESS OVER S/L 1-64/12-69			
13. EXCESS OVER S/L AFTER 12-31-69			
14. ADJUSTED BASIS (6-7 THRU 13)		42915	
15. EXPENSES OF SALE		238	
16. TOTAL ADJUSTED BASIS (14 + 15)		43153	
17. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT (5 - 16)	$		
18. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT - ORDINARY		$ 2313	$
19. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT - OTHER		$22834	$
20. CONTRACT PRICE (1 + 2 + 4)	$	$68300	$
21. GROSS PROFIT %	%	36.82%	%
22. PAYMENTS RECEIVED YEAR OF SALE			
23. CASH (1)		20148	
24. PRINCIPAL COLLECTIONS		-0-	
25. EXCESS MORTGAGE OVER BASIS		-0-	
26. OTHER (4)		-0-	
27. TOTAL PAYMENTS (23 THRU 26)		20148	
28. RECOGNIZED GAIN			
29. RECOGNIZED GAIN - ORDINARY		2313	
30. RECOGNIZED GAIN - OTHER		5105	

TAX-ABLE YR.	TOTAL PAYMENTS	LESS INT. (TO PT. 2. SEC. 3)	ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1245 REPORTED	ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1245 BALANCE	ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1250 REPORTED	ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1250 BALANCE	CAPITAL GAIN REPORTED	CAPITAL GAIN BALANCE
1975		NONE	7418	15416.				

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. FORM 86 SCHEDULE

RESIDENT
540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR
1975

PLACE PREADDRESSED LABEL HERE, if available. (Correct name and address, if necessary)
Enter social security number(s) only if incorrect or not shown on label.

Check One: ☒ Calendar Year ☐ Fiscal Year Ending ________ 1976

FOR FEDERAL PRIVACY ACT NOTIFICATION SEE PAGE 2 OF INSTRUCTIONS

NAME (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: RUBY
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CA

Your Social Security Number: 322 12 7997
Spouse's Social Security Number: 349 18 1920
OCCUPATION Yours: S/E
Spouse's: S/E

FILING STATUS—Check Only One:
1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Separate return of married person—Enter spouse's social security number and full name here ____
4 ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ____
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died 197__)

EXEMPTION CREDITS

6 Personal { If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 / If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50 } ●	6	50	00
7 Dependents — Do not list yourself, your spouse or the person who qualifies you as head of household. Enter name and relationship. ELISA THOMAS Total Number ■ 2 × $8 ●	7	16	00
8 Blind (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions ► ____ × $8	8		00
9 Total exemption credits (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20	9	66	00

10 **Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** { Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to face of this return. If unavailable, see instructions, Page 6 } ●	10	-0-
11 **Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540)) ●	11	17
12 **Interest.** Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540)) ●	12	95
13 **Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 48)	13	8872
14 **Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	8984
15 **Adjustments to income** (from line 55)	15	
16 **Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14) • If line 1 or 3 is checked and line 16 is $4,000 or less, enter zero tax on line 23. • If line 2, 4, or 5 is checked and line 16 is $8,000 or less, enter zero tax on line 23. { Do not complete lines 17 thru. 22 } ■	16	8984

- **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under $15,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.**
- **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $15,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**

17 **Deductions:** Itemized (from line 62) OR **STANDARD** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked) ●	17	5735
18 **Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19 ●	18	3249
19 **Tax from** (check one) Tax Table ☐ Tax Rate Schedule ☒ Income Averaging Schedule (G or G-1) ☐ ●	19	32
20 **Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	66
21 **Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	-0-
22 **Other credits** (from line 65)	22	
23 **Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	-0-
24 **Tax on preference income** (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540)) ⦿	24	
25 **Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-
26 **Total California income tax withheld** (attach W-2 or W-2P to face of this return) ■ 26		
27 **Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1975, complete Part I on page 2 ■ 27		
28 **1975 California estimated tax payments** ◆ 28		
29 **Excess California SDI tax withheld** (attach Form DE 1964 to face of this return) ◆ 29		
30 **Total prepayment credits** (add lines 26 thru 29) →	30	-0-
31 If line 25 is larger than line 30, enter BALANCE DUE. If it is equal to line 30, enter zero. Pay in full and mail with return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95867 — PAY IN FULL → ■	31	-0-
32 If line 25 is smaller than line 30, enter amount OVERPAID ● 32		
33 Amount of line 32 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU.** Allow at least six weeks. Mail return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, P.O. BOX 13-540, SACRAMENTO, CA 95813 → ■ 33		
34 Amount of line 32 to be credited on your 1976 ESTIMATED TAX ■ 34 ← ESTIMATED TAX		

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A
R

▲ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE ▼

▲ ATTACH HERE

ATTACH FORM DE 1964 HERE

Write social security number on check or money order.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN ▶ ________ Your signature ________ Date
HERE ▶ ________ Spouse's signature—if filing a joint return ________ Date

▶ ________ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) ________ Date
________ Address (and Zip code)

367-34-8729

PART I — Renter's Credit — All questions must be answered

35 Did you, on March 1, 1975, live in rented property which was your principal residence? ☐ Yes ☒ No If no, you may not claim this credit
36 Was the property you rented exempt from property tax? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, you may not claim this credit
37 Did you live with any other person who claimed you as a dependent for income tax purposes? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, you may not claim this credit
38 Did you or your spouse claim the homeowners' property tax exemption or receive public assistance? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, see page 6 of Instructions

PART II — Other Income

39	Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C(540))	● 39	7559
40	Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D(540))	● 40	(1000)
41	Net gain (or loss) from supplemental schedule of gains and losses (attach Schedule D-1(540))	● 41	2313
42	Pensions and annuities (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	● 42	
43	Rents and royalties (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	● 43	
44	Partnerships (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	● 44	
45	Estates and trusts (ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540))	● 45	
46	Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F(540))	● 46	
47	Miscellaneous income		
	(a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E(540)) 47a		
	(b) Alimony 47b		
	(c) Other (state nature and source) 47c		
	Enter total of lines 47(a), 47(b), and 47(c)	● 47	
48	Total (add lines 39 thru 47). Enter here and on line 13	48	8872

PART III — Adjustments to Income

49	"Sick pay," if included in line 10 (see instructions — attach statement)	● 49	
50	Moving expenses (see instructions — attach statement)	● 50	
51	Employee business expenses (see instructions — attach statement)	● 51	
52	Military exclusion (see instructions)	● 52	
53	Payment as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc. (see instructions)	● 53	
54	Forfeited interest penalty (see instructions)	● 54	
55	Total adjustments (add lines 49 thru 54). Enter here and on line 15	55	

PART IV — Itemized Deductions —

- **Attach Schedule A(540) and enter sub-totals on lines 56 thru 61, below**

56	Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 10)	● 56	1509
57	Total child adoption expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 13)	● 57	-0-
58	Total taxes (from Schedule A(540), line 20)	● 58	1207
59	Total interest expense (from Schedule A(540), line 23)	● 59	2857
60	Total contributions (from Schedule A(540), line 28)	● 60	150
61	Total miscellaneous deductions (from Schedule A(540), line 39)	● 61	
62	Total itemized deductions (add lines 56 thru 61). Enter here and on line 17	62	5735

PART V — Other Credits — SEE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH CREDIT CLAIMED BELOW.

63	"Other State" net income tax credit (attach copy of other state return and Schedule S(540))	⦿ 63	
64	Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R(540))	⦿ 64	
65	**TOTAL** (add lines 63 and 64). Enter here and on line 22	65	

PART VI — Reconciliation to Federal Return — If adjusted gross income on Federal Return is different from line 16, page 1, explain below.

DIV EX 17

IRA 375.

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
1975
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322-12-7887

A

If your adjusted gross income is $8,000 or less and your filing status is "Married, Filing Jointly," "Head of Household," or "Widow(er) With Dependent Child," or $4,000 or less and your filing status is "Single," or "Married, Filing Separately," do not itemize, enter zero on Form 540, line 23, and check the tax table box.

USE ONLY IF YOU DO NOT USE THE TAX TABLE OR TAKE THE STANDARD DEDUCTION

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care
2. Medicine and drugs
3. Enter 1% of line 16, Form 540
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1
6. Other medical and dental expenses:
   (a) Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.
   (b) Hospitals
   (c) Other (itemize)
7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)
8. Enter 3% of line 16, Form 540
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, line 56) SCH 1509

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list
12. Enter 3% of line 16, Form 540
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations. (Enter here and on Form 540, line 57)

Taxes

14. Real estate
15. State and local gasoline
16. General Sales
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)
18. Personal property (Boat and Aircraft)
19. Other (itemize)

SCH

20. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 14 thru 19. Enter here and on Form 540, line 58) 1207

Interest Expense

21. Home mortgage
22. Other (itemize)

SCH

23. **Total**—(Add lines 21 and 22. Enter here and on Form 540, line 59) 2857

Contributions

24. Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.
25. Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts

SCH

26. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement
27. Carryover from 1974—See instructions
28. **Total**—(Add lines 24, 25, 26, and 27. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, line 60) 150

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See instructions

NOTE: If you had more than one loss, omit lines 29 through 33 and follow instructions for guidance.

29. Loss before insurance reimbursement
30. Insurance reimbursement
31. Subtract line 30 from line 29. Enter difference (if line 30 is greater than line 29, enter zero)
32. Enter $100 or amount on line 31, whichever is smaller
33. Casualty or theft loss (line 31 less line 32)
34. **Alimony paid**
35. **Child care**—See instructions
36. **Union dues**
37. **Employment education expense**—See instructions
38. **Other**—(itemize)
39. **Total**—Add lines 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38. (Enter here and on Form 540, line 61)

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION
(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
19 25
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY
Social Security Number: 322-12-7997

A. Name and Address of Business: WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP
B. Federal Employer I.D. No.: 95-2651578

C. Principal business activity (i.e., retail–hardware; wholesale–tobacco; services–legal; etc.) SERVICE - SNACKBAR

D. Indicate method of accounting: ☐ cash; ☒ accrual; ☐ other

E. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar ~~year~~ filed (if required)? ☒ YES ☐ NO

F. Method of inventory valuation ► COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?
☐ YES ☐ NO If "Yes," attach explanation.

C

1	Gross receipts, sales, or fees $ .... Less returns and allowances $	Balance ►	
2	Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)		
3	Purchases $ .... Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $		
4	Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5	Materials and supplies		
6	Other costs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
7	**Total of lines 2 thru 6**		
8	Inventory at end of this year		
9	Cost of goods sold (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10	Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
11	Other income (attach schedule)		
12	**Total Income** (add lines 10 and 11)		
	OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
13	Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-1 or attach Schedule)		
14	Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
15	Rent on business property		
16	Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
17	Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
18	Insurance		
19	Legal and professional fees		
20	Commissions		
21	Amortization (attach statement)		
22	Retirement plans, etc. (other than your share, see instructions)		
23	Interest on business indebtedness		
24	Bad debts arising from sales or services (Not applicable if reporting on cash basis)		
25	Depletion (attach schedule)		
26	Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
27	**Total of lines 13 thru 26**		
28	Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 27 from line 12), Enter here and on Page 2, Form 540 or 540NR	SCH	7559

Schedule C-1 Depreciation Claimed on line 13.

Group and guideline class or description of property	Date Acquired	Cost or other basis	Depreciation allowed (or allowable) in prior years	Method of computing depreciation	Life or Rate	Depreciation for this year

Schedule C-2 Explanation of Lines 6, 14, 16, and 26.

LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT	LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1975
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

D

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1. 1974 LOSS CARRYOVER (20,360) USED 1974 1000.-					

2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 18, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

5.					

6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 20, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy) 5105
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7 5105

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

9.					

10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 22, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)
11. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8 3318
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach compuıation) (19360)
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16 (16042)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of:
    - (a) amount on lines 17;
    - (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or
    - (c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return)

(1000)

SCHEDULE D-1 FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULE OF GAINS AND LOSSES

(Sales or Exchanges Including Involuntary Conversions)
(Attach to Form 540, 540NR, 541 or 565)

TAXABLE 19 25 YEAR

Name as shown on Tax Return: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Identifying number as shown on return: 322-12-7997

D-1

PART I Gain From Disposition of Property Under Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, 18220

Lines 9 and 10 should be omitted if there are no dispositions of farm property or farm land; or, if this form is filed by a partnership.

1. Description of Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, and 18220 property.	Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	Date sold (mo., day, yr.)
(A) WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP	2/1/74	9/2/75
(B)		
(C)		
(D)		

Correlate lines 1(A) through 1(D) with these columns →	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)
2. Gross sales price				
3. Cost or other basis and expense of sale				
4. Depreciation allowed (or allowable)	INSTALLMENT			
5. Adjusted basis, line 3 less line 4				
6. Total gain, subtract line 5 from line 2				
7. If Section 18211 property:				
(a) Depreciation allowed (or allowable) after applicable date. (See Instruction D-3)	SALE			
(b) Line 6 or line 7(a), whichever is smaller				
8. If Section 18212-18 property:				
(a) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-63 and before 1-1-71				
(b) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-70				
(c) Enter line 6 or line 8(b), whichever is smaller				
(d) Line 8(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(e) Enter excess, if any, of line 6 over line 8(b)				
(f) Enter line 8(a) or line 8(e), whichever is smaller				
(g) Line 8(f) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(h) Add line 8(d) and line 8(g)				
9. If Section 18220 property:				
(a) If farm land, enter soil and water conservation expenses for current year and four preceding years				
(b) If farm property, other than land, subtract line 7(b) from line 6; OR, if farm land, enter line 6 or line 9(a), whichever is smaller (see Instruction D-5)				
(c) Excess deductions account (see Instruction D-5)				
(d) Enter line 9(b) or line 9(c), whichever is smaller				
10. If Section 18219 property:				
(a) Soil and water conservation expenses made after 12-31-69				
(b) Enter amount from line 9(d), if any; otherwise, enter a zero				
(c) Enter excess, if any, of line 10(a) over 10(b)				
(d) Line 10(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-5)				
(e) Line 6 less line 10(b)				
(f) Enter smaller of line 10(d) or line 10(e)				
SUMMARY OF PART I (Complete Property Columns (A) through (D) up to Line 10(f) before going to Line 11)				
11. Enter amounts from line 6	7418.			
12. Enter amounts from lines 7(b), 8(h), 9(d) and 10(f)	2313.			
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11, enter here and in appropriate Section in Part II (see Instruction D-2)	5105			
14. Total of Property Columns (A) through (D), line 12. Enter here and on line 24, Part III				2313.

PART II Sales or Exchanges of Property Used in Trade or Business and/or Involuntary Conversions (Section 18181-82) see Instruction E

Section A — INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS DUE TO CASUALTY AND THEFT

a. Kind of property (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain (or loss) (d. plus e. less f.)
15.						

16. Combine the amounts on line 15, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . .

(a) For all returns, except partnership returns: (1) If line 16 is zero or a gain, enter amount of each gain or loss, above, in column (g) of applicable Section B-1, B-2 or B-3; (2) If line 16 is a loss, enter such amount on line 25 of Part III.

(b) For partnership returns: Enter gain(s) and loss(es) in Schedule K (Form 565). See Instruction E.

Section B — SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY USED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS AND CERTAIN INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS (Not Reportable in Section A)

Section B-1 Property Held One Year or Less

17.						

18. Combine the amounts on line 17, enter here . . . .

Section B-2 Property Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

19. LINE 12						5105

20. Combine the amounts on line 19, enter here 5105

Section B-3 Property Held More Than Five Years

21.						

22. Combine the amounts on line 21, enter here . . . .

23. Combine the amounts on lines 18, 20 and 22; enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . .

(a) For all returns, except partnership returns: (1) If line 23 is a gain, enter the amounts from lines 18, 20 and 22, on lines 2, 6 and 10, respectively, of the Schedule D (Form 540), or if filing Form 541, enter amounts from lines 18, 20 and 22, on lines 2, 7 and 11, respectively, of the Schedule D (Form 541). (2) If line 23 is a loss, enter such amount on line 26 of Part III.

(b) For partnership returns: Enter amounts on lines 18, 20 and 22, in Schedule K(565)—see Instruction E.

PART III Ordinary Gains and Losses

a. Kind of property and how acquired (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements and expense of sale	g. Gain (or loss) (d. plus e. less f.)
24. Gain, if any, from line 14 . . .						2313
25. Loss, if any, from line 16 . . .						
26. Loss, if any, from line 23 . . .						
27.						

28. Combine lines 24 through 27, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows 2313

(a) For fiduciary and partnership returns: Enter the gain (or loss) shown on line 28 on the line provided for on the return being filed—see Instruction F for specific line reference.

(b) For individual returns:

(1) If the gain (or loss) on line 28 includes losses which are to be treated as an itemized deduction on Schedule A (Form 540 or 540NR) (see Instruction F), enter the total of such loss(es) here and on Schedule A (Form 540 or 540NR)—Identify as loss from line 28(b)(1), Schedule D-1 (Form 540) . . . 2313

(2) Redetermine the gain (or loss) on line 28, excluding the loss (if any) entered on line 28(b)(1). Enter here and on page 2 of Form 540 or Form 540NR, under "Other Income" . . . .

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY CALENDAR YEAR 19 75

ADDRESS 322-12-7997 SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		682
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		877
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES	1629	1629
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.	270	258
9	1359	1371
I +:½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.	150	150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▶	1509	1521

TAXES	STATE	FEDERAL
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME	-0-	-0-
12 REAL ESTATE		932
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		205
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		22
16 SALES TAX AUTO		-0-
17 TOTAL TAXES ▶	1207	1207

INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)	STATE	FEDERAL
18 MORTGAGE		2519
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS MISC		50
TRANSWORLD		186
SBA		7
FEDCO		100
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▶	2857	2857

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21a CASH CONTRIBUTIONS		
21b PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		150
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▶	150	150

CASUALTY OR THEFT (LOSS(ES)	STATE	FEDERAL
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▶		

MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
33 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
AUTO USE/DAMAGE		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS. (Sched		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▶		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (From LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line 29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▶	5723	5735

REMARKS

PSI Professional Stationers, Inc.
7340 Laurel Canyon Boulevard
North Hollywood, California 91605

Form 101

SCHEDULE

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. ______ CALENDAR YEAR 19 75

ADDRESS 322-12-7992 FISCAL YEAR ENDING

______ 19__

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		48924
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	800	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	24031.	
TOTAL	24831	
LESS INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	-0-	24831
GROSS PROFIT		24093
GROSS INCOME		24093
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	99	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE	1800	
BAD DEBTS		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE BELOW)	974	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS	126	
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	285	
INTEREST	1107	
JANITOR AND HAULING		
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	150	
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE		
RENT	4151	
REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE	625	
SALARIES AND WAGES	5632	
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	240	
TAXES PAYROLL	575	
TELEPHONE AND UTILITIES	168	
LINEN	158	
CONTRACT LABOR	444	
		16534
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) FEDERAL RETURN		7559

NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) STATE RETURN - SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF. (H) 5159 (W) 2400

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION

NO.	KIND AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED	METH.	YEARS OR %	COST OR OTHER BASIS		PRIOR DEPREC.	DEPRECIATION THIS YEAR
	EQUIPMENT	2/1/74	S.L	7YR	10228		1339	974
	GOODWILL	2/1/74			35000		-0-	-0-

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC FORM 104A
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE ______

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. or SOC. SEC. NO. ________ Calendar Yr. 1975

F/Y/E ________ 19__

GAINS ON INSTALLMENT SALES

DESCRIPTION OF PROPERTY COFFEE SHOP

DATE ACQUIRED 2/1/74 DATE SOLD 9/2/75

TYPE OF ASSET :	CAPITAL	SEC. 1245	SEC. 1250
1. **SELLING PRICE:** CASH	$	$20148	$
2. NOTES		48152	
3. MORTGAGE TRANSFERRED			
4. OTHER			
5. GROSS SALES PRICE (1+2+3+4)		68300	
6. **COST OR BASIS**	$	$45228	$
7. LESS ACCUMULATED DEPRECIATION			
8. PRIOR TO 1-1-62			
9. PRIOR TO 1-1-64			
10. AFTER 12-31-61		2313	
11. ST. LINE AFTER 12-31-63			
12. EXCESS OVER S/L 1-64/12-69			
13. EXCESS OVER S/L AFTER 12-31-69			
14. ADJUSTED BASIS (6-7 THRU 13)		42915	
15. EXPENSES OF SALE		238	
16. TOTAL ADJUSTED BASIS (14 + 15)		43153	
17. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT (5 – 16)	$		
18. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT – ORDINARY		$2313	$
19. TOTAL GROSS PROFIT – OTHER		$22834	$
20. CONTRACT PRICE (1 + 2 + 4)	$	$68300	$
21. GROSS PROFIT %	%	36.82%	%
22. **PAYMENTS RECEIVED YEAR OF SALE**			
23. CASH (1)		20148	
24. PRINCIPAL COLLECTIONS		-0-	
25. EXCESS MORTGAGE OVER BASIS		-0-	
26. OTHER (4)		-0-	
27. TOTAL PAYMENTS (23 THRU 26)		20148	
28. RECOGNIZED GAIN			
29. RECOGNIZED GAIN – ORDINARY		2313	
30. RECOGNIZED GAIN – OTHER		5105	

TAX-ABLE YR.	TOTAL PAYMENTS	LESS INT. (TO PT. 2, SEC. 3)	ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1245		ORDINARY INCOME SECTION 1250		CAPITAL GAIN	
			REPORTED	BALANCE	REPORTED	BALANCE	REPORTED	BALANCE
1975		NONE	7418	15416				

Form **1040** US **Department of the Treasury—Internal Revenue Service**

Individual Income Tax Return 1974

For the year January 1–December 31, 1974, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1974, ending ...., 19......

Please print or type

Name (If joint return, give first names and initials of both)	SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
Last name	RUBY
Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route)	16250 BIRCHER ST
City, town or post office, State and ZIP code	GRANADA HILLS CA
COUNTY OF RESIDENCE	LA
Your social security number	322 12 7997
Spouse's social security no.	349 18 1420
Occupation Yours ▶	S/E
Spouse's ▶	S/E

Filing Status (check only one)

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separately. If spouse is also filing give spouse's social security number in designated space above and enter full name here ▶
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household (See instructions on page 5) ▶
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died ▶ 19)

Exemptions Regular / 65 or over / Blind

6a Yourself . . . ☒ ☐ ☐
b Spouse . . . ☒ ☐ ☐
Enter number of boxes checked ▶ 2

c First names of your dependent children who lived with you ELISA
THOMAS
Enter number ▶ 2

d Number of other dependents (from line 27) . . ▶
7 Total exemptions claimed . . . . ▶ 4

8 **Presidential Election Campaign Fund** . . ▶ Do you wish to designate $1 of your taxes for this fund? . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
If joint return, does your spouse wish to designate $1? . . ☐ Yes ☐ No
Note: If you check the "Yes" box(es) it will not increase your tax or reduce your refund.

Please attach Copy B of Forms W-2 here

Income

9	Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation (Attach Forms W-2. If unavailable, see instructions on page 3.)	9	
10a	Dividends (See instructions on pages 6 and 13) $ 136, 10b Less exclusion $ 136, Balance ▶ (If gross dividends and other distributions are over $400, list in Part I of Schedule B.)	10c	-0-
11	Interest income. [If $400 or less, enter total without listing in Schedule B / If over $400, enter total and list in Part II of Schedule B] .	11	
12	Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 38)	12	8934
13	Total (add lines 9, 10c, 11, and 12)	13	8934
14	Adjustments to income (such as "sick pay," moving expenses, etc. from line 43) .	14	
15	Subtract line 14 from line 13 (adjusted gross income)	15	8934

- **If you do not itemize deductions and line 15 is under $10,000, find tax in Tables and enter on line 16.**
- **If you itemize deductions or line 15 is $10,000 or more, go to line 44 to figure tax.**
- CAUTION. If you have unearned income and can be claimed as a dependent on your parent's return, check here ▶ ☐ and see instructions on page 7.

Tax, Payments and Credits

16	Tax, check if from: ☐ Tax Tables 1–12 ☒ Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z ☐ Schedule D ☐ Schedule G OR ☐ Form 4726	16	48
17	Total credits (from line 54)	17	48
18	Income tax (subtract line 17 from line 16)	18	-0-
19	Other taxes (from line 61)	19	785
20	Total (add lines 18 and 19)	20	785
21a	Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2 or W-2P to front)	21a	
b	1974 estimated tax payments (include amount allowed as credit from 1973 return) . . .	b	
c	Amount paid with Form 4868, Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual Income Tax Return	c	
d	Other payments (from line 65)	d	
22	Total (add lines 21a, b, c, and d)	22	-0-

Pay amount on line 23 in full with this return. Write social security number on check or money order and make payable to Internal Revenue Service.

Please attach Check or Money Order here

Balance Due or Refund

23	If line 20 is larger than line 22, enter **BALANCE DUE IRS** . . . ▶ (Check here ▶ ☐, if Form 2210, Form 2210F, or statement is attached. See instructions on page 7.)	23	785
24	If line 22 is larger than line 20, enter amount **OVERPAID** . . . ▶	24	
25	Amount of line 24 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU** . . . ▶	25	
26	Amount of line 24 to be credited on 1975 estimated tax. ▶	26	

If all of overpayment (line 24) is to be refunded (line 25), make no entry on line 26.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here

▶ Your signature Date

▶ Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▶ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) Date

367-34-8729

Address (and ZIP Code) Preparer's Emp. Ident. or Soc. Sec. No.

16—88229—1

13717 VANOWEN STREET
VAN NUYS, CA. 91403
367-34-8729

Other Dependents

(a) NAME	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year, write B or D.	(d) Did dependent have income of $750 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write ALL.	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

27 Total number of dependents listed in column (a). Enter here and on line 6d ▶

Part I Income other than Wages, Dividends, and Interest

28 Business income or (loss) (attach Schedule C)	28	9934	
29 Net gain or (loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D)	29	(1000	)
30 Net gain or (loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Form 4797)	30		
31 Pensions, annuities, rents, royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E)	31		
32 Farm income or (loss) (attach Schedule F)	32		
33 Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E—see instructions on page 8)	33		
34 50% of capital gain distributions (not reported on Schedule D—see instructions on page 8)	34		
35 State income tax refunds (does not apply if refund is for year in which you took the standard deduction—others see instructions on page 8)	35		
36 Alimony received	36		
37 Other (state nature and source—see instructions on page 8) ▶	37		
38 **Total** (add lines 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37). **Enter here and on line 12** ▶	38	8934	

Part II Adjustments to Income

39 "Sick pay." (From Forms W-2 and W-2P. If not shown on Forms W-2 or W-2P, attach Form 2440 or statement.)	39		
40 Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	40		
41 Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or statement)	41		
42 Payments as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc.—see instructions on page 9	42		
43 **Total adjustments** (add lines 39, 40, 41, and 42). **Enter here and on line 14** ▶	43		

Part III Tax Computation (Do not use this part if you use Tax Tables 1–12 to find your tax.)

44 Adjusted gross income (from line 15)	44	8934	
45 (a) If you itemize deductions, check here ▶ ☐ and enter total from Schedule A, line 41 and attach Schedule A (b) If you do not itemize deductions, check here ▶ ☐ and enter 15% of line 44, but do NOT enter more than $2,000. ($1,000 if line 3 checked)	45	5590	
46 Subtract line 45 from line 44	46	3344	
47 Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 7, by $750	47	3000	
48 **Taxable income.** Subtract line 47 from line 46	48	344	

(Figure your tax on the amount on line 48 by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z, or if applicable, the alternative tax from Schedule D, income averaging from Schedule G, or maximum tax from Form 4726.) Enter tax on line 16.

Part IV Credits

49 Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R)	49		
50 Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	50	48	
51 Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	51		
52 Credit for contributions to candidates for public office—see instructions on page 9	52		
53 Work Incentive (WIN) credit (attach Form 4874)	53		
54 **Total credits** (add lines 49, 50, 51, 52, and 53). **Enter here and on line 17** ▶	54	48	

Part V Other Taxes

55 Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE) (H). 595. (W). 190.	55	785	
56 Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255)	56		
57 Tax from recomputing prior-year Work Incentive (WIN) credit (attach schedule)	57		
58 Minimum tax. Check here ▶ ☐, if Form 4625 is attached	58		
59 Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137)	59		
60 Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W-2)	60		
61 **Total** (add lines 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60). **Enter here and on line 19** ▶	61	785	

Part VI Other Payments

62 Excess FICA tax withheld (two or more employers—see instructions on page 9)	62		
63 Credit for Federal tax on special fuels, nonhighway gasoline and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	63		
64 Credit from a Regulated Investment Company (attach Form 2439)	64		
65 **Total** (add lines 62, 63, and 64). **Enter here and on line 21d** ▶	65		

Foreign Accounts

Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)? ▶ ☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," attach Form 4683. (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1974—O-548-047

16—83229-1

Schedules A&B—Itemized Deductions AND Dividend and Interest Income

(Form 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedules A and B (Form 1040).

1974

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Your social security number: 322 12 7997

Schedule A—Itemized Deductions (Schedule B on back)

Medical and Dental Expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) (See instructions on page 10.)

1 **One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care. (Be sure to include in line 10 below)**	
2 Medicine and drugs	
3 Enter 1% of line 15, Form 1040	
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	
5 Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	
6 Enter other medical and dental expenses:	
a Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.	
b Hospitals	
c Other (Itemize—include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, etc.) ▶	
SCH	
7 **Total** (add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)	
8 Enter 3% of line 15, Form 1040	
9 Subtract line 8 from line 7 (if less than zero, enter zero)	
10 **Total** (add lines 1 and 9). Enter here and on line 35 ▶	1386

Taxes (See instructions on page 10.)

11 State and local income	
12 Real estate	
13 State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)	
14 General sales (see sales tax tables)	
15 Personal property	
16 Other (Itemize) ▶	
SCH	
17 **Total** (add lines 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16). Enter here and on line 36 ▶	1062

Interest Expense (See instructions on page 11.)

18 Home mortgage	
19 Other (Itemize) ▶	
SCH	
20 **Total** (add lines 18 and 19). Enter here and on line 37 ▶	2992

Contributions (See instructions on page 11 for examples.)

21 a Cash contributions for which you have receipts, cancelled checks, etc.	
b Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts. ▶	
SCH	
22 Other than cash (see instructions on page 11 for required statement)	
23 Carryover from prior years	
24 **Total contributions** (add lines 21a, b, 22, and 23). Enter here and on line 38 ▶	150

Casualty or Theft Loss(es) (See instructions on page 12.)
Note: *If you had* **more than one loss**, *omit lines 25 through 28 and see instructions on page 12 for guidance.*

25 Loss before insurance reimbursement	
26 Insurance reimbursement	
27 Subtract line 26 from line 25. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	
28 Enter $100 or amount on line 27, whichever is smaller	
29 **Casualty or theft loss (subtract line 28 from line 27).** Enter here and on line 39 ▶	

Miscellaneous Deductions (See instructions on page 12.)

30 Alimony paid	
31 Union dues	
32 Expenses for child and dependent care services (attach Form 2441)	
33 Other (Itemize) ▶	
34 **Total** (add lines 30, 31, 32, and 33). Enter here and on line 40 ▶	

Summary of Itemized Deductions **A**

35 Total medical and dental—line 10	1386
36 Total taxes—line 17	1062
37 Total interest—line 20	2992
38 Total contributions—line 24	150
39 Casualty or theft loss(es)—line 29	
40 Total miscellaneous—line 34	
41 **Total deductions** (add lines 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 45 ▶	5590

16—83231-1

40)
of the Treasury
Revenue Service

Profit or (Loss) From Business or Profession

(Sole Proprietorship)

Partnerships, Joint Ventures, etc., Must File Form 1065.

▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedule C (Form 1040).

1974

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social security number: 322 12 7997

A Principal business activity (see Schedule C Instructions) ▶ SERVICE; product ▶ SNACK BAR

B Business name ▶ WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEESHOP

C Employer identification number ▶ 95-265 1578

D Business address (number and street) ▶ 16055 VENTURA BLVD

City, State and ZIP code ▶ ENCINO CA 91316

C

	Yes	No
E Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☐ Cash (2) ☒ Accrual (3) ☐ Other ▶		
F Were you required to file Form W-3 or Form 1096 for 1974? (See Schedule C Instructions.)	✓	
If "Yes," where filed ▶	▨	▨
G Was an Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 941, filed for this business for any quarter in 1974?	✓	
H Method of inventory valuation ▶ COST. Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? (If "Yes," attach explanation)		✓

Income

1 Gross receipts or sales $ .... Less: returns and allowances $ .... **Balance ▶**

2 Less: Cost of goods sold and/or operations (Schedule C–1, line 8)

3 Gross profit

4 Other income (attach schedule)

5 **Total income** (add lines 3 and 4)

Deductions

6 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C–3)

7 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C–2)

8 Rent on business property

9 Repairs (explain in Schedule C–2)

10 Salaries and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C–1 (exclude any paid to yourself)

11 Insurance

12 Legal and professional fees

13 Commissions

14 Amortization (attach statement)

15 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Schedule C Instructions)

(b) Employee benefit programs (see Schedule C Instructions)

16 Interest on business indebtedness

17 Bad debts arising from sales or services

18 Depletion

19 Other business expenses (specify):

(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

(h) (W) 2400

(i) (H) 7534

(j)

(k) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(j)) SCH

20 **Total deductions** (add lines 6 through 19)

21 Net profit or (loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 28. **ALSO** enter on Schedule SE, line 5(a): 9934.

SCHEDULE C–1.—Cost of Goods Sold and/or Operations (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 2)

1 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)

2 Purchases $........ Less: cost of items withdrawn for personal use $........ **Balance ▶**

3 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)

4 Materials and supplies

5 Other costs (attach schedule)

6 Total of lines 1 through 5

7 Less: Inventory at end of year

8 Cost of goods sold and/or operations. Enter here and on line 2 above

16

SCHEDULE C–2.—Explanation of Lines 7 and 9

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE C–3.—Depreciation (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 6) If you need more space, you may use Form 4562.

Note: If depreciation is computed by using the Class Life (ADR) System for assets placed in service after December 31, 1970, or the Guideline Class Life System for assets placed in service before January 1, 1971, you must file Form 4832 (Class Life (ADR) System) or Form 5006 (Guideline Class Life System). Except as otherwise expressly provided in income tax regulations sections 1.167(a)–11(b)(5)(vi) and 1.167(a)–12, the provisions of Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 are not applicable for taxable years ending after December 31, 1970. (See Publication 534.)

Check box if you made an election this taxable year to use ☐ Class Life (ADR) System and/or ☐ Guideline Class Life System.

a. Group and guideline class or description of property	b. Date acquired	c. Cost or other basis	d. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	e. Method of computing depreciation	f. Life or rate	g. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below) →						
2 Depreciation from Form 4832	(See Note above)		▨	▨	▨	
3 Depreciation from Form 5006			▨	▨	▨	
4 Other depreciation:						
Buildings						
Furniture and fixtures						
Transportation equipment						
Machinery and other equipment						
Other (specify)						
				SCH		1339
5 Totals						
6 Less amount of depreciation claimed in Schedule C–1, page 1						
7 Balance—Enter here and on page 1, line 6						1339

SCHEDULE C–4.—Expense Account Information (See Schedule C Instructions for Schedule C–4)

Enter information with regard to yourself and your five highest paid employees. In determining the five highest paid employees, expense account allowances must be added to their salaries and wages. However, the information need not be submitted for any employee for whom the combined amount is less than $25,000, or for yourself if your expense account allowance plus line 21, page 1, is less than $25,000.

Name	Expense account	Salaries and Wages
Owner		▨
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)? ☐ Yes ☒ No **(3)** Employees' families at conventions or meetings? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)? ☐ Yes ☒ No **(4)** Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W-2? ☐ Yes ☒ No

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1974—O-548-050 16—83228-1

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Gains and Losses

(Examples of property to be reported on this Schedule are gains and losses on stocks, bonds, and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.)
▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedule D (Form 1040).

1974

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY
Social security number: 322 12 7997

Part I Short-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held Not More Than 6 Months

D

	a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (Mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (Mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted (see instruction D) and expense of sale	f. Gain or (loss) (d less e)
1	LOAN TO SUMMIT EAGLE CORPORATION					(1000)

2	Enter your share of net short-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	2	
3	Enter net gain or (loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3	(1000)
4(a)	Short-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction G)	4(a)	( )
(b)	Short-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction G)	(b)	(1741)
5	Net short-term gain or (loss), combine lines 3, 4(a) and (b)	5	(2741)

Part II Long-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held More Than 6 Months

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.
6	100 CHIEFTAIN DEXEL	11/21/73	6/10/74	653	1382	(729)
	100 CHIEFTAIN DEXEL	11/21/73	6/19/74	678	1382	(704)
	100 TESORO PET	5/22/72	7/16/74	1622	2847	(1225)
	100 UNITRODE	5/15/72	9/19/74	358	1532	(1174)
	100 RCA	2/22/73	9/23/74	1055	3062	(2007)

7	Capital gain distributions	7	
8	Enter gain, if applicable, from Form 4797, line 4(a)(1) (see Instruction A)	8	
9	Enter your share of net long-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	9	
10	Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	10	
11	Net gain or (loss), combine lines 6 through 10	11	(5839)
12(a)	Long-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction G)	12(a)	(13322)
(b)	Long-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction G)	(b)	( )
13	Net long-term gain or (loss), combine lines 11, 12(a) and (b)	13	(19161)

Part III Summary of Parts I and II

14 Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain or loss here . . . 14 (21901)

15 If line 14 shows a gain—
(a) Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part VI for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13. . . . 15(a)
(b) Subtract line 15(a) from line 14. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 29 . . . (b)

16 If line 14 shows a loss—
▶ If losses are shown on BOTH lines 12(a) and 13, omit lines 16(a) and (b) and go to Part IV. See Instruction H.
▶ Otherwise,
(a) Enter one of the following amounts:
(i) If amount on line 5 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of amount on line 14;
(ii) If amount on line 13 is zero or a net gain, enter amount on line 14; or,
(iii) If amounts on line 5 and line 13 are net losses, enter amount on line 5 added to 50% of amount on line 13 . . . 16(a) (11983)
(b) Enter here and enter as a (loss) on Form 1040, line 29, the smallest of:
(i) The amount on line 16(a);
(ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—if a loss is shown on line 4(a) or 12(a), see instruction L for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or,
(iii) Taxable income, as adjusted (see Instruction K) . . . (b) (1000)

16—83232-1

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE.
▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedule SE (Form 1040).

1974

- ● If you had wages, including tips, of $13,200 or more that were subject to social security taxes, do not fill in this form.
- ● If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD) PHYLLIS RUBY

Social security number of self-employed person ▶ 349 18 1420

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶ SNACK BAR

- ● If you have only farm income complete Parts I and III. ● If you have only nonfarm income complete Parts II and III.
- ● If you have both farm and nonfarm income complete Parts I, II, and III.

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

A farmer may elect to compute net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD, line 3, instead of using the Regular Method, line 2, if his gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. However, lines 1 and 2 must be completed even if you elect to use the FARM OPTIONAL METHOD.

REGULAR METHOD		
1 Net profit or (loss) from: (a) Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 74 (accrual method)		
(b) Farm partnerships		
2 Net earnings from farm self-employment (add lines 1(a) and (b))		
FARM OPTIONAL METHOD 3 If gross profits from farming [1] are: (a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits		
(b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600		
4 Enter here and on line 12(a), the amount on line 2, or line 3 if you elect the farm optional method		

[1] Gross profits from farming are the total gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 72 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profits from farm partnerships (Schedule K–1 (Form 1065), line 15) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from NONFARM Self-Employment

REGULAR METHOD 5 Net profit or (loss) from: (a) Schedule C, line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	2400	
(b) Partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)		
(c) Service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. (Include rental value of parsonage or rental allowance furnished.) If you filed Form 4361, check here ☐ and enter zero on this line		
(d) Service with a foreign government or international organization		
(e) Other (See Form 1040 instructions for line 37.) Specify ▶		
6 Total (add lines 5(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e))	2400	
7 Enter adjustments if any (attach statement)		
8 Adjusted net earnings or (loss) from nonfarm self-employment (line 6, as adjusted by line 7)	2400	

If line 8 is $1,600 or more **OR** if you do not elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method, omit lines 9 through 11 and enter amount from line 8 on line 12(b), Part III.

Note: You may use the nonfarm optional method (line 9 through line 11) only if line 8 is less than $1,600 and less than two-thirds of your gross nonfarm profits,[2] and you had actual net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more for at least 2 of the 3 following years: 1971, 1972, and 1973. The nonfarm optional method can only be used for 5 taxable years.

[2] Gross profits from nonfarm business are the total of the gross profits from Schedule C, line 3, plus the distributive share of gross profits from nonfarm partnerships (Schedule K–1 (Form 1065), line 15) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE. Also, include gross profits from services reported on lines 5(c), (d), and (e), as adjusted by line 7.

SE

NONFARM OPTIONAL METHOD		
9 (a) Maximum amount reportable, under both optional methods combined (farm and nonfarm)	$1,600	00
(b) Enter amount from line 3. (If you did not elect to use the farm optional method, enter zero.)		
(c) Balance (subtract line 9(b) from line 9(a))		
10 Enter two-thirds of gross nonfarm profits [2] or $1,600, whichever is smaller		
11 Enter here and on line 12(b), the amount on line 9(c) or line 10, whichever is smaller		

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

12 Net earnings or (loss): (a) From farming (from line 4)			-	
(b) From nonfarm (from line 8, or line 11 if you elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method)			2400	
13 Total net earnings or (loss) from self-employment reported on line 12. **(If line 13 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of form.)**			2400	
14 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security tax for 1974 is			$13,200	00
15 (a) Total "FICA" wages as indicated on Forms W–2				
(b) Unreported tips, if any, subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9				
(c) Total of lines 15(a) and (b)			—0—	
16 Balance (subtract line 15(c) from line 14)			13200	
17 Self-employment income—line 13 or 16, whichever is smaller			2400	
18 If line 17 is $13,200, enter $1,042.80; if less, multiply the amount on line 17 by .079			190	
19 Railroad employee's and railroad employee representative's adjustment from Form 4469, line 10				
20 Self-employment tax (subtract line 19 from line 18). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 55			190	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1974—O-548-055

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE.
▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ See Instructions for Schedule SE (Form 1040).

1974

- If you had wages, including tips, of $13,200 or more that were subject to social security taxes, do not fill in this form.
- If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD): SAMUEL RUBY

Social security number of self-employed person ▶ 322 12 7992

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶ SNACK BAR

- If you have only farm income complete Parts I and III.
- If you have only nonfarm income complete Parts II and III.
- If you have both farm and nonfarm income complete Parts I, II, and III.

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

A farmer may elect to compute net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD, line 3, instead of using the Regular Method, line 2, if his gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. However, lines 1 and 2 must be completed even if you elect to use the FARM OPTIONAL METHOD.

REGULAR METHOD		
1 Net profit or (loss) from: (a) Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 74 (accrual method)		
(b) Farm partnerships		
2 Net earnings from farm self-employment (add lines 1(a) and (b))		
FARM OPTIONAL METHOD		
3 If gross profits from farming[1] are: (a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits		
(b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600		
4 Enter here and on line 12(a), the amount on line 2, or line 3 if you elect the farm optional method		

[1] Gross profits from farming are the total gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 72 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profits from farm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 15) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from NONFARM Self-Employment

REGULAR METHOD		
5 Net profit or (loss) from: (a) Schedule C, line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	7534	
(b) Partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)		
(c) Service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. (Include rental value of parsonage or rental allowance furnished.) If you filed Form 4361, check here ☐ and enter zero on this line		
(d) Service with a foreign government or international organization		
(e) Other (See Form 1040 instructions for line 37.) Specify ▶		
6 Total (add lines 5(a), (b), (c), (d), and (e))	7534	
7 Enter adjustments if any (attach statement)		
8 Adjusted net earnings or (loss) from nonfarm self-employment (line 6, as adjusted by line 7)	7534	

If line 8 is $1,600 or more **OR** if you do not elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method, omit lines 9 through 11 and enter amount from line 8 on line 12(b), Part III.

Note: You may use the nonfarm optional method (line 9 through line 11) only if line 8 is less than $1,600 and less than two-thirds of your gross nonfarm profits,[2] and you had actual net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more for at least 2 of the 3 following years: 1971, 1972, and 1973. The nonfarm optional method can only be used for 5 taxable years.

[2] Gross profits from nonfarm business are the total of the gross profits from Schedule C, line 3, plus the distributive share of gross profits from nonfarm partnerships (Schedule K-1 (Form 1065), line 15) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE. Also, include gross profits from services reported on lines 5(c), (d), and (e), as adjusted by line 7.

SE

NONFARM OPTIONAL METHOD		
9 (a) Maximum amount reportable, under both optional methods combined (farm and nonfarm)	$1,600	00
(b) Enter amount from line 3. (If you did not elect to use the farm optional method, enter zero.)		
(c) Balance (subtract line 9(b) from line 9(a))		
10 Enter two-thirds of gross nonfarm profits[2] or $1,600, whichever is smaller		
11 Enter here and on line 12(b), the amount on line 9(c) or line 10, whichever is smaller		

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

12 Net earnings or (loss): (a) From farming (from line 4)		
(b) From nonfarm (from line 8, or line 11 if you elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method)	7534	
13 Total net earnings or (loss) from self-employment reported on line 12. **(If line 13 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of form.)**	7534	
14 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security tax for 1974 is	$13,200	00
15 (a) Total "FICA" wages as indicated on Forms W-2		
(b) Unreported tips, if any, subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9		
(c) Total of lines 15(a) and (b)	-0-	
16 Balance (subtract line 15(c) from line 14)	13200	
17 Self-employment income—line 13 or 16, whichever is smaller	7534	
18 If line 17 is $13,200, enter $1,042.80; if less, multiply the amount on line 17 by .079	595	
19 Railroad employee's and railroad employee representative's adjustment from Form 4469, line 10		
20 Self-employment tax (subtract line 19 from line 18). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 55	595	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1974—O-548-055

3468

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Investment Credit

▶ Attach to your tax return.

1974

Name: Samuel & Phyllis Ruby

Identifying number as shown on page 1 of your tax return: 322-12-7997

1 Qualified investment in new and used property. (See instructions C and D for eligible property.)
NOTE: Include your share of investment in property made by a partnership, estate, trust, small business corporation, or lessor.

Type of property	Line	(1) Life years	(2) Cost or basis (See instruction G)	(3) Applicable percentage	(4) Qualified investment (Column 2 x column 3)
New Property	(a)	3 or more but less than 5		33⅓	
	(b)	5 or more but less than 7		66⅔	
	(c)	7 or more		100	
Used Property (See instructions for dollar limitation)	(d)	3 or more but less than 5		33⅓	
	(e)	5 or more but less than 7		66⅔	
	(f)	7 or more	10228	100	10228

2 Total qualified investment—Add lines 1(a) through 1(f)	10228
3 Tentative investment credit—7% of line 2 (4% for public utility property)	10228
4 Carryback and carryover of unused credit(s). (See instruction F and instruction for line 4—attach computation.)	716
5 Total—Add lines 3 and 4	716

Limitation

6 (a) Individuals—Enter amount from line 16, page 1, Form 1040 (b) Estates and trusts—Enter amount from line 24 or 25, page 1, Form 1041 (c) Corporations—Enter amount from line 5, Schedule J, Form 1120		48
7 Less: (a) Foreign tax credit		
(b) Retirement income credit (individuals only)		
(c) Tax on lump-sum distributions. (See instruction 7.)		
8 Total—Add lines 7(a), (b), and (c)		
9 Line 6 less line 8		48
10 (a) Enter amount on line 9 or $25,000, whichever is lesser. (Married persons filing separately, controlled corporate groups, estates, and trusts, see instruction for line 10.)		
(b) If line 9 exceeds line 10(a), enter 50% of the excess		
11 Total—Add lines 10(a) and (b)		48
12 Investment credit—Amount from line 5 or line 11, whichever is lesser (enter here and on line 50, Form 1040; line 6(b), Schedule J, Form 1120; or the appropriate line on other returns)		48

Schedule A

If any part of your investment in line 1 above was made by a partnership, estate, trust, small business corporation, or lessor, complete the following:

Name (Partnership, estate, trust, etc.)	Address	Property		
		New	Used	Life years
		$	$	

If property is disposed of prior to the life years used in computing the investment credit, see instruction E.

16—83238-1

Form **4798**
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Loss Carryover

► (From 1973 to 1974)
► Attach to Form 1040.

1974

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number: 322 12 7997

A. Who Should File.—You will need to complete either Part I or Part II of this form if you have a capital loss to carry over to 1974.

You will have a capital loss to carry to 1974 if the amount on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 16(a), or line 33, is **LARGER THAN** the loss deducted on your 1973 Form 1040, line 29.

B. How to Compute Carryover.—If you have a capital loss carryover, complete either Part I or Part II of this form, but do not complete both.

1. Complete only Part I if lines 4(a) and 12(a) on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040) **DO NOT SHOW A LOSS.**

2. Complete only Part II if either (or both) line 4(a) or line 12(a) on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040) shows a loss.

Part I Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers

Section A.—Short-term Capital Loss Carryover

1 Enter loss shown on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 6—then go to line 7	1	(2741)
2 Enter gain shown on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	2	-0-
3 Reduce any loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2	3	(2741)
4 Enter amount shown on your 1973 Form 1040, line 29	4	1000
5 Enter smaller of line 3 or 4	5	1000
6 Excess of amount on line 3 over amount on line 5	6	(1741)

Note: *The amount on line 6 is your short-term capital loss carryover from 1973 to 1974 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(b).*

Section B.—Long-term Capital Loss Carryover

7 Line 4 less line 5 (Note: If you ignored lines 2 through 6, enter amount from your 1973 Form 1040, line 29)	7	-0-
8 Enter loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 9 through 12	8	-0-
9 Enter gain shown on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5. If that line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	9	-0-
10 Reduce any loss on line 8 to the extent of any gain on line 9	10	-0-
11 Multiply amount on line 7 by 2	11	-0-
12 Excess of line 10 over amount on line 11	12	-0-

Note: *The amount on line 12 is your long-term capital loss carryover from 1973 to 1974 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(b).*

Part II Pre-1970 and Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers

Section A.—Short-term Capital Losses Identified

1 Enter loss shown on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 5; if none, enter zero and ignore lines 2 through 20—then go to line 21 . . . 1

2 Enter gain shown on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13. If that line is blank or shows a loss enter a zero . . . 2

3 Reduce loss on line 1 to the extent of any gain on line 2 . . . 3

Note: *If line 4(a) on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040) is blank, IGNORE lines 4 through 11, enter a zero on line 12—then go to line 13.*

4 Combine lines 3 and 11 on your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040). Enter the gain; or if zero or a loss, enter a zero . . . 4

Note: *If line 4 is zero IGNORE lines 5 through 11, enter on line 12 the loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a)—then go to line 13.*

5 Enter any gain from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 3 . . . 5

6 Enter smaller of line 4 or 5 . . . 6

7 Enter excess of gain on line 4 over line 6 . . . 7

8 Enter loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(a); otherwise, enter a zero . . . 8

9 Reduce any gain on line 7 to the extent of any loss on line 8 . . . 9

10 Enter loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a); otherwise enter a zero . . . 10

11 Add the gains on lines 6 and 9 . . . 11

12 Reduce the loss on line 10 to the extent of any gain on line 11 . . . 12

13 Pre-1970 short-term capital loss (Enter smaller of line 3 or 12) . . . 13

14 Short-term capital loss attributable to years beginning after 1969 (excess of line 3 over line 13) . 14

Section B.—Computation of Capital Loss Carryovers to 1974

15 Enter any loss from line 13, above . . . 15

16 Enter loss deducted on your 1973 Form 1040, line 29 . . . 16

17 Loss carryover to 1974 (excess of line 15 over line 16—if line 15 does not exceed line 16, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(a) . . . 17

18 Enter any loss from line 14, above . . . 18

19 Enter excess of line 16 over line 15—if line 16 does not exceed line 15, enter zero . . . 19

20 Loss carryover to 1974 (excess of line 18 over line 19—if line 18 does not exceed line 19, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 4(b) . . . 20

21 If you were required to complete Part IV of your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), enter any loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 30; otherwise, enter zero . . . 21 (13322)

22 Enter excess of line 19 over line 18—if line 19 does not exceed line 18, enter zero. (**Note:** *If you ignored lines 2 through 20 above, enter amount from your 1973 Form 1040, line 29.*) . . . 22 —0—

23 Loss carryover to 1974 (excess of line 21 over line 22—if line 21 does not exceed line 22, enter zero). Enter here and on 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(a) . . . 23 (13322)

24 If you were required to complete Part IV of your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), enter any loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 31. However, if Part IV was not required, enter any loss from your 1973 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 13 . . . 24

25 Enter excess of line 22 over line 21 ________ x 2 (If line 22 does not exceed line 21, enter zero.) . . . 25

26 Loss carryover to 1974 (excess of line 24 over line 25—if line 24 does not exceed line 25, enter zero). Enter here and on your 1974 Schedule D (Form 1040), line 12(b) . . . 26

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1974—O-548-157 52-0781521

NAME SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. ____________

CALENDAR YEAR 1974

ADDRESS 322-12-7997

FISCAL YEAR ENDING

__________ 19 ____

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		68084
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	-0-	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	36079	
LABOR		
TOTAL	36079	
INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	800	35279
GROSS PROFIT		32805
GROSS INCOME		32805
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	337	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE 12000 MI AT 15¢	1800	
BAD DEBTS		
CASH SHORT		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE ATTACHED)	1339	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS	16	
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	215	
INTEREST	1844	
JANITOR SERVICE		
LAUNDRY	241	
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	270	
MAINTENANCE		
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE	47	
RENT	7841	
REPAIRS	991	
SALARIES AND WAGES	5912	
SALARIES OFFICERS		
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	1063	
TAXES - PAYROLL	388	
TELEPHONE	322	
TRAVEL		
UTILITIES		
PARKING	45	
		22871
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) - FEDERAL RETURN		9934
	(H) 7534	
NET PROFIT OR LOSS) - STATE RETURN (SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.)	(W) 2400	

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. FORM 104
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE ____________

NAME SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY
ADDRESS
322-12-7997

I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO.

CALENDAR YEAR 19 74
FISCAL YEAR ENDING
19

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION / AMORTIZATION

KIND OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED MO YR	COST OR OTHER BASIS	SPEC 20% DEP		DEPRECIABLE BASIS	DEP ALLOWED PRIOR YEARS	REMAINING COST	METHOD	RATE(%) OR LIFE (YRS)	DEPRECIATION FOR THIS YEAR
EQUIPMENT	2/1/74	10228			10228	-0-	10228	S.L.	7YR	1339
GOODWILL	2/1/74	35000			-0-					
TOTALS										1339

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. FORM NO 102A

SCHEDULE

RESIDENT
540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR
1974

PLACE PREADDRESSED LABEL HERE, if available. (Correct name and address, if necessary)
Enter social security number(s) only if incorrect or not shown on label.

For calendar year or
Taxable year ending ____________, 197__

NAME (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: RUBY
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CA

Your Social Security Number: 322 12 7997
Spouse's Social Security Number: 349 18 1420
OCCUPATION Yours: S/E
OCCUPATION Spouse's: S/E

FILING STATUS—Check Only One:

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Separate return of married person—Enter spouse's social security number and full name here ____________
4 ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ____________
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died ► 197__)

EXEMPTION CREDITS

6	**Personal** { If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 } { If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50 }	6	50
7	**Dependents** — Do not list yourself, your spouse or the person who qualifies you as head of household. Enter name and relationship. ELISA THOMAS Total Number ► 2 × $8	7	16
8	**Blind** (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions ► ____ × $8	8	
9	**Total exemption credits** (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20	9	66

10	**Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** { Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to face of this return. If unavailable, attach explanation. }	10	
11	**Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	11	136
12	**Interest.** Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	12	
13	**Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 48)	13	8934
14	**Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	9070
15	**Adjustments to income** (from line 54)	15	
16	**Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14)	16	9070

- **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under $10,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.**
- **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $10,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**

17	**Deductions: Itemized** (from line 61) **OR Standard** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked)	17	5468
18	**Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19	18	3602
19	**Tax from** (check one) Tax Table ☐ Tax Rate Schedule ☒ Income Averaging Schedule (G or G-1) ☐	19	36
20	**Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	56
21	**Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	-0-
22	**Other credits** (from line 65—Includes special low income tax credit)	22	
23	**Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	-0-
24	**Tax on preference income** (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540))	24	
25	**Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-
26	**Total California income tax withheld** (attach Form(s) W-2 or W-2P to face of this return)	26	
27	**Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1974, complete Part 1 on page 2	27	
28	**1974 California estimated tax payments**	28	
29	**Excess California SDI tax withheld** (attach Form DE 1964 to face of this return)	29	
30	**Total prepayment credits** (add lines 26 thru 29)	30	-0-
31	If line 25 is larger than line 30, enter BALANCE DUE. If it is equal to line 30, enter zero. Pay in full and mail with return to: **FRANCHISE TAX BOARD SACRAMENTO, CA 95867** — **PAY IN FULL** →	31	-0-
32	If line 25 is smaller than line 30, enter amount OVERPAID Mail return to: **FRANCHISE TAX BOARD P.O. BOX 13-540 SACRAMENTO, CA 95813**	32	-0-
33	Amount of line 32 to be REFUNDED. (Allow at least six weeks) — **REFUND TO YOU** →	33	
34	Amount of line 32 to be credited on your 1975 ESTIMATED TAX	34	← **ESTIMATED TAX**

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A

▲ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE ▼

ATTACH HERE ▲

ATTACH FORM DE 1964 HERE

▼ Write social security number on check or money order.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN ► ____________ Your signature Date
HERE ► ____________ Spouse's signature—if filing a joint return Date

► ____________ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) Date

Address (and Zip code):
13717 VANOWEN STREET
VAN NUYS, CA. 91403
367-34-8729

Preparer's FEIN (or SSA) No.: 367-34-8729

PART I — Renter's Credit — All questions must be answered

See *Instructions*, Page 3, for Allowable Credit

35 Did you, on March 1, 1974, live in rented property which was your principal residence? ☐ Yes ☒ No If no, you may not claim this credit

36 Was the property you rented exempt from property tax? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, you may not claim this credit

37 Did you live with any other person who claimed you as a dependent for income tax purposes? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, you may not claim this credit

38 Did you or your spouse claim the homeowners' property tax exemption or receive public assistance? ☐ Yes ☐ No If yes, see page 3 of instructions

PART II — Other Income

39	Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C(540))		39	9934
40	Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D(540))		40	(1000)
41	Net gain (or loss) from supplemental schedule of gains and losses (attach Schedule D-1(540))		41	
42	Pensions and annuities — ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540)		42	
43	Rents and royalties — ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540)		43	
44	Partnerships — ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540)		44	
45	Estates and trusts — ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540)		45	
46	Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F(540))		46	
47	Miscellaneous income			
	(a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E(540))	47a		
	(b) Alimony	47b		
	(c) Other (state nature and source)	47c		
	Enter total of lines 47(a), 47(b), and 47(c)		47	
48	Total (add lines 39 thru 47). Enter here and on line 13		48	8934

PART III — Adjustments to Income

49	"Sick pay," if included in line 10 (see instructions — attach statement)	49	
50	Moving expenses (see instructions — attach statement)	50	
51	Employee business expenses (see instructions — attach statement)	51	
52	Military exclusion (see instructions)	52	
53	Payment as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc.	53	
54	Total adjustments (add lines 49 thru 53). Enter here and on line 15	54	

PART IV — Itemized Deductions — ON SEPARATE RETURNS OF MARRIED TAXPAYERS, BOTH MUST ITEMIZE DEDUCTIONS OR BOTH MUST TAKE THE STANDARD DEDUCTION.

- **Attach Schedule A(540) and enter sub-totals on lines 55 thru 60, below**

55	Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 10)	55	1386
56	Total child adoption expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 13)	56	
57	Total taxes (from Schedule A(540), line 21)	57	940
58	Total interest expense (from Schedule A(540), line 25)	58	2992
59	Total contributions (from Schedule A(540), line 29)	59	150
60	Total miscellaneous deductions (from Schedule A(540), line 40)	60	
61	Total itemized deductions (add lines 55 thru 60). Enter here and on line 17	61	5468

PART V — Other Credits — SEE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH CREDIT CLAIMED BELOW.

62	"Other State" net income tax credit (attach copy of other state return and Schedule S(540))		62	
63	Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R(540))		63	
64	(a) Special Low Income Tax Credit — If Adjusted Gross Income does not include net capital gains from assets held more than one year and is $8,000 or less (joint return of married couple, head of household or widow(er) with dependent child) or $4,000 or less (single or separate return of married person) enter the amount from line 21. If Adjusted Gross Income includes Capital Gains, complete Schedule B-1. See Page 3 of Instructions		64a	
	(b) Enter total here from line 4, Schedule B-1. If zero or a loss, enter zero	64b		
65	**TOTAL** (add lines 62 thru 64a. Enter here and on line 22		65	

PART VI — Reconciliation to Federal Return — If adjusted gross income on Federal Return is different from line 16, page 1, explain below.

DIV EX 13C

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
1974
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 Samuel & Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number 322 12 2997

A

Use only if you do not use the Tax Table or take the standard deduction.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care		
2. Medicine and drugs		
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540.		
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if line 3 is greater than line 2, enter zero)		
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1		
6. Other medical and dental expenses:		
(a) Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.		
(b) Hospitals		
(c) Other (itemize)		
SCH		
7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)		
8. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540		
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if line 8 is greater than line 7, enter zero)		
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 55) ►	1386	

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list		
12. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540		
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 56) ►	—0—	

Taxes

14. Real estate		
15. State and local gasoline		
16. General sales		
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)		
18. Personal property		
19. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify		
20. Other SCH		
21. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 14 through 20. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 57) ►	940	

Interest Expense

22. Home mortgage		
23. Installment purchases		
24. Other (itemize)		
SCH		
25. **Total**—(Add lines 22, 23 and 24. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 58) ►	2992	

Contributions

26. Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.		
27. Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts		
SCH		
28. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement		
29. **Total**—(Add lines 26, 27 and 28. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 59) ►	150	

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See Instructions

NOTE: If you had more than one loss, omit lines 30 through 34 and follow instructions for guidance.

30. Loss before insurance reimbursement		
31. Insurance reimbursement		
32. Subtract line 31 from line 30. Enter difference (if line 31 is greater than line 30, enter zero)		
33. Enter $100 or amount on line 32, whichever is smaller		
34. **Casualty or theft loss** (line 32 less line 33)		
35. **Alimony paid**		
36. **Child care**—See instructions		
37. **Union dues**		
38. **Employment education expense**—See instructions		
39. **Other**—See instructions (itemize)		
40. **Total**—Add lines 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 60) ►		

(Rev. 1974)

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
19 74
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

A. Principal business activity SERVICE ; product SNACK BAR
(See Instructions for "Item A.") (For example; retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP **C.** Federal employer identification number 95-2651578

D. Business address 16055 VENTURA BLVD - ENCINO CA 91316 (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☐ cash; ☒ accrual; ☐ other

F. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

G. Method of inventory valuation ► COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?
☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," attach explanation.

IMPORTANT—All applicable lines and schedules must be filled in.

INCOME	1 Gross receipts or sales $ ______ Less returns and allowances $ ______ Balance ►		
	2 Less: Cost of goods sold (Schedule C-1, line 29) and/or operations (attach schedule)		
	3 Gross profit		
	4 Other income (attach schedule)		
	5 **TOTAL** income (add lines 3 and 4)		
DEDUCTIONS	6 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-3)		
	7 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2)		
	8 Rent on business property		
	9 Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2)		
	10 Salaries and wages not included on line 24, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
	11 Insurance		
	12 Legal and professional fees		
	13 Commissions		
	14 Amortization (attach statement)		
	15 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Instructions for line 15(a))		
	(b) Employee benefit programs (see Instructions for line 15(b))		
	16 Interest on business indebtedness		
	17 Bad debts arising from sales or services		
	18 Depletion		
	19 Other business expenses (specify):		
	(a)		
	(b)		
	(c)		
	(d)		
	(e)		
	(f)		
	(g)		
	(h) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(g))		
	20 Total deductions (add lines 6 through 19) S.C.H.		
	21 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or Form 540NR	9934	

SCHEDULE C-1. COST OF GOODS SOLD (See Schedule C Instructions for line 2)

22 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)		
23 Purchases $ ______ Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $ ______ Balance ►		
24 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
25 Materials and supplies		
26 Other costs (attach schedule)		
27 Total of lines 22 through 26		
28 Less: Inventory at end of year		
29 Cost of goods sold. Enter here and on line 2, above		

SCHEDULE C-2. Explanation of Lines 7 and 9

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE C-3. DEPRECIATION

(See Schedule C Instructions for line 6). **NOTE: Depreciation may be computed by using the Asset Guideline Classes specified in Federal Revenue Procedure 72-10, regardless of when assets were placed in service. If this method is used, do NOT use the Lower Limit or the Upper Limit (ADR) Ranges. Attach detailed statement of depreciation computation.**

a. Group and guideline class or description of property	b. Date acquired	c. Cost or other basis	d. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	e. Method of computing depreciation	f. Life or rate	g. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below) →						
2 Asset Guideline Class System (See Note above)						
3 Other depreciation						
Buildings						
Furniture and fixtures						
Transportation equipment						
Machinery and other equipment						
Other (specify)						
				SLH		1339
4 Totals						
5 Less: Amount of depreciation claimed elsewhere in Schedule C-1						
6 Balance—Enter here and on page 1, line 6						1339

SCHEDULE C-4. Expense Account Information

(See Schedule C Instructions for Schedule C-4)

Enter information with regard to yourself and your five highest paid employees. In determining the five highest paid employees, expense account allowances must be added to their salaries and wages. However, the information need not be submitted for any employee for whom the combined amount is less than $10,000, or for yourself if your expense account allowance plus line 21, page 1 is less than $10,000.

Name	Expense Account	Salaries and Wages
Owner		
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)?
☐ Yes ☒ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)?
☐ Yes ☒ No

(3) Employees' families at conventions or meetings?
☐ Yes ☒ No

(4) Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W-2?
☐ Yes ☒ No

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1974
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

D

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

	a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1.	LOAN TO SUMMIT EAGLE CORPORATION					(1000)
	100 CHIEFTAIN DEXEL	11/21/73	6/10/74	653	1382	(729)
	100 CHIEFTAIN DEXEL	11/21/73	6/19/74	678	1382	(704)

2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 18, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3 (2433)

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

5.	100 TESORO PET	5/22/72	7/16/74	1622	2847	(1225)
	100 UNITRODE	5/15/72	9/19/74	358	1532	(1174)
	100 RCA	2/22/73	4/23/74	1055	3062	(2007)

6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 20, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7 (4406)

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

9. 1973 LOSS CARRYOVER
(16063)
LESS 1000 -

10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 22, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)
11. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4 (2433)
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8 (2864)
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach computation) (15063)
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16 (20360)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of:
    (a) amount on lines 17;
    (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or
    (c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return) (1000)

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby CALENDAR YEAR 19 74.

ADDRESS 322-12-7997 SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		504
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		930
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES		1504
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.		268
9		1236
1 +:½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.		150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▶	1386	1386
TAXES		
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME		122
12 REAL ESTATE		727
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		141
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		24
16 STATE DIS. INS. H W		
SALES TAX AUTO		
17 TOTAL TAXES ▶	940	1062
INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)		
18 MORTGAGE		2543
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS		
MERRILL LYNCH		263
TRANS WORLD		170
SBA		16
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▶	2992	2992

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21 PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS	150	
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▶	150	150
CASUALTY OR THEFT LOSS(ES)		
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27 Difference (not less than zero)		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▶		
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS		
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
33 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
Auto Use ________ Mi		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS. (Sched		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▶		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (From LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line 29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▶	5468	5590

REMARKS

ngeles, Calif. Form 101

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby CALENDAR YEAR 19 74

ADDRESS 322-12-7997 SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		504
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		930
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES		1504
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.		268
9		1236
1 +:½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.		150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▶	1386	1386
TAXES		
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME		122
12 REAL ESTATE		727
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		141
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		24
16 STATE DIS. INS. H W		
SALES TAX AUTO		
17 TOTAL TAXES ▶	940	1062
INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)		
18 MORTGAGE		2543
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS		
MERRILL LYNCH		263
TRANS WORLD		170
SBA		16
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▶	2992	2992

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21 PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS	150	
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▶	150	150
CASUALTY OR THEFT LOSS(ES)		
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27 Difference (not less than zero)		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▶		
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS		
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
33 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
Auto Use ______ Mi		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS. (Sched		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▶		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (From LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▶	5468	5590

REMARKS

Los Angeles, Calif. Form 101

NAME Sam & Phyllis Ruby I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. ____________ CALENDAR YEAR 1974

ADDRESS 322-12-7997

FISCAL YEAR ENDING ________ 19 ____

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		68084
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	-0-	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	36079	
LABOR		
TOTAL	36079	
INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	800	35279
GROSS PROFIT		32805
GROSS INCOME		32805
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	337	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE 12000 MI AT 15¢	1800	
BAD DEBTS		
CASH SHORT		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE ATTACHED)	1339	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS	16	
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	215	
INTEREST	1844	
JANITOR SERVICE		
LAUNDRY	241	
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	270	
MAINTENANCE		
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE	47	
RENT	7841	
REPAIRS	991	
SALARIES AND WAGES	5912	
SALARIES OFFICERS		
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	1063	
TAXES - PAYROLL	388	
TELEPHONE	322	
TRAVEL		
UTILITIES		
PARKING	45	
		22871
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) - FEDERAL RETURN		9934
	(H) 7534	
NET PROFIT OR LOSS) - STATE RETURN (SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.)	(W) 2400	

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. FORM 104
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE ____________

NAME Sam & Phyllis Ruby

ADDRESS

322-12-7997

I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO.

CALENDAR YEAR 19 74

FISCAL YEAR ENDING 19

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION / AMORTIZATION

KIND OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED MO YR	COST OR OTHER BASIS	SPEC 20% DEP		DEPRECIABLE BASIS	DEP ALLOWED PRIOR YEARS	REMAINING COST	METHOD	RATE(%) OR LIFE (YRS)	DEPRECIATION FOR THIS YEAR
EQUIPMENT	2/1/74	10228			10228	-0-	10228	S.L.	7YR	1339
GOODWILL	4/1/74	35000			-0-					
TOTALS										1339

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. FORM NO 102A

SCHEDULE

4-6-73

1040 US Individual Income Tax Return 1972

Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service

For the year January 1–December 31, 1972, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1972, ending ...., 19 ......

First name and initial (If joint return, use first names and middle initials of both) SAMUEL AND PHYLLIS	Last name RUBY	Your social security number (husband's, if joint return) 322 12 7907
Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route) [illegible]		Wife's number, if joint return 349 18 1420
City, town or post office, State and ZIP code [illegible] California	Occupation	Yours Self Employed Wife's Housewife

Filing Status—check only one:

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separately. If wife (husband) is also filing give her (his) social security number and first name here ▶

4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Enter year of death of husband (wife) ▶ 19)

Exemptions — Regular / 65 or over / Blind — Enter number of boxes checked

6 Yourself . . . . . ☒ ☐ ☐
7 Wife (husband) . . . ☒ ☐ ☐ ▷ 2

8 First names of your dependent children who lived with you Fred, Brian, Ellen, Thomas — Enter number ▷ 4

9 Number of other dependents (from line 32) . . . ▷

10 Total exemptions claimed . . . . ▷ 6

11 Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. (Attach Form W-2 to front. If unavailable, attach explanation)	11		
12a Dividends (see pages 6 and 7 of instructions) $ 70.00 12b Less exclusion $ 70.00 Balance ▷	12c	-0-	
(If gross dividends and other distributions are over $200, list in Part I of Schedule B.)			
13 Interest income. [If $200 or less, enter total without listing in Schedule B / If over $200, enter total and list in Part II of Schedule B]	13	22	00
14 Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 45)	14	5,969	40
15 Total (add lines 11, 12c, 13 and 14)	15	5,991	40
16 Adjustments to income (such as "sick pay," moving expenses, etc. from line 50)	16		
17 Subtract line 16 from line 15 (adjusted gross income)	17	5,991	40

[illegible] income and you could [illegible] your parent's return, [illegible] ○ If you do not itemize deductions and line 17 is under $10,000, find tax in Tables and enter on line 18. ○ If you itemize deductions or line 17 is $10,000 or more, go to line 51 to figure tax.

18 Tax, check if from: ☐ Tax Tables 1-12 / Schedule D ☐ Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z / Schedule G or ☐ Form 4726	18	-0-	
19 Total credits (from line 61)	19		
20 Income tax (subtract line 19 from line 18)	20	-0-	
21 Other taxes (from line 67)	21	522	70
22 Total (add lines 20 and 21)	22	522	70
23 Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2 or W-2P to front)	23		
24 1972 Estimated tax payments (include amount allowed as credit from 1971 return)	24		
25 Amount paid with Form 4868, Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual Income Tax Return	25		
26 Other payments (from line 71)	26		
27 Total (add lines 23, 24, 25, and 26)	27		
28 If line 22 is larger than line 27, enter BALANCE DUE IRS — Pay in full with return. Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service ▷	28	522	70
29 If line 27 is larger than line 22, enter amount OVERPAID ▷	29		
30 Line 29 to be REFUNDED TO YOU ▷	30		
31 Line 29 to be credited on 1973 estimated tax	31		

Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)? . . . . ▷ ☐ Yes ☒ No
If "Yes," attach Form 4683. (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

Note: Be sure to complete Revenue Sharing (lines 33 and 34) on next page.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here

Your signature — Date

Wife's (husband's) signature (If filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

EDWARD L. LAMBERT
Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) — Date
TAX CONSULTANT
17835 VENTURA BLVD., SUITE 106
ENCINO, CALIF. 91316
Address (include ZIP code) — Employer Ident. or Soc. Sec. No.
TEL. (213) 881-7350
S.S. 568-40-9527

Other Dependents

(a) NAME	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year, write B or D.	(d) Did dependent have income of $750 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write ALL.	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

32 Total number of dependents listed in column (a). Enter here and on line 9 . . . . ▷

Residence Information

33 Enter (or type) the location of your principal place of residence at end of year (not necessarily the same as your post office address).

(a) State	(b) County	(c) Locality. If you lived inside the boundaries of an incorporated city, town, etc., enter its name; if not, check here ▷ ☐	(d) Township (see instructions on page 5)
California	Los Angeles	Los Angeles	

34 Enter the number of persons included on line 10 who (1) are filing a return of their own; or, (2) did not live at your principal place of residence at the end of the year . . . . ▷ 0

For IRS use only—Leave blank

Part I Income other than Wages, Dividends, and Interest

35 Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C)	35	6,969	40
36 Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D)	36	(1,000	00)
37 Net gain (or loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Form 4797) . . .	37		
38 Pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E)	38		
39 Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F)	39		
40 Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E—see instructions on page 8) .	40		
41 50% of capital gain distributions (not reported on Schedule D)	41		
42 State income tax refunds (caution—see instructions on page 8)	42		
43 Alimony	43		
44 Other (state nature and source)	44		
45 Total (add lines 35 through 44). Enter here and on line 14 . . . . ▷	45	5,969	40

Part II Adjustments to Income

46 "Sick pay" exclusion (attach Form 2440 or other required statement)	46		
47 Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	47		
48 Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or other statement)	48		
49 Payments as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc. (see Form 4848)	49		
50 Total adjustments (add lines 46, 47, 48, and 49). Enter here and on line 16 . . . . . . ▷	50		

Part III Tax Computation (Do not use this part if you use Tax Tables 1–12 to find your tax.)

51 Adjusted gross income (from line 17)	51	5,991	40
52 (a) If you itemize deductions, enter total from Schedule A, line 40 and attach Schedule A (b) If you do not itemize deductions, enter 15% of line 51, but do NOT enter more than $2,000 ($1,000 if line 3 is checked) . . .	52	4,423	00
53 Subtract line 52 from line 51	53	1,568	40
54 Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 10, by $750	54	5,250	00
55 Taxable income. Subtract line 54 from line 53	55	(3,681	60)

(Figure your tax on the amount on line 55 by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y or Z, or if applicable, the alternative tax from Schedule D, income averaging from Schedule G, or maximum tax from Form 4726.) Enter tax on line 18.

Part IV Credits

56 Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R)	56		
57 Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	57		
58 Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	58		
59 Credit for contributions to candidates for public office—see instructions on page 9	59		
60 Work Incentive Program credit (attach Form 4874)	60		
61 Total credits (add lines 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60). Enter here and on line 19 . . . . . ▷	61		

Part V Other Taxes

62 Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE)	62	522	70
63 Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255)	63		
64 Minimum tax (see instructions on page 10). Check here ☐, if Form 4625 is attached	64		
65 Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137)	65		
66 Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W-2)	66		
67 Total (add lines 62, 63, 64, 65, and 66). Enter here and on line 21 . . . . . . ▷	67	522	70

Part VI Other Payments

68 Excess FICA tax withheld (two or more employers—see instructions on page 10)	68		
69 Credit for Federal tax on special fuels, nonhighway gasoline and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	69		
70 Credit from a Regulated Investment Company (attach Form 2439)	70		
71 Total (add lines 68, 69, and 70). Enter here and on line 26 . . . . ▷	71		

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1972 O 450 040 ☆ GPO 793 601

Schedules A&B—Itemized Deductions AND Dividend and Interest Income

1972

(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

▷ Attach to Form 1040.

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: [illegible] Ruby

Your social security number: 322 | 12 | 7997

Schedule A—Itemized Deductions (Schedule B on back)

[illegible] not compensated by insurance [illegible] drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance [illegible] for medical care, etc.

1 One-half [illegible] $150) of insurance [illegible] (Be [illegible])		
2 [illegible]		
3 [illegible] 1% [illegible] 17, Form 1040		
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference ([illegible] zero, enter zero)		
5 Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1		
6 Itemize other medical and dental expenses. Include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, etc.		
7 Total ([illegible] 4, 5, and 6)		
8 Enter 3% of line 17, Form 1040		
9 Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
10 Total deductible medical and dental expenses ([illegible]). Enter here and on line 33, below.) ▷	150	00
11 Real estate		
12 State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)		
13 General sales (see sales tax tables)		
14 State and local income		
15 Personal property		
16 Other		
17 Total taxes (Add lines 11 through 16. Enter here and on line 34, below.) ▷	841	00

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (Itemize—see instructions on page 11 for examples.)

18 Total cash contributions		
19 Other than cash (see instructions on page 12 for required statement). Enter total for such items here		
20 Carryover from prior years		
21 Total contributions (Add lines 18, 19, and 20. Enter here and on line 35, below.) ▷	200	00

Interest expense.

22 Home mortgage		
23 Installment purchases		
24 Other (Itemize)		
25 Total interest expense (Add lines 22, 23 and 24. Enter here and on line 36, below.) ▷	3,232	00

Casualty or theft loss(es)
See instructions on page 12. NOTE: If you had more than one casualty or theft loss occurrence, OMIT lines 26 through 29 and see page 12 of the instructions for guidance.

26 Loss before adjustments		
27 Insurance reimbursement		
28 $100 limitation	$100	00
29 Add lines 27 and 28		
30 Casualty or theft loss. (Excess of line 26 over line 29. Enter here and on line 37, below.) ▷		
31 Child and dependent care expenses from Form 2441. (Enter here and on line 38, below.) ▷		

Miscellaneous deductions for alimony, union dues, etc. (see instructions on page 13).

32 Total miscellaneous deductions (Enter here and on line 39, below.) ▷		

Summary of Itemized Deductions

A

33 Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from line 10)	150	00
34 Total taxes (from line 17)	841	00
35 Total contributions (from line 21)	200	00
36 Total interest expense (from line 25)	3,232	00
37 Casualty and theft loss(es) (from line 30)		
38 Child and dependent care expenses (from line 31)		
39 Total miscellaneous deductions (from line 32)		
40 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS. (Add lines 33 through 39. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 52.) S/A ▷	4,423	00

NAME [illegible] & Phyllis Ruby IDENTIFICATION NO. 322-12-7992

ADDRESS

SCHEDULE NO. A

SCHEDULE OF DEDUCTIONS

YEAR ENDED '82

MEDICAL	FEDERAL		STATE	
[illegible] HALF OF MEDICAL INSURANCE (NOT OVER $150.00)	110	00	110	00
[illegible] MEDICINES				
[illegible] % OF ADJ. GROSS INCOME				
[illegible] AND MEDICINES				
[illegible] S/DENTISTS				
[illegible] MEDICAL INSURANCE [illegible] ON TOP LINE				
[illegible] MEDICAL				
[illegible] APPLIANCES				
[illegible] EXPENSES				
[illegible] REIMBURSED BY INSURANCE				
[illegible] ADJ. GROSS INCOME				
[illegible] (NOT LESS THAN [illegible])				
[illegible] MEDICAL DEDUCTION [illegible] (LINE [illegible])	110	00	110	00
	FEDERAL		STATE	
[illegible] (LESS DED. [illegible])				
[illegible]	110	00	110	00
[illegible] AUTO				
[illegible] TAX	632	00	632	00
[illegible] PROPERTY TAX				
[illegible] TAX			¤ ¤	¤ ¤
[illegible] GAL. @ [illegible] c GAL.	105	00	105	00
DISABILITY INSURANCE				
MISC. TAX	¤ ¤	¤ ¤		
OTHERS:				
TOTAL TAXES	847	00	847	00

CONTRIBUTIONS	FEDERAL & STATE	
CHURCHES	100	00
COMMUNITY CHEST/UNITED CRUSADE		
SALVATION ARMY/GOODWILL INDUSTRIES		
RED CROSS		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
PARTNERSHIP RETURN		
PAYROLL DEDUCTION		
CITY OF HOPE		
OTHER ORGANIZED CHARITIES:	100	00
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS	200	00
INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)	FEDERAL & STATE	
MORTGAGE LOAN Colonial Mtg.	2,594	00
Sears	40	00
INSTALLMENT LOAN		
Bay Area Fin.	74	00
First Thrift of America	228	00
Wm, Vann & Co.	556	00
TOTAL INTEREST	[illegible]	00
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS	FEDERAL & STATE	
ALIMONY (EXPLAIN)		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX FEE		
UNION DUES		
SMALL TOOLS (GOOD 1 YEAR)		
TOOLS DEPRECIATION		
SAFETY EQUIPMENT		
UNIFORMS (NOT GEN. WEAR)		
LAUNDRY & CLEANING		
AUTO MILEAGE @		
TELEPHONE EXPENSE (NOT REIMB.)		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
DUES & SUBSCRIPTIONS		
INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
CHILD CARE		
OTHERS:		
TOTAL MISC. DEDUCTIONS		
CASUALTY LOSSES (EXPLAIN)	FEDERAL & STATE	
SUB TOTAL		
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
SUB TOTAL		
LESS $100.00 FOR EACH CASUALTY		
TOTAL CASUALTY LOSSES		

	FEDERAL	STATE
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS	[illegible] 00	[illegible] 00

EDWARD L. LAMBERT 17835 VENTURA BOULEVARD, SUITE 106 ENCINO, CALIFORNIA 91316

SCHEDULE C
(Form 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Profit (or Loss) From Business or Profession
(Sole Proprietorship)

▷ Attach to Form 1040.
▷ Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file Form 1065.

1972

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social security number: 322 | 12 | 7997

A Principal business activity (See Schedule C Instructions): Food Service; product .... (For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B Business name: Snack Bar

C Employer Identification Number ....

D Business address (number and street): 5416 Van Nuys Blvd.
City, State and ZIP code: Van Nuys, California

E Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☒ cash; (2) ☐ accrual; (3) ☐ other.

F Were you required to file Form 1096 for 1972? (See Schedule C Instructions) ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," where filed? ▷ ....

G Is this business located within the boundaries of the city, town, etc., indicated? ☒ YES ☐ NO.

H Did you own this business at the end of 1972? ☒ YES ☐ NO.

Ⓒ

I How many months in 1972 did you own this business? 12

J Was an Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 941, filed for this business for any quarter in 1972? ☐ YES ☒ NO.

IMPORTANT—All applicable lines and schedules must be filled in.

1 Gross receipts or sales $........ Less returns and allowances $........ Balance ▷	
2 Less: Cost of goods sold and/or operations (Schedule C-1, line 8)	SCHEDULE ATTACHED
3 Gross profit	
4 Other income (attach schedule)	
5 TOTAL income (add lines 3 and 4)	
6 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-2)	
7 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-3)	
8 Rent on business property	
9 Repairs (explain in Schedule C-3)	
10 Salaries and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	
11 Insurance	
12 Legal and professional fees	
13 Commissions	
14 Amortization (attach statement)	
15 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Schedule C Instructions)	
(b) Employee benefit programs (see Schedule C Instructions)	
16 Interest on business indebtedness	
17 Bad debts arising from sales or services	
18 Depletion	
19 Other business expenses (specify):	
(a)	
(b)	
(c)	
(d)	
(e)	
(f)	
(g)	
(h)	
(i)	
(j)	
(k)	
(l)	
(m)	
(n)	
(o)	
(p) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(o))	
20 Total deductions (add lines 6 through 19)	
21 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on line 35, Form 1040. ALSO enter on Schedule SE, line 1	6,969 40

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby
1972

SUPPLEMENT TO SCHEDULE C

Income	$45,499.72	
Less: Sales Tax	383.47	$45,116.25
Cost of Goods Sold		
Beginning Inventory	$ 800.00	
Purchases		
Beverages/milk	4,491.98	
Groceries	16,463.08	
Meat	2,923.29	
Bakery/bread	3,102.44	
Total Available	$27,780.79	
Less: Ending Inventory	800.00	26,980.79
Gross Income		$18,135.46
Expenses		
Rent	$ 1,728.82	
Accounting	100.00	
Payroll	3,877.93	
Payroll taxes	323.42	
Insurance	190.00	
Telephone	127.45	
Advertising	25.00	
Miscellaneous/repairs	254.15	
Equipment	382.25	
Taxes/licenses	214.51	
Hosiery	12.15	
Auto	425.29	
Linen	-0-	
Donations	61.94	
Newspapers	14.65	7,737.56
NET INCOME		$10,397.90
Less: Depreciation		3,428.50
NET INCOME		$ 6,969.40

DEPRECIATION

Equipment	4-70	$10,000.00	$4,000.00	5 Yr. SL	$2,000.00
Covenant not to Compete		5,000.00	2,000.00	2 Yr. SL	1,000.00
Leasehold Imp. (Balance of Lease)		3,000.00	957.00	7 Yr. SL	428.50
					$3,428.50

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▷ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE.
▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1972

▷ If you had wages, including tips, of $9,000 or more that were subject to social security taxes, do not fill in this page.
▷ If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD): Samuel Ruby

Social security number of self-employed person: 322 | 12 | 7997

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▷

Computation of Net Earnings from BUSINESS Self-Employment (other than farming)

1 Net profit (or loss) shown in Schedule C (Form 1040), line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	6,969	40
2 Net income (or loss) from excluded services or sources included on line 1. Specify excluded services or sources		
3 Net earnings (or loss) from business self-employment (Subtract line 2 from line 1, and enter here and on line 8(a), below.)	6,969	40

Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

SE

A farmer may elect to compute net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD (line 6, below) INSTEAD OF THE REGULAR METHOD (line 5, below) if his gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or loss, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. If your gross profits from farming are not more than $2,400 and you elect to use the optional method, you need not complete lines 4 and 5.

Computation under Regular Method

4 Net farm profit (or loss) from:
(a) Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 74 (accrual method) . . . .
(b) Farm partnerships . . . .
5 Net earnings from self-employment from farming. Add lines 4(a) and (b) . . . .

Computation under Optional Method

6 If gross profits from farming are:*
(a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits . . . .
(b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600

*Gross profits from farming are the total of the gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 78 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profit from farm partnerships as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

7 Enter here and on line 8(b), below, the amount on line 5 (or line 6, if you use the optional method) . . . .

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

8 Net earnings (or loss) from self-employment—				
(a) From business (other than farming) from line 3, above				
(b) From farming (from line 7, above)				
(c) From partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)				
(d) From service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. If you filed Form 4361, check here ☐ and enter zero on this line				
(e) From service with a foreign government or international organization				
(f) Other (director's fees, etc.). Specify				
9 Total net earnings (or loss) from self-employment reported on line 8. (If line 9 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of page.)			6,969	40
10 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security tax for 1972 is	$9,000	00		
11 (a) Total "FICA" wages as indicated on Form W-2 . .				
(b) Unreported tips, if any, subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9 . .				
(c) Total of lines 11(a) and 11(b)				
12 Balance (subtract line 11(c) from line 10) .				
13 Self-employment income—line 9 or 12, whichever is smaller .			6,969	40
14 If line 13 is $9,000, enter $675.00; if less, multiply the amount on line 13 by .075 .			522	70
15 Railroad employee's and railroad employee representative's adjustment for hospital insurance benefits tax from Form 4469				
16 Self-employment tax (subtract line 15 from line 14). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 62 .			522	70

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Gains and Losses

▷ Attach to Form 1040. ▷ Examples of property to be reported on this Schedule are gains and losses on stocks, bonds, and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

1972

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social security number: 322 | 12 | 7997

(D)

Part I | Short-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held Not More Than 6 Months

	a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (see instruction D)	c. Mo., day, yr. (Put date sold above dotted line and date acquired below dotted line)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted (see instruction E) and expense of sale	f. Gain (or loss) (d less e).	
1							
	SCHEDULE ATTACHED					(4,496	00)
						4,296	00

2	Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	2		
3	Enter net gain (or loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3		
4(a)	Short-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction H)	4(a)		
4(b)	Short-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction H) .	4(b)		
5	Net short-term gain (or loss), combine lines 3, 4(a) and 4(b)	5	200	00

Part II | Long-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held More Than 6 Months

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	
6							

7	Capital gain distributions	7		
8	Enter gain if applicable from line 4(a)(1), Form 4797 (see Instruction A)	8		
9	Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	9		
10	Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S) . . .	10		
11	Net gain (or loss), combine lines 6 through 10	11		
12(a)	Long-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction H)	12(a)	(14,522	00)
12(b)	Long-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction H) . .	12(b)		
13	Net long-term gain (or loss), combine lines 11, 12(a) and 12(b)	13		

Part III | Summary of Parts I and II

14	Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain or loss here	14	(14,322	00)
15	If line 14 shows a gain— (a) Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part VI for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13.	15(a)		
	(b) Subtract line 15(a) from line 14. Enter here and on line 36, Form 1040	15(b)		
16	If line 14 shows a loss— ▷ Omit lines 16(a) and 16(b) and go to Part IV if losses are shown on BOTH lines 12(a) and 13. See Instruction I. ▷ Otherwise, (a) Enter one of the following amounts: (i) If amount on line 5 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of amount on line 14; (ii) If amount on line 13 is zero or a net gain, enter amount on line 14; or, (iii) If amounts on line 5 and line 13 are net losses, enter amount on line 5 added to 50% of amount on line 13	16(a)		
	(b) Enter here and enter as a (loss) on line 36, Form 1040, the smaller of: (i) The amount on line 16(a); (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—if a loss is shown on line 4(a) or 12(a), see instruction M for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or, (iii) Taxable income, as adjusted (see Instruction L)	16(b)	(1,000	00)

Carryover (13,322.00)

SAMUEL D. and PHYLLIS RUBY

PAGE

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

SALESMAN Weis, Voisin and Co., Inc. NUMBER 1972 WEEK ENDING / /

SECURITIES	Present Customer	AMOUNT	PRICE	CONTRACT REM DATE PURCHASE T H PRO	APPL. NET PURCHASE PRICE	DATE SOLD	NET SALE PRICE	PRICE HR	+	COMMENTS AND EXPENSE NOTES (LOSS)	GA
[illegible] Mayer Inc.			62½								
[illegible] – 93-05%	ST	$5,000.00	62½	11-17-71	3165.29	1-6-72	3103.[illegible]	61		(62.00)	
[illegible] Conv. Deb.											
95-04%	ST	2,000.00	74½	12-27-71	1,547.62	1-19-72	1564.00	76			16
[illegible] Corp. Conv.											
Deb. 95-07%	ST	3,000.00	74⅝	12-27-71	2321.43	1-19-72	2,352.95	76¼			3
[illegible] Tun. Conv.											
92-04375%	ST	5,000	56¼	12-20-71	2,886.00	1-6-72	2,964.00	57⅝			78
[illegible] Inc.											
[illegible] 375%	ST	10,000	57⅝	1-6-72	5,930.00	1-19-72	6,544.00	65⅝			614.
[illegible] Corp.	ST	200 Sh.	22¼	1-19-72	4,524.00	2-2-72	4146.00	21¼		(378.00)	
[illegible] Corp. Wis.	ST	200 Sh.	15½	1-19-72	3,084.00	2-9-72	3287.00	16¾			203
[illegible] Serv. Corp.	ST	100 Sh.	22	1-26-72	2344.00	2-9-72	2497.00	25½			15
[illegible] Corp.	ST	200 Sh.	11½	2-2-72	2347.00	2-11-72	2069.00	10⅝		(278.00)	
[illegible] Serv. Corp.											
[illegible] Pfd.	ST	100 Sh.	18¾	2-11-72	1914.00	3-13-72	1931.00	19¾			1
[illegible]	ST	200 Sh.	18⅝	2-9-72	3741.00	3-13-72	3727.[illegible]	19		(14.00)	
[illegible] Inc.	ST	200 Sh.	12½	2-9-72	2630.00	3-13-72	2168.00	11½		(462.00)	
[illegible] Corp.	ST	100 Sh.	11½	2-2-72	1174.00	3-13-72	911.00	9⅛		(263.0)	
[illegible]										(1457.00)	1213
TOTALS											

SAMUEL D. and PHYLLIS RUBY

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

SALESMAN Weis, Voisin and Co., Inc. NUMBER ______ WEEK ENDING PAGE II

CUSTOMER NAME SECURITIES	Present Customer	SHARES	PRICE	CONTRACT DATE PURCHASED	PURCHASE PRICE	REVENUE BOOKED DATE SOLD	NET SALES PRICE	PRICE HR	+	COMMENTS AND EXPENSE NOTES (LOSS)	GA
[illegible]	ST	500	14¾	3-13-72	7558.00	4-28-72	7985.00	16	¼		4
[illegible] Chase Man. [illegible] 5.75%	ST	2,000	53	⅞	4-28-72	1161.00	5-22-72	1058.00	52½	(103.00)	
[illegible] Chase Man. Cap. Corp. [illegible] 5.75%	ST	2,000	56	⅞	4-28-72	1161.00	5-22-72	1116.00	55	(45.00)	
Dain [illegible] Chase Cap. Corp. [illegible] 5.75%	ST	8,000	56	⅞	4-28-72	4643.00	5-22-72	4303.00	53	(340.00)	
[illegible]	ST	200	14⅞	3-13-72	3023.00	7-17-72	3603.00	18	⅜		5
[illegible]	ST	100	9¾	8-10-72	1013.00	8-24-72	1057.00	10	⅞		5
[illegible] Purcell Drug	ST	100	18	8-10-72	1835.00	8-24-72	2033.00	20	¾		19
[illegible] Gen'l Wts.	ST	200	15	8-24-72	3061.00	9-6-72	3732.00	19			6
[illegible] Bates	ST	100	27⅞	5-22-72	2835.00	9-18-72	1950.00	19	⅞	(885.00)	
[illegible] Bates	ST	100	27⅝	6-9-72	2809.00	9-18-72	1913.00	19	½	(896.00)	
Nat'l Gen'l Wts.	ST	80	14⅜	9-18-72	1193.00	10-3-72	1145.00	14	⅝	(47.00)	
Nat'l Gen'l Wts.	ST	100	14⅝	9-18-72	1489.00	10-11-72	1519.00	15	½		3
Nat'l Gen'l Wts.	ST	100	14⅝	9-18-7	1489.00	10-11-72	1531.00	15	⅝		4
[illegible] Research [illegible]		100	10¾	3-31-71	1102.00	1-19-72	1073.00	11		(29.00)	
TOTALS										(29.00) (2340.00)	190

SAMUEL D. and PHYLLIS RUBY

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

SALESMAN BACHE and Co. 1972 NUMBER COMMODITIES TRANSA

CUSTOMER NAME COMMODITY	Present Customer	DATE of Purchase	Planned	CONTRACT PREM	INTL	TEL	PRO	APPLICATION PURCHASE PRICE	REVENUE BOOKED DATE SOLD	PRICE	CALL HRS HR	+	COMM EXPE NOTES (LOSS)	
[illegible]														
[illegible]		12-1-71		/				3.67	1-12-72	3.82				
[illegible]		12-21-71		/				3.67	1-12-72	3.82				
[illegible]		12-30-71		5	M	Bu.		123 3/8	1-6-72	122 5/8			(67.50)	
[illegible] Cocoa		1-17-72		/				24.05	1-18-72	25.00				22
[illegible]		1-6-72		/				101.20	1-24-72	102.70				73
[illegible] Cocoa		1-20-72		/				24.65	2-2-72	25.15				9
[illegible] Cocoa		2-3-72		/				24.90	2-7-72	25.60				150
[illegible] Cocoa		2-8-72		/				24.93	2-8-72	25.10			(139.00)	
[illegible]		1-26-72		/				133.00	2-8-72	121.90				
[illegible] Cocoa		2-8-72		/				25.10	3-7-72	25.20			(30.00)	
[illegible] Soybean Oil [illegible]		2-8-72		/				11.79	3-7-72	12.05				123
[illegible] Soybean		3-11-72		5	M	Bu.		337 1/4	3-15-72	351 1/4				7
[illegible] Hogs		3-20-72		/				27.30	3-16-72	27.75				[illegible]
[illegible] Soybean		3-21-72		5	M	Bu.		342.00	3-24-72	345.00				12
[illegible] Cocoa		4-3-72		/				26.44	4-14-72	25.10			(462.00)	
Total													(699.50)	1,0

35.00 FOR FINANCIAL PUBLICATIONS
5.00 FOR ADAMS LETTER
20.00 FOR TAGGER REPORT

TOTALS

RESIDENT 540	INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX	TAXABLE YEAR 1972

For calendar year 1972, or other taxable year beginning , 1972, ending , 1973

FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S)	LAST NAME	Your social security number
SAMUEL AND [illegible]	RUBY	322 12 7997

Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 [illegible]

Wife's number, if joint return: 349 18 1420

City, town or post office, State: Granada Hills, California

ZIP CODE:

OCCUPATION: Yours Self Employed; Wife's Housewife

Married, filing joint return

☐ Married, filing separate return. Enter spouse's social security number and first name here

☐ Head of Household—Complete Part 1, page 2

5. Dependents—Do not list yourself, your spouse or person who qualifies you as head of household

NAME (Include last name and/or address if different from yours) RELATIONSHIP

Fred, Brian, Elisa, Thomas

Enter Number ▷ 5 — 4

6. Blind (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions claimed ▷ 6

7. Total dependent and blind exemptions (add lines 5 and 6) . . . 7 — 4

8. Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. (Attach Copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to front. If unavailable, attach explanation)	8		
9. Dividends. Enter total (If over $500, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	9	70	00
10. Interest. Enter total (If over $500, complete and attach Schedule (B(540))	10	22	00
11. Income other than wages, dividends and interest (from page 2, line 41)	11	5,969	40
12. Total (add lines 8, 9, 10 and 11)	12	6,061	40
13. Adjustments to income (from page 2, line 47)	13		
14. Adjusted gross income (subtract line 13 from line 12)	14	6,061	40
○ If you do not itemize deductions AND line 14 is under $10,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 17. ○ If you itemize deductions OR line 14 is $10,000 or more complete lines 15 and 16. 15. Itemized deductions OR standard deduction (from page 2, line 56)	15	2,000	00
16. Taxable income (subtract line 15 from line 14). Figure your tax on this amount by using the appropriate Tax Rate Schedule in instructions. Enter tax on line 17	16	4,061	40
17. Tax (check if from ☐ Tax Table, ☒ Tax Rate Schedule ☐ ☐ Schedule G(540))	17	52	00
18. Personal Exemption. Single—$25. Married couple or head of household—$50 . . . 18 — 50 00			
19. Other Exemptions—Total on line 7 above, 4 × $8 . . . 19 — 32 00			
20. Total exemptions (add lines 18 and 19)	20	82	00
21. Tax liability (subtract line 20 from line 17)	21	-0-	
22. Other credits (from page 2, line 59)	22		
23. Net tax liability (subtract line 22 from line 21)	23	-0-	
24. Tax on preference income (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540))	24		
25. Total tax liability (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-	
26. Total California income tax withheld (attach Form(s) W-2 or DE-2P to front) . . . 26			
27. 1972 California estimated tax payments . . . 27			
28. Excess California SDI tax withheld (attach Form DE 1964 to face of return) . . . 28	○		
29. Total payments (add lines 26, 27 and 28)	29		
30. If line 25 is larger than line 29, enter BALANCE DUE. Pay in full. Mail payment with return to Franchise Tax Board, Sacramento, CA 95867. ◇	30	-0-	
31. If line 29 is larger than line 25, enter OVERPAYMENT. Mail return to P.O. Box 13-540, Sacramento, CA 95813. ▷	31		
32. Line 31 to be (a) REFUNDED. (Allow at least six weeks for your refund) ▷			
(b) Credited on 1973 estimated tax ▷			

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here ▷ Your signature—if filing jointly, BOTH must sign Date

▷ Spouse's signature Date

▷ Signature of preparer other than taxpayer Address Date

EDWARD L. LAMBERT
TAX CONSULTANT
17855 VENTURA BLVD., SUITE [illegible]
ENCINO, CALIF. 91316
TEL. (213) 881-7350
S.S. 568 40-9527

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
A

[illegible]—Head of Household—If claimed, answer the following questions *(See Instructions)*

Check one: ☐ Never married ☐ Widow(er) Date________ ☐ Legal separation (interlocutory decree does not qualify) Date________ ☐ Final divorce/dissolution Date________

Individual who qualified you as head of household (Do not list this individual as a dependent on page 1, line 5):

Name________ Relationship________ Age____ Did this person qualify as your dependent for [illegible] year 1972?____ Did this person reside in your home for the entire taxable year?____ If not, explain circumstances

[illegible] Income

[illegible] (or loss) (attach Schedule C(540))		33	6,969	40
(a) [illegible] (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D(540))	(1,000 00)			
(b) [illegible] gain (or loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Schedule D-1(540))				
[illegible] net gain (or loss)—add lines 34 (a) and (b)		34	(1,000	00)
[illegible] and annuities } Attach Schedule E (540)		35		
[illegible] royalties		36		
Partnerships		37		
Estates and trusts		38		
Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F(540))		39		
[illegible] (a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E)				
(b) Alimony				
(c) Other (state nature and source)........				
(d) Total miscellaneous income (add lines 40(a), (b) and (c))		40		
[illegible] 33 through 40. Enter here and on page 1, line 11		41	5,969	40

[illegible] Adjustments to Income

[illegible] included in line 8 (see Instructions—attach statement)	42		
[illegible] expenses (see Instructions—attach statement)	43		
[illegible] business expenses (see Instructions—attach statement)	44		
[illegible] exclusion—active duty pay only (see Instructions for line 8, page [illegible])	45		
[illegible] self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc.	46		
[illegible] adjustments (add lines 42 through [illegible]). Enter here and on page 1, line 10	47		

[illegible] Itemized Deductions or Standard Deduction

On separate returns of married taxpayers both must itemize deductions or both must take the standard deduction

If [illegible] deductions, complete and attach Schedule A (540) and enter sub totals on lines 48 through 53, below

[illegible] medical [illegible] expense (from Schedule A (540), line 10)	48		
Total [illegible] deduction [illegible] (from Schedule A (540), line 15)	49		
[illegible] (from Schedule A (540), line 21)	50		
Total [illegible] (from Schedule A (540), line 25)	51		
[illegible] expense (from Schedule A (540), line 29)	52		
Total miscellaneous deductions (from Schedule A (540), line 37)	53		
[illegible] itemized deductions (add lines 48 through 53)	54		
[illegible] not itemize deductions, enter a standard deduction of (a) [illegible], if single or married person filing separate return (b) [illegible], if head of household, or married couple filing joint return	55	08 2,000	00
[illegible] deductions (line 54) or standard deduction (line 55). Enter here and on page 1, line 15	56		

[illegible] for Net Income Tax Paid to Another State—Attach copy of "other state" return—and Retirement Income Credit

[illegible] derived from sources within State of .... and also taxable by California	A			
[illegible] adjusted gross income (from page 1, line 14)	B			
[illegible] tax liability (from page 1, line [illegible])	C			
[illegible]—line A ÷ line B ......% (100% maximum) × line C (cannot exceed tax paid other state)		57		
[illegible] (from Schedule [illegible] (540))		58		
[illegible] lines 57 and 58. Enter here and on page 1, line 22		59		

[illegible] Reconciliation to Federal Return—If adjusted gross income on Federal Return is different from line 14, page 1, explain below

04200-400 0-72 10,000M ⓔ △ OSP

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS

Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
19 72
YEAR

Name(s) as shown on Form 540
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number
322 | 12 | 7997

[illegible] Standard Deduction—You have a choice between two deduction [illegible] either itemize your deductions or take a standard deduction as [illegible] in the 540 instructions. On separate returns of a husband and wife, if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may not use the Tax Table or elect the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete the appropriate items below.

[illegible] (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for [illegible] drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospitals [illegible], insurance premiums for medical care, etc.		
[illegible]	1	[illegible]
[illegible]	2	
Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540 [illegible]	3	
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	4	
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	5	
6. [illegible] other medical and dental expenses	6	
[illegible]	7	
[illegible] of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540 [illegible]	8	
Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	9	
[illegible] lines 4 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2 ▷	10	150.00
[illegible] paid or incurred [illegible]. Attach itemized [illegible]	11	
[illegible] of adjusted gross income shown on [illegible]	12	
[illegible] here and on Form [illegible] ▷	13	
[illegible] Real estate	14	
State and local gasoline	15	
General sales	16	
[illegible]—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)	17	
[illegible]	18	
State disability insurance (SDI)—Employee (private [illegible])	19	
Other [illegible]	20	
21. Total [illegible]—Add lines 14 through 20. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2 ▷	21	841.00

Contributions

22. Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)	22	
23. Total cash contributions	23	
24. Other than cash (see instructions). Enter total here	24	
25. Total—Add lines 23 and 24. Maximum deduction may not exceed 20% of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2 ▷	25	200.00

Interest Expense

26. Home mortgage	26	
27. Installment purchases	27	
28. Other (itemize)	28	
29. Total—Add lines 26, 27 and 28. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2 ▷	29	3,232.00

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See instructions

NOTE: If you had more than one casualty or theft loss occurrence, omit lines 30 through 33 and follow instructions for guidance.

30. Loss before adjustments	30	
31. Insurance reimbursement	31	
32. $100 limitation	32	$100.00
33. Add lines 31 and 32	33	
34. Casualty or theft loss. (Line 30 less line 33)	34	
35. Child Care—See instructions	35	
36. Other—For education, alimony, union dues, etc. —See instructions	36	
37. Total miscellaneous deductions—Add lines 34, 35 and 36. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	37	

(Rev. 1972)

Schedule D on reverse

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION
(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
19 72
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565

Name(s) as shown on Form 540 / 540NR
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

A. Principal business activity Food Service ; product
(See instructions for "Item A.") (For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name Snack Bar C. Federal employer identification number
D. Business address 5618 Van Nuys Blvd. Van Nuys, California (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other.
F. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 597 for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☐ Yes ☒ No
G. Is the business located within the boundaries of the city, town, etc. indicated? ☒ Yes ☐ No
H. Did you own this business at the end of the taxable year? ☒ Yes ☐ No
I. How many months of the taxable year did you own this business? 12

IMPORTANT—All applicable lines and schedules must be filled in.

1. Gross receipts or sales $ Less returns and allowances $ Balance ▷	SCHEDULE
2. Less: Cost of goods sold (Schedule C-1, line 8) and/or operations (attach schedule)	ATTACHED
3. Gross profit	
4. Other income (attach schedule)	
5. Total income (add lines 3 and 4)	
6. Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-2)	
7. Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-3)	
8. Rent on business property	
9. Repairs (explain in Schedule C-3)	
10. Salaries and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	
11. Insurance	
12. Legal and professional fees	
13. Commissions	
14. Amortization (attach statement)	
15. (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Instructions for line 15(a))	
(b) Employee benefit programs (see Instructions for line 15(b))	
16. Interest on business indebtedness	
17. Bad debts arising from sales or services	
18. Depletion	
19. Other business expenses (specify):	
(a)	
(b)	
(c)	
(d)	
(e)	
(f)	
(g)	
(h)	
(i)	
(j)	
(k)	
(l)	
(m)	
(n)	
(o)	
(p) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(o))	
20 Total deductions (add lines 6 through 19)	
21 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or Form 540NR	6,969 60

(Rev. 1972)

SCHEDULE D FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE 1972 YEAR

[illegible] this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

[illegible] Ruby | 322 | 12 | 7997

[illegible] Assets Held Not More Than One Year

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d less e.)
	SCHEDULE ATTACHED				(4,496.00)
					4,296.00

[illegible] share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
[illegible] short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
Net gain or loss, [illegible] lines 1, 2 and 3	200.00

[illegible] More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.

[illegible] Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
[illegible] share of [illegible] from partnerships and fiduciaries	
[illegible] lines 5, 6 and 7	

[illegible] More Than Five Years

a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.

[illegible] Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
[illegible] partnerships and fiduciaries	
[illegible] long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	(14,322.00)
[illegible] or loss, [illegible] lines 9, 10, 11 and 12	

[illegible] of Capital Gains and Losses

[illegible]		
[illegible] of the [illegible] on line [illegible]		
[illegible] of the amount on line 13		
[illegible] amounts shown on lines 14, 15 and 16		
If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR		

If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of:
(a) amount on line 17
(b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets)
(c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return) . . . . (1,000.00)

Carryover (13,322.00)

7-13-72 2.50

Form **1040** US Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service

Individual Income Tax Return 1971

For the year January 1–December 31, 1971, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1971, ending ...., 19 ....

Please print or type

First name and initial (If joint return, use first names and middle initials of both)	Last name	Your social security number
SAMUEL AND PHYLLIS	RUBY	322 : 12 : 7997

Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route)	Spouse's social security number
16250 Bircher Street	349 : 18 : 1420

City, town or post office, State and ZIP code: Granada Hills, California

Occupation — Yours: Self Employed — Spouse's: Housewife

Filing Status—check only one:

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing jointly (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separately and spouse is also filing. Give spouse's social security number in space above and enter first name here ▶
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
5 ☐ Surviving widow(er) with dependent child
6 ☐ Married filing separately and spouse is not filing

Exemptions

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of boxes checked
7 Yourself	☒	☐	☐	
8 Spouse (applies only if item 2 or 6 is checked)	☒	☐	☐	▶ 2

9 First names of your dependent children who lived with you Fred, Brian, Elisa Thomas — Enter number ▶ 4

10 Number of other dependents (from line 33) ▶

11 Total exemptions claimed ▶ 6

Please attach Copy B of Form W-2 to back

Income

12 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. (Attach Forms W-2 to back. If unavailable, attach explanation)	12	
13a Dividends (see pages 6 and 11 of instr.) $ 42.50 13b Less exclusion $ 42.50 Balance ▶	13c	-0-
(If gross dividends and other distributions are over $100, list in Part I of Schedule B.)		
14 Interest. If $100 or less, enter total without listing in Schedule B. If over $100, enter total and list in Part II of Schedule B	14	178 86
15 Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 40)	15	6,350 33
16 Total (add lines 12, 13c, 14 and 15)	16	6,529 19
17 Adjustments to income (such as "sick pay," moving expense, etc. from line 45)	17	
18 Adjusted gross income (subtract line 17 from line 16)	18	6,529 19

- *See page 3 of instructions for rules under which the IRS will figure your tax.*
- *If you do not itemize deductions and line 18 is under $10,000, find tax in Tables and enter on line 19.*
- *If you itemize deductions or line 18 is $10,000 or more, go to line 46 to figure tax.*

Tax, Payments and Credits

19 Tax (Check if from: ☐ Tax Tables 1-13, ☐ Tax Rate Sch. X, Y, or Z, ☒ Sch. D, ☐ Sch. G or ☐ Form 4726)	19	-0-
20 Total credits (from line 54)	20	
21 Income tax (subtract line 20 from line 19)	21	-0-
22 Other taxes (from line 60)	22	551 27
23 Total (add lines 21 and 22)	23	551 27
24 Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2 or W-2P to back) 24		
25 1971 Estimated tax payments (include 1970 overpayment allowed as a credit) 25		
26 Other payments (from line 64) 26		
27 Total (add lines 24, 25, and 26)	27	

Bal. Due or Refund

28 If line 23 is larger than line 27, enter BALANCE DUE. Pay in full with return. Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service ▶	28	551 27
29 If line 27 is larger than line 23, enter OVERPAYMENT ▶	29	
30 Line 29 to be: (a) REFUNDED Allow at least six weeks for your refund check ▶		
(b) Credited on 1972 estimated tax ▶		

Foreign Accounts

31 Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)? If "Yes," attach Form 4683. (For definitions, see Form 4683.) ▶ ☐ Yes ☒ No

Write soc. sec. no. on Check or Money Order. Attach here

Sign here

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete.

▶ ________ Your signature ________ Date

▶ ________ Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▶ EDWARD L. LAMBERT
Signature of preparer other than taxpayer, based on all information of which he has any knowledge. Date

Address
1663 VENTURA BLVD., SUITE 510
ENCINO, CALIF. 91316
TEL. (213) 981-4020

Attach Copy B of Form W-2 here. ▶

PART I.—Additional Exemptions (Complete only for other dependents claimed on line 10)

32 (a) NAME	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year, write B or D.	(d) Did dependent have income of $675 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write ALL.	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

33 Total number of dependents listed above. Enter here and on line 10 ▶

PART II.—Income other than Wages, Dividends, and Interest

34	Business income or (loss) (attach Schedule C)	34	7,350	33
35	Net gain or (loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D)	35	(1,000	00)
36	Net gain or (loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Form 4797)	36		
37	Pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E).	37		
38	Farm income or (loss) (attach Schedule F)	38		
39 Miscellaneous income	(a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities not reported on Schedule E—see instructions on page 7			
	(b) 50% of capital gain distributions (not reported on Schedule D)			
	(c) State income tax refunds (caution—see instructions on page 7)			
	(d) Alimony			
	(e) Other (state nature and source)			
	(f) Total miscellaneous income (add lines 39(a), (b), (c), (d) and (e))	39		
40	**Total** (add lines 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39). **Enter here and on line 15** ▶	40	6,350	00

PART III.—Adjustments to Income

41	"Sick pay" if included in line 12 (attach Form 2440 or other required statement)	41		
42	Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	42		
43	Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or other statement)	43		
44	Payments as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc. (attach Form 2950SE)	44		
45	**Total adjustments** (add lines 41, 42, 43, and 44). **Enter here and on line 17** ▶	45		

PART IV.—Tax Computation (Do not use this part if you use Tax Tables 1–13 to find your tax.)

46	Adjusted gross income (from line 18)	46	6,529	19
47	(a) If you itemize deductions, enter total from Schedule A, line 32 and attach Schedule A (b) If you do not itemize deductions, and line 46 is: (1) $10,000 or more but less than $11,538.43, enter 13% of line 46 (2) $11,538.43 or more, enter $1,500. **Note:** deduction under (1) or (2) is limited to $750 if married and filing separately.	47	4,010	99
48	Subtract line 47 from line 46	48	2,518	20
49	Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 11, by $675	49	4,050	00
50	**Taxable income.** Subtract line 49 from line 48 ▶	50	-0-	

(Figure your tax on the amount on line 50 by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y or Z, or if applicable, the alternative tax from Schedule D, income averaging from Schedule G, or maximum tax from Form 4726.) **Enter tax on line 19.**

PART V.—Credits

51	Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R)	51		
52	Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	52		
53	Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	53		
54	**Total credits** (add lines 51, 52, and 53). **Enter here and on line 20** ▶	54		

PART VI.—Other Taxes

55	Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE)	55	551	27
56	Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255)	56		
57	Minimum tax (see instructions on page 8). Check here ☐, if Form 4625 is attached	57		
58	Social security tax on unreported tip income (attach Form 4137)	58		
59	Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W-2)	59		
60	**Total** (add lines 55, 56, 57, 58, and 59). **Enter here and on line 22** ▶	60	551	27

PART VII.—Other Payments

61	Excess FICA tax withheld (two or more employers—see instructions on page 8)	61		
62	Credit for Federal tax on special fuels, nonhighway gasoline and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	62		
63	Regulated Investment Company Credit (attach Form 2439)	63		
64	**Total** (add lines 61, 62, and 63). **Enter here and on line 26** ▶	64		

[illegible] U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE [illegible]

Schedules A&B—Itemized Deductions AND Dividend and Interest Income

(Form 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1971

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Your social security number: 322 ¦ 12 ¦ 7997

Schedule A—Itemized Deductions (Schedule B on back)

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1 One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care. (Be sure to include in line 10 below)		
2 Medicine and drugs		
3 Enter 1% of line 18, Form 1040		
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
5 Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1		
6 Itemize other medical and dental expenses. Include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, etc.		
7 Total (add lines 4, 5, and 6)		
8 Enter 3% of line 18, Form 1040		
9 Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
10 Total deductible medical and dental expenses (Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on line 27, below.) ▶	150	00

Taxes.

11 Real estate		
12 State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)		
13 General sales (see sales tax tables)		
14 State and local income		
15 Personal property		
16 Other		
17 Total taxes (Add lines 11 through 16. Enter here and on line 28, below.) ▶	743	31

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (Itemize—see instructions on page 10 for examples)

18 Total cash contributions		
19 Other than cash (see instructions on page 10 for required statement). Enter total for such items here		
20 Carryover from prior years		
21 Total contributions (Add lines 18, 19, and 20. Enter here and on line 29, below.)		

Interest expense.

22 Home mortgage		
23 Installment purchases		
24 Other (Itemize)		
25 Total interest expense (Add lines 22, 23, and 24. Enter here and on line 30, below.) ▶	2,617	68

Miscellaneous deductions for child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc. (see instructions on page 10).

26 Total miscellaneous deductions (Enter here and on line 31, below.) ▶	500	00

Summary of Itemized Deductions

A

27 Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from line 10)	150	00
28 Total taxes (from line 17)	743	31
29 Total contributions (from line 21)		
30 Total interest expense (from line 25)	2,617	68
31 Total miscellaneous deductions (from line 26)	500	00
32 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS. (Add lines 27 through 31. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 47.) S/A ▶	4,010	99

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby IDENTIFICATION NO. 322-12-7997

ADDRESS

SCHEDULE NO.

SCHEDULE OF DEDUCTIONS

YEAR ENDED

MEDICAL	FEDERAL		STATE	
1. ONE HALF OF MEDICAL INSURANCE (NOT OVER $150.00)	150	00	150	00
2. DRUGS AND MEDICINES				
3. LESS: 1% OF ADJ. GROSS INCOME				
4. NET DRUGS AND MEDICINES				
5. DOCTORS/DENTISTS				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
MEDICARE				
HOSPITAL				
LABORATORY				
BALANCE OF MEDICAL INSURANCE NOT DEDUCTIBLE ON TOP LINE				
TRAVEL FOR MEDICAL				
AMBULANCE				
GLASSES				
HEARING AID				
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES				
MEDICAL EXPENSES				
LESS: REIMBURSED BY INSURANCE				
6. TOTAL				
7. LESS: 3% OF ADJ. GROSS INCOME				
8. BALANCE (NOT LESS THAN ZERO)				
9. **TOTAL MEDICAL DEDUCTIONS** (LINE 1 PLUS LINE 8)	150	00	150	00

TAXES	FEDERAL		STATE	
AUTO LICENSE (LESS REG. FEE)				
SALES TAX	100	00	100	00
SALES TAX AUTO				
REAL ESTATE TAX	573	31	573	31
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX				
STATE INCOME TAX			x x	x x
GAS TAX 1000 GAL. @ .07 c GAL.	70	00	70	00
DISABILITY INSURANCE				
MISC. TAX	x x	x x		
OTHERS:				
TOTAL TAXES	743	31	743	31

CONTRIBUTIONS	FEDERAL & STATE	
CHURCHES		
COMMUNITY CHEST/UNITED CRUSADE		
SALVATION ARMY/GOODWILL INDUSTRIES		
RED CROSS		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
PARTNERSHIP RETURN		
PAYROLL DEDUCTION		
OTHER ORGANIZED CHARITIES:		
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS		

INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)	FEDERAL & STATE	
MORTGAGE LOAN		
Colonial Mtg	2617	68
INSTALLMENT LOAN		
TOTAL INTEREST	2617	68

MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS	FEDERAL & STATE	
ALIMONY (EXPLAIN)		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX FEE		
UNION DUES		
SMALL TOOLS (GOOD 1 YEAR)		
TOOLS DEPRECIATION		
SAFETY EQUIPMENT		
UNIFORMS (NOT GEN. WEAR)		
LAUNDRY & CLEANING		
AUTO MILEAGE @		
TELEPHONE EXPENSE (NOT REIMB.)		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
DUES & SUBSCRIPTIONS		
INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
OTHERS		
TOTAL MISC. DEDUCTIONS		

CASUALTY LOSSES (EXPLAIN)	FEDERAL & STATE		
Earthquake Damage 2-71	3100	00	
SUB TOTAL	3100	00	
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.	2500	00	SBA Forgiveness
SUB TOTAL	600	00	
LESS $100.00 FOR EACH CASUALTY	100	00	
TOTAL CASUALTY LOSSES	500	00	

	FEDERAL		STATE	
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS	4010	99	4010	99

EDWARD L. LAMBERT 16633 VENTURA BOULEVARD SUITE 510 ENCINO CALIFORNIA 91316

ULE C
m 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Profit (or Loss) From Business or Profession

(Sole Proprietorship)

▷ Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 1065.
▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1971

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social security number: 322 | 12 | 7997

A Principal business activity Food Service ; product ....
(See separate instructions) (For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B Business name Snack Bar

C Employer Identification Number

D Business address 5418 Van Nuys Blvd, Van Nuys, California 91401 (ZIP code)

E Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☒ cash; (2) ☐ accrual; (3) ☐ other.

F Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?
☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," attach explanation.

G Were you required to file Forms 1096 and 1099 or 1087 for the calendar year 1971? (See "Item G" in separate instructions for Schedule C.)
☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," where were they filed? ▷

1 Gross receipts or gross sales $ .... Less: Returns and allowances $ .... $

2 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory attach explanation)

3 Merchandise purchased $ ...., less cost of any items withdrawn from business for personal use $ ....

4 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)

5 Material and supplies

6 Other costs (explain in Schedule C–1)

7 Total of lines 2 through 6

8 Inventory at end of this year

9 Cost of goods sold and/or operations (subtract line 8 from line 7)

10 Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)

SCHEDULE ATTACHED

OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS

11 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C–2)

12 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C–1)

13 Rent on business property

14 Repairs (explain in Schedule C–1)

15 Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)

16 Insurance

17 Legal and professional fees

18 Commissions

19 Amortization (attach statement)

20 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (See Instructions).

(b) Employee benefit programs (See Instructions)

21 Interest on business indebtedness

22 Bad debts arising from sales or services

23 Depletion

24 Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C–1)

25 Total of lines 11 through 24

26 **Net profit (or loss)** (subtract line 25 from line 10). Enter here and on line 34, Form 1040. ALSO enter on Schedule SE, Part I, line 1 7,350

SCHEDULE C–1. EXPLANATION OF LINES 6, 12, 14, AND 24

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

SUPPLEMENT TO SCHEDULE C

Income		$43,479.18
Less: Sales Tax		174.63
		$43,304.55
Cost of Goods Sold		
Beginning inventory	$ 800.00	
Purchases		
Beverage/milk	4,980.70	
Groceries	15,169.50	
Meat	2,570.35	
Bakery/bread	2,815.62	
Total Available	$26,336.17	
Less: Ending inventory	800.00	25,536.17
Adjusted Gross Profit		$17,768.38
Expenses		
Casual labor	$ 48.12	
Rent	1,459.87	
Payroll	3,640.03	
Telephone	148.00	
Insurance	190.50	
Advertising	43.70	
Accounting	175.00	
Miscellaneous	27.04	
Equipment	74.03	
Maintenance/repairs	136.19	
Taxes/licenses	558.06	
Hosiery	130.04	
Auto	317.14	
Linen	17.83	
Donations	24.00	6,989.55
		$10,778.83
Less: Depreciation		(3,428.50)
NET PROFIT		$ 7,350.33

DEPRECIATION

Equipment	4/70	$10,000.00	$2,000.00	5 Yr. SL	$2,000.00
Covenant not to Compete		5,000.00	1,000.00	5 Yr. SL	1,000.00
Leasehold Imp. (Bal. of Lease)		3,000.00	428.50	7 Yr. SL	428.50
					$3,428.50

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▷ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE.
▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1971

▷ If you had wages, including tips, of $7,800 or more that were subject to social security taxes, do not fill in this page.
▷ If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

Name of self-employed person (as shown on social security card): Samuel Ruby

Social security number of self-employed person: 322 | 12 | 7997

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▷

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from BUSINESS Self-Employment (other than farming)

1 Net profit (or loss) shown in Schedule C (Form 1040), line 26. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	7,350	33
2 Net income (or loss) from excluded services or sources included on line 1. Specify excluded services or sources		
3 Net earnings (or loss) from business self-employment (Subtract line 2 from line 1, and enter here and on line 8(a), Part III below.)	7,350	33

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

SE

A farmer may elect to compute net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD (line 6, below) INSTEAD OF THE REGULAR METHOD (line 5, below) if his gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. If your gross profits from farming are not more than $2,400 and you elect to use the optional method, you need not complete lines 4 and 5.

Computation under Regular Method

4 Net farm profit (or loss) from:				
(a) Schedule F, line 52 (cash method), or line 71 (accrual method)				
(b) Farm partnerships				
5 Net earnings from self-employment from farming. Add lines 4(a) and (b)				

Computation under Optional Method

6 If gross profits from farming are:*		
(a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits		
(b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600		

***Note.**—*Gross profits from farming are the total of the gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 69 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profit from farm partnerships as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.*

7 Enter here and on line 8(b), Part III, below, the amount on line 5 (or line 6, if you use the optional method)		

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

8 Net earnings (or loss) from self-employment—						
(a) From business (other than farming) from line 3, Part I, above					7,350	33
(b) From farming (from line 7, Part II, above)						
(c) From partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)						
(d) From service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. If you filed Form 4361, check here ☐ and enter zero on this line						
(e) From service with a foreign government or international organization						
(f) Other (director's fees, etc.). Specify						
9 Total net earnings (or loss) from self-employment reported on line 8					7,350	33
(If line 9 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of page.)						
10 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security tax is			$7,800	00		
11 (a) Total "FICA" wages as indicated on Form W-2						
(b) Unreported tips, if any, subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9						
(c) Total of lines 11(a) and 11(b)						
12 Balance (subtract line 11(c) from line 10)						
13 Self-employment income—line 9 or 12, whichever is smaller					7,350	33
14 If line 13 is $7,800, enter $585.00; if less, multiply the amount on line 13 by .075					551	27
15 Railroad employee's and railroad employee representative's adjustment for hospital insurance benefits tax from Form 4469						
16 Self-employment tax (subtract line 15 from line 14). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 55					551	27

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Gains and Losses

▷ Attach to Form 1040. ▷ Examples of property to be reported on this Schedule are gains and losses on stocks, bonds, and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

1971

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social security number: 3[illegible]2 12 7997

D

Part I Short-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held Not More Than 6 Months

	a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (see instructions)	c. Mo., day, yr. (Put date sold above dotted line and date acquired below dotted line)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or (loss) (d less e)
1						
	SCHEDULE ATTACHED					(1,248 00)

2	Enter your share of net short-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	2	
3	Enter net gain or (loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3	
4(a)	Short-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction H)	4(a)	
4(b)	Short-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction H)	4(b)	
5	Net short-term gain or (loss), combine lines 3, 4(a) and 4(b)	5	

Part II Long-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held More Than 6 Months

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.
6						

7	Capital gain distributions	7	
8	Enter gain if applicable from line 4(a)(1), Form 4797 (see Instruction A)	8	
9	Enter your share of net long-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	9	
10	Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	10	
11	Net gain or (loss), combine lines 6 through 10	11	
12(a)	Long-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction H)	12(a)	(14,274 00)
12(b)	Long-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction H)	12(b)	
13	Net long term gain or (loss), combine lines 11, 12(a) and 12(b)	13	(14,274 00)

Part III Summary of Parts I and II

14	Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain (loss) here	14	(15,522 00)
15	**If line 14 shows a gain—**		
	(a) Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part VI for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13	15(a)	
	(b) Subtract line 15(a) from line 14. Enter here and on line 35, Form 1040	15(b)	
16	**If line 14 shows a loss**—See Instruction I. ▷ Omit lines 16(a) and 16(b) and go to Part IV if losses are shown on lines 12(a) and 13. ▷ Otherwise,		
	(a) Enter **one** of the following amounts: *(i)* If amount on line 5 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of amount on line 14; *(ii)* If amount on line 13 is zero or a net gain, enter amount on line 14; or, *(iii)* If amounts on line 5 and line 13 are net losses, enter amount on line 5 added to 50% of amount on line 13	16(a)	
	(b) Enter here and on line 35, Form 1040, the smaller of: *(i)* The amount on line 16(a); *(ii)* $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—if losses are shown on lines 4(a) and 5, see Instruction K for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or, *(iii)* Taxable income, as adjusted (see instruction J)	16(b)	(1,000 00)

Carryover (1-1 ($14,522.00)

…ends Stock Ruby 74 … 215 Interest Paid margin …

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

SALESMAN Bache & Co. Phyllis Ruby NUMBER All Stock WEEK ENDING Acquired "A"

CUSTOMER NAME	Present Customer	TYPE BUSINESS	Planned	CONTRACT PREM	CONTRACT INTL	CONTRACT TEL	CONTRACT PRO	APPLICATION	REVENUE BOOKED ONE TIME	REVENUE BOOKED MONTHLY	CALL HRS HR	CALL HRS +	COMMENTS AND EXPENSE NOTES
Description	Sh.	Date Acquired						Date Sold	Sale Price	Purchase Price			Gain or Loss
Transamerica Corp	10	12-15-70						1-5-71	3107-	2933-			174-
Wooden Co.	150	12-31-70						1-6-71	3318-	3,100-			218-
Tyler Corp.	200	1-6-71						1-19-71	3,132-	2,857-			275-
ller Corp.	50	1-6-71						1-19-71	779-	718-			61-
is AM Fletcher	200	1-19-71						1-22-71	4,073-	3,594-			479-
s Equity Funding	300	1-22-71						2-3-71	4,30[illegible]	3781-			522-
rysler Corp	100	2-3-71						2-16-71	2,772-	2,6[illegible]			125-
dway Inc.	300	2-4-71						2-17-71	1,999-	1,930-			69-
o Inc	200	2-3-71						2-26-71	2,390-	2,352			38-
Leasco 34.80	300	2-17-71						3-4-71	2,414-	2,536-			(122-)
ney Serv (VPR	50	2-16-71						3-4-71	514-	528			(14-)
ney Serv.	200	2-16-71						3-9-71	2,112-	2,044-			68-
ucky Fried Ch.	200	3-4-71						3-10-71	4,318-	3,776-			541-
ing Tiger	100	3-12-71						3-12-71	4,103-	4,155-			(52-)
umbia Pict Ind	200	3-11-71						3-26-71	2,909-	3,463-			(554-)
umbia Pict Ind	50	3-11-71						3-26-71	723-	770-			(47-)
heed Air Craft	300	3-26-71						4-6-71	3,319-	3,395-			(76-)
TALS													

(over)

S. D. Ruby

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

Phyllis R by

SALESMAN: Bache & Co NUMBER: All stocks WEEK ENDING: Acquired '71

CUSTOMER NAME	Present Customer Sh	TYPE BUSINESS	Planned	CONTRACT PREM	CONTRACT INTL	CONTRACT TEL	CONTRACT PRO	APPLICATION	REVENUE BOOKED ONE TIME	REVENUE BOOKED MONTHLY	CALL HRS HR	CALL HRS +	COMMENTS AND EXPENSE NOTES
Description		Date Acquired	/					[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]			[illegible]
ts Nat'l Genl Cp $40	200	3-9-71						4-30-71	1,355-	1,335			20-
ts Nat'l Genl Cp $40	100	3-9-71						5-14-71	741-	669			72-
Engraved Pt Sys	100	2-22-71						5-14-71	480-	850-			(370-)
lts Loews Theat	100	4-30-71						6-1-71	2,316-	2,091			225-
lts Nrth Wst Ind	200	4-6-71						6-4-71	3,535	2,955-			580-
ts Nrth Wst Ind '79	50	6-1-71						6-4-71	852	[illegible]			42-
ts Whittaker Corp	100	5-14-71						6-1-71	457-	55[illegible]			(95-)
ts Whittaker Corp	200	5-14-71						8-24-71	939-	[illegible]			(171-)
Republic Corp	200	6-4-71						8-24-71	1,034-	1,645-			(611-)
Silitron Devices	100	4-6-71						8-24-71	1,304-	1,952-			(648-)
Resorts Intnat'l	300	6-4-71						8-24-71	1,443-	2,422-			(979-)
ts Nrth Wst Ind '79	200	8-24-71						11-16-71	3,411-	4,448			(1037-)
TOTALS													

S. D. Ruby

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

SALESMAN: Bache + Co Commodity NUMBER: ______ WEEK ENDING / /

CUSTOMER NAME	Present Customer	TYPE BUSINESS	Planned	CONTRACT PREM	CONTRACT INTL	CONTRACT TEL	CONTRACT PRO	APPLICATION	REVENUE BOOKED ONE TIME	REVENUE BOOKED MONTHLY	CALL HRS HR	CALL HRS +	COMMENTS AND EXPENSE NOTES
Description	Contr	Date Acquired						Date Sold	Sale Price	Purch price			Gain or Loss
Ctr. May Sugar	1	11-12-71						11-19-71	4.93	4.84			35-
Ctr. Mar. Plywood	1	11-10-71						11-19-71	91-	88.70			101-
tr. Mar Plywood	1	11-11-71						11-19-71	91-	89.50			101-
Ltr. May Sugar	2	11-23-71						11-24-71	5.10	5.03			73-
tr. May Sugar	1	11-26-71						11-30-71	5.17	5.24			36-
Ctr. May Sugar	1	11-29-71						12-1-71	5.23	5.22			(31-)
tr. Mar Plywood	1	11-23-71						12-1-71	89-	89.50			(65-)
tr. May 11 Sugar	1	12-3-71						12-3-71	5.28	5.34			(351-)
tr. May 11 Sugar	4	12-5-71						12-10-71	5.23	5.35			218-
tr. May-11-Sugar	4	12-14-71						12-14-71	5.80	5.69			(303-)
tr. May-11-Sugar	2	12-15-71						12-15-71	6.05	6.35			(367-)
									Total	S.T. Loss			(1355.00)
TOTALS													

Samuel [illegible] All Securities Acquired

WEEKLY WORK PLAN/TIME REPORT

SALESMAN Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith NUMBER WEEK ENDING 1 1

CUSTOMER NAME	Present Customer	TYPE BUSINESS Date	Planned	CONTRACT PREM	CONTRACT INTL	CONTRACT TEL	CONTRACT PRO	APPLICATION Date	REVENUE BOOKED ONE TIME	REVENUE BOOKED MONTHLY	CALL HRS HR	CALL HRS +	COMMENTS AND EXPENSE NOTES
Description	S/	Acquired						sold	Sale Price	Buying Price			Gain or (Loss)
~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~						1-9-71	~~[illegible]~~	~~[illegible]~~			~~([illegible]-)~~
										Loss			([illegible]-)
Weis, Voisin & Co, Inc								Samuel D. Ruby (Only)					
at'l Gen'l Corp ny Sub 93-4%	5000	9-15-71						10-4-71	3023-	2987-			36-
Nat'l Gen'l Corp ny Sub 93-4%	5000	9-14-71						10-8-71	3051-	3017			34-
Pan Amer. Airways 1 86-4.5%	5000	10-8-71						10-21-71	2657-	2446-			212-
									2675	2713			(38-)
Pan Amer Airways 86 4.5%	5000	9-14-71						11-4-71	~~[illegible]~~ ~~27~~				
ondec Corp v-93-5%	5000	10-13-71						11-18-71	2716-	2610			106-
at'l Gen'l Corp ny Sub 93 4%	10000	11-19-71						12-17-71	6037-	5880-			157-
									TOTAL	10.0			(248.00)

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1971
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR	Social Security Number
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby	322 12 7997

SHORT-TERM—ASSETS HELD NOT MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d less e)
1.					
SCHEDULE ATTACHED					(1,248.00)

2. Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3. Enter net gain (or loss), combine lines 1 and 2	
4. Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
5. Net short-term gain (or loss), combine lines 3 and 4	

LONG-TERM—ASSETS HELD MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

6.					

7. Enter gain if applicable from line 4, Schedule D-1 (Form 540) (attach copy)	
8. Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
9. Net gain (or loss), combine lines 6 through 8	
10. Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	(14,274.00)
11. Net long-term gain (or loss), combine lines 9 and 10	
12. Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 11, and enter the net gain (or loss) here	(15,522.00)
13. If line 12 shows a gain—	
(a) Enter 50% of line 11 or 50% of line 12, whichever is smaller. Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 11	
(b) Subtract line 13(a) from line 12. Enter here and on line 32, Form 540 (line 33, Form 540NR)	
14. If line 12 shows a loss—	
(a) Add lines 4 and 10 (if lines 4 and 10 are blank, enter a zero here and on lines 14(b) and 14(c) and go to line 14(d))	
(b) Combine lines 3 and 9—if gain, enter gain; if loss, enter zero	
(c) Enter smallest of (i) line 14(a) less line 14(b); (ii) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and or losses—determine this figure via a side computation; or (iii) $1,000	
(d) Combine lines 3 and 9—if loss, enter loss; if gain, enter zero here and on line 14(e) and go to line 14(f)	
(e) Enter smallest of (i) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and or losses, less line 14(c)—determine this figure via a side computation; (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately); (iii) if line 3 is zero or shows a gain, 50% of line 14(d); (iv) if line 9 is zero or shows a gain, amount on line 14(d); or (v) if lines 3 and 9 show losses, line 3 added to 50% of line 9	
(f) Enter here, and on line 32, Form 540 (line 33, Form 540NR), the sum of lines 14(c) and 14(e)—**(Do not enter an amount greater than $1,000)**	(1,000.00)

Carryover (1-1) ($14,522.00)

See Instructions on Back

FORM 540 RESIDENT

CALIFORNIA
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN

TAXABLE 1971 YEAR

For Calendar Year 1971
or Fiscal Year Begun 1971 and Ended 1972

DO NOT WRITE ON THIS LINE

Please Type or Print

FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S): SAMUEL AND PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: RUBY
Your social security number: 322 12 7997
Spouse's social security number: 349 18 1420
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, or rural route): 16250 Bircher Street
Your occupation: Self Employed
Spouse's occupation:
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE: Granada Hills
STATE: California
COUNTY: Los Angeles
ZIP CODE:
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER AT TIME OF FILING: Self Employed

S	C	M	B	P	A

FILING STATUS—Check Only One: Claim your appropriate exemption on line 16

1. ☐ Single
2. ☒ Married, filing joint return
3. ☐ Married, filing separate return—If this item checked, enter spouse's social security number in space above and enter first name here ➤
4. ☐ Unmarried "head of household"—Complete Part I, page 2

BLIND and/or DEPENDENT EXEMPTIONS:

5. Blind ☐ Yourself ☐ Your spouse —Enter number of boxes checked ➤ 5
6. Dependents—Do not list yourself, your spouse, or person who qualifies you as head of household NAME (and address if different from yours) RELATIONSHIP
   Fred, Brian Elisa, Thomas
   Enter number ➤ 6 4
7. Total blind and dependent exemptions (add lines 5 and 6) ➤ 7 4

		Line	Amount	
Income	8. **Wages, salaries, tips, etc.** (before payroll deductions) if more than two employers, attach list — Employer's name — Where employed (city and state)	8		
	9. **Dividends.** Enter total here (complete and attach Schedule B (540), if total is over $100)	9	42	50
	10. **Interest.** Enter total here (complete and attach Schedule B (540), if total is over $100)	10	178	86
	11. **Other income** (from page 2, line 40)	11	6,350	33
	12. **Total** (add lines 8, 9, 10 and 11)	12	6,571	69
	13. **Adjustments to income** (from page 2, line 46)	13		
	14. **Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 13 from line 12)	14	6,571	69

- If you do not itemize deductions AND line 14 is under $10,000, find your tax in Tax Table in instructions. Enter tax on line 15.
- If you itemize deductions OR line 14 is $10,000 or more, go to Part IV on page 2 to figure tax. Enter tax on line 15.

		Line	Amount	
Your Tax, and Credits	15. **Tax from** (check one): ☐ Tax Table, ☒ Tax Computation (page 2, Part IV) or ☐ Schedule G (540), line 21	15	25	60
	16. **Personal Exemption.** Single—$25. Married couple or head of household—$50	16	50	00
	17. Multiply total number of exemptions on line 7 above, by $8	17	32	00
	18. **Total exemptions** (add lines 16 and 17)	18	82	00
	19. **Tax liability** (subtract line 18 from line 15—not less than zero)	19	None	
	20. **Other credits** (from page 2, line 62)	20		
	21. **Net tax** (subtract line 20 from line 19)	21		
	22. **Tax forgiveness**—20% of line 21 (use Part V on page 2, if reporting income on Schedule D (540)) **NOTE: You must file your return and pay any tax due (line 27) by the due date to be entitled to this forgiveness**	22		
	23. **Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if $1.00 or less, enter zero)	23		
	24. **Tax on preference income** (see instructions) check here ☐, if Schedule P (540) is attached	24		
	25. **Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	➤	
Balance Due or Refund	26. **1971 California estimated tax payment** (include 1970 overpayment allowed as a credit)	26	➤	
	27. **Balance due**—if any (subtract line 26 from line 25) **PAY IN FULL WITH RETURN**	27	None	
	28. **Overpayment**—if any (subtract line 25 from line 26) **OVERPAYMENT**	28		
	29. Portion of line 28 you wish to apply on 1972 estimated tax	29	➤	
	30. **Refund**—if any (subtract line 29 from line 28) **REFUND**	30	➤	

Do not write in this column

ATTACH REMITTANCE HERE

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here ➤ Your signature—if filing jointly, BOTH must sign — Date

Spouse's signature — Date

➤ Signature of preparer other than taxpayer — Address — Date

EDWARD L. LAMBERT
TAX CONSULTANT
[illegible] BLVD., SUITE 510
[illegible] CALIF. 91 16

Do not write in these spaces

T	
P	
I	
T	

Enter Your Social Security No. on Your Check or Money Order. Make Remittance Payable to FRANCHISE TAX BOARD—Mail to FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95867

PART I—Head of Household—If claimed, answer the following questions *(See Instructions)*

Check one: ☐ Never married ☐ Widow(er) Date ☐ Legal separation (interlocutory decree does not qualify) Date ☐ Final divorce/dissolution Date

Individual who qualified you as head of household:

Name .... Relationship .... Age .... Gross income $........

Is this person married? .... If yes, did he or she file a joint return with spouse? .... Did this person qualify as your dependent for the calendar year 1971? .... Did this person reside in your home for the entire taxable year? .... If not, explain circumstances

Total amount necessary to maintain household $........ How much did you contribute? $........

PART II—Other Income

31. Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C (540))	31	• 7,350	33
32. Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D (540))	32	• (1,000	00)
33. Net gain (or loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Schedule D-1 (540))	33		
34. Pensions and annuities (Attach Schedule E (Form 540))	34	•	
35. Rents and royalties (Attach Schedule E (Form 540))	35	•	
36. Partnerships (Attach Schedule E (Form 540))	36	•	
37. Estates and trusts (Attach Schedule E (Form 540))	37		
38. Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F (540))	38		
39. Miscellaneous Income (a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E)			
(b) Alimony			
(c) Other (state nature and source)			
(d) Total miscellaneous income add lines 39(a), (b) and (c)	39	•	
40. Total (add lines 31 through 39). Enter here and on page 1, line 11	40	6,350	33

PART III—Adjustments to Income

41. "Sick pay" if included in line 8 (see instructions—attach statement)	41	•	
42. Moving expenses (see instructions—attach statement)	42	•	
43. Employee business expense (see instructions—attach statement)	43	•	
44. Military exclusion (see instructions for line 8)	44	•	
45. Payments as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc., (attach Federal Form 2950SE)	45	•	
46. Total adjustments (add lines 41 through 45). Enter here and on page 1, line 13	46		

PART IV—Tax Computation—Do not use this part if you use the Tax Table to find your tax

47. Adjusted gross income (from page 1, line 14)	47	6,571	69
48. (a) If you itemize deductions, enter total from Schedule A (540), line 32, and attach Schedule A (b) If you do not itemize deductions, and line 14 is $10,000 or more, enter (1) $1,000, if single, or married person filing separate return (2) $2,000, if head of household, or married couple filing joint return	48	• 4,010	99
49. Taxable income (subtract line 48 from line 47). Figure your tax on this amount by using appropriate Tax Rate Schedule in instructions. Enter tax on page 1, line 15	49	2,560	70

PART V—Tax Forgiveness

Complete all lines below. However, if you used the income averaging method to compute your tax on line 15, omit lines 50, 51 and 52, enter on line 53 the amount shown on line 41 of Schedule G (540), and complete lines 54, 55 and 56.

50. Taxable income from line 49 above, or page 1, line 14 if Tax Table used	50		
51. Amount (if any) entered on Schedule D (540), line 13(a)	51		
52. Adjusted taxable income (subtract line 51 from line 50)	52		
53. Adjusted tax (use same method as used for determining tax on page 1, line 15)	53		
54. Add lines 18 and 20, page 1, and enter total here	54		
55. Adjusted net tax (subtract line 54 from line 53)	55		
56. 20% of line 55. Enter here and on page 1, line 22	56		

PART VI—Credit for Net Income Tax Paid to Another State—Attach copy of "other state" return —and Retirement Income Credit

57. Income derived from sources within State of .... and also taxable by California	57		
58. California adjusted gross income (from page 1, line 14)	58		
59. California tax liability (from page 1, line 19)	59		
60. Credit limitation—line 57 ÷ line 58 .... % (100% maximum) × line 59 (cannot exceed tax paid other state)	60	•	
61. Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R (540))	61	•	
62. Total (add lines 60 and 61). Enter here and on page 1, line 20	62		

PART VII—Reconciliation to Federal Return—If adjusted gross income on Federal Return is different from line 14, page 1, explain below

5 1773-400 8-71 13 OCCM ① △ OSP

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS

Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
19 71
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540	Social Security Number
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby	322 12 7997

Itemized vs. Standard Deduction—You have a choice between two deduction methods. You can either itemize your deductions or take a standard deduction as explained in the 540 Instructions. On separate returns of a husband and wife, if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may not use the Tax Table or cla the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete t appropriate items below.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care			1	
2. Medicine and drugs	2			
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	3			
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	4			
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	5			
6. Other medical and dental expenses (attach itemized list)	6			
7. Total—(Add lines 4, 5 and 6)	7			
8. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	8			
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)			9	
10. Total—(Add lines 1 and 9) ▶			10	150 00

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list	11	
12. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	12	
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations ▶	13	

Taxes

14. Real estate	14	
15. State and local gasoline	15	
16. General sales	16	
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)	17	
18. Personal property	18	
19. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify	19	
20. Other (specify)	20	
21. Total taxes—(Add lines 14 through 20) ▶	21	743 31

Contributions

22. Cash—Including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)	22	
23. Total cash contributions	23	
24. Other than cash (see instructions). Enter total here	24	
25. Total—Add lines 23 and 24—Maximum deduction may not exceed 20% of adjusted gross income ▶	25	

Interest Expense

26. Home mortgage	26	
27. Installment purchases	27	
28. Other (itemize)	28	
29. Total—(Add lines 26, 27 and 28) ▶	29	2,617 68

Miscellaneous Deductions

30. For child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc.—See instructions (itemize)	30	
31. Total miscellaneous deductions ▶	31	500 00
32. Total deductions—(Add lines 10, 13, 21, 25, 29 and 31). Enter total here and on Form 540, page 2, in space provided S/A	32	4,010 99

(Rev. 1971)

Schedule B on reverse

SCHEDULE C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE 19 71 YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby — Social Security Number: 322 12 7997

A. Principal business activity Food Service ; product
(For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name Snack Bar

C. Federal employer identification number

D. Business location 5418 Van Nuys Blvd. (Number and street or rural route) Van Nuys, (City—post office) California (State) 91401 (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other (describe)

F. Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? ☐ Yes ☒ No. If "yes," attach explanation.

G. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

1. Gross receipts or gross sales $ Less: Returns and allowances $		$
2. Inventory at beginning of year (If different than last year's closing inventory attach explanation)		SCHEDULE ATTACHED
3. Merchandise purchased $, less cost of any items withdrawn from business for personal use $		
4. Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5. Material and supplies		
6. Other costs (explain in Schedule C-1)		
7. Total of lines 2 through 6		
8. Inventory at end of this year		
9. **Cost of goods sold and/or operations** (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10. **Gross profit** (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
11. Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-2)		
12. Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-1)		
13. Rent on business property		
14. Repairs (explain in Schedule C-1)		
15. Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
16. Insurance		
17. Legal and professional fees		
18. Commissions		
19. Amortization (attach statement)		
20. (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see instructions)		
(b) Employee benefit programs (see instructions)		
21. Interest on business indebtedness		
22. Bad debts arising from sales or services		
23. Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells, timber, etc. (attach schedule)		
24. Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-1)		
25. Total of lines 11 through 24		
26. **Net profit (or loss)** (subtract line 25 from line 10). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or 540NR		$ 7,350 33

SCHEDULE C-1. EXPLANATION OF LINES 6, 12, 14, AND 24

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

Rev. 1971)

Form 1040 US Individual Income Tax Return 1973

Department of the Treasury—Internal Revenue Service

For the year January 1–December 31, 1973, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1973, ending ...., 19........

Please print or type

Name (If joint return, give first names and initials of both) SAMUEL & PHYLLIS | Last name RUBY

Present home address (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route) 16250 BIRCHER ST

City, town or post office, State and ZIP code GRANADA HILLS CALIF

COUNTY OF RESIDENCE LOS ANGELES

Your social security number 322 12 7997

Spouse's social security no. 349 18 1420

Occupation Yours ▶ S/E

Spouse's ▶ H/W

Filing Status—check only one:

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separately. If spouse is also filing give spouse's social security number in designated space above and enter full name here ▶ ____________
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died ▶ 19)

Exemptions

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	
6a Yourself . . .	☒	☐	☐	Enter number of boxes checked ▶ 2
b Spouse . . .	☒	☐	☐	

c First names of your dependent children who lived with you THOMAS ELISA - FRED Enter number ▶ 3

d Number of other dependents (from line 27) . . . ▶

7 Total exemptions claimed . . . ▶ 5

8 **Presidential Election Campaign Fund.**—Check ☐ if you wish to designate $1 of your taxes for this fund. If joint return, check ☐ if spouse wishes to designate $1. **Note:** *This will not increase your tax or reduce your refund.* **See note below.**

Income

9	Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. (Attach Forms W-2. If unavailable, attach explanation)	9	
10a	Dividends (See instructions on page 6.) $ 92, 10b Less exclusion $ 92 –, Balance ▶	10c	– 0 –
10d	(Gross amount received, if different from line 10a . . . . $..........)		
11	Interest income	11	345
12	Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 38) . . .	12	16196
13	Total (add lines 9, 10c, 11, and 12) . . .	13	16541
14	Adjustments to income (such as "sick pay," moving expenses, etc. from line 43) .	14	
15	Subtract line 14 from line 13 (adjusted gross income) . . .	15	16541

◉ **If you do not itemize deductions and line 15 is under $10,000, find tax in Tables and enter on line 16.**
◉ **If you itemize deductions or line 15 is $10,000 or more, go to line 44 to figure tax.**
◉ CAUTION. If you have unearned income and can be claimed as a dependent on your parent's return, check here ▶ ☐ and see instructions on page 7.

Tax, Payments and Credits

16	Tax, check if from: ☐ Tax Tables 1–12 ☐ Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z ☐ Schedule D ☒ Schedule G ☐ Form 4726 OR ☐ Form 4972	16	1095
17	Total credits (from line 54) . . .	17	
18	Income tax (subtract line 17 from line 16) . . .	18	1095
19	Other taxes (from line 61) . . .	19	396
20	Total (add lines 18 and 19) . . .	20	1491
21a	Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W–2 or W–2P to front) . . . 21a		
b	1973 estimated tax payments (include amount allowed as credit from 1972 return) . . . b		
c	Amount paid with Form 4868, Application for Automatic Extension of Time to File U.S. Individual Income Tax Return c		
d	Other payments (from line 65) . . . d		
22	Total (add lines 21a, b, c, and d) . . .	22	– 0 –

Balance Due or Refund

23	If line 20 is larger than line 22, enter **BALANCE DUE IRS** (Pay in full with return. Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service) ▶ (Check here ▶ ☐, if Form 2210, Form 2210F, or statement is attached. See instructions on page 8.)	23	1491
24	If line 22 is larger than line 20, enter amount **OVERPAID** . ▶	24	
25	Amount of line 24 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU** . ▶	25	
26	Amount of line 24 to be credited on 1974 estimated tax . . . ▶ 26		

Note: 1972 Presidential Election Campaign Fund Designation.—Check ☐ if you did not designate $1 of your taxes on your 1972 return, but now wish to do so. If joint return, check ☐ if spouse did not designate on 1972 return but now wishes to do so.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here

▷ ____________ Your signature · Date

▷ ____________ Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▷ ____________ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) · Date

Address (and ZIP Code) · Preparer's Emp. Ident. or Soc. Sec. No. 367-34-8729

16—82337-2

13717 VANOWEN STREET
VAN NUYS, CA. 91403
367-34-8729

Please attach Copy B of Forms W–2 here

Write soc. sec. no. on Check or Money Order. Attach here

Other Dependents

(a) NAME	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year, write B or D.	(d) Did dependent have income of $750 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write ALL.	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

27 Total number of dependents listed in column (a). Enter here and on line 6d ▶

Part I Income other than Wages, Dividends, and Interest

28 Business income or (loss) (attach Schedule C)	28	4948	
29 Net gain or (loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D)	29	(1000	)
30 Net gain or (loss) from Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses (attach Form 4797)	30	12248	
31 Pensions, annuities, rents, royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E)	31		
32 Farm income or (loss) (attach Schedule F)	32		
33 Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E—see instructions on page 8)	33		
34 50% of capital gain distributions (not reported on Schedule D)	34		
35 State income tax refunds (does not apply if refund is for year in which you took the standard deduction—others see instructions on page 8)	35		
36 Alimony received	36		
37 Other (state nature and source) ▶	37		
38 **Total** (add lines 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, and 37). **Enter here and on line 12** ▶	38	16196	

Part II Adjustments to Income

39 "Sick pay." (From Forms W-2 and W-2P. If not shown on Forms W-2 or W-2P, attach Form 2440 or statement.)	39		
40 Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	40		
41 Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or statement)	41		
42 Payments as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc. (see Form 4848)	42		
43 **Total adjustments** (add lines 39, 40, 41, and 42). **Enter here and on line 14** ▶	43		

Part III Tax Computation (Do not use this part if you use Tax Tables 1–12 to find your tax.)

44 Adjusted gross income (from line 15)	44	16541	
45 (a) If you itemize deductions, enter total from Schedule A, line 41 and attach Schedule A (b) If you do not itemize deductions, enter 15% of line 44, but do NOT enter more than $2,000. ($1,000 if line 3 checked)	45	5165	
46 Subtract line 45 from line 44	46	11376	
47 Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 7, by $750	47	3750	
48 **Taxable income.** Subtract line 47 from line 46	48	7626	

(Figure your tax on the amount on line 48 by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z, or if applicable, the alternative tax from Schedule D, income averaging from Schedule G, maximum tax from Form 4726, or special averaging from Form 4972.) Enter tax on line 16.

Part IV Credits

49 Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R)	49		
50 Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	50		
51 Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	51		
52 Credit for contributions to candidates for public office—see instructions on page 9	52		
53 Work Incentive (WIN) credit (attach Form 4874)	53		
54 **Total credits** (add lines 49, 50, 51, 52, and 53). **Enter here and on line 17** ▶	54		

Part V Other Taxes

55 Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE)	55	396	
56 Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255)	56		
57 Tax from recomputing prior-year Work Incentive (WIN) credit (attach schedule)	57		
58 Minimum tax. Check here ▶ ☐, if Form 4625 is attached	58		
59 Social security tax on tip income not reported to employer (attach Form 4137)	59		
60 Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W-2)	60		
61 **Total** (add lines 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60). **Enter here and on line 19** ▶	61	396	

Part VI Other Payments

62 Excess FICA tax withheld (two or more employers—see instructions on page 9)	62		
63 Credit for Federal tax on special fuels, nonhighway gasoline and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	63		
64 Credit from a Regulated Investment Company (attach Form 2439)	64		
65 **Total** (add lines 62, 63, and 64). **Enter here and on line 21d** ▶	65		

Foreign Accounts

Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)? ▶ ☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," attach Form 4683. (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

SCHEDULE A
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Itemized Deductions

▶ Attach to Form 1040.

1973

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Your social security number 322 12 7997

Medical and Dental Expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1 One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care. (Be sure to include in line 10 below)	150	
2 Medicine and drugs		
3 Enter 1% of line 15, Form 1040		
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
5 Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	475	
6 Enter other medical and dental expenses:		
a Doctors, dentists, etc.	730	
b Hospitals		
c Other (Itemize—include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, etc.) ▶	60	
7 Total (add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)	1265	
8 Enter 3% of line 15, Form 1040	496	
9 Subtract line 8 from line 7 (if less than zero, enter zero)	769	
10 Total (add lines 1 and 9). Enter here and on line 35 ▶	919	

Taxes

11 State and local income		
12 Real estate		
13 State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)		
14 General sales (see sales tax tables)		
15 Personal property		
16 Other (Itemize) ▶ SCH		
17 Total (add lines 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, and 16). Enter here and on line 36 ▶	927	

Interest Expense

18 Home mortgage		
19 Other (Itemize) ▶ SCH		
20 Total (add lines 18 and 19). Enter here and on line 37 ▶	3169	

Contributions (See instructions on page 11 for examples.)

21 a Cash contributions for which you have receipts, cancelled checks, etc.	150	
b Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts. ▶		
22 Other than cash (see instructions on page 12 for required statement)		
23 Carryover from prior years		
24 Total contributions (add lines 21a, b, 22, and 23). Enter here and on line 38 ▶	150	

Casualty or Theft Loss(es) (See instructions on page 12.)

Note: *If you had* **more than one loss,** *omit lines 25 through 28 and see instructions on page 12 for guidance.*

25 Loss before insurance reimbursement		
26 Insurance reimbursement		
27 Subtract line 26 from line 25. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
28 Enter $100 or amount on line 27, whichever is smaller		
29 Casualty or theft loss (subtract line 28 from line 27). Enter here and on line 39 ▶		

Miscellaneous Deductions (See instructions on page 12.)

30 Alimony paid		
31 Union dues		
32 Expenses for child and dependent care services (attach Form 2441)		
33 Other (Itemize) ▶		
34 Total (add lines 30, 31, 32, and 33). Enter here and on line 40 ▶		

Summary of Itemized Deductions

A

35 Total medical and dental—line 10	919	
36 Total taxes—line 17	927	
37 Total interest—line 20	3169	
38 Total contributions—line 24	150	
39 Casualty or theft loss(es)—line 29		
40 Total miscellaneous—line 34		
41 **Total deductions** (add lines 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, and 40). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 45 ▶	5165	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1973—O-500-049

SCHEDULE C
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Profit or (Loss) From Business or Profession
(Sole Proprietorship)

▶ **Attach to Form 1040.** ▶ **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file Form 1065.**

1973

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social security number: 322 12 7997

A Principal business activity (see Schedule C Instructions) ▶ SNACKBAR; product ▶ FOOD

B Business name ▶ SNACK BAR **C** Employer identification number ▶

D Business address (number and street) ▶ 5418 VAN NUYS BLVD

City, State and ZIP code ▶ VAN NUYS CA

C

E Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☒ Cash (2) ☐ Accrual (3) ☐ Other ▶

	Yes	No
F Were you required to file Form W-3 or Form 1096 for 1973? (See Schedule C Instructions.)	✓	
If "Yes," where filed ▶ FRESNO CA	▨	▨
G Was an Employer's Quarterly Federal Tax Return, Form 941, filed for this business for any quarter in 1973?	✓	
H Method of inventory valuation ▶ COST Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? (If "Yes," attach explanation)		

Income

1 Gross receipts or sales $ Less: returns and allowances $ **Balance** ▶
2 Less: Cost of goods sold and/or operations (Schedule C–1, line 8)
3 Gross profit
4 Other income (attach schedule)
5 **Total income** (add lines 3 and 4)

Deductions

6 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C–3)
7 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C–2)
8 Rent on business property
9 Repairs (explain in Schedule C–2)
10 Salaries and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C–1 (exclude any paid to yourself)
11 Insurance
12 Legal and professional fees
13 Commissions
14 Amortization (attach statement)
15 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Schedule C Instructions)
(b) Employee benefit programs (see Schedule C Instructions)
16 Interest on business indebtedness
17 Bad debts arising from sales or services
18 Depletion
19 Other business expenses (specify):
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
(k) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(j))
20 **Total deductions** (add lines 6 through 19)

21 Net profit or (loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and ~~on Form 1040, line 28. ALSO~~ SCHEDULE enter on Schedule SE, line 5(a) 4948

SCHEDULE C–1.—Cost of Goods Sold and/or Operations (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 2)

1 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)
2 Purchases $ Less: cost of items withdrawn for personal use $ **Balance** ▶
3 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)
4 Materials and supplies
5 Other costs (attach schedule)
6 Total of lines 1 through 5
7 Less: Inventory at end of year
8 Cost of goods sold and/or operations. Enter here and on line 2 above

16—82344-1

SCHEDULE C–2.—Explanation of Lines 7 and 9

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE C–3.—Depreciation (See Schedule C Instructions for Line 6) If you need more space, you may use Form 4562.

Note: If depreciation is computed by using the Class Life (ADR) System for assets placed in service after December 31, 1970, or the Guideline Class Life System for assets placed in service before January 1, 1971, you must file Form 4832 (Class Life (ADR) System) or Form 5006 (Guideline Class Life System). Except as otherwise expressly provided in income tax regulations sections 1.167(a)–11(b)(5)(vi) and 1.167 (a)–12, the provisions of Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 are not applicable for taxable years ending after December 31, 1970.

Check box if you made an election this taxable year to use ☐ Class Life (ADR) System and/or ☐ Guideline Class Life System.

a. Group and guideline class or description of property	b. Date acquired	c. Cost or other basis	d. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	e. Method of computing depreciation	f. Life or rate	g. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below)						
2 Depreciation from Form 4832	(See Note above)					
3 Depreciation from Form 5006						
4 Other depreciation:						
Buildings						
Furniture and fixtures						
Transportation equipment						
Machinery and other equipment						
Other (specify)						
5 Totals						
6 Less amount of depreciation claimed in Schedule C–1, page 1						
7 Balance—Enter here and on page 1, line 6						

SUMMARY OF DEPRECIATION (Other Than Additional First-Year Depreciation)

	Straight line	Declining balance	Sum of the years-digits	Units of production	Other (specify)	Total
1 Depreciation from Form 4832						
2 Depreciation from Form 5006						
3 Other	2000 —					2000

SCHEDULE C–4.—Expense Account Information (See Schedule C Instructions for Schedule C–4)

Enter information with regard to yourself and your five highest paid employees. In determining the five highest paid employees, expense account allowances must be added to their salaries and wages. However, the information need not be submitted for any employee for whom the combined amount is less than $10,000, or for yourself if your expense account allowance plus line 21, page 1, is less than $10,000.

Name	Expense account	Salaries and Wages
Owner		▨
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(3) Employees' families at conventions or meetings? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(4) Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W–2? ☐ Yes ☒ No

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973—O-500-050 16—82344-1

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Gains and Losses

▶ Attach to Form 1040. ▶ Examples of property to be reported on this Schedule are gains and losses on stocks, bonds, and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

1973

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social security number: 322 12 7997

D

Part I Short-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held Not More Than 6 Months

	a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (see instruction D)	c. Mo., day, yr. (Put date sold above dotted line and date acquired below dotted line)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted (see instruction E) and expense of sale	f. Gain or (loss) (d less e)
1	400 INTERNATIONAL REC	A	2/22/73 1/17/73	3218	3729	(511)
	100 LEVITZ	A	4/3/73 10/11/72	1281	2797	(1516)
	100 POTTER INST	A	6/29/73 3/19/73	348	695	(347)
	100 ESSEX INTER	A	6/29/73 4/3/73	1392	1759	(367)

2	Enter your share of net short-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	2	
3	Enter net gain or (loss), combine lines 1 and 2	3	(2741)
4(a)	Short-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction H)	4(a)	
4(b)	Short-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction H)	4(b)	
5	Net short-term gain or (loss), combine lines 3, 4(a) and 4(b)	5	(2741)

Part II Long-term Capital Gains and Losses—Assets Held More Than 6 Months

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.
6						

7	Capital gain distributions	7	
8	Enter gain, if applicable, from line 4(a)(1), Form 4797 (see Instruction A)	8	
9	Enter your share of net long-term gain or (loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	9	
10	Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	10	
11	Net gain or (loss), combine lines 6 through 10	11	
12(a)	Long-term capital loss component carryover from years beginning before 1970 (see Instruction H)	12(a)	(13322)
12(b)	Long-term capital loss carryover attributable to years beginning after 1969 (see Instruction H)	12(b)	
13	Net long-term gain or (loss), combine lines 11, 12(a) and 12(b)	13	(13322)

Part III Summary of Parts I and II

14	Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain or loss here	14	(16063)
15	**If line 14 shows a gain—**		
	(a) Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part VI for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13	15(a)	
	(b) Subtract line 15(a) from line 14. Enter here and on line 29, Form 1040	15(b)	
16	**If line 14 shows a loss—** ▶ Omit lines 16(a) and 16(b) and go to Part IV if losses are shown on BOTH lines 12(a) and 13. See Instruction I. ▶ Otherwise, (a) Enter one of the following amounts: (i) If amount on line 5 is zero or a net gain, enter 50% of amount on line 14; (ii) If amount on line 13 is zero or a net gain, enter amount on line 14; or, (iii) If amounts on line 5 and line 13 are net losses, enter amount on line 5 added to 50% of amount on line 13	16(a)	(16063)
	(b) Enter here and enter as a (loss) on line 29, Form 1040, the smallest of: (i) The amount on line 16(a); (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—if a loss is shown on line 4(a) or 12(a), see instruction M for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or, (iii) Taxable income, as adjusted (see Instruction L)	16(b)	(1000)

16—82339-1

Part IV Capital Loss Limitation—Where Losses Are Shown on Both Lines 12(a) AND 13

17 Enter loss from line 5; if line 5 is zero or a gain, enter a zero	17	(2741)
18 Enter loss from line 13	18	(13322)
19 Enter gain, if any, from line 5; if line 5 is zero or a loss, enter a zero	19	-0-
20 Reduce loss on line 18 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 19	20	(13322)
21 Combine lines 3 and 11 and if gain, enter gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero NOTE: If the entry on line 21 is zero, OMIT lines 22 through 28, and enter on line 29 the loss shown on line 12(a).	21	-0-
22 Enter gain, if any, from line 11	22	
23 Enter smaller of amount on line 21 or line 22	23	
24 Enter excess of gain on line 21 over amount on line 23	24	
25 Enter loss from line 4(a); if line 4(a) is blank, enter a zero	25	
26 Reduce gain, if any, on line 24 to the extent of loss, if any, on line 25 (see Instruction J)	26	
27 Enter loss from line 12(a)	27	
28 Add the gain(s) on line(s) 23 and 26	28	
29 Reduce the loss on line 27 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 28 (see Instruction K)	29	(13322)
30 Enter smaller of amount on line 29 or line 20 (if line 29 is zero, enter a zero)	30	(13322)
31 Subtract amount on line 30 from the loss on line 20	31	-0-
32 Enter 50% of the amount on line 31	32	-0-
33 Add lines 17, 30, and 32	33	(16063)
34 Enter here and enter as a (loss) on line 29, Form 1040, the smallest of: (a) Amount on line 33; (b) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing a separate return—see Instruction M for a higher limit not to exceed $1,000); or, (c) Taxable Income, as adjusted (see Instruction L)	34	(1000)

Part V Complete Part V if You are Married Filing a Separate Return and Losses are Shown on Lines 4(a) and 14. (See Instruction M).

35 Combine lines 3 and 11 and if gain, enter gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero NOTE: If the entry on line 35 is zero, OMIT lines 36 through 42, and enter on line 43 the loss shown on line 4(a).	35	
36 Enter gain, if any, from line 3	36	
37 Enter smaller of amount on line 35 or line 36	37	
38 Enter excess of gain on line 35 over amount on line 37	38	
39 Enter loss from line 12(a); if line 12(a) is blank, enter a zero	39	
40 Reduce the gain, if any, on line 38 to the extent of the loss, if any, on line 39 (see Instruction J)	40	
41 Enter loss from line 4(a)	41	
42 Add the gain(s) on line(s) 37 and 40	42	
43 Reduce the loss on line 41 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 42 (see Instruction K)	43	

Part VI Computation of Alternative Tax (See Instruction V to See if the Alternative Tax Will Benefit You)

44 Enter amount from line 48, Form 1040	44	
45 Enter amount from line 15(a)	45	
46 Subtract amount on line 45 from amount on line 44 (but not less than zero)	46	
47 Enter smaller of amount on line 13 or line 14 **If line 47 does not exceed $50,000 ($25,000 if married filing separately), check here ▶ ☐ and omit lines 48 through 54.**	47	
48 Enter long-term gains from certain contracts and installment sales referred to as "certain subsection (d) gains" (see Instruction V)	48	
49 Enter amount from line 48 or $50,000 ($25,000 if married filing separately), whichever is larger **If line 49 is equal to or greater than line 47, check here ▶ ☐ and omit lines 50 through 54.**	49	
50 Multiply amount on line 49 by 50%	50	
51 Add amounts on lines 46 and 50	51	
52 Tax on line 44 or 45, whichever is greater (use Tax Rate Schedule in instructions)	52	
53 Tax on the amount on line 51 (use Tax Rate Schedule in instructions)	53	
54 Subtract amount on line 53 from amount on line 52	54	
55 Tax on the amount on line 46 (use Tax Rate Schedule in instructions)	55	
56 If the block on line 47 or 49 is checked, enter 50% of line 45; otherwise enter 25% of line 49	56	
57 Alternative Tax—add amounts on lines 54 (if applicable), 55, and 56. If smaller than the tax figured on the amount on line 48, Form 1040, enter this alternative tax on line 16, Form 1040	57	

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973—O-500-051

SCHEDULE G
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Income Averaging

▷ See instructions on pages 3 and 4.
▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1973

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Your social security number: 322 12 7997

Taxable Income and Adjustments

	(a) Computation year 1973	(b) 1st preceding base period year 1972	(c) 2d preceding base period year 1971	(d) 3d preceding base period year 1970	(e) 4th preceding base period year 1969
1 Taxable income (see instruction 1)	7626	—0—	—0—	—0—	—0—
2 Income earned outside of the United States or within U.S. possessions and excluded under sections 911 and 931					
3 Excess community income and certain amounts received by owner-employees subject to a penalty under section 72(m)(5). See instruction 3					
4 Accumulation distributions subject to section 668(a). See Form 4970					
5 Adjusted taxable income or base period income. (Line 1 plus line 2, less lines 3 and 4.) If less than zero, enter zero	7626	—0—	—0—	—0—	—0—

Computation of Averagable Income

6 Adjusted taxable income from line 5, column (a)	6	7626
7 30% of the sum of line 5, columns (b), (c), (d), and (e)	7	—0—
8 Averagable income (line 6 less line 7)	8	7626

Complete the remaining parts of this form only if line 8 is more than $3,000. If $3,000 or less, you do not qualify for income averaging. Do not fill in rest of form.

G

Computation of Tax

9 Amount from line 7			9	—0—
10 20% of line 8			10	1525
11 Total (add lines 9 and 10)			11	1525
12 Amount from line 3, column (a), less any income subject to a penalty under section 72(m)(5) which was included in line 3			12	
13 Total (add lines 11 and 12)			13	1525
14 Tax on amount on line 13			14	219
15 Tax on amount on line 11	15	219		
16 Tax on amount on line 9	16	—0—		
17 Difference (line 15 less line 16)	17	219		
18 Multiply the amount on line 17 by 4			18	876
19 Total (add lines 14 and 18)			19	1095
20 Tax on income subject to the penalty under section 72(m)(5) which was included in line 3			20	
21 Tax (add lines 19 and 20). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 16. Also check Schedule G box on Form 1040, line 16			21	1095

16—82358—1

SCHEDULE SE (Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a Schedule SE.
▶ Attach to Form 1040.

1973

- If you had wages, including tips, of $10,800 or more that were subject to social security taxes, do not fill in this form.
- If you had more than one business, combine profits and losses from all your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

NAME OF SELF-EMPLOYED PERSON (AS SHOWN ON SOCIAL SECURITY CARD)	Social security number of self-employed person
SAMUEL RUBY	322 12 7997

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶ SNACK BAR

○ If you have only farm income complete Parts I and III.
○ If you have only nonfarm income complete Parts II and III.
○ If you have both farm and nonfarm income complete Parts I, II, and III.

SE

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

A farmer may elect to compute net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD, line 3, instead of using the Regular Method, line 2, if his gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. However, lines 1 and 2 must be completed even if you elect to use the FARM OPTIONAL METHOD.

1 **REGULAR METHOD**—Net profit or (loss) from:				
(a) Schedule F, line 54 (cash method), or line 74 (accrual method)				
(b) Farm partnerships				
2 Net earnings from farm self-employment (add lines 1(a) and 1(b))				
3 **FARM OPTIONAL METHOD**—If gross profits from farming are: [1]				
(a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits (b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600				
4 Enter here and on line 12(a), the amount on line 2, or line 3 if you elect the farm optional method				

[1] Gross profits from farming are the total gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 72 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profits from farm partnerships (Schedule K–1 (Form 1065), line 15) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from NONFARM Self-Employment

5 **REGULAR METHOD**—Net profit or (loss) from:		
(a) Schedule C, line 21. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	4948	
(b) Partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)		
(c) Service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. (Include rental value of parsonage or rental allowance furnished.) If you filed Form 4361, check here ☐ and enter zero on this line		
(d) Service with a foreign government or international organization		
(e) Other (director's fees, etc.). Specify ▶		
6 Total (add lines 5(a), 5(b), 5(c), 5(d), and 5(e))	4948	
7 Enter other adjustments (attach statement)		
8 Adjusted net earnings or (loss) from nonfarm self-employment (line 6, as adjusted by line 7)	4948	

If line 8 is $1,600 or more **OR** if you do not elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method, omit lines 9 through 11 and enter amount from line 8 on line 12(b), Part III.

Note: You may use the nonfarm optional method (line 9 through line 11) only if line 8 is less than $1,600 and less than two-thirds of your gross nonfarm profits,[2] and you had actual net earnings from self-employment of $400 or more for at least 2 of the 3 following years: 1970, 1971, and 1972. The nonfarm optional method can only be used for 5 taxable years.

[2] *Gross profits from nonfarm business are the total of the gross profits from Schedule C, line 3, plus the distributive share of gross profits from nonfarm partnerships (Schedule K–1 (Form 1065), line 15) as explained in instructions for Schedule SE. Also, include gross profits from services reported on lines 5(c), 5(d), and 5(e), as adjusted by line 7.*

9 **NONFARM OPTIONAL METHOD:**		
(a) Maximum amount reportable, under both optional methods combined (farm and nonfarm)	$1,600	00
(b) Enter amount from line 3. (If you did not elect to use the farm optional method, enter zero.)		
(c) Balance (subtract line 9(b) from line 9(a))		
10 Enter two-thirds of gross nonfarm profits [2] or $1,600, whichever is smaller		
11 Enter here and on line 12(b), the amount on line 9(c) or line 10, whichever is smaller		

16—82342-1

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

12 Net earnings or (loss):			
(a) From farming (from line 4)			
(b) From nonfarm (from line 8, or line 11 if you elect to use the Nonfarm Optional Method)			4948
13 Total net earnings or (loss) from self-employment reported on line 12. **(If line 13 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of form.)**			4948
14 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security tax for 1973 is		$10,800 00	
15 (a) Total "FICA" wages as indicated on Forms W-2			
(b) Unreported tips, if any, subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9			
(c) Total of lines 15(a) and 15(b)		—0—	
16 Balance (subtract line 15(c) from line 14)		10800	
17 Self-employment income—line 13 or 16, whichever is smaller			4948
18 If line 17 is $10,800, enter $864.00; if less, multiply the amount on line 17 by .08			396
19 Railroad employee's and railroad employee representative's adjustment for hospital insurance benefits tax from Form 4469			
20 Self-employment tax (subtract line 19 from line 18). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 55			396

You may use this space to make any needed computations

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973—O-500-055

Form **4797**
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Supplemental Schedule of Gains and Losses

Sales, Exchanges and Involuntary Conversions under Sections 1231, 1245, 1250, etc.

To be filed with Form 1040, 1041, 1065, 1120, etc.—See Instruction A

1973

Name SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Identifying number as shown on page 1 of your return 322-12-7997

Part I Sales or Exchanges of Property Used in Trade or Business and/or Involuntary Conversions (Section 1231)

SECTION A.—Involuntary Conversions Due to Casualty and Theft (See Instruction D)

a. Kind of property (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain or (loss) (d plus e less f)
1						

2 Combine the amounts on line 1, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . . . .

(a) For all returns, except partnership returns:

(1) If line 2 is zero or a gain, enter such amount in column g, line 3.

(2) If line 2 is a loss, enter the loss on line 5.

(b) For partnership returns: Enter the amount shown on line 2, on line 6, Schedule K (Form 1065).

SECTION B.—Sales or Exchanges of Property Used in Trade or Business and Certain Involuntary Conversions (Not Reportable in Section A) (See Instruction D)

3						

4 Combine the amounts on line 3, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . .

(a) For all returns, except partnership returns:

(1) If line 4 is a gain, enter such gain as a long-term capital gain on the Schedule D (Form 1040, 1120, etc.) that is being filed—see instruction D.

(2) If line 4 is zero or a loss, enter such amount on line 6.

(b) For partnership returns: Enter the amount shown on line 4, on line 7, Schedule K (Form 1065).

Part II Ordinary Gains and Losses

a. Kind of property and how acquired (If necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements and expense of sale	g. Gain or (loss) (d plus e less f)
5 Amount, if any, from line 2(a)(2)						
6 Amount, if any, from line 4(a)(2)						
7 Gain, if any, from line 21						12248
8						

9 Combine lines 5 through 8, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . . 12248.

(a) For all returns, except individual returns: Enter the gain or (loss) shown on line 9, on the line provided for on the return (Form 1120, etc.) being filed—see instruction E, for specific line reference.

(b) For individual returns:

(1) If the gain or (loss) on line 9, includes losses which are to be treated as an itemized deduction on Schedule A (Form 1040) (see instruction E), enter the total of such loss(es) here and include on line 29, Schedule A (Form 1040)—identify as loss from line 9(b)(1), Form 4797 . . . . . .

(2) Redetermine the gain or (loss) on line 9, excluding the loss (if any) entered on line 9(b)(1). Enter here and on line 30, Form 1040 . . . . 12248.

16—82348-1

Part III Gain From Disposition of Property Under Sections 1245, 1250, 1251, 1252—Assets Held More than Six Months (See Instruction F)

Lines 18 and 19 should be omitted if there are no dispositions of farm property or farmland; or, if this form is filed by a partnership.

10 Description of sections 1245, 1250, 1251, and 1252 property:	Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	Date sold (mo., day, yr.)
(A) SNACK BAR.	4/70	8/13/73
(B)		
(C)		
(D)		
(E)		

Correlate lines 10(A) through 10(E) with these columns ▷ ▷ ▷ ▷	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)	Property (E)
11 Gross sales price	28000 -				
12 Cost or other basis and expense of sale	28138 -				
13 Depreciation allowed (or allowable)	12386 -				
14 Adjusted basis, line 12 less line 13	15752				
15 Total gain, subtract line 14 from line 11	12248.				
16 If section 1245 property:					
(a) Depreciation allowed (or allowable) after applicable date (see instructions)	12386				
(b) Line 15 or line 16(a), whichever is smaller	12248				
17 If section 1250 property:					
(a) Enter additional depreciation after 12/31/63 and before 1/1/70					
(b) Enter additional depreciation after 12/31/69					
(c) Enter line 15 or line 17(b), whichever is smaller					
(d) Line 17(c) times applicable percentage (see instruction F.4)					
(e) Enter excess, if any, of line 15 over line 17(b)					
(f) Enter line 17(a) or line 17(e), whichever is smaller					
(g) Line 17(f) times applicable percentage (see instruction F.4)					
(h) Add line 17(d) and line 17(g)					
18 If section 1251 property:					
(a) If farmland, enter soil, water, and land clearing expenses for current year and the four preceding years					
(b) If farm property, other than land, subtract line 16(b) from line 15; OR, if farmland, enter line 15 or line 18(a), whichever is smaller (see instruction F.5)					
(c) Excess deductions account (see instruction F.5)					
(d) Enter line 18(b) or line 18(c), whichever is smaller					
19 If section 1252 property:					
(a) Enter soil, water, and land clearing expenses made after 12/31/69					
(b) Enter amount from line 18(d), if any; otherwise, enter a zero					
(c) Enter excess, if any, of line 19(a) over line 19(b)					
(d) Line 19(c) times applicable percentage (see instruction F.5)					
(e) Line 15 less line 19(b)					
(f) Enter smaller of line 19(d) or line 19(e)					

Summary of Part III Gains (Complete Property columns (A) through (E) up to line 19(f), before going to line 20)

20 Total of Property columns (A) through (E), line 15	12248
21 Total of Property columns (A) through (E), lines 16(b), 17(h), 18(d), and 19(f). Enter here and on line 7	12248
22 Subtract line 21 from line 20. Enter here and in appropriate Section in Part I (see instructions D and F.2)	-0-

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1973—O-500-154

Form **4798**
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Capital Loss Carryover

▷ (From 1972 to 1973)
▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1973

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number: 322 12 7997

A. Who Should File.—You will need to complete either Part I or Part II of this form if you have a capital loss to carryover to 1973.

You will have a capital loss carryover to 1973 if the amount on line 16(a), or on line 33, of Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972 is **LARGER THAN** the loss deducted on line 36, Form 1040 for 1972.

B. How to Compute Carryover.—If you have a capital loss carryover, complete either Part I or Part II, but do not complete both.

1. Complete only Part I if lines 4(a) and 12(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972, **DO NOT SHOW A LOSS.**
2. Complete only Part II if either (or both) line 4(a) or 12(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972, shows a loss.

Part I Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers

Section A.—Short-term Capital Loss Carryover

1 Enter loss from line 5, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; however, if such line is blank or shows a gain, check this block ☐, and OMIT lines 1 through 6 (because no short-term capital loss carryover exists) and enter the amount from line 36, Form 1040 for 1972 on line 7—then go to line 8	1	
2 Enter gain from line 13, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; however, if such line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	2	
3 Reduce loss, if any, on line 1 to extent of gain, if any, on line 2	3	
4 Enter amount from line 36, Form 1040 for 1972	4	
5 Enter smaller of amount on line 3 or line 4	5	
6 Excess of amount on line 3 over amount on line 5	6	

Note: *The amount on line 6 is your short-term capital loss carryover from 1972 to 1973 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on line 4(b), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1973.*

Section B.—Long-term Capital Loss Carryover

7 Line 4 less line 5 (unless you checked the block on line 1, and followed the line 1 instruction)	7	
8 Enter loss from line 13, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; however, if such line is blank or shows a gain, check this block ☐, and OMIT lines 8 through 12, because no long-term capital loss carryover exists	8	
9 Enter gain from line 5, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; however, if such line is blank or shows a loss, enter a zero	9	
10 Reduce loss on line 8 to extent of gain, if any, on line 9	10	
11 Multiply the amount on line 7 by 2	11	
12 Excess of amount on line 10 over amount on line 11	12	

Note: *The amount on line 12 is your long-term capital loss carryover from 1972 to 1973 that is attributable to years beginning after 1969. Enter this amount on line 12(b), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1973.*

Part II Pre-1970 and Post-1969 Capital Loss Carryovers

Section A.—Short-term Capital Losses Identified

1 Enter loss from line 5, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; however, if such line is blank or shows a gain, check this block ☒, and OMIT lines 1 through 20 (because no short-term capital loss carryover exists), complete line 21, enter loss from line 36, Form 1040 for 1972 on line 22—then go to line 23 1

2 Enter gain from line 13, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; however, if such line is blank or shows a loss enter a zero 2

3 Reduce the loss on line 1 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 2 3

Note: *If line 4(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972 is blank, OMIT lines 4 through 11, enter a zero on line 12—then go to line 13.*

4 Combine lines 3 and 11, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972 and if gain, enter gain; if zero or a loss, enter a zero 4

Note: *If line 4 is zero, OMIT lines 5 through 11, enter on line 12 the loss from line 4(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972—then go to line 13.*

5 Enter gain, if any, from line 3, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972 . . . 5

6 Enter smaller of amount on line 4 or line 5 6

7 Enter excess of gain on line 4 over amount on line 6 7

8 Enter loss from line 12(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; otherwise, enter a zero 8

9 Reduce the gain, if any, on line 7 to the extent of the loss, if any, on line 8 9

10 Enter loss from line 4(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972; otherwise, enter a zero 10

11 Add the gain(s) on line(s) 6 and 9 11

12 Reduce the loss on line 10 to the extent of the gain, if any, on line 11 12

13 Pre-1970 short-term capital loss (enter smaller of amount on line 3 or on line 12) 13

14 Short-term capital loss attributable to years beginning after 1969 (excess of line 3 over line 13) . 14

Section B.—Computation of Capital Loss Carryovers to 1973

15 Enter loss, if any, from line 13 above 15

16 Enter loss deducted on line 36, Form 1040 for 1972 16

17 Loss carryover to 1973 (excess of line 15 over line 16—If line 15 does not exceed line 16, enter zero). Enter here and on line 4(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1973 17

18 Enter loss, if any, from line 14 above 18

19 Enter excess of line 16 over line 15—if line 16 does not exceed line 15, enter zero 19

20 Loss carryover to 1973 (excess of line 18 over line 19—If line 18 does not exceed line 19, enter zero). Enter here and on line 4(b), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1973 20

21 If you were required to complete Part IV, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972, enter loss, if any, from line 30, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972. Otherwise, enter zero 21 (14322)

22 Enter excess of line 19 over line 18—if line 19 does not exceed line 18, enter zero (unless you checked the block on line 1, and followed the line 1 instructions) 22 1000

23 Loss carryover to 1973 (excess of line 21 over line 22—if line 21 does not exceed line 22, enter zero). Enter here and on line 12(a), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1973 . . . . . 23 (13322)

24 If you were required to complete Part IV, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972, enter loss, if any, from line 31, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972. Otherwise, enter loss, if any, from line 13, Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1972 24 1

25 Enter excess of line 22 over line 21 ⊳.................. × 2 (If line 22 does not exceed line 21, enter zero.) . . . . . 25 — 0 —

26 Loss carryover to 1973 (excess of line 24 over line 25—if line 24 does not exceed line 25, enter zero). Enter here and on line 12(b), Schedule D (Form 1040) for 1973 . . . . . 26 ([illegible])

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1973—O-500-156 36-2603-697

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby CALENDAR YEAR 19 73

ADDRESS 322-12-7997 SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	FEDERAL	STATE
MEDICINE/DRUGS		
LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
NET MED/DRUGS		
H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)	475	
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.	730	
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
HOSPITAL		
AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000	60	
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
MEDICAL EXPENSES	1265	1265
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.	496	499
	769	766
+ ½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.	150	150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▷	919	916

TAXES	FEDERAL	STATE
REAL ESTATE	601	
STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE	105	
GENERAL SALES TAX	218	
STATE & LOCAL INCOME	0	XXXXX
PERSONAL PROPERTY		
PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO	3	
STATE DISABILITY INS.	0	
SALES TAX AUTO		
17 TOTAL TAXES ▷	927	927

INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)	FEDERAL	STATE
MORTGAGE	2570.	
SBA	22.	
INSTALLMENT LOANS		
1ST THRIFT	154.	
BAY AREA	62	
MERRILL LYNCH	352	
WEIS VOISIN	9.	
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▷	3169.	3169

CONTRIBUTIONS	FEDERAL	STATE
PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS	150	
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
CHURCHES		
OTHER THAN CASH		
CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▷	150	150

CASUALTY OR THEFT LOSS(ES)	FEDERAL	STATE
LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
$100 LIMITATION (PER CASUALTY)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▷		

MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS	FEDERAL	STATE
INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
AUTO USE/DAMAGE		
ALIMONY (SCHEDULE)		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS. (SCHED)		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▷		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DEDUCT.	FEDERAL	STATE
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (FROM LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line 29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▷	5165	5162

REMARKS

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS, Inc., Los Angeles, Calif. Form 101

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. ____________ CALENDAR YEAR 19 73

ADDRESS ____________ FISCAL YEAR ENDING

322-12-7997 ____________ 19 ____

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY		
BUSINESS NAME EMPLOYERS NO.		
BUSINESS ADDRESS		
TOTAL RECEIPTS		33636
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	800	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	19336	
LABOR		
TOTAL	20136	
INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	—0—	20136
GROSS PROFIT		13500
GROSS INCOME		13500
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	151	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE	550	
BAD DEBTS		
CASH SHORT		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE ATTACHED)	2000	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS		
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	257	
INTEREST	120	
JANITOR SERVICE		
LAUNDRY		
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	600	
MAINTENANCE		
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE	53	
RENT	1060	
REPAIRS		
SALARIES AND WAGES	2487	
SALARIES OFFICERS		
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	192	
TAXES - PAYROLL	480	
TELEPHONE	91	
TRAVEL		
UTILITIES		
SALES TAX INCLUDED	511	
		8552
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) - FEDERAL RETURN		4948
NET PROFIT OR LOSS) - STATE RETURN (SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.)		

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. FORM 104
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE ____________

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY
ADDRESS
322-12-7997

I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO.

CALENDAR YEAR 19 73
FISCAL YEAR ENDING 19

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION / AMORTIZATION

KIND OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED MO YR	COST OR OTHER BASIS	SPEC 20% DEP		DEPRECIABLE BASIS	DEP ALLOWED PRIOR YEARS	REMAINING COST	METHOD	RATE(%) OR LIFE (YRS)	DEPRECIATION FOR THIS YEAR
KOODWILL	4/70	10000			—0—					
EQUIPMENT	4/70	10000			10000	6000	4000	S.L.	5YR	1167
COVENENT NOT TO COMPETE	4/70	5000			5000	3000	2000	S.L.	5YR	583
LEASEHOLD IMP.	4/70	3000			3000	1386	1614	S.L.	7YR	250
TOTALS		28000				10386				
Add 20% Additional Depreciation on Items Purchased THIS Year.										
TOTAL DEPRECIATION THIS YEAR										2000

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES . CALIF. FORM NO 102A

SCHEDULE

RESIDENT

540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR

1973

For the year January 1–December 31, 1973, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1973, ending ...., 19....

Please Type or Print FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S) SAMUEL & PHYLLIS	LAST NAME RUBY	Your Social Security Number 322 12 7997
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route) 16250 BIRCHER ST		Spouse's Social Security Number 349 18 1420
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE GRANADA HILLS CALIF	OCCUPATION	Yours S/E Spouse's H/W.

Filing Status - Check Only One

1. ☐ Single
2. ☒ Married filing joint return
3. ☐ Married filing separate return—Enter spouse's full name ....
4. ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ....
5. ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child. Enter year spouse died 19.......

Exemption Credits

6.	**Personal Exemption:** {If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 / If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50}	6	50
7.	**Dependents** - Do not list person who qualifies you as head of household. Name (include last name and/or address if different from yours) Relationship THOMAS — FRED ELISA Total Number ▶ 3 X $8	7	24
8.	**Blind** (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions ▶ .... X $8	8	
9.	**Total exemption credits** (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20 below	9	74

Income

10.	**Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** (Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to front, if unavailable, attach explanation)	10	
11.	**Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Capital gain dividends must be included at 100%	11	92
12.	**Interest.** (See instructions for taxability of federal, state and municipal bonds)	12	345
13.	**Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 50)	13	16196
14.	**Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	16633
15.	**Adjustments to income** (from line 56)	15	
16.	**Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14)	16	16633

- **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under 10,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.**
- **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $10,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**

17.	**Deductions: Itemized** (from line 63) **OR Standard** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked)	17	5162
18.	**Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19	18	11471

Your Tax and Credits

19.	**Tax**—If an averaging method is used, check appropriate box ☐ Schedule G, or ☐ Schedule G-1	19	249
20.	**Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	74
21.	**Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	175
22.	**Other credits** (from line 66)	22	
23.	**Net tax** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	175
24.	**Special tax credit**—from line 75 (see Instructions, page 2, for allowable credit)	24	53
25.	**Net Tax liability** (subtract line 24 from line 23—if line 24 is greater than line 23, enter zero)	25	122
26.	**Tax on preference income** (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540))	26	
27.	**Total tax liability** (add lines 25 and 26)	27	122

Your Prepayment Credits

28.	**Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1973, complete Part I on page 2		28	
29.	**Total California income tax withheld** (attach Form(s) W-2 or W-2P to face of return)	29		
30.	**1973 California estimated tax payments** (include amount allowable as a credit from 1972 return)	30		
31.	**Excess California SDI tax withheld** (attach Form DE 1964 to face of return)	31		
32.	**Total prepayment credits** (add lines 28 through 31)		32	—0—

Balance Due or Refund

33.	If line 27 is equal to or larger than line 32, enter amount of BALANCE DUE Pay in full and mail with return to: Franchise Tax Board, Sacramento, CA 95867	33	122
34.	If line 32 is larger than line 27, enter amount OVERPAID Mail return to: Franchise Tax Board, P.O. Box 13-540, Sacramento, CA 95813	34	
35.	Amount of line 34 to be REFUNDED. (allow at least six weeks for your refund)	35	
36.	Amount of line 34 to be credited on your 1974 estimated tax	36	

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN ▷ Your signature .... Date

HERE ▷ Wife's signature—if filing a joint return .... Date

▷ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) .... Date

Address (and Zip code)

Preparer's Employer — Identification (or SSA) Number 367-34-8729

13717 VANOWEN STREET
VAN NUYS, CA. 91403
367-34-8729

ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE

ATTACH HERE

ATTACH FORM DE1964 HERE

Write social security number on check or money order.

PART I - Renter's Credit - All questions must be answered

See *Instructions*, Page 2, for Allowable Credit

37.	Did you, on March 1, 1973, live in rented property which was your principal residence?	☐ Yes	☒ No	If no, you may not claim this credit
38.	Was the property you rented exempt from property tax?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, you may not claim this credit
39.	Did you live with any other person who claimed you as a dependent for income tax purposes?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, you may not claim this credit
40.	Did you or your spouse claim the homeowners' property tax exemption or receive public assistance?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, see page 2 of instructions

PART II - Other Income

41.	Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C(540))	41	4948
42.	Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D(540))	42	(1000)
43.	Net gain (or loss) from supplemental schedule of gains and losses (attach Schedule D-1(540))	43	12248
44.	Pensions and annuities — Attach Schedule E Form (540)	44	
45.	Rents and royalties — Attach Schedule E Form (540)	45	
46.	Partnerships — Attach Schedule E Form (540)	46	
47.	Estates and trusts — Attach Schedule E Form (540)	47	
48.	Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F(540))	48	
49.	Miscellaneous income (a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E(540))	(a)	
	(b) Alimony	(b)	
	(c) Other (state nature and source)........	(c)	
	Enter total of lines 49(a), (b) and (c)	49	
50.	Total (add lines 41 through 49). Enter here and on line 13	50	16196

PART III - Adjustments to Income

51.	"Sick pay", if included in line 10 (see instructions—attach statement)	51	
52.	Moving expenses (see instructions—attach statement)	52	
53.	Employee business expenses (see instructions—attach statement)	53	
54.	Military exclusion (see instructions)	54	
55.	Payment as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc.	55	
56.	Total adjustments (add lines 51 through 55). Enter here and on line 15	56	

PART IV - Itemized Deductions - ON SEPARATE RETURNS OF MARRIED TAXPAYERS, BOTH MUST ITEMIZE DEDUCTIONS OR BOTH MUST TAKE THE STANDARD DEDUCTION.

○ **Attach Schedule A(540) and enter sub-totals on lines 57 through 62, below**

57.	Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 10)	57	916
58.	Total child adoption expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 13)	58	—0—
59.	Total taxes (from Schedule A(540), line 21)	59	927
60.	Total interest expense (from Schedule A(540), line 25)	60	3169
61.	Total contributions (from Schedule A(540), line 29)	61	150
62.	Totals miscellaneous deductions (from Schedule A(540), line 40)	62	
63.	Total itemized deductions (add lines 57 through 62). Enter here and on line 17	63	5162

PART V - Other Credits - SEE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH CREDIT CLAIMED BELOW

64.	"Other State" net income tax credit (attach copy of other state return and Schedule S(540))	64	
65.	Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R(540))	65	
66.	Total (add lines 64 and 65). Enter here and on line 22	66	

PART VI - Special Tax Credit - If you report net gains from capital assets held more than one year on Schedule D(540), complete all lines below. **All other taxpayers enter "Net Tax" from line 23 on line 74 and complete line 75.**

67.	Taxable income from line 18 (or line 16 if Tax Table used)			67	
68.	Amount of gain or loss (if any) entered on Schedule D(540), line 14	68			
69.	Amount of gain or loss (if any) entered on Schedule D(540), line 15	69	(1000)		
70.	Combine lines 68 and 69 and enter total here. If zero or a loss, enter zero			70	—0—
71.	Adjusted taxable income (subtract line 70 from line 67)			71	
72.	Adjusted tax (use same method as used for determining tax on line 19)			72	
73.	Add lines 20 and 22, and enter total here			73	
74.	Adjusted net tax (subtract line 73 from line 72)			74	175
75.	Special tax credit—Determine allowable credit using Table on page 2 of instructions. Enter here and on line 24			75	53

13714-400 5-73 10,000M ① △ OSP

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS

Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
19 73
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

Itemized vs. Standard Deduction—You have a choice between two deduction methods. You can either itemize your deductions or take a standard deduction as explained in the 540 Instructions. On separate returns of a husband and wife, if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may **not** use the Tax Table or claim the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete the appropriate items below.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care	150	
2. Medicine and drugs		
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540		
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if line 3 is greater than line 2, enter zero)		
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	475	
6. Other medical and dental expenses:		
(a) Doctors, dentists, etc.	730	
(b) Hospitals		
(c) Other (itemize)	60	
7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)	1265	
8. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	499	
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if line 8 is greater than line 7, enter zero)	766	
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▶	916	

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list		
12. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540		
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▶	—0—	

Taxes (See tables on reverse)

14. Real estate		
15. State and local gasoline		
16. General sales		
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)		
18. Personal property		
19. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify		
20. Other		
21. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 14 through 20. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▶	927	

Interest Expense

22. Home mortgage		
23. Installment purchases		
24. Other (itemize) SCH		
25. **Total**—(Add lines 22, 23 and 24. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▶	3169	

Contributions

26. Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.	150	
27. Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts		
28. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement		
29. **Total**—(Add lines 26, 27 and 28. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▶	150	

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See Instructions

NOTE: If you had more than one loss, omit lines 30 through 34 and follow instructions for guidance.

30. Loss before insurance reimbursement		
31. Insurance reimbursement		
32. Subtract line 31 from line 30. Enter difference (if line 31 is greater than line 30, enter zero)		
33. Enter $100 or amount on line 32, whichever is smaller		
34. **Casualty or theft loss** (line 32 less line 33)		
35. **Alimony paid**		
36. **Child care**—See instructions		
37. **Union dues**		
38. **Employment education expense**—See instructions		
39. **Other**—See instructions (itemize)		
40. **Total**—Add lines 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▶		

(Rev. 1973)

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE 1973 YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR: SAMMEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number: 322 12 7997

A. Principal business activity SNACK BAR; product FOOD
(See Instructions for "Item A.") (For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name SNACK BAR

C. Federal employer identification number

D. Business address 5418 VAN NUYS BLVD - VAN NUYS CALIF (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other.

F. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

G. Method of inventory valuation ▷ COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? ☐ YES ☐ NO. If "Yes," attach explanation.

IMPORTANT—All applicable lines and schedules must be filled in.

INCOME	1 Gross receipts or sales $ Less returns and allowances $ Balance ▷	
	2 Less: Cost of goods sold (Schedule C-1, line 29) and/or operations (attach schedule)	
	3 Gross profit	
	4 Other income (attach schedule)	
	5 **TOTAL** income (add lines 3 and 4)	
DEDUCTIONS	6 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-3)	
	7 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2)	
	8 Rent on business property	
	9 Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2)	
	10 Salaries and wages not included on line 24, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	
	11 Insurance	
	12 Legal and professional fees	
	13 Commissions	
	14 Amortization (attach statement)	
	15 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Instructions for line 15(a))	
	(b) Employee benefit programs (see Instructions for line 15(b))	
	16 Interest on business indebtedness	
	17 Bad debts arising from sales or services	
	18 Depletion	
	19 Other business expenses (specify):	
	(a)	
	(b)	
	(c)	
	(d)	
	(e)	
	(f)	
	(g)	
	(h) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(g))	
	20 Total deductions (add lines 6 through 19)	SCHEDULE
	21 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or Form 540NR	4948

SCHEDULE C-1. COST OF GOODS SOLD (See Schedule C Instructions for line 2)

22 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)	
23 Purchases $ Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $ Balance ▷	
24 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)	
25 Materials and supplies	
26 Other costs (attach schedule)	
27 Total of lines 22 through 26	
28 Less: Inventory at end of year	
29 Cost of goods sold. Enter here and on line 2, above	

(Rev. 1-73)

SCHEDULE C-2. Explanation of Lines 7 and 9

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE C-3. DEPRECIATION

(See Schedule C Instructions for line 6). NOTE: Depreciation may be computed by using the Asset Guideline Classes specified in Federal Revenue Procedure 72-10, regardless of when assets were placed in service. If this method is used, do NOT use the Lower Limit or the Upper Limit (ADR) Ranges. Attach detailed statement of depreciation computation.

a. Group and guideline class or description of property	b. Date acquired	c. Cost or other basis	d. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	e. Method of computing depreciation	f. Life or rate	g. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below)			→			
2 Asset Guideline Class System (See Note above)			▨	▨	▨	
3 Other depreciation						
Buildings						
Furniture and fixtures						
Transportation equipment						
Machinery and other equipment						
Other (specify)						
4 Totals						
5 Less: Amount of depreciation claimed elsewhere in Schedule C-1						
6 Balance—Enter here and on page 1, line 6						

Summary	Straight line	Declining balance	Sum of the years-digits	Units of production	Other (specify)	Total
7 Line 2, above				▨	▨	
8 Other	2000					2000

SCHEDULE C-4. Expense Account Information

(See Schedule C Instructions for Schedule C-4)

Enter information with regard to yourself and your five highest paid employees. In determining the five highest paid employees, expense account allowances must be added to their salaries and wages. However, the information need not be submitted for any employee for whom the combined amount is less than $10,000, or for yourself if your expense account allowance plus line 21, page 1 is less than $10,000.

Name	Expense Account	Salaries and Wages
Owner		▨
1		
2		
3		
4		
5		

Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(3) Employees' families at conventions or meetings? ☐ Yes ☒ No

(4) Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W-2? ☐ Yes ☒ No

SCHEDULE D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE 1973 YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1. 400 INTER RECTIFIER	1/17/73	2/22/73	3218	3729	(511)
100 LEVITZ	10/11/72	4/3/73	1281	2797	(1516)
100 POTTER INST	3/19/73	6/29/73	348	695	(347)
100 ESSEX INT	4/3/73	6/29/73	1392	1759	(367)

2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 18, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3	(2741)

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

5.					

6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 20, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7	

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

9.					

10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 22, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
11. Enter your share of gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11	

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4	(2741)	
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8		
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12 1972 LOSS 14322 - 1000		
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach computation)	(13322)	
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16		(16063)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR		
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of: (a) amount on line 17; (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or (c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return).		(1000)

SCHEDULE
D-1
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULE OF GAINS AND LOSSES

(Sales or Exchanges Including Involuntary Conversions)
(Attach to Form 540, 540NR, 541 or 565)

TAXABLE
19 73
YEAR

Name as shown on Tax Return	Identifying number as shown on return
SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY	322-12-7997

PART I Gain From Disposition of Property Under Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, 18220

Lines 9 and 10 should be omitted if there are no dispositions of farm property or farm land; or, if this form is filed by a partnership.

1. Description of Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, and 18220 property.	Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	Date sold (mo., day, yr.)
(A) SNACK BAR	4/70	8/13/73
(B)		
(C)		
(D)		

Correlate lines 1(A) through 1(D) with these columns ➡	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)
2. Gross sales price	28000 –			
3. Cost or other basis and expense of sale	28138 –			
4. Depreciation allowed (or allowable)	12386 –			
5. Adjusted basis, line 3 less line 4	15752 –			
6. Total gain, subtract line 5 from line 2	12248.			
7. If Section 18211 property:				
(a) Depreciation allowed (or allowable) after applicable date. (See Instruction D-3)	12386.			
(b) Line 6 or line 7(a), whichever is smaller	12248.			
8. If Section 18212-18 property:				
(a) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-63 and before 1-1-71				
(b) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-70				
(c) Enter line 6 or line 8(b), whichever is smaller				
(d) Line 8(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(e) Enter excess, if any, of line 6 over line 8(b)				
(f) Enter line 8(a) or line 8(e), whichever is smaller				
(g) Line 8(f) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(h) Add line 8(d) and line 8(g)				
9. If Section 18220 property:				
(a) If farm land, enter soil and water conservation expenses for current year and four preceding years				
(b) If farm property, other than land, subtract line 7(b) from line 6; OR, if farm land, enter line 6 or line 9(a), whichever is smaller (see Instruction D-5)				
(c) Excess deductions account (see Instruction D-5)				
(d) Enter line 9(b) or line 9(c), whichever is smaller				
10. If Section 18219 property:				
(a) Soil and water conservation expenses made after 12-31-69				
(b) Enter amount from line 9(d), if any; otherwise, enter a zero				
(c) Enter excess, if any, of line 10(a) over 10(b)				
(d) Line 10(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-5)				
(e) Line 6 less line 10(b)				
(f) Enter smaller of line 10(d) or line 10(e)				
SUMMARY OF PART I (Complete Property Columns (A) through (D) up to Line 10(f) before going to Line 11)				
11. Enter amounts from line 6	12248			
12. Enter amounts from lines 7(b), 8(h), 9(d) and 10(f)	12248			
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11, enter here and in appropriate Section in Part II (see Instruction D-2)	–0–			
14. Total of Property Columns (A) through (D), line 12. Enter here and on line 24, Part III				12248 –

(REV. 1973)

PART II Sales or Exchanges of Property Used in Trade or Business and/or Involuntary Conversions (Section 18181-82) see Instruction E

Section A — INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS DUE TO CASUALTY AND THEFT

a. Kind of property (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain (or loss) (d. plus e. less f.)
15.						

16. Combine the amounts on line 15, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . .
(a) For all returns, except partnership returns: (1) If line 16 is zero or a gain, enter amount of each gain or loss, above, in column (g) of applicable Section B-1, B-2 or B-3; (2) If line 16 is a loss, enter such amount on line 25 of Part III.
(b) For partnership returns: Enter gain(s) and loss(es) in Schedule K (Form 565). See Instruction E.

Section B — SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY USED IN TRADE OR BUSINESS AND CERTAIN INVOLUNTARY CONVERSIONS (Not Reportable in Section A)

Section B-1 Property Held One Year or Less

17.						

18. Combine the amounts on line 17, enter here . . . .

Section B-2 Property Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

19.						

20. Combine the amounts on line 19, enter here . . . .

Section B-3 Property Held More Than Five Years

21.						

22. Combine the amounts on line 21, enter here . . . .
23. Combine the amounts on lines 18, 20 and 22; enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . .
(a) For all returns, except partnership returns: (1) If line 23 is a gain, enter the amounts from lines 18, 20 and 22, on lines 2, 6 and 10, respectively, of the Schedule D (Form 540 or 541) that is being filed. (2) If line 23 is a loss, enter such amount on line 26 of Part III.
(b) For partnership returns: Enter amounts on lines 18, 20 and 22, in Schedule K(565)—see Instruction E.

PART III Ordinary Gains and Losses

a. Kind of property and how acquired (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements and expense of sale	g. Gain (or loss) (d. plus e. less f.)
24. Gain, if any, from line 14 . . .						12248
25. Loss, if any, from line 16 . . .						
26. Loss, if any, from line 23 . . .						
27.						

28. Combine lines 24 through 27, enter here and also on the appropriate line as follows . . . . 12248 —
(a) For fiduciary and partnership returns: Enter the gain (or loss) shown on line 28 on the line provided for on the return being filed—see Instruction F for specific line reference.
(b) For individual returns:
(1) If the gain (or loss) on line 28 includes losses which are to be treated as an itemized deduction on Schedule A (Form 540 or 540NR) (see Instruction F), enter the total of such loss(es) here and on Schedule A (Form 540 or 540NR)—Identify as loss from line 28(b)(1), Schedule D-1 (Form 540) . . .
(2) Redetermine the gain (or loss) on line 28, excluding the loss (if any) entered on line 28(b)(1). Enter here and on page 2 of Form 540 or Form 540NR, under "Other Income" . . . . 12248 —

Form **1040** US Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service **Individual Income Tax Return** **1970**

For the year January 1–December 31, 1970, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1970, ending ...., 19....

Please print or type

First name and initial (If joint return, use first names and middle initials of both): SAMUEL AND PHYLLIS
Last name: RUBY
Your social security number: 322 12 7997
Present home address (Number and street or rural route): 16250 Bircher
Spouse's social security number: 349 18 1420
City, town or post office, State and ZIP code: Granada Hills, California
Occupation — Yours: Self-Emp. — Spouse's: Housewife

Filing Status—check only one:

1 ☐ Single; 2 ☒ Married filing jointly (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separately and spouse is also filing. If this item checked give spouse's social security number in space above and enter first name here ▷
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
5 ☐ Surviving widow(er) with dependent child
6 ☐ Married filing separately and spouse is not filing

Exemptions

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of boxes checked
7 Yourself	☒	☐	☐	
8 Spouse (applies only if item 2 or 6 is checked)	☒	☐	☐	2

9 First names of your dependent children who lived with you Fred, Brian, Elisa, Thomas — Enter number ▶ 4
10 Number of other dependents (from line 34) ▶
11 Total exemptions claimed ▶ 6

Please attach Copy B of Form W–2 to back

CLIENT'S COPY

Income	12 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. (Attach Forms W–2 to back. If unavailable, attach explanation)	12	
	13a Dividends (see pages 5 and 9 of instr.) $ 20.60 13b Less exclusion $ 20.60 Balance ▶ (Also list in Part I of Schedule B, if gross dividends and other distributions are over $100)	13c	
	14 Interest. Enter total here (also list in Part II of Schedule B, if total is over $100)	14	
	15 Income other than wages, dividends, and interest (from line 40)	15	7,284 97
	16 Total (add lines 12, 13c, 14 and 15)	16	7,284 97
	17 Adjustments to income (such as "sick pay," moving expense, etc. from line 45)	17	
	18 Adjusted gross income (subtract line 17 from line 16)	18	7,284 97

- See page 2 of instructions for rules under which the IRS will figure your tax and surcharge.
- If you do not itemize deductions and line 18 is under $10,000, find tax in Tables. Enter tax on line 19.
- If you itemize deductions or line 18 is $10,000 or more, go to line 46 to figure tax.

Tax and Surcharge	19 Tax (Check if from: Tax Tables 1-15 ☐, Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z ☐, Schedule D ☐, or Schedule G ☐)	19	117 53
	20 Tax surcharge. See Tax Surcharge Tables A, B and C in instructions. (If you claim retirement income credit, use Schedule R to figure surcharge.)	20	
	21 Total (add lines 19 and 20)	21	117 53
Payments and Credits	22 Total credits (from line 55)	22	
	23 Income tax (subtract line 22 from line 21)	23	
	24 Other taxes (from line 61)	24	538 20
	25 Total (add lines 23 and 24)	25	655 73
	26 Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W–2 to back) 26		
	27 1970 Estimated tax payments (include 1969 overpayment allowed as a credit) 27		Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service.
	28 Other payments (from line 65) 28		
	29 Total (add lines 26, 27, and 28)	29	
Bal. Due or Refund	30 If line 25 is larger than line 29, enter BALANCE DUE. Pay in full with return ▶	30	655 73
	31 If line 29 is larger than line 25, enter OVERPAYMENT ▶	31	
	32 Line 31 to be: (a) Credited on 1971 estimated tax ▶ $; (b) Refunded ▶ $		

Please attach Check or Money Order here

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete.

Sign here

▶ Your signature Date

▶ Spouse's signature (If filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▶ Signature of preparer other than taxpayer, based on all information of which he has any knowledge. Date

LAMBERT-MARKELL
Address 16633 VENTURA BLVD.
ENCINO, CALIF. 91316

16—81168-1

Attach Copy B of Form W-2 here. ▶

Foreign Accounts (check appropriate box) ▶ Did you, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country (except in a U.S. military banking facility operated by a U.S. financial institution)? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No.
If "Yes," attach Form 4683. (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

PART I.—Additional Exemptions (Complete only for other dependents claimed on line 10)

33 (a) NAME	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year write "B" or "D"	(d) Did dependent have income of $625 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support, if 100% write "ALL"	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
				$	$

34 Total number of dependents listed above. Enter here and on line 10 . . . . ▶

PART II.—Income other than Wages, Dividends, and Interest

35 Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C)	35	8,284	97
36 Sale or exchange of property (attach Schedule D)	36	(1,000	00)
37 Pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Schedule E) .	37		
38 Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F)	38		
39 Miscellaneous income (state nature and source)	39		
40 Total (add lines 35, 36, 37, 38, and 39). Enter here and on line 15 . . . . ▶	40	7,284	97

PART III.—Adjustments to Income

41 "Sick pay" if included in line 12 (attach Form 2440 or other required statement)	41		
42 Moving expense (attach Form 3903)	42		
43 Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or other statement)	43		
44 Payments as a self-employed person to a retirement plan, etc. (attach Form 2950SE)	44		
45 Total adjustments (add lines 41, 42, 43, and 44). Enter here and on line 17 . . . . ▶	45		

PART IV.—Tax Computation

46 Adjusted gross income (from line 18)	46	7,284	97
47 (a) If you itemize deductions, enter total from Schedule A, line 22 (b) If you do not itemize deductions, and line 46 is $10,000 or more, enter $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately)	47	2,745	44
48 Subtract line 47 from line 46	48	4,539	53
49 Multiply total number of exemptions claimed on line 11, by $625	49	3,700	00
50 Taxable income. Subtract line 49 from line 48. (Figure your tax on this amount by using Tax Rate Schedule X, Y, or Z unless the alternative tax or income averaging is applicable.) Enter tax on line 51	50	839	53
51 Tax. Enter here and on line 19 . . . . ▶	51	117	53

PART V.—Credits

52 Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R)	52		
53 Investment credit (attach Form 3468)	53		
54 Foreign tax credit (attach Form 1116)	54		
55 Total credits (add lines 52, 53, and 54). Enter here and on line 22 . . . . ▶	55		

PART VI.—Other Taxes

56 Self-employment tax (attach Schedule SE)	56	538	20
57 Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255)	57		
58 Minimum tax. See instructions on page 7. Check here ☐, if Form 4625 is attached	58		
59 Social security tax on unreported tip income (attach Form 4137)	59		
60 Uncollected employee social security tax on tips (from Forms W-2)	60		
61 Total (add lines 56, 57, 58, 59, and 60). Enter here and on line 24 . . . . ▶	61	538	20

PART VII.—Other Payments

62 Excess F.I.C.A. tax withheld (two or more employers—see instructions on page 7)	62		
63 Credit for Federal tax on gasoline, special fuels, and lubricating oil (attach Form 4136)	63		
64 Regulated Investment Company Credit (attach Form 2439)	64		
65 Total (add lines 62, 63, and 64). Enter here and on line 28 . . . . ▶	65		

☆☆☆☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1970—O-370-040

94-1149624

Schedules A&B—Itemized Deductions AND Dividend and Interest Income

(Form 1040)

Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

▷ Attach to Form 1040.

1970

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Your Social Security Number: 322 : 12 : 7997

Schedule A—Itemized Deductions (Schedule B on back)

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1 **One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care**		
2 Medicine and drugs		
3 Enter 1% of line 18, Form 1040		
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
5 Itemize other medical and dental expenses. Include hearing aids, dentures, eyeglasses, transportation, balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1, etc.		
6 Total (add lines 4 and 5)		
7 Enter 3% of line 18, Form 1040		
8 Subtract line 7 from line 6. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)		
9 **Total deductible medical and dental expenses** (Add lines 1 and 8. Enter here and on line 17, below.) ▶	150	00
Taxes.—Real estate		
State and local gasoline (see gas tax tables)		
General sales (see sales tax tables)		
State and local income		
Personal property		
10 **Total taxes** (Enter here and on line 18, below.) ▶	663	26

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (Itemize—see instructions on page 8 for examples)

11 Total cash contributions		
12 Other than cash (see instructions on page 8 for required statement). Enter total for such items here		
13 Carryover from prior years (see instructions on page 8)		
14 **Total contributions** (Add lines 11, 12, and 13. Enter here and on line 19, below. See instructions on page 8 for limitation) ▶	280	00
Interest expense—Home mortgage		
Installment purchases		
Other (Itemize)		
15 **Total interest expense** (Enter here and on line 20, below.) ▶	1,552	18
Miscellaneous deductions for child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc. (see instructions on page 8).		
16 **Total miscellaneous deductions** (Enter here and on line 21, below.) ▶	100	00

Summary of Itemized Deductions

A

17 Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from line 9)	150	00
18 Total taxes (from line 10)	663	26
19 Total contributions (from line 14)	280	00
20 Total interest expense (from line 15)	1,552	18
21 Total miscellaneous deductions (from line 16)	100	00
22 **TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS.** (Add lines 17 through 21. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 47) S/A ▶	2,745	44

16—81169-1

NAME Samuel and Phyllis Ruby IDENTIFICATION NO. 322-12-7997

ADDRESS 16250 Bircher Granada Hills, California

SCHEDULE NO. A

SCHEDULE OF DEDUCTIONS

YEAR ENDED 1970

MEDICAL	FEDERAL		STATE	
1. ONE HALF OF MEDICAL INSURANCE (NOT OVER $150.00)	150	00	150	00
2. DRUGS AND MEDICINES				
3. LESS: 1% OF ADJ. GROSS INCOME				
4. NET DRUGS AND MEDICINES				
5. DOCTORS/DENTISTS				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
DR.				
MEDICARE				
HOSPITAL				
LABORATORY				
BALANCE OF MEDICAL INSURANCE NOT DEDUCTIBLE ON TOP LINE				
TRAVEL FOR MEDICAL				
AMBULANCE				
GLASSES				
HEARING AID				
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES				
MEDICAL EXPENSES				
LESS: REIMBURSED BY INSURANCE				
6. TOTAL				
7. LESS: 3% OF ADJ. GROSS INCOME				
8. BALANCE (NOT LESS THAN ZERO)				
9. **TOTAL MEDICAL DEDUCTIONS** (LINE 1 PLUS LINE 8)	150	00	150	00

TAXES	FEDERAL		STATE	
AUTO LICENSE (LESS REG. FEE)	42	00	42	00
SALES TAX + Large Items	170	00	170	00
SALES TAX AUTO				
REAL ESTATE TAX	311	26	311	26
PERSONAL PROPERTY TAX				
STATE INCOME TAX			x x	x x
GAS TAX 2000 GAL. @ .07 c GAL.	140	00	140	00
DISABILITY INSURANCE				
MISC. TAX	x x	x x		
OTHERS:				
TOTAL TAXES	663	26	663	26

CONTRIBUTIONS	FEDERAL & STATE	
CHURCHES	150	00
COMMUNITY CHEST/UNITED CRUSADE		
SALVATION ARMY/GOODWILL INDUSTRIES		
RED CROSS		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
PARTNERSHIP RETURN		
PAYROLL DEDUCTION		
OTHER ORGANIZED CHARITIES:	100	00
Boy Scouts	15	00
Girl Scouts	15	00
TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS	280	00

INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)	FEDERAL & STATE	
MORTGAGE LOAN		
Colonial Mtg. Co.	1,133	10
INSTALLMENT LOAN		
Goodbody Co.	120	32
Bache Co.	119	12
First Thrift	89	10
Transworld	51	44
Revolving Charges (6%)	39	10
TOTAL INTEREST	1,552	18

MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS	FEDERAL & STATE	
ALIMONY (EXPLAIN)		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX FEE		
UNION DUES		
SMALL TOOLS (GOOD 1 YEAR)		
TOOLS DEPRECIATION		
SAFETY EQUIPMENT		
UNIFORMS (NOT GEN. WEAR)		
LAUNDRY & CLEANING		
AUTO MILEAGE @		
TELEPHONE EXPENSE (NOT REIMB.)		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
DUES & SUBSCRIPTIONS		
INCOME TAX PREPARATION	50	00
OTHERS Financial Publ.	50	00
TOTAL MISC. DEDUCTIONS	100	00

CASUALTY LOSSES (EXPLAIN)	FEDERAL & STATE
SUB TOTAL	
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.	
SUB TOTAL	
LESS $100.00 FOR EACH CASUALTY	
TOTAL CASUALTY LOSSES	

	FEDERAL		STATE	
TOTAL DEDUCTIONS	2,745	44	2,745	44

LAMBERT-MARKELL • 16633 VENTURA BLVD. • ENCINO, CALIF. 98140

SCHEDULE C
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Profit (or Loss) From Business or Profession

(Sole Proprietorship)

▶ Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 1065.
▶ Attach to Form 1040.

1970

Name as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social security number: 322 12 7997

A Principal business activity Food ; product
(See separate instructions) (For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B Business name Snack Bar

C Employer Identification Number 95-2651578

D Business address 5418 Van Nuys Boulevard Van Nuys, California 91401 (ZIP code)

E Indicate method of accounting: (1) ☒ cash; (2) ☐ accrual; (3) ☐ other.

F Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," attach explanation.

G Were you required to file Forms 1096 and 1099 or 1087 for the calendar year 1970? (See "Item G" in separate instructions for Schedule C.) ☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," where were they filed?

1	Gross receipts or gross sales $ Less: Returns and allowances $		$
2	Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory attach explanation)		
3	Merchandise purchased $, less cost of any items withdrawn from business for personal use $		
4	Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5	Material and supplies		
6	Other costs (explain in Schedule C–1)		
7	Total of lines 2 through 6		SCHEDULE ATTACHED
8	Inventory at end of this year		
9	Cost of goods sold and/or operations (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10	Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
	OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
11	Depreciation (explain in Schedule C–2)		
12	Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C–1)		
13	Rent on business property		
14	Repairs (explain in Schedule C–1)		
15	Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
16	Insurance		
17	Legal and professional fees		
18	Commissions		
19	Amortization (attach statement)		
20	Retirement plans, etc. (other than contributions made on your behalf—see separate instructions)		
21	Interest on business indebtedness		
22	Bad debts arising from sales or services		
23	Depletion		
24	Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C–1)		
25	Total of lines 11 through 24		
26	Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 25 from line 10). Enter here and on line 35, Form 1040. ALSO enter on Schedule SE, Part I, line 1		9,284 97

SCHEDULE C–1. EXPLANATION OF LINES 6, 12, 14, AND 24

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

16—81171-1

SCHEDULE SE
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

▶ Each self-employed person must file a separate Schedule SE
▶ Attach to Form 1040.

1970

▶ **If you had wages, including tips, of $7,800 or more that were subject to social security taxes, do not fill in this page.**
▶ **If you had more than one business, combine profits (or losses) from all of your businesses and farms on this Schedule SE.**

Important.—The self-employment income reported below will be credited to your social security record and used in figuring social security benefits.

Name of self-employed person (as shown on social security card)	Social security number	Check applicable block
Samuel Ruby	322 12 7997	1 ☒ Male 2 ☐ Female

Business activities subject to self-employment tax (grocery store, restaurant, farm, etc.) ▶

Part I Computation of Net Earnings from BUSINESS Self-Employment (other than farming)

1 Net profit (or loss) shown in Schedule C (Form 1040), line 26. (Enter combined amount if more than one business.)	8,284	97
2 Net income (or loss) from excluded services or sources included on line 1 Specify excluded services or sources		
3 Net earnings (or loss) from business self-employment (Subtract line 2 from line 1, and enter here and on line 1(a), Part III, below.)		

Part II Computation of Net Earnings from FARM Self-Employment

SE

A farmer may elect to compute net farm earnings using the OPTIONAL METHOD (line 3, below) INSTEAD OF THE REGULAR METHOD (line 2, below) if his gross profits are: (1) $2,400 or less, or (2) more than $2,400 and net profits are less than $1,600. If your gross profits from farming are not more than $2,400 and you elect to use the optional method, you need not complete lines 1 and 2.

Computation under Regular Method

1 Net farm profit (or loss) from:				
(a) Schedule F, line 52 (cash method), or line 69 (accrual method)				
(b) Farm partnerships				
2 Net earnings from self-employment from farming. Add lines 1(a) and (b)				

Computation under Optional Method

3 If gross profits from farming are:* (a) Not more than $2,400, enter two-thirds of the gross profits (b) More than $2,400 and the net farm profit is less than $1,600, enter $1,600		

*Note.—*Gross profits from farming are the total of the gross profits from Schedule F, line 28 (cash method), or line 67 (accrual method), plus the distributive share of gross profit from farm partnerships as explained in instructions for Schedule SE.*

4 Enter here and on line 1(b), Part III, below, the amount on line 2 (or line 3, if you use the optional method)		

Part III Computation of Social Security Self-Employment Tax

1 Net earnings (or loss) from self-employment—						
(a) From business (other than farming—from line 3, Part I, above)					8,284	97
(b) From farming (from line 4, Part II, above)						
(c) From partnerships, joint ventures, etc. (other than farming)						
(d) From service as a minister, member of a religious order, or a Christian Science practitioner. If you filed Form 4361, check here ☐ and enter zero on this line						
(e) From service with a foreign government or international organization						
(f) Other (director's fees, etc.). Specify						
2 Total net earnings (or loss) from self-employment reported on line 1					8,284	97
(If line 2 is less than $400, you are not subject to self-employment tax. Do not fill in rest of page.)						
3 The largest amount of combined wages and self-employment earnings subject to social security tax is			$7,800	00		
4 (a) Total "FICA" wages as indicated on Form W-2						
(b) Unreported tips, if any, subject to FICA tax from Form 4137, line 9						
(c) Total of lines 4(a) and 4(b)						
5 Balance (subtract line 4(c) from line 3)						
6 Self-employment income—line 2 or 5, whichever is smaller					7,800	00
7 If line 6 is $7,800, enter $538.20; if less, multiply the amount on line 6 by .069					538	20
8 Railroad employee's and railroad employee representative's adjustment for hospital insurance benefits tax from Form 4469						
9 Self-employment tax (subtract line 8 from line 7). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 56					538	20

16—81171-1 GPO

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

SUPPLEMENT TO SCHEDULE C

Income:	$32,657.34	
Less: Sales Tax	153.39	$32,503.95
Beginning inventory		
Purchases - Beverages/milk	$ 1,988.55	
Groceries	8,761.69	
Meat	1,893.83	
Bakery/bread	2,412.82	
	$15,056.89	
Less: Ending inventory	800.00	14,256.89
Adjusted Gross Profit		$18,247.06
Expenses:		
Rent	$ 1,172.16	
Payroll	2,046.30	
Payroll taxes	202.92	
Travel to employees	215.00	
Miscellaneous expense	219.40	
Interest	419.10	
Accounting	225.00	
Telephone	78.45	
Repairs	121.40	
Insurance	150.00	
Linen	21.00	
Auto - 3,000 M.	360.00	
Office	360.00	
Cleaning/maintenance	50.00	
Depreciation	3,321.36	(8,962.09)
Net Profit		$ 9,284.97

DEPRECIATION

Equipment	4/70	$10,000.00	5 Yr.	$2,000.00
Covenant Not To Compete		5,000.00	5 Yr.	1,000.00
Leasehold Imp. (7 Yr. Balance Lease)		3,000.00	7 Yr.	428.50
		April-December, 1970		$4,428.50

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Sales or Exchanges of Property

▶ Attach to Form 1040.

1970

Name(s) as shown on Form 1040: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number: 322 | 12 | 7997

D

Part I Capital Assets—Short-term capital gains and losses—assets held not more than 6 months

	a. Kind of property. Indicate security, real estate, or other (specify)	b. Description (Examples: 100 sh. of "Z" Co., 2 story brick, etc.)	c. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (see instr.)	d. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	e. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	f. Gross sales price	g. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	h. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	i. Gain (or loss) (f plus g less h)
1									
				SCHEDULE	ATTACHED				(15,274.00)

2 Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries

3 Enter net gain (or loss) from lines 1 and 2

4 Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)

5 Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 3 and 4

Long-term capital gains and losses—assets held more than 6 months

	a.	b.	c.	d.	e.	f.	g.	h.	i.
6									

7 Capital gain distributions

8 Enter gain from Part VII, line 47 or line 51(a), whichever applicable

9 Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries

10 Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)

11 Net gain (or loss) from lines 6 through 10

12 Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement) (15,274.00)

13 Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 11 and 12

14 Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 13, and enter the net gain (or loss) here

15 **If line 14 shows a gain—**

(a) Enter 50% of line 13 or 50% of line 14, whichever is smaller (see Part IV for computation of alternative tax). Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 13

(b) Subtract line 15(a) from line 14. Enter here and on line 17, Part II

16 **If line 14 shows a loss—**

(a) Add lines 4 and 12 (if lines 4 and 12 are blank, enter a zero here and on lines 16(b) and 16(c) and go to line 16(d))

(b) Combine lines 3 and 11—if gain, enter gain; if loss, enter zero

(c) Enter smallest of (i) line 16(a) less line 16(b); (ii) line 48, Form 1040 (line 18, Form 1040 if tax table used) disregarding capital gains and/or losses—determine this figure via a side computation; or (iii) $1,000

(d) Combine lines 3 and 11—if loss, enter loss; if gain, enter zero here and on line 16(e), and go to line 16(f)

(e) Enter smallest of (i) line 48, Form 1040 (line 18, Form 1040 if tax table used) disregarding capital gains and/or losses, less line 16(c)—determine this figure via a side computation; (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately); (iii) if line 3 is zero or shows a gain, 50% of line 16(d); (iv) if line 11 is zero or shows a gain, amount on line 16(d); or, (v) if lines 3 and 11 show losses, line 3 added to 50% of line 11.

(f) Enter here, and on line 17, Part II, the sum of lines 16(c) and 16(e)—(Do not enter an amount greater than $1,000) Carryover (14,274.00 (1,000.00)

Part II Summary of Schedule D Gains and Losses

17 Net gain (or loss) from line 15(b) or 16(f), Part I

18 Net gain (or loss) from line 22, Part III

19 Total net gain (or loss), combine lines 17 and 18. Enter here and on line 36, Form 1040

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

SUPPLEMENT TO SCHEDULE D

Shares	Description	Sale Price	Purchase Price	Gain (Loss)
200	Trans America Inc.	$1,738.00	$1,681.00	$ 58.00
200	Tool Research and Eng.	3,147.00	4,534.00	(1,387.00)
100	Nat'l Health Ent.	615.00	1,724.00	(1,109.00)
100	Botany Ind.	541.00	1,105.00	(564.00)
100	Datatron Processing	336.00	529.00	(193.00)
200	Castleton Ind.	814.00	1,479.00	(665.00)
100	Computer Equipment	492.00	1,219.00	(727.00)
100	Computer Equipment	984.00	2,463.00	(1,479.00)
100	Computer Inv.	857.00	1,648.00	(791.00)
100	Computer Inv.	830.00	1,661.00	(831.00)
100	Adams Russell	492.00	1,194.00	(702.00)
100	Cinerama Inc.	432.00	967.00	(535.00)
100	Summit Org.	358.00	840.00	(482.00)
100	Summit Org.	480.00	840.00	(361.00)
100	Itel Corp.	1,685.00	1,660.00	25.00
100	Asamere Oil Co., Ltd.	1,512.00	1,507.00	5.00
100	Saxon Ind.	2,078.00	2,041.00	38.00
100	Saxon Ind.	2,078.00	2,041.00	38.00
100	Telex Corp.	1,980.00	2,269.00	(289.00)
100	Telex Corp.	1,980.00	2,269.00	(289.00)
100	Salem Corp.	1,193.00	1,495.00	(302.00)
100	Equity Funding Corp.	2,250.00	2,584.00	(334.00)
3 Units	General Mtg. Invest.	3,301.00	3,011.00	290.00
200	Nat'l Health Enterprises	1,107.00	3,499.00	(2,392.00)
100	Botany Industries	517.00	1,105.00	(589.00)
100	Computer Equip.	456.00	1,219.00	(763.00)
100	Technicolor Inc.	1,403.00	2,465.00	(1,062.00)
			NET LOSS	($15,274.00)

FORM
540
RESIDENT

CALIFORNIA
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN

TAXABLE
1970
YEAR

For Calendar Year 1970 or Fiscal Year Begun 1970 and Ended 1971

Please Type or Print

FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S) SAMUEL AND PHYLLIS	LAST NAME RUBY	Your social security number 322 12 7997
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, or rural route) 16250 Bircher	COUNTY Los Angeles	Spouse's social security number 349 18 1420
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE Granada Hills	STATE California ZIP CODE 91344	Your occupation Self-Employed
NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER AT TIME OF FILING Self-Employed		Spouse's occupation Housewife

S
C
M
B
P
A

NAME AND ADDRESS ON 1969 CALIFORNIA RETURN. IF SAME AS ABOVE, WRITE "SAME". IF NONE FILED, GIVE REASON.
11346 Montgomery Avenue Granada Hills, Calif.

Adjusted gross income on 1970 Federal Return $ 8,284.97
If different from line 11, below, explain in Part VII, page 2.

Filing Status (check one)
1. ☐ Single
2. ☒ Married, filing joint return
3. ☐ Married, filing separate return—spouse's name:
4. ☐ Unmarried "head of household"—Complete Part I, page 2

Income If joint return, include all income of both husband and wife

ATTACH REMITTANCE HERE

5. Wages, salaries, tips, etc. (before payroll deductions) if more than two employers, attach schedule Employer's name / Where employed (city and state)	5		
6. Dividends. Enter total here (also list in Schedule B (540), Part I, if total is over $100)	6	20	60
7. Interest. Enter total here (also list in Schedule B (540), Part II, if total is over $100)	7		
8. Other income (from page 2, line 30)	8	8,284	97
9. Total (add lines 5, 6, 7 and 8)	9	8,305	57
10. Adjustments to income (from page 2, line 35)	10		
11. Adjusted gross income (subtract line 10 from line 9)	11	8,305	57

- If you do not itemize deductions AND line 11 is under $10,000, find your tax in Tax Table in instructions. Enter tax on line 12.
- If you itemize deductions OR line 11 is $10,000 or more, go to Part IV on page 2 to figure tax.

Your Tax, and Credits

12. Tax from (check one): Tax Table ☐, Tax Computation (page 2, Part IV) ☒, or Schedule G (540) ☐	12	51	00
13. Exemption credits (from page 2, line 43)	13	82	00
14. Tax liability (subtract line 13 from line 12)	14	None	
15. Total other credits (from page 2, line 49)	15		
16. Net tax liability (subtract line 15 from line 14—If $1.00 or less, enter "zero")	16	None	

Balance Due or Refund

17. 1970 California estimated tax payment or credit from 1969 (if any). If none, enter "zero"	17		
18. Balance due—if any (subtract line 17 from line 16) PAY IN FULL WITH RETURN	18	None	
19. Overpayment—if any (subtract line 16 from line 17) OVERPAYMENT	19		
20. Portion of line 19 you wish to apply on 1971 estimated tax	20		
21. Refund—if any (subtract line 20 from line 19) REFUND	21		

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here
Your signature—if filing jointly, BOTH must sign Date
Spouse's signature Date

Signature of preparer other than taxpayer
Address Date
LAMBERT-MARKELL
16633 VENTURA BLVD.
ENCINO, CALIF. 91316

Do not write in these spaces
T
P
I
T

Make Remittance Payable to FRANCHISE TAX BOARD—Mail to FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814.

PART I—Head of Household—If claimed, answer the following questions *(See Instructions)*

Check one: ☐ Never married ☐ Final divorce/dissolution Date........ ☐ Separate maintenance Date........ ☐ Widow(er) Date........

Individual who qualified you as head of household:

Name........ Relationship........ Age........ Gross income $........

Is this person married?........ If yes, did he or she file a joint return with spouse? .... Did this person qualify as your dependent for the calendar year 1970?........ Did this person reside in your home for the entire taxable year?........ If not, explain circumstances

....

Total amount necessary to maintain household $........ How much did you contribute $........

PART II—Other Income

22. Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C (540))	22	● 8,284	97
23. Sale or exchange of property (attach Schedule D (540))	23	● (1,000	00)
24. Pensions and annuities } Attach Schedule E (Form 540)	24	●	
25. Rents and royalties	25	●	
26. Partnerships	26	●	
27. Estates or trusts	27		
28. Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F (540))	28		
29. Miscellaneous income (state nature and source)........	29	●	
30. Total (add lines 22 through 29). Enter here and on page 1, line 8	30	7,284	97

PART III—Adjustments to Income

31. "Sick pay" if included on page 1, line 5 (attach statement)	31	●	
32. Moving expenses (attach statement)	32	●	
33. Employee business expense (attach statement)	33	●	
34. Military exclusion (maximum $1,000—$500 if separate return of husband or wife)	34	●	
35. Total adjustments (add lines 31 through 34). Enter here and on page 1, line 10	35		

PART IV—Tax Computation—If you do not use Tax Table or Income Averaging (Schedule G (540))

36. Adjusted gross income (from page 1, line 11)	36	7,305	57
37. If you itemize deductions, enter total from Schedule A (540), line 31 If you do not itemize deductions, and line 36 is $10,000 or more, enter (a) $1,000, if single, or married person filing separate return (b) $2,000, if head of household, or married couple filing joint return	37	● 2,745	44
38. Taxable income (subtract line 37 from line 36)	38	4,539	33
39. Tax from Tax Rate Schedule in Instructions. Enter here and on page 1, line 12	39	51	00

PART V—Exemption Credits

40. Single—$25. Married couple or head of household—$50	40	● 50	00
41. Blind ☐ Yourself ☐ Your spouse—$8 for each box checked	41	●	
42. Dependents—Do not list yourself, your spouse, or person who qualifies you as head of household			
NAME (and address if different from yours): Fred, Brian, Elisa, Thomas — RELATIONSHIP: children			
Number of dependents listed 4 × $8	42	● 32	00
43. Total exemption credits (add lines 40, 41 and 42). Enter here and on page 1, line 13	43	82	00

PART VI—Credit for Net Income Tax Paid to Another State—Attach copy of "other state" return—and Retirement Income Credit

44. Income derived from sources within State of .... and also taxable by California	44		
45. California adjusted gross income (from page 1, line 11)	45		
46. California tax liability (from page 1, line 14)	46		
47. Credit limitation—line 44 ÷ line 45 ....% (100% maximum) × line 46 (cannot exceed tax paid other state)	47	●	
48. Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R (540))	48	●	
49. Total (add lines 47 and 48). Enter here and on page 1, line 15	49		

PART VII—Reconciliation to Federal Return—If adjusted gross income on Federal return is different from line 11, page 1, explain below

Dividend Exclusion

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
19 70
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number
322 | 12 | 7997

Itemized vs. Standard Deduction—You have a choice between two deduction methods. You can either itemize your deductions or take a standard deduction as explained in the 540 Instructions. On separate returns of a husband and wife, if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may not use the Tax Table or claim the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete the appropriate items below.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care	1		
2. Medicine and drugs	2		
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	3		
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2 (if less than zero, enter zero)	4		
5. Other medical and dental expenses. Include balance of insurance premiums for medical care not deducted on line 1 (attach schedule)	5		
6. **Total**—(Add lines 4 and 5)	6		
7. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	7		
8. Subtract line 7 from line 6 (if less than zero, enter zero)	8		
9. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 8) ►	9	150	00
Child Adoption Expense			
10. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list	10		
11. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	11		
12. Subtract line 11 from line 10—See instructions for maximum limitations ►	12		
Taxes			
13. Real estate	13		
14. State and local gasoline	14		
15. General sales	15		
16. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)	16		
17. Personal property	17		
18. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify	18		
19. Other (specify)	19		
20. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 13 through 19) ►	20	663	26
Contributions			
21. Cash—Including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)	21		
22. Total cash contributions	22		
23. Other than cash (see instructions). Enter total here	23		
24. **Total**—Add lines 22 and 23—Maximum deduction may not exceed 20% of adjusted gross income ►	24	280	00
Interest Expense			
25. Home mortgage	25		
26. Installment purchases	26		
27. Other (itemize)	27		
28. **Total**—(Add lines 25, 26 and 27) ►	28	1,552	18
Miscellaneous Deductions			
29. For child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc.—See instructions (itemize)	29		
30. Total miscellaneous deductions ►	30	100	00
31. **Total deductions**—(Add lines 9, 12, 20, 24, 28 and 30). Enter total here and on Form 540, page 2, in space provided S/A	31	2,745	44

(Rev. 1970)

Schedule B on reverse

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
19 70
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR Samuel and Phyllis Ruby — Social Security Number 322 12 7997

A. Principal business activity Food ; product
(For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name Snack Bar — **C.** Federal employer identification number 95-2651578

D. Business location 5418 Van Nuys Boulevard (Number and street or rural route) Van Nuys, (City—post office) California (State) 91401 (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other (describe)

F. Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? ☐ Yes ☒ No. If "yes," attach explanation.

G. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

1. Gross receipts or gross sales $ Less: Returns and allowances $		$	
2. Inventory at beginning of year (If different than last year's closing inventory attach explanation)			
3. Merchandise purchased $, less cost of any items withdrawn from business for personal use $			
4. Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)			
5. Material and supplies			
6. Other costs (explain in Schedule C-1)		SCHEDULE ATTACHED	
7. Total of lines 2 through 6			
8. Inventory at end of this year			
9. **Cost of goods sold and/or operations** (subtract line 8 from line 7)			
10. **Gross profit** (subtract line 9 from line 1)			
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS			
11. Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-2)			
12. Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-1)			
13. Rent on business property			
14. Repairs (explain in Schedule C-1)			
15. Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)			
16. Insurance			
17. Legal and professional fees			
18. Commissions			
19. Amortization (attach statement)			
20. Retirement plans, etc. (other than your share)			
21. Interest on business indebtedness			
22. Bad debts arising from sales or service			
23. Losses of business property (attach statement)			
24. Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells, timber, etc. (attach schedule)			
25. Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-1)			
26. Total of lines 11 through 25			
27. **Net profit (or loss)** (subtract line 26 from line 10). Enter here and on page 2, Part II, Form 540 or 540NR		$ 9,284	97

SCHEDULE C-1. EXPLANATION OF LINES 6, 12, 14, AND 25

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

(Rev. 1970)

SCHEDULE D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE 1970 YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR	Social Security Number
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby	322 12 7997

Part I—CAPITAL ASSETS

SHORT-TERM—ASSETS HELD NOT MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

	a. Kind of property (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition (attach schedule)	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain or loss (d plus e less f)
1.			SCHEDULE ATTACHED				(15,274.00)

2.	Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3.	Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
4.	Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 1, 2 and 3	

LONG-TERM—ASSETS HELD MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

5.	Enter gain (if any) from line 16, Part II	
6.	Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
7.	Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
8.	Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 5, 6 and 7	(15,274.00)
9.	Combine the amounts shown on lines 4 and 8 and enter the net gain (or loss) here	
10.	If line 9 shows a GAIN, enter 50% of line 8 or 50% of line 9, whichever is smaller. (Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 8)	
11.	Subtract line 10 from line 9, Enter here and on line 17, Part III	
12.	If line 9 shows a LOSS, enter here and on line 17, Part III the **smallest** of the following: (a) the amount on line 9; (b) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and losses; or (c) $1,000 Carryover Loss (14,274.00)	(1,000.00)

Part II—SALE OR EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY UNDER SECTIONS 18181–82

13.	Enter gain (if any) from line 22, Part IV	
14.	Enter gain (if any) from line 25, Part IV	
15.	Enter your share of gain (or loss) of Section 18181–82 items from partnerships and fiduciaries	
16.	Net gain (or loss). If GAIN, enter on line 5, Part I; if LOSS, enter on line 29, Part V	

PART III—TOTAL NET GAIN OR LOSS FROM SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY

17.	Net gain (or loss) from line 10 or 11, Part I	
18.	Net gain (or loss) from line 31, Part IV	
19.	Total net gain (or loss)—Combine lines 17 and 18. Enter here and on Form 540 or Form 540NR, page 2, Part II, line 23	

(Schedule continued on reverse)

IRS 4101 Sepulveda 989-2700
787-0211

Form 1040 Combined with Form 1040A US Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service Individual Income Tax Return 1969

For the year January 1–December 31, 1969, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1969, ending ...., 19......

Please print or type

First name and initial (If joint return, use first names and middle initials of both)	Last name	Your social security number
Home address (Number and street or rural route)		Your occupation
City, town or post office, State and ZIP code		Spouse's social security number
Enter below name and address used on your return for 1968 (if same as above write "Same"). If none filed, give reason. If changing from separate to joint or joint to separate returns, enter 1968 names and addresses.		Spouse's occupation

Your present employer and address

Your Filing Status—(Check only one)

1 ☐ Single
2 ☐ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separate return and spouse is also filing a return. If this item checked give spouse's social security number in space provided above and enter first name here ▶
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
5 ☐ Surviving widow(er) with dependent child
6 ☐ Married filing separate return and spouse is not required to file

Your Exemptions

Check boxes for exemptions which apply

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of boxes checked ▶
7a Yourself	☐	☐	☐	
7b Spouse (only if her (his) income is included in this return or she (he) had no income)	☐	☐	☐	

8 First names of your dependent children who lived with you

Enter number ▶

9 OTHER DEPENDENTS	(a) NAME—Enter figure 1 in the last column to right for each name listed (if more space is needed, use other side)	(b) Relationship?	(c) Months lived in your home? See page 3 of instr.	(d) $600 or more income?	(e) Support you furnished. If 100% write "ALL."	(f) Support furnished by dependent and others	
					$	$	▶
							▶

10 Total exemptions from lines 7, 8, and 9 above ▶ 6

Your Income

11 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. Attach Forms W–2. If unavailable, explain on back	11		
12a Dividends (Total before exclusion) $ 46– (If over $100, list in Sch. B) Less 12b Exclusion $ 200– Balance ▶	12c	0	–
13 Interest (If over $100, list in Schedule B, Part II)	13	1,637	–
14 Other income from Schedule C ☐, Schedule D ☐, Schedule E ☐, Schedule F ☐	14		
15a Total (Add lines 11 thru 14) $ 1,637– Less 15b Adjustments (see back) $ 730, Adjusted Gross Income ▶	15c	907	–

Your Tax and Surcharge

A If line 15c is $5,000 or more, go to Schedule T, to figure tax and surcharge. (Omit lines 16a and 16b.)
B Also go to Schedule T, to figure tax and surcharge if you itemize deductions; or claim retirement income credit, foreign tax credit, or investment credit; or if you owe self-employment tax or tax from recomputing prior year investment credit. (Omit lines 16a and 16b.)
C If neither A nor B applies use Tax Tables instead of Schedule T. Complete lines 16a, 16b, and 16c. See paragraph D on back for rules under which the IRS will figure your tax and surcharge.

16a Tax from Tax Table: A ☐, B ☐, or C ☐ (check one)	16a	0 –		
16b Tax surcharge on amount on line 16a (see Page 10 of instr.)	16b	0 –		
16c Total add lines 16a and 16b OR enter amount from Schedule T (Form 1040), line 11			16c	0

Your Credits

17 Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W–2)	17	
18 Excess F.I.C.A. tax withheld (two or more employers—see page 5 of instr.)	18	
19 ☐ Nonhighway Federal gasoline tax—Form 4136, ☐ Reg. Inv.—Form 2439	19	
20 1969 Estimated tax payments (include 1968 overpayment allowed as a credit)	20	90–

Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service.

21 Total (add lines 17, 18, 19, and 20) 21 90 –

Balance Due or Refund

22 If line 16c is larger than line 21, ——▶ enter BALANCE DUE 22

23 If line 21 is larger than line 16c, ——▶ enter OVERPAYMENT 23 90

24 Line 23 to be: (a) Credited on 1970 estimated tax ▶ $; (b) Refunded ▶ $ 90

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete.

Sign here

Your signature Date | Signature of preparer other than taxpayer, based on all information of which he has any knowledge. Date

Spouse's signature (If filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income) | Address

16—1

Please attach Copy B of Form W–2 here

Please attach Check or Money Order here

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
U.S. Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service

Gains and Losses From Sales or Exchanges of Property

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1968

Name as shown on page 1 of Form 1040

Social Security Number

Part I—CAPITAL ASSETS—Short-term capital gains and losses—assets held not more than 6 months

	a. Kind of property. Indicate security, real estate, or other (Specify)	b. Description (Examples: 100 sh. of "Z" Co., 2 story brick, etc.)	c. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (See instr.)	d. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	e. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	f. Gross sales price	g. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	h. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	i. Gain or loss (f plus g less h)
1		See Schedule Attached							(6,359-)

2	Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3	Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
4	Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 1, 2, and 3	(6,359-)

Long-term capital gains and losses—assets held more than 6 months (12 months or more for certain livestock)

5 Enter gain from Part II, line 3

Total long-term gross sales price ☐

6a	Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
6b	Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	
7	Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
8	Capital gain dividends (see Form 1040 Instructions, page 5)	
9	Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 5, 6a, 6b, 7, and 8	
10	Combine the amounts shown on lines 4 and 9, and enter the net gain (or loss) here	(6,359-)
11	If line 10 shows a GAIN—Enter 50% of line 9 or 50% of line 10, whichever is smaller. (Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 9.) (See reverse side for computation of alternative tax.)	-0-
12	Subtract line 11 from line 10. Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, on reverse side	(6,359-)
13	If line 10 shows a LOSS—Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, the smallest of the following: (a) the amount on line 10; (b) the amount on Form 1040, page 1, ~~line 11b~~, computed without regard to capital gains or losses; or (c) $1,000 Line 3 Sch J	(-0-)

Part II—GAIN FROM DISPOSITION OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY UNDER SECTIONS 1245 AND 1250—assets held more than 6 months (see instructions for definitions)

D

Where double headings appear, use the first heading for section 1245 and the second heading for section 1250.

	a. Kind of property and how acquired (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below—write 1245 or 1250 to indicate type of asset)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale
1					

f. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition		g. Adjusted basis (e less sum of f-1 and f-2)	h. Total gain (d less g)	i. Ordinary gain (lesser of f-2 or h) —OR— (see instructions)	j. Other gain (h less i)
f-1. Prior to January 1, 1962 —OR— Prior to January 1, 1964	f-2. After December 31, 1961 —OR— After December 31, 1963				

2	Total ordinary gain. Enter here and in Part IV, line 2, on reverse side	
3	Total other gain. Enter here and in Part I, line 5; however, if the gains do not exceed the losses when this amount is combined with other gains and losses from section 1231 property enter the total of column j in Part III, line 1	

SCHEDULE T
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Tax Computation

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

S5 **1969**

Name (as shown on Form 1040)

Social Security Number

PRELIMINARY PROOF

Tax Computation

1	Your adjusted gross income (from line 15c, Form 1040)	907 —
	Note.—If your adjusted gross income is less than $5,000 and you choose to take the standard deduction instead of itemizing your deductions, omit lines 2, 3, 4, and 5. Find your tax in the tables on pages 10–12 in the instructions and enter it in line 6a instead of making a percentage rate computation.	
2	Enter on the line at the right the amount of your deduction figured under one of the following methods: —If you itemize deductions, enter the total from Schedule A (Form 1040), line 14 **OR** —Figure your standard deduction as follows: (a) Enter 10 percent of line 1 but not more than $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately) . $ (b) Enter the sum of: $200 ($100 if married and filing separately) plus $100 for each exemption claimed in line 10 of Form 1040, but do not enter more than $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately) . $ Enter the larger of (a) or (b) on the line at the right. If your spouse files a separate return, determine your deduction in the same manner that she (he) has.	1392 —
3	Subtract the amount on line 2 from the amount on line 1 and enter the balance here	0 —
4	Enter number of exemptions claimed on line 10, Form 1040, 6 Multiply this number by $600, and enter the amount on this line	3600 —
5	Subtract the amount on line 4 from the amount on line 3 and enter the balance here. This is your taxable income	0 —
6a	Tax: Use the appropriate Tax Rate Schedule on page 9 of instructions to figure your tax on the amount on line 5 (Check if tax is from: Tax Table ☐, Tax Rate Schedule ☐, Schedule D ☐, or Schedule G ☐)	0 —
6b	Tax surcharge. If line 6a is less than $730, find surcharge from tables on page 10 of instructions. If line 6a is $730 or more, multiply amount on line 6a by .05 and enter result. (If you claim retirement income credit, use Schedule R (Form 1040) to figure surcharge.)	0 —
6c	Total (add lines 6a and 6b)	0 —

Special credits

7a	Retirement income credit		
7b	Investment credit		
7c	Foreign tax credit		
7d	Total (add lines 7a, 7b, and 7c)		0 —
8	Income tax (subtract line 7d from line 6c)		0 —
9	Self-employment tax (from Schedule SE (Form 1040), line 13)		0
10	Tax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach statement)		
11	Total tax (add lines 8, 9, and 10). Enter here and on line 16c, Form 1040 (make no entries on line 16a or 16b, Form 1040)		0 —

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1969—O-337-051

SCHEDULE B
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Dividends and Interest Income Schedule

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1969

Name (as shown on page 1 of Form 1040)

Social Security Number

PART I—Dividends Income

1 Gross dividends and other distributions on stock (list payers and amounts—write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, or jointly)

PRELIMINARY PROOF

Total line 1 . . . .

2 Capital gain distributions (see page 5 of instructions) . .

3 Nontaxable distributions (see page 5 of instructions) . .

4 Total (add lines 2 and 3) . . . .

5 Dividends before exclusion (line 1 less 4—not less than zero). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 12, in space provided . . . .

PART II—Interest Income (list payers and amounts below)

Earnings from savings and loan associations and credit unions

(W)	Liberty Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. of Chicago	525 —
(W)	" " "	395 —
(W)	" " "	158 —
(W)	"	46 —

Other Interest (on bank deposits, bonds, tax refunds, etc.)

(W)	Central National Bank of Chicago	513 —

Total interest income. Enter here and on line 13 . .	1637 —

SCHEDULE A
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Itemized Deductions

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1969

Name (as shown on Form 1040)

Social Security Number

Itemized Deductions—You have a choice between two deduction methods. You can either itemize your actual deductions or take a standard deduction. Deductions may be itemized for charitable and other contributions, interest expense, medical expense, certain taxes, casualty losses, child care, and other items described in the instructions on back. If you take the standard deduction, you will get an amount equal to 10 percent of the income you report on line 15c of Form 1040, but not less than $200 plus $100 for each exemption claimed on line 10 of Form 1040 (subtract $100 if married and filing separately). The maximum standard deduction is $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately). If you choose to itemize your deductions, fill in the appropriate spaces below.

PRELIMINARY PROOF

Medical and dental expense (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, medical insurance premiums, etc.

1 **One half of insurance premiums for medical care (but not more than $150)**	150	—
2 Medicine and drugs	48	
3 Enter 1% of line 15c, Form 1040	9	—
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2 (not less than zero)	39	—
5 Itemize other medical, dental expenses (Include balance of insurance premiums not deducted on line 1)		
Hosp. Ins Prems	200	—
Dr. Reis	60	—
Dr. Strauss	42	—
Dr. Mendel	406	—
Dr. Robinson	25	—
Dr. Fox (Eye Exam) (Brian, Fredy Sam)	75	—
Weiner Optical (4 Pair Glasses)	92	—
6 Total (add lines 4 and 5)	939	—
7 Enter 3% of line 15c, Form 1040	27	—
8 Subtract line 7 from line 6	912	—
9 **Total** (line 1 plus line 8) ▶	1,062	

Taxes.—Real estate		
State and local gasoline	22	—
General sales (See page 15 of instructions)	108	—
State and local income		
Personal property		
10 Total taxes ▶	130	—

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc.

(Itemize) Boy &	15	—
Girl Scouts of Amer	15	—
Catholic Charities	10	—
11a Total cash contributions	40	—
11b Other than cash (see instructions for required statement). Enter total of such items here		
11c Carryover from prior years (see instructions on back)		
11d Total contributions (add lines 11a, 11b, and 11c—see instructions for limitation) ▶	40	—

Interest expense—Home mortgage		
Installment purchases		
Other (Itemize)		
Auto Loan Devon BK	120	—
Sears	15	—
12 Total interest expense ▶	135	—

Miscellaneous deductions for child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc. See instructions. 1968		
Income Tax Preparation	25	—
13 Total miscellaneous ▶	25	—

14 Total deductions (add lines 9, 10, 11d, 12, and 13—enter on Schedule T (Form 1040), line 2) ▶ 1,392 —

16—-1

1969

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby
11346 MONTGOMERY
Granada HILLS, CALIF.

All Stocks
Acquired "A"

To be attached to and made part of U.S. Individual Income Tax Form 1040, 1969

SHARES	DESCRIPTION	DATE ACQUIRED	DATE SOLD	SALE PRICE	PURCHASE PRICE	GAIN (LOSS)
	E. F. HUTTON and Co.					
200	MERCANTILE INDUSTRIES	10-68	1-69	3303-	2994-	309-
200	BOTANY INDUSTRIES	11-68	2-69	4,010-	3,726-	284-
200	MIDWESTERN FINANCIAL	10-68	2-69	1,466-	1,832-	(366-)
200	MIDWESTERN FINANCIAL	10-68	2-69	1,416-	1,832-	(416-)
200	VTR, INC.	3-69	5-69	5,325-	4,458-	867-
	McDONNELL & Co.					
100	WESTBURY FASHIONS	8-68	2-69	943-	853-	90-
100	IMPERIAL CORP. of AMER.	8-68	6-69	1,672-	1,749-	(77-)
	GOODBODY & Co.					
100	VOLUME MERCHANDISE	11-68	1-69	2,563-	2,645-	82-
300	PENNSYLVANIA ENG. CORP.	12-68	1-69	4,646-	3,809-	837-
200	BOTANY INDUSTRIES	11-68	2-69	4,010-	3,726-	284-
200	CINERAMA, INC.	1-69	2-69	2,627-	2,428-	189-
200	HENRY'S DRIVE-IN	2-69	10-69	2,463-	828-	(1,635-)
200	PENTRON ELECTRONICS Co.	10-69	10-69	875-	873-	2-
100	POLYCHROME CORP.	3-69	10-69	1,672-	2,002-	(330-)
200	NYTRONICS, INC.	1-69	11-69	3,320-	4,660-	(1,340-)
	COGAN-BERLIND-WEILL-LEVITT					
100	HELENE CURTIS INDUSTRIES	12-68	10-69	1,338-	2,153-	(815-)
100	ALLIED ARTISTS PICTS	3-69	10-69	1,078-	1,257-	(179-)
100	VANGUARD INT., INC.	9-68	10-69	671-	1,219-	(548-)
100	TELEVISION MFG. AMER	12-68	10-69	362-	739-	(377-)
100	NYTRONICS, INC.	6-69	11-69	1,647-	1,989-	(342-)
100	DIVERSIFIED IND.	6-69	12-69	1,722-	2,431-	(709-)
	BACHE & Co.					
100	UNITED PIECE & DYE WKS.	8-68	1-69	2,314-	2,343-	(29-)
100	SIBONEY CORP.	1-69	2-69	609-	588-	21-
100	SIBONEY CORP.	1-69	2-69	609-	600-	9-
400	MIDWESTERN FINANCIAL	8-68	2-69	2,932-	4,220-	(1,288-)
100	GENERAL BATTERY & CERAMIC	1-69	5-69	1,623-	1,484-	139-
100	GSC ENTERPRISES, INC.	2-69	5-69	979-	739-	240-
100	IMPERIAL CORP of AMER.	8-68	6-69	1,573-	1,749-	(176-)
200	GENERAL BATTERY & CERAMIC	6-69	10-69	3,394-	2,893-	501-
100	TOOL RESEARCH & ENG.	6-69	10-69	2,464-	2,267-	197-
100	NYTRONICS	2-69	12-69	1,276-	3,059-	(1,783-)
	TOTAL			64,902-	68,155-	(6,357-)

69

Samuel and [illegible]
11346 MONTGOMERY
GRANADA HILLS, CALIF

To be attached and made a part of U.S. Individual Income Tax Form 1040
1969

The below listed expenses are in connection with Schedule D

INTEREST PAID ON MARGIN ACCOUNTS

BACHE & Co.	137 —
McDONNELL & Co.	145 —
COGAN-BERLIND-WEILL-LEVITT	74 —
GOODBODY & Co.	176 —
E. F. HUTTON & Co.	51 —
TOTAL INTEREST	583 —
BOOKS, PERIODICALS & SERVICES	47 —
AUTO EXPENSE 6,000 MILES	
LESS PERSONAL 5,000 MILES	
BUSINESS MILES at 10¢ per 1,000 MILES	100 —
TOTAL EXPENSES	730 —

Form 1040 Combined with Form 1040A US Individual Income Tax Return 1969

Department of the Treasury / Internal Revenue Service

For the year January 1–December 31, 1969, or other taxable year beginning ______, 1969, ending ______, 19__

Please print or type

Co 322-12-7997 349-18-1420 Do36

SAMUEL + PHYLLIS RUBY
11346 MONTGOMERY AVE
GRANADA HILLS, CALIF 91344

Your social security number: 322 | 12 | 7997

Your occupation: Slf-EMPLOYED

Spouse's social security number: 349 | 18 | 1420

Spouse's occupation: Hswf

Enter below name and address used on your return for 1968 (if same as above write "Same"). If none filed, give reason. If changing from separate to joint or joint to separate returns, enter 1968 names and addresses.

Samuel + Phyllis RUBY - 6123 N. HOYNE - CHICAGO, Ill 60645

Name and address of employer at time of filing Self

Your Filing Status—(Check only one)

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Married filing separate return and spouse is also filing a return. If this item checked give spouse's social security number in space provided above and enter first name here ▶
4 ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
5 ☐ Surviving widow(er) with dependent child
6 ☐ Married filing separate return and spouse is not filing a return

Your Exemptions

Check boxes for exemptions which apply

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	
7a Yourself	☒	☐	☐	Enter number of boxes checked ▶ 2
7b Spouse (applies only if line 2 or line 6 is checked)	☒	☐	☐	

8 First names of your dependent children who lived with you FRED - BRIAN - ELISA - THOMAS Enter number ▶ 4

9 OTHER DEPENDENTS	(a) NAME—Enter figure 1 in the last column to right for each name listed (if more space is needed, use other side)	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. See instructions, B-2.	(d) $600 or more income?	(e) Support you furnished. If 100% write "ALL."	(f) Support furnished by dependent and others	
					$	$	▶
							▶

10 Total exemptions from lines 7, 8, and 9 above ▶ 6

Your Income

11 Wages, salaries, tips, etc. (Attach Form W-2 to back. If unavailable, explain on back) 11 0 —

12a Dividends [Total before exclusion] $ 46 — [See item 2 on 1040-1] 12b Less Exclusion $ 200 — Balance ▶ 12c 0 —

13 Interest (Enter total here and if over $100, also list in Schedule B, Part II) 13 1,637 —

14 Other income: Total from attached schedules (check schedules used—C ☐, D ☒, E ☐, F ☐) 14 0 —

15a Total [Add lines 11, 12c, 13 & 14] $ 1637 —, 15b Less Adjustments [See 1040-1] $ 730 —, Adjusted Gross Income ▶ 15c 907 —

Your Tax and Surcharge

- If line 15c is $5,000 or more, go to Schedule T, to figure tax and surcharge. (Omit lines 16 and 17.)
- Go to Sch. T to figure tax and surcharge if you itemize deductions; or claim retirement income credit, foreign tax credit, or investment credit; or if you owe self-employment tax or tax from recomputing prior year investment credit. (Omit lines 16 and 17.)
- If neither of above two items applies, go to Tax Tables instead of Sch. T. Complete lines 16, 17, & 18.

See 1040-1 for rules under which the IRS will figure your tax and surcharge.

16 Tax from Tax Table (see tables on T-2 and T-3) 16 0 —
17 Tax surcharge on line 16 (see T-1 for tax surcharge tables) 17 0 —
18 Enter total of lines 16 and 17 OR amount from Schedule T, line 18, if applicable (check if from Tax Table A ☐, B ☐, C ☐; Tax Rate Sch. ☐, Sch. D ☐, or Sch. G ☐) 18 0 —

Your Credits

19 Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2 to back) 19
20 Excess F.I.C.A. tax withheld (two or more employers—see R-2) 20
21 ☐ Nonhighway Federal gasoline tax, Form 4136; ☐ Reg. Inv., Form 2439 21
22 1969 Estimated tax payments (include 1968 overpayment allowed as a credit) 22 90 —
23 Total (add lines 19, 20, 21, and 22) 23 90 —

Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service.

Balance Due or Refund

24 If line 18 is larger than line 23, enter BALANCE DUE. Pay in full with return ▶ 24
25 If line 23 is larger than line 18, enter OVERPAYMENT ▶ 25 90 —
26 Line 25 to be: (a) Credited on 1970 estimated tax ▶ $; (b) Refunded ▶ $ 90 —

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete.

Sign here

Your signature Date

Spouse's signature (If filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

Signature of preparer other than taxpayer, based on all information of which he has any knowledge. Date

Address

Please attach Copy B of Form W-2 to back

Please attach Check or Money Order here

SCHEDULE A
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Itemized Deductions

▶ See instructions on A–1 and A–2.
▶ If you use this schedule, attach it to Form 1040.

1969

Name as shown on Form 1040: Samuel & Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number: 322 | 12 | 7997

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1 One half of insurance premiums for medical care (but not more than $150)	150	—
2 Medicine and drugs	48	—
3 Enter 1% of line 15c, Form 1040	9	—
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	39	—
5 Itemize other medical and dental expenses (include balance of insurance premiums for medical care not deducted on line 1)		
Hosp. Ins. Prems.	200	—
Dr. Reis	60	—
Dr. Strauss	42	—
Dr. Mendel	406	—
Dr Robinson	25	—
Dr. Fox (Eye Exam) (Fred, Brian, Samuel)	75	—
Weiner Optical (4 pair Glasses)	92	—
6 Total (add lines 4 and 5)	939	—
7 Enter 3% of line 15c, Form 1040	27	—
8 Subtract line 7 from line 6. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	912	—
9 Total deductible medical and dental expenses (add lines 1 and 8) ▶	1,062	—

Taxes.—Real estate		
State and local gasoline	22	—
General sales (see sales tax tables)	108	—
State and local income		
Personal property		
10 Total taxes ▶	130	—

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (Itemize)

Boy Scouts of Amer.	15	—
Girl Scouts of Amer.	15	—
Catholic Charities	10	—
11 Total cash contributions	40	—
12 Other than cash (see instructions on A–1 for required statement). Enter total for such items here		
13 Carryover from prior years (see instructions on A–2)		
14 Total contributions (add lines 11, 12, and 13—see instructions on A–2 for limitation) ▶	40	—

Interest expense—Home mortgage		
Installment purchases		
Other (Itemize)		
Auto Loan Devon Bank	120	00
Sears	15	00
15 Total interest expense ▶	135	—

Miscellaneous deductions for child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc. (see instructions on A–2)

1968 Income Tax Preparation	25	—
16 Total miscellaneous deductions ▶	25	—
17 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS (add lines 9, 10, 14, 15, and 16—enter here and on Schedule T, line 2) ▶	1,392	—

SCHEDULE B
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Dividend and Interest Income

▶ See instructions on B–1
▶ If you use this schedule, attach it to Form 1040

1969

Name as shown on Form 1040: SAMUEL + PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number: 322 12 7997

PART I—Dividend Income

1 Gross dividends and other distributions on stock (list payers and amounts—write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, or jointly)

2 Total of line 1 . . . .

3 Capital gain distributions (see instructions on B–1) . . .

4 Nontaxable distributions (see instructions on B–1) . . .

5 Total (add lines 3 and 4) . . . . . .

6 Dividends before exclusion (subtract line 5 from line 2). Enter here and on Form 1040, line 12a . . . . .

PART II—Interest Income

1 Earnings from savings and loan associations and credit unions (list payers and amounts)

(W) LIBERTY FEDERAL SAVINGS &LOAN ASSOC. of CHGO	525 –
(W) " " "	395 –
(W) " " "	158 –
(W) " " "	46 –

2 Other interest on bank deposits, bonds, tax refunds, etc. (list payers and amounts)

(W) CENTRAL NAT'L BK of CHGO	513 –

3 Total interest income. Enter here and on Form 1040, line 13 . . . . . . 1,637 –

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
Department of the Treasury
Internal Revenue Service

Sales or Exchanges of Property

▶ See instructions on D–1 and D–2.
▶ If you use this schedule, attach it to Form 1040.

1969

Name as shown on Form 1040 SAMUEL + PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

Part I—CAPITAL ASSETS—Short-term capital gains and losses—assets held not more than 6 months

	a. Kind of property. Indicate security, real estate, or other (Specify)	b. Description (Examples: 100 sh. of "Z" Co., 2 story brick, etc.)	c. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (See instr.)	d. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	e. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	f. Gross sales price	g. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	h. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	i. Gain or loss (f plus g less h)
1	SEE SCHEDULE ATTACHED								(6,359-)

2 Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . .

3 Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement) . . . . .

4 Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 1, 2, and 3 . . . . (6,359-)

Long-term capital gains and losses—assets held more than 6 months (12 months or more for certain livestock)

5 Enter gain from Part II, line 3 . . . .

					Total long-term gross sales price . .				

6a Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . . . .

6b Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S) . . . . .

7 Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement) . . . .

8 Capital gain dividends . .

9 Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 5, 6a, 6b, 7, and 8 . . . .

10 Combine the amounts shown on lines 4 and 9, and enter the net gain (or loss) here . . . . (6,359-)

11 **IF LINE 10 SHOWS A GAIN**—Enter 50% of line 9 or 50% of line 10, whichever is smaller. (Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 9.) (See reverse side for computation of alternative tax.) 0-

12 Subtract line 11 from line 10. Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, on reverse side . . . . (6,359-)

13 **IF LINE 10 SHOWS A LOSS**—Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, the smallest of: (a) line 10; (b) line 3, Sch. T., (line 15c, Form 1040, if tax table used) computed without capital gains or losses; or (c) $1,000 0-

Part II—GAIN FROM DISPOSITION OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY UNDER SECTIONS 1245 AND 1250—assets held more than 6 months (see instructions on D–1 for definitions)

D

Where double headings appear, use the first heading for section 1245 and the second heading for section 1250.

	a. Kind of property and how acquired (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below—write 1245 or 1250 to indicate type of asset)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale
1					

f. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition		g. Adjusted basis (e less sum of f-1 and f-2)	h. Total gain (d less g)	i. Ordinary gain (lesser of f-2 or h) —OR— (see instructions)	j. Other gain (h less i)
f-1. Prior to January 1, 1962 —OR— Prior to January 1, 1964	f-2. After December 31, 1961 —OR— After December 31, 1963				

2 Total ordinary gain. Enter here and in Part IV, line 2, on reverse side . . . .

3 Total other gain. Enter here and in Part I, line 5; however, if the gains do not exceed the losses when this amount is combined with other gains and losses from section 1231 property enter the total of column j in Part III, line 1 . . .

ULE T
1040)
of the Treasury
enue Service

Tax Computation

1969

▷ **If no entry is made** on line 14, line 16, or line 17, keep this for your records
▷ **If entry is made** on line 14, line 16, or line 17, attach to form 1040

shown on Form 1040 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number 322 12 7997

adjusted gross income (from line 15c, Form 1040) . . . . 907 —

:—If your adjusted gross income is less than $5,000 and you choose to take the standard deduction ad of itemizing your deductions, omit lines 2, 3, 4, and 5. Find your tax in the appropriate table B on T–2 or C on T–3). **Enter tax on line 6 below.**

r on the line at the right the amount of your deduction figured under one of the following nods:

you itemize deductions, enter the total from Schedule A, line 17

OR

gure your standard deduction as follows:

(1) Enter 10 percent of line 1 but do not enter more than $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately) . . $

(2) Enter the sum of: $200 ($100 if married and filing separately) plus $100 for each exemption claimed in line 10 of Form 1040, but do not enter more than $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately) . . $

Enter the larger of b(1) or b(2) on the line at the right. If your spouse files a separate return, determine your deduction in the same manner that she (he) has. 1,392 —

tract the amount on line 2 from the amount on line 1 and enter the balance here . . . . 0 —

er number of exemptions claimed on line 10, Form 1040, 6 Multiply this number by $600, and er the amount here . . . . 3600 —

tract the amount on line 4 from the amount on line 3 and enter the balance here. This is your able income. Figure tax on this amount by using the appropriate Tax Rate Schedule (I, II, or III) on . **Enter tax on line 6 below** . . . . 0 —

0 —

0

ou claim the retirement income credit, enter amount from Schedule R, line 12, here . . . . . . 0 —

tract line 7 from line 6 . . . . 0 —

surcharge. If line 8 is less than $735, find surcharge from tax surcharge tables on T–1. If line 8 is 35 or more, multiply amount on line 8 by .10 and enter result here . . . . . . 0 —

tal (Add lines 6 and 9) . . . .

tirement income credit from Schedule R, line 17 (attach Schedule R) . . . .

vestment credit (attach Form 3468) . . . .

reign tax credit (attach Form 1116) . . . . 0 —

tal credits (add lines 11, 12, and 13) . . . . 0 —

come tax (subtract line 14 from line 10) . . . . 0 —

elf-employment tax (attach Schedule SE) . . . . 0 —

ax from recomputing prior-year investment credit (attach Form 4255) . . . . 0 —

otal tax (add lines 15, 16, and 17). Enter here and on line 18, Form 1040 (make no entry on line 16 r 17, Form 1040). Attach Sch. T to Form 1040 only if you made an entry on line 14, 16, or 17 above . .

e Averaging.—If your income has ased substantially this year, it may your advantage to figure your tax e surcharge under the "averaging od." Obtain Schedule G from an nal Revenue Service office for full ls.

native Tax.—It will usually be to advantage to use the alternative tax r net long-term capital gain exceeds net short-term capital loss, or if you a net long-term capital gain only, and are filing (a) a separate return with ble income exceeding $26,000, or (b) a joint return, or as a surviving husband or wife, with taxable income exceeding $52,000, or (c) as a head of household with taxable income exceeding $38,000.

Line 9—Tax Surcharge.—The rate for the calendar year 1969 is 10 percent. The tax surcharge is an addition to the regular income tax. See the Tax Surcharge Tables on T–1.

Credit for Foreign Taxes and Tax-Free Covenant Bonds.—You may claim these credits only if you itemize deductions. To claim tax-free covenant bonds credit, enter the amount of credit above line 14, and write "covenant bonds" to left of the entry.

Line 16—Self-Employment Tax.—Enter amount shown on line 9, Part III, Schedule SE.

Line 17—Tax From Recomputing Prior Year Investment Credit.—Enter the amount by which the credit taken in a prior year or years exceeds the credit as recomputed due to early disposition of property. Attach Form 4255.

NS
ded by the
ons. This is
ule T. Also

	7	
	If 8 or more there is no tax	
	10%	Minimum
	$0 0	$0 0
	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
0 0 0 4	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
11 18 25 32	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
39 46 53 60	0 0 0 0	0 0 0 0
57 74 31 39	0 0 1 7	0 0 0 4
06 04 11 19	14 20 26 33	11 18 25 32
26	39	39

T–3

Goodbody a co 1970
Dividends
20.60

Interest
18,24
1837
1848
2323
1809
845
276
276
348
100
171
269
106

36-2586182

The Stanley-Oliver Mfg. Co.
1001 S. California Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60612

Type or print EMPLOYER'S identification number, name, and address above.

WAGE AND TAX STATEMENT 1968

Copy C—For employee's records

FEDERAL INCOME TAX INFORMATION			SOCIAL SECURITY INFORMATION	
Federal income tax withheld	Wages paid subject to withholding in 1968 [1]	Other compensation paid in 1968 [2]	F.I.C.A. employee tax withheld [3]	Total F.I.C.A. wages paid in 1968 [4]
156.00	2,250.00		99.00	2,250.00

EMPLOYEE'S social security number ▷▷ 322 12 7997

Samuel D. Ruby
6123 N. Hoyne Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60645

Type or print EMPLOYEE'S name and address (including ZIP code) above.

[1] Includes tips reported by employee. Amount is before payroll deductions or sick pay exclusion.

[2] Add this item to wages in figuring the amount to be reported as wages and salaries on your income tax return.

[3] The social security (F.I.C.A.) rate of 4.4% includes .6% for Hospital Insurance Benefits and 3.8% for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance.

[4] Includes tips reported by employee. If your wages were subject to social security taxes, but are not shown, these wages are the same as wages shown under "Federal Income Tax Information," but not more than $7,800.

Uncollected Employee Tax on Tips . . . . $____

FORM W-2—U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service

Copy

Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1968

U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service

for the year January 1–December 31, 1968, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1968, ending ...., 19......

Please print or type

First name and initial (If joint return, use first names and middle initials of both): Samuel and Phyllis

Last name: Ruby

Your social security number: 322|12|7997

Home address (Number and street or rural route): 6123 N. Hoyne

Your occupation: Self-employed

City, town or post office, and State: Chicago Illinois

ZIP code: 60645

Spouse's social security number: 349|18|1420

Enter below name and address used on your return for 1967 (if same as above, write "Same"). If none filed, give reason. If changing from separate to joint or joint to separate returns, enter 1967 names and addresses.
Same

Spouse's occupation: Housewife

Your present employer and address: Self-employed

Your Filing Status—check only one:

- 1a ☐ Single
- 1b ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
- 1c ☐ Married filing separately. If spouse is also filing a return, enter her (his) social security number in space provided above and give first name here ....
- 1d ☐ Unmarried Head of Household
- 1e ☐ Surviving widow(er) with dependent child

Your Exemptions

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	
2a Yourself . . .	☒	☐	☐	Enter number of boxes checked ▷ 2
2b Spouse . . .	☒	☐	☐	

3a First names of your dependent children who lived with you Fred, Brian Elisa Thomas — Enter number ▷ 4

3b Number of other dependents (from page 2, Part I, line 3)

4 Total exemptions claimed . . . . ▷ 6

Income

If joint return include all income of both husband and wife

5	Wages, salaries, tips, etc. If not shown on attached Forms W-2 attach explanation	5	2,250	00
6	Other income (from page 2, Part II, line 8)	6	5,869	40
7	Total (add lines 5 and 6)	7	8,119	40
8	Adjustments to income (from page 2, Part III, line 5)	8	716	83
9	Total income ("adjusted gross income") (subtract line 8 from line 7)	9	7,402	57

Find tax from table —OR— Figure tax using tax rate schedules

10	If you do not itemize deductions and line 9 is under $5,000, find tax in tables on pages 12–14 of instructions. Omit lines 11a, b, c, or d. Enter tax on line 12a.	10		
11a	If you itemize deductions, enter total from page 2, Part IV, line 17 If you do not itemize deductions, and line 9 is $5,000 or more enter the larger of: (1) 10 percent of line 9; OR (2) $200 ($100 if married and filing separate return) plus $100 for each exemption claimed on line 4, above. Deduction under (1) or (2) limited to $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately).	11a	740	26
11b	Subtract line 11a from line 9. Enter balance on this line	11b	6,662	31
11c	Multiply total number of exemptions on line 4, above, by $600	11c	3,600	00
11d	Subtract line 11c from line 11b. Enter balance on this line. (Figure your tax on this amount by using tax rate schedule on page 11 of instructions.) Enter tax on line 12a.	11d	3,062	31

Your Tax, Credits, and Payments

12a	Tax (Check if from: Tax Table ☐, Tax Rate Schedule ☒, Sch. D ☐, or Sch. G ☐)	12a	460	59
12b	Tax surcharge. If line 12a is less than $734, find surcharge from tables on page 10 of instructions. If line 12a is $734 or more, multiply amount on line 12a by .075 and enter result. (If you claim retirement income credit, use Schedule B (Form 1040) to figure surcharge.)	12b	26	00
12c	Total (add lines 12a and 12b)	12c	486	59
13	Total credits (from page 2, Part V, line 4)	13	11	55
14a	Income tax (subtract line 13 from line 12c)	14a	475	04
14b	Tax from recomputing prior year investment credit (attach statement)	14b	—	
15	Self-employment tax (Schedule C-3 or F-1)	15	—	
16	Total tax (add lines 14a, 14b, and 15)	16	475	04
17	Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W-2)	17	156	00
18	Excess F.I.C.A. tax withheld (two or more employers—see page 5 of instr.)	18		
19	☐ Nonhighway Federal gasoline tax—Form 4136, ☐ Reg. Inv.—Form 2439	19		
20	1968 Estimated tax payments (include 1967 overpayment allowed as a credit)	20		
21	Total (add lines 17, 18, 19, and 20)	21	156	00

Make check or money order payable to Internal Revenue Service.

Balance Due or Refund

22	If payments (line 21) are less than tax (line 16), enter Balance Due. Pay in full with this return	22	319	04
23	If payments (line 21) are larger than tax (line 16), enter Overpayment	23		
24	Amount of line 23 you wish credited to 1969 Estimated Tax	24		
25	Subtract line 24 from 23. Apply to: ☐ U.S. Savings Bonds, with excess refunded or ☐ Refund only	25		

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here ▷

Your signature .... Date

Spouse's signature (If filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

Signature of preparer other than taxpayer .... Date

Address

Please attach Copy B of Form W-2 here

Please attach Check or Money Order here

c69—16—80159—1

Part I Exemptions Complete only for dependents claimed on line 3b, page 1

	(a) NAME (If more space is needed attach schedule)	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year write "B" or "D"	(d) Did dependent have income of $600 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write "ALL"	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
1					$	$
2						

3 Total number of dependents listed above. Enter here and on page 1, line 3b . . . . ▷ ☐

Part II Income from sources other than wages, etc.

1a Gross dividends and other distributions on stock (list payers and amounts—write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, or jointly)

Sun Elect	20.00	Heu. Ind.	15.00
Coburn	52.50	Massey Ferg.	41.58
Atlas	20.00	Eastern Air	12.52
Diversified Metals			6.00

All (H)

	Total line 1a . . . . ▷		167 58
1b	Exclusion (see instructions).	100 00	
1c	Capital gain distributions (see page 5 of instructions).		
1d	Nontaxable distributions (see page 5 of instructions).		
1e	Total (add lines 1b, 1c, and 1d)		100 00
1f	**Taxable dividends** (line 1a less line 1e—not less than zero) . . . . . . ▷		67 58

Interest (list payers and amounts below)

Earnings from savings and loan assoc. and credit unions.

Other interest (on bank deposits, bonds, tax refunds, etc.)

Devon Bank 15.60

2	**Total interest income** . . . . ▷	15 60
3	Pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Sch. B) .	
4	Business income or loss (attach Schedule C) . .	
5	Sale or exchange of property (attach Schedule D) .	5,036 22
6	Farm income or loss (attach Schedule F) . . .	

Miscellaneous income (state nature and source)

Business Loan

Oliver J. Isenberg 750.00

7	**Total miscellaneous income** . . . . ▷	750 00
8	**TOTAL** (add lines 1f, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7) . Enter here and on page 1, line 6 . . . ▷	5 869 40

Part III Adjustments to income

1	"Sick pay" if included in line 5, page 1 (attach Form 2440 or other required statement) .	
2	Moving expenses (attach Form 3903) . .	
3	See Schedule ~~Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or other statement)~~	716 83
4	Payments by self-employed persons to retirement plans, etc. (attach Form 2950SE) .	
5	**TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS** (lines 1 through 4). Enter here and on page 1, line 8 . . ▷	716 83

Part IV Itemized deductions—Use only if you do not use tax table or standard deduction.

Medical and dental expense (not compensated by insurance or otherwise)—Attach itemized list.

1	One-half of insurance premiums for medical care (but not more than $150) . . .	
2	Total cost of medicine and drugs . . .	
3	Enter 1% of line 9, page 1	
4	Subtract line 3 from line 2 (not less than zero)	
5	Other medical, dental expenses (include balance of insurance premiums for medical care not deductible on line 1) . . .	
6	Total (add lines 4 and 5)	
7	Enter 3% of line 9, page 1	
8	Subtract line 7 from line 6 (not less than zero) .	
9	**Total** (add lines 1 and 8) . . . . . . ▷	

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)

10	Total cash contributions	
11	Other than cash (see instructions for required statement). Enter total of such items here .	
12	Carryover from prior years (see page 7 of instr.)	
13	**Total contributions** (add lines 10, 11, and 12—see instructions for limitation) ▷	

Taxes.—Real estate	
State and local gasoline	
General sales (see page 15 of instructions) .	
State and local income	
Personal property	
14 **Total taxes** . . . . ▷	

Interest expense.—Home Mortgage . . .

Installment purchases . . . .

Other (itemize)

15 **Total interest expense** . . . . . . ▷	

Miscellaneous deductions.—(see page 8 of instructions)

16 **Total miscellaneous** . . . . . . ▷	
17 **TOTAL DEDUCTIONS** (add lines 9, 13, 14, 15, and 16). Enter here and on page 1, line 11a. ▷	

Part V Credits

1	Retirement income credit (Schedule B) .	
2	Investment credit (Form 3468)	11 55
3	Foreign tax credit (Form 1116)	
4	**TOTAL CREDITS** (for page 1, line 13) . ▷	11 55

EXPENSE ACCOUNTS—If you had an expense allowance or charged expenses to your employer, check here ☐ and see page 6 of instructions.

☆☆☆☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1968—O-290-001 c60—16—80150-1

PREPARED BY..............
DATE..........................
CHECKED:
FOOTINGS BY............
EXTENSIONS BY........
SENIOR........................

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby
6123 N. Hoyne
Chicago, Illinois

To be attached to and made a part of U.S. Individual Income Tax Form 1040, 1968

Part III

The below listed expenses are in connection with my Schedule D.

Interest paid on margin accounts. to:			
McDonald		13107	
E.F. Hutton		1538	
Rothschild		2884	
Bache		7929	
Total Interest			25458
Book, Periodials and Services			12775
Auto			
Miles Travelled	6000		
Less Personal	4500		
Business	1500		
at 10¢			15000
Telephone			9600
Rent - Use of 1/4 of room			7200
Desk and Book Case $165.00 at 10 years			1650
Total Expenses (Adjustments To Income)			$ 71683

PREPARED BY..............
DATE..............
CHECKED:
FOOTINGS BY..........
EXTENSIONS BY........
SENIOR....................

Samuel and Phyllis Ruby
6123 N. Hoyne
Chicago, Illinois

To be attached to and made a part of U.S. Individual Income Tax Form 1040, 1968

Part III

The below listed expenses are in connection with my Schedule D.

Interest paid on margin accounts. to:			
McDonald		13107	
E.F. Hutton		1538	
Rothschild		2884	
Bache		7929	
Total Interest			25458
Book, Periodiak and Services			12775
Auto			
Miles Travelled	6000		
Less Persona	4500		
Business	1500		
at 10¢			15000
Telephone			9600
Rent - Use of 1/4 of room			7200
Desk and Book Case $165.00 at 10 years			1650
Total Expenses (Adjustments to Income)		$	71683

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
U.S. Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service

Gains and Losses From Sales or Exchanges of Property

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1968

Name as shown on page 1 of Form 1040	Social Security Number
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby	322 | 12 | 7997

Part I—CAPITAL ASSETS—Short-term capital gains and losses—assets held not more than 6 months

	a. Kind of property. Indicate security, real estate, or other (Specify)	b. Description (Examples: 100 sh. of "Z" Co., 2 story brick, etc.)	c. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (See instr.)	d. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	e. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	f. Gross sales price	g. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	h. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	i. Gain or loss (f plus g less h)
1		See	Schedule		Attached				5,036.22

2 Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3 Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
4 Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 1, 2, and 3	5,036.22

Long-term capital gains and losses—assets held more than 6 months (12 months or more for certain livestock)

5 Enter gain from Part II, line 3	

Total long-term gross sales price . . ☐

6a Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
6b Enter your share of net long-term gain from small business corporations (Subchapter S)	
7 Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
8 Capital gain dividends (see Form 1040 Instructions, page 5)	
9 Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 5, 6a, 6b, 7, and 8	
10 Combine the amounts shown on lines 4 and 9, and enter the net gain (or loss) here	5,036.22
11 If line 10 shows a GAIN—Enter 50% of line 9 or 50% of line 10, whichever is smaller. (Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 9.) (See reverse side for computation of alternative tax.)	
12 Subtract line 11 from line 10. Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, on reverse side	5,036.22
13 If line 10 shows a LOSS—Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, the smallest of the following: (a) the amount on line 10; (b) the amount on Form 1040, page 1, line 11b, computed without regard to capital gains or losses; or (c) $1,000	

Part II—GAIN FROM DISPOSITION OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY UNDER SECTIONS 1245 AND 1250—assets held more than 6 months (see instructions for definitions)

D

Where double headings appear, use the first heading for section 1245 and the second heading for section 1250.

	a. Kind of property and how acquired (If necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below—write 1245 or 1250 to indicate type of asset)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale
1					

f. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition					
f-1. Prior to January 1, 1962 —OR— Prior to January 1, 1964	f-2. After December 31, 1961 —OR— After December 31, 1963	g. Adjusted basis (e less sum of f-1 and f-2)	h. Total gain (d less g)	i. Ordinary gain (lesser of f-2 or h) —OR— (see instructions)	j. Other gain (h less i)

2 Total ordinary gain. Enter here and in Part IV, line 2, on reverse side		▨
3 Total other gain. Enter here and in Part I, line 5; however, if the gains do not exceed the losses when this amount is combined with other gains and losses from section 1231 property enter the total of column j in Part III, line 1		

Copy

Form 1040 U.S. Individual Income Tax Return 1967

U.S. Treasury Department Internal Revenue Service for the year January 1–December 31, 1967, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1967, ending ...., 19......

Please print or type

First name and initial (if joint return, use first names and middle initials of both): Samuel and Phyllis

Last name: Ruby

Your social security number: 322 12 7997

Home address (Number and street or rural route): 6123 N. Hoyne

Your occupation: Engineer

City, town or post office, and State: Chicago, Illinois

ZIP code:

Spouse's social security number: 349 18 1400

Enter below name and address used on your return for 1966 (if same as above, write "Same"). If none filed, give reason. If changing from separate to joint or joint to separate returns, enter 1966 names and addresses. Same

Spouse's occupation: Housewife

Your present employer and address: Stanley-Oliver Mfg Co., Chicago, Illinois

Spouse's present employer and address, if joint return

Your Filing Status—check only one:

1a ☐ Single

1b ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)

1c ☐ Married filing separately. If spouse is also filing a return, enter her (his) social security number in space provided above and give first name here ....

1d ☐ Unmarried Head of Household

1e ☐ Surviving widow(er) with dependent child

Your Exemptions

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of boxes checked ▶
2a Yourself	☒	☐	☐	2
2b Spouse	☒	☐	☐	

3a First names of your dependent children who lived with you: Fred, Brian, Elise, Thomas ...... Enter number ▶ 4

3b Number of other dependents (from page 2, Part I, line 3) ▶

4 Total exemptions claimed ▶ 6

Income If joint return include all income of both husband and wife	5	Wages, salaries, tips, etc. If not shown on attached Forms W-2 attach explanation	5	6,750	00
	6	Other income (from page 2, Part II, line 8)	6	(3	36)
	7	Total (add lines 5 and 6)	7	6,746	64
	8	Adjustments to income (from page 2, Part III, line 5)	8		
	9	Total income (subtract line 8 from line 7)	9	6,746	64
Find tax from table	10	If you do not itemize deductions and line 9 is less than $5,000, find your tax from tables in instructions. Do not use lines 11a, b, c, or d. **Enter tax on line 12.**	10		
—OR— Figure tax using tax rate schedules	11a	If you itemize deductions, enter total from page 2, Part IV, line 17 If you do not itemize deductions, and line 9 is $5,000 or more enter the larger of: (1) 10 percent of line 9; OR (2) $200 ($100 if married and filing separate return) plus $100 for each exemption claimed on line 4, above. Deduction under (1) or (2) limited to $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately).	11a	1,186	28
	11b	Subtract line 11a from line 9	11b	5,560	36
	11c	Multiply total number of exemptions on line 4, above, by $600	11c	3,600	00
	11d	Subtract line 11c from line 11b. Enter balance on this line. (Figure your tax on this amount by using tax rate schedule on page 11 of instructions.) **Enter tax on line 12.**	11d	1,960	36
Your Tax, Credits, and Payments	12	Tax (from either Tax Table, see line 10, or Tax Rate Schedule, see lines 11a–11d)	12	288	05
	13	Total credits (from page 2, Part V, line 4)	13		
	14a	Income tax (subtract line 13 from line 12)	14a	288	05
	14b	Tax from recomputing prior year investment credit (attach statement)	14b		
	15	Self-employment tax (Schedule C–3 or F–1)	15		
	16	Total tax (add lines 14a, 14b, and 15)	16	288	05
	17	Total Federal income tax withheld (attach Forms W–2) — 17: 349.60			
	18	Excess F.I.C.A. tax withheld (two or more employers—see page 5 of instr.) — 18			
	19	☐ Nonhighway Federal gasoline tax—Form 4136, ☐ Reg. Inv.—Form 2439 — 19			
	20	1967 Estimated tax payments (include 1966 overpayment allowed as a credit) — 20			
	21	Total (add lines 17, 18, 19, and 20)	21	349	60
Balance Due or Refund	22	If payments (line 21) are less than tax (line 16), enter Balance Due. **Pay in full with this return**	22		
	23	If payments (line 21) are larger than tax (line 16), enter Overpayment	23	61	55
	24	Amount of line 23 you wish credited to 1968 Estimated Tax	24		
	25	Subtract line 24 from 23. Apply to: ☐ U.S. Savings Bonds, with excess refunded or ☒ Refund only	25	61	55

Please attach Copy B of Form W–2 here

Please attach Check or Money Order here

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign here ▶ .... Your signature .... Date

▶ .... Spouse's signature (If filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▶ .... 3/1/68 Signature of preparer other than taxpayer .... Date

9241 N. Keeler Skokie Ill Address

c59—16—79328—1

SCHEDULE D
(Form 1040)
U.S. Treasury Department
Internal Revenue Service

Gains and Losses From Sales or Exchanges of Property

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 1040

1967

Name and address as shown on page 1 of Form 1040
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby, 6123 N. Hoyne, Chicago, Illinois

Part I—CAPITAL ASSETS—Short-term capital gains and losses—assets held not more than 6 months

a. Kind of property. Indicate security, real estate, or other (Specify)	b. Description (Examples: 100 sh. of "Z" Co., 2 story brick, etc.)	c. How acquired. Enter letter symbol (See instr.)	d. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	e. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	f. Gross sales price	g. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition	h. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	i. Gain or loss (f plus g less h)
1								
Stock	Zero Mfg	A	9-29-67	10-16-67	3,935.92	–	4483.26	(547.34)
Stock	Pike Corp	A	9-27-67	10-16-67	2,600.25	–	2,694.81	(94.56)

2 Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . .
3 Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement) . . . .
4 Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 1, 2, and 3 . . . . (641.90)

Long-term capital gains and losses—assets held more than 6 months (12 months or more for certain livestock)

5 Enter gain from Part II, line 3 . . .								
Stock	Beth Steel	A	2-65	9-67	5538.56		5,504.07	34.49
Stock	AMF	A	6-63	9-67	2,269.95		1,873.50	396.45
Stock	Jupiter	A	4-63	10-67	559.73		537.25	22.48
				Total long-term gross sales price . .				

6 Enter the full amount of your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . . . .
7 Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement) . . . .
8 Capital gain dividends (see Form 1040 Instructions, page 6) . . . .
9 Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 5, 6, 7, and 8 . . . . 453.42
10 Combine the amounts shown on lines 4 and 9, and enter the net gain (or loss) here . . . . (188.48)
11 If line 10 shows a GAIN—Enter 50% of line 9 or 50% of line 10, whichever is smaller. (Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 9.) (See reverse side for computation of alternative tax.) . . . .
12 Subtract line 11 from line 10. Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, on reverse side . . . .
13 If line 10 shows a LOSS—Enter here and in Part IV, line 1, the smallest of the following: (a) the amount on line 10; (b) the amount on page 1, line 11b, Form 1040, computed without regard to capital gains and losses; or (c) $1,000 . . (188.48)

Part II—GAIN FROM DISPOSITION OF DEPRECIABLE PROPERTY UNDER SECTIONS 1245 AND 1250—assets held more than 6 months (see instructions for definitions)

D

Where double headings appear, use the first heading for section 1245 and the second heading for section 1250.

a. Kind of property and how acquired (if necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below—write 1245 or 1250 to indicate type of asset)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale
1				

f. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition		g. Adjusted basis (e less sum of f-1 and f-2)	h. Total gain (d less g)	i. Ordinary gain (lesser of f-2 or h) —OR— (see instructions)	j. Other gain (h less i)
f-1. Prior to January 1, 1962 —OR— Prior to January 1, 1964	f-2. After December 31, 1961 —OR— After December 31, 1963				

2 Total ordinary gain. Enter here and in Part IV, line 2, on reverse side . . . .
3 Total other gain. Enter here and in Part I, line 5; however, if the gains do not exceed the losses when this amount is combined with other gains and losses from section 1231 property enter the total of column j in Part III, line 1 . .

16—79725-1

Part I Exemptions
Complete only for dependents claimed on line 3b, page 1

	(a) NAME (if more space is needed attach schedule)	(b) Relationship	(c) Months lived in your home. If born or died during year write "B" or "D"	(d) Did dependent have income of $600 or more?	(e) Amount YOU furnished for dependent's support. If 100% write "ALL"	(f) Amount furnished by OTHERS including dependent.
1					$	$
2						

3 Total number of dependents listed above. Enter here and on page 1, line 3b ▷

Part II Income from sources other than wages, etc.

1a Gross dividends and other distributions on stock (list payers and amounts—write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, or jointly)

Bethlehem Steel (H)	168.75
Amer. Mich. & Found (H)	67.50

Total line 1a ▶		236 25
1b Exclusion (see instructions).	100 00	
1c Capital gain distributions (see page 6 of instructions).		
1d Nontaxable distributions (see page 6 of instructions).		
1e Total (add lines 1b, 1c, and 1d)		100 00
1f Taxable dividends (line 1a less line 1e—not less than zero) ▶		136 25

Interest (list payers and amounts below)

Earnings from savings and loan assoc. and credit unions.

Other interest (banks, bonds, tax refunds, etc.)

1st Natl. Bank of Lincolnwood	48.87

2 Total interest income ▶	48 87
3 Pensions and annuities, rents and royalties, partnerships, estates or trusts, etc. (attach Sch. B)	
4 Business income or loss (attach Schedule C)	
5 Sale or exchange of property (attach Schedule D)	(188 48)
6 Farm income or loss (attach Schedule F)	

Miscellaneous income (state nature and source)

7 Total miscellaneous income ▶	
8 TOTAL (add lines 1f, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7). Enter here and on page 1, line 6 ▶	(3 36)

Part III Adjustments to income

1 "Sick pay" if included in line 5, page 1 (attach Form 2440 or other required statement)	
2 Moving expenses (attach Form 3903)	
3 Employee business expense (attach Form 2106 or other statement)	
4 Payments by self-employed persons to retirement plans, etc. (attach Form 2950SE)	
5 TOTAL ADJUSTMENTS (lines 1 through 4). Enter here and on page 1, line 8 ▶	

Part IV Itemized deductions—Use only if you do not use tax table or standard deduction.

Medical and dental expense (not compensated by insurance or otherwise)—Attach itemized list.

1 One-half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care	114 72
2 Total cost of medicine and drugs	
3 Enter 1% of line 9, page 1	
4 Subtract line 3 from line 2 (not less than zero)	
5 Other medical, dental expenses (include balance of insurance premiums for medical care not deductible on line 1)	686 72
6 Total (add lines 4 and 5)	686 72
7 Enter 3% of line 9, page 1	202 41
8 Subtract line 7 from line 6 (not less than zero)	484 31
9 Total (add lines 1 and 8) ▷	599 03

Contributions.—Cash—including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)

Misc. Charities	25.00
J.A.	16.00
U.S.Y	20.00

10 Total cash contributions	
11 Other than cash (see instructions for required statement). Enter total of such items here	
12 Carryover from prior years (see page 8 of Instr.)	
13 Total contributions (add lines 10, 11, and 12—see instructions for limitation) ▷	61 00

Taxes.—Real estate	
State and local gasoline	40 00
General +Furn. sales (see page 15 of Instructions)	175 00
State and local income	
Personal property	
14 Total taxes ▶	215 00

Interest expense.—Home Mortgage

Other (itemize)

Reynolds	210.87
Frechling	4.38
Misc	39.00
15 Total interest expense ▶	254 25

Miscellaneous deductions.—(see page 9 of Instructions)

Work Tools	57.00
16 Total miscellaneous ▶	57 00
17 TOTAL DEDUCTIONS (add lines 9, 13, 14, 15, and 16). Enter here and on page 1, line 11a. ▷	1,186 28

Part V Credits

1 Retirement income credit (Schedule B)	
2 Investment credit (Form 3468)	
3 Foreign tax credit (Form 1116)	
4 TOTAL CREDITS (for page 1, line 13) ▷	

EXPENSE ACCOUNTS—If you had an expense allowance or charged expenses to your employer, check here ☐ and see page 7 of instructions.

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1967—O-260-001

c59—16—79233-1

36-2586182
The Stanley-Oliver Mfg. Co.
1001 S. California Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60612

Type or print EMPLOYER'S identification number, name, and address above.

WAGE AND TAX STATEMENT 1967

Copy C—For employee's records

FEDERAL INCOME TAX INFORMATION			SOCIAL SECURITY INFORMATION	
Federal income tax withheld	Wages[1] paid subject to withholding in 1967	Other compensation[2] paid in 1967	F.I.C.A. employee tax withheld[3]	Total F.I.C.A. wages[4] paid in 1967
349.60	6,750.00		290.40	6,600.00

Type or print EMPLOYEE'S social security number 322 12 7997

Samuel D. Ruby
6123 N. Hoyne Ave.
Chicago, Ill. 60645

Type or print EMPLOYEE'S name and address (including ZIP code) above.

Uncollected Employee Tax on Tips . . . . $________

FORM W-2—U.S. Treasury Department, Internal Revenue Service

16—79067-1

---

[1] Includes tips reported by employee. This amount is before payroll deductions or "sick pay" exclusion.

[2] Add this item to wages in figuring the amount to be reported as wages and salaries on your income tax return.

[3] The social security (F.I.C.A.) rate of 4.4% includes .5% for Hospital Insurance Benefits and 3.9% for old-age, survivors, and disability insurance.

[4] Includes tips reported by employee. If your wages were subject to social security taxes, but are not shown, these wages are the same as wages shown under "Federal Income Tax Information," but not more than $6,600.

JFK ASSASSINATION COLLECTION
IDENTIFICATION FORM

Agency: HSCA
Record Number: 7310093

Record Series: NUMBERED FILES

Agency File Number: 004876

Originator: ~~Citizen~~ Ruby, Samuel

From: Ruby,, Samuel .... R

To: .... R

Title: .... R

Date: 1-24-78

Pages: 169

Subjects:
1. Ruby, Sam .... R
2. ~~Income Tax Returns~~ .... R
3. Ruby, Jack, Background Associates and Relatives R
4. .... R
5. .... R
6. .... R

Document Type : Other Textual

Classification: [✓ U] C S T

Restrictions: Open 1A 1B 1C 2 [✓ 3] 4 5 D

Current Status: O [✓ P] X

Date of Last Review: / /93

Opening Criteria:

Comments: w/ cover letter

Box #: 102 Folder Title:

RESIDENT 540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR 1976

LACE PREADDRESSED LABEL HERE, If available. (Correct name and address, if necessary)
nter social security number(s) only if incorrect or not shown on label.

Check One: ☒ Calendar Year ☐ Fiscal Year Ending ________ 1977

FOR PRIVACY NOTIFICATION SEE PAGE 2 OF INSTRUCTIONS

NAME (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL + PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: Ruby
Your Social Security Number: [redacted]
Spouse's Social Security Number: [redacted]
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CA
OCCUPATION: Yours S/E
Spouse's S/E

FILING STATUS (Check Only One)

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Separate return of married person—Enter spouse's social security number and full name here ________
4 ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ________
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died 197__)

EXEMPTION CREDITS

6 Personal { If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 / If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50 }	6	50	00
7 Dependents — Do not list the person who qualifies you as head of household ELISA THOMAS Total Number 2 × $8	7	16	00
8 Blind (see instructions) Number of blind exemptions ____ × $8	8		00
9 Total exemption credits (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20	9	66	00

10 **Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** { Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to face of this return. If unavailable, see instructions, Page 10 }	10	0
11 **Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	11	0
12 **Interest.** Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	12	5195
13 **Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 48)	13	2546
14 **Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	7741
15 **Adjustments to income** (from line 55)	15	0
16 **Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14)	16	7741

- **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under $15,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.**
- **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $15,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**

17 **Deductions: Itemized** (from line 63) **OR STANDARD** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked)	17	5686
18 **Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19	18	2055
19 **Tax from** (check one) ☐ Tax Table ☒ Tax Rate Schedule ☐ Income Averaging Schedule (G or G-1)	19	23
20 **Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	66
21 **Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	-0-
22 **Other credits** (from line 68—Including Special Low Income Tax Credit)	22	
23 **Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	-0-
24 **Other taxes** (from line 71)	24	
25 **Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-
26 **Total California income tax withheld** (attach W-2 or W-2P to face of this return)	26	0
27 **Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1976, complete Part 1 on page 2	27	0
28 **1976 California estimated tax payments**	28	
29 **Excess California SDI tax withheld** (see instructions)	29	
30 **Total Credits**	30	-0-
31 If line 25 is larger than line 30, enter BALANCE DUE. If it is equal to line 30, enter zero. Mail return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95867 — PAY IN FULL →	31	-0-
32 If line 25 is smaller than line 30, enter amount OVERPAID	32	-0-
33 Amount of line 32 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU.** Allow at least six weeks. Mail return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, P.O. BOX 13-540, SACRAMENTO, CA 95813 →	33	-0-
34 Amount of line 32 to be credited on your 1977 ESTIMATED TAX	34	

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A
R

If you do **NOT** want State income tax forms and instructions mailed to you next year, check here ☐ *See Instructions, Page 9*

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct, and complete. Declaration of preparer (other than taxpayer) is based on all information of which preparer has any knowledge.

SIGN ▷ Your signature ________ Date ________
▷ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) [redacted] Date ________

▲ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE ▼

te social security number on check or money order. ATTACH HERE

PART I – Renter's Credit – All questions must be answered

35	Did you, on March 1, 1976, live in rented property which was your principal residence?	☐ Yes	☑ No	If no, you may not claim this credit
36	Was the property you rented exempt from property tax?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, you may not claim this credit
37	Did you live with any other person who claimed you as a dependent for income tax purposes?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, you may not claim this credit
38	Did you or your spouse claim the homeowners' property tax exemption or receive public assistance?	☐ Yes	☐ No	If yes, see page 3 of instructions

PART II – Other Income

39	Business income (or loss) (attach Schedule C(540))		39	3546
40	Net gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of capital assets (attach Schedule D(540))		40	(1000)
41	Net gain (or loss) from supplemental schedule of gains and losses (attach Schedule D-1(540))		41	
42	Pensions and annuities	ATTACH SCHEDULE E FORM (540)	42	
43	Rents and royalties		43	
44	Partnerships		44	
45	Estates and trusts		45	
46	Farm income (or loss) (attach Schedule F(540))		46	
47	Miscellaneous income			
	(a) Fully taxable pensions and annuities (not reported on Schedule E(540))	47a		
	(b) Alimony	47b		
	(c) Other (state nature and source)	47c		
	Enter total of lines 47(a), 47(b), and 47(c)		47	
48	Total (add lines 39 thru 47). Enter here and on line 13		48	2546

PART III – Adjustments to Income

49	"Sick pay," if included in line 10 (see instructions - attach Form FTB 3805T)		49	
50	Moving expenses (see instructions - attach Form FTB 3805U)		50	
51	Employee business expenses (See instructions - attach Form FTB 3805N)		51	
52	Military exclusion (see instructions)		52	
53(a)	Payments to an individual retirement arrangement (attach FTB 3805P)	53a		
(b)	Payments to a Keogh (H.R. 10) retirement plan	53b		
(c)	Payments to a self-employed "Defined Benefit Plan"	53c		
	Enter total of lines 53(a), 53(b), and 53(c)		53	
54	Forfeited interest penalty (see instructions)		54	
55	Total adjustments (add lines 49 thru 54). Enter here and on line 15		55	

PART IV – Itemized Deductions

- Attach Schedule A(540) and enter sub-totals on lines 56 thru 62, below

56	Total deductible medical and dental expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 10)	56	1941
57	Total taxes (from Schedule A(540), line 17)	57	1128
58	Total interest expense (from Schedule A(540), line 20)	58	2517
59	Total contributions (from Schedule A(540), line 24)	59	100
60	Total casualty loss (from Schedule A(540), line 29)	60	0
61	Total miscellaneous deductions (from Schedule A(540), line 33)	61	0
62	Total child care and adoption expenses (from Schedule A(540), line 37)	62	0
63	Total itemized deductions (add lines 56 thru 62). Enter here and on line 17	63	5686

PART V – Other Credits – SEE INSTRUCTIONS FOR EACH CREDIT CLAIMED BELOW

64	"Other State" net income tax credit (attach copy of other state return and Schedule S(540))	64	
65	Retirement income credit (attach Schedule R(540))	65	
66	Special low income tax credit (see special instructions)	66	
67	Solar energy tax credit (see special instructions)	67	
68	**TOTAL** (add lines 64 thru 67). Enter here and on line 22	68	

PART VI – Other Taxes

69	Tax on preference income (see instructions - attach Schedule P(540)	69	
70	Tax on premature distributions from attached Form FTB 3805P	70	
71	Total (add lines 69 and 70) enter here and on line 24	71	

PART VII – Reconciliation to Federal Return – If adjusted gross income on Federal Return is different from line 16, page 1, explain below.

SCHEDULE A FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE 1976 YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 S+P Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted]

A

USE ONLY IF YOU DO NOT USE THE TAX TABLE OR TAKE THE STANDARD DEDUCTION

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care
2. Medicine and drugs
3. Enter 1% of line 16, Form 540
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1
6. Other medical and dental expenses:
   - (a) Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.
   - (b) Hospitals
   - (c) Other (itemize)

SCH

7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)
8. Enter 3% of line 16, Form 540
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, line 56) 1941

Taxes

11. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)
12. Real estate
13. State and local gasoline
14. General Sales
15. Personal property (Boat and Aircraft)
16. Other (itemize)

SCH

17. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 11 thru 16. Enter here and on Form 540, line 57) 1128

Interest Expense

18. Home mortgage
19. Other (itemize)

SCH

20. **Total**—(Add lines 18 and 19. Enter here and on Form 540, line 58) 2517

Contributions

21(a). Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.

(b). Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts

SCH

22. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement
23. Carryover from 1974 & subsequent years – See instructions
24. **Total**— (Add lines 21a thru 23. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, line 59) 100

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)

NOTE: If you had **more than one loss**, omit lines 25 through 28—See instructions for guidance

25. Loss before insurance reimbursement
26. Insurance reimbursement
27. Subtract line 26 from line 25, Enter difference (If less than zero, enter zero)
28. Enter $100 or amount on line 27, whichever is smaller
29. Casualty or theft loss (subtract line 28 from line 27. Enter here and on Form 540, line 60) 0

Miscellaneous Deductions

30. Alimony paid to:
31. Employment Education Expense
32. Union dues

Other (itemize)

33. **Total** (Add lines 30 through 32. Enter here and on Form 540, line 61) 0

Child Care and Adoption Expense

34. Child care expenses – Attach Form 3805X
35. Total adoption expense

Less 3% of line 16, Form 540

36. Net adoption expenses – See instructions for maximum limitations
37. Total child care and adoption expenses (add lines 34 and 36. Enter here and on Form 540, line 62) 0

SCHEDULE B FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

DIVIDEND AND INTEREST INCOME

Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE 1976 YEAR

lame as shown on Form 540 S+P RUBY

Social Security Number [redacted]

B

PART I—DIVIDEND INCOME

Line 1—Gross Dividends and Other Distributions on **tock**—If gross dividends and other distributions (including capital ain dividends) on stock were **$400 or less,** do not complete is part; but enter gross dividends (including capital gain distributions), less nontaxable portion, if any, on Form 540, page 1. Do NOT deduct the $100 federal exclusion.

"Capital gain dividends" are treated as ordinary dividends for State income tax purposes and **not** as capital gains as permitted under the federal law.

Gross dividends and other distributions on stock—List payers and amounts—Write (H), (W), (J), for stock held by husband, wife, jointly.		
Total dividends		
Nontaxable distributions		
Taxable dividends—Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter here and on line 11, form 540		

PART II—INTEREST INCOME

Interest on bonds, debentures, loans, notes, tax refunds and all ypes of savings accounts including banks, credit unions and postal avings is taxable.

Interest on the following obligations is exempt from tax:

(a) Bonds and other obligations (other than tax refunds) of the United States, the District of Columbia and territories of the United States. (Interest on Philippine Islands obligations issued on or after March 24, 1934 is not exempt.)

(b) Bonds (but not other obligations) of California and its political subdivisions issued after November 4, 1902.

(c) Interest on bonds of Alaska and Hawaii issued prior to their achieving statehood.

Note: If total taxable interest income was **$400 or less,** do not complete this part; but enter the total amount of interest received on Form 540, page 1.

Interest income—List payers and amounts		
NOTE ON WOODLEY BISTRO	4959	
UAL	17	
TRANS WORLD	11	
✓ ✓	191	
WORLD	17	
Total Interest Income. Enter here and on line 12, Form 540	5195	

SCHEDULE C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE 1976 YEAR

tach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565

me as shown on Form 540 or 540NR S. & P. Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted]

B. Federal Employer I.D. No. 95-2651578

Name and Address of Business
DOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP, 16055 VENTURA BLVD ENCINO CA.

Principal business activity (i.e., retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; etc.) SERVICE - SNACK BAR

Indicate method of accounting: ☐ cash; ☒ accrual; ☐ other

Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☒ YES ☐ NO

Method of inventory valuation ▶ COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?
☐ YES ☐ NO If "Yes," attach explanation.

		Balance ▶
1 Gross receipts, sales, or fees $ .... Less returns and allowances $		
2 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)		
3 Purchases $ .... Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $		
4 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5 Materials and supplies		
6 Other costs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
7 **Total of lines 2 thru 6**		
8 Inventory at end of this year		
9 Cost of goods sold (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
0 Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
1 Other income (attach schedule)		
2 **Total income** (add lines 10 and 11)		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
13 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-1 or attach Schedule)		
14 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
15 Rent on business property		
16 Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
17 Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
18 Insurance		
19 Legal and professional fees		
20 Commissions		
21 Amortization (attach statement)		
22 Retirement plans, etc. (other than your share, see instructions)		
23 Interest on business indebtedness		
24 Bad debts arising from sales or services (Not applicable if reporting on cash basis)		
25 Depletion (attach schedule)		
26 Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
27 **Total of lines 13 thru 26**		
28 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 27 from line 12). Enter here and on Page 2, Form 540 or 540NR	Sch	3546

Schedule C-1 Depreciation Claimed on line 13.

Group and guideline class or description of property	Date Acquired	Cost or other basis	Depreciation allowed (or allowable) in prior years	Method of computing depreciation	Life or Rate	Depreciation for this year
			Sch			106

Schedule C-2 Explanation of Lines 6, 14, 16, and 26.

LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT	LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

TAXABLE
1976
YEAR

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR: S+P Ruby

Social Security Number: [redacted]

D

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1.					

2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 17, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy) . . . .
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . .
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3 . . . .

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

5.					
INSTALLMENT SALE					5355

6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 19, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy) . . . .
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . .
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7 (If gain, see 540 instructions, line 24a (Preference Income)) 5355

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

9.					

10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 21, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy) . . . .
11. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries . . . .
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11 (If gain, see 540 instructions, line 24a (Preference Income)) . . . .

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4 . . . . -0-
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8 3481
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12 . . . . -0-
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach computation) 1975 . . . (15042)
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16 . . . . (1561)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR . . . .
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of:
    (a) amount on lines 17;
    (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or
    (c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return) . . . . (1000)

RESIDENT
540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR
1975

PLACE PREADDRESSED LABEL HERE, if available. (Correct name and address, if necessary)
Enter social security number(s) only if incorrect or not shown on label.

Check One: ☒ Calendar Year ☐ Fiscal Year Ending ________ 1976

NAME (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: RUBY
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CA

FOR FEDERAL PRIVACY ACT NOTIFICATION SEE PAGE 2 OF INSTRUCTIONS
Your Social Security Number [redacted]
Spouse's Social Security Number 349 18 1920
OCCUPATION Yours S/E
Spouse's S/E

FILING STATUS—Check Only One:

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Separate return of married person—Enter spouse's social security number and full name here ________
4 ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ________
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died 197__)

EXEMPTION CREDITS

6	**Personal** { If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 } { If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50 } ●	6	50 .00
7	**Dependents** — Do not list yourself, your spouse or the person who qualifies you as head of household. Enter name and relationship. ELISA THOMAS Total Number ■ 2 × $8 ●	7	16 .00
8	**Blind** (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions ► ____ × $8	8	.00
9	**Total exemption credits** (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20	9	66 .00

10	**Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** (Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to face of this return. If unavailable, see instructions, Page 6) ●	10	-0-
11	**Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540)) ●	11	17
12	**Interest.** Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540)) ●	12	95
13	**Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 48)	13	8872
14	**Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	8984
15	**Adjustments to income** (from line 55)	15	
16	**Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14) • If line 1 or 3 is checked and line 16 is $4,000 or less, enter zero tax on line 23. • If line 2, 4, or 5 is checked and line 16 is $8,000 or less, enter zero tax on line 23. { Do not complete lines 17 thru 22 } ■	16	8984
	• **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under $15,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.** • **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $15,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**		
17	**Deductions:** Itemized (from line 62) OR **STANDARD** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked) ●	17	5735
18	**Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19 ●	18	3249
19	**Tax from** (check one) Tax Table ☐ Tax Rate Schedule ☒ Income Averaging Schedule (G or G-1) ☐ ●	19	32
20	**Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	66
21	**Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	-0-
22	**Other credits** (from line 65)	22	
23	**Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	-0-
24	**Tax on preference income** (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540)) ⦿	24	
25	**Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-

26	**Total California income tax withheld** (attach W-2 or W-2P to face of this return) ■	26			
27	**Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1975, complete Part 1 on page 2 ■	27			
28	**1975 California estimated tax payments** ◆	28			
29	**Excess California SDI tax withheld** (attach Form DE 1964 to face of this return) ◆	29			
30	**Total prepayment credits** (add lines 26 thru 29) →			30	-0-
31	If line 25 is larger than line 30, enter BALANCE DUE. If it is equal to line 30, enter zero. Pay in full and mail with return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CA 95867 — **PAY IN FULL** → ■			31	-0-
32	If line 25 is smaller than line 30, enter amount OVERPAID ●	32		Do not write in these spaces	
33	Amount of line 32 to be **REFUNDED TO YOU.** Allow at least six weeks. Mail return to: FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, P.O. BOX 13-540, SACRAMENTO, CA 95813 → ■	33		P E M	
34	Amount of line 32 to be credited on your 1976 ESTIMATED TAX ■	34	← **ESTIMATED TAX**	A R	

▲ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE ▼

ATTACH HERE ▲

ATTACH FORM DE 1964 HERE

▼ Write social security number on check or money order.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN ► ________ Your signature ________ Date
HERE ► ________ Spouse's signature (if filing joint return) ________ Date

► ________ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) ________ Date [redacted]
Address ________

SCHEDULE **A** FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE **1975** YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number [redacted]

A

If your adjusted gross income is $8,000 or less and your filing status is "Married, Filing Jointly," "Head of Household," or "Widow(er) With Dependent Child," or $4,000 or less and your filing status is "Single," or "Married, Filing Separately," do not itemize, enter zero on Form 540, line 23, and check the tax table box.

USE ONLY IF YOU DO NOT USE THE TAX TABLE OR TAKE THE STANDARD DEDUCTION

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care
2. Medicine and drugs
3. Enter 1% of line 16, Form 540
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1
6. Other medical and dental expenses:
   (a) Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.
   (b) Hospitals
   (c) Other (itemize)
7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)
8. Enter 3% of line 16, Form 540
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, line 56) SCH 1509

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list
12. Enter 3% of line 16, Form 540
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations. (Enter here and on Form 540, line 57)

Taxes

14. Real estate
15. State and local gasoline
16. General Sales
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)
18. Personal property (Boat and Aircraft)
19. Other (itemize) SCH
20. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 14 thru 19. Enter here and on Form 540, line 58) 1207

Interest Expense

21. Home mortgage
22. Other (itemize) SCH
23. Total—(Add lines 21 and 22. Enter here and on Form 540, line 59) 2857

Contributions

24. Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.
25. Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts SCH
26. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement
27. Carryover from 1974—See instructions
28. **Total**—(Add lines 24, 25, 26, and 27. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, line 60) 150

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See instructions

NOTE: If you had more than one loss, omit lines 29 through 33 and follow instructions for guidance.

29. Loss before insurance reimbursement
30. Insurance reimbursement
31. Subtract line 30 from line 29. Enter difference (if line 30 is greater than line 29, enter zero)
32. Enter $100 or amount on line 31, whichever is smaller
33. Casualty or theft loss (line 31 less line 32)
34. **Alimony paid**
35. **Child care**—See instructions
36. **Union dues**
37. **Employment education expense**—See instructions
38. **Other**—(itemize)
39. **Total**—Add lines 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, and 38. (Enter here and on Form 540, line 61)

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
19 25
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number [redacted]

A. Name and Address of Business WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP

B. Federal Employer I.D. No. 95-2651578

C. Principal business activity (i.e., retail–hardware; wholesale–tobacco; services–legal; etc.) SERVICE - SNACKBAR

D. Indicate method of accounting: ☐ cash; ☒ accrual; ☐ other

E. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar ~~year~~ filed (if required)? ☒ YES ☐ NO

C

F. Method of inventory valuation ► COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?

☐ YES ☐ NO If "Yes," attach explanation.

1 Gross receipts, sales, or fees $ .... Less returns and allowances $	Balance ►	
2 Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)		
3 Purchases $ .... Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $		
4 Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5 Materials and supplies		
6 Other costs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
7 **Total of lines 2 thru 6**		
8 Inventory at end of this year		
9 Cost of goods sold (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10 Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
11 Other income (attach schedule)		
12 **Total income** (add lines 10 and 11)		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
13 Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-1 or attach Schedule)		
14 Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
15 Rent on business property		
16 Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
17 Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
18 Insurance		
19 Legal and professional fees		
20 Commissions		
21 Amortization (attach statement)		
22 Retirement plans, etc. (other than your share, see instructions)		
23 Interest on business indebtedness		
24 Bad debts arising from sales or services (Not applicable if reporting on cash basis)		
25 Depletion (attach schedule)		
26 Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-2 or attach Schedule)		
27 **Total of lines 13 thru 26**		
28 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 27 from line 12), Enter here and on Page 2, Form 540 or 540NR	SCH	2559

Schedule C-1 Depreciation Claimed on line 13.

Group and guideline class or description of property	Date Acquired	Cost or other basis	Depreciation allowed (or allowable) in prior years	Method of computing depreciation	Life or Rate	Depreciation for this year

Schedule C-2 Explanation of Lines 6, 14, 16, and 26.

LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT	LINE NO.	EXPLANATION	AMOUNT

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1975
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number [redacted]

D

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1. 1974 LOSS CARRYOVER (20,360) USED 1974 1000 -					

2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 18, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3	

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

5.					

6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 20, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	5105
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7	5105

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

9.					

10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 22, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)	
11. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries	
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11	

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4		
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8	3318	
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12		
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach compuıation)	(19360)	
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16		(16042)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR		
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of: (a) amount on lines 17; (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or [illegible] husband or wife filing a separate return)		(1000)

SCHEDULE
D-1
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULE OF GAINS AND LOSSES

(Sales or Exchanges Including Involuntary Conversions)
(Attach to Form 540, 540NR, 541 or 565)

TAXABLE
19 75
YEAR

Name as shown on Tax Return: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Identifying number as shown on return: [redacted]

D-1

PART I Gain From Disposition of Property Under Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, 18220

Lines 9 and 10 should be omitted if there are no dispositions of farm property or farm land; or, if this form is filed by a partnership.

1. Description of Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, and 18220 property.	Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	Date sold (mo., day, yr.)
(A) WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP	2/1/74	9/2/75
(B)		
(C)		
(D)		

Correlate lines 1(A) through 1(D) with these columns	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)
2. Gross sales price				
3. Cost or other basis and expense of sale				
4. Depreciation allowed (or allowable)	INSTALLMENT			
5. Adjusted basis, line 3 less line 4				
6. Total gain, subtract line 5 from line 2				
7. If Section 18211 property:				
(a) Depreciation allowed (or allowable) after applicable date. (See Instruction D-3)	SALE			
(b) Line 6 or line 7(a), whichever is smaller				
8. If Section 18212-18 property:				
(a) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-63 and before 1-1-71				
(b) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-70				
(c) Enter line 6 or line 8(b), whichever is smaller				
(d) Line 8(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(e) Enter excess, if any, of line 6 over line 8(b)				
(f) Enter line 8(a) or line 8(e), whichever is smaller				
(g) Line 8(f) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(h) Add line 8(d) and line 8(g)				
9. If Section 18220 property:				
(a) If farm land, enter soil and water conservation expenses for current year and four preceding years				
(b) If farm property, other than land, subtract line 7(b) from line 6; OR, if farm land, enter line 6 or line 9(a), whichever is smaller (see Instruction D-5)				
(c) Excess deductions account (see Instruction D-5)				
(d) Enter line 9(b) or line 9(c), whichever is smaller				
10. If Section 18219 property:				
(a) Soil and water conservation expenses made after 12-31-69				
(b) Enter amount from line 9(d), if any; otherwise, enter a zero				
(c) Enter excess, if any, of line 10(a) over 10(b)				
(d) Line 10(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-5)				
(e) Line 6 less line 10(b)				
(f) Enter smaller of line 10(d) or line 10(e)				

SUMMARY OF PART I (Complete Property Columns (A) through (D) up to Line 10(f) before going to Line 11)

	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)
11. Enter amounts from line 6	7418.			
12. Enter amounts from lines 7(b), 8(h), 9(d) and 10(f)	2313.			
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11, enter here and in appropriate Section in Part II (see Instruction D-2)	5105			

14. Total of Property Columns (A) through (D), line 12. Enter here and on line 24, Part III: 2313.

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY CALENDAR YEAR 19 75

ADDRESS [redacted] SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		682
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		877
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES	1629	1629
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.	270	258
9	1359	1371
I +: ½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.	150	150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▶	1509	1521
TAXES		
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME	-0-	-0-
12 REAL ESTATE		932
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		205
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		22
16 SALES TAX AUTO		-0-
17 TOTAL TAXES ▶	1207	1207
INTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)		
18 MORTGAGE		2514
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS MISC		50
TRANSWORLD		186
SBA		7
FEDCO		100
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▶	2857	2857

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21a CASH CONTRIBUTIONS		
21b PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		150
XMAS & EASTER SEALS		
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▶	150	150
CASUALTY OR THEFT (LOSS(ES)		
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▶		
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS		
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
33 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
AUTO USE/DAMAGE		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS.(Sched		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▶		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (From LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line 29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▶	5723	5735

REMARKS

PSI Professional Stationers, Inc

Form 101

SCHEDULE

NAME SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO. ____ CALENDAR YEAR 19 75

ADDRESS [redacted] FISCAL YEAR ENDING ____ 19 ____

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		48924
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	800	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	24031.	
TOTAL	24831	
LESS INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	-0-	24831
GROSS PROFIT		24093
		24093
GROSS INCOME		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	99	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE	1800	
BAD DEBTS		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE BELOW)	974	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS	126	
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	285	
INTEREST	1107	
JANITOR AND HAULING		
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	150	
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE		
RENT	4151	
REPAIRS AND MAINTENANCE	625	
SALARIES AND WAGES	5632	
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	240	
TAXES PAYROLL	575	
TELEPHONE AND UTILITIES	168	
LINEN	158	
CONTRACT LABOR	444	
		16534
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) FEDERAL RETURN		7559
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) STATE RETURN - SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.	(H) 5159 (W) 2400	

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION

NO.	KIND AND LOCATION OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED	METH.	YEARS OR %	COST OR OTHER BASIS		PRIOR DEPREC.	DEPRECIATION THIS YEAR
	EQUIPMENT	2/1/74	S.L	7YR	10228		1339	974
	GOODWILL	2/1/74			35000		-0-	-0-

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC FORM 104A
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.

SCHEDULE ____

RESIDENT
540

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR
1974

PLACE PREADDRESSED LABEL HERE, if available. (Correct name and address, if necessary)
Enter social security number(s) only if incorrect or not shown on label.

For calendar year or
Taxable year ending ______, 197__

NAME (If joint return, give first names and initials of both): SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: RUBY
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CA

Your Social Security Number: [redacted]
Spouse's Social Security Number: [redacted]
OCCUPATION Yours: S/E
Spouse's: S/E

FILING STATUS—Check Only One:

1 ☐ Single
2 ☒ Married filing joint return (even if only one had income)
3 ☐ Separate return of married person—Enter spouse's social security number and full name here ______
4 ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ______
5 ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child (Year spouse died ▶ 197__)

EXEMPTION CREDITS

6	**Personal** { If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25 / If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50 }	6	50
7	**Dependents** — Do not list yourself, your spouse or the person who qualifies you as head of household. Enter name and relationship. ELISA THOMAS Total Number ▶ 2 × $8	7	16
8	**Blind** (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions ▶ ______ × $8	8	
9	**Total exemption credits** (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20	9	66

▲ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE ▼

10	**Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation** { Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to face of this return. If unavailable, attach explanation. }	10	
11	**Dividends**—before federal exclusion. Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	11	136
12	**Interest.** Enter total (if over $400, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	12	
13	**Income other than wages, dividends and interest** (from line 48)	13	8934
14	**Total** (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	9070
15	**Adjustments to income** (from line 54)	15	
16	**Adjusted gross income** (subtract line 15 from line 14)	16	9070

- **If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under $10,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.**
- **If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $10,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.**

17	**Deductions: Itemized** (from line 61) **OR Standard** ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked)	17	5468
18	**Taxable income** (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19	18	3602
19	**Tax from** (check one) Tax Table ☐ Tax Rate Schedule ☒ Income Averaging Schedule (G or G-1) ☐	19	36
20	**Total exemption credits** (from line 9, above)	20	56
21	**Tax liability** (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	-0-
22	**Other credits** (from line 65—Includes special low income tax credit)	22	
23	**Net tax liability** (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	-0-
24	**Tax on preference income** (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540))	24	
25	**Total tax liability** (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-

▲ ATTACH HERE ▼

26	**Total California income tax withheld** (attach Form(s) W-2 or W-2P to face of this return)	26			
27	**Renter's credit**—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1974, complete Part 1 on page 2	27			
28	**1974 California estimated tax payments**	28			
29	**Excess California SDI tax withheld** (attach Form DE 1964 to face of this return)	29			
30	**Total prepayment credits** (add lines 26 thru 29)			30	-0-
31	If line 25 is larger than line 30, enter BALANCE DUE. If it is equal to line 30, enter zero. Pay in full and mail with return to: **FRANCHISE TAX BOARD SACRAMENTO, CA 95867** ——— **PAY IN FULL** →			31	-0-
32	If line 25 is smaller than line 30, enter amount OVERPAID. Mail return to: **FRANCHISE TAX BOARD P.O. BOX 13-540 SACRAMENTO, CA 95813**	32	-0-		
33	Amount of line 32 to be REFUNDED. (Allow at least six weeks) ——— **REFUND TO YOU** →	33			
34	Amount of line 32 to be credited on your 1975 ESTIMATED TAX	34		← ESTIMATED TAX	

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A

ATTACH FORM DE 1964 HERE

Write social security number on check or money order.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN HERE ▶ ______ Your signature ______ Date
▶ ______ Spouse's signature (if filing joint return) ______ Date

▶ Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) ______ Date
13717 VANOWEN STREET
VAN NUYS, CA. 914
367-34-8720
Address (and Zip code) ______ [redacted] Preparer's FEIN (or SSA) No.

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
1974
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number [redacted]

A

Use only if you do not use the Tax Table or take the standard deduction.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care		
2. Medicine and drugs		
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540.		
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if line 3 is greater than line 2, enter zero)		
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1		
6. Other medical and dental expenses:		
(a) Doctors, dentists, nurses, etc.		
(b) Hospitals		
(c) Other (itemize)		
SCH		
7. **Total**—(Add lines 4, 5, 6a, b, and c)		
8. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540		
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if line 8 is greater than line 7, enter zero)		
10. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 55) ▶		1386

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list		
12. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540		
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 56) ▶		-0-

Taxes

14. Real estate		
15. State and local gasoline		
16. General sales		
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)		
18. Personal property		
19. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify		
20. Other SCH		
21. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 14 through 20. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 57) ▶		940

Interest Expense

22. Home mortgage		
23. Installment purchases		
24. Other (itemize)		
SCH		
25. **Total**—(Add lines 22, 23 and 24. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 58) ▶	2992	

Contributions

26. Cash contributions for which you have receipts, canceled checks, etc.		
27. Other cash contributions. List donees and amounts		
SCH		
28. Other than cash.—See instructions for required statement		
29. **Total**—(Add lines 26, 27 and 28. Maximum deduction may not exceed **20%** of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 59) ▶	150	

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See Instructions

NOTE: If you had more than one loss, omit lines 30 through 34 and follow instructions for guidance.

30. Loss before insurance reimbursement		
31. Insurance reimbursement		
32. Subtract line 31 from line 30. Enter difference (if line 31 is greater than line 30, enter zero)		
33. Enter $100 or amount on line 32, whichever is smaller		
34. **Casualty or theft loss** (line 32 less line 33)		
35. **Alimony paid**		
36. **Child care**—See instructions		
37. **Union dues**		
38. **Employment education expense**—See instructions		
39. **Other**—See instructions (itemize)		
40. **Total**—Add lines 34, 35, 36, 37, 38 and 39. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2, line 60) ▶		

SCHEDULE **C** FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE 1974 YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number [redacted]

A. Principal business activity SERVICE ; product SNACKBAR.
(See Instructions for "Item A.") (For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name WOODLEY BISTRO COFFEE SHOP **C.** Federal employer identification number 95-2651578

D. Business address 16055 VENTURA BLVD - ENCINO CA 91316 (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☐ cash; ☒ accrual; ☐ other

F. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☒ Yes ☐ No

G. Method of inventory valuation ▶ COST

Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs, or valuations between the opening and closing inventories?
☐ YES ☒ NO. If "Yes," attach explanation.

IMPORTANT—All applicable lines and schedules must be filled in.

INCOME

1	Gross receipts or sales $ ____ Less returns and allowances $ ____ Balance ▶	
2	Less: Cost of goods sold (Schedule C-1, line 29) and/or operations (attach schedule)	
3	Gross profit	
4	Other income (attach schedule)	
5	**TOTAL** income (add lines 3 and 4)	

DEDUCTIONS

6	Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-3)	
7	Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-2)	
8	Rent on business property	
9	Repairs (explain in Schedule C-2)	
10	Salaries and wages not included on line 24, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	
11	Insurance	
12	Legal and professional fees	
13	Commissions	
14	Amortization (attach statement)	
15	(a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see Instructions for line 15(a))	
	(b) Employee benefit programs (see Instructions for line 15(b))	
16	Interest on business indebtedness	
17	Bad debts arising from sales or services	
18	Depletion	
19	Other business expenses (specify):	
	(a)	
	(b)	
	(c)	
	(d)	
	(e)	
	(f)	
	(g)	
	(h) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(g))	
20	Total deductions (add lines 6 through 19) SCH	
21	Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or Form 540NR	9934

SCHEDULE C-1. COST OF GOODS SOLD (See Schedule C Instructions for line 2)

22	Inventory at beginning of year (if different from last year's closing inventory, attach explanation)	
23	Purchases $ ____ Less cost of items withdrawn for personal use $ ____ Balance ▶	
24	Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)	
25	Materials and supplies	
26	Other costs (attach schedule)	
27	Total of lines 22 through 26	
28	Less: Inventory at end of year	
29	Cost of goods sold. Enter here and on line 2, above	

SCHEDULE D FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE 1974 YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Social Security Number: [redacted]

PART I—Assets Held One Year or Less

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d. less e.)
1. LOAN TO SUMMIT EAGLE CORPORATION					(1000)
100 CHIEFTAIN DEVEL	11/21/73	6/10/74	653	1382	(729)
100 CHIEFTAIN DEVEL	11/21/73	6/19/74	678	1382	(704)
2. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 18, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)					
3. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries					
4. Net gain or loss, combine lines 1, 2 and 3					(2433)

PART II—Assets Held More Than One Year But Not More Than Five Years

5. 100 TESORO PET	5/22/72	7/16/74	1622	2847	(1225)
100 UNITRODE	5/15/72	9/19/74	358	1532	(1174)
100 RCA	2/22/73	9/23/74	1055	3062	(2007)
6. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 20, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)					
7. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries					
8. Net gain or loss, combine lines 5, 6 and 7					(4406)

PART III—Assets Held More Than Five Years

9. 1973 LOSS CARRYOVER (16063) LESS 1000 –					
10. Enter gain (or loss), if applicable, from line 22, Schedule D-1 (540) (attach copy)					
11. Enter your share of net gain or loss from partnerships and fiduciaries					
12. Net gain or loss, combine lines 9, 10 and 11					

PART IV—Summary of Capital Gains and Losses

13. Enter amount from line 4	(2433)	
14. Enter 65% of the amount on line 8	(2864)	
15. Enter 50% of the amount on line 12		
16. Enter unused capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach computation)	(15063)	
17. Combine the amounts shown on lines 13, 14, 15 and 16		(20360)
18. If line 17 shows a gain, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR		
19. If line 17 shows a loss, enter here and on page 2, Part II of Form 540 or 540NR the smallest of: (a) amount on lines 17; (b) the taxable income for the taxable year (computed without regard to gains or losses from sale or exchange of capital assets; or (c) $1,000 ($500 in the case of a husband or wife filing a separate return)		(1000)

NAME Samuel & Phyllis Ruby CALENDAR YEAR 19 74.

ADDRESS [redacted] SOC. SEC. NO.

DEDUCTION SCHEDULE

MEDICAL	STATE	FEDERAL
2 MEDICINE/DRUGS		
3 LESS 1% A.G.I. (Line 18 - 1040)		
4 NET MED/DRUGS		
5 H & A INS. (½ + EXCESS)		504
6a DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		930
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
DR.		
6b HOSPITAL		
PROSTHETIC APPLIANCES		
HEARING AID		
6c AMBULANCE		
LABORATORIES		
TRAVEL FOR MED. 1000		70
MEDICARE INS.		
GLASSES		
7 MEDICAL EXPENSES		1504
LESS REIMBURSED BY INS.		
8 LESS 3% ADJ. GROSS INC.		268
9		1236
+:½ (TO $150) OF H & A INS.		150
10 TOTAL MEDICAL DED. ▶	1386	1386
TAXES		
11 STATE & LOCAL INCOME		122
12 REAL ESTATE		727
13 STATE & LOCAL GASOLINE		48
14 GENERAL SALES TAX		141
15a PERSONAL PROPERTY		
15b PERSONAL PROPERTY AUTO		24
16 STATE DIS. INS. H W		
SALES TAX AUTO		
17 TOTAL TAXES ▶	940	1062
NTEREST (TO WHOM PAID)		
18 MORTGAGE		2543
19 INSTALLMENT LOANS		
MERRILL LYNCH		263
TRANS[illegible]		170
SBA		16
20 TOTAL INTEREST ▶	2992	2992

CONTRIBUTIONS	STATE	FEDERAL
21 PARTNERSHIP SHARE		
GIRL/BOY SCOUTS		
HEART FUND/CANCER FUND		
RED CROSS/UNITED FUND		
XMAS & EASTER SEALS	150	
MISC. ORGANIZED CHARITIES		
POLITICAL CONTRIBUTIONS		
CHURCHES		
22 OTHER THAN CASH		
23 CARRY OVER FROM PRIOR YRS.		
24 TOTAL CONTRIBUTIONS ▶	150	150
CASUALTY OR THEFT LOSS(ES)		
25 LOSS BEFORE ADJUSTMENT		
26 INSURANCE REIMBURSEMENT		
27 Difference (not less than zero)		
28 ($100 LIMITATION PER CAS.)		
29 TOT. CAS. OR THEFT LOSS ▶		
MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS		
30 ALIMONY		
31 UNION/PROFESSIONAL DUES		
32 CHILD & DEP. CARE (Form 2441)		
33 INCOME TAX PREPARATION		
UNIFORMS/PROTEC. CLOTHING		
SMALL TOOLS AND SUPPLIES		
LAUNDRY AND CLEANING		
Auto Use ______ Mi		
INVEST. COUNSEL & PUBS. (Sched		
EMPLOYMENT AGENCY FEES		
SAFE DEPOSIT BOX		
TEL. REQ. IN BUSINESS		
34 TOTAL MISC. DED. ▶		

SUMMARY OF ITEMIZED DED.	STATE	FEDERAL
35 TOT. DEDUCTIBLE MEDICAL & DENTAL EXPENSES (FROM LINE 10)		
36 TOTAL TAXES (From LINE 17)		
37 TOTAL INTEREST (Line 20)		
38 TOTAL CONTR. (Line 24)		
39 CAS. & THEFT LOSS(ES) (Line 29)		
40 TOTAL MISCELLANEOUS DEDUCTIONS (FROM LINE 34)		
41 TOTAL ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS ENTER ON FORM 1040 LINE 45 ▶	5468	5590

REMARKS

NAME SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY I.D. NO. OR SOC. SEC. NO.

CALENDAR YEAR 1974

ADDRESS [redacted]

FISCAL YEAR ENDING

19

SCHEDULE OF PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

PRINCIPAL BUSINESS ACTIVITY

BUSINESS NAME

EMPLOYERS NO.

BUSINESS ADDRESS

TOTAL RECEIPTS		68084
INVENTORY AT BEGINNING OF YEAR	-0-	
MERCHANDISE PURCHASED	36079	
LABOR		
TOTAL	36079	
INVENTORY AT END OF YEAR	800	35279
GROSS PROFIT		32805
GROSS INCOME		32805
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
ADVERTISING	337	
AUTO AND TRUCK EXPENSE 12000 MI AT 15¢	1800	
BAD DEBTS		
CASH SHORT		
COMMISSIONS		
DELIVERY		
DEPRECIATION (SCHEDULE ATTACHED)	1339	
DUES AND SUBSCRIPTIONS	16	
ENTERTAINMENT AND PROMOTIONAL		
INSURANCE	215	
INTEREST	1844	
JANITOR SERVICE		
LAUNDRY	241	
LEGAL AND ACCOUNTING	270	
MAINTENANCE		
OFFICE SUPPLIES AND EXPENSE	47	
RENT	7841	
REPAIRS	991	
SALARIES AND WAGES	5912	
SALARIES OFFICERS		
SUPPLIES		
TAXES AND LICENSES	1063	
TAXES - PAYROLL	588	
TELEPHONE	322	
TRAVEL		
UTILITIES		
PARKING	45	
		22871
NET PROFIT OR (LOSS) - FEDERAL RETURN		9934
NET PROFIT OR LOSS) - STATE RETURN (SEE DEPREC. SCHEDULE FOR DIFF.)	(#) 7534 (W) 2400	

SCHEDULE

FORM 104

NAME SAM & PHYLLIS RUBY
ADDRESS
[redacted]

I.D. NO.
OR
SOC. SEC. NO.

CALENDAR YEAR 19
FISCAL YEAR ENDING 19

SCHEDULE OF DEPRECIATION / AMORTIZATION

KIND OF PROPERTY	DATE ACQUIRED MO YR	COST OR OTHER BASIS	SPEC 20% DEP		DEPRECIABLE BASIS	DEP ALLOWED PRIOR YEARS	REMAINING COST	METHOD	RATE (%) OR LIFE (YRS)	DEPRECIATION FOR THIS YEAR
EQUIPMENT	2/1/74	10228			10228	—0—	10228	S.L.	7YR	1339
GOODWILL	4/1/74	35000			—0—					
TOTALS										1339

PROFESSIONAL STATIONERS INC. LOS ANGELES, CALIF. FORM NO 102A

SCHEDULE

RESIDENT
540

INDIVIDUAL
CALIFORNIA
INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR
1972

For year 1972, or other taxable year beginning , 1972, ending , 1973

FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S) PRIVATE	LAST NAME RUBY	Your social security number [redacted]
(number and street, including apartment number, or rural route) 16230 [illegible] Street		Wife's number, if joint return [redacted]
City, town or post office, State [illegible] Hills, California	ZIP CODE	OCCUPATION: Yours Self Emplo Wife's Housewife

☐ Married, filing joint return
☐ Married, filing separate return—Enter spouse's social security number and first name here

☐ Head of Household—Complete Part 1, page 2

5. Dependents—Do not list yourself, your spouse or person who qualifies you as head of household
NAME (Include last name and/or address if different from yours) RELATIONSHIP
Fred, Brian, Elisa, Thomas
Enter Number ▷ 5 4

6. Blind (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions claimed ▷ 6

7. Total dependent and blind exemptions (add lines 5 and 6) 7 4

8. Wages, salaries, tips, and other employee compensation. (Attach Copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to front. If unavailable, attach explanation)	8	70[illegible]
9. Dividends. Enter total (if over $500, complete and attach Schedule B(540))	9	[illegible]
10. Interest. Enter total (if over $500, complete and attach Schedule (B(540))	10	
11. Income other than wages, dividends and interest (from page 2, line 41)	11	5,9[illegible]
12. Total (add lines 8, 9, 10 and 11)	12	6,0[illegible]
13. Adjustments to income (from page 2, line 47)	13	
14. Adjusted gross income (subtract line 13 from line 12)	14	6,051
If you do not itemize deductions and line 14 is under $10,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 17. If you itemize deductions or line 14 is $10,000 or more complete lines 15 and 16.		2,000
15. Itemized deductions OR standard deduction (from page 2, line 56)	15	
16. Taxable income (subtract line 15 from line 14). Figure your tax on this amount by using the appropriate Tax Rate Schedule in instructions. Enter tax on line 17	16	4,051
17. Tax (check if from): ☐ Tax Table, ☒ Tax Rate Schedule (.) ☐ Schedule G(540)	17	
18. Personal Exemption. Single—$25. Married couple or head of household—$50	18	50 00
19. Other Exemptions—Total on line 7 above, 4 × $8	19	32 00
20. Total exemptions (add lines 18 and 19)	20	82
21. Tax liability (subtract line 20 from line 17)	21	-0-
22. Other credits (from page 2, line 59)	22	
23. Net tax liability (subtract line 22 from line 21)	23	-0-
24. Tax on preference income (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540))	24	
25. Total tax liability (add lines 23 and 24)	25	-0-
26. Total California income tax withheld (attach Form(s) W-2 or DE-2P to front)	26	
27. 1972 California estimated tax payments	27	
28. Excess California SDI tax withheld (attach Form DE 1964 to face of return)	28	0
29. Total payments (add lines 26, 27 and 28)	29	
30. If line 25 is larger than line 29, enter BALANCE DUE. Pay in full. Mail payment with return to Franchise Tax Board, Sacramento, CA 95867.	30	-0-
31. If line 29 is larger than line 25, enter OVERPAYMENT. Mail return to P.O. Box 13-540, Sacramento, CA 95813.	31	
32. Line 31 to be (a) REFUNDED. (Allow at least six weeks for your refund) ▷		
(b) Credited on 1973 estimated tax ▷		

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign ▷ Your signature—If filing jointly, BOTH must sign Date

▷ EDWARD L. LAMBERT
TAX CONSULTANT
17835 VENTURA BLVD., [illegible]
Signature of preparer other than taxpayer

Do not write in these spaces
P
E

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
19 72
YEAR

Name(s) as shown on Form 540
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number
[redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

[illegible] choice between two deduction [illegible] or take a standard deduction on [illegible] returns of a husband and wife,

If one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may not use the Tax Table or claim the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete the appropriate items below.

Medical and Dental Expense (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. [illegible]	1	[illegible]
2. Medicine and drugs	2	
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	3	
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	4	
5. [illegible]	5	
6. Other medical and dental expenses	6	
7. [illegible] 5, 6 [illegible]	7	
8. [illegible]	8	
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	9	
10. [illegible] lines 1 and 9. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	10	150.00

Child Care [illegible]

11. [illegible] paid [illegible]	11	
12. [illegible] of adjusted gross income [illegible]	12	
13. Subtract [illegible] for maximum limitation. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	13	

Taxes

14. Real estate	14	
15. State and local gasoline	15	
16. General sales	16	
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)	17	
18. Personal property	18	
19. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify	19	
20. Other	20	
21. Total taxes—(Add lines 14 through 20. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	21	841.00

Contributions

22. Cash—Including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)	22	
23. Total cash contributions	23	
24. Other than cash (see instructions). Enter total here	24	
25. Total—(Add lines 23 and 24. Maximum deduction may not exceed 20% of adjusted gross income. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	25	200.00

Interest Expense

26. Home mortgage	26	
27. Installment purchases	27	
28. Other (itemize)	28	
29. Total—(Add lines 26, 27 and 28. Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	29	3,232.00

Miscellaneous Deductions

Casualty or Theft Loss(es)—See instructions
NOTE: If you had more than one casualty or theft loss occurrence, omit lines 30 through 33 and follow instructions for guidance.

30. Loss before adjustments	30	
31. Insurance reimbursement	31	
32. $100 limitation	32	$100.00
33. Add lines 31 and 32	33	
34. Casualty or theft loss. (Line 30 less line 33)	34	
35. Child Care—See instructions	35	
36. Other—For education, alimony, union dues, etc. —See instructions	36	
37. Total miscellaneous deductions—Add lines 34, 35 and 36. (Enter here and on Form 540, page 2) ▷	37	

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE 19 72 YEAR

[illegible] your Income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565.

[illegible] Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted]

[illegible] Food Service ; product ....

(For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name Snack Bar C. Federal employer identification number..........

D. Business address 5418 Van Nuys Blvd. Van Nuys, California (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other.

F. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599 for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

G. Is this business located within the boundaries of the city, town, etc. indicated? ☒ Yes ☐ No

H. Did you own this business at the end of the taxable year? ☒ Yes ☐ No

I. How many months of the taxable year did you own this business? 12

[illegible] applicable lines and schedules must be filled in.

1 [illegible] receipts or sales $ ________ Less returns and allowances $ ________ Balance ▷	~~SCHEDULE~~
2 [illegible] Cost of goods sold (Schedule C-1, line 8) and/or operations (attach schedule)	~~ATTACHED~~
3 Gross profit [illegible]	
4 [illegible]	
5 [illegible] (add lines 3 and 4)	
6 [illegible] (explain in Schedule C-2)	
7 [illegible] business or [illegible] property (explain in Schedule C-3)	
8 [illegible] business property	
9 [illegible] (explain in Schedule C-3)	
10 [illegible] and wages not included on line 3, Schedule C-1 (exclude any paid to yourself)	
11 Insurance	
12 Legal and professional fees	
13 [illegible]	
14 Amortization (attach statement)	
15 (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see instructions for line 15(a))	
(b) Employee benefit programs (see instructions for line 15(b))	
16 [illegible] on business [illegible]	
17 Bad debts arising from sales or services	
18 Depletion	
19 Other business expenses (specify):	
(a)	
(b)	
(c)	
(d)	
(e)	
(f)	
(g)	
(h)	
(i)	
(j)	
(k)	
(l)	
(m)	
(n)	
(o)	
(p) Total other business expenses (add lines 19(a) through 19(o))	
20 Total deductions (add lines 6 through 19)	
21 Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 20 from line 5). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or Form 540NR	6,969 40

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1971
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number
[redacted]

SHORT-TERM—ASSETS HELD NOT MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d less e)
1.					
SCHEDULE ATTACHED					(1,248.00)

2. Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3. Enter net gain (or loss), combine lines 1 and 2	
4. Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
5. Net short-term gain (or loss), combine lines 3 and 4	

LONG-TERM—ASSETS HELD MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

6.					

7. Enter gain if applicable from line 4, Schedule D-1 (Form 540) (attach copy)	
8. Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
9. Net gain (or loss), combine lines 6 through 8	(14,274.00)
10. Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
11. Net long-term gain (or loss), combine lines 9 and 10	
12. Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 11, and enter the net gain (or loss) here	(15,522.00)
13. If line 12 shows a gain—	
(a) Enter 50% of line 11 or 50% of line 12, whichever is smaller. Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 11	
(b) Subtract line 13(a) from line 12. Enter here and on line 32, Form 540 (line 33, Form 540NR)	
14. If line 12 shows a loss—	
(a) Add lines 4 and 10 (if lines 4 and 10 are blank, enter a zero here and on lines 14(b) and 14(c) and go to line 14(d))	
(b) Combine lines 3 and 9—if gain, enter gain; if loss, enter zero	
(c) Enter smallest of (i) line 14(a) less line 14(b); (ii) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and or losses—determine this figure via a side computation; or (iii) $1,000	
(d) Combine lines 3 and 9—if loss, enter loss; if gain, enter zero here and on line 14(e) and go to line 14(f)	
(e) Enter smallest of (i) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and or losses, less line 14(c)—determine this figure via a side computation; (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately); (iii) if line 3 is zero or shows a gain, 50% of line 14(d); (iv) if line 9 is zero or shows a gain, amount on line 14(d); or (v) if lines 3 and 9 show losses, line 3 added to 50% of line 9	
(f) Enter here, and on line 32, Form 540 (line 33, Form 540NR), the sum of lines 14(c) and 14(e)—**(Do not enter an amount greater than $1,000)**	(1,000.00)

Carryover (1-1) ($14,522.00)

See Instructions on Back

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS

Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE
19 71
YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number
[redacted]

Itemized vs. Standard Deduction—You have a choice between two deduction methods. You can either itemize your deductions or take a standard deduction as explained in the 540 Instructions. On separate returns of a husband and wife, if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may not use the Tax Table or the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete appropriate items below.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care	1	
2. Medicine and drugs	2	
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	3	
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	4	
5. Enter balance of insurance premiums for medical care not entered on line 1	5	
6. Other medical and dental expenses (attach itemized list)	6	
7. Total—(Add lines 4, 5 and 6)	7	
8. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	8	
9. Subtract line 8 from line 7. Enter difference (if less than zero, enter zero)	9	
10. Total—(Add lines 1 and 9) ▶	10	150 00

Child Adoption Expense

11. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list	11	
12. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	12	
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11—See instructions for maximum limitations ▶	13	

Taxes

14. Real estate	14	
15. State and local gasoline	15	
16. General sales	16	
17. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)	17	
18. Personal property	18	
19. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify	19	
20. Other (specify)	20	
21. Total taxes—(Add lines 14 through 20) ▶	21	743 31

Contributions

22. Cash—Including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)	22	
23. Total cash contributions	23	
24. Other than cash (see instructions). Enter total here	24	
25. Total—Add lines 23 and 24—Maximum deduction may not exceed 20% of adjusted gross income ▶	25	

Interest Expense

26. Home mortgage	26	
27. Installment purchases	27	
28. Other (itemize)	28	
29. Total—(Add lines 26, 27 and 28) ▶	29	2,617 68

Miscellaneous Deductions

30. For child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc.—See instructions (itemize)	30	
31. Total miscellaneous deductions ▶	31	500 00
32. Total deductions—(Add lines 10, 13, 21, 25, 29 and 31). Enter total here and on Form 540, page 2, in space provided	32	4,010 99

Schedule B on reverse

SCHEDULE
C
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE
19 71
YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted]

A. Principal business activity Food Service ; product
(For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name Snack Bar

C. Federal employer identification number

D. Business location 5418 Van Nuys Blvd. Van Nuys, California 91401
(Number and street or rural route) (City—post office) (State (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other (describe)

F. Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? ☐ Yes ☒ No. If "yes," attach explanation.

G. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

1. Gross receipts or gross sales $ Less: Returns and allowances $		$
2. Inventory at beginning of year (If different than last year's closing inventory attach explanation)		SCHEDULE ATTACHED
3. Merchandise purchased $, less cost of any items withdrawn from business for personal use $		
4. Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5. Material and supplies		
6. Other costs (explain in Schedule C-1)		
7. Total of lines 2 through 6		
8. Inventory at end of this year		
9. **Cost of goods sold and/or operations** (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10. **Gross profit** (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
11. Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-2)		
12. Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-1)		
13. Rent on business property		
14. Repairs (explain in Schedule C-1)		
15. Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
16. Insurance		
17. Legal and professional fees		
18. Commissions		
19. Amortization (attach statement)		
20. (a) Pension and profit-sharing plans (see instructions) (b) Employee benefit programs (see instructions)		
21. Interest on business indebtedness		
22. Bad debts arising from sales or services		
23. Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells, timber, etc. (attach schedule)		
24. Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-1)		
25. Total of lines 11 through 24		
26. **Net profit (or loss)** (subtract line 25 from line 10). Enter here and on page 2, Form 540 or 540NR		$ 7,350 33

SCHEDULE C-1. EXPLANATION OF LINES 6, 12, 14, AND 24

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

30- 1971

SCHEDULE
D
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

CAPITAL GAINS AND LOSSES

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

TAXABLE
1971
YEAR

Use this schedule to report gains and losses on stocks, bonds and similar investments, and gains (but not losses) on personal assets such as a home or jewelry.

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR
Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted]

SHORT-TERM—ASSETS HELD NOT MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

a. Kind of property and description (Example, 100 shares of "Z" Co.)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Cost or other basis, as adjusted, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	f. Gain or loss (d less e)
1.					
SCHEDULE ATTACHED					(1,248.00)

2. Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3. Enter net gain (or loss), combine lines 1 and 2	
4. Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
5. Net short-term gain (or loss), combine lines 3 and 4	

LONG-TERM—ASSETS HELD MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

6.					

7. Enter gain if applicable from line 4, Schedule D-1 (Form 540) (attach copy)	
8. Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
9. Net gain (or loss), combine lines 6 through 8	
10. Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	(14,274.00)
11. Net long-term gain (or loss), combine lines 9 and 10	
12. Combine the amounts shown on lines 5 and 11, and enter the net gain (or loss) here	(15,522.00)
13. If line 12 shows a gain—	
(a) Enter 50% of line 11 or 50% of line 12, whichever is smaller. Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 11	
(b) Subtract line 13(a) from line 12. Enter here and on line 32, Form 540 (line 33, Form 540NR)	
14. If line 12 shows a loss—	
(a) Add lines 4 and 10 (if lines 4 and 10 are blank, enter a zero here and on lines 14(b) and 14(c) and go to line 14(d))	
(b) Combine lines 3 and 9—if gain, enter gain; if loss, enter zero	
(c) Enter smallest of (i) line 14(a) less line 14(b); (ii) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and or losses—determine this figure via a side computation; or (iii) $1,000	
(d) Combine lines 3 and 9—if loss, enter loss; if gain, enter zero here and on line 14(e) and go to line 14(f)	
(e) Enter smallest of (i) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and or losses, less line 14(c)—determine this figure via a side computation; (ii) $1,000 ($500 if married and filing separately); (iii) if line 3 is zero or shows a gain, 50% of line 14(d); (iv) if line 9 is zero or shows a gain, amount on line 14(d); or (v) if lines 3 and 9 show losses, line 3 added to 50% of line 9	
(f) Enter here, and on line 32, Form 540 (line 33, Form 540NR), the sum of lines 14(c) and 14(e)—**(Do not enter an amount greater than $1,000)**	(1,000.00)

Carryover (1-1) ($14,522.00)

See Instructions on Back

RESIDENT **540**

INDIVIDUAL CALIFORNIA INCOME TAX

TAXABLE YEAR **1973**

or the year January 1–December 31, 1973, or other taxable year beginning ...., 1973, ending ...., 19....

FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S): SAMUEL & PHYLLIS
LAST NAME: RUBY
Your Social Security Number: [redacted]
Spouse's Social Security Number: [redacted]
PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, including apartment number, or rural route): 16250 BIRCHER ST
CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE, STATE AND ZIP CODE: GRANADA HILLS CALIF
OCCUPATION Yours: S/E
OCCUPATION Spouse's: H/W.

Filing Status - Check Only One

1. ☐ Single
2. ☒ Married filing joint return
3. ☐ Married filing separate return—Enter spouse's full name ....
4. ☐ Head of Household—Enter name of qualifying individual ....
5. ☐ Widow(er) with dependent child. Enter year spouse died 19........

Exemption Credits

6. Personal Exemption: If line 1 or 3 checked, enter $25; If line 2, 4 or 5 checked, enter $50	6	50
7. Dependents - Do not list person who qualifies you as head of household. Name (include last name and/or address if different from yours) Relationship: THOMAS – FRED ELISA Total Number ► 3 X $8	7	24
8. Blind (refer to instructions) Number of blind exemptions ► ...... X $8	8	
9. Total exemption credits (add lines 6, 7 and 8) Enter here and on line 20 below	9	74

Income

10. Wages, salaries, tips and other employee compensation (Attach copy 2 of Form(s) W-2 to front, if unavailable, attach explanation)	10	
11. Dividends—before federal exclusion. Capital gain dividends must be included at 100%	11	92
12. Interest. (See instructions for taxability of federal, state and municipal bonds)	12	345
13. Income other than wages, dividends and interest (from line 50)	13	16196
14. Total (add lines 10, 11, 12 and 13)	14	16633
15. Adjustments to income (from line 56)	15	
16. Adjusted gross income (subtract line 15 from line 14)	16	16633

- If you do NOT itemize deductions AND line 16 is under 10,000, find tax in Tax Table and enter on line 19.
- If you itemize deductions OR line 16 is $10,000 or more, complete lines 17 and 18.

17. Deductions: Itemized (from line 63) OR Standard ($1,000 if line 1 or 3 checked—$2,000 if line 2, 4 or 5 checked)	17	5162
18. Taxable income (subtract line 17 from line 16) Compute tax from Tax Rate Schedule—Enter tax on line 19	18	11471

Your Tax and Credits

19. Tax—If an averaging method is used, check appropriate box ☐ Schedule G, or ☐ Schedule G-1	19	249
20. Total exemption credits (from line 9, above)	20	74
21. Tax liability (subtract line 20 from line 19—if line 20 is greater than line 19, enter zero)	21	175
22. Other credits (from line 66)	22	
23. Net tax (subtract line 22 from line 21—if line 22 is greater than line 21, enter zero)	23	175
24. Special tax credit—from line 75 (see Instructions, page 2, for allowable credit)	24	53
25. Net Tax liability (subtract line 24 from line 23—if line 24 is greater than line 23, enter zero)	25	122
26. Tax on preference income (see instructions—attach Schedule P(540))	26	
27. Total tax liability (add lines 25 and 26)	27	122

Your Pre-payment Credits

28. Renter's credit—if you lived in rented property on March 1, 1973, complete Part I on page 2	28	
29. Total California income tax withheld (attach Form(s) W-2 or W-2P to face of return).	29	
30. 1973 California estimated tax payments (include amount allowable as a credit from 1972 return)	30	
31. Excess California SDI tax withheld (attach Form DE 1964 to face of return)	31	
32. Total prepayment credits (add lines 28 through 31)	32	-0-

Balance Due or Refund

33. If line 27 is equal to or larger than line 32, enter amount of BALANCE DUE. Pay in full and mail with return to: Franchise Tax Board, Sacramento, CA 95867	33	122
34. If line 32 is larger than line 27, enter amount OVERPAID. Mail return to: Franchise Tax Board, P.O. Box 13-540, Sacramento, CA 95813	34	
35. Amount of line 34 to be REFUNDED. (allow at least six weeks for your refund)	35	
36. Amount of line 34 to be credited on your 1974 estimated tax	36	

Do not write in these spaces
P
E
M
A

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN ► Your signature .... Date
HERE ► Wife's signature (if filing a joint return) .... Date

► Preparer's signature (other than taxpayer) .... Date
Address (and Zip code) .... Preparer's Employer — Identification (or SSA) Number [redacted]

◄ ATTACH COPY 2 OF FORM W-2 HERE ►

ATTACH HERE ►

◄ Write social security number on check or money order. Attach form 540 here

SCHEDULE
D-1
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

SUPPLEMENTAL SCHEDULE OF GAINS AND LOSSES

(Sales or Exchanges Including Involuntary Conversions)
(Attach to Form 540, 540NR, 541 or 565)

TAXABLE 19 73 YEAR

Name as shown on Tax Return: SAMUEL & PHYLLIS RUBY

Identifying number as shown on return: [redacted]

PART I **Gain From Disposition of Property Under Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, 18220**

Lines 9 and 10 should be omitted if there are no dispositions of farm property or farm land; or, if this form is filed by a partnership.

1. Description of Sections 18211, 18212-18, 18219, and 18220 property.	Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	Date sold (mo., day, yr.)
(A) SNACK BAR	4/70	8/13/73
(B)		
(C)		
(D)		

Correlate lines 1(A) through 1(D) with these columns →	Property (A)	Property (B)	Property (C)	Property (D)
2. Gross sales price	28000-			
3. Cost or other basis and expense of sale	28138-			
4. Depreciation allowed (or allowable)	12386-			
5. Adjusted basis, line 3 less line 4	15752-			
6. Total gain, subtract line 5 from line 2	12248.			
7. If Section 18211 property:				
(a) Depreciation allowed (or allowable) after applicable date. (See Instruction D-3)	12386.			
(b) Line 6 or line 7(a), whichever is smaller	12248.			
8. If Section 18212-18 property:				
(a) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-63 and before 1-1-71				
(b) Enter additional depreciation after 12-31-70				
(c) Enter line 6 or line 8(b), whichever is smaller				
(d) Line 8(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(e) Enter excess, if any, of line 6 over line 8(b)				
(f) Enter line 8(a) or line 8(e), whichever is smaller				
(g) Line 8(f) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-4)				
(h) Add line 8(d) and line 8(g)				
9. If Section 18220 property:				
(a) If farm land, enter soil and water conservation expenses for current year and four preceding years				
(b) If farm property, other than land, subtract line 7(b) from line 6; OR, if farm land, enter line 6 or line 9(a), whichever is smaller (see Instruction D-5)				
(c) Excess deductions account (see Instruction D-5)				
(d) Enter line 9(b) or line 9(c), whichever is smaller				
10. If Section 18219 property:				
(a) Soil and water conservation expenses made after 12-31-69				
(b) Enter amount from line 9(d), if any; otherwise, enter a zero				
(c) Enter excess, if any, of line 10(a) over 10(b)				
(d) Line 10(c) times applicable percentage (Instruction D-5)				
(e) Line 6 less line 10(b)				
(f) Enter smaller of line 10(d) or line 10(e)				
SUMMARY OF PART I (Complete Property Columns (A) through (D) up to Line 10(f) before going to Line 11)				
11. Enter amounts from line 6	12248			
12. Enter amounts from lines 7(b), 8(h), 9(d) and 10(f)	12248			
13. Subtract line 12 from line 11, enter here and in appropriate Section in Part II (see Instruction D-2)	—0—			

14. Total of Property Columns (A) through (D), line 12. Enter here and on line 24, Part III 12248-

FORM **540** RESIDENT

CALIFORNIA
INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN

TAXABLE **1970** YEAR

For Calendar Year 1970 or Fiscal Year Begun 1970 and Ended 1971

Please Type or Print

FIRST NAME(S) AND INITIAL(S): SAMUEL AND PHYLLIS

LAST NAME: RUBY

Your social security number: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

PRESENT HOME ADDRESS (Number and street, or rural route): 16250 Bircher

COUNTY: Los Angeles

Spouse's social security number: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

CITY, TOWN OR POST OFFICE: Granada Hills

STATE: California

ZIP CODE: 91344

Your occupation: Self-Employed

NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER AT TIME OF FILING: Self-Employed

Spouse's occupation: Housewife

NAME AND ADDRESS ON 1969 CALIFORNIA RETURN. IF SAME AS ABOVE, WRITE "SAME". IF NONE FILED, GIVE REASON.
11346 Montgomery Avenue Granada Hills, Calif.

Adjusted gross income on 1970 Federal Return $ 8,284.97
If different from line 11, below, explain in Part VII, page 2.

S
C
M
B
P
A

Filing Status (check one)
1. ☐ Single
2. ☒ Married, filing joint return
3. ☐ Married, filing separate return—spouse's name:
4. ☐ Unmarried "head of household"—Complete Part I, page 2

Income
If joint return, include all income of both husband and wife

5. Wages, salaries, tips, etc. (before payroll deductions) if more than two employers, attach schedule Employer's name / Where employed (city and state)	5		
6. Dividends. Enter total here (also list in Schedule B (540), Part I, if total is over $100)	6	20	60
7. Interest. Enter total here (also list in Schedule B (540), Part II, if total is over $100)	7		
8. Other income (from page 2, line 30)	8	8,284	97
9. Total (add lines 5, 6, 7 and 8)	9	8,305	57
10. Adjustments to income (from page 2, line 35)	10		
11. Adjusted gross income (subtract line 10 from line 9)	11	8,305	57

ATTACH REMITTANCE HERE

- If you do not itemize deductions AND line 11 is under $10,000, find your tax in Tax Table in instructions. Enter tax on line 12.
- If you itemize deductions OR line 11 is $10,000 or more, go to Part IV on page 2 to figure tax.

Your Tax, and Credits

12. Tax from (check one): Tax Table ☐, Tax Computation (page 2, Part IV) ☒, or Schedule G (540) ☐	12	51	00
13. Exemption credits (from page 2, line 43)	13	82	00
14. Tax liability (subtract line 13 from line 12)	14	None	
15. Total other credits (from page 2, line 49)	15		
16. Net tax liability (subtract line 15 from line 14—if $1.00 or less, enter "zero")	16	None	

Balance Due or Refund

17. 1970 California estimated tax payment or credit from 1969 (if any). If none, enter "zero"	17		
18. Balance due—if any (subtract line 17 from line 16) PAY IN FULL WITH RETURN	18	None	
19. Overpayment—if any (subtract line 16 from line 17) OVERPAYMENT	19		
20. Portion of line 19 you wish to apply on 1971 estimated tax	20		
21. Refund—if any (subtract line 20 from line 19) REFUND	21		

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Do not write in these spaces
T
P
I
T

Sign here
Your signature—if filing jointly, BOTH must sign Date
Spouse's signature Date

Signature of preparer other than taxpayer
Address Date
LAMBERT-MARKELL
16633 VENTURA BLVD.
ENCINO, CALIF. 91316

● **Make Remittance Payable to FRANCHISE TAX BOARD—Mail to FRANCHISE TAX BOARD, SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA 95814.**

SCHEDULE
A
FORM 540

CALIFORNIA
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS
Attach to Form 540

TAXABLE 19 70 YEAR

Name as shown on Form 540 Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Itemized vs. Standard Deduction--You have a choice between two deduction methods. You can either itemize your deductions or take a standard deduction as explained in the 540 Instructions. On separate returns of a husband and wife, if one spouse itemizes deductions, the other may not use the Tax Table or claim the standard deduction. If you choose to itemize your deductions, complete the appropriate items below.

Medical and dental expenses (not compensated by insurance or otherwise) for medicine and drugs, doctors, dentists, nurses, hospital care, insurance premiums for medical care, etc.

1. One half (but not more than $150) of insurance premiums for medical care			1		
2. Medicine and drugs	2				
3. Enter 1% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	3				
4. Subtract line 3 from line 2 (if less than zero, enter zero)	4				
5. Other medical and dental expenses. Include balance of insurance premiums for medical care not deducted on line 1 (attach schedule)	5				
6. **Total**—(Add lines 4 and 5)	6				
7. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	7				
8. Subtract line 7 from line 6 (if less than zero, enter zero)			8		
9. **Total**—(Add lines 1 and 8) ▶			9	150	00

Child Adoption Expense

10. Total expenses paid or incurred—Attach itemized list	10		
11. Enter 3% of adjusted gross income shown on Form 540	11		
12. Subtract line 11 from line 10—See instructions for maximum limitations ▶	12		

Taxes

13. Real estate	13		
14. State and local gasoline	14		
15. General sales	15		
16. Auto license—Excess of registration and weight fees (see instructions)	16		
17. Personal property	17		
18. State disability insurance (SDI)—Employer private disability plans do not qualify	18		
19. Other (specify)	19		
20. **Total taxes**—(Add lines 13 through 19) ▶	20	663	26

Contributions

21. Cash—Including checks, money orders, etc. (itemize)	21		
22. Total cash contributions	22		
23. Other than cash (see instructions). Enter total here	23		
24. **Total**—Add lines 22 and 23—Maximum deduction may not exceed 20% of adjusted gross income ▶	24	280	00

Interest Expense

25. Home mortgage	25		
26. Installment purchases	26		
27. Other (itemize)	27		
28. **Total**—(Add lines 25, 26 and 27) ▶	28	1,552	18

Miscellaneous Deductions

29. For child care, alimony, union dues, casualty losses, etc.—See instructions (itemize)	29		
30. **Total** miscellaneous deductions ▶	30	100	00
31. **Total deductions**- (Add lines 9, 12, 20, 24, 28 and 30). Enter total here and on Form 540, page 2, in space provided S/A	31	2,745	44

Schedule B on reverse

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

SCHEDULE C FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

PROFIT (OR LOSS) FROM BUSINESS OR PROFESSION

(Sole Proprietorships)

TAXABLE 19 70 YEAR

Attach this schedule to your income tax return, Form 540 or 540NR — **Partnerships, joint ventures, etc., must file on Form 565**

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

A. Principal business activity Food ; product
(For example: retail—hardware; wholesale—tobacco; services—legal; manufacturing—furniture; etc.)

B. Business name Snack Bar

C. Federal employer identification number 95-2651578

D. Business location 5418 Van Nuys Boulevard (Number and street or rural route) Van Nuys, (City—post office) California (State) 91401 (ZIP code)

E. Indicate method of accounting: ☒ cash; ☐ accrual; ☐ other (describe)

F. Was there any substantial change in the manner of determining quantities, costs or valuations between the opening and closing inventories? ☐ Yes ☒ No. If "yes," attach explanation.

G. Were Forms 591, 592, 596 and 599, for the calendar year filed (if required)? ☐ Yes ☒ No

1. Gross receipts or gross sales $ Less: Returns and allowances $		$
2. Inventory at beginning of year (If different than last year's closing inventory attach explanation)		
3. Merchandise purchased $, less cost of any items withdrawn from business for personal use $		
4. Cost of labor (do not include salary paid to yourself)		
5. Material and supplies		
6. Other costs (explain in Schedule C-1)		
7. Total of lines 2 through 6		SCHEDULE ATTACHED
8. Inventory at end of this year		
9. Cost of goods sold and/or operations (subtract line 8 from line 7)		
10. Gross profit (subtract line 9 from line 1)		
OTHER BUSINESS DEDUCTIONS		
11. Depreciation (explain in Schedule C-2)		
12. Taxes on business and business property (explain in Schedule C-1)		
13. Rent on business property		
14. Repairs (explain in Schedule C-1)		
15. Salaries and wages not included on line 4 (exclude any paid to yourself)		
16. Insurance		
17. Legal and professional fees		
18. Commissions		
19. Amortization (attach statement)		
20. Retirement plans, etc. (other than your share)		
21. Interest on business indebtedness		
22. Bad debts arising from sales or service		
23. Losses of business property (attach statement)		
24. Depletion of mines, oil and gas wells, timber, etc. (attach schedule)		
25. Other business expenses (explain in Schedule C-1)		
26. Total of lines 11 through 25		
27. Net profit (or loss) (subtract line 26 from line 10). Enter here and on page 2, Part II, Form 540 or 540NR		$ 9,284 97

SCHEDULE C-1. EXPLANATION OF LINES 6, 12, 14, AND 25

Line No.	Explanation	Amount	Line No.	Explanation	Amount
		$			$

SCHEDULE D FORM 540

CALIFORNIA

TAXABLE 1970 YEAR

SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY

Attach to Form 540 or 540NR

Name as shown on Form 540 or 540NR: Samuel and Phyllis Ruby

Social Security Number: [redacted] [redacted] [redacted]

Part I—CAPITAL ASSETS

SHORT-TERM—ASSETS HELD NOT MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

a. Kind of property (If necessary, attach statement of descriptive details not shown below)	b. Date acquired (mo., day, yr.)	c. Date sold (mo., day, yr.)	d. Gross sales price	e. Depreciation allowed (or allowable) since acquisition (attach schedule)	f. Cost or other basis, cost of subsequent improvements (if not purchased, attach explanation) and expense of sale	g. Gain or loss (d plus e less f)
1.		SCHEDULE ATTACHED				(15,274.00)

2. Enter your share of net short-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
3. Enter unused short-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
4. Net short-term gain (or loss) from lines 1, 2 and 3	

LONG-TERM—ASSETS HELD MORE THAN 6 MONTHS

5. Enter gain (if any) from line 16, Part II	
6. Enter your share of net long-term gain (or loss) from partnerships and fiduciaries	
7. Enter unused long-term capital loss carryover from preceding taxable years (attach statement)	
8. Net long-term gain (or loss) from lines 5, 6 and 7	(15,274.00)
9. Combine the amounts shown on lines 4 and 8 and enter the net gain (or loss) here	
10. If line 9 shows a GAIN, enter 50% of line 8 or 50% of line 9, whichever is smaller. (Enter zero if there is a loss or no entry on line 8)	
11. Subtract line 10 from line 9, Enter here and on line 17, Part III	
12. If line 9 shows a LOSS, enter here and on line 17, Part III the **smallest** of the following: (a) the amount on line 9; (b) the amount of taxable income on Form 540 or 540NR, computed without capital gains and losses; or (c) $1,000 Carryover Loss (14,274.00)	(1,000.00)

Part II—SALE OR EXCHANGE OF PROPERTY UNDER SECTIONS 18181–82

13. Enter gain (if any) from line 22, Part IV	
14. Enter gain (if any) from line 25, Part IV	
15. Enter your share of gain (or loss) of Section 18181–82 items from partnerships and fiduciaries	
16. Net gain (or loss). If GAIN, enter on line 5, Part I; if LOSS, enter on line 29, Part V	

PART III—TOTAL NET GAIN OR LOSS FROM SALES OR EXCHANGES OF PROPERTY

17. Net gain (or loss) from line 10 or 11, Part I	
18. Net gain (or loss) from line 31, Part IV	
19. Total net gain (or loss)—Combine lines 17 and 18. Enter here and on Form 540 or Form 540NR, page 2, Part II, line 23	

(Schedule continued on reverse)

SCHEDULE E -- SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	GEORGE MARCUS 1301 MIAMI GARDENS DR, N. MIAMI, FLA, 33162	[redacted]	7500
(b)	EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER DR, BIRMINGHAM, MICH 48010	[redacted]	7500
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, line 9, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 29 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 37) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)
(a)	$ 32,036.39	$ 32,380.38	$ 32380.38
(b)	32,036.38	32,380.38	32380.38
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

SCHEDULE E -- SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	GEORGE MARCUS 1301 MIAMI GARDENS DR, N. MIAMI, FLA, 33162	[redacted]	7500
(b)	EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER DR, BIRMINGHAM, MICH 48010	[redacted]	7500
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, line 9, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) Distributive income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 29 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 37) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)
(a)	$ 32,036.39	$ 32,380.38	$ 32380.38
(b)	32,036.38	32,380.38	32380.38
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

SCHEDULE F – SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)
(a) EARL RUBY 4380 STONY RIVER DR. BIRM. MI	[redacted]	7,500	46,840.04
(b) ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL. 60602		7,500	46,840.05
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 34 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 43) difference between column 4 and column 5 (See instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 22 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (See instructions)	(8) Enter here and on form MI-1040, each shareholder's proportionate share of Single business tax paid. (See instructions)
(a)	46,840.04			
(b)	46,840.05			
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

SCHEDULE F – SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)
(a) EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER BIRM. MI	[redacted]	500	19,730.16
(b) ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1120 CHICAGO ILL. 60602		500	19,730.15
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 34 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 43) difference between column 4 and column 5 (See instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 22 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (See instructions)	(8) Enter here and on form MI-1040, each shareholder's proportionate share of Single business tax paid. (See instructions)
(a)	19,730.16		46.61	
(b)	19,730.15		46.61	
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

D-1040 (NR)

CITY OF DETROIT

CITY OF DETROIT INCOME TAX
INDIVIDUAL RETURN — NONRESIDENT 1976

or other taxable year beginning ...., 1976, ending ...., 19......

EXTENSION NUMBE

If you are an EMPLO
enter your Federal EMPLO
Identification No. here:

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

First Name and Initial Earl R. and Marge	Last Name Ruby	Your Social Security Number [redacted]
(If joint return of husband and wife, use first names and middle initials of both)		Your Occupation Sales
Home Address (Number and Street or Rural Route) 18135 Livernois		Spouse's Social Security Number
City, Town or Post Office Detroit,	State Michigan	Postal Zip Code 48221
		Spouse's Occupation Housewife

IP | FP | APP. | OA.

A. If married, is spouse filing a separate return? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If yes, enter spouse's first name................................

B. Enter the name and address used on your return for 1975 (If the same as above write "Same". If different, indicate date moved.) If none filed, give reason. Same

Auditor

SCHEDULE A — EXEMPTIONS

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of exemptions checked
1. YOURSELF	☒	☐	☐	
SPOUSE	☒	☐	☐	

2. Enter first names of each of your DEPENDENT CHILDREN who lived with you: Enter No.

3. OTHER DEPENDENTS

NAME Enter figure 1 in the last column to right for each name listed	Relationship	Months lived in your home during 1976	

4. Total exemptions from lines 1, 2 and 3; enter here and on line 15 below. → 2

INCOME (If joint return, include all income of both husband and wife)

5. Enter GROSS income from employers for wages, salaries, commissions, tips, etc. — indicate (W) for wife

Employer's Name	Where employed (City and State)	Total wages reported on DW-2 or W-2	Detroit Income Tax Withheld	WAGES, ETC. EARNED IN DETROIT
COBO CLEANERS, INC.	DETROIT, MICH.	$ 164,200.00	$ 970.00	$ 82,100.00
COBO-RUMAR SALES, INC.	DETROIT, MICH.	16,500.00	110.00	8,250.00
6. TOTALS		180,700.00	1,080.00	90,350.00

7. Rental income (or loss) from tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 2, Schedule B, line 4	631.72
8. Other income (or loss) from partnerships, etc. — from page 2, Schedule F, line 4	4,481.00
9. Gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 3, Schedule E, line 10	
10. Net profit (or loss) from business — from page 3, Schedule C, line 8 ◆	
11. Income (or loss) — TRUSTS AND ESTATES ONLY — from page 4, Schedule G, line 7 (see instructions for exemption to enter on line 15)	
12. Total (add lines 6 through 11 of last column)	95,462.72
13. Less: Deductions from page 2, Schedule M, line 5 (if none, enter zero)	
14. Total (line 12 less line 13)	95,462.72
15. Less Amount for Exemptions: Enter number of exemptions from line 4 above 2 and multiply by $600	$ 1,200.00
16. TOTAL INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX	94,262.72
17. CITY OF DETROIT TAX: Multiply line 16 by .005 (½%) ●	$ 471.31

PAYMENTS AND CREDITS

18. a. Tax withheld by employer — from line 6 above — ATTACH Forms DW-2 or W-2	$ 1,080.00
b. Payments and credits on 1976 Declaration of Estimated Detroit Income Tax ●	
c. Other Credits — explain in attached statement (See Instructions)	
19. TOTAL — Add Lines 18a, b, and c ●	$ 1,080.00

TAX DUE OR REFUND

20. If your payments (line 19) are larger than your tax (line 17), enter amount of **OVERPAYMENT** ●	$ 608.69
21. Check box if you wish overpayment on line 20 to be: (A) ☐ Credited on 1977 Estimated Tax or (B) ☒ Refunded.	
22. If your tax (line 17) is larger than your payments (line 19) enter amount of **BALANCE DUE** Pay in full with this return ●	$

Make check payable to: "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT." A balance due of less than one dollar ($1.00) need not be paid.

Attach Copy of Form DW-2 or W-2 Here

Attach Check or Money Order Here

SIGN → HERE

I declare that I have examined this return (including accompanying schedules and statements) and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN HERE ....
(Taxpayer's signature and date)

SIGN HERE ....
(Spouse's signature and date) (If joint return, BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE MUST SIGN)

....
(Signature of preparer other than taxpayer) (Date)

GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
19675 WEST TEN MILE ROAD
(Address)

MAIL TO: Finance Department, Treasury Division, 104 City-County Building, Detroit, Michigan 48226

RETURNS MUST BE FILED BY APRIL 30

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Mich. Dept. of Treasury

C-8000K ☐

Schedule of Partners or Shareholders— Partnership, Subchapter S Corp., Professional Corp.

See instructions on reverse side

1976 ☐

1 Name: Cobo-Rumar Sales, Inc.

2 Account Number: 38-1812707

PART I SUMMARY

3 Total Number of Partners or Shareholders........ 3 1

4 Total Number of Qualified Partners or Shareholders from Part II—enter here and on C-8000, line 60a.... 4

PART II QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS

A NAME AND ADDRESS	B SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	C % Time	D SHAREHOLDER'S SALARY	E % Own.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S F Share of Bus. Inc.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S G Share of SBT Paid
Earl Ruby 4380 Stoney River;Birm.	[redacted]	100%	18,000 | 00	100%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00

PART III NON-QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS. If more space is needed submit separate schedule and enter totals on line 7.

		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
(Part II and Part III)	7	| 00	%	| 00	| 00

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

INTANGIBLES TAX RETURN

Calendar Year 19 76
OR FISCAL YEAR
Beginning ____________ 19____
Ending ____________ 19____
☒ INDIVIDUAL (Check
☐ FIDUCIARY One)

THIS NUMBER WHEN SUBMITTING PAYMENT, OR IN CORRESPON

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RUBY EARL & MARGIE
18135 LIVERNOIS AVE
DETROIT MI 48221

6 9 8 8 5 5

Husband's Social Security No. [redacted]
Wife's Social Security No.

Mo.	Day	Yr.								
09	30	76	698855	007	82		1		76	12
Retroactive Date			Intangible Account Number	Type	County	City	K	C	File Date	

If this return is for an Estate, give Probate.
File No.
County
Date of Death
POSTED:
AUDITED:
Employer Identification No.

Computation of Tax Due

LINE NO.		AMOUNT	LINE NO.	TAX
1.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (non-income producing only)		1.	
2.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable		2.	
3.	Balance Taxable @ 1/10th of 1%		3.	
4.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (income producing only)		4.	
5.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable (use only that portion, if any, not used in Line 2)		5.	
6.	Balance Taxable		6.	
7.	Income applicable to balance		7.	
8.	Tax @ 3½% of Income (Line 7) or 1/10th of 1% of Balance (Line 6), whichever is greater.		8.	
9.	Stocks and Bonds - - - - - Schedule A, Column 9.		9.	2,376.23
10.	Mortgages and Land Contracts - - - - - Schedule B, Column 8.		10.	
11.	Annuities - - - - - Schedule C, Column 9.		11.	
12.	Beneficiary Return (attach copy hereto)		12.	
13.	TOTAL		13.	2,376.23
14.	Less Statutory deduction ($175.00 or $350.00 by husbands and wives filing joint return)		14.	350.00
15.	BALANCE DUE		15.	2,026.23
16.	Cash on Hand or in Transit as of **retroactive date** (include cash in safety deposit boxes)		16.	▨
17.	Bank Deposits in Banks Located Outside of Michigan {or Withdrawn from Mich. Banks or Ass'ns. after RETROACTIVE DATE.}		17.	▨
18.	Savings in Building and Loan Ass'ns. Located Outside of Michigan		18.	▨
19.	TOTAL		19.	▨
20.	TAX @ **20¢ per $1000.00** of Line 19		20.	
21.	TOTAL TAX DUE (Line 15 plus Line 20)		21.	2,026.23
22.	Less Advance Payment of Tax		22.	
23.	TOTAL TAX DUE		23.	2,026.23
24.	Penalties & Interest; Penalty ______ %, $______ ; Interest ______ % ______ Months, $______		24.	
25.	TOTAL AMOUNT DUE WITH THIS RETURN (Due on or before April 30) Or Four Months after End of Authorized Fiscal Year		25.	2,026.23

Make Remittance Payable To: *"STATE OF MICHIGAN"* Write your Intangible Account No. on your check.
Mail To: MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, TREASURY BUILDING, LANSING, MICHIGAN 48922

Business or Profession of Taxpayer: SALES	Amount Single Business Tax Paid:	Single Business Tax Account No.:	Telephone Number: 863 0400
Year of Last Return Filed: 1975	Address of Last Return: SAME		

Check which Method your return is Computed by.
☒ RETROACTIVE DATE ☐ MONTHLY AVERAGE

NOTE: If this return is from a Trustee, attach a list of Names and Addresses of Beneficiaries and Date of Creation of Trust.

I declare under the penalties imposed by Act No. 301 P.A. of 1939, as Amended, that this return, including any accompanying schedules and statements has been examined by me and to the best of my knowledge and belief is a true, correct and complete return.

Signature

Signature

Title: (State whether Individual, Owner, Executor, Administrator, Trustee, etc.)

Prepared By: GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Address of Preparer: 19675 WEST TEN MILE ROAD
SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN

Reference copy, JFK Collection: ESCA (RG 233)

1975 MI-1040

MICHIGAN INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN

for 1975, or taxable year beginning ________, 1975, ending ________, 19____

First name and initial (if joint return, use first names and initials of both): Earl R. and Marge

Last name: Ruby

Your social security number: [redacted]

Home address (number and street or rural route): 18135 Livernois

Your occupation: Sales

City, town or post office, and State: Detroit, Michigan

ZIP code: 48221

Spouse's social security no.

Spouse's occupation

Please Print or Type

Residency Status during tax year:
☒ Resident ☐ Non-resident ☐ Part-year resident, from ________ to ________

① Filing Status:
A ☐ Single
B ☒ Married, filing jointly
C ☐ Married, filing separately (see instructions, page 2)
Name of Spouse ________
(Give spouse's Soc. Sec. No. in the space provided)

1. Exemptions:
(a) Enter here the number of exemptions claimed on your federal income tax return 4
(b) Special exemption for paraplegics & quadriplegics . [See instructions] ________
(c) TOTAL EXEMPTIONS, add lines 1(a) and 1(b) .... ①ᶜ 4

2. STATE CAMPAIGN FUND
Do you wish to designate $2.00 of your taxes for this fund? ② ☐ YES ☒ NO
If joint return, does your spouse wish to designate $2.00? ..... ☐ YES ☒ NO
NOTE: If you check the 'YES' boxes it will not increase your tax or reduce your refund.

Attach State Copy of Form W-2 Here

3. Adjusted gross income as defined in the Internal Revenue Code and which should be reported on Federal Form 1040, line 15, or 1040 A, line 12 Attach copies of any Federal schedules that indicate a loss or deduction from gross income. (See page 5 of the instructions) .... ③ 178,036|18
4. Additions to adjusted gross income, (from page 2, line 35) .... ④ ________
5. Total, add lines 3 and 4 .... 5. 178,036|18
6. Subtractions from adjusted gross income, (from page 2, line 44) .... ⑥ ________
7. Subtract line 6 from line 5 .... 7. 178,036|18
8. Residents multiply exemptions claimed on line 1 by $1,500.00 (part-year and nonresident allowance from line 48) ... ⑧ 6,000|00
9. Income subject to tax (subtract line 8 from line 7) .... 9. 172,036|18
10. Tax: multiply line 9 by 4.37% (.0437) .... 10. 7,517|98

CREDITS (See instructions - pages 7-10)

		AMOUNT PAID		CREDIT
11. Income tax paid to Michigan cities	⑪	100|89	11a.	20|09
12. Contributions to Michigan colleges & universities (attach receipts).	⑫		12a.	
13. Income tax paid to another state (attach copy of return)	13.		⑬ᵃ	

14. Total credits (add lines 11a, 12a, and 13a), enter total here .... 14. 20|09
15. Income tax, subtract line 14 from line 10 (if line 14 is greater than line 10, enter 'NONE') .... ⑮ 7,497|89
16. Credits from any MI-1040 CR form. (see page 9 of instructions). .... ⑯ ________

Do not complete lines 17 thru 21 if you have claimed a credit on line 16.

17. Household income from line 56 .... ⑰ ________
18. Enter 1975 homestead property tax or amount from line 59 ..... ⑱ ________
19. Tax not eligible for credit, enter 3.5% (.035) of line 17 .... 19. ________
20. Subtract line 19 from line 18, if line 19 is greater, enter 'NONE' .. 20. ________
21. Property tax credit, 60% (.60) of line 20, ($500.00 maximum) .... 21. ________
22. Personal property tax paid on inventory. ㉒ ________ X 39% (.39) .... 22. ________

PAYMENTS

23. Michigan tax withheld (attach State copy of W-2) .... ㉓ 2,157|50
24. Michigan estimated tax payments .... ㉔ 4,000|00
25. 1974 overpayment credited to 1975 .... ㉕ ________
26. Add lines 16, 22, 23, 24, and 25,/or lines 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25 .... 26. 6,157|50
27. If line 26 is less than line 15, enter BALANCE OF TAX DUE HERE .... PAY ▶ ㉗ 1,340|39
28. If line 26 is greater than line 15, enter AMOUNT OVERPAID .... 28. ________
29. Amount of line 28 to be REFUNDED TO YOU .... REFUND ▶ ㉙ ________
30. Amount of line 28 to be credited to 1976 estimated tax .... ㉚ ________

NOTE: If all of overpayment (line 28) is to be refunded (line 29), make no entry on line 30.

Attach Check or Money Order Here

This return is due April 15, 1976 or on the 15th day of the fourth month after the close of your tax year.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than the taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

OFFICE USE

Sign Here ▶ ________ Your signature ________ Date
Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▶ Signature of preparer other than taxpayer ________ Date
GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
19675 WEST TEN MILE ROAD
Address

[illegible] expected in 1976

2. Exemptions (number of allowable exemptions times $1,500.00) ....

3. Subtract line 2 from line 1. (This is your estimated taxable income) ....

4. Estimated tax (line 3 times .046 or 4.6%) ....

5. LESS: Total estimated tax credit for Michigan City income taxes, personal property tax on inventories, Michigan homestead property taxes and contributions to Michigan colleges and universities ....

6. Subtract line 5 from line 4. Enter here and on line 1 below ....

MICHIGAN
THE GREAT LAKE STATE

MICHIGAN DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS– 1976

For calendar year 1976 or fiscal year ending ____________, 19____

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Treasury

FORM
MI-1040-ES

Please print or type

First name and initial (if joint declaration, use names and initials of both)

Last name

Your social security number

Address (number and street)

Spouse's social security number

City, State, and ZIP code

1. Your estimate of 1976 income tax ....

2. Estimated income tax withheld and to be withheld during entire year of 1976 ....

3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1 less line 2). (If less than $100, no declaration is required) ....

4. COMPUTATION OF INSTALLMENT. Check proper box below and enter amount indicated.

If this declaration is due to be filed on:
☐ April 15, 1976, enter 1/4 of line 3; ☐ September 15, 1976, enter 1/2 of line 3
☐ June 15, 1976, enter 1/3 of line 3; ☐ Jan. 15, 1977, enter amount on line 3 ....

5. If you had an overpayment on your 1975 income tax return which you elected to have applied as a credit against your 1976 estimated tax, enter the amount here ....

6. To apply entire overpayment credit to this installment and any excess to the next, enter here the amount on line 5. To spread credit evenly to each installment, divide it by number of installments and enter results here ....

7. Amount to be paid with this declaration at time of filing (line 4 less line 6) ....

8. Note: The payment of the estimated tax (line 3 less any 1975 overpayment credit) with this return eliminates the filing of quarterly estimates. Enter lump sum payment here ....

I have examined this declaration and to the best of my knowledge it is correct.

Signature(s) .... Date ...., 19......

If joint estimate, both husband and wife must sign

MICHIGAN
THE GREAT LAKE STATE

MICHIGAN DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS– 1976

For calendar year 1976 or fiscal year ending ____________, 19____

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Treasury

FORM
MI-1040-ES

Please print or type

First name and initial (if joint declaration, use names and initials of both): Earl R. and Marge

Last name: Ruby

Your social security number: [redacted]

Address (number and street): 18135 Livernois

Spouse's social security number

City, State, and ZIP code: Detroit, Michigan 48221

1. Your estimate of 1976 income tax 5,600.00

2. Estimated income tax withheld and to be withheld during entire year of 1976 ....

3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1 less line 2). (If less than $100, no declaration is required) 5,600.00

4. COMPUTATION OF INSTALLMENT. Check proper box below and enter amount indicated.

If this declaration is due to be filed on:
☒ April 15, 1976, enter 1/4 of line 3; ☐ September 15, 1976, enter 1/2 of line 3
☐ June 15, 1976, enter 1/3 of line 3; ☐ Jan. 15, 1977, enter amount on line 3 .... 1,400.00

5. If you had an overpayment on your 1975 income tax return which you elected to have applied as a credit against your 1976 estimated tax, enter the amount here ....

6. To apply entire overpayment credit to this installment and any excess to the next, enter here the amount on line 5. To spread credit evenly to each installment, divide it by number of installments and enter results here ....

7. Amount to be paid with this declaration at time of filing (line 4 less line 6) 1,400.00

8. Note: The payment of the estimated tax (line 3 less any 1975 overpayment credit) with this return eliminates the filing of quarterly estimates. Enter lump sum payment here ....

I have examined this declaration and to the best of my knowledge it is correct.

Signature(s) Date ...., 19......

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

D-1040 (NR)
CITY OF DETROIT

CITY OF DETROIT INCOME TAX 1975
INDIVIDUAL RETURN — NONRESIDENT

or other taxable year beginning ...., 1975, ending ...., 19......

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

First Name and Initial: Earl R. and Marge
Last Name: Ruby
(If joint return of husband and wife, use first names and middle initials of both)
Home Address (Number and Street or Rural Route): 18135 Livernois
City, Town or Post Office: Detroit, Michigan
State:
Postal Zip Code: 48221

Your Social Security Number: [redacted]
Your Occupation: Sales
Spouse's Social Security Number:
Spouse's Occupation:

EXTENSION NUMBE
If you are an EMPLO enter your Federal EMPLO Identification No. here:

IP	FP	APP.
		OA.

Auditor

A. If married, is spouse filing a separate return? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If yes, enter spouse's first name ....

B. Enter the name and address used on your return for 1974 (If the same as above write "Same". If different, indicate date moved.) If none filed, give reason. Same

SCHEDULE A — EXEMPTIONS

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of exemptions checked
1. YOURSELF	☒	☐	☐	
SPOUSE	☒	☐	☐	

2. Enter first names of each of your DEPENDENT CHILDREN who lived with you: Denise, Joyce — Enter No.

3. OTHER DEPENDENTS

NAME Enter figure 1 in the last column to right for each name listed	Relationship	Months lived in your home during 1975	

4. Total exemptions from lines 1, 2 and 3; enter here and on line 15 below. → 4

Attach Copy of Form DW-2 or W-2 Here

INCOME (If joint return, include all income of both husband and wife)

5. Enter GROSS income from employers for wages, salaries, commissions, tips, etc. — indicate (W) for wife

Employer's Name	Where employed (City and State)	Total wages reported on DW-2 or W-2	Detroit Income Tax Withheld	WAGES, ETC. EARNED IN DETROIT
COBO CLEANERS, INC.	DET, MICH.	$ 70,000.00	$ 229.00	$ 35,000.00
		16,500.00	110.00	8,250.00
6. TOTALS		86,500.00	339.00	43,250.00

7.	Rental income (or loss) from tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 2, Schedule B, line 4	396.13
8.	Other income (or loss) from partnerships, etc. — from page 2, Schedule F, line 4	2,508.00
9.	Gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 3, Schedule E, line 10	
10.	Net profit (or loss) from business — from page 3, Schedule C, line 8 ◆	
11.	Income (or loss) — TRUSTS AND ESTATES ONLY — from page 4, Schedule G, line 7 (see instructions for exemption to enter on line 15)	
12.	Total (add lines 6 through 11 of last column)	46,154.13
13.	Less: Deductions from page 2, Schedule M, line 5 (if none, enter zero)	
14.	Total (line 12 less line 13)	46,154.13
15.	Less Amount for Exemptions: Enter number of exemptions from line 4 above 4 and multiply by $600	$ 2,400.00
16.	TOTAL INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX	43,754.13
17.	CITY OF DETROIT TAX: Multiply line 16 by .005 (½%) ●	$ 218.77

Attach Check or Money Order Here

PAYMENTS AND CREDITS

18. a.	Tax withheld by employer — from line 6 above — ATTACH Forms DW-2 or W-2	$ 339.00
b.	Payments and credits on 1975 Declaration of Estimated Detroit Income Tax ●	
c.	Other Credits — explain in attached statement (See Instructions)	
19.	TOTAL — Add Lines 18a, b, and c ●	$ 339.00

TAX DUE OR REFUND

20.	If your payments (line 19) are larger than your tax (line 17), enter amount of **OVERPAYMENT** ●	$ 120.23
21.	Check box if you wish overpayment on line 20 to be: (A) ☐ Credited on 1976 Estimated Tax or (B) ☒ Refunded.	
22.	If your tax (line 17) is larger than your payments (line 19) enter amount of **BALANCE DUE** Pay in full with this return ●	$

Make check payable to: "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT." A balance due of less than one dollar ($1.00) need not be paid.

I declare that I have examined this return (including accompanying schedules and statements) and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN HERE
SIGN HERE ▷ .... (Taxpayer's signature and date)
▷ .... (Signature of preparer other than taxpayer) (Date)
GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT (Address)
SIGN HERE ▷ .... (Spouse's signature and date) (If joint return, BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE MUST SIGN)

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
Revenue Division
INTANGIBLES TAX RETURN

THIS NUMBER WHEN SUBMITTING PAYMENT, OR IN CORRESPONC

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE

Calendar Year 19____
OR FISCAL YEAR ____
Beginning ______ 19____
Ending ______ 19____

Check One:
Individual ☐
Partnership ☐
Michigan Corporation ☐
Foreign Corporation ☐
Fiduciary ☐

RUBY EARL & MARGIE
18135 LIVERNOIS AVE
DETROIT MI 48221

69885,5

POSTED	FILED

IF THIS RETURN IS FO
ESTATE GIVE PROBA
County ______
File No. ______
Date of Death ______

RETROACTIVE DATE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	ACCOUNT NO.	TYPE	COUNTY	CITY	K	C	FILE DATE	
11	30	75	698855	007	82		1		75	12

Computation of Tax Due

Line No.		AMOUNT	Line No.	TA
1.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (non-income producing only)		1.	
2.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable		2.	
3.	Balance Taxable @ 1/10th of 1%		3.	
4.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (income producing only)		4.	
5.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable (use only that portion, if any, not used in Line 2)		5.	
6.	Balance Taxable		6.	
7.	Income applicable to balance		7.	
8.	Tax @ 3½% of Income (Line 7) or 1/10 of 1% of Balance (Line 6), whichever is greater		8.	
9.	Stocks and Bonds - - - - - Schedule A, Column 9.		9.	2952 87
10.	Mortgages and Land Contracts - - - - - Schedule B, Column 8.		10.	
11.	Annuities - - - - - Schedule C, Column 9.		11.	
12.	Beneficiary Return (attach copy hereto)		12.	
13.	TOTAL		13.	2952 87
14.	Less Statutory deduction ($175.00 or $350.00 by husbands and wives filing joint return)		14.	350 00
15.	BALANCE DUE		15.	2602 87
16.	Cash on Hand or in Transit as of retroactive date (include cash in safety deposit boxes)		16.	▨
17.	Bank Deposits in Banks Located Outside of Michigan — or Withdrawn from Mich. Banks or Ass'ns. after RETROACTIVE DATE.		17.	▨
18.	Savings in Building and Loan Ass'ns. Located Outside of Michigan — or Withdrawn from Mich. Banks or Ass'ns. after RETROACTIVE DATE.		18.	▨
19.	TOTAL		19.	▨
20.	TAX @ 40¢ per $1000.00 of Line 19		20.	
21.	TOTAL TAX DUE (Line 15 plus Line 20)		21.	2602 87
22.	Less Advance Payment of Tax		22.	
23.	TOTAL TAX DUE		23.	2602 87
24.	Penalties & Interest; Penalty ____%, $____; Interest ____% ____Months, $____		24.	
25.	TOTAL AMOUNT DUE		25.	2602 87

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO STATE OF MICHIGAN
Please forward Remittance for Amount Shown Here on or before April 30.
To: MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LANSING, MICH. 48922 (or four months after end of authorized fiscal year)

IMPORTANT—Be Sure to Answer the following Question When Applicable.

1. Business or Profession of Taxpayer SALES Phone No. 863-0400
2. Give year of last return filed. 1974 Address of Last Return SAME
3. Check here if return is computed on a Retroactive Date Method ✓ or Monthly Average Method ____
4. If taxpayer is a corporation give State and Date of Incorporation ____ Federal Employers Identification Number ____
5. If this is the return of a Trustee attach list of names and addresses of beneficiaries and date of creation of trust.
6. If this is a Business Return a copy of the Balance Sheet as of the close of the Tax Year must be attached.

I declare under the penalties imposed by Act No. 301 P. A. of 1939, as Amended, that this return, including any accompanying schedules and statements (has been examined by and to the best of my knowledge and belief is a true, correct and complete return.

Social Security Number [redacted]

Return Prepared by GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
[illegible] WEST TEN MILE ROAD

Signed ______

Signed ______

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

SCHEDULE F — SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(if additional space is needed, attach schedule)

(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)
(a) EARL ROBY 11380 STONY RIVER DR. BIRM. MI	[redacted]	7,500	46,840.04
(b) ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL. 60602		7,500	46,840.05
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 34 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 43) difference between column 4 and column 5 (See instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 22 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (See instructions)	(8) Enter here and on form MI-1040, each shareholder's proportionate share of Single business tax paid. (See instructions)
(a)	46,840.04			
(b)	46,840.05			
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

1975 MI-1040

MICHIGAN INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN

for 1975, or taxable year beginning ________, 1975, ending ________, 19____

Please Print or Type

First name and initial (if joint return, use first names and initials of both): Earl R. and Marge
Last name: Ruby
Your social security number: [redacted]
Home address (number and street or rural route): 18135 Livernois
Your occupation: Sales
City, town or post office, and State: Detroit, Michigan
ZIP code: 48221
Spouse's social security no.:
Spouse's occupation:

Residency Status during tax year: ☒ Resident ☐ Non-resident ☐ Part-year resident, from ________ to ________

Filing Status:
A ☐ Single
B ☒ Married, filing jointly
C ☐ Married, filing separately (see instructions, page 2)
Name of Spouse ________
(Give spouse's Soc. Sec. No. in the space provided)

1. Exemptions:
(a) Enter here the number of exemptions claimed on your federal income tax return 4
(b) Special exemption for paraplegics & quadriplegics . [See instructions]
(c) TOTAL EXEMPTIONS, add lines 1(a) and 1(b) .... ❶ 4

2. **STATE CAMPAIGN FUND**
Do you wish to designate $2.00 of your taxes for this fund? ❷ ☐ YES ☒ NO
If joint return, does your spouse wish to designate $2.00? ..... ☐ YES ☒ NO
NOTE: If you check the 'YES' boxes it will not increase your tax or reduce your refund.

Attach State Copy of Form W-2 Here

3. Adjusted gross income as defined in the Internal Revenue Code and which should be reported on Federal Form 1040, line 15, or 1040 A, line 12 Attach copies of any Federal schedules that indicate a loss or deduction from gross income. (See page 5 of the instructions)	❸	178,036	18
4. Additions to adjusted gross income, (from page 2, line 35)	❹		
5. Total, add lines 3 and 4	5.	178,036	18
6. Subtractions from adjusted gross income, (from page 2, line 44)	❻		
7. Subtract line 6 from line 5	7.	178,036	18
8. Residents multiply exemptions claimed on line 1 by $1,500.00 (part-year and nonresident allowance from line 48)	❽	6,000	00
9. Income subject to tax (subtract line 8 from line 7)	9.	172,036	18
10. Tax: multiply line 9 by 4.37% (.0437)	10.	7,517	98

CREDITS (See instructions - pages 7-10)

		AMOUNT PAID			CREDIT				
11. Income tax paid to Michigan cities	⓫	100	89	11a.	20	09			
12. Contributions to Michigan colleges & universities (attach receipts)	⓬			12a.					
13. Income tax paid to another state (attach copy of return)	13.			13a					
14. Total credits (add lines 11a, 12a, and 13a), enter total here							14.	20	09
15. Income tax, subtract line 14 from line 10 (if line 14 is greater than line 10, enter 'NONE')							⓯	7,497	89
16. Credits from any MI-1040 CR form. (see page 9 of instructions)				⓰					

Do not complete lines 17 thru 21 if you have claimed a credit on line 16.

17. Household income from line 56	⓱				
18. Enter 1975 homestead property tax or amount from line 59	⓲				
19. Tax not eligible for credit, enter 3.5% (.035) of line 17	19.				
20. Subtract line 19 from line 18, if line 19 is greater, enter 'NONE'	20.				
21. Property tax credit, 60% (.60) of line 20, ($500.00 maximum)			21.		
22. Personal property tax paid on inventory. ㉒ ________ X 39% (.39)			22.		

Attach Check or Money Order Here

PAYMENTS

23. Michigan tax withheld (attach State copy of W-2)	㉓	2,157	50			
24. Michigan estimated tax payments	㉔	4,000	00			
25. 1974 overpayment credited to 1975	㉕					
26. Add lines 16, 22, 23, 24, and 25,/or lines 21, 22, 23, 24, and 25				26.	6,157	50
27. If line 26 is less than line 15, enter BALANCE OF TAX DUE HERE			PAY ▶	㉗	1,340	39
28. If line 26 is greater than line 15, enter AMOUNT OVERPAID				28.		
29. Amount of line 28 to be REFUNDED TO YOU			REFUND ▶	㉙		
30. Amount of line 28 to be credited to 1976 estimated tax	㉚					

NOTE: If all of overpayment (line 28) is to be refunded (line 29), make no entry on line 30.

OFFICE USE

This return is due April 15, 1976 or on the 15th day of the fourth month after the close of your tax year.
Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than the taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign Here ▷ Your signature ________ Date ________
▷ Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▷ Signature of preparer other than taxpayer ________ Date ________
GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
Address
19675 WEST TEN MILE ROAD

Mail return and payment to — Michigan Income Tax, P.O. Drawer H, Lansing 48904

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

D-1040 (NR)

CITY OF DETROIT

CITY OF DETROIT INCOME TAX
INDIVIDUAL RETURN — NONRESIDENT 1975

or other taxable year beginning ...., 1975, ending ...., 19......

EXTENSION NUMBER

PLEASE PRINT OR TYPE

First Name and Initial: Earl R. and Marge	Last Name: Ruby	Your Social Security Number: [redacted]
(If joint return of husband and wife, use first names and middle initials of both)		Your Occupation: Sales
Home Address (Number and Street or Rural Route): 18135 Livernois		Spouse's Social Security Number:
City, Town or Post Office: Detroit, Michigan	State	Postal Zip Code: 48221

Spouse's Occupation

If you are an EMPLOYER enter your Federal EMPLOYER Identification No. here:

IP | FP | APP. | OA.

Auditor

A. If married, is spouse filing a separate return? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If yes, enter spouse's first name..................

B. Enter the name and address used on your return for 1974 (If the same as above write "Same". If different, indicate date moved.) If none filed, give reason. Same

SCHEDULE A — EXEMPTIONS

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of exemptions checked
1. YOURSELF	☒	☐	☐	
SPOUSE	☒	☐	☐	

2. Enter first names of each of your DEPENDENT CHILDREN who lived with you: Denise, Joyce — Enter No.

3. OTHER DEPENDENTS

NAME Enter figure 1 in the last column to right for each name listed	Relationship	Months lived in your home during 1975	

4. Total exemptions from lines 1, 2 and 3; enter here and on line 15 below. → 4

INCOME (If joint return, include all income of both husband and wife)

5. Enter GROSS income from employers for wages, salaries, commissions, tips, etc. — indicate (W) for wife

Employer's Name	Where employed (City and State)	Total wages reported on DW-2 or W-2	Detroit Income Tax Withheld	WAGES, ETC. EARNED IN DETROIT
COBO CLEANERS, INC.	DET, MICH.	$ 70,000.00	$ 229.00	$ 35,000.00
		16,500.00	110.00	8,250.00
6. TOTALS		86,500.00	339.00	43,250.00

7. Rental income (or loss) from tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 2, Schedule B, line 4	396.13
8. Other income (or loss) from partnerships, etc. — from page 2, Schedule F, line 4	2,508.00
9. Gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 3, Schedule E, line 10	
10. Net profit (or loss) from business — from page 3, Schedule C, line 8 ◆	
11. Income (or loss) — TRUSTS AND ESTATES ONLY — from page 4, Schedule G, line 7 (see instructions for exemption to enter on line 15)	
12. Total (add lines 6 through 11 of last column)	46,154.13
13. Less: Deductions from page 2, Schedule M, line 5 (if none, enter zero)	
14. Total (line 12 less line 13)	46,154.13
15. Less Amount for Exemptions: Enter number of exemptions from line 4 above 4 and multiply by $600	$ 2,400.00
16. TOTAL INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX	43,754.13
17. CITY OF DETROIT TAX: Multiply line 16 by .005 (½%) ●	$ 218.77

PAYMENTS AND CREDITS

18. a. Tax withheld by employer — from line 6 above — ATTACH Forms DW-2 or W-2	$ 339.00
b. Payments and credits on 1975 Declaration of Estimated Detroit Income Tax ●	
c. Other Credits — explain in attached statement (See Instructions)	
19. TOTAL — Add Lines 18a, b, and c ●	$ 339.00

TAX DUE OR REFUND

20. If your payments (line 19) are larger than your tax (line 17), enter amount of **OVERPAYMENT** ●	$ 120.23
21. Check box if you wish overpayment on line 20 to be: (A) ☐ Credited on 1976 Estimated Tax or (B) ☒ Refunded.	
22. If your tax (line 17) is larger than your payments (line 19) enter amount of **BALANCE DUE** Pay in full with this return ●	$

Make check payable to: "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT." A balance due of less than one dollar ($1.00) need not be paid.

Attach Copy of Form DW-2 or W-2 Here

Attach Check or Money Order Here

I declare that I have examined this return (including accompanying schedules and statements) and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN → HERE

SIGN HERE .... (Taxpayer's signature and date)

SIGN HERE .... (Spouse's signature and date) (If joint return, BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE MUST SIGN)

.... (Signature of preparer other than taxpayer) (Date)

GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
19675 WEST TEN MILE ROAD

(Address)

MAIL TO: Finance Department, Treasury Division, 104 City-County Building, Detroit, Michigan 48226

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

expected in 1976

2. Exemptions (number of allowable exemptions times $1,500.00)
3. Subtract line 2 from line 1. (This is your estimated taxable income)
4. Estimated tax (line 3 times .046 or 4.6%)
5. LESS: Total estimated tax credit for Michigan City income taxes, personal property tax on inventories, Michigan homestead property taxes and contributions to Michigan colleges and universities
6. Subtract line 5 from line 4. Enter here and on line 1 below

MICHIGAN
THE GREAT LAKE STATE

MICHIGAN DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS– 1976

For calendar year 1976 or fiscal year ending ____________, 19___

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Treasury

FORM
MI-1040-ES

Please print or type

First name and initial (if joint declaration, use names and initials of both):
Last name:
Your social security number:
Address (number and street):
Spouse's social security number:
City, State, and ZIP code:

1. Your estimate of 1976 income tax
2. Estimated income tax withheld and to be withheld during entire year of 1976
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1 less line 2). (If less than $100, no declaration is required)
4. COMPUTATION OF INSTALLMENT. Check proper box below and enter amount indicated.
   If this declaration is due to be filed on: ☐ April 15, 1976, enter 1/4 of line 3; ☐ September 15, 1976, enter 1/2 of line 3; ☐ June 15, 1976, enter 1/3 of line 3; ☐ Jan. 15, 1977, enter amount on line 3
5. If you had an overpayment on your 1975 income tax return which you elected to have applied as a credit against your 1976 estimated tax, enter the amount here ☐
6. To apply entire overpayment credit to this installment and any excess to the next, enter here the amount on line 5. To spread credit evenly to each installment, divide it by number of installments and enter results here
7. Amount to be paid with this declaration at time of filing (line 4 less line 6)
8. Note: The payment of the estimated tax (line 3 less any 1975 overpayment credit) with this return eliminates the filing of quarterly estimates. Enter lump sum payment here

I have examined this declaration and to the best of my knowledge it is correct.

Signature(s) .... Date ...., 19........
If joint estimate, both husband and wife must sign

MICHIGAN
THE GREAT LAKE STATE

MICHIGAN DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS– 1976

For calendar year 1976 or fiscal year ending ____________, 19___

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Treasury

FORM
MI-1040-ES

Please print or type

First name and initial (if joint declaration, use names and initials of both): Earl R. and Marge
Last name: Ruby
Your social security number: [redacted]
Address (number and street): 18135 Livernois
Spouse's social security number:
City, State, and ZIP code: Detroit, Michigan 48221

1. Your estimate of 1976 income tax 5,600.00
2. Estimated income tax withheld and to be withheld during entire year of 1976
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1 less line 2). (If less than $100, no declaration is required) 5,600.00
4. COMPUTATION OF INSTALLMENT. Check proper box below and enter amount indicated.
   If this declaration is due to be filed on: ☒ April 15, 1976, enter 1/4 of line 3; ☐ September 15, 1976, enter 1/2 of line 3; ☐ June 15, 1976, enter 1/3 of line 3; ☐ Jan. 15, 1977, enter amount on line 3 1,400.00
5. If you had an overpayment on your 1975 income tax return which you elected to have applied as a credit against your 1976 estimated tax, enter the amount here ☐
6. To apply entire overpayment credit to this installment and any excess to the next, enter here the amount on line 5. To spread credit evenly to each installment, divide it by number of installments and enter results here
7. Amount to be paid with this declaration at time of filing (line 4 less line 6) 1,400.00
8. Note: The payment of the estimated tax (line 3 less any 1975 overpayment credit) with this return eliminates the filing of quarterly estimates. Enter lump sum payment here

I have examined this declaration and to the best of my knowledge it is correct.

Signature(s) .... Date ...., 19........

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

MENT OF TREASURY
Revenue Division
INTANGIBLES TAX RETURN

ASE USE

THIS NUMBER WHEN SUBMITTING PAYMENT, OR IN CORRESPONE

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE

Calendar Year 19______
OR FISCAL YEAR ______
Beginning________19____
Ending________19____

Check One
- Individual ☐
- Partnership ☐
- Michigan Corporation ☐
- Foreign Corporation ☐
- Fiduciary ☐

RUBY EARL & MARGIE
18135 LIVERNOIS AVE
DETROIT MI 48221

6 9 8 8 5 5

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

POSTED	FILED

IF THIS RETURN IS FO
ESTATE GIVE PROBA
County______
File No.______
Date of Death______

MONTH	DAY	YEAR								
11	30	75	698855	007	82		1		75	12
RETROACTIVE DATE			ACCOUNT NO.	TYPE	COUNTY	CITY	K	C	FILE DATE	

Computation of Tax Due

Line No.		AMOUNT	Line No.	TA
1.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (non-income producing only)		1.	
2.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable		2.	
3.	Balance Taxable @ 1/10th of 1%		3.	
4.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (income producing only)		4.	
5.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable (use only that portion, if any, not used in Line 2)		5.	
6.	Balance Taxable		6	
7.	Income applicable to balance		7.	
8.	Tax @ 3½% of Income (Line 7) or 1/10 of 1% of Balance (Line 6), whichever is greater		8.	
9.	Stocks and Bonds - - - - - Schedule A, Column 9		9.	295. 5
10.	Mortgages and Land Contracts - - - - - Schedule B, Column 8		10.	
11.	Annuities - - - - - Schedule C, Column 9		11.	
12.	Beneficiary Return (attach copy hereto)		12.	
13.	TOTAL		13.	2952 8
14.	Less Statutory deduction ($175.00 or $350.00 by husbands and wives filing joint return)		14.	350 00
15.	BALANCE DUE		15.	2602 8
16.	Cash on Hand or in Transit as of retroactive date (include cash in safety deposit boxes)		16.	▨
17.	Bank Deposits in Banks Located Outside of Michigan — or Withdrawn from Mich. Banks or Ass'ns. after RETROACTIVE DATE.		17.	▨
18.	Savings in Building and Loan Ass'ns. Located Outside of Michigan — or Withdrawn from Mich. Banks or Ass'ns. after RETROACTIVE DATE.		18.	▨
19.	TOTAL		19.	▨
20.	TAX @ 40¢ per $1000.00 of Line 19		20.	
21.	TOTAL TAX DUE (Line 15 plus Line 20)		21.	2602 87
22.	Less Advance Payment of Tax		22.	
23.	TOTAL TAX DUE		23.	2602 87
24.	Penalties & Interest; Penalty ____%, $____; Interest ____% ____ Months, $____		24.	
25.	TOTAL AMOUNT DUE		25.	2602 8

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO STATE OF MICHIGAN
Please forward Remittance for Amount Shown Here on or before April 30.
To: MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LANSING, MICH. 48922 (or four months after end of authorized fiscal year)

IMPORTANT—Be Sure to Answer the following Question When Applicable.

1. Business or Profession of Taxpayer SALES Phone No. 863-0400
2. Give year of last return filed. 1974 Address of Last Return SAME
3. Check here if return is computed on a Retroactive Date Method ✓ or Monthly Average Method______
4. If taxpayer is a corporation give State and Date of Incorporation______ Federal Employers Identification Number______
5. If this is the return of a Trustee attach list of names and addresses of beneficiaries and date of creation of trust.
6. If this is a Business Return a copy of the Balance Sheet as of the close of the Tax Year must be attached.

I declare under the penalties imposed by Act No. 301 P. A. of 1939, as Amended, that this return, including any accompanying schedules and statements (has been examined by and to the best of my knowledge and belief is a true, correct and complete return.

Social Security Number [redacted]

Return Prepared by GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
19675 WEST TEN MILE ROAD
SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN 48075

Signed ______
Signed ______
Title ______
State whether Individual Owner, Member of Firm, Executor

SCHEDULE F – SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)
(a) EARL RUBY 11350 STONY RIVER DR. BIRM. MI	[redacted]	7,500	46,840.04
(b) ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 65 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL. 60602		7,500	46,840.05
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 34 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 43) difference between column 4 and column 5 (See instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 22 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (See instructions)	(8) Enter here and on form MI-1040, each shareholder's proportionate share of Single business tax paid. (See instructions)
(a)	46,840.04			
(b)	46,840.05			
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

SCHEDULE F – SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)
(a)	EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER BIRM. MI	[redacted]	500	19,730.16
(b)	ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO ILL. 60602		500	19,730.15
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 34 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 43) difference between column 4 and column 5 (See instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 22 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (See instructions)	(8) Enter here and on form MI-1040, each shareholder's proportionate share of Single business tax paid. (See instructions)
(a)	19,730.16		46.61	
(b)	19,730.15		46.61	
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Mich. Dept. of Treasury

C-8000K ☐

Schedule of Partners or Shareholders— Partnership, Subchapter S Corp., Professional Corp.

See instructions on reverse side

1976 ☐

1 Name: Cobo-Rumar Sales, Inc.

2 Account Number: 38-1812707

PART I SUMMARY

3 Total Number of Partners or Shareholders 3 1

4 Total Number of Qualified Partners or Shareholders from Part II—enter here and on C-8000, line 60a . . . 4

PART II QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS

A NAME AND ADDRESS	B SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	C % Time	D SHAREHOLDER'S SALARY	E % Own.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S F Share of Bus. Inc.	G Share of SBT Paid
5 Earl Ruby 4380 Stoney River;Birm.	[redacted]	100%	18,000 00	100%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00

PART III NON-QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS. If more space is needed submit separate schedule and enter totals on line 7.

6			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
			00	%	00	00
PART IV TOTALS (Part II and Part III)		7	00	%	00	00

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Mich. Dept. of Treasury

C-8000X ☐

Schedule of Partners or Shareholders— Partnership, Subchapter S Corp., Professional Corp.

See instructions on reverse side

1976 ☐

1 Name: Cobo Cleaners, Inc.

2 Account Number: 38-1806433

PART I **SUMMARY**

3 Total Number of Partners or Shareholders 3 1

4 Total Number of Qualified Partners or Shareholders from Part II—enter here and on C-8000, line 60a ... 4

PART II **QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS**

A NAME AND ADDRESS	B SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	C % Time	D SHAREHOLDER'S SALARY	E % Own.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S F Share of Bus. Inc.	G Share of SBT Paid
Earl Ruby 4380 Stoney River; Birm.	[redacted]	100%	144,600 | 00	100%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00

PART III **NON-QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS.** If more space is needed submit separate schedule and enter totals on line 7.

5		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
PART IV **TOTALS** (Part II and Part III)	7	| 00	%	| 00	| 00

Reference copy, JFK Collection: HSCA (RG 233)

Mich. Dept. of Treasury

C-8000K ☐

Schedule of Partners or Shareholders— Partnership, Subchapter S Corp., Professional Corp.

See instructions on reverse side

1976 ☐

1 Name: Cobo Cleaners, Inc.

2 Account Number: 38-1806433

PART I SUMMARY

3 Total Number of Partners or Shareholders 3 1

4 Total Number of Qualified Partners or Shareholders from Part II—enter here and on C-8000, line 60a 4

PART II QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS

A NAME AND ADDRESS	B SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	C % Time	D SHAREHOLDER'S SALARY	E % Own.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S F Share of Bus. Inc.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S G Share of SBT Paid
Earl Ruby 4380 Stoney River; Birm.	[redacted]	100%	144,600 | 00	100%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		%	| 00	%	| 00	| 00

PART III NON-QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS. If more space is needed submit separate schedule and enter totals on line 7.

5		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
		| 00	%	| 00	| 00
PART IV TOTALS (Part II and Part III)	7	| 00	%	| 00	| 00

Reference copy, JFK Collection: ESCA (RG 233)

Mich. Dept. of Treasury
C-8000K ☐

Schedule of Partners or Shareholders—Partnership, Subchapter S Corp., Professional Corp.

1976 ☐

See instructions on reverse side

1 Name: Cobo Cleaners, Inc.

2 Account Number: 38-1806433

PART I **SUMMARY**

3 Total Number of Partners or Shareholders 3 1

4 Total Number of Qualified Partners or Shareholders from Part II—enter here and on C-8000, line 60a 4

PART II **QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS**

A NAME AND ADDRESS	B SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	C % Time	D SHAREHOLDER'S SALARY	E % Own.	PARTNER'S or SHAREHOLDER'S	
					F Share of Bus. Inc.	G Share of SBT Paid
Earl Ruby 4380 Stoney River; Birm.	[redacted]	100%	144,600 00	100%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00
		%	00	%	00	00

PART III **NON-QUALIFIED PARTNERS OR SHAREHOLDERS. If more space is needed submit separate schedule and enter totals on line 7.**

		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
		00	%	00	00
TOTALS (Part II and Part III)	7	00	%	00	00

Reference copy, JFK Collection: ESCA (RG 233)

MICHIGAN INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURN MI-1040

Department of Treasury

for 1973, or taxable year beginning ...., 1973, ending ...., 19.....

Please Print or Type

First name and initial (if joint return, use first names and initials of both): EARL AND MARGE

Last name: RUBY

Your social security number: [redacted]

Home address (number and street or rural route): [illegible] LIVERNOIS

Your occupation: SALES

City, town or post office, and State: DETROIT, MICHIGAN

ZIP code: 48221

Spouse's social security no.:

Were you a Michigan resident prior to July 1, 1972? ☒ Yes ☐ No

1. Exemptions-Enter here total number of exemptions claimed on your 1973 Federal income tax return → 3

2. Filing status - check one. ☒ Married Filing Jointly ☐ Single ☒ Resident (full year)
☐ Married Filing Separately - Name of Spouse .... ☐ Part-year from .... to ....
Give spouse's social security no. in space provided ☐ Nonresident

Attach State Copy of Form W-2 Here

3. Adjusted gross income as defined in the Internal Revenue Code and which should be reported on Federal Form 1040, Line 15 or 1040A, Line 12 Attach copies of any Federal schedules that indicate a loss or deduction from gross income. (See page 5 of the instructions)	③	128,683 07
4. Additions (from page 2, line 36)	④	2,024 95
5. Add lines 3 and 4	5.	130,708 02
6. Subtractions (from page 2, line 44)	⑥	
7. Balance line (5 less line 6)	7.	130,708 02
8. Residents multiply exemptions claimed on line 1 by $1200.00 Part-year and nonresident allowance from line 48	⑧	3,600 00
9. Income subject to tax (line 7 less line 8)	9.	127,108 02
10. Tax: multiply line 9 by .039 (3.9%)	10.	4,957 21

CREDITS

	AMOUNT PAID		CREDIT	
(See pages 8, 9, and 10 of the instructions)				
11. Income tax paid to Michigan cities	⑪ 198 59	11a.	27 44	
12. Contributions to Michigan colleges and universities (attach receipts)	⑫	12a.		
13. Income tax paid to another state (attach copy of return)	13.	⑬a.		
14. Total credits (add lines 11a, 12a, and 13a,) enter total here				14. 27 44
15. Subtract line 14 from line 10 (If line 14 is greater than line 10, enter NONE)				15. 4,929 77

Homestead property tax relief - lines 16 thru 20 - senior citizens, veterans and blind persons see form MI-1040CR.

Attach Check or Money Order Here

16. Enter 1973 homestead property tax or line 51	⑯		
17. Household Income from line 58	⑰		
18. Enter 3.5% (.035) of Household Income shown on line 17	18.		
19. Difference between line 16 and line 18 (If line 18 is greater than line 16, enter NONE)	19.		
20. Enter 60% of line 19 (Maximum $500.00)		20.	
21. Credit from MI-1040CR (attach form MI-1040CR)		㉑	
22. Personal property tax paid on inventory	㉒		
23. Inventory tax credit — 25% of line 22		23.	

PAYMENTS

24. Michigan tax withheld (attach State copy of W-2)	㉔ 2,266 20		
25. Michigan estimated tax payments	㉕ 695 00		
26. 1972 overpayment credited to 1973	㉖		
27. Add line 20 or 21 to lines 23, 24, 25, and 26		27.	2,961 20
28. If line 27 is less than line 15, enter BALANCE OF TAX DUE HERE **PAY IN FULL WITH RETURN**		㉘	1,968 57
29. If line 27 is greater than line 15, enter OVERPAYMENT HERE		29.	
30. Amount of line 29 you wish to apply to your estimated tax payments		㉚	
31. Amount to be REFUNDED (subtract line 30 from line 29)		㉛	

This return is due April 15, 1974 or on the 15th day of the fourth month after the close of your tax year.

Under penalties of perjury, I declare that I have examined this return, including accompanying schedules and statements, and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

Sign Here

▷ .... Your signature .... Date

▷ Spouse's signature (if filing jointly, BOTH must sign even if only one had income)

▷ .... Signature of preparer other than taxpayer .... Date

GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
17350 TEN MILE ROAD
SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN 48075

Make checks payable to "State of Michigan." Mail return and payment to — Michigan Department of Treasury, P.O. Drawer, Lansing, Michigan 48904 [illegible] in 1974 [illegible] ....

2. Exemptions (number of allowable exemptions times $1,500.00) ....
3. Subtract line 2 from line 1. (This is your estimated taxable income) ....
4. Estimated tax (line 3 times .039 or 3.9%) ....
5. LESS: Total estimated tax credit for Michigan City income taxes, personal property tax on inventories, Michigan homestead property taxes and contributions to Michigan colleges and universities ....
6. Subtract line 5 from line 4. Enter here and on line 1 below ....

MICHIGAN
THE GREAT LAKE STATE

MICHIGAN DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS— 1974

For calendar year 1974 or fiscal year ending ____________, 19____

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Treasury

FORM MI-1040-ES

Please print or type	First name and initial (if joint declaration, use names and initials of both)	Last name	Your social security number
	Address (number and street)		Spouse's social security number
	City, State, and ZIP code		

1. Your estimate of 1974 income tax ....
2. Estimated income tax withheld and to be withheld during entire year of 1974 ....
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1 less line 2). (If less than $100, no declaration is required) ....
4. COMPUTATION OF INSTALLMENT. Check proper box below and enter amount indicated.
If this declaration is due to be filed on: ☐ April 15, 1974, enter 1/4 of line 3; ☐ September 16, 1974, enter 1/2 of line 3; ☐ June 17, 1974, enter 1/3 of line 3; ☐ Jan. 15, 1975, enter amount on line 3 ....
5. If you had an overpayment on your 1973 income tax return which you elected to have applied as a credit against your 1974 estimated tax, enter the amount here .... ☐
6. To apply entire overpayment credit to this installment and any excess to the next, enter here the amount on line 5. To spread credit evenly to each installment, divide it by number of installments and enter results here ....
7. Amount to be paid with this declaration at time of filing (line 4 less line 6) ....
8. Note: The payment of the estimated tax (line 3 less any 1973 overpayment credit) with this return eliminates the filing of quarterly estimates. Enter lump sum payment here ....

I have examined this declaration and to the best of my knowledge it is correct.

Signature(s) .... Date ...., 19........
If joint estimate, both husband and wife must sign

MICHIGAN
THE GREAT LAKE STATE

MICHIGAN DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX FOR INDIVIDUALS— 1974

For calendar year 1974 or fiscal year ending ____________, 19____

STATE OF MICHIGAN
Department of Treasury

FORM MI-1040-ES

Please print or type	First name and initial (if joint declaration, use names and initials of both) EARL AND MARGE	Last name RUBY	Your social security number [redacted]
	Address (number and street) 18135 LIVERNOIS		Spouse's social security number
	City, State, and ZIP code DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48221		

1. Your estimate of 1974 income tax 2,000.00
2. Estimated income tax withheld and to be withheld during entire year of 1974 ....
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1 less line 2). (If less than $100, no declaration is required) 2,000.00
4. COMPUTATION OF INSTALLMENT. Check proper box below and enter amount indicated.
If this declaration is due to be filed on: ☒ April 15, 1974, enter 1/4 of line 3; ☐ September 16, 1974, enter 1/2 of line 3; ☐ June 17, 1974, enter 1/3 of line 3; ☐ Jan. 15, 1975, enter amount on line 3 .... 500.00
5. If you had an overpayment on your 1973 income tax return which you elected to have applied as a credit against your 1974 estimated tax, enter the amount here .... ☐
6. To apply entire overpayment credit to this installment and any excess to the next, enter here the amount on line 5. To spread credit evenly to each installment, divide it by number of installments and enter results here ....
7. Amount to be paid with this declaration at time of filing (line 4 less line 6) 500.00
8. Note: The payment of the estimated tax (line 3 less any 1973 overpayment credit) with this return eliminates the filing of quarterly estimates. Enter lump sum payment here ....

I have examined this declaration and to the best of my knowledge it is correct.

Signature(s) .... Date ...., 19........
If joint estimate, both husband and wife must sign

For calendar year 1973 or other taxable year beginning ...., 1973, ending ...., 19..

First Name and Initial / Last Name (If joint return) Home Address City, Town or Post Office	4 F704298 [redacted] RUEY EARL & MARGE 18135 LIVERNOIS DETROIT, MI 48221	Your Social Security Number Your Occupation Spouse's Social Security Number Spouse's Occupation

EXTENSION NUMBER

If you are an EMPLOYER, enter your Federal EMPLOYER Identification No. here:

IP FP APP. OA.

A. If married, is spouse filing a separate return? ☐ YES ☒ NO. If yes, enter spouse's first name............

B. Enter the name and address used on your return for 1972 (If the same as above write "Same". If different, indicate date moved.) If none filed, give reason. SAME

Auditor

SCHEDULE A — EXEMPTIONS

	Regular	65 or over	Blind	Enter number of exemptions checked →
1. YOURSELF	☒	☐	☐	2
SPOUSE	☒	☐	☐	

2. Enter first names of each of your DEPENDENT CHILDREN who lived with you: [illegible] Enter No. → 1

3. OTHER DEPENDENTS	NAME Enter figure 1 in the last column to right for each name listed	Relationship	Months lived in your home during 1973	
				→
				→

4. Total exemptions from lines 1, 2 and 3; enter here and on line 15 below. → 3

INCOME (If joint return, include all income of both husband and wife)

5. Enter GROSS income from employers for wages, salaries, commissions, tips, etc. — indicate (W) for wife

Employer's Name	Where employed (City and State)	Total wages reported on DW-2 or W-2	Detroit Income Tax Withheld	WAGES, ETC. EARNED IN DETROIT
[illegible] CLEANERS, INC.	DET, MI	$ 50,350.00	$ 238.27	$ [illegible]
[illegible] SALES, INC.	DET, MI	10,000.00	120.00	[illegible]
6. TOTALS		60,350.00	358.27	[illegible]

7. Rental income (or loss) from tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 2, Schedule B, line 4	[illegible]
8. Other income (or loss) from partnerships, etc. — from page 2, Schedule F, line 4	76[illegible]
9. Gain (or loss) from sale or exchange of tangible property in the City of Detroit — from page 3, Schedule E, line 10	
10. Net profit (or loss) from business — from page 3, Schedule C, line 8	
11. Income (or loss) — TRUSTS AND ESTATES ONLY — from page 4, Schedule G, line 7 (see instructions for exemption to enter on line 15)	
12. Total (add lines 6 through 11 of last column)	[illegible]
13. Less: Deductions from page 2, Schedule M, line 5 (if none, enter zero)	
14. Total (line 12 less line 13)	[illegible]
15. Less Amount for Exemptions: Enter number of exemptions from line 4 above 3 and multiply by $600	$ [illegible]
16. TOTAL INCOME SUBJECT TO TAX	[illegible]
17. CITY OF DETROIT TAX: Multiply line 16 by .005 (½%)	$ [illegible]

PAYMENTS AND CREDITS

18. a. Tax withheld by employer — from line 6 above — ATTACH Forms DW-2 or W-2	$ 358.27
b. Payments and credits on 1973 Declaration of Estimated Detroit Income Tax	
c. Other Credits — explain in attached statement (See Instructions)	
19. TOTAL — Add Lines 18a, b, and c	$ [illegible]

TAX DUE OR REFUND

20. If your payments (line 19) are larger than your tax (line 17), enter amount of **OVERPAYMENT**	$ 185.06
21. Check box if you wish overpayment on line 20 to be: (A) ☐ Credited on 1974 Estimated Tax or (B) ☒ Refunded.	
22. If your tax (line 17) is larger than your payments (line 19) enter amount of **BALANCE DUE** Pay in full with this return	$

Make check payable to: "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT." A balance due of less than one dollar ($1.00) need not be paid.

SIGN → HERE

I declare that I have examined this return (including accompanying schedules and statements) and to the best of my knowledge and belief it is true, correct and complete. If prepared by a person other than taxpayer, his declaration is based on all information of which he has any knowledge.

SIGN HERE............
(Taxpayer's signature and date)

SIGN HERE............
(Spouse's signature and date) (If joint return, BOTH HUSBAND AND WIFE MUST SIGN)

(Signature of preparer other than taxpayer) (Date)

GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT
17350 TEN MILE ROAD
SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN 48075

MAIL TO: City Treasurer, 104 City-County Building, Detroit 48226
RETURNS MUST BE FILED BY APRIL 30

Attach Check or Money Order Here ← Attach Copy of Forms DW-2 or W-2 Here

Revenue Division
INTANGIBLES TAX RETURN

Calendar Year 19 73

OR FISCAL YEAR ______
Beginning ______ 19 ______
Ending ______ 19 ______

THIS NUMBER WHEN SUBMITTING PAYMENT, OR IN CORRESPONDENCE

DO NOT WRITE ABOVE THIS LINE

Individual ☐
Partnership ☐
Michigan Corporation ☐
Foreign Corporation ☐
Fiduciary ☐
Check One

RUBY EARL & MARGIE
18135 LIVERNOIS AVE
DETROIT MI 48221

6 9 3 3 5 5

POSTED	FILED

IF THIS RETURN IS FOR AN ESTATE GIVE PROBATE
County ______
File No. ______
Date of Death ______

RETROACTIVE DATE MONTH	DAY	YEAR	ACCOUNT NO.	TYPE	COUNTY	CITY	K	C	FILE DATE	
11	30	73	698855	007	82		1		73	12

Line No.	Computation of Tax Due	AMOUNT	Line No.	TAX
1.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (non-income producing only)		1.	
2.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable		2.	
3.	Balance Taxable @ 1/10th of 1%		3.	
4.	Accounts and Notes Receivable (income producing only)		4.	
5.	Less Accounts and Notes Payable (use only that portion, if any, not used in Line 2)		5.	
6.	Balance Taxable		6	
7.	Income applicable to balance		7.	
8.	Tax @ 3½% of Income (Line 7) or 1/10 of 1% of Balance (Line 6), whichever is greater		8.	
9.	Stocks and Bonds ----- Schedule A, Column 9.		9.	1926.64
10.	Mortgages and Land Contracts ----- Schedule B, Column 8.		10.	
11.	Annuities ----- Schedule C, Column 9.		11.	
12.	Beneficiary Return (attach copy hereto)		12.	
13.	TOTAL		13.	[illegible]
14.	Less Statutory deduction ($175.00 or $350.00 by husbands and wives filing joint return)		14.	[illegible]
15.	BALANCE DUE		15.	1576
16.	Cash on Hand or in Transit as of retroactive date (include cash in safety deposit boxes)		16.	
17.	Bank Deposits in Banks Located Outside of Michigan ______ or Withdrawn from Mich. Banks or Ass'ns. after RETROACTIVE DATE.		17.	
18.	Savings in Building and Loan Ass'ns. Located Outside of Michigan ______		18.	
19.	TOTAL		19.	
20.	TAX @ 40¢ per $1000.00 of Line 19		20.	
21.	TOTAL TAX DUE (Line 15 plus Line 20)		21.	1576.64
22.	Less Advance Payment of Tax		22.	
23.	TOTAL TAX DUE		23.	1576.64
24.	Penalties & Interest; Penalty ______ %, $ ______; Interest ______ % ______ Months, $ ______		24.	
25.	TOTAL AMOUNT DUE		25.	1576.64

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO STATE OF MICHIGAN
Please forward Remittance for Amount Shown Here on or before April 30.
To: MICHIGAN DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY, LANSING, MICH. 48922 (or four months after end of authorized fiscal year)

IMPORTANT—Be Sure to Answer the following Question When Applicable.

1. Business or Profession of Taxpayer SALES Phone No. 543-5430
2. Give year of last return filed. 1972 Address of Last Return SAME
3. Check here if return is computed on a Retroactive Date Method ✓ or Monthly Average Method ______
4. If taxpayer is a corporation give State and Date of Incorporation ______ Federal Employers Identification Number ______
5. If this is the return of a Trustee attach list of names and addresses of beneficiaries and date of creation of trust.
6. If this is a Business Return a copy of the Balance Sheet as of the close of the Tax Year must be attached.

I declare under the penalties imposed by Act No. 301 P. A. of 1939, as Amended, that this return, including any accompanying schedules and statements has been examined by and to the best of my knowledge and belief is a true, correct and complete return.

Social Security Number [redacted]

Signed ______

Signed ______

Title ______
State whether Individual Owner, Member of Firm, Executor, Administrator, Trustee, etc., or give title if officer of corporation

Return Prepared by GORDON L. HOLLANDER, P.C.
~~CERTIFIED PUBLIC ACCOUNTANT~~
Address 17350 TEN MILE ROAD
SOUTHFIELD, MICHIGAN 48075

ON REVERSE SIDE

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

1974

C of D-15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-73)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1974 $

B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION) $

C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B) $

D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW $

D-1040-ES

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19...

1974

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $...........................; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax .... $

2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974 ....

3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) .... $

4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☐ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100% $

5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit ⟶ $

6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) .... $

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ________________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19...

1974

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) COMO CLEANERS, INC.

ADDRESS 19155 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT, STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☑ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $ 1,580.53; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax .... $ 1,600.00

2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974 ....

3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) .... $ 1,600.00

4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☒ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100% $ 400.00

5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit ⟶ $

6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) .... $ 400.00

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ________________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

[illegible] (specify)		[illegible] inventory? ☐ Yes ☐ No	
1 Inventory at beginning of year		5 Total of lines 1 through 4	
2 Merchandise bought for manufacture or sale		6 Less inventory at end of year	
3 Salaries and wages		7 Cost of goods sold (enter here and on line 2, page 1)	
4 Other costs (attach schedule)			

COMPENSATION OF OFFICERS (See instruction 12)

1. Name of officer	2. Social security number	3. Title	4. Time devoted to business	5. Percent of corporation stock owned	6. Amount of compensation	7. [illegible]
	[redacted]					
	[redacted]					

Total compensation of officers (enter here and on line 12, page 1) . . . .

BAD DEBTS—RESERVE METHOD (See instruction 15)

1. Year	2. Trade notes and accounts receivable outstanding at end of year	3. Sales on account	Amount added to reserve		6. Amount charged against reserve	7. Reserve for bad debts at end of year
			4. Current year's provision	5. Recoveries		
1968						
1969						
1970						
1971						
1972						
1973						

DEPRECIATION (See instruction 21)

Note: If depreciation is computed by using the Class Life (ADR) System for assets placed in service after 1970, or the Guideline Class Life System for assets placed in service before 1971, you must file Form 4832 (Class Life (ADR) System) or Form 5006 (Guideline Class Life System) with your return. Except as otherwise expressly provided in regulations section 1.167(a)–11(b)(5)(vi) and regulations section 1.167(a)–12, the provisions of Revenue Procedures 62–21 and 65–13 are not applicable for taxable years ending after [illegible]

Check box(es) if you made an election this taxable year to use ☐ Class Life (ADR) System and/or ☐ Guideline Class Life System. See Pub. [illegible]

1. Group and guideline class or description of property	2. Date acquired	3. Cost or other basis	4. Depreciation allowed or allowable in prior years	5. Method of computing depreciation	6. Life or rate	7. Depreciation for this year
1 Total additional first-year depreciation (do not include in items below)						
2 Depreciation from Form 4832			▨	▨	▨	
3 Depreciation from Form 5006			▨	▨	▨	
4 Other depreciation:						
Buildings						
Furniture and fixtures						
Transportation equipment						
Machinery and other equipment						
Other (specify)						
5 Totals						
6 Less amount of depreciation claimed in Schedule A						
7 Balance—enter here and on line 21, page 1						

SUMMARY OF DEPRECIATION (other than additional first-year depreciation)

	Straight line	Declining balance	Sum of the years-digits	Units of production	Other (specify)	Total
1 Depreciation from Form 4832				▨	▨	
2 Depreciation from Form 5006				▨	▨	
3 Other						

TAX COMPUTATION (See instructions)

1 Taxable income (line 28, page 1)		
2 (a) Enter 48% of line 1 (members of controlled groups, see instructions)		
(b) Subtract $6,500 and enter difference	6,500.00	
3 Net long-term capital gain reduced by net short-term capital loss (from line 9(b), page 1)		
4 Subtract $25,000. (Statutory minimum.)		25,000.00
5 Balance (line 3 less line 4) (see instructions)		
6 Enter 30% of line 5 (see instructions)		
7 Income tax (line 2 or line 6, whichever is lesser). Enter here and on line 29, page 1		

[illegible]

[illegible] Undistributed Taxable Income

1 Taxable income (line 28, page 1) . . . .

2 Less: (a) Money distributed as dividends out of earnings and profits of the taxable year . . . . . .

(b) Tax imposed on certain capital gains (line 31, page 1) . . . .

3 Corporation's undistributed taxable income . . . .

SUMMARY OF DISTRIBUTIONS AND OTHER ITEMS [illegible]

1. Name and address of each shareholder	2. Social security number	3. Stock ownership: Number of shares	3. Stock ownership: Period held: From	3. Stock ownership: Period held: To	4. Compensation	5. [illegible]
[illegible]	[redacted]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]		
[illegible]	[redacted]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible]	

4 Actual dividend distributions taxable as ordinary income (Do not include amounts shown on line 6) . . . .

5 Actual dividend distributions taxable as long-term capital gains (after tax)* . . . .

6 Actual dividend distributions taxable as ordinary income and qualifying for dividend exclusion . . . .

7 Nondividend distributions . . . .

8 Undistributed taxable income—taxable as ordinary income or (loss) . . . .

9 Undistributed taxable income—taxable as long-term capital gain (after tax)* . . . .

*[illegible] amount of his pro rata share of long-term capital gains may qualify as subsection (d) gains. See section [illegible]

10 INTEREST ON INVESTMENT INDEBTEDNESS:

(a) Investment interest expense . . .

(b) Net investment income or (loss) . .

(c) Excess expenses over rental income attributable to net lease property .

(d) Excess of net long-term capital gains over net short-term capital losses attributable to investment property .

11 ITEMS OF TAX PREFERENCE:

(a) Accelerated depreciation of:

(1) Low-income rental housing . .

(2) Other real property . . . .

(3) Personal property subject to a net lease . . . .

(b) Amortization of:

(1) Certified pollution control facilities .

(2) Railroad rolling stock . . .

(3) On-the-job training facilities .

(4) Child care facilities . . . .

(c) Reserves for losses on bad debts of financial institutions . . . . .

(d) Excess percentage depletion . .

(e) Net long-term capital gain (after tax) . .

12 INVESTMENT CREDIT PROPERTY:

Basis of new investment property	(a) 3 or more but less than 5 years .	
	(b) 5 or more but less than 7 years .	
	(c) 7 or more years	
Cost of used investment property	(d) 3 or more but less than 5 years .	
	(e) 5 or more but less than 7 years .	
	(f) 7 or more years	

COMPLETE A SEPARATE SCHEDULE K-1 FOR EACH SHAREHOLDER—File Copy A with Form 1120S, give Copy B to each shareholder, and keep Copy C for your records.

F Date incorporated June 1, 1966

G Did the corporation at the end of the taxable year own, directly or indirectly, 50% or more of the voting stock of a domestic corporation? ☐ Yes ☐ No. (For rules of attribution, see section 267(c).) If the answer is "Yes," attach a schedule showing:

(a) name, address, and employer identification number; and

(b) percentage owned,

H Did the corporation during the taxable year have any contracts or subcontracts subject to the Renegotiation Act of 1951? ☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," enter the aggregate gross dollar amount billed during the year . . . .

I Amount of taxable income or (loss) for: 1970 48,505.67; 1971 [illegible]; 1972 6,666.64

J Refer to page 7 of instructions and state the principal:

Business activity [illegible]

Product or service [illegible]

K Were you a member of a controlled group subject to the provisions of sections 1561 or 1562? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

L Did you claim a deduction for expenses connected with any:

(1) Entertainment facility (boat, resort, ranch, etc.)? . ☐ Yes ☐ No

(2) Living accommodations (except employees on business)? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

(3) Employees' families at conventions or meetings? ☐ Yes ☐ No

(4) Employee or family vacations not reported on Form W-2? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

M Did you file all required Forms 1099, 1096 and 1087? ☐ Yes ☐ No

N Did the corporation, at any time during the taxable year, have any interest in or signature or other authority over a bank, securities, or other financial account in a foreign country? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

If "Yes," attach Form 4683. (For definitions, see Form 4683.)

O Answer only if (1) this is the first 1120S return filed since year of election to be treated as a small business corporation and (2) the corporation was in existence for the taxable year prior to the election and had investment credit property:

Was an agreement filed under section 1.47–4(b) of the Regulations? . . . . ☐ Yes ☐ No

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D–15-0.7-3 (Rev. 8-73)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1974	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19....

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $.........................; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax ...... $
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974 ......
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) ...... $
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☐ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100% $
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit → $
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) ...... $

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19.... 1974

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) [illegible] SALES, INC.

ADDRESS [illegible] LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48[illegible]

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted] [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $ 219.04; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax ...... $ 225.00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974 ......
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) ...... $ 225
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☐ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100% $
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit → $ 220
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) ...... $ -0-

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

SCHEDULE K—SHAREHOLDERS' SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS
(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	[illegible] [illegible]	[redacted]	7[illegible]
(b)	[illegible] MARCUS [illegible] MIAMI, FLA [illegible]	[redacted]	7[illegible]
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	[illegible] income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) [illegible] line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on [illegible] line 35 or on page 2, schedule [illegible], line 43) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)
(a)	$ 38,747.35	$ 38,747.35	$ —0—
(b)	38,747.36	38,747.36	—0—
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D-15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-73)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1974	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ……………………, 19……
1974

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)
ADDRESS
CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $………………; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax	$
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100%	$
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

∨ DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ……………………, 19……
1974

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) COBB CLEANERS, INC.
ADDRESS 16165 LIVERNOIS
CITY DETROIT, STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]
SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☒ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $ 1,580.53 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax	$ 1,600.00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$ 1,600.00
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☒ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100%	$ 400.00
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$ 400.00

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX
TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D-15-D.7-3 (Rev. 6-73)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1974	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX

For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $..........................; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax .... $
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974 ....
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) .... $
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☐ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100% $
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit → $
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) .... $

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

OFFICE OF THE CITY TREASURER — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES

CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX

For Calendar Year 1974 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19........ 1974

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) [illegible] SALES, INC.

ADDRESS [illegible] LIVERNAIS

CITY [illegible] STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48[illegible]

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted] [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1973 Detroit Income Tax $ 219.04; 1b. Your Estimate of 1974 Detroit Income Tax .... $ [illegible]
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1974 ....
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) .... $ [illegible]
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☐ Apr. 30, 1974—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1974—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1974—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1975—100% $
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1973 return which you elected to claim as a credit → $ [illegible]
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) .... $ -0-

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

SCHEDULE F — SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER, BIRM. MICH.	[redacted]	7,500
(b)	ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL. 60602		7,500
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) Distributive income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 37 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 46) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 25 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (see instructions)
(a)	$ 9,169.69	9,169.69		[illegible]
(b)	9,169.69	9,169.69		[illegible]
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D-15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-74)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1975	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $.....................; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT" AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

FINANCE DEPARTMENT — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) COBO-RUMAR SALES, INC.

ADDRESS 18135 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT, STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☒ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $ 367.39; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$ 400.00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$ 400.00
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☒ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$ 100.00
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$ 100.00

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

SCHEDULE F — SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER DR. BIRM. MI 48010	[redacted]	7,500
(b)	ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL 60602		7,500
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 37 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 46) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 25 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (see instructions)
(a) $	36,331.38	36,331.38		91.94
(b)	36,331.37	36,331.37		91.94
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C or D-15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-74)

A TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1975	$
B EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ………, 19……

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $……; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ______

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

FINANCE DEPARTMENT — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ………, 19……

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) [illegible] CLEANERS, INC.

ADDRESS 18135 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☒ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $ 1,469.26; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$ 1,600.00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) ●	$ 1,600.00
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☒ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$ 400.00
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit → ●	$ 130.74
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) ●	$ 269.26

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ______

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

SCHEDULE F — SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	CARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER, BIRM. MICH.	[redacted]	7,500
(b)	ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL. 60602		7,500
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 37 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 46) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 25 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (see instructions)
(a)	$ 9,169.69	9,169.69		49.00
(b)	9,169.69	9,169.69		49.00
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D-15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-74)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1975	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
- ☐ INDIVIDUAL
- ☐ CORPORATION
- ☐ PARTNERSHIP
- ☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $..................; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax .... $

2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975 ....

3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) .... $

4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100% $

5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit ⟶ $

6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) .... $

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

FINANCE DEPARTMENT — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) COSO-RUMAR SALES, INC.

ADDRESS 18135 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT, STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]-[redacted] [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
- ☐ INDIVIDUAL
- ☒ CORPORATION
- ☐ PARTNERSHIP
- ☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $ 367.39; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax .... $ 400.00

2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975 ....

3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) .... ● $ 400.00

4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated:
☒ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100% $ 100.00

5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit ⟶ ● $

6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) .... ● $ 100.00

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

SCHEDULE F — SHAREHOLDERS SHARE OF INCOME AND CREDITS

(If additional space is needed, attach schedule)

	(1) Name and Address of Each Shareholder	(2) Social Security Number	(3) Number of Shares
(a)	EARL RUBY 4380 STONEY RIVER DR. BIRM. MI 48010	[redacted]	7,500
(b)	ESTATE OF GEORGE MARCUS 69 W. WASHINGTON #1150 CHICAGO, ILL 60602		7,500
(c)			
(d)			
(e)			
(f)			
(g)			
(h)			
(i)			
(j)			

	(4) Amount taxable as ordinary income (schedule K, total of lines 4 and 8, U.S. 1120-S)	(5) Distributive Income from page 1, line 5, or page 2, schedule B, line 6	(6) Amount to be used by shareholder on MI-1040 (enter on page 2, schedule 1, line 37 or on page 2, schedule 2, line 46) difference between column 4 and column 5 (see instructions)	(7) Enter here and on form MI-1040, page 1, line 25 each shareholder's proportionate share of personal property taxes paid on inventories or the credit for franchise fees paid. (see instructions)
(a)	$ 36,331.38	36,331.38		91.94
(b)	36,331.37	36,331.37		91.94
(c)				
(d)				
(e)				
(f)				
(g)				
(h)				
(i)				
(j)				

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D—15-DIT-J Rev. 8-74

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1975	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19 ......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $..........; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

FINANCE DEPARTMENT — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19 ......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) [illegible] CLEANERS, INC.

ADDRESS 18135 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☒ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $ 1,469.26; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$ 1,600 00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2) ●	$ 1,600 00
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☒ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$ 400 00
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit → ●	$ 130 74
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5) ●	$ 269 26

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX **1975**

TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D-15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-74)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1975	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ……………, 19……

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $……; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

FINANCE DEPARTMENT — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ……………, 19……

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) MARUBY, INC.

ADDRESS 18135 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☒ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $ 98.22; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$ 100.00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$ 100.00
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$ 100.00
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$ 61.83
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$ 38.17

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION.

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration.

DATE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

TAX COMPUTATION SCHEDULE

C of D—15-DIT-J (Rev. 8-74)

A. TOTAL DETROIT INCOME EXPECTED IN 1975	$
B. EXEMPTIONS ($600.00 FOR EACH EXEMPTION)	$
C. ESTIMATED DETROIT TAXABLE INCOME (LINE A LESS LINE B)	$
D. ESTIMATED DETROIT INCOME TAX—NONRESIDENT INDIVIDUALS ENTER ½ OF 1% OF LINE C. ALL OTHER TAXPAYERS ENTER 2% OF LINE C. ENTER TAX HERE AND ON LINE 1b OF DECLARATION BELOW	$

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE)

ADDRESS

CITY STATE POSTAL ZIP CODE

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☐ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

KEEP THIS COPY FOR YOUR RECORDS

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $........................; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

MAKE REMITTANCE PAYABLE TO "TREASURER, CITY OF DETROIT"
AND MAIL WITH DECLARATION TO:

FINANCE DEPARTMENT — INCOME TAX DIVISION
104 CITY-COUNTY BUILDING
DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226

This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

DATE

DETACH ON PERFORATION AND SEND FORM BELOW WITH YOUR REMITTANCE

D-1040-ES CITY OF DETROIT DECLARATION OF ESTIMATED INCOME TAX 1975

For Calendar Year 1975 or Fiscal Year Ending ...., 19......

NAME(S) (PRINT OR TYPE) MARUBY, INC.

ADDRESS 18135 LIVERNOIS

CITY DETROIT, STATE MICHIGAN POSTAL ZIP CODE 48221

YOUR SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER [redacted]

SPOUSE'S SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER

CHECK TYPE OF DECLARATION
☐ INDIVIDUAL
☒ CORPORATION
☐ PARTNERSHIP
☐ OTHER

DOCUMENT LOCATOR NUMBER

1a. Your 1974 Detroit Income Tax $ 98.22; 1b. Your Estimate of 1975 Detroit Income Tax	$ 100.00
2. Amount of Detroit Income Tax to be withheld or other credit expected in 1975	
3. ESTIMATED TAX (line 1b less line 2)	$ 100.00
4. Computation of Installment: Check Due Date of declaration below and enter portion of line 3 as indicated: ☐ Apr. 30, 1975—1/4; ☐ June 30, 1975—1/3; ☐ Sept. 30, 1975—1/2; ☐ Jan. 31, 1976—100%	$ 100.00
5. Less: Amount of overpayment on 1974 return which you elected to claim as a credit →	$ 61.83
6. AMOUNT TO BE PAID WITH THIS DECLARATION (line 4 less line 5)	$ 38.17

IF YOU ARE AN EMPLOYER, ENTER EMPLOYER IDENTIFICATION NUMBER ____________

I CERTIFY THAT THIS IS A CORRECT DECLARATION. This declaration of estimated tax is not a Tax Return.

Signature of Taxpayer. Spouse also if joint declaration. DATE

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 9/30/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10073-10321

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 005174 (2 OF 8)

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : DOWINING, THOMAS N.
TO : BATES, C.M.

TITLE :

DATE : 12/03/1976
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :

HSCA, ADMINISTRATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : LETTER
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Consulted
CURRENT STATUS : Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/15/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box #:109.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

THOMAS N. DOWNING, VA., CHAIRMAN
HENRY B. GONZALEZ, TEX.
CHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
UIS STOKES, OHIO
ALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
BURT L. TALCOTT, CALIF.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3341 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

December 3, 1976

Mr. C. M. Bates
Superintendent of Buildings
Room 246, C.H.O.B.
Washington, D. C. 20515

Dear Bates:

The following staff personnel of the Select Committee on Assassinations have not been issued House identification cards at this time due to no fault of their own. Should any of the below listed staffers wish to enter the committee rooms, #3342, House Office Building Annex #2, after hours and when there is no one present, please allow them access after verification of identification and social security number:

Mrs. Edyth Baish	169-16-0121
Ms. Sheryl Bonifer	228-82-4715
Ms. Linda Connor	231-58-8079
Steven Fallis	Will furnish Social Security at later date.
Thomas Gannon	180-30-1309
Gerald Hamilton	251-88-1541
Thomas Howarth	015-18-1386
Belford Lawson	579-58-9975
Alvin Lewis	205-26-3636
Ralph Locke	017-36-1972
Denise McCrea	577-72-8453
Andy Purdy	211-38-9707
James Wolfe	057-40-6887

Thanking you in advance for your cooperation, I am

Sincerely,

Thomas N. Downing
Chairman

TND:vm

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 9/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10076-10105
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	008269[PT.11]

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	NEW ORLEANS DISTRICT ATTORNEY
FROM :	LOISEL, LYNN
TO :	IVON, LOUIS
TITLE :	
DATE :	01/11/1967
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	FERRIE, DAVID LEADS AND INFORMATION JOHNSON, JIMMY
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/04/1996
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 151.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88326 Date: 2025

MEMORANDUM

January 11, 1967

SSN. = 420-56-3625
(Later referred to as "Agent #1")

TO: LOUIS IVON, INVESTIGATOR

FROM: LYNN LOISEL, INVESTIGATOR

RE: PHONE CALL FROM JIMMY JOHNSON REGARDING FERRIE AND THE SMITH CASE (January 10, 1967, 4:00 P. M.)

It is to be noted that Jimmy Johnson who was once a close associate of Ferrie, but broke free from Ferrie but as a favor for this office, renewed his friendship with Ferrie for information purposes for this office.

Jimmy stated that Ferrie had contacted Pershing the other day in regards to the Cuban woman's name that was mentioned in the Saturday Evening Post article.

That Ferrie had called a lawyer (name unknown) last night which would be January 9, 1967, and spoke with the lawyer about his being investigated by this office. Details of conversation unknown.

Ferrie has a lot of old army paraphernalia in his apartment, such as, walkie talkies, incendiary bombs, etc.

Ferrie was showing nude pictures (moving films) to two young boys and a district police car shined a light on his front porch and he really became frightened and uncontrollable, telling Jimmy that the police must suspect him.

Jimmy stated that one Steve Littleton parked a twin-engine beachcraft in Ferrie's spot at the airport, and that their plane was flown in from out-of-town. It is at Ferrie's disposal. He also heard Ferrie and Littleton talking about a little island somewhere and they were interested in knowing if they could land the beachcraft on this island.

Jimmy feels that they may have taken a smaller airplane and flew to this island today to look at a possible landing spot.

End of Communication

LYNN LOISEL

LL/bb

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/14/20

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10078-10492

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 009441

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CALL, RICHARD DENNIS
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/06/1978
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :

CALL; RICHARD, DENNIS
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY; PRE-RUSSIAN PERIOD
MILITARY SERVICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/20/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : 173-6. Box 173.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

009441

1. Identifying Information:

Name ~~Ron~~ Richard DENNIS Call
Address Box 623A- Route #5
City/State FLEMINGTON, N. JERSEY 08822
Date of Birth 1-6-38
Social Security 162-32-1053

Date 6-6-78
Place FLEMINGTON, N. JERSEY
Telephone 201-782-7832
M or S MARRIED
Spouse
Children 1 daughter

2. Physical Description:

Height
Weight
Ethnic Group White Male

Color Eyes Hair
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: College PROFESSOR -
Address FLAMINGTON, N. JERSEY
Telephone

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name
Address

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks:

Investigator Clarence Day

Date 6-6-78

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Richard Dennis Call Date June 6, 1978 Time 4:00 p.m.

Address Box #623-A, Route 5, Flemington, New Jersey 08822 Place Residence

Interview: Mr. Call stated that in 1959 he was in the United States Marine Corps and stationed at El Toro Bay Marine Air Station in Santa Anita, California. He stated that at the time he was a Sergeant in the Marine Corps and that his Marine military speciality was aeronautical electronics operator. He stated that Lee Harvey Oswald was under his immediate supervision.

Call stated that his duties and that of his unit was to track aircraft on a radar scope. He further advised that his unit at that time only worked two or three days out of a week. He stated further that Lee Harvey Oswald's specific duties involved sitting in front of a large radar screen that constantly scanned certain areas for aircraft. Once the aircraft was spotted, it was his duty to track the aircraft until it had cleared the area. Call further continued and stated that his unit had security clearance and he described this level of clearance as being "confidential." He indicated that the security clearance was necessary due to the nature of the work that his unit was doing and also because of the type of radar equip-

Interviewer Signature Clarence J Day

Typed Signature Clarence Day

Date transcribed 6-23-78

By: br Form #4-A

ment the unit used. Mr. Call stated that he was Oswald's immediate supervisor. He was not a close friend of Lee Harvey Oswald but the interest they shared was mainly the game of chess. Oswald would play chess with him quite often. He described Oswald as being quiet. He didn't talk very much. During any conversation that went on, the other person had to solicit it from him. He described him as being a loner, staying off to himself, not having very many friends or having very much contact with other people in the unit. In his words, Mr. Call described Oswald as being "an oddball." Call stated that he had never gone off the base or socialized off the base with Lee Harvey Oswald. He knew of no civilian or military personnel who he was particularly friendly with.

In regards to whether or not Mr. Call knew that LHO was studying a foreign language, Mr. Call stated that LHO was studying the Russian language. He had many books and he purchased Russian records, that is, records of music. Mr. Call could not recall the title of the books but he did state that LHO subscribed to two Russian periodicals, or newspapers. He stated that the two newspapers were the two most popular Russian newspapers in circulation in the United States today. Mr. Call recalled a particular record that he owned that was in Russian. The name of the record he said was "Russian Fireworks." He said that LHO enjoyed listening to the Russian music that he owned, that is, Mr. Call's. Mr. Call recalled to memory that on occasions he would be playing Russian music in his quarters and if LHO heard the music he would respond to where he was and reply "Did you call?" Mr. Call stated that it was common knowledge in his unit that LHO was studying the Russian language and that he was very interested in the Russian way of life. Mr. Call knew of no persons that Oswald was studying Russian with. He stated that LHO also had a security clearance, the same security clearance as everyone else in the unit. Call was not sure of what particular training LHO had had; however, he did indicate that LHO had had training in the use of radar tracking equipment. He stated that LHO was a very tight person with money. He never knew him to have an over-abundance of money. Call stated that he had no knowledge of any military personnel who LHO had close contact with, with the exception of a lieutenant by the name of Donavan who he used to play chess with. He also played chess with a Marine by the name of Botello. Call stated that he did/not know Botello's full name, but he believed he was a major in the Marine Corps, that at the present time Botello is a judge in the state of California. although he isn't certain of which state. As far as LHO's interests--personal or professional--were concerned, Call stated that he had no knowledge except that LHO was very interested in the Russian way of life. He was extremely interested in trying to learn to speak the Russian language, so much so that it became a joke in the unit. Instead of calling LHO

"Lee," the men in the unit would call him either "Comrade" or "Oswaldovitch." Lee would show his interest in the Russian way of life by, on occasion, when he was playing chess, if he was asked which men he wanted out of the set of red and black men, LHO would say "the Reds always." Mr. Call knew of no particular military program that LHO was interested in. However, he did state that in 1959 he, LHO, and another Marine named Delgado, all qualified on the rifle range. He considered LHO a very good shot with a rifle. LHO qualified with a score of 212. He stated that he shot right alongside LHO during their qualification. This witness knew of no organizations or informal groups that LHO belonged to. Mr. Call stated that LHO had never spoken to him about the U-2 program. Call further continued and stated that at that time he didn't know what the U-2 program was, that is, Mr. Call didn't know what the U-2 program was. Mr. Call stated that he knew that LHO had shot himself in the arm, or that he had been shot in the arm, that he heard from other men in the unit that Oswald had shot himself in the arm. Call did not know the particulars of the incident. Call stated that he did not know that LHO had a family until 1959 when he was about to be discharged from the service. LHO came to him and told him that his mother was ill and that he was getting a hardship discharge from the service. Call stated that before this time, LHO during the entire time he knew him, had never spoken of any member of his family. Call indicated that he was quite shocked to learn that LHO was getting out on a hardship discharge. Call further stated that prior to his discharge from the Marine Corps, LHO told him that he had been accepted to study at a university in Switzerland. Mr. Call knew of no long extensive periods of time that LHO was separated from the unit while he was under his command. When asked if he, Mr. Call, had been questioned by any federal agency after the assassination, Mr. Call responded that about a week after the assassination of President Kennedy, he was interviewed by agents of the FBI. He does not recall the agents' names. Mr. Call further stated that about a year ago, he was contacted and interviewed by Edward Jay Epstein, the author of the book entitled, "The Legend of Lee Harvey Oswald." Mr. Call described LHO as being a person who was very discontent with the conditions in the United States at that time. Mr. Call stated that he had never heard LHO make a threat against the President or any other official of the United States.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/14/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10086-10257
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	009046

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	BROWN, JUANITA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/01/1978
PAGES :	8
SUBJECTS :	BROWN, JUANITA, ASSOCIATION WITH OSWALD WILLIAM REILLY COFFEE CO. OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, EMPLOYMENT
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/18/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 164.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name Juanita Brown
Address 561 Andrews St.
City/State Metairie, La.
Date of Birth 5-21-29
Social Security 438-28-1981

Date 6-1-78
Place 640 Magazine St.
Telephone 504-835-4860
M or S M
Spouse
Children

2. Physical Description:

Height 5'1"
Weight 110
Ethnic Group Caucasian

Color Eyes Brn Hair Bld
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: William B. Rielly Coffee Co.
Address 640 Magazine St. New Orleans, La.
Telephone 504-524-6131 X 225

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name
Address

b. Area frequented:
c. Remarks: Saw LHO in Alba's Garage

Investigator Robert Buras
Date 6-1-78

Form #4-B

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE 6-1-78 TIME 3:30 PM

I. Identifying Information:

Name Juanita Brown Telephone 504-835-4860

Address 561 Andrews St. Metairie, La.

Type of Contact: ☐ Telephone
☒ Person

II. Summary of Contact:

Mrs. Brown works in the payroll deparment of the William B. Rielly Coffee Co. She worked there when Lee Harvey Oswald Worked for the company. Mrs. Brown and other ladies used to go to Adrain Alba's garage next to the company to buy a cold drink because the company did not have a drink machine. Occassionally several of the ladies would go together on their break. Mrs. Brown remembers that on a couple of occassions Oswald was in the garage office. She did not talk to him nor does she remember him ever saying anything in her presence. She couldn't remember any of the other ladies at the time of this contact but she will call back if she recalls any of the names.

End Of Memo

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

None

Signature: Robert Buras

Form #5

6-1-78 3:D PM

504-835-4860

Juanita Brown
561 Andrews St. Metairie, La.

X

Mrs. Brown works in the payroll deparment of the William B. Rielly Coffee Co. She worked there when Lee Harvey Oswald Worked for the company. Mrs. Brown and other ladies used to go to Adrain Alba's garage next to the company to buy a cold drink because the company did not have a drink machine. Occassionally several of the ladies would go together on their break. Mrs. Brown remembers that on a couple of occassions Oswald was in the garage office. She did not talk to him nor does she remember him ever saying anything in her presence. She couldn't remember any of the other ladies at the time of this contact but she will call back if she recalls any of the names.

End Of Memo

None

6-1-78 3:30 PM

504-835-4860

Juanita Brown
561 Andrews St. Metairie, La.

X

Mrs. Brown works in the payroll deparment of the William B. Rielly Coffee Co. She worked there when Lee Harvey Oswald worked for the company. Mrs. Brown and other ladies used to go to Adrain Alba's garage next to the company to buy a cold drink because the company did not have a drink machine. Occassionally several of the ladies would go together on their break. Mrs. Brown remembers that on a couple of occassions Oswald was in the garage office. She did not talk to him nor does she remember him ever saying anything in her presence. She couldn't remember any of the other ladies at the time of this contact but she will call back if she recalls any of the names.

End Of Memo

None

Juanita Brown
561 Andrews St.
Metairie, La.

5-21-29
438-28-1981

6-1-78
640 Magazine St.
504-835-4860 X225

M

5'1"
110
Caucasian

Brn

Bld

William B. Rielly Coffee Co.
640 Magazine St. New Orleans, La.
504-524-6131 X 225

Saw LHO in Alba's Garage

Robert Buras

6-1-78

Juanita Brown
561 Andrews St.
Metairie, La.

6-1-78
640 Magazine St.
504-835-4860 X225

5-21-29
438-28-1981

M

5'1"
110
Caucasian

Brn

Bld

William B. Rielly Coffee Co.
640 Magazine St. New Orleans, La.
504-524-6131 X 225

Saw LHO in Alba's Garage

Robert Buras

6-1-78

Juanita Brown 6-1-78
561 Andrews St. 640 Magazine St.
Metairie, La. 504-835-4860 X225

5-21-29 M
438-28-1981

5'1" Brn Bld
110
Caucasian

William B. Rielly Coffee Co.
640 Magazine St. New Orleans, La.
504-524-6131 X 225

Saw LHO in Alba's Garage

Robert Buras

6-1-78

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 9/21/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10091-10228
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	008822

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	ROBERTS, WARREN
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	05/18/1978
PAGES :	11
SUBJECTS :	....ACTIVITIES, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE AUSTIN, HORACE J. BRINQUIER, CARLOS JOSE ROBERTS, WARREN HERNANDEZ, CELSO MACARIO OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE.. CRUZ, MIGUEL MARIANO
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/25/1995
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Attached notes. Box #:160.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

Identifying Information:

Name Warren Roberts
Address 501 N. Rampart St.
City/State New Orleans, La.

Date of Birth 3-30-41
Social Security 435-56-3193

Date 5-18-78
Place 501 N. Rampart St.

Telephone 586-5011

M or S
Spouse
Children

Physical Description:

Height 6'2"
Weight 225
Ethnic Group Caucasian

Color Eyes Blue Hair Blond

Special Characteristics

Personal History:

a. Present Employment: Sergeant New Orleans Police Department
Address 715 S. Broad St.
Telephone 586-5011

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name
Address

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks:

Investigator Robert Buras

Date

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Warren Roberts
Date 5-1878 Time 3:00PM
Address 501 N. Rampart St.
New Orleans, La.
Place 501 N. Rampart St.

Interview:

Investigator Robert Buras spoke with Sgt. Roberts relative to the attached report dated Aug. 12, 1963. Roberts stated that he was in company with Sgt. Horace Austin who actually made the report. The Officers spoke with all the arrested subjects in one room at the same time. The only interest at that time was to ascertain the possiblity of trouble from any individual or group represented by the arrested subjects. Feelings were high in the room and Roberts had to caution the Cubans to keep from trying to argue with Oswald. At one point in the interview the Commanding Officer of the First District, Captain James Arnold, came into the room and asked Oswald if the Fair Play For Cuba Committee was communist or a communist front. Oswald denied that he was a communist and that the organization was a communist front. Oswald stated that he joined the F.P.C.C. after finding a leaflet on the street and sending $5.00 to New York. He also stated that he met with members locally but did not want to give any names etc.

Roberts stated that he did not see or hear anything about Oswald wanting to call or talk with an F.B.I. Agent while he was there. Roberts couldn't remember any other details about the interview.

End Of Memo

Interviewer Signature ____________________

Typed Signature ____________________

Date transcribed ____________

By: _____ Form #4-A

Lee Harvey File

DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
INTEROFFICE CORRESPONDENCE

TO : Major Presly J. Trosclair Jr. DATE August 12, 1963

FROM : Sgt. Horace J. Austin & Patn. Warren Roberts

SUBJECT: Interview of four male subjects at the First District Police Station, on Friday, August 9, 1963, after their arrest from Canal Street.

Sir:

The following information is respectfully reported relative to the interview of four arrested subjects in the First District Police Station, beginning at about 4:45 P.M., Friday, August 9, 1963. One of the four subjects, identified as Lee Harvey Oswald, WM, age 23, residing 4907 Magazine Street, had allegedly been distributing communist literature on Canal Street, and three Cubans, the other three arrested subjects, had become involved in an altercation with Oswald, which resulted in the arrest of the four subjects.

Lee Harvey Oswald furnished the following information when interviewed.

He is a member of The Fair Play For Cuba Committee, whose address is 799 Broadway, New York 3, N. Y., telephone OR4-8295. Oswald had in his possession a National Membership card issuon on 5/28/63, and the presidents name on this card was "V. T. Lee." Oswald had also a local membership card dated 6/6/63 (N.O. Chapter of the FPFCC), and the president of the local chapter, whose name was on the card was "A. Hidell."
Oswald presented his Social Security Card, which did not bear his signature, and the number of this card was 433-54-3937.
Oswald presented his U. S. Marine Corp. discharge card (Honorable) bearing service number 1653230, and date of active duty from 24 Oct 1956 to 11 Sept. 1959.

Oswald stated he was born in New Orleans on October 18, 1939, that he is about 5' 9" tall, about 140 lbs., and is a mechanic by trade. He stated he did mechanic work in the Marine Corps, and that he is presently unemployed and has been so about three weeks. Before he was laid-off, Oswald stated, he worked at the Louisiana Coffee Company for about three months, and before that he had worked at Fort Worth, Texas, at a sheetmetal place. Oswald stated he worked in Fort Worth at the sheetmetal place for several months, but was very evasive in answering any further questions of employment prior to that time.

Oswald stated that he lives with his wife, whose maiden name was Marina Pross, WF, age 21. They were married in Fort Worth, have one child seventeen months of age, and reside presently at 4907 Magazine Street, lower center, New Orleans.

Oswald stated that he has two brothers, who reside, like his mother, in Fort Worth, Texas. He stated that his father, John Lee Oswald, is deceased.
Oswald's mother: Margarette Oswald, resides by herself in Fort Worth, Texas.
Oswald's brothers: Robert Oswald, WM, age 27,
John Oswald, WM, age 32,

Oswald stated he had talked to Major Trosclair about getting a permit for F.P.F.C.C. and the Major advised him to consult his attorney. Oswald said he never did go and see about a permit at city hall.

Oswald further stated the Cubans came up to him where he was giving out the leaflets and began to tear them up and throw them in the street. Oswald stated that they started to yell that he was a communist and about that time the officers from the First Disteict came up and a crowd had gathered. Oswald stated he joined the Fair Play for Cuba Committee when he found a leaflet on the street one day and read what was on it, and sent $5.00 to the address which was in New York city and after a brief period of time he was sent material through the mail and contacted locally, and he started to attend the meetings, which he stated were held in each others homes. Oswald stated they, the members, get together and talk about how it would be to visit Cuba, life in Cuba, etc..

Oswald denied the organization was communist, or a communist front, when asked by Captain James Arnold, Commanding Officer of the First Police District, who came in during the interview, but Oswald had in his possession and was carrying a piece of cardboard with"VIVA VIVA Fidel" painted on it and the paraphernalia he was handing out was pasted on this cardboard also. Oswald stated he has never been to Cuba, and it appeared as though he is being used by these people and is very uninformed and knows very little about this organization that he belongs to and its ultimate purpose or goal. Oswald stated that the people that attend these informal meetings are working class people, such as clerical, trades, etc..

The three Cubans were interviewed and furnished the following information:

#1. Celso Macario Hernandez, WM, age 47, D.O.B. 1/8/16, Social Security number 265-76-8756

Hernandez stated he came to the United States via Miami, Florida, on October 9, 1962, with his family and he was a traveling book salesman in Cuba. He came to New Orleans on January 8, 1963 and resides at 519 Adele Street, New Orleans with his family. He has not had any employment except for a few days of manual labor in Miami, Florida, and is presently on relief or welfare.

The names of the family of Celso M. Hernandez are as follows:
Wife: Maria De La Caridad Valero, WF, age 41 (Maiden name)
Daughter: Maria De Los Angles, WF, age 14
Son: Nicholas Pablo, WM, 11
Daughter: Teresita, WF, age 6

Hernandez stated he saw Oswald at approximately 1:30 P.M., August 9, 1963, passing out communist literature and he went and got his friends at 107 Decatur Street and at first they were unable to locate this subject Oswald when they got on the Canal Street streetcar, and they rode to Jefferson Davis Avenue and not being able to locate Oswald they returned to 107 Decatur Street, the Casa Roca retail clothing store. They remained there until someone came in and told them where Oswald was and they then proceeded to that location, where the three of them were carrying the sign described in formation relative to Carlos Bringuier in this memo. They then began to argue with Oswald and a crowd gathered and they were all (four) arrested by the police.

#2. Carlos Jose Bringuier, age 29, D.O.B. 6/22/34, 5'8", 150 lbs., residiing 501 Adele Street, residing this address about three months, born in Havana, Cuba.

Bringuier stated he is manager of the Casa Roca retail clothing store, located 107 Decatur Street, New Orleans. He began his employment about October 1, 1962.

Bringuier previously residing at 2046 Pelopidas Street. He lives with his wife and four children.
Wife: Maria Del Carmen (Bearce), WF, age 25
Born in Argentina, Buenos Aires
Married in Buenos Aires, April 14, 1956
Entered U. S. February 8, 1961, at Miami, Florida, by plane.
Wife entered U. S. in Miami in May, 1961.
Ages of children are 6, 5, 3 and 2.

Julio and Vicenta Bringuier, mother and father, reside at 1769 S. W. 17th. Street, Miamai, Florida, Bringuier stated. Julio was born in 1895 in Remedios, Cuba, entered the U. S. after invasion, believed by Bringuier to be in May of 1961. Vicenta was born in 1894 in Moron, Cuba, and entered the U. S. with Julio.

Carlos Bringuier gave the following names of his brothers and sisters:

Julio Enrique Bringuier, (brother), age 41, born Moron, Cuba, now residing 1769 SW. 17th. Street, Miami, entered the U. S. at end of 1961.

Maria Gertrudis (Pelaez) age 42, (sister), resides 2224 Mendez Street, married to Rolando Pelaez, who also works at the Casa Roca clothing store, 107 Decatur Street, New Orleans.

Juan Feliepe Bringuier, age 35, (brother), born in Cuba, entered the U. S. December 24, 1962, resides in New York City, is unmarried.

Maria Del Carmen (Medina), age 39, (sister), married to Jorge Medina, age 41, who is in Cuba. Maria Del Carmen lives in Iberville project in New Orleans, believed to be on Iberville Street. Jorge Medina was working in Criminal Court in Havana, went crazy.

Carlos Jose Bringuier also gave the following information relating to himself.
His social security number 435-64-3717,
His selective service number 16 42 34 462, classified 5-A, local board #42, New Orleans, dated August 24, 1961
Possesses Louisiana drivers license number 1585883, date of issue 2/26/62, address on license 4525 Duplessis Street.
Possesses Immigrant Resident card #A 12 546 223, dated 2/8/61

Bringuier further stated that he is a local delegate of the CUBAN STUDENT DIRECTORATE, in City of New Orleans, appointed by one Jose Antonio Lanuza, Secretary, American Affairs, Cuban Student Directorate, P.O. Box 805, Main Post Office, Miami, Florida, telephone Franklin 3-1476.

Bringuier stated that his first job in New Orleans was with the California Redwood Produce Co., on S. Peters Street, owned by Mr. L. C. Levy. Bringuier stated he worked here two days.

Bringuier then worked at Mac's Discount House, located at 714 Canal Street, for about one year, beginning April 1, 1961.

Bringuier then became a self employed pedler in April of 1962 with his brother-in-law, Rolando Pelaez. They bought clothing and radios wholesale and went aboard ships to sell same. Bringuier stated that he had a Port Security Card.

Bringuier then stated that on October 1, 1962, he opened the Casa Roca clothing store, 107 Decatur Street, and has been working here until this date.

Bringuier stated that he keeps the sign, in the Cuban's possession at the time of arrest this date, in his store. This sign measures about 3 feet by 4 feet, with a picture of the Statue of Liberty, hand with dagger on end of long chain, and Cuba ringed by two links of the chain. The sign reads "Danger! Only 90 miles from U.S.A., Cuba lies in chains!"

Bringuier stated that the sign was given to him by Arnesto Rodriguez, age in his 30's, who resided at 1208 St. Charles Street in New Orleans, at the time Arturo Frondizi came to New Orleans in January or February of 1962. Bringuier believes Frondizi is a communist, and he has two brothers in Argentina who are Communists.

Bringuier further stated that he came to New Orleans right from Miami, Florida, by Greyhound bus, arriving in New Orleans on February 18, 1961.

#3. Miguel Mariano Cruz, age 18, D.O.B. 9/27/44, residing 2526 Mazant Street, New Orleans, unmarried, lives with mother, father and three sisters.

F.

Mother: Victoriana (Enriquez) Cruz, age 56
Father: Claudio Cruz, age 64, unemployed, on Welfare.
Sisters: Hordensia Maria Cruz, age 26, a student at Capelle Beauty Schoold, 1509 St. Charles Avenue.
Ina Josefa Cruz, age 25, stays at home.
Maria Teresa Cruz, age 19, works at a petroleum company at night.

Miguel Mariano Cruz stated that he is unemployed and is a student Nichols High School, 11th. grade, in New Orleans.

Miguel Cruz presented his Selective Service Card, #16 145 44 483, classified 1-A, dated 5/27/61, Local Board #145, Orleans Parish., also his Immigrant resident card #A 12 920 831, bearing name "Miguel Mariano Cruz Enriquez".

Miguel Cruz stated that he entered the U. S. in San Juan, Puerto Rico, on December 5, 1962, went to Miami, Florida, right away, stayed for two days, in Plaza Hotel, and left Miami and came right to New Orleans, arriving December 12, 1962. He stated that his parents and three sisters entered the U. S. on the same date.

When asked about other relations, Miguel Cruz named the following brothers.
Paul Cruz, age 32, address unknown, in New Orleans, married, wife's name "Olga". Has two children, and is employed as a waiter at the Royal Orleans Hotel.
Claudio Cruz, age 33, residing 2569 Congress Street, wife's name "Angela", no children, employed as Bus Boy at the Royal Orleans Hotel.
Enrique Cruz, age 23, residing 2601 Bartholomew Street, wife's name "Olga", no children, is unemployed and on Welfare.

The interview of the above four arrested subjects by Sgt. Austin and Patn. Roberts was concluded at approximately 6:00 P.M., same date, August 9, 1963.

Respectfully,

Horace J. Austin Jr.
Sgt. Horace J. Austin Jr.

Patn. Warren Roberts Jr.

6/6/63 A. Hidell

social security # 433-54-3937
Lee Harvey Oswald

in USMC #1653230
24 Oct. 1956 to 11 Sept 1959

W/M 28 Oct 18, 1939. born in N.O.
5'9" 140 lbs Mechanic
Married - Marina Prosa W/F 21 Ft Worth Tex
1 child - 17 mths.

Worked at La. coffee co 3 mths.
at Worth Texas, worked for several mths.

Talked to Major about obtaining a permit. But has never applied for any.

Cubans came up & tore up leaflets.

Robert Oswald W/M 27 Fort Worth

John Oswald W/M 32 Arlington, Texas

Fair Play for Cuba Committee
799 Broadway NY 3, NY Or4-8295
Lee H. Oswald -
issued 5/28/63 V. T. Lee

FPFCC N.O. Chapter
6/6/63 A. Hidell

social security # 433-54-3937
Lee Harvey Oswald

in USMC #1653230
24 Oct. 1956 to 11 Sept 1959

W/M 23 Oct 18, 1939. born in N.O.
5'9" 140 lbs Mechanic
Married - Marina Pross W/F 21 Ft Worth
1 child - 17 mths.

Worked at La. coffee co 3 mths.
Ft Worth Texas, worked for several mths.

Talked to Major about obtaining a
permit. But has never applied for any.

Adams came up & then up

ended 5 15 pm

5 15 PM 8/9/63

Celso Macario Hernandez
W/M 47 DOB 1/8/16

265-76-8756

Oct 9, 1962 came to U.S. via
Miami Fla.

1/8/63 came to N.O.

Traveling book salesman in Cuba,
519 Adele st. residence

Maria De La Caridad Valero W/F 41
Maria De Los Angeles W/F 14
Nicholas Pablo W/M 11
Teresita W/F 6
1 30 PM went to Canal st. (closed up store)

All 3 carrying signs

Own by self

Mother Marguerite Oswald W/F [illegible]

/ Father John Lee Oswald W/M (Deceased)

/ 4907 Magazine (lower center)

ended 5:15 pm

/ 5:15 PM 8/9/63

/ Celso Macario Hernandez
W/M 47 DOB 1/8/16

/ 265 - 76 - 8756

/ Oct 9, 1962 came to U.S. via
Miami Fla.

/ 1/8/63 came to N.O.

/ Traveling book salesman in Cuba

/ 517 Adele st. residence

/ Maria De La Caridad Valero W/F 41

/ Maria De Los Angeles W/F 14

[illegible] Pablo W/M 11

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/1/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10093-10162

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 001304

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : MORIARTY, JACK
TO : FENTON, CLIFFORD

TITLE : PETER CARROLL GLYNN, JR.

DATE : 04/25/1977
PAGES : 14

SUBJECTS :

PRO-CASTRO CUBANS
GLYNN, PETER CARROLL

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/18/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Includes letter of transmittal. Box 27.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326
Date: 2025

[illegible]UIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
JOHN B. ANDERSON, ILL.
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

MEMORANDUM

001304

TO: Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.

FROM: Jack Moriarty

RE: Peter Carroll Glynn, Jr.

DATE: April 25, 1977

Pursuant to an earlier phone contact, I interviewed Mr. Glynn on his job at 4301 Suitland Road, Suitland, Maryland at 2:35 p.m. Friday, April 22, 1977. Subject is employed as an Intelligence Analyst by NOSIC (Naval Oceanic Surveillance Information Center) 763-2258 and resides at 107 Howard Street, Dumfries, Virginia, 221-8748.

He was serving with the U.S. Army on 11-22-63 assigned to Fort Walters, Mineral Wells, Texas as a radio technician and as such regularly monitered messages between Mexico and Cuba. As a result, he overheard comments in the sphere which were adverse to the newly assassinated President and were upsetting to him. Although he doesn't recall the exact dialogue, the gist concerned the humor found by the Cubans and Mexicans appraising this murder as being done by his own people and yet suspecting foreigners like themselves.

Consequently, it has occurred to Glynn that we may benefit by causing a thorough check to be made of the ASA (Army Security Agency) who Glynn believes recorded all such messages usually in tape form-and stored same. He also prepared dossier of which he gave me the original and one copy. .

He goes on to say their mission at Fort Walters was labeled a training mission and, as such, was comprehensive enough to encompass the recording of all such collateral messages. Additionally, he recalls the Mexican sending station used the name of "Chihuahua."

JM/rlm

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE: 10 oct 97 DLB

STATEMENT

FROM: MR. PETER CARROLL GLYNN. JR.
107 HOWARD STREET
DUMFRIES, VIRGINIA 22026 TEL 703 221-8748

WORK: DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY (NOSIC)
4301 SUITLAND ROAD, SUITLAND, MARYLAND. 20390 TEL 202 763-2258 OR 59

SSN: 022-30-2275
SERVICE NUMBER RA 11 396 679

TO: MR. MORIARTY INVESTIGATIVE REPRESENTATIVE
FOR ASSASSINATION COMMITTEE.

SUBJ: ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY.

ENCL: (1) DD398, DD FORM 1584, AND OPNAV FORM 5510-2.
(2) SPECIAL ORDERS NO 175 OF 22 AUG 1972.
(3) DD 214.

1. ENCLOSURES 1 THROUGH 3 IS FORWARDED HEREWITH TO VALIDATE MY WHEREABOUTS BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER SUBJECT INCIDENT AND POSSIBLY SAVING THE ASSASSINATIONS INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE ADDITIONAL VALIDATION STEPS.

2. DURING SUBJECT INCIDENT I WAS STATIONED AT THE 330TH ASA COMPANY (A) OF THE 303RD ASA BN (CORPS) USASA, LOCATED AT FORT WALTERS, MINERAL WELLS, TEXAS. THE COMMANDING OFFICER AT THAT TIME WAS CHARLES R. GINN, CAPT, AIS. OUR MISSION, IF I REMEMBER CORRECTLY, WAS LABELED AS A "TRAINING MISSION". I PERSONALLY BELIEVE THERE MAY BE A REMOTE POSSIBILITY DATA OBTAINED FROM THIS MISSION BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER SUBJECT INCIDENT, MAY POSSIBLY BE OF VALUE TO THE INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE.

3. SUGGESTIONS:

A. I SUGGEST REPRESENTATIVES OF YOUR COMMITTEE CONTACT PERSONNEL CONCERNED, LOCATED AT "US ARMY SECURITY AGENCY (ASA)" HEADQUARTERS, ARLINGTON HALL STATION, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA AS TO WHAT THIS MISSION WAS, ITS DATA STORAGE LOCATION (IF ANY), AND POSSIBLY DATA ANALYSIS EVALUATION RESULTS.

B. IF THIS DATA IS AVAILABLE I SUGGEST IT BE RESEARCHED BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER SUBJECT INCIDENT BY YOUR INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE.

C. I ADDITIONALLY SUGGEST A SIMILAR INVESTIGATION BE CONDUCTED FOR DATA OBTAINED AT HOMESTEAD AIR FORCE BASE (FLORIDA) BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER SUBJECT INCIDENT.

D. FINALLY, I SUGGEST SIMILAR INVESTIGATION(S) BE CONDUCTED FOR ANY OTHER KNOWN SITE BEFORE, DURING, AND AFTER SUBJECT INCIDENT.

4. I MUST APOLOGIZE FOR BEING EXTREMELY VAGUE IN REFERENCE TO MY WORK WITH THE ARMY SECURITY AGENCY, BUT I BELIEVE WHAT HAS BEEN SURFACED WITHIN THIS "STATEMENT" MAY POSSIBLY BRANCH YOUR INVESTIGATION INTO NEW AND HOPEFULLY MORE RESOURCEFUL AREAS.

IF I CAN BE OF ANY ADDITIONAL ASSISTANCE, PLEASE FEEL FREE TO CONTACT ME AT ANY TIME AT HOME OR AT WORK. I PRAY TO THE LORD THIS INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE UNVEILS ALL NECESSARY INFORMATION AND CLOSES THIS CASE AND SIMILAR CASES AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

VERY RESP 22 APRIL 77

NO ARMY DECLASSIFICATION ACTIVITY
OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF

DATE: 18 OCT 97 / LB

Duplicate copy (less old 398) previous
BI, submitted to Jack Mahon
75 0415 1200.

STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

1. (Print) FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—MAIDEN NAME (If any)—LAST NAME ☒ MR. ☐ MRS. ☐ MISS Peter Carroll Glynn. Jr.	2. STATUS XX CIVILIAN ☐ MILITARY ON ACTIVE DUTY
3. ALIAS(ES), NICKNAME(S), OR CHANGES IN NAME (Other than by marriage) NONE	4. PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS 107 Howard St.,Dumfries,Va. 22026

5. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, month, year) 05 March 1940	PLACE OF BIRTH (City, County, State, and Country) Fall River, Bristol, Mass. U.S.A.	PLACE CERTIFICATE RECORDED Fall River, Massachusetts.

HEIGHT 5 FT 8 IN	WEIGHT 184	COLOR OF EYES Hazel	COLOR OF HAIR Gray	SCARS, PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS Scar,left wrist, 3½ inches long

6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS? ☐ YES XX NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS NARCOTICS OR BARBITURATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

7. U. S. CITIZEN ☒	NATIVE: XX YES / NO	IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO.	IF DERIVED, PARENTS' CERTIFICATE NO(S).	DATE, PLACE, AND COURT
ALIEN ☐	REGISTRATION NO.	NATIVE COUNTRY	DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY	DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME A U. S. CITIZEN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

MILITARY SERVICE

8. ARE YOU PRESENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES DRAWING FULL PAY? ☐ YES XX NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION	DATE CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE STARTED

ARE YOU PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF A U. S. RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION

HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOURS OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY, DRAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF "YES" COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

COUNTRY	SERVICE	COMPONENT	FROM (Date)	TO (Date)	TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO.
					N/C
N/C					

9. EDUCATION (Account for all civilian schools and military academies. Do not include service schools)

MONTH AND YEAR FROM—	TO—	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	GRADUATE YES	GRADUATE NO	DEGREE
		N/C			
N/C					

10. FAMILY (List in order given, parents, spouse, guardians, stepparents, foster parents, parents-in-law, former spouse(s) (if divorced give date and place), children, brothers and sisters, even though deceased. Include any others you resided with or with whom a close relationship existed or exists. If the person is not a U. S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate number and place of issuance.)

RELATION AND NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING	U. S. CITIZEN YES	U. S. CITIZEN NO
FATHER Peter Carroll Glynn	N/C	N/C		
MOTHER (Maiden name) Margaret Mary McMahon	N/C	N/C		
SPOUSE (Maiden name) Betty Marie Speer	23 December 1943 Hubbard, Texas.	107 Howard St. Dumfries, Virginia 22191	X	
(sister) Carolyn L. Cashman	14 January 1938 Fall River, Massachusetts	505 Hillsboro Drive Silver Spring, Md.	X	
(son) James Michael Glynn	21 October 1966 Falls Church, Virginia.	107 Howard St. Dumfries, Virginia 22191	X	
(daughter) Christine Marie Glynn	20 January 1970 Falls Church, Virginia.	107 Howard St. Dumfries, Virginia 22191	X	
(mother-in-law) Myra Speer	N/C	N/C		
(father-in-law) Verlin Speer	N/C	N/C		

DD FORM 1 MAR 64 398 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 53 WHICH MAY BE USED.
02 004 2200

Exception to Standard Form 86
Approved by Bureau of the Budget June 1960

(ENCLOSURE 1)

11. OTHER RELATIVES AND ALIEN FRIENDS LIVING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (*List grandparents, first cousins, aunts, uncles, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and other persons with whom a close relationship existed or exists*)

RELATIONSHIP AND NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	ADDRESS	CITIZENSHIP
NONE				
N/C				

12. FOREIGN TRAVEL (*Other than as a direct result of United States military duties*)

DATES		COUNTRY VISITED	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL
FROM—	TO—		
N/C			

13. EMPLOYMENT (*Show every employment you have had and all periods of unemployment*)

MONTH AND YEAR		NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	REASON FOR LEAVING
FROM—	TO—			
30SEPT70	CURRENT	(NOSIC) NAVAL OCEAN SURV INFO CENTER 4301 SUITLAND RD.,SUITLAND.MD.20390	Mr Donald Noble	
JULY 1965	30SEP70	(NIPSSA) "B" BLDG RT 50,ARLINGTON HALL STA,ARLINGTON,VA.	Mr Donald Noble	MASS TRANSFER NIPSSA TO NOSIC
		(((((SEE SUPPLEMENT)))))		

DID ANY OF THE ABOVE EMPLOYMENTS REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE? ☒ YES ☐ NO DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED BOND? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
022-30-2275

14. CREDIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES (*Do not include relatives, former employers, or persons living outside the United States or its Territories.*

NAME (*List 3 credit and 3 character*)	YEARS KNOWN	STREET AND NUMBER (*Business address preferred*)	CITY	STATE OR TERRITORY
Virginia Investment Co Inc	74-75	4600 Lee Hwy	Arlington	Va 22207
John Hancock Life Ins Co	60-75	PO BOX 236 (ATTN MR MARGULIES)	Falls Church	Va 22046
Virginia National Bank	71-75	PO BOX 1359	Norfolk	Va 23501
Mr&Mrs Lawson Pilkinton	74-75	110 Howard Street	Dumfries	Va 22026
Mr&Mrs Robert Lutes	71-75	15110 Concord Drive(DaleCity)	Woodbridge	Va 22191
Mr&Mrs Carl Haller	69-75	3921 North Forestdale(DaleCity)	Woodbridge	Va 22191
Mr&Mrs Kenneth Malzi	69-75	4517 Weyburn Drive	Annandale	Va 22003
Mr Sidney Maddux	64-75	801 Karen Ct NO 102	Laurel	Md 20810

REMARKS

STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

15. LIST ALL RESIDENCES FROM 1 JANUARY [illegible]

MONTH AND YEAR		STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
FROM—	TO—			
APRIL 74	PRESENT	107 Howard Street	Dumfries	Virginia 22026
MAY 69	APRIL 7	3922 North Forestdale Avenue(DALE CITY)	Woodbridge	Virginia 22191
		(((((SEE SUPPLEMENT)))))		

16. PAST AND/OR PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND ADDRESS	TYPE (Social, fraternal, professional, etc.)	OFFICE HELD	MEMBERSHIP FROM—	MEMBERSHIP TO—
American Legion, POST 139 Wilson Blvd, Arlington,Va.	SOCIAL	MEMBER	Jan 1969	Dec 74
American Legion, POST 162 Lorton, Virginia (STREET UNK)	SOCIAL	MEMBER	Dec 1974	PRESENT

17\.

YES	NO	
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ANYWHERE?
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS AN AGENT, OFFICIAL, OR EMPLOYEE?
	X	ARE YOU NOW ASSOCIATING WITH, OR HAVE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH ANY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING RELATIVES, WHO YOU KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE, ARE OR HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
	X	HAVE YOU EVER ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE: CONTRIBUTION(S) TO, ATTENDANCE AT OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY ORGANIZATIONAL, SOCIAL, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SAID ORGANIZATIONS OR OF ANY PROJECTS SPONSORED BY THEM; THE SALE, GIFT, OR DISTRIBUTION OF ANY WRITTEN, PRINTED, OR OTHER MATTER, PREPARED, REPRODUCED, OR PUBLISHED, BY THEM OR ANY OF THEIR AGENTS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES?

IF "YES," DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS FOR A FULL DETAILED STATEMENT. IF ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIFY NATURE AND EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION WITH EACH, INCLUDING OFFICE OR POSITION HELD, ALSO INCLUDE DATES, PLACES, AND CREDENTIALS NOW OR FORMERLY HELD. IF ASSOCIATIONS HAVE BEEN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, THEN LIST THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY WERE OR ARE AFFILIATED.

NONE

18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DETAINED, HELD, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (*excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of $25, or less was imposed*)? INCLUDE ALL COURT MARTIALS WHILE IN MILITARY SERVICE. ☐ YES ☒ NO

IF "YES," LIST THE DATE, THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR VIOLATION, THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT OR PLACE OF HEARING, AND THE PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF EACH CASE.

NONE

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

NONE

20. REMARKS

ITEM #13 "SECURITY CLEARANCES HELD"

ORGANIZATION:	DEPT:	CLEARANCE:	INVESTIGATIVE AGENCY:	DATE COMPLETED:
U.S.ARMY	ARMY	T.S. CRYPTO	CIC	APPROX MARCH 1962
DIO NDW	NAVY	T.S. S.I.	DIO NDW	05 MARCH 1965 FILE #1313-1C
NIPSSA	NAVY	T.S. S.I.	BELIEVED TO BE N.I.S.	APPROX JUNE 1965
NIPSSA/NOSIC	NAVY	T.S. S.I. (UPDATE)	BELIEVED TO BE N.I.S.	APPROX JUNE 1970

ITEM #10
(wife's step-brother)

NAME	DOB/POB	PRESENT ADDRESS	U.S. CITIZEN
Thomas Howard Speer	25 October 1933 Omaha, Texas.	403 Hornel Avenue Baltimore, 24, Maryland. 21224	"YES"

ITEM #14 "CREDIT REFERENCES"

VIRGINIA MORTGAGE AND INVESTMENT CO INC.....ACCOUNT NUMBER 0143270
VIRGINIA NATIONAL BANK.......................ACCOUNT NUMBER 1001578

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH (*See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001*)

DATE: 15 APRIL 1975

SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM:

TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS:
MR DONALD W. NOBLE
5314 FENWOOD AVE.OXON HILL,MD. 20022

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS: Donald W Noble

21. *THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION*

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (*top secret, secret, etc.*) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS

RECORD OF PRIOR CLEARANCES

DATE OF CLEARANCE	TYPE OF CLEARANCE	AGENCY THAT CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION

REMARKS

INGERPRINT CARD OPNAV FORM-5510-2 (REV. 9-66) *(Supersedes OPNAV-32-327 (6-50))* S/N 0107-752-3000

PPLICANT

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

GLYNN PETER CARROLL JR.
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

SEX M

RACE CAU

GNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

CONTRIBUTOR & ADDRESS

DOD NAC CENTER
Post Office Box 4
Fort Holabird, Md. 21219

COMPANY & ADDRESS

COMMANDER
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMAND, 2461
EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VA. 22331

HT. (IN.) 68

WT. 184

DATE OF BIRTH 05 MARCH 1940

ESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

07 HOWARD ST, DUMFRIES, VA 22026

HAIR GRAY

EYES HAZEL

GNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

Dick Meier

NUMBER

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

YPE OR PRINT ALL REQUESTED DATA

DATE FINGERPRINTED 15 APR 1975

CLASS. ____________________

PLACE OF BIRTH FALL RIVER, MASS.

REF. ____________________

CITIZENSHIP U.S.

(SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS)


1. RIGHT THUMB
2. RIGHT INDEX
3. RIGHT MIDDLE
4. RIGHT RING
5. RIGHT LITTLE
6. LEFT THUMB
7. LEFT INDEX
8. LEFT MIDDLE
9. LEFT RING
10. LEFT LITTLE
EFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
LEFT THUMB
RIGHT THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FINGERPRINT CARD OPNAV FORM-5510-2 (REV. 9-65) *(Supersedes OPNAV-32-327 (6-50))* S/N 0107-792-3009

APPLICANT

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

GLYNN	PETER	CARROLL JR.
LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME

SEX: M

RACE: CAU

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED: 07 HOWARD ST, DUMFRIES, VA 22026

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

TYPE OR PRINT ALL REQUESTED DATA

(SEE REVERSE SIDE FOR FURTHER INSTRUCTIONS)

CONTRIBUTOR & ADDRESS

DOD NAC CENTER
Post Office Box 4
Fort Holabird, Md. 21219

COMPANY & ADDRESS

COMMANDER
NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
COMMAND, 2461
EISENHOWER AVENUE
ALEXANDRIA, VA. 22331

HT. (IN.): 68

WT.: 184

DATE OF BIRTH: 05 MARCH 1940

HAIR: GRAY

EYES: HAZEL

NUMBER

DATE FINGERPRINTED: 15 APR 1975

PLACE OF BIRTH: FALL RIVER, MASS.

CITIZENSHIP: US

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

CLASS. ______

REF. ______ ______


1. RIGHT THUMB
2. RIGHT INDEX
3. RIGHT MIDDLE
4. RIGHT RING
5. RIGHT LITTLE
6. LEFT THUMB
7. LEFT INDEX
8. LEFT MIDDLE
9. LEFT RING
10. LEFT LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
LEFT THUMB
RIGHT THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY TRAINING CENTER & SCHOOL
Fort Devens, Massachusetts

SPECIAL ORDERS
NUMBER 175

EXTRACT

27 Aug 1962

15 TC 221. Fol reassignment dir. TDN. WP: 4 Sep 62 2132010 01-1361 -1363 P1513 S99-999.

FRISBY, CLARENCE R RA15658275 PFC E3 058.10 Co A USASATR (9322) this sta.
Asg to: 303rd USASA Bn, Camp Wolters, Texas.
Rept Date: 7 Sep 62
PCS (MDC): AD
ADC: 3 yrs
BPED: 11 Dec 61
ETS: Dec 64
Lv Data: DDALVAHP-NONE
EDCSA: 11 Sep 62
Scty Clnc: Interim TS & Crypto

PPSC: B
Nr Depn: 1
Last FST & Tvl Sta: Z
DROS: NONE
DMOS: 058.10
FSAC: 6
Auth: Aloc CUSASA, Aug D101-10
Grad date: 22 Aug 62

Sp Instr: TO will detm & furn nec TR & AMT fr this sta to Camp Wolters, Texas only. Govt tvl fr N Sta to S Sta or Logan Airport Boston, Mass is auth.

GINCLEY, KENNETH E RA13750222 PVT E2 058.10 Co B USASATR (9322) this sta.
Asg to: 303rd USASA Bn, Camp Wolters, Texas.
Rept Date: 7 Sep 62
PCS (MDC): AD
ADC: 3 yrs
BPED: 22 Dec 61
ETS: Dec 64
Lv Data: DDALVAHP-NONE
EDCSA: 11 Sep 62
Scty Clnc: Final TS & Crypto

PPSC: A
Nr Depn: 1
Last FST & Tvl Sta: Z
DROS: NONE
DMOS: 058.10
FSAC: 6
Auth: Aloc CUSASA, Aug D101-10
Grad date: 22 Aug 62.

Sp Instr: TO will detm & furn nec TR & AMT fr this sta to Camp Wolters, Texas only. Govt Tvl fr N Sta to S Sta or Logan Airport Boston, Mass is auth.

GLYNN, PETER C Jr RA11396679 PFC E3 058.10 Co E USASATR (9322) this sta.
Asg to: 303rd USASA Bn, Camp Wolters, Texas.
Rept Date: 7 Sep 62
PCS (MDC): AD
ADC: 3 yrs
BPED: 18Sep61
ETS: Sep 64
Lv Data: DDALVAHP- NONE
EDCSA: 11 Sep 62
Scty Clnc: Final TS & Crypto

PPSC: A
Nr Depn: 0
Last FST & Tvl Sta: Z
DROS: NONE
DMOS: 058.10
FSAC: N
Auth: Aloc CUSASA Aug D101-10
Grad date: 22 Aug 62

Sp Instr: TO will detm & furn nec TR & AMT fr this sta to Camp Wolters, Texas only. Govt Tvl fr N Sta to S Sta or Logan Airport Boston, Mass is auth.

ENCLOSURE (2)

EXTRACT: SO175 HQ, U.S. ASA TNG CEN & SCH FT DEVENS, MASS. 27 AUG 62

16. TC 221. Fol reassignment dir. TDN. WP: 7 Sep 62 2132010 01-1361-1363 P1513 S99-999.

HOLBROOKS, JAMES R RA13752318 PVT E2 058.10 Co E USASATR (9322) this sta.
Asg to: 303rd USASA Bn, Camp Wolters, Tex. PPSC: A
Rept Date: 7 Sep 62 Nr Depn: 0
PCS (MDC): AD Last FST & Tvl Sta: Z
ADC: 3 yrs DROS: NONE
BPED: 18 Dec 61 DMOS: 059.10
ETS: Dec 64 FSAC: 6
Lv Data: DDALVAHP-NONE Auth: Aloc CUSASA, Aug 101-10
EDCSA: 11 Sep 62 Grad date: 22 Aug 62
Scty clnc: Interim TS & Crypto
Sp instr: TO will detm & furn nec TR & AMT fr this sta to Camp Wolters, Texas only. Govt Tvl fr N Sta to S Sta or Logan Airport Boston, Mass is auth.

HOLLIS, CALVIN V III RA13750110 PFC E3 Co A USASATR (9322) this sta.
Asg to: 303rd USASA Bn, Camp Wolters, Tex. PPSC: A
Rept Date: 7 Sep 62 Nr Depn: 0
PCS (MDC): AD Last FST & Tvl Sta: Z
ADC: 3 yrs DROS: NONE
BPED: 12 Dec 61 DMOS: 058.10
ETS: Dec 64 FSAC: 6
Lv Data: DDALVAHP-NONE Auth: Aloc CUSASA, Aug D101-10
EDCSA: 11 Sep 62 Grad date: 22 Aug 62.
Scty clnc: Interim TS & Crypto
Sp instr: TO will detm & furn nec TR & AMT fr this sta to Camp Wolters, Texas only. Govt Tvl fr N Sta to S Sta or Logan Airport Boston, Mass is auth.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

OFFICIAL:

T. S. BELL
Capt AGC
Asst Adj

GEORGE E FIGEL
Major, AS(Inf)
Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION: C & L
plus CUSASA ATTN:IAAG-AS AHS Arl 12, Va. (2 cys)
CO 303rd USASA Bn, Camp Wolters, Texas. (5 cys)

ENCLOSURE (2)

RE-1

LEGEND: Insert N/A to the items below which are not applicable

PERSONAL DATA

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME GLYNN, PETER CARROLL, JR.	2. SERVICE NUMBER RA 11 396 679	3a. GRADE, RATE OR RANK SP4 E-4 (P)	b. DATE OF RANK (Day, Month, Year) 6 Dec 62

4. DEPARTMENT, COMPONENT AND BRANCH OR CLASS ARMY - RA - AIS	5. PLACE OF BIRTH (City and State or Country) Fall River, Massachusetts	6. DATE OF BIRTH	DAY 5	MONTH Mar	YEAR 40

7a. RACE N/A	b. SEX Male	c. COLOR HAIR Gray	d. COLOR EYES Brown	e. HEIGHT $67\frac{1}{2}$	f. WEIGHT 172	8. U.S. CITIZEN ☒ YES ☐ NO	9. MARITAL STATUS Single

10a. HIGHEST CIVILIAN EDUCATION LEVEL ATTAINED 12 Years	b. MAJOR COURSE OR FIELD Academic

TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE DATA

11a. TYPE OF TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE Transferred to USAR (See Item 18)	b. STATION OR INSTALLATION AT WHICH EFFECTED FORT WOLTERS, MINERAL WELLS, TEXAS

c. REASON AND AUTHORITY AR 635-200 SPN 201 Expiration of Term of Service	d. EFFECTIVE DATE	DAY 17	MONTH Sep	YEAR 64

12. LAST DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND MAJOR COMMAND 330th ASA Co (A) 303D ASA Bn (Corps) USASA	13a. CHARACTER OF SERVICE HONORABLE	b. TYPE OF CERTIFICATE ISSUED None

SELECTIVE SERVICE DATA

14. SELECTIVE SERVICE NUMBER 37	3	40	42	15. SELECTIVE SERVICE LOCAL BOARD NUMBER, CITY, COUNTY AND STATE Local Board #3 Newport, Rhode Island	16. DATE INDUCTED DAY	MONTH N/A	YEAR

17. DISTRICT OR AREA COMMAND TO WHICH RESERVIST TRANSFERRED
Transferred to USAR Control Group (Reinforcements) XIII U. S. Army Corps

SERVICE DATA

18. TERMINAL DATE OF RESERVE OBLIGATION DAY 17	MONTH Sep	YEAR 67	19. CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE OTHER THAN BY INDUCTION a. SOURCE OF ENTRY ☒ ENLISTED (First Enlistment) ☐ ENLISTED (Prior Service) ☐ REENLISTED ☐ OTHER:	b. TERM OF SERVICE (Years) 3	c. DATE OF ENTRY DAY 18	MONTH Sep	YEAR 61

20. PRIOR REGULAR ENLISTMENTS None	21. GRADE, RATE OR RANK AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE PVT E-1 (P)	22. PLACE OF ENTRY INTO CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE (City and State) Providence, Rhode Island

23. HOME OF RECORD AT TIME OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE SERVICE (Street, RFD, City, County and State)
50 Hobson Avenue
Tiverton (Newport) Rhode Island

24. STATEMENT OF SERVICE		YEARS	MONTHS	DAYS
a. CREDITABLE FOR BASIC PAY PURPOSES	(1) NET SERVICE THIS PERIOD	3	0	0
	(2) OTHER SERVICE	0	0	0
	(3) TOTAL (Line (1) + line (2))	3	0	0
b. TOTAL ACTIVE SERVICE		3	0	0
c. FOREIGN AND/OR SEA SERVICE		0	0	0

25a. SPECIALTY NUMBER AND TITLE 058.10 Morse Intercept	b. RELATED CIVILIAN OCCUPATION AND D.O.T. NUMBER Radio Operator 0-61

26. DECORATIONS, MEDALS, BADGES, COMMENDATIONS, CITATIONS AND CAMPAIGN RIBBONS AWARDED OR AUTHORIZED
Marksman Badge (Rifle M-1)
Good Conduct Medal

27. WOUNDS RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF ACTION WITH ENEMY FORCES (Place and date, if known)
None

28. SERVICE SCHOOLS OR COLLEGES, COLLEGE TRAINING COURSES AND/OR POST GRADUATE COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED			29. OTHER SERVICE TRAINING COURSES SUCCESSFULLY COMPLETED
SCHOOL OR COURSE a	DATES (From-To) b	MAJOR COURSES c	
USASATC&S	26 Weeks - 1962	T/T Intercept	CBR Training Battle Indoc Military Justice Code of Conduct Non-Jud Pun Geneva Convention

VA DATA

30a. GOVERNMENT LIFE INSURANCE IN FORCE ☐ YES ☒ NO	b. AMOUNT OF ALLOTMENT N/A	c. MONTH ALLOTMENT DISCONTINUED N/A
31a. VA BENEFITS PREVIOUSLY APPLIED FOR (Specify type) None		b. VA CLAIM NUMBER C- N/A

AUTHENTICATION

32. REMARKS
Blood Group: 0
SSAN: 022-30-2275
Lump sum payment made for 15 days accrued leave.
EM entitled to reenlistment bonus No. 1 in pay grade E-4 UP Chap 9 AR 37-104.
Accumulative amount of bonuses and allowances paid subsequent to 1 Oct 49: None

33. PERMANENT ADDRESS FOR MAILING PURPOSES AFTER TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE (Street, RFD, City, County and State) 50 Hobson Ave, Tiverton (Newport) R. I.	34. SIGNATURE OF PERSON BEING TRANSFERRED OR DISCHARGED
35a. TYPED NAME, GRADE AND TITLE OF AUTHORIZING OFFICER J M HENDRICKSON CWO W-3 USA Asst Adjutant	b. SIGNATURE OF OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO SIGN

DD FORM 1 NOV 55 214 REPLACES EDITION OF 1 JUL 52, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES
REPORT OF TRANSFER OR DISCHARGE

1

(ENCLOSURE 3)

S U P P L E M E N T: DD 398 STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY

GIVEN, PETER CARROLL JR. SSN: 022-30-2275

ITEM #15 (RESIDENCES):

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS:	CITY:	STATE:	
APR 1974	PRESENT	107 HOWARD STREET	DUMFRIES	VA	22025
MAY 1969	APRIL 1974	3922 NORTH FORESTDALE AVE	DALE CITY	VA	22191
			WOODBRIDGE,		
MAR 1966	MAY 1969	817 SOUTH FLORIDA STREET	ARLINGTON,	VA	
		(NOTE: NO LONGER DOES ABOVE ADDRESS EXIST)			
JAN 1965	MAR 1966	133 NORTH WAYNE STREET	ARLINGTON,	VA	
OCT 1964	JAN 1965	903 SOUTH STAFFORD STREET	ARLINGTON,	VA	
SEP 1964	OCT 1964	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	RI	
SEP 1962	SEP 1964	303 US ASA BN (CORPS)	FORT WALTERS,		
		330 US ASA CO	MINERAL WELLS,	TEXAS	
DEC 1961	SEP 1962	CO "E" US ASA TR	FORT DEVENS, AYER	MASS	
NOV 1961	DEC 1961	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	RI	
SEP 1961	NOV 1961	3RD TRNG RGMT CO "C"	FORT DIX,	NEW JERSEY	
AUG 1955	SEP 1961	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	RI	
MAR 1940	AUG 1955	303 CAMBRIDGE STREET	FALL RIVER,	MASS	

……

ITEM #13 (EMPLOYMENT):

FROM	TO:		EMPLOYER:	ADDRESS:	CITY:	STATE:
30 SEPT 70	PRESENT		NAVAL OCEAN SURV INFO CENTER (NOSIC)	4301 SUITLAND RD	SUITLAND,	MD 20390
JUL 1965	30SEPT70		NAVAL INTELL PROC SYS SUPPORT ACTY(NIPSSA)	ARLINGTON HALL "B" BLDG RM 1402	ARLINGTON,	VA
OCT 1964	JAN 1965	*	ARLINGTON DETECTIVE AGCY	2201 WILSON BLVD	ARLINGTON,	VA
JAN 1965	AUG 1965	*	TOWN CENTER PLAZA	1001 3rd ST SW	WASHINGTON,	D.C.
OCT 1964	JUN 1965		DIO NDW (NAVY DEPT)	NAVY WEAPONS PLANT M ST AT 11TH SW	WASHINGTON,	D.C.
SEP 1964	OCT 1964		UNEMPLOYED	50 HOBSON AVE	TIVERTON,	R.I.
SEP 1961	SEP 1964		UNITED STATES ARMY			
JUL 1961	SEP 1961		THIBOUTOT AUTO BODY	SLADE STREET	FALL RIVER,	MASS.
SEP 1959	JULY 1961		UNITED STATES TRUNK CO (CLARKE PRECISION MOULDING)	951 BROADWAY	FALL RIVER,	MASS.
APR 1959	SEP 1959		UNEMPLOYED	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	R.I.
SEP 1955	APR 1959	*	STONE BRIDGE INN	MAIN ROAD,	TIVERTON,	R.I.

* DENOTES PART TIME EMPLOYMENT.

……

DATE: 15 APRIL 1975

SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM:

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS:

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1959—234,415

STAPLE HERE

NACC Use Only	DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST	REQUEST DATE
	1. LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDDLE NAME GLYNN, PETER CARROLL JR	2. SEX MALE
	3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S)	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 022-30-2275
5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH MARCH 05, 1940	6. PLACE OF BIRTH FALL RIVER, BRISTOL COUNTY, MASS.	7. SERVICE NUMBER RA 11-396-679

RETURN RESULTS TO: (Include Zip Code)

8. a. SECURITY PROGRAM
☐ MILITARY
☒ CIVILIAN
☐ INDUSTRIAL

b. ☐ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST

9. RELATIVES	10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	11. PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER PETER CARROLL GLYNN	MARCH 21, 1908 FALL RIVER, MASS.	50 HOBSON AVENUE TIVERTON, RHODE ISLAND	U.S.A.
b. MOTHER (Full Maiden Name) MARGARET MARY MC MAHON	MARCH 14, 1914 FALL RIVER, MASS.	50 HOBSON AVENUE TIVERTON, RHODE ISLAND	U.S.A.
c. SPOUSE (Full Maiden Name) BETTY MARIE GLYNN	DECEMBER 23, 1943 HUBBARD, TEXAS.	107 HOWARD STREET DUMFRIES, VIRGINIA	U.S.A.

13. RESIDENCES (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
		(((((SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENT)))))		

14. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent employment.)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
		(((((SEE ATTACHED SUPPLEMENT)))))	

15. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
SEPT 9, 1955	6 APR 1959	DE LA SALLE ACADEMY	(NOTE: CLOSED APPROX 1973) BELEVUE AVE, NEWPORT, RHODE ISLAND.

YES	NO	16. ("Yes" answers must be explained in Item 18, below.)
	X	a. Is the subject an alien or naturalized citizen?
	X	b. Has the subject any foreign connections, employment or military service?
	X	c. Has the subject travelled or resided abroad other than for the U.S. Government?
X		d. Has the subject had employment requiring a security clearance or investigation?
X		e. Is the subject now or has he ever been in the Federal Civil Service or Armed Forces?
	X	f. Has the subject qualified DD Form 398, 98, 48-1, or similar security form?
	X	g. Has the subject ever been addicted to drugs?

17. REQUEST DATA

a. REQUESTOR DESIGNATOR				b. REASON	
	ARMY		DASA		BASIC TRAINEE
	NAVY		DCA		PRE-COMMISSION
	AIR FORCE		DCAA		NUCLEAR
	OSD		DIA		SI
	JCS		DSA		SECRET CLEARANCE
	NSA		DISCO		
	USMC				

18. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)

ITEM #16d SECURITY CLEARANCES REQUIRED:
US ARMY.....TS CRYPTO.....CIC.....COMPLETED APPROX MARCH 1962
DIO NDW.....TS SI.........DIO NDW.COMPLETED APPROX MARCH 5, 1965 FILE #1313-1C
NIPSSA......TS SI.........N.I.S...COMPLETED APPROX JUNE 1965
NIPSSA/NOSIC..TS SI.......N.I.S...COMPLETED APPROX JUNE 1970

DD FORM 1584 1 DEC 58 S/N 0102-016-1700

NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

SUPPLEMENT:

SSN: 022-30-2275

GLYNN, PETER CARROLL JR.

ITEM #13 (RESIDENCES):

FROM:	TO:	ADDRESS:	CITY:	STATE:	
APR 1974	PRESENT	107 HOWARD STREET	DUMFRIES	VA	22026
MAY 1969	APRIL 1974	3922 NORTH FORESTDALE AVE	DALE CITY	VA	22191
			WOODBRIDGE,		
		817 SOUTH FLORIDA STREET	ARLINGTON,	VA	
MAR 1966	MAY 1969	(NOTE: NO LONGER DOES ABOVE	ADDRESS EXIST)		
		133 NORTH WAYNE STREET	ARLINGTON,	VA	
JAN 1965	MAR 1966	903 SOUTH STAFFORD STREET	ARLINGTON,	VA	
OCT 1964	JAN 1965	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	RI	
SEP 1964	OCT 1964	303 US ASA BN (CORPS)	FORT WALTERS,		
SEP 1962	SEP 1964	330 US ASA CO	MINERAL WELLS,	TEXAS	
		CO "E" US ASA TR	FORT DEVENS, AYER	MASS	
DEC 1961	SEP 1962	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	RI	
NOV 1961	DEC 1961	3RD TRNG RGMT CO "C"	FORT DIX,	NEW JERSEY	
SEP 1961	NOV 1961	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON,	RI	
AUG 1955	SEP 1961	303 CAMBRIDGE STREET	FALL RIVER,	MASS	
MAR 1940	AUG 1955				

ITEM #14 (EMPLOYMENT):

FROM	TO:		EMPLOYER:	ADDRESS;	CITY: STATE:
30 SEPT 70	PRESENT		NAVAL OCEAN SURV	4301 SUITLAND RD	SUITLAND, MD 20390
			INFO CENTER (NOSIC)		
			NAVAL INTELL PROC	ARLINGTON HALL	ARLINGTON, VA
JUL 1965	30SEPT70		SYS SUPPORT ACTY(NIPSSA)	"B" BLDG RM 1402	
OCT 1964	JAN 1965	*	ARLINGTON DETECTIVE	2201 WILSON BLVD	ARLINGTON, VA
			AGCY	1001 3rd ST SW	WASHINGTON, D.C.
JAN 1965	AUG 1965	*	TOWN CENTER PLAZA	NAVY WEAPONS PLANT	
OCT 1964	JUN 1965		DIO NDW (NAVY DEPT)	M ST AT 11TH SW	WASHINGTON, D.C.
				50 HOBSON AVE	TIVERTON, R.I.
SEP 1964	OCT 1964		UNEMPLOYED		
SEP 1961	SEP 1964		UNITED STATES ARMY		
JUL 1961	SEP 1961		THIBOUTOT AUTO BODY	SLADE STREET	FALL RIVER, MASS.
SEP 1959	JULY 1961		UNITED STATES TRUNK CO	951 BROADWAY	FALL RIVER, MASS.
			(CLARKE PRECISION MOULDING)		
APR 1959	SEP. 1959		UNEMPLOYED	50 HOBSON AVENUE	TIVERTON, R.I.
SEP 1955	APR 1959	*	STONE BRIDGE INN	MAIN ROAD,	TIVERTON, R.I.

* DENOTES PART TIME EMPLOYMENT.

ITEM [illegible] FEDERAL CIVIL SERVICE/ARMED FORCES:
I HAVE BEEN EMPLOYED WITH CIVIL SERVICE FROM OCT 1964 TO PRESENT.
SEE ITEM #14 ABOVE FOR INCLUSIVE DATES.
I WAS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY FROM 18 SEPT 61 TO 17 SEPT 1964.
RANK E-4, SERIAL NUMBER RA 11-396-679, SEPARATION--HONORABLE, AND
DISCHARGE--HONORABLE.

DATE: [illegible] APRIL 1975 SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1969—294-413

STAPLE HERE

NACC Use Only

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST

REQUEST DATE

1. LAST NAME-FIRST NAME-MIDDLE NAME
GLYNN, BETTY MARIE

2. SEX
FEMALE

3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S)
SPEER, BETTY MARIE

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
454-74-9639

7. SERVICE NUMBER

5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH
DECEMBER 23, 1943

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
HUBBARD, (COUNTY UNK) TEXAS.

8. a. SECURITY PROGRAM
☐ MILITARY
☒ CIVILIAN
☐ INDUSTRIAL

b.
☐ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST

RETURN RESULTS TO:
(Include Zip Code)

9. RELATIVES	10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	11. PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER			
b. MOTHER *(Full Maiden Name)*			
c. SPOUSE *(Full Maiden Name)*			

13. RESIDENCES *(List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)*

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE

14. EMPLOYMENT *(List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent employment.)*

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE

15. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE

YES	NO	16. *("Yes" answers must be explained in Item 18, below.)*
		a. Is the subject an alien or naturalized citizen?
		b. Has the subject any foreign connections, employment or military service?
		c. Has the subject travelled or resided abroad other than for the U.S. Government?
		d. Has the subject had employment requiring a security clearance or investigation?
		e. Is the subject now or has he ever been in the Federal Civil Service or Armed Forces?
		f. Has the subject qualified DD Form 398, 98, 48-1, or similar security form?
		g. Has the subject ever been addicted to drugs?

17. REQUEST DATA

a. REQUESTOR DESIGNATOR				b. REASON	
	ARMY		DASA		BASIC TRAINEE
	NAVY		DCA		PRE-COMMISSION
	AIR FORCE		DCAA		NUCLEAR
	OSD		DIA		BI
	JCS		DSA		SECRET CLEARANCE
	NSA		DISCO		
	USMC				

18. REMARKS *(If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)*

SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION: PETER CARROLL GLYNN JR (SPOUSE)

S/N 0102-013-1700

DD FORM 1584 1 DEC 66

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/2/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10094-10459
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	011475

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	USLOV, SERGY ALEXANDROVECH
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/22/1978
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	CIA USLOV, SERGY ALEXANDROVECH OSWALD, LEE; RUSSIAN PERIOD GOLOVACHEV, PAVEZ A.
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/05/1996
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 207.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

011475

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name SERGY ALEXANDROVECH USLOV Date 8/22/78
Address 414 AVENUE N #6D Place RESIDENCE
City/State BROOKLYN, NEW YORK

Date of Birth 11/19/49 - MINSK, USSR ~~M or S~~
Social Security 075-60-6025 Spouse
Children

2. Physical Description:

Height
Weight
Ethnic Group RUSSIAN

Color Eyes GREY Hair BLK
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: UNEMPLOYED
Address
Telephone

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name ARAISM PINEVNA BOROV USLOV - MOTHER
Address 414 AVENUE N #6D
BROOKLYN, N.Y

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks:

Investigator CLIFFORD A. FENTON, JR.
Date

Form #4-B

KENNEDY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Sergy Alexandrovech Uslov Date August 22, 1978 Time 3:00 p.m.

Address 414 Avenue N #6 D Place Residence
Brooklyn, New York

Interview: On August 22, 1978, Sergy A. Uslov was interviewed at his residence relative to an allegation that, through a friend, Lee Harvey Oswald stated he could make money if he killed the President. Uslov's mother, Araism Uslov, 55 years, lives with him; however, was not present at the time of the visit. He is currently unemployed, having left his job as a packer/salesman for Fada Industries, 1201 Broadway, New York, New York, (212) 679-4280, approximately two weeks ago. He presently is hopeful of purchasing a Madallion Taxi-cab in New York City.

Uslov stated that he arrived in the United States via TWA on March 23, 1977, having arrived from Russia through Austria and Italy (Alien Record #A21703170; Permit #0669968). His departure from Russia was accomplished through subterfuge. His mother was of Jewish ancestry and both he and his mother were granted their request to go to Israel. Since such travel to Israel necessitates first stopping in Italy, upon arrival Uslov and his mother contacted the U.S. Embassy and were per-

Interviewer Signature

Typed Signature Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.

Date transcribed 9-8-78

By: br Form #4-A

mitted to enter the United States. The CIA contacted Uslov via telephone approximately two months later. A meeting was arranged and he was debriefed as to his knowledge of Russian life, KGB, etc. At this point, Uslov stated that he would shoot himself if he ever had to return to Russia.

After sixteen years of age when continuous education ceased, Uslov worked at several odd jobs while intermittently attending the Institute of History and of Foreign Languages. He speaks German, Russian, White Russian and English.

Uslov stated that he had written a manuscript concerning Lee Harvey Oswald; a manuscript written mostly from information he had elicted from Pavez A. Golovachev in Minsk, the U.S.S.R. Uslov first met Golovachev through a friend, V. Egor, in 1965. After the casual meeting, Egor told him that Golovachev was a good friend of Lee Harvey Oswald. Several years later, Uslov next met Golovachev while he was drinking and Golovachev stated that he did know Oswald and that his wife Marina was his girlfriend before their marriage. Sometime in 1975, while in Golovachev's apartment in Moscow, an intoxicated Golovachev supplied much informative data relative to Oswald.

Golovachev explained to him that he and Lee Harvey Oswald worked together at a radio factory in Moscow and were close friends. Oswald was a very nervous person; nervous about everything, laughed like a crazy man, and liked his wife "very, very much." Further, he had stated that Oswald saw how life was really like in Russia and was very disenchanted. Oswald wanted a lot and the Government "did everything." He even tried Russian writing once and failed, as usual. Then he expressed the desire to return to America with his wife, also a wish of hers. Golovachev asked, "What are you going to do in America?" Golovachev was inquiring as to how was he going to earn money as he did not have a talent for anything. Oswald replied, "Don't worry. There are many ways to make good money." Oswald stated that he could get "good money", for example, by killing the President in a good way. Oswald further stated that "you don't know America. The people would make you a hero; they'd write books, magazine articles, even make movies about you." Further, Oswald implied that he most likely would not receive the money personally but that the money would go to his wife.

Golovachev further told Oslov that because of his contact with Oswald, immediately following the assassination of President Kennedy and identification of Oswald, the KGB took him into custody. After hours of questioning, the KGB searched his apartment and took everything pertaining to Oswald, which included photographs and papers.

It is surmised that as Golovachev became garrulous while drinking, the KGB discovered that he was still in possession of a group photograph depicting Lee, Marina and Golovachev among other people. Accordingly, sometime in 1971 or 1972, the KGB took the photo.

Uslov explained that he wrote the complete story in Russian and submitted it to the CIA for transmittal to the HSCA. They advised that it be translated to English. In November of 1977, he sent the manuscript to Radio Freedom on 42nd Street in New York City for translation and to be forwarded to the Committee. It is his belief that he was contacted by the HSCA as a result of reading his manuscript. He is presently attempting to locate his copy, which is in Russian, for our perusal.

After giving a full dissertation on life in Russia, Uslov requested that his identity remain anonymous. He wanted to give his information only to the HSCA.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/14/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10096-10399
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	009532

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	TAYLOR, GARY.
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/11/1978
PAGES :	9
SUBJECTS :	DE BAHRENSCHILDT, GEORGE. TAYLOR, GARY. OSWALD, MORING; ASSOCIATES AND RELATIVES. OSWALD, LEE; POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD; ASSOCIATES & RELATIVES.
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY.
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	06/21/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 175. Outside contact report.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name Gary Edward Taylor
Address 3716-Cole Ave
City/State Dallas, Texas 75204
Date of Birth 12-24-39
Social Security 456-58-3508

Date 6-11-78
Place 300 PM
Telephone
M or S Married
Spouse Cynthia Marie Taylor
Children

2. Physical Description:

Height 6 feet
Weight
Ethnic Group White Male

Color Eyes Gray Hair Brown
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: (Cab Driver) Yellow Cab Co.
Address Dallas, Texas
Telephone

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests 2-Arrest For loitering 1958 - Dismissed
2. Convictions 1- For loitering 1962 - Fined

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name Mother - Lila Marie Taylor (Nee Espin)
Address 4235- NorthCrest Rd.
Dallas, Texas

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks: Bell-Boy Pager - Call-214-742-2872
Pager # 859

Investigator Clarence J Day

Date 6-11-78

Form #4-B

KENNEDY

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE 6-11-78 TIME 3⁰⁰ PM

I. Identifying Information:

Name Gary Edward Taylor Telephone 214-526-8151

Address 3716 - Cole Ave #102 - Dallas, Texas 75204

Type of Contact: ☐ Telephone
☑ Person

II. Summary of Contact:

Purpose was to review Statement and to interview the witness.

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

Clarence Day

Form #5

KENNEDY

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Gary Edward Taylor
Address 3716 Cole Avenue, #102,
Dallas, Texas 75204

Date June 11, 1978 Time 3:00 p.m
Place Holiday Inn, Regal Row,
Dallas, Texas

Interview: The purpose of the interview of Mr. Taylor was to review his Statement and to interview the witness. This interview took place on Sunday, June 11, 1978, at 3:00 p.m. at the Holiday Inn, 1575 Regal Row, Dallas, Texas. Mr. Gary Edward Taylor, date of birth 12-24-39, who is the employed as a taxi cab driver for the Yellow Cab Company in Dallas, Texas. Telephone number at work is 426-2626. Mr. Taylor stated that he met Lee Harvey Oswald and Marina Oswald in early September of 1962 in Fort Worth, Texas. In describing LHO, Mr. Taylor stated that he was not a very nice person to know. He was never lighthearted nor did he ever make jokes. He was not a very sociable person. Mr. Taylor stated that during the time that he knew LHO, he had talked with him only on a very general basis about his stay in Russia. Taylor stated that Oswald had never discussed his ever being debriefed by the KGB while he was in the Soviet Union. Mr. Taylor said that he had never heard LHO mention that he had attempted to commit suicide while in Russia nor had he ever noticed any scars as a result of that attempt. Mr. Taylor stated that LHO would talk about Russia and his stay

Interviewer Signature Clarence J Day
Typed Signature Clarence J. Day

Date transcribed 6-23-78

By: br Form #4-A

in the Soviet Union only in a general way and would never be specific. He talked about the society as a whole but never about his position in it. Mr. Taylor had the impression that Oswald did not like living in the Soviet Union. He stated that LHO did mention that he had worked in a radio factory while in Minsk and stated that he made metal chassis. He described his job as being that of a sheet metal worker. However, Taylor stated that Oswald did not go into any details concerning his work. Mr. Taylor described Oswald at this point in the interview as being a very superficial person. He described him as "like a kid coming to school without doing his homework." Mr. Taylor further recalls that he (Mr. Taylor) thought it odd that LHO did not know how to drive a car. Taylor stated that he had been asked by George De Mohrenschildt and a friend of the De Mohrenschildts by the name of George Bouhe to teach LHO how to drive. Taylor stated however that he has no knowledge of Oswald ever learning to drive a car.

Mr. Taylor stated that LHO talked only in general terms about where he lived in Russia. He did mention living in Minsk but gave little insight into his living conditions. Taylor stated that he got a feeling that Oswald lived under average conditions. He stated that Oswald had mentioned that he made the minimal wages, which were about forty-five rubles a month. He went on to state that he had spoken of having only one pair of shoes and one coat. Taylor recalled that LHO had never discussed with him what his social life was like while he was in

Russia and he added that LHO was "a person of few social graces" and that he appeared to be a person who had no time for people in general. He described him as being untypical and as being a person who was self-motivated to personal efforts or personal goals.

Mr. Taylor reflected that he could not understand the interest that George De Mohrenschildt showed towards LHO during this period. He described De Mohrenschildt's actions as giving Oswald money, helping him by giving him clothing and then by virtually forcing Oswald on his friends, that is, the friends of De Mohrenschildt. He also stated that De Mohrenschildt spent a great deal of time with LHO. Mr. Taylor said that was difficult to understand because George De Mohrenschildt had children and a family of his own and he had never done any of the things that he had done for LHO for his own family. He stated further that this interest was out of character for George De Mohrenschildt, considering that lHO was a "nobody."

Mr. Taylor stated that LHO had never mentioned having any contact with the KGB. He stated that Oswald could not understand why the Russian Government was not interested in him and he believed that this hurt LHO. Taylor stated that sometime about six months before the assassination, he had visited Marina at their apartment on Neeley Street in Oakcliff but Lee was not home at the time. While he was at the apartment, Marina had shown him a rifle belonging to LHO which she got from behind the door. Taylor could not describe the weapon except to say that it was a rifle. He stated that he believed Marina was afraid of LHO and during this visit she sensed that she anxious for him to leave. He recalled that he had seen signs of Marina being battered by LHO. He had observed on occassions bruises and abrasions which he believed were caused by LHO. Taylor stated that lHO never discussed why the Soviet Government allowed him to remain in Russia or why they let him return to this country.

This witness had no knowledge of any friends or associates of LHO other than those persons mentioned in the Warren Commission Report. He stated that he never discussed the U-2 program with LHO. Taylor advised that he had no knowledge that LHO was an extensive reader. He recalled that he did subscribe to and receive one Russian periodical. He did not remember the name. He later stated that he recalled that Oswald did mention that he had read Lenin, Karl Marx, and Adolph Hitler.

Mr. Taylor stated that he knew of only one interest that LHO had, and that interest was writing. He said that LHO spent most of his spare time writing. He further recalls that Oswald had given him a manuscript which he, LHO, had written. Taylor said that he read a very small part of the writings and concluded that it was very poorly done and so he never finished reading it.

Taylor continued to recall and stated while giving his Warren Commission testimony, he was shown a manuscript by Mr.

Jack Genner, Counsel for the Warren Commission, and that he did not reconize it as the one given him by LHO. He further stated that about a year ago he was interviewed by Edward Epstein, the author, and at that time he was shown a manuscript by Mr. Epstein which he (Taylor) recongized as the one given him by LHO. Mr. Taylor said he could think of nothing LHO did or said that led him to believe that Oswald had a motive for killing President Kennedy. He stated that LHO to him was just an insignificant person.

Mr. Taylor, when questioned about his employment in 1959 or 1960, stated that he had worked at a number of jobs during that time. He was a student in college and he recalled that one place he worked was the stockroom in J. C. Penny's Store in Dallas, Texas. He could not name his supervisor. Mr. Taylor stated that he had worked for R.C.A. Service Company at Redstone Arsonal, in Alabama, as a sound engineer and that he had trouble getting a security check clearance; however, he had later gotten the clearance. When asked if he knew Donald Waltrum, Jack Moore, and R. K. Johnson, or Sigmund Andrews, Mr. Taylor said that he knew them all except Donald Waltrum.

Taylor said that he had lived two doors down from Jack Moore when he lived at 3245 North Crest, in Dallas, Texas. Moore at that time was living at 4241 North Crest. He admitted knowing Moore since 1951. He stated that Moore's children and his children are friends. He advised that Moore is now retired from a family business. The family business was selling surgical supplies. The business carries the family name and is still in Dallas, Texas. Taylor stated that his son and Moore's grand-daughter are now dating each other.

R. K. Johnson was a close personal friend of Taylor. He was a free-lance photographer who had taught him photography. He had worked for Johnson as a free-lance photography assistant at 3507 Travis Street in Dallas, Texas. He stated that he met Johnson in 1957 when he became interested in motion pictures. Johnson was in that profession at the time. He stated that Ralph Johnson died Easter Sunday, 1967.

Mr. Taylor said that he met Sigmund Andrews in 1957 when he was involved in motion pictures and he stated that in 1960 Andrews came to Dallas and they worked together doing industrial and motion picture advertising for Keitz Herdon Company in Dallas. His former wife, that is, Andrew's former wife's name is Norma, and she is now married to William Holiman who is the assistant agent in charge of the Dallas Field Office for the F.B.I. He stated that he has not seen or had contact with Andrews in quite some time, for over a year, but that he has seen Norma Holiman recently. Mr. Taylor stated that he had worked for Sellers Company or Sellers T.V. Studio at 2102 Johnson Street in Dallas, Texas. in 1963 and 1966. He stated that he worked as a sound engineer and that there were only three people in the company, a man by the name of Ken Brown, and J. E. Sellers and himself. The company was involved in making television/motion picture advertising.

Taylor stated that he knew of no employee of the Sellers Company who was acquainted with, associated with, or even knew LHO. Near the end of this interview, Mr. Taylor asked me if the Committee had George De Mohrenschildt's papers from his estate. I made no comment and Mr. Taylor stated that, asked me, in other words, if I knew that there was a confession among George De Mohrenschildt's papers. I still made no comment. Mr. Taylor then stated that he had been told by Alexandra De Mohrenschildt, his former wife, that there was a confession among George De Mohrenschildt's papers, and he indicated that that fact was the reason why John, Jane and Alexandra De Mohrenschildt were fighting so hard in the courts to obtain possession of George De Mohrenschildt's estate, papers and all. Mr. Taylor was very cooperative during this interview. He suggested very strongly that some member of this Committee contact and interview his former wife, Alexander De Mohrenschildt. He stated that if there was any way that he could help in the investigation, the Committee is free to contact him at any time.

JFK Assassination System Date: 10/14/20
Identification Form

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10096-10401

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES.

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 009534

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : FLYNN, DENNIS A.
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 06/16/1978
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :
CIA.
FLYNN, DENNIS A; INTERVIEWS.
DOS.

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY.
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/21/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 175.

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

009534

1. Identifying Information:

Name Dennis A. Flynn
Address 11749 Stuart Mill Rd.
City/State Oakton, Virginia
Date of Birth
Social Security

Date June 16, 1978
Place His home
Telephone 620-3239
M or S Married
Spouse
Children

2. Physical Description:

Height
Weight
Ethnic Group

Color Eyes Hair
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment:
Address
Telephone

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name
Address

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks:

Investigator Robert W. Genzman

Date June 27, 1978

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Dennis Flynn
Date June 16, 1978 Time 11:30 am
Address 1749 Stuart Mill Rd.
Oakton, Virginia
Place at his home

Interview: Robert Genzman and Harold Leap interviewed Dennis Flynn at his home on June 16, 1978. The interview yielded the following information.

Flynn worked for the FBI from 1934 to 1946, and for the Department of State from 1947 to 1967. From 1953 to 1956 he was Director of Security at the State Department.

Flynn recalls the following procedures for State Department cover for CIA employees. The State Department's Personnel Office would request clearances from the Security Office. The Security Office would contact the CIA liaison officer, who would certify clearance. The Security Office would then grant clearance. A record of CIA certification of clearance would probably be placed in the individual's State Department security file.

Flynn believed that the State Department at no time kept a listing of CIA employees under State Department cover. He said that the Security Officer and the head of the Bureau of Intelligence Research generally knew about these cover arrangements.

Flynn stated that at no time from 1959 to 1963 did the

Interviewer Signature Robert Genzman
Typed Signature Robert Genzman Harold Leap
Date transcribed June 26, 78
By: ROSS
Form #4-A

CIA use consular cover. Flynn said that he remembers the CIA officers who had State Department cover in Moscow during this period. He is sure that Richard E. Snyder and Jack F. Matlock were not CIA employees, and he is fairly certain that John A. McVickar, Joseph Norbury, and Alexis Davison were not CIA employees.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/1/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10096-10448
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	009555

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	UNIV. OF NEW MEXICO, SCHOOL OF MEDICINE.
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/21/1978
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	HSCA, ADMINISTRATION.
DOCUMENT TYPE :	STATEMENT.
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/06/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 175.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

THE UNIVERSITY OF NEW MEXICO ☐ SCHOOL OF MEDICINE
OFFICE OF THE MEDICAL INVESTIGATOR
NEW MEXICO CENTER FOR FORENSIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE
ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO 87131, TELEPHONE 505: 277-3459
ADMINISTRATIVE 505: 277-2861

June 21, 1978

STATEMENT

Preparation of Report of the Forensic Pathology Panel to the Select Committee on Assassinations, U. S. House of Representatives

James T. Weston, M.D. SS# 560-46-7395	10 days @ $130/day	$ 1,300.00
Laura Krug SS# 525-06-0333	68 hrs @ $5.34/hr	363.12
Debbie McMath SS# 227-86-5821	67 hrs @ $5.34/hr	357.78
Karen C. Schwartz SS# 543-56-2545	45 1/2 hrs @ $5.34 hr	242.97
Printing		89.37
Postage		79.37
	TOTAL	$ 2,432.61

Date: 10/6/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10104-10294
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	HSCA

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	00/00/0000
PAGES :	14
SUBJECTS :	BINION, BENNY. CAMPISI, JOE. JAFFE, MILTON. INS, FILES. CIVELLA, JOSEPH.
DOCUMENT TYPE :	OTHER TEXTUAL.
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/27/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	INS file review; typed notes. Box 250.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Howard Shapiro

014048

INS File Reviews

A. Benny Binion

File #A8 952 077
DOB: 11/20/04
POB: Pilot Grove, Texas
FBI #206 216

General Information:

- Took over policy in Dallas after Freiden killed in 1936 -- ex-boss of Dallas million dollar policy racket -- had 40% of Herbert Noble's take -- in protection racket he had trouble with Noble, bitter enemies -- 7 attempts to kill Noble -- Noble's wife killed 11/29/49 when she started her car.

- DPD Lt. reportedly tapped phone calls and miked room -- BB supposedly knew who killed Noble's wife and would have him killed in jail as good-will gesture if Noble let BB back into Dallas rackets. BB fled Dallas in 1946.

- Record: charged in Freiden killing but released 12/28/36.
  charged concealed weapon 9/30/32.
  homicide conv. of bootlegger 5/25/32; got suspended sentence.

- 12/6/53 news clip:

  - BB pays $516,541.93 in back taxes
  - Still got 5-year sentence on tax evasion rap.

- 1956 invest. satisfies INS that BB is U.S. citizen through birth as he claimed and will not be deported.

- 7/8/55 INS memo:

  - BB currently prisoner at Leavenworth.

- BB file also contains reference to invest. of Harry Remer Urban. DOB: 9/9/06; Dallas

B. R.D. Matthews File #A14 529 111

- 3/23/65 report:
    - RDM was born 9/26/20 under the name Russell Douglass Boyd, Jr. and later changed his name in court.
    - Says RDM has been arrested many times since 1948.
    - INS concludes that RDM appears to be U.S. citizen.
    - Name change was in Dallas court on 11/17/60 (Bureau of Vital Stats Certificate #39787 #5139).
    - Attached affidavit from RDM's mother:
        - Says RDM served in Marines in WW-II
        - RDM used Matthews after father died and mother remarried.

C. Joe Campisi File #A12 531 109

- 8/5/69 letter
    - Says JC, Peter J. Piccola, and Jimmy I. Maggiota are of interest to O.C. and racket section of Justice Department.
- 3/7/62 report:
    - Verifies JC's citizenship (through his father and school records).
    - Carlo Campisi - says he came to U.S. with wife in 1907 to La. Moved to Dallas in 1917.
    - Lists JC as a gambler, making bets in excess of $1000 on baseball games and says he knows many influential people in Dallas city government and DPD.
- 11/7/61 memo
    - INS investigator lists Dallas residents who are involved in gambling rackets and/or liquor rackets:

JC
S. Campisi
Jimmy Maggiotta
Joe L. Tinnerrello
Joseph J. Colletta
John Michael Carcelli
P. Piccola
Johnny Patrona

D. Sam Campisi File #A12 531 043
DOB: 5/20/20

- 10/23/63 memo:
  - Lists individuals identified as LCN members:

SC
Charles P. Manicchia
Ross Peter Interrante
Luke Cortemeglia
Jimmy Maggiotta
Phillip Municchia

E. Joseph Civello

File #A11 302 676
DOB: 2/3/02, Port Allen, La.

- 9/9/59 memo
  - Original family name was Shivera; changed to Civello in 1932.
  - Few news clips on Civello and Appalachia meeting.
- 5/22/59 memo
  - Says Civello and Frank Desimone claim to be cousins. INS unable to verify this.
- 3/13/59 news clip
  - JC won't testify before L.A.
    - g.j. - his attorney sayd he's uneducated and confused.
    - g.j. - will give him another chance before contempt rap.
- 9/11/58 report
  - Ross Musso is JC's brother-in-law.

Civello's file contains testimony given by John Cusach, Narcotics Agent, on 1/19/58 before N.Y. Joint Legis. Comm. on Govt. Operations.

- This text runs down list of top Mafia men in 1958 with brief bio sketches.
- Civello is mentioned; says he was convicted in Dallas in 1937 (on narcotics rap?) and got 15-year sentence - commuted and released from prison 11/6/48. Now he has pardon application pending.
- Gabriel Mannarino is mentioned: DOB - 10/31/16, Pa.
  - Says he runs numbers and slot machines with brother Sammy in Westmoreland Cty, Pa.
  - In 1950 word was that GM was going to move in on Pittsburgh numbers racket and let "Cuban mob" take over in New Kensington.

E. Joseph Civello (Cont'd)

  - Info that Mannarino has concession at Sans Souci in Havana (owned by Trafficante).

- 11/26/57 report

  - Lists murder arrest for JC on 7/14/23 - later exonerated.

Howard Shapiro

F. Milton Jaffe

File #A13 093 381
DOB: 8/19/95, Braddock, Pa.

- 6/4/63 report
    - Lists prior residences as:
        - 5725 Torkes Ave., Pittsburgh
        - 6308 Pennsylvania Ave., Pittsburgh
    - Employment last five years:
        - Owns 2% interest in Karat, Inc, dba Stardust Casino, L.V.
        - Prior occupations: gambling, 6308 Penn Ave., Pittsburgh.
        - Details Jaffe family history -nothing startling.
- 2/18/63 memo
    - Lists MJ as important figure in L.V. gambling circles along with: B. Rothkopf
      M. Rubin
      J. Gottlieb

G. Pedro Digno Fox-Zamora File #A12 479 246
FOB: 6/13/13, Havana

- Copy of PF's naturalization certificate - #38033; 3/15/68
    - Signed Pedro Rudy Fox (wants name changed to this)
    - Lists DOB as 10/24/09
    - Admitted to US 11/29/61
    - Res.: 302 Beacon Blvd., Miami.
        - Says since 5/29/61 he has never left U.S. for more than six months.
        - Last place of foreign residence is Tropicana nightclub.
        - Present occupation: restaurant captain at Deauville Hotel.
        - Denies Communist affiliation and criminal record.

- Other names used: Rudy P. Fox
- Was general manager at Tropicana.

- Records show entry into N.Y.: 5/18/60
  " " " " Miami: 3/13/60

- Passport #14776

- Fox applied for immigrant visa at American Embassy in Mexico City.
    - Says he is a merchant.
    - Lists assets as:

$ 5,000	cash
81,200	bank deposits
15,000	real estate
10,000	investment

- Residences:

1924-29	Havana
1929-39	Miami
1939-60	Havana
1960-date	Miami

H. Martin Gabriel Zamora-Fox File #A12 416 893
DOB: 3/18/96, Matanzas, Cuba

- 3/25/66 letter to Social Sec. Adm.
  - Says MF is Pedro Fox's brother.
  - MF entered U.S. 7/2/61 at Miami from Mexico as permanent resident.
  - This is response to Pedro Fox 3/23/66 request for info so his brother can get Medicare benefits; note on request says applicant is mentally ill -- don't know if this means Pedro or Martin.

- 7/2/61 immigrant visa application
  - Martin has passport #13603
  - Lists occupation as real estate owner
  - Assets: $ 15,000 cash
    50,000 bank deposits
    30,000 real estate
  - Martin was always in Cuba.

- 6/26/61 letter from Pan American Bank, Miami to U.S. Consul, Mexico City
  - Says MF has had checking account with substantial deposits since October 1952.

I. Luis Eusebio Balbueka-Calzadillo File #A12 854 523

- Naturalization certificate #47462 - 5/1/70
    - DOB: 12/15/28; Guantanamo, Cuba
    - Denies Communist affiliatons and criminal record
    - Residence: 450 N.W. 45th Ave., Miami
    - Has lived in U.S. since 7/6/62
    - Lawfully admitted 8/23/64
    - Previous U.S. addresses: 927 SW 3 St., Miami
      918 SW 10th St., Miami
    - Employment in U.S.:

1/68	Aero Cast, Inc.
9/65 - 1/68	Air Craft Casting
2/64 - 9/65	Spring Lock Scaffol
3/63 - 2/64	Singer Co.
10/62 - 1/63	Richards Dept. Store

    - Occupation: caster
    - Worked for U.S. Government, Guantanamo Bay, from 1943 - 10/61.
- Untitled documents:
    - States LB can't return to Cuba for political reasons.
- 10/4/62 report - Lists LB as anti-Castro "founder of anti-Castro Patrionatas de Libertad in Oriente Province."

  "ex-member of MRR," "connected w/Nino."

J. Edward Browder, Jr. File #A11 876 213

- 6/8/60 letter from INS to Browder (at 6300 Snapper Creek Drive, Miami)
    - Informs EB that he is not to depart from U.S. to Cuba until further notice.

K. Norman Rothman File #A11 885 359

- 6/11/63 memo from Bureau of Narcotics to INS
  - Lists Cuban types mixed up in narcotics
  - NR listed as violator and suspect along with others, including: Trafficante
    Tourine
    Lanally
  - Lists associates of NR:

    Michael Morrison
    Jean Baptiste Croce
    Josef Albert Bistoni
    Paul D. Mondolini
  - States NR spends much time around Havana casinos. Was associated with Lucien Rivard in operation of El Morocco casino in Camagney, Cuba into which he imports slot machiens from U.S.
  - INS recommends deportation from Cuba to U.S.
- 6/13/60 - news clip
  - Says George Mecalling has revealed himself as true owner of Biltmore Terrace Hotel in Miami and will ask for Fed. bankruptcy.
    - Hotel is described as haven for Batista Cubans and NR described as big-time builder in Cuba under Batista and as front man at hotel until Mecalling's disclosure.
    - Says NR was convicted in Feb. in case involving smuggling weapons into Cuba - now on appeal.

L. Dominick Bartone File #A10 190 157

- 10/28/ memo
  - DOB: 8/8/13; N.Y.
    Res.: 25 Lansdowne Rd., Toledo, Ohio
  - Mentions DB's long record and some specific raps
  - "Unconfirmed rumors have circulated for years that during the late 1950's he was involved in some capacity w/the CIA."

M. Edward Ivan Arthur

File #A13 137 451
DOB: 6/15/35
SS #290-28-2188
Res.: 92 Belpre Pl., W.,
Waterville, Ohio 43081

- File only contains correspondence between Arthur, his attorney (Robert E. Cesner, Jr.) and INS on Arthur's FOIA request for his files.
- Only thing in the file is FBI report (10/30/63) deleted for HSCA due to 3rd agency rule.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/14/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10104-10354
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES.
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	009383

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	DOD
FROM :	MILLER, JUDITH A.
TO :	BLAKEY, G. ROBERT.
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/22/1978
PAGES :	22
SUBJECTS :	CIA. OSWALD, LEE; PRE-RUSSIAN PERIOD-MILITARY SERVICE. NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE (1960-64). DOD, FILES.
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT.
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3; Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	12/20/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 172.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301

009385

June 22, 1978

G. Robert Blakey, Esq.
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Blakey:

Attached are fact sheets submitted by the Department of the Navy in response to inquiries from the Select Committee dated March 15 and 20 (date of receipt); April 12, 20, 28; May 3 and 9; and June 1, 1978.

For your information, the Air Force, DIA and DIS have now completed their reviews for information requested in all letters received at DoD by June 6, 1978. With the exception of your May 8, 1978 request (on which a search is still proceeding), the Navy has also completed its review for all information requested through June 6, 1978. The Army has completed its search efforts for the first twenty-six of your letters, dated between December 27, 1977, and May 11, 1978. The results of these searches have been made available for review at this Department--with the exception of a few items where further information has been requested to permit completion of the search.

Sincerely,

Judy Miller

Judith A. Miller
Assistant to The Special Assistant

Attachments

FACT SHEET ON SELECT COMMITTEE REQUESTS FOR
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY RECORDS

Date of Request		
3/15/78	1.	Valeriy Valdimirovich Kostiko - no records identifiable within the Department of the Navy.
	2.	Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko - no records identifiable within the Department of the Navy.
3/20/78 (received)	1.	William P. Dolzel - no records identifiable.
	2.	Alberto Hernandez Hechevarri - no records identifiable.
	3.	Orest Pena - no records identifiable.
	4.	Rolando Pelasz - no records identifiable.
	5.	Clay Shaw - no records identifiable.
	6.	Kerry Wendall Thornley - no records identifiable.
	7.	Jonquin Villoda - no records identifiable.
	8.	Luis Balbuena - no records identifiable other than what DIA possesses (previously made available).
4/20/78	1.	Eleanor E. Archer - no records identifiable.
	2.	Anthony Colosacco - no records identifiable.
	3.	Herman Milton - no records identifiable.
	4.	John M. Geizzaffi - no records identifiable.
	5.	Maurice Lerner - no records identifiable.
	6.	Gordon McLendon - no records identifiable.
	7.	Albert Meadows - no records identifiable.
	8.	Isadore Miller - no records identifiable.
	9.	Thomas R. Peasner - no records identifiable.
	10.	Victor Periera - no records identifiable.

Date of
Request

4/20/78 (con't)

11. Harry Raymond Pope - no records identifiable.

12. Helen Kay Smith - no records identifiable.

13. John Eli Stone - no records identifiable.

14. Charles Tourine - no records identifiable.

15. John Benton Turns - no records identifiable.

16. Anthony Zoppi - no records identifiable.

4/28/78 (Ltr #2)

1. Richard Cain - no records identifiable within the Department of the Navy.

2. Jorge Alonso Pujol - no records identifiable.

3. Henry Savaadra - no records identifiable.

4. I. Irving Davidson - no records identifiable.

5. James Plumeri - no records identifiable.

6. Salvadore Granello - no records identifiable.

7. John La Rocca - The Naval Investigative Service (NIS) holds a file on an enlisted member of the U.S. Marine Corps by the name of John Andrew LaRocca. This individual is not believed to be identifiable with "John LaRocca, Pennsylvania mobster arrested in 1957", as he was born in 1948.

8. Angelo Bruno - The NIS holds a file containing the results of a January 1978, investigation conducted at Naples, Italy, concerning an individual named Angelo Frank Bruno. That individual's date and place of birth is listed as January 25, 1902 or 1903, at Licato, Sicily, Italy. At the time of the investigation Bruno was incarcerated in a Federal prison in the United States. Nevertheless, there is nothing in the file which would indicate this individual is identifiable as the Angelo Bruno, "Philadelphia Crime Boss."

9. Sam Mannarino - no records identifiable.

10. Garbriel Mannarino - no records identifiable.

11. Joseph Shimon - no records identifiable.

12. Sergio Arcaha Smith - file has been made available.

13. George Woodcock, Jr. - a copy of the NIS Report of Investigation is available.

Undated Committee Request:

1. Zack Stout - 1607642. Latest available mailing address provided Select Committee by phone.

2. George Arthur Wilkins, Jr. - Latest available mailing address provided Select Committee by phone.

3. Robert Augg - Identified as former Marine Robert Royce Augg - 1596827. Personnel record has been made available for inspection.

4. Nelson Delgado - Identified as former Marine Nelson Delgado 1644884. Personnel record has been made available for inspection.

5. Carson Roberts - Has been previously identified as Lieutenant General Carson A. Roberts, 04463, U.S. Marine Corps Retired. Mailing address previously provided the Committee.

6. Thomas Arthur Vallee - 1114455. Identified as a former Marine. Personnel record has been made available for inspection.

7. Allan O. Thompson - Has been tentatively identified as a former Marine by the name of Alva Owen Thompson. Marine Corps personnel record has been made available for inspection.

8. Kerry Wendall Thornley - A former Marine with same name but the date of birth of 4/17/38 instead of 4/19/38 has been identified and a certified copy of Thornley's Marine record has been made available for inspection.

9. John E. Donovan - A former Marine with same name but with date of birth of 8/31/34 instead of 8/21/34 has been identified and a certified copy of Donovan's personnel record has been made available for inspection. It was noted that correspondence in the Marine Corps jacket indicated that Donovan joined the U.S. Army subsequent to his tour with the Marine Corps.

10. Chief Warrant Officer Morgan - This officer has been identified as Captain Roger G. Morgan, U.S. Marine Corps Retired. His mailing address is Route 1, Sewalls Point, Jensen Beach, Flordia 33457.

Date of Request		
5/3/78	1.	Colonel Mario Silvesto - no record identifiable.
	2.	Thomas Arthur Vallee - no record identifiable.
	3.	Gary Taylor - no record identifiable.

Date of
Request

5/3/78
(con't)

4. Leonard Calvery - no record identifiable.

5. Jack Brown - no record identifiable.

6. Robert Augg - all information previously forwarded.

7. Zack Stout - all information previously forwarded.

8. Richard Call - all information previously forwarded.

9. Nelson Delgado - no record identifiable.

10. Aline Mosley - no record identifiable.

11. Pauline Bates - no record identifiable.

12. Carson Roberts - no record identifiable.

13. Adrian Alba - no record identifiable.

14. Mrs. G. Stanley Brown Vera - no record identifiable.

15. Emmet Charles Babe, Jr. - no record identifiable.

16. Lt. Francis Martello - no record identifiable.

FACT SHEET ON NAVAL INVESTIGATIVE SERVICE, 1960-64

With regard to the last two paragraphs of the undated request received in the Office of the Secretary of Defense on March 20, 1978, the Naval Investigative Service has been unable to identify any personnel presently or formerly associated with its Service, or its predecessor organizations, who were involved in the activities described. In general, the monitoring of activities or the utilization of sources within the Cuban anti-Castro groups in Miami and New Orleans during the period 1960 to 1964 was under the primary jurisdiction of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).

The NIS was established in 1966 under the Naval Intelligence Command (NIC). At that time, the Service assumed the basic mission of what previously had been known as the Investigations Branch (Op-921D), and the Counterintelligence Branch (Op-921E) of the Security Division (Op-921) of the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). During the period 1960 to 1964, the primary activity of those branches involved criminal investigations, counterintelligence investigations, and background investigations of Navy military and civilian personnel and Department of Defense civilian contractor personnel for security clearance. Contacts with both current and former NIS personnel knowledgeable of the activities of both Op-921D and Op-921E during the period in question revealed no recollection of assignment of agents or other employees to maintain sources or otherwise investigate or monitor the Cuban anti-Castro groups in those cities. Their recollection was that the FBI and CIA did investigate such activities.

As further background, it is noted that the establishment of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) in the early 1960's created shifts of mission and personnel from ONI to that organization. Prior to the establishment of the DIA, the structure of ONI included, in addition to the above-mentioned Security Division (Op-921), the Intelligence Production Division (Op-922) and the Administrative Division (Op-923). The former, Op-922, was sometimes referred to as the Foreign Intelligence Division and most of its functions were transferred to DIA. That transfer of functions also included transfers of ONI personnel and records. OP-922H was the branch responsible for collection and dissemination of foreign intelligence. A knowledgeable individual currently assigned with the NIC stated that the activities of Op-922H included interviews of anti-Castro Cubans at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, but noted that any necessary contacts or utilization of anti-Castro Cubans in Miami or New Orleans were required to be coordinated through the FBI or the CIA, because of the jurisdiction of those organizations in those geographical locations.

FACT SHEET ON APRIL 12 REQUESTS CONCERNING LEE HARVEY OSWALD

The following information has been provided by the Naval Investigative Service and responds to those portions of the April 12, requests by the Select Committee for all records regarding: Lee Harvey Oswald; any and all records concerning or referring to investigations into Oswald's background conducted by the 112th Military Intelligence Group, circa 1963; a detailed statement explaining why a photograph of Oswald in the possession of the Navy was contained in an envelope marked "Received 14 Nov 1963" and "CIA 77978," and answers to other questions regarding actions in connection with the photograph.

A written list of those persons who were either connected with, responsible for, or knowledgeable about the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) file pertaining to Oswald is attached, as Appendix A.

All available records held by the NIS pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald have previously been made available to the Select Committee, with the exception of records which were originated by or under the release authority of the Department of State, the Office of the Attorney General, the CIA, the FBI, and the DIA. The latter records were referred to those agencies for processing and a direct response to the Select Committee.

The NIS holds no records concerning or referring to investigations into Oswald's background by the 112th Military Intelligence Group. Copy pages of the NIS file numbered 253 through 255 (previously forwarded to the Select Committee) consists of a U.S. Continental Army Command (USCONARC) message. It contains information concerning Oswald which was provided to the "112th INTC GP" by an Assistant Chief of Police with the Dallas Police Department.

Enclosure (1) to Appendix B is a copy of the envelope which the Select Committee referred to in connection with a photograph of Oswald. The notations on the envelope refer to a Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) message with a date/time group of 251800Z October 1963, which readdressed a CIA teletype numbered 77978. The ONI file on Oswald, which is the file maintained by the NIS, did not contain a copy of the CNO message in question, and it is not known why a copy of it was not contained therein. On 25 April 1978 a representative of NIS obtained a copy of CIA teletype number 77978 of 24 October 1963 (enclosure (2), appendix B). That copy is in the format in which the CIA has released it to the public in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. Enclosure (2), is addressed to the Department of the

Navy; refers to a CIA teletype number 74673 of 10 October 1963 (referring the possible presence of Oswald in Mexico City), and requests that two copies of the most recent photograph of Oswald be provided to the CIA for purposes of determining whether he and the individual in Mexico City were one and the same. Enclosure (3) to appendix C is a copy of CIA teletype number 74673 of 10 October 1963. It was also obtained from the CIA on 25 April 1978, and is in the format in which the CIA has released it to the public in response to Freedom of Information Act requests. The ONI file on Oswald contained a copy of a CNO message with a date/time group of 102012Z October 1963, which readdressed CIA teletype number 74673. A copy of that CNO message was one of the documents referred by NIS to the CIA on 15 August 1977.

To respond directly to the Select Committee's questions, the reason that a photograph of Oswald was at one time contained in an envelope marked "Received 14 Nov 1963" and "CIA 77978" appear to be that it was obtained as a result of the request of the CIA set forth in Enclosure (2) to appendix B. There is no documentation in the Oswald file revealing the manner in which the identification photograph of Oswald was obtained. References to the photograph appear on copy pages numbered 268, 278, and 282 of the material that was forwarded to the Select Committee. Those documents are dated 22 and 23 November 1963, the day of and the day following the assassination of President Kennedy. The references to the photograph on the copy page numbered 278 indicated that Admiral Taylor, who was then the Director of Naval Intelligence (DNI), would "....require at least two extra copies of the photograph of Oswald, for forwarding by DNI to Mexico City, by mail, and for Mr. McCone."

On 25 April 1978, the identification photograph of Oswald which had been mailed to Mexico City, and the envelope in which it was mailed, were viewed at CIA Headquarters, Langley, Virginia. The photograph was a 3" x 3" print which was stapled to a piece of paper indicating it had been received at 1530, Mexico City time, on 26 November 1963. The envelope indicated it was mailed, Air Mail-Special Delivery, by CNO (Op-923M) to an individual at the Embassy of the United States of America, Mexico City, and was postmarked on 23 November 1963. (In 1963, Op-923M was the administrative code for the General Services Branch, Administrative Division, ONI.)

PERSONS KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE ONI FILE ON OSWALD

For purposes of providing background in regard to the list of persons who were connected with, responsible for, or knowledgeable about the ONI file on Oswald, it is necessary to understand the structure of the ONI during the period starting when Oswald defected to Russia (1959), to the time of the assassination of President Kennedy (1963). During that period of time, the ONI (Op-92) consisted primarily of three divisions, the Security Division (Op-921), the Intelligence Production Division (Op-922), and the Administrative Division (Op-923). As explained in the fact sheet on the NIS, the Naval Investigative Service was established in 1966, at which time the personnel and basic mission of what had previously been known as the Investigations Branch (Op-921D) and the Counterintelligence Branch (Op-921E) of the Security Division, ONI were assumed. There was no ONI file on Oswald prior to his defection to Russia. Because of his inactive duty/civilian status from that time on, the primary investigation jurisdiction in regard to the counterintelligence interest in him rested with the FBI. This is the reason the bulk of the ONI file on Oswald consisted of other agency and administrative documents, and newspaper clippings. The primary responsibility for monitoring the file within ONI was with the Counterintelligence Branch (Op-921E), or, more specifically, the Programs Section (Op-921E2) of the Counterintelligence Branch. In reviewing the file in regard to identification of individuals who originated administrative documentation for signature by individuals further up the chain of command, the names of three junior naval officers appear. This indicates that they probably had the period between Oswald's defection and the assassination. The file identifies those officers as Lieutenant Junior Grade G. M. Fredrickson in 1960, Lieutenant Junior Grade P. C. LeSourd in 1962, and Ensign J. A. Hazelton in 1963. Other individuals who, because of their positions within the ONI, or more particularly, their positions within ONI at the time of the assassination of President Kennedy, would have become connected with and knowledgeable about the file are:

- o Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, USN (Retired), the DNI (Op-92) at the time of the assassination;
- o Captain Robert P. Jackson, Jr., USNR (Retired), the Assistant DNI for Security (Op-921) at the time of assassination;
- o Captain Jack O. Johnson, USN (Retired), the Executive Officer to Captain Jackson at the time of the assassination;
- o Captain John C. Lacy, USNR (Retired), Head, Counterintelligence Branch (Op-921E) in 1959;
- o Commander William H. Clark, USNR (retired), Head Counterintelligence Branch (Op-921E) in 1963;

APPENDIX A

- Mr. William Abbott, Civilian, Assistant to the Head, Counterintelligence Branch, during the entire period of 1959 through 1963;
- Mr. Prosser W. Palmer, Civilian, assigned to the Programs Section (Op-921E2) during the entire period of 1959 through 1963; and
- Mr. Donald R. Paschal, Civilian, assigned to Programs Section (Op-921E2) in 1963.

The three junior naval officers have been more fully identified as follows:

- LTJG George Marsh Fredrickson, USN
  Military Service Number (MSN): 559112
  Social Security Account Number (SSAN): 503-28-3599
  Year of Birth (YOB): 1934
  Last Known Address (1966): 91 Reed Street
  Lexington, Mass.
- LTJG Peter Charles LeSourd, USNR
  MSN: 638384
  SSAN: 538-34-2364
  YOB: 1938
  Last Known Address (1971): 1222 East Crockett
  Seattle, Washington
- ENS John Anthony Hazelton, USNR
  MSN: 662076
  DOB: 15 December 1938
  Last Known Address (1972): 6333 Shoreham Drive
  Madison, Wisconsin

The addresses of the other officers are as follows:

- Vice Admiral Rufus L. Taylor, USN (Retired)
  Current Address: 90 N. Lakeview Drive
  Whispering Pines, North Carolina
- Captain Robert P. Jackson, Jr., USNR (Retired)
  Current Address: Street Address Unknown
  Metairie, Louisiana
- Captain Jack O. Johnson, USN (Retired)
  Current Address: 195 East Stanford Street
  Bartow, Flordia
- Commander William H. Clark, USNR (Retired)
  Current Address: 740th Street, Unit 209
  Ocean City, Maryland

- Mr. William Abbott
  Last known Address (1970): 2737 Devonshire Road, NW
  Washington, D. C.

- Mr. Prosser W. Palmer
  Last Known Address (1967): 4643 Seminary Road
  Apt 303
  Alexandria, Virginia

- Mr. Donald R. Paschal
  Current Address: c/o DCI Security Committee
  Community Headquarters Building
  Washington, D. C. 20505
  Telephone: 376-5580

The NIS has unsubstantiated information that Admiral Taylor is terminally ill.

FACT SHEET ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S SERVICE IN THE MARINE CORPS
(requested in undated letter received June 1, 1978)

C.1. Oswald's level of security clearance was "confidential." On September 11, 1959, a Security Termination Statement (OPNAV FORM 5511-14) was executed by Oswald.

C.2. Oswald was separated from his unit overseas due to hospitalization from October 27, 1957 through November 15, 1957, and again from October 7, 1958 through October 15, 1958.

Oswald did not sail from Yokosuka, Japan, on September 16, 1958. He remained aboard NAS, Atsugi as part of the MAG-11 rear echelon.

C.3. Oswald was confined at hard labor from June 27, 1958 until he rejoined his unit on August 13, 1958.

For further clarification, Oswald received a sentence for 20 days confinement in April 1958 as a result of a Summary Courts Martial. The confinement was suspended for six months. If Oswald's conduct was satisfactory for the period of suspension the sentence would not have been executed. Oswald committed another offense in June 1958, received another Summary Courts Martial and was awarded confinement at hard labor for 28 days. This second offense caused the suspension of the first sentence to be vacated resulting in an accumulation of 48 days confinement at hard labor minus any credit for good behavior.

The offenses in April and June 1958 were those of:

1. Violation of Article 92, Uniform Code of Military Justice; Violate a lawful general order by having in his possession a privately owned weapon that was not registered.

2. Violation of Article 117, Uniform Code of Military Justice; Wrongfully used provoking words to a Staff Non-Commissioned Officer.

[illegible]
RECEIVED

Copy

(HARVEY)
Lee H. Oswald (ex USMC)

Date of photo
28 Oct 56

Ens Hazelton Rm. 212

MSG CNO 251820Z Oct.
(Requested by CIA 77978

Rec'd 14 Nov 6

App B

Enclosure 1

UNIT :
EXT. :
DATE : 10 Oct 1963

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : SEE BELOW

CS COPY

10 OCT 63 20 12z

FROM: [redacted] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF:

INFO : XX

R ROUTINE

TO INFO CITE DIR 74673

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
[redacted]
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

for FOIA Review on

1. ON 1 OCTOBER 1963 MEXICO REPORTED THAT AN AMERICAN MALE, IDENTIFIED AS LEE OSWALD, CONTACTED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY INQUIRING WHETHER THE EMBASSY HAD RECEIVED ANY NEWS CONCERNING A TELEGRAM WHICH HAD BEEN SENT TO WASHINGTON. THE AMERICAN WAS DESCRIBED AS APPROXIMATELY 35 YEARS OLD, WITH AN ATHLETIC BUILD, ABOUT SIX FEET TALL, WITH A RECEDING HAIRLINE.

IS THIS (REALLY) DESCRIPTION OF WAS THE "INDIVIDUAL" IN MEXICO [illegible] HUG NOT "OSWALD"

2. IT IS BELIEVED THAT OSWALD MAY BE IDENTICAL TO LEE HENRY OSWALD, BORN ON 18 OCTOBER 1939 IN NEW ORLEANS, LOUISIANA, A FORMER U.S. MARINE WHO DEFECTED TO THE SOVIET UNION IN OCTOBER 1959 AND LATER MADE ARRANGEMENTS THROUGH THE UNITED STATES EMBASSY IN MOSCOW TO RETURN TO THE UNITED STATES WITH HIS RUSSIAN-BORN WIFE, MARINA NIKOLAEVNA PUSAKOVA, AND THEIR

(CONTINUED)

CS COPY

RELEASING OFFICER

COORDINATING OFFICERS

10 Oct 63
AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE :

☐ INDEX
☐ NO INDEX
☐ FILE IN CS FILE NO.

/

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO :

FROM: DIRECTOR

CON

INFO

DEFERRED

ROUTINE

PAGE TWO

TO INFO CITE DIR

CHILD.

3. THE INFORMATION IN PARAGRAPH ONE IS BEING DISSEMINATED TO YOUR REPRESENTATIVES IN MEXICO CITY. ANY FURTHER INFORMATION RECEIVED ON THIS SUBJECT WILL BE FURNISHED YOU. THIS INFORMATION IS BEING MADE AVAILABLE TO THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE.

END OF MESSAGE

INFO BASED ON (IN 36017)

COORDINATING OFFICERS

/

RELEASING OFFICER

AUTHENTICATING OFFICER

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED.

Copy No.

NOTE: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION AFFECTING THE NATIONAL DEFENSE OF THE UNITED STATES WITHIN THE MEANING OF THE ESPIONAGE LAWS, TITLE 18, U.S.C., SECTIONS 793 AND 794. THE TRANSMISSION OR THE REVELATION OF ITS CONTENTS IN ANY MANNER TO AN UNAUTHORIZED PERSON IS PROHIBITED BY LAW. REPRODUCTION OF THIS MATERIAL IN ANY FORM BY OTHER THAN ACTIVITIES OF THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS IS NOT AUTHORIZED EXCEPT BY SPECIFIC APPROVAL OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS

INFORMATION REPORT
OFFICE OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

SERIAL NO. 142-60

DATE OF REPORT: 30 JULY 1960

EVALUATION: F-3

REQUEST NO.

AREA REPORTED ON: Political Matters Venez

DATE OF INFORMATION: 18-21 JULY 1960

SOURCE: Personal Contact

FROM: U.S. NAVAL ATTACHE, CARACAS

SUBJECT: VENEZUELA/CUBA - Request for assistance by former Cuban army officer

BRIEF (FOR REPORTS OF MORE THAN ONE PAGE, ENTER CAREFUL SUMMARY)

This report covers the visit of two Cuban nationals to the office of the Naval Attache.

1. Background. On 18 July, The Chief of the U.S. Naval Mission to Venezuela called the
Naval Attache and said that two Cubans had approached him in an effort to obtain
assistance in getting visas to the U.S. He stated that he had directed them to the
office of the Naval Attache.

2. Interview. Shortly thereafter the two men arrived at the CNA. The identified
themselves as:

S[illegible]CACIL Smith

~~Hotel [illegible]~~

Avenida Urdaneta #11, esquina La Pelota

Telephone 32 07 92

Cuba - Venez

NY

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

He possessed a valid Cuban passport and stated that he was married to a Spanish subject who
had a valid Spanish passport. Claims his grandfather was an American and that he is a
graduate of Columbia University. Stated he had been in the Cuban diplomatic service
briefly and that he presently represented several U.S. firms in Venezuela, primarily in
textiles. He was acquainted with CHIAVENIS from business calls he had made at Venezuelan
Naval Headquarters selling uniform equipment. In showing his papers he exposed a police
type shield. When queried stated that it was an honorary police badge of the New York
Police, given to him by Paul Taylor, whom he said was Deputy Police Commissioner, NYC.

REC 22

[redacted]

Cuba

Venez

and Rolando LIZARRAGA Alesn

THIS REPORT CONTAINS UNPROCESSED INFORMATION. PLANS AND/OR POLICIES SHOULD NOT BE EVOLVED OR [illegible] IS OF THIS REPORT

NOT RECORDED
18 AUG 10 1960

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED. NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL

189

ACT [illegible]

SE

DISTRIBUTION BY ORIGINATOR

CINCLANTFLT - CSL - COM 15 - CCSP

DISTRIBUTION BY ONI (only to those addressees preceded by copy number)

9	CIA		CinCPac		ComSubLant		OP25		OP92	
5	STATE		CinCPacFlt		COMSTS		OP32	2	921E	
	AFCIN		CinCLant/Flt		ComAlSeaFron		OP31		92C	
3	ACSI		CinCNelm		ComCaribSeaFron		OP33		92E	
	NIPC		CinCNelmRep		ComEastSeaFron		OP34		92W	
1	NSA		FltCdrs		ComHawSeaFron		OP36		921	
1	OSI, USAF		ComTAC		ComWestSeaFron		OP40		926	
1	FBI		ComNavJapan		LES		OP41		64	
	ICA		ComNavKorea		BuSandA		OP50		65	
	Commerce		ComNavMarianas		BuShips		OP55		81	
	AEC		ComMidEastFor		BuAer		OP56		83	
	USCG		ComNavPhil		BuDocks		OP60		834	
	SecNav		Com1STFlt		BuMed		OP61		83	
	SecDef		Com2NDFlt		BuOrd		OP62		83	
	OASD		Com6THFlt		BuPers		OP63		84	
	62, USMC		Com7THFlt		NWC		OP		81	
1	NA HAVANA		ComNavPac		ONR		OP		82	
1	CGYMFLANT		ComNavLant		NIS		OP		84	
			ComSubPac		PIC		OP		Y	

	Y1	ENCLOSURE
	Y2	05
	34	81
1	82	63
1	83	
1	N3W	
		CC each add
		CC each rpt
1	Justice (I&NS)	

ART. 0424.1

5399408

137-3

CONFIDENTIAL

[redacted]

50 AUG 25 1960

JUN 28 1961

XEROXED ORIGINAL RETAIN

Declassified/~~Downgrade to~~
Auth: DIRNIS
Date: 05-09-98 Unit: 02F

INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION	FROM	REPORT NO.	DATE
CONFIDENTIAL	NA, CARACAS	142-60	30 JULY 1960

He stated that he was a former Cuban Army Captain in the Batista regime and had been a professional soldier - without politics. Had been officer in charge of the Army detachment at the MATA HAMBRE copper mine, Inpinalde Rio. He left Cuba and came to Venezuela on 5 June ~~January~~ 1959. He had legal sized piece of paper with photo and signed by the Cuban Minister of Interior giving him permission to leave Cuba. It was captioned "Special Passport". Stated he had been jailed 4 times between 1 January, and 5 June [illegible], by CASTRO. ARCACHA stated that he had been arrested and jailed on 29 June during the big cleanup following the attempt on the life of President Betancourt. He was confined for 16 days and released finally on 14 July. ZUBIZARRETA was arrested by DIGEPOL on 1 July and confined without charges until 12 July when he was released. At that time he was given a "Salvoconducto" #P4030-E by the Venezuelan Ministry of Interior dated 15 July, 1960 and expiring 15 January 1961.

ZUBIZARRETA spoke almost no English and it appears that ARCACHA was accompanying him to aid in interpreting if necessary. He said that he feared for his life both in Venezuela and also possible extradition to Cuba where he might be tried and executed although he claimed to have been guilty only of having been in the Army in Batista's time.

Both spoke contemptuously of CASTRO and tried to draw the NA into conversation and controversy. They were taken to the Visa Section of the Consulate and turned over to the Vice Consul.

3. Subsequent Visits. The next morning ZUBIZARRETA appeared with his papers partially filled out and requested assistance in completing them. This was done and he left. Two days later ARCACHA and ZUBIZARRETA returned together, the former claiming that he had additional character and financial references that he wanted to offer to assist ZUBIZARRETA in obtaining his visa more quickly. ARCACHA volunteered that he wanted to warn me about a CASTRO agent, whom he stated was in charge of intelligence for CASTRO in Venezuela. This person, named Juan Antonio DOLL was alleged to be a partner in an [illegible] service that has recently opened in Caracas. He also advised that another Cuban, Cre[illegible]ARCHA, a journalist was very dangerous to the U.S. The interview was cut short and they were again turned over to the Vice Consul who stated no additional information was needed and that it would probably be a month before information upon which a visa could be issued would be received from Havana and Washington. ZUBIZARRETA expressed fear that he would be picked up and extradited before that time. The NA mentioned that the U.S. was full of exiles and that sincere anti-Castroites could do more good spreading the gospel in Venezuela. This shook both of them considerably and they replied that at present it was almost as dangerous for an anti-Castro on the streets of Caracas as it was on the streets of Havana. They left after being discouraged by the Consul on the prospects of a decision in the near future. ARCACHA did not appear too worried for himself and a check proved that he had a valid tourist visa issued to him on 18 November, 1959. ~~XXX~~ His wife, being a Spanish subject, is going to have considerably more difficulty.

Cuba
Venz

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CONFIDENTIAL

INFORMATION REPORT

CLASSIFICATION	FROM	REPORT NO.	DATE
CONFIDENTIAL	NA, CARACAS	142-60	30 JULY 1960

Source Information: Personal Contact

Preparing and Forwarding Officer's Comments: Local CAS files show nothing on DOLL and VARONA. The principal owner of the armored car service referred to is a Pan American pilot, ROWE (fnu) and friend of the Army Attache. He has one or two Cuban partners and recent inquiry reveals that their original company in Havana has been expropriated by CASTRO. They state that DOLL was a former employee of theirs but was released some time ago.

Prepared and Forwarded:

ROBERT E. HOSE
CAPT, USN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

CONFIDENTIAL

ORIG :
UNIT :
EXT :
DATE : 23 OCT 1963

☐ INDEX
☒ NO INDEX
☒ FILE IN CS FILE NO. 301

ROUTING			
1		4	
2		5	
3		6	

TO : DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY

CS COPY

FROM : D[redacted] CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CONF :

INFO :

XX

Oct 63 19 10 z

24 Oct 63

DEF

ROUTINE

date changes - 23 Oct on mem
should be 24 Oct

TO INFO CITE DIR 77978

SUBJECT: LEE HENRY OSWALD

REFERENCE IS MADE TO CIA OUT TELETYPE NO. 74673, DATED 10 OCTOBER 1963, REGARDING POSSIBLE PRESENCE OF SUBJECT IN MEXICO CITY. IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU FORWARD TO THIS OFFICE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TWO COPIES OF THE MOST RECENT PHOTOGRAPH YOU HAVE OF SUBJECT. WE WILL FORWARD THEM TO OUR REPRESENTATIVE IN MEXICO, WHO WILL ATTEMPT TO DETERMINE IF THE LEE OSWALD IN MEXICO CITY AND SUBJECT ARE THE SAME INDIVIDUAL.

END OF MESSAGE

BASED ON: (IN 40357)

24 Oct 63

Document Number 10-6

for FOIA Review on APR 1976

CS COPY

COORDINATING OFFICERS

REPRODUCTION BY OTHER THAN THE ISSUING OFFICE IS PROHIBITED. Copy No.

FACT SHEET ON RADIOGRAPH REQUEST

With respect to the May 9, 1978, request for access to radiographs taken the week of November 22, 1963, at Bethesda Naval Hospital by the same unit used to take radiographs at President Kennedy's autopsy, hospital personnel have reported that none of the radiographs are annotated to indicate the particular instrument used; thus, no means are available to determine which radiographs were taken on the same unit as that used during the President Kennedy autopsy. Additionally, the radiographs unit used during the aforementioned autopsy is no longer in use and after a search could not be located.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/6/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10106-10008

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 014135

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : GERACI, PHILLIP
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 04/14/1978
PAGES : 2

SUBJECTS :

ACTIVITIES, FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE
OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE
BRINGUIER, CARLOS
BLALOCK, VANCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/09/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 251.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

014135

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name Phillip Geraci
Address 8849 Braemont
City/State Houston, Texas
Date of Birth 2-21-48
Social Security 437-74-6323

Date 4-14-78- 9 PM
Place Residence

M or S ____
Spouse ____
Children ____

2. Physical Description:

Height ____
Weight ____
Ethnic Group ____

Color Eyes ____ Hair ____
Special Characteristics ____

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: Fluor Engr & Const Co
Address 4600 N- Braeswood Ave, Houston, Texas
Telephone 662- 3096

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests ____
2. Convictions ____

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name ____
Address ____

b. Area frequented: ____

c. Remarks: ____

Investigator William Brown, JFK
Date 4/20/78

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

NAME Phillip Geraci **Date** 4-14-78 **Time** 9 p.m.

Address 8849 Breasmont **Place** Residence

Houston, Texas

Interview: (Synopsis)

Phillip Geraci, was in Carlos Bringuier's store when LHO came in and offered his Marine manuel.

Subject reiterated his Warren Commission testimony, changed one point--subject states Vance Blalock (whereabouts unknown to date) mentioned that LHO asked Carlos Bringuier if he was a member of the (Cosa Nostra)--subject feels the name asked was Casa Roca, the store operated by Carlos Bringuier. Subject was a C.A.P. cadet for approximately one (1) year--62-63, didn't know David Ferrie, and had little or no contact with senior group headed by Ferrie. Subject viewed photo book, supplied by the Committee, numbered in sequential order #1-110, with photo #72/73 missing--identified #57, LHO.

Interviewer ____________________

(Signature)

William Brown

(Name)

Date Transcribed 4/21/78 **by** cs

(Ini

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/6/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10106-10011
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	014138

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	STEELE, CHARLES
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	04/13/1978
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, POLITICAL AND SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/31/1996
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 251.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

014138

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name Charles Steele, Jr
Address 2119 Selma St
City/State New Orleans, La
Date of Birth 11-5-43
Social Security 438-60-8716

Date 4-13-78
Place Residence

M or S M
Spouse
Children

2. Physical Description:

Height
Weight
Ethnic Group

Color Eyes   Hair
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: IBEW Local #130
Address 1806 Canal St - New Orleans, La
Telephone

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name
Address

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks:

Investigator William Brown, JFK
Date 4-19-78

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

NAME Charles Steele, Jr. **Date** 4-13-78 **Time** 7 p.m.

Address 2119 Selma St.
New Orleans, LA

Place Residence

Interview: (Synopsis)

Charels Steele passed out Pro-Cuba leaflets with LHO. Subject refused to answer questions concerning his knowledge of LHO prior to passing out leaflets on Canal St. He states he was inside of unemployment office on Canal Street when he was approached by LHO and was offered $5.00 to pass out leaflets. He accepted the offer and after passing out the first batch, read the leaflets, stopped, collected his money and left. The subject said he didn't know the second male who was assisting,--describes him as, white male, 20, light brown hair, medium height and build, and brown eyes. The subject refuses to answer when asked if he saw LHO again.

Subject states he was not a member of any organization during this period. He identified photos #5, Clay Shaw and #57, LHO. The photo book supplied by the committee is numbered in sequential order from 1-110 with #72/73 missing.

Subject requests copy of his Warren Commission testimony.

Interviewer ______________________
(Signature)

William Brown
(Name)

Date Transcribed 4/21/78 **by** cs
(Ini

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/2/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10107-10006

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 012727

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : ATZENHOFFER, ANTHONY WILLIAM
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 10/16/1978
PAGES : 3

SUBJECTS :

ATZENHOFFER, ANTHONY W. JR., STATEMENTS, INTERVIEWS
FERRIE, DAVID
VOEBEL, ED
SHAW, CLAY
TULANE UNIVERSITY
OSWALD, LEE, PRE-RUSSIAN PERIOD, ASSOCIATES AND RELATIVES

DOCUMENT TYPE : OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/01/1993

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 225.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

012727

Investigation Interview Schedule

Identifying Information

Name. Anthony William Atzenhoffer Jr. 10-16-78
740 Goodson Dr. Gretna, La.

D of B 4-20-39 Phone 504-393-6899
Soc Sec. 435-56-3420

Height 5'9" Green eyes brown hair
Weight 175
Caucasian

Employment. Tony's Aurora Gulf Service Station
4933 General Meyer Ave.
Algiers (new Orleans), La. 394-9189

Remarks. Remembers Lee Oswald's name on his roll call and remembers him vaguely at Moisant meetings. Tony was platoon Sgt. in Civil Air Patrol Cadets.

Investigator Robert Buras 10-16-78

KENNEDY

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE 10-16-78 TIME 3PM

I. Identifying Information:

Name Anthony William Atzenhoffer, Jr. Telephone 504-393-6899

Address 740 Goodson Dr. New Orleans (Algiers), La.

Type of Contact:
__ Telephone
X Person

II. Summary of Contact:

Investigator Robert Buras met Mr. Atzenhoffer at his service station and learned that he had joined the Civil Ari Patrol Cadets ,Moisant Squadron in Sept. 1954 and left 1957. He was a platoon Sgt. and used to call the roll and remembered Oswald's name being on the roll. He has no recollection of ever training with him or speaking with him, and remembers him being a quiet guy. When he saw Oswald on TV in 1963 he didn't recognize him but on one of the newscasts he saw Ed Voebel talking about him (LHO). He remembered Voebel as the man that Oswald was close too and stayed with at the meetings. Atzenhoffer only knew Voebel from CAPC, not socially.

Ferrie did come to Moisant Squadron and teach some courses and Atzenhoffer took his first plane flight with Ferrie. He

con't

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

None. He doesn't have any photos or records that might help.

Signature: Robert Buras

Page two of interview with Anthony Atzenfoffer

never got to know Ferrie very well. He went to one social party that was given at either Ferrie's house or Col. Jim Salmon (James Salmon was killed in a plane accident 10-15-78). The party was all guys and when they started drinking he left. He was about 16 and his father didin't allow him to drink. Salmon and some others were seniors and Atzenhoffer didn't get to know them. He remembers that Ferrie flew at blue Stinson that he kept at Moissant Airport, (Now New Orleans International and they don't allow private planes there any more).

Ferrie never indicated that he was homosexual in any way. The only thing that he can remember that was not of CAPC was Ferrie wanting the kids to participate in some kind of experiment for Tulane University. They didn't do it.

Atzenhoffer was shown the photo book and related the following:

#5. Clay Shaw knew from newspapers.

#27. Looked familiar but name didn't mean anything.

#62. Melvin "Pinky" Seeling. Knew from either CAPC or other friends. He remembers that Seeling's father owned a large dairy farm in Kenner, La. Last saw him a few years ago. Seeling is in the Air Force and is stationed in Corpus Christi, Texas. Garrion's men showed him a mug shot of Seeling and he was suprised to learn that he had been arrested.

A check of New Orleans PD files indicate that he was arrested on August 30, 1961 and booked with Vagrancy, Investigation of Burglary and Hold for the F.B.I. under item number H-13903-61. His date of birth is given as 8-1-37. The report will have to be ordered from microfilm section.

* Subject not identified in photo book except by last name.

End Of memo

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/20/20

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10110-10100

RECORD SERIES : SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 125-JFK

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 1

SUBJECTS :
OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 4.

[With Danny get exact documented visits + phonecalls:]

Edwin J Lopez
prepared by Dan Hardway

SCENARIO
CHRONOLOGY OF OSWALD'S VISITS TO THE SOVIET AND CUBAN EMBASSIES.

September 26, 1963
Thursday

azcue

① A man claiming to be Oswald vists the Cuban Embassy between 10:00 A.M. and 2:00 P.M. The visit probably occurs around one o'clock. "Oswald" is discribed as 5'6" tall, blond hair, sunken cheeks, very thin, aquiline nose, very straight eyebrows, approximately 35 years old and wearing a light blue Prince of Wales suit. He was said to look very cold with a hard face and a penetrating cunning way of looking at you. "Oswald" was seeking an intransit visa to Cuba on his way to Russia. He displayed documents that showed his membership in the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and the American Communist Party. He was told that he would have to first obtain a visa to Russia before he could be issued an intransit visa. He is also told that he should return to the Cuban Embassy with his passport and a copy of a photograph in order to fill out the visa application.

September 27, 1963
Friday

Circa 10:30 A.M. Teltap

a "Oswald" calls the Soviet Military Attache (SMA) with whom he speaks in Spanish. He tells the SMA that he is looking for a visa to Odessa. The SMA tells him to call the Consulate. "Oswald" asks for directions to the Embassy and recieves them.

10:37 A.M. Teltap

b "Oswald" calls the Soviet Consulate and asks to speak to the Consul in Spanish. He is told that the Consul is not in. He is told that he can call back at 11:30. "Oswald" says that he is looking for a visa to Odessa.

circa 11:30 A.M. Tel tap at 4:26

② "Oswald" goes to the Russian Embassy where he once again exhibits the documents he has already shown the Cubans as well as other documents such as his and Marina's marriage license. "Oswald" discusses his situation with someone at the Embassy and comes away with the understanding that everything would be expeditiously handled.

circa 12:15 P.M. Stop here Azque —

Someone from the Soviet Embassy calls Azcue whom he is aware of because of what "Oswald" has told him, and tells him that they have to get authorization from Moscow to grant him a visa and that it will probably take four months.

circa 12:45 A.M.

③ "Oswald" returns to the Cuban Embassy with the

9/27/63
12:45 (cont'd)

Azcue

Silvia says
5:00

Duran

photo and completes the visa application, stating that he would like to leave in three days. He asks Azcue about how long it will take to get the visa. Azcue explains his misconception to him, an argument results and Azcue throws Oswald out. Duran feels sympathetic to Oswald, gives him ~~her address~~ and promises to help in any ~~way she can.~~ She feels that Oswald should have been granted the visa with no problems and that Azcue's actions are wrong. w/C

1:25 P.M.

c

Oswald calls the Soviet Consulate in an attempt to find out what has gone wrong with the arraingment he thought he had. In Spanish, he asks for the Consul. He is told that the Consul is out and that he can be contacted between four and five on Mondays and Fridays. This call may have been from Duran's phone. If it was he then told her that he could get hold of the Soviet he had his deal with and would she be kind enough to talk to him. She said that she would and to come back at four o'clock. If the call was not made then Oswald got this message to Silvia and the same arraingments for Silvia's four o'clock call were made.

4:05 P.M.

— 4,
Tel tap

Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Embassy. She tells them the American citizen, the one who wants a visa to Cuba in transit to Russia, is there. She asks who he talked to at the Soviet Embassy when she sent him there to get a Soviet visa so he could get an intransit visa to Cuba. She tells the official she is speaking with that the man seeking the visa wants to know with whom he spoke because he had been assured that there would be no problem. The man at the Soviet Embassy puts another man on the phone and Silvia goes through it again. He tells her that her call will be returned.

4:26 P.M.

Tel Tap

A Soviet Official returns Silvia's call. The situation is explained to Silvia. She realizes that she cannot give him a visa because of the delay on the Soviet end and the fact that he does not know anyone in Cuba. What does Silvia tell Oswald who is still setting there waiting? In light of subsequent events it was probably something that would keep his hopes up.

Night

?

Oswald goes to a party at Rubin Duran's with Silvia and two American friends. This may have been, more likely was, the night of the 26th. He is seen by Elena Garro de Paz. He spends the night with Silvia.

September 28, 1963 Saturday		
circa 11:00 A.M.	⑤	Oswald is back at the Soviet Embassy bugging them to expedite his visa. They send him back to the Cuban Embassy to get an address.
11:51	6) d	Duran calls the Soviet Consulate and puts Oswald on the phone. He tells them that he is returning to the Soviet Embassy with the address.
circa 12:00	7,	Oswald returns to the Soviet Embassy and is assured that a telegram will be sent and that it will be handled as quickly as possible.
afternoon		Oswald decides that he needs more help and tracks down a revolutionary, pro-Castro Cuban group on the campus of the University of Mexico. Maybe he hopes that he can find someone who will say they know him in Cuba. In any case, he seeks some sort of assistance from these Pro-Castroites. He spends the night with them.
September 29, 1963 Sunday Morning		Oswald spends the day with the Pro-Castro group.
Sunday Afternoon/ evening and night		?
September 30, 1963 Monday		? Note: the association with the Cuban group could have been anytime between the afternoon of 9/28 and the afternoon of 9/30. Contreras said that he met Oswald in the afternoon and spent the rest of the day, that night and part of the next day with him.
October 1, 1963 10:31 A.M. Tuesday	e	Oswald calls the Soviet Military Attache inquiring about a telegram. He is refered to the Consulate.
10:45 A.M.	f	Oswald calls the consulate with the same inquiry and learns that the telegram has been sent but no reply has been received. He is discouraged. Obyedkov hangs up on him.
later or earlier	8	Oswald calls the man with whom he had made his "arrangement" and discusses the assistance that was promised him. He is dangled and the man eventually hangs up on him.
later or on the 2nd. Wednesday		Oswald leaves Mexico.

On or about	this may have happened
9/30/63 Monday	MCS recieves a transcript in which Silvia Duran discusses an American and his problem with a Soviet Co~~u~~ns~~e~~ul. Win Scott writes "Can we identify?" on transcript. Goodpasture notifies Flick that an American is apparently trying to get a visa and that the COS would like to ID. The Cuban and Soviet monitors are asked to notify Flick of any conversation involving an american, or in English. ETC, HOWEVER.
10/1/63 Goodpasture ties in 9/28 Soviet conversation re: address.	Flick is notified by a monitor that there is an English conversation on the Soviet tap. Flick listens and hears the man ID himself as Oswald. He pulls the tape and marks it "urgent" and notifies Goodpasture that they have an ID on an American. The tape is delivered to Tarasoff for immediate transcription. It is recieved late this day or early on the second by Goodpasture. Disposition of tape unknown, could "urgent" tapes have been routinely retained for longer period? Goodpasture now has ID but does not know for sure that it is the one that Scott has asked about. The guy in the 9/27 conversation sounds real interesting but there is nothing in this conversation, OR 9/2 that clearly connects. She discusses reporting it with Manell. There is some disagreement over whose responsiblity it is to report. Either dec~~e~~ision is made, or conflict continues until photos is checked.
10/7/63	Photos from 10/1, 10/2, 10/3, 10/4 (?) are recieved in base from Soviet Embassy.
10/8/63	B. Manell drafts report cable. Goodpasture adds paragraph 2.
10/10/63	(in interim: Goodpasture tries to ID MMM photo? how?) HQ response recieved. Descriptions don't match. Controversy in station on whether Oswald's same. 9/27 + 9/28 conversation tied DEFINATELY in to LHO during this week. by similarity of subtantive content of cable and conversation and voice comparison.
10/16/63	Oswald "P" file opened.
10/18/63	by this time photo of MMM recieved at Station. Goodpasture picks up on it. This MMM photo one from Cubemb on 10/15.

10/21/63

10/15 MMM shown to penetration agents by this time. What response? MCS cables HQ asking for a photo of LHO. For what purpose? Was it just to compare to surveillance photos? Were they planning on showing to penatration agents? why? note: quite a few people say interest level was high--so what actions were taken?

24 August 1978

HSCA Interview of David Atlee Phillips at HSCA offices, 8/23/78, 1:20 to 4:35 P.M., by Dan Hardway, Charles Berk, and Gaeton Fonzi.

Mr. Phillips was reminded that the CIA omnibus release letter still applied to our discussions and that he should feel free to answer our questions in spite of any secrecy oath that he may have executed during his employment with the CIA. He was asked if he remembered and understood the letter and if he wanted to review the letter again. Mr. Phillips stated that he remembered the letter and did not think it necessary to see the letter again.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his activities in Mexico that related to his job as Chief of Covert Action in the Mexico City Station from 1961 to 1963. Mr. Phillips was asked how many persons were in his propoganda shop in Mexico City. He said that it was manned only by himself, a case officer under his direction and a secretary. He later added that there was also one other case officer under his direction who worked under deep cover outside of the Embassy. Mr. Phillips stated that from 1961 to 1963 he ran only about 6 or 7 operations or projects. He added that there would have also been many "ad hoc" actions. Under questioning, he stated that it is possible that he was responsible for as many as 14 to 17 ongoing operations and 3 to 6 developmental stage operations. Most of these operations were directed at the Cuban target and "the great percentage of them had an anti-Cuban or anti-Soviet bias."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the handling of agents. He stated that he himself handled "very very few" agents. "Usually I met with someone who was working deep cover and they in turn would handle several agents." Mr. Phillips did recall handling one agent personally, a radio-TV broadcaster. He also said that he would often meet with other agents even though he was not handling them on a day to day basis. He stated that at all times he had at least one deep cover officer working outside of the Embassy and that, sometimes, he had two such officers.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did have access, and did use in some of his propoganda activities, agents who were located outside of Mexico. Mr. Phillips also stated that he did use a few assets that he had developed prior to his transfer to Mexico City; he specifically recalled a man named SAYAS who had been a newspaperman in Cuba and went to work in Mexico City. He said that while he had been a propoganda officer for the JMARC operation he had used assets that he had developed during his prior tour of duty in Havana. Mr. Phillips said that such assets were usually handled by him personally during the Bay of Pigs.

Mr. Phillips stated that during the Bay of Pigs operation he travelled to Miami "fairly frequently; every 6 weeks, 3 weeks, 5 weeks." He stated that responsibility for propoganda operations were divided between him and his subordinate in Miami, William Kent. When asked to explain that division Mr. Phillips stated:

> Kent reported to my shop in Washington. He had day to day contact with the groups we were supporting down there, the student group and the doctors or whatever, and the people involved in Radio Swan.

Phillips stated that Radio Swan was run out of Miami, through the mechanism of the Gibralter Steamship Company. He did say that he was in contact with the agent who ran Radio Swan. He said that he felt uncomfortable naming thēan agent and suggested we ask the Agency for his identity.

Mr. Phillips stated that when he traveled to Miami he often went to see the people he knew from Havana, including those he was running as agents himself. He would also, on occassion, meet with agents whom

Bill Kent was running "if Bill Kent got to the point where he felt he would like a little weight." Sometimes he went down to Miami on a "trouble shooting" mission, as when problems developed with a commercial radio station the Agency was funding.

Mr. Phillips stated that he had had no recent contact with Mr. Kent relating to anything being done by this Committee. He did state that, approximately a month ago when Mr. Kent retired from the CIA, he received a call from Mr. Kent. He said that Mr. Kent said that he was setting up an executive employment agency and had asked for Mr. Phillips help in finding jobs for former employees of the agency as well as referring people for specific skilled jobs. They did not discuss the HSCA at all, according to Phillips.

Mr. Phillips stated that it would be accurate to state that there were two "sets" of propoganda activities during the Bay of Pigs; one that was run out of the Miami offices coordinated by Bill Kent and a second set that he personally ran without coordinating with Mr. Kent. Most of Mr. Phillips prior established assets were in the second set of propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that even after he became Chief of Cuban Operations in Mexico City he still worked very closely with the propoganda shop, and his successor as head of that shop, James Flannery, in propoganda operations.

Mr. Phillips said that his "Cuban shop" covered the activities of the Cuban Embassy and that a special group covered the airport. He said that a good deal of time was spent looking for opportunities to recruit Cubans who came to Mexico City. The shop also ran a debriefing center for Cubans who left Cuba by way of Mexico. He also said that one of the primary activities of the Cuban shop would have been to identify the DGI officers in the Cuban Embassy and their functions, duties and assignments whenever possible. Mr. Phillips said that he was still involved in propaganda activities at this time specifically recalling a Mexican broadcaster whose radio station could be heard in Cuba. Mr. Phillips pointed out that he had been a close friend of Mr. Flannery's and that Mr. Flannery was made Chief of Covert Action in Mexico on his, Phillip's, recommendation.

Mr. Phillips' said that he had "quite good" relations with Win Scott and that he reported directly to him as opposed to reporting through the Deputy Chief of Station which would have been the routine manner. Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that Robert Shaw had been in charge of the Cuban photographic surveillance operations and that they had two penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy. He stated that he could not remember the names of the penetration agents and was not sure of the cryptonyms.

Mr. Phillips was asked why his name came up so infrequently in a review of Agency documents of this period from Mexico City. He said that his name should appear on any "formal project" he had going, but that he "did like to delegate work." He said that his name must be on many papers.

Mr. Phillips said that there was a CI responsibility in the Cuban shop. "You always watch out for it, but there was no formal program." He said, however, that "I never really understood what CI was." Phillips said that there were some CIA officers who made counter-intelligence their primary concern during their entire careers but that he was not one of them. He described the CI effectiveness of the Mexico City Station as "average" and its Cuban section as "less than average."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was aware of the existence of the Special Affairs Staff in Washington that dealt with Cuban matters. He was also aware that the SAS had its own counter-intelligence section. He recalled meeting the Chief of that section, Hal SWENSON, on a trip to Washington. He also said that it would have been normal routine for Mr. Swenson to have traveled to Mexico City on "routine trips" or special cases. He said that he had probably seen Swenson in Mexico but that he did not recall any specific meetings.

Mr. Phillips recalled that the Legat office of the U.S. Embassy in Mexico was large; that it had 11 to 20 officers assigned to it. He said that there was a close relationship between the Agency station and the Legat office. He said that the Legat got "drop copies" – what? of most reports. He said that it would have been routine to advise the Legat of "interesting cases" and that an American reporting to a foreign embassy would have been such a case. He said that a local dissemination would have definately been routine and that this liaison relationship would have been at least partially responsible for reporting such a visit to Headquarters.

Mr. Phillips was queried about whether, in such a case, it would have been routine for the Agency station to take any action other than just reporting the information that had come to its attention. Mr. Phillips said that it could have happened in certain circumstances, such as if the contact looked as if he had recruitment potential or was a serious security case. In those instances it was possible that other actions would be taken. Mr. Phillips remembers one such instance specifically and pointed out that it is related in his book, Nightwatch, on pp. 126-128. This is a story of an American military officer who offered to spy for the Cubans and an operation mounted against him by the Agency in Mexico. In response to a direct question Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the Station could, and often did, take actions/other than just reporting in regard to Americans in Mexico that were in contact with Soviet or Bloc Embassies without a specific request from another interested agency; i.e., they often took investigative and operational action on their own initiative. Mr. Phillips said that the reason that the Station could do this was Mr. Scott's ranking (informal) in the agency. Mr. Phillips illustrated this point by saying that when Mr. Scott returned to Washington to report he did not go to the Chief of Western Hemisphere Division but directly to either the DCI or DDP. He pointed out that Scott had been a division chief himself prior to his assignment as Chief of Station in Mexico.

Mr. Phillips was asked if the CIA shared assets and informants with the FBI in Mexico. He said that he did not know of any such cases but there was coordination and liaison with the Bureau on the surveillance operations.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that one additional area in which the Station and the FBI shared an interest was the colony of American expatriates in Mexico. He said that he was not sure of who had the responsibility for that area in the Station but that it may ~~of~~ have been Ms. Ann Goodpasture. Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware of any Agency liaison in Mexico City with either Army or Navy regarding counter-intelligence or counter-espionage cases. He said that he had never heard of any arguments that may have occured concerning whose responsibility it was to report Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy or about the extensiveness of the Station's reporting after the assassination.

Mr. Phillips does remember Viola June COBB. "Blonde, flew an airplane, track record for hitting a lot of beds in Cuba, had a twin sister involved in aviation. That's what comes to mind." He vaguely remembers messages or reports from or about her coming out of his Cuban shop but he believes that she was run out of Washington or Miami as an asset and that someone from one of those two places would have regularly come to Mexico to run her.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did not recall an officer with a hair lip or who spoke with a lisp.

Phillips stated that he did not know if Ms. Cobb was also an informant for the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Phillips stated that he recalls three or four members of the Warren Commission staff coming to Mexico. He said that he may have chatted with them informally but he had no formal dealings with them. He said that they spent most of their time with Mr. Scott.

Mr. Phillips said that he first heard the name of Silvia Duran about the time he arrived in Mexico, as soon as he started reading the telephone tap transcripts. "Her name appeared time and time again." He added: "We had no interest in her. She wasn't friendly with anyone." Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned, in his discussion of the Cuban shop's interest in recruiting agents, the name of Ambassador Lachuga and their interest in pitching him. Mr. Phillips was shown Slawson's memo concerning his trip to Mexico where Scott told him that the CIA had a substantial prior interest in Duran because of her affair with Lachuga. Phillips seemed surprised and said "No one let me in on this operation." Mr. Phillips said that it is possible that the Agency pitched Duran. "At one time we pitched almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy. She must have been considered." Mr. Phillips said that it was possible that she was not pitched because the station could not identify any of her weaknesses. At this point Mr. Phillips was told about the LITAMEL/9 reports on Duran that said that all that

~~all that~~ that would have to be done to recruit her was get a blonde, blue eyed American in bed with the little "puta." Mr. Phillips admitted that it sounded like she had at least been targeted and that the station's interest was substantial and that the weakness and means had been identified. He pointed out, however, that targeting does not necessarily mean that she had been pitched, or, even if she was pitched, that she had accepted the pitch. Mr. Phillips said that he was not aware that a pitch had been made.

Phillips stated that Ms. Duran's 201 file should be "very thick". He stated that a thin 201 file prior to the assassination "would be very surprising". He said that a name trace should come up with at least a lot of 3x5 cards that predate the assassination.

Mr. Phillips stated that he saw ~~La~~chuga only three times after he left Cuba: once on an airplane from Miami--"we just nodded"--; once at the inauguration of Mexican President Diaz Ordaz; and once when he was having lunch at a fancy resturant near the American Embassy in Mexico. On the last encounter Phillips said that he knew ~~La~~chuga was going to be there and that he had specifically gone there to talk to him. He said that Lachuga turned off all the advances he made.

Phillips was asked why the Agency had sent a cable to Mexico after Ms. Duran's arrest saying "don't allow any Americans to have contact with her." (paraphrase). He said: "Don't know. I can't tell you why they did that. I can't guess why." He said that he was not aware that the

Warren Commission staffers who were in Mexico wanted to talk to Duran. He said that he knew Clarence BOONSTRA well, that the last he heard he was in North Florida, but that he had never discussed the assassination or Oswald with him.

Mr. Phillips said that he vaguely remembered that Win Scott did have a safe in his office. He guessed that Scott and his secretary would have been the only people who had access to that saff. He said that Scott had had several secretaries over a period and that he only remembers the first name of one of them: Dottie. He said that he had no idea of what Scott kept in his safe. He said that when he personally was chief of station in the Dominican Republic, Brazil and Venezuela, he kept ~~really~~ "very sensitive" material in his safe in his office. He assumes that the same would have been true of Mr. Scott. Phillips offered the example that someone would call and say that someone at the Embassy was a prostitute, he would note that for the record ~~in~~ and keep it in the private safe. He guessed that the material in the safe would have been material Scott generated himself. He said that memos of meetings with the Mexican president in which sensitive topics were discussed would have been a likely candidate for retention in Scott's safe. He said that he does not know what happened to Scott's safe after he died but that he has heard a vague story that someone went out and found a lot of documents that Scott had kept.

Mr. Phillips stated that he thought that the Chief of the DGI in Mexico was a man named "LUNA."

Mr. Phillips was asked about the story in his book concerning the DGI officer with the penchant for antique jewelry that appears at page 133. He said that he does not remember the name of that person, but says he took some literary license because he doesn't specifically recall if the person was, in fact, a DGI officer. "Thank God my next book is fiction," he said.

Phillips was asked about the following DGI officers:
Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez--"vaguely familiar";
Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez--"Yes, familiar.";
Manual Vega--could have been Chief of DGI;
Luisa Calderñ--"familiar";
Teresa Proenza--"definitely familiar";
Alfredo Mirabal--"familiar";
Eusebio Azcue--the consul, "to my knowledge he was not Cuban intelligence."

Mr. Phillips was asked if Proenza was a CIA asset. He said "The name is familiar but I don't recall the context." He also could not remember if Luisa Calderon had been an asset. He said: "I don't really remember the true names of the agents. I never saw them or dealt with them." He stated that he could not remember whether the Agency had ever pitched Ruiz but that "there were several attempts to pitch intelligence types."

Mr. Phillips was shown Carlos Blanco's report of 28 June 1963. He stated that he had probably seen it previously but does not remember it specifically. He said that the name

Carlos Blanco had probably been made up for the purposes of this one report. He said that he recalled the name of Luisa Calderon a bit better after reading the document. He said that she may have been the asset who worked in the Embassy for the Agency but he still could not be certain because he could not recall the true names. He said that he did not know if there would have been a "further report" and that, if there was, it would not have necessarily been sent to Headquarters unless it had been of special interest.

Mr. Phillips was then shown the dispatch concerning Luisa's sister. (CIA # 3715.) He said that he does not know whether she was ever identified, contacted or used. He said that he had never heard of a "domestic exploitation section" and pointed out that the words were not capitalized.

Mr. Phillips stated that he did know Mr. Barney Hidalgo. He does not recall him ever being in Mexico but said that it was possible that Mr. Hidalgo could have been there and that he would not have known about it. He said that he had on occassion worked with Mr. Hidalgo. He said that Hidalgo did not have any executive talents, but he was involved in a lot of operations. He said that Hidalgo had some problems: "I don't want to say he was crazy, but I was always uncomfortable around him." Mr. Phillips also recognized the cryptonym AMMUG/1.

Mr. Phillips was shown CIA #'s 3665 and 3662 which are reports from AMMUG that the Cubans believed that Calderon had been recruited by the CIA and had, therefore, called her back to Cuba. Mr. Phillips said that that did not help him recall that much about Calderon other than to make him think that she was not a CIA agent "because she went back to Cuba."

Mr. Phillips stated that he was not aware that after the assassination that Thomas Mann expressed a great deal of interest in the Mexico City investigation. He also said that he did not know why Mann would have been pressing for the arrest and questioning of Luisa Calderon. He said that, in fact, he had never known or heard that such was the case.

Mr. Phillips was shown the transcript of the Calderon call. (CIA 3717.) He said "I've seen this document before... when we were reviewing things after the assassination." He was asked what the Mexico Station had done to follow up on that conversation. He said that he could not recall that anything was done other than forwarding the conversation to Headquarters. He said that he did not know what Headquarters had done with it. He said that he could not remember being tasked or his shop being tasked, with anything concerning this lead. He said that he did not know if this conversation was given to the WC by HQ but acknowledged that it was not shown to the staff members who visited Mexico. He does not recall any specific follow up regarding Calderon. He does not know why Calderon was not arrested.

The section of Carlos Blanco's report concerning Teresa Proenza was pointed out to Phillips. He said that he thought the report may have been written by a person used by the station that thought that everyone was a communist. He said this may

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

have been LIHUFF/1. He said that the document did not help his memory that much and that "I don't know of any reason why she would be termed dangerous."

Phillips was shown the LITAMEL/9 contact report regarding the firing of Teresa Proenza (CIA # 3714.). Mr. Phillips stated that he dos not know why Teresa Proenza was fired. He said that he did recognize the cryptonym AMROD. He said that it was a disinformation operation and that it may have been aimed, in part, at Teresa Proenza. He said that the person in his book that he refers to as a cultural attache with a penchant for antique jewelry was not Teresa Proenza. He said that he remembers that the person he refers to in that story was definately a man. Phillips stuck adamantly to this contention.

Phillips stated that he does not recall that the Mexico City Station ever developed any information that Oswald was in contact with anyone else at the Cuban Embassy other than Azcue and Duran. Mr. Phillips was shown the FBI report of an interview with Ms. Proenza's brother. Mr. Phillips stated that it did not ring any bells and he could not recall ever having heard of such a thing. Mr. Phillips was also informed of the FBI report from a CIA source that indicated that Oswald had had contact with Proenza. He said that he had never heard of it. Mr. Phillips then stated that some things were coming back to him. He asked if Proenza was a lesbian but he didn't recall if that was a fact or part of the disinformation campaign aimed at her.

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

The timing of the departures of Calderon and Proenza was pointed out to Mr. Phillips as well as the indications that they had met Oswald, had prior knowledge of the assassination, the nominal reason regarding Proenza over the Raul Roa note. He was asked if he knew if their recalls were connected and if they were connected with the assassination. He said that he did not know, maybe Calderon and Proenza had been lovers, but that may have been part of the disinformation, he just could not remember which, fact or fiction.

Mr. Phillips stated that it was very possible that HQ or JMWAVE could have recruited and run Cuban agents in Mexico without the knowledge of the Mexico Station. Phillips said: "I suppose it would have been possible for an agent in Mexico City to be run out of JMWAVE station in Miami without my knowledge, but I would have been furious if I found out about it:. He said that this may have even been "probable" in the case of a "sensitive operation," but he pointed out that anyone doing that took the risk of crossing Win Scott who was close to both the DCI and DDP. This lead Mr. Phillips to say that if that was the case then the DDP, at least, would probably have approved the WAVE use of an agent in Mexico. We took Mr. Phillips through the documents on Ms. Calderon again and asked him if this could have been an instance such as that we were talking about. He said that it very well could have been but that he had no knowledge that would indicate that that was the case. He said that this was the kind of thing "they might have asked Barney Hidalgo to do." Phillips agreed that

CIA #3665 indicates that a pitch to Calderon was to be made by someone outside of Mexico. "If it was someone from the CIA there would be something in her 201 files... but possibly it could have been run out of a soft file." He said that her file should be substantial. He said he could not explain why the Calderon conversation would not have been in her 201 while it was in Oswald's.

Mr. Phillips was informed of the testing of the impulse camera beginning on September 27, 1963. He stated that he had "no recollection" of the disposition of the photographs obtained during that testing.

Mr. Phillips stated that if another cable (a third) was sent to HQ regarding Oswald prior to the assassination that he did not know about it.

Mr. Phillips was asked if there was a way for HQ and a Station to communicate without the commo becoming part of the permanent record. He stated that there was at least one way that he knew of in addition to telephone and personal courier. He said that it was technically possible to set up a "telcom" system by persuading the cable operators to set it up on a "back channel". He stated that such a system would work on a question and answer sheme. He said "It has been done on occassion but I don't recall it ever having been done in Mexico." Mr. Phillips also stated that he did not believe that there had been any telephone communications concerning the assassination. Refuting documents were not shown.

Mr. Phillips acknowledged that the FBI would manipulate their files on employees of the CIA at the Agency's behest. He also said that he would not be surprised if other catagories of files could be manipulated, including internal CIA files. Mr. Phillips was asked what factors would make him suspicious of a file. He said that missing references, pages that had half of them torn off, things like that would arouse his suspicion. He also listed a missing report from a sequentially numbered series of reports as one thing that would arouse his suspicion. In response to a direct question, Mr. Phillips said that, if what we had told him about Ms. Duran's file was true, then we could be fairly certain that her file had been "manipulated."

Mr. Phillips was asked about James Angleton. He said: "He didn't tell me anything about his operations. He kept promising to tell me, but he never did." He said that Angleton held his operation very tightly to his vest. Phillips said it is possible that J.C. King mignt have had some operations outside of the JMARC structure but that they could not have been funded without someone knowing about them. A division chief does have access to operational and developmental funds but, Phillips said, he has never heard of a discretionary fund available to Division Chiefs. He said that the developmental fund usually had a lot of money in it but that it eventually had to be accounted for. "I can't remember having such a fund that I didn't account for through the DDP."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not participate, nor was he aware of, in any campaign after the assassination to spread misinformation about the death of Kennedy. He could not explain why the misinformation that came from the Cuban groups and individuals that tended to point to Castro involvement were predominantly from assets that he had handled personally as opposed to ones that had been ran out of the Miami station. He said that he agreed that it was strange that the one peice of evidence that tended to show at least DGI foreknowledge was not pursued by his shop while disinformation from his former assets occupied the attentions of investigators in that area. Mr. Phillips stated that he did not kow of any hard evidence that existed in 1963 that pointed to Castro's involvement.

Mr. Phillips was asked about his operations in Havana, specifically the names of the operations he was involved in, when he worked there as a covert operative from 1958 to 1961. He said he went to Cuba in the summer of 1958 after he had retired from the Agency. He said the Agency heard he was setting up his own public relations business there and asked him to continue working for them, not on a staff status but on a contract basis. Most of his work, he said, involved propaganda operations for Latin American coundtries and not Cuba. He did do what he termed "ad hoc" stuff as it came along and he did develop propaganda news stories and editorial material that was sent out to the provincial newspapers. He also specifically recalled attending a meeting of a group of businessmen who began talking about developing anti-Castro activity, but that group never got off the ground because there was an informant in the group and most of the participants were shortly afterwards arrested.

When asked about his relationsip with Julio Lobo, he became a bit upset and said he thought he had covered that adequately in his deposition. He sa~~ys~~id as far as he ~~can~~ could recall he met Lobo only one time, perhaps it was even in Madrid and not Havana, he doesn't recall, and he had no substantial dealings with him. He wanted to know if Veciana's story about Bishop is still being considered and if any decision about his being Bishop had been conclusively arrived at. He said he doesn't like living under the fear and tension of possibly being called before the television cameras and having Veciana suddenly stand up and point his finger at him and say that he is Bishop and that he saw him with Oswald. Phillips was told by the interviewers that they had no authority to disclose anything of substance about our investigation to him. He asked that the interviewers seek permission to let him know what was going on. He was told that his request would be brought to high-level attention but that a response of any kind at all could not be assured.

Phillips stated that he did not know Paul Bethel very well. but it was not Bethel who introduced him to Lopez-Fresquet. He said that that introduction was made by Bethel's boss, Dick Cushing.

Phillips said that he had no additional recollections on Jack Cogswell other than he remembered that he was an

American businessman in Havana.

Mr. Phillips stated that he "probably" did have some contacts with someone or some persons associated with the Moa Bay Mining Company, but he did not recall any specific names. He also "must have" had some contact with Freeport Sulpher people. "I was fairly socially active at the time and the name of the company is familiar to me."

Mr. Phillips said that he did not have many public relations clients during that time. He could recall only the man who owned Ambar Motors and the El Mundo newspaper. He also traded for free French lessons at the Berlitz School although he can not recall exactly what kind of public relations work he did in return.

Phillips did not recall the name Darnell.

He said that he did know Wayne Smith, political attache at the American Embassy, very well. He remembered him as a big guy because they were in a little theatre group together and in one play Phillips had to throw Smith out of a window.

Phillips said that he did not know Roberto Vale.

Phillips was asked about the procedure of traveling out of the country on covert operations. He said he always traveled out under his true name and with his legitimate passport. He would have other documentation on him for use with his alias when he arrived in the country. He said that's the way it was always done by every agent as far as he knew unless it was a "very sensitive operation." He knew of no specific sensitive operation in which a phoney passport was issued by the agency.

"I don't know how that mechanism worked," he said. He added that he had never had a phoney passport.

Mr. Phillips said that he had met McClendon (Gordon) once whent they were in college. He said that he had not seen him again until September of 1976 when he attended a Retired Intelligence Officers meeting. Later McClendon had called him and reminded him of an incident mentioned in Nightwatch involving a shool day's episode and MecClendon told him that he was the kid who picked him up in his car. As far as Phillips can recall, he never had any contact with McClendon during the intervening years. He never met McClendon at any time during 1963 in Dallas.

Phillips stated that he has no familiarity with the Catherwood Foundation or Cummins Caterwood or E. Wharton Shober. He was not specifically familiar with the Foundation's Cuban Aid Relief operation in Miami.

Phillips said that the debriefing centers in Miami were under the aegis of the CIA but the Agency only got the product from them, they were actually run by another agency. He said that they may have been ran by military intelligence. He said that he had never met any of the supervisory personnel who ran those centers.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/21/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10110-10121
RECORD SERIES :	SECURITY CLASSIFIED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	151-JFK

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/02/1978
PAGES :	7
SUBJECTS :	OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO CIA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/07/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 5.

KENNEDY

000044

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Arnold Arehart (psydo)
Date 6/2/78
Time 2:00 pm
Address Mexico City
Place American Embassy, Mexico

Interview:

Mr. Arehart was interviewed by HSCA Staff members Gary Cornwell, Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez, and Harold Leap. He was shown a copy of the CIA omnibus release letter and stated that he understood that it released him of any secrecy agreement he may have signed while employed by the CIA.

Mr. Arehart was assigned to Mexico City as a technician in 1960. Mr. Arehart worked continuously on one project until his retirement after Phillip Agee's revelations compromised his project. Mr. Arehart worked outside the U.S. Embassy under deep cover. He worked inside of the base that monitored and taped the telephones that were subject to the CIA/Mexican liaison tapping operation. His specific duty was to do all technical work required in the base and to keep the equipment in working order.

Mr. Arehart stated that the base monitored 30 telephones, i.e., there were thirty incoming lines and thirty tape machines to record the conversations. He stated that he was not sure where the taps were placed or how many taps were in what locations. Mr. Arehart was in contact, routinely, with Anne Goodpasture and Win Scott. He said that there was

Interviewer Signature

Typed Signature dan hardway Dan Hardway

(more)

Date transcribed 6/19/78

By:

Form #4-A

counterpart to him in the base in that he represented the Americans and his counterpart represented the Mexicans. He said that the counterpart's name was fnu Coseo. Coseo's father was the Mexican official in charge of the Mexican's involvement in the operations. Mr. Arehart was not at all clear about the role of Coseo Sr.

The tapeing equipment was impulse activated in that a call coming into or going out of the tapped phone would automatically activate the recorders.

Mr. Arehart said that he was the only American in the base. He said that there were 6 to 8 Mexicans who monitored the conversations and transcribed the tapes. As the Mexicans monitored the conversations they would make summaries of the important conversations. It was up to the monitors to decide which conversations were important enough to summarize. Arehart was not aware of any instruction that was provided the Mexican monitors on which conversations should be deemed important. In addition to the summaries, the tapes from the Cuban taps and the Spanish language portions of the tapes from the Soviet taps were transcribed in the base. Arehart turned the summaries, Cuban transcripts, Russian (Spanish) transcripts, and the Russian tapes, over to his contact. He stated that his routine contact was Anne Goodpasture and that he just assumed that she was the case officer for the project even though he claims that he received his orders directly from Win Scott by telephone. Summaries were always delivered very early in the morning the day after a conversation occured. The transcripts were literal transcriptions. Mr. Arehart said that sometimes, if the Mexican monitors felt something was really important, tapes and transcripts were passed immediately to Ms. Goodpasture.

Mr. Arehart stated that he believed that the summaries would have been maintained at the station, probably in a chronological file.

Mr. Arehart was questioned extensively about the retention and erasure of tapes used in the listening post. Mr. Arehart said that the tapes produced at the base would fall into three catagories:

1) tapes produced by taps on Cuban related phones;
2) tapes produced by taps on Soviet related phones;
3) tapes produced by taps on other phones such as Mexican radicals, politicians, etc.

Mr. Arehart said that the tapes produced by the Cuban taps were maintained in the listening post. He said that he had a special rack for these tapes in his workshop which was on the floor above the room in which the listening post was situated. This rack had thirty slots in it. The tapes from each day's production went into a seperate slot with the oldest tapes going back into use in the monitor room, i.e. the tapes from the Cuban tapes were held for thirty days before reuse. Mr. Arehart said that he routinely got requests for delivery of specific Cuban tapes from Ann Goodpasture but that the tapes were not routinely given to her unless she asked for them.

Mr. Arehart said that the Russian tapes were routinely given to Ms. Goodpasture so that she could get them to the Russian transcribers. He said that not all of these tapes were returned to him. He said that he knew this because his supply of tapes for the Russian taps kept dwindling. He assumes, while claiming no actual knowledge, that tapes were routinely retained by either the Russian translator or someone in the Station. He does not know which because he claims to have no knowledge about what happened to the tapes after they left his possession and before they were returned to him. He said that the tapes were returned to him already erased and ready for use.

Tapes from the third catagory were not held for very long and were routinely re-used, usually within a day or so after they were taped.

Mr. Arehart said that he was not aware of any other surveillance operations in Mexico City. He said that he assumed that there was photographic surveillance since the Agency would not be fulfilling their obligations if they did not have it. Mr. Arehart said that there was a process whereby the station could be notified that an interesting individual, or an individual whom the station was interested in, was at, or was going to be at, one of the Embassies. Mr. Arehart said that in such a situation the monitor would bring it to his attention and he would then call Ms. Goodpasture and alert her. Mr. Arehart stated that his second duty at the base was to alert the station to anything important.

Mr. Arehart said that he did not know what happened to the Soviet tapes. He did say that for a short time he was responsible for delivering the tapes to Boris Tarasoff in order to expedite the process. Mr. Arehart said that he did remember a man named "Rudy" but he did not remember what he did or what he looked like.

Mr Arehart said that it was possible that one of the Mexican agents transcribed English language conversations. He said that these convesations (tapes) were usually sent to the Embassy. He was not at all certain on these points. He said that on English conversations that he remembers that a Mexican would often come to the second floor and ask him to come and listen to the conversation.

Mr. Arehart was questioned about whether there was a process whereby transcription of important conversations in English or Russian could be expedited. He explained that there would not be such a process for a Russian conversation since they could not judge the importance of the conversation due to the fact that no one in the base understood Russian. He said that there was such a procedure for English conversations. He siad that after listening to the conversation and deeming it important he would Mark the tape "Urgent" and would put it in a box and deliver it.

Mr. Arehart said that when he worked with Tarasoff that he would pick up the tapes to reuse as well as drop them off for transcription. He said that he did not pick up the transcripts from Tarasoff and has no idea about what happened to them. Mr. Arehart said that he did not receive all of the tapes back and just assumed that they had been retained because of interest in the conversations contained on them. He said this was routine. After getting the tapes back, either from Tarasoff or Goodpasture depending on the time period, he would put them back into the working order. The tapes were not retained after they were returned to the base.

Mr Arehart said that the tape machines were activated at approximately 7:00 a.m. They were turned off at 11:00 p.m.

Mr. Arehart said that the Russian tapes were taken off the machines on a daily basis for delivery to Goodpasture or Tarasoff. The Cuban tapes were left on the machines until the reel was full. They were then removed and transcribed.

Mr. Arehart said that Lee Harvey Oswald never came to his attention prior to the assassination. He does not know whether or not he was ever asked to retain, or turn over to the station, any tape containing Oswald's voice. He explained that such requests would be made to him by giving him the tape number and that he never knew what was on any particular tape that was requested from him. He has never heard of a tape of Oswald existing nor has he heard that such tapes did not exist; he has simply never discussed it.

Mr. Arehart stated that there was a file of transcripts maintained at the base of the transcripts that were produced at the base. He remembered that after the assassination someone requested that those files be checked. Mr. Arehart said that he was not certain but thought that they had located one short conversation either by or about Oswald. Mr. Arehart could not remember the details of that conversation. He stated that he does not know what happened to the files that were maintained at the base station after his retirement.

Mr. Arehart said that we were the first people to ever talk to him about these events. He said that he has never talked to anyone from the CIA about these things. He confirmed that he had never been contacted by anyone from the IG staff in regards to the assassination or Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico. Mr. Arehart said that he had never discussed the case with anyone in the Mexico CIA station, either at the time or since then.

Mr. Arehart said that he did not get along with Anne Goodpasture. He said that she was a "show must go on type" that would get angry if she tried to contact him and he happened to be out to

Mr. Arehart said that Ann was so efficient that it was often very irratating. He said that Win Scott was also very efficient.

Mr. Arehart said that he believed that the listening post used Ampex 701's to tape the conversations they intercepted. He said that the calls were monitored by the three or four of the employees as they came in. These employees prepared the log sheets and the resumen (summary). The reels were then given to the transcribers who fixed the times and reel footage cite numbers to the specific conversations on the transcripts. Mr. Arehart said that the times on the transcripts would be accurate, usually, within 15 minutes more or less.

Mr. Arehart was shown transcripts from the Soviet and Cuban Embassy taps. These transcripts were in the Spanish language. He identified them as transcripts produced in the base.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/16/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10110-10484
RECORD SERIES :	REPORT ON LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S TRIP TO MEXICO CITY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	LEE HARVEY OSWALD THE CIA AND MEXICO CITY
DATE :	00/00/1978
PAGES :	393
SUBJECTS :	CIA CIA, METHODOLOGY, PHOTOSURVEILLANCE SOVIET EMBASSY OSWALD, LEE, POST-RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIP TO MEXICO CUBAN EMBASSY
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/01/2003
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Redacted and declassified.Box 1.

12/15/78

Classification: TOP SECRET Copy #3 of 3

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

OUTLINE: LEE HARVEY OSWALD, THE CIA AND MEXICO CITY.
Part I.

014972

I. Introduction.

- A. Issues Addressed. (p. 1.)
- B. Differences Between the Warren Commission Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City and the House Select Committee on Assassinations' Investigation. (p. 3.)
- C. Conclusions. (p. 5.)
- D. Structure and Relevancy. (p. 10.)

II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance Operations in Mexico City in September and October 1963.

- A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound. (p. 12.)
  - 1. Introduction. (p. 12.)
  - 2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets. (p. 12.)
  - 3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided. (p. 13.)
  - 4. Disposition of Production from the Operation. (p. 30.)
- B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound. (p. 31.)
  - 1. Introduction. p. 31.)
  - 2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets. (p. 31.)
  - 3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided. (p. 33.)
  - 4. Procedure and Timing Involved in Processing Production from the Operation. (p. 45.)
  - 5. Responsibility for the Operation. (p.47.)
  - 6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations. (p. 52.)
- C. Electronic Surveillance of Telephones at the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds in 1963. (p. 53.)
  - 1. Existence. (p. 53.)
  - 2. Responsibility. (p. 53.)
    - a. General. (p. 53.)
    - b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained. (p. 54.)
  - 3. Telephone Lines Covered. (p. 56.)

512

Classification: TOP SECRET

200053

Classified by derivation: __________

Outline: Page Two.

4. Production from Operation. (p. 58.)
a. Types. (p. 59.)
b. Handling Procedures. (p. 59.)
(1) Resuma. (p. 59.)
(2) Cuban Tapes. (p. 60.)
(3) Soviet Tapes. (p. 61.)
(a) General Handling. (p. 61.)
(b) Retention and Reuse of Tapes. (p. 62.)
(c) English Language Conversations. (p. 64.)
(d) Handling by Tarasoffs. (p. 66.)
(e) Expedited Procedure for English Language Coversations or other Conversations of Special Interest. (p. 67.)
(f) Handling in the Station. (p. 70.)
(g) Format of Transcripts. (p. 71.)
c. Voice Comparisons. (p. 72.)

III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of that Information.

A. Information that was Available. (p. 72.)
1. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office. (p. 73.)
a. September 27, 1963, Friday. (p. 73.)
b. September 28, 1963, Saturday. (p. 76.)
c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday. (p. 78.)
d. October 3, 1963, Thursday. (p. 79.)
2. Information Available to the Mexico City CIA Station from CIA Headquarters. (p. 80.)
3. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound. (p. 81.)
4. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Photographic Surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds. (p. 81.)
✓ 5. Possibility that Additional Information from the Electronic Surveillance on the Soviet Compound was Available to the Mexico City Station. (p. 82.)

Outline: Page Three.

6. Possibility that the CIA Photosurveillance Obtained a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald. (p. 90.)
   a. Missing Materials. (p. 91.)
   b. Likelihood that the Photosurveillance Operation would have Missed Oswald. (p. 91.)
   c. Reports of the Existence of a Photograph. (p. 93.)
      (1) Phillip Agee Allegation. (p. 93.)
      (2) Daniel Stanley Watson Allegation. (p. 97.)
      (3) Joseph Burkholder Smith Allegation. (p. 99.)
      (4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr. Allegation. (p. 102.)
      (5) Statements of Dan Niescuir. (p. 105.)
   d. HSCA Investigation of the Possibility that the Mexico City Photosurveillance Operation Produced a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald. (p. 107.)
      (1) Introduction. (p. 107.)
      (2) Investigation of the Allegations. (p. 108.)

B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.
   1. Introduction. (p. 115.)
   2. Information Available from the Soviet Wiretaps that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey Oswald. (p. 116.)
   3. When were the intercepted Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey Oswald? (p. 120.)
   4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man. (p. 122.)

IV. Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station an Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

   A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI Regarding American Cityizens in Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in Mexico City. (p. 123.)

   B. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to the Assassination. (p. 124.)

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination.

   A. Reporting of Information Concerning the Photograph

Outline: Page Four.

of the Mexico Mystery Man. (p. 178.)

B. Reporting of Information Concerning Lee Harvey Oswald from the Electronic Intercept Operation Aimed at the Soviet Embassy. (p. 180.)

PART II

C. Silvia Duran. (p. 184.)

VI. Information Not Available at the Time of the Warren Commission Investigation.

A. Silvia Tirado (nee Duran). (p. 191.)
  1. House Select Committee on Assassinations 6/6/78 Interviewo of Silvia Tirado. (p. 191.)
  2. CIA Information Not Available at the Time of the Warren Commission Investigation. (p. 194.)
    a. LIRING/3 Allegation. (p. 194.)
    b. Possibility that Silvia Duran was an Agent for either American, Mexican or Cuban Intelligence. (p. 197.)
      (1) Was Silvia Duran an Agent, Asset, or Source for Mexican or American Intelligence? (p. 197.)
      (2) Was Silvia Duran a Cuban Intelligence Agent? (p. 201.)

B. The Cubans. (p. 202.)
  1. Eusebio Azcue Lopez. (p. 202.)
  2. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz. (p. 205.)

C. Elena Garro de Paz. (p. 206.)
  1. Elena's Story as Reported October 5, 1964. (p. 206.)
  2. October 12, 1964, CIA Memo for the Record. (p. 208.)
  3. November 24, 1964, CIA Informant Report. (p. 209.)
  4. November 24, 1964, Elena Garro Meeting with Mexico City Legal Attache Officers. (p. 210.)

Outline: Page Five.

5. Charles Thomas Meeting with Elena Garro on December 10, 1965. (p.)
6. Charles Thomas' Meeting with Elena Garro on December 25, 1965. (p. 216.)
7. December 27, 1965, Legal Attache Memo to the United States Ambassador re Elena Garro. (p. 221.)
8. CIA Investigation of Elena's Allegation that She Created a Disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963. (p. 223.)
9. Legal Attache 2/23/66 Memo to the United States Ambassador Regarding Elena Garro's Allegation. (p. 225.)
10. Legal Attache Memo to Winston Scott re Elena's Allegation that She Had Stayed at the Hotel Vermont from the Day After the Assassination Until November 30, 1963. (p. 225.)
11. Charles Thomas' September 30, 1969, Letter to State Department and Legal Attache's Response. (p. 226.)
12. House Select Committee on Assassination's Investigation of Elena Garro's Allegations. (p. 228.)

D. Oscar Contreras Lartigue. (p. 235.)

VII. Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City.

A. Introduction. (p. 240.)

B. Did Lee Harvey Oswald or an Imposter Contact the Cuban and Soviet Consulates in Mexico City? (p. 242.)

C. What were Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City? (p. 250.)

D. Was Lee Harvey Oswald Alone While He Travelled to Mexico? (p. 259.)

Appendix I: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Cuba Trip 1. (p. 261.)

Appendix II: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Mexico Trip 1. (p. 265.)

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Outline: Page Six.

Appendix III: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Mexico Trip 2. (p. 273.)

Appendix IV: HSCA Procedural Write-up: Cuba Trip 2. (p. 287.)

Appendix V: Biography: Elena Garro de Paz. (p. 297.)

Appendix VI: Glossary of Terms Used in Report. (p. 301.)

Appendix VII: Listing of CIA Documents Cited. (p. 305.)

Classification: TOP SECRET

20.1053

Classified by derivation: ____________

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

ADDENDUM TO FOOTNOTE # 614 OF "LEE HARVEY OSWALD, THE CIA AND MEXICO CITY.

Some controversy has arisen in regard to the question of whether the tapes existed at the time of the assassination due to a memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to the head of the Secret Service which said:

> The Central Intelligence Agency advised that on October 1, 1963, an extremely sensitive source had reported that an individual identified himself as Lee Oswald, who contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring as to any messages. Special Agents of this Bureau, who have conversed with Oswald in Dallas, Texas, have observed photographs of the individual referred to above and have listened to a recording of his voice. These Special Agents are of the opinion that the above-referred-to individual was not Lee Harvey Oswald.

(Memorandum from Hoover to James J. Rowley, 11/23/63, pp. 4-5.) The HSCA has determined that this statement was probably based on another FBI memorandum which said:

> Inasmuch as the Dallas Agents who listened to the tape of the conversation allegedly of Oswald from the Cuban Embassy to the Russian Embassy in Mexico and examined the photographs of the visitor to the Embassy in Mexico and were of the opinion that neither the tape nor the photograph pertained to Oswald, I requested Shanklin to immediately send a photograph of Oswald to our Legal Attache.

(Memorandum from Belmont to Tolson, 11/23/63, p. 1. Mr. Belmont was reporting the results of a conversation with the Special Agent in Charge in Dallas, Gordon Shanklin, that occured at 11:50 A.M.)

[illegible] Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation: ________

ADDENDUM: Page Two.

Later that same day SAC Shanklin informed the Director that the tape of Oswald's voice had been erased: "It should be noted that the actual tape from which this transcript was made has been erased." (Teletype from SAC Dallas to Director, # 232220, 7:30 P.M. CST, 11/23/63. Emphasis in the original.)

The confusion about whether or not there was a tape apparently continued for several days after the SAC in Dallas informed the Director that such a tape did not exist. On 11/25/63 the FBI Legat in Mexico City sent a Cablegram to the director which said:

> There appears to be some confusion in that no tapes were taken to Dallas but only typewritten transcripts supplied by CIA, the tapes not being available because they had been erased.

(Cablegram # 182 & 183, p. 2.)

The FBI was asked to explain the paragraph from the Hoover memorandum quoted above. It responded:

> The paragraph appearing on pages 4 and 5 of the leterhead memorandum, which is quoted in your (FBI) request of March 17, 1978, contains some incorrect information regarding a tape recording of the voice of an individual who identified himself as Lee Oswald.
>
> Retrievable information contained in files of the FBI indicates that this Bureau received information derived from transcripts of tape recordings furnished by another government agency which conducts intelligence type inves-

ADDENDUM: Page Three.

> tigations. The transcripts indicated that on September 28, 1963, and October 1, 1963, the voice of an individual identifying himself as Lee Oswald was recorded by the other government agency conducting intelligence type investigations. Additionally, this government agency provided the FBI with photographs of an individual who appeared to be an American; these photographs being taken by said agency on October 1, 1963.
>
> It is noted that the FBI never received the actual tape recordings from which the transcripts were derived, as the tapes were erased by the other government agency providing the transcripts....
>
> As a result, no FBI employee ever listened to a tape recording purporting to contain Lee Harvey Oswald's voice as no tape was ever provided to this Bureau.

(JFK Classified Document # 131.) No FBI agent interviewed by the Committee recalled listening to any tape recording purporting to contain a conversation involving Oswald.

Copy #3 of 3

I. INTRODUCTION

A. Issues Addressed

The House Select Committee on Assassinations' investigation into Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City has been directed at answering the following questions:

1) Did Lee Harvey Oswald visit the Soviet and Cuban Consulates or Embassies in Mexico City?
2) In addition to the visits which may have been made to the Embassies, what were Lee Harvey Oswald's activities while he was in Mexico City?
3) Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone in Mexico City? If not, who were his associates and what were their activities?
4) Did the Central Intelligence Agency maintain any surveillance operation(s) aimed at the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic missions in Mexico City? If so, what kind?
5) What information, if any, about Oswald's stay in Mexico was known by the CIA Mexico City Station prior to the assassination and what was the source of that information?

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

6) Was the information, if any, in the possession of the CIA Mexico City Station reported to the CIA Headquarters accurately and expeditiously prior to the assassination?

7) Was the information in the possession of the CIA Mexico City Station reported to the CIA Headquarters accurately and expeditiously after the assassination?

8) Was the information developed by the CIA in Mexico City communicated to the Warren Commission in an accurate and expeditious manner?

9) Did the CIA photo-surveillance of the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds in Mexico City, if such photo-surveillance existed, obtain a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald? If so, what became of that photograph?

Classified by derivation: ____________

B. Differences Between the Warren Commission Investigation of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City and the House Select Committee on Assassination's Investigation.

The approach taken by this Committee's investigation differs from that of the Warren Commission primarily in terms of scope. The Warren Commission and the investigative agencies at its disposal went to great lengths to establish Oswald's travel to and from Mexico, but devoted minimal effort to evaluating Oswald's contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Consulates. It is the conclusion of this Committee that the Warren Commission correctly established that Oswald had traveled to Mexico City. Hence, this Committee has chosen not to reinvestigate Oswald's travel to and from Mexico City. Instead, the Committee's approach has been to focus narrowly on Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions in Mexico City and on evidence that was not available to the Warren

Commission that could possibly shed light on Oswald's activities in Mexico City outside of the Soviet and Cuban installations.

The Warren Report limited its discussion of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions to information obtained from Sylvia Duran and the Cuban Government.1/

At one point in the Report the Commission referred to other information:

> By far the most important confirmation of Senora Duran's testimony, however, has been supplied by confidential sources of extremely high reliability available to the United States in Mexico. The information from these sources establishes that her testimony was truthful and accurate in all material respects. The identities of these sources cannot be disclosed without destroying their future usefulness to the United States.2/

The Warren Commission did not print anything in the twenty-six volumes of evidence to support its statement that Silvia Duran's testimony was confirmed by "confidential sources of extremely high reliability."

TOP SECRET

In an attempt to answer the questions posed by Lee Harvey Oswald's visit to Mexico City in September and October of 1963, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has pursued the following investigative procedure:

1) Conducted extensive interviews, depositions, and executive session hearings involving Central Intelligence Agency personnel;

2) Interviewed Cuban citizens who could have knowledge of Oswald's sojourn in Mexico;

3) Interviewed Mexican citizens who could have knowledge of Oswald's activites and associations while he was in Mexico;

4) Conducted an extensive review of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that pertain to Oswald and Mexico City.

C. Conclusions

1) Someone who identified himself as Lee Harvey Oswald called the Soviet Consulate on 1 October 1963. This

individual indicated that he had visited the Soviet Consulate at least once. Other evidence from the CIA wiretaps, and witness testimony, indicates that the individual visited the Soviet and Cuban Consulates on five or six different occasions. While the majority of the evidence tends to indicate that this individual was indeed Lee Harvey Oswald, the possibility that someone else used Lee Harvey Oswald's name during this time in contacts with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates cannot be absolutely dismissed.

2) This Committee has not been able to determine Lee Harvey Oswald's activities outside of the Cuban and Soviet Embassies with certainty. There is a report, which has not been confirmed, indicating that during his stay in Mexico Oswald attended a "twist party" at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro, the brother-in-law of

Classification: [illegible]

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Silvia Duran. There is also unconfirmed evidence which, if true, would indicate that Oswald spent one night and parts of two days with a group of pro-Castro students from the University of Mexico.

3) There is a report that Oswald may have been in the company of a tall, thin, blond-headed man while in Mexico. This report has not been confirmed. If true, it is possible that this same individual may on occasion have used Oswald's name in dealing with the Cuban and Soviet Consulates. The man's name, if there was such a man, is not known.

4) On the dates that Oswald was in Mexico, the CIA had photographic surveillance operations which covered entrances to the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban Embassy and Consulate. The CIA also had electronic surveillance on telephones in the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office and Cuban diplomatic compounds. The

Classification: [illegible]

2[illegible]

Classified by derivation: 122

telephone at the Cuban Consulate was not subject to that surveillance.

5) The CIA's Mexico City Station definitely knew of Oswald's contacts with both the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds and of his desire to obtain an intransit visa for travel to Russia via Cuba. The source of this information was the electronic surveillance on the Soviet Consulate and Soviet Military Attache's Office.

6) All information in the possession of the CIA Mexico City Station was not reported to CIA Headquarters in an accurate and expeditious manner prior to the assassination.

7) With the exception of a few, possibly benign, irregularities, and considering the possibility that not all of the information available to the Station has been provided to this Committee, the information in the possession of the CIA Mexico Station was reported in an

accurate and expeditious manner after the assassination to headquarters.

8) With the exception of those areas that involved sensitive sources and methods, such as theinformation pertaining to the electronic and photographic surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds, information developed by the CIA in Mexico was generally relayed to the Warren Commission in an accurate and expeditious manner.

9) It is the conclusion of this Committee that the CIA's photo-surveillance operations in Mexico City probably obtained a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald entering either or both the Soviet and Cuban Consulates. The CIA denies that such a photograph exists. Hence, the dispostion of this photograph is unknown.

10) The CIA telephone surveillance on the Soviet Embassy taped several calls of a man using the name 'Lee Oswald." These tapes were retained for a routine two week period and were most likely erased shortly after 16 October 1963. These tapes were probably not in existence at the time of the assassination.

11) The Committee is aware of the allegations that Silvia Tirado de Duran may have been an intelligence agent for either the Cubans, Mexicans or Americans. Ms. Duran was probably never employed by Cuban intelligence. While there is no direct evidence on the question other than Ms. Duran's denial, the Committee believes that the circumstantial evidence that tends to indicate that Ms. Duran had a relationship of some type with either Mexican or American intelligence is of such a nature that the possibility can not be dismissed.

D. Structure and Relevancy

The following report detailing the results of this Committee's investigative efforts regarding Mexico City is divided into general areas:

1) CIA surveillance operations in Mexico City during September and October of 1963;
2) Information about Lee Harvey Oswald's stay in Mexico City that was known prior to the assassination;
3) Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and Headquarters activity regarding Oswald prior to the assassination;
4) Mexico City reporting of information after the assassination;
5) Witnesses from the Cuban Consulate;
6) Investigation of related information that was not available to the Warren Commission; and
7) Reconstruction of Oswald's activities in Mexico City.

The reader should be advised at the outset that the first section following is technical in nature and may not appear directly relevant at first blush. But the report is cumulative in nature. The specific, detailed analyses of the standard operating procedures in the first section are necessary to, and form a partial basis for, the reconstruction of the Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case. There are many gaps left by the documentary and testimonial evidence concerning the manner in which the CIA's Mexico City Station and Headquarters reacted to Oswald's presence in Mexico City. A knowledge of the way in which the Mexico City Station operated and the procedures involved in those surveillance operations which detected Oswald is valuable in filling the gaps of the specific case which is the subject of this report.

II. Central Intelligence Agency Surveillance Operations in Mexico City in September and October 1963

A. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound

1. Introduction

The Mexico City Station of the Central Intelligence Agency maintained photographic surveillance on the Cuban diplomatic compound during September and October of 1963.3/ The purpose of this operation was to get identifiable photographs of all individuals who visited the Cuban diplomatic compound.4/

2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets

The Cuban diplomatic compound covered one city block in Mexico City between Tacubaya, Francisco Marquez and Zamora Streets. The entrance to the Cuban Embassy was located on the corner of Tacubaya and Francisco Marquez.5/ Next to this entrance on Francisco Marquez Street was another entrance for automobiles.6/ The entrance to the Cuban Consulate, which was in a separate building from the Embassy, was located on the corner of Francisco Marquez and Zamora.7/ The CIA surveillance post was located at 149 Francisco Marquez Street.8/ An agent photographed visitors to the Embassy from one window in the third floor apartment at 149 Francisco Marquez Street.9/ A pulse camera covered the entrance to the Consulate from a second window in the same third floor apartment.10/

3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided

One CIA officer, who claimed to have had a marginal role in this surveillance operation, remembers that they had trouble covering both the Cuban Embassy entrance and the Consulate entrance.11/ "The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties."12/ Two former CIA employees who were in Mexico City in 1963 remembered that there were two cameras covering the Cuban diplomatic compound.13/ Ms. Goodpasture, a case officer in the

Mexico City Station, testified that she could not remember the locations of the two cameras.14/ David A. Phillips, Chief of the Cuban Section in the Mexico City Station, testified that the Consulate entrance was covered along with the Embassy entrance.15/ Mr. Phillips was not absolutely sure of his recollection, but thought that it was possible that the Embassy entrance had been covered by a manned photographic base and the Consulate entrance was covered by a pulse camera.16/

The CIA staff technician who serviced the cameras and trained the agents at the CIA photographic base that covered the Cuban compound was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations. The technician stated that he had set up the cameras in the photographic base at the inception of an operation in the early 1960's designed to provide photographic surveillance of the Cuban compound. For a short time after the inception of the operation, the technician had been responsible for maintaining liaison between the agents inside the base and the Station. After the agent's training was completed,

Source is FW017

the technician turned the liaison responsibilities over to a case officer.17/ He could not remember with certainty the identity of that case officer, but thought that it may have been Robert Shaw.18/ The technician remembered that the operation had originally covered the Cuban Embassy entrance probably with a manually operated Exacta or Leica camera. He said that this camera had been set up on a tripod and was equipped with a Bal-Scope.19/ Later, according to the technician, a pulse camera was installed in this base. Ibid p3 The pulse camera was set up to cover the Consulate entrance, while the agents continued covering the Embassy entrance with the manual camera. Ibid The technician could not remember with certainty when the pulse camera was installed in the base. The technician told the House Select Committee on Assassinations that the exact time of installation could be checked by reviewing the project files maintained at CIA Headquarters.20/

The technician remembered quite a few details about how the pulse camera had been set up and how it worked. He remembered that the shutter was triggered by a device attached to a spotting scope.21/ The triggering device was activated by changes in light intensity. Ibid p3-4 The spotting scope was trained on a very narrow area of the door latch of the Cuban Consulate entrance. The camera itself covered a much broader field than the spotting scope. Ibid p-1 The camera was set up so as to make sure that a person triggering the camera by passing between the spotting scope and its target, the door latch, would be photographed from the waist up.22/ Ibid.

The technician stated that the agent in the photographic basehouse serviced his own cameras, and developed the film and made contact prints in the basehouse.23/ The agent covering the Embassy entrance kept a log corresponding to the photographs taken.24/

The project files for this operation bear out the technician's recollections. An examination of these files by the House Select Committee on Assassinations revealed several of the technician's monthly reports. An examination of the chronological file of dispatches passing between CIA Headquarters and the Mexico City Station turned up one additional monthly report that was not located in the project file. A third relevant dispatch was made available to the Committee on 20 November 1978. The report in the dispatch chronology covers the period of 1 September to 30 September 1963.25/ The dispatch reports that on 23 September 1963 the agent who ran the Cuban photographic basehouse called the technician into the basehouse to discuss the layout of the Cuban Consulate.26/ The entrance to the Cuban Consulate had been closed in 1961 due to harassment and stink bombings.27/ A few days prior to the 23rd, the Consulate had once again opened its door to the public. Prior to this reopening of the Consulate door, the photography agent had limited his coverage to the main Embassy gate.28/ He used an Exacta camera with a Bal-Scope with a 30-power eyepiece. The dispatch reported, however, from the position he had to cover the main gate, he could not cover the newly reopened Consulate entrance.29/ The base agent told the technician that at that time, approximately seventy percent of all the visitors to the Cuban compound were using the Embassy entrance and the remainder used the Consulate entrance.30/

The technician discussed this problem with the case officer for the project, Robert Shaw.31/ Mr. Shaw asked the technician to add additional photographic coverage to the basehouse so as to cover the Consulate door.32/ On 26 September the technician tested equipment for use in the basehouse.33/ The dispatch goes on to say:

> On the morning of 27 September, PARMUTH installed the VLS-2 Trigger Device at the LIERODE basehouse and used the 500 mm lens issued with this system, one 400 mm Telyt, one reflex housing to be used with the Telyt adapted to fit the Robot Star camera, one Robot Star Camera, one solenoid release for mounting and triggering the Robot Star camera, one Kodak K-100 adapted for single or burst type exposure, one solenoid release to be used with the K-100... one 152 mm f/4 Cine Ektar Lens, and two additional tripods.34/

The photography agent was instructed to test each camera for four days. The report says that the results of these test days will be forwarded to the Technical Services Division at Headquarters as soon as they become available.35/

On 7 November 1963 the Mexico City Station filed a report on the functioning of the pulse camera.36/ This dispatch is referenced to

HMMA-22307, paragraph 5, c.37/ It says that the VLS-2 triggering device had been performing well with little false triggering. The 500 mm lens was replaced with a 6-inch lens so as to obtain wider coverage of the Consulate door.38/ During the first two weeks that the pulse camera was in operation, the VLS-2 triggered the camera anytime that anyone entered or left the Consulate door. This dual photography used an excessive amount of film, so the base agent adjusted the VLS-2 so that it only photographed people leaving the Cuban compound by the Consulate door.39/ The base agent used "the K-100 camera with ~~the~~ a 152 mm lens for one day, ~~and~~ turn~~ed~~ing in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film."40/ Samples of the photos taken "on that day" with the camera are enclosed with the dispatch.41/ The Robot Star camera that was placed in the base on September 27 broke down after four days of operation and was replaced with a second Robot Star camera.42/ This Robot Star broke down after five days of operation. At the time of this dispatch in November, a Robot Star camera was in operation.43/ Samples of this camera's photographs were also sent with this dispatch.44/ Hence, between September 27, 1963 and November 7, 1963, at least three, and possibly four, cameras were used in the photo base with the VLS-2 automatic triggering device. On the 27th, the photo-technician installed two cameras, the K-100 and the first Robot Star, with the VLS-2 triggering device.45/ The K-100 was used for one day.46/ The first Robot Star worked for four days; a second Robot Star worked for five days.47/ On 11/7/63 a Robot Star was in operation at the base.48/ It is not clear whether the Robot Star which was working at the time of the November dispatch was a third camera or one of the earlier ones which could have been repaired. In any event, the Station asked that a new camera be sent to replace the Robot Star.49/

On June 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters alerting them that they were sending up the negatives from the pulse camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy.50/ All available negatives and five packages of undeveloped film were sent to Headquarters by transmittal manifest #252572.51/

The cable apologizes for the delay in sending the negatives caused by "consolidation and dating." 52/ The cable suggests that Headquarters retain possession of the negatives and informs Headquarters that the negatives will be forwarded to them on a regular basis. 53/

A transmittal manifest is "unaccountable." 54/ That means that the document and the material it transmits is not made part of the record and is, therefore, unretrievable. 55/

The CIA made the photo-technician's monthly port for December available to the Committee on 16 November 1978. 56/ On the morning of 17 December 1963, a 35 mm Sequence camera was installed in the base house ~~with~~ and the VLS-2 trigger device. 57/ The installation of this Sequence camera was probably in response to the request for a replacement camera in HMMA-22433.

On 22 June 1965 the CIA Mexico City Station sent a dispatch to Headquarters to familiarize them with the details of the pulse camera operation. 58/

> This dispatch is intended to familiarize Headquarters with the details of the Pulse Camera operation in Mexico City, which was mounted in December 1963 and is targeted against the (Cuban) Embassy and Consulate.59/

The dispatch goes on to report that a technician from Headquarters brought a pulse camera to Mexico City in mid-December 1963, installed and tested it, and instructed the technician resident in Mexico City and the base agent in the use and maintenance of the camera.60/

On the basis of HMMA-22307, HMMA-22433 and MEXI 9940, the Committee believes that it is probable that the pulse camera was in operation on the days that Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate. This Committee requested the photographs produced by the pulse camera by the project's cryptonym on 22 June 1978. The CIA informed a House Select Committee on Assassinations researcher on 7/20/78 that the cryptonym did not refer to a photographic project.61/ A more specific request for the photographs was made on 21 July 1978.62/

On 13 October 1978 the Committee, as a result of a review of materials taken by James Angleton from Win Scott's safe at the time of his death,63/ addressed another letter to the CIA on this matter.64/ This letter said, in part:

> First, while admittedly there are contradictions in the Agency's written records, these records nevertheless suggest that an impulse camera was in operation when Oswald visited the Cuban Embassy. Such a camera would have automatically been triggered to photograph any person entering the Embassy. In addition, it has been determined by this Committee that Oswald entered and exited from the Cuban and Soviet compounds on at least five separate occasions, resulting in a total of ten opportunities during which Oswald could have been photographed by CIA surveillance cameras. The existence of an Agency photograph of Oswald has been further corroborated by CIA personnel both in Mexico City and at Agency headquarters who claim to have seen this material.
>
> Finally, on October 6, 1978, a manuscript written by the late Win Scott, former Chief of Station of the CIA's Mexico City Station, was reviewed by a staff member of this Committee. While the criticism can be offered that Scott's manuscript has not yet been established as a true record, relevant portions of this manuscript do suggest that the contents are accurate and that photographs of Oswald were in fact obtained by the CIA's Mexico City surveillance operations. At page 273 of the manuscript, Scott wrote:
>
>> These visits and conversations are not heresay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit. The conversations are also known to have taken place, including the one in which he told the Soviet to whom he was talking that he should have heard, received a message, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington, indicating

> obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in Washington had offered to help Oswald.
>
> Scott's comments are a source of deep concern to this Committee, for they suggest your Agency's possible withholding of photographic materials highly relevant to this investigation.
>
> Therefore, the Committee reiterates its request of May 2, including but not limited to any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Lee Harvey Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City. In addition, the Committee requests a detailed explanation regarding the withholding of any and all photographs in the CIA's possession of Oswald resulting from CIA surveillance operations directed against the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and Consulates in Mexico City.65/

The CIA responded to this letter on 25 October 1978.66/ The CIA informed the Committee that it was their belief that the pulse camera was not in operation during September of 1963.67/

> First, there was no pulse camera...opposite the entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December 1963...In fact, there had been no photographic coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the visit of Lee Harvey Oswald to Mexico City...The Consulate entrance had been closed for some time, and after it was reopened the 27th of September was scheduled as the day for installation of photographic equipment for its coverage. Difficulty was experienced in the installation and the technicians had to machine a part for

> the equipment...The technicians probably ~~had to~~ return to their shop and had to make the part in question. On that date, or at some date not long afterwards, there was test photography of the entrance... Various difficulties were experienced with the equipment, which seems eventually to have been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in December 1963. There is no question about the sequence set forth above.68/

HMMA-22307 definitely reports the installation of the two cameras and a VLS-2 trigger device on 27 September 1963.69/ But the cameras did not function smoothly.70/ HMMA-22433 reported that the K-100 camera broke down after one day's operation.71/ It was replaced with the first Robot Star, which had also been installed on September 27. The first Robot Star broke down four days after its installation.72/ A second Robot Star broke down after five days of operation.73/ A Robot Star was working on 7 November 1963, when HMMA-22433 requested that Headquarters send a replacement camera to Mexico.74/ In all likelihood, that request was filled with the installation of the Sequence camera on 17 December 1963 detailed in HMMA-22726.75/ Under this interpretation of the documents, the operation would have gone into continuous operation in mid-December 1963 as claimed by the CIA. But the first pulse camera was set up on Friday, September 27, 1963. The documents do not specify the days that the original cameras functioned. HMMA-22307 says:

> (The base agent) was requested to test the Robot Star Camera for four days and the K-100 for another four days.76/

HMMA-22433 says:

> (The base agent) used the K-100 with a 152 mm lens for one day, turning in 10 fee (sic) of 16 mm film...The Robot Star and the Telyt 400 mm lens are now being used with the VLS-2 on this project...The Robot Star camera which was given to (the base agent) with the VLS-2 broke down after ~~four~~ [illegible] days of photographing. (The technician) replaced this with another Robot. Five days later the second camera failed to advance properly.77/

This Committee believes that it is reasonable to assume that the base agent started using the equipment immediately after it was installed.78/ Hence, the one day that the K-100 was used would have been either the 27th (the day it was installed), the 28th (a Saturday) or the 30th (the following Monday). It is also reasonable to assume that the Robot Star was put into action the day of, or the day following, the breakdown of the K-100. This camera worked for four days. So the Consulate was probably the subject of photographic surveillance from 27 September to 1 October, assuming that the five days of coverage from the original cameras started on the day of installation and ran continuously, except for Sunday, September 30th.

The base agent developed the film from the pulse camera and turned it over in negative form to his contact.79/ The film was probably routinely sent to Headquarters. 80

The technician who set up the cameras in the base house said that the objective of the operation was to get identifiable photographs of all visitors to the Cuban compound.81/ The goals of the operation were spelled out in the 1966 Project Renewal request.

> Its original objectives, still current, include furnishing photographic coverage during daylight hours of the Embassy and Consulate entrances..82/

Even though this was the stated objective, Ann Goodpasture testified that she was not sure, but thought that the coverage of the Cuban Consulate and Embassy would have been continuous only during office hours.83/ This was also the recollection of David

Phillips.84/ During September, October and November of 1963, the Cuban Consulate was open to the public from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m.; the Embassy was open to the public from 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.85/

A blind memo, dated 11/27/64, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of Embassies and info on Kostikov," implies that the coverage on the Cuban Embassy was of a continuous nature during daylight hours. This memo also implies that there was a coverage of the Cuban Consulate.86/ The technician who serviced this operation in Mexico City remembers that he tried to get full daylight coverage of the compound but that it was very difficult.87/ He said that the manual coverage was usually good but that human error had to be taken into account when considering the manual coverage. He pointed out that it was hard for a person to maintain constant attention in such a sedentary job and, hence, some visitors would get by the manual operation.88/ The technician also remembered that he had set up the pulse camera to provide constant daylight coverage.89/ By 1965 the pulse camera was

FOOTNOTES
FOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD, MEXICO CITY AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1/ See Warren Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736. In support of its account of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions, the Warren Commission published the following as exhibits:

1) A note from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss Ambassador in Cuba. (Commission Exhibit 2445.)

2) Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba's letter denying the visa. (Commission Exhibit 2564.)

3) Letterhead Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald's Application for a Cuban Visa." (Commission exhibit 3127.)

4) The pages of Lee Harvey Oswald's notebook with the telephone numbers of the Cuban Consulate, the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's office. (Commission Exhibit 2121.)

5) A letter dated 11/9/63 from Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Commission Exhibit 15.)

6) A letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Warren Commission listing the contents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. (Commission Exhibit 834. This document listed a Central Intelligence Agency "release" dated 10/9/63 that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.)

7) A memorandum dated 5/11/64 to the United States Embassy in Mexico City from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mexico. (Commission Exhibit 2120.)

8) A memorandum dated 6/9/64 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (Commission Exhibit 2123.)

only working for six hours a day.90/ The House Select Committee on Assassinations has not been able to determine the scope of the pulse camera coverage during September and October 1963 by examination of the production because that production, if it exists, has not been made available for review.91/

The CIA has made the photographic production and logs from the manual coverage of the Embassy entrance available for House Select Committee on Assassinations review.92/ All production from the manual camera coverage of the Cuban Embassy for the months of September, October and November was examined.93/ This examination revealed that the coverage of the Embassy was fairly consistent between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. on weekdays.95/ There was coverage, with a few exceptions, on every weekday.96/ There was no coverage on weekends.97/ During the three-month period examined by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, only four weekdays were not covered by the photographic surveillance operation aimed at the Cuban Embassy.98/ There was no evidence in the files of serious technical difficulties or camera problems in the manual operation during these three months.99/

4. Disposition of Production from the Operaton

The photographs from the manual camera were maintained in a chronological file at the CIA station in Mexico City.100/ These photographs were routinely shown to a penetration agent in the Cuban Embassy for identification purposes.101/ After this agent left the employment of the Cuban Embassy in 1965, the photographs were sent to the JMWAVE Station in Miami, Florida for review by Cuban defectors such as AMMUG/1.102/

The disposition of the pulse camera photographs in general, beyond the fact that as of 1965, and possibly earlier, the production was routinely sent to Headquarters, is unknown.103/ The CIA denies that the pulse camera was functioning during the time Oswald was in Mexico.104/ If the Committee's belief that the pulse camera was functioning on the days that Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate is correct, then the ultimate disposition of the photographs produced on those days remains a mystery.

B. Photographic Surveillance Operations Aimed at the Soviet Diplomatic Compound

1. Introduction

The Mexico City CIA Station maintained photographic surveillance on the Soviet diplomatic compound in Mexico City in 1963. Three photographic sites, or bases, were used in this operation.105/ The primary objective of the operation was to photograph people who visited the Soviet Embassy.106/ The operation, generally, covered the main gate of the Soviet compound between 900 and 1800 (or dark) on weekdays and from 900 to 1400 on Saturdays.107/

2. Physical Positioning of Surveillance Bases and Targets.108/


de Los Santos
LIMITED (primary photo-base located in a 1st floor apartment)--------
GELATI
CHICONTEPEC
LILYRIC (second photo-base located in a 2nd floor apartment)------
---gate
fence
Soviet Compound
embassy
court-yard
TACUBAYA

There were three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet diplomatic compound in 1963.109/ One of the bases overlooked the enclosed garden or "backyard" area of the Soviet Embassy.110/ The other two bases, of primary concern to this Committee, covered the entrance to the Soviet compound.111/ The primary base, LIMITED, was directly across the street intersection from the main Soviet Embassy gate; the secondary, or "back-up," LILYRIC base was across the street and down a little way from the main Embassy gate.112/

3. Objectives of Operation and Scope of Coverage Provided

The purpose of this operation has also been described as being to obtain photographs of Soviet officials and their families; all foreigners (non-Latins) who visited the Embassy; and cars with foreign license plates.113/ One of the main purposes of the photographic bases that covered the Embassy gate was to obtain a photograph of every "foreigner," or non-Latin, in contact with the Soviet Embassy.114/

This was done in an attempt to identify possible Soviet espionage agents.

> My understanding of that was that it was to be used to identify those people who might be working for the Soviets as espionage agents who were U.S. citizens who went down there driving a car with a U.S. license plate on it, or people we did not know but could identify. The same procedure was also used for trying to identify people other than U.S. citizens...115/

It is reported that the Mexican nationals who manned the photographic bases and actually took the photographs had an "uncanny ability" to pick out foreigners.116/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations next attempted to determine the scope of the photographic coverage on the main gate of the Soviet Embassy. At a minimum, the Embassy was probably covered by the photographic operations during office hours. "The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours)..."117/ "Instructions were to cover office hours, photograph each new Soviet and family, all foreigners and foreign license plates."118/ The normal work hours of the Soviet Embassy during September and October of 1963 were from 9:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.119/

There are some indications that the photographic coverage was more extensive than just office hours. Even though the Embassy was not open past 6:00 p.m., visitors could still gain entrance by ringing the gate bell. "Russian speakers can get in any time."120/ ~~One~~ Two CIA officers who ~~was~~ were in Mexico City remember~~s~~ "that the photo surveillance was constant except for instances where it would be down for security reasons or equipment malfunction."121/ A blind memorandum, dated 11/27/63, entitled "Memo passed to Mr. Papich of FBI with info on photo coverage of embassies and info on Kostikov," says, in part,

> We have photographic coverage during daylight hours on the USSR, Cuban, Czechoslovak and Polish Embassies. Their consulates are located in the embassies and therefore the coverage of the embassies would include coverage of the consulates. The photographic coverage is of a continuous nature during daylight hours. However, weather conditions and other factors affecting any photographic efforts require that the coverage not be considered as total or complete.122/

Ann Goodpasture was questioned about the scope of the photographic coverage on the Soviet compound. She said:

> I cannot give you the exact times (of coverage). I can guess, and my guess is that they were

> open most of the time when the Consulate was opened for business hours. But the person who would have that information, the only person who would know, is the case officer who was handling the project at that time.123/

Ms. Goodpasture explained the discrepancy between the time of coverage as stated in her notes and testimony and that in the 11/27/63 memorandum by saying that the memorandum referred to the coverage instituted after the assassination of John Kennedy.124/ An examination of the photographic production from the LIMITED base shows that the coverage from that base prior to the assassination was fairly uneven.125/ The log sheets for this operation show that, if anything, coverage decreased after the assassination.126/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations reviewed production and log materials from one base, LIMITED, which covered the gate of the Soviet diplomatic compound.127/ The LIMITED base was referred to as the "primary" base because it began operation before the LILYRIC base opened.128/

LILYRIC was planned as an alternate photo base to LIMITED. It was in an upper story...on the same side of the street as LIMITED but in the middle of the block South. It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy.129/

The following chart lists the production from the LIMITED base which was made available to the House Select Committee on Assassinations.130/

Date	Hours of coverage stated	Time of 1st photograph	Time of last photograph	Number of Photographs taken
Aug. 31	800-1400	956	1220	8 (Saturday)
Sept. 1	800-2000	1009	1321	6 (Sunday)
2	830-1900	935	1556	19
3	830-1800	1131	1334	18
4	830-1800	1001	1715	43
5	1200-1900	1238	1510	12
6	830-1800	926	1702	39
7	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
8	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
9	900-1900	1159	1640	3
10	830-1800	855	1119	17
11	900-1900	1132	1550	14
12	900-1900	1015	1233	7
13	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
14	1000-1400	1047	1344	10 (Saturday)
15	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
16	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
17	900-1900	1133	1549	19
18	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
19	900-1900	1105	1654	13
20	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
21	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
22	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
23	900-1900	1137	1300	7
24	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
25	900-1900	1040	1137	6
26	*************NO COVERAGE**************************			
27	900-1900	1018	1146	16

	28	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	29	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	30	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
Oct.	1	900-1900	1251	1251	2	
	2	900-1900	1139	1259	14	
	3	900-1900	1200	1222	5	
	4	900-1900	1103	1251	21	
	5	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	6	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	7	900-1900	1158	1235	6	
	8	900-1900	1219	1232	5	
	9	900-1900	1108	1210	4	
	10	900-1900	1031	1719	18	
	11	900-1900	1522	1733	9	
	12	1000-1400	1002	1015	2	(Saturday)
	13	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	14	800-1900	831	944	12	
	15	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	16	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	17	900-1900	1624	1649	7	
	18	1200-1900	1404	1437	2	
	19	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	20	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	21	*************NO COVERAGE************************				
	22	1200-1900	1305	1307	3	
	23	1200-1900	N.A.+	N.A.	8	
	24	1200-1900	N.A.	N.A.	22	
	25	1200-1900	N.A.	N.A.	21	
	26	1000-1600	N.A.	N.A.	14	(Saturday)

+Not Available.

Given the somewhat uneven nature of the coverage maintained by LIMITED,131/ the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff asked whether the two bases were run in conjunction so as to provide more comprehensive coverage. Thomas Keenan, the project's case officer, did not remember that this was the case. He did remember that both bases operated at the same time so as to get the most complete coverage possible.132/ Mr. Keenan was not sure whether there was routine coverage of the Soviet Embassy on weekends.133/ He said that it was possible that there was routine coverage on Saturday mornings.134/

An examination of the project file maintained by the CIA on the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy does not bear out Mr. Keenan's assertion that the two bases duplicated efforts. In fact, the project file confirmed that the bases complemented each other rather than duplicated efforts. This was the case in 1960 when a project review stated:

> LIMITED - This base compiles daily logs indicating all arrivals, departures and, where possible, identities of every person visiting or working at the LIMERICK target...LIMITED's photographic coverage is still concentrated on visitors, as opposed to employees, to the LIMERICK installation...LILYRIC photographs also are concentrated on visitors to the target, as opposed to employees. It should be noted that LILYRIC operates for photographic coverage during the hours from daylight to 1400 hours each day of the week except Sunday. The LIMITED base maintains photographic coverage from 1400 hours to darkness each day except Sunday.135/

In 1961 the project review said:

> 1. To collect operational information pertaining to LIMERICK personnel and physical facilities through use of photographic base houses. Three photographic bases, LIMITED, LILYRIC,...contribute to this objective. To avoid repetition, the Station is omitting the usual description of the functions of these three bases and how they contribute to the above objective. There has been no change in the coverage as described in the 1960 Request for Project Renewal.136/

Similar statements are included in the project reviews for 1962 and 1963.137/ At one point a move was made at Headquarters to close the LILYRIC base:

> FI/OPS recommends strongly that the photo coverage be reviewed from the standpoint of value and usefulness with a view to determining whether the LILYRIC activity could not be safely eliminated and the additional photographic coverage conducted on a more selective basis, without materially affecting overall usefulness.138/

The Mexico City Station took exception to this recommendation:

> While HMMA 14093 correctly referred to LIMITED, LILYRIC... as "photographic base-houses," the Station would like to emphasize that photographic coverage is only one of their functions... LIMITED is used as a radio dispatch base for automobile surveillance teams in addition to physical surveillance of persons entering the front gate. Their photography is negligible compared to their other duties. The LILYRIC base performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate, perhaps because the vantage point for taking the pictures is from the second floor and above the street traffic which partially blocks LIMITED photographs. LILYRIC also does individual reports on LIMERICK personnel entering and leaving the main gate...139/

In 1964 the Mexico City Station restated the operating procedures of the two bases in a dispatch referenced to the above paragraph from HMMA-14793:

The Station feels that it would be helpful to summarize at this time information previously reported to Headquarters (see paragraph 3, reference B) concerning the photo basehouses under this project and thereby give Headquarters an updated frame of reference in which to view the roles of the various basehouses.

The LIMITED and LILYRIC basehouses provide coverage of front of the LIMERICK installation. Although on the surface it may appear that these two basehouses provide duplicate take, this is not the case. It has been the Station's experience in running the unilateral LIEMPTY operation that a 0900 to evening workday, which would be required of a single basehouse in order to cover the LIMERICK target effectively, is just too long for any pair of agents to remain effective. This is especially true when it is considered that these basehouse operators are essentially unsupervised during their workday. It would also be impossible for a single base-house to provide the kind of coverage this station needs on the target installation, especially during the peak hours of activity, namely late morning and early afternoon. For these reasons, the LILYRIC basehouse generally operates from 0900 to 1400 or 1500 weekdays. LIMITED operates from 1200 to 1800 or dark (as the daily situation dictates) on weekdays, and 0900 to 1400 on Saturdays. (These hours are subject to change to fit Station needs.) Special coverage for Sunday is arranged on a need basis; however, past experience has shown regular coverage of Saturday afternoons and Sundays is not rewarding. This schedule provides for both basehouses to be in action

> during the peak activity hours of the LIMERICK target. Although even this arrangement is not completely airtight, anything less than this would present unacceptable gaps in the coverage. It must also be considered that without two basehouses covering the front of the target installation, any illness, personal problem or vacation for operators of one basehouse would terminate Station coverage...
>
> new ¶ It is the Station's opinion that as long as the LIMERICK installation is a prime target of the Station, it will be necessary to maintain the present three basehouses. To eliminate any one of the three would create a gap in the Station's coverage that would not be compatible with the emphasis placed on this target..140/ (emphasis added)

But the information in the preceding chart does not correlate with the statement of the coverage in HMMA-23343. The above chart, on pages 37-38, refers to the coverage of the Soviet compound by the base that the review of HMMA-23343 reveals covered the compound from 1200 to 1800 or dark. The chart shows that while 1200 to 1800 coverage is sometimes the case, the base's coverage of the Embassy, at least during the months of September and October, on days when the base operated at all, was not always in that time period. This is the base that the dispatch also states covered Saturday morning. Out of the nine Saturdays covered by the above chart, this base was in operation on only four of those days. This Committee has not been able to establish or disprove the possible inference that LILYRIC covered those days when there was no coverage from LIMITED because the production and logs from the LILYRIC base were not made available for review.400. That material was requested but has not been made available.141/ An explanation of why this material is missing was requested on 7/25/78.142/ The CIA's explanation stated that the photographs and logs "may have been destroyed in a purge of Mexico City Station files and that the folders for the destroyed material were reused to forward more recent photographic material to Headquarters for retention."143/ The folders which once contained the production were located at the National Archives' Warrenton Records Center but, according to the CIA's explanation, the folders contained production material from 1967.144/ Because the CIA has not provided the photographic production and logs from the LILYRIC for examination, no precise determination detailing the effectiveness of the coverage of the Soviet compound can be made.

Regardless of the scope and effectiveness of the two bases, a question that may never be resolved due to the conflicting evidence and missing production, the surveillance was considered adequate:

> Q: How thorough was the coverage?
>
> A: They covered the categories that we asked them for on a routine basis, which was to identify any people who appeared to be non-Latin and any Soviets.
>
> Q: I understand that was the purpose. Given that purpose, how thorough was the coverage?
>
> A: I think it was accurate.
>
> Q: Was Win Scott satisfied with the performance of the photo operation at the Soviet Embassy?
>
> A: To the best of my knowledge he was.145/

4. Procedure and Timing Involved in Processing Production from the Operation

The CIA photographic bases were manned by at least one agent who took photographs and kept a log sheet of people entering and leaving the Embassy and of the photographs that he took.146/ The film remained in the camera until the whole role was exposed, which often took two or three days.147/

After the assassination of John Kennedy, this procedure was changed and the film was cleared from the camera on a daily basis.148/

The CIA contract agent outside of the United States Embassy who was in charge of the photographic bases was Ramon-Joseph Alvarez Durant.149/ Alvarez picked up the film, prior to the assassination, from the photo bases three times a week.150/ Alvarez then took the film to his brother-in-law, who worked at night, to develop it. The brother-in-law also printed the film into eight-by-ten contact prints.151/ After the film was developed and printed, Alvarez turned over the negatives and contact prints to Thomas Keenan.152/

Ms. Ann Goodpasture picked up the photo production if Mr. Keenan was not available.153/ Mr. Keenan or Ms. Goodpasture, would then bring the photographic production back to the Mexico City Station in the American Embassy.154/ Mr. Keenan did not remember with certainty to whom he turned over the material, but believed it was either Ms. Goodpasture or Herbert Manell.155/

5. Responsibility for the Operation

There is some controversy as to who had overall responsibility for this project. Ms. Goodpasture testified that the responsibility was Mr. Keenan's.156/ Mr. Keenan, according to Ms. Goodpasture, made all the decisions and had all the responsibility involved in the operation.157/ Mr. Keenan was the most junior Operations Officer in the Mexico City Station in 1963, and claims that his role in the operation was largely limited to legwork.158/ Ms. Goodpasture testified that her role in the operation was limited to acting as an alternate Case Officer, internal routing of the production, and review of the photographs to insure the maintenance of technical quality in the operation.159/ Ann Goodpasture's annual Fitness Report for the period 1 January 1963 to 31 December 1963 specifies her duties in regard to this operation. The fitness report says,

> Working with [Keenan] (regular contact and case officer), supervises work of three photo bases operating against Soviet Embassy; processes take; identifies Soviets and intelligence function. Alternate contact with

Staff Agent.160/

Ms. Goodpasture denied that she had any supervisory role in relation to this operation.161/ The House Select Committee on Assassinations redeposed Ms. Goodpasture in November 1978 and asked her about this apparent inconsistency between her Fitness Report and her testimony:

Q: Now, having read your Fitness Report for 1963, are there any portions of your prior testimony that you wish to modify?

A: No, not really. Now, this LIEMPTY project, this is a case of where I cannot seem to make it clear how our functions were. Now, the case officer had responsibility for the operation of the project. He decided how much to pay the agents, what hours they worked, where the meetings were held. He hired them; he fired them and he knew the identities; he met with all of them.

He brought in the photographs, the product. He dumped it on my desk and he was finished with it. I took the product film and prints and the contact file and distributed those.

I could levy any requirements of him or other people in the Station which as he remembered it it might have been for supervision, but when he was out of town I met with one agent with his so-called cut-out...162/

Q: This (Fitness Report) is not accurate?

A: It is not precise the way the work was divided...163/

Q: Now, I don't uncerstand why, if you knew this descriptior was inaccurate, you left (sic) this documert go to Headquarters?

A: I think it was made on the basis of trying to get a promotion for me.164/

Alan White, who was Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico City in 1963, testified that Ann Goodpasture was "a Special Assistant" to the Chief of Station and that "her main responsibilities were to handle the surveillance operations."165/ Mr. White stated that this included both the photographic and electronic surveillance.166/ Mr. White remembered that Thomas Keenan "did help Annie with some of the pickup (of production)" but that his main responsibilities were with another operation.167/ Mr. White also testified that:

> (Ann Goodpasture) carried with her a lot of invisible authority that devolved upon her because of her operational relationship with the Chief of Station, who had absolute confidence in her. She had a marvelous memory. She was meticulous in detail. I think he had every reason to put that kind of trust in her.

> She reported directly to him. While she may not have been invested with any command authority by virtue of her position at the Station, certainly she was a kind of unofficial deputy for the purposes of the operations that she was involved in.168/

Ms. Goodpasture was asked about Mr. White's statements as well as similar statements by other people associated with the CIA's Mexican operations.169/

> Ms. Goodpasture: Well, I made more of those statements as those people saw it in their relationship with Mr. Scott's projects. They are true the way they saw it but I had no responsibility outside the projects that we worked on, but the liaison projects and the telephone tapping project touched every operation in the Mexico Station. I just didn't think I was as important as other people seemed to imply that I was.170/

Separate quotes
New ¶

Ms. Goodpasture also testified that her relationship with Mr. Scott could be termed special in that she was responsible for the day-to-day handling of the telephone tapping operation of which Mr. Scott was the case officer.171/

Mr. Keenan's recollection that he turned the photographic production over to Mr. Manell or Ms. Goodpasture was confirmed by Ms. Goodpasture.172/ Ms. Goodpasture also testified that the primary responsibility for the photographs after they were in the Station was that of Mr. Manell.173/ Ms. Goodpasture testified that she was responsible for routing the photographs and that the complete production went to the Manells before it was filed.174/ Copies of the important photographs were given to the Manells for them to retain for routine use in the course of their work.175/

The Manells' recollection of their role in this operation is very different from that of Ms. Goodpasture. Mrs. Manell testified that Ann Goodpasture held the photographic production very tightly.176/ Her recollection was confirmed by her husband.177/ The Manells stated that they did not routinely review or see all of the production from the Soviet Embassy photographic surveillance operation.178/ They claim they only saw the photographs that Ms. Goodpasture thought were important enough to bring to their attention.179/ According to the Manells, access to this file was tightly controlled by Ms. Goodpasture.180/

6. Coordination of Photographic and Electronic Surveillance Operations

The Mexico City Station employed an operating procedure whereby the functioning of the photographic base and the electronic intercept base could be coordinated. If the listening post monitor heard something that would lead him to believe that there was someone at one of the Embassies that should be photographed, he would alert the CIA technician in the listening post who would then alert Ann Goodpasture.181/ Ms. Goodpasture could then alert Thomas Keenan who would then notify the photographic base.182/ The reporting to Headquarters of information generated by the photographic surveillance operation and the electronic operation was also coordinated.183/ The Station was able to go back to the photographic chronological file to check for photographs of people that were picked up on the tap operation when the transcripts were reviewed.184/ It was a matter of routine to check the photographic production when reporting information developed from the tap operation that indicated a contact with an Embassy that was subject to photosurveillance.185/

> A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage ..sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced.186/

C. Electronic Surveillance of Telephones at the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds in 1963

1. Existence

The Soviet and Cuban compounds were, in 1963, the targets of a multiple line telephone intercept operation.187/ This operation was run in liaison with the highest officials of the Mexican Government.188/

2. Responsibility

a. General

Win Scott, the Chief of the Mexico City Station, was, nominally, the case officer for the telephone surveillance project.189/ Even though Mr. Scott was the nominal case officer, the "routine case officer functions" were performed by Ms. Ann Goodpasture.190/ An American technician was stationed in the listening post to maintain the equipment and to protect the Station's interests there.191/ Ms. Goodpasture's duties in this operation ranged from meeting with the technician/officer inside the base for the purposes of daily supervision of the operation to handling the collection and distribution of the tapes and transcripts.192/ Ms. Goodpasture worked in this capacity until 1968.193/ With the exception of the technician, the listening post and the transcription room of this base were staffed by Mexican Army officers.194/ This listening post covered up to thirty lines at one time.195/

b. Analysis and Reporting of Information Obtained

Mr. Herbert Manell was responsible for the analysis, processing, and daily review of the Soviet transcripts.196/ The transcripts were reviewed on a daily basis by Barbara Manell. Mrs. Manell would bring conversations of interest or importance to Mr. Manell's attention.197/

Mr. Manell was also responsible for reporting the information developed from the Soviet wiretaps. He indicated that the reports were usually written by himself or Barbara Manell.198/ These reports were usually in the form of cables or dispatches to CIA Headquarters.199/ The Manells also usually handled the notification of representatives of various other United States government organizations in Mexico City when the information warranted such notification.200/

David A. Phillips, a CIA officer who was stationed in Mexico City in 1963, testified that information from the taps would be reported if the information was important, if it was useful to another Agency component, or if it was something that should "go in the record."201/ Mr. Phillips said that only a small amount of the information developed from the taps would be formally reported to CIA Headquarters and that the information that was reported was generally something more important than the usual conversations that were routinely intercepted.202/

It should be noted, though, that an examination of the project files shows that Americans in contact with Communist diplomatic institutions were routinely reported to Headquarters for name traces and dissemination to the intelligence community.203/

3. Telephone Lines Covered

This Committee has made an attempt to determine which telephone lines at the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic compounds were subject to this electronic intercept operation in September and October of 1963. The monthly operational report of this project for the month of September lists the following phones as targets of the operation:204/

14-42-37	Cuban Embassy
14-92-14	Cuban Embassy
25-07-95	Cuban Embassy
14-13-26	Cuban Embassy
15-60-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-61-55	Soviet Embassy (Chancery)
15-69-87	Soviet Embassy (Military Attache)
15-61-07	Soviet Embassy (Commercial Office)
15-12-64	Soviet Embassy (Film Representative)

The report notes that lines 14-92-14 and 25-07-95 at the Cuban Embassy were disconnected on 23 September 1963.205/ The monthly report for October says that there has not been any change in the relevant lines covered since September.206/

A review of the transcripts produced by this operation revealed that the CIA has transcripts on file from the two-month period of interest to this Committee from three Cuban lines: 14-42-37, 14-13-26, and 25-09-14.207/ It is noted that the last telephone line was not listed in the monthly reports.208/ A review of the Soviet transcripts revealed that the five lines listed in the monthly reports were tapped on 27, 28 and 30 September.209/ Only two of the lines, 15-61-55 and 15-60-55 , were covered on Sunday, 29 September.210/

The House Select Committee on Assassinations has found some indications in testimony given before this Committee and CIA documents that more Cuban lines were tapped at that time.211/ This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty whether three lines (the number of lines on file in the transcripts), two lines (the number given by the contemporaneous monthly report), or five lines (the number given by some witnesses and documents) were subject to the intercept operation. It should be noted, though, that there were five lines tapped in the Cuban compound in 1964.212/ They were:

14-42-37	The Ambassador's private telephone
25-07-95	The Chancery
14-13-26	The Chancery
25-09-14	The Commercial Office
11-28-47	The Consulate

One CIA employee who was involved in Cuban operations in Mexico City remembered that there were taps on the telephone of the Cuban Consulate.213/ It is possible that the employee, Mr. Phillips, who was stationed in Mexico City from 1961 to 1966, was incorrect, after a fifteen-year hiatus, in placing this tap in 1963.214/ As the above notes, an examination of the project files fails to support Mr. Phillips' memory, although those files do show that the Consulate telephone was tapped in 1964.

4. Production from Operation

The intercept listening post operated from approximately 7:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m. every day.215/

Thirty recording machines that were impulse activated every time a tapped telephone was used taped the surveilled conversations.216/ In addition, the intercepted conversations were monitored by personnel in the listening post.217/

a. Types

The production from this listening post was broken down into three categories for the purposes of handling the tapes and transcripts: (1) intercepts of interest to the Mexican officials (these included such groups as the Movimento de Liberacion Nacional, individual Communists, the Mexican Directorate of Federal Security); (2) Cuban intercepts; and (3) Soviet and bloc country intercepts.218/

b. Handling Procedures

(1) Resuma

A summary of the conversations deemed of sufficient interest by the listening post monitors was prepared as they were monitored.219/ These summaries were called "resuma."220/ The resuma were given to

Ann Goodpasture by the technician early in the morning the day after they were prepared.221/ Ms. Goodpasture had the previous day's resuma on Win Scott's desk by 9:00 a.m. on the morning of the day after they were prepared.222/ Win Scott marked these resuma for action by his case officers before routing them through the Station.223/ This Committee has requested copies of these resuma from the CIA but they have not been made available for review.224/

The resuma covered all thirty lines that were covered by the intercept operation.225/ Only important conversations were included in the resuma.226/ The monitors made the decision as to which conversations were important.227/ After the resuma were prepared, the tapes from the lines of interest to the Mexicans were held for approximately ten days and were then reused.228/ The resuma were maintained in a chronological file at the listening post.229/

(2) Cuban Tapes

The Cuban tapes (tapes produced by taps on the Cuban telephones) were left on the machines until the reel was used up.230/ When the reels were full, they were removed and transcribed in the listening post.231/ The transcripts would be turned over to Ms. Goodpasture at the same time as the resuma.232/ The tapes produced by the Cuban taps were maintained in the listening post.233/ There was a special rack for those tapes inthe technician's workshop, which was situated on the floor above the room in which the listening post was located.234/ This rack had thirty slots in it. The tapes from each day's production went into a separate slot, with the oldest tapes going back into use in the monitor room; i.e., the tapes from the Cuban intercept were held for thirty days prior to reuse.235/ The tapes were not turned over to Ms. Goodpasture unless she requested a specific tape.236/

(3) Soviet Tapes

(a) General Handling

The Soviet tapes were removed daily from the machines.237/ The Spanish language portions of the tapes would then be transcribed in the listening post.238/ The transcripts and tapes from the Soviet lines were then routinely turned over to Ann Goodpasture along with the resuma and Cuban transcripts.239/ Ms. Goodpasture then turned the tapes over to Robert Zambernardi, who then delivered them to Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription of the Russian language portions of the tape.240/

(b) Retention and Reuse of Tapes

There is some question about how long the Soviet tapes were retained before reuse. There are indications that the tapes were routinely held for two weeks and then reused.241/ The technician who ran the listening post could not state with certainty what the practice regarding retention and reuse of the Soviet tapes was. He said that he did not hold the tapes at all once they were returned to him by Ms. Goodpasture.242/ He stated that he assumed that some of the tapes were retained by either the station or the Russian translator because his supply of tapes for the Russian taps kept dwindling.243/ The tapes were not retained by the translator.244/ It is possible that the tapes were held for two weeks in the station before they were erased and sent back to Arehart for reuse.245/ Robert Zambernardi remembers that Thomas Keenan spent a lot of time in the Station erasing tapes on a special machine for that purpose.246/ One of the main sources for the two-week period being ascribed to retention of the Soviet tapes is DIR-88680, which says:

> Upon receipt you may resume usual practice of keeping Cuban and Soviet tapes two weeks and then erasing.247/

This Committee has not found any evidence that would contradict the above-quoted statement in regard to the Soviet tapes.

There was a procedure whereby the tapes could be held for longer than two weeks if someone thought that the tape should be preserved as well as the transcript.248/ The interested officer could make a note on the transcript or he could notify Ann Goodpasture, orally or by note, that he wanted the tape preserved.249/ There were no written rules or regulations governing this procedure.250/

(c) English Language Conversations

There are some indications that English language conversations were transcribed at the listening post. The Tab F Draft says:

> Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location [other than the listening post] for translation and typing.251/

Goodpasture's notes say:

> Those transcripts which had Russian or another language besides Spanish or English went out of the listening post the day after the transcript (of ~~the~~ conversations on the reel) was typed. These reels were taken to another location where they were translated and typed.252/

But, in her testimony before the House Select Committee on Assassinations in executive session on 4/13/78, Ms. Goodpasture said:

> The transcribers, or the transcription that I picked up, the transcribers were working at the same place with the Spanish text. If the language were other than Spanish, it would have to be taken to another location to be transcribed. The material that was picked up the day after the date on which it occurred was in the Spanish language, normally.253/

It is clear that the reels of tape with conversations in the Russian language were delivered to Mr. Boris Tarasoff for translation and transcription.254/

Mr. Tarasoff has testified that he was also responsible for the transcription of the English language conversations although his wife, Anna Tarasoff, usually did the actual transcribing.255/ This testimony is confirmed by the testimony of Anna Tarasoff.256/ Arehart, the technician in the listening post, could not clearly remember whether or not any of his Mexican transcribers did the English language conversations.257/ He remembered that these tapes were usually sent to the Station.258/ He said that he did remember that monitors would often come to his workshop and ask him to come downstairs to listen to a conversation in English.259/

All of the conversations in the Spanish transcripts are in Spanish.260/ It appears that All of the conversations in Spanish were transcribed in Spanish.261/ It is doubtful that the listening post transcribers, who were Mexican nationals, would have translated an English conversation into Spanish and then transcribed it. In light of this, Tarasoff's recollection and Arehart's recollection, it is probable that all the English language conversations were sent to the

Tarasoffs for transcription.

(d) Handling by Tarasoffs

Along with the reels of tape that contained Russian language conversations (and probably English language conversations), Mr. Tarasoff received a copy of the Spanish transcripts.262/ When the Tarasoffs received the tapes, they transcribed only those conversations that were denoted on the Spanish transcript as being in Russian.263/

Mr. Tarasoff routinely received the tapes the day after they were made.264/ Mr. Tarasoff testified that he would then immediately transcribe the tapes and turn over the completed tapes and transcripts to his contact the next morning.265/

Mr. Tarasoff said that ~~the volume of work he had to do at any given time fluctuated, but~~ the transcripts were always finished in one day.266/ "Sometimes there was so little work in transcribing the Russian portion of the tape that I was just hanging around doing nothing."267/ Ann Goodpasture, at one time, put the time lag for completion of the

Russian transcription at approximately one week.268/ In her testimony before this Committee, Ms. Goodpasture stated that it generally took Mr. Tarasoff one or two days to complete the translations and transcriptions.269/

(e) Expedited Procedure for English Language Conversations or other Conversations of Special Interest

There was a procedure whereby Mr. Tarasoff's transcription could be expedited if there was a special interest in a particular conversation.270/ When the monitor in the listening post encountered something he considered important enough to require expedited transcription, it was possible for him to bring this quickly to the Station's attention.271/ Although Arnold Arehart was not the Tarasoffs' contact in September or October of 1963, he did serve as such at one time.272/ When he was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations, Mr. Arehart was asked whether there was a process whereby transcription of important conversations in English or Russian could be expedited.273/ He explained that there would not have been such a process for a Russian conversation, since the importance of the conversation could not be judged due to the fact that no one in the listening post could understand that language.274/ Arehart did say that there was such a procedure for English language conversations.275/ When one of the Mexican monitors encountered a conversation in English, he would ask Arehart to listen to that conversation.276/ After listening to the conversation, Arehart would decide whether or not it warranted special attention.277/ If he deemed that it was important enough, he would mark the tape "Urgent," put it in a box, and deliver it to Ms. Goodpasture.278/

Mr. Arehart's recollection was confirmed by an examination of the project files for this operation. One of the monthly project reports explains this procedure and its purpose:

> Headquarters (is) not well informed on the way the Mexico Station exploits operational leads from (this operation). The outside staff agent, Arnold Arehart has instructions to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations. This is done by a telephone call from outside the tap center at a pay phone to (Ann Goodpasture) inside the Station. Emergency meetings are arranged in double talk...(Goodpasture) meets Arehart within fifteen minutes at a pre-arranged downtown location and receives the reel with an extract of the pertinent conversation. The reel is then taken to the Station and given to the case officer responsible for the target the person was trying to contact. Headquarters is notified by cable of the action taken. Only in rare cases is information on a U.S. citizen passed without prior Headquarters approval.279/

If the tape was from a Soviet installation, the tape would have been delivered the same day to the Tarasoffs by Mr. Zambernardi.280/ Along with the tape, the Tarasoffs would receive a note indicating which conversation was to be transcribed on a priority basis. The Tarasoffs would then immediately transcribe that conversation and return it to their regular contact that same day.281/ It should be noted that the monthly report says that the Soviet transcripts would be delivered to the case officer responsible for the target installation.282/ In the case of the

Soviet target, that case officer would have been Mr. Herbert Manell.283/ Mr. Manell testified that he had nothing to do with transporting the transcripts to or from the Tarasoffs except in rare instances when no one else was available to do the job.284/ Mrs. Tarasoff testified that the "urgent" tapes were delivered and picked up by their regular contact.285/

(f) Handling in the Station

All of the transcripts were brought into the Station to Ms. Goodpasture.286/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the copies of the transcripts and retained one copy for her own file.287/ One copy of all of the Soviet transcripts was given to the ~~put on Barbara~~ Manell's desk by Ann Goodpasture the morning they were received.288/ Ms. Goodpasture routed the Cuban transcripts to either Robert Shaw or David Phillips.289/ One copy of all the transcripts eventually went into a chronological file.290/ One copy of the Soviet transcripts was cut and pasted onto separate sheets of paper and filed in appropriate subject or personality files.291/ The resuma were also maintained in a chronological file.292/ One copy of the Cuban transcripts was routinely sent to Headquarters on a weekly basis.293/

(g) Format of Transcripts

The format of the transcripts that Mr. Tarasoff produced was much the same as those of the Spanish language transcripts described above.294/ Mr. Tarasoff's transcripts were from Russian into English.295/ Many of Mr. Tarasoff's transcriptions bear the notation "(previously transcribed)"296/ after the meter number referring to the reel footage location of a conversation.297/ Mr. Tarasoff indicated that this notation meant that the conversation had already been transcribed from a tap on another embassy phone:

> "Previously transcribed" means, for instance, I went to the embassy first and the embassy number was 605055. Now this number 501264 belonged to the film's office. So consequently if that particular call went out of the main building to the films office and it had been transcribed before, that is exactly what I would do, put down "previously transcribed". So there was no question of doing it twice.298/

C. Voice Comparisons

In addition to his translation and transcription duties, Mr. Tarasoff as a matter of routine attempted to identify the voices of the participants in a conversation.299/ This eventually led to Mr. Tarasoff's collecting voice samples from tapes of Russian officials whose voices he had identified.300/ Mr. Tarasoff also made comments about the personality and dispositions of the participants in conversations that he transcribed. Generally, these comments, or "personality assessments" were made on separate pieces of paper and not on the transcripts themselves.301/

III. Information About Lee Harvey Oswald's Stay in Mexico that was Known by the CIA Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination of John Kennedy and the Sources of that Information

A. Information that was Available

In 1963 the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station surveilled both the Cuban and Soviet diplomatic compounds electronically and

188

photographically.302/
The Mexico City Station received daily transcriptions of the telephonic surveillance of the Embassies.303/
The Station received twice, or three times, a week the photographic coverage of the Embassies and Consulates.304/

I. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Soviet Consulate and Military Attache's Office.

From the electronic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy, the CIA Mexico City Station learned of the following conversations that were subsequently linked by Station personnel to Lee Harvey Oswald:

a. September 27, 1963, Friday

(1) At or about 10:30 a.m. an unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a visa to Odessa. He was referred to the Consulate. The man then asked for and was given directions to the Consulate office. The directions

were not noted by the transcriber. The entire conversation was transcribed in Spanish.305/

(2) At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul. He was told that the Consul was not in. The man outside stressed that it was necessary for him to get a visa to Odessa. He was told to call back at 11:30. This conversation was also transcribed in Spanish.306/

(3) At 1:25 an unidentified man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for the Consul. The man was told that the Consul was not in. The man outside asked, "when tomorrow?" The Soviet official told him that on Mondays and Fridays the Consul was in between four and five. This conversation was also in the Spanish transcriptions.307/

(4) At approximately 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Embassy. She told the person at the Embassy that an American citizen seeking a visa was at the Cuban Consulate. Silvia explained that the American citizen wanted to know the name

of the official he had dealt with at the Soviet Embassy. Silvia had sent the American to the Soviet Embassy, stating that his acquiring a Cuban visa was contingent on his previously acquiring a Soviet visa. Silvia explained to the Soviet official that the American had stated that he was assured that there would be no problem. At that point, the Soviet official put another official on the phone, causing Silvia to repeat the story. The official then asked Silvia to leave her name and number so he could call later. This conversation was also in Spanish.308/

(5) At 4:26 p.m. an unidentified Soviet official called Silvia Duran inquiring whether the American citizen had been to the Cuban consulate office. Silvia responded affirmatively, stating the American was at the office at that time. The Soviet official told Silvia that when the American visited the Soviet Consulate office he had displayed papers from the Soviet Consulate in Washington. He also had a letter stating that he was a member of an organization that favored Cuba. The American wanted to go to the U.S.S.R. with his Russian wife and remain there a

long time. The Soviet official had not received an answer from Washington to the American's problem. The problem traditionally took four to five months to resolve because Washington had to secure authorization from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet official added that the American's wife could get a visa in Washington very quickly and she could have it sent anywhere, but he felt that the American would not get a visa soon. Silvia said that the Cuban government could not give the American a visa because he had neither friends in Cuba nor authorization for a visa from the U.S.S.R. The Soviet official added that the Soviets could not give the American a letter of recommendation because they did not know him. This conversation was also in the Spanish transcripts.309/

b. September 28, 1963, Saturday

At 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. She said that there was an American citizen at the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. The Soviet asked Silvia to wait a minute. Upon his return to the telephone, Silvia put the American on the line. At first the American spoke in Russian and the Soviet spoke English. The conversation then proceeded in English until the Russian discontinued it and put another Soviet on the line. The Soviet spoke in English, but the American, speaking in broken Russian, asked him to speak Russian. The conversation resumed in Russian at that point. It also became incoherent and is thus quoted in its entirety:

Russian: What else do you want?

American: I was just now at your Embassy and they took my address.

Russian: I know that.

American: /speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian/ I did not know it then. I went to the Cuban Embassy to ask them for my address, because they have it.

Russian: Why don't you come again and leave your address with us; it is not far from the Cuban Embassy.

American: Well, I'll be there right away.310/

c. October 1, 1963, Tuesday

(1) At 10:31 a.m. an unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache and, in broken Russian, said that he had visited the Consulate the previous Saturday and had spoken to the Consul. The man wanted to know if the Soviets had received an answer from Washington. At that point, the Soviet official gave the man the Consulate phone number and asked him to call there. This conversation is in the English transcripts, indicating the man spoke in either Russian or English.311/

(2) At 10:45 a.m.312/ a man who, according to the translator's comment, had phoned a day or so before and had spoken in broken Russian, called the Consulate and spoke to an employee named Obyedkov. The man calling introduced himself as "Lee Oswald" and stated that he visited the Soviet Consulate the previous Saturday. He told Obyedkov that he spoke with the Consul on that day. Oswald added that the Consul had stated that they would send a telegram to Washington and he wanted to know if they

194

had received an answer. Oswald also said that he did not remember the name of the Consul with whom he had spoken. Obyedkov asked if it had been Kostikov and described him as "dark." The man outside replied affirmatively and repeated that his name was Oswald. Obyedkov asked Oswald to hold on a minute while he inquired. When Obyedkov resumed the conversation, he stated that the Soviet Consul had not yet received an answer but the request had been sent. Obyedkov then hung up the telephone as Oswald began another sentence with the words "and what." This conversation is in the English transcripts.313/

d. October 3, 1963, Thursday

An unidentified man called the Soviet Military Attache and spoke in broken Spanish and then in English. When the man inquired about a visa to Russia, he was given the Consulate phone number. The man then inquired if they issued visas at the Consulate. The Soviet stated that he was not certain but that the caller should call the Consul nonetheless.314/

2. Information Available to the Mexico City CIA Station from CIA Headquarters

On October 11, 1963, three days after the Mexico City Station made the initial report to Headquarters of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy, the Mexico City Station received some information about Lee Oswald from CIA Headquarters. Headquarters informed Mexico that the Lee Oswald who visited the Soviet Embassy may be identical to Lee Henry (sic) Oswald. 315/ Mexico City received this cable on 11 October 1963. 316/ This cable described Oswald as:

> born 18 Oct. 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar operator in United States Marines who defected to USSR in Oct. 1959. Oswald is five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue eyes. 317/

The cable reported Oswald's defection in 1959; his desire to return to the United States in 1962; his employment in Minsk; his marriage to a Russian citizen; the return of his passport; and the State Department's issuance of visas for Oswald and his family. 318/

3. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Electronic Surveillance Aimed at the Cuban Diplomatic Compound

An examination of the production from the electronic surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound's telephones failed to reveal any telephone conversation that directly mentioned Oswald or information that clearly and directly referred to him.319/

4. Information Available to the Mexico City Station from Photographic Surveillance of the Soviet and Cuban Diplomatic Compounds

An examination of the production from these operations failed to reveal a photograph of Oswald.320/ This Committee has not been able to rule out the possibility that a photograph of Oswald was obtained in Mexico City by these operations since the material made available for review was incomplete.321/ The possibility that such a photograph was obtained is discussed in Section III.A.6. below. The photograph that was mistakenly linked to Oswald by the Mexico City Station is discussed in Sections III.B.4.

5. Possibility that Additional Information from the Electronic Surveillance on the Soviet Compound was Available to the Mexico City Station

Ms. Anna Tarasoff assisted her husband, Boris, in the transcription of tapes from the Russian Embassy.322/ Ms. Tarasoff testified before this Committee on 12 April 1978.323/ She was shown the transcripts from the conversations that were intercepted on 10/1/63 at 10:31 a.m. and 10:45 a.m.; 9/28/63 at 11:51; and 10/3/63.324/ She recognized these transcripts as being her husband's work.325/ She testified that she could identify his work by the style of his writing or typing and the use of slash marks.326/

In addition to these transcripts, Ms. Tarasoff testified that she remembered one more conversation that involved Lee Oswald.

> According to my recollection, I myself, have made a transcript, an English transcript, of Lee Oswald talking to the Russian Consulate or whoever he was at that time, asking for financial aid.
>
> Now, that particular transcript does not appear here and whatever happened to it, I do not know, but it was a lengthy transcript and I personally did that transcript. It was a lengthy conversation between him and someone at the Russian Embassy.327/

Ms. Tarasoff testified that the transcript that she remembered was approximately 1 1/2 to two pages long.328/ She testified that the caller identified himself as Lee Oswald.329/ She was certain that the 10/1/63, 10:45 a.m. conversation was not the one that she recalled.

> N. This would not be the conversation that I would be recalling for the simple reason that this is my husband's work and at that time probably the name didn't mean much of anything. But this particular piece of work that I am talking about is something that came in and it was marked as urgent.330/

In the call that Ms. Tarasoff recalled, Oswald spoke only English.331/ Ms. Tarasoff testified that the 10/1/63, 10:45 conversation could not be the call she remembered because the transcript indicates that Oswald spoke in borken Russian as opposed to English; the transcript is shorter than the one she remembers; the transcript is in her husband's style as opposed to her own; and there is no mention of Oswald's finances in the transcript.332/

Ms. Tarasoff remembers the procedure for urgent tapes.333/ Her memory is confirmed in this narrow respect by the project files reviewed by House Select Committee on Assassinations staff members.334/ Ms. Tarasoff recalled that there would be a piece of paper enclosed with the reel which would indicate the footage number where the conversation occurred and ask for priority handling over the other conversations on the reel.335/ After the conversation was transcribed, the Tarasoffs would immediately notify their contact and then turn the transcript over to him on the same day that it had been delivered.336/

Ms. Tarasoff was questioned about the details of the conversation which she remembered. She stated that Oswald definitely identified himself and that he was seeking financial aid from the Russians.

> (H)e was persistent in asking for financial aid in order to leave the country. They were not about to give him any financial aid whatsoever. He had also mentioned that he tried the Cuban Embassy and they had also refused financial aid.337/

Mr. Boris Tarasoff also testified before this Committee on 12 April 1978. Mr. Tarasoff also recognized the four transcripts from September 28, 1963 and October 1st and 3rd as his work:338/ Mr. Tarasoff testified that he recognized the 10/1/63 conversation as his work because the name Lee Oswald was underlined.

> We got a request from the station to see if we can pick up the name of this person because sometimes we had a so-called "defector" from the United States that wanted to go to Russia and we had to keep an eye on them. Not I -- the Station. Consequently they were very hot about the whole thing. They said, "If you can get the name, rush it over immediately." Therefore, it is very seldom that I underlined the name because I put them in capitals. In this case I did because it was so important to them.339/

Mr. Tarasoff testified that he did not know how Oswald had come to the Station's attention prior to this conversation or what led to the request to get his name.340/ He speculated that it was possible that Oswald first came to the Station's attention through Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy.341/

Mr. Tarasoff did not confirm his wife's recollection of another conversation including Oswald.342/ He said that he did not remember any other calls involving Lee Oswald or any details of Oswald's conversations that were not reflected in the transcripts.343/

Although Ms. Tarasoff's memory was not confirmed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations review of the transcripts for the period while Oswald was in Mexico, there are several points of circumstantial corroboration for her story. There was a procedure by which tapes could be expedited in the manner in which Ms. Tarasoff recalls.344/ There are also indications that this procedure may have been used when Oswald's conversation was intercepted.345/ The first report that the Americans received regarding Silvia Duran made mention of the fact that Silvia claimed that she had told Oswald that the only aid they could give him was to refer him to the Soviet Consulate.346/

This statement in the original Mexican report given to the CIA in Mexico after the assassination would tend to add credence to Ms. Tarasoff's recollection that Oswald mentioned to the Soviets that he had also tried to elicit aid from the Cubans.347/ At least one other CIA official who was in Mexico also remembers that Oswald indicated in his discussions with the Soviet Embassy that he hoped to receive assistance with the expenses of his trip.348/

Daniel Stanley Watson, a retired CIA employee who was Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969, told the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff that he had seen a file on Oswald in Mexico City that contained only one or two intercept transcripts and surveillance photographs of Oswald.349/ Mr. Watson also told HSCA staff investigators that Win Scott had a private personal safe in which he maintained especially sensitive materials.350/ According to Mr. Watson, these materials were removed from the safe by James Angleton at the time of Scott's death.351/ This Committee requested access to any relevant materials from this safe on July 6, 1978.352/ Access was granted on October 6, 1978. Two statements by Mr. Scott contained in these materials lend circumstantial support for Ms. Tarasoff's testimony. In 1970 Mr. Scott wrote:

> During my thirteen years in Mexico, I had many experiences, some of which I can write in detail. One of these pertains to Lee Harvey Oswald and what I know (emphasis in original) of his activities from the moment he arrived in Mexico, his contacts by telephone and his visits to both the Soviet and Cuban Embassies and his requests for assistance from these two Embassies in trying to get to the Crimea with his wife and baby. During his conversations he cited a promise from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that they would notify their Embassy in Mexico of Oswald's plan to ask them for assistance.353/

In his unpublished manuscript, Scott refers to a conversation in which Oswald gave the Soviet Embassy "his name very slowly and carefully."354/ Although the transcripts available do not bear out Scott's recollections, there are interesting parallels with the testimony of Anna Tarasoff and David Phillips.355/

204

There are indications also that there was one other additional call that may have been available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. In the first statement by Silvia Duran provided to the CIA by the Mexican government, Silvia says that the Cuban Consul ~~called~~ spoke to the Soviet Consular official who dealt with Oswald.356/ This statement is also missing from most subsequent reports of Ms. Duran's statements, with the notable exception of the first CIA report to the Warren Commission.357/ Ms. Duran's early statement was confirmed by Eusebio Azcue.358/ This conversation was not discovered by a review of the transcripts from the intercept operation. It is possible that the call made by Azcue was to a phone at the Russian Consulate that was not subject to electronic surveillance. It is known that two of the phones at the Soviet Consulate were subject to surveillance.359/ This Committee has not determined how many telephones were in the Soviet Consulate in Mexico City.

While this Committee has not been able to find any direct corroboration of Anna Tarasoff's claim, the circumstantial corroboration is such that the possibility that there was an additional transcript concerning Oswald that was available to the Mexico City Station in late 1963 cannot be dismissed. In all likelihood, the Azcue call to the Soviet Consulate concerning Oswald was probably made on telephones not subject to CIA surveillance and, hence, would not have been available to the CIA's Mexico City Station.

6. Possibility that the CIA Photosurveillance Obtained a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald

This Committee cannot state with certainty that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was not obtained by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City because of three reasons: (a) the photographs from LILYRIC, the "alternate" photographic base which covered the Soviet Embassy main gate, and the photographs from the pulse camera, which covered the Cuban Consulate entrance, with the exception of a

206

few samples were not made available for review by the CIA; (b) testimony from knowledgeable people that it would have been unlikely that the photosurveillance would have missed someone whom it had at least five chances of recording;361/ and (c) reports that such a photo did, in fact, exist.362/

a. Missing Materials

The documentation and elaboration of the first reason can be found in Sections II.A. and B. preceding. Simply put, this Committee has not seen all of the photographs produced by the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City.363/ Hence, it cannot conclude that a photograph of Oswald does not exist among those photographs it has not seen.

b. Likelihood that the Photosurveillance Operation would have Missed Oswald

CIA officers who were in Mexico in 1963 and their Headquarters counterparts generally agreed that it would have been unlikely for the photosurveillance operations to have missed ten opportunities to have photographed Oswald.364/ The transcripts of conversations about or involving Oswald intercepted at the Soviet Embassy reveal that a man later identified as Oswald was at the Cuban Consulate at least three times on Friday and Saturday, September 27 and 28. They also reveal that he was at the Soviet Embassy at least twice on those same days.365/ The CIA technician who serviced the Cuban photographic installations said that it was possible that the operation missed Oswald if: (1) Oswald's visits were after dark; (2) Oswald's visits were on Saturday afternoons or Sundays; (3) the case officer had given the photographic basehouse agents the days off that Oswald visited; (4) the pulse camera was not working.366/ It is known that Oswald's visits were on a weekday during daylight hours and a Saturday morning.367/ This Committee has not been able to determine with certainty, because of the missing production, whether all of the basehouses were operating on the days of Oswald's visits.368/ This Committee believes that the pulse camera was in operation on at least one of the days that Oswald visited (Friday, September 27, 1963) the Cuban

Consulate and that the LILYRIC base covering the Soviet gate should have been operating at the time of Oswald's visits to the Soviet Consulates on September 27th and 28th.369/

c. Reports of Existence of a Photograph

(1) Phillip Agee Allegation

On 6 January 1978, Phillip Agee telephonically contacted two House Select Committee on Assassinations staff investigators at their office in Washington, D.C. Mr. Agee informed the investigators that he "would give the true story on the photograph produced by the CIA which the CIA claimed was taken of Oswald in Mexico City in 1963."370/ Phillip Agee was interviewed by HSCA staff investigators on 11 and 12 January 1978.

Mr. Agee told the investigators that he had been assigned to the Mexico Branch of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA's Clandestine Services in September of 1966.371/ Mr. Agee was assigned to work on the Headquarters support for the Agency's operations in Mexico City that were aimed at the

Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, excluding Cuba.372/ At the time that he assumed this job, a woman named Elsie Scaleti was in charge of the operational support projects for Mexico.373/ Agee stated:

> ... [S]he ~~She~~ was the officer in Washington in charge of all of the paperwork and other administrative matters relating to the support in Washington to these operations which were underway in Mexico City.374/

Ms.Scaleti trained Mr. Agee for his new position. Mr. Agee characterized Ms. Scaleti as "the key figure in the Mexico Branch in Headquarters, because she had been there for so long."375/

After his transfer to the Mexico Branch, Mr. Agee heard a story about photographs of Oswald. Mr. Agee could not remember with certainty who it had been that told him the story, but thought that it may have been Ms. Scaleti.376/ Mr. Agee's recollection of the story he had heard was that on the day of the assassination Ms. Scaleti was working in the Mexico Branch in much the same position that she occupied in 1966.377/ When the news about Oswald's arrest reached Ms. Scaleti, she recalled seeing his name and a photograph taken by an observation post in Mexico

City.378/ Within an hour or two, Ms. Scaleti had located the photograph of Oswald visiting the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.379/ Mr. Agee went on to say:

> I don't know, don't recall in fact, how she had been able to reconcile or how they were able to reconcile in Mexico City the photograph with the name, unless someone had known the face. Because the problem with these observation posts is that you can get a lot of photographs from them, but to find out the exact identity of the people is not always an easy thing to do. And it may be that as they were listening to the telephones of the Soviet Embassy, and also the Cuban Embassy, that she remembered the name Oswald or Lee Harvey Oswald from the telephone tap, if in fact he had identified himself over the telephone, and tried to make an appointment with the consul or whoever. And then they were able somehow to reconcile the telephone conversation with the photograph that was taken from the observation post the same day or more or less whenever the appointment was made. On the other hand it may be that this photograph had not been identified until the time of the assassination but that she had heard or recalled perhaps either reading the transcript from the telephone tapping or getting a condensed report perhaps a weekly report or something of the take from the telephone tap that she remembered the name Lee Harvey Oswald and then went back into the files of all the photographs and looked through all the photographs until eventually she found a photograph that was similar to all the photographs of Oswald that immediately began to come over the television and the news services. So those details I don't remember

> exactly, but I do recall that it was considered a coup of some sort for her to act so fast in digging out the photograph and the information on Oswald's visit to Mexico City,380/ ....

Mr. Agee could not remember whether he had actually seen the photograph that Ms. Scaleti allegedly found.381/ When Mr. Agee was told that the photograph that the CIA produced from the Mexico photosurveillance operations did not look anything at all like Lee Harvey Oswald, Mr. Agee said that that was the first time he had ever heard that. He stated:

> ...I was led to believe all along that it in fact was Oswald's photograph....I had always been led to believe that that was considered a very significant achievement on the part of the Agency and Elsie in particular for having done that so fast. And so accurately. But now there seems to be some doubt. And it wasn't anything that was particularly secret around the Branch. It was just one of those shop-talk stories that persist over the years.382/

Mr. Agee speculated that the production from the photosurveillance was routinely sent to CIA Headquarters and that Ms. Scaleti would have had access to the file at Headquarters.383/

(2) Daniel Stanley Watson Allegation

On June 4, 1978, the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewed Mr. Daniel Stanley Watson in Mexico. Mr. Watson served as a CIA officer in Mexico City from approximately 1965 to 1969. Mr. Watson was the Chief of Covert Action (propaganda) from 1965 to 1967. He was the Deputy Chief of the Mexico City Station from 1967 to 1969.384/

Mr. Watson told the HSCA staff members that sometime between 1965 and 1967 he had had occasion to request Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Station personality file,385/ and that when ~~When~~ this file was delivered to him, it contained only one or two photographs and intercept transcripts.386/ Mr. Watson stated that the file was very thin and that the photo(s) was a 3/4 shot from behind -- "basically an ear and back shot."387/ Mr. Watson said that he did not think that there was anyone else in the photograph and he thought that it was a photograph of Oswald.388/

Mr. Watson said that he could not recall why he had requested to see Lee Oswald's file in 1965 or 1966.389/ Mr. Watson said that it was his understanding that the file was the complete Mexico City personality file on Oswald.390/ Mr. Watson said that he would be surprised if Oswald's Mexico City personality file was seven volumes long.391/ Mr. Watson was asked whether or not Winston Scott, the Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico, would have destroyed files or photographs.392/ Mr. Watson said that that would not surprise him.393/ At that point, Mr. Watson volunteered that Mr. Scott often kept highly sensitive information in a personal safe in his office. He said that this information would not have been filed or indexed in the usual manner.394/ Mr. Watson said that when Winston Scott retired he had taken the contents of this personal safe with him and stored them in a safe in his home. He added that ~~When~~ when Mr. Scott died, James Angleton flew to Mexico and removed the contents of this safe before Mr. Scott's funeral.395/ Mr. Watson said he did not know what had been in Mr. Scott's safe or what happened to the things that Mr. Angleton removed at the time of Scott's death. Mr. Watson said that his source for this allegation was Winston Scott's widow, Janet.396/ Mr. Watson stated that he thought the CIA Mexico City Station had given the Warren Commission all the material in its possession but, he added, he also knew that Winston Scott was capable of "phonying a photo if asked to produce one. I never believed Win Scott the first time he told me something."397/

(3) Joseph Burkholder Smith Allegation

Mr. Joseph Smith, a retired CIA officer, was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 19 October 1977. At this interview Mr. Smith mentioned that the Mexico City Station had been very proud of finding "the picture of Oswald."398/ He mentioned this in connection with a woman who worked for Winston Scott in Mexico.399/ Mr. Smith was reluctant to speak about this at the time and the topic was not pursued.400/

215

Mr. Smith was reinterviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 20 April 1978. Mr. Smith was shown the omnibus CIA release letter and fully cooperated in answering the staff investigator's questions at this interview.401/ At this time, Mr. Smith recalled hearing a story that someone, at the time of the assassination, had remembered seeing Lee Harvey Oswald's face somewhere in the photographic coverage of the Cuban or Russian Embassies.402/ This person went back through the files and found the picture.403/ Mr. Smith said that he does recall that the discovery of the picture had greatly pleased President Lyndon Johnson and that it had made Winston Scott his "number one boy."404/

Mr. Smith said that he could not recall when he had first heard this story about the photograph, but he said he was certain however, that he had heard the story more than once.405/ He said that the earliest that he could have possibly heard the story was in 1964 while he was stationed in Argentina.406/ He said that not long after the assassination he may have heard the story from someone "coming through"

216

Argentina.407/

> Des (Fitzgerald) might have even mentioned it when he came through, which was in early '64, or Gerry Droller might have mentioned it when he came through, talking about how the Mexico City Station was helping out during the investigation.408/

Mr. Smith stated that he did know Elsie Scaleti. He described her as a "very severe person and very diligent and very much the Counter-Intelligence mentality."409/ Mr. Smith stated that he also knew Ann Goodpasture. He said:

> Annie was another one of Win Scott's case officers. She was in Mexico City for about 14 years. Annie was what we called the "resource person." Annie knew everything.410/

Mr. Smith said that Win Scott also had another very knowledgeable woman who worked with Ann Goodpasture in the Mexico City Station whose name he recalled as Leach or Lynch.411/ Mr. Smith's recollection associated Ms. Leach (or Lynch) with the discovery of the photograph of Oswald, but Mr. Smith was not at all sure of this recollection.412/ When asked if he had any recollection of Ms. Scaleti finding the photograph, he said:

217

> It could very well have been, and Annie, too. But I thought it was this other girl, Lynch. But no, I don't think I ever heard specifically who found the damn picture. I guess...I didn't care.413/

(4) Joseph Piccolo, Jr. Allegation

Mr. Joseph Piccolo, Jr. was interviewed by the House Select Committee on Assassinations on 11 August 1978. Mr. Piccolo is an operations officer in the CIA. He was stationed in Mexico City from December 1957 to January 1960 and again from August 1965 to January 1968. Mr. Piccolo was involved in anti-Cuban operations from 1962 to 1968.414/

During this interview, Mr. Piccolo told the HSCA that sometime after the assassination of John Kennedy he had seen photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald.415/ Mr. Piccolo said that he had been shown these photographs by an individual who told him that they were photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald that were obtained from the CIA's Mexico City surveillance of the Cuban diplomatic compound.416/ Mr. Piccolo could not remember the identity of the person who showed him the photographs, nor when nor where he saw the photographs.417/

Mr. Piccolo stated that the The first picture shown was a three-quarter full shot of Oswald, exposing a left profile as Oswald looked downward, and that the ~~The~~ second photograph which ~~Mr~~. he ~~Piccolo~~ remembered seeing was a back of the head view of Oswald.418/ Mr. Piccolo remembered that both of these photographs were taken from above Oswald and to his left.419/ Mr. Piccolo was shown a copy of Warren Commission Exhibit #237, the famous Mexico Mystery Man photograph. He stated that this was definitely not the man in the photographs exhibited to him.420/ Mr. Piccolo correctly identified an unlabeled frontal photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald shown to him by the HSCA.421/

Mr. Piccolo was also asked whether he knew anything about the circumstances surrounding the Agency's initial discovery of the photographs he claims to have seen. He stated that he did not have any first-hand knowledge of their discovery, but that it was the type of thing, "a coup," that would have traveled through the Agency "grapevine."422/

Mr. Piccolo stated that he had heard stories about a surveillance photograph of Oswald being found both in Mexico City and at CIA Headquarters in Langley.423/ He stated that Ann Goodpasture may have been the person who found a photograph of Oswald in Mexico City.424/ Mr. Piccolo said that he has heard several times that Elsie Scaleti found a photograph of Oswald.425/ He recalled that ~~The~~ last time ~~that~~ he heard this story was two weeks prior to his interview by the House Select Committee on Assassinations.426/

Mr. Piccolo stated that he currently shares an office at CIA Headquarters with a man who worked on the Oswald case during a recent CIA "in-house" investigation.427/ Mr. Piccolo said that they were discussing Oswald's case because of the House Select Committee on Assassinations' release of several unidentified photographs. Mr. Piccolo stated that during the course of this discussion his office-mate, Mr. Dan Niescuir, stated that Elsie Scaleti, "the gal at the Mexico desk," had found the surveillance photographs of Oswald.428/ Mr. Piccolo stated that he assumed Mr. Niescuir had become aware of Ms. Scaleti's coup through his research into the Oswald case.429/ Mr. Piccolo was not certain as to when he first heard the story that Ms. Scaleti had found the photograph, but he was certain that he had heard it prior to hearing it from Mr. Niescuir.430/

Mr. Piccolo speculated that the Mexico City Station may have routinely sent photographs of unidentified Americans who visited Communist Embassies to Headquarters for possible identification.431/

Mr. Piccolo also told the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewers that he was aware, when he was in Mexico, that Win Scott had a personal safe in his office. He said that "restricted materials" were held in Mr. Scott's safe. "Restricted materials" ~~were~~ he defined as very sensitive materials that did not find their way into the routine files and indexes.432/

(5) Statements of Dan Niescuir

Mr. Neiscuir stated that he had never been involved in any of the CIA's "in-house" investigations of the Kennedy assassination or Oswald.433/ He did state, though, that he had once worked on an

221

"Oswald Task Force."434/ He said that this occurred in late September or October of 1975, when ~~At that time,~~ there were two or three FOIA suits pending ~~brought~~ against the Agency concerning the Agency's files on Oswald.435/ He recalled that these ~~These~~ files had to be processed and the task was delegated to the Counter-Intelligence Staff and he was assigned to the task force.436/ Mr. Niescuir stated that he was also one of the primary contacts with two investigators from the Senate Select Committee who were looking into the Agency's files on Oswald at approximately the same time.437/ He stated that the ~~The~~ task force that he was part of conducted no research and analysis of which he was aware.438/ Mr. Neiscuir stated that the only photograph he remembers seeing is the Mexico Mystery Man photo.439/ He said that he did not recognize the name "Elsie Scaleti."440/ He stated that he did not recall ever being told that there was a photo of Oswald from the Mexico City surveillance operations.441/ He denied ever telling anyone that such a photo was found.442/ He did admit, however, to discussing the assassination with Joseph Piccolo.443/

d. HSCA Investigation of the ~~p~~P ossibility that the Mexico City Photosurveillance Operation Produced a Photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald

(1) Introduction

This Committee has conducted a general investigation into the CIA's photographic surveillance operations in Mexico City in 1963 ~~as well as a~~ in addition to the specific investigation into the allegations mentioned above. 444/

In an attempt to determine whether the CIA's Mexico City photographic bases did, in fact, photograph Oswald, this Committee requested the CIA to make available to the HSCA the production of these bases. 445/ The CIA has in part responded to this request. 446/ However, the production from LILYRIC, the second base that covered the Soviet Embassy entrance, and the pulse camera that covered the Cuban Consulate entrance, has not been made available for review. 447/ The Agency's withholding of certain production materials from the photographic bases has prevented the Committee from determining whether a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was taken by these photosurveillance operations.

Also in the course of its general investigation into the CIA's surveillance operations in Mexico City and Oswald's visit to that city, the Committee has interviewed many CIA officers who were stationed in Mexico City, or worked in 1963 at CIA Headquarters in support of Mexican operations. They uniformly testified that the Station had not obtained a photograph of Oswald from the photosurveillance operations in Mexico City. 448/

(2) Investigation of the Allegations

Ms. Elsie Scaleti worked on the Mexico Desk in 1963. 449/ Ms. Scaleti could not recall her particular responsibilities while she was assigned to the Mexico Desk. 450/ She told the HSCA that she would have been doing routine case officer work which would have involved name traces, projects, budgets, et cetera. 451/ She could not recall any specific projects that she worked on and she stated that the case officers on the desk would not have had specific titles such as "Chief of Support Operations." 452/ She stated that the work of the Desk was assigned to the case officers by project and that work that was levied that was not part of an assigned project would have been done by anyone on the desk who happened to be available. 453/

One of Ms. Scaleti's supervisors, Mr. John

Scelso, Chief of the Mexico Branch in 1963, remembers that:

> (Elsie Scaleti)...was the, sort of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects. 454/

Ms. Scaleti was in the position that Mr. Agee said she was in 1963. 455/

A major part of the allegations is dependent upon whether or not the CIA Mexico Station sent the photoproduction to Headquartres. HSCA review of CIA files has revealed no evidence that the photoproduction was routinely sent to Headquarters in 1963. 456/

HMMA-22307 detailed the installation of a pulse camera to cover the Cuban Consulate on September 27, 1963. 457/ The dispatch states that the results of the testing would be sent to Headquarters as soon as they were available. 458/ ~~This~~ The Committee did not find any indication that photographs from this camera were sent to Headquarters prior to 6/19/64, when Headquarters was notified that some production was being sent by unaccountable transmittal manifest, 459/ with the exception of HMMA-22433, 11/7/63 which sent samples of the photographic production from the camera. 460/ These six samples when reviewed by the HSCA did not include a photograph of Oswald. 461/

Ms. Scaletti was asked about the allegations, however, her memory of 22 November 1963 is not good:.

Q: When was the next time after you sent a cable to Mexico City Station and you teletyped thoese other agencies, when was the next time you heard of Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: I don't remember. The only thing I can say is that based on what is in the file that I must have heard about it when the Station came in and asked--well, if there was nothing else in the file the name popped up again, I just don't remember about the assassination or whenever.

Q: Would the testimony be that to the best of your recollection the next time you heard the name was when you heard about the assassination?

A: Probably.

Q: At that time did the name Oswald ring a bell? Did you remember the earlier cable traffic about him?

A: I just don't know. When he was assassinated, I don't even remember how long it was before they got the name of Oswald.

Q: Oswald was picked up within two hours after the assassination and the name was made public.

A: Immediately?

Q: Yes.

A: If I were in the office, unless I had the radio on--we didn't have a radio in the office necessarily--I would not have heard the name Oswald until the next day probably. I would assume this was a little bit unusual, I might have tied it in. I am sure the first thing they would have done is make a name trace when they came up with that name and they would come up with a 201 file all over again.

Q: Do you recall where you were on Friday, November 22, 1963?

A: The only thing I remember about it is going home and finding my husband sitting in front of the TV and talking about it. I probably was at the office but I don't remember anything. I blanked out. I must have been at the office.

Q: Do you remember bringing John Scelso the Oswald file on that day?

A: I wouldn't remember that. If he had asked for it I probably did. It would have been natural for me to if I did. I just don't know.

Q: Did you ever find a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald at CIA Headquarters?

A: I don't remember ever finding an Oswald photograph.

Q: Right around the time of the assassination?

A: I don't remember it.

Q: Did you find a photograph of someone whom you thought to be Lee Harvey Oswald?

A: I don't remember that either.

Q: Do you know Philip Agee?

A: Yes.

227

Q: Did you ever tell Joe Smith or Phillip Agee that you had found a photograph of Oswald or someone you thought to be Oswald?

A: I ~~did not know~~ only knew Joseph Smith in Mexico City. I had never seen Joe except at the station in Mexico City and Phil I ~~only~~ saw when I was in Mexico, and worked with him at Headquarters. I would have no reason to say that.

Q: So your answer to the question is no?

A: I don't recall it and I don't see that I would have any reason.

Q: I guess for the purpose of clarification I would like to ask the question one more time. Did you ever tell Phillip Agee or Joseph Smith that you found a picture of Oswald or someone whom you ~~thgout~~ thought to be Oswald?

A: Not that I can recall. 462/

At the time of the assassination the CIA's 201 personality file on Lee Harvey Oswald was in the possession of the Mexico City Desk. 463/ That desk had had possession of the file from 10 October 1963 when it had received a report that a man claiming to be Lee Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. 464/

Fortunately, Ms. Scaleti's supervisor had a better memory of the events that transpired at CIA Headquarters on the day that President Kennedy was assassinated. He said:

A: ...I do not know how long after the actual shooting it was that Oswald's name became

228

known, perhaps an hour, hour and a half. Within minutes after that, they were out with the cables in their hands.

Q: Within minutes of the name Oswald being on the radio, an officer came in with Oswald cables?

A: Yes.

Q: Who was that officer?

A: I believe it was Mrs. (Elsie Scaleti) who was the, sort of the Major Domo of the Branch. She managed all the records, handled all of the cables from Mexico that dealt with security suspects, or asked for traces on security suspects.

Q: Did you ask her how she was able to obtain the Oswald cables so quickly?

A: No, I know where she would have gotten them. We have copies of them right in our Branch.

Q: At that time, did she also have a photograph of Oswald?

A: No, I do not think so.

Q: Do you know whether (Elsie Scaleti) ever discovered a photograph of Oswald at CIA Headquarters?

A: I do not think so...I do not remember any photograph of Oswald at that time, the day of the assassination, or even later. I do remember our asking -- we had to ask ONI for a photo, and so on. As far as I recall, they never sent us one. It could be that later on she found one, but I don't recall.[465]

The chief of the Mexico Branch quoted above was alsc responsible for the initial CIA investigation into the assassination of John Kennedy.466/

Mr. Scelso also testified that, at the time of the assassination, the name of Lee HarveyOswald did not ring a bell with him because "~~T~~[t]housands of names were crossing my desk every month."467/ He was asked why Ms. Scaleti, who came across as many names as he did, ~~would have~~ remembered Oswald ~~when~~ whereas he had not. He replied:

> She was concerned only with Mexico and I had five or six other countries to work with as well. She has a fantastic memory. . . (Elsie Scaleti) in her job as the manager of records, traces and files, in this Mexico desk, was an outstanding officer to whom I gave, in one of her fitness reports, the highest evaluation, outstanding, number 6 and so on, that can be given, that was very rarely given at that time. Her work was pretty near flawless and she also was an outstanding trainer of new employees.468/

new paragraph separated by . . . from first paragraph

Material removed from Win Scott's safe now in possession of the CIA provides critically important circumstantial evidence that the CIA photo-surveillance operations obtained photographs of Oswald:

> "(Oswald's) visits and conversations are not hearsay; for persons watching these embassies photographed Oswald as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit." 469/

This Committee believes that a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald was probably obtained by CIA photosurveillance in

230

Mexico. There are allegations that such a photo was found; there is testimony that such a photo should have been obtained. These and other factors -- the CIA's withholding of materials, Ms. Scaleti's strange lapse of memory regarding the events of 11/22/63, and Mr. Scott's manuscript ~~these things, in the Committee's view,~~ --would tend to indicate that a photo of Lee Harvey Oswald was obtained. On the other hand, the consistent testimony that a photo was not obtained in Mexico, the absence of any record of transmittal of the photo to Headquarters (the weight of this consideration is mitigated by the fact that there were methods of communication available that were not incorporated into the CIA's record keeping systems.), and the testimony of Ms. Scaleti and Mr. Scelso that a photo was not discovered would tend to indicate that, in fact, the allegations that Ms. Scaleti found a photo of LHO are false.

III. B. Information Connected to Lee Harvey Oswald by the Mexico City Station Prior to the Assassination.

1. Introduction

This study has demonstrated that the information from the Soviet Embassy taps and from Headquarters was available to the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. In addition to the Agency acknowledged information, there is a distinct possibility that

231

the Station had available to it one additional telephonic intercept transcript, and one or more surveillance photographs.

This Committee has made an attempt to determine when the available information was linked to Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee has also made an attempt to determine whether all the intercepted telephone calls were in fact connected with Oswald or involved Oswald. It should be pointed out, however, that this analysis can only be directed at that information now known to have been available to the Mexico City Station. This information will be discussed briefly in the following section. In addition, the question of whether Oswald or an Oswald imposter visited the Embassies and made the phone calls, along with the possibility that Oswald was not alone in Mexico City, will be dealt with in greater detail in the final section of this report.

2. Information Available from the Soviet Wiretaps that was Connected with or involved Lee Harvey Oswald.

The Mexico City Station possessed nine intercepted telephone conversations that may have dealt with Oswald. The conversations are summarized below for easy reference.470/ In the following discussion the conversations will be referred to by date and time of ~~occurance~~ occurrence.

DATE	TIME	SUMMARY
9/27/63	10:30 AM	Man calls Soviet Military Attache regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish.)
9/27/63	10:37 AM	Man calls Soviet Consulate regarding a visa for Odessa. (Spanish)
9/27/63	1:25 PM	Man calls the Soviet Consulate and asks for the Consul. (Spanish)
9/27/63	4:05PM	Silvia Duran calls the Soviet Consulate. (Spanish)
9/27/63	4:26PM	Soviet Consulate calls Duran (Spanish)
9/28/63	11:51AM	Duran calls Soviet Consulate and puts a man on the phone. (Spanish Russian and English.)
10/1/63	10:31AM	Man calls Soviet Military Attache. (Russian)
10/1/63	10:45 AM	Man calls Soviet Consulate identifying himself as Lee Oswald. (Russian and English)
10/3/63	?	Man calls the Soviet Military Attache. (Spanish and English.)

After the assassination the CIA's Mexico City Station passed copies of seven of the above listed conversations to the U. S. Embassy Legal Attache.471/ The 9/27/ 10:30 and the 9/27 1:25 calls listed above are not included in this dissemination.472/ The cover memorandum states:

> Attached are photostatic copies of transcripts of all conversations from technical operations of this office which are possibly pertinent in this case.473/

The HSCA has not been able to determine why the 9/27 10:30 and 9/27 1:25 calls were not included in this memorandum. While the 1:25 call could be considered unrelated, it is unlikely that the same would apply to the 10:30 call since the 9/27 10:37 call is included in the memorandum.

At the bottom of each attachment page to the Scott memorandum, a summary of the conversation is provided.474/ The Station questioned the relevancy of only one of the seven calls presented in the mrmorandum. The summary of the 10/3 call says:

> By the context of other conversations by Oswald and the fact that this called (sic) spoke in broken Spanish and English rather than Russian which he used previously, it is probable that this caller is not Oswald.475/

(Ibid., p.9.)

A judgement that this call did not pertain to Lee Harvey Oswald could be based on the following facts:

1) the caller spoke broken Spanish; 2) the caller did not have the number of the Consulate; 3) the caller did not know that visas were issued at the Consulate; and 4) the caller states that he is seeking a visa, not that he is checking on an application already made. The majority of the evidence indicates that Lee Harvey Oswald could not speak Spanish.476/

In light of Delgado's assertions, it is possible that Oswald had at least a limited knowledge of Spanish. It should be noted that the 10/3 transcript listed above indicates that the caller spoke initially in broken Spanish.477/ The fact that this conversation was in Spanish, should not by itself rule out the possibility that Oswald made the phone call. This is especially true in light of Delgado's allegations and the 9/27 10:30, 9/27 10:37 and 9/27 1:25 calls which were also in Spanish.478/

The record reflects that Oswald had the phone numbers of both the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache in his notebook.479/ It can not be determined when Oswald entered the numbers in the notebook. Since Oswald had previously called the Consulate it is likely that he had the number prior to 3 October. It is also clear that Oswald knew that the Consulate was responsible for issuing visas due to his prior dealings with the Soviet and Cuban Consulates. Thus, it is probable that the 10/3 conversation did not pertain to Oswald.

The 10/1 10:45 call is clearly relevant because the caller identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" The 10/1 10:31 conversation is probably relevant due to the similarity with the 10/1 10:45 call and the marginal notations about the quality of the Russian spoken by the caller, The 9/28 11:51 call is clearly relevant, again due to the marginal notations and the involvement of Silvia Duran. Duran's calls on 9/27 clearly related to Oswald due to the substantive information discussed in those calls.

In summary, the above listed calls contain the substance of the information available to the CIA MCS prior to the assassination from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. The first three calls on 9/27/63 and the one on 10/3/63, if they were indeed Oswald, add little of substance to the information that was available from the other calls.

3. When were the Intercepted Conversations Linked to Lee Harvey Oswald.

HSCA staff researchers reviewed the transcripts from the liaison wiretaps on the Soviet Embassy. The chronological production from this operation is on microfilm at CIA Headquarters.480/ In addition to the choronological file, numerous copies of the transcripts that pertain to Oswald were found throughout the CIA's files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

It is obvious that the Mexico City Station linked the

10/1 10:45 call to Lee Harvey Oswald because Oswald identified himself in the call and the Mexico City Station reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy to Headquarters on 10/8/63.481/ On this transcript the translator added the notation:

> ... the ~~T~~he same person who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian.482/

The transcript from the 9/28 11:51 call also bears marginal notations from the translator. "MO (man outside) takes the phone and says in broken Russian ... speaks terrible, hardly recognizable Russian."484/ The first copy of this transcript in Oswald's Mexico City "P" file485/ also bears routing indications that show that the transcript was sent to Win Scott, Ann Goodpasture and Robert Shaw.486/ These routing indications were made by Barbara Manell.487/ Mrs. Manell testified that these routing indications would have been made when she first saw the transcript.488/ Mrs. Manell also wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in the "Soviet Contacts" file at the same time.489/ The 9/27 4:05 transcript also bears Mx..Manell's routing and file instructions490/

The 9/27 4:26 transcript also bears Ms. Manell's routing and filing instructions.491/ In addition, this transcript also bears a notation from Win Scot which says "Is it possible to identify?"492/ Herbert Manell wrote an instruction on this transcript to file it in Oswald's "P" file.493/

The above four conversations which occurred on 9/27 and 9/28 contain almost all of the substantive information that was available to the Mexico City station on Oswald from the Soviet electronic intercept operation. These conversations were not linked to Oswald prior to 8 October 1963 when MEXI 6453 was sent to Headquarters reporting Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy on 1 October, 1963.494/

The conversations discussed above were linked to Lee Harvey Oswald by 16 October 1963, the date that the Mexico City tation opened it's "P" file on Oswald.495/ The process by which, and the events leading up to, the linkage of Oswald to the intercepted calls will be discussed in the following section on the Mexico City Station's actions regarding the Oswald case prior to the assassination.

4. The Photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man.

A photograph of an unidentified individual who visited the Soviet Embassy was incorrectly linked to Oswald prior to the assassination.496/ The manner in which this mistake was made and the consequences of that mistake will be discussed in the following sections on the Mexico City Station's actions prior and subsequent to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Reconstruction of the CIA Mexico City Station and Headquarters Actions Prior to the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

A. Introduction--CIA Interest in and Liaison with FBI Regarding American Citizens in Contact with Soviet Bloc Embassies in Mexico City.

The Central Intelligence Agency has claimed that no investigation of Oswald was made in Mexico prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. For this reason, the Agency claimed, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy was not discovered until after the assassination:

> It was not until 22 November 1963, when the Station initiated a review of all transcripts of telephone calls to the Soviet Embassy that the Station learned that Oswald's call to the Soviet Embassy on 1 October 1963 was in connection with his request for a visa to the USSR. Because he wanted to travel to the USSR by way of Cuba, Oswald had also visited the Cuban Embassy in an attempt to obtain a visa allowing him to transit Cuba.
>
> Inasmuch as Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA and because the Agency had not received an official request from those agencies having investigative responsibility requesting the Agency to obtain further information, the Station did nothing other than ask Headquarters on 5 October for a photograph of Oswald. 497/

Neither of the above assertions is accurate. An analysis of the information available will show that the first assertion of the above quote, that the Station did not learn of Oswald's contact with the Cuban Consulate and the fact that he was seeking a visa until after the assassination is incorrect. 498/

CIA's IG Report inaccurately implies that no action would have been taken by the Mexico City Station with respect to an American in contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico other than merely reporting the contact unless the Station had received a specific request from an interested U.S. government agency. The IGR's implication is inaccurate because, as will become apparent in the following discussion, the CIA had an understanding with the FBI regarding this class of cases and often did more that just report without any specific interest being expressed by any other agency of the United States government. 499/ In fact, the station often monitored and mounted operations against Americans in contact with Bloc Embassies. 500/ At a minimum they attempted to collect as much information as possible on Americans in contact with the Embassies. This was routine, it was also the case with Lee Harvey Oswald.

B. Narrative of Mexico City Station Actions Prior to The Assassination

On 27 September 1963 Silvia Duran contacted the Soviet Consulate on behalf of Lee Harvey Oswald. 501/

Later that same day, the Soviet Consulate returned Ms. Duran's call. 502/ Under normal procedures, these transcripts would have been in the CIA Station by the first of October and Ms. Goodpasture brought these transcripts into the Station on that morning and put them on Ms. Manell's desk. 503/ Ms. Manell recognized the transcripts as containing information of a possible counterespionage or counter-intelligence interest and routed them to Mr. Shaw, Ms. Goodpasture and Win Scott (in reverse order.) 504/ Mr. Scott wrote, at the top of the 9/27/4:26 call, "Is it possible to identify?" 505/ This was the first interest in Oswald recorded by the Mexico Station even though the caller was as yet unidentified. It indicates a routine interest in an American who is in contact with the Soviet Embassy. After the transcripts were routed they were filed in a general subject file. 506/

The 9/28/ call was probably received at the CIA Station on Monday, 30 September 1963. The routing and filing instructions indicate that it was handled in much the same way as the 9/27 conversations. [Cite?]

On 1 October 1963 a conversation in which an English speaking person identified himself to the Soviet

Consulate as Lee Oswald came to the attention of a monitor in the electronic surveillance base-house. 507/ The monitor immediately notified the American technician who then listened to the tape. 508/ The technician had instructions "to alert the Station immediately if a U.S. citizen or English speaking person tries to contact any of the target installations" 509/ The technician called Ann Goodpasture and a meeting was arranged. 510/ The technician marked the tape "Urgent," specifying where the conversation occurred on the reel, put it in a box, and delivered it to Ms. Goodpasture within fifteen minutes of the telephone call to Ms. Goodpasture. 511/ The tape was delivered to Boris Tarasoff who transcribed it and returned it to the Station on that same day. 512/

As soon as the Station learned that an American had contacted the Soviet Embassy (Ms. Goodpasture began to screen the photographs from the Soviet surveillance operations. 513/ The photographs from the coverage of the Soviet Embassy, however, were not delivered as prompty as the transcripts. The photographs from October 1, 1963, were not removed from the camera until 3 or 4 October. 514/ Hence, they would not have been received until 4 (Friday) or 7 (Monday) October by the Station. 515/

242

A cable reporting Lee Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy was written and sent to Headquarters by Ms. Manell on 10/8/63. Various reasons have been advanced to explain the seven day delay in sending this cable. David Phillips explained the delay by saying that Mr. Manell was too busy to be bothered by something of such a routine nature. 516/ Phillips stated:

> Mr. Manell was a busy man, sometimes procrastinating. His wife was working for him, and on one or two occasions I spoke to Mr. Manell kiddingly saying, hey, where is the cable about this fellow, or something like that, or maybe to his wife. I am not sure. In any event, what happened a few days passed and Mrs. Manell prepared a message--she was working for her husband, and as I recall it, she typed it herself, but I am not positive on that point, but in any event, she prepared the cable and took it to Mr. Manell, at which time he signed off on it. During that process, it did come to me, also to sign off on, because it spoke about Cuban matters, and then went to the Chief of Station and was released. ~~577~~ 517/

A blind CIA memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald" was located in a soft file on the Unidentified Man photograph. This memorandum asserts that Dave Phillips "didn't know what he was talking about." The memorandum's assertion is correct. Mr. Manel did not sign off on the cable reporting Oswald's contact

243

with the Soviet Embassy. 518/ Mr. Phillips did not sign off on that cable. 519/ The cable did not mention anything about the Cuban Consulate or Oswald's contact with it. 520/ Mr. Phillips never discussed the cable with the Manells according to their testimony. 521/ In fact, Mr. Phillips was on a temporary duty assignment in Washington, D.C., and Miami, Florida, from at least late September ? to October 9, 1963. 522/

The blind memorandum referred to above regarding the delay offers another explanation for the seven day lapse before sending the cable. After explaining that the photoproduction would not have arrived at the Station until Monday, 7 October, the memorandum says:

> A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone but that wasn't the way Win Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage...sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the "numbers game" of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables or reports produced. 523/

In all likelihood the delay in sending this initial cable was due to a combination of factors. Mr. Manell testified that, in fact, he was not too concerned with the task and left it to his wife. He stated:

> The only action I took was the action my wife took, was to send the cable to Washington summarizing the information we had on Oswald and his contact with the Embassy... We also asked our headquarters for a trace of an American. That was routine. 524/

The delay could also have been partially due to the wait for the photo-production. Ms. Goodpasture did check the photographs and did add a paragraph to the cable concerning a photogarph. 525/

Another reason that the cable was delayed was that there was some question within the Station about who had the responsibility to report Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy. [Need introduction to quotation]

> Q: What action did you take after seeing this transcript (from the 10/1 conversation)?
>
> A: I think I was the third or beyond person who saw it. It was brought to my attention by the chief, the Head of the Soviet Section, and by Ann Goodpasture who was discussing this and who was going to notify headquarters and whose responsibility it was. As I recall, I was told to write it up.
>
> to the memorandum I think there was a bit of discussion about
>
> Q: Why was there discussion about whose responsibility it was?
>
> A: I think because when it was an American it sort of fell between whether we should have to do it, whether it was our responsibility to send this up because it had to

245

> be accompanied by a memo and it took time, or whether it was Ann's responsibility. It was just a little, not argument, but a discussion about, well, "you do it, I don't want to do it, you handle it," and I had to do it. 526/

The reason that the responsibility would have lain with the Soviet Section is obviously because the American was in contact with the Soviet Embassy. Ms. Goodpasture also had a potential basis for responsibility because she was responsible for liaison functions with the Legal Attache, Army, Navy and Air Force on routine couter-espionage cases. 527/ She also assisted the Chief of Station and Deputy Chief of Station on these cases as they occurred. 528/

The primary reason for the delay was most likely a combination of the responsibility dispute and the routine nature of the case as perceived by the CIA officers at that time. Barbara Manell stated:

> (Ann Goodpasture) probably came in--it was really a matter of here is another one of those things again and we were having a little gabble about who would send it up because it was pain to do these. I probably, I think I handled it as soon as I got it but I think there was a discussion, as I say maybe a half a day, about who was going to do it. It was done because it was required but it was considered unimportant. 529/

Important or significant information was usually sent to Headquarters by cable as opposed to the slower dispatch which was sent to Headquarters by diplomatic courier. John Scelso explained:

> Cables were sent if the information was of such a nature that it had to be acted on within a day or a day and half or two days. Dispatches took so long that you really could not take any kind of operational action predicated on dispatch. 530/

Mr. Manell, the Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico City recalled that the criterion for a cable as opposed to a dispatch was the perishability of the information being transmitted:

> The normal criterion would be the urgency attached to that information, the perishability of the information, not its importance necessarily. The perishability was the criterion...If it was something that concerned an event that was going to happen in the two or three days you did not want to use a medium which was going to take a week to get to Washington. 531/

Hence, it is possible that Oswald's contact was reported by cable because it was considered significant by the Mexico Station; but this interpretation is not supported by the weight of the testimony.

Two other criteria for reporting by cable were pointed out: information concerning Soviets, Cubans and Americans. Generally, "[e]verything Soviet was of high

247

priority. Cuban Operations, a lot of cables were sent." 532/

And, in the case of Oswald:

> ...[I]n ~~In~~ this specific case, a cable was used to send this information to Headquarters only because it concerned an American, not because it concerned a matter was considered to be of importance. 533/

The tesimony of former CIA Mexico City officers consistently supports the position that Oswald's initial contact with the Soviet Embassy was considered fairly routine. 534/ The testimony indicates that the routine procedure of the Station was to report such a contact by cable whether it was considered routine or not. 535/ The Station had instructions to report Americans in contact with the Bloc Embassies to Headquarters because it was of interest to the FBI. 536/ The following quotes illustrate these points. Allan White said:

outward because Q + A

> Q: Was Oswald's contact at the Embassies in Mexico City considered to be important?
>
> A: At the time it first occurred?
>
> Q: Yes.
>
> A: I would have to conclude that it wasn't recognized as anything extraordinary at the time it first occurred.
>
> Q: Why do you conclude that?

248

A: Because had it been, it would have been pulled out and sent to Washington either with a complete transcription, a complete excerpt out of the transcription, or the entire tape and transcript would have been sent to Washington by the first available pouch, probably by special courier.

Q: Does the fact that Mexico City Station sent to Headquarters a cable reporting Oswald's contact suggest that the station considered the contact to be important?

A: You are asking what is the significance of the cable?

Q: Yes.

A: Well, operational, that is all. Here is an American citizen, at least a man who appeared to be an American citizen, speaking broken Russian and in contact with the Embassy. This is of operational interest. This is the kind of information that we were directed among others, to get back to Washington because they passed that kind of thing to the Bureau.

Q: Were contacts by Americans with the Soviet Embassy considered to be unusual?

A: Well, we were 1963 then. They were considered worhty of note, let me put it that way. Of course, from an operational point of view we were looking for any way we could exploit a contact with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: Were such contacts by Americans frequent?

A: Not terribly frequent. Not terribly frequent. There were members of the exile

249

colony in Mexico City who were in kind of routine contact with the Soviets, usually on cultural matters. No, I would say they were relatively infrequent. That is why--

Q: The cable was sent?

A: Yes. 537/

The Chief of the Soviet Section testified on this point also:

Q: Was this particular contact considered to be unusual or routine?

A: Routine.

Q: Why is that?

A: During the summer period, particularly, or toward the end of the summer period, a relatively large number of Americans, for various reasons, made contact with the Soviet Embassy. This appeared to me, when I had the information reported, to be just another case of an American contacting the Embassy, for no significant reasons.

Q: In each case that an American contacted the Embassy, would a cable be sent to Washington?

A: Yes, indeed. 538/

Mrs. Manell, the person who actually handled the reporting, also considered the case to be routine:

Q: Was the Oswald contact with the Soviet Embassy considered to be unusual?

A: No.

Q: Why not?

A: Well, there were cases of other Americans who contacted the Embassy for various reasons. We were only obliged to report the contact of any American with the Soviet Embassy.

Q: So in Oswald's case it was just a routine contact by an American as far as you were concerned?

A: Yes.

Q: If that is the case, then why was the cable sent concerning Oswald?

A: That is why I asked you earlier, because in the case of Americans we were required to send it by cable and not by dispatch.

Q: Was that a written regulation?

A: I don't know if it was written but it was understood at our Station that any Americans who were in touch with the Soviet Embassy [sic] that that fact had to be known to Headquarters by cable. It was always sent that way, whether we considered it very unimportant or routine or not. So there must have been a regulation but I am not aware of it. 539/

It should be noted ~~The reader should be reminded~~ here that the only conversation that had been linked to Oswald at that point in time was the one that occurred on 1 October. 540/ The other transcripts had passed over the Manells' and Goodpasture's desk 541/ but had not been linked to Oswald because his name was not mentioned in them. Mrs. Manell did not recheck the earlier transcripts, but did check the Station's index system to see (Grammar) if it had any record of a Lee Oswald, which it did not. 542/ [Need intro to quotes]

> Q: (H)ere it says in brackets, comment by the translator, "the same who phoned a day or so ago and spoke in broken Russian."
>
> A: Right.
>
> Q: Despite this indication here I believe your tesimony is that you did not go back to check the transcript because by virtue of your memory you knew that Oswald's name had not come up in any earlier conversation, is that correct?
>
> A: Yes. 543/

So, Ms. Manell drafted the first paragraph of the 10/8 cable on the basis of the 10/1/10:45 conversation alone even though the other information was available. 544/ That paragraph of the cable provided an accurate summary of the intercepted conversation. It said:

> Acc (Soviet wiretap) 1 Oct 63, American male who spoke broken Russian said his name Lee Oswald (Phonetic), stated he at Sovem on 28 Sept when spoke with Consul whom he believed to be Valeriy Vladmirovich Kostikov. Sujb asked Sov Guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there is anything new re telegram to Washington. Obyedkov upon checking said nothing received yet, but request had been sent. 545/

Ann Goodpasture added a second paragraph to the

252

cable. 546/

This paragraph concerned a photograph that she had found in the production from one of the photosuveillance bases that covered the Soviet Embassy. 547/ This paragraph said:

> Have photos male appears be American entering Sovem 1216 hours, leaving 1222 on 1 Oct. Apparent age 35, athele-tic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, balding top. Wore Khakis and sport shirt. Source: ~~LIMITED~~ LIEMPTY. 548/

The explanation for mistakenly linking this photograph to Oswald advanced by the CIA officers in Mexico who had knowledge of the circumstances is that this was the only photograph taken on October 1, the day that the conversation occurred, that appeared to be of a non-Latin, and, hence, possibly an American. 549/ [Need intro to quote]

> Q: Do you know how that photograph was linked to the person mentioned?
>
> A: By date. It was taken entering the Soviet Embassy and leaving on the same date this conversation took place. I remember that proceding because we were combing through the takes for that day to determine any person who looked like an American male. I believe this was the only one. 550/

The testimony also corroborates that the photographs would have been checked for several days prior to the date of

253

the conversation.

> Q: You checked the photosurveillance materials for approximately a four or five day period, is that correct?
>
> A: Yes, I think it is.
>
> Q: During that four or five day period... this man was the only non-Latin appearing man whose photograph you found, is that correct?
>
> A: I think it was the only non-Latin appearing person's photograph that we found that we could not identify as somebody else. A lot of the people who went to the Soviet Embassy all the time, we came to know who they were. After they had been identified, they made frequent visits there. 551/

The review of the photoproduction from LIMITED, the one base that has been made available to this Committee, makes the explanation of the mistake about the identity of the individual due to his being the only non-Latin implausible. The record reflects that unidentified American males were listed on the log sheet as "U A M" after the time was given. The photograph that was linked to Oswald was the only "U A M" that appeared on 2 October 1963. But on September 27, 1963 another "U A M" had appeared. The Committee has concluded from a review of a note that Ann Goodpasture wrote on the log sheet that this individual had not been identified by the time that the 10/8 cable was written The note says: "This is a Mexican named Gutierrez--license plate changed in Feb 64 to Mexican." 552/

This Committee cannot be certain that other "U A M"s did not turn up on the production from the LILYRIC base because that production has not been made available for review.

Ms. Goodpasture was asked about this and explained that the man, Gutierrez, was known in the station and that the base house agent was mistaken in identifying him as an American. 553/

This Committee finds the above quoted explanation hard to accept for other reasons. The October 1 transcript does not indicate that Oswald visited the Embassy on that day, however, it does indicate a visit on the previous Saturday. 554/ Even if he did visit the Embassy on the first of October, the photograph referred to in the cable was not taken until the second of October, 1963. 555/

The photographs from the one surveillance base for 1, 2 and 3 October were on one roll of film and one log sheet was prepared by the base. The text of the log sheet is in black type. The separate days coverage is set off by a row of red typed percentage (%) marks. 556/

Ms. Goodpasture attempted to explain this mistake.

Q: Looking at the log, can you now explain to the Committee why the cable referred to a photograph taken on October 1st when actually it was taken on another day?

A: If you look at the log here you see at the top--it was just an oversight on the part of the person who was writing that cable. It looks as though the date is 1 October, but if you read it very closely you see there are only two frames that were shot on 1 October and 2 October, it starts up with fram number 3, et cetera, et cetera, and there the shots occur. That is the only explanation I can give.

Q: Is your explanation that whomever referred to the log simply looked at the date at the top of the page, the date being October 1st, and did not see any reference to the date October 2nd?

A: Right. 557/

This Committee finds it implausible that Ann Goodpasture, who had the specific duty of "processing for operational leads all Station photosurveillance info pertaining to the Soviet target" since 1960 and had received a rating of outstanding on her annual fitness reports,

256

would make such an oversight mistake and not discover it until 1976. 558/ This Committee thinks that the fact that the mistaken date of the photograph was not discovered for so long is especially suspect in light of the fact that on the day after the assassination CIA Headquarters sent a cable to Mexico which said:

> "(FBI) says that photos of man entering Soviet Embassy which MEXI sent to Dallas were not of Oswald. Presume MEXI has double-checked dates of these photos and is also checking all pertinent other photos for possible shots of Oswald. 559/

Headquarter's preseumption was evidently mistaken. No record exists that would indicate a reply to this cable by the Mexico City Station.

The likelihood that a photograph of Oswald was indeed obtained makes the "explanation," proferred by Goodpasture, et al., even more implausible. 560/ At this time the Committee can not conclude why the original mistake was made even though it does find the explanation offered by Goodpasture, et al., to be highly implausable.

Regardless of why the mistake was made, Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy and the mistaken photographic identification of him were reported to Headquarters. The 10/8 cable was received at Headquarters on 9 October

257

1963. 561/ The cable, as was routine, went to the Mexico Desk for action. 562/ The person who handled the case for the Mexico Desk was Elsie Scaleti. 563/ Ms. Scaleti initially considered the information routine. 564/ She took the routine steps of requesting a name trace. 565/ From the name trace she learned that there was a 201 file on a Lee Henry Oswald but that it was restricted to a branch of the Agency known as "CI/SIG." 566/ The custodian of Oswald's file, in October 1963, was Ann Elizabeth Goldsborough Egerter of the Counter-Intelligence/Special Investigations Group. This group's purpose and interest in Oswald is detailed in another section of ths final report dealing with whether or not Lee Oswald was an agent or asset of the Central Intelligecne Agency. 567/

Ms. Scaleti went to Ms. Egerter and asked to see Lee Oswald's file which was provided to her by Ms. Egerter. 568/ Once the information from the Oswald 201 and the information in the cable from Mexico City was combined, the Oswald contact took on more significance:

> Q: Now, once the information...had been obtained by you, did that in any way increase the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy?

A: As I recall that is what I thought made it very significant.

Q: Can you explain why?

A: Any American who had tried to renounce his U.S. citizenship in the Soviet Union, now having again a relationship with the Soviet Embassy would lead one to wonder why he had tried to renounce his citizenship in the first place, and why he was still in contact with the Soviets, whether there was a possibility he really was working for the Soviets or what. 569/

Ms. Egerter remembers that the cable from Mexico City caused a lot of excitement. She was shown the 10/9 cable.

Q: Is this the cable that cause the excitement?

A: Yes, one of them.

Q: Why was excitement caused by this cable?

A: "Contact with Kostikov."

Q: What is the significance of the contact with Kostikov?

A: I think we considered him a KGB man.

Q: Any other reason for the excitement?

A: He had to be up to something bad to be so anxious to go to the Soviet Union. At least that is the way I felt. 570/

After reviewing Oswald's 201, which CI/SIG loaned to the Mexican Desk where it reamined until the time of the assassination, Ms. Scaleti drafted a response to the Mexico City 10/9 cable and also disseminated information about Oswald to other branches of the American intelligence community. 571/ These two documents were drafted at the same time and were sent within several hours of each other. 572/ Several aspects of these two documents are interesting and illustrate various points, as well as raise serious questions.

The cable which Ms. Scaleti sent to Mexico says, in full:

> 1. Lee Harvey Oswald who called Sovemb 1 Oct probably identical Lee Henry Oswald (201-289248) born 18 October 1939, New Orleans, Louisiana, former radar operator in United States Marines who defected to USSR in Oct 1959. Oswald is five feet ten inches, one hundred sixty five pounds, light brown wavy hair, blue eyes.
>
> 2. On 31 Oct 1959 he attempted to renounce his United States citizenship to the United States Embassy in Moscow, indicating he had applied for Soviet citizenship. On 13 Feb the US emb Moscow received an undated letter from Oswald five postmarked Minsk cn ~~05~~ 4 Feb 1961 in which subj indicated he desired return of his US ppt as wished to return to USA if "we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me." On 8 July on his own initiative he appeared at the Emb with his wife to see about his return to the States. Sub stated that he actually had never applied for Soviet citizenship and that his

260

> application at that time had been to remain in USSR and for temporary extension of his Tourist visa pending outcome of his request. This application, according to Oswald, contained no ref to Soviet citizenship. Oswald stated that he had been employed since 13 Jan 1960 in Belorussian Radio and TV Factory in Minsk where worked as metal worker in research shop. Oswald was married on 30 April 1961 to Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, a dental technician born July 1941 USSR. No HDQS traces. He attemped arrange for wife to join him in Moscow so she could appear at Emb for visa interview. His American ppt was returned to him. US Emb Moscow stated twenty months of realities of life in Soviet Union had clearly had maturing effect on Oswald.
>
> 3. Latest HDQS info was (State Department) report dated May 1962 saying (State) had determined Oswald is still US citizen and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits and Dept State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.
>
> 4. Station should pass info ref and para one to (U.S. Embassy, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Navy, and Immigration and Naturalization) locally. Info paras two and three originates with (State).
>
> 5. Ref and possible identification being disseminated to HDQS of (FBI, State, Navy and I&NS). Pls keep HDQS advised on any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald. 573/

Ms. Scaleti wrote this cable. 574/ Ms. Egerter was one of the people who reviewed the cable for accuracy. 575/ The cable was released by the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans, Thomas Karamessines. 576/

The teltype which Ms. Scaleti wrote was sent to the Department of State, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the Department of the Navy. 577/ This teletype says:

> 1. On 1 October 1963 a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as Lee Oswald, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City inquiring whether the Embassy had received any news concerning a telegram which had been sent to Washington. The American was described as approximately 35 years old, with an atheletic build, about six feet tall, with a receding hairline.
>
> 2. It is believed that Oswald may be identical to Lee Henry Oswald, born on 18 October 1939 in New Orleans, Lousiana, a former U.S. Marine who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959 and later made arrangements through the United States Embassy in Moscow to return to the United States with his Russian wife, Marina Nikolaevna Pusakova, and their child.
>
> 3. The information in Paragraph One is being disseminated to your representative in Mexico City. Any further information received is being made available to the Immigration and Naturalization Service. 578/

The first substantive conflict between these two documents are the dissimilar descriptions of Oswald. The response sent to Mexico gave a fairly accurate description of Oswald while the dissemination to other government agencies gave the description that had mistakenly been connected to Oswald by the 10/9 cable from Mexico City. 579/ Ms. Egerter testified that she could not explain why the description discrepancies occurred. 580/ When Ms. Scaleti was asked why this occurred she first responded taht there was a rule that prevented the Agency from disseminating any information obtained from a third agency of the government. 581/ Hence, the accurate desciprtion of Oswald which was from information furnished to the Agency by the State Department could not be included in the dissemination. 582/ It was pointed out to Ms. Scaleti that the information in the second paragraph of the teletype was from the State Department sources and that the Mexico City Station had been instructed to disseminate the description locally which she claimed could not be disseminated due to a third agency rule. She was asked the question again and the following exchange occurred:

> A. Let us start over again. The actual physical description on Lee Henry Oswald from (the 10/10 cable) was sent to the Station to assist them in further investigation to see if they knew of anybody or had anybody down there that really fitted what we thought was an accurate physical description of the Oswald that we had a

263

?
file on...When we came to...the teletype to State, FBI and Navy, we did not, and I would not normally even today, provide those investigative agencies with the physical description of Lee Henry Oswald as we thought it to be then.

We provided them only with our intelligence, not with State Department intelligence which gave the stuff out about the audio and the possible physical description. The wording here in paragraph 1 on our teletype...is worded that the American was described. As I told your man from your Committee earlier, it possibly would have been better, although it did not occur to me at the time and this is the way those things were written in those times, to say that an American described as this could possibly be identifiable and qualified but the normal procedure in 1963 was to provide to the other government agencies information and intelligence from our sources. xx

...

Q: Were you aware when you sent out the cable and the teletype that you were giving different descriptions?

A: Yes. I assume I was. I don't remember now. This is some time ~~xx~~ ago.

Q: Was there any intention of your part to deceive any other agencies by giving a description contained in that paragraph in the teletype?

A: None at all. 583/

Ms. Scaleti was interviewed by Committee staff members on 3/30/78. She was questioned, as she indicates in the above quote at that time about the description discrepancy. When Ms. Scaletti was shown the 10/9 cable on that occasion she stated that she would not have taken the description of the individual in paragraph two to be a description of Oswald. 584/ The description discrepancy was specifically pointed out to Ms. Bustos and she was specifically questioned on that point. The report of that interview says:

> We next pointed out to Ms. Scaletti the fact that the response to Mexico had a correct description of Oswald and the dissemination had an incorrect one. She said that the info in the first paragraph of the dissemination came from MEXI 6453 and that explained the incorrect description. We pointed out to her the fact that she had the correct description and that had already told us that she did not associate the description in 6453 with Oswald, and that she had said that the cable and teletype had been prepared simultaneously by three knowledgable people. She said, first, that the correct description would not have been put in the dissemination because it came from the file review. I pointed out that all of the information in the second paragraph of the dissemination was from the file review. She responded that they had not been sure that the "Lee Oswald" referred to in 6453 was the same as "Lee Henry Oswald" on whom they had a file, hence they would not have had included a description from 6453 that she did not think was connected to Oswald. She said that it had obviously been a mistake that doesn't matter now, but if she had it to do over again, she would not put any description in the dissemination because she was not sure that either applied to

265

> the man who identified himself as Lee Oswald at
> the Embassy in Mexico 585/

The second point of interest that is illustrated by the 10/10 cable and teletype is the inference that can be made from reviewing paragraph 3 of the teletype, paragraph 5 of the cable, and Thomas Karamessines signing off on the cable, that the CIA was asking for, and promising, a further investigation of Oswald without a specific request from any other government agency ~~who~~ which might [write out words] have had, as the '77 IGR says, "investigative responsibility." [cite]

Herbert Manell) ~~The~~ the Chief of the Soviet Section in Mexico City recognized such a routine investigative responsibility as part of the normal course of his duties. He stated:

> One of our responsibilities was to assist
> the FBI in identifying people who might become Soviet agents, particularly in America. 586/

As a matter of fact, the Chief of the Branch of the CIA responsible for the Mexican operations at Headquarters thought this was one of the Mexico City Station's strongest and most successful areas of endeavor.

> They (Americans) were detected enough so
> that J. Edgar Hoover used to glow every
> time that he thought of the Mexico City
> Station. This was one of our outstanding
> areas of cooperation with the FBI. 587/

The request for further investigation and dissemination contained in paragraph 5 of the 10/10 cable to Mexico was the reason that the cable was sent to the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans for release. 588/ The Chief of the Mexico Branch was questioned extensively on this point:

A: Well, it went up to Mr. Karamessines because it involved disseminating information on an American citizen to the U.S. government agencies, you see. At that time--probably still--the CIA did not investigate or pass around information on American citizens unless it were requested to by another government agency, either in that particular case or by some standard operating procedure. In other words, the CIA, seeing an American abroad, observing an American abroad, observing an American abroad engaging in some skullduggery, would inform the responsible U.S. agency here and sit and wait for instructions before doing anything further. In this case, we were passing on information to other U.S. government agencies in Mexico City and this probably went to other places in Washington as well.

Q: This particular information was disseminated to other agencies without a request of any such agency. Is that correct?

A: Yes.

Q: This fit into the other category of cases where disseminations were made?

A: Disseminations would be made to other interested agencies, and any information we came across had action taken to follow up to take investigative steps. Dissemination would only be taken if another agency requested it, either specifically in that case, or unless it were a part of standard operating procedure, which would have been agreed upon with another agency.

Q: Was any follow-up action contemplated by this (the 10/10) cable?

A: Yes. "Please keep Headquarters advised of any further contacts or for positive identification of Oswald."

Q: That would be considered follow-up?

A: Yes. They were instructed to stay alert and report any further evidence of this man's presence. Therefore, Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it.

Q: Mr. Karamessines had to sign off on it because follow-up action was contemplated?

A: With regard to a U.S. citizen abroad.

Q: For purposes of clarification, I think you said that there were two situations where Mr. Karamessines would have to sign off. One would be where another agency requested the dissemination?

A: Yes. No--not the question of the dissemination. It is a question of operational action being taken.

Q: A request for operational action. What is the second example?

A: Well--

Q: Would the Agency itself decide to take operational action?

A: Ordinarily, operational action in an ordinary case would not require Mr. Karamessines approval at all. It was only because an American citizen was involved. That interest in an American citizen might come about because of a specific statement of interest about

268

this individual from another U.S. government agency or it might come about because of a standard operating procedure.

For example, we had an agreement with the FBI that we would follow up leads on any American citizen in Mexico City who appeared around the Soviet Embassies, and so on, or anybody who was down there appearing to defect, which we might learn through our telephone intercepts.

We could just as well have sent this cable out without Mr. Karmessines releasing it. I do not know why we did it.

Q: In fact, you pointed to something which I was going to ask you about. I was wondering why somebody as high up in the Agency as Mr. Karamessines was the releasing officer.

A: I would have been because of the U.S. citizen aspect, because so many other U.S. Government agencies were involved, State Department, FBI and the Navy. I suppose one of these things is the Navy. One of them could be the Immigration and Naturalization Service.

Q: Let me attempt to summarize again. Karamessines would be responsible for signing off on this because operational action pertaining to an American was taken?

A: Yes.

Q: Either pursuant to the request of another government agency or pursuant to some standard operating procedure of the Agency itself.

A: Yes.

Q: Any other reason that you can think of?

A: No.

Q: I believe you indicated that there was an arrangement,

> or an agreement, with the FBI that any activities by Americans around the Soviet or Cuban Embassy would be reported and followed up on by the Agency. Was that agreement in writing?
>
> A: I do not know. It probably was in writing somewhere. It antedated my tenure, and the agreement was not in the files. It would have been in the files of the DDP or of the CI Staff. 589/

The Chief of the Mexico Branch hence believes that further investigation of Oswald was requested by CIA Headquarters without the prior expression of interest from another government agency with "investigative responsibility." This request for "operational activity" concerning an American abroad is advanced as the reason for the Assistant Deputy Director of Plans signing off on the cable. Even though the cable was brought to Karamessines' attention and he did sign off on it, Mr. Scelso told this Committee that that was not necessary due to a standing agreement with the FBI under which the CIA had agreed to investigate Americans in Mexico in contact with the Soviet Embassy without any specific request from another agency. 590/ This recollection is corroborated by other testimony and documents. 591/ Elsie Scaleti also recalled that it would not have been necessary, in 1963, to bring such a request for operational action to the ADDP's attention. 592/ She suggested that the reason for bringing it to the ADDP's attention did not have to do with the request for operational action, but because Oswald's contact was considered important enough to merit his attention:

> Q: Why would someone as high up in the organization as Karamessines ask to be the releasing officer of this particular cable?
>
> A: I can only surmise now that I might have thought or what several of us might have thought at the time, that since it involved somebody of this nature who had tried to renounce his citizenship, who was in the Soviet Union, married to a Soviet, got out with a Soviet wife presumably, which is very strange, and now the contact with the Soviets, we could have a security, a major security problem. This was one way of informing him and getting attention at the higher level. 593/

Even though the CIA denies such an agreement (if it was in writing) that covered the CIA's investigation of American citizens in Mexico, this Committee is certain, on the basis of the above detailed evidence, that such an agreement existed, either formally or informally. 594/ Hence, the assertion in the 1977 IG report that "Oswald was not an investigative responsibility of the CIA" 595/ is seemingly inaccurate and misleading.

This Committee has attempted to determine what actions, if any, were taken by the CIA's Mexico City Station after Headquarters responded to the initial report of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet Embassy. In this

271

respect, two assertions of the '77 IGR are important: 1) that it was not discovered that Oswald was seeking a visa to Russia and that he had also been in contact with the Cuban Embassy until November 22, 1963; and 2) that the Station did "nothing other than ask Headquarters on 15 October for a photograph of Oswald" because no other government agency had made an official request for further information. 596/ It has already been shown that the "official request" that the Agency claims was not forthcoming was, in fact, not necessary and that, as a matter of fairly routine operating procedure, the CIA Headquarters requested a follow-up on the information already reported about Oswald. It has also been shown that the Oswald matter, after the name trace was done at Headquarters, was considered to be fairly significant by the Headquarters officials involved. In this regard, it should be pointed out that Headquarters communicated its concern to Mexico by requesting in paragraph 5 of DIR 74830 more information on Oswald. It should also be noted that the CIA Headquarters also, by notifying the interested government agencies that "Any further information received on this subject will be furnished to you" 597/ belied the necessity of one of the agencies

212

making an official request for further action. Hence, the excuse offered for the claimed lack of action by the Mexico Station is invalid and the question becomes 1) whether or not that Station did any follow-up; 2) whether they did discover additional information about Oswald prior to the assassination; 3) whether that information, if any, was reported in an accurate and expeditious manner; and 4) if it was not reported, what was the reason for the failure to report.

The Mexico City Station received DIR 74830 on 11 October 1963. The Mexico City copy of this cable is in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City "P" file along with the Station routing slip. There are several interesting aspects to this copy of the cable and there is evidence that provides indications of the Stations' actions and the timing of those actions.

There are several marginal notations on this document. Perhaps the most interesting is the notation "Sic" with an arrow drawn to the 'Henry" in the name "Lee Harvey Oswald." That notation was made by Win Scott when he read the cable on the day it was received in Mexico. 598/ This notation struck Committee investigators as very strange because it was a possible indication that Win

Scott knew, at the time the cable was received, that Lee Oswald's middle name was not "Henry." David Phillips was questioned about that possibility:

> Q: Do you have any reason to believe that when this cable was received in October of 1963 Mr. Scott knew that cable's reference to Lee Harvey Oswald was incorrect?
>
> A: No, I don't recall that, but reading this obviously at whatever time he wrote that "sic" on there he felt it was incorrect or he would not have spotlighted it that way. But I don't have any recollection. I don't have any recollection that we knew before this cable came back down that it was Lee Harvey Oswald. 599/

The explanation most often advanced was that Mr. Scott often used the symbols "Sic" and "aka" interchangeably and that all he was indicating here was that the "Lee Oswald" from the taps was also to be indexed and filed under the additional name "Lee Henry Oswald." 600/ Mr. Phillips was also asked about this explanation:

> Q: Was he [Win Scott] the kind of individual that would have interchanged or used interchangeably the words, the letters "aka" and "sic" interchangeably as having the same meaning? Do you appreciate that?
>
> A: Yes. I don't think so. He was an intellectual. His great secret was that he wrote poetry. He didn't want anyone else to know that. He was very well educated, extremely well read, and no, he is not the kind of man--
>
> Q: He would appreciate the distinction?

A: He would appreciate the distinction between the two. 601/

If Mr. Scott did in fact make this notation prior to the assassination of John Kennedy, this Committee has not been able to determine why "sic" was used. 602/

The description of Oswald is marked on this cable with a double black line, a check mark and the notation "24 years old" in Ann Goodpasture's hand-writing. 603/ At

at what point - give date

this point at least Ms. Goodpasture and Allan White, the DCOS, realized that the photograph they had described in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. 604/ But this realization was evidently not shared by all the officers in the station. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that there was some controversy in the station about whether the man described in the 10/11 cable was the same man who had been picked up by the Station's photographic surveillance. Ms. Goodpasture remembers that she believed, based on the cable, that the photograph reported in MEXI 6453 was not of Oswald. She said that she argued over the identification with Win Scott and that "he said, "Oh, that may be incorrect' and so forth. But there was some quibbling over it." 605/

The routing slip on the 10/11 cable indicates some of the dates when subsequent Mexico City Station actions occurred. Cite routing [illegible] Ms. Goodpasture noted that "We should ask HQ for photo. No?" Barbara Manell noted that the dissemination requested by Paragraph 4 of the cable was done on 15 October 1963. Win Scott wrote, "Please set up "P" file on Lee Henry OSWALD and put all data we have into it. Photos?" 606/ The document was sent to the files on 15 October 1963. 607/ Hence, we know that Oswald's Mexico "P" file was opened on or about 15 October 1963 and that Win Scott asked that "all" information be included in the file. There is substantial reason to believe that most, if not all, of the information available to the Station was incorporated into the file at that time. 608/

The 10/11 cable greatly increased the significance of Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in the eyes of the Mexico City Station just as the name trace results reported by that cable had made the matter more significant to the officers involved at Headquarters. 609/ This cable aroused the Station's operational interest in Oswald. (Need intro to quote)

...[T]

Q: To your knowledge did that (the 10/11 cable) in any way enhance the importance of Oswald's

276

contact with the Soviet Embassy?

A: Oh, yes, sure, it did. The fact that he had that kind of background. Sure, he became someone of considerable operational interest. Again, there was nothing other than operational interest.

Q: In all likelihood that cable would have prompted the people at the station to go back and look at the earlier transcripts?

A: Yes, I would think so. 610/

This Committee believes that Station personnel did, between October 11 and October 15, go back and recheck the transcripts and connect the important substantive calls to Oswald. Under normal operating procedures a tape of Oswald's calls to the Soviet Embassy should not have been erased until 16 October, 4 to 5 days after the case took on added significance. 611/ The one transcript of the call on 10/1/63 that had definitely been linked to Oswald prior to receipt of the 10/11 cable bore a reference to an earlier conversation by a man who spoke broken Russian, the text of the 10/1 call allowed that the prior call had probably occurred on September 28, 1963. 612/ It should have been possible at that point to compare the tapes to see if they were in fact the same caller. Indeed, a notation made by Ann Goodpasture on a newspaper article in 1964 suggests that this was the case.

The notes says:

> The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared by (Tarasoff.) 613/

The cable traffic after the assassination confuses this point rather than clarifies it. This will be dealt with in more detail in a subsequent section. An examination of documents in Lee Harvey Oswald's Mexico City Station P file and the cable traffic from Mexico City to Headquarters after the assassination, raised a possibility that at least one tape of Oswald's voice existed as late as 16 October 1963. 614/

Assuming that the 10/1/63 call in which an individual identifies himself as "Lee Oswald" was handled in an expedited manner, the tape and the transcript would have been in the Station by the following day at the latest. 615/ If the tape had been held for the normal two-week retention period, it would have been erased on or about 16 October. The tape from the 9/28/63 conversation would have probably been in the station by the first or second of October at the latest. 616/ Moreover, it ~~It~~ would not have normally been erased until on or about 16 October ~~also~~. It seems clear that the tapes, under normal procedures would have been retained until at least the middle of

218

October. An examination of the documents does not clarify this question but rather adds confusion to the issue.

Several documents and cables deal with the tapes and a voice comparison of the recorded conversations. In Oswald's "P" file there is a newspaper clipping of an article from the 21 October 1964 Washington Post. The article, by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, is entitled "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission." One paragraph from that article says:

> The investigators also are trying to determine why the CIA in its preassassination report to the State Department on Oswald's trip to Mexico City gave details only of the defector's visit to the Russian Embassy and not the Cuban Embassy. The CIA did not report the latter visit until after Kennedy's assassination in Dallas.

Next to that paragraph Ann Goodpasture wrote:

> The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until HQ sent traces on Oswald and voices compared by (Tarasoff). 617/

That statement is very clear in saying that a voice comparison was made. The cable traffic that went from Mexico to CIA Headquarters after the assassination is not so clear.

On 23 November, the CIA Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to send the full transcripts of Oswald's conversations and "original tapes if available" to Headquarters as soon as possible by a special courier. 618/ On that same day, Ann Goodpasture sent a cable to Headquarters reporting the 9/28/63 conversation. That cable said, in part, "Station unable compare voice as first tape erased prior receipt ~~of~~ second call." 619/ Later that same day Ms. Goodpasture wrote another cable which said:

> (Tarasoff) who did transcriptions says Oswald identical with person para one speaking broken Russian who called from Cuban Embassy 28 September to Soviet Embassy. 620/

The next day the Mexico City Station informed Headquarters that it had been unable to locate any tape of Oswald's voice. "Regret complete recheck shows tapes for this period already erased." 621/

The statement in MEXI 7023 that a voice comparison was not possible because of the first tape being erased prior to the second tape being received is inconsistent with the statements made in testimony and in other cables 622/ and with the procedure then in effect at the station at that time. 623/ It is, therefore, considered highly unlikely that a tape would be held only one or two days, the situation that is implied by the statement in MEXI 7023.

The other statements by Ms. Goodpasture in the cables and on the newspaper articles clearly indicate that a voice comparison was made. Ms. Goodpasture was questioned about this:

Q: To your knowledge, was a voice comparison ever made between the tapes to deterimne whether the same person was speaking in each one?

A: I do not know. I did not make one. I do not know whether someone else made one or not. There is a transcript, a cable here, in which the transcriber of the Soviet tape says that it is the same voice, which would lead one to believe that he made a voice comparison, but it just may have been that he, from his memory, came to that conclusion. 624/

. . .

Q: On the lower righthand corner of the newspaper article that is contained there, marked off with a dark line is a paragraph. Kindly read that paragraph, starting with the words "The investigators..'

(Pause.)

A: This would suggest--

Q: One moment.

A: --Tarasoff compared the voices on a tape of October.

Q: Whose handwriting appears?

A: That is mine.

...

Q: That indicates that the caller--could you please read that to us. Read what you wrote that day.

A: "The caller from the Cuban Embassy was unidentified until Headquarters sent traces on Oswald." Now, that would have been in answer to the cable that was dated 8th October. I believe their cable was 18 October, "and voices compared by Feinglass." Feinglass was the pesudonym used by Tarasoff.

Q: In fact, that indicates--

A: He compared the Cuban Embassy voices with the others, with Oswald's call, in which he used his name.

Q: When would that have happened?

A: I said 18 October because I thought that was the date of the cable. 10 October. 625/

Boris Tarasoff testified that he had not been queried at all about Oswald in 1963 and that he had not done a voice comparison. 626/ Herbert Manell testified that Tarasoff did not do a voice comparison but connected the two conversations in his marginal comments in the transcripts on the basis of memory. 627/

Whether or not Mr. Tarasoff or someone else did a voice comparison of the tapes, it is likely that the tapes did exist until at least the 16th of October and would have been available for such a comparison. It is possible that the connection between the 10/1/63 call and the 9/28/63 call was made on the basis of Mr. Tarasoff's

233

memory. In any event the record clearly indicates that the tapes should have been available, and probably were available, as late as 16 October 1963. 628/ This is significant because it was after receipt of the 10/10 cable from Headquarters that the Oswald case took on a more than routine coloring.

The increased significance that the Oswald visit took on during the period from October 11 to October 16, 1963, could have provided the station with reason to retain the Oswald tapes. 629/

Ms. Goodpasture was asked what became of the Oswald tapes:

Q: What happened to that tape containing Oswald's voice?

A: What happened?

Q: What happened to that tape? ~~yes?~~ Yes.

A: I do not know.

Q: Do those tapes exist today?

A: What?

Q: Do those tapes exist today?

A: If they do, I do not know where they are.

Q: Are you aware of the fact that, after the assassination, it has been alleged that some tapes were given to the FBI to listen to and that it was said that these tapes contained Oswald's voice on them?

A: Someone asked me about that, but I do not think that I had those tapes. I do not remember if I did, and I was not aware that we gave any to the FBI. I do not know whether Mr. Manell got tapes from Mr. Tarasoff and passed them to the FBI, or if the Chief of Station or Deputy passed anything to the FBI. I just do not know. 630/

On the whole most CIA officers who testified stated that, if a tape of Oswald's voice existed at the time of the assassination, they did not know anything at all about it. 631/ One CIA officer, the Chief of the Branch responsible for Mexico, testified that he believed the tapes did exist at the time of the assassination:

Q: Were they able to locate the original tapes?

A: I think so.

Q: Do you recall what was done with those tapes?

A: No.

Q: Did you ever--

A: I never heard them.

A: You never heard them?

A: No.

Q: On what basis do you say the original tapes were found?

234

A: I had the impression that after the assassination they did a lot of transcribing. I may be wrong.

Q: Let us look at (MEXI 7025.) Paragarph four there, which indicates that the person who did the transcript and says, "Oswald is identical with the person in an earlier paragraph who spoke broken Russian and called on 28 September." That indicates that some sort of a voice comparison was made.

A: Yes. Tapes were probably still in existence. 632/

The Tarasoffs do not remember ever doing, or being asked to do, a voice comparison of the Oswald tapes. 633/ But ~~the~~ other evidence, albeit circumstantial, seems to indicate that the tapes were in existence and that the voices were compared by someone. 634/ Herbert Manell suggested that Tarasoff may have confirmed the fact that the two calls were made by the same person by memory after receipt of the 10/11 cable. 635/

However, the Station made the connections, whether by voice comparison and/or by comparison of the substantive information in the 10/11 cable to the substantive information in the transcripts, the conversations were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination and probably by the time that the "P" file was opened on or about 16 October 1963. 636/ Ms. Goodpasture was also asked about this:

Q: On October 1st, you found out that Oswald had been at the Russian Embassy the preceding

285

Saturday. Was any effort made to check your materials from the surveillance operation, the photographic surveillance operation, or from the telephonic surveillance operation to get additional information on this?

A: I do not know whether I checked it immediately or not at this stage. I do know that they were checked thoroughly after the assassination. In fact, I think they were checked thoroughly after the information came back from Washington identifying a Lee Oswald. 637/

On October 15, 1963, a "P" file was opened on Oswald. 638/ That same day the CIA Mexico City Station requested that Headquarters send them a photograph of Oswald. 639/ On that date also Ms. Manell drafted a local dissemination memo regarding Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy. 640/ By this date at least the 10/1/10:45 call, the 9/28/11:51 call, the 9/27/4:05 call, and the 9/27/4:26 call had been linked to Oswald. 641/

On 16 October 1963 the memorandum drafted by Ms. Manell was circualted at the U. S. Embassy. It said:

> 1. The following information was received from a usually reliable and extremely sensitive source: On 1 October 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as Lee OSWALD. This officer (sic) determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on 28 September 1963 and had talked with Valeriy Valdimirivoch KOSTIKOV, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We

> have no clarifying information with regard to this request.
>
> 2. Our Headquarters has informed us that the OSWALD above is probably identical with Lee Henry OSWALD, born on 18 October 1939, in New Orleans, Louisiana, a former radar operator in the U. S. Marine Corps who defected to the Soviet Union in October 1959.
>
> 3. This office will advise you if additional information on this matter is received. 642/

When Ms. Manell was asked why she had stated that it had been "determined" that Oswald had been in contact with the Soviet Embassy on 28 September she said that it must have been because she had rechecked the transcripts by this time as otherwise she would not have used such certain language. 643/ When asked why the 10/16 memo said that there was no clarifying information on Oswald's "request" when it was known by this time that he was seeking a visa, Ms. Manell said that "They had no need to know all those other details." 644/

There are no indications that any other actions were taken by the Mexico City Station prior to the assassination. 645/

Even though the Station's actions after the 10/11 cable were not highly extensive, it is inaccurate and misleading to say that those actions were limited to requesting a photograph of Oswald from Headquarters. Other actions included rechecking the transcripts and discovering the substantive ones that concerned Oswald and reporting the information in MEXI 6453 and DIR 74830 to various components in the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City in a misleading manner. Hence, the fact that Oswald was seeking a visa and had been in contact with the Cubans as well as the Russians was known prior to the assassination, and the Station's actions prior to the assassination were more comprehensive than merely requesting a photograph; although if any action other than a file check was taken, no record of that action has been made available to this Committee.

It is unlikely, but possible, that this information that was developed by the Mexico City Station after 10/11/63 was reported to Headquarters. Elsie Scaleti pointed out that a report of this additional information on Oswald's activities in Mexico "would have been expected." 646/ Ms. Scaleti's belief that the information should have been reported to Headquarters is shared for identical reasons by her superior at Headquarters. 647/

The testimony from the people involved, both at headquarters and in Mexico, while often uncertain, is, generally, that they do not remember that such a cable was sent. Ms. Scaleti said that she could not recall that Mexico had sent any other information to Headquarters prior to the assassination, but added, I "could not swear to that." 648/ The head of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters was certain that this information was reported but he could not recall the form of the report or whether it occurred before or after the assassination. 649/ Robert Shaw first testified that, to his knowledge, the information was not reported prior to the assassination and then added "but I would have no way of knowing." 650/ The Deputy Chief of Station in Mexico, Mr. Allan White, was also unsure on this point:

> Q: ...[D]id Did they ever indicate to Headquarters that Oswald had been to the Cuban Embassy as well as to the Soviet Embassy and that he wanted a visa?
>
> A: I would have to assume that they did. I realize that "assume" is a bad word.
>
> Q: You don't have personal knowledge one way or another?
>
> A: No, prior to the assassination I would not. 651/

Ann Goodpasture was also unsure of her recollection in this area:

Q: But Headquarters was never appraised of that voice comparison?

A: I think they were in a cable.

A: Prior to the assassination?

A: No, I do not think they were prior to the assassination. xxx

. . .

Q: It is determined that the same person was talking on each tape and there is no follow-up to headquarters, even though Headquarters clearly considered this to be significant?

A: The follow-up was made by disseminating this information from the traces locally and trying to identify Oswald, trying to locate the man. That is the way the follow-up was made. We thought that he may still be in Mexico.

Q: The point is, however, that upon the making of a voice comparion, if, in fact, that was done, that information was not communicated to anyone.

A: I do not know if it was or not. You would have to check the file completely, the cable traffic, to see if it was. To the best of my knowledge, it was not until after the assassination. xx

. . .

Q: In fact, headquarters did not know that he had also been to the Cuban Embassy?

. . .

A: At that point, no.

Q: At least, according to your recollection, it was not until after the assassination that Headquarters was informed of that fact?

A: That is probably right. /~~4~~652/

Only one person who was interviewed by this Committee was certain of her recollection. Ms. Barbara Manell was certain that a second cable reporting Oswald's contacts with the Cuban Embassy had been sent to Headquarters prior to the assassination.

Q: It does not strike you as more significant that the American contacts the Soviet Embassy and he also contacts the Cuban Embassy? To me that would make him seem more significant and therefore, if you found out about this after the time the (first) cable was sent you would have sent another cable.

A: I did not send another cable but I know another cable was sent. I didn't send it.

Q: Another cable concerning Oswald was sent?

A: I think so. Where is the whole file? Wasn't there a cable saying he was in touch with the Cuban Embassy?

Q: We have not seen one.

A: I am pretty such there was.

Q: Did you send that cable?

A: No, I did not send the cable. When I found out about it I remember this, I said how come?

Q: Who did? Do you know?

A: I don't know who sent it. I think Ann (Goodpasture) might have. She might have sent a follow-up one with this information 653/

The staff of this Committee suggested that Mr. Phillip's clear recollection of involvement in reporting Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy and that he was seeking

291

a visa along with the fact that Mr. Phillips was not in Mexico at the time that the first cable was sent, 654/ could possibly be an indication that he is recalling a second cable. When asked about this, Mr. Phillips stated that he had no knowledge of a second cable sent prior to the assassination. 655/

Some corroboration of Ms. Manell's assertions were found in the materials from Win Scott's safe. Scott wrote:

> "...(O)n page 777 of (the Warren) report the erroneous statement was made that it was not known that Oswald had visited the Cuban Embassy until after the assassination! Every piece of information concering Lee Harvey Oswald was reported immediately after it was received to: U. S. Ambassador Thomas C. Mann, by memorandum; the FBI Chief in Mexico, by Memorandum; and to my headquarters by cable; and included in each and every one of these reports was the conversation Oswald had, so far as it was known. These reports were made on all his contacts with both the Cuban Consulate and with the Soviets. 656/

New paragraph

If the cable was sent it is not in the files made available to the HSCA by the CIA.

The head of the Mexico Branch admitted that the information should have been reported and that, if it had been, the Oswald case would have been handled differently, at least as far as the dissemination of information about him was concerned.

292

Q: Had the information concerning Oswald's visit to the Cuban Embassy in addition to the Soviet one, that Oswald had been requesting a visa, if it had been sent to CIA headquarters, would his case prior to the assassination have been handled in any different manner?

A: It would have been in the case of dissemination of information about him, but I do not think that any operational action would have taken to apprehend him or to contact him or to try to force him back to the United States.

Q: ... (H)ow ~~how~~ would the dissemination have been treated differently?

A: Well, it simply means that we would have disseminated any additional information that we got. 657/

It cannot be determined with exactitude whether or not this additional information about Oswald was reported to Headquarters. In all likelihood it was not. The Chief of the Mexico Desk was asked whether or not the Station was ever criticized for this failure to report in the face of a specific request to do so by CIA Headquarters. He replied: ~~said:~~

> No. That was not because we were trying to go easy on them, it is simply because it is in the nature of the business. What you are trying to do is engage, as I used to say, in important illegal manipulations of society, secretly.
>
> We were running, at that time, a vast political action program in Mexico City to try to swing Mexico around from its Leftist direction to a middle of the road direction and it succeeded.

> I do not know whether you informed yourself about the magnitude of our political action program at the time--absolutely enormous.
>
> We were trying to follow the Soviets and all the satellites and the Cubans. At the same time, the main thrust of the Station's effort was to attempt to recruit Russians, Cubans and satellite people. 658/

Perhaps the nature of the CIA Mexico City Station's handling of the Oswald case prior to the assassination can best be summed up in Dave Phillips' response when he was asked how he would characterize that handling: "At the very best, it is not professional, at the best." 659/

V. Mexico City Station Reporting of Information Concerning Oswald After the Assassination

A. Reporting of information concerning the photograph of the Mexico Mystery Man

Even though some people in the Station clearly disassociated the photograph that was described in MEXI 6453 from Oswald after receiving the 10/11 cable, 659A 656/ it is clear that some people still considered it possible for some reason that the photograph was of Oswald. In October, Ann Goodpasture had argued this very point with Winston Scott. 659B 657/ On the day of the assassination, the Mexico City Station cabled Headquarters that it was sending as soon as possible "copies of only visitor to

294

Sovemb 28 Oct who could be identical with Oswald." ~~658/~~ 659C/ The date was later corrected to read 1 October. ~~659/~~ 659D/ Mr. Scott was not the only person in the Mexico Station who still thought that the photo could possibly be Oswald. Mr. Manell testified on this point:

> Q: As of the day of the assassination, you thought that there was still a possibility that there was a photograph of Oswald?
>
> A: Indeed. As I recall, we tried to get that photograph to headquarters as fast as we could. As it turned out it wasn't necessary to send it. But ~~tat~~ that was our intention. 660/

The photograph was sent to Dallas where Special Agent Odum of the FBI showed it to Mrs. Marguerite Oswald on 23 November 1963. 661/ Mrs. Oswald would later claim it was a photograph of Jack Ruby, 662/ beginning a period of controversy and uncertainty about this photograph that has continued to this day. The interaction of the Warren Commission and the CIA on this question is detailed in another section of this report. On 23 November Mexico informed Headquarters that "At obvious photos sent to Dallas were not iden with Lee Oswald." 663/ Since the time of the assassination, this man has been identified as Yuriy Ivanovich Moskalev, a Soviet KGB officer. The identification is unconfirmed and comes from only one source. 664/

295

In any case, it is unlikely that this man had any connection with Oswald outside of the mistaken belief of several CIA officers in Mexico. 665/

B. Reporting of information concerning Lee Harvey Oswald from the electronic intercept operation aimed at the Soviet Embassy

The first cable that Mexico sent to Headquarters after the assassination referred Headquarters to the cable traffic concerning Oswald that had occurred prior to the assassination. 666/ Headquarters replied that they had also noted the "connection." 667/

The cable traffic on the day of the assassination, and the early traffic from the following day, deal almost exclusively with the photograph of the person who later became known as the Mexico Mystery Man. The first cable 668/ obviously referred to the October 1 contact and brought it to Headquarters' attention by referring Headquarters to MEXI 6453. The first cable that specifically refers to the transcripts occurred on the following day. Headquarters cabled Mexico that it was important that the station review all transcripts "since 27 September to locate all material possibly pertinent." 669/ The cable went on to instruct the station to send the full transcripts and original tapes to Headquarters by special courier. 670/ The cable also asks if the original tapes are still available. 671/

This Committee has not been able to determine how the CIA Headquarters knew, on 23 November 1963, that a review of the tap material should begin with the production from 27 September, the day Oswald first appeared at the Soviet and Cuban Embassies. There is no recrd that Headquarters had been informed of the 9/27 visits prior to this cable having been sent. It is possible, as some witnesses have suggested, that his information was provided to CIA Headquarters by the FBI in Washington. 672/ If that is the case then it merely shifts the question. This may indicate that the CIA Headquarters was aware of the 9/27 visits prior to the assassination. An even stronger inference is that they were aware of those visits at least by the day after the assassination. The manner in which they learned of these visits by that date has not been determined. It is possible that Headquarters was informed by telephone. Even though witnesses generally denied that there was telephone communication between Mexico City and Headquarters at the time of the assassination, there is strong evidence that there was such communication on at least two instances. 673/

As will become evident, the transcripts were cabled to headquarters that same day. It is not clear why Headquarters asked that the transcripts and tapes, if they existed, be sent to Headquarters by special courier as opposed to cabling the transcripts which would have been faster. 674/ There is no record that indicates that these transcripts of Oswald's calls were sent to Headquarters by special courier.

On the 23rd, the Mexico City Station reported all of the substantive Oswald conversations to Headquarters by cable. Logically, one would expect that since the circumstantial evidence indicates that these conversations were linked to Oswald prior to the assassination, that they would all have been reported in one cable, especially in light of the request from Headquarters in DIR 84886. 675/ At this point, according to the files and records made available to the HSCA staff by the CIA, the Mexico City Station had informed Headquarters of

298

only the 9/28 and the 10/1/10:45 conversations. It should be noted that the 10/1/10:45 conversation makes reference to the fact that Oswald was also at the Embassy on 9/28. The next cable that Mexico City sent to Headquarters said, in part, "Other than Info already sent re Oswald's connection with Sov and Cuban Embs, no other info available." 675A/ The next cable reports a literal transcription of the 9/28 and 10/1/10:45 conversations. 677/ The next cable that refers to the transcripts of Oswald's conversations reports the 9/27/10:30 call, the 9.27/4:05 call, the 9.27/4:26 call, the 10/1/10:31 call, and the 10/3 call. 678/ With this cable Mexico City informed Headquarters of all the substantive information available from the Soviet Embassy electronic surveillance. 679/

Mexico City also informed Headquarters on 11/24/64 that the tapes from the period in which Oswald had visited the Soviet and Cuban Embassies had been erased. 680/ A cable on the previous day had informed Headquarters that it was "probable" that the Oswald tapes had been erased. 681/ An earlier cable that same day reported that "Station unable compare voice as first tape erased

299

prior receipt of second call " 682/ This would imply that the tape of the 28 September conversation, which may not have been received at the station until the 30th or the 1st of October, was destroyed before the tape of the conversation on the 1st of October was received in the station on that same day. In light of the standard operating procedures in effect in the station at that time, that possibility is highly unlikely. 683/

In view of what is now known about the standard operating procedures and about the Station's actions prior to the assassination, the Station's confusing and somewhat contradictory reporting after the assassination is strange. 684/ It is possible that these confusions and contradictions arose out of the crisis atmosphere at the station and the rush to report information. This Committee has not found any solid evidence that there were sinister qualities in the reporting after the assassination.

FOOTNOTES FOR LEE HARVEY OSWALD, MEXICO CITY AND THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

1/ See Warren Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736. In support of its account of Oswald's contacts with the Soviet and Cuban diplomatic missions, the Warren Commission published the following as exhibits:

1) A note from the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the Swiss Ambassador in Cuba. (Commission Exhibit 2445.)

2) Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Cuba's letter denying the visa. (Commission Exhibit 2564.)

3) Letterhead Memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Technical Examination of Photographs of Lee Harvey Oswald's Application for a Cuban Visa." (Commission exhibit 3127.)

4) The pages of Lee Harvey Oswald's notebook with the telephone numbers of the Cuban Consulate, the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's office. (Commission Exhibit 2121.)

5) A letter dated 11/9/63 from Lee Harvey Oswald to the Soviet Embassy in Washington, D.C. (Commission Exhibit 15.)

6) A letter from J. Edgar Hoover to the Warren Commission listing the contents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation's file holdings on Lee Harvey Oswald prior to the assassination. (Commission Exhibit 834. This document listed a Central Intelligence Agency "release" dated 10/9/63 that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.)

7) A memorandum dated 5/14/64 to the United States Embassy in Mexico City from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for Mexico. (Commission Exhibit 2120.)

8) A memorandum dated 6/9/64 from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mexico to the United States Embassy in Mexico City. (Commission Exhibit 2123.)

9) A letterhead memorandum to J. Lee Rankin from Richard Helms re: "Hours of Work at the Cuban and Soviet Consulates." (Commission Exhibit 2568.)

2/ Warren Commission Report, p. 305.

3/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, pp. 1-2; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 123; HSCA Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321; Thomas Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2; Robert Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2. [illegible] Phillips [illegible] 11/27 and 4/25/78 [illegible]

4/ Robert Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4.

5/ See JFK Exhibit F-438, reprinted at page .

6/ *Ibid*.

7/ *Ibid*.

8/ *Ibid*.

9/ *Ibid*.; see also Section II, A, 3, below.

10/ See JFK Exhibit F-438 and Section II, A, 3, below. A pulse camera is a camera equipped with a device that automatically triggers the shutter of the camera thereby exposing the film.

11/ Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 13

12/ Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)," p. 5. Hereinafter cited as Tab F Draft.

13/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 123; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 44.

14/ *Ibid*.

15/ Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 123; ~~Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 43.~~

302

16/ Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321.

17/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.

18/ Ibid.

19/ Ibid.

20/ Ibid., p. 3.

21/ Ibid.

22/ Ibid.

23/ Ibid., p. 4. CF: Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108 and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 45-46 in which Zambernardi is said to have printed the contact sheets.

24/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, pp. 1-2.

25/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.

26/ Ibid., para. 5, c. There were two common means of communication between the CIA Mexico City Station and CIA Headquarters: cables and dispatches. A dispatch from Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "HMMA." A dispatch from Headquarters to Mexico City always has the letter prefix "HMMW." A cable from Mexico City to Headquarters always has the letter prefix "MEXI." A cable from Headquarters always has the letter prefix "DIR."

27/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

28/ Ibid.

29/ See JFK Exhibit F-438.

30/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

31/ Ibid. There is general agreement that Robert Shaw was the case officer for this operation. The only person who takes exception to that characterization of Mr. Shaw's role in the project is Mr. Shaw. (See: Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 107-108; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 45-46; Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 6. But see: Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 34.)

32/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

33/ *Ibid.*

34/ *Ibid.*

35/ *Ibid.* The Committee declines to assume that there had been no production by the time of this dispatch in October. The handling of the production, i.e., when it was picked up and taken to the Station, when it was developed, etc., is not known. But as the following analysis will show, there is a strong likelihood that the pulse camera was operating in late September and early October 1963.

36/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.

37/ *Ibid.*

38/ *Ibid.*, para. 1.

39/ *Ibid.*, para. 2.

40/ *Ibid.*,para. 3.

41/ *Ibid.*, attachment B.

42/ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

43/ *Ibid.*

44/ *Ibid.*, Attachment C.

45/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para 5, c.

46/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3.

47/ *Ibid.*

304

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

48/ Ibid.

49/ Ibid., para. 4.

50/ MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.

51/ Ibid.

52/ Ibid.

53/ Ibid.

54/ HSCA Classified notes of discussion with CIA employee, 7/20/78.

55/ Ibid.

56/ HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, CIA #4098.

57/ Ibid., para. 5, g.

58/ HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.

59/ Ibid., para. 1.

60/ Ibid., para. 3.

61/ HSCA Classified Notes of discussion with CIA employee, 7/20/78. The cryptonym was changed on 8 July 1964. (HMMW 12725, 7/8/64.)

62/ Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/21/78.

63/ See Sections III, A, 5 and 6 below.

64/ JFK Classified Document #142.

65/ Ibid.

66/ JFK Classified Document #146.

67/ Ibid.

68/ Ibid.

Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation: ____________

69/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

70/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.

71/ *Ibid.*, para. 3.

72/ *Ibid.*

73/ *Ibid.*

74/ *Ibid.*, and para. 4.

75/ HMMA 22726, 1/16/64, para. 5, g.

76/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

77/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, para. 3.

78/ This assumption is considered reasonable in light of the desire of the Mexico City Station to establish coverage of the newly reopened Consulate entrance. See HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.

79/ HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 3.

80/ See MEXI 9440, 6/19/64; HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.

81/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4.

82/ 1966 LIONION Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66. "LIONION" was the CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound.

83/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 43-44.

84/ HSCA Outside Contact Report, David A. Phillips, 5/11/78, JFK Document No. 008321.

85/ MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.

86/ See discussion of this memo in Section II, B, below.

87/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 2.

88/ *Ibid*., p. 4.

89/ *Ibid*.

90/ HMMA 26414, 6/22/65, para. 5.

91/ See pages 24-27, , above.

92/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, pp. 1-2.

93/ *Ibid*.

94/ *Ibid*.

95/ *Ibid*.

96/ *Ibid*.

97/ *Ibid*.

98/ *Ibid*.

99/ *Ibid*.

100/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 47.

101/ Robert Shaw Testimony, 5/16/78, p. 35; HMMA 26006, 4/30/65, para. 8.

102/ *Ibid*.; HMMW 13645, 5/13/65; HMMA 26160, 5/21/65, paras. 1 and 2.

103/ See MEXI 9440 and HMMA 26414.

104/ JFK Classified Document #142.

105/ Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff, re: "Background on Mexico Station Support Assets (Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)", 2/10/77, p. 1. Hereinafter cited as Goodpasture Notes. See also: Tab F Draft, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.

106/ Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979, 11/18/60; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.

107/ HMMA-23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. It is possible that the Saturday coverage was more extensive in 1963 during Oswald's visit. See following discussion of Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-15979, 11/18/60;

Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61; Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-20052, 10/18/62; Reivew of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA-22387, 10/25/63; and Section B. 4, following "LIEMPTY" is the CIA cryptonyn referring to the overall photo-surveillance operation aimed at the Soviet diplomatic compound.

108/ Sketch based on HMMA-4300, 3/12/56 with attachments; Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3; Goodpasture Exhibit #1, 11/20/78.

109/ Goodpasture Notes, 2/10/77, p. 1; Tab F Draft, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 15.

110/ Ibid.

111/ Ibid.

112/ Ibid. See Map above. Even though LIMITED is referred to as the "primary" base because it was the first to be put into operation, the LILYRIC base produced the best photographs. (HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, para. 3)

113/ Tab F Draft, pp. 2 and 5; HSCA Executive Session Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 13; HSCA Staff Interview of Thomas Keenan, 3/24/78, p. 3.

114/ Ibid. on all preceeding; HSCA Staff Interview of Herbert and Barbara manell, 3/20/78, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 18-19; Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.

115/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 13.

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

116/ Herbert and Barbara Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5.

117/ Tab F Draft, p. 5; parenthetical in original.

118/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 9.

119/ MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.

120/ *Ibid*.

121/ Herbert and Barbara Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 5.

122/ See also Section II, A, 3 above.

123/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 23. Ms. Goodpasture stated that the case officer handling the project was Thomas Keenan. (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 34) Thomas Keenan could not remember with certainty the scope of the photographic coverage of the Soviet Embassy gate. (Thomas Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, pp. 3-6.)

124/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 28-29.

125/ See below for more detail.

126/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78; CIA File entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J 110) to 9 Dec. 1963 (J 163) from Archives-Job #70.209 Box #1 LIMITED Production Material."

127/ *Ibid*.

128/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 2; HSCA Staff Interview of Thomas Keenan, 3/24/78, p. 4; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; HMMA-31303, 2/7/67 with attached map; HMMA-23343, 4/30/64, para. 2.

129/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 2. See also map printed above at p. 32.

130/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78; CIA File entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J 110) to 9 Dec. 1963 (J 163) from Archives-Job #70.209 Box #1 LIMITED Production Material."

Classification: [illegible]

309

Classified by derivation: ________

131/ See above chart.

132/ Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 4.

133/ *Ibid*.

134/ *Ibid*.

135/ Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 15979, 11/18/60. Emphasis added. "LIMERICK" is a CIA cryptonym meaning "Soviet."

136/ Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61.

137/ See Review of Project LIEMPTY, attachments to HMMA 20052, 10/18/62 and HMMA 22387, 10/25/63.

138/ Memorandum from Chief of FI/OPS to Chief of Operations/DDP, 1/8/60.

139/ HMMA 14793, 4/8/60, para. 3.

140/ HMMA 23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. Emphasis added.

141/ Memorandum for the Record, 5/19/78 from Gabielson/Cornwell.

142/ Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/25/78. See also JFK Classified Documents #'s 142 and 146.

143/ Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July 1978," 8/20/78; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78, p. 1. CF. Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 47-51, Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, pp.50-51, where Ms. Goodpasture testified that although the logs and the contact prints from the LILYRIC base are missing, thenegatives are on file at the CIA.

144/ Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July 1978," 8/20/78; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 10/31/78, p. 1.

145/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 41. HMMA 23343, 4/30/64, para. 2. Win Scott was the Chief of Station in Mexico

310

City in 1963. He was a demanding and "hard" bose. (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 11.) He was also a stickler for detail and for recording information in a retrievable form. (Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 6; Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 6; Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 30.)

146/ Log Film 144; Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2.

147/ Log Film 144; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Tab F Draft, p. 5; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 41.

148/ Ibid.

149/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 7.

150/ Tab F. Draft, p. 2; Goodpasture Notes, p. 2. In 1962 or 1963 a cut-out was instituted in Alvarez's dealings with the LIMITED photographic base. The films were still developed and processed by Alvarez. (Project Renewal Request, attachment to HMMA-22387, attached to Memorandum for DDP from J. C. King, 11/27/63, section I, B, 1.)

151/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 2.

152/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 7; Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2.

153/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 33.

154/ Ibid.; Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 2.

155/ Ibid.

156/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 34.

157/ Ibid., p. 38.

158/ Keenan Interview, 3/24/78, p. 1.

159/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 33-38, 14-15.

160/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 6/26/78, pp. 3-5; Annual Fitness Report on Ann Goodpasture, 1/14/64.

161/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 14-15.

162/ Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, pp. 38-39.

163/ Ibid., p. 40.

164/ Ibid., p. 41.

165/ Alan White Deposition, 5/18/78, p. 7.

166/ Ibid.

167/ Ibid., p. 9.

168/ Ibid., p. 15.

169/ See H. Manell Deposition, 4/28/78, p. 4 ; where he calls Ms. Goodpasture "an assistant to the Chief of Station;" B. Manell Deposition 4/28/78, p. 9 , where she calls Ms. Goodpasture "Win Scott's right-hand person"; Robert Scelso Deposition, 5/16/78, p. 22 , where he calls Ms. Goodpasture "sort of the special assistant to Win Scott"; Robert Shaw Deposition, 5/16/78, p. 11 , where he says that Win Scott "relied very heavily on Ann Goodpasture."

170/ Goodpasture Deposition, 11/20/78, p. 34.

171/ Ibid., pp. 8-9. See Section II, C, below for detail on the telephone tapping operation.

172/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 34-35.

173/ Ibid., p. 35.

174/ Ibid., pp. 42-43.

175/ Ibid.

176/ HSCA Deposition of Barbara Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 11-12.

177/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 15. Herbert Manell was in charge of the Soviet Branch of the CIA Station in Mexico City. Barbara Manell was his assistant.

178/ Ibid.

179/ Ibid.; ~~Herbert and~~ Barbara Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 3. ~~Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 47.~~

180/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 15; HSCA Deposition of Barbara Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 11-12.

181/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 64-69; Arnold Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 4.

182/ Ibid. Goodpasture pp67-68

183/ Blind Mememorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald"; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/15/78, p. 4; ~~Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 65.~~

184/ Ibid. Goodpasture pp64-65

185/ Herbert and Barbara Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 12.

186/ Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about OSWALD"; Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA files, 3/15/78, p 4.

187/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, pp. 12-13; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, p. 6; HSCA Deposition of R. Shaw, pp. 21-24.

188/ CIA Component report on wiretap operations prepared by Paul Levister entitled "ZRSOLD and ZRJOINT: Two Telephone Tap Operations," pp. 10-11. Hereinafter cited as Levister Memo. Paul Levister (pseudonym) was a Headquarters technician. He was in Mexico City from 22 September to 1 October, 1963, preparing a report on this electronic intercept operation. (HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, para. 8.) This report will be referred to in some cases in this discussion of the intercept operation. The report, however, was simplified in order "not to risk losing the reader." (Memorandum from Chief, WHD, to COS, Mexico City, 12/30/63, para. 2.) This simplification was mainly in the area of a distinction between reels of tape and transcripts and in the procedures used in the collection and distribution of the reels and transcripts. (Ibid.) In this discussion of the operation other sources will be relied upon in these areas.

In addition to the telephone surveillance maintained by the CIA Station in cooperation with the Mexican Government, the Station also maintained some unilateral surveillance on the Soviets without the knowledge or cooperation of the Mexican officials. The unilateral surveillance was not directed at the Soviet diplomatic compound but rather at the private apartments of Soviet officials in Mexico City. (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 56; Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 7; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 7; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 16-17.) There was also unilateral coverage of some Cuban targets. (Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 51-52.) Ann Goodpasture testified that she believed that some of these targets were located in the Cuban diplomatic compound. (Ibid.) Ms. Goodpasture's memory is not borne out by the project file for the unilateral intercept. The only Cuban target of this project was the home of the Cuban Commercial Attache. (HMMA-22536, 11/9/63, para. F.2.)

189/ Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA-25141; Goodpasture Notes, p. 5.

190/ HMMA 21845, 1/30/63, para. 8.

191/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 4; Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 1; Levister Memo, p. 22.

192/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 5; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 54.

193/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 7.

194/ Tab F Draft, p. 4; Levister Memo, p. 21.

195/ Tab F Draft, p. 4; Memorandum to DDP from Chief WHD, 1/21/64, para. 5.

196/ Manell Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 1-2; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 4.

197/ Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 2; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 7, 3[illegible].

198/ Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 2.

199/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 22-24.

200/ Memorandum to the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott, 10/16/63, re: Lee Oswald/Contact with the Soviet Embassy; Manell Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 17-18; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 21, 31, 36; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 51-52.

201/ Phillips Testimony, 11/27/7[illegible], p. 19.

202/ *Ibid*., p. 20.

203/ HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 4. See also HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, para. 4; HMMA-22135, 9/13/63, para. 4; HMMA-22452, 11/7/63, para. 4 which all list reports of intercepts of American citizens, or English speaking people, in contact with Communists in Mexico. HMMA-21845, 7/30/63, para. 4, reports that the "traffic" is reviewed daily for English speaking persons making contact with the Soviet or Soviet satellite embassies.

204/ HMMA 22267, 10/8/63, para. 2.

205/ *Ibid*. In addition to the lines at the Soviet and Cuban compounds, telephones of interest to the Mexicans, lines at the Czechoslovakian and Yugoslavian Embassies were subjects of taps. (HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, para. 2.) The two lines disconnected on 23 September at the Cuban Embassy were put on lines at the Yugoslavian Embassy on the same day. (*Ibid*.)

206/ HMMA 22452, 11/7/63, para. 2.

207/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78, p. 1.

208/ See above; HMMA 22267, 10/18/63, para. 2.

209/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 7/26/78, p. 1.

210/ Ibid.

211/ See Tab F Draft, p. 4, which states that five Cuban lines were covered; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8, which also states that 5 Cuban lines were covered; and Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 11, and Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 51-53, in which they state their belief that more than three lines in the Cuban diplomatic compound were covered by this liaison intercept operation.

212/ Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA 25141, section D, 1, (b), (1).

213/ Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 11. See also Section III, A, 3, below.

214/ Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated, entitled "Periodic File Summary - Dave Phillips - 3 Components," p. 1.

215/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; Levister Memo, p. 22.

216/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2.

217/ Ibid., Levister Memo, p. 11.

218/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.

219/ Ibid., p. 2; Levister Memo, p. 11; HSCA Deposition of R. Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 20.

220/ Ibid. See also Tab F Draft p. 4. Cf. Herbert and Barbara Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 8, in whcih the Chief of the Soviet Section in the Mexico City Station claims never to have heard of such summaries.

221/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, pp. 2-3.

222/ Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Levister Memo, p. 11; Memorandum from Paul Levister to Chief/FI, 10/2/63, para. 2.

223/ Ibid.

316

224/ Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/6/78.

225/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2; Levister Memo, p. 11.

226/ Ibid.

227/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 2.

228/ Ibid., p. 4; Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attachment to HMMA-25141, Section D, (2).

229/ Ibid.

230/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.

231/ Ibid.

232/ Ibid., p. 2. The resuma provided quick summaries with the full detailed transcripts arriving at the Station one or two days after the resuma.

233/ Ibid.

234/ Ibid.

235/ Ibid.

236/ Ibid., p. 3.

237/ Ibid., p. 5.

238/ Ibid.

239/ Ibid., p. 2.

240/ HMMA 22267, 10/2/63, para. 8; HMMA 21845, 7/30/63, para. 8. For handling of English language conversations see Sections II, C, 4, b, (3), (c), (d) and (e) below.

241/ DIR 88680, 12/13/63; Goodpasture Testimoy, 4/13/78, p. 63; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 43.

242/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.

317

243/ Ibid.

244/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 11.

245/ After the assassination Headquarters asked Mexico City not to destroy any of the Soviet tapes from this operation. (DIR 87770, 12/9/63) A note written by Ann Goodpasture in 1963 seems to confirm Arehart's assumption that the tapes were retained at the station.

> (The Soviet tap operation) people just keep bringing in the reels to me (the ones I give them are not labeled so they don't necessarily know which ones return.) The storage problem is one for us and as the reels come in with transcriptions, I store them. When we can erase them, I'll take off the labels and send them back out.

(Note by Ann Goodpasture, 12/10/63, attached to DIR 87770, 12/9/63. Second parenthetical in original.)

246/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 5.

247/ Emphasis added. Mr. Arehart was absolutely positive that Cuban tapes were retained for thirty days because he maintained them in the special rack. (Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 3.) Hence, the two week "usual practice" is probably not correct insofar as the Cuban tapes are concerned.

248/ Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 40-47.

249/ Ibid.

250/ Ibid., p. 47.

251/ p. 5.

252/ p. 8.

253/ p. 61.

254/ Ibid.; Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Tab F Draft, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 3/28/78, pp. 28-29; Boris Tarasoff Testimony, 4/21/78, p. 7; HMMA-22267, 10/8/63, paras.

3 and 8; HMMA-21845, 7/30/63, paras. 3 and 8; Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 4; Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 4.

255/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 19.

256/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 2-3.

257/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.

258/ *Ibid*.

259/ *Ibid*. See also Section (e) below.

260/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 2-4.

261/ Levister Memo, p. 32.

262/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 8; Boris and Anna Tarasoff Interview, 4/11/78; Boris and Anna Tarasoff Interview, 11/30/76, p. 17. The Spanish transcriptions had the name of the Embassy which was taped at the top of the first page of each transcript. (Transcript here means one day's coverage on one telephone line.) Following the name of the Embassy, the number of the phone covered is given. The date and times of coverage follow immediately after the phone number. The reel number is also given at the top of the page. Along the left-hand column of the page is the cite to the meter number on the tape recorder where the transcribed conversation is located. Generally, the time that the conversation occured, and a notation as to whether it is an incoming or outgoing call, appears at the beginning of the transcribed conversations. (Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Document, 3/9/78, p. 1; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 69-70.) The format of the transcripts from the Cuban Embassy was essentially the same as the format of the Spanish language transcripts from the Soviet Embassy. (Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA documents, 5/12/78, pp. 1-2; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 1-2.) Conversations that were in Russian were noted on the Spanish transcript were a number referring to the place on the reel where the conversation occurred. (Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 1; CIA Transcript, CIA No. 32.)

not transcribed

263/ ~~A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 8~~; Tarasoff Interview, 4/11/78; Tarasoff Interview, 11/30/76, pp. 17-18.

264/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 9.

265/ Ibid. Mr. Tarasoff prepared an original and two carbon copies of all of his transcriptions. All three copies were delivered to the Station. (B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 15.) One carbon was cut and pasted onto a separate sheet of paper, with the conversations grouped by identity of the caller or by subject matter. This was done by Mrs. Tarasoff. (Ibid., and p. 19.) The original, one intact carbon and the one cut up carbon were all delivered to the station. (Ibid.)

320

266/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. [illegible]9.

267/ Ibid., p. 12.

A 268/ Goodpasture Notes, p. 8; Tab F Draft, p. 5.

269/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 61.

270/ ~~Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 112~~; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 36; A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-11; B. Manell Deposition, 4/28/78, p. 28.

271/ Tab F Draft, pp. 5-6; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 36-37.

272/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; HMMA 22267, 10/8/63, para. 8; HMMA 21845, 7/30/63, para. 8; HMMA 22452, 11/7/63, para. 8.

273/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.

274/ Ibid. The daily resuma for Spanish language conversations (See Section II, C, 4, b, (1), above) largely negated the need for a smiliar procedure for Spanish language conversations in that the important and/or interesting ones were summarized in the resuma.

275/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5.

276/ Ibid.

277/ Ibid.

278/ Ibid.

279/ HMMA 22005, 8/23/63, para. 4. See also Levister Memo, p. 19.

280/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-12.

281/ Ibid.

TA 282/ HMMA 22005, 8/23/63, para. 4.

283/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. ~~8~~ 4.

284/ *Ibid*., p. 6.

285/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 8-12.

286/ *Ibid*., p. 12; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 62-63.

287/ *Ibid*.

288/ *Ibid*.; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 8.

289/ Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 63; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 14.

290/ Manell Interview, 3/20/78, p. 3; Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 14-16; Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 54, 63.

291/ *Ibid*.

292/ Project Renewal Request, 1/11/65, attached to HMMA 25141.

293/ HMMA-22135, 9/13/63, para. 3; HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 3.

294/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 1.

295/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 7.

296/ *Ibid*., pp. 16-19; Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 3-4.

297/ *Ibid*., pp. 2-3.

298/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 30.

299/ *Ibid*., p. 13.

300/ *Ibid*.

301/ *Ibid*., p. 14; Manell Interview, 3/20/78, pp. 4 and 11.

302/ See Section II above.

303/ See Section II, C, 4 above

304/ See Sections II, A and B above.

305/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 5; MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.

306/ Ibid.; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.

307/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 6.

308/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 6-7; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.

309/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 7-10; MEXI 7025, 11/23/63; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.

310/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 10-12, CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/28/63.

311/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 12; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.

312/ CIA Mexico City Investigation Chronology, Bulky #WX-7241, Vol. I, p. 3. The transcript of this call does not give the time the call occured. (CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63)

313/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, pp. 12-14; CIA Transcript from the Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.

314/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78, p. 14; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/3/63.

315/ DIR 74830, 10/10/63. See also MEXI 6453, 10/8/63 and Section IV, B, below.

316/ DIR 74830, 10/11/63. (Mexico City copy.)

317/ Ibid.

318/ Ibid.

323

319/ Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78, p. 1. On September 27, 1963, at 10:54 a.m., the following call occured. A woman named Silvia named Guillermo Ruiz. Ruiz tells her that he has not yet been able to reach the consul and because of that he has not called her. Silvia tells him that "we" have no time for that and asks him for the Consul's phone number. Ruiz responds by asking her not to get annoyed and he wants to know if Silvia wishes to speak to the Consul personally. Silvia responds that she does. Ruiz says that the number is 11-28-47. Silvia says that is fine and the conversation ends. (CIA transcript from Cuban Embassy, 9/27/63.) It cannot be determined whether this caller was indeed Silvia Duran or if she subsequently called the Consul since Duran's office phone was not tapped. The tap was on the telephone used by Ruiz.

320/ Classifed Staff Summaries of Review of CIA Documents, undated and 5/12/78.

321/ See Sections II, A and B above.

322/ See Sections II, C, 4, b, (2), (c) and (d) above.

323/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78.

324/ See Section III, A, 1 above.

325/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 4.

326/ Ibid.

327/ Ibid., p. 6.

328/ Ibid.

329/ Ibid.

330/ Ibid.

331/ Ibid. See also Sections II, C, 4, b, (3), (c) and (e), above.

332/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 7-8.

333/ Ibid.

334/ See Section II, C, 4 b, (3), (e) above.

335/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 7-8.

336/ Ibid., p. 9.

337/ Ibid., p. 10.

338/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 25.

339/ Ibid., p. 26.

340/ Ibid.

341/ Ibid., p. 27.

342/ Ibid., p. 33.

343/ Ibid.

344/ See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), (e), above.

345/ See Section III, B below.

346/ Blind Memo re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de Duran, Source: LI/4, 11/26/63, p. 5.

347/ A. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, p. 10. It is also interesting to note that Ms. Duran's statement that Oswald had blond hair, is also left out of subsequent CIA and Mexican official reports. (See Section V, C and VI, A below.)

348/ Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, pp. 52-53.

349/ Daniel Stanley Watson Interview, 6/4/78, p. 1.

350/ Ibid., p. 2.

351/ Ibid. James Angleton testified that he had in fact cleaned out Win Scott's safe but that he had not found any photographs or intercept transcripts pertaining to Lee Harvey Oswald. (HSCA Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 116.)

352/ Classified Letter from Blakey to Breckinridge, 7/6/78.

353/ Draft of letter from Scott to John Barron, 11/25/70, p. 3. Emphasis added.

354/ Foul Foe manuscript, p. 267.

355/ See discussion above.

356/ Blind Memo re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de Duran; Source: LI/4, 11/26/63, p. 5.

357/ See Sections V, C and VI, A, below.

358/ Eusebio Azcue Public Testimony, 9/18/78, pp. 33-35.

359/ See Section II, C, 3 above.

360/ See Sections II, A and B, above.

361/ See below.

362/ See below.

363/ It should be noted that the two sets of photographs which are missing are the most relevant of all the photographs produced by the Mexico City surveillance operations. Had a photograph of Oswald been obtained, it would have most likely have been done by one or both of the bases from which production is missing. Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate which was covered by a pulse camera. The photographs of people entering the Cuban Embassy have been made available to this Committee for review but the material from the pulse camera which covered the entrance to the Consulate which Oswald visited has not been forthcoming. (See Section II, A, 3, above, for details.) The documented standard operating procedure of the Soviet target bases indicates that LILYRIC, the base from which production was not forthcoming, would have been the one in operation at the time of

Oswald's visit. (See Section II, B, 4 above and Section (b) below for details.) In addition, HMMA-14793, 4/8/60, indicated that the base from which production is missing "performs the best photography of persons visiting the front gate."

364/ Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 95; HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaletti, 5/19/78, p. 65; HSCA Deposition of Allen White, 5/18/78, p. 42; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 51; Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 98.

365/ See preceding Section III, A, 1. In fact, Oswald may have visited the Soviet Embassy 3 times also. See analysis in Classified Letter from Turner to Stokes 10/25/78, JFK Classified Document #146.

366/ Zambernardi Interview, 6/3/78, p. 6.

367/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

368/ See Sections II, A and B, above.

369/ See Sections II, A, 3 and II, B, 3 above.

370/ HSCA Outside Contact Report, Phillip Agee, 1/6/78, JFK Document No. 004578.

371/ Phillip Agee Interview, 1/11/78, p. 1, JFK Document No. 004633.

372/ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

373/ "Elsie Scaleti" is the CIA assigned pseudonym of this individual.

374/ Agee Interview, 1/11/78, pp. 3-4.

375/ *Ibid.*

376/ *Ibid.*

377/ *Ibid.*

378/ *Ibid.*

Classification: TOP SECRET

[illegible]

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

379/ Ibid., pp. 5-6.

380/ Ibid., pp. 6-7.

381/ Ibid., p. 11.

382/ Ibid., pp. 18-19.

383/ Ibid., p. 12.

384/ Daniel Stanley Watson Interview, 6/4/78, p. 1.

385/ Ibid.

386/ Ibid.

387/ Ibid.

388/ Ibid.

389/ Ibid.

390/ Ibid.

391/ Ibid.

392/ Ibid.

393/ Ibid. and p. 2.

394/ Ibid., p. 2.

395/ See HSCA Deposition of James Angleton, 10/5/78, p. 116.

396/ Watson Interview, 6/4/78, p. 2.

397/ Ibid.

398/ Joseph B. Smith Interview, 10/19/77, p. 2, JFK Document No. 003012.

399/ Ibid.

400/ Ibid.

TOP SECRET

328

Classification: [illegible]

Classified by derivation: ________

401/ Joseph B. Smith Interview, 4/20/78, p. 1, JFK Document No. 008279.

402/ *Ibid.*, p. 6.

403/ *Ibid.*

404/ *Ibid.*

405/ *Ibid.*

406/ *Ibid.*

407/ *Ibid.*

408/ *Ibid.*, and p. 7. Des Fitzgerald was the Chief of the CIA's Cuban Task Force in 1964. Droller was a CIA Officer.

409/ *Ibid.*, p. 7. Mr. Smith explained the "Counter-Intelligence mentality" by saying that people who had it were "rabid anti-Communists" (Smith Interview, 11/2/77, p. 3, JFK Document No. 003012) and "confirmed believers in the world Communist conspiracy theory...These guys actually believed that the split between the Russians and Chinese was a great deceptive operation. Colby (former Director of Central Intelligence) even says something more amazing. He claims that Angleton absolutely believed that all CIA operations were run by the KGB. (Soviet Intelligence.) He says Angleton (former Chief of Counter-Intelligence for the CIA) believed that every top Soviet defector we took in was a plant. I think that's incredible but I know there were some guys on his staff were his true believers." (Smith Interview, 4/20/78, p. 3, JFK Document No. 008279.)

410/ *Ibid.*, p. 7.

411/ *Ibid.*

412/ *Ibid.*

413/ *Ibid.*

414/ Joseph Piccolo Interview, 8/11/78, p. 1.

329

415/ Ibid., p. 4.

416/ Ibid.

417/ Ibid.

418/ Ibid.

419/ Ibid.

420/ Ibid., p. 4.

421/ Ibid., p. 4.

422/ Ibid., p. 5.

423/ Ibid.

424/ Ibid.

425/ Ibid.

426/ Ibid.

427/ Ibid.

428/ Ibid.

429/ Ibid.

430/ Ibid.

431/ Ibid.~~, pp. 4-5~~.

432/ Ibid., p. 6.

433/ Dan Neiscuir Interview, 8/29/78, p. 1, JFK Classified Document No. 156.

434/ Ibid.

435/ Ibid.

436/ Ibid.

437/ Ibid.

438/ Ibid.

439/ Ibid.

440/ Ibid.

441/ Ibid.

442/ Ibid.

443/ Ibid.

444/ In considering the above detailed allegations, it is important to distinguish between the allegation that a photograph was found at headquarters as opposed to the assertion that a photograph was found in Mexico City. It is also important to remember that these allegations are what can be termed "grapevine stores." There was a photograph found in Mexico City of a man that was thought possibly to be Oswald. This photograph and the circumstances surrounding it will be dealt with in a subsequent section. Ms. Anne Goodpasture of the Mexico City Station found this photograph. (See below.) In the absence of any evidence otherwise--Note: The Watson allegation says there was a photo in Mexico City in the mid-60's; not that it was found there--it is most likely that the grapevine stories about a photo being found in Mexico arise from Ms. Goodpasture's reporting the photo of the man who has since become known as the Mexico mystery man in the same cable that reported Oswald's visit to the Soviet Embassy. (See below.) The findings of this Committee regarding the general Mexico City surveillance operations are presented in Section II, A and B above. In summary, this Committee found that there were three photographic surveillance bases (four cameras) that may have photographed Lee Harvey Oswald in September and October of 1963. This was determined from analysis of project files for these operations and the testimony of CIA officials. (See preceding sections.)

445/ Letter from Blakey to Carpentier, 3/2/78, JFK Document No. 005879.

331

446/ See JFK Classified Document No. 146; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, undated; HSCA Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 5/12/78; JFK Classified Document No. 142; and Sections II, A, 4 and II, B, 3 above.

447/ See JFK Classified Document No. 142; JFK Classified Document No. 146.

448/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 37, 96; HSCA Deposition of Ann Elizabeth Goldsborough Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 73; HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 56; HSCA Deposition of Allen White, 5/18/78, p. 25; HSCA Deposition of H. Mannell, 4/28/78, pp. 20, 47; David Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 67; David Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 44; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 77, 97.

449/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, pp. 6-7.

450/ Elsie Scaleti Interview, 3/30/78, pp. 3-4.

451/ Ibid.

452/ Ibid.

453/ Ibid.

454/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 31.

455/ Ibid.

456/ In addressing this question, the HSCA staff reviewed all the cable and dispatch traffic between Mexico City and Headquarters for the period from October 1, 1963 to 26 November 1963 in an attempt to determine whether Oswald's photo may have been sent to Headquarters. This examination also revealed no evidence that a photograph of Oswald was sent to CIA Headquarters. This Committee did find that there were several types of communications between Headquarters and field stations that were treated as non-record material. Because of the non-record nature of these communications, it was not possible to review that material.

332

457/ See Section II, A, 3 above.

458/ HMMA 22307, 10/18/63, para. 5, c.

459/ See Section II, A, 3 above.

460/ Ibid.

461/ HMMA 22433, 11/7/63, attachments B and C.

462/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaletti, 5/19/78, pp. 44-47.

463/ HSCA Deposition of Ann E. G. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 70; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 31.

464/ Ibid.

465/ Ibid., and p. 32.

466/ Ibid., p. 7.

467/ Ibid., p. 47.

468/ Ibid. Emphasis added.

469/ Foul Foe manuscript, p. 27[illegible].

470/ See Section III, A, 1 above for a more detailed exposition of the conversations.

471/ Memorandum to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63, with seven attachments.

472/ Ibid.

473/ Ibid., p. 1.

474/ Ibid.

475/ Ibid., p. 9.

476/ Warren Commission Testimony of Pamela Mumford, 5/19/64, Vol. II, p. 217; Warren Commission Testimony of Evaristo Rodriguez, 7/21/64, Vol. II, p. 341; Commission Exhibit

333

2120, p. 7; Commission Exhibit 2121, p. 54. CF, Warren Commission Testimony of Nelson Delgado, Vol. VIII, p. 236 and 237 in which it is claimed that Oswald spoke Castillian Spanish.

477/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/3/63.

478/ If one assumes that Oswald could not speak any Spanish then only two conclusions about the first three calls of 9/27/63 are possible: 1) either these calls do not pertain to Oswald, or 2) they do pertain to Oswald but were made by someone other than Lee Harvey Oswald. This second possible conclusion will be addressed in a more detailed fashion in subsequent sections due to its ramifications vis a vis Oswald's activities and possible associates as opposed to the substance of the information available to the CIA Station prior to the assassination.

479/ Warren Commission Exhibit 2121, p. 112.

480/ Classified Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 3/9/78.

481/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63; MEXI 6453, 10/8/63. This cable was sent from Mexico on 8 October and was received by Headquarters on 9 October. Hence, it is alternately referred to as either the 10/8 or 10/9 cable.

482/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63; B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 26-28.

483/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/78.

484/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/28/63.

485/ A "P" file is simply a personality file. It was the Mexico City Station equivalent of a 201 file.

486/ Ibid.

487/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 38; HSCA Deposition of Barbara Manell, 4/28/78, p. 72.

488/ Ibid.

489/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 46.

490/ Ibid.; CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.

491/ Ibid.

492/ Ibid.; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 76.

493/ Ibid., HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 46.

494/ HSCA Deposition of Barbara Manell, 4/28/78, p. 69; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 38-39,

495/ HSCA Deposition of Alan White, 5/18/78, pp. 33-34; HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 46; HSCA Deposition of Barbara Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89.

496/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 107; MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 2.

497/ 1977 CIA Inspector General's Report, Tab G-2, pp. 2-3. Hereinafter cited as '77 IGR.

498/ See Sections III, B, 2, above, and IV, B, below.

499/ D. Phillips Interview, 8/24/78; Report on Oswald from John Scelso to J. Angleton, 12/24/63, p. 4.

500/ Ibid.

501/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 9/27/78.

502/ Ibid.

503/ See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), above.

504/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 72; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 38.

505/ CIA Transcript from Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 76.

506/ CIA transcripts from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63.

507/ Tab F Draft, p. 5.

508/ Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, pp. 4-5.

509/ HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. [illegible]; see also Section II, C, 4 above.

510/ *Ibid.*

511/ *Ibid.*; Arehart Interview, 6/2/78, p. 5; Testimony of B. Tarasoff, 4/12/78, p. 10.

512/ Testimony of Boris Tarasoff 4/12/78, p. 11; Testimony of A. Tarasoff, 4/12/78, p. 14.

513/ Tab F Draft, p. 5.

514/ *Ibid.*

515/ Tab F Draft, p. 5; Preceding Section II, B, 5; Log Film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63.

516/ See *Nightwatch*, pp. 140-141.

517/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 64.

518/ MEXI 6453, 10/8/63.

519/ *Ibid.*

520/ *Ibid.*

521/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 58; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 35.

522/ Classified HSCA Staff Summary of CIA documents, undated, entitled "Periodic File Summary - Dave Phillips - 3 Components."

523/ Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in Sending the first Cable about Oswald."

524/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 30.

525/ Tab F Draft, p. 5; MEXI 6453, 10/8/63; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 62-63; HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/63, p. 21.

526/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 56-57.

527/ Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 6/26/78, p. 4.

528/ *Ibid.*

529/ Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 65. *CF.* "Foul Foe" manuscript, p. 268, where Win Scott writes: "In fact, Lee Harvey Oswald became a person of great interest to us during this 27 September to 2 October 1963 period"; and on page 269, where he writes: "Because we thought at first that Lee Harvey Oswald might be a dangerous potential defector from the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union, he was of great interest to us, so we kept a special watch on him and his activities."

530/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 25.

531/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 25-26.

532/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 26.

533/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 36.

534/ See above. *Cf.* "Foul Foe' manuscript, pp. 268-269.

535/ HSCA Deposition of Barbara Manell, 4/28/78, p. 52.

536/ HSCA Deposition of Alan White, 5/18/78, p. 26-28.

537/ *Ibid.*

538/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 30.

337

539/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 51-52. The HSCA has requested a copy of any internal regulations or any liaison agreement with the Federal Bureau of Investigation that may have been in existence in 1963. (Letter to Breckinridge, 7/20/78.) The CIA responded "that there are not now, nor were there any, agreements between the CIA and FBI or other U.S. government agencies concerning CIA responsibility to report on contacts of U.S. cutizens with Communist Embassies or officials... The CIA under operative legislation has a counterintelligence responsibility for counterintelligence cases but it is notamatter of agreement with other agencies nor does it concern simple contacts of Americans abroad with Communist Embassies or officials." (Memorandum to Breckinridge from Shepanek, 7/31/78.)

540/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 69; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/73, pp. 38-39,

541/ See Section III, B, 2, above.

542/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 59-60.

543/ *Ibid.*, p. 62.

544/ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

545/ MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 1.

546/ Tab F Draft, p. 5; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 62-63, 66; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 21; MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 1.

547/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 62-63.

548/ MEXI 6453, 10/8/63, para. 2. The connection of this photograph to Oswald by including the description in the cable that reported Oswald's contact with the Soviet Embassy has created more confusion and controversy than perhaps any other CIA related issue stemming from assassination. Consequently, this Committee has made an attempt to determine the circumstances surrounding the mistaken linkage of this photograph to Oswald as well as the consequences of that mistake. The consequences of the mistake will be dealt with in more detail in subsequent sections.

549/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 33; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 35; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 81, 86-87.

550/ HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 28.

551/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 107. See also Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 84; and HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 32.

552/ Log Film 143, 9/25/63 through 9/27/63.

553/ HSCA Deposition of Ann Goodpasture, 11/16/70, pp. 57-58.

554/ CIA Transcript from Russian Embassy, 10/1/63.

555/ This mistake was evidently not discovered until 1976. See WX7241, a chronology of the Mexico City investigation prepared by Raymond Rocca in 1967 which lists the date as 1 October; A note on HMMW-15488, 5/18/67 which indicates that Ann Goodpasture checked the photographs and that "negatives are in LIMITED photo chrono for 1 Oct 1963."

556/ Log film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63.

557/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 102.

558/ See Classified HSCA Staff Summary of Review of CIA Documents, 6/26/78, pp. 3-5.

559/ DIR 84888, 11/23/63.

560/ See Section III, A, 5 above.

561/ MEXI 6453, 10/9/63.

562/ Ibid.

563/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 34; HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, p. 26.

564/ Ibid.

565/ Ibid.

566/ Ibid. A restricted file is a method of keeping abreast of any information that develops on the subject of the file. The file is marked to indicate that it cannot be reviewed without the permission of the person who made the restriction. The effect is that if anyone wants to see the file, the custodian of the file learns of that desire and the information leading to it. (HSCA Deposition of Ann E. G. Egerter 5/19/78, p. 51.)

567/ See Section

568/ HSCA Deposition of A. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 77.

569/ Deposition of Elsie Scaleti 5/19/78, p. 29.

570/ HSCA Deposition of Ann Egerter, 5/17/78, pp. 78-79.

571/ Ibid., pp. 70-71; HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, p. 33.

572/ Ibid. The Zed (Greenwich) times stamped on the cable and the teletype indicates that the teletype was sent before the cable.

573/ DIR 74830, 10/10/63.

574/ Ibid.

575/ Ibid.

576/ Ibid.

577/ Teletype from CIA to State, FBI and Navy, DIR 74678, 10/10/63.

578/ Ibid.

579/ The mistaken identification of Oswald as "Lee Henry" is dealt with in another section of this final report.

580/ HSCA Deposition of A. Egerter, 5/17/78, p. 77.

340

581/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, pp. 34-35.

582/ Ibid.

583/ Ibid., pp. 35-37/

584/ Elsie Scaleti Interview, 3/30/78, p. 8.

585/ Ibid., pp. 11-13.

586/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 37.

587/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 51.

588/ Report on Oswald from John Scelso, C/WH/3, to James Angleton, C/CI, 12/24/63, p. 4.

589/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 40-43. Emphasis added.

590/ Ibid.

591/ See preceding text.

592/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie Scaleti, 5/19/78, p. 31.

593/ Ibid., p. 30; See also HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 27, 28.

594/ See HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 40-43, 51; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 37; HMMA-22005, 8/23/63, para. 4.

595/ '77 IGR, Tab G.3, p. 3.

596/ Ibid.

597/ Teletypes from CIA to State, FBI and Navy, 10/10/63, DIR 74678.

598/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 43; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 89-90.

341

599/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, p. 30.

600/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 90-91; Ann Goodpasture Testiony, 4/13/78, p. 142.

601/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 92-93.

602/ Scott's manuscript may provide a clue when he writes that during his first contact with the Soviet Embassy, Oswald "gave his name very slowly and distinctly." (Foul Foe Manuscript, p. 267.) If Oswald used his middle name at that time it would explain why Scott wrote "sic." by "Henry." But it should be noted that Oswald's name does not come up in any of the transcripts made available by the CIA until 10/1/63, and Oswald's middle name is not given in that transcript. It is possible that there is one additional transcript, possibly of the conversation that Scott, on page 267 of his manuscript, refers to as Oswald's "first contact," which, if in existence, has not been made available to this Committee. (See Section III, A, 5, above.)

603/ DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

604/ HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 35; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 104.

605/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony 4/13/78, p. 105.

606/ Emphasis in original.

607/ Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

608/ HSCA Deposition of Alan White, 5/18/78, pp. 33-34; HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 46; HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89.

609/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 43-44; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 89.

610/ HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 37.

611/ See Section III, A, 7, above.

612/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

613/ Note on Article by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission," 10/21/64.

614/ The Chief of the Mexico Branch at Headquarters has told this Committee that it is his belief that the tapes were probably still in existence at the time of the assassination. (HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 76-77.) But the tesitmony of the persons at the Mexico City Station is consistent in saying that the tapes did not exist at the time of the assassination. (See HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 29; HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 20; David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 63; David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 17, 23; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.)

615/ See Section II, C, 4, b, (3), (e); Tab F Draft, pp. 5-6.

616/ If the 9/28/63 conversation received expedited handling also it is possible that it would have been in the Station prior to the first or second of October.

617/ A. Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 95.

618/ DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 2.

619/ MEXI 7023, 11/23/63, para. 2.

620/ MEXI 7025, 11/23/63, para. 4.

621/ MEXI 7054, 11/24/63, para. 3.

622/ See discussion in text above and below.

623/ See Section II, C, 4, above.

624/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94.

625/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 95-96; See also pp. 77, 93, 110.

✓626/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, 13.

✓627/ HSCA Deposition of Herbert Manell, 4/28/78, p. 28.

628/ See discussion above.

629/ See footnote 614 above.

✓630/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 96.

631/ ✓HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, p. 29; ✓HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 20; ✓David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 63; ✓David A. Phillips Testimony, 4/25/78, pp. 17-23; Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 94. ✓

✓632/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, pp. 76-77.

✓633/ B. Tarasoff Testimony, 4/12/78, pp. 12, 13.

✓634/ See Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 94-95, 77.

✓635/ HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 28.

636/ H. Manell and B. Manell Interview, 3/28/78, pp. 14-15; ✓HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, pp. 33-34; ✓HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 88-89, 84-86; ✓HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 38-39, 46.

✓637/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. Emphasis added.

✓638/ Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

✓639/ MEXI 6534, 10/15/63.

? [illegible] dated Oct. 16, not 15

640/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 96.

641/ H. Manell and B. Manell Interview, 3/18/78, p. 14-45; ✓HSCA Deposition of Allan White, 5/18/78, p. 33-34; ✓HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 84-86, 88-89; ✓HSCA Deposition of H. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 38-39, 46; ✓Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, p. 75. See also Section III, B., above.

642/ Memorandum for the Ambassador from Winston M. Scott, re: Lee OSWALD/Contact with the Soviet Embassy, 10/16/63. Emphasis added.

643/ Manell Interview, 3/28/78, p. 17

644/ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

645/ There are some cryptic references to the CIA Station trying to determine Oswald's whereabouts after receiving the 10/11 cable. (See Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 4/13/78, p. 113.) The procedures used in this attempt and the actions that may have been taken have not been determined. If any records exist of these efforts they have not been made available to this Committee.

646/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaleti, 5/19/78, p. 43.

647/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 61-62.

648/ HSCA Deposition of Elsie I. Scaleti, 5/19/78, pp. 29-30.

649/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 44-47.

650/ HSCA Deposition of Robert Shaw, 5/16/78, pp. 62, 69.

651/ HSCA Deposition of Alan White, 5/18/78, p. 36.

652/ Ann Goodpasture Testimony, 4/13/78, pp. 111-114.

653/ HSCA Deposition of B. Manell, 4/28/78, pp. 75-76; See also *Ibid.*, p. 81.

654/ See discussion above.

655/ Phillips Interview, 8/30/78, p 5.

656/ Foul Foe manuscript, pp. 268-269. Emphasis added.

657/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 63-64.

658/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 64-65.

659/ David A. Phillips Testimony, 11/27/76, p. 96.

345

659-A/See preceding section.

659-B/ *Ibid*.

659-C/ MEXI 7014, 11/22/63, para. 3.

659-D/ MEXI 7203, 11/23/63, para. 3.

660/ HSCA Depositin of H. Manell, 4/28/78, p. 53.

661/ JFK Classified Document, #131.

662/ *Ibid*.

663/ MEXI 7029, 11/23/63, para. 1.

664/ Clasified HSCA Staff Summary, 3/15/78, p. 11.

665/ See Section III, B, 2, above.

666/ MEXI 7014, 11/22/63, para. 2.

667/ DIR 84802, 11/22/63; para. 1. The sequence of the cables can be determined in that they were numbered sequentially as they were sent. In this regard it should be noted that this system can indicate the order in which the cables were sent but not the order in which they were written because, at least in Mexico, several of the Station officers were drafting and sending cables. Hence, the order of writing them may not be the same as the order in which they were sent.

668/ MEXI 7014; see preceding paragraph.

669/ DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 1.

670/ *Ibid*., para. 2

671/ *Ibid*., para. 3.

672/ HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 37.

346

673/ David A. Phillips interview, 8/24/78, p. 16; Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033, 11/23/63; HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 45, 87.

674/ DIR 84886, 11/23/63, para. 2.

675/ MEXI 7023, 11/23/63.

676/ MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 6.

677/ MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.

678/ MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.

679/ HSCA staff have wondered whether or not the Mexico City Station was entirely forthcoming of their own will with Headquarters. This speculation was based on three pieces of information. The first is the report in MEXI 7024 that Headquarters had all the available information. The second is a note from Win Scott on the Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033 which says:

> I had a call from Washington (John Scelso) at 1620 hours on 23/XI. I told John Scelso at 1630 hours (our time) on 23/XI that this would be on route to him.

The third is a cable reporting that on the 23rd Win Scott had an urgent call to see the President of Mexico. The cable reports that Scott expected the President to express his condolences over the assassination but "developed that (Mexican agent) had located call to Soviet Embassy of Lee Oswald made on 28 September. Believe fact that (President of Mexico) aware of this contact (from our joint operation) and passed data to COS is important." (MEXI 7023, 11/23/63, paras. 2 and 3)

The Committee declines to speculate that the Mexico City Station was possibly considering not reporting all the information available to them. It was considered that this may have been contemplated in order to protect themselves from a charge about their failure to report the information prior to the assassination.

347

The discovery that the Mexicans were also aware of the conversations would have made holding back the transcripts perilous in that the Mexicans could have revealed their existence to the detriment of the Station. Hence, the full report followed very shortly after the meeting between the Mexican President and Win Scott, and immediately after Scott discussed the situation with his nominal superior in Washington by telephone. Scott's superior was asked about this. He said that he did not remember the substance of his telephone call to Win Scott on the 23rd. (HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, p. 88) "I do not have any idea why (I called). I may have been ordered to call him on any number of things." (Ibid., p. 87.) He was also asked about Scott's meeting with the Mexican President.

> You get a psychological question. The Chief of Station is called in to speak to the President of Mexico. There had been a big fight when the new Ambassador got there--no, it wasn't that. It was a very peculiar situation in Mexico whereby the Mexican President's primary contact with the U.S. government was through our Chief of Station rather than through the Ambassadors. This caused no great problem with the then-Ambassador whose name I have forgotten.
>
> Q: Thomas Mann?
>
> A: Yes. He was a very fine guy and recognized the usefulness of this arrangement. The next Ambassador, Mr. Freeman, tried to cut Win Scott out of contact with the President of Mexico, whereupon the President of Mexico called in Win Scott and said, "I want you to send a cable to the White House telling them I am not going to deal with this jackass, I want to deal only with you."
>
> So, the result was eventually, Winston Scott and Ambassador Freeman went to the White House and talked to President Johnson and straightened the whole thing out in favor of Winston Scott.

348

> So, Scott is just remarking that it is interesting that the President of Mexico is aware of our telephone operation.

Q: He should have been since it was a liaison operation.

A: Yes. But you do not always know whether he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. I think we always knew he was informed. It is just significant that the person calls you in and says, here is some intelligence about the Kennedy thing.

(HSCA Deposition of John Scelso, 5/16/78, pp. 83-84.)

Win Scott indicated that he was going to write a memorandum concerning his meeting with the President of Mexico. (Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7028, 11/23/63.) If Mr. Scott wrote such a memo, it has not been made available to the HSCA. David Phillips, who after serving in Mexico, went on to accumulate quite an impressive record as a Chief of Station in several countries himself, told Committee investigators that a memorandum of this sort, along with other "sensitive" information would be the type of thing that Win Scott probably kept in his private safe. (David A. Phillips Interview, 8/24/78, p. 10.) Mr. Phillips added that he did not know what happened to Mr. Scott's safe after he died but he had heard vague stories about someone finding a lot of documents that Scott had kept. (Ibid.)

680/ MEXI 7054- 11/24/63, para. 3.

681/ MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 3.

682/ MEXI 7024, 11/23/63, para. 3.

683/ MEXI 7023, 11/26/63, para. 2.

684/ See Section II, C, 4, above.

685/ For example, MEXI 7023 reports that a voice comparison was not done while MEXI 7025 implies that one was done and a year later Ann Goodpasture noted on a newspaper article that such a comparison was done. Note also that MEXI 7024 reported that HQ had all the available information when in fact all conversations were reported in a later cable, MEXI 7033.

685/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

686/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

687/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

688/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

689/ Note to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 444; Cable re Oswald-Duran, MEXI 7029, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 441; Raymond Rocca Chronology WX 7241, Entry 36, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.

690/ Ibid.

691/ See below, p.

692/ Note written by Winston Scott re phone call with John Scelso, November 23, 1963; Chronology prepared by Raymond Rocca, WX7241, entry 37, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.

693/ Ibid.

694/ Ibid.

695/ Chief of Station phone call to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 440; Flash Cable from Karamessines to Mexico City Station, November 23, 1963, DIR 84916, CIA No. 403; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, entry 46, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 636.

696/ Blind Memo re Lee Harvey Oswald and Silvia Duran, November 26, 1963, CIA #473.

697/ Ibid.

698/ Cable from Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27, 1963, MEXI 7101, CIA #493.

300

Classification: ______________

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

TOP SECRET

C. Silvia Duran

When President John F. Kennedy was assassinated on November 22, 1963, the United States investigative agencies--FBI, CIA, Secret Service, etc.--were asked to investigate the assassination. When the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station remembered that Lee Harvey Oswald had visited Mexico City during late September and early October, it reviewed the electronic surveillance files and found evidence of phone calls to the Soviet Embassy made September 27th, September 28th, and October 1st, that could have been made by Oswald. 685/ Review of the electroic surveillance files also produced telephone calls on September 27, 1963 between the Russian Consul and Silvia Duran, a secretary at the Cuban Consulate, where Oswald was discussed. 686/ In addition, the Mexico City Station found a September 28, 1963 phone call from Silvia Duran to the Soviet Consulate where Silvia Duran stated that there was an American citizen at the Cuban Consulate who had previously visited the Soviet Consulate. 687/ A final phone call was made on October 1, 1963 where the "alleged" Oswald identified himself was also found. 688/

On November 23, 1963 the Mexico City Station deter-

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation: ______

mined that it would request the Mexican government--with whom it had a good relationship--to arrest Silvia Duran (as Silvia Duran was a Mexican citizen, she did not have diplomatic immunity) because she might shed some light on the circumstances surrounding the assassination. 688a/

The Mexico City Station sent a note to the Gobernacion head, Luis Echevarria, with Silvia Duran's address, her mother's address, her brother's address, her license plate number, her home phone number, her place of work and a request that she be arrested immediately. 689/ The Mexico City Station also suggested that Duran he held incommunicado until she could be questioned on the matter. 690/

The Mexico City Station did not receive prior authorization from CIA Headquarters to request the arrest of Silvia Duran by Mexican authorities. 691/ Headquarters feared that a request to arrest Ms. Duran would jeopardize the clandestine relationship between certain Mexican government officials and the CIA if it were disclosed that Americans were behind Duran's arrest. 672/ John Scelso, Chief of Western Hemisphere/3, stationed at Langley Headquarters, telephoned Winston Scott, the Mexico City Chief of Station, and requested that Silvia Duran not be arrested. 693/ Scott told Scelso that he could not rescind the request, and that Headquarters should already have received a cable stating that Silvia Duran had been arrested. 694/ After Winston Scott's conversation with John Scelso, Scott called Luis Echevarria and stated that the Mexico City Station desired that all information received from Duran be forwarded immediately to the Mexico City Station, and that her arrest and statements not be communicated to any leftist groups. 695/

On November 27, 1963, the Mexican government forwarded to the Mexico City Station a copy of Silvia Duran's ten-page signed statement. 696/ It said,

> "Upon learning about the assassination she and her husband speculated that President Kennedy might have been assassinated for racial reasons. When she became aware that the assassin was Lee Harvey Oswald, she ascertained that it was the same man who approximately two months prior had been to the Cuban Consulate to solicit an intransit visa to Russia. Having taken his name from the special documentation he presented she knew that he was married to a Russian woman and belonged to the "Fair Play for Cuba Committee." She checked the data in the Consulate archives and became certain that it was the same individual who was blonde, short, dressed unelegantly and whose face turned red when angry. The Consul had denied the visa because to obtain an intransit visa from the Cuban government, it was imperative that he previously obtain a visa from the Soviet Consulate. Since obtaining a visa from the Soviets took four months and Oswald's Mexican visa expired soon Oswald was advised that he see the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that office. The Soviet official told her that they would have to consult Moscow which would take four months. That afternoon, Oswald returned to the

> Cuban Consulate and Silvia Duran confirmed that he could get a Cuban visa only after he received a Russian visa. She gave Oswald her name and business phone number but never gave him her address because she had no reason to give it to him. The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul and calling the person in charge of that office. She knew that phoning the Soviet Consulate was not one of her duties and that if she did so she did it only to help Oswald. She gave Oswald her business phone number only because he would have to call subsequently to check whether he had obtained a visa. He never called back."

Silvia Duran, released on November 24, 1963, was rearrested November 27, 1963, when the Mexican government alleged that she was attempting to leave Mexico for travel to Havana. 698/ According to the Mexican officials who detained Duran a second time, there was no addition to her story. 699/

The Mexico City Station forwarded Duran's ten-page signed statement to Headquarters on November 27, 1963. 700/ The following day, Headquarters sent a clarification cable to the Mexico City Station seeking to insure that neither Silvia Duran nor the Cubans would have any basis for believing that the Americans were behind her rearrest. The cable stated, "We want the Mexican authorities to take the responsibility for the whole affair." 701/

When the Central Intelligence Agency began to work with the Warren Commission, Headquarters cabled the Mexico

City Station that its plan in passing information to the Warren Commission was to eliminate mention of telephone taps in order to protect their continuing operations. 702/ Headquarters cabled that it would rely on Silvia Duran's statements and on the Consular files which the Soviets gave the State Department. 703/ Headquarters stressed that exact, detailed information from LITAMIL-7 and LITAMIL-9--penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy--on what Silvia Duran and other officials had said about Oswald's visit and his dealings would be valuable and usable corroborative evidence. 704/

When the Central Intelligence Agency forwarded to the Warren Commission a copy of Duran's signed statement. It read as follows:

> ...she remembered...(that Lee Harvey Oswald) was the name of an American who had come to the Cuban Consulate to obtain a visa to travel to Cuba in transit to Russia, the latter part of September or the early part of October of this year, and in support of his application had shown his passport, in which it was noted that he had lived in that country for a period of three years; his labor card from the same country written in the Russian language; and letters in that same language. He had presented evidence that he was married to a Russian woman, and also that he was apparently the leader of an organization in the city of New Orleans claiming that he should be accepted as a "friend" of the Cuban Revolution. Accordingly, the declarant, complying with her duties, took down all of the

TOP SECRET

information and completed the appropriate application form; and the declarant, admittedly exceeding her responsibilities, informally telephoned the Russian Consulate, with the intention of doing what she could to facilitate issuance of the Russian visa to Lee Harvey Oswald. However, they told her that there would be a delay of about four months in processing the case, which annoyed the applicant since, according to his statement, he was in a great hurry to obtain visas that would enable him to travel to Russia, insisting on his right to do so in view of his background and his loyalty and his activities in behalf of the Cuban movement. The declarant was unable to recall accurately whether or not the applicant told her he was a member of the Communist Party, but he did say that his wife***was then in New York City, and would follow him,*** (Senora Duran stated) that when Oswald understood that it was not possible to give him a Cuban visa without his first having obtained the Russian visa,*** he became very excited or angry, and accordingly, the affiant called Consul Ascue (sic),*** (who) came out and began a heated disucssion in English with Oswald, that concluded by Ascue telling him that "if it were up to him, he would not give him the visa," and "a person of his type was harming the Cuban Revolution rather than helping it," it being understood that in their conversation they were talking about the Russian Socialist Revolution and not the Cuban. Oswald maintained that he had two reasons for requesting that his visa be issued promptly, and they were: one, that his tourist permit in Mexico was about to expire; and the other, that he had to get to Russia as quickly as possible. Depsite her annoyance, the decalarant gave Oswald a paper*** in which she put down her name, "Silvia Duran," and the number of the telephone at the Consulate, which is "11-28-47" and the visa application

TOP SECRET

> was processed anyway It was sent to the Ministry of (Foreign) Relations of Cuba; from which a routine reply was received some fifteen to thirty days later, approving the visa, but on the condition that the Russian visa be obtained first, although she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she gave him. 705/

The Central Intelligence Agency had relied on Duran's statements but had deleted Duran's description of Oswald as blonde and short. 706/ It had also excised Duran's statement--"The only aid she could give Oswald was advising that he see the Soviet Consul, and calling the person in charge of that office" which alluded to Oswald asking for some type of aid at the Cuban Consulate. 707/ In addition, Ms. Duran's strong statement "He never called her back" 707a/ was changed to "she does not recall whether or not Oswald later telephoned her at the Consulate number that she have him."707b/ Had the statements been included, the Warren Commission's conclusions would not have seemed as strong.

The Warren Commission staff was not completely satisfied with Ms. Duran's ten page signed statement obtained by the Mexican authorities. W. David Slawson wrote:

> We then discussed...the problem of (interviewing) Silvia Duran. We pointed out that our only interest in witnesses (in Mexico) other than Duran was to get their formal testimony for authentication purposes...This was not true of Duran, however, because she had been interviewed only by the Mexican police

and we considered that interview inadequate. (I should point out that we do not consider it totally inadequate, however. It is only on details such as Oswald's physical appearance, side comments or remarks he may have made, etc., that we would like to interrogate Mrs. Duran further. On the essential point of whether or not his contacts with the Embassy consisted of anything other than an attempt to travel to Cuba, Silvia Duran's knowledge has probably been exhausted.) 708/

The Warren Commission staff's attempts to interview Ms. Duran never succeeded. 709/ Ms. Duran was not interviewed by Americans until 1976, when two reporters from the Washington Post interviewed her. 710/ On June 6, 1978, representatives of the House Select Committee on Assassinations interviewed Ms. Duran in Mexico City.

VI. Information not available at the time of the Warren Commission investigation

A. Silvia Tirado (nee Duran)

1. House Select Committee on Assassinations 6/6/78 Interview of Silvia Tirado

Ms. Tirado (Silvia divorced Horatio Duran in 1968) was never questioned by American officials in 1963. Thus, the Committee established contact with the Mexican government and requested that the Mexican government make Silvia Tirado available for an interview. 711/ The Mexican

TOP SECRET

government complied on 6/6/78. Ms. Tirado told the House Select Committee on Assassinations the following:

Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate three times on September 27, 1963, not twice as the Warren Commission previously reported. 712/ Oswald first visited the Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:00 a.m., requesting an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final destination. 713/ He showed her some documents, then left to obtain photographs needed for his application. 714/

Oswald returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. with four photographs. 715/ Ms. Tirado typed the application in duplicate, stapled a picture on top of each and had Oswald sign each in her presence. 716/ As identification, Oswald showed her documents he had brought: his Russian labor card, marriage certificate with the name of his Russian wife, his American Communist Party membership card and his "Fair Play for Cuba" membership card. 717/

Ms. Tirado found Lee Harvey Oswald's behavior suspicious because normally a Communist traveled only with his passport as belonging to the Communist Party was illegal in Mexico in 1963. 718/

There was a procedure whereby the American Communist Party would arrange visa matters for their members with the

Cuban Communist Party. 719/ The American would then come to Mexico, visit the Cuban Consulate, and receive his visa immediately. 710/ When Tirado asked Oswald why he did not have the American Communist Party arrange his trip to Cuba, he stated that he had not had the time. 721/

After explaining to Oswald that he had to acquire a Russian visa before he could receive a Cuban visa, Tirado jotted her name and business phone number on a piece of paper and gave it to Oswald who then left to get his Russian visa. 722/

Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate between 5:00 p.m. and 6:00 p.m., which was after normal working hours, 10:00 to 2:00 p.m. 723/ The guard called Tirado, stating that someone who did not speak Spanish was at the gate inquiring about a visa. 724/ As routine procedure, she asked the guard to escort the individual to her office. 725/ Oswald told her that he had acquired a Russian visa. 726/ Since he did not produce it when asked, she called the Russian Consulate. 727/ The Consul told Duran that Oswald had been to the Consulate requesting a visa and had been told that the reply would take approximately four months. 728/ When she relayed the message to Oswald, he got very excited, insisting that as a person who had been in jail because of the Cuban Revolution he should receive a visa. 729/ Oswald stated that he could not wait that long because his Mexican visa expired in three days. 730/ At this point, Ms. Tirado informed Consul Eusebio Azcue of the situation. 731/ Azcue had been in his private office which he shared with his upcoming replacement, Alfredo Mirabal. 732/ Azcue politely explained the requisites for an intransit visa to Oswald. 733/ When he noticed that Oswald was a stubborn man he told Oswald that he was obviously not a friend of the Cuban revolution because he would otherwise understand that Cuba had to be extremely careful with the people it allowed in the country. 734/ Azcue and Oswald yelled at each other. 735/ Then Azcue went to the door opened it and asked Oswald to leave. 736/ Oswald did not revisit or telephone the Consulate. 737/ Ms. Tirado described Lee Harvey Oswald as approximately five feet six, with sparse blonde hair, weighing about 125 pounds. 738/

2. CIA information not available at the time of the Warren Commission investigation

a. LIRING/3 allegation

In 1967 a report that Silvia Duran had had intimate relations with Lee Harvey Oswald came to the attention of the Central Intelligecne Agency's Mexico City Station. 739/ The source, LIRING/3, stated that he had recently received a call from Silvia Duran. 740/ A telephone tap on LIRING/3's telephone confirmed that Silvia Duran had called LIRING. 741/ LIRING/3 reported that he had visited Silvia to renew acquiaintancees. 742/ During the visit, Duran told LIRING/3 that she had met Lee Harvey Oswald at the Cuban Consulate when he applied for a visa and had dated him on several occasions. 743/ Duran admitted that she had had intimate relations with Oswald, but insisted that she had no idea of his plans. 744/ In addition, Duran told LIRING/3 that when the news of the assassination became public knowledge, the Mexican government arrested her and during the interrogation beat her until she admitted that she had had an affair with Lee Harvey Oswald. 745/ Rowton 746/ counseled LIRING/3 against any further contact with Duran because the Cubans or the Mexican police might become suspicious of him. 747/ There is no indication in Rowton's report as to why contact with Silvia would make the Cubans suspicious.

The CIA Mexico City Station reported this information to Headquarters:

First, that Silvia Duran had sexual intercourse with Lee Harvey Oswald on several occasions when the latter was in Mexico is probably new, but adds little to the Oswald case. Second, the Mexican police did not report the extent of the Duran-Oswald relationship to this Station. 749/

In the chronology of the Mexico City investigation of Oswald, Raymond Rocca notes: "Why didn't Mexico police give us all info?" 750/ This was not the first report of such a relationship between Oswald and Duran. Elena Garro had reported the same information to Charles Thomas in 1965. 751/

That the Mexican government did not disclose all the information in its possession to American authorities raises one of three possibilities:

1) the Mexican government did not want to disclose that one of its citizens had had intimate relations with the assassin of John Kennedy; or
2) Silvia Duran was a Mexican penetration agent in the Cuban Consulate and the Mexican government was protecting its informant by minimizing her relationship with Oswald; or
3) they forgot, i.e., a pure and simple mistake.

TOP SECRET

b. The possibility that Silvia Duran was an agent for either American, Mexican or Cuban Intelligence

Since the publication of the Warren Commission Report in September 1964, critics have written about the possibility that Silvia Duran was an intelligence agent for either the Americans, Mexicans or Cubans.

1) Was Silvia Duran an agent, asset or source for Mexican or American intelligence?

In an effort to resolve this question, the House Select Committee on Assassinations reviewed the United States investigative agencies' files on Silvia Duran. 752/ The Committee found no evidence in this file review that Silvia Duran was either an American or Mexican intelligence agent.

In addition, the Committee has interviewed most of the Mexico City Station employees about the possibility. Only David Phillips, Chief of Covert Action and the Cuban Section in the Mexico City Station in 1963, a position which made him very knowledgeable, considered that Duran was possibly an agent or source. Mr. Phillips stated that "at one time the agency pitched 753/ almost everyone at the Cuban Embassy." 754/ Mr. Phillips stated that he had first heard Duran's name from the telephone intercept transcripts. 755/ But Mr. Phillips asserted that the CIA had no interest in Ms. Duran because "she wasn't friendly with anyone." 756/ Mr. Phillips had previously mentioned the CIA Mexico City Station's interest in recruiting a former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico named Lechuga. 757/ Mr. Phillips was shown a memorandum written by W. David Slawson of the Warren Commission staff regarding a trip to Mexico by Warren Commission staff members which said:

> Mr. Scott's (Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico City) narrative disclosed that the CIA's action immediately after the assassination consisted basically of alerting all its confidential sources of information throughout Mexico to immediately channel all information into their headquarters, and of compiling as complete dossiers as possible on Oswald and everyone else throughout Mexico who at that time the CIA knew had had some contact with Oswald... This meant especially Silvia Duran, who because she had previously been having an affair with Lechuga, the former Cuban Ambassador to Mexico and presently the Cuban representative at the United Nations, had previously been of substantial interest to the CIA...758/

Mr. Phillips was surprised by this and stated that "No one let me in on this operation." 759/ But

Mr. Phillips added that he doubted that Duran would have been pitched because the Station could not identify any of her weaknesses. The Committee staff members then told Mr. Phillips about the reporting on file concerning Ms. Duran from one of the Station's penetration agents, LITAMIL/9, at the Cuban Embassy. At one point LITAMIL/9 had reported to his case officer that all that would have to be done to recruit Ms. Duran was to get a blonde, blue-eyed American in bed with her. 761/ With this, Mr. Phillips said that it did indeed sound as if the Station had targeted Ms. Duran for recruitment, that the Station's interest had been substantial, and that the weaknesses and means had been identified. 762/ Mr. Phillips pointed out, however, that because Duran had been targeted did not necessarily mean that she had been pitched. 763/ In addition, he stated that he had never heard that Duran had been pitched. 764/

Mr. Phillips did state that he would expect that Ms. Duran's file at the CIA would be "very thick" because of all the telephone intercepts that concerned her and the substantial interest that the Station had in her. 765/ He stated that much of the material in her file should predate the assassination. 766/ Mr. Phillips stated that he would be very surprised if Ms. Duran's 201 file was small and contained only a few pre-assassination documents. 767/ This is in fact the case of the Headquarters 201 file. 768/ This Committee has asked the CIA to make Ms. Duran's Mexican "P" 769/ (personality) file available for review. The CIA informed the Committee that there was no "P" file available on Ms. Duran. 770/

Another CIA employee, Dan Neiscuir, who worked on an "Oswald Task Force" in late September or early October of 1975 dealing with Freedom of Information Act law suits brought against the Agency concerning the files on Lee Harvey Oswald, stated that he believed that Ms. Duran may have been a source of information for either the CIA or the Mexicans. 771/ Mr. Neiscuir could not recall why he specifically had this recollection, but thought that it was due to something he had seen in Oswald's file. 772/ He said that it may have been the Agency's attempts to protect Ms. Duran after the assassination and the heavy cable traffic that those attempts generated that led him to his inference that she was a source of information for either the Agency or the Mexicans. 773/

Despite LIRING/3's case officer's asking LIRING/3 not to recontact Ms. Duran, Mr. Phillips' statements, and

Mr. Neiscuir's hazy recollections, the Committee cannot definitely resolve whether Silvia Duran was a Mexican or American intelligence agent or source.

(2) was Silvia Duran a Cuban intelligence agent?

In an effort to resolve this question, the HSCA reviewed the United States investigative agencies' files on Silvia Duran. 774/ The Committee found no evidence in the files that would indicate that Ms. Duran was associated with Cuban intelligence.

In addition, the HSCA interviewed most of the Mexico City Station employees about the possibility that Duran worked for Cuban intelligence. Only Barney Hidalgo, a CIA officer who travelled to Mexico City in 1963, considered the possibility to be likely. 775/ Mr. Hidalgo, professing not to remember all the details, stated that he thought that Duran was a Cuban intelligence agent. 776/ Hidalgo said:

> At the time when this contact told me of Silvia Duran I tied the two together, yes, sir. I don't know, how at that time it was obvious to me as an intelligence agent that there was some connection there but it was of no interest whatsoever to me, I do remember that when I next saw this contact of mine I mentioned the fact to him and let him proceed to do whatever he

TOP SECRET

wanted to. 777/

Mr. Hidalgo further stated that he never resolved the issue. 778/

With no corroborating evidence for Mr. Hidalgo's memory, the Committee must conclude that Silvia Duran was probably never employed by Cuban Intelligence.

B. The Cubans

1. Eusebio Azcue Lopez

When Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban Consulate, Eusebio Azcue Lopez, a Cuban citizen, was the Cuban Consul. 779/ Because he had diplomatic immunity, the Cuban government had never been asked to make him available for questioning. 780/ The Committee, in an effort to investigate Oswald's contacts with representatives of the Cuban government, asked the Cuban government to make Eusebio Azcue available for Committee and staff interviews. 781/ The Cuban government complied with the Committee's request on April 1, 1978. 782/

During that interview, Mr. Azcue alleged that the man Jack Ruby shot in the Dallas Police Station was not the same individual who had visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963. 783/ In addition, Mr. Azcue stated that Alfredo

TOP SECRET

Mirabal, who in September 1963, had recently arrived from Cuba to assume the Consul's duties, had also been present during Oswald's visit. 784/ During a second trip to Cuba, the Committee interviewed Alfredo Mirabal. 785/ Subsequent to this second trip to Havana, the Committee asked the Cuban government to make Eusebio Azcue and Alfredo Mirabal available for the public hearings on September 18, 1978. 786/ The Cuban government complied with the Committee's request.

Eusebio Azcue Lopez told the House Select Committee on Assassinations at a public hearing on 9/18/78 the following:

An individual who gave the name Lee Harvey Oswald visited the Cuban Consulate on three occasions in late September 787/ and early October 1963. 788/ The individual first visited the Cuban Consulate during working hours, requesting an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final destination. 789/ The man showed the secretary, Silvia Duran, some documents 789a/ which he believed would be sufficient to obtain a visa. 789b/ When the secretary would not grant him a visa, the man asked Azcue to see whether upon examination of the documents he could

TOP SECRET

grant him a visa. 789c/ Azcue answered negatively. 789d/ The individual then left to obtain photographs needed for his application. 789e/

The man probably returned on September 27, 1963 789f/ with the photographs and completed the applications in Ms. Duran's presence. 789g/ As the amount of time required to process this document could have taken as long as twenty days or the response could have been negative, Azcue told the man that he could grant him an intransit visa to Cuba, without consulting his government, if he had a Russian visa. 789h/ The individual then left to attempt to obtain his Russian visa. 789i/

After the man left the Cuban Consulate, Azcue received a telephone call 789j/ from the Soviet Consulte. 790/ The Soviet Consul explained that the man's documents were legitimate, but that the Soviet Consulate could not issue a visa until it received authorization from Moscow. 791/

Emphasizing that the Cuban Consulate never received visitors after working hours 792/ Mr. Azcue opined that the individual probably returned to the Consulate on September 28, 1963. 793/ When Azcue explained to Oswald that he could not grant him a visa, the man made statements directed against Cuba and called Cuba a

-371

bureaucracy. 794/ At that point, Azcue became upset and asked the individual to leave the Consulate. 795/ Oswald did not revisit the Consulate. 796/

Mr. Azcue described the man who visited the Consulate as follows: a white male, between 5'6" and 5'7", over 30 years of age, very thin long face, with straight eyebrows and a cold look in his eyes. 797/ Azcue alleged that he would never have identified Lee Harvey Oswald as the man who visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963.

2. Alfredo Mirabal Diaz

Alfredo Mirabal Diaz told the House Select Committee on Assassinations, at a public hearing on 9/18/78, 797A/ the following:

Lee Harvey Oswald, seeking a visa, visited the Cuban Consulate twice 798/ in September 1963. 799/ Since Mirabal could not speak English though he was the new Consul, ex-Consul Azcue handled the matter. 800/ On both occasions there were such loud arguments between Oswald and Azcue that Mirabal thought that the man's visit to the Consulate was a case of provocation. 801/

Though Mirabal caught only glimpses of the man he opined that the person whose picture appears on Lee

Harvey Oswald's visa application was the same Lee Harvey Oswald who visited the Consulate. 802/ Mirabel was about 4 meters away from Oswald each time he caught glimpses of him. 802a/ Oswald was at the Consulate between 15 and 20 minutes on each visit. 802b/

C. Elena Garro de Paz

On October 5, 1964, eleven days after the publication of the Warren Commission Report, Elena Garro de Paz' story alleging Lee Harvey Oswald's presence at a party in Mexico City attended by Cuban government personnel came to the attention of the Central Intelligence Agency. 803/

1. Elena's story as reported October 5, 1964

Elena Garro de Paz 804/ and Deba Garro de Guerrero Galvan, first cousins of Horatio, Ruben and Lydia Duran, were invited to a twist party at the home of Ruben Duran in the middle of the week in the fall of 1963. 805/ Lee Harvey Oswald was alleged to have been at this party in the company of "two other beatnik-looking boys." 806/ The Americans remained together the entire evening and did not dance. 807/ When Elena tried to speak with the Americans, she was "shifted" to another room by one of her cousins. 808/ The memo does not state whether Elena had mentioned which cousin had not allowed her to speak to the Americans. One of Elena's cousins told her at the time that (he or she) did not know who the Americans were except that Silvia Duran (an employee of the Cuban Embassy and the wife of Horatio Duran), had brought them to the party. 809/

The day after the party, Elena and Deba saw the three Americans on the Insurgentes, a main avenue in Mexico City. 810/ The Garros claimed that they had recognized Oswald's photograph when it was published after the assassination. 811/ Silvia Duran's arrest "underlined the Garros' 'certainty' that the man had been Lee Harvey Oswald. 812/

The source of the memo was a witting 813/ Central Intelligence Agency asset known by the cryptonym LICOOKIE/1 whom the Committee identified as June Cobb Sharp while reviewing the LICOOKIE file. According to Elena, Ms. Cobb was sent to her house shortly after the assassination for a few days, by a mutual friend, a Costa Rican writer named Eunice Odio. 814/ Ms. Garro asserted that while at her house, Ms. Cobb expressed interest in the Kennedy assassination. 815/ One night, Elena's sister Deba, who was visiting, got drunk and told the whole story. 816/ Claiming to be a CIA agent, Cobb suggested that Elena and

Deba go to Texas to tell their story. 817/ Elena stated that when Cobb's suggestion was rejected, Cobb stated that she would arrange a meeting with the CIA Station Chief. 818/ The meeting did not occur because Ms. Cobb was asked to leave the Garro house evidently because she kicked Elena's cat. 819/ A notation on the memo says that LICOOKIE/1 never regained contact with Elena Garro de Paz. 820/

The LICOOKIE memo was not inserted in either the Elena Garro or Lee Harvey Oswald "P" 821/ (personality) file but in a local leftist and Cuban project file. The Committee learned about the memo from Wx-7241, a chronological history of the Oswald case prepared by Raymond Rocca for the CIA in 1967. The memo was found in December, 1965 by Stanley Watson. A marginal notation on Wx7241 says, "Why was this not sent to Headquarters?" 823/ The Committee has been able to determine that the memo was forwarded to Headquarters shortly thereafter.

2. October 12, 1964 CIA Memo for the Record

On October 12, 1964 the CIA Mexico City Station's Chief of Covert Action, Jim Flannery, wrote a memo for the record reporting that Elena Garro de Paz had told her story to Eunice Odio. 824/

The Committee has not been able to determine if Elena Garro told Ms. Odio the story personally or if Ms. Cobb related the story to Ms. Odio who relayed it to "Tichborn." 825/

The story is not as detailed as the 10/5/64 version. There is no mention of Deba Garro Guerrero Galvan. The story, perhaps because it is third hand, differs from the previous story in two areas: It states that the party was at the Cuban Embassy, as opposed to Ruben Duran's; and that Elena talked to a Cuban Embassy official instead of her cousins about the three Americans.

Attached to the memo was a note from Flannery to the Chief of Station, Winston Scott, which read, "Do you want me to send the gist of this to Headquarters?" Scott then noted that the memo should be filed. 826/ The file indications show that the memo went into the Oswald "P" file and the Elena Garro "P" file. 827/

3. November 24, 1964 CIA Informant Report

On November 24, 1964 a Central Intelligence Agency agent 828/ reported information 829/ derived from an asset, "LICHANT/1." 830/ The agent asserted that June Cobb was an "American Communist" who rented a room from Elena Garro. 831/ In addition, the informant claimed that Elena had also told her story to an American official at the Embassy, who claimed to represent the Warren Commission. 832/ The Chief of Station noted that he had asked LICHANT/1 to pursue the story 833/ but there is no indication that the Chief of Station followed through with the request. 834/

4. November 24, 1964 Elena Garro meeting with Mexico City Legal Attache officers

Elena and her daughter reported their story to the Mexico City Legal Attache on November 24, 1964. 835/ (The Legal Attache in 1964 was Clark Anderson.) They recounted the same story previously given to June Cobb Sharp in October 1964. 836/ Elena gave the date of the party as September 30, October 1 or October 2, 1963. 837/ The agent who wrote the report 838/ noted that Lee Harvey Oswald could not have been identical with the American 839/ allegedly observed by Mrs. Paz at the party if this party were held on the evening of October 1 or October 2, 1963. 840/

Elena was questioned regarding the identity of other persons attending the party at the Ruben Duran home who might have been in a position to observe the three Americans. 841/ Elena stated that in the course of the party her daughter met a young man named "Alejandro" at the party and danced with him. 842/ He was apparently quite smitten with the daughter and tried to call her on several occasions after the party. 843/ The daughter did not take the calls and as a result "Alejandro" wrote several letters to the daughter. 844/ Ms. Garro exhibited two of the letters, as well as a business card which identified the young man as Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius. 845/

The letter which Ms. Garro said was the first written by the young man to her daughter bore the date September 1, 1963 and the Mexico City Post Office postmark dated September 2, 1963. 846/ When this was pointed out to Ms. Garro she commented that the Communists probably had facilities for falsifying postmarks. 847/

To investigate Ms. Garro's story further, representatives from the Legal Attache's office interviewed Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius on November 27, 1964. 848/ Lavagnini recalled that there were approximately thirty people at Ruben Duran's party, few of whom he knew. 849/ He recalled having met a Mexican girl who had recently returned from living in France. 850/ He was unable to fix the date of the party but felt it was probably early in September because of a heavy rain which occurred as they were leaving the party about 2:00 a.m. 851/

Lavagnini said that no Americans were present at this party. 852/ He was familiar with the physical description of Lee Harvey Oswald because of publicity following the assassination of President Kennedy, but otherwise had no knowledge of him and had never seen him except for news photographs following the assassination. 853/

Lavagnini was the only person interviewed by the Legal Attache representatives who attended parties at the Duran house in the September-October time frame.

There is no indication in the FBI document that this information was given to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station. 854/

5. Charles Thomas' first meeting with Elena Garro where Lee Harvey Oswald is discussed

On 12/10/65, Charles Thomas, a political officer at the American Embassy, wrote a memorandum about a conversation with Elena Garro de Paz. 855/ The meeting with Elena had been about other matters 856/ but she mentioned knowing Oswald. 857/ Thomas noted that she was reluctant to talk but did. 858/

Elena's story reported here is the same as that given in the LICOOKIE memo dated 10/5/64, but with more details. She said that General Jose Jesus Clark Flores (a friend of Ruben Duran's), Silvia Duran, Eusebio Azcue, Emilio Carballido (a pro-Communist writer-friend of the Durans), and a Latin American Negro man with red hair (unidentified) were at the party. 859/ A marginal comment by this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How did Elena know about a red-haired Negro?" 860/ Elena also told Thomas that she had later learned that "Silvia Duran had been Oswald's mistress while he was there." 861/ A note by this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How did Elena Garro know about Silvia being the mistress of Oswald? This is 1965." 862/ The Mexico City Station did not hear about the Oswald-Duran "affair" until July 1967 when a CIA asset, LIRING/3, reported it. 863/

Elena told Thomas that she and her daughter had gone to the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963 and shouted "Assassins" and other insults at the Embassy employees. 864/ According to Elena, that same day, a friend, Manuel Calvillo, whom the Garros thought to be an official in the

Gobernacion, took her and her daughter to a small hotel in the center of Mexico City. 865/ Calvillo kept Elena Garro and her daughter there for eight days under the pretext that they were in danger of being harmed physically by Communists. 866/ Elena claimed she told Calvillo her story and that she wanted to tell it to the American authorities at the U.S. Embassy 867/ but that Calvillo dissuaded her by telling her that the American Embassy was full of Communist spies. 868/ Elena said that some of the other people who had been at the party were taken to Veracruz where they were "protected" by Governor Lopez Arias. 869/ She said that Ruben Duran, reportedly "protected" by General Clark Flores, was very prosperous and was driving a big car. 870/ Elena also claimed that Ruben Duran told her months after the assassination that he was not really a Communist and that killing Kennedy had been a mistake. 871/ Ruben Duran claimed he had no reason to tell Elena that killing Kennedy had been a mistake since he had no involvement. 872/

Charles Thomas circulated a copy of his memorandum concerning Elena's allegations in the American Embassy including the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station to aid them in their investigation of the John

F. Kennedy assassination. 873/ The COS wrote a note on the memo: "What an imagination she has!?! Should we send to Headquarters?" 874/ The Officer replied, on the memo, "Suggest sending. There have been stories around town about all this, and Thomas is not the only person she has talked to...If memory serves me, didn't LICOOKIE refer to Oswald and the local leftists and Cubans in one of her squibs?" 875/

The Mexico City Station cabled the information in Thomas' 12/10/65 memorandum of conversation to CIA Headquarters. 876/ The cable reported that Elena's story would be checked with LICHANT/1, against the production from the Cuban surveillance operation "and other sources." 877/ Winston Scott wrote, next to the routing indications on the cable, "Please ask Charles Thomas if he'll 'follow up.' Get questions from Ann G. 878/ Please let's discuss. Thanks." 879/

After the December 10 memorandum of conversation, Winston Scott 880/ and Nathan Ferris 881/ called Charles Thomas for a meeting. 882/ They asked him to get a more detailed account of Ms. Garro's story. 883/ At this meeting, Winston Scott made it clear that the FBI had full responsibility for any further investigation in the

TOP SECRET

Oswald case. 884/

6. Charles Thomas' Meeting with Elena Garro on December 25, 1965

Thomas met with Elena again on December 25, 1965. On that date, he wrote a memorandum of conversation which provided a much more detailed restatement of Ms. Garro's alleged encounter with Lee Harvey Oswald. 885/

Elena admitted that she had spoken to two men at the Embassy, "presumably from the Legal Attache's Office." 886/ Elena said that she did not tell them the complete story because "the Embassy officers did not give much credence to anything she and Elenita said." 887/

She stated that the party had been at Ruben Duran's home. 888/ She was unclear about the date of the party. 889/ She thought it had been a few days before the Soviet Astronaut, Gagarin, visited Mexico; she thought that this would put the party around September 2 or 3, 1963. 890/ She believed that the party was on a Monday or Tuesday because it was an odd night for a party. 891/ Elena could not check her calendar to refresh her memory at the time of this interview because the calendar was in a desk that had been stored away. 892/

TOP SECRET

During the conversation, Elena described Oswald and his companions. 893/ The man who she thought was Oswald wore a black sweater. 894/ She said he was quiet "and stared a lot at the floor." 895/ One of his companions "was very tall and slender and had long blond hair and a rather long protruding chin." 896/ The other companion was also tall, with short, light brown hair and no distinguishing characteristics. 897/ The three Americans did not dance or mix with the other guests. 898/ Elena saw the same three men on the street the next day. 899/

Elena was certain that Eusebio Azcue, Horacio Duran, Silvia Duran, Lydia Duran, Deba Guerrero, General Clark Flores and his mistress, a doctor from Dalinde Hospital, a young American couple who were honeymooning in Mexico, and several other people were at the party. 900/ She said that Ricardo Guerra, whom she claimed converted Horatio Duran to Communism, and his wife, Rosario Castellanos, were supposed to be at the party but did not attend. 901/

Elena alleged that the red-haired man and Emilio Carballido were not at the party that Oswald attended but at another party where Carballido and Azcue got into a heated argument about President Kennedy. 902/ "They came to the conclusion that the only solution was to kill him." 903/ - 904/ Elena was not clear on whether this party was before or after the party where she met Oswald. 905/ Eusebio Azcue stated that this conversation never occurred. 906/

Elena reitereated that the incident at the Cuban Embassy, where she and her daughter shouted "assassins," etc., at the Embassy employees, occurred on November 23 at or about 3:00 p.m. 907/ Elena and Elenita were driven to the Cuban Embassy by Elena's brother who was embarrassed by their behavior. 908/ This occurred before they had seen photographs of Oswald. 909/

Ms. Garro claimed that later in the day she and Elenita were visited by Manuel Calvillo who told them that they were in serious danger from the Communists and that he would take them to a small hotel, where they would be safe for a few days. 910/ Elena said she trusted and believed Calvillo because he was a known undercover agent for the Mexico Government. 911/ He was also a friend of Noe Palomares 912/ and of President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz. 913/ Calvillo also told Elena and her daughter that Silvia Duran had been arrested. 914/

Duran's arrest was not public information at that time. 915/

Elena could not remember the name of the hotel so that same day (12/25/65) she took Thomas to the section of Mexico City where she thought it was. 916/ They found the hotel, the Hotel Vermont. 917/ Elena said that she assumed that Calvillo had registered them as relatives or friends from San Luis Potosi. 918/ They stayed at the hotel until the following Friday, November 30, 1963, hardly leaving their rooms. 919/

Elena claimed that while she and Elenita were at the hotel they saw the photos of Oswald and realized that he had been the man at Ruben Duran's party. 920/ When Calvillo visited them at the hotel, Elena told him that she wanted to report her story, which she related to Calvillo, to the American Embassy. Calvillo, however, dissuaded her by saying that the American Embassy was full of Communists. 921/ Elena stated that when she returned home, guards were posted outside her house. 922/

Elena alleged that after she returned home she saw her sister, Deba Guerrero, who had independetly come to the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald had been at Ruben Duran's party. 923/ Deba was "terrified" because approximately two months after the assassination two "Communists" personally warned her never to reveal that she had been to a party with Oswald. 924/ Deba, consequently, would not accompany Elena to the American Embassy to tell her story on November 24, 1964. 925/

Elena stated that it was "common knowledge" that Silvia had been Oswald's mistress. 926/ When asked who could verify the allegation, she could only remember one person who had told her this. 927/ Elena claimed that person was Victor Rico Galan, 928/ a "pro-Castro journalist." 929/ (See Section VI, A, 2, a, above.)

Subsequent to December 25, 1965, Elena found her calendar and reconstructed the date of the party as late September and not early September. 930/ When Thomas went to Ferris' office and informed him, Ferris replied that Elena had given the late September date when she had originally reported her story at the American Embassy. 931/ However, Mr. Ferris explained to Thomas that someone who had been at the twist party had stated that there were no Americans there. 932/ Mr. Ferris did not tell Mr. Thomas that Ario Alejandro Lavagnini Stenius had provided this information in 1964. 933/ Mr. Ferris suggested that it was not necessary for Thomas to pursue Elena's allegations since he considered the

Oswald case closed and had heard all the rumors before. 934/

Thomas forwarded (the same day) a copy of his memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station to aid in its investigation of the John F. Kennedy assassination. 935/ On the first page of the memorandum of conversation, Winston Scott wrote, "Shouldn't we send to Headquarters?" Someone responded, "Of course." 936/

The Mexico City Station sent a cable to Headquarters on December 12, 1965, reporting that it was "following up" and would cable the results. 937/

7. December 27, 1965 Legal Attache Memo to the United States Ambassador re Elena Garro

On December 27, 1965 Nathan Ferris wrote a memo to the Ambassador reporting that Elena and her daughter were interviewed on 17 and 24 November 1964 by the Legal Attache's office in Mexico City. 938/ The memo recorded that Elena and her daughter had furnished information similar to the information reported in Thomas' 12/10/65 memo. 939/ The memo further stated,

> "Inquiries conducted at that time (November 1964), however, failed to substantiate the

TOP SECRET

> allegations made by Mrs. Garro de Paz and her daughter. In view of the fact that Mrs. Garro de Paz' allegations have been previously checked out without substantiation, no further action is being taken concerning her recent repetition of those allegations. 940/

The Legal Attache forwarded a copy of the memorandum to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station 941/ prior to 12/29/65. 942/

A cable written by Anne Goodpasture on December 29, 1965 reporting the Legat interview with Elena and the Legat Office's failure to substantiate Elena's story was sent to Headquarters. 943/ The cable promised to keep Headquarters advised if any further information was to developed. 944/

LICOOKIE's 10/5/64 memo is attached to the 12/29/65 cable. Wx-7241 explained this in a marginal comment, "This document by LICOOKIE was not in (Oswald's file), but was copied from (a project file) and attached to MEXI 5741, 29 Dec. 65." 946/

A note stapled to this cable by Allen White stated, "I don't know what FBI did in November 1964, but the Garros have been talking about this for a long time and she is said to be extremely bright." 947/ Anne Goodpasture wrote that the FBI had found Elena's allegations unsubstantiated but that "we will try to confirm or refute Ms. Garro de Paz' information and follow up." 948/ Win Scott wrote, "She is also 'nuts.'" 949/

8. CIA Investigation of Elena's allegation that she created a disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963

On February 3, 1966, Anne Goodpasture forwarded Thomas' December 25, 1965 memo to the Cuban section at the Mexico City Station with an attached note asking the Section to check whether Elena was "seen creating such a disturbance as they claimed in front of the Cuban Embassy." 950/

One Cuban section officer responded, "No bells ring with me." Another one wrote, "Me neither." The third officer wrote, "No pictures either." 951/ There is no indication, after reviewing CIA files, that the penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy were queried about Elena's allegation. 952/ That there are no pictures is reasonable since Elena claimed that the event happened: 1) on a Saturday at 3:00 p.m. when the Cuban Embassy was not normally photographically surveilled; 953/ and 2) the "disturbance" occurred inside the Cuban compound. HSCA examination of the CIA

Cuban Embassy photographic surveillance showed no surveillance on 11/23/63. 954/ The Committee found that Central Intelligence Agency made no other effort to corroborate Ms. Garro's allegations.

9. Legal Attache 2/23/66 Memo to the United States Ambassador Regarding Elena Garro's Allegations

On 2/23/66 the Legal Attache wrote a memo to the Ambassador reporting that "extensive investigation" failed to disclose that Oswald had traveled to Mexico prior to September 26, 1963 and that no information had developed that would show that he had not been in New Orleans in the early part of that month. 955/ The memo reiterated that no further action was being taken by the FBI because Elena's allegations had not been substantiated by it. 956/ The Legal Attache forwarded a copy of this memo to the Central Intelligence Agency's Mexico City Station. 957/ A marginal comment made by Raymond Rocca next to this entry in Wx-7241 says, "How can it be ascertained that Oswald did not travel to Mexico prior to early September 1963? There must be some basis for Elena's reporting." 958/

10. Legal Attache Memo to Winston Scott re Elena's Allegation that She Had Stayed at the Hotel Vermont from the Day After the Assassination Until November 30, 1963

On 10/13/66, the Legal Attache wrote a memo to Win Scott reporting that a reliable confidential informant had reported that the records of the Hotel Vermont disclosed that one "Elena Paz, housewife from San Luis Potosi," had registered at the Hotel Vermont on November 23, 1963. 959/ She left on November 30, 1963. 960/ The memo said, "The above individual may or may not be identical with Elena Garro de Paz." 961/ The House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to determine why the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigations waited until 1966 to investigate this aspect of Elena's story.

Charles Thomas' 12/25/65 memo stating "She and her daughter did not personally register at the hotel. She thinks Calvillo registered them as relatives or friends of his from San Luis Potosi," corroborates Elena Garro's presence at the Hotel Vermont. 962/ The entry for the 10/13/66 Legat memo in Wx-7241 bore the notation, "This is what Elena claimed and no one would believe her." 963/

11. Charles Thomas' September 30, 1969 Letter to State Department and Legal Attache's Response

No further report on Elena's story was generated until 1969 when Charles Thomas was "selected out" of the United States Foreign Service. 964/ At that time, he wrote a memorandum to the Secretary of State which included a cover letter stating, "Since I was the Embassy Officer in Mexico who acquired this intelligence information, I feel a responsibility for seeing it through to its final evaluation." 965/

Charles Thomas' memorandum stated that "he got no reaction from Nathan Ferris and Winston Scott" regarding his memorandum of December 25, 1965. 966/ In addition, Thomas wrote that the only person to speak to him about the December 25, 1965 memorandum, Clarence Boonstra 967/ told him that Oswald had not been in Mexico on the date given for the party. 968/ Thomas noted that even when he reiterated that Elena had not changed her story but rather that she had now given a more detailed account, Boonstra stated that the date was wrong and dismissed the entire affair. 969/

One of the Mexico City Legat Officers, Nathan Ferris, in reply to Thomas' letter and memorandum, asserted that Thomas' office had been advised by memoranda dated December 27, 1965 and February 23, 1966 that since Elena Garro's allegations had previously been investigated without substantiation, no further action was being taken concerning her recent repetition of those allegations. 970/ In its report, the Legat's Office concluded that either the Counselor for Political Affairs did not route the memoranda to Charles Thomas or that Thomas did not recall receiving them. 971/

Thomas wrote that when he went to Nathan Ferris' office to inform him that Elena had found her calendar 972a/ and had reconstructed the date of the party as late September, Ferris replied that Elena had given the late September date when she had originally reported her story at the American Embassy. 972/ Thomas noted that Ferris explained that someone who had been at the party had stated that there had not been any Americans in attendance. 973/ Thomas wrote that he had assumed that Elena could have clearly been mistaken about the identity of the American she saw there, but never doubted that she had seen some Americans. 974/ Thomas wrote that Ferris had suggested that it was not necessary for Thomas to pursue the matter since he considered the Oswald case closed and had heard all the rumors before. 975/

The Legal Attache's reply to Thomas' memo stated that Mr. Ferris had not told Thomas that someone who was at the party had stated that there had not been any Americans present. 976/ The Legal Attache's memo asserted that Thomas had been told that it would not be necessary for him to pursue the matter any further since Elena's story had been investigated previously without being substantiated. 977/ In addition, the memo stated that Thomas had been told that Elena's story was considered a closed issue, not that the Oswald case was closed. 978/

12. House Select Committee on Assassination's Investigation of Elena Garro's Allegations

The House Select Committee on Assassinations investigated Elena Garro's story both through file reviews and personal interviews. The Committee requested and reviewed the CIA's, FBI's and State Department's files on Elena Garro de Paz, Elenita Garro de Paz, Manuel Calvillo, Noe W. Palomares, June Cobb Sharp, Victor Rico Galan, Eunice Odio, Sylvia Duran, Lydia Duran, Ruben Duran, Betty Serratos, Horatio Duran, Eusebio Azcue, and Emilio Carballido. Only the Elena Garro de Paz file contained information on her allegations. Though all the names listed above played a role in Elena Garro de Paz' story, not one of their files included a reference to Elena Garro de Paz.

Furthermore, the House Select Committee on Assassinations requested and reviewed the Central Intelligence Agency's LICOOKIE/1, LICHANT/1, LIRING/3, and TICHBORN files. Once again, not one of the files included a mention of Elena Garro's allegations. The House Select Committee on Assassinations learned that LICOOKIE/1, who first reported to the CIA Elena's allegation, was June Cobb Sharp.979/ LICHANT/1 was Manuel Calvillo who had hidden Elena Garro and her daughter in a hotel the day following the assassination. 980/ He also told Elena that Silvia Duran had been arrested before this fact had become public knowledge. 981/

Since a file review was inconclusive, the Committee arranged interviews in Mexico with Ruben Duran, Horatio

Duran, Elena and Elenita Garro, Silvia Duran, Lynn Duran, Emilio Carbillido and Betty Serratos. 982/ The Mexican Government informed the House Select Committee on Assassinations that Elena and Elenita Garro disappeared in 1968 during the student uprisings and have never returned to Mexico. 983/ The officials stated that Elena and her daughter might be in Spain. 984/ The Mexican government reported that Emilio Carballido could not be found. 985/ The others were interviewed between June 1 and June 6, 1978. 986/

Betty Serratos, Lydia Duran, Ruben Duran and Horatio Duran all stated that Elena was not the dancing type and therefore did not attend any of the twist parties at the Duran homes. 987/ When Silvia Duran was asked if Elena or Elenita Garro ever attended twist parties at the Duran homes, she recalled Elena attending one twist party at Ruben's home in 1963 after the Garros returned to Mexico from France. 988/ All the Durans denied that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended any party at one of their homes. 989/

The Committee next asked the Central Intelligence Agency to arrange interviews with LICHANT/1 (Manuel Calvillo), LICOOKIE/1 (June Cobb), who may have had information related to Lee Harvey Oswald's trip to Mexico City. 990/ The

Central Intelligence Agency declined to aid the Committee in this aspect of the investigation. 991/

The Committee returned to Mexico City on August 7, 1978 and attempted to locate June Cobb Sharp and Manuel Calvillo on its own. 992/

The Mexican government told the Committee that June Cobb Sharp received a tourist permit, number 72781, on June 27, 1947 when she entered Mexico through Nuevo Lardeo. She asked, but was denied, permission to represent the magazine, Modern Mexico. On June 21, 1948, she received a coutesy permiet, number 25556. Furthermore, the Mexican government explained that she disappeared in 1954 and never returned to Mexico. 993/

The Committee believes that this information is incorrect. According to Ms. Cobb's CIA file, she worked for the agency as an asset in Mexico from 1961 through 1966. 994/ Elena also stated that Ms. Cobb resided at her home in 1964. 995/

The Mexican government told the Committee that Manuel Calvillo did not live at Cuchtemoc 877-3 as the Committee had informed it. The Mexican Government's agent-in-charge had spoken to the superintendent at the apartments at which Manuel Calvillo was believed to reside, and was informed by the superintendent who had worked at the apartments for twenty-five years, said that no Manuel Calvillo had ever resided there. When Committee staffers gave the Mexican government Calvillo's pen name, the Mexicans gave the same answers. 996/

The Committee believes that there is a possibility that Mr. Calvillo lived at this address since it acquired the address from a recent CIA document. 997/

The Committee believes that there is a possibility that a U.S. Government agency requested the Mexican government to refrain from aiding the Committee with this aspect of its work. 998/ (See Procedural Write-up Trip 2 Mexico City and Section VII, C, below.)

The Committee made every attempt possible to locate Elena. On July 7, 1978 the Committee telephoned her publisher, Mortiz, in Mexico City and inquired about Elena's whereabouts. 999/ The publisher stated that Ms. Garro was living in the Hotel S.A.C.E. in Madrid, Spain. 1000/ The Committee telephoned the Hotel S.A.C.E. in Spain and spoke to the manager who told him that Ms. Garro had moved. 1001/ On July 14, 1978 the Committee called her publisher again and was told to contact the Mexican Embassy in Madrid, Spain. 1002/ The publisher stated that all Elena's payments were sent there because she did not even trust her publisher with her address. 1003/

The Committee called the Mexican Embassy in Madrid, Spain and spoke to Adolfo Padilla, a Mexican employee of the Embassy who stated that when Elena had visited the Embassy a couple of weeks before to pick up a check she seemed financially destitute. 1004/ He stated that when he asked Elena her new address she declined to give one, stating that she would return every few weeks to pick up checks and mail. 1005/ The Committee gave Padilla a telephone number and a message asking Elena to telephone the Committee collect. 1006/

On September 5, 1978 Elena Garro called the Committee. 1007/ When it was explained that the Committee wished to talk to her in person and would pay both her daughter's and her travel from Spain to the United States, Ms. Garro asked why she should believe the Committee was what it claimed to be. 1008/ The Committee asked Ms. Garro to call back collect in the next few days when it could explain to her when and where she could receive a Committee letter delineating why the Committee wished to interview her. 1009/ The Committee wrote the letter and made arrangements with the State Department for a letter to be hand-delivered to Elena at the American Embassy in Spain. 1010/

On September 7, 1978, Elena Garro called the Committee and asked when the letter would arrive. 1011/ The Committee explained that she could pick up the letter on Monday, September 11, 1978 from George Phelan, the Counsellor for Consular Affairs at the American Embassy. 1012/ Ms. Garro stated that she would get the letter on September 11, 1978 and follow our suggestions. 1013/

Ms. Garro never went to the American Embassy in Spain to pick up the Committee's letter. 1014/ The Committee, hoping she would pick up the letter before her flight date, proceeded to purchase air tickets for both Elena and her daughter. 1015/ Elena did not pick up the tickets at the airport. 1016/ The Committee has not been able to regain contact with Ms. de Paz again.

The Committee also investigated whether Charles Thomas' "selection out" was related to the Oswald case. After interviewing his widow, Ms. Cynthia Thomas, the Committee has concluded that his dismissal was unrelated. 1017/

In sum, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has not been able to confirm the evidence that would indicate that Lee Harvey Oswald, on one night while he was in Mexico, attended a "twist party" at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro, the brother-in-law of Silvia Duran. In addition, the House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to confirm the allegation that Lee Harvey Oswald travelled while in Mexico City with "two beatnik-looking boys." A large part of the Committee's attempts to investigate these issues has met with frustration.

D. Oscar Contreras Lartigue

On March 16, 1967, B. J. Ruyle, the American Consul in Tampico, reported to the American Embassy that he had spoken to a reporter who allegedly had met Lee Harvey Oswald at the National Autonomous University of Mexico City 1018/ in 1963. 1019/ The reporter, stressing that he had only a fleeting contact with Oswald, had claimed to have known only about Lee Harvey Oswald's desire to travel to Cuba and the Embassy's unwillingness to grant him a visa. 1020/ When B. J. Ruyle asked the reporter for permission to cable the story to the American Embassy, the reporter declined, stating that he feared losing his job. 1021/ Subsequent to the assassination, the reporter had told his editor about his contact with Lee Harvey Oswald, who had advised him not to report it. 1022/ The reporter granted B. J. Ruyle permission to cable the story to the American Embassy when Ruyle promised that it would be handled with the strictest confidence. 1023/ Ruyle wrote that he thought the reporter was genuinely concerned about his job. 1024/

A letter from B. J. Ruyle to the State Department dated May 11, 1967 provided additional details of the reporter's story. 1025/ The reporter alleged that he and some fellow students had met Lee Harvey Oswald as they exited the Cineclub at the Escuela de Filosofia (School of Philosophy) at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. 1026/ Oswald told the group that he had gone to the National Autonomous University of Mexico looking for pro-Castro students who might help him persuade the Cuban Embassy to grant him a visa. 1027/ Oswald claimed that he was from California and was a member of a pro-Castro group in New Orleans. 1028/ Oswald remained with the students the rest of that day and evening, as well as the following day. 1029/ The reporter described Oswald as a strange and introverted individual who spoke very little Spanish. 1030/

The State Department forwarded a copy of Ruyle's letter to the Central Intelligence Agency. 1031/ On June 14, 1967, CIA Headquarters sent the Mexico City Station a copy of Ruyle's letter to Bowles. 1032/ CIA Headquarters considered Ruyle's report "the first piece of substantive info about Oswald's sojourn in Mexico" since the assassination. 1033/ Consequently, Headquarters cabled that though it understood the source's reluctance to become involved "the fact remains that this info cannot continue to be withheld or concealed." 1034/ Headquarters instructed the Mexico City Station to elicit the identity of the source from Ruyle. 1035/ In addition, Headquarters asked the Mexico City Station to bear in mind, while interviewing Ruyle's source, that Lee Harvey Oswald was a homosexual. 1036/ The final sentence of the dispatch, "It is our hope that the facts obtained through these interviews will help to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations about involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are false," 1037/ explained the Central Intelligence Agency's motives for pursuing the story.

On June 29, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled

Headquarters that a station officer had gone to Tampico where he had interviewed Rurle's source, Oscar Contreras. 1038/ The cable reported that Contreras was a reporter for El Sol 1039/ in Tampico; was circa thirty years old; married, with three children; studied law at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) from 1960 to 1964; belonged to a pro-Castro group at UNAM; was persecuted by the Mexican police for this affiliation and moved to Tampico to escape the persecution 1040/.

Contreras told the Mexico City Station official that he and four other individuals 1041/ had met Oswald as they exited a roundtable discussion held at the School of Philosophy at UNAM. 1042/ Contreras stated that Oswald had made inquiries on the UNAM campus about pro-Cuban groups and had been directed to his group. 1043/ Contreras reported that though the group initially mistrusted Oswald fearing he was a "CIA provocation," they allowed Oswald to remain with them that day and night and part of the following day. 1044/ Contreras noted that Oswald never mentioned assassination but kept emphasizing that he had to get to Cuba. 1045/ In addition, Oswald had exhibited no homosexual tendencies while he was with the

TOP [illegible]

group. 1046/

On July 4, 1967, Headquarters cabled the Mexico City Station that Contreras story should be explored to the fullest even though he might have fabricated it. 1047/ Headquarters suggested that the FBI handle the story. 1048/ The following day, July 5, 1967, the Mexico City Station cabled that it preferred turning Contreras' case over to the Mexican authorities and to the F.B.I. 1049/ The same day, the Chief of Station informed the Legat of Contreras' story, but asked him not to take any action without first consulting the Mexico City Station. 1050/

On July 10, 1967, Jeremy K. Benedum ("JKB") wrote a memo delineating the results of a Mexican government review of Oscar Contreras' file. 1051/ According to a memo, a lone Oscar Contreras appeared in the UNAM law school records, Oscar Contreras Lartigue, born 2/14/39 in Ciudad Victoria, Tamaulipas. 1052/ The memo also reported that a newspaper article appearing in "Excelsior" listed an Oscar Contreras as a signer of a protest for the Bloque Estudiantil Revolucionario 1053/ which had been formed mid-1961. 1054/ The memo speculated that Contreras probably signed the protest as a front man to protect the real leaders of the group. 1056/ The Mexico

City Station cabled the information to Headquarters the following day, June 11, 1969. 1056/

The Committee has determined that the Central Intelligence Agency's main interest in Oscar Contreras was "to confirm that several of Garrison's allegations about involvement of anti-Castro Cubans, the CIA, etc. are false." 1057/ After the CIA Mexico City Station official's interview with Contreras 1058/ revealed nothing that could be useful to the agency, it decided to allow the FBI to follow the story through. 1059/ Nonetheless, the Agency's Mexico City Station interviewed the key witness, reviewed pertinent files and records about the witness in the Mexican government's possession, and reported all the information to Headquarters expeditiously.

VII. Analysis of Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City

A. Introduction

After the Warren Commission published its report two very important allegations related to Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City came to the attention of the United States investigative agencies. In 1964, Elena

Garro de Paz reported that she had seen Lee Harvey Oswald, accompanied by two other men, at a party at the home of Ruben Duran Navarro, the brother-in-law of Silvia Duran. 1060/ In 1967, Oscar Contreras Lartigue reported that he met Lee Harvey Oswald on the campus of the National Autonomous University of Mexico. 1061/

In addition, the testimony of the Warren Commission's primary witness related to Mexico City, Silvia Tirado Duran, has been called into question by the critics throughout the years. 1062/ Some of the information that is inconsistent with Ms. Duran's original story--that Oswald visited the Consulate on two occasions which were the only times she saw him--was available at the time of the Warren Commission's inquiry although it was ignored. 1063/ Some of the information has developed after the publication of the Warren Report. 1064/

The Garro and Contreras allegations, in conjunction with the inconsistencies of Ms. Duran's story raise three major questions: (1) did Lee Harvey Oswald or an imposter visit the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City?; (2) other than his visits to the Cuban Consulate, what were Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City?; and, (3) was Lee Harvey Oswald travelling alone in Mexico? These three questions overlap somewhat in detail; e.g., if Oswald was not traveling alone, did one of his companions impersonate him at the Cuban Consulate? Nonetheless, each of the three questions will be dealt with in separate sections below.

In an attempt to answer these questions the House Select Committee on Assassinations has: 1) interviewed Mexican 1065/ and Cuban citizens 1066/ who could have knowledge of Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate; 2) interviewed Mexican citizens 1067/ who could have knowledge of Oswald's activities and associations in Mexico City; 3) conducted an extensive review of the files of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation that pertain to Oswald's sojourn in Mexico City. 1068/

B. Did Lee Harvey Oswald or an Imposter Contact the Cuban and Soviet Consulates in Mexico City?

Lee Harvey Oswald himself probably visited the Cuban Consulate at least once since his application for a Cuban instransit visa bears his signature. 1069/ Though the Cuban Consulate allowed visa applicants to take blank applications out of the Consulate to be returned when completed, 1070/ Silvia Duran stated she was certain that Oswald signed the application in her presence. 1071/ Oswald's signature on the Cuban visa application, however, does not by itself rule out the possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in contacts with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies.

An analysis of the telephone conversations which the CIA's Mexico City Station intercepted by tapping the Soviet Consulate and the Soviet Military Attache's telephone reveals that someone, later identified by the CIA as Oswald, visited the Cuban Consulate at least two times and the Soviet Consulate at least three times. 1072/ On September 27, 1963, at 4:05 p.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. In this conversation she referred to an American seeking an intransit visa to Cuba. 1073/ The substantive information given indicates that she was discussing Oswald. 1074/ At this time the individual using Oswald's name already had been at the Soviet Embassy at least once, since Silvia requested the name of the Soviet Embassy official who dealt with the American. 1075/ Silvia also stated that the American was, at that time, in the Cuban Consulate. 1076/ At 4:26 p m. a Soviet Consular official returned Silvia Duran's call. 1077/ This official stated specifically that Oswald had visited the Soviet Consulate. 1078/

On September 28, 1963, at 11:51 a.m. Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consulate. 1079/ She put the American, later identified as Oswald, on the telephone. 1080/ The American, who was at the Cuban Consulate at the time, said that he had just been at the Soviet Consulate. 1081/ The conversation ended with the American stating that he was returning to the Soviet Consulate. 1082/

Analysis of Silvia Duran's and Eusebio Azcue's testimony would tend to indicate that Oswald, or someone impersonating him, visited the Cuban Consulate at least one and possibly two additional times on September 27, 1963. Silvia Duran says that Oswald first visited the Cuban Consulate at approximately 11:00 a.m. requesting an intransit visa to Cuba with Russia as the final destination. 1083/ Ms. Duran sent Oswald to obtain photographs that he needed for the visa application. 1084/ Eusebio Azcue recalls that this visit probably occurred on the date on the visa application, 9/27/63. 1085/

Ms. Duran also stated that Oswald returned at approximately 1:00 p.m. with four photographs. 1086/ Eusebio

Azcue also stated that the individual later identified as Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate about 1:00 p.m. with the photographs probably on "the date that appears on the application, that is to say on the 27th." 1087/ The Committee believes that there is a possibility that the argument between Azcue and the individual occurred during this visit. 1088/

Ms. Duran stated that Oswald's third and last visit occurred in the late afternoon after working hours on the 27th. 1089/ This visit is confirmed by the CIA's tap on the Soviet Consulate. 1090/

In addition to the alleged Oswald visits to the Consulates, there were other telephonic contacts that may have been between Oswald, or an imposter, and the Consulates. 1091/ Several details about Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate, and telephonic contacts with both Consulates suggest that the individual involved may not have been Oswald.

Silvia Duran's description of Oswald did not resemble Oswald's true physical appearance. 1092/ This description, which appeared early in the reporting of information obtained from Ms. Duran was deleted from subsequent reports and was not at all mentioned in the Warren

Report. 1093/ (See Section V, C, for details.) Eusebio Azcue's description of Oswald was similar to Silvia Duran's, but more detailed. 1094/ Perhaps the most remarkable thing about these descriptions is their similarity to Elena Garra de Paz' description of one of Oswald's alleged companions. 1095/

Another possible indication that an imposter may also have visited the Consulate is the 9/28/63 intercepted conversation. 1096/ Silvia Duran adamantly denies that Oswald or any other American visited the Cuban Consulate on Saturday, September 28, 1963. 1097/ In light of the CIA intercept of that date, Ms. Duran has either lied to the Committee or the individual who visited the Consulate on September 28 was not Oswald. 1098/ Ms. Duran, in light of the inconsistencies detailed in Sections V, C and VI, A above, may not be the most credible witness, but there are indications that she was truthful when she stated that Oswald did not visit the Consulate on September 28. The September 28, 1963 conversation was linked to Oswald because of the marginal notations made by the CIA translator on the transcript. 1099/ The translator noted on the transcript that the caller spoke "terrible, hardly recognizable

Russian." 1100/ On October 1, 1963, a man called the Soviet Consulate and identified himself as "Lee Oswald." 1101/ This man also stated that he had been at the Consulate on Saturday, the 28th. 1102/ The translator noted that this was the same man who had called the Consulate "a day or so ago" and had spoken in broken Russian. 1103/ From this information, and possibly a voice comparison 1104/, the 9/28 caller was identified as Oswald. 1105/ The problem with assuming that the caller on 9/28 and 10/1 was Oswald is that Oswald spoke fluent Russian. 1106/ Granted, Ms. Duran's denial of the Saturday visit and the proficiency of the caller's Russian is not sufficient evidence to conclude that the person who visited the Cuban Consulate on Saturday and who called the Soviet Consulate on Saturday and on October 1st was an imposter. Yet the information is sufficient to question the assumption that it was Oswald, especially in light of Azcue's and Duran's descriptions and Elena Garro de Paz' allegation.

The Committee notes the possibility, but does not conclude, that the missing production from the pulse camera and the LILYRIC base has something to do with the possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in Mexico.

Three calls that also occurred early on September 27, 1963 may have been by an imposter. At approximately 10:30 a.m. a man called the Soviet Military Attache looking for a visa to Odessa and was referred to the Soviet Consulate. 1108/ At 10:37 a.m. a man called the Soviet Consulate and asked for a visa to Odessa. 1109/ He was told to call back at 11:00. 1110/ At 1:25 p.m. a man called the Soviet Embassy and was told the Consul would return between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. that day.

While only the callers' requests for a visa to Russia 1112/ (Odessa) connect these calls to Oswald, the HSCA believes that they do fit logically into a time sequence created by what is known from testimony and the electronic intercepts about his actions on that day. For example, the following is a reasonable possible chronology of Oswald's actions on 9/27/63 based on analysis of the available evidence. Oswald probably arrived in Mexico around 10:00 a.m. on September 27. 1113/ By 10:30 Oswald had time to arrive at the Hotel del Comercio and to place a call to the Soviet Military Attache who referred him to the Consul. 1114/ The military attache also gave the caller directions to the Consulate. 1115/

During the 10:37 a.m. call to the Consulate, the caller learned that he could contact the Soviet Consul at 11:00 a.m. 1116/ This done, Oswald then visited the Cuban Consulate where he arrived around 11:00 a.m., on his way to the Soviet Consulate. This meeting lasted only approximately fifteen minutes. 1118/ Oswald was then sent to obtain photographs and to the Russian Embassy to get the necessary Russian visa. 1119/ Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate around 1:00 p.m. 1120/ At this point he had his encounter with Azcue and completed his application. Oswald realized at this point that he would have problems obtained the visas. 1122/ After this visit to the Cuban Consulate, which lasted approximately fifteen minutes 1123/ Oswald tried to contact the Soviet Consul whom Oswald claimed had assured him that he would have no problems obtaining a visa. 1124/ Hence, the 1:25 call. 1125/ During this conversation Oswald learned that the Consul would be in that evening between 4:00 p.m. and 5:00 p.m. 1126/ Oswald returned to the Cuban Consulate at 4:00 and Silvia Duran called the Soviet Consul on his behalf. 1127/ Hence, the 4:05 and 4:26 p.m. calls involving Duran. 1128/

But there is a problem with attributing the first three calls on September 27, 1963 to Oswald. The conversations are all in Spanish. With the exception of the testimony of Delgado,[1129] the evidence indicates that Oswald did not speak Spanish.[1130] Hence, either the above detailed calls were not made by Oswald or Oswald could speak Spanish.

There is not enough evidence firmly to conclude that some one did impersonate Oswald in Mexico. On the other hand, the evidence is of such a nature that the possibility cannot be dismissed.

C. What were Lee Harvey Oswald's Activities in Mexico City?

When the Warren Commission wrote about Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City, it concluded:

> The Commission undertook an intensive investigation to determine Oswald's purpose and activities on this journey, with specific reference to reports that Oswald was an agent of the Cuban or Soviet Governments. As a result of its investigation, the Commission believes that it has been able to reconstruct and explain most of Oswald's actions during this time.
>
> By Saturday, September 28, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald had failed to obtain visas at both the Cuban and Soviet Embassies. From Sunday, September 29, through Wednesday morning, October 2, when he left Mexico City on a bus bound for the United States, Oswald spent considerable time making his travel arrangements, sightseeing and checking again with the Soviet Embassy to

learn whether anything had happened on his visa application. 1131/

Subsequent to the Warren Commission's Report, the allegations of Elena Garro 1132/ and Oscar Contreras Lartigue 1133/ came to the attention of the United States investigative agencies. The main allegation of both these people, that they met Lee Harvey Oswald in Mexico City, remains to this day without direct corroboration. Yet the Committee feels that it cannot dismiss these allegations without giving them any consideration.

The testimony of Silvia Duran and the Cuban Consulate Officials Azcue and Mirabal place Oswald's last contact with the Cuban Embassy on Friday evening, September 27, 1963. 1134/ The transcripts from the CIA's wiretaps on the Soviet Consulate place Oswald's last visits to the Soviet and Cuban Consulates on Saturday morning, September 28, 1963. 1135/ Oswald's last telephonic contact with the Soviet Consulate came on Tuesday, October 1, 1963. 1136/ Oswald's activities on the days between September 28 and October 1 are not clearly recorded. The Warren Commission speculated that he spent most of this time sightseeing and making travel arrangements. 1137/

It is entirely possible that Oswald did spend some of his time during this weekend sightseeing and making his travel arrangements. It is also entirely possible that, after his failure to obtain his visas on Saturday, September 28, that Oswald did not give up completely and did attend a party where he would have come into contact with the Cuban Consular officials and, later, sought help from pro-Castro students.

It is entirely possible that Ruben Duran had a "twist party" on September 30, or October 1 1138/ as Elena Garro has claimed. Ruben, Horacio, Lydia and Silvia Duran all admitted that they frequently had twist parties in 1963. 1139/ Only Silvia Duran recalled Elena Garro attending any of the "twist parties" at the Durans' home. 1140/ She recalled Elena and Elena's daughter, Elenita, attending one twist party at Ruben's home in 1963. 1141/ The other Durans adamantly denied that Lee Harvey Oswald had attended a twist party at one of their homes. 1142/

Many of the details of Elena Garro's allegations have not been, or cannot be, corroborated. For example, Elena's allegation that some of the people who had been at the party were taken to Veracruz under the protection of Governor Lopez Arias 1143/ has not been verified. Ruben Duran denied that he had ever discussed the assassination with Elena Garro. 1144/ Eusebio Azcue denied that he had discussed President Kennedy with Emilio Carballido at a party at the Durans' home as alleged by Elena Garro. 1145/ The Committee has not been able to verify whether or not guards were posted outside of Elena's home in 1963 as she claims.

But other details of Elena's story are very credible. Perhaps the most striking is the suggestion that Oswald's relationship with Silvia Duran was more extensive than just the business contacts in the Cuban Consulate. 1146/ Another detail is the manner in which Elena's allegations were handled, and the manner in which this Committee's attempts to investigate those allegations have been frustatred. 1147/

In 1965 Elena Garro reported that Silvia Duran had been Oswald's mistress while he was in Mexico City. 1148/ In 1967 this report was confirmed by a CIA agent who talked to Silvia Duran. 1149/ The CIA Station did not consider the information significant and told the agent to end his contact with Ms. Duran. 1150/ If that information is accurate, then that Silvia invited Oswald to a party would not have been surprising. Silvia Duran admitted that the Mexican police had questioned her on this point but denied that she had had an affair with Oswald. 1151/ Ms. Duran denied having any extra-marital affairs while she was married to Horacio Duran. 1152/ This denial is not consistent with evidence of her reputation at the Cuban Consulate. A CIA penetration agent there reported to his case officer that all that would have to be done to recruit Silvia Duran, whom he referred to by using the Spanish word for whore, would be to get a blond blue-eyed American into bed with her. 1153/ There is also CIA information that indicates that Silvia Duran had an affair with a Cuban Ambassador to Mexico in the early 1960's. 1154/

The HSCA attempted to interview the CIA penetration agent about Ms. Duran. 1155/ An interview with the agent was also desired so as to attempt to verify whether Elena Garro had created a disturbance at the Cuban Embassy on November 23, 1963. 1156/ The Committee's attempts to interview this agent were frustrated. 1157/

Ms. Garro's claim that she stayed at the Hotel Vermont was verified by the Mexico City Legal Attache on

October 13, 1966. 1158/ Ms. Garro claimed that she had been held there by Manuel Calvillo whom she believed worked for the Mexican Ministry of Government. 1159/ In 1963, Mr. Calvillo was an unwitting asset of the Central Intelligence Agency. 1160/ Ms. Garro claimed that she told Mr. Calvillo her story on November 23, 1963. 1161/ Yet the CIA Mexico City Station did not receive a report from Calvillo on this matter until November 24, 1964, the same day that Elena first told her story to American officials. 1162/ For these reasons it was felt that Manuel Calvillo could well be a key to determining the veracity of Ms. Garro's story. The Committee's attempt to interview Mr. Calvillo were also frustrated.

There is also circumstantial corroboration of Ms. Garro's allegations regarding June Cobb Sharp. For example, Ms. Cobb was indeed a CIA agent and she did file the first report of Ms. Garro's story. 1164/ It should be noted that this first report was accurate in its detail in that Ms. Garro's story remained essentially the same in subsequent repetitions. Ms. Garro claimed that she kicked Ms. Cobb out of her house. 1165/ There is a notation on Ms. Cobb's report that she was not able to regain access to Ms. Garro. 1166/ The Committee attempted to obtain an interview with Ms. Cobb, but was once again frustated. 1167/

Reviewing the manner in which the CIA Mexico City Station and the Legal Attache's office in Mexico City handled Ms. Garro's allegations reveals that, at best, her allegations were handled in an irresponsible manner because they were dismissed after a superficial investigation. The first report that came to the CIA was misfiled and forgotten. 1168/ The Legat, after talking to Elena, dismissed her story after interviewing one person whom she said may have been at the party. 1169/ The manner in which the official American community handled Charles Thomas' reporting is detailed in Section VI, C, 11, above. Mr. Thomas speculated in 1969 about why Ms. Garro's story had been largely ignored by the American officials in Mexico:

> It would appear that whereas the FBI has discounted the Elena Garro allegations, the CIA is still considerable disturbed by them. The CIA may not have pressed for further investigation, however, for a number of reasons: 1) considering the sensitive overlap and subtle competition between two intelligence collecting agencies, it had to yield to the FBI's clear jurisdiction; 2) there are obvious complications

> in conducting such an investigation in a foreigh country; 3) there is a close and delicate relationship between the CIA Station Chief and the former Minister of Interior--President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz; and 4) some of the people appearing in the Elena Garro scenario may well be agents of the CIA. Under the circumstances it is unlikely that any further investigation of this matter will ever take place unless it is ordered by a high official in Washington. 1170/

The Committee attempted to locate Elena Garro. Although the Committee established telephonic contact with Ms. Garro, the Committee was totally frustrated in this aspect of its investigation, but yet believes that there is a possibility that Lee Harvey Oswald did attend a twist party at the home of Ruben Duran.

The Committee also considers it possible that Lee Harvey Oswald contacted pro-Castro students at the National Autonomous University of Mexico (Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico, hereinafter UNAM) as claimed by Oscar Contreras Lartigue. 1172/ Silvia Duran admitted that she had told Oswald of two ways in which he could get a Cuban visa: 1) he could get an intransit visa by first obtaining a visa to another Communist country such as Russia; 2) he could obtain a regular Cuban visa by knowing someone in Cuba who would vouch for him. 1173/

Classification: ________________

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents)

TOP SECRET

It is possible that after Oswald's attempts to obtain a visa by the first method were frustrated on Saturday, September 28, that he made one final effort to locate someone trusted by the Cuban Consulate to vouch for him.

There is no direct evidence about how Oswald could have learned of the pro-Castro group at UNAM. There is a possibility that Ernesto Leffeld Miller, a friend of the Durans who borrowed Horacio's car often took Lee Harvey Oswald to the campus of the National Autonomous University. On the days when Lee Harvey Oswald allegedly visited the Consulate, Mr. Miller did also. It is possible that Silvia Duran asked him to escort Oswald to the campus. Mr. Miller denied having ever met Oswald. 1174A/ Oscar Contreras says that Oswald first contacted him as he was leaving a round-table discussion at the school of philosphy. 1174/ It is known that, in 1963, the Durans were close friends with the Chairman of the Philosophy Department at UNAM, Ricardo Guerra, who held seminars on Kant, Hegel and Marx in the Durans' home. 1175/ It is possible, if Silvia Duran had more than just a purely business relationship with Oswald,

Classification: ~~TOP SECRET~~ -322

Classified by derivation: __________

that she referred Oswald to one of Guerra's Marxist seminars in his search for help. Unfortunately, Contreras does not name who headed the round table discussion at which he met Oswald. 1176/ Silvia Duran denied that she referred Oswald to anyone for help. 1177/ Ricardo Guerra is presently the Mexican Ambassador to East Germany and was not available to the Committee for an interview. On both of the Committee's trips to Mexico, the Mexican Government told the Committee that Mr. Contreras would be made available for an interview. The interview never occurred. 1178/ Although the Committee's attempt to investigate Mr. Contreras' allegation met largely with frustration, the allegation can not be dismissed.

D. Was Lee Harvey Oswald alone while he travelled to Mexico?

The Warren Commission concluded that Lee Harvey Oswald travelled alone while he was in Mexico. 1179/ All of the witnesses, with the exception of Elena Garro de Paz who stated that Oswald was accompanied by two "beatnik looking boys" 1180/ at Ruben Duran's party, have stated that when they saw Oswald in Mexico he was and Lopez [illegible]

alone. Although the American authorities did not handle the Elena Garro allegation properly, the Committee does not believe that it can readily dismiss Ms. Garro's allegation that Oswald had a companion in Mexico in light of: 1) the corroboration of details of Ms. Garro's story; 1181/ 2) the possibility that someone impersonated Oswald in Mexico 1182/ and 3) the similiarity in the description of Oswald by Ms. Duran and Mr. Azcue and the description of Oswald's companion by Ms. Garro. 1183/

Appendix I: HSCA Procedural Write-up Cuba Trip 1

Select Committee members Chairman Louis Stokes and Congressman Christopher Dodd, accompanied by G. Robert Blakey, Gary Cornwell and Ed Lopez of the Select Committee staff arrived in Cuba at 3:30 p.m., March 30, 1978. They were met and escorted through Cuban Customs by the Mayor of Havana, Honorable Oscar Fernandez Mell, the Minister of Justice, Dr. Armando Torres Santrayll, Señor Buergo, Ricardo Escartin and the Cuban government translator, Juanita Vera. At approximately 7:30 p.m. Señor Mell escorted the Select Committee staff to a restaurant in Old Havana. The following day Congressman Richardson Preyer arrived in Cuba at 7:00 a.m.

At 9:30 a.m. on March 31, 1978 the Select Committee representatives met with Ricardo Escartin, Senén Buergo and Captain Felipe Villa of the Ministry of the Interior. The Cuban Government gave the members and Committee its official reply to the Committee's questionnaire, given to the Cuban government prior to the Committee's trip to Cuba.

At 3:00 p.m., the Select Committee met again with

Ricardo Escartin, Senen Buergo, Felipe Villa and Juanita Vera. During this session, the two major areas of discussion were Lee Harvey Oswald's visa application and the dates of Jack Ruby's visits to Cuba in 1959. 1184/ At 7:30 p.m. the House Select Committee on Assassinations staff dined with the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll.

At 9:00 a.m. on April 1, 1978, the Select Committee staff again met with the same Cuban officials for a third session. Santo Trafficante was the major area of discussion. 1185/ At noon, Committee members and staff representatives met with Cuba's Minister of Education, Honorable Jose Ramon Fernandez, who gave a presentation on the improvement in quality of Cuban education since the Cuban Revolution.

Following Señor Fernandez's discussion, at 3:15 p.m., Eusebio Azcue was interviewed by the Committee staff representative. Azcue was questioned extensively about Oswald's alleged trip to Mexico City, Oswald's alleged visits to the Cuban Consulate, and Señor Azcue's alleged argument with Lee Harvey Oswald. 1186/

At 7:30 p.m., April 1, 1978, Messers. Escartin and Hernandez accompanied the House Select Committee staff for dinner and show to the Tropicana Club which, prior to the Revolution, was operated by organized crime. The Tropicana Club is presently run by the Cuban government.

At 11:00 a.m. on April 2, 1978, the Committee staff again met with Senen Buergo, Ricardo Escartin, Felipe Villa, Aramis Guetierrez and Juanita Vera. Santo Trafficante, Jack Ruby and Mexico City were the major areas of discussion. 1187/ This session terminated at 1:00 p.m. At 4:50 p.m., the morning's meeting resumed. During the afternoon session, the major area~~s~~ of discussion was the alleged pro-Castro involvement in the assassination. 1188/

At 9:15 a.m., April 3, 1978, the Committee staff met with the Cuban officials for a final work session. During this session, the intelligence agencies and general questions derived from the questionnaire which the Committee had provided to the Cuban government were the major areas of discussion. 1189/ During the session, the Committee staff and Cuban officials also exchanged listings of pending material which might be covered during a subsequent trip to Cuba by HSCA representatives and Congressmen. 1190/

At 6:00 p.m. the Committee staff met with President Fidel Castro Ruz who assured the Committee that neither he nor his government had any involvement in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

The House Select Committee on Assassinations staff departed Havana, Cuba at 10:00 a.m., April 4, 1978, arriving in Washington, D.C. at 4:30 p.m.

427

Appendix 2: HSCA Procedural Write-up Mexico Trip

House Select Committee on Assassinations staffers Gary Cornwell, Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez and Harold Leap arrived at the Mexico City airport at 8:30 p.m., May 30, 1978. (All times are Mexico City times, unless otherwise specified.) They were met and escorted through Customs by David Patton, an employee of the United States Embassy.

The following morning, May 31, 1978 the HSCA representatives met with U S. Embassy Political Officer Richard Howard concerning procedure. Mr. Howard scheduled a meeting at 11:15 a m. with the Chief of the CIA Station in Mexico City. This meeting was preliminary in nature and concerned procedures regarding arrangement of the interviews of ex-CIA employees in Mexico.

At 12:00 noon, the HSCA representatives and Richard Howard met representatives of the Government of Mexico. The Mexican representatives were: 1) Dr. Jesus Yanes, Advisor to the Attorney General's Executive Officer; 2) Fernando Baeza, Chief Administrative Officer for the Attorney General; and 3) Commandate Florentino Ventura, Chief of the Mexican Federal Police. The Mexicans informed the staff members at this meeting that they had located Silvia Duran, Horacio Duran, Ruben Duran and Pedro Gutierrez Valencia 1192/ and that each person was willing to be interviewed by the HSCA representatives. Procedure for conduct of the interviews was also discussed at this meeting.

The Mexican government decided that the initial interview would be an informal contact with the witnesses in which the Committee's objectives would be described. The witnesses' statements would be formalized at a later, taped interview. The Mexican officials informed the HSCA staff members that they had been unable to locate Oscar Contreras, 1193/ Elena Garro de Paz, and Elenita Garro de Paz. 1194/ The Mexican Government had not had contact with the Garros since 1968. The Mexicans said that they were trying to locate the Garros through the Foreign Ministry since Elena's ex-husband, Octavio Paz, had once been an important person in that ministry. The Mexicans asked that we determine the name of the Mexican Government contact during 1964 with the Warren Commission so that they could locate their records in the Archives.

The Mexican officials left to set up the preliminary interviews with witnesses. The preliminary interviews were conducted by Gary Cornwell. HSCA staff members Dan Hardway, Edwin Lopez and Harold Leap were present during Cornwell's questioning. The Mexican Government was represented by Dr. Jesus Yañes, Commandante Florentino Ventura, and Jesus Meixueiro Kanty, second in command to Ventura. Pedro Gutierrez Valencia was interviewed at 2:30 p.m. Ruben Duran was interviewed at 5:00 p.m. Horacio Duran was interviewed at 5:30 p.m. Silvia Duran was interviewed at 6:15 p.m.

At 9:30 a.m. on June 1, 1978, the HSCA staff representatives met with the Mexican police representatives. The HSCA staff requested 1) the records of the company that employed Gutierrez Valencia in 1963; press clippings of the Mexican newspaper coverage of Oswald and Silvia Duran (attached); 3) once again, an interview with Oscar Contreras; 4) individual files on Elena Garro de Paz and Silvia Duran; 5) evidence related to Silvia Duran's assertion that Oswald was at the Cuban Embassy on one day only; 6) an interview with Deba Garro de Guerrero Galvan; 1195/ 7) an interview with Eunice Odio; 1196/ 9) an interview with Emilio Carballido; 1197/ and 10) an interview with Victor Rico Galan. 1198/ The

HSCA also asked to be shown the Cuban Consulate.

The Mexican representatives informed the HSCA staff that Victor Rico Galan had, at one time, been arrested on political charges but that he was subsequently pardoned by either Diaz Ordaz or Luis Echevarria. 1199/ The Mexicans said that they were searching for all files and newspaper articles requested by the HSCA.

The Mexican officials also offered their observations orally on the preliminary interviews conducted the previous day. They pointed out that they found it strange that Silvia had told Oswald he could not travel while in Cuba. They wondered what Duran was trying to tell Oswald and whether she thought that Oswald had some objective in going to Cuba other than that ascribed by the popular version. They also considered the manner in which Silvia obtained employment at the Cuban Consulate unusual. Generally they noted that Silvia and her brothers seemed to have almost programmed responses and a defensive demeanor. They pointed out, however, that all the Durans had been very interested in talking to us. In their opinion, Ruben Duran was the most credible of those interviewed by the HSCA the previous day.

At this point, a Mexican official who had been checking the computer records informed us that Victor Rico Galan had died.

HSCA staff members provided the Mexican authorities with the names of the Mexican officials who had been involved in the investigation in 1963.

HSCA staff members met again with the Mexican police authorities at 10:00 a.m. on June 2, 1978. At this time, the Mexican police provided the copies of the newspaper clippings on the assassination of John F. Kennedy from the Excelsior. HSCA staff members asked if the Mexicans could persuade the newspapers to reveal the sources of their stories about Oswald and Silvia Duran. The Mexican officials' response was negative. The Mexican officials informed the HSCA staff members that most of the data we wanted from the files was in their Security Service files. The Mexican officials working with the HSCA explained that they were the Mexican equivalent of the FBI and that the Security Service was the Mexican equivalent of the CIA; hence there was the usual bureaucratic problem involved in obtaining access to the Security Service's files. The Mexicans informed the HSCA representatives that Emilio Carballido had been located;

that Deba Garro could not be located; and that there was no record of anyone named Eunice Odio. HSCA representatives told the Mexican officials that Odio, who was either Costa Rican or Guatemalan, had been the mistress of Emilio Carballido. The assassination and the reaction of the Mexican people to it was discussed.

At 1:00 p.m., HSCA staff members conducted an interview at the United States Embassy in connection with the CIA aspects of the Mexico City investigation.

At 2:30, Gary Cornwell discussed problems with the Chief of the Mexico City CIA Station. He requested that the COS cable Headquarters regarding restrictions placed on the HSCA staff in Mexico.

At 6:00 p.m., the HSCA staff members, accompanied by Jesus Meixuerio Kanty and his assistant, Honorio Escondon, met with the assistant chief of the Mexican Security Service Nazar. Mr. Nazar gave an oral resume of the interviews which Mexican officials conducted in 1963 of Silvia, Horatio and Ruben Duran and Betty Serratos. Mr. Nazar said that the files had to be formally requested before he could consider releasing them. He suggested that we secure statements admissible in United

States courts from the witnesses whom we wished to interview. Mr. Nazar suggested that our best investigatory avenue would be to concentrate on Oswald's interrogation after his arrest on November 22nd. Mr. Nazar had a very low opinion of Elena Garro de Paz' credibility. He felt that she confused fact and fiction.

June 3 and 4, 1978, were spent on CIA-related aspects of the Mexico City investigation. Two interviews were conducted. All interviews, with the exception of interviews with CIA personnel, were taped and later transcribed.

At 11:00 a.m. on June 5, 1978, the HSCA staff interviewed Horacio Duran for the record. 1200/ At 1:00 p.m., HSCA staff member Edwin Lopez and Mexican officials Honorio Escondon and Dr. Alfonso Orozco Gutierrez interviewed Pedro Gutierrez Valencia for the record. 1201/ At 5:00 p.m., HSCA staff members interviewed Lynn Duran, aka Lydia Duran, for the record. 1202/

On June 6, 1978 at 11:00 a.m., the HSCA staff interviewed Ruben Duran for the record. 1203/ At 1:00 p.m., the staff representatives met with Commandate Ventura. The staff representatives agreed to supply the Mexicans with questions for two witnesses, Oscar Contreras and

Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, who could not then be interviewed. 1204/ Commandate Ventura authorized Honorio Escondon to interview Oscar Contreras Lartigue and Ernesto Lehfeld Miller. At 5:00 p.m., the wife of Ruben Duran, Betty Serratos, 1205/ was interviewed for the record. At 5:45 p.m., Silvia Duran was interviewed for the record. 1206/

The HSCA staff representatives left Mexico City at 8:30 a.m. on June 7, 1978, arriving in Washington, D.C. at 5:30 p.m., Washington time.

Appendix 3: HSCA Procedural Write-up Mexico Trip 2

House Select Committee staffers Edwin Juan Lopez and Harold Leap traveled to Mexico City on August 7, 1978. The staff members were met by David T. Patton, a State Department official, at the Mexican airport at 10:15 p.m. Mr. Patton then checked the staffers into Room 1754 at the Maria Isabel Hotel. Mr. Patton informed the staff members that Larry Sternfield CIA Chief of Station in Mexico City, wished to see us at 8:30 a.m. the following morning.

On Tuesday, August 8, 1978, Committee staffers met with Larry Sternfield. He informed the staffers that the two individuals the Committee wished to interview, Daniel Flores, 1207/ aka Luis Aparicio, and Ramon Alvarez Duran, 1208/were now available.

At 9:30 a.m., August 8, 1978, Committee staff members interviewed Danny Flores. 1209/ The interview ended at approximately 10: 5 a.m.

Committee staff members returned to Mr. Sternfield office. Mr. Sternfield stated that it appeared that the Government of Mexico had only been able to locate two witnesses for the Committee, Oscar Contreras Lartigue 1210/ and Noe W. Palomares. 1211/ Sternfield asked the staff members to whom they wished to speak. The Committee staff members explained that they would like to interview LICHANT 1, 1212/ LICOOKIE I, 1213/ LITAMIL 7, 1214/ LITAMIL 9, 1215/ and LIRING 3, 1216/ Mr. Sternfield then stated that it appeared that the House Select Committee on Assassinations had already asked the Mexicans to locate the individuals listed above.

Mr. Sternfield stated that the HSCA's interview with Ramon Alvarez Duran was considered "highly sensitive." He explained that three rooms at a nearby hotel would be used. In one room, Ramon Alvarez Duran would sit, Committee staff members would sit in a second room and two CIA personnel officers would insure that the equipment worked properly in a third room. Mr. Sternfield then phoned Mr. Niles Gooding, who had been sent to the Mexico City Station from Headquarters to arrange the procedures for the interviews. Mr. Gooding explained that in 1977 Stansfield Turner had created a new position at Headquarters to insure that important sensitive meetings were within the guidelines previously arranged. Mr. Gooding stated that the Central Intelligence Agency had been under greater Congressional scrutiny the past two years. Therefore, Director Turner, in order to demonstrate the Agency's good faith, had engaged a retired Army officer to act as liaison at sensitive interviews by Congressional representatives. Mr. Gooding then explained that the HSCA staff would be escorted by two CIA personnel to the interview with Ramon Alvarez Durant.

At 10:55 a.m., August 8, 1978, Committee staff members interviewed Ramon Alvarez Durant. 1217/

At 12:30 p.m., Committee staff members telephoned Captain Fernandez Ventura Gutierrez. His secretary explained that Mr. Ventura was not in the office, but that she would have him call us when he returned. At 6:30 p.m., since Mr. Ventura had not yet returned the staffer's call, they again called his office. His secretary apologized for Mr. Ventura and explained that he had not yet returned to the office and she assured us that Mr.Ventura would telephone upon his return. At 9:15 p.m., Dr. Jesus Yanez, the Assistant to the official mayor, telephoned the staff members explaining that Mr. Ventura was very busy on an important assignment and asked us to visit the Police Station known as the Procuraduria General at 11:00 a.m. the following morning.

At 10:15 a.m., August 9, 1978, Committee staff members met with State Department Official Richard Howard to alert him that the Committee would request the Mexican officials to make Silvia Duran available in Washington for an HSCA hearing. Mr. Howard explained that once we had permission from the Mexican government, the State Department would insure that she was in Washington when necessary.

At 11:00 a.m., August 9, 1978, Committee staff members met with Dr. Jesus Yañes and Ciprianio Martinez Novoa. Mr. Yanes told Committee staff members that Ciprianio Martinez Nova, the Mexican agent in charge, would try to aid us in all our interviews. Mr. Martinez then briefed the Committee staff members on their up-to-date progress:

Oscar Contreras Lartigue had been located and pre-interviewed by Mr. Martinez in Tampico, Mexico. The Committee would fly to Tampico on Friday, August 11, 1978 at 7;35 a.m. to interview him.

Noe W. Palomares had been located and could be interviewed during the afternoon of Thursday, August 10, 1978 at his office, Cerrada de la Presa 4. His phone number, 595-0891, was made available to the Committee.

June Cobb Sharp received a tourist permit, number 72781, on June 27, 1947. She entered Mexico through Nuevo Lardo, Texas. She requested but was denied permission by the Mexican government to represent the magazine, Modern Mexico. On June 21, 1948, she received a courtesy permit, number 25556. She disappeared in 1954 and never returned to Mexico.

The Committee staffers did not tell the Mexicans that the House Select Committee on Assassinations had evidence from review of June Cobb's 201 file that she was in Mexico in the Sixties.

Eunice Odio Infante, a Costa Rican, received a three-month tourist permit from the Mexican government on February 9, 1964. She remained in Mexico, illegally residing at Nacas-45-a, until 1972. She applied to write for the Excelsior magazine on many different occasions, but was rejected every time. In 1972, Ms. Odio married a Comminist painter, Rudolfo Sanabria Gonzalez and moved to Rio Neba-16 Apartment 40. On May 24, 1972, Ms. Odio was found dead in her bathtub. The official presiding at her autopsy concluded that Ms. Odio had poisoned herself.

Emilio Carballido Fontanes was in Carcas, Venezuela, on vacation and scheduled to return to Mexico in early September. His address is Constituyentes 207. His phone number is 515-8345.

Consuelo Esperon's (LITAMIL 7) personnel record in Mexico could not be located. When the Mexican officials inquired about her at the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City prior to the Committee's trip, no one at the office remembered that she had worked there. Committee staff members were told that Esperon was probably dead. No basis was given for the Mexican government's conclusion.

Carlos Jurado J. Delmar (LIRING 3) was born in Cuba on November 3, 1927. He entered Mexico July 1, 1965 and taught Graphics and Art at U.N.A.M. until January 1, 1968 when he disappeared. The Mexican officials assumed that he returned to Cuba.

General Jesus Jose Clark Flores 1218/ died in the early 1970's.

Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, 1219/ Academic Coordinator at the School of Interior Design, had not yet been located.

Luis Alberue Suoto (LITAMIL 9) lives at Michelet #7, Apartment #301, Colonia Anzura, Mexico City. His phone number is 545-9947. The landlady at his apartment explained to the Mexican officials that Mr. Alberue had left town hurriedly on Monday, August 7, 1978. Mr. Martinez, wishing to know when he returned, had placed a piece of scotch tape on the bottom right edge of his door. Mr. Martinez explained that he checked it every four hours and would notify us if Alberue returned before we left.

Manuel Calvillo (LICHANT 1) did not live at Cauhtemoc 877-5 as the Committee had stated. The landlady for the past twenty-five years at the apartments told Mr. Martinez that Manuel Calvillo had never resided there. Committee staff members explained that Calvillo went by a pen name which would be forwarded to the Mexican officials the following morning.

When Committee staff members inquired whether Ms. Silvia Tirado Bazan could testify at an HSCA hearing, the Mexican officials stated that they would have an answer for the staffers by Friday morning. The Mexican officials explained that they would have to speak to her to insure that she was willing to travel to Washington.

On Thursday, August 10, 1978, at 11:00 a.m. the Committee staff members met with Dr. Jesus Yañez, Agent Ciprianio Martinez Novoa, Captain Florentino Ventura Gutierrez and Attorney General Licensiado, Manuel Calvillo's "pen name" was given to the Mexicans who stated that they would check it with the landlady at his alleged apartment building.

Committee staffers returned to their hotel room with Agent Ciprianio Martinez Novoa after the meeting. Agent Martinez attempted without success to telephone Oscar Contreras Lartigue to inform him of our visit. At 3:30 p.m., Agent Martinez finally reached Mr. Contreras' child who informed him that Mr. Contreras was not in Tampico. He had traveled to Mexico City for a Partido Republicano

Institucional convention. When Agent Martinez asked the child if he knew where his father was staying in Mexico City, he responded that he did not. Agent Martinez explained to the child that he would call at a later time to speak to his mother.

Agent Martinez telephoned Noe W. Palomares at 4:00 p.m. and arrange an interview for 6:30 p.m. that evening. Mr. Martinez asked Committee staff members to meet him at his office at the Procuraduria General at 6:00 p.m.

At 6:00 p.m., August 10, 1978, Committee staff members met Agent Ciprianio Martinez at the Procuraduria General. Martinez then drove the HSCA representatives to Mr. Palomares' office. At 6:30 p.m., Committee staff members interviewed Noe W. Palomares. 1270/

Following the interview, Agent Martinez returned to the Maria Isabel Hotel with Committee staff members. He attempted to reach Mrs. Contreras telephonically at Tampico twice without success. At 9:45 p.m., he finally contacted her. Mrs. Contreras told Agent Martinez that Mr. Oscar Contreras had told her that he would try to get a room at either the Hotel Regis or Hotel San Francisco. Mrs. Contreras explained that since there were a few conventions scheduled in Mexico City that weekend she could not assure that he would be at either hotel. Mrs. Contreras told Agent Martinez that she would notify him if her husband should call.

Mr. Martinez called both hotels and inquired whether Oscar Contreras Lartigue was registered. He was not registered at either; they were completely booked up.

Mr. Martinez attempted to reach by telephone Silvia Tirado Byazan at ther home to ask her whether she would be willing to travel to Washington to testify at a HSCA hearing and to ask if she knew where Mr. Ernesto Lehfeld Miller could be located. She was not at home, however.

Agent Martinez explained that he would attempt to locate Oscar Contreras Lartigue at the hotel where the Partido Republicano Institucional (Institutional Republican Party) was holding its convention early the following morning; after which he would meet the staff members at 9:30 a.m. at their hotel room.

-445

At 9:45 a.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez met Committee staffers at their hotel room and explained that he was unable to locate Mr. Contreras Lartigue at the convention. Mr. Martinez then left to check the whereabouts of Mr. Alberue Suoto and Silvia Tirado Bazan.

at 12:30 p.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez returned to the Committee staff members' hotel room. He telephoned Mrs. Contreras in Tampico who stated that her husband had not telephoned her since she had last spoken to Agent Martinez. At 1:50 p.m., another agent, Honorio Escondon, telephoned Agent Martinez at the Committee staffers' hotel room to inform him that Luis Alberue Suoto must be back in town because the scotch tape placed at the base of his entranceway door was no longer in place. AT 1:55 p.m., Agent Martinez telephoned Luis Alberue Suvoto. During the phone conversation, Alberue denied that he had worked at the Cuban Embassy in the Sixties, stated that he knew nothing about the assassination, and declined the Committee staff members' request to interview him.

At 2:00 p.m., August 11, 1978, Agent Martinez telephoned

Silvia Duran. Agent Martinez then gave the telephone to Committee staffer Lopez. Mr. Lopez asked Ms. Tirado whether she would be willing to testify sometime in September at a Committee hearing in Washington; she answered affirmatively. She stated that September 13th, 14th and 15th would not be "good days" because the Mexican Revolution celebration would be taking place and she was a planner and participant. When Mr. Lopez asked Ms. Tirado if she knew Mr. Ernesto Lehfeld Miller's phone number, she stated that she did not, but she stated that if we telephoned her husband Horatio at either 516-0398 or 515-8621, he would be able to help us.

At 2:15 p.m., Committee staffer Lopez telephoned Horatio Duran, who have him Ernesto Lehfeld Miller's office phone number, 548-4839. At 2:20 p.m., Lopez telephoned Mr. Miller and arranged a meeting for 9:00 p.m. that evening.

At 2:30 p.m., Agent Martinez telephoned Captain Ventura to report on his progress, pertaining to his work with the HSCA. When Martinez told Ventura that he had located Alberue,

-447

Ventura asked Martinez if he was alone. When Agent Martinez lied and stated that he was alone, Ventura told him that he should under no circumstances allow us to interview Alberue. When Agent Martinez completed his phone call, he said, "I don't understand why nobody wants you to talk to him."

At 9:00 p.m., August 11, 1978, Committee staffers interviewed Ernesto Lehfeld Miller 1221/

At 11:15 a.m., August 12, 1978, Committee staffer Lopez called Luis Alberue Suoto at his home. When Mr. Lopez identified himself, Mr. Alberue immediately stated that he knew nothing. He further stated that he never worked for the Cuban Embassy. When Lopez explained to him that employees at the Cuban Embassy had stated that he had been employed there, Mr. Suoto hung up. Mr. Alberue's voice quivered throughout the short talk.

At 11:45 a.m., Silvia Tirado called Lopez and stated that she had thought all night about travelling to Washington. She said she had seen a report in the newspapers in which Azcue had stated that the man who visited the Cuban Consulate in 1963 was not Lee Harvey Oswald. She stated that Azcue had only seen Oswald once while she had seen Oswald at least three times.

Ms. Duran further stated that if she testified in Washington and the Committee concluded that she was lying she would be crucified when she returned to Mexico. Mr. Lopez reassured her and explained that when he returned to Washington he would send her a long letter explaining procedures.

At 12:05 p.m., Agent Martinez met the Committee staff members at the airport. He stated that Contreras and Calvillo had not been located. The Committee staffers gave Martinez a list of questions to ask Oscar Contreras Lartigue. Agent Martinez stated that he would mail the results of the interview to Lopez at the Committee offices in Washington. The Committee never received any interview reports from the Mexican government.

The Committee staff members left Mexico City at 1:55 p.m. and arrived at Washington s Dulles Airport at 10:35 p.m.

449

Appendix 4: HSCA Procedural Write-up Cuba Trip 2

On August 25, 1978, Congressman Richardson Preyer and HSCA staff members G. Robert Blakey and Edwin Juan Lopez Soto traveled to Cuba from Miami at 8:25 a.m. on an Air-Taxi Service charter plane. The Committee representatives arrived in Cuba at 10:15 a.m. They were met by the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll; Washington Consul Ricardo Escartin; American Department official, Senen Buergo; and translator, Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. The Committee representatives were escorted to their suite, room number 2003, at the Hotel Riviera at 11:00 a.m.

At 12:15 p.m., the Committee representatives met with Ricardo Escartin, Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo and translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade. Also present were two Cuban stenographers. Senen Buergo, the spokesperson, welcomed the Committee representatives to Cuba and thanked the Committee for its correspondence. Mr. Buergo apologized on behalf of the Cuban government for the postponement of a previously scheduled trip of

May 24th and 25th, 1978. Mr. Buergo stressed that in his opinion there was a conspiracy to link Cuba to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. At that point, he handed four files to Congressman Richardson Preyer. The files consisted of: a) material concerning Santo Trafficante; b) a letter dated 25 November 1963 from Hernandez Armas (Mexican Ambassador in 1962 to Raul Roa (Minister of Foreign Relations in 1963); c) the results of the Cuban government's research into mis-information linking the Cuban Government to the assassination of President John F. Kennedy; and d) the report of the Investigative Committee of the International Tribunal of the Eleventh Festival reporting on the defamation campaign to link Cuba to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Mr. Buergo stated that both Eusebio Azcue Lopez and Alfredo Mirabal Diaz would that day be made available for interviews. Mr. Buergo stated that Nilo Otero 1222/ would be made available for interview the following day, 26 August 1978. Mr. Buergo stated that Rogelio Rodriguez 1223/ was presently stationed in West Germany. Buergo stated that Ricardo Escartin previously interviewed Mr. Rodriguez and was told by Rodriguez that he had had no contact with Lee Harvey Oswald. Mr. Buergo stated that if the Committee still desired to interview Rodriguez, he would be made available to the Committee. Mr. Buergo stated that an interview with Rolando Cubela Secades 1224/ would be arranged.

Mr. Buergo asked if the Committee was still interested in interviewing Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez. 1225/ Mr. Buergo stated that the Cuban government had no record of a citizen named Griselle Rubio. 1226/ Mr. Buergo inquired whether the Committee representatives were interested in watching the videotaped statements of James Wilcott 1227/ and Phillip Agee 1228/ at the Tribunal. 1229/ Congressman Preyer responded that the Committee's representatives would want to view the Wilcott and Agee videotaped statements.

Mr. Buergo stated that our schedule included dinner with the Minister of Justice at 8:00 p.m. on 25 August 1978, fishing on 27 August 1978 (Sunday), and a farewell dinner on 28 August 1978.

Congressman Preyer thanked the Cuban officials for making both the documents and witnesses available to the Select Committee.

Professor Blakey stated that the Committee was no longer interested in interviewing Rolando Cubela. Mr. Blakey stated that Griselle Rubio had been found in Miami and interviewed by a Committee investigator. Mr. Blakey stated that the Committee wanted to interview Oreste Guillermo Ruiz Perez for two reasons: He worked at the Cuban Embassy in September 1963 when Oswald allegedly visited the Cuban compound in Mexico City; and, he is married to the cousin of a counter-revolutionary, Antonio Veciana Blanch. Mr. Blakey stated that Rogelio Rodriguez need not be interviewed.

Captain Felipe Villa stated that the Cuban government, relying on the seriousness and honesty of the Committee's work, thought that the Committee should have knowledge of Cuebela's statements. Mr. Villa stated that the Committee still needed to provide the Cuban government with the following: a) a workable formula on counter-revolutionaries that could be used by the Cuban government to aid the Committee in its investigation of such organizations;

b) copies of Lee Harvey Oswald's signatures that the Cuban government could use to perform its own handwriting comparison test; and c) E. Howard Hunt's aliases;

Mr. Blakey stated that examples of Lee Harvey Oswald's handwriting would be forthcoming. Mr. Blakey stated that the Committee had not yet developed a formula for identifying counter-revolutionary groups active against the Cuban government in 1963 or a method for providing E. Howard Hunt's aliases. Mr. Blakey stressed that both these areas would be discussed in the Committee's final report.

At 1:00 p.m. the first work session ended.

At 3:15 p.m. House Select Committee on Assassinations representatives interviewed Juan Nilo Otero in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, translator Juanita Vera and two stenographers. 1230/ The interview ended at 5:15 p.m.

At 8:00 p.m. the Committee's representatives met Senen Buergo and translator Nellie Ruiz de Zarade at the

Hotel Riviera's lobby. The group was chauffered to the Bodeguita del Medio--one of Cuba's most famous restaurants--where they dined with the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll.

At 10:15 a.m., 26 August 1978, Select Committee representatives interviewed Alfredo Mirabal Diaz 1231/ in Room 2003 at the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, Ricardo Escartin, translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers. The interview ended at 12:45 p.m.

After the Mirabal interview Mr. Buergo asked whether the HSCA representatives wished to interview Jose Verdacia Verdacia, 1232/ the Warden of Trescornia while Santos Trafficante was a detainee. When Congressman Richardson Preyer stated that the Committee would indeed be interested in interviewing Jose Verdacia Verdacia, Mr. Buergo stated that he would be available for an interview at 3:00 p.m.

At 3:30 p.m., HSCA representatives interviewed

Jose Verdacia Verdacia in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, Ricardo Escartin, Arais Gutierrez, translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade, and two stenographers. 1233/ The interview ended at 4:20 p.m.

On Sunday morning, 27 August 1978, the Cuban Government's representatives took the Select Committee representatives to Veradero Beach.

At 8:35 p.m. Select Committee representatives interviewed Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez at the Hotel Internacional at Veradero Beach. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juana Lopez Soto, Richardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo and translator Juanita Vera. 1234/ Because there were no stenographers present the Cuban representatives tape-recorded the interview. The interview ended at 9:20 p.m.

On 28 August 1978, at 10:25 a.m., HSCA representatives interviewed Rolando Cubela Secades in Room 2003 at the Hotel

Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Ricardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo, translator Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade, and two stenographers. Also present was Antonio Hernandez who escorted Mr. Cuebla from prison to the Hotel. 1235/ The interview ended at 11:45 p.m.

At 3:25 p.m., HSCA representatives interviewed Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez Soto, Richardo Escartin, Captain Felipe Villa, Senen Buergo, Antonio Hernandez, translator Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers. 1236/ The interview ended at 4:15 p.m.

On 29 August 1978, at 9:30 a.m., the HSCA representatives met the Cuban delegation for a final work session in Room 2003 of the Hotel Riviera. Present were Congressman Richardson Preyer, G. Robert Blakey, Edwin Juan Lopez, Ricardo Escartin, Senen Buergo, Captain Felipe Villa, translators Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade and two stenographers. 1237/

The Cuban delegation spokesperson, Senen Buergo, explained that Mr. Manuel Piniero 1238/ was out of the country and therefore an interview could not be arranged. Mr. Buergo explained that the Cuban delegation had located Luisa Calderon Carralero 1239/ but because she was ill an interview could not be arranged. Mr. Buergo suggested that the HSCA forward questions to the Cuban Government. Ms. Calderon's answers would then be forwarded to the Committee.

Mr. Buergo explained that Raul Roa 1240/ had a very busy schedule. Mr. Roa felt that he could not add any more information to what Nilo Otero had already provided and declined the interview.

Material handed to the HSCA representatives at this time included:

a) a list of persons whom the Cuban delegation believed to have had close relations with Santo Trafficante;

b) photographs depicting what the Cuban government believed to be a Central Intelligence Agency photographic surveillance base targeted against the Cuban Consulate and Embassy in Mexico City during 1963;

c) an essay entitled "Imperialism's Political, Economic, and Military Organizations and Agencies of Crime, such as the CIA" and

d) an article entitled "Finally We Have Eliminated That Pinto in the White House, said Bob, When He Heard About JFK's Assassination"

The final work session ended at 11:00 a.m.

At 1:00 p.m., the Cuban delegation escorted the Committee's representatives to the airport. At the airport they were ~~bid~~ bade farewell by the Minister of Justice, Armando Torres Santrayll, Senen Buergo, Juanita Vera and Nellie Ruiz de Zarade.

At 3:30 p.m., the HSCA representatives and Washington Consul, Ricardo Escartin, departed Cuba.

-238

Appendix 5: Biography: Elena Garro De Paz

Elena Garro de Paz was born of Spanish parents in Puebla, Mexico on December 11, 1917. (All information in this section culled from Biography Data form prepared by Charles Thomas.) Ms. Garro attended the National Autonomous University of Mexico and later did graduate work at Berkley in California and at the University of Paris. In 1963, Elena had long been married to Octavio Paz, a career diplomat who is also one of Mexico's finest poets and leading intellectuals. When Octavio was named Mexican Ambassador to India, the couple separated by mutual consent. Elena's daughter, also named Elena, has always resided with her mother.

Since Elena spent seventeen years of her early life in Europe she had a rather un-Mexican objectivity about her native land and had a reputation for being one of its more articulate detractors. At the same time, Elena was considered emotionally committed to many aspects of Mexican life and made an important contribution to its artistic development

In the 1960's Elena became a significant writer. Hogar Solido, El Rey Mago, La Senora en su Balcon, Ventura Allende, Andaise por las Ramas, Parada Empresa, and El Viaje are plays that have had appreciative audiences in Europe, where they were translated into German, as well as in Mexico. Ms. Garro's short stories are collected in a volume called La Semana de Colores. The Literacy Supplement of the London Times has called her novel Los Recuerdos de Porenir, "a splendid success." Critics have said of her: "For Elena Garro, there is no frontier between reality and fantasy; in any case, the latter is a second reality--perhaps more intense--to which one may penetrate without passport or forewarning, thanks to the effectiveness of a literature fired with passion, flavor and life." Many people who knew Elena have asserted that the frontier between reality and fantasy is also difficult for her to distinguish in real life. (Biography Data Form on Elena Garra de Paza prepared by Charles Thomas)

Ms. Garro, for many years, was an active worker in the Confederacion Naccional Campesina (CNC), the agrarian

-460

arm of the Partido Reformista (PRI). Because Ms. Garro was a tireless propagandist and agitator on behalf of the poorer Mexican peasants, she was on close personal terms with and enjoyed the respect of peasant leaders from all over the country. (Ibid.)

Elena was considered a witty, urbane and opinionated woman with an unflagging sense of humor. Her forthright opinions and sharp wit tended on occasion to ruffle feathers in Mexico, but her important social, literacy, and political connections rendered her fairly immune from serious cunter-attack until 1968. Then, Ms. Garro was forced to flee the country with her daughter, Elenita and her sister, Deba Guerrero de Galvan, in the midst of the student strikes. The House Select Committee on Assassinations has been unable to determine the exact reason Ms. Garro had for fleeing Mexico.

Before her disappearance from Mexico, Elena was well disposed toward the United States and had been friendly with Embassy officers. Her broad range of significant personal friends, the views of many important to the

461

American Embassy, made her a useful Embassy target. (A "useful Embassy target" is a person deemed important enough because of acquaintances to merit frequent contact, either witting or unwitting, with American Embassy officials.)

APPENDIX SIX: GLOSSARY OF TERMS USED IN REPORT.

Agent: A person who knowingly works for the CIA on a contract or job basis.

Asset: A general term for persons, not officers, used by the CIA. For example, both agents and sources are assets. An asset is anyone used in an operation or project, whether or not that is aware that he is being used.

Case officer: See Operations officer.

Coverage: Surveillance.

Cryptonym: A series of letters used by the CIA to identify someone or something while protecting that person or things true identity. All the letters in a cryptonym are capitalized. The first two letters are assigned by the subject matter or local to which the person or thing belongs. The rest of the cryptonym is randomly assigned. See LIMITED for example. The "LI" designates that the project was located in Mexico. 2) The planet on which Superman was born.

Chronological file: A folder in which material is stored in chronological order. Usually used for production or communications type material.

Electronic intercept base: House, apartment, or building that contains equipment used in intercepting and tapping telephone conversations subject to electronic surveillance.

FOIA: Freedom of Information Act.

LIEMPTY: CIA cryptonym for photographic project aimed at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

LIERODE: CIA cryptonym, pre-1964, for surveillance operation aimed at the Cubans in Mexico City.

LILYRIC: CIA cryptonym assigned to one of the three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

40[illegible]

LIMERICK: CIA cryptonym meaning "Soviet".

LIMITED: CIA cryptonym of one of three bases which provided photographic surveillance of the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City.

LIONION: CIA cryptonym for photographic surveillance operations aimed at the Cuban diplomatic compound in Mexico City after July, 1964.

Listening post: See electronic intercept base.

Logs: A list of photographs taken and the times they were taken prepared by agents in the photographic base houses.

Monitors: Mexican Army officers who worked in the electronic intercept base listening to conversations on telephone lines subject to wiretaps and summarizing those conversations they deemed to be important.

Officer: CIA career employee.

Operation: A subpart of a project. Often used interchangably with "project".

Operations officer: CIA career employee; term usually used in connection with an employee with responsibility for a particular operation or project.

Penetration agent: An agent who works inside a target institution. For example, LITAMEL/9 worked for the CIA in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City.

P file: Designation assigned to a personality file in the CIA's Mexico City Station. A file for the retention of information in written form arranged according to individual's names.

Photographic base: House, apartment, or building used for housing of photographic surveillance equipment and the agents who operate it. Always located near the target.

Pitched: Made an effort to recruit as an agent, asset or source.

Production: Materials or information generated by an operation or project.

Project: A group or set of operations by the CIA aimed at a specific person, institution or thing, with the aim of collecting information, influencing behavior, etc.

Project files: A folder for the retention of information generated by, or relating to a project. Generally broken down into four sub-files: Development and plans, production; support; and operations.

Psuedonym: False name assigned to CIA officers for use in communication channels.

Pulse camera: A camera with a shutter that is automatically tripped by a triggering device activated by changes in light density.

Resuma: Daily summary of important conversations on surveilled telephone lines prepared by monitors in the listening post.

Selected Out: Phrase used when a Foreign Service officer is retired after having been in one grade for the maximum period of time and is not considered qualified for promotion to a higher grade.

Source: A person who either wittingly or unwittingly provides information to the CIA.

Station: A CIA over-seas installation. It is the Headquarters for operations in a particular country and is ussually located in the United States Embassy in the capital of the country in which it is situated.

Subject file: Folder for the retention of information in written form arranged by the subject matter of the information contained.

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Target: A person, institution or thing at which a project, operation or pitch is aimed.

VLS-2 trigger device: A machine which automatically triggers the shutter of a camera when it senses a change in light density. Used along with a camera and a spotting scope in a "pulse camera."

-436

2001017

Classification: TOP SECRET

Classified by derivation: __________

APPENDIX SEVEN: LISTING OF CIA DOCUMENTS CITED.

Annual Fitness Report on Ann Goodpasture, 1/14/64.

Article, with note in margin, in Oswald P file, by Robert S. Allen and Paul Scott, "CIA Withheld Vital Intelligence from Warren Commission," 10/21/64.

Blind Memorandum entitled "Delay in sending the first cable about Oswald."

Blind memorandum re: Lee Harvey Oswald/Silvia Tirado de Duran, Source: LI/4 11/26/63.

CIA Component Report on wiretap operations, "ZRSOLO and ZRJOINT: Two Telephone Tap Operations," Paul Levister.

DIR 74830, 10/10/63. (A "DIR" is a cable from Headquarters to a field station. In this report the field station is always Mexico City.)

DIR 84886, 11/23/63.

DIR 84888, 11/23/63.

DIR 84916, 11/23/63.

DIR 85371, 11/28/63.

DIR 87770, 12/9/63, with attached note.

DIR 88680, 12/13/63.

DIR 90466, 12/21/63.

DIR 16823, 7/4/67.

Draft of letter from Win Scott to John Barron, 11/25/70.

Foul Foe, The, by Winston Scott writing as Ian Maxwell.

HMMA 4300, 3/12/56. (An "HMMA" is a dispatch from Mexico City to Headquarters.)

HMMA 14793, 4/8/60.

2001013

HMMA 21845, 7/30/63.

HMMA 22005, 8/23/63.

HMMA 22135, 9/13/63.

HMMA 22267, 10/8/63.

HMMA 22307, 10/18/63.

HMMA 22433, 11/7/63.

HMMA 22452, 11/7/63.

HMMA 22536, 11/9/63.

HMMA 22726, 1/16/64.

HMMA 23343, 4/30/64.

HMMA 26006, 4/30/65.

HMMA 26160, 5/21/65.

HMMA 26414, 6/22/65.

HMMA 31303, 2/7/67.

HMMA 32243, 5/27/67.

HMMA 32497, 7/11/67.

HMMW 12725, 7/8/64. (An "HMMW" is a dispatch from CIA Headquarters to Mexico City.)

HMMW 13645, 5/13/65.

HMMW 15557, 6/14/67.

HMMW 15428, 5/18/67. (Mexico City Copy.)

Inspector General Report, 1977, Tab G-2.

Log Film 143, 9/25/63 through 9/27/63 in CIA file

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J110) to 9 Dec 1963 (J163) from Archives-Job # 70.209 Box # 1, LIMITED Production material.

Log Film 144, 10/1/63 through 10/3/63, in CIA file

entitled "LIMITED 17 July 63 (J110) to 9 Dec 1963 (J163) from Archives-Job # 70.209 Box # 1, LIMITED Rroduction material.

LIONION Project Renewal Request, 1/1/66.

Memorandum entitled "Response to HSCA request of 25 July, 1978," 8/20/78.

Memorandum for the Record from W. David Slawson re: Trip to Mexico City, 4/22/64.

Memorandum from Chief DDP/PG to Chief of Operations/DDP, 2/3/61.

Memorandum from Chief of FI/OPS to Chief of Operations/DDP, 1/8/60.

Memorandum from Chief/WHD to COS/Mexico City, 12/30/63.

Memorandum from "JKB" re: Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67.

Memorandum from Shepanek to Scott Breckinridge, 7/31/78.

Memorandum from Winston Scott to the files re: June Cobb, 11/25/64.

Memorandum to Clark Anderson from Winston Scott, 11/27/63, with seven attachments

Memorandum to DDP from Chief/WHD, 1/21/64.

Memorandum to the Legal Attache from the COS/Mexico City, 7/5/67.

Memorandum to the Ambassador from Winston Scott, 10/16/63, re "Lee Oswald Contact with the Soviet Embassy."

Mexico City Investigation Chronology, Bulky # WX-7241, Volume I.

Classification: TOP SECRET

-409

2001020

Classified by derivation: ____________

MEXI 6453, 10/8/63. (Mexico copy. A "MEXI" is a cable from Mexico City.)

MEXI 6453, 10/9/63. (Headquarters copy.)

MEXI 6534, 10/15/63.

MEXI 7014, 11/22/63.

MEXI 7023, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7024, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7025, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7029, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.

MEXI 7054, 11/24/63.

MEXI 7101, 11/27/63.

MEXI 7105, 11/27/63.

MEXI 7364, 12/12/63.

MEXI 9332, 5/6/64.

MEXI 9440, 6/19/64.

MEXI 5621, 12/16/65.

MEXI 5741, 12/29/65.

MEXI 1950, 6/29/67.

MEXI 1991, 7/5/67.

Note from Ann Goodpasture to Mexico City Station Cuban Section, 2/3/66.

Note to Luis Echevarria, 11/23/63.

Notes made by A. Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff, re: "Background on Mexico Station Support Assets (Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)," 2/10/77.

Project Renewal Request, /11/65, attachment to HMMA 25141.

Report on Oswald from John Scelso, C/WH/3, to James Angleton, C/CI, 12/24/63.

Review of Project LIEMPTY attachment to HMMA 15979 11/18/60.

Review of Project LIEMPTY attachment to HMMA 17999, 10/31/61.

Review of Project LIEMPTY attachment to HMMA 20054, 10/18/62.

Review of Project LIEMPTY attachment to HMMA 22387, 10/25/63.

Routing and Record Sheet for DIR 74830, 10/11/63.

Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7028, 11/23/63.

Routing and Record Sheet for MEXI 7033, 11/23/63.

Teletype from the CIA to the State Department, FBI and Navy, DIR 74678, 10/10/63.

Transcript from Cuban Embassy, 9/27/63.

Transcripts from Russian Embassy, 9/27/63, 9/28/63, 10/1/63 and 10/3/63.

Undated Draft of 1977 CIA Staff Report, Tab F, "Mexico Station Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies (1963)."

Write-up: Wallace B. Rowton meeting with LIRING/3, 5/26/67.

****

Note: in addition to the above listed documents many Summaries of file reviews, depositions of employees, interviews of employees, etc, are cited in the report.

and a year later Ann Goodpasture noted on a newspaper article that such a comparison was done. Note also the MEXI 7024 reported that HQ had all the available information when in fact all conversations were reported in a later cable, MEXI 7033.

685/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

686/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

687/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

688/ See Section III, A, 1, above.

688a/ Note to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 444; Cable re Oswald-Duran, MEXI 7029, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 441; Raymond Rocca Chronology WX 7241, Entry 36, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.

689/ *Ibid.*

690/ *Ibid.*

691/ See below.

692/ Note written by Winston Scott re phone call with John Scelso, November 23, 1963; Chronology prepared by Raymond Rocca, WX 7241, entry 37, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 635.

693/ *Ibid.*

694/ *Ibid.*

695/ Chief of Station phone call to Luis Echevarria, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 440; Flash Cable from Karamessines to Mexico City Station, November 23, 1963, DIR 84916, CIA No. 403; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, entry 46, November 23, 1963, CIA No. 636.

696/ Blind Memo re Lee Harvey Oswald and Silvia Duran, November 26, 1963, CIA #473.

697/ *Ibid.*

698/ Cable from Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27, 1963, MEXI 7101, CIA #493.

699/ Cable from Mexico City Station to Director, December 12, 1963, MEXI 7364, CIA No. 557-558.

700/ Cable Mexico City Station to Headquarters, November 27, 1963, MEXI 7105, CIA No. 479; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, November 27, 1963, entry no. 127, CIA No. 562.

701/ Cable from Headquarters to the Mexico City Station, November 28, 1963, DIR 85371, CIA No. 464; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, Nov. 28, 1963, WX 7241, entry No. 141, CIA No. 658.

702/ CIA Cable from Headquarters to Mexico City Station, December 21, 1963, DIR 90466, CIA No. 549; Chronology of Raymond Rocca, December 21, 1963, Entry No. 268, CIA No. 682.

703/ Ibid.

704/ Ibid. also see Section VI, B, 1.

705/ CE 2120, pp. 37-40.

706/ Supra, p. 186.

707/ Supra, p. 187.

707a/ Supra, p. 187.

707b/ Supra, p. 190

708/ Memorandum for the Record re Trip to Mexico City, from W. David Slawson, 4/22/64, pp. 39-40. Last Parenthetical in the original.

709/ Ibid.

710/ HSCA Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document #011775, p. 17.

711/ Letter HSCA to Mexican government, , JFK Document #

712/ HSCA interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. #011775, p. 20.

713/ Ibid., p. 19-23.

714/ Ibid., p. 19-23.

715/ Ibid., p. 23.

716/ Ibid., p. 24-25.

717/ Ibid., p. 28.

718/ Ibid., p. 30.

719/ Ibid., p. 29-30.

720/ Ibid., p. 30.

721/ Ibid., p. 29.

722/ Ibid., p. 45, 31.

723/ Ibid., p. 40.

724/ Ibid., p. 40-41.

725/ Ibid., p. 41.

726/ Ibid.

727/ Ibid., p. 42.

728/ Ibid., p. 43.

729/ Ibid.

730/ Ibid.

731/ Ibid., p. 42.

732/ Ibid., p. 43.

733/ Ibid., p. 43, 51,

734/ Ibid.

735/ Ibid., p. 48.

736/ Ibid., p. 51.

737/ Ibid.

738/ Ibid., p. 96.

739/ Write-up: Wallace B. Rowton meeting with LIRING/3, May 26, 1967.

740/ Ibid.

741/ LIRING/3 was a source the CIA rated reliable.

742/ Ibid.

743/ Ibid.

744/ Ibid.

745/ Ibid.

746/ LIRING 3's case officer's pseudonym.

747/ Ibid.

748/ Ibid.

749/ HMMA-32243, 5/27/67.

750/ See Section, VI, C, below.

751/ W -7241, entry no. 613.

752/ FBI, CIA, State Department

753/ "Pitched" is a term used by the CIA to designate an attempt to recruit an individual

754/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8. See also HSCA Testimony of Ann Goodpasture, 11/20/78, p. 63.

755/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8.

756/ Ibid.

757/ Ibid.

-475

758/ Memorandum for the Record on Trip to Mexico City, from W. David Slawson, 4/22/64, pp. 22-23. Emphasis added.

759/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 8.

760/ Extremely reliable source.

761/ HSCA Review of LITAMIL 9 file.

762/ HSCA Interview of David Phillips, 8/3/78, p. 9.

763/ *Ibid*.

764/ *Ibid*.

765/ *Ibid*.

766/ *Ibid*.

767/ *Ibid*.

768/ Summary of CIA file review of Silvia Duran.

769/ Personality.

770/ The HSCA requested of the CIA on August 20, 1978 an explanation of why there was no "P" file on Silvia Duran, Luisa Calderon Carralero, Teresa Proenza Proenza, Eusebio Azcue Lopez, Guillermo Oresta, Ruiz Perez, Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, Juan Manuel Calvillo Alonso and June Viola Cobb Sharp

The agency responded the following on September 11, 1978:

> Station index cards show the following information re 201 numbers and "P" numbers:
>
> 1) Silvia Duran (No info re "P" number)
> 2) Luisa Calderon Carralero P-8292 Destroyed
> 3) Teresa Proenza Proenza (No info re "P" number)

4) Eusebio Azcue Lopez P-6613 Destroyed

5) Guillermo Orestes Ruiz Perez (No info re "P" number)

6) No index card on Gilberto Policarpo Lopez, there is an index card on one Gilberto Policarpo Lopez which does not list any 201 or "P" number.

7) Juan Manuel Calvillo Alonso (No info re "P" number)

8) June Viola Cobb Sharp P-7381 Destroyed.

771/ HSCA Interview of Dan Neiscuir, 8/29/78, p. 1.

772/ Ibid.

773/ Ibid., p. 1.

774/ CIA, FBI, State Department.

775/ HSCA Testimony of Barney Hidalgo, 8/10/78, p. 16.

776/ Ibid.

777/ Ibid.

778/ Ibid.

779/ Warren Commission, p. 302.

-217

780/ The U.S. relations with Cuba in 1963-1964 were not very good. See U.S.-Cuban Relations Section. Also, Azcue traveled from Mexico to Cuba on November 18, 1963.

781/ Letter from HSCA to Cuban government, , JFK Doc. #

782/ See Transcript Cuba Trip 1, April 1, 1978.

783/ HSCA Interview of Eusebio Azcue, April 1, 1978, pp. 12-21, JFK Doc. # 007005. See p. 205

784/ Ibid.

785/ See Cuba procedural write-up trip 2.

786/ Letter HSCA to Cuban government, , JFK Doc. #

787/ Mr. Azcue could not pinpoint the exact dates of the visit.

788/ HSCA public hearing testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, pp. 30-31.

789/ Ibid.

789-A/ Communist party membership card, Fair Play For Cuba membership card, Soviet Union residence card, marriage certificate with the name of his Russian wife.

789-B/ HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 5-30.

789-C/ Ibid., p. 29-30.

789-D/ Ibid., p. 30.

789-E/ Ibid., p. 20.

789-F/ Azcue could not pinpoint the exact date.

789-G/ HSCA Public Testimoy of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 32.

789-H/ Ibid., p. 33.

Classification: TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

789-I/ Ibid.

789-J/ Azcue could not pinpoint the time of the phone call.

790/ HSCA Public Hearing Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 34.

791/ Ibid., p. 35.

792/ 10:00 - 2:00

793/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 36.

794/ Ibid., p. 38.

795/ Ibid.

796/ Ibid.

797/ Ibid., pp. 50-51. 797a/ AMMUG, a CIA Defector, alleged that Mirabel Diaz was a DGI agent.

798/ Mr. Mirabal could not pinpoint the exact dates of Oswald's visit but opined that the second visit occurred on September 27, 1963.

799/ HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p. 117.

800/ Ibid.

801/ Ibid., p. 118.

802/ Ibid., p. 120. 802a/ Ibid. p. 199 802b/ Ibid.

803/ WX 7241, p. 94, entry no. 430; Blind Memo dated 10/5/64.

804/ See appendix 5 for biography.

805/ WX 7241, p. 94, entry no. 430; Blind memo dated 10/5/64.

806/ Ibid.

807/ Ibid.

479

Classification: TOP SECRET

2001030

Classified by derivation: ____________

808/ *Ibid*.

809/ *Ibid*.

810/ *Ibid*.

811/ *Ibid*.

812/ *Ibid*.

813/ A "witting" asset is the title given to a CIA source whose information is being used by the CIA.

814/ CIA No. 580-583, WX 7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.

815/ *Ibid*.: circa October 1964.

816/ *Ibid*.

817/ *Ibid*.

818/ *Ibid*.: Also, Winston Scott was the Mexico City Chief in 1964.

819/ CIA No.'s 580-583; WX 7241, Entry #427, p. 42, CIA #719.

820/ WX 7241, p. 94, Entry #430, CIA #721; Blind memo dated 10/5/64, CIA #576.

821/ Personality.

822/ See WX 7241, p. 94, CIA #721.

823/ WX 7241 p. 87, CIA #714.

824/ CIA 10/12/64 memo, CIA #595; WX 7241, p. 87, CIA #714.

825/ Tichborn was Henry P. Lopez' cryptonym. Mr. Lopez was a witting asset who wrote propaganda pieces for the CIA. After careful review of Lopez' CIA file, the HSCA has not been able to establish a link from Mr. Lopez to either Ms. Odio or Cobb.

1480

826/ The Committee has not been able to determine why the memo was not sent to Headquarters.

827/ CIA 10/12/64 Memo, CIA #595; WX 7241, p. 87, CIA #714.

828/ The House Select Committee has been unable to determine the agent's identity since his name does not appear in any CIA files.

829/ Memo from Winston Scott to the files, re June Cobb, 11/25/64, CIA No. 592-593; WX 7241, p. 88, Entry # 404, CIA #715.

830/ While reviewing LICHANT/1's file the Committee determined that the CIA asset's true name was Manuel Calvillo who Elena claimed escorted her and her daughter to the Vermont Hotel for protection the day following JFK's assassination.

831/ Memo from Winston Scott to the files, re June Cobb Sharp, 11/25/64, CIA Nos. 592-593, WX 7241, p. 88, Entry #404, CIA No. 715.

832/ *Ibid.*

833/ *Ibid.*

834/ HSCA Review of Classified CIA Documents.

835/ The Legal Attache in 1964 was Clark Anderson.

836/ FBI 105-825555 Report, December 11, 1964 entitled Lee Harvey Oswald, p. 1.

837/ *Ibid.*

838/ To be checked at FBI.

839/ FBI investigation of President Kennedy's assassination had established that Lee Harvey Oswald had departed Mexico City by bus at 8:30 a.m. on October 2, 1963. Elena Insurgente.

840/ FBI 105-825555 Report, December 11, 1964 entitled Lee Harvey Oswald, p. 1.

841/ Ibid., p. 3.

842/ Ibid.

843/ Ibid.

844/ Ibid.

845/ Ibid.

846/ Ibid.

847/ Ibid.

848/ Ibid., p. 4.

849/ Ibid.

850/ Ibid.

851/ Ibid.

852/ Ibid.

853/ Ibid.

854/ A review of CIA files corroborrated that the FBI never forwarded the information to the CIA.

855/ CIA # 586-587, WX-7241, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.

856/ The Committee has been unable to determine who initiated the discussion re Lee Harvey Oswald.

857/ CIA #586-587, Wx-7241, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.

858/ Ibid.

859/ Ibid.

860/ Ibid.

861/ Ibid.

862/ CIA #586-587, Wx-7241, Entry No. 425, CIA p. 718.

863/ See Section VI, A, 2a.

864/ CIA #586-587, Wx-724 , Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.

865/ Ibid.

866/ Ibid.

867/ Ibid.

868/ Ibid.

869/ Ibid.; also see HSCA investigation of Elena Garro de Paz/ allegations.

870/ CIA No. 586-587, Wx-7241, Entry No. 425, p. 91, CIA p. 718.

871/ Ibid.

872/ HSCA pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78

873/ The House Select Committee has determined that the Central Intelligence Agency received the copy of the Thomas memorandum prior to December 25, 1965, his next meeting with Elena Garro; Also, see below.

874/ CIA No. 588, note from Stanley Watson to Chief of Station.

875/ Ibid.

876/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 5621, Dec. 16, 1965, CIA No. 584-585.

877/ Ibid.

878/ Ann Goodpasture.

879/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 5621, Dec. 16, 1965 CIA Nos. 584-585.

880/ Chief of Station in Mexico City.

483

881/ Sucessor to Clark Anderson as Legal Attache in Mecico City.

882/ State Department: Letter from Charles Thomas to William P. Rogers, July 25, 1969. JFK Document No. 011684.

883/ Ibid.

884/ Ibid.

885/ CIA Nos. 580-583, Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.

886/ Ibid.; The meeting with the Legal Attache officer occurred on November 24, 1964. Also, see supra, p.

887/ CIA Nos. 580-583, Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.

888/ Ibid.

889/ Ibid.

890/ Ibid.

891/ Ibid.

892/ Ibid.

893/ Ibid.

894/ Ibid.

895/ Ibid.

896/ Ibid.

897/ Ibid.

898/ Ibid.

899/ Ibid.

900/ Ibid.

901/ Ibid.

438

902/ Ibid.

903/ Him: John F. Kennedy.

904/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92. CIA #719.

905/ Ibid.

906/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 84-85

907/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #719.

908/ Ibid.

909/ Ibid.

910/ Ibid.

911/ Ibid.

912/ Noe Palomares was the Mexican Minister of Immigration in 1963.

913/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA #719.

914/ Ibid.

915/ Ibid.

916/ Ibid.

917/ Ibid.

918/ Ibid.

919/ Ibid.; Also, for confirmation see Memo from Legat to Winston Scott, 10/13/66, CIA No. 564; Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725.

920/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA p. 719.

921/ Ibid.

922/ Ibid.

923/ Ibid.

924/ Ibid.

925/ Ibid.

926/ Ibid.

927/ Ibid.

928/ Victor Rico Galan is dead. The Committee could not verify Ms. Garro's allegation.

929/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA p. 719; also, Silvia Duran denied the allegation, (see HSCA Interview at Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 81 . Also, see Section VI, A, 2a.)

930/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241, Entry No. 427, p. 92, CIA, p. 719.

931/ FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. No. 011684.

932/ Ibid.

933/ Supra, p.

934/ FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. # 011684.

935/ CIA Nos. 580-583; Wx-7241 Entry #427, p. 92, CIA #710.

936/ Ibid.

937/ MEXI 5621, Dec. 16, 1965; Wx-7241, Entry #426, p. 92, CIA #710.

938/ Memo to the Ambassador from the Legal Attache, 12/27/65, CIA #578; Wx-7241, Entry 429, p. 94, CIA #721.

939/ Ibid.

940/ Ibid.

941/ Ibid.

942/ Winston Scott superimposed a note to Ann Goodpasture on this memo which read, "Can we send in a report to Headquarters 'dismissing' our cable? Goodpasture responded, Done." The cable Winston Scott wanted dismissed was MEXI 5621 which reported that station was "following up" and cabling results. The new cable was written and sent on December 29, 1965; see text.

943/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 12/29/65, MEXI 5741, CIA #575; Wx-7241. Entry #430, p. 94, CIA #721.

944/ Ibid.

945/ Ibid.

946/ Ibid.

947/ Ibid.

948/ Ibid.

949/ Ibid.

950/ Note from Ann Goodpasture to Mexico City Station, Cuban Section, 2/3/66, CIA No. 57); Wx-7241, Entry 428, p. 94, CIA #721.

951/ Ibid.

952/ Ibid. HSCA Staff Summary of CIA Files on LITAMIL-7 and LATIMIL-9.

953/ See Section II,,A, 3 above.

954/ Classified Summary of Staff Review of CIA Documents, undated, p. 3, CIA #763.

955/ Memo from Legat to Ambassador, 2/23/66, CIA #571; Wx-7241, Entry #455, p. 95, CIA #722.

956/ Ibid.

957/ The House Select Committee has been unable to determine when the copy was forwarded to the CIA.

958/ Ibid.; see also 12/25/65 Thomas memo for corroboration.

959/ Memo from Legat to Winston Scott, 10/13/66, CIA No. 564; Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725; Thomas' 7/13/66 memo.

960/ Ibid.

961/ Ibid.

962/ Memo of Conversation by Charles Thomas, 12/25/65, p. 3, CIA #582. JFK Doc. #011684.

963/ Wx-7241, Entry #466, p. 98, CIA #725.

964/ "Selected out" is a phrase used when an officer is retired after having been in one grade for the maximum period of time and is not considered qualified for promotion to a higher grade.

965/ State Department: Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers, Secretary/State, July 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.

966/ Ibid.

967/ Deputy Chief of Mission, State Department, Chief of Affairs at the time of President Kennedy's assassination and subsequent Oswald investigation.

968/ Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers, Secretary of State, July 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.

969/ Ibid.

970/ FBI Report, 9/30/69, pp. 3-4, JFK Doc. #011684.

971/ Ibid.

972/ Letter from Charles Thomas to William Rogers, Secretary of State, July, 25, 1969. JFK Doc. #011684.

972a/ The Committee was unable to determine when Elena found her calendar.

973/ Ibid.

974/ Ibid.

975/ Ibid.

976/ FBI Report, 9/30/69, p. 4. JFK Doc. # 011684.

977/ Ibid.

978/ Ibid.

979/ Supra, p.

980/ Supra, p.

981/ Supra, p.

982/ Letter HSCA to Mexican Goverment, , JFK Document, No.

983/ See Mexico City Procedural Wirte-up Trip I.

984/ Ibid.

985/ Ibid.

986/ Ibid.

987/ See HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/6/78, p. 6, JFK Document No. 013392 ; HSCA Staff Interview of Lydia Duran, 6/5/78, p. 6, JFK Document No. 011681; HSCA Staff Interview of Horatio Duran Navarro, 6/5/78, p. 25, JFK Document No. 011683; HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/5/78, p. 16 , JFK Document No. 011680

988/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Tirado Duran 6/6/78, p. 90, JFK Document No. 011775.

989/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. #011775, p. 54 ; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Lydia Duran ~~6/5/78,~~ ; HSCA Staff pre-Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/6/78, ; HSCA Staff Interview of Horatio Duran Navarro, 6/5/68, JFK Document # 011683, p. 9 ; HSCA Staff pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78

990/ Letter from HSCA to CIA, ,

991/ Letter from CIA to HSCA.

992/ See Procedural Write-up Trip 2, Mexico City.

993/ Ibid.

994/ HSCA Staff Review of June Cobb Sharp file at CIA Headquarters.

995/ Supra, p.

996/ See Procedural Write-up Mexico City Trip 2.

997/ HSCA Staff Review of Manuel Calvillo file.

998/ See procedural write-up Trip 2, Mexico City and Section VII, C, below.

999/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/7/78, JFK Document No. 10016

1000/ Ibid.

1001/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/7/78, JFK Document. No. 013486.

1002/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 7/14/78, JFK Document No. 9950.

1003/ Ibid.

1004/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 8/31/78, JFK Doc. # 013487.

1005/ Ibid.

1006/ Ibid.

1007/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/5/78, JFK Document No. 011268.

1008/ Ibid.

1009/ Ibid.

1010/ Letter to Elena Garro from Committee, 9/6/78, JFK Document No. 011383; see also, HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/5/78, JFK Document No. 011268.

1011/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/7/78, JFK Document No. 011345.

1012/ Ibid.

1013/ Ibid.

1014/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/15/78, JFK Document # 013488.

1015/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/12/78, JFK Document # 011344.

1016/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, 9/15/78, JFK Document # 013488.

1017/ HSCA Staff Contact Report, , JFK Document #

1018/ UNAM - Universided Nacional Autonoma de Mexico

1019/ American Embassy Incoming Telegram # A-43-570, p. 110, CIA #737.

1020/ Ibid.

1021/ Ibid.

1022/ Ibid.

1023/ Ibid.

1024/ Ibid.

1025/ Letter to Wesley D. Bowles, Chief of Mexican Political Affairs, Office of Mexican Affairs, Department of State from B. J. Ruyle, American Consul, Tampico, 5/11/67; Wx-7241 Entry #597, p. 114, CIA #741.

1026/ Ibid.

1027/ Ibid.

1028/ Ibid.

1029/ Ibid.

1030/ Ibid.

1031/ The Committee could not determine when the State Department forwarded the letter to the CIA.

1032/ Dispatch from the Director to Mexico City, 6/14/67, HMMW 15557; Wx-7241, Entry #616, p. 117, CIA #744.

1033/ Ibid.

1034/ Ibid.

1035/ Ibid.

1036/ Ibid.

1037/ Ibid.

1038/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67, Wx 7241, Entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745.

1039/ El Sol is a newspaper, The Sun.

1040/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67; Wx-7241, entry #622, p. 118, #745.

1041/ When Contreras was asked to identify the other four individuals who had met Lee Harvey Oswald, he refused to reveal their names because he feared that informing on them might endanger his family.

1042/ Cable from Mexico City to Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67; Wx-7241, entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745.

1043/ Ibid.

1044/ *Ibid*.

1045/ *Ibid*.

1046/ *Ibid*.

1047/ Cable from the Director to Mexico City, 7/4/67, DIR 16823, Wx-7241, Entry 626, p. 119, CIA #746.

1048/ *Ibid*.

1049/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991; Wx-7241, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.

1050/ Memo to Legat, 7/5/67 from Chief of Station; Wx-7241, entry 628, p. 119, CIA #746.

1051/ Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67, Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

1052/ *Ibid*.

1053/ The leaders of the group were Victor Manuel Barcelo, Carlos Andaluz, Hugo Castro Aranda, Antonio Tenario Adame, Jose Guerrero Guerrero, Carlos Ortiz Fejeda, Daniel Molina, Brion Balvez, Humberto Hiriarte, Oscar Gonzales, Hibam Garcia, Pedro Sainz Zepeda, Alberto Cerecer, Jose Eduardo Pascual, Juan Saldana, Martin Reyes Baissadel, Vicente Lvillamar, Rubelio Fernandez Durado and Jesus Ochoa.

1054/ Memo from JKB re Oscar Contreras, 7/10/67; Wx-7241, Entry #634, p. 120, CIA #747.

1055/ *Ibid*.

1056/ Dispatch from Mexico City to Director, HMMA 32497, 7/11/67; Wx-7241, Entry #635, p. 121, CIA #748.

1057/ Dispatch from the Director to Mexico City, 6/14/67, HMMW 15557; Wx-7241, Entry #616, p. 117, CIA #744.

1058/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, MEXI 1950, 6/29/67; Wx-7241, entry #622, p. 118, CIA #745

1059/ Cable from Mexico City to the Director, 7/5/67, MEXI 1991; Wx7241, Entry 627, p. 119, CIA #746.

1060/ See Section VI, C.

1061/ See Section VI, D, above.

1062/ See Warren Commission Report, pp. 299-304, 733-736; also, Section I, B, VC and VI A above. Some of the more prominent are Paul Hoch and Peter Dale Scott in the Assassination in Dallas and Beyond and A. T. Weberman in Coup d etat in America.

1063/ See Sections V C, VIA and B respectively.

1064/ Ibid.

1065/ Silvia Duran.

1066/ Eusebio Azcue Lopez, Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez, Nilo Otero, Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza.

1067/ Noe W. Palomares, Pedro Gutierrez Valencia, Silvia Duran, Horacio Duran, Ruben Duran, Lydia Duran, Betty Serratos, Ernesto Lehfeld Miller.

1068/ See Glossary.

1069/ The Handwriting Panel concluded that the signature on the visa application was identical to other samples of Lee Harvey Oswald's handwriting.

1070/ HSCA Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document 011775. Consul Azcue stated that standard operating procedure at the Cuban Consulate did not allow applications to be removed from the office. (HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 41)

1071/ Ibid., pp. 31-33.

1072/ See Sections II C, III A 1 and III B 2 above.

1073/ See Section III B 2 above.

1074/ Ibid.

1075/ CIA Electronic Surveillance transcript from Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63.

1076/ Ibid.

1077/ Ibid.

1078/ Ibid.

1079/ CIA Electronic Surveillance transcript from Soviet Embassy, 9/28/63.

1080/ Ibid.

1081/ Ibid.

1082/ Ibid.

1083/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 19.

1084/ Ibid., pp. 20-23.

1085/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue, 9/18/78, p. 36.

1086/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document #011775, p. 23.

1087/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, 9/18/78, p. 32-33.

1088/ See Sections VC, and VIB above.

1089/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document # 011775, p. 37.

1090/ See Supra, p.

1091/ See Sections III, A1 and III B above.

1092/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document # 011775, p. 92-100; also, see Section VC for details.

1093/ See Sections VC for details.

1094/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez 9/18/78, p. 51.

1095/ See Section VI C above and VII B below.

1096/ See Section III A 1 above. Telephone taps.

1097/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 44

1098/ The CIA's classification of the transcript of this conversation prevented the HSCA from directly confronting Ms. Duran with the information.

1099/ See Sections II, C, 3, 4 and III A1 above.

1100/ CIA Electronic Surveillance transcript of Soviet Embassy, 9/28/63.

1101/ Ibid., October 1, 1963.

1102/ Ibid.

1103/ Ibid.

1104/ See Section IV, B above.

1105/ Ibid.

1106/ HSCA Public Testimony of Marina Oswald, , Warren Commission Testimony of George DeMorenschildt. Warren Commission Testimony of George Boule.

1107/ CIA Electronic Surveillance of Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63.

1108/ Ibid.

1109/ Ibid.

1110/ Ibid.

1111/ Ibid.

1112/ The caller said Odessa.

1113/ Warren Commission Report, p. 301.

500

1114/ CIA Electronic Surveillance of Soviet Embassy, September 27, 1963.

1115/ Ibid.

1116/ Ibid.

1117/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 31.

1118/ HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p. 119.

1119/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document 011775, p. 23.

1120/ Ibid., p. 31.

1121/ Ibid.

1122/ Ibid.

1123/ HSCA Public Testimony of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 9/18/78, p. 119.

1124/ CIA Electronic Surveillance of Soviet Embassy, 9/27/63.

1125/ Ibid.

1126/ Ibid.

1127/ Ibid.; also HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775. p. 41.

1128/ Ibid.

1129/ Warren Commission Testimony of Nelson Delgado, Vol. III, p. 236-237.

1130/ Warren Commission Testimony of Pamela Mumford, 5/19/64, Vol. II, p. 217; Warren Commission Testimony of Evaristo Rodriguez, 7/21/64, Vil. II. p. 34, CE 2120, p. 7; CE 212, p. 54.

1131/ Warren Commission Report, p. 301.

1132/ See Section VI C, above.

1133/ See Section VI D, above.

1134/ See Section VII D, above.

1135/ See Sections III A 1 and III B 2.

1136/ *Ibid*.

1137/ Warren Commission Report, p. 301.

1138/ A night when Oswald's activities are not known.

1139/ HSCA Staff pre-interview of Ruban Duran, 3/31/78, No. 011680, p. 54; HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Lydia Duran, 6/5/78, HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011683 p. 9; HSCA Staff Pre-Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/1/78, HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 54.

1140/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p.91.

1141/ *Ibid*.

1142/ HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/ 6/78, JFK Document No.011680 , p. HSCA Staff Interview of Lydia Duran, 6/ 5/78, JFK Document No. 011681, p. ; HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/ 5/78, JFK Document No.011683, p. . HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, 6/6/78 JFK Document No. 013392.

1143/ See Section VI, C, above.

1144/ HSCA Staff Pre-interview of Ruben Duran, 5/31/78.

1145/ HSCA Public Testimony of Eusebio Azcue Lopez, p. 84-85.

1146/ See Section VI, C above.

1147/ See Mexico City Procedures Write-up Trip 2 Appendix 3.

1148/ See Section VI, C, above.

1149/ See Section VI, C, above.

1150/ See Section VI, A 2 above

1151/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775 , p. 81

1152/ Ibid., p.87-88.

1153/ HSCA Staff Review of LITAMIL 9 file.

1154/ HSCA Staff Review of CIA Silvia Duran file,

1155/ See Appendix 3.

1156/ Ibid.

1157/ Ibid.

1158/ See Section VI, C 10 above.

1159/ See Section VI, C, above.

1160/ See Section VI, C, above.

1161/ See Section VI, C above.

1162/ See Section VI, C above.

1163/ See Appendix 3.

1164/ See Section VI, C, 1 above.

1165/ Ibid.

1166/ Ibid.

1167/ See Appendix 3.

1168/ See Section VI, C 1 above.

1169/ See Section VI, C, above.

1170/ Letter from Charles Thomas to William P. Rogers, July 25, 1969, JFK Document No. 011684.

1171/ See Section VI,C, above.

1172/ See Section VI, D above for details.

1173/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p. 95.

1174/ See Section VI, D above.

1175/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK No. 011755, p. 101-102.

1176/ See Section VI, D above.

1177/ HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775, p.95

1178/ See Appendices II and III.

1179/ Warren Commission Report, p. 305.

1180/ See Section VI C above.

1181/ See Section VII, C above.

1182/ See Section VII, B above.

1183/ See Sections VI ABC above.

1184/ See Verbatim transcript of meetings prepared by Cuban government. Hereinafter, called transcript. JFK Doc. #012212.

1185/ Ibid.

1186/ Ibid.; see also, HSCA Staff Interview of Eusebio Azcue, 4/1/78, JFK Document No. 007005

1187/ See transcript.

1188/ Ibid.

1189/ Ibid.

1190/ Ibid.

1191/ See HSCA Interview of Fidel Castro Ruz, April 3, 1978. JFK Document # 007004

1192/ Pedro Gutierrez Valencia claimed that he bumped into Lee Harvey Oswald at the Consulate on September 27, 1963. Valencia was at the Consulate doing a credit check on one of the Cuban employees.

1193/ See Section VI, D above for details on Oscar Contreras' allegations.

1194/ See Section VI C for details on Elena and Elenita Garro's allegations.

1195/ Elena Garro's sister who came to the conclusion that Lee Harvey Oswald was at one of Ruben Duran's twist parties in the fall of '63.

1196/ Eunice Odio reported on Elena Garro's allegations in 1965. See Section VI, C, above.

1197/ Elena Garro reported that at one of the twist parties, Emilio Carballido and Eusebio Azcue had come to the conclusion that Kennedy had to be assassinated. (See also, Section VI, C, above.

1198/ Elena Garro alleged that Victor Rico Galan had claimed that Lee Harvey Oswald had been Silvia Duran's lover. See also, Section VI, C, above.

1199/ Diaz-Ordaz and Echevarria were the two presidents of Mexico respectively from 1964 to 1970 and 1970 to 1976.

1200/ See HSCA Staff Interview of Horacio Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011680.

1201/ See HSCA Staff Interview of Pedro Gutierriz Valencia, 6/5/78, JFK Document No. 011682.

1202/ Lynn Duran is the sister of Horatio and Ruben Duran. The Committee wished to ask her whether Lee Harvey Oswald had attended any twist parties at the Durna homes.
See HSCA Staff Interview of Lynn Duran, 6/5/78, JFK Doc. # 011681

1203/ See HSCA Staff Interview of Ruben Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Doc. # 011680.

1204/ The Committee never sent the Mexican government the questions because a 2nd trip to Mexico was arranged.

1205/ The Committee wished to ask Ms. Serratos whether Lee Harvey Oswald had attended any twist parties at the Duran homes. See HSCA Staff Interview of Betty Serratos, JFK Doc. # 011392.

1206/ See HSCA Staff Interview of Silvia Duran, 6/6/78, JFK Document No. 011775.

1207/→Danny Flores was one of AMMUG's (a Cuban DGl Defector in 1964) Security Officers. The Committee wished to ask Mr. Flores about AMMUG's statements about Lee Harvey Oswald's Trip to the Cuban Consulate.

1208/ Ramon Alvarez Dupont was a CIA agent in charge of picking up the photographic surveillance film from personnel stationed at the three bases and delivering it to his brother-in-law (unknown) and later delivering it to his case officer Ann Goodpasture.

1209/ See HSCA Staff Write-Ups of Danny Flores Interview 8/8/78.

1210/ Oscar Contreras Lartique claimed that he met Oswald in Mexico City in the fall of 1963. See Section VI, D above.

1211/ Elena claimed that when she told Noe W. Palomares about meeting Lee Harvey Oswald, he advised her to send an anonymous letter to Texas, explaining her account. The Committee wished to question Mr. Palomares about Elena's credibility.

1212/ LICHANT I is Manuel Calvillo. See Section VI, C for details and significance.

1213/ LICOOKIE I is June Cobb Sharp. See Section IV, C for details.

1214/ LITAMIL 7 is Consuelo Esperon, a CIA penetrator agent working as a secretary at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to ask Ms. Esperon about commentary after the assassination at the Cuban Embassy about both Lee Harvey and John F. Kennedy's assassination.

1215/ Litamil 9 was Luis Alberue Suoto, a CIA penetration agent at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to question Mr. Alberue about the Cuban Embassy employees reactions to the assassination. The Committee also wished to question Mr. Alberue about Silvia Duran and his knowledge of Lee Harvey Oswald.

1216/ LIRING 3 was a Cuban citizen, Carlos Jurado Delmar who was a source for the CIA. He had reported that Silvia Duran had told him that she had had an affair with Lee Harvey Oswald. The Committee wished to question him about Silvia Duran.

1217/ See HSCA Staff write-up of Interview with Ramon Alvarez Durant.

1218/ General Jesus Jose Clark Flores escorted Ruben Duran to Russia in 1962 and was considered by many to be Duran's protector. Also, Elena claimed that Flores was at the party that she stated Lee Harvey Oswald was in attendance. The Committee wished to ask Mr. Clark Flores about all the above.

1219/ Ernesto Lehfeld Miller is a Mexican citizen that resembled Eusebio Azcue's description of the man that allegedly visited the Cuban Consulate. All the Durans recognized Miller. Horatio and Silvia said that Miller was a close friend and borrowed Horatio's car often.

1220/ See House Select Committee on Assassinations Staff Write-Up of Noe W. Palomares, 8/10/78.

1221/ See HSCA Staff write-up of interview with Ernesto Lehfeld Miller, 8/11/78.

1222/ In 1963 Nilo Otero as an official in the Cuban governments Ministry of Foreign Relations, interviewed Eusebio Azcue about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate.

1223/ In 1963 the Cuban government employed Rogelio Rodriguez at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Mr. Rodriguez about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the Kennedy assassination.

1224/ Rolando Cubela, known as AMLASH, was prominent in the Senate Select Committee's Book V which reported the possibility that the Central Intelligence Agency's attempts to assassinate Cuban President Fidel Castro provoked the Cuban government to orchestrate the assassination of President Kennedy in retaliation.

1225/ In 1963 the Cuban government employed Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Mr. Rodriguez about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the Kennedy assassination. In addition, Mr. Ruiz is the cousin-in-law of one of the most active anti-Castroites, Antonio Veciana Blanch.

1226/ Griselle Rubio claimed in a letter Dec. 1963 to DRI that Ruby had been in Cuba in 1962 or 1963 visiting Solomon Pratkins. The Committee located and interviewed Ms. Rubio in Miami.

1127/ James Wilcott is an ex-CIA employee who appeared voluntarily in August 1978 at the Cuban Government's Tribunal which accused the CIA of complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

1228/ Philip Agee is an ex-CIA employee who appeared voluntarily in August 1978 at the Cuban government's Tribunal which accused the CIA of complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination.

1229/ The Tribunal, held in August 1978 was an effort by the Cuban government to accuse the CIA of complicity in the John F. Kennedy assassination. Ex CIA agents, James Wilcott and Phillip Agee testified at the Tribunal along with ex-Cuban Consul in Mexico, Eusebio Azcue.

1230/ See HSCA Interview of Juan Nilo Otero, 9/25/78, JFK Document No.

1231/ Alfredo Mirabal Diaz assumed the Consul position, in the Cuban government's Mexico City Consulate on September 2, 196[illegible]. He was present during all of Oswald's visits to the Consulate. Also, see HSCA Interview of Alfredo Mirabal Diaz, 8/26/78, JFK Document No.

2004053

1232/ The Committee wished to question Mr. Verdacia about the identities of the organized crime figures detained in Trescornia at the inception of the Cuban revolutionary government.

1233/ HSCA Interview of Jose Verdacia Verdacia, 8/26/78, JFK Doc. # 012224.

1234/ See HSCA Interview of Orestes Guillermo Ruiz Perez, 8/27/78, JFK Doc. #

1235/ See HSCA Interview of Rolando Cubela Secades, 8/28/78, JFK Document #

1236/ In 1963 the Cuban government employed Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Ms. Proenza about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the assassination of John F. Kennedy. Also, See HSCA Interview of Maria Teresa Proenza y Proenza, 8/28/78, JFK Doc. #

1237/ See Verbatim transcript of 8/28/78 session. JFK Doc. # 012208

1238/ In 1963, Manuel Piniero, Chief of the Ministry of Foreign Relations, interviewed Eusebio Azcue about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate. In a-dition, Mr. Piniero was the Cuban revolutionary government official who met with Santo Trafficante and gave him 24 hours to leave the country.

1239/ In 1963 the Cuban government employed Luisa Calderon Carralero at the Cuban Embassy. The Committee wished to interview Ms. Proenza about Lee Harvey Oswald's visits to the Cuban Consulate and about the Cuban Embassy employees' reactions to the assassination of John F. Kennedy.

Classification TOP SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

1240/ In 1963 Raul Roa interviewed Eusebio Azcue in Cuba about Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City.

TOP SECRET

511

Classification: ____________

2001062

Classified by derivation: ____________

140.A

There is evidence that when the LILYRIC base was originally set up that it was planned to have it operate in this manner.

"The LILYRIC base will be principally used for photographic surveillance of the LIMERICK target, *working alternately but without any pattern*, with the LIMITED base." (HMMA-4160, 2/20/56, para. 5.) (emphasis added) The station planned the operation in this manner so that ~~the~~ "many of the outward signs of photographic surveillance ... will be reduced." (*Ibid.*, para. 6.)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/2/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10111-10051

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 012509

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : CIA
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 09/24/1978
PAGES : 8

SUBJECTS :
CIA, METHODOLOGY
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY - RUSSIAN PERIOD, RETURN TO U.S.
KGB
GOLITSIN, ANATOLI

DOCUMENT TYPE : SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 1A
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 01/01/2003

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Photocopy of note attached. Box #:222.

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name Donald Deneslya

Address 12508 Knowledge Lane

City/State Bowie, Maryland 20715

Date of Birth ________

Social Security ________

Date September 24, 1978

Place North Arlington, Virginia

Telephone (301) 464-2361

M or S M

Spouse ________

Children ________

2. Physical Description:

Height ________

Weight ________

Ethnic Group ________

Color Eyes ________ Hair ________

Special Characteristics ________

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment: Self-employed real estate agent

Address Above

Telephone Above

b. Criminal Record

1. Arrests ________

2. Convictions ________

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name ________

Address ________

b. Area frequented: ________

c. Remarks: ________

James P. Kelly

Investigator James P. Kelly

Date ________

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

Name Donald Deneslya

Date 9-24-78 Time 1:00 p.m.

Address 12508 Knowledge Lane
Bowie, Maryland 20715

Place North Arlington, Va.

Interview: Subject was directed to the writer by former Chief of Counterintelligence of the CIA. He is currently working as a real estate agent in Maryland but is planning shortly to leave for Oslo, Norway, where he will become involved in the importation and sale of American automobiles.

He was employed by the Central Intelligence Agency from 1961 to 1964. During this period he became involved as Administrative Assistant for a Russian defector, Golitsin, also known as "Stone." In this capacity he was to spend approximately five hours each day assisting Stone in the preparation of a book. His "cover" was that he (Donald) was a student at Georgetown University, although Stone knew that he was CIA. He described this work under the crypotonym, "AELADLE project," "AE" being the prefix relating to Soviet Russia.

When Stone, or Golitsin --as Donald referred to him, had been processed by the CIA and his bona fides accepted. He was domiciled in a house in the McLean area of Virginia. He

Interviewer Signature James P. Kelly

Typed Signature James P. Kelly

Date transcribed 9-28-78

By: br

Form #4-A

says that Golitsin was given a settlement of approximately $200,000.00 and provided with Donald as an A.A. and guards. Golitsin was first given the name "John Stone." His wife was called "Irene" and his daughter "Kitty." The CIA had told him that he could write a book.

It was Donald's feeling that Golitsin was a very intelligent defector. His knowledge of leaks from Western Intelligence sources was phenomenal. He turned up traitors in many Western countries, including but not limited to: Wennerstrom in Sweden; two West German Generals, and Willy Brandt's secretary; a high-level French leak in NATO (Cf., DeVosjoli information) and gave the CIA information which led to the unmasking of "Kim" Philby, then the number two man in British Intelligence, as a Soviet agent. Donald said that Golitsin had been stationed in Vienna in 1954 and then brought back to the Soviet and placed in the section of Soviet (KGB) Intelligence which dealt with America and the Western countries. In this capacity he was able to read the material which these traitors had been sending to the Soviet side. He had an incredible memory and had been planning to "come over" to our side for some time so he prepped himself on things which would be to our interest to know. He defected in 1961 in Helsinki. Howard Osborne went over to Helsinki to bring him back to the United States. One of the functions of Golitsin in Moscow had been the reading of high-level American Intelligence Reports which convinced him that there was a "mole" in the CIA, but he could not identify this person by name. While he was working for Golitsin, Golitsin dictated a long letter describing the deficiencies in Western Intelligence agencies which he was going to give to Robert Kennedy. It was Golitsin's feeling that the Soviets were winning the Intelligence War.

[redacted].

Golitsin's principal handler was a Colonel Leonard Weigner, a foreign-born agent whose parents had come out of Russia through Mancuria. Weigner had been in Air Force Intelligence. He became involved in the Pirigov case in 1948-49. This involved a Russian MIG pilot who defected and brought his plane intact to the West. Weigner seemed to get along very well with Golitsin. Others who knew him at the time were Howard Osborne, now retired; Ed Knowles; Dave Murphy (after 1963); John McMahon, a side-kick to Weigner out of SR-CI and Tennent Bagley, aka "Pete" Bagley, who was head of Counter Intelligence in the Soviet Russia Division. He also mentioned Ted Poling, a Deputy to Bagley in SR.

In November 1962 Donald received a strange request from Golitsin. Rudolf Nureyev was appearing in Chicago, Illinois and there was an ad in the paper that tickets were available at a certain bookstore. He wanted Deneslya to contact the store and find out where Nureyev was staying. Deneslya had heard that the KGB was planning to kidnap or kill Nureyev.

Deneslya told the writer that a Charles Bohr, a CIA doctor, was the case officer on Golitsin. Bohr was a psychiatrist. Deneslya said that he never heard anyone even remotely suggest that Golitsin was "paranoid" until he heard about the testimony of ex-CIA officer John Hart before HSCA. It was his feeling that in 1963 the Agency had great respect for Golitsin because of the information which he was providing. There were times when they would get exasperated with him because he would sometimes go over the heads of the people he was dealing with if he didn't think they were reacting to his information. Golitsin was apprehensive about Soviet world intentions and made no bones about it. He knew how widely the Soviets had penetrated other intelligence agencies. He told us about Felfe (ph.) and Klemens who had penetrated the Gehlen Organization of West German Intelligence which was the same as penetrating the CIA because the Gehlen group was an extension of CIA.

From February to July 1963, Golitsin went to England to advise the British on the extent of Philby's damage. Deneslya says that when he returned to this country the attitude of some people in the SR Division had changed towards Golitsin. He detected a hostility towards Golitsin which had not been there before.

When Donald first came into the CIA he worked in the Foreign Documents Division. Among the various types of reports which came across his desk were "contact" reports which filtered in from the many contact divisions which the Agency had around the world. One in particular caught his eye, circa July-August 1963. It concerned an American re-defector, a Marine, who would be returning to the United States "with his family." This ex-Marine had worked in Minsk in a radio factory. The report, which Deneslya says came out of New York City, did not mention this defector by name. This, in itself, was not unusual because the Contact Division liked to conceal sources. He said the report identified this person as a former Marine "cpl." or "cpt.", which Deneslya felt could mean corporal or captain. He was certain they were talking about Lee Oswald.

Deneslya said we could find this report probably in the Industrial Registry for the radio factory in Minsk. He said there was only one radio factory in Minsk. This Registry is maintained by the CIA at Langley, Virginia headquarters and he thinks it was on the second floor in corridor "H." The fact that the contact report was out of New York was not significant because the report could have originated in Moscow and was rerouted and rewritten in New York, again to conceal the point of origin.

He also told me that it was his experience that sometimes the Agency, when they want to surface material in the "overt" side of the CIA, will say that it came from that side when in fact it did not.

Deneslya said that it was also his information that the Russians sent over "dispatched" agents from time to time. He recalls that at one time there was discussion of an agent who was caught because the Russians stamped his passport twice at different pages with the same stamp but with a different date and this game him away. He did not recall the agent's name.

Deneslya said that the Committee should determine who made out the #201 on Oswald--who opened it and what division they were in. He said that about a year after he gave testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee (1975) he saw a report in the newspapers that someone in the CIA had recommended that Lee Harvey Oswald be contacted.

Donald gave the writer a written authorization to inspect his Senate Intelligence Committee testimony.

Sept 24, 1978

I the undersigned Donald E Deneselya do hereby authorize James B Kelly full access to my testimony given in October 1975 before the Senate Committee on Intelligence.

Donald E Deneselya

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/13/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10111-10288
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	014784

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	06/10/1970
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	EVINS, AMOS LEE, ARREST
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	07/12/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box #:282.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

FORM NO. 71-15

POLICE DEPARTMENT
IDENTIFICATION SECTION
Dallas, Texas 75201

picture on original

The following is a transcript of the record as shown in the files of this Section concerning :

Name: AMOS LEE EUINS

DPD # 86341 FBI # DPS #

DATE	DEPARTMENT AND NUMBER	NAME	CHARGE	DISPOSITION
5/10/70	Dallas,Tex PD	Amos Lee Euins	T/O $50 (auto)	2 yrs.TDC Prob 7/31/70

Notations indicated by * are NOT based on fingerprints, but are listed as investigative leads as being possibly identical with subject of this

NAME AMOS LEE EWING

MASTER I 18 A 16

SEX MALE RACE NEGRO DPD # FBI # DPS #



AGE 22 HT. 5-6¾ WT. 124 HAIR Blk EYES Mar COMP. Lt. OCC. Porter

NATIVITY & D.O.B. 1-10-48 Henderson, Tex. ARREST # 70-34551

ADDRESS 1517 Ave. B., Dallas, Tex. SOC. SEC. # 463-78-4003

SCARS AND MARKS I. Ta t. cross & "J" FAO ~~II. Tat. heart FAO.~~ SEL. SERVC # 41-31-48-779

DATE OF ARREST 6-10-70 MILITARY # None

ARRESTED BY Q. Hodges 2696 OP. LIC. None

CHARGE Inv. Auto Theft

6-10-70 PRINTED BY FDa 8³⁰ Am PHOTO BY CLASSED BY SEARCHED BY

NEAREST RELATIVE AND ADDRESS Lurlene Jones-Mother-411 Ave. F., Dallas, Tex.

Married

SIGNATURE Amos Lee Ewing

a card missing from files



POLICE DEPARTMENT, DALLAS, TEXAS IDENTIFICATION SECTION

Form 69-126

Form 69-7

POLICE DEPARTMENT
CITY OF DALLAS

Disposition PROSECUTION REPORT **Filing Information**

Date 7-31-70

Court CDC3

Docket C70-4742J

Method PGBC

Disposition 2 yrs. TDC Prob.

45788

Date Filed 6-11-70

With Whitwell

By Parks

F. G. Phillips #1415
Investigating Officers

Q. Hodges #2696
J. D. Davis #1901
Arresting Officers

City Jail
Location of Defendant

Defendant EUINS, AMOS LEE
(Surname - First - Middle)

Race Colored Age 22 Sex M D.O.B. 1/10/48 Residence 1517 Ave. B

Date and Time of Arrest 6/10/70 1:30 AM Identification No. 86341

Place of Arrest 400 Danel Arrest No. 70-34551

Date and Time of Offense 5/29-6/10/70 7AM - 10AM

Complainant Gross Ed w/m/40 104 Hillside, Frisco, Texas 214-377 2926 352-2413
(Surname - First - Middle or Business Name - Address, Telephone No., etc.)

Where and How Committed 3101 W. Mockingbird Lane Stole Car.

Charge THEFT OVER FIFTY DOLLARS (AUTOMOBILE)

Property Taken and Value 1 1970 Javelin, 2 door, color blue, 1970 Texas license MFL 180, VIN: AOC797H248060. TOTAL VALUE: $2,000.00

List Evidence and Seizures Above vehicle recovered in 400 block Danel partically stripped; stored 606 S. Good-Latimer Expressway on P.T. 64348.
(Include where recovered and present location)

Attachments: ☐ Voluntary Statement ☐ Affidavits ☒ Arraignment Sheet ☒ Other Transcripts

Accomplices Race Age Sex D.O.B.

Summary of Case Arresting officers observed this defendant underneath the stolen vehicle with a wrench in his hands. He was removing the nuts from the bolts which holds the bucket seats on the passenger side.

ence address, business address, telephone numbers, relationship to

PREVIOUS ARRESTS	SEE ATTACHED TRANSCRIPT.
COMPLAINANT: National Car Rental System 3377 Edward Drive 352 2413 Ed. Gross w/m/40 104 Hillside Frisco, Texas 214-277-2926 Service Manager	Will testify to the fact that the 1970 model Javelin, 2 door, color blue, 1970 Texas license MFL 180, VIN: ACC797H248060 is a rental car unit 126887; that the vehicle had been parked on the lower deck parking at 3101 W. Mockingbird Lane. That it was taken between the dates of May 29, 1970 at 7AM and June 10, 1970 at approximately 10AM. That neither he nor any other employee gave this defendant or any other person permission to drive, have custody of, or to remove any parts from the vehicle.
ARRESTING OFFICER: Q. Hodges #2696 J. D. Davis #1901 Radio Patrol Division DPD 748 9711 Ext. 511	Will testify to fact they received a call on a colored male stripping a vehicle in the 400 block of Danel. On their arrival they observed this defendant underneath the above described vehicle with a wrench in his hand removing nuts from bolts which hold in the bucket seats. They placed the nuts and bolts in the police property room on tag #81191. They made a legal arrest on the defendant.
INVESTIGATING OFFICERS: F. G. Phillips #1415 Crimes Against Property Auto Theft DPD 748 9711 Ext. 556	Will testify to fact he handled general investigation of the case and prepared it for filing. That he had the defendant arraigned before Judge Chapman on 6/10/70 approximately 1:50 PM. That he checked out the story that he was removing bolts from the U-Joint to repair it. The bolts were still intact on the drive shaft and the only nuts gone were those on the bucket seats on the passenger side.

fjb
6/10/70

NOTICE OF ADULT PROBATION

DALLAS COUNTY CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURTS

DALLAS, TEXAS

DATE May 7, 1971

NAME EUINS, AMOS LEE

ADDRESS 2333 Fernwood, Apt. 106, Dallas

SEX M RACE C AGE 23 DATE OF BIRTH 1-10-48

HEIGHT 5'5 WEIGHT 130 EYES Brn HAIR Blk COMPLEXION Med.Brn

EMPLOYER

OFFENSE Theft over $50.00 (auto) SENTENCE 2 years

COURT No. 3 DOCKET No. C70-4742-LJ

DATE OF PROBATION 5-7-71 PROBATION CASE No. 3-71-965 pv

PROBATION OFFICER D.D. Dozier

FBI No. DPS No. SO No. 194590 DPD No. 86341

REMARKS

Form 69 —94

POLICE DEPARTMENT - DALLAS, TEXAS

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/1/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10113-10119
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	003362

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	ORR, PATRICIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	08/05/1977
PAGES :	7
SUBJECTS :	CIA MEXICO CITY HUNT, E. HOWARD
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/01/2003
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	CIA 77-4. Box 77.

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM

8/5/77

003362

TO: JH, KK

FROM: PMO

RE: CIA Station in Mexico City

Attached find a list of individuals known to have been connected with the CIA station in Mexico City during Lee Harvey Oswald's visit.

This information has been gleaned mainly from the executive session testimony of David Phillips, ex-CIA agent who had been in charge of Cuban Affairs for the CIA in Mexico City. Other information comes from staff interviews with a witness, Boris Tarasoff, formerly with the intercept unit of the CIA station.

It has been suggested that E. Howard Hunt may have been involved in CIA activities in Mexico City and specifically with the visit of Lee Harvey Oswald. Many critics cite the fact that the CIA Station Chief has never been identified publicly as a basis for speculation that Hunt possibly held that position. This, however, would conflict with information from Phillips that the Station Chief was named Winston Scott, now deceased.

This does not preclude the possibility that Hunt held some other position in the station

SENSITIVE

another position at the station, but Tarasoff was shown photographs of E. Howard Hunt which he could not identify nor did he recognize the name from CIA-Mexico City.

I will also be forwarding an organizational chart of the CIA station as best I can make it out with the information known presently.

ORR 8/5/77

SENSITIVE

MEXICO CITY -- CIA

A review of notes taken from interviews with David Phillips indicates that there are a several areas which our witness may be questioned about.

Organization & Personnel
Personnel in Mexico City Station:

David Phillips:

In 1963 Phillips was in charge of Cuban affairs for the CIA in Mexico City. As such, he was responsible for the monitoring of the Cuban Embassy.

He was in Mexico City from September 1961 to early 1965, succeeding Tom Hazlett.

He originally comes from Ft. Worth and joined the CIA in 1950.

He recalls the Oswald tape as an intercept between the Soviet and Cuban embassies. Herbert Manel, head of Russian affairs at Mexico City Station would have been primarily responsible for information derived from this intercept.

Phillips was never in the intercept unit, which was staffed mainly by Mexican nationals.

His immediate superior was Warren Dean, but he answered to Winston Scott.

Winston Scott:

Station Chief for the Mexico City CIA Station in 1963. Supervisor for Phillips in practice, although the deputy Chief of Station would normally have been the person to whom Phillips was to report.

Scott was known for his almost photographic memory and a strong personality. He did not like to delegate authority.
Scott was the person who made final determination as to whether information coming in over an intercept was to be forwarded to Washington or not.

Scott is now deceased. He died of a heart attack around 1972. His name was not previously known publicly.

Warren Dean:

Deputy Station Chief under Scott in Mexico City. Phillips was not sure whether it was Dean or Allen White who held this office at the time of Oswald's visit, but he feels fairly positive that it was Dean.

SENSITIVE

MEXICO CITY -- CIA

Dean (cont'd):

Phillips reported to Scott even though Dean was next man up the hierarchy.

Phillips believes he is retired and lives in the Washington area.

Allen White:

Succeeded Dean as Deputy Stattion Chief; Phillips worked under him for a time.

Phillips believes he is retired and resides in the Washington area.

Joe Picolo:

CIA officer under Phillips.

Robert Shaw:

CIA officer under Philips.

Eventually Shaw and Phillips had the "whole assignment" in Mexico City.

Two CIA operatives working inside the Cuban Embassy reported to Shaw. One worked for the administrative area; one worked in the diplomatic area.

Phillips believed Shaw is living in the Washington area and is still with the CIA.

George Monroe:

Phillips named him as the senior man in charge of the interception of telephone conversations of the Cuban Embassy's offices.

He would have been responsible for "dozen" or so involved in the intercept unit outside CIA headquarters.

Monroe came to the CIA from the FBI and had been with the CIA for 3 or 4 years at the time of the Oswald visit.

Phillips believes Monroe is still in Mexico today.

Ann Goodpasture:

Phillips mentions her as the person responsible for transporting the tapes from the intercept unit to CIA offices and back again.

It is unclear whether she brought back tapes or transcripts of the conversations from the Russian Embassy. It appears that she brought back transcripts

Goodpasture (cont'd):
in Spanish, ie. translations were done at the intercept unit when the language was Spanish. The tapes that were in Russian were brought back to CIA headquarters in all likelihood. (From Phillips' testimony, it appears that the Russian translator for the CIA was based in the Embassy where CIA headquarters were.) Goodpasture transported the tapes and transcripts in suitcases. She was notified if tape was interesting or not.

Phillips believes that Goodpasture is retired and residing in Dallas, Texas.

Raymond Swider:
Also assigned to Phillips, replacing Joe Picolo.

Phillips believed Swider presently works in the Washington headquarters of the CIA.

George Misco: (phonetic)
Although Phillips was somewhat shakey about facts with respect to Misco, he was able to tell us that Misco was the Russian translator for the CIA and that his office was most likely in CIA headquarters rather than the Soviet intercept unit outside.

Phillips claims that Misco was not in Mexico City at the time of Oswald's visit.

Herbert Manel:
CIA officer in charge of the assignment for Russian affairs, and as such was Phillips' counterpart at CIA station.

Manel worked with his wife, Babara, on this assignment.

Manel and his wife later worked with Phillips when they were all assigned to Caracas, Venezuela.

Phillips maintained that it would have been Manel's responsibility to decide where the inforation contained in the Oswald intercept was to go and whether the intercept should be kept for any reason. Win Scott, though, would have ultimate responsibility.

Phillips did no know of the Manel's whereabouts today.

Clark Anderson:
Local FBI agent in Mexico City, who would routinely receive petinent information from the CIA.

His title was Legal Attache at the American Embassy. He is identified in the Church report only as "Legat". Since he was the highest ranking BI official in Mexico, the FBI investigation there was under his direction.

SENSITIVE

MEXICO CITY -- CIA

Anderson (cont'd):
Anderson worked with Phillips in the Dominican Republic in 1965.

He is presently retired and residing in San Antonio, Texas.

Desmond Fitzgerald:
Chief of CIA operations in Washington CIA headquarters, who originally recommended Phillips to the Mexico City job.

(Fitzgerald is mentioned in the Church report as one of the CIA agents involved with plots against Catro's life. The Church report names him as "the senior CIA officer charged with responsibility for Cuban affairs." He had a meeting with AMLASH on October 29, 1963 for a policy discussion, informing AMLASH that the U.S. was prepared to provide support for a Cuban uprising only after a real coup had been effected.)

Fitzgerald is now deceased.

Barabara Manel:
Wife of Herbert Manel; worked with him at Soviet Affairs desk, assisting him in the work. She would prepare the reports to headquarters, etc. and he would sign them.

She had previously resigned from another staff employee position at the CIA, but was hired again on apart-time basis for her knowledge or Russian and her experience in Soviet matters.

Benjamin Pepper:
Worked under Herbert Manel.

Concerned with other matters related to Soviet affairs, such as Eastern European affairs.

SENSITIVE

MEXICO CITY -- CIA

Personnel:

From other sources, namely, through information garnered by our own investigation, we are also aware of others involved with CIA Mexico City Station in 1963.

Mr. and Mrs. Boris Tarasoff:

As one of the CIA's husband-and-wife teams, the Tarasoff's, had the job of translating and transcribing conversations in the Russian language going in and out of the Soviet Embassy by telephone.

They were experts in voice identification using such aids as newspaper clippings and other miscellaneous informations about different individuals to help determine geographic origins, etc. about persons whose conversations were being tapped.

The Tarasoffs were directly involed in the translation and transcription of the Oswald conversation, although the specifics have become dim in Mr. Tarasoff's memory.

Tarasoff succeeded George Misko.

Tarasoff was never questioned by any investigative agency about the Oswald conversations.

Boris Tarasoff thought the conversation was most likely between Kanstaninov and Oswald and did not involve Kostikov or Yatskov. Tarasoff knew no one by the name of Kostin.
Tarasoff presently resides in Guadalajara, Mexico.

William Bright:

Identified by Tarasoff as CIA "contact" between the station and the translators. It is not clear whether Tarasoff was in the station or in a separate intercepting unit, but it appears that he was probably outside the station.

Bright seemed especially interested when the second call between Oswald and the Soviet Embassy was intercepted and Oswald identified.

Robert Zambernardi:

Identified by Tarasoff as the photographic expert at the Mexico City station at least from September 1963 to November 1963.

Charles Flick:

ORR 8/5/77

MEXICO CITY -- CIA

ORGANIZATION

The CIA Station was housed at the U.S. Embassy. We have been able to identify several CIA positions from various descriptions. May I suggest the following skeletal framework as a possible picture of the CIA's organizational chart for September-October 1963.



WASHINGTON

CHIEF OF OPERATIONS
SPECIAL AFFAIRS
(Desmond Fitzgerald)

MEXICO

STATION CHIEF
(Winston Scott)

Overall responsibility for CIA activities in Mexico.

AMERICAN EMBASSY

- AMBASSADOR
- LEGAL ATTACHE
(Clark Anderson) FBI
"Legat"

DEPUTY
STATION CHIEF
(Warren Dean,
later Allen White)

Joe Picolo - assisted Phillips; replaced by Ray Swider
Robert Shaw - oversaw Cuban operatives

CUBAN AFFAIRS
(David Phillips)

REPORTS OFFICER
&
ASSISTANT

RUSSIAN AFFAIRS
(Herbert Manel)

Barabara Manel - Soviet affairs; assists H. Manel
Benjamin Pepper - Eastern European affairs

CUBAN EMBASSY

2 CIA operatives: one in the diplomatic section, one in the administrative section.

CONTACT
Ann Goodpasture

INTERCEPT UNIT
(George Monroe)

CONTACT
Bill Bright

Robert Zambernardi
(photo expert)

Boris Tarasoff
Mrs. Tarasoff

George Misko (before 10/63)

(Russian translations, transcriptions)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/7/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10113-10246
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	014336

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	MORIARTY, JACK
TO :	BRADY, SURRELL
TITLE :	LAWRENCE HUBER FLORER
DATE :	06/28/1978
PAGES :	2
SUBJECTS :	USAF; FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	10/25/1995
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 256.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

MEMORANDUM

014336

TO: Surell Brady
Counsel, JFK

FROM: Jack Moriarty JPM
Investigator, JFK

DATE: June 28, 1978

RE: Lawrence Huber Florer

I responded to Judy Miller's office (3-E-854) in the Pentagon this date and viewed U.S.A.F. file (Registry #4198089), accompanied by a secretary during my inspection of the file's contents.

Essentially, the subject's file reveals he enlisted in the United States Air Force 8-30-62 in Dallas, Texas, for a period of six years. He received an honorable discharge 8-29-68 at Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas. His assignment as a member of the 136th Air Refueling Group, Texas Air National Guard, Hensley Field, Dallas, Texas 75211, changed from Basic Airman to Sergeant (Specialty Accounting), but not geographically.

This record goes on to reflect he was born in Dallas, Texas, 7-25-40, lived with his mother, Gladys H. Florer at 3609 Potomac, Dallas (father deceased), attended local schools ultimately graduating from N.T.S.U. (Denton, twenty miles north of Dallas) with a B.B.A. in accounting in 1962.

Aside from basic training, he received no special education while assigned to "Air Rflg Gp (TAC), Tex ANG, USNAS, Dallas, Texas."

His service Serial Number is listed as AF 25988326; Social Security #463 62 2151; married Barbara Watson (dob 10-13-44) 8-28-66 in Wichita Falls, Texas, changing their residence to 3736 Glencoe, Apartment #117, Dallas, Texas 75206 (later moved to Apartment #202).

He was promoted to Airman Third Class 11-24-62 and to Sergeant 11-4-63.

A check of his attendance record discloses he normally pursued his military career on weekends.

Example: 11-9-63 (Sat.)
11-10-63 (Sun.)
12-7-63 (Sat.)

Although no photos exist (in the file), his medical records reveal his general health is normal, he wears glasses (20/200 vision w/o aid). He has a 6" scar on inner left arm and is 5'9", 175 pounds, with blue hair and eyes.

Nothing of a disciplinary nature was noted.

br

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/13/20

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10117-10032

RECORD SERIES : NUMBERED FILES

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 015097

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : MONTGOMERY COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF POLICE
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : EUGENE MICHAEL CARRAFA

DATE : 08/03/1976
PAGES : 141

SUBJECTS :

...IDENTIFICATION
ANTI-CASTRO ACTIVITIES
CARRAFA, EUGENE MICHAEL
ROSELLI, JOHN
ORGANIZED CRIME
OSWALD, LEE HARVEY; PRE RUSSIAN PERIOD; DESCRIPTION AND....
CIA; STAFF

DOCUMENT TYPE : REPORT
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/14/1996

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Tabbed FBI 295-1. File 6-32. Box 295.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Copy 1 of 1

①

MONTGOMERY C[illegible]
ORGANIZED CRIME SECTION
ORGANIZED CRIME REPORT

File No. 6-32
Date 08-03-76

015097

Subject **Eugene Michael Carrafa**

Source (Name or Number) **Det. J. Arnold** ☐ Confidential

Evaluation of Source:

Highly Reliable ☒ Usually Reliable ☐ Reliability Questionable ☐

Source Identification:

Private Citizen ☐ Officer ☒ Gov't Agency ☐
Criminal Source ☐ Other (Specify)____________________

Information Acquired by: Hypothesis ☐ News Media ☐
Personal Knowledge ☒ Documents ☐ Heresay/Rumor ☐

INFORMATION:

#1. Eugene Michael CARRAFA
W/M, 05-23-40
7828 Briardale Terrace
Derwood, Maryland
(301) 948-8713
Vehicle: 75 Lincoln Mark IV
White in color
Md. reg. GINO

#2. Gino's Classical Cars, Inc.
3909 Pulaski Highway
Abington, Harford County, Md.

#3. Stanley Norman TASHOFF, Atty.
W/M, 6'4", 180, 12-11-40
9321 Garden Court
Potomac, Md.
(301) 299-6991 (home)
&
19110 Montgomery Village Ave.
Gaithersburg, Maryland
948-1466

On the above date writer was contacted by Det. J. Arnold, Crimes Against Property, wherein Arnold related that he was working a missing person case on subject #1, CARRAFA. Arnold related that CARRAFA'S daughter suspected foul play as her father went to Brooklyn, New York on or about 07-26-76 to get $10,000.00 from one J. Knol (phoenetic) of 3848 Atlantic Avenue, Seagate, Brooklyn, New York. Contact by the family (CARRAFA'S) with Knol resulted in Knol, allegedly, telling them that CARRAFA went on to California after receiving the money.

Information Content:

Verified ☒ Partially Verified ☐ Unverified ☐

Similar Info. in File No.____________________

Recommended Followup:

Investigator to Verify ☒ Source to Verify ☐ Analyze & Evaluate ☐
File ☐

Approved by______________________________

Signature

②

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

[illegible] ______________

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Det. Arnold contacted Mrs. CARRAFA and attempted to secure CARRAFA'S home and business toll records as same, according to Mrs. CARRAFA, were allegedly at home and in the office. On 08-04-76 Mrs. CARRAFA related that she could not find the records, and writer and Det. Arnold summonsed same from the C & P Telephone Co. of Maryland.

It was further learned that on 07-22-76 to 07-23-76 person or persons, unknown, allegedly broke into Gino's Classic Cars and removed the following three vehicles:

1. 1936 Packard Conv., gray in color, tan top & red wheels, Serial # 904485; title issued to CARRAFA; value $70,000.00.
2. 1931 Cadillac Conv., brown in color with tan fenders & top, Serial #1002698; owned by CARRAFA; value $90,000.00.
3. 1954 Mercedes Benz Conv., white in color with black top, Serial #300186014; owned by CARRAFA, LEC #00519409, value $23,000.00.

TOTAL VALUE OF ALL CARS: $183,000.00

It was further learned that CARRAFA'S associate was one Det. Joseph Ronald Smisek, W/M, 09-06-45, this department.

On 08-04-76 writer contacted NYCPD reference a check on Knol (ph.) and a possible hit was made on the following:

Jay Knohl
W/M, DOB 03-10-33
NYCPD B#516067
909 East 29th Street
Brooklyn, New York

Writer has requested arrest record and photograph, via letter, on Knohl for identification purposes by daughter. Knohl is known to be a "pick-up man" for an unknown banker in New York as he was arrested on 11-25-68, 01-16-69, and 03-09-70 for possession of slips with horse bets on same.

PAGE# ______________

③

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

[illegible]# ____________

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
	On 08-05-76, Det. Fred Elflein, NYCPD, O/C, contacted writer reference to their recovery, at 1915 hours, 08-04-76, of the body of a W/M, ~~shot numerous times in the head and~~ STRANGLE wrapped in chains. Said body had identification papers of CARRAFA and Knol (ph.); and same rose to the surface near buoy #4, Great Kills Harbor, off Staten Island. It is believed that the body is that of CARRAFA.
	F.B.I. contacted by writer and are forwarding prints on CARRAFA to writer. CARRAFA has no record, served in Marine Corp., and was born in Waterbury, Conn.
	Check of Gino's Classical Cars through State Department of Assessments and Taxation reveals that same was incorporated on 11-18-74 by Stanley N. Tashoff, Esq.

PAGE# ____________

④

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-05-76

Information received from NYCPD that in 1968 Jay Knohl turned in two New York driver's licenses to the Maryland Department of Motor Vehicles. Check with M.V.A. reveals a Maryland License for:

J. G. Knohl
W/M, 03-10-33, 5'10", 175
17929 Archwood Way
Olney, Maryland

Subject has one point, a '73 Lincoln, no tags, and a non-published telephone number. It is noted that CARRAFA'S wife, Carol Mildred CARRAFA, is employed by the M.V.A.

Writer checked with Community Storage Park, Redland Road, 948-8813 reference any garages being leased by Knohl, CARRAFA, Smisek, or Gino's Classical Cars with negative results.

Source advises that Miss Shoemaker, CARRAFA'S daughter, called C & P on 08-04-76 and requested that one of two telephones, 948-8713, be disconnected. The other line going into CARRAFA'S residence is 948-0427.

CARRAFA'S tolls received from C & P are as follows reference New York telephone calls:

Brooklyn	(212) 946-3976
Brooklyn	(212) 946-0260
Brooklyn	(212) 372-7198
from Brooklyn	(212) 235-5382
Brooklyn	(212) 946-7917
from Brooklyn	(212) 342-2534

08-06-76

Telephone call from Det. Smisek wherein he inquired as to whether there would be any problem with his attending CARRAFA'S funeral. Smisek further related that he knew and dealt with CARRAFA when they were purchasing $3,000 class cars.

Smisek related that Mrs. CARRAFA called Mr. Fritz, M.V.A.; and stated that she did not believe that the body in New York was CARRAFA'S. He further stated that CARRAFA'S friend was one Ralph Dawson a driver for Passport Transport Co., Philadelphia, a carrier of classical cars.

PAGE#

③

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

A subject by the name of "Reds", 424-6151 will be called by Smisek in an attempt to locate Dawson.

Smisek also related that Bill Bogley knows Jay Knohl, and that in November of '75 a mutual friend of Smiseks and CARRAFA'S, Bob Leonardo, from Kensington, allegedly died of brain cancer.

08-06-76 Source in Plantation Florida P.D. advises the following subscriber information for the four Florida telephone numbers called by CARRAFA:

(305) 857-0293	Lillian Hair 5908 Luzon Drive Orlando, Florida
(305) 595-9339	Alan Smith 9315 S.W. 77th Ave., Apt. 119 Miami, Florida
(305) 776-6765	Lewis E. Iandoli #1 Compass Road Fort Lauderdale, Florida
(305) 941-0746	Ann Iandoli Ann's Beach Ware 37 Ocean Side Center Pompano Beach, Florida also (305) 941-0745

Reference "Reds" and (301) 424-6151; cross directory and M.V.A. reveal him to be Joseph John Ilgenfritz, W/M, 03-19-07, 5'9", 175, Soundex I-425-441-429-207, of 401 West Montgomery Avenue, Rockville, Maryland. Subject has two vehicles registered to him with the following title numbers:

3959498
4077488

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/ID#~~ OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-06-76 CARRAFA'S long distance toll records reveal that he called the following numbers:

(301) 268-1192 Annapolis
761-9393 Glen Burnie
838-2010 Bel Air
838-9189 Bel Air
272-2800 Aberdeen
774-7200 Ashton
Montgomery General Hospital
335-3043 Chase
761-8860 Glen Burnie
829-2153 Mt. Airy
838-3100 Bel Air
272-5800 Aberdeen
679-6467 Edgewood

(202) 665-0576 Washington, D.C.
operator says 665 number is for a mobile telephone listed to Kensington Motor Sales, 10615 Connecticut Avenue, Kensington, Md. listed number for same is 948-2803

Court House records checked reference incorpration of Gino's Classical Cars, Inc., and same reveal the following:

Locate Liber HMS 242 Folio 261
Incorporators: (1) Jay Knohl
17929 Archwood Way
Olney, Md.
(2) Eugene CARRAFA
(3) Stanley N. Tashoff, Esq.

close corporation, 100 shares issued
two (2) directors - Jay knohl & Gino Carrafa

Corporation papers located in liber 2122 folio 155 at State Department of Assessments and Taxation.

On 08-06-76 writer went to 17929 Archwood Way, Olney, Md., for this was the residence listed for Knohl's Md. operator's license and noted on his corporation papers. Parked in the

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXXXXX OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

driveway of the residence was a late model Monte Carlo, Michigan reg. MDH 710 and a Continental D.C. dealer tag D1546.

It was larned from Mrs. David P. Knohl (maiden name Camille NMN Saviano, W/F 12-24-39) that Jay Knohl was her brother-in-law; and he rarely lived there. Her husband, David P. Knohl, W/M, 07-10-41, was not at home at the time of the interview; however a visitor was present and he is as follows:

✓ Louis Anthony Piccerelli
W/M, 05-04-39, approx. 6'2", 200 lbs.
32402 Barclay Square
Warren, Michigan 48093
(313) 979-4777

Mrs. Knohl stated that she last saw Gino CARRAFA on 07-26-76 at her residence for dinner. Piccerelli stated that he too was present at the dinner. Mrs. Knohl stated that the family went to Ocean City, Md. on August 1 and on August 2 one Guy Sullivan, (301) 768-4331 notified her that CARRAFA was missing. Mrs. Knohl also stated that she talked to Jay Knohl on 08-05-76 and Jay stated that he gave CARRAGA some money when he saw him in New York.

Writer had a discussion with Piccerelli and it was learned that up until a few weeks ago he was a bouncer at Fran O'Brians Anthony House. Piccerelli stated that he knew Richie McCaleb, McGowan, Joe Nesline, Becky Sutton; and without any prompting Charlie Tourine. Piccerelli stated that the aforementioned were only gamblers and McGowan was too dumb to be a "hit man" as reported in a media article - The Washingtonian.

When I inquired of Piccerelli what he was presently doing, he stated that in two weeks he and two partners were going to open a bar in Detroit called "The Three of Us". When I remarked that Joseph Zerelli might be around, Piccerelli stated that Joe was too old and his brothers, Tony (Anthony), and another name, were in jail. Writer commented that some of Zerelli's family appeared to be moving to New York and he replied, yeah, they all married into the New York families. He further stated that the police were trying to pin Hoffa's murder on Tony Jackalone.

Mrs. Knohl also stated that her mother was questioned years

PAGE# ____________

⑧

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~V-I/RD#~~ OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

in Brooklyn for possibly writing book; however it was an error as the numbers she possessed were relative to lot and number of pairs of pants she boxed in a garmet house where she worked. Mrs. Knohl further stated that she brought her down from Brooklyn and got her an apartment in Rockville. Maryland telephone directory lists one Jennie Saviano, 199 Rollins Ave., Rockville, Md., 770-6784; and it is noted that she is the only Saviano in the book.

At approximately 1930 hours David P. Knohl called writer, having returned home; however he could not furnish any information. Knohl did say that this was a double shock for Mr. Piccerelli as he burried his wife two weeks ago.

Listing obtained on D.C. dealer tag D 1546 to National Auto Brokers Wholesale, Inc., rear of 5102 Georgia Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. (202) 723-4100 and (202) 291-6400.

Writer contacted MSP Trooper Burns reference the three classical cars reported stolen by CARRAFA on 07-22-76 to 07-23-76, and he stated that CARRAFA refused a polygraph three times; and CARRAFA told him that the reason was that he was into other things. Burns feels that the theft of these vehicles was staged by CARRAFA as he showed Burns one point of entry and a United States Fidelity & Guarantee Insurance Adjustor another point of entry. Burns also related that there were no tire marks in the dirt road that led to Gino's Classical Car's garage. USF & G adjustor is one Sharon Kohler, (301) 547-3569.

Burns noted that a vacationing Pennsylvania police officer, on 07-21-76, two days before the theft, observed a blue GMC Tractor with a yellow trailer operated by two negro males at the Union 76 Truck Stop in Colesville, Pa. The truck was being followed by a negro male in a maroon Rolls Royce. The yellow trailer was loaded with six classical cars, a white over black Cadillac, a Mercedes, what appeared to be a Rolls Royce but could have been the Packard and three other cars.

Lastly, Burns related that one Investigator Jones, Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration, assisted CARRAFA in going into business. Burns and Hones inspected Gino's numerous times and found violations such as un-notarized titles, but Jones took no enforcement action.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Writer attempted to contact Guy Sullivan, and the subject who answered stated that he has not seen him today. It was learned that (301) 768-4331 is Timbuck Two, Rt. 2, Box 231, Hanover, Md. 21076. From background noise it appears as if this is a bar or truckstop.

It was also learned that CARRAFA, Piccerelli and Knohl became acquainted in the Marine Corp. and they all worked as bouncers.

Lisitng obtained on Michigan MDH 710 and same on a 1975 Chevrolet, 2 dr. to Louis A. Piccerelli, 32402 Barclay Square, Warren, Michigan.

Det. Arnold contacted and he furnished the following:

1. CARRAFA'S married daughter named Shoemaker, (301) 977-9312
2. Sgt. Shelton, Long Beach, Calif. P.D., (213) 436-9811, was the complainant reference the first stolen classical car that was sent to Gino's.

08-07-76

Interview with Det. Smisek reveals that one William (Bill) C. Heider, 3670 5th Avenue, Edgewater-Bowie Glendale, Md., (301) 261-4293 is a former partner of CARRAFA and J. Knohl.

Interview with Mrs. CARRAFA reveals that Jay Knohl's right hand man is one Robert White, a gorilla type, of Brooklyn, N.Y. Like Jay Knohl, White has a Md. driver's license and lists David Knohl's address of 17929 Archwood Way, Olney, Md.

New York Detectives working this case are Al Santoro and Al Siragusa, (212) 979-4355 or 979-4356, of NYCPD, Staten Island area, 2320 Hylan Blvd., Staten Island, New York.

CARRAFA'S son-in-law is Stewart Luther Shoemaker, AKA Tinker, W/M, 12-31-50; lives at CARRAFA'S home now; operates 74 Chev. truck, blue, Md. reg. K 52764.

Ralph's telephone number is (314) 831-7964. Bill Bogley called Mrs. CARRAFA twice on 08-07-76 and offered his assistance; and left the following numbers (301) 473-8562 and (301) 831-7580.

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD~~# OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Reliable source will secure any tag numbers visiting Archwood Way address on 08-08, 08-09 and 08-10.

Telephone call received from Det. R. Smisek wherein Smisek stated that Bill Bogley called him and stated that he would give us a confidential statement with reference to Jay Knohl. Bogley told Smisek that when he was in tax trouble ($100,000 plus) Knohl offered to pay all of the liens for a piece of the action. Knohl slso told Bogley that he sent a car - when unknown - to a shredder in NYC.

Smisek related that Gino CARRAFA advertised the three cars that he reported stolen in the August issue of Hemmings Motor News, and Smisek stated that he felt that one of cars reported stolen is in Lake George, New York; however he did not say why.

Information received from Chicago P.D., Homicide, that Janice Mae Piccerelli was found dead on Rush St., Chicago, Ill. on 07-21-76. The case is being handled by Dets Schuler and Grogman, Area 6 Homicide, (312) 744-8262.

Source advises that a female called Mrs. CARRAFA on 08-07-76, approximately 1800 hours, identified herself as a maid of Jay Knohls; and stated that Jay had been involved in an accident; and he was in jail for the weekend for operating on an expired license.

Source also advises that Pat Sherman, AKA Nutsy, was the mentalcase/alcoholic that worked for CARRAFA, and Knohls' insisted that CARRAFA get rid of him as he "knew too much". Sherman lived above Gino's Classical Cars, Inc., and supposedly went to Virginia; but he has not been heard from since.

Interview conducted with Mrs. CARRAFA, her sisters, and daughters at 1430-1700 hours 08-07-76. Numerous personal papers of CARRAFA'S secured, and one of them had the following written on the back:

Romano's Funeral Home
3264 White Plains
Bronx, N.Y.
820 E. 214 Street
Bronx, N.Y.
Pisano

Joseph 634-2503

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXK/RD# OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-08-76

Telephone interview with Det. Adorjian, Chicago P.D., Area 6, Homicide, reference OD death of Janice Mae Piccerelli w/f 7-11-40
7-11-38

Det. Adorjian - 900 N. Rush, I don't know if you've got this information

Alban - 900 N. Rush

Det. Adorjian - Maryland Hotel, Apt. 1305, now they've got quite a few dates here, I guess she checked in on the 15th to the 21st date occurred, I don't know if she has been found in the bathroom, one of the beat guys or uniform mean assigned to DOA Maryland Hotel Apt. 1305, Investigation disclosed the following: victim was found lying on right side in bathroom on arrival. Victim was last seen Thursday, 15th July at 1100 hours. Reporting officers requested evaluation due to suspect nature of death, crime lab in Area 6 Homicide requested, Crime lab came, Area 6 on scene, Homicide transported to Henrode and then transported to Cook County, Morgue, room was sealed.

OK - I'll read you the investigation of the

Primary stages of decomposition face, back and associated discoloration with blistering and skin slippage, she was there for awhile. Apparent accidental overdose. Photographs taken. Identified by personal papers in victim's room. Manger of hotel identified and interviewed. Nelson Berralli, Psychiatrist interviewed also. Somebody notified by name of George Hanley from Wilkesbury, Pa. Victim's ex-husband.

Reporting investigators were assigned this death investigation such and such time, proceeded to scene, Rm. 1305, crime lab was taking pictures and the victim was observed lying on her back with her head in the bathroom and feet in hallway. It was ascertained that she was lying first on her face on the bathroom floor and prior to arrival of the police, she was turned over for the purpose of examining the body for injuries. The victim was observed to be wearing only a black pair of panties and on the bathroom floor were various body fluids and decomposition states. I guess she was cooking there for awhile. The living room of the apartment contained several dressers, a bed, two end tables, charis and a closet, window of apartment was slightly open and on the nightstand was observed a bottle of

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXVKRXX# OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

VO with only one or two ounces in the bolle. Several pills were noted on the table with the bottle. Two bottles of prescription of 200 librium only six capsules were in the bottle.

Interviewed the manager of the hotel indicated that he had noticied an odor coming from victim's room and having had previous experience of such contacted the engineer and they went in. Not one of our better places it is right in the Rush street area which is our swinging part of town. She indicated last time she saw her was six days prior when she left instructions for the maid not to clean her room until Tuesday the 20th which is kind of strange. They don't elaborate any more on that.

Alban - that would be the 15th then if she was found the 21st.

Adorjian - yeah and she doesn't want her room cleaned until the following Tuesday OK. In the room were various hospital bills indicating the victim had recently been hospitalized. They were from Henroten and Northwestern Hospitals which are in close proximity to the Maryland Hotel. They went to the hospital, examined the body and nothing other than the decomposition was noted. Went to the Henroten Hospital and revealed victim was in fact patient of hospital, but failed to show for next of kin purposes. Went to Northwestern Hospital and interviewed Doctor Nelson Berrelli and indicated victim was receiving psychiatric care and listed an ex-husband whose name you've got.

Alban - that is Louis Piccerelli

Adorjian - no George E. Hanley

Alban - George Hanley

Adorjian - with an address of another address in here Dr. record victim's father Melvin Bliffen. Door was locked on the inside, 13th floor up, no fire escape. Due to fact all the pills other than that, it is being classified as death investigation waiting outcome of coroners examination and inquest. Apparently, no foul play connected at this particular time unless we have some further information.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Alban - any fingerprints left, is it normal

Adorjian - I don't know if they dusted for prints, to be honest with you.

Alban - yeah, cause

Adorjian -Right off the top of my head I would have to tell you know

Alban - yeah, we could get copies out there. It is way out

Adorjian - going to blow the whistle because of her goofieness

Alban - that could have been it, unless Piccerelli, Lou says he is opening a place in Detroit, I don't know if he happens to be an insurance recepiant. I don't know that at this point, but we're trying to find out why Carrafa got hit. Initially we think it was the classical cars you know, but then all of a sudden they through us this damn curve and of course Lou Piccerelli is an associate of all of them and then his wife has Od and both Piccerelli and Knohls and Knohl has 19 busts in N.Y.

Adorjian - do you, do we have any idea when she came to this city here, Chicago

Alban - no I'm only into this thing for about two days. She according to Mrs. Carrafa's family that she has been in the racketts and dating racketeers in Chicago and of course Piccerelli knows the Zerilli family pretty well in Detroit, and he knows all the heavy OC figures in Washington, D.C. area and this Maryland suburb. Of course Jay Knohl has been identified bt NYCPD Organized Crime as an unknown maybe a pickup man for an unknown banker up there. He's got 19 busts with numbers, but he is a little bit more than that, we have a big timer down here that was involved with the Marvin Mandel Governor of Maryland indictment and he had a tax lean of damn near 1/2 million and this Knohl called him and said he would bail him out if he could have a piece of the action, probably infiltration of legitimate business.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-08-76

Source advises that CARRAFA'S brother arrived in Maryland on 08-07-76 from Connecticut; same operating 75 Buick, 4 dr. Sedan, green, Conn. reg. KE 9712; listed to Matthew Carrafa, 271 Citizens Avenue, Waterbury, Connecticut. Matthew Carrafa allegedly stated that if the police didn't find his brothers murderer in sixty days, he would have things taken care of.

1800 hrs. - Telephone interview with Stanley Tashoff, Esq. wherein Tashoff related the following:

1. incorporated Knohl & Carrafa about a year ago

2. Knohl & Carrafa in office Tuesday, 7-27-76 reference B & E at Gino's Classic Cars and police wanted Carrafa to take a polygraph

3. didn't admit to false report, but Tashoff says, "regardless of my feelings on the subject which wouldn't make any difference one way or the other", said place got broken into on Friday

4. Knohl was cordial towards Gino; always cordial; asked Tashoff to arrange with police to stop hasseling Gino about the break-in

5. heard from Jay Knohl reference whether Carol Carrafa was going to New York alone to identify body; asked Tashoff to work something out where Knohl and brother would make the identification

6. freezing proceeds or company - Jay can sell business tomorrow if he wants

7. do they both own an equal share in the business - "can't tell you that"

8. Mrs. Carrafa told me she owned 20% - "I told her I thought she owned 20%" - "doesn't really matter, Jay owned 50%, I as trustee (Tashoff) owned other 50% - of that Gino had 20% and he could purchase the rest at his option

PAGE#

15

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

9. Why were cars titled in Gino's name - Tashoff says "they just title them in any way they want - I don't know why they were in his name. The business was run in a slipshot way

10. I met Jay through Gino, Mike Grady whose father owned Grady Motors in Bethesda - later Bogley's - where I met Gino

11. Did Jay say where he got his money - no

12. If you stereotyped Jay, what would you stereotype him as? I won't answer that, I may have my own suspicions, but I have no proof of it

13. "I told him he was out of his head to open a business in Abingdon

14. Knows of Iandoli case

15. Tashoff says he doesn't know Piccerelli or Knohl's brother, David; may have met David years ago

16. "I think Gino knew what he got in to, but you can't do anything about it now."

08-09-76 Telephone interview with Lt. William F. Juliano, Crimes Against Persons, New York City Police Dept., 2320 Hylan Blvd., Staten Island, N.Y. 10306, (212) 979-4748 wherein he stated that when his detectives went to question Jay Knohls they were met by other detectives who had just arrested Knohls for sodomizing two nine year old boys. It was further learned that Knohls raped a young girl last year, and the girl's mother is now Knohls' housekeeper.

It was also learned that Carrafa rented a flatbed truck on 07-21-76, capable of hauling three cars, for a trip to Chicago.

Al Cooley's, NFI, identification found on CARRAFA'S body.

Observation and remote-yet possible connection:

On July 28, 1976 - same day CARRAFA went to New York - John

PAGE# __________

16

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Roselli, LCN - Late Sam Giancana's Chicago family, disappeared from his brother-in-laws' residence, 5220 S.W. 10th Court, Plantation, Florida (Joseph E. Daigle & Edith); telephone (305) 581-6585. It is noted that the late Janice Mae Piccerell allegedly dated O/C figures in Chicago. On the 7th of August, 1976, John Roselli's decomposing body was found in a 55 gallon oil drum floating in the ocean near Miami. The oil drum had been weighted with heavy chains; and a preliminary autopsy report notes that Roselli died from asphyxiation - similar to CARRAFA'S demise and disposition.

It is further noted that a piece of paper relating to a change of vehicle title (md.) was found on CARRAFA'S body, and the transaction had been handled by Mrs. Carrafa.

It was learned from Det. J. Arnold that a uniform car responded to a family fight at the CARRAFA residence on Sunday night, 08-08-76. It was further learned that D/Sgt. J. Mangan, Crimes Against Property, observed Det. Ronald Smisek going through Det. Arnold's box on his desk on the weekend of 8/7 - 8/8/76.

Writer contacted Det. Carl Shoffler, Washington, D.C. P.D., O/C and Shoffler related that he knows Louis Anthony Piccerelli from Fran O'Brian's Anthony House, and he thought Piccerelli was in Detroit where he has LCN connection. Shoffler further related that a source told him that a "hit" man was "in town" at Fran O'Brians Anthony House las week. The subject was operating a yellow Cadillac, Md. reg. EHB 608; and same is listed on a 1976 Cadillac to Allied Construction Co., 18805 Briars Court, Olney, Md.

Shoffler also stated that there has been extensive traffic between Florida - Washington - and New York, and one Bobby Vannuchi, (AKA Bobby Van - has a T.V. show at 1130 hours daily) has been coming to Washington regularly. Vannuchi reputedly has O/C connections in Florida. It was also learned that Lawrence Luxenberg, AKA Larry Lux, is the Vice President of National Auto Broke rs Wholesale, Inc. Luzenberg is a known gambler and a member of Joseph Francis Nesline's family. Nesline reports to Charles (The Blade) Tourine, 69, AKA Charles White; and Tourine has been identified as a high-ranking member of the New York underworld family formerly headed by the late Vito Genovese.

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

It is further noted that Larry Luxenberg was the subject of a 1972 FBI investigation, Field Office File # BA 166-848, Bureau File # 166-4698 - Interstate Transporation in Aid of Racketeering - Gambling.

Another F.B.I. report notes that WF 1704-C advised on 11/26/69 that Larry Luxenberg had been involved with one Jack Berman in a Cadillac theft ring. Luxenberg had been residing in Miami, Florida prior to this date. Refer to MCP --OCR report 73-1077 for further details.

Reference Allied Construction Co., source at Court House advised same dissolved in 1957 according to corporate records. Officers were Salvatore DiMaio, Robert DiMaio, Howard Michnick, and Simon Michnick; attorney was the late Donald K. Staley.

M.V.A. check reveals that Louis Anthony Piccerelli, W/M, 05-04-39, 6'3", 230, Box 124, Deale, Md., soundex P-264-549-067-34 same subject as above noted - previously held a Maryland driver's license.

Toll calls received on David Knohl's residence and three calls to Fort Lauderdale as follows:

(305) 735-6952	Abraham Knohl 2800 N.W. 47th Terrace Lauderdale Lake, Fla.
(305) 733-2151	Samuel J. Cole 3051 N.W. 46th Avenue Lauderdale Lake, Fla.
(305) 776-4880	Holiday Inn North 4900 Powerline Rd. Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

With reference to Bobby Vannuchi, AKA Bobby Van, Ft. Lauderdale Intelligence states that he owns the Bachelors III nightclub with Joe Namath. About four years ago David Lancaster was shot and killed there by Jimmy Capatorto. Capatorto, an LCN figure, was shot 13 times, and killed, along with Wayne Neeld and Bobby Dominici three months ago in a drug extortion plot.

PAGE#

(18)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXK/RDXX OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Ft. Lauderdale has nothing on Louis E. Iandoli except he lives in a 1/2 million to million dollar neighborhood.

Det. Don Valicki says that he the name Louis Anthony Piccerelli is recently familiar and he is checking same out. Valicki also advises that there is a nightclub in Ft. Lauderdale named "The Three of Us" and it is owned by Dominick Santerelli, Chicago Syndicate.

Dominick Santerelli's partner was Phillip Damiano, Cleveland LCN, who was recently murdered. Santerelli and Damiano owned a majority of the land in Alaska where the pipeline is being laid, most of the port city of Valdez, and both are close associates of Charles Tourine who was indicted July 8, 1976 in an Alaska gambling and prostitution conspiracy centered in Valdez.

Interview with Matthew Carrafa, (203) 574-1878, work (203) 272-2211 wherein he related that there would be a wake for the deceased CARRAFA on 08-12-76 and burial on 08-13-76 in Waterbury, Connecticut. CARRAFA further related that if the police are unable to do anything he will look around New York as "I have the same connections in New York as they are investigating."

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-09-76

Interview with Michael J. Rinaldi of Rinaldi-Hines Funeral Home reference the services held for Janice Mae Piccerelli, W/F, 38 years. Mr. Rinaldi stated that two of the visitors were "storybook" O/C types, W/M, 40's, dark suits, sunglasses, and hats. Certificate of Cremation # 10679, reveals that subject was cremated on July 23, 1976 and her date of death was given as July 21, 1976 - date found. She was cremated at the Oakridge Abbey, Hillside, Illinois; and the Funeral Directors were Mrazek & Russ, Chicago, Illinois.

Mr. Rinaldi stated that no death certificate accompanied the ashes, and he found it unusual that subject would be cremated without the certificate. Mr. Rinaldi further stated that Piccerelli's brother, Conrad Joe Bliffin, paid $864.00 cash for the service; and no one has bothered to apply for the $250.00 social security death benefit.

Flower cards were checked and the following persons sent cards through the noted florists:

Jimmy Rym, Becky & Justine	Frieds Florist of Hillandale
Lee Havez and Ann	Gemeny's Flowers 58-7979
Seidel Chevrolet	Marche, 277-5900
Dorothy & Herbert Perry	Muses, Falls Church
Melvin, Betty, Jane Perry	" " "
Benny & Kenneth Perry	" " "
Barbara Ann Perry	" " "
"Love Rose"	Henderson Florist 1121 "H" St., N.W. District 7-5022
Kathy & Doreen Hanley	
Conrad Joe Bliffin	

08-10-76

Bill Gallinaro, U. S. Senate Permanent Subcommittee on O/C, investigator reports the following:

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXXXXXX OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

1. Lewis E. Iandoli - has known organized crime associates
   W/M, 04-25-19
   #1 Compass Rd.
   Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.

2. Jay G. Knohl

Arrests:

1956 -	Miami-	Assault & Battery
1967 -		Extortion & Loansharking
1969		Rape
1969-1970		nine (9) arrests relating to possession of gambling slips
1971		Criminal possession of burglary tools
1974		Assault in the 3rd degree
1976		Sex abuse of child

On 08-09-76, Det. Sgt. Michaleski and Det. Cpl. Swain, O/C Unit, located CARRAFA'S girlfriend, who is employed at the Bush Rivers Restaurant. Her statement is as follows:

PAGE# ____________

Todays date is August 9, 1976, the time is 1615 hours, the person to be interviewed is Doris Ann Duafala, DOB 08/24/55, 1800 Sohn Road, Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, phone 412-375-1013, attends Edonboro State College where she will be a senior this fall, majoring in sociology, College address: Douglas #2, Heather Apartments, Edenboro, Pa. 16412. Present during the interview is D/Sgt. S. Michaleski and D/Cpl. R. Swain, Montgomery County Police.

Code: D = Duafala
M = Michaleski
S = Swain

M - Ok, Doris go ahead and go back to when you first met Gino

D - I met Gino last summer, he and some of his friends came into where I work and I dated him all last summer, he kept in contact with me after I quit work and went back to school and then when I came down here again this summer, I went out with him once or twice and he would come in to see me at work.

M - You say some of his friends, do you know their names?

D - Sully, Jason's brother, Jason, Patrick Sherman

M - Sully, who is Sully, do you know his full name?

D - No not positive, but it might be David Sullivan, I'm not sure

M - David Sullivan

D - It might be, but I'm not sure.

M - Well, how did it come that you met Gino

D - Well I work , uh and his place is just down the road, they stopped in for a drink and we talked to each other you know, and he asked me if I needed a ride into work the next day, which I did, he took me to work and then we just started going out.

M - Did Gino indicate to you where he lived at?

D - Bethesda, or what ever it is

M - Bethesda

D - yeah, he lived in a condominium there

M - Do you know the address:

D - No, Gino would never give me his address or his phone number, he didn't want me to know

M - Would the name Pooks Hill ring a bell?

D - No

M - How about Prominade

D - No, he has a good friend down there who owns a restaurant that probably would know exactly where he lives

M - do you know who that friend is?

D - no, I know that is where Gino worked quite often

M - Would you recall the name of the restaurant if I happened to mention it to you

D - no

M - he never mentioned the name of the restaurant to you

D - no

M - but he said he lived in a condominium in Bethesda

D - uh huh, I'm pretty sure that is what he said, I'm pretty sure that is what he told me, I never really, Gino just always wanted to keep a lot of things to himself so I never really questioned him too much. I didn't ask where he lived or anything like that

S - How did you get in touch with him

D - I never did, well either I called Gino's Classic Cars or else I didn't get in touch with him. He usually was the one who would get in touch with me.

M - do you think that he was mixed up in something that wasn't exactly on the up and up?

D - yes

M - what makes you feel that way?

D - just for the different times when he wouldn't give me his phone number of his address. He said he didn't give it out to anybody, and at times he said he wished he could tell me things but he just couldn't and a awful lot of times he indicated things but didn't come right out and say

M - such as

D - uh, right off I can't think

M - did he ever make any trips to New York

D - did I

M - did he

D - of yes he did

M - frequently or infrequently

D - Uh, pretty frequently, as a matter of fact he was just there, a couple times this summer his partner lives in New York and Gino went there quite often and he spent a good deal of time in California recently.

M - how recently?

D - oh, I guess it was, well it was my second semester of school, you know, which was this past term, so it must have been in February, March, April

M - Did he say why he went to California?

D - I was under the impression it was for art, looking for cars and things like that

M - did he drive out or fly out, do you know?

D - I think he, I'm almost positive that he drove back because that is when he bought his second Lincoln

M - that is the one that he presently owns

D - yes, he owns two presently, and he drove it back and I'm not exactly sure how he got out there.

M - the uh, back up a little bit, you mentioned that you had seen Gino's truck go down the road, Monday and uh that is the brown one, did it have Maryland tags on it or?

D - yes it did

M - it had Maryland tags on it

D - well, uh, you know

M - you assume it was Maryland tags

D - well, I've been in it before and I am almost positive it had Maryland tags on it. I believe he bought it off somebody in Pennsylvania, but it did have Maryland tags on it

M - you don't know who he bought it from do you?

D - no

M - do you recall the name of Gino's partner

D - Jason

M - Jason

D - he uh

M - you don't know his last name,do you?

D - no, but I know where he lives

M - you do

D - up at, by, near Coney Island, his house is right on the water

M - you don't by any chance have the address

D - no, his last name may be Sullivan but I am not sure

M - could you describe him, have you ever met him?

D - Oh, yes, several times, Gino and Jason and I went out to dinner and Jason whenever Jason was in the area, Jason and Gino would stop in to see me and I talked to Jason a few times over the phone

M - Could you describe Jason to me?

D - he is a nice looking man, gray hair, medium build, I'd say he is about 5'8", 5'9", blue eyes

M - about how old?

D - I would guess 45

M - how much would you say he weighed?

D - uh 160

M - uh huh, you have been to the house up there

D - yes

M - is Jason married, do you know?

D - no, he may have been married at one time, but presently he is not married, he has a housekeeper

M - do you know her name

D - I can't remember it, I did meet her, but I can't remember her name

M - but you say the house is located in New York, Coney Island

D - down from Coney, it is in Brooklyn

M - Brooklyn

D - yeah

M - Did Jason ever tell you what kind of business he was in?

D - no, uh, I questioned Gino one time as to what Jason did and Gino evaded the question and another time I asked Gino how come if they were partners, how come it was Gino's Classic Cars and uh you know Gino just said, not to ask questions and made a joke of it as he usually does

M - to your knowledge, did Gino carry a lot of money on him?

D - always

M - always

D - always

M - can you give me an estimate of how much

D - no I never

M - a couple of hundred dollars

D - sometimes even more than that, he always you know had quite large sums on him

M - uh huh, who did Gino have working for him, you know immediate workers, right there all the time

D - Patrick just quit

M - Patrick

D - Sherman, just quit

M - what did he look like?

D - uh, red hair, long, very long mustache, fairly heavy, he was short, 5'7", 5'8"

M - do you know why he quit?

D - uh, Gino said that it was because he felt that he was holding Patrick back and that Patrick was more or less in a rut and Patrick said that he had a lot of things on his mind and Gino had a lot of things or his mind and it was better for both of them if they split. Patrick was back in the area, Patrick had been in a hospital and he came back, a matter of fact he was in Sunday night, the night before the last when I saw Gino and then he also came in with Gino's brother uh and sister-in-law with Patrick when he came in last Monday

M - do you, have you been inside the building up there

D - oh yes

26

M - does he have a lot of cars in there

D - well uh, he used to have three usually three in the showroom and he had about three in the back that he was working on and I don't know if he did sell that Cadillac or if it was stolen or uh, there had been a car in the paint room

M - now did you hear that a Cadillac was stolen in the paint room from California

D - I had heard that only through reading the paper, as a matter of fact someone else called my attention to it, I didn't even know and I couldn't understand why Gino didn't mention it to me that Monday when he was in. Because from the way I understood it, the robbery happened on Friday or Saturday night and Gino was in here MOnday and I couldn't understand why he didn't say anything to me

M - you say he had some stuff stolen from the showroom

D - that is what, I was told from other people

M - did he have a large number of people hanging out up there

D - no, he also had another boy working for him, a young kid, named Jay, Jerry, Jack his name was Jack. I think he was only about 16 or 17

M - do you know where he lived at

D - no, he was just a young kid and then of course the uh man who lives next door he re-does furni, he refinishes furniture, he would come over occasionally and the man who has the garage just down from him would come down, but other than that

M - did Gino ever indicate to you that he commuted, commuted between Bethesda

D - oh yes

M - that is a long drive

D - yes it is, I often asked him why he didn't bother to get an apartment or house up here, but he didn't want to

M - did he ever say why

D - no

M - did he ever say why he got located here instead of down in Bethesda, his business

D - he said that he felt this was a better location because of its where it was in relationship to New York and Philadelphia and

D - some other places, just general it was a better place

M - why wouldn't New York and Philadelphia necessarily be a good location to be close to

D - I don't know

M - you don't know

D - I'm not positive, but I think Gino was thinking of moving out to the coast very soon

M - out to the coast, why do you say that

D - he, uh, liked it out there and he said something to me about moving out there and that uh in talking to his brother that you know the just of the conversation about moving out to the West Coast

M - which brother came to visit him

D - Joe, the baby in the family

M - Joe, where was he from?

D - Connecticut

M - Connecticut. Did Gino ever buy you anything?

D - oh yeah, uh he sent me roses and little things

M - did he ever buy you any jewelry

D - no, not that I can think of

S - I'm just curious, when we first started talking about him, you mentioned the fact that you felt there was something, something wasn't quite right about what Gino was doing and you spent some time in the shop and everything, did you have any idea what that might be

D - no, I uh, I never, I often wondered about it and I even mentioned it to my sister, my sister had advised me to stay away from Gino, but

S - well, why did you tell your sister if she advised you to stay away from Gino

D - just that I thought he was doing something illegal that I thought he was mixed up in something, I don't know what just cars

S - you must have had some guess or something

D - parden me

S - you must have had some guess or something

D - no, it was just you know, I thought it was very odd that he would never give me his phone number or things like that and well impression of other things, everything seemed very odd to me

S - for instance, what types of things did you question

D - uh

S - don't miss understand, we're not trying to divulge any evidence against Gino in any way,

M - we're trying to find out who did this to him

D - right off, I just cant think

S - what about his partner, did he every say anything about him

D - no, not anything much

S - how often did his partner come down here, about, that you know

D - oh, not that often, they would call each other quite frequently you know, like once every day, they would call each other

S - once a day

D - probably

S - when you say not that often, how often do you mean

D - uh, lets see, I'd say once every few months Jason would be down cause as far as I know Jason may have been down twice this summer to my knowledge

M - how recently, what is the most recent time that he was down

D - he was definitely down here in JUne because he stopped in to see me, but he may, I'm not positive, I think he was taking a plane out of Baltimore and I think he stopped in, I think Gino had taken him to the airport, but I'm not positive about that

S - out of Baltimore to where, back to New York

D - I have no idea

S - going back to the very recent past, the last time that you saw Gino was say about two weeks ago

D - uh huh

S - and he stopped in and was with who

D - his brother JOe and his sister-in-law and Patrick Sherman

S - OK, did you get an opportunity to talk to him

D - yeah

S - what did the conversation involve

D - oh, they were giving me a hard time before and like being very funny towards Gino and you know they were teasing him about you know things like that, that was basically the, other than general, his brother had bought a new car and he had brought it down for Gino to look at it to see what Gino thought was and the conversation just jumped around about cars and that was about it

M - what type of car was that, do you know

D - it was something like a Vega, something like that

M - he bought it here in Maryland or

D - no, well his brother bought it in Connecticut and wanted Gino to see it and they were on there way to uh Virginia Beach or one of the beaches for a few days

S - did Gino every during the time you said, that you were trying to break off the relationship, at least slow it down some, uh at any time during when you were having a good relationship, did he ever give you any indication of how his business was doing or anything like that

D - uh, Gino always tried to make everyone think that he was doing very well, you known

S - was that including you

D - yeah, occasionally he would you know make a joke if I don't get this car sold that I'm not going to have you know, you know some money, things like that, but usually he would try to make it sound as if he was doing very well and he would try to you know show off his money, try to be very extravigant with his money

S - when you were dating Gino, last summer, about how often were you seeing him

D - about every week and he would take me almost every week

S - once or twice a week, something like that

D - well, I'd see him, you know I would see him two, three, maybe four times a week and then, uh, Gino did buy me a piece of jewelry, he bought me a charm for a charm braclet, they had a going away party for me but that was just you know everybody had bought me, Gino wouldn't always take me out on my day off because a lot of things would come up that is another thing that I couldn't understand is uh we would make plans to go somewhere and all of a sudden he would call me up that afternoon and say I'm sorry but I must go to Philadelphia for I must go here, he just made a recent trip to Philadelphia as a matter of fact, uh he stopped by to take me with him, but I already had another date, so he left

M - did he say why he was going to Philadelphia

D - no, cars usually

M - this is sort of personal, but did he every purpose marriage to you

D - yeah, we had talked about it

M - uh, would you say he lived above his means or within his means

D - I don't know what his means were

M - did you get the impression that maybe he is a high roller, do you know what I mean by high roller

D - uh, yeah, In some ways I think he was and in other ways I don't know

M - did he gamble any to your knowledge

D - when he was younger he gambled but he didn't gamble any more

M - but the time that you have known him, your knowledge he has never gambled

D - no he quit gambling

M - how do you know that he gambled when he was younger

D - well he told me stories about you know when they used to go to the race trach and you know things like this

M - how much, what do you mean by when he was younger

D - either just getting out of the service or while he was in the service

M - did he ever explain to you how he came into money to set up his business

D - no, and I never really asked him, Patrick was always saying

D - that Gino worked very hard for everything that he has gotten. Patrick I think was trying to advise Gino to get out of what he was doing, I don't know what Patrick, when Patrick was drinking or Patrick would tell me how you know he wishes Gino would just quit all this and I don't know exactly what Patrick meant by quiting

M - did Patrick go by a nickname

D - no

S - when was the last time that you say Patrick was with Gino and them, where is Patrick now, do you have any idea

D - in Virginia

S - do you know where in Virginia

D - no

S - a guess

D - no, he may be working in construction, but I'm not sure, it is either construction or at a garage something like that

S - does he have any friends, relatives or anyone that he dates around here

D - Patrick, no, I don't know of anybody that he would keep in contact with

S - does he have a car

D - uh a Chevy, I believe it is a Chevy, that Gino had given him

M - did Gino have a bookkeeper or a Secretary of anything

D - no, he had one years ago but she and he hasn't replaced it

S - two or three years ago

D - uh, I guess quite a few you know

M - let me ask you this or maybe you can give us some kind of an answer, or a speculation anyway, since you have known Gino and dated him and so forth, did he ever indicate to you or did you ever get a feeling that maybe there was somebody out to get him

D - no, but uh, not so much Gino, but I knew Jason has had a couple stunts with people in his neighborhood really and they had gone as far as doing damage to cars and things like this, and I knew Jason wasn't too well, you know slashed roof tops and things like this, I knew things like that, but as far as Gino not I didn't know of anything

D - car rental at the Airport because that is where friends friends brother, Sully, I think it was Sully that runs it

M - what airport, do you know?

D - The Baltimore, baltimore-Washington

M - Does the name Fran O"Brian right a bell?

D - no

M - How about McGowan?

D - no

M - How about the name Joe Nesline?

D - no

M - How about Charles Tourine?

D - no

M - did he ever make mention of an individual by the name of Charlie the Blade?

M - to your knowledge did Gino ever carry a gun on him?

D - no

M - To your knowledge was he ever fearful for his life?

D - no

S - Did you ever have any indication at all that he was in a financial bind or for some other reason he might want to double cross his partner or anything like that?

D - no

S - we know he garble

D - I don't think Gino would every doublecross Jason, they were very close and

M - let me ask you this, do you think Jason would ever harm Gino?

D - no

M - why do you say that?

D - I don't think he would, they seemed to get along very well and they seemed to be very close in their business

33

M. - Why would Jason do something like that?

D - some disagreements in the neighborhood, and you know he had killed a lot shurbs and they in return drove nails in his cars or something like that and went back and forth, but as far as Gino, no, I don't know of anything

S - Has Gino ever been married, do you know?

D - he told me he wasn't

S - had he ever

D - he told me he had never been

M - let me show you a couple of pictures and see if you recognize any of these people. do you recognize those two individuals?

D - no

M - you don't know them, how about these two individuals

D - that is Gino, but I don't know who the girl is, this most have been taken recently though

M - Why do you say that?

D - I recognize the suit that Gino has on, it just got that within a year

M - you don't know who the girl is. Are you sure that Gino lived in Bethesda

D - Gino would always just refer to it as outside of D.C. and then just recently he had been more specific where he was living and I know Gino has a housekeeper or somebody, because Patrick told me that Gino had somebody coming in and all the time watching his dog and watching the house for him and Gino didn't get along well with his neighbors as far as I know

S - why do you say that

D - because they always complained about where he parked his cars occasionally I guess he would drive the older cars home and he would want them right on the lawn close to the house and he told me several times when people would come over and try to fight with him he would tell them off and as far as I know he wasn't close to anybody down there, with exception of the man who owned the restaurant, I know he

M - he was close with this guy who owned the restaurant

D - Gino, always, not always, I know he rented some cars through the

34

S - Was it a social relationship too?

D - yes, I don't know for sure but it seemed like Jason would usually call the shots and Gino would usually Jason had more to say about the business

M - was there ever any indication as to who actually owned the business?

D - I took it that they were partners

M - Partners, 50 50. Did the name Stanley Tashoff ever arise?

D - Is that his lawyer?

M - yeah

D - yes

M - have you ever met his lawyer?

D - no

S - what contex did it come up in?

D - uh, problems with the place, the city would say he had to have such and such and he would contact Stanley

M - The 75 Lincoln, the white one I believe it was, do you recall seeing that one?

D - No, it wasn't white, one was beige and the other was silver, wasn't it.

M - silver, OK, the one with the tag number GINO

D - yes that was

M - which one did he bring back from California?

D - the beigh one, it was tan color, cream color interior was the one that he had driven back

S - that trailer that his truck was pulling, describe it for me so I know we are talking about the same trailer

D - its uh white and it has Horseless Carriage Carrier written on it

S - about how big is it?

D - I think it is an 18 wheeler, I'm not sure, but I think it is

M - we just came by his place of business and we saw this big tractor trailer parked in the back, without the tractor, does that belong to Gino?

35

D - he had two

M - he had two of them?

D - yeah

M - you don't know where the other one is?

D - did that one say Horseless Carriage Carrier on it?

M - no, this is a pretty big one it takes a tractor to pull an eight wheel

D - OK, this one, this is the one that I just told you about that I believe I saw last Monday night

S - did you get any impression at all, you must have had some impression because you said it wasn't Gino driving it so what kind of impression led you to believe it wasn't Gino?

D - the man in it didn't look like Gino

S - what did he look like?

D - I honestly can't tell you, I honestly can't

M - Does the name Bill Bogley ever come up in conversation, how about a name Ronald, Ronald Smisek? How about a guy by the name of Knohl?

M - Did Gino seem to be upset over the fact that he had three of these cars stolen?

D - no, not at all

M - he didn't?

D - no, that is why probably the reason he didn't mention it to me

S - he never mentioned it to you?

D - never, not once did he say anything about it. He was in an extremely good mood

S - Is Gino going with anybody now since you all have kind of

D - not that I know of, Gino is very set with me, I plan, uh and going to talk with him, but when he came here to pick me up that one time and take me out, he was very upset with me that I already had another date and you know he was in the bar and he tried to joke around with me and try to get me to come over sit with them and his brother mentioned going out to dinner together and I just made light of it and Gino was a little

36

D - upset over that.

M - how does, the name Louis Piccerelli every mean anything?
but does , you say Pat Sherman knows, worked for Gino and would know what went on at the shop if anything?

D - Patrick worked there, Patrick had lived there until a just about a month ago

S - why would he leave, did he ever elaborate on, just Gino had things on his mind, he never elaborated on it

D - no

M - did Gino ever mention going to Detroit?

D - no

M - he never mentioned that. He did say he went to California, do you recall where in California?

D - Los Angeles I think

M - you think?

D - uh, he also went to Florida, I forgot

M - do you know where in Florida

D - uh, Ft. Lauderdale

M - do you know where?

D - uh, no, and then he went to Clearwater

S - for what, do you know?

D - in this letter it says he going to look at a Rolls Royce, at least he said that is why he is going to Clearwater

M - do you know where in Florida he went

D - Ft. Lauderdale

M - Im sorry, I mean California

D - I can't remember, I thought it was Las Angeles. He even tried to convince me into going out there for a weekend

M - did Gino ever mention anything about having a brother that was in trouble with the law?

D - no Gino came from a very large family and he uh wasn't real close with anybody except his brother Joe was the impressions that I have gotten, he though the world of his brother Joe

(37)

M - how about a guy named Bob White? does that ring a bell

D - no

M - Can you think of anything else that would be of some help to us?

D - Not right off I can't

M - let me ask you a question, when you went out with Gino and Jason up in New York, where did you generally go?

D - Oh, I only went out with Jason and Gino one time in New York and that was to an Italian Restaurant, Jolies

M - Julies

D - Giollies, an Italian Restaurant, something like Giollies, Gino and Jason both liked the food there

S - Is it in the city?

D - No, it was, I honestly can't remember, it was run by an Italian family who I guess it has been in the family for years and they seemed to both go there.

S - The charm that he bought you for your braclet what type of charm was it?

D - A little car, a classic car

S - Where was it purchased, do you have any idea?

D - In a little jewelry store in Aberdeen somewhere.

M - Did he always make reference to us people from D.C. you mentioned something that he made reference to us people from D.C.

D - no, no, he always said he lived outside of D.C. and he uh, I always thought that he lived in D.C. up until one time when he got a traffic ticket last summer and when he pulled out a Maryland license, I said I thought you lived in D.C. and he said well I say D.C. but it is really Maryland

M - Did he ever talk about going down to West Virginia any?

D - no, he did go to Pittsburgh in June to give somebody a car, he was selling somebody something it was more like a package then he went you know to Pittsburg and he was going to bring it to here, they had it worked out, so I know Gino went to Pittsburgh in June

M - what time did he generally get into the shop if you know?

D - not until late, he wouldn't get in until 11 or 12, never early

M - and he usually left at a decent hour?

D - well it varied, sometimes he would leave at 6:00, sometimes at 7:00, sometimes he would stay until later on, depending on what he wanted to get done

S - is this the most recent letter you have?

D - uh, I believe so because I think after that after he went to Florida is when he went out to California and he didn't bother to write to me at all from California, he called me he never would write

S - When he called you did he call collect?

D - No, a lot of times he would call me person to person

M - he would call you at the restaurant

D - No, this was when I was in school

M - Oh, I see, at school

D - yes

M - Did you get the impression that he fouled around a lot with other women other than you

D - yeah

M- you did

M - was he a jealous type person? in your opinion

D - uh, average, he didn't like it when I went out with other people and he got upset when he would call up at school and I wasn't there, he always, he'd joke around, but he meant was he was joking around

M - did he ever give you any money for your schooling?

D - no

M - did he ever give you any money at all?

D - he offered to do a lot of things for me but I'm not the type person to take them

M - Like what did he offer you?

D - to put a phone in for me. He offered to get me a car, you

39

D - know used, I was trying to decide whether to come back down here again I didn't have a car and he told me that he would give me a car if I came down here

M - how about, you say, Pat lived there

D - yeah, upstairs

M- upstairs, do you have any idea, how long Pat lived there?

D - ever since I've known Gino he lived there

M - for at least two years then

D - well

M - two summers, that you know of

D - a year

M - a year, OK. Who drove the truck usually when there was something to be picked up?

D - Gino used to have drivers, but right now I think Gino was doing it himself, I'm not positive, but I think so

D - Jason's brother and Gino and this other man who will be at that car rental place, all ran around together, the three of them

M - Jason's brother, the guy that ran the car rental place

D - the one that Gino would come see at the car rental place, Gino, uh I was there twice with Gino at this car rental place and both times he was there, so I know he does something there

M - now, this is at the Baltimore-Washington International Airport

D - right and if you can't get ahold of that man

M - what does this man look like?

D - uh, he has glasses and he is dark hair, if you can't get him there I know another place where you would be able to find out some information, it's called the Tim Buck Two Bar somewhere in that area and that man goes there all the time, as a matter of fact Gino used to go there a lot with him

M - and they were good friends

D - you know the first time I met Gino the three of them were together, David and Sully and Gino were together

(40)

M - David

D - David, Sully and Gino were together, I think that is there

M- you think it is the man that owns it

D - right

M - but you think the person who owns the car rental place maybe Sully or something like that

D - No there is three, David is one person and Sully is another person

M - that runs the place

D - right and it is either David or Sully, I always got the two of them mixed up because whenever Gino would talk about them there and I couldn't keep them straight

M - Well, the reason we asked you if you had any inclination that Gino was married is because he was

D - I thought that he, he had been because, well, last year there would be note on his desk saying, you know, he had gotten a phone call from what was her name Carol

M - uh huh

D - Carol, OK, and uh I didn't want to say anything you know about it to Gino and he suspected that I suspected something and he got real, very upset with me and we argued over it and it is something I didn't want to know either way because I just didn't, I didn't want to no and Gino was real upset that night

S - does that, knowing that he was married does that explain the secret about it, about his business and everything or do you still feel there is something that there is something of a mystery about it

D - I still feel there

S - because you did suspect at the time

M - It isn't that he was married, up until he died he had a wife

D - uh huh

M - OK, I just wanted to make that clear. This is a very mysterious situation and we are trying to get to the bottom of it all and ther is only one way of doing it and that is to talk to people that were associated with him and like I say you have cleared up some questions for us, but if there is anything else that you

M - can think of that would be of any help to us, to aid us we would appreciate it. We would like to get to the bottom of it

S - Because this has happened so quickly, it is hard for us to keep it in our mind, the garble that Tinker wrote down. Do you know the relationship there, Tinker

D - no

S - There is, there was something in addition to that, that bothered you, that bothered you sister

D - my sister, I made mention to my boss, I don't know if you talked to him or not

M - up at the restaurant

D - yeah

M - yeah, we talked to him

D - but, I thought no it's best to keep that to myself, but I just discussed it with my sister that I suspect that

M - the one time that you went to New York, did you drive up

D - yeah we drove up in a rented car

M - in a rented car from where?

D - I don't know, he picked me up, he picked me up in the car

M - why a rented car

D - cause we were driving back in a 1940 Ford, Jason had bought it and it was in Jason's garage

M - how long ago was this?

D - this was last July, probably July

M - did he ever give you any explanation why he wasn't upset about having these three cars stolen from

D - no, when he came out on Monday, he didn't even mention it. If it wasn't for somebody reading the paper and they came in they made a comment about it and I said you're kidding I wonder why he didn't mention it, cause they came in on Wednesday and he was in on Monday and the cars were stolen on Friday, Monday and Wednesday and I said you're kidding he was just in here and he didn't make mention of that to me and I was surprised he didn't say something you know cause something like that you

(42)

D - would think somebody would mention. I was very surprised to find out that he had had cars stolen

M - but Sherman wasn't working there

D - no, but Patrick was back, uh, Patrick was in Sunday night. Patrick and Gino came in on Monday

M - the cars were stolen that weekend, right

D - on Friday

M - the weekend prior to that

D - right, like the cars were stolen I believe on Friday, or Thursday night weren't they

S - Thursday night or Friday Night

D - OK, so Thursday or Friday they were stolen and then it was Sunday Patrick came in and Monday was when Gino and Patrick and his brother and sister-in-law came in

S - so, did Patrick say anything about it

D - no

S - you don't know where Patrick was staying

D - Patrick had been in the hospital

S - which hospital was he in?

D - it must have been Northern Virginia

M - do you know what for?

D - I can't remember what he told me, I asked Gino why he didn't mention it to me and he said that when you asked how Patrick was, I said fine and he was fine, I said why didn't you tell me that he was in the hospital and Gino just made a joke out of it, just because he was in the hospital he was still doing fine and that is the way he passed it off. I thought that was kind of odd that Gino wouldn't tell me that Patrick was in the hospital

M - Well, OK, this concludes the interview, the time is 1715 hours

(43)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RE#~~ OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
08-10-76	The following hospitals were checked for a Patrick Sherman in July 1976 with negative results: Montgomery General Hospital Arlington Hospital Fairfax Hospital Jefferson Memorial Hospital
08-10-76	A check with M.V.A. indicated the following vehicles registered to Gino Carrafa: 1964 Harley-Davidson M.C. Md. 54900 1968 Lincoln, Md. GINO I 1975 Lincoln, Md. GINO 1969 Rolls Royce 1930 Lincoln 1958 Cadillac Convertible 1976 Chevrolet Stationwagon, Md. EPP 200
08-10-76	The only vehicle registered to Gino's Classic Cars is a 1969 International D.S., Md. FA 4254

PAGE# ____________

(44)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XVXI/RMXX OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-11-76 Telephone call from Lt. Juliano, NYCPD, reveals the following:

CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION

NOT TO BE RELEASED

I. Carrafa's body was found with the following weights:

1. round 15 lb. anchors, mushroom types, blue in color, "Zurn"; price $13.50 on same with magic marker
2. 10 foot of 1/4" anchor chain, marked "Italy"
3. Two (2) 1/4" shackles, marked LVS
4. Brass padlock, 2 1/2", marked A

A is Advanced Affiliates Lock Co.

II. CARRAFA rented a truck from Stephanie Truck Co. (ph) on 07-21-76 for a trip to Chicago.

III. Reference CARRAFA'S state of decomposition:

a. hair separated from head (slippage)
b. skin slippage on hands
c. legs drawn up in fetal position, knees bent in rigor mortis
d. superficial laceration on forehead
e. observation: this state of decomposition not typical of being immersed in water for the limited time period indicated. This state of decomposition would be more appropriate of a body exposed to heat and humidity prior to being immersed in water.
f. cause of death asphyxiation; manner of death ligature strangulation; type of death is murder
g. the point that CARRAFA'S body survaced is a straight line from Jay Knohl's residence; and according to tide tables the surfacing is compatible to a disposition of the body from Knohl's - waterfront residence.

PAGE#

(85)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XX/RX# OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

According to Lt. Juliano, Robert White is a W/M, 6', 200, 07-18-38, Md. driver's license # W-300-745-000-567 T. Check with MVA confirms same and reveals that White's address is also listed as 17929 Archwood Way, Olney, Md. (David Knohl's residence). White's license was issued 07-09-76 and same expires 07-18-78.

CARRAFA'S body contained the following papers:

1. Bill dated 4/76, Cartiers (ph.) Jewelers, for a chain and pendant - $2,850.00.
2. Commercial & Savings Bank of Bel Air bank deposit slip
3. Carbon of a Treasurer's check drawn on the Fredericktowne Bank and Trust Co., to Eugene CARRAFA, dated 04-14-75, #31209, for $14,872.12

At time of Jay Knohl's arrest in New York, he had in his possession the Maryland Dealers License for Gino's Classical Cars.

Surveillance of David Knohl's residence at 2200 hours, 08-10-76, revealed a white vehicle in the driveway with D.C. tags TRP 016, assumed to be transporter tags. Listing reveals same are 75 Dealer tags to National Auto Wholesale Brokers, Washington, D.C.

Contact with Sgt. Skelton, Long Beach, California P.D., Auto Squad, reveals that CARRAFA called the following numbers in Southern California from the Holiday Inn in March 1976:

(213) 464-0563
" 465-8461
" 343-7332
" 822-4642
" 826-0016
" 626-9111

CARRAFA was supposed to pick up a car from one Donald W. Babb, 2620 West Avenue M-8, Antelope Valley, California 93534, (805) 947-5460. The name Harry Andrews also came up reference the theft while CARRAFA was there of Babbs 30 or 31 Cadillac. More information to follow.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Check with MSO reveals that they received a request from NYCPD on 08-04-75, 2150 hours, file 25, #23968 for further identification marks, etc., on CARRAFA. On 08-05-76, a Maryland State Trooper was dispatched to CARRAFA's residence at 0844, arrived 0903, and cleared call at 1126 hours. This would have been the first notification that Mrs. Carrafa received relative to CARRAFA'S death.

On 08-05-76, David Knohls, Jay Knohl's brother, at 1430 hours told Bill Bogley, in Bish Thompsons Restaurant, about CARRAFA'S death and method of same. Check will be made as to who, and when, Mrs. CARRAFA notified that day.

Check with National Auto Brokers Wholesale Inc. reveals that Lawrence Luxenberg has been gone from the firm for 2 to 2 1/2 years. Luxenberg can be reached at Car Wholesalers, 726-1208.

Highly reliable source reports the following:

REF: Romano's Funeral Home
3254 White Plains Rd.
Bronx, New York
(212) 547-7799

Same is used for funerals by members of the Genovese family. 1962 Louis "Babe" Milo wake held there and in 1975 Joseph Milo wake held there. Both Milo's LCN figures. Romano's funeral home was formerly very small but it is now a large firm and same is allegedly backed by Gaetano Somma, LCN Genovese family. Somma's proteges, who have been arrested with him are his brother-in-law Carlo Passarelli and Nicholas Romano - son of the owner of the funeral home.

Somma also used the aliases Guy Kaye and Thomas Kaye. An infamous team in the Bronx "Kaye & Aldo" are familiar to Bronx officers. Aldo is Aldo Mazzaratti (ph.) or Mazzorotti (ph.) A complaint was made by a woman to a N.Y. law enforcement agency, last year, that her husband was in debt to two Shylocks from Romano's funeral home - Aldo & Kaye.

The Pisano at 820 E. 214th Street, Bronx, N.Y. (212) 654-2503 is Joseph Pisano. Possibility exists that this is

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Joseph James Pisano, AKA Pisani, ~~FBI #B135851~~, NYCPD B#135851. If so, this Pisano is formerly of the Old East Side gang that was run by Thomas (3 fingers brown) Luchese (deceased); and Luchese's replacement is Carmen Tramunti, LCN, New York. Pisano is now into gambling, and it is noted that NYCPD O/C files were checked reference Romano's Funeral Home, and they report a gambling case in file reference Romano's. Details to follow.

N.Y.S.P., Manhatten, advises that their files reveal a Joseph J. Pisano, NYCPD B#118162 and a Joseph Pisano, NYCPD B#351099. Joseph J. Pisano had a telephone number of 726-1657. Both Pisano's use the nickname "Pepe". Joseph J. Pisano was a "hit man" for Albert Anastasia - Murder, Inc.

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~V-I/RD#~~ OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
08-11-76	MCP, OCR File 73-675 reflects that on 01-28-75 Special Agent Sid Roache, F.B.I. requested a records check on the DiMaio Brothers, Inc. Agent Roache had, allegedly, received an Airtel inquiry from the N.Y. office of the F.B.I. that said that the brother of Joseph Columbo's consigliere, Theodore Neil Persico, had called the DiMaio brothers long distance within the past three months. The brother of Theodore Persico is Alphonse Persico and he is a known associate of the Columbo family. Theodore Persico's NYCPD B#532242. Sal DiMaio resides at 4515 Great Oak Road, Norbeck, Maryland (301) 460-5529.
08-12-76	Det. Swain advises that NYCPD can put CARRAFA, Jay Knohls and Bob White on Knohl's front lawn on 07-28-76.
B#, 35851 →	N.Y.C.P.D. O/C section advises that the Joseph Pisano, W/M, 10-06-12, FBI # 962956 of 820 E. 214th Street, Bronx, N.Y. is a known gambler and LCN figure. Romano's Funeral Home has definitely been identified as a meeting place for O/C figures of the Genovese family. ?
	It was further learned that the F.B.I., New York, has been taking surveillance photographs at Knohl's residence.
	Reference Robert White, W/M, 07-18-38, NYCPD O/C advised that he has been in and out of mental hospitals three times and his rap sheet included bank robbery (twice), Assault (twice) and receiving stolen property. White cannot be found at this time.
	*Lt. J. Roby and Cpl. W. Thieman, Homicide/Sex Squad have been completely apprised of this case.
	F.B.I. Special Agent Sullivan, Silver Spring Regional Office, apprised, generally, of this case.
	Though probably unrelated, one Joseph Odano, LCN figure, was found shot to death in the cloakroom of a bar on 08-11-76.
	Telephone interview with Det. Dick Wolf, Dade County Department of Public Safety, Homicide, (305) 547-7456 reveals that the late John Roselli called the following numbers from

PAGE= ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXX/BXXX OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

his brother-in-law's residence:

1. (301) 299-2357 calls made 4/11, 4/12, 3/27, 5/20, 5/9, 5/13	Leslie Scherr W/M, 04-17-38, 5'9", 160 lbs. 9808 Wilden Lane Potomac, Md. Md. Lic.# S-600-511-012-298 Vehicles: 69 Ply., 4 dr., GXZ 350 74 Toyota S/W DBY 116
2. (301) 453-3479 12/75	
3. (202) 338-5989	
4. (202) 387-4887 or (202) 887-4887	
5. (202) 833-3939	Margolius Davis Shefferman Finkelstein & Karlin, Attys. 1120 Conn. Ave., N.W. Washington, D.C.
6. (201) 679-2341	
7. (201) 247-7552	
8. (617) 426-2203 (two calls)	
9. (312) 943-1155	
10. (201) 679-2341	
11. (201) 879-6335	
12. (202) 243-8090	

Reference Aldo Mazzarati and Gaetano Somma, both identified as soldiers in the Vincent Alo regime of the Genovese family. Charles Tourine, Sr. identified as a soldier in the Richard Boiardi regime - Genovese family.

Reference Roselli homicide, source in Ft. Lauderdale stated that a "hit" man from Chicago name Whitehall or Whitehouse was in the Ft. Lauderdale area.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXX# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-12-76 Summons served at Commercial and Savings Bank, Bel Air, Maryland, 21014 for records pertaining to the account of Gino's Classic Cars, Inc., account #0300-0320. Documents received show a balance of $684.00 in the checking account as of 08-05-76. Photocopies of the transactions pertaining to this account dating back to 06-25-75 will be made a part of the file. Additionally, bank records reflect a mortgage loan of $35,000 for Gino's Classic Cars, Inc. The date of the loan is 10-27-75. The monies was held in escrow for payment on the showroom which was added onto the building. The loan is for one year - ten years payout and matures on 12-1-76. The balance on the loan as of 07-06-76 is $33,773.64. Monthly payment of $462.53. Documents concerning the loan reflect Eugene Carrafa as president and Jay G. Knohl as vice-president and treasurer of Gino's Classic Cars. Knohl gave as his home address 17929 Archwood Way, Olney, Maryland 20832, which is where his brother David resides.

Information received that Gino, Larry Lacy and Pat Shurman always hung around together. Lacy is employed at National Car Rental, Baltimore-Washington airport, phone 761-8860.

Information received a subject with a first name of Mike, AKA "The Big Dude" brought used cars to Gino's place when Gino first opened for business. The cars would stay at the shop for two to three days and then moved out. Mike is described as a W/M, 6'6", 35 years, about 260 lbs. Mike's father is suppose to own a Ford dealership in Bethesda.

The sixteen year old employee at Gino's is believed to be Jack Chilcoat, Pamela Drive, Abington, Maryland, no phone number available.

Barbara Bradley, 3807 Washington Avenue, Abington, Maryland worked four months as a secretary for Gino. She wasn't allowed to answer the phone or look at the company books. During her time of employment she typed only one business letter.

PAGE# ______

㉛

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXD# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Wendel Clayson, 73 Dixon Avenue, Aberdeen, Maryland, phone 301-272-3145 and Wayne Ratcliff, employed at Greir Chevrolet, Stewartstown, Pennsylvania, rented the rear portion of Gino's building for a short period of time. They did body work and operated under the business name of W & W Body Shop. Allegedly they did some work for Gino. Although unconfirmed, information has been received that Clayson stated Gino always talked about being a hit man.

Ben Addison, the owner of J & J Furniture Refinishing, located next door to Gino's, advised on Monday 8-2-76 he observed three subjects in Gino's building. They had the door opened and acted as if they belonged there. They loaded some cars on the trailer which was being pulled by the brown International truck owned by Gino. The trailer had "Horseless Carriage Carrier" written on the side. Two White males left Gino's in the truck and a black male followed them operating an antique car.

On 08-13-76 Doris Duafala, Gino's girlfriend, was questioned about whether she observed a vehicle following the truck the day (Monday) she saw it traveling East on Route #40. She stated she believed she saw a black guy operating an antique car following the truck, but she is not real certain. She further added that Gino had no black people working for him. He hated black people because one was suppose to have shot him accidently in the arm while in the Marines.

According to information received Gino was not seen at the business very often. The place was not open all the time. Up until a couple of months ago a person by the name of Pat acted as a watchman. At the beginning of the year Gino use to spend more time at the shop working. Lately more expensive cars would be in the shop. Carrafa seemed to be a nice guy. He wasn't a flashy dresser. He usually was in work clothes. He didn't seem to be the drinking type. He was friendly, but not too close.

Sgt. S. Michaleski

PAGE#

52

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~[illegible]~~ OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE — OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-12-76 Call made by Roselli to Boston (617) 426-2203 to Braswell Shipyard, 300 Northern Avenue, Boston, Mass.

Lt. Juliano advises that the telephone book found on CARRAFA contained the following:

Harry Romano	(212)	445-0827/work HI 9-4088
Pete Gaeta	(212)	377-4668
Frank Gaeta	(201)	264-7508
Shoe		683-0287
Shoe (Bar)		282-8387
	(305)	781-9340
	(305)	785-1990

Reference Roselli's calls to the following numbers:

(301) 453-3479	Joseph Shiman Kitzmiller, Md.
(202) 338-5989	F.B. Black 2700 Virginia Avenue, N.W. Apt. 109 Washington, D.C.
(202) 387-4887	Mrs. N. Black 2426 Tracey Pl., N.W. c/o F.B. Black 2700 Virginia Ave., N.W. Apt. 109 Washington, D.C.

Fort Lauderdale P.D. Intelligence advises that (305) 781-9340 listed to Lowry W. Davis, Earl Faircloth, and Dennis Rogers, Attorneys-at-law, 950 N. Federal Highway, Pompano Beach, Fla.

(305) 785-1990 is a private line to Earl Faircloth, same address as above.

Lt. Juliano advises that Jay Knohl's is out on $150,000.00 bail. Housekeeper seen leaving in vehicle followed by another vehicle with two males in same.

Fort Lauderdale advised that one Jack Adler, from Chicago, is the "paper" owner of "The Three of Us" in Ft. Lauderdale.

PAGE# ____________

(53)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXX/XX# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
8-12-76	0900 hours, interview with Mrs. Schurman, wife of Patrick Schurman. Mrs. Schurman states that she last saw her husband on Tuesday evening of this week, which would be the 10th. At that time her husband attempted to speak to her and stated to her that he knew why and who Gino Carrafa was murdered. She has extremely poor relations with her husband and stated that she did not wish to discuss it with him, she did not want to know anything about the situation. Mrs. Schurman stated that the last time she saw Gino frequently or on a regular basis was approximately eight years ago; now she would only see him occasionally and does not consider him to be a friend. She does not know anything about the business other than the fact it was Gino's Classic Cars, and it dealt in antique automobiles. Mrs. Schurman was given the investigators name and telephone number and advised to contact him any time that she heard from her husband, so that we might interview him. She further stated that she expected to see him sometime in the near future as he was going to return some property to her that he allegedly stole from her residence. She also stated that in her last conversation with him she was advised by him that he had intentions of attending the funeral of Gino Carrafa in Connecticut, and further that as far as she knew he was sleeping in his car because he didn't have any money and on Tuesday evening he was at the California Inn on Route #1, Laurel, Maryland, which would have been 8-10-76. Cpl. R. W. Swain
8-12-76	Interview with bartender at California Inn, conducted on 8-12-76 at 1215 hours. She advises that Patrick Schurman was in there on the evening of the 10th, and he may have been in on the evening of the 11th, but she didn't work. He usually comes in approximately 3:00 in the afternoon with a group of other guys and plays the machines. The bartender advised to contact the investigator if she sees the subject. Cpl. R. W. Swain

PAGE#

㉞

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXX# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
8-13-76	Sgt. Ed Abair phone 224-4240, Detroit Michigan Organized Section, advises that Louis Peterelli is not indexed in their files concerning organized crime, however Warren, Michigan, where Peterelli's actual address is, advised them that in 1974 Peterelli was the victim of a robbery, Warren Michigan case number 74-5432. At that time Louis Peterelli was manager of the Anthony House in Warren, Michigan, whose address is 24300 Hoover Street, Warren, Michigan. The Anthony House in Warren, Michigan is considered to be an organized crime hangout by Warren Michigan P.D. Sgt. Abair further advised that when Cpl. Swain mentioned Fran O'Brien as being one of the owners of the Anthony House, he mentioned the fact that Fran O'Brien and Patrick Burke were both arrested in a major gambling raid that they had called the Carrollton House Case. Also arrested along with Fran O'Brien and Patrick Burke were Jackalone himself and members of his LCN family. Also arrested in that gambling raid was Tom Johnson who shows up in the corporate papers of Anthony House in D.C. Reference should also be made to OCR number 6-30, the Italian Fisherman file. Cpl. R. W. Swain
8-13-76	Dallas City Intelligence Section was contacted by the investigator for criminal records checks on Eugene Carrafa, David Paul Knohl, Louis Anthony Peterelli and J. G. Knohl. While the file was being checked, Dallas City Intelligence advised that Sam Giacana in a hospital, just prior to going to Chicago, where he was murdered. They felt that he might be in the hospital in Houston to attempt to contact the Marcello's of New Orleans, a known LCN family. However they are reasonably certain that he did not in fact make contact. Cpl. R. W. Swain

PAGE# ____________

55

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XX/XXX# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
8-13-76	Sgt. Bracken of N.Y.C.P.D. relates that Jay Knohl's housekeeper has returned and Jay Knohl himself is back at the house. Cpl. R. W. Swain
8-17-76	Mr. John Smith of Mountville Road, Adamstown, Maryland, contacted the investigator by telephone and advised that he was working for Fraley Supplies when Gino Carrafa had a classic car business across the street from him on Taft Street in Rockville. This is approximately 18 months ago. Mr. Smith's home phone is 874-2020, his work phone is 662-2323. Mr. Smith stated that Gino would transport large numbers of cars in and out of his bay area. They cars may come in in the morning, there would be a flurry of activity and they would go back out that same evening. Upon reading newspaper accounts, he felt this was unusual. Cpl. R. W. Swain

PAGE# ____________

36

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXXXXXX OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-13-76 According to source F. B. Black, 2700 Virginia Avenue, N.W., The Watergate, is the Fred B. Black, Jr. noted by the Justice Dept. as an O/C figure with high contacts.

It was further learned that John Roselli has given secret testimony to the Senate subcommittee and one Mario Kolhy, a subject with high O/C connections, recently testified before the same committee. It is speculated that the questions asked by the subcommittee may have indicated what the committee knew, and consequently, who gave them that information - namely, Roselli.

It was further leanred that retired - Washington, D.C. Police Inspector Joseph Shiman met with John Roseli and Salvatore (Sam) Giancana in a hotel on New York Avenue, Washington, D.C., shortly before Giancana was murdered. It is noted that Roselli's long distance toll records reveal that he called Joseph Shiman at (301) 453-3479. Writer called this number and asked for Inspector Shiman, and a woman said, "yes, hold on please." Another source speculates that Inspector Shiman Washington, D.C. Police's liason with the C.I.A.

Another source reveals that F.B.I. Chicago - this is unconfirmed - has photographs of Knohl and/or CARRAFA at Giancana's home last year.

Pat Sherman, AKA Nutsy, missed court today in Upper Marlboro, Md. Sherman is the subject that worked for CARRAFA whom Knohl told CARRAFA to get rid of.

NYCPD O/C also advises that Michael Rizzitello, LCN, formerly of the lat Joe Gallo mob, met with Roselli in California last year.

Lt. Garret Kerwin, MPD, advises that Inspector Shiman was the best electronic surveillance man in the Department, he was "dirty", and his phone book contained the new and old telephone numbers of Sam Giancana. Shiman's notebook also had Mike Grasso's name and telephone number. Mike Grasso is Angelo Bruno's - LCN Philadelphia - nephew; and he now resides in Florida and Santo Trafficante, Jr. is his godfather.

It is further noted that Fred Black was a Capital Hill lobby involved with Bobby Baker and the late President Lydon Baines

PAGE# ________

67

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~V-I/RD#~~ OCR #6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, EUGENE MICHAEL

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Johnson. Black is also a known associate of Joseph Francis Nesline and Charles Tourine.

Leslie Scherr identified as a D.C. attorney with offices in the Bender Building. The owner of the building is Stanley Bender, a known organized crime figure in Washington, D.C.

Following information received from F.B.I.

1. David Paul Knohl
   W/M, 07-10-42
   brother of Jay Knohl arrested 03-29-63 for breaking and entering and larceny

2. Louis Anthony Piccerelli
   W/M, 05-04-39
   FBI # 433 336 D
   4 arrests

3. Jay G. Knohl
   FBI # 198 492 E
   18 arrests starting on 03-31-56, Miami

Roselli also called the following numbers:

(617) 665-4207	Mass.
(617) 287-9100	Mass.
(507) 282-2581	
(317) 253-9003	
(212) 628-4237	NYC
(602) 385-4597	Ariz.
(702) 735-9546	Nev.

PAGE# ____________

58

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXXX# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-13-78 Anonymous source relates that a reporter named Dick Carlson, San Diego, California, reports that Carrafa met with John Roselli on the East Coast this year. Source could elaborate no further.

Female called Frederick Post newspaper and stated that Sherman was staying with Bill Bogley.

Boston P.D. O/C advises that the numbers called by Roselli are as follows:

(617) 665-4207
Richard Mascaritolo
5 Kenmore Road,
Melrose, Mass.

(617) 287-9100
Chalet Susse Motor Lodge
800 Morrissey Blvd.,
Boston, Mass.

O/C files reveal nothing on the above two subscribers.

Interview with source, B.B., reveals that Sherman stated that Jay Knohl came down to Maryland, unknown when, and picked up the trailer.

Tashoff's secretary called and stated that Sherman wants to meet with us today.

Learned that David Knohl's mother was flying up from Florida on Saturday, 8-14-76, to talk to David Knohl about this incident.

Call of Roselli's to Arizona is as follows:

(602) 385-4597
Kent and Judy Brunson
510 San Carlos
San Manuel, Arizona
Kent Brunson, W/M, 12-18-41
formerly of Utah

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Rhode Island State Police report negative on Knohls boys, Carrafa boys, and Louis A. Piccerelli.

C & P notes telephone number of the Maryland Hotel is (312) 664-8600.

It was learned that Caraffa called the following numbers from the Holiday Inn while in California:

(213) 464-0563
(213) 465-8461
(213) 343-7332
(213) 822-4642
(213) 826-0016
(213) 626-9111

Source advises that Tashoff is into Classic cars, and in the winter of 75/76 he went skiing in New York with one of the clients.

Information received from highly reliable source (CS) that Fred Black from his address of 2426 Tracey Place, N.W., called the following numbers on the following dates:

(213) 274-7777 on 12-26-75 - Beverly Hills, Ca.
(507) 282-2581 on 03-01-76 - Rochester, Minn.

Roselli called (213) 274-7777 on 05-23-76, and he called (507) 282-2581 on 05-14-76.

Source in California advises that (213) 274-7777 is the Beverly Hilton Hotel, 9876 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California. LAPD will check guest registers for both dates indicated.

Interview with Conrad Joe Bliffin, brother of deceased Janice Mae Piccerelli, 2000 - 2300, 08-16-76, revealed the following:

1. Three years ago Janice came back to Maryland and told her brother that she had to leave Chicago as people were looking for her. She moved into the Country

60

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXX/RD # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Club Apartments in Glen Burnie, Maryland, and one night she answered her door and was stabbed in the face and chest.

2. A friend of Janice's, known as the "Little Corporal" and Frankie, a rackets figure was shot and is believed to be dead.

3. Bliffin last talked to Janice on 06-30-76 by telephone.

4. Janice worked at the Millionaires Club and she had a workman's compensation claim for $49,500.

5. Bliffin stated that when he went in Janice's hotel room he found that all of her possessions were laying on the bed, pictures were torn out of an album, and parts of pages were torn out of her address book. Though a three pack a day chain smoker, all three ash trays in the room were empty; and there was no drinking glass in the room.

6. Lou and Janice Piccerelli use to live in Fort Lauderdale and D.C.

7. Louis Piccerelli told Bliffin that he had just returned from Florida when he found out about Janice.

8. At the funeral home, Bliffin's sister told him that when she hugged Lou she felt a gun in a shoulder holster.

9. On July 25th Lou was suppose to come to the funeral home but Carrafa called Bliffin and stated that Lou could not get a flight out of Chicago.

10. Janice's telephone number was (312) 664-8600.

11. Janice's father Melvin E. Bliffen, 2340 Research Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, is involved in the rackets.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXXX # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

12. On the 27th or 28th of July Piccerelli's mother called Bliffin as she was attempting to ascertain his whereabouts.

13. At the Cemetery on the 26th of July Lou, Gino, and a woman arrived in a blue Continental, with blue or black vinyl roof and telephone equipped - three antenna on trunk deck - and Bliffin believes that another male subject stayed in the car.

14. Piccerelli, Carrafa, and a subject named Johnny Calotta (ph.) were in the service together and Calotta is in the rackets in D. C.

15. Louis Piccerelli formerly owned the "Skipjack" bar in Deale, Maryland.

16. Six (6) months ago Janice was in Phoenix, Arizona relative to the opening of a Millionaires Club there.

17. About three years ago Bliffin got drunk and was arrested in the 2nd District, D.C. Following a call to Piccerelli a watch commander arrived and C. J. Bliffin was released without charges.

18. Janice Mae Piccerelli's social security #218-36-5140.

19. Janice's sister is Eileen Hafner (301) 974-0671.

FBI rap sheet received on Robert Ernest White, W/M, 07-18-38; FBI #247 D; and same notes LKA (1968) 502 Azalea Drive, Rockville, Maryland.

Davenport of Anaheim advises that LAPD O/C Investigator Bob McGuire has ascertained that John Roselli stayed at the Beverly Hilton on the following dates:

1-18-76 through 2-10-76
5-24-76 through 6-2-76
6-17-76 one day

PAGE# ____________

62

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VIVRD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Dick Carlson, Channel 8, San Diego, California (714) 232-2114 heard a rumor - unknown where - that Carrafa met Roselli in Chicago.

Chicago Intelligence reports that (312) 943-1155, is listed to Louis J. Lederer, 860 N. Lake Shore Drive, Chicago, Ill.

Telephone numbers found in Janice M. Piccerelli's telephone book (312) 321-0110 with notation Little Corporal listed to Little Corporal Restaurant, Chicago, Illinois. Name Ruggles (312) 642-3353 unlisted.

Interview with Pat "Nutsy" Sherman on 08-17-76 reveals the following (see interview):

1. "Lou's wife Janice was murdered because she witnessed a murder."
2. Jay is a "lay-off" man.
3. When asked if he knew Joe Nesline, he said yeah, he reports to Tourine.

Diners Club card #2308 2204 1, exp. 12-71 issued to Frank J. Nenning found behind J. Piccerelli's Riggs National Bank checkbook. NCIC check negative.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

63

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: Eugene Michael Carrafa

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
08-16-76	Doris Duafano telephoned the investigator and advised that she had had contact on Saturday and Sunday, the 14th and 15th of August, with Patrick Schurman. Patrick Schurman told her that Jason Knohl was responsible for the death of Gino Carrafa and Bob White was the individual who physically carried out the murder. Patrick Schurman further stated that the motive behind the murder was for money, and that Knohl will get approximately one million dollars as a result of Gino Carrafa's death. Doris Duafano stated that at approximately 0100 hours on 08-16-76 Trooper Burns of the Maryland State Police met with her and Patrick Schurman. Patrick Schurman declined to speak to him and Trooper Burns gave him his card. Further Doris Duafano stated that on August 15, 1976 there were three cars in the showroom of Gino's Classic Cars. Patrick Schurman believed one of them to be a Cadillac. Patrick Schurman is allegedly operating a dark grey or blue 1967 or 1968 Chevolet with Maryland registration possibly PK- 18-. Doris Duafano will try to convince Patrick Schurman to speak to the investigator.
08-16-76	Diane Schurman, estranged wife of Patrick Schurman, contacted the investigator and said that Patrick Schurman had been in touch with her and told her that he had spoken to a cousin or brother of Gino who is a policeman in Connecticut and told him everything. Diane Schurman stated that she would attempt to have Patrick Schurman contact the investigator.

Cpl. R. W. Swain, Jr.

PAGE#

(64)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

8-18-76

Carollo -
mt

NYPD O/C advises that (212) 628-4237 (called by Roselli) is to N. Czar, 200 E. 71st Street, Manhattan, New York. Check of their files negative.

NYPD already knew of White's Rockville address, and they are still attempting to locate him.

Reporter named Miller, Channel 5, N.Y.C., has apprised NYPD O/C and Homicide that Carrafa was a "hit man" in Florida. Santoro, N.Y.P.D., checked same with Florida.

Carrafa's daughter advises that her father lived in D.C. prior to Montgomery County, as did her mother; and her father was stationed at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina at one time.

Telephone call from Mrs. Carrafa wherein she related that Gino Carrafa came to the Washington area from Connecticut. Carrafa served in the Marine Corps at Lejeune, N.C., New York, Newfoundland, and Quantico, Virginia.

Check of realtor listing 502 Azalea Drive, reveals same being sold by a Mrs. Shim, and a check with her reveals that she owned the property since 1971, and prior to that it was a rental property of Shannon and Luchs Realtors.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

08-19-76

Writer interviewed Guy William Holcomb, Jr., 9913 LaDuke Drive, Kensington, Maryland, 949-2803, and 588-4710, at Kensington Motor Sales as Carrafa's toll records reveal that he called Holcomb on 02-28-76 on Holcomb's mobile-automobile-telephone of (202) 665-0576. Holcomb, a former D.C. narcotic officer for eight years, stated that he has not talked to Carrafa in almost two years. Holcomb advised writer to contact Tommy Van Veen and Paul Fulford as both knew Carrafa. It is noted that Holcomb has a green 69 Lincoln, Md. dealer registration D32083 with a mobile telephone.

Writer contacted Fulford at Fulford's T.V., Old Georgetown Road, Bethesda; however he could add nothing further.

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
Carlee mt	Writer unable to locate Van Veen, and check of MCP records reveal that he is Thomas Newell Van Veen, W/M, 12-18-27, MCP ID #7411 - one arrest for disorderly on 03-18-56.
	Reference Holcomb, Lt. G. Kerwin, D.C. Intelligence, advises that he always ran with gamblers and had a large amoutn of money. Holcomb was recently involved in the GEICO Insurance Co. scandal wherein GEICO was paying off on vehicles that were repossessed as opposed to being stolen.
	MCP OCR File 73-900 reveals that a transcript dated Feb. 12, 1965 by Shelda Lilienfield, former girlfriend of Joseph Francis Nesline, states that Guy Holcomb, a policeman, dated Betty Moretti, AKA Betty Miller, and Moretti was her, Lilienfield's, former roommate.
	Cpl. M. F. Alban
08-20-76	Information received from NYPD O/C, McKevitt, that two subjects in a red Continental, Maryland registration unknown, have picked up Knohl's housekeeper and Knohl's girlfriend recently.
	Reference the 54 Mercedes reported purchased from Dorothy Chapnick, 345 Rockaway Avenue, Valleystream, New York, and reported stolen from Gino's Classic Cars, McKevitt reports that New York MVA notes a David White at that address. David White has the same DOB, height, and weight of Robert White and probably is the same person. David White is listed as owning a '63 Mercedes, and his telephone number is (516) 561-5514.
	Reference the '35 Packard and '31 Cadillac allegedly owned by Mack F. Staton, 114-40 180th, St. Albans, New York MVA notes he also owns two '73 Chevrolet Suburbans; and McKevitt notes that this address is in an all Negro neighborhood. MVA check on Mack Staton, reference his driver's license, notes that Staton carries the following address on his license - 111-31 200th Street, Hollis, New York, a Negro neighborhood.

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

ocr
~~V-I/RR~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
Carded - mT	NYPD notes that the Brooklyn DA's office notes that Soto's Grocery, 630 Blake, Brooklyn, New York posted $90,000 of Knohl's bond.
	Gino's Classic Cars tolls reveal three calls on 07-06-76 to (202) 393-4200. This number is L. E. Harris Insurance Agency, 1511 "K" Street, N.W., Washington, D. C.
	Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/BD#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-23-76 Calls made by Carrafa while in California were to the following:

Carollo -
MT

(213) 464-0563 (changed to 213 651-5870)

Jean La Fitte
8500 Wilshire Blvd., #825
Los Angeles, Calif.

(213) 465-8461 (non pub)
Jack Guiragossian
5527 Barton Ave., #3,
Los Angeles, Calif.

(213) 343-7332
Thomas L. Powels
6933 Yolanda Ave.,
Reseda, Calif.

(213) 822-4642 (non pub)
Summer Wind
4676 Admiralty Way, #406,
Marina Del Rey, Calif.

(213) 826-0016
F. B. Van Grove
1325 Amherst Ave., #8,
Los Angeles, Calif.

(213) 626-9111
New York Life Insu. Co.
8500 Wilshire Blvd.,
Los Angeles, Calif.

Calls made by Roselli to California as follows:

(213) 274-9165 (non pub)
Gary Crosby
1856 Loma Vista Dr.,
Beverly Hills, Calif.

(213) 273-3838
Doheney Towers Office
838 N. Doheney Dr.,
Los Angeles, Calif.

PAGE#

(68)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/ID~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Names noted in Janice Mae Piccerelli's personal telephone book are as follows:

Cardell
mt

George Conglis
Jimmy Feinades
Philima
Vincent U. Giglio Jersey City
George Dakis
Vincent Gesunouia
John Guerrero
Pete Lagonas
Nick Kolaras
Alex Papps
Pete Gulackis
(Joe Pagano Phila.
(1825 South 8th St.,
Richie Baratelli
George Shamounki
Rodger Singer - Silver Slipper
Joyce Dandridge
Steve Emlock (212) MU 6-1790
(Merel Garner
(225 S. Taylor, 848-7020, Oak Park
George Panis
Roger Jackson
Lee Armathar
Millionaire Club, Michigan Ave., (312) 642-3900
Anna Martone
Jeff Morris
Mary Koch
Mike Karlin
Nancy Scott
Linda Phillips
Sam Porter
Richie Baratelli, South Philadelphia
Ruggles 642-3353
Mel Small
Stella Bella
Tommy Mathegh, 7301 Waverly, Bethesda
Pat Ursillo
Dr. Milan Vuitch
Ed White

PAGE# __________

69

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~
~~V-I/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
	Interview with David Knohl on 8-20-76 confirmed that his brother was a policy man in New York and Bob White was his "heavy". Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ________

(70)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR ~~WI/RR~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: Eugene Michael Carrafa

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
08-24-76	Sharon Kohler, of USF & G Insurance Company contacted the investigator and advised him that their investigators had contacted Steve Segal of Kruze Auctions in Ft. Wayne, Indiana reference Caraffa's alleged purchase of the three automobiles reported stolen by him from a Kruze auction.
	Steve Segal advised the USF & G Investigators that they keep records on all automobiles handled by their agency however they do not have any records of the three automobiles in question ever being offered for sale by their agency or of them ever being purchased by Caraffa. In addition Caraffa owes Kruze Auctions $1,822.00.
	Sharon Kohler is forwarding documentation to the investigator concerning the above.
	Cpl. R. W. Swain, Jr.

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-24-76

CAUTION CAUTION CAUTION

ABSOLUTELY NO FURTHER DISSEMINATION

Information from CS is that Roselli stayed at Fred Black's apartment when in D.C., Black's address is Watergate West, Apartment 1009, Washington, D.C.

When Giancana came to D.C. he stayed at Shiman's farm in Kitzmill Maryland.

- -

Det/Cpl. Swain contacted Steve Segal of Kruze Autioneer, Ft. Wayne, Indiana; and Segal stated that they had no record of the three automobiles, reported stolen by Caraffa, in their records. It was further learned that Caraffa owed Kruze $1822.00.

Cpl. M. Alban

08-25-76

Following information received from McKevitt, N.Y.P.D. O/C:

(1) Papers found on Jay Knohl when arrested on sodomy charge:
  (a) Maryland operator's license #K-540-379-270-184R
  (b) various credit cards
  (c) address book with the following names, addresses, etc.

*1. Cobra Johnson
Sonny 518-279-1141
2. Aquaduct 641-4700
3. Bob Adams (414) 835-4182
4. Bob Blake Off. (602) 258-3219, home 275-7759
5. Boston, Mass. lawyer; Joel Rosenthal (617) 523-9000
6. Al Meyers, 245 BdWay 10017, Off. 267-3096
7. Artie Candy, home 342-3673, 377-9555-4
8. Alvin Jones, 467-1182, Andy 622-0313
*9. Alan Smith, 9315 S.W. 77th Ave., Miami, Fla., 665-8791, 665-8272
10. Al Vacarro, 965-4050; 768-0978
11. Andy 783-8104
*12. Bruce Nole, (213) 826-0116, 11943 W. Kiowa, #8, L.A., Calif.

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Carroll -
mt

13. Bill Thompson, home 460-0203, work 656-2400
*14. Bogley, farm 371-5486, home 948-9495
15. Bob Plummer, 996-6614
16. Bob-Pass (314) 426-6777
17. Carmen, house 871-1225, store 342-8812
18. Charlie, store 857-1214, home 266-6430
19. Carl Mess, DE 8-7403
20. Carl Crop, 372-0103, Carlos 647-3469
21. Cano 498-8460
22. Charlie Sutter 827-7022
23. Don Smith, 713 E. 108th St., Apt. 3-C, 272-2650
24. Dick Hessgrt, 372 Prospect Ave.; Clove Rich 981-94
25. Earl, (305) 781-9340; (305) 785-1990
26. Dave Schwartz, TW 1-7262
27. David 774-7640, work 627-6500
28. Diaz, 197 New Lots, 346-3211
29. Eddy Falk; mother, 296-0241, home YU 7-6393, work 894-5651
30. Ellie HI 9-4342, 273-2575
31. Emo, 856-1965
32. George 451-0444; Goody 266-6410
33. Forest Main Corp.
2259 Nost, CL 3-6600
34. Gail, 743-7070; home 769-5875
35. Fingo 455-0806, Frank 377-4087
36. Gert, 2800 N.W. 47th Terr., Ft. Lauderdale, 33313, 735-6952, work 764-4181
37. Pete Gaeta, 377-4648
38. Gino, 7828 Briardale Ter., Rock. 20855, work 679-8347; home 948-7813
39. Frank Fisk, 3924 Ave. I (C240) 252-2304, truck MU 7-5305; home 372-4713, Club 646-9743
40. 840-9425
41. Gas Station Charlie 372-9088
42. Gomez, 45 Rockaway, 455-1393
43. Mrs. Gaeta 377-7976
44. Frankfurter, 1580 Pitkin 485-1312
45. Felix (& Carmen) 261 New hots, 385-3560
46. Frank Gaeta (201) 264-7508 and (201) 442-3637
47. Gran Trmo, Mark Derish (516) 676-7272
48. Herb Wetson, (516) 374-9567
49. Hesh, 263-6692
50. Harry, Calif. (213) 424-8796, home 426-6040
51. Herman 491-6295

PAGE# ________

(73)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Carella
MT

*52. Harry Romano, (212) 445-1827 home; work (212) HI 9-4088
53. Gomez 455-1393
54. HR, 496-7536, work 498-2574
*55. Lewis E. Iandoli
1 Compass Road, Fort Lauderdale 33308
Annes Sportswear, Ocean Side Shopping Center, East Pompano Beach, (305) 941-0745; brother Richarc 993-2900
56. Imperial DE 9-4761
57. Industrial 251-9346
58. John House, 93 Silver Leaf Avenue, Chatham, Mass.
59. James 774-8929
60. Jose (Izzig), 342-2967
61. Julius,342-9454
62. Jim, 868 Clarkson, 774-8929
63. Joy Osmowsky (?) 121 Wilson Ave., Long Beach, Calif
64. Joe, 257-6419
65. John, 266-5844
66. Joe O., 946-9207; work 237-6342; Teddy 858-0589
*67. Joe Soto, 444-7069 home, 9107 Ave. L, 342-2534
68. Kenny 845-9372
69. Russel Krause (219) 925-4004, (800) 348-2757
70. Linda 946-0642, 332-9859
71. Maureen (305) 864-6154
72. Md. Bank 676-4321, Paul
73. Mary 452-1720, 187 Howard
74. Joe Mariuso, (212) 895-6366; (516) 661-1144
75. Mindy 946-4697
76. Joe Marino (516) 234-2140, 14-40 180th St.
*77. Mac, St. Albans, 453-3706; 443-9491; home 739-0334
78. May 495-1750
79. Millie CL 8-2425
80. Majors 372-8091
81. National (Nat) (202) 291-6400
82. Nancy (516) LO 1-1433
83. Oscar Reich 449-3259, pay 372-9114; home NI 6-331
84. Elliot 934-3068
85. Papo 342-0421
86. Pete Shoe 693-8321, BU 4-0382

PAGE#

74

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XX/RNX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

*87. Pepe, 452-0912
88. (516) 872-0179
89. 774-3762, Store 773-9186, 53 Buffalo Atlantic
90. Roosevelt Raceway (516) 746-6000
91. Ralph 345-1256
92. Work (717) 342-6228
93. Rose Stuckart, 1414 Pittston Ave., Scranton, Pa. 18505, (717) 347-9284
94. Ralph 235-4939
95. Rubin 996-1266, 946-5226
96. Stan 946-9535
97. Sam Cole (305) 733-2151
98. Edith Cohen 733-2151
99. Sea Gate Police 946-4851
100. Seymour, 2120 E. 65th St., 444-3497; 241-0731
101. Henry Shuman & Steve Laifer, 16 Court St., Rm 2203, UL 5-5340
102. Shop Gino's & Tashoffs name & number
103. Sharron (213) 656-3301
104. Steve ST 3-9262
105. Sam, Marcie & Mad 789-9867; 789-9893
106. Shoe 693-0287, Bar 282-8387
107. Tony 748-0008
108. Torres 273-2502
109. Walter Updike (215) 295-3057; 996 Virga Ave., Levittown, Pa. 19054
110. Mark 373-6157
d. business card - Major Prime Meat Market, Inc., 1516 Mermaid Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y., ES 2-8091-2
e. Md. Uniform traffic summons #3451775
f. Md. Used Car Dealer License U-1841
*g. P. O. Box rent receipt, box 258, for the period ending August 1977, Box #258, combination to box is right H I, left twice CD, right C
*h. National Car Rental System, Inc., business card with name Guy P. Sullivan

Telephone calls made by Carrafa to New York are as follows:

(212) 946-7917, Frank Marino, 1781 W. 9th St., Brooklyn, N.Y.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD#~~ XXXXX 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Cardella
mt

(212) 946-3976, Gonzalo Garcia, 3178 Bayview Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

(212) 372-7198, Cristine Geffken, 2402 Benson Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

(212) 235-5382, Ralph Leon, 3 Van Siclen Ct., Brooklyn, N.Y. now changed to unlisted number (212) 235-4939

(212) 342-2534, Soto's Grocery Store, 630 Blake Ave., Brooklyn, N.Y.

All of the above checked reference criminal records with negative results. $90,000 of Knohl's bond put up by one G. Bodegas (Puerto Rican Grocery Stores).

The following was found on Carrafa's body when recovered:

1. various credit cards
2. Md. Gratis Vehicle Salesman's LIcense #GS0472
3. Md. Dealer Registrations for D20892 and D20375
4. L. E. Harris Agency, Inc. insurance business card
5. various receipts
6. Wells Fargo Bank check #333 for $500.00 to Gino's Classical Cars; from expense account of L. Bruce Nole, One Wilshire Building, Los Angeles, Calif., 90017, 626-9111
7. Md. MVA certificate wherein Md. dealer tag #D20894 was replaced by tag #D31623. D31623 is the license plate on Carrafa's missing Continental. This transaction was handled by MVA employee C. Carrafa - Eugene Michael Carrafa's wife.
8. Various business cards including one for Taylor Insurance Agency, Inc.
9. Name Pete Kriss (412) 823-0904.

Cpl. M. Alban

PAGE# ____________

(76)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXRD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-26-76 Information received from Dade County, Florida reference Roselli making the following calls:

(216) 745-3104
(216) 836-6556
(216) 837-3575
(216) 372-2000
(216) 381-5295
(414) 245-6906
(414) 275-3006

It was also learned that the following names, from Chicago, have arisen in the Roselli case:

Henry Susk
Eddie Vogel
Allen Smiley
Peter Epstein - owner of the Pontiac Place Restaurant

Cpl. M. Alban

08-27-76 With reference to the name Pepe and the number (212) 452-0912 found in Jay Knohl's phone book at the time of his arrest NYPD O/C advises that on 5-26-76 that number was assigned to Cubas Grocery Store, 81 Rockaway Avenue, Brooklyn, New York, and prior to that the number, which was disconnnected 02-18-76, was to John Cedollero, 64 Bleeker St., Brooklyn, N.Y. Inasmuch as Knohl's notebook reflected another number for Pepe - which had been scratched through - it is reasonable to assume that the former subscriber, Cubas Grocery Store, is the number Knohl knew.

NYPD also advises that Jay Knohl failed to appear in court on 08-26-76 reference his sodomy case, and a warrant has been issued for his arrest.

With reference to Roselli information from Dade County reveals that Santo Trifficante, Tony Accardo, and Anthony Zerilli's name have been linked to the Roselli case.

Information received from Chicago P.D. Intelligence is as follows:

PAGE# ____________

77

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Carded
mt

1. Reference Janice Mae Piccerelli's employer, the Millionaire's Club - president of the club is Chris C. Carson, 154 Kenilworth Ave., Kenilworth, Illinos. Carson has associated with the late Sam Giancana, the late Ned Bakes, and Hy Brody.

2. Reference credit card of Frank J. Nenning in J. Piccerelli's possession - no record in Chicago files.

3. Reference name Ruggles and telephone number of (312) 642-3353 found in Janice Piccerelli's personal telephone book - same is an unlisted number to John Cofoid, 745 N. Dearborn St., Chicago, Illinois. Subject has one arrest for disorderly.

4. Reference Roselli's call to (312) 943-1155 to Louis J. Lederer, 860 N. Lake Shore, Chicago, Illinois- same identified as a gambler with hoodlum connections.

5. Reference number of (312) 321-0110 in J. Piccerelli's telephone book same is to the Little Corporal Restauran 1 East Wacker Drive, Chicago, Illinois.

6. Reference notation in Jan Piccerelli's personal phone book of the name Vincent A. Gesumaria (301) 656-2332 - Gesumaria resides at 5609 Old Chester Road, Bethesda, Maryland.

Toll calls from Gino's Classic Cars reveal the following numbers called:

(301) 840-9425
(301) 948-9490 Taylor Insurance AGency

David Knohl's tolls reflect the following unknown numbers called

(305) 731-7692
(213) 598-6730

Pfc. M. Alban

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RN#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-27-76

Information received from Wolf, Dade County, that Lederer and Roselli were well acquainted and Lederer is in the process of opening gambling casino's in various foreign countries. Lederer was allegedly involved in the murder of Richard Cain, an ex-cop who went bad and had mob connections.

Roselli's toll records reveal that he called Fred Black on July 27, 1976 - the day before he disappeared - at 1738 hours; and he talked for four minutes.

It was also learned that a call was made to Black from Roselli's residence on 8-1-76, and a call from Roselli's residence was made to Lederer on 07-31-76 - three days after Roselli's disappearance. Roselli's sister and brother-in-law deny making the calls.

It was also learned that on 08-27-76 an ex-CIA agent was called by a subject whom identified himself as Dade County Detective Robinson, and an interview was requested. This CIA agent was involved in an attempt on Castro's life. The CIA agent told the subject named Robinson that he would call him back, and the ex-agent then checked with Dade County and learned that they had no one in Washington by that name. The CIA has moved the agent and his family from their residence for safety factors.

Information received from Mrs. Caraffa that September's issue of Hemmings magazine notes two '32 Lincolns for sale on page 2859. The advertisement gives Jay Knohl's home telephone number- as opposed to Gino's Classic Cars as previously done - and the ad, in writing and paid for, had to be in prior to August 8, 1976. It is noted that Caraffa's body was recovered on 08-04-76, and no one knew of this until 08-05-76. Jay Knohl was arrested on 08-06-76 and remained in jail until at least 08-09-76. Thus Knohl, when placing the advertisement, knew that Caraffa would not be around to answer calls at Gino's Classical Cars, Inc.

Cpl. M. Alban

08-30-76

NYPD advises that Jay G. Knohl failed to appear in court and forfeited $90,000.00 bond. Robert White still has not been found as of this date.

Cpl. M. Alban

PAGE#

(79)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XX/BX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
08-31-76	Reference call made by David Knohl to (213) 598-6730; subscriber information lists this number as belonging to Howard Knohl, M.D., 3742 Toland Avenue, Los Alamitos, California. Cpl. M. F. Alban
09-01-76	Juvenile Section advises that Johanna Knohl, daughter of David Knohl, has been a runaway since 06-13-76. This incident was not reported to police until 08-31-76. See RD #W 642-832. Detective Al Santoro, NYPD, advises that Caraffa's car was located at Kennedy Airport and same had been there since 07-28-76. Cpl. M. F. Alban
09-03-76	Reference Richard Cain, same's real name is Richard Scalzetti. Cpl. M. F. Alban
09-07-76	Information received that Richard Arnold Kline, W/M, 01-12-58, was arrested in D.C. driving a stolen vehicle. The vehicle had been repainted twice - originally blue, then white, then black. The vehicle was bearing Maryland dealer tags listed to Kensington Motors - Guy Holcomb's business. Information from J. McH. that it is believed that Giancana was killed by his bodyguard Dominic Blasi (ph.) at the urging of Anthony Accardo. Reference Roselli and Black's call to (507) 282-2581, Rochester, Minnesota, same is to the Kahler Hotel. Reference Henry Susk, the Chicago Crime Commission Report, November, 1969 notes that the following business has hoodlum connections: Henry Susk Pontiac Company, 520 N. Wabash Avenue, Chicago, Illinois.

PAGE#

80

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XX/RMX# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Naval Intelligence reports the following Marine Corp history for Carrafa:

11/58 to 3/59 Camp Lejeune, N.C.
4/59 to 10/60 Newfoundland
11/14/60 to 3/22/61 Fleet Marine Force
03/61 to 12/62 Quantico, Virginia

With reference to the above service it is noted that Caraffa was deployed as a warehouseman, security guard, and a marksmanship instructor. He was rated as a four during his service and according to Marine sources this is a marginal Marine. Caraffa incurred two disciplinary actions during his enlistment - both minor - and one was a 1961 traffic offense and in 1962 a larceny charge ($70.00 of government items). It is further noted that the Fleet Marine Force, noted above, was deployed in the area of Cuba during the Bay of Pigs invasion; however it is not yet known as to whether Caraffa himself was there.

With reference to the miniscule possibility of a relationship between any of the principals in this case and the Kennedy assassination the following is noted:

Lee Harvey Oswald
AKA "Ozzie Rabbit"
USMC 1653230

Oswald's background is as follows:

1. August 1952 moved to New York, 325 East 92nd Street.
2. Moved to one room basement apartment at 1455 Sheridan Avenue, Bronx, New York; and attended Public School 117.
3. January 1953 moved to 825 East 179th Street.
   April 1953 in Youth HOuse until May 7th.
   September 1953 entered Public School 44.
4. 10/26/56 Marine Corp Recruit Depot, San Diego, Calif. (2nd Recruit Training Battalion).
5. 01/18/57 Camp Pendleton, Calif. - "A" Company of the First Battalion, Second Infantry Training Regiment.
6. 03/18/57 Naval Air Technical Training Center - Naval Air Station, Jacksonville, Florida (6 weeks).
7. 04/57 Keesler AFB, Biloxi, Miss.
8. 07/09/57 Marine Corp Air Station, at El Toro, Calif.

PAGE# ____

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR ~~V.I.R.D.~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

9. 08/57 on board U.S.S. Bexar.
10. 09/12/57 Marine Air Control Squadron No. 1, (MACS-1), Marine Air Group 11, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing, Atsugi, Japan.
11. 10/27/57 to 11/15/57 patient at Naval Hospital, Yokosuka, Janap.
12. 11/03/57 on board Terrell County, LST 1157 for Phillipines.
13. 03/07/58 USS Wexford County, LST 1168 to Atsugi, Japan.
14. 12/22/58 Marine Air Control Squadron #9 (MACS-9) Marine Corp Air Station, El Toro, California
15. 09/04/59 to H & H Squadron.

Marines that knew Oswald:

1. Kerry Thornley
2. Daniel Powers
3. Nelson Delgado
4. James A. Boteho
5. Donald P. Camarata
6. John E. Donovan

Reference John Roselli - real name Filippo Sacco, AKA Don Giovanni, arrived U.S. 09-16-11.

1951 (Kefauver Hearings) Roselli testified that he knew Jack Dragna, Momo Adamo, Tony Accardo, Frank Costello, Joe Sica, Bugsy Siegel, Joe Adonis, Anthony (Little Augie Pisano) Carfano, Joe Massei, Meyer Lansky, Louis (Little New York) Campagna, Frank Milano, Joe Profaci, Sam Maceo, and Lucky Luciano.

Roselli answered to Louis Tom Dragna and Harold Meltzer, and he was sponsored for membership in the Beverly Hills Friar's Club by Frank Sinatra and Dean Martin.

On 10/20/67 Roselli took the 5th before U. S. District Court Judge Warren Ferguson in Los Angeles during a hearing reference an immigration charge of failing to register and he was fingerprinted. During this hearing Mrs. Barbara Crosby, wife of singer Gary Crosby, testified that she knew Roselli and he was like a father to her. It is noted that Roselli's tolls reflect that he called Gary Crosby this year.

PAGE# __________

82

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

In November 1967 Roselli came to Washington, D.C. where he allegedly met two attorneys who were former FBI agents, several senators, and an inspector of police who drove him to the airport. It is speculated that the inspector was Joseph Shiman. This trip was, allegedly, for the purpose of straightening out his immigration problems and it is of note that he was never deported prior to his demise.

In December of 1967, following a Los Angeles Federal Grand Jury probe into the cheating of card players at the Friar's Club, Roselli was indicted along with Maurice Friedman, Manuel (Ricky) Jacobs, Benjamin J. Teitelbaum, and a prominent Beverly Hills physician. The indictment against the physician was later dropped.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

09-08-76 Telephone interview with Mrs. Carrafa wherein she relates that Jay Knohl has possession of her husband's 1976 Suburban station wagon, Maryland registration EPP 200, serial #CCS166F161048, title #6101813.

Mrs. Carrafa further related that her husband carried the titles to both '32 Lincolns in his attache case, as well as the title for the Suburban; and her husband carried the attache case everywhere. She feels that if her husband had received $10,000 and gone on to Los Angeles he would have kept the titles with him; however by Jay Knohl's advertising these two '32 Lincolns for sale, she assumes that he now possesses the titles and took them from Carrafa's attache case following his demise.

It was also learned that Carrafa received a traffic summons from MSP trooper for violating Article 66 1/2, Sec. 11-309 and he was due in Shady Grove Court on 08/20/76. MSP will be contacted reference circumstances surrounding this summons. Trooper believed to be Tpr. Fontaine.

Writer contacted MSP Trooper Johnny Fortune, Rockville Barracks, who stated that on 07-18-76 at 1940 hours, Sunday, he issued Carrafa a ticket for passing in a "no passing trucks" zone on Interstate 270, South of State Route 109, Summons #S3451775. Fortune could not remember anything of the incident.

PAGE# ____________

83

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VIRD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

It is noted that this was the weekend when Carrafa and Knohl were suppose to be in Chicago, and they may have been returning at that time. Carrafa was operating a '74 International Tractor Trailer, Md. reg. FB 9629. F.B. 9629 listed on a 73 International Dumpster to Ryder Truck REntal, 920 S. Brunswick St., Baltimore, Maryland.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

09-09-76 Mr. Frank Yarian, Erie Insurance Co., 587-1200 contacted in that Carrafa had written his name and address on a piece of paper. Mr. Yarian stated that earlier this year he contacted Roger Smith of the Roger Smith Insurance Agency reference the feasibility of continuing to insure Carrafa's vehicles. A loss prevention man was sent to Gino's Classical Cars whereupon he met a W/M, burly, NFD; and when the insurance man commented about the building being susceptible to burglary the subject commented that someone once broke in but he hit the man over the head and broke both of his legs. Yarian then told Roger Smith that no further insurance was to be written on Carrafa's vehicles, and as a result thereof Carrafa called, and later visited, Mr. Yarian. Mr. Yarian then told Carrafa that Erie was not in the business of insuring antique dealers as this was a specialty and Carrafa left without further incident.

Mrs. Muriel R. Harris of L. E. Harris, Insurance Agency, (202) 393-4200 contacted reference Carrafa's calls to this number. Mrs. Harris related that Carrafa carried his homeowners, life, and his wife's auto insurance with them; and Mrs. Carrafa is the beneficiary.

Philadelphia P.D. Intelligence and O/C contacted reference the following names that were in Janice Piccerelli's personal telephone book:

Joe Pagano, 1825 South 8th St., Philadelphia
Richie Baratelli, South Philadelphia

Philadelphia O/ C Section advises that their files contain the names of Joseph Pagano of 2234 South 19th Street, Philadelphia, Pa. This Pagano, and his brother, Vincent Albert Pagano, AKA Al Pajamas, are affiliated with the Liberty Clown Club, and they are involved with the Angelo Bruno LCN family.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

84

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-09-76

Major Brown received a call from Mr. James W. Shoemaker, 19515 Darnestown Road, Bealsville, Maryland, 972-8325, and Mr. Shoemaker related that he found some papers belonging to Eugene Michael Carrafa on his property located at 14825 Dufief Mill Road, Gaithersburg, Maryland. Writer, Cpls. Swain and Cleveland responded to this address - a farm - and were led to a private dumping area about one mile from the road and in the woods. It was further learned that Tinker Shoemaker, Carrafa's son-in-law, asked permission to dump some junk on 09-04-76 (?) and some of his correspondence was found along with the following:

A. Desk Telephone Locator, obviously from Carrafa's business, some names and numbers are:

1. Aldo LU 4-1843
2. Bondsmen DC Md
   Winestien: ME 8 9292: WO 6-6700: EM 3 4100
3. Cohen: 7730 Eastern Avenue: JU 5 6830
4. Ciprinano 577-1122
5. Cashdown JU 8-2254, 10710 Lockridge
6. Dutch JO 8-9561
7. Marvin Gallimore WA 7 4290
8. Jackson Det. DC
   Home JO 8 4267 (number not in service)
9. Lawyers: Ruffin Brantley
   Milton Conn NA 8 1712 JU 5-8060
   Bartel, Wm. J. LI 6-3424
   Bonner
   King, Herbert 2038th N.E., LI 6-9761
   King, Allie WA 7-7195
   Keys: DE 2-5972
   Charlie: RA 6-0703
10. Lieberman DI 7-3833
11. Keys 864-4904
12. Laborer: Bill Meeks LU 4-3950
13. Seomardi JO 1-3620
14. Marinari LU 1-3116
15. Morris Mann LI 3-5115
16. Montague CY 7-9222
17. Paul Friedman 1030 15th N.W. RE 5-6486
18. Mickey Carmody = phone under Joyce; 8560 River View Rd., Oxon Hill, Md.

PAGE# ____

85

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

19. Owen Inspt. EM 2-1213, office RI 3-5681
20. Palace TU 2-1600
21. Reds 927-2568
22. Rowe Burly 768-8626
23. Sewer: Kahler EX 2355
24. Eddie Smith 423-6243
25. Norman Zipkin EM 3 6728, Davenport St.
Father UN 4-1680, 2410 Sheridan

B. Business Cards, some of which are as follows:

1. NYCPD 68th Precinct card with notation "Case #6306"
2. Model Plating Co., Dick Fratello
3. Michael B. Green Associates - rear of card name - Capt. McDonald 225-5607
4. Frank Malatesta, Florida Specialists, "Specializing in Florida Moving"
5. Horseless Carriage Carriers, Inc., Walter Riley, Vice President
6. Classic Carriage House of Arizona
Russ Jackson (602) 946-8393. Brian Jackson (602) 275-6825
7. Aristocrat Properties Inc., Frank R. White, President, National Press Building, Suite 898, 14th & "F" N.W., Washington, D.C., (202) 244-2125✓
8. Tom's Auto Parts & Wrecking, 5601 Foster Avenue, Brooklyn 34, New York RN 3-4131 and CH 1-5760
9. Benny's Rebel Room, 829 14th Street, N.W., Washington D.C., Keith Snider✓ Proprietor, (202) 638-1642 and notation Home 280-1348; rear of card notes name Tom Antico, Jr., NYC, (212) SA 7-0183
10. Marlow Heights Auto Center, J. J. Guttilla

C. Other Papers:

1. Two tickets to car auction on 07-17-76 at Lake County Fairgrounds, Grayslake, Ill.
2. Mobil Credit Card #8781221919 (Carrafa)
3. Washington Shopping Plate 209 261 833 to (Carrafa)
4. Central Charge Service credit card #20 9261 833 to Carrafa.
5. Three color slides.

PAGE# ____________

86

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

6. Selective Service System Card #6 11 40 309
7. Contract of sale from Richard R. Moran, 12811 Three Sisters Road, Potomac, Md. post mark Mar. '75.
8. An address book with names and dates of horses in alphabetical order.
9. A map of "Movie Stars Homes" in Beverly Hills and other areas.
10. Partial set of false teeth.
11. Miscellaneous bills and documents addressed to Eugene Michael Carrafa at his business and to his home.
12. List of parts for a '31 Cadillac

The Cohen mentioned above, #3 in telephone book, is Isidore Cohen, 1401 Blair Mill Road, Silver Spring, Maryland, 585-6830. MPD intelligence advises that Cohen is a member of the Progress Club - a gambling club.

Captain McDonald, noted above, at 225-5607, changed to 225-0400, is now an Inspector in the U. S. Capitol Police; and according to a source he is "dirty." McDonald was contacted and he stated that the name Carrafa is familiar but he cannot place him or the reason that his name is familiar.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

09-10-76 N.Y. City Homicide advises that a warrant now exists for Robert White charging him too with sodomy.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

09-13-76 It is further noted that a letter of "invitation to join" from the Mont-Iliano Lodge 2288, Sons of Italy, to Carrafa, was found among those items recovered from the Shoemaker find. The letter was signed by Edward J. Battaglia, "membership chairman", and the membership committee is noted as, 1974, consisting of Larry Merola, Lou Pillon, and Emilio Cocozzella. This lodge meets at the Glenmont Recreation Hall, 2600 Glenallen Avenue, Silver Spring, Maryland.

PAGE# ________

87

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

FBI check reveals that a Janice Mae Piccerelli, W/F, 7-11-38, was arrested on 02-22-62 in Fort Lauderdale, Florida for petty larceny. Fort Lauderdale to send further information if available.

Reference the name and number for Frank Gaeta found in Jay Knohl's address book at the time of his arrest:

1. Frank W. Gaeta
   W/M, 07-16-29
   5'7", 190, brn/brn.
   SS #121 20 2576
   arrested 06-16-52 Weehawken, N.J.,
   arrested contempt of court Elizabeth, N.J.

2. Peter Gaeta
   No record

3. (201) 264-7508 to F. W. Gaeta, #1 Mark Street, Haylet, New Jersey

4. (201) 442-3637 to James or Joseph Nolan, 267 Water Street, Perth Amboy, New Jersey - no record

5. (201) 377-4648 to Nicholas E. Palmieri, 28 North Street, Madison, Morris County, New Jersey. Born 4/1940 and employed as a special police officer in Madison, New Jersey

Reference Name of Vincent U. Giglio, and telephone number of (201) 659-2539 found in Janice Mae Piccerelli's personal telephone book:

1. No record on Giglio
2. (201) 659-2539 is a non-pub to Kathleen Sullivan, 3461 Kennedy Blvd., Jersey City, N.J.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

88

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR ~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-14-76 On 03-01-76 Fred B. Black called (507) 282-2581, the Kahler Hotel, Rochester, Minnesota, and on 05-14-76, Roselli called this number. Eugene Carrafa's telephone directory - recovered from the dump on Shoemaker's farm - notes the following:

Sewer: Kahler EX 2355

Writer called the Kahler Hotel and asked for Mr. Sewer, and the switchboard operator asked, "how do you spell 'Sewer'." When writer spelled same and stated that he was not sure of the spelling the operator replied that there was a "Mr. Sever as others have called for him, but he has checked out; did you try the hospital." A check of the desk revealed no SEWER or SEUER at the Kahler Hotel nor was there an extension or room number EX 2355. Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Investigation following-up obvious leads above.

It is further noted that Lee Harvey Hswald, in 1952, resided at 1455 Sheridan Avenue, Bronx, New York. Carrafa's telephone directory notes a name, telephone number, and 2410 Sheridan Avenue. It is further noted that Sheridan Blvd. runs into White Plains Road and Romano's Funeral Home is located on the latter road. NYPD will be contacted reference the above addresses, and the subject residing at 2410 Sheridan Avenue.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-ICRD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-15-76

Documented - information received from Fort Lauderdale P.D. that Janice Mae Piccerelli, W/F, 07-11-38, AKA Janice M. Hanley, was arrested on 02-21-62 for shoplifting along with Lacy Lowell Rollins, W/M, 04-01-38, AKA "Buddy." Janice M. Piccerelli listed her address as 1025 S.W. 2nd Ct., Fort Lauderdale, Fla, and her occupation as housewife. Rollins listed the same address as above and his employee as the Trade Winds. He further noted a former address of 1120 14th St., Washington, D.C.

Rollins escaped from custody on 03-14-62, and he was arrested on 03-19-62 at Lenny's Bar, 2800 S. Federal Highway, Ft. Lauderdale. Following Rollins' arrest he was interviewed on 03-21-62 by a Det. Hughes, and Hughes' supplementary report notes that Rollins came to Florida with Louis Piccerelli and Janice Mae Piccerelli. It is further noted that Louis Piccerelli was questioned about Rollins at his place of employment, Lenny's Bar, about Rollins' escape on 03-19-62 and L. Piccerelli employed Rollins in Cranston, Rhode Island, and met him in D.C.

It is further noted that Rollins' wife's - Barbara - address was given as 1133 North Stewart Street, Arlington, Virginia.

A further check of Janice Mae Piccerelli's personal telephone book reveals the following:

Kefales or Kefalos, Geo.
Work Bob White
2461 Wisconsin Ave., N.W.,
Sales 337-5400
Ser. 546-7100

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXRD # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-15-76 Interview with Mrs. Carrafa wherein additional long distance toll records were secured, and some are as follows:

12/75	Brooklyn	(212) 372-7198
12/75	Scottsdale	(602) 945-0721
12/75	Odessa, Tex.	(915) 337-9765
1/9/76	Phoenix	(602) 275-6825
3/75	Overland, Mo.	(314) 426-6777
3/75	Cedarhurst, N.Y.	(516) 569-4105
3/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 986-4230
3/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 685-0365
3/75	Paul Smiths, N.Y.	(518) 327-3309
3/75	Chicago	(312) 431-6040
3/75	Brooklyn	(212) 946-5133
3/75	Bronx	(212) 298-2228
4/75	Chicago	(312) 431-6155
4/75	Washington	(202) 337-7505 ✓
4/75	Washington	(202) 291-6400 ✓
4/75	Skokie, Ill.	(312) 674-2439
4/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 369-4263
4/75	Englewood, N.J.	(201) 871-0471
4/75	Southfield, Mich.	(313) 357-1229
4/75	Woodbridge, N.J.	(201) 634-9859
4/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 722-9682
4/75	Yonkers	(914) 963-0018
4/75	Lawrenceville, N.J.	(609) 896-0362
4/75	Chicago	(312) 226-6811
4/75	Milwaukee	(414) 771-7171
4/75	Brooklyn	(212) 946-0260
4/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 226-9413
4/75	Queens	(212) 895-2640
5/75	Brooklyn	(212) 946-7423
5/75	Queens	(212) 458-7654
5/75	Brooklyn	(212) 251-2150
5/75	D.C.	(202) 526-2556
5/75	D.C.	(202) 829-5259
5/75	D.C.	(202) 291-6400 ✓
4/75	S. River, N.J.	(201) 254-9573
5/75	Roselle, Ill.	(312) 885-5300
5/75	Brooklyn	(212) 338-4860
5/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 695-3311
5/75	Philadelphia	(215) 755-9554
6/75	Philadelphia	(215) 744-3333

PAGE# ______

91

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XX-X/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

6/75	Miami	(305) 595-9339
6/75	Bronx Village, N.Y.	(914) 793-5118
10/75	Pompano Beach	(305) 785-2200
10/75	D.C.	(202) 333-3353
10/75	Boston	(617) 536-1319
11/75	Brooklyn	(212) 377-4087
11/75	Queens	(212) 845-8976
11/75	W. Los Angeles	(213) 826-0116
11/75	Provo, Utah	(801) 373-1379
10/75	Northboro, Mass.	(617) 393-8167
10/75	Tukahbrxvl., N.Y.	(914) 793-5117
10/75	N. Dade, Fla.	(305) 947-3045
10/75	Plainfield, N.J.	(201) 755-1911
6/75	Utica, N.Y.	(315) 797-0555
6/75	Staten Island, N.Y.	(212) 948-1466
7/75	D.C.	(202) 483-6666 ✓
6/75	Cleveland	(216) 333-0561
6/75	Westminster, Calif.	(714) 893-4541
6/75	N. Dade, Fla.	(305) 652-9990
7/75	Brooklyn	(212) 240-7219
7/75	Newark, N.J.	(201) 243-2858
7/75	Fort Worth, Texas	(817) 738-7021
7/75	Los Angeles	(213) 321-8680
7/75	Somers Pt., N.J.	(609) 927-7300
7/75	Kansas City, Kansas	(913) 321-9684
7/75	D.C.	(202) 223-6200
7/75	Kenner, La.	(504) 721-2345
9/75	D.C.	(202) 387-9664
9/75	Sacramento, Calif.	(916) 331-1761
9/75	Miami	(305) 823-6714
9/75	Miami	(305) 592-5195
10/75	D.C.	(202) 245-1891 ✓
10/75	D.C.	(202) 333-3353
10/75	D.C.	(202) 965-9392
12/75	D.C.	(202) 755-8862
11/75	Brooklyn	(212) 342-2534
12/75	N.Y., N.Y.	(212) 942-7000
12/75	Scottsdale,	(602) 945-7666
12/75	Scottsdale	(602) 959-9682
11/75	Los Angeles	(213) 626-9111

PAGE# ____________

92

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RIX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Sharon Kohler, U.S.F. & G advises that on October 4, 1975 Jay Knohl reported that his 1933 Rolls Royce was stolen from a motel where he was staying in Lancaster, Pa. Vehicle was valued at $35,000 and J. C. Taylor Insurance Agency paid this claim in December of 1975.

Some articles recovered from Mrs. Carrafa are as follows:

1. Florida registration card for a '29 Cadillac Convertible, serial #335770; same registered to Lewis E. Iandoli, P. O. Box 2735, Pompano Beach, Fla.

2. Scraps of paper or memo's with the following notations:

   a. Bob Hajack, dealer, (312) 298-1610, Chicago
   b. Mr. Losie, Utah
   c. Dan Tierce, 14431 Harris Place, Miami Lakes, Florida
   d. Jeffery Quist, (213) 726-0303, 1207 Wash., Ave., Santa Monica, Calif.
   e. Albert L. Horley, 7107 Fulton St., Chevy Chase, Md. (301) 654-3286, Wash. (202) 245-1891
   f. Jay Knohl (315) 736-9902, Utica
   g. Frank Gaeta, 1 Marc St., Hazlet Keyport, N.J.
   h. Charles Payne, 125 Onienta Dr., Altamonte Springs, Fla. (305) 831-3525 & (305) 339-3967
   i. Rolwski (312) 649-1414
   j. Burton Friedman, 111 Imperial House, 35 S. Whitehorse Ave., Audubon, N.J. (609) 547-0773
   k. Bruce Nole (213) 826-0116
   l. John Campo (602) 959-9682
   m. Manuels (212) 342-0248

3. An old Washington Post news clipping (1975) reference the seizure of a tractor-trailer loaded with 613 cases of Coors Beer and the body of Robert Louis Hamilton, 32, 5500 Holmes Run Parkway, Alexandria, Va. Hamilton had been found dead on 8/8/75 in an apartment in Claremont, Calif., from a "possible drug overdose." Hamilton had driven the truck to California prior to overdosing and the below named were arrested with the truck. The body was taken to a local funeral home by the men prior to their arrest. The men are: Claude J. Hill, Walter F. Riggin, and Nicholas C. Scandone.

PAGE# ______

Cpl. M. F. Alban

(93)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE — OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09/17/76

Interview with Mrs. Carrafa on 09/15/76 also revealed that she was employed at Rand's Bar in D.C. - as was Janice and Lou Piccerelli - and her maiden name was Carol Mildred LaCovey, DOB 01-18-40. Mrs. Carrafa further related that she was formerly married to Charles William Taylor, W/M, 02-17-32. D.C.P.D. notes that Taylor has a 3 page sheet.

Carrafa's Marine Corp photo album shows two pictures and notes that prior to 1962, 1960 or 61, Carrafa was in Biloxi, Miss. and Houston, Texas.

Gino's Classical Cars' long distance toll records for 1975 reveal that calls were made to National Auto Brokers Wholesale in D. C. - David Knohl's place of employment.

Milwaukee P.D. advises the following information on the numbers called by Roselli:

(414) 245-6906 to Richard W. Fiedler, Jr.,
P. O. Box 153, Williams Bay, Wisc.
No record or intelligence

(414) 275-3006 to General Telephone Company,
Sun Prairie, Wisconsin
also has companion number of (608) 837-1500

Dade County Homicide advises that Lewis E. Iandoli has come up in the Roselli investigation. Details to follow.

FBI advises that Louis Anthony Piccerelli's Marine I.D. number was 1655208 and he entered the Marine Corp. at Boston, Mass.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-20-76 Reference Chris Carson's associations, Ned Bakes is an identified member - West Side - of the Chicago LCN family.

George J. Murges, Attorney, contacted reference Janice Piccerelli; however he could add nothing further except that her case was referred to him by Pete Karas, 111 W. Washington St., Chicago, Illinois, (312) 263-1144, and Karas learned of J. Piccerelli from one of his clients. Attempts to contact Karas negative at this time.

Leslie Scheer, Roselli's D.C. attorney, contacted; however he denies ever hearing, or knowing, Carrafa. He further stated that Roselli probably called Tom Waden, Edward Morgan, Fred Black, and Joseph Shiman; and Sheer knew that Black went to the Mayo Clinic about twice a year.

On July 8, 1976 Charles (Charlie the Blade) Tourine, Richard L. McVeigh, Alexander Miller, Donald Robert Owens, Jake Leroy Schumaker, Frank Eugene Irick, Andrew Day, Donald Mac Namee, and Vickie Cornell were indicted on charges of promoting gambling and prostitution in Valdez, Alaska. Donald Robert Owens is from LaPlata, Maryland; and he is an associate of Joseph F. Nesline and numerous other Washington area O/C gamblers.

Reference numbers called by Carrafa in 1975, subscribers are as follows:

(202) 337-7505	New York Life Insurance Co., Wash., D.C.
(202) 483-6666	Veteran's Hospital, Washington, D.C.
(202) 291-6400	changed to 722-9200 National Auto Brokers Wholesale
(202) 245-1891	Office of the Secretary, Department of Health, Education and Welfare

Cpl. M. F. Alban

09-22-76 1745 hours writer called (212) 946-7917 reference the two '32 Lincolns advertised by Jay Knohl and a female answered the telephone and denied advertising the cars. Subject inquired as to where writer was calling from.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____

(95)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
09-23-76	1100 hours Sgt. Michaleski called Jay Knohl's residence in New York and told the housekeeper that "this is David, have Jay call me at"; whereupon the housekeeper stated that "a lot of people want Jay to call them; this isn't David" and shortly thereafter she hung up.

REF: Charles Tourine
AKA Charles White
W/M, 03-25-06
FBI #695716
S.S. #157-22-2762
addresses: 24 Cleveland
Miami Beach, Fla.
N.Y. Phone (212) 421-5317

68 Main St.,
Matawan, N.J.

Subject arrested in Nevada in 1974 and his address book reflected the following numbers:

(305) 971-1684
(702) 735-2111
(201) 566-1234 and 566-1033
(312) 726-6858
(201) 992-6362
(401) 944-7450
(702) 735-1450
(702) 734-7110
(702) 735-2111
(617) 884-8200
(201) 864-0051
(305) 895-1915 Gene K & Shirley
(516) 767-7318
(609) 695-4266
(609) 599-2061
(215) 295-4654
(516) 883-3494
(516) 627-2002
(516) 767-1817
(516) 538-6633
(202) 338-7125
(301) 559-2615 Joe Nesline & Rebecca Sutton
(201) 751-6910
(201) 461-3900

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXRD# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

(702) 732-1129	
(213) 254-6492	
(916) 544-7977	
(916) 544-5941	Donna Moss
(702) 826-1171	
(702) 882-1396	Donald Robert Owens
(504) 885-3419	Tillman
(702) 574-4040	
(305) 893-3344	
(614) 282-6403	
(201) 743-9295	
(702) 457-3122	
(702) 786-4838	
(305) 782-1662	Nick
(305) 759-4351	
(215) 627-6998	Allan Cohen
(203) 359-2700	
(305) 895-1096	
(702) 735-2111	

Cpl. M. F. Alban

09-24-76 Information received from Chicago P.D. reference the associates of Louis J. Lederer and Dominick Santerelli. Lederer's associates are noted as Malcolm Clarke of Las Vegas, Charles Baron, and a dentist, Dr. Sidney Lipsky. Domick Santerelli has been known to associate with the following named hoodlums: Charles English, Gus Alex, Sam Alex, and Jerry Goldberg.

A copy of the Toxicologist's Report of the Coroner of Cook County, Illinois on Janice Mae Piccerelli was received and same notes the following:

Analysis for alcohols, tranquilizers, narcotics

1. analysis of liver failed to show the presence of barbiturates
2. analysis of liver showed the presence of 29.0 mg % ethanol
3. analysis of liver failed to show the presence of narcotics
4. analysis of liver failed to show the presence of tranquilizers.

PAGE# ______

97

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
	A check of the Maryland State Medical Examiner's Office in Baltimore reference the 29.0 mg % ethanol in Piccerelli's liver reveals that this is the normal amount of ethanol produced by a decomposing liver; and if this was translated to a blood-alcohol percentage it would only be .03%.
	In essence, Janice Mae Piccerelli did not die of an overdose of alcohol and/or tranquilizers.
	Reference the name Frank Gaeta found on papers in Knohl's possession at the time of his arrest, FBI reveals and confirms same to be Frank William Gaeta, W/M, 07-16-21, P.O.B. Brooklyn, New York; NYPD B #339249. Gaeta has three abortion arrests and one A & B, drunk driving and resisting arrest. Gaeta also uses DOB of 07-16-29.
	Cpl. M. F. Alban
09-27-76	On 09-24-76 Andimo (Tommy Noto) Pappadio, reputed head of the Thomas Luchese Family, was shotgunned to death in the driveway of his New York home. Note is made of this reference the Pisano that may be related to the Carrafa investigation - Joseph James Pisano (Pisani), NYPD B #135851.
	Reference the Merel Garner name found in Janice Mae Piccerelli's telephone book, Oak Park, Illinois P.D. advises that he is Merle Eugene Garner, W/M, 04-29-29, P.O.B. Detroit, Michigan, presently residing at 213 Marion Street, Oak Park, Illinois, (312) 386-2805. Subject has no record in Chicago or Oak Park, and subject applied for a cab license on 02-15-72.
	Dade County advises that L. Iandoli is not the same subject as is involved in the Roselli case.
	Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE#

98

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXXD# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE

OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-27-76

Merel Garner called writer and stated that he knew Jan Piccerelli through the Millionaires Club, and she sold memberships to the club. Garner further stated that Jan Piccerelli dated someone in the club by the name of Ken. Garner stated that he plays the piano at the club.

Reference telephone calls made to the Kahler Hotel, Rochester, Minnesota, the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Investigation notes that on 03-01-76 one Robert A. White, 38441 Anbark, Belleville, Illinois (618) 243-7609 stayed at the Kahler. White will be contacted to confirm this stay due to the close similarity in his name and that of Robert E. White.

On 05-14-76 Fred B. Black checked into Room 1012 of the Kahler Hotel and stayed until 05-20-76. Black noted his reason for the stay as being "medical," and he requested a room near rooms 1002 and 1003. MBCI reports that these rooms were vacant during Black's stay there. Black listed his address as Commercial Transfer Corporation, 16319 Gannon Avenue, West, Apple Valley, Minnesota.

A check of Minnesota corporate records reveal no such current corporation, and 16319 Gannon Avenue, West, is a residential neighborhood and a check of this address reveals the occupant to be one Steven W. Homa - no criminal record or intelligence this subject.

Telephone information reveals a Chicago number, (312) 939-4523, for the Commercial Transfer Corporation.

Reference the notation EX 2-3555, found in Carrafa's notebook, there is an extension 2355 in the Mayo Clinic, x-ray division.

Pursuant to a request by Dade County, Homicide, Fred B. Black's long distance toll records were secured by MPD and turned over to the writer this date for forwarding to Dade County.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

(99)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

09-30-76 Special Agent Jim Norment, FBI, advises that his office interviewed Joseph F. Nesline relative to the Roselli case, and Nesline admitted to knowing Roselli but would add nothing further.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

10-04-76 0922 hours - interview with William Henry McAvay, W/M, 02-23-52, 11801 Rockville Pike, #1108, Rockville, Maryland, 468-0141 - friend of David Knohl - whereupon McAvay stated the following:

1. two weeks ago Jay's housekeeper called Jay's mother in Florida and told her not to use his Bankamericard anymore.
2. David Knohl's runaway daughter returned home, Friday 10-01-76 she had been in Ocean City, Maryland and California.
3. The FBI questioned David Knohl; however he does not know the gist of the questioning.
4. Larry Luxemburg now owns Car Wholesalers along with Al Davis.
5. Nathan Mensh owns National Auto Brokers Wholesale.
6. Carrafa went to Chicago and Jay Knohl may not have gone with him. Upon Carrafa's return from Chicago, McAvoy noted that Carrafa never mentioned the auction, cars seen, or friends seen as he normally did.

Reference the name Joe Pagano, LKA 1825 South 8th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania found in Janice Piccerelli's telephone book, Philadelphia P.D. O/C advises that their records reflect a Joseph Pagano, W/M, 03-25-41, of 2234 South 19th Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania - President and Director of the "Old Liberty Clown Club", 1216 Sansom Street, Philadelphia, Pa. - out of business.

A check of Philadelphia O/C "location" files reveal that in 1974, at 1825 South 8th Street, Philadelphia, one Carmen Conde, W/M, 07-16-19, FBI #288 615 L2, was arrested as the proprietor

PAGE# ____________

100

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~[illegible]~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

of a gambling house. 1825 S. 8th Street was the number listed under Joseph Pagano's name in Janice Piccerelli's telephone book FBI sheets en route on both.

With reference to Jay Knohl's Bank Americard writer contacted Eddie Gill Murray, Chase Manhattan Bankamericard, Lake Success, New York (516) 328-2778; and Murray stated that in 2/76 they received a flyer from Banker's Trust Company that Jay Knohl should be refused a Bankamericard as it would be used for fraudulent purposes. Banker's Trust Company had numerous Italians, residing at Knohl's 3848 Atlantic Avenue address, perpetrating frauds with Bankamericards. Jay Knohl gave his Social Security number as 109 24 6156, and his FBI sheet notes his Social Security number as 109 24 6876.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

10-05-76 With reference to Carrafa's 1975 toll records to Chicago, Chicago Intelligence advises the following:

(312) 431-6040 (312) 431-6155	Original Warshawsky's 1900 South State Street, Chicago, Illinois
(312) 674-2439	Seymour Gold 6738 East Prairie Lincolnwood, Illinois
(312) 226-6811	Midland Warehouses 1500 South Western Avenue, Chicago, Illinois
(312) 885-5300	U.N. Oil 200 East Golf Road, Palatine, Illinois

With reference to a scrap of paper that belonged to Carrafa with the following notation: (312) 298-1610; same listed to Denalco Leasing, 2340 Des Plaines, Suite 112, Des Plaines, Illinois.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-IHRD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

All of the aforementioned checked negative by Chicago P.D.

It was also learned that the late Janice Mae Piccerelli called the following number on 06-20-76 and 06-30-76: (301) 242-3864.

The following are some of the long distance calls made by Fred B. Black between July 27, 1976 - day before Roselli and Carrafa's disappearance - and August 10th. Carrafa's death was published on 08-05-76 and Roselli's death was known on 08-09-76 - in Washington; also included are some of Black's calls back to 07-15-76, the last day Janice Piccerelli was seen alive:

JULY:

Las Vegas	7/26	(702) 734-0099
Las Vegas	7/27	(702) 735-4740
Fort Lauderdale	7/27	(305) 581-6585
Silver Spring, Md.	7/27	(301) 585-5426
D.C.	7/23	(202) 387-4887
D.C.	7/24	(202) 338-5989
West Palm Beach	7/26	(305) 683-3322
from Vienna, Va.		(703) 471-5344
Beverly Hills	7/26	(213) 553-6060
from W. Palm, Fla.	7/22	(305) 683-3322
Las Vegas	7/22	(702) 735-4768
from W. Palm, Fla.	7/20	(305) 683-3332
Las Vegas	7/20	(702) 382-9651
from W. Palm		(305) 683-3339
from Provo, Utah	7/21	(801) 373-9672
from Provo, Utah	7/21	(801) 373-3400
Springdale, Utah	7/21	(801) 772-3224
D.C.	7/16	(202) 338-5989
from W. Palm, Fla.		(305) 626-4545
Rockville, Md.	7/19	(301) 299-8098
Hempstead, N.Y.	7/26	(516) 481-9000
Philadelphia	7/27	(215) 745-6325
Beverly Hills, Calif.	7/23	(213) 278-0245 ✓
S. Orange, N.J.	7/26	(201) 763-8550
Los Angeles, Calif.	7/21	(213) 878-1100
Las Vegas	7/22	(702) 385-7440
Van Nuys, Calif.	7/18	(213) 986-3675
Baltimore	7/20	(301) 367-7800

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD#~~ 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Las Vegas	7/20	(702) 385-3711
Newark, N.J.	7/13	(201) 481-1400
New York, N.Y.	7/16	(212) 755-7592
Baltimore	7/12	(301) 764-0279 ✓
Baltimore	7/9	(301) 276-3200
from N.Y., N.Y.	7/6	(212) 737-4722
Beverly Hills	7/20	(213) 271-6587

AUGUST:

Las Vegas	8/2	(702) 734-7110
Berlin, Md.	8/6	(301) 641-0936 ✓
Scottsdale, Ariz.	8/11	(602) 948-7594
Las Vegas	8/10	(702) 384-7040
Rochester, Minn.	8/14	(507) 288-3455
from Las Vegas	8/8	(702) 452-3443
Las Vegas	8/10	(702) 384-7040
from D.C.		(202) 296-9612
D.C.	8/3	(202) 387-4887
from Inglewood, Calif.		(213) 646-7742 ✓
Fort Lauderdale	8/3	(305) 581-6585
from W. Palm Beach	8/3	(305) 532-2416
Miami	8/3	(305) 532-2416
from W. Palm	8/4	(305) 683-4905
Arrowhead, Calif.	8/1	(714) 337-3342 ✓
from Las Vegas		(702) 734-1122
Malibu, Calif.	8/1	(213) 457-9152 ✓
D.C.	8/2	(202) 833-9500
Beverly Hills	8/2	(213) 553-6060
D.C.	8/2	(202) 387-4887
D.C. (2 calls)	7/28	(202) 387-4887
from Inglewood, Calif.	7/30	(213) 673-9534 ✓
Dubois, Wyo.	8/28	(307) 455-2702
Ocean City, Md.	8/25	(301) 289-3106 ✓
Miami	8/26	(305) 532-2416
W. Palm Beach, Fla.	8/26	(305) 833-2186
Maimi	8/26	(305) 866-7986
Atlantic City, N.J.	8/27	(609) 344-3161
Baltimore	8/23	(301) 764-1030
North Dade, Fla.	8/23	(305) 652-8818
Boston	8/18	(617) 482-7530

PAGE#

103

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/BD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

from Bronx, N.Y.	8/19	(212) 796-2593
Chicago	8/16	(312) 943-1155
Kitzmiller, Md.	8/12	(301) 453-3479
Baltimore	8/10	(301) 764-0279
Southamboy, N.J.	8/10	(211) 679-2341
Las Vegas	8/10	(702) 734-0099
Newark, N.J.	8/10	(201) 481-1400
Miami	8/10	(305) 858-2500
Balacynwyd, Pa.	8/10	(215) 664-2588
Merchantville, N.J.	8/10	(609) 662-2700
Las Vegas	8/11	(702) 382-1713
Miami	8/11	(305) 633-3083
Chicago	8/8	(312) 943-1155
Scottsdale	8/8	(602) 948-7594
Rochester, Minn.	8/8	(507) 288-3455
N.Y., N.Y.	8/9	(212) 755-7592
Elizabeth, N.J.	8/9	(201) 354-3400
West Fork, Ark.	8/9	(501) 839-2503
W. Palm Beach, Fla.	8/9	(305) 655-4374
W. Palm Beach, Fla.	8/9	(305) 683-3322
Miami	8/10	(305) 866-7986
Roselle, N.J.	8/6	(201) 245-3945
Miami	8/8	(305) 858-0281
Los Angeles	8/4	(213) 272-6235
Orange, Calif.	8/3	(714) 538-4325
Jefferson City, Mo.	8/3	(314) 634-3002
Miami	8/3	(305) 866-7986
N.Y., N.Y.	8/4	(212) 759-3000
Miami	8/4	(305) 666-7874

Information received from CS in New York is as follows reference Joseph Pisano:

same is a W/M, 10-15-38
AKA - Waghaus, Waglary, Shepard
of 239 Lee Avenue, Brooklyn, N.Y.
Indictments: 969/1955
125/1957
Sentences: twice to N.Y. City Penitentiary

PAGE#

104

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XX/RDX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Reference schools attended by Oswald:

1. Public School 117 is now Joseph H. Wade Junior High School 117, 1865 Morris Avenue, Bronx, 10453. It is in District 9; Superintendent Dr. John Green, 1275 Grand Concourse, Bronx, N.Y. 10452.

2. Public School 44 is now Daniel G. Farragut Junior High School, 1825 Prospect Ave., Bronx 10457. It is in District 12; Superintendent Dr. Felton Lewis, 708 East Tremont Ave., Bronx, N.Y. 10457.

C & P Telephone Security advises the following on Janice Mae Piccerelli's calls to (301) 242-3864:

Mildred Bliffen
2340 Research Avenue,
Arbutus, Maryland

Cpl. M. F. Alban

10-05-76

Tolls received from Florida on Lewis E. Iandoli, as applicable to this case, are as follows:

*Bronx	7/23	(212) 993-2900
Manhasset, N.Y.	7/23	(516) 365-8031
*Westhampton, N.Y.	7/23	(516) 288-3115
North Hollywood	7/24	(213) 766-7089
Queens	7/24	(212) 526-3916
*Sun Valley, Cal.	7/24	(213) 767-0420
*Queens	7/25	(212) 291-4858
*Manhasset, N.Y.	7/25	(516) 627-0370
*Sunldtujng, Ca.	7/25	(213) 353-5695
*Brookville, N.Y.	7/25	(516) 626-1714
*Long Beach, Calif.	7/25	(213) 428-1468
*Floral Park, N.Y.	7/25	(516) 488-6135
*Miami	7/26	(305) 261-5581
*North Dade	7/27	(305) 620-0731
*Miami	7/29	(305) 592-7494
*N.Y., N.Y.	7/30	(212) 755-9297
*N.Y., N.Y.	7/30	(212) 421-2444

PAGE# ________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Miami	8/1	(305) 823-3146
Bronx	8/5	(212) 669-3000
Miami	8/6	(305) 823-5000
Longbeach, Calif.	8/6	(213) 428-1468
North Dade, Fla.	8/7	(305) 625-1311
Brookeville, N.Y.	8/15	(516) 626-1051
Houston, Texas	8/24	(713) 656-2129
North Hollywood, Ca.	8/28	(213) 766-7089
Chestertown, Md.	8/29	(301) 778-0548 ✓
Babylon, N.Y.	8/31	(516) 661-0420
W. Palm Beach, Fla.	8/31	(305) 845-2024

FBI rap sheet on Carmen Conde, FBI #288 615 LZ received; and same reflects three arrests by Philadelphia P.D. on gambling charges.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

08-17-76 Patrick Schurman, W/M, 10-13-40, AKA Nutsy, P.O.B. Brooklyn, New York, interviewed by Sgt. S. Michaleski and Cpl. W. Cleveland; and a synopsis of same is as follows:

CarO.C-
mT

1. Schurman stated that he knew Carrafa for sixteen years; was in the Marine Corp. with him; Carrafa was an expert with a rifle and pistol and taught at Quantico; and Carrafa hated his name because it implied Mafia.

2. Schurman further stated that Carrafa said that "that name is going to kill me eventually."

3. Gino was hit because he wanted out; his nerves were shot.

4. Schurman, Carrafa, and L. Piccerelli were friends and we worked together as bouncers in D.C. along with "Little Chico" and Johnny Coffee (ph.)

5. Schurman stated "I've known Lou (Piccerelli) since 1960; his wife just got bumped off in Chicago; she was shot; she was going with a Mafia-man; Gino told me that she was going with a Mafia man. She saw a murder in Chicago - you know how they are, no witnesses; they get rid of them."

6. Ref: Romano's Funeral Home - "someone was talking about that, I think Gino was talking about it. Someone got knocked off and was laid out there."

7. Gino and I always went outside to talk; he was worried about "bugs."

8. Ref: Joe Pisano - heard about him from Gino; Gino said he was "bad news"; he could take care of any action.

9. Ref. following O/C figures:

    a. McGowan - no.
    b. Joe Nesline - I knew him personally; Joe is Charlie Tourine's man; haven't seen Joe in years.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~V-I/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

c. [redacted] - I know him.
d. [redacted] - was Nesline's boy.
e. McCaleb - strikes a bell, but I don't know him personally.

10. I know all the bookies in D.C.

11. '31 Cadillac - Gino took car from California because the guy screwed Gino out of $7,000; they took it for parts.

12. Gino told me that the three cars reported stolen by Gino were never at the shop; Gino and Jay themselves acquired these cars by stealing them.

13. Jay Knohl has a bookie partner in Florida.

14. Jay called D.C. bookies and the guy "Al" in Florida.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE#

108

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
10-15-76	Dade County advises that Chuck Delmonico, AKA Charles English - son of Charlie Tourine - has arisen in their investigation as Delmonico had access to Sam Giancana's basement. It was further learned that Roselli associated with Jimmy Fratianno while in California, and Fratianno is into pornography; and same has associated with Michael Zaffarano. Zaffarano, N.Y.C.P. B#250223 is a member of the New York LCN family of Bonanno - Sciacca; and he owns the Playhouse Theatre, 727 15th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. When in D.C. Zaffarano resides at 1310 New Hampshire Avenue, Washington, D.C. Dr. Robert Sabatino, D.D.S., has also come to light in the Roselli case. Cpl. M. F. Alban No Further Dissemination
10-18-76	Louis Anthony Piccerelli's Marine Corp. record reveals that on March 20, 1957 he was assigned to the Naval Air Technical Training Center, Jacksonville, Florida. Warren Report notes that on March 18, 1957 Lee Harvey Oswald was assigned, for six weeks, to the Naval Air Technical Training Center, Jacksonville, Florida. Lastly, Oswald discharged September 1959 and Piccerelli discharged 10/59. No Further Dissemination Reference Carrafa's Marine Corp. record, same reflects that he served with the 2nd Force Service Regiment from 14 Nov. 60 to 22 Feb. 61. This unit was based at Camp LeJeune, North Carolina, and it deployed to the Caribbean and to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; however it appears that Carrafa was not at Guantanamo based on the short amount of time in that unit. In 1961 Louis Piccerelli was employed at Lenny's Bar, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; and Det. Don Valicki advises that the building in which the club was located was owned by Milwaukee LCN figure James Fazio. The club was run by Benny Salerno, brother of Sam Salerno, New York LCN figures. Salerno's partner was one Jack Smith.

PAGE#

(109)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

It is noted that ~~Anthony Salerno~~ and ~~Angelo Salerno~~ are soliders in the ~~Michael Coppola~~ regime of the Genovese family.

Dade County advises that the following names have come up in their investigation: Dominick Santerelli, James Fazio, Salerno. It was also learned that one ~~Howard Cook~~ was associated, through classical cars, with James Fratiano. It was further learned that Santo Trafficante, FBI #482531B, Miami telephone number ~~(305) 949-9048~~ has been in contact, via telephone, with ~~John Simone~~ of the Angelo Bruno, Philadelphia LCN family.

It has also been learned that Fratiano knew James ~~Ianone~~, AKA ~~Danny Wilson~~.

In 1956 Jay G. Knohl was arrested for armed robbery in Miami along with one ~~Gerald Stuart Held, W/M,~~ NFI.

Reference Giancana's death, it has been learned that Gus Alex and Tony Accardo are considered suspects as well as Charles English.

Source, GK, advises that Michael Grasso and Chuck Delmonico are friends, and Delmonico is now in Florida.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

10-19-76 Re-check of Carrafa's trash reveals the names: ~~Fred Roccaintis Auto, 1260 N. Federal Highway, Pompano Beach, Florida 33062.~~

Accountant for Gino's Classical Cars was ~~Benjamin Weinmann,~~ CPA, New York and Tennessee, Bethesda, Maryland.

~~Daniel C. Pierce, Modern Equipment Cleaning, Inc., 5560 N.W. 84th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33166.~~

~~Tom Larkie, Sportsman Club~~
~~Jim Hightower, 321-7670~~

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE#

(10)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

10-22-76

N.Y.C.P.D., O/C Section, advises that the following are the subscribers of the numbers called by Fred Black in New York.

Phone #	Listed to	Address
(212) 796-2593	R. H. Bergman	600 W 239th St., N.Y., N.Y
(212) 689-2526	Allan B. Alpern Atty.	45 E 89th St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 755-7592	Jane & Majory Gans	340 E 52nd St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 737-4722	J. Majuk	1413 York Ave., N.Y., N.Y
(212) 687-4141	B. Minkoff	60 E 42nd St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 687-4141	Robert Rubin	60 E 42nd St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 687-4141	William Rubin	60 E 42nd St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 753-3500	Hotel Wyndam	42 W 58th St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 687-2244	National Order Systems	2 W 45th St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 759-3000	Hotel Plaza	22 W 59th St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 838-7400	Metropolitan Club	1 E 60th St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 751-3500	Grey Advertisement Inc.	777 3rd Ave., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 246-0212	Solow & Son Diamonds	48 W 48th St., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 486-7378	Rodgers & Hammerstein	598 Madison Ave., N.Y., NY
(212) 352-9381	Parness Window Cleaning	24-31 Francis Lewis Blvd. N.Y., N.Y
(212) 682-6334	Wilson & Allen	200 Park Ave., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 682-6334	T.R.Barton Ins.	200 Park Ave., N.Y., N.Y.
(212) 796-1053	J. Parness	5 Alderbrook Rd.,Bronx,NY

Cpl. M. F. Alban

10-27-76

Reference the number (301) 778-0548 called by Lewis E. Iandoli on 08-29-76, same is to Richard (NMN) Carvell, W/M, 09-19-02, Rt. 3, Country Club Estates, Chestertown, Maryland.

Reference the following numbers * called by Fred Black on 07-12-76, 08-06-76, and 08-25-76 respectively same are to the following:

*(301) 764-0279 (301) 358-0942	Irvin Kovens, W/M, 10-20-17, 3601 Clark Lane, Apt. 502, Baltimore, Md.
(301) 539-8800	Kovens Co. 1335 W. Baltimore St., Baltimore, Maryland

PAGE# ____________

111

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
XXXXX # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

*(301) 641-0936 Harry Elmer Arthur, Jr.
W/M, 07-24-05
Rt. 1, Box 187,
Whaleysville, Maryland

*(301) 289-3106 Tides Motel
7100 Coastal Highway,
Ocean City, Maryland

Reference Irvin Kovens above: Kovens has been indicted along with Md. Governor Marvin Mandel, W. Dale Hess, Harry W. Rodgers, III, William A. Rodgers, and Ernest N. Cory, Jr. on political corruption charges. Mandell, for gifts and a hidden interest in Marlboro (Md.) Race Track attempted to pass legislation lengthening Marlboro's racing days. Kovens and the above mentioned subjects owned Marlboro, and Kovens also has an interest in Charles Town (W. Va.) Race Track.

Reference Fred B. Black's long distance calls to Maryland -

1. (301) 585-5426 G. P. Price
1512 East-West Highway,
Silver Spring, Maryland

MVA reports Gerald Patrick Price, Sr., W/M, 11-07-09, 6'1", 220, and Gerald Patrick Price, Jr., W/M, 01-30-50, 6'2", 169, at the above address.

2. (301) 229-4711 Beverly Peters Heurich
W/F, 11-27-19, 5'4", 135 lbs.,
4940 Sentinel Dr.,
Bethesda, Md.

3. (301) 299-8098 (NON PUB) Harry Turner Gilbert
W/M, 02-27-12, 5'8", 145 lbs.,
11301 South Glen Rd.,
Potomac, Maryland

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
10-28-76 0005	Writer and Sgt. Michaleski interviewed Johanna ~~Knohl, W/F~~ ~~01-09-60~~ P.O.B. Manhattan, New York reference her running away from David Knohl's residence and any knowledge about Jay G. Knohl and Bob White. Johanna stated that David Knohl is her stepfather and Knohl is not her real last name; however she and her sister, ~~Frances Antonette Knohl, W/F, 12-21-61~~, do not know their birth-name or who their father was. Johanna further stated that her mother, Camille Knohl, mentioned that she once worked for a subject named Lou in a D.C. nightclub and it may have been Rand's. Subject probably Louis Piccerelli. Johanna further stated that she knew Bob White and Jay Knohl and that they might be in Montreal, Canada, PQ; however she has no concrete basis for this assumption. Cpl. M. F. Alban
10-29-76	George B. Rose, Consumer Affairs, contacted reference complaints about Gino's Classical Cars when same was located in Rockville. Rose stated that one consumer complained that a Gino salesman, ~~Dennis M. Grady~~, 12213 Pawnee Drive, ~~Gaithersburg, Maryland~~, 948-2237, was selling Gino cars from his home. Nothing further noted. Records check on Grady negative. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XX/RIX~~# 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
11-03-76	Reference Lewis Iandoli's toll calls made in Florida, subscribers are as follows:

Cardel.
mt

(305) 620-0731 (N.P.)	Reed Combest 1601 Rue Vendore Pembroke Lakes, Fla.
(305) 845-2021 (N.P.)	DeSimone Excavation & Foundation Corp. 145 Ocean Drive, Apt. 508 Riveria Beach, Florida
(305) 261-5581	Jantzen Inc. 777 N.W. 72nd Avenue, Miami, Florida
(305) 592-7494	General Adjustment Bureau 5200 N.W. 84th Avenue, Miami, Florida
(305) 823-3146	Guy H. Vurt 6931 Holly Road, Miami, Florida
(305) 823-5000	Dr. Marvin Baker Palm Meadow Hospital 2001 W. 68th Street, Hialeah, Florida
(305) 625-1311	✓ Calder Race Course 21001 N.W. 27th Avenue, Miami, Florida

Cpl. M. F. Alban

10-04-76	Schurman called writer and advised that Jay Knohl's girlfriend, Linda, was dealing with Stanley Tashoff reference the sale of Gino's Classical Cars.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XXXXX~~ ~~V-I/RD#~~ 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
11-04-76 Carlell -	CS advises that one Michael Viner, brother of Robert Viner, worked for John Roselli; and Michael Viner delivered money from Roselli to Judith Campbell Exner. Tongsun Park allegedly uses Robert Viner's box seats at the Capital Center, and Viner and Sonny Jurgensen attended a 1975 New Years day party at Park's home. Robert Viner can be contacted, when he is in New York, at (212) 628-2204 or (212) 759-9826. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

115

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~XX/RXX~~# 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE — OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

11-05-76

Carollo - mt

Chicago P.D. Intelligence identified the following companies with telephone number (312) 939-4523; said number checks to 327 South LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois.

Commercial Transport Corporation
American Commercial Barge Line Company
Commercial Carriers Corporation
Jefferson Boat & Machine Company
Jeffersonville Boat & Machine Company

State of Illinois Certified List of Domestic and Foreign Corporations for 1975 reveals the following:

American Commercial Barge Line Company, Registered Agent is C.T. Corporation System, 208 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois; President is F. H. Blaske, P. O. Box 610, Jeffersonville Indiana; Secretary is W. B. Threlkeld, 3800 Frederica Street, Owensboro, Kentucky.

Commercial Carriers Incorporated, Registered Agent is C. T. Corporation System, 208 S. LaSalle Street, Chicago, Illinois; President is J. G. Skala of 2965 Hickory Lane, Anne Arbor, Michigan; Secretary is W. B. Threlkeld of 1255 Hickory Lane, Owensboro, Kentucky.

Commercial Transport Incorporated, Registered Agent is D. R. McClane of South 20th Street, P. O. Box 297, Belleville, Illinois; President is Alfred R. White, same address; Secretary is same as Resident Agent.

Jefferson Boat and Machine Company and Jeffersonville Boat and Machine Company are not listed with the State of Illinois.

It is noted that Fred Black, when staying at the Kahler Hotel on 05-14-76, listed his address as the Commercial Transfer Corporation, and the number of same was (312) 939-4523.

Janice Piccerelli's father is Melvin Elick Bliffen, W/M, 12-03-17, 5/11, 175, of 2340 Research Avenue, Baltimore, Maryland, and according to a relative, he is involved in the rackets in Baltimore. Baltimore County P.D. has no intelligence on this subject.

Cpl. M. F. Alban
PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
[illegible] 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
11-08-76 [illegible]	Reference the name Vincent Besumaria and the number 656-2332 in Janice Piccerelli's personal telephone book, same resides at 5609 Old Chester Road, Bethesda, Maryland; and same owns Vincent & Vincent Hair Stylers, 517 11th Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. Gesumaria is a member, 1976, of the Progress Club, 7826 Eastern Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. The name Iscidore Cohen, noted as being a member of the Progress Club by D. C. Intelligence, is not noted in the 1976 membership list for the Progress Club. Cpl. M. F. Alban
11-09-76	Stanley Tashoff contacted and he stated that he was mailed a power of attorney, that enables him to sell Gino's Classical Cars, from a girl named Linda; however he refused to divulge her name. The power of attorney is allegedly signed by Jay Knohl. Tashoff related that Mrs. Carrafa vouched for Linda and knows her last name. Writer called Mrs. Carrafa and she stated that she did not know Linda's last name but she lived at Seagate. Writer persuaded Mrs. Carrafa to contact Tashoff and secure Linda's last name. Mrs. Carrafa called writer and stated that Tashoff met Linda, Gator, (ph.) in New York and received the power of attorney. She further related that the power of attorney is dated 08-12-76. Cpl. M. F. Alban
11-10-76	NYPD O/C, Elflein, advises that a New York reporter called him reference one William Medina who was shot (DOA), and inquired as to whether Medina's name was linked to Columbo or the Carrafa case as he recognized Medina's name but couldn't place it. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

(117)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~[illegible]~~# 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
11-10-76	Sgt. Jack Hanford, Broward County Sheriff's Department, called and stated that he had a source in Ft. Lauderdale, Ed Byrnes, who asked him to inquire as to whether a Maryland man named Carrafa was found murdered in Staten Island, New York. Source will contact New York Homicide, and writer has apprised New York Homicide of above. Cpl. M. F. Alban
11-15-76	According to the Washington Post, 11-13-76, the Justice Department discovered a 1964 memorandum by the late FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover saying that Lee Harvey Oswald told Cuban officia in advance of President Kennedy's assassination that he intended to kill the President. The source allegedly was told this by Fidel Castro. Documentation exists placing Oswald in Mexico City less than two months before the assassination, and he met three alleged Cuban intelligence agents identified as Luisa Calderon, Manuel Vegas Perez, and Rogelio Rodriguez Lopez. Oswald also was in contact with an embassy official named Siliva Duran. Fred Black's toll records reveal that on 08-12-76 he called (301) 453-3479, Joseph Shiman, retired D. C. Police Inspector; and (312) 943-1155, Louis J. Lederer. NYPD O/C reports that the Cuban gambling operations in New York are being controlled by Ricardo Ramos and in New Jersey they are controlled by Bayonne Joe (NFI). Both allegedly under Genovese. David Knohl's toll records reveal numerous calls to (301) 627-6500. Said number is subscribed to by Radio Communications Inc., Prince Frederick, Maryland. D.C. advises that Charles English, AKA Chuck Delmonico, resides in Dade County, Florida; and he also owns a jewelry store in Miami. English's father Charles Tourine, AKA Charlie The Blade, FBI #695 716, resides at 7928 West Drive, Apartment 908, North Bay Village, Miami, Florida; and source advises that Joseph Francis Nesline, W/M, 09-12-13, FBI #831391 is currently visiting Tourine. Source further advises that Frank Sturgis - one of the Watergate burglars - knows Nesline and

PAGE#

(118)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD#~~ 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Tourine, and he once worked for them in a gambling casino.

Dade County Homicide advises that Fred B. Black's toll records reflect that he called Jack Ben Cooper, W/M, 11-29-15, FBI #924194E, after calling Roselli's brother-in-law, Daigle, and inquiring about Roselli's disappearance. Cooper is a known associate of Santo Trafficante.

It was also learned that Sam Cagnina, W/M, 12-13-35, FBI #349 955 C, is a viable suspect in the Roselli homicide.

On 10-01-76 Santo Trafficante appeared before the Senate Intelligence Committee, and he stated that he last talked to Roselli in July of 1976.

It was further learned that a Cuban, LNO Aleman, in May or June, told a Washington Post reporter that Roselli, Angelo Bruno, and Santo Trafficante had a meeting wherein the JFK "hit" was discussed.

NYCPD O/C advises that the area of Brooklyn wherein Jay G. Knohl had his policy operation is controlled by the Columbo family.

Reference the name and telephone number of Tom Antico, (212) SA 7-0183, found with Carrafa's business cards, telephone subscriber information reveals that the above number is listed to Hale Crenzo, 98 Victory Blvd., Staten Island, New York. With reference to the address of 2410 Sheridan - found in Carrafa's desk locator - N.Y.P.D. advises that Sheridan in New York only goes to the 1500 block.

With reference to inquiries made of N.Y. Board of Education as to the possibility of Jay G. Knohl attending the same schools, at the same time, as Lee Harvey Oswald, Joseph H. Wade, Jr. High School, formerly P.S. 117, reports that Jay G. Knohl was never a student there.

With reference to P.S. 44 in the Bronx - Oswald there 9/53 to 12/53 - Felton E. Lewis, Community Superintendent sent writer the following letter:

PAGE# ____________

119

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD#~~ 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
	"...The regulations under which we function do not permit us to release any information on a student or former student, without written permission from that individual or from a parent if the individual is under eighteen years of age. We will release the information on Mr. Knohl if we receive written permission from him. We cannot, however, release information on any of his classmates if he did indeed attend P.S. 44." Cpl. M. F. Alban
11-17-76	Rhode Island State Police advise that (401) 278-6472 is listed to Industrial National Bank of Rhode Island. This number was called by Fred B. Black. Interview with David Knohl revealed, allegedly, that Jay G. Knohl attended Brooklyn College, James Madison High and P.S. 206 in Brooklyn. Jay G. Knohl's alias is Sidney Firguerson. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD#~~ 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE — OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

11-30-76

Long Beach, California P.D. report #7618005, notes that one Jon Frederick Martin, W/M, 07-21-43,N S.S. #552 68 0122, reported that he left his 1931 Cadillac with one Paul Albert Schinnerer, W/M, 04-30-24,N S.S. #571-22-9607, for six years for the purpose of restoration, and when he went to get his vehicle he found that numerous parts were missing.

Long Beach, California P.D. report #761-3111, notes that the above Paul Albert Schinnerer reported his 1930 Cadillac as stolen, and it was noted that Schinnerer was restoring the car for Louis Iandoli, #1 Compas Road, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida; however Iandoli sold the vehicle to Carrafa. The stolen vehicle had parts missing, and ill feelings developed between victim and Carrafa. Schinnerer told investigating officers that he was holding the missing parts as the original owner, Iandoli, owed him $1400.00; and he had heard through second and third party intermediaries that possible bodily harm might come to him if the parts didn't show up. Schinnerer suspects that Carrafa took this vehicle, and Martin suspects that some of his parts were on the stolen vehicle.

FBI records check on Martin and Schinnerer revealed that Martin, FBI #728 014 F, has four arrests, the last, and most serious, being drunk driving, carrying concealed weapons, and possession of dangerous drugs; Schinnerer, FBI #891 202 B, has four arrests - all for oral copulation, oral sex perversion and lewd conduct.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

12-08-76

Detective Al Santoro, NYCPD, advised that last week, in Sea Gate, New York, George Goran, the man who swore out sodomy charges against Knohl, was about to enter his car when an unknown assailant in a yellow automobile sped past him, firing a shotgun blast at his head. Goran was wounded in the neck, and with Goran, at the time of this incident, was his nine-year old son, the complainant against Knohl.

The day before Goran was shot, Jose SotoN - who posted $60,000 worth of Knohl's bond - narrowly escaped death when a car attempted to run him down.

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR
~~VI/RD~~# 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
	The two incidents came shortly after Knohl's attorney made a reported attempt to deal with prosecutors by offering to turn Knohl over to them in return for a bail reduction or a lessening of charges against him. Cpl. M. F. Alban
12-09-76	Det. McKevitt, NYCPD O/C, advises that Soto was upset about the forfeiture of the bond he posted for Knohl, and a meeting was set-up at a vacant house between Soto and Bob White's lawyer; however no one appeared at the meeting. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

122

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD~~# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
01-03-77	LAPD advises the following subscriber information on the numbers called by Fred Black:

213/273-6022	Published	LAPPEN-ABELSON-HARRIS, Attys. 361 N. Camden Dr., Beverly Hills, Ca.
213/274-7179	Non-published	Sidney Traxler, Atty. 9460 Wilshire Blvd., 8th floor, Beverly Hills, Ca.
213/274-7777	Published	Beverly Hilton Hotel 9876 Wilshire Blvd., Beverly Hills, California
213/278-0245	Published	Joe Klapperman 342 N. Rodeo Dr., #105, Beverly Hills, Ca.
213/552-2860	Non-published	Charles Wessler 10385 W. Olympic Blvd., #8, W. Los Angeles, Ca.
213/624-2654	Published	Glasser Brothers, Bailbondsman 999 N. Vignes Los Angeles, Ca.
213/646-7742	Published	TWA 350 World Way International Airport
213/670-9462	Public Telephone	350 World Way International Airport
213/673-9534	Public Telephone	550 World Way International Airport
213/974-4211	Published	Los Angeles Sheriff's Office 320 W. Temple St., Los Angeles, Ca.

PAGE# ________

123

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~V-I/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

213/457-9152 - Published - M. F. Affolter
6711 S. Wandermere Rd.,
Malibu, Ca.

714/328-3172 - Published - Fred Wilson
41001 Thunderbird Rd.,
Rancho Mirage, Ca.

714/337-3342 - Published - Fred C. Wilson
833 Shelter Cove Dr.,
Lake Arrowhead, Ca.

213/272-4008 - Published - Irving G. Glasser
838 N. Doheny Dr., Apt. 706,
Los Angeles, Ca.
FBI #1576546 - a local bailbondsman

213/272-6235 - Published - Management Brokers Inc.
130 E. Camio Drive,
Beverly Hills, Ca.

213/273-0555 - Published - Edward Levinson
917 N. Beverly Dr.,
Beverly Hills, Ca.
FBI #3591999

Edward Levinson, former Florida and Kentucky bookmaker, is currently residing in Southern California with his wife, Betty. Levinson, a close associate of organized crime figure Meyer Lansky, has had numerous interests in various East Coast and Las Vegas casinos. Currently, his wife, Betty, is investing in a restaurant-cocktail lounge and gambling casino at Lake Elsinore.

Levinson's criminal record dates back to 1928 when he was charged with operating a gambling place in Detroit. He was repeatedly arrested for the same offense, but each time the charge was dismissed.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

[illegible]# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

During the 1964 Senate Rules Committee investigation of the Bobby Baker case, Levinson claimed the privilege of the 1st, 4th, and 5th Amendments. During the investigation, it was revealed that Levinson was a stockholder with Baker in the Waikiki Savings and Loan Association in Honolulu, the other members being Cliff Jones and his law partner, Louis Weiner; Edward Barrick, a part-owner in the Flamingo, Fremont, and Horseshoe Club; Mike Singer, deceased labor racketeer and former business agent of Teamster Local 626 in Los Angeles; Morris "Moe" Genser, former assistant chief investigator for the California Department of Motor Vehicles, later indicted for bribery, grand theft, extortion, and assorted other crimes; and Fred Black, Jr. Levinson also joined with Baker and Black in a stock deal which involved the Farmers and Merchants State Bank in Tulsa, Oklahoma.

In May 1967, a U. S. Grand Jury in Las Vegas returned an indictment of income tax evasion against Levinson; Edward Torres, former vice president of the Fremont Hotel; and Paul Weyerman and Cornelius Hurlay, former stockholders and employees of the Fremont Hotel.

In March 1968, Levinson pled nolo contendere to the "skimming" charges, admitting that he had "willfully aided and assisted in the preparation of false corporate tax returns for the fiscal year ending in 1963", and was fined $5,000.

In 1967, a group of organized crime figures attempted to defraud the Chase Manhattan Bank of almost $2 million, using the Exchange Bank of Geneva, Switzerland as a cover. The bank was owned by a group of Americans, including several prominent businessmen, as well as Levinson and Benjamin Siegelbaum. The investigation revealed that the Swiss bank had served as a "laundry shop" for Mafia money for years.

On March 1, 1974, Levinson's wife, Betty, invested approximately $90,000 as a stockholder in Lake Elsinore Sands, Inc., a "restaurant, cocktail lounge, and gambling casino" at Lake Elsinore. The officers of Lake Elsinore Sands, Inc., are Jack Barenfeld, President, who was arrested in 1934 for suspicion of murder; and Carl Braverman, Vice President and Treasurer, who was arrested in West Virginia in 1927 for larceny and again in New York in 1943 for untrue advertising. Barenfeld and Braverman are also partners in B & B Ltd.

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXX/RDX# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

Levinson then moved to Newport, Kentucky, where he operated the Flamingo Club, a casino, along with Las Vegas racketeer Irving "Nig" Devine. In 1951, he moved to Miami Beach, where he operated the bookmaking concession at the San Souci Hotel. Levinson was chased out of Miami in 1951 by the Kefauver Committee, so he ventured to Las Vegas and became part-owner in the Sands Hotel, which was being operated for Joseph "Doc" Stacher, a Meyer Lansky lieutenant.

By 1955, Levinson, having acquired interests in the Flamingo and Dunes hotels, was ready to give them all up for his coming involvement in Doc Stacher's Fremont Hotel. At that same time, he also acquired a major interest in the Horseshoe Club. (By late 1963, he was the largest single stockholder in the Fremont Hotel and in the Horseshoe.)

He became involved in the establishment of the Bank of World Commerce, Ltd., which incorporated in 1961 under British law in Nassau. Ed Levinson and Cliff "Big Juice" Jones, former Nevada Lieutenant Governor, were listed as stockholders, with the directors of the bank being Levinson; Benjamin Sigelbaum, a reported bagman for Meyer Lansky; Irving Devine; and John Pullman. Reportedly, the Bank of World Commerce served as a "laundromat" for syndicate cash by allowing money to flow into the bank only to return to the United States from Nassau in the form of loans for everything from homes for gangsters to savings and loan associations around the country.

During the 1960's Levinson became associated with several political figures. No only did he aid financially troubled Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa, but he became a partner in the Serv-U Vending Corporation with Bobby Baker, then secretary to the Democratic Majority Leader of the United States Senate; Fred Black, Jr., a Washington lobbyist for North American Aviation Company; and Benjamin Siegelbaum. This company provided vending machines for companies working on government contracts and was substituted for a firm that had handled North American Aviation's vending business for years, despite the fact that Serv-U had no employees, vending machines, or experience.

In 1962, Levinson, along with Benjamin Sigelbaum, appeared to be involved in Airway Hotel, Inc., the hotel corporation which created the Intenational Airport Hotel on Century Boulevard in Los Angeles.

PAGE# ____________

126

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXXYRXX# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

It appears that Riverside County may be in for several changes due to influence by outside elements. Since Levinson entered the area, Lake Elsinore has amended its ordinance to allow the Lake Elsinore Sands to serve liquor in its card room. Robert Willis Wilson, another newcomer to Riverside County, has proposed an initiative to legalize gambling. (For further information, see June 1974 Criminal Information Bulletin). With the new gambling interests in Riverside County, it may in time become the Las Vegas of California.

Dade County Homicide advises that one Samuel Ray Calabrese, AKA Whole, W/M, 02-22-33, FBI #577 794 J1, S.S. #554-42-0214, may have information relative to the Roselli homicide.

Virginia State Police advise that Calabrese was recently arrested with the following subjects in Richmond, Virginia:

1. Sanford E. Rafsky, W/M, 43

2. Thomas Francis Regan
   W/M, 10-09-28

3. Joseph Charles Palumbo
   W/M, 08-01-29
   of 338 Ednam Drive, Charlottesville, Va.
   (804) 295-5880
   Office: 2307 Commonwealth Dr.,
   Charlottesville, Va.
   (804) 973-3306

On 12-20-76 NYCPD, Det. Scarpati, (212) 946-3311, sent a TTY to this jurisdiction reference ascertaining whether one William Thompson, 15221 Manor Lake Drive, Wheaton, Maryland purchased a certain shotgun from the Sportsman Shop in Bethesda, Maryland; and whether Thompson knew Jay Knohl. Officer Packard, Wheaton-Glenmont, determined that Thompson purchased two shotguns and sold both about 1 1/2 years ago to David Knohl; and Thompson understood that the shotguns had been given to Jay Knohl. Thompson further stated that he knew Gino Carrafa.

Vehicle parked at Thompson residence had Maryland vanity tag PEACE, and same listed to Bish Thompson's Restaurant, 7935 Wisconsin Avenue, Bethesda, Maryland.

PAGE# ____________

(127)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/ID#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

12-13-76 Reference toll calls made by Fred Black, Detective Long, Baltimore County Police Department, advises the following subscriber information:

(301) 542-8400 - Teamco of Baltimore, Inc.
4430 Park Heights Avenue,
Baltimore, Maryland

Cardell -
mf

(301) 276-7555 changed - Teamco of Baltimore
to 276-3200

(301) 539-0400 - Seaboard Finance Corp.
9 Light Street,
Baltimore, Maryland - dials directly to a
Mr. Sidney Movens office

(301) 366-1085 - Micro Inc.
3001 Vineyard Lane,
Baltimore, Maryland

(301) 542-8800 - American Bio-physical Corp.

(301) 764-1030 - private residence - Glen Burnie

(301) 367-7800 - Sinai Hospital

(301) 667-6650 - private residence, Timonium area

Washington Star article, 12-09-76, states that Dr. Alberto Garcia Menocal, a prominent Cuban exile, stated that Lee Harvey Oswald met repeatedly with Fidel Castro's diplomats in Mexico before the assassination of President John F. Kennedy.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

128

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD~~# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

On 12-28-76 Johanna Knohl was arrested by Officer S. Kessler in a stolen 1972 Ford Thunderbird, New York registration 403 NZS. Johanna Knohl stated that she left home in November and was picked up by a subject named Lyle William Cothern in Georgia. After going to Florida both subjects allegedly went to Las Vegas, Nevada; and Knohl took the vehicle there and returned to Maryland. Vehicle was stolen in Pompano Beach, Florida; and same is registered to Shirley (NMN) Drexler, 250 Garth Road, Scarsdale, New York.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

01-04-76 N.Y.P.D. Organized Crime advises that Dorothy Chapnick is Bob White's girlfriend. It was also learned that Bob White is using the alias Aaron White, and he recently registered two of blocks away from Max Staton's address. Staton previously resided at 325 Chauncey Street, Brooklyn, New York.

On 12-21-76 Larry Samuel Policano, Jr., W/M, 06-23-38, was allegedly robbed of $18,150 in cash at the Montgomery Mall. Further investigation revealed that $47,550 was stolen, and $29,400 was gambling proceeds. It was also determined that Policano's organized crime connections include the following:

(1) Robert Lester Cathers
W/M, 06-23-38

(2) Joseph Boogich (deceased)
NYCPD B#263778
LKA 1204 East 91st St.,
Brooklyn, New York

Policano was previously employed by National Auto Brokers and Bill Bogley. Joseph Boogich was murdered in NYC in 1971 and he was a Luchese family associates according to Nassau County Police.

Mrs. Carol Carrafa interviewed and she stated that Gino Carrafa knew both Policano and Cathers. (See OCR report on Policano for further details.)

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
01-13-77	Detective Williams, Crimes Against Property Unit, reports that Knohl's runaway daughter told him that her father, David Paul Knohl, and her mother, were bookmakers in New York prior to moving to Maryland. Knohl is still taking bets according to the daughter over his mobile telephone 855-6500. Knohl's home number is 774-3875. 855-6500 is the same mobile operator used by Policano. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# __________

130

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

12-14-76

Information from Dade County that one Sam Calabrese - current in jail in Richmond, Virginia - may have information on the Roselli homicide.

Ex-CIA Agent ~~Jim O'Connell~~ was interviewed by Dade County reference the Roselli case.

Confidential source at MVA advises that Carol Carrafa recently purchased a new Continental Mark V, white in color. Source further advises that Mrs. Carrafa is always dressed in the latest fashions, and source feels that she is living beyond her means.

Jay Knohl's attorney Stanley Tashoff contacted and he stated that he has not sold Gino's, though he does have an offer. Tashoff further related that Mrs. Carrafa collected a substantial amount of insurance upon her husband's death.

N.Y.P.D. advises that Jose Soto may be deeply involved in the narcotics business.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

12-22-76

Information received from Virginia State Police that Sam Calabrese is Samuel Ray Calabrese, AKA "Whole," W/M, 02-22-33, FBI #577 494 J1, S.S. #554-42-0214. Calabrese was involved in the Virginia SBA investigation along with the following subjects:

(1) Sanford E. Rafsky
W/M, 48
of Forest Hills, N.Y. & Miami, Fla.

(2) Thomas Francis Regan
W/M, 10-09-28

(3) Joseph Charles Palumbo
W/M, 08-01-29
residence: 338 Ednam Dr., Charlottesville, Va.
(804) 295-5880
office: 2307 Commonwealth Dr., Charlottesville, Va
(804) 973-3306

PAGE# ______

(131)

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

(4) John J. Lombardozzi

(5) Alexander Heller

Subject #5, Heller, was involved with Sam Cagnina, W/M, 12-13-35, in a Florida deal.

Virginia State Police further advise that Palumbo and Regan went to Las Vegas, Nevada where they met Calabrese for the purpose of building a hospital.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD~~# OCR 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
02-08-77	San Diego County, California, D.A.'s office, is working a case wherein classical cars are being stolen and Cruze Autioneers may be involved. A subject by the name of Michael Leibowitz, AKA Michael Lane, Lloyd Hersh, and LNO Stefano from New York, are allegedly involved in this theft ring. Another subject by the name of Godoy Glad - an Orange County narcotics figure - is also involved in San Diego's case. Further information to follow. Cpl. M. Alban

PAGE# ____________

133

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~XXXXX~~ VI/RD# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE | OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES

02-25-77 San Diego County District Attorney advises that Peter Epsteen, mentioned earlier in this report, but spelled incorrectly, is a car dealer with known organized crime ties in Southern California. Epsteen is originally from Chicago. It was further learned that one Jack Lambert - a hotel manager - is alleged to be a partner of Joe Namath. Lambert was an associate of the recently murdered Frank Bompensiero.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

02-27-77 The following five LCN figures were subpoenaed to answer questioned in Miami relative to the Roselli murder:

Meyer Lansky
Anthony Giacalone
Charles (The Blade) Tourine
Gus Alex
Julio Greco

Cpl. M. F. Alban

03-01-77 Washington Post article, 03-01-77, notes that Richard McVeight, former U. S. Attorney for Alaska; Alex Miller, former Democratic national committeeman for Alaska, and Frank Irick were found innocent of conspiring to set up a multimillion-dollar gambling and prostitution ring.

Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

134

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXXXXXX ~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
02-15-77	Detective Al Siragusa, N.Y.P.D., called reference writer contacting Mrs. Carrafa about her making arrangements for the disposal of her late husband's 1971 Continental. Writer contacted Mrs. Carrafa at (301) 840-9425, and she stated that Gino's Classical Cars was sold to the man who had the business next door. It was also learned that Mrs. Carrafa's son-in-law has left her daughter, and Mrs. Carrafa's home is up for sale. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ____________

135

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXX/RDX#X OCR 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE:

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
03/07/77	San Diego County District Attorney's office advises that the following figures have been linked to a classical car theft ring in California:

1. Rene Byron Piccarreto AKA The Painter of New York
   Bonnano Family
2. Joe Sica
   of New York - Bonnano Family
3. Harold Alonyo Williams, N/M
   California "hit man"
4. Robert Frederick Pressler
5. Jimmy Caci

Cpl. M. Alban

PAGE#

136

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XXWRDX# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
03-17-77	Dade County advises that the day after Frank Bompensiero's murder in San Diego, 02-11-77, Gus Alex, Jackie Cerone, and Tony Ricci had a meeting in Florida. Bompensiero was an informant on members of the Giancana family - of which Alex, Cerone, and Ricci were members - and these three subjects were subpoenaed to testify relative to the Roselli murder. On 03-16-77 Santo Trafficante, Jr. invoked the First, Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, fourteen times, in refusing to answer questions about the Kennedy assassination. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# __________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

XX/XXX# OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
03-31-77	A gangland enforcer - involved in the assassination attempt on Fidele Castro - Charles Nicoletti was found shot to death in a burning car near the Golden Horns Restaurant in Northlake, Illinois. Nicoletti was once a capo in the Chicago family, and he was once Sam Giancana's right-hand man. On 03-29-77 George de Mohrenschildt - former friend of Oswald - allegedly committed suicide in Manalapan, Florida at the home of Mrs. Charles Tilton, III. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

OCR # 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE:

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
4/12/77	Miami Herald article, 4/8/77, notes that Philip Cerone, W/M/63, of 8335 S.W. 72nd Ave., Miami, Florida, - an executioner for the Chicago LCN - refused to answer questions about the murder of John Rosselli. Cpl. M. Alban

PAGE#

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT CASE REFERENCE: CARRAFA, Eugene Michael

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
04-13-77	Tpr. Thomas Cloud, Pa. State Police, called and stated that on 10-14-75 Jay Knohl reported a '33 Rolls Royce convertible, serial number A9M, two tone tan, valued at $32,000 stolen. Vehicle was stolen from Dutch Wonderland at a Cruze auction, and one Dave Schwartz was with Knohl when the theft was reported. The following names have come up during the Pennsylvania investigation: 1. Bishop Auto Tops and Boat Covers, New York 2. Kristine Mann - Floral Park, New York 3. Richard Mann 4. Sherril Goldstein,Fresh Meadows, New York Cpl. M. F. Alban
04-26-77	Charles Rettstadt, Michigan Department Attorney General, reports that Lou Piccerelli is running a bar in Warren, Michigan - The Three of Us - and on his liquor license application Piccerelli noted that he was only arrested once; and he was never married. Piccerelli is known to associate with one Ronald Morelli, an LCN figure. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ________

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 6-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: Eugene Michael Carrafa

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
05-31-77	Washington Post article dated 05-29-77 notes that Harry Aleman, a reputed crime syndicate hit man from Melrose Park, was acquitted in the murder of William Logan by Cook County Circuit Court Judge Frank J. Wilson following a bench trial. Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE# ______

VICE-INTELLIGENCE DIVISION
MONTGOMERY COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

CONTINUING INVESTIGATIONS REPORTS

~~VI/RD#~~ OCR 76-32

SUBJECT/CASE REFERENCE: Carrafa, Eugene M.

DATE	OBSERVATIONS/INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED/EXPENSES
06-17-77	Source, SOI 16, advises that Frank Paterno was part of the Carrafa, Piccerelli, Knohl, Sherman crowd; and Paterno had mental problems, due to pills, in 1964. Carrafa also was acquainted with one Mary Bray, NFI; and a subject in Dansbury, Connecticut name Coffee (ph.) Cpl. M. F. Alban

PAGE#

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10117-10245
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	004062

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	11/25/1977
PAGES :	4
SUBJECTS :	BOLDEN, ABRAHAM USSS; STAFF FOSTER, WILLIAM
DOCUMENT TYPE :	OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/14/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	HSCA outside contact report. Box 86.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

KENNEDY

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT 004062

DATE 11/25/77 TIME

I. Identifying Information:

Name Mr. William Foster Telephone

Address Federal Probation Office, Northern District, Ill.

Type of Contact: X Telephone
__ Person

II. Summary of Contact:

In re: Former SS Agent Abraham Bolden DOB 1/19/35; Social Security No. 330-28-2266. A trace of Abraham Bolden's prison record was developed from a newspaper article found in the LBJ Library which mentioned initial incarceration in Springfield, Mo. Mr. Bolden was transferred from Springfield to Maxwell Field Federal Prison Camp (Montgomery, Alabama) and was placed on parole in September of 1959. Maxwell retained no records except for an indication that at some time Bolden stated that he had had "a residence in Chicago." This lead suggested that an inquiry be made to the Federal Probation service for the Chicago area.

Coincidentally, Mr. Foster was the probation officer who personally supervised Mr. Bolden while Bolden was on probation. (cont.)

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

Signature Belford V. Lawson, III

Form #5

Foster remarked that the Bolden case was unique in his experience because of the nondisclosure by authorities of information that is automatically released to the probation officer in a given case.

Specifically, in every other case which Mr. Foster has processed, the prosecutor gave the probation officer a "version," i.e., a recital of fact about the crime and the circumstances surrounding it. Only in cases where an undercover informant is under parole supervision is the name of the informant withheld, but even then a version is always presented despite the witholding of the name. In Bolden's case, the prosecutor gave the probation officer only the indictment. Bolden's prosecutor was named Richard T. Sykes.

Mr. Foster's statement about Mr. Bolden's record while under parole supervision was that Mr. Bolden violated parole by talking to the media in order to convey his information that the Secret Service knew about the assassination three or four weeks before Dallas. However, for reasons which were not disclosed either to Mr. Foster or on the record Mr. Bolden's parole status was not revoked. Foster recounted that his records show that Bolden's statement was published in the April 12, 1970 Chicago Sun-Times.

Mr. Foster also set forth certain materials about Mr. Bolden's prosecution and conviction, supplying enough detail to make clear that at least one of the witnesses upon whose testimony the conviction was based subsequently recanted his testimony. The recantation, however, did not enable Bolden to overturn his conviction.

Mr. Foster then provided the following information about Mr. Bolden and the name and addresses of Bolden's relatives. The validity of the information is not confirmed for the period after 1972.

past employer of Mr. Bolden: National Lead Company
1800 S. Peoria Street
Chicago, Illinois

address for Bolden: 7632 S. Sangomon
Chicago, Illinois
Phone: 488-4822

residents at that address: Barbara Bolden (wife)
Alvia Bolden (daughter)
Abraham Bolden, Jr. (son)
Darren Bolden (son)

Father's address: Daniel Bolden, Sr.
431 Pfeiffer Road
East St. Louis, Illinois

Mother's address: Ophelia Bolden
325 N. 26th Street
East St. Louis, Illinois

brother: Daniel Bolden, Jr.
2128 Kimball Avenue
North Chicago (or Chicago) IL.

brother: Benjamin Bolden
(resides with father)

sister: Cecelia Griffin
92 Sangomon Street
Chicago, Illinois

sister: Eara Dixon
3317 Bond Street
East St. Louis, Illinois

sister: Faye Bolden
(resides with mother)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/13/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10120-10150
RECORD SERIES :	NUMBERED FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	015081

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	02/24/1978
PAGES :	3
SUBJECTS :	CAISON, LARRY F. DOD, FILES USAF GOBEL, RUDOLPH STANLEY, WILLIAM C. FISCHER, CHARLES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	SUMMARY
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	05/09/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 292.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

KENNEDY ~~015072~~

015081

INVESTIGATION INTERVIEW SCHEDULE

1. Identifying Information:

Name Sgt. Lewis Wesley LEBER
Address Headquarters TAC
City/State Langley AFB, VA 23665

Date of Birth 38 years
Social Security 226-52-6354

Date 2/24/78 12:03 P.M.
Place Bldg. #693 HQS TAC
Langley AFB
Telephone

M or S
Spouse
Children

2. Physical Description:

Height
Weight
Ethnic Group

Color Eyes Hair
Special Characteristics

3. Personal History:

a. Present Employment:
Address
Telephone

b. Criminal Record
1. Arrests
2. Convictions

4. Additional Personal Information:

a. Relative(s): Name
Address

b. Area frequented:

c. Remarks:

Investigator

Date

Form #4-B

SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

NAME Sgt. Lewis Wesley LEBER Date 2/24/78 Time 12:03P.M.

Address Headquarters TAC Place Bldg. #693 Hqs. TAC

Langley AFB, VA

Interview:

Due to the nature of the interview, DOD approval was sought and acquired prior to scheduling contact with Sgt. LEBER. The sensitive nature of the military activities at Langley AFB also required that approval be given to Sgt. Leber to participate in the interview with the undersigned, which in turn resulted in the presence of two military personnel at the outset of the session, namely Colonel Gene D. Hunter and Special Agent David Herb Pelham, both of the USAF Office of Special Investigations. (804) 764-7778

Because of the awkward circumstances, the two civilian-attired military observers were asked to leave the room IN ORDER to help Sgt. Leber ~~to~~ relax and to encourage freer recall. Without objection, both observers left soon after the interview began.

During the course of the conversation with Sgt. Leber, the following information was elicited:

1. Subject recalled the full name of the person in question as Captain William C. STANLEY, Special Security Officer for Headquarters TAC-Intelligence. Captain Stanley had been working under a Major Rudolph GOBEL sometime during 1970 and/or 1971.

Interviewer
(Signature)

Clifford A. Fenton, Jr.
(Typed)

Date Transcribed 3/20/78 jeg

2. Since Leber was transferred to Hqs. TAC at Langley AFB in 1970, he only knew STANLEY for approximately 2-3 months (exact time unknown). However, during this period of time, LEBER does not recall any conversation with STANLEY relative to the JFK assassination, Russia, Cuba and/or Mexico.

3. LEBER stated that Capt. STANLEY was an ex-enlisted man who had served 16 years in the Army and was about 38 years of age in 1970. He was possibly "r.i.f.'ed" from the service in 1971 and was said to have had severe financial problems.

4. Further, it is believed that Capt. STANLEY left the service and went to study law at the University of Miami (Florida) in 1971.

5. Two servicemen were identified as having served under Capt. STANLEY, namely Larry F. CAISON and Chief Master Sergeant Charles FISCHER, about whom, it was felt, additional information could be secured.

Following the termination of the interview, assistance was provided in obtaining the addresses of the above-referenced servicemen:

Lt. Col. Rudolph D. GOBEL, Jr., Retired
2671 Merrie Oaks Road
Winter Park, Florida 32789

Larry F. CAISON
1508 Gronin Drive
Hampton, Virginia

At the present time the whereabouts of Sgt. FISCHER and Capt. STANLEY are unknown.

DATE 03/07/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/79 TO 02/28/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	24,900.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	02-01-79	02-28-79	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	02-01-79	02-28-79	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
108-30-7723	EMAN EL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR	43,500.00	3,625.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	38,400.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCH ATTORNEY	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00	1,916.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	17,000.00	1,416.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W ACTING DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	13,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
027-38-2968	WATRISS,HELEN WHITNEY ASSISTANT EDITOR	27,000.00	2,250.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	1,200.00	100.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	40,600.00	3,383.33	02-01-79	02-28-79	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 03/07/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/79 TO 02/28/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID/ACTIVE		THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	16	16	34,300.01	34,300.01
GRAND TOTAL	16	16	34,300.01	34,300.01

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Staff Director

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 03/07/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/79 TO 02/28/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	24,900.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	02-01-79	02-28-79	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEP TY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	02-01-79	02-28-79	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
108-30-7723	EMAN EL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOC MENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS DEP TY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR	43,500.00	3,625.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	38,400.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOC MENT CLERK	14,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCH ATTORNEY	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00	1,916.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	17,000.00	1,416.67	02-01-79	02-28-79	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W ACTING DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	13,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-79
027-38-2968	WATRISS,HELEN WHITNEY ASSISTANT EDITOR	27,000.00	2,250.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	1,200.00	100.00	02-01-79	02-28-79	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP TY CHIEF COUNSEL	40,600.00	3,383.33	02-01-79	02-28-79	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 03/07/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/79 TO 02/28/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID/ACTIVE		THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	16	16	34,300.01	34,300.01
GRAND TOTAL	16	16	34,300.01	34,300.01

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

DATE 02/04/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/79 TO 01/31/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY		GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00		2,250.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,800.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00		3,033.33 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	24,900.00		2,075.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	*	2,500.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	27,100.00		150.56 ✓	01-01-79	01-02-79	TERMINATED 01-02-79
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	*	3,958.33 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	*	3,708.33 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
354-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	16,100.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
454-52-5320	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00		1,500.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00		1,333.33 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	47,500.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	*	1,500.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	*	1,166.67 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	40,600.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,100.00	*	1,341.66 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	45,200.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 02/04/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/79 TO 01/31/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	23,400.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 *	2,666.67 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	4,200.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	45,900.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	16,800.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B SENIOR COUNSEL	32,000.00	1,777.78 ✓	01-01-79	01-20-79	TERMINATED 01-20-79 ✓
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	29,300.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00 *	1,425.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR	43,500.00 *	3,625.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	38,400.00	3,200.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	23,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	27,100.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCH ATTORNEY	24,000.00 *	2,000.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	16,800.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	31,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78

DATE 02/04/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/79 TO 01/31/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY.	27,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00 *	1,916.67 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	16,100.00 *	1,341.66 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	19,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	19,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	17,000.00 *	1,416.66 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	43,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	16,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	16,700.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	13,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	16,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W ACTING DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	13,700.00	1,141.67 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
027-38-2968	WATRISS,HELEN WHITNEY ASSISTANT EDITOR	27,000.00 *	2,250.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
049-34-8393	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	16,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78

DATE 02/04/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/79 TO 01/31/79

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY		GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	1,200.00	*	100.00 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	16,800.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	22,700.00		0.00			TERMINATED 12-31-78
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	40,600.00	*	3,383.34 ✓	01-01-79	01-31-79	APPOINTMENT 01-03-79

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID	/ACTIVE	THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	26	24	51,928.33	50,000.01
GRAND TOTAL	26	24	51,928.33	50,000.01

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

Chairman Louis Stokes for January 1 & 2, 1979 only.

Allowed:

Clerk of the House for January 3 - 31, 1979

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 12/01/76
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/76 TO 11/30/76

OFFICE: 06689. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 39,600.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		20,000.00	1,666.67	11-01-76	11-30-76	
AMATO,CAROLYN HANSEN SECRETARY	257-56-9440		16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-76	11-30-76	
BAISH,EDYTH TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	169-16-0121		18,000.00	100.00	11-29-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-29-76
BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		15,000.00	1,208.33	11-02-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-02-76
BROOTEN,KENNETH EDWARD,JR STAFF COUNSEL	519-42-7339		34,000.00	2,833.33	11-01-76	11-30-76	
CHARDAK,BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		34,000.00	188.89	11-29-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-29-76
FEENEY,RICHARD J CLERK	213-46-6688		25,000.00	2,083.33	11-01-76	11-30-76	P/R CHANGE--11-01-76
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		25,000.00	2,083.33	11-01-76	11-30-76	P/R CHANGE--11-01-76
HESS,JACQUELINE ASSISTANT CHIEF RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		20,000.00	1,666.67	11-01-76	11-30-76	
KIEL,JOSEPH STAFF COUNSEL	214-38-6637		30,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-76	11-15-76	TERMINATED 11-15-76
KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		14,000 00	77.78	11-29-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-29-76
LARSON,BILLIE GAY SECRETARY	529-60-6414		13,000.00	1,083.33	11-01-76	11-30-76	
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		13,000.00	577.78	11-15-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-15-76
MARTIN,REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		20,000.00	1,277.78	11-08-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-08-76
MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. CLERK	240-66-7674		14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-76	11-30-76	
MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		15,000.00	333.33	11-23-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-23-76
ORR,PATRICIA M RESEARCHER	215-66-2714		13,000.00	850.00	11-22-76	11-21-76	P/R CHANGE--11-22-76
OZER,ROBERT C STAFF COUNSEL	174-32-6125		30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-76	11-30-76	
SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		8,000.00	444.44	11-11-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-11-76
SPRAGUE,RICHARD A ACTING COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	402-30-6486		39,600.00	3,300.00	11-01-76	11-30-76	
THORNELL,JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		25,000.00	1,597.22	11-08-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-08-76
WALSH,KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		15,000.00	41.67	11-30-76	11-30-76	APPOINTMENT 11-30-76

DEC 8 1976

DATE: DEC 7, 1976

OFFICE NAME: SEL. COMM. ON ASSASSINATIONS

OFFICE CODE: 06689

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/76 TO 11/31/76

NOVEMBER PAID IN DECEMBER

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
TINAJERO, DOROTHY R Task Force Office Manager	427-54-6905		18,000.00	400.00	11-23-76	11-30-76	APPT. 11-23-76

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
CLERK HIRE CHARGES	1			400.00			

CORRECT: SERVICES RENDERED.
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PERSONS NAMED ON THE WITHIN PAYROLL IS NOT PROHIBITED BY ANY PROVISIONS OF LAW LIMITING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE APPROPRIATION (S) INVOLVED

....

DATE 12/01/76
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/76 TO 11/30/76

OFFICE: 06689. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES		PROJECTION		NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
				THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NEXT MONTH	UNUSED		
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	21	0	136,962.77	27,663.88	109,298.89	35,549.99	73,748.90		

CORRECT: SERVICES RENDERED.
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE EMPLOYMENT OF THE PERSONS NAMED ON THE WITHIN PAYROLL IS NOT PROHIBITED BY ANY PROVISIONS OF LAW LIMITING THE AVAILABILITY OF THE APPROPRIATION(S) INVOLVED

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

* Indicates employees paid on supplemental payroll in November, 1976.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 01/05/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/78 TO 12/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,800.00	2,733.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	33,100.00	2,758.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	27,100.00	2,258.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,000.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-20-78	TERMINATED 12-20-78
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	77.78 ✓	12-01-78	12-02-78	TERMINATED 12-02-78
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	47,500.00	3,958.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-15-78	TERMINATED 12-15-78
354-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00	2,166.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	47,500.00	3,958.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	

DATE 01/05/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/78 TO 12/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	40,600.00	3,383.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	45,200.00	3,766.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	2,141.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	23,400.00	1,950.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00	958.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	4,200.00	350.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	45,900.00	3,825.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	42,700.00	3,558.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	29,300.00	2,441.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR	43,500.00	3,625.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	0.00 ✓			TERMINATED 12-15-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	23,500.00	1,958.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	27,100.00	2,258.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	

DATE 01/05/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/78 TO 12/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	19,000.00	1,583.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	31,700.00	2,641.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00	1,916.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	16,700.00	1,391.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	16,800.00	46.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-01-78	TERMINATED 12-01-78
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	16,100.00	0.00 ✓			TERMINATED 11-30-78
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	19,000.00	1,583.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	19,700.00	1,641.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	17,000.00	1,416.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	43,000.00	3,583.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	16,000.00	1,333.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	16,700.00	1,391.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	13,000.00	1,083.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	

DATE 01/05/79 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/78 TO 12/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	16,000.00	1,333.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	622.22 ✓	12-01-78	12-07-78	TERMINATED 12-07-78
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	18,100.00	1,508.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
027-38-2968	WATRISS,HELEN WHITNEY ASSISTANT EDITOR	27,000.00	2,250.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	1,607.22 ✓	12-01-78	12-22-78	TERMINATED 12-22-78
049-34-8693	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	16,000.00	1,333.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	22,700.00	1,891.67 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	P/R CHANGE--12-01-78
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33 ✓	12-01-78	12-31-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 12/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/78 TO 11/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	27,100.00	2,258.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	888.89	11-01-78	11-20-78	TERMINATED 11-20-78
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	47,500.00	3,958.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	APPOINTMENT 11-01-78
354-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00	2,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	8,000.00	666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	1,011.11	11-01-78	11-10-78	TERMINATED 11-10-78
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00	958.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	4,200.00	350.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	APPOINTMENT 11-01-78
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	29,300.00	2,441.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR	41,200.00	3,433.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	0.00			LWOP SINCE--07-16-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	

DATE 12/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/78 TO 11/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	19,000.00	1,583.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	31,700.00	2,641.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00	1,916.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	16,700.00	1,391.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	19,700.00	1,641.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	16,700.00	1,391.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	

DATE 12/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/78 TO 11/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	13,000.00	1,083.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	13,700.00	1,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
027-38-2968	WATRISS,HELEN WHITNEY ASSISTANT EDITOR	27,000.00	2,100.00	11-03-78	11-30-78	APPOINTMENT 11-03-78
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 12/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/78 TO 11/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	27,100.00	2,258.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	888.89	11-01-78	11-20-78	TERMINATED 11-20-78
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	47,500.00	3,958.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	APPOINTMENT 11-01-78
354-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00	2,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	8,000.00	666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	1,011.11	11-01-78	11-10-78	TERMINATED 11-10-78
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00	958.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	4,200.00	350.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	APPOINTMENT 11-01-78
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	29,300.00	2,441.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS DEPUTY STAFF DIR & BUDGET OFCR	41,200.00	3,433.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	0.00			LWOP SINCE--07-16-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	

DATE 12/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/78 TO 11/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	19,000.00	1,583.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	31,700.00	2,641.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00	1,916.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	16,700.00	1,391.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	19,700.00	1,641.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	16,700.00	1,391.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	P/R CHANGE--11-01-78
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	

DATE 12/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/78 TO 11/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	13,000.00	1,083.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	13,700.00	1,141.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
027-38-2968	WATRISS,HELEN WHITNEY ASSISTANT EDITOR	27,000.00	2,100.00	11-03-78	11-30-78	APPOINTMENT 11-03-78
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	11-01-78	11-30-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	11-01-78	11-30-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-78	11-30-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 11/03/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/78 TO 10/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	47,500.00	3,958.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
354-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00	2,166.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	8,000.00	666.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	2,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00	958.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00	3,433.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	0.00			LWOP SINCE--07-16-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	25,700.00	2,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,800.00	2,233.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	

DATE 11/03/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/78 TO 10/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
047-34-7188	MCDONALD,JAMES E SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL	38,000.00	211.11	10-01-78	10-02-78	TERMINATED 10-02-78
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	23,000.00	1,916.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	16,800.00	1,400.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	16,100.00	1,341.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00	1,291.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	13,000.00	1,083.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	13,700.00	1,141.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E DEPUTY CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	26,300.00	2,191.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	16,800.00	1,400.00	10-01-78	10-31-78	P/R CHANGE--10-01-78
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	10-01-78	10-31-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	10-01-78	10-31-78	

DATE 11/03/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PAGE 1211
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/78 TO 10/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID	ACTIVE	THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	86	85	163,277.80	163,066.69
GRAND TOTAL	86	85	163,277.80	163,066.69

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

ok
JH

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 10/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/78 TO 09/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 08-31-78
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
351-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A (Dipaolo -sp.) RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00	2,166.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	8,000.00	666.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	P/R CHANGE--09-01-78
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	

DATE 10/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/78 TO 09/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	2,141.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00	958.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	875.00	09-01-78	09-15-78	TERMINATED 09-15-78
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00	3,433.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	0.00			LWOP SINCE--07-16-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	

DATE 10/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/78 TO 09/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
047-34-7188	MCDONALD,JAMES E SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL	38,000.00	3,166.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	Terminated 10-2-78
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00	1,291.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	

DATE 10/05/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/78 TO 09/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00	958.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB,DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	550.00	09-01-78	09-11-78	TERMINATED 09-11-78
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	20,900.00	0.00			TERMINATED 08-31-78
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-78	09-30-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	09-01-78	09-30-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	09-01-78	09-30-78	

DATE 09/06/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/78 TO 08/31/78

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	Term. 8/31/78
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
354-42-1661	DEPAOLO,PAUL A RESEARCH ATTORNEY	26,000.00	2,166.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	APPOINTMENT 08-01-78
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	4,000.00	333.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	P/R CHANGE--08-01-78 8,000 9/1
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	15,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-78
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-78

DATE 09/06/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PAGE 1235
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/78 TO 08/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00 ✓	2,675.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
033-40-0589	GOLDEN,PAUL T XEROX/MESSENGER	11,500.00 X	766.67	08-07-78	08-31-78	APPOINTMENT 08-07-78
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
148-52-9861	GREEN,CHARLOTTE A SUMMER INTERN	6,240.00 ✓	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-78
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00 X	1,750.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	Term. 9-15-78
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00 ✓	3,433.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00 ✓	0.00			LWOP SINCE--07-16-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	1,125.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00 ✓	3,708.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	

DATE 09/06/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/78 TO 08/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-78
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
047-34-7188	MCDONALD,JAMES E SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL	38,000.00	3,166.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	Term. 10-2-78
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	

DATE 09/06/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 CERTIFICATION REPORT
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/78 TO 08/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-78
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00 ✓	1,783.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00 ✓	1,291.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00 ✓	958.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	1,125.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB,DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 X	1,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	Term 9-11-78
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	20,900.00 X	1,741.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	Term 8-31-78
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	08-01-78	08-31-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	08-01-78	08-31-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	08-01-78	08-31-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 08/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/78 TO 07/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	2,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	P/R CHANGE--07-01-78
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	583.33	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
438-88-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,066.67	07-01-78	07-16-78	TERMINATED 07-16-78
462-88-1332	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	

DATE 08/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/78 TO 07/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00 X	07-01-78	07-31-78	Terminated 7/9/78
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W ~~RESEARCHER~~ Staff Counsel	25,700.00	2,141.67 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
148-52-9861	GREEN,CHARLOTTE A SUMMER INTERN	6,240.00	520.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	1,750.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00 ✓	07-01-78	07-31-78	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	1,038.89	07-01-78	07-11-78	TERMINATED 07-11-78
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00	3,433.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	

DATE 08/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/78 TO 07/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD		REMARKS
				FROM	TO	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	1,716.67	07-01-78	07-15-78	LWOP SINCE--07-16-78
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 06-30-78
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	450.00	07-01-78	07-09-78	TERMINATED 07-09-78
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
047-34-7188	MCDONALD,JAMES E SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL	38,000.00	3,166.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00	712.50	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	

DATE 08/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/78 TO 07/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	19,300.00	1,608.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	P/R CHANGE--07-01-78
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 06-30-78
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00	1,291.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00	666.67	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00	583.33	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00	958.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00	804.17	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78

DATE 08/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/78 TO 07/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A. STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB,DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	P/R CHANGE--07-01-78
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	20,900.00	1,741.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-78	07-31-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	07-01-78	07-31-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	07-01-78	07-31-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-78	07-15-78	TERMINATED 07-15-78

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 07/08/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/78 TO 06/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
302-46-7079	ADRINE,RONALD STAFF COUNSEL	27,000.00	1,950.00	06-05-78	06-30-78	APPOINTMENT 06-05-78
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	P/R CHANGE--06-01-78
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	1,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00	1,458.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	P/R CHANGE--06-01-78

DATE 07/08/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/78 TO 06/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00	2,141.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
148-52-9861	GREEN,CHARLOTTE A SUMMER INTERN	6,240.00	520.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	1,750.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00	1,425.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00	3,433.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	

DATE 07/08/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/78 TO 06/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	3,433.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	16,100.00	1,341.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	P/R CHANGE--06-01-78
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00	3,708.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	16,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 05-31-78
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
047-34-7188	MCDONALD,JAMES E SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL	38,000.00	3,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	2,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	

DATE 07/08/78 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/78 TO 06/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00	1,875.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00	1,783.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00	1,291.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00	958.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00	1,125.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00	791.67	06-01-78	06-19-78	TERMINATED 06-19-78

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/78 TO 06/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00	1,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00	1,608.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB,DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	20,900.00	1,741.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	06-01-78	06-30-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	06-01-78	06-30-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-78	06-30-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 06/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/78 TO 05/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00 ✓	1,966.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	P/R CHANGE--05-01-78
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00 ✓	3,958.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00 ✓	3,708.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00 ✓	1,458.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	

DATE 06/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/78 TO 05/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00✓	3,033.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00✓	2,675.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00✓	2,666.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
148-52-9861	GREEN,CHARLOTTE A SUMMER INTERN	6,240.00✓	329.33	05-12-78	05-31-78	APPOINTMENT 05-12-78
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00✓	1,750.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00✓	2,316.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00✓	2,666.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00✓	2,316.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	

DATE 06/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/78 TO 05/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
577-76-1080	JACKSON,BEVERLY SECRETARY	13,500.00✓	600.00	05-15-78	05-31-78	APPOINTMENT 05-15-78
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00✓	3,708.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	X 5/31/78
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00✓	3,033.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	X 6/30/78
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
047-34-7188	MCDONALD,JAMES E SENIOR STAFF COUNSEL	38,000.00✓	3,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	APPOINTMENT 05-01-78
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00✓	2,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00✓	1,791.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00✓	2,675.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00✓	1,875.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	

DATE 06/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/78 TO 05/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00 ✓	1,558.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	1,125.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00 ✓	1,783.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00 ✓	1,291.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00 ✓	958.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	1,125.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78 x	6/22/78
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	

DATE 06/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/78 TO 05/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00✓	1,608.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB,DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	20,900.00✓	1,741.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	P/R CHANGE--05-01-78
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00✓	1,341.67	05-01-78	05-31-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	05-01-78	05-31-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	05-01-78	05-31-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 05/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/78 TO 04/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY ✓	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00 ✓	1,966.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	13,700.00 ✓	1,141.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	P/R CHANGE--04-01-78 ✓
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00 ✓	3,958.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00 ✓	3,708.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00 ✓	1,458.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	

DATE 05/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/78 TO 04/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00✓	3,033.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	27,800.00✓	77.22	04-01-78	04-01-78	TERMINATED 04-01-78✓
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00✓	2,675.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00✓	2,666.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00✓	1,750.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00✓	2,316.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00✓	2,666.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00✓	2,316.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	

DATE 05/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/78 TO 04/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00 ✓	3,708.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00 ✓	3,033.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,833.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00 ✓	2,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00 ✓	1,791.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00 ✓	2,675.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00 ✓	1,875.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
237-90-5178	NORRIS,ELIZABETH BROWN STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	

DATE 05/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/78 TO 04/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00 ✓	1,558.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	1,125.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	21,400.00 ✓	1,783.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	P/R CHANGE--04-01-78 ✓
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	25,700.00 ✓	1,856.11	04-01-78	04-26-78	TERMINATED 04-26-78 ✓
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00 ✓	1,291.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00 ✓	958.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH,CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	1,125.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00 ✓	1,608.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	

DATE 05/03/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/78 TO 04/30/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB,DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00 ✓	1,625.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	04-01-78	04-30-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	04-01-78	04-30-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	04-01-78	04-30-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 04/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
290-50-4529	BERK,CHARLES M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	800.00	03-15-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-15-78 ✓
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00 ✓	1,966.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
139-24-4355	BILLINGS,RICHARD N EDITORIAL CHIEF	30,000.00 ✓	2,083.33	03-06-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-06-78 ✓
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00 ✓	3,958.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
579-58-9427	BRIGGS,YVONNE W SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	666.67	03-15-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-15-78 ✓
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
098-20-3182	BROWN.WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
438-48-7116	BURAS.ROBERT C.JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✗	0.00			TERMINATED 02-28-78 ✓
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
086-46-9506	CHAMPION.OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
024-44-5163	COLLINS.WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
263-06-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
460-74-1179	CORNWELL.GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00 ✓	3,708.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	17,500.00 ✓	1,458.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	

DATE 04/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ×	0.00			TERMINATED 02-28-78 ✓
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00 ✓	3,033.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
527-96-7881	EWING,MICHAEL SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	900.00	03-13-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-13-78 ✓
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00 ✓	2,675.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00 ✓	1,750.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H OFFICE MGR-KENNEDY SUBC	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓

DATE 04/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	533.33	03-01-78	03-08-78	TERMINATED 03-08-78 ✓
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	44,500.00✓	3,708.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	17,100.00✓	807.50	03-01-78	03-17-78	TERMINATED 03-17-78 ✓
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00✓	3,033.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✗	0.00			TERMINATED 02-28-78 ✓
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	45,500.00✗	0.00			TERMINATED 02-28-78 ✓
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C RESEARCHER/SECRETARY	18,000.00✓	1,100.00	03-01-78	03-22-78	TERMINATED 03-22-78 ✓
013-34-3361	MATHEWS.ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	

DATE 04/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00✓	2,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00✓	1,791.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00✓	2,675.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	22,500.00✓	1,875.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78✓
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00✓	1,558.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00✓	1,341.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	375.00	03-01-78	03-09-78	TERMINATED 03-09-78✓
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78✓
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78✓
192-34-0781	RIFE,REBECCA A SECRETARY	13,500.00✓	937.50	03-06-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-06-78✓
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00✓	1,666.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
042-42-5437	SACCO,THOMAS W RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00✓	200.00	03-27-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-27-78✓
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78✓
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	15,500.00✓	1,291.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78✓
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
114-44-4360	SHAPIRO,HOWARD L RESEARCHER ATTORNEY	18,000.00✓	500.00	03-21-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-21-78✓

DATE 04/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
245-56-4327	SISSON, BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH, BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00 ✓	958.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
578-68-0385	SMITH, CONSTANCE C SECRETARY	13,500.00 ✓	675.00	03-13-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-13-78 ✓
528-64-5299	SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER, MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00 ✓	2,666.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND, ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN, LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
036-34-9187	TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00 ✓	1,608.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
216-34-9326	THOMAS, JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER, OLIVE E STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
260-40-7319	WALKER, ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN, MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
542-60-3245	WEBB, DEAN B RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	550.00	03-20-78	03-31-78	APPOINTMENT 03-20-78 ✓
049-34-8893	WEBB, WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	P/R CHANGE--03-01-78 ✓
102-40-6872	WELBURN, BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER, ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS, MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00 ✓	1,625.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN, LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	03-01-78	03-31-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF, JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	03-01-78	03-31-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE, RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	03-01-78	03-31-78	

DATE 04/05/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/78 TO 03/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID/ACTIVE		THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	118	114	209,945.00	213,316.67
GRAND TOTAL	118	114	209,945.00	213,316.67

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 03/09/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/78 TO 02/28/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY SENIOR COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	P/R CHANGE--02-01-78
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00	1,833.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
438-48-7116	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	11,000.00	916.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00	1,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	

DATE 03/09/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/78 TO 02/28/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00	1,208.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	P/R CHANGE--02-01-78
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	27,800.00	2,316.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
272-42-7056	GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	38,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 01-31-78
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	1,750.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00	3,433.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	3,433.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	

DATE 03/09/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/78 TO 02/28/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	P/R CHANGE--02-01-78
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	17,100.00	1,425.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	45,500.00	3,791.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C RESEARCHER/SECRETARY	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00	2,166.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
301-46-2531	MCHARGH,KENNETH S STAFF ATTORNEY	27,000.00	675.00	02-22-78	02-28-78	APPOINTMENT 02-22-78
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/78 TO 02/28/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	P/R CHANGE--02-01-78
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	21,400.00	1,783.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00	1,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00	1,666.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00	1,625.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00	1,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00	958.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	11,000.00	916.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	

DATE 03/09/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/78 TO 02/28/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00	1,608.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	14,000.00	1,166.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	02-01-78	02-28-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	02-01-78	02-28-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	02-01-78	02-28-78	

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 02/10/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/78 TO 01/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00	1,833.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00	1,966.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
438-48-7116	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	11,000.00	916.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00	1,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	

DATE 02/10/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/78 TO 01/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00	1,208.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00	3,208.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	27,800.00	2,316.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
272-42-7056	GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	38,500.00	3,208.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00	1,425.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	1,750.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00	3,433.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00	3,433.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/78 TO 01/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
577-56-7465	JOHNSON,LILLIAN B SECRETARY	13,000.00	433.33	01-01-78	01-12-78	TERMINATED 01-12-78
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	17,100.00	1,425.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00	3,033.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	45,500.00	3,791.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C RESEARCHER/SECRETARY	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00	2,166.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	

DATE 02/10/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/78 TO 01/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00	2,675.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	21,400.00	1,783.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00	1,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00	2,141.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	P/R CHANGE--01-01-78
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00	1,666.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00	1,625.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00	1,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00	958.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	11,000.00	916.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	

DATE 02/10/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/78 TO 01/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00	1,608.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	14,000.00	1,166.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	01-01-78	01-31-78	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	01-01-78	01-31-78	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	01-01-78	01-31-78	

DATE 02/10/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/78 TO 01/31/78

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID/ACTIVE		THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	114	113	210,341.66	209,908.33
GRAND TOTAL	114	113	210,341.66	209,908.33

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	✓25,700.00	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓22,000.00	1,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	✓28,000.00	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 ✓
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	✓23,600.00	1,966.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 ✓
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	✓25,700.00	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	✓47,500.00	3,958.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	✓28,000.00	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
438-48-7116	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	✓12,000.00	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	✓11,000.00	916.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
024-44-5163	COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	✓18,000.00	100.00	12-29-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-29-77
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	✓16,100.00	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	✓12,000.00	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	✓42,500.00	3,541.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	✓16,000.00	1,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
462-88-1832	DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
454-52-5820	DOWNEY,JANE LIND SECRETARY	✓15,000.00	41.67	12-30-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-30-77

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	✓ 14,500.00	1,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	✓ 34,000.00	2,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	✓ 14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	✓ 38,500.00	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	✓ 27,800.00	2,316.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	✓ 12,000.00	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 38,500.00	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	✓ 15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 32,100.00	2,675.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
272-42-7056	GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	✓ 38,500.00	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	✓ 18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	✓ 17,100.00	1,425.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	✓ 30,000.00	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	✓ 21,000.00	1,750.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	✓ 27,800.00	2,316.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	✓ 15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	✓ 30,000.00	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	✓ 27,800.00	2,316.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	✓ 15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
559-28-5038	HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 11-30-77 11/4/77
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	✓ 34,000.00	2,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	✓ 41,200.00	3,433.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	✓41,200.00	3,433.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	✓36,400.00	3,033.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
577-56-7465	JOHNSON,LILLIAN B SECRETARY	✓13,000.00	1,083.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
577-32-9574	JOHNSTON,ALICE E RECEPTIONIST	12,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 11-30-77 11/14/77
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	✓12,000.00	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	✓17,100.00	1,425.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	✓36,400.00	3,033.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	✓34,000.00	2,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
371-32-3731	KUHN,DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	✓14,000.00	777.78	12-01-77	12-20-77	TERMINATED 12-20-77
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	✓25,700.00	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	✓25,700.00	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	✓45,500.00	3,791.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	✓12,000.00	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	✓18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	✓18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	✓18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C RESEARCHER/SECRETARY	✓18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	✓26,000.00	2,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	✓30,000.00	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	✓ 17,100.00	1,425.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	✓ 21,500.00	1,791.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	✓ 14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 32,100.00	2,675.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	✓ 21,400.00	1,783.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	✓ 15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	✓ 18,000.00	200.00	12-27-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-27-77
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	✓ 18,700.00	1,558.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	✓ 16,100.00	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	✓ 18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH SECRETARY	✓ 15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	✓ 25,700.00	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	✓ 12,000.00	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	✓ 16,100.00	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	✓ 15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
048-58-4432	ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	✓ 18,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 11-30-77
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	✓ 20,000.00	1,666.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	✓ 19,500.00	1,625.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	✓ 14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓ 16,000.00	1,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	✓ 14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	✓ 11,500.00	958.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	✓28,000.00	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	✓11,000.00	916.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	✓19,300.00	1,608.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	✓30,000.00	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	✓14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	✓28,000.00	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	✓15,000.00	41.67	12-30-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-30-77
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	✓16,000.00	1,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	✓19,500.00	1,625.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	✓15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	✓16,100.00	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	✓38,500.00	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	✓24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM		EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948		AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
390-44-4227	(1)	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00✓	1,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
075-14-0710		BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
046-36-4592		BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00✓	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
327-46-4790		BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-46-4548		BERNING,ELIZABETH L CHIEF CLERK	23,600.00✓	1,966.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
243-74-5787		BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
243-48-4536		BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00✓	3,958.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
556-78-1139		BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00✓	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
237-90-5178		BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
098-20-3182		BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
438-48-7116	(2)	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
414-98-4025		BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
086-46-9506		CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	11,000.00✓	916.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77 ✓
024-44-5163		COLLINS,WENDY S RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00✓	100.00	12-29-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-29-77 ✓
438-86-9756		CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	16,100.00✓	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
263-08-0234		COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
460-74-1179		CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00✓	3,541.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
579-40-4377		CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
220-36-0563		CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
132-14-2717		DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
229-26-0374		DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
436-62-4154	(3)	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
462-88-1832		DINNEEN,EILEEN GAIL RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
454-52-5820		DOWNEY,JANE LIND SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	41.67	12-30-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-30-77 ✓

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00 ✓	1,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
136-28-8924	(4) FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00 ✓	2,675.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
272-42-7056	(5) GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	38,500.00 ✓	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E OFFICE MANAGER	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
082-14-2877	(4) GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
212-58-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00 ✓	1,750.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00 ✓	2,316.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
~~559-28-5038~~	~~HOLT,LAURA MAE~~ ~~STAFF COUNSEL~~	~~24,000.00~~	~~0.00~~			~~TERMINATED 11-30-77~~
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	41,200.00 ✓	3,433.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	41,200.00✓	3,433.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,400.00✓	3,033.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
ok ~~577-56-7465~~ (5)	~~JOHNSON,LILLIAN B~~ ~~SECRETARY~~	13,000.00✓	1,083.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
~~577-32-9574~~	~~JOHNSTON,ALICE E~~ ~~RECEPTIONIST~~	~~12,000.00~~	~~-0.00~~			~~TERMINATED 11-30-77~~
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	36,400.00✓	3,033.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
371-32-3731	KUHN,DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	14,000.00✓	777.78	12-01-77	12-20-77	TERMINATED 12-20-77
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
Leap		30,000.00✓	2,500.00			
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	45,500.00✓	3,791.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C RESEARCHER/SECRETARY	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00✓	2,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00 ✓	1,425.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00 ✓	1,791.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	32,100.00 ✓	2,675.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	21,400.00 ✓	1,783.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
129-36-3080	OPPENBERG,GALE LYNN RESEARCH ATTORNEY	18,000.00 ✓	200.00	12-27-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-27-77 ✓
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00 ✓	1,558.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
508-22-0421 Parisi ←	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00 ✓ → 28.000.00	1,500.00 2.333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
254-66-1801 (b)	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III RESEARCHER	16,100.00 ✓	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
~~048-58-4432~~	~~ROSEN,MERETE MUFF~~ ~~RESEARCHER~~	~~18,000.00~~	~~0.00~~			~~TERMINATED 11-30-77~~
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00 ✓	1,666.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00 ✓	1,625.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00 ✓	958.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	

DATE 01/06/78
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/77 TO 12/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W CLERICAL ASSISTANT	11,000.00	916.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	19,300.00	1,608.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
260-40-7319	(b) WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	
102-40-6872	WELBURN,BRENDA L RESEARCHER	15,000.00	41.67	12-30-77	12-31-77	APPOINTMENT 12-30-77
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H ASSISTANT CHIEF CLERK	19,500.00	1,625.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN RESEARCHER	16,100.00	1,341.67	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER DEP CHIEF COUNSEL, LEGAL UNIT	38,500.00	3,208.33	12-01-77	12-31-77	P/R CHANGE--12-01-77
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	12-01-77	12-31-77	

114
1 Leap
1 Parisi

116
1 Johnson, L

115

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	✓AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
390-44-4227	✓BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00✓	1,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
075-14-0710	✓BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	1,133.33	11-14-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-14-77 ✓
046-36-4592	✓BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
327-46-4790	✓BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-46-4548	✓BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	22,000.00✓	1,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
243-74-5787	✓BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00✓	2,141.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
243-48-4536	✓BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00✓	3,958.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
556-78-1139	✓BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
237-90-5178	✓BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	13,000.00✓	1,083.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
098-20-3182	✓BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
438-48-7116	✓BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
414-98-4025	✓BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
086-46-9506	✓CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	9,500.00✓	791.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
438-86-9756	✓CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
263-08-0234	✓COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
462-88-1832	✓COPELAND,EILEEN RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
460-74-1179	✓CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00✓	3,541.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-40-4377	✓CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
220-36-0563	✓CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
132-14-2717	✓DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
229-26-8374	✓DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
436-62-4154	✓DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
578-32-6132	✓EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00✓	1,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
324-40-6284	✓EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PAGE 1205
REPORT ID D01.00.00 PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	36,000.00	3,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	26,000.00	2,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	333.33	11-21-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-21-77
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	36,000.00	3,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
272-42-7056	GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
219-40-9759	GIANGRASSO,DOMINICK K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 10-31-77
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	1,750.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	26,000.00	2,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00	2,316.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
559-28-5038	HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
577-56-7465	JOHNSON,LILLIAN B SECRETARY	13,000.00	1,083.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
577-32-9574	JOHNSTON,ALICE E RECEPTIONIST	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,172.22	11-08-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-08-77
371-32-3731	KUHN,DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	11,000.00	916.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
042-32-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00	2,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00	1,425.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30,000.00	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	20,000.00	1,666.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00	1,558.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00	416.67	11-21-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-21-77
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
048-58-4432	ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00	1,666.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00	1,625.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00	958.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
227-76-3525	✓ STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
264-98-4680	✓ SVENDSEN,LANCE W XEROX/MESSENGER	9,500.00 ✓	791.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
036-34-9187	✓ TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
216-34-9326	✓ THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
550-50-7581	✓ TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
101-22-5012	✓ WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	11,000.00 ✓	916.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
260-40-7319	✓ WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
087-26-0521	✓ WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
049-34-8893	✓ WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
169-28-6880	✓ WILLS,MARION H SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
171-38-3757	✓ WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
383-52-5221	✓ WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
057-40-6887	✓ WOLF,JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL	36,000.00 ✓	3,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
113-18-5784	✓ WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

DATE: 11/30/77

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassination

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/1/77 TO 11/30/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM TO	REMARKS
Alice E. Johnston Receptionist	577-32-9574		12,000.00	$466.67 ✗	11/1/77 - 11/14/77	Term. 11/14 ✓
Laura Mae Holt Staff Counsel	559-28-5038		24,000.00	$266.67 ✗	11/1/77 - 11/4/77	Term. 11/4 ✓

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
2			$733.34			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

/S/

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00 ✓	1,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
075-14-0710	BASTERI,JOSEPH J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	1,133.33	11-14-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-14-77 ✓
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	22,000.00 ✓	1,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	25,700.00 ✓	2,141.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00 ✓	3,958.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	13,000.00 ✓	1,083.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
438-48-7116	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	9,500.00 ✓	791.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
462-88-1832	COPELAND,EILEEN RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00 ✓	3,541.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00 ✓	1,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	36,000.00✓	3,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	26,000.00✓	2,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
207-46-8088	FEELEY,ELIZABETH C DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00✓	333.33	11-21-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-21-77✓
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	36,000.00✓	3,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
272-42-7056	GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77✓
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
219-40-9759	GIANGRASSO,DOMINICK K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 10-31-77✓
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00✓	1,750.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-22-9353	HACK,ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	26,000.00✓	2,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	27,800.00✓	2,316.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77✓
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
559-28-5038	HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00✓	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	38,500.00✓	3,208.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
577-56-7465	JOHNSON,LILLIAN B SECRETARY	13,000.00 ✓	1,083.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
577-32-9574	JOHNSTON,ALICE E RECEPTIONIST	12,000.00	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	16,000.00 ✓	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,833.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
074-30-3065	KREIDMAN,MELVIN STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00 ✓	2,172.22	11-08-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-08-77 ✓
371-32-3731	KUHN,DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	11,000.00 ✓	916.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00 ✓	3,541.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00 ✓	2,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE 12/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/01/77 TO 11/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS ✓
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	17,100.00✓	1,425.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00✓	1,791.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30,000.00✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	20,000.00✓	1,666.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,700.00✓	1,558.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	15,000.00✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
579-58-9953	ROBINSON,BARBARA J RESEARCHER	15,000.00✓	416.67	11-21-77	11-30-77	APPOINTMENT 11-21-77 ✓
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
048-58-4432	ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	18,000.00✓	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	P/R CHANGE--11-01-77 ✓
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00✓	1,666.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00✓	1,625.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00✓	1,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
235-94-3124	SMITH,BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11,500.00✓	958.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
023-36-0715	SPEISER,MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W XEROX/MESSENGER	9,500.00 ✓	791.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00 ✓	1,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00 ✓	2,500.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	11,000.00 ✓	916.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
049-34-8893	WEBB,WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00 ✓	2,333.33	11-01-77	11-30-77	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H SECRETARY	14,000.00 ✓	1,166.67	11-01-77	11-30-77	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	12,000.00 ✓	1,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00 ✓	1,250.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL	36,000.00 ✓	3,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	
113-18-5784	WRASE,RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00 ✓	2,000.00	11-01-77	11-30-77	

DATE: 11/30/77

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassination

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 11/1/77 TO 11/30/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
Alice E. Johnston Receptionist	577-32-9574		12,000.00	$466.67 ✓	11/1/77 -	11/14/77	Term. 11/14 ✓
Laura Mae Holt Staff Counsel	559-28-5038		24,000.00	$266.67 ✓	11/1/77 -	11/4/77	Term. 11/4 ✓

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PR
2			$733.34			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
✓ 416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00	1,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	22,000.00	1,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-01-77
✓ 556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	466.67	10-25-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-25-77
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	13,000.00	1,083.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
438-48-7116	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	9,500.00	791.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
✓ 263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	933.33	10-03-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-03-77
462-88-1832	COPELAND,EILEEN RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
158 436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00	1,208.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1.200.00 MAX 47.500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
108-30-7723	EMANUEL.CARYL M SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS.EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	36.000.00	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
341-44-6951	FACTER.JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	26.000.00	2.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
082-22-5909	FENTON.CLIFFORD A.JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	36.000.00	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN.T MARK RESEARCHER	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
136-28-8924	FONZI.GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
272-42-7056	GAY.DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	36.000.00	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN.ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18.000.00	1.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
✓ 219-40-9759	GIANGRASSO.DOMINICK K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	X
119-36-4041	GODFREY.JANE E SECRETARY	16.000.00	1.333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH.MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
082-14-2877	GONZALES.ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
212-56-6718	GRIMES.MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21.000.00	1.750.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
✓ 579-22-9353	HACK.ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	appointment ~~P/R CHANGE~~--09-06-77
251-88-1541	HAMILTON.GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	26.000.00	2.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY.DAN L RESEARCHER	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN.ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
220-48-5696	HESS.JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	26.000.00	2.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
219-58-7593	HINDLE.LOUIS H SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
559-28-5038	HOLT.LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK.JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34.000.00	2.833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH.THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	38.500.00	3.208.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
226-10-4799	HUTTON.E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	38.500.00	3.208.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
128-20-8996	ISRAEL.MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
437-92-5320	JACKSON.MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
✓ 223-38-6743	JOHNSON.ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	Appointment ~~P/R~~ CHANGE--09-06-77
371-40-1135	JOHNSON.GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
577-56-7465	JOHNSON.LILLIAN B SECRETARY	13,000.00	1,083.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
577-32-9574	JOHNSTON.ALICE E RECEPTIONIST	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
578-58-2498	JONES.DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY.JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER.ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
068-38-5091	KLEIN.KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
371-32-3731	KUHN.DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	11,000.00	916.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
233-92-1962	LARKIN.JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-58-9975	LAWSON.BELFORD L.III STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
093-42-2090	LEE.SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
071-28-5111	LEHNER.ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
✓ 042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS.BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	666.67	10-11-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-11-77
✓ 534-50-0480	LINDLEY.ROBIN D RESEARCHER	15,000.00	541.67	10-18-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-18-77
017-36-1972	LOCKE.RALPH C RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ.EDWIN J RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
338-48-1298	MARS.MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
237-56-8144	MASON.M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
✓ 013-34-3361	MATHEWS.ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00	2,166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
✓ 526-74-9097	MATTHEWS.LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	1,666.67	10-11-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-11-77
109-20-5111	MAXWELL.ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON.VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
214-42-6489	MILLER.DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
[illegible]-24-7659	[illegible] ANNE B SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES PAGE 1211
REPORT ID D01.00.00 PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1.200.00 MAX 47.500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
579-24-3862	MORIARTY.JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
403-36-7980	MORRISON.ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	20.000.00	1.666.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY.BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
215-66-2714	ORR.PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	17.500.00	1.458.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
219-64-3205	ORR.PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT CLERK	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
508-22-0421	PALMER.ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18.000.00	1.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER.MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
211-38-9707	PURDY.DONALD A.JR STAFF COUNSEL	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
254-66-1801	REEVES.FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK.GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER.MARLIN.III DOCUMENTS CLERK	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
220-20-6648	ROSE.HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
048-58-4432	ROSEN.MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
227-18-5345	ROSS.IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20.000.00	1.666.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN.JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19.500.00	1.625.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ.NANCY P SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK.ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16.000.00	1.333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON.BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
235-94-3124	SMITH.BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST	11.500.00	31.94	10-30-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-30-77
528-64-5299	SMITH.JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
023-36-0715	SPEISER.MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28.000.00	77.78	10-30-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-30-77
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND.ANN LYON SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN.LANCE W ~~XEROX/MESSENGER~~	9.500.00	791.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR.ANN FURNALD SENIOR RESEARCHER	18.000.00	1.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
216-34-9326	THOMAS.JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1.200.00 MAX 47.500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT.WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
101-22-5012	WAGNER.OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	11.000.00	916.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
260-40-7319	WALKER.ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN.MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
049-34-8893	WEBB.WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28.000.00	2.177.78	10-03-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-03-77
247-78-3852	WILANDER.ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
169-28-6880	WILLS.MARION H SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN.LESLIE H RESEARCHER	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
383-52-5221	WOLF.ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT CLERK	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
057-40-6887	WOLF.JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL	36.000.00	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
113-18-5784	WRASE.RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	400.00	10-25-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-25-77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID	ACTIVE	THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	111	111	188.754.19	197.500.00
GRAND TOTAL	111	111	188.754.19	197.500.00

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

Allowed:

/S/

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

AUGUST PAID IN OCTOBER

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DATE: 10-28-77

OFFICE NAME: Select Committee on Assassinations

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 8/1/77 TO 8/31/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Robert K. Tanenbaum Deputy Chief Counsel	127-32-4970		$36,000.00	$300.00	8/1/77	8/3/77	Employee terminated 8/3/77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES		NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
			THIS MONTH	UNUSED		
1			$300.00			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this Committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

/S/

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	32,000.00	2,666.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
390-44-4227	BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22,000.00	1,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
046-36-4592	BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	2,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
327-46-4790	BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-46-4548	BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	22,000.00	1,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
243-74-5787	BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47,500.00	3,958.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-01-77
556-78-1139	BRADY,SURELL STAFF COUNSEL	28,000.00	466.67	10-25-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-25-77
237-90-5178	BROWN,ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	13,000.00	1,083.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
098-20-3182	BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
438-48-7116	BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
414-98-4025	BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	9,500.00	791.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
263-08-0234	COOPER,CYNTHIA SUE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	933.33	10-03-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-03-77
462-88-1832	COPELAND,EILEEN RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL,GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-40-4377	CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS,JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
132-14-2717	DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
229-26-8374	DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
436-62-4154	DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
578-32-6132	EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	14,500.00	1,208.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT,MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
242-28-3222	ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1.200.00 MAX 47.500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
108-30-7723	EMANUEL.CARYL M SECRETARY	14.000.00 ✓	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS.EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	36.000.00 ✓	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
341-44-6951	FACTER.JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	26.000.00 ✓	2.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
082-22-5909	FENTON.CLIFFORD A.JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	36.000.00 ✓	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN.T MARK RESEARCHER	12.000.00 ✓	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
136-28-8924	FONZI.GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30.000.00 ✓	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
272-42-7056	GAY.DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	36.000.00 ✓	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN.ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18.000.00 ✓	1.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
219-40-9759	GIANGRASSO.DOMINICK K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00 ✓	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
119-36-4041	GODFREY.JANE E SECRETARY	16.000.00 ✓	1.333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH.MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30.000.00 ✓	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
082-14-2877	GONZALES.ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00 ✓	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
212-56-6718	GRIMES.MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21.000.00 ✓	1.750.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-22-9353	HACK.ALFRED S STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00 ✓	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	~~P/R~~ appointment CHANGE--09-06-77
251-88-1541	HAMILTON.GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	26.000.00 ✓	2.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY.DAN L RESEARCHER	12.000.00 ✓	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN.ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30.000.00 ✓	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
220-48-5696	HESS.JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	26.000.00 ✓	2.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
219-58-7593	HINDLE.LOUIS H SECRETARY	14.000.00 ✓	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
559-28-5038	HOLT.LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	24.000.00 ✓	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK.JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34.000.00 ✓	2.833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
015-18-1386	HOWARTH.THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	38.500.00 ✓	3.208.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
226-10-4799	HUTTON.E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	38.500.00 ✓	3.208.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
128-20-8996	ISRAEL.MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00 ✓	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
437-92-5320	JACKSON.MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00 ✓	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

REPORT ID D01.00.00

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
223-38-6743	JOHNSON,ERNESTINE G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	Appointment ~~P/R~~ CHANGE--09-06-77
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
577-56-7465	JOHNSON,LILLIAN B SECRETARY	13,000.00	1,083.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
577-32-9574	JOHNSTON,ALICE E RECEPTIONIST	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
371-32-3731	KUHN,DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	11,000.00	916.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
042-52-4602	LICHTENFELS,BETH ANNE DOCUMENTS CONTROL CLERK	12,000.00	666.67	10-11-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-11-77
534-50-0480	LINDLEY,ROBIN D RESEARCHER	15,000.00	541.67	10-18-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-18-77
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	26,000.00	2,166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	P/R CHANGE--10-01-77
526-74-9097	MATTHEWS,LEODIS C STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	1,666.67	10-11-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-11-77
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	1,791.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1.200.00 MAX 47.500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
579-24-3862	MORIARTY.JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
403-36-7980	MORRISON.ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	20.000.00	1.666.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY.BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
215-66-2714	ORR.PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	17.500.00	1.458.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
219-64-3205	ORR.PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT CLERK	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
508-22-0421	PALMER.ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18.000.00	1.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER.MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
211-38-9707	PURDY.DONALD A.JR STAFF COUNSEL	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
254-66-1801	REEVES.FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK.GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER.MARLIN.III DOCUMENTS CLERK	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
220-20-6648	ROSE.HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
048-58-4432	ROSEN.MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
227-18-5345	ROSS.IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20.000.00	1.666.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN.JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19.500.00	1.625.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ.NANCY P SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK.ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16.000.00	1.333.33	10-01-77	10-31-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON.BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
235-94-3124	SMITH.BEVERLY CLERK TYPIST.	11.500.00	31.94	10-30-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-30-77
528-64-5299	SMITH.JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
023-36-0715	SPEISER.MARK A STAFF COUNSEL	28.000.00	77.78	10-30-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-30-77
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND.ANN LYON SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN.LANCE W XEROX/MESSENGER	9.500.00	791.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR.ANN FURNALD SENIOR RESEARCHER	18.000.00	1.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
216-34-9326	THOMAS.JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	

DATE 11/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 10/01/77 TO 10/31/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT.WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30.000.00	2.500.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
101-22-5012	WAGNER.OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	11.000.00	916.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
260-40-7319	WALKER.ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
087-26-0521	WAXMAN.MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
049-34-8893	WEBB.WILLIAM A STAFF COUNSEL	28.000.00	2.177.78	10-03-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-03-77
247-78-3852	WILANDER.ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
169-28-6880	WILLS.MARION H SECRETARY	14.000.00	1.166.67	10-01-77	10-31-77	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN.LESLIE H RESEARCHER	12.000.00	1.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
383-52-5221	WOLF.ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT CLERK	15.000.00	1.250.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
057-40-6887	WOLF.JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL	36.000.00	3.000.00	10-01-77	10-31-77	
113-18-5784	WRASE.RICHARD C STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	400.00	10-25-77	10-31-77	APPOINTMENT 10-25-77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID	ACTIVE	THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	111	111	188.754.19	197.500.00
GRAND TOTAL	111	111	188.754.19	197.500.00

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS. UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

DATE: 10-28-77

OFFICE NAME: Select Committee on Assassinations

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 8/1 /77 TO 8 / 31/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Robert K. Tanenbaum Deputy Chief Counsel	127-32-4970		$36,000.00	$300.00	8/1/77	8/3/77	Employee terminat 8/3/77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PRO
1			$300.00			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this Committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE: 9/30/77

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

OFFICE NAME: Assassinations Committee

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 9/1/77 TO 9/30/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD		REMARKS
					FROM	TO	
Alfred S. Hack Staff Investigator	579-22-9353		$24,000	1,666.67	9/6/77	9/30/77	New employee
Ernestine G. Johnson Staff Investigator	223-38-6743		$24,000	1,666.67	9/6/77	9/30/77	New employee

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES		NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
				THIS MONTH	UNUSED		
Appropriation Total	2			$3,333.34			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this Committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 10/07/77 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/77 TO 09/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1.200.00 MAX 47.500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
416-54-2948	AKERS.JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	20.000.00	1.666.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
390-44-4227	BAETZ.CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	22.000.00	1.833.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
046-36-4592	BEESON.PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	28.000.00	2.333.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
327-46-4790	BERLOW.LISA M RESEARCHER	12.000.00	1.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
579-46-4548	BERNING.ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	21.500.00	1.791.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
243-74-5787	BLACKMER.S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
243-48-4536	BLAKEY.G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	47.500.00	3.958.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
215-52-9164	BOLAND.COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	15.000.00	666.67	09-01-77	09-16-77	TERMINATED 09-16-77
258-72-6151	BROWN.CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	15.000.00	833.33	09-01-77	09-20-77	TERMINATED 09-20-77
237-90-5178	BROWN.ELIZABETH METTS STAFF ASSISTANT	13.000.00	144.44	09-27-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-27-77
098-20-3182	BROWN.WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
438-48-7116	BURAS.ROBERT C.JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
414-98-4025	BURFORD.JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	12.000.00	1.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
086-46-9506	CHAMPION.OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	9.500.00	791.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
438-86-9756	CONZELMAN.JAMES K RESEARCHER	15.000.00	1.250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
462-88-1832	COPELAND.EILEEN RESEARCHER	15.000.00	1.250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
460-74-1179	CORNWELL.GARY T DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42.500.00	3.541.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-01-77
579-40-4377	CROSS.WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	16.000.00	1.333.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
220-36-0563	CULLINGS.JEROME A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	1.466.67	09-09-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-09-77
132-14-2717	DALY.MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
229-26-8374	DAY.CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
436-62-4154	DELSA.LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
578-32-6132	EAGLE.MARJORIE A SECRETARY	13.500.00	1.125.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
324-40-6284	EBERHARDT.MICHAEL C STAFF COUNSEL	32.000.00	1.066.67	09-19-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-19-77
242-28-3222	ECCLES.FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24.000.00	2.000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	

DATE 10/07/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/77 TO 09/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
108-30-7723	EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
129-22-1805	EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	36,000.00	3,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
341-44-6951	FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	26,000.00	2,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
132-34-5625	FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	36,000.00	1,200.00	09-01-77	09-12-77	TERMINATED 09-12-77
231-86-6887	FARMER,JOHN J,JR CLERK	7,200.00	0.00			TERMINATED 08-31-77
082-22-5909	FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	36,000.00	3,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
214-60-6734	FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
136-28-8924	FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
272-42-7056	GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	36,000.00	3,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
299-50-7438	GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
219-40-9759	GIANGRASSO,DOMINICK K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,666.67	09-06-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-06-77
119-36-4041	GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
058-44-6772	GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
082-14-2877	GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
212-56-6718	GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	21,000.00	1,750.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
251-88-1541	HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	26,000.00	2,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
263-17-0952	HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
129-38-7823	HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
220-48-5696	HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	26,000.00	2,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
219-58-7593	HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
559-28-5038	HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
194-30-5931	HORNBECK,JOHN W STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	1,133.33	09-19-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-19-77
015-18-1386	HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	38,500.00	3,208.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
226-10-4799	HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	38,500.00	3,208.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
128-20-8996	ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	

DATE 10/07/77 U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
REPORT ID D01.00.00 PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/77 TO 09/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
437-92-5320	JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
371-40-1135	JOHNSON,GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
577-56-7465	JOHNSON,LILLIAN B SECRETARY	13,000.00	1,083.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
577-32-9574	JOHNSTON,ALICE E RECEPTIONIST	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
578-58-2498	JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
103-18-7227	KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
161-38-7640	KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
068-38-5091	KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	34,000.00	2,833.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
371-32-3731	KUHN,DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	11,000.00	916.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
233-92-1962	LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
579-58-9975	LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
093-42-2090	LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
071-28-5111	LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	42,500.00	3,541.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
017-36-1972	LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
087-48-2165	LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
338-48-1298	MARS,MITCHELL A RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,150.00	09-08-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-08-77
518-56-7099	MARTIN,REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	22,000.00	1,833.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
237-56-8144	MASON,M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
013-34-3361	MATHEWS,ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	19,500.00	1,625.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
109-20-5111	MAXWELL,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
240-66-7674	MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
214-42-6489	MILLER,DAWNE C ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	21,500.00	955.56	09-15-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-15-77
132-24-7659	MISITA,ANNE B SECRETARY	12,000.00	833.33	09-06-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-06-77
102-30-2631	MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00	812.50	09-01-77	09-15-77	TERMINATED 09-15-77
579-24-3862	MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/77 TO 09/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
403-36-7980	MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	20,000.00	1,666.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
177-42-4376	MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
215-66-2714	ORR,PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	17,500.00	1,458.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
219-64-3205	ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
508-22-0421	PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
452-74-2381	PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
211-38-9707	PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
254-66-1801	REEVES,FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
147-40-4845	RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
438-68-2917	RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
220-20-6648	ROSE,HAROLD A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,666.67	09-06-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-06-77
048-58-4432	ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
227-18-5345	ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	20,000.00	1,666.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
578-80-2773	RUDDER,MIRIAM MAIL/DOCUMENT CLERK	9,500.00	791.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
029-38-8530	SCHLICHTMANN,JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	19,500.00	1,625.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
209-46-4088	SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
531-50-7701	SELLECK,ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	16,000.00	1,333.33	09-01-77	09-30-77	
245-56-4327	SISSON,BETTY LOU SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
528-64-5299	SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
227-76-3525	STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
264-98-4680	SVENDSEN,LANCE W XEROX/MESSENGER	9,500.00	791.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
036-34-9187	TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD SENIOR RESEARCHER	18,000.00	1,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
216-34-9326	THOMAS,JOSEPH A STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,466.67	09-09-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-09-77
550-50-7581	TRIPLETT,WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	30,000.00	2,500.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
101-22-5012	WAGNER,OLIVE E RECEPTIONIST	11,000.00	672.22	09-09-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-09-77

DATE 10/07/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION
ACCOUNTING PERIOD 09/01/77 TO 09/30/77

OFFICE 83000 SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM SALARY LIMITS: MIN 1,200.00 MAX 47,500.00

SOC SEC NUM	EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND JOB TITLE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY EARNED	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
260-40-7319	WALKER,ROBERT J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	1,666.67	09-06-77	09-30-77	APPOINTMENT 09-06-77
020-36-4147	WALSH,KEVIN RESEARCHER	15,000.00	666.67	09-01-77	09-16-77	TERMINATED 09-16-77
087-26-0521	WAXMAN,MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	24,000.00	2,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
247-78-3852	WILANDER,ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
169-28-6880	WILLS,MARION H SECRETARY	14,000.00	1,166.67	09-01-77	09-30-77	
171-38-3757	WIZELMAN,LESLIE H RESEARCHER	12,000.00	1,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
383-52-5221	WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT CLERK	15,000.00	1,250.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	
057-40-6887	WOLF,JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL	36,000.00	3,000.00	09-01-77	09-30-77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	EMPLOYEES NUMBER OF PAID	ACTIVE	THIS MONTH PAYROLL EXPENDITURES USED	SALARY PROJECTION USED
CLERICAL			.00	.00
PROFESSIONAL			.00	.00
SUB TOTAL			.00	.00
INVESTIGATIVE	107	102	174,859.76	178,583.36
GRAND TOTAL	107	102	174,859.76	178,583.36

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON

-- Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 09/07/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/77 TO 08/30/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 47,500.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		20,000.00	1,666.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	
BAETZ,CONRAD E STAFF INVESTIGATOR	390-44-4227		22,000.00	1,833.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-01-77
✓BEESON,PETER G STAFF COUNSEL	046-36-4592		28,000.00	1,788.89	08-08-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-08-77
BERLOW,LISA M RESEARCHER	327-46-4790		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		21,500.00	1,791.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
BLAKEY,G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	243-48-4536		47,500.00	3,958.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	
BOLAND,COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
BROWN,CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
BROWN,WILLIAM STAFF INVESTIGATOR	098-20-3182		24,000.00	1,066.67	08-15-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-15-77
BURAS,ROBERT C,JR STAFF INVESTIGATOR	438-48-7116		24,000.00	1,066.67	08-15-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-15-77
BURFORD,JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	414-98-4025		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
CHAMPION,OLIVER J CLERICAL ASSISTANT	086-46-9506		9,500.00	343.06	08-18-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-18-77
CHARDAK,BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		34,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-77
CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
COPELAND,EILEEN SECRETARY	462-88-1832		13,500.00	1,125.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
CROSS,WILLIAM H ASST TO DIR OF SECURITY	579-40-4377		16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-01-77
DALY,MARTIN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	132-14-2717		24,000.00	1,066.67	08-15-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-15-77
DAY,CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	229-26-8374		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
DELSA,LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	436-62-4154		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
DOYLE,KEVIN SEAN CLERICAL ASSISTANT	077-48-6826		9,500.00	422.22	08-01-77	08-16-77	TERMINATED 08-16-77

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/77 TO 08/30/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
EAGLE,MARJORIE A SECRETARY	578-32-6132		13,500.00	1,125.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
ECCLES,FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	242-28-3222		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
EMANUEL,CARYL M SECRETARY	108-30-7723		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		36,000.00	3,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		26,000.00	2,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		36,000.00	3,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
FARMER,JOHN J,JR CLERK	231-86-6887		7,200.00	600.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR	082-22-5909		36,000.00	3,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	214-60-6734		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		36,000.00	3,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
GENZMAN,ROBERT W RESEARCHER	299-50-7438		18,000.00	100.00	08-29-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-29-77
GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
GOLDSMITH,MICHAEL STAFF COUNSEL	058-44-6772		30,000.00	166.67	08-29-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-29-77
GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	082-14-2877		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
GRANT,KENNETH G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	099-20-0966		24,000.00	1,533.33	08-01-77	08-23-77	TERMINATED 08-23-77
GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		21,000.00	1,750.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		26,000.00	2,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
HAMLIN,ALICE E JOHNSTON RECEPTIONIST	577-32-9574		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	263-17-0952		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	129-38-7823		30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		26,000.00	2,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
HINDLE,LOUIS H SECRETARY	219-58-7593		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		27,692.30	2,000.00	08-05-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-05-77

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/77 TO 08/30/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
HOWARTH, THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		38,500.00	3,208.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
HUTTON, E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		38,500.00	3,208.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
ISRAEL, MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	128-20-8996		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
JACKSON, MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	437-92-5320		12,000.00	994.45	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-02-77
JOHNSON, GENE R ASST DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	371-40-1135		34,000.00	2,833.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
JOHNSON, LILLIAN B SECRETARY	577-56-7465		13,000.00	72.22	08-29-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-29-77
JONES, DIANA N SECRETARY	578-58-2498		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
KELLY, JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	103-18-7227		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
KILKER, ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	
KLEIN, KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		34,000.00	2,833.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
KUHN, DOROTHY W RECEPTIONIST-TYPIST	371-32-3731		10,000.00	833.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-01-77
LARKIN, JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	
LAWSON, BELFORD L, III STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
LEE, SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL	093-42-2090		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
LEHNER, ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		42,500.00	3,541.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
LOCKE, RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
LOPEZ, EDWIN J RESEARCHER	087-48-2165		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
MARTIN, REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		22,000.00	1,833.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
MASON, M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	237-56-8144		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
MATHEWS, ISIAH C SPECIAL COUNSEL	013-34-3361		19,500.00	1,516.67	08-03-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-03-77
MAXWELL, ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	109-20-5111		24,000.00	1,000.00	08-16-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-16-77
MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	
MORDANA, SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		19,500.00	1,625.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
MORIARTY, JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	579-24-3862		30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/77 TO 08/30/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
MORRISON, ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	403-36-7980		20,000.00	1,666.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	
MORTON, CECELIA T SECRETARY	578-66-0125		12,000.00	166.67	08-01-77	08-05-77	TERMINATED 08-05-77
MOSLEY, BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	177-42-4376		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
ORR, PATRICIA M SENIOR RESEARCHER	215-66-2714		17,500.00	1,458.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT CLERK	219-64-3205		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
PALMER, ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	508-22-0421		18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	
PURDY, DONALD A, JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
REEVES, FLOYD L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	254-66-1801		24,000.00	2,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-01-77
RESNICK, GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	147-40-4845		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
RISINGER, MARLIN, III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
ROBERTS, ANTOINETTE MORRIS	048-28-0439		14,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-77
ROSEN, MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
ROSS, IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		20,000.00	1,666.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	
RUDDER, MIRIAM MAIL/DOCUMENT CLERK	578-80-2773		9,500.00	791.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
SCHLICHTMANN, JAN R LAW ASSISTANT	029-38-8530		19,500.00	325.00	08-25-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-25-77
SCHULTZ, NANCY P SECRETARY	209-46-4088		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
SELLECK, ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	531-50-7701		16,000.00	1,333.33	08-01-77	08-31-77	
SISSON, BETTY LOU SECRETARY	245-56-4327		14,000.00	350.00	08-22-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-22-77
SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
STRICKLAND, ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	
SVENDSEN, LANCE W XEROX/MESSENGER	264-98-4680		9,500.00	791.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-01-77
TANENBAUM, ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		36,000.00	0.00			TERMINATED 07-31-77
TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD SENIOR RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		18,000.00	1,500.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 08/01/77 TO 08/30/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	550-50-7581		30,000.00	2,500.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
WALSH, KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
WAXMAN, MEL STAFF INVESTIGATOR	087-26-0521		24,000.00	533.33	08-23-77	08-31-77	APPOINTMENT 08-23-77
WILANDER, ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	247-78-3852		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
WILLS, MARION H SECRETARY	169-28-6880		14,000.00	1,166.67	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
WIZELMAN, LESLIE H RESEARCHER	171-38-3757		12,000.00	1,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	
WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT CLERK	383-52-5221		15,000.00	1,250.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77
WOLF, JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL	057-40-6887		36,000.00	3,000.00	08-01-77	08-31-77	P/R CHANGE--08-01-77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	PROJECTION NEXT MONTH	PROJECTION UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	95	0	541,564.36	150,904.20	390,660.16	162,324.37	228,335.79		

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 08/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/77 TO 07/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1.200.00 MAXIMUM 47.500.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150.000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS.JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		20.000.00	1.666.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
BERLOW.LISA M RESEARCHER	327-46-4790		12.000.00	1.000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
BERNING.ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		16.000.00	1.333.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
BLACKMER.S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		18.000.00	1.500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
BLAKEY.G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	243-48-4536		47.500.00	3.958.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-01-77
BOLAND.COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		13.000.00	1.083.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
BROWN.CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		15.000.00	1.250.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
BURFORD.JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	414-98-4025		10.000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
CHARDAK.BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		34.000.00	2.833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
CHENOWETH.JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		28.000.00	222.66	07-01-77	07-11-77	TERMINATED 07-11-77
CONZELMAN.JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		13.000.00	1.083.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
COPELAND.EILEEN SECRETARY	462-88-1832		11.000.00	916.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
DAY.CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	229-26-8374		24.000.00	2.000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
DELSA.LAWRENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	436-62-4154		24.000.00	1.733.33	07-05-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-05-77
DOYLE.KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9.000.00	750.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
EAGLE.MARJORIE A SECRETARY	578-32-6132		13.500.00	1.125.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
ECCLES.FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	242-28-3222		24.000.00	2.000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
EMANUEL.CARYL M SECRETARY	108-30-7723		10.850.00	904.17	07-01-77	07-31-77	
EVANS.EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		30.000.00	2.500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
FACTER.JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		25.000.00	2.083.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
FALLIS.STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		36.000.00	3.511.11	07-01-77	07-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-17-77

DATE 08/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/77 TO 07/31/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
FARMER,JOHN J,JR CLERK	231-86-6887		7,200.00	410.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-20-77
FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
FLANAGAN,T MARK RESEARCHER	214-60-6734		12,000.00	666.67	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
GONZALES,ALBERT STAFF INVESTIGATOR	082-14-2877		24,000.00	1,333.33	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
GRANT,KENNETH G STAFF INVESTIGATOR	099-20-0966		24,000.00	200.00	07-28-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-28-77
GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		21,000.00	1,750.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HAMLIN,ALICE E JOHNSTON RECEPTIONIST	577-32-9574		10,000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-01-77
HARDWAY,DAN L RESEARCHER	263-17-0952		12,000.00	666.67	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
HAUSMAN,ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	129-38-7823		28,000.00	2,333.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HINDLE,LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		13,000.00	1,083.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		20,000.00	1,666.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		36,000.00	3,511.11	07-01-77	07-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-17-77
ISRAEL,MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	128-20-8996		24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
JACKSON,MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	437-92-5320		10,000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
JOHNSON,GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		32,000.00	2,666.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
JONES,DIANA N SECRETARY	578-58-2498		12,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
KELLY,JAMES P STAFF INVESTIGATOR	103-18-7227		24,000.00	1,333.33	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		16,000.00	1,333.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	

DATE 08/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/77 TO 07/31/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		30,000.00	2,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		20,000.00	1,666.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		23,000.00	1,916.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		36,000.00	3,511.11	07-17-77	07-16-77	P/R CHANGE--07-17-77
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
LOPEZ,EDWIN J RESEARCHER	087-48-2165		12,000.00	666.67	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
MARTIN,REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		20,000.00	1,666.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
MASON,M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	237-56-8144		12,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		16,000.00	1,333.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		24,000.00	2,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
MORRISON,ROBERT C DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	403-36-7980		20,000.00	1,555.55	07-11-77	07-10-77	P/R CHANGE--07-11-77
MORTON,CECELIA T SECRETARY	578-66-0125		11,000.00	916.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
MOSLEY,BARBARA L TYPIST/SECRETARY	177-42-4376		12,000.00	866.67	07-05-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-05-77
ORR,PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		16,000.00	1,333.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		11,000.00	916.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	508-22-0421		18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		18,000.00	1,500.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	147-40-4845		10,000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
ROBERTS,ANTOINETTE MORRIS	048-28-0439		14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		13,000.00	1,083.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	

4

DATE 08/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/77 TO 07/31/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
ROSS, IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		20,000.00	1,666.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
RUDDER, MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
SCHULTZ, NANCY P SECRETARY	209-46-4088		12,000.00	1,000.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
— SELLECK, ELIZABETH K STAFF INVESTIGATOR	531-50-7701		16,000.00	888.89	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
STRICKLAND, ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		14,000.00	1,166.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
TANENBAUM, ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		36,000.00	3,511.11	07-01-77	07-31-77	P/R CHANGE--07-17-77
TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		17,000.00	1,416.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	
— TRIPLETT, WILLIAM K STAFF COUNSEL	550-50-7581		30,000.00	1,166.67	07-17-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-17-77
WALSH, KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		15,000.00	1,250.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
WILANDER, ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	247-78-3852		13,000.00	1,083.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
WILLS, MARION H SECRETARY	169-28-6880		13,500.00	1,125.00	07-01-77	07-31-77	
— WIZELMAN, LESLIE H RESEARCHER	171-38-3757		12,000.00	666.67	07-11-77	07-31-77	APPOINTMENT 07-11-77
WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	07-01-77	07-31-77	
WOLF, JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		29,000.00	2,416.67	07-01-77	07-31-77	

DATE 08/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 07/01/77 TO 07/31/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES		PROJECTION		NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER MINORI CLERKS/P
				THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NEXT MONTH	UNUSED		
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	83	0	415,238.84	126,325.71	288,913.13	131,004.16	157,908.97		

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 07/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/77 TO 06/30/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1.200.00 MAXIMUM 47.500.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150.000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD		REMARKS
					FROM	TO	
AKERS.JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		20.000.00	1.666.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
BERLOW.LISA M RESEARCHER	327-46-4790		12.000.00	300.00	06-22-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-22-77
BERNING.ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		16.000.00	1.333.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
BLACKMER.S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		18.000.00	1.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
BLAKEY.G ROBERT CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	243-48-4536		27.000.00	1.050.00	06-17-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-17-77
BOLAND.COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		13.000.00	1.083.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
BROWN.CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		15.000.00	1.250.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
BURFORD.JUDITH R DOCUMENT CLERK	414-98-4025		10.000.00	250.00	06-22-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-22-77
CHARDAK.BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		34.000.00	3.770.83	06-26-77	06-25-77	P/R CHANGE--06-26-77
CHENOWETH.JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		28.000.00	607.25	06-01-77	06-30-77	
CONZELMAN.JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		13.000.00	1.083.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
COPELAND.EILEEN SECRETARY	462-88-1832		11.000.00	916.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
DAY.CLARENCE J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	229-26-8374		24.000.00	266.67	06-27-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-27-77
DOYLE.KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9.000.00	750.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
EAGLE.MARJORIE A SECRETARY	578-32-6132		13.500.00	600.00	06-15-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-15-77
ECCLES.FRANK L STAFF INVESTIGATOR	242-28-3222		24.000.00	1.533.33	06-08-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-08-77
EMANUEL.CARYL M SECRETARY	108-30-7723		10.850.00	904.17	06-01-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-01-77
EVANS.EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		30.000.00	2.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
FACTER.JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		25.000.00	2.083.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
FALLIS.STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		47.500.00	3.958.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
FARMER.JOHN J.JR CLERK	231-86-6887		3.600.00	230.00	06-08-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-08-77

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/77 TO 06/30/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
FENTON.CLIFFORD A.JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		30.000.00	2.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
FONZI.GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		30.000.00	2.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
GANNON.THOMAS M.SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		20.000.00	944.44	06-01-77	06-17-77	TERMINATED 06-17-77
GAY.DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		30.000.00	2.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
GILBERT.HOWARD M STAFF COUNSEL	549-48-4370		30.000.00	666.67	06-01-77	06-08-77	TERMINATED 06-08-77
GODFREY.JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		14.000.00	1.166.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
GRIMES.MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		21.000.00	1.750.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
HAMILTON.GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		24.000.00	2.000.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
HAMLIN.ALICE E JOHNSTON RECEPTIONIST	577-32-9574		11.300.00	941.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-01-77
HAUSMAN.ALAN B STAFF COUNSEL	129-38-7823		28.000.00	2.333.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-01-77
HESS.JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		24.000.00	2.000.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
HINDLE.LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		13.000.00	1.083.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
HITCHCOCK.CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		20.000.00	388.89	06-01-77	06-07-77	TERMINATED 06-07-77
HOLT.LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		20.000.00	1.666.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
HOWARTH.THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		30.000.00	2.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
HUTTON.E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		47.500.00	3.958.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
ISRAEL.MAURICE STAFF INVESTIGATOR	128-20-8996		24.000.00	266.67	06-27-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-27-77
JACKSON.MARGO E DOCUMENT CLERK	437-92-5320		10.000.00	833.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-01-77
JOHNSON.GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		32.000.00	3.097.22	06-01-77	06-30-77	P/R CHANGE--06-11-77
JONES.DIANA N SECRETARY	578-58-2498		12.000.00	833.33	06-06-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-06-77
KILKER.ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		16.000.00	1.333.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
KLEIN.KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		30.000.00	2.500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
LARKIN.JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		14.000.00	1.166.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
LAWSON III.BELFORD L STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		20.000.00	1.666.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/77 TO 06/30/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		23,000.00	1,916.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		47,500.00	3,958.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
LEWIS,ALVIN B,JR STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		47,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 05-31-77
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
MARTIN,REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		20,000.00	1,666.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
MASON,M C TYPIST/SECRETARY	237-56-8144		12,000.00	300.00	06-22-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-22-77
MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		24,000.00	2,000.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
MORRISON,ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
MORTON,CECELIA T SECRETARY	578-66-0125		11,000.00	916.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-01-77
ORR,PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		16,000.00	1,333.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		11,000.00	916.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
PALMER,ELIZABETH J RESEARCHER/DOCUMENT CLERK	508-22-0421		18,000.00	450.00	06-22-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-22-77
PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
PRICE,PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	0.00			TERMINATED 05-31-77
PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		18,000.00	1,500.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
RESNICK,GINA I DOCUMENT CLERK	147-40-4845		10,000.00	500.00	06-13-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-13-77
RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
ROBERTS,ANTOINETTE MORRIS	048-28-0439		14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	P/R CHANGE--06-01-77
ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		13,000.00	1,083.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		20,000.00	1,666.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
RUDDER,MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
SCHULTZ,NANCY P SECRETARY	209-46-4088		12,000.00	1,000.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 06/01/77 TO 06/30/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
STRICKLAND, ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		14,000.00	1,166.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
TANENBAUM, ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		47,500.00	3,958.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		17,000.00	1,416.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
WALSH, KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		15,000.00	1,250.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
WILANDER, ANNE PAUL STAFF ASSISTANT	247-78-3852		13,000.00	650.00	06-13-77	06-30-77	APPOINTMENT 06-13-77
WILLS, MARION H SECRETARY	169-28-6880		13,500.00	1,125.00	06-01-77	06-30-77	
WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	06-01-77	06-30-77	
WOLF, JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		29,000.00	2,416.67	06-01-77	06-30-77	
ZEVNIK, PAUL A STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	415-84-5593		22,000.00	1,038.89	06-01-77	06-17-77	TERMINATED 06-17-77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	PROJECTION NEXT MONTH	PROJECTION UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	73	0	308,498.97	111,090.02	197,408.95	118,104.15	79,304.80		

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 06/02/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/77 TO 05/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE	LUMP SUM	MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED	999
APPROPRIATION CODE	H RES 1557	MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED	
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM	1.200.00 MAXIMUM 47.500.00	MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED	
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT	150.000.00		

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS.JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		20.000.00	1.666.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
BARROW.GIULIA M SECRETARY	145-46-6759		14.000.00	583.33	05-01-77	05-15-77	TERMINATED 05-15-77
BERNING.ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		16.000.00	1.333.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
BLACKMER.S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		18.000.00	1.500.00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
BOLAND.COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		13.000.00	1.083.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
BROWN.CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		15.000.00	1.250.00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
CHARDAK.BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		47.500.00	3.958.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
CHENOWETH.JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		28.000.00	661.42	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-02-77
CONZELMAN.JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		13.000.00	1.083.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
COPELAND.EILEEN SECRETARY	462-88-1832		11.000.00	458.33	05-16-77	05-31-77	APPOINTMENT 05-16-77
DOYLE.KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9.000.00	750.00	05-01-77	05-31-77	
EVANS.EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		30.000.00	3.861.11	05-29-77	05-28-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
FACTER.JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		25.000.00	2.583.34	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-09-77
FALLIS.STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		47.500.00	3.958.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
FEENEY.RICHARD J DEPUTY DIRECTOR-OPERATIONS	213-46-6688		47.500.00	1.451.39	05-01-77	05-11-77	TERMINATED 05-11-77
FENTON.CLIFFORD A.JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		30.000.00	3.861.11	05-29-77	05-28-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
FONZI.GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		30.000.00	3.861.11	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
GANNON.THOMAS M.SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		20.000.00	1.666.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
GAY.DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		30.000.00	3.861.11	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
GILBERT.HOWARD M STAFF COUNSEL	549-48-4370		30.000.00	3.861.11	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
GODFREY.JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		14.000.00	1.166.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/77 TO 05/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
GRIMES.MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		21 000 00	1.750 00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
HAMILTON.GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		24 000 00	2.326 39	05-06-77	05-05-77	P/R CHANGE--05-06-77
HESS.JACOUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		24 000 00	2 326 39	05-06-77	05-05-77	P/R CHANGE--05-06-77
HINDLE.LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		13 000 00	1 083 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
HITCHCOCK.CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		15 000 00	1 250 00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
HOLT.LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		20 000 00	1.666 67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
HOWARTH.THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		30 000 00	3 861 11	05-29-77	05-28-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
HUTTON.E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		47 500 00	3 958 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
JOHNSON.GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		47 500 00	3.958 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
KILKER.ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		16 000 00	1 333 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
KLEIN.KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		30 000 00	3 861 11	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-29-77
LARKIN.JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		14 000 00	1.166 67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
LAWSON III.BELFORD L STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		20 000 00	1 666 67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
LEE.SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		23 000 00	2.052 78	05-03-77	05-02-77	P/R CHANGE--05-03-77
LEHNER.ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		47 500.00	3.958 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
LEWIS.ALVIN B.JR STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		47 500 00	3.958 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
LOCKE.RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		15 000 00	1 250 00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
MARTIN.REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		20 000 00	1.666 67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
MCCRAY.DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		12 000 00	500 00	05-01-77	05-15-77	TERMINATED 05-15-77
MCPHERSON.VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		16.000 00	1.333 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
MORDANA.SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		15 000 00	1.250 00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
MORIARTY.JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		24 000 00	2.326 39	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-06-77
MORRISON.ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		16 000 00	1.333 33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
~~MORTON.RITA L~~ ~~SECRETARY~~	579-64-6855		26 000 00	0 00			TERMINATED 04-30-77

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 05/01/77 TO 05/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
ORR.PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		16,000.00	1,333.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
ORR.PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		11,000.00	916.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
PONDER.MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		14,000.00	1,166.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
PRICE.PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	541.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	
PURDY.DONALD A.JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		18,000.00	1,500.00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
RISINGER.MARLIN.III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
ROBERTS.ANTOINETTE MORRIS	048-28-0439		16,200.00	1,170.00	05-05-77	05-31-77	APPOINTMENT 05-05-77
ROSEN.MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		13,000.00	1,083.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
ROSS.IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		20,000.00	1,666.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
RUDDER.MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	05-01-77	05-31-77	
SCHULTZ.NANCY P SECRETARY	209-46-4088		12,000.00	266.67	05-23-77	05-31-77	APPOINTMENT 05-23-77
SMITH.JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
STRICKLAND.ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		14,000.00	1,166.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
TANENBAUM.ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		47,500.00	3,958.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
TAYLOR.ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		17,000.00	1,416.67	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
THORNELL.JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		25,000.00	1,819.45	05-01-77	05-19-77	TERMINATED 05-19-77
WALSH.KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		15,000.00	1,250.00	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77
WILLS.MARION H SECRETARY	169-28-6880		13,500.00	1,087.50	05-02-77	05-31-77	APPOINTMENT 05-02-77
WOLF.ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	
WOLF.JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		29,000.00	3,598.61	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-24-77
ZEVNIK.PAUL A STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	415-84-5593		22,000.00	1,833.33	05-01-77	05-31-77	P/R CHANGE--05-01-77

MAY 3 1977

DATE 05/03/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/77 TO 04/30/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 47,500.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		42,400.00	3,533.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
BARROW,GIULIA M SECRETARY	145-46-6759		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		33,600.00	2,800.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		38,200.00	3,183.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
BOLAND,COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		22,000.00	1,833.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
BROWN,CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		30,000.00	2,500.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
CHARDAK,BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
CHENOWETH,JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		47,500.00	2,232.25	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		22,000.00	1,833.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
DOYLE,KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9,000.00	750.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	
EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
FEENEY,RICHARD J DEPUTY DIRECTOR-OPERATIONS	213-46-6688		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
GANNON,THOMAS M,SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		42,400.00	3,533.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-12-7056		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
GILBERT,HOWARD M STAFF COUNSEL	549-48-4370		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		44,600.00	3,716.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77

MAY 8 1977

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/77 TO 04/30/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
HAMILTON.GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
HESS.JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
HINDLE.LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		13,000.00	1,083.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
HITCHCOCK.CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		30,000.00	2,500.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
HOLT.LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		42,400.00	3,533.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
HOWARTH.THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
HUTTON.E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
JOHNSON.GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
KELLY.FRANCIS J DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	082-24-2085		18,450.00	0.00			TERMINATED 03-31-77
KILKER.ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		33,600.00	2,800.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
KLEIN.KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
LARKIN.JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
LAWSON III.BELFORD L STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		42,400.00	3,533.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
LAZIN.TERRY W STAFF COUNSEL	149-38-9108		47,500.00	1,451.39	04-01-77	04-11-77	TERMINATED 04-11-77
LEE.SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
LEHNER.ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
LEWIS.ALVIN B.JR STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
LOCKE.RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		30,000.00	2,500.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
MARTIN.REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		42,400.00	3,533.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
MCCRAY.DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		18,000.00	1,500.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
MCPHERSON.VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		33,600.00	2,800.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
MORDANA.SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		30,000.00	2,500.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
MORIARTY.JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
MORRISON.ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		33,600.00	2,800.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 04/01/77 TO 04/30/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
MORTON,RITA L SECRETARY	579-64-6855		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
ORR,PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		33,600.00	2,800.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		14,000.00	1,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
PRICE,PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	541.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	
PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		38,200.00	3,183.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	
ROBERTS,ANTOINETTE MORRIS SECRETARY	048-28-0439		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		22,000.00	1,833.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		42,400.00	3,533.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
RUDDER,MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	
SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	
SPRAGUE,RICHARD A CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	402-30-6486		24,354.00	0.00			TERMINATED 03-31-77
STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		26,000.00	2,166.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
TANENBAUM,ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		36,100.00	3,008.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
THORNELL,JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
WALSH,KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		30,000.00	2,500.00	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	
WOLF,JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		47,500.00	3,958.33	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77
ZEVNIK,PAUL A STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	415-84-5593		46,700.00	3,891.67	04-01-77	04-30-77	P/R CHANGE--04-01-77

DATE 04/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/77 TO 03/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 47,500.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BAISH,EDYTH TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	169-16-0121		11,070.00	246.00	03-01-77	03-08-77	TERMINATED 03-08-77
BARROW,GIULIA M SECRETARY	145-46-6759		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		11,070.00	922.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BOLAND,COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BONIFER,SHERYL L SECRETARY	228-82-4715		10,000.00	111.11	03-01-77	03-04-77	TERMINATED 03-04-77
BROOTEN,KENNETH EDWARD,JR STAFF COUNSEL	519-42-7339		20,910.00	464.67	03-01-77	03-08-77	TERMINATED 03-08-77
BROWN,CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
CHARDAK,BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		20,910.00	1,742.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
CHENOWETH,JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		21,913.00	100.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	P/R CHANGE--03-01-77
CONNOR,LINDA MAE EDITOR/HISTORIAN	231-58-8079		12,300.00	683.33	03-01-77	03-20-77	TERMINATED 03-20-77
CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
DOYLE,KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9,000.00	750.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		15,375.00	1,281.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FEENEY,RICHARD J DEPUTY DIRECTOR-OPERATIONS	213-46-6688		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GANNON,THOMAS M,SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	

DATE 04/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/77 TO 03/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GILBERT,HOWARD M STAFF COUNSEL	549-48-4370		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		12,915.00	1,076.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		14,760.00	1,230.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		14,760.00	1,230.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HINDLE,LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		9,100.00	758.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HITCHCOCK,CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
JENKINS,NANCY S SECRETARY	216-40-9950		10,332.00	114.80	03-01-77	03-04-77	TERMINATED 03-04-77
JOHNSON,GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		19,680.00	1,640.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
KELLY,FRANCIS J DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	082-24-2085		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LARSON,BILLIE GAY SECRETARY	529-60-6414		10,000.00	166.67	03-01-77	03-06-77	TERMINATED 03-06-77
LAWSON,BELFORD L.III STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LAZIN,TERRY W STAFF COUNSEL	149-38-9108		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		14,145.00	1,178.75	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LEWIS,ALVIN B,JR STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		20,910.00	1,742.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	

DATE 04/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/77 TO 03/31/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
MARTIN,REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MCCRAY,DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		14,760.00	1,230.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORRISON,ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORTON,RITA L SECRETARY	579-64-6855		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ORR,PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
PRICE,PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	541.67	03-01-77	03-31-77	
PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		11,070.00	922.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ROBERTS,ANTOINETTE MORRIS SECRETARY	048-28-0439		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ROSS,IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
RUDDER,MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
SPRAGUE,RICHARD A CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	402-30-6486		24,354.00	2,029.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
TANENBAUM,ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		10,455.00	871.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
THORNELL,JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		15,375.00	1,281.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
TINAJERO,DOROTHY R TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	427-54-6905		11,070.00	215.25	03-01-77	03-07-77	TERMINATED 03-07-77

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 03/01/77 TO 03/31/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
WALSH,KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
WOLF,JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		17,835.00	1,486.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ZEVNIK,PAUL A STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	415-84-5593		13,530.00	1,127.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES		PROJECTION		NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
				THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NEXT MONTH	UNUSED		
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	66	0	66,545.20	74,994.58	-8,449.38	74,718.83	-83,168.21		

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 03/24/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 to 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 47,500.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BAISH,EDYTH TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	169-16-0121		11,070.00	922.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BARROW,GIULIA M SECRETARY	145-46-6759		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		11,070.00	922.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BOLAND,COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BONIFER,SHERYL L SECRETARY	228-82-4715		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BROOTEN,KENNETH EDWARD,JR STAFF COUNSEL	519-42-7339		20,910.00	1,742.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
BROWN,CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
CHARDAK,BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		20,910.00	1,742.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
CHENOWETH,JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		20,964.00	100.00 20.92	03-01-77	03-31-77	
CONNOR,LINDA MAE EDITOR/HISTORIAN	231-58-8079		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
DOYLE,KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9,000.00	750.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		15,375.00	1,281.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FEENEY,RICHARD J DEPUTY DIRECTOR-OPERATIONS	213-46-6688		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GANNON,THOMAS M,SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	

DATE 03/24/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 to 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GILBERT,HOWARD M STAFF COUNSEL	549-48-4370		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		12,915.00	1,076.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		14,760.00	1,230.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		14,760.00	1,230.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HINDLE,LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		9,100.00	758.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HITCHCOCK,CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
JENKINS,NANCY S SECRETARY	216-40-9950		10,332.00	861.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
JOHNSON,GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		19,680.00	1,640.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
KELLY,FRANCIS J DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	082-24-2085		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		18,450.00	1,537.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LARSON,BILLIE GAY SECRETARY	529-60-6414		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LAZIN,TERRY W STAFF COUNSEL	149-38-9108		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		14,145.00	1,178.75	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LEWIS,ALVIN B,JR STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		20,910.00	1,742.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 to 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
MARTIN, REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MCCRAY, DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORDANA, SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORIARTY, JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		14,760.00	1,230.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORRISON, ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
MORTON, RITA L SECRETARY	579-64-6855		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ORR, PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
PRICE, PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	541.67	03-01-77	03-31-77	
PURDY, DONALD A, JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		11,070.00	922.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
RISINGER, MARLIN, III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ROBERTS, ANTOINETTE MORRIS SECRETARY	048-28-0439		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ROSEN, MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ROSS, IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		12,300.00	1,025.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
RUDDER, MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
SPRAGUE, RICHARD A CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	402-30-6486		24,354.00	2,029.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	
STRICKLAND, ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
TANENBAUM, ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		22,140.00	1,845.00	03-01-77	03-31-77	
TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		10,455.00	871.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
THORNELL, JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		15,375.00	1,281.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
TINAJERO, DOROTHY R TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	427-54-6905		11,070.00	922.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	

DATE 03/24/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 to 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
WALSH,KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
WOLF,ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	03-01-77	03-31-77	
WOLF,JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		17,835.00	1,486.25	03-01-77	03-31-77	
ZEVNIK,PAUL A STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	415-84-5593		13,530.00	1,127.50	03-01-77	03-31-77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	PROJECTION NEXT MONTH	PROJECTION UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
PPROPRIATION TOTAL	73	0	66,545.20	~~80,053.83~~ 80,132.91	-13,508.63	81,779.91	-95.288.54		

CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR
SIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE
D THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP
A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED
REON.

FEB. PAID IN MARCH

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DATE: 3/11/77

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2 / 1 / 77 TO 2 / 28/ 77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Risinger, Marlin, III Documents Clerk	438-68-2917		$10,000.00	$833.33	2/1/77	2/28/77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES		NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
				THIS MONTH	UNUSED		
CLERK HIRE CHARGES	1			$833.33			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

February paid in March

DATE: March 8, 1977

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. On Assassinations

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2/01/77 TO 2/28/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
Akers, Jeremy Ray	416-54-2984		12,300.00	1,025.00	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Baish, Edyth	169-16-0121		11,070.00	922.50	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Berning, Elizabeth	579-46-4548		10,000.00	833.33			
Blackmer, Jon	243-74-5787		11,070.00	922.50			
Brooten, Ken	519-42-7339		20,910.00	1,742.50			
~~Chardak, Burton~~	~~194-18-8264~~		~~20,910.00~~	~~1,742.50~~			
Connor, Linda	231-58-8079		12,300.00	1,025.00			
Evans, Ed	129-22-1805		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Facter, Jeff	341-44-6951		15,375.00	1,281.25			
Fallis, Stephen	132-34-5625		22,140.00	1,845.00			
Feeney, Rick	213-46-6688		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Fenton, Clifford	082-22-5909		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Fonzi, Gaeton	136-28-8924		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Gannon, Thomas	180-30-1309		12,300.00	1,025.00			

February paid in March

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

DATE: March 8, 1977

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2/1/77 TO 2/28/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Gay, Donovan	272-42-7056		18,450.00	1,537.50	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Gilbert, Howard	549-48-4370		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Grimes, Mary	212-56-6718		12,915.00	1,076.25			
Hamilton, Gerald	251-88-1541		14,760.00	1,230.00			
Hess, Jackie	220-48-5696		14,760.00	1,230.00			
~~Holt, Laura~~	~~559-28-5038~~		~~12,300.00~~	~~1,025.00~~			
Howarth, Thomas	015-18-1386		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Hutton, E Mck	226-10-4799		22,140.00	1,845.00			
Jenkins, Nancy	216-40-9950		10,332.00	861.00			
Johnson, Gene	371-40-1135		19,680.00	1,640.00			
Kelly, Francis	082-24-2085		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Kilker,Elizabeth	161-38-7640		10,000.00	833.33			
Klein, Kenneth	068-38-5091		18,450.00	1,537.50			
Larson, Billie	529-60-6414		10,000.00	833.33			
Lawson, Belford	579-58-9975		12,300.00	1,025.00			

February paid in March'

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

DATE: March 8, 1977

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2/1 / 77 TO 2/28/77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Lazin, Terry	149-38-9108		12,300.00	1,025.00	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Lee, Sheila	093-42-2090		14,145.00	1,178.75			
Lehner, Robert	071-28-5111		22,140.00	1,845.00			
Lewis, Alvin	205-26-3636		20,910.00	1,742.50			
Martin, Rebecca	518-56-7099		12,300.00	1,025.00			
~~McPherson, Vivian~~	~~240-66-7674~~		~~10,000.00~~	~~833.33~~			
Moriarty, John	579-24-3862		14,760.00	1,230.00			
Morrison, Robert	403-36-7980		10,000.00	833.33			
Orr, Patricia	215-66-2714		10,000.00	833.33			
Purdy, Donald A. Jr.	211-38-9707		11,070.00	922.50			
Ross, Ida Jane	227-28-5345		12,300.00	1,025.00			
Sprague, Richard A.	402-30-6486		24,354.00	2,029.50			
Tanenbaum, Robert K.	127-32-4970		22,140.00	1,845.00			
Taylor, Ann Furnald	036-34-9187		10,455.00	871.25			
Thornell, Joan Talbert	579-54-1505		15,375.00	1,281.25			

FEBRUARY PAID IN MARCH

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DATE: 3-8-77

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2/ 1/ 77 TO 2 /28/ 77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
Tinajero, Dorothy R.	427-54-6905		11,070.00	922.50	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Wolf, James Lerer	057-40-6887		17,835.00	1,486.25			
Zevnik, Paul A.	415-84-5593		13,530.00	1,127.50			

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
CLERK HIRE CHARGES	47			$59,857.98			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

FEBRUARY PAID IN MARCH

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DATE: 3-9-77

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2/ 1/ 77 TO 2/28 / 77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD		REMARKS
					FROM	TO	
Boland, Colleen T. Researcher	215-52-9164		$10,000.00	$833.33	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Godfrey, Jane E. Secretary	119-36-4041		10,000.00	833.33	2/1/77	2/28/77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
CLERK HIRE CHARGES	2			$1,666.66			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

FEBRUARY PAID IN MARCH

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

DATE: 3/14/77

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2 / 1 / 77 TO 2 /28 / 77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Rosen, Merete Muff Researcher	048-58-4432		10,000.00	833.33	2/1/77	2/28/77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
CLERK HIRE CHARGES	1			833.33			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

FEBRUARY PAID IN MARCH

U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM
PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

DATE: 3/15/77

OFFICE NAME: Select Comm. on Assassinations

OFFICE CODE: 83000

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 2/ 1/ 77 TO 2 /28/ 77

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION #, TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
Barrow, Giulia M. Secretary	145-46-6759		$10,000	833.33	2/1/77	2/28/77	
Strickland, Ann Secretary	227-76-3525		10,000	833.33	2/1/77	2/28/77	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	LEAVE W/O PAY	AMT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	UNUSED	NO. OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NO. OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
CLERK HIRE CHARGES	2			1,666.66			

I certify that the listed employees have performed their assigned official duties in the offices of this committee and that they have certified that they have no relationship to a current Member of Congress, unless otherwise noted hereon.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 03/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 TO 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 39,600.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
~~AKERS,JEREMY RAY~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~416-54-2948~~		~~13,000.00~~	~~1,083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~BAISH,EDYTH~~ TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	~~169-16-0121~~		~~11,700.00~~	~~975.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
BARROW.GIULIA M SECRETARY	145-46-6759		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~BERNING,ELIZABETH L~~ SECRETARY	~~579-46-4548~~		~~10,400.00~~	~~866.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~BLACKMER,S JONATHAN~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~243-74-5787~~		~~11,700.00~~	~~975.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
BOLAND.COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
BONIFER,SHERYL L SECRETARY	228-82-4715		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~BROOTEN,KENNETH EDWARD,JR~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~519-42-7339~~		~~22,100.00~~	~~1,841.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
BROWN.CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~CHARDAK,BURTON A~~ PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	~~194-18-8264~~		~~22,100.00~~	~~1,841.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
CHENOWETH.JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		20,964.00	100.00	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~CONNOR,LINDA MAE~~ EDITOR/HISTORIAN	~~231-58-8079~~		~~13,000.00~~	~~1,083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
CONZELMAN.JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
DOYLE,KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9,000.00	750.00	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~EVANS,EDWARD M~~ CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	~~129-22-1805~~		~~19,500.00~~	~~1,625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~FACTER,JEFFREY~~ STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	~~341-44-6951~~		~~16,250.00~~	~~1,354.17~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES~~ DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	~~132-34-5625~~		~~23,400.00~~	~~1,950.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~FEENEY,RICHARD J~~ DEPUTY DIRECTOR-OPERATIONS	~~213-46-6688~~		~~19,500.00~~	~~1,625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR~~ CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	~~082-22-5909~~		~~19,500.00~~	~~1,625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~FONZI,GAETON J~~ STAFF INVESTIGATOR	~~136-28-8924~~		~~19,500.00~~	~~1,625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~GANNON,THOMAS M,SJ~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~180-30-1309~~		~~13,000.00~~	~~1,083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	

DATE 03/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 TO 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
~~GAY.DONOVAN L.~~ CHIEF RESEARCHER	~~272-42-7056~~		~~19.500.00~~	~~1.625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~GILBERT.HOWARD M~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~549-48-4370~~		~~19.500.00~~	~~1.625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
GODFREY.JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		10.000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	/
~~GRIMES.MARY SUSAN~~ RESEARCHER	~~212-56-6718~~		~~13.650.00~~	~~1.137.50~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~HAMILTON.GERALD P~~ DEPUTY:CHIEF RESEARCHER	~~251-88-1541~~		~~15.600.00~~	~~1.300.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~HESS.JACQUELINE~~ DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	~~220-48-5696~~		~~15.600.00~~	~~1.300.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
HINDLE.LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		9.100.00	758.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
HITCHCOCK.CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		10.000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~HOLT.LAURA MAE~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~559-28-5038~~		~~13.000.00~~	~~1.083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~HOWARTH.THOMAS~~ BUDGET OFFICER	~~015-18-1386~~		~~19.500.00~~	~~1.625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~HUTTON.E MCK~~ DEPUTY DIRECTOR	~~226-10-4799~~		~~23.400.00~~	~~1.950.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~JENKINS.NANCY S~~ SECRETARY	~~216-40-9950~~		~~10.920.00~~	~~910.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~JOHNSON.GENE R~~ ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	~~371-40-1135~~		~~20.800.00~~	~~1.733.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~KELLY.FRANCIS J~~ DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	~~082-24-2085~~		~~19.500.00~~	~~1.625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~KILKER.ELIZABETH A~~ SECRETARY	~~161-38-7640~~		~~10.400.00~~	~~866.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~KLEIN.KENNETH D~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~068-38-5091~~		~~19.500.00~~	~~1.625.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
LARKIN.JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		10.000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~LARSON.BILLIE GAY~~ SECRETARY	~~529-60-6414~~		~~10.400.00~~	~~866.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~LAWSON.BELFORD L.III~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~579-58-9975~~		~~13.000.00~~	~~1.083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~LAZIN.TERRY W~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~149-38-9108~~		~~13.000.00~~	~~1.083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~LEE.SHEILA JACKSON~~ STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	~~093-42-2090~~		~~14.950.00~~	~~1.245.83~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~LEHNER.ROBERT J~~ DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	~~071-28-5111~~		~~23.400.00~~	~~1.950.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~LEWIS.ALVIN B.JR~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~205-26-3636~~		~~22.100.00~~	~~1.841.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
LOCKE.RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		10.000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	

DATE 03/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 TO 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
~~MARTIN,REBECCA W~~ CHIEF CLERK	~~518-56-7099~~		~~13,000.00~~	~~1,083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
MCCRAY,DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L~~ EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	~~240-66-7674~~		~~10,400.00~~	~~866.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~MORIARTY,JOHN J~~ STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	~~579-24-3862~~		~~15,600.00~~	~~1,300.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~MORRISON,ROBERT C~~ SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	~~403-36-7980~~		~~10,400.00~~	~~866.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
MORTON,RITA L SECRETARY	579-64-6855		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~ORR,PATRICIA M~~ SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	~~215-66-2714~~		~~10,400.00~~	~~866.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
PONDER,MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
PRICE,PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	541.67	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~PURDY,DONALD A,JR~~ STAFF COUNSEL	~~211-38-9707~~		~~11,700.00~~	~~975.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	✓
ROBERTS,ANTOINETTE MORRIS SECRETARY	048-28-0439		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
ROSEN,MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	✓
~~ROSS,IDA JANE~~ ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	~~227-18-5345~~		~~13,000.00~~	~~1,083.33~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
RUDDER,MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	02-01-77	02-28-77	
SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~SPRAGUE,RICHARD A~~ CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	~~402-30-6486~~		~~25,740.00~~	~~2,145.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
STRICKLAND,ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	✓
~~TANENBAUM,ROBERT K~~ DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	~~127-32-4970~~		~~23,400.00~~	~~1,950.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~TAYLOR,ANN FURNALD~~ RESEARCHER	~~036-34-9187~~		~~11,050.00~~	~~920.83~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~THORNELL,JOAN TALBERT~~ SPECIAL ASSISTANT	~~579-54-1505~~		~~16,250.00~~	~~1,354.17~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~TINAJERO,DOROTHY R~~	~~427-54-6905~~		~~11,700.00~~	~~975.00~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	

DATE 03/08/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 02/01/77 TO 02/28/77

OFFICE: 83000. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	TO	REMARKS
WALSH, KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.33	02-01-77	02-28-77	
~~WOLF, JAMES LERER~~ STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	~~057-40-6887~~		~~18,850.00~~	~~1,570.83~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	
~~ZEVNIK, PAUL A~~ STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	~~415-84-5593~~		~~14,300.00~~	~~1,191.67~~	~~02-01-77~~	~~02-28-77~~	

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	PROJECTION NEXT MONTH	PROJECTION UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	73	0	34,516.00	~~83,454.93~~ 20,274.93	-48,938.93	85,101.93	-134,040.86		

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER OF CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON.

---

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 02/12/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/77 TO 01/31/77

OFFICE: 06689. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 39,600.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS,JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BAISH,EDYTH TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	169-16-0121		11,700.00	1,010.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BARROW,GIULIA M SECRETARY	145-46-6759		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BERNING,ELIZABETH L SECRETARY	579-46-4548		10,400.00	897.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BLACKMER,S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		11,700.00	1,010.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BOLAND,COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		10,000.00	850.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BONIFER,SHERYL L SECRETARY	228-82-4715		10,000.00	855.56	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BROOTEN,KENNETH EDWARD,JR STAFF COUNSEL	519-42-7339		22,100.00	1,907.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
BROWN,CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		10,000.00	861.11	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
CHARDAK,BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		22,100.00	1,907.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
CHENOWETH,JAMES H STAFF INVESTIGATOR	081-12-1326		20,964.00	139.09	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-01-77
CONNOR,LINDA MAE EDITOR/HISTORIAN	231-58-8079		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
CONZELMAN,JAMES K RESEARCHER	438-86-9756		10,000.00	850.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
DOYLE,KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9,000.00	750.00	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
EVANS,EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
FACTER,JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		16,250.00	1,402.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
FALLIS,STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		23,400.00	2,020.00	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
FEENEY,RICHARD J DEPUTY DIRECTOR-OPERATIONS	213-46-6688		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
FENTON,CLIFFORD A,JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
FONZI,GAETON J STAFF INVESTIGATOR	136-28-8924		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
GANNON,THOMAS M,SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/77 TO 01/31/77

OFFICE: 06689. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
GAY,DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
GILBERT,HOWARD M STAFF COUNSEL	549-48-4370		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
GODFREY,JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
GRIMES,MARY SUSAN RESEARCHER	212-56-6718		13,650.00	1,178.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HAMILTON,GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		15,600.00	1,346.66	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HESS,JACQUELINE DEPUTY CHIE RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		15,600.00	1,346.66	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HINDLE,LOUIS H CLERK	219-58-7593		9,100.00	758.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HITCHCOCK,CORNISH F STAFF COUNSEL	042-40-0959		10,000.00	861.11	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HOLT,LAURA MAE STAFF COUNSEL	559-28-5038		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
HUTTON,E MCK DEPUTY DIRECTOR	226-10-4799		23,400.00	2,020.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
JENKINS,NANCY S SECRETARY	216-40-9950		10,920.00	942.66	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
JOHNSON,GENE R ASST CHIEF COUNSEL-KING	371-40-1135		20,800.00	1,795.56	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
KELLY,FRANCIS J DIRECTOR OF SECURITY	082-24-2085		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		10,400.00	897.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
KLEIN,KENNETH D STAFF COUNSEL	068-38-5091		19,500.00	1,683.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LARKIN,JOYCE ANN SECRETARY	233-92-1962		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LARSON,BILLIE GAY SECRETARY	529-60-6414		10,400.00	897.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LAZIN,TERRY W STAFF COUNSEL	149-38-9108		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LEE,SHEILA JACKSON STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	093-42-2090		14,950.00	1,290.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		23,400.00	2,020.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LEWIS,ALVIN B,JR STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		22,100.00	1,907.78	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		10,000.00	861.11	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/77 TO 01/31/77

OFFICE: 06689, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
MARTIN, REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
MCCRAY, DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		10,000.00	844.45	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
MCPHERSON, VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		10,400.00	897.78	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
MORDANA, SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		10,000.00	861.11	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
MORIARTY, JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		15,600.00	1,346.66	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
MORRISON, ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		10,400.00	897.78	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
MORTON, RITA L SECRETARY	579-64-6855		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
ORR, PATRICIA M SPEC ASST TO CHIEF COUNSEL & DIRECTOR	215-66-2714		10,400.00	897.78	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
ORR, PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		10,000.00	838.89	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
PONDER, MARY ELIZABETH ADMINISTRATIVE ASSISTANT	452-74-2381		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
PRICE, PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	541.67	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
PURDY, DONALD A, JR STAFF COUNSEL	211-38-9707		11,700.00	1,010.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
RISINGER, MARLIN, III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	833.34	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
ROBERTS, ANTOINETTE MORRIS SECRETARY	048-28-0439		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
ROSEN, MERETE MUFF RESEARCHER	048-58-4432		10,000.00	850.00	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
ROSS, IDA JANE ADM SECTY/RECEPTIONIST	227-18-5345		13,000.00	1,122.22	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
RUDDER, MIRIAM CLERK	578-80-2773		7,500.00	625.00	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
SMITH, JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		10,000.00	833.34	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
SPRAGUE, RICHARD A CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	402-30-6486		25,740.00	2,222.00	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
STRICKLAND, ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		10,000.00	855.56	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
TANENBAUM, ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		23,400.00	2,020.00	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
TAYLOR, ANN FURNALD RESEARCHER	036-34-9187		11,050.00	953.88	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
THORNELL, JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		16,250.00	1,402.78	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
TINAJERO, DOROTHY R TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	427-54-6905		11,700.00	1,010.00	01-03-77	01-02-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77

DATE 02/12/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 01/01/77 TO 01/31/77

OFFICE: 06689. SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
WALSH, KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		10,000.00	861.11	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
WOLF, ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10,000.00	833.34	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
WOLF, JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		18,850.00	1,627.22	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77
ZEVNIK, PAUL A STAFF COUNSEL-KENNEDY	415-84-5593		14,300.00	1,234.44	01-01-77	01-31-77	APPOINTMENT 01-03-77

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	PROJECTION NEXT MONTH	PROJECTION UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	73	0	51,629.27	86,145.53	-34,516.26	85,101.93	-119,618.19		

I CERTIFY THAT THE LISTED EMPLOYEES HAVE PERFORMED THEIR ASSIGNED OFFICIAL DUTIES IN THE OFFICES OF THIS COMMITTEE AND THAT THEY HAVE CERTIFIED THAT THEY HAVE NO RELATIONSHIP TO A CURRENT MEMBER of CONGRESS, UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED HEREON.

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

DATE 01/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/76 TO 12/31/76

OFFICE: 06689, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

TYPE ALLOWANCE LUMP SUM
APPROPRIATION CODE H RES 1557
SALARY LIMITS: MINUMUM 1,200.00 MAXIMUM 39,600.00
ALLOWANCE AMOUNT 150,000.00

MAXIMUM NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES AUTHORIZED 999
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF CLERKS AUTHORIZED
MAXIMUM NUMBER OF PROFESSIONALS AUTHORIZED

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
AKERS, JEREMY RAY STAFF COUNSEL	416-54-2948		20,000.00	1,666.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	
AMATO, CAROLYN HANSEN SECRETARY	257-56-9440		16,000.00	666.67	12-01-76	12-15-76	TERMINATED 12-15-76
BAISH, EDYTH TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	169-16-0121		18,000.00	1,500.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	
BLACKMER, S JONATHAN STAFF COUNSEL	243-74-5787		15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	
BOLAND, COLLEEN T RESEARCHER	215-52-9164		13,000.00	144.44 ✓	12-27-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-27-76
BONIFER, SHERYL L SECRETARY	228-82-4715		14,000.00	700.00 ✓	12-13-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-13-76
~~BOWER, LEWIS A, JR~~ LEWIS, ALVIN B, JR. STAFF COUNSEL	205-26-3636		34,000.00	2,361.11 ✓	12-06-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-06-76
BROOTEN, KENNETH EDWARD, JR STAFF COUNSEL	519-42-7339		34,000.00	2,833.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
BROWN, CLAIRE L RESEARCHER	258-72-6151		15,000.00	83.33 ✓	12-29-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-29-76
CHARDAK, BURTON A PUBLIC INFORMATION OFFICER	194-18-8264		34,000.00	2,833.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
CONNOR, LINDA MAE EDITOR/HISTORIAN	231-58-8079		20,000.00	888.89 ✓	12-15-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-15-76
DOYLE, KEVIN SEAN MESSENGER	077-48-6826		9,000.00	425.00 ✓	12-14-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-14-76
EVANS, EDWARD M CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KING	129-22-1805		26,000.00	1,300.00 ✓	12-13-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-13-76
FACTER, JEFFREY STAFF COUNSEL LEGAL UNIT	341-44-6951		25,000.00	69.44 ✓	12-30-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-30-76
FALLIS, STEPHEN JAMES DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	132-34-5625		36,000.00	2,400.00	12-07-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-07-76
FEENEY, RICHARD J ADMINISTRATOR	213-46-6688		25,000.00	2,083.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
FENTON, CLIFFORD A, JR CHIEF INVESTIGATOR-KENNEDY	082-22-5909		26,000.00	1,300.00 ✓	12-13-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-13-76
GANNON, THOMAS M, SJ STAFF COUNSEL	180-30-1309		20,000.00	1,000.00 ✓	12-13-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-13-76
GAY, DONOVAN L. CHIEF RESEARCHER	272-42-7056		25,000.00	2,083.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
GODFREY, JANE E SECRETARY	119-36-4041		14,000.00	38.89 ✓	12-30-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-30-76
HAMILTON, GERALD P DEPUTY CHIEF RESEARCHER	251-88-1541		20,000.00	1,666.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-01-76

DATE 01/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/76 TO 12/31/76

OFFICE: 06689, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
HESS,JACQUELINE ASSISTANT CHIEF RESEARCHER	220-48-5696		20,000.00	1,666.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	
HOWARTH,THOMAS BUDGET OFFICER	015-18-1386		30,000.00	2,500.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-01-76
*A JENKINS,NANCY S SECRETARY	216-40-9950		16,800.00	186.67 ✓	12-27-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-27-76
KILKER,ELIZABETH A SECRETARY	161-38-7640		14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	
LARSON,BILLIE GAY SECRETARY	529-60-6414		14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	P/R CHANGE--12-01-76
A LAWSON,BELFORD L,III STAFF COUNSEL	579-58-9975		20,000.00	1,666.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-01-76
A LEHNER,ROBERT J DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	071-28-5111		36,000.00	2,500.00	12-06-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-06-76
LOCKE,RALPH C RESEARCHER	017-36-1972		13,000.00	1,083.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
MARTIN,REBECCA W CHIEF CLERK	518-56-7099		20,000.00	1,666.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	
*A MCCRAY,DENISE LOUISE SECRETARY	577-72-8453		12,000.00	600.00 ✓	12-13-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-13-76
MCPHERSON,VIVIAN L. EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT	240-66-7674		14,000.00	1,166.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	
MORDANA,SARI LAW ASSISTANT	102-30-2631		15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	
*A MORIARTY,JOHN J STAFF INVESTIGATOR/KENNEDY	579-24-3862		24,000.00	266.67 ✓	12-27-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-27-76
* MORRISON,ROBERT C SECURITY/INVESTIGATION/AA	403-36-7980		14,000.00	700.00 ✓	12-13-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-13-76
* MORTON,RITA L SECRETARY	579-64-6855		14,000.00	155.56 ✓	12-27-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-27-76
ORR,PATRICIA M RESEARCHER	215-66-2714		13,000.00	1,083.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
*A ORR,PHOEBE CURTIS DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	219-64-3205		11,000.00	458.33 ✓	12-16-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-16-76
OZER,ROBERT C STAFF COUNSEL	174-32-6125		39,600.00	770.00	12-01-76	12-07-76	TERMINATED 12-07-76
*A PRICE,PATRICIA LYNN CLERK	228-98-6892		6,500.00	270.83 ✓	12-16-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-16-76
A PURDY,DONALD A,JR STAFF COUNSEL	322-38-9707		15,000.00	1,250.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-01-76
*A RISINGER,MARLIN,III DOCUMENTS CLERK	438-68-2917		10,000.00	111.11 ✓	12-27-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-27-76
*A ROBERTS,ANTOINETTE MORRIS SECRETARY	048-28-0439		14,000.00	350.00 ✓	12-22-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-22-76
SMITH,JOHANNA LYNN DOCUMENT CLERK	528-64-5299		8,000.00	666.67	12-01-76	12-31-76	
SPRAGUE,RICHARD A CHIEF COUNSEL AND DIRECTOR	402-30-6486		39,600.00	3,300.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	

DATE 01/06/77
REPORT ID D01.00.00

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SYSTEM

PAYROLL CERTIFICATION

ACCOUNTING PERIOD 12/01/76 TO 12/31/76

OFFICE: 06689, SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS

EMPLOYEE NAME POSITION NO. AND TITLE	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	PAY SCHEDULE	ANNUAL SALARY	GROSS PAY	PERIOD FROM	PERIOD TO	REMARKS
*A STRICKLAND.ANN LYON SECRETARY	227-76-3525		14,000.00	116.67 ✓	12-28-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-28-76
A TANENBAUM.ROBERT K DEPUTY CHIEF COUNSEL	127-32-4970		36.000.00	2.500.00	12-06-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-06-76
✓ THORNELL.JOAN TALBERT SPECIAL ASSISTANT	579-54-1505		25,000.00	2,083.33	12-01-76	12-31-76	
✓ TINAJERO.DOROTHY R TASK FORCE OFFICE MANAGER	427-54-6905		18.000.00	1,500.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	
✓ WALSH.KEVIN RESEARCHER	020-36-4147		15.000.00	1,250.00	12-01-76	12-31-76	
*A WOLF.ELIZABETH ANN DOCUMENT/RESEARCHER	383-52-5221		10.000.00	83.33 ✓	12-28-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-28-76
*A WOLF.JAMES LERER STAFF COUNSEL-LEGAL UNIT	057-40-6887		29.000.00	886.11 ✓	12-20-76	12-31-76	APPOINTMENT 12-20-76

OFFICE PAYROLL SUMMARY

	NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES	NUMBER LEAVE W/O PAY	ALLOWANCE AMOUNT AVAILABLE THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES THIS MONTH	EXPENDITURES UNUSED	PROJECTION NEXT MONTH	PROJECTION UNUSED	NUMBER OF MAJORITY CLERKS/PROF	NUMBER OF MINORITY CLERKS/PROF
APPROPRIATION TOTAL	50	0	110.548.92	61.716.39	48.832.53	81.991.70	-33.159.17		

CORRECT: SERVICES RENDERED.
I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT THE EMPLOYMENT
OF THE PERSONS NAMED ON THE WITHIN PAYROLL IS NOT
PROHIBITED BY ANY PROVISIONS OF LAW LIMITING THE
AVAILABILITY OF THE APPROPRIATION(S) INVOLVED

Allowed:

Chairman, House Administration Comm.

Employees paid in supplemental payroll

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10125-10172
RECORD SERIES :	SECURITY VIOLATION CASE FILE
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	07/00/1978
PAGES :	100
SUBJECTS :	PHOTOGRAPHS AND FILM KENNEDY, JOHN, AUTOPSY BLAHUT, REGIS HSCA, ADMINISTRATION CIA, STAFF HSCA, FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	REPORT
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/20/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 1.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

3-26-79

To whom it may concern!

This file is of an unusual nature because it deals with an incident involving a CIA employee and this committee. It has not been logged into our system by agreement with the CIA.

Lance Svendsen
Director of Security

it's a very interesting story

I-336 (Rev. 4-28-78)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Washington, D. C. 20537

REPORT

of the

LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION
IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

July 14, 1978

YOUR FILE NO.
FBI FILE NO. 62-117290
LATENT CASE NO. B-63462

TO: Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
3331 House Office Building
Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

RE: REQUEST BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
U. S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (HSCA)
FOR LATENT PRINT COMPARISONS

REFERENCE: Letter July 13, 1978, and specimens delivered to Latent Fingerprint Section on July 13, 1978
EXAMINATION REQUESTED BY: Addressee
SPECIMENS: Two cards bearing five transparent lifts
Five photographs of enlarged inked fingerprints

This report supplements and confirms the information personally furnished to Mr. Kenneth Klein on July 13, 1978.

The specimens were examined and four latent fingerprints of value for identification purposes are present on three of the transparent lifts.

The latent fingerprint, which is present on the lift on the card bearing the notation "off back of $39E_2$," and the inked fingerprint appearing in the two photographs designated A-1 and A-2 in the Latent Fingerprint Section were made by one and the same individual.

(Continued on next page)

THIS REPORT IS FURNISHED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The two latent fingerprints, which are present on one lift on the card bearing the notation "B - from inside outer edge of safe door," and the inked fingerprints appearing in the two photographs designated B and C in the Latent Fingerprint Section were made by one and the same individual.

The remaining latent fingerprint is not identical with the inked fingerprints appearing in the five submitted photographs.

The specimens are being retained in the Latent Fingerprint Section until called for by a representative of your office.


1

off back of 39E2



A81 63371A

A2



2. R. Forefinger

D

A81 6331A



A 21 6331 A

A-1

1-267 (REV. 3-19-75)

FBI LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

FILE#
LC# B-63462



1-267 (REV. 3-19-75)

FBI LATENT FINGERPRINT SECTION

FILE#
LC# B-63462

A= from face of safe drawer
B= from inside outer edge of safe door

A- Flanagan, thomas mark

G RB
2:30
7-10-75
Key prints



A81 6231A



Ø

8

A 8 B 6 3 3 1 A

C

7/11/78.

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

TO: Griffin Bell

	Approved	Date
Fenton		
Hess		
Gay		
Klein		
Wolf		
[✓ Cornwell]	GC	7/13
[✓ Blakey]	GB	7-13-78

Cornwell

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.
(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

July 13, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C.

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2112

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

This is to request that the Federal Bureau of Investigation provide the Select Committee with a qualified fingerprint expert to examine certain lifted and known fingerprints, and to render an opinion as to whether they are the fingerprints of the same person.

Thank you in advance for your assistance in this matter.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

GRB:gcd

cc: Danny Coulson

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

TO: Griffin Bell

	Approved	Date
Fenton		
Hess		
Gay		
Klein		
Wolf		
Cornwell		
[✓ Blakey]		6-27-78

DRAFTED BY: Dawn Miller

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

June 27, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

This is to request that the fingerprint cards prepared in connection with the FBI security background check on the following staff people be returned, temporarily, to the Committee:

Andy Purdy
Mark Flanagan
Mitch Mars
Dan Hardway
Eddie Lopez
Lance Svendsen
Oliver Champion
Bill Cross
Bob Morrison
Betty Lou Sisson

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:dm

cc: Danny Coulson

JFK

3

OUTGOING CORRESPONDENCE

TO: Griffin Bell

	Approved	Date
Fenton		
Hess		
Gay		
Klein		
Wolf		
Cornwell		
Blakey	GRB	6-29-78

DRAFTED BY: Dawne Miller

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRMAN
RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.
SAMUEL L. DEVINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MC KINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

June 29, 1978

The Honorable Griffin B. Bell
Attorney General of the United States
Department of Justice
Washington, D. C. 20530

Attn: Mr. Robert L. Keuch
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division, Room 2113

Dear Mr. Attorney General:

This is to request that the fingerprint cards prepared in connection with the FBI security background check on the following staff people be returned, temporarily, to the Committee:

Joseph J. Basteri -10/24/22
New York City William Brown 9/18/28
New Orleans, LA Robert C Buras 7/3/37
Memphis TN Judith R Burford 9/24/55
Brooklyn, NY Martin J Daly 7/11/29
? Clarence Day
New Orleans, LA Lawrence J Delsa 8/11/43
Philadelphia, PA. Eileen G Dineen 9/4/48
Phoenixville, PA. Marjorie A Eagle 10/2/23
North Carolina Frank L Eccles 1/7/24
New York, NY Al bert Gonzales 4/22/23
WASH, DC MARK Susan Grimes 11/4/49
Pittsburgh, PA John W Hornbeck 1/23/40

E. M. ilbert Hutton 9/25/20 Hampton, VA
Ralph C Locke 2/10/53 Boston, MASS
Vivian L McPherson 2/4/43 Norfolk, VA
Floyd L Reeves 2/25/43 Tampa, Florida
Gina I Resnick 4/3/53 New Brunswick, NJ
Marlin Risinger III 12/8/54 Shreveport, LA
Harold A Rose 9/28/28 Baltimore, MD
Elizabeth K Selleck 12/3/48 Wenatchee, WA
Ann L Strickland 8/4/46 Rocky Mount, N.C.
Ann F Taylor 12/19/49 San Diego, CAL
Joseph A Thomas 10/13/31 St Mary's County MD
William K Triplett 8/8/40 Delano, CA
Robert J Walker 9/11/22 Atlanta, GA.
Richard C Wrase 6/19/28 New York, NY

Thank you for your attention to this matter.

Sincerely,

LOUIS STOKES
Chairman

LS:dm

cc: Danny Coulson

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE. $300

POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
JUS-432

U.S.MAIL

Mr. G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
3331 House Office Building
Annex 2
Washington, D. C. 20515

July 5, 1978

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF FINGERPRINT CARDS

I, William H. Cross, hereby acknowledge receipt from the FBI of twenty-three (23) Applicant Fingerprint Cards (Form FD-258) concerning the following persons:

	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth
1.	Basteri, Joseph John	10-24-22	U. S. A.
2.	Brown, William	9-8-28	New York, New York
3.	Burford, Judith Renee	9-24-55	Memphis, Tennessee
4.	Daly, Martin James	7-1-29	New York, New York
5.	Day, Clarence Joseph	1-8-31	Alexandria, Virginia
6.	Eagle, Marjorie Ann	10-2-23	Phoenixville, Pennsylvania
7.	Gonzales, Albert	4-22-23	New York, New York
8.	Grimes, Mary Susan	11-4-49	Washington, D. C.
9.	Hornbeck, John William	1-23-40	Pennsylvania
10.	Hutton, Elbert McKinley	9-25-20	Hampton, Virginia
11.	Locke, Ralph Christopher	2-10-53	Boston, Massachusetts
12.	Lopez, Edwin Juan	5-3-55	New York
13.	McPherson, Vivian Leigh	2-4-43	Norfolk, Virginia
14.	Reeves, Floyd Leroy	7-25-43	Tampa, Florida
15.	Resnick, Gina Irene	4-3-53	New Jersey
16.	Risinger, Marlin III	12-8-54	Louisiana
17.	Rose, Harold A.	9-28-28	Baltimore, Maryland
18.	Strickland, Ann Lyon	8-4-46	Rocky Mount, N. Carolina
19.	Taylor, Ann Furnald	12-19-49	San Diego, California
20.	Thomas, Joseph Aloysious	10-13-31	Maryland
21.	Triplett, William Karrol	8-8-40	Delano, California
22.	Walker, Robert James	9-1-23	Atlanta, Georgia
23.	Wrase, Richard Charles	6-19-28	New York, New York

Rec'd from W. H. Cross
7/5/78. above
Fingerprint Card.
Colon Alford

Signed William H. Cross.

Title Assistant Director of Security HSCA

July 5, 1978

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF FINGERPRINT CARDS

I, William H. Cross, hereby acknowledge receipt from the FBI of twenty-three (23) Applicant Fingerprint Cards (Form FD-258) concerning the following persons:

	Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth
1.	Basteri, Joseph John	10-24-22	U.S.A.
2.	Brown, William	9-8-28	New York, New York
3.	Burford, Judith Renee	9-24-55	Memphis, Tennessee
4.	Daly, Martin James	7-1-29	New York, New York
5.	Day, Clarence Joseph	1-8-31	Alexandria, Virginia
6.	Eagle, Marjorie Ann	10-2-23	Phoenixville, Pennsylvania
7.	Gonzales, Albert	4-22-23	New York, New York
8.	Grimes, Mary Susan	11-4-49	Washington, D. C.
9.	Hornbeck, John William	1-23-40	Pennsylvania
10.	Hutton, Elbert McKinley	9-25-20	Hampton, Virginia
11.	Locke, Ralph Christopher	2-10-53	Boston, Massachusetts
12.	Lopez, Edwin Juan	5-3-55	New York
13.	McPherson, Vivian Leigh	2-4-43	Norfolk, Virginia
14.	Reeves, Floyd Leroy	7-25-43	Tampa, Florida
15.	Resnick, Gina Irene	4-3-53	New Jersey
16.	Risinger, Marlin III	12-8-54	Louisiana
17.	Rose, Harold A.	9-28-28	Baltimore, Maryland
18.	Strickland, Ann Lyon	8-4-46	Rocky Mount, N. Carolina
19.	Taylor, Ann Furnald	12-19-49	San Diego, California
20.	Thomas, Joseph Aloysious	10-13-31	Maryland
21.	Triplett, William Karrol	8-8-40	Delano, California
22.	Walker, Robert James	9-1-23	Atlanta, Georgia
23.	Wrase, Richard Charles	6-19-28	New York, New York

Signed William H. Cross.

Title Assistant Director of Security HSCA

June 28, 1978

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF FINGERPRINT CARDS

I, Colon Alford, hereby acknowledge receipt from the ~~FBI of~~ William Cross eight (8) Applicant Fingerprint Cards (Form FD-258) concerning the following persons:

Name	Date of Birth	Place of Birth
1. Champion, Oliver John	6-12-55	Jersey City, N. J.
2. Cross, William Horace	8-22-32	Washington, D. C.
3. Flanagan, Thomas Mark	8-25-54	Pittsburgh, Pa.
4. Hardway, Danny Lynn	2-15-54	Webster Springs, W. Va.
5. Mars, Mitchell Allen	9-13-52	Chicago, Illinois
6. Morrison, Robert Crittendon	7-7-33	Glasgow, Kentucky
7. Purdy, Donald Alexander, Jr.	4-5-51	Philadelphia, Pa.
8. Svendsen, Lance William	9-8-52	Great Lakes, Illinois

Signed Colon Alford

7-6-78

Title

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

Bicrud 11-25-77 Dan

11/25

Bomber crim

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

BASTERI, JOSEPH JOHN

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED: Joseph J Basteri

ALIASES AKA

ORI: USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED:
5 HILLCREST AVENUE
ARDSLEY, N.Y. 10502

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month Day Year: 10 24 22

CITIZENSHIP CTZ: YES

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	5-9	160	BLU	BLO	U.S.A.

DATE: 11-16-77 SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS: Charles D. Offerso

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS: 21 0 15 R OIM 19
I 28 W OII

REF 19

FBI NO. FBI

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS: SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATION

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REF.

REASON FINGERPRINTED: clearance

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC: 075 14 0710

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


0
M
W
21
R
I
W
M
W
19
/
1. R. THUMB
5. R. LITTLE
\
W
0
W
I
W
I
W
14
/
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
29825 (CIVIL)
4/25
7B 21
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY [illegible] IN SPACE [illegible] THE NAME OF [illegible] CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for S. Massie
Rm 11263 current & Ad
reply for trans
11-28-77 88PE
FPCS 11-28-77

11/11
11-28

APR 4 1978 1750

MAR 24 1978 1635

RECORDED
NOV 25 1977
IDENT. DIV. 79

JTC
2W

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 -495-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM 6 FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

-Broad, William —

FBI LEAVE BLANK

872-602 A

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

William Broad

0 8/16 [illegible]

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOROOOZ A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

120-17 Darrow Place
Bronx, 10475, NY

CITIZENSHIP CTZ USA

SEX M RACE B HGT 6-2½ WGT 214 EYES BR HAIR BL

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month Day Year -9 8 28

PLACE OF BIRTH POB NYC

DATE 8/15/77 SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS Det. Henry Bullock

YOUR NO. OCA

FBI NO. FBI

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS 15 M 5 U 00I 12
I 1 U IOI

REF

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

HSE Select Comm:
Wash. D.C. 20515

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Appl for Employment.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC 098-20-3182

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


15
10
12
13
12
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
1
7
11
10
12
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

373w

383 Jw-17-55

[illegible]

8-18-77
mah

1 Civil O 8-17-77-383 gm

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. [illegible] THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE [illegible] AND ONLY THOSE [illegible] RECORD HAS [illegible] FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. [illegible] THAT FED- [illegible] OFFICIALS [illegible] WHETHER SUCH [illegible] CITE, BASIS OF AUTHORITY [illegible] WILL BE MADE OF IT.

3. [illegible] IS [illegible] TO THE FBI.

[illegible] ED [illegible]

**[illegible] NO., [illegible] SECURITY [illegible] (VA.)

[illegible] (Rev. 5-17-73) [illegible] PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 - 585-270

5U
1U

RECORDED
AUG 16 1977
IDENT. DIV. 9

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

Burford Judith Renee'

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Judith R. Burford

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

800 4th st S.W.
WASH. D.C.

7-8
332 BOS

ALIASES AKA

USHOR0000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB

9 - 24 - 55

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
F	B	5'4"	115	Bro.	Bro.	Memphis Tenn.

DATE

6/29/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS

Ltd. Lockhart, USCP

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

435
335

FEMALE

CLASS 16 M 1 U 0I0 19
M 1 U 000

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Select
Comittee on Assa

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Clearance

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

414 - 98-4025

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


16
13
10
19
19
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
12
11
12
18
16
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

390 SW 8 - ALL x MIU xxx x
1 MIU xxx
4781A - 855
606 KO

11.8

600
SMC
7-7

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

APR 3 1978 379

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS [illegible] THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE [illegible] AND ONLY THOSE [illegible] HAS [illegible] (FBI) SEARCH.
2. PRIVACY [illegible] FEDERAL [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible] WHETHER [illegible] OF [illegible] WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "[illegible] AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRACTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY [illegible] THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

RECORDED
JUL 7 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 8-17-[illegible]) ☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

16/14

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME
DALY	Martin	James

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED: Martin J. Daly

8822 Civil Amil O

ALIASES AKA

ORI: USHOR0000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB: 07 01 29

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED:
109A Frederick Circle
Charlottesville, Virg.

| Civil
Hes 8-19

CITIZENSHIP CTZ: U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	76	215	Blue	Brwn	N.Y.C.

DATE: 8/8/77 SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS: Michael Haegarty 3470

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS: 14 M 27 W MOO 13
S 2 K OOI

REF.

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS:
House Select Committee
On Assassinations

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC: 132-14-2717

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
14
M
13
16
13
211 mi 23
CMW 8-23
107700 22-55

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. [illegible] THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE [illegible] AND ONLY THOSE [illegible] RECORD HAS [illegible] FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. [illegible] AGENCIES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, [illegible] AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS [illegible] WHETHER [illegible] OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY [illegible] SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF [illegible] SHOULD BE SHOWN [illegible] IS THE NAME [illegible] THE FINGERPRINT CARD [illegible]

4. [illegible] IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

[illegible] ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 593-270

33wr

MAR [illegible] 955

RECORDED
AUG 22 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

FBI LEAVE BLANK

DAY, Clarence Joseph

Clarence J Day 378 515 CB25

Buck Day

USHOR000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

1-8-31

4729 10th Street N.E.
Washington, D.C. 20017

U.S. Citizen

M B 72½" 210 brw.blk Alexandia,VA.

6/29/77 L. G. Lockhart USCP

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS 12 0 1 U00I 13
M 17 U000

REF. 17
17

RA 13 319 394

229 26 8374

MNU

U.S. House of Representaive
Select Committee on
Assassinatiohs

1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
0
W
12
W
11
13
13
16
12
11
15
394-11

1606KO

378 55

600 Jmc 7 11

5 Cuvid 4 7/8/77 328

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. *PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
3. **IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. – RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

17W1

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
JUL 7 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

EAGLE, Marjorie Ann

FBI LEAVE BLANK

Marjorie A. Eagle

ADW 333 8-26

1 Civil

1 Dolores

ALIASES AKA

USHOROOOZ A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB 10/2/23

301 N. Beauregard St. # 919
Alexandria, Virginia 22312

CITIZENSHIP CTZ American

F C 5'1/2" 112 blue Brown Phoenixville, PA

YOUR NO. OCA

8/23/77 L. G. [illegible] USCP.

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

Select Committee on
Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS 10 M 21 W 24 FEMALE 17
29 I 19 W 000

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC 578-32-6132

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

REF. 9

CLEARANCE —

Ridges worn due to Employment.


M
1. R. THUMB
I
2. R. INDEX
10
3. R. MIDDLE
21
(0)
W
4. R. RING
17
5. R. LITTLE
I
6. L. THUMB
0
7. L. INDEX
13
8. L. MIDDLE
22
9. L. RING
17
10. L. LITTLE
5243
CMW 8-30
332a29 Civil
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
1 Civil 4
L. THUMB
8/24/77
R. THUMB
33
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT


1. LOOP


2. WHORL


3. ARCH

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

[illegible]

1. [illegible] BE FURNISHED [illegible] THOSE [illegible] HAS [illegible] SHOULD BE [illegible] FBI [illegible]
2. [illegible] FBI [illegible] OTHER [illegible] OF [illegible] WILL [illegible]
3. [illegible] IS [illegible]
4. [illegible] FURNISHED [illegible]

MISCELLANEOUS NO. – RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-73)   ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973 O - 498-270

21W
19W

RETURN PRINT
fol

RECORDED
AUG 26 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM

Gonzales Albert -

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

7-27
757 2700 AM

ALIASES AKA

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

FBI LEAVE BLANK

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
4- 22- 23

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

143 N.Magnolia St.
Pearl River, N.Y. 10965

CITIZENSHIP CTZ
USA

SEX | RACE | HGT. | WGT. | EYES | HAIR | PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M W 6" 4" 250 Brn Gr N.Y., N.Y.

DATE | SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS
7/14/77 L. A. Lockhart, U.S.C.P.

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

FBI NO. FBI

CLASS 14 0 13 U 000 10
M 18 R 000

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
Select Committee on
Assassinations. Annex 2

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC
082 14 2877

REF.

REASON FINGERPRINTED
Clearance

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

0
14
15
0
10.
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
M
11
14
30
9
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

2700AM

394.27

600
SMC
7-27

1 card & 7-27-77 669

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT [illegible] CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

[illegible]

[illegible]

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

APR 05 1978 1339

RECORDED
JUL 22 1977
IDENT. DIV. 15

13 W
18 L

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [illegible]

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

no civil file 4-27
5552B05

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

0
Grimes, Mary Susan

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED
Mary Susan Grimes

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED
1531 26th ST N.W
WASH. D.C. 20007

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
11 4 49

U.S

F W 5'4" 110 Bl Bn. WASH D.C.

1/4/77 L.G. Lockhart U.S.C.P.

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
US HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS. HOUSE ANEX #2

REASON FINGERPRINTED

LEAVE BLANK

FEMALE

16 M 9 R 00 I 7
5 9 A I 0

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC
212-56-6718

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

16
1. R. THUMB
14
2. R. INDEX
R
0
3. R. MIDDLE
W
I
4. R. RING
7
5. R. LITTLE
9
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
A?T
5
8. L. MIDDLE
15
9. L. RING
2
10. L. LITTLE
12
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

AW55/2085

RKW 4-24-77

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. [illegible] CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS [illegible] OR INSURED [illegible] TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. [illegible] PRO- [illegible] THOSE [illegible] HAS [illegible] FBI SEARCH.

2. [illegible]

3. [illegible]

4. [illegible] FURNISHED IN THE AP[illegible]

**[illegible] OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. [illegible] REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. [illegible] SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

APR 3 1978

RECORDED
APR 27 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

(Rev. 2-17-76) ☆U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

FBI LEAVE BLANK

9/27

D

HORNBECK, JOHN WILLIAM

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

1-23-40

John William Hornbeck

Sele. Comm. on Assassinations
House Annex II, US House of Reps
Washington, DC.

US	M	C	70"	160	Ble.	Blnd	Pa.

9/20/77

Sele. Comm. on Assassinations
US House of Representatives
Washington, D. C.

2 0 9U IOM 13
m 27W IOO

SOC 194-30-5931

MNU

CLEARANCE.......................


0
2
0
M
0
13
1. R. THUMB
W
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
W
4. R. RING
W
5. R. LITTLE
12
1
15
17
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
m
744W 28
9/28/77
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

9-28-77

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] STATE IDENTIFICATION [illegible] FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] FORCES NO., [illegible] PORT SECURITY CARD NO. [illegible] SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

[illegible] ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 [illegible]595-270

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
SEP 26 1977
IDENT. DIV. 70

O APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM | FIRST NAME | MIDDLE NAME

O

HUTTON ELBERT McKINLEY

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

X E. McK. Hutton

Mc Cwil OAE per [illegible] 7-12-77

9 7-12 55RB05

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

4500 S. Four Mile Run Dr. #116
Arlington, VA 22204

DATE | SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS

7/7/77 J.G. Lakhart USCP

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

Select Com on Assassinations
Washington, DC 20515

REASON FINGERPRINTED

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOR0000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

USA

YOUR NO. OCA

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

226-10-4799

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

FBI LEAVE BLANK

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year

9-25-20

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR
M	W	6'3"	260	Bl	Br

PLACE OF BIRTH POB

Hampton, VA

REF.

LEAVE BLANK

14 I 2R r 12
L 17 T


I
14
4
19
See reverse
12
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
W
R
r
14
17
3
I
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
T
Ur
12
55RB05 89
9271MS 7-12
293 PAC 7-12
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT



#5

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
**2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA.).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Spot Reply by P. Camp
Rm-11(6) for Ham 5-18-
223 PBC 7/12/77 / 9-JMS 3-15-77

APR 4 1978 1750

2
17 Rn

RECORDED
JUL 11 1977
IDENT. DIV. 9

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

0 APPLICANT	LEAVE BLANK no civil file	TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME Locke, Ralph. Christopher	FBI LEAVE BLANK
SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED Ralph C. Locke 4-29 575 ABD		ALIASES AKA	USHOROOOZ A US HOUSE OF REP WASH. DC
RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED 815 Massachusetts Ave. NE Washington, D.C. 20002		U.S.	DATE OF BIRTH DOB 2-10-53
			M W 5'8" 150 bl br Boston. Mass.
DATE 12/10/76	SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS L.H. Lockhart U.S.C.P.		
EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS Select Committee on Assassinations, Washington, D.C. 20515			CLASS 17 L 1 T 00 13 S 1 U 000
			REF. R
REASON FINGERPRINTED security clearance for sensitive position		SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC 017-36-1972	
		MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU	

17
1. R. THUMB
(2)
2. R. INDEX
1 R
13
3. R. MIDDLE
17
4. R. RING
13
5. R. LITTLE
4
6. L. THUMB
13
7. L. INDEX
13/15
8. L. MIDDLE
14
9. L. RING
12
10. L. LITTLE
746 Q-30-55-MA
1 1
M 30
LPW 5-4-77
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES AND PRIVATE CONTRACTORS WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

ITu

MAR 30 1978 955

RECORDED
APR 29 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

O APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

Lopez, Edwin Juan.

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Edwin J. Lopez

no arrest
Delores Wms
7-27-77

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

75. S. Reynolds. (Oakwood Towers)
Alex. Va #G107
22304

DATE

7/11/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS

L. G. Lockhart U.S.C.P.

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Annex 2
Assassination Room 3331
Washington, D.C. 20515

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Security Search
Clearance

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year
5 3 55

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	Hisp.	5'6"	120lbs	Hazel	Brown	New York.

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

FBI NO. FBI

CLASS

8 1A II 8
1tA II

23
13

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

087-48-2165

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


8
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
5
3. R. MIDDLE
9
4. R. RING
8
5. R. LITTLE
(2)
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
A
2
8. L. MIDDLE
12
9. L. RING
9
10. L. LITTLE
A
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for S. Massie
Rm 11262 Nal reply
for transmittal
7-28-77 SSPE FPcs
7-28-77 ~~ggq2g~~
7-28

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

1A/4 RT

MAR 30 [illegible] 955

RECORDED
JUL 27 1977
IDENT. DIV. 9

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

no crim rec

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME
McPherson,	Vivian	Leigh

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Vivian Leigh McPherson

4-29
515 BOS

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

4201 S. 31st Street
#318
Arlington, Va. 22206

USHOR000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
2 4 43

U.S.

F Ca 5'5" 125 blu br.

PLACE OF BIRTH POB
Norfolk,Va.

DATE
4/22/77 L.G. Jackson USCP

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

U.S. House of Representatives
Wash. D.C.

REASON FINGERPRINTED

LEAVE BLANK

FEMALE

15 M 10 U OIM
M 8 W OOM

240-66-7674


15
14
9
M/O
0
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
12
0
13
M/I/O
I
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

LKW
5-3-77

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, [illegible] STATE STATUTES [illegible].*
3. [illegible] CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] BANKING [illegible] MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF [illegible].

[illegible]

1. [illegible] CHECKED [illegible] APPROPRIATE [illegible] THOSE [illegible] HAS [illegible] FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible] FEDERAL [illegible] OF [illegible]
3. [illegible] IS [illegible] CARD TO THE FBI.
4. [illegible] FURNISHED IN THE APPLICANT [illegible] SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. [illegible] ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. [illegible] REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. [illegible], SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA.).

APR 3 1978 3 7 9

10 U
8 W

RECORDED
APR 29 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975—595-270

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

no civil 8-9-77

del 80 sdc 8-10 ain

REEVES, FLOYD LEROY

Floyd L Reeves

ALIASES AKA N/A

ORI USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

3540 N. Campcreek Pkwy.,S.W,#C-7
Atlanta, Georgia 30331

CITIZENSHIP CTZ U.S.

DATE OF BIRTH DOB 7 25 43

SEX	RACE	HGT	WGT	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	B	6'	195	BR.	BLK.	Tampa, Fla.

8/3/77 S.A. Lockhart usep

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS 16 m 9 U oom
m 14 U ooI 18

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
U.S. HOUSE OF REP.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS, Washington, D.C. 20515

FBI NO. FBI

REASON FINGERPRINTED

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC 254-66-1801

16
20
0
m
0
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
16
13
15
18
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

600 smc 8-11

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. [illegible] CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] THE COUNTY [illegible]

[illegible]

1. [illegible] THE APPROPRIATE [illegible] ONLY THOSE [illegible] FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. [illegible] FED- [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] (VA.).

FD-258 (Rev. 8-12-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 595-270

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
AUG 8 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

D APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

MIDDLE NAME

RESNICK gina - irene

FBI LEAVE BLANK

Gina I. Resnick 6-20 5.5 ~~1~~

607 Brown's Ct SE
Washington, D.C. 20003 no civil pDan 6-20

CTZ
USA

USHORODOZ A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year
04 03 53

F - C - 5'6" - 115 - g - b -

PLACE OF BIRTH POB
New Jersey

6/14/77 S.G. Lockhart, uscp

LEAVE BLANK

FBI NO. FBI

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
select committee on assassinations
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

21 L 5U00 ~~FEMALE~~ 14
I 1U0II

FEMALE

REASON FINGERPRINTED
Clearance

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC
147-40-4845

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


21
1. R. THUMB
15
2. R. INDEX
13
3. R. MIDDLE
14
4. R. RING
14
5. R. LITTLE
I
6. L. THUMB
16
7. L. INDEX
8
8. L. MIDDLE
10
9. L. RING
18
10. L. LITTLE
17228
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
gmw 6-21

966 20 5.51

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, [illegible] STATE STATUTES [illegible].*
3. U.S. [illegible] CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] SECURITY [illegible].

[illegible]

1. [illegible] CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE [illegible] THESE [illegible] RECORD HAS [illegible] FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible] FEDERAL, [illegible] OF AUTHORITY [illegible] WILL [illegible].
3. [illegible] IS [illegible] FINGERPRINT CARD [illegible].
4. [illegible] SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

54

APR 3 1978 379

RECORDED
JUN 17 1977
IDENT. DIV. 9

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

Risinger, Marlin (NMN) III

FBI LEAVE BLANK

169-432-K3

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Marlin Risinger III

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOR000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

843 Delaware st. no civil
Shreveport, LA. Jcol 5-3

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

U.S

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month Day Year

12-08-54

DATE SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

12/3/76 L.G. Lockhart U.S.C.P.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	C	71"	160	Bk	Blnd	Louisiana

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

29 W
20 W

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

Hse of Reps.
WASH. D.C.

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

438-68-2917

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

Clearance


1. R. THUMB
W
2. R. INDEX
W
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
W
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
W
7. L. INDEX
W
8. L. MIDDLE
/
9. L. RING
W
10. L. LITTLE
1688
226/15
604
15
2MP-4-55
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT







TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. — RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

RECORDED
MAY 2 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

15

258 (Rev. 5-27-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 592-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

ROSE HAROld A.

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Harold A. Rose

O 80 8-10

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

1907 Tadcaster Rd.
BALTIMORE, MARYLAND 21228

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB

SEPT. 28, 1928

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	6'	189	BROWN	BROWN	BALTIMORE, MARYLAND

DATE

8-3-77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

Sharon S. Talmadge

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Select Committee
on Assassinations

REASON FINGERPRINTED

LEAVE BLANK

14 M 30 W IOI
I 22 U 00I

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

220-20-6648

M O
I
14
I M O
O
W
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
I
14
13
I
I
W
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
600 SMC 8-15
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
4 Rev
8-11-77 685

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES [illegible] CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. *PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible] FED- [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible] NUMBER [illegible] OF [illegible] WILL
3. [illegible] IS [illegible] FINGERPRINT [illegible]
4. [illegible] FURNISHED [illegible] SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. [illegible] ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

APR 4 1978 1750

29
25 W

RECORDED
AUG 8 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 2-17-76) ★ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

STRICKLAND ANN LYON

FBI LEAVE BLANK

Ann Lyon Strickland

no civil
JCS 5-3

411 South Fairfax Street
Alexandria, Virginia 22314

4/22/77 USCP

Select Committee on
Assassinations

227-76-3525

USHOR0000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

8 4 46

USA F W 5'9" 125 Br Br Rocky Mt.,N.C.

LEAVE BLANK

FEMALE

5 5 9 U 00M 9
5 2T 0I


5
14
15
M
9
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
W
5
16
I
12
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
W
T 2 A
CMW
5-5
1289 Ch. 455
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

[illegible]

1. [illegible] THOSE [illegible] HAS [illegible] FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible] FURNISHED [illegible] THE [illegible]

MISCELLANEOUS [illegible] OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

MAR 27 1978 259

9V
2T

RECORDED
MAY 2 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

MIDDLE NAME

Taylor Ann Furnald

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Ann Furnald Taylor 52 75 eye

USHOR000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

2506 Lakevale Dr.
Vienna, Virginia

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year

12-19-49

US

			WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
F	W	5'4"	127	BL	BK	San Diego, Ca

DATE SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

1/10/77 E. K. Hoy

LEAVE BLANK

FEMALE

6 M 25 W II O 15
M 17 U O I O

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

U.S.House of Represenatives
H.O.B. Annex #2

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Employment

036-34-9187


M O
I
6
O
15
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
16
11
10
17
16
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
Hoover
444
emw 5-5
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

1CIVIL0 5/4/77 17602

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES [illegible]*
3. [illegible] WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

[illegible]

1. [illegible] THESE [illegible] HAS [illegible] FOR FBI [illegible]
2. [illegible] FEDERAL [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible]
3. [illegible] SHOULD BE SHOWN [illegible] CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. — RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

FD-258 (Rev. 9-12-75)

☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 598-270

APR 3 1978 3 7 9

25 W
17 U

RECORDED
MAY 2 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

Thomas, Joseph Aloysious

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

1 Civil [illegible] 9/16/77

Joseph A. Thomas

THOMAS JOSEPH ALOYSIOUS

9/16

ALOYSIOUS

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOR0000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

3212 Blue Hill Rd
Baltimore Md # 21207

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month Day Year

10th 13th 31st

DATE

9/9/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

Ronald Sutherland

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

USA

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	Blk	5'8½	185	Brn	mix	Md

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

335
255

9 0 5 U I00 16
±17 R I00

FBI NO. FBI

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

Select Committee on Assassination
400 2nd St S.W.

MNU

216-34-9326

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Employment Clearance

See Reverse 0

9
11
19
16
1. R. THUMB
5. R. LITTLE
1
5
12
18
17
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
10. L. LITTLE
254 R
W16
Sub M
429
9/19
821
LAH
9-19
1442W/1655
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

1 CIVIL Ø 9/16/77

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. [illegible] IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible] REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS [illegible] AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
3. [illegible] THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. — RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

RIGHT THUMB



Prepared for P. Carnigh Rm. 11262,
card + tissue for
[illegible] 9-19-77, 821, [illegible],
FPCs 9-19-77.

MAIL

955

RECORDED
SEP 15 1977
IDENT. DIV. 70

5 U
17 R

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

TRIPLETT, WILLIAM KARROL

FBI LEAVE BLANK

898 754 J2

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

William K. Triplett

7-28
757

ALIASES AKA

NONE

ORI

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

6362 BURTON CIRCLE
FALLS CHURCH, VIRGINIA

DATE OF BIRTH DOB

Month Day Year

8 8 40

CITIZENSHIP CTZ

U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	6'	155	HZL	BRN	DELANO, CA.

DATE: 7/18/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS

2/W
1/R

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

SELECT COMMITTEE ON
ASSASSINATIONS

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

NONE

REASON FINGERPRINTED

SECURITY CLEARANCE

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

550-50-7581

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

W

R

3/7/25

2 McDon

394.25

875 CPB
7/25

NW 88326 DocId:32269709 Page 71

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. [illegible] IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. *PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible] FED- [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible] WILL [illegible]
3. [illegible] IS [illegible]
4. [illegible] FURNISHED [illegible]
5. [illegible] NO., [illegible] FORT SE- [illegible] (VA.), VETERANS ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA.).

RECORDED
JUL 22 1977
IDENT. DIV. 13

[illegible] (Rev. [illegible]) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: [illegible] 226-270

660
CL

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

1cuvd. tny 9.12.77 Dan

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

WALKER, ROBERT JAMES

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Robert J. Walker

9/12 SSCB05

ALIASES AKA

ORI

USHOROOOZ A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

7838 MONROE DR. NE 30324

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month Day Year

9 1 23

CITIZENSHIP CTZ US

SEX RACE HGT. WGT. EYES HAIR PLACE OF BIRTH POB

M W 6'2 220 BL BR ATL. GEO

DATE 9/6/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS

135
246

17 L 1 R II 0 14
M 1 R I 00

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Select Committee
on ASSASSINATION
House Annex II

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Clearance.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC

260-40-7319

REF.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

17
4
10
18
14
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
16
6
14
21
14
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE N[illegible]LTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

NonD. with #32909283 Army 1-31-45

MAR 2 [illegible] 335
623 [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. – RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

Prepared for S Maxwell Rm 11262 ND answer for trans to US House of Rep Wash DC 9-13-77
88PE FPCS 9-13-77

RECORDED
SEP 12 1977
IDENT. DIV. 70

457
[illegible]
9/13

1R

FD-258 (Rev. 5-17-73) [illegible] GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

FBI LEAVE BLANK

yo circ 11-7-77

118

LAST NAME NAM / FIRST NAME / MIDDLE NAME	WRASE, RICHARD Charles
SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED	Richard C Wrase
ALIASES AKA	
ORI	USHOR0002 A US HOUSE OF REP WASH. DC
RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED	37 Clearview DR WHEATLEY HEIGHTS N.Y. 11798
DATE OF BIRTH DOB	6-19-28
CITIZENSHIP CTZ	CTZ
SEX	M
RACE	W
HGT.	6' 4"
WGT.	270
EYES	BL
HAIR	GRY
PLACE OF BIRTH POB	N.Y. N.Y.
DATE / SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS	10/25/77 L.J. Lockhart #15CP
YOUR NO. OCA	
EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS	U.S. HOUSE OF REP. WASH D.C.
FBI NO. FBI	
ARMED FORCES NO. MNU	
REASON FINGERPRINTED	House Select Committee on Assassinations Clearance
SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC	113-18-5784
MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU	

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS 1 0 1 U $\frac{122}{\frac{111}{111}}$ 10
m 17 R III

REF. 9 / 17


1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
1
7
5
(6)
(47)
10
(8-13)
W
T
W
W
13
2
4
3
10
1
R
28
22 mil 11-9-77
2052-8-55
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for L. [illegible] 11762 [illegible]
Quantity [illegible] 11-9-77 22 [illegible]
FPCS 11-9-77
1-9

9V
17R

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
NOV 7 1977
IDENT. DIV. 79

FD-258 (Rev. 8-17-76) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 575-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME
CROSS	WILLIAM	H ORACE

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED
William H. Cross

8.40 505 580

ALIASES AKA

ORI
USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED
1906 Fenwood Avenue
Oxon Hill, Maryland 20021

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year
8/22/32

CITIZENSHIP CTZ
Yes

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	5'10"	185	Brn	Brn	Wash DC

DATE
8/2/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS
USCP

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS
16 M 2 R 000 13
M 1 R III

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
Select Committee on
Assassinations
3rd Floor Annex 2

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED
clearance

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC
579-40-4377

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


16
13
12
17
See reverse
13
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
R
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
13
4
5
13
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
R
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
1881
SS
Sh-14
600
SMC
8-17
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

1 Card 9 8-15-77 2 60/-

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH

ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

#5

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES [illegible] REQUIREMENT.*
3. [illegible] IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS [illegible] THE SECURITY OF [illegible]

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS [illegible] CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE [illegible] BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS [illegible] HAS [illegible] FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. [illegible] FED- [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible] OTHER [illegible] OF [illegible] WHICH WILL [illegible]

3. [illegible] SHOULD BE SHOWN [illegible] IS [illegible] THE FINGERPRINT [illegible]

4. [illegible] BE FURNISHED [illegible]

5. [illegible] OTHER ARMED FORCES NO. [illegible] ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

MAR 30 [illegible] 9 5 5

RECORDED
AUG 10 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 5-12-75)   ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 O-595-270

APPLICANT	LEAVE BLANK [illegible] 7-27-77.	TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME HARDWAY, DANNY LYNN	FBI LEAVE BLANK
SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED Danny L Hardway		ALIASES AKA	ORI USHOR000Z A US HOUSE OF REP WASH. DC
RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED 755. Reynolds Apt #G102 Alexandria, VA. 22304		CITIZENSHIP CTZ U.S.A.	DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month 2 Day 15 Year 54

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	C	5'10"	125	Br	Br	Webster Springs, W.V.

DATE 7/12/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS L L Lockhart USCP

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS
HOUSE ANNEX #2, Room 3331
WASHINGTON.

REASON FINGERPRINTED
Clearance

YOUR NO. OCA

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC
263-17-0952

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS
444
134
21 L 1 U 000 9
M 1 R I00

REF.


21
1. R. THUMB
14
2. R. INDEX
13
3. R. MIDDLE
15
4. R. RING
9
5. R. LITTLE
14
6. L. THUMB
4
7. L. INDEX
R
12
8. L. MIDDLE
14
9. L. RING
9
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. [illegible] IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. [illegible] BANKS, [illegible] SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

[illegible]

1. [illegible]
2. [illegible]
3. [illegible]
4. [illegible] FURNISHED IN THE [illegible] SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - [illegible] OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for S. Massie
Rm. 11262 NE reply
for transmittal
7-28-77 38 PE 7-28-77
29929
7-28

CS Rec
9-27-77
mf

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
JUL 27 1977
IDENT. DIV. 9

FD-258 (Rev. 5-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1973 - 596-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

MIDDLE NAME

Mars Mitchell Allen

[illegible] 9-16-77

Mitchell A. Mars

9/16

582605

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

FBI LEAVE BLANK

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

1330 35th Street N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20007
(temporary)

United States

DATE OF BIRTH DOB

9 13 52

M	C	5'8"	140	Hazel	Brown	CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

9/7/77

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Select Committee on
Assassinations
House Office Building-Annex #2
Washington, D.C. 20515

LEAVE BLANK

45
45

25 L 9 U 000 15
L 1 U 000

REASON FINGERPRINTED

CLEARANCE

338/48/1298



23
13
18
0
15
(12-18)
1. R. THUMB
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
W
5. R. LITTLE
18
16
16
17
20
6. L. THUMB
7.
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10.
254J
4616
4/29
9/19
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. — RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

94

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for J. P. Carrigh [illegible] 11862
Card + tissue in ans to [illegible]
Trans to U.S. [illegible]
Wash DC 3/29/[illegible]
Bull [illegible] 4/1/[illegible]

MAR 30 1977 9 55

RECORDED
SEP 15 1977
IDENT. DIV. 70

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 593-270

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

0

MORRISON Robert Crittendon

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Robert Crittendon Morrison

0 4-19 75 Stygen

ALIASES AKA

1 civil 0 gol

USHOR000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

FBI LEAVE BLANK

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year
7 7 33

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED
1910 N. Calvert Street #101
Arlington, Virginia 22201

U. S.

M	CA	6'1"	195	Bl	BLD	Glasgow, KY

PLACE OF BIRTH POB

DATE SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS
12/13/76 L. G. Lockhart USCP.

LEAVE BLANK

5 0 25 W MHD 19
S 17 V OII

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS
Select Committee on Assassinations
U. S. House of Representatives
Washington, D. C. 20515

REASON FINGERPRINTED

403-36-7980

CLEARANCE..................

0
M
5
0
19
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
5
1
10
4
19
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

5033/1955 MA

3/6/21

4-21-77 mah

1 civil 0

4/19/77

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. [illegible]
[illegible]

[illegible] CLEAR.

[illegible]

[illegible]:

*1. [illegible] THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE [illegible] BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE [illegible] HAS [illegible] SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. – RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA.).

APR 4 1978 1750

5W
1U

RECORDED
APR 18 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

no civil

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

SVENDSEN, LANCE William

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Lance Svendsen

ALIASES AKA

ORI USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

9003 Cherrytree Dr.
Alexandria, VA.

8/11
SSLB05

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month 9 Day 8 Year 52

CITIZENSHIP CTZ U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	5'11"	170	BRW	BRN	Great Lakes ILL

DATE 7/29/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS Ronald Roberland

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

15 9 R 000 10
1 a U I00

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS Select Comm. on Assissinations,

FBI NO. FBI

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC 264-98-4680

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Clearance


15
1. R. THUMB
10
2. R. INDEX
R
14
3. R. MIDDLE
0
4. R. RING
10
745
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
9
7. L. INDEX
11
8. L. MIDDLE
14
9. L. RING
8
10. L. LITTLE
1848
11-55
1-8-11
LRS 8/11/77
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. [illegible] IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.
**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

9 c R
1 a U

MAR 30 [illegible] 955

RECORDED
AUG 10 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME
PURDY	DONALD	ALEXANDER

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED: Donald A. Purdy, Jr. 5-2 75 [illegible]

ALIASES AKA

ORI: USHOR0000Z A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED:
822 So. FAIRFAX
ALEXANDRIA, VA. 22314

DATE OF BIRTH DOB Month 4 Day 5 Year 51

CITIZENSHIP CTZ: U.S.

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	C	5'10½	170	Blue	Blond	PHILA., PA.

DATE: 12/13/77 SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS: L. Y. Lockhart USCP

YOUR NO. OCA

LEAVE BLANK

CLASS 3 0 13 R IIIm10 3
I 25 U III

REF.

FBI NO. FBI

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS: House Select Committee on Assassinations

ARMED FORCES NO. MNU

REASON FINGERPRINTED

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC: 211-38-9707

MISCELLANEOUS NO. MNU


0
3
M
0
3
1. R. THUMB
W
2. R. INDEX
R
3. R. MIDDLE
W
4. R. RING
W
5. R. LITTLE
I
4
8
9
5
6. L. THUMB
W
7. L. INDEX
W
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
249 4.55
WA+
1 civil 5-4-77 249
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
Crim 5-5
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. [illegible] CLEARANCE.
4. [illegible] SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. — RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

13 u

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
MAY 2 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

O APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME
Champion	Oliver	John

LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

x Oliver J. Champion

Ms Carol C. Evans 9-7-77

9/12 SFVB65

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

224 N. Wakefield Dr. Arlington
Va.

DATE: 9/6/77

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS: Richard A. Rodge USCP

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

H. S. Comm. On Assassinations
3331 H. O. B. No. 2

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Clearance

ALIASES AKA

CITIZENSHIP CTZ: U. S.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC: 086-46-9506

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB

Month	Day	Year
6	12	55

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
m	Bl	5 11	165	Br	Br	Jersey City N.J.

LEAVE BLANK

21 m 1U 000 15
L 2U 0 II


21
15
14
0
15
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
19
16
I
I
16
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
24
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for S. Mazzie Rm 1160 card & tissue in [illegible] to for trans to 9-13-77 721 [illegible] 9-13-77.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.
2. [illegible] THAT FEDERAL [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible] WHETHER [illegible] BASIS OF [illegible] WHICH WILL [illegible]
**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.
4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. – RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

114
2

145 PRO
9-13

MAR 20 [illegible] 955

RECORDED
SEP 12 1977
IDENT. DIV. 70

FD-258 (Rev. 9-17-75) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 595-270

0 APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

Flanagan, Thomas Mark

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Thomas Mark Flanagan

7-22
757 AU

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

8901 Miles Street

Silver Spring, Maryland

U.S.

ORI

USHOR0002 A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

FBI LEAVE BLANK

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
Month Day Year
8 25 54

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR	PLACE OF BIRTH POB
M	W	5-8	150	Br	Br	Pittsburgh,Pa

DATE SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING THE FINGERPRINTS

7/12/77 L. G. Lockhart USCP

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Assassinations
Committee
House Annex #2

REASON FINGERPRINTED

Clearance

LEAVE BLANK

22 L 23 W 000 14
I 22 R III

214-60-6734


22
0
21
18
14
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
W
3. R. MIDDLE
5. R. LITTLE
I
3
I
I
16
6. L. THUMB
W
7. L. INDEX
R
8. L. MIDDLE
W
9. L. RING
W
10. L. LITTLE
2780W
26/4/22
600
SmL
7-26
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

13558328 (1) #155

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. [illegible] THAT FED- [illegible] INDIVIDUALS [illegible] ANOTHER [illegible] EACH OF [illegible] WILL [illegible]

[illegible] IS [illegible] RIGHT [illegible]

[illegible] FURNISHED [illegible] MILITARY/NAVAL NO. – REF. NO. [illegible] NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

APR 4 1978 1750

RECORDED
JUL 22 1977
IDENT. DIV. 15

FD-258 (Rev. 5-17-73) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1975 593-270

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	SEX	RACE
			HT. (Inches)	WT.
			HAIR	EYES
			DATE OF BIRTH	

FINGERPRINTS SUBMITTED BY

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

FINGERPRINTED BY

Person to be Notified in Case of Emergency

NAME ____________________________

ADDRESS ____________________________

See Reverse Side for Further Instructions

DATE FINGERPRINTED

PLACE OF BIRTH

CITIZENSHIP

SCARS AND MARKS

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

CLASS. ____________________________

REF. ____________________________

1. RIGHT THUMB	2. RIGHT INDEX	3. RIGHT MIDDLE	4. RIGHT RING	5. RIGHT LITTLE
6. LEFT THUMB	7. LEFT INDEX	8. LEFT MIDDLE	9. LEFT RING	10. LEFT LITTLE

LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY	LEFT THUMB	RIGHT THUMB	RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION

To obtain classifiable fingerprints:

1. Use printer's ink.
2. Distribute ink evenly on inking slab.
3. Wash and dry fingers thoroughly.
4. Roll fingers from nail to nail, and avoid allowing fingers to slip.
5. Be sure impressions are recorded in correct order.
6. If an amputation or deformity makes it impossible to print a finger, make a notation to that effect in the individual finger block.
7. If some physical condition makes it impossible to obtain perfect impressions, submit the best that can be obtained with a memo stapled to the card explaining the circumstances.
8. Examine the completed prints to see if they can be classified, bearing in mind the following:
   Most fingerprints fall into the patterns shown below (other patterns occur infrequently and are not shown here):

PASTE

PHOTOGRAPH HERE

(OPTIONAL)

WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

FD-353 (REV. 7-27-65)

GPO : 1971 O - 439-875

Rcvd-Agents
GB
7-16-78
2:30

The item identified below has been withdrawn from this file:

File Designation Blahut File

Date 7-11-78 and 7-13-78

From

To

2 audio cassettes: Interview and questioning of Regis Blahut

THIS ITEM HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN AND TRANSFERRED TO ~~THE MOTION PICTURE AND SOUND RECORDING BRANCH~~. separate ~~box~~ at end of series

KING or [✓ KENNEDY]

(Circle one)

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE 7-11-78 TIME 11:30 (ish)

I. Identifying Information:

Name Scott Breckinridge Telephone

Address CIA

Type of Contact: ✓ Telephone
__ Person

II. Summary of Contact:

Call re concern on possible security violation re JFK autopsy photo's.

Wanted to talk with Regis Blahut – one among other who had access to area

Talked informally with him

wanted to take more formal, i.e., tape, statement

(over)

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

Signature: G. Robert Blakey

Scott said he would
recommend that he be
oked to cooperate.
Would call Garbus
for O.K.

Scott called back
and said cleared with
Garbus + Regis B
would be told O.K.
by phone.

July 10, 1978

TO: G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations

FROM: Robert Morrison, Director of Security
William H. Cross, Assistant Director of Security

RE: The tampering with Kennedy Autopsy photos located in Safe #102095 in the Reading Room of Room 3381 of the Committee Offices.

About 4:05 P.M. Friday June 23, 1978, Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the Security Room along with Lance Svendsen of the Security Staff upon opening safe #102095 noted that several Kennedy autopsy photos were loose on top of the Kennedy Autopsy photo books. The photos removed from the books were numbered 39E1, 39E2, 40E and 41E. This was two pages consisting of 4 photos. 39E1 and 39E2 along with the cellophane cover had been ripped from the book, and the cellophane enclosure was torn at binder holes. One photo, 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and lying loose. A quick check by Flanagan and Svendsen revealed the photos were from Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos. An immediate check of all the photo books was begun to ascertain if any other photos were missing. This check by Flanagan and Svendsen showed no other photos to be missing or tampered with. Book Five, Part One had not been signed out since September of 1977 according to the check out log.
Both Flanagan and Svendsen stated they would have noticed the photos when the safe was opened at 10 A.M. Friday June 23, 1978 if they had been lying where they were when discovered. They both feel there was no way this could have been done accidently. Someone had to enter the safe, and do this. The safe was unlocked, but shut.

Approximately 5 P.M. Friday, June 23, 1978 at the request of Committee Investigator John Moriarty, three members of the Metropolitan Police Identification section responded to Room 3381 for the purpose of attempting to get latent prints. Pvt. Pat McGinnis, Sgt Blake and Detective Pvt McGinnis was able to lift 13 separate cards of latent prints from the interior of the safe, and from the Kennedy Autopsy photo book that was tampered with. These men left at approximately 8:35 PM Friday June 23, 1978. Investigator John Moriarty, William H. Cross or Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey were present at all times during the lifting of the prints. The lifted prints were turned over to Investigator John Moriarty, and remained in his possession.

The persons who were in this office alone on Friday June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez, Dan Hardway and Mitch Mars of the Committee Staff, and Regis Blahut of the CIA.

On Monday June 26, 1978 the 13 cards of prints lifted by Pvt McGinnis were turned over to Director of Security Robert Morrison by Investigator John Moriarty and locked in safe #45471 in Room 3381 of Committee Office.

On June 27, 1978, and June 29, 1978 requests were made to the FBI for certain Committee Staff member fingerprint cards.

The first request for cards was filled, and received the latter part of the week of June 25, 1978. The second request was filled and received on July 5, 1978. Investigator John Moriarty had contacted a Pvt Colon Alford of the Metropolitan Police Identification section, and requested he try to make comparisons of known and latent prints. During the week of June 26, 1978 Pvt. Alford spent one hour in Committee spaces checking staff members prints against those lifted. On July 5, 1978 at the request of Pvt Alford, and with the consent of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey the 13 cards of lifted prints and all staff member print cards from the FBI were turned over to Pvt Alford which he receipted for, so he could take them away from Committee spaces to enable him to spend more time studying them. During the week of July 2, 1978. Pvt Alford was able to obtain the fingerprints of Regis Blahut, an employee of the CentralIntelligence Agency. On Friday July 7, 1978 at approximately 2:30 P.M. Pvt Alford phoned William H. Cross of Security Staff and stated he had made a tentative identification of Blahuts prints on the inside of the safe door, and on one of the photos in Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos. On Monday July 10, 1978 at 2;30 P.M. Pvt Alford responded to the Committee offices and in the presence of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Robert Morrison, and William H. Cross returned all fingerprint cards, and the 13 cards of lifted prints. These were returned to safe #45471 in Room 3381. Pvt Alford stated he had identified a certain number of points in several prints, and in his opinion they were those of Regis Blahut. These prints were matched with those on the inside of the safe door, and on the back of photo 39E2 which had been ripped from Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos, and the photo which had been removed from the cellophane cover. After returning all materials Pvt Alford departed Committee Spaces at 2;55 P.M. Monday July 10, 1978.

Robert C. Morrison
Robert Morrison
Director of Security

William H. Cross
William H. Cross
Assistant Director of Security

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE July 11 1978 TIME ______

I. Identifying Information:

Name Regis Blahut Telephone ______

Address ______

Type of Contact: ☐ Telephone
☒ Person

II. Summary of Contact:

On two occasions on this date Gary Cornwell and I spoke with Regis Blahut of the CIA. We first spoke to him at approximately 11AM in Gary Cornwell's office. We spoke with him a second time at approximately 2PM at which time we recorded his statement pertaining to a breach of security at the HSCA. The recorded statement fully covers the substance of the first conversation with two exceptions:

1) In the first conversation Regis originally told us that he looked through an autopsy photo book after receiving permission to do so. Later, during that same conversation, when asked from whom he received permission to look through the autopsy photo book he denied having said he received permission to look through the book and stated that he at no time received permission to look through the autopsy photo book. Both Gary and I distinctly recall him telling us at the outset of the conversation that he looked through the book only after receving permission to do so.

2) In the first conversation Regis told us that he was alone in the security room when he saw the book on the window sill and decided to look through it. However, when asked during the taped recorded conversation whether he was alone when he looked through the autopsy book he then stated that there were people present in the room when he looked through the autopsy book but that he cannot recall who they were. Once again, both Gary and I clearly recall him telling us when we first spoke with him that no one was present when he looked through the photo book.

III. ~~Recommended Follow-up (If any):~~

At the outset of the recorded conversation Regis told us that he had spoken to his superiors and neither he nor they had any objections to the conversation being recorded.

We gave him a copy of the tape recording (made simultaneously) at the termination of the taped interview session. GC 7/11/78

Signature: Kenneth Klein

Gary Cornwell

Form #5

July 10, 1978

TO: G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations

FROM: Robert Morrison, Director of Security
William H. Cross, Assistant Director of Security

RE: The tampering with Kennedy Autopsy photos located in Safe #102095 in the Reading Room of Room 3381 of the Committee Offices.

About 4:05 P.M. Friday June 23, 1978, Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the Security Room along with Lance Svendsen of the Security Staff upon opening safe #102095 noted that several Kennedy autopsy photos were loose on top of the Kennedy Autopsy photo books. The photos removed from the books were numbered 39E1, 39E2, 40E and 41E. This was two pages consisting of 4 photos. 39E1 and 39E2 along with the cellophane cover had been ripped from the book, and the cellophane enclosure was torn at binder holes. One photo, 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and lying loose. A quick check by Flanagan and Svendsen revealed the photos were from Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos. An immediate check of all the photo books was begun to ascertain if any other photos were missing. This check by Flanagan and Svendsen showed no other photos to be missing or tampered with. Book Five, Part One had not been signed out since September of 1977 according to the check out log. Both Flanagan and Svendsen stated they would have noticed the photos when the safe was opened at 10 A.M. Friday June 23, 1978 if they had been lying where they were when discovered. They both feel there was no way this could have been done accidently. Someone had to enter the safe, and do this. The safe was unlocked, but shut.

Approximately 5 P.M. Friday, June 23, 1978 at the request of Committee Investigator John Moriarty, three members of the Metropolitan Police Identification section responded to Room 3381 for the purpose of attempting to get latent prints. Pvt. Pat McGinnis, Sgt Blake and Detective Pvt McGinnis was able to lift 13 separate cards of latent prints from the interior of the safe, and from the Kennedy Autopsy photo book that was tampered with. These men left at approximately 8:35 PM Friday June 23, 1978. Investigator John Moriarty, William H. Cross or Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey were present at all times during the lifting of the prints. The lifted prints were turned over to Investigator John Moriarty, and remained in his possession.

The persons who were in this office alone on Friday June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez, Dan Hardway and Mitch Mars of the Committee Staff, and Regis Blahut of the CIA.

On Monday June 26, 1978 the 13 cards of prints lifted by Pvt McGinnis were turned over to Director of Security Robert Morrison by Investigator John Moriarty and locked in safe #45471 in Room 3381 of Committee Office.

On June 27, 1978, and June 29, 1978 requests were made to the FBI for certain Committee Staff member fingerprint cards.

The first request for cards was filled, and received the latter part of the week of June 25, 1978. The second request was filled and received on July 5, 1978. Investigator John Moriarty had contacted a Pvt Colon Alford of the Metropolitan Police Identification section, and requested he try to make comparisons of known and latent prints. During the week of June 26, 1978 Pvt. Alford spent one hour in Committee spaces checking staff members prints against those lifted. On July 5, 1978 at the request of Pvt Alford, and with the consent of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey the 13 cards of lifted prints and all staff member print cards from the FBI were turned over to Pvt Alford which he receipted for, so he could take them away from Committee spaces to enable him to spend more time studying them. During the week of July 2, 1978. Pvt Alford was able to obtain the fingerprints of Regis Blahut, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. On Friday July 7, 1978 at approximately 2:30 P.M. Pvt Alford phoned William H. Cross of Security Staff and stated he had made a tentative identification of Blahuts prints on the inside of the safe door, and on one of the photos in Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos. On Monday July 10, 1978 at 2;30 P.M. Pvt Alford responded to the Committee offices and in the presence of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Robert Morrison, and William H. Cross returned all fingerprint cards, and the 13 cards of lifted prints. These were returned to safe #45471 in Room 3381. Pvt Alford stated he had identified a certain number of points in several prints, and in his opinion they were those of Regis Blahut. These prints were matched with those on the inside of the safe door, and on the back of photo 39E2 which had been ripped from Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos, and the photo which had been removed from the cellophane cover. After returning all materials Pvt Alford departed Committee Spaces at 2;55 P.M. Monday July 10, 1978.

Robert C. Morrison

Robert Morrison
Director of Security

William H. Cross

William H. Cross
Assistant Director of Security

riday 26 May

P.M. 1:00
ct R. Morrison 1:15
date to say 1:30
He was seen 1:45
Bldg a few 2:00
ter as I was 2:15
rip to Airport 2:30
c business. 2:45
d he would 3:00
es to me at a 3:15
. I informed 3:30
hat he should 3:45
cial I.D now 4:00
d he would be 4:15
not push him 4:30
d the situation 4:45
as instructed. 5:00
5:15
5:30
5:45
7:30
7:45
8:00
8:15
8:30
8:45

Sa

8:00 A.M.
8:15
8:30
8:45
9:00
9:15
9:30
9:45
10:00
10:15
10:30
10:45
11:00
11:15
11:30
11:45
12:00
12:15
12:30
12:45

To: Robert C. Morrison
From: William Webb
Re: Access to Autopsy Photographs

At 3:50pm on 5/27/78 Ida Dox, the medical illustrator, requested permission to view the Kennedy autopsy photographs along with the Medical Pannel. After trying to contact Blakey and Mathews without success, I, William Webb, authorized Oliver Champion to allow the pannel and Mrs. Dox access.

KENNEDY

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE July 14 1978 TIME 11AM

I. Identifying Information:

Name Regis Blahut Telephone

Address

Type of Contact: __ Telephone
x Person

II. Summary of Contact:

On this date Gary Cornwell and myself spoke with Regis Blahut in Gary's office. Mr. Blahut stated the following: 1) He lied to us in our conversation of July 13 when he stated that on the second occasion he looked through the black looselead binder, he put it back on the window sill after reading it. He told us that the truth was that while he was looking through the book it dropped on the floor. He stated that when it dropped on the floor some of the pages came out of the book. He became frightened that someone would enter the room at this time so he opened the black safe which contained the autopsy books and placed the black looseleaf binder and the pages which had fallen out, into the top part of the safe. Prior to him opening it to put in the book, the safe door had been completely closed (i.e. not ajar), although it was not locked. He said he opened it by pressing down on the handle and pulling the door open. He stated that he did not recall whether the top part of the safe

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

over

Signature:

Form #5

had a shelf or a drawer in it. He also stated that at this time he did not observe any of the photos to be out of the plastic sheeting which ordinarily held them in the black binder. Mr. Blahut denied however that he opened the safe at any time other than when he put the book inside.

2) He stated to us that the first time he had looked through the book --the time when Jim Conzelman took it out of the safe-- he slid one of the photos partly out of the plastic to look at it. To the best of his recollection this photo was either a photo of the br~~e~~ain or a photo of the bust of Kennedy. He stated this was the only time that he had observed any of the photos to be out of their plastic sheeting.

3.) He stated that he did not wish to allow us to make a tape recording of this statement.

Gary Cornwell

KENNEDY

OUTSIDE CONTACT REPORT

DATE 7/17/78 TIME 8:00 A.M.

I. Identifying Information:

Name Admiral Stansfield Turner Telephone

Address Central Intelligence Agency

Type of Contact: __ Telephone
XX Person

II. Summary of Contact:

Bob Blakey and I met with DCI Turner, DDCI Carlucci and Fred Hitz of the Office of Legislative Counsel at 8:00 A.M. in Turner's office. Blakey initially noted that he had come at Chairman Stokes' request to discuss with Turner a recent security violation which had been discovered by the Committee. Blakey began by describing to Turner the nature of the Kennedy autopsy pictures, the restrictions under which the Committee has acquired and possessed them, the security precautions (separate safe, limited access, and log record) utilized to safeguard them, and the possible motives that might exist for someone unlawfully removing them from the Committee.

Blakey next described the circumstances and details of the Committee's discovery, made on 6/23/78, that the autopsy

III. Recommended Follow-up (if any):

Signature: G. Robert Blakey Gary Cornwell photos had been tampered with, and the investigation which the staff thereafter conducted, including the identification of all of those persons who had access to the security space where they were located, the fingerprinting process and results, and ultimately the questioning of Regis Blahut, the CIA employee who was in the security space on that date.

Finally, Blakey recalled to Turner his (Turner's) statement made to Blakey and Cornwell on February 4, 1978, to the effect that if the Committee found any impropriety or wrongdoing on the part of any CIA employee, he would personally look into and get to the bottom of it. Blakey stated that the Chairman had been told of Turner's comment on February 4, 1978, and now requested that Turner conduct a further investigation of the Blahut matter. Blakey stated that the Committee felt such an investigation was necessary for the following reasons:

1. The Committee had spoken to Blahut on three occasions (July 11, 13 and 14) about his knowledge of the tampering with the autopsy photos, on two of which, by Blahut's own subsequent admissions, he had lied about significant details, and on the last of which, by independent evidence, Blahut had also lied;
2. Blahut's actions were deliberate, as evidenced

by the fact that Blahut had opened the Committee's safe in which the photos were stored, and on the first two interviews with the Committee, he lied about having done so;

3. There is only one possible innocent motive for Blahut's handling and viewing of the autopsy photos, that being personal curiosity, and the evidence unequivocally shows that personal curiosity was not the motive (a page was ripped out, a photo was removed from the plastic sheeting, the log shows that the photo book in question had not been removed from the safe by the Committee staff since September, 1977, and Blahut's story about his handling of, and access to that photo book on June 23, 1978 is patently unbelievable); and most significantly,

4. Prior to at least two of the three occasions on which Blahut was interviewed by the Committee staff, he spoke to his superiors at the Agency, and after each of those conversations he told lies to the Committee about his involvement.

Turner said that he had already looked into the matter, and handed us a report which had been written. Turner suggested that Blakey and Cornwell go read the report (not take a copy with them from the building), and also look at Blahut's personnel file, and then let the Agency know what else he (Blakey) suggested they should do.

Upon inspection, the report reflected the following:

(a.) The Agency interviewed Blahut on Friday evening, July 14, and polygraphed him three times for roughly two hours each time on Saturday, July 15;

(b.) Blahut's supervisors had been spoken to, and denied any involvement;

(c.) Blahut admitted lying to the Committee;

(d.) Blahut basically told the same story to the polygraph expert (Felippo) he had finally told the Committee on the morning of July 14, except that on July 15 he admitted that he was never given permission by any Committee staff member to view the Kennedy autopsy pictures;

(e.) Blahut persisted in his story (but lied in doing so, according to the polygraph) that he had opened the Committee safe only once, and that was to put a photo book into the safe, and also (again, untruthfully) stated that he had only viewed the autopsy books on two occasions.

(f.) Blahut has been assigned to a CIA operation code named MHCHILD since April, 1977.*

Office of Security Chief Gambino, and Carlucci's assistant, Hav Smith, met with Blakey and Cornwell after they

* Polgraph showed no deception on
1) didn't copy
2) entered nothing else
3) didn't talk to media
4) not "sent on mission"

had reviewed the investigative report provided by Turner. Blakey requested that he be permitted to see Blahut's security file. Gambino refused, but offered the personnel file instead.

The personnel file reflected that Blahut had consistently received excellent ratings from his superiors, (he was thought bright + mature) that he showed leadership qualities in his work, and that he had been commended for consistently reporting to his superiors what he had observed and done during his assignments, and alerting them to any problems he encountered.*

Finally, Smith and Gambino asked Blakey what he felt the Agency should do now. Blakey said that full interviews of all of Blahut's supervisors should be conducted, and written reports made. In addition, Blakey stated that new polygraphs should be taken, focusing primarily on the area that was essentially omitted on July 15, namely, the question of motive.

Hav Smith asked whether the Committee was going to accept the Agency's investigation after it was completed; he said he wanted to know now, that he wanted a commitment. Smith said that he was 99 percent sure that the final report would show no involvement in the tampering on the part of the Agency. Gambino said, "We know we're clean." In reply, I asked how the Agency could be so sure at this early point that none of their employees except Blahut were involved, and I also commented that Smith was asking the Committee to "buy a pig in a poke" in suggesting that we should tell him now whether or not we would be satisfied with the Agency's investigation

* The polygraph report indicated Blahut said we accused him of being a "CIA plant." It also said we didn't want to tape him on the 3rd occasion. [illegible] Smith + Gambino that each statement was untrue,

before it was even conducted. Both Blakey and I stated that what we could now state was that we had come to the Agency with the suggestion that they investigate it, because we felt that from among the alternatives now available to the Committee, that alternative was the one with the best chance of success. Finally Blakey also noted that his hope was that after the Agency's investigation was complete, copies of the reports could be placed in the Agency's and the Committee's files, and that would be the end of it.

The meeting was terminated with the general understanding that Blakey's suggestions would be followed, and the Agency would let us know when they had their reports complete.

July 10, 1978

TO: G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsul & Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations

FROM: Robert Morrison, Director of Security
William H. Cross, Assistant Director of Security

Re; The tampering with Kennedy Autopsy photos located in Safe # 102095 in the Reading Room of Room 3381 of the Committee offices.

About 4:05 P.M. June 23, 1978 Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the Security room along with Lance Svendson of Security staff upon opening safe #102095 noted that several autopsy photos were lying loosely on top of the other books. The photos removed were 39E1, 39E2, 40 E and 41 E. This was two pages consisting of 4 photos. Photos 39 E1 and 39E2 had been ripped from the book. One photo 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and laying loose. A quick check showed that these photos were from Book Five, Part One. An immediate check of all books was begun by Flanagan and Svendsen to ascertain if any other photos might be missing. No other photos were found to be missing or tampered with. Book Five, Part One had not been signed out recently according to the check out log. Both Mark Flanagan and Lance Svendsen stated they would have noticed the photos when the safe was open at 10 AM June 23, 1978 if they had been lying were they were. They both feel there is no way this could have been done accidently. Someone had to enter safe and do this. The safe was unlocked but shut.

Aprroximately 5 P.M. June 23, 1978 at the request of Committee Investigator Jack Moriarty three members of the Metropolitan Police Identification section responded to Room 3381 for the purpose of attempting to get latent prints. Pvt Pat McGinniss, Sgt Blake and Det.   Pvt. McGinniss was able to lift 13 separate cards of latent prints from the interior of the safe, and from the Kennedy Autopsy photos book that was tampered with. These men left at approximately 8:35 PM June 23, 1978. Investigator Moriarty, William H. Cross or G. Robert Blakey were present at all times during the lifting of the prints. The lifted prints were turned over toInvestigator Moriarty, and remained in his possession.

The persons who were in this office on June 23, 1978 other than Security personnel wereEdwin Lopez, Dan Hardway, Mitch Mars, and committee staff Regis Blahut of the CIA.

On June 27, and June 29, 1978 requests were made to the FBI for certain staff members print cards. The first were recieved the week of June 26, 1978, and the second packet on July 5, 1978. Investigator Moriarty had contacted a Pvt. Colon Alford of the Metropolitan Police Department ID section and requested he try to make comparisons of known and latent prints. During the week of June 26, 1978 Pvt Alford spent one hour in Committee offices checking staff members prints against those lifted. On July 5, 1978 the latent prints and all staff members print cards from the FBI were turned over to Pvt. Alford which he receipted for so he could take them away from Committee spaces To enable him to ~~so he could~~ spend more time studying them. During the week of July 2, 1978 Pvt. Alford was able to obtain the fingerprint card of Regis Blahut(a Former D.C. Fireman) On Friday July 7, 1978 at approximately 2:30 P.M. Pvt Alford contacted William Cross of Security staff and stated he had made a tentative identification of Blahuts prints on the safe door and one of the photos in Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autposy photos. On Monday July 10, 1978 at 2:30 PM Pvt Alford responded to the Committee offices and in the presence of G. Robert Blakey, Robert Morrison and William H. Cross returned all fingerprint cards, The 13 cards of lifted prints, and stated he had identified a certain number of points in several prints, and in his opinion they were those of Regis Blahut. These prints were on the inside of the safe door and on photo 39E2 which had been ripped from Book Five Part One, and had been removed from the cellophane cover. After returning all materials Pvt Alford departed at 2:55 PM July 10, 1978

ROBERT MORRISON

WILLIAM H. CROSS

About 4.05 PM June 23, 1978 Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the security room along with Lance Svendson noted that several autopsy photos were laying loosely on top of the other books. The photos removed were 39E1, 39E2 and 40 E and 41 E. this was two pages consisting of 4 photos. Photos 39el and 39E2 had been ripped from the book. One photo 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and laying loose. A quick check showed that theses photos were from Book Five Part one A immediate check of all the books was begin by Flanagan and Svendson to ascertain if any other photos might be missing. This check is still in progress..

Book Five has not been signed out recently

Check completed by Mark & Lance. Nothing found missing

The persons who were in this room on June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez. Dan Hardway, Mitch Mars, Regis Blahut CIA

Both Mark + Lance feel There is No way This could have been done Accidently. Some one had To go into The Safe And do This

About 4.05 PM June 23, 1978 Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the security room along with Lance Svendson noted that several autopsy photos were laying loosely on top of the other books. The photos removed were 39E1, 39E2 and 40 E and 41 E. this was two pages consisting of 4 photos. Photos 39el and 39E2 had been ripped from the book. One photo 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and laying loose. A quick check showed that theses photos were from Book Five Part one A immediate check of all the books was begin by Flanagan and Svendson to ascertain if any other photos might be missing. This check is still in progress..

Book Five has not been signed out recently

Check completed by Mark & Lance. Nothing found missing

The persons who were in this room on June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez. Dan Hardway, Mitch Mars, Regis Blahut CIA

Both Mark + Lance feel There is No way This could have been done Accidenlty. Some one had To go into The SAFE And do This

Mr Blakey was notofied at 5:05 PM after he completed a meeting in his office. He stated that from now on the JFK safe will be locked at all times. If something is taken out the safe will be relocked until it is returned.

I suggest that until such time as the persons using that room are finished in there we should lock all the safes at all times

Bill

July 10, 1978

NOTICE OF RECEIPT OF FINGERPRINT CARDS

I, L. SWENDSEN, hereby acknowledge receipt from the FBI of the following:

One (1) FD-258 Applicant Fingerprint Card for Betty Lou Sisson, date of birth 3-11-39

One (1) Photographic copy of an Armed Forces Fingerprint Card for Lawrence J. Delsa, Jr., date of birth 8-11-43

Signed

Title Security Assistant

APPLICANT

LEAVE BLANK

TYPE OR PRINT ALL INFORMATION IN BLACK

LAST NAME NAM FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME

Sisson Betty Lou

FBI LEAVE BLANK

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

Betty Lou Sisson

No civil 8 29 [illegible] 80

8 29 575 [illegible]

RESIDENCE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED

ORI USHOR0OOZ A
US HOUSE OF REP
WASH. DC

DATE OF BIRTH DOB
3/11/39

PLACE OF BIRTH POB
N. Washington C.

American

SEX	RACE	HGT.	WGT.	EYES	HAIR
F	W	5'4½	115	Br.	Bl.

DATE: 8/22/77
SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS: L. S. Lockhart, USCP.

EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS

House Select Committee on Assassination

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. SOC
245-56-4327

Clearance

LEAVE BLANK

449
334-3 FEMALE

CLASS 20 L 1 U 000 13
M 1 U I00



20
13
16
14
13
13
9
18
16
9
1. R. THUMB
2. R. INDEX
3. R. MIDDLE
4. R. RING
5. R. LITTLE
6. L. THUMB
7. L. INDEX
8. L. MIDDLE
9. L. RING
10. L. LITTLE
1318
Blue 29-5
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
L. THUMB
R. THUMB
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
6-30
8-30

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20537

APPLICANT

1. LOOP



THE LINES BETWEEN CENTER OF LOOP AND DELTA MUST SHOW

2. WHORL



THESE LINES RUNNING BETWEEN DELTAS MUST BE CLEAR

3. ARCH



ARCHES HAVE NO DELTAS

TO OBTAIN CLASSIFIABLE FINGERPRINTS:

1. USE BLACK PRINTER'S INK.
2. DISTRIBUTE INK EVENLY ON INKING SLAB.
3. WASH AND DRY FINGERS THOROUGHLY.
4. ROLL FINGERS FROM NAIL TO NAIL, AND AVOID ALLOWING FINGERS TO SLIP.
5. BE SURE IMPRESSIONS ARE RECORDED IN CORRECT ORDER.
6. IF AN AMPUTATION OR DEFORMITY MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO PRINT A FINGER, MAKE A NOTATION TO THAT EFFECT IN THE INDIVIDUAL FINGER BLOCK.
7. IF SOME PHYSICAL CONDITION MAKES IT IMPOSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PERFECT IMPRESSIONS, SUBMIT THE BEST THAT CAN BE OBTAINED WITH A MEMO STAPLED TO THE CARD EXPLAINING THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
8. EXAMINE THE COMPLETED PRINTS TO SEE IF THEY CAN BE CLASSIFIED, BEARING IN MIND THAT MOST FINGERPRINTS FALL INTO THE PATTERNS SHOWN ON THIS CARD (OTHER PATTERNS OCCUR INFREQUENTLY AND ARE NOT SHOWN HERE).

THIS CARD FOR USE BY:

1. LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN FINGERPRINTING APPLICANTS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT POSITIONS.*
2. OFFICIALS OF STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS FOR PURPOSES OF EMPLOYMENT, LICENSING, AND PERMITS, AS AUTHORIZED BY STATE STATUTES AND APPROVED BY THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES. LOCAL AND COUNTY ORDINANCES, UNLESS SPECIFICALLY BASED ON APPLICABLE STATE STATUTES DO NOT SATISFY THIS REQUIREMENT.*
3. U.S. GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN CONNECTION WITH CLEARANCES.**
4. OFFICIALS OF FEDERALLY CHARTERED OR INSURED BANKING INSTITUTIONS TO PROMOTE OR MAINTAIN THE SECURITY OF THOSE INSTITUTIONS.

INSTRUCTIONS:

*1. PRINTS MUST FIRST BE CHECKED THROUGH THE APPROPRIATE STATE IDENTIFICATION BUREAU, AND ONLY THOSE FINGERPRINTS FOR WHICH NO DISQUALIFYING RECORD HAS BEEN FOUND LOCALLY SHOULD BE SUBMITTED FOR FBI SEARCH.

2. PRIVACY ACT OF 1974 (P.L. 93-579) REQUIRES THAT FEDERAL, STATE, OR LOCAL AGENCIES INFORM INDIVIDUALS WHOSE SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER IS REQUESTED WHETHER SUCH DISCLOSURE IS MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY, BASIS OF AUTHORITY FOR SUCH SOLICITATION, AND USES WHICH WILL BE MADE OF IT.

**3. IDENTITY OF PRIVATE CONTRACTORS SHOULD BE SHOWN IN SPACE "EMPLOYER AND ADDRESS". THE CONTRIBUTOR IS THE NAME OF THE AGENCY SUBMITTING THE FINGERPRINT CARD TO THE FBI.

4. FBI NUMBER, IF KNOWN, SHOULD ALWAYS BE FURNISHED IN THE APPROPRIATE SPACE.

MISCELLANEOUS NO. - RECORD: OTHER ARMED FORCES NO., PASSPORT NO. (PP), ALIEN REGISTRATION NO. (AR), PORT SECURITY CARD NO. (PS), SELECTIVE SERVICE NO. (SS), VETERANS' ADMINISTRATION CLAIM NO. (VA).

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

Prepared for
S. Opanski, Km,
11262 1 non ident
reply (Ident) for trans
to US House of Rep
Wa[illegible] in answer
to CP reply. 8-30-77
771 ab. EKS 8-30-77.

67505
8-30-77

APR 3 1978 3 7 9

RECORDED
AUG 29 1977
IDENT. DIV. 58

20 | Q

FD-258 (Rev. 5-12-76) ☆ U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1976 - 593-270

ARMED FORCES

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

0

DELSA JR., LAWRENCE JOSEPH

LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	MIDDLE NAME	RACE
DELSA JR.,	LAWRENCE	JOSEPH	CAUC

SIGNATURE OF PERSON FINGERPRINTED: Lawrence J. Delsa Jr.

5-4-76

SERVICE (use capitals or large stamp): MARINE CORPS RESERVE

HEIGHT (inches): 71

DATE OF BIRTH: 11 Aug 43

PLACE OF ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, ETC.: MARTD,MARTC NAS,New Orleans,La.

SERVICE NO.:

PLACE OF BIRTH: New Orleans,Louisiana

DATE OF ENLISTMENT, APPOINTMENT, ETC.: 13 May 62

COLOR OF EYES: Green

SCARS AND MARKS: None

COLOR OF HAIR: Black

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS:

WEIGHT: 175

DATE SIGNED BY OFFICIAL TAKING FINGERPRINTS: 13 May 62

SEX: Male

LEAVE THIS SPACE BLANK

CLASS. 5 O 1 T-n 11
L 18 Ua

REF.


1. RIGHT THUMB
0
2. RIGHT INDEX
3. RIGHT MIDDLE
10
5
9.6.77
4. RIGHT RING
10
5. RIGHT LITTLE
10
11
9.6.77
TA
9.6.77
6. LEFT THUMB
9.6.77
7. LEFT INDEX
23
9.6.77
8. LEFT MIDDLE
9. LEFT RING
10. LEFT LITTLE
13
LEFT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY
9-6-77
LEFT THUMB
RIGHT THUMB
5
RIGHT FOUR FINGERS TAKEN SIMULTANEOUSLY

PHOTO CARDED JUN 6 1962

G.P.O. 1957 O-444650

Since neither fingerprints nor an
identifying number which is indexed
in our files accompanied your request,
FBI cannot guarantee in any manner
that this material concerns the
individual in whom you are interested.

Mr Banner 324-5404.
or Mr. Payne.

Robert J. Burós. New Orleans 7/3/37
Eileen G. Duneen (Copeland) Phila Pa 9/14/48
Frank L. Eccles - 1/7/24 N.C.
Eliz. K. Selleck. 12/3/48 Wenatchee Wa

They have Session.
Laurence Delsa will make photo copy of military

3x5 Tissue stating no record.

Lopez,
5 min

June 27.

June 29.

over to Alfred for which he
signed a receipt. During the
week ~~ending~~ ~~June 8th~~ 1978 of July Pat
Alfred was able to obtain
the fingerprint card of Regis
Blahut (a former D.C. Fireman)
On Friday July 7, at 2^{30} pm
He contact William Cross of
Select Comm. and stated he had
made an ~~ident~~ tentative ident
of Blahut prints on the safe
door and one of the photos.
~~in the~~ Book Five of Kennedy
autopsy photos on Monday
July 10, 1978 Pat Alfred reported
to HSCA office in the presence
of G Robert Blakey, Robert Morrison
& William Cross returned all
fingerprint card, The 13 cards
of lifted prints, and stated he
had identified a certain number
of points in several prints.
~~which in his opinion were~~
conclusive that Regis Blahut
had handled these items

On June 27, + June 29
~~that~~ 1978 request were made to
the FBI ~~[illegible]~~ for certain staff
member fingerprint cards. ~~These~~ The first
were received ~~on the~~ the week of
June 26 the second on Wednesday
July 5, 1978. ~~All~~ Investigator
Moriarty had contacted a Pvt
Colon Alford of MPDC latent and
request he try to make comparison
of known + latent lifts. During
the week of June 26 off Alford
spent one hour in committee
area check prints of staff against
those lifted. On July 5, 1978
The latent lifts and all staff
Fingerprint card from FBI were turned

approx. 5 pm: Jun. 23, 1978 at the request of Investigator Jack Moriarty — 3 members of the MPDC Ident section responded for the purpose of attempting to get latent prints. Officer Pat McGinnis, Sgt Blake and Det. ——— McGinnis was able to get latent prints — 13 separate cards from the interior of safe and from the Kennedy Autograph photo book that was tampered with. These men left at approximately 835 pm 6/23/78 and Investigator Moriarty, William Cross & G Robert Blakey were present at all times during the lifting of prints.

Safe open 10 min by Lance.

About 4.05 PM June 23, 1978 Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the security room along with Lance Svendson noted that several autopsy photos were laying loosely on top of the other books. The photos removed were 39E1, 39E2 and 40 E and 41 E. this was two pages consisting of 4 photos. Photos 39el and 39E2 had been ripped from the book. One photo 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and laying loose. A quick check showed that theses photos were from Book Five Part one A immediate check of all the books was begin by Flanagan and Svendson to ascertain if any other photos might be missing. ~~This check is still in progress.~~. No other photos were found to be missing or tampered with

Book Five has not been signed out recently

~~Check completed by Mark & Lance. Nothing found missing~~

The persons who were in this room on June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez. Dan Hardway, Mitch Mars, Regis Blahut CIA

Both Mark + Lance feel There is No way This could have been done Accidenlty. Some one had To go into The SAFE And do This.

2 ~~30pm 5/10/78~~.

About 4.05 PM June 23, 1978 Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the security room along with Lance Svendson noted that several autopsy photos were laying loosely on top of the other books. The photos removed were 39E1, 39E2 and 40 E and 41 E. this was two pages consisting of 4 photos. Photos 39e1 and 39E2 had been ripped from the book. One photo 39E2 was out of the cellophane enclosure and laying loose. A quick check showed that theses photos were from Book Five Part one A immediate check of all the books was begin by Flanagan and Svendson to ascertain if any other photos might be missing. This check is still in progress..

Book Five has not been signed out recently

Check completed by Mark & Lance. Nothing found missing

The persons who were in this room on June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez. Dan Hardway, Mitch Mars, Regis Blahut CIA

Both Mark + Lance feel There is No way This could have been done Accidently. Some one had To go into The SAFE And do This

Book V part 1
Photos Removed

39E1

39E2

40E

41E

Two pages total

4 photos

One page Riped out
39E1
39E2

Photo Laying out completly
39E2

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

4⁰⁵ pm 6/23/78.
3 photos from one of the Kenny auto
Book 5
Ports 1

Alford 727-4118

Blahut - not the great

inside outer edge rope door

6 to 7 points

left hand

Back 39 E2 — 7 points

(Motorcycle) (itself) back portion

right thumb.

Alford say in his opin

Blahut is the man

Rympalty

727-4565

727 4118 7AM

THURSDAY

AC FORD

They were prints on the inside of rule door and on 39E2 photo on the front + rear. After return all material Pitt Alfred left on 2 55 pm.

TO G Robert Blakey
Director & Chief Counsel
HSCA

From Walter H Cis
Ass Director of Security
HSCA

~~Subject~~ : Re: Tampering with Kennedy autopsy photos located in safe 102095 in ready room of Rm 3381. HS Committee on Assassination Offices.

July 10, 1978

TO: G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director
House Select Committee on Assassinations

FROM: Robert Morrison, Director of Security
William H. Cross, Assistant Director of Security

RE: The tampering with Kennedy Autopsy photos located in Safe #102095 in the Reading Room of Room 3381 of the Committee Offices.

About 4:05 P.M. Friday June 23, 1978, Mark Flanagan upon returning some autopsy material to the Security Room along with Lance Svendsen of the Security Staff upon opening safe #102095 noted that several Kennedy autopsy photos were loose on top of the Kennedy Autopsy photo books. The photos removed from the books were numbered 39E1, 39E2, 40E and 41E. This was two pages consisting of 4 photos. 39E1 and 39E2 along with the cellophane cover had been ripped from the book, and the cellophane enclosure was torn at binder holes. One photo, 39E2 was out of the cellophan enclosure and lying loose. A quick check by Flanagan and Svendsen revealed the photos were from Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos. An immediate check of all the photo books was begun to ascertain if any other photos were missing. This check by Flanagan and Svendsen showed no other photos to be missing or tampered with. Book Five, Part One had not been signed out since September of 1977 according to the check out log.
Both Flanagan and Svendsen stated they would have noticed the photos when the safe was opened at 10 A.M. Friday June 23, 1978 if they had been lying where they were when discovered. They both feel there was no way this could have been done accidently. Someone had to enter the safe, and do this. The safe was unlocked, but shut.

Approximately 5 P.M. Friday, June 23, 1978 at the request of Committee Investigator John Moriarty, three members of the [redacted] section responded to Room 3381 for the purpose of attempting to get latent prints. [redacted] was able to lift 13 separate cards of latent prints from the interior of the safe, and from the Kennedy Autopsy photo book that was tampered with. These men left at approximately 8:35 PM Friday June 23, 1978. Investigator John Moriarty, William H. Cross or Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey were present at all times during the lifting of the prints. The lifted prints were turned over to Investigator John Moriarty, and remained in his possession

The persons who were in this office alone on Friday June 23, 1978 were Edwin Lopez, Dan Hardway and Mitch Mars of the Committee Staff, and Regis Blahut of the CIA.

On Monday June 26, 1978 the 13 cards of prints lifted by Pvt McGinnis were turned over to Director of Security Robert Morrison by Investigator John Moriarty and locked in safe #45471 in Room 3381 of Committee Office.

On June 27, 1978, and June 29, 1978 requests were made to the FBI for certain Committee Staff member fingerprint cards.

The first request for cards was filled, and received the latter part of the week of June 25, 1978. The second request was filled and received on July 5, 1978. Investigator John Moriarty had contacted a [redacted] of the [redacted] section, and requested he try to make comparisons of known and latent prints. During the week of June 26, 1978 [redacted] spent one hour in Committee spaces checking staff members prints against those lifted. On July 5, 1978 at the request of [redacted] and with the consent of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey the 13 cards of lifted prints and all staff member print cards from the FBI were turned over to [redacted] which he receipted for, so he could take them away from Committee spaces to enable him to spend more time studying them. During the week of July 2, 1978. [redacted] was able to obtain the fingerprints of Regis Blahut, an employee of the Central Intelligence Agency. On Friday July 7, 1978 at approximately 2:30 P.M. [redacted] phoned William H. Cross of Security Staff and stated he had made a tentative identification of Blahuts prints on the inside of the safe door, and on one of the photos in Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos. On Monday July 10, 1978 at 2;30 P.M [redacted] responded to the Committee offices and in the presence of Chief Counsel G. Robert Blakey, Robert Morrison, and William H. Cross returned all fingerprint cards, and the 13 cards of lifted prints. These were returned to safe #45471 in Room 3381. [redacted] stated he had identified a certain number of points in several prints, and in his opinion they were those of Regis Blahut. These prints were matched with those on the inside of the safe door, and on the back of photo 39E2 which had been ripped from Book Five, Part One of the Kennedy Autopsy photos, and the photo which had been removed from the cellophane cover. After returning all materials [redacted] departed Committee Spaces at 2;55 P.M. Monday July 10, 1978.

Robert C Morrison
Robert Morrison
Director of Security

William H. Cross
William H. Cross
Assistant Director of Security

off outer plastic to 39E

Off face of 39E2

2 ①

Off face of 39E2

Palm Prints

off face of 29E outer

outer plastic 39E2 Palm Print



off outer plastic [illegible]
43E

Palm Prints

Off outer plastic to 39 E2

NO good

outer plastic 35E2

Off outer plastic of [illegible]
43E

from inside of safe door
outer edge



GRB
7.10.75
2:30pm.

G.C. 7/11/78

Resealed 7/13/78
G.C.

off outer plastic of 38E Palm
Print

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/19/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10131-10324
RECORD SERIES :	SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	014724

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	NOSENKO, YURI
TO :	
TITLE :	TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO
DATE :	06/20/1978
PAGES :	141
SUBJECTS :	CIA, METHODOLOGY KGB, FILES KGB, METHODOLOGY MCMILLAN, PRISCILLA JOHNSON SOLIE, BRUCE NOSENKO, YURI, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD, DEFECTION TO RUSSIA MEXICO CITY
DOCUMENT TYPE :	TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	Consulted
CURRENT STATUS :	Withhold
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/21/1993
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Folder 2 of 2. Box 4

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF:	PAGE
YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO -- Resumed	2

EXHIBITS

	Marked	Received
JFK F-2	10	
JFK F-3	11	
JFK F-4	18	
JFK F-5	24	
JFK F-6	32	
JFK F-7	49	

THOMAS/srs
retype smnp

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

Tuesday, June 20, 1978

- - -

U.S. House of Representatives,
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy
Washington, D. C.

The Committee met, pursuant to recess, at 6:20 o'clock p.m., in Room 1-D, Headquarters, Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia, the Honorable Louis Stokes (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Present: Representatives Stokes, Preyer, Burke, Fithian, Devine and Sawyer.

Also present: G. R. Blakey, G. Cornwell, M. Goldsmith, R. Morrison, E. Berning, M. Jackson, J. Smith, K. Klein and S. Brady.

- - -

The Chairman. The Committee will come to order.

At this time the Committee will resume its sitting. We are still in executive session by virtue of the resolution adopted by the Committee this past evening.

At this time the Chair will recognize Mr. Blakey.

Mr. Blakey. Off the record.

(Discussion off the record.)

The Chairman. Anything further?

Bring the witness in.

Let the record reflect that the Committee has resumed its sitting and at this time the witness, Yuri Nosenko, is back before the Committee once again.

Mr. Nosenko, I admonish you that you are still under the oath that you took last night.

TESTIMONY OF YURI IVANOVICH NOSENKO -- Resumed

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. And at this time, then, the Committee will recognize the counsel for the Committee, Mr. Klein.

Mr. Klein. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good evening.

Mr. Nosenko. Good evening, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us that after the assassination you had an opportunity to be present when Oswald's file was brought from Minsk, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

Mr. Klein. Did you have an opportunity to read the entire file at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. How much of the file did you read?

Mr. Nosenko. It was simply looking, page by page, first part of the first volume.

Mr. Klein. You went through the first part of the first volume, page by page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you go through any of the other volumes?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us that an officer named Matveev took the file away to prepare a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who wrote that summary?

Mr. Nosenko. The summary was written by the First Department of the Second Chief Directorate.

Mr. Klein. Do you know who, in particular?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not know.

Mr. Klein. And did you ever have an opportunity to read the summary that the First Department prepared?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; I didn't see it.

Mr. Klein. The Russian word "spravka", does that mean --

Mr. Nosenko. Is summary, right.

Mr. Klein. And why were you not able to read the summary that they wrote?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, the file was taken in the First Department. I was working in the Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. Did you make any attempt to read it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Was it at all unusual that with all your involvement in the case you did not have an opportunity to read that file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was the decision of the Chief of the Second Chief Directorate, given big importance to this question, that a resume will be prepared by the most prestigious department, American Department, and that is why we couldn't even ask.

Mr. Klein. You didn't even ask to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. So it was not unusual that you were not allowed to see it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it was not unusual.

Mr. Klein. You have testified before this Committee that the KGB did not allow Lee Harvey Oswald to defect because he was uninteresting. You have testified the KGB did not even speak to Lee Harvey Oswald because he was uninteresting; and that you ~~decided~~ he was not interesting without speaking to him.

Do you know what year Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. 1959.

Mr. Klein. In 1959, approximately how many Americans wanted to defect to the Soviet Union or requested permission to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. There was a defectionist, I remember, one of the employees, one of the workers, who was helping to organize the American Exhibition in Moscow, Mr. Webster.

Mr. Klein. Without giving particular names, how many Americans would you say asked permission to defect in 1959?

What would the number be?

Mr. Nosenko. These two were known to me -- Oswald and Webster.

Mr. Klein. From 1955 to 1960, what would be your best estimate as to how many Americans asked permission to defect to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I heard, there I think was one only.

Mr. Klein. One other, meaning three altogether.

Mr. Nosenko. One besides Oswald and Webster, what I know.

Mr. Klein. Three?

Mr. Nosenko. Three.

Mr. Klein. Of the three, was Oswald the only one turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you know any other defector who was ever turned down because he was uninteresting?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Allow me to tell, as you have seen, and you told yourselves, how many Americans are defected. It is a very rare occasion and KGB prefers defection when they are planning, they want, these types of defectors, they like and invite those people who can give them certain information which is valuable.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall telling this Committee yesterday that up until 1960 the Seventh Department was recruiting left and right?

Mr. Nosenko. Absolutely right.

Mr. Klein. And that you recruited a woman in Utah who was --

Mr. Nosenko. I simply had given example of this recruitment which took place up to 1960. When Seventh Department was recruitng and giving files to the Intelligence Service, First Chief Directorate, not asking them before, is it person will be for them valuable or not.

Mr. Klein. And that KGB officers were getting bonus and promotions when they induced people to recruit?

Mr.Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. And despite that, Lee Harvey Oswald, when he asked to defect, you turned him down without even speaking to him, to find out if he had any information; is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, we had quite a few recruitments in '59, a very big amount of them in '59 very interesting, much, much more interesting -- professors and teachers -- and even was a co-op from CIA we had quite a few recruitments, and Oswald was nothing on this base, on this foundation.

Mr. Klein. Would the KGB have any interest in an American student?

Mr. Nosenko. As I told you yesterday, KGB interested in students, but particularly those students who are studying the Russian language, Russian history, Russian economy.

Mr. Klein. And would they have any interest in an American who had strong anti-American views and who was a professed Marxist? Would they have any interest in that kind of person?

Mr. Nosenko. Here were are coming to a very interesting and sensitive question. From mid-1950, by the order of Central Committee Communist Party, Soviet Union, KGB was prohibited to make any approachment and recruitment of members of the Communist Party of the West.

Mr. Klein. I am not asking about a member of the Communist Party.

Mr. Nosenko. Your question is, and if he is some type of Marxist here, the question maybe he is possibly a member of Communist Party, and to check it for KGB very difficult if he is a member of Communist Party or not of his country.

Mr. Klein. Would they ask him if he is a member of the Communist Party?

Would they check it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would not ask him.

Mr. Klein. They wouldn't ask him?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Would the Soviet Union be interested in someone who was in the military and worked with radar equipment?

Mr. Nosenko. It depends. If he was corporal, private, is no big interest. If he was officer, maybe they would be interested.

Mr. Klein. The fact that he worked with the equipment wouldn't be enough; they would want to know what his rank was?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir; it is not enough because they had sources.

Mr. Klein. And in 1959 would the Soviet Union have been interested in someone who served as a radar operator on an air base where U-2s took off and landed?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir; it would be very interested.

Mr. Klein. It is your testimony that Lee Harvey Oswald, who was a student, who was a professed Marxist, who had --

Mr. Nosenio. Students? I never heard that he was a student.

Mr. Klein. -- who had been a radar operator and had worked on a base from which U-2 airplanes took off and landed, that he wasn't even interesting enough for the KGB to speak to him, to find out if he knew any of this information?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I understand your position, but we didn't know that he had any connection with U-2s flights. That is one thing.

And if you, Mr. Klein, are basing on what was written by Mr. Epstein in the book, it is a little bit from the air taken ideas. Mr. Epstein even telling that how important for KGB to know about such base -- that base. We knew it in '50's when I worked in GRU at the Navy, in 1950, '51, '52. We knew every base and in Japan, at this Atsugi Base, and we knew what kind of airplanes had been. We didn't know about U-2, no. Sure, it is very interesting, but when Oswald applied, requested to stay in the Soviet Union, we didn't know a word about his knowledge, anything concerning U-2 flights.

Mr. Klein. And you didn't ask him if he had any kind of information about that when he wanted to defect, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. And you told us that one reason that no one was working on Oswald was because all of your people were concentrating on the American Exhibition in 1959, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. Not only American Exhibition, there were other tourists and among them were interesting targets, very interesting targets.

Mr. Klein. You told us yesterday that things didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. I can explain you why, because an American Exhibition in Moscow was by the information which KGB had, I don't know how much it's right, how much it's wrong, but it was suspected quite a number of people from American intelligence community who were working on American Exhibition in Moscow, and when the work is going on against such targets, it is not one officer, it is a big amount of people involved on each case, because it is very serious target.

Mr. Klein. Do you know what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I do not.

Mr.Klein. Mr. Chairman, I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. Without objection.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-2 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at this document --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Did counsel want to identify for the record how the document has been marked?

The Clerk. JFK-F-2.

Mr. Klein. Looking at this document, does it say on the top "Visa and Registration Office, Interior Department, Executive Committee of the Moscow City Council"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Do you recognize that type of document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes. It is from Department of giving Visas and Registrations, which is working under auspices of Directorate of Internal Affairs of Moswcow City.

Mr. Klein. And does this appear to be an authentic document, an authentic copy of the document?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Looking at Number 8, does it say what date Lee Harvey Oswald came to the Soviet Union for the first time?

Mr. Nosenko. October, 1959.

Mr. Klein. October what?

Mr. Nosenko. October 16, 1959.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. Without objection.

Would the clerk indicate for the record?

The Clerk. JFK-F-3, Mr. Chairman.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-3 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at the newspaper article clipping, on the right hand side, with the heading "U.S. Fair in Soviet Jammed at Close," do you see that?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And what is the date of that story?

Mr. Nosenko. The date is September 4.

Mr. Klein. Are you aware of the fact that the American Exhibition ended on September 4, more than a month before Oswald came to the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Klein, I would like you to ask when Americans who were working for this Exhibition left Moscow.

Mr. Klein. I will ask you another question.

Yesterday, when I asked you if things got back to normal once the fair ended, did you say yes?

Mr. Nosenko. No, till they were leave the Soviet Union. No. They are the same targets. Okay, you are right, it is closed September 4th, but does it change the importance of these people against whom KGB was working? They were still in Moscow.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall yesterday my asking you, did things in your department get back to normal once the fair ended, and do you recall saying yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I meaning fair ended when left all the people involved in work on American Exhibition, Americans when they left, and they were staying quite a long time after it was closed. It was closed for visits for Soviet citizens, but it took quite a time for them to leave.

Mr. Klein. You also testified yesterday that Lee Harvey Oswald was allowed to stay in the Soviet Union after he said that he was going to kill himself if they sent him home. You told us that he slashed his wrists and two psychiatrists examined him and both found him mentally unstable.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. What was the point of having the two psychiatrists examine him?

Mr. Nosenko. I think simply to be assured that it was right found decision, concerning this person. Two independent.

Mr. Klein. After they examined him, the decision was made to let him stay; is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not because of the examination he was allowed to stay, Mr. Klein. You are a little bit mixing things. He was allowed to stay because KGB and Soviet Government had come to the conclusion if this person will kill himself it will bereaction in newspapers, which can in any way hurt the starting, the warming of Soviet-American relations.

Mr. Klein. The Soviets were worried he would kill himself in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, if they would not allow him to stay.

Mr. Klein. Could the KGB have taken him and put him on the next plane out of Russia and thereby ended their whole problem with Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. It is a very sensitive question. He can jump out of car. If he decided, if he is mentally unstable, you don't know what he will do.

Mr. Klein. Do you think the KGB didn't do that because they were worried he might jump out of the car or do something like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Simply a mentally unstable person, they didn't want to go it on any such action.

Mr. Klein. They would rather keep him in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. No, they would rather prefer they washed their hands, Mr. Klein; they are not making decision, KGB. In Soviet Union decisions are made by the Central Committee of the Communist Party, and General Secretary and Politburo, not by KGB. KGB a servant of the Politburo and Central Committee Communist Party.

Mr. Klein. Going by the facts as you have told them to this Committee --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- why wasn't he put on a plane and sent back to America?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB washed their hands. Then from Intourist it was given information Ministry of Foreign Trade; Ministry of Foreign Trade reported to the Soviet Government. As I said, I assumed the Chairman was surely asked; he told his opinion of the KGB, and up to the Soviet Government how they would decide.

Mr. Klein. Could he have been brought to the U.S. Embassy and told them he is an American, "You take care of him; we don't want him"?

Mr. Nosenko. It can be done, sure. It can be done, but it wasn't done.

Mr. Klein. Instead they elected to allow him to stay indefinitely in the Soviet Union and they have to worry about him every single day, what an unstable American would do, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. They didn't allow, KGB didn't allow. Soviet government allowed.

Mr. Klein. The facts as you have testified to them are that the KGB allowed this mentally unstable person to stay in Russia, and they sent him to Minsk to live and work in a radio factory. Then the KGB allowed this mentally unstable individual to marry a Soviet woman, and then this mentally unstable individual was allowed to join a hunting club where he had access to a gun.

Can you think of any other cases in all the time you worked in the KGB where a mentally unstable person was treated in thiskind of manner?

Mr. Nosenko. I told you I do not know any other cases of mentally unstable, excluding one code clerk, American, was also mentally ill; he was delivered in Soviet Union. I heard it. I never have worked with him, I never have seen him. And the thing is, I am sorry, but you are putting and stressing a number of questioning, and it sounds so peculiar. What does it mean, KGB allow him to marry?

Mr. Klein, in the Soviet Union there is by degree of Presidium of Supreme Soviet U.S.S.R. a law allowing marriage of

Soviet citizens with foreign. A foreigner can marry a Soviet citizen, by the law. There is not a thing that KGB can in any way try not to give, not to make it possible, but this is in cases when the person who is marrying a foreigner worked in some sensitive place, let's say, in missiles, rocket industry production, was in process of any place of his working seeing classified material. In these cases, KGB will try to put different type of fences. But it is unlawful. In accordance with Soviet law, marriage is allowed; he doesn't need to ask permission of Soviet Government or anyone. And his wife, Marina, wasn't working in any place which was sensitive from the point of view of Soviet security.

Mentally unstable it doesn't mean that he is raving mad; it is mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified that not only was Oswald not spoken to when he first said he wanted to defect but even after the decision was made to allow him to remain in the Soviet Union, still nobody from the KGB spoke to him, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You also tetified to the extensive resources that were devoted to put physical and technical surveillance on Oswald. You told us the men involved, the time involved, the facilities involved?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Do you find great contradiction --

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. -- in the fact that, on the one hand, you put all these resources into following Oswald around, trying to see who he talked to and what he does and, on the other hand, you don't even have a person go and talk to him and ask him, "Tell us your background; tell us about yourself."

Is there any contradiction?

Mr. Nosenko. Even in the United States, yes, sure, for you, for me just now American citizens, yes, sure, but there, no.

Mr. Klein. They don't talk to people there?

Mr. Nosenko. They can talk and cannot to talk, but I don't see contradiction there. Anyone, any foreigner who will be staying, even if this defector not on his own, but, let's say, KGB pushed him to stay, to defect, he still will be watched and on him will be put this same type of work that was put on Oswald, not less.

Mr. Klein. You talk about their society is different than ours. Is it unusual that they allow an American to defect and live there without ever questioning him, to ask him if he is an intelligence agent?

Mr. Nosenko. On the contrary, no doubt, let's say he was intelligence agent, what he will tell them that he was sent with mission as intelligence agent? Why to scare him? Let him live how he wants. We will be watching him. He will show by his behavior, by his action.

Mr. Klein. They purposely don't speak to him; is that your testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. In this case they didn't speak with him because he didn't present interest for the KGB and because he was mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. You testified that you read the reports of two psychiatrists who examined Lee Harvey Oswald at the hospital after he cut his wrist, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. You said both found him mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You told us in great detail how this decision was made to have these psychiatrists examine him.

I would ask that this document be marked for identification.

The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. It will be JFK-F-4.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-4 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Have you ever seen that document before?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I haven't seen it.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the Soviet Government provided certain documents to the Warren Commission in 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. I wasn't aware of this.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that document in front of you --

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. -- is that a hospital record?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, sure. It is a hospital record.

Mr. Klein. And whose hospital record? Does it have a name on it?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. It is from Botkin Hospital.

Mr. Klein. Whose name is it?

Mr. Nosenko. Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Does it say what date he was admitted?

Mr. Nosenko. Discharged, admitted 23rd, discharged 28th.

Mr. Klein. What year is that?

Mr. Nosenko. October of 1959.

Mr. Klein. And does it have on the bottom the diagnosis, why he was in the hospital?

Mr. Nosenko. Incised wound of one-third of the left forearm.

Mr. Klein. And that date, October of 1959, is that when Oswald first came to the Soviet Union and cut his wrist?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you dates, sir. I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. You have in front of you the other document which told -- Number 8 -- what date he came to the Soviet Union. Is that still there?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. This is admittance to the hospital and dischargement.

Mr. Klein. Number 8?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrival, October 16.

Mr. Klein. And the date on the hospital admittance is what date?

Mr. Nosenko. Twenty-third of October.

Mr. Klein. And would you turn to the hospital admittance form, the one I just gave you, to the third page, please?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says "History of Present Illness"?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I don't see.

Mr. Klein. On the third page?

Mr. Nosenko. I have the third page.

Mr. Klein. It has Number 6 on the top of the page, but it's the third page on the document.

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, Number 6, History of Present Illness. Yes. Just a second.

Mr. Klein. Would you glance through that and would you tell us if this is the hospital report from when Lee Harvey Oswald cut his wrist and was taken to Botkin Hospital?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Now, would you turn to the next to the last page. It has a 13 on the right hand side.

Do you see that page?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr.Klein. The next to the last page.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And do you see where it says, two-thirds of the way to the bottom, "Psychiatric Department" underlined?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read what is said under that?

Mr. Nosenko. "His mind is clear; perception is correct; no hallucination or deliriums. He answers the questions legible and logically; he has a firm desire to remain in the Soviet Union; no psychiatric symptoms were noted; the patient is not dangerous for other people; his condition permits him to stay in Psychiatric Department by an order of the Assistant to the Chief PHysicians, Dr. Kornika. The patient is transferred to the Seventh Ward."

Mr. Klein. Is there anything in there to indicate he is mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see.

Mr. Klein. Does that report indicate that he was normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Here I do not see what I have seen. But this you receive from the Soviet Government, and if you think you received the true things, what was in file, you are wrong, Mr. Klein.

Mr. Klein. And that document, according to you, is that not an authentic copy?

Mr. Nosenko. KGB can prepare you any document. Take the material, or ask the doctors who are cooperating with KGB and they will prepare you any document.

Mr. Klein. I -am not asking you what they can do. Are you testifying that this document is not authentic, it is not the document?

Mr. Nosenko. This document never was in the file of the KGB.

Mr. Klein. So --

Mr. Nosenko. This I testify.

Mr. Klein. -- it is your tetimony that the KGB sent us a phony document?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You testified before this Committee that there was periodic physical surveillance of Lee Harvey Oswald which was ordered by Moscow, to be carried out in Minsk?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. And you testified in detail about that, and you told us how the physical surveillance consisted of following Oswald for a month or month and a half at a time, and there were a number of people that would be involved, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. It was a big operation?

Mr. Nosenko. Big operation? No, it's not a big operation.

Mr. Klein. There were a number of people involved, weren't there?

Mr. Nosenko. It is not a big operation. It is routine. In KGB it is a routine, nothing serious. It's not an operation even. It's surveillance, it's not an operation.

Mr. Klein. And have you ever stated that the only coverage of Oswald during his stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks at his place of employment, inquiry of neighbors and associates and review of his mail? Have you ever stated that was the only coverage of Oswald in Minsk?

Mr. Nosenko. I stated before, and I stated it to you yesterday, and I state now, that the order was given, and I have seen it -- to cover him by surveillance periodical, to cover him by an agent watching in places of his living, places he is working, control over his correspondence and control of his telephone conversations.

Mr. Klein. My question is, have you ever stated that the only coverage was checking at his places of employment and his neighbors and associates, and not say anything about periodic, physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I cannot tell you what I stated. I was for quite a big period of time, quite a few years, interrogated, by hours, and in different types of conditions, including hostile conditions.

Mr. Klein. That was by the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Where they asked questions in such form which later my answer will be interpreted in any way, however they want to interrogate us.

Mr. Klein. That was by CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. And I cannot tell you what I did say. I cannot remember dates. You must understand, it's hundreds of interrogations, hundreds.

Mr. Klein. This period that you are telling us about, you were questioned by the CIA during that period, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure.

Mr. Klein. Were you questioned during that period by FBI?

Mr. Nosenko. I questioned by FBI in February, yes.

Mr. Klein. At this time I would ask that this document be marked for identification and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. The clerk will indicate for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. Exhibit JFK-F-5.

(The document referred to was marked
as JFK Exhibit No. F-5 for

identification.)

Mr. Klein. These hostile interrogations you just alluded to, did they lead you to state other than the truth to these interrogators?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering questions which were put to me.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever not tell the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I was telling the truth.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Just a moment. Before you you have a Federal Bureau of Investigation report, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Iwould direct your attention to page 29 of that report.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. The last paragraph, beginning with, "Nosenko stated" -- it's underlined. Would you please read that paragraph to us?

Mr. NOsenko. "Nosenko stated that in view of instruction from the KGB Moscow, no active interest could be taken in Oswald in Minsk without obtaining prior approval from KGB in Moscow. According to Nosenko, no such approval was ever requested or granted, and based on his experience, he opined that the only coverage of Oswald during this stay in Minsk consisted of periodic checks of his places of employment, inquiries of neighbors and associates, and review of his mail."

Mr. Klein. Did you make that statement?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir. What do you find here wrong?

Mr. Klein. Does that statement say anything about physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it didn't.

Mr. Klein. Did you forget to tell them about the physical surveillance?

Mr. Nosenko. Maybe I forget; maybe they didn't put; I do not know.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to agents Poptanich and Gheesling on March 3rd and 4th, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you. I do remember the date, no. I remember I was speaking with agents from FBI.

Mr. Klein. When you spoke to them, did you recall that they spoke to you at that time, March 3rd and 4th, about Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I told you,they were speaking with me about Oswald, but I cannot tell you the date whem.

Mr. Klein. Was it in March 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. They were speaking with me -- February and the beginning of March of 1964.

Mr. Klein. And did they tape the conversations?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, they were taping all conversations.

Mr. Klein. Did the agents make notes when you were talking?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did they ever show you those notes?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the statements you were making to them were going to be written down in to a report?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever have an opportunity to see the report?

Mr. Nosenko. No. The only one which was sent to the Warren Commission, this I have seen.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that the report would be put in your file?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be.

Mr. Klein. Were you aware that report would be shown to a committee such as this investigating the assassination?

Mr. Nosenko. I didn't know that it would be created, the Committee, because it was 1964.

Mr. Klein. You didn't know that?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Did you know that this Committee -- in 1964 -- will be existing in '78, '77?

Mr. Klein. And were you telling them the truth when you told them that the only coverage of Oswald, and listing these things and not telling them about the physical surveillance, was that the truth you told them?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I told them that there was done the work against Oswald; it was ordered, passive type of work , it's called passive. Whenever it's ordered not to make an approachment, not to make a contact, not to make a recruitment, this is passive.

Anything when enters besides whatever is done, contact, approachments, recruitment, attempt to recruit, it is immediately called active.

Mr. Klein. Looking at that report, did you tell them about the physical surveillance which you told this Committee about yesterday?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not see here, but I have no doubts. I do not know. Maybe I didn't mention that this date you said, maybe. I didn't mention but I was telling them about surveillance.

Mr. Klein. Didn't you tell us that you always told the truth and told everything you knew when you spoke to the FBI and the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you, "Was there physical surveillance?" --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I will answer yes, it was.

Mr. Klein. -- you would have answered yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. You also testified before this Committee that in accord with the orders from Moscow that there was technical surveillance, and you told us in detail about how they tapped his phone and they would record it and make copies of it and gave it to a certain person.

Again, drawing your attention to page 29 of that same paragraph, does that say anything about the technical surveillance that you told us about?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you forget?

Mr. Nosenko. But, if you ask, even an agent of FBI, I doubt it, no. In KGB control of correspondence, control of telephone, it's not big deal. It's giving order to control a telephone can be given by Chief of Section, not speaking of Chief of Department, not speaking of Chief of Directorate, and not speaking to receive a warrant from the judge. Control of correspondence can be signed, permission to put control over correspondence can be done by the Deputy Chief of Section even.

Do you understnd what I want to tell you, it is absolutely considered, KGB, nothing important.

Mr. Klein. Is it a big deal to check periodically at someone's place of employment and talk to their neighbors? Is that a big deal?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. But you told them about that, didn't you?

Mr. Nosenko. I tried simply to describe them what kind of, not to take active -- what does it mean, passive type of coverage of the target?

Mr. Klein. If they would have asked you was there any technical surveillance, then would you have told them?

Mr. Nosenko. I would have said they were told, even word for word, in this document said not the technical surveillance. They have a certain terminology. Let's say surveillance, it's called to lead, the measurement N/N, and to control telephone to lead the measurement M.

Mr. Klein. If they would have said, "Was there any technical surveillance of Oswald?" would you have said "yes"?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Klein. You also testified to this Committee that the KGB would have had to have known about Marina Oswald, you said, by the end of the month they would have a batch of papers?

Mr. Nosenko. You told me, if she had seen him, you something metnioned, 15, 13.

Mr. Klein. Because surveillance was on Oswald, they would have had to pick her up?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot tell you it was in the moment when he was seeing her or not. You said assume that he met her 16 and 13, and it became known to KGB through surveillance. I said by the end of month that at least something will have on her, who is she, where she is working, where she studied, where she work.

Mr. Klein. They would know that through the surveillance on Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. The fact will be known through surveillance; then through other outfits of KGB they will find whatever possible on her.

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the following answer:

"Question: Why wouldn't she -- referring to Marina -- have been investigated when she first met Oswald?

"Answer: They did not know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marraige. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Were you ever asked that question and did you give that answer?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember my questions, and answers.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this document be marked for identification, please, and shown to the witness.

The Chairman. The clerk will identify for the record the number appearing on the document.

The Clerk. JFK-F-6.

(The document referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-6 for identification.)

Mr. Klein. Looking at that document, have you ever seen it before?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. You have never seen that before?

Mr. Nosenko. I never have seen it before.

Mr. Klein. And is that a report that says on the cover, "Memorandum for the Record; Subject: Followup Report on the Oswald Case; Source: AEDONOR." Was AEDONOR your code name at one time?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Klein. "Date of Interview: 3 July 1964." Does it say that on the cover?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. And turning to the very last page, page 18.--

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Does it say, "Thomas A. Ryan"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. "SR/CI/KGB"?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever hear of a man named Thomas A. Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know a man Thomas A. Ryan.

Mr. Klein. Do you recall speaking to a man named Thomas Ryan?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you turn in this document to page 9. On page 9, the last question and answer, would you read the question for us, and read the answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?"

"They didn't know she was a friend of Oswald until they applied for marriage. There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her."

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked that question and did you ever --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, sir. But if it is, it must be asked and I this answered.

Mr. Klein. Was that the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. As far as I remember, those conditions in which I was asked, better ask where I was in this period of time, what conditions I was kept, and what type of interrogations were going on.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell us yesterday that you always told the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. -- when you spoke about Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Was this question relating to Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I was answering what I could.

Mr. Klein. Is that the truth, that they didn't --

Mr. Nosenko. It's how it is put, how it is put. You see, again, why wouldn't she have been investigated. Here must be question was in this form. The investigation, not the checkup of her, but, let's say, invitation for conversation, something of this kind, it's some kind of here misunderstanding on both parts, that would be mine and interrogator.

Mr. Klein. It is an inaccurate transcript?

Mr. Nosenko. I consider many, many things are inaccurate.

Mr. Klein. Is that transcribed accurately?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know, sir.

Mr. Klein. That answer, do you think it is transcribed accurately, that that's your answer?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I can only explain only one thing. Let's say there was KGB found out that he had an acquaintance, Marina Prusakova. They were not married. They didn't know -- they didn't apply for marriage. What kind of first will be investigation? Checkup in archives of KGB of Byelorussia, and on the basis whatever kind of material on her will be found. Let's say, if she was ever on trial by militia, under arrest. If militia had any material, they can expand further. They can also send checkup in the place of her -- one, it's in one order, to give us the picture of the character of the target, check on him in place of his work and check in place of his living, in one order.

But more, farther investigation, the true investigation -- this is called checkup -- will be studied and they will start when they see something, let's say, suspicious in behavior of Oswald and this his connection.

In case of Marina, when they found out that they are going to marry, sure, they will be more, farther investigation, thorough invetigation; but before it will only be checkup. From thispoint of view I was answering this question.

Mr. Klein. Let me make it simple.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. If the question was asked exactly as it appears here, "Why wouldn't she have been investigated when she first met Oswald?" would this be your answer? Is that a correct answer as it appears here?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, it appears here, but I do not remember.

Sure, I answered and this was question, but, gentlemen --

Mr. Klein. Was this true? This says "There was no surveillance on Oswald to show that he knew her" -- is that right or wrong?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered, yes. It is right. It is written here.

Mr. Klein. You remember answering that?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Klein. How do you know you answered that?

Mr. Nosenko. You are giving me official document.

Mr. Klein. You have no recollection of answering this?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not have any recollection of interrogations.

Mr. Klein. If you answered that, were you telling the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. I don't know. I answered. Must be. This is how I answered question.

Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that the KGB decided to have Lee Harvey Oswald examined by two psychiatrists. You told us about how it was decided, who decided it, where it was decided. Then they found Lee Harvey Oswald to be mentally unstable?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Have you ever been asked the following questions and given the following answers:

"Question: Did the KGB make a psychological assessment of Oswald?

"Answer: No, nothing, but at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he is not normal.

"Question: Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?

"Answer: I don't think so. There was no report like this."

Mr. Nosenko. No, I told that there was opinion of psychiatrists that hewas mentally unstable.

Mr. Klein. Is what I read to you correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know whether it is correct or wrong. I am answering you what I know.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever make a statement like that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember statements for five years, interrogation.

Mr. Klein. I would direct your attention to the Ryan Report.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Page 7.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. Would you read for us the first and second questions and answers, please.

Mr. Nosenko. "Did the KGB make psychological assessment of Oswald?"

"No, nothing. But at the hospital it was also said he was not quite normal. The hospital didn't write that he was mad, just that he was not normal, mentally unstable."

Mr. Klein. Please keep reading.

Mr. Nosenko. "Did the hospital authorities conduct any psychological testing?"

"I don't think so. There was no report like this.

"What was the Soviets' opinion of Oswald's personality, what kind of man did they think he was?"

"KGB throught he was of no interest for the country or for the KGB, that he is not normal, that he should leave the country."

Mr. Klein. Did you say anything in there about two psychiatrists examining Oswald and about reading their reports which said he was mentally unstable? Did you say anything about that there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember what I said to them; but I would like you to find out the conditions in which interrgations were done, how it was done, by what procedures, when two interrogators are seated. I never knew any names -- they never announced me names -- one playing part of bad guy and other good guy, and it starting slapping then, not physically but I mean, psychologically and in conversation, turning question upside down, however they would like, then this leave, another one will start in softer way.

Mr. Klein. When did this --

Mr. Nosenko. And I would not trust any of their documents in those periods of time. Up to 1967 when we started from the beginning, to work, Mr. Bruce Solie. That is the one thing. Second, my knowledge of language was very poor in '64. I didn't understand many questions, and none of them, excluding Mr. Deryabin, knew Russian language and Mr. Deryabin was asking me only questions concerning my biography and this type of question, but nonoperative questions.

Mr. Klein. Do you have any recollection of being asked these questions and giving the answers that you just read to us?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I told you, and I will tell, I do not remember their questions, and I do not remember my answers; but I tried to be truthful with them. Then was period of time when I have seen that they were simply was laughing at me; I rejected to answer questions, and whenever they were asking, I would answer, "I do not remember, I do not know, I do not remember."

Mr. Klein. These answers, do they say "I do not know, I do not remember" or do these give responsive answers?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not trust this document prepared by people in those years.

Mr. Klein. Is it your testimony that these might not be accurate questions and answers?

Mr. Nosenko. My opinion -- I cannot tell you exactly, I say might be.

Mr. Klein. You testified --

Mr. Nosenko. One more thing: If we are going into this, a number of interrogations, I was under drugs, and on me was used a number of drugs, and I know that, and hallucinations and talking during night and sodium and everything, even many others, and a number of things were absolutely incoherent.

Mr. Klein. This hostile interrogation that you have been referring to, when did it begin?

Mr. Nosenko. Arrested me 4th of April, 1964, started interrogate me in two days. They interrupted -- I don't know - interrogate a month, two, made break; then again, then again period of no interrogation; then again interrogations, up to 24 hours, not giving me possibility to sleep.

Mr. Klein. And this was all after April 4, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

That is why I will not take as a document anything what concerns interrogations in hostile, absolutely hostile, situation.

Mr. Klein. You testified in detail yesterday about the cable which you saw which was sent from Mexico City to the First Chief Directorate in Moscow, and you testified that you actually read that cable and that it told that Oswald was in Mexico City and he wanted permission for visa to come to the Soviet Union.

Do you remember reading that cable and describing it for us in detail, how long it was?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say to anyone that after Oswald went to Minsk, the next time you heard of him was in connection with Oswald's application to the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa, and you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of the subject's application; your knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of your department by M.I. Turalin.

Did you ever say that, that you did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of Oswald's application?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember. I am telling you what I have seen, cable, what was told through Lieutenant Colonel Alekseev to tell to Turalin the opinion of Second Chief Directorate Seventh Department.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 30 of the FBI report in front of you.

Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.

(Pause)

Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. On the top of page 30, read for us the underlined section on the top, beginning "The next time" --

Mr. Nosenko. "The next time Nosenko heard of Oswald was in connection with Oswald's application to Soviet Embassy in Mexico City for a Soviet reentry visa. Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. His knowledge resulted from an oral inquiry of Nosenko's department by Turalin, Service No. 2, Counterintelligence in Foreign Countries, First Chief Directorate. Nosenko recalled that Turalin had orally contacted Vladimir Alexseev, Chief of Sixth Section of Nosenko's Tourist Department, with respect to Oswald. Nosenko's department had no interest in Oswald and they recommended that Oswald's request for reentry visa be denied. Nosenko couldn't recall when Oswald visited Mexico City in connection with visa application."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say this to an FBI agent?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be I said it, it's here in document.

Mr. Klein. It says in here that Nosenko did not know how Mexico City advised Moscow of subject's application. Did you say that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be; I said this in this way.

Mr. Klein. And did you tell us that not only did you know how they advised them by cable but that you read the cable?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I recollection.

Mr. Klein. Did you tell them the truth?

Mr. Nosenko. I was trying to tell what I remembered.

Mr. Klein. And this FBI report which you just read from, would you look back on the first page and would you tell us the date of thatreport?

Mr. Nosenko. Fifth of March, 1964.

Mr. Klein. March 5, 1964. Is that before April 4, 1964?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes,sir.

Mr. Klein. That was before any hostile interrogations began, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Klein. And at that time you said that you did not know anything about the cable, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. This is what I answered them, how I remembered.

Mr. Klein, I have a question. Do you understand from what psychological turmoil a person passing who defected, do you understand that it is necessary time, time to settle psychologically, he doesn't know how he will be living, what he will be doing, and at the same time a person feels attitude on the part of those who helped him to come CIA? I felt something going on.

Mr. Klein. You testified to us today that you didn't know how wrote the summary of Oswald's file in the First Department because you never had an opportunity to read it. Did you ever tell anyone that Fedroseve and Matveev, F-e-d-r-o-s-e-v-e and M-a-t-v-e-e-v of the First Department, Second Chief Directorate, took the file and wrote a second "spravka", which you told us was a summary?

Mr. Nosenko. Summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Must be I told, it is again right, because you see, not Fedroseve -- Fedroseve was Chief of First Department, American Department, and I will repeat what I told you yesterday. Matveev has come to take file, but surely Fedroseve who is Chief of American Department, he had given call to Chief of Seventh Department. He was involved in this; that is why I mentioned him. He was Chief of First American Department. His deputy, Colonel Matveev, has come, and not alone; with him was a couple of officers, has come and told that Gribanov ordered and Fedroseve giving call to Department, we must take it, and took. Who of them wrote, I do not know, no doubts that Fedroseve and Matveev were participated in the preparation of documents.

They are responsible for First American Department.

Mr. Klein. So you have an idea of who would have written, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. American Department, no doubts that this two will be participating or correcting.

Mr. Klein. But you didn't read that summary, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember reading the summary.

Mr. Klein. Did you read it? Do you have any recollection of reading it?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I haven't seen summary.

Mr. Klein. Are you positive that you didn't see that summary?

Mr. Nosenko. I have seen summaries in the file of Oswald.

Mr. Klein. Are you positive you didn't see the summary written by the First Department after they took the file away?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember seeing. As I told you, I haven't seen it.

Mr. Klein. You testified that Oswald was considered normal prior to the time he cut his wrist, and even told us that you were surprised, you had no indication he would do something like that.

Were you ever asked the following question, and did you give the following answer:

"In what way was the Oswald case handled differently from cases of other American defectors?"

"Answer: The main difference is that he was not to be allowed to stay. He was considered to be not normal."

Mr. Nosenko. This is what cases I know, who were staying.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal, referring to the period before he tried to commit suicide?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; but if I said it, it's not right becuase we didn't know that he was normal or not normal. Up until the moment of he cut his wrist we started to suspect.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that he was considered not normal?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. Well, if you would have said it, would it have been correct?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it would not be correct, because he cannot be considered abnormal. We didn't know anything up till he cut the wrist.

Mr. Klein. You testified to this Committee that you were present at a meeting with the Chief of the Seventh Department Chief of your section, Major Rastrusin, at that meeting, it was decided that Oswald should not be given permission to defect. You told us where the meeting took place, told us who was there.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. You told us that Krupnov was not even in the

Seventh Department at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Krupnov appeared a little later.

Mr. Klein. Did you ever tell anyone that on the basis of your evaluation of Oswald, you instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through Intourist interpreter that Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa?

Did you ever tell anybody that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember. If I said it, it was wrong, not right, because Krupnov started participation only in this case when Oswald was allowed to stay. In the moment when Oswald arrived in Soviet Union, when he went in hospital, Krupnov was still not in Seventh Department. He very soon appeared later. Then it was wrong. If I stated it, it was wrong.

Mr. Klein. Directing your attention to the FBI report in front of you, I would like to draw your attention to page 28.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Klein. Beginning with the underlined section beginning with the first "On the basis" in the second paragraph, would you read this?

Mr. Nosenko. "Nosenko and Krupnov on the basis of this information, concluded that Oswald was of no interest to the KGB and both agreed that Oswald appeared somewhat abnormal."

Mr. Klein. Not that, the second paragraph, "On the basis of" --

Mr. Nosenko. "On the basis of Nosenko's evaluation of Oswald, he instructed Krupnov to advise Oswald through the Intourist interpreter Oswald would not be permitted to remain in the U.S.S.R. permanently and that he would have to depart at the expiration of his visa, and thereafter seek reentry as a permanent resident through routine channels at the Soviet Embassy in the United States."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever say that?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember saying this. It can be that simply misunderstanding, and, you see, this is not transcription from the tape. It is, I will say a summary, and I do not remember. But, if I said this, it is not right because Krupnov didn't participate it in the beginning.

Mr. Klein. Also it says --

Mr. Nosenko. It was participation of Rastrusin.

Mr. Klein. Also is it correct when it says in there that you made the decision and --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't make decision, being Deputy Chief of Section.

Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there --

Mr. Nosenko. I could say my opinion, yes.

Mr. Klein. Does it say anything there about a meeting to determine what to do, or does it say that on basis of your evaluation, you told Krupnov to do it?

Mr. Nosenko. It's not right. I said only that Krupnov appeared later. This period, what we are discussing here, was Rastrusin involved, decision cannot be done on my own, being Deputy Chief of Section, decision cannot be done even being [illegible] Deputy Chief of Section, Chief of Section, at least it must be on the level of Chief of Department.

Mr. Klein. So it is incorrect, is that what you are saying?

Mr. Nosenko. It is incorrect, and Krupnov -- I do not remember.

Mr. Klein. You told us, when I questioned you about the fact that you didn't tell the FBI that there was physical surveillance, the last question I asked you, if they would have asked you if he was physically surveilled, would you have told them, and you said yes?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sure. I will say.

Mr. Klein. Were you ever asked the following question and did you give the following answer:

"Was he physically surveilled" and that is referring to Minsk, and you answered "No, there was none"?

Mr. Nosenko. It was not right, because it was order given and he was under periodical surveillance.

Mr. Klein. I draw your attention to page 9 of the CIA document in front of you, Memorandum for the Record.

Mr. Nosenko. I do not have it.

Mr. Klein. The Ryan Report. I draw your attention to page 9.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Klein. Would you read the first question and the first answer?

Mr. Nosenko. "Was he physically surveilled?"

"No, there was none."

Mr. Klein. Did you ever give that answer to that question?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember; it's not right, the answer.

Mr. Klein. I would ask that this tape, which is marked 3 July '64, Reel No. 66, be deemed marked for identification.

The Chairman. Indicate for the record the marking.

The Clerk. JFK-F-7.

(The item referred to was marked as JFK Exhibit No. F-7 for identification.)

The Chairman. We will recess for about five minutes.

(A brief recess was taken.)

The Chairman. The Committee is back in session.

During the recess the witness made a request of the Chair that he be permitted to make a brief statement prior to counsel for the Committee resuming interrogation.

The Chair is going to grant that request and recognize the witness at this time for such statement as he would like to make.

Mr. Nosenko. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I arrived in the United States in 1964, 12th of February. I felt something was going wrong because the attitude on the part of the officers from CIA who was dealing with me, I felt was going wrong, by a number of remarks, their behavior. Besides, I was in a psychological process. It's a very big thing, when you are coming to live in a new country. I left the country where I was born, never mind, my defection was strictly on ideological basis, but still psychologically is very big thing and very serious thing.

A very short period of time, April 4, I was invited on checkup for the doctor, and this checkup turned to be arrest. Arrested was in very rude form, nobody beat my physically , no, but in rude form, trying to put dignity of the person, of human being, down, kept in very hard conditions. I was smoking from 14 years old, never quitted. Iwas rejected to smoke. I didn't see books. I didn't read anything. I was sitting in four walls, metal bed in the center of the room and that is all.

I was hungry, and this was the most difficult for me because how I tried not to think about food. I was thinking about food because all the time I want to eat. I was receiving very small amount, and very poor food. I was sitting some kind of attic; it was hot, no air conditioning, cannot breathe; windows -- no windows, closed over. I was permitted to shave once a week, to take showers once a week.

From me were taken toothpaste, toothbrush. The conditions were really inhuman, conditions in this place; and later transferred in another place, which is now I know where it was, the second place, Camp Perry, where certain house and the same very, very Spartan conditions; three and a half years. Besides that, on me were used different types of drugs and sleeping drugs, hallucination drugs, and whatever I do not know, and don't want to know.

What I want to tell you, the arrest was done illegally, without due process of law, without -- in violation of Constitution, which was found by Rockefeller Commission. It wasn't mentioned, my name, but simply nameless defector, who was over three years in extremely Spartan conditions.

Interrogations were done sometimes 24 hours, not giving me an hour to sleep. Interrogations were in very hostile manner. Simply, what I would say were rejected. How long I will be, why it is without due process, no warrants; "You will be eternally, 25 years." How long we would want you to keep. That is why I consider all interrogations, all materials, which concerns this period of time are illegal, and I am not recognizing them and don't want to see them. And I am asking you not to ask questions based on this interrogations, including trying to play the tape during this interrogations. For me it's difficult to return back. I passed through hell. I started new life in

'69 only because I was true defector. I never raised this question with correspondents. I never went in press, because I am loyal to the country which accepted me, and I didn't wanted to hurt the country.

I didn't hurt, even to hurt, the intelligence, the CIA. I didn't consider the whole CIA was responslbe. Were responsible several people, for this. Thank God they are not working there anymore. They are out. If I will go in press, if I would be telling about these inhumane conditions, I will hurt not only the agencies, the intelligence service of the U.S., I will hurt the interests of the U.S.. Who would like to defect, reading in what conditions and what treatment defectors is receiving.

Sir, I prefer that you be using materials when it was started humane relations with me, which was started at the end of '67. I still was under arrest but I was transferred from the extremely Spartan conditions, and with me started to work Mr. Bruce Solie, who passed through the whole life, through all cases, through everything. People who were talking with me before were coming with what they were told, how to approach to me, how to treat me. They have come with made opinion, before whatever I will say yes or no. That is why I consider it is all unlawful documents in the period of interrogations done by anyone in CIA up until the end of '67.

The Chairman. Is there anything further, Mr. Nosenko?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

(Pages 53 thru 78, being Committee business only, are excerpted.)

Mr. Blakey. Shall I inform the witness?

The Chairman. In light of the time situation and our original intention of trying to wind up by 10:00 p.m., the Chair thinks perhaps we ought to try and invoke a five minute rule so that everybody gets a fair opportunity rather than to proceed informally and extend this matter over a long period of time.

Anyone have any objection?

All right, bring the witness in.

(Whereupon, at 8:43 o'clock p.m., the witness returned to the hearing room.)

The Chairman. Let the record reflect the fact the witness has again returned to the witness table and, Mr. Nosenko, at this time counsel for the Committee has concluded his questions to you and at thispoint in time the members of the Committee would like to be able to pose questions to you with reference to your testimony here yesterday and this evening. Is that agreeable to you, sir?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

The Chair at this point would invoke the five minute rule. The Chair will begin the questions.

Mr. Nosenko, you are now a citizen of the United States, you are now an employee of the CIA, I understand as a consultant, is that correct?

Mr. Nosenko. On private contract. I am not an employee of the CIA. I am on a private contract, used as a consultant on counterintelligence of the Soviet KGB.

The Chairman. And in that capacity, sir, are you paid an annual salary?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am paid an annual salary.

The Chairman. And what is that salary?

Mr. Nosenko. $35,000.

The Chairman. And --

Mr. Nosenko. It is the last year, because it was cost of living.

The Chairman. I see. In that capacity, do you contract out also to other persons or other organizations?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

The Chairman. This is your sole income?

Mr. Nosenko. Only one sole income.

The Chairman. Has the CIA given you anything else of value other than a salary, that is, a home, anything of that sort?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. And in the book published, written by Epstein was mentioned CIA bought me home. No, sir, I bought home on my money, nobody bought me a home, no.

The Chairman. You also now are remarried and you have --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, I am married. I am American citizen, I have five stepchildren and six grandchildren.

The Chairman. You now have a passport? Do you have a passport as a --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I have a passport, which I once used being sent by the Agency in 1975, in England, for week where I was talking with British Intelligence and Counterintelligence Services, concerning my knowledge of the Second Chief Directorate, KGB in general.

The Chairman. Is that the only country to which you have traveled since your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I have traveled on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency also for the last four years. I was in eleven countries. And I never received or demanded or asking any special fees for consultations with all friendly intelligence services, never.

The Chairman. Have you ever returned to Soviet Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Never once in Soviet Union from 1964 and hope will never see it again.

The Chairman. And how long have you now been a consultant for CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I was from 1969, from April 1969, when I was released from detention arrest.

The Chairman. Now, will you clarify for us when you first were placed under arrest?

Mr. Nosenko. Fourth of April, 1964.

The Chairman. And on what date had you defected?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected 4th of February of 1964 in Geneva, Switzerland.

The Chairman. And when you were placed under arrest, where were you placed in detention?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not know, it was somewhere around Washington, close to Washington, where I was '64 and beginning '65, approximately. I don't hear any radio, I didn't see any newspaper, I do not know, didn't know anything what happen in the world for many years.

I know that it was by car from Virginia where I was staying from 12 of February '64, I was taken by car for visit to doctor, and it was 30, 40 minute drive, it was in this area, but then in approximately after a year and maybe 13 months, a year and one month, roughly, I was transferred in very peculiar conditions, was put under shackles and handcuffs, blindfolded, put in the car, and don't know where I was going, only I heard, passing through city, I couldn't understand, I couldn't see anything, then I heard airplanes, I understood that I was somewhere in airport, and once I was scared to death, I think I was thinking they were returning me to the Russians. Well, they put me in airplane --

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, my time has expired. I want to recognize --

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know the place, sir. I know I only now found out reading the book of Daniel Schorr that I was in Camp Perry up to the end of '67. That is what I found out from the book.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Mr. Preyer.

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, one thing that comes through very strongly in your testimony is that it is a hard life to be a defector. I think to the average mentality we think it would be good for a country to welcome a defector, but to the intelligence mentality apparently a defector is immediately suspect, and you have recounted your treatment here, and apparently Lee Harvey Oswald, from your testimony, was greeted somewhat like this in the U.S.S.R. His treatment was much different from yours.

One thing he was not an intelligence agent, of course. But you have indicated that he was kept at arms' length by the KGB. The impression I get was the mere fact of being a defector caused the KGB to be less interested in him than if it was someone they had recruited?

Mr. Nosenko . Right.

Mr. Preyer. Although he was kept at arms' length by the KGB, in the sense that he was not contacted, it does appear that he lived very well there, relatively speaking. He certainly lived much better than you lived in your early years. That he was given a job in Minsk, he was given a pension, which is something that seems extraordinary in this country, from the Red Cross, and apparently pretty good housing conditions in Minsk.

Is that typical way that a defector would be treated in Russia, is at arm's length?

Mr. Nosenko. Every defector will be watched but, sir, when you mentioned what he received being in Russia, it is very little. I can give you only one example. When defectors Martin and Mitchell, employees of NSA, who cooperated with KGB abroad, and then they defected to Soviet Union, they received extraordinary help. It is not like Oswald. Oswald is nothing.

Mr. Preyer. The amount of money?

Mr. Nosenko. The amount of money and other things, extroardinary.

Mr. Preyer. For Oswald were not extraordinary?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Preyer. You mentioned the other three defectors that you had known of. What sort of treatment did they receive?

Mr. Nosenko. I will tell you what Martin and Mitchell --

Mr. Preyer. Were they two of the other three?

Mr. Nosenko. These two, for example. I can mention others, what I heard, I never work with them, what I heard. Martin and Mitchell, by decision of Soviet Government was given them, to each one, $100,000 on their account, was given apartment, not like Oswald received, but real good apartment, so-called classless society, living high class. Each one was given car, each one received life pension a month of 5000 Soviet rubles up to death. And each one was helped with work. Both were assigned with some type of research work where they had given position, let's say Martin was given position of researcher. But amount of pay of his was analogical to the amount of pay of the Director of this Institute, besides what he is receiving of pension. This is the treatment of those defectors whom they want, who had given them valuable information.

In case of -- excuse me -- was Annabella Bucar defected something early '50s. She was working in American Embassy in Press Department. She also received, in spite of the fact was making very good money in the Soviet Union, she was working for Moscow Radio, she was receiving life pension of big amount, amount approximately what in Soviet Union is received by Deputy of Minister, of Ministry, of this or that industry.

Mr. Preyer. But the defector who was not giving information?

Mr. Nosenko. Now, he will be given a little bit something, pension like was Oswald, to Oswald given pension. I don't know what was given to Webster, a worker, who was defected in '59 and by the way, in very short period of time he decided he doesn't like the life in the so-called Soviet paradise. He wanted to return back home, but if he received it will be analogical to what Oswald received, not more.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Were you solicited to be a defector?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. Why did you defect?

Mr. Nosenko. I defected because I for years of my life has come to number of conclusions that the whole society, the whole system, is dictatorial system, nondemocratic system, the true police state system, and especially working the KGB opened eyes for me. My defection was strictly on ideological basis.

Mr. Devine. Had you been out of the Soviet Union prior to your defection?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Devine. Other than to Geneva?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I was in England twice, then I was passing through a number of countries, staying day, two, France, Belgium, HOlland. I was in 1960 in Cuba.

Mr. Devine. You were a married man in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Devine. Had a child?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, two daughters.

Mr. Devine. Were you having some domestic difficulties?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I tried in 1960-'61, I tried to arrange to go to work abroad with my family, and in the last moment it fell down, and I understood I cannot go abroad with family, and that is why when I contacted CIA in '62, I -- psychologically I was ready, ideologically was ready and psychologically ready to defect, but the question of family was bothering me.

Mr. Devine. But not enough to keep you there?

Mr. Nosenko. Not enough to keep me there. And in '64 I has come knowing that I will never return.

Mr. Devine. You were willing to abandon your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, because I didn't see possibility to take family out. I was living the last four or five years as a man with two souls, splitted personality, one I must show and was showing, as good KGB officer, as a good Communist, as a patriot of the Soviet system, the Soviet Union, and the other part of me, the true part I am not believing in what I am telling, I am not believing in the system, I do not like it, I do not want it, and I consider what phony things are going on because I was working in KGB, I knew it. I simply couldn't more tolerate to be with this double splitted personality.

Mr. Devine. How did you dispose of your children and your wife in Russia?

Mr. Nosenko. The thing was psychologically, my had, had in my mind. help me. My mother was rather rich, after death of father, she was very rich woman and she had a lot that will be enough not only for my children but their children and grandchildren. From the point of view of material they will never suffer.

Mr. Devine. Yes,but as a defector would there not be reprisals taken by the Soviet Union against your family?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, before the death of Stalin it could be taken drastic measures against the family, but after the death of Stalin, from middle 1950s, quite a little changes took place in the Soviet Union, and the family will not suffer.

Another thing, oh sure, will be certain things which they cannot achieve. Let's say my brother who studied later in the same Institute what I finish, Institute of International Relations, he will never have possibility to go abroad, but he will never be put in jail, can never be exiled from Moscow, the same, nothing happened with family.

Mr. Devine. The fact that you were a KGB man didn't your defection cause some irritation among those in power over there?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure.

Mr. Devine. Did they want to get you back, didn't they want to get even with you?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, yes, and they are looking for me.

Mr. Devine. But they took no reprisals against your family.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. How do you know that?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I do not know exactly, but you see, there were some defections before. The family didn't suffer like it was, let's say, in '40s and maybe up to death of Stalin.

Mr. Devine. Were those KGB defections?

Mr. Nosenko. Even from KGB.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Burke?

Mrs. Burke. Well, I would like to go back a little bit after you decided to defect. I think you had a number of conversations with the American Embassy, was it, or was it CIA, during those ten days that you were in touch, where you negotiated whether or not you would in fact defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I contacted CIA in 1962 and --

Mrs. Burke. In '64?

Mr. Nosenko. In '64, when I arrived in Geneva, on second day I mailed a cable, and I knew -- a prearranged addressed, and I knew that in two days somebody in appropriate place and appropriate time will meet me from CIA.

Mrs. Burke. And they met you --

Mr. Nosenko. They met me and I was meeting them every day, visiting, and when I had free time, visited secret address in Geneva.

Mrs. Burke. All right, during those times you were meeti them, did you negotiate in terms of what your situation would be here in the United States if you defected, or where you wo go?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I put a question that what amount o salary I want, that will find for me job. This I negotiate

Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss whether or not you wou be imprisoned?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it never come to my mind that they would imprison me.

Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that -- I think you told us you had some information you would well to them for a certain amount of money.

Mr. Nosenko. It's in '62.

Mrs. Burke. In '62 you said that. In '64 you didn't discuss any sale of any information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, on the contrary, for the period of '62 -'64, I tried to get as much as possible information, not only to come what I knew where I participated in the department where I worked but to find out as much as possible what can be valuable to the American intelligence and I had come with some luggage.

Mrs. Burke. All right, well, during the time that you were talking to them about what your salary would be, the circumstances of your defection, and I assume you told them what your rank was, some of the things you worked on --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. -- did you tell them you worked on the Oswald file?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not remember, I can mention. I do not remember, honestly.

Mrs. Burke. Did you discuss Oswald at all with them during that period?

Mr. Nosenko. I must, sure, mentioned this fact because, no, it happened such a thing. I must mention. But I do not remember. I cannot tell you what questions were, what my answers were.

Mrs. Burke. Did you tell them that the Soviet Union thought that Oswald may have been a United States agent?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I certainly -- it would be -- anyone treated. Oswald, or anyone from the United States who come to live on his own decided to defect, or they contacted him before, they will still will be suspected in a possibility that he is an agent of American intelligence, and also this fact.

Mrs. Burke. And is this the reason that you gave him why he was not allowed to remain in the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. The reason was that they didn't want him to stay because, KGB, because they didn't consider him an interesting target, an interesting person who has valuable information.

Mrs. Burke. I know that. In fact, I remember you saying something about a person would only be interesting under certain circumstances, one of which would be if they came in as a tourist and they applied a very short time before they arrived.

Mr. Nosenko. Oh no.

Mrs. Burke. And they were an add on to, for instance, the tour.

Mr. Nosenko. Right. Right.

Mrs. Burke. Now, from what that report shows, it shows that

Oswald received his visa in two days to come to the Soviet Union. So he would be automatically suspect, and he would be automatically what you would call an interesting person.

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no. In this case, you see, Oswald even didn't receive a visa in United States; he received it passing through Europe.

Mrs. Burke. Through Helsinki?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, in Finland, where it's process was easier than it will be in the United States. He simply bought a tour and he received, managed to receive visa.

Mrs. Burke. Let me just ask one other thing.

Did you tell them any of your, aside from the ideological, why you wanted to defect? For instance, did you tell them anything about this promotion you thought you had when you went to, was it, Gorki?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. But then you --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I didn't tell them. I simply said that my position, because with me, it was documented, I lied. I said my position was Lieutenant Colonel. It wasn't true. It was false statement. The same false statement was concerning recall telegram when I wanted to push the defection process.

Mrs. Burke. My time is up. May I just ask one question? Were you upset when you didn't get your promotion after they had --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no ma'am. I still didn't receive it. It was sent on signature. You see, they are signing, not immediately when they are received. Personnel Directorate gather in from all over the Soviet Union, from all KGBs and comment on signature to the Chairman, twice, three times a year. They were simply gathering in and didn't get enough materials. I do not know. Maybe it was signed in January. But up to my leaving, nobody informed me that it was signed. I didn't -- wasn't rejected.

The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I wonder if you might let me ask you -- let me start back here, very quickly. One of the very first questions you were asked last night by Mr. Klein, was the way Mr. Klein worded the question, and I will ask you to expound on it if it is a correct recall on my part.

Mr. Klein asked you or stated that you arranged for your transfer to the American section of the KGB. He used the words you arranged for your transfer to that section. Is that an accurate statement? Did you want to be in that section? Did you specifically ask to be in that section?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it wasn't accurate, it wasn't right. Arrangement was done in work form. I was working after finishing Institute in GRU, Navy Intelligence, and being in 1952 New Year, in Moscow on New Year on a short leave, I was in company where it was one of my friends with whom I studied at the Institute. He worked in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. But his father-in-law was high ranked General of MGB, in those years was called KGB, and he asked me what I am doing, this General.

I said that I am working for the Navy Intelligence, GRU.

Do you like this work?

I said no, because I am not using what I received education.

Would you like to work in MGB?

I said, if it will be with the use of my disciplines which I studied at the Institute, why not? That is all. And in March after death of Stalin this general was appointed the First Deputy Minister of MGB of Beria. He remembered this conversation and several days after death of Stalin I was recalled to MGB which was called MVD in this period of time, in March of '53, and was assigned to Second Chief Directorate. This is what true statement.

Mr. Dodd. When you sent to the safe house or whatever it was in Geneva, in 1964, by your own admission you lied to the agent there in that you stated you had received a telegram issuing your recall back to the Soviet Union.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. Therefore, it was that important that they accept you immediately.

Did you show anyone a telegram?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir. There wasn't any telegram.

Mr. Dodd. Did they ask for a telegram?

Mr. Nosenko. No, but, sir, what happened, I started to meet them in January, had passed three, four, five, six, seven days. I am afraid of that any moment my Chief of the Second Chief Directorate will be returning from France.

Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you that, Mr. Nosenko. My question to you is, were you asked whether or not you had a copy of the telegram that you had received from the Soviet Union?

Mr. Nosenko. And I -- if I was even asked I couldn't give them because I cannot take it. It would be secret cable.

Mr. Dodd. You have answered my question.

You stated last night that -- and this might have been a supposition on your part, but I am curious about it -- you stated that it was your feeling that the intelligence community in this country considered you a dispatched agent in 1962. Is that something that you felt in 1962?

Mr. Nosenko. No. It's --

Mr. Dodd. A reflection back?

Mr. Nosenko. A reflection back. No, no, sir.

Mr. Dodd. You, by your own statement, again have received some very rough treatment, inhuman treatment, to use your words, living under spartan conditions, and I am sort of brushing over this very quickly, between 1964 and 1969. Certainly you couldn't have been very pleased with the way you were being treated by a country that you had defected to and offered to give information to. So for a period of that '64, to '69, five years, you went through a rather rough period in your life?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. Why did you go to work for somebody who treated you like that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I, even was five year there, I didn't consider that it was decision of the whole CIA. I didn't consider that -- I didn't blame the whole CIA because it wasn't the question decided by the whole Agency. It was decided question by several persons who were I consider simply in this period of time sick, mentally sick, not ill, but were simply in fear, in scare, in mania as if KGB penetrated everything.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your statement to me that for five years, while you were incarcerated in almost solitary confinement, that you thought that this was the individual acts of a couple of employees of this Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Not employees.

Mr. Dod. Without the approval of the very highest authority in this Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I have seen Chief of Soviet Russia Division, Mr. David Murphy. He was a high ranking man. It was his decision, decision of Mr. Angleton, decision of Mr. Murphy, and when they are coming to Director, and I know, from my life, they can report in the way how they will report it, and the Director will accept because they are responsible people, they are sitting in this place. He is not going into details, he is not going and studying, he is not going himself visiting.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. First, have you received any compensation for the period during which you were held in jail?

Mr. Nosenko. I received in several years later, I put the question, I want to be paid for every year which I was unlawfully arrest, the amount of money which we have agreed, with taken taxes and whatever American citizens are paying.

Mr. Sawyer. Did you get that?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, and on this sum of money I bought the house.

Mr. Sawyer. I see.

I will tell you what bothers me about your testimony, very frankly. You stated that they would be very interested in a member of the American intelligence community that they could even compel to defect. Here you had a willing defector, a guy who said that undoubtedly that he didn't like America, and that he did like Russia, and he wants to defect, and nobody even interrogates him, according to you, as to what exposure or experience he had. He might have worked in the missile silos, he might have done anything, but nobody asked him, and that he lives there for a period of, a long period of time. Here is a guy that is totally willing to talk. It is not like approaching somebody who doesn't want to talk to you or that might not want to talk to you. And here is a fellow who was a radar operator, experienced to some degree, and I don't know to what degree, but apparently the Russians don't know to what degree either, because nobody asked him, in a highly secret air base in Japan, but they didn't ask him even about that, and it is very rare to have one come.

I have listened to Radio Free Cuba, where they air all kinds of propaganda, and this guy would have been certainly good for propaganda when he loved Russia and hated the United States. And I just, with those circumstances, I very frankly find it almost impossible to believe that they did not thoroughly interrogate him at least.

Mr. Nosenko. They never considered him an interesting target. It was known that he served in Marine Corps.

Mr. Sawyer. What I am getting at, how did they know whether he was an interesting target when they never even asked.

Mr. Nosenko. They judging by what they know about him what in questionnaire he filled and plus what they found out from interpreter on him. He said to interpreter, he served in Marine Corps, he finished his years of service.

Mr. Sawyer. But he might have been a cryptographer in the Marine Corps. He might have been as an enlisted man, he might have been a cryptographer and know all our codes and code methodology that might help break codes and that sort of thing, but nobody ever asked him. That is what I don't understand. And I can't believe it, very frankly.

Mr. Nosenko. I understand, sir, but I am telling you he wasn't considered interesting target, and --

Mr. Sawyer. But they didn't have any facts to know whether he was interesting, and here is a guy that wants to talk to them.

Mr. Nosenko. But the judgment made on each person to work actively against him on the basis of his questionnaire. If in questionnaire will be said he is, let's say, professor, teacher, let's say he is working for the government, any department, but for the Federal Government, or he is an officer, sure, on him will be paid attention.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, all right, we can drop that for a minute.

But now, he got a visa in two days in Finland. I happen to have been in Finland four years ago and wanted to get a visa, a sort of a last minute decision, to go to Leningrad, and I was told there is a minimum of 30 days before you can get a visa. Now, to issue him a visa in two days for Russia, that is very unusual, apparently, so they must have had some interest in getting him there.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, what I know, there wasn't any interest to get him. He managed to get this visa.

Mr. Sawyer. All right.

The other thing I am curious about is when they interrogated you so carefully here, why someone like Oswald, a known defector and who could well have been now a Russian intelligence agent, comes back to the country, apparently CIA or FBI, or nobody paid a bit of attention to him, and let him wander around the country with a Russian wife at will.

I have used up my time.

The Chairman. Okay. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Nosenko, as I piece it together, there are four possibilities for this Committee to believe. Let me sketch out what those possibilities are.

One, that you told the truth in 1964, but you are now misleading this Committee.

Two, that you told an untruth in 1964, basically your statements in 1964 were not true, but you are telling the truth now.

Three, that in fact you were dispatched here by the KGB, or the Soviet Government, because of apparent but unreal connections between the Soviets and Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy. Obviously the USSR would need this for obvious reasons. They would badly need this for all sorts of international reasons.

And finally, the fourth option is that you were dispatched here by the Soviet Government and the KGB because there was an actual connection between the KGB and the assassination of President Kennedy.

These are the items which I have picked up in the last two days that would tend to lead some people to believe the last of the four, or at least the third to the last of the four, either that the KGB dispatched you here because they needed it for political reasons, though they were not involved, or they dispatched you here because in fact they did collaborate with Oswald.

First, Oswald goes to Russia. You say he is rejected, but they grant him a pension, however small.

Second, they grant him the pleasures of a hunting club, even though you said earlier he was mentally unbalanced, and you are allowing him to use a gun.

Three, they allowed him to marry in Russia.

Four, they gave him a job.

Now, in -- not talking about the time when you were under stress and incarcerated, but just talking about the two months prior to that -- the FBI questioning, and the prearrest story makes no sense.

The rejection of Oswald's offer to defect makes absolutely no sense to me.

Mr. Sawyer has just pursued that momentarily. I think that can be rejected by us, by reasonable people, prima facie. I see no reason to accept that part of your story whatsoever.

The exposition, taking you off to worry about the exposition, and so forth, was demonstrated a fraud.

No reprisals against your family. Nobody was working against Oswald, you said, yet later on you said you had seven to eight large files, you only read the first portion of one file. You said no KGB ever talked to Oswald regarding letting him defect. The reason you gave us for that was that he slashed his wrists and you concluded he was unstable. Yet prior to that discovery of his instability, you granted him a visa in two days and he asked to be permitted to defect prior to slashing his wrists, and therefore you had to make the decision prior to slashing his writs, prior to knowing that he slashed his wrist, that you were going to reject him. That doesn't hold water either.

Finally, you said in your testimony American defection was very rare. All the more reason, if it only happens once every year or a couple of times a year, or three times between '56 and '59, it is totally incredible to me that he would not have been interrogated. No reasonable person can believe that story.

You said he was not interesting, you were not interested in him, the KGB rejected him. Despite that, you were "recruiting right and left all kinds of people to assist in the espionage operation."

Now, all of these things, Mr. Nosenko, leads me to be very, very disturbed by your story because it simply just on the face of what you told us last night and tonight, can't possibly be true.

In the first place, you remember too much now. You remember too much in the way of details after 15 years. Therefore, I have great difficulty accepting any of your story.

We as a Committee of the United States Congress are charged with trying to assess what actually happened in the assassination of President Kennedy. That is the central story. You have not helped us very much. You have confused the issue. In fact, by your testimony you have led at least this member to wonder whether or not you are still working with the KGB.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I will permit the witness to answer.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman said his opinion. Do you ask me any question?

Mr. Fithian. I would just like to have you tell me why I shouldn't believe that you were dispatched here by the KGB, in the light of just the points I am making, in the light of the enormous differences, not in the CIA interrogation under duress, but in the earlier period when you were not under that kind of duress. It doesn't wash with me.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if you want me to defend myself, I can say only one thing. I never done from the first day in the United States anything directed against this country. I tried before I has come, when I contacted '62 the CIA, and has come in '64, I tried to get as much as possible information. I am the source who told concerning existence of microphones in American embassy in Moscow. I am the man who have given, I don't know , 300 cases --

Mr. Fithian. We are only concerned --

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

It is very hard to follow Mr. Fithian's comments because I would like to shift gears a little bit. BUt you indicated to our Chairman that you now act as a consultant to the CIA.

Is that your only job?

Mr. Nosenko. It is the only job.

Mr. Edgar. In the course of acting as consultant to the CIA, do you have access to talking with CIA employees from time to time who contact you and who assist you and protect you and give you some of the direction for your consulting?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Edgar. Have you ever been in a conversation with any of the agents of the CIA about who might have been responsible for having you detained on April 4th, --1964?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Edgar. -- 1964.

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Edgar. You indicated earlier you thought it was a man by the name of Murphy.

Mr. Nosenko. Murphy, Chief of Soviet, former Chief of Suviet Russian Division, and Chief of Counterintelligence, former Chief of Counterintelligence of the CIA Mr. Angleton because it cannot without him be decided.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know of any other KGB agents or other defectors who were held in those very same conditions?

Mr. Nosenko. No, I do not know.

Mr. Edgar. Were there any other prisoners held nearby that you could hear or --

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I was in solitary absolutely confinement, no prisoner, nobody I could see.

Mr. Edgar. Yet you are still willing to be a consultant to the CIA?

Mr. Nosenko. I am -- no. Sir, I am consultant only on the base, on my knowledge what I know about counterintelligence work of the KGB.

Mr. Edgar. Well, you have suggested to the Committee that your statements given to the CIA in 1964 cannot be considered reliable because the statements were given under duress, and prior to our recess a few moments ago you indicated that you felt that the tapes and the FBI and the CIA interrogations of '64, '65, and '66 should not be considered as reliable statements.

Is that not correct?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, because I considered the whole arrest was unlawful, without due process of law, illegal arrest, what was the finding as unlawful by Rockefeller Commission.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you.

You were held under those spartan conditions and you indicated that those statements would have to be unreliable.

Now, I have three specific questions, then, to ask you.

Have you ever told the CIA that these statements could not be considered reliable?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, when we started, they change the situation, they moved me from spartan conditions, started to talk with me as a human being, to treat me as a human being.

Mr. Edgar. Did you go on a point by point correction of any of those statements you previously made?

Mr. Nosenko. It wasn't in the form of simply returning to document, it was case by case, whatever concerns me, my biography, my work, whatever cases I knew, whatever cases I was involved, all questions were raised by 20, 30 times each case, when it was reevaluation of all information given by me.

Mr. Edgar. And it is your testimony that after 1967, '68, when those interrogations took place, you gave accurate, truthful statements?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, whatever and how good I recollect, at the best.

Mr. Edgar. And those statements of '67-'68 should be considered by this Committee as the absolute truth?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Edgar. And nothing but the truth.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. And it is clear to you that all the questions that were raised about Oswald were also raised in 1967 and '68?

Mr. Nosenko. Everything was raised in this period.

Mr. Edgar. If, then, this Committee discovers inconsistencies in your statements that you made in 1967 and '68, after your incarceration and the illegal period that you talk about, if we find inconsistencies between that statement and the statements you gave us last night and tonight, which should we believe?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if -- you must believe -- not you must -- it is up to you what you believe. But, sir, let's say was read to me by Mr. Klein a question, that I said when I said concerning Oswald, I did not mention physical surveillance. It is a big operation. It is nothing big in the KGB to put under surveillance Soviet or foreigner, or to control telephone conversations or correspondence. I could maybe something miss, you see, when I mentioning. I do not have such a brilliant, brilliant mind that immediately like photographic memory, immediately return word and word. I simply was describing that it wasn't active work, that there wasn't planned recruitment, there wasn't planned approachment, contact. There was type of passive work which is called in KGB to watch him and what is it, agents, control of correspondence, and explaining this, I simply, I could miss that he was under surveillance.

You can return to this and tell me, uh-huh, you told in '67 you didn't mention that he was under surveillance. It is not a contradiction.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Nosenko, in reply to Mr. Sawyer's question, you indicated you were paid for the period of time that you were under arrest, that it was a lump sum payment I suppose?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. What amount of money was that?

Mr. Nosenko. Something about, oh, about $80,000.

The Chairman. About $80,000?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

The Chairman. Any other sum in addition to that were you paid?

Mr. Nosenko. I think I received about $15,000 or $20,000 when I started on my own to live, to buy furniture. I received, yes, in the beginning, in '69, in April. But this lump I received in '70, '71. '71.

The Chairman. So that the record is clear, you received $80,000 for the period of time you were under arrest.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. In order to get started again, you were given an additional $15,000, and that was in 1969.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Since 1969, to the present time, you have received $35,000 --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.

The Chairman. Would you --

Mr. Nosenko. They started, when they released me they started to pay me in the beginning $16,000. Then they raised each year, $2000, two and a half thousand were raises. I only received $35,000 this year, '78, from October of '77, approximately.

The Chairman. From October '77 to the present time you received $35,000.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

The Chairman. Can you give us some indication of how many days you have worked during 1978?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I am working at home besides coming here when they needme, at least twice a month, and spending a week, approximately, besides traveling when they are sending me the last few years abroad to talk with friendly intelligence services. I am also working at home on my own. I am studying Soviet periodicals, Soviet magazines, Soviet newspapers. I am making certain researches, I am trying not to lose what is going on, what changes taking place in policy.

The Chairman. Would it be fair to say that you sort of set your time and that no one else sets your time?

Mr. Nosenko. When I am out of this area, yes, at home, I am myself setting time.

The Chairman. And during the last year, how many weeks would you say you have spent here at the Agency?

Mr. Nosenko. Not at the Agency. They are meeting me in other places. I am very rare visiting this place, only if they invite me for a lecture or about KGB counterintelligence. But I am meeting them when I am in this area, under certain conditions, in certain places where they need me.

Well, one month, twice I am coming. Let's say I am spending about 12, 13 days a month here, it can be in some cases seven, eight days a month, but in main the last period of time I am coming, the last years, I am coming almost twice a month.

The Chairman. For how long?

Mr. Nosenko. For a week, five, six days.

The Chairamn. My time has expired.

Mr. Preyer?

Mr. Preyer. Mr. Nosenko, your testimony has been considered a major piece of evidence, and was so considered by the Warren Commission as rebutting any Russian connection with the assassination of Lee Harvey Oswald, and I think the key part of your testimony that we are concerned with, not so much the question about any inconsistencies in it, but are you right on the big question, namely, was Lee Harvey Oswald a KGB agent?

I want to mention, I have been a little surprised by your testimony, bythe gaps in your knowledge of Oswald, and really how little you knew about him. For example, when he went to Minsk, he was tranferred out of your oversight, I take it, and as I understood you, you did not know he was married until later on, and did not know he had gone back to the United States.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Congressman, if I was staying and working '60 and '61 period in the same Seventh Department which sent file on Oswald in Minsk, I would know, but I was working in First American Department.

Mr. Preyer. Right. Now, I am not questioning you about that. The question I wonder, that that brings to my mind is, if Oswald had been a KGB agent, are you certain you would have known it? In other words, if you didn't even know he was married, didn't even know he had gone to the United States, couldn't he have been a KGB agent in that period without your knowledge, or are you certain --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I couldn't, you are absolutely right, I couldn't know. But in '63 when happened assassination of the President, when it was mentioned that Oswald shot the President, when it start, demanded the file back from Minsk, when started conversation with Minsk, started in KGB investigation, detailed approach. This is what --

Mr. Preyer. So you convinced that seeing the first section--

Mr. Nosenko. Seeing the first section in which the most important material in the whole file will be this in first section of the first volume.

Mr. Preyer. Were the rest of the sections of that file, incidentally, wire -- telephone taps?

Mr. Nosenko. It will be information from agents in second part. In third part will be from telephone conversations, from surveillance. In fourth part, photocopies of letters, different mail, when they checking Soviet connections, Soviet friends of Oswald.

Mr. Preyer. Well, on this question of your knowledge of Oswald and being in position to know about him, you knew about the cablegram from Mexico yet you did not know he had gone back to the United States. Is that because you had moved to--

Mr. Nosenko. Again, I returned in Seventh Department and I was working '62, '63, up to '64 in Seventh Department and the cablegram has come in Seventh Department. Seventh Department was started against Oswald in '59.

Mr. Preyer. Have you read a lot about the Oswald case in recent years?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, I read several books, what appeared. I only didn't read the last book which was written about Marina Oswald by Mrs. Priscilla Johnson. Why? Because I knew that I would appear here, that the staff of your -- your staff will be talking with me. I didn't wanted something to get -- I can, you know, mix what I knew and something to use what I got from the book.

Mr. Preyer. I just wondered if you had read about the Mexican cable, and perhaps through the years may have been --

Mr. Nosenko. No, I never have seen that it was mentioned Mexican cable. I have seen that he visited Mexico, in Mexico visited Soviet and Cuban embassies. This I have seen in books, this fact.

Mr. Preyer. If I have got one more moment, Mr. Chairman, to change the subject, one of the things that struck me is that when you defected, as Mrs. Burke mentioned, in Geneva, in 1964, very shortly after the Kennedy Assassination, I get the impression that the CIA or American forces to whom you defected, did not have much to say about the assassination or was not --

Mr. Nosenko. They are -- I mentioned must be Oswald, the asked. But they were asking different, whatever cases I can immediately give them, names, when recruited, his position, from what country, this they were interested, as much as possible to take this type of information. They asked me about Oswald. I told them what I knew.

The Chairman The ;time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Devine.

Mr. Devine. I don't want to know where you live, but do you reside in the general area of the nation's capital?

Mr. Nosenko. I was living in this area up to 19 -- middle of 1973, but FBI gentlemen -- I didn't mention , I also meeting FBI people when I am here, not only CIA, but they are not paying me anything. FBI people inform me that they have information that KGB trying to locate me. Then it happened in the area where I was living in Maryland up to 1973, I was in a shopping center, and on me was coming a Soviet from KGB. I knew his face, and this whole -- I immediately reported this and we decided that for me better to move from the area where Soviet diplomats, KGB officer working under cover of diplomats are freely traveling and can spot me.

Mr. Devine. That person didn't recognize you?

Mr. Nosenko. I immediately turned and went, turned my back and went in another direction.

Mr. Devine. Have you been contacted or in touch with anyone from the Soviet Embassy here in Washignton?

Mr. Nosenko. Only in 1964, the Soviet Embassy in Washington demanded to see me after defection.

Mr. Devine. Did you see them?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, in the State Department, in presence of American diplomats, I have seen for five, say seven minutes, Consul from Soviet Embassy and interpreter, another diplomat.

Mr. Devine. What did they want with you?

Mr. Nosenko. They ask me how could I do it, and do I understand the importance of this thing, that I defected from the country, and I said, gentlemen, nobody pushed me on this question, it is absolutely my own decision, and decision of free will, which I made long ago, and without any return. Then they told me now we know how to treat you, and what do you think about your Soviet citizenship.

I said, it's automatically, I am rejecting it. I do not need. And on this I finished conversation.

Mr. Devine. They made no threats of reprisals against your family back there?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no. They later only, Mr. Congressman, they later sent two letters, one from wife and another from my mother. These letters were delivered by them. They visited American embassy in Moscow and had left these two letters. These letters were sent by American embassy in Moscow to State Department, State Department had given to CIA, CIA had given me these letters. I answered one short note that my decision is final, decision ideological and in spite of all my love to the family, and in spite of my respect to the memory of the father, I can repeat that if he was alive I would also would do the same, that is all.

Mr. Devine. Getting back to one of Mr. Stoke's questions about the amount of money paid to you for your years of incarceration, the fact that they gave you $15,000 or $20,000 which you used for furniture and so forth, were there any strings tied to either of those funds, the $80,000 or the subsequent amount?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no.

Mr. Devine. That you would not contact the press or anybody else about this?

Mr. Nosenko. No, it never was mentioned, never.

Mr. Devine. No strings attached?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Devine. Finally, do you have any knowledge of any connection with Oswald and the assassination of President Kennedy?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Devine. From your connections in the KGB at that time?

Mr. Nosenko. Whatever I said, nothing more. I do not know anything.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mrs. Burke.

Mrs. Burke. I have just a few random questions. You mentioned Priscilla Johnson's book. Did you by any chance while you were working in the American tourist area, did you have any occasion to investigate her coming to Russia or did she come during any of that time as a student?

Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson?

Mrs. Burke. Yes.

Mr. Nosenko. Why, yes, her name, she was a correspondent in Moscow working, and KGB didn't like her dispatches and they made very, very rude operations against her. They --

Mrs. Burke. What did they do.

Mr. Nosenko. Huh?

Mrs. Burke. What did they do to her?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, they wanted to get rid of her from the Soviet Union. They didn't see possibility to recruit her. They didn't see any possibility to find or to create compromising situation. They didn't like her dispatches which they were anti-Soviet. Then they decided to get rid of her, and they made such an operation in restaurant where she had dinner in evening. They put drugs in her liquor, which she was drinking, wine or vodka or whatever it would be, and she was absolutely drunk. And she was delivered in local regional, one of the regional little -- it's not clinic, it is where they deliver drunks to spend night. And they put her there and made photo pictures of her being drunk and other women drunk laying there and published an article and put even a picture. And surely she was immediately recalled by her agency or her newspapers for which she was working.

Mrs. Burke. Do you think that is the wrong Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. Edgar. If the gentlewoman would yield, are you sure that you are talking about the same person?

Mr. Nosenko. Priscilla Johnson, yes, this correspondent, yes.

Mrs.Burke. Let me ask you one other question.

When she was there, did she interview Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. I know it is now reading here the books. I didn't know that she interviewed. I only found out it with living in the United States, with reading books.

Mrs. Burke. That she interviewed him. That didn't show in your file?

Mr. Nosenko. I didn't read her book -- this is what in some other books mentioned that she had interviewed him.

Mrs. Burke. Let me ask again about Oswald in Minsk, and first of all, can American tourists go to Minsk easily?

Mr. Nosenko. Minsk is open city, yes.

Mrs. Burke. It is an open city now. Was it an open city then?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. And when he was there, of course, I realize that you don't know and you did not keep up with what he was doing there, but in reading that file, in the first few pages or anything, did you notice anything in terms of his contacts with Americans, or did you notice anything at all that was extrardoinary about him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, there wasn't. For the whole his period of time there wasn't found any indication on suspicion, suspicious meetings or anything suspicion concerning his contacts with Americans.

Mrs. Burke. Let me -- As I understand it, it was fairly routine that everyone's phone would be tapped, so that that was not --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mrs. Burke. -- your information that that would be nothing unusual.

You know, there is one thing that is bothering me, and that is the inconsistency and the greater detail that is present today than in your earlier statements.

Could you give us an explanation of why there is more detail today?

For instance, in your earlier statements I noticed you refer to the interpreter as a tourist, the tourist guide, as just a tourist guide or an interpreter? Today you referred by name to that person. And again, the two psychiatrists --

Mr. Nosenko. I don't know even now name of this interpreter. I do not remember name.

Mrs. Burke. I see. I thought --

Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter, I never mentioned.

Mrs. Burke. You never mentioned the interpreter?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I do not remember her name.

Mrs. Burke. It was just this officer Rastrusin?

Mr. Nosenko. Officer, yes.

Mrs. Burke. He was -- but he was the one that found -- wasn't he the one that found Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. No, this is the officer who reported about him.

Mrs. Burke. He reported it, but he didn't find him?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, interpreter found him with administration of the hotel where Oswald was staying.

Mrs. Burke. Oh, I see.

Mr. Nosenko. You see, interpreter has come in the morning to take him or has come to take him to city, to show him, as interpreter on a guide, on a tour. And she was waiting about 20, 25, 30 minutes and was concerned.

The Chairman. Time is up. One more.

Mrs. Burke. All right, just one more question.

When Oswald arrived, then, he didn't speak very much Russian, is that right?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Ididn't hear that he spoke in Russian.

Mrs. Burke. I see. Were there any notations at all in the file -- what is your understanding of his fluency in Russian during the time of his stay?

Mr. Nosenko. Well, during time of his stay surely he started a little bit to talk, but it wasn't very, it wasn't good Russian. It wasn't even --

The Chairman. The time of the gentlewoman has expired.

Mrs. Burke. Thank you.

The Chairman. Mr. Dodd.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would like to just pick up on that line of questioning, if I could, with you, Mr. Nosenko.

Correct me if I am wrong, but as I understand it, Oswald, you were aware of Oswald's desire to defect. There was a decision, and in fact he was informed through his Intourist guide that his request had been rejected.

Is that correct so far?

Mr. Nosenko. Is in general, but it wasn't in this ways told to him. It was in so-called, you know, soft manner. It was explained to him by through Intourist --

Mr. Dodd. That he would have to go through his embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, that Intourist not dealing with this question. He must go through this, this, this procedures.

Mr. Dodd. Okay.

Now, you, at the time of this, of Oswald's request, you were working in the Seventh Department of the Second Directorate which was involved with tourism?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. Okay. Could you tell me what would be the normal operating procedures within the Soviet Union if a tourist were involved, say, in a car accident with an Intourist guide. Say a Frenchman was involved in a car accident. Assuming it was not his fault, someone hit him, what happens? Do they notify immediately the French Embassy, what steps do they take in order to deal with that individual?

Mr. Nosenko. I would assume, sir, that he will be, sure, he immediately will be taken in polyclinic, will be informed his embassy.

Mr. Dodd. Those kind of steps.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Dodd. If you had made a decision that Oswald should not be accepted in the Soviet Union, and if you find him in his room with his wrist slit, why don't you then contact the American Embassy and notify them that you have an American on your hands who just tried to kill himself?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, he wasn't an employee of American embassy.

Mr. Dodd. He was a tourist, though.

Mr.Nosenko. A tourist.

Mr. Dodd. And I just asked you about a Frenchman who might be a tourist and get in a car accident, and you said you would take him to the hospital, you would notify the embassy. Why don't you take Mr. Oswald to the hospital and notify the American embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. Nobody knew that he would cut wrist.

Mr. Dodd. No, but you found him with his wrist cut.

Mr. Nosenko. Right. He was delivered in hospital .

Mr. Dodd. Why didn't you notify the American embassy?

Mr. Nosenko. He wasn't dying, he wasn't serious, they made transfusion and put stitches. It is -- I am telling what I think why it was.

Mr. Dodd. You understand my problem here. You have got someone who you don't want to accept him. You have already made a decision that he shouldn't be allowed to defect. You walk into his room and find him with his wrist slit, it would seem to me that this guy has already indicated just by that act alone that he is not playing with a full deck of cards, and you decide then that you are going to accept him because you are worried that it might cause some embarrassment after Camp David.

Mr. Nosenko. No. But the question to inform the Embassy, it must be passing through such stage. Intourist itself cannot contact the American Embassy.

Mr. Dodd. No, obviously.

Mr. Nosenko. No. They must contact their Minister of Foreign Trade which in its turn putting question to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet

Union can contact the embassy.

Mr. Dodd. LEt me jump onto something else quickly in the time we've got.

You knew that Lee Harvey Oswald was a Marine?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Dodd. You knew by your answer to Mrs. Burke's question a minute ago that Oswald had a student's knowledge of Russian?

Mr. Nosenko. When he was living in Minsk, not before, before he has come. No.

Mr. Dodd. You didn't know that?

Mr. Nosenko. No, when he was living in Minsk, when he was in daily contact with Soviets working at the plant and having friends.

Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had been a student of Marxism?

Mr. Nosenko. No.

Mr. Dodd. Did you know that he had given the U.S. embassy his notice to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I know that he visited embassy and after was, he was told that he will be allowed to stay, after this.

Mr. Dodd. You were not aware at that time that he contacted through Intourist and eventually your office and made it known that he intended to defect or wanted to defect, you were not aware or your department was not aware that he had already notified the American embassy that he intended to defect?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, sir.

Mr. Dodd. You were not aware of that.

Mr. Nosenko. No. He wasn't under surveillance. We didn't know. When he was going alone without interpter, we didn't know.

Mr. Dodd. I didn't ask you how you know. I just asked you whether or not -- he didn't tell you that?

Mr. Nosenko. No. Nobody from KGB talked with him.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. When Congressman Devine asked you how you knew your family was okay or that they hadn't invoked any reprisals, I didn't get the answer.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I asked Mr. Solie in '69, '70, once I asked, anything about my family?

Mr. Sawyer. Mr. who?

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Bruce Solie, CIA officer who was in contact with me, '69, '70. He answered me that they are all right, everything okay. But he didn't went in any detail and I never returned more to this question. But there is another point, sir. Besides the father's position, after he died, she was receiving, she received pension, and besides that, for the years --

Mr. Sawyer. How did you know she died?

Mr. Nosenko. Father died, I said. Father died in 1956. After father's death she received a pension.

Mr. Sawyer. I understand. You went through that before. I noticed here though, when he slashed his wrist, the psychiatric examination report here by the doctor says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian, so he must have spoken Russian, you know, to whatever degree, when he went there. I thought you said you were always interested in someone who can speak Russian or has studied anything Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. Who specializes in any field of Russia, who will be working for the United States government.

Mr. Sawyer. But here is a guy at that time, when he first came there, within a matter of days after, the doctor says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir --

Mr. Sawyer. That would have keyed interest right there, wouldn't it?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, if we knew that he studied in Columbia University, in Yale University --

Mr. Sawyer. Well, it says right --

Mr. Nosenko. In Russian Institute.

Mr. Sawyer. It says on the report, this was on the 21st or the 23rd or 25th of October, a week after he arrived, it says the patient apparently understands the questions asked in Russian. So you knew he spoke Russian at that time. And yet that was one of your criteria.

Mr. Nosenko. Well, sir --

Mr. Sawyer. Something else I am a little curious about. Apparently, coming here, wanting to defect, wanting to leave America, wanting Russia, here is a guy that if he didn't know anything would be apparently capable of going back to the United States at the behest of KGB in areas of the country that Russian diplomats and so forth, KGB people weren't allowed to go and dig up information for them and come back. Here is a guy you didn't have to threaten, he volunteers. And it seems strange you wouldn't talk to him or be interested in him just from that point of view.

And how -- and another thing that greatly bothers me, how did you know that he, being in the Marines, you knew that, but how did you know he wasn't a cryptographer or how did you know he wasn't stationed in the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as a guard or as a messenger or a clerk, or that he worked with U-2s, which apparently he did. Why would the KGB not at least find these things out, with a guy that wants to go to Russia, wants to be a Russian?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I only can repeat you, when on him was received the first information about his arrival, checkup was made on him. There wasn't any existing material in KGB, any knowledge about him. He never was before in the Soviet Union.

In judging by the question --

Mr. Sawyer. Why weren't they asking, why wouldn't they ask, that's the question. Why wouldn't they ask?

Mr. Nosenko. They are not --

Mr. Sawyer. Apparently they knew he could speak Russian.

Mr. Nosenko. -- asking Americans approaching.

Judging by the questionnaire, they decided, the KGB decided, Seventh Department, he is not an interesting target.

Mr. Sawyer. Well, why would a person like this not even be interesting for something like the Tokyo Rose, on some kind of propaganda program where he could say how bad things were in the United States, and why he didn't want to stay there anymore and how great they were in Russia, like these propagandists do?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I am telling you why it was decided, and how KGB was thinking about him.

Mr. Sawyer. I yield back the balance of my time.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian.

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Chairman, I just now got this report. I wonder if I could let Mr.Edgar go ahead of me?

The Chairman. The Chair will recognize Mr. Edgar.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a series of questions which I hope most of which will be yes and no kinds of questions.

Did you conduct in the KGB a program to compromise and recruit journalists?

Mr. Nosenko. I was working, when I started to work in the KGB in 1953, the first year I was working against American correspondents.

Mr. Edgar. But the KGB, not you personally, but the KGB did have a policy of going against journalists and trying to compromise them, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Trying to recruit or compromise them.

Mr. Edgar. Did they censor all the journalists' notes that they could gather from the journalists? Did they censor the notes before they allowed the story to go out?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. Priscilla Johnson interviewed Oswald on the 15th of November, 1959. Would the KGB have looked at her notes from that interview?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, they are censored not by the KGB, but there is special -- it is government organization was censoring this. Some materials are coming to the KGB, some are not coming.

Mr. Edgar. Well, she reveals in her article that he was a Marxist, that Oswald was a Marxist and a Marine Corps radar man. It would seem to me the KGB would have discovered that in November of 1959.

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I didn't know this in those days.

Mr. Edgar. Do you know a correspondent by the name of Arlene Mosby?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, I heard such a name, Mosby, a woman who was a correspondent.

Mr. Edgar. In the earlier questioning of Congresswoman Burke, you were not confusing Arlene Mosby with the treatment of Priscilla Johnson?

Mr. Nosenko. I think it was Priscilla Johnson, the case which I described, I think so. I think so, it was Priscilla Johnson.

Mr. Edgar. How do you know?

Mr. Nosenko. What I heard from colleagues who were in KGB, who were working against correspondents.

Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely clear?

Mr. Nosenko. And then there was an article in --

Mr. Edgar. You are not absolutely --

Mr. Nosenko. In literary newspaper, I think it was, not in Pravad, Izvestia, but in Literary Gazette.

Mr. Edgar. But you are not absolutely certain?

Mr. Nosenko. No. I think it was Priscilla JOhnson, as I said.

Mr. Edgar. But it could have been someone else.

Mr. Nosenko. An American correspondent, woman.

Mr. Edgar. Are you certain that after 1967 you sat down with the CIA and corrected your earlier statements about Oswald, yes or no?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

Mr. Edgar. We have only a few pages of written testimony, some three pages that you gave, and in fact, in the beginning part of that testimony, you indicate that you don't want to go through it again because your earlier testimony will stand for itself. I am paraphrasing what you said.

Were the notes and the recordsings of those corrections made and kept by the CIA?

Mr. NOsenko. Sir, Mr. Bruce Solie talking with me every day for a period from the end of '67, the whole '68, 1968, '69, every conversation he was recording. But he never has come and showed his notes, transcriptions or anything. He was returning to every case, to every aspect by 20, 25, 30 times.

Mr. Edgar. But specifically on the Oswald case, would it be correct in our assuming that it was more than three pages of notes on specifically Lee Harvey Oswald after 1967?

Mr. Nosenko. If he was raising questions concerning also Lee Harvey Oswald.

MR. Edgar. We have some information that Bruce Solie --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, Mr. Solie.

Mr. Edgar. Stated in a deposition that there is nothing on Oswald other than the three pages.

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot say how many pages. I know that he was passing through all cases, all questions, with me for the period almost two years.

Mr. Edgar. Who other than Bruce Solie did you talk to about correcting your earlier statements?

Mr. Nosenko. I wasn't correcting them. They were correcting; they were talking returning back to every case.

Mr. Edgar. One final question.

Mr. Nosenko. And also besides Mr. Solie, were people coming from FBI with cases in which were interested for them.

Mr. Edgar. One final question. You stopped our hearing about an hour ago and were concerned about our playing the tape and bringing up old memories, and I respect the fact that you are very patriotic in coming before this Committee and helping us.

Would you be willing to sit down with our staff and go through a series of written questions which outline specifically for you the contradictions of your 1964, '65, '66 and early '67 timeframe, with the statements that you made in '67, '68 and '78, and indicate in a yes-no manner which statement, laid side by side, is true and which statement is false?

Mr. Nosenko. If it is the wish of the Committee, sure.

Mr. Edgar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

Mr. Fithian?

Mr. Fithian. Mr. Nosenko, do you remember when it was that the FBI first interviewed you concerning Oswald?

Mr. Nosenko. Sir, I do not remember dates, but --

Mr. Fithian. It was between February and April?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, right.

Mr. Fithian. The information we have is that it was early March, the first week in March. Is that about right?

Now, have you talked to the FBI about that testimony at any time since then?

Mr. Nosenko. Gentlemen, on many, many times I have seen FBI, many, many questions raised. I cannot -- about this testimony, no, no.

Mr. Fithian. About the Oswald testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. About Oswald were asked questions, but not about this testimony . I do not remember about this testimony.

Mr. Fithian. My question is, there is a written transcript summary of your testimony to the FBI taken on March 5th, 1964.

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. My question is, have you at any time since then visisted with the FBI about this testimony?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, no, sir.

Mr. Fithian. Now, next, when -- what is your understanding as to when Oswald first offered to defect, when you first knew, when the KGB first knew he was interested in defecting?

Mr. Nosenko. I cannot give you a date.

Mr. Fithian. All right.

Well, he filled out an application --

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no application, in oral form. He told the interpreter in oral form.

Mr. Fithian. This was the Intourist?

Mr. Nosenko. Interpreter of the Intourist.

Mr. Fithian. And then the Intourist came to the KGB?

Mr. Nosenko. Right, and it immediately was informed to KGB that this American applies, wants to stay, said to interpreter.

Mr. Fithian. And then you reviewed the file?

Mr. Nosenko. It was several pieces of pages what we had on him. It wasn't even file.

Mr. Fithian. But you reviewed whatever applications --

Mr. Nosenko. Right. No it wasn't application to stay. He in oral form told the interpreter that he wants to stay Soviet Union.

Mr. Fithian. You reviewed the pages that he had filled out for the visa and any other sheets that you had?

Mr. Nosenko. He didn't -- yes, these documents, yes, for the visa, questionnaire and --

Mr. Fithian. Yes. What I am trying to get at is what did you have in front of you physically, knowledgeably about Oswald?

Mr. NOsenko. What I remember, it was it was several pages only, was questionnaire, was form of document from Intourist received how long his tour and how many days. There was checks of Oswald in archives of KGB to forms. There was information from Intourist who work with Oswald and --

Mr. Fithian. All right. Let me just stop you here.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes.

Mr. Fithian. The forms in there by the KGB were filled out based on what information?

Mr. Nosenko. On his name, what he supplied, who he is, when he was asking visa.

Mr. Fithian. But they conducted no check, no search?

Mr. Nosenko. It is in the archives of KGB, if he ever was in Soviet Union, on him there will be something. If he wasn't in Soviet Union but he was known to intelligence service --

Mr. Fithian. But you didn't have any record on that.

Mr. Nosenko. Nothing.

Mr. Fithian. And so the final question is that the only thing that you had to judge -that he was an uninteresting subject was what he had told the Intourist guide?

Mr. Nosenko. Right.

Mr. Fithian. That is the only substantive thing?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir, and his questionnaire for who he is, his name, whatever he filled about himself. That's all.

The Chairman. The time of the gentleman has expired.

The Chair has one additional request from one member, for one additional question.

Mr. Sawyer?

Mr. Sawyer. I just have one additional question, and that is the $80,000 you got for compensation and the $15,000 or $20,000 you got later, that was net money after whatever taxes or whatever it was --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, after all taxes were taken.

Mr. Sawyer. Thank you.

Mr. Dodd. Mr. Chairman?

The Chairman. Mr. Dodd?

Mr. Dodd. I just wondered for the record, I wondered if, Mr. Nosenko, you could tell us when you arrived in this country on February 12th, 1964, between February 12th, 1964 and April 4th, 1964, where were you in this country?

Mr. Nosenko. February 12 of 1964 and April 4th, I was staying in house in Virginia. I do not know address.

Mr. Dodd. Did you go -- did you travel at all?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir.

Mr. Dodd. No vacation?

Mr. Nosenko. Oh, I went in March on week to Hawaii I was.

Mr. Dodd. Were you on your own?

Mr. Nosenko. No, no, no, with guards.

Mr. Dodd. It was a relaxed period for you and just a chance to rest?

Mr. Nosenko. Chance to get a little bit rest.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that this is the normal way that defectors are treated when they come to this country?

Mr. Nosenko. I do not know.

Mr. Dodd. Just one last point, Mr. Chairman, and that is with regard to the American exhibit, as a result of a statement by Mr. Klein which I understand you did not disagree with, the American exhibit ended on Sepgember 4th, 1959? That's when the termination of the exhibit was?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, he showed me an article.

Mr. Dodd. Is it your knowledge that employees that worked during the exhibit stayed on for a period of time after that?

Mr. Nosenko. Sure, to it will be disassembled, this is the whole process is going on. It is closed for visitors to visit, to look.

Mr. Dodd. How long a period would that have been, a week?

Mr. Nosenko. No, more.

Mr. Dodd. More?

Mr. Nosenko. More, sure.

Mr. Dodd. Thank you, Mr.Chairman.

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, with reference to your earlier comments this evening regarding what transpired during your period of isolation, which you described as extreme spartan conditions, I would like to make this request of you. I think the record ought to in a very graphic way portray those conditions under which you were subjected during that period of time, and while you are complying with Mr. Edgar's request and working with the staff in terms of the contradictory data, would you also agree to work with the staff in terms of seeing that the record has a complete and accurate description --

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. --of all the conditions which you underwent during that period?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you.

Did you have some?

Mr. Cornwell. Following up on the question that Congressman Dodd just asked you, the staff, in an attempt to determine how long it took to disassemble the exhibition, checked with a knowledgeable employee who was involved in that process in the State Department and were informed by that person that the exhibition was disassembled and the persons who were operating it had left by October the 4th, approximately 30 days after the exhibition was terminated.

Would you disagree with that information?

Mr. Nosenko. No, sir, I cannot disagree. I do not remember. I do not know, even, when they left, no, sir.

Mr. Cornwell. That is all I have.

The Chairman. Anything further from the Committee?

Now, Mr. Devine, do you have anything?

Mr. Devine. No. He is under continuing subpoena.

The Chairman. Under the rules of the Committee, Mr. Nosenko, any witness appearing before our Committee is entitled at the conclusion of his testimony to address the Committee for a period of five minutes for the purpose of clarifying anything for the record or making any statement he so desires, and I want to at this time afford you that five minute period to make such a statement, if you so desire.

Mr. Nosenko. Mr. Chairman, ladies and gentlemen, I consider my appearance, invitation to appear at Committee, as I told also the same applies before, my meetings with the staff of the Committee, I consider it honor, great honor for me. I will try to answer whatever I remember, whatever I know as only truth, and but the truth. And you would like to see me appear at any time, I am at your disposal and I will try to give you the only things what I know.

The Chairman. Thank you.

That is the completion of your statement, sir?

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Mr. Nosenko, on behalf of the Committee and the United States Congress, I want to express our appreciation to you for having appeared here and having given this Committee the benefit of your testimony. At this time I would remind you of the terms of your agreement to work with our staff and provide further information to the Committee, that you will continue under the oath administered to you by this Committee.

Mr. Nosenko. Yes, sir.

The Chairman. Thank you very much for your appearance here.

Mr. Nosenko. Thank you, sir.

The Chairman. You are excused.

At this time, there being no further business to come before the Committee, the meeting is adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

(Whereupon, at 10:17 o'clock p.m., the Committee was adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.)

- - -

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/19/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10131-10325
RECORD SERIES :	SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	014725

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH
TO :	
TITLE :	DEPOSITION OF BERNARD HUGH TOVAR
DATE :	06/29/1978
PAGES :	48
SUBJECTS :	CIA, METHODOLOGY TOVAR, BERNARD HUGH, TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OSWALD, LEE, RUSSIAN PERIOD, DEFECTION TO RUSSIA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION :	Top Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/26/1997
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 5

CONTENTS

TESTIMONY OF:	PAGE
Bernard Hugh Tovar	2

ASSASSINATION OF JOHN F. KENNEDY

- - -

Thursday, June 29, 1978

- - -

U. S. House of Representatives,
John F. Kennedy Subcommittee of
Select Committee on Assassinations,
Washington, D. C.

Deposition of:

BERNARD HUGH TOVAR

called for examination by staff counsel for the subcommittee, pursuant to notice, in the offices of House Annex II, Room 3370, Second and D Streets, Southwest, Washington, D. C., beginning at 2:00 o'clock p.m., before Albert Joseph LaFrance, a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia, when were present on behalf of the respective parties:

For the Subcommittee:

MICHAEL GOLDSMITH, ESQ. Staff Counsel

ELIZABETH WOLF

For the Deponent:

(There was-representation by counsel)

TESTIMONY OF HUGH TOVAR

Mr. Goldsmith. State your name for the record.

Mr. Tovar. I sign my name B. Hugh. My full name is Bernard Hugh Tovar.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, my name is Michael Goldsmith, Senator Staff Counsel of the Select Committee on Assassinations. I have been designated by the Committee to take your deposition today. You are here voluntarily today?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. You have the right to have counsel present. Do you waive that right?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you read a copy of the Committee's supporting resolution?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to read Rule Number 4?

Mr. Tovar. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Committee rules provide for the transcript of a deposition to be made available to a witness and actually be delivered for retention by any witness that gives the Committee a statement. However, by virtue of the arrangement that the Committee has worked out with the CIA, the Agency has asked us to request Agency employees testifying before us to waive the right actually to receive a copy of the transcript.

The reason for that is because the transcript frequently will contain classified information and the Agency prefers for that information to be kept in our secure area here. So I would like to ask you to waive your right to receive a copy of your statement but in so doing, I want to assure you that you will be given a right to review the transcript for accuracy, o make comment upon it and if necessary, to give an additional statement.

Mr. Tovar. I agree.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to inform you that the court reporter will provide you with a transcript and the transcript will be certified by the reporter as a complete, accurate and true record of all the testimony that you give here today.

Now, you are employed by the CIA, is that correct?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I had given you earlier a copy of a letter dated 23 March 1978 from Mr. Carlucci to the Chairman of this Committee. Have you had a chance to read that letter?

Mr. Tovar. I have.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it?

Mr. Tovar. I understand it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Then I think we are ready to proceed to the substance of the questioning. What is your present position with the CIA?

Mr. Tovar. I am the Chief of the Counterintelligence

Staff of the Directorate of Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working in that capacity?

Mr. Tovar. Ever since a year ago April.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working with the Agency?

Mr. Tovar. Thirty years.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was your assignement prior to becoming Chief of the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. I was recently returned from overseas where I was Station Chief in Bangkok and three years before that, Chief of the Station in Laos.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to assuming your position as Chief of the CI Staff had you had extensive experience in the area of counterintelligence?

Mr. Tovar. No, not particularly. We don't as a rule specialize. We are normally generalists. I do not consider myself a counterintelligence expert.

Mr. Goldsmith. During the years 1959 to '63 what position did you occupy with the Agency?

Mr. Tovar. In 1959 I was Chief of Station in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia.

In 1920, I came back and I was originally Deputy Chief and then Chief of the Branch in Far East Division which controls operations in the Phillipines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Australia, New Zealand, and Oceania. That was until 1964.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you had a chance to review CIA document number 1817 and the pages that follow it?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, I have read these. I had not read these. They were released by one of my subordinates, Mr. Friedlander.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you telling us that today is the first chance you had to read them?

Mr. Tovar. I did not read them this time. They went to you, to the Committee but I have since read them.

Mr. Goldsmith. They were prepared by whom?

Mr. Tovar. Jack Friedlander, Chief of Operations. They were signed by him, not prepared by him. They would have been originated probably by Mr. Kowalski or Mr. Bradley, I am not sure which. I think Kowalski almost certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. The memorandum which is labeled CIA No. 1817 was a response by the Agency to an inquiry by the Committee as to whether it was standard operating procedure for the Agency to debrief what in effect were repatriated defectors. I believe it is fair to say by way of summary that the memo says that it was not in fact standard operating procedure during the years 1959 to '63 to debrief such individuals. Is that correct?

Mr. Tovar. Insofar as I understand it. My knowledge is limited to what I see here before me in the paper. During this period in question I was not involved, so I didn't know what the current policy was then.

What I have been told since by those who should know is that there was no policy as set forth here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the criteria were for selecting the 117 individuals whose files were reviewed?

Mr. Tovar. No. I think someone mentioned the other day that the names were incorporated in a memorandum I think origionally by the FBI but I would not certify to that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tovar, since you have no direct knowledge as to the manner in which this memo was prepared and, for example, you don't know the criteria that was used for choosing these 117 people, I am not going to ask you questions pertaining to that document. I would like to request that you communicate with the Office of Legislative Counsel at the Agency and tell them the individual who was involved in the actual direct preparation of the document so that I could spend some time with him.

Mr. Tovar. The document, of course, is over my signature, so I stand behind the document. I am responsible for what was said there. If it is incorrect then I am incorrect in leeting that document out. I have no personal first hand knowledge of the research he did to arrive at the conclusion here which he presented to me and I endorsed. I am prepared to stand behind it but I will give you his name.

Mr. Goldsmith. I want to ask you some questions about the document. CIA no. 1818 indicates that CI Staff has completed a review of the files of 117 US persons who had "defected" to the USSR between 1959 and '63 and since returned to the United States. Is that correct? '58 to '63?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to review the statement under the name Thomas Morridian M-O-R-R-I-D-I-A-N. While you read that paragraph, I will state for the record thst the way the memo is set forth it indicates that it was not standard operating procedure to debrief such individuals, that of 117 people whose files were reviewed only ten were debriefed. Then it proceeds to list the ten individuals who in fact were debriefed.

I have now requested Mr. Tovar to read the first summary which is right next to the name of the first person who was debriefed.

Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did that individual defect?

Mr. Tovar. 1947 is the year he went to the USSR. I assume that is the year he defected, if that is the term.

Mr. Goldsmith. So that in fact that individual was not someone who defected between 1958 and 1963?

Mr. Tovar. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us look at the next individual under B, Joseph Marshall.

Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did Mr. Marshall defect?

Mr. Tovar. It is not clear. He was born in the US in 1897. He said he was employed in Hawaii in 1921. There is no indication whence he went to the USSR.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no indication he defected between '58 and '63?

Mr. Tovar. No. He was arrested by the Soviets in 1945. Conceivably he might have defected after that.

Mr. Goldsmith. The letter "C", Tommaro S-G-O-V-I-O. Would you please read that section and tell us when this individual defected?

Mr. Tovar. Again, he went to the USSR with his parents in the 1930s. No indication when he defected. He left the USSR in 1960. No way of telling.

Mr. Goldsmith. This individual did not defect between '58 and '63?

Mr. Tovar. At last we have no indication he did. One would assume to the contrary.

Mr. Goldsmith. Letter "D", Mary Mackler, will you please read the first summary and tell us when she defected?

Mr. Tovar. There is no indication when she defected. She went to the USSR with her parents in 1931. Sometime after, married a Soviet.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, no indication she defected between

'58 and '63?

Mr. Tovar. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you look at letter "E". Sonia and Fred A-S-I-N-I-A-N. When did they defect?

Mr. Tovar. They renounced their US citizenship in 1948. So I assume that is the operative year.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will you look at the letter "F" now?

Mr. Tovar. Jack Kuralski.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did he defect?

Mr. Tovar. He recounced his US citizenship in '34 and departed USSR I assume in 1934.

Mr. Goldsmith. The point I am trying to make is that the memo responding to the Committee's inquiry makes reference to ten individuals who defected between the years '58 and '63. It then proceed to provide us with ten names. But in fact, if we continue to look through the list we will see that seven of the ten individuals did not defect during that time period. Some of them did return during that time period.

Mr. Tovar. And were debriefed.

Mr. Goldsmith. And were debriefed.

Mr. Tovar. Contacted.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of the ten, perhaps three or four returned during the relevant time period. I asked those questions mainly to draw your attention to the fact that the response given was not really --

Mr. Tovar. -- precisely what you wanted?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. I don't know the answer to that. I would assume that the criteria they applied here as best they could was when did he defect, when did he return, was he debriefed or contacted? In some cases they hit one out of three, in other cases two out of three. I think they were giving the best correlation with your criteria that they could.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. My point might be then that the introductory section should not have stated that these were people in 1958 and '63 when in fact they were not.

Mr. Tovar. You are right. That is an incorrect statement. Is your requesting memo here? That is not a very good statement.

Mr. Goldsmith. Here is the letter dated April 6, 1978 which I show you just for your information to show you what the Committee was requesting from the Agency. If you will look under number two.

Mr. Tovar. Then this would appear to correlate with that. You asked to indicate whether the AGency from '58 to '63 interviewed or debriefed former American defectors. So, the time they defected is not the operative consideration.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, it was not.

Mr. Tovar. The time of the debriefing --

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, that would be the focus.

Mr. Tovar. So these would be at least consistent with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, that is true. I would like also for purposes of further clarification, to have you read the letter dated May 12, 1978 starting with the second full paragraph. It is not numbered.

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. I show you that only for your background purposes, not to ask you any questions about it. In any event, I would appreciate having the name of the individual who prepared the memo passed along to the Office of the Legislative Counsel.

Mr. Tovar. Yes sir.

Mr. Goldsmith. The response that was provided to the Committee indicates that the CIA had no standard precedure for debriefing returning US defectors. What was the basis for that policy or actually for the absence of the policy?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate only -- not having been there and not having any involvement -- I don't know what mentality of those in charge was at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would your specilation be?

Mr. Tovar. I would speculate that the contact with and debriefing, in effect the supervision of Americans in that category would be FBI's prerogative and the Agency as a rule would not have had any basic interest or reason to be involved unless there were a specific counterintelligence concern.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the Agency today have a policy of, as a matter of routine operating procedure, debriefing returning defectors?

Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again would you say you relied on the FBI to conduct those interviews?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is there any coordination between the Agency and the FBI so that the Bureau is informed when someone in fact is returning?

Mr. Tovar. On American defectors, the type you are speaking of here?

Mr. Goldsmith. An American defector who is repatriated.

Mr. Tovar. I know of no case where they would be interested in the subject. I can't say there is a procedure in being. Knowing the way we relate to the FBI, if we knew of a case of returning Americans, Say we learned it from an overseas station and it seemed of interest, we would probably refer it directly to the FBI by letter.

I am speculating here because I know of no case in point.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard procedure for contactingthe Bureau and informing them of a returning defector?

Mr. Tovar. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would be the person who would be aware of such a procedure?

Mr. Tovar. Berween the Soviet-East European Division and CI Staff we should be aware of it. The two were most primarily concerned with the USSR. I think one or the other of us would inform the Bureau. This is not our primary concern. The Americans, even when they have been naughty boys, having gone to USSR and decided to return, we still don't have necessarily a professional interest in that type of person.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the responsibility of the CI Staff within the CIA?

Mr. Tovar. In a couple of sentences it is a little difficult. I will tell you what we do. The CI Staff has two principal areas of activity. We are first of all a staff. Are you familiar with the staff as opposed to the division?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, I am not.

Mr. Tovar. You have seen the table of organization of DDO?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. You know generally how we are organized?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. The main set of components of the Directorate is divisions and staffs. The divisions operate a function overseas. We are staff and that is in the military sense we support the Directorat and we support the Director, we suppor one another in an advisory capacity and in various ways. So, we are not an operating component. We don't run spies. We have a lot of activities which impact on operations but we are not in the true sense of the term an operating element.

So, having said that, the primary field of activity for the CI Staff is research and analysis, and then the other, what we refer to as operations coordination. Now, that is sort of the term which does not -- research and analysis is clear. We examine and analyze cases, essentially cases. We are not scrutinizing people. We are looking at intelligence operations, old and current, primarily things that are not terribly current. We don't tend to follow current operations in the analytic sense. We take old cases and look them over to see if mistakes were made, to see if we can derive lesssons from mistakes made in the past. We publish papers for the Agency's community at large, all in the R&A field.

On the other side we function in the sense of a true staff. We keep our fingers on the activity of the Directorate overseas. We monitor what they are doing, not in the sense of being spooky but we simply read the correspondence. We are given normal distribution of most correspondence coming back from overseas. We keep a hand on the pulse of counterintelligence activities abroad.

To do this, we obviously have to have reasonable currency on operational activity across the board. So, we are generally aware of the operational patterns of activity that prevail in various overseas stations. On that basis we are in a position to advise the DDO or Directorate as to the level of performance, the kind of activity conducted, the quality, the proper or improper degree of emphasis. We maintain an overview on behalf of DDO.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is your concentration oriented towards counterintelligence threats of a foreign nature?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, totally.

Mr. Goldsmith. You would not be concerned at all with counterintelligence threats domestically?

Mr. Tovar. None whatsoever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it correct to say that would be the responsibility of the Bureau?

Mr. Tovar. Absolutely.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, Lee Harvey Oswald returned from the Soviet Union in 1962. While in the Sovietion Union he worked as a worker in a radio factory. Upon his return I imagine there was someone concerned about his being a counterintelligence threat. Is it fair to say, and I do not want to ask you leading questions but would it be fair to say that would be more the responsibility of the Bureau rather than the Agency upon his actual return?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, the question whether or not he was, let us say, a counterintelligence threat.

Mr. Goldsmith. KGB agent?

Mr. Tovar. That would be a Bureau concern, no question about that.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, would the Agency make any effort to interview Osald while Oswald was entroute from the Soviet Union to the United States?

Mr. Tovar. You are speaking of what the Agency might have done in '63 or '62?

Mr. Goldsmith. '62.

Mr. Tovar. Again, we are speculating concerning the intelligence of the men who were in charge then. Today I would like to think we would be interested in what he is doing. At the time I don't know. I would think, why not. On the other hand, I couldn't say they would or should be interested. It was not their primary precise prerogative. I think if they could, as I assume they did, the Bureau would discharge its responsibilities vis-a-vis any American of questionable propensity, I should think they would be deferring to the Bureau.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would be the aspect of Oswald where there was a concern taht he posed a counterintelligence threat. What about the fact that Oswald may have had positive intelligence information that would have been helpful to the Agency? That would not be within the jurisdiction of the Bureau?

Mr. Tovar. I think in that context it might have been appropriate for the Agency, if the assumed the point you made, to seek an interview with him. I think the appropriate vehicle for that would have been the Domestic Contact Division which I think handled most of the contacts referred to in this memorandum.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the function of the Domestic Contact Division?

Mr. Tovar. They are responsible for intelligence that can be checked properly and legally in the United States normally through American businessmen or American persons and nonofficials who travel abroad and acquire intelligence of interest. This is not just USSR. It could be any other country. Their primary field of activity is to contact and debrief on a vluntary basis, if they so choose to respond, Americans who return from overseas.

Mr. Goldsmith. I notice that the Committee's inquiry concerning the CI's policy as to returning American defectors was routed to your staff, CI Staff. When the memo was prepared by the CI Staff for the Committee, was it done with the thought of representing the entire agency or just the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. It is difficult for us to presume to speak for the entire Agency. I think on this matter we are speaking for the Directorate of Operations, not for the entire Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. That is really the area with which I was concerned anyway, Directorate of Operations.

Mr. Tovar. The only other element of the Directorate of Operations that would be of an interest in this type of thing, which might be construed as having an interest in this type of activity, would be the SC Division. On this I think the CI staff could be considered as speaking for the Directorate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Domestic Contact Division part of the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. No, part of the Directorate of Operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. The response of the Agency dated April 20, 1978, which appears in CIA Number 1818, indicates that contact seems to be based on opportunity and circumstance. Then it goes on to say only ten of the 117 persons have had any contact with CIA. Would it be possible for you to go into more dtail on what is meant by opportunity and circumstance?

Mr. Tovar. In the asecne of a policy, of a guideline, a procedure, internal instruction which says you will debrief Americans who return from having resided in the USSR, in the absence of that, this thing is left to chance obviously. I cannot explain to you how the names of these 11 passed the desk of whoever was in charge at the time, but assuming they did, my guess, and it is really only a guess, would be that the person who read that, whatever document it was, would say, "Hmmph! He looks like he might be interesting", and perhaps would then get in contact with CCD and suggest if they get in contact with a person, let us say he is known to be living in New York, suggest that they might want to seek out his location and if possible interview him.

I think it would be a matter of chance in the sense that the analyst or whoever it was who reviewed that document, might react, and yet he or she might not, too, depending on how they woke up that morning. It is sheer whimsy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let me explain to you why the question whether or not it was standard operating procedure to debrief returning defectors is important to the Committee. Since the assassination of the President, there has arisen a group of researchers who have reviewed the Warren Commission Report and have reviewed releases made under the Freedom of Information Act by the CIA and the FBI.

Having reviewed these materials the argument has been made that Oswald received unusual treatment at the hands of the CIA. One example of this unusual treatment is that there is no record of Oswald having been debriefed by the CIA upon his return. For that reason, we are focusing on this issue. Is there any way you can give us guidance on how to respond to that question?

Mr. Tovar. I can't becuase I am sphculating every step along the way. I would hesitate to say more than Oswald simply didn't connect with whoever happened to be looking -- let us assume his name appeared. Was his namde in the list?

Mr. Goldsmith. No. That is the list of people who were debriefed.

Mr. Tovar. One hundred seventeen?

Mr. Goldsmith. I haven't seen the list of 117 people.

Mr. Tovar. What is this?

Mr. Goldsmith. That is a list of 350 odd people I was going to ask you about. However, since you don't have knowledge of the 117, I am not going to ask you about them.

Mr. Tovar. If Oswald's name was on the list, I can't explain why he might not have been contacted. Maybe he didn't appear attractive or interesting enough. I don't know what information might have been given with these names on the list, such as a memo from the FBI or State Department, whoever had originated it, what they said that would have titilated the analyst who might have seen it that would have elicited a response on the part of the analyst who would say "Ah, let us look into this further."

Mr. Goldsmith. In particular, a lot of focus has been given to Mr. Robert Edward Webster, who appears in CIA Number 1820 who defected approximately the same time that Oswald did and returned at approximately the same time that Oswald did and who was debried by the CIA for two weeks in Virginia.

Mr. Tovar. I didn't know that he was. It doesn't say so here.

Mr. Goldsmith. That does not indicate the extend of the debriefing. That information was obtained independently by this Committee.

Mr. Tovar. The name means nothing to me so I can't enlighten you on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the CIA have any affiliation with organizations in the United States who might be responsible for debriefing someone?

Mr. Tovar. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, if anyone is going to be debriefed it would be by the Domestic Contact Division?

Mr. Tovar. In the intelligence sense. In the sense of elucidation of intelligence, DCD would do it. A different type of inquiry, personal investigation, the Office of Security, or whoever it works through, would be the one.

The one we are talking about, DCD is the only organization I know of. I can visualize a circumstance under which operating components might seek out an individual or might have in times past but I can't think of a case in point in my own recollection. I would say, given the strictures on our operating in the United States, we would rely upon DCD to do it if they had any positive intelligence connotation. If it were of an operational nature today, the Foreign Resources Division might pursue it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. It is the division level of the Directorate. It is the division which seeks in the United States to develop potential intelligence assets for abroad. I think I had better defer to the other people on that. That is roughly where it stands. They certainly would not have interest in debriefing defectors that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. In any event, for the purposes of summary, there is today no standard operating procedure of interviewing returning defectors?

Mr. Tovar. Right, insofar as I am aware, there is none.

Mr. Goldsmith. There is no standard operating procedure between the Bureau and the CIA which would coordinate any effort to contact returning defectors and share information?

Mr. Tovar. None that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning to another area which I would like to get into briefly, would you define what a 201 file is?

Mr. Tovar. A 201 file is a file or files -- it could be several volumes to it -- which relates to an individual. It might pose a dicotomy, a 201 file and project file. A project file might deal with an activity, say collection operations in Timbucktu, a broad scale of activity involving several numbers of people, there might be several 201 files, A, B, C, who were associates in that project The 201 file would be on the individual himself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Ti would contain primarily biographic information?

Mr. Tovar. No. It would contain a much vaster -- some of them might contain one sheet of paper with name, rank and date of birth. But if the association with him developed and became more extensive, it might contain a considerable amount of information. If he became involved with this operation it might include operational material, intelligence operations as well, all part of the 201 complex.

The point I am making is that it is an individual file as opposed to an activity file.

Mr. Goldsmith. If you wanted to learn about the operations that an individual was involved in, would you go to his 201 file or to his operations file?

Mr. Tovar. I would go to the 201 file first. There might not be an operations file. In fact, in the vast majority of the 201 cases there are no operational files because there is no hard and fast rule on when you open a 201 file or who opens a 201 file.

If I, for example, am overseas and I become interested in a person who looks to me to have considerable promise from the operational standpoint, say a local foreign type, I might give my own local checks, I might examine my own files to see if I know anything about him. Then I say to headquarters "here is Joe Doe. He is interesting to me for these reasons. Will you please check against headquarters records and other agencies and let me know if you have anything of interest on him."

I might not ask for a 201 file. Headquarters might then, because they thought he was interesting, open a 201 file. Conversely, I might likewise say this looks terribly interesting Please open a 201 file and give me all of the information you can collect on him."

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that the fact that someone has a 201 file does not mean at all that the individual was involved in any operations of the Agency. If you wanted to get information of an operational nature, would you go both to the 201 file and operations file?

Mr. Tovar. Assuming there was information of an operational nsture?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed we would.

Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of the CIA -- I am not referring now to case officers or staff agents -- someone is a field agent for the Agency, would that fact be indicated in the 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the Directorate of Operations someone might open up a 201 file on an individual if the person was of a potential positive intelligence significance?

Mr. Tovar. Or counterintelligence, either one.

Mr. Goldsmith. That was going to be my question. The CI Staff in particular, when would you have occasion to open a 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. CI staff would not necessarily be the only one to open a 201 file. In the case of a person of CI interest, a field station might have a counter-person I described earlier and become interested in him because he did have some CI attraction or interest. The station itself or the division would open the 201 file. It would not be us. The CI Staff as a rule is not involved in that type of thing.

At this stage of the game since we are not operating and we are not out soliciting new contacts, we are not working in that sense of the term, we don't to my knowledge originate 201 files.

Mr. Goldsmith. The CI Staff does not open up 201 files?

Mr. Tovar. There is no reason that we couldn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a pratical matter?

Mr. Tovar. As practical matter it does not work that way. Our research is primarily focused upon established cases, cases that may even be dead, terminated, or dormant, or even current in certain cases, but as a rule not very many. 201 file is opened by someone else. We may examine those files and review them. We do review other activities. But the 201 file would be in existence. They whould not be created by ourselves.

In former days when CI Staff files were segregated from therest of the Directorate it might have been different. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was that?

Mr. Tovar. Say prior to 1974, 1957. Today our foles are integrated in the files of the Directorate or it is in the process of being integrated. We have been working on this. This is one of our major final exercises in the past two or three years to make sure, when you go to the central files and research a name, if there is something in the CI Staff repository that will turn up when you are making a check of the index.

Mr. Goldsmith. Will most 201 files be open as a result of information coming into headquarters from the field, one of the field stations?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, the vast majority. In years before when they has such programs as MH Chaos, I assumed they opened 201 files of their own.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is that?

Mr. Tovar. MH Chaos program?

Mr. Goldsmith. For the record, will you indicate what that program is?

Mr. Tovar. I frankly would rather not becuase I don't know the precise definition of the program. It was a program which has been described in the press as domestic surveillance. Whether that is the correct proper designation, I don't know. Our CI Staff does not normally open a 201 file. We don't have occasion to.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the term CI/SIG stands for?

Mr. Tovar. Counter Intelligence/Special Investigative

Group, I think it is. Investigative or investigations, I don't know which.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that group still in existence today?

Mr. Tovar. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did it go out of existence?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know exactly. Before my time. I think it ended in '73, '74, '75. I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the function of that group was?

Mr. Tovar. Only in a very vague sort of way. I have heard about it, it was the investigative group in the CI Staff that investigated whatever the CI Staff did in those days. I can't speak to that with any first hand knowledge. I know some things they did but I would be hesitant to make a general definition of their function.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the function of that group was to investigate Agency employees who were suspected of having been penetrated?

Mr. Tovar. I think, because I have seen nothing in writing on the subject, but I have been given to understand that was one of their functions in the context of their responsibilities that was included. But I am no authority on the subject.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether CI/SIG would have occasion to open a 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know. I can speculate. I don't know.

Mr. Goldsmith. What would your speculation be?

Mr. Tovar. I would speculate in the days when they were functioning they probably did. You have a very unauthoriative witness on that subject.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the relationship if any between the Office of Security and the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. We have basically different functions. The Office of Security is under the Directorate of Administration and is responsible for the personnel and physical security of the entire division. It focuses on personnel security and physical security.

The CI staff as I described it, is an element of DDO concerned with research and analysis and operation and coordination. The relation between us and the Office of Security is simply that between us and another fraternal element of the Agency which has responsibility which sometimes comes close together.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the Office of Security maintain files which contain information of a derogatory nature on individuals, not necessarily limited to Agency employees?

Mr. Tovar. To my knowledge they don't. My assumption is ii I have never seen what is in their files -- my assumption is that they have files only on Agency personnel. I cannot visualize circumstances under which they would maintain information on people who are not in the Agency or who had not been applicates for employment and then left.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is the Office of Security interested in maintaining information so that if in the future an individual was being considered for employment in some capacity with the Agency the Secuirty Office would have that information on him?

Mr. Tovar. I cannot visualize that heppening today.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to ask you to read CIA 0786, which is a document that this Committee obtained from the Office of Security files on Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Tovar. That sort of suggests they maintained such information then. I still cannot visualize there doing it today.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you think the function of the Office of Security may be different today from what it was in 1959 with regard to maintaining such files?

Mr. Tovar. The function, I would use the term function, I would say the policy of the Office as far as the way the office operates today. I don't know what they do intrinsically. I cannot visualize their maintaining that kind of current records today. Maybe this is historic, it was in the files since 1969. With the injunction against destroying files, the files remained.

If it was John Q. Doe appearing today in a similar context I would not visualize the Office of Security maintaining this kind of document.

Mr. Goldsmith. To whom would this document go today?

Mr. Tovar. You mean from the State Department?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, a State Department document. Which is indicating that an American citizen is giving information, intelligence information to a foreign country, to whom in the CIA would that document go?

Mr. Tovar. I am not sure it would come to the CIA at all because the CIA does not have responsibility for that type of person. I think it would go to the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though the individual is overseas?

Mr. Tovar. Yes. He is an American. Again, this is speculation. I don't know what moves the person who releases cables to the Moscow Embassy today. He might decide or somebody here in State Security might decide that CIA should see this. In that event, it probably would go to the Office of Security as a matter of information..

Mr. Goldsmith. Would information contained in this type of telegram normally lead to the opening of a 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. I would think not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Tovar. There is nothing that suggests here this is going to be of continuing interest to the CIA. This is 1959. Let us say in 1962 the man came back and another message came over and it indicated that he was available for discussion or was of interest and so on and maybe there are reasons for debriefing, I can visualize a 201 being opened if the matter were of apparent continuing interest. I can see no reason why a 201 would be opened in this case.

Mr. Goldsmith. What if this telegram was followed by a aable indicating that the individual had decided to defect?

Mr. Tovar. What do you mean? He is applying for Soviet citizenship, so he is defecting here?

Mr. Goldsmith. You are correct. I withdraw the question.

Mr. Tovar. I think basically my point is that it is a fact that a 201 need not be opened up on this type -- this is a casual piece of information. If one could eliminate the name Lee Harvey Oswald, which raises flages, it is John Doe and there is nothing in this -- someone might say what an SOB this is but there is nothing to indicate anything but an unfortunate incidental event, I would say today, "why bother. We have enought to do without opening 201 files on people of that nature." The encyclopedic approach is not one that we try to apply.

Bear in mind, I am doing a lot of speculating here. I perhaps shouldn't.

Mr. Goldsmith. You really aren't aware of what the procedure would be in 1959 for dealing with a telegram like this?

Mr. Tovar. No. I would still say today I would not expect that kind of document to be retained in Agency files anywhere. You know, inter-departmental correspondence is firing paper in all directions all the time on an informational basis. That does not mean it is retained.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to this document, after 1959 your testimony is moreorless speculation but you are saying that today you don't think that this type of document would be retained and have any special significance?

Mr. Tovar. I don't think so. I am scratching my head trying to visualize circumstances under which it could be retained. There is nothing of interest to the Agency. There is nothing of immediate counterintelligence interest. I don't know who would retain it or why.

Mr. Goldsmith. For the purpose of clarification, if the CI asked that of the CIA, by that I mean the counterintelligence aspect of the CIA concerned primarily with a foreign counterintelligence threat, in otehr words, foreign nationals, foreign citizens?

Mr. Tovar. You are asking is it?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. Primarily yes, but not solely. We are concerned with Americans of counterintelligence interest. If an overseas station is informed by somebody that an American is contacting the Soviets and is apparently engaged in what looks like espionage, we would become interested. That is espionage I am talking about.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand.

Mr. Tovar. You realize of course with the sensitivity of Americans investigations of Americans we have to be an we are extremely careful in making the determination as to when a person is of counterintelligence interest. We have very strict rules and regulations on the consideration of investigations, considerations retaining information, the rights of a person. The criteria are very stringent. Theyare under esecutive order and Attorney General guidelines. We don't approach this casually at all. It is proscribed activity.

Mr. Goldsmith. Both as to Americans?

Mr. Tovar. Primarily Americans. The Attorney General is not concerned essentially with non-US persons. Our focus of sensitivity is on US persons who are US citizens or residents, aliens or US entities, organizations, which are primarily American in composition.

Mr. Goldsmith. Again, would you focus outside the borders of the United States?

Mr. Tovar. Yes. Inside US is FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Before when you made reference to a station overseas, you became aware of an American who might be involved in espionage for another country, you were referring to an American who was living abroad, is that correct?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, or traveling abroad.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you CIA Number 788 which is the field personality file request form that was used to open Oswald's 201 file. In the middle of the page there is a box which states the term 'Other identification". If someone wrote the number or letter "AG" down, what does that stand for?

Mr. Tovar. I have no idea. What are they referring to here? I cannot think of anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. The form also indicates that Oswald's file was restricted. Do you know of any reason why Oswald's file would have been restricted?

Mr. Tovar. Where is that?

Mr. Goldsmith. Here.

Mr. Tovar. No, I don't know. I don't know what criteria they would have used at that time or even today for that matter, to open a restricted file. Bear in mind, there is a lot of latitude given to the individual who opened these things. He could be a very junior analyst who for reasons of his own decided he would do it this way. Supervision would not necessarily get down there very closely behind him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what the inter-agency source register is?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is that?

Mr. Tovar. As I understand it, it is a register maintained in which other agencies of the government register their interest in a person. Let us take, for example, you are working for the Army Intelligence and you are in Germany and you become interdsted in Mr. Smith. Let us say you check Mr. Smith with the CIA and with the other agencies and in so doing you wish to have him recorded under the ISR, Inter Agency Source Registry, the entry of his name in the ISR will normally flag prior interest on the part of somebody in the government, in this case you are in the Army.

I don't know what this symbol is but they put two asterisks which indicates to anybody else who checks that name later the US Army has a prior interest in that person.

Mr. Goldsmith. What kind of interest would that be?

Mr. Tovar. Intelligence interest to me, potential intelligence interest. Again, the ISR may have ramifications that I am not aware of. In my experience the ISR has been the place we go to check, say, a new or potentially new source to see if there is ny other previously established government interest in the person which means keep your hands off. The military rely upon this very heavily because we coordinate their clandestine intelligence operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would an ISR index be checked prior to opening up a 201 file as a matter of routine?

Mr. Tovar. It has been so many years since I have done this. The way we have become mechanized today I would assume that a normal file check through the central files of the

Directorate would include or would turn up anything that was in the ISR. I am just not sure how it works.

Mr. Goldsmith. If someone were an agent of another intelligence organization would that be indicated in the 201 file?

Mr. Tovar. If it were an agent, agent of another service, that would be in the ISR only if it had been of interest to another agency which said "Put Joh Doe's name in the ISR and indicate he is a US Army intelligence source," at the very least a person of interest to the US Army Intelligence Agency. It would not be there if the Army had not put it in. So you might not know.

Again, I think almost any agent of the military would rely upon the ISr, I would think almost certainly would be entered in the ISr, because they want to maintain control of it, to make sure nobody else gets in the way arnd interferes with their operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone were an agent it would in all likelihood be indicated in the ISR and assuming the ISR is checked by a CI person prior to opening up the file, he would take note of that fact?

Mr. Tovar. Say that again. Some of this is pretty fuzzy to me. I don't want to mislead you by extrapolating from my own ignorance.

Mr. Goldsmith. If someone is an agent of another intelligence service, that fact would be noted in the ISR?

Mr. Tovar. Another US intelligence service?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. A US military intelligence service only, yes, the military intelligence service would normally be registered in the ISR. Other than the military, the FBI intelligence assets would not be registered in the ISr to my knowledge.

Mr. Goldsmith. But the military tends to make that listing?

Mr. Tovar. In my experience the miltiary has been the primary element involved in the use and the exploitation of the ISR. Let me interpose another point here. I am not an expert in these procedures and I am way out of touch. You live most of your life overseas, you don't do these things back at headquarters. These procedures may be quite different in actuality. I am groping through my memory to see how they were dealt with on an active basis.

A fellow like Bill Donnelly might enlighten you much more than I could about the ISR.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that. I think you can tell I am not pressing you for detail on it.

Mr. Tovar. I would like to help you. I am prepared to specualte as I have been doing on things that are somewhat beyond my direct experience and direct responsibility. There is a limit.

Mr. Goldsmith. Now, if someone checking ISR notes that an individual is a military intelligence agent would the fact of that agency status be noted and a 201 file opened on that individual?

Mr. Tovar. I am not sure. I would think it would be. Again, I am speculating. I think almost certainly if I were doing a file check on a person whose name came from one of the field stations and it turned up the fact he was already registered in the ISR, if a person is of interest let us say, to the US Army Intelligence, that would automatically sort of proscribe further attempts on my part to go in and get involved. I think a notation would be made in the 201 file.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a practical matter that would be a good reason for making the notation?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the CIA regularly use the ISR?

Mr. Tovar. We maintain it as I understand it.

Mr. Goldsmith. So if someone is an agent of the CIA, would that fact be noted in the ISR?

Mr. Tovar. No, I don't believe it would. Again, you can check on that to make certain. Donelly I think can help much better on it. I cannot visualize all our sensitive sources being registered there.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how internal memoranda prepared by James Angleton when he was head of the CI Staff, how internal paperwork relating to the JFK assassination was prepared and subsequently stored?

Mr. Tovar. No, I really don't. I have no idea. I have seen no documents on that subject. I have seen nothing either originated or approved or signed by him. You realize that any files on this subject are dead files. I am just doing my current job. Until you poeple became interested, we were not dealing with them on a daily basis.

Mr. Goldsmith. What happens to the personal files of an individual such as Angletons or even yourself after leaving the CI STaff?

Mr. Tovar. After leaving the staff or leaving the Agency?

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us take the first after leaving the CI Staff, what would happen to your personal papers?

Mr. Tovar. The personal file, official file on the person in the Agency is retained by the Office of Personnel.

Mr. Goldsmith. That would givern your personal file, your personal papers. What about internal memos, soft copy type files, what would happen to them?

Mr. Tovar. Having been only one element of the organization during my career, it is hard to say.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not talking now about personnel file. I am talking about soft copy, working files that an individual may maintain.

Mr. Tovar. You mean the files he himself as an individual maintained?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. Most individuals don't maintain personal files, I don't think. I would say, for example, anything I write, I dictate a memorandum and I send it to anybody you want to name, in a sense that is my work, I have done it but I don't keep a personal file on that. That goes into my office file. It is part of the office chronological file which is maintained by my secretary. Let us say multiply that by 500,000 over a period of years the foles grow. At the time I leave I am incidental in a sense. I just happen to be the person in the job at the time. The files will still be there.

There is a normal retirement and destruction under normal conditions, retirement and destruction program which eliminates the accumulation of excessive useless material.

Mr. Goldsmith. Most paperwork would go in this office chrono file?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, anything of significance would go in the office chrono file. Anything I write to the Directorate of Operations, DDO, CI, it is normally part of the chrono files. If I want it, it is there. It is my own file in the sense that when I am on the job I have total access to it. If I left the job and wanted to look at it six months later, it is still in the fole and I would ask somebody who took my place could I see what I wrote. I would not take it with me.

Mr. Goldsmith. If it is an office chrono file does that meant that everything is filed in a chronological order?

Mr. Tovar. Not necessarily. Here you ought to consult my secretary. There might be a subject breakdown. Ordinarily hte front office, we don't main-ain a lot of files. There is no point in it. Let us say something I signed off on, here is a case in point, memos that are signed on my behalf or that I might have signed, if I were there that day, I would not maintain that in my front office as a rule. That would probably be maintained by the office of origination. I think if I signed it my secretary would certainly maintain a log of things that had gone through me for signature. But I don't think, I could be wrong on this, I don't think as a rule she would maintain a routine memorandum just because I happened to sign it because I sign so many things on that staff. I sign off on a host of things which are not really my creation. I am representing the staff as a whole.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when Mr. Angleton left the CI Staff?

Mr. Tovar. Yes. I am not certain of the precise date. I think it was either December '74 or January '75. That is the position of Chief, Counterintelligence?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. I believe he may have retmained in the office for several months after that before he finally retired.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether, after Mr. Angleton left the CI Staff, any type of followup was done by that staff on the Nosenko issue?

Mr. Tovar. Followup work?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. For example, one of the issues, the key issue with regard to Mr. Nosenko was his bona fides.

Mr. Tovar. Yes, indeed.

Mr. Goldmsith. After Mr. Angleton left was any additional analytical work done on that issue?

Mr. Tovar. A very detailed study was done by my predecessor George Kalaris. A very thorough analysis was made of the whole Nosenko question.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you referring to the Hart Report?

Mr. Tovar. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Other than the Hart report was any type of followup work or analytical work done after Mr. Angleton's departure?

Mr. Tovar. I don't know for certain. The Hart Report is a thick piece of paper. In the preparation of that report there were probably all kinds of drafts, scratchings and sort of preliminary jobs. All that I know would be in the context of that report. All I know would be some representations in response to the Director's inquiry or your inquiry or someone else's inquiry as to what happened, what did it say, what does it mean, that type of thing, but really correlary efforts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Think for a moment on the Nosenko issue. As Chief of the CI Staff, if it were demonstrated to you very clearly that the story given by Mr. Nosenko on Lee Harvey Oswald was full of contradictions and in addition to contradictions, it was in many ways simply incredible, what impact would that have on the Agency's assessment of Mr. Nosenko as being a bona fide rather than a dispatched defector?

Mr. Tovar. Well, it is difficult to answer. You are posing a question in a narrow sense. You are focusing on one point, Nosenko vis-a-vis Oswald and contradictions that may emerge there. I would answer by saying that again I am not an expert on Nosenko. I don't profess to have a full grasp of his bona fides or anything related to it.

I would say that question alone would not be enough to satisfy me that the inquiry had been made carefully. There is much more to it than what Nosenko had to say about Oswald. There are more aspects about the bona fides issue, more than I could give you today.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have read the Hart Report.

Mr. Tovar. He tried to deal with the whole consideration, the whole Oswald, the handling, the methodology. He did not go into every jot and tittle of the issue.

Mr. Goldsmith. In fact, the Hart Report did not mention the word "Oswald" even one time. Even so, the question I have, if it were demonstrated to you that Nosenko's story on the

Oswald issue is untrue, cannot be believed, would that have any impact on the Agency's assessment of him as a bona fied?

Mr. Tovar. The first reaction would be I would be deeply distressed and concerned, I would want to know more about it. You have to exptrapolate from me to the Agency. Other people have views on this other than myself. If you carried this thing further and convinced everythody, the point you made is valid, then you would have --

Mr. Goldsmith. We are talking hypothetically now. Let us go beyond you. If it were demonstrated to the Director of the Central intelligence Agency that the story given by Nosenko on Oswald -- I am not talking about any of the other information he gave, but on Oswald -- simply cannot be believed because, A, part of it is incredible, B, it is full of contradictions, what effect do you think that would have on the Agency's assessment of him as a bona fide defector?

Mr. Tovar. I literally don't know. I am not sure what the comparative weight of that point would be when considered against the backdrop of the full Nosenko question.

Mr. Goldsmith. As Chief of the CI Staff, you would personally be troubled by that?

Mr. Tovar. Yes, I think I would be troubled by it. I would be troubled. I would be troubled that our current assessment is wrong. That would trouble me.

Again, I would say, too, if this is a serious proposition you are making, let us say you adduced a number of analysts who examined this thing thoroughly and were in a position of making that kind of judgment, I would say, "I want to have these analysts talk to my analysts because I am not in a position to make that kind of judgment."

Mr. Goldsmith. First of all, I am not making the statement that Nosenko's story on Oswald is inaccurate in any way.

Secondly, even if the story is inaccurate, I don't want to suggest that because of that anyone on this Committee has any feeling that that means Nosenko is not bona fide. My question is really very limited. A, if it were demonstrated that the story on Oswald is inaccurate, what impact would that have on your overall assessment?

Mr. Tovar. You mean demonstrably inaccurate?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Tovar. It would have to be examined. It would have to be examined the full panoply of the whole Oswald issue. I would say we will get this team of analysts and we will fight it out. We are talking about hypothesis.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes. I would prefer to stay away from the term "fighting it out" because there is no one here who is in the posture of making a fighting issue out of it.

I no longer have any questions. I will have questions to ask whoever on your staff participated in the preparation of the memo that we discused earlier.

Normally whenever a witness has an opportunity to testify before the Committee at a hearing, the Committee gives him five minutes at the end to make a statement. This is not a hearing. However, if you would like to make a statement for the record, feel free to do so. If not, you will be given a chance to verify the record for accuracy.

Mr. Tovar. Since I have no position to present and no point to make it is probably improper to make a statement. The only think I would reiterate is that I have been sort of speculating here in many respects. Bear in mind there is an area here where I have a purview that is perhaps valid. We are talking about a lot of things which are way beyond my immediate experience and certainly my current responsibility.

I would say, take some of my speculation with a grain of salt, because I don't mean to be dogmatic on these things. The procedure for handling the 201 file, there are some GS-7 girls down the line who could tell you much more about the 201 files than I would ever be able to compile for you. They are the ones you really should talk to.

Things like the ISR, I know the ISR in a limited framework from the standpoint of a guy overseas who is dealing frequently with the military and registers military sources in the ISR and checks the ISR either on behalf of the military or to see if they have already registered prior interest and so on. There may be other aspects of the thing that you should ge more professional advice on.

I think your questions have been reasonable. I have found no objection to try to meet you more than halfway on it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Thank you very much.

(Whereupon, at 3:20 p.m., the deposition was concluded.)

CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

I, Alfred Joseph LaFrance, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by me; that the testimony of said witness was taken by me in stenotype to the best of my ability and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction, that said deposition is a true record of the testimony given by said witness; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken; and further that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Notary Public in and for the
District of Columbia

My Commission expires November 14, 1980.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 10/19/20

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10131-10329
RECORD SERIES :	SECURITY CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	014727

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	SHAW, ROBERT T.
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	05/16/1978
PAGES :	78
SUBJECTS :	CIA, FILES CIA, METHODOLOGY SHAW, ROBERT T., TESTIMONY BEFORE THE COMMITTEE OSWALD, LEE, POST RUSSIAN PERIOD, TRAVEL, TRIPT TO MEXICO DURAN, SYLVIA
DOCUMENT TYPE :	TRANSCRIPT
CLASSIFICATION :	Secret
RESTRICTIONS :	1B
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	02/01/2003
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 5

EXECUTIVE SESSION

- - -

TUESDAY, MAY 16, 1978

- - -

U.S. House of Representatives,

Subcommittee on the Assassination of John F. Kennedy of the Select Committee on Assassinations,

Washington, D.C.

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 4:40 p.m. in room 3370, House Annex No. 2, 2nd and D Streets, S.W.

Present: Michael Goldsmith and Dan Hardway.

- - -

Mr. Goldsmith. Miss Reporter, would you please swear in the witness?

The Reporter. Do you solemnly swear that the testimony which you are about to give will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. Shaw. I do.

TESTIMONY OF ROBERT T. SHAW

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you state your name and address for the record?

Mr. Shaw. Robert T. Shaw, 3715 Acosta Road, Fairfax, Virginia, 22031.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is your present occupation, Mr. Shaw?

Mr. Shaw. I am undercover with the Department of State, but my actual occupation is Inspector, Office of the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, I handed you earlier a copy of a letter from the Acting Director of the Central Intelligence, Mr. Carlucci, to the Chairman of this Committee. It corresponds to JFK Exhibit No. 94 in the Committee's hearing record.

Have you had a chance to read that letter?

Mr. Shaw. I read it just now.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand it?

Mr. Shaw. I understand it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I also would like to hand you the Committee's rules and resolutions and ask you at this time to read Rule No. 4 to yourself.

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. I read it over.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that?

Mr. Shaw. I understand it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that you have a right to counsel?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you waive that right to counsel?

Mr. Shaw. I do not need counsel.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you understand that, under the Committee rules, that you have a right to receive a copy of the statement you are going to give us at this deposition?

Mr. Shaw. I should hope so, to check it for accuracy.

Mr. Goldsmith. However, by virtue of the arrangement that the Committee has worked out with the Central Intelligence Agency, we have been asked to request of Agency employees that they waive their right to receive a copy of the deposition for their own retention. By that, I mean we would certainly be willing to grant you access to the deposition, to correct it in any way necessary, but the Agency has requested that we ask you to waive your right to receive an actualy copy of the deposition.

Mr. Shaw. I have no problem with that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you.

For the record, I would like to say that the Committee's mandate is to investigate the assassination of the President. The scope of the mandate includes who killed the President, was there a conspiracy? We are also required to evaluate the performance of the investigative agencies, specifically the FBI and the CIA and to evaluate the work of the Warren Commission.

Do you understand that as well?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldmsith. Prior to coming here today, have you discussed what your tesimony is going to be with any CIA employee?

Mr. Shaw. I have not, except to tell them that I was going to tell the truth when I got over here.

Mr. Goldsmith. In terms of discussing the substance of your testimony?

Mr. Shaw. None whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Have you discussed with any CIA employee, past or present, who either has been interviewed by the Committee or has given a statement under oath to the Committee, what questions were asked of him or her?

Mr. Shaw. I have not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you here today voluntarily and without subpoena?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, how long have you been working under State Department cover?

Mr. Shaw. Since approximately the date I came aboard, because I was promptly sent to the Department of State for training. That would be March, 1948.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would your State Department file, if reviewed by a member of this Committee, indicate that you were actually a CIA employee?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. You do not understand how the cover arrangement would work between the Agency and the Department of State?

Mr. Shaw. I have never had anything to do with the setting up of such cover. It would well be that there might be some sort of an indicator or flag, or something in that file that would indicate to a person who knew the ropes that I was not bona fide.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would there be a personnel file on you at the Central Intelligence Agency?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of procedure, in terms of how you get paid, do you get paid by the Department of State?

Mr. Shaw. No. I am under, at the present time, nominal state cover. I actually, as far as the Department of State is concerned, resigned over there in 1973, I believe. At the present time, I am paid by the Agency.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you were working under cover, were you being paid by State at that time?

Mr. Shaw. Yes, I was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar at all with the literature that has been generated by the assassination of the President and the work done by the Warren Commission?

Mr. Shaw. Very little. I just noticed that green book there a minute ago. I have never read that thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Book 5, for the record, of the Senate Committee Report.

Mr. Shaw. I have seen copies of the Warren Commission Report in various places around the government, but I never read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you were working with the State Department in other than a nominal capacity, what was your title?

Mr. Shaw. My last title was Special Assistant to the Ambassador and First Secretary of Embassy, Honduras.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever work as a consular officer?

Mr. Shaw. Yes, I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. When you worked as a consular officer, were you required to fulfill both responsibilities as a consular officer and as a CIA employee?

Mr. Shaw. To a certain extent.

For example, I have never issued a visa. I have issued a passport for another consular officer who accepted the application and I would be on the road in northwestern Mexico and issued the passport to the American citizen concerned.

I have done a modicum of what we call protection and welfare work. This would usually involve being again on the road, stopping in, for example, in a prison to see if there was an American citizen there, to find out what the story was, why he was there, how he was being treated and that sort of thing, and relay that information to the consular when I got back.

Actually, I have not done much consular work. I used the cover on several occasions, but was never emersed into the role to the point where it interfered with my Agency activity.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally when somebody is acting under State Department cover, is the person required to hold down two jobs at the same time?

Mr. Shaw. It depends on the location of the person. As I understand it, people we have, for example, in the Iron Curtain countries, or the countries of Eastern Europe, do hold down virtually 100 percent full-time State Department, Foreign Service jobs. Some of the people that I have run into in my work as an Inspector for the Office of the Inspector General, notably in the Mid-Eastern countries, have spent much more time on their cover work than I did.

I think that it has to do basically with the permissiveness, or lack thereof, of the operational environment that you are in. In Mexico, it was not necessary to spend much time, at least not for me, on cover duties.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long have you been working for the Office of the Inspector General?

Mr. Shaw. Since August of 1976.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you have any responsibility in the writing of the 1977 Inspector General Report pertaining to the CIA's handling of the investigation of the Kennedy assassination?

Mr. Shaw. None whatever.

Mr. Goldsmith. Has anyone ever interviewed you before pertaining to the Mexico City situation as far as it pertained to Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. Yes. It was about that time of '76, somebody interviewed me in the CIA Headquarters building, and I think it was a Senate Committee, but I am not sure. They had some files.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you give your testimony under oath at that time?

Mr. Shaw. No, not that I remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did any CIA person ever interview you concerning Lee Harvey Oswald's activities in Mexico City and the operations of the Mexico City station?

Mr. Shaw. I would have to qualify that. We discussed the subject, of course, in Mexico City at the time of the assassination, or immediately after the assassination.

But I cannot recall that I was ever called in anywhere and asked for my account of what transpired after the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. Headquarters never asked you to come in and give a description, for example, of Oswald's activities, to your knowledge, in Mexico City in 1963?

Mr. Shaw. No. I would not have known anything about Oswald's activities anyway.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you familiar with the photograph that was taken in 1963 that was reportedly linked to Oswald and which subsequently turned out not to be a picture of Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. I am familiar with a photograph that was identified by people at the station in Mexico City as possibly being an American-appearing person. I do not know that it was every considered to be Oswald.

I think, if I remember correctly, what they were doing --

Mr. Goldsmith. We will get into that. My question is, did anybody from Headquarters ever ask you about that particular photograph or the circumstances surrounding it?

Mr. Shaw. Negative.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did anybody from Headquarters ever ask you to give a statement or report as to the manner in which the surveillance operation in Mexico City were underatken in 1963?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Where were you serving in 1963?

Mr. Shaw. From about the middle of April, I was serving in Mexico City in our station.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long did you stay in Mexico City?

Mr. Shaw. I stayed there until September of 1966.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the Station Chief in Mexico City?

Mr. Shaw. Winston Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you give us your assessment of his competence?

Mr. Shaw. Competence. It is difficult, because I was not looking from on high. He was a brilliant man. He was reputed to have a doctorate in mathematics. He had an uncanny ability to remember numbers and he carried in his head the file numbers of what we called P-files in Mexico City. P stood, I think, for personality. A P number usually was four digits or so, maybe five digits.

And he carried all these numbers in his head and he could mark something for such and such a file in black ink -- he always wrote in black ink -- putting the number down. He had a very good memory for numbers.

Winn and I were friendly. We were not close. We were not on the same level at all.

I considered him to be, from my standpoint, a competent, effective, Chief of Station.

Mr. Goldsmith. What type of file-keeping system did he have in effect, without asking you to describe it in detail? By that, my question is directed towards his thoroughness and comprehensiveness.

Mr. Shaw. I would say that he probably had one of the most -- let me see -- complete file systems in being in the Agency. I think that he, my personal opinion is that he went overboard, and we had so much stuff back in our files, it was hard to believe the amount of paper we had in there.

His tendency was not to rely on cross-indexing. If you have a document, this piece of paper means something to you and you want to keep it and it has 15 names on it, he was quite capable of setting up 15 files for the same piece of paper. And we had a tremendous file room.

I often wondered if we needed that much paper. It was very thorough. I am not a technician as far as managing files, but I do know that the people who worked in the file room were kept very, very busy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were Mr. Scott's chief deputies? Let me rephrase the question. Upon which individuals did he tend to rely the most?

Mr. Shaw. He had one Deputy who was Allen White. As far as reliance on other people, I would say he relied very heavily on Annie Goodpasture -- not in any way in a command function, but as a Girl Friday.

He also seemed to think rather highly of a former one-time FBI agent named George Monroe.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about David Phillips?

Mr. Shaw. Yes. Dave Phillips ran the, what we called the CA side of the shop, covert action, mostly propaganda. I came to Mexico City with the understanding that I was going to head up the Cuban shop. Very soon after I arrived there, Dave Phillips was tapped -- it was while we were still in the old Embassy building.

He was tapped and named the new Cuban Office Chief.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did that happen in October '63?

Mr. Shaw. I don't know. I do not remember. But it was not too long after I was there, and I was asked, I think by Dave; I don't remember -- if I had any objections to continuing to serve in Cuba.

I liked Dave, I respected him. I did not feel that I was being hurt, hurt careerwise, to step back and I was very interested in Cuban operations, so I did willingly, let us say, relinquish command, if you want to, of Cuban Ops and I served Dave as one more officer.

Later on, after Dave left, a year or two later, I once again took over the Cuban Ops group.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were in charge of Cuban Operations at the beginning. Then Phillips took it over at some point and then, after Phillips left, you went back to that position?

Mr Shaw. That is right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Our review of Agency records indicates that Phillips would have assumed that position on October of '63. Would that be consistent with your recollection?

Mr. Shaw. My recollection would have been, had you not told me this based on your review of the files, that it took place earlier than October, but I do not know. I really do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. My questions are going to be confined, unless I indicate to the contrary, to the period up to the end of 1963. So, from the time of your arrival in Mexico City until the end of 1963, prior to the time that Mr. Phillips assumed the position of Cuban operations --

Mr. Shaw. Chief.

Mr. Goldsmith. Chief would be the word, and you had those responsibilities, what did those responsibilities include?

Mr. Shaw. Since it was not ratified to me upon my arrival that I was, indeed, Chief of Cuban Ops, I simply considered myself to be one more case officer working against the Cuban target. Our basic interest was in effecting penetrations of the Cuban government.

What we wanted most of all were effective penetrations of the Cuban Embassy, the Cuban Intelligence Service, and some possible line-in to their communications set-up.

Mr. Goldsmith. In 1963, did you manage to place any penetration agents in the Cuban Embassy or consulate?

Mr. Shaw. Did I?

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the station?

Mr. Shaw. There were two. I did not place either one, and I think they both pre-dated 1963.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were those two penetration agents within the Cuban consulate or Embassy at the time of the President's assassination?

Mr. Shaw. Yes. One was in the consulate -- LITAMIL-7 was the cryptonym. L-I-T-A-M-I-L-7. And the other one was in the Embassy -- L-I-T-A-M-I-L-9.

Mr. Goldsmith. What information did these people give you after the assassination pertaining to the possible involvement of the Cuban government?

Mr. Shaw. I did not handle LITAMIL-7, and LITAMIL-9. I did handle,

Mr. Goldsmith. Who handled LITAMIL-7?

Mr. Shaw. I think that it was Ray Swider, but I am not sure. I did not meet LITAMIL-7 until Ray Swider left the country.

Mr. Goldsmith. You nevertheless have had access to the information that this individual gave to Swider?

Mr. Shaw. I would normally have seen copies of contact reports which were reports that we wrote -- any of us who were case officers wrote -- after station meetings, and it would have been normal for me, for example, to see any information of consequence that LITAMIL-7 produced, just like it would have been normal for any other case officer in the Cuban section to see my contact reports on meetings with LITAMIL-9.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of that, do you know what information LITAMIL-7 gave concerning the Cuban government's reaction to the death of the President?

Mr. Shaw. I do not recall, and I do not recall the specifics of anything. You may have something in your files with my name on it; I do not know what LITAMIL-9 produced. I do have the recollection of the sense of feeling on the part of those people that there was no exultation or jubilation or happiness whatsoever inside the Cuban Embassy at the assassination of President Kennedy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did the penetration agents ever indicate that Oswald had been to the Embassy and had stated that he was going to attempt to kill the President?

Mr. Shaw. No, not that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did any of those agents ever indicate that Oswald had had contact with the Agency -- with the Embassy, rather?

Mr. Shaw. I whould imagine that LITAMIL-7 probably did -- I do not recall it. But since she was in the consulate, and since it was my understanding that Oswald's contact with the consular field rather than with the Embassy field, I should imagine, given the discussions that undoubtedly took place in the Cuban Embassy after this assassination, that she probably spoke about it. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the name of LITAMIL-7?

Mr. Shaw. I'd rather not give names.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, in light of your response, I am certainly aware of the sensitivity of this issue and of your concern for sources and methods, and I would also make two points. One is that under the letter, you are free of your secrecy obligation. At the same time, I am not about to rely upon that letter to compel an answer out of you, because you are here voluntarily today to help us. And, as I said, because I understand your concern for a sensitive source in this case, I am not going to ask you to state for the record the name of either one of these individuals.

Mr. Shaw. May I say something at this point?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Shaw. It is my understanding that both of these people are, if they are still alive, are living in Mexico and I do not want to be in a position of revealing a name which could harm either of those people. I notice here that it says --

Mr. Goldsmith. You are referring now to the letter from Mr. Carlucci?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

"To provide the affected person the opportunity to receive guidance from me or my designees on the applicability of this authorization, particularly to questions which are asked."

I would like to get Frank Carlucci to tell me that I would reveal two names of agents, if it is necessary -- or you can find out from the file, probably, who they are.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, I understand your position. I want to make sure you understand mine. I am in no way forcing you to reveal a name. Once you had demonstrated a reluctance to, then, as far as I was concerned, then the matter was terminated.

Mr. Shaw. No problem?

Mr. Goldsmith. I will say that we will pursue this by contacting the appropriate people at the Agency.

Mr. Shaw. I think if you requested the Agency for those two names, it would probably produce them. I wouldn't want to be the guy to say it.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand your position perfectly. I hope you understand mine.

Mr. Shaw. I do.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would not want you to go back to the Agency and say that the staff of this Committee attempted to compel an answer out of you.

Mr. Shaw. I will not say any such thing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

For the record, would you spell the cryptonyms of these penetration agents?

Mr. Shaw. One of them was LITAMIL-7 -- L-I-T-A-M-I-L - 7. The other was LITAMIL-9.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are these two agents still active?

Mr. Shaw. Neither one is active. I am quite sure that neither one is active.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of clarification, LITAMIL-7, was that agent working out of the consulate?

Mr. Shaw. That agent was an employee of the consular section of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. LITAMIL-9 was an officer of the Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, on the question of the identity of these two agents, when you go back to the Agency, could you raise this question with the appropriate individual, appropriate superior authority, and we will do the same so that some time this week we can get together on that?

Mr. Shaw. I do not see any reason for us to get together. You can get it from them, I am sure. It is just that I have a rather strong feeling about protecting anybody who has cooperated with us.

It is not that I consider you do not have a right to that information, if you feel that you need it. It is just that I cannot bring myself to reveal the true name of an agent unless I am required to do so.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that concern. I certainly respect it.

(Pause)

I have been informed by my researcher, Dan Hardway, that the Agency is in the process of looking into this issue.

Mr. Shaw. Okay.

Mr. Goldsmith. At this time, I would like to get into the area of the telephone taps that were in operation in 1963 against the Cuban Embassy and consulate. My first question is, what responsibility, if any, did you have with regard to the telephone tap operation?

Mr. Shaw. No responsibility. I saw the product, usually.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the individual who was in charge of that tap?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know whose responsibility it was. I rather suspect that it may have been Ann Goodpasture's, but I do not know for sure. I do not remember.

There were two telephone operations, two tap operations. One of them was unilateral and one of them was joint with the Mexican government.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which one was the unilateral one? By that, I mean which phones were covered by the unilateral one?

Mr. Shaw. There was a mix, and I cannot recall which were which. It may well have been that we were tapping some Cuban Embassy phones unilaterally, and some of them were being tapped jointly. I know that there was coverage on the joint tap operation, which I believe was called LIENVOY. I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is correct.

You indicated that you think Ann Goodpasture may have been responsible for the telephone tap operation against the Cuban operation. What basis do you have for that?

Mr. Shaw. Responsible in the sense of picking up the take. I am not sure of that, because I know she did some of that kind of work. I am not sure who did it. We used to get copies of the transcripts and I remember -- I am sure I saw some of the Cuban stuff on joint taps. And then, of course, taps that were run by the Mexican government.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you review the transcripts that came in as a matter of regular routine?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you read all of them?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Which ones would you read?

Mr. Shaw. I would have been interested primarily in the Cuban ones, and what they called the resuma -- it was sort of a Spanish word for resume -- the resuma was a distillation, if you will, of the digest of the joint tap that was prepared, I believe, for the Mexican President. You look at the resuma, which may be two pages, and you may have the gist of what might be a whole bunch of pages of tap.

Mr. Goldsmith. Normally, you read transcripts of conversations that took place on telephones of the Cuban Embassy, is that correct?

Mr. Shaw. Normally, I read some of that stuff. I do not remember whether I saw it all or not, because quite a bit of it was processed by other people. I do not know who they were, people on the outside, I suppose. And I read summaries of what appeared on these things, but I remember also, at times, seeing the verbatim -- Man Outside says so and so; Person Inside, Woman Inside, says such and such.

Mr. Goldsmith. Sometimes you would get summary transcriptions of the summary conversations or English and sometimes you would get verbatim translations, is that correct?

Mr. Shaw. Yes. I would see them, I would not get them. They would go past me. I would see them.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was it more likely that what you would see in verbatim form, conversations that took place, for example, in Russian and had to be translated before you received them?

Mr. Shaw. I certainly would not see any conversations in Russian, because the Cuban Embassy did not have any Russian conversations. I cannot really answer that question. I am not really sure I fully understand it. I do remember seeing a variety of take, what we call take, from the various tap operations. This take sometimes was processed into English. The stuff that appeared in the resuma was in Spanish. Sometimes the conversations were typed out in Spanish and translated into English. I prefer them in Spanish, because I am at home in Spanish.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people reviewed the take from the surveillance operation of the Cuban Embassy and consular telephones?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea. I assume there were quite a few. The stuff was widely passed around.

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, how many people would review them?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many people were in Cuban operations?

Mr. Shaw. I would guess five or six.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who were they?

Mr. Shaw. Dave Phillips.

Mr. Goldsmith. We are talking now about the period 1963?

Mr. Shaw. That is right. Dave Phillips, myself, Ray Swider. I am trying to think of the girl's name. We had various secretaries in there. I do not know who was the secretary in '63. Peggy Magert. I'm not sure she was there at that time.

Of course, Allen White would see it. Winn Scott would see it.

Mr. Goldsmith. They would not review every transcript or summary that came in, would then? Allen White or Winn Scott?

Mr. Shaw. I imagine Winn Scott; I do not know about Allen White. Winn was pretty much, he tended to review almost all of the paper that came in and out of the station.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you saying that there was no routine procedure established for who was to review the take from the Cuban telephone surveillance operations?

Mr. Shaw. I am saying that, when I got there, the case officers in Cuban Ops saw this stuff that was routed around through the station and that persisted during the time that I was there.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not sure that the answer --

Mr. Shaw. How that was routed, I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you customarily see every conversation that came in?

Mr. Shaw. I doubt it. I doubt it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would have seen the conversation and decided that it was not important enough to merit your attention?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who brought in the take from these operations to the station?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know that either, but it was my understanding that non-official cover people on the outside picked up the tapes -- don't consider this gospel, but this is my understanding -- picked up tapes from the various listening posts, some of which had been processed by people in the listening post; some of which had not. But they, in turn, either processed those tapes or took them to people to continue the processing in case they had a foreign language in them, or something, and then turn them over to the station.

Somebody went out from the station, probably with a little attache case or something, and picked up takes again. It is my understanding that the person primarily involved in that was Ann Goodpasture, but I do not know for sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the first person that the transcripts would go to upon their arrival at the Embassy?

Mr. Shaw. I rather suspect Winn Scott, because I remember great numbers of those white pages that came across our desk had P numbers written on them in black ink by Winn Scott.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how many lines were being tapped at the Cuban consulate and Embassy?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. You reviewed the transcripts and summaries of these conversations for two years and you have no idea how many lines were tapped?

Mr. Shaw. No. This was fifteen years ago. I can give you a guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Sure. A best guess would be helpful.

Mr. Shaw. I would guess three or four lines. The primary interest was in the Soviets. You had far more converage. That is a guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Understood.

Mr. Shaw. I would guess, off-hand, two lines in the Embassy, one line in the consulate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if the Cuban consul's telephone was tapped?

Mr. Shaw. If the consulate line was tapped --

Mr. Goldsmith. It would have been his?

Mr. Shaw. Probably it would have been his, but they may have had a direct line in there. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would a telephone tap actually work? I am talking now about the actual mechanics of the tap.

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I never had anything do do with them. I know they used to take some of their taps at what they call the junction boxes. These would be the boxes out in the street where lines came in to be fed into this central -- I would rather suspect that the joint operations were mostly done at the central, since the Mexican government simply could have issued orders, you will tap such and such a phone.

Mr. Goldsmith. My question is oriented towards the following. Once a tap has been placed on a line, would that mean that all calls, ingoing or outgoing, on that phone would be picked up, so long as the tap is in effect?

Mr. Shaw. So long as it is in effect, yes. Whether those would appear in the transcripts is another matter. If it was like a wrong number, or somebody saying pick up three rolls and bring them home for lunch, probably it would not appear on the transcript.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would make that decision?

Mr. Shaw. Whoever transcribed the tapes.

Mr. Goldsmith. How much time would pass from the moment that a call came in until the transcription passed across your desk?

Mr. Shaw. I cannot answer your question with any precision. There was a system in the Embassy whereby if you had a fast-breaking situation, or something like that, you could -- I sure would like to get the transcripts of such and such a line fast, and that information would be processed and funneled back in to the Embassy or into the station on a priority basis.

I would guess, offhand, that it ran -- again, this is a guess -- five, six, seven days.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about the high priority cases?

Mr. Shaw. Sometimes you can get that pretty fast.

Mr. Goldsmith. Within a day?

Mr. Shaw. Yes. We could have somebody looking for a certain call, and I do not recall ever doing that. But it was my understanding that if you expected some situation, that you could levy a requirement -- for example, let me give you a for instance here.

Let us suppose that we, the station, someone in the station was going to make a recruitment pitch to a Soviet officer. It would have been possible for the station to have organized things so that there was a live body and not just a machine hanging over phone calls coming in to the Soviet Embassy in case the guy called up and said, let me tell you the discussion I just had, or something like that.

This would be a little far-fetched, because a Soviet would not be likely to handle it by phone. But in a case where you are looking for something fast-breaking to protect yourself, being on top of the situation -- it would not apply much to Mexico, but if you had a revolutionary situation breaking out someplace, surely there is a possibility of getting information very quickly off any given line.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would the transcripts be reviewed by you in chronological order?

Mr. Shaw. I got them in batches and I would review them just in the order in which they came. I might have shuffled them in chronological order, yes. Quite often they came in four or five or six pages stapled together.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would they tend to come in chrolological order so you read a transcript from the 15th before the 16th?

Mr. Shaw. Generally yes, right.

Mr. Goldsmith. What happened to the transcripts after they were reviewed by you?

Mr. Shaw. They were usually routed. They had a routing sheet on it, and they would go on to somewhere else. Where they went, I do not know. Sometimes we would mark them for files. Of course, if there were a transcript in there that had specific information on somebody that we were interested in, we would mark a copy for the files and it would go into that person's -- either their P-file, which was their personnel file, or into any operational self-file that would we make, building up background information on a person, the little things like whether an officer's wife was unhappy with the maid or with living conditions or the cost or what have you of the drugstore . These little bits and pieces were built up and those came from transcripts.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would these transcripts eventually get sent to headquarters?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I will say that it was unlikely that Winn Scott ever threw anything away. It was somewhere, probably, in the file room.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about the tapes? What would happen with the tapes after a conversation had been transcribed?

Mr. Shaw. Again, you are getting into an area where I never had any personal experience. It is my understanding that tapes were erased and reused, and they were used over and over again. Otherwise, we would have ended up with a room full of tapes and there really was no reason to keep them.

Now, I would also assume that if there was something important on a tape that they might have held it. I do not know. I do not recall ever saying, hold that tape for me. The transcript usually sufficed as the record.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if, at the time of the assassination, that the station had a tape recording of Lee Harvey Oswald's voice?

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not know if they did. I think they did not. It was my understanding that what they had was a transcript of some guy calling, again, it is my understanding. I believe he called the Soviet Embassy from the Cuban Embassy, or the Cubans called the Soviet Embassy, I am not sure. But as far as having the tape with Oswald's voice on it, I seriously doubt it.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to show you now what was marked here as CIA No. 197 and, for purposes of the record and for your information, the Agency has provided us with its documents. Each page has been assigned a number. The reason it has been assigned a number is so that the Agency can make sure that everything given to the Committee is returned. For reference purposes, we simply use those numbers for a witness when we are going through this pile of materials.

Now I would like you to take a look at CIA No. 197, the second paragraph.

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. Okay.

Mr. Goldsmith. The second paragraph indicates that the station is unable to compare the voices, as the first tape was erased prior to the receipt of the second call.

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest to you that at least one tape was still in existence on November 23rd, the date that this cable was sent? Otherwise, the second paragraph would have said the tapes had been erased, routinely, whatever.

Mr. Shaw. It could indicate that. It does not definitely state that. That is an interpretation, certainly.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that refresh your memory as to whether or not there was a taping system?

Mr. Shaw. I do not have anything in writing. This did not refresh my memory at all. This probably would have been considered. Was this after the assassination?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not think it necessarily indicates, but I am surprised that it does not say that they were both destroyed, or both erased.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please take a look at CIA 208.

Mr. Shaw. 208.

Mr. Goldsmith. And read paragraph number four. Read it to yourself, please.

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to paragraph number four, it indicates that it seems a voice comparison of some kind was made.

Mr. Shaw. Yes, or it could well be that this guy, Fineglass --

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Tarasoff?

Mr. Shaw. Remembered the poor Russian of the first tape and the poor Russian of the second tape and figured that it was the same guy.

Mr. Goldsmith. How long were tapes normally retained prior to being erased?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea. It would seem to me if you had a very productive tape, you probably would not keep it very long, once you transcribed it.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you to read the CS comment on CIA 239.

Mr. Shaw. I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. According to that, it indicates that the normal time lag would be two weeks. In other words, the tapes would normally be retained for a two-week period.

Mr. Shaw. That is what it seems to say, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is that consistent with your memory now, at the time?

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not have any idea. I was not involved in tape pick-ups or tape erasures.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Oswald telephone calls, as we will see later on, came in within approximately four days of each other, if, as CIA 239 indicates, the tapes were normally retained for two weeks prior to being routinely erased. Does that suggest to you that the Oswald tape was, for some reason, treated in an unusual manner, because either the first call came in, let's say September 27th. By the time the second call came in, the first tape had already been erased.

Mr. Shaw. No, it does not suggest that to me. -- what is this number here -- because this message came out 9 December 63. What it suggests to me is that, subsequent to the assassination, is that the station was to hold tapes for a minimum of two weeks.

Mr. Goldsmith. Please read into the record what 239 says.

Mr. Shaw. CS comment: station to erase routine tapes, Soviet Embassy, keeping normal two week lag.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does that suggest to you that the normal lag would not be two weeks?

Mr. Shaw. This was not addressed to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

Mr. Shaw. There is no reason for me to read this anymore than there is reason for you to read that. The words stand by themselves.

Mr. Goldsmith. That is right, and you have just given an interpretation of those words, suggesting that that the meaning is prospective in intent. In other words, after December 9, 1963, the timelag for retention of tapes prior to erasure would be two weeks.

Mr. Shaw. I think it could read that, yes. I do not know what went on between Winn and the station as far as periods for keeping these, but I think what you are trying to do is lead me into a situation of pointing out that the station was remiss in destroying tapes, and I do not believe that is the case.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to indicate to you, and also for the record, that what I am trying to do here is go over questions that are raised by the documents and the Committee has no predisposition, one way or the other, to reach any particular conclusions.

The truth is that unless these questions are asked of you, both the Agency and the Committee will be criticized by people in the future who review these documents and say, why were not these questions asked of you.

Mr. Shaw. I can understand why you are asking the questions. I am simply not in a position to tell you, from memory or anything else what the normal station procedure was regarding retention of tapes, although, as I did indicate earlier, that the tapes were routinely erased and used over again. As far as the time lag, you know as much about it, and probably more than I do, by now.

Mr. Goldsmith. What responsibility, if any, did you have with regard to the photo-surveillance operation against the Cuban Embassy and consulate?

Mr. Shaw. I had no responsibility for that operation until after I reassumed the Cuban Ops section which would have been the day Phillips left for Mexico, probably a year or two down the road. I do know, however, that the operation -- there was a Cuban photo, or a photo operation against the Cuban Embassy.

I do not remember why, but I think that observation was not active in the period when Oswald was in Mexico. If I remember correctly, the man, to the best of my knowledge who handled that, who was actually the inside case officer, if you will, was the little guy who was snapping the pictures, was a fellow by the name of Robert Zambarnadi, and I believe he is retired and living in Mexico. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the station case officer responsible for running the photo-surveillance operation against the Cubans?

Mr. Shaw. As far as I know, it was Robert Zambarnardi, who was the technical officer of the station. He was a technically qualified man.

Mr. Goldsmith. There was no one overseeing him?

Mr. Shaw. I do not believe so, but maybe Dave was. I do not know. We used to get batches of pictures. One of the things that I would do with the agent that I mentioned earlier was that I handled was take batches of these pictures to him and sit down with him and say, did you ever see this guy, or who was that? And he'd say, that's a courier, or that's the new officer who just arrived, or I do not know who this guy was, but he came in and talked to so and so, that sort of thing.

We used to try to identify people with those pictures.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many photo bases were there taking pictures of the Cuban consulate and Embassy?

Mr. Shaw. To the best of my knowledge, there was only one photo base. At times, the consulate was not covered and the Embassy was. If I may draw you a picture, this would be the block, the compound block. The Cuban Embassy was the big building up here, and there was a little gatehouse down here. I do not remember whether it was in or out.

This was the consulate, on the corner. People who would want to get visas would routinely appear here and they would send them down the street and they would go into the consulate. Sometimes they knew where they were going and they came in here, or they asked a cab, take me to the Cuban consulate, they would probably be delivered here.

This is a block, a city block. The house from which the photographs were taken is over here on this corner. The photographs were taken long distance down here and here. This was not always covered. This was considered more important, because it was routine -- either there was a lot of routine visa stuff here.

Later on, subsequent -- gosh, it must have been a year later. I do not remember just when -- we developed a system, or somebody up here in the states who developed a system whereby the camera would be triggered automatically. That is movement -- sort of like a photo-electric cell or something -- movement up here in the picture that the camera was to cover would cause a series of photos to be taken, maybe four or five, zap, zap, zap, something like that.

But I believe that, at the time Oswald was in Mexico City, not only was this down for some reason and not functioning, but I believe, had it been functioning, that it would have been individual picture snapping. I do not think that automatic equipment was in Mexico at that time. I could be wrong.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am not going to be able to introduce this diagram into the record, so I am just going to describe it as best as I can.

You indicated that on one block, one one corner of that block was a consulate building for the Cubans. The other side of the block was the Embassy building.

Across the street was the photo base.

Mr. Shaw. This was all wall. This was a compound. Excuse me, if I may interject. There was another building back here that had a theatre downstairs and had offices upstairs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was that within the compound also?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Three buildings within the Cuban compound?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. The photo base was located across the street. It was closer to the consulate than it was to the entrance of the Embassy?

Mr. Shaw. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. From the diagram that you drew, it would seem that the location of the camera was closer to the consulate than it was to the Embassy entrance, yet you also indicated that most of the people of interest would have been entering the Embassy, not the consulate?

Mr. Shaw. That is correct.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was not the placement of that camera in an inappropriate position?

Mr. Shaw. I imagine that camera was placed wherever we could get it. Getting real straight across from one of those embassies was very difficult.

I know, had we had our druthers, we would have placed that camera closer up here and the Soviet Embassy had a similar sort of situation, a camera over here and one down here. I believe the closer the better, yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many photo bases were there operating against the Soviet compound, without drawing a diagram?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know, but I think there must have been two or three.

Mr. Goldsmith. Are you sure you were not the case officer overseeing the surveillance operation against the Cubans?

Mr. Shaw. I certainly am.

Mr. Goldsmith. So Mr. Zambernardi was not working under you?

Mr. Shaw. I did not consider him working under me, at that time. Later on, when he was replaced and I am not sure whether Dave Phillips was there or not, I did move into this operation. I am trying to think of the cryptonym for the operation. I cannot recall.

And the chap who then handled it was Zambernardi's replacement, I think his name was Humphrey. That was the surname. Lou Humphrey, I think. I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the purpose of the photo-surveillance operation?

Mr. Shaw. Primarily to identify people in touch with the foreign embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would everyone's picture be taken?

Mr. Shaw. No, no way.

Mr. Goldsmith. Whose picture would be taken?

Mr. Shaw. For example, that you would normally in an operation like this be limited by time available for the photographer. You would be limited by daylight. You would not photograph a milkman, or a mailman or somebody who would be there repeatedly. You would not photograph a staffer of the Embassy if once you knew who he was, unless he was walking with somebody.

You would not photograph a regular visitor to the Embassy, if you knew who he was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you photograph all foreigners?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I would have to say the answer is no. I never photographed any of them. Do you mean would all foreigners be photographed? I would say, given the limitations that I have enumerated, namely how long a person can sit there and watch, and they have to take a break now and then, daylight, Sundays -- they probably did not photograph because there is little activity. I am sure there were considerable down periods in this sort of operation.

No, I would say all foreigners were not photographed. Ideally, you would like to have a picture of anybody who went in and out of there, surely.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand that.

My question is, while surveillance base was in operation, would a primary purpose of it be to take pictures of foreigners?

Mr. Shaw. Yes. That would have been a primary purpose. Not necessarily foreigners, but people you do not recognize. Foreigners or Mexicans; Mexicans are foreigners to us, of course.

Another thing they did, by the way, was they tried to photograph the license plates of automobiles that came to these embassies.

Mr. Goldsmith. During what hours were these photo bases in operation?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I would say most likely during business hours and proper daylight conditions, when the photographer was available to do the job.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you read back that answer?

The Reporter: Question: "During what hours were these photo bases in operation?"

Answer: "I do not know. I would say most likely during business hours and proper daylight conditions, when the photographer was available to do the job."

Mr. Goldsmith. As a matter of routine, when would photographers have been available to do the job?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I was not involved in these operations. I used to see quite a bit of coverage.

Mr. Goldsmith. What were your primary responsibilities when you were down there? You were not involved in the photo-surveillance operation; you were not involved -- excuse me for interrupting you.

Mr. Shaw. Go ahead.

Mr. Goldsmith. You were not involved in the photo-surveillance operation and you were not involved in the wire tap operation, so, my question is, what was your primary responsibility?

Mr. Shaw. My primary responsibility was to try to effect penetrations of the Cuban government. I spent a good bit of time with Cubans of the non-Castro persuasion, attempting to identify Cubans of the Castro persuasion that we might go after.

By "go after," I mean attempt to recruit.

I spent a lot of time collecting information from the Cuban asset on the outside to process into the intelligence reports on what was happening in Cuba.

We had a system set up in Mexico City under an agent called AMSAIE who was the representative of the exile community. He would arrange to meet, help, debrief, Cubans who were arriving constantly from Cuba on the way to the United States or to Mexico or to somewhere else in the world, people who were exiting Cuba.

Mexico did not break relations with Cuba as did the other countries of the Hemisphere. The OAS recommended that; Mexico did not do it.

So, when the refugee flow dried up in Florida, we probably had one of the most productive operations there in Mexico City regarding information on what was going on in Cuba.

I spent a lot of time with AMSAIL on that.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever try to recruit Eusbio Ascue?

Mr. Shaw. His name is Eusbio Ascue.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Mr. Shaw. A-s-c-u-e. Fist name, E-u-s-b-i-o.

I did not try to recruit Ascue. That may have been attempted prior to my arrival, in which the man who would know about it, if it had been attempted, would be Mr. Thomas Hazelit.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Teresa Proenza?

Mr. Shaw. No, I never made any attempt to recruit Teresa Proenza?

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know if anyone ever did?

Mr. Shaw. I know we had an officer in Washington who had formerly served in Mexico City who was very interested in Teresa Proenza. That officer's name was Charles Anders.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is he still with the Agency?

Mr. Shaw. It is my understanding that he is.

Mr. Goldsmith. What about Guillermo Ruiz?

Mr. Shaw. That does not even ring a bell. Ruiz is a very common Spanish name. Do you want to tell me who he is or if you have anything on him? Maybe it might ring a bell.

Mr. Goldsmith. Apparently, Mr. Ruiz was a Cuban intelligence officer at the Embassy, Cuban Embassy.

Mr. Shaw. I do not recall him there when I was there.

Mr. Goldsmith. What did you say that Mr. Ray Swider's responsibilities were, if you said?

Mr. Shaw. I did not say. I used his name -- he was another officer, like I was, in Cuban operations.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether he had anything to do with the photo operation.

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. He may have; I do not know. I do not think he did. He may have.

Mr. Goldsmith. After your arrival in Mexico City, did anyone attempt to recruit Ascue?

Mr. Shaw. As far as I know, there was no attempt made to recruit Ascue after my arrival. My memory could be playing tricks on me. I know I never went after him.

(A brief recess was taken.)

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like to get into the number of people who were in Cuban Operations in October of '63, September, October of '63. Could you tell me again how many?

Mr. Shaw. If you could show me a list of the people at the American Embassy at that time, I think I could pretty well quickly, in the station -- if you have such a list, I probably could very quickly identify those that had some connection with Cuban Ops.

Mr. Goldsmith. The Agency has not given us that list today to have for this purpose.

Mr. Shaw. Do you have one lying around?

Mr. Goldsmith. No.

So far, according to my recollection of appearances, we have Mr. Phillips, yourself and Mr. Swider.

Mr. Shaw. When I arrived there, Tom Hasbrook would have been there. He would have been gone by that time.

John Zambernardi would have been involved in the technical ops.

I am not sure whether Peggy Magret was there or not.

Mr. Goldsmith. How many case officers were there in Cuban operations?

Mr. Shaw. Probably just three, three or four, I am not sure.

Mr. Goldsmith. There were three case officers,probably four?

Mr. Shaw. At least three, yes. Dave and Ray and myself.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a fourth?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I cannot recall, offhand, who else was there.

Wait a minute. Lorna McKay was there, as a researcher -- what was it called? Research analyst.

Mr. Goldsmith. I am interested now only in case officers.

I do have a list here, referred to as CIA 169-70, which has a list of Agency employees. Would you please examine that list?

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. Okay.

Perhaps there would have been myself, Ray Swider, Dave Phillips and Lorna McKay.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Lorna McKay a case officer?

Mr. Shaw. Lorna McKay was not considered -- yes, I guess she was a case officer. I do not know what cases she handled. She did more of what we call INTEL analyst work. She had officer rank, I believe. I believe she was a GS-9 or -11 or something. I do not remember.

But Peggy, the girl I mentioned awhile ago, was not there until 1965. That was about it.

The ranking would have been David Phillips, myself, Ray Swider, Lorna McKay.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did you divide up your responsibilities?

Mr. Shaw. Let me interject. Jack Stewart was there, but he was not in Mexico City. He was in Yucatan, in the consulate.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine.

How did you four divide up your responsibilities?

Mr. Shaw. We were given certain agents to handle and we handled those agents, and Dave Phillips would decide what other activities he would pass around. I notice --

Mr. Goldsmith. Which were those other activities?

Mr. Shaw. Anything that might come to light that Dave would -- an ad hoc requirement, or something like that, he might ask any of us to help out, or somebody else might ask us to do something. I went out and helped surveil a meeting one time for one of these guys down here. It had nothing to do with Cuban Ops.

Mr. Goldsmith. What procedures did the four of you establish for reviewing photographs?

Mr. Shaw. The only procedure that was established was route the photographs and show them to any agent, personnel, who might be in a position to identify the persons in the photographs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did any of you identify all the photographs in the Cuban Operation Branch?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was there a system to this?

Mr. Shaw. If there was, I did not set it up. When I got photographs, I would show them to LITAMIL-9 and have him tell me who they were and I would write a contact report and submit it to my Chief, who was Dave Phillips.

I would assume that Ray Swider probably did the same thing with his agents.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, unless there was a system for reviewing the photographs, you had no way of knowing that all of the photographs were being reviewed by you and other Cuban Operations case officers?

Mr. Shaw. I had no way of knowing. I was seeing all the photographs, that is true. I assumed I did.

Mr. Goldsmith. You had no way of knowing that?

Mr. Shaw. Not unless I would have gone to pick them up from the man who took them and developed them, which I did not do.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the transcripts, did you have any procedure for insuring that all of the transcripts were being reviewed?

Mr. Shaw. Did I have a procedure? No. The station routed the transcripts to the various officers. Winn Scott quite often routed them. I notice you had a transcript somewhere here --

Mr. Goldsmith. We will look at the transcripts later on.

Mr. Shaw. Winn Scott quite often routed those to a specific officer.

Mr. Goldsmith. Were all of the transcripts pertaining to Cuban operations that were sent to the station reviewed by at least one of the Cuban operations case officers?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Was Mr. Scott a very demanding man?

Mr. Shaw. What do you mean by "demanding"?

Mr. Goldsmith. Did he expect his employees to work hard and to perform thorough, competent work?

Mr. Shaw. I assume he did. He never said so in so many words.

It was my understanding that until he was remarried he worked long hours in the Embassy, before I got there. Sometimes he had people in there at 9:00 o'clock at night.

Mr. Goldsmith. Compared to other station chiefs that you had worked under, was he more demanding or less?

Mr. Shaw. I would not say he was any more. He expected work out of his people and got it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that the Mexico City station had one of the biggest telephone surveillance operations in existence?

Mr. Shaw. Certainly in Latin America.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any CIA station?

Mr. Shaw. I don't know about any CIA station. Certainly in Latin America. It ate up a lot of man hours.

Mr. Goldsmith. In light of the fact that Mr. Scott apparently was a demanding man and that you had one of the largest surveillance operations in effect in Latin America, your testimony today is that you do not know whether the Cuban operations case officers reviewed all of the transcripts?

Mr. Shaw. I do not think that the prefacing was necessary. The latter part of that, in which you asked me if I am aware that all of the transcripts of the Cuban Ops were examined by the Cuban Ops section, I would have to, again, say I do not know.

(Discussion off the record.)

Mr. Goldsmith. We just went off the record for a moment because Mr. Shaw had a question about where his car was parked and whether there would be any problem about that, and I indicated that I did not think there would be a problem.

Mr. Shaw, do you recall who delivered the photographs to the station, the tape from the surveillance operation?

Mr. Shaw. It was my understanding that the technician picked them up. Bob Zambernardi would have picked them up from the agent.

You are talking of the Cuban Embassy now?

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes, and consulate.

Mr. Shaw. It is my understanding that he would have picked them up from the agent who took the photographs. The agent who took the photographs developed them, printed them, and turned the prints over to Mr. Zambernardi. That is the way I think it worked.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you actually get to review the photographs? Who would bring them to you?

Mr. Shaw. Usually I do not remember who brought them to me. I have the impression it may have been Lorna McKay, but I could be wrong. Maybe Bob brought them to me. I do not know.

But I would get a batch of photographs to go through.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who had reporting responsibility for passing along the information that had been obtained from the photographs and the transcripts?

Mr. Shaw. There was little reporting that came out of the photographs. Usually, **it yielded** what we called operational information rather than intelligence information, to enable us to develop a better understanding of who was in the area, of who was in the Cuban Embassy, and what they were up to.

As far as reporting intelligence that came from those, it probably was reported by the reports section of the Embassy. Next to Winn Scott's office was the CA Chief's office and, next to that -- I'm getting in the new embassy now. I don not remember where the report section was in the old embassy.

We had reports officers who actually repaired most of the reports from raw reports, if you will, reported by the case officers.

Again, I would like to point out that these photographs yielded very little reportable intelligence. It was mostly operational intelligence.

Mr. Goldsmith. Understood.

Who was George Monroe?

Mr. Shaw. George Monroe was a former agent, Special Agent, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation who retired or resigned, I do not know how he left the Bureau, and worked in Mexico

City on the outside, as a non-official cover asset for Winn Scott. Ann Goodpasture, I believe, had a lot of contact with George Monroe. I very seldom saw George Monroe. I had nothing to do with him operationally.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what his responsibilities were?

Mr. Shaw. I believe his responsibilities had to do with dealings with the Mexican government, liaison responsibilities. I think George was used by Winn because George had good contacts in the Ministry of Interior, which would have been sort of the equivalent of the Department of Justice here and out of that Ministry came, for example, the man who became President of Mexico. He was the station asset, contact, not agent.

Mr. Goldsmith. You mentioned earlier, Mr. Charles Anderson, is that correct?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Mr. Anderson had an interest in Eusbio Ascue?

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not believe it was. I think it was Teresa Proenza. I do not think he had any interest in Ascue.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who was the individual who had the interest in Ascue?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. I said if it had been before my arrival, I would suspect it was Tom Hasley. He was carrying the ball down there and was responsible for that sort of activity. I do not know that he did, but if it happened in, say, late '62 or somewhere in there, it probably would have been Tom who would have done that.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was Anderson's position at the Embassy?

Mr. Shaw. He was not at the Embassy then. He was at the Embassy back in 1965. I do not know, for a number of years. At that time, Charlie had gone back to Headquarters and he was involved in Cuban operations from Headquarters, the details of which were not made known to me. Whether they were made known to Winn Scott or Dave Phillips or others, I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. When would he have made an effort, if he did, to recruit Teresa Proenza?

Mr. Shaw. I am not sure that he ever tried to recruit. I am merely saying that he had a lot of interest. I do not think anybody ever tried to recruit her. If they did, they were wasting their time.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why were they wasting their time?

Mr. Shaw. She was a pretty tough nut. I never saw -- if I can remember -- I do not remember any vulnerability of Teresa Proenza.

Mr. Goldsmith. What was the nature of Mr. Anderson's interest in her?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know. Some Cuban operational interest, maybe trying to get some information from her through a third party. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did he spend time in Mexico City that he would have had an opportunity?

Mr. Shaw. He visited Mexico City quite often.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though he was not stationed down there, he visited often?

Mr. Shaw. That is correct. He madé trips in and out of Mexico City.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know what Teresa Proenza's position was at the Cuban Embassy or Consulate?

Mr. Shaw. I think by that time she was out of the Embassy, was she not? I do not remember. She left.

Teresa Proenza was a Mexican. She was not a Cuban. And I am under the impression that by the time I got there, Teresa had left the Embassy. I may be wrong. I think that she was involved in cultural activities.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether Mexican intelligence would have had any penetration agents at the Cuban Embassy or consulate?

Mr. Shaw. I think they would have tried. I do not know how effective Mexican intelligence was. I did not deal with it.

It would be assumed that they made every attempt, the Cubans were gradually removing Mexicans from their employee, from the Cuban Embassy. I think it highly unlikely that the

Mexican government, given its position, was the only government in the Western Hemisphere which maintained relations with Cuba, would have been -- it would have been highly unlikely for them to have tried to pitch a Cuban national.

On the other hand, I think it would have been likely, and would have been expected of them, to have tried to find out from any Mexican working in the Cuban Embassy what was going on.

What this comes down to, of course, is gardeners and secretaries.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why do you make that distinction between a Cuban national and a Mexican?

Mr. Shaw. I make that distinction because of the flap potential. If the Mexicans had attempted to pitch a Cuban and the Cuban had not accepted that pitch and had reported it to his superiors, the Mexican Foreign Office then would have had a problem with the Cuban Foreign Ministry.

Mr. Goldsmith. Of course, the Mexican government was also taking a risk by being involved in the liaison operation or the Agency as well.

Mr. Shaw. One could assume that they had measured their risk, yes, certainly. There is an element of risk in every operation. Do not get me wrong. I do not know whether they had anything going or not. I would assume, just based on my experience, that they would not have tried to pitch Cubans, that they would have tried to exert subtle coercion on Mexicans working there to report in the interest of Mexican national security on what is going on in that Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would have been in a position to know if the Mexican government successfully penetrated the Cuban Embassy or consulate?

Mr. Shaw. The President of Mexico would have known. The chief or chiefs of the Mexican service or services.

Mr. Goldsmith. Any American?

Mr. Shaw. Not that I know of.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether there was any coordination between the telephone tap operations and the photo operations. For example, if a conversation of interest came up on the tap operation, would the people monitoring the call be able to contact through an intermediary the photo bases to warn them or indicate to them that someone is coming of interest?

Mr. Shaw. It is my understanding that such a system did not exist, and I do not believe that the guys monitoring the telephone tap intercept bases were made aware of photograph coverage.

However, I would assume that a man running a technical operation, if he heard something exciting on the line, as opposed to a tape several days later, would notify his case officer right away and then it might be possible for the case officer, assuming a quick reaction capability, to crank up the people at the photo house to take pictures. This was in the most perfect of all worlds. Usually things did not work that way and you end up out on the street, in the middle of the night two days later, contacting whoever it is taking photographs.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the Mexico City station ever obtained a photograph of Lee Harvey Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. To my understanding, they did not. I never saw anything down there that looked like Lee Harvey Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever hear an allegation that Charlotte Bustos, at CIA Headquarters in Washington, found a photograph of Oswald, or someone she thought to be Oswald, in the Headquarters files shortly after the assassination?

Mr. Shaw. No, I have never heard such a story. Knowing Charlotte -- not knowing her well, but having known her over the years, I would assume that had she found such a thing she would have rung a big loud bell and say, hey, look what I found.

Mr. Goldsmith. With regard to the photo operation, let us assume for a moment that you come across a picture of interest. Did you have any way of determining on what day and approximately what time the picture would have been taken?

Mr. Shaw. Very definitely.

Mr. Goldsmith. How would you have done that?

Mr. Shaw. The photographs were squared off and were annotated. We knew the day. We knew, usually, morning or afternoon, a.m. or p.m. Sometimes you could judge by the sequence.

Furthermore, sometimes the actual time of the person going in and going out was actually annotated, if the person operating was operating manually, he would no doubt, the guy with the red-checkered Hawaiian shirt went in at 10:05. He would note that in a little log.

I do not know whether he would note it on the photograph or submit the log with the number keyed to the log in the photograph. Quite often we knew to the minute when a person in a photograph came in or went out or stood in front or walked by.

Mr. Goldsmith. I see.

So, to your knowledge, there were photo-production logs that could be checked?

Mr. Shaw. To my knowledge, such logs did exist, yes. Whether the logs were kept after the information was noted on the photograph, on the back of the photograph or wherever it was noted, I have no idea.

The photographs quite often came in the form of 35 mm. contact strip prints and then blow-ups of a number of those.

I recall -- I had not thought about it all these years, but usually you knew when a guy, you certainly knew when he went in on Tuesday morning, the 16th of May, whatever that date was.

Mr. Goldsmith. Who would make the notations on the back of the photograph or contact print as to the time?

Mr. Shaw. In our case, I believe it was the man taking the photographs because he took the photographs, developed the photographs, printed them and turned them over.

Mr. Goldsmith. If he were to put the time on, he would have to go to his log and see what the time was and then make the entry?

Mr. Shaw. Right. He probably made a little notation to himself like I mentioned, the bright shirt or something. Then he would recognize that person in the photograph and make that notation.

(Pause)

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the first time that the name Lee Harvey Oswald came to your attention?

Mr. Shaw. It would have been the evening of the day of the assassination.

Mr. Goldsmith. How did that happen?

Mr. Shaw. We listened. We had a radio. I think it was one of those Zenith Trans-Oceanics in one of the Embassy offices.

I was out at an agent meeting when I heard about the assassination and I came back to the Embassy and went upstairs and we sat and stood around that radio and I believe it was in Pat Johnson's office -- her name was something else in those days. I can't remember her married name.

And they said something about the police said it was Lee Harvey Oswald, or something. I do not remember. That was the first time that it came to my attention.

Mr. Goldsmith. I would like you now to take a look at CIA No. 13 which is a transcript of the conversation allegedly involving Oswald, a conversation taking place on 1 October '63. Would you please read through that?

(Pause)

When was the first time that you saw that transcript, if you have ever seen it before?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know whether I have ever seen it or not, but I may well have. I was aware that he had called the Soviet Embassy, was made aware after the notoriety of the man was established, but I do not recall ever seeing this before that.

Normally, I would not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Prior to the assassination, did you see it?

Mr. Shaw. No. If I did, I did not pay any attention. I do not believe that it was on a Cuban line.

Mr. Goldsmith. No, it was not.

Mr. Shaw. Sometimes you can tell who saw these things by the initials up top.

Mr. Goldsmith. There are no writings or notations on that one, however.

Would you please read CIA 177, which is a cable from Mexico City station dated October 8th?

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. Yes, this is typical where they try to identify somebody that was in the Embassy at the same time. Of course, that does not sound like it.

Mr. Goldsmith. This was the famous cable that has given rise to some of the issues that the Committee was concerned with. My first question is, did you have anything to do with the writing of this cable?

Mr. Shaw. No, I did not. I would not have had.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how the photograph referred to in paragraph number two of that cable was in some way linked to Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. I would assume, my answer to your question is no. I would assume that this was an effort on the part of the person drafting the cable to help Headquarters identify Lee Oswald, the man who had made the call.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know how she made that conclusion that the photograph reflected Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. No. I do not think she did. I think she merely says that we got a guy who looks like he might be an

American going in, and maybe this is the fellow. I do not see from this cable any conclusion that that is Oswald. I rather suspect they never got a picture of Oswald. This is the one that appeared there, that looked like it could be an American. Therefore, an effort was made to help Headquarters by saying a man who looked like he might be an American entered the Soviet Embassy at that time.

Mr. Goldsmith. I agree with you, Mr. Shaw. Certainly, the cable does not say that the photograph is a photograph of Oswald. At the same time, though, it gives the information in paragraph 1 on Oswald and the second paragraph makes reference to a photograph taken of someone who appears to be North American.

Certainly they would not have sent to Headquarters simply a cable indicating the existence of a photograph, so by putting the photograph in paragraph 2 immediately below the information on Oswald, although the cable does not say that the photograph is one of Oswald, it does in some way suggest that they are related.

Mr. Shaw. It suggests to me that they know an American who claimed to be Lee Oswald called at a certain time, and then they went to the photographs to see if they could find anybody who looked like he might be an American, and the photo they found was of a man apparently 35, athletic build, about 6 feet tall, receding hair line and so forth; and they submitted this on the off-chance that this might have been the man who made the call.

Mr. Goldsmith. I understand your answer. I am hopeful that you understand that I am not suggesting that the cable definitely says the photograph is one of Oswald.

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not see that it does at all.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you please take a look, now, at CIA 183?

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. All right, I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is a cable, is it not, from CIA Headquarters back to the Mexico City station responding to the earlier cable from the station reporting Oswald's contact?

Mr. Shaw. That is what it looks like to me.

Mr. Goldsmith. The fifth paragraph of that cable requests that the station keep Headquarters advised of any further contacts or positive identification of Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. Yes.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether the station ever sent any additional information to Headquarters concerning Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not, and I do not recall ever seeing this cable, either.

Mr. Goldsmith. Today is possibly the first time that you have seen that cable?

Mr. Shaw. It could well be, yes. You may have one with my initials on it, but I doubt it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Looking at CIA 183, there is an arrow pointed to the word "Henry", "Lee Henry Oswald." Adjacent to the arrow it says "sic," s-i-c.

What do you think Mr. Scott was intending to indicate when he wrote "sic" next to the "Henry" in "Lee Henry Oswald"?

Mr. Shaw. I would rather suspect that he wrote this on here subsequent to the assassination when the word came out it was "Harvey Oswald" rather than "Henry Oswald" unless there is something in here that says "Harvey." Is there any?

Mr. Goldsmith. No, there is none.

Mr. Shaw. I would imagine that is something he wrote on later so that they would get the file in the right name. That would be my guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Would you now take a look at CIA No. 14. You may also want to take a look at CIA No. 15 at the same time.

(Pause)

Would you identify the document that you just reviewed?

Mr. Shaw. What it looks like is a normal LIENVOY transcription. I see my name up here, but I don't see anything that indicates that I ever saw it. It looks like Scott and Goodpasture made checks on it. There is my name, but there is no indication, no initial on my part. Probably I did not see it.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that transcript?

Mr. Shaw. 28 September 1963 is what is listed on here.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you recall whether you ever saw that transcript before?

Mr. Shaw. I do not recall. I must have seen it afterwards, because I know Sylvia Duran was a person who had dealt with Oswald.

Mr. Goldsmith. When was the first time that this transcript was linked to Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let us backstep for a moment. The transcript that appears at CIA No. 13 contains a notation in brackets by the transcriber that this is the same person who called a day or so ago.

Mr. Shaw. To the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. Goldsmith. Yes.

Oswald also said I was there last Saturday. The transcript you just looked at, September 28th, was for a Saturday.

Do you recall whether anyone ever came to you and asked you whether you were aware of a contact by Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. I do not recall that anybody ever came to me, and I do not think that they did. This sounds familiar. I would have heard about this after the assassination, because I remember Sylvia Duran was the person being a Mexican citizen inside the Cuban Embassy who I dealt with.

Mr. Goldsmith. In other words, the point I was making on the October 1st transcript, it refers back to something that happened a day or two earlier, possibly Saturday, and I wondered if Herb Minnell, when they were discussing this, came to you to discuss this matter?

Mr. Shaw. I do not believe they did. Barbara probably would have processed this, but I do not recall that anybody ever came to me about it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Fine. Would you please now take a look at CIA Nos. 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20?

(Pause)

Mr. Shaw. Here you have one that I saw. Those are my initials -- No. 19. I did not see this one.

Let me see what we have got here.

(Pause)

I have read it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, you have read through CIA document No. 22.

Mr. Shaw. Yes, I have not read them carefully, but I have looked them over.

Mr. Goldsmith. Taking a look at CIA No. 16, could you identify that document?

Mr. Shaw. This is a LIENVOY transcript.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it a summary or a verbatim transcript?

Mr. Shaw. It is a summary.

Mr. Goldsmith. What is the date of that transcript?

Mr. Shaw. According to the thing in the margin, 27 September '63, 1963. This is really the same darned thing here.

Mr. Goldsmith. The same as the transcript that appears on CIA No. 17?

Mr. Shaw. It appears to be.

Mr. Goldsmith. Approximately what time was this phone call received?

Mr. Shaw. It looks like something put on by pen, "Five minutes after 4:00 in the afternoon." MF means a woman -- is that MF?

Mr. Goldsmith. Do not worry about that.

When was the first time you saw this transcript?

Mr. Shaw. I do not remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you see it before the assassination?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Your name appears in the right-hand corner.

Mr. Shaw. My name appears there. However, it is not crossed out. If you turn over a couple of pages, you will see my initials on another thing which deals with the same period.

Mr. Goldsmith. I will do that in a minute.

Do you know whether this transcript was linked to Oswald prior to the assassination?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know whether it was or not. I gather it was not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Shaw. It does not say. There is no mark on it, Oswald on here anywhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. What are these numbers on the bottom right-hand --

Mr. Shaw. That is the file number.

Mr. Goldsmith. What file would that be?

Mr. Shaw. That says subject file. 50-8-10-6. I do not know off-hand what that is. I think the 50 stands for Mexico. 8-10-6 would be a subject file.

Probably, possibly someplace where they put information on people where they are trying to travel to the Soviet Union. I do not know; that is a guess.

Mr. Goldsmith. Let's take a look at CIA No. 19.

Mr. Shaw. Okay. CIA No. 19, 27 September, that looks like my initial. It is very similar.

Mr. Goldsmith. In the upper right-hand corner?

Mr. Shaw. I cannot imagine anyone else putting it there.

Mr. Goldsmith. This is the conversation that took place later in the day, is that correct?

Mr. Shaw. 27 September 63, right.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it fair to say that this conversation took place sometime around 4:26 in the afternoon, according to the documents?

Mr. Shaw. There is an indication there.

Mr. Goldsmith. When did this document first come to your attention?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea, because there is no date up there. I do not know when it was circulated or anything.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know when it was first linked to Oswald?

Mr. Shaw. I do not.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Herbert or Barb Minnell ever come to you to discuss this transcript or conversation with you in reference to the transcript dated October 1st?

Mr. Shaw. Not that I remember.

Mr. Goldsmith. At the bottom of CIA No. 19, it says copy Oswald P-file. Essentially, do you know when that notation was put on?

Mr. Shaw. I do not know.

Mr. Goldsmith. Turning back to CIA-177, there is a notation on the left-hand side of the page. It says, D:200-5-41. Do you know what that would refer to?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea what the D stands for. The 200-5-41 sounds like a file number.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know for what?

Mr. Shaw. No, I do not, but I would assume, again, that maybe that would be -- if it is in the 50 series, it would be a Mexico City file. But it may be a Headquarters -- is this a Mexico City document, or a Headquarters document?

Mr. Goldsmith. This is a Headquarters document.

Mr. Shaw. That is a Headquarters file number. I have no idea what the D stands for. It does not look right.

Mr. Goldsmith. I have asked this question before, but for the record and purposes of clarification, I would like to ask you again, to your knowledge, after the Mexico City station received the cable from Headquarters dated October 10th or 11th, did the Mexico City Station ever send any additional information concerning Oswald to Headquarters?

Mr. Shaw. To my knowledge, they did not, but I would have no way of knowing.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever speak to Herb Minnell about this?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Barbara Minnell?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Dave Phillips?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. What, if anything, do you know about the arrest of Sylvia Duran shortly after the assassination?

Mr. Shaw. I remember that Sylvia Duran was arrested. I do not know why. I could have suggested that myself, but I do not remember.

I do remember sending a message to Winn Scott suggesting that, right after the assassination, that the Mexicans put in a ring of guards around the Cuban Embassy and question everybody going in and out. I remember that idea coming out of my head.

I know that Sylvia Duran was arrested. She was fair game because she was a Mexican national and the Cubans -- she did not have any Cuban diplomatic immunity.

I would have thought it would have been a good idea to question here very closely. As to whether I said that she should be arrested or I had anything to do with that, I do not know. I was perfectly capable of making such a suggestion.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Headquarters was upset about that arrest?

Mr. Shaw. I have no idea.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know why Headquarters did not want any Americans to confront her or to interview her?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any reason to believe that Oswald may have been an agent of the KGB?

Mr. Shaw. I have no reason to believe it.

Mr. Goldsmith. How about an agent, asset or source of the CIA?

Mr. Shaw. I would think that that would be completely out of the question.

Mr. Goldsmith. For purposes of the record, could you explain why you think that would be out of the question?

Mr. Shaw. Because I think it would have come to light immediately had he had any CIA connections.

Mr. Goldsmith. In what manner?

Mr. Shaw. Somebody would have revealed this fact.

Mr. Goldsmith. Had he been an agent of the CIA, asset or employee, is it possible that someone would have been able to cover that fact up?

Mr. Shaw. I do not think anyone could have covered up.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why not?

Mr. Shaw. Had he been an agent, then it would have been on the record somewhere.

Mr. Goldsmith. Is it possible that the record could have been erased or purged in some way?

Mr. Shaw. I seriously doubt it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Could you give a reason?

Mr. Shaw. Just my belief in the integrity of the organization. It stands on that, and the people in it.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does the Agency, to your knowledge, have any safeguards to prevent records from being erased or purged?

Mr. Shaw. Nowadays, of course, we have laws which say you can't destroy material. I would say that the safeguards again come back to the basic integrity of the people in the organization. When you lose a President, you do not mess around, and I think everybody would have turned over every possible stone to find out anything they could that would be useful in determining the responsibility for that assassination.

I know I would have. I was a Kennedy man, and I imagine there were a lot of us in the outfit who identified very closely with the President.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did you ever know anybody by the name of Maurice Bishop?

Mr. Shaw. No.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you know whether David Phillips, or anyone else, ever used the name Maurice Bishop as an operational alias of some kind?

Mr. Shaw. I am not aware that they did, but I would have to answer your question no. Dave Phillips does not seem like a Maurice type, somehow.

Mr. Goldsmith. Did Headquarters ever criticize the Mexico City station in any way for its handling of the Oswald matter prior to the assassination?

Mr. Shaw. Not that I am aware of.

Mr. Goldsmith. For that matter, after the assassination?

Mr. Shaw. Not that I am aware of. I must add that criticism would have been conveyed to the Chief of Station rather than to the case officers.

Mr. Goldsmith. When Oswald returned to the United States from the Soviet Union, would it have been standard operating procedure for the Agency to have interviewed him or debriefed him in some way?

Mr. Shaw. No. I think that it would have been more likely for the FBI to interview him.

Mr. Goldsmith. Why is that?

Mr. Shaw. Because he was an American citizen in the United States. That was the FBI's territory.

Mr. Goldsmith. Even though Oswald worked for several years -- not for several years, but for some time -- in a radio factory while he was in Russia?

Mr. Shaw. I was not aware that he worked in a radio factory, but the fact that he had been in the Soviet Union, the fact that he had been in the United States Marine Corps, would indicate to me that if he had been interviewed, he would have been interviewed by the FBI.

Mr. Goldsmith. Does not the Agency have a Domestic Contacts Division, or service, which customarily interviews people who have been abroad in Communist countries?

Mr. Shaw. The Agency has the Domestic Contacts Division. It used to be called O/O Contacts. I never worked with those people.

It is my understanding that what they do is routinely debrief, if the person is willing, businessmen -- in the old days, tourists -- who had visited the Soviet Union, or to debrief a man who might have other involvement in the Soviets would not, I believe, have fallen within the purview of the 0/O Contacts Branch.

Mr. Goldsmith. Do you have any knowledge of the operational activity of the CI/SIG Branch of the CIA?

Mr. Shaw. No. I do not know what SIG means. I have never heard of CI/SIG.

CI is Counterintelligence staff. I don't know what SIG is.

Mr. Goldsmith. Mr. Shaw, I would like to thank you for your testimony today. I especially would like to thank you for spending all of this time with us. I know that you have been here since approximately 3:00 o'clock or so and it is now about 7:30. You have been very patient.

Customarily, whenever a witness testifies before the Committee, the witness is given an opportunity to make a statement for the record. This is not a hearing, but I would like to give you the same opportunity, if you would like to take advantage of it.

Mr. Shaw. Well, I might take advantage of it. I had not thought about it until you mentioned it, but harkening back to what I said a little while ago, I do believe that our organization was made up of, like Bill Colby has on the cover of his book over there on the next table, of honorable men, and I do not think that anyone in the organization would have allowed any cover-up or any destruction of evidence which might shed some light on the assassination of President Kennedy.

I might add a little vignette. We had what it called a Libra Pecima which is a book that the people signed when they come to a funeral or something. You may have run into something like this in the states, when you go in and sign in at the funeral parlor that you were there or something. You express your regrets -- pecima, in Spanish, means regrets, or sorrow.

We had a book down in the lobby of the Embassy building and when I came out one day shortly after the assassination somebody in the crowd yelled Spanish for Bob, and I went over and it was the Governor of the State of Sonora, which is a big state up in northwestern Mexico. I had known him some years earlier. He was the son of the General who was the outstanding military leader of the Mexican Revolution from about 1913 to about 1920.

His father had been President of Mexico. His father was assassinated, having been elected to a second term. He was already elected; he had not taken office.

I was profoundly touched by the presence of this son of an assassinated President in the lobby of our Embassy to, in turn, express his sorrow to us for the assassination of our President.

That does not prove anything one way or another, but it made a tremendous effect on me.

As I mentioned very early in our session today, I am not aware that there was any exultation, satisfaction, or happiness inside the Cuban Embassy over the assassination of the President. And I think, and my personal belief is, that everything points to Lee Harvey Oswald having done it, and done it alone.

There is nothing I have ever seen or heard which would lead me to accept, for one moment, any complicity on the part of my Agency or any other agency of the United States government.

Mr. Goldsmith. Thank you, Mr. Shaw.

I would like to add that as soon as the transcript of this deposition is available, we will be in touch with you so that you can have an opportunity to review it for accuracy and again, I would like to thank you for your time and help today.

Mr. Shaw. I thank you, gentlemen.

(Thereupon, at 7:30 p.m. the Executive Session recessed.)

- - -

CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Rosemary C. Tascione, the officer before whom the foregoing deposition was taken, do hereby certify that the witness whose testimony appears in the foregoing deposition was duly sworn by the Notary; that the testimony of said witness was taken by myself, stenomask reporter, and thereafter reduced to typewriting under my direction; that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the parties to the action in which this deposition was taken, and further, that I am not a relative or employee of any attorney or counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor financially or otherwise interested in the outcome of the action.

Rosemary C. Tascione
REPORTER

Box 6
F11
#28A

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED

OLC 78-2091
1 June 1978

Done except Casasin

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: House Select Committee on Assassinations Request

1. (S) The HSCA requests the following persons be made available for deposition. Depositions are conducted in the HSCA office spaces.

B. Hugh Tovar — Deposition 28 June 78
William S. Donnelly — Deposition 27 June 78
Thomas B. Casasin — UNESCO - Paris - NOC - resigned
(T) Jacques Richardson

2. (S) The Committee also requests the following persons be made available for interviews. The interviews will be conducted in Agency office spaces.

Marguerite D. Stevens - OS - ret. 2 June 1968
Walter P. Haltigan (P) - (T) = James [illegible] 5E
Robert G. Lamprell - (P) - (T) = Wm R Sinclair
interviews 13.6
died

3. (U) This request was presented verbally on 1 June 1978 and is made an official written request by virtue of the HSCA senior representative whose signature appears below on behalf of the Committee.

Rodger
RODGER S. GABRIELSON

Michael Goldsmith
Michael Goldsmith
House Select Committee on Assassinations

6/6/78
Date

Distribution:
Orig - OLC/Subj
1 - OGC (Rininger)
1 - SA/DO/O (Shepanek)
1 - OLC/Chrono
OLC/RSG/ksn

E2 IMPDET CL BY

~~SECRET~~

3991

P. 2nd file

Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3342 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515
(202) 225-4624

Box 11
F10
OLC # 78-22
Item 1
COMMITTEE SENSIT

July 19, 1978

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
as redacted

STURBITTS, LA DIV,
Responding.

Mr. Scott Breckinridge
Principal Coordinator/HSCA
Office of Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Breckinridge:

This letter is written to follow-up the conversation that Chairman Stokes had with Admiral Turner.

The following are those individuals that the Committee would appreciate the assistance of the Agency in arranging interviews with in Mexico next week:

05 June Cobb Sharp [- [illegible] agent] Castro mistress -
[(Henry P. Lopez) = (Edward G. Tichborn) - (Staff agent, ret. [illegible]).
Gen. Jose Jesus Clark Flores - 24
[Manuel Calvillo - unwitting coopte]
Al Witrich (sp?)
Luis Alberu Suoto
Consuelo Esperon
Noe Palomares
Ramon Joseph Alvarez Durant -
[LIONION I]

If additional identifying data is required, I will be glad to provide it orally.

Because information referring to some of the people listed above may be of a sensitive or classified nature, this letter may require appropriate classification.

Sincerely,

G. Robert Blakey

G. Robert Blakey
Chief Counsel and Director

Ed Lopez - Michael Goldsmith
to Mexico 24-28 July 1978.

GRB:dm

SECRET

COMMITTEE SENSITIVE

5782

2/IN

141-10015
~~140-10122~~

Daniel A. Parsons Genzman 5-12-78

Air Force cover

entered 1958 JOT jun. off. training

Ap 58 HQ (SE) Sept. 62 - terminate CIA relationship

end of 62

Jan. 63-4-Jan 66 Moscow

66-7 Vienna USIA cooling off

67-9 HQ 2yrs SE Covert Action

69-71 Munich

72-4 London

SE Div Moscow Branch would have admin. papers

Moscow - Cult. Attaché (USIA)

-deeply integrated

John Sager was supervisor

-senior officer

~~Sum~~ of 63 Paul Garbler - first COS

Cover - Dean Rusk, Edward R. Murrow

USIA cover

6 CIA max. at SU

Johnson - knew of as cult. writer

Korengold - knew

never utilized am. press

consular div. not utilized

Langelle - only CIA man when left → probably not

Montgomery - succeeded Abidian in summer of 62, png 6 mon. later (Penkovsky)

Gerzman
5-12-78

Montgomery,
Carlson, Dick Jacobs, DOS: [redacted]
William Jones, Davison

Joe Bulik - senior man at
HQ (SR9) on Penkovsky
Winters probably not Cland. Serv.
George Kisevalter - SR9 - Penkovsky

John Abidian replaced Langelle,
was coopted.

~~Norengold~~ Goldberg - didn't know
Mosby - UPI - knew of
No CIA use
Jean Seberman - not staff, maybe coopted.

LHO - no HQ request on info

Ganzman
5-12-78

Index - Star - ref. #s → documents or files
↓
IBM
201 or operational activities file

name-grouping used for storage & retrieval

name-grouping tables
- alphabetical
- names from DDO correspondence according criteria. terrorists, KGB, etc.

matrinymic search

Pseud. - office assigns
manual file

J. Daniel A. Parsons [illegible] Genzman 5-12-78

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT as redacted

Air Force cover.

entered 1958 JOT jun. off training

Ap. 58 HQ (SE) Sept. 62 - terminate CIA relationship

end of 62

Jan. 63-4-Jan 66 (Moscow) ☆

66-7 (Vienna [redacted] cooling off

SE Div (Moscow Branch would have admin. papers)

67-9 HQ 2yrs SE Covert Action

69-71 (Munich

72-4 London)

[redacted] (Moscow \ - Cult. Attaché [redacted] ☆

(- deeply integrated)

John Sager | was supervisor

- senior officer

Summ. of 63 Paul Garbler - first COS ☆

[redacted]

☆ - excisions based on sensitivity of cover

[redacted] ☆

6 CIA max at SU

Johnson - knew of as cult. writer

Korengold - knew

never [redacted] utilized am. press

consular div. not utilized

(Langelle - only CIA man when left → probably not

(Montgomery - succeeded Abidian in summ. of 62, png 6 mon. later (Penkovsky

10141-10457

5-12-78

(Montgomery,
Carlson, Dick Jacobs,) DOS: [redacted]
William Jones, Davison)

Joe Bulik - senior man at
HQ (SR9) on Penkovsky
Winters probably not Cland. Serv.
George Kisevalter - SR9 - Penkovsky

(John Abidian) replaced (Langelle,)
was coopted.

Goldberg
~~Nosengold~~ - didn't know
Mosby - UPI - knew of
No CIA use
Jean Seberman - not staff; maybe coopted?

LHO - no HQ request on info

~~SECRET~~

Genzman
5-12-78

?

Index - Star - ref. #s → documents or files
IBM
201 or operational activities file

name-grouping used for storage & retrieval

name-grouping tables
- alphabetical
- names from DDO correspondence according criteria. terrorists, KGB, etc.

matrinymic search

Pseud. - office assigns
manual file

~~SECRET~~

SECRET Nosenko II 5-26 ①

talked to him up to mid march

Koptanich
FBI morris Taylor - Ret - taped
Donald Walker - Ret

James Wooton
FBI Elwood Turner - 1969 - tape

Solie - end of 1967 - tape

march 1964 FBI tape on Oswald
signed transcript

talked to John Barron - Inside KGB
went w/o agency approval

1960 - in Cuba month + a half

in Cuba - Security Officer - watch group ?

every Rep has university in capital

1959 - Oct - Senior Case Officer
Rastrusin - tells him LHO wants to defect

SECRET

SECRET

had nothing on LHO - cannot cover every tourist ②

spot interesting tourist (if American)

1) intelligence Community
2) fed gov worker
3) specialist on Russia - Prof, teacher
4) Students studying Russia
5) Am w/ Roots in Russia - use relatives, for leverage
6) watch groups for suspicious people
— must be intelligence
7) Big Corporation - military corporations - produce mil equipment

LHO not interesting
- nothing in FCD archives
- " " central "

not any position - place of work

didn't see any
- [illegible] written request to stay in Sov. Union by LHO
see Intourist document

showed material to chief of Section - went 1 Chief of 7th Dept - Dukas - reported to him - knew nothing - doesn't think it went any higher

first tells Intourist to turn down LHO
- not interesting

Day or 2 betw decision & wrists were cut

no newspaper articles from US on LHO defection were given to [illegible] N - would have received them

SECRET

③

SECRET

at writs

Botkin hosp - taken there

in hosp - kill himself if not allowed to stay

said lets have psych check him - given orders to Kos - 2 psych

use SOP of KGB to get psych

Both said mentally unstable

N saw reports
pages 1½ each

Intourist never made statement about being abnormal until then

show to chief of Dept the Reports
say let Intourist report to Sov govt - doesn't want to be involved

Let LHO stay - warning of relat betw Sov & US

KGB would do same w/ LHO if came out mentally stable

KGB never spoke to him - Sov Red Cross talks to LHO

R.C. couldn't tell N if LHO said he was a marine

SECRET

[redacted]

④

SECRET

if LHO said ~~he knew~~ U-2 info - KGB would go to him

as officer was ordered to go to KGB [illegible] as translator for Powers

SCD - American Directorate

50% of people at Powers trial were KGB

man from street cannot [illegible] go to [illegible] Powers trial

many officers in SCD knew of [illegible] U-2 before shot down

keep LHO - no bad publicity
given pension from Red Cross
pension - 700 rubles = 70 rubles

after [illegible] decision made - must prepare Minsk
SCD did not decide vs. Moscow
a for Minsk

no Knowledge

any defector -
only Moscow can { recruit a foreigner
or approach

end of 1959 prepare papers for Minsk

SECRET

Minsk Most **SECRET** ⑮

① Regular agent checking work

② correspondence opened + read + copy   P.K.

③ control of telephone - he had a phone - [illegible] am

④ periodical surveillance - KGB agents follow him

⑤ agents observation - agents in place of work + living

Know they did it - sees file in 1963.

typed up - N sees it

written by Krupnov

Dec 1959 - to other Dept.

1962 - Back to 7th Dept

1963 - chief of section responsible for auto tourist

Alekseyev - call from FCD

" shows cable to HQ from Mex City

says LHO visited embassy + applied for Visa

goes to chief of Dept -

Alekseyev - knows N supervises work on

Americans - comes to N. office

SECRET

SECRET

Alex + N alone in office

N didn't try to get LHO file - Remember LHO was
a not
go to chief of Dept

Moscow doesn't have to be notified of marriage

not usual to send cable like this to Moscow

go to chief of Dept - made decision
- Alex of N, chief + possibly chief of
America Section of 7th present

Chief of SCD calls N - contact Minsk
tell them to send whatever they have
tell them we send mil plane
ask them if they had contact with him

N talked to several people in Minsk
- Dep Chief of Second Dir of Belorussia

Chief of Section first person - tell him to send files by mil plane

then asked if contact w/LHO - told "no"
used passive - no contact or recruitment

~~talked~~ other knew case - didn't have
file

SECRET

[illegible] talk to Minsk for 3 or 4 min
- told re contact w/ LHO

had file 1-1½ hr.

Read of file is first part

went page by page

after looking thru it - Resumé

Read Summary on file done by Minsk
- one for 6 months
- one for observation

Kru ______ shev - told N he went to Minsk

2 or 3 days after assass.
plant where LHO worked - talked with workers w/ whom LHO worked
- LHO had shot

Marina's uncle - doesn't Remember any statement by uncle to LHO

met w/ Epstein, Fulton Osler - taped conver of 4 hrs.
only 1 hr. came out on tape

SECRET

⑧

3½ hrs. on Structure of KGB
30 min. about LHO

1962 - Pete Bagley
George

1964 - Bagley
George
Nick

in Germany Murphy - CSB Div - couple of Days

Feb in US - Bagley
Nick
John
Murphy
George

FBI
Taylor
Poptanich
Walker

1967 Solie
Brown

1975 # [redacted] CI Staff
Khalaris
Hugh Tovar
McCoy
Arlen Harvey
Vas Gemerkin
1969-71 - Mr. Peper

1978 FBI - Tom Palmenlee
instructs on work vs. American by KGB

SECRET

SECRET

First Lie Detector test
1964

said OK - willing to take it
Said all CIA people take it - he says some suburb of Wash

See Doctor - pulse
physical examination
nothing to eat or drink

before Lie detector - "something funny" - John Murphy invited John to dinner - gave him the feeling of double games - plants
little Lack of friendliness

tell him to leave clothes + go to another Room

wearing
white shirt
pants
shoes

didn't I know definite what his situation was - turmoil

[he is former CI officer]

John takes him to Lie Det person

John leaves

SECRET

SECRET

⑩

1 chair + equipment

asked him questions -

think in Russian

Lie det man - "doing his job"

told questions first + gave second time

then John Returns + shouts - you are Lying

no questions ON LHO

Angelton breaks due to embarrassment of Philby

drugs used on him -
halluc drugs
sleepy

Report about Drugs - see Hart

talk w/ psychologist

(took him by Douglas C27 - 25 seater)

SECRET

Bagley gives 10-12 page paper to sign.
- if sign then treatment changes.
- nature of confession
refuses to sign

Camp Perry

hunger strike - lost 40 lbs
TB started to recur

no typed words - 3½ yrs

Here - Nov 1967 - 1968 - everyday

photographic memory

[redacted]

Camp Perry - Polygraph - in 6

1966 or 67

led to room - one man
wearing clothes
Polygraph man - lie detection director
make him angry
tell about homosexual activity
ask about mission - plant
ans. questions truthfully
English questions
1 hr. of questions

after test - told he was lying

[redacted]

⑫

Polygr

SECRET

Solie 1968 - told beforehand
- present - Solie + questioner
several days of question
don't know if questions of LHO
don't remember LHO questions
1 - 1½ first day
came back next day - no hostility during
these tests

Helms

Colby

never saw Angleton face to face
— cannot judge someone on paper - must
must see eye-to-eye to make decision on someone

SECRET

SECRET

Nos ~~III~~

don't remember other defector rejected cause not interesting – only handful of defectors

allowed to marry Sov woman & leave Russia

no cases of Sov defector leaving Russia & returning to US.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

Briefing 2/14/78

Bill Donnelly - Chief of Information Services Staff
Mike Cuffy?
Lee Coyle
Virginia Jones

Opening of 201
Operational interest
Trace would be conducted → bring together existing materials → open 201
Trace produces computer printout w/ refs., not documents. In early '60s, it produced index cards.
Who opens 201?
Case officer - it's his judgement which determines whether of
If no indication of continuing interest, 201 may not be opened.
If it's an Am. & info. comes from a source such as FBI, CIA may not open a 201.
If this type of info. comes in, it would go into index
There are certain criteria
1) Recruitment
2) High-Level Communist officials

There are some operations which are run out of headquarters, in which case, a case officer is involved.

PRQ. Pt. I - bio info.
Pt. II - more extensive
- might indicate op. involvement

There should be a doc. indicating reasons why a part. person is not recruited.
There should be a reference in 1st file to document in 2nd file if there is one.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

0001742

~~SECRET~~

②

Info. in PRQ I is info. elicited from others.
" " " II is info. from person if he is recruited → ∴ they want it separated, to be viewed only on "need-to-know" basis.
Standard form for opening 201 file - would not contain reason; would contain ref. to a document which would be the reason.
201 #'s are assigned by a particular office - they are opened in sequential numerical order as request for openings occur.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

201 would contain photo if agency has one - if it has been sent in from field.
If photo is sent in from field or another agency after 201 has been opened, it would be added to 201.

Doc. "Review of 201 File on U.S. Person" - Person is categorized by a review of the file using specific criteria.

PRQ I does not imply a PRQ II.
Normally PRQ I & PRQ II would exist in the same file. If PRQ II contains primarily op. info., then it would be maintained in separate file, to which ~~would be~~ a reference would be made.
If operational info. is ~~ex~~ very sensitive, the entire 201 would have limited access.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

True name & cryptonyms are not maintained on the same list.
On 201 req. form, there is room for a cryptonym, but it is not filed in a true name file.

There is a table of contents list of what is available in 201 file
This is compiled from abstract record list - in computer system

Green list check: Info. gathered as ~~the~~ a result of SIGINT or COMINT.
K list check: also a separate check, but Cuffy doesn't know what it checks.

③

CIA – State Dept. integration

"Fig leaf" cover – where S.D. employees are aware that CIA emp. is in fact employd by not

More integrated cover where a person would do a full-time S.A. job & also a CIA job which is unbeknownst to rest of S.D. employees. — could be a "deep official cover" as well as a "deep cover"

Central Cover Staff

Am. citizens or most foreigners being used in some manner would, as a general rule, have a security check.

If that person was an official of another govt. agency or from military, that org. would have to be consulted.

Probably would use ~~that~~ org's

PCS – Policy & Co-ord. Staff

↳ would be involved in co-ord. of a project in which both the CIA & another org. was involved

To the extent of CIA involvement, files would be maintained. That is not to say ~~that~~ the other would not have more comprehensive files.

Project file

Graphics –

OCR

OCR – Office of Central ~~Registry~~ Reference – part of NFAC ~~photos~~ of ships, ~~things~~ of intelligence nature are maintained there.

Photos of prominent persons – in Bureau

Photos of tourists or random groups would not be of interest

Finance Office Vouchered / Unvouchered Funds

P & L : Prescribed & Limited – refers to communications which are compartmentalized

Opening of P & L channel of comm. is determined by one of 3 persons — Chief of PCS, ADDO, or DDO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

④

This has always been true — In earlier times, it may have been restricted by even fewer persons.
P & R communication may, in time, be downgraded; may never be destroyed.

Is it possible, in context of a CI threat, in case of our hypothetical that info. would not be compiled in a 201 file? Yes, it is conceivable that many docs. could exist in the system & not be compiled into a 201 if there doesn't appear to be a reason for a 201

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pseudo: false name used for purposes of communication
Crypto: used to id. area of ops. by digraph, followed by group of letters
You cannot assign a cryptonym w/out having a 201 #

If hypo. Am. soldier ~~who~~ has given away mil. secrets & then defects, a 201 file would not necessarily have been opened — it might be a mil. matter.
CI staff may have had interests in defector
In early 60's, there was an interest in defectors.

Dan's hypo based on ZRRIFLE:
574 A form: request to put doc. into system
? 1897 " : " " " " into index
In op. such as ZRRIFLE, docs. may be severely P & R - might ~~not~~ never go into system except upon determination of officer handling case.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Sleeper agent" hypo: to run 2 or 3 sleepers in Comm. China - [redacted] doesn't necessarily have to know @ it since it is being run from Hqtrs. - from DDP to CI Staff - reasonable scenario

Would a 201 be opened on sleeper?
Competing ' of secrecy vs. being able to keep track of sleeper

Change of sleeper to Am. soldier defecting to E. Germany, - no 201 opened - C.O. in E. Ger. - - report comes in ~~ff~~ from reliable source stating that sleeper is providing info.

⑤

Plans would take place in small room in CI Staff.
Form must be signed by DDO — would be put into op. file on the subj.
Op. File would be held at CI staff desk or at action desk.
Problems : Communication
: Equipment

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Op. files can generally be destroyed according to guidelines.

Is it possible for someone to have both a 201 file & Staff Personnel File? yes

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1/26/78 TO Frates

Records Administration — helps diffe directorates set up records sys
— Bruce Johnson
+ George Frates

RID - defunct designation for part of Info Services Staff that handles DDO records



REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DDO has a filing sys unto itself

Any DD can call upon RA to give assistance. But DD can also design its own filing sys so long as RA's legal guidelines are followed. But RA usually is informed of how the other filing sys work.

Day to day maintenance of files is decentralized.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISS central sys is also heart of indiv ~~di~~ division C.I. and systems.
- for items of record value

Special materials might not go into central file. ie Special Correspondence.

"Prescribed & Limited" info

- highly sensitive info - limited distri to certain indivs

Designation as P&L is made by DDO & senior staff officer

P&L designation - deep cover agent in hostile territory might receive this designation.

- this P&L designation would not be uncommon in cases of this kind.

10 or 15 yrs ago, w/ super sensitive operations, this was relatively common.

* Possi for something to be so sensitive that no 201 file is assigned.

CI staff has gone over accumulation of many yrs & is now catching up to place names in central index.

possi ~~to~~ that situation where a P+L file is no longer [illegible] to locate.

- lost, destroyed, archived.

Could open 201 file w/o giving indication of prior assoc w/ CIA. This, according to Johnson, would be irresponsible.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Georg Frater

Cryptonym would be in 201 file.

201 - need for a continuing interest in order to open a file.

source
asset
adversary
KGB [illegible]
collaborator

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Counterintelligence threat
→ 201 file would be opened w/i matter of days or a wk — assuming source is accurate.

i.e. an American serviceman ~~given~~ in Germany who is giving info to Russians.

To locate where documents were filed prior to being placed in file, refer to ~~ex~~ abstract sys under document #.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

If ~~sleeper~~ Amer. soldier in Ger is actually sleeper who w[illegible] ... no 201 file & ~~open~~ # assigned to him, it is possi that his ~~cr~~ case officer would prevent opening of a 201 file #.

---

applies to all intelligence agencies → Intragency source register exists ⇒ avoids poss. of > 1 agency hiring same agent.

Graphics index - will not contain routine pictures of tourists or groups

201 files will not nec'ly contain pictures.

See next page

There is no centralized ~~action~~ name index correlated to ~~crypts~~ 201s

— ~~Best~~ [illegible] not certain, but did say ~~the~~ this info would not be retained for record purpose.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possi for 201 file not to contain crypt.

deepcover - these people don't have 201's in their true name.

201's are not opened in pseudonym

Bob Barton.

There is only ~~1~~ version of a 201 file - no copies. Local offices have working files.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Files other than 201

subject files - particu target.
project files
policy + mgmt.

~~SECRET~~

Project files
└ for every project in wh ~~run by~~ Agency's involved, even if project run by another org (i.e. DOD).

cover staff - involved in creation of cover.

# of people involved in setting up deep cover persons would be at least 12.
— unless you slave to DOD

such ~~co~~ deep cover programs do exist.

There is a central listing of cryptonyms. From this list you get true name, then go to 201 file if there is one.

Staff personnel
└ no duplicates of 201's

agent file will include "trail of association."

There is no card filing sys by true name, pseudonym, crypt, & 201.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

There is no ~~pers~~ staff officer or asset filing indicating what operations /projects the staff officer/asset was involved in.

continuous employee relationship w/ US govt.

Case officer = SA in ~~FBI~~
Contract ~~em~~ support capacities
agents ~~are~~ or unpaid people who are controlled by CIA.
agent & asset may be the same.
" is not nec'ly a
agent bec as " is " always controlled

source - provider of info
asset - ~~may~~ someone who may provide a service or info.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Name ck process - procedure to learn what is known about a person.
-involves a ck of ~~the~~ files
results ~~will~~ go into 201 file if there is one.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

201 files are generally in sequence.

Name cks are always done w/ opening of 201.

True id may be kept out of 201, + it would be worked in cryptonyms.

There is a centralized filing sys by true name, pseudonym, crypt, + 201 ~~#~~. - called a true name index.

[Sec offi[illegible] may be [illegible]ling its dual filing sys]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fretar
201
subject - countries, projects

exist for all projects that CIA is involved in.

support files
Finance ~~receiving~~ receipts,
there will be a crypt file
Logistics - automobiles, clothing, supplies
Communications - ~~cables~~ chrono file on cables; microfilmed.
Security - security file; under pseudonym.
personnel - files on applicants + agency employees.
for agents - 2 file in office of security
Overt
covert
biog data, results of sec. investigation. assignments,

anything that he does when he's overseas i.e. writing a dispatch, ~~projects~~ assignments listed* in sec file.

Medics - ~~med~~ medical histories on all staffers + some agents if they can get it.
psych profile

training - agents, reps, secretaries, officers

ODP (office of data processing) - put tog programs used by agencies so those programs relate to computers,

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Wolf

CIA Briefing - January 26, 1978

Records Admin. Branch - w/in DDA

RID → subsumed into ISS - Inf. Services Staff - only DDO

DDA
|
ISAS - Info. Systems Analysis Staff
|
Records Admin. Branch

Can be used for any level w/in any Division, but anyone can design their own systems, providing they inform RAB so that they can monitor compliance.

"Family Jewels Collection":

Highly sensitive & compartmented info. tends to be diverted from central records.

Guidelines for handling & maintaining secret but not for completing "bigot list" emphasis on limiting access.

↳ P & L

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

p.2

"Prescribed & Limited" Distribution (P&L): doesn't cover files but info., communications

"Sleeper" hypo: Operation could have been so sensitive as to be kept out of filing, indexing system, particularly 10-15 years ago.

May have been handled out of front offices; may not have even rec'd. 201 file #.

201 #'s: assigned by ISS; were assigned by RID 10-15 yrs. ago

Files were not designated "P&L", but were "restricted" to confined jurisdictions.

Cryptonym assignment: part of ISS - Central Top Secret & Cryptic Reference Staff

"Sleeper" would have to have a cryptonym for op. purposes. Would list cryptonym w/201 # → ∴ no name, not in STAR system

Bob Bertone - Basis for opening a 201 file:

Some sense of "continuing interest" either as a potential source, agent, KGB official - can be either for operational or counter-intell. purposes

Could be either to consolidate several references in STAR system

Could be opened in response to one reference - Ex.: 1 credible source ref. to some suspected KGB person

201 could be opened in a matter of hrs., days or weeks if someone recognized info. of significance on part. person

"Files content listing" - supplemental listing from STAR system

When did system start? Abstract system of STAR: could find prior references to a part. document

sometime in '60's

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED
REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

p.3

Central Source Register

Ask Grigg for details — Interagency Source Register: in effect probably since beg. of CIA (of Intelligence Agencies) – doesn't include regular personnel – only assets – would be based on true names – wouldn't contain sensitive sources

201 files would not necessarily contain a photograph. Even if photo existed, it may not have been in 201 file but may be X-ref. to a specific desk.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Graphics collection in DDI

Ask Grigg — Indiv. desks will collect photos of persons of interest
may Contain~~s~~ photos of terrain, etc. Not particularly interested in group pics., etc.

Listing of assets – would be maintained in a working manner at separate desks.

Ref. Grigg — DDO would be only place where there would be access to this type of listing.

By & large, no 201 files on employees, unless there was an op. interest prior to employment → Official Personnel File

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Opening docs. of 201 files would contain refs. to clearance papers (which would be maintained in Sec. Office)

Emp. under deep cover → Staff Agent – his files would be converted & would appear under his pseudonym.

Don't open 201's on pseudonyms, but would open one on cryptonyms.

p.4

Only 1 copy of a 201 file; may be a working field copy

Subject files:
Project files:
Policy & mgmt. files

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Project file: operational mgmt. record of a given project
A. Administration
B. Support
C. Production
201 would have info on asset involved in project; project file's info is on operation itself.

See Gregg Operational Details

Central list of cryptonyms - where they're registered - you can match the cryptonym with the true name. The more sensitive the asset or operation → the more difficult it will be to get to true name.

Hard file: Official information
Soft file: includes working papers - anything of record value in soft file would be included in hard file.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

? Project files: where are approval, decision-making records filed?

Personnel File contains: when worked; supervisor's name; type of work done; evaluations
Does not contain specific operations in which employee was involved.

p.5

Employees
↳ Case officers – intelligence officers

Contract employees
Agents: may or may not be paid; represent assets who are under their control
Asset: someone from whom they can get useful services, including
Source: Source of information

Ask Gregg PRQ: Basic biog. info.
Way of ordering available info.
Fundamental doc in an agent's 201 file.

Name check (= trace) process includes check of following:
STAR trace
Travel files
Office of Security
Provisional Oper. Approval
Also do name checks for other agencies

Negative AM/LASA name trace –
Green check list:

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

p.6 George Fratas

Subject Files : countries, projects, misc.
201 Files : individuals

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Would be a matter of routine to maintain files on another operation originating in another agency.

Agent:
201 :
Office of Security
" of Finance :
CI Staff might have info.

Finance: acctgs., vouchers, receipts ; will have a cryptonym file
Logistics: support - autos, clothing, etc. necessary to run operations
Communications: cables, telegraphs
Maintain a chrono. file on cables - on microfilm
Cables are logged in w/ a number, date, station
Security : Security files - listed under pseudonym if an agent
" " true name if an employee

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Started to eliminate dual filing @ mid-'60's

~~[illegible]~~ Agents- 2 files - each with the same #
Overt - true name Covert - pseudonym - listed in index

Ask DDO - Would an agent ever operate under a pseudonym

→ If it has pseudonym → he is in file
(overt) True name: biog. data, results of bckgrd. check, security violations & assignments
(covert) Pseudonym: contains everything the person did = lists where

p.7

he worked, what he did, etc.

If an agent, it would have a POA for each project the agent was involved in.

If a staff employee it will only have a list of assignments.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Medics: Medical histories on all staffers; on agents if they can get it
Psychological profiles

Training: Train agents, mgrs., secys., officers
Run all training centers

Office of Data Processing: Put together programs used by computers.

Personnel: applicants for agency employ.
all agency employees

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(true name index)
DDO has central index which X-refs. true names, cryptonyms, pseudonyms & 201 numbers.

OS
OP

2/13/78

SECRET 0002330

Periodic File Summary
(one component)

Alexis Davison: A *Nedelya* article named one Malcom Toon as the supervisor of CIA operations in the Moscow embassy.

Daniel Carswell - after his return from Cuba in April of 1963. His travel was restricted until August 1963. Carswell is 6', 180 lbs, has grey eyes and brown hair. He was imprisoned with Eustace H. Danbrunt and Edmund R. Taransky.

Luis Posada:
1960. - member of the Frente Revolucianario Jose A Echevarria in Cuba.
1961 - on February 25 Posada sought political asylum in the Argentine embassy in Mexico City. He arrived in the U.S. on February 28. In April of 1961 he was trained for the Bay of Pigs

SECRET

SECRET

invasion in Gautemala. In October 1961 he took a job with the Firestone Rubber Company, Akron Ohio. He stayed at this job until March of 1963.

1963 - On February 21, 1963 the CIA put into motion the beauracratic machinery necessary for an interview of Posada. In March of 1963 Posada joined the United States Army. He served a Fort Benning Georgia in the ~~1st Battalion,~~ 2nd Platoon (weapons), Co. B, 1st Battalion, 29th Infantry, Brigade 197. In June 23rd he divorced his wife, Maria Concepcion Castaneda Napoles in Chicago, (PDOB: 1931, Cardenas, Martanzas, Cuba; married 1955; last known address: 6540 Seville St., Apt. C, Hunington Park, CA.) In August the CIA ~~granted permission for an interview~~

SECRET

[redacted]

NOTIFIED THE INTERVIEWING COMPONENT THAT the FBI HAD NO objection to THE INTERVIEW. ~~of Posada~~ Posada claims that he joined JURE at some point during this year.

1964. Posada left the U. S Army in March with the rank of 2nd lieutenant. In September he claims he was employed by the Pan Am Eterminating Co. 275 S.W. 6th St, Miami. He also claims to have been representing JURE in the Dominican Republic in 1964 ~~and 1965~~.

1965. In April Posada is in Miami working as an autobody repairman when he ~~is~~ was recruited as a training instructor. A name check returned positive from FBI, ONI, I+NS, the ~~Adjunct~~ ADJUTANT Generals Office and the Army Chief of ~~Security~~ STAFF FOR Intelligence. The FBI reportedly has evidence

6002333

SECRET

of Posada's involvement in a plot to kill Castro in this year.

NOTE: Posada claims to have been the chief instructor for JURE camps for three MONTHS ~~years~~ ~~in 196~~ an unspecified year in the early 60's.

Additional info:

1. AKA: Luis Clemente Carriles
   Bambi Posada Carriles
   Bambi Carriles
   Julian Posada Carriles
   Julian Carriles

2. He has, at times, listed as references:

Carlos Porro, 395 E. Tallmadge, Akron, Ohio.
Antonio Garcia, 3604 S.W. 26th Terrace, Miami, Fla.
Segundo Ortes, 685 Carnegie Ave, Akron Ohio.
Dick Patterson, Akron, Ohio.

SECRET

3. SS # 265-72-1345

4. US Army #C-2312445

5. US Army dossier # 265-~~71~~ 72-1345

6. Posada ~~associates with~~ WAS IN CONTACT WITH ONE "Lefty" Rosenthal in Miami.

7. Posada claims to be an ~~excellent~~ GOOD Marksman.

Cesear Diosdado

DOB 8/16/21, Lorado, Texas. employed in 1961 WITH CUSTOMS. HE SERVED AS A SOURCE FOR THE CIA. THE CIA REIMBURSED HIS SALARY TO CUSTOMS. Has allegedly been involved in gun running since 1957. Allegedly sold guns to a group planning an invasion of Haiti in 1966. In 1967 Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez told a press conference in Cuba that Diosdado was a CIA recruiting agent. Diosdado was the undercover agent who busted ~~Raymond~~ RICHMOND C. Harper in 1972 in a guns for heroin deal.

David A. Phillips:
(two components)

2/1/51 to 2/28/51	contract agent
11/25/52 " 7/31/53	" "
3/4/54 " 1/31/55	" employee
4/1/55 " 2/6/56	staff employee
~~8/13/58~~ "	
~~8/1~~	
2/7/56 to 8/13/58	staff agent
8/19/58 to 3/13/60	Cont. Ag. (Cuba)
3/14/60 to retire.	staff employ.
1961 - 1966	Mexico

in 1963 was in charge of Cuban Operations.

Mitchell L WerBell III
held provisional operational approval from 8/4/59 to 10/14/59. He has been characterized as a con man. In ~~Oct~~ AUG. and Sept 1962, he did try to get several Latin American governments to recognize a Cuban govern-

SECRET

0002336

nment in exile. He has ~~regularly~~ ON OCCASSION volunteered information to the CIA and has often impersonated CIA officers.

Associates: ~~in Cuban Affairs~~:

Edward McGill
Edward Lewis Bankston
Chester Gray AKA Zochowski.
Rolando Masferrer
Bruce Arman Baker
11379 President Drive N.E.
Blaine Village, Minn.
Robert Bayard
WAlter Joseph Meckem (Mackem)
PDOB 12/13/37, Omaha, Neb.
2609 N. Potomac
Arlington, VA.
Steve Van Cleave
Edward Manger
Paul Bethel
Charles Hall
Robert K. Brown.

SECRET

Werbell's POA was cancelled because the CIA determined he was trying to use the agency for personal reasons (more detail in 201 summary)

893-8100

[redacted]

HARDWAY

0002337 **SECRET** OS - HUNT

1

1949 joined CIA PPS/OPC

Was in Vienna in late 40's with Economic Coop. Admin. ~~where~~ before joining CIA.

12/11/50 resigned to accept position @ State.

There is no indication of his rejoining the Agency but there are clearances for his novels.

1951 - "The violent ones"
1951 - "Whisper Her Name"
while DCOS under State Cover. WHD
1952 - "Paris VIII"

1953 - is in Mexico - returns HQ in Feb. for reassignment

1953 - "Darkness on the Land"
rejected coz racism -
used psydonym? by Edwards

SECRET

HUNT

OS withdrew denial when it learned that Hunt would be reassigned to Latin America.

1954 travelling in Europe!
JAPAN

1957 assigned 3/1/57 to Montevideo, Uruguay — some kind of stir before assignment — re: lost cables. Hunt was polygraphed.

SKIPS to:

6/18/65 assigned to Madrid as an I.O.

1966 working @ NATO intelli.

1970 memo on Give us this Day. Bill Buckley was pushing it., Holt, Rhinehart declined to publish coz "too controversial."
ibid Arlington House

HUNT

Hunt left Montevideo in 1960

was in Cuba 12/7-15/56

Mexico 12/50 to 3/55

9/27/60 Hunt given alias "Edward J. Hamilton"

In 6/63 a po box was opened in D.C. for Hunt (woodridge STATION) under the alias.

10/60 assigned JMWAVE

box cancelled 6/65.

1970 retired.

7-60 to 10-60 assigned MCS
1/57 to 6/60 Montevideo.

7/60 to 3/61 was @ JMATE in MC & Coral Gables.

C002340

HUNT

Twicker compromised on 12/2/60 + cancelled. was assigned "Terence S. Crabanac."

- was COS in Montevidea

- President Nardone of Uruguay asked Eisenhower not to transfer Hunt.

Envelope:
"1960 Personal Information re: Auto accident, desire to stay on in Uruguan assignment and work related problems."

June 27, 1960

6/27/60 Hunt TDY to Cuba then to Mexico City on PCS under commercial cover. both JMARC Duties

SO for JMARC was Joseph Langan.

Hunt was polit. action officer, representative to FRD in ~~Cuba~~ Mexico.

C002341

HUNT

6/23 memo ~~from~~ to Dep Dir. SEC.; From DDS (Inves. + open. sup.). calls Hunt "something of a character and free wheeler". Hunt wants a gun + a automobile, convertable for use in M.C. - Langan would be happy if Hunt used on project.

Tracy Barnes denies pushing Hunt for position - says hes just an interested friend.

J.C. King informed of Security's reservations.

To Chief SRS/OS
From Chief RB/SRS/OS

MEMO DATED 24 JAN 1961

1/61 O.S. concerned coz Hunt is giving info on operations to Uraguian officials
"Subject has been a problem in the past and apparently

Hunt
continues to be a problem."

May 1962 effective 7/1/62 Hunt reassigned
to DDP/DODS
Facilities Branch
Research + Publications
3129-
1000-
1000.
D.C.
Chief of ~~branch or~~ Section
stayed on covert funding.
9/21/62 military cover
for Hunt established
with U.S. Army Element
, Composite Operations
Group. (8738)

11/15/61
Hunt reassigned to:
DDP/CA Staff
Plans + Research Group
Evaluation Branch
D.C.
C.F. to C.F.
from DDP/WH/Br 4/Temporary

Documents indicate that
Hunt knew Richard Ober
as far back as early

SECRET

HUNT

50's — worked operation with him in 9/61 (approved by Helms)

1/17/62 reassigned
DDP/CA Staff
Office of the Chief.
CF to CF.
2121-1000-1000

Envelope:
"Re Investigation + Apprasel Infor dtd 11/62 + 2/63"

Sanitized version:

11/62 Hunt requests that wife be allowed to work at Spanish Embassy — Security disapproved. - big to do, several documents, "Memorandum for the Record:

Subject: Procurement of Intelligence by Mrs. Dorothy L. Hunt.

1. On 25 February 1963, I delivered to Mr. W. Lloyd George, Chief, FI, thermofax copies of a memorandum and a letter of transmittal dated 18 and 20 February respectively. Both were prepared by Ambassador ~~Both were~~, Antonio Garrigues for Prince Stanislas Radziwill and taken to the latter in New York by Alfonso de Borbon, 2d Secretary of the Spanish Embassy in Washington.

2. The purport of the material was to enlist the aid of Radziwill in (a) persuading the President to visit Madrid during his next European trip, and (b) conveying to the President the views of

Hunt

Ambassador Garrigues regarding U.S.-Latin American relations.

3. Mr. George regarded the material to sensitive to be handled by routine means, and decided to show it only to Mr. Helms.

4. On 27 February 1963, Mr. George telephoned me to say that he had just shown the material to Mr. Helms who speculated whether he ought not take it to the White House at once. Mr. George demurred, pointing out the sensitivity of the source (my wife), whereupon Mr. Helms indicated that nothing should be done with the material until Mr. George returned from a Far East trip and could consider the matter further.

SECRET

HUNT

5. Mr. George then asked Mr. Helms whether my wife should register under the Foreign Agents Registration Act, and Mr. Helms said that under the circumstances she absolutely should not.

signed H. H. "

MEMO F.R.
4/18/63

by PATT
L.G.

This upset Agency because "Mrs. Hunt is engaging in intelligence collection in the United States — without any official sanction".

OS objects but C/FIS shows operational interest.

Hunt apparently @ DODS at liaise

George + Helms decide to have her stay on & so inform Security

10 MAY 63

SECRET

HUNT

1964 Hunt writes William Buckley's show on Invisible Government entitled: "Hate CIA week."

Letter from Buckely to Hunt attached to article. Cover Sheet (Routing + Record) says: "The ~~following~~ attatched draft column by Bill Buckly will appear in 75 U.S. newspapers.... The background of this placement is the fact that Buckeley worked for me as a Staff Agent in Mexico 1950-51 and we have remained close friends."

Copies to Helms + DCI.
6/1/64.

Re-Investigation Program waived for Hunt.

7/9/64 reassigned DDP/DDO
US Field / CA Staff

CF to CF 5129-0253

12

C002348

HUNT

2/16/55 reassigned to
DDP
Operational Services
Office of Chief
5-126-0117 CF to V.

Hunt resigned in 1965.
went into official State
cover.

15/8/68 Hunt worked as
DDP representative on
CIA team preparing
the historical material
for the Johnson Library.

Mr. Hunt will be required to have access to documents in both the TKH and BYEMAN systems.

[redacted] replaced Hunt
as polit. officer for
Frente in mid-March '61.

Hunt's book terms
Carr + Noel as "Col.
King's Crony" who were
active in non-frente
Cuban groups thereby
undercutting him.

455-4566

SECRET

C002349

13

HUNT

Hunt connection to A "Henry Durkin" via ~~Maxwell Wil~~ "C.W."

Voluntarily retired after this fracas.

Working on same operation in 1954 as Phillips.

Interview report 4/24/70 reason: retirement. states that Hunt has taken job @ Mullen & Co and that Karamessines has asked him to keep in touch. Also notes that Mullen does provide cover for agents.

Memo dated 2/22/74 For the record from Laurence J. Howe. re: interview of ~~Fred N. Evans.~~ Edward Ryan.

SECRET

HUNT

Hunt was assigned to Madrid between 7/65 + 9/66.
Ryan was DC/WED.
said Hunt's assignment was handled w/o benefit of routine processing.
was coordinated by Karamessines.
W.E. totally unaware of his activities, targets, etc.

Hunt was on "Contract A" Status at time.
2/1974 CIA tries to trace down K + what Hunt was doing.
2/15/74 memo of interview ~~on~~ ~~a~~ Budget O. who would have been responsible for Hunt's K etc:
It was his memory that "it was Mr. Hunt's habit to deal only with the most senior officer available."

SECRET HUNT

couldn't find any record of operational funding in office of finance files.

Envelope:
"Current OS Sources and Methods (not relevant to HSCA inquiry

Envelope:
"Documents regarding Hunt's 'letter address' (accomodation address) set up in 1963 and terminated in 1965 — (address is still being used by another indiv.)"

6/3/70 ~~letter~~ memo from C/CCS to OS.
CSA requested orally on 5/28/70 for Hunt under Project QKENCHANT.

OS refuses w/o first gaining concurrence of DDP

SECRET

CCS memo to DDP.
approval noted +
signed by T Karamessines
10/14/70

evidently the plan
was that Hunt would
take over management
of Mullen & Co from
Mullen.

8/30/71 DDP requested
summary Hunt bio
after joining WH staff.

5/10/72
M.F.R.
Holograph.

Hunts novels were
sponsored by the CIS.
CCS has asked ID of
David St. John - from OS.
"~~Inasm~~
author contacted Ed
Sayle, SRS:
"Inasmuch as Subject
had written under the
guidance of CI staff,
Sayle advised against
identifying him by
name.... He suggested

HUNT

instead that [inquiry]
be ~~directed to~~ referred
to Ray Rocca, Deputy
Chief, CI Staff ..., or
Mr. Angelton ...."

Rocca later denies!

Documents on Photo
allegation.
It was brought to CIA's
attention by Sam Jaffe
on 9/~~20~~13/74.
Finance records show
Hunt took 11 hrs sick
leave for 4 wk period
ending 11/23/63.
next 4 wks he took 3 hrs
sick leave + 27 hrs annual
leave.
travel records show
official travel to N.Y
in 9, 10 + 13 /63.

C002354

HUNT

10/15/74 memo for record by Erwan E. Kuhnke, Jr. re action taken on the photo allegation.

action limited to file review "and a search of our records which produced the Jack Anderson article refered to..."
"A Bum Rap for Frank Sturgis in Miami"
WP. 4/16/74. p B15.

-was working under a special assistant to the DDO., Seymour Bolton.

"Mr. ~~Jo~~ Bolten appeared satisfied and advised that no further action appeared necessary at this time."

also discussed potentiality that they would some day have to present proof to a Cong. Comm. that Hunt - there.

DDS&T Did do AN ANAlysis

SECRET

OFFICE of Security File.

0002355

Alexis H. DAVISON

5/7/63 Memo for Record Wash. Post Clipping re Davison trip to Oslo. on May 6-63., at end of tour of duty.

5/7/63 NYT article - same subject

Indices Search Request. 5/7/63 found reference to file on Greville Wynne.

Memo for Record 5/31/63 by Ray S. Cline (DDI) re: visit from Lt. Colonel Donald M. Dessert from Air Force Intelligence re: inquiry as to whether A.D. had been used in any CIA ops. other than Penchovsky. - DDI informed him he hadn't.

6/4/64 Memo: Mother's address + quote from Wise + Ross passed to FBI.

SECRET

SECRET

0002356

DAVISON - 2

16 May 1966
Check on Majorie Clare Anderson churned out reference to Davison (Uncle-In-Law).

1 February 71
SRS memo re exposure of CIA Personnel.
says Nedelya article said Amembr. operations were being supervised by a Mr. Malcom TOON.

29/Nov/72. SRS Memo to files name check on Soviet Visa Black List.
request for check from CSCI

FINIS.

SECRET

5C File. **SECRET**

C002357

43872

DAVID LAMAR Christ

9/9/50 Memo from Contacts Officer, Personnel Security Branch. to Intelligence Integration Division. (name check)

10/20/50 NEGATIVE RESPOSE.

DOB 1/20/18
POB TAMAQUA, PA
Address: #2 MOUNTAIN, PA.

8/30/50 Request for Investigation to FBI

9/22/50 Wisner memo to Chief, Inspection + Security re: clearance for Christ. Served @ Signal Corps, U.S. Army, WWII

"SECURITY WAIVER"

10/3/50
security waiver - given request for Provisional Clearance, Christ placed in Unclassified Pool on 11/1/50.

8/Nov./50 **SECRET**
FBI response to Investi. of Christ - NR reported by

SECRET

a "Mr. Shanklin."

11/9/50
P.C. granted for Christ as an electronics engineer GS-10 in O.P.C.
"Office of Policy Coordination" predecessor of DDP.

1950 FBI reports on background enveloped.

11/22/50
recomendation from Appraisal Section for full security approval.
~~NOTICE TO EM.~~

11/24/50 Security approval granted
NOTICE to Employees Division

11/24/50
notice to Phys. Sec. Branch.

SECRET

1/23/51
permission for Christ to work part time after hours @ Sholar Services, INC.

C002359 SECRET

Christ -2.

12/11/51
Christ transfered to TSD.

3/3/52
permission granted for attendance of Institute of Radio Engineers meeting N.Y.C. 3/3-6/52.

6/19/52
Christ security violation for leaving safe open. + transmittal sheet for report.

7/29/52
update on Christ status
address:
5405 Hamilton St
Hyattsville, Md.
shared apt c̄
Salmeron Diffine
Clyde Parrish.
now is GS-12
Supervisor: PAUL H LEE.
associate: Thom Strope

SEC

Christ, p. 3

~~note: there is a photo~~

12/18/52
letter Commanding General of Wright-Patterson that Christ will rep. CIA at conference there.

2/26/53
confirmation of Christ security class. to Direc. of R+D, Pentagon. Christ in Applied Physics Division of TSS

4/23/53
authorization to attend IRE conference in NY.

9/15/53
confirmation of S.C. to Bureau of Aeronautics.

undated personal action list

C002361 SECRET

Christ - 4

9/28/53
confirm S. C. to D.S.

10/9/53
IBID to Army Signal Officer

10/30/53
IBID to NAVY

11/3/53
security violation report + transmittal

3/4/54
IRE CONVENTION Approval

6/9/54
name ck on Dorothy Anne Sampson kicks out Christ.

10/15/54
confirm S.C. to A.E.C.

10/29/54
IBID to Naval ops.

SECRET

Christ - 5

12/18/54
request clearance for "Special Intelligence"

12/9/54
clearance requested @ P.S.D.

1/19/55
SC confirm to Signal Corps.

1/31/55
IBID. to Sec. of Def Office

2/24/55
IRE CONVEN. App.

4/21/55
authorization to remove tech. equip. from CIA Buildings

undated-
PANELofEXAM. have no obj. to Christ becoming member of Career Staff.

Christ - 6

8/18/55
Clearance Cert to Bur. of Aero.

9/5/55
IBID

3/1/56
IBID - Wright-Patterson

2/21/56
IRE Conven.

4/13/56
Overseas travel approval.
(GS-14)
to Japan, Formosa + Korea.
Air Force cover.

7/24/56
Clear. Cert. to C.I./AF.

7/24/56
request for preceding

9/6/56
certified to Bureau of Ships

C002364

SECRET

Christ - 7.

9/7/54
request for cert.

3/4/57
IRE conven.

4/11/57
A.E.C. request for Class Q clearance.

4/15/57
IBID

7/19/57
Christ pledge re: contents of A security File review For FBI. - means they reviewed it re: "Q" clearance - atomic energy clearance.

6/25/57.
travel auth for "various EE" under A.F. Cover

8/15/57
list Of Children

SECRET

0002365

SECRET

Christ 8

8/20/57
Q clearance granted.

9/17/57
travel to South Amer.

9/19/57
listing of previous employment (informal) but doesn't make any sense + may not relate to Christ.

3/15/57
Clearance - cert.

9/17/57
~~for~~ travel auth.
Air Force Cover.

1957 third FBI ENVELOPED, backgrd. Investigation + transmittal

11/8/57 BIO SUMMAY SHEET.
form 180A

9/25/57 Invest. Trans. Sheet.

SECRET

Christ – 9

11/12/57.
IBID

11/15/57
IBID

3/13/58
reassignment from R+D (applied Physics) to Tech. Aids / Audio Sup. Div.

2/26/58
request to Records to block CIA assocn. w Christ coz he's going under cover.

3/7/58
travel auth. to KArachi TEhErAN, ANKArA, AthENS, FrANkfurt, ViENNA, Et. AL.
A.F. COVEr.

4/4/58 SECRET
cable IN 12282 request sec. conf. so he can enter BErliN. — NotE thAt it WAS doNE

0002367

SECRET

Christ - 10.

5/1/58
~~carve~~ CCB reopens blocked name

1/22/59
CCB request for block.

1/23 59
Travel Author.
LONON + FrankFort
AF COVER.
~~[illegible]~~

8/11/60
"Special Secrecy Agreement"
re "Project "JMARC" —

3/13/60
(GS-15) Travel Auth.
Rabat
AF cover.

6/12,13/63
OS - Interrogation
Research Div. - Info Flag
sheet → means he was
polygraphed as part of debriefing
after return from Cuba.

SECRET

SECRET

0002368 Christ - 11

9/23/60
Credit chk report.
+ blocks placed

8/20/63
Memo for file says that "Mr. Miller, Chief, Central Cover Staff, and Chairman of the ZRCHEST Panel" reported that Christ was seeking approval for TDY authorization outside of US.
W. M. Knott DC/SRS says its okay w him.

8/27/63
Security Aproval for "Project I, A, C and O Phase 3"

8/30/63
Security APPROVAL for "CORAL Clearance."
OVERHEAD RECON.

9/16/63
Special Intelligence Clearance

SECRET

Christ-12

9/2/63
Investigative Transmittal Sheet

9/26/63
approved for "domestic assignment in D.C.
w R+D analysis DDS+T'

10/4/63
reports review of case under "program recorded in the DD/S memo ~~flo~~ 13 December 1962"
reports recommends: "No flag be issued."

Envelope:
"Sensitive Sources + Methods SAS memo date 26 Oct 63 to C/TSD."
→ deals w placement of sensitive source still in place.'
bring to M.G. attention

0002370

Christ 13

9/19/63

"reassignment, Change of SD and Transfer to vouchered funds."

SD = SERVICE DESIGNATION, indicates change from "CF" (covert funds) to "V" (vouchered)

JACK SULLIVAN.

- represented to me that "CF" are unvouchered.

"Cost Center No. Chargeble 4262-1000-1000"

should ASK our questions re: this form to Personnel

GS-16

70/27/64

Clearance granted for cryptographic material "Briefing Statement".

9/10/64

Memo for Dir. Finance re: Loss of Offical Funds by Conviscation Christ "$423.58"

SECRET

Castro Confiscated Christe was on assignment

Christ #14

for FE Division in
9/60 in Havana.
"Allotment number
1137-07169-5995"

2/16/65
indices search request.

ENVELOPE:
"Personal Information
regarding a third party"
1 ¶ re Christ reproduced.
Apparently he was
being entertained by
a woman in Cuba +
it may have lead to
his arrest.

12/22/64
request for Agency I.D.
Age: 46
Height: 6'
Weight: 185
Eyes: Grey
Hair: Brown

11/2/65
Clearance certif. to State

SECRET

C002372

Christ #15

11/18/64
Sec. Cert. to State

1/12/66
Juan A. Rodriguez
3000 SW 24 Terrace,
Miami, Fla.
says he was imprisoned
w "Caswell."

11/16/65 Special Clearance
for Project RHYOLITE

12/13/65 RHYOLITE
secrecy agreement –
overhead recon.

12/13/65
special Clearance RH

4/14/64
EP project access
termination.
overhead recon.

2/27/64
Clearance ~~for~~ EP.

SECRET

Christ 16

3/2/64
IBID

3/11/64 EARPOP agreement

3/1/67
appointment - Top Secret
Control Officer

ENVEL:
1967 Agency Bckgrd ck.

9/29/67
Reinvesti process. sheet

4/21/67
approval as emergency
courier.

10/12/67
ID request.

9/13/63
ARGON agreement.
CORONA "
IDEALIST "
OXCART "

0002374

Christ 17

9/27/63
#Request for entry of
Christ ~~for~~ on "Domestic
Cover list. afterwhich
he will be told to
deny association
Military cover for
operational purposes.
(probably travel cover again)

4/30/63
Christ "Reassignment
and Change of Service
Designation
"CF" to "CF"
Cost Center No. 3125-19904000

1/21/64
Cover assignment to
US Army Element, Joint
Operations Group.
for operational purposes.
ref: request for cover (form 1322)
9/27/63.
Document entitled
"Notification of Establishment
of Military Cover Backstop."

Christ 18.

1/22/68
Christ imprisoned Ⓤ
Thornton J. Anderson
AKA Eustace H. Danbrunt
62067

WALTER E. SZUMINSKI
AKA Edmund R. Taransky.
213816.
Debriefings → some info in SRS #3280

5/21/68
Security Violation

6/5/68
EP Clearance.

6/12/68
IBID

11/13/68
ID request.

12/19/68
"Termination Understanding"

SECRET

6/19/69
Outside Activity Approval Granted

Christ 19

9/13/69
Secrecy agreement

8/3/70
8/5/70
8/10/70 } MEMOS RE: Telegram to CUBA ERRONEOUSLY billed To Christ.

10/12/70 Application for Retirement
SS 181-01-6133
6212 MAIDEN LANE, Bethesda

10/22/70
retirement
"V to V"

11/9/70
letter from Helms.

11/16/70
Honor Recomendation

11/19/70
granted

11/30/70
RESUME

[redacted]

Christ 20

11/20/70
Standby Reserve approval

11/19/70
ck. for DOD Industrial Security Clearance.

11/24/70
Secrecy Oath
+ briefing report

11/16/70
OS has no objection to merit award.

11/24/70
Termi. Secr. Agrees.

12/15/70
SEC. Approval for contract work @ DERVENCO

11/24/70
Revocation of Crypt Clear.

1/4/71
Cross reference to
607 446. "CUBAN IMPRISONMENT OF CIA AUDIO TECH!"

SECRET

0002378

SECRET

Christ 21

12/18/70
"K" ck- internal name ck.
"no record"

2/10/71
Clearance from DISCO

2/9/71 Name ck Rpt

ENVEL:
1971 Agency Bckgrd ch

4/13/71
mm ck Donna K. Coston

1/26/71
DEVENCO SECRECY Agree.

8/10/71
Computer file ref. printout

7/27/71
D.C.S. @ SEC. CK request

8/25/71
Case Processing Rec.

SECRET

8/25/71 response to DCS

C002379

Christ 22

9/26/72
request for contact security approval.
Household Water Corp
Reston.

10/3/72
Computer Printout

10/5/75
request for Industrial Security approval.

9/27/72
Liaison Clearance.

9/21/72
Secrecy Agreement

11/8/72
Termination Devenco
AGREEMENT

5/18/73
Computer printout

5/30/73
Case processing Req.

Christ - 23

8/14/61

Memo for Record re Mrs. Christ & Cuba Opera.
Christ was Chief Audio Operations Branch - services all requests for surreptitious instal.

Also arrested Robert MEET - CO under STATE COVER - ARRESTED & released

AKA [redacted]

CORRECT NEET

Christ's COVER: VICTOR VACHHTA ENGINEERING ASSOCIATES, NYC

D.C. attorney: Murphey

operation [redacted]ESCALADE

Hugh Kessler Amend. contact transmitted cover story.

0002383

Christ 26

10/12/77 routing slip - request for Siragusa + ~~Anderson~~ Christ file review withdrawn. info I.G. was seeking was confirmed by another source.

12/4/50
secrecy agreement

3/22/57
PSQ

JMARC FlAG.

7/17/67
Personnel History Statement

12/10/70
Devenco Clearance

PSQ (DOD)

4/23/73
Itek Security Clearance
Consultent.

SECRET

Christ 27.

WAtergate File Review
FlAg - 6/20/74.
in re McCORD CIARDS
matter.
photo included -
taken 8/69.

SECRET

SECRET

2/6/78

Office of Security Files

002385

Dave Christ 43872 1

cover address established in 8/60
at [redacted] [redacted] - [redacted] residence

Carswell given birth cert
[redacted], [redacted],
~~Schuylkill Cty, PA~~
1/20/78
No 37, File # 166171-18
SS # [redacted]

NY drivers license 325-8920

Caroline Stacey - women
involved in Cuban project

Joe Langan - JMARC security
officer in 9/60

operation LCHARVEST

expenses assigned to
Allotment # 1125-1007-1000
on 9/29/60

10/16/61 - Christ "debriefed"
+ clearances revoked.

SECRET

Christ 2

8/17/62 - negotiations for release underway.

9/13/63 - Christ "Indoctrinated for Special Intelligence".

Personal History Statement
scar above left eye - on right forearm, left foot + ankle

Last address: 6212 Maiden
Lane, Bethesda, Md.

Diosdado I 432-469

1 1/9/61
request for liaison
approval.
DOB 8/16/21, Laredo Texas.

2. 1 time secret clearance
granted same date

3. 2/21/61 Invest. report.

4. Case Process. record.

5. used to Inspect
JMATE covert installation
under FAA jurisdiction.

6. 5/15/62. liaison request.
from Harvey.

7. 11/23/64 liaison request.

8. 3/10/66 " "

9. 3/2/67 " "

10 7/16/62 request nm. ck.
for use as CI asset.

Diosdado 2

11 IBID

12. Bio:

13. 2/5/63 files cancelled.
C # 100985.

14. 5/3/66
memo re: investi. by customs
"Jerry Mullane, WH/ Security Officer, R.L. 1459, reported subject's salary is being paid by the WAVE Station and association began in 1961 and it is continuing to date".
file # 276656 (C) and 432469 (O).
- Jack says first is now in one I'm examining.

15 5/5/66
now SAIC - Key West
memo re: investi.

16 5/18/66 - report of investi.

0002397

Dios 3.

17 holographic memo from Customs
Dios alleged to have sold guns to a group planning an invasion of Haiti in 1966. – involved in gun running since 1957, including Castro.

18 2/23/67
memo re: allegations

19 2/21/67
memo re: calling off IRS investigation

20 3/23/67
Customs takes no action because his salary paid by CIA
FBI called off.

21 9/1/67 memo
re: Cuban G-2 interrogation of Jose Ricardo Rabel Nunez + his giving them Diosdados name as a CIA recruiting agent.

SECRET

00023S8

Dios 4

22 memo re: Cubans
arrested 7/18/62
(RABEL)

23. news-clipping
11/13/72
re: Richmond C Harper's
arrest in a guns for
Heroin deal - undercover
agent was Diosdado.

SECRET

SECRET

0002393

Phillips 1 40696

DOB 10/31/22 Fort Worth

1930's in Santiago, Chile
used by OSO, OPC.
1952 clearance as
contract agent
1954 as staff officer.

AKA (1954) John D. Nadelman
1956 Paul D Lagevin.
cover compromised → 1957 Michael M. Choaden

56. - HAVANA
*16/MAY57 Egypt + Arab States
TRANSFER (REASSIGN) RPA Branch Op. Officer
Project [redacted]CTATE.
Unvouchered
" Appropriation
From: 6-3545-55-055
To: 7-3361-91-215"

* 8/18/58 resignation on form "Notification of Personnel Action." notice that he will be traveling in Latin America on "Business."

TELEVISION ASSOCIATES IN CUBA.

SECRET

SECRET

Phillips 2.

4/3/59 mm ck for operation AMOURETTE-X

ENVELOPE:
Army records on Phillips.

9/59 concern over ~~blown~~ cover under name CHOADIN

Develop. Compon.

* 1/16/60 back at HQ.

changed from contract agent to staff employee on 3/14/60, 3/15/60 start setting up a domestic cover for him.

* 4/15/60 reassigned to WHD, Branch 4. + JMARC

2/1/61 man named [redacted] ([redacted]) brought in to work @ Phillips. McCord concerned because of his association with Count Wood.

SECRET

Phillips 3.

☆ 6/28/61 reass. M.C.

☆ 8/23/66 reass. to Santo Domingo. – [redacted]

☆ 8/30/67 back in D.C. as Ops Officer CH

Envelope: 1968 Bkgrd Inves.

☆ 1/2/70 Assigned to Brazil [redacted].

☆ 1/19/72 [redacted] Caracas, Venezuela.

☆ 5/30/73 CH/WHD.

☆ 5/1975 retires

0002403

SECRET

(2 folders)

WERBELL p1 ~~#0~~ 27686

Folder 1 (thin).

1 Bio Infor (undated)

2 nm. ck. 7/20/59
informant - Dom. Rep.

3. Adm Response

4. Bio data

5 IBID

6 POA granted 8/4/59
C# 78785 (DDO #)

7. Bio DATA

8. Request for NA ck. 8/14/59
"Do Not Contact FBI. Also
~~Contact~~ Check Military
(0-1649236)"

10 Envelope
1959 BKgrd Inves.

11 9/21/62 FBI requests info

12. 10/14/59 POA cancelled

SECRET

WERBELL 2

13 10/28/59 completion of investigation

14 9/22/60 memo
CO Tom COBB
MW apparently causing trouble - calls him a "con man!"

15. Cable from 12/17/63 Dom. Rep.
MW:-VP of Frutas Intercontin-entales, C. por A. (FINCA)

16. NM. CK.

17. response to 15 (1/29/64)
Station to avoid contact on "operational matters" but should monitor.
201-259910
contacted ODENVOY ~~ISA~~ in April of '63 + said he was president of Communications International Inc.
In ~~8/9/~~ Oct, Sept 1962 he tried to get CA countries to recog. a Cuban gov't

0002465

MW-3

in exile.

IN 10/62 ODENVY MW was being investigated for involvement in shipping arms to Ecuador.

18. 1/9/68 memo re: potential prosecution by Munitions Control Board. (DOD interest in weapon.)

19

2/26/68 cable re: call from c/ ~~M.W.~~ offering info. reported Venus loading for raid on Cuba to take place on 2/28/68. + info on WerBell + Manger.

20. report of inves. — 3/1/68 Neal T Andrews, 45-09 Bruce Street, Doraville Ga. was informant was Engineer for Sionics, Inc.
M.W. worked w/ Manger + Army Capt. Robert Braun ON CUBA + HAiti.

C0024C6

MW -4

21 bkgrd ck on 3rd party

22 nm ck 10/31/68
passport # J-685508
MW in Saigon
Embassy records list him as
ABC News REP.

23 response

24 Newspaper Clipping on
Haitian operation 2/26/70

25 5/27/70 memo
volunteered info to DCS
Miami in 2/67

26 Post story 12/27/70

27 Cable

28 5/25/73 memo re Coast
Guard Inquiry

29 10/14/73 re: M.W. call
asking to speak to Colby

MW-5

30 1/25/74 memo re: no associations with MW's firms

31. computer print out

32. Corrien mm trace

33. 6/30/75 Memo.
involvement w
Ralph M McGill +
Edward Lewis Bankston
in "White Rose" operation
(anti-Castro group.

34. 12/26/75 memo re:
investigation in an
extortion plot.

35. St. George Article.

36. computer print out.

37. FBI envelope 10/7/75

38 MEMOS RE involvement
w VITA

SECRET

0002408

MW - 6 (File #2 (Large))

1. envelope 1945 bkgrd. ck.

2. 8/11/45 Inves. Report.
security approval granted
glowing recomendations

3. 12/10/45 Termination inter.
SO branch/China.
leassing SSU + Army

4 9/9/62 record ck. on
Werbell/arms/Ecuador
1959

5. 10/24/62 letter to Hoover
from DDP - response
to 4. - no info on arms -
reports seeking recog.
for Cuba exile gov't.
went to Guatemala,
El Salvador, + Nica.

6 2/23/67 "Diary"
"Gleichauf" calls + reports
Werbell says Chet Gray
concerned over alleged assass.
attempt on a foreign slip +
will go to gov. Calif

SECRET

SECRET

MW 7
if not contacted immediately - info passed to Papich
CC MIAMI
AUTHOR
JW McCONNEL

7. memo 2/24/67 DCS to OS. transmittal of 6.

8. search for Werbell + Masferrer FBI reports

9. FBI report 2/20/67 re plot to assass UNI. Mid-East Ruler.

10. FBI report (no subst.)

11 security ck request from DCS 2/27/67 reports MW supplies info to Miami office

12 Case Process. Rec.
N.A. ck.

13 envelope FBI/MW
2/17/66, 2/15/66, 2/7/66, 2/3/66,
2/66, ~~2~~ 1/26/66
MASFERRAR: 10/66

SECRET

CCC2410

MW 8

14 3/21/67 Bio Data
Leader of Organization
to Combat Communism.

15 4/26/67 Passport info
issued 5/29/62 for
business trip to
Eng. + Germ.

16 Case Re nos. Rec.

17 blind report says
other agency reports
MW is "con man".

18 inter-office memo 7/5/67
to DCS ~~reporting~~
forwarding 15 + 17.

19 memo to TSD 9/7/67
silencer demo on 8/10/67
morning to CIA, $A^{D.}R^{ES}P^{ROJ}A^{GENCY}$ &
DOD [redacted]
AFTERNOON - J.C.S.
describes MW as a pest.

20 St. George article "The
Deadliest Salesman." in TRU$_{E}^{1/68}$

MW 9

21 memo to Ch of Sec. 1/9/68. – same as in File #1.

22. memo to Office of Log. 1/11/68 summarize MW.

23. 1/9/68 memo re State Dept interest in MW. *no CIA interest or Business contact.

24 1/11/68 memo to DDS. SUMMARY & TRUE Art.

25 computer print

26 3/4/68
Bruce Aiman Baker
11379 President Drive NE
Blaine Village Minn.
keeps calling CIA requesting clearance that MW tells him he needs to work @ him on gun running.

MW 10

5/15/69 OSI requests ck on MW since he is working @ firm @ military contract. memo says MW was "an unsolicited contact" from 1959 till he reached "peak notoriety" in 11/67 @ Masferrer & Haiti.

APPARENTLY DUE TO SHIPPING AK47s FROM SAIGON

7/7/69 - report that MW now under investigation by OSI internal security Division for contract fraud.

RPTS MW. SHOWS UP TO MAKE "FAST BUCK" BY SELLING ARMS TO SUPPORT COUPS.

5/69/26 cable from [redacted] reports MW passing self off as a ~~con man~~. COS Thailand

St. George article 4/70 TRUE The MAFIA VS. the CIA.

3/10/74 memo MIAMI DCS

MW 11
reporting call from
MW about DOD revoking
his security clearance.

MW sought administrative
review

4/14/72 memo re: call
from MW seeking Conein's
address so he can
renew his friendship.

Cable 2/20/67 Miami
DCS re MW:
says that even tho
unsavory character
"much of the information
he has furnished has
proved true. He
furnished complete
details on the recent
Haitian Invasion plan".
reports Chet Gray
allegation - sez Gray
is a notorious hoodlum
in LA who was approached
CIA reporter met him
at a contacts house

SECRET

CCL2414

MW 12
in 1962 — details in
OOA (S) 5601 + OOA (S) 5598
dated 12/18/62.

8/6/74 ABACO adventure
two "former" agency
employes, John Patrick
Muldoon and
~~Theodore John Rousso,~~
reported on it — advised
to report to FBI — memo
to FBI written by
D. A. Phillips.

8/8/74 routing slip on
FBI Report 8/6/74 (ENVELOPED)
Phillips says he (MW)
~~wa~~ is "an American
creep" + that DP had
predicted trouble w
ABACO — MW said
to have letter from
DCI

6/27/74 memo by
Phillips to FBI RE M.W.
FBI File # MM 105-21382.

SECRET

SECRET

0002416

MW 13

Wehbell formed (INVESTIGATION)
Central Information
Agency in early 70's.

8/12/74 reports that
MW working with
Chester Zochowski, ALIAS
Chester GAdy ON Abaco.

4/10/75 memo:
Bayard WAS is pres of MW's CIA.
subsidiary: Security
Consultants, International
MW/CIA Wash. office
sub-leased to DEA
↓

Josef Mackena, now
working for SCI -
former agency employee
was on loan to DEA
from 2/72 to 10/73.

Walter Joseph Mackem
12/13/37, Omaha, Nebraska
2609 N. Potomac
Arlington, VA.

SECRET

0002417

SECRET

MW 14)

7/25/75 memo:
St. George - first interest by CIA in 12/49 when they learned he had worked for Soviet Intelligence in Vienna in 1~~945~~. mid 40's.
debriefed 12/58 re Castro's activities
also interest by OO/CD in 1/60, 2/62 + 4/64.

12/23/75
memo reporting that MACKEM is chief suspect in an extortion opera. involving over a billion dollars. - FBI says investi. to point that it will confront or drop.

ENVElopE: 3rd agency DEA 3/8/74 request for ck to see if CIA did any elec. sur. of MW.
response: NO.

SECRET

SECRET

C002418

MW 15.

St George article on ABACO - "The Amazing New-Country Caper". 2/75

7/13/76 blind MEMO RE: meeting between "source", Lou Conien & Steve VAN CLEAVE re tanks for Israel,

CONIEN presently in difficulty at DEA "due to a NEWSPAPER ARTICLE" + has been relieved & may be fired.

"source" is an old friend of Conien's who was invited along to evaluate Van Cleve.

"source" & Conien agreed that "source would go by the name of "~~Va~~ Mike BISHOP."

SOURCE = Michael JAMES King.

SECRET

SECRET

0002419 MW 16

6/29/76 memo re FBI inves of Letter Bomb extortion.
B.R. FOX / MACKEM
↓
worked out of MW's CIA DC office

8/19/76
Ed MARGER WAS used Oper mid-60's

Marger OS # 760 184
201 760-184
DOB 18 March 1928 NY, NY
9/16/64 Provisional Covert Security approval.
CSA granted 2/17/65

1967 case (Haiti) against Werbell was dropped due to illegal FBI surveillance

WerBell, Bethel, + Charles Hall tried to get WACKENhut involved in ABACO -
UNSUCCESSful.

SECRET

SECRET

0002423

MW 17

Robert K Brown -
agency concern due to
a planned book on
Cuban operations
201-189473
involved in Haiti

Lyndon Hermyle LA ROUCHE
9/8/22, Chairman of
the National Caucus of
Labor Committees hired
WerBell as a bodyguard
in 8 or 9 /1977

SECRET

SECRET

0002450

meticulous files.

memo to Legat at same time as cable.

SECRET

10143-10100

Goldsmith

3/6/ Notes re Hardway summary of M.C. tapes, transcripts, + cables. - Preassassination

SECRET

2 1. transcriptions generally are summaries rather than verbatim.

2. "previously transcribed" materials are not in the materials that Hardway examined.

3. marginal notations are common

4. Spanish transcripts are of poor quality. - Why would there even be any Spanish transcripts.

5. transcripts for 9/15 + 9/16/63 are missing. Holmes' explanation is that [~~intercept~~] activity ~~was~~ may have been shut down on weekends.

6. 9/27/63

translated from Spanish transcription {
1. M.O. seeking visa to Odessa
2. same person calls back at 10:37 a.m.
3. another call 1:25
}

LHO 4:05 pm 4. Duran to Soviet emb. - conversation in Spanish re LHO, who was then at Cuban emb. - apparent that LHO had been at emb earlier

LHO 4:26 pm 5. Sov. emb → Duran re LHO; (LHO still at emb)

Win Scott sought to id ~~person~~ LHO; parts underlined in red; ①

also applies to 9/28

7. 9/28/63

LHO 1. Duran → Sov. emb; LHO talks to S.O.

(LHO to go to Sov. emb)

8. 10/1/63 Apparent that LHO had been at Sov emb

? 1. 10:31 a.m. - possibly LHO calling ^ earlier for info re teleg. from Wash. mil' attache

LHO 2 10:45 - LHO to guard in reference to teleg. - LHO identifies himself

[1+2 previously transcribed]

SECRET

9. 10/3/63
- call to Sov emb re visa
0002452 [previously transcribed]

10. 10/1/63 #6344 re Phillips
10/8/63 6384 - missing - Obtain
DIR 78527 - re Phillips

11. Correct dates of photos 10/1 + 10/2 or 10/2 + 10/4.

12. 10/8/63 cable 6453 MCS → HQ
reports LHO visit.
absence of routing slip on cable

Account [illegible] Obtain [illegible]

10/10/63 DIR 74830 → MCS re background on LHO + instructed MCS - re LHO + passing info to 3d agencies locally.
10/10/63 DIR dissemination - cable contained erroneous description.

13. What ~~was~~ [~~Tarasoff's~~] procedures or crypt?

14. Scott's suggestion of a P file on LHO.

15. ~~14.~~ 10/10/63 - HQ dissemination to other agencies re LHO
#74673

16. 10/15/63 MCS 6534 requesting pouched photo of LHO.
- No response to this cable.
Obtain

17. 10/16/63 Scott memo to ~~Earl~~ Mann re LHO; no mention of visa aspect.

~~18. Oswald?~~ P file - all data re LHO

Obtain Soviet contacts file - MCS file
Absence of routing slips on some of cables

SECRET

0002453

15th & 16th PARAPHRASE? — MARGINAL NOTES + P.T.

[LIAISON] routing - transcrip, etc/time

[unilateral] operation

[PENETRATION] AGENTS.

first trans. + action (consult?)

Post ASS'N:
NATURE of checks. - DIR 84886

Mexi 7023 ERASURE/dATE correc.
"not recorded this date"

7024 - All info reported
(prior to 27th calls etc)
by [H.M.]

SECRET

(Hunt
Bishop.
P.T.
Importance

SECRET

7025 - report of 9/28 + 10/1 conv. by A.G.

0082454

28 - ~~cat~~ [Mexican] pick-up of 9/28

when first realized photos ≠ LHO

7033 reports all calls.

7034 recheck of all photos.

SECRET

I General.
  A. duties
  B. typical day.

II People.
  list

III the surveillance ops.

2/14/78

SECRET

0002456

DDO Briefing on 201's.

Bill Donley - former op off.
Mike Levy
[Lee Coyle]
Virginia Jones.

---

basis for opening
1. operational interest -
   a. recruitment (access) (trace)
   b. Tracking
   c. CIS (threat)

generally - amassed material in indexes brought together into 201. - actual process of opening only takes an hour or so.

---

* When MC report came in in 10/9 there was a response - ~~we~~ is there a document re this trace?

---

opened by:
A. case officer.

Mick scenario - judgement call by officer - there may not be a 201 opened even though a reliable source suggest counter-intelligence threat type problem.

most 201's are on people who are being considered for recruitment.

SECRET

SECRET

C002457

MH: ~ necessarily open 201 but would go into an index. Info would be disseminated.

— There are criteria for opening high level commies. } HANDbook
recruitees.
usually opened by operations (desk) officer.

— re~~as~~search
↓ 2 days?
desk (decision)

— There are ops run from HQ in which case the CO is the desk officer.

— the 201 is indigenous to DDO.

— PRQ part I → automatic 201. — Required for clearance.
Part II — extended @ assessments, detail bkgnd analysis, operational projections.
OS has no need for Part II. which is kept in 201.

— Agree essentially correct RULE an bifurcated files. — central card reference between them. Index check should lead to both.

MAINLY IN FIELD.

201 — true NAME — PRQ I +
reference to second.
seperete file PRQ II

SECRET

0002458

201 mainly bio – try hard not to run operations out of 201's.

reason for opening – necessarily in it. would be a reference to a cable or document.

201 assigned chronologically as the name comes in.

would have his picture if ~~he~~ one could be gotten – not required. – would go right in.

there should be a table of contents list on a 201 – computerized.

green list — info on subject compiled as a result of signal/communications intelligence.

[State cover can go from "fig leaf" to fully integrated.]

project files – ~~p~~ Policy Coordination Staff – coord. w other agencies – may also be a project file on desk if serious agency involvement

graphics file. – do obtain a great deal of photos of things like ships. – DDI if positive

SECRET

0002459

intelligence value + may
be disseminated.
might be photos of individuals
of prominence.
graphics file not in DDO
biographics registry in DDI
OCR - Office of Central Reference

P&L - part of compartmentation system
refers to cable traffic
opened by one of top 3
officers in DDO.

crypt can't be assigned to
a 201.

if got into a debriefing
of handling a defector to
us then that is automatic
criteria for opening.
a report of fact of defection
alone wouldn't be enough.

547A form /1896 form.

Ø41

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED. 1/7/98

6/27/78 D. HARDWAY

1 Summary of Review of [02]BADGER files.

1. Vol. I, Production, 10/23/58 - 3/4/64.
2. Vol. II, DEVELOPMENTAL PLANS, 1/16/63 - & 11/2/67.
3. Vol III, SUPPORT, 1/25/62 - 11/13/64
4. Vol. VI, OPERATIONS, 1/3/62 - 12/19/63

Note that the above volumes are numbered 1, 2, 3, and 6. I have asked Barbara if there is a volume 4 and 5. She said that Project Files are maintained in 4 parts: production, Developmental Plans, Support and Operations. She said she thought I had the whole file but would check with the Mexican desk to make sure. Barbara returned call and said that the person on the Mexico desk was on 2 weeks vacation so she could not find an answer for my question.

10

Volume I / Production

¶ See summary of Dispatch traffic for HMMA-22452. In addition to paragraph about Arehart it says; under heading "Exploitation of LIENVOY Information":
"MEXI 6453 reported a contact by an English-speaking man with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This was forwarded to Headquarters for further dissemination."

¶ See Dispatch Traffic Summary for details on HMMA-22455. The file # on most documents in this volume is 50-6-75/4. The file number on this Dispatch is 50-8-10. I have asked Barbara what this file is.

¶ HMMA 22452 also cites other cables that reported Americans in contact with the Cuban embassy. MEXI 6591 reported a call from Herb Provost from Las Vegas claiming to be a student working with the Cubemb. The dispatch says: "Further dissemination was left to Headquarters." Mexi 6615 reported contact between NYT writer Herbert Matthews and the Cubemb. The dispatch says: "No investigative action was taken by the Mexico Station."

¶ HMMA-22678, 1/2/64 is the first monthly operational report for LIENVOY
THE FILE. after the assassination. Under "exploitation..." the dispatch says: "The most significant information provided by LIENVOY was
12 record of contact by Lee

Oswald with the Cuban and Soviet Embassies in Mexico prior to the assassination of President Kennedy. Oswald's contact had been cabled to Headquarters on 8 October 1963 for investigation by ODENVY (MEXI-6453)."

Under the "Liaison" heading the dispatch says:

"[redacted] operation since it was necessary for Curtis to request his assistance in investigating a highly sensitive lead in connection with the assassination of President Kennedy. This has been reported in detail to Headquarters via other channels."

9T HMMA 22788 - 1/24/6~~4~~ says:
"There is attached one copy
93 of the Cuban Embassy traffic

covering the period from 16 January through 23 January 1964." HMMA-22959 2/24/64 transmits the take for 2/11 to 2/21. HMMA 23019, 3/4/64 transmits the take for 2/22 to 3/2. My examination of the dispatch traffic between 10/16 and 11/26 shows that the Cubemb take was transmitted to HQ routinely on a weekly or bi-weekly basis also during that period. There are some "transcripts" in this file. They are yellow carbons in Spanish. They cover the period 1/16/64 to 1/23/64. These are the only ones in the file.

4

096

6

Volume II, Development and Plans.

π [Memorandum for DDP re: "Request for Renewal of the LIENVOY Project," from J.C. King, C/WHD (signed by R.W. Herbert, 1/21/64. This memo states the objectives of the operation as being A.) the provision of a [redacted] telephone tap unit, and b.) provision for a [redacted] Under "effectiveness" the memo says: "This center records an average of 525 reels per month, from which

π HMMA-22679, 12/31/63 transmitting Mexi copy of Project Renewal request.

π 95 HMMW 12220, 12/30/63 transmitting paper on LIENVOY)

7

LIFEAT by Paul V. Levister.

P. 11 reference to Scott's notation on resumen.
p. 5. reason for cutting out and [redacted]
p. 12 liaison procedure re Soviet tapes.
p. 10 MEXI [redacted] tap CApAbility
p. 16 quality of monitor work. /RESUME /RETENTION of tapes
p. 17 monitor who speaks English
p. 18-19 Procedure RE notice to station
p 20 LP Files
p 22. Arehart + SCOPE
22 + 23 equipment
25. MEXI [redacted]
32 + 33 delivery
34 + 35 reporting + reports officers
37 Cuban coverage
403 TRANSCRIPTION V SUMMAY.
42 STATION REVIEW.
44 SPECIAL Situ. + ODENVY

96

8

HMMA 24229, 9/3/64

1. re reporting American contact
2. couriers in operation.

Project Renewal request 1/11/65. HMM 25141 1/15/65 (?)

1. [redacted] relationship and roles.
2. HMMS & HMMT — NON-RECORD.
3. copy of Arehart's monthly load log and list of targets
4. general nature of contacts on phone lines. Can we get a 1963 phone book.
5. Chart of operation.

Volume 3 / Support

¶ HMMA-19804, 9/12/62 has a floor plan of LP

¶ MEXI 5412, IN 81732, 7/17/63 re HORSFALL'S transfer to Mexico.

¶ DIR 56443, 7/24/63 TRANSCRIPTS V SUMMARIES.

¶ MEXI 5570, 7/31/60 Tarasoff's abilities.

Vol. ~~IV~~ VI / OPERATIONS.

¶ HMMA 19153, 6/5/62 w photo of LP attatched

¶ HMMA-19729, 8/30/62 1. timing of transcription/ inside proceedure.

¶ HMMA - 22540 6/13/63 w resumen attatched

¶ MEXI 5498 IN 87722, 7/26/63

8 SAME subject AS DIR 56443

rD

¶ HMMA-21845, 7/1/63 June monthly report.
1. TARASOFF/HORSFALL + BACKlog.
2. U.S. CITIZENS IN CONTACT.
3. TARASOFF CONTACT
4. AREHART + LEADS OF INTEREST
5. RETENTION OF SUMMARIES.

¶ HMMW-11831; 8/6/63
Station follow-ups on Am. contact

¶ HMMA-22005 8/23/63
1. forwarding of Cub. take
2. HORSFALL + FIENGLASS
3. AREHART + Am. CONTACTS

¶ letters to Scott + Witten from LEVISTER RE: his TDY in Mexi

¶ HMMA-22135, 9/13/63
1. Horsfall

¶ Memo to Ch/FI, 10/2/63 "TDY to Mexico City."

¶ HMMA-22135, 9/13/63
1.[target lines] for sept.
2. delivery
3.[LEVISTER] visit.

000102

50-8-10
Soviet Official Representation in Mexico.

100-5-1
Soviet Intelligence Services in the USA.

101-102

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

8/17/76

[AMERICAN EMBASSY / PARIS]

Box 28
Folder 13
#3

1973 RETIRED

NOV 63 STAT IN PARIS]
[NO GOVT COVER]
[SOV OPS]
[SEPT. 62] ARRIVED

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

[DEFENSE COVER] AS BRANCH 6 CHIEF
TWO YRS IN SEC 6
SEPT 1960 ASSIGNED

[PARIS]
NOT INFREQ CONTACT
EV 2½ WKS
[MADE ON OUTSIDE BY TELE TO PERSON W/ OFF COVER]
NEVER WRITTEN COMM

SEC 6
OP ~~RES~~ SUPPORT OF SR DIV
AUX REPORTING INFO IN SUPPORT OF SR DIV — CLASSICAL ESPIONAGE W/ USSR
PENETRATION OF PURPS OF ESPIONAGE
CARTO
DEMOG
SOCIOLOGISTS
SCI, POL INFO PERSONS
IT WAS IN DOWN PHASE AT THE TIME
20-25 WHEN HE CAME IN

[JAPAN]
FEB 1955 - JUNE 1960
CHIEF OF SOV BASE OF N. ASIA COMMAND

ATTACHED TO FAR EASTERN COMM OF ARMED FORCES
ONE OF FOUR BASES: THEY WERE TARGETS
SOV BASES BUT NOT AGAINST JAPAN
SOV, JAPAN, N. KOREA, RED CHINA

9 OR 10 IN SOV BASE

ASSIGNED AS HEAD IN 1955

TYPES OF OPS FROM SOV BASE
ESPIONAGE
COV OPS - PSYCHO WARFARE, RADIO TRANSMISSION TO INTERNAL SOV AUDIENCE

ESP - SOV NAVAL & INDUSTRIAL TARGETS IN SOV PORTS USING MAINLY JAPANESE OPERATIVES

EXTREMEL LIM WORK W/ MILITARY
WOULD BRIEF MILITARY
TRIED TO WORK W/ CLANDESTINE UNITS OF ARMY, NAVY HAD NONE
BUT THEY HAD LOW DEGREE OF PROFESSIONALISM
MILITARY SAID IT WAS RUNNING OPS BUT IT WAS NEVER CONFIRMED
MILITARY INTELL PERSO
CAPT PEREZ OSI
JOHN B STANLEY ARMY HEAD

OP. SUPP. WAS PROVIDED BY NAVY
I.E. COVER FOR PERSONS CONTACTING SOVIETS

CANNOT RECALL SPECIFIC INFO ABOUT MILI. USING AM. MILITARY
EXCEPT RUMORS OF TRAFFICKING
THE IND. INTELL AGENCIES WOULD HAVE HANDLED

CAME TO HIS ATTENTION
NO CONCRETE INFO OF AM CONTACT W/ SOVS

SUPERVISORS CHIEF OF N. ASIA COMM: 1955: RETIRED VICE
ADM. O.
THEN HARRY LITTLE 1957

HIS COMMUNICATIONS WERE GENERALLY BACK
TO HQ

N. ASIA COMM AT TIME WAS TIED UP W/
KOREA + JAPAN

DOES NOT KNOW WHO HAD OVERSIGHT FOR U-2
WAS WELL COMPARTMENTED
NEVER LEARNED
ASSUMED IT WAS PARAMILITARY

N. ASIA BASE RAN NO PARAMILITARY OPS
MOST SMALLER STATIONS DID NOT

DOESN'T RECALL DISCUSSING USING AM DEFECTORS TO
1ST CHIEF DIR
THOUGHT KGB WOULD SUSPECT HIM FROM BEGINNING
KNEW A LOT ABOUT KGB
FROM DISPLACEMENT OF CITI

AM ESP INTEREST WAS MUCH MORE SHORT RANGE
AS TO PRECLUDE PROGRAM
NOT IN AM WAY OF DOING THINGS

LESSENING OF TENSIONS DID ALLOW SOME
SHALLOW PENE: SHORT TERM TOURISTS, FOREIG

BUT NO DIRECT + OBVIOUS EFFECT

435-173-A

DOES REMEMBER MEMO

ONE OF HIS CONTACTS
LAMPRELL = WM RBT. SINCLAIR D. OF CANCER FEW YRS AGO; WAS SR. OFF IN SOV. OFF OF PARIS STATION (#2 MAN)

WALTER HALTIGAN =
JAMES FLINT WAS HIS NORMAL CONTACT

DOESN'T KNOW WHY TIME DELAY
ASSUMES HALTIGAN WASN'T AVAILABLE

(RECALLS)
WROTE MEMO SPONTANEOUSLY BECAUSE OF NEWSCAST WHEN HE HEARD INFO ABOUT MINSK, [MARRYING] [FOREIGNER,] REMEMBERED STATE DEPT. INFO

REDWOOD: CLAND OPS / CHIEF OF SR WAS RESPONSIBLE
AS OPPOSED TO
REDCAP: TARGETS AGAINST SOVS OUT OF USSR

[CI WAS STAFF REVIEW, BUT SUPPOSEDLY NO COMMAND VOICE; BUT THEY DID HAVE THEIR OWN CLOSELY HELD OPS]
THEY GAVE OP APPROVAL FOR EVERY OPERATION

POSSIBLE OR PROBABLE THAT THEY RAN OPS IN HIS GEO. TARGET

RESEARCH WAS AN OP FUNCTION OF THE 6 BRANCH
CANNOT REMEMBER RESEARCH'S EXACT MANDATE

BRANCH
1 SCANDINAVIA
2 ~~[illegible]~~
3 MIDD + LATIN
5 FAR EAST
INTER BRANCH

RESEARCH WOULD GET INFO FROM DEFECTORS ABOUT SOV. ~~DEFECTORS~~ REALITIES, GETTING DETAILS ABOUT SOVIET LIFE

WOULD 'NORMALLY' PUMP PERSON LIKE O. ABOUT LIFE IN USSR

DOESN'T PERSONALLY KNOW OF DEFECTOR BEING USED AS SOURCE IN HIS BRIEF TIME IN SOV. UNION

AGENCY BENEFITED FROM FBI DEBRIEFINGS

CONTACTS
DIV / OO HAD MANDATE IN US

BELIEVES [FIELDS FROM CZECHOS] WAS DEBRIEFED

BELIEVES HE GOT INFO ON AMER IN SOV UNION FROM STATE DEPT VISAS OR FROM PRESS

[6 RESEARCH SEC
CHIEF: CANNOT REMEM
DEP. CHIEF: OLDER WOMAN AT AGE OF RETIREMENT]

RUDOLF
BALABAN (UKR-AMER.) CAN REMEMBER NAMES

[DATE OF DISCN:
LAST DAYS OF WORK: 3RD OR 4TH WK OF JULY 1962
SO DISCUSSION TOOK PLACE !]

ASSUMED HE HAD BEEN SENT OUT BY KGB SO DID NOT DEBRIEF

SUMMER 1960 - 6/25 LEFT JAPAN, TRAVELLED THRU EUROPE ON LEAVE W/ FAMILY UNTIL SEPT.
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN 1960
USED WRONG YR IN THE MEMO

[KUJUMP: OPS DIV; HAD CONTACTS DIV FOR DE-BRIEFING]

[SUIT CHANNELS: INS, FBI]

HAD RECD MAYBE ONE STATE DEPT DISPATCH ON
RETURNING AM
IF HE GAVE UP PASSPORT HAD TO APPLY IN
SOME WAY TO RETURN

BELIEVES AM HAD CONTACTS INITIATED BY HIM

KNEW WHATEVER WAS IN STATE DEPT DISPATCH
ABOUT HIM

0 LOOKS ODD
CIA'S OWN EVALUATION
BECAUSE HE WAS ALLOWED TO LIVE IN
& MARRY

CONTROLLED STATION COULD TALK & CONTACT IN
PERFUNCTORY MANNER

1945-60
DOESN'T BELIEVE MORE THAN 10 CAME TO
THEIR ATTENTION
FROM STATE
MILI

REDSKIN = LEGAL TRAVELLERS PROGRAM
VERY LEGIT PRESENCE IN USSR

DEBRIEFING AGENCY WOULD WRITE INFO & PASS IT ON
HE BELIEVES HE WOULD HAVE KNOWN

+

BELIEVES IT INCONCEIVABLE O WOULD HAVE BEEN OPERATIVE

NO INFO

KGB OPERATIONS MADE IT CONC HE COULD HAVE BEEN LAY LOW OPERATIVE

MINSK

HAD SOME SPECIAL DESIGN PLANTS OF INTEREST.

AVIATION

NUCLEAR ENERGY

BACTERIO WARFARE

CAN'T REMEM WHICH WERE IN MINSK

ANYONE NEAR THEM WAS OF INTEREST

CONFIDENT O WAS NOT WORKING IN SUCH A SECURITY

WAS NOT CLEARLY MILI OR SECURITY AREA

BELIEVES THEY HAD ANLYC INFO ON THE RADIO FACTORY IN OFF. OF RESEARCH + REPORTING

WASN'T AWARE OF KGB FAC IN MINSK

LEGAL TRAV PROG

HEADED BY ALEKANDER SOKALOFF SR DIV

BEGAN PRE 1960 AS LESSENING OF TENSIONS BEGAN

SOK CAME OUT AS CHILD W/ RUSSIAN PARENTS

DEFS WERE KEPT AT ARMS LENGTH

MEANT HAD RELA WELL BEFORE HIS TRIP

KNEW WHAT HE'D BE DOING, COULD GIVE
REQ'TS

C. WAS NOT INVOLVED IN IT
C WAS OPPOSED BECAUSE IT WAS TOO SHORT TERM
IN TIME OF RESOURCES, RISK

COVER MAY HAVE BEEN USED BY AGENCY, BUT
DOESN'T KNOW, SAID HE BELIEVES THEY'D
BE TOLD

HARVEY STORY
MUST HAVE
GIVE CRYPTONYM HE WAS USING AT STORY
[PONDERS ?]
WOULD HAVE TO HAVE PROMPTING OF MEMORY
DOUBTS IT WOULD BE SOMEBODY'S TRUE NAME

NEVER CONTACTED BY ANYBODY ABOUT O OR
MEMO

O. INTEREST WAS JUST A LEAD — NO FOLLOW UP
NOT UNUSUAL

O'S GOING TO USSR WAS UNUSUAL, LEFT HIM
OPEN TO CONTACT BY KGB
— BUT HE WAS THEREFORE OF MARGINAL INTEREST

NORMAL TO NOT MAKE CHECK FOR 201,
ONCE THEY DECIDED NOT TO USE HIM
IT'S POSS A[COLLEAGUE]COULD HAVE
CHECKED, BUT DOESN'T RECALL ANY

SUBORDINATES
BALABAN

RICHARD [WINK] ?

CHARLES COX LIAISON W/ TECH SUPPORTS DIV
(i.e. CONCEALMENT DEVICES)

DEPUTIES: CHACHAVADZE, DAVID IN 1960 FOR 3-4 MOS.
?
AVERILL
A.T. STEWART, STAYED ON - COULD REMEMBER MORE DETAILS

BECKY BALABAN

201: INDICATION THAT REQ ~~H~~ HAD BEEN MADE FOR PROV. OP. APPROVAL: WOULD INDICATE OP. USE & INTEREST; WOULD REFER

DOESN'T KNOW CRITERIA FOR OPENING 201'S
MANY #'S REMAINED OPEN W/O BEING ASSETS

AGENCY PEOPLE WERE ASSIGNED [TO ATSUGI]

OSWALD

WHATEVER I MEANT BY HARVEY HAD NOTHING TO DO W/ HIM

CI = COUNTERINT ~~COMMUNICA~~
SIG: SIGNAL INTELL, BUT NOT SURE
NSA OR MILI MIGHT HAVE PICKED NAME UP IN TRANSMISSION IF HE HAD ACCESS TO SUCH

201 SEC OF
REGISTRY COULD ANSWER QUES OF ENTRIES

AG: DOESN'T KNOW

[CROSSES + ENTRIES:] DOESN'T KNOW
BELIEVES PERMA CHARGE MEANS STAY IN REGISTRY W/ NO OP SIGNIFICANCE

WOULD BE ROUTINE OPENING IF SIMILARLY OPENED ON OTHER AM DEFECTORS

[BRANCH 6] DIDN'T HAVE INTERES

STATE DISP. WOULD HAVE BEEN PASSED ON FOR INFO + BACK TO REGISTRY WHO KEPT 3A DOCS

BELIEVES FROM MEMO HE SAW SEVERAL DISP WOULD BE NORMAL TO SEE CONSECU SERIES



BELIEVES DOC IS PASSIVE + NOT OPERATIONAL

THEY GOT VISAS TOO EASILY

"UNUSUAL BEHAVIOR":
DEFECTION; REASONS UNKNOWN, DISORIENTED (DOESN'T THINK HE WAS SENT BACK ON MISSION, BUT DOESN'T EXCLUDE POSS.).
MARRIED RUSSIAN

DOESN'T BELIEVE WE WERE ABLE TO MONITOR HIM IN SOV. U - WOULD HAVE BEEN TOO RISKY

HIS REVEALING MILI SECRETS WOULD HAVE BEEN OF INTEREST

WOULD MEMO HAVE EXISTED ABOUT HIS INTEREST IN LHO
DOESN'T THINK SO NOR REMEM DOING SO
NOT CUSTOMARY
WHAT WAS FIRST [ODACID] DISPATCH REC'D

NOTE: C'S MEMO OF 11/25/63 PRESUPPOSES A LOT OF EARLY INFO ON O'S ACTIVITIES IN MINSK

FILE REVIEW

SECRET

OFFICE OF SECURITY

CLAUDE BARNES CAPEHART
BUSTER BARNES CAPEHART

INCL. DATES 1963-1975

TERMINATION SEC. AGREEMENT

9 JULY 1975
WITNESS: JOHN F. MCNAMARA
NAME + ADDRESS OF AFFILIATION: GLOBAL MARINE, LOS ANGELES, CA.
REMARKS: MATADOR

~~SPECIAL PROJECT SEC. AGREEMENT~~
[AGREEMENT] 1/30/75

I UNDERSTAND THAT NO CHANGE IN MY EMPLOYMENT ... WILL RELIEVE ME OF MY OBLIG. UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.

I HAVE BEEN ADV. OF THE PROCEDURES TO FOLLOW IN ORDER TO DETERMINE THE IDENTITY OF INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE BEEN APPROVED FOR ACCESS TO THIS PROJ., THE CURRENT ESTIMATE OF HAZARD INVOLVED IN TRAVEL TO A FOREIGN AREA OR TO RESOLVE ANY OTHER QUES. WHICH MAY ARISE UNDER THIS AGREEMENT.

PROJECT: MATADOR

11112730

WITNESS: B E SAVAGE
NAME + ADD. OF AFF.: GLOBAL MARINE, INC. L.A.

DERIVATIVE CL BY 007472
☐ DECL ☒ REVW ON 18 Dec. 1998
DERIVED FROM 9c(1); 9c(3.15)

SECRET

180 10143 10171

MEMO 17 JAN 74

TO: HQ

FROM: NPRC ST. LOUIS

RECORDS DESTROYED IN FIRE OF 12 JULY 1973

AGREEMENT

10/30/73

PROJ. AZORIAN & T.D.

WITNESS: PAUL H. ITO

PHASE: III

GLOBAL MARINE, INC.

REQ. FOR SEC. ACCESS APPROVAL 1 AUG 73

POSITION: CRANE OPERATOR/DRILLER

PROJ. AZ PHASE III

JUSTIFICATION: PERFORM DUTIES ON BOARD SS

PRE EMPLOYMENT INTERVIEW

EMPLOYMENT APP.

VISA PARTICULARS FORM

BIO. DATA 9 AUG 73

BORN OKEMAH, OKLA.

11112731

RESIDENCES SEPT. 72 — N.J.

2/66 - 9/72 NEV.

9/64 - 2/66 - NEV.

3/55 - 9/64 - CALIF.

SECRET

MILI. 9/43-7/46: USARMY, SARG. #39145469

EMP. 9/72 - 6/73 NY
3/72 - 9/72 REYNOLDS HEAT LNG., LAS VEGAS
2/72-3/72 MECK SERVICES, LAS VEGAS
11/71-2/72 UNEMPLOYED
11/67-11/71 REYNOLDS HEAT LNG., LAS VEGAS

MEMO:
DATE:
TO:
FROM:

REF.: HQS LTR DTD ______
CSC COMPL. BI 1 DEC. 1965 REFLECTS
COV:

EMPLOY: NEV. CA. TEXAS.
REFS.: NEV. CA
NEIGH. NEV. CA.
P+C: NEV. CA, TEXAS
MISC.: MPRC - MO.

11112732

CC: NYFO
[redacted] } CROSSED OUT
[redacted] }

SENT 9/25/[73]

SECRET

SPOUSE: ROBERTA MARY CAPEHART
NEE BAILEY B. 2 DEC 22, WINSBORO, LA.
CHILDREN: NEAL HENRY CAPEHART
B. 11 AUG. 53, BAKERSFIELD
ADDRESS: BOX 7011 RENO, NEV.

HQ. LETTER OF ASSIGNMENT + INVEST. TRANSMITTAL 9/73

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS:
COVERT CASE: NO GOVT. INTEREST TO BE SHOWN

MARINE GLOBAL APP. FOR EMPLOYMENT
OFFSHORE DRILLING + OCEAN TECHNOLOGY
LOS ANGELES — HOUSTON — LONDON

ADD. 4425 STACEY AVE. LAS VEGAS
PHONE 702 648 6070
CRANE OPERATOR — DRILLER

BR. HAIR
BR EYES
6' HT.
210 LBS.

11112733

REFERRED BY TOM WILLIAMS, GMI EMPLOYEE

SECRET

EMP. 10/63 - 12/63

MONOLITH PORTLAND CEMENT CO.
327 TROPICANA AVE. LAS VEGAS
TRUCK DRIVER
LEFT TO RETURN TO MERCURY

3/63 - 10/63

WHEELER TRUCKING
337550 POLARIS AVE., LAS VEGAS
QUIT OVER LABOR DISPUTE

REFS

FRANCIS NOFFSINGER	L.V.	878 5306
EVERETT L. YOUNG		8702281
OSCAR SLAYTON		452 1945
JIM STINER		6429368

LETTER 6/20/73

FROM PERINI NORTH RIVER ASS.
NY, NY
9/72 - 6/73 DRILL BARGE SUPER

REQUEST FOR SEC. ACCESS APPROVAL 11 NOV. 63

ORG. MONOLITH PORTLAND CEMENT CO.

SEC. ACCESS APR. OF SUBJECT TO PROJECT
R PHASE 1 K REQ.
[NO JUSTIFICATION REF. IS LISTED]

TO CHIEF I.D FOR ACTION 11112734

APPROVED 12/20/63 SECRET

BLIND PAGE "UUDT-1764
PAGE 12 OF 61"

LISTS CAPGHART PER MONOLITH
ARRIVED KW CEILING: 9 OCT. 1963

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/25/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10143-10222
RECORD SERIES :	CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	29-05-01

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	00/00/0000
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	HSCA, FILES CIA, FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	FORM
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	Open in Full
CURRENT STATUS :	Release
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/16/1995
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 19

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Box 29
Folder 5

ALAN HAUSMAN
2 MAR 1978

11110224

SECRET

~~0002453~~

I would like to see:

1) DDO files concerning James Earl Ray, and JER under any of his aliases

2) Real names of Crypographic references in 8 June 1968 Ottawa 5446 Telex
SMABOVE/9
LNERGO REP
SMABLE

3) 3rd Agency
a) INS - Report from San Francisco Field Office of INS dtd 6/17/68 subject: CHANG, Fang Nang (A17-288-758)
[Ray's name given as Eric S Galt]

b) State Dept Telexes

London	10573	7/3/68
London	10554	7/3/68
State	195240	7/2/68
London	10017	6/18/68
State	183535	6/14/68
Lisbon	1567	6/14/68
State	181198	6/12/68
London	9738	6/11/68
Ottawa	1813	6/8/68

Thanks,
Alan Hausman

SECRET

1 0225

~~SECRET~~

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

Ray File - No. 541-245 ~~0002454~~

John (m) Reeves, Jr, (Security Analysis Group) - 12/12/75 Memo to Files

Hanes was confidential correspondent for Office of Security from 1952-1959 & was on OGC cleared Atty. Panel in 1961

CIA had no file on JER prior to the assassination

Memo - (Subject:) Arthur J. Hanes - #0-340826 & #C67413

The handwritten note by Richard Helms, DCI, to Howard J. Osborn, Director of Security on memorandum dated 20 Nov. 68 is to be considered in any future action concerning subject. SUBJECT IS NOT TO BE USED AGAIN BY THE AGENCY.

Memo - 11/20/68 For: Elizabeth Dunlevy
From: Howard J. Osborn
Dir of Security

Handwritten Note by Helms to Osborn "Thank you - lets not use him again."

Hanes, FBI A (1948-51) known to officers in Office of Security

Applied to CIA in 1950 when considering leaving FBI, but application w/drawn a week later

Was confidential correspondent for Office of Security from 5/52 to 2/59 - he terminated due to pressure of regular employment (Hayes Aircraft Corp from 8/51 to 11/61)

Elected Mayor of Birmingham in 1961

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

but only served one year ~~0002455~~

Granted covert security clearance in 8/61 by Off. of Gen. Counsel on Cleared Attys. ~~Board~~ Panel

Instrumental in recruiting Ala. Nat. Guard pilots during Bay of Pigs – several killed

When terminated relationship w/ Office of Security in 2/59 was unhealthy segregationist + possibly tended toward racist. "For this reason, we were not too unhappy with his decision to sever his relationship with us. Nonetheless, we have always considered him pro-Agency + his statements regarding the Agency are somewhat surprising."

6/3/68 Las Vegas Sun

Inside Washington Column

Robert Allen Paul Scott

"One CIA report indicates that Ray, who is linked to the murder weapon by fingerprints and ballistic data, may have visited Cuba during his Mexican trip, according to information furnished by a Mexican airline official"

~~SECRET~~

11110227

SECRET

6/8/68 Telex ~~27362~~ London 5061

As of early 8 June, local FBI believed Sneyd in ~~Londo~~ Lisbon, FBI sent 2 Reps there ~~0002456~~

6/8/68 Telex ~~27367~~ London 5062

"FBI here apparently believes Ray has been 'floating around Europe' since arrival from Toronto 7 May. FBI had been trying follow-up earlier lead Ray had been trying arrange get to Rhodesia in hopes Smith Regime would not look angrily at man who shot Negro

SECRET

11110223

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

~~CIA HAS [illegible] TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT~~

~~SECRET~~

Arthur J. Hanes # 67413

~~34082~~

10/15/68 Memo

Subj: Hanes, Arthur J

#340826 (O)

#67413 (C)

From James P. O'Connell

Dep. Dir. of Security (PTOS)

"6. There is no current Agency interest in Mr. Hanes"

"Material Dated Prior to 1966

(Internal OS Investigative

Data and FBI material

~~0002455~~

~~SECRET~~

Classification: SECRET 1 of 9 pages

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

INTERVIEW OF THOMAS CASASIN
AUGUST 17, 1978
AMERICAN EMBASSY/ PARIS, FRANCE

By Surell Brady

Casasin stated that he retired from the Central Intelligence Agency in 1973. At the time of the assassination of President Kennedy in November, 1963 he was stationed in Paris; he was working in the area of Soviet operations, but had no official cover. He arrived in Paris in September, 1962.

He stated that in September, 1960 he was assigned 24 [defense cover] as Branch 6 Chief. He worked for two years in Section 6.

Casasin said that during his assignment in Paris he had not infrequent contact with the CIA station in Paris. He estimated that the contact occurred every two and a half weeks. The contact was made on the outside by telephoning a person with official cover. He said he never made written contact with the station.

Casasin explained that the function of Section 6 was operations in support of the Soviet Russia Division of the CIA. He said the work consisted of amassing information in support of the SR Division; he characterized that work as classical espionage work against the USSR. He said it involved penetration for the purpose of espionage and included cartography, demography, sociology, and experts in the fields of science and political science. He stated that the section was in a "down" phase when he entered and that it consisted of only 20-25 persons.

Casasin worked in Japan from February 1955 to June 1960. He served as Chief of the Soviet Base of the North Asia Command. He said his unit was attached to the Far Eastern Command of the Armed Forces. He explained that his unit was one of four bases: Soviet, Japan, North Korea and Red China. Each of those geographical areas was a target. The Soviet base in which he worked was therefore targeted against the Soviet Union. He was assigned head of that base in 1955.

He said the operations out of the Soviet base included espionage. The covert operations consisted of psychological warfare and radio transmission to internal Soviet audiences. He said the espionage also included spying against Soviet naval and industrial targets in Soviet ports, using mainly Japanese operatives who had access to the ports.

Casasin said that his base had extremely limited work with the

Classification: SECRET

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Classified by derivation: ________

military. He said it consisted primarily of briefing the military on items of mutual interest. He said the CIA had tried to work with clandestine units of the military, including the Army (he said the Navy had no clandestine units), but it was the opinion of the CIA that the military had too low a degree of professionalism for the successful operation of clandestine projects. Casasin stated that during this time the military said it was actually running operations, but it was never confirmed by the CIA and they found no evidence of such military operations.

Casasin identified two military intelligence personnel in the area when he was stationed in Japan: Captain Perez, OSI, and John B. Stanley, Army head.

Casasin said, however, that the Navy did provide some operational support for his base. It consisted of providing [cover]24 for persons running operations against the Soviets.

Casasin said he cannot recall any specific information that the military was using American military personnel in any of its operations. He said, however, that there were ~~was~~ occasional rumors that an American serviceman was trafficking with suspected foreign subversives. He said the individual intelligence agencies would have handled any such cases. He stated that he never heard any concrete information of American contact with the Soviets.

Casasin could not recall the name of the Chief of the North Asia Command in 1955; he believed the man was a retired vice admiral and that his last name began with the letter "O." Harry Little succeeded that person in 1957.

Casasin said that most of his communications during that time from Japan went back to headquarters. He explained that the North Asia Command at that time was tied up with the situation of Korea and Japan.

Casasin said that he does not know who had the oversight responsibility or authority for the U-2 program. He cited that as an example of how well compartmentalized their work was. He said he never learned who was in charge of the U-2 program out of Japan. He said that he assumed it was some type of paramilitary operation. He said the North Asia base ran no paramilitary operations and that most such smaller units usually did not.

Casasin said he does not recall any discussions concerning the possible use of American defectors to penetrate the Soviets. He said one reason for no interest in such use was probably that the First

Ymc

Chief Directorate of the KGB would suspect any such American from the beginning as being CIA connected. He said the CIA at that point knew a lot about the KGB and its thinking because they had had experience with displaced persons from the communist bloc.

Casasin explained further that American intelligence interests were much more short range than the type of slow, long-range project of working an American defector into some sensitive or intelligence-productive position within the Soviet Union. He said that was simply not the American way of conducting intelligence and that that thinking precluded such programs.

Casasin said lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union from such things as the Spirit of Camp David did allow some shallow penetration. This consisted primarily of using short-term tourists and foreigners on legitimate business within the Soviet Union. But he said these projects had no direct or obvious effects on our intelligence gathering against the Soviet Union.

I referred Casasin to CIA Document 435-173-A, which is a memo dated 25 November 1963 from Thomas B. Casasin to Walter P. Haltigan on Mr. Lee Harvey Oswald. Casasin says he does remember the memo. I asked him to explain the cover memo dated 12 December 1963 by Robert G. Lamprell to Chiefs of SR and WH re: GPFLOOR-Lee Harvey Oswald.

3 Casasin explained that Lamprell (whose real name was [William Rober Sinclair] he died of cancer a few years ago) was one of Casasin's contacts in Paris. He said that Lamprell was the Senior Officer in the Soviet Office in the Paris Station, and served as the second in 3 command. Casasin said that Walter Haltigan (whose real name was [James Flint] was his normal contact in Paris. He surmised that his memo was sent out by Lamprell because Haltigan might not have been available He does not know the reason for the delay between the date of his memo, 25 November, and the transmission by Lamprell, 12 December.

Casasin said he recalls that he wrote the memo spontaneously when he heard a news cast about Oswald after the assassination. He recognized Oswald when he heard the news information that Oswald had lived in Minsk in the Soviet Union and had married a foreigner. He remembered those details from State Department information he had seen.

Casasin explained the cryptonym REDWOOD as clandestine operations; the Chief of the SR Division was responsible for that project. He explained that was separate from the REDCAP program, which was operatio against Soviets outside of the USSR.

Casasin explained the relationship of the Counterintelligence

2/mc

staff to other divisions. He said Counterintelligence had primary responsibility for staff review, but supposedly no command voice. However, they did have their own closely held operations. Counterintelligence gave approval on every operation. Casasin said that it was possible or even probable that Counterintelligence ran operations in his geographical target.

Casasin said research was one of the functions of the 6 Branch. But he cannot recall research's exact mandate within the 6 Branch. He listed the branches besides 6 Branch: (1) Scandinavia; (2) Western Europe; (3) Middle East and Latin America; (4) ? ; (5) Far East; and the Inter-Branch.

Casasin said the the research unit of Branch 6 would get information from defectors about Soviet realities and details about Soviet life which could be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union. He said such defectors were normally pumped about personal life in the USSR. However, Casasin said he does not personally know of any defectors being used as a source in his brief time in the SR Division. He said the agency also benefitted from FBI debriefings of such defectors. In part this was due to the CIA's limited charter domestically in the United States. But the Contacts Division (OO) did have a domestic mandate within the U.S. Casasin said he thought the American defector to Czechoslovakia, Fields, had been debriefed by the agency. Casasin said he believed the agency also got information on Americans in the Soviet Union from State Department information about visas or from the press.

Casasin said he cannot remember who served as Chief of the Section 6 research branch while he was there. He said the deputy chief was an older woman near the age of retirement. He said that Rudolf Balaban worked with him and is still at the agency; he could probably remember the names of the others in the section.

I asked when Casasin recalled the discussion took place which he refers to in his memo. He said it was the last days of his work with the section; he assumes it was the third or fourth week of July, 1962 when he left the section, so he believes the conversation about Oswald took place the first week of July, 1962.

Casasin said at the time he assumed Oswald had been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB, so he exercsied caution and did not attempt to debrief Oswald.

Casasin gave the following dates in an effort to pin down when the conversation took place. He said he left Japan on June 25, 1960 and

Classification: SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

travelled through Europe on leave with his family until Spetember, 1960. He said therefore the conversation could not have taken place in the summer of 1960 as the memo states. He said he used the wrong year in the memo.

Casasin identified KUJUMP as the Operations Division. He said it had a contacts division for debriefing persons. He said the "suitable channels" for debriefing referred to in the memo were the Immi gration and Naturalization Service and the FBI. He said he believed he had received maybe one State Department dispatch on the returning American. He said the dispatch probably originated if Oswald had given up his passport at the Embassy in Moscow and had had to reapply to the embassy to be able to return to the United States. Casasin said he believes Oswald's contacts with the Embassy in Moscow were initiated by Oswald. Casasin said he only knew whatever appeared in the State Department dispatches about Oswald.

He said his statement in the memo that Oswald looked "odd" was the CIA's evaluation of Oswald. This was based on the fact that he was allowed to live in the Soviet Union and permitted to marry a Soviet citizen. Casasin said he believed some type of controlled intelligence station should approach Oswald; they would be able to contact and talk to him in a perfunctory manner for debriefing purposes.

Casasin said that during the period 1945-60 no more than 10 American defectors came to their attention from the State Department and the military.

Casasin identified the REDSKIN cryptonym as the legal travellers program. It involved using persons to give information about the Soviet Union who had a "very legitimate" presence in the Soviet Union, such as scientists, etc.

Casasin said the agency which conducted the debriefing of these people and defectors would write the information and pass it on. He believes therefore that if Oswald had been debriefed he would have seen the information in that form.

Casasin said he believes it is inconceivable that Oswald would have been any type of operative of the CIA. However, he also gave his opinion that the nature of KGB operations made it conceivable that Oswald could have been a "lay-low" Soviet operative.

I asked about the CIA interest in Minsk which is reflected in Casasin's memo. Casasin said it was known that there were some type of special design plants in Minsk which were of interest to the CIA.

Classification: SECRET

Classified by derivation: ____________

Casasin said that type of special design plant dealt with aviation, nuclear energy, bacterialogical warfare, etc. He said that he cannot remember specifically which type of plants were located in Minsk, but the city was of interest for that reason. Additionally, anyone in the area of those plants was of interest to the agency. Casasin said he is confident that Oswald was not working in any type of security facility. He said even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was not identified as a security or military priority area. Casasin said also that he believes they had some type of encyclopedic information at the agency on the radio factory in Minsk where Oswald worked. He said that kind of information was maintained in the Office of Research and Reporting. Casasin said he was not aware of a KGB facility in Minsk.

Casasin said the Legal Travellers Program was headed at the time of his memo by Alexander Sokaloff (phonetic) of the Soviet Russia Division. He said the program began pre-1960 with the lessening of tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. He said Sokaloff had come out of the Soviet Union with his parents as a child. He explained that defectors such as Sokaloff were kept at arms length for security reasons by the agency.

The Legal Travellers Program operated in such a way that the agency contact was in touch with the traveller well before the proposed trip and would be informed as to which areas would be visited, what he would be doing in the country, etc. The agency contact would then be able to give the traveller the agency's "requirements" for information while he was abroad. Casasin said he was not involved in the program. He said he was opposed to it because it was too short-term to justify the investment of resources and the risk involved. He said he believes the travellers were told that their contacts were CIA, but he doesn't know for sure. He said cover may have been used by the contact.

I asked Casasin what the reference to the "Harvey Story" in the last line of his memo referred to. He said at first that it must have been some kind of cryptonym he was using at the time. He pondered a while. Then he said he would need some kind of prompting of his memory. He said he doubts that it would have been someone's true name.

Casasin said he has never been contacted by anybody, including the Warren Commission, about the memo.

He said that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memo was just a lead. He said the fact of no follow-up on that lead was not unusual. He said Oswald's going to the Soviet Union was unusual, but that left him open to the possibility of KGB contact. He therefore ultimately was of only marginal interest to the agency.

Casasin said it was normal to not make a check for a 201 file on a person like Oswald, meaning that it was not unusual that he did not check for Oswald's 201. He said this was epsecially not unusual since they had made the decision not to use Oswald. It's possible that a colleague of Casasin's might have checked, but Casasin said he doesn't recall any such check.

Casasin said his subordinates in the Branch 6 were Balaban, a man named Richard, last name possibly [Wink] and [Charles Cox,] who was the liaison with the Technical Supports Division (i.e., concealment devices). He said deputies in the branch were David Chachavadze (in 1960 for three or four months), A.T. Stewart (possibly Averill); Stewart stayed on in the branch and Casasin believe he could be of more help in remembering details about the branch; also, Becky Balaban, who is married to Rudolf Balaban.

Casasin said that the purpose of a 201 is to indicate that a request had been made for provisional operational approval. He said the file would indicate operational interest and would then refer one to the specific office with the interest in the individual. He said he doesn't know ~~that~~ actual criteria for opening 201's. He said also that after initial interest was shown in an individual by the opening of a 201, the number might remain with the individual without the person actually being developed as an asset.

Casasin mentioned that agency people were assigned to the military base at Atsugi.

Casasin referred agin to the "Harvey Story" reference in his memo. He sated that "Whatever I meant by Harvey had nothing to do with him (Oswald)."

I showed Casasin the Personality (201) File Request form from Oswald's 201 file. He said he had never seen it before and did not know there actually existed a 201 file on Oswald. Referring to the source of the form, CI/SIG, Casasin said Ci stood for Counterintelligence. He said he thought SIG stood for Signal Intelligence, but he was not sure. He said that notation would mean that NSA or the military had picked up Oswald's name in some type of transmission. He asked if Oswald had access to any type of radio transmissions. He said he thought the 201 section of the Registry Office could answer questions about the notations on the form.

Referring to the "AG" notation in the Other Identification

2/mc

block on the form, Casasin said he does not know what it stood for. I asked him if he understood why some of the notations were crossed out and new notations had been made; he said he could not explain that. He said he thought the Permanent Charge notation meant that the file would stay in the Office of Registry and that the file therefore had no operational significance. In this file he said he thought it would be routine to open a file on defectors such as Oswald, so it may have had some other office charge because of that. He said Branch 6 did not have an interest in the Oswald file.

I asked how he would have come across the State Department communications on Oswald. He said the normal distribution of such State Department information would mean that the dispatches would be circulated for information and then routed back to registry where they would be kept on file as Third Agency documents. He said he believes from the dispatches he saw on Oswald that they were in a consecutive series as received from the State Department. He believes from the memo that he must have seen several such dispatches with information about Oswald.

Casasin explained the operational interest various divisions within the agency might have in this way:



He said he believes the 201 Personality form in Oswald's file is passive and not operational and sees nothing to indicate operational interest. He said the above scheme means that only the line divisions would carry the operations, and he does not see any indication of such an interest on the form. The fact that only Counterintelligence is indicated on the form seems to preclude any operations.

Casasin talked further about suspicions about Oswald. He expressed the feeling the Oswald and Marina got their visas to leave the Soviet Union too easily. He expalined the "unusual behavior" of Oswald as being his defection: his reasons were unknown, he seemed disoriented, he married a Russian. Casasin said that while he does not believe Oswald was sent back to the United States by the Soviets, he cannot preclude that possibility.

I asked if the Americans were able to follow Oswald's activities

Classification: SECRET

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

while he was living in the Soviet Union. Casasin said he doesn't believe we were able to monitor him inside the USSR. He said it would have been too risky to run the chance of exposing any operatives inside the country.

I asked if Oswald's threat at the Embassy in Moscow to reveal milit ary secrets to the Soviets wouldn't have made Oswald of more intelligence interest. Casasin said if he had revealed secrets he would have been of interest for security.

I asked Casasin if a memo would have existed from the time of the conversation referred to in his 1963 memo about interest in Oswald. He said he doesn't think so; he said it was not customary to write memos about such leads which were discussed and not follow-up. He does not remember preparing any such memo.

Classification: ____________

Classified by derivation: ________

Genzman #
5-4-78

Russell August Langelle

SECRET

Robert Genzman and Harold Leap interviewed Russell August Langelle at CIA headquarters on May 4, 1978. The interview yielded the following information:

Langelle joined the CIA in September 1950, and worked mainly in SR9 of the Soviet Russia Division. In November 1955 he resigned from the Agency [on the pretext that he was disgruntled with his assignments. His CIA files would have reflected this termination of employment. The only document to the contrary would have been a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allan Dulles, stating that Langelle would retain all rights and benefits when he returned to the CIA.] (at present this document would probably be in his personnel file.)

11112574

[Approximately fifteen people knew that Langelle was still with the CIA after his resignation in 1955. These included John Maury (SE), (Joe Bulik) 03 (SR 9), Quentin Johnson (Chief of Operations), George Kisevalter, Frank Levy, Ted Polling,]

SECRET

VPV

2

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

03

[Jack Kindschi, (June Sworbuck,)
(Ed Galloway), Leonard McCoy
(Reports $\overset{03}{\text{and}}$ Requirements), Pierre
de Silva (COS), and someone at
the State Department's Office of
Security] [redacted]

At the time of his resignation,
Langelle applied for employment
with the State Department. In
the interim he worked at the
Hecht Company. In March 1956
he started to work at the
State Department as a Security
Officer. In September 1956 he
was sent to Vienna, where he
earned a reputation for being
a strict Security Officer at the
Embassy. [He was deliberately tough
on CIA personnel who breached
security, in order to build his
32 cover as a non-CIA foreign
service officer. His salary was
paid by the State Department.
27 (The CIA Chief of Station) in Vienna
and the Ambassador knew he
was with the CIA.]

11112575

Langelle served as the Security
Officer at the Moscow Embassy
from December 1957 to September
1959. [In addition, he was the
senior CIA officer there. The
CIA contingent in Moscow [redacted]
consisted of five or six officers]

SECRET

4|R

3

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

[working inside the Embassy and approximately four outside. Inside, with deep cover, were George P. Winters (Econ 03 Officer), FNU 03 (Mahoney), FNU (Venables) and (Steve 03 Washenko) (Econ 32 or Agric. Officer)]. Outside were Jean Leberman (teacher 24 at the American school)) and three or four students, who handled orientation projects rather than operations projects.]

[Langelle handled CIA communications in Moscow. The CIA used State Department channels of communication, but could code messages by means of one-pad encrypting so that the message was secret until it was forwarded to CIA headquarters, where it was decoded.]

In 1959 the Soviets declared Langelle persona non grata as a result of his involvement with P.S. Popov. [Langelle was the case officer of] Popov, who worked for the GRU, Soviet military intelligence. [While making a contact with Popov,] Langelle was detained by the KGB and was questioned for two and a half hours. The KGB attempted to recruit him, and then released him. The State

SECRET

5
4|R

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

Department filed a formal protest, but Langelle was told to leave the Soviet Union within three days. He left the Soviet Union in early October 1959.

Langelle first became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald when he heard in a conversation that a Marine had contacted the American consular office in Moscow to renounce his citizenship. He later heard that this individual had changed his mind and was returning to the United States. He does not recall the details of these conversations, but he believes they took place in the United States.

11112577

Langelle characterized Oswald's defection as a consular case to be handled by consular officers, rather than an intelligence case involving intelligence officers, [who were shorthanded in Moscow at that time. He stated that the few intelligence officers in Moscow at that time were involved in specific operations, and did not perform general intelligence functions. He also stated that intelligence officers at the Embassy did not use the consular officers for intelligence purposes, and that there were]

SECRET

5

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

[no CIA people in the consular section.]

Langelle stated that the military intelligence people at the Embassy probably would have been contacted about Oswald's defection. The military intelligence personnel included [Leo Dulacki (Marines), Paul Adams (Navy), John Munson (Navy), and Ted Hoffman (Army). He did not know whether Alexis Davison (Navy) was an intelligence officer or whether Davison was involved in the Penkovsky case]

Langelle stated that when Oswald left the Soviet Union, he was the responsibility of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the FBI.

11112578

When Langelle left [illegible] [illegible] Moscow in 1959, [Winters was the senior CIA officer there. 03 (Mahoney) and Leberman were still there, and [Washenko] 03 may still have been there.] Langelle's replacement as Embassy Security Officer was John Abidian [who was not with the CIA. Abidian was later replaced by Hugh Montgomery, who was Winter's successor as senior CIA officer.]

SECRET

2/RJ

6

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

[Montgomery was later replaced by Paul Garbler, who became the first officially designated Chief of Station in Moscow. Other CIA officers in Moscow circa 03 1962 included (Rodney Carlson), Bill Horvaly, and possibly (John 03 D. Hemenway).]

At headquarters the chief of the Soviet Russia Division was John Maury, followed by Howard Osborne and then David E. Murphy.

With regard to American journalists in Moscow, Langelle had no contacts with R. G. Korengold, or Aline Mosby, did not know A. I. Goldberg, and was contacted by Priscilla Johnson for an interview after he was declared persona non grata.

SECRET 11112579

When Langelle returned to the United States, he continued working for the State Department. He resumed [his] CIA duties on a part-time basis in 1961. [He dealt with communications between Washington and Moscow.] In September 1961 he resumed [his] CIA duties on a full-time basis at headquarters. He worked mainly in the Soviet Russia Division, External Operations, Africa and Europe. At present he is still with the CIA [and still paid by the State 32 Department,] but he plans to retire soon.

3|R

SECRET

Langelle

~~L'Angeli~~ was born on October 7, 1922. His social security number is [495-18-8808] He is married, with three children. 30

Langelle ~~L'Angeli~~ joined the CIA in September, 1950, and worked mainly in SR9 of the Soviet ~~Russian~~ Division. In November 1955 he resigned from the Agency on the pretext that he was disgruntled with his assignments. His CIA files would ~~would~~ ~~have~~ have reflected this ~~his~~ termination of employment. The only document to the contrary would have been a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allan Dulles, stating that Langelle ~~L'Angeli~~ would retain all rights and benefits when he returned to the CIA. (~~This document~~ at present this document would probably be in his personnel file.) Approximately fifteen people knew that he was still with the CIA after his resignation in 1955. These included John Maury (CSE), Joe Bulik 03 (SR9), Quentin Johnson (Chief of Operations), George Kisevalper (sp), Frank Levy, Ted Polling, Jack Kindschi, June 03 Swoboda 03 Ed Galloway, Leonard McCoy (Reports and Requirements); Pierre da Silva (COS); and someone at the State Department's Office of Security.

SECRET 11112580

~~L'Ang.~~ ~~After~~ At the time of his resignation Langelle ~~L'Angeli~~ applied for employment with the State Department.

1542R

4|pv

SECRET

[Langelle handled CIA communications in Moscow. The CIA used State Department channels of communication, but ~~code~~ could code messages by means of one-pad encrypting so that the message was secret until it was forwarded to CIA Headquarters for decoding.]

11112581

SECRET

2 [deliberately tough on CIA personnel for security breaches ~~In~~ in order to ~~[illegible]~~ build
32 his cover as a non-CIA foreign service officer. His salary was paid by the State Department] SECRET

In the interim he worked at the Hecht Company. In March 1956 he ~~began~~ started to work at the State Department as a Security Officer. ~~His salary was paid by the~~ ~~State Department~~ ~~He was sent to Vienna in September 1956,~~ In September 1956 he was sent to Vienna, where he ~~developed the~~ earned a reputation ~~[illegible]~~ for being a strict Security Officer at the Embassy. ~~He~~ was [The CIA 27 Chief of Station] ~~and the~~ [in Vienna] and the ambassador knew 10 he ~~was~~ was with the CIA] ~~He served as the Security~~

Par ~~[illegible]~~ ~~L'Angeli~~ Langelle served as the Security Officer at the Moscow Embassy from December 1957 to September 1959. [In addition, he was the senior CIA officer there, with five or six CIA officers working inside the Embassy and approximately four outside. Inside, with deep cover, were ~~Inside were~~ George P. Winters (Econ. Officer), 9
03 (Mahoney), (Venables), 03 and 03, 32 [Steve Vashenko (Econ. or Agric. Officer)]. Outside were Jean Lieberman (a [teacher 24 at the American School]) and three or four students, who handled orientation projects rather than operations projects.]

[insert]

SECRET 1112582

In 1959 ~~L'Ana~~ the Soviets declared L'Angeli persona non grata as a result of ~~[illegible]~~ his involvement with P.S. Popov. [L'Angeli was the case officer for Popov, who worked for the ~~Soviet~~ GRU, Soviet military intelligence. ~~L'Angeli~~ ~~Langelle~~ [~~had been contacting Popov~~] + While

?IPN

SECRET

~~after~~ [making a contact with Popov] Langelle was detained by the KGB and was questioned for two and a half hours. The KGB attempted to recruit him, and then released him. ~~and~~ The State Department filed a formal protest, but Langelle was forced to leave the Soviet Union within three days.

Langelle first became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald when he heard in a conversation that a ~~former~~ Marine had contacted the American consular office in Moscow to renounce his citizenship. He later heard that this individual had changed his mind and was returning to the United States. He does not recall the details of these conversations, but he believes they took place in the United States.

11112583

Langelle characterized Oswald's defection as a consular case to be handled by consular officers [rather than an intelligence case ~~which~~ involving intelligence officers, who were shorthanded in Moscow at that time. He stated that the few intelligence officers in Moscow at that time were involved in specific operations, and did not ~~handle~~ perform general intelligence functions.] He stated that Oswald, when he ~~returned~~

SECRET

[* He also stated that the intelligence officers at the Embassy did not use the consular officers for intelligence purposes, *] [and that there were no CIA ~~[illegible]~~ people in the consular section.]

SECRET

left the Soviet Union, was the responsibility of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the FBI.

When Langelle left Moscow in 1959, [Winters was the senior CIA officer there. (Mahoney)^03 and Leberman were still there, and (Waskenko) may still have been there.] Langelle's^03 replacement as Embassy Security Officer was John Abidian [who was not with the CIA. Abidian was latered replaced by Hugh Montgomery, who ~~replaced~~ was Winter's ~~as the~~ successor ~~became the senior~~ as senior CIA officer. Montgomery was later replaced by Paul Garbler, who became the first officially designated Chief of Station in Moscow. Other CIA officers in Moscow circa 1962 included 03 (Rodney Carlson) Bill Hardley, and possibly (John D. Hemingway).]

~~Military~~ ^03 ~~intelligence personnel in Moscow included~~ [~~Paul Adams (Naval) Attache (Navy), Ted Hoffman (Army)~~]

At headquarters, the ~~[illegible]~~ chief of the Soviet Russia Division was John Maury, followed by Howard Osborne and then David E. Murphy.

SECRET

4/rJ

SECRET

When Langelle returned to the United States, he continued working for the State Department. He resumed [his] CIA duties on a parttime basis in 1961 [He dealt with communications between Washington and Moscow.] In September 1961 he resumed [his] CIA duties on a full-time basis at Headquarters. He worked mainly in the Soviet Russia Division, External Operations, Africa and Europe. ~~He is present~~ at present he is still with the CIA [and is still 32 paid by the State Department], but he plans to retire soon.

SECRET

1.

Russell August ~~L'Angeli~~ Langellè

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

10-7-22

[(495-18-8808)] 30

M 3 ch.

SR Div. (SR9) language, operational + mil. experience, rel[illegible], stabil.

CIA Sept. 50

[~~[illegible]~~ word - disgruntled]

Nov 55 resigned from agency - Sec. Off.

[memo from director all rights + benefits when returns (Dulles)]

15 knew (SR9 - internal ops Hqs. component + couple of officers in Division

↓ inter in job at Hecht Co.

started State Mar 56

Vienna Sept. 56

Vienna [covert building 24 COS knew (briefed orally) status + amb.]

Moscow - Dec. 57

Sept. 59

[people all buried not a station]

[first COS Paul Garbler]

SE John Maury

SR9 (Joe Bulick) 03

Ch. of Ops Quentin Johnson

~~George [illegible]~~ (sp.) Kisevalter

~~[illegible]~~

Frank Levy

Ted Polling

Jack Kindschi

(June Swobuck) 03

(Ed Galloway) 03

11112586

Reports + Requirements

Leonard McCoy

[COS Pierre de Silva]

DOS - Office of Security

[[illegible] otepba not aware]

Moscow [5 to 6 officers inside 4 outside]

SECRET

[illegible]

Langelle

~~[illegible]~~

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

[inside – George P. Winters, [Mahoney]03 [Venables]03
[Steve Washenko (Econ. Officer)] 03,32
outside – Jean Leberman [teacher] 24
3 or 4 students – orientation
rather than operations]

left in 59 John Abidian (State Sec. Officer
took over State
responsibilities)

abidian [replaced by Hugh Montgomery (integrated)) 32 senior officer]

[C/A George P. Winters32 – Econ. Off. – sort of senior (agric.) off.]
[Washenko] – maybe still there
(Mahoney)03 & Leberman

PNG – [agency operation
~~[illegible]~~
penetration on GRU – mil. intell.
Pytor S ~~[illegible]~~ Popov. agent
LG was case off.
case compromised
got approval from Khrush.
to kidnap – as stepped off a bus]
tried to recruit
released after 2½ hrs.
said they would get in touch
State protested
PNG

11112587

Back to US – worked for State Jan 60
handled State Dept duties
[+ agency functions]

SECRET

[Resumed] CIA parttime '61, [Communications to Mos.] Sept. '61 HQ at full time basis.

8/N

Sangelle
~~L'Angelo~~

3

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

(Penkovsky)
cut-out - Brit. wife
SR9 Sept. 61 - 62

[redacted]

[moved back] to CIA
on full-time basis Sept. 61
(Dec. 58 - Sept. 59)

[(Mahony)^{03} : GSA officer]

[Communicat. - Mos. to HQ]
SR9 Jack Maury

[Winters remained]

LHO,
in conversation a consular officer said Marine
renounced citizenship

walk-ins
consular off. would bring it to your attention

[George Kieswalper] in Berlin, handled [Popov] while
in E. Berlin + Vienna.
[- handled Penkosky.
- maybe Nosenko.]

11112588

Used State communications
[one pad encrypting]

SECRET

1/PV

Sangelle
~~L'Angeli~~

4

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

[no [redacted] CIA people in consular section

mil. intell. Paul Adams Nav.
Ted Hoffman Arm
~~Mundsen~~ Munson Nav.
Dulacki Mar.]

would have been contacted

Korengold - no contacts
Johnson - asked for interview after his PNG
Mosby - no contacts
Goldberg - didn't know

[Davison - doesn't know if agency
not involved in Penk. to his knowledge]

[dip. personnel could not be used for intel. without
prior approval from State.]

Provocations
[Harmstone]

11112589

Naval aviator
Atsugi - 53-55

SECRET

Langelle
~~L'Angeli~~

5.

SECRET

Penzman
5-4-78

62 [Hugh Montgomery (senior)
(John D. Hemingway)03 (?)
Paul Garbler (COS; replaced Montgomery)
(Rodney Carlson)03
Bill Hardy]

No common source register with mil. + Moscow

63 - SR, Chief of External Ops.
Africa + Eur.

[(Still paid by State)]
32

[(FSR 4 in Moscow
GS 13 - Moscow)]

David E. Murphy - Chief of SR Div. 64-65
COS [in Berlin during
Popov operation while
L'A in Moscow]

then Maury
followed by Howard Osborne
" " Murphy

11112530

SECRET

3/17

☆

He believed that the military intelligence people at the Embassy would have been contacted about Oswald's defection. The military intelligence personnel included [~~Paul Hoffman~~ ~~Adams~~ ~~(Navy)~~, Dulacki (Marines), Paul Adams (Navy), Munson (Navy) and Ted Hoffman (Army). Langelle did not know whether Alexis Davison (Navy) was an intelligence officers or whether he was involved in the Penkovsky case. ~~or whether Davison~~]

With regard to American journalists in Moscow, Langelle had no contacts with R. G. Korengold or Aline Mosby, did not know A. I. Goldberg, and was contacted by Priscilla Johnson ~~after his expulsion~~ for an interview after he was declared persona non grata.

SECRET

Winters]

res.61 [Eugene 03 (Mahoney) - Rt. 1 [Berkeley 08 Springs, W.Va]

30-61 - 11 '64 Garbler - Vienna [1503 Irving Hill Ct. 22180]

Osborne - McLean

17 Feb 62 - 20 ap. 63 Montgomery -]

[356-4650]

[first COS]

2 June 62 - 14 Dec. 62 [Rodney 03 Carlson]

11 Jul 63, 31 Aug 65 [Edward 03 Gotchef] HQ

annual leave til May 22

11 Jan 63, 18 Jan. 64 [Jerry Brehm] HQ 2 p.m. May 12

C/SR John Maury

1 Dec 54 - 29 Jul. 62 3704 Farr Ave,
Fairfax

Howard J. Osborne

30 Jul 62 15 Sept. 63 Atty. John Debalus
948-6727

David E. Murphy

16 Sept 63 - 10 Mar 68 1537 Forest Villa Lane, McLean
356-9523

11112592

SECRET

ukIN

3-9-78

SECRET

Priscilla Johnson MacMillan

CI/OA 102798 (old file C-70300)
Case Officer Alex. Mikhalevsky
DIV. SR/2/F1
DOB 19 July 28, Feeks Lane, Locust Valley L.I.
John Gerry
C/SR/2
POA request 5 May 58
PRQ Part 1
aka Mary Post
18 April 58 Redskin uncrisp
Kutube proposal
24 Ap 58 Proceeding with recruitment POA
28 Ap. 58 Request for Investigation + Approval
Redskin traveler + informant.
SR/2 will have primary responsibility
of handling agent -
Subject unaware of CIA interest
6 May 58 Expedite FBI check
5/6/58 Use: Legal traveler
6/5/58 approval request
ND Memo on Traces
name discrepancies

22 June 58
10 April 58 Request cable traces 11112623
Redskin
Byrnes presently in touch.
20 May 58 Memo
advise Central Cover Branch/
Non-Official Cover ... when
subject has been activated.
7 May 58 Redwood Redskin
30 May 58 Subj has agreed "Embassy"
briefing prior departure (to SU).
Believe after careful briefing
subj could act as spotter
and might contact approp
Sovs of interest Kubark.
Also letter mailing.

SECRET

p. 2 MacMullan
CI/OA

3-9-78

19 June 58 Cancel POA
6 June 58
11 July 60 Radakin
Subj ref well known to FOB and previously contacted by Oswald D. Probey in PBPRIME.

7 Jul 60
Feb. 61 Re Yulew Greenman
— Feb. 64 Memo
SR has a CSA + is in contact with Rex
Case officer - Gary Coit of SR/CA
201 in SR contains several recent contact reports.
201 - no mention of Oswald's name

3 Mar 64 Memo
interview with LHO
4 Mar 64 Casual contact, cleared, used by SR/CA
10 Mar 64 Memo re LHO
2 Dec 65 Memo
Suggest official notice be placed in 201 file, now held in SR, that there is another 201 folder in CI/OA.

9 Dec 65

SECRET

R. Genzman

Priscilla Johnson MacMillan

201-102798

ECRET

Personality File Request
Memo - name tracer
Biog. data
- source Don Larrimore (Nov. 56 (?)
- she would be good at approaches, and source thinks she would cooperate with us.
- interview ended with security lecture by Mr. J.

29 Nov. 56 Memo re contact from Alexander Sogolow
Ap 1, 58 Cable
- headquarters record prior Kubark use
18 Ap. 58 LC Pupit opinion - subj. would be receptive to the proposal
25 Ap. 58 Vascoter assessment favorable.
PRQ by Lowell D. Byrnes

24 Ap. 58
1 May 58
3 May 58
5 May 58 Memo to Helms re permission to brief
- debriefed in 1956
- memo written by John M. Maury Dir. Ch/SR Div.
8 May 58 Denise S. Ronzpies potential emergency contact for subj.
Kapok/Redskin/Unterop
15 May 58 Use of Ronzpies precluded
9 June 58 Byrnes contact for → 23 June 58
19 June 58 POA request cancelled
20 Sept 58 Johnson heard broadcasting from Moscow
9 Ap. 62 OK Opera project
16 Sept. 62 Source - Johnson 11112625
24 Oct. 62 Source - Johnson
27 Nov. 62 Memo re conversation with PJ
source - Marion Shaw OGI

SEC

MacMillan
201-102798

SECRET

Genzman
3-9-78

11 Dec. 62	Contact Report
	PJ & Donald Jameson SR/CA
17 Dec. 1962	Project AE Dinosaur
	PCSA requested to debrief PJ
	re contacts in SU
	- Donald Jameson (SR/CA
8 Jan 63	- debriefing by OO/Contact Div.
	-1958 SR Div. debriefing
Mar 17, 1963	Letter PJ to Mr. MacDonald
Mar 18, 63	Letter PJ to Ms. MacDonald
3 May 63	PCSA, Project AEdinosaur
22 Aug 63	Contact with Garry Coit
4 Feb. 64	Contact with Garry Coit SR/CA
5 Feb. 64	Contact with Garry Coit SR/CA
3 Mar 64	" " " "
	re LHO
23 Feb. 65	Phone Call from PJ to Garry Coit
Mar 2, 65	Letter from Coit to PJ
June 18, 65	" " " "
	- re his transfer
	- future contact with James
	MacDonald
17 Mar 67	Phone Call - Donald Jameson
	& Patricia Blake
	re PJ & Svetlana
22 Nov 67	" " " "
5 Jan 75	PJ witting collaborator

SECRET

SECRET

7/28/78
Palmer

Clare ~~Claire~~ Booth Luce

1 pkg. Loose documents
1 pkg. DCD documents
1 volume #C-71976 CI/OA Staff
Loose Documents - Archives - 3 folders & 2 documents.

CI/OA #C-71976 Clare Booth Luce

① Request for Investigation & Approval dtd 1 July 1958 To be used as a donor for Project PBGREGALE Request covert security approval. Requested that non-official Cover be utilized in conducting Clearance since subject is unaware U.S. Govt & CIA interest and of impending investigation.

1111421

② 16 Sept 1958 - Fred Bucci, Investigation & Support Branch request investigation of Luce be cancelled as her services as a 'donor' for PBGREGALE will not be needed.

③ 8 July 1963. Memo for Chief: CI from F. Mark Wyatt, CI/WE/4 Subject: Operational Approvals for Former Ambassadors to Italy: Luce, Clair (sic) Booth - C-71976 Zellerbach, James David, C-11016

~~0003121~~

William Harvey, COS, Rome, asked for Operational Approvals on Subjects he checked. Wyatt requests OA's be granted for an indeterminate period so Mr. Harvey can speak with them any time they are in Italy or he is in the U.S.

#

SECRET

Talmer

②
Luce 7/28/78

SECRET

⑧ 11 July 1963 Memo to Chief, WE/4/X from Edward P Brown, Acting Chief, CI/OA

Records show Office of Security issued a Covert Security Approval on Zellerbach on 1 May 1963 & should be understood that O/S information should be reviewed before he is utilized in any capacity. It is conclusion of this office that a request for Covert Security Approval from O/S should be made for Mrs. Luce.

#

Loose Documents - DCD - no notes

#

11111422

Loose Documents

Third Agency deletions - 2 sealed envelopes

① FBI Document 65-58190 (Wash. D.C) dtd 2/2/57.
Subject: Israeli Consulate, NYC

② FBI # 65-603360, N.Y. 65-15816 dtd 12/24/52
Subject: Chanan Bar-~~Or~~ On, aka ----

no notes - 1950's information

#

Loose Documents - Archives. No notes 1940-1950 information — little of which pertained to Clare Booth Luce.

~~8003122~~

CRET

SECRET

Palmer
8/1/78

Clare Booth Luce -
Office of Security. - One volume

Deletions - one sealed envelope - Summary of FBI Investigation July 1973 (BUD BI of 1953 BI)

① 26 July 1963
Covert Security approval requested so Luce can contact COS, Rome (Wm. Harvey) when he visits U.S. or she visits Italy.

② 8 Aug 1963 - Covert Security Approval granted for a 6 mo. period. Luce, Clare Boothe #169 102

11111423

~~0003595~~

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 3/28/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10143-10384
RECORD SERIES :	CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	29-19-25

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	
TITLE :	
DATE :	09/08/1978
PAGES :	8
SUBJECTS :	GAUDET, WILLIAM G. CIA, FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	NOTES
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	
CURRENT STATUS :	Release
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	01/01/2003
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 20

2025 Release under the President
John F. Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of 1992

SECRET

Palmer ①

9/8/78

Office of Security — William G. Gaudet

Third Agency deletion — one sealed envelope.

Investigative Rcds dtd 4 June 1953 (source)

State/ACSI/ONI

① William G. Gaudet — DOB — circa 1906.

Residence -1948 — New Orleans, LA — 2176 Esplande Ave

Occupation '48 — Pres, Latin American Reports, Inc.

Govt Service — State Dept. 1940-42

② Secrecy Agreement signed by Gaudet on 2 March 1950

③ 23 Jan 1950 Memo to Asst Dir/OO from Chief, Inspection & Security Staff. Re: William G. Gaudet.

Proposes series of special reports on Latin America by Gaudet. Subject was cleared as a contact in Jan. 1948. State Dept. says that when he was employed by them he had a reputation of boastfulness & was outspoken. This should not raise any security questions.

11112297

SECRET

Palmer ②
9/8/78

SECRET

Office of Security - Marita Lorenz

① Memorandum for: Chief, Security Analysis Group
Subject: Agency Castro Assassination Plotting
(Sam Giancana & Santo Trafficante)
Reference made to SSCI Interim Report
20 Nov. 1975.

P. 3- "Attached to instant memorandum is a copy of an 18 June 1976 memorandum in the name of Frank Anthony Sturgis aka Frank Fiorini (#353 459) which identifies Marie Lorenz and contains a copy of referenced article" (13 June 1976 New York Daily News article by Paul Meskill)

#

11112298

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer ③

9/8/78

Office of Security - Antonio Soto Vasquez.

Third agency deletions - one sealed envelope -

Polygraph results.

① PRQ Part I - DPOB 20 Aug 1934, Havana

② Request for Investigation - 23 March 1961

Soto to be used as PM Trainee.

③ 15 Oct 1963 Memo for Chief, Alien Affairs Staff as

Fr: Robert Gambino, Security Officer, Spec. Operations Division.

Soto to be employed under Project WITHRUSH in the Congo.

④ 4 May 1966 Memo for File from Alien Affairs Office. Subject: Antonio SOTO Vasquez # 242369 (C)

Soto returned from Congo to U.S. on 20 Dec 1965. No longer of interest to SOD. File closed.

④ 30 Aug 1966 Cable to Director from JMWAVE

Soto request return to Congo. Possibility exists he had problems w/ polygraph test. Request Hdqtrs decision re-use in Congo & opportunity to retest him.

(Request for reuse denied in Cable 32999 to JB Scanlon from Director.

11112299

SECRET

SECRET

④

Palmer
9/8/78

Office of Security – William D. Pawley
Two volumes.
Deletions – 10 sealed envelopes
Volume I

① 24 Jan 1952 Memo to W.A. Osborne from George O'Rourke Subj. Pawley, William Douglas, EE-7144-A

OO/C requested security check on Pawley as potential source of foreign intelligence information. No derogatory info. on his loyalty & due to his prominence in U.S., suggest he be placed in Approved/Caution Category.

During investigation several persons described him as shady, slick business operator. General Chennault stated his record in India & China was questionable & that he was involved in attempted bribery.

② Volume II
Deletions – Three sealed envelopes

① 13 July 1954 Memo to Director from Sheffield Edwards, Dir of Security: Subj: William D. Pawley.

State Dept Security file ~~indicates~~ contained derogatory info. alleging black market activities, income tax difficulties, possible misuse of lend lease material & questionable money transactions.

11112300

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer Ⓢ
9/8/78

Wm. Pawley (contd)

② 20 Feb 1964 Memo to Dep. Director Security from Desmond FitzGerald, Chief, SAS.

Request that William D. Pawley be granted a Covert Security Approval for use by JMWAVE on a continuing basis.

#

11112301

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

Palmer
9/8/78 ⑥

Office of Security
Pedro Diaz Lanz
Two Volumes.
Volume I - no notes
Volume II - Deletions - one sealed envelope - FBI memos
No notes

11112302

CONFIDENTIAL

McCarthy
DDO
#16
March 8

SECRET

Palmer ①
9/8/78

MRR - DDO - (continued)

Third Agency deletions - Seven sealed envelopes, six FBI, one Dept of Defense 5-366-0308-64 23 Mar 1964 Re: Cuban exile group counter-revolutionary activities

Jose Luis Arango - military coordinator for MRR - used name Angelito.

No notes

#

Justin McCarthy - DDO - 1 ~~vol.~~ packet - loose documents

① Nov. 14, 1961 Cable - WA CITE NYOR 4995

New York ~~patrol~~ Parole board enquiring about any agency business with Justin McCarthy, DBOB 11 July 1919, Denver, Colorado.

Pencilled notation: "DAD/O HOLDS, since source disclosed self to ~~Patrol~~ Parole Board - we can confirm without 'revealing' identity. NYFO instructed to confirm, verbally, to Parole Board that JMcC did, in fact, approach us & offer suggestions/information. NYFO will make record of statement made by Reeves + forward cc to support." 11112303

SECRET

② Memo for files, 15 Nov 1961 from Harry A. Real
Subj: Justin McCarthy - New York Parole Board Inquiry
Regarding Relations With CIA.

SECRET

Palmer ②
8/9/78

DADO is field office designation - for Barbara

Authorized by DADO (through Robert Crowley) to reveal to ~~Patrol~~ Parole Bd. extent of CIA contacts w/ McC, Real phoned Mr. Bowering of Parole Bd. & said McC made voluntary approach to agency in April 1961 & thereafter a representative of CIA went to McC on two occasions & except for these two meetings, contacts have been confined to telephone conversations made at his initiative & to best of our knowledge, McC has had no contact w/ Agency in Washington.

Bowering said McC is paroled from sentence for armed hold-up - suspected of being a "Con" man but so far no evidence of a swindle. McC's violation of parole subject to investigation. Bowering said Real's info would suffice unless McC makes further issue of his relations w/ CIA in which case Bowering would need to know more. Real said matter would have to be discussed with higher authority if more info is desired.

#

11112304

SECRET

LESOWITZ
532-7211

Sept 22 - 2pm - Fri
[illegible]11

Palmer ①
9/8/78

SECRET

FRD - Mexico - Two Volumes DDO

Third agency deletions - two sealed envelopes - FBI

Volume I

~~① Memo for Act~~

① Cable dtd Aug 25, 1960 To: Mexico JMASH Twicker from Director OUT 62451

FYI - During AMHAWK recent visit to U.S. he reportedly solicited funds Las Vegas gamblers. Suggest at your descretion you probe report.

Volume II

Third agency deletions - ~~Four~~ Four sealed envelopes

No notes

11112305

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files - Manuel Ray y Rivero
DCD Documents
May 2, 1978

11110819

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

1. Memo dated 24 Oct 1962 to Chief, Contact Division, from Chief, San Francisco Office
Subject: Suitability of Manuel Ray and Miro Cardona for Important Roles in a Possible New Cuban Government

Information received from [redacted] Professor of Political Science at [redacted] and long-time source of exceptional value. [redacted] visited in Miami and contacted about 25 former Castro supporters representing a broad political gamut. [redacted] got the impression from many of the Cubans that they suspected Ray of being a "possible Communist sleeper". [redacted] reluctant to pass along this information, because accusations were very broad.

2. Information report dated 16 July 1962 and Earlier
Source: Cuban National (Alien File #A-12570921) who asked for an interview on occasion of first contact with CIA.

RETURN TO CIA Background Use Only Do Not Reproduce

Cannot vouch for his bona fides. Had credential indicating membership in branch of revolutionary army's intelligence service, now in exile in U.S. and maintaing connections with colleagues in that country.

A friend of his reports plans to assassinate top Castro leadership in Cuba. To be done by poison -- "Clostridium Botulinum" which is strong, odorless, and tasteless. Takes about 12 days to kill. About 5cc would do the job. Waiting for next visit of major delegation from a Communist country -- dinner in honor of the occasion should bring together most of the important members of the regime and that is when the attempt will be made.

2. Cable dated Oct. 3, 1961 - WA CITE NYOR 4902 Support (Travis) info L/A Branch from Daniels. Source is Ernesto Dezaldo - Cuban lawyer now living in New York City. Stated the MRP in Havana is far less radical than under the leadership of Ray, who has been completely discredited in recent months. Primary purpose today is (a) assassination of top leaders in Castro regime and (B) sabotage of important industrial and government installations in Havana. Strength of MRP in Havana estimated to exceed 1,000 -- success measured more in terms of fund raising ability and blowing up of buildings.

DRE

3. Information dated June 4, 1961, Subject: Underground Student Leader Comments on Post-invasion Cuba. Reporting officer talked with ISIDRO BORJA, on the leaders of BRE. Borja says top DRE members in jail or in a friendly embassy in Havana but said new leaders have been selected and will resume sabotage activities shortly. Thought the underground could restore tension in Cuba in 3-4 months. However, said outside help needed to get rid of Castro. Claimed that prior to invasion, is was possible to buy almost anything in Cuba from Castro officials -- they were tainted by corruption. Since Castro's victory at Bay of Pigs, his popular support is estimated to be around 80-85%. Most support is out of fear because the people believe he will be in power permanently. Borja said DRE outside of Cuba working hard for release of former leader, Alberto Muller from prison.

SECRET

5/8R

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110820

DCD Documents - Manuel Ray y Rivero
Page 2

4. Memo to Acting Chief, Contact Division dtd 20 May 1964
From: Chief, Miami Field Office
Subject: Alleged "New York Times" Publicity Build-up for Manolo Ray

Hal Hendrix, Scripps-Howard L.A. correspondent believes NY Times publicity buildup for Ray in full swing. Tad Szulc reporting Ray's war movements from Miami. Also with Szulc is close friend, Henry Raymont of the Times. Hendrix said Times playing up Ray while downplaying Artime and Gutierrez Menoyo. Think's Times exaggerating Ray's plans to take teams of highly trained guerrillas into Cuba, and that Ray's "war" is little more than an MGM-type New York Times production so far.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110821

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII

March 29, 1978

Volume I   Undated to September 1960

1. Cable suggests that an offer of financial assistance to Ray's wife and children from CIA rather than through the FRD may pay large future dividends. Family to arrive circa September 1960.

2. Cable to Director
   From: MASH
   19 September 1960

Increasing suspicion RAUL CHIBAS a Castro plant. Since exfiltration by KAPPES, CHIBAS has laid low but back in picture as representative of RAY. Common knowledge that CHIBAS brought KAPPES out of Cuba, but should be noted that KAPPES has since been in and out of Cuba three times with no apparent difficulties.

CHIBAS' sources of information:
Mason in U. S. government
Manuel de Jesus and Bender as FRD representatives
Nino Diaz as Alianza representative
Don Hogan Kappes as Alberto Fernandez representative.

This should get a good picture of the U.S. anti-Castro activities.

* 3. Summer 1960. Ray very actively recruited to become FRD member. CIA considered him an important political asset. RAUL CHIBAS, Ray's assistant, spoke for him with U.S. authorities. Urged strong organization inside Cuba before outside help could be effective. CHIBAS meets with Bender 9/7/60, says he is in favor of FRD but completely committed to Ray and would check with him.

* 4. 27 September 1960.
Memo to Western Hemisphere/4 Chief
From: Rudolph E. Gomez, Acting Chief, WH
Subject: Approval from State to Include Manuel Ray Rivero in the FRD Complex

At a 20 September 1960 meeting, Ray's name was suggested for inclusion in FRD and State desired to look further into his background. Ray was discussed again on 9/27/60 with Mr. Divine who further conferred with Ambassador Mallory same day and Mallory approved Ray's inclusion.

* 5. September 29, 1960 cable from MASH to WH9 indicates MASH somewhat doubtful about Ray's feelings toward U.S. and continued dealings with this group needs further policy consideration.

* There is a restricted CI/OA folder on Ray of this 201 file held under
[C#85514]
* Ask about -- documents sent for microfilming in July 7, 1967.
[UGFA 12222] 3 November 1963 201 239298

6. Ray granted Provisional Operation Approval (POA) on 25 October 1960.
(form says, Green list attached 104591)

SECRET

7. PRQ Part 2 169 C85514
Section I Contact and Development

Woodrow C. Olien met Ray October 1958 when Ray was head of Civic Resistence Movement in Havana. Three clandestine meetings were held prior to 04 1 January 1959, attended by Olien, Wallace A. Growery, [redacted] (MRC member) who originally introduced Olien to Ray. After 1 January 1959, Ray given important post in revolutionary government and Olien has seen him only twice since, Olien paising as political officer to State Department.

Section II of PRQ states Ray is friendly to U.S., once having received a grant for special study there. A dedicated, patriotic Cuban, opposed to Communism but taken no active part in combatting it.

8. An undated, unaddressed letter from Antonio Gonsales Mora, Jr. --- P.S. Says Joaquin Sanjenis appears to be a person in whom CIA has great confidence. Linked to Artime conspiracy. Responsible for all "inter-Cuban" intelligence matters. Is a "shady character" -- gangster background -- gives impression of mental retardation. Not known as individual of any importance, but he is! "An inexplicable affair"

9. PRQ Part 2 (contd)
Section VI -- Subject has definite political action potential, is a pro-democratic official of government who is not in sympathy with aims of international Communism and who is interested in strengthening ties between Cuba and U. S. Probably would never consent to agent status, but could by persuasion and argument be encouraged to influence policies of his government along lines compatible with U.S. government policies.

Section XIV -- Information in PRQ Parts I and II were obtained from file research and personal contact with subject.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII
March 29, 1978

11110823

Volume II
October 1, 1960 - November 22, 1960

* * 1. As of 21 November 1960, MRP organized as follows:

Manuel Ray - Chief
Raul Chibas - Sepcial Assistant to Ray
Juan Esteves Ramires - Secretary
Ramon Barquin - Military and Intelligence matters
Cisneros - Chief of MRP in Cuba

1. 10/4/60 Cable from [redacted] claims that new Cuban resistance group organized under Ray and has 400-500 men in Las Villas Province. Not part of FRD but in touch with it.

* 2. 10/7/60 Cable from Havana. AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO has withdrawn from FRD. JUSTO CARRILLO and FELIPE PAZOS will be integrated into Ray's MRP. VARONA wishes to join, also, but Ray insists VARONA return to Cuba to do so.

3. 10/12/60 Cable to Director. RAMON BARQUIN claims CARRILLO and ARANGO are going to boycott FRD Executive Committee and sabotage its work. Barquin planning to join with Pazos, Ray, Chibas, MIRO and QUEVEDO to form a new frente and then request union with FRD. If accepted, Barquin would become military head. If Barquin does not get U.S. government support for this plan, he will return to Cuba to try to overthrow Castro and win election on an anti-Yankee platform.

* 4. 10/17/60 Contact report from [Wallace A. Parlett]
Subject: Meeting with JUAN ESTEVEZ and JORGE BERUFF, 10/13/60
Cubans said Ray's group will not lower themselves to answer "Fidelismo without Fidel" charge and let their actions speak for themselves. MRP is highly disciplined and feel the majority of Cuban people favor thier platform. Its leaders are interchangeable. If Ray comes out of Cuba, Chibas or Estevez could go in and take his place.

5. 10/24/60 Memo for files
Subject: Representative of Manuel Ray to Professional Groups

ENRIQUE HIRAM GUTIERREZ y RODRIGUEZ (dob 5/20/31, Havana) travels frequently to Puerto Rico on architectural business. Also frequently enters U. S. at Miami. Represents Ray's organization to various professional groups in Havana. Also serves as courier to Miami.

DRE

6. DRE information. 10/24/60 Cable states [MULLER] reported receiving letter from ANTONIO GARCIA, DRE representative in Cuba that organization is going well but needs funds and material aid. MASH [asks Mueller] to get details of Garcia's "groupos de accion" and details of organization. MASH [gave Muller $500] for Garcia. [Muller] is concerned about Manolo Ray

whom he says is gaining strength in Cuba. Says students eager to join active group and will go to Ray if DRE can't get help soon.

7. Provisional Operational Approval granted to Ray on 10/26/60.

* 8. 10/26/60 Cable to Director from Havana reports Ray held MRP meeting on 10/23/60 and made following statements:

a. MAJOR WILLIAM MORGAN had been very helpful to MRP - responsible for obtaining most of their weapons.
b. In four months, MRP will have 20,000 militants throughout Cuba. Organized now in all provinces except Pinar del Rio. Invasion could not take place for 4 months but FRD still in favor of earlier date.
c. CARRILLO and ANGEL del CERRO have left FRD and now with MRP

MRP urging Ray to escape Cuba and they feel it is only a matter of time until he is picked up and executed. MRP manifesto will be released this weekend.

9. 10/28/60 Monthly payments of [$400] approved for Ray's wife in behalf of Bender group.

* 10. 10/28/60 Memo for Record
Subject: Conversation of CARRILLO and [PAUL J. MANSON] Chief, MASH
Economic philosophy: When FRD first formed it was attacked by RUBIO PADILLA as "Fidelismo without Fidel." Now FRD saying same thing about MRP.

* 11. 11/5/60 Cable to Director from MASH
Verona tells HUNT that he received information that Ray wanted to leave Cuba and was to be exfiltrated clandestinely by Bender group.

12. 11/8/60 Memo for Record [John D. Peters]
Subject: [Contact] report on meeting with ROGELIO GONZALES

Gonzales considers Ray highly dangerous because of his ambition to play prominent role in Cuban government after overthrow of Castro. Thinks he poises threat to Varona's authority inside Cuba. Ray appears to have support of middle class, politicians and professionals. Should Ray join FRD, Gonzales thinks he will still operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede FRD with MRP.

* 13. 11/11/60 Cable to Director from JMASH
Ray arrived Tampa morning of 11/10/60. Mash officer staying with him until surfacing date which depends on safe arrival from Cuba of two other individuals. They are the last of the HUBER MATOS escapee group known by Ray to still be hiding in Cuba.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110825

14. 11/14/60 Cable to Director from MASH.
Ray to surface at press conference scheduled for 11/16/60 in Miami.

*15. 11/17/60 Cable to Director from MASH
On 11/15/60 [Parlett] alias Bender met with Ray in complete privacy. "Unquestionably, the youthful, softspoken, unassuming, almost humble Ray is a natural leader of highest intellect, deepest sincerity and convistion." Ray's political posture doubtful as far as U.S. government acceptance is concerned.

Explained to Ray the U.S. government's desire to have all Cuban exiles unified in their efforts. Ray says MRP does not wish to reinstate 1950 constitution. Provisional government of 30 honorable Cubans would be established and elections held 18 months thereafter. Castro laws passed at beginning of his regime to be promulgated. State would regulate private investment and utilities would be nationalized.

Ray wants to keep MRP "lean and hungry" -- each member to have specific responsibilities and feel important to revolution.

Ray asked for permission to start a fund drive in Cuba and U.S. Also asked for $10,000 by next Wednesday -- Bender made commitment.

[Parlett] believes net result of meeting was establishment of private MRP-U.S. link and door remains open for some kind of relationship with FRD. Ray agrees to discuss this with Miro Cardona. Of all the groups being supported, FRD, MRP and MRR are most significant. All Cuban groups seem to be looking to Bender group to show a preference before joining one of the above three. How long current flexibility can be maintained is problematical.

*16. 11/21/60 Memo for Record
Subject: Meeting with King and Esterline on subject of handling MRP, 11/18/60

Consensus was that Ray did not politically represent anything to cheer about. Writer felt MRP opposed to joining FRD and recognized need to control MRP and wean it away to the extent possible from its leaders. Could be done by controlling financial and military support. It was agreed in meeting with Mr. Barnes that financial and military support for MRP be channelled through FRD.

17. 11/23/60 Contact Report: Meeting with Ray and Chibas in NYC, 11/22/60
Ray says MRP has contacts at Isle of Pines with two garrisons and can expect about 750 men to desert Castro at proper time. CAPTAIN CAPOTA is contact with Ray's group.

Ray's people also in contact with commander of prison where Huber Matos is incarcerated. Matos believes PADILLA, the prison commander, would assist

SECRET

1110826

him in an escape. Ray interested in single operation to get military defectors and free Matos. Wants to effect plan on 11/27/60.

Ray wants assistance from U.S. -- military information and supplies.

18. 11/24/60 Cable to Director from JMASH
Meeting with AMCHIRP-1 on 11/23, revealed he had information that MRP in Havana had capabilities to blow up power plant and TV stations in Havana -- a diversionary tactic planned to coordinate with Isle of Pines operation. Ray expects Isle of Pines operation support about 12/15/60.

* Notation about Cable: "Operation Unity" is to create dramatic show which will demonstrate that Manolo Ray is wrong when telling contacts in U.S. that his group is the only one capable of action."

19. 11/24/60 Cable to Director from Havana.
Operation Unity involves MRR, MDI, OA, 30th of November Group and MAR (not MAR of PEPIN RIVERO).

MAR and OA groups to blow electric cables in Regla area. MDC group, at same time, to make assassination attempt on CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ at University of Havana.

20. 11/30/60 Cable to Director from Havana
JULIO ANGEL METRE advised planning to travel to Miami 12/1/60 escorted by Brazilian ambassador to Panama. Accompanied by ambassador's wife. MESTRE will be introduced to Ray and will offer services of MDC to Ray at that time. Mestre says plan is approved by "DR. LUCAS" (JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE) MDC coordinator in Cuba.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File Review - Manuel Ray y Rivero Volume III of XVIII
March 30, 1978

December 1960 - January 1961 1110827

1. Cable 12/6/60 to Director from [Gold]
Ray contacted by [Weisinger] and made statement that Isle of Pine's operation failed in his opinion because Bender failed to forward paper to Havana with key to operation.

2. 12/8/60 Cable to Director from WAVE

Ray advised [Wiesinger] he is departing for Washington same day to visit ERNESTA BETANCOURT of OAS and others. In New York on 12/9 to contact Raul Chibas. Return Miami about 12/11/60.

3. 12/23/60 Cable to Director from Havana indicates Ray wishes return to Cuba as soon as possible and [asks that OLIEN make arrangements] through his official channel. Doesn't want Cubans in WAVE or Cuba to know of his return.

* 4. 12/22/60 Information report from U.S. citizen, free-lance writer and part-time sugar broker [(DONALD HOGAN)]

Says Miro Cardona has accepted teaching position in Puerto Rico effective early January 1961. Is disgusted with bickering among anti-Castro Cubans and will sit on sidelines for time being. Is partivularly opposed to Ray -- program is too Marxist and Ray is an opportunist.

* 5. 1/16/61 Information Report from U.S. national in a U.S. governemnt agency. Source had contact with DR. GUILLERMO SALAZAR SANCHEZ, former Cuban ambassador to Switzerland and DR. SERGIO ROJAS SANTAMARINA, former Cuban Ambassador to United Kingdom. Salazar said he had heard from a reliable source that Ray was not a bona fide defector and still acting on behalf of Castro and is a member of the "Blue Legion". (no further explanation.)

Dr. Salazar mentioned group called "The Ten Unknowns" who are key figures in making Communist policy in Latin America. (Ray not implicated as one of these).

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes 1 - XVIII (201-239298

April 6, 1978

11110828

VOLUME IV - February 1, 1961 - March 31, 1961

*1. Operation Approval granted for Ray's use as a political asset on 7 February 1961

2. Memo to WH/4?Security, From WH/4?CI
Subject: Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo Group
Date: 23 February 1961

Ray pressuring Mr. Droller to have four individuals freed from McAllen Detention Camp who belong to Gutierrez group. Ray claims they are members of his group and have been most active against Castro regime in Cuba. They are as follows:

ASENCIO, Suarez, Lazaro
LESNIK, Menendez, Max DPOB 8 Sept 1930, Vueltas, Las Villas
PORTA Bolanos, Gustavo
REDONDO, Gonzalez, Roger

*3. Cable to Bell, from JMWAVE
Date: March 1, 1961

Artime advises that Ray's group opposed to banning Communist Party and in favor of "nationalizing everything". Ray favors maintaining trade with USSR, wants no change in present agrarian reform program.

4. Cable to JMWAVE from Bell
Date: March 10, 1961

INS is concerned over the increased news coverage of Ray's arrival in U.S. and activities here. Afraid they will be confronted about Ray's arrival (which was describad as "black" in another communication) so JMWAVE asked to re-advise Ray that his story is that on 10 Nov 1960, he landed somewhere on Keys in a fishing boat, made way to road where picked up by INS patrol car, taken to WAVE area, examined, declared refugge and released with admonition to always keep INS advised of his address.

*5. Memo to S - Dr. Berle, From: ARA - Philip W. Bonsal
Subject: Recent Cuban Developments
Date: March 16, 1961

Conversation with Jose Miro Cardona and Berle, reveals that Cardona has misgivings about Ray and Pazoz and the MRP. Says Ray is bitterly anti-American as well as probably totalitarian in his thinking. He no longer believes Ray has any considerable support inside Cuba. Thinks Ray group endeavoring to exercise influence in our government so as to be the major recipient of whatever assistance can be obtained here. He is particularly ~~concern~~ concerned about the role played by Felipe Pazos.

~~SECRET~~

6. Field Information Report
Subject: Background, Character and Economic Concepts of Manuel Ray Rivero
Date: 16 March 1961
Sources: [Dr. Oscar SALAS Marrero (paragraphs 1-11) Knew Ray in Cuba
Dr. Jose ALVAREZ Diaz, former Minister of Finance under Prio (Pg 12)
Dr. Jorge BERUFF, former president of Banco de Desarrollo
Economico de Cuba, (pg 13)

Note: Cover note pencilled comment (The content is so biased and mixed with untruth that it would be a disservice to the intelligence community to disseminate it.

Synopsis of paragraphs 1-11. [Dr. Salas] says during his childhood Ray was a Protestant but today is completely atheistic. Said Ray organized the MRC against Batista and shortly after Batista's fall, MRC and 26th of July Movement fused into one, and as soon as Castro came into power, control of the organization was given to the Communists. Tells of Ray's association with Castro and that he did not resign his position when his own brother was renounced by Castro. Stated that Ray's rupture with Fidel was due to the fact that Ray opposed the idea of shooting Hubert Matos as a traitor. Ray resigned his post but said publicly that he approved and supported the Castro regime without any mental reservations. Says in Cuban clandestine circles Ray is regarded as boastful, ostentatious and deceitful. Intimate friends of Ray feel that he is a man of anti-democratic procedures, and does not like to take advice, even from members of his own movement.

Synopsis of paragraph 12. [Dr. Alvarez] said Ray was in favor of maintaining relations with USSR and not making Communist Party illegal. Said that although Ray withdrew all these statements when threatened with press coverage, [Alvarez] thinks they are representative of Ray's thinking and would try to put ideas into practice if he ever came to power. [Alverez] also mentioned Rays thinking on nationalization of public services, socialized medicine, nationalization of banks, etc.

Synopsis of paragraph 13. [Dr. Beruff] said Ray well-intentioned with no Communist tendencies. Cited a meeting at which the basic points of the MRP platform were discussed and said that since Ray was in disagreement with the others on most of the points, Dr. Felipe Pazos acted as chairman of the meeting and Ray argued his case as a simple member of the group. Out of this meeting came a declaration of 14 points, including the nationalization of the banks and public utilities.

On 9 March, Ray said that ideas attributed to him in paragraph 12 were not true and part of a "campaign against him by Mr. Pawley of the Miami City Transit Company".

* 7. Report dated March 17, 1961, Marked Urgent

"It has been reported by a very reliable source that Manuel Ray (MRP) is bringing as an Adviser, Professor Fiterre from Habana University - This man Fiterre is an undisclosed Communist that has always openly admitted and braged about being aCommunist.

* 8. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 27 March 1961
Subject: Ray accepts appointment to Council: -----
Signed: Gerard Droller

Miro was able to convince Ray to join CRC. Thus, as of 27 March 1961, Council's composition isas follows: Chairman: Miro Cardona; Board of Directors: Varona, Hevia, Carrillo, Maceo, Ray and Artime.

9. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 27 March 1961
Subject: Reported Anti-MRP Rally Promoted by Aureliano Sanchez Arango
Signed: B. E. Reishhardt

Julio Lobo reported that Sanchez is planning a rally in Miami, 29 March to protest against the Ray/Pazos combine in the revolutionary council. Writer says, obviously, such a rally at this time could be most damaging and some attempt should be made to get to Sanchez to take the steam out of this maneuver.

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - XVIII

April 6, 1978
VOLUME V - April 1961 - July 1961

11110831

* 1. Cable from JMWAVE to Bell
Date: April 3, 1961

Ray meets with [Olien] and said he was not as yet prepared to join ~~CRC~~ FRD. Said Miro had welshed on commitments and while willing to accept Ray into CRC, not willing to give him any voice in the Council. [Olein] apptempts to convince Ray he was doing great disservice to Cuban people by refusing to serve within FRD.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from Bell
Date: April 4, 1961

"To test actual MRP capabilities inside request you inform Ray to hit targets G, I and K during period 5-10 April. Attack target 0 including diesel locomotive engines immediately. Will forward additional targets if Ray shows any capability."

* 3. Letter to Editor (Pencilled note: Propaganda against MRP by Artime's replacement Jose Manuel Hernandez Puentes received from QD Date 6 Apr 61.)

"I am a Cuban who still thinks that Cuba can be rehabilitated after the fall of Castro. For this reason many Cubans have been baffled by the list of names now given as the saviors of Cuba for a Provisional Government. Among these are such notorious Castro followers as: Ray, Barquin, Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Chibas and others whose names remind us of an era of mourning, persecution and misery."

* 4. Report on Manuel Ray received from [Enrique Molinet] a road and airfield construction engineer under Batista regime. Cover note dated 4/7/61. [Molinet] outlines his distaste for Ray, citing at the beginning his refusal to leave Castro even after the questionable suicide of his brother, Rene. After Ray was ousted from his Cabinet job, he continued to visit Castro, occupying a prominent position in all Castro's public appearances. Said that even before Castro, Ray was an active member of the Cuban Orthodox Party, highly infiltrated with communists. Claims that when Ray in his Cabinet position, indoctrinations programs were held expousing communistic ideals. Also while Minister of Public Works, claims he (Ray) threw out hundreds of employees without due cause and destroyed every successful contractor that existed.

* 5. Memorandum for the Record
Subject: Custody of Revolutionary Council, 19-20 April 1961
Signed: [Robert F. Moroney]
Date: 24 April 1961

Relates that on 19 April 1961, President Kennedy met with the six members of FRD's Revolutionary Council where President expressed his deep sorrow and concern over the failure of the military effort (Bay of Pigs). Ray one of the group.

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray Files
Volume iv of xviii
Page 2

11110832

* 6. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 5 May 1961
Subject: Manolo Ray - Comments on his Anti-Castro Activities
Signed: Calvin Hicks WH/4/PM/Operations

"Ray is believed to have accomplished pratically nothing towards the effort to overthow Castro. Instead, it seems that whenever we played with his so-called assets, we were burned. He is notorious for claiming assets or operations, several days after some other group had already set them up or claimed them. Whenever it came to producing and backing up his claims, he always came up with excuses for not producing, rather than results. He has always tended to try to take over other goups, rather than cooperate with them, and when he couldn't take them over he would "politic" against them. His actions all seemed to be directed toward making him the future power in Cuba rather than toward overthrowing Castro. It is believed that Manolo RAY is so far "left" in his thinking that he would be as dangerous (or more so in the long run) to United States interests as Castro, if he ever got to be the power in Cuba."

* 7. Memorandum for the Record
Subject: ~~Manolo/R~~ Relations with Manolo Ray and the MRP
Date: 2 June 1961 03
Signed: [redacted]

In a 12 May 1961 meeting, Ray promises to write a prospectus of his plans for MRP within ten days. Not received by 2 June, but Ernesto Betancourt is asking for financial support for MRP activities. Tracy Barnes agrees with [redacted] that no money should be given Ray until his plans are studied. Ray is asking for support separate from FRD since Ray has withdrawn from this group. [redacted] further states in Memo, "...I would like to point out the security risks inherent in any arrangements with RAY-BENTANCOURT-CISNEROS trio. These fellows have had easy access to the White House and to the Department, are notorious for their 'planned leaks', will probably presume all the Department officials they deal with are privy to the arrangement, and before we know it the whole exile community will be well aware that we are providing financial and material support to the RAY group."

* 8. Cable to Bell from [Caracas]
Date June 8, 1961
On June 2, Venezuelas governemnt refused to issue a visa to Manolo Ray.

9. Cable to Director from [Caracas] dated June 28, 1961. re: meeting with Jose R. Barbeito on 20 June in Valencia. Barbeito claims was member of MRP of Manolo Ray and took part clandestine activities Havana. Admitted was communist "many years ago" but now completely opposed to Castro and Communism.

Review of Manuel Ray Files
Volume v of xviii
Page 3

10. Intelligence Report
Date: 7-11 July 1961
Place: San Juan, P.R.
Source: Cuban Exile Lawyer
Evaluation: F-6

Report transmits information concerning activities, persons visited and purpose of visit of Ray to Puerto Rico, terminating when Ray hurridely left Puerto Rico following press account that he had been removed as Coordinator of the MRP.

Source said MRP leaders in exile believe Rays dismissal due to propaganda and pressures by the CIA which brought about the impression that the obstacle to receipt of help from outside (money, arms, etc) was Ray himself and that once Ray removed, they would receive all types of help. The exile leaders are of opinion that it was also brought about because Ray was a divisionist inasmuch as he had abandoned Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Council.

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files Volumes I - XVIII

April 6, 1978
Volume VI - August 1, 1961 - June 30, 1962

11110834

1. Cable to JMWAVE from Director
   Date: August 1, 1961

FBI conducting investigation on MRP and Ray and Director indicates he needs to know purpose of investigation to respond properly.

* 2. Dispatch from Chief of Base, JMWAVE
   Date: August 4, 1961
   Subject: Debriefing of Father Bastarrica

Father Bastarrica recently arrived from Cuba as a political exile. At a luncheon meeting, he reported as follows:

MRP formed in Cuba around 26 July 1960. Organizers were Dr. Amalio Fiallo Gonzalez, Dr. Antonio Fernandez Nuevo, Reynol Gonzalez, Humberto Perez Herrera. All these men belonged to group called Accion Democratica. The name of MRP was suggested by Raul Chibas and in itself it does not constitute a party or group but rather a coalition of several small groups, which were the following:

- a. The 20 May group, led by Manuel Ray
- b. Accion Democratica, led by Dr. Fiallo
- c. Accion Verde Olivo, led by Dr. Rufo Lopez Fresquet
- d. 30 November Movement, led by David Salvador (never really joined)
- e. Chibas' group with Jorge Beruff and Felipe Pazos
- f. Dr. Valdez Pino, in asylum in Embassy of Peru and belonged to Accion Democratica.

Father Bastarrica's opinion of Ray is that he had no way of judging whether Ray is Communist or Marxist. Lacks quality of leadership because he does not publically hold to a definite political, social and economic ideology. He appears to agree with every person he talks to, never arguing with them or opposing them, all of which shows he has no ideology and makes him a very dangerous man. Is extremely ambitous for himself, with great desire for power.

* 3. Memorandum for Chief, WH Division, dated 10 October 1961, from Warren S. Yauger, Subject: General - Cuban Matters; Specific - Manuel (Monolo) Ray Planning Board of Puerto Rico announced on 9 October 1961 that Ray has accepted position as consultant to that Board. Board is an important agency of Puerto Rican government, attached to the Office of the Governor. Has broad powers over economic and social planning and is active in exercising these powers. Ray to receive $12,000 per year. Ray presently in Venezuela but expected to arrive Puerto Rico within a week.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files
Volume vi of xviii
Page 2

11110835

4. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated May 27, 1962 discusses front page article in Miami Herald of this date by James Buchanan entitled "Miro fades as Exile Chief: Three Latin Leaders Behing Ray". States that Ray has the backing of Gov. Monoz Marin, Pres. Romulo Betancourt and former President Jose Figueras and that Ray has taken over post with blessings of the U.S. Further states Ray's appointment as "Chief in Exile" came from underground in Cuba according to Joaquin Godoy, Provisional MRP head in Miami. Article credits Cubans in Miami with saying "new man in field" is Adolf A. Berle, Jr. who has been special asst. to State Dept. and is also member of Pres. Kennedy's special task force on Latin America. Implication being that Berle is running new U.S. sponsored Cuban effort. Release causing furor in local Cuban colony.

Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 28 May 1962 states State Department spokesman will state story without foundation at a noon press briefing this date.

5. Listing of principal persons in Puerto Rico with the MRP

RAY, Manuel
PAZOS, Felipe
BARQUIN, (Col) Ramon
MELENDEZ, Juan
GELAVERT
NODAL, Rodolfo

PORTELA, J. Migues
CARMONA, Claudio
ESTEVEZ, Jeromino
BERGNUS
ALVAREZ, Gabriel
PORTELA, Sara

* 6. On 9 June 196~~1~~2, Ray transmitts a detailed study of a general program designed to attain the liberation of Cuba. General Thesis states that MRP believes that the strongest position for representation and canalization of aspirations of the large majority of the Cuban people is offered by the set of ideas and aims of the democratic left.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII

April 24, 1978 11110836

Volume VIII July 1962 - August 1962

*1. Cable dated July 2, 1962 to Director from [San Juan]
Clear that Manolo Ray looked upon with great favor by Puerto Rican government. No evidence, however, that Puerto Rican government is supporting the MRP. Believe record will show that while our past contact with Ray has not always been happy one, it always revealing of Ray's intentions.

*2. Memo for Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez 12 July 1962
Subject: Manolo Ray Rivero

"Ray has indicated to WAVE sources that whereas he is not persona grata with the Agency, he has important political connections in Washington and is thus kept informed of much of the Agency's activities. Ray's new organization is not to be military or engage in military thrusts against Cuba because military activity is presently controlled by the Agency and cannot be wrested from it at this time. Ray's new organization will cooperate with the Consejo and attempt to move in on it with the ultimate aim of taking over and dominating it."

*3. Memorandum for Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez 25 July 1962
Subject: Manolo Ray Meeting in New York

Ray sorry he joined FRD prior to April invation. Let tide of time suck him in and take him along. Obvious to him that show run in good faith but bad judgment. Ray discusses hope that JURE will be long-lasting organization in Cuba. Ray's political views are assessed as democratically oriented, and if he became ruler of Cuba, his greatest preoccupation would be with economic progress. Rodriguez says Ray is not to be under-estimated. Commands respect because he is well educated and has something to contribute.

*4. Ray begins to give information about possible defectors from Castro. Cable dated 25 July 1962 reports that Ray told [Willard R. Nauman] that [Armando Hart Davalos] is a feasible target.

former mgr., Kings Ranch, Cuba

7. Additional information to a July 1962 memorandum from Jack Malone (named on interoffice route slip). Information obtained from difference sources from persons close to Ray and their views are complete reliable. Ray did not leave Castro's cabinet because of ideological or policy discrepancies with Castro but because of a heated discussion with the Minister of Labor. Martinez Sanchez, who almost shot Ray after a Cabinet meeting. The sources of information agree that Ray is not any different than Castro. Some of them believe he may not have completely severed his relations with Castro and think he may still be in contact with him. Diplomatic relations were suspended but recognition was not withdrawn.

*6. Memo from [Jack Malone] dated July 16, 1962 Cover letter addressed to [C. Mechen] Says Ray's ethics are poor and he is capable of sacrifycing his own kin and friends if such sacrifice turns out in favor of his personal plans. Claims Ray is irresponsible and ignorant of present international conditions and particularly of the Cuban social and economic reality.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Betsy Palmer

11110837

Manolo Ray
Volume VII continued

Quotes Ray as having said, "When I was Minister of Public Works, we, the inner circle of the Department, took a course in Marxist economics, and if what we were taught is communism, I must say that communism is not as bad as it is claimed to be."

8. Report on visit with Ray in Puerto Rico during first week of June, 1962, submitted by Winterrowd through Walt Raymond. Winterrowd states his general impression of Ray was a good one -- seems of be a moderate, intelligent man, a little given to hysteria and slogan-mongering. Best quality is in his skill as an organizer

* 9. Cable to Director from JMWave, dated Aug 15, 1962 DIR Cite WAVE 7062 Ray had meeting in Miami area 11 or 12 August in which an informant says Ray stated that he has arsenals in Venezuela and Dominican Republic, has a B-26 plane, territory available for training in Costa Rica and has the support through indirect means of U.S. Has invited journalists from New York Times and Time Magazine to cover his announcement of the formation of JURE.

10. Cable to Mexico City from Director, dated 6 August 62 says Ray plans to travel to Central America late August or September and needs visitors visa for Mexico. Says he has close acquaintance and wants to make personal effort to recruit him or talk him into defecting.

CIA makes inquiries in an effort to obtain visa for Ray.

11. Cable to Director from San Juan, dated August 20, 1962. Ray believes Llanusa will defect but needs financial support. Jose Gelabert to make pitch to Llanusa. Later cable says CIA willing to offer Llanusa $5,000.

12. Cable to Mexico City from Director, 23 August 1962 with directions to proceed to procure visa permit but make every effort to conceal U.S. connection. Ray had agreed in N.Y. meeting to make recruitment or defection effort towards Cuban Ambassador in Mexico.

* 13. Memo to Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez dated 24 Aug 1962
Subject: Operational Use of Ray Expenditure of Funds

Rodriguez feels beginning collaboration with Ray can be based on three specific proposals:
1. creation of an intelligence network inside Cuba
2. creation of recruitment or defection capability to assist our efforts in MEXI, RIO, SAGO, and MONT
3. immediate effort to recruit in place Carlos LEGHUGA and Raul PRIMELLES.

Recommends paying Ray $84,700 over a six month period to begin this initial operation.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manolo Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes 1 - XVIII

April 24, 1978

11110838

Volume VIII - September 4, 1962 - December 27, 1962

* 1. Telegram Information Report (circa Sept. 10) Unevaluated information. Ray in the U.S. 8-9 September. Intends forming new organization. Some of those participating with Ray in this effort are Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Ramon Barquin and Justo Carrillo. Ray is of the opinion that nothing will be done about Cuba in the immediate future as the President of the United States is fulfilling "an expedient of a political nature." However, there is an ally in the White House who has assured Ray that if he organizes a purely revolutionary group, he will be heard.

* 2. Junta Revolucionaria Cubana
Declaration of Principles outline the following areas:

1. Cuban Reaffirmation - recognition of sovereignty of the people, through suffrag
2. Human Rights - human fraternity and social solidarity for all Cubans
3. Social Justice - equality of opportunity for education, work, homes, etc.
4. Economic Development - intense industrialization
5. Agrarian Reform - Cuban pesantry to own land he cultivates
6. International Relations - break with Soviet bloc
7. Restoration of Legitimate Property - not that under public power
8. Political Parties - Communist Party will be proscribed
9. Political Prisoners - immediate release
10. Elections - within 18-month period

2. Dispatch to Chief, Task Force W from Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Date obscured

AMTHRILL-1 provided information on Ray obtained from Silvia KOURI de Pendas, a fellow student of Ray's at Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza #1 in Havana. Ray never known to have sympathy for Communist cause. However, one of his good friends, Pedro Valdes Vivo, is active member of Communist cell and a brother of Raul Valdes Vivo, now sub-director of Communist paper "Noticias de Hoy."

3. Cable to Priority San Juan, Info: Priority JMWAVE, Priority Mexico City
From: Director (Rodriguez originator) dated 9 Oct 1962
Admission visa not pouched 00 forwarding document will be in WAVE hands 10 October for passing to Ray. Lechuga is principal target in area of Ray trip. Stress desire keep Lechuga in place in preference to defection.

4. Memorandum for the Record dated 8 October 1962 from Patrick I. Karnley
Subject: Notes on Manolo Ray
In conversation with Luis Laboy, Laboy said Ray does not have any significant following among Cuban exiles -- says Ray is honest person completely motivated by patriotism but lacks qualities of a politician. Says Ray is too blunt and even Cisneros is not happy with him these days.

Puerto Rican Police are apparently canvassing Cuban exiles regarding Manolo Ray. In (a)IN-1 Report #54 dated 30 Sept 1962, he refers to fact that both he and Fermin Alvarez Silva were visited by officer of PR Internal Security Force soliciting their opinions of Ray.

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Manuel Ray
Volume VIII continued

11110839

5. Excerpt from Bohemia Libre 21 October 1962, page 85 Engineer Ray's Latest Attitude

Letter to magazine from Olga Hernandez, Santurce, PR - an exile who believes Ray really a Communist. Her reasons based on Ray's statements to "El Mundo" on his arrival in exile that after Castro's defeat there should be maintenance of cultural and economic relations with Russia, maintenance of militia, mainenance of confiscated property, socialized medicine, supervision of national schools and gradual supression of private schools.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - XVIII
April 24, 1978

11110840

Volume IX - January 1963 - July 1963

1. Cable to Director from Caracas, dated Feb. 22, 1963

FRANCISCO SUAREZ QUINONES wishes travel to Maimi to attend JURE rally 24 February. In view Ref B (WAVE 2462) info that Suarez communist and also MRP member, DCM has asked if any info that Suarez was undercover agent for MRP or if he may be double agent working for Castro.

2. Confidential Controlled Dissem. dated 3 June 1963
Title: Plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Infiltrate the Ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency

On 30 April 1963, Rogelio Cisneros reported on meeting of JURE exec. board in his home attended by, among others, Antonio Arias. During meeting, Cisneros said it was mentioned that Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a trusted man into the CIA in order to learn details of any plans with regard to Cuba and if possible infiltrate this man into Cuba. Cisneros also said JURE planning leaflet drop into Cuba which will include such matters as Ray's Manifesto against the U.S. Government and against the CIA.

*3. Cable to Director from Paris, dated 19 June 1963 #7727Z

Ray in Paris - contacted by Jervay. Ray driven to airport by Alberto Baez with whom Ray spent much time and who seems to be closest to Ray among his contacts in Paris.. Ray in Paris and Brussels for purpose of turing Franqui and Arcos to agents in place, or defection. Also Cabrera. Ray convinced Cubans here disillusioned with Castro. Asks for update of list of personnel and addresses of all Cuban embassies in Europe to be passed to him in San Juan and RUMBLE 6 in Paris. Wants to be trained in short wave system between himself and RUMBLE 6 and station felt these were good ideas and could be done.

4. Memo for the Record from Alfonso Rodreguez, dated 19 June 1963
Subject: Manolo Ray
Ray's attitude towards CIA - feels that the Agency has in the past purposely and actively attempted to destroy him as a political leader and has proof of at least one CIA officer plotted with certain MRP officials to remove him from the Mrp as a condition for CIA assistance to that organization. Ray cannot be overlooked in the struggle for Cuban freedom. "-- of all the Cubans I have met, he is the most purposeful, methodical, as well as the most experienced clandestine operator.."

5. Confidential Controlled Dissem. dated 27 June 1963
Re: Creation of an Intelligence Corps within the JURE
Reliable information from former Rebel Army member (F) active in clandestine movements. JURE meeting about 30 March 1963 at home of journalist Antonio Arias said JURE national executive board had created an Intelligence Corps with JURE whose function was to infiltrate JURE members into various

Betsy Palmer

11110841

Volume IX continued

organizations operating in Miami, as well as into some of the agencies of the U.S. govt. Said intelligence group would produce great results and stated as an example the infiltration of the U. S. Army.

*6. Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Dated July 22, 1963
Subject: Manuel Ray Rivero's Opinion of CIA ([AMTAUP-2] source of info)
"During a conversation on an unspecified date, involving [AMTAUP-2] Ray and Rogelio Cisneros Diaz, Ray told Cisneros that they had to be very careful with CIA agents because they were more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration. The Kennedy Administration would end but the CIA agents always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of elephants and they never forgot or forgave. Ray told Cisneros that he feared CIA agents would try to assassinate him because they were irreconcilable enemies."

~~SECRET~~

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files of Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII

April 24, 1978

11110842

Volume X - August 1963 - September 1963

* 1. Memorandum for the Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, dtd. 2 August 1963
Subject: Meeting with Ray (27 July 1963 in Miami)

Ray to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant and wants 20lbs high explosives as well as 6-8 thermite grenades. Requested that the materials be cached inside Cuba (preferably) or in San Juan. Requested that arrangements be made for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo to visit his brother to inform him of JURE plans -- Rodriguez says possibility remote. Ray planning to visit Caracas and Costa Rica later if he has a visa from Mexico. Purpose of trip is fund raising.

2. Cable from JMWAVE to Director #63249 dtd 22 Aug 1963
[Ray's Mexican visa forwarded WAVE by safehand Sept 62 and request it be airmailed to Ray in Puerto Rico.] Ray planning trip Costa Rica, Caracas, Dom. Rep. and Mexico. Departing San Juan 29 August for first leg.

* 3. Memorandum for the Record dated 23 August 1963, from A. Rodriguez
Subject: Ray, Contact Report

Met with Ray in N.Y.C. on 19 August. Rodriguez recommends to Ted Shackley that ammunition for JURE be cached near Florida Keys. Thinks it necessary to help Ray this much in order to measure his capabilities. Ray is having a 25-foot boat outfitted in Miami area to be operational by about Sept. 10. Will be used primarily for infiltration and exfiltration of personnel into Cuba. Ray also says he has been offered a 210 ft. Corvette, flying a Venezuelan flag and owned by Spaniards friendly to JURE. Said he could extend operations along the south coast of Cuba for as much as 2 - 3 weeks with this vessel. Ray was interested in whether or not KLM flights were to be resumed into Cuba as he is hopeful of returning by legal means which would not pose as many difficulties as present Mexican and Spanish air travel conditions.

[Ray says he hoped to soon penetrate the Cuban delegation to the U.N. Said his contact with Ambassador Lechuga, through a woman member of the JURE, continues, but without significant progress. Lechuga is most friendly towards her but does not wish to discuss any of his problems with her.]

Rodriquez recommends continuation of monthly $10,000 payments to Jure and an additional $15,00 to cover cost of vessels to be acquired.-- total of $25,000 monthly for 6 months.

4. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 24 August 1963 #232228Z
Ray Mexican visa waiver number 50844 issued 3 Sept 62 valid for six months, hence now expired. Under circumstances, WAVE not mailing to Ray unless otherwise instructed.

5. Cable to JMWAVE from Director, dtd 24 Aug 63 Cite Dir. 63774 Please air mail as Ray will need to procure new waiver.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Betsy Palmer

Volume X continued

1110843

6. Cable to [San Jose, Caracas, Santo Domingo, Mexico CityK] JMWAVE
From: Director dated 31 August 63

Ray departing 29 Aug. on trip to first three addees. Attempting renew Mexican visa waiver for travel there later. Purpose of trip to solicit political backing, raise funds, tighten JURE organization, streamline communication and establish take-off points for operations against target.

* 7. Cable to Director from JMWAVE dtd 7 Sept 63, Ref WAVE 3895

Reported conversation with Ray's sister-in-law wherein she stated Ray visited her home on 30 August to say goodby. He was going to be infiltrated into Cuba and would not see her for some time. Said he was not in accord with certain U.S. officials on Cuban policy and has no confidence in U.S. ability to liberate Cuba. Said he had refused two invitations extended by RFK to discuss Cuban situation.

8. Document transfer and Cross Reference dtd 10 Sept 63 [UFG-03590]
Ray arrived secretly in Miami from Puerto Rico, had secret meeting with Manuel Quiza Docal, IDR of Cubanos Libres, in which Quiza officially connected his organization to JURE for all action. Later traveled to N.Y.C. to purchase c-4 explosives.

* 9. Cable to Director from JMWAVE dtd 11 Sept 63, report from [AMTAUP-2] who spoke with Rogelio Cisneros on 6 Sept. Cisneros stated Ray departed for Costa Rica on 5 Sept to interview President Orlich. Said on Ray's last meeting with RFD; the private secretary of President Romulo Betancourt was present. Cisneros said JURE objective is to have different prominent figures in Latin American governments witness promises made by U.S. govt. Cisneros said JURE not obligated to report military or political plans to CIA but CIA obligated to deliver to JURE all military equipment needed to fight Castro. Delivery of equipment will be on high seas from a CIA boat to JURE boat which will proceed to Cuba.

10. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 6 Sept 63. Elania Germania (Bernal) de Paula reported she learned from her brother-in-law, Manuel Ray, that he had recently been in Europe negotiating arms purchases in Belgium. Contact man for purchase ~~of~~ Col. Ramon Barquin.

11. Cable to Director from MEXI dtd 27 Sept 1963 #6301

[LI [01] -2] approached by Julio Lanier on behalf of Ray and JURE. Want to start military operation against Cuba using Mexico as a base. Lanier says Ray receiving money from Venezuela. [L-2 is a CIA agent -] Cuban citizen living in Mexico. [Mexican station] wants to keep him clean of overt exile activity.

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files on Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII
April 24, 1978

11110844

Volume XI - October 1963 - December 1963

1. Field Information Report dated 1 October 1963 Notes that source (a former Cuban diplomat who is a reliable source) said Ray in Tegucigalpa, Honduras about week or 10 days ago -- had spoken with Foreign Minister Roberto Perdomo Paredes (has a 201#). A radio station manager says Ray there about 20 September.

2. Memo for the Record, 2 October 1963 from Alfonso Rodriguez

Met with Ray in San Juan Sept. 24-25, 1963. Said Ray departing Puerto Rico October 7, 1963 for Venequela and perhaps Mexico. Ray and JURE involved in infiltrating Cuba and subsequently invading.

3. Dispatch 3 October 1963 to Chief, WHD from [CS/Panama.] On 26 Sept 1963, [[c3] SAGE-1] learned that Jose Puente Blanco recently met with Ray in Costa Rica for a 3-day meeting.

* 4. Draft, dtd 4 October 1963 by Rodriquez
Subject: Manuel Ray Rivero

Ray, unlike many Latain American political leaders, is convinced that organization and work alone can assure lasting political success. Ray's philosophy is a way of life. He is a prodigious worker, given to study of details (training at U. of Utah mentioned) Ray devoting full time to JURE

5. Contact Report 15, dtd 8 October 1963
Contact with MRR member by [CO Warren K. Guertler]
Would like to know what position to take re: Ray if [A-19] asks about U.S. backing. [A-19] considers Ray part of Kremlin conspiracy to put someone in power in place of Castro. [CO has told A-19] that MRR are CIA's "chosen people" but if someone in U.S. (maybe State Dept) wants Ray, CIA will have to accept him.

6. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dtd 11 Oct 63
DIR Info, [BARR,] MEXI Cite WAVE 5656
Persecution of JURE's Mexico City delegation by local secret police
DOI: 26 Sept 63
Information received from Rogelio Cisneros Diaz. Cisneros advises delegation to work clandestinely, operate in cells, and not maintain public offices as they had in the past.

SECRET

Volume XI continued - page 2

7. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dtd 11 Oct 63
On October 1, Cisneros tells AMTAUP-1 that Ray to visit Betancourt later in week to report on status of JURE negotiations with U.S. and promises made to Ray by RFK during recent interviews.

8. CAble 172301Z 17 Octobar 63 to Director from JMWAVE.
On 15 October 1963, Jose (Gomez) Rodriguez, aka Cabeza, JURE member tells AMTAUP-1 that CIA officials from Washington, D. C. coming to Miami to finalize agreements with JURE. Also said JURE would never tell CIA exact landing sites on Cuban coast.

9. Cable to Director from Mexico City, 26 October 1963
Secret 260035Z
Dir WAVE Cite Mexi 6677
Ref A Mexi 6455 (not sent WAVE) (IN 36021
REF B HMMA 22285 (also recd 2285)
JURE representative Julio Lanier pressing LJ 01 -2 to obtain Mexican visas for Luis Giun Figueredo and Rogelio Cisneros Diaz who want to inspect plane of Ref A.

Fast action needed or L-2 will not be able to meet Cisnero and have an "in" with JURE group for purpose of ooverage of JURE PM activities Mexi. Lanier will set up meeting in Miami or San Juan.

10. Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs from CS/JMWAVE, dtd 21 Oct 63
Information received from AMTAUP-2
Ray to arrive in Miami 26 July, in secret, because he wanted to hold private meetings to discuss military affairs with action groups in Miami. Met at home of Rogelio Cisneros Diaz on 28 July. Met with Armando Alanis Angulo and asked him to join JURE. Alanis former Chief of Fiscal District of the Treasury in Camaguey Province. Ray says he has organization inside Cuba but needs personnel on outside with which to operate. Claimed to have 300 weapons in Miami.

On 18 August, Cisneros meets with Alanis and Luis Aguiar (who belongs to Alanis group). Talked of plans for Aguiar's men to infiltrate Las Villas Province and open a JURE organization.

Alanis officially joins JURE on 20 August 1963 and received Cisnero assurances they will get financial help from JURE.

11. Cable to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from JMWAVE/CS dtd 22 Oct 1963
#6. On 30 September, Ray departed for San Juan from Miami, after having visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama to gain support for operations against Cuba.

12. Cable 79065 on 29 October 1963. Willard R. Nauman will arrive San Juan October 31, 1963 to meet Ray in St. Thomas. Do not plan contact unless need arises.

Betsy Palmer

Volume XI - continued - Page 3

11110846

13. Field Information Report dtd 26 October 1963
Ray in Miami 10/26/63 to meet with Ernesto Betancourt, former MRP and now Washington, D. C. delegate of ELC. May have met in an effort to merge ELC with JURE. Ray feels need to be in Cuba in 90 days - hurricane Flora has seriously damaged Cuba and this is an opportune time.

14. Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Meeting with Ray in St. Thomas on 31 October and 1 November 1963
Discussed JURE plans to begin operations inside Cuba by end of December.

15. Cable dtd 16 Nov 1963 to Director from JMWAVE indicates Ray ~~taking~~ meetig vessel REX within 50 miles of Cuba - cargo, 600 lbs. demolitions.

*16. Cable dtd 18 November 1963 to JMWAVE from Director confirms understanding that all dates mentioned in Rules of Engagement this operation are moved up two days. Thus, WAVE will begin operation by caching materials and departing scene by 1200 on 25 November 1963.

*17. Cable dated 3 December 1963 to JMWAVE from Director indicates Ray involved in infiltration plan, Operation BOLA, and CIA doubts his story as to why he couldn't complete mission -- said low on gas.

18. Payments to Ray 21 June 1963 - 5 December 1963, totalled $107,925.00
No payments in November.

*19. Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, dtd 13 Dec 1963

Meets with Ray in N.Y.C. 12/6/63. JURE ship failed to pick up materials deposided on Roncador Cay on 25 November 1963. Ray had no full explanation for failure. Low on gas theory doubtful as ship did arrive a Puerto Limon on 27 November as scheduled. -- Ray doubts this story. Alternate date of 20 December set up, embarking from Puerto Limon, Costa Rica this time.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XII - January 1964 - February 1964

11110847

1. Intelligence Information Cable, 4 January 1964 - information from Carlos Hernandez Hernandez, an Executive Member of Brigade 2506 veterans Association said the Brigade rejected a proposed alliance with JURE on December 7, 1963. Brigade is opposed to Artime, but more opposed to Ray.

2. Identification provided by CIA for Ray in his attempt to infiltrate Cuba. Request made 6 January 1964 - Ray to use identity of Juan Cardenas Mendez.

3. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 8 January 1964, Dir Cite WAVE 0106

[AMOT-84] said he learned from newspaperman Abelardo (Garcia) Berry that Ray had met in Paris with Carlos Franqui Mesa to propose that Franqui join Ray's organization, that is, sector of "Betrayed Revolution". Garcia believes that in order to obtain Franqui's defection, Ray told him about alleged plans of U.S. to overthrow Castro in which Ray was to play a prominent part. Garcia further believes that Franqui's "falling into disgrace" in Cuba is a trick of Castro and Franqui.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 8 January 1964 states that Governor Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico, pledged to give Ray double any amount Ray raised on a bond sale by JURE to buy guns. JURE has large quantity of arms in P.R. under protection of the Governor.

*5. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 14 January 1964. Cisneros said JURE has military training base in Costa Rica under command of Julio Cesar Alonso, Military Chief of JURE. All JURE boats now at Costa Rican base and also arms which had been in Puerto Rico. Said JURE leaders do not plan ~~to~~ to work in Miami area or anywhere else in U.S. because they are afraid CIA will seize their military equipment.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 16 Jan 1964 [Amtaup/2] reported that ~~Armando/Alanis/Angulo~~ Julio Cesar Alonso replaced as chief of Costa Rican military base of JURE because of his failure to go on a scheduled operation. (Check to see if this was the aborted mission of 25 November 1963)

WAVE, dated 30 January 1964. [Amtaup/2] reported
Sanchez and Rogelio Cisneros. Cisneros said FBI and
up JURE arms and explosives cached at Cajon de
ld pick cache up, it was discovered by a fisherman who
RE boat found and searched, but not retained as they
guns overboard. Governor of P.R. called newspapers
ught Castro had cached the arms in order to overthrow
id this to sidetrack FBI and INS investagations and
Ray's activities would be revealed. Cisneros
n P.R. and registered in Panama in name of person
o governor P.R. and bitter enemy of CIA. [Amtaup/2]
.R. was trusted by Jure, to which Cisneros replied
nationalist and enemy of U.S. imperialist politics
f CIA.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

* 6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 31 Jan 64 - Article in Miami Herlad about the discovery of arms cache in Puerto Rico confirms accuracy of Amtaup/2 reporting that Ray involved in robbery U.S. Military installation and that Governor Marin is misleading FBI investigation. WAVE believes the C-3 explosive found in cache was provided Ray by WAVE as directed by Hdqtrs, but WAVE did not provide any weapons. WAVE will tell loaal FBI that they know nothing regarding background of cache discovery and assume Hdqtrs will coordinate case at Wash.D.C. level with FBI.

* 7. Intelligence Information Cable, dated 4 Feb. 1964 - reliable source says RAY expected in Caracas, Venezuela middle of February 1964 to establish a guerrilla training base for JURE in venezuela. Will be a regional center used by JHRE members in Venezuela and Panama. (Likely that if Ray succeeds in setting up camp, it will be with tacit consent of Betancourt government. Field Comment). Ray claims he will be inside Cuba by 20 May 1964.

8. Cable to DIR from Panama City, dated 9 Feb 1964 states JOSE MARIA PUENTE BLANCO, Panamanian/Cuban, DOB 17 July 1930, Havana, Cuba, left Panama City for Caracas on 8 Feb. He is possible Castro agent and Panama City would appreciate information re his activities in Caracas and/or subsequent travel.

* 9. Memo for the Record, dtd 12 Feb 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Meeting with AMBANG/1

ELC, according to Ray, was now disolved and became a part of JURE on 17 Jan. 1964. This brings to JURE the best former rebel army officers in exile and should give JURE a military background and support second to none in the exile community.

Comments: AMTAUP/2 reports have indicated Cisneros activities and statements are directed against the CIA. Rodriguez discusses Amtaup/2 s reporting with Tony Sforza and Warren Frank. If Cisneros is in fact directing a program of denigration against the CIA, suggest agency follow the activities of Dionisio Suarez Esquival, who reportedly has been selected to carry out such a program in various Latin American univerities.

10. Cable to DIR from Panama City, dated 22 Feb. 1964. The PUENTE BLANCO brothers have been under some suspicion since their arrival in PACY following their release from Cuban prison as result of intervention of Thelma King. Part of suspicion is a result of activities of their brother, Jorge, still in Cuba.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XIII - March 1964 - April 1964

1110849

1. Memorandum to Acting Chief, Contact Division, dated 6 March 1964
From: Cincinnati R.A.
Thru: Chief, Detroit Office
SUBJECT: Castro Type Subversion Likely/Manuelo Ray Dangerous Exile Leader now in Puerto Rico
REFERENCE: CR-64-2 and WH-1694

Architect, Nocholas Quintana, residing in Cuba, told the following to a Mr. Raphael Katzen, consulting engineer in U.S. Manuelo Ray is in Quintana's opinion more dangerous to U.S. than Castro. Ray is not a Soviet type Communist according to Quintana, but his socialism is so extreme and his anti-U.S. feelings so deep that he considers Ray a dangerous exile leader, at least to the U.S.

Manuelo Ray is known to be of interest to the local FBI (Cincinnati).

(Check -- is ~~this CIA memo~~ DCD file?)

2. Memorandum for the Record, dated 16 March 1964
From: [Sidney P. Di Ubaldo]
Subject: Contact Report, Meeting with Ernesto Betancourt

Betancourt has known Ray for several years and admired him through all various seasons of their relationship. Betancourt impressed with Ray's organizational talents and talents as an engineer.. Says Ray an effective and judicious personality and appeals to Cuban exiles of various stripes. Betancourt expressed a fear that Ray, in his zeal, might commit himself to such tight timing that he would be forced to undertake action at a disadvantageous moment.

[Di Ubaldo] comments that if Betancourt was leading him on in an attempt to sell Ray to him, it was done with a "subtlety to which I am definitely not accustomed".

* 3. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 17 March 1964. Cisneros told [AMTAUP/2] that CIA had ordered personnel of [AMWORLD] (Artime's group) boats to fire on JURE boats and therefore Cisneros had instructed his crewmen to fire on [AMWORLD] boats wherever encountered. CITE WAVE 3691

Cisneros had meeting at his home on 15 March, attended by Armando Alanis Angulo, Dunney Perez Alamo, Jose Puente Blanco, National Chief JURE youth and member of JURE national Executive, and [AMTAUI /2] Cisneros related that Romulo Betancourt told Ray in Caracas that Betancourt will work in favor of JURE. Puente confirmed this. Betancourt promised to arrange urgent meeting with U.S. officials in Washington to get promise from them that CIA would not sabotage any of JURE's planned operations.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Manuel Ray - Volume XIII
Page 2

11110850

*4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 28 March 1964 - [AM AUF/2] spoke with Blas Enrique Comas Castro, captain of JURE boad VENUS which is in Puerto Rico. Said Cisneros and Ray recently arrived in P.R. from Caracas and said Venus would be used to infiltrate Ray into Cuba in a few days.

[AMTAUI/2] said Armando Alanis Angulo said he was leaving Miami on 30 March for new JURE base within 6 hours of Miami. Said base under responsibility of Dunney Perez Alamo and himself. Also said Ray had chosen Venus to make trip to Cuba and Venus armed with 20MM gun, four 50 Cal and one 30 Cal machine guns.

5. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 28 Marhh 1964 - [AMTAI /2] reports that Alanis, Perez and Antonio Arias Gonzalez, JURE members, are dissatisfied with Ray's organization because they had now been forbidden to criticize U.S. government policies, and the fact that they were allowed to have a training camp near Miami indicated that Ray is accepting CIA aid. Cisneros claimed the main objective of JURE was to keep U.S. govt. entertained with the training base set up in Miami area and that departure of JURE members to infiltrate Cuba will be outside U.S.

6. Accounting of funds received by Ray, from June 21, 1963 - April 8, 1964, show a total expenditure of $217,924.28 by CIA.

*7. Memo for the Chief, WH Division, dated 14 April 1964, from Alfonso Rodreguez - Subject: My Meeting with Ray on 13 April 1964.

Essense of Ray's plans: 1. Two teams expected to go into Oriente Province this week.
2. Ray will turn over JURE contact with us to Cisneros, effective 23 April.

Ray's immediate objective once in Cuba will be to initiate systematic, continuous bombings of strategic and non-strategic targets. Power plant in Havana, major refinery and aquaduct in Santa Clara are immediate objectives.

*8. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 26 April 1964. [AM /2] reported that JURE training base opened near Tampa, Fla. for 30 men and planning to set up a base in Dominican Republic.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File Review, Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XIV - May 1964

11110851

-MRR

1. [AMWORLD] Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964
   Subject: Ray's Plans
   Submitted by [Henry l. Hecksher] WH/SA/SO/HH

Ray's plans to infiltrate Cuba by 20 May were discussed at meeting. Questions about Ray's financing of Puerto Rican conference and ability to store arms and engage in training activities on U.S. soil were raised by [AMYUM/19] MRR) Member). He volunteered to tell [Hecksher] where arms could be found be [Hecksher] "quickly dissuaded him from divulging further details" at which point [AMYUM 19] commented that [GUERTLER] had reacted in a similar way when offered facts and figures about Ray's activities. Artime stated he would not put it past Ray to go into hiding in a secure place while pretending to be in Cuba.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, 7 May 1964 - After looking at [AMTAUP/] material, it is obvious much of conspiratorial talk in JURE is for internal consumption only, the purpose being to protect myth that JURE is independent as basically hostile to CIA. In a desire to obtain proof of any anti-CIA or U.S. govt. activity by Ray, urge every effort to check accuracy of [AMTAUP/AMOT] reporting and follow through for any overt manifestations of many allegations made.

3. Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence, from Richard Helsm, DD/P, dated 13 May 1964. Subject: Plans of Manuel Ray and the JURE to Infiltrate into Cuba.

Helms says there is no question but that Ray seriously plans to enter Cuba sometime in May 1964. JURE has 6 teams ready to infiltrate -- a total of 27 men. Ray hopes with aid of 40 men, he can demonstrate that resistance is possible and that Castro can be defied.

* 4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, , dtd 20 May 1964. Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-Life, left Miami 18 May with JURE elements for rendezvous with Ray.

* 5. Memo for the Record dtd 20 May 1964, from Samuel Halpern
   Subject: JURE Purchase of Arms

Chronological resume of reports reaching WH/SA desk regarding attempted purchase of arms by JURE in El Monte, California.

A. Revenue officials queried CIA re its knowledge of certain arms being handled by Juan Erquiaga Aizcorbe in L.A. area for shipment to Florida. WH/SA denied knowledge. Discussion about 20 May 1964.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110852

B. Rogelio Cisneros calls Rodriguez (~~Halpern~~) on 20 May to advise him certain arms being manufactured to JURE specifications in El Monte and being investigated by U.S. Treasury. Cisneros says JURE has invested $50,000 in these weapons being manufactured bu Knuson (sic) Manufacturing Co.

C. Rodriguez ~~(the undersigned)~~ tells Cisneros this is pretty sad situation that JURE must make use of Costa Rican, Venezuelan and other L.A. connections or they were going to get "clobbered" in U.S.

D. Halpern and Rodrigaez advised Mr. FitzGerald of the above. He agreed agency could not assist JURE in this matter. On 20 May, Mr. Bowdler of St. Dept. notified of the matter, and Deputy Chief, WH/SA advised.

E. Joseph O'Neill of OGC called on 20 May and informed that JURE was involved but agency did not want Revenue called off its investigation because of the "autonomous" nature of our relationship with JURE.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 22 May 1964. Sender states that the manner of Tad Szulc in an office visit on May 21 and new confident tone expressed by Cisneros conveyed feeling to cable sender that Ray has made it into Cuba.

7. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, dated 23 May 1964. Request Reuteman advise AMCARBON/1 that he has checked with hdqtrs and that Ray is not receiving CIA support. Reuteman should trace history of intimate relationship of AMCAPE/1 with Ray noting that since Bay of Pigs, AMCAPE/1 has been serving, in effect, as a public relations man and lobbyist for Ray. Further explain to AMCARBON/1 that AMCAPE/1 must be credited with single-handedly placing entire Cuban nation on alert and causing withdrawal of masses of conscripted workers from cane fields merely by articles playing on theme of threat of infiltration of Ray and a few men. Tell AMCARBON/1 that CIA would not become party to Ray operation knowing close relationship with AMCAPE/1, particularly since latter well known to be less than friendly to CIA.

8. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 26 May 1964. Cisneros says that as of 23 May 1964, no contact has been established with Ray but Cisneros believes he has reached Cuba.

9. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 28 May 1964 - Cisneros says Ray has not as yet been able to infiltrate Cuba and will make ~~another~~ attempt night of 28 May 1964. Cisneros says vigilance by U.S. authorities over activities of JURE reps. in Florida making support of Ray's effort extremely difficult.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

11110853

May 1, 1978
Volume XV - June 1964

✱ 1. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 30 May 1964 - information from Rogelio Cisneros Diaz - as of 30 May 1964, Ray had not entered Cuba. Boat to be used in final infiltration developed motor trouble. JURE reps were making all out effort to go to Ray's aid with replacement for boat and an additional supply of drinking water.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, dated 2 June 1961, Ref: WAVE 7218 (in 95616)* Please note similarities rumor reported Ref Para 2 and statement attributed to Rogelio Cisneros that CIA had instructed AMWORLD boats to fire on JURE boats per WAVE 3691 (IN 41477). Is this significant?

* Artime's followers authorized to attack any of Ray's or Gutierrez's men on high seas.

✱ 2. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE dated 3 June 1964 ; stating that Ray and Andrew St. George were among the individuals arrested by the British near Cayo Largo. (Location of Anguilla Cay also used in cable). Detainees taken to Nassau. Tom Dunkan, Life photographer, also in group.

3. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 4 June 1964 - AMTAUP/2 reported that Ray's organization going to make press statement that Ray's failure to enter Cuba was fault of CIA.

✱ 4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE dtd 6 June 1964 reflects feelings of Cuban exile community over Ray's failure to enter Cuba.

   a. Ray made a fool of himself by taking a girl and two non-Cuban newsmen with him, none of whome adapted to rigors of guerrilla warfare.
   b. British and U.S. participated in Ray's capture
   c. Whole thing was a publicity stunt which went wrong.
   d. Enrique Huertas jubilant over Ray's disgrace, but feels it is a loss of exile prestige and harbingers bleak and hopeless period
   e. Dr. Antonio Maceo says many have lost faith in Ray for lack of accomplishment this past year.
   f. Ray is laughing stock. Those who had hopes now feel he is only an ambitious politican not will to keep promises.
   g. JURE members confused and undecided over how to defend Ray. Alanis and Zarraga wish to remove their followers from JURE.
   h. Cisneros states to AMTAUP that Ray will accuse U.S. govt of treachery for cutting off economic aid one month ago and for searching his home, automobile and offices (Cisnero's?)(Photostats in volume XIV)

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110854

5. Memo for the Record, dtd 9 June 1964, from Alfonso Rodreguez
   Subject: Possible Plans of Ray

Opinion of Rodriguez that Ray will attempt asap to mount another infiltration effort. He is relatively certain JURE has or can procure a small craft capable of making trip from Florida to Cuba. He also thinks that ~~either Cisneros or~~ Ray "would be willing to publicly give the lie to the TIME magazine article of 12 June 1964.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 10 June 1964 - re-canvassing of exile community reveals Ray's prestige at near-absolute low point. Trend is tendency to ignore Ray completely. Information that JURE in considerable dissension. Threats of various factions to withdraw unless Cisneros dismissed and national board reorganized.

7. Memo for Record, dtd 12 June 1964 from Samuel Halpern
   Subject: Information from the British in Answer to Questions Re; Identify of American Who Allegedly Paid Manuel Ray's fine in Nassau.

[redacted] called 12 June to say Gov. of Bahamas had replied to our query as to the identify of American who allegedly paid Ray's fine in Nassau. (see TIME of 12 June 1964, page 48 -- alleged CIA paid). Governor stated he had seen no such figure and to best of his knowledge, there was no such person. "I of course did not tell [redacted] that we knew the identity of the American as reported to us by Rogelio Cisneros of JURE."

8. Memo for Record, dtd 12 June 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
   Subject: JURE telegram to TIME Magazine

Protest falsity of information published by TIME re: capture of Manuel Ray and his group. False that a CIA ship participated in any phase of operation. Also false that a CIA individual paid fine -- the $84.00 was sent to JURE by an American citizen at request of one of his employees.

9. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 27 June 1964: According to AMFAST/6, Ray informed Pepe Catillo (Jose Garcia Valdez) their departure date for Cuba would be July 1. Boat to be used is unnamed Rybovitch rented in Ft. Lauderdale. Ray planning to stay in Cuba about 15 days.

* 10. Memo for Record, dtd 29 June 1964, from Alfonso Rodriguez
   Subject: Establishment of Base Abroad; Manuel Ray Rivero

On June 22, the Special Group agreed "no monies would be forthcoming, specifically a requested $25,000, until he ceased" all activities from U.S. mainland.

[redacted]

Betsy Palmer

File Review - Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII
May 2, 1978

11110855

Volume XVI - July 1, 1964 - August 28, 1964

1. Draft on Manuel Ray by Alfonso Rodriguez dtd 6 July 1964

After his failure to reach Cuba during May 1964, Ray believes he must go into Cuba as soon as possible. Within JURE, according to Ray, his detention by the British is viewed as an unfortunate incident. Ray said some JURE members considering demonstrations before British embassies and consulates.

2. Memo for the Record dtd 7 July 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
   Subject: Tad Szulc Relationship with Manuel Ray

Rodriguez questioned Ray's using newspaper correspondents as emissaries to departments of the U.S. govt. Ray stated that Szulc took it upon himself to speak about matters related to assisting Ray. Rodriguez says it would be wrong to assume that Ray is controlled by Szulc but Ray "undoubtedly knows that Szulc has worked hard, first with President Kennedy and now, for him and his interest. This cannot but influence Ray."

2. Intelligence Information Memo, 14 and 15 June 1964 [redacted]
   Source:

JURE's national executive met 14/15 June to discuss crisis within the organization concerning Cisneros. Dr. Raul Chibas Ribas stated that if Cisneros not removed from his position, Chibas would make public his resignation.

* 3. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, dtd 9 July 1964
   From: Desmond FitzGerald, Chief/WH Division
   Subject: Chronology of Concept of Autonomous Operations and Summary of Financial Support to Manuel Artime

Attachment A is listing of origin, briefings, discussions, and approvals by appropriate policy levels of the concept of autonomous operations and specifically support to Artime. Chron clearly shows that from the very beginning the problems inherent in autonomous operations were clearly stated at all times by the Agency and that appropriate policy levels were kept fully and regularly informed of the status of autonomous operations.

Attachment B contains summary and breakdown of financial support for Artime. Summary states that, "From June 1963 through 30 June 1964 the Agency spent $4,933,293 in support of the Artime operation." Fixed monthly subsidy is $225,000.

[redacted]

Betsy Palmer

11110856

Volume XVI - continued
page 2

Origin of Autonomous Operations

Integrated Covert Action Program for Cuba, approved by Higher Authority in June 1963, provided for "support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution" of other courses of action. Concept was first voiced in Sept. 1962 in Walter Rostow's proposal for a "Track Two" approach to Cuban operations. Parallel to regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams, CIA would extend financial aid and some advice and guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Manuel Ray.

Rules of Engagement incorporated into June 1963 program.

1. "It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.
2. The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, they cannot be resumed.
3. All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.
4. The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U. S. complicity.
5. The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.
6. These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule."

4. Article from New York Times, Wednesday, July 15, 1964, bylined Tad Szulc "Ray Said To Leave For Cuba Landing - Castro Foe, Balked in May, Reported on Way Again."

* 5. Cable to DIR from [JMBARR] dtd 15 Jul 1964. M/V True with Manolo Ray and crew returned Key West area --- had motor trouble.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 18 July 1964. Ray's latest misadventures trying get into Cuba mid-July greeted with relative indifference majority Cuban exiles Miami area.

* 7. Wireservice prinout - Miami, Flay, July 24, 1964. Three exile groups withdrew from Ray's JURE today protesting that Ray failed to make good his promise to enter Cuba to reactivate the anti-Castro underground. Spokesman was Jesus Dieguez of the Revolutionary National Assembly.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files - Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

Volume XVII - September 1964 - February 1965 11110857
May 2, 1978

1. Memo dtd 1 Sept 1964, Subject: [AMTAUP-2] Production
"Chief of Reports Comments: It would appear that [AMTAUP-2's] reporting on JURE matters have been generally reliable."

*2. Autonomous Operations - Operating Plan
Activity: [AMBANG]
For the Period: 1 October - 31 December 1964. Total of $75,000 paid to effect move of JURE activities from U.S. territory and as a final payment to JURE.

3. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 9 Sept 1964
Source: Jose Garcia Valdez, aka "Pepe Gatillo"
Subject: Plans of JURE leader Manuel Ray Rivero to depart Miami for an Undisclosed Location.

Ray asked Garcia on 9 Sept 64 to take him, St. George and Mirta Borras on trip to unspecified destination. To depart on JURE catamaran.

*4. Memo for the Record, dtd 11 Sept 1964 from Alfonso Rodreguez

On Aug 24, 1964, Rogelio Cisneros called to report his resignation from JURE. Stated Ray incapable of directing both political and military activities. Cisneros thinks Raul Chibas will soon also resign. Cisneros said Ray not prepared for ill-fated May attempt into Cuba and Cisneros thinks Ray had believed he could arrange for CIA to take him into Cuba. "Ray is politically unformed --- politically that which he last read". Cisneros further stated that he believed Ray had planned his entire return-to-Cuba angle with President Kennedy and the presidential elections of November 1964 in mind. According to him, Ray planned to make JURE and Ray outstanding liberal and democractic exile group with the thought that prior to the 1964 elections, Mr. Kennedy would have to do something about Cuba. With Kennedy's death, according to Cisneros, all of Ray's plans went awry. Rodriguez expresses to Cisneros that this seems like a far-fetched possibility and Cisneros admits he got idea out of thin air, but said theory widely held within Directorate of JURE.

*5. Memo for the Record - draft - dtd 22 Sept 1964 - Alfonso Rodriguez
Conclusions "I recommend we give Ray what he asks and close the JURE books for good. If Ray is succesful in Cuba he will not need our help, if he is not, our help won't do much good.

"He is honest and at least the money will largely be spent for the purpose he wants to achief.

"Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyond reproach."

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110858

6. Erquiaga Arms shipment to JURE episode.
Cable from [redacted] 16-15 DIR CITE [redacted] 21-15 7152] REF: DIR-63886

Please pass to Asst. Sec. Mann from Ambassador Telles: "I saw President Orlich and Minister Quiros Sasso on 18 November and conveyed reference position. The President was visibly shaken to learn that US government was not involved in this arms shipment. After some discussion with Minister Quiros, President Orlich requested that we not issue license for [AMBANG-1] shipment. President Orlich made clear he would be happy at any time to undertake action such as this if US government wanted him to. While he does wish see Cuba free he inclined to agree with US position Re Hit and Run raids undertaken principally for publicity sake. President Orlich's decision based on (1) relaization that he would not be doing us a favor and, (2) further realization that CRG would be hard pressed to explain such a $70,000 purchase of arms if it became a campaign issue in 1965."

[redacted]

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File Review Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII

Volume XVIII - March 1965 -----------

11110853

May 2, 1978

1. Memo dtd 18 November 1965 to: United States Secret Service
   From: Deputy Director for Plans
   Subject: Ray, Rivero, Manuel Antonio aka: Ray, Manolo

In response to a telephonic request of 15 Nov. 1965 for a name trace on Ray. CIA files contain voluminous information from sources of varying reliability re: Ray who is well known to Intelligence Community as a prominent anti-Castro Cuban exile leader and head of JURE. If particular info is desired, please specify.

2. Memo dtd 6 Dec 1965 to Secret Service from DD/P gives 2 1/2 page standard bio information on Ray.

3. Memo dtd 15 Dec 1965 to Commissioner, INS from DD/P
   Subject: Roige Cerezo, Jose
   (A 12 399 923 TC)

According to CIA files, information dtd Aug 1963 from a Cuban emigree source, Roige was designated chief of intelligence by National Direction Abroad of JURE. Source said intelligence group created in March 1963 on orders of Manuel Ray for purpose of infiltrating JURE members into various organizations which operated in Miami area, as well as into agencies of U.S. govt. Further, that in April 1963, Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a JURE member into CIA in order to learn details of plans regarding Cuba. JURE also intended to drop leaflets into Cuba of a derogatory nature regarding U.S. govt. Included in these leaflets was Subject's manifesto against the U.S. govt and against this Agency.

4. Ltr. dtd June 2, 1966 from Dr. Julian Gallo to Harry (Mahoney?)

Gallo is contact with Ray in Puerto Rico and trying to discover the names of Ray's contacts in Cuba. Ray, apparently is seeking a Mexican visa from Gallo and unhappy that it did not come through. Refused to reveal names or addresses to Gallo and would not give information about where his radio broadcast tapes were to be sent for transmission into Cuba.

5. Memo for the Record, dtd 21 June 1966 from Charles Anderson

Met with Ray on 28 April 1966. Anderson said in general Ray had less information on the "purge situation that I did." Ray said relatives of Gustavo Arcos in P.R. had telephone contact with Arcos family in Cuba, about 25 April and that Arcos still in prison but charges against him were thin. "(This means there was at least one more telephone call than we knew of previously, and this has probably served to increase the pressure on Arcos)." Anderson tells of his concern and strong interest in Arcos on the chance that Ray might assume Arcos had been CIA agent. Doesn't know if Ray will construe remark this way but it seemed like an opening "to use an important exile channel as a possible deception mechanism."

"I believe that later in the summer it might be a good idea to have another talk with [AMBANG] to keep up with exile thinking, and feeding more deception thoughts."

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Volume XVIII continued
Page 2

11110860

6. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 28 June 1966
Source: Qualified American Observer

On 15 June 1966, Rafael Garcia-Bango, Cuban exile in Spain, received call in Madrid from Ray in P.R. regarding Ray's plans to assume power in Cuba. Garcia-Bango told Ray it was essential he come Madrid before 25 June and return to San Juan in order to talk to a member of Cuban delegation for 10th Caribbean and CenAm games in P.R., prior to return of delegation to Cuba. Ray agreed to do so.

Ray enthusiastic over possibility of overthrowing Castro in next several months. Knows Garcia-Bango has bad reputation but feels he could prove useful. Also useful would be Garcia-Bango's brother, Jorge Garcia-Bango Dirube, who has more respectable reputation. Ray also state that he had received indirectly a message from Jose Llanusa Gobel and c onsiders him a potential ally.

7. Harry Mahoney debriefs Ray, described in Memo for the Record dtd 8 July 1966. Mentions Julian Gallo at this time and Ray indicates he knows and respects him.

8. Memo No. 771, 1 Sept 1966 for: Chief, OPS Cuba/WH Division/DDP Attn: Mr. Harry Mahoney, Subject: MIG-21. Attaching communication from DIA authorizing $100,000 should MIG-21 operation succeed. Funds to come from Air Force escrow fund [now held by CIA.]
(Note: Other memos refer to MIG which Ray said he knew a Cuban pilot would fly out of Cuba. Ray never comes through with any information that is usable, and finally says he cannot contact pilot)

* 9. Cable dtd 4 Jan 69 CITE WH/Miami 2233
Ref: [redacted]1490

[AMOT] reports on 9 Aug 68 indicating Ray plans to dissolve JURE and hold a Congress of Cuban exiles in 1969 to create a new organization to fight Castro. Ray working with Haitian groups and hopes, if new invasion of Haiti successful, he will be granted operational bases and radio station in Haiti.

10. Memo dtd Feb. 8, 1971 to Director, FBI from DD/P indicates that CIA has no current operational interest in Manuel Ray Rivero.

[redacted]

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

April 5, 1978
Review of Manuel Rey Rivero files

11110861

Assortment of documents not in files at time review began on 3/29/78

1. 10 June 1966 Dispatch to Chief, WH, From Chief of Station, [redacted] 16-10 Subject: Haitian Exile Activities in the Dominican Republic.

02 [EMHEFTY-1] provided information on Haitian exile activities. On May 30, 1966 [EMHEFTY] was taken to a meeting ~~by~~ (with) Godefray Moscoso at the Hotel Comercial.
02 [EMHEFTY] was taken to meeting by Gerard Max Lafontant, a Haitian Communist At the meeting, Lafontant told Moscoso that Manolo Rey had obtained explosives for him to use in the first invasion against Haiti and that Rey was now living in the Dominican Republic. Lafontant described Rey as a former collaborator of Fidel Castro, but was not now on speaking terms with Castro. He said the Communist-oriented 14th of June Revolutionary Movement had on one occasion accused Rey of being a CIA [~~WOFACT~~] agent, but this was not true. Rey can obtain explosives within 24 hours after the request is made.

* 2. Cable to Director from Hunt, August 25, 1960 states that Carrillo advised that FRD should keep an eye on new anti-Castro group being formed by Raul Chibas and Manuel Ray, Marcel Fernandez, Julio Durate and Jose Pepin Bosch. Chibas told Carrillo that Miro would follow Chibas line which would be neither join nor fight FRD but help if necessary. Bosch financing Chibas and Miro with initial credit. Results negative when Carillo invited new group to join FRD. Carrillo feels if new group succeeds, it will try to draw in Feliue Pazos and Ramon Barquin. (Note date of cable)

* 3. Dispatch to Deputy Chief, WH/SA from Chief of Station, JMWAVE dated 14 April 1964 in Mexico, D. F. Lengthy and very rambling letter which, among many other things, states the story about Manuel Ray being closely associated with ALBIZU CAMPOS and friendly with Puerto Ricans who were working on the rennovation of the White House and the group that tried to assassinate Truman. (Pencilled notation of A. Rodriguez -- "Who is [AMSHOT/1?] Could he be agent provacateur? What is his access? Can we take him seriously?) Although postmarked in Mexico, [AMSHOT] apparently still in Cuba. 1964 Not a Cuban citizen - wife in U.S. Trying to get a Mexican Visa.

4. Cable 21 May 1964 or information report.
On 21 May 1964, unidentified members of JURE stated that Manuel Ray Rivero entered Cuba successfully on 17 May 1964 and is still there. He departed from an unidentified embarcation point near Cuba at 3 am on 17 May and reached his destination by 10 am that day. Ray was accompanied by a labor leader believed to be JOSE COMEZ RODRIGUEZ and a 22 year old man who was to serve as Ray's communications clerk and guide.

SECRET

5. Field Information Report on Cuba
Subject: Lecture of Manuel Ray Rivero to Member of JURE's Delegation from Tampa, Orlando, and Miami, Florida
Date: 26 May 1965
Source: A young Cuban exile trained in information collection.

Ray gave opening lecture to 25-30 JURE delegates gathered in Miami on 22 May 1965. Ray claims JURE has men and equipment to win war of liberation in Cuba and reiterates that only an internal revolution will overthrow Castro. Said some arms had been left on a military base in the Dominican Republic and that, regardless of who takes over in the DR, the arms will be returned to JURE. Made an appeal for money so that organization would purchase the M/V VENUS, a 110-foot vessel registered in Panama. (Previous reporting on JURE's base and equipment in DR contained in the following: TDCSDB-315/00539-65, 16 Feb 65; TDCSDB-315/00301-65, 38 Jan 65; TDCSDB-315/00383-65, 27 Jan 65; and TDCSDB-315/00269-65, 28 Jan 65.

* 6. Field Information Report on Cuba
Subject: Plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Infiltrate the Ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 30 April 1963
Source: Former Rebel Army member (F) active in clandestine movements
Appraisal of Content: 3

On 30 April 1963, Rogelio Cisneros, JURE Exec. Bd. member, said a meeting held in his home and Antonio Arias, propaganda chief in Miami, in attendance. Cisneros said it was mentioned that Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a trusted man into the CIA in order to learn details of any plans with regard to Cuba and if possible to infiltrate this man into Cuba. Cisneros said it might be possible to use contacts of George Volsky (sp?) who had CIA contacts. In regard to future propaganda, JURE plans to introduce thousands of anti-American phamphlets into Cuba, including Ray's manifesto against the U.S. government and the CIA.

* 7. Report on Cuba/Dominican Republic
Subject: Urgent plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Enter Cuba
Involvement of Ray with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Haiti
Date: 18 September 1964
Source: [redacted] part of group of Cubam emigres trained in techniques of information collection.

Andrew St. George said Ray is attempting to drop himself into Cuba, regardless of risk, to regain his political prestige. Ray feels he cannot now compete with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, military leader of SNFE, and other revolutionary organizations, unless he enters Cuba. He wants to have same influence of others when Haiti leadership starts distributing bases to Cuban exiles and providing them help for their aid in overthowing Francois Duvalier (a trade off). According to St. George, the Haiti combine is composed of Gutierrez, Antonio Cuesta del Valle of Commandos L, and DRE members. Also, Rolando Masferrer Rojas on the inside of Haiti operations and has the most influence among the Haitians.

~~SECRET~~ Betsy Palmer

Miscellaneous documents not in files
Page 3

11110863

8. Information Report - Cuba/Dominican Republic
Subject: Purchase of a Boston Whaler for Manuel Ray Rivero, Leader of the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE)
Date: 18 September 1964
Source: Naturalized American citizen - formerly in shipping business in Cuba, well-trained and experienced debriefer

On 14 Sept 1964, a Miami yacht builder firm purchased a 13-foot six inch Boston whaler for Ray. Purchaser, Angel Aixala Pertierra said he planned to go to Santo Domingo to get permission to operate the whaler in Dominican waters, and once this had been granted, would deliver the boat to Ray. It was on Aixala's Catamaran ct 1208 D, that Ray made his ill-fated initial attempt to enter Cuba. Aixala is not a member of JURE.

* 9. Classified Message to Director, from [Paris]
Date: 8 June 1963

Ray and Emio Guede arrived in Paris and Ray contacted by Nauman on 7 June. Reviewed plan for Franqui recruitment in place. Urged Ray to take immediate action before his presence in Paris was leaked. Guede tries to contact Franqui by phone and on all occasions, phone answered by Edith Sorel or her roomate, Helene Pulish (phonetic). Guede leaves message each time and on last call told Franqui going to Brussels and may have already left. On 7 June Guede sees Franqui at the opening of his exhibition and talks to him. Franqui listened to him, but made no responses to his veiled overatures. Guede surmizes Franqui not interested -- thinks he is incapable of defending regime but not willing or capable of breaking with it. Grovery and JERVAY met Ray. Feel this important re possible future use Ray Europe. Pari support excellent. (C/S comment: HQS has reason believe no obstacle convincing Ray push for Franqui return for period to be eyes and ears anti-Castro conspiracy.)

* 10. Cable Report to Director, from [Paris]
Date: 14 June 1963

Ray and party travel to Brussels on 11 June, and Ray continues his efforts [to recruit an agent in place for CIA.] Contacts Guillamo Cabrera and surmised Cabrera held back from a break due to his concern for a brother inside who is ill. Ray asks Cabrera to arrange a meeting with Gustave Arcos but Cabrera unable to do so since Arcos//// leaving for a few days. Ray extends his trip. [Contacts Nauman who tells Ray it is not possible to] resolve all the personal problems of those he has contacted and Ray must show them the wisdom and practicality of working in place as a means of eliminating the regime. Ray willing to settle for defection as he believes this had an impact on the regime. Report states that Ray extremely active, moves fast and purposefully, and has given impression of frank cooperation. Has volunteered to assign a man to be station contact, but feels [(o)] RUMBLE 2 is too young but should be aware of whomever is designated.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ Betsy Palmer

Miscellaneous documents not in files
P age 4

11110864

*11. Information Cable to Director from JMWAVE
Date: 5 November 1963
Subject: Unification Activities by Manuel Ray Rivero, 23 Oct 1963
Source: A trained observer with access to wide variety of Cuban exiles. Source is known to most of his contacts as a channel to U.S. intelligence. Obtained information from Reinaldo Pico Ramon, officer in the Alianza de Trabajadores Cubanos (ATC, Alliance of Cuban Workers).

Pico was told by an unidentified informant, who is probably on the JURE National Executive, that Luis Manuel Rodriguez, a former rebel army lieutenant from Santioago de Cuba, and who was known as "Mama Dolores" while a member of Brigade 2506, is serving as a Ray agent at Fort Benning, Georgia. Individuals who are working with Rodriguez are SILAS CUERVO CASTILLO and LUIS CLEMENTE BARCENA SERRANO, both former members of Brigade 2506.

~~SECRET~~

180-10144-10068 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

CIA files on these persons were requested and reviewed by HSCA staff members.

their contact with the defector to the Agency. (Girard. ~~Davis~~ Author. 2 blocks.) One file reg. a former military person ~~who defected to the~~ contains a debriefing & report of a debriefing conducted by mil. intell. (Davis)

One ~~Of~~ of the remaining 4 indivs. was

14-6 [Copenhagen – ~~[illegible]~~ in Copenh file] no lock

~~Of the remaining 4 indivs. who [illegible] were directly debriefed~~

Rec. [illegible] in info. in several areas

Of the remaining 4 indivs. who ~~were~~ had a direct Ag. contact upon their ret. to the U.S., the

Webster:

The circumstances of the Agency's contact w/the 4 remaining indivs. were diff. in each case. [*] Another returning, H.C., ~~One of the defectors~~ was [unwittingly] interviewed [by a CIA officer in the Am. Emb. in [14-6 Copenhagen]] upon his departure from the S.U. en route to the U.S. While C's file indicates that the Agency considered it desirable that a full & controlled debriefing by the CIA & FBI be conducted & Angleton wrote to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in C's 201 file nor any DCD docs. which suggest further contact on the part of the CIA.

One of the individuals ~~was interviewed by the [illegible]~~ whose file reflects that he had actually been living in the USSR since 1933 & ~~was~~ returned to the U.S. in 1962, & ~~He was interviewed debriefed by the CIA a CIA officer [using DOD 24 cover] after he applied after~~

[He was debriefed by a CIA officer [using DOD 24 cover] after applying for employment in response to a newspaper advertisement. (Rev. of [illegible] file.)]

~~Overt debriefings were conducted of the other two defs. Rbt. E. Webster, the highly a plastics expert with ~~plastics~~ the Rand Dev. Corp. in 1959 whose defection ~~[illegible]~~ was highly publicized, was in~~

More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other 2 defs. Rbt. E. Webster, a plastics expert with the Rand Dev. Corp. whose defection to the S.U. in 1959 was highly publicized, ret. to the U.S. in 6/62. Shortly thereafter, ~~he was debriefed by~~ components w/in the Agency conducted a ~~[illegible]~~ debriefing of Webster in his home territory. Webster had been employed in the S.U. at the Leningrad Scientific Instit. of Polymeric Plastics

4 BR

(This fact was corroborated by) ~~another~~ CIA employee, Donald Deneselya, who ~~worked~~ worked in the FDD in the Sov. branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962 told the HSCA that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence info. regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. In fact, Deneselya ~~believes~~ claims that, during the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report ~~of an interview by~~ from reps. ~~from~~ of the CIA's N.Y. field office, who interviewed a former Marine who had ~~both~~ worked at the Minsk Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. This person who Deneselya believes may have been Oswald had been living w/ his family in Minsk. Deneselya advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch which, in 1962, was a component of the OCR.

The HSCA ~~requested a~~ made a request to the ~~to the~~ ~~the CIA:~~ The HSCA requested that the CIA provide the Committee ~~with~~ both the above-described contact report & the vol. of materials concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. (10/-/78 letter) ~~The letter was~~ The HSCA's A review of the docs. in the volume on the M.R.P. revealed that no such ~~The CIA provided the volume of regarding the M.R.P., but no~~ contact report existed in that file (OCR). The file review did indicate that in 1975, Daniel Schorr had made a similar request ~~based on info. from the source~~ he had rec'd from Deneselya & was informed by the CIA that no such report existed.

Of the 29 persons requested, ~~one person did not have~~ the Ag. was not able to locate a file for one indiv. ~~The files~~ In the case of 6 other indivs., the file review did not indicate that they ever ret. to the U.S.

22

~~The HSCA reviewed~~ The HSCA ~~After~~ req. files on the 29 indivs. who fit the above-described criteria & ~~were~~ the CIA provided files on ~~the 28 of the 29~~ 28 indivs. on whom they maintained records. ~~All~~ Both 201 files were reviewed as well as any existing DCD files ~~for~~ regarding these indivs. In the case of 6 indivs., there is no indication in their files that they ever returned to the U.S. Even so, there were occasional reports from sources who observed or spoke w/ these persons while in the S.U., but there is no indication of direct contact w/ them by the CIA.

18 4 In regard to the other 22 (4) defectors, the file review indicates that there is no record of direct CIA contact w/ 18 of them. Again, some of these files contain a report from a source who reported

It becomes clear from the review of files on these defs. that debriefing of defectors was in fact somewhat of a random occurrence. However, ~~the~~ in the instances ~~[illegible]~~ ~~instances~~ in which the Ag. did choose to debrief returning Am. defs., the Ag. appeared ~~[illegible]~~ ~~they seemed~~ to be interested in ~~usually~~ topics of general interest rega. ~~life in~~ certain areas of the Sov. U. In this regard,

DO —— Where are you?

the persons who were debriefed were similar to O in that they def. & ret. w/in the same general time period & each spent their time in the S.U. in areas of interest to the CIA.

More ext. deb. were conducted of the other 2 defs. R.E.W., a plastics expert w/R.A.C. whose def. to the S.U. in 1959 was highly publicized, ret. to the U.S. in 6/62. W had been employed in the S.U. at the Gen. Scient. Instit. of Polytech. Plastics. Shortly after his return, W was debriefed in his home territory by ~~[illegible]~~ reps. from DO/C, SR/6 & the A.F. It was decided that a more ext. debriefing was in order & W was subseq. brought to the Washington where he was deb. for a period of 2 wks. The deb. reports incl. a chron. of W's life & the CIA's assess. of him as well as a lge. body of info. regarding life in the S.U., W's work there & biog. info. on persons he had met during his residence there.

Def. 7/59
Ret. 6/28/63

Likewise, Libero Ricciardelli who had lived in the S.U. for nearly 4 yrs., was ~~[illegible]~~ contacted for purposes of debriefing shortly after his ret. to the U.S. in late June of 1963. His initial debriefing included such subjs. as his motivation to defect to USSR as well as activities engaged in during Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev & general aspects of life such as residence controls & costs. ~~While~~ the Ag. felt that they would be interested in eliciting more info. ~~re. life~~ on such topics in the S.U. as cost of living, med. care, consumer goods, ~~[illegible]~~ highways, transport., & restrictions w/in Kiev,

While the CIA felt it was unfeasible to debrief R more thoroughly due to his current status of trying to regain U.S. cit.,

~~the Ag. felt~~

1622-1125-B : Indexcards

#1623-1125-C Dated 30 Oct. 1975

Discusses letters intercepted

States that copies of intercepted letters were passed to FBI in course of normal exchange of intelligence. Substance doesn't relate to JFK assass.

"The records examined to date do not disclose whether or not this information was made avail. to the W.C. by the FBI or CIA.

Vol. 5 608-256-C

Copies of letters written by LHO to mother were forwarded to CIA by letter dated 17 March 1964 from J. Lee Rankin, G.C. of W.C. to R. Helms, DDP

Intro - questions
Gen. Backgd.
ATH. file on LHO - items
Index cards
HSCA question
Agency response

#1

I. CIA statements to W. C. (testimony ~~#988-927-BD~~, affidavit ~~#1038-405-B~~,
CIA info. provided W.C. #1063-964-B, Insert for CI Staff History #1073-964-L)

II. CIA statements to Fensterwald (~~#961~~, ~~962~~, ~~969~~, ~~970~~)
CIA statements to HSCA; DCD;

III. T.B.C. memo & interviews (#435-173-A)
[#3369]

IV. Defectors
M.K. (#1004-400)
S.O.P. - DCD

V. G.R.B. request

VI. ~~S.O.P. - DCD~~ #609 #610 See #1188-1000 p. 3

#618-673
609-786
610-263
1188-1000
1004-400
1187-
Hock - Rock. Comm.

SECRET 8/1/78
Palmer ①

11111450

Orlando Bosch Avila - DDO - Six Volumes
#201-299-292

* Volume I - Third agency material in eight sealed envelopes, all FBI

#7 ① Undated report.

Dr Orlando Bosch Avila CAM 01 [DITTO/23]

DPOB: 18 Aug 1926, Santa Clara, Cuba

Bosch was one of many critical of CIA policy & personnel following Bay of Pigs. However, in March 1962, WAVE requested a POA on Bosch, advising he was "cooperative and secure." To be utilized as General Coordinator of Evelio Duque group. POA granted on 6 March 1962. Given polygraph in May 1962 & came out clean. His clearance was cancelled in Nov. 1962.

Bosch aligns himself with individuals and organizations that are currently involved in operations against Cuba, usually serving as General Coordinator & takes responsibility for securing financial backing.

~~C003437~~

SECRET

② 7 June 1965

Biographical Data Report - Orlando Bosch Avila

Personal Data: Bosch is shrewd, cunning, devious & deceptive. He is primarily an adventurer & probably an anarchist rather than a true revolutionary. He is probably paranoid psycopath. He is a good doctor but neglects his job to devote time to raiding activities He is a notorious liar & has several times

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

1BR

Palmer ②
8/1/78
Bosch

SECRET

announced raids over Cuba which never occurred.

# 11111451

Volume II - No. notes 1965 - 68.
Third agency deletions - nine sealed envelopes - all FBI.

Volume III 1968 - 1974
3rd agency deletions - 16 sealed envelopes - all FBI
No. notes.

Volume IV 1975 - 1978
① Third agency deletions - ~~8~~ 23 sealed envelopes.
ⓐ DOD document - Intelligence Report dtd 9 June 1976
# 2 231 0221 76
470th MI group, Ft Amador - Canal Zone
Subject: Cuban Exile Terrorist Group.

Ⓑ SS Cable 21 Feb. 1976. - San Jose 105
Subject: Re Arrest of Juan Bosch at this Location

ⓒ: ~~4~~ 5 envelopes SS documents re: visit of Henry Kissinger to Caracas, circa Feb. 1976.

Ⓓ ~~Remainder - FBI~~ USAF Cable from JCS 10 Jan 1978
File # MSGNO 46 (MIIR) Subject: Venezuelan Aircraft Security Threat Expands.

~~0003436~~
SECRET

Palmer
③
8/1/78
Bosch

SECRET

11111452

⑤ State Cables - Nov, Dec. 1977 - Visas for wife & child of Orlando Bosch

⑧ State Cables - bombings - July 12-13, 1976

⑨ Remainder sealed envelopes - FBI documents.

② 12 Feb. 1976 Cable IN 824723
CITE: 16-17 [Caracas] 29063 16-23 16-29
To: Priority director, [Santiago] [Buenos Aires]. LA/Miami

01 [WKSCARLET-3] (former unilateral asset) advises he is investigating bombing Cuban ambassador, Caracas & is travelling during week of 15 Feb to Santiago, Buenos Aires & Miami.

Cuban Ambassador Norberto Hernandez Curbelo reported receiving bomb in large manila envelope bearing return address of Dr. Gustavo A. Vollmer. 01 [WK.Scarlet/1], former 01 [WKScarlet] chief, is security consultant to Vollmer & has retained 01 [WKScarlet/3] who is operating a commercial investigations service, to determine who used Vollmer's name. 01 [WKScarlet/3] maintains contacts with Orlando Bosch.

18 Feb. 1976 Cable IN 830506 CITE: 16-17 [Caracas] 29129

③ Frank Castro had knowledge of attempt to assassinate ~~Henry Kissinger~~ nephew of Allende & told 01 [WKScarlet/3]. In order to use information, Agency afraid they will compromise 01 [WKScarlet/3]

~~C503439~~
SECRET

1158

SECRET

11111453

④
Palmer 8/11/78
Orlando Bosch

④ Volume V August 1976 - October 1976
Third Agency Deletions - 10 sealed envelopes, State & FBI
No. notes.

Volume VI. -
Third Agency deletions - 6 sealed envelopes.
4 FBI - 2 State - Oct. 1976 -

① 12 Nov. 1976
Cable 943114 16-23 16-15 16-17
To: Priority [Santiago] Info [San Jose], [Caracas]
p. 3 #2 Morales was source of numerous secret service reports during Kissinger visit to Caracas in Feb. 1976 on reported attempt by Bosch to kill Kissinger. One SS report indicated Morales had provided Caracas legal attache with reliable info in the past.

② Dispatch 15 Nov. 1976
to Chief: LA. Division 16-12
From: Chief of Station, [Quito]
03 [NOC Byron W. Gutradt] met [WK Scarlet/3] 01
in 1964 when both were enrolled in OCS at Ft. Benning, Ga.

~~0503440~~

SECRET

6/BR

⑤
Palmer
8/1/78

SECRET

Bosch

Loose Documents.
One sealed envelope - F.B.I. documents deleted

Bosch, Orlando - C - 97563
One sealed envelope - Office of Security Information

11111454

~~G-003442~~

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer 8/7/78

①

Orlando Bosch Avila - Office of Security 257 921
1 Volume - Dates 1962-78
Deletions - 1 sealed envelope

11111455

① 5 March 1977 Cable IN 207098
To: Director CITE [Caracas] 16-17
Response to a 4 March news article in "El Mundo", Caracas - named CIA agents as Orlando Bosch, Ricardo Morales Navarette, Orlando Garcia Vasquez, Luis Posada Carriles - etc. Cable states "fortunately, none are currently active assets."

② 8 April 1977, Memo; Chief: Security Analysis Group. From: John F Sullivan Jr./Michael W. Renick
Subject: El Mundo Exposure
Office of Security indices check on names (some of which outlined in #1 above).
"In those cases above where a security file exists, there is no evidence that any of the individuals are current, active assets."

~~0003594~~

SECRET

1/BR

Box 24
Folder 50

SECRET

Palmer
8/2/78

①

Victor Paneque.
1 pkg. loose documents
1 pkg. DCD documents
1 Volume CI/OA documents
1 Volume - DDO documents

DDO Volume

① 24 October 1960.

11111456

Personality File Request
Victor Paneque - 201-286 382
Reportedly an agent of DIER

② Undated document giving Paneque's background political activity. All 1960 information.

1. On arrival in U.S., stayed with Orlando Bosch, suspected Castro agent.
②. Associated with leader of MRR "Camilo Cienfuegos" Carlos Rodriguez Castro, suspected Castro plant in U.S.
③ Reportedly spent 2 hrs. with Raul Castro before defecting.
④ Major Sanjenis, former Chief G-2, says Paneque of GOC agent.
⑤ Organization Autentica reporting to State Dept that Paneque is a Castro plant.
⑥ 00-A 3168667 reports Paneque one of two DIER plants at Uni of Havana + students planning to assassinate him.
⑦ Cuban businessman says Paneque is G-2 plant.
⑧ CIA reported to FBI that Subject has been reported as G-2.

SECRET

0003442

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Palmer ②
8/2/28
SECRET Paneque

③ April 29, 1959 Classified Message to Director from Havana say Raul Castro has begun a major purge of Cuban Armed Forces. Among those to be eliminated are Victor Paneque, aka "Diego"

X

④ 18 Oct. 1960 11111457

Conversation with Major Victor M. Paneque (Commadante Diego, 6 October at 900).

When Paneque arrived in Miami, he got together with Alianza de Liberacion through Dr. Luis Conte Aguero. He could not get immediate help from this group, so resigned. Also said he had tried to get help from U.S. govt. but unsuccessful.

Paneque is convinced that the only thing needed to overthrow Castro is arms & supplies. Has a plane which he intends to fly into Cuba with cargo of arms

Author of memo recommeats that CIA offer assistance to Paneque independent of all other organizations as he seems to be capable of becoming an important factor in the future.

~~EJ03443~~

SECRET

⑤ Nov. 2, 1960 Cable to Director from Masl

Paneque & 8 men leaving for Cuba night of 1 Nov on 40-foot yacht, Trudy Lou. Craft purchased by Orlando Bosch.

* #6

Palmer ③
8/2/78

DIER - Departamento Investigativo
Del Ejercito Revolucionario

SECRET

Paneque

⑥ 14 Dec. 1960
Cable to Director from Havana. IN 16758
Paneque reportedly under arrest at Cabana prison & his wife at Women's prison, on charges of aiding Escambray fighters.

11111458

⑦ Jan 13, 1961
Cable to Bell from Guatemala City. IN 1688
Alexander Rourke gives information that Frank Fiorini & Orlando Bosch, of Miami, represent Paneque in Cuba. Fiorini & Bosh recruiting & equiping force for assault on Cuba 18 Jan. Receiving financial aid from Anti Communist International Association of NYC.

⑧ 14 March 1962
Dispatch to Chief, Task Force W from COS/JMWAVE
Paneque organized a Hunger Strike by Cuban Exiles & held a rally 13 March 1962. Purpose was to show JFK that Cubans are willing to die in exile if their right to defend Cuba from Communism is negated. Motto of strike is "Hunger or War".

~~5503444~~

⑦ PRQ part 1 - July 4, 1964

SECRET

Aliases: Diego   Rene Ricardo (Clandestine Activity)

④
Palmer ~~Pa~~ 8/2/78
Paneque

SECRET

⑨ Request for Information & Review 5 Nov. 1964
POA granted 13 Nov 1964

11111459

⑧ 8 Oct 1964
Report of Covert Assessment
from Assessment & Evaluation Staff, Medical Staff.

Paneque one of 6 members of the "radop trainees (radio operators') given psychological assessments in Aug 1964. Paneque is oldest, (DOB 18 Sept 1920) ~~and~~ least intelligent, most experienced of the group. Likely he would try to dominate the group because of his past experience. His shortcomings seem to outweigh his assets.

⑩ 17 Nov 1964 Classified Message 162258Z
Paneque assigned AM[RU$\overset{01}{\text{G}}$-5].

⑪ 19 Dec. 1964
Memorandum of Oral Commitment

Paneque engaged under oral contract on 1 Dec 1964. To receive $275.28 per month following completion of satisfactory service. Will receive raise of $50 per month on completion of training & $50 raise upon infiltration. (Possibly an infiltration of Oriente Province) see item 13

C~~003445~~

1/M

⑤

Palmer
8/2/78

Paneque

SECRET

(12) 1 Oct 1965

Dispatch from COS/JMWAVE

Paneque terminated as of 31 Oct 1965. Agent Service record recommends him for re-use, on basis of his knowledge of internal contacts in Northern Oriente.

11111460

(13) 15 Sept 1977. D $\overset{16-22}{\text{[Managua]}}$ #095686

Paneque participated in Cuban exile activities in New York area in 1962 and later registered in ISR & Dept of Army in August 1962 (Dropped without prejudice 18 Nov 1963.) In 1964 Paneque was member of MDC
X infiltration team. Recruited by Miami station as radio operator/infiltree and favorably swirled on 5 August 1964. POA granted 13 Nov 1964. Paid #275 monthly beginning 1 Sep 1964. Trained by Cuban agents in Miami but never used operationally. Amicably terminated 1 Oct 1965 & recommended for re-use. Reported in 1969 as conducting clandestine trips inside Cuba on behalf of Junta Militar de Cuba.

#

Third agency deletions nine sealed envelopes.
8 - FBI 1 Dept of Army.

#

~~000344~~6

SECRET

⑥
Palmer 8/2/78

SECRET

Volume CI/OA — No notes necessary.
Victor Manuel Paneque Batista — C-286382

Deletions — 1 sealed envelope.
FBI report 3 Nov 1960 and Office of Security polygraph Interview.

//

11111461

Victor Paneque
DCD Documents — no notes.
Loose Documents — Victor Paneque.
17 Feb. 1972.
Subject: Identification of PCC, DSE, UJC Members, etc
page 3 — Item 9: Information acquired through interrogation of CC-4993, Jacinto BAEZ Galiano, a Cuban refugee & former resident Regla, Havana Province, who left Cuba 22 Nov 1971. Subsource Worked for Superphoshates Enteprise from 1950-1968.
Victor Manuel Paneque employed until 1968 as laboratory Chief of Superphosphates, is a member of the PCC, militia, & Defense Committee (CDR). He is an agronomist & former director of School of Agronomy, Havana University. He is described as Caucasian, 5'2" tall, weight about 165 lbs, born 1927-32, black hair, dark-colored eyes.

~~0003447~~

(note)
Victor Paneque Batista is 5'6", brown hair, blue eyes, born 1920.

SECRET

①

Box 30
Fldr 62
Doc. 1

NOTES

03
[Dan Neuscuin] interview
8/29 / 10:00

letter ✓

Charles R. Roistade (ps.)

present position: CI staff
C/ops cord branch
east Asia & Africa

LOU CONIEN.
WERBELL

1963 - Viet Nam - dep. ch.
Sp. ops. branch.

to HQ - [N. VN / CAMBODIA]/CI desk.
~~Sta~~

27, 03
[DCOS [Burma]] 68-70

13-5
70 [Thailand] DCO/ext. ops.
71-72 SAssist for narcotics
& dangerous drugs.

then to "NARCOG" HQ liaison
on Drugs 7/~~8~~3-7/75

1975 → CI staff/SOB → sensitive
CI matters.

These
are
Dan Neiscuir's
initals

expertise in East Asian
& CI.

---

inhouse investigations:

never did any of them.

did work on an "Oswald
Task Force"

2 or 3 FOIA suits late 9 or 10/75.
info had to be processed
& C/CIS decided to have
ops off do review.

03

[DN] one as well as a
primary contact w
2 investigators from SSC.
which was going on at
same time
"much the same as Russ
Holmes is doing right now"

no research & analysis
that he was aware of.

CI/SIG - heard of →
apparently component

under Angleton before
(DN)^{03} joined staff.
never clear what did
"tightly held compartmented
component"
may have dealt ⓦ codes
+ ciphers - there is still
a "residual branch" in
CIS that deals ⓦ that

CI/SIG was part of R+A.

"D" was (is) component
that deals ⓦ NSA - all
matters
Station "close support
team" monitored commo
per NSA requirements

D had responsibility on
Agency's part to respond
to NSA requirments

seperate from CIS.

TSD → support for tech.
ops also seperate.

was not "Special Intelligence"
was "Investigations."

if SIG worked codes
would have had high
level liaison w D.
+ SIG may have been
tasked by D for things
that required CI knowledge

pure supposition.

Ray Rocca or Russ Holmes
would know best about
SIG.

SIG would have opened
201 cause LHO defector.

only 2 peices of paper
Agency originated prior
to ass'n.

a year to open? doesn't
know if unusual - he
would have opened in
59 on first hearing. Could
have been a soft file

MEXI :-p''5

but never heard of
consolidation of files
when Rocky commission
looked into it.

Micktenbaugh "hits a note."
but cannot recall.

Didn't know Annie wrote
History.

only photo he recalls
in file is MMM.
ID's CE237.
doesn't recall series

Bustos doesn't ring a bell

Robert Wall
Bill Perkins
[Robert Litwiak] (ph)
03
OS. TASK FORCE.

about 15 or 20 worked on
FOIA sanitazation
LEN BREA (ph)
Tony ~~Getia~~ (ph) SILEO
[KEN JASPER] 03
PAUL HARTMAN - ROCCA'S "honcho" on
INVESTIGATION

2/1N

material witheld from
SSC – about 10 document
but were shown to them
on specific request.
irrelevant sources +
methods – identity of
agents.

MET ROCCA TWICE – CAN'T
RECALL WHEN. – SAT IN ON
A SSC SESSIONS @ him.

never have been able to
locate delimitation agree.
has never heard of it
but "from his lips."

Rocca's memos: interesting
theory in sense Castro
was trying to give us
a signal. But wondered
why Rocca waited ten
years to advance it.

Swenson: no Bells.

Piccolo – okay memory –
sometimes fuzzy.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 2/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10144-10288

RECORD SERIES : CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION

AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 35-04-01

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM : BLAKEY, G. ROBERT
TO : CARPENTIER, PATRICK

TITLE :

DATE : 03/08/1978
PAGES : 7

SUBJECTS :
CIA, FILES

DOCUMENT TYPE : LETTER
CLASSIFICATION : Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 08/23/1995

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Box 26

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

OLC 78-1057

LOUIS STOKES, OHIO, CHAIRM[illegible]

RICHARDSON PREYER, N.C.
WALTER E. FAUNTROY, D.C.
YVONNE BRATHWAITE BURKE, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.
HAROLD E. FORD, TENN.
FLOYD J. FITHIAN, IND.
ROBERT W. EDGAR, PA.

SAMUEL [illegible]VINE, OHIO
STEWART B. MCKINNEY, CONN.
CHARLES THONE, NEBR.
HAROLD S. SAWYER, MICH.

(202) 225-4624

Select Committee on Assassinations
U.S. House of Representatives
3331 HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING, ANNEX 2
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 8, 1978

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

Mr. Patrick Carpentier
Office of the Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

Dear Mr. Carpentier:

In connection with its investigation into the circumstances surrounding the assassination of President Kennedy, the Select Committee on Assassinations requests that it be granted access to all files and file references generated by or in the possession of the Central Intelligence Agency concerning or referring to the following individuals:

1) JOHN P. ADAMCIK - Approximate date of birth: 1938. 4621 Samuell Boulevard, Apt. 166, Dallas, Texas (1964) Last known employment: Dallas Police Department as a detective.

2) DANNY GARCIA ARCE - Date of birth: 9/14/45. 1964 address: 1502 Bennett Avenue, Dallas, Texas, phone TA1-3289. Last known employment: Order Filler at Texas School Book Depository.

3) MARY BLEDSOE - 1963 address: 621 North Marsalis Street, Dallas, Texas, phone WH2-1985.

4) WELCOME EUGENE BARNETT - Date of birth: 7/12/32 in New Hope, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department (joined approximately 1955).

5) ELMER L. BOYD - Born in Blooming Grove, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department (joined May 1952), Homicide. Earlier employment with Navy, and Gas Company.

6) HOWARD LESLIE BRENNAN - Approximate date of birth: 1919. 1964 address: 6814 Woodward, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Steamfitter at Wallace & Beard Construction Company. Married, two children in 1964.

7) E. D. BREWER - Approximate date of birth: 1932. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department - Motorcycle (joined approximately 1953). In U. S. Coast Guard three years.

8) V. J. BRIAN - Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Criminal Intelligence (joined in 1955).

9) MRS. EARLE CABELL - 1964 address: 5338 Drane, Dallas, Texas. Wife of former Dallas Mayor.

10) WARREN CASTER - Date of birth: 7/15/18. 1964 address: 3338 Merrell Road, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Southwestern District Manager.

11) MALCOLM V. COUCH - Approximate date of birth: 1939. 1964 address: 4215 Live Oak, Dallas, Texas. Master of Theology, Dallas Seminary, 1964. Worked as part-time news cameraman with WFAA-TV and Keitz and Herndon Film Studios.

12) JAMES N. CRAWFORD - Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Clerk (joined Dallas County about 1953).

13) J. C. DAY - Approximate date of birth: 1914. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Lt., Crime Scene Search (Joined approximately 1940).

14) C. N. DHORITY - Date of birth: 8/23. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Detective (joined August 1946).

15) JACK EDWIN DOUGHERTY - Date of birth: 8/12/23 in Dallas, Texas. 1964 address: 1827 South Marsalis Street, Dallas, Texas, phone WH6-7170.

16) CAPTAIN GEORGE DOUGHTY - Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Crime Lab.

17) ROBERT E. (Bob) EDWARDS - aka: Bobby Gene Edwards. Date of birth: 2/4/43, Dallas. 1963 address: 821 South Nursery, Irving, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas County Auditor's Office. Social Security #: 467-64-6793. Navy #: 5848308. FBI #: 484 594H

18) AMOS LEE EUINS - Date of birth: 1/10/48. 1963 address: 411 (?) Avenue F, Dallas, Texas, phone WH3-9701. Social Security #: 463-78-4003. Selective Service #: 41-31-48-779.

19) JACK W. FAULKNER - Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff.

20) RONALD B. FISCHER - Approximate date of birth: 1939. 1963 address: 4007 Flamingo Drive, Mesquite, Texas, phone BR9-0950.

21) BUELL WESLEY FRAZIER - Date of birth: 6/4/44. 1964 address: 2439 West Fifth Street, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Order Filler at Texas School Book Depository - began in 1963. Lived in Huntsville, Texas with sister, Linnie Mae Randle; mother, Essie Mae Williams.

22) J. W. FRITZ - Born in Dublin, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Homicide Head (joined in January 1921).

23) CHARLES DOUGLAS GIVENS - Date of birth: 5/16/25. 1964 address: 4208 First Avenue, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Order Filler/Wrapper at Texas School Book Depository. FBI #: 584 036 A.

24) CLYDE A. HAYGOOD - Approximate date of birth: 1932. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/ Motorcycle.

25) JOHNNY B. HICKS - Date of birth: 9/29/18. 1964 address: 4318 Matilda, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Iden. Div. (joined approximately 1941).

26) GERALD LYNN HILL - Approximate date of birth: 1930. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Sgt. (joined in March 1955) Earlier employment with Dallas Times Herald.

27) HARRY D. HOLMES - Approximate date of birth: 1907. 1964 address: 1711 McManus, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: U. S. Postal Inspector.

28) JAMES EARL JARMAN - Born in Dallas, Texas. 1964 address: 4930 Echo, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Texas School Book Depository - since 1961. Earlier employed at Parkland Hospital and Baker's Hotel. FBI #239 661 F.

29) MARVIN JOHNSON - Approximate date of birth: 1921. 1964 address: Route 3, Box 279, Terrell, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department (joined in 1953).

30) FRANKIE KAISER - Born in Omaha, Nebraska. Last known address: 5230 West Ledbetter Street, Redbird Mobile Trailer Park, Duncanville, Texas. Loaned clipboard to Oswald which was later found discarded on the sixth floor.

31) BILLY NOLAN LOVELADY - Date of birth: 2/19/37 in Myrtle Springs. 1964 address: 7722 Hume Drive, Dallas Texas. Last known employment: Stock Clerk at Texas School Book Depository. Earlier employed as truck driver. FBI #: 742 048 D.

32) A. D. McCURLEY - Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff.

33) CECIL J. McWATTERS - 1963 address: 2523 Blyth, Dallas, Texas.

34) JOE R. MOLINE - Date of birth: 6/18/24. 1964 address: 4306 Brown Street, Dallas, Texas. Employed in 1964 as bookkeeper at Neuhoff Employees' Credit Union.

35) LESLIE DELL MONTGOMERY - Approximate date of birth: 1934. 1964 address: 9043 Anaconda, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Detective/Homicide (joined about 1954).

36) LUKE MOONEY - Approximate date of birth: 1923, in Hopkins County, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff's Office (joined in February 1958). Earlier employment on farm and in service.

37) HENRY M. MOORE - approximate date of birth: 1925. Married with family in 1964. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Detective (joined in January 1949). Earlier employment on farm and in Army.

38) HAROLD DEAN NORMAN - Date of birth: 7/6/38, in Clarksville, Texas. 1964 address: 4858 Beulah Street, Dallas, Texas. Employed at Foxboro Company as porter in 1964. Social Security #: 465-48-5688.

39) J. L. OXFORD - Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff.

40) EDDIE PIPER - Date of birth: 1/23/08 in Travis County. 1964 address: 1507 McCoy Street, Dallas, Texas, phone TA1-2190. Last known employment: Janitor at Texas School Book Depository.

41) WALTER EUGENE POTTS - Date of birth: 4/28/22 in Sherman, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Detective (joined in October 1947).

42) LINNIE MAE RANDLE - Approximate date of birth: 1933. November 22, 1963 address: 2439 West Fifth Street, Irving, Texas. 1964 address: 2438 Westfield, Irving, Texas.

43) MRS. ROBERT A. REID - 1964 address: 1914 Elmwood Boulevard, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Clerical supervisor at Texas State Book Depository.

44) EARLENE ROBERTS - Deceased. November 22, 1963 address: 1026 North Beckley Street, Dallas, Texas. April 8, 1963 address: 5000 Tremont, Dallas, Texas.

45) JAMES ELBERT ROMACK - Approximate date of birth: 1925. 1964 address: 10825 Benbrook Drive, Dallas, Texas. In 1964 worked for Coordinating Transportation Co. Social Security #: 463-20-7539. FBI #: 14 5 851 N 10.

46) GUY F. ROSE - 1964 address: 714 Hall Road, Seagoville, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Detective/Homicide (joined approximately 1954).

47) ARNOLD ROWLAND - Date of birth: 4/29/45. 1963 address: 3026 Hammerly Street, Dallas, Texas, phone FE7-1861. Married to Barbara Rowland; attended Adamson High School. FBI #: 921 481 F.

48) MITCHELL J. SCIBOR - 1964 address: 2942 North Sayre Avenue, Chicago, Illinois. Last known employment: General Manager, Klein's Sporting Goods.

49) WILLIAM H. SHELLEY - Date of birth: 7/19/25. 1964 address: 126 South Tatum Street, Dallas, Texas. Social Security #: 302-16-6801. FBI #: 852 354 6.

50) RICHARD M. SIMS - Born in Dallas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Detective (joined in August 1948).

51) L. C. SMITH - Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff.

52) RICHARD S. STOVALL - Date of birth: 1928. 1964 address: 3211 Grayson Drive, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Detective/Homicide.

53) ROBERT LEE STUDEBAKER - Born in Niles, Michigan. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department/Crime Scene Search (joined February 1954).

54) ALLAN SWEATT - Chief Criminal Deputy/Dallas County Sheriff's office.

55) ROY SANSOM TRULY - Approximate date of birth: 1908, in Hubbard, Texas. 1964 address: 4932 Jade Drive, Dallas, Texas.

56) F. M. TURNER - Approximate date of birth: 1929 in Murphy, Texas. Lived in Garland, Texas with family in 1964. Last known employment: Dallas Police Department Detective

57) WILLIAM J. WALDMAN - Date of birth 11/16/12. 1964 address: 335 Central Avenue, Wilmette, Illinois. Last known employment: Vice President, Klein's Sporting Goods, Inc.

58) EDDIE RAYMOND ("Buddy") WALTHERS - Date of birth: 7/17/28. 1964 address: 2527 Boyd Street, Dallas, Texas. Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff.

59) RALPH WALTERS - Last known employment: Dallas County Deputy Sheriff.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 2/23/201

Agency Information

AGENCY :	HSCA
RECORD NUMBER :	180-10144-10402
RECORD SERIES :	CIA SEGREGATED COLLECTION
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	48-14-13

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :	HSCA
FROM :	CIA
TO :	[Restricted]
TITLE :	
DATE :	03/03/1978
PAGES :	5
SUBJECTS :	CIA, FILES
DOCUMENT TYPE :	NOTES
CLASSIFICATION :	Unclassified
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	08/23/1995
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	Box 26

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

NOTE: Posada claims to have been the chief instructor for JURE camps for three months in an unspecified year prior to 1965.

Additional info:

1. AKA: Luis Clemente Carriles
   Bambi Posada Carriles
   Bambi Carriles
   Julian Posada Carriles
   Julian Carriles

2. He has listed as references:
   Carlos Porro, 395 E. Tallmadge, Akron
   Antonio Garcia, 3604 S.W. 26th Terrace, Miami
   Segundo Ortes, 685 Carnegie Ave., Akron
   Dick Patterson, FBI, Akron.

3. SS # 265-72-1345

4. U.S. Army # C-2312445

5. U.S. Army Dossier # 265-72-1345

6. Posada was in contact with one "Lefty" Rosenthal in Miami.

Box 54
F 4
9B

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Notes taken 24 March 1978

THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.

TRUE NAME?

crypt?

structure?
of
file?

Reported to HQ?

Howard Leap
31 March 1978

James E Woods
DOB 2 feb 28
SNN 502-16-6806

CIA
28 Apr. 52
Wash

Present
Record Mg. Officer
Jul 73

15-9
Italy-Rome
4 yrs.

RS

2, 15-1

2 yrs London

Vit

Jan 67

13-3

Japan

Apr. ~~62~~ 61

Oct 66

Wash

Feb. 59

Apr 61

2/Rs

13-16

3 13-3

Korea / Japan

54 56

13-1

Phil.

56

13-3

Johnson Station

1961

16.

Wash Heights

62 & 63

13-18

Fuchu Station

Air base

4.

Chief of Registry

duty Cable traffic

Commun

Knew SR

unit:

[redacted]

Rouise worked

in Photo

Lab:

Friends of
Jim & Elsie
(dancing group)
did not discuss
LHO-agent
issue

Never heard the
LHO-CIA
allegation in
[13-3
Japan] Read
about it 1976?

If he had
heard allegation
he would have
checked index
cards.

RS

6.

Jim has discussed this issue with wife, Louise, Louise doesnot remember any discussion with the Wilcots or any one else relative to the LHO-Agent issue.

F 4
9 C

① 3/24/78

HARdwAY + LEAP

Randall interview

1951 - joined FE division
junior desk
32
11/55 - [(~~Jakarta~~)] [(~~State cover~~)]
13-20
5/58. desk Chief Indonesia

12/59

mid/61 staff off. FI/FE
13-3
9/61 [(~~Tokyo~~)] until
6/65
13-3
in [(~~Tokyo~~)]

St. Off in Station
(branch chief - coordi-
of foreign clandes cross border denied AREA
intelligence of M.I.)
C.O. for some outside
work - one or 2 little ops.
senior supervisor
O.T.S.

per DCID/5

6/65 - Domes. Ops Div.

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE

180-10145-10233

4/RJ

2

9/70 or 71 - C.O. in DDO operating in U.S.

1/71, FR (foreign resources)

1975 FOIA officer for DDO

presently in Information Services Staff.

13-3

[[redacted]]

was not DCOS.

first [Pete Wheeler]

[[redacted]] in '64.

03

300 people there.

didn't really know all the people.

Station was spread out over at least [[redacted]] different locations (in) [different covers.]

24

R was under [air force] [cover.]

R. lived + worked on a military base (army or A.F.) 10

[[redacted]] base

in 1963 office moved to [~~HB~~ & [redacted]] (phonetic)

10

[redacted]

Also Joint MI Staff 32

1/

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

6/11/N

10

11/63 - living on [(~~Kanto Mura~~)] + reporting to [(~~FU CHU~~)] [illegible] 10
Station was divided by area (target) divisions.
Had China branch.
Finance people
DDS+T office
SR there but physical separate LOCATION + different [cover.
some SUPPORT + LOGISTICS.

dramatic decrease in # of CO's tween 61 - 65
24 [(300)] to [(100)] 24 no personal knowledge of reason.

24
1961 - [(100)] CO's (guess)
1965 - [(70)] " "
24

persons in station w knowledge all projects + agents + MI operations.
Randall would know all MI that they would inform of — they often didn't — CIA sometimes caught them
1961 - MI wasn't Reporting ANYTHING - R was brought there to correct

6|N

4

All CO's had access.

↑

TRUE NAME

they did maintain card file source registar for CIA + MI agents.

COS
DCOS would know all
Chief of Ops if they had one,

would true name to crypto file in some form as all stations do.

source index reported to HQ
YES. — in some form.

there had to be CIA HQ approval before utilizing agent.

military?

UNSURE → thinks would probably have to clear as high as CINCPAC - but ~ familiar ⓦ procedures?

there were written guidelines from HQ for exceptions

targets ~ NOT included in agent file → access of agents would be.

can't rember nature of individual (201) filing system on individuals.

card file would lead to the CO if you got a hit. CO would have a project file + part of it would be on personnel.

first time heard allega. LHO was an agent.

1975- FOIA learned of allegations of "assassinations books".

Wilcott:
remember him vaguly as finance clerk at [~~FU CHU~~] 10 quiet individual.

can't remember any Associations or any of Wilcotts duties.

Jack Randall was Chief of Finance.

Wilcott could have
been dispensing off +
if was would
probably have discussed
project/expenses ⓦ him.

11/22/63:
maid told him news.

first heard it was LHO
+ he was ex marine
stationed in Japan:

answer: 1975 FOIA duties.

never heard anything about
it in Tokyo.

Box 5
F4
#10

SURELL BRADY
3/7/78

KOSTIKOV, VALERIY VLADIMIROVICH
201-305052
3 VOLS.

THIS COPY IS NOT
FOR RELEASE.

11110762

VOL. 1 - 1959-1962

[some type of phone memo or [intercept]]
15 Oct 1962

"MO asks NEFYEDOV for either GARMASHEV or KOSTIKOV. Neither of them is in. NEF asks who is speaking. VSEMOCHKIN /ph./. MO says that NEF doesn't know him. "We" are passing through Mexico. NEF tells MO to hold the line. GARM takes phone. MO repeat his name - VSEMOCHKIN. MO says that KOSTIKOV promised to come over. KOSTIKOV takes phone. MO asks KOST if he will come and get "us". KOST doesn't have an auto available right now. KOST says that everything opens at 1000. MO says we will be waiting for KOST. / Apparently MO and others are going to Habana. / MO asks if KOST could get 500 dollars that "we" have spent on the trip. KOST will see about it."

DOB 3/17/33 MOSCOW

EMPLOYEE, SOV. EMB., MEXICO CITY, DOI JUNE 1961

~~SECRET~~

KOSTIKOV

VOL. II JAN. 63 - DEC. 64

11110763

DOCUMENT TRANSFER AND CROSSREFERENCE

15 SEP 64 FBI

"The files of this bureau do not contain any info to fully support statement in par five of your proposed draft to effect that subj believed to work for Dept Thirteen of First Chief Directorate of Comm for State Security of KGB/

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

4 DEC 1963

"... coverage of Kostikov and Alferiev thru 30 Nov indicate no particular deviation of their mode activities, no travel outside Mexi."

CLASSIFIED MESSAGE

23 NOV 1963

"At 1250 hrs on 22 Nov Cuban Consul Alfredo Mirabal Diaz asked to speak w/ suspect KGB Pavel Antonovich Yatskov. Latter apparently unavailable and

Kostikov came on line with foll conversation ensuing in familiar form "tu

Kos: Forgive me for arriving late.

Mir: Did you recover the suitcase?

Kos: yes

Mir: Then it was arriving or the other trip?

Kos: yes

Mir: I called to tell you the following, that regarding that matter that we had talked about, to see if we would spend Sunday in Chapultepec Park because my wife is preparing some food to eat there.

Kos: I'm sorry but I've just made plans for another trip and I'm leaving this very day. So please forgive me for not being able to go with you. (at this point Kostikov in error addressed Mirabal as Azcue, and Mir corrects him. ...)

Kos: Have you already talked w/ Nechiporenko?

Mir: I'd like to talk w/ Pavel Yatskov

Kos: Wait a minute, he'll come now,

Mir: If he's busy I'll call him later, but I'll be available for the next

~~SECRET~~

Half hour at Tel No. 11 28 47
Kos: OK

~~SECRET~~

504-02
4/13/78

~~SECRET~~

11110766

Dispatch

12/5/63

To: Chief, WH Division

From: Chief of Station, Mexico City

Subj.: [GPFLOOR] / Gilberto Lopez

OSWALD

subject checked into Hotel Roosevelt, Avenida Insurgentes 287, Mexico D.F. at 1600 hrs. on 11/25/63, Room 203

On 11/27/63 at 2100 hours departed for Havana Cubana Flight #465 as only passenger w/ crew of nine used U.S. passport # 310162 which contained a Cuban "Courtesy" visa

~~SECRET~~

Lopez
4/13/78

~~SECRET~~

Classified message 11110767
3/20/64

. . . .

Enrique Ruiz Montalvo, Agent of the Federal Judicial Police, informed base that one of his contacts reported in late February that Gilberto Lopes, U.S. citizen, was involved in President Kennedy's assassination

~~SECRET~~

Lopez
4/13/78

FBI memo 105-126109 11110763
3/31/64

Subject reported by sources to have attended gatherings of FPCC in private residence Tampa, Fla. 11/20/63 and was expecting to get phone call from Cuba in order to get word on his departure for Cuba.
Obtained Mex. tourist card at Honorary Consulate of Mexico in Tampa 11/20/63, entered Mex. by private auto 11/23/63 and departed Mexico City en route to Havana 11/27/63

U.S. State Dept. contains no record of subject applying for or being granted permission for travel to Cuba.

further desc:
prominent nose, high bridge

Tampa FPCC met 11/~~20~~17/63 at home of Mary Twist to show color slides taken in Cuba
Lopez identified by photo as having been present at the meeting

SECRET

11110763

Cristina Arnon, Clearwater, Fla, also
had FPCC meetings at her home
husband Manuel Arnon had been
chairman of Tampa FPCC
Aug. 1963 they moved to Tampa

Cristina Arnon announced at 12/8/63
meeting that Lopez had arrived
safely in Cuba

carried courtesy Cuban visa
at time of issuance of Mex. tourist card
Lopez had said his destination was
Mexico, valid for 15 days

Louis Fritz, Tampa Art and Music Co.;
205 East Tyler St., Tampa placed
ad for FPCC in Tampa Tribune on 5/15/6
Tampa FPCC did not exist at that time
" " Organized 1/9/61

SECRET

Lopez
4/13/78

~~SECRET~~

11110770

Gilberto Policarpo Lopez

FBI report 8/26/64
File No. 105-126109

registered for Selective Service at Key West, Fla. 7/29/60 and classified 4-F 2/23/62 due to language barrier

under medication for grand mal epilepsy

remained in U.S. about a year and then returned to Cuba because of homesickness

cousin Guillermo Rodriguez advised that subj. is pro-Castro but not involved in pro-Castro activity in U.S.

born 1/26/40 in Havana
U.S. passport #310162
lived with uncle Raul Rodriguez, 1124 Seminary Street
employed at Molina Bakery in Key West

desc. 5'7", 126 lbs, brown hair, green eyes, ruddy complexion

brothers:
Selito: member of Cuban militia

~~SECRET~~

SECRET 11110771

* Raimundo Policarpo Lopez
sent to Russia by Cuban government to study

left Key West in late 1963 to go to Tampa to attempt to return to Cuba
had returned to U.S. 1960 or 1961 because he was afraid of being drafted into the Cuban militia

married to Blanche Andrea Leon on 8/11/62 before a Notary Public in Key West
wife lived at Porter Place Housing Project in 1964 employed at Neisner's, Inc., Key West

wife stated subj did not have funds to travel to Mexico and Cuba; he said he had gotten financial help from an "unrecalled organization"; presumably in the Tampa area

subj. had apparently had no prior history of epilepsy before coming to the U.S.

treated by Dr. James D. Malgrat, 3207

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

Flagler Avenue, Key West
and Dr. Irving Perlmutter, neurosurgeon
in Miami

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 4/13/78

11110773

Classified message
Date: 11 Jul 60
To: Director
From: 15-20 [Frankfurt]

Bonn Info Dir 20-20 [Fran] Cite 20-20 [FRDB 7294]
[Redskin]
Ref 20-13 [Bonn 9956]

1. Subj ref well known to 15-20 [FOB] and previously contacted by [Oswald D.] [Probey] in [PBPrime]

2. Appreciate the offer but at present [Probey] on leave therefore defer to HQ for full debriefing

~~SECRET~~

5/mc

McMillan
4/13/78
DDO

~~SECRET~~

11110773

3 May 1977

Memo for: Chief, Info and Privacy Staff
From: Charles A. Briggs
DDO Info Review Officer
Subj: Priscilla M. P. Johnson McMillan
Ref: A. Request no. P-76-1861
B. OS Referral dated 1 Dec 1976

. . . .

5. The following documents should be referred to the appropriate Govt. agencies and components as indicated (Tab D).

Doc # 125

FBI Report on Howard Sochurek, 17 Sept 1964, which mentions subject. This reproduction is not very legible. We ask the FBI to deny the release of this Report as all the info contained therein is from the CIA and involves cover, etc. Denial based on Privacy Act exemptions (j)(1)(b,e) and (k)(1)

. . . .

7. This Directorate also has two DCD Intelligence Information Reports

SECRET

mcmillan
4/13/78

~~SECRET~~

11110:74

File [C-102798 (Old file C-70300)]
Inclusive Date: May 58 thru Oct. 76

Classified Message
7 Jul 60
From: [15-13 Bonn]

Dir [20-20 Fran FROB] Cite [20-13 Bonn] 9956
[RedsKin]

Priscilla Johnson, age 32, born Long Island, for past two years employee North American Newspaper Alliance Moscow, now unemployed because of Soviet refusal to renew visa, stopping Bad Godesberg 9 July for several days, possibly week, on way back to United States. Purpose of Bad Godesberg visit is to discuss her future with Ed Faltermayer, Bonn correspondent of Wall Street Journal, who old acquaintance. Marlene R. Cauchon, who acquainted w/ Faltermayer, will see Johnson. Although doubtless HQ will doubtless wish debrief her upon return to States, Cauchon could arrange for introduction of [25-20 FROB] officer for social and exchange of views meeting in Bad Godes

~~SECRET~~

4/MC

~~SECRET~~

11110775

berg if desired

~~SECRET~~

4/13/78
DDO
DCD Docs

~~SECRET~~

Report No. 00-B-3,239,496
Date Distr. 19 Oct. 62
Country: USSR
Date of Info: Apr. 62
Place + Date of Acq: Moscow 16 Sep 62

11110776

Subject: Reported attempt on Khrushchev life

....

On 16 September 1962, while visiting Moscow, I talked with a Soviet friend who is a free lance journalist.

....

~~SECRET~~

4/13/78
DDO

~~SECRET~~

Report No.: OO-B-3,239,848

Date Distr.: 24 Oct. 62

Country: USSR

11110777

Date of Info: Aug - Sept. 62

Date and Place of Acq.: Moscow/Leningrad/London Aug - Sep. 62

Subject: Changes in Cultural Affairs/ Party Officials Patronize Writers

~~SECRET~~

of which the Subject was the source. DCD will not release these reports via the mail. However, if Subject writes to see them, we will allow her to review them, in sanitized form, in the presence of an Agency officer.

[illegible]
4/13/78
DDO

SECRET

11110780

13 Dec 1977

Memo for: Chief, Info and Privacy Staff (U)
From: Robert E. Owen (U)
Info Review Officer
Subj: Priscilla M. P. Johnson McMillan (U)
Reference

(C) After considering the concern expressed by Mr. Zebell in Reference D, we agree that all references to possible [[clandestine use by 24 the USSR of this DCD] contact should be denied her. Accordingly, we have further sanitized the following documents to reflect this change: 63, 64, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 89, and 90. Resanitized copies of these documents have been inserted into their proper places in the letter and in the IPS holdback package.

SECRET

YM

McMillan
4/13/78
DDO

SECRET

Classified message 11110781

Date: 3 May 58

To: Director

From: [[15-4 Paris]]

[Redskin]

1. Subj reports has received four-month tourist Soviet visa and plans depart within next two weeks. Upon arrival Moscow will explore job ~~possibilities~~ opportunities. Plans take boat via Riga.

2. Subj. has agreed "Embassy" briefing prior departure. Expressed willingness do what could during time Moscow. Matter not pursued since subject not yet cleared.

3. Subj. has Sov friends whom will contact upon arrival, all from intellectual and artistic circles. Believe after careful briefing subj could act as spotter and might contact appropriate Sovs of interest Kubark. Also letter mailing.

SECRET

1/MC

47/78

~~SECRET~~

11110782

JOHNSON, PRISCILLA

201-102798

Review of 201 file on U.S. Citizen 3 Jan. 75

"can most accurately be categorized as... witting collaborator."

~~SECRET~~

BRADY SECRET 4/17/78
O.S.

11110783

REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF INVESTIGATIVE ACTION

TO: CI/ OPERATIONAL APPROVAL AND SUPPORT DIVISION
SEC. SUPPORT DIVISION/ OFFICE OF SEC.

. . . 25 MAY 1962

SPECIFIC AREA OF USE

[LONDON, U.K.]

FULL DETAILS OF USE

CLEARANCE TO EMPLOY SUBJ AS NEWS EDITOR - WRITER FOR MAGAZINES SUBSIDIZED BY [(?) DTLEAFAGE] (CHINA QUARTERLY + ENCOUNTER) AND SOVIET SURVEY.

. . .

~~SECRET~~

RIF

JMC

~~SECRET~~

4/17/78
O.S.

11110784

THIRD AGENCY DOCS:

① FBI REPORT DATED 24 JAN 56

② STATE CABLE FROM MOSCOW TO SEC OF STATE
DATED 22 JUNE 1960
CONTROL #16476
EMBTEL 3154

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

9/17/78
O.S.

INDICES:

11110785

/D NY TIMES 26 MAR 64 OSWALD, LEE H

/D MEMO DATED 15 FEB 1962 IN FILE OF WALLROD, GEORGE R.

* WINTERS, GEORGE P., JR. - 16 DEC. 1960

VAN HOLLEN, EDITH ELIZA MEMO TO CH/CI/SRS 2/25/57

JOHNSON, PRISCILLA *90079
HOTEL METROPOLE
MOSCOW USSR
*MEMO FOR CI STAFF 10/30/58 - P.6"

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4/27/78
O.S.

11110786

CHIEF SRS

25 APR 1967

. . .

M.D. STEVENS

SVETLANA STALINA

#505112

. . .

THE THEN PRISCILLA JOHNSON WAS OF INTEREST IN THE OSWALD CASE, IN THAT SHE MET LHO AND INTERVIEWED HIM IN MOSCOW SOON AFTER HIS ARRIVAL THERE AND RENUNCIATION OF HIS U.S. CITIZENSHIP. AFTER THE ASSASSINATION SHE WROTE A NUMBER OF ARTICLES ABOUT HIM.

. . . .

THE INDIVIDUAL WHO APPEARS TO BE MASTERMINDING STALINA'S VISIT TO THIS COUNTRY AND THE PUBLICATION OF HER BOOK IS GEORGE F. KENNAN, #31883 (O+C), FORMER US AMBASSADOR TO THE SOV. UNION. IT WAS HE WHO RECOMENDED PRISCILLA JOHNSON MCMILLAN TO HARPER AND ROW AS ONE OF FIVE RUSSIAN SPEAKING EXPERTS. MR. KENNAN SEEMS TO BE ACTING IN CONCERT WITH EDWARD S. GREENBAUM, WHO BECAME STALINA'S PERSONAL COUNSEL AFTER VISITING HER IN SWITZERLAND.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4/17/78
O.S.

11110787

[APPEARS TO BE LHO ADDRESS BOOK TRACES]

(8) PAGE 61 (PAGE 22 OF REPORT)

JOHNSON-MOSCOW

. . .

JOHNSON'S OS FILE HAS BEEN REVIEWED BY M. PAUL HARTMAN OF CI IN REGARD TO THE OSWALD MATTER.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4/19/78
O.S.

11110783

8 APRIL 1964

MEMO FOR THE RECORD

SUBJ: LHO

ADDRESS BOOK

FBI RPT 12/31/63

Reference is made to previous memoranda concerning items found in Subject's address book. The following additional info was noted from the files of OS:

[separate page]:

memo to files

The following is the result of Office of Security file reviews on names #36-40

#36 Danmar, Nansi (Nancy)

Otkryt s (open from) 11.2.71

... Biographic Register ... Nancy Dammann, an employee of the State Dept, was born 8 May 1919 in Illinois. She has been assigned to several posts in the Far East and is currently in Manila.

#37 Dzhonson, Vil'yam

William HE Johnson

#289 217

#401 625 BB

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110783

Born 10 Sept 1907 in Wash. D.C.

1934-39: teaching + research in Europe, primarily USSR

contributed articles to *Daily Worker*

1941-47: Johnson and his wife were connected with cited organizations

close associates reported as members of the Comm. Party or Commu. sympathizers

alleged that wife was CP member

1943-46: Johnson was Chief, Russian Political Section, US Military Intelligence

1947-1955: Carnegie Institute of Tech.

1955: University of Pittsburgh

1966-67: research in USSR, Poland, Czech, Yugo under Dept. State sponsorship

12 Nov. 1953: disapproved for any use by CIA

Mar 1967: was of interest to DCS but should be approached with extreme caution and not be exposed to classified material.

#39 Dzhons, U. Persona non grata USA
(Johns, U.)
no record

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110790

#40 DzheRob, R.   Persona non grata
(Jacob, R.)

Richard C. Jacob, #201 610 was born 24 May 1936 in Altoona, Pa.

Jacob was a CIA employee from 1960-69. He was p.n.g.'ed as a result of the Penkovsky case. Clearance was issued for him for use as a spotter-assessor in March 1972. Is now a stock broker in New York City.

~~SECRET~~

R/F

BRADY ~~SECRET~~ FILE REVIEW
4/17/78

ALINE MOSBY 1111079

OS

THIRD AGENCY MATERIALS

① FBI MEMO DTD 4 NOV 1964 RE SAMMY - ESPIONAGE - RUSSIA

② DEPT. STATE MEMO DTD 8 AUG 1967 RE CONVERSATION W/ ALINE MOSBY

③ FBI RPT DTD 4 AUG 1964 RE ISAAC HENRY SHAPIRO, LUDMILA SHAPIRO

④ EXTRACT FROM FOR. SVCG DISPATCH #392 FROM AEMB MOSCOW TO WASH DTD 12 DEC 1960, SUBJ: WESTERN CORRESP.'S IN MOSCOW

⑤ EXTRACT FROM BI DTD SEPT 1958
2, 7, 10, 23, 30 OCT. 1958

~~SECRET~~

4/17/78
OS

11110792

MOSBY, ALINE   MISS   T

N RECOGNIZED NAME AS CORRESPONDENT WHO WAS [COMPROMISED - NEWS ARTICLE, EVEN PHOTO - DONE BY DIRECTORATE II, DEPT 10, SECTION WORKING ON ALL CORRESPONDENTS;] N HEARD ONLY SHE WAS [COMPROMISED DID NOT COMPROMISE HERSELF - KGB RAN OP.]
... ACCREDITED FOR NIXON USSR TRIP JULY-AUG 59
. . .

STAMP "RECORDS OS/SRS MAY OR MAY NOT CONTAIN ADDITIONAL INFORMATION.
BRUCE L. SOLIE."

~~SECRET~~

OSBY
4/17/78
OS

11110793

MOSBY, ALINE

OR 72 E402610-C

/D MEM 03 APR 72 SHAPIRO, HENRY

/N MOSBY, ALINI OR E412610-C

/A MOSBY EILEEN /YF

/D FBI 04 AUG 68 P2 SHAPIRO, ISAAC H

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

MOSBY
4/17/78
O.S.

11110794

MEMO

TO: ACTING CHIEF, FIOB/ SEC. RESEARCH STAFF 7 MAR 6

FROM: E MENDOZA

SUBJ: ALINE MOSBY
#172 252 C
A-119

BACKGROUND

BORN 27 JULY 1922 AT MISSOULA MONTANA

B.A. DEGREE FROM UNIV. MONTANA 1943

EMPLOYED UPI IN 1943 IN SEATTLE OFFICE

TRANSFERRED TO HOLLYWOOD

ALLEGEDLY FIRED BY UPI FOR LEAKING INFO TO "CONFIDENTIAL" MAGAZINE

BECAME AFFILIATED WITH N.A.N.A. DURING 1950'S AND IN 1958 WAS KNOWN TO BE RESIDING IN BRUSSELS

SUBSEQUENTLY REHIRED BY UPI; MOSCOW 1958-1961 ON STAFF OF HENRY SHAPIRO !

SINCE 1961 WORKED IN BONN... RETURN TRIP TO MOSCOW DURING 1964

NOTATION: (HANDWRITTEN)

27 SEPT 73

CURRENT INTEREST CLOSED

BRUCE SOLI

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110795

AGENCY INTEREST

... NO CLEARANCE REQUESTS ... COVERT INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN 1958 AT REQUEST OF SR DIVISION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

4/17/78
O.S.

11110796

31 MAR 64

TO: CHIEF, RESEARCH BRANCH/SRS

FROM: M.D. STEVENS

SUBJ: LHO CASE
(ADDRESS BOOK)

PAGE 45 OF ADDRESS BOOK:

20575 SHARAPOV
MINSK
HOUSE NO. 4, APT. 24
UL. KALININA

NOTATION: OSWALD'S RET. ADD ON LTR TO JOHN TOWER, SEN. - TEXAS 1962
E. MENDOZA

NAME ALSO APPEARS AS "COMRADE SHARAPOV 20525 ON STRIP OF PAPER IN OSWALD'S WALLET WHEN INTERVIEWED BY MARTELLO

...SECURITY INDICES

(1) LT. COL. NIKOLAI GEORGIYEVICH SHARAPOV RIS CAREER OFFICER... OLDTIME CHEKIST W/ INTERROGATION EXP.

...1942 CHIEF OF SMALL COUNTER-ESP. SECTION IN SECOND DIR. OF NKVD

1942 HELD RANK OF CAPT. AND AS OF SOME TIME AFTER FEB 1954 WAS CHIEF OF A SECTION IN SEVENTH CHIEF DIRECTORATE MVD

...HAS A SON ABOUT OSWALD'S AGE

... CIA INFORMATION RPT 24 FEB 1955 TITLED "ORGANIZATION, FUNCTIONS AND PERSONALITIES OF THE INKGB" WAS LISTED AS THE "SUB-SECTION

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

CHIEF OF THE SURVEILLANCE SECTION (NN) OF THE INDEPENDENT SECTIONS OF THE NKGB (X DIRECTORATE?)

(2) E.Y. BELITSKIY IDENTIFIED P.I. SHARAPOV AS ONE TIME DIRECTOR OF ALL RUSSIAN TEXTILE SYNDICATE IN NEW YORK CITY; SYNDICATE WAS CONTROLLED BY SOVIET GOVT.

(3) LT. GEN. ANDREI RODIONOVICH SHARAPOV OF SOVIET MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE AT UNITED NATIONS WAS INVOLVED IN SOV. ESPIONAGE (INFO PROVIDED TO FBI IN 1948)
TOOK OVER DUTIES OF HEAD OF 1ST DEPT OF SOV. INTELLIGENCE IN US BEFORE JUNE 1948

~~SECRET~~

MOSBY
4/17/78
O.S.

~~SECRET~~

11110793

PHONE NUMBERS AS OF 8/15/60

72-66-81

72-43-04

(IN MOSBY NOTE TO ALEX PARKER)

MOSBY INDICES

DOLBERG, ALEX	
SMITH, FITZGERALD	6/22/59
WINTERS, GEORGE P. JR.	12/16/60
BELITSKY, BORIS	9/5/58
SHAPIRO, HENRY	8/4/64

INTERVIEW 22 NOV 62 W/ GEORGE WINTERS

. . .

SUBJECT (WINTERS) STATED THAT ANOTHER NEWSPAPER WOMAN IN MOSCOW WAS PRISCILLA JOHNSON.

. . .

NOTATION: JOHNSON ALSO CAME IN CONTACT WITH OSWALD IN MOSCOW.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110793

ATTACHMENT

SUBJ: BELITSKIY, BORIS YEFIMOVICH #175069-SSD
MOSBY, ALINE #172252

ACCORDING TO SEVERAL SOURCES BORIS Y. BELITSKIY IS AN ASSOCIATE OF ALINE MOSBY, WHOSE NAME APPEARED IN OSWALD'S ADDRESS BOOK.

....

... PRISCILLA JOHNSON, #71589-DL, SHE HAS BEEN MENTIONED IN NEWSPAPER ARTICLES AS ONE WHO RECALLED HAVING COME IN CONTACT WITH LEE HARVEY OSWALD IN MOSCOW, WHERE SHE INTERVIEWED (OR TALKED) WITH HIM. HER NAME, LIKE MOSBY WAS LISTED IN HIS ADDRESS BOOK UNDER HER LAST NAME ONLY.

~~SECRET~~

6/30/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ANGLETON 11110573

OFFICE OF SECURITY

MEMO 1 JULY 1975

FOR: INSPECTOR GEN'L

SUBJ: POSSIBLE QUESTIONABLE ACTIVITY

. . . .

2. BACKGROUND: ON 27 JUNE JIM ANGLETON TELEPHONED WALT ELDER. DAVE AARON OF THE SSC STAFF HAD UNCOVERED A STAFF AGENT IN NEW YORK WHO HAD BEEN AN AGENCY MAFIA PENETRATION WHICH ANGLETON SAID ~~HAD BEEN AN~~ WAS MADE ~~AGENT~~ ON THE AUTHORIZATION OF ATTY GEN'L ROBT F KENNEDY IN 1963. THE AGENT HAD TRIED TO CONTACT HIS CASE OFFICER BUT WAS UNSUCCESSFUL AND SO HAD INSTEAD CONTACTED ANGLETON.

. . . .

3. I DISCUSSED THE MATTER WITH JOHN GREANE IN SUMMARY, HE TOLD ME THAT THE AGENT, [MARIO BROD,] IN FEB. 1963 HAD COME INTO CONTACT WITH HERBERT ITKIN WHO HAD INFO ABOUT LINKS BETW THE CHICAGO TEAMSTER UNION AND THE MAFIA. [BROD] REP'D THIS TO HIS CASE OFFICER, AND IN A FEW DAYS THE DDP (HELMS) DISCUSSED THE MATTER W/ RFK BECAUSE OF KENNEDY'S REQUIREMENTS FOR INFO ON HOFFA AND W/ SAM PAPICH OF THE FBI

. . .

[BROD] WAS TO DEVELOP ITKIN AS AN FBI

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

SOURCE AND TURN HIM OVER TO THEM. CIA COULD NOT TURN OVER [BROD] TO THE FBI [BECAUSE HE WAS A LONG TIME AGENT (RECRUITED IN ITALY IN 1944 BY JAMES ANGLETON) WHO HAD OPERATIONAL INVOLVEMENTS FOR US IN HAITI AND OTHER PLACES.] IN MAR 1963 BROD TURNED ITKIN OVER TO THE FBI BUT UNFORTUNATELY KEPT A STRING ON HIM. ITKIN WAS A HANDLIN PROBLEM AND FROM TIME TO TIME WOULD RETURN TO BROD FOR ADVISE AND SO FORTH. ROCCA (CI) HAD PREPARED A FULL BOOK ON THE ITKIN/BROD CASE [BUT THEY ONLY ARE MENTIONED IN PSEUDO.].

... 9 JUNE 1975 TIME ARTICLE NAMED CERTAIN MAFIOSO IN CONNECTION W/ CIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

11110573

ANGLETON
OFFICE OF SECURITY

(TELETYPE NOV 1976
FM FBIS LONDON
TO RUDIC (AMEMB LONDON)

ANGLETON INTERVIEW / LONDON DOMESTIC T.V.

A: WELL, I CAN SAY THAT MAIL COVERAGE WAS VERY SUCCESSFUL ON OSWALD

. . . .

CORR: WHAT DO YOU MEAN SUCCESSFUL

A: WELL, SUCCESSFUL IN THE SENSE THAT WHEN HE APPEARED AS THE ASSASSIN OF THE PRES. AND WHEN I WENT BACK IN THE FIELDS THERE WAS CORRESPONDENCE FROM MOSCOW THAT GAVE AN INSIGHT THAT NO AGENTS COULD POSSIBLY HAVE GIVEN TO THE MAN

. . . .

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~SECRET~~

GEO. DE MOHRENSCHILDT 11110573

OFFICE OF SECURITY

MEMO 12/30/74 BY JERRY G. BROWN, SAG
LEFT DALLAS AFTER 19 APR 1963 FOR A TRIP TO N.Y., PHILA. AND WASH. DC, THEN TRAVELING TO HAITI

NO INFO IN TESTIMONY ON WHOM THEY HAD CONTACT W, OR WHAT THEY WERE DOING 19 APR - LATE MAY 1963

ON APR 29 1963 GALE ALLEN, DOD CASE OFFICER HAD REQUESTED AN EXPEDITE CHECK ON DE M - EXACT REASON UNKNOWN'

"IT IS INTERESTING THAT ALLEN'S INTEREST IN DE M COINCIDED W/ THE EARLIER PORTION OF THIS TRIP AND THE INFO WOULD SUGGEST THAT POSSIBLY ALLEN + DE M WERE POSSIBLY IN THE SAME ENVIRONMENT IN WASH DC CIRCA 26 APR 1963"

MEMO 8 APR 1964

[ED TORAZ.]. CIA CABLE IN 68452 [FROM] [MANAGUA] DATED 20 NOV 1963 RELATING TO OSWALD MATTER CONTAINS INFO REGARDING ONE E. TORRES (PROBABLY EDELBERTO TORRES OF MEXICO CITY

TORRES ALSO MENTIONED IN CABLE IN 68376

~~SECRET~~

SECRET

11110580

FROM [MEXICO CITY] DATED 26 NOV 1962

H. WARNER KLOEPFER

WAS OF INTEREST TO OO/C [DOMESTIC CONTACTS SERVICE] DURING SEPT 1963, APPARENTLY IN RELATION TO OSI [OFF. SCIENT. INTELL.] REQUIREMENTS

. . . . .

MEMO 1/7/44

MAJOR BISHOP 179 E. 79 ST NYC

GIVEN AS REFERENCE BY GEO DE M

~~SECRET~~

6/30/78

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

EPSTEIN

1111058

OFFICE OF SECURITY

MEMO 26 SEPT 1977

FOR: DEP. DIR. SECURITY

FROM: BRUCE SOLIE

CHIEF, SECURITY ANALYSIS GROUP

GORDON STEWART, FORMER DIR. OF PERSONNEL AND INSPECTOR GENERAL (RET. 1971) WAS I.G. IN EARLY 1968

SELECTED BY DCI TO ACT IN A MIDDLE-MAN CAPACITY IN CONTROVERSY OVER NOSENKO CASE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

· IRVING DAVIDSON

OFFICE OF SECURITY

1/19/21 PITTSBURGH, PA

CONFIDENTIAL MEMO APRIL 11, 1977

RECORDS OF OPERATIONAL LIAISON OFFICE, DDO [(MR. CHAS. ENRIGHT)] DISCLOSED NO DDO RELATIONSHIP W/ DAVIDSON

RECORDS OF CIA OFF OF SEC (ERVAN KUHNKE) NOTED INFORMAL CONTACT OF CIAHQ BY DAVIDSON PRIOR TO JULY 16, 1971 . . .

JULY 1971 A REP OF GEN'L COUNSEL CIA ADVISED MR. HENRY PETERSON, CHIEF, CRIM. DIV., DEPT. JUSTICE THAT DAVIDSON HAD FURNISHED SOME INFO TO CIA BUT THAT IT WAS INSUFFICIENT INTEREST TO WARRANT CIA INTERFERENCE W/ PROS OF DAVIDSON

MEMO 12 APR 71

FOR: GEN'L COUNSEL

SUBJ: ISADORE IRVING DAVIDSON

... A REVIEW OF SUBJ'S 201, SECURITY AND DOMESTIC CONTACT SERV FILE DOES NOT REFLECT ANY USE OF SUBJ BY THIS AGENCY

~~SECRET~~

11110583

AT ANY TIME

. . . .

MEMO 16 JULY 1971

BY JOHN S. GREANY, ASST GEN'L COUNSEL

FOLLOWING RECORDS TELE CONVERSATION W/ MR. HENRY PETERSON, CRIM DIV., DEPT JUSTICE ON 13 JULY . . . DAVIDSON IS DEFENDANT IN A MAIL FRAUD AND BANKRUPTCY CASE IN DIST. CT. IN CALIF. DAVIDSON HAS BEEN A FRONT MAN FOR JIMMIE HOFFA AND SPECIFICALLY INVOLVED W/ THE WEST COAST TEAMSTERS, HEADED BY BEVERLY RIDGE.

CHARGE OF CONCEALING ASSETS OF INTERSTATE EXCAVATION COMPANY

. . .

3. WITHIN THE LAST TEN DAYS, A FLURRY OF RUMORS OF PRESSURE BEING BROUGHT TO BEAR INFLUENCE ON THE JUST. DEPT HAVE DEVELOPED.

a. MEMO FROM HELMS TO ATTY GEN MITCHELL

b. MEMO FROM HELMS TO DEP. ATTY GEN KLEINDEINST

c. MEMO FROM ASST AG MARDIAN, INTERNAL SEC DIV TO ASST ATTY GEN WILSON

d. LETTER TO MURRAY CHOTINER FROM MAJOR GEN YARIV, CHIEF ISRAEL MILI. INTELL.

11110584

TELETYPE 28 APR 1971

4. AS HQS AWARE, DAVIDSON IS OCCASIONAL [ODENVY] INFORMANT AND HE THUS MAY BE WILLING COOPERATE WITH [WODISH] IF NOT [WOMACE.]

WASH POST 9/29/64

CHARLES MADE TRIP TO US CITIES, INCLUDING DALLAS IN EARLY 1964 TO BUY BOATS AND OTHER WEAPOINS

MEMO 25 APR 1962

USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE REP'D THAT ON 30 NOV 1957 WHILE IN MEXICO CITY DAVIDSON WANTED INFO AT "ALMOST ANY PRICE" FOR INFO ON GUATEMALAN, NICARAGUAN AND COSTA RICAN EXILE ACTIVITY IN MEXICO FOR SUBMISSION TO PRES. SOMOZA OF NICARAGUA

DAVIDSON SAID HE REPORTS DIRECTLY TO WHITE HOUSE THRU FRANK BERRY OF EISENHOWER'S STAFF CONCERNING CENTRAL AMER. ACTIVITIES. DAVIDSON WAS ACCOMPANIED TO MEXICO BY W.D. FELDER III OF W.D. FELDER & CO., COTTON MERCHANTS OF DALLAS

CIA
1:00 PM

~~SECRET~~

11110585

Murphy interview

1963 fall Sov. Sec Chief
East European Div. before that

case run by Sov Div at time of '62 contact

SR was responsible for actual handling

doesn't remember

N case was low priority because of interest in developing other areas

Sov did not have full access to the material

not aware of conclusions of CI staff from 1962 on

CI staff was kept abreast of handling of case but didn't actually participate

not aware of what differences there were

N's info didn't clarify overlap w/ the new info

~~SECRET~~

SECRET 11110586

Mar or Apr 64 pressures by Sov Div
to resolve caused decisions made
to change type of interrogation
CI staff want to float him along
letting him think he was believed
but Sov Div didn't think that
would resolve it
ultimate decision made by DCI
also nature of Oswald info made
it important to resolve

CIA in period was particularly sensitive
to penetration; had cases in friendly
intelligence agencies

FBI had contact during interrogation
they did not have penetration problem

H went on TDY for month in June 67
to visit Euro stations
review of N was prompted by Adm.
Taylor + Gordon Stewart of IG

left June '68

① wrap by SR w/ no conclusion
② CI staff report
③ Solie report

~~SECRET~~

④ IG report fall/spring 68

CI may only have encapsulated

CI was coordinating point for all info to WC + FBI on Oswald in Soviet Union

SR worked up traces + exploration on associates + life in Soviet Union

SR or CI may have done work up on Oswald's contacts w/ Kostikov or Golub

~~SECRET~~ 6/29/78
CIA FILE REV.

IRVING DAVIDSON

11110583

OFFICE OF SEURITY

DOC: MEMO 7 JAN 1964
FROM: ROBT GOTTSCHLING

CONF. INFORMANT RECENTLY ADVISED THAT PRES. OF HAITI DURING LAST WEEK OF DEC. 1963 SENT CONF MESSAGE TO SUBJ [DAVIDSON] CONTENTS NOT KNOWN

DOC NEWS CLIP
WASH. POST 9/29/64 BY NORMAN GALL

HAITIAN PRES. DUVALIER REC'D PURCHASE OF TWO T-28 FIGHTER PLANES FROM DALLAS
FIGHTER PLANES FLOWN TO HAITI ILLEGALLY

DAVIDSON VISITED HAITI MAY 1963 W/ TWO DALLAS ARMS SUPPLIERS
DUVALIER MADE DOWN PAYMENT W/ LETTER OF CREDIT FOR $210,000 DRAWN ON BANQUE COMMERCIAL OF PORT-AU-PRINCE
PRES. + PRINCIPAL STOCKHOLDER OF BANQUE IS CLEMENT JOS. CHARLES . . . CLOSE DUVALIER ALLY
. . . EARLIER THIS YEAR MADE SHOPPING TRIP

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110583

TO US, INCL. DALLAS TO BUY BOATS AND OTHER WEAPONS

9/30/64 TRANSACTION WENT THROUGH MEX BANK

STAR
6/10/65 DOMESTICALLY, DAVIDSON REPRESENTS TEXAS CORP. OWNED BY MURCHISON INTERESTS AND FRIENDSHIP W/ BOBBY BAKER

DOC MEMO 12/28/59 SECRET
FROM JIM McCORD
RE DAVIDSON, IRVING I.
SEE FILE ON DONALD HOGAN ~~& DAVID PHILLIPS~~
FOR ADDITIONAL PERTINENT INFO ON DAVIDSON

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ CIA FILE REVIE

11110590

SYLVIA LUDLOW HYDE HOKE

OFFICE OF SECURITY (SOFT FILE)

SEE OSI (USAF) RPT DTD 12/14/56 (#33-3439)
TITLE: SYLVIA LUDLOW HYDE HOKE

SEE FBI RPTS 9/17/56 - 2/6/57)
FD-204, 5/7/54

DOC: INDEX: HYDE, WM. A.
FBI RPT 21 SEPT 56

DOC: MEMO FOR THE RECORD 7/30/71
SUBJ: HOKE, SYLVIA
FILE # 318201
IDENTIFIED AS CIA EMPLOYEE IN '61 ISSUE OF FALLS CHURCH VA. DIR.

BRUCE L. SOLIE
DEPUTY CHIEF, SRS

DOC: MEMO 9 MAY 67.
FROM: E. MENDOZA/SRS
SUBJ.: SYLVIA LUDLOW HOKE

DAUGHTER OF WM. A. HYDE G 157435

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

1111059

MOTHER-IN-LAW IS HELEN HOKE WATTS, PARTNER IN NY PUBLISHING FIRM W/ DOROTHY WILSON, AKA DOROTHY WILSON SELIGSON, AKA MRS. LOU SELIGSON, IDEN. AS MEMBER OF CP 1962-63 WILSON HAD CONTACT W/ ISADORE GIBBY NEEDLEMAN CONCERNING FINANCIAL PAYMENTS FROM BERNARD GEIS

DOC: MEMO 5 DEC 1963
FROM: CHIEF, RESEARCH BRANCH/OS/SRS SOLIE

WM. HYDE CONSIDERED FOR COVERT USE IN VIETNAM IN 1957 BUT NOT USED

POSSIBILITY THAT WM. AVERY HYDE WAS FATHER OF RUTH PAINE WAS PREVIOUSLY BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF MR. PAPICH THROUGH MR. O'NEAL, CI/SIG

DOC: MEMO TO BRUCE SOLIE 21 DEC 1955
FROM TALBOT BIELEFELDT
SUBJ ORR, PAUL, VIOLET AND OTHERS

WM. A HYDE WAS IN WASH. THIS LAST WEEK-END VISITING JOHN + SYLVIA HOKE. HOKE INVITED BIELEFELDT + RICHARD JENKINS OVER SINCE THEY HAD BEEN FRIENDS AT STANFORD

~~SECRET~~

11110592

~~SECRET~~

DOC: MEMO FROM SOLIE 6/15/55

REQ THAT FILE BE SET UP ON SYLVIA HYDE HOKE

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110593

RUTH HYDE PAINE

OFFICE OF SEC. (SOFT FILE)

MEMO 25 MAR 64

TO CHIEF/ EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH

SUBJ. TALBOT BIELEFELDT

SUBJ REPORTED PHONE CALL FROM MRS. CAROL HYDE, MOTHER OF RUTH PAINE; PAINE IN WASH. TO TESTIFY BEFORE WARREN COMM.

SUBJ STATED HE MIGHT VISIT MRS. HYDE BUT BELIEVES HE WILL NOT VISIT MRS. PAINE

~~SECRET~~

CIA FILE REVIEW

~~SECRET~~

11110594

JOHN LINDSAY HOKE

OFFICE OF SECURITY (SOFT FILE)

SEE FBI RPT 9/21/56
TITLE: SYLVIA LUDLOW HYDE HOKE
FD-204; 5/7/54

DOC: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF LIAISON/RENEWAL
13 AUG 64
TO: CHIEF, EMPLOYEE ACTIVITY BRANCH PSD/OS
SUBJ: REQ FOR SECURITY APPROVAL OF LIAISON ON A CONTINUING BASIS

HARRY W. KISTNER AND OTHER SUCH MEMBERS OF ENGINEERING STAFF DESIGNATED BY HIM

TITLE: COMMUNICATIONS RESOURCES SPECIALIST
AID/ WASH. DC

SECRET CLASSIFICATION

DOC: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF LIAISON/RENEWAL
22 AUG 1963

DOC: REQUEST FOR APPROVAL OF LIAISON
21 AUG 1962

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~ 5/2/78

BIOGRAPHY 11110527

B. 30 OCT. '27 IN NIKOLAYEV, UKRAINE
DEFECTED 4 FEB. '64
FATHER: IVAN ISIDOROVICH NOSENKO
PROMINENT SOV. SHIPBUILDING ENG.
BECAME SOV. MINISTER OF SHIPBUILDING IN
MOSCOW

ATTENDED NAVAL TRAINING SCHOOLS
AT END OF WAR: ENTERED INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN MOSCOW
MARRIED IN 1947 TO DAUGHTER OF SOV. LT. GEN.
MARRIAGE DISSOLVED AFTER STALIN'S PURGE
OF FATHER-IN-LAW
1950 JOINED SOV. NAVAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
AND SERVED IN FAR EAST AND IN BALTIC
EARLY 1953 TRANSFERED TO KGB: ASSIGNED AS
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OFFICER OF AMER. EMB. SECTION OF THE AMER. DEPT.
JUNE 1953 MARRIED DAUGHTER OF FIRST DEPUTY
CHIEF OF STATE COMM FOR COOR. OF SCIENTIFIC
RESEARCH WORK; WIFE AND CHILDREN LEFT IN
SOV. UNION WHEN HE DEFECTED
JUNE 1955 TRANSFERRED TO TOURIST SECTION OF
SEVENTH DEPT. OF KGB INTERNAL COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE
JOINED COMMUNIST PARTY IN 1957 ~~SECRET~~
PRIMARILY INVOLVED IN OPERATIONS DESIGNED

~~SECRET~~

11110523

TO RECRUIT AMER. AND BRITISH COMMONWEALTH TOURISTS

1957, 1958 USED ALIAS YURIY IVANOVICH NICOLAYEZ WENT TO LONDON AS SECURITY ESCORT FOR SOV. SPORTS DELEGATION

1958 JOINED AMER-BRIT COMMONWEALTH SECTION OF SEVENTH DEPT. FOR TO IDENTIFYING AND RECRUITING FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AGENTS VISITING SOV. U. AS TOURISTS; INCL. CI OPS INVOLVING ENTRAPMENT

JAN. 1960 TRANSFERRED TO AMER. EMB. SECTION OF THE AMER. DEPT.; RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING CONTACTS BETW US EMB PERSONNEL AND SOV. CITS AND FOR COLLECTING OF INFO ON AMER. EMB. PERSONNEL TO FACILITATE RECRUITMENT

MARCH 1962 ACCOMPANIED SOVIET DELEGATION TO THE DISARMAMENT CONF IN GENEVA AS SEC ESCORT

JAN 1964 RETURNED TO GENEVA AS SEC ESCORT FOR SOV. DELE TO DISARMAMENT CONF IN GENEVA

~~SECRET~~

5/2/78

~~SECRET~~

11110520

FILE: EXAMINATION OF BONA FIDES OF A KGB DEFECT
FEB. 1968
CI

NOTE ON COVER:

...CIA FINDS THIS STUDY TO BE INACCURATE IN MANY IMPORTANT DETAILS AND TO OBTAIN THE RESULTS OF FAULTY JUDGMENTS LEADING TO UNFOUNDED CONCLUSIONS

INTERROGATION PERIODS

P. 5

12 FEB 1964	ARRIVED IN WASH. D.C.
14 FEB 1964	MET W/ REPS OF SWISS AND SOVIET GOVT.; RENOUNCED USSR CITIZENSHIP
18 FEB	INITIAL DEBRIEFING COMPLETED
24 FEB	INTRODUCED TO FBI FOR QUESTIONING
12-26 MAR.	HAWAII VACATION
4 APR	PLACED IN PERMANENT SAFEHOUSE OUTSIDE WASH. D.C.; POLYGRAPH BEGUN
24 APR	INTERROGATION COMPLETED
MAY - NOV.	FRIENDLY INTERROGATION
	INTERIM CONSULTATION W/ FBI
26 JAN 1965 - 5 MAR	HOSTILE INTERROGATION
FEB 1965	N. EXECUTED PROTOCOLS
26 JULY - 14 AUG.	FURTHER INTERROGATION
19-25 OCT. 1966	" "
MAY 1965	3 WEEK INTERROGATION BY PSYCHIATRIST AND PSYCHOLOGIST

~~SECRET~~

OCT. 1966 INTERROGATION ENDED

P.20 SOVIET OFFICIALS CLAIMED N.'S DEFECTION CAUSED SEVERE DAMAGE TO KGB, PROMPTED EXPULSION AND DISGRACE OF NUMEROUS SENIOR KGB PERSONNEL, CAUSED RECALL OF PERSONNEL FROM ABROAD, SUSPENSION OF OPERATIONS IN U.S.

59 "DESPITE HIS CLAIMED ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE IN THE NAVY, N. KNOWS NOTHING OF SOV. NAVY TRADITION, DOCTRINE, ORGANIZATION, OR PROCEDURES. HE DISCLAIMS KNOWLEDGE OF RU ORGANIZATION OTHER THAN AT THE POSTS WHERE HE SERVED, "BECAUSE OF HIS JUNIOR RANK." HOWEVER, EVEN AT THOSE POSTS HE DESCRIBES NEITHER THE STAFF, THE FUNCTIONS NOR THE PERSONNEL INTELLIGIBLY NOR DOES HE DESCRIBE THE POSTS' ACTUAL LOCATIONS."

~~SECRET~~

1111053

Dobrynin
Unidentified
Kostikov
Lopez
McMillan
Mosby

~~SECRET~~

BRADY

~~SECRET~~

11110532

FILE: NOSENKO INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT

REEL #1 26 JULY 1965 (DERYABIN) COMPLETE TRANSLATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

Q: WHENCE + HOW DID YOU SHOW UP IN CITY OF MOSCOW

A: AT END OF 1952 ARRIVED IN MOSCOW FROM CITY OF SOVETSK, PRIMORSKIY KRAY (10-15 KILO. FROM CITY OF BALTIYSK, FORMERLY PILLAU - BASE OF FOURTH NAVAL FLEET OF BALTIC

NAVY INTELLIGENCE POINT IS IN SOVETSK - WORKED THERE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS IN 1952

WENT TO MOSCOW TO WORK IN NAVY INTELLIGENCE AND THEN FIND SOMETHING ELSE

WAS ON ONE-MONTH LEAVE WHEN HE WENT TO MOSCOW, DID NOT HAVE TO REPORT TO HQ

(D. DISPUTES THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO GO ON LEAVE AND RELOCATE W/O REPORTING)

P. 14 WHILE ON LEAVE IN MOSCOW "THE BUSINESS AROSE THAT I WOULD BE TAKEN TO WORK IN THE MGB" (MINISTRY OF STATE SECURITY)

QUESTION OF BEING TRANSFERRED TO MGB CAME UP AT KOBULOV'S DACHA AT ABOUT 1/1/53, PARENTS PRESENT

LATER CONTACTED BY MINISTRY OF STATE SEC. AND TOLD TO REPORT ~~SECRET~~

(D. ASSERTS THAT PERSON WHO WORKED IN KGB WOULD KNOW PERFECTLY STATE RULES AND REGULATIONS INSTEAD OF MERELY GUESSING WHAT PROCEDURES WOULD HAVE BEEN)

57 CANNOT REMEMBER NAME OF PERSONNEL QUESTIONNAIRE ("ANKETA") THAT HE FILLED OUT

75 AT BEGINNING OF APRIL MET W/ GORBATENKO OF FIRST DEPT., FIRST SECTION AS CASE OFFICER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE AGAINST AMERICAN EMB.

BRADY

4/26/78

~~SECRET~~

1111053-1

FILE: NOSENKO INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT

REEL #2: 26 JULY 1965 (DERYABIN) COMPLETE TRANSLATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

P. 1-4 D. QUESTIONS FACT THAT N. DID NOT KNOW A SECOND SAVCHENKO WHO WAS LT. GENERAL IN KGB

5 NOSENKO'S CHIEFS: FEDOTOV, SHUBNYAKOV, GRIBANOV

9 NOSENKO STATES HE REC'D PAY OF 1700 RUBLES PLUS 500 FOR RANK

D. CLAIMS NO PAY WAS GIVEN FOR RANK AT TIME N. BEGAN IN MAR. 1953

27 N. SERVED AS INTERPRETER-TRANSLATOR OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE SEVENTH NAVAL FLEET IN THE PACIFIC OCEAN

28 AFTERWARDS WORKED IN BALTIC IN 1952 AS A SENIOR INTERPRETER TRANSLATOR OF THE MAG, MRP OF INTELLIGENCE OF THE FOURTH NAVAL FLEET IN THE BALTIC

41 CANNOT TELL MAIN SAFE APT OR SURVEILLANCE BASE OF 1ST DEPT FOR 1953-55

42 N. NAMES SAFE APTS OF SURVEILLANCE OF THE SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE

VOSSTANIYE SQUARE

AREA OF KROPOTKINSKAYA BRIDGE ~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

OPPOSITE THE EMBASSY

~~SECRET~~

O.P.

~~SECRET~~

11110537

FILE [DONALD J. RARICK] 3

CONVERTED TO PSEUDO PER REQUEST FROM PAUL HARTMAN 2/5/74

ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGNATIONS:

DDP DIRECTORATE

SOVIET BLOC

02 02
[[AE]SPHINX] [FORMERLY [[AE]TOWER]]

BIOGRAPHIC DATA

MAY 1944 TRANSFERRED TO GUKR/MGB MOSCOW AND COMPLETED COURSE AT HIGHER COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE SCHOOOL IN MAY 1945

MAY 1945 TRANSFERRED TO COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE FOR NAVY, SERVING AS ITS KOMSOMOL SECRETARY

MAY 1946 TRANSFERRED BACK TO HOME AREA W/ MGB

APRIL 1947 - JUNE 1951 ASSIGNED TO CHIEF DIRECTORATE OF THE GOV. GUARD, PROMOTED TO MAJOR IN 1949

JUNE 1951 - DEFECTION 1954 MGB OPERATIONS OFFICER AT MOSCOW HQ + ABROAD

BY [WM. TYNG]

* MEMO IN LIEU OF FITNESS REPORT 26 SEPT 1973

HAS PREPARED MAJOR ANALYSES ON TWO PERSONS WHO APPEAR TO HAVE BEEN SOVIET PENETRATIONS 101 PAGES, 425 PAGES ~~SECRET~~

3/mc

~~SECRET~~

FILE: NOSENKO INTERROGATION TRANSCRIPT

REEL #3: 28 JULY 1965 (DERYABIN) COMPLETE TRANSLATION OF VERBATIM TRANSCRIPT

P. 3 WAS IN KOMSOMOL 1943-1954

6 AT END OF 1953 ELECTED SEC. OF PARTY ORGANIZATION OF SECOND CHIEF DIRECTORATE

23 RE: HOW HE BECAME SECRETARY OF KOMSOMOL ORG.

DOES NOT REMEMBER KOMSOMOL COMM. REP.

25 DOES NOT REMEMBER HOW KOMSOMOL ELECTIONS ARE CARRIED OUT

32 DOES NOT REMEMBER NUMBER OF KOMSOMOL IDENTIFICATION

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

11110533

DERYABIN

INTERROGATED NOSENKO DURING 26 JULY - 13 AUG 1965

---

27 NOV 1963

MEMO FOR: CHIEF SR/CI

SUBJ: PETER DERYABIN COMMENTS ON PRES. KENNEDY'S ASSASSINATION

BENEFITS TO KRUSCHEV OF JK'S DEATH

1. LESS WESTERN PRESSURE ON KRUSCHEV; CONCILIATORY US ATTITUDE

2. DIVERSION FOR INTERNAL SOVIET PROBS (PROBS OF 1963 HARVEST, CHICOM ARGUMENTS)

3. BECAUSE OF CASTRO ALLEGATIONS, JOHNSON WOULD RESTRAIN FROM ANY PLANNED INTERVENTION IN CUBA

4. KRUSCHEV'S HAND WOULD BE STRENGTHENED IN DEALING WITH CHICOMS

5. ANY PLANS BY JFK TO GET TOUGH WITH SOVIETS DURING ELECTION YEAR WOULD THUS BE SABOTAGED

6. DE GAULLE WOULD EMERGE AS STRONG WESTERN LEADER; HE WAS SUPPORTIVE OF SOVIETS

7. RISING INTELLECTUAL DISSENSION IN USSR WOULD BE THWARTED

8. THE ASSASSINATION WOULD PIT RIGHT AND

~~SECRET~~

LEFT IN USA AGAINST EACH OTHER

9. JFK'S MURDER, WHETHER PLANNED OR NOT, WILL PROVE POWER AND OMNISCIENCE OF KGB

"... THE SOVIET INTELLIGENCE SERVICES HAVE SUFFERED SOME VERY REAL REVERSES RECENTLY WITH PENKOVSKY, GOLITSIN'S DEFECTION, THEIR IGNOMINIOUS EXPULSION FROM THE CONGO, ETC. I HAVE LONG PREDICTED THAT THE USSR WOULD TAKE SOME DRASTIC ACTION TO HALT THE RAPID EROSION OF THEIR SECURITY

RAISES POSSIBILITY THAT OSWALD WAS "INVITED" TO MOSCOW OR "INSPIRED" TO TRAVEL TO USSR AND GIVEN ADVICE OR FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE

THAT ~~KGB~~ SOVIETS NEVER GIVE A VISA WITHOUT MAKING AN INVESTIGATION OF THE PERSON MAKING THE APPLICATION

WAS THE PERSON WHO GAVE OSWALD THE VISA A KGB AGENT OR EMPLOYEE

IN MOSCOW OSWALD WOULD HAVE BEEN UNDER OBSERVATION, INVESTIGATION AND "COMPLETE CONTROL" BY KGB; WOULD HAVE GOTTEN ALL POSSIBLE INFO FROM HIM, ESPECIALLY ABOUT SERVICE IN MARINE CORPS

ANY FOREIGNER, ESPECIALLY AN AMERICAN WOULD BE UNDER CONSTANT OBSERVATION AND STUDY FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE BY SOV. INTELL. AND C.I. SERVICES

BELIEVES SOVIETS WOULD HAVE CONDUCTED INVESTIGATION OF O. THROUGH SOV. AGENT NETWORKS + PRO COMMUNIST ORGS. W/IN USA

THAT INITIAL REFUSAL TO MAKE HIM A SOVIET CITIZEN WOULD HAVE BEEN FOR PURPOSE OF FURTHER STUDY AND INV.

THEORY:
AFTER O. ASKED TO RETURN TO U.S. WAS ASKED TO FIGHT FOR COMMUNIST CAUSE W/IN THE USA

THAT STATE SECURITY METHOD OF HANDLING FOREIGNERS WOULD BE TO MAKE MARINA AN AGENT

IF MARINA WERE NOT INVITED TO OFFICIAL SOVIET OFFICES IN AN ATTEMPT TO TALK HER OUT OF THE MARRIAGE, THAT WOULD INDICATE IT WAS ARRANGED BY KGB.

IF MARRIAGE AND PAPERWORK WERE ARRANGED AFTER ONLY FEW MONTHS WAIT, WOULD INDICATE IT HAD BEEN HANDLED BY KGB

1/17/78

1111054

JAMES HERBERT MARTIN

OFFICE OF SECURITY

"SOFT FILE" = MATERIALS FROM INDEX; DID NOT HAVE ACTUAL FILE ON HIM

---

23 MAY 1968

MEMO FOR: CHIEF, CI/R&A
ATTN: [MR KESLER]
SUBJ: MARTIN, JAMES HERBERT

PER YOUR REQUEST OF 10 MAY 1968 FOR A SEARCH OF OS INDICES ON ONE JAMES HERBERT MARTIN, ATTACHED IS A SUMMARY OF INFO AVAILABLE ON SUBJ IN OS RECORDS

PAUL F. GAYNOR
CHIEF, SEC. RESEARCH STAFF/OS

... COULD NOT BE IDENTIFIED W/ ANY ONE OF THE SAME NAME WHO APPEARS IN OS INDICES ... COPY OF NEWSPAPER CLIPPING ... WASHINGTON POST FOR 28 FEB 1964 ... ONLY INFO AVAILABLE IN OS RECORDS ON SUBJ

WASHINGTON POST ARTICLE:

WIFE'S AGENT DENIES OSWALD PLOT ON NIXON

~~SECRET~~

SURELL BRADY

~~SECRET~~

11110542

MURRET, MARILYN DOROTHY
201-761577
D.O.B. 14 JUL 28

INCLUSIVE DATES: 1963-1965

DELETIONS: FBI REPORT, 1964

PERSONALITY FILE ACTION REQUEST

TUBE STA.: DW 6

DATE 17 SEPT 1964

SOURCE DOC.: FBI REPORT 7 MAY 1964

COUNTRY OF LOCATION: PAKISTAN

ACTION DESK: [SI/SIG CODE 731]

COMMENTS: LISTED AS ONE OF THE "MOST WANTED" DEFECTORS IN THE ALLEN-SCOTT REPORT OF MAR. 26, 1964

DOC. TRANSFER & CROSS REF.

PERTINENT INFO

9 DEC 63: FBI N.O. WAS CONTACTED RELATIVE TO THEIR INTERVIEW W/ SUBJ, COUSIN OF LEE HARVEY OSWALD, AND SHE DENIED HAVING SEEN OSWALD AT ANY TIME OUTSIDE THE U.S.

DOC. TRANSFER & CROSS REF.

SUBJ ACTUAL OR POTENTIAL DEFECTOR

11 FEB 65

201-761577 100-002-077

~~SECRET~~

R 6507141156

SRELL BRADY
3/7/78

SECRET

SHIRAKOVA, RIMA
201-803914

11110543

~~NEE~~ ZMITRYUK = MARRIED NAME
HUSBAND VALERIY ZMITRYUK B. 29 OCT. 1937, ENGINEERING STUDENT

MEMO

DEPT. OF STATE, BUREAU OF INTELL. & RESEARCH
TO DEP. DIR. PLANS, CIA (DATE NOT LEGIBLE)
ATTN: MR. CALVIN TENNEY
SUBJ.: ZMITROOK, RIMA -- LEE HARVEY OSWALD'S INTOURIST GUIDE IN MOSCOW

...

"ALTHOUGH COMPLETE FILES AT OUR OFFICE OF SPECIAL CONSULAR SERVICES NO LONGER ARE AVAILABLE ON PERSONS WHO MIGHT HAVE SOUGHT FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AT EMBASSY MOSCOW BETWEEN 1958 AND 1963..."

DISPATCH 15 AUG. 1966

AFTER BIRTH OF HER DAUGHTER IN OCT. 1963 SHIRAKOVA LEFT INTOURIST AND WAS EMPLOYED AS A TEACHER OF ENGLISH IN A MOSCOW TEACHER'S TRAINING COLLEGE

BORN: 14 JAN 1939
DATE OF MARRIAGE: 1963

SECRET

SECRET

Gerald Brady

CIA Briefing

11110544

files and records

basis for opening 201 file
operational interest in individual (mostly foreigners): potential recruitment
would trace files in the field or system for any info on the person
tracking an individual: e.g. foreign specialist, counterintelligence

sometimes when there are several files on a person it is more convenient to put it all in one file = 201

tracing = running through all variations of person's name, computer print-out

case officer could initiate 201 file; he's usually most knowledgeable

hypo: reliable tip that person is disclosing military secrets
ans: judgment call as to whether 201 file is opened, but the info would be passed on to name indexing, even if a 201 file is not opened

SECRET

CIA

~~SECRET~~

11110545

routine 201 criteria:

recruitment

high-level foreign officer

there are written regulations governing these criteria

some operations are run from HQ, and not the field, so the HQ officer would initiate the 201 file

PRQ I: biographical info

II: bio. data, assessment, surveillance results (may be filed *after* contact w/ the individual)

they would be located in 201 file, sometimes II is not made, so it won't necessarily be included w/ I

there is dual filing: pseudonym or cryptonym will *not* be filed w/ name file; PRQ II will usually use cryptonym, so they would be stored elsewhere

you can run index check to locate all files, or original file should refer to other files ~~SECRET~~

status sheet in 201 file should be maintained to reference other files

201 file is biographical, not operational

criteria for classification of sources
detailed criteria exist (e.g. witting collaborator)
incl. witting collaborator
unwitting "
potential witting collaborator
former witting collaborator
potential / never contacted
(classes A1 - A7)

there is table of contents list to 201 files
ask for that: computer will spit out other file references and all material which has been classified into that file

green list info = compiled through communications intelligence (no longer exist, used to be kept separately)
K check = special clearance

if another agency is conducting an operation PCS would maintain file to coordinate CIA's involvement

voucher system
agent in the field is most likely un-vouchered
(see Director of Finance)

prescribed + limited (P+L) = communications which are compartmented (e.g. sealed envelopes)
"P+L traffic channel" is determined by top three DDO staff
that info may be downgraded subsequently
destruction of docs is prescribed by archives; materials are not destroyed due to nature of the operation

Soviets use parallel system
dual intelligence with no cross reference between the two

cryptonym may be used for associates (e.g. family members) but that does not necessarily mean a 201 file would exist for each of them

defection of American soldiers may be primarily military rather

201 file would not be opened unless there was operational interest

CI staff did have interest in defectors in 60's

→ CI did at one time maintain separate files on their interests

an effort is being made now to integrate those files into HQ system

547 A form = request to put document into central files

very sensitive operations have very limited access; person handling would make decision whether to

? put documents into system

there can be operations for which files do not exist

it is possible that 201 file would not reflect a particular operation

cryptonym may exist for project, for which no 201 would exist

Operation files are separately maintained by desk in charge

~~SECRET~~

11110543

what sources feed into their original info

- are there any files in the field that are not also maintained at HQ

✓ are there other interests which result in other types of files

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

operational files can usually be disposed of after 10 years; individual files are maintained 50 years it is possible that after an operations file is destroyed the individual's name file may not refer to or disclose the operation

Office of Personnel files are maintained separately from 201 files

SECRET 11110754

FILE: ALL MATERIAL REC'D FROM AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN RELATING TO OSWALD (SOV. GOVT. DOCS) 1964

MEMO FOR: J. LEE RANKIN
SUBJ: DOCS ON OSWALD FURNISHED BY SOV. GOVT.

C. THE INCLUSION OF MARINA'S EXIT VISA APPLICATION IS SINGULAR IN VIEW OF FACT THAT COMM. HAD NOT REQUESTED INFO ON MARINA. MOREOVER, THE DOC PURPORTING TO BE AN APPLICATION FOR AN EXIT VISA HARDLY QUALIFIES AS SUCH. WE KNOW FROM THE CASES OF OTHER SOV. CITIZENS .... THAT SUCH PERSONS ARE REQ'D TO PROVIDE CONSIDERABLY MORE INFO THAN WAS REFLECTED IN MARINA'S "APPLICATION". MOREOVER, IN INTERVIEWS MARINA REFERRED TO HAVING FILLED OUT THE NECESSARY "FORMS" AND O. NOTED IN HIS DIARY THAT ABOUT 20 DOCS WERE NEC TO OBTAIN AN EXIT VISA

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

O.'S BIOGRAPHY TO WORK IN RADIO FACTORY STATED THAT HE: SERVED IN U.S. MARINE CORPS, SERVED IN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES ATTENDED MILITARY SCHOOLS CONCERNED WITH ELECTRONICS, SERVED AS RADAR OPERATOR WITH AN AVIATION UNIT

SECRET

THE NAMES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE ILLEGIBLE ON SOV. GOVT. DOCS

DOBRYNIN MATERIALS

TRANSLATIONS OF MATERIAL REC'D FROM SOV. EMB. WASH D.C. RELATIVE TO EMB. FILE ON LHO AND MARINA

MARINA'S APPLICATION TO REGISTER RESIDENCE PERMIT: LAST PLACE OF RES. IN USSR: CITY OF MINSK, UL. KOMMUNISTICHESKAYA, HOUSE 4, APT. 25

LHO LETTER TO RUSSIAN EMB., WASH., D.C.
ASKS FOR INFO ON HOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO "PROVA" OR "IAVESTIA" RUSSIAN LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS OR SOME OTHER RUSSIAN LANGUAGE MAGAZINES SUCH AS "IGONYOK"
"I WOULD LIKE FOR THE EMBASSY TO SEND US ANY PERIODICALS OR BULLETINS WHICH YOU MAI PUT OUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF YOUR CITIZENS LIVING, FOR A TIME, IN THE USA".

ILLEGIBLE NAMES :

~~SECRET~~

11110757

① DOC. WHO EXAMINED LHO FOR FACTORY WORK 1/11/60

② TRAINER AT FACTORY 1/11/60

③ APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF ALIEN IDENTITY CARD, INSPECTOR WHO REC'D APP & VERIFIED DOCS 1/4/62

④ APPLICATION FOR IDENTITY CARD FOR PERSON W/O CITIZENSHIP 1/4/61, INSPECTOR WHO REC'D APPLICATION & VERIFIED DOCS

⑤ APPLICATION FOR VISA FOR DEPARTURE FROM USSR (LHO) 7/16/61, EMPLOYEE WHO REC'D & VERIFIED DOCS

⑥ APPLICATION FOR I.D. CARD FOR ________ 12/29/59 IDENTITY CARD, SERIES P NO. 311479 ISSUED ON 1/4/60 BY ________.

⑦ CERTIFICATE THAT LHO IS EMPLOYED AS ASSEMBLER IN RADIO PLANT, MINSK 1/1/60

ISSUED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE DEPT. M FOR ____ SIGNATURE ______

⑩ CERTIFICATE 7/13/61 THAT LHO LIVES AT NO. 4 KALININ ST., APT 24, CHIEF OF ZhKO ______

⑪ EMPLOYMENT RECORD BOOK, CHIEF ______

⑫ LETTER 7/9/62 FROM SOV. EMB. WASH. TO MARINA

PLEASE SEND TO ILLEGIBLE YOUR RESIDENCE ILLEGIBLE FOR REGISTRATION.

AT THE SAME TIME PLEASE ILLEGIBLE NO. 118.

~~SECRET~~

BRADY ~~SECRET~~ 4/25/78

11110415

FILE: "ALL MATERIAL REC'D FROM AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN RELATING TO OSWALD (SOV. GOVT. DOCS)" 1964

MEMO FOR: J. LEE RANKIN

SUBJ: DOCS ON OSWALD FURNISHED BY SOV. GOVT.

...

c. THE INCLUSION OF MARINA'S EXIT VISA APPLICATION IS SINGULAR IN VIEW OF FACT THAT COMM. HAD NOT REQUESTED INFO ON MARINA. MOREOVER, THE DOC PURPORTING TO BE AN APPLICATION FOR AN EXIT VISA HARDLY QUALIFIES AS SUCH. WE KNOW FROM THE CASES OF OTHER SOV. CITIZENS ... THAT SUCH PERSONS ARE REQ'D TO PROVIDE CONSIDERABLY MORE INFO THAN WAS REFLECTED IN MARINA'S "APPLICATION". MOREOVER, IN INTERVIEWS ... MARINA REFERRED TO HAVING FILLED OUT THE NECESSARY "FORMS" AND O. NOTED IN HIS DIARY THAT ABOUT 20 DOCS WERE NEC TO OBTAIN AN EXIT VISA

....

RICHARD HELMS
DDP

O.'s "BIOGRAPHY" TO WORK IN RADIO FACTORY STATED THAT HE SERVED IN U.S. MARINE CORPS, SERVED IN JAPAN AND THE PHILIPPINES ATTENDED MILITARY SCHOOLS CONCERNED WITH ELECTRONICS; SERVED AS RADAR OPERATOR WITH AN AVIATION UNIT

~~[illegible]~~

THE NAMES OF SOVIET OFFICIALS ARE ILLEGIBLE
ON SOV. GOVT. DOCS

11110416

~~SECRET~~

DOBRYNIN MATERIALS

TRANSLATIONS OF MATERIAL REC'D FROM SOV. EMB. WASH D.C. RELATIVE TO EMB. FILE ON LHO AND MARINA

MARINA'S APPLICATION TO REGISTER RESIDENCE PERMIT: LAST PLACE OF RES. IN USSR: CITY OF MINSK, UL. KOMMUNISTICHESKAYA, HOUSE 4, APT. 25

LHO LETTER TO RUSSIAN EMB., ~~SOV.~~ WASH. D.C.

ASKS FOR INFO ON HOW TO SUBSCRIBE TO "PROVA" OR "IAVESTIA" RUSSIAN LANGUAGE NEWSPAPERS OR SOME OTHER RUSSIAN LANGUAGE MAGAZINES SUCH AS "IGONYOK"

"I WOULD LIKE FOR THE EMBASSY TO SEND US ANY PERIODICALS OR BULLETINS WHICH YOU MAY PUT OUT FOR THE BENEFIT OF YOUR CITIZENS LIVING, FOR A TIME, IN THE USA".

~~SECRET~~

LHO DOCS FROM DOBRYNIN
ILLEGIBLE NAMES:

1110413

① DOC. WHO EXAMINED LHO FOR FACTORY WORK 1/11/60

② TRAINER AT FACTORY 1/11/60

③ APPLICATION FOR ISSUANCE OF ALIEN IDENTITY CARD, INSPECTOR WHO REC'D APP + VERIFIED DOCS 1/4/62

④ APPLICATION FOR IDENTITY CARD FOR PERSON W/O CITIZENSHIP 1/4/61, INSPECTOR WHO REC'D APPLICATION + VERIFIED DOCS

⑤ APPLICATION FOR VISA FOR DEPARTURE FROM USSR (LHO) 7/16/61, EMPLOYEE WHO REC'D + VERIFIED DOCS

⑥ APPLICATION FOR I.D. CARD FOR __________ 12/29/59 IDENTITY CARD, SERIES P NO. 311479 ISSUED ON 1/4/60 BY __________.

⑦ CERTIFICATE THAT LHO IS EMPLOYED AS ASSEMBLER IN RADIO PLANT, MINSK 1/1/60
ISSUED FOR PRESENTATION TO THE DEPT. M FOR ______
SIGNATURE ________

⑩ CERTIFICATE 7/13/61 THAT LHO LIVES AT NO. 4 KALININ S., APT 24, CHIEF OF ZhKO ________

⑪ EMPLOYMENT RECORD BOOK, CHIEF ________

⑫ LETTER 7/9/62 FROM SOV. EMB. WASH. TO MUZINA

PLEASE SEND TO ILLEGIBLE YOUR RESIDENCE ILLEGIBLE FOR REGISTRATION.

AT THE SAME TIME PLEASE ILLEGIBLE NO. 118.

~~SECRET~~

Classification: ______________________

[illegible]

Box 54
FOLDER 7
ITEM 4A

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

THIS FOLDER CONTAINS NOTES ON CLASSIFIED MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA HEADQUARTERS BY HOUSE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS AND NOTES GENERATED UPON ACCOUNTABLE PAGES HEREIN

HSCA STAFF MEMBER: ______________________

PAGE NUMBERS OF NOTES ON CLASSIFIED MATERIAL REVIEWED AT CIA:

____

____

____

____

PAGE NUMBERS OF ACCOUNTABLE NOTE PAPER ISSUED FOR FURTHER NOTES GENERATED AT HSCA

____

____

TE	FOLDER REQUESTED BY (PRINT NAME)	REQUESTOR'S SIGNATURE

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

ALL PAGES HEREIN ARE ACCOUNTABLE
NO DOCUMENTS MAY BE COPIED OR REMOVED FROM THIS FOLDER

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

Classification:

10145-10265

SECRET 11110717

Contact Report

Persuant to critic ~~allegations~~ publications and specific ~~statements~~ allegations by former CIA employee James Wilcott that LHO was a CIA agent, Staff Investigator Harold Leap, interviewed the following CIA personnel to determine if there is ~~existing~~ corroboration for ~~the~~ Wilcott's statements ~~he had personal knowledge~~ relating to the Oswald CIA agent issue.

1. Robert P Wheeler, DOB 4 Oct 15, SSN 258-12-0844, 6600 Melwood Rd, Bethesda, Maryland, telephone no. 229-6368. 13-3 Position with CIA, was Deputy Chief [of Station, Tokyo, Japan], June to ~~Sept~~ Oct 64. Interviewed at CIA Hdqs 4-13-78 Subject is retired

2. Leo Rosenbaum, DOB 2 Dec 23, SSN 122-14-222 1815 Opalocka Dr., McLean, VA, telephone no 356-5283. Position with CIA for the period ~~May 58 to July~~ 64 was chief of Counter Intelligence, SR Branch, 13-3 [Tokyo Japan]. Interviewed CIA Hdqs 4-10-78. Subject is retired

Jun 60

3. 03 [Hope Irene Mason], DOB 24 May 33, SSN 03 [018-26-3500] Subject presently employed at CIA Hdqs and has cover. 03 [Mason's] position with the CIA in 1963 at 13-3 [Tokyo Japan] was Intelligence assistant for the SE Section. Interviewed at CIA Hdqs on 4-7-78

Jun 61 to Jun 63

4. Frederick C. Randall, DOB 28 Oct 26, SSN 508-20-4068, Presently employed at CIA Hdqs and has cover. Randall position with the CIA in Sept 62 13-3b Aug 63 was Chief of Registry at the [Tokyo Station] Interviewed at CIA Hdqs on ______.

[illegible]

SECRET

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

notes ~~[illegible]~~

5. James S Wood, DOB 20 feb 28, SSN ______ presently employed at CIA Hqs. Wood's 13-3 position from Apr 61 to [illegible] at [Tokyo station] as finance officer. Subject interviewed at CIA Hqs on 3-31-78.

6. George James von Bretzel DOB 12 Dec 21 SSN 074-18-5912, 14801 Springfield Rd Germantown Md, telephone 916-6908. former CIA case officers, 13-3 [Tokyo, Japan] SRB from July 63 to July 67 - presently retired, interviewed 4-10-78. ~~interviewed [illegible]~~

7. Howard M. Orr, DOB 22 Jul 22, SSN 275 12 4377, address 8405 Weller Ave, Mc Lean Va, telephone 893-3325, presently retired. Positions with CIA, HDQS 59-61 (SR Div) 13-3 [Tokyo] Nov 61-63 (Case officer SB.), Nov 63 HDQS, SR DIV, desk officer for 13-3 [Japan]. interviewed 4-11-78

8. George A Fill, DOB 29 May 21 SSN address 27 Bay Tree, North Myrtle Beach, South Carolina 29582, telephone # 803-249-3193. Presently retired. Fill was chief of the Soviet Branch at the 13-3 [Tokyo Station] from June 1960 to June 1965 interviewed 4-29-78

5/ML

9. Robert N. Keith, DOB 11 Aug 27, SSN 257-28-6051, address 2011 Glenway Dr. Sanford, Fla. 32771. telephone 305-323-7434 13-3 former CIA case officer at (Tokyo Station), SR Bra
Jan 59 -to Oct 63, interviewed 4-30-78

10. Jerome E. Fox, DOB 9 Oct 18, SSN 102-22-91
address 3663 NW 21 st, Miami, Fla. telephone 305-634-2997, 13-3 former CIA intelligence analysis at (Tokyo station) from Jul 1959 to Dec 962, worked in program involving military intelligence. interviewed 5-1-78

11. William V. Broe, DOB 24 Aug 13, SSN 032 01 816. address 111 Indian Trails, Scituate, Mass telephone 27 617-545-6113. former ~~COS~~ CIA 13-3 [COS Tokyo, Japan] from 1961 to 1965 interviewed 5-15-78

12. William Crawford, DOB 19 Sept 24, SSN 429-26-4954 address 4944 Cass St, Apt 806 San Diego, Ca. 92109 telephone 714-273-2770 former CIA executive officer at Atsugi air base in charge of the U-2 program. (Details of interview conducted 5-14-78 submitted in separate report).

SECRET

3/M

CIA employees

The above ~~individuals~~ individuals were selected for interview because of the position they held ~~at the time~~ with the CIA at the [13-3 Tokyo station] ~~[illegible]~~ during the time ~~period~~ frame of 1959 to 1964.

James Wilco~~tt made~~ gave testimony in a closed hearing before the SCA that a CIA case officer ~~told him~~ stationed in [13-3 Tokyo, Japan] told him that LHO was a CIA agent and ~~gave~~ also mentioned LHO's crypto~~nym~~nym. The ~~[illegible]~~ conversation ~~that~~ took place in the [13-3 Tokyo station] shortly after the word of the JFK assassination was received on 23 Nov 63. Wilcot ~~also stated that~~ could not recall the name of the case officer or the cryptonym. Wilcott also advised that considerable conversation took place among CIA employee's in [13-3 Tokyo] at the time concerning the Oswald-CIA agent issue.

The basic questions asked of the CIA employee selected were as follows

(a) Have you ever seen written documents which would indicate that LHO was a ~~CIA~~ intelligence agent or a source of information?

(b) ~~Have~~ Were you ever ~~heard~~ advised orally that LHO was an agent?

(c) Have you ever heard conversation or heard, ~~speculation~~ conversational that LHO was a CIA agent or intelligence source for any government ~~agen~~ Service?

(d) Were you in a position to know if LHO was recruited as a~~n~~ CIA agent during his tour of duty with the military in Japan.

(2) When was the first time you ever heard the allegation that LHO ~~was possibly~~ ~~may have been~~ a CIA agent.

(4) Did you know James & Elsie Wilcott in [Japan?] 13-3

~~Some of~~ the ~~other~~ all individuals interviewed stated they never saw any documents nor heard any information that LHO was a CIA agent while stationed in Tokyo. Only after ~~their departure the~~ critic publication and the Garrison investigation in the late 60s were they ~~so~~ ~~aware~~ aware of the ~~published~~ allegation.

Subjects 2, 7 & 8 express belief that LHO ~~could~~ may have been recruited by the KGB during his tour of duty in Japan. They based their belief on the fact that during the period of time that LHO was in Japan, the CIA [Station] 13-3 in [Tokyo] 13-3 had identified a KGB program specifically ~~double~~ ~~directed~~ designed to recruit U.S. military personnel in Tokyo. However they had no information that the recruitment of LHO by the KGB did in fact take place.

3

Subject Jerome E. Fox was ~~specifically~~ one person who Wilcot could remember ~~with~~ ~~the~~ who he had conversation ~~with~~ concerning the speculation that LHO was an agent for the CIA. The conversation supposedly took place in 13-3 [Japan] after the information was received that LHO was the assassin of JFK. Fox advised investigator Leap that he was in the U.S at the time of Assassination on 23 Nov 63. Fox's CIA personnel reflects he was transfered from the 13-3 [Tokyo station] to the U.S in 1962.

Subjects 2, 7, 8, 9 and 11 all thought they would have known if LHO have been ~~as~~ recruited as a CIA agent while he was in Japan. All the subjects worked within 13-3 the SR Branch of the [Toyko Station] and theoretically ~~would have~~ one of them would have handled or had knowledge of the recruitment. All thought if Oswald have been recruited with out their knowledge it would have been a rare exception to the working policy and guidelines of the 13-3 [station].

John Sullivan by

H

Wilcott, James Bernard, Jr Security file

sealed

FBI - 100-457761
May 9 1969 - SDS

Security Matter - Students for a Democratic Society -

McGarraghy - nothing concerning the issue.

JM WAVE

---

memo 29 Sept 65 by Daniel A. Cullen

Polygraphically interviewed by James Kyle of ISD

Results - favorable in the area of morals, loyalty, and associates etc, and there were no evidences of deception. Subject considered a very naive man.

FBI informed that the problem has been resolved.

SECRET

Doris - 6616 or 7165

Houdeshell
personnel file

Wilcott, James B. JR.
~~09-15-63~~ DOB 09-27-31

Personnel file

09-15-63
18-3
DDP/FE, FOREIGN FIELD, [FE/JKO]
13-3
[TOKYO STATION], SUPPORT STAFF
POSITION - FISCAL ACCT ASST

FITNESS REPORT 26 APR 65 - 15 APR 66
"Subject was barely adequate in performing his assigned tasks".

11 Oct 64 to 25 Apr 65
Subject considered proficient and described as cooperative and dependable.

1 Jul 63 to 30 Jun 64
Subject considered proficient - Remarks "Subject has performed his duties in a competent manner".

Specific duty no 1 - "As Station cashier responsible for the daily receipt and disbursement of cash (04 [Japanese yen] U.S. dollars, MPC)"

SECRET

1 Jul 62 to 30 Jun 63
Subject considered proficient

3/m

SECRET

1 Apr 61 to 30 Jun 62
Proficient

27 May 60 to 31 Mar 61
Competent

1 Apr 59 to 31 Mar 60
Competent

SECRET

Box 7

Folder 8

~~3~~ #3

SECRET

Betsy Palmer
May 1, 1978

Cable Traffic, Mexico City/Director
October 1963

[illegible]

72527 to MEXI from DIR dated 10/1/63

1. Basic Hdqtrs position -- assist any responsible anti-Castro group. JURE qualifies. L/2 can give covert assistance but not jeopardize his ops utility. Recommend Lanier contact be maintained.

2. Julio Lanier Hevia one of original members Pro-Unidad Cubana en Exilio formed February 1962.

3. Manolo Ray and Ernesto Betancourt (MEXI 6255) of ELC have had dealings in past and jointly held discussions with U.S. govt. on Cuban problems. Possible therefore Lanier and Betancourt approaches related.

#79557 to MEXI from DIR, dated 31 October 1963

1. Do not wish MEXI station intervene wit Mexi foreign minister behalf JURE reps as this 01 would obviously establish official U.S. support JURE. Hdqtrs not aware Li[tamil]2 has foreign minister contact but if he can assist on visa problem no objection. Might be useful L/2 make pretense of helping in order appear cooperative to Lanier.

2. Angel Luis Guiu Figueredo was chief military operations MRP in Cuba until took asylum May 1961. WAVE asset mid 62 to mid 63. Rogelio Cisneros Diaz is member JURE Executive Board and former national coordinator MRP in Cuba.

#6455 to DIR from MEXI, dated 9 October 1963

1. JURE rep in Mexico, Julio Lanier Hevia, told 01 Li[tamil]2 that long-range seaplane lined up for use against Cuban soil. Currently used commercially haul shellfish. Based near Tampico. Two JURE leaders coming Mexico soon to inspect it. L/2 will try elicit more details.

c/s Comment: Requested timely reporting re any air strikes being planned or mounted against Cuba by anyone.

Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, 1963 - Joaquin Hernandez Armas

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

SECRET

2 ML

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110215

SERGIO ARCACHA SMITH
September 14, 1965

I Loose Documents

Reply to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service from DD/P stating: Reference is made to the request dated 23 August 1965 concerning Subject (File No. AL 055 004 TC) The files contain no pertinent additional information to that previously forwarded to the FBI in CScl-3/764,414 dated 30 March 1961, subject: Friends of Democratic Cuba

In yellow manila envelope: Letter to agency dated 23 August 1965 referred to above.

II 201-835474 (Personality File Action Request) June 25, 1968
~~Psedonym - James H. Kesler~~

Attended college in Havana
A graduate of Columbia University Law School
Served in Cuban Diplomatic Service before Castro
New Orleans delegate of Frente Revolucionaria Democratico in 1960
Additional info in File 100-300-017

June 9, 1967 Memo for Record
Reference: Brief Comments re: FBI Report, DBB 78940 of 25 April 1967
States: Other sources have stated that Gordon Novel and Arcacha Smith have "marquie" letters granting them immunity and are allegedly employed by CIA.

Garrison's investigation started when Everett Gordon Schaeffer (phonetic) took a deposition from David Ferrie in which Ferrie admitted knowing Lee Harvey Oswald.

November 13, 1975 (outgoing message: on Smith for Customs.
DPOB 1923, Cuba. Lawyer: FBI has further information on him.

black
to be
consistent
w/
180-10145-
10295

done 3/11/98 bh

SECRET

SECRET

Sergio Arcacha Smith
Page 2
Betsy Palmer

11110713

Third Agency Deletions

1. FBI document (DBC-00999) dated 21 Feb. 1967, Classification: not given
   Subject: ~~Assination~~ Assassination/JFK Nov. 22, 1963, Dallas, Tex.
   File # - not given.

2. FBI document (DBB 78198) dated 30 March 1967, Classification: not given
   Subject: Assassination/JFK Nov. 22, 1963 Dallas, Tex.
   FBI File # : (S) 62-10960 (Bureau)

3. FBI document, DBB-77295, dated April 10, 1967
   Classification: not given
   Subject: Assassination/JFK, Nov. 22, 1963 Dallas, Texas
   FBI File #: Not given

SECRET

Betsy Palmer
May 1, 1978

SERGIO ARCACHA SMITH - Office of Security File Review
April 28, 1978

11110817

1. Search Request on 4/6/67

2. Report deleted, dated 7/19/61 - Third Party Information

3. Sergio visits survivors of Cuban exile infiltration of U.S. who landed in New Orleans and were hospitalized because of their weakened condition. He tried to see them on 3 May 1961 but entrance to the hospital was denied until his bona fides could be established. Visited them on 10 May 1961. Arcacha then head of New Orleans chapter of CRC.

4. Washington Start article, dated 1 April 1967 on Garrison proble - warrent issued for Arcacha's arrest on charges of conspiring to burglarize munitions bunker in 1961 with Gordon Novel.

5. Bio memo - undated. Sergio Arcacha Smith one of promoters of Friends of Democratic Cuba in New Orleans, 6 January 1961. Investigation conducted by a reliable Miami Station asset concluded that FRC organized for personal gain.

6. FBI memo on FRD, 1/18/61, New Orleans, deleted.

7. Memo dated 31 May 1967 by Ramond G. Rocca
Subject: Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination - Gordon Dwane Novel

A. Summary - Novel has both claimed and denied CIA affiliation -- a thorough check of CIA records shows no affiliation. It is possible that NBC is supporting Novel to get a large audience for expose of Garrison. Novel may have exaggerated his presumed relationship with Sergio Arcacha Smith who also is not CIA affiliated.

B. Novel is mysterious -- little information -- 29 year old former owner of bar in French Quarter and an electronics expert.

C. In Columbus, Ohio, Novel is free on $10,000 bond - living in a rent-free apartment and drives a car with dealer tags. Rocca questions where money is coming from.

D. Novel in McLena, Virginia 25-26 March 1967. Given a polygraph by Lloyd Furr. Furr and Richard L. Bast operate firm Redex -- sell audio and counter audio devices.

E. CIA finds no evidence of ever having an Evergreen Advertising Agency which Novel claims he worked for and was CIA front.

F. Records show CIA never recruited or paid Arcacha directly but since he was associated with FRD in New Orleans, which was created with CIA assistance, guidance anf financial support may have been given him through the Miami FRD circa May 1960.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer
Page 2
Office of Security/Sergio Arcacha Smith

1130213

8. Memo dated 28 Septembar 1967 from Donavan E. Pratt
Subject: Garrison Investigation - Queries from Justice Department

Questions prepared by Deputy Assistant Attorney General/ Criminal Division.

A. During 1948-56 period of his association with CTA, what services did Clay Shaw perform for agency?
(Shaw submitted information on international trade which was incorporated into 8 reports -- East German directory of firms engated in such trade; a Czechoslovakian Trade Exhibit; foreign exchange problems in Peru, etc.

B. What was his remuneration? DCS has to supply this information.

C. What were his contacts:
(Contacted by DCS representative in New Orleans seven times 1949, twice 1950, five times 1951, nine times 1952, once 1953, twice 1954, twice 1955 and twice 1956.

C. What was reason for cessation of relationship? Files dont' answer - DCS must furnish answer.

Questions about Sergio Arcacha Smith - same memo.

A. What was his exact relationship with Agency? Never a direct one. Miami FRD headquarters may have mentioned CIA sponsorship to him.

B. What was Agency interest in and support of FRD? Answered above. In the CRC? Had direct access to and support of White House and CIA.

C. CIA interest/support of Crusade to Free Cuba Committee? No record - wheck with WH/COG

Questions about Gordon Novel - same memo. No CIA connection with Novel or his attorney, Steven Plotkin or his former business partaer Rancier Blaise Ehlinger.

Questions about Jack Ruby - No CIA relationship or file.
David Ferrie - No CIA relationship
Richard Rudolph Davis - No CIA relationship
Alvin Beaufouef - No CIA relationship
Guy Banister or Hugh Ward - no CIA relationship
White Russians - no - see pp. 716-23 W Report
De Mohrenschildt - no

Is CIA tapping Garrison's phone - no

Marine training site at Atsugi was removed from the U-2 area to which the Marines did not have access.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files - Manuel Ray y Rivero
DCD Documents
May 2, 1978

1141081[illegible]

1. Memo dated 24 Oct 1962 to Chief, Contact Division, from Chief, San Francisco Office
Subject: Suitability of Manuel Ray and Miro Cardona for Important Roles in a Possible New Cuban Government

05

Information received from Dr. Robert North, Professor of Political Science 05 at Stanford University and long-time source of exceptional value. North visited in Miami and contacted about 25 former Castro supporters representing a broad political gamut. Dr. North got the impression from many of the Cubans that they suspected Ray of being a "possible Communist sleeper". North reluctant to pass along this information, because accusations were very broad.

29

05

05

2. Infomation report dated 16 July 1962 and Earlier 08
Source: Cuban National (Alien File #A-12570921) who asked for an interview on occasion of first contact with CIA.

Cannot vouch for his bona fides. Had credential indicating membership in branch of revolutionary army's intelligence service, now in exile in U.S. and maintaing connections with colleagues in that country.

A friend of his reports plans to assassinate top Castro leadership in Cuba. To be done by poison -- "Clostridium Botulinum" which is strong, odorless, and tasteless. Takes about 12 days to kill. About 5cc would do the job. Waiting for next visit of major delegation from a Communist country -- dinner in honor of the occasion should bring together most of the important members of the regime and that is when the attempt will be made.

03

2. Cable dated Oct. 3, 1961 - WA CITE NYOR 4902 Support (Travis) info L/A Branch from Daniels. Source is Ernesto Dezaldo - Cuban lawyer now living in New York City. Stated the MRP in Havana is far less radical than under the leadership of Ray, who has been completely discredited in recent months. Primary purpose today is (a) assassination of top leaders in Castro regime and (B) sabotage of important industrial and government installations in Havana. Strength of MRP in Havana estimated to exceed 1,000 -- success measured more in terms of fund raising ability and blowing up of buildings.

3. Information dated June 4, 1961, Subject: Underground Student Leader Comments on Post-invasion Cuba. Reporting officer talked with ISIDRO BORJA, on the leaders of DRE. Borja says top DRE members in jail or in a friendly embassy in Havana but said new leaders have been selected and will resume sabotage activities shortly. Thought the underground could restore tension in Cuba in 3-4 months. However, said outside help needed to get rid of Castro. Claimed that prior to invasion, is was possible to buy almost anything in Cuba from Castro officials -- they were tainted by corruption. Since Castro's victory at Bay of Pigs, his popular support is estimated to be around 80-85%. Most support is out of fear because the people believe he will be in power permanently. Borja said DRE outside of Cuba working hard for release of former leader, Alberto Muller from prison.

SECRET

5/BR

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110820

DCD Documents - Manuel Ray y Rivero
Page 2

4. Memo to Acting Chief, Contact Division dtd 20 May 1964
From: Chief, Miami Field Office
Subject: Alleged "New York Times" Publicity Build-up for Manolo Ray

Hal Hendrix, Scripps-Howard L.A. correspondent believes NY Times publicity buildup for Ray in full swing. Tad Szulc reporting Ray's war movements from Miami. Also with Szulc is close friend, Henry Raymont of the Times. Hendrix said Times playing up Ray while downplaying Artime and Gutierrez Menoyo. Think's Times exaggerating Ray's plans to take teams of highly trained guerrillas into Cuba, and that Ray's "war" is little more than an MGM-type New York Times production so far.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110821

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII

March 29, 1978
Volume I Undated to September 1960

1. Cable suggests that an offer of financial assistance to Ray's wife and children from CIA rather than through the FRD may pay large future dividends. Family to arrive circa September 1960.

2. Cable to Director
From: MASH
19 September 1960

Increasing suspicion RAUL CHIBAS a Castro plant. Since exfiltration by KAPPES, CHIBAS has laid low but back in picture as representative of RAY. Common knowledge that CHIBAS brought KAPPES out of Cuba, but should be noted that KAPPES has since been in and out of Cuba three times with no apparent difficulties.

CHIBAS' sources of information:
Mason in U. S. government
Manuel de Jesus and Bender as FRD representatives
Nino Diaz as Alianza representative
Don Hogan Kappes as Alberto Fernandex representative.

This should get a good picture of the U.S. anti-Castro activities.

3. Summer 1960. Ray very actively recruited to become FRD member. CIA considered him an important political asset. RAUL CHIBAS, Ray's assistant, spoke for him with U.S. authorities. Urged strong organization inside Cuba before outside help could be effective. CHIBAS meets with Bender 9/7/60, says he is in favor of FRD but completely committed to Ray and would check with him.

4. 27 September 1960.
Memo to Western Hemisphere/4 Chief
From: Rudolph E. Gomez, Acting Chief, WH
Subject: Approval from State to Include Manuel Ray Rivero in the FRD Complex

At a 20 September 1960 meeting, Ray's name was suggested for inclusion in FRD and State desired to look further into his background. Ray was discussed again on 9/27/60 with Mr. Divine who further conferred with Ambassador Mallory same day and Mallory approved Ray's inclusion.

5. September 29, 1960 cable from MASH to WH9 indicates MASH somewhat doubtful about Ray's feelings toward U.S. and continued dealings with this group needs further policy consideration.

* There is a restricted CI/OA folder on Ray of this 201 file held under C#85514

* Ask about -- documents sent for microfilming in July 7, 1967.
UGFA 12222 3 November 1963 201 239298

6. Ray granted Provisional Operation Approval (POA) on 25 October 1960. (form says, Green list attached 104591)

SECRET

7. PRQ Part 2 169 C85514
Section I Contact and Development

Woodrow C. Olien met Ray October 1958 when Ray was head of Civic Resistence Movement in Havana. Three clandestine meetings were held prior to 04 1 January 1959, attended by Olien, Wallace A. Growery, [Ignacio Mendoza] (MRC member) who originally introduced Olien to Ray. After 1 January 1959, Ray given important post in revolutionary government and Olien has seen him only twice since, Olien poising as political officer to State Department.

Section II of PRQ states Ray is friendly to U.S., once having received a grant for special study there. A dedicated, patriotic Cuban, opposed to Communism but taken no active part in combatting it.

8. An undated, unaddressed letter from Antonio Gonsales Mora, Jr. --- P.S. Says Joaquin Sanjenis appears to be a person in whom CIA has great confidence. Linked to Artime conspiracy. Responsible for all "inter-Cuban" intelligence matters. Is a "shady character" -- gangster background -- gives impression of mental retardation. Not known as individual of any importance, but he is! "An inexplicable affair"

9. PRQ Part 2 (contd)
Section VI -- Subject has definite political action potential, ia a pro-democratic official of government who is not in sympathy with aims of international Communism and who is interested in strengthening ties between Cuba and U. S. Probably would never consent to agent status, but could by persuasion and argument be encouraged to influence policies of his government along lines compatible with U.S. government policies.

Section XIV -- Information in PRQ Parts I and II were obtained from file research and personal contact with subject.

1/mc

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII
March 29, 1978

1110823

Volume II
* October 1, 1960 - November 22, 1960

As of 21 November 1960, MRP organized as follows:

Manuel Ray - Chief
Raul Chibas - Sepcial Assistant to Ray
Juan Esteves Ramires - Secretary
Ramon Barquin - Military and Intelligence matters
Cisneros - Chief of MRP in Cuba

1. 10/4/60 Cable from (London) 15-1 claims that new Cuban resistance group organized under Ray and has 400-500 men in Las Villas Province. Not part of FRD but in touch with it.

* 2. 10/7/60 Cable from Havana. AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO has withdrawn from FRD. JUSTO CARRILLO and FELIPE PAZOS will be integrated into Ray's MRP. VARONA wishes to join, also, but Ray insists VARONA return to Cuba to do so.

3. 10/12/60 Cable to Director. RAMON BARQUIN claims CARRILLO and ARANGO are going to boycott FRD Executive Committee and sabotage its work. Barquin planning to join with Pazos, Ray, Chibas, MIRO and QUEVEDO to form a new frente and then request union with FRD. If accepted, Barquin would become military head. If Barquin does not get U.S. government support for this plan, he will return to Cuba to try to overthrow Castro and win election on an anti-Yankee platform.

* 4. 10/17/60 Contact report from Wallace A. Parlett
Subject: Meeting with JUAN ESTEVEZ and JORGE BERUFF, 10/13/60
Cubans said Ray's group will not lower themselves to answer "Fidelismo without Fidel" charge and let their actions speak for themselves. MRP is highly disciplined and feel the majority of Cuban people favor their platform. Its leaders are interchangeable. If Ray comes out of Cuba, Chibas or Estevez could go in and take his place.

5. 10/24/60 Memo for files
Subject: Representative of Manuel Ray to Professional Groups

ENRIQUE HIRAM GUTIERREZ y RODRIGUEZ (dob 5/20/31, Havana) travels frequently to Puerto Rico on architectural business. Also frequently enters U. S. at Miami. Represents Ray's organization to various professional groups in Havana. Also serves as courier to Miami.

6. DRE information. 10/24/60 Cable states MULLER reported receiving letter from ANTONIO GARCIA, DRE representative in Cuba that organization is going well but needs funds and material aid. MASH asks Mueller to get details of Garcia's "groupos de accion" and details of organization. MASH gave Muller $500 for Garcia. Muller is concerned about Manolo Ray

SECRET

1/mc

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File review, Manuel Ray
Volume ii of xviii
Page 2

11110624

whom he says is gaining strength in Cuba. Says students eager to join active group and will go to Ray if DRE can't get help soon.

7. Provisional Operational Approval granted to Ray on 10/26/60.

* 8. 10/26/60 Cable to Director from Havana reports Ray held MRP meeting on 10/23/60 and made following statements:

  a. MAJOR WILLIAM MORGAN had been very helpful to MRP - responsible for obtaining most of their weapons.
  b. In four months, MRP will have 20,000 militants throughout Cuba. Organized now in all provinces except Pinar del Rio. Invasion could not take place for 4 months but FRD still in favor of earlier date.
  c. CARRILLO and ANGEL del CERRO have left FRD and now with MRP

MRP urging Ray to escape Cuba and they feel it is only a matter of time until he is picked up and executed. MRP manifesto will be released this weekend.

9. 10/28/60 Monthly payments of $400 approved for Ray's wife in behalf of Bender group.

* 10. 10/28/60 Memo for Record
Subject: Conversation of CARRILLO and [PAUL J. MANSON] Chief, MASH
Economic philosophy: When FRD first formed it was attacked by RUBIO PADILLA as "Fidelismo without Fidel." Now FRD saying same thing about MRP.

* 11. 11/5/60 Cable to Director from MASH
Verona tells HUNT that he received information that Ray wanted to leave Cuba and was to be exfiltrated clandestinely by Bender group.

12. 11/8/60 Memo for Record -[John D. Peters] 03
Subject: Contact report on meeting with ROGELIO GONZALES

Gonzales considers Ray highly dangerous because of his ambition to play prominent role in Cuban government after overthrow of Castro. Thinks he poises threat to Varona's authority inside Cuba. Ray appears to have support of middle class, politicians and professionals. Should Ray join FRD, Gonzales thinks he will still operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede FRD with MRP.

13. 11/11/60 Cable to Director from JMASH
Ray arrived Tampa morning of 11/10/60. Mash officer staying with him until surfacing date which depends on safe arrival from Cuba of two other individuals. They are the last of the HUBER MATOS escapee group known by Ray to still be hiding in Cuba.

SECRET

Ymc X

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review Of Manuel Ray
Volume ii of xviii
Page 3

11110225

14. 11/14/60 Cable to Director from MASH.
Ray to surface at press conference scheduled for 11/16/60 in Miami.

** 15. 11/17/60 Cable 03 to Director from MASH
On 11/15/60, [Parlett] alias Bender met with Ray in complete privacy. "Unquestionably, the youthful, softspoken, unassuming, almost humble Ray is a natural leader of highest intellect, deepest sincerity and convistion." Ray's political posture doubtful as far as U.S. government acceptance is concerned.

Explained to Ray the U.S. government's desire to have all Cuban exiles unified in their efforts. Ray says MRP does not wish to reinstate 1940 constitution. Provisional government of 30 honorable Cubans would be established and elections held 18 months thereafter. Castro laws passed at beginning of his regime to be promulgated. State would regulate private investment and utilities would be nationalized.

Ray wants to keep MRP "lean and hungry" -- each member to have specific responsibilities and feel important to revolution.

Ray asked for permission to start a fund drive in Cuba and U.S. Also asked for $10,000 by next Wednesday -- Bender made commitment.

03
[Parlett] believes net result of meeting was establishment of private MRP-U.S. link and door remains open for some kind of relationship with FRD. Ray agrees to discuss this with Miro Cardona. Of all the groups being supported, FRD, MRP and MRR are most significant. All Cuban groups seem to be looking to Bender group to show a preference before joining one of the above three. How long current flexibility can be maintained is problematical.

* 16. 11/21/60 Memo for Record
Subject: Meeting with King and Esterline on subject of handling MRP, 11/18/60

Consensus was that Ray did not politically represent anything to cheer about. Writer felt MRP opposed to joining FRD and recognized need to control MRP and wean it away to the extent possible from its leaders. Could be done by controlling financial and military support. It was agreed in meeting with Mr. Barnes that financial and military support for MRP be channelled through FRD.

17. 11/23/60 Contact Report: Meeting with Ray and Chibas in NYC, 11/22/60
Ray says MRP has contacts at Isle of Pines with two garrisons and can expect about 750 men to desert Castro at proper time. CAPTAIN CAPOTA is contact with Ray's group.

Ray's people also in contact with commander of prison where Huber Matos is incarcerated. Matos believes PADILLA, the prison commander, would assist

SECRET

him in an escape. Ray interested in single operation to get military defectors and free Matos. Wants to effect plan on 11/27/60.

Ray wants assistance from U.S. -- military information and supplies.

18. 11/24/60 Cable to Director from JMASH
Meeting with AMCHIRP-1 on 11/23, revealed he had information that MRP in Havana had capabilities to blow up power plant and TV stations in Havana -- a diversionary tactic planned to coordinate with Isle of Pines operation. Ray expects Isle of Pines operation support about 12/15/60.

* Notation about Cable: "Operation Unity" is to create dramatic show which will demonstrate that Manolo Ray is wrong when telling contacts in U.S. that his group is the only one capable of action."

19. 11/24/60 Cable to Director from Havana.
Operation Unity involves MRR, MDI, OA, 30th of November Group and MAR (not MAR of PEPIN RIVERO).

MAR and OA groups to blow electric cables in Regla area. MDC group, at same time, to make assassination attempt on CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ at University of Havana.

20. 11/30/60 Cable to Director from Havana
JULIO ANGEL METRE advised planning to travel to Miami 12/1/60 escorted by Brazilian ambassador to Panama. Accompanied by ambassador's wife. MESTRE will be introduced to Ray and will offer services of MDC to Ray at that time. Mestre says plan is approved by "DR. LUCAS" (JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE) MDC coordinator in Cuba.

Betsy Palmer

File Review - Manuel Ray y Rivero   Volume III of XVIII
March 30, 1978

December 1960 - January 1961   11110827

1. Cable 12/6/60 to Director from Gold
Ray contacted by Weisinger and made statement that Isle of Pine's operation failed in his opinion because Bender failed to forward paper to Havana with key to operation.

2. 12/8/60 Cable to Director from WAVE

Ray advised Wiesinger he is departing for Washington same day to visit ERNESTA BETANCOURT of OAS and others. In New York on 12/9 to contact Raul Chibas. Return Miami about 12/11/60.

3. 12/23/60 Cable to Director from Havana indicates Ray wishes return to Cuba as soon as possible and asks that OLIEN make arrangements through his official channel. Doesn't want Cubans in WAVE or Cuba to know of his return.

4. 12/22/60 Information report from U.S. citizen, free-lance writer and part-time sugar broker DONALD HOGAN

Says Miro Cardona has accepted teaching position in Puerto Rico effective early January 1961. Is disgusted with bickering among anti-Castro Cubans and will sit on sidelines for time being. Is partivularly opposed to Ray -- program is too Marxist and Ray is an opportunist.

5. 1/16/61 Information Report from U.S. national in a U.S. governemnt agency. Source had contact with DR. GUILLERMO SALAZAR SANCHEZ, former Cuban ambassador to Switzerland and DR. SERGIO ROJAS SANTAMARINA, former Cuban Ambassador to United Kingdom. Salazar said he had heard from a reliable source that Ray was not a bona fide defector and still acting on behalf of Castro and is a member of the "Blue Legion". (no further explanation.)

Dr. Salazar mentioned group called "The Ten Unknowns" who are key figures in making Communist policy in Latin America. (Ray not implicated as one of these).

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes 1 - XVIII (201-239298

April 6, 1978
VOLUME IV - February 1, 1961 - March 31, 1961

11110823

1. Operation Approval granted for Ray's use as a political asset on 7 February 1961

2. Memo to WH/4?Security, From WH/4?CI
Subject: Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo Group
Date: 23 February 1961

Ray pressuring Mr. Droller to have four individuals freed from McAllen Detention Camp who belong to Gutierrez group. Ray claims they are members of his group and have been most active against Castro regime in Cuba. They are as follows:

ASENCIO, Suarez, Lazaro
LESNIK, Menendez, Max DPOB 8 Sept 1930, Vueltas, Las Villas
PORTA Bolanos, Gustavo
REDONDO, Gonzalez, Roger

3. Cable to Bell, from JMWAVE
Date: March 1, 1961

Artime advises that Ray's group opposed to banning Communist Party and in favor of "nationalizing everything". Ray favors maintaining trade with USSR, wants no change in present agrarian reform program.

4. Cable to JMWAVE from Bell
Date: March 10, 1961

INS is concerned over the increased news coverage of Ray's arrival in U.S. and activities here. Afraid they will be confronted about Ray's arrival (which was describad as "black" in another communication) so JMWAVE asked to re-advise Ray that his story is that on 10 Nov 1960, he landed somewhere on Keys in a fishing boat, made way to road where picked up by INS patrol car, taken to WAVE area, examined, declared refugge and released with admonition to always keep INS advised of his address.

* 5. Memo to S - Dr. Berle, From: ARA - Philip W. Bonsal
Subject: Recent Cuban Developments
Date: March 16, 1961

Conversation with Jose Miro Cardona and Berle, reveals that Cardona has misgivings about Ray and Pazoz and the MRP. Says Ray is bitterly anti-American as well as probably totalitarian in his thinking. He no longer believes Ray has any considerable support inside Cuba. Thinks Ray group endeavoring to exercise influence in our government so as to be the major recipient of whatever assistance can be obtained here. He is particularly [illegible] concerned about the role played by Felipe Pazos.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray files
Volume iv of xviii
Page 2

11110620

6. Field Information Report
Subject: Background, Character and Economic Concepts of Manuel Ray Rivero
Date: 16 March 1961
Sources: Dr. Oscar SALAS Marrero (paragraphs 1-11) Knew Ray in Cuba
Dr. Jose ALVAREZ Diaz, former Minister of Finance under Prio (Pg 12)
Dr. Jorge BERUFF, former president of Banco de Desarrollo Economico de Cuba, (pg 13)

Note: Cover note pencilled comment (The content is so biased and mixed with untruth that it would be a disservice to the intelligence community to disseminate it.

Synopsis of paragraphs 1-11. Dr. Salas says during his childhood Ray was a Protestant but today is completely atheistic. Said Ray organized the MRC against Batista and shortly after Batista's fall, MRC and 26th of July Movement fused into one, and as soon as Castro came into power, control of the organization was given to the Communists. Tells of Ray's association with Castro and that he did not resign his position when his own brother was renounced by Castro. Stated that Ray's rupture with Fidel was due to the fact that Ray opposed the idea of shooting Hubert Matos as a traitor. Ray resigned his post but said publicly that he approved and supported the Castro regime without any mental reservations. Says in Cuban clandestine circles Ray is regarded as boastful, ostentatious and deceitful. Intimate friends of Ray feel that he is a man of anti-democratic procedures, and does not like to take advice, even from members of his own movement.

Synopsis of paragraph 12. Dr. Alvarez said Ray was in favor of maintaining relations with USSR and not making Communist Party illegal. Said that although Ray withdrew all these statements when threatened with press coverage, Alvarez thinks they are representative of Ray's thinking and would try to put ideas into practive if he ever came to power. Alverez also mentioned Rays thinking on nationalization of public services, socialized medicine, nationalization of banks, etc.

Synopsis of paragraph 13. Dr. Beruff said Ray well-intentioned with no Communist tendencies. Cited a meeting at which the basic points of the MRP platform were discussed and said that since Ray was in disagreement with the others on most of the points, Dr. Felipe Pazos acted as chairman of the meeting and Ray argued his case as a simple member of the group. Out of this meeting came a declaration of 14 points, including the nationalization of the banks and public utilities.

On 9 March, Ray said that ideas attributed to him in paragraph 12 were not true and part of a "campaign against him by Mr. Pawley of the Miami City Transit Company".

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray files
Volume iv of xviii
Page 3

7. Report dated March 17, 1961, Marked Urgent

"It has been reported by a very reliable source that Manuel Ray (MRP) is bringing as an Adviser, Professor Fiterre from Habana University - This man Fiterre is an undisclosed Communist that has always openly admitted and braged about being aCommunist.

8. Memorandum for the Record
   Date: 27 March 1961
   Subject: Ray accepts appointment to Council: -----
   Signed: Gerard Droller

Miro was able to convince Ray to join CRC. Thus, as of 27 March 1961, Council's composition isas follows: Chairman: Miro Cardona; Board of Directors: Varona, Hevia, Carrillo, Maceo, Ray and Artime.

9. Memorandum for the Record
   Date: 27 March 1961
   Subject: Reported Anti-MRP Rally Promoted by Aureliano Sanchez Arango
   Signed: B. E. Reishhardt

Julio Lobo reported that Sanchez is planning a rally in Miami, 29 March to protest against the Ray/Pazos combine in the revolutionary council. Writer says, obviously, such a rally at this time could be most damaging and some attempt should be made to get to Sanchez to take the steam out of this maneuver.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - XVIII

April 6, 1978
VOLUME V - April 1961 - July 1961

1111083

1. Cable from JMWAVE to Bell
Date: April 3, 1961

Ray meets with Olien and said he was not as yet prepared to join ~~CRC~~ FRD. Said Miro had welshed on commitments and while willing to accept Ray into CRC, not willing to give him any voice in the Council. Olein apptempts to convince Ray he was doing great disservice to Cuban people by refusing to serve within FRC.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from Bell
Date: April 4, 1961

"To test actual MRP capabilities inside request you inform Ray to hit targets G, I and K during period 5-10 April. Attack target O including diesel locomotive engines immediately. Will forward additional targets if Ray shows any capability."

3. Letter to Editor (Pencilled note: Propaganda against MRP by Artime's replacement Jose Manuel Hernandez Puentes received from QD Date 6 Apr 61.)

"I am a Cuban who still thinks that Cuba can be rehabilitated after the fall of Castro. For this reason many Cubans have been baffled by the list of names now given as the saviors of Cuba for a Provisional Government. Among these are such notorious Castro followers as: Ray, Barquin, Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Chibas and others whose names remind us of an era of mourning, persecution and misery."

4. Report on Manuel Ray received from Enrique Molinet, a road and airfield construction engineer under Batista regime. Cover note dated 4/7/61. Molinet outlines his distaste for Ray, citing at the beginning his refusal to leave Castro even after the questionable suicide of his brother, Rene. After Ray was ousted from his Cabinet job, he continued to visit Castro, occupying a prominent position in all Castro's public appearances. Said that even before Castro, Ray was an active member of the Cuban Orthodox Party, highly infiltrated with communists. Claims that when Ray in his Cabinet position, indoctrinations programs were held expousing communistic ideals. Also while Minister of Public Works, claims he (Ray) threw out hundreds of employees without due cause and destroyed every successful contractor that existed.

5. Memorandum for the Record
Subject: Custody of Revolutionary Council, 19-20 April 1961
Signed: [Robert F. Moroney]
Date: 24 April 1961

Relates that on 19 April 1961, President Kennedy met with the six members of FRD's Revolutionary Council where President expressed his deep sorrow and concern over the failure of the military effort (Bay of Pigs). Ray one of the group.

SECRET

SECRET Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray Files
Volume v of xviii
Page 2

11110832

6. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 5 May 1961
Subject: Manolo Ray - Comments on his Anti-Castro Activities
Signed: Calvin Hicks WH/4/PM/Operations

"Ray is balieved to have accomplished pratically nothing towards the effort to overthow Castro. Instead, it seems that whenever we played with his so-called assets, we were burned. He is notorious for claiming assets or operations, several days after some other group had already set them up or claimed them. Whenever it came to producing and backing up his claims, he always came up with excuses for not producing, rather than results. He has always tended to try to take over other goups, rather than cooperate with them, and when he couldn't take them over he would "politic" against them. His actions all seemed to be directed toward making him the future power in Cuba rather than toward overthrowing Castro. It is believed that Manolo RAY is so far "left" in his thinking that he would be as dangerous (or more so in the long run) to United States interests as Castro, if he ever got to be the power in Cuba."

7. Memorandum for the Record
Subject: ~~Manolo/R~~ Relations with Manolo Ray and the MRP
Date: 2 June 1961 03
Signed: [James A. Noel]

In a 12 May 1961 meeting, Ray promises to write a prospectus of his plans for MRP within ten days. Not received by 2 June, but Ernesto Betancourt is asking for financial support for MRP activities. Tracy Barnes agrees with 03 [Noel] that no money should be given Ray until his plans are studies. Ray is asking for support separate from FRD since Ray has withdrawn from this group. 03 [Noel] further states in Memo, "---I would like to point out the security risks inherent in any arrangements with RYA-BENTANCOURT-CISNEROS trio. These fellows have had easy access to the White House and to the Department, are notorious for their 'planned leaks', will probably presume all the Department officials they deal with are privy to the arrangement, and before we know it the whole exile community will be well aware that we are providing financial and material support to the RAY group."

8. Cable to Bell from Caracas
Date June 8, 1961
On June 2, Venezuelas governemnt refused to issue a visa to Manolo Ray.

9. Cable to Director from Caracas, dated June 28, 1961. re: meeting with Jose R. Barbeito on 20 June in Valencia. Barbeito claims was member of MRP of Manolo Ray and took part clandestine activities Havana. Admitted was communist "many years ago" but now completely opposed to Castro and Communism.

SECRET

3/mc

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray Files
Volume v of xviii
Page 3

11110633

10. Intelligence Report
Date: 7-11 July 1961
Place: San Juan, P.R.
Source: Cuban Exile Lawyer
Evaluation: F-6

Report transmits information concerning activities, persons visited and purpose of visit of Ray to Puerto Rico, terminating when Ray hurridely left Puerto Rico following press account that he had been removed as Coordinator of the MRP.

Source said MRP leaders in exile believe Rays dismissal due to propaganda and pressures by the CIA which brought about the impression that the obstacle to receipt of help from outside (money, arms, etc) was Ray himself and that once Ray removed, they would receive all types of help. The exile leaders are of opinion that it was also brought about because Ray was a divisionist inasmuch as he had abandoned Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Council.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files Volumes I - XVIII

April 6, 1978
Volume VI - August 1, 1961 - June 30, 1962

1110834

1. Cable to JMWAVE from Director
Date: August 1, 1961

FBI conducting investigation on MRP and Ray and Director indicates he needs to know purpose of investigation to respond properly.

2. Dispatch from Chief of Base, JMWAVE
Date: August 4, 1961
Subject: Debriefing of Father Bastarrica

Father Bastarrica recently arrived from Cuba as a political exile. At a luncheon meeting, he reported as follows:

MRP formed in Cuba around 26 July 1960. Organizers were Dr. Amalio Fiallo Gonzalez, Dr. Antonio Fernandez Nuevo, Reynol Gonzalez, Humberto Perez Herrera. All these men belonged to group called Accion Democratica. The name of MRP was suggested by Raul Chibas and in itself it does not constitute a party or group but rather a coalition of several small groups, which were the following:

a. The 20 May group, led by Manuel Ray
b. Accion Democratica, led by Dr. Fiallo
c. Accion Verde Olivo, led by Dr. Rufo Lopez Fresquet
d. 30 November Movement, led by David Salvador (never really joined)
e. Chibas' group with Jorge Beruff and Felipe Pazos
f. Dr. Valdez Pino, in asylum in Embassy of Peru and belonged to Accion Democratica.

Father Bastarrica's opinion of Ray is that he had no way of judging whether Ray is Communist or Marxist. Lacks quality of leadership because he does not publically hold to a definite political, social and economic ideology. He appears to agree with every person he talks to, never arguing with them or opposing them, all of which shows he has no ideology and makes him a very dangerous man. Is extremely ambitous for himself, with great desire for power.

3. Memorandum for Chief, WH Division, dated 10 October 1961, from Warren S. Yauger, Subject: General - Cuban Matters; Specific - Manuel (Monolo) Ray Planning Board of Puerto Rico announced on 9 October 1961 that Ray has accepted position as consultant to that Board. Board is an important agency of Puerto Rican government, attached to the Office of the Governor. Has broad powers over economic and social planning and is active in exercising these powers. Ray to receive $12,000 per year. Ray presently in Venezuela but expected to arrive Puerto Rico within a week.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files
Volume vi of xviii
Page 2

11110235

4. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated May 27, 1962 discusses front page article in Miami Herald of this date by James Buchanan entitled "Miro fades as Exile Chief: Three Latin Leaders Behind Ray". States that Ray has the backing of Gov. Monoz Marin, Pres. Romulo Betancourt and former President Jose Figueras and that Ray has taken over post with blessings of the U.S. Further states Ray's appointment as "Chief in Exile" came from underground in Cuba according to Joaquin Godoy, Provisional MRP head in Miami. Article credits Cubans in Miami with saying "new man in field" is Adolf A. Berle, Jr. who has been special asst. to State Dept. and is also member of Pres. Kennedy's special task force on Lantin America. Implication being that Berle is running new U.S. sponsored Cuban effort. Release causing furor in local Cuban colony.

Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 28 May 1962 states State Department spokesman will state story without foundation at a noon press briefing this date.

5. Listing of principal persons in Puerto Rico with the MRP

RAY, Manuel
PAZOS, Felipe
BARQUIN, (Col) Ramon
MELENDEZ, Juan
GELAVERT
NODAL, Rodolfo
PORTELA, J. Migues
CARMONA, Claudio
ESTEVEZ, Jeromino
BERGNUS
ALVAREZ, Gabriel
PORTELA, Sara

6. On 9 June 1961, Ray transmitts a detailed study of a general program designed to attain the liberation of Cuba. General Thesis states that MRP believes that the strongest position for representation and canalization of aspirations of the large majority of the Cuban people is offered by the set of ideas and aims of the democratic left.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII

April 24, 1978

11110236

Volume VIII _ July 1962 - August 1962

1. Cable dated July 2, 1962 to Director from San Juan
Clear that Manolo Ray wooked upon with great favor by Puerto Rican government. No evidence, however, that Puerto Rican government is supporting the MRP. Believe record will show that while our past contact with Ray has not always been happy one, it always revealing of Ray's intentions.

2. Memo for Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez 12 July 1962
Subject: Manolo Ray Rivero

"Ray has indicated to WAVE sources that whereas he is not persona grata with the Agency, he has important political connections in Washington and is thus kept informed of much of the Agency's activities. Ray's new organization is not to be military or engage in military thrusts against Cuba because military activity is presently controlled by the Agency and cannot be wrested from it at this time. Ray's new organization will cooperate with the Consejo and attempt to move in on it with the ultimate aim of taking over and dominating it."

3. Memorandum for Chief, Task Force W from Alfonson Rodriguez 25 July 1962
Subject: Manolo Ray Meeting in New York

Ray sorry he joined FRD prior to April invation. Let tide of time suck him in and take him along. Obvious to him that show run in good faith but bad judgment. Ray discusses hope that JURE will be long-lasting organization in Cuba. Ray's political views are assessed as democratically oriented, and if he became ruler of Cuba, his greatest preoccupation would be with economic progress. Rodriguez says Ray is not to be under- estimated. Commands respect because he is well educated and has something to contribute.

4. Ray begins to give information about possible defectors from Castro. Cable dated 25 July 1962 reports that Ray told Willard R. Nauman that Armando Hart Davalos is a feasible target.

5. Additional information to a July 1962 memorandum from Jack Malone (named on interoffice route slip). Information obtained from difference sources from persons close to Ray and their views are complete reliable. Ray did not leave Castro's cabinet because of ideological or policy discrepancies with Castro but because of a heated discussion with the Minister of Labor. Martinez Sanchez, who almost shot Ray after a Cabinet meeting. The sources of information agree that Ray is not any different than Castro. Some of them believe he may not have completely severed his relations with Castro and think he may still be in contact with him. Diplomatic relations were suspended but recognition was not withdrawn.

former mgr., Kings Ranch, Cuba

6. Memo from Jack Malone, dated July 16, 1962 Cover letter addressed to C. Mechen. Says Ray's ethics are poor and he is capable of sacrifycing his own kin and friends if such sacrifice turns out in favor of his personal plans. Claims Ray is irresponsible and ignorant of present international conditions and particularly of the Cuban social and economic reality.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110237

Manolo Ray
Volume VII continued

Quotes Ray as having said, "When I was Minister of Public Works, we, the inner circle of the Department, took a course in Marxist economics, and if what we were taught is communism, I must say that communism is not as bad as it is claimed to be."

03 03 03

8. Report on visit with Ray in Puerto Rico during first week of June, 1962, submitted by [Winterrowd] through [Walt Raymond] [Winterrowd] states his general impression of Ray was a good one -- seems of be a moderate, intelligent man, a little given to hysteria and slogan-mongering. Best quality is in his skill as an organizer

9. Cable to Director from JMWave, dated Aug 15, 1962 DIR Cite WAVE 7062 Ray had meeting in Miami area 11 or 12 August in which an informant says Ray stated that he has arsenals in Venezuela and Cominican Republic, has a B-26 plane, territory available for training in Costa Rica and has the support through indirect means of U.S. Has invited journalists from New York Times and Time Magazine to cover his announcement of the formation of JURE.

10. Cable to Mexico City from Director, dated 6 August 65 says Ray plans to travel to Central America late August or September and needs visitors visa for Mexico. Says he has close acquaintance and wants to make personal effort to recruit him or talk him into defecting.

CIA makes inquiries in an effort to obtain visa for Ray.

11. Cable to Director from San Juan, dated August 20, 1962. Ray believes Llanusa will defect but needs financial support. Jose Gelabert to make pitch to Llanusa. Later cable says CIA willing to offer Llanusa $5,000.

12. Cable to Mexico City from Director, 23 August 1962 with directions to proceed to procure visa permit but make every effort to conceal U.S. connection. Ray had agreed in N.Y. meeting to make recruitment or defection effort towards Cuban Ambassador in Mexico.

13. Memo to Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez dated 24 Aug 1962
Subject: Operational Use of Ray Expenditure of Funds

Rodriguez feels beginning collaboration with Ray can be based on three specific proposals:
1. creation of an intelligence network inside Cuba
2. creation of recruitment or defection capability to assist our efforts in MEXI, RIO, SAGO, and MONT
3. immediate effort to recruit in place Carlos LEGHUGA and Raul PRIMELLES.

Recommends paying Ray $84,700 over a six month period to begin this initial operation.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manolo Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes 1 - XVIII

April 24, 1978

11110633

Volume VIII - September 4, 1962 - December 27, 1962

1. Telegram Information Report (circa Sept. 10) Unevaluated information. Ray in the U.S. 8-9 September. Intends forming new organization. Some of those participating with Ray in this effort are Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Ramon Barquin and Justo Carrillo. Ray is of the opinion that nothing will be done about Cuba in the immediate future as the President of the United States is fulfilling "an ezpedient of a political nature." However, there is an ally in the White House who has assured Ray that if he organizes a purely revolutionary group, he will be heard.

2. Junta Revolucionaria Cubana
Declaration of Principles outline the following areas:
1. Cuban Reaffirmation - recognition of sovereignty of the people, through suffrag
2. Human Rights - human fraternity and social solidarity for all Cubans
3. Social Justice - equality of opportunity for education, work, homes, etc.
4. Economic Development - intense industrialization
5. Agrarian Reform - Cuban pesantry to own land he cultivates
6. International Relations - break with Soviet bloc
7. Restoration of Legitimate Property - not that under public power
8. Political Parties - Communist Party will be proscribed
9. Political Prisoners - immediate release
10. Elections - within 18-month period

2. Dispatch to Chief, Task Force W from Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Date obscured

[AMTHRILL-1 provided information on Ray obtained from Silvia KOURI de Pendas, a fellow student of Ray's at Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza #1 in Havana. Ray never know to have sympathy for Communist cause. However, one of his good friends, Pedro Valdes Vivo, is active member of Communist cell and a brother of Raul Valdes Vivo, now sub-director of Communist paper "Noticias de Hoy."

3. Cable to Priority San Juan, Info: Priority JMWAVE, Priority Mexico City
From: Director (Rodriguez originator) dated 9 Oct 1962
Admission visa not pauched 00 forwarding document will be in WAVE hands 10 October forpass ing to Ray. Lechuga is principal target in area of Ray trip. Stress desire keep Lechuga in place in preference to defection.

4. Memorandum for the Record dated 8 October 1962 from [Patrick I. Karnley]
Subject: Notes on Manolo Ray
In conversation with Luis Laboy, Laboy said Ray does not have any significant following among Cuban exiles -- says Ray is honest person completely motivated by patriotism but lacks qualities of a politician. Says Ray is too blunt and even Cisneros is not happy with him these days.

Puerto Rican Police are apparently canvassing Cuban exiles regarding Manolo Ray. In [SK]IN-1 Report #54 dated 30 Sept 1962, he refere to fact that both he and Fermin Alvarez Silva were visited by officer of PR Internal Security Force soliciting their opinions of Ray.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Manuel Ray
Volume VIII continued

11110830

5. Excerpt from Bohemia Libre 21 October 1962, page 85 Engineer Ray's Latest Attitude

Letter to magazine from Olga Hernandez, Santurce, PR - an exile who believes Ray really a Communist. Her reasons based on Ray's statements to "El Mundo" on his arrival in exile that after Castro's defeat there should be maintenance of cultural and economic relations with Russia, maintenance of militia, mainenance of confiscated property, socialized medicine, supervision of national schools and gradual supression of private schools.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - XVIII
April 24, 1978

11110840

Volume IX - January 1963 - July 1963

1. Cable to Director from Caracas, dated Feb. 22, 1963

FRANCISCO SUAREZ QUINONES wishes travel to Maimi to attend JURE rally 24 February. In view Ref B (WAVE 2462) info that Suarez communist and also MRP member, DCM has asked if any info that Suarez was undercover agent for MRP or if he may be double agent working for Castro.

2. Confidential Controlled Dissem. dated 3 June 1963
Title: Plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Infiltrate the Ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency

On 30 April 1963, Rogelio Cisneros reported on meeting of JURE exec. board in his home attended by, among others, Antonio Arias. During meeting, Cisneros said it was mentioned that Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a trusted man into the CIA in order to learn details of any plans with regard to Cuba and if possible infiltrate this man into Cuba. Cisneros also said JURE planning leaflet drop into Cuba which will include such matters as Ray's Manifesto against the U.S. Government and against the CIA.

3. Cable to Director from Paris, dated 19 June 1963 #7727Z

Ray in Paris - contacted by Jervay. Ray driven to airport by Alberto Baez with whom Ray spent much time and who seems to be closest to Ray among his contacts in Paris.. Ray in Paris and Brussels for purpose of ~~toring~~ Franqui and Arcos to agents in place, or defection. Also Cabrera. Ray convinced Cubans ~~here~~ disillusioned with Castro. Asks for update of list of personnel and addresses of all Cuban embassies in Europe to be passed to him in San Juan and [UNRUMBLE 6] in Paris. Wants to be trained in short wave system between himself and [UNRUMBLE 6] and station felt these were good ideas and could be done.

4. Memo for the Record from Alfonso Rodreguez, dated 19 June 1963
Subject: Manolo Ray
Ray's attitude towards CIA - feels that the Agency has in the past purposely and actively attempted to destroy him as a political leader and has proof of at least one CIA officer plotted with certain MRP officials to remove him from the Mrp as a condition for CIA assistance to that organization. Ray cannot be overlooked in the struggle for Cuban freedom. "-- of all the Cubans I have met, he is the most purposeful, methodical, as well as the most experienced clandestine operator.."

5. Confidential Controlled Dissem. dated 27 June 1963
Re: Creation of an Intelligence Corps within the JURE
Reliable information from former Rebel Army member (F) active in clandestine movements. JURE meeting ~~o~~about 30 March 1963 at home of journalist Antonio Arias said JURE national executive board had created an Intelligence Corps with JURE whose function was to infiltrate JURE members into various

SECRET

2/mc

Volume IX continued

organizations operating in Miami, as well as into some of the agencies of the U.S. govt. Said intelligence group would produce great results and stated as an example the infiltration of the U. S. Army.

6. Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Dated July 22, 1963
Subject: Manuel Ray Rivero's Opinion of CIA (AMTAUP-2 source of info)
"During a conversation on an unspecified date, involving AMTAUP-2, Ray and Rogelio Cisneros Diaz, Ray told Cisneros that they had to be very careful with CIA agents because they were more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration. The Kennedy Administration would end but the CIA agents always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of elephants and they never forgot or forgave. Ray told Cisneros that he feared CIA agents would try to assassinate him because they were irreconcilable enemies."

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files of Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII

April 24, 1978

11110242

Volume X - August 1963 - September 1963

1. Memorandum for the Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, dtd. 2 August 1963
Subject: Meeting with Ray (27 July 1963 in Miami)

Ray to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant and wants 20lbs high explosives as well as 6-8 thermite grenades. Requested that the materials be cached inside Cuba (preferably) or in San Juan. Requested that arrangements be made for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo to visit his brother to inform him of JURE plans -- Rodriguez says possibility remote. Ray planning to visit Caracas and Costa Rica later if he has a visa from Mexico. Purpose of trip is fund raising.

2. Cable from JMWAVE to Director #63249 dtd 22 Aug 1963
Ray's Mexican visa forwarded WAVE by safehand Sept 62 and request it be airmailed to Ray in Puerto Rico. Ray planning trip Costa Rica, Caracas, Dom. Rep. and Mexico. Departing San Juan 29 August for first leg.

3. Memorandum for the Record dated 23 August 1963, from A. Rodriguez
Subject: Ray, Contact Report

Met with Ray in N.Y.C. on 19 August. Rodriguez recommends to Ted Shackley that ammunition for JURE be cached near Florida Keys. Thinks it necessary to help Ray this much in order to measure his capabilities. Ray is having a 25-foot boat outfitted in Miami area to be operational by about Sept. 10. Will be used primarily for infiltration and exfiltration of personnel into Cuba. Ray also says he has been offered a 210 ft. Corvette, flying a Venezuelan flag and owned by Spaniards friendly to JURE. Said he could extend operations along the south coast of Cuba for as much as 2 - 3 weeks with this vessel. Ray was interested in whether or not KLM flights were to be resumed into Cuba as he is hopeful of returning by legal means which would not pose as many difficulties as present Mexican and Spanish air travel conditions.

Ray says he hoped to soon penetrate the Cuban delegation to the U.N. Said his contact with Ambassador Lechuga, through a woman member of the JURE, continues, but without significant progress. Lechuga is most friendly towards her but does not wish to discuss any of his problems with her.

Rodriquez recommends continuation of monthly $10,000 payments to Jure and an additional $15,00 to cover cost of vessels to be acquired.-- total of $25,000 monthly for 6 months.

4. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 24 August 1963 #232228Z
Ray Mexican visa waiver number 50844 issued 3 Sept 62 valid for six months, hence now expired. Under circumstances, WAVE not mailing to Ray unless otherwise instructed.

5. Cable to JMWAVE from Director, dtd 24 Aug 63 Cite Dir. 63774 Please air mail as Ray will need to procure new waiver.

SECRET

SECRET Betsy Palmer

Volume X continued

11110243

6. Cable to [San Jose, Caracas, Santo Domingo,] Mexico Cityk JMWAVE
From: Director dated 31 August 63

Ray departing 29 Aug. on trip to first three addees. Attempting renew Mexican visa waiver for travel there later. Purpose of trip to solicit political backing, raise funds, tighten JURE organization, streamline communication and establish take-off points for operations against target.

7. Cable to Director from JMWAVE dtd 7 Sept 63, Ref WAVE 3895

Reported conversation with Ray's sister-in-law wherein she stated Ray visited her home on 30 August to say goodby. He was going to be infiltrated into Cuba and would not see her for some time. Said he was not in accord with certain U.S. officials on Cuban policy and has no confidence in U.S. ability to liberate Cuba. Said he had refused two invitations extended by RFK to discuss Cuban situation.

8. Document transfer and Cross Reference dtd 10 Sept 63 [UFG-03590]
Ray arrived secretly in Miami from Puerto Rico, had secret meeting with Manuel Quiza Docal, LDR of Cubanos Libres, in which Quiza officially connected his organization to JURE for all action. Later traveled to N.Y.C. to purchase c-4 explosives.

9. Cable to Director from JMWAVE dtd 11 Sept 63, report from AMTAUP-2] who spoke with Rogelio Cisneros on 6 Sept. Cisneros stated Ray departed for Costa Rica on 5 Sept to interview President Orlich. Said on Ray's last meeting with RFD, the private secretary of President Romulo Betancourt was present. Cisneros said JURE objective is to have different prominent figures in Latin American governments witness promises made by U.S. govt. Cisneros said JURE not obligated to report military or political plans to CIA but CIA obligated to deliver to JURE all military equipment needed to fight Castro. Delivery of equipment will be on high seas from a CIA boat to JURE boat which will proceed to Cuba.

10. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 6 Sept 63. Elania Germania (Bernal) de Paula reported she learned from her brother-in-lay, Manuel Ray, that he had recently been in Europe negotiating arms purchases in Belgium. Contact man for purchase of Col. Ramon Barquin.

11. Cable to Director from MEXI dtd 27 Sept 1963 #6301

[LITAMIL-2 approached by Julio Lanier on behalf of Ray and JURE. Want to start military operation against Cuba using Mexico as a base. Lanier says Ray receiving money from Venezuela. L-2 is a CIA agent - Cuban citizen living in Mexico. Mexican station wants to keep him clean of overt exile activity.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Volume XI continued - page 2 11410845

7. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dtd 11 Oct 63
On October 1, Cisneros tells AMTAUP-1 that Ray to visit Betancourt later in week to report on status of JURE negotiations with U.S. and promises made to Ray by RFK during recent interviews.

8. CAble 172301Z 17 Octobar 63 to Director from JMWAVE.
On 15 October 1963, Jose (Gomez) Rodriguez, aka Cabeza, JURE member tells AMTAUP-2 that CIA officials from Washington, D. C. coming to Miami to finalize agreements with JURE. Also said JURE would never tell CIA exact landing sites on Cuban coast.

9. Cable to Director from Mexico City, 26 October 1963
Secret 260035Z
Dir WAVE Cite Mexi 6677
Ref A Mexi 6455 (not sent WAVE) (IN 36021
REF B HMMA 22285 01 (also recd 2285)
JURE representative Julio Lanier pressing LITAMIL-2 to obtain Mexican visas for Luis Giun Figueredo and Rogelio Cisneros Diaz who want to inspect plane of Ref A.

Fast action needed or L-2 will not be able to meet Cisnero and have an "in" with JURE group for purpose of ooverage of JURE PM activities Mexi. Lanier will set up meeting in Miami or San Juan.

10. Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs from CS/JMWAVE, dtd 21 Oct 63
Information received from AMTAUP-2
Ray to arrive in Miami 26 July, in secret, because he wanted to hold private meetings to discuss military affairs with action groups in Miami. Met at home of Rogelio Cisneros Diaz on 28 July. Met with Armando Alanis Angulo and asked him to join JURE. Alanis former Chief of Fiscal District of the Treasury in Camaguey Province. Ray says he has organization inside Cuba but needs personnel on outside with which to operate. Claimed to have 300 weapons in Miami.

On 18 August, Cisneros meets with Alanis and Luis Aguiar (who belongs to Alanis group). Talked of plans for Aguiar's men to infiltrate Las Villas Province and open a JURE organization.

Alanis officially joins JURE on 20 August 1963 and received Cisnero assurances they will get financial help from JURE.

11. Cable to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from JMWAVE/CS dtd 22 Oct 1963
#6. On 30 September, Ray departed for San Juan from Miami, after having visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama to gain support for operations against Cuba.

12. Cable 79065 on 29 October 1963. Willard R. Nauman will arrive San Juan October 31, 1963 to meet Ray in St. Thomas. Do not plan contact unless need arises.

Betsy Palmer

Volume XI - continued - Page 3

11110846

13. Field Information Report dtd 26 October 1963
Ray in Miami 10/26/63 to meet with Ernesto Betancourt, former MRP and now Washington, D. C. delegate of ELC. May have met in an effort to merge ELC with JURE. Ray feels need to be in Cuba in 90 days - hurricane Flora has seriously damaged Cuba and this is an opportune time.

14. Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Meeting with Ray in St. Thomas on 31 October and 1 November 1963
Discussed JURE plans to begin operations inside Cuba by end of December.

15. Cable dtd 16 Nov 1963 to Director from JMWAVE indicates Ray ~~taking~~ meetig vessel REX within 50 miles of Cuba - cargo, 600 lbs. demolitions.

16. Cable dtd 18 November 1963 to JMWAVE from Director confirms understanding that all dates mentioned in Rules of Engagement this operation are moved up two days. Thus, WAVE will begin operation by caching materials and departing scene by 1200 on 25 November 1963.

17. Cable dated 3 December 1963 to JMWAVE from Director indicates Ray involved in infiltration plan, Operation BOLA, and CIA doubts his story as to why he couldn't complete mission -- said low on gas.

18. Payments to Ray 21 June 1963 - 5 December 1963, totalled $107,925.00
No payments in November.

19. Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, dtd 13 Dec 1963

Meets with Ray in N.Y.C. 12/6/63. JURE ship failed to pick up materials deposited on Roncador Cay on 25 November 1963. Ray had no full explanation for failure. Low on gas theory doubtful as ship did arrive a Puerto Limon on 27 November as scheduled. -- Ray doubts this story. Alternate date of 20 December set up, embarking from Puerto Limon, Costa Rica this time.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes I - XVIII

11110847

May 1, 1978

Volume XII - January 1964 - February 1964

1. Intelligence Information Cable, 4 January 1964 - information from Carlos Hernandez Hernandez, an Executive Member of Brigade 2506 veterans Association said the Brigade rejected a proposed alliance with JURE on December 7, 1963. Brigade is opposed to Artime, but more opposed to Ray.

2. Identification provided by CIA for Ray in his attempt to infiltrate Cuba. Request made 6 January 1964 - Ray to use identity of Juan Cardenas Mendez.

3. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 8 January 1964, Dir Cite WAVE 0106

[AMOT-84 said he learned from newspaperman Abelardo (Garcia) Berry that Ray had met in Paris with Carlos Franqui Mesa to propose that Franqui join Ray's organization, that is, sector of "Betrayed Revolution". Garcia believes that in order to obtain Franqui's defection, Ray told him about alleged plans of U.S. to overthrow Castro in which Ray was to play a prominent part. Garcia further believes that Franqui's "falling into disgrace" in Cuba is a trick of Castro and Franqui.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 8 January 1964 states that Governor Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico, pledged to give Ray double any amount Ray raised on a bond sale by JURE to buy guns. JURE has large quantity of arms in P.R. under protection of the Governor.

5. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 14 January 1964. Cisneros said JURE has military training base in Costa Rica under command of Julio Cesar Alonso, Military Chief of JURE. All JURE boats now at Costa Rican base and also arms which had been in Puerto Rico. Said JURE leaders do not plan to work in Miami area or anywhere else in U.S. because they are afraid CIA will seize their military equipment.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 16 Jan 1964 - Amtaup/2 reported that ~~Armando/Alanis/Angulo~~ Julio Cesar Alonso replaced as chief of Costa Rican military base of JURE because of his failure to go on a scheduled operation. (Check to see if this was the aborted mission of 25 November 1963)

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 30 January 1964. Amtaup/2 reported conversation with Sergio Sanchez and Rogelio Cisneros. Cisneros said FBI and INS, Puerto Rico, picked up JURE arms and explosives cached at Cajon de Muerto. Before JURE could pick cach up, it was discovered by a fisherman who advised authorities. JURE boat found and searched, but not retained as they had thrown antiaircraft guns overboard. Governor of P.R. called newspapers and informed them he thought Castro had cached the arms in order to overthrow P.R. Cisneros says he did this to sidetrack FBI and INS investagations and to eliminate possibility Ray's activities would be revealed. Cisneros said JURE boat located in P.R. and registered in Panama in name of person who is extremely close to governor P.R. and bitter enemy of CIA. Amtaup/2 questioned by Governor P.R. was trusted by Jure, to which Cisneros replied that Governor primarily nationalist and enemy of U.S. imperialist politics and therefore an enemy of CIA.

SECRET

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 31 Jan 64 - Article in Miami Herlad about the discovery of arms cache in Puerto Rico confirms accuracy of Amtaup/2 reporting that Ray involved in robbery U.S. Military installation and that Governor Marin is misleading FBI investigation. WAVE believes the C-3 explosive found in cache was provided Ray by WAVE as directed by Hdqtrs, but WAVE did not provide any weapons. WAVE will tell loaal FBI that they know nothing regarding background of cache discovery and assume Hdqtrs will coordinate case at Wash.D.C. level with FBI.

7. Intelligence Information Cable, dated 4 Feb. 1964 - reliable source says RAY expected in Caracas, Venezuela middle of February 1964 to establish a guerrilla training base for JURE in venezuela. Will be a regional center used by JHRE members in Venezuela and Panama. (Likely that if Ray succeeds in setting up camp, it will be with tacit consent of Betancourt government. Field Comment). Ray claims he will be inside Cuba by 20 May 1964.

8. Cable to DIR from Panama City, dated 9 Feb 1964 states JOSE MARIA PUENTE BLANCO, Panamanian/Cuban, DOB 17 July 1930, Havana, Cuba, left Panama City for Caracas on 8 Feb. He is possible Castro agent and Panama City would appreciate information re his activities in Caracas and/or subsequent travel.

9. Memo for the Record, dtd 12 Feb 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Meeting with AMBANG/1

ELC, according to Ray, was now disolved and became a part of JURE on 17 Jan. 1964. This brings to JURE the best former rebel army officers in exile and should give JURE a military background and support second to none in the exile community.

Comments: AMTAUP/2 reports have indicated Cisneros activities and statements are directed against the CIA. Rodriguez discusses Amtaup/2's reporting with Tony Sforza and Warren Frank. If Cisneros is in fact directing a program of denigration against the CIA, suggest agency follow the activities of Dionisio Suarez Esquival, who reportedly has been selected to carry out such a program in various Latin American univerities.

10. Cable to DIR from Panama City, dated 22 Feb. 1964. The PUENTE BLANCO brothers have been under some suspicion since their arrival in BACY following their release from Cuban prison as result of intervention of Thelma King. Part of suspicion is a result of activities of their brother, Jorge, still in Cuba.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XIII - March 1964 - April 1964

11110240

1. Memorandum to Acting Chief, Contact Division, dated 6 March 1964
   From: Cincinnati R.A.
   Thru: Chief, Detroit Office
   SUBJECT: Castro Type Subversion Likely/Manuelo Ray Dangerous Exile Leader now in Puerto Rico
   REFERENCE: CR-64-2 and WH-1594

Architect, Nocholas Quintana, residing in Cuba, told the following to a Mr. Raphael Katzen, consulting engineer in U.S. Manuelo Ray is in Quintana's opinion more dangerous to U.S. than Castro. Ray is not a Soviet type Communist according to Quintana, but his socialism is so extreme and his anti-U.S. feelings so deep that he considers Ray a dangerous exile leader, at least to the U.S.

Manuelo Ray is known to be of interest to the local FBI (Cincinnati).

(Check -- is ~~this CIA memo~~?)

2. Memorandum for the Record, dated 16 March 1964
   From: Sidney P. Di Ubaldo
   Subject: Contact Report, Meeting with Ernesto Betancourt

Betancourt has known Ray for several years and admired him through all various seasons of their relationship. Betancourt impressed with Ray's organizational talents and talents as an engineer.. Says Ray an effective and judicious personality and appeals to Cuban exiles of various stripes. Betancourt expressed a fear that Ray, in his zeal, might commit himself to such tight timing that he would be forced to undertake action at a disadvantageous moment.

Di Ubaldo comments that if Betancourt was leading him on in an attempt to sell Ray to him, it was done with a "subtlety to which I am definitely not accustomed".

3. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 17 March 1964. Cisneros told AMTAUP/2 that CIA had ordered personnel of AMWORLD (Artime's group) boats to fire on JURE boats and therefore Cisneros had instructed his crewmen to fire on AMWORLD boats wherever encountered.

Cisneros had meeting at his home on 15 March, attended by Armando Alanis Angulo, Dunney Perez Alamo, Jose Puente Blanco, National Chief JURE youth and member of JURE national Executive, and AMTAUP/2. Cisneros related that Romulo Betancourt told Ray in Caracas that Betancourt will work in favor of JURE. Puente confirmed this. Betancourt promised to arrange urgent meeting with U.S. officials in Washington to get promise from them that CIA would not sabotage any of JURE's planned operations.

Betsy Palmer

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 28 March 1964 - AMTAUP/2 spoke with Blas Enrique Comas Castro, captain of JURE boad VENUS which is in Puerto Rico. Said Cisneros and Ray recently arrived in P.R. from Caracas and said Venus would be used to infiltrate Ray into Cuba in a few days.

AMTAUP/2 said Armando Alanis Angulo said he was leaving Miami on 30 March for new JURE base within 6 hours of Miami. Said base under responsibility of Dunney Perez Alamo and himself. Also said Ray had chosen Venus to make trip to Cuba and Venus armed with 20MM gun, four 50 Cal and one 30 Cal machine guns.

5. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 28 Marbh 1964 - AMTAUP/2 reports that Alanis, Perez and Antonio Arias Gonzalez, JURE members, are dissatisfied with Ray's organization because they had now been forbidden to criticize U.S. govarnment policies, and the fact that they were allowed to have a training camp near Miami indicated that Ray is accepting CIA aid. Cisneros claimed the main objective of JURE was to keep U.S. govt. entertained with the training base set up in Miami area and that departure of JURE members to infiltrate Cuba will be outside U.S.

6. Accounting of funds received by Ray, from June 21, 1963 - April 8, 1964, show a total expenditure of $217,924.28 by CIA.

7. Memo for the Chief, WH Division, dated 14 April 1964, from Alfonso Rodreguez - Subject: My Meeting with Ray on 13 April 1964.

Essense of Ray's plans:
1. Two teams expected to go into Oriente Province this week.
2. Ray will turn over JURE contact with us to Cisneros, effective 23 April.

Ray's immediate objective once in Cuba will be to initiate systematic, continuous bombings of strategic and non-strategic targets. Power plant in Havana, major refinery and aquaduct in Santa Clara are immediate objectives.

8. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 26 April 1964. AMTAUP/2 reported that JURE training base opened near Tampa, Fla. for 30 men and planning to set up a base in Dominican Republic.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File Review, Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XIV - May 1964

11110654

1. AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964
Subject: Ray's Plans
Submitted by Henry D. Heckshera WH/SA/SO/HH

Ray's plans to infiltrate Cuba by 20 May were discussed at meeting. Questions about Ray's financing of Puerto Rican conference and ability to store arms and engage in training activities on U.S. soil were raised by AMYUM/19(MRR) Member). He volunteered to tell Heckshe where arms could be found be Heckshe "quickly dissuaded him from divulging further details" at which point AMYUM 19 commented that GUERTLER had reacted in a similar way when offered facts and figures about Ray's activities. Artime stated he would not put it past Ray to go into hiding in a secure place while pretending to be in Cuba.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, 7 May 1964 - After looking at AMTAUP material, it is obvious much of conspiratorial talk in JURE is for internal consumption only, the purpose being to protect myth that JURE is independent as basically hostile to CIA. In a desire to obtain proof of any anti-CIA or U.S. govt. activity by Ray, urge every effort to check accuracy of AMTAUP/AMOT reporting and follow through for any overt manifestations of many allegations made.

3. Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence, from Richard Helsm, DD/P, dated 13 May 1964. Subject: Plans of Manuel Ray and the JURE to Infiltrate into Cuba.

Helms says there is no question but that Ray seriously plans to enter Cuba sometime in May 1964. JURE has 6 teams ready to infiltrate -- a total of 27 men. Ray hopes with aid of 40 men, he can demonstrate that resistance is possible and that Castro can be defied.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, , dtd 20 May 1964. Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-Life, left Miami 18 May with JURE elements for rendezvous with Ray.

5. Memo for the Record dtd 20 May 1964, from Samuel Halpern
Subject: JURE Purchase of Arms

Chronological resume of reports reaching WH/SA desk regarding attempted purchase of arms by JURE in El Monte, California.

A. Revenue officials queried CIA re its knowledge of certain arms being handled by Juan Erquiaga Aizcorbe in L.A. area for shipment to Florida. WH/SA denied knowledge. Discussion about 20 May 1964.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110852

Manuel Ray - Volume XIV
Page 2

B. Rogelio Cisneros calls Rodriguez (~~Halpern~~) on 20 May to advise him certain arms being manufactured to JURE specifications in El Monte and being investigated by U.S. Treasury. Cisneros says JURE has invested $50,000 in these weapons being manufactured bu Knuson (sic) Manufacturing Co.

C. Rodriguez (~~the undersigned~~) tells Cisneros this is pretty sad situation that JURE must make use of Costa Rican, Venezuelan and other L.A. connections or they were going to get "clobbered" in U.S.

C?. Halpern and Rodrigaez advised Mr. FitzGerald of the above. He agreed agency could not assist JURE in this matter. On 20 May, Mr. Bowdler of St. Dept. notified of the matter, and Deputy Chief, WH/SA advised.

E. Joseph O'Neill of OGC called on 20 May and informed that JURE was involved but agency did not want Revenue called off its investigation because of the "autonomous" nature of our relationship with JURE.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 22 May 1964. Sender states that the manner of Tad Szulc in an office visit on May 21 and new confident tone expressed by Cisneros conveyed feeling to cable sender that Ray has made it into Cuba.

7. Cable tp JMWAVE from DIR, dated 23 May 1964. Request Reuteman advise AMCARBON/1 that he has checked with hdqtrs and that Ray is not receiving CIA support. Reuteman should trace history of intimate relationship of AMCAPE/1 with Ray noting that since Bay of Pigs, AMCAPE/1 has been serving, in effect, as a public relations man and loggyist for Ray. Further explain to AMCARBON/1 that AMCAPE/1 must be credited with single-handedly placing entire Cuban nation on alert and causing withdrawal of masses of conscripted workers from cane fields merely by articles playing on theme of threat of infiltration of Ray and a few men. Tell AMCARBON/1 that CIA would not become party to Ray operation knowing close relationship with AMCAPE/1, particularly since latter well known to be less than friendly to CIA.

8. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 26 May 1964. Cisneros says that as of 23 May 1964, no contact has been established with Ray but Cisneros believes he has reached Cuba.

9. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 28 May 1964 - Cisneros says Ray has not as yet been able to infiltrate Cuba and will make ~~another~~ attempt night of 28 May 1964. Cisneros says vigilance by U.S. authorities over activities of JURE reps. in Florida making support of Ray's effort extremely difficult.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

File Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

11110853

May 1, 1978
Volume XV - June 1964

1. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 30 May 1964 - information from Rogelio Cisneros Diaz - as of 30 May 1964, Ray had not entered Cuba. Boat to be used in final infiltration developed motor trouble. JURE reps were making all out effort to go to Ray's aid with replacement for boat and an additional supply of drinking water.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, dated 2 June 1961, Ref: WAVE 7218 (in 95616)* Please note similarities rumor reported Ref Para 2 and statement attributed to Rogelio Cisneros that CIA had instructed AMWORLD boats to fire on JURE boats per WAVE 3691 (IN 41477). Is this significant?

* Artime's followers authorized to attack any of Ray's or Gutierrez's men on high seas.

2. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE dated 3 June 1964 stating that Ray and Andrew St. George were among the individuals arrested by the British near Cayo Largo. (Location of Anguilla Cay also used in cable). Detainees taken to Nassau. Tom Dunkan, Life photographer, also in group.

3. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 4 June 1964 - AMTAUP/2 reported that Ray's organization going to make press statement that Ray's failure to enter Cuba was fault of CIA.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE dtd 6 June 1964 reflects feelings of Cuban exile community over Ray's failure to enter Cuba.

a. Ray made a fool of himself by taking a girl and two non-Cuban newsmen with him, none of whome adapted to rigors of guerrilla warfare.
b. British and U.S. participated in Ray's capture
c. Whole thing was a publicity stunt which went wrong.
d. Enrique Huertas jubilant over Ray's disgrace, but feels it is a loss of exile prestige and harbingers bleak and hopeless period
e. Dr. Antonio Maceo says many have lost faith in Ray for lack of accomplishment this past year.
f. Ray is laughing stock. Those who had hopes now feel he is only an ambitious politican not will to keep promises.
g. JURE members confused and undecided over how to defend Ray. Alanis and Zarraga wish to remove their followers from JURE.
h. Cisneros states to AMTAUP that Ray will accuse U.S. govt of treachery for cutting off economic aid one month ago and for searching his home, automobile and offices (Cisnero's?)(Photostats in volume XIV)

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Volume XV - June 1964
Page 2

5. Memo for the Record, dtd 9 June 1964, from Alfonso Rodreguez
Subject: Possible Plans of Ray

Opinion of Rodriguez that Ray will attempt asap to mount another infiltration effort. He is relatively certain JURE has or can procure a small craft capable of making trip from Florida to Cuba. He also thinks that ~~either Cisneros or~~ Ray "would be willing to publicly give the lie to the TIME magazine article of 12 June 1964.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 10 June 1964 - re-canvassing of exile community reveals Ray's prestige at near-absolute low point. Trend is tendency to ignore Ray completely. Information that JURE in considerable dissension. Threats of various factions to withdraw unless Cisneros dismissed and national board reorganized.

7. Memo for Record, dtd 12 June 1964 from Samuel Halpern
Subject: Information from the British in Answer to Questions Re; Identify of American Who Allegedly Paid Manuel Ray's fine in Nassau.

03

[Chris Phillpotts] called 12 June to say Gov. of Bahamas had replied to our query as to the identify of American who allegedly paid Ray's fine in Nassau. (see TIME of 12 June 1964, page 48 -- alleged CIA paid). Governor stated he had seen no such figure and to best of his knowledge, there was no such person. "I of course did not tell [Chris Phillpotts] that we knew the identity of the American as reported to us by Rogelio Cisneros of JURE."

8. Memo for Record, dtd 12 June 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: JURE telegram to TIME Magazine

Protest falsity of information published by TIME re: capture of Manuel Ray and his group. False that a CIA ship participated in any phase of operation. Also false that a CIA individual paid fine -- the $84.00 was sent to JURE by an American citizen at request of one of his employees.

9. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 27 June 1964: According to AMFAST/6, Ray informed Pepe Catillo (Jose Garcia Valdez) their departure date for Cuba would be July 1. Boat to be used is unnamed Rybovitch rented in Ft. Lauderdale. Ray planning to stay in Cuba about 15 days.

10. Memo for Record, dtd 29 June 1964, from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Establishment of Base Abroad; Manuel Ray Rivero

On June 22, the Special Group agreed "no monies would be forthcoming, specifically a requested $25,000, until he ceased" all activities from U.S. mainland.

Betsy Palmer

File Review - Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII
May 2, 1978

1111085.5

Volume XVI - July 1, 1964 - August 28, 1964

1. Draft on Manuel Ray by Alfonso Rodriguez dtd 6 July 1964

After his failure to reach Cuba during May 1964, Ray believes he must go into Cuba as soon as possible. Within JURE, according to Ray, his detention by the British is viewed as an unfortunate incident. Ray said some JURE members considering demonstrations before British embassies and consulates.

2. Memo for the Record dtd 7 July 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Tad Szulc Relationship with Manuel Ray

Rodriguez questioned Ray's using newspaper correspondents as emissaries to departments of the U.S. govt. Ray stated that Szulc took it upon himself to speak about matters related to assisting Ray. Rodriguez says it would be wrong to assume that Ray is controlled by Szulc but Ray "undoubtedly knows that Szulc has worked hard, first with President Kennedy and now, for him and his interest. This cannot but influence Ray."

2. Intelligence Information Memo, 14 and 15 June 1964 ON, 08
Source: [Jose Alvarez Sola, private chauffeur of Rogelió Cisneros Diaz]

JURE's national executive met 14/15 June to discuss crisis within the organization concerning Cisneros. Dr. Raul Chibas Ribas stated that if Cisneros not removed from his position, Chibas would make public his resignation.

3. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, dtd 9 July 1964
From: Dismond FitzGerald, Chief/WH Division
Subject: Chronology of Concept of Autonomous Operations and Summary of Financial Support to Manuel Artime

Attachment A is listing of origin, briefings, discussions, and approvals by appropriate policy levels of the concept of autonomous operations and specifically support to Artime. Chron clearly shows that from the very beginning the problems inherent in autonomous operations were clearly stated at all times by the Agency and that appropriate policy levels were kept fully and regularly informed of the status of autonomous operations.

Attachment B contains summary and breakdown of financial support for Artime. Summary states that, "From June 1963 through 30 June 1964 the Agency spent $4,933,293 in support of the Artime operation." Fixed monthly subsidy is $225,000.

Betsy Palmer

Volume XVI - continued
page 2

11110853

Origin of Autonomous Operations

Integrated Covert Action Program for Cuba, approved by Higher Authority in June 1963, provided for "support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution" of other courses of action. Concept was first voiced in Sept. 1962 in Walter Rostow's proposal for a "Track Two" approach to Cuban operations. Parallel to regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams, CIA would extend financial aid and some advice and guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Manuel Ray.

Rules of Engagement incorporated into June 1963 program.

1. "It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

2. The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, they cannot be resumed.

3. All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

4. The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U. S. complicity.

5. The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

6. These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule."

4. Article from New York Times, Wednesday, July 15, 1964, bylined Tad Szulc "Ray Said To Leave For Cuba Landing - Castro Foe, Balked in May, Reported on Way Again."

5. Cable to DIR from JMBARR, dtd 15 Jul 1964. M/V True with Manolo Ray and crew returned Key West area --- had motor trouble.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 18 July 1964. Ray's latest misadventures trying get into Cuba mid-July greeted with relative indifference majority Cuban exiles Miami area.

7. Wireservice prinout - Miami, Flay, July 24, 1964. Three exile groups withdrew from Ray's JURE today protesting that Ray failed to make good his promise to enter Cuba to reactivate the anti-Castro underground. Spokesman was Jesus Dieguez of the Revolutionary National Assembly.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files - Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

Volume XVII - September 1964 - February 1965 11110857
May 2, 1978

1. Memo dtd 1 Sept 1964, Subject: AMTAUP-2 Production
"Chief of Reports Comments: It would appear that AMTAUP-2's reporting on JURE matters have been generally reliable."

2. Autonomous Operations - Operating Plan
Activity: AMBANG
For the Period: 1 October - 31 December 1964. Total of $75,000 paid to effect move of JURE activities from U.S. territory and as a final payment to JURE.

3. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 9 Sept 1964 05
Source: Jose Garcia Valdez, aka "Pepe Gatillo"
Subject: Plans of JURE leader Manuel Ray Rivero to depart Miami for an Undisclosed Location.

Ray asked Garcia on 9 Sept 64 to take him, St. George and Mirta Borras on trip to unspecified destination. To depart on JURE catamaran.

4. Memo for the Record, dtd 11 Sept 1964 from Alfonso Rodreguez

On Aug 24, 1964, Rogelio Cisneros called to report his resignation from JURE. Stated Ray incapable of directing both political and military activities. Cisneros thinks Raul Chibas will soon also resign. Cisneros said Ray not prepared for ill-fated May attempt into Cuba and Cisneros thinks Ray had believed he could arrange for CIA to take him into Cuba. "Ray is politically unformed --- politically that which he last read". Cisneros further stated that he believed Ray had planned his entire return-to-Cuba angle with President Kennedy and the presidential elections of November 1964 in mind. According to him, Ray planned to make JURE and Ray outstanding liberal and democractic exile group with the thought that prior to the 1964 elections, Mr. Kennedy would have to do something about Cuba. With Kennedy's death, according to Cisneros, all of Ray's plans went awry. Rodriguez expresses to Cisneros that this seems like a far-fetched possibility and Cisneros admits he got idea out of thin air, but said theory widely held within Directorate of JURE.

5. Memo for the Record - draft - dtd 22 Sept 1964 - Alfonso Rodriguez
Conclusions "I recommend we give Ray what he asks and close the JURE books for good. If Ray is succesful in Cuba he will not need our help, if he is not, our help won't do much good.

"He is honest and at least the money will largely be spent for the purpose he wants to achief .

"Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyond reproach."

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Volume XVII - continued
Page 2

11110853

6. Erquiaga Arms shipment to JURE episode.
Cable from [San Jose] DIR CITE [SJOS] 7152, REF: DIR-63886
16-15 21-15

Please pass to Asst. Sec. Mann from Ambassador Telles: "I saw President Orlich and Minister Quiros Sasso on 18 November and conveyed reference position. The President was visibly shaken to learn that US government was not involved in this arms shipment. After some discussion with Minister Quiros, President Orlich requested that we not issue license for AMBANG-1 shipment. President Orlich made clear he would be happy at any time to undertake action such as this if US government wanted him to. While he does wish see Cuba free he inclined to agree with US position Re Hit and Run raids undertaken principally for publicity sake. President Orlich's decision based on (1) relaization that he would not be doing us a favor and, (2) further realization that CRG would be hard pressed to explain such a $70,000 purchase of arms if it became a campaign issue in 1965."

SECRET

2/mc

Betsy Palmer

File Review Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII

Volume XVIII - March 1965 -----------
May 2, 1978

11110653

1. Memo dtd 18 November 1965 to: United States Secret Service
From: Deputy Director for Plans
Subject: Ray, Rivero, Manuel Antonio aka: Ray, Manolo

In response to a telephonic request of 15 Nov. 1965 for a name trace on Ray. CIA files contain voluminous information from sources of varying reliability re: Ray who is well known to Intelligence Community as a prominent anti-Castro Cuban exile leader and head of JURE. If particular info is desired, please specify.

2. Memo dtd 6 Dec 1965 to Secret Service from DD/P gives 2 1/2 page standard bio information on Ray.

3. Memo dtd 15 Dec 1965 to Commissioner, INS from DD/P
Subject: Roige Cerezo, Jose
(A 12 399 923 TC)

According to CIA files, information dtd Aug 1963 from a Cuban emigree source, Roige was designated chief of intelligence by National Direction Abroad of JURE. Source said intelligence group created in Marc 1963 on orders of Manuel Ray for purpose of infiltrating JURE members into various organizations which operated in Miami area, as well as into agencies of U.S. govt. Further, that in April 1963, Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a JURE member into CIA in order to learn details of plans regarding Cuba. JURE also intended to drop leaflets into Cuba of a derogatory nature regarding U.S. govt. Included in these leaflets was Subject's manifesto against the U.S. govt and against this Agency.

4. Ltr. dtd June 2, 1966 from Dr. Julian Gallo to Harry (Mahoney?)
Gallo is contact with Ray in Puerto Rico and trying to discover the names of Ray's contacts in Cuba. Ray, apparently is seeking a Mexican visa from Gallo and unhappy that it did not come through. Refused to reveal names or addresses to Gallo and would not give information about where his radio broadcast tapes were to be sent for transmission into Cuba.

5. Memo for the Record, dtd 21 June 1966 from Charles Anderson
Met with Ray on 28 April 1966. Anderson said in general Ray had less information on the "purge situation that I did." Ray said relatives of Gustavo Arcos in P.R. had telephone contact with Arcos family in Cuba, about 25 April and that Arcos still in prison but charges against him were thin. "(This means there was at least one more telephone call than we knew of previously, and this has probably served to increase the pressure on Arcos)." Anderson tells of his concern and strong interest in Arcos on the chance that Ray might assume Arcos had been CIA agent. Doesn't know if Ray will construe remark this way but it seemed like an opening "to use an important exile channel as a possible deception mechanism."

"I believe that later in the summer it might be a good idea to have another talk with AMBANG to keep up with exile thinking, and feeding more deception thoughts."

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Volume XVIII continued
Page 2

11110860

6. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 28 June 1966
Source: Qualified American Observer

On 15 June 1966, Rafael Garcia-Bango, Cuban exile in Spain, received call in Madrid from Ray in P.R. regarding Ray's plans to assume power in Cuba. Garcia-Bango told Ray it was essential he come Madred before 25 June and return to San Juan in order to talk to a member of Cuban delegation for 10th Caribbean and CenAm games in P.R., prior to return of delegation to Cuba. Ray agreed to do so.

Ray enthusiastic over possibility of overthrowing Castro in next several months. Knows Garcia-Bango has bad reputation but feels he could prove useful. Also useful would be Garcia-Bango's brother, Jorge Garcia-Bango Dirube, who has more respectable reputation. Ray also state that he had received indirectly a message from Jose Llanusa Gobel and considers him a potential ally.

7. Harry Mahoney debriefs Ray, described in Memo for the Record dtd 8 July 1966. Mentions Julian Gallo at this time and Ray indicates he knows and respects him.

8. Memo No. 771, 1 Sept 1966 for: Chief, OPS Cuba/WH Division/DDP Attn: Mr. Harry Mahoney, Subject: MIG-21. Attaching communication from DIA authorizing $100,000 should MIG-21 operation succeed. Funds to come from Air Force escrow fund now held by CIA.
(Note: Other memos refer to MIG which Ray said he knew a Cuban pilot would fly out of Cuba. Ray never comes through with any information that is usable, and finally says he cannot contact pilot)

9. Cable dtd 4 Jan 69 CITE WH/Miami 2233
(6-17
Ref:[Caracas]1490

AMOT reports on 9 Aug 68 indicating Ray plans to dissolve JURE and hold a Congress of Cuban exiles in 1969 to create a new organization to fight Castro. Ray working with Haitian groups and hopes, if new invasion of Haiti successful, he will be granted operational bases and radio station in Haiti.

10. Memo dtd Feb. 8, 1971 to Director, FBI from DD/P indicates that CIA has no current operational interest in Manuel Ray Rivero.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

April 5, 1978
Review of Manuel Rey Rivero files

11110862

Assortment of documents not in files at time review began on 3/29/78

16-10

1. 10 June 1966 Dispatch to Chief, WH, From [Chief of Station, Santo Domingo.] Subject: Haitian Exile Activities in the Dominican Republic.

02 [EMHEFTY-1 provided information on Haitian exile activities. On May 30, 1966, 02 [EMHEFTY was taken to a meeting ~~by~~ (with) Godefray Moscoso at the Hotel Comercial .
02 [EMHEFTY was taken to meeting by Gerard Max Lafontant, a Haitian Communist At the meeting, Lafontant told Moscoso that Manolo Rey had obtained explosives for him to use in the first invasion against Haiti and that Rey was now living in the Dominican Republic. Lafontant described Rey as a former collaborator of Fidel Castro, but was not now on sepaking terms with Castro. He said the Communist-oriented 14th of June Revolutionary Movement had on one occasion accused Rey of being a ~~WOFACT~~ CIA agent, but this was not true. Rey can obtain explosives within 24 hours after the request is made.

* 2. Cable to Director from Hunt, August 25, 1960 states that Carrillo advised that FRD should keep an eye on new anti-Castro group being formed by Raul Chibas and Manuel Ray, Marcel Fernandez, Julio Durate and Jose Pepin Bosch. Chibas told Carrillo that Miro would follow Chibas line which would be neither join nor fight FRD but help if necessary. Bosch financing Chibas and Miro with initial credit. Results negative when Carillo invited new group to join FRD. Carrillo feels if new group succeeds, it will try to draw in Feliue Pazos and Ramon Barquin. (Note date of cable)

* 3. Dispatch to Deputy Chief, WH/SA from Chief of Station, JMWAVE dated 14 April 1964 in Mexico, D. F. Lengthy and very rambling letter which, among many other things, states the story about Manuel Ray being closely associated with ALBIZU CAMPOS and friendly with Puerto Ricans who were working on the rennovation of the White House and the group that tried to assassinate Truman. (Pencilled notation of A. Rodriguez -- "Who is AMSHOT/1? Could he be agent provacateur? What is his access? Can we take him seriously?) Although postmarked in Mexico, AMSHOT apparently still in Cuba. 1964 Not a Cuban citizen - wife in U.S. Trying to get a Mexican Visa.

4. Cable 21 May 1964 or information report.
On 21 May 1964, unidentified members of JURE stated that Manuel Ray Rivero entered Cuba successfully on 17 May 1964 and is still there. He departed from an unidentified embarcation point near Cuba at 3 am on 17 May and reached his destination by 10 am that day. Ray was accompanied by a labor leader believed to be JOSE COMEZ RODRIGUEZ and a 22 year old man who was to serve as Ray's communications clerk and guide.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

11110262

5. Field Information Report on Cuba
Subject: Lecture of Manuel Ray Rivero to Member of JURE's Delegation from Tampa, Orlando, and Miami, Florida
Date: 26 May 1965
Source: A young Cuban exile trained in information collection.

Ray gaxe opening lecture to 25-30 JURE delegates gathered in Miami on 22 May 1965. Ray claims JURE has men and equipment to win war of liberation in Cuba and reiterates that only an internal revolution will overthrow Castro. Said some arms had been left on a military base in the Dominican Republic and that, regardless of who takes over in the DR, the arms will be returned to JURE. Made an appeal for money so that organization would purchase the M/V VENUS, a 110-foot vessel registered in Panama. (Previous reporting on JURE's base and equipment in DR contained in the following: TDCSDB-315/00539-65, 16 Feb 65; TDCSDB-315/00301-65, 38 Jan 65; TDCSDB-315/00383-65, 27 Jan 65; and TDCSDB-315/00269-65, 28 Jan 65.

* 6. Field Information Report on Cuba
Subject: Plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Infiltrate the Ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency
Date: 30 April 1963
Source: Former Rebel Army member (F) active in clandestine movements
Appraisal of Content: 3

On 30 April 1963, Rogelio Cisneros, JURE Exec. Bd. member, said a meeting held in his home and Antonio Arias, propaganda chief in Miami, in attendance. Cosneros said it was mentioned that Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a trusted man into the CIA in order to learn details of any plans with regard to Cuba and if possible to infiltrate this man into Cuba. Cisneros said it might be possible to use contacts of George Volsky (sp?) who had CIA contacts. In regard to future propaganda, JURE plans to introduce thousands of anti-American phamphlets into Cuba, including Ray's manifesto against the U.S. government and the CIA.

* 7. Report on Cuba/Dominican Republic
Subject: Urgent plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Enter Cuba
Involvement of Ray with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Haiti
Date: 18 September 1964
Source: Jose Garcia Valdez - part of group of Cubam emigres trained in techniques of information collection.

Andrew St. George said Ray is attempting to drop himself into Cuba, regardless of risk, to regain his political prestige. Ray feels he cannot now compete with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, military leader of SNFE, and other revolutionary organizations, unless he enters Cuba. He wants to have same influence of others when Haiti leadership starts distributing bases to Cuban exiles and providing them help for their aid in overthowing Francois Duvalier (a trade off). According to St. George, the Haiti combine is composed of Gutierrez, Antonio Cuesta del Valle of Commandos L, and DRE members. Also, Rolando Masferrer Rojas on the inside of Haiti operations and has the most influence among the Haitians.

SECRET

~~SECRET~~ Betsy Palmer

Miscellaneous documents no in files
Page 3

11110663

8. Information Report - Cuba/Dominican Republic
Subject: Purchase of a Boston Whaler for Manuel Ray Rivero, Leader of the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE)
Date: 18 September 1964
Source: Naturalized American citizen - formerly in shipping business in Cuba, well-trained and experienced debriefer

On 14 Sept 1964, a Miami yacht builder firm purchased a 13-foot six inch Boston whaler for Ray. Purchaser, Angel Aixala Pertierra said he planned to go to Santo Domingo to get permission to operate the whaler in Dominican waters, and once this had been granted, would deliver the boat to Ray. It was on Aixala's Catamaran ct 1208 D, that Ray made his ill-fated initial attempt to enter Cuba. Aixala is not a member of JURE.

* 9. Classified Message to Director, from Paris
Date: 8 June 1963

Ray and Emio Guede arrived in Paris and Ray contacted by Nauman on 7 June. Reviewed plan for Franqui recruitment in place. Urged Ray to take immediate action before his presence in Paris was leaked. ,Guede tries 06 to contact Franqui by phone and on all occasions, phone answered by Edith Sorel or her roomate, Helene Pulish (phonetic). Guede leaves message each time and on last call told Franqui going to Brussels and may have already left. On 7 June Guede sees Franqui at the opening of his exhibition and talks to him. Franqui listened to him, but made no responses to his veiled overatures. Guede surmizes Franqui not interested -- thinks he is incapable of defending regime but not willing or capable of breaking with it. Grovery and JERVAY met Ray. Feel this important re possible future use Ray Europe. Pari support excellent. (C/S comment: HQS has reason believe no obstacle convincing Ray push for Franqui return for period to be eyes and ears anti-Castro conspiracy.)

* 10. Cable Report to Director, from Paris
Date: 14 June 1963

Ray and party travel to Burssels on 11 June, and Ray continues his efforts to recruit an agent in place for CIA. Contacts Guillamo Cabrera and surmised Cabrera held back from a break due to his concern for a brother inside who is ill. Ray asks Cabrera to arrange a meeting with Gustave Arcos but Cabrera unable to do so since Arcos ~~[illegible]~~ leaving for a few days. Ray extends his trip. Contacts Nauman who tells Ray it is not possible to resolve all the personal problems of those he has contacted and Ray must show them the wisdom and practicality of working in place as a means of eliminating the regime. Ray willing to settle for defection as he believes this has an impact on the regime. Report states that Ray extremely active, moves fast and purposefully, and has given impression of frank cooperation. Has volunteered to assign a man to be station contact, but feels UNRUMBLE 2 is too young but should be aware of whomever is designated.

02

~~SECRET~~

SECRET Betsy Palmer

Miscellaneous documents not in files
P age 4

11110064

*11. Information Cable to Director from JMWAVE
Date: 5 November 1963
Subject: Unification Activities by Manuel Ray Rivero, 23 Oct 1963
Source: A trained observer with access to wide variety of Cuban exiles. Source is known to most of his contacts as a channel to U.S. intelligence. Obtained information from Reinaldo Pico Ramon, officer in the Alianza de Trabajadores Cubanos (ATC, Alliance of Cuban Workers).

Pico was told by an unidentified informant, who is probably on the JURE National Executive, that Luis Manuel Rodriguez, a former rebel army lieutenant from Santioago de Cuba, and who was known as "Mama Dolores" while a member of Brigade 2506, is serving as a Ray agent at Fort Benning, Georgia. Individuals who are working with Rodriguez are SILAS CUERVO CASTILLO and LUIS CLEMENTE BARCENA SERRANO, both former members of Brigade 2506.

SECRET

SECRET

HSCA Notes
Betsy Palmer

Office of Security file

11110565

SECRET

11110566

SECRET

July 6, 1978
Betsy Palmer

Guy Banister - 428810

source of foreign intelligence —

Banister approved on 10 Nov 1960 for contact use as a routine Investigative Report - dtd 13 Sept 1960 conducted in the event Guy Banister & Associates, Inc. might be used as a cover mechanism.

Synopsis:

General business reputation is good, but his business is not very sound. He was incorporated on 21 Jan 1958 & is President, his wife Vice-Pres. & Sec-Treas ~~is~~ was Joseph A. Oster.

Lien has been placed on Company an NSF Checks have been returned. Four informants interviewed: they advised Banister suspended as Asst Supt. of NOPD because he was involved in down-town bar incident during Mardi Gras in March 1957. Suspension from NOPD lifted & Banister reassigned to position with no authority - he resigned 2 days later. Purchased a newspaper in Gretna, LA which he had for 1½ years, during which time he was charged with defamation of character.

Began private detective business & became associated with Kent Courtney, publisher of right-wing publication, Independent American.

Checks done on Banister, Oster & Gerdes in course of investigation (credit & police).

SECRET

Betsy Palmer
Guy Banister
page 2

Informant states there was publicity after Mardi Gras incident alleging Banister was "framed" by NOPD because he was uncovering corruption within the dept. N.O. Crime Commission defended Banister as did many other prominent groups in the area.

Banister has associated himself with Leander Perez, D.A. for Plaquemine Parish. Perez is extremely right-wing & known to have denied voting rights to blacks.

Interview with official of NOPD indicates Banister had good record, but began to publicly ~~critiz~~ criticize his superiors. His incident at Absinthe Bar in 1957 was thoroughly investigated & 50 witnesses made statements. The majority stated Banister drunk.

Two other interviewees indicate bar incident exaggerated because Banister was getting too close to the bosses of police administration.

#

Guy Banister Associates, Inc.

Investigation of Banister's firm for cover operation was to consider the following.
Nature of business; Scope & extent of operations; apperance & location of office; general business reputation; general organizational structure; names of principle officers

SECRET 7/10/78 + 7/11/7

1111055 Palmer

Office of Security - File Review

James Garrison - Vol. I - no notes. Mostly newspaper clips + memos seen in DDP files.

James Garrison - Vol. II - no notes necessary.

#

Garrison Case - Volume 1 - no notes

~~" " " 2 - " "~~

~~" " " 3 - " "~~

Volume ~~#4~~ 2 " ~~3~~ - checks run on 213 individuals connected w/ Garrison investigation - members of Truth or Consequences Sq Jurors, Grand Jury Commissions, Lawyers, Writers, Salvadore Panzeca - one of Shaw's defense attorneys - but not Irwin Dymond - not Mark Lane

① 29 Sept 1967

Memo to Director/CI

From: Laurence R Houston

Subject: Clay L. Shaw's Trial + the CIA

Page 5. No action on part of CIA can be recommended at this time. We may be in for some difficult decisions if Shaw is convicted on information that could be refuted by CIA.

SECRET

Volume 3 - no notes

11110553

Perez arrived in U.S. at Miami on 17 Aug 1961.

04
[Jose Ignacio Augusto Rasco Bermuda]
# 214485

① Memo dtd 14 Dec. 1967.
Office of Security gave support to (04 [Rasco]) in May 1960 by obtaining hotel ~~Room~~ reservation for him in N.Y. during time FRD was having a conference. [Rasco 04] was a founder of FRD. Subject not implicated by Garrison but his friendship with Frank Bartes & FRD merits present trace on him.

② 21 May 1965
04 [Rasco] was of C interest in 1960, granted OA on 8 Feb. 1961 & is currently under consideration for another OA.

Arnesto Rodriguez (Arnest Napoleon Rodriguez [y Gonzalez])

① 10 June 1960 DOB 15 Aug. 1891, Havana, Cub
Subject; C-82375
#214833
Request investigation for subjects' use in Audio surveillance work in Cuba by WH. Division under Project JMARC.

4/mm

SECRET

7/10/78
Palmer

Office of Security - File Review.

Carlos Bringuier - no notes.

John Koch Gene 11110552

① Referred to FBI report dated ~~3~~ 16 August 1963
Title: Victor Domenador Espinosa Hernandez.
Carlos Eduardo Hernandez Sanchez.
John Koch Gene
Acelo Pedroso.

② 11 Sept 1961 - Request for Investigation/Name Check.
Project: JMATE
To: Dep. Director of Security
From: Chief CI/Operational Approval & Support Division
Subject will be used by PA/PROP in across the board training for an infiltration operation

Manuel Gil Gomez (Gil) Manuel Orlando
Investigative check on 28 Dec. 1960 for subject's use in AMOT project.

Dueney Perez Alamo. -201.# - 334081

① 10 Nov. 1965
File # 470-526.
General: At Miami, Fla. -

SECRET

Palmer
7/10/78

SECRET

1111055-1

Carlos Zarraga Martinez   no-notes

Cuban Revolutionary Council   & Frente Revolucionario
Democratico.

① 30 Oct. 1967
Subject: FRD – Created by Agency in May 1960.
Allegation: Houma bunker alleged to be CIA
Cache for munitions for Bay of Pigs
invasion. Sergio Arcacha Smith accused
by Garrison of robbing this bunker.

Details: FRD created w/ Agency assistance, guidance & financial support & consisted of several anti-Castro groups. Formed as political action, propaganda & military unit. Helped recruit & carried on program of social assistance for 2506 Brigade & their families.

Circa Jan. 1961, the CRC formed to coordinate & direct FRD activities with Agency & White House ~~approval~~ support.
FRD completely absorbed by CRC in Oct. 196.
~~[illegible]~~ CRC had direct access to President Kennedy & top White House aides.

SECRET

7/7/78 ①
Betsy Palmer

Ricardo Anibal Morales Navarrete - Office of Security
(201-285923)

① { Morales had been employed by CIA - per Memo for Record, dtd 3 Jan 1969 by John K. Greaney, Asst Gen. Counsel.

11110555

② 17 Oct 1968 Cable
To: Director
Ref: A. JMCOBRA 1253
B. Director 39974

ⓐ LNERGO plans to use Morales as prosecution witness against Bosch, et al.

ⓑ LNERGO also has following on list for possible pick up:

Julio Aton Constanza Palau
Puli Tamayo
Hector Cornillot
Juan Garcia Cardenas
Omar Soto

③ Morales - additional information may be found in U.S. Army's Monthly Intelligence Summary dated 1 Sept 1968, p. 30. (HQS - First U.S. Army, Ft. Geo. G. Meade, Md.)

7/7/78
Palmer
②

SECRET

④ 27 Aug 1965
Memo to File from Laurance J. Parr
From: Alien Affairs Staff
Subject: Ricardo Anibal Morales (Navarrete)
380858

On 8/26/65 Morales had returned to U.S. having completed his assigned duties for SOD, debriefed & is no longer of interest to SOD. Hence no I-512 to be issued for him to replace one which expires 9/25/65.

11110556

⑤ 10 Dec. 1964
Memo to file from W. M. Knott

Morales (AAC-1142) - # 380858(C) and Alberto Perez Martinez (AAC-1143) - # 223124(C) returning US on PAA flight into Kennedy International on 11 Dec. 1964. Braden, I&NS advised & requested to have his N.Y. office keep the I-94's from showing a N.Y. entry. & instead use following:

Paroled Section 212(d)(5) Dec 11, 1964 Indefinitely.

(Regarding assignment in Congo which began circa 9/25/64. Morales stayed behind to escort Perez - rest of group arrived at Andrews AFB on 5 Dec 1964 on Air Force plane

SECRET

7/7/78
Palmer ③

27 Feb. 1964 memo to Chief CI/OA from Desmond Fitzgerald

⑥ Morales given lie detector test because he had, according to FBI, made derogatory remarks about CIA.

11110557

SECRET

Palmer
5/23/78 &
6/22/78

Office of Security file
on Rogelio Wenceslau Cisneros Diaz

① FBI reference card.
Report dtd 15 Dec. 72 Subj. Rogelio Wenceslao Cisneros

② Memo to files dtd 3 May 1961
From.: Chief, Alien Affairs Staff /s/ Harry J Murphy
[illegible] Cisneros is requested to be retained by CIA in Miami area.

③ Cisneros DPOB: 3/20/27 Camaguey, Cuba

④ Report of Investigation dtd 15 Feb. 1973
Case # 532-652 Cisneros, Rogelio Wenceslao
By: SA Leslie D. Ashe

RC admitted to U.S. on 12/22/62 as a permanent alien.

11110442

SECRET

6/22/78
B. Palmer

Laureano Batista Falla ~~1111~~ Office of Security, CIA.

① 13 Dec. 1967.

Report - Subj LBF

OS Indices Results:

Copy of 22 Nov 1963 letter in Subject's file signed as Sec for Military Affairs, Exec. Committee, MDC. addressed to Major General Bela K. Kiraly, President, Hungarian Freedom Fighters Federation, Inc. offering services of MDC + arranging meetings + discussions with other anti-Castro organizations and the Hungarian Freedom Fighters. The Hungarian Freedom Fighters were agency sponsored & Covert Action requesting info on MDC before granting approval for contact between two organizations,

CIA Connection: LBF granted Provisional Operational Approval on 30 Dec. 1959 and Operational Approval on 20 Feb. 1960 for use as a PP Agent, Havana, Cuba.
Political & Psychological

② Deletion: Extract from investigation of Justin McCarthy, dtd. April 1961. Limited info included re one Laurino Batista.

③ Memo to files (undated) indicates CA/1 will give approval for Batista to meet with Kiraly

6/22/78
Palmer

③ Biographical Data
Paneque (Batista) Victor Manuel
DPOB - 18 Sept 1929, Sao Arriba, Holguin, Cuba

Jw

①

SECRET ~~11110446~~

1/19/78 CIA. '77 Report Comments on Book V

— operation, started in '63 by Cuban exiles - given by K. Ad. to CIA.

TAB A: Organization For Review

Key Members tried in Cuba Post '65.

p23. AMLASH - not direct objective to Kill C; other operations were.

TAB B: CIA Performance on the Inquiries.

Airline Flights in Mex. City to Cuba.

Nov. 27 flight → Mexican tourist card issued in Tampa.

TAB C: CIA Operations Against Cuba.

some exiles had support of CIA, as well as other elements of U.S. gov-t (?)

Operation ___

2 Cuban exiles in U.S. 1) former public official 2) lawyer meetings w/White House Advisor, State. To Overthrow C From w/in - recruit armed Forces.

Discontinued; considered not secure.

Syndicate

Sturgis - how much could he have known?

S-T link reported in press.

Giancana, FBI reports, say pills will be used in Nov. 1960. (18 Oct 1960 FBI memo to CIA).

CIA - no pills for delivery until Feb. '61. (but had it been discussed?).

Roselli contacts X, already receiving CIA support thru Cuban groups. R: original contact point for CIA w/ MAFIA.

SECRET

(2)

SECRET

1110447

Other Plots

Antonio Veciana - never CIA; Alpha 66 affiliated.
CIA refused his offers 3 times.

Agent messages in '61. - not mentioned in Church
5 messages; 3 - same plan.
1) 3 message plan: April 9 '61 in conjunction w/appearance at Sports Palace; sabotage electric plant.
2) 4 June '61
3) 3 May '61

All IMPROPERLY SANITIZED

TAB D AMLASH
CIA: no operational relationship as assassination plot during JFK's life. Only materialized afterwards.

TAB E: Materials Forwarded to WC & FBI.
TAB F: All DELETED MEXICO CITY COVERAGE of LHO.
TAB G: NEWSPAPER STORIES - phone call tape.

67 I.G. Report
① Prior to August '60. [Pre '61]
② Syndicate:
Phase I August 60 - late April 61
Phase II April 62 - Feb 63
Bissell
Edwards
I: Director of Security (CIA) contacts Maheu
O'Connell - case officer
Sept 14, 1960 - N.Y. Roselli - Maheu - O'Connell.
Roselli mentions "Gold" (Giancana).

SECRET

③

SECRET 11110443

Miami meeting ~ Sept 25, 1960. R-G-T.
[Casino's open until Sept 30, 1961.

Fall/Winter '60.

March - April 61 DRF

Moss: D.C. P.R. (relationship w/ Cellini
sister).

off until post '62.

Phase 2

Harvey briefed in Feb. '61 on phase I.

"Executive Action Capability" ZRRIFLE.

QJWIN - principle asset, agent used for
Congo operation.

Bissell
Nov. 15, '61 (discussion of Harvey - Edwards)

ZRRIFLE - Syndicate plans start to
converge.

QJWIN - terminated by Luxembourg station -
April 21, 1964.

April '62. O'Connell phasing out

Harvey - Roselli meet, Reactivate operation

8-9th April, N.Y. perhaps Maheu there.

Meet in D.C. next week, then to Miami -

[Pills delivered.]

April 21, 1962. Harvey in Miami. Finds
Roselli already in touch w/ —
Cuban Exile Leader in Phase I.

Harvey requested Giancana be excluded.

T no longer involved - no access since Cuba closed.

Roselli used "Maceo"; (Garcia - Gomez; Godoy)

SECRET

④

SECRET 11110443

Harvey procures armaments for Roselli & Maceo.
Leaves in a truck in Miami.
May '62 - Sept '62. pills in Cuba - waiting for opportunity.

Sept '62 - Jan '63.
Feb '63 : operation called off.
June 63 : Harvey - Roselli dinner in D.C.
SAM Papich calls Harvey mid dinner - does he know guests identity (R) - yes.

WireTapping Incident
Giancana asks Maheu to bug Rowan.
(p57)

SECRET

Cuban Counter Revolutionary Handbook
10 Oct 1962 FBI

11110450

SECRET

Since BOP, C/R organizations have increased in number; decreased in effectiveness.
Cuban G-2 partially responsible; eg. so called August 1962 "uprising" permitted final decimation of resistance ranks.

CRC - not really a C/R org but a political superstructure which sits on top major groups willing to follow guidance in exchange for U.S. support of which CRC principal channel.

CRC originally known as FRD & rose fall 1961
- Leader Dr. Jose Miró Cardona outstanding.
- offices in Miami, N.Y. N.O, Washington, France, Spain
- Sergio Arcacha, Varona, Miró, have traveled to CA & Panama to gain support

. CE - Corporacion Economica
Connection w/ CRC & composed of 30 Cuban business leaders & assoc.
President: Dr. Julio Diaz Rivera
Exec. Committee: Dr. German ALVAREZ Fuentes.
— Rafael GARCIA Bango
Dr. Francisco ESCOBAR Quesada
Dr. Leslie PANTIN de Armas
George McDonald Stewart
Dr. Rodolfo BEREGUISTAIN Rivera
— Dr. Antonio GIL Dominguez

SECRET

SECRET

I. 30 November. Revolutionary Movement
Leader: Manolo Ray
Jesus FERNANDEZ Hernandez
1111045 Oswaldo BETANCOURT Collazo
Orlando Rodriguez Perez
Carlos Rodriguez Quesada
(leader of March 1962 anti-[illegible] [illegible]

II MRR
- Movement for Revolutionary Recovery
Experienced crew & boats, money from CRC

III DRE
left CRC in March 1962; formerly part of MRR
Leader: Luis FERNANDEZ Rocha,
Juan Manuel SALVAT Roque.

Sabotage, has received clandestine U.S. support but sometimes resists U.S. sponsors due to policy against autonomous operations

IV. RDR
Represented in original FRD & new CRC
Manuel Antonio de Varona.
Varona - bitterly opposed Ray, a driving force behind BOP
Varona bitterly criticized JFK in August 1962 broadcast & opposed to ransom

V MRP Mar May 1961 w/ CRC
Joaquin Godoy a

SECRET

Was a hard-hitting sabotage outfit not responsive to US or exile groups.
(After Oct 61 inside organ non-existent
Trying to rebuild in US to get funds from CRC

11110452

VI Triple A
Aureliano Sanchez - who was defunded for FRD funding by Varona
supported Castro until 1960

VII UNR National Revolutionary Unity.
Alberto del JUNCO Mena MDC
Antonio FERNANDEZ, MRTN
Manuel Antonio De VARONA - RDR
Salvador GARCIA Aller

VIII TURE Manolo Ray
Takes US support but wants to run war by Cubans
Not very effective.

IX MDM Marti Democratic Movement.
Integral member of UR
DUARTE Oil, Manuel CHAO,
Tomas PRIETO Ratn.
Victor PANEQUE
April 62, DUARTE in US for military material for resistance. Debriefed on G-2, Soviet troops ship movements

10. Masonic Clandestine Movement.
Planning to assassinate Castro on Aug 62 but thwarted by DRE attack on Havana

11. MRAC/AC
Daniel Humberto TARAFA Machado
- military destruction of Communist regime
- Claim Varona agreed leadership on 15

12. MRRC. 11110453
Splinter group of MRR - radical.
Pedro Diaz Lanz (Widow 1962

13. OA Authentic Organization.
- Pro Socarras & De Varona
- Purpose - to carry on sabotage

14. Alpha 66
Organized in Puerto Rico in 1962. Commando attacks & funds collection in PR while covert military operations from Miami.
- Has shown uncharacteristic security & compartmentation

High pressure collection effort.

Antonio Veciana

15. OESA Organization of Anti-Comm. Secret Army
- Mafia style organ.; opposed to CRC
Jose Ramon FAYAD, Julio TUR
Julio DARNAS

SECRET

1111045-1 Julio GARCERAN
· training camps in Guatemala
& maybe Fla

* 19. S.F.N.E. Second Nat'l Front of the Escambray
- guerilla leftist org.
Eloy GUTIERREZ Menoyo, ~~also~~
A-66 military commander & ~~both~~
groups are joined secretly.
-

"The Unity" in D.C. January '62 with
Manolo Ray, SANCHEZ, Arango & ELC

SECRET

11110455

Rosselli Tab C

Dale Coy - on 24 August
- info on 12 Cubans
- info on 3 prob. US citizens
- Ten general questions - some of which may be answered in testimony before them
-declassification of 2 documents

Defector Julio Ojeda &
Chas Zabregalett
Paul Daly & Carlton Bunell FBI
Mike Madigan, Rick Inderfurth
✓ Mike Epstein

1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez (killed) born 2 May 1936 or 5 Feb 36 identified as boat manufacturer able to travel in Cuba.
2. Roberto Magaña, 12 Jun 1918
3. Luciano Nieves (shot
4. Jose De La Torriente (shot
5. Jose Quintana.
3 Oct 1945; replaced by marriage to Rosa
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortigo 10-Jan 42
7. Manola Artimie
8. AMLLASH
10 - 3 Cubans in Rosselli testimony
2 of 3 names in 9 Dec 1970 memo.

poss opt
B-1 & Anti Castro group

FUL Fred Black, W L Mayer, Joe Shimon

SECRET

2 memos 1 Dec. 1970 re John Roselli
for DCI fm DOS. Subj Roselli [illegible]
Blind memo, 9 Aug. 76 Subj John Roselli

11110456

14 March 1974

Frank O'Malley referral of Hunt to Bob Mullen of Mullen Company

Hughes was client of Mullen. — & 2 men connected in '60s w/ Free Cuba Committee

O'Malley had referred Hunt to Mullen to get guidance on companies which might be interested in Hunt's public relations talents

No relationship between Agency/Mullen/Hughes.

O'Malley approached by Hunt to refer an individual having locks & surreptitious entry skills for Hughes in Las Vegas.

(also a monitoring & listening device)

Thomas C. Amato referred to Hunt but declined job.

Hunt also requested O'Malley to "sweep" for a confidential client.

Lenzner interested in info supplied by Hughes to Admin. circa 1971 in effort to obtain blackmail type info on principals in Democratic Party

White House correspondence on the subject coincided w/ date of Anderson column on Castro plot

Lenzner referred also to a May 14, 1962 memo by Sheffield Edwards & a meeting of

SECRET

CIA General Counsel w/ RFK re quashing Grand Jury subpoena against Giancana

Houston could not recall info sent to White House circa 1971. Only officials who knew were Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca & Houston

215-688-4103
John Scaimeio
Fed Pub. Def

SECRET

ELC Liberation Army of Cuba
Rolando Masferrer & Mitchell Werbell
(Invasion of Haiti) Column
Dec 1966

11110453

March 1963 MIRO Cardona resigned ~~as~~ CRC. Dr. Antonio MACEO kept many CRC alive for a time but group destroyed in June 1963 following a false CRC communique claiming Cuban landings in June 63.

Action groups embittered over inadequate US policies & took some steps to move to other countries.

Office 225 4624

Gary 2 copies of future
Blakeley; [illegible]

SECRET

77 Report SECRET

AMTRUNK

FBI Rpt 14 August 64 re Santos Traff.

Priscilla Balger [illegible]

Oct 1, 1963 info from Soviet Embassy received in Headquarters on 9 Oct. — disseminated on 10 Oct Dept of State, FBI, Navy & INS

Telephone calls - 27, 28, Sept, 1 Oct 3 Oct (not LHO)

WC 3151

11110450

Washington Post 13 Nov. 76

2-Aug 76 No relationship w JR, Clay Shaw, LHO

1 Oct 63

16 Aug 1961

Moran, Mario Garcia Kohly arrested w/ 50 mill in phony Cuban pesos to depress Cuban economy.

[illegible] As Chief of the 6 Branch D. [illegible] Richards summer 1965 LWI ~~[illegible]~~ then Chief & DC of the 6 Research Section the [illegible] information from TUTUMP or other sensitive channel.

Cuba Desk Aug 1975 based on traces of the names, furnished by Castro to McGovern

Sept 63 AMTRUNK had 3 intelligence sources in Cuba; one ~~[illegible]~~ close to AMLASH [illegible], Drug & AMLASH arrested in 65

SECRET

Tad Szulc's Jorge Volsky suspect as Communist informant [illegible] both worked since 1961 of [illegible] & White House

[illegible] opinion is that [illegible] could have been a Cuban plant [illegible]

NY Daily News J Paul Meskil quotes Sturgis

11110460

Daniel A. Parsons

Genzman 5-12-78

32
(Air Force) cover
entered 1958 JOT jun. off. training
Ap 58 HQ (SE) Sept. 62 - terminated CIA relationship
end of 62
Jan. 63-4-Jan66 Moscow
66-7 Vienna USIA cooling off
67-9 HQ 2yrs SE Covert Action
69-71 (Munich) 15-21
72-4 (London) 15-1

SE Div Moscow Branch would have admin. papers

14-2
[redacted] (Moscow) - Cult. attaché (USIA)
(-deeply integrated) 32
John Sager was supervisor
-senior officer
Sum. of 63 Paul Garbler - first COS
(Cover) - Dean Rusk, Edward R. Murrow
24 USIA (cover)
24

24
(6) CIA max. at SU

Johnson - knew of as cult. writer
Korengold - knew
never [redacted] utilized am. press

consular div. not utilized

Langelle - only CIA man when left → probably not
Montgomery - succeeded Abidian in summer of 62, png 6 mon. later (Penkovsky)

8|RV

10145-10280

Genzman
5-12-78

06 Montgomery, 06
06 (Carlson), (Dick Jacobs), DOS: [redacted]
(William 06 Jones), (Davison) 06

03
Joe (Bulik) - senior man at
HQ (SR9) on Penkovsky
Winters probably not Cland. Serv.
George Kisevalper - SR9 - Penkovsky

John Abidian replaced Langelle,
was coopted.

Goldberg ~~Norengold~~ - didn't know
Mosby - UPI - knew of
No CIA use
Jean Leberman - not staff, maybe cooptee.

LHO - no HQ request on info

5?
7/N

Genzman
5-12-78

Index - Star - ref. #s → documents or files
       & IBM   201 or operational
activities file

name-grouping used for storage & retrieval

name-grouping tables
- alphabetical
- names from DDO correspondence according criteria. terrorists, KGB, etc.

matrinymic search

Pseud. - office assign's
manual file

180-10145-10285 2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT 5 June 1978 HSCA

TO:
Mr. Robert Morrison
House Select Committee on
Assassinations
3381 House Annex #2

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7 D 35
Washington, D.C. 20505

Box 54
Folder #1

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

INFORMATION	ACTION	XXXX RETENTION	LOAN

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (*Unclassified preferred*)	CLASS.
	3/13/78	Sanitized Notes - Leslie Wiselman of William Alexander Morgan	S
		Sanitized Notes - Beth Lichtenfels of DeMohrenschildt	S
	5/12/78	Sanitized Notes - Bob Genxman of Daniel A. Parsons	S
		Sanitized Notes - Leslie Wizelman of Herman Greenspun and Gordon McLendon	S
	5/24/78	Sanitized Notes of Jim Wolf of Deryabin file	S
		Sanitized Notes & Patricia Orr of David W. Ferrie	S

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

19561

RECEIPT

SIGNATURE (*acknowledging receipt of above documents*)

DATE OF RECEIPT

RETURN TO ➡ OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 7 D 35
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FORM 10-76 3772B

1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY
2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK
3 - CANARY, OLC HOLD BACK

10145-10285

DDO
Leslie Wizelman
8/13/78

SECRET

William Alexander Morgan

Ⓐ The Morgan File contains the following documents and information:

Information covering 1959 - 1973:

1- Cable dated March 24, 1959 stating that Morgan is staying at the Hotel Capri in Havana and is very close to Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo. Morgan hired Tony Beacon, Phila. Daily newsman, to handle publicity. POA request initiated, for Morgan, 24 March.

2- Biographic Data Sheet: Alias "El Americano"
DOB 4-19-28 POB: Cleveland.

3- Request for Cancellation of Approval - May 5, 1959
reason: Derogatory info. Cancelled May 6, 1959.

Ⓑ Information covering 1 Jan 1960 - 14 Aug 1974:

① May 19, 1960 cable from the Director reporting that U.S. Army [redacted] was in contact with HQs on March 18 re a plan. They're considering recruiting Morgan. U.S. Army [redacted] inquired if CIA had any operational interest in Morgan and the group around him, mentioning Bob McCormack, Bob Brown, Tony Nichols, Morgan's bodyguards: Michael S. Colin, Jack Ossorio, Frank Emmick, Jerry Hemming, and June Cobb (Fidel's secretary). HQs replied no operational interest. Cobb was from N.Y and working for Castro as a translator since Sept. 1959.

② 17 March 1960 - source stated that on 16 Feb 1960 he had observed Morgan in Toledo, Ohio in company of Roberto Augustus Brown, Jr., Toledo Police Dept

SECRET

morgan

③ march 22, 1960 cable reporting that they feel strongly that it would be a serious mistake for any U.S. gov't agency to recruit morgan for operational purpoes. " morgan who reportedly under local cloud is pefectly capable betraying U.S. govt or his own mother if it would advance his personal interests."

④ memo, 29 march 1960 subject: meeting with U.S. army officer to discuss plan they are considering to recruit William morgan. Army officer was told that the CIA had no operational interest in William morgan and they had a bad impression of morgan. The army officer felt that "successful recruitment of morgan would be extremely worthwhile."

⑤ Oct 5, 1960 memo reporting that on 4 Oct 1960 FI staff member was informed that major Carpenter from the office of ACSI Ass't chief staff Intelligence (U.S. Army) was requesting a secret writing system from SAB to be passed to morgan. TSD was informed that WH/4 had made known its objections to the ACSI on any use of morgan approx. 6 months ago and that the Branch position had not changed. "It was still felt that to have any dealings with morgan was a mistake, and that ACSI was doing it over the strenuous objections of WH[illegible] morgan

⑥ cable Oct 5, 1960 reporting that a secret writing system had been provided for issuance to Morgan. "U.S. Army using morgan inspite strenuous HQS recommendations to contrary."

⑦ Background Info

Oct 21, 1960 - Morgan's arrest announced.

Copy of the last written statement made by William Alexander Morgan before his execution.

) extract from a memo of conversation written by by the FI Departmental - Coordination Group re Discussion with ffice of ~~OACSI~~ ✓ dated 9 may 1973. OACSI said

Asst Chief Staff Intelligence (U.S. Army)

the OACSI files were incomplete as to the nature of Army contact / or use of morgan. "An ISR check confirmed that Morgan was not registered at any time, but that he was connected in an undefined manner to a registered source of Army."

0- Info on Frank Emmick', Gus Kangos', [redacted]

Bill Lichtenfeld

De Mohrenschildt

Vol 3 Jeanne disappeared on April 14, 1954, according to Mr Gold, pres of Nardis of Dallas, 4110 S. Poydras St. Jeanne worked for him from Sept 6, 1953 - April 14, 1954. Left without notice

friend - Graydon Heartsill of Dallas Times Herald - fashion reporter

friend - Elizabeth Cleveland, writes for a trade publication

marriage ~~license~~ license application says dob was May 5, 1914

Nardis - 1914

Albert Stillman - Personnel Dir for Sanger-Harris Co says files reveal

maiden name - Fomenko

dob - May 5, 1919

was saleslady for $50.00 a week had been making $300-600 a month as a designer

Mrs Cuba Selby - supervisor - Millinery dept Sanger-Harris said Jeane M ~~said~~ ~~he~~ ~~they~~ sent her a Christmas card telling her they live in a little house on the side of a mountain in Haiti and received mail thru Amer Embassy

Friends: - Paul Raigorodsky, Sam Ballen, Igor Voshinin;
Max E. Clark, Henry Rogatz
Col. Lawrence Orlov (daughter Laura of de M's)
Laurie McNaughton

In Feb 1963 - deM asked Judge Dussel if he could help a young man get his discharge changed - said he was from Fort Worth, had defected to Russia and had returned. Attempted but could not reach young man. Matter dropped.

deM claims to have met a high Russian official in Mexico City - (Mikoyan ?)

de M attempted to borrow $100,000 from Raigorodsky to develop a corp. which would develop commercial resources in Haiti

Rogatz claims deM made a pleasure trip to Mexico in early 1950's

Belonged to Petroleum Club in Dallas

Gary Taylor claims de M + J to have been in Yugo- at same time due to pictures he had seen

J de M had savings account of 1280.60 - 1st Nat Bank of Dallas

3rd agency - FBI doc 3/19/64, 3 pages re G de M
Wood Kahler - friend, Lawrence Orlov

de M entered Haiti w/ tourist card - not passport

1st met LHO through G. Bouhe
LHO moves into YMCA

Interview of Gary Taylor
de M claims to have worked for State Dept in mid 1950's
J de M. - 5'5"-135

Mr. J M Burne recalled conver. w/ G de M in which he stated he had been forced to join the Communist party while living in Russia - alternative = death

Mr Tom Sardy - Manager of Pitkin County Commiss. & Owner of Aspen Lumber and Supply Co. said there has never been any organization known as Rangely Supply Co at Aspen

Report of James Wood - 3/14/64.
On 1/63 he wrote letter to acquaintance stating he had been informed by FBI that GdeM was harmless - interviewed at Port-au-Prince - said Max Clark told him GdeM was O.K. - was of impression Clark had been w/ FBI

G.M was principal in Walden Oil Co. w/ Ed. C Waly
had office in Republic Nat. Bank Bldg Rm
1639-40 from Sept 3 1954 - May 28, 1959

"Childrens Exercise Research Found - Dallas by Sharples

Source
Mr. [redacted] met LHO in 1962. LHO had arrived at deM home in middle of dinner but did not eat. After dinner LHO, deMs + [redacted] Source went to a house or nearby bldg in Dallas + showed a film covering entire trip thru Mexico [redacted] Source did not talk to LHO or see him again.

Col. Orlov stated DeM casually mentioned he + some others were trying to arrange a divorce for Marina from LHO.

Resumé states he had special connections w govt circles in Cuba etc.

3d agency - FBI Report 3/10/64 - Titled - GdeM
FBI Docs dated 3/3/64 → GdeM
2/28/64 13-R

Friends - Serge Obolensky - restaurateur in New York City

Vol 6 - list of [illegible]

Russian Student Fund

3rd agency G+J 28/6/65 - Philly
" 22/4/65 - Phoenix · FBI

(Vol 4) 3rd - ① G+J de M 18/3/64 LA
100-17448 (field) 100-32965
② G+J de M 26/3/64 Philly
105-146 105-10229 (field) 100-329
(Bureau
③ G+J de M - Miami
26/3/64 # 105-76 field
100-32965 Bureau
④ Phoenix 26/3/64 # PX 100-2995
100-32965 Bu.
⑤ New York 25/3/64 NY 100-10310
⑥ New Orleans 25/3/64
105-2180 105-2184
100-32965 - Bureau
⑦ 24/3/64 - DC - no #
⑧ Boston 24/3/64 105-11242
100-32965 Bu

① State Doc. Memo of Conver. Sub: Visit to Dept by GM. 24/4/64
② State telegram # 881 - 18/4/64 from Port au Prince
③ " " # 871 " "
④ FBI doc 17/4/64 on GM 105-632 (field)
100-32965 Bureau
⑤ FBI doc 21/4/64 GdeM - No #

FBI ~~Rpt~~ Report NY 15/4/64 G+J deM 100-10310 field. 100-32965 Bureau
FBI Report - Philly 14/4/64 G+J deM 105-146 105-1020
FBI Report - Dallas 13/4/64 re J deM 105-10766 - field
100-32965 - Bur
FBI Report NY 2/4/64 G+J 100-10310 field -
100-32965 Bureau
FBI Report Chicago 1/4/64 J deM 105-123 field
-100-32965 - (15
" " DC 1/4/64 G+J - no #

after visited [redacted]

deM = member of Petroleum Club - play tennis

1963 - members of staff of lg business firm had attended a discussion grp in 1963 & LHO was there,

Nov 4 1931 sentenced by tribunal Correctional at Antwerp to 8 days in prison on chgs of resisting a police officer + 8 days or fine of 182 francs for drunken driving & use of false name. - 3 yr ~~per~~ probation.

FBI Rept 28/2/64 - deM contact w/ Fedor Alekseevich Garanin - Soviet diplo in DC. Alekseevich member of Soviet State Security Force since mid 1940's served in Cuba

Marilyn Wilcox - Pan Am employee. learned from Jean + Suzanne Samuel that deM was a good friend of Robert McElhennon top Pan Am official

had made prior arrangmts for [illegible]
at Alban Towers

At 0530 7 May a call was made to Mrs Matlack to confirm that Charles would be in DC on the day & that a meeting had been arranged w/ an agency rep for 12 noon. Mrs Matlack retorted that D+J had called her that previous evening to confirm a 12:00 lunch appt w/ her. Mrs Matlack was concerned that CIA & Army should not be working at cross purposes. She had received authorization from ACSI to meet Charles at lunch & felt it would be impolite to w/draw since Army considered her the pt of contact w/ Charles. WH division wanted meeting then changed to afternoon - Late Matlack believed that due to conflicting instructions she had been placed in 'middle'.

Matlack - Domestic Exploitation Sec. ACSI

Gary 4/14/77 - Dennis Berend planned to call [redacted] in Dallas re RD article by J.E. 'Sooner or later E will get onto our office in Dallas, find [redacted] was there at the time & try to make a connection.' Dennis just wanted to alert us.

3rd Attachment from R+R dated 4/14/77 from Dallas FO

Another reference to trip 4/19/63 to NY + Philly - does not mention DC.

Kelley mentions that JDM saw gun in [illegible] in Oakleaf a Dallas suburb

NY Times art. 20/Dec/63 arrest of Russell McLarry on chg of threatening JFK lived in "Oakcliff" section of Dallas - as sprawling area where LHO lived.

impt names - Sam Ballen - invest. banker, interviewed LHO for job
Theo Meller + Russian wife
Bernard Yarrow - reference for JDM

GDM - employed by ICA for Mission to Yugosl.
Feb 1957 - Oct 1957

Signed Marian Anderson petition - believed to have 7% of Comm in DC Area on list. for advancement of blacks.

DM said to have detailed photos of Harbor defenses at Corpus Christi.

1911 - 1920 - USSR
1920 - 1930 - Poland
1930 - 1937 Belgium
1938 - USA

Pardo de Zavala, Lilia - allegedly lived w/ GDM.

3rd Agency - 2 letters 1 from DeM to State 10/19/62
1 to DeM from State 10/22/62

State - 1957 Invest. FBI 1941 42 44 45 47 48 info
Civil Service 1957 Invest.

3rd Agency - Copy of 1942 ONI Invest. + 1943 MID ~~to~~ invest.

Memo to C [redacted] [redacted] from [redacted] - [redacted] - April 26 1963

Dir of Oper - Article written in Le Moniteur 3/13/63 stating that SM was awarded $280,000 + a 10 yr option for a concession on sisal

DeM claims he has done geolog. work for Mex. Corp. in offshore oil, the Arabia Peninsula + in mentioning this DeM looked around the room + over his shoulder & said 'my connection w/ this is, of course, confidential.' Worked thru Min. of Finance Herve Boyer to gain concession.

[redacted] said M. Charles + DeM were anxious to develop a # of business interests in Haiti includ. an office in deM's bank which would enter into car financing & would buy some of the banks commercial paper. [redacted] said M Charles made an unusual statement announcing that the 3rd partner in addition to Charles & DeM - a Frenchman is arriving in NY on Monday + a meeting sunday had been set up for [redacted] to meet him on Monday. M Charles said "it is not appropriate for a banker to ask for $"

[redacted] said deM sought every available handout in his office -

friend - Col. Lawrence Orlov (retired) in oil lending business

Fed.
application for employment 1 - May 64 (?)
when employed by Sharmex SA Edificio Continental Mexico DF Mexico - did work in Cuba.

On May 10 1964 Irwin B Bornfriend saw J de M + Galicki at Kyona Beach 35 miles outside of Port au Prince
Who is Mrs. Finkelstein?

dispatch April 7 1969 - de M showed [redacted] a card from Pres. Francois Duvalier with which he said he could travel anywhere in the republic w/o prob.

April 21 1964 - Letter to Mr. [redacted] questioning whether we (CIA?) had hand in blackballing [redacted] de M.

source
[redacted]
DCD documents - report stating [redacted] wanted to deal w/ US govt officials w/o de M.

source
Memo - Sub. [redacted] 20/May 63
had appt to see V.P. Johnson
Sen Keating + Cong. Rogers according to Mrs Matlack

Security
~~[illegible]~~ Files - DeM.

Sept 28 1967 - Memo Sudy - Garrison Invest -
pg 6 Queries from Justice Dept -
Any CIA assoc w/ DeM. - No
Ex FBI Agent W. Turner - DeM may have been
LHO's CIA babysitter in Dallas

CIA Connect -
disproved for OSS empl - susp of Nazi agent
July 18 1962
Aug 13 1958 - derogatory info furnished to
Contact office interested in interrogating him.
Jeanne DeM - employed as recept. by
cover proj. NCFE from 1950-1951
DeM brother - Dimitri S Von M - approved
April 11 1958 for exploitation as contact for
foreign intell on a limited basis - not
to receive classified info above confid.
Tour of duty w/ OSS 1942-45
GDM Investig by FBI 1941, 42, 45, 47 57.
1940-42 - considered to be pro German
suspected of espionage agent + German propag.

Possible signif names - Schlumberger Well
Surveying Corp. (Houston) Janet Souvier
Oscar Castro, Mayaguez PR.

WC Testimony - did not assoc w/ LHO after 4/19/63 when they left for NY Philly + DC.

made thru Anna Keenan
DOD

Request for info on GDM ~~xy~~ made by Gen. Allen - 4/27
Interesting that Allens interest in DM coincided w/ earlier portion of this trip & info would suggest tha possibly Allen & DM were possibly in same environment in DC circa de April 63.

? State Dept airgram DOA-153 12/22/63 contains results of 2nd interview w/ DM also indicates tha MO lived w/ Millers in Dallas. (Anna Miller) Mr. Miller worked for Sangers Dept. Store.

? Ruth Paine is daughter of Wm Avery Hyde OSC-15790 who was being considered for covert use by IO Div. but did not receive security clearan

16-8

Message from [Port Au Prince] Oct 19, 66
J + D left for Haiti aboard Mora One -
D listed on crew as sailor wife as cook
D told [[Haiti 27 offices]] 10 Oct plans. Return Dallas Left Haiti w/ several months rent unpaid

Chevalier Garde, Inc. 730 5th Ave NY employed GDM an alleged nazi agent

Baron Von Mayseel - head of Facts + Films Motion Pict

possibly aka Maydenskald

21N

Memo 18/3/77 from Dallas Field O.
[redacted] + Surkin meeting - Surkin advised [redacted] that a Cuban had reported that he had met w/ a CIA agent named Morris Bishop + LHO in 505 N. Ervay Bldg approx 1 month < JFK assass. Surkin said it was common knowledge that the CIA had offices there + Morris Bishop was an alias of [redacted]

Bogen w/ DCD

vol 1

3rd agency - [redacted] 30/12/63 Office of Sec.
sub. OS Info on DM + connections w/ LHO

State Airgram no A-406 11/4/63 from Port au Prince
sub. US Business man signs contract w/ Haitian
Gov't + local Bank

State Airgram no G-22 2/2/61 from AmConGen,
Alexandria

State Airgram no. 119 27/1/61 from Alexan
Doc. from OS dated 2/4/58, 4/3/58, 19/2/58
all re: DM.

FBI doc 30/11/63 info prov. by Florence McDon.
re: LHOs + deM

State Airgram A-295 25/6/63 from ~~C~~
Cotonou: Sub: Egyptians reportedly
mounting intell. campaign in Black Africa

Treasury Report 12/12/63 re deM.

State Doc - 16/12/63 re: deM

" Airgram A-153 20/12/63 2nd interview
w/ J+G deM.

FBI Doc 23/12/63 re J+G deM

further notes

arrived dec 21 (no yr) Port 12th luggage not
([redacted]) inspected)
(Aug 1958 - CIA interview)

this person stayed at GM's home

discussed residence + activity
of citizen - Mohammed (has bodyguard) Fayid w/out encouragemen
Alex had been dating - did not trust him.

speculation - deM assoc w/ Mohammed seems

DDO
Leslie Wizelma

SECRET

Herman Greenspun
DOB - 8/27/09
POB - Brooklyn, N.Y.

Third Agency
1-Justice Dept. report dated 9 June 1950
re Leland Robert Lewis / w/address et al. Neutrality Act
2-Navy Dept intel. Report dated 27 July 48 re Panama-
Palistine Air Line, further information re.

SECRET

Leslie Wizelman
DDO-Summary
Leslie Wizelman
5/18/78

McLendon, Gordon

1975 Review of file - McLendon classified as [redacted]

Genzman
5-12-78

?

Index - Star - ref. #s → documents or files
& IBM
201 or operational activities file

name-grouping used for storage & retrieval

name-grouping tables
- alphabetical
- names from DDO correspondence according criteria. terrorists & KGB, etc.

matrinymic search

Pseud. - office assigns
manual file

[illegible]

David W. Ferrie File - DDO
201-835476

File opened 25 Jun 68
Contains 201 Personality Files Action Request form with basic biographical data only.

Review of 201 on 5 Feb 75
notes: file opened "as part of ... Garrison case", monitored because Garrison had been trying to implicate the agency.

DCD - # 191987
Contains FOIA requests from Bernard Fensterwald & Dan Rather.

Note from Day -

JLW ① of 4 All Documents from Deryabin File.

5/24/78 Memo Dec. 12, 1963

From: Deputy Director Plans
To: Director, FBI; Attention: Mr. S. J. Papich
Subject: Peter Deryabin's Comments on Kennedy
Assassination.

Agency does not specifically endorse conclusions.

Did KGB send LHO on another mission, & LHO on his own initiative assassinate JFK?

(F) strengthens DeGaulle's leadership.

Was MOP low-level informer for KGB after she met LHO inside Russia?

i - party affiliation in Russia?
- member of Komsomol? - would they expel her if she tried to travel outside U.S.S.R. - if not expelled, KGB interference
- which offices was she invited to - before & after marriage. Did they try to dissuade her from marrying foreigner?
- how many times did she write for visa to Foreign Affairs ministry?
- who present at marriage. how registered
- who chose Minsk; what friends.
- invited to police stations?
- gun in U.S.S.R? Permission?
- Financial assistance?
- was 1st child born in U.S.S.R. baptized there?
was 2nd " " " " USA " " ?

SECRET

② 14

5/24/78 Memo 12/12/63.
Sbj: Deryabin

Fm: Deryabin File:
Questionnaire for Marina Oswald?
CI/Holmes: custody.

BIO

Q: Why MOP not officially adopted by Medvedyev?
Q: who made her return to mother & stepfather post grandparents.
Q: What made move to Leningrad?
Q: Why quit job in one day? – took meals outside of hosp – where is this?
Q: who chose Minsk? Why LHO's salary so high & hers so low?

Moscow Trip – July '61.
Q: did she have permission for trip? how was it accomplished? What did they do?
Q: Visit to U.S. Embassy – must have known it was surveilled.
What reprimands?

Kharkov Trip – fall '61.
Q: how travelled
Did she see Mikhailov there?

Autobiography LHO ties to Berlov – and uncle in Minsk
what of Prusakov? " " " "

SECRET

|24|78

Domestic Contact Division
unfounded allegations of terrorist school at Minsk. (existence of school thought affirmed at trial of Bandera - assassin in West Germany). dated 6/16/64.

Volume I
201-743808
File opened 1/27/64.
- Biodata on A.S. Medvedev. [Stepfather's last name, wrong MO]
- FBI report JEH letter to DCIA
4/7/51 subj: Vladimir Markovin

Dec. 2, 1963 memo:
3 items: Dept. of State Report dated July 11, 1961
② ONI Report dated Dec. 18, 1961.
Immigration File of MOP contains
12/2/63
a list of other items

Born 1941; July 17
married 30 April 1961

FBI report of Hosty
6/22/64
subj - Lydia Dymitruk.

W.C. Doc. #361 - Biographical info on MOP + Relatives - available to public FOIA.

④ of 4

Certificate for people going abroad:
- why no family listed.

Lists of names of Associates.

SECRET

②

5/24/78 Vol II

201-743808

FBI Report 2/17/64 DL 100-10461

dictated 2/18/64

Boguslav + Heitman; (p439 + seq.).

FBI reports indexed under LHO.

Vol ~~III~~

SECRET

③ of 4

~~Memo 12/13/65~~ ~~[illegible]~~

6/24/78 Q's for MOP.

- list of MOP's family.

Military Service Booklet

arrived August 59 in Minsk, why no voyenny bilet (MSB) until 22 Sept? no stamp until 28 Oct. Why does booklet not reflect Komsomol membership?

§10 1959 Why moved Aug 4 from Frunzenskiy Rayon to Aug 9 - Leninskiy Rayon, when planning to move to U.S.A. ASAP - had started getting documents for a visa?

Birth Certificate

how did she obtain B.C. & notarized copies. What's happened to original.

Work Booklet:

July 28, 1961 - reflects promotion at hospital. Why, if she was being harrassed about plans to leave USSR.

Trade Union Booklet:

she expected to depart as wife on non-quota immigrant status. Did she expect to return w/in 2 years?

- her passport valid 1/11/62 to 1/11/64
- how was she informed of permission to leave S.U.?

professionally necessary but dangerous.
May 21, 63 - deM drops into code word [redacted] Says M. Charles has returned to Haiti + is seriously being considered as next president

FBI Memo from Hoover to Rankin - 3/23/64
"Reference is made to your letter dated 2/12/64 wherein you request a full-scale intell-type investig.. concerning G + J deM.
In view of the present residence of the deMs in Haiti + their previous travels thru Mexico + Central America you may desire to contact the CIA re deM.

Reports prepared by FBI -

Report of	Date	Office
W. James Wood	2/28/64	Dallas
"	"	"
J. Hall McMenamin	"	Denver
James S. Weir	"	Houston
James F. Morrissey	"	DC
Warren de Brueys	"	New Orleans
James C Kennedy	3/1/64	San Antonio
Harry H Whidbee	3/2/64	LA
J. S. Weir	3/3/64	Houston
J. K. Wineberg	"	Philly
John McHugh	"	San Fran
Rob. Baker	3/4/64	San Diego
"	"	"
L Russell Hashman	3/6	Denver

SECRET

James Feeney	3/12/~~7~~	New ~~Haven~~ York
Rob Moffat	3/10	New Haven
Walter Rogers	"	Chicago
Feeney	2/28	NY
R. B Kellog	3/14	Miami
W. James Wood	"	Dallas

Rept # CS 3/449,717 Info Rept. Noform
Sub: Secr. Activ. of Al-Nasr Trading Co.

June/July 1960 - profits of Al Nasr were being transferred to a special govt fund for financing clandestine operations. UAR Govt used company for "illegal" transactions ~~to~~ such as trade w/ France on basis of commission fee ~~[illegible]~~ of 10%.

Lt Col. Mohammed Ghanim dir of Co reported to have engaged in intell op. during previous assignt as manager of Nil Com.

Memo 1/30/42 from Ensign Horrigan to Comm Vanderbilt Office of Strategic Services

met deM said he was rep an Irish film co distributing films taken under the auspices of Irish govt during Span. War. His uncle's place was raided shortly thereafter at ~~my~~ suggestion of a friend of mine found many films of a pro Nazi nature which are intended to show force + effectiveness of German army.

SECRET

Office of Strategic Services June 26 1942

"It is imposs for us to decide your deferral for another week or 2. In the meantime, if you decide to accept the Mex. offer, please advise us where you can be reached."

Wm Vanderbilt

June 23, 1942 -

Letter to Vand. offering services w/ resume. Mention "new + exciting business enterprise in Mex"

resume - states he was foreign corres of 2 Polish newsps. & collaborated w/ Polish official Press Ag.

1941 - Collab w/ Dept of Econ Info + French Govt

Letter May 25, 1942 to Vande. stating Mr Kwapiszewski - Chg d'Affaires of Poland in DC can give him info on GdeM.

May 19 1942 - from Robert Alcorn to Vande. "Here is another non-citizen who looks like good material"

Note: application - OSS Character ref -

W. Carmichael - 630 5th Ave NY
Mayor Bishop 179 E. 79th St
Mrs Miller 1148 5th Ave
A. Tarsaidze 2 Sutton P.

Helped French commercial Info. Service

remarks "may go w/ Rockefeller Comm"

Vol 6 Muhamad Faid 1/12/64
said to have connections w/ Castro -
represents Gen Commerce + Navig. Co of Kuwa

GdM was present at MtG and introduced LHO to group

3rd agency - GdeM. 1/3/67 Dallas - FBI
de M's close contact w/ Haiti is Wlodzimierz Galicki - polish commercial rep in Haiti Subject (de M) has also been on close terms w/ [redacted]
[redacted]

3rd agency - GdeM 2/2/66 Haiti File # IR27502207
DIA

[redacted] (US [redacted]) [redacted] - Venezuel

mailing assoc - Mrs E. Milewski
232 Abercairn Rd London SW
Eng.
RM Iglehart
3824 Sweon Bld.
Dallas
M/M Franklin G Smith
PO Box 96
Milton W Va
J Wold
36 Badger Rd
Medford Ma

4059 4272

Bert Lichtenfels

SECRET

Vol XD on May 6 63 we had private convers w/ source [redacted] - if Duvalier learned of his contact w/ US govt would cost his wife's life.

info re picture taken of [redacted] - per req of HSCA invest. re Channel 8 WFAA Dallas

Charge made on WFAA-TV LHO was employed by CIA in 1962 + [redacted] knew LHO

Bob Sirken - WFAA TV - advised that a Cuban had reported that he had met w/ a CIA agent named Maurice Bishop + LHO in the 505 N Ervay Building approx a month before assass. + at that time the CIA agent had offered $ to LHO to kill JFK. Sirken said it was common knowledge that CIA had offices in 505 N Ervay at time of assass.

Bishop = alias ~~for~~ used by [redacted]

[redacted] service in Dallas as overt employ in 1954 continuously except 1972-73 when served at DCD headqts.

Routing + Record Sheet - refers to De M as a former contact of the Dallas Office on whom there is a headqts. file

Possibility that NY office wanted copy of security check on De M.

SECRET

deM had been in DC in. report stating...

...deM acknowledged to the UC that during WWII he worked in US on behalf of French Intelligence, a fact which perhaps was not known at the time of our contact w/ him in D.C + NY.

"Obviously deM's acknowledgement of his affiliation w/ French Intell & his friendship w/ [redacted] source of Haiti indicate the necessity for reviewing our friendship w/ them. Should we meet w/ [redacted] in NY if he requests interview? What should we do if [redacted] source shows up in company of G de M. couple? Please advise."

Could have made trip to DC Nov 13 1957.

Vol 5 - Erwin Werner - Visiting in Haiti w/ Miss Vera Somoff
George Edwin McMillan - Writer for Life - Sat. Even Post

John Hall - Classmate of G de M
Luis Pagan - Visited Haiti w/ J. Hall - deM

SECRET

3rd agency Vol 5
FBI Report George E. McMillan
2-28-42 file 101-21
3-9-42 " 101-18
4-10-42 101-157
5-1-42 101-2357

Report dated 5/4/44 at NY by SA Bernard J. Trahger - "Dr. Erwin A. Werner aka Dr. Irwin A. Werner, Terry Werner

FBI Report - Titled Jack Marvin Perlman 12/7/43
77-1416 BJF
77-6877 12/24/43
11-4-53
12/1/53 - John Mabey

Telegram: from NY dated 26/April/65
" Now understand alleged agreement w/ man called Maski who small stampdealer & travel agent who depends on others for financing. Most unlikely he could offer let alone implement mentioned terms. Please telephone collect. Regards - Manfred

In early Nov 64 - DM received a postcard marked Ceylon from Erik E. Lehmann -
... Best greetings from other side - Hope all's well w/ you - has there been any progress in our matters? ...

Letter from "Sam" Dec 8 1964 -
... ~~Mrs~~ Priscilla I was w/ Marina the night you appeared on NBC - & she reports that Marina felt J is jealous since George has "carnal" feelings

toward her - ?

Vol 2 - 3rd agency
FBI Rept of SA James Morrissey
at DC on 2/25/64 #100-32965

April 21, 1958 - In attempted contact w/ American Republic - DC

3rd Agency - FBI Report of SA James Weir
at Houston 2/28/64 100-32965
FBI " " " W. James Wood
Dallas 2/28/64 100-32965
L. Russell Hashman
at Denver 3/6/64 100-32965

DeM had registered for Selective Service - in NY on Oct 16 1948 - Classified IV-F for hypersensitivity

Daniel A. Parsons [illegible] Genzman 5-12-78

(Air Force)32 cover

entered 1958 JOT jun. off training

Ap 58 HQ (SE) Sept. 62 - terminated CIA relationship

end of 62

SE Div Moscow Branch would have admin. papers

Jan. 63-4 - Jan66 Moscow ☆

66-7 Vienna [redacted] cooling off

67-9 HQ 2yrs SE Covert Action

69-71 (Munich) 15-21

72-4 (London) 15-1

[illegible] (Moscow)14-2 - Cult. Attaché [redacted] ☆

-deeply integrated) 32

John Sager was supervisor

-senior officer

~~Sum~~ of 63 Paul Garbler - first COS

[redacted] ☆

☆ - excisions based on sensitivity of cover

[redacted] ☆

(6)24 CIA max at SU

Johnson - knew of as cult. writer

Korengold - knew

never [illegible] utilized am. press

consular div. not utilized

Langelle - only CIA man when left → exactly? not?

GIN Montgomery - succeeded Abidian in summ: of 62, png 6 mon. later (Penkovsky)

SECRET

5-12-78

Montgomery,
06 (Carlson), 06 (Dick Jacobs) DOS: [redacted]
(William Jones) 06, (Davison) 06

03
Joe (Bulik) - senior man at
HQ (SR9) on Penkovsky
Winters probably not Cland. Serv.
George Kisevalter - SR9 - Penkovsky

John Abidian replaced Langelle,
was coopted.

~~Norengold~~ Goldberg - didn't know
Mosby - UPI - knew of
No CIA use
Jean Leberman - not staff, maybe coopted.

LHO - no HQ request on info

SECRET

51N

Folder 9
#2B

TRANSMITTAL AND DOCUMENT RECEIPT

HSCA

TO: Mr. Michael Goldsmith
Select Committee on Assassination
House of Representatives
3381 House Annex # 2
2nd & D Street, S.W.

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7 D 35
Washington, D.C. 20505
26 Jun78

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

☐ INFORMATION	☐ ACTION	☐ RETENTION	☐ LOAN

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT *(Unclassified preferred)*	CLASS.
		Notes of Wolf and Goldsmith (HSCA request (Wolf) 26 Jun 78 0001742 -0001761	SECR
		Information on 201 files HSCA request (Wolf_ 25 Jun 78 0001762 -)0001781_	SECRE

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993
CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM

19570

RECEIPT

SIGNATURE *(acknowledging receipt of above documents)*

DATE OF RECEIPT

RETURN TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 7 D 35
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

RM 0-76 3772B

1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY
2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK

10145-10287

Briefing 2/14/78

Bill Donnelly - Chief of Information Services Staff
Mike Cuffy?
[Lee Coyle
Virginia Tores]

Opening of 201
Operational interest
Trace would be conducted → bring together existing materials → open 201
Trace produces computer printout w/ refs., not documents. In early '60's, it produced index cards.
Who opens 201?
Case officer - it's his judgement which determines whether if
If no indication of continuing interest, 201 may not be opened.
If its an Am. & info. comes from a source such as FBI, CIA may not open a 201.
If this type of info. comes in, it would go into index
There are certain criteria
1) Recruitment
2) High-Level Communist officials

There are some operations which are run out of headquarters, in which case, a case officer is involved.

PRQ. Pt. I - biog. info.
Pt. II - more extensive
- might indicate op. involvement

There should be a doc. indicating reasons why a part. person is not recruited.
There should be a reference in 1st file to document in 2nd file if there is one.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

③

Central Cover Staff

CIA - State Dept. integration

"Fig Leaf" cover - where S.D. employees are aware that CIA emp. is in fact employed by not

More integrated cover where a person would do a full-time S.D. job & also a CIA job which is unbeknownst to rest of S.D. employees. — could be a "deep official cover" as well as a "deep cover"

Am. citizens or most foreigners being used in some manner would, as a general rule, have a security check

If that person was an official of another govt. agency or from military, that org. would have to be consulted.

Probably would use that org's

PCS - Policy & Co-ord. Staff

↳ would be involved in co-ord. of a project in which both the CIA & another org. was involved

To the extent of CIA involvement, files would be maintained. That is not to say that the other would not have more comprehensive files.

Project file

OCR

Graphics—

OCR - Office of Central ~~Registry~~ Reference - part of NFAC photos of ships, things of intelligence nature are maintained here.

Photos of prominent persons - ex. Brezhnev

Photos of tourists or random groups would not be of interest

Finance Office Vouchered / Unvouchered Funds

P & L : Prescribed & Limited - refers to communications which are compartmentalized

Opening of P & L channel of comm. is determined by one of 3 persons —Chief of PCS, ADDO, or DDO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This has always been true — In earlier times, it may have been restricted by even fewer persons.

P&L communication may, in time, be downgraded; may never be destroyed.

Is it possible, in context of a CI threat, in case of our hypothetical that info. would not be compiled in a 201 file? Yes, it is conceivable that many docs. could exist in ~~the~~ system & not be compiled into a 201 if there doesn't appear to be a reason for a 201

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pseudo: false name used for purposes of communication
Crypto: used to id. area of ops. by digraph, followed by group of letters
You cannot assign a cryptonym w/out having a 201 #

If hypo. Am. soldier ~~lots~~ has given away mil. secrets & then defects, a 201 file would not necessarily have been opened — it might be a mil. matter.
CI Staff may have had interests in defector
In early 60's, there was an interest in defectors.

Dan's hypo based on ZRRIFLE:
574 A form: request to put doc. into system
? 1897 " : " " " into index
In op. such as ZRRIFLE docs. may be specially P&L — might ~~not~~ never go into system except upon determination of officer handling case.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Sleeper agent" hypo: to run 2 or 3 sleepers in Comm. China [{station there] 24] doesn't necessarily have to know @ it since it is being run from Hqtrs. — from DDP to CI Staff — reasonable scenario

Would a 201 be opened on sleeper?
Competing ' of secrecy vs. being able to keep track of sleeper

Change of sleeper to Am. soldier defecting to E. Germany: — no 201 opened — C.O. in E. Ger. — report comes in from reliable source stating that sleeper is providing info.

Y/mc

④

This has always been true – In earlier times, it may have been restricted by even fewer persons.
P & L communication may, in time, be downgraded; may never be destroyed.

Is it possible, in context of a CI threat, in case of our hypothetical that info. would not be compiled in a 201 file? Yes, it is conceivable that many docs. could exist in ~~the~~ system & not be compiled into a 201 if there doesn't appear to be a reason for a 201

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Pseudo: false name used for purposes of communication
Crypto: Used to id. area of ops. by digraph, followed by group of letters
You cannot assign a cryptonym w/out having a 201 #

If hypo. Am. soldier ~~lots~~ has gives away mil. secrets & then defects, a 201 file would not necessarily have been opened – it might be a mil. matter.
CI staff may have had interests in defector
In early 60's, there was an interest in defectors.

Dan's hypo based on ZRRIFLE:
574 A form: request to put doc. into system
? 1897 " : " " " " into index
In op. such as ZRRIFLE docs. may be specially P & L – might ~~not~~ never go into system except upon determination of officer handling case.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

"Sleeper agent" hypo: to run 2 or 3 sleepers in Comm. China – [Station ^{24} Here] doesn't necessarily have to know @ it since it is being run from Hqtrs. – from DDP to CI Staff – reasonable scenario

Would a 201 be opened on sleeper?
Competing ' of secrecy vs. being able to keep track of sleeper

Change of sleeper to Am. soldier defecting to E. Germany – no 201 opened – C.O. in E. Ger. – report comes in ~~if~~ from reliable source stating that sleeper is providing info.

⑤

Plans would take place in small room in CI Staff.
Form must be signed by DDO — would be put into op. file on the subj.
Op. File would be held at CI ~~staff~~ ~~desk~~ or at action desk.
Problems: Communication
: Equipment

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Op. files can generally be destroyed according to guidelines.

Is it possible for someone to have both a 201 file & ~~then~~ Personnel File? yes

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

1/26/78: TO Frazer

Records Administration – helps diffe Directorates set up
– Bruce Johnson records sys
+ George Fraters

RID – defunct designation for part of Info Services Staff wh handles DDO records



REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DDO has a filing sys unto itself

Any DD can call upon RA to give assistance. But DD can also design its own filing sys so long as RA's legal guidelines are followed. But RA usually is informed of how the other filing sys work.

Day to day maintenance of files is decentralized.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ISS central sys is also heart ~~fo~~ of indiv ~~fi~~ division (i.e. area) systems.
– for items of record value

Special materials might not go into central file. ie Special Correspondence.

"Prescribed & Limited" info
– highly sensitive info – limited distri to certain indivs
Designation as P&L is made by DDO & senior staff officer

P&L designation – deep cover agent in hostile territory might receive this designation.
– this P&L designation would not be uncommon* for cases of this kind.

10 or 15 yrs ago, w/ super sensitive operations, this was relatively common.
* Possi for something to be so sensitive that no 201 file is assigned.

CI staff has gone over accumulation of many yrs & is now catching up to place names in central index.

possi ~~to~~ that situations occur where a P&L file is no longer [illegible] to locate.
– lost, destroyed, archived.

Could open 201 file w/o giving indication of prior assoc w/ CIA. This, according to Johnson, would be irresponsible.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

George Frater
"
"

Cryptonym would be in 201 file.

201 - need for a continuing interest in order to open a file.

source
asset
adversary
KGB
collaborator

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Counterintelligence threat
→ 201 file would be opened w/i matter of days or a wk – assuming source is accurate.
i.e. an American serviceman ~~giv~~ in Germany who is giving info to Russians.

To locate where documents were filed prior to being placed in file, refer to abstract sys under document #.

If ~~Sleep~~ Amer soldier in Ger is actually sleeper who w/ P&L – no 201 file & ~~open~~ # assigned to him, it is possi that his ~~co~~ case officer would prevent opening of a 201 file #.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

applies to all intelligence agencies → Interagency source register exists → avoids poss. of > 1 agency using same agent.

Graphics index – will not contain routine pictures of tourists or groups

201 files will not nec'ly contain pictures.

See next page

There is no (centralized ~~action~~ name index correlated to ~~crypts~~ AIRS
– ~~Rost~~ [illegible] was not certain, but did say ~~[illegible]~~ this info would not be retained for record purpose.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

possi for 201 file not to contain crypt.

deepcover – these people did have 201's in their true name.
201's are not opened in pseudonym

Bob Barton.

There is only version of a 201 file – no copies. Local offices have working files.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Files other than 201

subject files – particu target.
project files
policy + mgmt –

SECRET

Project files
└ for every project in wh ~~run~~ ~~by~~ Agency, is involved, even if project run by another org (i.e. DOD).

cover staff - involved in creation of cover.

# of people involved in setting up deep cover ~~plan~~ would be at least 12.
— unless you slave to DOD

such ~~co~~ deep cover programs do exist.

There is a central listing of cryptonyms. From this list you get true name, then go to 201 file if there is one.

Staff personnel
└ no duplicates of 201's

agent file will include "trail of [illegible]."

There is no back filing sys by true name, pseudonym, crypt, + 201.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SECRET

SECRET

There is no ~~[illegible]~~ staff officer or asset filing indicating what operations/projects the staff officer/asset was involved in.

continuous employee relationship w/ US govt.

Case officer = SA in ~~FBI~~

Contract employee support capacities

agents = paid or unpaid people who are controlled by CIA.

agent & asset may be the same.

" is not nec'ly an agent bec as" is " always controlled

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

source = provider of info

asset - ~~may~~ someone who may provide a service or info.

Name ck process - procedure to learn what is known about a person.

-involve a ck of ~~the~~ files

results ~~are~~ go into 201 file if there is one.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

201 files are generally in sequence.

Name cks are always done w/ opening of 201.

True id may be kept out of 201, & it would be worked in cryptonym

There is a centralized filing sys by true name, pseudonym, crypto, + 201 #. - called a true name index.

[See [illegible] regarding its dual filing sys]

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Fretas
201
subject - countries, projects

exist for all projects that CIA is involved in.

support
Finance - receipts,
there will be a crypt file
Logistics - automobiles, clothing, supplies
Communications - ~~cables~~ chrono file on cables; microfilmed.
Security - security file; under pseudonym.
personnel - files on applicants & agency employees.
for agents - 2 files in office of security
Overt
covert
biog data, results of sec. investigation. assignments,

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

anything that he does when he's overseas i.e. writing a dispatch,
assignments ~~projects~~ listed * in sec file.

Medics - medical histories on all staffers & some agents if they can get it.
psych profile

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

training - agents, [illegible], secretaries, officers

ODP (office of data processing) - put tog. programs used by agencies to [illegible] programs [illegible] to computers,

Betsy Wolf

CIA Briefing - January 26, 1978

Records Admin. Branch - w/in DDA
RID → subsumed into ISS. Inf. Services Staff - only DDO

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

DDA
|
ISAS - Info. Systems Analysis Staff
|
Records Admin. Branch

Can be used for any level w/in any Division, but anyone can design their own systems, providing they inform RAB so that they can monitor compliance.

"Family Jewels Collection":

Highly sensitive & compartmented info. tends to be diverted from central records.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Guidelines for handling & maintaining secret but not for completing "bigot list" emphasis on limiting access.
↳ P & L

p.2

"Prescribed & Limited" Distribution (P&L): doesn't cover files but info., communications

"Sleeper" hypo: Operation could have been so sensitive as to be kept out of filing, indexing system, particularly 10-15 years ago.

May have been handled out of front offices; may not have even rec'd 201 file #.

201 #'s: assigned by ISS; were assigned by RID 10-15 yrs. ago

Files were not designated "P&L" but were "restricted" to confined jurisdictions

Cryptonym assignment: part of ISS - Central Top Secret & Cryptic Reference Staff

"Sleeper" would have to have a cryptonym for op. purposes. Would list cryptonym w/201 # → ∴ no name, not in STAR system

Bob Bartowe - Basis for opening a 201 file:

Some sense of "continuing interest" either as a potential source, agent, KGB official - can be either for operational or counter-intell. purposes

Could be either to consolidate several references in STAR system

Could be opened in response to one reference - Ex.: 1 credible source ref. to some suspected KGB person

201 could be opened in a matter of hrs., days or weeks if someone recognized info. of significance on part. person

"Files content listing" - supplemental listing from STAR system

hen did system start? — Abstract system of STAR: could find prior references to a part. document

outine in '60's

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

p.3

Central Source Register

Ask Gregg for details

Interagency Source Register: in effect probably since beg. of CIA (of Intelligence Agencies) – doesn't include regular personnel – only assets – would be based on true names – wouldn't contain sensitive sources

201 files would not necessarily contain a photograph. Even if photo existed, it may not have been in 201 file but may be x-ref. to a specific desk.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ask Gregg

Graphics collection in DDI
Indiv. desks will collect photos of persons of interest
may contain photos of terrain, etc. Not particularly interested in group pics, etc.

Listing of assets – would be maintained in a working manner at separate desks.

Ref. Gregg

DDO would be only place where there would be access to this type of listing.

By & large, no 201 files on employees, unless there was an op. interest prior to employment → Official Personnel File

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Opening docs. of 201 files would contain refs. to clearance papers (which would be maintained in Sec. Office)

Emp. under deep cover → Staff Agent – his files would be converted & would appear under his pseudonym.

Don't open 201's on pseudonyms, but would open one on cryptonyms.

p. 4

Only 1 copy of a 201 file; may be a working field copy

Subject files:
Project files:
Policy & mgmt. files

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Project file: operational mgmt. record of a given project
A. Administration
B. Support
C. Production
201 would have info. on asset involved in project; project file's info is on operation itself.

See Gregg Operational Details

Central list of cryptonyms - where they're registered - you can match the cryptonym with the true name. The more sensitive the asset or operation → the more difficult it will be to get to true name.

Hard file: Official information
Soft file: includes working papers - anything of record value in soft file would be included in hard file.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

? Project files: where are approval, decision-making records filed?

Personnel File contains: where worked; supervisor's name; type of work done; evaluations
Does not contain specific operations in which employee was involved.

p.5

Employees
↳ Case officers – intelligence officers

Contract employees
Agents: may or may not be paid, represent assets who are under their control
Asset: someone from whom they can get useful services, including
Source: Source of information

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ask Gregg PRQ: Basic biog. info.
Way of ordering available info.
Fundamental doc in an agent's 201 file.

Name check (= trace) process includes check of following:
STAR trace
Travel files
Office of Security
Provisional Oper. Approval
Also do name checks for other agencies

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Negative AM/LASA name trace –
Green check list:

p.6 George Fratas

Subject Files: countries, projects, misc.
201 Files: individuals

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Would be a matter of routine to maintain files on another operation originating in another agency.

Agent:
201:

Office of Security
" of Finance:
CI Staff might have info.

Finance: acctgs., vouchers, receipts; will have a cryptonym file
Logistics: support - autos, clothing, etc. necessary to run operations
Communications: cables, telegraphs
Maintain a chrono. file on cables - on microfilm
Cables are logged in w/ a number, date, station
Security: Security files - listed under pseudonym if an agent
" " true name if an employee

Started to eliminate dual filing @ mid-'60's

Agents - ~~[illegible]~~ 2 files - each with the same #
Overt - true name Covert - pseudonym - listed in index

Ask DDO - Would an agent ever operate under a pseudonym

If it has pseudonym → he is in file
(overt) True name: biog. data, results of bckgrd. check, security violations & assignments
(covert) Pseudonym: Contains everything the person did - lists where

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

p.7

he worked, what he did, etc.

If an agent, it would have a POA for each project the agent was involved in.

If a staff employee it will only have a list of assignments.

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Medics: Medical histories on all staffers; on agents if they can get it
Psychological profiles

Training: Train agents, mgrs., secys., officers
Run all training centers

Office of Data Processing: Put together programs used by computers.

Personnel: applicants for agency employ.
all agency employees

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

(true name index)
DDO has central index which X-refs. true names, cryptonyms, pseudonyms & 201 numbers.

TRANSMITTAL A.. JCUMENT RECEIPT 9 June 1978

TO:
Mr. Robert Morrison
House Select Committee on
Assassinations
3381 House Annex #2

FROM: Office of Legislative Counsel
Central Intelligence Agency
Room 7 D 35
Washington, D.C. 20505

THE DOCUMENTS LISTED HEREON ARE FORWARDED FOR:

☐ INFORMATION	☐ ACTION	XXXXX RETENTION	☐ LOAN	

CONTROL NUMBER	DOC. DATE	SUBJECT (*Unclassified preferred*)	CLASS.
	Mar 78	Sanitized Notes of Betsy Palmer re OS file on Manuel Antonio Ray y Rivero	S
	24 Feb 78	Sanitized Notes of Betsy Palmer re file on CAS - Alpha 66	S

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

~~APPROVED FOR RELEASE 1993 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM~~

19588

RECEIPT

SIGNATURE (*acknowledging receipt of above documents*)

DATE OF RECEIPT

RETURN TO OFFICE OF LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
ROOM 7 D 35
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

FORM 10-76 3772B

1 - WHITE, RETURN COPY
2 - PINK, ADDRESSEE HOLD BACK
3 - CANARY, OLC HOLD BACK

10145-10295

Betsy Palmer
May 1, 1978

Cable Traffic, Mexico City/Director
October 1963

72527 to MEXI from DIR dated 10/1/63

1. Basic Hdqtrs position -- assist any responsible anti-Castro group. JURE qualifies. L/2 can give covert assistance but not jeopardize his ops utility. Recommend Lanier contact be maintained.

2. Julio Lanier Hevia one of original members Pro-Unidad Cubana en Exilio formed February 1962.

3. Manolo Ray and Ernesto Betancourt (MEXI 6255) of ELC have had dealings in past and jointly held discussions with U.S. govt. on Cuban problems. Possible therefore Lanier and Betancourt approaches related.

#79557 to MEXI from DIR, dated 31 October 1963

0)

1. Do not wish MEXI station intervene wit Mexi foreign minister behalf JURE reps as this would obviously establish official U.S. support JURE. Hdqtrs not aware [Litamil/2] has foreign minister contact but if he can assist on visa problem no objection. Might be useful L/2 make pretense of helping in order appear cooperative to Lanier.

2. Angel Luis Guiu Figueredo was chief military operations MRP in Cuba until took asylum May 1961. WAVE asset mid 62 to mid 63. Rogelio Cisneros Diaz is member JURE Executive Board and former national coordinator MRP in Cuba.

#6455 to DIR from MEXI, dated 9 October 1963

0)

1. JURE rep in Mexico, Julio Lanier Hevia, told [Litamil/2] that long-range seaplane lined up for use against Cuban soil. Currently used commercially haul shellfish. Based near Tampico. Two JURE leaders coming Mexico soon to inspect it. L/2 will try elicit more details.

c/s Comment: Requested timely reporting re any air strikes being planned or mounted against Cuba by anyone.

Cuban Ambassador to Mexico, 1963 - Joaquin Hernandez Armas

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

2/M

Betsy Palmer

SERGIO ARCACHA SMITH
September 14, 1965

I Loose Documents

Reply to the Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service from DD/P stating: Reference is made to the request dated 23 August 1965 concerning Subject (File No. AL 055 004 TC) The files contain no pertinent additional information to that previously forwarded to the FBI in CScl-3/764,414 dated 30 March 1961, subject: Friends of Democratic Cuba

In yellow manila envelope: Letter to agency dated 23 August 1965 referred to above.

II 201-835474 (Personality File Action Request) June 25, 1968
[~~Psedonym - James H. Kesler~~]

Attended college in Havana
A graduate of Columbia University Law School
Served in Cuban Diplomatic Service before Castro
New Orleans delegate of Frente Revolucionaria Democratico in 1960
Additional info in File 100-300-017

June 9, 1967 Memo for Record
Reference: Brief Comments re: FBI Report, DBB 78940 of 25 April 1967
States: Other sources have stated that Gordon Novel and Arcacha Smith have "marquie" letters granting them immunity and are allegedly employed by CIA.

Garrison's investigation started when Everett Gordon Schaeffer (phonetic) took a deposition from David Ferrie in which Ferrie admitted knowing Lee Harvey Oswald.

November 13, 1975 (outgoing message: on Smith for Customs.
DPOB 1923, Cuba. Lawyer: FBI has further information on him.

Sergio Arcaeha Smith
Page 2
Betsy Palmer

Third Agency Deletions

1. FBI document (DBC-00999) dated 21 Feb. 1967, Classification: not given
   Subject: ~~Assination~~ Assassination/JFK Nov. 22, 1963, Dallas, Tex.
   File # - not given.
2. FBI document (DBB 78198) dated 30 March 1967, Classification: not given
   Subject: Assassination/JFK Nov. 22, 1963 Dallas, Tex.
   FBI File # : (S) 62-10960 (Bureau)
3. FBI document, DBB-77295, dated April 10, 1967
   Classification: not given
   Subject: Assassination/JFK, Nov. 22, 1963 Dallas, Texas
   FBI File #: Not given

Betsy Palmer
May 1, 1978

SERGIO ARCACHA SMITH - Office of Security File Review
April 28, 1978

1. Search Request on 4/6/67

2. Report deleted, dated 7/19/61 - Third Party Information

3. Sergio visits survivors of Cuban exile infiltration of U.S. who landed in New Orleans and were hospitalized because of their weakened condition. He tried to see them on 3 May 1961 but entrance to the hospital was denied until his bona fides could be established. Visited them on 10 May 1961. Arcacha then head of New Orleans chapter of CRC.

4. Washington Start article, dated 1 April 1967 on Garrison proble - warrent issued for Arcacha's arrest on charges of conspiring to burglarize munitions bunker in 1961 with Gordon Novel.

5. Bio memo - undated. Sergio Arcacha Smith one of promoters of Friends of Democratic Cuba in New Orleans, 6 January 1961. Investigation conducted by a reliable Miami Station asset concluded that FRC organized for personal gain.

6. FBI memo on FRD, 1/18/61, New Orleans, deleted.

7. Memo dated 31 May 1967 by Ramond G. Rocca
Subject: Garrison and the Kennedy Assassination - Gordon Dwane Novel

A. Summary - Novel has both claimed and denied CIA affiliation -- a thorough check of CIA records shows no affiliation. It is possible that NBC is supporting Novel to get a large audience for expose of Garrison. Novel may have exaggerated his presumed relationship with Sergio Arcacha Smith who also is not CIA affiliated.

B. Novel is mysterious -- little information -- 29 year old former owner of bar in French Quarter and an electronics expert.

C. In Columbus, Ohio, Novel is free on $10,000 bond - living in a rent-free apartment and drives a car with dealer tags. Rocca questions where money is coming from.

D. Novel in McLena, Virginia 25-26 March 1967. Given a polygraph by Lloyd Furr. Furr and Richard L. Bast operate firm Redex -- sell audio and counter audio devices.

E. CIA finds no evidence of ever having an Evergreen Advertising Agency which Novel claims he worked for and was CIA front.

F. Records show CIA never recruited or paid Arcacha directly but since he was associated with FRD in New Orleans, which was created with CIA assistance, guidance anf financial support may have been given him through the Miami FRD circa May 1960.

SECRET

8. Memo dated 28 Septembar 1967 from Donavan E. Pratt
Subject: Garrison Investigation - Queries from Justice Department

Questions prepared by Deputy Assistant Attorney General/ Criminal Division.

A. During 1948-56 period of his association with CIA, what services did Clay Shaw perform for agency?
(Shaw submitted information on international trade which was incorporated into 8 reports -- East German directory of firms engaged in such trade; a Czechoslovakian Trade Exhibit; foreign exchange problems in Peru, etc.

B. What was his remuneration? DCS has to supply this information.

C. What were his contacts:
(Contacted by DCS representative in New Orleans seven times 1949, twice 1950, five times 1951, nine times 1952, once 1953, twice 1954, twice 1955 and twice 1956.

C. What was reason for cessation of relationship? Files dont' answer - DCS must furnish answer.

Questions about Sergio Arcacha Smith - same memo.

A. What was his exact relationship with Agency? Never a direct one. Miami FRD headquarters may have mentioned CIA sponsorship to him.

B. What was Agency interest in and support of FRD? Answered above. In the CRC? Had direct access to and support of White House and CIA.

C. CIA interest/support of Crusade to Free Cuba Committee? No record - Check with WH/COG

Questions about Gordon Novel - same memo. No CIA connection with Novel or his attorney, Steven Plotkin or his former business partner Rancier Blaise Ehlinger.

Questions about Jack Ruby - No CIA relationship or file.
David Ferrie - No CIA relationship
Richard Rudolph Davis - No CIA relationship
Alvin Beaufouef - No CIA relationship
Guy Banister or Hugh Ward - no CIA relationship
White Russians - no - see pp. 716-23 W Report
De Mohrenschildt - no

Is CIA tapping Garrison's phone - no

Marine training site at Atsugi was removed from the U-2 area to which the Marines did not have access.

Betsy Palmer

File Review - Manuel Ray y Rivero Volume III of XVIII
March 30, 1978

December 1960 - January 1961

1. Cable 12/6/60 to Director from [Gold]
Ray contacted by Weisinger and made statement that Isle of Pine's operation failed in his opinion because Bender failed to forward paper to Havana with key to operation.

2. 12/8/60 Cable to Director from WAVE

Ray advised Wiesinger he is departing for Washington same day to visit ERNESTA BETANCOURT of OAS and others. In New York on 12/9 to contact Raul Chibas. Return Miami about 12/11/60.

3. 12/23/60 Cable to Director from Havana indicates Ray wishes return to Cuba as soon as possible and asks that OLIEN make arrangements through his official channel. Doesn't want Cubans in WAVE or Cuba to know of his return.

* 4. 12/22/60 Information report from U.S. citizen, free-lance writer and part-time sugar broker [(DONALD HOGAN)]

Says Miro Cardona has accepted teaching position in Puerto Rico effective early January 1961. Is disgusted with bickering among anti-Castro Cubans and will sit on sidelines for time being. Is partivularly opposed to Ray -- program is too Marxist and Ray is an opportunist.

* 5. 1/16/61 Information Report from U.S. national in a U.S. governemnt agency. Source had contact with DR. GUILLERMO SALAZAR SANCHEZ, former Cuban ambassador to Switzerland and DR. SERGIO ROJAS SANTAMARINA, former Cuban Ambassador to United Kingdom. Salazar said he had heard from a reliable source that Ray was not a bona fide defector and still acting on behalf of Castro and is a member of the "Blue Legion". (no further explanation.)

Dr. Salazar mentioned group called "The Ten Unknowns" who are key figures in making Communist policy in Latin America. (Ray not implicated as one of these).

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes 1 - XVIII (201-239298

April 6, 1978
VOLUME IV - February 1, 1961 - March 31, 1961

1. Operation Approval granted for Ray's use as a political asset on
7 February 1961

2. Memo to WH/4?Security, From WH/4?CI
Subject: Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo Group
Date: 23 February 1961

Ray pressuring Mr. Droller to have four individuals freed from McAllen Detention Camp who belong to Gutierrez group. Ray claims they are members of his group and have been most active against Castro regime in Cuba. They are as follows:

ASENCIO, Suarez, Lazaro
LESNIK, Menendez, Max DPOB 8 Sept 1930, Vueltas, Las Villas
PORTA Bolanos, Gustavo
REDONDO, Gonzalez, Roger

3. Cable to Bell, from JMWAVE
Date: March 1, 1961

Artime advises that Ray's group opposed to banning Communist Party and in favor of "nationalizing everything". Ray favors maintaining trade with USSR, wants no change in present agrarian reform program.

4. Cable to JMWAVE from Bell
Date: March 10, 1961

INS is concerned over the increased news coverage of Ray's arrival in U.S. and activities here. Afraid they will be confronted about Ray's arrival (which was describad as "black" in another communication) so JMWAVE asked to re-advise Ray that his story is that on 10 Nov 1960, he landed somewhere on Keys in a fishing boat, made way to road where picked up by INS patrol car, taken to WAVE area, examined, declared refugge and released with admonition to always keep INS advised of his address.

* 5. Memo to S - Dr. Berle, From: ARA - Philip W. Bonsal
Subject: Recent Cuban Developments
Date: March 16, 1961

Conversation with Jose Miro Cardona and Berle, reveals that Cardona has misgivings about Ray and Pazoz and the MRP. Says Ray is bitterly anti-American as well as probably totalitarian in his thinking. He no longer believes Ray has any considerable support inside Cuba. Thinks Ray group endeavoring to exercise influence in our government so as to be the major recipient of whatever assistance can be obtained here. He is particularly ~~[illegible]~~ concerned about the role played by Felipe Pazos.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray files
Volume iv of xviii
Page 2

* 6. Field Information Report
Subject: Background, Character and Economic Concepts of Manuel Ray Rivero
Date: 16 March 1961
Sources: Dr. Oscar SALAS Marrero (paragraphs 1-11) Knew Ray in Cuba
Dr. Jose ALVAREZ Diaz, former Minister of Finance under Prio (Pg
Dr. Jorge BERUFF, former president of Banco de Desarrollo
Economico de Cuba, (pg 13)

Note: Cover note pencilled comment (The content is so biased and mixed with untruth that it would be a disservice to the intelligence community to disseminate it.

Synopsis of paragraphs 1-11. Dr. Salas says during his childhood Ray was a Protestant but today is completely atheistic. Said Ray organized the MRC against Batista and shortly after Batista's fall, MRC and 26th of July Movement fused into one, and as soon as Castro came into power, control of the organization was given to the Communists. Tells of Ray's association with Castro and that he did not resign his position when his own brother was renounced by Castro. Stated that Ray's rupture with Fidel was due to the fact that Ray opposed the idea of shooting Hubert Matos as a traitor. Ray resigned his post but said publicly that he approved and supported the Castro regime without any mental reservations. Says in Cuban clandestine circles Ray is regarded as boastful, ostentatious and deceitful. Intimate friends of Ray feel that he is a man of anti-democratic procedures, and does not like to take advice, even from members of his own movement.

Synopsis of paragraph 12. Dr. Alvarez said Ray was in favor of maintaining relations with USSR and not making Communist Party illegal. Said that although Ray withdrew all these statements when threatened with press coverage, Alvarez thinks they are representative of Ray's thinking and would try to put ideas into practice if he ever came to power. Alverez also mentioned Rays thinking on nationalization of public services, socialized medicine, nationalization of banks, etc.

Synopsis of paragraph 13. Dr. Beruff said Ray well-intentioned with no Communist tendencies. Cited a meeting at which the basic points of the MRP platform were discussed and said that since Ray was in disagreement with the others on most of the points, Dr. Felipe Pazos acted as chairman of the meeting and Ray argued his case as a simple member of the group. Out of this meeting came a declaration of 14 points, including the nationalization of the banks and public utilities.

On 9 March, Ray said that ideas attributed to him in paragraph 12 were not true and part of a "campaign against him by Mr. Pawley of the Miami City Transit Company".

✱ 7. Report dated March 17, 1961, Marked Urgent

"It has been reported by a very reliable source that Manuel Ray (MRP) is bringing as an Adviser, Professor Fiterre from Habana University - This man Fiterre is an undisclosed Communist that has always openly admitted and braged about being aCommunist.

8. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 27 March 1961
Subject: Ray accepts appointment to Council: -----
Signed: Gerard Droller

Miro was able to convince Ray to join CRC. Thus, as of 27 March 1961, Council's composition isas follows: Chairman: Miro Cardona; Board of Directors: Varona, Hevia, Carrillo, Maceo, Ray and Artime.

9. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 27 March 1961
Subject: Reported Anti-MRP Rally Promoted by Aureliano Sanchez Arango
Signed: B. E. Reishhardt

Julio Lobo reported that Sanchez is planning a rally in Miami, 29 March to protest against the Ray/Pazos combine in the revolutionary council. Writer says, obviously, such a rally at this time could be most damaging and some attempt should be made to get to Sanchez to take the steam out of this maneuver.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - XVIII

April 6, 1978
VOLUME V - April 1961 - July 1961

1. Cable from JMWAVE to Bell
Date: April 3, 1961

Ray meets with Olien and said he was not as yet prepared to join ~~CRC~~ FRO. Said Miro had welshed on commitments and while willing to accept Ray into CRC, not willing to give him any voice in the Council. Olein apptempts to convince Ray he was doing great disservice to Cuban people by refusing to serve within FRO.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from Bell
Date: April 4, 1961

"To test actual MRP capabilities inside request you inform Ray to hit targets G, I and K during period 5-10 April. Attack target O including diesel locomotive engines immediately. Will forward additional targets if Ray shows any capability."

3. Letter to Editor (Pencilled note: Propaganda against MRP by Attime's replacement Jose Manuel Hernandez Puentes received from QD Date 6 Apr 61.)

"I am a Cuban who still thinks that Cuba can be rehabilitated after the fall of Castro. For this reason many Cubans have been baffled by the list of names now given as the saviors of Cuba for a Provisional Government. Among these are such notorious Castro followers as: Ray, Barquin, Pazos, Rufo Lopez Fresquet, Chibas and others whose names remind us of an era of mourning, persecution and misery."

4. Report on Manuel Ray received from Enrique Molinet, a road and airfield construction engineer under Batista regime. Cover note dated 4/7/61. Molinet outlines his distaste for Ray, citing at the beginning his refusal to leave Castro even after the questionable suicide of his brother, Rene. After Ray was ousted from his Cabinet job, he continued to visit Castro, occupying a prominent position in all Castro's public appearances. Said that even before Castro, Ray was an active member of the Cuban Orthodox Party, highly infiltrated with communists. Claims that when Ray in his Cabinet position, indoctrinations programs were held expousing communistic ideals. Also while Minister of Public Works, claims he (Ray) threw out hundreds of employees without due cause and destroyed every successful contractor that existed.

5. Memorandum for the Record
Subject: Custody of Revolutionary Council, 19-20 April 1961
Signed: Robert F. Moroney
Date: 24 April 1961

Relates that on 19 April 1961, President Kennedy met with the six members of FRD's Revolutionary Council where President expressed his deep sorrow and concern over the failure of the military effort (Bay of Pigs). Ray one of the group.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray Files
Volume iv of xviii
Page 2

* 6. Memorandum for the Record
Date: 5 May 1961
Subject: Manolo Ray - Comments on his Anti-Castro Activities
Signed: Calvin Hicks WH/4/PM/Operations

"Ray is balieved to have accomplished pratically nothing towards the effort to overthow Castro. Instead, it seems that whenever we played with his so-called assets, we were burned. He is notorious for claiming assets or operations, several days after some other group had already set them up or claimed them. Whenever it came to producing and backing up his claims, he always came up with excuses for not producing, rather than results. He has always tended to try to take over other goups, rather than cooperate with them, and when he couldn't take them over he would "politic" against them. His actions all seemed to be directed toward making him the future power in Cuba rather than toward overthrowing Castro. It is believed that Manolo RAY is so far "left" in his thinking that he would be as dangerous (or more so in the long run) to United States interests as Castro, if he ever got to be the power in Cuba."

* 7. Memorandum for the Record
Subject: ~~Manolo R~~ Relations with Manolo Ray and the MRP
Date: 2 June 1961 03
Signed: James A. Noel

In a 12 May 1961 meeting, Ray promises to write a prospectus of his plans for MRP within ten days. Not received by 2 June, but Ernesto Betancourt 03 is asking for financial support for MRP activities. Tracy Barnes agrees with Noel that no money should be given Ray until his plans are studies. Ray is asking for support separate from FRD since Ray has withdrawn from 03 this group. Noel further states in Memo, "...I would like to point out the security risks inherent in any arrangementw with RYA-BENTANCOURT-CISNEROS trio. These fellows have had easy access to the White House and to the Department, are notorious for their 'planned leaks', will probably presume all the Department officials they deal with are privy to the arrangement, and before we know it the whole exile community will be well aware that we are providing financial and material support to the RAY group."

* 8. Cable to Bell from Caracas
Date June 8, 1961
On June 2, Venezuelas governemnt refused to issue a visa to Manolo Ray.

9. Cable to Director from Caracas, dated June 28, 1961. re: meeting with Jose R. Barbeito on 20 June in Valencia. Barbeito claims was member of MRP of Manolo Ray and took part clandestine activities Havana. Admitted was communist "many years ago" but now completely opposed to Castro and Communism.

3/ML

Betsy Palmer

10. Intelligence Report
    Date: 7-11 July 1961
    Place: San Juan, P.R.
    Source: Cuban Exile Lawyer
    Evaluation: F-6

Report transmits information concerning activities, persons visited and purpose of visit of Ray to Puerto Rico, terminating when Ray hurridely left Puerto Rico following press account that he had been removed as Coordinator of the MRP.

Source said MRP leaders in exile believe Rays dismissal due to propaganda and pressures by the CIA which brought about the impression that the obstacle to receipt of help from outside (money, arms, etc) was Ray himself and that once Ray removed, they would receive all types of help. The exile leaders are of opinion that it was also brought about because Ray was a divisionist inasmuch as he had abandoned Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Council.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files Volumes I - XVIII

April 6, 1978
Volume VI - August 1, 1961 - June 30, 1962

1. Cable to JMWAVE from Director
Date: August 1, 1961

FBI conducting investigation on MRP and Ray and Director indicates he needs to know purpose of investigation to respond properly.

* 2. Dispatch from Chief of Base, JMWAVE
Date: August 4, 1961
Subject: Debriefing of Father Bastarrica

Father Bastarrica recently arrived from Cuba as a political exile. At a luncheon meeting, he reported as follows:

MRP formed in Cuba around 26 July 1960. Organizers were Dr. Amalio Fiallo Gonzalez, Dr. Antonio Fernandez Nuevo, Reynol Gonzalez, Humberto Perez Herrera. All these men belonged to group called Accion Democratica. The name of MRP was suggested by Raul Chibas and in itself it does not constitute a party or group but rather a coalition of several small groups, which were the following:

a. The 20 May group, led by Manuel Ray
b. Accion Democratica, led by Dr. Fiallo
c. Accion Verde Olivo, led by Dr. Rufo Lopez Fresquet
d. 30 November Movement, led by David Salvador (never really joined)
e. Chibas' group with Jorge Beruff and Felipe Pazos
f. Dr. Valdez Pino, in asylum in Embassy of Peru and belonged to Accion Democratica.

Father Bastarrica's opinion of Ray is that he had no way of judging whether Ray is Communist or Marxist. Lacks quality of leadership because he does not publically hold to a definite political, social and economic ideology. He appears to agree with every person he talks to, never arguing with them or opposing them, all of which shows he has no ideology and makes him a very dangerous man. Is extremely ambitous for himself, with great desire for power.

3. Memorandum for Chief, WH Division, dated 10 October 1961, from Warren S. Yauger, Subject: General - Cuban Matters; Specific - Manuel (Monolo) Ray Planning Board of Puerto Rico announced on 9 October 1961 that Ray has accepted position as consultant to that Board. Board is an important agency of Puerto Rican government, attached to the Office of the Governor. Has broad powers over economic and social planning and is active in exercising these powers. Ray to receive $12,000 per year. Ray presently in Venezuela but expected to arrive Puerto Rico within a week.

4. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated May 27, 1962 discusses front page article in Miami Herald of this date by James Buchanan entitled "Miro fades as Exile Chief: Three Latin Leaders Behind Ray". States that Ray has the backing of Gov. Monoz Marin, Pres. Romulo Betancourt and former President Jose Figueras and that Ray has taken over post with blessings of the U.S. Further states Ray's appointment as "Chief in Exile" came from underground in Cuba according to Joaquin Godoy, Provisional MRP head in Miami. Article credits Cubans in Miami with saying "new man in field" is Adolf A. Berle, Jr. who has been special asst. to State Dept. and is also member of Pres. Kennedy's special task force on Lantin America. Implication being that Berle is running new U.S. sponsored Cuban effort. Release causing furor in local Cuban colony.

Cable to JMWAVE from Director, 28 May 1962 states State Department spokesman will state story without foundation at a noon press briefing this date.

5. Listing of principal persons in Puerto Rico with the MRP

RAY, Manuel
PAZOS, Felipe
BARQUIN, (Col) Ramon
MELENDEZ, Juan
GELAVERT
NODAL, Rodolfo
PORTELA, J. Migues
CARMONA, Claudio
ESTEVEZ, Jeromino
BERGNUS
ALVAREZ, Gabriel
PORTELA, Sara

6. On 9 June 1961, Ray transmitts a detailed study of a general program designed to attain the liberation of Cuba. General Thesis states that MRP believes that the strongest position for representation and canalization of aspirations of the large majority of the Cuban people is offered by the set of ideas and aims of the democratic left.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manolo Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes 1 - XVIII

April 24, 1978

Volume VIII - September 4, 1962 - December 27, 1962

1. Telegram Information Report (circa Sept. 10) Unevaluated information. Ray in the U.S. 8-9 September. Intends forming new organization. Some of those participating with Ray in this effort are Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas, Ramon Barquin and Justo Carrillo. Ray is of the opinion that nothing will be done about Cuba in the immediate future as the President of the United States is fulfilling "an expedient of a political nature." However, there is an ally in the White House who has assured Ray that if he organizes a purely revolutionary group, he will be heard.

2. Junta Revolucionaria Cubana
Declaration of Principles outline the following areas:
1. Cuban Reaffirmation - recognition of sovereignty of the people, through suffrag
2. Human Rights - human fraternity and social solidarity for all Cubans
3. Social Justice - equality of opportunity for education, work, homes, etc.
4. Economic Development - intense industrialization
5. Agrarian Reform - Cuban pesantry to own land he cultivates
6. International Relations - break with Soviet bloc
7. Restoration of Legitimate Property - not that under public power
8. Political Parties - Communist Party will be proscribed
9. Political Prisoners - immediate release
10. Elections - within 18-month period

2. Dispatch to Chief, Task Force W from Chief of Station, JMWAVE
Date obscured

AMTHRILL-1 provided information on Ray obtained from Silvia KOURI de Pendas, a fellow student of Ray's at Instituto de Segunda Ensenanza #1 in Havana. Ray never know to have sympathy for Communist cause. However, one of his good friends, Pedro Valdes Vivo, is active member of Communist cell and a brother of Raul Valdes Vivo, now sub-director of Communist paper "Noticias de Hoy."

3. Cable to Priority San Juan, Info: Priority JMWAVE, Priority Mexico City
From: Director (Rodriguez originator) dated 9 Oct 1962
Admission visa not pouched 00 forwarding document will be in WAVE hands 10 October for pass ing to Ray. Lechuga is principal target in area of Ray trip. Stress desire keep Lechuga in place in preference to defection.

4. Memorandum for the Record dated 8 October 1962 from Patrick I. Karnley
Subject: Notes on Manolo Ray
In conversation with Luis Laboy, Laboy said Ray does not have any significant following among Cuban exiles -- says Ray is honest person completely motivated by patriotism but lacks qualities of a politician. Says Ray is too blunt and even Cisneros is not happy with him these days.

Puerto Rican Police are apparently canvassing Cuban exiles regarding Manolo Ray.02-In SKIN-1 Report #54 dated 30 Sept 1962, he refere to fact that both he and Fermin Alvarez Silva were visited by officer of PR Internal Security Force soliciting their opinions of Ray.

Betsy Palmer

Manuel Ray
Volume VIII continued

5. Excerpt from Bohemia Libre 21 October 1962, page 85 Engineer Ray's Latest Attitude

Letter to magazine from Olga Hernandez, Santurce, PR - an exile who believes Ray really a Communist. Her reasons based on Ray's statements to "El Mundo" on his arrival in exile that after Castro's defeat there should be maintenance of cultural and economic relations with Russia, maintenance of militia, mainenance of confiscated property, socialized medicine, supervision of national schools and gradual supression of private schools.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - XVIII
April 24, 1978

Volume IX - January 1963 - July 1963

1. Cable to Director from Caracas, dated Feb. 22, 1963

FRANCISCO SUAREZ QUINONES wishes travel to Maimi to attend JURE rally 24 February. In view Ref B (WAVE 2462) info that Suarez communist and also MRP member, DCM has asked if any info that Suarez was undercover agent for MRP or if he may be double agent working for Castro.

2. Confidential Controlled Dissem. dated 3 June 1963
Title: Plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Infiltrate the Ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency

On 30 April 1963, Rogelio Cisneros reported on meeting of JURE exec. board in his home attended by, among others, Antonio Arias. During meeting, Cisneros said it was mentioned that Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a trusted man into the CIA in order to learn details of any plans with regard to Cuba and if possible infiltrate this man into Cuba. Cisneros also said JURE planning leaflet drop into Cuba which will include such matters as Ray's Manifesto against the U.S. Government and against the CIA.

3. Cable to Director from Paris, dated 19 June 1963 #7727Z

Ray in Paris - contacted by Jervay. Ray driven to airport by Alberto Baez with whom Ray spent much time and who seems to be closest to Ray among his contacts in Paris.. Ray in Paris and Brussels for purpose of turing Franqui and Arcos to agents in place, or defection. Also Cabrera. Ray convinced Cubans here disillusioned with Castro. Asks for update of list of personnel and addresses of all Cuban embassies in Europe to be passed to him in San Juan and UNRUMBLE-6 in Paris. Wants to be trained in short wave system between himself and UNRUMBLE 6 and station felt these were good ideas and could be done.

4. Memo for the Record from Alfonso Rodreguez, dated 19 June 1963
Subject: Manolo Ray

Ray's attitude towards CIA - feels that the Agency has in the past purposely and actively attempted to destroy him as a political leader and has proof of at least one CIA officer plotted with certain MRP officials to remove him from the Mrp as a condition for CIA assistance to that organization. Ray cannot be overlooked in the struggle for Cuban freedom. "-- of all the Cubans I have met, he is the most purposeful, methodical, as well as the most experienced clandestine operator.."

5. Confidential Controlled Dissem. dated 27 June 1963
Re: Creation of an Intelligence Corps within the JURE

Reliable information from former Rebel Army member (F) active in clandestine movements. JURE meeting about 30 March 1963 at home of journalist Antonio Arias said JURE national executive board had created an Intelligence Corps with JURE whose function was to infiltrate JURE members into various

2/M

Volume IX continued

organizations operating in Miami, as well as into some of the agencies of the U.S. govt. Said intelligence group would produce great results and stated as an example the infiltration of the U. S. Army.

6. Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from Chief of Station, JMWAVE
   Dated July 22, 1963
   Subject: Manuel Ray Rivero's Opinion of CIA (AMTAUP-2 source of info)

"During a conversation on an unspecified date, involving AMTAUP-2, Ray and Rogelio Cisneros Diaz, Ray told Cisneros that they had to be very careful with CIA agents because they were more dangerous than the Kennedy Administration. The Kennedy Administration would end but the CIA agents always stayed, and their memory was longer than the memory of elephants and they never forgot or forgave. Ray told Cisneros that he feared CIA agents would try to assassinate him because they were irreconcilable enemies."

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files of Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII

April 24, 1978

Volume X - August 1963 - September 1963

1. Memorandum for the Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, dtd. 2 August 1963
Subject: Meeting with Ray (27 July 1963 in Miami)

Ray to attempt a sabotage operation against the Havana power plant and wants 20lbs high explosives as well as 6-8 thermite grenades. Requested that the materials be cached inside Cuba (preferably) or in San Juan. Requested that arrangements be made for Rogelio Cisneros to visit Guatanamo to visit his brother to inform him of JURE plans -- Rodriguez says possibility remote. Ray planning to visit Caracas and Costa Rica later if he has a visa from Mexico. Purpose of trip is fund raising.

2. Cable from JMWAVE to Director #63249 dtd 22 Aug 1963
Ray's Mexican visa forwarded WAVE by safehand Sept 62 and request it be airmailed to Ray in Puerto Rico. Ray planning trip Costa Rica, Caracas, Dom. Rep. and Mexico. Departing San Juan 29 August for first leg.

3. Memorandum for the Record dated 23 August 1963, from A. Rodriguez
Subject: Ray, Contact Report

Met with Ray in N.Y.C. on 19 August. Rodriguez recommends to Ted Shackley that ammunition for JURE be cached near Florida Keys. Thinks it necessary to help Ray this much in order to measure his capabilities. Ray is having a 25-foot boat outfitted in Miami area to be operational by about Sept. 10. Will be used primarily for infiltration and exfiltration of personnel into Cuba. Ray also says he has been offered a 210 ft. Corvette, flying a Venezuelan flag and owned by Spaniards friendly to JURE. Said he could extend operations along the south coast of Cuba for as much as 2 - 3 weeks with this vessel. Ray was interested in whether or not KLM flights were to be resumed into Cuba as he is hopeful of returning by legal means which would not pose as many difficulties as present Mexican and Spanish air travel conditions.

Ray says he hoped to soon penetrate the Cuban delegation to the U.N. Said his contact with Ambassador Lechuga, through a woman member of the JURE, continues, but without significant progress. Lechuga is most friendly towards her but does not wish to discuss any of his problems with her.

Rodriquez recommends continuation of monthly $10,000 payments to Jure and an additional $15,000 to cover cost of vessels to be acquired.-- total of $25,000 monthly for 6 months.

4. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 24 August 1963 #232228Z
Ray Mexican visa waiver number 50844 issued 3 Sept 62 valid for six months, hence now expired. Under circumstances, WAVE not mailing to Ray unless otherwise instructed.

5. Cable to JMWAVE from Director, dtd 24 Aug 63 Cite Dir. 63774 Please air mail as Ray will need to procure new waiver.

Betsy Palmer

Volume X continued

6. Cable to San Jose, Caracas, Santo Domingo, Mexico Cityk JMWAVE
From: Director dated 31 August 63

Ray departing 29 Aug. on trip to first three addees. Attempting renew Mexican visa waiver for travel there later. Purpose of trip to solicit political backing, raise funds, tighten JURE organization, streamline communication and establish take-off points for operations against target.

7. Cable to Director from JMWAVE dtd 7 Sept 63, Ref WAVE 3895

Reported conversation with Ray's sister-in-law wherein she stated Ray visited her home on 30 August to say goodby. He was going to be infiltrated into Cuba and would not see her for some time. Said he was not in accord with certain U.S. officials on Cuban policy and has no confidence in U.S. ability to liberate Cuba. Said he had refused two invitations extended by RFK to discuss Cuban situation.

8. Document transfer and Cross Reference dtd 10 Sept 63 UFG-03590
Ray arrived secretly in Miami from Puerto Rico, had secret meeting with Manuel Quiza Docal, LDR of Cubanos Libres, in which Quiza officially connected his organization to JURE for all action. Later traveled to N.Y.C. to purchase c-4 explosives.

9. Cable to Director from JMWAVE dtd 11 Sept 63, report from AMTAUP-2 who spoke with Rogelio Cisneros on 6 Sept. Cisneros stated Ray departed for Costa Rica on 5 Sept to interview President Orlich. Said on Ray's last meeting with RFD, the private secretary of President Romulo Betancourt was present. Cisneros said JURE objective is to have different prominent figures in Latin American governments witness promises made by U.S. govt. Cisneros said JURE not obligated to report military or political plans to CIA but CIA obligated to deliver to JURE all military equipment needed to fight Castro. Delivery of equipment will be on high seas from a CIA boat to JURE boat which will proceed to Cuba.

10. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 6 Sept 63. Elania Germania (Bernal) de Paula reported she learned from her brother-in-lay, Manuel Ray, that he had recently been in Europe negotiating arms purchases in Belgium. Contact man for purchase of Col. Ramon Barquin.

11. Cable to Director from MEXI dtd 27 Sept 1963 #6301

01

LITAMIL-2 approached by Julio Lanier on behalf of Ray and JURE. Want to start military operation against Cuba using Mexico as a base. Lanier says Ray receiving money from Venezuela. L-2 is a CIA agent - Cuban citizen living in Mexico. Mexican station wants to keep him clean of overt exile activity.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files on Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII
April 24, 1978

Volume XI - October 1963 - December 1963

1. Field Information Report dated 1 October 1963 Notes that source (a former Cuban diplomat who is a reliable source) said Ray in Tegucigalpa, Honduras about week or 10 days ago -- had spoken with Foreign Minister Roberto Perdomo Paredes (has a 201#). A radio station manager says Ray there about 20 September.

2. Memo for the Record, 2 October 1963 from Alfonso Rodriguez

Met with Ray in San Juan Sept. 24-25, 1963. Said Ray departing Puerto Rico October 7, 1963 for Venequela and perhaps Mexico. Ray and JURE involved in infiltrating Cuba and subsequently invading.

42

3. Dispatch 3 October 1963 to Chief, WHD from CS/Panama. On 26 Sept 1963, HYSAGE-1 learned that Jose Puente Blanco recently met with Ray in Costa Rica for a 3-day meeting.

4. Draft, dtd 4 October 1963 by Rodriquez
Subject: Manuel Ray Rivero

Ray, unlike many Latain American political leaders, is convinced that organization and work alone can assure lasting political success. Ray's philosophy is a way of life. He is a prodigious worker, given to study of details (training at U. of Utah mentioned) Ray devoting full time to JURE

5. Contact Report 15, dtd 8 October 1963
Contact with MRR member by CO Warren K. Guertler
Would like to know what position to take re: Ray if A-19 asks about U.S. backing. A-19 oonsiders Ray part of Kremlin conspiracy to put someone in power in place of Castro. CO has told A-19 that MRR are CIA's "chosen people" but if someone in U.S. (maybe State Dept) wants Ray, CIA will have to accept him.

6. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dtd 11 Oct 63
DIR Info, BARR, MEXI Cite WAVE 5656
Persecution of JURE's Mexico City delegation by local secret police
DOI: 26 Sept 63
Information received from Rogelio Cisneros Diaz. Cisneros advises delegation to work clandestinely, operate in cells, and not maintain public offices as they had in the past.

Volume XI continued - page 2

7. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dtd 11 Oct 63
On October 1, Cisneros tells AMTAUP-1 that Ray to visit Betancourt later in week to report on status of JURE negotiations with U.S. and promises made to Ray by RFK during recent interviews.

8. CAble 172301Z 17 Octobar 63 to Director from JMWAVE.
On 15 October 1963, Jose (Gomez) Rodriguez, aka Cabeza, JURE member tells AMTAUP-2 that CIA officials from Washington, D. C. coming to Miami to finalize agreements with JURE. Also said JURE would never tell CIA exact landing sites on Cuban coast.

9. Cable to Director from Mexico City, 26 October 1963
Secret 260035Z
Dir WAVE Cite Mexi 6677
Ref A Mexi 6455 (not sent WAVE) (IN 36021
REF B HMMA 22285 (also recd 2285)
JURE representative Julio Lanier pressing LITAMIL-2 to obtain Mexican visas for Luis Giun Figueredo and Rogelio Cisneros Diaz who want to inspect plane of Ref A.

Fast action needed or L-2 will not be able to meet Cisnero and have an "in" with JURE group for purpose of ooverage of JURE PM activities Mexi. Lanier will set up meeting in Miami or San Juan.

10. Dispatch to Chief, Special Affairs from CS/JMWAVE, dtd 21 Oct 63
Information received from AMTAUP-2
Ray to arrive in Miami 26 July, in secret, because he wanted to hold private meetings to discuss military affairs with action groups in Miami. Met at home of Rogelio Cisneros Diaz on 28 July. Met with Armando Alanis Angulo and asked him to join JURE. Alanis former Chief of Fiscal District of the Treasury in Camaguey Province. Ray says he has organization inside Cuba but needs personnel on outside with which to operate. Claimed to have 300 weapons in Miami.

On 18 August, Cisneros meets with Alanis and Luis Aguiar (who belongs to Alanis group). Talked of plans for Aguiar's men to infiltrate Las Villas Province and open a JURE organization.

Alanis officially joins JURE on 20 August 1963 and received Cisnero assurances they will get financial help from JURE.

11. Cable to Chief, Special Affairs Staff from JMWAVE/CS dtd 22 Oct 1963
#6. On 30 September, Ray departed for San Juan from Miami, after having visited Venezuela, Costa Rica, Honduras and Panama to gain support for operations against Cuba.

12. Cable 79065 on 29 October 1963. Willard R. Nauman will arrive San Juan October 31, 1963 to meet Ray in St. Thomas. Do not plan contact unless need arises.

13. Field Information Report dtd 26 October 1963
Ray in Miami 10/26/63 to meet with Ernesto Betancourt, former MRP and now Washington, D. C. delegate of ELC. May have met in an effort to merge ELC with JURE. Ray feels need to be in Cuba in 90 days - hurricane Flora has seriously damaged Cuba and this is an opportune time.

14. Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Meeting with Ray in St. Thomas on 31 October and 1 November 1963
Discussed JURE plans to begin operations inside Cuba by end of December.

15. Cable dtd 16 Nov 1963 to Director from JMWAVE indicates Ray ~~taking~~ meetig vessel REX within 50 miles of Cuba - cargo, 600 lbs. demolitions.

16. Cable dtd 18 November 1963 to JMWAVE from Director confirms understanding that all dates mentioned in Rules of Engagement this operation are moved up two days. Thus, WAVE will begin operation by caching materials and departing scene by 1200 on 25 November 1963.

17. Cable dated 3 December 1963 to JMWAVE from Director indicates Ray involved in infiltration plan, Operation BOLA, and CIA doubts his story as to why he couldn't complete mission -- said low on gas.

18. Payments to Ray 21 June 1963 - 5 December 1963, totalled $107,925.00
No payments in November.

19. Memo for Record from Alfonso Rodriguez, dtd 13 Dec 1963

Meets with Ray in N.Y.C. 12/6/63. JURE ship failed to pick up materials deposited on Roncador Cay on 25 November 1963. Ray had no full explanation for failure. Low on gas theory doubtful as ship did arrive a Puerto Limon on 27 November as scheduled. -- Ray doubts this story. Alternate date of 20 December set up, embarking from Puerto Limon, Costa Rica this time.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XII - January 1964 - February 1964

1. Intelligence Information Cable, 4 January 1964 - information from Carlos Hernandez Hernandez, an Executive Member of Brigade 2506 veterans Association said the Brigade rejected a proposed alliance with JURE on December 7, 1963. Brigade is opposed to Artime, but more opposed to Ray.

2. Identification provided by CIA for Ray in his attempt to infiltrate Cuba. Request made 6 January 1964 - Ray to use identity of Juan Cardenas Mendez.

3. Cable to Director from JMWAVE, dated 8 January 1964, Dir Cite WAVE 0106

AMOT-84 said he learned from newspaperman Abelardo (Garcia) Berry that Ray had met in Paris with Carlos Franqui Mesa to propose that Franqui join Ray's organization, that is, sector of "Betrayed Revolution". Garcia believes that in order to obtain Franqui's defection, Ray told him about alleged plans of U.S. to overthrow Castro in which Ray was to play a prominent part. Garcia further believes that Franqui's "falling into disgrace" in Cuba is a trick of Castro and Franqui.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 8 January 1964 states that Governor Munoz Marin, Puerto Rico, pledged to give Ray double any amount Ray raised on a bond sale by JURE to buy guns. JURE has large quantity of arms in P.R. under protection of the Governor.

5. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 14 January 1964. Cisneros said JURE has military training base in Costa Rica under command of Julio Cesar Alonso, Military Chief of JURE. All JURE boats now at Costa Rican base and also arms which had been in Puerto Rico. Said JURE leaders do not plan to to work in Miami area or anywhere else in U.S. because they are afraid CIA will seize their military equipment.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 16 Jan 1964 - Amtaup/2 reported that ~~Armando/Alanis/Angulo~~ Julio Cesar Alonso replaced as chief of Costa Rican military base of JURE because of his failure to go on a scheduled operation. (Check to see if this was the aborted mission of 25 November 1963)

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dated 30 January 1964. Amtaup/2 reported conversation with Sergio Sanchez and Rogelio Cisneros. Cisneros said FBI and INS, Puerto Rico, picked up JURE arms and explosives cached at Cajon de Muerto. Before JURE could pick cach up, it was discovered by a fisherman who advised authorities. JURE boat found and searched, but not retained as they had thrown antiaircraft guns overboard. Governor of P.R. called newspapers and informed them he thought Castro had cached the arms in order to overthrow P.R. Cisneros says he did this to sidetrack FBI and INS investagations and to eliminate possibility Ray's activities would be revealed. Cisneros said JURE boat located in P.R. and registered in Panama in name of person who is extremely close to governor P.R. and bitter enemy of CIA. Amtaup/2 questioned by Governor P.R. was trusted by Jure, to which Cisneros replied that Governor primarily nationalist and enemy of U.S. imperialist politics and therefore an enemy of CIA.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 31 Jan 64 - Article in Miami Herlad about the discovery of arms cache in Puerto Rico confirms accuracy of Amtaup/2 reporting that Ray involved in robbery U.S. Military installation and that Governor Marin is misleading FBI investigation. WAVE believes the C-3 explosive found in cache was provided Ray by WAVE as directed by Hdqtrs, but WAVE did not provide any weapons. WAVE will tell loaal FBI that they know nothing regarding background of cache discovery and assume Hdqtrs will coordinate case at Wash.D.C. level with FBI.

7. Intelligence Information Cable, dated 4 Feb. 1964 - reliable source says RAY expected in Caracas, Venezuela middle of February 1964 to establish a guerrilla training base for JURE in venezuela. Will be a regional center used by JHRE members in Venezuela and Panama. (Likely that if Ray succeeds in setting up camp, it will be with tacit consent of Betancourt government. Field Comment). Ray claims he will be inside Cuba by 20 May 1964.

8. Cable to DIR from Panama City, dated 9 Feb 1964 states JOSE MARIA PUENTE BLANCO, Panamanian/Cuban, DOB 17 July 1930, Havana, Cuba, left Panama City for Caracas on 8 Feb. He is possible Castro agent and Panama City would appreciate information re his activities in Caracas and/or subsequent travel.

9. Memo for the Record, dtd 12 Feb 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Meeting with AMBANG/1

ELC, according to Ray, was now disolved and became a part of JURE on 17 Jan. 1964. This brings to JURE the best former rebel army officers in exile and should give JURE a military background and support second to none in the exile community.

Comments: AMTAUP/2 reports have indicated Cisneros activities and statements are directed against the CIA. Rodriguez discusses Amtaup/2's reporting with Tony Sforza and Warren Frank. If Cisneros is in fact directing a program of denigration against the CIA, suggest agency follow the activities of Dionisio Suarez Esquival, who reportedly has been selected to carry out such a program in various Latin American univerities.

10. Cable to DIR from Panama City, dated 22 Feb. 1964. The PUENTE BLANCO brothers have been under some suspicion since their arrival in PACY following their release from Cuban prison as result of intervention of Thelma King. Part of suspicion is a result of activities of their brother, Jorge, still in Cuba.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XIII - March 1964 - April 1964

1. Memorandum to Acting Chief, Contact Division, dated 6 March 1964
   From: Cincinnati R.A.
   Thru: Chief, Detroit Office
   SUBJECT: Castro Type Subversion Likely/Manuelo Ray Dangerous Exile Leader now in Puerto Rico
   REFERENCE: CR-64-2 and WH-1694

Architect, Nocholas Quintana, residing in Cuba, told the following to a Mr. Raphael Katzen, consulting engineer in U.S. Manuelo Ray is in Quintana's opinion more dangerous to U.S. than Castro. Ray is not a Soviet type Communist according to Quintana, but his socialism is so extreme and his anti-U.S. feelings so deep that he considers Ray a dangerous exile leader, at least to the U.S.

Manuelo Ray is known to be of interest to the local FBI (Cincinnati).

(Check -- is DCD file ~~this CIA memo~~?)

2. Memorandum for the Record, dated 16 March 1964
   From: Sidney P. Di Ubaldo
   Subject: Contact Report, Meeting with Ernesto Betancourt

Betancourt has known Ray for several years and admired him through all various seasons of their relationship. Betancourt impressed with Ray's organizational talents and talents as an engineer.. Says Ray an effective and judicious personality and appeals to Cuban exiles of various stripes. Betancourt expressed a fear that Ray, in his zeal, might commit himself to such tight timing that he would be forced to undertake action at a disadvantageous moment.

Di Ubaldo comments that if Betancourt was leading him on in an attempt to sell Ray to him, it was done with a "subtlety to which I am definitely not accustomed".

3. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 17 March 1964. Cisneros told AMTAUP/2 that CIA had ordered personnel of AMWORLD (Artime's group) boats to fire on JURE boats and therefore Cisneros had instructed his crewmen to fire on AMWORLD boats wherever encountered. CITE WAVE 3691

Cisneros had meeting at his home on 15 March, attended by Armando Alanis Angulo, Dunney Perez Alamo, Jose Puente Blanco, National Chief JURE youth and member of JURE national Executive, and AMTAUP/2. Cisneros related that Romulo Betancourt told Ray in Caracas that Betancourt will work in favor of JURE. Puente confirmed this. Betancourt promised to arrange urgent meeting with U.S. officials in Washington to get promise from them that CIA would not sabotage any of JURE's planned operations.

Betsy Palmer

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 28 March 1964 - AMTAUP/2 spoke with Blas Enrique Comas Castro, captain of JURE boad VENUS which is in Puerto Rico. Said Cisneros and Ray recently arrived in P.R. from Caracas and said Venus would be used to infiltrate Ray into Cuba in a few days.

AMTAUP/2 said Armando Alanis Angulo said he was leaving Miami on 30 March for new JURE base within 6 hours of Miami. Said base under responsibility of Dunney Perez Alamo and himself. Also said Ray had chosen Venus to make trip to Cuba and Venus armed with 20MM gun, four 50 Cal and one 30 Cal machine guns.

5. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 28 Marbh 1964 - AMTAUP/2 reports that Alanis, Perez and Antonio Arias Gonzalez, JURE members, are dissatisfied with Ray's organization because they had now been forbidden to critigize U.S. govarnment policies, and the fact that they were allowed to have a training camp near Miami indicated that Ray is accepting CIA aid. Cisneros claimed the main objective of JURE was to keep U.S. govt. entertained with the training base set up in Miami area and that departure of JURE members to infiltrate Cuba will be outside U.S.

6. Accounting of funds received by Ray, from June 21, 1963 - April 8, 1964, show a total expenditure of $217,924.28 by CIA.

7. Memo for the Chief, WH Division, dated 14 April 1964, from Alfonso Rodreguez - Subject: My Meeting with Ray on 13 April 1964.

Essense of Ray's plans: 1. Two teams expected to go into Oriente Province this week.
2. Ray will turn over JURE contact with us to Cisneros, effective 23 April.

Ray's immediate objective once in Cuba will be to initiate systematic, continuous bombings of strategic and non-strategic targets. Power plant in Havana, major refinery and aquaduct in Santa Clara are immediate objectives.

8. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 26 April 1964. AMTAUP/2 reported that JURE training base opened near Tampa, Fla. for 30 men and planning to set up a base in Dominican Republic.

Betsy Palmer

File Review, Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XIV - May 1964

1. AMWORLD Meeting in San Juan, P.R., 2-5 May 1964
Subject: Ray's Plans
Submitted by Henry D. Hecksher, WH/SA/SO/HH

Ray's plans to infiltrate Cuba by 20 May were discussed at meeting. Questions about Ray's financing of Puerto Rican conference and ability to store arms and engage in training activities on U.S. soil were raised by AMYUM/19(MRR) Member). He volunteered to tell Hecksher where arms could be found be Hecksher "quickly dissuaded him from divulging further details" at which point AMYUM 19 commented that GUERTLER had reacted in a similar way when offered facts and figures about Ray's activities. Artime stated he would not put it past Ray to go into hiding in a secure place while pretending to be in Cuba.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, 7 May 1964 - After looking at AMTAUP material, it is obvious much of conspiratorial talk in JURE is for internal consumption only, the purpose being to protect myth that JURE is independent as basically hostile to CIA. In a desire to obtain proof of any anti-CIA or U.S. govt. activity by Ray, urge every effort to check accuracy of AMTAUP/AMOT reporting and follow through for any overt manifestations of many allegations made.

3. Memo for the Director of Central Intelligence, from Richard Helsm, DD/P, dated 13 May 1964. Subject: Plans of Manuel Ray and the JURE to Infiltrate into Cuba.

Helms says there is no question but that Ray seriously plans to enter Cuba sometime in May 1964. JURE has 6 teams ready to infiltrate -- a total of 27 men. Ray hopes with aid of 40 men, he can demonstrate that resistance is possible and that Castro can be defied.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, , dtd 20 May 1964. Andrew St. George, on assignment with Time-Life, left Miami 18 May with JURE elements for rendezvous with Ray.

5. Memo for the Record dtd 20 May 1964, from Samuel Halpern
Subject: JURE Purchase of Arms

Chronological resume of reports reaching WH/SA desk regarding attempted purchase of arms by JURE in El Monte, California.

A. Revenue officials queried CIA re its knowledge of certain arms being handled by Juan Erquiaga Aizcorbe in L.A. area for shipment to Florida. WH/SA denied knowledge. Discussion about 20 May 1964.

B. Rogelio Cisneros calls Rodriguez (~~Halpern~~) on 20 May to advise him certain arms being manufactured to JURE specifications in El Monte and being investigated by U.S. Treasury. Cisneros says JURE has invested $50,000 in these weapons being manufactured bu Knuson (sic) Manufacturing Co.

C. Rodriguez (~~the undersigned~~) tells Cisneros this is pretty sad situation that JURE must make use of Costa Rican, Venezuelan and other L.A. connections or they were going to get "clobbered" in U.S.

D. Halpern and Rodrigaez advised Mr. FitzGerald of the above. He agreed agency could not assist JURE in this matter. On 20 May, Mr. Bowdler of St. Dept. notified of the matter, and Deputy Chief, WH/SA advised.

E. Joseph O'Neill of OGC called on 20 May and informed that JURE was involved but agency did not want Revenue called off its investigation because of the "autonomous" nature of our relationship with JURE.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 22 May 1964. Sender states that the manner of Tad Szulc in an office visit on May 21 and new confident tone expressed by Cisneros conveyed feeling to cable sender that Ray has made it into Cuba.

7. Cable tp JMWAVE from DIR, dated 23 May 1964. Request Reuteman advise AMCARBON/1 that he has checked with hdqtrs and that Ray is not receiving CIA support. Reuteman should trace history of intimate relationship of AMCAPE/1 with Ray noting that since Bay of Pigs, AMCAPE/1 has been serving, in effect, as a public relations man and lobbyist for Ray. Further explain to AMCARBON/1 that AMCAPE/1 must be credited with single-handedly placing entire Cuban nation on alert and causing withdrawal of masses of conscripted workers from cane fields merely by articles playing on theme of threat of infiltration of Ray and a few men. Tell AMCARBON/1 that CIA would not become party to Ray operation knowing close relationship with AMCAPE/1, particularly since latter well known to be less than friendly to CIA.

8. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 26 May 1964. Cisneros says that as of 23 May 1964, no contact has been established with Ray but Cisneros believes he has reached Cuba.

9. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 28 May 1964 - Cisneros says Ray has not as yet been able to infiltrate Cuba and will make ~~another~~ attempt night of 28 May 1964. Cisneros says vigilance by U.S. authorities over activities of JURE reps. in Florida making support of Ray's effort extremely difficult.

Betsy Palmer

File Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

May 1, 1978
Volume XV - June 1964

1. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 30 May 1964 - information from Rogelio Cisneros Diaz - as of 30 May 1964, Ray had not entered Cuba. Boat to be used in final infiltration developed motor trouble. JURE reps were making all out effort to go to Ray's aid with replacement for boat and an additional supply of drinking water.

2. Cable to JMWAVE from DIR, dated 2 June 1961, Ref: WAVE 7218 (in 95616)* Please note similarities rumor reported Ref Para 2 and statement attributed to Rogelio Cisneros that CIA had instructed AMWORLD boats to fire on JURE boats per WAVE 3691 (IN 41477). Is this significant?

* Artime's followers authorized to attack any of Ray's or Gutierrez's men on high seas.

2. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE dated 3 June 1964 stating that Ray and Andrew St. George were among the individuals arrested by the British near Cayo Largo. (Location of Anguilla Cay also used in cable). Detainees taken to Nassau. Tom Dunkan, Life photographer, also in group.

3. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 4 June 1964 - AMTAUP/2 reported that Ray's organization going to make press statement that Ray's failure to enter Cuba was fault of CIA.

4. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE dtd 6 June 1964 reflects feelings of Cuban exile community over Ray's failure to enter Cuba.

   a. Ray made a fool of himself by taking a girl and two non-Cuban newsmen with him, none of whome adapted to rigors of guerrilla warfare.
   b. British and U.S. participated in Ray's capture
   c. Whole thing was a publicity stunt which went wrong.
   d. Enrique Huertas jubilant over Ray's disgrace, but feels it is a loss of exile prestige and harbingers bleak and hopeless period
   e. Dr. Antonio Maceo says many have lost faith in Ray for lack of accomplishment this past year.
   f. Ray is laughing stock. Those who had hopes now feel he is only an ambitious politican not will to keep promises.
   g. JURE members confused and undecided over how to defend Ray. Alanis and Zarraga wish to remove their followers from JURE.
   h. Cisneros states to AMTAUP that Ray will accuse U.S. govt of treachery for cutting off economic aid one month ago and for searching his home, automobile and offices (Cisnero's?)(Photostats in volume XIV)

5. Memo for the Record, dtd 9 June 1964, from Alfonso Rodreguez
Subject: Possible Plans of Ray

Opinion of Rodriguez that Ray will attempt asap to mount another infiltration effort. He is relatively certain JURE has or can procure a small craft capable of making trip from Florida to Cuba. He also thinks that ~~either Cisneros/or~~ Ray "would be willing to publicly give the lie to the TIME magazine article of 12 June 1964.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 10 June 1964 - re-canvassing of exile community reveals Ray's prestige at near-absolute low point. Trend is tendency to ignore Ray completely. Information that JURE in considerable dissension. Threats of various factions to withdraw unless Cisneros dismissed and national board reorganized.

7. Memo for Record, dtd 12 June 1964 from Samuel Halpern
Subject: Information from the British in Answer to Questions Re; Identify of American Who Allegedly Paid Manuel Ray's fine in Nassau.

05 Chris Phillpotts called 12 June to say Gov. of Bahamas had replied to our query as to the identify of American who allegedly paid Ray's fine in Nassau. (see TIME of 12 June 1964, page 48 -- alleged CIA paid). Governor stated he had seen no such figure and to best of his knowledge, there was no such person. "I of course did not tell Chris Phillpotts that we knew the identity 05 of the American as reported to us by Rogelio Cisneros of JURE."

8. Memo for Record, dtd 12 June 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: JURE telegram to TIME Magazine

Protest falsity of information published by TIME re: capture of Manuel Ray and his group. False that a CIA ship participated in any phase of operation. Also false that a CIA individual paid fine -- the $84.00 was sent to JURE by an American citizen at request of one of his employees.

9. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 27 June 1964: According to AMFAST/6, Ray informed Pepe Catillo (Jose Garcia Valdez) their departure date for Cuba would be July 1. Boat to be used is unnamed Rybovitch rented in Ft. Lauderdale. Ray planning to stay in Cuba about 15 days.

10. Memo for Record, dtd 29 June 1964, from Alfonso Rodriguez
Subject: Establishment of Base Abroad; Manuel Ray Rivero

On June 22, the Special Group agreed "no monies would be forthcoming, specifically a requested $25,000, until he ceased" all activities from U.S. mainland.

Betsy Palmer

File Review - Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII
May 2, 1978

Volume XVI - July 1, 1964 - August 28, 1964

1. Draft on Manuel Ray by Alfonso Rodriguez dtd 6 July 1964

After his failure to reach Cuba during May 1964, Ray believes he must go into Cuba as soon as possible. Within JURE, according to Ray, his detention by the British is viewed as an unfortunate incident. Ray said some JURE members considering demonstrations before British embassies and consulates.

2. Memo for the Record dtd 7 July 1964 from Alfonso Rodriguez
   Subject: Tad Szulc Relationship with Manuel Ray

Rodriguez questioned Ray's using newspaper correspondents as emissaries to departments of the U.S. govt. Ray stated that Szulc took it upon himself to speak about matters related to assisting Ray. Rodriguez says it would be wrong to assume that Ray is controlled by Szulc but Ray "undoubtedly knows that Szulc has worked hard, first with President Kennedy and now, for him and his interest. This cannot but influence Ray."

2. Intelligence Information Memo, 14 and 15 June 1964
   Source: [Jose Alvarez Sola, private chauffeur of Rogelio Cisneros Diaz] 05,08

JURE's national executive met 14/15 June to discuss crisis within the organization concerning Cisneros. Dr. Raul Chibas Ribas stated that if Cisneros not removed from his position, Chibas would make public his resignation.

3. Memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, dtd 9 July 1964
   From: Dismond FitzGerald, Chief/WH Division
   Subject: Chronology of Concept of Autonomous Operations and Summary of Financial Support to Manuel Artime

Attachment A is listing of origin, briefings, discussions, and approvals by appropriate policy levels of the concept of autonomous operations and specifically support to Artime. Chron clearly shows that from the very beginning the problems inherent in autonomous operations were clearly stated at all times by the Agency and that appropriate policy levels were kept fully and regularly informed of the status of autonomous operations.

Attachment B contains summary and breakdown of financial support for Artime. Summary states that, "From June 1963 through 30 June 1964 the Agency spent $4,933,293 in support of the Artime operation." Fixed monthly subsidy is $225,000.

Betsy Palmer

Volume XVI - continued
page 2

Origin of Autonomous Operations

Integrated Covert Action Program for Cuba, approved by Higher Authority in June 1963, provided for "support of autonomous anti-Castro Cuban groups to supplement and assist in the execution" of other courses of action. Concept was first voiced in Sept. 1962 in Walter Rostow's proposal for a "Track Two" approach to Cuban operations. Parallel to regular CIA-controlled Cuban teams, CIA would extend financial aid and some advice and guidance to independent and uncontrolled Cuban leaders such as Manuel Ray.

Rules of Engagement incorporated into June 1963 program.

1. "It is the keystone of autonomous operations that they will be executed exclusively by Cuban nationals motivated by the conviction that the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime must be accomplished by Cubans, both inside and outside Cuba acting in consonance.

2. The effort will probably cost many Cuban lives. If this cost in lives becomes unacceptable to the U.S. conscience, autonomous operations can be effectively halted by the withdrawal of U.S. support; but once halted, they cannot be resumed.

3. All autonomous operations will be mounted outside the territory of the United States.

4. The United States Government must be prepared to deny publicly any participation in these acts no matter how loud or even how accurate may be the reports of U. S. complicity.

5. The United States presence and direct participation in the operation would be kept to an absolute minimum. Before entering into an operational relationship with a group, the U.S. representative will make it clear that his Government has no intention of intervening militarily, except to counter intervention by the Soviets. An experienced CIA officer would be assigned to work with the group in a liaison capacity. He would provide general advice as requested as well as funds and necessary material support. He may be expected to influence but not control the conduct of operations.

6. These operations would not be undertaken within a fixed time schedule."

4. Article from New York Times, Wednesday, July 15, 1964, bylined Tad Szulc "Ray Said To Leave For Cuba Landing - Castro Foe, Balked in May, Reported on Way Again."

5. Cable to DIR from JMBARR, dtd 15 Jul 1964. M/V True with Manolo Ray and crew returned Key West area --- had motor trouble.

6. Cable to DIR from JMWAVE, dtd 18 July 1964. Ray's latest misadventures trying get into Cuba mid-July greeted with relative indifference majority Cuban exiles Miami area.

7. Wireservice prinout - Miami, Flay, July 24, 1964. Three exile groups withdrew from Ray's JURE today protesting that Ray failed to make good his promise to enter Cuba to reactivate the anti-Castro underground. Spokesman was Jesus Dieguez of the Revolutionary National Assembly.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files - Manuel Ray y Rivero - Volumes I - XVIII

Volume XVII - September 1964 - February 1965
May 2, 1978

1. Memo dtd 1 Sept 1964, Subject: [AMTAUP-2]Production
"Chief of Reports Comments: It would appear that AMTAUP-2's reporting on JURE matters have been generally reliable."

2. Autonomous Operations - Operating Plan
Activity:[AMBANG]
For the Period: 1 October - 31 December 1964. Total of $75,000 paid to effect move of JURE activities from U.S. territory and as a final payment to JURE.

3. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 9 Sept 1964
Source: Jose Garcia Valdez, aka "Pepe Gatillo"
Subject: Plans of JURE leader Manuel Ray Rivero to depart Miami for an Undisclosed Location.

Ray asked Garcia on 9 Sept 64 to take him, St. George and Mirta Borras on trip to unspecified destination. To depart on JURE catamaran.

4. Memo for the Record, dtd 11 Sept 1964 from Alfonso Rodreguez

On Aug 24, 1964, Rogelio Cisneros called to report his resignation from JURE. Stated Ray incapable of directing both political and military activities. Cisneros thinks Raul Chibas will soon also resign. Cisneros said Ray not prepared for ill-fated May attempt into Cuba and Cisneros thinks Ray had believed he could arrange for CIA to take him into Cuba. "Ray is politically uninformed --- politically that which he last read". Cisneros further stated that he believed Ray had planned his entire return-to-Cuba angle with President Kennedy and the presidential elections of November 1964 in mind. According to him, Ray planned to make JURE and Ray outstanding liberal and democractic exile group with the thought that prior to the 1964 elections, Mr. Kennedy would have to do something about Cuba. With Kennedy's death, according to Cisneros, all of Ray's plans went awry. Rodriguez expresses to Cisneros that this seems like a far-fetched possibility and Cisneros admits he got idea out of thin air, but said theory widely held within Directorate of JURE.

5. Memo for the Record - draft - dtd 22 Sept 1964 - Alfonso Rodriguez
Conclusions "I recommend we give Ray what he asks and close the JURE books for good. If Ray is succesful in Cuba he will not need our help, if he is not, our help won't do much good.

"He is honest and at least the money will largely be spent for the purpose he wants to achief .

"Whatever Ray may ever say, he was treated the way he asked to be treated. We have played the game in a manner beyond reproach."

Betsy Palmer

6. Erquiaga Arms shipment to JURE episode.
Cable from San Jose: DIR CITE SJOS 7152, REF: DIR-63886
16-15 21-15

Please pass to Asst. Sec. Mann from Ambassador Telles: "I saw President Orlich and Minister Quiros Sasso on 18 November and conveyed reference position. The President was visibly shaken to learn that US government was not involved in this arms shipment. After some discussion with Minister Quiros, President Orlich requested that we not issue license for AMBANG-1 shipment. President Orlich made clear he would be happy at any time to undertake action such as this if US government wanted him to. While he does wish see Cuba free he inclined to agree with US position Re Hit and Run raids undertaken principally for publicity sake. President Orlich's decision based on (1) relaization that he would not be doing us a favor and, (2) further realization that CRG would be hard pressed to explain such a $70,000 purchase of arms if it became a campaign issue in 1965."

2/BR

Betsy Palmer

File Review Manuel Ray y Rivero, Volumes I - XVIII

Volume XVIII - March 1965 -----------
May 2, 1978

1. Memo dtd 18 November 1965 to: United States Secret Service
   From: Deputy Director for Plans
   Subject: Ray, Rivero, Manuel Antonio aka: Ray, Manolo

In response to a telephonic request of 15 Nov. 1965 for a name trace on Ray. CIA files contain voluminous information from sources of varying reliability re: Ray who is well known to Intelligence Community as a prominent anti-Castro Cuban exile leader and head of JURE. If particular info is desired, please specify.

2. Memo dtd 6 Dec 1965 to Secret Service from DD/P gives 2 1/2 page standard bio information on Ray.

3. Memo dtd 15 Dec 1965 to Commissioner, INS from DD/P
   Subject: Roige Cerezo, Jose
   (A 12 399 923 TC)

According to CIA files, information dtd Aug 1963 from a Cuban emigree source, Roige was designated chief of intelligence by National Direction Abroad of JURE. Source said intelligence group created in Marc 1963 on orders of Manuel Ray for purpose of infiltrating JURE members into various organizations which operated in Miami area, as well as into agencies of U.S. govt. Further, that in April 1963, Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a JURE member into CIA in order to learn details of plans regarding Cuba. JURE also intended to drop leaflets into Cuba of a derogatory nature regarding U.S. govt. Included in these leaflets was Subject's manifesto against the U.S. govt and against this Agency.

4. Ltr. dtd June 2, 1966 from Dr. Julian Gallo to Harry (Mahoney?) Gallo is contact with Ray in Puerto Rico and trying to discover the names of Ray's contacts in Cuba. Ray, apparently is seeking a Mexican visa from Gallo and unhappy that it did not come through. Refused to reveal names or addresses to Gallo and would not give information about where his radio broadcast tapes were to be sent for transmission into Cuba.

5. Memo for the Record, dtd 21 June 1966 from Charles Anderson Met with Ray on 28 April 1966. Anderson said in general Ray had less information on the "purge situation that I did." Ray said relatives of Gustavo Arcos in P.R. had telephone contact with Arcos family in Cuba, about 25 April and that Arcos still in prison but charges against him were thin. "(This means there was at least one more telephone call than we knew of previously, and this has probably served to increase the pressure on Arcos)." Anderson tells of his concern and strong interest in Arcos on the chance that Ray might assume Arcos had been CIA agent. Doesn't know if Ray will construe remark this way but it seemed like an opening "to use an important exile channel as a possible deception mechanism."

"I believe that later in the summer it might be a good idea to have another talk with AMBANG to keep up with exile thinking, and feeding more deception thoughts."

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Volume XVIII continued
Page 2

6. Intelligence Information Cable, dtd 28 June 1966
Source: Qualified American Observer

On 15 June 1966, Rafael Garcia-Bango, Cuban exile in Spain, received call in Madrid from Ray in P.R. regarding Ray's plans to assume power in Cuba. Garcia-Bango told Ray it was essential he come Madrid before 25 June and return to San Juan in order to talk to a member of Cuban delegation for 10th Caribbean and CenAm games in P.R., prior to return of delegation to Cuba. Ray agreed to do so.

Ray enthusiastic over possibility of overthrowing Castro in next several months. Knows Garcia-Bango has bad reputation but feels he could prove useful. Also useful would be Garcia-Bango's brother, Jorge Garcia-Bango Dirube, who has more respectable reputation. Ray also state that he had received indirectly a message from Jose Llanusa Gobel and c onsiders him a potential ally.

7. Harry Mahoney debriefs Ray, described in Memo for the Record dtd 8 July 1966. Mentions Julian Gallo at this time and Ray indicates he knows and respects him.

8. Memo No. 771, 1 Sept 1966 for: Chief, OPS Cuba/WH Division/DDP Attn: Mr. Harry Mahoney, Subject: MIG-21. Attaching communication from DIA authorizing $100,000 should MIG-21 operation succeed. Funds to come from Air Force escrow fund now held by CIA.
(Note: Other memos refer to MIG which Ray said he knew a Cuban pilot would fly out of Cuba. Ray never comes through with any information that is usable, and finally says he cannot contact pilot)

9. Cable dtd 4 Jan 69 CITE WH/Miami 2233
Ref: Caracas 1490
16-17

AMOT reports on 9 Aug 68 indicating Ray plans to dissolve JURE and hold a Congress of Cuban exiles in 1969 to create a new organization to fight Castro. Ray working with Haitian groups and hopes, if new invasion of Haiti successful, he will be granted operational bases and radio station in Haiti.

10. Memo dtd Feb. 8, 1971 to Director, FBI from DD/P indicates that CIA has no current operational interest in Manuel Ray Rivero.

SECRET

1/BR

Betsy Palmer

April 5, 1978
Review of Manuel Rey Rivero files

Assortment of documents not in files at time review began on 3/29/78

1. 10 June 1966 Dispatch to Chief, WH, From Chief of Station, Santo Domingo. Subject: Haitian Exile Activities in the Dominican Republic. 16-10

DR EMHEFTY-1 provided information on Haitian exile activities. On May 30, 1966, EMHEFTY was taken to a meeting ~~by~~ (with) Godefray Moscoso at the Hotel Comercial 0.

02 EMHEFTY was taken to meeting by Gerard Max Lafontant, a Haitian Communist At the meeting, Lafontant told Moscoso that Manolo Rey had obtained explosives for him to use in the first invasion against Haiti and that Rey was now living in the Dominican Republic. Lafontant described Rey as a former collaborator of Fidel Castro, but was not now on sepaking terms with Castro. He said the Communist-oriented 14th of June Revolutionary Movement had on one occasion accused Rey of being a CIA ~~WOFACT~~ agent, but this was not true. Rey can obtain explosives within 24 hours after the request is made.

* 2. Cable to Director from Hunt, August 25, 1960 states that Carrillo advised that FRD should keep an eye on new anti-Castro group being formed by Raul Chibas and Manuel Ray, Marcel Fernandez, Julio Durate and Jose Pepin Bosch. Chibas told Carrillo that Miro would follow Chibas line which would be neither join nor fight FRD but help if necessary. Bosch financing Chibas and Miro with initial credit. Results negative when Carillo invited new group to join FRD. Carrillo feels if new group succeeds, it will try to draw in Feliue Pazos and Ramon Barquin. (Note date of cable)

* 3. Dispatch to Deputy Chief, WH/SA from Chief of Station, JMWAVE dated 14 April 1964 in Mexico, D. F. Lengthy and very rambling letter which, among many other things, states the story about Manuel Ray being closely associated with ALBIZU CAMPOS and friendly with Puerto Ricans who were working on the rennovation of the White House and the group that tried to assassinate Truman. (Pencilled notation of A. Rodriguez -- "Who is AMSHOT/1? Could he be agent provacateur? What is his access? Can we take him seriously?) Although postmarked in Mexico, AMSHOT apparently still in Cuba 1964. Not a Cuban citizen - wife in U.S. Trying to get a Mexican Visa.

4. Cable 21 May 1964 or information report.
On 21 May 1964, unidentified members of JURE stated that Manuel Ray Rivero entered Cuba successfully on 17 May 1964 and is still there. He departed from an unidentified embarcation point near Cuba at 3 am on 17 May and reached his destination by 10 am that day. Ray was accompanied by a labor leader believed to be JOSE COMEZ RODRIGUEZ and a 22 year old man who was to serve as Ray's communications clerk and guide.

5. Field Information Report on Cuba
   Subject: Lecture of Manuel Ray Rivero to Member of JURE's Delegation from Tampa, Orlando, and Miami, Florida
   Date: 26 May 1965
   Source: A young Cuban exile trained in information collection.

Ray gave opening lecture to 25-30 JURE delegates gathered in Miami on 22 May 1965. Ray claims JURE has men and equipment to win war of liberation in Cuba and reiterates that only an internal revolution will overthrow Castro. Said some arms had been left on a military base in the Dominican Republic and that, regardless of who takes over in the DR, the arms will be returned to JURE. Made an appeal for money so that organization would purchase the M/V VENUS, a 110-foot vessel registered in Panama. (Previous reporting on JURE's base and equipment in DR contained in the following: TDCSDB-315/00539-65, 16 Feb 65; TDCSDB-315/00301-65, 38 Jan 65; TDCSDB-315/00383-65, 27 Jan 65; and TDCSDB-315/00269-65, 28 Jan 65.

*6. Field Information Report on Cuba
   Subject: Plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Infiltrate the Ranks of the Central Intelligence Agency
   Date: 30 April 1963
   Source: Former Rebel Army member (F) active in clandestine movements
   Appraisal of Content: 3

On 30 April 1963, Rogelio Cisneros, JURE Exec. Bd. member, said a meeting held in his home and Antonio Arias, propaganda chief in Miami, in attendance. Cosneros said it was mentioned that Ray had issued orders to infiltrate a trusted man into the CIA in order to learn details of any plans with regard to Cuba and if possible to infiltrate this man into Cuba. Cisneros said it might be possible to use contacts of George Volsky (sp?) who had CIA contacts. In regard to future propaganda, JURE plans to introduce thousands of anti-American phamphlets into Cuba, including Ray's manifesto against the U.S. government and the CIA.

*7. Report on Cuba/Dominican Republic
   Subject: Urgent plan of Manuel Ray Rivero to Enter Cuba
   Involvement of Ray with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo and Haiti
   Date: 18 September 1964
   Source: Jose Garcia Valdez - part of group of Cubam emigres trained in techniques of information collection.

Andrew St. George said Ray is attempting to drop himself into Cuba, regardless of risk, to regain his political prestige. Ray feels he cannot now compete with Eloy Gutierrez Menoyo, military leader of SNFE, and other revolutionary organizations, unless he enters Cuba. He wants to have same influence of others when Haiti leadership starts distributing bases to Cuban exiles and providing them help for their aid in overthowing Francois Duvalier (a trade off). According to St. George, the Haiti combine is composed of Gutierrez, Antonio Cuesta del Valle of Commandos L, and DRE members. Also, Rolando Masferrer Rojas on the inside of Haiti operations and has the most influence among the Haitians.

Betsy Palmer

Miscellaneous documents no in files
Page 3

8. Information Report - Cuba/Dominican Republic
Subject: Purchase of a Boston Whaler for Manuel Ray Rivero, Leader of the Junta Revolucionaria Cubana (JURE)
Date: 18 September 1964
Source: Naturalized American citizen - formerly in shipping business in Cuba, well-trained and experienced debriefer

On 14 Sept 1964, a Miami yacht builder firm purchased a 13-foot six inch Boston whaler for Ray. Purchaser, Angel Aixala Pertierra said he planned to go to Santo Domingo to get permission to operate the whaler in Dominican waters, and once this had been granted, would deliver the boat to Ray. It was on Aixala's Catamaran ct 1208 D, that Ray made his ill-fated initial attempt to enter Cuba. Aixala is not a member of JURE.

* 9. Classified Message to Director, from Paris
Date: 8 June 1963

Ray and Emio Guede arrived in Paris and Ray contacted by Nauman on 7 June. Reviewed plan for Franqui recruitment in place. Urged Ray to take immediate action before his presence in Paris was leaked. Guede tries to contact Franqui by phone and on all occasions, phone answered by Edith Sorel or her roomate, Helene Pulish (phonetic). Guede leaves message each time and on last call told Franqui going to Brussels and may have already left. On 7 June Guede sees Franqui at the opening of his exhibition and talks to him. Franqui listened to him, but made no responses to his veiled overatures. Guede surmizes Franqui not interested -- thinks he is incapable of defending regime but not willing or capable of breaking with it. Grovery and JERVAY met Ray. Feel this important re possible future use Ray Europe. Pari support excellent. (C/S comment: HQS has reason believe no obstacle convincing Ray push for Franqui return for period to be eyes and ears anti-Castro conspiracy.)

* 10. Cable Report to Director, from Paris
Date: 14 June 1963

Ray and party travel to Burssels on 11 June, and Ray continues his efforts to recruit an agent in place for CIA. Contacts Guillamo Cabrera and surmised Cabrera held back from a break due to his concern for a brother inside who is ill. Ray asks Cabrera to arrange a meeting with Gustave Arcos but Cabrera unable to do so since Arcos ~~leaves~~ leaving for a few days. Ray extends his trip. Contacts Nauman who tells Ray it is not possible to resolve all the personal problems of those he has contacted and Ray must show them the wisdom and practicality of working in place as a means of eliminating the regime. Ray willing to settle for defection as he believes this has an impact on the regime. Report states that Ray extremely active, moves fast and purposefully, and has given impression of frank cooperation. Has volunteered to assign a man to be station contact, but feels UNRUMBLE 2 is too young but should be aware of whomever is designated.

03

UBR

SECRET Betsy Palmer

Miscellaneous documents not in files
P age 4

*11. Information Cable to Director from JMWAVE
Date: 5 November 1963
Subject: Unification Activities by Manuel Ray Rivero, 23 Oct 1963
Source: A trained observer with access to wide variety of Cuban exiles. Source is known to most of his contacts as a channel to U.S. intelligence. Obtained information from Reinaldo Pico Ramon, officer in the Alianza de Trabajadores Cubanos (ATC, Alliance of Cuban Workers).

Pico was told by an unidentified informant, who is probably on the JURE National Executive, that Luis Manuel Rodriguez, a former rebel army lieutenant from Santioago de Cuba, and who was known as "Mama Dolores" while a member of Brigade 2506, is serving as a Ray agent at Fort Benning, Georgia. Individuals who are working with Rodriguez are SILAS CUERVO CASTILLO and LUIS CLEMENTE BARCENA SERRANO, both former members of Brigade 2506.

SECRET

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Files - Manuel Ray y Rivero
DCD Documents
May 2, 1978

1. Memo dated 24 Oct 1962 to Chief, Contact Division, from Chief, San Francisco Office
   Subject: Suitability of Manuel Ray and Miro Cardona for Important Roles in a Possible New Cuban Government

05
Information received from Dr. Robert North, Professor of Political Science 29 at Stanford University and long-time source of exceptional value. North 05 visited in Miami and contacted about 25 former Castro supporters representing a broad political gamut. Dr. North got the impression from many of the 05 Cubans that they suspected Ray of being a "possible Communist sleeper". 05 North reluctant to pass along this information, because accusations were very broad.

2. Infomation report dated 16 July 1962 and Earlier
   Source: Cuban National (Alien File #A-12570921) who asked for an interview on occasion of first contact with CIA.

Cannot vouch for his bona fides. Had credential indicating membership in branch of revolutionary army's intelligence service, now in exile in U.S. and maintaing connections with colleagues in that country.

A friend of his reports plans to assassinate top Castro leadership in Cuba. To be done by poison -- "Clostridium Botulinum" which is strong, odorless, and tasteless. Takes about 12 days to kill. About 5cc would do the job. Waiting for next visit of major delegation from a Communist country -- dinner in honor of the occasion should bring together most of the important members of the regime and that is when the attempt will be made.

2. Cable dated Oct. 3, 1961 - WA CITE NYOR 4902 Support (Travis) info L/A Branch from Daniels. Source is Ernesto Dezaldo - Cuban lawyer now living in New York City. Stated the MRP in Havana is far less radical than under the leadership of Ray, who has been completely discredited in recent months. Primary purpose today is (a) assassination of top leaders in Castro regime and (B) sabotage of important industrial and government installations in Havana. Strength of MRP in Havana estimated to exceed 1,000 -- success measured more in terms of fund raising ability and blowing up of buildings.

3. Information dated June 4, 1961, Subject: Underground Student Leader Comments on Post-invasion Cuba. Reporting officer talked with ISIDRO BORJA, on the leaders of DRE. Borja says top DRE members in jail or in a friendly embassy in Havana but said new leaders have been selected and will resume sabotage activities shortly. Thought the underground could restore tension in Cuba in 3-4 months. However, said outside help needed to get rid of Castro. Claimed that prior to invasion, is was possible to buy almost anything in Cuba from Castro officials -- they were tainted by corruption. Since Castro's victory at Bay of Pigs, his popular support is estimated to be around 80-85%. Most support is out of fear because the people believe he will be in power permanently. Borja said DRE outside of Cuba working hard for release of former leader, Alberto Muller from prison.

SECRET

5/88

Betsy Palmer

DCD Documents - Manuel Ray y Rivero
Page 2

4. Memo to Acting Chief, Contact Division dtd 20 May 1964
From: Chief, Miami Field Office
Subject: Alleged "New York Times" Publicity Build-up for Manolo Ray

Hal Hendrix, Scripps-Howard L.A. correspondent believes NY Times publicity buildup for Ray in full swing. Tad Szulc reporting Ray's war movements from Miami. Also with Szulc is close friend, Henry Raymont of the Times. Hendrix said Times playing up Ray while downplaying Artime and Gutierrez Menoyo. Think's Times exaggerating Ray's plans to take teams of highly trained guerrillas into Cuba, and that Ray's "war" is little more than an MGM-type New York Times production so far.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII

March 29, 1978
Volume I   Undated to September 1960

1. Cable suggests that an offer of financial assistance to Ray's wife and children from CIA rather than through the FRD may pay large future dividends. Family to arrive circa September 1960.

2. Cable to Director
From: MASH
19 September 1960

Increasing suspicion RAUL CHIBAS a Castro plant. Since exfiltration by KAPPES, CHIBAS has laid low but back in picture as representative of RAY. Common knowledge that CHIBAS brought KAPPES out of Cuba, but should be noted that KAPPES has since been in and out of Cuba three times with no apparent difficulties.

CHIBAS' sources of information:
- Mason in U. S. government
- Manuel de Jesus and Bender as FRD representatives
- Nino Diaz as Alianza representative
- Don Hogan Kappes as Alberto Fernandex representative.

This should get a good picture of the U.S. anti-Castro activities.

3. Summer 1960. Ray very actively recruited to become FRD member. *CIA considered him an important political asset. RAUL CHIBAS, Ray's assistant, spoke for him with U.S. authorities. Urged strong organization inside Cuba before outside help could be effective. CHIBAS meets with Bender 9/7/60, says he is in favor of FRD but completely committed to Ray and would check with him.

4. 27 September 1960.
Memo to Western Hemisphere/4 Chief
From: Rudolph E. Gomez, Acting Chief, WH
Subject: Approval from State to Include Manuel Ray Rivero in the FRD Complex

At a 20 September 1960 meeting, Ray's name was suggested for inclusion in FRD and State desired to look further into his background. Ray was discussed again on 9/27/60 with Mr. Divine who further conferred with Ambassador Mallory same day and Mallory approved Ray's inclusion.

5. September 29, 1960 cable from MASH to WH9 indicates MASH somewhat doubtful about Ray's feelings toward U.S. and continued dealings with this group needs further policy consideration.

* There is a restricted CI/OA folder on Ray of this 201 file held under C#85514

* Ask about -- documents sent for microfilming in July 7, 1967.
UGFA 12222 3 November 1963 201 239298

6. Ray granted Provisional Operation Approval (POA) on 25 October 1960. (form says, Green list attached 104591)

SECRET

7. PRQ Part 2 169 C85514
Section I Contact and Development

Woodrow C. Olien met Ray October 1958 when Ray was head of Civic Resistence Movement in Havana. Three clandestine meetings were held prior to 1 January 1959, attended by Olien, Wallace A. Growery, Ignacio Mendoza (MRC 04 member) who originally introduced Olien to Ray. After 1 January 1959, Ray given important post in revolutionary government and Olien has seen him only twice since, Olien poising as political officer to State Department.

Section II of PRQ states Ray is friendly to U.S., once having received a grant for special study there. A dedicated, patriotic Cuban, opposed to Communism but taken no active part in combatting it.

8. An undated, unaddressed letter from Antonio Gonsales Mora, Jr. --- P.S. Says Joaquin Sanjenis appears to be a person in whom CIA has great confidence. Linked to Artime conspiracy. Responsible for all "inter-Cuban" intelligence matters. Is a "shady character" -- gangster background -- gives impression of mental retardation. Not known as individual of any importance, but he is! "An inexplicable affair"

9. PRQ Part 2 (contd)
Section VI -- Subject has definite political action potential, ia a pro-democratic official of government who is not in sympathy with aims of international Communism and who is interested in strengthening ties between Cuba and U. S. Probably would never consent to agent status, but could by persuasion and argument be encouraged to influence policies of his government along lines compatible with U.S. government policies.

Section XIV -- Information in PRQ Parts I and II were obtained from file research and personal contact with subject.

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII
March 29, 1978

Volume II
* October 1, 1960 - November 22, 1960

As of 21 November 1960, MRP organized as follows:

Manuel Ray - Chief
Raul Chibas - Sepcial Assistant to Ray
Juan Esteves Ramires - Secretary
Ramon Barquin - Military and Intelligence matters
Cisneros - Chief of MRP in Cuba

15-1

1. 10/4/60 Cable from London claims that new Cuban resistance group organized under Ray and has 400-500 men in Las Villas Province. Not part of FRD but in touch with it.

* 2. 10/7/60 Cable from Havana. AURELIANO SANCHEZ ARANGO has withdrawn from FRD. JUSTO CARRILLO and FELIPE PAZOS will be integrated into Ray's MRP. VARONA wishes to join, also, but Ray insists VARONA return to Cuba to do so.

3. 10/12/60 Cable to Director. RAMON BARQUIN claims CARRILLO and ARANGO are going to boycott FRD Executive Committee and sabotage its work. Barquin planning to join with Pazos, Ray, Chibas, MIRO and QUEVEDO to form a new frente and then request union with FRD. If accepted, Barquin would become military head. If Barquin does not get U.S. government support for this plan, he will return to Cuba to try to overthrow Castro and win election on an anti-Yankee platform.

* 4. 10/17/60 Contact report from Wallace A. Parlett
Subject: Meeting with JUAN ESTEVEZ and JORGE BERUFF, 10/13/60
Cubans said Ray's group will not lower themselves to answer "Fidelismo without Fidel" charge and let their actions speak for themselves. MRP is highly disciplined and feel the majority of Cuban people favor tair platform. Its leaders are interchangeable. If Ray comes out of Cuba, Chibas or Estevez could go in and take his place.

5. 10/24/60 Memo for files
Subject: Representative of Manuel Ray to Professional Groups

ENRIQUE HIRAM GUTIERREZ y RODRIGUEZ (dob 5/20/31, Havana) travels frequently to Puerto Rico on architectural business. Also frequently enters U. S. at Miami. Represents Ray's organization to various professional groups in Havana. Also serves as courier to Miami.

6. DRE information. 10/24/60 Cable states MULLER reported receiving letter from ANTONIO GARCIA, DRE representative in Cuba that organization is going well but needs funds and material aid. MASH asks Mueller to get details of Garcia's "groupos de accion" and details of organization. MASH gave Muller $500 for Garcia. Muller is concerned about Manolo Ray

whom he says is gaining strength in Cuba. Says students eager to join active group and will go to Ray if DRE can't get help soon.

7. Provisional Operational Approval granted to Ray on 10/26/60.

* 8. 10/26/60 Cable to Director from Havana reports Ray held MRP meeting on 10/23/60 and made following statements:

a. MAJOR WILLIAM MORGAN had been very helpful to MRP - responsible for obtaining most of their weapons.
b. In four months, MRP will have 20,000 militants throughout Cuba. Organized now in all provinces except Pinar del Rio. Invasion could not take place for 4 months but FRD still in favor of earlier date.
c. CARRILLO and ANGEL del CERRO have left FRD and now with MRP

MRP urging Ray to escape Cuba and they feel it is only a matter of time until he is picked up and executed. MRP manifesto will be released this weekend.

9. 10/28/60 Monthly payments of $400 approved for Ray's wife in behalf of Bender group.

* 10. 10/28/60 Memo for Record
Subject: Conversation of CARRILLO and PAUL J. MANSON, Chief, MASH
Economic philosophy: When FRD first formed it was attacked by RUBIO PADILLA as "Fidelismo without Fidel." Now FRD saying same thing about MRP.

* 11. 11/5/60 Cable to Director from MASH
Verona tells HUNT that he received information that Ray wanted to leave Cuba and was to be exfiltrated clandestinely by Bender group.

12. 11/8/60 Memo for Record - [03 John D. Peters]
Subject: Contact report on meeting with ROGELIO GONZALES

Gonzales considers Ray highly dangerous because of his ambition to play prominent role in Cuban government after overthrow of Castro. Thinks he poises threat to Varona's authority inside Cuba. Ray appears to have support of middle class, politicians and professionals. Should Ray join FRD, Gonzales thinks he will still operate on a unilateral basis while seeking to supercede FRD with MRP.

13. 11/11/60 Cable to Director from JMASH
Ray arrived Tampa morning of 11/10/60. Mash officer staying with him until surfacing date which depends on safe arrival from Cuba of two other individuals. They are the last of the HUBER MATOS escapee group known by Ray to still be hiding in Cuba.

1/8R

14. 11/14/60 Cable to Director from MASH.
Ray to surface at press conference scheduled for 11/16/60 in Miami.

#* 15. 11/17/60 03 Cable to Director from MASH
On 11/15/60, [Parlett] alias Bender met with Ray in complete privacy. "Unquestionably, the youthful, softspoken, unassuming, almost humble Ray is a natural leader of highest intellect, deepest sincerity and convistion." Ray's political posture doubtful as far as U.S. government acceptance is concerned.

Explained to Ray the U.S. government's desire to have all Cuban exiles unified in their efforts. Ray says MRP does not wish to reinstate 1940 constitution. Provisional governmant of 30 honorable Cubans would be established and elections held 18 months thereafter. Castro laws passed at beginning of his regime to be promulgated. State would regulate private investment and utilities would be nationalized.

Ray wants to keep MRP "lean and hungry" -- each member to have specific responsibilities and feel important to revolution.

Ray asked for permission to start a fund drive in Cuba and U.S. Also asked for $10,000 by next Wednesday -- Bender made commitment.

03
[Parlett] believes net result of meeting was establishment of private MRP-U.S. link and door remains open for some kind of relationship with FRD. Ray agrees to discuss this with Miro Cardona. Of all the groups being supported, FRD, MRP and MRR are most significant. All Cuban groups seem to be looking to Bender group to show a preference before joining one of the above three. How long current flexibility can be maintained is problematical.

*16. 11/21/60 Memo for Record
Subject: Meeting with King and Esterline on subject of handling MRP, 11/18/60

Consensus was that Ray did not politically represent anything to cheer about. Writer felt MRP opposed to joining FRD and recognized need to control MRP and wean it away to the extent possible from its leaders. Could be done by controlling financial and military support. It was agreed in meeting with Mr. Barnes that financial and military support for MRP be channelled through FRD.

17. 11/23/60 Contact Report: Meeting with Ray and Chibas in NYC, 11/22/60
Ray says MRP has contacts at Isle of Pines with two garrisons and can expect about 750 men to desert Castro at proper time. CAPTAIN CAPOTA is contact with Ray's group.

Ray's people also in contact with commander of prison where Huber Matos is incarcerated. Matos believes PADILLA, the prison commander, would assist

2/BR

him in an escape. Ray interested in single operation to get military defectors and free Matos. Wants to effect plan on 11/27/60.

Ray wants assistance from U.S. -- military information and supplies.

18. 11/24/60 Cable to Director from JMASH
Meeting with AMCHIRP-1 on 11/23, revealed he had information that MRP in Havana had capabilities to blow up power plant and TV stations in Havana -- a diversionary tactic planned to coordinate with Isle of Pines operation. Ray expects Isle of Pines operation support about 12/15/60.

* Notation about Cable: "Operation Unity" is to create dramatic show which will demonstrate that Manolo Ray is wrong when telling contacts in U.S. that his group is the only one capable of action."

19. 11/24/60 Cable to Director from Havana.
Operation Unity involves MRR, MDI, OA, 30th of November Group and MAR (not MAR of PEPIN RIVERO).

MAR and OA groups to blow electric cables in Regla area. MDC group, at same time, to make assassination attempt on CARLOS RAFAEL RODRIGUEZ at University of Havana.

20. 11/30/60 Cable to Director from Havana
JULIO ANGEL METRE advised planning to travel to Miami 12/1/60 escorted by Brazilian ambassador to Panama. Accompanied by ambassador's wife. MESTRE will be introduced to Ray and will offer services of MDC to Ray at that time. Mestre says plan is approved by "DR. LUCAS" (JOSE FERNANDEZ BADUE) MDC coordinator in Cuba.

SECRET

Betsy Palmer

Review of Manuel Ray y Rivero Files, Volumes I - VIII

April 24, 1978
Volume VIII July 1962 - August 1962

1. Cable dated July 2, 1962 to Director from San Juan
Clear that Manolo Ray wooked upon with great favor by Puerto Rican government. No evidence, however, that Puerto Rican government is supporting the MRP. Believe record will show that while our past contact with Ray has not always been happy one, it always revealing of Ray's intentions.

2. Memo for Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez 12 July 1962
Subject: Manolo Ray Rivero

"Ray has indicated to WAVE sources that whereas he is not persona grata with the Agency, he has important political connections in Washington and is thus kept informed of much of the Agency's activities. Ray's new organization is not to be military or engage in military thrusts against Cuba because military activity is presently controlled by the Agency and cannot be wrested from it at this time. Ray's new organization will cooperate with the Consejo and attempt to move in on it with the ultimate aim of taking over and dominating it."

3. Memorandum for Chief, Task Force W from Alfonson Rodriguez 25 July 1962
Subject: Manolo Ray Meeting in New York

Ray sorry he joined FRD prior to April invation. Let tide of time suck him in and take him along. Obvious to him that show run in good faith but bad judgment. Ray discusses hope that JURE will be long-lasting organization in Cuba. Ray's political views are assessed as democratically oriented, and if he became ruler of Cuba, his greatest preoccupation would be with economic progress. Rodriguez says Ray is not to be under- estimated. Commands respect because he is well educated and has something to contribute.

4. Ray begins to give information about possible defectors from Castro. Cable dated 25 July 1962 reports that Ray told Willard R. Nauman that Armando Hart Davalos is a feasible target.

former mgr., Kings Ranch, Cuba

7. Additional information to a July 1962 memorandum from Jack Malone (named on interoffice route slip). Information obtained from difference sources from persons close to Ray and their views are complete reliable. Ray did not leave Castro's cabinet because of ideological or policy discrepancies with Castro but because of a heated discussion with the Minister of Labor. Martinez Sanchez, who almost shot Ray after a Cabinet meeting. The sources of information agree that Ray is not any different than Castro. Some of them believe he may not have completely severed his relations with Castro and think he may still be in contact with him. Diplomatic relations were suspended but recognition was not withdrawn.

5. Memo from Jack Malone, dated July 16, 1962 Cover letter addressed to C. Mechen, Says Ray's ethics are poor and he is capable of sacrifycing his own kin and friends if such sacrifice turns out in favor of his personal plans. Claims Ray is irresponsible and ignorant of present international conditions and particularly of the Cuban social and economic reality.

SECRET

Manolo Ray
Volume VII continued

Quotes Ray as having said, "When I was Minister of Public Works, we, the inner circle of the Department, took a course in Marxist economics, and if what we were taught is communism, I must say that communism is not as bad as it is claimed to be."

8. Report on visit with Ray in Puerto Rico during first week of June, 1962, submitted by Winterrowd through Walt Raymond. Winterrowd states his general impression of Ray was a good one -- seems of be a moderate, intelligent man, a little given to hysteria and slogan-mongering. Best quality is in his skill as an organizer

9. Cable to Director from JMWave, dated Aug 15, 1962 DIR Cite WAVE 7062 Ray had meeting in Miami area 11 or 12 August in which an informant says Ray stated that he has arsenals in Venezuela and Dominican Republic, has a B-26 plane, territory available for training in Costa Rica and has the support through indirect means of U.S. Has invited journalists from New York Times and Time Magazine to cover his announcement of the formation of JURE.

? /o

10. Cable to Mexico City from Director, dated 6 August 65 says Ray plans to travel to Central America late August or September and needs visitors visa for Mexico. Says he has close acquaintance and wants to make personal effort to recruit him or talk him into defecting.

CIA makes inquiries in an effort to obtain visa for Ray.

11. Cable to Director from San Juan, dated August 20, 1962. Ray believes Llanusa will defect but needs financial support. Jose Gelabert to make pitch to Llanusa. Later cable says CIA willing to offer Llanusa $5,000.

12. Cable to Mexico City from Director, 23 August 1962 with directions to proceed to procure visa permit but make every effort to conceal U.S. connection. Ray had agreed in N.Y. meeting to make recruitment or defection effort towards Cuban Ambassador in Mexico.

13. Memo to Chief, Task Force W from Alfonso Rodriguez dated 24 Aug 1962
Subject: Operational Use of Ray Expenditure of Funds

Rodriguez feels beginning collaboration with Ray can be based on three specific proposals:
1. creation of an intelligence network inside Cuba
2. creation of recruitment or defection capability to assist our efforts in MEXI, RIO, SAGO, and MONT
3. immediate effort to recruit in place Carlos LECHUGA and Raul PRIMELLES.

Recommends paying Ray $84,700 over a six month period to begin this initial operation.

Betsy PALMER

March 4, 1978
Office of Security
Manuel Antonio Ray y Rivero #224594
1960-1974

* 1. Cross reference sheet - Memo dated 7/11/63,
Subject: Justin McCarthy (OS# 246-271) - references that McCarthy associated most actively with Ray, the DRE, etc) in 1961-62.

2. FBI report 19 October 1960, Re: Ray

3. See FBI report 11/21/74 - Subject: EMILIO ECHARTE PEDROSO

4. 30 August 1965, #C-777 579 Subject: Duran, Gustavo Bergnes:
States that Ray, an associate~~d~~, was granted POA on 24 October 1960 and an OA on 1 February 1961.

* 5. Cross reference to JORGE A. VOLSKY
CR R 300438 / yM
ID Mem. 15 March 1963 p. 2

6. #203308 TORROELLA, LUIS
IRD report 8/15/60 Iden List

7. Memo 14 Feb. 1961 To Alien Affairs Officer
Varona, Artime, Ray and Maceo departing for Guatemala 18 Feb. 1961, returning 25 February.

8. Gossip Column from Here & There by Don Diego
June 4, 1962
Ray earns $1,000 per month in Puerto Rico as one of Committee of Planning in P.R.

9. 6 March 1961 - INS states it has not record of how Ray last entered U.S.

10. Ray being considered in connection with Project Zenith per form letter dated 18 November 1960, from Sheffield Edwards, D.S. to Director, FBI

* 11. Dep. Director Security (Investigations and Operational Support) Memo for Chief Cl/CA "No CIA files other than those in OS have been searched in connection with this case. Assumed all pertinent information concerning Ray has been furnished pursuant to provisions of Clandestine Services Instruction." DTD 17 JAN 1961

Notes sent out for sanitization that are still pending:

Betsy Palmer's notes on:	Mexico City cable traffic, w/BS Sergio Arcacha Smith Manuel Ray y Rivero (OLC 78-1065/24, 4 May 78 - DDO)
Betsy Palmer's notes on:	Manuel Antonio Ray y Rivero (OLC 78-1065/25, 4 May 78 - OS) w/BS ok/GS
Surell Brady's notes on:	Priscilla Johnson McMillan Aline Mosby (OLC 78-1065/23, 27 Apr 78 - OS) w/BS ok/GS
Surell Brady's notes on: w/Barbara made copy SJ	Ambassador ~~Dobrynin~~ Unidentified Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov Gilberto Lopez (OLC 78-1065/22, 27 Apr 78 - DDO)
Betsy Palmer's notes on: w/Barbara SJ	OAS - Alpha 66 Manuel Ray Rivero (OLC 78-1065/21, 27 Apr 78 - DDO)
Dan Hardway's notes on: w/ CA 5/9	ECPOEM-WURABBIT, WURABBIT, WUPUND] WUBONBON, WUHUSTLER, ETC. (Hunt Summary) (OLC 78-1065/18, 11 Apr 78 - DDO)
Leslie Wizelman's notes on: OS/ok BS/ok w/DCD	Edward K. Moss, Joseph Ray Merola, Eduardo Whitehouse Insua, Edwara Browder, Dino Cellini, Norman Rothman, John Martino (OLC 78-1065, 13 Mar 78 - OS)
Dan Hardway's notes on: Sent + Returned	Unidentified Man Photographs Pre-Assassinations - Mexico - not to be sent to be sanitized or unsanitized (OLC 78-1065/7, 21 Mar 78 - DDO)
Leslie Wizelman's notes on:	William Alexander Morgan (OLC 78-1065/9, 21 Mar 78 - DDO)
Edwin Lopez's notes on:	Ortiz Ramirez (OLC 78-1065/5, 16 Mar 78 - DDO) Conte has to type up notes

61BR

Notes sent out for sanitization that are still pending:

Betsy Palmer's notes on:	Mexico City cable traffic, Sergio Arcacha Smith Manuel Ray y Rivero (OLC 78-1065/24, 4 May 78 - DDO)
Betsy Palmer's notes on:	Manuel Antonio Ray y Rivero (OLC 78-1065/25, 4 May 78 - OS)
Surell Brady's notes on:	Priscilla Johnson McMillan Aline Mosby (OLC 78-1065/23, 27 Apr 78 - OS)
Surell Brady's notes on:	Ambassador Dobrynin Unidentified Valeriy Vladimirovich Kostikov Gilberto Lopez (OLC 78-1065/22, 27 Apr 78 - DDO)
Betsy Palmer's notes on:	OAS - Alpha 66 Manuel Ray Rivero (OLC 78-1065/21, 27 Apr 78 - DDO)
Dan Hardway's notes on:	ECPOEM-WURABBIT, WURABBIT, WUPUND WUBONBON, WUHUSTLER, ETC. (Hunt Summary) (OLC 78-1065/18, 11 Apr 78 - DDO)
Leslie Wizelman's notes on:	Edward K. Moss, Joseph Ray Merola, Eduardo Whitehouse Insua, Edwara Browder, Dino Cellini, Norman Rothman, John Martino (OLC 78-1065, 13 Mar 78 - OS)
Dan Hardway's notes on:	Unidentified Man Photographs Pre-Assassinations - Mexico (OLC 78-1065/7, 21 Mar 78 - DDO)
Leslie Wizelman's notes on:	William Alexander Morgan (OLC 78-1065/9, 21 Mar 78 - DDO)
Edwin Lopez's notes on:	Ortiz Ramirez (OLC 78-1065/5, 16 Mar 78 - DDO)

61BR

Box 55
Folder 1

Central Intelligence Agency
has no Objection to Release
Date: AS SANITIZED
2003

SECRET

8/1/78
Palmer ①

Orlando Bosch Avila - DDO - Six Volumes
#201-299292

Volume I - Third agency material w/ eight sealed envelopes. all FBI

① Undated report

Dr. Orlando Bosch Avila CAMDITTO/23/
DPOB: 18 Aug. 1926, Santa Clara, Cuba

Bosch was one of many critical of CIA policy & personnel following Bay of Pigs. However, in March 1962, WAVE requested a POA on Bosch, advising he was "cooperative and secure." To be utilized as General Coordinator of Evelio Duque group. POA granted on 6 March 1962. Given polygraph in May 1962 & came out clean. His clearance was cancelled in Nov. 1962.

Bosch aligns himself with individuals and organizations that are currently involved in operations against Cuba, usually serving as General Coordinator & takes responsibility for securing financial backing.

000343

SECRET

② 7 June 1965
Biographical Data Report - Orlando Bosch Avila
Personal Data: Bosch is shrewd, cunning, devious & deceptive. He is primarily an adventurer & probably an anarchist rather than a true revolutionary. He is probably paranoid psycopath. He is a good doctor but neglects his job to devote time to raiding activities. He is a notorious liar & has several times

Palmer (2)
8/1/78
Bosch

SECRET

announced raids over Cuba which never occurred.

#

Volume II - No notes 1965 - 68.
Third agency deletions ~~1~~ nine sealed envelopes - all FBI.

Volume III 1968 - 1974
3rd agency deletions - 16 sealed envelopes - all FBI
No notes.

Volume IV 1975 - 1978.
(1) Third agency deletions - 23 sealed envelopes.
(a) DOD document - Intelligence Report dtd 9 June 1976
2 231 0221 76
470th MI Group, Ft Amador - Canal Zone.
Subject: Cuban Exile Terrorist Group.

(B) SS Cable 21 Feb. 1976. - San Jose 105
Subject: Re Arrest of Juan Bosch & the Location

(C) 5 envelopes SS documents re: visit of Henry Kissinger to Caracas, circa Feb. 1976.

(D) ~~Remainder - FBI~~ USAF Cable from JCS 10 Jan 1978
File # MSGNO 46 (MIIR) Subject: Venezuelan Aircraft Security Threat Expands.

Palmer
③
8/1/78
Bosch

SECRET

⑤ State Cables - Nov, Dec 1977 - Visas for wife & child of Orlando Bosch

③ State Cables - bombings - July 12-13, 1976

⑦ Remainder sealed envelopes - FBI documents -

② 12 Feb. 1976 Cable IN 824723
CITE: [redacted] 29063
To: Priority director, [redacted], [redacted]. LA/[redacted]

WKSCARLET-3 (former unilateral asset) advises he is investigating bombing Cuban ambassador, Caracas & is travelling during week of 15 Feb to Santiago, Buenos Aires & Miami.

Cuban Ambassador Norberto Hernandez Curbelo reported receiving bomb in large manila envelope bearing return address of Dr. Gustavo A. Vollmer. WK Scarlet/1, former WK Scarlet chief, is security consultant to Vollmer & has retained WK Scarlet/3 who is operating a commercial investigations service, to determine who used Vollmer's name. WK Scarlet/3 maintains contacts with Orlando Bosch.

18 Feb. 1976 Cable IN 830506 CITE: [redacted] 29129

③ Frank Castro had knowledge of attempt to assassinate nephew of allende ~~Henry Kissinger~~ & told WK Scarlet/3. In order to use information, Agency afraid they will compromise WK Scarlet/3

SECRET

Palmer ④ 8/1/78
Orlando Bosch

④ Volume V August 1976 - October 1976
Third Agency Deletions - 10 Sealed envelopes, State & FBI
No. notes.

Volume VI -
Third Agency deletions - 6 sealed envelopes.
4 FBI - 2 State - Oct. 1976 -

① 12 Nov. 1976
Cable 943114
TO: Priority [redacted] Info [redacted], [redacted]

p. 3 #2 Morales was source of numerous secret service reports during Kissinger visit to Caracas in Feb. 1976 on reported attempt by Bosch to kill Kissinger. One SS report indicated Morales had provided Caracas legal attache with reliable info in the past.

② Dispatch 15 Nov 1976
To Chief: LA Division
From: Chief of Station, [redacted]

[redacted] Byron W. Gutradt met WK Scarlet/3 in 1964 when both were enrolled in OCS at Ft. Benning, Ga.

⑤
Palmer
8/1/78
Bosch

SECRET

Loose Documents.

One sealed envelope - FBI documents deleted

Bosch, Orlando - [C - 97563]

One sealed envelope - Office of Security Information

~~SECRET~~

Palmer
8/2/78

(1)

Victor Paneque.
1 pkg. loose documents
1 pkg. DCD documents
1 Volume CI/OA documents
1 Volume - DDO documents

DDO Volume

Central Intelligence Agency
has no Objection to Release
Date: AS SANITIZED
2003

(1) 24 October 1960.
Personality File Request
Victor Paneque - 201-286 382
Reportedly an agent of DIER

(2) Undated document giving Paneque's background political activity. All 1960 information.

1. On arrival in U.S., stayed with Orlando Bosch, suspected Castro agent.

(2) Associated with leader of MRR "Camilo Cienfuegos" Carlos Rodriguez Castro, suspected Castro plant in U.S.

(3) Reportedly spent 2 hrs. with Raul Castro before defecting.

(4) Major Sanjenis, former Chief G-2, says Paneque of GOC agent.

(5) Organización Auténtica reporting to State Dept that Paneque is a Castro plant.

(6) [00-A 3168667] reports Paneque one of two DIER plants at Uni. of Havana + students planning to assassinate him.

(7) Cuban businessman says Paneque is G-2 plant.

(8) CIA reported to FBI that subject [illegible] as G-2.

Palmer ②
8/2/78
~~SECRET~~ Paneque

③ April 29, 1959 Classified Message to Director from Havana says Raul Castro has begun a major purge of Cuban Armed Forces. Among those to be eliminated are Victor Paneque, aka "Diego"

④ 18 Oct. 1960
Conversation with Major Victor M. Paneque (Commadante Diego, 6 October at 900).

When Paneque arrived in Miami, he got together with Alianza de Liberacion through Dr. Luis Conte Aguero. He could not get immediate help from this group, so resigned. Also said he had tried to get help from U.S. govt. but unsuccessful.

Paneque is convinced that the only thing needed to overthrow Castro is arms & supplies. Has a plane which he intends to fly into Cuba with cargo of arms.

Author of memo recommends that CIA offer assistance to Paneque independent of all other organizations as he seems to be capable of becoming an important factor in the future

000344.3

~~SECRET~~

⑤ Nov. 2, 1960 Cable to Director from Mash
Paneque & 8 men leaving for Cuba night of 1 Nov on 40-foot yacht, Trudy Lou. Craft purchased by Orlando Bosch.

Palmer ③
8/2/78

Paneque

DIER – Departamento Investigativo
Del Ejercito Revolucionario

~~SECRET~~

⑥ 14 Dec. 1960
Cable to Director from Havana. IN 16758
Paneque reportedly under arrest at Cabana prison & his wife at Women's prison, on charges of aiding Escambray fighters.

⑦ Jan 13, 1961
Cable to Bell from Guatemala City. IN 1688
Alexander Rourke gives information that Frank Fiorini & Orlando Bosch of Miami, represent Paneque in Cuba. Fiorini & Bosh recruiting & equiping force for assault on Cuba 18 Jan. Receiving financial aid from Anti Communist International Association of NYC.

⑧ 14 March 1962
Dispatch to Chief, Task Force W from COS/JMWAVE
Paneque organized a Hunger Strike by Cuban Exiles & held a rally 13 March 1962. Purpose was to show JFK that Cubans are willing to die in exile if their right to defend Cuba from Communism is negated. Motto of strike is "Hunger or War".

000344

⑦ [PRQ part 1 – July 4, 1964.
Aliases: Diego Rene Ricardo (Clandestine Activity)

④
Palmer
8/1/78
Panequa

SECRET

⑨ Request for Information & Review 5 Nov. 1964
[POA granted 13 Nov 1964]

⑧ 8 Oct 1964
Report of Covert Assessment
from Assessment & Evaluation Staff, Medical Staff.

Paneque one of 6 members of the "radop trainees (radio operators?) given psychological assessments in Aug 1964. Paneque is oldest, (DOB 18 Sept 1920) ~~and~~ least intelligent, most experienced of the group. Likely he would try to dominate the group because of his past experience. His shortcomings seem to outweigh his assets.

⑩ 17 Nov 1964 Classified Message 162258Z
[Paneque assigned AMRUG-5]

⑪ 19 Dec. 1964
Memorandum of Oral Commitment

Paneque engaged under oral contract on 1 Dec 1964. To receive $275.28 per month following completion of satisfactory service. Will receive raise of $50 per month on completion of training & $50 raise upon infiltration. (Possibly an infiltration of Oriente Province) see item 13

(5)
Palmer
8/2/78
Panequa

SECRET

(12) 1 Oct 1965
Dispatch from COS/JMWAVE
Panequa terminated as of 31 Oct 1965. Agent Service record recommends him for re-use, on basis of his knowledge of internal contacts in Northern Oriente.

(13) 15 Sept 1977 to [redacted] #095686
Panequa participated in Cuban exile activities in New York area in 1962 and later registered in ISR to Dept of Army in August 1962 (Dropped without prejudice 18 Nov 1963.) In 1964 Panequa was member of MDC infiltration team. Recruited by Miami station as radio operator/infiltree and favorably swirled on 5 August 1964. POA granted 13 Nov 1964. Paid $275 monthly beginning 1 Sep 1964. Trained by Cuban agents in Miami but never used operationally. Amicably terminated 1 Oct 1965 & recommended for re-use. Reported in 1969 as conducting clandestine trips inside Cuba on behalf of Junta Militar de Cuba.]

* * *

Third agency deletions nine sealed envelopes.
8 - FBI 1 Dept of Army.

* * *

⑥
Palmer 8/2/78

SECRET

Volume CI/OA — No notes necessary.
Victor Manuel Paneque Batista - C-286 382

Deletions - 1 sealed envelope.
FBI report 3 Nov 1960 and Office of Security polygraph Interview.

//

Victor Paneque
DCD Documents - no notes
Loose Documents - Victor Paneque
17 Feb. 1972
Subject: Identification of PCC, DSE, UJC Members, etc.
page 3 - Item 9: Information acquired through interrogation of CC-4993, Jacinto BAEZ Galiano, a Cuban refugee & former resident Regla, Havana Province, who left Cuba 22 Nov 1971. Subsource worked for Superphosphates Enterprise from 1950-1968. Victor Manuel Paneque employed until 1968 as laboratory Chief of Superphosphates, is a member of the PCC, militia, & Defense Committee (CDR). He is an agronomist & former director of School of Agronomy, Havana University. He is described as Caucasian, 5'2" tall, weight about 165 lbs, born 1927-32, black hair, dark-colored eyes.

0003447

(note)
Victor Paneque Batista is 5'6", brown hair, blue eyes, born 1920.

SECRET

Palmer
8/3/78

SECRET

Morales. – Response to 24 July 1978 request.
20 Jan. 1961 dispatch to Chief/WH from Chief, JMWAVE.
Subj: Operational [/JMATE/AMOT]
Ref: Bell-0447

When info of referenced cable passed to [AMOT/2] he stated he had received some info from Felipe Rodriguez de la Torre. According to (A/2) he already alerted [AMIRON] (A-2) said that Subject has, as of 13 Jan 1961, not attempted to enlist in [AMIRON]. Both base WAVE and [AMOT] are attempting to locate subject.

Box 55 Folder 1

Palmer 8/7/78

①

Orlando Bosch Avila - Office of Security 257 921
1. Volume - Dates 1962 - 78
Deletions - 1 sealed envelope

① 5 March 1977 Cable IN 207098
To: Director CITE [redacted].
Response to a 4 March news article in "El Mundo", Caracas - named CIA officers as Orlando Bosch, Ricardo Morales Navarette, Orlando Garcia Vasquez, Luis Posada Carriles - etc. Cable states "fortunately, none are currently active assets."

② 8 April 1977. Memo: Chief: Security Analysis Group. From: [John F Sullivan] Jr./Michael W. Raneck
Subject: El Mundo Exposure
Office of Security indices check on names (some of which outlined in #1 above).
"In those cases above where a security file exists, there is no evidence that any of the individuals are current, active assets."

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer
8/1/78

Clare Booth Luce
Office of Security - One volume

Deletions - one sealed envelope - Summary of FBI Investigation July 1973 (BUD BI of 1953 BI)

① 26 July 1963
Covert Security approval requested so Luce can contact COS, Rome (Wm. Harvey) when he visits U.S. or she visits Italy.

② 8 Aug 1963 - Covert Security Approval granted for a 6 mo. period. Luce, Clare Boothe #169 102

SECRET

③
Palmer 8/14/78

Godoy

in Cuban underground.

⑥ 5 Jan. 1963
Cable to Director from JMWAVE
Godoy elected unanimously as General Coordinator, MRP on 4 January. Decision being sent Cuba for radification of underground. Godoy plans to contact Dr Miro re: MRP entry into CRC

⑦ PRQ Part I - 13 March 1963 aka Oscar Acosta

⑧ Cancellation & Diversion 5 Feb 1963
Attn: Walter Kuzmuk.
File on Godoy cancelled & closed CI/OA because of failure to submit PRQ II as required under CSI no. 10-5 or to indicate any further interest.

⑨ Domestic Asset Report
Godoy - DPOB 13 March 1927, Havana. One of the three present leaders of MRP in exile. Has experience in clandestine activities. Assigned to recruiting candidates for MRP. Godoy is a professional man who lost his business when Fidel took over. He is easy to control & has a better concept of PM activity than Ambang-2 or Ambang 4. Relationship with c/o is good.

④

Palmer
8/4/78

Godoy

⑪ PRQ Part II 3 May 1963
Subject will be [redacted] & will be paid a monthly stipend depending on amount & type of his production.

⑫ Cable 8 July 1963 IN 7543
To Director From JMWAVE
Indicates MRP, Alpha 66 & SFNE have combined.

⑬ 1 July 1965 Dispatch to Chief/WH from COS/Miami
Transmits Memorandum of Oral Commitment on Godoy, who began employment with CIA in a PW capacity in 1961, subsequently transferred to CI activities & up until now paid from OOA funds. To receive a salary of $350 per month.

⑭ 6 July 1967 Dispatch to Chief/WH
From: COS, JMWAVE
Godoy terminated 30 June 1967. His overall reporting has been marginal at best during past year, partly due to his lengthy absence from area & a decreased interest on part of JMWAVE in exile groups he is reporting on. Recommend for reuse if situation arises. Has been hired as consultant for Hudson Institute

#

SECRET

Palmer ©
8/7/78

Joaquin Godoy y Solis (contd from 8/4/78

DCD documents - no notes

Godoy y Solis, Joaquin - C-94894
CI/OA

① Request for Approval or Investigative Action
17 October 1961 - Godoy AMPAZZ/1
To be used as contact between WAVE and MRP.

② PRQ - Part I 16 Oct 1961
Godoy - aka Oscar Acosta
DPOB - March 13, 1927, Havana, Cuba
~~AMPAZZ~~ ; No political affiliations - works for MRP

③ Provisional Operational Approval granted 17 Oct. 1961

④ PRQ - Part II - 3 May 1962
Clarence E. Imeryage developed Godoy in JMWAVE area for PM operational leads after his arrival from Cuba in summer of 1961. As an official of MRP, Godoy to influence its policies and guide its anti-Communist propaganda effort. To be offered approx. $300 monthly, half in cash and half in escrow, the latter for both cover & control purposes.

0003600

⑤ Request for cancellation of Godoy on 27 July 1967.

#

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer 8/7/78

①.

George Nobregas - 201-310131
. DDO - 1 Volume + 1 pkg Loose Documents

①. 8 November 1961
Personality File Action Request from Howard Gossage /WH4.
Jorge Angel Nobregas Herin (sic) DPOB: 7/22/24, Havana

② 3 June 1957 - Field Information Report
Documentary - list of Cubans who left Havana for exile during period of 7 May - 1 June 1957.
Jorge A. Nobregas Heria (sic) 1 June to San Jose

③ PRQ 23 October 1961 Jorge Angel Nobregas Heren
Educated in U.S. - Ga. Military Academy, North Georgia College, & Uni of Georgia (B.A. - Intl Relations 1950)

④ Dispatch - 27 Oct 1961 to Chief: WHD from COS/JMWAVE
Lists Nobregas as one of crew members of M/V Susan Ann.

0003601

⑤ Aug. 29, 1961 miami Memorandum - Attn: Bill Signed: B amclatter/1
Information on Jorge Nobregas, aka "Coco"
Jorge one of three brothers (Leslie, Jorge & Evelio).
Was an activist in revolution against Batista & worked in the Aleman group. When Castro took over, Nobregas took over Hotel Riviera in Cuba. Accused of stealing Riviera funds but protected by Chief of Police Almejeiras who supposedly was the one who placed him in the Ministry

SECRET

③

Palmer 8/7/78

Nobregas

of Recuperation. In this position he was involved in theft of jewels & money. All sources involved in informing on Nobregas consider him ~~of~~ a man of no scruples, a homosexual & not to be trusted.

⑥ Cable dtd 15 Nov 1961 TO: Director From: JMWAVE. IN 22200

JMWAVE receiving derogatory info on Nobregas from reliable sources. In August, Leslie Nobregas, Captain of Susan Ann, instructed to get rid of his brother, Jorge, due to many reports of his homosexual tendencies. Leslie refused. Because of reasons listed below, JMWAVE must sever completely all operational relationships with Nobregas brothers & two of Jorge's special friends who are crewmen of Susan Ann.

ⓐ on Nov 1, entire crew ~~not~~ mutinied due to unfair treatment & favoritism shown to Jorge clique.

ⓑ Crew lacks confidence in Leslie's fortitude

ⓒ. Crew says Leslie has more than once been forced to accomplish a mission because crewmen held a pistol to his back.

ⓓ Goudies say they will not "operate with us" if Nobregas group remains.

ⓔ Other crews resent support of Nobregas group.

SECRET

③

Palmer 8/7/78

Nobregas.

⑦ 18 January 1963 Dispatch to Chief/~~WH~~ Task Force W from
COS/JMWAVE #UFGA-7219
Subject: Operational/GYROSE/AMCONCERT/1
Report on Jorge Nobregas Heria
Nobregas was jailed in La Cabanas prison after jewel theft in 1959. Jose Aleman Jr. made arrangements through Jose Llanusa Gobel to have Jorge released.

#

⑧ Information Report 22 Nov. 1963.
TDCS DB 3/658,111
Source: Reliable Local law enforcement officer - Miami.
As of 11/20/63, Nobregas, member of Montecristi group, had 14 M-3 submachineguns which he was offering for sale in Miami. Believed weapons represent some which were stolen at Big Pine Key at time of April 1961 invasion.

#

Deletions; Sealed envelope

① FBI 2 April 1963 no ~~fed~~ file # - Wash. D.C.
Subj: Anti-Castro Activities

② FBI 13 April 1963, #MM 105-1360 (Miami)
Subject: DRE

0003603

#

Loose Documents — no notes. ~~Steps~~

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer 8/7/78

①

Duney Perez Alamo - 201-334081
DDO - 2 Volumes + 1 pkg DCD documents
1 Volume C1/OA

Volume I - DDO
Deletions - sealed envelopes

① FBI - 23 Jan 1962 - #105-2878 - Subj: Military & Naval Matters - Cuba

② FBI - 21 Jan 1964 - #105-8130 (Miami) S: Manuel Duasso

③ FBI - 29 Jan 1973, #105-20913 (Miami) S: Partido Revolucionario Del Pueblo
21 Oct 1971, #105-20202 (Miami) S: Directorio Revolucionario (DR)

④ FBI - 14 Aug 1973, Cable from Director, FBI, S: DR (no file #)
23 June 1973, #105-20202 (Miami) S: DR

⑤ FBI - 12 Sept 1963 - #MM 105-20202 (Miami) S: DR
24 Aug 1973 - Cable from Director, FBI, S: DR (no file #)

⑥ FBI 6 March 1974 - #105-21596 (Miami) S: Rafael Colon - Explosion at Oasis Motel, ~~Avo~~ Avrainville, France, 2 Aug 1973.
13 Feb. 1974 - #105-20202 (Miami) - S: DR
16 Jan 1974 - #105-2856 (Miami), S: Orlando Bosch Avila

⑦ FBI - 27 Feb. 1974 - #105-4953 (Miami) S: Dunney Pio Perez Alamo

⑧ FBI - 9 July 1974, Cable from Dir. FBI, S: Bomb Explosion in ~~France~~ Front of Cuban Embassy, Paris, France, July 3, 1974

⑨ FBI - 26 July 1974, #105-1953 (Miami) S: Dunney Pio Perez Alamo

⑩ FBI - 31 July 1974, #105-21947 (Miami), S: Accion Cubana (AC)

⑪ FBI - 8 May 1975, #105-4953 (Miami), S: Dunney Pio Perez Alamo

⑫ FBI - 3 Dec 1974, #105-4953 (Miami) S: " " " "

⑬ FBI - 4 Nov. 1976 - Cable from Dir., FBI, S: Bombing of Cubana Airlines DC-8 near Barbados, West Indies, Oct 6, 1976

SECRET

③

Palmer 8/7/78

Dunney Perez

to establish the location of operational contacts.

#

CI/OA - 1 volume

Dunney Perez Alamo - C-33408 /

1965 Information

Deletions - 1 sealed envelope, Office of Security

Investigative report + Polygraph.

No notes

#

DCD Documents - no notes. 1961 Info.

SECRET

Palmer 8/8/78

①

Francisco Rodriguez Tamayo - 201-293114
DDO records
201 file - 1 Volume
DCD documents - 1 pkg.
Loose Documents - 1 pkg

Volume 1 - 201 file DDO
Third agency deletions - sealed envelopes.

① FBI, 16 July 1959, (New York) S: Anti-Fidel Castro activities
② FBI, 22 Oct 1959, #105-1891 (Miami) S: Francisco Rodriguez Tamayo (FRT)
2 Sept 1959, (Atlanta) S: Anti Fidel Castro Activities
③ FBI - 6 May 1960, #105-1891, S: FRT
14 March 1960, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
④ FBI - 3 May 1961, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
13 March 1961, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
27 Dec. 1960, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
⑤ FBI - 23 Jan 1964, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
16 Oct. 1963, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
⑥ 26 Sept 1960, " " " "
29 June, 1959, #109, 584 (Wash. DC) S: Anti-Fidel Castro Activities
11 Aug. 1960, #105-1792 (Miami) S: Francisco Valentin Perez y Perez
23 July 1963, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
⑦ INS - 21 June 1968, #CO 105.3-C, S: Your CSCI-316/02115-68 dtd.
7 June 1968, FRT aka Nicolas Diaz
⑧ FBI - 28 Oct 1968, #105-1891 (Miami) S: FRT
⑨ FBI - 10 Feb. 1969, #105-15774 (Miami) S: Re Connections w/Cuban Power
⑩ 3 FBI documents, 28 Nov 1969, 22 July 1969, 12 March 1969 #105-1871 (Miami)
Subjects: FRT

SECRET

Palmer ②
8/8/78
Rodriguez Tamayo

① Personality File Action Request - 23 Feb. 1961
Rodriguez a member of FRD in 1961
#201-293114. DPOB 1935, Cuba

~~②~~

② Cable 6 Dec 1960
To: JMGOLD From: Director OUT 99988

FBI report from: Francisco Bustard, former G-2 agent, revealed Rodriguez, aka El Mexicano, or 4 colleagues working with Diaz Lanz group volunteered provide Cuban G-2 following info:

1. Who financing Diaz Lanz group in Cuba.
2. Location of arms in Cuba
3. Names of Diaz Lanz group in Cuba
4. Locations outside Cuba where materials are stored
5. Place, date, times plane departures for Cuba.
6. General plans of Counter-revolution.

FRT stated reports would furnish sufficient proof to put subjects in prison. Wanted $5000 for report on who was person in Cuba financing counter revolution. FRT stated only reason he was in U.S. because he faced a 30 year prison sentence in Cuba.

Another report indicates a female friend of Diaz Lanz, working at Miami airport, also G-2 agent. Suggest Diaz Lanz be cautioned.

SECRET

③
Palmer
8/8/78

Rodriguez Tamayo

③ 22 March 1963
Memo. to Director, FBI, from DDP
Subject: Francisco Rodriguez Tamayo, aka "El Mexicano".
An untested source told CIA representative on Dec 1962 that FRT was responsible for the imprisonment of Roberto Perez Crusat. Source was imprisoned with Perez in Principe prison. Perez said Major Efigenio Armejeiras told him FRT was a paid agent of GOC in Miami. Perez executed a few days later.

④ Cable 30 May 1968
To Director from [redacted]
CIRASH/4 advised ~~FRT~~ man arrested using false passport - Nicolas Diaz but actually FRT, "a gangster long sought by the FBI". Source said he had come to Venezuela to assassinate unknown target for $15,000.

#

DCD - 1 document - no notes. Same info as #3 above.

#

0003609

Loose Documents - 1 pkg.
Deletions - 1 sealed envelope.

① FBI 30 June 1959 - (New York) S: Dr. Alberto Henriquez Vasquez - Anti-Fidel Castro Activities.
17 Dec. 1959 - #105-36449 (N.Y.), S: FRT

SECRET

SECRET

Palmer ④ 8/8/78

Rodriguez Tamayo.

(Deletions cont'd)

FBI - 19 May 1960, #100-10838 (Miami) S: Joseph Manuel Paula
11 Aug. 1960, #105-1792 (Miami) S: Francisco Valentin Perez y Perez.
30 Sept 1965, #92-726 (Miami) S: Frank Lang "Lefty" Rosenthal, et al.

No notes - 1965 + 1968 information - Rodriguez may be connected w/ Black Power group.

SECRET

Palmer ①
8/8/78

Juan Manuel Salvat Roque
DDO files - 1 Volume - 201-286051

1 pkg loose documents
CI/OA - 1 Volume - #C-86065
Deletions - sealed envelopes.

① FBI - 26 Dec 1956, no file #, Subject: Roque Salvat, Manuel
② FBI - 13 Apr. 1963, #105-1360 (Miami) S: DRE
③ INS - 30 March 1963, #A-12 421 546, S: Notice of Prevention of Departure.
④ FBI - 10th Mar 1967, #105-3348, S: Foreign Political Matters - Cuba
⑤ FBI - 6 June 1968, no file # (Miami), S: " " " ".

Volume I.

① Personality File Action Request - 19 Oct. 1960
Manuel Salvat Roque - 201-286051
DPOB - March 27, 1940, Sagua, Cuba

0003611

② News article - Miami News - Hal Hendrix - no date
"Red Terrorism Rules at Havana University"
Three Uni. students escaped after hiding in Havana 2 months: Alberto Muller, Ernesto Fernandez Travieso & Manuel Salvat. Escape possible under protection of Brazilian Embassy. All three blamed Maj. Rolando ~~Cubella~~ Cubela, Castro's personal choice to head the University Student Federation, and his aides of "murdering" the autonomy of the university. The three, on arrival in Miami, offered their services to Cuban Democratic Revolutionary Front - want to organize an anti-~~Communist~~ student org. within the front.

SECRET

Palmer 8/8/78

Salvat

③ External Asset Report - undated.
Salvat is National Coordinator Clandestine ops.
POA extended to 16 Feb. 1961, (sic) PRQ Part II submitted
1 Nov 1961. (sic) OA pending. Salary $275 month.
Subject has extensive training - should
have highest priority for Infil. ops.

④ 6 April 1960 Cable to Director From Havana
Salvat [redacted] AMPALM/1. Salvat
in hiding in Havana - thinks he may be
picked up by DIER in connection with
his outspoken support of Conte Aguero.
Ampalm/11 [redacted] is Elena Falla, a
local embassy employee.

⑤ 3 Sept. 1960 Cable To: Director From: MASH. IN 47347
Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (DRE) to be
formed 5 Sept 1960. DRE Committee to travel
to a Latin American country to make public
announcement of formation of group.
Propaganda Head of DRE is Manuel Salvat.

⑥ 13 Sept. 1960 Cable to Director Fr: MASH.
DRE to be affiliate, not member AMRASP.
Mueller & Salvat also members of AMRASP
student group.

SECRET

③

Palmer 8/8/78
Salvat

⑦ Nov. 4, 1960
Cable to Director Fr: MASH
MASH planning infiltrate first DRE team Havana Province by 10 Nov. 1960 in order to be present when student general strike occurs on 14 Nov. Long range objective of team is to organize anti-Castro student, propaganda & harassment force within student circles. Salvat & Mueller on this team

⑧ POA granted 3 Nov. 1960 for Salvat.

⑨ May 9, 1961 Cable to Bell Fr: JMWAVE
[redacted]
Salvat arrested in Cuba about 18 April. His true identity did not become known to authorities & following interrogation & investigation, he was released.

⑩ PRQ Part II 1 Nov. 1961
Case Officer - Ross Crozier (Roemayr)
Salvat has met Oliver H. Corbuston on one or two occasions & knows him as Douglas Gupton. Salvat's PM duties will be limited, but involves some sabotage & demolition as well as distribution & organization of clandestine - guerilla groups within Cuba.

When DRE leader, Alberto Muller was in Sierra Maestra with 400 guerillas, CIA failed to support effort with material air drops.

Palmer 8/8/78

Salvat

With their leader abandoned & in jeopardy, Salvat wrote to friends in U.S. that he would kill CIA personnel involved if anything happened to Muller.

⑪ 3 Feb. 1962 Dispatch UFGW-796
Operational Approval granted Salvat effective 23 January 1962.

⑫ 8 March 1962 Station Asset Report
Salvat is action type, considered one of the bulwarks of the free Cuban student world. Has infiltrated Cuba + worked in underground, undergone arrest + interrogation, freed & returned to Miami, infiltrated again on three attempts that failed latter part of 1961. He is almost legendary among Cuban high school & university youth.

⑬ 13 March 1968 - Request for Cancellation.
Salvat no ~~loger~~ longer of Operational interest to CIA.

#

Loose Documents - no notes.

SECRET

Palmer
8/8/78 ⑮

Salvat

Volume - CI/OA
Manuel Salvat Roque - C-86065 -
No notes - redundant.

SECRET

Palmer ①
8/8/78

Jose Ignacio Rasco
DCD File 103981 – 1 volume
Loose Documents – 1 pkg.
DCD Documents – 1 pkg

① 16 Aug 1962 Information Report #00-K-3,233,366
Subject: Christian Democratic Movement (MDC)
Source: Cuban national presently in exile in U.S.

After failure of Bay of Pigs, MDC began to split into factions. In October 1961, Pepin Fernandez Badue aka "Lucas" arrived from Cuba & stated he was a representative of the clandestine MDC movement in Cuba. Miro Cardona accepted his credentials & assigned him to the CRC council.

MDC in exile consists of 3 groups. One, headed by Jose Ignacio Rasco has the largest following & is organized in Miami, N.Y., Chicago, Venezuela & Cuba. Another group is headed by Melchor Gaston – this group broke away after invasion but is now coming back to original MDC. Third group headed by Laureano Batista who is also bringing his group back to original MDC. Batista is presently president of MDC & three groups believed will be reunited by Aug 1962 under Batista's leadership.

Palmer ②
8/8/78

Rasco.

② Loose Documents - no notes

DCD Documents -

① 12 Aug 1960 memo to Chief, Contact Division
from: Chief: N.Y Office
The 10 June 1960 issue of N.Y. Times
carried a description of FRD + listed
membership as follows:
Capt. Manuel Artime - MRR.
Dr. Justo Carillio - Montecristi Group.
Dr. Aureliano Sanchez Arango - Havana Uni. faction
Dr. Antonio Varona - Autentico party.
Dr. Jose Ignacio Rasco - MDC.

SECRET

Palmer ①
8/9/78

Amador Odio
Loose Documents.

Deletions - 1 sealed envelope. - FBI document, 22 April 1954 - #109-43 (New York) Subj: Carlos Prio Socarras, et al.

① 3 January 1966.

Memo to: Officer in Charge, INS
Fr: Deputy Director for Plans
Subj: Odio Padron, Amador
DOB: June 1913, CIT: Cuba
Case number 500012

Info - received 10 March 1954 from "a usually reliable source" states Amador Odio operated Expreso Trafico y Transporte, SA. in Havana. Company had been importing arms for the opposition & shipping them to various points in the interior of Cuba. Odio's house was raided on 3 March 1954 by military intelligence because of allegations that a clandestine radio operating from that address. Late that night, Odio's sons, Cesar Odio and Cesar Lancis were given asylum in Guatemalan Embassy in Havana.

② 10 March 1954 Report #HKH-738 from a controlled American, Havana Cuba. Is basis for memo to INS (#1, above) but contains additional information that Amado Oodio also sought asylum in the Guatemalan embassy & left for Guatemala on 10 March ~~1953~~ 1954.

SECRET

Palmer ②
8/9/78

Amador Odio

[redacted] Report further states that Aureliano Sanchez Arango was in Odio home shortly before the raid, but due to ineptitude of Cuban military police, Sanchez escaped. Dr. Raquel del Valle, professor of the Instituto de Segunda Enseñanza was arrested.

#

Palmer 8/9/78

Arnesto Rodriguez, Sr.
DDO -
201-275643 file - 1 pkg
DCD documents - 1 pkg
No Deletions

DDO file

① 1 Feb. 1962 Despatch (poor copy) between JMWAVE and Chief, WHD - Re: Cancellation of Provisional Operational Approval. Among those listed is Arnesto Napoleon Rodriguez Gonzales

② 17 April 1961 -
Provisional Operational Approval granted 8 Apr. 1960 and extended, to 8 Oct. 1961.

③ 24 August 1960 Despatch from COS/Havana to Chief: WHD, Info: COB, JMASH → # HKHA-6718 Conversation with AMJUTE/1 (Rodriguez) signed by Gerald L. Gardyne

Rodriguez gives info. to case officer on information regarding anti-Castro military with which he is in contact. Says old military groups, about 10,000 strong, have organized to oppose Castro. Sent a representative to Miami to offer support to Tony Verona of the FRD.

0003620

④ 6 April 1960 - Request for Approval or Investigative Action report. Rodriguez to be used in audio surveillance operations.

SECRET

Palmer ②
8/9/78

Arnesto Rodriguez

DPOB: 15 August 1891, Habana, Cuba.

#

DCD Documents: no notes.

SECRE

SECRET

Palmer ①
8/9/78

Democratic Revolutionary Front - FRD.
DDO - Five Volumes.

Volume I.

① Dec 15, 1960 Dispatch #UFGA-465
To: Chief, WHD fr: COB/JMWAVE.
Subj: AMOT-2 Sub Sources in Havana.
[redacted] - uses pseudonym "Napoleon". Address [redacted]
[redacted]

0003622

② 22 Feb. 1961 Dispatch to Chief: WH Div from Chief of Base/JMWAVE
AMOT reports on Friends of Democratic Cuba, Inc. in New Orleans, concludes:

"Although we acknowledge the 'lack of understanding' of some Cubans and the ambitions which grow in exile, we believe that the establishment of this company was thought up by Mr. Durham and Mr. Banister to obtain personal benefits with the approval of Mr. Arcacha. We also doubt that this Company received no donations of any type and I believe that a thorough investigation of the funds of the stevedor's union and the books of the New Orleans Exporters Company should be conducted by authorized persons, and we suppose that interesting developments should come from this matter, maybe pointing not only to personal gain by its promoters but also to the evasion of federal taxes of the U.S. Government."

SECRET

Palmer ②
8/9/78

FRD

Volume II

Deletions – 1 sealed envelope – FBI, 19 Apr 62 (Miami)
Re: Camilo Cienfuegos Gorriaran, #105-1236
No notes – AMOT, intelligence information reports, mainly from Cuba

Volume III – no notes. Cuban intelligence reports from AMOTS. Same for Vol. IV & Vol V.

(Note: These are wrong documents for CRC/FRD. DDO attempting to secure correct documents 8/9/78)

Palmer 8/9/78

①

JURE

DDO - 4 Volumes.

Volume 1

Deletions - sealed envelope. ~~&~~ Six ~~FBI~~ envelopes - all F.B.I documents.

① 11 July 1962. Despatch UFG-1223 (? poor copy)

Report from Cuban businessman on Planned Formation of a new group by Manuel Ray Rivero.

Manuel Ray, Felipe Pazos, Raul Chibas and Ramon Barquin, among others, planning to form new, yet unnamed, organization. Ray has sent Rogelio Cisneros to Miami to contact various exile personalities for this purpose.

Ray hoping to get financial assistance from CRC for his new group. Feels CRC is worn out organization but good place to be while new group gains momentum.

② July 25, 1962 Cable TO Director from San Juan.

23 July 1962 press interview - Ray announces formation of JURE to include all "popular" factions outside Cuba in an effort to restore splintered movements into effective working organization.

SECRET

Palmer ②
8/9/78
JURE

Volume II -
Deletions - sealed envelopes -
FBI - 卌 卌 | State - ||
Eleven FBI envelopes - 2 St. Dept.

① Jan. 4, 1963 Cable To: Director Fr: JMWAVE IN 44301
Following paragraphs reflect present WAVE position re: enumerated groups & their activities.
A. JURE. WAVE has no contact or interest this group and intends avoid any involvement. Group only peripherally active WAVE area.

② Report dtd 13 Dec 1963
From: London, England. # OEL-36,849, Leroy T. Wadsworth
Contains report dtd 29 Nov 1963 stating that JURE members met in Los Caracas, Venezuela from 21-23 Nov. 1963 & worked on plans to mount an insurrection in spring of 1964. In attendance were Manuel Ray, Raul Chibas, Rogelio Cisneros, Jose Gomez. #

0003625

Volume III
Deletions - 3 sealed envelopes of FBI documents.
No notes - See Manuel Ray Rivero file review.

Volume IV -
Deletions - sealed envelopes. Twelve envelopes FBI
Two envelopes State Dept
FBI - 卌 卌 || $500 worth of Time pencils State - || #

SECRET

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT

~~as redacted~~

Classification: SECRET

CLIFF Fenton

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Memo dtd 19 Sept 77 for FBI re LHO

Appended to memo – handwritten Russian lang. report by S. Uzlov.

a. Pavel G. – former Soviet fighter pilot

b. PG student Radio Tech Inst in Minsk knew English

c. LHO had lot of ambition – no ability reduced fr tech to laborer in radio factory app not of exception

d. MO would disclaim him – find another husband

e. PG asked "how would he earn lots of money" "I will kill the Pres." – considered joke by PG. "If I manage this, my wife will become rich."

f. PG had been corr. w/L+M after ret to US KGB [illegible]

MO id Pavel Golovachev
Minsk, Zakharov St. House 11 # 22
(poss # 72)

h – engr. career ended. – became an alcoholic.

i. Father was former colonel of commando

SU 11/19/49 Minsk ethnic Jew
Foreign lang + hist student – various jobs
Arr US Mar '77 – int by CIA Apr '77
Off to subm. written report – subs. rec'd via mail
Jan Zaprudnik, Belorussian Sr. Ed. for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, N.Y.
SU bona fides + rep. reliability not established

Classification: SECRET

11112313
Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET

Fenton

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

Report: Golovachev

PG was intro officially to LHO + told to cultivate him.

MO liked good clothes - Gen. liked social life

PG on KGB watch list - corr. w/ L+M

PG became a broken down alcoholic.

M also guilty - led LHO to monstrous crime

Compare fate:

MO - complete secure

Gen. dismissed

Mother + sister live far away fr PG (in Pulek

RFE-RL - Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty

30 East 42nd St. NY 10017 (212) 867-5200

Jan Zaprudnik, Belorussian Sr, Corr. NY Production Cent.

SU

1966-67 - Movie Oper. at theatre "MIR" - same time sales-man.

1967-68 - Concrete worker

1968-72 Student German Minsk State Pedagogical Inst. of foreign lang.

1972-74 Radio lab worker at Byelorussian State Univ. Same time student eve. courses historical faculty

1974-76 Photographer at Photo Center

* SU had a no. of friends who entered the KGB in Minsk.

* SU info Soviet interpreters travelling abroad + KGB officers in Minsk

Classification: SECRET

Classified by derivation:

Classification: SECRET

FENTON

(This form is to be used for material extracted from CIA—controlled documents.)

15-9

SU

CABLE FR [ROME] 3/77

SUBJ. AGGRESSIVE + OUTGOING
COULD NOT HOLD STEADY JOB + WAS
NOT PERSISTENT IN COLLEGE
FAVORITE PASTIME HANGING AROUND
"YUBILEYNAYA" HOTEL - CHILD OF
MINSK TOP SOCIETY + KGB OFFICERS
EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR INTELL. CAREER IN
NEW HOMELAND.

REFRAINED FROM GIVING SUBJ BIDFIELD AA

DOB = 1/19/49

201-948382

[PETER K (see KINGLAND)] KNEW SU IN GERMANY

1/90

Classification: SECRET

Classified by derivation:

Genzman
5-4-78

Russell August Langelle

SECRET

Robert Genzman and Harold Leap interviewed Russell August Langelle at CIA headquarters on May 4, 1978. The interview yielded the following information:

Langelle joined the CIA in September 1950, and worked mainly in SR9 of the Soviet Russia Division. In November 1955 he resigned from the Agency on the pretext that he was disgruntled with his assignments. His CIA files would have reflected this termination of employment. The only document to the contrary would have been a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allan Dulles, stating that Langelle would retain all rights and benefits when he returned to the CIA. (at present this document would probably be in his personnel file.)

1112574

Approximately fifteen people knew that Langelle was still with the CIA after his resignation in 1955. These included John Mawry (SE), Joe Bulik (SR 9), Quentin Johnson (Chief of Operations), George Kisevalper, Frank Levy, Ted Polling,

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

Jack Kindschi, June Sworbuck, Ed Galloway, Leonard McCoy (Reports and Requirements), Pierre de Silva (COS), and someone at the State Department's Office of Security.

At the time of his resignation, Langelle applied for employment with the State Department. In the interim he worked at the Hecht Company. In March 1956 he started to work at the State Department as a Security Officer. In September 1956 he was sent to Vienna, where he earned a reputation for being a strict Security Officer at the Embassy. He was deliberately tough on CIA personnel who breached security, in order to build his cover as a non-CIA foreign service officer. His salary was paid by the State Department. The CIA Chief of Station in Vienna and the Ambassador knew he was with the CIA.

Langelle served as the Security Officer at the Moscow Embassy from December 1957 to September 1959. In addition, he was the senior CIA officer there. The CIA contingent in Moscow consisted of five or six officers working inside the Embassy and approximately four outside. Inside, with deep cover, were George P. Winters (Econ. Officer), FNU Mahoney, FNU Venables, and Steve Washenko (Econ. or Agric. Officer). Outside were Jean Leberman (teacher at the American school) and three or four students, who handled orientation projects rather than operations projects.

Langelle handled CIA communications in Moscow. The CIA used State Department channels of communication, but could code messages by means of one-pad encrypting so that the message was secret until it was forwarded to CIA headquarters, where it was decoded.

In 1959 the Soviets declared Langelle persona non grata as a result of his involvement with P. S. Popov. Langelle was the case officer of Popov, who worked for the GRU, Soviet military intelligence. While making a contact with Popov, Langelle was detained by the KGB and was questioned for two and a half hours. The KGB attempted to recruit him, and then released him. The State

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

Department filed a formal protest, but Langelle was told to leave the Soviet Union within three days. He left the Soviet Union in early October 1959.

Langelle first became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald when he heard in a conversation that a Marine had contacted the American consular office in Moscow to renounce his citizenship. He later heard that this individual had changed his mind and was returning to the United States. He does not recall the details of these conversations, but he believes they took place in the United States.

Langelle characterized Oswald's defection as a consular case to be handled by consular officers, rather than an intelligence case involving intelligence officers, who were shorthanded in Moscow at that time. He stated that the few intelligence officers in Moscow at that time were involved in specific operations, and did not perform general intelligence functions. He also stated that intelligence officers at the Embassy did not use the consular officers for intelligence purposes, and that there were

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

no CIA people in the consular section.

Langelle stated that the military intelligence people at the Embassy probably would have been contacted about Oswald's defection. The military intelligence personnel included Leo Dulacki (Marines), Paul Adams (Navy), John Munson (Navy), and Ted Hoffman (Army). He did not know whether Alexis Davison (Navy) was an intelligence officer or whether Davison was involved in the Penkovsky case.

Langelle stated that when Oswald left the Soviet Union, he was the responsibility of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, and the FBI.

11112578

When Langelle left [redacted] Moscow in 1959, Winters was the senior CIA officer there. Mahoney and Leberman were still there, and Washenko may still have been there. Langelle's replacement as Embassy Security Officer was John Abidian, who was not with the CIA. Abidian was later replaced by Hugh Montgomery, who was Winter's successor as senior CIA officer.

SECRET

SECRET

Montgomery was later replaced by Paul Garbler, who became the first officially designated Chief of Station in Moscow. Other CIA officers in Moscow circa 1962 included Rodney Carlson, Bill Horbaly, and possibly John D. Hemenway.

At headquarters the chief of the Soviet Russia Division was John Maury, followed by Howard Osborne and then David E. Murphy.

With regard to American journalists in Moscow, Langelle had no contacts with R. G. Korengold or Aline Mosby, did not know A. I. Goldberg, and was contacted by Priscilla Johnson for an interview after he was declared persona non grata.

SECRET 11112579

When Langelle returned to the United States, he continued working for the State Department. He resumed his CIA duties on a part-time basis in 1961. He dealt with communications between Washington and Moscow. In September 1961 he resumed his CIA duties on a full-time basis at headquarters. He worked mainly in the Soviet Russia Division, External Operations, Africa and Europe. At present he is still with the CIA and still paid by the State Department, but he plans to retire soon.

SECRET

Langelle
~~L'Angeli~~ was born on October 7, 1922. His social security number is 495-18-8808. He is married, with three children.

Langelle
~~L'Angeli~~ [illegible] joined the CIA in September, 1950, and worked mainly in SR9 of the Soviet Russian Division. In November 1955 he resigned from the Agency on the pretext that he was disgruntled with his assignments. His CIA files would ~~would~~ ~~have~~ [illegible]
have reflected this ~~his~~ termination of employment. The only document to the contrary would have been a memorandum from the Director of Central Intelligence Allan Dulles, stating that Langelle ~~L'Angeli~~ would retain all rights and benefits when he returned to the CIA. (~~This document~~ at present this document would probably be in his personnel file.) Approximately fifteen people knew that he was still with the CIA after his resignation in 1955. These included John Maury (CSE), Joe Bulik (SR9), Quentin Johnson (Chief of Operations), George Kisevalter (sp), Frank Levy, Ted Polling, Jack Windschi, June Sworbuck, [illegible] Ed Galloway, Leonard McCoy (Reports and Requirements), [illegible] Pierre de Silva (COS), and [illegible] [illegible] someone at the State Department's Office of Security. SECRET 11112580

~~L'Ang~~ ~~After~~ at the time of his resignation Langelle ~~L'Angeli~~ applied for employment with the State Department.

1542 R

Langelle handled CIA communications in Moscow. The CIA used State Department channels of communication, but ~~code~~ could code messages by means of one-pad encrypting so that the message was secret until it was forwarded to CIA Headquarters for decoding.

deliberately tough on CIA personnel for security breaches in order to ~~[illegible]~~ build his cover as a non-CIA foreign service officer. His salary was paid by the State Department

SECRET

In the interim he worked at the Hecht Company. In March 1956 he ~~began~~ started to work at the State Department as a Security Officer. ~~His salary was paid by the~~ ~~He was sent to~~ ~~State Department~~ ~~Vienna in September 1956,~~. In September 1956 he was sent to Vienna, where he ~~developed~~ earned ~~the~~ a reputation ~~[illegible]~~ at the Embassy for being ~~He was~~ a strict Security Officer. The CIA Chief of Station ~~and the~~ in Vienna and the ambassador knew he was with the CIA. ~~He served as the Security~~

Par ~~[illegible]~~ ~~L'Angeli~~ Langelle served as the Security officer at the Moscow Embassy from December 1957 to September 1959. In addition, he was the senior CIA officer there, with five or six CIA officers working inside the Embassy and approximately four outside. ~~Inside were~~ Inside, with deep cover, were George P. Winters (Econ. Officer), Mahoney, Venables, and Steve Vashenko (Econ. or Agric. Officer). Outside were Jean Leberman (a teacher at the American school) and three or four students, who handled orientation projects rather than operations projects.

[insert]

In 1959 ~~[illegible]~~ the Soviets declared L'Angeli persona non grata as a result of ~~[illegible]~~ his involvement with P.S. Popov. L'Angeli ~~was~~ the case officer for Popov, who worked for the ~~Soviet~~ GRU, Soviet military intelligence. ~~L'Angeli~~ Langelle ~~had been contacting Popov~~ While

~~after~~ making a contact with Popov, Langelle was detained by the KGB and was questioned for two and a half hours. The KGB attempted to recruit him, and then released him. ~~and~~ The State Department filed a formal protest, but Langelle was forced to leave the Soviet Union within three days.

Langelle first became aware of Lee Harvey Oswald when he heard in a conversation that a ~~former~~ Marine had contacted the American consular office in Moscow to renounce his citizenship. He later heard that this individual had changed his mind and was returning to the United States. He does not recall the details of these conversations, but he believes they took place in the United States.

Langelle characterized Oswald's defection as a consular case to be handled by consular officers, rather than an intelligence case ~~which~~ involving intelligence officers, who were shorthanded in Moscow at that time. He stated that the few intelligence officers in Moscow at that time were involved in specific operations, and did not ~~handle~~ perform general intelligence functions.* He stated that Oswald, when he ~~returned~~

---

* He also stated that the intelligence officers at the Embassy did not use the consular officers for intelligence purposes.

and that there were no CIA ~~employees~~ people in the consular section.

SECRET

left the Soviet Union, was the responsibility of the State Department, the Immigration and Naturalization service, and the FBI.

When Langelle left Moscow in 1959, Winters was the senior CIA officer there. Mahoney and Leberman were still there, and Washenko may still have been there. Langelle's replacement as Embassy Security Officer was John Abidian, who was not with the CIA. Abidian was latered replaced by Hugh Montgomery, who was ~~replaced~~ Winter's ~~as the~~ successor ~~became the senior~~ as senior CIA officer. Montgomery was later replaced by Paul Garbler, who became the first officially designated Chief of Station in Moscow. Other CIA officers in Moscow circa 1962 included Rodney Carlson, Bill Harbley, and possibly John D. Hemingway.

~~Military intelligence personnel in Moscow included Paul Adams (Naval) Attache (Navy), Tad Hoffman (Army~~

At headquarters, the chief of the Soviet Russia Division was John Maury, followed by Howard Osborne and then David E. Murphy.

6

SECRET

When Songelle returned to the United States, he continued working for the State Department. He resumed his CIA duties on a parttime basis in 1961. He dealt with communications between Washington and Moscow. In September 1961 he resumed his CIA duties on a full-time basis at Headquarters. He worked mainly in the Soviet Russia Division, External Operations, Africa and Europe. ~~He is present~~ at present he is still with the CIA and is still paid by the State Department, but he plans to retire soon.

SECRET

1

Russell August ~~[illegible]~~ Langelle

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

10-7-22

495-18-8808

M 3 ch. (SR9) language, operational + mil. experience, relig., stabil.

CIA Sept. 50 SR Div. ~~so~~ word-disgruntled

Nov. 55 resigned from agency - Sec. Off-

↓ memo from director Vienna cover building COS knew (briefed orally) status + amb.

interim job at Hecht Co. all rights + benefits when returns (Dulles) Moscow - Dec. 57

Sept. 59

started State Mar ~~55~~56 15 knew (SR 9 - internal ops Hqs. component + couple of officers in Division people all buried not a station

Vienna Sept. 56 first COS Paul Garbler

SE John Maury
SR9 Joe Bulick
Ch. of Ops Quentin Johnson
~~George [illegible]~~ (sp.) Kisevalter
~~Jack Kinsely~~
Frank Levy
Ted Polling
Jack Kindschi
June Swarback
Ed Galloway

11112586

Reports + Requirements
Leonard McCoy
COS Pierre de Silva

DOS - Office of Security
~~[illegible]~~ Otepka not aware

Moscow - 5 to 6 officers inside
4 outside

SECRET

Langelle
~~[illegible]~~

2

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

George P.
inside — Winters, Mahoney, Venables
Steve Washenko (Econ. Officer)
outside — Jean Leberman - teacher
3 or 4 students - orientation
rather than operations

left in 59 — John Abidian (State Sec. Officer
took over State
responsibilities)

Abidian replaced by Hugh Montgomery (integrated) senior officer

- sort of senior
CIA George P. Winters - Econ. Off.
agric. Off.
Washenko - maybe still there
Mahoney & Leberman

PNG - agency operation
~~[illegible]~~ penetration on GRU - mil. intell.
Pytor S. Popov agent
Lt was case off.
case compromised
got approval from Khrush.
to kidnap - as stepped off a bus
tried to recruit
released after 2½ hrs.
said they would get in touch
State protested
PNG

11112587

Back to US - worked for State Jan 60
handled State Dept duties
& agency functions
communications to Mos
Resumed CIA partime '61, Sept. 61 HQ at full time basis.

SECRET

Sangelle
~~L'Angele~~

3

Genzman
5-4-78

SECRET

(Penkovsky)
cut-out-Brit. wife
SR9 Sept. 61 - 62

[redacted]

moved back to CIA
on full-time basis Sept. 61
(Dec. 58 - Sept. 59)

Mahony GSA officer
Communicat. - Mos. to HQ
SR9 Jack Maury

Winters remained

LHO,
in conversation a consular officer said Marine
renounced citizenship

walk-ins
consular off. would bring it to your attention

George Kieswalper - in Berlin, handled Popov while
in E. Berlin + Vienna.
- handled Penkosky.
- maybe Nosenko.

11112588

Used State communication
one pad encrypting

SECRET

Sangelle
~~L'Angeli~~

4

SECRET

Genzman
5-4-78

no [redacted] CIA people in consular section

mil. intell. Paul Adams Nav.
Ted Hoffman Arm
Munson ~~Mundsey~~ Nav.
Dulacki Mar.
would have been contacted

Kokengold - no contacts
Johnson - asked for interview after his PNG
Mosby - no contacts
Goldberg - didn't know

Davison - doesn't know if agency
not involved in Penk. to his knowledge

dip. personnel could not be used for intel. without
prior approval from State.

Provocations
Hairmotone
~~Har~~

11112589

Naval aviator
Atsugi - 53-55

SECRET

Langelle
L'Angeli

5

SECRET

Penzman
5-4-78

62 Hugh Montgomery (senior)
John D. Hemingway (?)
Paul Garbler (COS; replaced Montgomery)
Rodney Carlson
Bill Harbley

No common source register with mil. + Moscow

63 - SR, Chief of External Ops.
Africa + Eur.
Still paid by State (FSR 4 in Moscow
GS 13 - Moscow)

David E. Murphy - Chief of SR Div. 64-65
COS in Berlin during
Popov operation while
L'A in Moscow

then Maury
followed by Howard Osborne
" " Murphy

SECRET

5

SECRET

☆

He believed that the military intelligence people at the Embassy would have been contacted about Oswald's defection. The military intelligence personnel included ~~Paul Hoffman~~ ~~Adams~~ ~~(Navy)~~; Dulacki (Marines); Paul Adams (Navy); Munson (Navy) and Ted Hoffman (Army). Langelle did not know ~~of~~ whether Alexis Davison (Navy) was an intelligence officers of whether he was involved in the Penkovsky case. ~~or whether~~ ~~Davison~~

With regard to American journalists in Moscow, Langelle had no contacts with R. G. Korengold or Aline Mosby, did not know A. I. Goldberg, and was contacted by Priscilla Johnson ~~after his expulsion~~ for an interview after he was declared persona non grata.

SECRET

SECRET

Winters
rec. 61 Eugene Mahoney - Rt. 1 Berkeley Springs, W.Va
30-61 - 11 64 Garbler - Vienna 1503 Irving Hill Ct. 22180
(Osborne - McLean
17 Feb. 62 - 20 Ap. 63 Montgomery -
356-4650
first COS
2 Jun 62 - 14 Dec. 62 Rodney Carlson

11 Jul 63, 31 Aug 65 Edward Gotchef HQ
annual leave til May 22

11 Jan 63, 18 Jan. 66 Jerry Prehn HQ 2 p.m. May 12

C/SR John Maury
1 Dec 54 - 29 Jul. 62 3704 Farr Ave,
Fairfax

Howard J. Osborne
30 Jul 62 15 Sept. 63 Atty. John Debelius
948-6727

David C. Murphy
1537 Forest
16 Sept 63 - 10 Mar 68 Villa Lane, McLean
356-9523

SECRET

Box 53
Folder 7

Background

SECRET

0002173

In April 1976, the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities (SSC) published their Final Report (Book V) which in essence faulted the CIA ~~and to some ext~~ for its errors of omission in not informing the Warren Commission of the Agency's ongoing plots against the revolutionary government in Cuba and its [illegible] attempts on the life of ~~its~~ the premier, Fidel Castro. The Committee's rationale is [illegible] detailed on pages 6-7 of its Findings but one paragraph succinctly sums up their position.

P7 Book V

"Senior CIA officials also should have realized ~~that~~ their agency was not utilizing its full capability to investigate Oswald's pro-Castro and anti-Castro connections. They should have realized ~~that~~ CIA operations against Cuba, particularly operations involving the assassination of Castro, needed to be considered in the investigation. Yet, they directed their subordinates to conduct an investigation without telling them of these vital facts. These officials, whom the Warren Commission relied upon for expertise, ~~advised~~ the Warren Commission that the CIA had no

SECRET

THIS COPY IS NOT FOR RELEASE.

10145-446 1044

existence of a foreign conspiracy?

Stung by the Senate criticism and the "rippling effect" that Book V ~~has~~ occasioned in the media, the CIA prepared a comprehensive report in 1977 designed to answer at least within the Agency, the critical questions posited in the SSC Final Report. However, even the CIA's 1977 Report tacitly recognizes the inadequacy of the CIA's narrow response to the Warren Commission's quest for all possibly relevant information. ["Relevancy" is of course, the "buzzword" upon which both the Senate and Agency each base their position on the importance of the anti-Castro plots to the Commission's work.] On page 10 of the Agency's Conclusions, the 1977 Report acknowledges that: "

"While one can understand today why the Warren Commission limited its inquiry to normal avenues of investigation, it would have served to reinforce the credibility of its effort had it taken a broader view of the matter. CIA, too could have considered in specific terms what most saw in general terms -- the possibility of Soviet or Cuban involvement in the assassination (JFK) because of tensions of the time. ..... The Agency should have

p 10
1977 ~~[illegible]~~
Report

taken broader initiatives, ~~then~~, as well."

It is not the purpose of this analysis to detail ~~and~~ the conflicting viewpoints of the SSC and CIA with regard to the significance of the CIA's Castro assassination attempts to the work of the Warren commission and to resolve ~~their~~ the parties controversy as to ~~their~~ the operations importance. ~~Rather,~~ Instead this paper seeks to present a comprehensive review of all ~~the~~ facts, drawn from a variety of sources, of organized crime's involvement or potential involvement in CIA operations against Cuba during 1960-63. Certain inferences and conclusions ~~are~~ will then be drawn upon the nature, scope, and motivations ~~of the operations~~ of the syndicate participants in the operations.

Involvement of Organized Crime in CIA Plots to Assassinate Fidel Castro

SECRET

The genesis of the ~~use~~ utilization of the United States criminal syndicate by the CIA to attempt to assassinate Castro is placed by the 1967 Inspector General's Report as occurring during a conversation between the Deputy Director of Plans, ~~[illegible]~~ Richard Bissell, and the Director of the Office of Security, Colonel Sheffield Edwards.+ [1967 IG Rpt. p. ; Interim Rpt p 74; see note 1.] Edwards assigned the specific task of locating the right party to "eliminate" or assassinate Castro, to James "Big Jim" O'Connell, who was the Chief of the Operational Support Division of the Office of Security. Both men agreed that Robert A. Maheu+ who ~~he~~ had been previously utilized by the Agency in several sensitive covert operations, would be contacted to recruit the necessary personnel.

+[Maheu's CIA history and relationship to O'Connell are detailed on pp 74-75, Interim Report]

Although Maheu and O'Connell differ as to who initially brought up John Rosselli's name for consideration there was a meeting between Maheu and Rosselli at the Brown Derby Restaurant in Los Angeles in early September 1960 [Interim Report p 75]

SECRET

[Comment: Maheu seems the

SECRET

logical person to have thought of and contacted Rosselli for several reasons. In an Office of Security file on Ed Morgan, Maheu's attorney, there is a memo to the DCI dated 19 November 1970 which reviews the mafia operation. Paragraph 5 states that", Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one John Rosselli on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually through other clients, but was given to understand that he was a 'high ranking member of the syndicate' and controlled all the ice making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Rosselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests."

quotes?

0002182

[Comment

Confirmation of ~~our~~ the earliest Maheu-Rosselli contact is found in Rosselli's FBI file and consists of an alleged telephone call in 1959 from Maheu to Rosselli. [See Rosselli write-up]

[Comment

Maheu and Rosselli had mutual contacts in Las Vegas prior to 1960, including Hank Greenspun, editor of the Las Vegas Sun.]

date?

SECRET

SECRET

0002183

Roselli, although apparently skeptical at first, agreed to a meeting in New York City with Maheu and O'Connell to discuss further details

[[illegible] Report p.76; Office of Security memo from Morgan file, dated 19 Nov. 1970]

Although the Inspector General's Report places the meeting at the Plaza Hotel on 14 Septem 1960, Roselli recalled that the [illegible] discussions took place during Castro's visit to the United Nations which began on September 18, 1960.

Comment

Tony de Varona admits going to NY c at the time of Castro's visit, but it is unlikely that he was in contact with Roselli at this time or [Testimony of de Varona, that his visit had an assassination motivation]

p.3 ?

According to a 19 Nov. 1970 memo to the DCI, it was at this September meeting in New York City, that Roselli "agreed to introduce him (Maheu) to a friend, "Sam Gold", who knew the Cuban crowd".

Comment:

The timing of the introduction of both Gian[illegible]cana ("Gold") and Trafficante ("Joe") is [illegible] important to the analysis of the "true" role of the mob in the Castro assassination plots. According

?? to the 1967 I.G. Report, the ~~[illegible]~~ introduction of Giancana took place “ during the week of 25 September 1960”.... [1967 I.G. Report, p18.]

In contrast, the SSC Interim Report at p.76, does not ~~[illegible]~~ fix a date certain ~~the~~ for Giancana's initial appearance ~~but as~~ (although it was ~~[illegible]~~ "certainly prior to October 18." (p76)) because of conflicting ~~testimony~~ evidence between the 1967 I.G. September date and Maheu's Senate testimony which set the introduction in ~~at~~ November 1960. As a compromise, the Interim Report reasoned that Giancana had been introduced to ~~the~~ Maheu "prior to October 18" because (1) the Las Vegas wiretap occurred on October 30, 1960, and (2) ~~the~~ DDP Bissell had received an FBI memo dated 18 October 1960 which revealed an FBI ELSUR quoting Giancana as discussing his involvement in an assassination plot against Castro ” [FBI memo, dated 18 Oct 1960 from Hoover to Bissell; Interim Report, p 79]

& ??

0002184

[Comment:
Each ~~The~~ dual reasons listed in the Interim Report on p 77 are subject to critical analysis which will be dealt with separately ~~in the~~ below.]

[Comment:
Although the 1967 I.G. Report stated

that " Maheu pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met ~~either~~ "Gold" or Joe", the Interim Report disputes this observation by apparently quoting from O'Connell's ~~Senate~~ testimony and stating ~~that~~ " The Support chief, who was using the name "Jim Olds," said he had met "Sam" and Joe, once, and then only briefly [O.C. 5/30/75, pp 26-29; Interim Rept p 7

~~Comment~~ Comment

Conflicts appear also on ~~a variety~~ several ~~of~~ relatively minor points surrounding the September 1960 meetings in N.Y.C. and Miami. For instance:

1) Did Rosselli know from the beginning that ~~Maheu~~ the operation was CIA?

a) O'Connell stated that Maheu told Rosselli that they were representing international business interests whereas Rosselli testified that Maheu told him that O'Connell was CIA [Interim Rept p 76. Also, footnote 1 on p. 76 indicates that Rosselli told O'Connell: " about 3 weeks after the New York meeting", which is during the Miami involvement of Giancana, that " I am not kidding, I know who you work for".

The importance of Rosselli's recognition of CIA ~~was~~ situation is that it is doubtful if Giancana and Trafficante

SECRET

could have been enlisted unless they could be sure of government protection. this theme will be developed more fully below.

(2) Roselli told his Cuban contacts that he was an "agent of some business interests of Wall Street ~~that~~ had.. _nickel_ interests and properties around Cuba... (Roselli; 6/24/75 pp 9,17)

Cf. Jack Anderson column of Jan. 19, 1971, which stated that: ? (4.) "Could the plot against Castro have backfired against President Kennedy? ..... None of the assassination teams, however, had direct knowledge of the CIA involvement. The CIA instigators had represented themselves as _oilmen_ seeking revenge against Castro for his seizure of oil holdings."

If Anderson's sources for this article were Roselli and ~~[illegible]~~ William Harvey, who was not privy to the details of Phase I, it is another example of serious discrepancies which exist between the CIA, Senate, and Anderson versions which all purport to depend, in varying degrees, upon Roselli.

3) The alleged ~~discovery~~ "surprise discovery" by Maheu and O'Connell as to the ~~true~~ identities of "Sam Gold" and "Joe" is really suspect. First, ~~alt~~ although it is

possible that the Senate Committee Staff overlooked the specific Miami newspaper Sunday supplement (Parade) which purportedly included pictures of Giancana and Trafficante, thus ~~[illegible] [illegible]~~ graphically showing Maheu and O'Connell ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ the nature of the people with whom they were dealing, it is a relatively easy matter to research Parade magazine for the months of October and November. It would appear that ~~they~~ O'Connell and Maheu were looking for an ~~ex~~ post facto reason for continuing the operation after the introduction of two of the top Mafiosi in the United States. O'Connell testified that his discovery was after "we were up to our ears in it" which is difficult to fathom since the operation was in the embryonic stage and no pills were delivered to Roselli et al until approximately March 1961. ? Whatever the reason, the Senate staff insists it could not find the Parade article. In Senate Report P77, Ft 1

The principals in Phase I of the operation ~~[illegible]~~ also disagree as to the roles which were to be played by both "Gold" and "Joe" in ~~Phase~~ the pre-Bay of Pigs phase of the operation.

"Although Maheu described Giancana as playing a "key" role, 0002189 (Maheu, 7/29/75, p.34) and discussed his job as "to locate someone in Castro's entourage who could accomplish the assassination", Roselli downplayed Giancana's part to that of a "back-up" man (Roselli 6/24/75, p.15) ~~All of the circumstantial also~~ [Whether Roselli received a "message" from Giancana's murder four days before Roselli's Senate appearance is open for question. J. Roselli's Senate characterization of Giancana's role as minor is in contrast to his alleged recruitment of ~~description of~~ Giancana due to his "knowledge of the Cuban world" as the 19 Nov. 1970 memo recorded.

Trafficante(s) involvement in Phase I is even more puzzled by the available evidence. The 1967 I.G. Report and Senate Interim Report ~~says~~ states that "'Sam' identified 'Joe' to Maheu as a man who would serve as a courier to Cuba and make arrangements there" (I.G. Report p.19; Interim Report, p.77). To support the description of Trafficante as a "courier," the ~~1967 I.G. Report~~ Interim Report quotes p.19 of the 1967 I.G. Report in stating that, "At that time, the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba and Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami and Havana on syndicate business."

SECRET

0002190 Comment

This factually unsupported assertion runs contrary to the evidence available through official government records of other agencies. As an example, State Department files reflect that Trafficante applied for a passport in Cuba on October ?, 1959 and received that document in Havana on February ?, 1960. (See Trafficante File, State Dept). ~~From this record~~ No records available to the Committee from INS, State Department or FBI record any later 1960 travels even though the Bureau ~~and [illegible]~~ maintained decent surveillance on Trafficante during the period. In his Committee testimony, Trafficante recalled ~~maintained~~ that he made two trips to Cuba after his release from prison in August 1959 and placed these sojourns within two or three months after his release from prison. (Testimony, pp 4-5-3, ~~Oct~~ , 1978) His testimony has some logical credibility in that all of the casinos in Havana were either closed or operating in the red by mid-1960, all law enforcement reports placed him in the Tampa-Miami area consistently ~~in this~~ during the pre-Bay of Pigs period.)

By the time of the Senate testimony of Rosselli, however, Trafficante's role had diminished to a point

SECRET

SECRET

00021[illegible]1

even below Giancana; he had been reduced from "courier" to a mere "translator" and was needed only to facilitate conversation between Rosselli and the Cubans who had been recruited for the actual assassination. Internally, Trafficante and Rosselli 1975 and 1977 Congressional appearances dovetail well but remain in contradiction to the ~~[illegible]~~ facts as they were being reported in 1963 of the principals.

[Comment: The Senate testimony of Rosselli and Trafficante needs to be outlined ~~[illegible] to~~ with a view to contrasting ~~the~~ "courier vs interpreter" role. My memory is that the Senate did not vigorously cross examine either man on this discrepancy nor did ~~they~~ the Interim Report "hint" at the problem.]

Once the actors had been assembled for the launching of the enterprise, a discussion began as to the method ~~of~~ to be employed to accomplish the goal. The Agency took the simplistic, straight forward approach of shooting Castro but this plan was rejected

SECRET

by Giancana. In a Comment to its 1967 Report, the Inspector General noted that "Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival and escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink... Trafficante (Joe; the courier) was ~~[illegible]~~ in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man inside as Juan Orta, who was then office chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister Castro. The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests but had since lost that source of income and needed the money." [I.G. Report, p 25]

Comment

The observations quoted above of the 1967 I.G. Report ~~has~~ are ~~[illegible]~~ extremely significant in several respects. First, the poison pill ~~of~~ [illegible] proposal originated with Giancana, not the Agency; a point

0002193 which is crucial to the final conclusions presented below.

Secondly, ~~Trafficante~~ is identified as ~~providing~~ having access to and providing the putative assassin in Cuba which is inconsistent with his "self-serving" role description of "interpreter." His ability to recruit Orta apparently ~~as~~ was directly tied to his ~~of~~ former gambling empire associations which formed a constant pattern

for all his illegality of conduct ~~for Trafficante~~ both during and after his Cuban days. [See Trafficante profile.]

Comment

Speculation concerning Orta's role arose during the ~~a~~ Agency's 1977 Report when it was forced to address a problem raised by an April 23, 1975 article, concerning Frank Sturgis, written by Paul Meskill of the New York Daily News. Sturgis was quoted as saying, "The third (assassination) scheme involved planting a bomb in Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office," Sturgis said, "I knew Fidel's private secretary, Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy." (American Embassy in Havana)

What was disturbing to the

writers of the 1977 Report was the fact that Orta's name had surfaced in connection with a Castro assassination plot, before revelation of the CIA-Mafia connection by the Senate Intelligence Committee. The Report references news stories linking Sturgis with Trafficante and with a "gambling partner" of Trafficante's, Norman Rothman (see Rothman Profile). Coupled with Sturgis' alleged mob relationships, is the allegation that Sturgis "had a role in infiltrating the gambling casinos in Cuba on behalf of the Castro government and could have developed an contact with Orta in running gambling kickbacks."

A second aspect of Miskil's news series concerned a claim by Marita Lorenz that she had acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 in attempting to poison Castro. which dovetailed with the 18 October 1960 FBI memorandum on Giancana's electronically surveilled conversation in which he stated that "the assassination had been arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro's." (Memo, Hoover to DCI, Att. DDP. 10/18/60.

0002195

The tentative conclusions advanced in the 1977 Report are as follows:

[illegible] "It is obvious that many lines of speculation can be developed, not the least of which is that the Agency did not know the full extent of syndicate activities..."

Additional considerations:

1. Criminal syndicate may well have had some independent activities of its own underway prior to CIA involvement in late 1960. Also, could have been ongoing when CIA undertook plan in 1962 but ??

2. Syndicate operations could have had actions such as those in New York Daily News stories in 1975 and 1976.

3. Frank Sturgis seems to have had contacts with but not a member of syndicate. Could well have been used by the syndicate.

4. Sturgis has not been a reliable source. He probably knew Orta in Cuba but he was outside Cuba when Orta assumed role of assassin.

If there was an earlier operation w/ Orta, it was not CIA's; could have been earlier operation of syndicate.

Sturgis could have known or been involved in syndicate operation, or picked up gossip from him in 1965 after Orta settled there.

000002197 SECRET

Neither the 1967 I.G. Report or the SSC Interim Report can pinpoint the precise date on which the Agency passed the poison pills which O'Connell delivered to Rosselli [Interim Report, p80]. The chain of custody, according to the 1967 I.G. Report ~~then~~ was for the lethal pills ~~to~~ to be delivered from Rosselli to Trafficante. Although the next intervening steps remain a mystery, Rosselli reported to O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba in late February - early March 1961 [Interim Rpt. p 27; Interim Rpt p 80

Comment:

The Senate Interim Report reported the version of Joe Shimon ~~whose~~ ~~[illegible]~~ whose memory was that the money and pills for the operation were delivered at a meeting at the Fountainbleau Hotel on March 12, 1961 attended by "Maheu, Rosselli, Trafficante, and the Cuban". [Interim Rpt p81] Shimon's ~~memory~~ ~~[illegible]~~ story is filled with vivid ~~[illegible]~~ details which are documented on p 82 of the Report, but his credibility is subject to serious question as this account is not shared by anyone else connected with the plan ~~and~~ nor is his relationship with

SECRET

0002198 Roselli, Giancana, or Trafficante appear as "cozy" as he would lead one to believe.

It is also apparent that Shimon was a source for Jack Anderson's column of January 19, 1971 which fixed the date of the passage of the poison at the Fountainebleau by Roselli as March 13, 1961" and contained the report that Castro became ill a few ~~days~~ weeks later.

The real problem with Shimon's story is ~~that~~ the pills were returned to the CIA for a few weeks because Orta could or would not attempt the poisoning, a fact apparently unknown to Shimon before his "leaks" to Anderson and his Senate testimony.]

Comment

One additional fact concerning Orta's inability to carry out the mission ties in with the final thesis of this report. Orta "lost his position in Castro's office on 26 January 1961, while ~~the~~ planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and Washington."

It would seem though, that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lost his access to Castro [IG 1967 IG Report p. 27]

With the failure of Orta to produce the desired results, the project was at a standstill until, once again, Santo Trafficante assumed command. Rosselli [illegible] that "Trafficante believed a certain leading figure in the Cuban exile movement ~~[illegible]~~ might be able to accomplish the assassination [~~Fol~~ 1967 IG Rpt, p 29; Interim Rpt p80.

Comment:

The exile leader was, of course Tony de Varona, ~~[illegible]~~ who was the subject of speculation in an FBI memorandum of 18 January 1961 crediting him with receiving financial aid from American gangsters for anti-Castro activities which [illegible] the CIA operation.

At the time of his introduction ~~[illegible]~~ into the CIA mob plots, deVarona was already being funded by the Agency through the Revolutionary Front and was heavily involved in CIA planning for the Bay of Pigs invasion which was imminent.

In fact de Varona was also being ~~[illegible]~~ in 1960-61 by Mike McLaney whose advertising agency was ~~[illegible]~~ engaged in promoting Varona's image in collaboration with McLaney's friend

000220 "Chirri" or "Chilo" Mendoza (Mendoza is described in Trafficante's FBI files as a close Cuban associate]

Completing the picture of support for Varona is the promotional efforts of the Dino and Eddie Cellini, Mickey and Lansky business associates, who were reportedly working through a Washington D.C. public relations firm, Edward K Moss and Associates. Moss had previous CIA associations and was supposedly acting as a conduit for funds supplied by the Cellini benefactors with ~~the~~ understanding that their group would have "privileged treatment" in the Cuba of the Future". Attempts to verify ~~these~~ reports were unsuccessful" [1967 IG Report P.30]

The Lansky influence using the Cellini brothers as a "front" is particularly interesting in light of Varona's admission that Jorge Pujol arranged a meeting in Miami in ~~[illegible]~~ approximately 1960 wherein Meyer Lansky offered to financially "back" Varona's efforts ~~to~~ ~~[illegible]~~ "educate" the American people about Castro, which may be a euphemism for anti-Castro plots. [See Varona transcript

??

The logical inference to be drawn is that both the Agency ~~and~~ organized crime, and other persons interested in removing the Castro regime had settled upon de Varona, possibly independently, as an individual who had the potential of uniting the ~~vast~~ multitude of exile groups who were in a continual internecine turmoil. de Varona was understandably pleased to permit ~~both~~ the U.S. government and criminal syndicates ~~to~~ offer him support and asked no questions as to the source of the funds or the motives of his benefactors [see Varona testimony —]

Although de Varona ~~has~~ no specific memory of meeting Trafficante, the Tampa crime boss admits that he acted as an "interpreter" in several meetings attended by de Varona, Roselli, Giancana, and other exiles. These meetings were arranged by Rafael "Macho" Gener, a Trafficante gambling partner from Havana who continued to serve Trafficante in Miami during the 1960s. Trafficante claimed that Roselli had primary recruited Gener but this appears unlikely in view of Trafficante's long-standing relationship with Gener in Cuba. and Roselli's admission to

O'Connell that ~~[illegible]~~ Trafficante would provide the replacement for the ill-fated Juan Orta who had escaped to the Venezuelan Embassy in April 1961.

Comment: ~~Parallelly~~ Parallelling the situation at the Senate hearings July 1975 when Roselli's description of Trafficante's role ~~changes~~ changed from ~~the it~~ his "courier" characterization ~~statement~~ in 1960-61 as reported by the Agency to conform to Trafficante's "interpreter" statement, is the recent interview with Gener who agrees with the Trafficante's ~~Committee~~ testimony that he was an intermediary ~~only~~ with de Varona for Roselli. ~~In~~ The net result in both instances ~~is~~ is to minimize Trafficante's exposure. (~~See~~ Cf. Fonzi interview with Gener, May? 1978 and Trafficante testimony, Oct? 1977]

~~However, the meetings with Varona came to pass,~~ the

If ~~Confusion~~ ambiguity exists as to the specifics of the introduction of de Varona into ~~place~~ one of the Castro assassination plots, more ~~clear~~ ~~ambiguity~~ confusion surrounds de Varona's ~~pre~~ actual participation prior to the Bay of Pigs invasion. The IG Report indicates that de Varona ~~attempted~~ a second poison mission before the ~~Cuban~~ invasion ~~that~~ Roselli was positive that only one attempt, (Orta's) was made. He was also positive that he 0002203 delivered both pills, money and supplies to de Varona which is corroborated by O'Connell ~~[illegible]~~ during 1961. The conflict is resolved by the Senate in speculating "that only one pre-Bay of Pigs attempt was made, and that ... [de Varona] was the contact in the United States who arranged for ... [Orta] ... to administer the poison."

Comment

There appears to be no further way to resolve de Varona's initial contribution to the poison attempts especially since Varona denies ever having received poison pills from Rosselli or being involved in any attempt on Castro's life at any time [See Varona transcript]

Comment

The Agency was aware of the possible dangers inherent in having de Varona participate in the mob's plots while ~~a~~ continuing his part on the Revolutionary Council. However, "Steps were taken to end his participation in the syndicate's plan but [they] were apparently ineffective." [1967 I.G. Report, p 32]

0002204 SECRET

Phase II

The debacle which marked the mid-April 1961 Bay of Pigs effort, curtailed CIA efforts with the mob to assassinate Castro, but it was not until, April 1962, when Bill Harvey assumed Agency responsibility for the task, were efforts made to re-establish contact with Roselli.

However, the fact that the Agency was squeamish during the Bay of Pigs aftermath to continue to try to kill Castro, does not mean that the mob shared their shyness. Indeed, both ~~Harvey~~ and O'Connell swore that Harvey "took over a going operation." [I.G. Rept p 33] The exact details of what that operation might have been ~~cannot be discovered~~ has not been uncovered, but Roselli's ability to regenerate his forces ~~was~~ in response to Harvey's contact in April 1962 was immediate. Once again the ubiquitous de Varona ~~was~~ was to provide the ~~[illegible]~~ individuals who would carry the lethal poison into Cuba.

However, there were some significant ~~important~~ differences between Phase One and Phase Two of the operation which bear upon the ultimate question of the mob's motivation and seriousness in carrying out their part of the bargain struck in 1960 with the Agency.

First. In Phase One, Rosselli et al had demonstrated their ability to execute the contract on Castro by naming their source who was, in fact, in a position close to Castro to succeed. In contrast, the details of the modus operandi and the ability of the ~~[illegible]~~ putative assassins was deliberately vague. After ~~when~~ Harvey initially met Rosselli in Miami in April 1962, Harvey reported that "the manner in which the lethal material was to be introduced ~~to~~ into Castro's food [which involved] an asset of Varona's who had access to someone in a restaurant frequented by Castro." L19417 FR/4 p4 By June 1962 after ~~the~~ Varona had received money and munitions from the JMWAVE station and had presumably sent the pills ~~into~~ Cuba, ~~the~~ "Rosselli reported to Harvey on 21 June that Varona had dispatched a team of three men to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Harvey said that they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make the attempt -- perhaps using the pills. Harvey never learned work for Pearson and did learn that Anderson had more than a passing acquaintance with Morgan. - Morgan also tight with Pat Coyne of NSC their names or anything about them" [1967 IG. Report p51]

Comment

As the 1967 IG authors correctly observed, Harvey's tale of the "favorite restaurant" poisoning opportunity ~~with the same plan that" Edwards~~ was familiar in "that Edwards had decided pursue the same plan". the fact that Varona related the exact modus operandi to Harvey as he had discussed with Edwards in Phase One (circa 1960-mid 1961) leads to the possibilities that:

(1) Harvey was correct in assuming that he was taking over an ongoing operation in April 1962 or

(2) the mob had been using de Varona before, during, and after the Bay of Pigs and permitted the CIA to provide logistical support and future protection against the Justice Department; or

(3) de Varona was simply making up a story for the Agency to gain their financial backing or in response to directives from organized crime

Second

the cast of underworld

characters changed. Harvey had insisted that Maheu and Giancana be dropped from the operation which Rosselli readily acceded to. Trafficante's "interpreter" role was assumed by "Maceo", a mysterious "Cuban who spoke Italian" and who sometimes used the names [illegible] and Godoy.

Comment

"Maceo's" introduction into one of the most sensitive CIA covert actions in history without any attempt ~~to~~ made by the Agency to check his background or to ascertain his identity is extraordinary. Yet, the Agency apparently went blithely "to bed" ~~to~~ ~~two~~ with ~~two~~ prominent of the top hoodlums in the United States without doing any basic background security investigation.

Although the 1967 I.G. Report characterizes Maceo as "Rosselli's man," it is probable that this individual was ~~[illegible]~~ drafted by Trafficante who had provided all the Cuban personnel previously used in the attempts and who still possessed, in 1962, the most complete network of Cuban allies in Miami and Cuba.

SECRET

0002208

? The termination of the CIA-mafia was plots slow and undramatic. Rosselli, in May 1962, reported to Harvey ~~that~~ the pills and guns which had been delivered to Varona in Miami in April had arrived in Cuba, and an unidentified three-man team had been dispatched in June to execute the plan [Interim Report p84]

? During September 1962, ~~one~~ Rosselli related to Harvey that de Varona ~~was~~ readying a second three-man team who were "supposedly militia men whose assignment was to penetrate Castro's body guard. During this period the 'medicine' was reported as still in place and the three men of the first team safe [1967 I.G. Report, p51] However, the second team never made Cuba and a series of alibis were constructed during December and Jany 1963. Nevertheless, de Varona supposedly collected $2700 for the maintenance of these individuals from Rosselli who had received the payment from Harvey. [1967 I.G. Report p52]

In mid-Jany 1963 both Harvey and Rosselli agreed that "nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future" [1967 I.G. Rept p52 Rosselli was instructed to ease his way out of touch with Varona which he presumably did. The last meeting between Harvey

SECRET

and Rosselli occurred in Washington D.C. in June 1963. when he was Harvey's ~~guest~~ ~~fo~~ overnight guest. However their meeting ostensibly was not directly related to any assassination plots.

CONCLUSION

SECRET

The available evidence suggests ~~that organized crime~~ the thesis which, in part, is tacitly assumed by the Agency in its 1977 internal Inspector General's Report wherein it states that, "It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had under way. ... In a ~~sense~~ sense, CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate, and, in addition to its material contributions, was also supplying an aura of official sanction." [1977 IG Rpt p 208] ?

The relevant evidence is as follows

1. FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 re Giancana ELSUR:

"... Giancana reportedly assured those present ~~that~~ Castro's assassination would occur in November. Moreover, he allegedly indicated that he had already met with the assassin-to-be on three occasions ... Giancana claimed that everything has been perfected for the killing of Castro, and that the assassin had arranged with a girl, not further described, to drop a 'pill' in some drink or food of Castro." [1977 IG Rpt p 19]

Comment

SECRET

Although the dates of the reported meetings between Maheu, Roselli, and Giancana are subject to different interpretation, it is clear that no plans were formalized between the parties ~~by~~ until sometime after October 18, 19 the date of the FBI's intercepted conversation of Giancana.

The poison pills, prepared by the CIA at Giancana's request, were not ready for delivery until late February-early March 1961, so that it is difficult to see how Giancana's November 1960 assassination plot could be a part of the CIA operation. Rather, it appears that the mob had its poison plan in progress, using a mistress of Castro's to accomplish the deed, when the CIA fortuitously happened along to offer its support. The mob was then in a perfect position. If their ~~[illegible]~~ private plot actually worked and Castro died, then the Syndicate had enormous blackmail potential against ~~the~~ CIA which it could exercise at the opportune moment. However, if their ~~plot~~ intrigue back-fired, then their position ~~is~~ would be that ~~they~~ were only attempting to execute the wishes of their Government.

Additional Comment

The actions of Giancana's "hired hand", Richard Cain ~~[illegible]~~ ~~not to~~ raise some interesting possibilities. Given Cain's admission

SECRET

0002212

to the FBI that he had ~~been~~ joined the Chicago Police Department and Sheriff's office while on Giancana's payroll. Cain's approach to ~~[illegible]~~ the CIA Chicago office in the fall of 1960 to volunteer ~~his services~~ information on the Cuban community ~~is~~ appears a little more than ~~significant~~ coincidental. Then when FBI files disclose that he is planning to go to Cuba for Life magazine (~~and~~ one story), and to "bug" influential Cubans in Havana ostensibly for ex-President Prio (second story) the coincidence becomes more suspect. The suspicion is that Cain was being sent by Giancana to supervise the poisoning attempt on Fidel Castro. Cain could be the "a man to be" whom Giancana referred to in the FBI memo of ~~[illegible]~~ Oct 18, 1960 or he could be the contact man for the operation.

[Tie in memo on Cain with Salerno's view which is ~~so~~ strongly supported by the evidence, that Cain was the "missing second man" in the Las Vegas wiretap of Oct 30, 1960. Maheu needs to be questioned on this point]

Cain continued to "volunteer" information and assistance to the CIA during 1961-1963. In August 1963, he offered information on the DRE Student Directory in Chicago to that office of the Agency. In writing, [illegible]

SECRET

0002213

was the former head of the Directorio in Cuba where he was a major power in deposing Batista.

In September 1963, Cain reported to the Chicago office of the CIA that DRE was in a deal to purchase a large arms shipment. He was told by the Agency to "get out of the picture" ~~which~~ a directive which is subject to several interpretations including the fact that the CIA was a witting participant in the deal.

Again, on November 27, 1963, Cain now the chief investigator for Cook County Sheriff's Office, gave the Agency some information that Oswald was in ~~Cuba~~ Chicago in April 1963 with the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and had purchased the assassination rifle in March 1963.

2. Recruitment of ~~Assassin~~ the potential Assassin(s)

In describing the putative poisoner, Giancana spoke in October 1960 of a "girl" who was close to Castro while the individual recruited for the CIA pills was Juan Orta, a secretary in Castro's Prime Ministry.

The identity of the "girl" referred to by Giancana can never be ascertained but Trafficante was clearly in the best position to recruit ~~a Cuban~~ one of Castro's Cuban mistresses due to his multitude of contacts in the Cuban gaming and prostitution circles

0002214

It was common for American gangsters to have Cuban mistresses and Trafficante, Rothman, and Tourine were typical examples. Also, one witness told the Committee that Castro was accustomed to arrive at the Nacional Hotel (owned by Mike McLaney) unescorted on a regular basis to visit one of his paramours. Thus, it would have been relatively easy for Trafficante to have arranged for ~~a~~ a young women to service Castro and to attempt to poison him.

Marita Lorenz is a confusing witness to say the least, and her potential as an assassin recruited by Frank Sturgis has been previously discussed. However, the interesting point is that she was also Charles Tourine's mistress and thus could have been solicited to activate the poison plot. Unfortunately, Tourine is totally uncooperative and Lorenz was not asked about her relationship with Tourine in Cuba so that we do not know the dates match.

Comment

Juan Orta, the ~~a~~ man identified to the Agency as the gangsters' contact in Castro's inner circle, was presumably indebted to Trafficante, due to his former receipt of gambling "kickbacks."

One fact is extremely bothersome however, in attempting to gauge the depth of the mob's sincerity in using Orta to execute the assassination plans. According to the IG Report (page 23):

Orta "lost his position in the Prime Minister's Office on 26 January 1961, while planning for the operation was still going on in Miami and in Washington." According to the official version Orta received the pills in late February–early March 1961 and kept the pills for a couple of weeks before returning them" [1967 IG Rpt p 27] If the mob was close enough to Orta to have pills smuggled in and out of Cuba, then they had to know that Orta had lost his position of accessibility. ?? the other possibility also exists, i.e., that the pills never left the United States and thus were available to give to de Varona when he was brought into the plot.

The question arises then, as to whether the mob was pursuing their own assassination plot and the CIA operation or, what appears more likely, simply using the Agency for the ulterior motives previously outlined.

Turning to Phase II of the operation which began in April 1962, ~~there also~~ the same possibilities exist. If Harvey and O'Connell are correct in assuming that Harvey had walked into an "ongoing" operation, then ~~this~~ ~~they~~ it can be assumed that the mob's relationship with de Varona, which predated the CIA participation according to the FBI memos of 21 Dec 1960, and 18 January 1961, had continued uninterrupted after the Bay of Pigs, with the exception of the CIA's participation, funding and material ~~support~~ could, once again be returned to the Agency although deVarona would continue to deal through his most contacts, Russell and "Maceo."

~~Due to~~ the loose structure of Phase II in terms of the ambiguous nature of the operational means of ~~attack~~ the lack of identity of the potential assassins, the complete reliance of Harvey ~~upon~~ Rosselli's word ~~as~~ that attempts were actually being carried out, the Agency's lack of control or ~~in~~ability to corroborate Rosselli's information, the ~~[illegible]~~ speculation arises that the syndicate was not seriously trying to assassinate Castro after the Bay of Pigs fiasco and the solidification of Soviet influence in Castro's Cuba. Being solid businessmen, Trafficante, Lansky and other former Cuba casino owners must have realized that the "golden goose" of Havana had laid its last egg and that fortunes were to be made elsewhere. Certainly, the evidence shows growing Lansky influence in the Bahamas, Las Vegas, and Trafficante projects in the Dominican Republic and a new opportunity for bolita ~~[illegible]~~ tremendous operations in Florida with the influx of Cuban exiles. It was also abundantly clear that the new Justice Department program on organized crime would never permit the "wide-open" Cuba of the pre-Kennedy era ~~[illegible]~~ even if Castro ~~[illegible]~~ and all his Communist associates could be eliminated.

?.?

SECRET

~~So although~~ Despite the relatively

SECRET

0002217

usual business sense in continuing the assassination attempts against Castro in a substantive way, there still was a percentage in "stringing the Agency along." First, there was no expense to the syndicate because the Agency was providing full logistical support for Varona. Second, there was the mounting pressure from the ~~Agency~~ FBI and Justice Department which had to be blunted, if possible. No better weapon to accomplish this goal could be found than to use one agency (CIA) against another (F. A brief look at the record shows the employment of ~~the~~ this strategy ~~at that time~~ at moments of crisis for those who participated in the plots.

1. Robert Maheu
   - Quashing of Long Committee subpoena in 1966 [Interim Report, p 79, note 3; Interview Edward P Morgan
   - solidification of position with the CIA and with Hughes Organization [Hughes was definitely told of the project by Maheu in Nov. 1960, and was himself interested in an alliance with the CIA which in fact, occurred later when Maheu was Hughes' principal agent] [Interim Report, p 75, note 2; Maheu Senate Testimony ?
   - Dispute with Hughes; See memo 20 May 1971 in office of Security file on Edward P Morgan]

?,

2. John Roselli
   - evading criminal prosecution [Interim Report, p 85, note 4.
   - use in ~~alleged~~ legal memo in March 1971 to attempt to reduce sentence
   - ~~was~~ attempt to delay deportation hearings with INS which included

SECRET

0002218

Jack Anderson's personal intervention with INS [See Anderson interview, ~~and~~ CIA Rosselli file; ~~re in~~ CIA Office of Security file re Edward P. Morgan]

3. Sam Giancana

- October 1960 wiretap in Las Vegas where Giancana got Maheu to "take the heat" for him by claiming the tap was a result of the CIA plots.
- Early 1967, intervention with FNU Farrell of INS re possible deportation [See Tab C, Rosselli CIA file, stating that nf Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, or Houston knew]
- attempts to ward off FBI surveillance in 1963 [1967 I.G. Report p 129]

- Conversation with Sam Papich on 3 May 1967, Sam commented that Rosselli and Giancana have CIA "over a barrel" because of "that operation". He said that he doubted that the FBI would be able to do anything about either Rosselli or Giancana because of "their previous activities with your people" [1967 I.G. Rpt p 131]

SECRET

Notes re Jack Anderson "Castro Retaliation" Theory,

0002219

March 3, 1967 }
March 7, 1967 } Drew Pearson Article

Source:

1967 I.G. Report:

1) It is quite likely that Rosselli is the source, Morgan the channel, and Anderson and Pearson the recipients (p126)

- a) We may now assume that Pearson's story is not pasted together from bits and pieces picked up here and there. His ultimate source Rosselli, knows more about certain details than we do, and he evidently has talked (p126)

?! - Impact

The Rosselli-Garrison contact in Las Vegas in March is particularly disturbing. It lends substance to reports that Castro had something to do with the Kennedy assassination in retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's life. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do (CIA emphasis) know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this (p127)

- Maheu

SECRET

does have good reason for not wanting the story aired further. Unfavorable publicity might cause him to lose his lucrative

032221

client, Hughes. There might be some value to be gained from endorsing his suggestion that he approach Morgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion

- The Pearson story, which is now causing us so much distress, includes one detail that is not found in Phase Two: the three-man team

Comment

Not necessarily since Varona was involved in Phase One also, he may have begun the 3-man team initially and not briefed Roselli on the concept in Phase Two or Roselli just didn't mention the 3 man team to Maheu or O'Connell during Phase II

Comment

- In figuring out "ulterior motives" for a leak to Pearson, agency makes the following point -

If protection was what the source was seeking, he could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach to CIA for help. pg 123

Since Agency c/n figure an ulterior motive, they decide that Roselli is drinking too much and [illegible] talking to Morgan who is also drinking and talky to Greenspun & [or Pearson]

Comment

SECRET

Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used two of his best goodies in the story of the plots

and the fact of the State Dept. meeting.
(P 127)

SECRET

0002222

Comment

See p 112 wherein "Drew Pearson claims to have a report that there was a high-level meeting at the Dept of State at which plans for the assassination were discussed."

I.G. speculates that Pearson is talking about the 10 August 62 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) which was attended by Harvey. (p 112)

[RFK was not present]

2. Other Sources

a) Memo re 15 Feb 1972

DCI aware that Rosselli was going to expose plots. He "decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Rosselli or someone in his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident."

(Memo in Office of Security file re Maheu.

3. Memo: 20 May 1971
Subject: Intertel

Mr. Al Pease (former CIA & now with Intertel) said Maheu & Anderson together on some oil mix deals. ... Recent exposure of Anderson re Maheu's role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robert Maheu using his son Peter as an intermediary.

SECRET

0002223 SECRET

Pease' theory is that Maheu probably thought that such publicity would "scare them off" (i.e. Intertel w/ a name CIA stuff to embarrass Hughes).

-"Morgan making noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement with CIA [Memo in Security File re Morgan]

4. Memo 19 Nov 1970

→?

- Harvey had contacts with Roselli in November - December 1967 and Jan 1968 following Roselli conviction -
- 17 Nov 1970

Morgan had received a call from Tom Waddin who represented Roselli that Roselli faced deportation and would blow story. DCI decided to ignore threat and Maheu agreed.

"Maheu further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it affected him personally.

5. 19 Dec. 1967

- Series of conversations instigated by Harvey on Rosselli's behalf to get CIA intervention directly or at least discover how good govt case against Roselli was.

- Calls from Roselli began on October to Harvey.. Roselli knew ~~what~~ Agency had done for Maheu with Sen. Long because DC Morgan told

Roselli

- Also, the Director (Helms) had sent Harvey a news clipping re Agency use of Giancana (presumably the August 1963 Chicago story of Sandy Smith)

Roselli said the leak came from Senator Kennedy's office when Kennedy was still Atty General.

6. Memo 28 April 1967

- O'Connell sent to Las Vegas to find out source of Pearson story
- Maheu admitted telling Morgan some of the Phase I operation due to Agency delaying on Long committee subpoena.
- Maheu visibly upset over Morgan going to Pearson and asked if he (Maheu) had been identified as the "client" ~~by~~ Morgan because he was afraid of the publicity affecting his relationship with Hughes. with Roselli
- Maheu denied knowing latter phase of mission & said he had no knowledge of operation after April 1962

? ?

- Roselli met Morgan through Hank Greenspun in the 1950s
- Maheu recalled that Morgan and Roselli met with him in Las Vegas during March 1967. Under the ~~mistaken~~ impression that Roselli seeking legal advice from Morgan but did not know the circumstances
- Roselli under pressure from FBI during hearings & had a 19 yr old girl.
- Believed Morgan had done some

John Hamill SECRET

Review of Office of Security File June 16th

15 Jun 1977

0002225

Memo re request of Dade Cty investigator for information on 8 Cubans:

1. a. Ramon Don Estevez
   b. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
   c. Luciano Nieves
   d. Jose De La Torriente
   e. Jose Quintana
   f. Joaquin Antonio Cortigo
   g. Manolo Artime
   h. AMLASH

2. Two of the 3 Cubans mentioned in Roselli (SSCI) testimony.

Two names mentioned in a 9 Dec 1970 Office of Security memo

v. No background investigation done on Roselli or Giancana

vi. Sporadic contacts, direct and indirect between Roselli & Agency officials up until approx. 1971.

ix. O'Connell has already been interviewed by Dade Cty.

x. Office of Security has no such evidence that Cuban Intelligence Service may have been involved or Cuban agents in Miami area during time of his death

SECRET

0002226

Nieves

c. Released in March 1965 after serving approx 16 months of a 20 yr sentence for anti-Castro plot.; went to Spain briefly where he was of interest to Madrid Station

- August 1965 entered U S
- Nov 1965 to Jan 1966 of operational interest to DDO

Shimon

He is mentioned in the John Roselli file as a personal friend of Roselli. It is further noted that Shimon knew Roselli but nature & extent of their official/social relationship is unknown

---

30 August 1976 request by S/A Edward C. Rudiger, Alexandria FBI Office.

- Cuban contacts of Roselli

1. Juan Orta

Was an official of the Castro Govt circa 1960-61 and was a contact of Santos Trafficante. Orta was reportedly selected by Trafficante to make the assassination attempt against Castro.

2. Tony Varona

When Juan Orta was not successful in carrying out the mission against Castro, Trafficante suggested Varona be used. Roselli contacted Varona. de Varona was to use assets of his own to carry out the mission. Varona also reportedly used his son-in-law to assist him in this effort but there is no identifying info in regard to the son-in-law.

3. Roselli had a man, also presumably in Miami, known to Harvey as "Maceo", who also used the names Garcia Gody and Godoy. Harvey was unable to identify Maceo, who was described as a Cuban who spoke Italian.

5. No info in regard to death or 517-339-3523 violence threats against Roselli or cubans in OS or Maheu, Giancana - Traff, [illegible], or Morgan in CI

3. Memo 15 Feb 1972

4. This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf. The DCI decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as to the consequences that may occur by the disclosure of his story. This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf furnishing Jack Anderson details of the incident.

0002229

Memo 20 May 1971

Subject. Inter Tel

OGC

- Morgan had been engaged by Hughes Tool probing the Maheu efforts. Al Pearce former Agency man & Intertel now, said Morgan made noises to certain Hughes officials that they had better take it easy on Maheu because of his past involvement w/ CIA

I John Southard - in 1962-64 was on board w/ Maheu & simultaneously working out details of a non official cover arrangements w/ Aircraft Div of Hughes Tool.

For past services Morgan had been paid until

On May 10, 1971 Mr. Pearce said Maheu & Anderson are involved together in some oil/money deals. Intertel looking into this & all other such similar matters to trace the source & disposition of funds. Recent expose by Anderson re Maheu role in the Cuban Revolution was a deliberate exposure instigated by Robt. Maheu using his son Peter as an intermediary. Pearce's theory is that Maheu prob. thought such publicity would 'scare them off'. The Intertel staff is aware of a series of contacts & meetings between Peter Maheu and Jack Anderson or a member of his staff.

0002230 Memo 19 Nov 1970

For: DCI

Subj Roselli, Johnny

2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M. Bissell ~~approached~~ Col. Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.

5. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one J R on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew him casually thru clients, but was given to understand ~~that~~ he was a high ranking member of the 'syndicate' and controlled all of the ice making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if R was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.

6. Maheu to approach R who knew M as a pr exec. handling domestic & foreign accts.

7. Pitch made on 14 Sept 1960 at Hilton Plaza. His initial reaction was to avoid getting involved but, thru M's persuasion, he agreed to introduce him to a friend Sam Gold who knew the "Cuban crowd." No money requested or paid.

8. During the week of 25 Sept, Maheu introduced to Sam staying at the Fontainebleau. It was several weeks after his meeting w/ Sam and Joe, who was identified

SECRET

C002232

to him as a courier operating between Havana & Miami that he saw photos in Sunday "Supplement" of Parade

9. In discussing ~~the~~ possible methods of accomplishing ~~this~~ mission Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but if he could be furnished some type of potent pill that could be placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective operation. Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kick-back payments from the gambling interests, who still had access to Castro and was in a financial bind.

11. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After several weeks of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold feet & asked out of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made several attempts w/out success.

12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona ... had become disaffected w/ the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing to handle ~~the~~ mission thru his own resources.

13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he be given $10,000 for organizational expenses & $1000 for communications

? [illegible]

SECRET

[illegible] [illegible] R.O.K. on [illegible] [illegible] up to Maheu in event [illegible] [illegible]. At our request ~~[illegible]~~ dropped.

17. May 1962 Harvey took over as Case officer & it is not known by this office whether R. was used operationally from that point on

0002233

17. Illegal entry Nov. 1967

18. 2 Dec 1968 R convicted of Friars case.

19. Harvey reported to Office of Security his contacts w/ R in Nov - Dec 1967 & Jan 1968. It was his belief that Johnny would not contact the Agency for assistance on deportation unless he actually faced deportation. R expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.

20. 17 Nov 1970.

Maheu called O'Connell to advise that Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan, had recd a call from Tom Wadden who stated appeal exhausted & R faces deportation. If someone didn't intercede on R's behalf, he would make a complete exposé of his activities w/ Agency

21. 18 Nov 1970. DCI briefed & decided not to assist R. Maheu was so advised of Agency's position & he was in complete agreement w/ our stand. He further advised that he was not concerned about any publicity as it applied him personally.

[illegible] Hall June 18, 1971

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [illegible], [illegible] team on a

SECRET

rooftop; last of Feb or first of March 1963

C0022[illegible]4

March 13, 1961 R delivered capsules to his contact at Fontainebleau

0L022[illegible]5

- a few weeks later Castro ill

Feb 23, 1971

Once he called on Chi racket boss Sam Giancana to line up a contact. The confidential files report that G had "gambling interest and an interest in the shrimp business in Cuba". However, the Chi gangster took no direct part in the assassination plot.

19 Dec 1967

Memo for Record

Telephone conversation - Harvey & Howard Osborn

2. He first revealed Dir of Security the subject of our last lengthy conversation re. J.R. the validity of the Justice Dept case against him; & whether or not the Agency planned to consider any possible intervention on his behalf

3. Harvey indicated that he thought the policy of "sitting tight" might be alright, but that he felt it would be a simple matter for the Dir to see Hoover personally & discuss on an unofficial, background basis what actual case the Justice Dept had.

Osborn - speculates Harvey trying to find out validity of case for passing to Maheu

(Harvey to work for Maheu

0002236

11 Dec 1967

1. Harvey reported luncheon meetings w/ Papich on 8th Dec. & Osborn on Dec 9th

2. 26 Nov. 1967 R calls Harvey. who met him at Madison Hotel for 3 hrs.

27 Nov, they "bumped" into Jim Angleton & Harvey introd R as "Mr. Ralston."

28 Nov spent 11 hours at Bethesda

4. Acc'ng to Harvey, Country Club. R in town to see Morgan re a radio station in San Jose. Not worried re indict which he brought.

-R said he had not seen Giancana since 1965 (Papich checking & may respond to Harvey)

- R d/n state or imply that he wanted help from Agency.

6. Joly told Harvey re luncheon mtg w/ Col. Edwards in 1966 & long mtg O'Connell had w/ Maheu & R in Cal when he returned from duty in Far East.

7. Harvey insists that he must know status of case. If it is a good case, then Harvey feels the Agcy must exert influence to have the indict "killed". If it is not a good case, that Harvey will tell Joly & he will handle it accd.

10. Harvey indignant at suggestion his intent was other than to protect Agcy

0002237

He had only the highest regard for Agency and the way we had handled his problem

8 Nov 1967

R. Harvey is source

R called on Oct 22nd & 27th but Harvey refused to serve as R's attorney

- R wondered why Agency could not do as much for him as it did for Maheu. Ed Morgan knew what Agency did for Maheu w/ Sen. Long & had told Johnny about this.

4 Oct 67

Osborn & Harvey at lunch.

- R quite vehement & bitter re Maheu indicating Maheu would "sell anyone down the river to protect his own neck."

- Dor had sent Harvey a news clipping re use of [illegible]. R said leak came from Sen. Kennedy's office when he was still AG

[illegible] Orig Maheu

28 April 67

1 Commt- Morgan allegedly contacted some high-placed officials in Govt indicating he had a client who had been involved in an operation [illegible].

~~[illegible]~~ Maheu recalled & said he had told Morgan when Agency helped on Long subpoena.

2 Maheu really upset & asked if he had been identified as client source

C0002238 publicity on his relationship w/ Hughes.

5. No knowledge of mission after April 1962 & never discussed latter phases w/ R

6. Maheu - R met Morgan thru Greenspun in 1950's when Morgan doing legal work for Las Vegas Sun.

R & Morgan in Vegas simultaneously in March. Jimmy Cannon in town." It was Maheu's recollection that these individuals spent some time together. He was under the impression that Johnny sought legal advice from Morgan but did not know nature of their conversation.

7. Claimed R had deteriorated rapidly; [illegible]; 11 yr old girl & arrested by Sheriff Lamb for failing to register. R putting pressure for Maheu to [illegible] his friends.

8. Believed Morgan had done some work for Pearson & did know that Friedman had more than a passing acquaintance w/ Morgan.

Morgan tight w/ Pat Coyne fr NSC.

9. Knows Johnny having problems w/ the FBI but didn't know details.

10. It is evident that Maheu is deeply concerned about possibility of being identified w/ Castro project. but played cooperative role to denying involvement

)002239

Sen Long Maheu
S. Shenker, Long's personal Atty, told [illegible]
~~that~~ Maheu involved w/ Agency.

7 June 66
Maheu reported g Morgan is dealing
w/ St Louis Atty, a personal friend of Long,
re Maheu's appearance.

3. Fensterwald had identified Sam
Onam, etc by name to O'Connell &
Col. Edwards,
In the case of Sam, Ed DuBois
& a couple of his technicians were aware
of Maheu's tie-in w/ Giancana.

31 May 1966
Maheu asked if "Sam's friends" were in
the news
12. Morgan had assured Maheu that he
knew Long's personal ~~atty~~ who exerts great
influence on Long. They flew to St Louis
& there the 3 men flew to D.C. & met
w/ Long & Fensterwald. Fensterwald
wanted Maheu as his "ace in the hole"
in that Maheu's clients have great appeal
for T.V. Also that Maheu would not put
enough to hide behind. Unless Long says
no, Fensterwald would proceed
13. Maheu claims because of Hughes to

Sam thru a series of circumstances that were pursued at our request. The then A.G. RFK was orally briefed on the background that led up to Maheu's involvement & a Top Secret document furnished to Justice Dept which served as a backup of the briefing

1967 I.G. Rpt

0002242

SECRET

P3 Each phase is a reflection of the then prevailing gov't attitude toward the Cuban regime

a. Prior to August 1960

All of the identifiable schemes prior to Aug. 1960, w/ one possible exception, were aimed only at discrediting Castro personally by influencing his behavior or by altering his appearance

b. August 1960 to April 61

Plots aggressively pursued; viewed by at least some of participants as one aspect of effort to overthrow regime culminating in BOP

c. April 1961 to late 1961

Major scheme begun Aug 60 was called off after BOP & remained dormant for several mos.

d. Late 1961 to late 1962

Particular scheme reactivated in early 1962 & pushed vigorously in era of MONGOOSE

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis & collapse of Project MONGOOSE, aggressive scheme begun Aug. 60, revived in April 1962, were finally terminated early 1963

P6 Drew Pearson column of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assassinate Castro.

He also has info:

a) State Dept meeting at which assassination discussed

b) team actually landed in Cuba w/ pills

SECRET

5. FI syndicate evidently its own operations, tends to reinforce thought that details would have been elaborated by discussion or security during FBI Oct 1960 report.

p 68 Final Report recognizes that such plots bore no relation on a precaution theory

---

Riely – Trafficante

Other Reported Assassination Proposals

5 agent messages were identified that made reference to plans to kill Castro or proposing such action. Three of the messages related to the same operation the other two relating to separate proposals; there is no indication that any of these proposals was the result of CIA initiative.

AMBRONC 01/5 arrested 29 May 1962 and was executed 30 August 62. He has been reported as never admitting that he was a CIA agent. His name not given to media. Three other were

1/PV

AMLASH

C002244

SECRET

SSC

1) inference that AMLASH a Castro agent with the mission of providing a plot against Castro so ~~that~~ Castro had justification for retaliation,

or

2) AMLASH so indiscreet the details would have been known thus providing Castro

whatever, should have been reported to WC

Agency - the character of the relationship between CIA and AMLASH/1, prior to assassination of Pres Kennedy, was so insubstantial and inconclusive ~~that~~ it provided no basis for AMLASH/1 to feel that he had any tangible CIA support for plotting against Castro,

.... there was little for him to report or leak"!

Comment p 5

Over a year passed between August 1962 and Sept 1963 when he was not contacted by CIA. In terms of the relationship ~~that~~ he had with CIA ~~the~~ critical period, one is therefore between 5 Sept and 22 Nov 1963,

Reason for hiatus is that AMLASH [illegible] leave Cuba; he was uncontacted due to his potential.

Cf p 13 Field report

SECRET

SECRET

0002245

Cable on Sept 7th says "AMLASH [illegible] totally spoiled brat who will always be a control problem.

... is best approached as a chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts among whom we may then find persons susceptible to long distance and covert [illegible]

p Clearly, at that point, while AMLASH/1 was viewed as potentially important, he was also viewed as a person of uncertain capabilities, requiring careful but long range developments for whatever course of action that might later ensue

pp3-4 of SSC Summary and Findings, presents AMLASH as an assassination plot & inference is that Castro Sept 7th speech might have been a result of leak by AMLASH

p10 "the fact remains that whatever views AMLASH/1 may have expressed, he had no response from his CIA contacts of any support for his proposals at that time

Fitzgerald meeting - stated he rejected high-power rifle w/ telescopic sights

SECRET

14 Nov AMWHIP reported that ~~AMLASH~~ satisfied w/ policy considerations but unhappy over fact he "had not been given technical assistance. He c/n understand why he had not been given "certain small pieces of equipment which promised a final solution to the problem" . . .

p.84

Comment

In essence he (AMLASH/1) was told there would be no U.S. support until after the fact, and then only if he was successful. While ~~that~~ may not seem a very realistic way in which to bring about the overthrow of a govt, it is directly relevant to the question of what AMLASH/1 was told and what he understood. It is contrary to the statement in the SSC Final Report (p10) to the effect that it was not clear how AMLASH/1 interpreted the visit ~~of~~ of Fitzgerald.

Cites July 1964 FBI Report stating that AMLASH/1 unhappy with CIA response and A.G. Kennedy had refused to support the plan

19 Nov 63 Fitzgerald "approved telling AMLASH/1 he would be given a cache inside Cuba. The cache

could, if he requested it, include.. high-power rifles w/ scopes..

19 Nov. AMLASH tells CIA he is returning to Cuba.

Request by headquarters to ask him to delay for 1 more meeting.

AMLASH agrees "if it is something interesting"

p 19 SSC speculates that this is first indication he might receive specific supp. Agency — at best a piece of highly speculative analysis, not supported by the evidence.

[Fails to mention pen w/ Blackleaf point in the text.]

---

p 24 "A"

"unaware of AMLASH1 1963 association with CIA"

His info at least 1½ years ~~[illegible]~~ after death of JFK; no idea of 1963 CIA ties w/ AMLASH which were very incriminating a CIA twice (first in early 1961 & again in early 1962) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate members... The 1961 plot aborted & pills were recovered.

These furnished in April 1962 passed by gambling rep. to a Cuban exile leader in Fla who in turn, had them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In June 1962, the exile leader reported that a team of 3 men had been dispatched to Cuba to recruit for the operation.

or "... while the events described by Drew Pearson did occur & are subject to being patched together as the one complete story, the implication of a direct, causative relationship among them is unfounded."

p18. "During the week of 25 Sept 1960, O'Connell & Maheu went to Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gold" at a meeting in the Fontainebleau Hotel. "Gold" said he had a man whom he identified only as "Joe", who would serve as a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there. Maheu pointed out "Gold" to O'Connell from a distance but O'Connell never met either "Gold" or "Joe""

p19 At that time the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuba & Trafficante was making regular trips between Miami & Havana on syndicate business.

SECRET

p.24 Despite the decision that a poison in liquid form would be most desirable, what was actually prepared and delivered was a solid in the form of small pills ~~about~~ the size of saccharine tablets.

0002252

(Comment - Giancana was flatly opposed to the use of firearms. He said that no one could be recruited to do the job because the chance of survival & escape would be negligible. Giancana stated a preference for a lethal pill that could be put into Castro's food and drink. Traf. (Joe; the courier was in touch with a disaffected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters named their man as Juan Orta who was then Office Chief and Director General of the Office of the Prime Minister. inside

The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to receive kickbacks from the gambling interests, had since ~~lost that~~ source of income and needed ~~the~~ money)

P27. Late Feb - March 1961

~~is~~ passed the pills to Traf. Roselli reported to O'Connell ~~that~~ the pills had been delivered to Cuban Orta. Orta is understood to have kept the pills for a couple of weeks before using them. According to the gangsters, Orta got cold feet.

SECRET

Comment Orta lost his position in [illegible] offices on 26 Jan. 1961, while paying for the operation was still going on in Miami & Washington. He took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy

April 1961 ...

... It would seem tho, that the gangster did know ~~that~~ Orta had already lost his access to Castro.

p30. The Cellini brothers were believed to be in touch with Varona. These Moss and were reported to have offered Varona large sums of money for his operations against Castro, with the understanding that they would receive privileged treatment "in the Cuba of the future". Attempts to verify these reports were unsuccessful.

p31. Traff approached Varona and told him that he had clients who wanted to do away with Castro & that they would pay big money for the

Comment.

Rosselli said as a loyal American he would do whatever he could & would never divulge the operation]

p31. R went to deliver money to Varona for expenses.
- O'Connell recalls 5,000; Edwards recalls 25,000; Bannerman recalls $\overset{20}{25}$,000

p32 Rosselli gave the pills and money to Varona. Man Rosselli dealt with under a pseudonym. Little is known of the detailed channels beyond Varona p.32 Edwards recalls something about a ~~contact~~ who worked in a restaurant frequented by Castro.

p33 (O'Connell) believes that there was something going on between April 1961 and April but he cannot now recall what. He agrees with Bill Harvey that when the operation was revived April 1962, Harvey took over a "going operation".

p34. O'Connell believes he must have passed the pills, but he has no specific recollection of having done so.

p 49. Roselli needed Gian. & Traff in the first phase as a means of establishing contacts inside Cuba. He did not need them in the second phase because he had Varona. However, it would be naive to assume ~~that~~ Roselli did not take the precaution of informing higher ups in the syndicate that he was working in a territory considered to be the private domain of someone else in the syndicate)

p. 51 June 1962 Harvey said they appeared to have no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recruit others who might be used in such a scheme. If an opportunity to kill Castro presented itself, they or the persons they recruited were to make ~~the~~ attempt. perhaps using the pills.

SECRET

0002256

Harry never learned their names or anything about them.

p52 Harry says Rosselli wasn't [illegible] happy. He agreed with Harry that nothing was happening and that there was not much chance that anything would happen in the future.

p42a RFK- I trust that if you ever ~~stay~~ try to do business with organized crime - with gangsters you will let the Atty General know before you do it;
Houston quotes Edwards as replying that this was a reasonable request.

p. 66. The Atty Generals copy of the memorandum for the record of that briefing (7 May 62 by Edwards Houston) is in Archives of the AG's office.

p67. Chicago Sun-Times article of 16 August 1963 cites Justice Dept belief that Giancana never did any spying - merely pretended to go along "in the hope that the Justice Dept drive to put him behind bars might be slowed or at least affected - by his ruse of co-operation w/ another govt agency."
Article puts his cooperation from 1959 to some time in 1960 - long before the abortive rebel invasion at the Bay of Pigs in April 1961
Reports McGuire bugging incident.

p69 20 August 1963 Chicago Daily News

FBI agent tailing man who allegedly says:

Why don't you fellows leave me alone? I'm one of you!

Giancana pictured as being approached by CIA but declining

0002258

AMLASH

079 ? - DR took Presidential Palace which they refused to surrender to Che; later did to Fidel

- Cubela believed to be one participant in assassination of LtCol Antonio BLANCO Rico, head of Batista's military intelligence

- DR quite apart from 26th of July but signed a unity pact

= ... Agency was primarily interested in keeping Cubela active in [redacted] PRON program directed against Cuban military leaders, while resisting his pleas for technical assistance in an assassination attempt. The voluminous project files and info furnished us by Nestor Sanchez, Cubela's case officer, do not wholly support these recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubela's plottings.

087 16 Sept 1963

Cubela wrote Tepedino - "I don't intend to see (be interrogated by) your friends again!" which you should tell them, " so they don't

SECRET

made the trip: I want to get away from politics completely."

pg 2 Sandy says that, while Cubela was anxious to do away with Castro, Cubela was not willing to sacrifice his own life in exchange for Castro's. What Cubela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle w/an effective range of hundreds or thousands of yards. Cubela finally said that, as a doctor of medicine (which he was) he was quite sure that we could devise some technical means of doing the job that would not automatically cause him to lose his own life in the try."

The Drew Pearson Story

	Published Details	The Facts as we know them
a)	Robt. Kennedy may have signed an assassination plot	Not true. He was briefed on Phase One after it was over – He was not ~~[illegible]~~ briefed on Phase 2
b)	Three (3) hired assassins were caught in Havana; one still in prison	R tells Harvey on 21 June 67, that Rosselli says 3 men in Cuba. We do not know their identities or what may have happened to them. We have no proof ~~that~~ they were actually dispatched. Many of the announced captures and executions during this period fits this team

Castro learned enough at least to believe the CIA was seeking to kill him. He is reported to have

This reportedly has come up in the Garrison investigation. It was also stated by Castillo in the Philippines under direct interrogation. We have no independent corroboration of any sort. (Note that Varona met w/ Rosselli in Las Vegas March 1963)

0002260

1977

SECRET

9 May 1967.

Beauboeuf apparently to be used as a source of rumors to show Oswald a CIA agent & was to be used to assassinate Castro. Garrison alleges he has letters signed by CIA reps or by Sen. RFK authorizing certain persons to work with Cubans for assass. of Castro. This memo is intended to record that such letters never existed & therefore could not be in Garrison's possession.

0002261

SECRET

Request

SECRET

- Richard Cain aka Robert Scully Cain
Richard Scalzetti
DOB Oct 1931 Chicago

FBI memos
- 21 Dec 1960 not formally [illegible]
- 18 Jan 1961
identifies individuals

- Identity of WI ROGUE

- April 61 to April 62 indicates
- ~~[illegible]~~ "something going on" independent of Agency.

- RFK secretary called on 4 March 67 to obtain memo; already knew article of 7 March 67

- 15 March 65
Bango in Madrid & claims group in Cuba ready.
Jailed in July 62

1 March 66 Arrests in Cuba
Trial referred only to late fall 64 & early 65 w/ Artime meetings

SECRET

10 June 64 "Pepin" Bosch Rum approach The Wh

SECRET

0002266

OConnell's interview of Malone in May 19

- Additional info on S.T. JR & SG contained in material previously cleared for review on Sturgis

- Chicago Trib
  Dec 28, 31, 1973

- Cain
  - Fall 1960, contact in Chicago
  - Summer 1961 Mexico City
  - April 1962 Mexico City
  - 4 June 62 deported
  - 19 Aug 63 Chicago
  - 26-30 Aug 63 Info - re Student Directory, Miami
  - 12 Sept 63 DRE arms purchase
    - told to get out of picture
  - 1 May 1972 disappear.

27 NOV 63 - Fair Play met in Feb 63 at 907 S. Spaulding under direction Richard Criley
- LHO purchased rifle March 63
- Story suspicion LHO in Chicago 1963 April.

SECRET

SECRET

0002267

1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez
   DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1934

2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas
   DOB 12 Jan 1918

3. Luciano Nieves

4. Jose de la Torriente

5. Jose Quintana
   DOB 3 Oct 45 nephew of [illegible]

6. Joaquin Antonio Cortayo DOB 10 Jan 43

Edward Pierpont Morgan DOB 28 May 1913 St Lou

SECRET

TAB B

(2-9-78)

SECRET

0002268

Morgan

Covert Security Clearance on 2 Feb 1951 for use as "cut out" re negotiations for School of Advanced Int'l Studies & John Hopkins Univ.

Amended & Approved March 1951 to include Morgan's use in providing covert legal support for operations in the form of a "cut out"; legal advice, transmission of funds in connection w/ DDO projects.

∴ DDO should make decision whether to release info.

Personnel

Resorts Int. #591 722
Wallace Groves OS file #473 865
- assoc w/ Meyer Lansky
- Corp. Grand Bahama Development Corp
w/ Albert Whitsant (#633 974) and
John P. Roulett (#639 997)

Cain

According to DeMar, Cain in Mexico 1961 into 1962
- 1964-65

SECRET

John Hornbeck
9 FEB 1978

SECRET

0002269

Bradley Earl Ayers 7-Mar-35
St Paul, Minn
36 yr
Eglin AF Base Fla.

April 12, 1971 Post

April 27, 1971 Post

Sunday April 18 1971
Cover name? Daniel B. Williams
Paragon Air Service
Zenith Technical Enterprises - south
campus of Miami U.
Rudy; Harvey, Robertson (Rip) Big [illegible]

Training sites
Palo Alto Key
Upper Key Largo
Card Sound on edge of Everglades

Security Approval
Date 10 Aug 1964

Reference 23826 (DDP/WH/SA

Case No. 366085

Request For Personnel Action

Serial No
366085

Nature
Separation Return to Parent SVC 12-15-64

Organizational Designations:
DDP/SAS
US Field Office
Forward operating ~~Station~~ - JMWAVE
Paramilitary Branch Section [illegible]
Reinstated CRC Indep Pol Groups

SECRET

SECRET

C002270

ZR/RIFLE

All (cable) traffic bearing ZR/RIFLE to be delivered in sealed envelope to Chief FI/Div. D, 1502 L Bldg only

- Personally approved by DD Plans

Harvey
Chief FI/Div D

19 Feb 1962

To Harvey re authorization of QJWIN for ZR RIFLE activities thru Dec 1962

Because of sensitive nature of this activity, accounting for funds will be by general category & by your certification

2. Salary 7500 per yr; 7500 in addition to salary

3. Memo to be considered in lieu of project & constitutes authorization for all travel per diem, operational & other expenses

4. Eyes only

Rich. D Helms.

Hand written notes

Morgan – Roselli – Maheu – Giancana

– Maheu in Las Vegas

Morgan & Jack Anderson

1) Prior to Aug 60

2) Aug 60 to April 61 (BOP)

3) April 61 to late 61

4) late 61 to late 62 (Cuban missile crisis

5) late 62 to mid 63

SECRET

SECRET C002271

Roselli op started in Sept 60
(Maheu to Roselli to Giancana)

AG brfd 7 May 62

Taylor became chairman of JCS
on 9 Aug 62

Rusk, McNamara, Taylor, Bundy,
Goodwin, Gilpatric, Lansdale,
Murrow, McCone

Memo For Record
Rept at request of DCI; consigned
to IG on 23 March 67
The one stayback burn copy (IG)
all notes, & other derived source material
destroyed 23 May 67.

Memo: Chief WH (Davis)
From Dir of Security
Subject: WH/Security Project

Final accounting of monies expended on
a sensitive project of interest to DD/P, Chief WH
& Dir of Secy.
Disbursements.
25 Sept 1960 thru To cutout 6900.
6 Feb 1961

SECRET

SECRET

CC02272

11 Feb 1961   TO Principal Agent   13,000
31 Jan 1961
14 Feb [illegible] 61   Commo Expenses   1,045
26 Sept 1961
Aug
12 Feb 1961   [illegible]   995

Page 3 IG Rpt

e. Late 1962 until well into 1963

After missile crisis Oct 62 & collapse of MONGOOSE, aggressive scheme that was begun in Aug 1960 & revived in April 1962, was finally terminated early 1963.

Two other plots were originated in 1963 but were impracticable & nothing came of them.

P ?

b. 10 August 1962

Meeting of Special Group (Augmented) wherein McNamara broached subject of liquidation of Cuban leaders.

Result - Project MONGOOSE memo by Lansdale

Sec (c)

31 July 64

Discussion at Special Group of a Clandestine Services memo of exile plot to kill Castro. CIA had refused to fund. [illegible] & had no involvement

Missing page

and Jose Luis
P 2 Gonzalez Gallarreta   Press Release 9 March 1966

-purpose of contact for intelligence & not further to [illegible] project

SECRET

-Jorge ROBRENO, Albert Blanco Romariz, Luis Tapedera

Now in ~~[illegible]~~ with [illegible] [illegible].

SECRET

0002273

Late Sept 1960

Edwards, O'Connell, Bissell say plans acceptable; Edwards then briefed Allen Dulles & General Cabell.

Maheu called O'Connell & pointed out Parade section showing Gold & Joe
(Previously just knew. Maheu & O'Connell knew names.)

Joe a courier to Cuba & make arrangements there according to Gold

Traff making regular trips to Havana
7 Jan 59 - casinos closed
13 Jan 59 - Castro announces re-opening
17 Feb 59 - Cabinet announces opening
30 Sept 61 - last casino closed

P 23 Technical Chief TSD
4 approaches: (1) highly toxic like shellfish poison to be administered w/a pin (which Commander Roosevelt said was supplied to Gary Powers
(2) bacterial material in liquid or (3) cigar
(4) handkerchief

P29. March April 1961
Rosselli told O'Connell that Traff knew a man high up in exile movement. (Varona)
Rpt from FBI suggest him Traff.

SECRET

SECRET

C002274

Item Varona:

a) 21 Dec 1960 FBI memo re gangster financing Cuban activities to overthrow Castro.
b) 18 Jany 1961 accounts V. with these schemes; V had hired Moss as a fund-raiser

---

CIA had interest in Moss but no indication of any involvement in Cuba.

24

March (1959 89) for use in (WE Division as consultant to Indian Embassy)

- Nov 62 by CA Staff under ZR MAJOR a program for exploitation of political consultants.

Roselle to deliver $ to V. Estimates vary but Esterline says 10,000 + 1000 of communication as per [illegible] memo.

P32 Comment - V one of 5 key figures in Rev. Front & heavily involved in BofP. Steps taken to end his participation in syndicate plan but apparently unsuccessful.

People who knew:
1. O.O. - original man to go in
2. A V-
3. son-in-law of A V.

SECRET

2/PV

Phase 2

SECRET

C002275

Harvey briefd by authority of Bissell in Feb 1961 in connection with a general stand-by capability for Executive action

Harvey had already discussed problem w/ 05 (Arnold Silver) & Sidney Gottlieb both parties probably cut in to Cuba project.

Helms briefd on general concept but not on ongoing Cuba plot.

QJ WIN recruited by (Arnold 05 Silver) for use in Congo; Justin O'Donnell recruited other

ZR RIFLE covered as a FI/D operation (ostensibly to develop a capability to enter safes & kidnap couriers)

15 Nov 61 - Harvey discusses application of ZR RIFLE to Cuba; instructed by Bissell to renew syndicate operation

Unrelated - Helms puts Harvey in charge of Agency's Cuba task force

Late 1961 - Early 1962 Harvey busy

Feb/ March 62

- March 62 Harvey takes over Castro

- Harvey view-

came to think of Castro operation & ZR RIFLE as being synonymous.

Harvey's interpretation

- Exec Actn as synonymous w/ QJWIN

- ZR RIFLE [illegible] used to Exec Actn

ZR RIFLE alone meant Castro

SECRET

2/PV

A review of his correspondence was unrevealing

[Personally handled Castro operation & d/n use any of assets being developed in ZR RIFLE]

- Memo of Harvey after he left Task Force W & going to Rome on 27 June 1963 to Chief FI/Staff that ~~or~~ original reason for being QJWIN no longer exists & suggesting termination.
- Records (OLLA-1974, 24 April 64) show termination of his retaining status on 21 April 64.
- There is no indication in the file ~~that~~ the Exec Action Capability of ZR/RIFLE/QJWIN ~~was~~ ever used]

Edwards -

- No activity after B of P until Harvey met Roselli & reactivated April 62.
- Edwards out of contact w/ RFK over McGuire wiretap
- 14 May 62 - Harvey called Edwards & indicated he was dropping Roselli from further use

p43 'Harvey - took over a "going" operation. since he described plan for getting poison to a favorite Castro restaurant The mechanics were identical to those described by Edwards and as reported in Phase One.

- O'Connell thinks "something going on" between April 61 & April 62 but c/n remember

0002277

April 8th Agency

- Harvy met w/ Rosselli & O'Connell
- O'Connell positive Maheu there

/ Harvy says he would have remembered Maheu; saw him socially once or twice after 1947 when Harvy came to Agency; not since '52 when Harvy sent to Berlin.

- Edwards deliberately did not mention Maheu when he first briefed Harvey

p45 O'Connell out of June '62 when he was assigned PCS to Okinawa

p47 18 April 62 O'Connell gets pills for Roselli mtg w/ Harvy in Miami

O'Connell says operation going on when Harvy took it over altho he cd n remember when & exactly.

Harvy specified that Gian. not to be brought in for ~~[illegible]~~ 2nd phase & believes Roselli honored request.

Roselli reptd that Gian asked him what was going on; R replied "nothing" Gian – "Too bad"

p48 Maceo – unlikely a Varona associate Antonio MACEO Mackle who Harvy probably would have known. Also, it's clear Maceo was "Roselli man".

Roselli essential to 2nd phase as a contact to Varona.

p 49. When the pills were given to [illegible] [illegible] Varona requested arms and equipment needed for his end of the operation.

SECRET

V requested arms & support & Rosselli passed word to Harvey. With help of Shackley, chief of JMWAVE, about 5K of weapons & equipment.

April 1962

a) explosives
b) detonators
c) 20 .30 caliber rifles
d) 20 .45 cal. handguns
e) 2 radios
g) 1 boat radar

Harvey & Shackley rent U-Haul & put truck in parking lot for delivery to Maceo, V, or V's son-in-law.

Harvey & Shackley set up watch as do Rosselli & O'Connell.

Shackley not aware of plan.

p 50 May 62 - Rosselli reported that the pills were in Cuba & at the restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro.

June 62

V had ~~sent~~ dispatched 3 man team to Cuba

Sept 1962

Harvey saw Rosselli in Miami on 7-11 Sept. Another 3 man team of militia men assigned to penetrate Castro's body guard but never happened. "Medicine" reported ~~safe~~ still in place and first team safe

Sept 62 - Jan 63

Harvey in Miami 22 Dec - 6 Jan & saw Rosselli & Maceo several times. Gave Rosselli 2700 to V for upkeep of 3 militia men who never left (in Fla Keys)

p 51
militia men poised to take off

Delay due to
a) conditions inside
b) [illegible]

Feb 63

Harvey left word for Maceo in Miami 11-14 Feb that nothing new & looked as if deal off. (Just how Harvey left this word for Maceo is not clear.)

SECRET

SECRET

0002279

Apl May 63

Helms approved a last mtg w/ Harvey & Roselli before Harvey left for Rome.

People who knew

055 Bruce Cheever (Harvey's dpty 1962) knew Harvey meeting w/ gangsters in Reno in winter of 62

May 62

Shef Edwards & Lawrence Houston briefed RFK "all the way". RFK agreed not to prosecute wiretap case but wanted to be informed of Agency ever dealt w/ "gang-sters" again. RFK asked for a memo of the meeting via a phone call. memo prepared on 14 May 1962 by Edwards & Houston.

NO briefing of McCone, General Carter, or Helms

RFK not told that Phase II had begun; that V had pills & arms in Castro Hdq.

On 14 May 62 Harvey ~~briefs~~ Helms; advises against briefing McCone & General Carter. Writes Edwards that Roselli is not going to be used

Comment

RFK's secretary called on 4 March 67 to obtain Edwards memo. He knew

SECRET

of Pearson article of 7 March 67 & apparently wanted to check his recollection of what he had been briefed upon.

Helms had lunch w/ RFK & allowed him to read memo. He d/n not leave a copy.

1954-55 Maheu hired by Niarchos to offset Onassis control of Saudi oil shipments. Worked at top levels of U.S. & British gov't & met at least once w/ Nixon.

O'Connell rep'td that during negotiations w/ Long Committee, Maheu stated he might brief his attorneys [illegible] [illegible] w past activities.

10-11 Augt 62 SECRET

03

(Wainwright) Tepedino & Cubela in Copenhagen & (Wainwright) used "assassinate" & Cubela insisted on 03 "eliminate"

000229

14-23 Augt 62

03 Cubela, Tepedino, (Wainwright) 03 & (Carl Williams) from Madrid: met in Paris.

Cubela given S/W training & supplies; shown a demolition demonstration.

Refused to be polygraphed.

(Williams) 03 cabled that no physical elimination missions be given as a requirement but he might do it on his own initiative. Headquarters' strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cubela.

5-8 Sept 63

Brazil- met by (Wainwright) 03 Tepedino & Nestor Sanchez who became case officer.

Cubela claimed 2 S/W messages but only 1 received. Afraid of postal censorship.

Thot highly of Ramon Guin Diaz AMTRUNK-10 who was likely Miguel DIAZ Isalgue (AMICE-14) who had been sent to recruit him

SECRET

14 Sept 63

From Brazil Cubela flew to Paris & was going to tell Castro after the fact

G/PN

AMLASH SECRET

0002281

9 March 61 03 - Mexico City Station

P28 (Jack Stewart) met w/ Cubela in Mexico City, arranged by Carlos Tepedino AMWHIP 1, a long-time friend. Cubela knew (Stewart) from Havana where he was once 03 assigned.

Cubela 2nd leader of DR an elite group of leftist students organized in 1956 to fight Batista; Nestor Sanchez - case officer.

28 March 61

Both Cubela & Orta wanted to defect; according to asset of Miami Station.

Exfiltration called off on report that Cuban police aware of Cubela's desire to defect & his departure plans.

(Comment:

First of 3 known links with [illegible] & Cubela -; but unknown if Cubela an asset of [illegible] in Cuba.)

Other two links are even more nebulous

~~15 June~~ 14 August 61

Message from airline stew (girl friend) to Tepedino that Cubela going to Paris & wants to talk with a "friend of Stewart's". No indication of any mtg.

SECRET

15 June 62

Lucia Echevarria Bianchi told an asset (AMCONCERT-1) that Cubela going to Helsinki & wanted to defect.

21PV

Would stop in Paris to see Tepedino

27 June 1962

Tepedino approached FBI in Miami on 11 June ~~with~~ idea that Cubela wanted to defect. FBI sent a detailed memo to CIA since they knew Tepedino to be a CIA asset.

8 July 62

Tepedino dissatisfied w/ CIA handling of Cubela's "defection" in Paris in 61 so he contacted FBI. Stated his source of info on reasons for defection were w Chivarrias.

30 July -0 August 62 03

(Wm Wainwright) met w/ Tepedino a jeweller in NYC & both went to Helsinki: Cubela talked into being recruited "in place" & not defecting.

Cubela wanted to blow up oil refineries, kill Castro, Carlos Rodriguez, & Soviet Ambassador.

7-9 August 62

Meetings in Stockholm because Helsinki too risky. Cubela stated that he told 4 of his Cuban associates that he met Tepedino in Helsinki.

4/PV

SECRET

that he was taking a vacation.

0002286

3 Oct 63

Sandy arrives in Paris to meet w/ Cubela who had written Tepedino in NY that he didn't want to continue.

CIA had to tell [French Govt 24 that contacts were for purposes of defection. French unilaterally keeping Cubela under surveillance.]

11 Oct 63 Sandy cables that Cubela insisting on meeting w/ RFK; assumed Cubela going to try an attempt on Castro even w/out U.S. support.

29 Oct 63

Fitzgerald, using SAS, goes to Paris & got approval from Helms.

Fitz states he told Cubela that U S would have no part in attempt on Castro's life.

Written record from Sandy is contrary

14 Nov 63

19 Nov 63

Sandy memo states ~~Fitz~~ assumes that Cubela would get cache of rifles w/ scopes inside Cuba, on request.

22 Nov 63

SECRET

Sandy arrives in Paris on Nov 22 after getting pen w/ ~~Black Leaf 40 poison~~

Sandy says Cubela accepted pen but stated he would not take it to

I/M

Cuba with him. SECRET

0002287 Cubela asked for a cache of arms to be placed at AMTRUNK farm. [2 high-powered rifles w/ telescopic sights; 20 grenades; 20 lbs C-4 explo] As they left meeting heard JFK shot.

Sandy stated he received an OP im cable from Fitzgerald that everything is "off" but nothing in AMLASH file.

Cubela will not take S/W with him to Prague

1 Dec 63

Cubela returns from Prague to Cuba

19 Feb 1964

JMWAVE to have 2 caches in place in March.

Done on 17-21 March 64 on AMTRUNK VIII

24 April 1964

Tepedino had been briefed to meet Carlos Jorge ROBRENO Mauny who has message from Cubela.

[illegible] 3 May 64 - Robreno says Cubela wanted a silencer

30 August 64

Artime received info thru Madrid that a group of dissident members of Castro regime wanted to establish direct contact. 7 Oct 64, Artime sends Alberto BLANCO Romariz.

13 Nov. 64. SECRET

Artime agrees to talk to AMLASH-1 if it turns out he is contact man for internal dissident group. Artime thinks if AMLASH-1 is chief of dissident group we can forget about operations

4 Dec 64

Sandy prepares a memo for 6570 for Artime to maintain contacts w/ dissident groups' reps in [illegible]. Artime does

6-7 Dec 64

Sandy meets Cubela in Paris & was ~~told~~ going to continue his plans. Told U.S. could not be involved.

10 Dec 64.

Artime d/n know nor Cubela that CIA in direct contact with each. Rather SAS contrived to put both men together.

CIA d/n want to put silenced weapon in ~~[illegible]~~ Cubela's hands directly but could do it thru Artime.

27 Dec; 30 Dec (1st time)

Cubela & Artime meet 1st time in Madrid. Artime reports to Sandy that Cubela had requested a silencer for FAL rifle but Americans w/n give him one. Artime to come up w/ silencer or different rifle in Cuba.

11 Feb 65

Cubela to receive pistol w/ silencer & Belgian FAL rifle w/ silencer from Artime's secy. Both weapons come from ~~[illegible]~~ U.S. & are now in Madrid.

SECRET

Congress

0002289

SECRET

12 Feb 65

Artime has weapons delivered to Cubela in Madrid.

4 March 65 - Cubela in Havana; source ~~[illegible]~~ is friend of Tepedino who telephones him

15 March 65

Rafael Garcia-Bango Dirube arrives in Madrid from Cuba & introduced to a station officer. Publicly close friend of Cubela; & claims to be in touch w/ group of military leaders planning to eliminate Castro.

Jailed in July '62 for rep. Traff. as lawyer for Capri Hotel. Traff - ex manager

(Another name - [illegible]

June 1965

Victor ESPINOSA Hernandez, a former PM trainee who was terminated as a malcontent on 20 March 1961, contacted INS who brought FBI on 3 June 65.

Espinosa stated he had received letter from a friend in Paris urging him to meet w/ Alberto Blanco who had a message from Cubela who wanted it delivered to CIA

Message - Cubela in a position to kill Castro & would CIA & US Govt be willing to support him. If "yes", then details on what he needed.

SECRET

Cubela had wanted $10,000 money in Paris on 1 Feb 65. Turned down & upset -

16 Feb 65 Sandy gave him two.

0002290 Tepedino 7,000 in NYC.

SECRET

23 June 1965 headquarters sent cable terminating contact. "convincing proof that entire AMLASH group insecure"; terminate ASAP

1 March 66 - Cubela & [illegible] arrested for activities w CIA

Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallarreta, Alberto Blanco Romariz, Juan Alsina Navarro. confessing

Also appearing - Guillermo Cunill Alvarez, "Angel" Herrero Veliz

Gonzalez Gallarreta 03 - attests in Spain contacted by (James Noel [~~[illegible]~~ "senior" officer]) at US Embassy in Madrid. 32

Cubela meets w/ Artime in Spain in Feb. 1965.

Artime sent Gallego to US to get telescopic sight & silencer. Delivered to Blanco Romariz who delivers it to Gonzalez Gallarreta then to Cubela the day before he left Madrid.

Seized in Cubela's residence were telescopic sight, FAL rifle +. Tasco

9 March 66

Castro sends personal letter ~~that~~ death sentence not be asked.

10 March 66

Cubela testimony:

Silencer did not work; I threw it away because it was burning my hands

SECRET

SECRET

000229

I spoke to Fidel in January. He opened the doors to me ~~but~~ I did not have the courage to tell him

(Comment)

Trial evidence confined to trips to Europe in late 64 & early 65 to meet w/ Artime. No mention of Mach at the Nov 65 contacts w/ Agency.

No hint of poison pen Nov 63.

Speculate

If full details would have come out, Castro would have little of choice [illegible], & politically imprudent to execute someone in inner circle.

2 high-level interagency meetings where Castro assassination discussed

Special Group (Augmented)
10 August 62 (probably one described by Pearson)
State: Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, Richard Goodwin, Robt Hurwitch
White House
Maxwell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (RFK absent)
Defense:
McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Lansdale
CIA - McCone Harvey
USIA - Edward Murrow, Donald Wilson
Secy - Thomas Parrott

Parrott's notes d/n mention assassination but McCone & Harvey remember McNamara ~~[illegible]~~ raising it & Murrow concurring.

McCone raised objection & McNamara "heartily agreed".

SECRET

Lansdale wrote memo on 13 August to Harvey, Hurwitch, Harris, & Wilson which

SECRET

Probably Pearson's info re a high-level mtg was 10 Sept 62

O'Connell interviewed Maheu in May 67 & wrote a report:

1- Maheu briefed Morgan on Phase I

2- Never heard of Phase II from Roselli

0002293 or anyone

3. Roselli steered to Morgan by Greenspun

4- Maheu suspects Roselli a client of Morgan

5- Roselli drinking heavily; Morgan in Vegas recently "induced"

6- Garrison, Morgan, Roselli in Vegas in March. Garrison was in touch w/ Roselli; so was Morgan

It is Our impression that Greenspun also involved in the conversations.

p122 and so confirms Point finger to Roselli as source of info & Morgan as Pearson's source.

p123 Summer of 62 - Edwards, Maheu, & Roselli had lunch & Edwards said he told Roselli he informed RFK of Roselli connection.

Q of Robt Maheu re theory new IA allegations with immediate knowledge of the [illegible] Kennedy project

Pearson's story seems to rely on two phases. Could be hazy if only 1 source. Probably from 2 sources; State Dept meeting + mob operation so Roselli chief suspect.

SECRET

Defense: Roselli drinking too much & Morgan drinking & talking to a newspaperman friend (Greenspun

SECRET

Lansdale memo assigned drafting papers for various subjects related to Cuban operation. A portion excised from CIA copy of memo was "including elimination of leaders". Lansdale reportedly tried to raise assassination of Castro w/ Harvey over next several weeks but Harvey declined.

At least 5 people in Lansdale's office knew Mongoose & Lansdale intent on assassination as part of it.

0002292

30 July 1964

303 Committee met in Situation Room of White House.

McGeorge Bundy, Vance, McCone, Thomas Hughes & Des. Fitzgerald for a discussion of Cuba

~~Thomas~~ Peter Jessup as secy.

10 June 64 memo from DD/P to DCI re Mafia plot to assassinate Castro.

Price was 150,000 w/ 10,000 exp. Cuban exile; Jose Mario "Pepin" Bosch, Bacardi Rum, to contribute 50,000. He approached JMWAVE for US participation. Refused outright

19 August 64

DCI (McCone) to Bundy - re FBI interviews w/ all participants

SECRET

SECRET

C002294 Publicity has not run its course:

a) Pearson has not yet used the pills & fact of State Dept meeting

b) Garrison has not revealed full case; CIA should be prominently displayed when he does

c) Puerto Rican in custody & will be deported

Pearson story includes 1 detail found only in Phase II - the 3 man team.

---

p26 Put in its best light - that there is no ulterior motive in spreading the story

p 127. We do not know that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this.

p 129. Maheu reports that Traff in jail in Tampa. Rosselli is persona non grata in Las Vegas, being required to register with police any time he is in town. None of them would have compunctions about dragging in this CIA connection when he was pressed by law enforcement authorities. Giancana has already done it when the FBI was crowding him in 1963, Rosselli appears to be doing it in his conversation with Morgan & Garrison.

P 131. Speech - 3 May 1967

Comment'd Bob has CIA over a barrel

SECRET

SECRET

0002295

Tab A

24 July 75 memo

Santos Traff.

4. ST delivered poison pills to agent who had access to Castro

When this attempt failed, T supported another candidate (cancelled re BofP)

- Maheu formerly contract employee w/ Office of Security -
- Roselli convictions

Nov 1967 - illegal entry
Dec 68 - Friars Club

Senate Staff 7-8-June 1975

Ad Hoc Staff
No 838-75
9 June 75

4. Report to Maxwell Taylor made by Dick Bissell on 8-10 Dec 1971 DDO

(maybe on continuing covert action capability)

5. Who is Torvella (yet another (alleged Castro assassin) DDO

6. - WIROGUE 01 operational aliases?

- who was WIZARD/4 (John Stein's memo)
- 2 Agency officers who employed WIROGUE DDO
- Want talk w/ John Stein & see WIROGUE file by Walt Elder

SECRET

SECRET

Memo 5 May 1967

Subj - Wm K. Harvey 0002296

1. ~~Helms~~ Bill Harvey contacted Papich to report to Papich some contact he had w/ "gangster" and offer his co-op to FBI. He expressed to Papich — — —

MISSING

16 May 67

Tab B   Attention Edward Cohen
From Gambino
re Dade Cty   7 April 77

Morgan associated w/ Agency circa 1951 as a lawyer "cut out" in matters of interest to DDO.

Stuart Pierpont Morgan
DOB 28 May 1913 St Louis

Richard Scully Cain
AKA - Richard Scalzetti SS 357-22-333
1969 Texarkana Tex (Reg No. 17169-TT)

In May 1964 Bolden refused to testify before Warren Comm. in absence of counsel George Howard.

SECRET

Chicago American for 26 Nov. 1963 in column Daly Diary by Maggie Daly - rumor that assassination planned earlier [illegible] Cuban group

SECRET

1 Sept 67 issue of Life

Garrison a guest of Mario Marino, a henchman of Marcello, at Las Vegas hotel. Garrison denied knowledge of Marino's connect to Marcello.

TAB B

TO Chief SRS
Subj. Garri 9 Oct 1967

Info re meeting of Fair Play under Richard Criley (# 346 116)
Source of info on Guillermo ESCOBAR who was 'int' of Horace Speeds (SAS) leads obtaind from Ralp PEREZ (4442
Speed # C199499)
Escobar recruiting Cubans for Communist Party in Chicago.

SECRET

File

7 Dec 1976 DCI for Dep of State
Roselli, Johnny

SECRET

9 August 1976
Blind memo ~~Subj~~: Johnny Roselli

0002298

Tab B & C

Additional info re Trafficante, Roselli, & Giancana contained in material previously released for review re Sturgis.

21 May 1975 Memo by Breckinridge re Arthur Balletti & Fred Haun arrest

1. 12 Jan 1961 Maheu told FBI he recommended DuBois for an LA atty whom he w/n disclose

2. Atty is James Cantillon per a 13 March 1961 report.

3. 22 May 61 FBI memo re conference w/ Col. Edwards who said he contacted Maheu in fall of 1960 for use as a "cut-out" for Giancana. Giancana gave every indication to Maheu he would attempt to accomplish several clandestine efforts in Cuba.

10 Jan 1974
Memo: Chief Western Hemisphere Division
Subj: Salvatore Giancana & Richard Cain
Re: Chicago Tribune Articles of 28 and 31 Dec. 1973
Richard S. Cain # 272141
DOB Oct 1931 in Chicago.

Left vice squad in 1960; Accurate Laboratories.
a P.I. firm

CIA contacts

SECRET

A. Fall 1960

Cain initiated contact w/ Chicago office & volunteered info on Cuban exile groups in Chicago area.

B. June 61

Contacted Lohmann of Chicago Field Office re a Mr. Krouganoly who was negot w/ president of Panama to investigate Communism.

C. Summer 61

Cain met in Mexico City a CIA staffer identity & purpose unknown

D. Oct 1961

Cain wrote to Lohman from Panama offering his services

E. April 1962

Cain makes unannounced visit to Agency reps. Winston Scott & Warren Dean in Mexico City saying he had an investigative agency w/ branches in Chicago & LA which he used to provide training for Mexican Govt Agents

F 4 June 62

Deported from Mexico for [illegible] has troubles & impersonating a Mexican official & working

G. 19 August 63

met in Chicago at Lake Shore Drive Athletic Club & Adolphus Club of Horace Speed WH Div staff officer & Chief of Chicago DCD office

He would like to work overseas for CIA

Cain worked for Cook Cy Sheriff & ~~ge~~ in contact with Cubans in Chicago area & would provide info on undercover activities of Cubans particularly Paulino Sierra

H. 26-30 Aug 1963

Cain info re the Student Directory, a Cuban exile group in Miami

- Miro Cardona's interest in purchasing arms

2 Sept 63 J. DRE people who had purchased arms. (Horace Speed) via Washington & Chicago told Cain to get out of the picture

K. 1967

FBI investigating Cain's assoc w Mob & recommend CIA sever contact

L. 15 April 1972

Cain returned to Chicago from Mexico City; then disappeared 1 May 1972 saying he was going to Latin America. Involved in illegal arms deals (international) & on various occasions stated he was CIA

M. 16 May 1972

FBI agent in Mexico City asked Mexico City Station for traces on Cain

Eastern Airlines pilot id. Cain as skyjacker who had forced him to Honduras. 5 May 72

(/P/

SECRET

27 Nov 63 0002301

By Robt B. P. Johnson

1. Fair Play for Cuba Committee in Feb 63 met at 987 S. Spaulding Chicago under direction of Michael Crilly, Secy of Chicago chapter. Assassination of Pres. discussed

3. LHO purchased rifle in March 1963

Sheriff's office had not established LHO at Feb meeting but strong suspicion he was in Chicago in April 1963 & responsible for firing the offices of UPI

4. Sheriff Ogilvie didn't like FBI so had "officially" asked FBI for info on Fair Play for Cuba; If they developed anything definite they would probably inform FBI

~~Could not recall~~! "that early in 1963 the Chicoms took over operation in US for Fair Play

---

15 August 63

Sandy Smith Chicago Sun Times following up a lead that he call c/A re report Duncan used to get intelligence from Cuba but no info of value.

Said he did not show info to Ed Guthman but to someone in Guthman's office (Justice

SECRET

SECRET

Breckenridge memo to Dept of requests

1. Persons in Sec A of paragraph 3 is contained in over 50 volumes of material
2. Section B lists 3 American citizens.
   Contact is minimal
3. Questions in Section C
   B1 is Artime; Also used by Mafia in Castro operation

Detectives have already interviewed O Connell who is retired.

Tab C

1. Ramon Don Estevez Dominguez (shorty)
   DOB 2 May or 5 Feb 1936
2. Rolando Masferrer Rojas family
   DOB 12 Jan 1918
3. Luciano Nieves (shorty)
4. Jose De La Torriente (shorty)
5. Jose Quintana DOB 3 Oct 45
   reputedly a nephew by marriage to Raul
6. Joaquin Antonio Cortizo DOB 10 Jan 40
7. Manuel Artime

SECRET

TAB C

SECRET

0002303

14 March 1974
Meeting w/ Terry Lenzner

Frank O'Malley referred Hunt to Bob Mullen of the Mullen Comp.
- O'Malley knew Hughes a client of Mullen's, this information picked up in course of a cordial relationship between O'Malley & Mullen in early 60's in connection with Free Cuba Committee.

Hunt & Mullen met in Paris during Marshall Plan
- when Mullen decided to hire Hunt possible impact on cover placements caused consternation.

- ~~Hunt~~ approached O'Malley for an individual having locks & surreptitious entry skills
- Thomas C. Amato apparently referred job.

- Houston
- Early 60s intervention w/ Farrell of I&NS re possible deportation of Braccone
- ask people who knew well Edwards, Osborn, Angleton, Rocca, & Houston

SECRET

1977 Report

SECRET 0002304

AMTRUNK

Designed to identify & later use disaffected personnel in armed forces in Cuba.

Early '63, Nestor Antonio Moreno Lopez & Enrique Cayado Rovera developed Leonardo Plan to overthrow Castro.

Moreno defects in April 1961 & assoc. w/ Jorge Volsky; Cuban citizen of Polish origin. Previously USSR (1940's) & then in Polish Air Force under British Command. Married a Cuban & arrived in Miami May 61.

early 63 Volsky contacts Tad Szulc & met with Goodwin & Hurwitch (State). CIA assigns plan to Miami Station & it is known as AMTRUNK.

Never progressed very far & by Sept 63 had 3 sources including Guin.

Moreno in Oct 63 was removed from AMTRUNK due to indiscretion. He was going to appeal to JFK thru Volsky & Szulc.

Had some contacts but no real action capability; In '65 Guin & Puig arrested.

Szulc & Volsky both Polish & met in Cuba in 195-60

SECRET

Jose Ricardo RABEL Nunez

suspected agent who defected Dec '62 & joined AMTRUNK; returned to Cuba on his own

X in 65 to exfiltrate his family. Arrested & given 30 yrs. but freed in 67.

Accusation RABEL a Cuban agent as early as July 1963.

Possibility -

AMTRUNK might have been an ingenious Cuban plan from the beginning. Only action was laying caches & some infil & exfiltration.

Mob.

NY Daily News 20-25 April 1975 by Paul Meskil.

- quotes Sturgis on assassination attempts including using Juan Orta to bomb Castro. "I recruited him to work w/ the embassy (US)

Sturgis' id of Orta, prior to its disclosure by external investigators, raises question as to what he knew

Office of Security wrote memo in 1975 noting connection betwn Sturgis & Rothman in 1960 citing FBI reports.

(made in conjunction w/ Daily News stories)

Giancana in FBI memo 18 Oct 1960 indicated he had met w/ assassin-to-be. & pills in Castro's food or drink.

Since CIA pills not until Feb 1961, seems that mob had their own plan

✓

- Lorenz claims Sturgis recruited her in 1960

SECRET

000 0
0002307

Varona

FBI 21 Dec 1960
- Mob support for exiles
FBI 18 Jan 1961
V receiving some of that support

Sturgis could have learned of Varona's role after Varona settled in Miami in 1965

FBI report
14 August 1964 records a statement by a person jailed in Cuba w/ Traff.

Other Proposals

1. May 1975
Cuban exile who came to be a contract employee stated that in Feb 1961 he was given a rifle & a mission to kill Castro.
Tried to enter Cuba 3 times & failed

2. May 1977 Anderson column re Antonio Veciana
On 3 occasions (Dec 1960, July 62, Apr 63) he proposed to CIA the assassination of Castro
In 1970 report he made a proposal to an AID employee at an overseas post.

5 Agent Messages in 1961

SECRET

1. 3 of messages involved same group of agents

SECRET

so probly same plan 0002308

1. 27 March 1961 AMBRONC/5

Plan to sabotage electric company in Havana & hit Castro at Sports Palace

2. 29 March 1961

same idea with offensive arrived on 30 March but no comment on assassination

3. 5 April 61

Only arms for 50 men; would try 9 April but need military aid.

a) AMBRONC infiltrated several times & finally executed 30 August 62 after May 62 arrest. Reported as never claiming he was CIA; & not mentioned in McGovern Book

b) AMCOAX 11 ~~both~~ three persons in

c) AMPUG 11 touch w/ AMBRONC

d) AMPANIC 12?) & mentioned in McGovern book; Doing 38 yr sentences.

All 3 people sentenced prior to B of P & none had assassination mission. Only AMBRONC mentioned that!

06, 24

4. 4 June 61 [Moratori of Italian Embassy]

claimed he had plans for invasion w/in 30 days after killing Fidel.

Reply was that info was untrue & (Moratori) unknown.

06

SECRET

2|N

SECRET

5. 3 May 61

0002309

- from a member of Revolutionary Recovery Movement saying they should try to kill "Fidel today"

- Reply was "Lay low"

- Maybe AMPUL 1

Tab D

AMLASH

- Rejects notion that AMLASH a Cuban agent.

- No contact between August 1962 and Sept 1963

- 7 Sept & 9 Sept cables indicate that AMLASH is a "spoiled brat"; hopeless as intell performer; best approach is chief conspirator allowed to recruit his own cohorts."

P 3-4 Summary & Findings

Book V leaves inference that Castro's speech to Dan Harker after AMLASH leak but CIA had not proposed anything at that time & did not meet until 3 Oct 63

Nov 19, 63 AMLASH told CIA officer he was returning to Cuba. On 20 Nov he was requested to delay until Fitzgerald advised "of something interesting" AMLASH

P 26 SSC Final Rpt. SECRET

On 24 Nov. Mexico Station responded to a Headquarters request for names of known contacts of certain Soviet personnel in Mexico, Purpose was to determine significance LHO's contact w/ Soviets.

AMLASH/1 name was included.

But in reference to contact between a member of the Soviet embassy & a Cuban cultural attache. NOT a report of a contact between AMLASH/1 and the Soviet

"A" role - clearly did not know of AMLASH 1963 associations w/ CIA

Table E

24 Nov 63 Subj: Cuban Reaction following Assassination of Pres Kennedy.

28 Nov 1963 DIR 85657 (C/WH/3)
John Wilson - Hudson

29 Nov 63

Acting on FBI request, Agency requests Alvarado be turned over to Mexican authorities.

12 Dec 1963 CSCI-3/779,048 (C/WH/3)
Subj - WILSON, Carlos John

30 Jan 1964 CSCI-3/779,814 (CI/SIG,
Subj: Jack RUBY - LHO

SECRET

20 March 1964 CSCI-3/780/612 (SR/CI/R)
Photo of individual closely resembling LHO

SECRET

10 June 1964 CSCI - 3/781,841 (CI/R&A)
Info re Ruby

6 Oct 64 CSCI-316/01446-64
VIADUCT interview on 9 Sept 1964
His Comments on 7 Photos Forwarded FBI

W C Doc. 1054 Ruby & Associates.

SECRET

June 21/1978

1977 I.G. Report

SECRET

0002312

1. Comments on Book V

The criticisms of the CIA are based on a series of presumptions of how various investigative leads were handled, and on the non-reporting of various Agency operational activities that the SSC Final Report judges to have been relevant to the Warren Commission inquiry.

2. A stated thesis of the SSC Final Report is that the operations of the intelligence agencies against Cuba caused a negative influence on the quality of their support for the W.C. investigation

"It places particular .... investigation p 2

they should have .... facts .. p 7

Certainly .... information. p 7

A central feature of the rationale is the concept that if Castro had learned of these activities it would have provided him with motivation against Pres. Kennedy. The SSC Final Report makes it clear that it feels this ~~theory~~ should have been pursued and accepted at the time by the intelligence agencies (not to mention the WC) leading to a review of the various anti-Castro programs to see what it might reveal.

Agency views the provocation theory in the Final Report to [illegible] form of " the

result of an evolution in perception.
i.e. Provocation existed in 63 from both Cuba & USSR from Bay of Pigs, Missile Crisis; along with the array of US Cuban programs.

"The SSC Final Report has elected to emphasize instead CIA operational activity against Cuba as requiring specific attention.

Review by Agency -

Persons ~~in charge~~ who knew details of 1963 & 1964 operations for the most part are no longer available. Primary reliance on records.

CIA has now conducted such a review - looking at "the other end" of a possible chain of evidence, where they theoretically could have started. This has produced no new evidence bearing on the assassination, altho' it has produced the basis for new lines of speculation. In fact, the review sometimes seemed to become a futile exercise in trying to fit facts to the provocation theory rather than being able to identify evidence actually bearing on the assassination of Pres. Kennedy. The exploration sometimes became one of asking if this activity (whichever was under review) could have provoked Castro to order the assassination President Kennedy had

SECRET

he (Castro) learned of it. The SSC, in its Final Report, fell into this very trap, trying to make the AMLASH operation actually fit the thing for which the SSC's presentation seemed to be tailored!

Tab C

AMLASH

The Agency had only a tentative relationship with this man during Pres Kennedy's life, altho the SSC Final Report – in trying to prove its thesis -- has attempted to present it differently. Because the case is discussed so extensively in the SSC Final Report, it is treated in a separate annex in the paper at Tab D. The key point is that prior to Pres. Kennedy's death the relationship ~~the~~ with AMLASH/1 was amorphous and without substance. Had Castro learned of it he could learn only that there was a contact that had not developed to the point of an understanding.

p 14 New Considerations on the Syndicate Operation

In a series of stories by Paul Meskil in the New York Daily News, of April 20-25, 1975 it quoted Sturgis as follows:

"The third assassination scheme involved planting a ~~bomb in~~ Castro's office. I had access to the Prime Minister's office,' Sturgis said. I knew Fidel's private secretary Juan Orta. I recruited him to work with the Embassy (American embassy in Havana).

"He (Sturgis) has claimed on a number of occasions to have been an employee of CIA, altho there is no record of any such relationship. He was in contact with some of the CIA Cuban employees in the Miami area, but had no direct relationships with the Agency.

"Orta was the director of the Office of the Prime Minister, which gave him the access that would make it possible for him to poison Castro. The plan failed because Orta lost his position, and with it his access, in late January 1961. This was prior to delivery of the poison pills to him in late Feb or early March 1961. Orta's role in this operation was over when he took refuge in the Venezuelan Embassy in Havana in April 1961. He was allowed to leave Cuba in October 1964 and settled in Miami in Feb. 1965.

Same news stories and one 13 June 1974 discuss a possible relationship between Sturgis and Trafficante, also naming a Norman Rothman as a gambling partner of Trafficante. Office of Security wrote a memorandum in 1975, noting a connection between Sturgis and Rothman in 1960, citing FBI reports.

Presumes that Sturgis reported to have had a role in gambling also. Orta's availability due to his "lost payoffs." One could deduce that Sturgis and Orta could have known one another because of their connections with the gambling activities as well as having contacts with the men heading the gambling operations.

June 1976 Story also reports claims by Marita (Marie)^{CIA} Lorenz that she acted on behalf of Sturgis in 1960 re poison pills in jar of face cream.

Quotes FBI memo on Varona: "This seems to confirm some plot involving a woman to kill Castro with poison. However, the timing of events does not fit the time frame known to CIA. While consideration had been given to various schemes, ~~there~~ were no CIA pills for delivery until February 1961. IG suggests that the syndicate may have been moving (U) ahead on its own."

SECRET

In fact, it is possible that Varona already was involved in independent

SECRET

operations with the criminal syndicate when first approached prior to B of Pigs in March 1961 to carry out the Castro assassination, the 1967 IG Report refers ~~to two~~ FBI reports that bear on this. One of them, on 21 Dec. 1960, indicates support by the criminal underworld for some of the Cuban exiles. The other report, on 18 Jany 1961, suggests that Varona was one of those receiving that support, altho' this was not confirmed.

... As late as June 64 another gangster plot in Miami area for 150,000.

Speculation that when Harvey took over in April 1962 case officer felt "there was something already ongoing."

It is possible that CIA simply found itself involved in providing additional resources for independent operations that the syndicate already had underway. . . .

In a sense CIA may have been piggy-backing on the syndicate and — in addition to its material contributions was also supplying an aura of official sanction.

A10

Box 6, 4th Doc. 4

The CIA has publicly stated that it never interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald. Numerous allegations have arisen over the years since President Kennedy's assassination that Oswald either had been or should have been debriefed by the CIA upon his return from the Soviet Union since he appeared to be in a position to provide useful information due to the ~~length of stay~~ unusual duration of his residence and employment there. The claim response that no records exist which indicate a debriefing of Oswald has stimulated speculation that Oswald may have had some kind of Agency relationship either because the contact was not reported through normal channels or because the CIA communicated with Oswald in another manner which alleviated obviated(?) alleviated(?) the necessity for a routine debriefing.

stimulated by the allegation, not the response.

The HSCA attempted to determine: 1) whether Oswald was, in fact, interviewed by the CIA upon his return from the Soviet Union; 2) whether there is an official report of the interview if one was conducted; and 3) the reasons why Oswald would not have been interviewed if that was in ~~fact~~ finality actuality the case.

RETURN TO CIA
Background Use Only
Do Not Reproduce

In response to the Warren Commission's request of ...., John A. McCone, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, submitted an affidavit stating that the CIA had had no relationship of any kind with Lee Harvey Oswald. ~~In this~~ The affidavit, dated 18 May 1964, ~~stated~~ certifies that "the Agency never contacted him, interviewed him, talked with him or received or solicited any reports or information from him, or communicated with him, directly or indirectly, in any other manner." (... Exhibit #870, 17H 866) Mr. McCone's testimony before the Warren Commission on May 14, 1964 gave the same ~~reflects~~ the same assertion as to the Agency's lack of contact with Oswald. Mr. McCone was asked specifically whether the CIA had had any contact with Oswald during his stay in the Soviet Union. McCone replied, "No; not to my knowledge, nor to the knowledge of those who would have been in a position to have made such contact, nor according to any record we have." (Warren Commission Hearings & Exhibits, 5H 123) He also responded negatively to the question of whether the CIA had any personal contact with Oswald subsequent to his return to the United States. (Ibid.)

17H 866 [illegible]
1033-1065 [illegible]
[illegible]

Was it, or was it not, in response to Warren Commission request

?

Malone's affidavit was ~~primarily~~ partially instigated by the appearance of an article on 28 February 1964 in the Northern Virginia Sun which made the following allegation:

~~Alleged that~~ "State Department records show that Oswald had several meetings with the CIA representative in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. During this period, the assassin was seeking to renounce his citizenship. One State Department cable, No. 234, dated November 2, 1959, reports that Oswald was interviewed by the CIA and other embassy officials" (CIA FOIA Document #609-786).

The CIA memoranda reporting this Show information both internally and to the Warren Commission advises that this allegation is totally unfounded. (Ibid. and CIA FOIA Document #610-263). The ~~internals~~ memos explain that the reference to the State Department "cable" is erroneous and that the document to which the article was referring is undoubtedly a State Department "despatch", No. 234, which was dated 2 November 1959 from the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. (Ibid.) (not a new paragraph)

?

According to the internal memorandum, the despatch contained no statement or reference that Richard E. Snyder, who was the Second Secretary of the

U.S. Embassy in Moscow and the only person mentioned by name in the dispatch, had any CIA connection. (CIA FOIA Doc. #[illegible]-75:

However, the memorandum acknowledged that Holt Snyder and Edward L. Freers, the State Department official who signed the dispatch, had had some past connection with the Agency. Snyder had been employed by the CIA for less than one year in 1950 when he resigned in order to assume a position with the State Department. (Ibid.) Although the CIA's ~~Freers had never~~ records indicate the existence of ~~actually been employed by the~~ a history of Agency interest in Freers, he was never actually employed by the CIA. (Ibid.)

The record of the Central Intelligence Agency throughout the years is consistent with the position ~~that~~ as stated to the Warren Commission that the CIA never interviewed Lee Harvey Oswald. A 9 February 1972 letter from Bernard Fensterwald to the Assistant Director of the CIA requests any records pertaining to a "debriefing" of Oswald by or on behalf of the CIA following his return from the Soviet Union. This request for information contrary to the Agency's previously ~~[illegible]~~ stated position appears to be generated by a statement made by Richard Helms on 14 April 1971 before the American Society of Newspaper Editors that "... if there is a chance that if a private citizen travelling abroad has acquired foreign information that can be useful to the American policymaker, we are certainly going to try to interview (CIA FOIA Doc. #961-927-AG). Since Fensterwald cites Oswald as appearing to be such a person.

There follows an exchange of letters between Fensterwald and Angus M. Thuermer who was the Assistant to the Director of the CIA in which Thuermer refers Fensterwald to the testimony of McCone and

Helms before the Warren Commission. Thuermer states that "the testimony is still valid; therefore the information you request does not exist." (CIA FOIA Doc #962-927-AN)

When Fensterwald responds to this answer with a request for Thuermer's own position with respect to the records rather than "conclusions based upon statements of persons other than yourself", Thuermer ends the exchange by stating that his previous response was "a simple declarative statement on the best possible authority that the Agency never had any contact with Oswald and that, therefore, the information sought by you in your letter of February 9th does not exist and never did exist." (CIA FOIA Doc #970-927-AP).

In April of 1978, the HSCA requested that the CIA provide a statement as to whether Lee Harvey Oswald was ever contacted, spoken to or interviewed by anyone directly or indirectly representing the CIA. (HSCA letter to CIA, 4/5/78). The Agency responded in the same manner it had used in responding to previous requests from other sources, by way of referring the Committee to the testimony of Helms and McCone before the Warren Commission and to McCone's affidavit denying any Agency contact with Oswald. (CIA Statement Regarding and Con-tact [illegible] [illegible] [illegible]).

A 25 November 1963 CIA Memorandum (now located in LHO's 201 file as CIA FOIA #435-173-A) is the only documented evidence of any CIA interest in interviewing Oswald. ~~The author of the memo,~~ The memorandum written by [Thomas B. Casasin], stated: "As soon as I had heard Oswald's name, I recalled that as Chief of the 6 Branch I had discussed ~~with~~ sometime ~~the then~~ in Summer 1960 - with the then Chief and Deputy Chief of the 6 Research Section the laying on of interviews through (KUJUMP) or other suitable channels. At the moment I don't recall if this was discussed while Oswald and his family were en route to this country or if it was after their arrival." (CIA FOIA Document #435-173-A).

[Casasin] was interviewed by the HSCA ~~staff members~~ on August 17, 1978. In this interview, he stated that he worked as Chief of the 6 Branch from September 1960 until his reassignment in September 1962. (HSCA Staff Interview of CIA Employee, 8/17/78, p1) He advised that the function of the 6 Branch was to amass information from defectors concerning details about Soviet life which could then be used to assist persons working inside the Soviet Union. (Ibid.) The 6 Branch also relied upon the CIA's Contacts Division and the FBI as sources of this type of information, as well as collecting information from the State Department and the press concerning Americans in the Soviet Union. (Ibid., p.4)

During this interview, (Casasin's) recollection of the discussion mentioned in the 25 November 1963 memo was that it took place during the last days of his tenure with the 6 Branch. (Ibid., p.4) This would have placed the discussion sometime in July 1962. He stated that the date cited for the discussion in the memo must have been erroneous as he was travelling with his family between assignments in the summer of 1960 and did not begin his assignment with the 6 Branch until September of that year. (Ibid., pp. 4-5)

(Casasin) stated that at the time the Oswald case was discussed, he assumed that Oswald must have been sent out of the Soviet Union by the KGB. (Ibid., p.4) Therefore, exercising caution, he did not attempt to debrief Oswald but suggested that Oswald be debriefed by (KUTUMP) which represented the Office of Operations, an office which debriefed persons through its Contacts Division or "other suitable channels" by which he meant the FBI or the Immigration and Naturalization Service (Ibid., pp. 4-5). He ~~did not~~ stated that he did not believe that this had been done at that time because ~~such~~ this type of information would have been routinely passed on to the CIA and to his section if such a debriefing had occurred (Ibid., p. 5). Whatever information he had on Oswald at the time was in the form of State Department dispatches. (Ibid.)

In the memorandum, (Casasin) states that he told his subordinates something to the effect of "Don't push too hard to get the information we need, because this individual looks odd. (CIA FOIA Document #435-173-A). He explained in the interview that this statement reflected the CIA's assessment of Oswald based on the unusual facts that Oswald was permitted by the Soviets to remain in the USSR and was further permitted to marry a Soviet citizen (HSCA Staff Interview of CIA Employee, 5/17/78, p. 5).

¶

(Lesasie) stated that his interest in Oswald as expressed in the memorandum was just a lead and that it was not unusual that there had been no follow-up regarding a debriefing of Oswald (Ibid., p. 9). He wrote no memo at the time of the discussion as it was not customary to write memos regarding leads that were discussed and subsequently ~~left~~ dismissed as being ~~unproductive because being~~ of little unimportance. (Ibid.)

(Walter P. Haltigan), the person to whom (Cassini's) 25 November 1963 letter was written, was then employed by the CIA as Chief of ~~(HSCA Staff Interview of CIA Employee, 6/13/78, p. 1)~~ (Haltigan's) recollection was is the Soviet section of the (Paris station). ~~In 1978 he explained in an interview with HSCA staff members~~ that because of the nature of (Cassini's) position under (non-official) cover, (Cassini) frequently wrote informal memos such as the one in FOIA #435-173-A which were then passed on through the use of cut-outs to the (Paris station). (Ibid.) These memoranda would then be forwarded to CIA Headquarters, generally by (Haltigan). However, in this particular instance, Robert G. (Kempnell), who served under (Haltigan) received and forwarded the memorandum to Headquarters as (Haltigan) was in the hospital. (Ibid.)

~~[illegible] (Ibid.)~~

(Haltigan) expressed the general Agency opinion that had the CIA wished to contact a returning defector, it would have done so through

11

the Contacts Division of the Office of Operations but that it was not standard operating procedure to interview returning defectors because this job fell within the FBI's jurisdiction. (*Ibid.*, p. 2)

¶(Thomas) also told the HSCA ~~(Casasin)~~ stated that the CIA had a specific interest in Minsk as it was ~~known~~ known that the city contained some type of special design plants that may have involved aviation, nuclear energy or bacteriological warfare. (HSCA Staff Interview of CIA Employee, pp.5-6). Consequently, although (Casasin) did not think ~~believe~~ that LHO was working in any type of security facility, he believed that anyone, who would have been in the area of those plants would have been of interest to the Agency. (Ibid., p.6). However, even with the presence of the design plants, Minsk was not identified as a security or military priority area. (Ibid.).

(Casasin) believed that the CIA maintained a large volume of information on the Minsk radio factory in which Oswald worked. (Ibid.) This information was stored in the Office of Research and Reporting. ~~This fact was corroborated by another CIA employee.~~ Another former CIA employee, [Donald Deneslya] DO who worked in the Foreign Documents Division in the Soviet Branch of the Directorate of Intelligence in 1962 told the HSCA that he specifically recalled collecting intelligence regarding the Minsk Radio Plant. (HSCA Class. Interview of CIA Employee, 9/28/78, p.1).

In fact, [Deneselya] 03 ~~[illegible]~~ claims that, during the summer of 1962, he reviewed a contact report from representatives of the CIA's New York field office who interviewed a former Marine who had worked at the Minsk Radio Plant following his defection to the USSR. (Ibid.) This person, who [Deneselya] 03 believes may have been Oswald, had been living with his family in Minsk. (Ibid.) [Deneselya] 03 advised the Committee that the contact report was filed in a volume concerning the Minsk Radio Plant which should be retrievable from the Industrial Registry Branch, which was then a component of the Office of Central Reference in 1962. (Ibid.)

The HSCA requested that the CIA provide the Committee both the above-described contact report and the volume of materials concerning the Minsk Radio Plant. (HSCA Ltr. to CIA [illegible]). A review of the documents in the volume on the Minsk Radio Plant revealed that no such contact report existed in that file. (Outside Contact Report of 10/17/78, JFK Doc. #012.023).

The file review did indicate that in 1975, Daniel Schorr had made a similar request and was informed by the CIA that no such report existed. (*Ibid.*)

The Select Committee on Assassinations requested that the Central Intelligence Agency provide a written statement indicating whether ~~whether~~ the CIA, from 1958-1963, interviewed or debriefed returning American defectors to the Soviet Union as a matter of standard operating procedure. (HSCA letter to CIA, 4/5/78). The Agency was also requested to indicate the circumstances under which an interview would be initiated if such interviews were not conducted as standard operating procedure. (Ibid.)

The Agency's response indicated that the Counterintelligence Staff reviewed the files of 117 persons who had "defected" to the USSR between 1958 and 1963 and who had subsequently returned to the United States. (CIA Memorandum B. Hugh Tovar to Special Assistant to DDO for External Oversight, 4/20/78). This review revealed that only ten of the 117 individuals had been contacted by any component within the CIA and that the CIA had no procedure for the systematic debriefing of such persons. (Ibid.) Instead, the Agency stated maintained that the contacts that were initiated appeared to be based on "opportunity and circumstance." (Ibid.)

Another memorandum explained that the CIA had no standard operating procedure with respect to debriefing returning American defectors

6161

as the Agency relied upon the FBI for reporting the results of interviews it may have conducted in connection with its responsibility for internal security matters (CIA Memorandum, Tovar to Special Asst. to DDO for External Oversight, 5/25/78). The Agency further stated that there were no manuals or regulations for the period of 1958-1963 which specifically address the subject of American defectors. (Ibid.)

In fact, the ten persons with whom the CIA admitted having had contact did not strictly meet the specific requirements as requested in the HSCA's request. Seven of the ten individuals had not actually defected to the USSR during the period 1958-1963, but had resided there for at least ten years prior to 1958 (CIA Memo from Tovar, 4/20/78). Three of the ten individuals returned to the United States and were subsequently debriefed after 1963. (Ibid.) The CIA employee who conducted the research in preparation for the Agency's response told the HSCA that the requirements he had utilized in arriving at his conclusions had been somewhat broader than those requested in order to include all those persons regarded as defectors who were residing in the Soviet Union during the time period in question, rather than just those who actually defected at that time. (HSCA Staff Interview of CIA Employee, 7/21/78).

The House Select Committee on Assassinations conducted ~~[illegible]~~ a review of defectors' files in order to determine whether defectors other than Oswald were routinely debriefed upon their return to the United States. The Committee requested that the CIA provide a list of persons travelling to the Soviet Union during the period from 1958 to 1963, including both visitors and those persons considered by the Agency to be "defectors." ([illegible] HSCA to CIA) ~~The Committee~~ In response ~~was~~ the CIA provided a computer listing of 380 individuals entitled "U.S. Persons Who Have or May Have Defected to the USSR Between 1958-1963." (Attachment to 27 January 78 Memo, E. Hugh [illegible] to S.A. to DDO) The Agency stated that this listing represented ~~individuals~~ U.S. persons, including some non-U.S. citizens who owed some measure of allegiance to the United States, who ~~has~~ either defected or had shown some intention of defecting to the USSR ~~for~~ within the requested time period. (27 January 78 Memo, [illegible] to S.A. to DDO)

As this list was compiled from a more detailed computer program

on American defectors, a more detailed description concerning these individuals was requested and provided in an expanded version of the original list. This machine listing included the following information where ~~available~~ relevant or available for each individual: name, date and place of birth, 201 file number, date arrival in Soviet Union, departure fr. Soviet Union, employment in Soviet Union, most current address, and other miscellaneous information compiled from the individual's 201 file and/or third agency documents regarding this individual.
("Expanded Computer List of U.S. Persons ....")

The Committee compiled a list of persons who appeared, from the information available in the Agency's expanded list, to be U.S. citizens born in the United States, who defected or attempted to defect to the Soviet Union between the years of 1958 and 1963 and who returned to the United States within the same period of time. ~~Also on-~~ In addition, ~~Added to the list were~~ the Committee included individuals from an October 1960 State Department ~~[illegible]~~ request for information from the CIA regarding these persons whom they considered to be defectors to the Soviet Union or Soviet bloc countries.
(25 (Letter from State, [illegible])

Like Tennyson's "Brook" goes on and on and on and on

The HSCA requested files on twenty-nine individuals who fit the above-described criteria and the CIA provided files on twenty-eight individuals on whom they maintained records. ~~Both~~ These 201 files were reviewed as well as any existing Domestic Contact Division files regarding these persons. The HSCA file review revealed that, in the case of six of the individuals, there is no indication that they ever returned to the United States. In some of these cases, the files contained a report from a source who observed or spoke with the subject and then reported the contact to the CIA, but there is no indication of direct contact with any of these persons on the part of the CIA.

In regard to the other twenty-two defectors, the file review ~~indicates~~ shows that there is no record of CIA contact with eighteen of them. Again, four of these files contain a reports by a sources who advised the Agency of their contact. ([illegible])

One file regarding a former military person contains a report of a debriefing conducted by military intelligence. ([illegible])

The circumstances of the CIA's contact with the four remaining defectors differed in each case. The file of one individual reflects that he had

20

actually been living in the USSR since 1933 and returned to the United States in 1962. He was debriefed in 1964 by a CIA officer using [Department of Defense] cover after applying for employment in response to a newspaper advertisement. (Rev. of Irving [illegible] 201 file)[29] Another returning defector, Harold Citrynell, was unwittingly interviewed by a CIA officer [in the American embassy][10] in Copenhagen upon his departure from the Soviet Union en route to the United States. While Citrynell's file indicates that the Agency considered it desirable that a full and controlled debriefing by the CIA and FBI be conducted and Angleton wrote to the FBI suggesting a joint debriefing, there is no evidence in Citrynell's 201 file nor in any DCD documents which suggest further contact on the part of the CIA.

More extensive debriefings were conducted of the other two defectors. Robert E. Webster, a plastics expert with the Rand Development Corporation whose defection to the Soviet Union in 1959 was highly publicized, returned to the United States in June of 1962. ([illegible] Webster had been employed in the Soviet Union at the Leningrad Scientific Institute of Polytechnic Plastics.

E/BR

Shortly after his return to the United States, Webster was debriefed in his home territory by representatives from the CIA's Office of Operations and SR/6 ~~and~~ in conjunction with representatives from the Air Force. It was decided that a more extensive debriefing was in order and Webster was subsequently brought to the Washington, D.C. area where he was debriefed for a period of two weeks. The debriefing reports include a chronology of Webster's life and the CIA's assessment of him as well as a large body of information regarding life in the Soviet Union, Webster's work there and biographic information on persons he had met during his residence there

Likewise, Libero Riccardelli who had lived in the Soviet Union for nearly four years, was contacted for purposes of debriefing ~~shortly~~ soon after his return to the United States in late June of 1963. His initial debriefing included such subjects as his motivation to defect to the USSR as well as well as activities engaged in during his Moscow stay, relocation from Moscow to Kiev and general aspects of life such as residence controls and costs. While the CIA felt it was unfeasible to debrief Riccardelli more thoroughly due to his current status of attempting to regain U.S. citizenship, the Agency expressed an interest in eliciting more information on such topics as cost of living, medical care, consumer goods, highways, transportation and restrictions upon travel within Kiev.

It becomes clear from the review of files on these defectors that debriefing of defectors by the CIA was, in fact, somewhat of a random occurrence. However, in the instances in which the Agency did choose to debrief returning American defectors, the Agency appeared to be interested in topics of general interest regarding life in certain areas of the Soviet Union. In this regard, the persons who were debriefed were similar to Oswald in that they defected and returned ~~for the~~ within the same general time period and each spent his time in the Soviet Union in areas of interest to the CIA.

It appears, from an examination of all available materials, that Lee Harvey Oswald was not interviewed by the CIA following his return to the United States from the Soviet Union. Although persons in a branch of the Soviet Russia Division expressed an interest in interviewing Oswald, they never followed up on this interest. There is also no indication that the Domestic Contact Collection Division of the Office of Operations interviewed Oswald.

While the CIA did conduct interviews of some tourists who visited the Soviet Union during ~~this~~ the period 1959-1963 as well as some American citizens who defected to the Soviet Union and then returned to the United States, there was no standard policy to interview all persons in either category. Thus, the fact that Oswald was not interviewed was more the rule than the exception according to procedures followed by the CIA at that point in time.

HSCA was advised that at time of Oswald's return, there were many Soviet citizens leaving USSR & debriefing program probably concentrated on them.

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10257
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10257
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 08/01/77
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : REEVES, FLOYD L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

REEVES, Floyd
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number　Level　Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD

1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT
8-1-77

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
5	5

Month	DAY OF MONTH																															ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.																																1	1					6	6	
Feb.																																1	1					7	7	
Mar.																																1	1					8	8	
Apr.																																1	1					9	9	
May																																1	1					10	10	
June																												X	X	X		1	1	11	11	3.		8	11	
July					X	X	X			X	X	X	X	X																				8	11	8		0	11	
Aug.																																								
Sept.																																								
Oct.																																								
Nov.																																								
Dec.																																								

Terminated 7/15/78

7

⧄ = 0.5 day annual leave
☒ = 1.0 day annual leave
⧄S = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
⧄A = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
⧄U = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
⧄ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature　Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature　Date

Approved:
Clerk of the House　Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Floyd L. Reeves	7/15/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
254-66-1801	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date July 7, 19 78

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Floyd L. Reeves	8/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
254 66 1801	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Blakey

FROM: Edward M. Evans, Chief Investigator

DATE: July 28, 1977

SUBJECT: Floyd L. Reeves - Investigator

254 66 1801

Mr. Reeves has agreed to take a position with us as Staff Investigator assigned to the Martin Luther King, Jr. Task Force. After an initial period here reviewing the case, he will be assigned to the Atlanta area.

He will start on August 1, 1977 at $24,000.

EME:ek

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______

Signature of Employee

8-4-77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10258
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

Date : 07/08/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10258
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 11/21/77
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : ROBINSON, BARBARA JEAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Barbara J. Robinson	December 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9953	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$16,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. x☐ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:__________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Barbara J. Robinson	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9953	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business_______________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________

ID ____________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll ____________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	Effective Date
Barbara J. Robinson	November 21, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
579-58-9953	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business____________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary*
Researcher	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date November 22, 19 77

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $_______.00 as of ____________

ID ____________

Benefits ____________

Payroll ____________

(Revised: August 1 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Tom Howarth, Budget Officer

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: November 17, 1977

RE: Barbara Jean Robinson

This is to advise you that Barbara Jean Robinson has accepted a position as a researcher on the Martin Luther King Task Force, effective November 21, 1977, at an annual salary of $15,000.

Please extend every possible assistance to Ms. Robinson.

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

Barbara J. Robinson
Signature of Employee

11/21/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10259
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10259
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/27/78
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : SACCO, THOMAS W.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM
(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Wayne Sacco	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042-42-5437	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID __________________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Thomas Wayne Sacco	3/27/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
042-42-5437	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Research Attorney	18,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res.956__of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date___March 29______________________, 19_78__

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
____
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ____________________

Payroll_____________________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1 1977)

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M.

DATE: 23 March 1978

RE: Mr. Thomas W. Sacco

Please be advised that effective Monday, March 27, 1977, Mr. Thomas W. Sacco has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the Martin Luther King Task Force/HSCA. His effective starting salary will be $18,000.00.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

ICM:j

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin

nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law

brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ______________________

____

Signature of Employee

3/28/78
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10260
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10260
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 10/30/77
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : SPEISER, MARK A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mark A. Speiser	December 7, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
023-36-0715	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________
Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ________
ID ________
Benefits________
Payroll________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mark A. Speiser	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
023-36-0715	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$32,000

*If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll _______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mark A. Speiser	October ~~31~~ 30 LS, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
023-36-0715	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$28,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level_________ Step_________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 31, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $___________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M

DATE: October 26, 1977

RE: Mr. Mark A. Speiser

Mr. Mark A. Speiser has accepted the position of Senior Staff Counsel with the Martin Luther King Task Force. His effective starting date will be October ~~27~~ 31, 1977, and his starting salary will be $28,000.00.

Mr. Speiser is a 1972 graduate of the University of North Carolina Law School and was previously employed as an Attorney-Advisor with the SEC. He also spent two years with the Organized Crime Strike Force in the Southern District of New York.

Your full co-operation will be appreciated in familiarizing Mr. Speiser with staff procedures and welcoming him aboard.

ICM:jl

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10261
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 8
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 6

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10261
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 12/28/76
PAGES : 8
SUBJECTS : STRICKLAND, ANN L.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

STRICKLAND, Ann
Name of Employee

Address

Address

Phone Number

Position Title

Position Number — Level — Step

OFFICE OF THE CLERK
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
PERSONAL LEAVE RECORD
1978
YEAR

DATE OF APPOINTMENT 12-28-76

PRIOR FEDERAL SERVICE
.... Years .... Months

ANNUAL LEAVE CATEGORY
1.0 ☐
1.5 ☐
2.0 ☐

BALANCE BROUGHT FORWARD FROM PRECEDING YEAR

Annual Leave	Sick Leave
2	12

Month	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
Jan.												S	S																		
Feb.																															
Mar.			X																												
Apr.					A		S							X																	
May																			X						S	S					
June									S					X	X	X			X												
July																															
Aug.																															
Sept.																															
Oct.																															
Nov.																															
Dec.																															

Terminated 6/19/78

Month	ACCRUED THIS MONTH		AVAILABLE THIS MONTH		USED THIS MONTH		BALANCE AT CLOSE OF MONTH		EMPLOYEE INITIALS
	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	Annual Leave	Sick Leave	
Jan.	1	1	3	13		2	3	11	
Feb.	1	1					4	12	
Mar.	1	1	5	13	1		4	13	
Apr.	1	1	5	14	1	1	4	13	
May	1	1	5	14	1	2	4	12	
June	1	1	5	13	5	1	0	12	
July									
Aug.									
Sept.									
Oct.									
Nov.									
Dec.									

/ = 0.5 day annual leave
X = 1.0 day annual leave
S/ = 0.5 day sick leave
S or S/S = 1.0 day sick leave
A/ = 0.5 day administrative leave
A or A/A = 1.0 day administrative leave
U/ = 0.5 day unauthorized absence
U or U/U = 1.0 day unauthorized absence
▨ = 0.5 day leave without pay
▨ = 1.0 day leave without pay

CERTIFIED CORRECT:

Employee's Signature — Date
(If employee refuses to sign, state reason below.)

Chief's Signature — Date

Approved: Clerk of the House — Date

This record will be forwarded to the Clerk of the House at the end of each calendar year, or in case of termination, along with the request for termination. Upon approval, the record will be filed in the employee's official personnel folder.

EXHIBIT I

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Lyon Strickland	June 19, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
227-75-3525	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________ Specify Date)
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level_________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date June 21, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Lyon Strickland	December 1, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
227-76-3525	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Secretary	$15,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☑ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 1, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

eb

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ____________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll _______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Lyon Strickland	5/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
227 76 3525	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
	$14,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date May 10, 19 77

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

FO 5/11

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Lyon Strickland	4/1/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
227 76 3525	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$26,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date April 29, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

GPO : 1975 O - 57-255

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Lyon Strickland	1/3/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
227 76 3525	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
	$10,000.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 11 of 95 Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date________________, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Henry B. Gonzalez
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Ann Lyon Strickland	December 28, 1976
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Select Committee on Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	Gross Annual Salary
Secretary	$14,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 1540 of 94th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level_________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 23, 1976

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Thomas N. Downing, Chairman
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Select Committee on Assassinations
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:______________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Staff Employees

FROM: Budget Officer

DATE: January 3, 1977

RE: Payroll Certification

Starting with the January, 1977 payroll, the certification to the House Finance Office requires, among other things, the relationship, if any, of each staff employee to any current Member of Congress (those taking office January 3, 1977).

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

- father
- mother
- son
- daughter
- brother
- sister
- uncle
- aunt
- first cousin
- nephew
- niece
- husband
- wife
- father-in-law
- mother-in-law
- son-in-law
- daughter-in-law
- brother-in-law
- sister-in-law
- stepfather
- stepmother
- stepbrother
- stepsister
- half-brother
- half-sister

All staff employees are requested to complete this form and return it to the Budget officer.

Approved
Richard A. Sprague

I am not related ✓

I am related by the following relationship ____________________

Ann Lyon Strickland
Signature of Employee

January 10, 1977
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
           AGENCY : HSCA
    RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10264
    RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88326 Date: 2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10264
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 08/23/77
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : WAXMAN, MEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mel Waxman	December 22, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
087-26-0521	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business ________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date December 11, 1978

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title – If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialized by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mel Waxman	October 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
087-26-0521	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
	$26,300.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 10, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

Chairman
(Title - If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of __________

ID __________

Benefits __________

Payroll__________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Mel Waxman	8/23/77
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
087 26 0521	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Investigator	$24,000

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date August 23, 1977

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title—If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: Mr. Blakey

FROM: Robert J. Lehner

DATE: August 23, 1977

SUBJECT: Mel Waxman - Investigator

O.K.
GRB
8-23-77

This is to confirm that Mel Waxman is starting on the King investigative staff on August 23, 1977 at $24,000 per annum.

RJL

RJL:ek

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☑ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

Signature of Employee

8/23/77
Date

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

```
          AGENCY : HSCA
   RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10265
   RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :
```

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 4

Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 2

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

Date : 07/08/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10265
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 03/20/78
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : WEBB, DEAN B.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dean B. Webb	9/11/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
542-60-3245	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number__________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date September 14, 1978 ____________________
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES, CHAIRMAN
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

____
(Title–If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:____________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $________.00 as of ____________

ID____________

Benefits____________

Payroll____________

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter
or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
Dean B. Webb	March 20, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
542-60-3245	☒ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Research Attorney	$18,000.00

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number______________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 22, 1978

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:_______________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________

ID ______________________

Benefits ______________________

Payroll ______________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

Howarth

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
Elizabeth Berning, Chief Clerk

FROM: G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel and Director

DATE: 17 March 1978

RE: Mr. Dean Webb

3-17-78

Please be advised that effective Monday, March 20, 1978, Mr. Dean Webb has accepted the position of Research Attorney with the Martin Luther King Task Force, HSCA. His effective starting salary will be $18,000.00.

If you have any questions concerning this matter, please contact me at your convenience.

GRB:j

Certificate of Relationship/Nonrelationship to Any Current Member of Congress

Date March 17, 1978

To: Select Committee on Assassinations
(Employing Authority)

☑ I certify that I do not have any of the following relationships to any current Member of Congress.

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepson
stepdaughter
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

☐ I certify that I am the ______________________ of the
(Relationship)

Honorable ______________________.
(Name of Member to whom related)

Dean B. Webb
(Employee)

GPO 16-78695-3

Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10266
RECORD SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

December 8, 1995

Status of Document: Postponed in Part

Number of releases of previously postponed information: 5
Reason for Board Action: The Review Board's decision was premised on several factors including: (a) the significant historical interest in the document in question; (b) the absence of evidence that the release of the information would cause harm to the United States or to any individual.

Number of Postponements: 3

Postponements: All the postponements in this document represent Social Security numbers.

Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because the public disclosure of the redaction could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, and that invasion of privacy would be so substantial that it outweighs the public interest.

Substitute Language: SSN

Date of Next Review: 2017

Board Review Completed: 10/24/95

Released under the John F.
Kennedy Assassination
Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note).
Case#:NW 88326 Date:
2025

Date : 07/08/95
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : HSCA
RECORD NUMBER : 180-10147-10266
RECORDS SERIES : STAFF PAYROLL RECORDS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : HSCA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE :
DATE : 10/03/77
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : WEBB, WILLIAM A.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PRINTED FORM
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/26/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Box 3

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
William A. Webb	12/31/78
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
049-34-8893	☐ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☒ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business__________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________ If applicable, Level______ Step______

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date January 2, 19 79

____
(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

CHAIRMAN
(Title – If Member, District and State)

____
(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

____
(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code________

Monthly Annuity $______.00 as of ________

ID ________

Benefits ________

Payroll ________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
William A. Webb	March 1, 1978
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
049-34-8893	☐ Appointment ☒ Salary Adjustment ☐ Title Change ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date) ☐ Leave without pay (Beginning with effective date above and ending close of business________________________________) Specify Date
Employing Office or Committee/Subcommittee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment, Salary Adjustment, or Title Change, complete appropriate information below.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary***
Staff Counsel	$30,000

* If employee is a civil service annuitant (includes U.S. House of Representatives), the gross annual salary shown should include the annuity received by the employee plus the salary received from the employing office.

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special (Investigative staff of Standing Committee) or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 956 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number_______________If applicable, Level________Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date March 14, 19 78

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

LOUIS STOKES
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

(If appropriate, signature of Subcommittee Chairman or Ranking Minority Member)

(Type or print name and title of above official)

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code___________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00 as of ______________________________

ID ________________________

Benefits ________________________

Payroll ________________________

(Revised: August 1, 1977)

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

PAYROLL AUTHORIZATION FORM

(Please Use Typewriter or Ballpoint Pen)

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Washington, D.C. 20515

(Any erasures, corrections, or changes on this form must be initialed by the authorizing official.)

To the Clerk of the House of Representatives:

I hereby authorize the following payroll action:

Employee Name (First-Middle-Last)	**Effective Date**
William A. Webb	October 3, 1977
Employee Social Security Number	**Type of Action**
049-34-8893	☑ Appointment ☐ Salary Adjustment ☐ Termination (At close of business on effective date)
Employing Office or Committee	
Assassinations	

(If type of action is an Appointment or Salary Adjustment, complete the following information.)

Position Title	**Gross Annual Salary**
Staff Counsel	$28,000.00

(If Committee Employee, complete appropriate item below.)

1. ☐ Standing Committee: Staff—☐ Clerical or ☐ Professional.
2. ☒ Special or Select Committee: Authority—H. Res. 465 of 95th Congress.
3. ☐ Joint Committee.

(If Employee of an Officer of the House, complete item below.)

Position Number________________ If applicable, Level________ Step________

I certify that this authorization is not in violation of 5 U.S.C. 3110(b), prohibiting the employment of relatives.

Date October 11, 1977

(Signature of Authorizing Official)

Louis Stokes
(Type or print name of Authorizing Official)

Chairman
(Title—If Member, District and State)

eb

All appointments and salary adjustments for employees under the House Classification Act and for Committee employees, except those of the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on the Budget, and the Joint Committees, must be approved by the Committee on House Administration.

APPROVED:________________________________
Chairman, Committee on House Administration

Office of Finance use only:

Office Code__________

Monthly Annuity $__________.00

Copy for Initiating Office or Committee

MEMORANDUM

TO: ALL STAFF

RE: Payroll Certification

The Regulations and Accounting Procedures for Allowances and Expenses of Committees, Members and Employees of the U.S. House of Representatives require that, among other things, the Committee's monthly payroll certification include the relationship, if any, of each employee to any current Member of Congress. This certification is signed monthly by our Chairman.

The following are the relationships to be included in the certification:

father
mother
son
daughter
brother
sister
uncle
aunt
first cousin
nephew
niece
husband
wife
father-in-law
mother-in-law
son-in-law
daughter-in-law
brother-in-law
sister-in-law
stepfather
stepmother
stepbrother
stepsister
half-brother
half-sister

Please complete the appropriate portion below, sign and date this form, which will then become a part of your permanent personnel file. If this status changes, you must notify the Committee's Budget Office immediately of the change.

☒ I am not related to any current (95th Congress) Member of Congress.

☐ I am related to a current (95th Congress) Member of Congress. (Please specify.) ____________________

____

Signature of Employee

Oct 3, 1977
Date

MEMORANDUM

TO: Thomas Howarth, Budget Officer
FROM: I. Charles Mathews, Special Counsel I.C.M
DATE: September 28, 1977
RE: Mr. William A. Webb

Mr. William A. Webb has accepted the position as Staff Attorney with the Martin Luther King Task Force. His effective starting date will be October 3, 1977, and his starting salary will be $28,000.00 per annum.

Mr. Webb graduated from the University of Connecticut School of Law in 1974 and for the last 2½ years has served as Assistant District Attorney for Allegheny County, (Pittsburgh) Pennsylvania.

Your full co-operation is expected in familiarizing Mr. Webb with staff procedures and welcoming him aboard.

ICM:jl

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 11/04/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10001-10168
RECORDS SERIES : DOD AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC678001R - PAGES 1420-1431 & 1436-1446

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USAF - OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
FROM : ROBERT H. WAYLAND, JR. COL
TO :
TITLE : PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
DATE : 10/24/69
PAGES : 23
SUBJECTS : MITCHELL LIVINGSTON WERBELL, III

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION - CUSTOMS VIOLATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/08/95
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY USAF
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH USAF HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED RELEASABLE, PER MEMO DTD 13 MAY 96. CLOSING STATEMENT ATTACHED WITH POSTPONEMENTS SECTION(B)3.

TITLE

PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK
Lt Col, FR 35859, SSAN: 513-10-4236

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

REPORT MADE BY
JOSEPH A. CICCONE, SA mp

PERIOD
1 - 9 October 1969

STATUS	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	REPORT MADE AT	FILE NR.
PENDING	OSI District 7	OSI District 7	07D18-1

CHARACTER
CUSTOMS VIOLATION

DATE OCT 24 1969

REFERENCE
ROI, OSI District 45, 17 October 1969

SYNOPSIS

Permission to interview WERBELL granted by IRS. Review of air and surface shipment records, Eglin AFB, FL, failed to disclose any information pertinent to this investigation. WERBELL interviewed by IRS. During interview WERBELL advised that firearms shipped to him by SUBJECT in April 1969 were obtained by him (WERBELL) in Vietnam and registered during amnesty period; however, no authorization was obtained to import these firearms. WERBELL stated that majority of firearms currently being held at Eglin AFB were sent at WERBELL's request by ARPA and authorized by PATTERSON, who thought firearms were for AF museum purposes. WERBELL asserted seized firearms were sent by him to Vietnam after receiving State Department approval and were to be returned to SIONICS by Air Force. No authorization for this action was obtained by WERBELL. WERBELL advised that firearms which were not sent by him to Vietnam, and which were seized at Eglin AFB, were sent to SUBJECT for use in Air Force museums and that, to WERBELL's knowledge, Forms 6 were not filed on any of the seized firearms.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED (AFR 124-4)

DISTRIBUTION

Comdr, Eglin AFB, FL (Action)(w/atch)	2
Dir OSI (w/atch)	2
ATFC(IRS) Atlanta, GA (Info)(w/o atch)	1
OSI District 6 (w/atchs)	2
File (w/atch)	2

WITHIN USAF
This is a privileged document under military law. This report may not be reproduced or given additional dissemination except as authorized by AFR 124-4. If this report is classified see also AFR 205-1.

APPROVED

1420

Robert H. Wayland
ROBERT H. WAYLAND, Jr, Col, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

FILE STAMP

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

#5

OSI FORM MAY 62 6 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

GPO: 1965—758-092

DETAILS:

1. On 1 October 1969, Investigator WILLIAM C. GOODMAN Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Control Division, IRS, Pensacola, FL, was interviewed by SA WILLIAM D. DIXON. GOODMAN advised that as of that date, he had not received any additional information concerning the matter under investigation. GOODMAN was requested to determine if IRS would object to an interview of MITCHELL L. WERBELL III by OSI. GOODMAN advised that he would query his higher headquarters regarding the request, and subsequently, GOODMAN advised that he had spoken to his supervisor in the Atlanta office and that his agency had no objection to an interview of WERBELL, Vice-President and Director of Research and Development of Sionics.

2. On 8 Oct 69 Mr. SHELLEY F. REEVES, GS-8, SSAN 261-50-7220, Shipment Planner, 3201st Trans Sq., EAFB, FL, advised that it was possible for a shipment to arrive at Eglin AFB without any paperwork, such as a Government Bill of Lading (GBL); however, if such shipment arrived by military air, it should be listed on the manifest of the aircraft involved. REEVES added that the Air Transportation Section is required to keep copies of aircraft manifests for one year.

3. On 9 Oct 69 EUGENE D. LAWRENCE, MSgt, FR 407-38-0038, Director of Air Transportation, 3201st Trans Sq, EAFB, FL, made available to the writer copies of all military air shipment manifests for the months of May, June and July 1969. Review of these manifests disclosed no information pertinent to this investigation.

4. On 9 Oct 69, NAOMI J. KING, GS-5, Freight Rate Assistant, 3201st Trans Sq, EAFB, FL, made available to the writer her log of all shipments received from Charleston, SC, from Jan 69 through Jul 69. Review of all GBL's concerning these shipments failed to disclose any information pertinent to this investigation.

5. On 9 Oct 69, WILLIAM N. GRIFFIN, Assistant Regional Commissioner, Alcohol, Tobacco andFirearms Tax Division, Internal Revenue Service, Southeast Region, Atlanta, GA, advised by letter that WERBELL had been interviewed by agents of his office on 16 Sep 69. GRIFFIN advised in summary as follows:

WERBELL stated the 11 Title II firearms shipped by SUBJECT to SIONICS on or about 11 April 1969 were obtained by WERBELL in Vietnam and registered during the amnesty period. SIONICS did not apply for or receive authorization to import these firearms. The Title II firearms received at Eglin AFB, FL during June 1969 were sent at WERBELL's request by ARPA. Col PATTERSON authorized the shipments after WERBELL had told PATTERSON that the firearms were for AF museum purposes. WERBELL reviewed the list of firearms currently being held by OSI at Eglin AFB, FL, and advised that all the sound suppressors, except the one marked HELE 4A, and the Winchester Model 52, Cal .22 rifle, SN 69494B, were the property of SIONICS and were taken or sent to Vietnam by him after approval of the shipment by the State Department. According to WERBELL, the Air Force agreed to send the weapons to Vietnam and return same to SIONICS; however, he could not produce written authorization for this action. WERBELL said the remainder of the firearms were to be sent to SUBJECT for the purpose of Air Force museum displays.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

DETAILS (Cont'd)

WERBELL related that Forms 6 were not filed on any of the firearms either by him or to his knowledge by anyone else. WERBELL concluded that prior to the passing of the Gun Control Act of 1968, the procedures used for exporting and importing of the firearms was the acceptable method with the Statement.

A copy of the letter summarized, with inclosures, is attached to this report of investigation.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Reproduced copy of letter addressed to Col WAYLAND from WILLIAM N. GRIFFIN, Assistant Regional Commissioner, Southeast Region, IRS, US Treasury Department, dated 7 Oct 69, with inclosures (Letter report of Special Investigator CHARLES E. STANFILL, Atlanta, GA, dated 22 Sep 69, with Report of Interview of MITCHELL L. WERBELL III).
2. ROI, OSI District 7, 29 Jul 69
3. ROI, OSI District 51, 2 Sep 69
4. ROI, OSI District 7, 24 Sep 69
5. ROI, OSI District 50, 9 Oct 69
6. ROI, OSI District 5, 14 Oct 69
7. ROI, OSI District 45, 17 Oct 69

FOR COMMANDER, EGLIN AFB, FL
FOR DIR OSI

Copy of Attachment 1

FOR OSI District 6

Copy of Attachments 1 through 7.

FOR FILE

Copy of Attachment 1

PENDING

1422

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

[redacted]

Address any reply to: P.O. Box 926, Atlanta, Ga. 30301
US Treasur Department

Regional Commissioner
Internal Revenue Service
Southeast Region

Date: OCT 7 1969
In reply refer to: ATEA:AWS:rs

Colonel Robert H. Wayland, Jr., USAF
Department of the Air Force
OSI District 7 (HQ USAF)
Patrick Air Force Base, Florida 32925

Wayland
9 Oct 69

Dear Colonel Wayland:

This refers to your letter of September 26, 1969 transmitting OSI Report of Investigation by Special Agent Grover C. Ayers, Jr. concerning Lt Col Paul Arnold Marriott.

We are attaching for your information a report submitted by Special Investigator Charles E. Stanfill concerning this investigation. Further reports will be forwarded when received.

Your cooperation is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

William N. Griffin
Assistant Regional Commissioner
(Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms)

Enclosure

1423

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

September 22, 1969

Chief Special Investigator
Atlanta, Georgia

Special Investigator Charles E. Stanfill
Atlanta, Georgia

Ga. L. I. 69-112 - Fla. S. I. 1176(F)

This report relates to an investigation conducted at the request of Chief Special Investigator, Jacksonville, Florida. The Office of Special Investigations, Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, in conjunction with Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division, Pensacola, Florida, is currently conducting an investigation regarding the alleged illegal importation of certain Title II firearms by Lt. Col. Paul A. Marriott.

On September 16, 1969, Special Investigator in Charge Arbie R. Odom, Jr. and I interviewed Mitchell L. WerBell III, at his residence in Powder Springs, Georgia. In answer to questions asked by Florida, we obtained the following information: (1) The shipment of firearms shipped by Lt. Col. Marriott on or about April 11, 1969, to Sionics, Atlanta, Georgia, contained 11 Title II firearms. These weapons were obtained by Mr. WerBell in Vietnam and registered during the amnesty period. Sionics did not apply for or receive authorization to import these firearms.

(2) The additional boxes of Title II firearms received at Eglin Air Force Base during June 1969, were sent at the request of Mr. WerBell by ARPA, and Col. Patterson authorized the shipments after Mr. WerBell told him they were for Air Force museum purposes. Mr. WerBell was shown a list of firearms contained in the two boxes currently being held by the OSI at Eglin Air Force Base and asked to identify any belonging to Sionics. He stated all the sound suppressors except the one marked HELE 4A, and the Winchester Model 52, caliber .22 rifle, serial number 69494B, were property of Sionics and were taken or sent to Vietnam by him. He stated these were taken over on approval of the State Department, and that the Air Force had agreed to send them to Vietnam and return them to Sionics; however, he has no written authorization. He stated the remainder of the firearms were given to him by authorized persons, and were to be given to the Air Force to put in museums.

Before Lt. Col, Marriott left Vietnam, Mr. WerBell told him he would attempt to obtain captured enemy weapons which he would send to Lt. Col. Marriott for the purpose of museum displays.

1424

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Lt. Col. Marriott told Mr. WerBell he thought the museum would be grateful for them. Mr. WerBell stated he did not file any Forms 6 on any of the firearms and had no knowledge of anyone else filing them.

Sionics is in the business of developing and manufacturing silencers for sale to United States Military Units and United States Allies. Although there are apparent violations of Title II of The Gun Control Act of 1968, it appears from talking to Mr. WerBell that on the part of Sionics, they were unintentional. Mr. WerBell stated that prior to the passing of the Gun Control Act of 1968, the procedure used in exporting and importing the firearms was the acceptable method with the State Department.

Charles E. Stanfill
Charles E. Stanfill

Attachments: 14

1425

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Ga. L. I. 69-112 - Fla. SI 1176(F)

REPORT OF INTERVIEW

With Mitchell L. WerBell III, on September 16, 1969, at 2:30 p. m., at his residence at RFD#1, Powder Springs, Georgia, by Special Investigators Charles E. Stanfill and Arbie R. Odom, Jr.

This interview was conducted in the presence of Sionics President Fred N. Brown and Secretary-Treasurer Jo Florence. It was conducted in the basement of Mr. WerBell's residence, which is used as a laboratory for research and development for Sionics. Mr. WerBell is Vice-President and Director of Research and Development of Sionics. Sionics currently hold Federal Firearms License Number 58-3742, which expires March 31, 1970, as a manufacturer of firearms other than destructive devices, and License Number 58-6156 which expires May 18, 1970, as an importer of firearms other than destructive devices. Sionics is also holder of Special Occupational Tax Stamp Return Number 1-58611 169 85398, as a Class 1 Manufacturer (Firearms), and Return Number 1-58611 169 85399, as a Class 1 Importer (Firearms), both issued for the period beginning July 1, 1969. Sionics was also holder of a Class 1 Manufacturer Tax Stamp for the previous year, however, they did not hold an Importers Tax Stamp. According to officials of Sionics, they were a registered importer under the Munitions and Control Act, registered with the State Department. Mr WerBell stated as follows:

(b) (3)
26 USC 6103

Mr. WerBell said he went to Vietnam in September of 1968 for the purpose of demonstrating "Sound Suppressors" manufactured by Sionics. He stated this trip was authorized by Mr. Stanford of the State Department, Munitions Control, Washington, D. C., who also authorized him to take and send weapons and sound suppressors for demonstrations, however, he has nothing in writing from them. He stated he took some of these weapons with him and sent the rest through the Air Force to Vietnam in care of Col. Fagen. Mr. WerBell stated that in the course of his business and travels, he was able to acquire 12 captured enemy weapons from the date of his arrival through about November of 1968. He said these weapons were given to him by General Dong of the South Vietnamese Army and by other authorized sources. He stated he sent descriptions and serial numbers of the firearms to Sionics in Atlanta, Georgia, with instructions to register them, and then asked Lt. Col. Marriott to ship them to the United States for him. He said he didn't think there was anything wrong with this procedure because of the military involvement, and that he didn't make application for importation of the firearms for the same reason.

1426

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Mr. WerBell said he told Lt. Col. Marriott he could pick out any of the weapons he wanted for the museum, and that he could take any that he had picked from the shipment when it arrived at Eglin Air Force Base. Mr. WerBell stated he wanted the firearms for research purposes, except for the Chinese Rocket Launcher, which he wanted for company display purposes. He stated some of the fighting units of Thailand are being furnished with captured enemy weapons, and that officials of Thailand had expressed an interest in Sound Suppressors for same. Mr. WerBell showed us an AK-47 which had a Sionics Sound Suppressor attached. Mr. WerBell stated before Lt. Col. Marriott returned to the United States, he advised him that he would attempt to obtain other captured weapons which he would give to Lt. Col. Marriott for the purpose of displaying in a museum, and that Lt. Col. Marriott told him he thought the museum would be grateful for them. He said he was hopeful at the time that arrangements could be made to transfer any of the weapons not used by the museum to Sionics, but he could not recall if this had been discussed with Lt. Col. Marriott.

Mr. WerBell stated he collected numerous captured enemy weapons during the next few months, and during that time he sent them in two cases to Eglin Air Force Base in care of Lt. Col. Marriott. He stated he sent these shipments through ARPA, and that Col. Patterson authorized the shipments after WerBell told him they were for Air Force museum purposes. Mr. WerBell again stated he thought there was nothing wrong with this procedure at the time because of the military involvement, and for that reason did not make application for importation of the firearms. Mr. WerBell was shown a list of firearms currently under seizure by the OSI, and ask to identify any belonging to Sionics. He stated weapons listed were the ones sent by him to Lt. Col. Marriott and that all the listed noise suppressors belonged to Sionics with the exception of the one marked HELE 4A, which is one he picked up that has been shot out, manufactured by a competitor. He also stated the .22 caliber Winchester M-52, serial number 69494B, with Scope, serial number 31411, belonged to Sionics. He stated the noise suppressors were manufactured by Sionics and either taken or sent to Vietnam by him. He stated he could not explain why one had no serial number without examining it, however, some of the earlier models had the serial number on a front part which may have been removed. He stated the Winchester rifle was also either taken or sent to Vietnam by him. Mr. WerBell stated as far as he was concerned, all the other firearms were the property of the United States Air Force, although he had hoped any that weren't used by the Air Force would be transferred to Sionics. Mr. WerBell further stated he left many firearms and suppressors in Thailand, which are in the custody of Major Stevens, 46th Group, Special Forces.

1427

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

He stated he was waiting instructions from Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division before attempting to have them imported. He states most of the firearms were taken to Vietnam by him, however, some are weapons that he acquired there. (See attached list).

Mr. WerBell stated on his return to the United States he made an inventory of the firearms received from Eglin Air Force Base and found that he had made several errors when copying the serial numbers from the firearms, and thus some of the firearms had been registered on Form 4467's with wrong serial numbers. (See attached list). Mr. WerBell stated the errors were made by him, and they were made because of the condition of the numbers and the difficulty in reading them. Mr. WerBell said he had not notified the National Office of the errors, however, he would notify them now and ask instructions.

Charles E. Stanfill
Charles E. Stanfill

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1428

PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
Rel. Born: 5 Jun 15, OK
Lt Col, 513 10 4326FR
Eglin AFB, FL

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

REPORT MADE BY	RICHARD H. GRAHAM Ad
PERIOD: 16-21 October 1969	STATUS: RUC
OFFICE OF ORIGIN: OSI DIST 7 / REPORT MADE AT: OSI DIST 51	FILE NO.: 07D18-1
TITLE: CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS	DATE: 29 October 1969

ROI, OSI District 50, 9 October 69

BANGERT, Office of Secretary of Defense/Advance Research Projects Agency (OSD/ARPA) advised he was introducted to WERBELL during Jan 69 by COL. PATTERSON, Dep. Dir., RDC-T, who informed him WERBELL represented SIONICS Corp and the purpose of his visit was to show special weapons. WERBELL produced travel orders approved by American Embassy in Saigon, and authorized by Counselor for Administration, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. Orders specified travel by U.S. Military Aircraft between Bangkok and Saigon with small arms and automatic weapons to accompany him. During Jan 69, YOUNG, Battelle Memorial Institute Laboratory Support Mgr., advised a box containing weapons was received via Military Aircraft, shipped by U.S. Embassy, Saigon, to Bangkok, marked for attention of WERBELL, SIONICS. BANGERT advised PATTERSON suggested in memorandum that weapons in question should be shipped by Military Air to Eglin AFB, FL. marked for attention of SUBJECT. Weapons were subsequently shipped by YOUNG per instruction of PATTERSON. A second box of weapons, referenced in a membrandum signed by SMSGT THOMPSON, Chief, Resources Mgt Div, reflected verbal instructions from PATTERSON to ship box to SUBJECT in same manner as first shipment. THORNE, Counselor for Administration, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, advised ACKERMAN, former Counselor, apparently furnished U.S. Embassy Funding Citation for endorsement of WERBELL's travel orders. ACKERMAN presently attending Stanford University. WONG, Budget and Fiscal Officer, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, furnished copies of travel orders issued to WERBELL, and opined that DOBBS (NFI) accompanied WERBELL during travel to Saigon.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 9

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED WITHIN USAF (AFR 124-4)

OSI District 7 (Comdr, Eglin AFB-Action-2) (w/atch)	4
OSI District 19 (w/atch)	3
Dep Dir OSI (PACAF)(w/atch)	2
(w/atch)	2
(w/atch)	1

This is a privileged document under military law. This report may not be reproduced or given additional dissemination except as authorized by AFR 124-4. If this report is classified see also AFR 205-1.

07D18-1/22

APPROVED

GEORGE W. BLANK, Lt Col, USAF
Commander

1429

OSI DPSE

12 23

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OSI FORM 6b PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED.

Arch 6

07D16-1

DETAILS:

1. ON 16 Oct 69, Mr. WILLIAM A. BANGERT, Assistant Director for Support Management. Office of the Secretary of Defense/Advance Research Projects Agency (OSD/ARPA) was interviewed by SA GERALD A. TRIMBLE and the writer at Bangkok, Thailand. BANGERT elected to execute a signed, sworn statement, the body of which is quoted verbatim as follows:

"This statement is made in response to inquiry by Special Agent Mr. Richard H. GRAHAM, Office of the Special Investigations, The Inspector General, USAF. concerning the person of one Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell, and specifically, the shipment of two (2) boxes containing assorted firearms from Bangkok, Thailand to Eglin Air Force Base, Florida. Only information based on first-hand knowledge and available records is contained in this statement.

"Statement: 1. Mr. Mitchell WerBell

"During the month of January 1969 (exact date unknown) I was introduced to Mr. Mitchell L. WerBell by Col. John V. Patterson, the former Deputy Director, RDC-T in the latter's office. Col. Patterson stated that Mr. WerBell was representing the SIONICS Corporation and the purpose of his visit was to show to the Thai and U.S. staff of the Military Research and Development Center (MRDC) an assortment of special weapons. I attended one of several so-called indoor demonstrations given by Mr. WerBell when I noticed approximately 3 - 4 custom-made, suit-case type containers in which these weapons were transported. When I casually questioned Mr. WerBell how he got these weapons into Thailand he answered that they were flown in from Vietnam by a Thai Royal Air Force transport plane at the request of Air Chief Marshal Dawee, Supreme Command Armed Forces. Concurrently Mr. WerBell produced a set of official U.S. Government Travel Orders approved by the American Embassy in Saigon and authorized by the Counselor for Administration, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. As I recall, these orders specified travel by U.S. Military Aircraft authorized between Bangkok and Saigon and small arms and automatic weapons to accompany passenger.

"2. Shipment of Box No. 1

"Also during the month of January 1969 I received information from the Battelle Memorial Institute Laboratory Support Manager (BMI/LSM), Mr. Ross B. Young, that a box containing special weapons had been received in the MRDC warehouse. The box in question had been shipped via Military Aircraft by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon to RDC-T Bangkok, Attn: Mr. WerBell, SIONICS. The transportation and Movement Document DD Form 1384 listed the contents of the box as "official equipment".

"On 28 January 1969, I notified Mr. Ross B. Young (BMI/LSM) in writing that RDC-T had no contractual connections with the SIONICS Corporation, did not desire to store the equipment shipped by the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, and therefore, to return the shipment to the vendor via the Transportation Officer, Dobbins Air Force Base, Marietta, Georgia.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

"On 31 January 1969, Mr. Ross B. Young, EMI/LSM acknowledged my 28 January 1969 memo cited above in writing and notified me that the requested shipment to the vendor via the Transportation Officer, Dobbins Air Force Base could not be accomplished because of the lack of official documentation required to effect shipment. I instructed Mr. Young verbally not to take any further action until appropriate disposition of the contents of the box in question had been resolved.

"On 3 February 1969, Col. John V. Patterson, Deputy Director, RDC-T suggested in a memorandum to Mr. Young and me that the box in question should be shipped via Military Air Transport (MAT) to Commander, Air Force Armament Laboratory, (DOL-AFSC) Eglin Air Force Base, Florida, Attention: Lt. Col. Paul A. Larriot, FR35859. In the same memorandum Col. John V. Patterson stated that he would attest to the nature and official aspects of this equipment. Several days later I learned from Mr. Ross Young that he had effected the shipment of Box 1 to Eglin Air Force Base on the basis of the instructions received from Col. John V. Patterson. (See Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Shipment of Weapons to A.F. Armament Laboratory, Eglin AFB, Florida, of June 13, 1969, signed: Ross B. Young.)

"3. Shipment of Box No. 2

"A second box, allegedly containing assortment of firearms was delivered to the MRDC warehouse on or about 10 May 1969, according to the Memorandum for the Record of June 13, 1969, signed Ross B. Young. During this time I was on TDY in the U.S. and can only reference available documentation concerning the shipment of this box to Eglin AFB. According to the memorandum cited above, the EMI Laboratory Support Manager, Mr. Ross B. Young was advised by the Deputy Director, RDC-T to ship this box in the same manner similar to Box 1. With the permission of William R. Thompson, Senior Master Sergeant, USAF, I attach a memorandum for AD/PM, Subject: Shipment of Box Containing Armaments to Armaments Laboratory Eglin AFB., dtd 16 June 1969, Signed: William R. Thompson, SMSgt, USAF which was received by me upon return from the U.S."

Any errors in the above statement were typed from the original, which is being retained by OSI District #7, available to proper authority upon request. In addition to the above, BANGERT furnished a reproduced copy of the above described memorandum signed by SMSGT WILLIAM R. THOMPSON, which is quoted verbatim as follows:

AD/PM - WRT:ml

16 June 1969

"MEMORANDUM FOR: The Assistant Director for Program Management, RDC-T

SUBJECT: Shipment of Box Containing Armaments to Armaments Laboratory, Eglin Air Force Base

1431

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

TITLE

PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK
Lt Col. 513 10 4326FR
Eglin AFB, FL

UNITED S[illegible]ES AIR FORCE
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

REPORT MADE BY SA: LAWRENCE K. HARPER is

PERIOD: 12 Nov 1969

STATUS: RUC

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: OSI DIST 7

REPORT MADE AT: OSI DIST 19

FILE NO.: 07D18-1

CHARACTER: CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS

DATE: 18 NOV 1969

REFERENCE: ROI, OSI District 51, 29 Oct 1969

XXXXXX DETAILS:

On 12 November 1969, KARL D. ACKERMAN (former Counselor for Administration, United States Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand), 99 Victoria Drive, Atherton, California, was interviewed by SA ROBERT J. NOVACK and the writer, and related substantially as follows:

ACKERMAN had several conversations with Colonel WALTER ADAMS concerning the practical problems of getting weapons, belonging to a MITCHELL L. WERBELL, into Thailand from the Republic of Vietnam in order that WERBELL could put on a fire power demonstration for the King of Thailand's birthday. At all times during these conversations, ACKERMAN assumed the weapons were WERBELL's wares, and that he had brought them from the United States with him. With this in mind, ACKERMAN stated that he instructed Mr. GERALD T. CARTA to annotate WERBELL's travel orders with a Bangkok United States Embassy Funding Citation number. ACKERMAN said the citation numbers were in a block of numbers belonging to the Embassy, and because he did not feel he had the authority to issue WERBELL any other type of number, he issued him an Embassy number. When ACKERMAN was asked if he knew PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT, he said the name was vaguely familiar but could not recall anything further. When ACKERMAN was asked if he knew EARLENE DOBBS, he stated that he did not, to the best of his knowledge. ACKERMAN stated that his knowledge of WERBELL came solely from ADAMS and other stories he heard around the Embassy of the fire power demonstration to be given for the King. ACKERMAN stated he had no personal knowledge of WERBELL.

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO OFFICE OF ORIGIN

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED WITHIN USAF (AFR 124-4)

DISTRIBUTION	
OSI Dist 7	4
Comdr, Elgin AFB, FL- Action - 2	
DIR OSI	2
FILE	1

This is a privileged document under military law. This report may not be reproduced or given additional dissemination except as authorized by AFR 124-4. If this report is classified see also AFR 205-1.

APPROVED
FOR THE COMMANDER
Robert J. Dean 1436
ROBERT J. DEAN, Lt Col, USAF
Chief, Criminal Inves Div
[redacted]

OSI DIST ______

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 RNB
14 AUG 95

OSI FORM DEC 68 6b PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED. RT CH#7 D-18056 ✓

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

10/23

REPLY TO ATTN OF: AFISIGA (07D18-1)

20 OCT 1969

SUBJECT: Paul Arnold Marriott, Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK, Lt Col, 513-10-4236FR, Eglin AFB, FL

TO: Industrial Security Clearance Review Division (Mr. W. J. Scanlon)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

Reference is made to the Directorate letter of 6 October 1969. Attached for your information is a pending report of investigation which reflects the results of further investigation by OSI.

L. L. FREE, Colonel USAF
Deputy Director for Operations
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General

1 Atch
OSI ROI, DO 50, 07D18-1,
dtd 9 Oct 69

1437

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Underwrite Your Country's Might – Buy U.S. Savings Bonds

[redacted]

TITLE

PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK
Lt Col, 513 10 4236FR
Eglin AFB, FL

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

REPORT MADE BY SA: JEROME J. CASTELUCIO wt

PERIOD: 20-24 September 1969

STATUS: RUC

OFFICE OF ORIGIN: OSI DIST 7

REPORT MADE AT: OSI DIST 50

FILE NO.: 07D18-1

CHARACTER: CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS

DATE: 9 October 1969

REFERENCE: ROI, OSI District 51, 2 Sep 69

SYNOPSIS

Information re: WERBELL, as contained in files of OSI District 50, obtained and set forth. CARTA advised WERBELL, during Jan 69, requested his assistance in shipping various captured enemy automatic weapons and official equipment from Saigon to Bangkok. WERBELL was traveling on a U. S. Invitational Travel Order, without funding citation, authorizing space available travel only from Bangkok to Saigon and return. CARTA stated WERBELL told him he had collected the weapons while in northern sectors of RVN, with U. S. Army Airborne and Special Forces units. Packaging and preparation of Transportation Control and Movement Documents (TCMD) were prepared by U.S. Embassy, Saigon. CARTA did not know why one TCMD reflected antique arms when contents were known to be automatic weapons. CARTA received authorization and funding citation number for WERBELL's shipment from the Counselor for Administration, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok. This was only shipment processed by CARTA for WERBELL. CARTA did not know of or process any shipments for SUBJECT and/or SIONICS, INC.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED WITHIN USAF (AFR 124-4)

DISTRIBUTION

DO 7 (Comdr, Eglin AFB-Action-2)	4
DO 51	2
Dep Dir OSI (PACAF)	2
DIR OSI	2
FILE	1

This is a privileged document under military law. This report may not be reproduced or given additional dissemination except as authorized by AFR 124-4. If this report is classified see also AFR 205-1.

APPROVED

1438

Robert B Pritchard
ROBERT B. PRITCHARD, Lt Col, USAF
Deputy Commander

[redacted]

OSI DIST ____________

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

OSI FORM DEC 68 6b PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED. D-18056

DETAILS

1. On 20 September 1969, Mr. GERALD T. CARTA, Staff Operations Officer, U.S. Embassy, Saigon, Republic of Vietnam (RVN), was interviewed with the assistance of SA RONALD A. CUNDIFF and provided the following information:

During early January 1969, a Mr. MITCHELL WERBELL, a senior officer in an American firm (NFI), came to his office requesting assistance in shipping one or two cartons of captured automatic weapons to Bangkok, Thailand. WERBELL stated that he was a weapons expert and was in the RVN on invitation from the U.S. Government to demonstrate some of his new weapon accessory inventions to the military services of the RVN and Thailand. WERBELL indicated that he had just spent the last 2-4 weeks in various northern sectors of the RVN, with U.S. Army Airborne and Special Forces units. During this period WERBELL had collected various captured enemy automatic weapons. He advised that he needed these weapons for examination, in that he was in the process of designing a new automatic weapon that would far surpass the capabilities of the best foreign made automatic weapon. WERBELL produced an Invitational Travel Order, issued by the USAF Air Attache, Bangkok, Thailand. This travel order was approved by the Counselor for Administration (CFA), U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand. This travel order authorized WERBELL to travel, on a space available basis, from Thailand to the RVN and return. The travel order did not reflect a funding citation, which is necessary to ship any large items aboard a military aircraft. WERBELL stated that he had attempted to ship these weapons aboard military aircraft stationed at Tan Son Nhut AB (TSNAB), RVN, however, because his orders did not reflect the necessary funding citation, he was sent to the U.S. Embassy. WERBELL indicated he was going to use these captured weapons in a fire power demonstration, to be held for the King of Thailand on his birthday, which was on the following Saturday. WERBELL stated he was a personal friend of the King and Queen of Thailand and numbered among his friends many high ranking military and civilian officials of the Thai government. CARTA placed a long distance call to the CFA, U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand. The CFA advised that WERBELL was expected in Thailand by the King for a weapon demonstration, to be held on the King's birthday. The CFA was informed that WERBELL wanted to ship one or two heavy cartons to Thailand. The CFA then gave CARTA the Bangkok U.S. Embassy funding citation, with instructions to have same added to WERBELL's travel orders. He then asked the CFA: "Do you know what he wants to ship?" and the CFA replied: "Yes, it's okay". After this conversation the weapons were packed, along with some items of official equipment, as identified by WERBELL. Transportation Control and Movement Documents were executed and signed by CARTA. The U.S. Embassy, Bangkok, Thailand, funding citation was reflected on these documents. At no time did CARTA examine the contents of the boxes. CARTA identified the Transportation Control and Movement Documents reflected as attachments 1 and 3, ROI, D07, 2 Sep 69, as the ones executed and signed by him. CARTA could provide no explanation as to why one of the Transportation Control and Movement Documents (Atch 1) reflected the contents as antique arms. CARTA stated that he knew of no other shipments of firearms that had been processed by WERBELL. He concluded that he does not know SUBJECT, nor has he ever processed any shipments under SUBJECT's name or for SIONICS, INC.

1439

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

2. On 24 September 1969, a review by SA CUNDIFF of case file 50D24G-133, of which WERBELL is the SUBJECT, revealed the following information:

WERBELL was in the RVN in an unofficial status, with the concurrence of ASD, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH, to demonstrate a noise and flash suppressor assembly for the M-16 rifle, as well as other firearms equipment. He possessed no security clearance. He was to demonstrate his equipment only in the RVN and was then to return to the U.S. Upon his arrival in the RVN, he was given a Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) Identification and Privilege Card (MACV Form 6) for use while in country. The application for this card was filled out by Col WILLIAM M. FAGAN, Commander, Det 6, ASD, TSNAB, RVN. The card, to expire Mar 69, was only to reflect WERBELL was to have BX privileges, and no grade or rank was reflected intentionally. The card that was finally issued reflected equivalent rank of GS-16 and gave WERBELL postal, BX, commissary and check privileges for a period of one year, to Sep 69. The application form was adjusted to show this and someone other than FAGAN placed FAGAN's initials in the appropriate blocks to obtain these privileges.

SUBJECT was the individual who met WERBELL upon his arrival in country, and who took care of getting his weapons registered in accordance with MACV directives. SUBJECT also set up the demonstrations WERBELL was to give.

At the conclusion of the demonstrations, rather than return to the U.S., WERBELL traveled to Bangkok and Korea, utilizing his MACV ID card and dropping names of alleged acquaintances of high reputation in order to show his equipment in those countries. FAGAN obtained the MACV ID card from WERBELL in Bangkok on 8 May 69.

3. On 24 September 1969, a review by SA CUNDIFF of 50D24G-0/86 revealed the following information concerning WERBELL:

FAGAN advised that in Jan 69, WERBELL stated he had captured weapons he wanted to ship back. FAGAN told him he would help through legitimate channels if the weapons were for a government agency; otherwise, he would ship back only the equipment WERBELL brought over. FAGAN heard no more from WERBELL until early Feb 69, when WERBELL stated he was ready to leave and would bring the items to be shipped. He was told by FAGAN to bring the items in an open box, which would be sealed at the aerial port.

FAGAN was unable to locate WERBELL after that meeting until 8 May 69, when he located WERBELL in Bangkok to retrieve the MACV ID card. WERBELL requested FAGAN to ship some gear from Saudi, Arabia, to the U.S. FAGAN again replied he would ship back only the original equipment from TSNAB.

The files contained no further information pertinent to the present investigation.

REFERRED UPON COMPLETION TO OFFICE OF ORIGIN

[redacted]

1440

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

OSP 10/8/69

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

6 OCT 1969

REPLY TO ATTN OF: AFISIGA (07D18-1)

SUBJECT: Paul Arnold Marriott, Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK
Lt Colonel, 513-10-4236FR, Eglin AFB, FL

TO: Industrial Security Clearance Review Division (Mr. W.J. Scanlon)
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Administration)

1. Reference is made to the Directorate letter of 20 August 1969, concerning Subject, and to your letter of 22 August 1969, regarding Mitchell L. Werbell III. Attached for your information is a pending report of investigation reflecting further inquiries by OSI.

2. You may note that on 5 August 1969, a representative of the Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Control Division, Internal Revenue Service (IRS), advised that his agency had initiated an investigation concerning the involvement of Sionics, Inc., in this matter. The IRS representative indicated too, that they proposed to interview Mr. Werbell in the near future and would furnish OSI with the results, including copies of any statements provided. On 2 October 1969, OSI was advised by IRS that they had not as yet interviewed Mr. Werbell, but in view of the USAF interest in resolving this matter expeditiously, would not now interpose any objection to OSI interviewing Werbell.

3. You will be furnished the results of this interview as soon as it is completed together with any other pertinent information made available by IRS or obtained by OSI.

FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

L. L. FREE, Colonel USAF
Deputy Director for Operations
Directorate of Special Investigations
The Inspector General

1 Atch
ROI, DO 7, 07D18-1,
dtd 3 Sep 69, w/atch

[illegible]
OCT 14 [illegible]
RECEIVED

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 RG
14 AUG 95

[redacted]

TITLE PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK Lt Col, 513-10-4236 FR Eglin AFB, FL	UNITED STATES AIR FORCE THE INSPECTOR GENERAL OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS **REPORT OF INVESTIGATION** REPORT MADE BY WILLIAM D. DIXON, SA ep PERIOD 28 Jul - 27 Aug 69

STATUS PENDING	OFFICE OF ORIGIN OSI District 7	REPORT MADE AT OSI District 7	FILE NR. 07D18-1
CHARACTER CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS			DATE SEP 03 1969
REFERENCE ROI, DO 7, 29 Jul 69			

SYNOPSIS

SUBJECT furnished previously prepared, notarized statement, on 28 July 1969, in which he stated substantially the same as in his verbal statement of 17 July 1969. Representative of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Division, IRS, advised his agency had initiated investigation concerning the involvement of SIONICS, Inc., in this matter. Commander, Air Force Armament Laboratory, Eglin AFB, FL advised that they have no contract with SIONICS nor does SUBJECT have authority to ship weapons to SIONICS. ARNOLD and COOLEY advised that weapons are shipped by serial number and denied advising SUBJECT to list weapons as "miscellaneous equipment". BEAUDOIN informed SUBJECT of proper procedure for shipment of weapons. DAVIS advised that AFATL has no contract with SIONICS or any requirement to send weapons to SIONICS.

SPECIAL HANDLING/REQUIRED (AFR 124-4)

WITHIN USAF

DISTRIBUTION	
Comdr, Eglin AFB (Action) (w/atch)	2
Dir OSI (w/atch)	2
ATFC (IRS) Atlanta (Info) (w/atch)	1
US Customs, Mobile (Info) (w/atch)	1
File (w/atch)	2

This is a privileged document under military law. This report may not be reproduced or given additional dissemination except as authorized by AFR 124-4. If this report is classified see also AFR 205-1.

APPROVED

1442

Robert H. Wayland

ROBERT H. WAYLAND, JR, Col, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

FILE STAMP

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 RWG
14 AUG 95

OSI FORM 6 MAY 62 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED. GPO: 1965—758-092

DETAILS

1. On 28 July 1969, SUBJECT Voluntarily appeared at OSI Detachment 710. Eglin AFB, FL and released a previously prepared signed, notarized, undated statement pertinent portions of which are set forth as follows:

Read carefully Att.

> My assignment is Assistant to the Commander of the Air Force Armament Laboratory. I am responsible for many staff duties, the following of which bear directly upon my official actions which were taken in connection with the matter being investigated. (These, of course, are known by Colonel Martin). Although SIONICS never has made a sale to the Air Force Armament Laboratory, or been awarded a contract by the lab, they are working on developments related to laboratory requirements and continue to try to come up with attractive proposals. They are welcome to keep working to meet our requirements as are other contractors who naturally try to make sales.
>
> As AFSC munitions specialist in SEA for the second tour, during 1969, I was directed officially to work with SIONICS in the combat theater. The AFSC Liaison detachment was requested by its chain-of-command supervisor, Colonel Louis Schaffer, AFSC Assistant for Limited War, Hq ASD (ASJ), WPAFB, to afford the SIONICS representative every assistance to include assisting him to get materials in and out of the country (Vietnam), to introduce him to units in the theater to whom he could demonstrate SIONICS items developed to use in combat, to advise and assist him in obtaining quarters and transportation, and in short, to assist him in every way to perform his mission. The recipient of this direction was Colonel William Fagan, Commander of the AFSC Liaison Detachment and my boss in SEA.
>
> The facts in this paragraph are set down only because of the nature of the questions raised by the OSI. First, why did we telephone SIONICS? We have already mentioned the base defense proposal SIONICS wishes to submit and for which they made advance queries. In addition to this subject, SIONICS called frequently to find out if we had received evaluations through the SEA liaison office of the items placed throughout the combat theater as previously explained. Many of these were still outstanding when I left Vietnam. We checked to see if any had been received after each call and called back. Sometimes we were out when called and were requested to call back. Also, of course, there were calls about the shipments. Second, what are our personal relations with SIONICS? AFSC liaison office in SEA and for the Armament Lab as herein explained. My actions have been directed and authorized or no special or unusual favors have been done for SIONICS. I have had only one social contact with Mr. Brown. A few weeks ago, the Browns

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

DETAILS Contd

(of SIONICS) took us to an Atlanta Braves-Los Angeles Dodgers baseball game and the next evening we invited them to dinner as our guest at the Marriott Hotel. We spent more on them than they had on us. We have many contractor friends and acquaintances and are very careful to go "Dutch" in social affairs. This is the standard and the requirement for military people who have dealings with contractors. Regulations prohibit us from accepting any form of gratuity so we make certain we go more than half way in meeting social obligations. We have no especial relations or connections with SIONICS or any other contractor, nor has SIONICS ever suggested or hinted we have any. Further SIONICS has never demonstrated or hinted at any tendency to evade laws, licenses or other requirements.

The original of the above statement is being retained in the files of OSI District 7 and will be available to proper authority upon request. A reproduced copy of the statement is appended to this report as an attachment.

2. On 5 August 1969, Mr. ROBERT CORBIN, Investigator, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Control Division, Internal Revenue Service, Pensacola, FL, telephonically advised that his agency had initiated an investigation concerning the involvement of SIONICS, Inc in this matter but that results of their inquiry were not yet available. CORBIN advised that his agency would furnish the results of their investigation upon completion.

3. On 20 August 1969, William GOODMAN, Special Investigator, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Control Division, Internal Revenue Services, Pensacola, Florida advised Special Agent Grover C. Ayers, Jr. that investigation being conducted by his service is continuing; however, he has not received any additional information from the Atlanta, Ga Office. He advised that upon receipt of additional information it would immediately be made available to OSI.

4. On 22 August 1969, ABNER B. MARTIN, Colonel, SSAN: 251-30-1478FR, Commander, Air Force Armament Laboratory (AFATL), Eglin AFB, FL was interviewed at his duty station and advised substantially as follows: AFATL developes all types of weapons for the USAF, but very few small arms are required, therefore there is little activity in the small arms area. At the present AFATL is developing a survival weapon which is in the small arms area. SUBJECT, as a representative of AFATL while on TDY in SEA could send captured enemy weapons of any type or quantity to AFATL for test purposes, based on his judgment, if he followed established procedures which would include notifying AFATL that such weapons were being sent back. Colonel MARTIN stated that to the best of his knowledge AFATL received no indication or notification that any such weapons were being sent to AFATL. Colonel MARTIN further stated that the enemy weapons in this case could conceivably be used either

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992

DETAILS Contd

in testing or as museum pieces. Colonel MARTIN also said that he felt it unusual that SUBJECT would have such frequent telephonic conversations with SIONICS at government expense. Colonel MARTIN further stated that the AFATL has no contract with SIONICS, nor has the USAF ever had any contract with SIONICS and SUBJECT had no authority to ship any weapons to SIONICS for any purpose.

5. On 27 August 1969, CLARENCE M. COOLEY, GS-9, SSAN 505-32-7744, Logistics Officer, AFATL (ATDA-Log), was reinterviewed at Eglin AFB, FL, and advised that when weapons are shipped by his office, they are always listed by serial number, and he at no time told SUBJECT that he should list a shipment of weapons as "miscellaneous equipment". COOLEY further stated that to the best of his knowledge no shipments are made from AFATL to a non-contractor.

6. On 27 August 1969, PAUL (NMN) ARNOLD, SSgt, FR489-38-5452, Logistics Office, AFATL, Eglin AFB, FL, was reinterviewed at his duty station and advised that at no time did he advise SUBJECT that a shipment of weapons could be listed as "miscellaneous equipment". ARNOLD further stated that weapons are always shipped by serial number, in accordance with the SOP which so specifies.

7. On 27 August 1969, EUCLIDE P. BEAUDOIN, GS-12, SSAN: 087-14-3917, Staff Transportation Office, 3201st Transportation Squadron, Eglin AFB, FL, advised at his duty station that sometime subsequent to 15 July 1969, SUBJECT telephoned him at his office and inquired as to the proper procedures for shipping material to Air Force Contractors; and if a memorandum signed by a "responsible officer" would serve as justification for the shipment. BEAUDOIN stated that he advised SUBJECT that any property being sent at government expense to a contractor had to be contractorally authorized prior to being shipped and to have been cleared through the base contracting office. BEAUDOIN stated that he further advised SUBJECT that the justification should contain the statement that the item being shipped was government property and that receipt of the material being sent by the contractor was advantageous to the government.

8. On 27 August 1969, DALE M. DAVIS, GS-15, SSAN: 232-42-3600, Technical Director of Guns and Rockets, AFATL, Eglin AFB, FL was interviewed at his duty station and advised that prior to Colonel PINKSTON's retirement he had worked in the same facility with him. DAVIS further advised that as early as April or May 1967, his facility had been experimenting with noise supressors manufactured by SIONICS, which were furnished to AFATL at no expense to the government for evaluation. DAVIS also stated that

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

DETAILS Contd

AFATL has no contract with SIONICS nor does he know of any plans to enter into a contract with SIONICS, due to the fact that the Air Force has no need at this time for noise supressors. DAVIS added that in his opinion AFATL would need not more than one of each type of foreign weapon for evaluation by AFATL and he knew of no requirement to send any weapons to SIONICS.

ATTACHMENT

1. Reproduced copy of signed, notarized, undated statement furnished by SUBJECT on 28 July 1969.

FOR ALL DISTRIBUTEES

Copy of attachment

PENDING

1446

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

[redacted]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10001-10169
RECORDS SERIES : DOD AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC678001R - PAGES 1456-1490

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USAF - OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS
FROM : ROBERT H. WAYLAND, JR. COL
TO :
TITLE : PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
DATE : 07/29/69
PAGES : 36
SUBJECTS : REPORT OF INVESTIGATION - CUSTOMS VIOLATION - INITIAL REPORT

PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/08/95
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY USAF
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH USAF HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE PER MEMO DTD 22 AUG 95. OSI FORM 6, FOR PERIOD 7-21 JUL 69. ATTACHED: PAPER CYS OF WEAPON AND MUNITIONS, 2 LTRS, SHIPMENT FORMS AND WITNESS

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE
THE INSPECTOR GENERAL
OFFICE OF SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS

REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

TITLE
PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT
Male Born: 5 Jun 15, OK
Lt Col, 513-10-4236FR
Eglin AFB, FL

REPORT MADE BY
GROVER C. AYERS, JR., SA emp

PERIOD
7 - 21 Jul 69

STATUS	OFFICE OF ORIGIN	REPORT MADE AT	FILE NR.
PENDING	DO 7	DO 7	07D 18-1

CHARACTER
CUSTOMS VIOLATIONS

DATE
29 JUL 1969

REFERENCE
INITIAL REPORT

SYNOPSIS

Investigation requested by Comdr, Eglin AFB, FL on 7 Jul 69, to determine circumstances surrounding importation of 3 boxes of captured enemy weapons by SUBJECT. Two boxes containing a total of 21 weapons, 5 noise suppressors, and related equipment seized. Both boxes marked for SUBJECT. Munitions officials advised boxes were stored at request of SUBJECT. Deputy Comdr, AFATL, advised his agency was queried by ARPA, a DOD agency, about a box of weapons being sent through ARPA channels. Investigation disclosed SUBJECT sent 12 weapons to Eglin AFB from SEA while TDY in RVN in Nov 68. Eleven of these weapons were subsequently shipped from Eglin AFB to Sionics, Atlanta, at SUBJECT's request and at government expense. The twelfth weapon recovered at Eglin AFB. Deputy Comdr, AFATL, advised SUBJECT had no known authority to send weapons from SEA nor to ship weapons to Sionics; Sionics does not have AF contract. Records reflect SUBJECT, since Nov 68, has placed 7 long distance telephone calls to Sionics, at government expense. In verbal statement, SUBJECT advised he shipped one box containing 12 captured enemy weapons from SEA in approximately Nov 68 as part of his assigned duties to assist Vice-President of Sionics; that 11 of the weapons were subsequently forwarded to Sionics in Mar 69, because he considered Sionics an AF contractor. He advised that official telephone calls were placed for same reason. SUBJECT stated he acted as an agent for the USAF in all instances. He declined to execute a written statement at this time. SUBJECT's former supervisor in SEA advised that he did not authorize or direct the shipment of any captured enemy weapons to Sionics. Matter coordinated with U. S. Treasury agents who opined that SUBJECT was in violation of Public Law 90-618.

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED (AFR 124-4)

DISTRIBUTION

Comdr, Eglin AFB (action) (w/atchs)	2
Dir OSI (w/atchs)	2
DO 51 (w/atchs)	2
File (w/atchs)	2

WITHIN USAF
This is a privileged document under military law. This report may not be reproduced or given additional dissemination except as authorized by AFR 124-4. If this report is classified see also AFR 205-1.

APPROVED
1456

Robert H. Wayland
ROBERT H. WAYLAND, JR, Col, USAF
Commander

[redacted]

FILE STAMP

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

OSI FORM 6 MAY 62 PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM WILL BE USED UNTIL STOCK IS EXHAUSTED. GPO: 1965—758-092

07D 18-1

DETAILS

1. This investigation was requested by the Commander, Eglin AFB, Florida on 7 July 1969, based on a request from the Commander, Air Force Armament Laboratory (AFATL), Eglin AFB, to determine the circumstances surrounding the importation of three boxes of captured enemy weapons by **PAUL ARNOLD MARRIOTT (SUBJECT)**, Lt Col, 513-10-4236FR, AFATL, during the approximate period of November 1968 - July 1969.

2. On 7 July 1969, at Eglin AFB, Florida, a letter dated 3 July 1969, from the Commander, AFATL, was reviewed and the body of the letter is set forth as follows:

"1. It is requested that an investigation be conducted to determine if the laws/regulations regarding the importation of firearms have been complied with in the following instance.

"a. Approximately the first week in June Mr Beard of ARPA called Colonel Berkow of ADTC and inquired about a box of enemy weapons that had been shipped through the transportation capabilities of ARPA to Eglin AFB, Attention of Lt Colonel P. A. Marriott. Colonel Berkow called the Armament Laboratory (AFATL) since Lt Colonel Marriott is assigned to AFATL.

"b. A search was made to locate the shipment. Two boxes were found each containing North Vietnamese weapons. Both boxes were addressed as follows: FB2823 USAF (DOL-AFSC) Attn L/C P. A. Marriott.

"c. Subsequently, it was discovered that a shipment of North Vietnamese weapons and ammunition had been received at Eglin in early March and had been reshipped to Sionics Corporation, 1655 Peachtree Street, N.E., Atlanta, Georgia. The attached documents pertain to this shipment.

"2. Colonel J. H. Hobaugh, telephone 882-2763, will be available to discuss in more detail the above information."

The above letter is being retained in the files of OSI District 7 and will be available to proper authority upon request.

3. On 9 July 1969, J. T. KING, Lt Col, 472-12-2614FR, Staff Judge Advocate, 3201st Air Base Group, Eglin AFB, Florida, was apprised of the information contained in the above letter, by **SA WILLIAM D. DIXON**. KING advised that in his opinion, there existed probable cause to warrant the issuance by the Base Commander of an authorization for search and seizure of any captured enemy weapons contained in the storage facilities of the 3207th Armament and Munitions Test Support Squadron (AMTS), Eglin AFB.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

KING also opined that there was probably a violation of Public Law 90-618 (Gun Control Act of 1968), possibly a violation of customs regulations, and possibly a fraud in that government transportation facilities had been misused.

4. On 9 July 1969, DONALD V. THOMPSON, Colonel, 472-12-2614FR, Deputy Commander, 3201st Air Base Group, Eglin AFB, Florida, was briefed concerning this matter, by SA DIXON. Colonel THOMPSON subsequently executed an Authority to Search and Seize, thereby authorizing the seizure of any captured enemy weapons contained in the storage facilities of the 3207th AMTS.

5. On 9 July 1969, a search of the storage facilities of the 3207th AMTS, Building 1270, Eglin AFB, Florida, was conducted by SA DIXON, in presence of JOSIAH C. MUSICK, CMSgt, FR361-07-1904, and CLARENCE M. GREEN, SMSgt, FR250-44-2188, NCOIC and Assistant NCOIC, respectively. The search revealed the presence of two packing crates marked for SUBJECT containing a total of 21 various automatic weapons, five noise suppressors, two range finders, 32 ammunition magazines and a brass plaque mounted on a piece of wood. The crates and contents were seized and taken as evidence against proper receipt and are being held by the evidence custodian of OSI Detachment 710, Eglin AFB, Florida, and are available to proper authority upon request.

6. On 11 July 1969, this investigation was coordinated with WILLIAM C. GOODMAN, SSAN: 579-20-9774, and ROBERT E. SANDERS, SSAN: 150-26-6417, Special Investigators, Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Control Division, Internal Revenue Service (Treasury Department), Pensacola, Florida, at Eglin AFB, Florida. GOODMAN advised that based on the available information, it appears that SUBJECT is in violation of Public Law 90-618; however, he would query his headquarters in Atlanta, Georgia and Washington, D. C. in an attempt to ascertain if SUBJECT had applied for permission to import the weapons or had submitted application to register the weapons. GOODMAN added that his inquiry would be accomplished by the most expeditious means available. GOODMAN and SANDERS requested that they be present during the photographing and identification of the weapons and during all interviews of witnesses and SUBJECT during this investigation.

7. On 11 July 1969, at Eglin AFB, Florida, the weapons were photographed in the presence of the writer, SA DIXON, GOODMAN and SANDERS, by CARL (NMI) CASSULO, SSgt, FR122-14-3910, Photographic Laboratory, Eglin AFB. The weapons are further identified as follows:

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1458

PACKING CRATE NR 1:

1 each Light Machine Gun (ChiCom), S/N 930228

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47) (ChiCom), S/N KZ 10682

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47)(ChiCom), S/N 11062936

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47) (ChiCom), S/N 12057463

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47) (ChiCom), S/N 9004420

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47) (Folding Stock) (ChiCom), S/N 610138

1 each Burp Gun (ChiCom), S/N 368603

1 each Machine Gun (K) (Swedish), S/N 502166

1 each Rocket Launcher (B-40) (Russian), S/N AF 305

1 each Rocket Launcher (B-40) (Russian), S/N 902098

1 each Rifle (M-14) (USA), S/N 4800

1 each Rifle, Caliber .22 (Winchester M-52), S/N 69494B, (w/Scope S/N 31411)

1 each Noise Suppressor Nr HELE 4A

1 each Noise Suppressor Nr 6A

1 each Noise Suppressor Nr 605

1 each Noise Suppressor Nr 19

1 each Noise Suppressor (no number)

PACKING CRATE NR 2:

1 each Rocket Launcher (B-40) (Russian), S/N 424 (w/Scope S/N DB264)

1 each Rocket Launcher (B-40) (Russian), S/N 510 (w/Scope S/N 7078)

1 each Assault Rifle (Swedish), S/N 14449

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47) (ChiCom), S/N 12091918

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1 each Assault Rifle (AK-47)(ChiCom), S/N 12045

1 each Burp Gun (ChiCom), S/N 334002

1 each Machine Gun (M3A1)(US), S/N 607613

1 each Thompson Submachine Gun (US), S/N 255947

1 each Light Machine Gun (w/drum)(ChiCom), S/N 212160

It is noted that one of the above noise suppressors is marked "Sionics."

The above mentioned inventory also revealed the presence of a total of 32 ammunition magazines of various types.

Photographs of the above mentioned weapons are appended to this report as attachments.

8. On 14 July 1969, JOHN H. HOBAUGH, Colonel, 165-05-2634FR, Deputy Commander, AFATL, Eglin AFB, Florida, was interviewed at his duty station by GOODMAN and the writer. Colonel HOBAUGH advised substantially as follows: The first part of June 1969, he received a telephone call from Colonel BERKOW of the Armament Development and Test Center (ADTC), Eglin AFB. Colonel BERKOW stated that he had received a call from a Mr. BEARD (NFI) of the Advance Research Project Agency (ARPA), a DOD agency, who inquired about a box of enemy weapons that had been shipped through the transportation capabilities of ARPA to Eglin AFB, to the attention of Lt Col P. A. MARRIOTT. At this time Colonel HOBAUGH attempted to contact SUBJECT, but was unable to do so as SUBJECT was on leave; however, he left a message for SUBJECT to call him the next day. The next day SUBJECT called Colonel HOBAUGH and was instructed to telephonically contact Mr. BEARD and explain to BEARD the circumstances surrounding the shipping of the enemy weapons. At this time Colonel HOBAUGH went on leave, returning about 1 July 1969. Upon his return to duty, Colonel HOBAUGH was asked by Colonel MARTIN, Commander, AFATL, to look into the circumstances surrounding the shipment of enemy weapons and ammunition to Sionics from Eglin AFB, Florida and at the same time showing Colonel HOBAUGH a shipping document, dated 13 March 1969, requesting the shipment of two boxes of miscellaneous equipment to Sionics, 1655 Peachtree Street, NE, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Attn: Mr. FRED BROWN, signed by SUBJECT. Colonel HOBAUGH further stated that the boxes of so called miscellaneous equipment were found to contain weapons and ammunition and were therefore repacked and shipped by the organizational logistics personnel according to their instructions from SUBJECT.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Colonel HOBAUGH advised that SUBJECT made several conflicting statements concerning his knowledge of how the enemy weapons got into the U.S. from the Republic of Vietnam (RVN). SUBJECT stated that he thought the weapons were registered by Sionics; SUBJECT stated that he thought the weapons were for the museum at Eglin AFB; and SUBJECT denied any knowledge of how any of the boxes of enemy weapons were sent to Eglin AFB. SUBJECT stated to Colonel HOBAUGH that while assigned to 7th Air Force in RVN, he acted as escort officer for MITCHELL WER BELL III, Vice-President of Sionics, and during such duties introduced WER BELL to several agencies. Colonel HOBAUGH also recalled that SUBJECT had stated that WER BELL was in RVN under Air Force sponsorship and was a close friend of the Thai Chief of Staff. Colonel HOBAUGH recalled that Colonel BILL FAGAN was SUBJECT's supervisor in RVN. Colonel HOBAUGH stated that to the best of his knowledge the Air Force museum at Eglin AFB has only a few old Viet Cong weapons as the museum was appointed to display weapons of U.S. origin and the Air Force Laboratory has no test program for enemy weapons. Furthermore, no need exists for enemy weapons at Eglin AFB. Colonel HOBAUGH stated that it is not likely that SUBJECT had any authority to ship any enemy weapons from RVN, and SUBJECT unequivocally had no authority to ship any weapons to Sionics as the Air Force Laboratory at Eglin AFB presently has no contract with Sionics, nor has it ever had a contract with Sionics for any purpose.

9. On 14 July 1969, the following information was disclosed from a review of SUBJECT's administrative records on file at the CBPO, Eglin AFB, Florida:

NAME:	PAUL ARNOLD MARIOTT
GRADE/AFSN:	Lt Col/FR35859
D&POB:	5 Jun 15/Greenfield, OK
MARITAL STATUS:	Married-2
DATE OF CURRENT ENLISTMENT:	9 Feb 51
DATE OF EST:	None indicated
LENGTH OF SERVICE:	27 years, 1 month
AFSC:	2716
EDUCATION:	BA, 1938
MILITARY RESERVE AFFILIATION:	None
SSAN:	513-10-4236
DATE ASSIGNED:	14 Jul 65
DUTY TITLE:	Lab Chief Assistant
ORGANIZATION:	AFATL, Eglin AFB, FL
MAJOR AIR COMMAND:	AFSC
CLEARANCE:	TOP SECRET, 16 Sep 63, Det 1 SHAPE, 1141st USAF Spc Act Sqd, APO 55 NY; Location of file: DO 5

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 #06
14 AUG 95

HOME OF RECORD: c/o Llewellyn Co., 7th at Montgomery, Fort Worth, TX

RACE/SEX: Caucasian/Male

RECORD OF DISCIPLINARY ACTION: None indicated

OTHER PERTINENT INFORMATION: Wife: BETTY B. MARRIOTT, 14 Alexandria Place SE, Fort Walton Beach, FL

Highest Award Held: BSM, 26 Dec 68

TDY to SEA, 28 May to 21 Nov 68

10. On 15 July 1969, OTIS R. FRYE, WS-8, SSAN: 228-10-2575, Freight Checker, 3201st Transportation Squadron, Eglin AFB, Florida, advised at Eglin AFB, that a review of his files revealed a copy of a Government Bill of Lading (GBL) Nr Z-6,684,529, dated 19 May 1969, which reflected an incoming shipment of firearms weighing 183 pounds, from Chief, JUSMAG Thailand, Bangkok, Thailand, through Charleston AFB, South Carolina to Eglin AFB, Florida. The shipment was marked: USAF ARMAMENT LABORATORY (DOL-AFSC) ATTN: LTC P. A. MARRIOTT. The shipment arrived at Eglin AFB, Florida on 2 June 1969 and was receipted for by CHARLIE B. MOBLEY, SSgt, 3207th AMTS on 7 July 1969. FRYE furnished the above document to the writer. A reproduced copy of the document is appended to this report as an attachment. The copy furnished by FRYE is being retained in the files of OSI District 7 and will be released to proper authority upon request. Copy +

11. On 15 July 1969, S. F. REEVES, GS-8, SSAN: 261-50-7220, Shipment Planner, 3201st Transportation Squadron, Eglin AFB, Florida, advised at Eglin AFB that a review of his files revealed a copy of a GBL, Nr F-0,648,922, dated 28 March 1969, with an attached DD Form 1149 (REQUISITION AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT), dated 13 March 1969, Requisition Nr FB2823 9073X100XXX, both of which he furnished to the writer. A review of these documents revealed that an outgoing shipment consisting of one box of small arms ammunition weighing 55 pounds and a box of captured enemy weapons, weighing 140 pounds, was shipped from AFATL (ATEL), Eglin AFB, Florida 32542 (Mr. COOLEY/882-2328) to Sionics, 1655 Peachtree Street N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Attn: Mr. FRED BROWN. The DD Form 1149 reflects serial numbers for the 11 weapons as follows: 4514, 1300273, 35285, 68149, 12099391, 928231, 8414320, 12047120, 411564, 700867 and 930843.

1462

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

A copy of the above mentioned documents are appended to this report as attachments.

12. On 15 July 1969, CLARENCE M. COOLEY, GS-9, SSAN: 505-32-7744, Logistics Officer, AFATL (ATDA-Log), was interviewed at Eglin AFB, Florida, and advised as follows: On 13 March 1969, Sgt ARNOLD of his office advised him that there were two boxes of small arms and ammunition in the logistics storage facility for SUBJECT. COOLEY stated that he advised SUBJECT that the arms and ammunition could not be shipped without authorization. SUBJECT therefore requested by letter dated 13 March 1969 that the arms and ammunition be shipped as miscellaneous equipment to Sionics, 1655 Peachtree Street, Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Attn: Mr. FRED BROWN. COOLEY therefore made the arrangements for the shipment and the DD Form 1149, Nr FB2823 9073 X100XXX was executed. A file containing the following documents was furnished to the writer by COOLEY:

a. Original letter dated 13 March 1969, signed by SUBJECT, requesting Mr. COOLEY to ship two boxes of miscellaneous equipment to Sionics.

b. Form letter dated 8 April 1969, to Sionics advising them of the shipment of weapons and ammunition to them; this letter reflects shipment received on 11 April 1969.

c. Two copies of AF Form 1149 (with air movement designator FB 5629 8325X002, 20 Nov 68) reflecting the shipment of a total of 12 captured enemy weapons, 19 magazines, 2 pouches with magazines, and 1 circular drum, from Hq 7 AF DAFSC APO 96307 to ACK 2823 Eglin AFB, FL 32542, marked: Hold for LtCol MARRIOTT.

The above mentioned DD Form 1149 further reflects that an attempt has been made to obliterate one of the serial numbers from the list of 12 weapons. The effaced serial number appears to be 9473736.

COOLEY advised that the box of weapons was opened on 13 March 1969 in the presence of SUBJECT and Sgt ARNOLD, and that they should have knowledge of the missing weapon.

The above mentioned documents are being retained in the files of OSI District 7 and are available to proper authority upon request. Copies of the documents are appended to this report as attachments.

1463

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

13. On 15 July 1969, JOHN C. LYNCH, SMSgt, FR215-22-3876, First Sergeant, AFATL, Eglin AFB, Florida, furnished to the writer the AF Forms 1072 (AUTHORIZED LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE CALLS) for the period from 1 December 1968 to date. A review of these forms disclosed that SUBJECT placed seven long distance telephone calls to either Mr. FRED BROWN or Sionics at telephone numbers 404-873-3672, 404-873-3673, and 404-366-7120 during the period from 2 December 1968 to 9 July 1969. The documents for the pertinent periods are being retained in the files of OSI District 7, available to proper authority upon request.

14. On 15 July 1969, LIDA R. McEWEN, SSAN: 372-22-1834, Secretary, AFATL, Eglin AFB, Florida, advised that she recalled SUBJECT personally placed a long distance telephone call to Sionics in approximately December 1968.

15. On 16 July 1969, PAUL (NMN) ARNOLD, SSgt, FR489-38-5452, Logistics Office, AFATL, Eglin AFB, Florida, was interviewed at his duty station and advised substantially as follows: On 13 March 1969, SUBJECT informed him that there were two boxes in the AFATL storage facility that had to be shipped out. ARNOLD subsequently went to the storage facility with SUBJECT and Capt JERRY McEWEN where the two boxes were opened and were found to contain weapons and ammunition. Among the weapons there was one that had apparently been damaged in combat and both SUBJECT and McEWEN expressed a great deal of interest in the weapon. ARNOLD stated that he left the storage facility to proceed to packing and crating to make arrangements for the shipment, and SUBJECT and McEWEN were left alone in the facility with the weapons. ARNOLD stated that he did not see either SUBJECT or McEWEN remove a weapon from that area, but he felt that one or the other took the weapon, therefore explaining why only 11 weapons were shipped to Sionics.

16. On 16 July 1969, JERALD B. MASSEY, Lt Col, 711-14-9602FR, Commander, 3207th AMTS, advised at Eglin AFB, Florida that in approximately February 1969, someone from SUBJECT's office called him to ask if a box of arms could be stored for a few days. He assented and the box was therefore stored in Building 1270 until seized by OSI on 9 July 1969.

17. On 16 July 1969, WARREN G. COOK, CMSgt, FR015-16-6519, 3207th AMTS, advised at Eglin AFB, Florida that on 6 July 1969, SUBJECT called and requested that a box of weapons, which was at that time in the transportation storage locker, be picked up by COOK and placed in the AMTS storage area until such time as SUBJECT could get some plaques made so that the weapons could be

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

displayed in the AFATL museum. Sgt MOBLEY was therefore instructed by COOK to proceed to transportation and pick up the box of weapons, at which time the weapons were stored in Building 1270 and remained there until seized by OSI on 9 July 1969.

18. On 17 July 1969, SUBJECT was interviewed by GOODMAN, supra, and the writer at OSI Detachment 710, Eglin AFB, Florida. Prior to the interview SUBJECT was advised of the nature of the investigation; of his rights under the provisions of Article 31, UCMJ; of his right to remain silent; his right to have a lawyer present during the interview; and that he could obtain a civilian lawyer of his own choosing, at his own expense, or if he wished, the Air Force would appoint a military lawyer for him free of charge. SUBJECT advised that he wished to waive his rights and made the following verbal statement:

In approximately November 1968, while assigned to 7th Air Force Headquarters, RVN, as a munitions expert, he was ordered by his OIC, Colonel FAGAN, to assist and support WER BELL, the Vice-President of Sionics, to the fullest extent possible. Therefore, when WER BELL asked SUBJECT to send a box of 12 captured weapons to the U.S., SUBJECT complied by sending the weapons through official channels to Eglin AFB, Florida, as he (SUBJECT) considered Sionics, and therefore WER BELL, an official Air Force contractor. On approximately 13 March 1969, at SUBJECT's request, 11 of the 12 weapons sent to Eglin AFB by him were further sent to Sionics, after FRED BROWN, President of Sionics, assured SUBJECT that the weapons had been licensed and registered with the proper authorities. The shipment was sent to Sionics through official government transportation channels, at government expense. SUBJECT also admitted placing approximately 7 long distance telephone calls since November 1968 from his office at Eglin AFB, Florida to Sionics or FRED BROWN in Atlanta, Georgia, at government expense as he (SUBJECT) stated that Sionics is an Air Force contractor. SUBJECT further stated that he had the twelfth weapon that was sent to Eglin AFB from SEA in approximately November 1968 stored in the lock-up room at Range 22, Eglin AFB. SUBJECT also advised that during the approximate period of February to June 1969, two additional boxes of captured enemy weapons were sent to Eglin AFB, Florida (Attn: Lt Col P. A. MARRIOTT) from Bangkok, Thailand, by (to the best of SUBJECT's knowledge) WER BELL. SUBJECT then asked the appropriate personnel at Eglin AFB to store the weapons for safekeeping and SUBJECT stated that if the weapons were not sent to Sionics, he assumed the weapons would be sent to the Air Force museum at Eglin AFB. SUBJECT further stated that as the officer responsible for the Air Force museum,

1465

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 KDF
14 AUG 95

he had been ordered to procure foreign weapons for the museum. SUBJECT stated that he at all times acted as an agent for the USAF, and at no time acted on his own. SUBJECT subsequently released to the writer against proper receipt, an AKA-47 Assault Rifle, S/N 9473736, one of the 12 captured enemy weapons sent by SUBJECT from RVN in approximately November 1968. It was noted that when SUBJECT removed the weapon from the lock-up area at Range 22, Eglin AFB, that it was marked with SUBJECT's name on the stock. The above mentioned weapon is being retained at OSI Detachment 710 by the evidence custodian, available to proper authority upon request.

19. On 18 July 1969, SUBJECT was reinterviewed at OSI Detachment 710 by the writer, in the presence of THOMAS F. KERN, Capt, 579-46-3076FR, Assistant Staff Judge Advocate, after SUBJECT was again advised of his rights as set forth in paragraph 18, above. SUBJECT advised that based on advice of his legal counsel, he wished to make no statement until sometime in the future. The interview was then terminated.

20. On 18 July 1969, Internal Revenue Service Publication 627 (1-69), Gun Control Act of 1968 (Public Law 90-618), was reviewed at Eglin AFB, Florida by the writer. Pertinent portions of this document are set forth as follows:

"Sec. 5844. Importation

"No firearm shall be imported or brought into the United States or any territory under its control or jurisdiction unless the importer establishes, under regulations as may be prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate, that the firearm to be imported or brought in is:

"(1) being imported or brought in for the use of the United States or any department, independent establishment, or agency thereof or any State or possession or any political subdivision thereof; or

"(2) being imported in for scientific or research purposes; or

"(3) being imported or brought in solely for testing or use as a model by a registered manufacturer or solely for use as a sample by a registered importer or registered dealer;

****

"Sec. 5845. Definitions

1466

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 RWG
14 AUG 95

"For the purpose of this chapter:

******

"(7) a muffler or a silencer for any firearm is included

"(b) Machinegun: The term machinegun means any weapon which shoots, is designed to shoot, or can be readily restored to shoot, automatically more than one shot, without manual reloading, by a single function of the trigger. The term shall also include the frame or receiver of any such weapon, any combination of parts designed and intended for use in converting a weapon into a machinegun, and any combination of parts from which a machinegun can be assembled if such parts are in the possession or under the control of a person.

"(c) Rifle: The term rifle means a weapon designed or redesigned, made or remade, and intended to be fired from the shoulder and designed or redesigned and made or remade to use the energy of the explosive in a fixed cartridge to fire only a single projectile through a rifled bore for each single pull of the trigger, and shall include any such weapon which may be readily restored to fire a fixed cartridge.

******

"Sec. 5861. Prohibited Acts

"It shall be unlawful for any person:

"(a) to engage in business as a manufacturer or importer of, or dealer in, firearms without having paid the special (occupational) tax required by section 5801 for his business or having registered as required by section 5802; or

"(b) to receive or possess a firearm transferred to him in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or

"(c) to receive or possess a firearm made in violation of the provisions of this chapter; or

"(d) to receive or possess a firearm which is not registered to him in the National Firearms Registration and Transfer Record; or

******

"(i) to receive or possess a firearm which is not

1467

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

"identified by a serial number as required by this chapter; or

"(j) to transport, deliver, or receive any firearm in interstate commerce which has not been registered as required by this chapter; or

"(k) to receive or possess a firearm which has been imported or brought into the United States in violation of section 5844; or

******

"Sec. 5871. Penalties

"Any person who violates or fails to comply with any provision of this chapter shall, upon conviction, be fined not more than $10,000, or be imprisoned not more that ten years, or both, and shall become eligible for parole as the Board of Parole shall determine."

21. On 21 July 1969, **WILLIAM M. FAGAN**, Colonel, 533-14-6288FV, **SUBJECT**'s former commander in RVN, was interviewed at his summer home in Destin, Florida. Colonel **FAGAN** executed a sworn statement, pertinent portions of which are set forth as follows:

"On or about 5 Sept 68 I was advised that a Mr. Mitchell Wer Bell of Sionics was arriving at Saigon Airport and would bring some munitions equipment (guns and suppressors) for demonstration ***** "I assigned Lt Col Marriott the task of handling all facets of Mr Wer Bell's visit which he did by meeting Mr Wer Bell at the Commercial Terminal and assisted him to get settled in a hotel. Mr Wer Bell was in RVN as a private citizen and we were aware that he had no security clearance. ******* "I departed on a Trip to CONUS at the end of Nov 68 and returned to Saigon 13 Dec 68. Mr Wer Bell was still in SEA, but I did not know where. I was aware a shipment of guns had gone to Eglin during my absence but had already arranged through the Commander of FTD W-PAFB that we should have shipped such items to FTD and they would forward them to the designated base. I did nothing to counter this Nov 68 shipment as it was going to the A.F. Armament Lab for a "museum". ******

"In early Feb 69 I found Mr Wer Bell and we concluded that he would leave RVN about 17 Feb 69 and he would give me his MACV form 6 and I would ship back only what he brought over. I was very specific about no enemy weapons being involved and if he had such for the Air Force, that I would ship them to FTD as instructed. After my return from my second CONUS trip on 23 Apr 69 I found that Wer Bell did not depart RVN. I asked around for him and heard many stories of his activities and felt I should take direct action. I called the OSI

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

"about 1 May 69 and made a statement and asked them to investigate. About 7 May I heard Mr Wer Bell was in Bangkok at the President Hotel. I went there with a Capt Gaylord and got back the MACV form 6. On 14 May I turned it over to the OSI. I felt that I had closed out our sponsorship, but also felt his (Wer Bell's) activities in SEA warranted investigation. This is why I went to the OSI. I did not authorize or direct the shipment of any captured enemy weapons to Mr Wer Bell and/or Sionics."

The original of the above statement is being retained in the files of OSI District 7 and will be available to proper authority upon request. A reproduced copy of the statement is appended to this report as an attachment.

ATTACHMENTS:

1. Photograph of the weapons contained in packing crate Nr 1.
2. Close-up photograph of first half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 1.
3. Close-up photograph of second half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 1.
4. Photograph of the weapons contained in packing crate Nr 2.
5. Close-up photograph of first half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 2.
6. Close-up photograph of second half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 2.
7. Photograph of light machine gun contained in packing crate Nr 2.
8. Close-up photograph of noise suppressor contained in packing crate Nr 1.
9. Overall photograph of noise suppressor contained in packing crater Nr 1.
10. Exploded view of noise suppressor contained in packing crate Nr 1.
11. Exploded view of noise suppressor with extra piece of equipment contained in packing crate Nr 1.
12. Bore shot of suppressor contained in packing crate Nr 1.
13. GBL, Nr Z-6, 684,529, dated 19 May 1969.
14. GBL, Nr F-0,648,922, dated 28 Mar 69.
15. DD Form 1149, dated 14 March 1969.
16. Letter signed by SUBJECT, dated 13 March 1969.
17. Form letter sent to Sionics, dated 8 April 1969.
18. DD Form 1149, signed by SUBJECT in RVN, reflecting the shipment of 12 captured enemy weapons.
19. Reproduced copy of statement executed by Colonel FAGAN on 21 July 1969.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

07D 18-1

FOR COMDR, EGLIN AFB
FOR DIR OSI
FOR DO 51
FOR FILE

Atchs 1 - 19

PENDING

1470

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

[redacted]


AK 47
AK 47
AK 47
AK 47
9004420
AK 47
B40 RL

CID 15-1 Atch 1



Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1471

Photograph of the weapons contained in packing crate Nr 1.


LT MG (CHICOM)
930228.
AK 47
KZ10682
AK 47
11062936
AK 47
12057463
AK47
9004420
AK 47 (Fol Stk)
6101038
CHICOM BURP
368603
SWEDISH K 9
502166
MAGIZINES
FOR
M-3 Sub-MG

G70 12-1 Atch 2


L7 MG (CHICOM)
930228
AK 47
KZ10682
AK 47
11062936
AK 47
12057463
AK 47
9004420
AK 47 (Fol Stk)
6101038
CHICOM BURP
368603
SWEDISH K
502166
MAGIZINES FOR
M-3 Sub-MG

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1472

Close-up photograph of first half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 1


SWEDISH K 9mm
502166
B40 RL
~~#~~AF305
B40 RL
902098
45 Mag
M-14
4800
Winc. Mod. 5
69494-B

070 12-1 Atch 3


SWEDISH K 9mm
502166
B40 RL
AF-305
B40 RL
902098
M-14
4800
Winc. Mod. 5
69494B
45 Mag
M-16 Mag

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 KNB
14 AUG 95

Close-up photograph of second half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 1.


B-40 Rocket Launcher (Russian) with Scope
B-40 Rocket Launcher (Russian) With Scope
Sor # 510
Assault Rifle
Ser # 449
Chicom
AK-47
Chicom
Chicom Burp Gun
# 334002
U.S M3A1
607613
LMG
w/ drum
MAGS FOR THOMPSON
MAGS FOR M3

GTO 10-1 Atch. A


B-40 Rocket Launcher
(Russian)
With Scope
B-40 Rocket Launcher
(Russian)
With Scope NO 7071
Ser # 510
Assault Rifle
Ser # 149
AK-47
Ser
China
Chicom Burp Gun
# 334002
U.S. M3A1
607613
US Thompson
.45 SMGun
# 255947
Mags for M3
Mags for Thompson
Thompson Mags
Mags for Burp Gun
7.62 MAG
MG
Mags

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1474

Photograph of the weapons contained in packing crate Nr. 2


CHICOM
MG
212160
w/D[illegible]
B-40 Rocket Launcher
(Russian)
With Scope [illegible]B 064
SER# [illegible]04
B-40 Rocket Launcher
(Russian)
With [illegible] HD 7674
Scope [illegible]
Assault Rifle
SER# 14449
AK-47
SER# 1209191
CHICOM


CHICOM
MG
212160
w/Case
B-40 Rocket Launcher (Russian)
With Scope 6064
S/N # 434
B-40 Rocket Launcher (Russian)
With NO 7474
Scope # 5 1
Assault Rifle
S/N # 14449
AK-47
S/N# 1204191
CHICOM

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 KWK
14 AUG 95

1474A

Close-up photograph of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 2.



CPD 15-1 Atch 6



Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG

1475

Photograph of second half of weapons contained in packing crate Nr 2



OTD 16-1 Atch 7



1476

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG

Photograph of light machine gun contained in packing crate Nr 6.



CFD 18-1 Atch 6



Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

1477

Close-up photograph of noise suppressor contained in packing crate Nr 1.



OTD 18-1 Atch 9



Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 KWB
14 AUG 95

Overall photograph of noise suppressor contained in packing crate Nr 1.



OTD 13-1 Atch 10



Reviewed by AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 Aug 95

Exploded view of noise suppressor contained in packing crate Nr 1.



07D 15-1 Atch 11



1400

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Exploded view of noise suppressor with extra piece of equipment contained in packing crate Nr. 1



CD 1542 Arch 12



1401

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

Bore shot of suppressor contained in packing crate # 1.

[illegible] COMPTROLLER GENERAL, U.S. 24 JAN 66

SRA [illegible]8

SHORT FORM, U.S. GOVERNMENT BILL OF LADING
MEMORANDUM COPY

B/L NO. Z-6,684,529

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY TENDERED TO
REA EXPRESS [illegible] (PROTECTIVE SIGNATURE SERVIECE)

TRANSPORTATION CONTROL NO.
AT0995 9139 X001xxx

DESTINATION
EGLIN AFB, FLA. (DDD 30 MAY 69 IPD 03)

MARKS
TRANS PRI 1
M/F: USAF ARMAMENT LABORATORY (DOL-AFSC
ATTN: LTC PA.MARRIOTT

CONSIGNEE (Name and Mailing Address)
TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICER
EGLIN AFB, FLORIDA 32542

F.O.B. POINT NAMED IN CONTRACT

FROM (Shipping Point)
CHARLESTON AFB,S.C.

CHARGES TO BE BILLED TO (DEPARTMENT OR ESTABLISHMENT, BUREAU OR SERVICE AND LOCATION)
FINANCE CENTER
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION, U. S. ARMY
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA 46249

FULL NAME OF SHIPPER
TMO 437TH MAW CHARLESTON AFB,S.C.29404

APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE
PEC62702D =
97X0400.1311 1270 P9G10 0600 S830399 97D[illegible]
~~330/2020/5A77304/77250/220/330/237/57800~~

PACKAGES NO.	PACKAGES KIND	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES (Use Carriers' Classification or Tariff Description if Possible, Otherwise a Clear Nontechnical Description.)	WEIGHTS*	
				8 9 05
1	BX	FIREARMS,NOI (NMFC: 69300) CUBE 8.8	183	
		HANDLE I A W, AFR 205-1		

CONTRACT,PURCHASE ORDER OR OTHER AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT

ISSUING OFFICE
TMO 437TH MAW CHARLESTON AFB,S.C. 29404

CARRIER'S AGENT (Signature)
REA

DATE OF SHIPMENT
5-26-69

ISSUING OFFICER (Signature and Title)
Donald J. [illegible] IA FOR
P.B.BOONE,DAFC ~~TMO~~

DATE
26 MAY 69

*Show also cubic measurements for shipments in co[illegible] where required.

CONSIGNEE COPY 3

1482

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 [illegible]
14 AUG 95

07D18-1 94h-13

Standard Form 1103a
5 GAO 3000
1103-112-06

S. GOVERNMENT BILL OF LAD S
MEMORANDUM COPY

B/L NO. F-0,648,922

TRANSPORTATION COMPANY

TENDERED TO → REA EXPRESS, INC.

TRAFFIC CONTROL NO

STOP THIS CAR OR TRUCK AT

FOR

CAR INITIALS AND NO.

KIND

TRUCK NO.

IMPORTANT

When the original of this bill of lading is surrendered to the initial carrier a memorandum copy thereof so certified must be forwarded to the consignee immediately.

CAR-TRUCK LGTH FT. INS †		MARKED CAPACITY †		DATE FURNISHED †	DATE B/L ISSUED
ORDERED	FURNISHED	ORDERED	FURNISHED		
					28 MAR 6

† FURNISH THIS INFORMATION IN CASE OF CARLOAD OR TRUCKLOAD SHIPMENTS ONLY

RECEIVED BY THE TRANSPORTATION COMPANY NAMED ABOVE, SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS NAMED ON THE REVERSE OF THE ORIGINAL BILL OF LADING, THE PROPERTY HEREINAFTER DESCRIBED, IN APPARENT GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION (CONTENTS AND VALUE UNKNOWN), TO BE FORWARDED TO DESTINATION BY THE SAID COMPANY AND CONNECTING LINES, THERE TO BE DELIVERED IN LIKE GOOD ORDER AND CONDITION TO SAID CONSIGNEE.

FROM

(SHIPPING POINT) → EGLIN AFB, FLA. 32542

FULL NAME OF SHIPPER

TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT OFFICER

CONSIGNEE (NAME AND MAILING ADDRESS)

SIONICS
1655 PEACHTREE STREET, N.E.
ATLANTA, GEORGIA 30309

MARKS

ATT: MR. FRED BROWN

Reviewed by AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 Aug 95

DESTINATION

ATLANTA, GEORGIA IPD:03 DDD:4 APRIL 1969

VIA (ROUTE SHIPMENT ONLY WHEN SOME SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST OF THE GOVERNMENT IS SERVED THEREBY)

CHARGES TO BE BILLED TO (DEPARTMENT OR ESTABLISHMENT, BUREAU OR SERVICE AND LOCATI

FINANCE CENTER
TRANSPORTATION DIVISION
U. S. ARMY
INDIANAPOLIS 49, INDIANA

SEAL NOS.

APPLIED BY:

FOR CARRIER'S USE ONLY

WAYBILL NO. | FREIGHT BILL NO.

APPROPRIATION CHARGEABLE

(0A59-72) 57X3600 289 4769 P6706 GD S527900

CONTRACTORS WILL RETURN UNUSED OR CANCELED BILLS OF LADING TO GOVER MENT OFFICE FROM WHICH RECEIVED.

PACKAGES NO.	PACKAGES KIND	DESCRIPTION OF ARTICLES (USE CARRIERS' CLASSIFICATION OR TARIFF DESCRIPTION IF POSSIBLE, OTHERWISE A CLEAR NONTECHNICAL DESCRIPTION)	NUMBERS ON PACKAGES	WEIGHTS*
		TCN FB2823 9073 X100 XXX		
1	BX	FIREARMS OR PARTS, NOI(NMFC:69300)		140
1	BX	SMALL-ARMS AMMUNITION(CARTRIDGES, SMALL ARM, BLANK OR LOADED)(NMFC:13940) "CLASS 'C' EXPLOSIVES"		55
2	PCS	TOTAL		195
		AUTH: AFM 75-2 PARA 205804 (b) (4)		

5 73

This is to certify that the above named articles are properly described, and are packed and marked and are in proper condition for transportation according to the regulations prescribed by the Interstate Commerce Commission.

James D Brown

IF THIS SHIPMENT FULLY LOADS THE CAR OR TRUCK USED, CHECK ☐ YES

TARIFF OR SPECIAL RATE AUTHORITIES (C/L-T/L OR VOL. ONLY)

CARRIER FURNISHED SERVICE AT ORIGIN ☐ PICK UP– ☐ TRAP CAR–
INITIALS OF SHIPPER'S AGENT

NAME OF TRANSPORTATION COMPANY → REA EXPRESS, INC.

DATE OF RECEIPT OF SHIPMENT

INITIAL CARRIER'S AGENT, BY SIGNATURE BELOW, CERTIFIES HE RECEIVED THE ORIGINAL BILL OF LADING. ☑ YES (INDICATE BY CHECK)

1483

SIGNATURE OF AGENT

PER

CERTIFICATE OF ISSUING OFFICER

I CERTIFY THAT THIS SHIPMENT IS MADE PURSUANT TO THE TERMS OF CONTRA OR PURCHASE ORDER NO. SEE ABOVE DATED
OR OTHER AUTHORITY FOR SHIPMENT. F.O.B. POINT NAMED IN CONTRACT

ISSUING OFFICE EGLIN AFB, FLA.

TA/TMO ~~Xxx~~

SIGNATURE OF ISSUING OFFICER GEORGE HOLLINHEAD JR, TMO

DATE

TITLE

MEMORANDUM COPY

CARRIER FURNISHED SERVICE AT DESTINATION. ☐ DELIVERY– ☐ TRAP CA

07D18-1

AYCL-14

SHIPPING CONTAINER TALLY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

REQUISITION AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT

SHEET NO.	NO. OF SHEETS	5. REQUISITION DATE	6. REQUISITION NO.
1	1	9073	FB2823 9073 X100XXX

1. FROM
AFATL (ATEL) Eglin AFB, Fla. 32542 (Mr. Cooley/882-2328)

2. TO
[redacted]
Atlanta, Ga. 30309

3. SHIP TO - MARK FOR
SIONICS
1655 Peachtree Street N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Attn: Mr. Fred Brown

7. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED:

8. PRIORITY: 03

9. AUTHORITY OR PURPOSE: Ltr ATS 13 Mar 69

10. SIGNATURE: A McCauley

11a. VOUCHER NUMBER AND DATE: 70T00641

b. VOUCHER NUMBER AND DATE:

12. DATE SHIPPED: 091

13. MODE OF SHIPMENT: TRUCK

14. BILL OF LADING NUMBER: F0648922

15. AIR MOVEMENT DESIGNATOR OR PORT REFERENCE NUMBER:

ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA

ITEM NO. a	FEDERAL STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES b	UNIT OF ISSUE c	QUANTITY REQUESTED d	SUPPLY ACTION e	TYPE CONTAINER f	CONTAINER NOS. g	UNIT PRICE h	TOTAL COST i
1	Captured Enemy Weapons, Serial #4514; 1300273; 35285; 689149; 12099391; 928231; 8414320; 12047120; 411564; 700867; 930843.	ea	11	V-11				14
2	Box Small Arms Ammo. 7.62	ea	1	V-1				
	XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX LAST ITEM XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX				1	Box	55# 3 cu	13940
	put ICC description				1	Box	140# 6 cu.	69300
	Item #2 is A class 'C' Explosive.							
	Signed receipt requested by this organization							

16. TRANSPORTATION VIA MATS OR MSTS CHARGEABLE TO

17. SPECIAL HANDLING

18. RECAPITULATION OF SHIPMENT		TOTAL CONTAINERS	TYPE CONTAINER	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL WEIGHT	TOTAL CUBE
ISSUED BY		1	[illegible]	20X14X13	55	3
CHECKED BY		1	[illegible]	45X15X15	140	6
PACKED BY						
		2	←	TOTAL →	195	9

19. RECEIPT	DATE	BY
CONTAINERS RECEIVED EXCEPT AS NOTED		
QUANTITIES RECEIVED EXCEPT AS NOTED		
POSTED		

VOUCHER NO.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

DD FORM 1 MAR 59 1149 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED

07018-1

9td. 15

AF AT I-R
67-3

MISC

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE ARMAMENT LABORATORY (AFSC)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: ATS (882-1640)

13 March 1969

SUBJECT: Shipment of Miscellaneous Equipment

TO: ATEL (Mr. Clarence M. Cooley)

1. Please ship two boxes of miscellaneous equipment to:

SIONICS
1655 Peachtree Street, N.E.
Atlanta, Georgia 30309
Attn: Mr. Fred Brown

2. It will be necessary to add packing material and band the boxes prior to shipment.

3. Sgt Arnold knows which boxes are to be shipped and their location. I suggest he handle the project.

4. Please make this a priority shipment.

PAUL A. MARRIOTT, Lt Col, USAF
Assistant for Systems Support

FB2823 9073 X100XXX

70T00641

Loading Area
Sgt Musick 3530
Bldg — 1247

1485

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 JHB
14 AUG 95

07D18-1

9Ch-16

MISC

E#69

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
AIR FORCE ARMAMENT LABORATORY (AFSC)
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 32542

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: ATEL (Mr. Cooley/882-2328) 8 April 1969

SUBJECT: Shipment of Project Support Equipment, Project Number Misc.

TO: Sionics
1655 Peachtree St. NE
Attn: Mr. Fred Brown
Atalanta, Ga. 30309

1. The following equipment/supplies is being shipped to your activity on the subject project number:

Nomenclature	Stock/Part No.	Qty	Requisition Number GBL or Air Bill
Weapons	N/A	11	FB2823 9073 X100XXX Shipped 1 Apr 69 REA Express GBL F0648922
Magazines	N/A	19	
Pouches	N/A	2	
Circular Drum	N/A	1	
7.62 Munition in clips			

2. Please notify this office (ATEL) if the listed property is not received by the required in-place date of 15 Apr 69.

3. Immediately upon receipt of all the listed property, please sign below and return one copy of this letter to AFATL (ATEL/Mr. Cooley), Eglin AFB, Florida, 32542. Reply required for accounting purposes.

FOR THE COMMANDER

Wm F. Kindred
WM F. KINDRED
Logistics Support Officer

THE ABOVE LISTED MATERIEL
WAS RECEIVED ON 4-11-69
Date

Florence 4-11-69
Signature and Date

1486

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

07D 18-1

atch-17

AFSC - EGLIN AFB, FLA.

SHIPPING CONTAINER TALLY 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

REQUISITION AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT

SHEET NO. 1
NO. OF SHEETS
5. REQUISITION DATE
6. REQUISITION NO.

1. FROM HQ 7AF DAFSC APO 96307 (4874/4163)
7. DATE MATERIEL REQUIRED
8. PRIORITY

2. TO ACK 2823 EGLIN AFB, FLA. 32542
9. AUTHORITY OR PURPOSE OFL USE AF ARM. LAB.
10. SIGNATURE Marriott L/Col
11a. VOUCHER NUMBER AND DATE

3. SHIP TO - MARK FOR HOLD FOR L/COL MARRIOTT
12. DATE SHIPPED
b. VOUCHER NUMBER AND DATE
13. MODE OF SHIPMENT
14. BILL OF LADING NUMBER
15. AIR MOVEMENT DESIGNATOR OR PORT REFERENCE NUMBER FB 5269 8225 X002

4. ACCOUNTING AND FUNDING DATA

ITEM NO. a	FEDERAL STOCK NUMBER, DESCRIPTION, AND CODING OF MATERIEL AND/OR SERVICES b	UNIT OF ISSUE c	QUANTITY REQUESTED d	SUPPLY ACTION e	TYPE CON-TAINER f	CON-TAINER NOS. g	UNIT PRICE h	TOTAL COST i
	CAPTURED ENEMY WEAPONS [redacted] 4574; 800273; 35285; 689149; 12099391; 928231; 8414320; 12047120; 411564; 700867; 930843		12					1487
	MAGAZINES		19					
	POUCHES WITH MAGAZINES		2					
	CIRCULAR DRUM		1					

16. TRANSPORTATION VIA MATS OR MSTS CHARGEABLE TO

17. SPECIAL HANDLING

18. RECAPITULATION OF SHIPMENT		TOTAL CONTAINERS	TYPE CON-TAINER	DESCRIPTION	TOTAL WEIGHT	TOTAL CUBE
	ISSUED BY					
	CHECKED BY					
	PACKED BY			← TOTAL →		

19. RECEIPT				
	CONTAINERS RECEIVED EXCEPT AS NOTED	DATE	BY	SHEET TOTAL
	QUANTITIES RECEIVED EXCEPT AS NOTED	DATE		
	POSTED	DATE		NO.

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

DD FORM 1 MAR 59 1149 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 … 95 96 97 98 99 100

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 MAY 58 WHICH MAY BE USED

07D 181

9kh-18

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 RDG
14 AUG 95

STATEMENT OF WITNESS

Destin Flordia
(Place)
21 July 69
(Date)

I, Col. William M. Fagan 533-14-6288 FV, hereby state that Grover A. Ayers, JR has identified himself to me as Special Agent - OSI USAF.
(Special Agent OSI, Air Police Investigator, Other—Specify)

I do hereby voluntarily and of my own free will make the following statement without having been subjected to any coercion, unlawful influence or unlawful inducement.

On or about 5 Sept 68 I was advised that a Mr. Mitchell WerBell of Sionics was arriving at Saigon Airport and would bring some munitions equipment (guns and suppressors) for demonstration to Air Force units and other U.S. forces as we in Det 6 of ASD (AFSC) thought worthwhile. The prime piece of equipment to be demonstrated was the Sionics Suppressor. This notice of arrival came from ASD (ASJ) Wright-Patterson AFB Ohio. I assigned Lt Col Marriott the task of handling all facets of Mr WerBell's visit which he did by meeting Mr WerBell at the Commercial Terminal and assisted him to get settled in a hotel. Mr WerBell was in RVN as a private citizen and we were aware that he had no security clearance. We hosted him to the extent that we obtained a MACV form 6, Identification and Privilage Card, and Col Marriott, at my instructions, set up a demonstration of his equipment (WerBell's) for the Army, Navy, Air Force and ARPA people on the VNAF firing range. Prior to the demonstration I had received notification and did receive a box (about 375 # W.M.F.) of equipments for the demonstration. ~~It~~ W.M.F. had come via MAC airlift out of Charleston W.M.F. and was addressed to me at 7th AF (DAESC).

AF FORM Sep 61 1169

GPO: c43 16 - 77632 - 1

Page 1 of 3 Pages
W.M.F.

07D18-1 ATCH-19

After several cables of Mr W Bell's traveling around through SEA I was becomming concerned and wanted to close ~~of~~ W.M.7. out his business and send him home. In the month of Nov 68 I located him and instructed him that I felt our business was over and he should prepare to leave – or at least we would withdraw our sponsorship of him (The only concern was that he had a MACV form 6 that showed ASD as his sponsor). I departed on a Trip to CONUS at the end of Nov 68 and returned to Saigon 13 Dec 68. Mr WerBell was still in SEA, but I did not know where. I was aware a shipment W.M.7. of guns had gone to Eglin during my absence but had already arranged through the Commander of FTD W-PAFB that we should have shipped such items to FTD and they would ~~to ship~~ W.M.7. forward them to the designated base. I did nothing to counter this Nov 68 shipment as it was going to the A.F. Armament Lab for a "museum". (On a later trip to CONUS in March 69 I advised Col Weinbrenner (FTD Commander) of the one shipment). I had no knowledge of or authorized any other shipment. The Nov 68 shipment was intended for Air Force use and there was no knowledge or intent on my part that they were to be sent to Sionics.

In early Feb 69 I found Mr WerBell and we concluded that he would leave RVN about 17 Feb 69 and he would give me his MACV form 6 and I would ship back only what he brought over. I was very specific about no enemy weapons being involved and

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992
14 AUG 95

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES W.M.7.

Conti ation Sheet for AF Form 1168 an r 1169

if he had such for the Air Force, that I would ship them to FTD as instructed. After my return from my second CONUS trip on 23 Apr 69 I found that Wer Bell did not depart RVN. I asked around for him and heard many stories of his activities and felt I should take direct action. I called the OSI about 1 May 69 and made a statement and asked them to investigate. About 7 May I heard Mr Wer Bell was in Bangkok at the President Hotel. I went there with a Capt Gaylord and got back the MACV form 6. On 14 May I turned it over to the OSI. I felt that I had closed out our sponsorship, but also felt his (Wer Bell's) activities in SEA warranted investigation. This is why I went to the OSI. I did not authorize or direct the shipment of any captured enemy weapons to Mr Wer Bell and/or Sionics.

I further state that I have read this entire statement, initialed all pages and corrections, and signed this statement, and that it is correct and true as written.

William M Fagan
(Signature)

110 Alden Dr Ft Walton Bch Fla.
(Address)

WITNESSES:

(Address)

(Address)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21st day of July 1969 at DESTIN, FLORIDA.

(Signature of person administering oath)

GROVER C AYERS, JR
(Typed name of person administering oath)

SPECIAL AGENT-OSI
(Official title and grade)

Reviewed By AFOSI
For Public Disclosure
In Accordance With
JFKARCA, 1992 JNB
14 AUG 95

1420

AF FORM Sep 61 1170

GPO: 643 16 - 77966 - 1

Page 3 of 3 Pages

W. M. F

Date : 08/24/98
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10001-10381
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 754

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CPT DAVID F. HILS
TO : CHIEF, USAPSG
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 07/10/57
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : [RESTRICTED]

COMMENT 2

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/08/95
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY THE ADJUTANT GENERAL FOR RELEASE
COMMENTS : Document has been referred to HQDA (DAJA-AL), 2200 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310-2200 for releasability determination.

***
***
***
* *
W
I
T
H
D
R
A
W
A
L
* *
C
A
R
D
* *
***
***
***

~~SECRET~~ JAGO NO. 16736.

Copy No. 1 of 4 Copies

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JAGA 1967/208 (23 May 67)
SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert - SSN: 112-28-1134 (U)

18 JUL 1967

10 JUL 1967

~~THRU Director of Sec., ACSI~~ FROM TJAG DATE CMT 2
CPT Hils/59557

TO Chief, USAPSG

1. (U) Pursuant to Army Regulations 604-10, 4 November 1959, as changed, this office has examined the statements contained in paragraph 3, Comment No. 1, and the report of investigation in support thereof.

2. (U) The credible evidence contained in the report of investigation pertaining to Subject's activities is deemed insufficient within the criteria set forth in paragraph 14, Army Regulations 604-10, supra, to warrant the drafting of allegations.

FOR THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL:

David F. Hils

1 Incl
nc

DAVID F. HILS
Captain, JAGC
Chief, Personnel Security Branch
Military Affairs Division

754

USA PSG S 151-7

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TO BE MARKED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"
when separated from classified material

~~SECRET~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10001-10490
RECORDS SERIES : FOREIGN PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AB632604W - PAGE 1A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : DA FORM 2371 - INDEX TRACING RECORD OF ALIASES AND COSUBJECTS
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : ROMERODELGADO, EPIFANIO

ROMERO EPIFANIO

DELGADO, EPIFANIO

ROMERO-DELGADO, EDIFANIO

ROMERO, EDIFANIO

DELGADO, EDIFANIO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

INDEX TRACING RECORD OF ALIASES AND COSUBJECTS
(AR 381-45)

NOTE: *Alias and cosubject names developed during subsequent or "bring-up" investigations, will be separated from those previously recorded by entry of the date this supplemental action is taken.*

SUBJECT *(Last Name - First Name - Middle Name)*: ROMERODELGADO EPIFANIO ✓

DOSSIER NUMBER: AB632604

SOCIAL SECURITY OR SERIAL NO.: 463-74-2051

DATE OF BIRTH: 0~~1-21-36~~

PLACE OF BIRTH: CU

THE FOLLOWING NAMES HAVE BEEN CARDED AS ALIASES OR COSUBJECTS APPEARING IN THIS DOSSIER. THIS FORM WILL BE PLACED AT THE TOP OF THE DOSSIER. 36-01-21

ALIASES - IDENTIFYING DATA AS ABOVE

ROMERO EPIFANIO ✓	ROMERO, EDIFANIO
DELGADO, EPIFANIO ✓	DELGADO, EDIFANIO
ROMERODELGADO, EDIFANIO	

COSUBJECTS	SOCIAL SECURITY OR SERIAL NO.	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	DOCUMENT DATED*
X FORNELLJACINTO, JOSE LUIS				page 8 ~~[illegible]~~ 11-68
X FORNELL, JOSE LUIS				page 8
X ARTIME, MANUEL				page 9 2
+ FONT RAMON				page 9
X PELAEZ, FELIX X	✓			"
X BORGESGALINDO, ALFREDO				"
X CLARKSANCHEZ JOSE BENITO	✓			"
X BORGES, ADOLFO	✓			"
[redacted] X ✓				04-17-68
X [redacted]	X			
X [redacted]	X			
X [redacted]				
X [redacted]	✓			
X [redacted]	✓			

*Enter the date of the document in which name is recorded.

DA FORM 2371, 1 NOV 60

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O - 576545

iA

(9)

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10001-10495
RECORDS SERIES : FOREIGN PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AB632604W - PAGE 75

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM : ARMANDO C. PISANO
TO :
TITLE : SUBJECT INTERVIEW
DATE : 01/21/63
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : ROMERODELGADO, EPIFANIO

ROMERO-DELGADO, EPIFANIO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

Epifanio ROMERO-Del
A 13 108 636
21 January 1936
Canderlario, Pinar del Rio, Cuba

(SUBJECT Interview) On 25 February 1963, Epifanio ROMERO-Delgado, cuban pre inductee, who resides at 135 SW 18th Court, Miami, Florida; permanent mailing address c/o Gustavo Acosta, 1140 SW 9th street, Miami, Florida; employed in a shoe factory in Hialeah, Florida, name and address of shoe factory unknown to SUBJECT, social security number is 463-74-2051, was interviewed in the spanish language at the U.S. Armed Forces Main Induction Station, Coral Gables, Florida, concerning HIS arrests, and HE stated substantionally as follows:

On 20 April 1961, HE was arrested by the G-2, in Finca de la Mar, San Cristobal, Pinar del Rio, on suspition of working with the anti castro elements there. HE was suspected because of the company HE kept, people who were anti Castro, and that HE did not socialize with those who were in favor of castro. HE was held 5 days by the G-2, during this time HE was interrogated, a number of Times, and held without food or water. HE was then sent to the jail in Consolacion del Sur, Pinar del Rio, Cuba where HE was held for 13 days. HE was then released without trial, lack of evidence.

SUBJECT stated this was the only time HE has ever arrested; and that HE has other that what was mentioned here in, never been held, arrested, detained or imprisoned for civil, political or military reasons.

Armando C Pisano

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10001-10496
RECORDS SERIES : FOREIGN PERSONNEL AND ORGANIZATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AB632604W - PAGES 76-79

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :
FROM : EDIFANIO ROMERO-DELGADO
TO :
TITLE : DD FORM 398 - STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY
DATE : 01/18/63
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : ROMERODELGADO, EPIFANIO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

---

els CR #53348

STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY

CUBAN

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

1. *(Print)* FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—MAIDEN NAME *(If any)*—LAST NAME
☒ MR. ☐ MRS. ☐ MISS Edifanio ROMERO-Delgado

2. STATUS: ☒ CIVILIAN ☐ MILITARY ON ACTIVE DUTY

3. ALIAS(ES), NICKNAME(S), OR CHANGES IN NAME *(Other than by marriage)*: Piche

4. PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS: 1140 SW 9th St. Miami, Fla.

5. DATE OF BIRTH *(Day, month, year)*: 21 Jan 1936

PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, County, State, and Country)*: Candelario, PinardelRio, Cuba

PLACE CERTIFICATE RECORDED: Candelario, PinardelRio, Cuba

RACE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES	COLOR OF HAIR	SCARS, PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS
Cau	66"	165	Brown	Brown	NONE

6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS NARCOTICS OR BARBITURATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

7. U. S. CITIZEN ☐ NATIVE ☐ YES ☐ NO IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO. IF DERIVED, PARENTS' CERTIFICATE NO(S). DATE, PLACE, AND COURT

ALIEN	REGISTRATION NO.	NATIVE COUNTRY	DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY	DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME A U. S. CITIZEN?
☒	A13 108 636	Cuba	21 Sept 1962 Texas	YES X NO

8. MILITARY SERVICE

ARE YOU PRESENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES DRAWING FULL PAY? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION	DATE CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE STARTED

ARE YOU PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF A U. S. RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION

HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOURS OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY, DRAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

COUNTRY	SERVICE	COMPONENT	FROM *(Date)*	TO *(Date)*	TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO.

9. EDUCATION *(Account for all civilian schools and military academies. Do not include service schools)*

MONTH AND YEAR FROM—	TO—	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	GRADUATE YES	GRADUATE NO	DEGREE
Sep 46	Jun 49	Escuela Publica San Cristobal			

10. **FAMILY** *(List in order given, parents, spouse, guardians, stepparents, foster parents, parents-in-law, former spouse(s) (if divorced give date and place), children, brothers and sisters, even though deceased. Include any others you resided with or with whom a close relationship existed or exists. If the person is not a U. S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate number and place of issuance.)*

RELATION AND NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING	U. S. CITIZEN YES	U. S. CITIZEN NO
FATHER Felipe Romero	date unknown Conzolaciondel Sur, Cuba	DECEASED		X
MOTHER *(Maiden name)* Sagunda Delgado	date unknown " " "	Finca Sabana La Mar SanCristobalPinardelRio, Cuba		X
SPOUSE *(Maiden name)* Ilda Martinez	1 Feb 1936 Candelaria Pinardel Rio, Cuba	" " " "		X
OTHER *(Specify)* Arturo Romero Son	9 May 1962 San Cristobal Pinar delRio, Cuba	" " " "		X
Balerio Romero B	Finca Sabana La MarSan CristobalPinardelRio Cuba	" " " "		X
Jose Manuel Romero B	" " "	" " " "		X
Aniceto Romero B	" " " 76	" " " "		X
Santiago Romero B	" " "	" " " "		X

1 MAY 55 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

Exception to Standard Form 86
Approved by Bureau of the Budget June 1960

11. **OTHER RELATIVES AND ALIEN FRIENDS LIVING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES** *(List grandparents, first cousins, aunts, uncles, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and other persons with whom a close relationship existed or exists)*

RELATIONSHIP AND NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	ADDRESS	CITIZENSHIP
Juan Delgado U	36	farmer	ConsolasiondelSur, Cuba	Cuban
Pedro Delgado U	38	"	CandelariaPinardelRio, Cuba	"
FranciscoDelgado U	40	"	Santa GrusPinardelRio, Cuba	"
Niebe Delgado A	39	housewife	" " " "	"
Maria Delgado A	39	"	" " " "	"

12. **FOREIGN TRAVEL** *(Other than as a direct result of United States military duties)*

DATES FROM—	DATES TO—	COUNTRY VISITED	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL
29Aug62	21Sep62	Mexico	in transit to USA

13. **EMPLOYMENT** *(Show every employment you have had and all periods of unemployment)*

MONTH AND YEAR FROM—	MONTH AND YEAR TO—	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	REASON FOR LEAVING
Feb59	Jan 60	Equipos Quesada PinardelRio, Cuba	Nestor Prieto	Politicalreasons

DID ANY OF THE ABOVE EMPLOYMENTS REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE? ☐ YES ☒ NO DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED BOND? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.

463-74-2051

14. **CREDIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES** *(Do not include relatives, former employers, or persons living outside the United States or its Territories.*

	NAME *(List 3 credit and 5 character)*	YEARS KNOWN	STREET AND NUMBER *(Business address preferred)*	CITY	STATE OR TERRITORY
CREDIT	NONE				
CHARACTER	Juan Noriega	10	1040 15thSt. Apt#15	MiamiBeach	Fla.
	Gustado Acosta	10mo	1140SW 9th St.	Miami	"
			77		

REMARKS.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960 O—573450

15. **LIST ALL RESIDENCES FROM 1 JANUARY 1937**

MONTH AND YEAR		STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
FROM—	TO—			
Jan37	Aug62	FincaSabanaIamar	PinardelRio	Cuba
Aug62	Dec62	1140 SW 9th St.	Miami	Fla.

16. **PAST AND/OR PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND ADDRESS	TYPE (*Social, fraternal, professional, etc.*)	OFFICE HELD	MEMBERSHIP	
			FROM—	TO—
MRC CUBA	Subject claims he assisted	any and all organizations		
MDC CUBA	against Castro. These were	all in Cuba		
UNIDAD REVOLUCIONARIA,CUBA				
30deNov, CUBA				

17.

YES	NO	
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ANYWHERE?
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?
	X	ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS AN AGENT, OFFICIAL, OR EMPLOYEE?
	X	ARE YOU NOW ASSOCIATING WITH, OR HAVE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH ANY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING RELATIVES, WHO YOU KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE, ARE OR HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
	X	HAVE YOU EVER ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE: CONTRIBUTION(S) TO, ATTENDANCE AT OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY ORGANIZATIONAL, SOCIAL, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SAID ORGANIZATIONS OR OF ANY PROJECTS SPONSORED BY THEM: THE SALE, GIFT, OR DISTRIBUTION OF ANY WRITTEN, PRINTED, OR OTHER MATTER, PREPARED, REPRODUCED, OR PUBLISHED, BY THEM OR ANY OF THEIR AGENTS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES?

IF "YES," DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS FOR A FULL DETAILED STATEMENT. IF ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIFY NATURE AND EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION WITH EACH, INCLUDING OFFICE OR POSITION HELD, ALSO INCLUDE DATES, PLACES, AND CREDENTIALS NOW OR FORMERLY HELD. IF ASSOCIATIONS HAVE BEEN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, THEN LIST THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY WERE OR ARE AFFILIATED.

18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DETAINED, HELD, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (*excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of $25, or less was imposed*)? INCLUDE ALL COURT MARTIALS WHILE IN MILITARY SERVICE. ☒ YES ☐ NO
IF "YES," LIST THE DATE, THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR VIOLATION, THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT OR PLACE OF HEARING, AND THE PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF EACH CASE.

Has been in Jail without trial in the G-2 of Pinar del Rio,Cuba about 18 days from 22 April 1961 for political reasons.

75

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

20. REMARKS

ITEM #10

Fernando Romero	B	San Cirtobal Pinardel Rio Finca Santa Amalia Sabana La Mar	San Cristobal Pinardel Rio, Cuba
Sabina Romero	S	" " " "	" " "
Augustina Romero	S	" " " "	" " "

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH (*See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001*)

DATE: 18 Jan 63

SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM: Epifanio Romero Delgado

TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS: LUIS A. ZAYAS, MSGT, AFES&IS, CORALGABLES, FLA.

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS: Luis A. Zayas

21. *THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION*

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (*top secret, secret, etc.*) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS

79

RECORD OF PRIOR CLEARANCES

DATE OF CLEARANCE	TYPE OF CLEARANCE	AGENCY THAT COMPLETED INVESTIGATION

REMARKS.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960 O—573450

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10002-10091
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 274-370

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 05/31/67
PAGES : 97
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R.

FROMER, IRVING RHODES

COMMUNIST PARTY ACTIVITIES

AMERICAN-RUSSIAN INSTITUTE OF SAN FRANCISCO

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES

FLYNN, ELIZABETH GURLEY

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FOREIGN BORN

SAN FRANCISCO CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/12/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY FBI
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH FBI HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER MEMO DTD 17 OCT 1997.

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant
DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
31 May 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
7129-6003 564-58-8137

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) (LOCAL AGENCY-SUBJECT'S FATHER) On 23 May 1967, files of the San Francisco Office (SFO), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, were examined regarding Irving Fromer for any information subsequent to 1 February 1962 by a representative of Source who furnished the following:

~~(C)~~ (U) The representative furnished a copy of a report, SFO FBI, dated 27 March 1962, Field Office File No: 100-33836, Title: Irving Rhodes Fromer, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which is attached as EXHIBIT VII. This report contains information regarding Fromer's communist activities.

~~(C)~~ (U) The representative furnished a copy of a report, SFO FBI, dated 29 March 1963, Field Office File No: 100-33836, Title: Irving Rhodes Fromer, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which is attached as EXHIBIT VIII. This report contains information regarding Fromer's communist activities.

~~(C)~~ (U) The representative furnished a copy of a report, SFO FBI, dated 30 March 1964, Field Office File No: 100-33836, Title: Irving Rhodes Fromer, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which is attached as EXHIBIT IX. This report contains information regarding Fromer's communist activities.

~~(C)~~ (U) The representative furnished a copy of a report, SFO FBI, dated 30 March 1965, Field Office File No: 100-33836, Title: Irving Rhodes Fromer, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which is attached as EXHIBIT X. This report contains information regarding Fromer's communist activities.

~~(C)~~ (U) The representative furnished a copy of a report, SFO FBI, dated 14 March 1966, Field Office File No: 100-33836, Title: Irving Rhodes Fromer, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which is attached as EXHIBIT XI. This report contains information regarding Fromer's communist activities.

~~(C)~~ (U) The representative furnished a copy of a report, SFO FBI, dated 28 March 1967, Field Office File No: 100-33836, Title: Irving Rhodes Fromer, classified CONFIDENTIAL, which is attached as EXHIBIT XII. This report contains information regarding Fromer's communist activities.

AGENT'S NOTE: Exhibits are attached to the original only of this report.

[redacted]

274

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
EUGENE J. POWER, 115th MI Group (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Eugene J. Power

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF—656148

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Exhibit Number: VII

SUBJECT: FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant
DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois

File Number: 7129-6003 564-58-8137

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: 31 May 1967

Description: Report, SFO FBI dated 27 March 62 reSUBJECT'S father

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/15/97 dal
✓ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

[redacted]
Classification

275

ICGP-F Form 2-25
(Rev 25 Mar 66)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

[redacted]NTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to:

Report of: SA FRANCIS T. DAVIS
Date: 3/27/62
Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Field Office File No.: San Francisco 100-33836
Bureau File No.: 100-365779

Title: IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character: INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Synopsis: Subject resides 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, and is employed as an architectural draftsman through American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearny Street, San Francisco. Subject reported to be member Lincoln Club, SFCCP and reported in attendance at SFCCPAF, CCCL and ARI meetings.

- P* -

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/15/97 cl
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

276

[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

DETAILS: I. BACKGROUND

Residence

The Subject resides at 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco.

Mr. E. A. PAULSEN
879 Clayton Street
San Francisco on
3/15/62.

Employment

The Subject is employed as an architectural draftsman for various architects and construction projects in the San Francisco area obtaining his employment through the placement service of the American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearny Street, San Francisco.

Mrs. ETHEL SMITH
Executive Director,
AIA, on 3/21/62

II. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

San Francisco County Communist Party (SFCCP)

The Subject is a member of the Lincoln Club, SFCCP, and although he has recently moved into the area which encompasses the members of the Sunset Club, SFCCP, he has not as yet effected a transfer into the Sunset Club.

SF T-1 - 3/15/62

American-Russian Institute of San Francisco (ARI)

> The ARI has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The Subject attended the 30th Anniversary celebration of the ARI, which was held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, on November 19, 1961. The purpose of this meeting was also to celebrate the 44th anniversary of the Russian revolution and the 75th birthday of the Secretary of the ARI. One of the speakers at this meeting told of his trip to New Delhi and the Soviet Union. He said the Soviet Union, Cuba, and China have been accused of suppressing rights, freedom, religion and speech. He said that this was not true. These countries do not want soap box criticisms but they respect the broader right of the majority and sometimes individual rights have to give way to the rights of the majority.

The guest speaker at this meeting was DMITRY MURAYEV, who was introduced as a Cultural Attache with the Soviet Embassy. He presented the Secretary of the ARI with a gold watch and read a prepared speech. He said Russia wants peace and that the U.S. and Russia fought together during the war and still can be friends but Nazi elements in Germany are being supported by the U.S. Government. He said Russia would disarm if disarmament could be agreed upon but now the U.S. has rearmed Germany and they have the second largest army in Europe with rockets, tanks, and atomic weapons. He said the Russians are ready to defend their homeland against the Germans and felt that they had to do something to dramatize their readiness to defend themselves so they resumed atomic testing.

SF T-2 - 11/20/61

The Subject attended a reception sponsored by the ARI and held at the Sheraton-Palace Hotel in San Francisco, on January 20, 1962. This reception honored a group of visitors from the Soviet Union.

HOLLAND ROBERTS, President of the ARI, and M. M. DOMRACHEV, a member of the Board of the Institute of Soviet-American Relations, gave speeches which stressed cultural exchange and friendship.

SF T-3 - 1/22/62

Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCCL)

See Appendix Page.

The Subject attended a meeting sponsored by the CCCL held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue on December 15, 1961. At this meeting a monologue was presented entitled "Are You Now Or Have You Ever Been A Horse Thief", which was a satire on the McCarren Act.

A skit was then presented to represent the petition of the Communist Party before the Supreme Court in regard to the registration provisions of the McCarran Act. After the skit, MICKEY LIMA was introduced as Chairman of the Northern California District of the CP, who would present his views on the registration. LIMA read a statement in which he said that the CP in good conscience could not and would not register because to do so would violate the law of self-incrimination. If the CP registered, they would admit to being spies, saboteurs, and agents of a foreign power.

LIMA said that the CP is leading the fight for freedom. If the present trend continues, the Government can later attack the labor unions and the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The ruling party in the Government will be able to get any group they wish to register.

SF T-2 - 12/18/61

Subject attended a meeting sponsored by the CCCL held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, on January 24, 1962. The Chairman of the meeting gave an opening statement of the purpose of the CCCL and the purpose of the meeting. He mentioned that the Bill of Rights is under attack and that the military forces are controlling the Government and the press and that civil rights are being repressed. He said that these things are of concern to the Committee and they have asked GUS HALL to present his views of the current situation.

HALL then spoke and said that he is presently on a lecture tour all over the country presenting the views of the CP. He mentioned that he had requests to speak at schools all over the United States. He said that the CP is being prevented by law and by control of the press from expressing their views and that they only want the right of free speech which is being denied them.

HALL said that at a recent press conference he was asked to give his position in the Party both now and prior to June 6, 1961. He told the press at that time that he could be referred to as an authoritative spokesman for communism.

HALL said that the people don't really know what the McCarran law means. When the law went into effect he was supposed to register. He has been indicted already and is under possible sentence of 500 years in jail and $1,000,000 fine. HALL went on to say that he went to jail under the Smith Act and that for thirty years the Government has tried to prove that the CP has been advocating the violent overthrow of the Government and that all communists are agents of a foreign power and are espionage agents etc. but has failed to do so.

According to HALL, the McCarran Act came into being during the McCarthy era when the Administration was being pressured to prosecute communists. The Attorney General said the Government couldn't prosecute them as they did not have the necessary evidence. Congress decided to get around the courts by legislative enactment. They appointed a political committee and presented a lot of illegal and unconstitutional evidence and came up with a finding that the communists are agents of a foreign power and spies and saboteurs.

HALL said that, according to the Attorney General, the present Act is simply a registration statute similar to registrations of foreigners, voters, dealers in securities, etc. However, a recent decision of the Supreme Court held that it is not necessary to be a card carrying member of the CP or do an act which is generally attributed to communists but it is only necessary to have a state of mind and be in sympathy with any of the objectives of communism and you could be prosecuted under the law.

HALL said assuming he did register, he would have to register each official and member of the Party and if he didn't, they would be required to register or be liable to $10,000 fine and ten years imprisonment for each day they failed to register. He would also be required to register any communist organization or any association or organization that has affiliation with the CP. He must also list every typewriter, mimeograph machine, photostat machine, and printing press by serial number. HALL said that you can begin to see the diabolical threat of fascism which is beginning to become real. He said that in addition to these penalties, he can receive the death penalty in Texas, a life sentence in other states and sentences of 20 to 50 years in other states. He is also prohibited from obtaining Veterans or Government housing, employment in the teaching profession, from making movies in

Hollywood, or plays on Broadway under this Act. He said that communists can't even work in Government atomic plants.

HALL said that California has more native right-wing support than any other state and it is the idea of certain right-wingers to unite these organizations under one group. He said that is how Nazism came about and they won't stop with the CP. HALL said that the reason the right-wing is making such an onslaught is because a different social system is overtaking capitalism and many of the older people find it difficult to accept the new philosophy of life and they oppose it.

SF T-2 - 1/25/62

San Francisco Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (SFCCPAF)

See Appendix Page.

The Subject attended a fund raising party sponsored by the SFCCPAF for FRANK WILKINSON held at 939 Ashbury Street, San Francisco, on February 17, 1962.

WILKINSON gave a speech in which he denounced the Government and the Supreme Court for the decisions they have handed down outlawing the CP. He predicted that an irate populace would soon force the Supreme Court to change its position on these issues.

He spoke of his jail experiences and condemned the Government for segregating the staffs of the Federal prisons.

SF T-4 - 2/20/62

In an article in the "San Francisco Examiner" newspaper of March 20, 1961, it was noted that WILKINSON was convicted of contempt of Congress for refusing to state before the House Committee on Un-American Activities whether he had ever been a member of the CP. His sentence of one year in jail was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.

"People's World" (PW)

The PW is a west coast communist newspaper published in San Francisco.

SF 100-33836
FTD/rew

The Subject attended a PW bazaar through the period December 8 - 10, 1961.

SF T-4 - 12/11/61

CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS

A source advised on May 4, 1960, that the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (CCPAF) was organized in Los Angeles, California, in January, 1952, for the announced purpose of supporting a number of individuals from the medical and legal professions who had been subpoenaed to appear before the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

Since its establishment, the CCPAF, in extending its scope, has worked for the abolition of all Congressional, State, and local committees investigating subversive activities and in the latter part of 1954 became very active in opposition to State and Federal legislation directed at the Communist movement.

FRANK WILKINSON, Executive Secretary of the CCPAF, is described by the source as the "brains and energy" behind the organization.

Another source advised on September 17, 1952, that FRANK WILKINSON was a Communist Party member as of September, 1952.

APPENDIX PAGE

SAN FRANCISCO CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS (SFCCPAF)

A source advised on April 7, 1960, that a San Francisco affiliate of the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (CCPAF) had been established at a meeting held in San Francisco on April 4, 1960. The source advised that the San Francisco affiliate, to be known as the San Francisco CCPAF, would carry out in Northern California, the program of the CCPAF.

Source advised on May 15, 1961, that the San Francisco CCPAF is active.

APPDNEIX PAGE

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (NORTHERN CALIFORNIA)

A source advised on June 19, 1961, that MICKEY LIMA, Chairman, Northern California District, Communist Party (CP), reported on June 15, 1961, that the CP, USA, in response to the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961, relating to the Internal Security Act of 1950 (ISA-50) had decided to create a committee known as Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCCL), 22 East 17th Street, New York City, and that a local committee would be organized for Northern California.

This source advised on June 26, 1961, that a meeting was held on June 18, 1961, at the home of ROSCOE PROCTOR, member of the National Committee, CP, USA, for the purpose of formulating the CCCL for Northern California.

A second source advised on September 14, 1961, that the CCCL had opened an office at 942 Market Street, Room 401, San Francisco, California, and that some of the furniture for this office had come from the CP office on the same floor.

A third source advised on September 25, 1961, that MICKEY LIMA (Supra) had indicated no further organizational efforts would be expended on the CCCL in Northern California until the local CP resolves its policy with regard to this committee.

APPENDIX PAGE

SF 100-33836
FTD/rew

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES

A source advised on June 11, 1961, that a meeting of the National Executive Committee (NEC), Communist Party, USA (CPUSA), was held on June 10, 1961, at CP headquarters, 23 West 26th Street, New York, New York. According to the source, the main topic of discussion at this meeting was the CP's plans in regard to combating the June 5, 1961, decision of the United States Supreme Court, requiring the CP to register with the Attorney General of the United States as a communist-action organization pursuant to the provisions of the Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 and the Court's decision of the same date upholding the April 21, 1955, conviction of Junius Scales under the Smith Act provision covering membership in the CP. This source further advised that during this discussion a special CP defense committee was formed and it was decided that this committee would have an office, which would be managed by Miriam Friedlander who, according to the source, is a member of the CPUSA National Committee.

Another source advised on June 14, 1961, that at a meeting of the CPUSA National Board and invited guests held on that date at CP headquarters, New York City, it was announced that the CP defense committee would have an office at 22 East 17th Street, New York, New York, under the name of the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCCL).

A third source advised on July 20, 1961, that at a meeting of the CP defense committee held on that date at CP headquarters, New York City, the purpose and scope of the CCCL was discussed. It was stated that this committee has been set up to serve as a national coordinator and service center for every effort being made by whatever source to repeal the McCarran and Smith Acts. In addition, it has been set up to reverse the Supreme Court's decision of June 5, 1961, or secure an indefinite stay of any enforcement of the law by the Department of Justice.

It is to engage in generating a popular defense movement to mobilize legal assistance of any organization or individual whose "democratic rights are infringed upon by these laws." This committee wants to encourage the creation of local organizations or groups to work in support of any one of the above-stated objectives. The committee will also serve as an exchange center of material and provide speakers for any local organization.

[redacted]

FD-323 (3-28-60)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. 100-33836

San Francisco, California
March 27, 1962

Title IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character INTERNAL SECURITY - C

Reference Report of Special Agent FRANCIS T. DAVIS dated and captioned as above at San Francisco.

All sources (except any listed below) used in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

FTD/rew
(7) #9

287

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Exhibit Number: VIII

SUBJECT: **FROMER, David Reed**
SSvc Registrant
DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois

File Number: **7129-6003 564-58-8137**

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: **31 May 1967**

Description: Report, SFO FBI dated 29 March 63 re SUBJECT'S father

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/15/97
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

[redacted]

Classification

288

ICGP-F Form 2-25
(Rev 25 Mar 66)

FL 04 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to:

Report of: SA FRANCIS T. DAVIS
Office: SAN FRANCISCO
Date: 3/29/53
Field Office File #: 100-33836
Bureau File #: 100-365779
Title: IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis: Subject resides 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, and is employed as an architectural draftsman through American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearney Street, San Francisco. Subject reported to be a member of Lincoln Club, SFCCP and in attendance at public meetings sponsored by SFCCP, NCCPFB, SFCCPAF, ARI, PW, FPCC, and NG.

- C -

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Residence

The Subject resides at 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, California.

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10-12-97 dat
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

[redacted]

289

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

B. Employment

The Subject is employed as an Architectural Draftsman for various architects and construction projects in the San Francisco area, obtaining employment through the Placement Service of the American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearney Street, San Francisco.

(Mrs. ETHEL SMITH,
Executive Director,
AIA, 3/15/63)

II. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. San Francisco County CP (SFCCP)

SF T-2, a self-admitted former member of the CP in the San Francisco area during the period from 1952 to 1957, advised on November 5, 1962, that she knows IRVING FROMER and his wife as members of the CP in San Francisco during that period.

At a meeting of the Sunset Club, SFCCP, which was held at 1235 42nd Avenue, San Francisco, on May 16, 1962, a discussion was held regarding IRVING FROMER and his wife. It was noted that the FROMERs had recently moved to the area covered by the Sunset Club. HERB NUGENT, Chairman of the SFCCP and a member of the Sunset Club, remarked that the FROMERs are in the Lincoln Club, SFCCP, and that they are needed in the Lincoln Club. He said, however, that the FROMERs do not contribute much to Club life and this is one of the problems of the Lincoln Club. He said that the Lincoln Club had agreed to meet at the FROMERs house, and the FROMERs didn't even arrive to attend meetings held at their own home. NUGENT said that both of the FROMERs are active in other mass organizations.

(SF T-3, 5/18/62)

IRVING FROMER is a member of the Lincoln Club, SFCCP.

(SF T-3, 3/1/63)

The Subject attended a May Day meeting held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, on May 1, 1962, sponsored by the San Francisco Free Speech Forum. The Free Speech Forum was set up by the SFCCP to hold public meetings.

WALTER STACK, a member of the SFCCP, was chairman of this meeting and spoke on the meeting of May Day as a labor holiday.

ARCHIE BROWN, a member of the SFCCP, discussed his conviction under the Landum-Griffith Act. He said it is a test case to see if the act is constitutional. They noted that he was elected to the Executive Board of Local 10, International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union (ILWU), by members of the local and it would make no difference if he resigned from the CP because the Landum-Griffith Act says a person must not have been a member in the past five years.

RALPH IZARD, a member of the SFCCP, gave a speech on the subject of government and monopolies . He said the government should spend money on the unemployed, the sick, and the ill-housed instead of spending money trying to dominate former colonial countries trying to establish independence.

ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN, Chairman, CP of the United States of America (CPUSA), was the featured speaker. She said that things were different today for Communists under indictment than when she was indicted under the Smith Act. She said at that time all doors were shut to them, but now all doors are open. She said that GUS HALL and BEN DAVIS, Communist functionaries, have been speaking to students all over the country. She said that the government knows ~~that~~ that she is the Chairman of the CPUSA but so far has not been able to prove that she is a member of the CP. She said that the State Department is trying to take away her passport under the McCarran Act.

She also said that she had visited the Soviet Union as a fraternal delegate to the Congress of the U.S.S.R. and gave the Russians the greetings of the American people. She also visited some of the Social Democracies and found no unemployment there.

She said that capitalism cannot solve the problems of the people but the development of Socialism can.

(SF T-3, 5/11/52)

Subject's attendance at this meeting was verified.

(SF T-4, 5/2/52
SF T-5, 5/3/52
SF T-6, 5/8/52)

The Subject attended a public meeting sponsored by the CP held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue on December 5, 1952. MICKEY LIMA, Chairman of the Northern District of California CP, was Master of Ceremonies at this meeting. He said that he need not be introduced as everyone knew what his political views were. He introduced JOHN APT, Legal Council for the CP and Defense Attorney for CP members victimized by the McCarran Committee.

JOHN APT spoke of the complexities of the McCarran Act and how it had been used before in an attempt to convict MICKEY LIMA and others, and he told how the government had reversed the conviction on LIMA and the others because they lacked evidence to prove their charges. Now, the government is trying to get these people to confess to something that they had failed to prove the first time.

APT stated that President TRUMAN vetoed the McCarran Act on the grounds that it would put the government in the roll of a dictator.

He also spoke of the concentmation camps scattered throughout the country and noted that anyone could be placed in them if the government felt they were a danger to the national war crisis.

He spoke of the flexibility of the McCarran Act, which he said could be used against any citizen for any given reason and at any given time.

ELIZABETH GURLEY FLYNN also spoke and said she felt slighted because she was not indicted for failure to register along with GUS HALL and BEN DAVIS, however, she had some satisfaction in that the government was trying to take her passport from her.

(SF T-7, 12/5/62)

B. Northern California Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born (NCCPFB), and Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCL)(See Appendix Pages)

The Subject attended a conference sponsored by the NCCPFB and CCL held at 739 Page Street, San Francisco, on September 23, 1962. JEAN KRAMER, Chairman of the conference, opened the meeting by stating that its purpose was to discuss the WALTER MCCARRAN Act and the California "Little McCarran Act" (Proposition 24 on the California Ballot)

KRAMER read a written speech which had been prepared by LLOYD MC MURRAY Civil Liberties Attorney, who had planned to attend the meeting but was unable to make it. MC MURRAY's speech dealt with the Chinese Confession Program which was set up to give Chinese who were illegally in the country protection if they came forth and told their real identity. The main gist of the speech was condemning the Immigration Service because of their policy of sending illegal immigrants back to China.

The "San Francisco Call Bulletin" issue of November 18, 1957, carried an article which stated that JEAN KRAMER had been ordered deported as an alien who belonged to the CP. The article stated that she came to the United States in 1933 and was a CP member from 1933 to 1948.

LLOYD MC MURRAY was an active member of the CP in San Francisco from 1946 to 1950.

(SF T-8, 6/23/55)

LAURENT FRANTZ, introduced as an expert in constitutional law and a writer and publisher, spoke on the Walter McCarran Act and said that the security of the nation is hampered by this act.

The "New York Guild Lawyer", volume 20, March and April, 1962, a self-described publication of the National Lawyers Guild, lists LAURENT FRANTZ as a member at large of the National Executive Board, National Laywers Guild (NLG). (See Appendix Page for NLG).

ROSE CHERNIN, introduced as the Executive Director of the Committee for the Protection of the Foreign Born from Los Angeles, said that the committee is fighting the Walter McCarran Act and will not register as a communist front group.

Other speakers who spoke in favor of a repeal of the McCarran Act included ROSCOE PROCTOR, HERBERT PHILLIPS, and FRANK WILKENSON.

WILKENSON also urged for the abolishment of the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the defeat of Proposition 24 on the California ballot..

HERBERT PHILLIPS is Chairman of the CCL.

(SF T-4, 9/25/62)

ROSCOE PROCTOR attended meetings of the CPUSA National and District Leaders held in New York City June 22 to 24, 1962.

(SF T-9, 6/29/62)

FRANK WILKENSON, according to an article in the "San Francisco Examiner" of March 20, 1961, was convicted of contempt of congress and refusing to state before the House Committee on Un-American Activities whether or not he had ever been a member of the CP. His sentence of one year in jail was upheld by the United States Supreme Court.

(SF T-6, 9/24/62, SF T-10, 9/26/62,
SF T-4, 9/25/62, SF T-5, 10/3/62,
SF T-11, 10/1/62)

C. San Francisco Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (SFCCPAF)(See Appendix Page)

Subject attended a meeting of the SFCCPAF which was held at 750 Sanchez Street, October 8, 1962. Chairman of this meeting was NORMAN LEONARD, and a discussion was held regarding the activities of various individuals and groups who were fighting for the defeat of Proposition 24 (proposed anti CP registration) on the California ballot.

(SF T-10, 10/11/62)

NORMAN LEONARD is a currently active member of the NLG.

(SF T-4, 3/22/62)

On November 10, 1962, Subject was present at a party held at his residence, 881 Clayton Street, to celebrate the defeat of Proposition 24.

(SF T-12, 11/15/62)

D. American Russian Institute (ARI)

The ARI of San Francisco has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

Subject attended a public meeting sponsored by the ARI held at the Pallace Hotel in San Francisco on November 30, 1962.

VINCENT HALLINAN was one of the speakers and he told of his recent trip to Europe, including Hungary. He gave some of the history and background and culture of Hungary and said there was no democratic government in Hungary until after the war.

HALLINAN said that the Hungarian people had some legitimate complaints under STALIN and the revolution in 1956 was somewhat justified, but the Facists took over almost immediately and they were responsible for the hangings and other atrocities that occurred.

(SF T-4, 12/5/62
SF T-5, 12/3/62
SF T-13, 12/5/62)

VINCENT HALLINAN was candidate for president of the United States on the Independent Progressive Party ticket in 1952 (See Appendix Page).

E. "People's World" (PW)

The PW is a west coast communist newspaper published in San Francisco.

The Subject attended a dinner for the benefit of the PW held at 81 Clementina Street, March 16, 1962. At this dinner the Business Manager of the PW announced that those present should sign petitions asking the President not to enforce the McCarran Act. He also suggested a telegram be sent to the President to protest the arrest of GUS HALL and BEN DAVIS under the McCarran Act.

(SF T-4, 3/19/62)

The Subject attended a social affair for the benefit of the PW which was held at 608 2nd Avenue, San Francisco, on March 31, 1962.

(SF T-5, 4/3/62)

This social affair was sponsored by the Teamsters Club, SFCCP, for the benefit of the PW.

(SF T-14, 3/62)

A meeting of the committee to organize a book fair for the benefit of the PW was held at 81 Clementina Street, on May 3, 1962. A Business Manager of the PW announced that IRVING FROMER had agreed to contact painters of recognized ability to display their work at this book fair.

(SF T-6, 5/24/62)

The Subject attended an art bazaar sponsored by the PW held at 81 Clementina Street, San Francisco, on June 22, 1962.

(SF T-15, 7/3/62)

The Subject attended a bazaar sponsored by the PW held at PW offices at 81 Clementina Street, San Francisco, December 8 and 9, 1962.

(SF T-6, 12/10/62)

F. Fair Play For Cuba Committee (FPCC)(See Appendix Page)

Subject attended a meeting of the FPCC held at 625 Polk Street, San Francisco, on December 7, 1962.

MARJORIE MORRAY, wife of JOSEPH P. MORRAY, a Stanford Professor, told of her experiences in Cuba in 1960 and 1961. She said she was a supervisor for English teachers in Cuba, and her husband was engaged in research at the University of Havana.

She said the United States State Department policy on Cuba was bad as it prevented good relations between the two countries. She asked for contributions to send medical supplies to Cuba.

The "National Guardian" (NG)(See Appendix Page), issue of November 29, 1962, lists JOSEPH P. MORRAY as a Guardian correspondent who spent two years in Havana.

WILLIAM WORTHY also spoke at this meeting, and he described himself as a reporter for an Afro-American newspaper in Baltimore, Maryland. He said he was sentenced in September, 1962, to three months in Federal prison for entering the United States without a passport. He said he had lost his passport when he traveled to Red China several months previous.

WORTHY said that the CIA is involved in every trouble spot in the world, particularly when Communism enters the picture.

WORTHY branded the United States as an imperialistic nation determined to undermine Latin American countries and bleed them of their natural resources.

He said that Cuba is showing the world what socialism can produce without the help of imperialistic countries.

(SF T-4, 12/10/62)
SF T-12, 12/12/62)

G. "National Guardian" (NG)

Subject attended a meeting sponsored by the NG which was held at 625 Polk Street on November 16, 1962. The purpose of the meeting was to hear a report on Cuba by JOSEPH P. MORRAY and SAUL LANDAU.

LANDAU told of visiting universities throughout the country and speaking of recent events in Cuba, he said he found hatred in the eyes of the students and felt at times as though they wanted to lynch him. He said that many educators feel that the right wing is getting control of the universities.

He also discussed life in Cuba as he observed it during his stay there.

SAUL LANDAU is editor and publisher of Studies on the Left (See Appendix Page).

(SF T-16, 1962)

JOSEPH P. MORRAY described himself as a former officer in Naval Intelligence, a lawyer and a former professor in Havana. He said that when the revolution in Cuba was started, the CP was against it and told CASTRO it was ill-advised, ill-timed, however, CASTRO went ahead with the revolution and when the Communist saw he was accepted as the national leader, they joined forces and accepted his leadership.

MORRAY said the first president after the revolution was a conservative who demanded that CASTRO kick out the Communists and close the Communist papers. He also wanted appropriate compensation to be paid for land and factories which were nationalized. MORRAY said that CASTRO agreed only to pay the value which had been declared for these properties in their tax returns.

MORRAY said that CASTRO is a Leninist and disagrees somewhat with Communists. He said that the Cuban people are proud of being socialists and that CASTRO is in Cuba to stay.

He said he was skeptical about Russian missiles being in Cuba and decided that the Russians were trying to build a nuclear wall between Russia and Cuba.

(SF T-4, 11/23/62)

III. MISCELLANEOUS

On October 27, 1962, the Subject was present at a demonstration held in Civic Center Plaza, San Francisco, California, to protest the blockade of Cuba by the United States Navy.

(SF T-4, 10/29/62)

Subject was observed at this demonstration by Special Agents of the FBI.

At a meeting of the San Francico County Committee of the SFCCP, it was brought out that it was the duty of the CP members to infiltrate church activities, and all Party people were urged to take part in the activities of the Friends Service Committee. IRVING FROMER and his wife, KAY, are active participants in the Friends Service Committee activities and in a Unitarian Church group which participated in past issues. This church group at one time had the sponsorship of the Unitarian Church, but this sponsorship was later withdrawn.

The FROMERS are active in these activities as part of the mass work for the CP.

(SF T-3, 6/14/62)

COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (CCL), aka. Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties - San Francisco

A source advised on June 19, 1961, that MICKIE LIMA, Chairman, Northern California District, Communist Party (CP), reported on June 15, 1961, that the CP, USA, in response to the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961, relating to the Internal Security Act of 1950 had decided to create a committee known as Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCCL), 22 East 17th Street, New York City, and that a local committee would be organized for Northern California.

This source advised on June 26, 1961, that a meeting was held on June 18, 1961, at the home of ROSCOE PROCTOR, member of the National Committee, CP, USA, for the purpose of formulating the CCCL for Northern California.

A second source advised on September 14, 1961, that the CCCL had opened an office at 942 Market Street, Room 401, San Francisco, California, and that some of the furniture for this office had come from the CP office on the same floor.

One of these sources, in March, 1962, advised that CP officials in Northern California are active in supporting and promoting the CCL and in disseminating its literature.

A third source, in April, 1962, advised that correspondence and literature emanating from the CCL is aimed at the non-enforcement and repeal of the Internal Security Act of 1950 (McCarran Act). Some of the literature disseminated is purchased from the CCCL, New York, New York.

The two officers of the CCL in San Francisco are Doctor HERBERT J. PHILLIPS, Chairman, and WALTER STACK, Treasurer.

Doctor PHILLIPS testified in open court in 1953 to CP membership since 1935. WALTER STACK is a current CP member in San Francisco.

APPENDIX

[illegible]

1.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (NEW YORK CITY)

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 42 concerning "Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (New York City)":

1. "On the basis of its investigations and hearings to date, the committee concludes that the National Assembly for Democratic Rights and a coordinating and organizing group in support thereof, titled the 'Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties,' are Communist fronts. Created, dominated, and controlled by members and officials of the Communist Party, the National Assembly for Democratic Rights and the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties were organized as propaganda devices for the conduct of 'mass activity' in support of the avowed objectives of 'reversal or nonapplication' of the Supreme Court decisions of June 5, 1961, which upheld the constitutionality of the registration and disclosure provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as applied to the Communist Party, and the Smith Act membership clause making punishable active and purposive membership in the Communist Party."

"* * * The long-range objective of the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties is to serve as the vehicle for concealed Communist participation in, and direction of, propaganda and agitational activities aimed to nullify the Internal Security and Smith Acts."

"* * * Committee investigation disclosed that the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties was formed on or about June 12, 1961 * * *."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report and Hearings on Manipulation of Public Opinion by Organizations Under Concealed Control of the Communist Party (National Assembly for Democratic Rights and Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties), House Report 1282, Part 1, October 2 and 3, 1961, pp. 137, 143 and 144.)

APPENDIX

14

1

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE, BAY AREA CHAPTER also known as Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (BAFPCC)

The "New York Times" newspaper on November 20, 1960, carried an article captioned "Pro-Castro Body Reports U.S. Gain," which reported that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) had 5,000 paid-up members in the United States. The article declared that the FPCC had headquarters at 799 Broadway, New York City, New York, and had chapters in other cities, including one in San Francisco.

A source advised in March, 1961, that the Bay Area Chapter of the FPCC (BAFPCC) began to be formed in San Francisco in November, 1960, under the direct guidance and leadership of ASHER HARER, who the source identified as a member of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and a member of the National Committee of the SWP.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A source advised in May, 1962, that the BAFPCC is currently active in the San Francisco area and includes members in San Francisco and surrounding counties. He advised that the BAFPCC has no headquarters but receives mail through Post Office Box 2615, San Francisco 26, California, which is a box maintained by ASHER HARER. He stated that the announced aims and purposes of the BAFPCC are to "spread the truth about Cuba and to prevent U.S. intervention in Cuba."

A source advised in March, 1962, that in the recent elections of the BAFPCC, the SWP continued its influence by having SWP members elected to the Executive Committee.

1.

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE (FPCC)

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contains a full page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening in Cuba," placed by the FPCC. This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revoluntionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On October 3, 1960, a source advised that the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in New York had become active in the FPCC, and that SWP members, in a FPCC election, had been able to remove several Communist Party (CP) members who were on the Executive Board of the FPCC and gain control of the organization.

A second source advised that an announcement from National Headquarters of the SWP was made on September 24, 1961 to the effect RICHARD GIBSON had fired the secretary in the FPCC headquarters and was trying to break the SWP influence in the FPCC.

Column 2, page 8, of the February 22, 1962, edition of "The New York Times" contains an article captioned "Castro Backer Resigns" which announced that ROBERT TABER had resigned as Executive Secretary of the FPCC and as President of the Institute for the Improvement of Inter-American Relations, Inc., which had organized the FPCC in April, 1960.

On May 17, 1962, a third source advised that National Headquarters of the FPCC is located in room 329 at 799 Broadway, New York City, and that the FPCC is operating under the direction of RICHARD GIBSON, Acting National Executive Secretary of the FPCC.

The SWP and the CP, USA, have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

504

APPENDIX

1.

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY - SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source advised on August 1, 1960, that the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed approximately in the early part of 1938 and the Oakland Branch of the SWP was formed in the latter part of 1938.

A second source advised on October 26, 1959, that the name of the Oakland Branch of the SWP was changed to the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

A third source advised on April 9, 1962, that the San Francisco Branch and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP follow the policies and directives of the National SWP with whom they are affiliated.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

1.

INDEPENDENT PROGRESSIVE PARTY

The 1955 Report of the California Committee on Un-American Activities, page 46, stated, "The Independent Progressive Party in California was quickly captured by the communists, and by the time the Wallace for President campaign had swung into high gear was being operated lock, stock, and barrel by the Communist Party of California. Time after time the committee in questioning witnesses throughout the State discovered that the leaders of the Communist Parties in various localities were identical with the leaders of the Independent Progressive Party in the same area. It is true, of course, that in the Independent Progressive Party there were many sincere liberals who, because of dissatisfaction with the two major political organizations registered as Independent Progressives and continued their affiliation until the true control of the I. P. P. became obvious. These people invariably resigned, many of them having given the benefit of their experience to various official agencies interested in the exposure of subversive activities."

APPENDIX PAGE

1

STUDIES ON THE LEFT (SOTL)

The "Wisconsin State Journal," a daily newspaper published at Madison, Wisconsin, on November 26, 1959 announded that a new scholarly magazine, "Studies on the Left," a historical review dedicated to the leftist point of view, edited by present and former graduate students at the University of Wisconsin (UW), but having no connection with the UW itself, would begin publication soon.

Records of the Wisconsin Secretary of State reflect SOTL was incorporated under laws of Wisconsin July 16, 1959 as a non-stock, non-profit corporation with headquarters P.O. Box 2121, Madison, Wisconsin. Three issues were published during the period December, 1959 to November, 1960. The first issue contained a policy statement of the editors stating SOTL was primarily a magazine for national circulation designed to give younger men with radical views a place to voice their opinions.

Publicly listed members of SOTL's Editorial Board SAUL LANDAU, JOAN BROMBERG, STEPHEN SCHEINBERG, MARTIN J. SKLAR and JAMES WEINSTEIN have been identified by sources previously as having participated in the activities of the Labor Youth League (LYL); while Editorial Board members DAVID EAKINS and MATTHEW CHAPPERON have been identified as active members of the Communist Party (CP). Another source has identified LANDAU and EAKINS as handling the finance and business affairs of SOTL.

The Communist Party, USA, and the Labor Youth League have been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX PAGE

19

307

1

NORTHERN CALIFORNIA COMMITTEE FOR PROTECTION OF FOREIGN BORN

The "Daily People's World," now known as the "People's World," a West Coast Communist newspaper, of November 2, 1950, page 10, columns 1 and 2, contained an article entitled, "Northern California Committee for Foreign Born Planned." This article stated that plans for the organization of a Northern California Committee for Protection of Foreign Born would be made at a meeting on November 6, 1950, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California.

A source advised on April 25, 1962, that the Northern California Committee for Protection of Foreign Born, although an independent organization, carries out a program of activity in Northern California which coincides with the aims of the American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born (ACPFB).

The source further advised that the Northern California Committee for Protection of Foreign Born continues to be active in defending the foreign born in deportation proceedings and in securing support for the repeal of the Walter-McCarran Law.

The ACPFB has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

1.

"NATIONAL GUARDIAN"

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 193 concerning "National Guardian":

1. "established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly * * *. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell, August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

APPENDIX

1

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD
SAN FRANCISCO CHAPTER

A source advised on April 19, 1962, that the San Francisco Chapter of the National Lawyers Guild, which is affiliated with the National Lawyers Guild and follows its policies and directives, was organized in the Summer of 1937, and is currently active in San Francisco, California.

APPENDIX

1.

NATIONAL LAWYERS GUILD

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 121 concerning "National Lawyers Guild":

1. Cited as a Communist front.

(Special Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 1311 on the CIO Political Action Committee, March 29, 1944, p. 149.)

2. Cited as a Communist front which "is the foremost legal bulwark of the Communist Party, its front organizations, and controlled unions" and which "since its inception has never failed to rally to the legal defense of the Communist Party and individual members thereof, including known espionage agents."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 3123 on the National Lawyers Guild, September 21, 1950, originally related September 17, 1950.)

3. "To defend the cases of Communist lawbreakers, fronts have been devised making special appeals in behalf of civil liberties and reaching out far beyond the confines of the Communist Party itself. Among these organizations are the * * * National Lawyers Guild. When the Communist Party itself is under fire these offer a bulwark of protection."

(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 91.)

APPENDIX

22

311

SAN FRANCISCO CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS (SFCCPAF)

A source advised on April 7, 1960, that a San Francisco affiliate of the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (CCPAF) had been established at a meeting held in San Francisco on April 4, 1960. The source advised that the San Francisco affiliate, to be known as the San Francisco CCPAF, would carry out in Northern California, the program of the CCPAF.

Source advised on April 17, 1962, that the San Francisco CCPAF is active.

APPENDIX

[redacted]

1.

CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 43 concerning "Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms":

1. "The (Communist) party's front operations in the Southern California District today are * * * confined to four major organizations," which include the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms.

"The Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms * * * specializes in propaganda aimed at abolishing the Committee on Un-American Activities and discrediting the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Created in Los Angeles in 1952, the front organization is run by Frank Wilkinson, an identified Communist who recently resumed the full-time, paid post of executive secretary after approximately a year's leave of absence to assist in a similar campaign by another front in New York City, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

"When the Committee on Un-American Activities held hearings in Los Angeles September 2-5, 1958, to inquire into the nature of the party's recent reorganization in California, the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms sponsored a series of public meetings to protest the hearings and the very existence of the committee. Communists subpenaed as witnesses were guests of honor.

"At this time, leaders of the party's Southern California District were mobilizing Communists in the area for participation in an intensified campaign to abolish this committee of Congress. How the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms served the party in this effort was revealed by (Communist Party) District Chairman Dorothy Healey in a report to the party's Southern California District Council on September 21, 1958. Mrs. Healey declared that the party preferre public protest meetings to be held by the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms rather than under party auspices because Communists could attend without danger of being exposed as members of the party. She also noted that Communists scheduled as congressional committee witnesses could not appear beforehand at openly Communist rallies without creating the impression that the party was conspiring with witnesses to withhold information from the committee."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 259 on the Southern California District of the Communist Party, April 3, 1959, pp. 7 and 8.)

313

25* APPENDIX

[redacted]

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California
March 29, 1963

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title **IRVING RHODES FROMER**

Character **SECURITY MATTER -C**

Reference **Report of Special Agent FRANCIS T. DAVIS, dated and captioned as above, at San Francisco**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

314

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Exhibit Number: IX

SUBJECT: [illegible], David Reed
SSvc Registrant
DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois

File Number: 7129-6003 564-58-8137

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: 31 May 1967

Description: Report, SFO FBI dated 30 ^{M}ar 64 re SUBJECT'S father

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/97 Jcd
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSB
(JFK)

[redacted]

Classification

315

ICGP-F Form 2-25
(Rev 25 Mar 66)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to:

Report of: SA FRANCIS T. DAVIS
Date: March 30, 1964

Office: SAN FRANCISCO

Field Office File No.: 100-33836

Bureau File No.: 100-365779

Title: IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis:

Subject resides at 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, and is employed as an architectural draftsman through the American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearny Street, San Francisco. Subject attended CP sponsored May Day meeting and ARI affairs. He taught class on Marxism and Art at San Francisco SSS. He attended PW bazaar, National Guardian affair and film sponsored by SFCCPAF. Attended mass meeting in San Francisco sponsored by CURT and took part in peace walk in San Francisco. Also attended meetings sponsored by the Continuations Committee of World Congress on General Disarmament and Peace.

- C -

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Residence

The Subject resides at 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, California.

CHARLES TERSHEY, 217 Frederick Street - 3/4/64

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/97 dd
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

[redacted]

~~GROUP 1 Excluded f[illegible] automatic downs[illegible]ng and d[illegible]lassification~~

316

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SF 100-33836
FTD/msl

B. Employment

Subject continues to be employed as an architectural draftsman in the San Francisco area, obtaining employment through the placement service of the American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearny Street San Francisco.

Mrs. ETHEL SMITH,
Executive Director,
AIA - 3/20/64

II. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. Communist Party

The Subject attended a May Day meeting sponsored by the San Francisco Free Speech Forum held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, on May 4, 1963. MARGRIT PITTMAN acted as chairman of the meeting and noted that she had celebrated May Day last year in Moscow. She said she regarded this a privilege and honor and said that May Day in Moscow was celebrated in a spirit of good will and fraternity and should be celebrated in a like manner in this country. She said that some day everyone would live under socialism and there would be no more war and everyone would be friends and brothers.

ARCHIE BROWN, introduced as a well known labor leader and progressive, gave a speech critical of the city administration in San Francisco, and claimed that the slum clearance program drove under-privileged people from one slum area into marginal area which then became slums.

CARL BLOICE and several others then put on an entertainment skit prior to the introduction of HYMAN LUMER as a featured speaker. LUMER was introduced as an historian and economist and a Taft-Hartley victim.

LUMER discussed the unemployment situation in the United States, and said unemployment was increasing because of automation and he said the unions are worried and noted that recent strikes were for job security rather than increased benefits. He said that if the United States had a planned economy and traded with Soviet nations, most of the ills of unemployment could be cured. He also spoke briefly on repressive government acts and union busting legislation. He said the government is applying antitrust provisions to unions and there is a vicious prosecution of labor leaders. He said these acts are the products of the cold war and reaction.

A resolution to the President and the Attorney General was passed at this meeting which requested the government take action against the Birmingham Police Department for police brutality. At the suggestion of IRVING FROMER, they had a condemnation of the government for past inactivity to the resolution.

SF T-1 - 5/8/63
SF T-2 - 5/9/63
SF T-3 - 5/6/63
SF T-4 - 5/6/63

The San Francisco Free Speech Forum is a name used by the San Francisco County Communist Party (SFCCP) to present CP affairs which would not be identified publicly with the CP.

SF T-5 - 5/7/62

MARGRET PITTMAN is a member of the SFCCP.

SF T-6 - 5/63

ARCHIE BROWN is a member of the SFCCP.

SF T-5 - 5/63

CARL BLOICE is a member of the SFCCP.

SF T-7 - 5/63

HYMAN LUMER has been listed as the editor of "Political Affairs", a self-described theoretical organ of the CP, USA, since May, 1963.

B. American Russian Institue of San Francisco (ARI)

The ARI has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The Subject attended a reception sponsored by the ARI held on April 26, 1963, at the Sheraton Palace Hotel in San Francisco, in honor of VICTOR ARNAUTOFF. The invitation to this affair noted that ARNAUTOFF was born in Russia, and had lived and worked in China, Mexico, and the United States, since 1920. He was described as a member of the Department of Art at Stanford University since 1917, and it was noted that he was leaving for a year of painting exhibitions and cultural work in the Soviet Union. Among those listed as giving greetings and recognition of his work was IRVING FROMER, artist and chairman of the Graphic Arts Workshop.

The program at the reception consisted of entertainment including songs by one of FROMER's sons, and by JAMES WOOD.

SF T-8 - 4/29/63
SF T-9 - 6/13/63
SF T-4 - 4/29/63
SF T-1 - 4/29/63

VICTOR ARNAUTOFF is a member of the San Francisco County Communist Party.

SF T-6 - 5/63

JAMES WOOD is a member of the CP in the Northern District of California.

SF T-11 - 5/21/63

The Subject attended affair sponsored by the ARI held at the Sheraton Palace Hotel on November 24, 1963. This affair celebrated the 30th anniversary of the establishment of U. S. and USSR diplomatic relations, as well as the recent signing of the Test Ban Treaty. HOLLAND ROBERTS, President of the ARI, acted as chairman of the meeting and commented on the assassination of President KENNEDY, which he stated was a deliberate plan of the extreme right forces, those forces apposed to peace. He introduced the counselors of the USSR Embassy in Washington, D.C., who conveyed the condolenses of the Soviet Ambassador and members of the Embassy to the audience on the death of President KENNEDY.

The main speaker of the evening, JOHN HOWARD LAWSON, said that he had spent the past two years in the Soviet Union, where he wrote a book and participated in the making of movies. He made a comparison between the moral decadence of United States youth and the healthy spirit of Soviet youth. He also tried to convey the impression that the late President KENNEDY had been slain by forces apposed to peace.

SF T-9 - 11/29/63

JOHN HOWARD LAWSON is a member of the CP in the Los Angeles, California area.

SF T-15 - 12/4/63

HOLLAND ROBERTS is a member of the CP in Palo Alto, California.

SF T-10 - in 1963

C. Peoples World (PW)

The PW is a west coast Communist newspaper published in San Francisco.

The Subject attended a bazaar sponsored by the PW held December 6 - 8, 1963, at 81 Clementina Street, San Francisco, California.

SF T-3 - 12/12/63

D. San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS) (See appendix)

The fall, 1963, bulletin of the SFSSS listed IRVING FROMER as an instructor in a class on Marxism and Art held on Monday evenings from 8:45 P.M. to 10:15 P.M. at 345 Franklin Street, San Francisco, starting on October 14, 1963.

SF T-9 - 10/20/63

On October 14, 1963, FROMER conducted a class on Marxism and Art and recommended the class read a book on art and social life by PLEKOVOV whom he described as a theoretical writer of Marxist Socialism. He also recommended other literature by Soviet writers.

SF T-12 - 10/23/63

Subject conducted class on Marxism and Art on October 21, 1963, at which he discussed objective and subjective art. He also discussed WALT WHITMAN as a painter. He remarked that the American Art Board is composed of reactionaries like ROCKEFELLER and CARNEGIE.

SF T-1 - 10/28/63

Subject conducted a class of Marxism and Art on October 28, 1963, at which class he showed still slides of various art works upon which he commented briefly.

SF T-1 - 10/30/63

On November 20, 1963, a meeting of teachers and class representatives of the SFSSS was held at 345 Franklin Street, San Francisco, to discuss the program of the school and plans for the future. The Subject was not present at this meeting; however, his art class was widely discussed and it was stated that there were only four students left in the advanced class. It was decided that the course would be dropped in the next semester because of the low attendance and the fact that the course had nothing to do with Marxism.

SF T-2 - 11/21/63

On December 19, 1963, TERRENCE HALLINAN, Director of the SFSSS, announced that the school had ceased classes until the end of January, and remarked that IRVING FROMER's art class would be canceled due to lack of attendance.

SF T-13 - 12/20/63

E. National Guardian (See appendix)

The Subject attended a folk song jamboree sponsored by the National Guardian held at 309 Fourth Avenue, San Francisco, on March 23, 1963. The Subject's son, JOHN FROMER, was among those who provided the entertainment.

SF T-4 - 3/26/63

F. San Francisco Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (SFCCPAF) (See appendix)

The Subject attended a film showing sponsored by the SFCCPAF held at the Hall of Flowers, Golden Gate Park, San Francisco, on April 12, 1963. The film was captioned "The Un-Americans" and depicted scenes from the San Francisco riots held in the City Hall during an appearance of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HCUA).

At this affair, FRANK WILKINSON spoke on recent bills which were introduced into Congress attempting to do away with the House Committee on Un-American Activities. He said the first bills were worked on by only six people and at present they have a working force of 86 Congressmen who are attempting to abolish the HCUA.

SF T-2 - 4/18/63
SF T-1 - 4/22/63

See appendix on SFCCPAF for characterization of FRANK WILKINSON.

G. Continuations Committee of the World Congress on General Disarmament and Peace (CCWCGDP)

Subject attended a meeting sponsored by CCWCGDP held at ILWU auditorium, 400 North Point Street, San Francisco, on May 7, 1963. The featured speaker was former Brigadier General HUGH B. HESTER, who said that after World War II, the United States of America refused to negotiate with the other four big powers on the disposition of Berlin. He said now the big issue in the world is Berlin, and he said it should be declared a free city under the United Nations with a treaty guaranteeing the right to come and go through Germany. HESTER said that he was in East Germany the previous year and the East German's are willing to make concessions for the unification of all Germans. HESTER also said that if the United States would take the trouble to understand China, they would find that there is nothing wrong with that nation. He said that China should be a member of the United Nations and the United States should trade with China.

SF T-4 - 5/8/63
SF T-13 - 5/23/63

The June 8, 1962, issue of the "New York Times" contained an advertisement revealing that the World Peace Council sponsored the World Congress on General Disarmament and Peace held in Moscow, on July 9 - 14, 1962.

The June 15, 1963, issue of the bulletin of the World Peace Council reported that the Continuations Committee of the WCGDP had been founded by U.S. delegates to the 1962 Congress in Moscow.

See appendix for characterization of World Peace Congress.

II. Committee To Uphold the Right to Travel (CURT) (See appendix)

At a meeting of the Steering Committee of CURT held in San Francisco, on August 12, 1963, the list of sponsors of CURT was announced and included among the names of sponsors was IRVING FROMER.

SF T-14 - 8/14/63

On September 21, 1963, the Subject attended a demonstration held at the Civic Center Plaza in San Francisco, honoring students who had recently returned from Cuba. The demonstration was sponsored by CURT and several students spoke protesting the government's curtailment of the right to travel to Cuba. One of the students spoke and said the government should send troops to Birmingham instead of trying to prevent people from going to Cuba. He also noted that the capitalistic press had lied about Cuba, and the conditions were different than had been reported.

SF T-1 - 9/24/63

SF 100-33833
FTD/msl

The Subject was observed at the above meeting by Special Agents of the FBI.

I. Miscellaneous

The Subject took part in a peace walk held on April 13, 1963, from the Civic Center Plaza to Golden Gate Park, San Francisco.

SF T-13 - 4/19/63
SF T-8 - 4/15/63

COMMITTEE TO UPHOLD THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL

A source advised on August 1, 1963, and October 4, 1963, that at a meeting sponsored by Progressive Labor and held on July 31, 1963, at Stiles Hall, Berkeley, California, it was decided that a committee be formed in behalf of the San Francisco Bay Area students who had traveled to Cuba in June, 1963, in defiance of the ban by the United States Department of State on travel to Cuba. The name decided upon was the Committee to Uphold the Right to Travel (CURT).

The same source and a second source advised that CURT, a non-membership organization, has as its principal and main purpose the directing of publicity toward the thought of freedom to travel. In the event of the prosecution of the students who traveled to Cuba, CURT will become a committee to aid in their defense.

The first source advised that of the twelve officers elected, five are currently members of the Socialist Workers Party and one was a member of the Socialist Workers Party until July, 1963. The current members are:

SUE MATTINGLY, Recording Secretary
BRIAN SHANNON, Steering Committee
HAROLD VERB, Educational Director
TOM SANDERS, Steering Committee
RICHARD AOKI, Steering Committee

The former member of the Socialist Workers Party is JAMES PETRAS of the Student Committee.

APPENDIX PAGE

1

BAY AREA PROGRESSIVE LABOR, aka "Progressive Labor"

A source advised on December 12, 1962, that in the latter part of 1962 a group of former members of the San Francisco County Communist Party (SFCCP), who had split from the SFCCP during 1960 over a factionalist dispute, had grouped together to support and further the aims of "Progressive Labor" and reportedly had allied themselves with the Progressive Labor Party, which reportedly has been organized nationally.

The masthead in the September, 1963, issue of "Progressive Labor," Volume II, No. 9, reflects "Progressive Labor" is published monthly by the Progressive Labor Co., G.P.O. Box 808, Brooklyn 1, N.Y....San Francisco address listed....P.O. Box 843, San Francisco 1, California....West Coast Editor: LEE COE.

A second source advised on February 28, 1963, that leaflets and invitations were distributed in San Francisco, California, by the above-mentioned group during February, 1963, under the name Bay Area Progressive Labor (BAPL), P.O. Box 843, San Francisco, California, along with the name of LEE COE as one of two signatures appearing thereon.

A third source advised on November 1, 1963, that LEE COE is active in BAPL activities in the San Francisco Bay area and appears to be one of its leaders.

APPENDIX

327

1

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY;
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT;
"PROGRESSIVE LABOR"

A source advised on July 2, 1962, that Progressive Labor groups held a conference in New York City on July 1, 1962, where MILTON ROSEN acted as chairman. He read a statement at this conference setting forth their intention to form a new Marxist-Leninist Party in the United States. ROSEN stated that a more formal organization was necessary, one which would provide a framework for all who wanted to join in a united effort to build an American vanguard. The functions of this new organization are to consolidate all existing forces around Progressive Labor and organize additional forces; expand and improve political activities; win additional forces to an outlook of Marxism-Leninism and increase the open advocacy of socialism; develop a significant Marxist-Leninist program for the new party; and organize a collective organization of leaders and members.

> "The Worker," an east coast communist newspaper, issue of January 7, 1962, page 10, column 3, reported the expulsion of MILTON ROSEN, former labor secretary of the New York State Communist Party, from the Communist Party, USA.

A second and third source advised in February, 1963, that this new Marxist-Leninist Party had not yet been organized on a formal basis but that Progressive Labor groups had been formed in several localities in line with proposals of MILTON ROSEN. The sources advised as of February, 1963, that the leaders of this group were referring to it as the Progressive Labor Movement.

The "Amsterdam News," a daily New York City newspaper, dated July 27, 1963, page 22, set forth that the "Progressive Labor Party is a new political formation based on Progressive Labor Movement, a Socialist organization with groups in all parts of the United States. The organization publishes a monthly magazine called Progressive Labor."

The July-August, 1963, issue of "Progressive Labor" set forth that it is published monthly by Progressive Labor Company, G.P.O. Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York.

APPENDIX

328

1

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source advised on August 1, 1960, that the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed approximately in the early part of 1938 and the Oakland Branch of the SWP was formed in the latter part of 1938.

A second source advised on October 26, 1959, that the name of the Oakland Branch of the SWP was changed to the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

A third source advised on April 30, 1963, that the San Francisco Branch and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP follow the policies and directives of the National SWP with which they are affiliated.

The SWP has been designated by the
Attorney General of the United States
pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

329

1

"NATIONAL GUARDIAN"

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 193 concerning "National Guardian:"

1. "established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly***. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell, August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, aka
San Francisco School of Social Science,
San Francisco Marxist Study Group,
San Francisco School of Marxism-Leninism,
San Francisco School of Marxism

A source advised on February 6, 1962, that the first class on the San Francisco Marxist Study Group (SFMSG), was held on February 5, 1962, at 345 Franklin Street, San Francisco, California, and that the instructor of this class stated that the main purpose of the SFMSG was to train young people for leadership of the people in the event the U. S. wakes up to the advantages of communism.

A second source advised on February 6, 1964, that the San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS), which has been known as the "San Francisco School of Social Science," "San Francisco Marxist Study Group," "San Francisco School of Marxism-Leninism," and the "San Francisco School of Marxism," concluded its Fall 1963 series of classes on December 19, 1963, and would be commencing a new series of classes in the near future

The second source furnished the Fall 1963 Bulletin of the SFSSS on October 17, 1963, which reflected that TERENCE HALLINAN was Director, and KAROL BURKETT, Secretary, of the SFSSS. The source advised that HALLINAN controls the policy under which the SFSSS is run and consults an advisory board of class representatives only as to suggestions for future courses and opinions as to current ones.

A third source advised on October 17, 1963, that TERENCE HALLINAN was in attendance at a meeting of the Communist Party, Northern District of California, Youth Commission held October 14, 1963, at 100 Broderick Street, San Francisco.

The third source advised in December, 1963, that KAROL BURKETT was in attendance at a joint meeting of the San Francisco Communist Party Youth Club and the Berkeley, California, Off-Campus Communist Party Youth Club held in San Francisco in December, 1963.

APPENDIX

1

CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 43 concerning "Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms":

1. "The (Communist) party's front operations in the Southern California District today are * * * confined to four major organizations," which include the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms.

"The Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms * * * specializes in propaganda aimed at abolishing the Committee on Un-American Activities and discrediting the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Created in Los Angeles in 1952, the front organization is run by Frank Wilkinson, an identified Communist who recently resumed the full-time, paid post of executive secretary after approximately a year's leave of absence to assist in a similar campaign by another front in New York City, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

"When the Committee on Un-American Activities held hearings in Los Angeles September 2-5, 1958, to inquire into the nature of the party's recent reorganization in California, the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms sponsored a series of public meetings to protest the hearings and the very existence of the committee. Communists subpoenaed as witnesses were guests of honor.

"At this time, leaders of the party's Southern California District were mobilizing Communists in the area for participation in an intensified campaign to abolish this committee of Congress. How the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms served the party in this effort was revealed by(Communist Party) District Chairman Dorothy Healey in a report to the party's Southern Californi District Council on September 21, 1958. Mrs. HEALEY declared that th party preferred public protest meetings to be held by the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms rather than under party auspices because Communists could attend without danger of being exposed as members of the party. She also noted that Communists scheduled as congressional committee witnesses could not appear beforehand at openly Communist rallies without creating the impression that the party was conspiring with witnesses to withhold information from the committee."

(Committee on Un-American Activities,
House Report 259 on the Southern
California District of the Communist
Party, April 3, 1959, pp. 7 and 8.)

332

SAN FRANCISCO CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS (SFCCPAF)

A source advised on April 7, 1960, that a San Francisco affiliate of the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (CCPAF) had been established at a meeting held in San Francisco on April 4, 1960. The source advised that the San Francisco affiliate, to be known as the San Francisco CCPAF, would carry out in Norther California, the program of the CCPAF.

A second source advised on May 9, 1963, that the San Francisco CCPAF is active.

APPENDIX

1

[redacted]

WORLD PEACE COUNCIL

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the Committee on un-American Activities, U.S. House of Representatives, page 179, contains the following citation regarding the World Peace Council:

Cited as having been formed at the conclusion of the Second World Peace Congress in Warsaw and which was heralded by the Moscow radio as 'the expression of the determination of the peoples to take into their own hands the struggle for peace.'

(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 378 on the Communist 'Peace' Offensive, April 25, 1951, originally released April 1, 1951, p. 38)

APPENDIX PAGE

[redacted]

19*

334

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

San Francisco, California

March 30, 1964

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No. SF 100-33836

Title **IRVING RHODES FROMER**

Character **SECURITY MATTER - C**

Reference **Report of SA FRANCIS T. DAVIS, dated March 30, 1964, at San Francisco.**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

SF 100-33836
FTD/msl
(7)

335

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Exhibit Number: X

SUBJECT: [illegible], David Reed
SSvc Registrant
DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois

File Number: 7129-6093 564-50-6137

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: 31 May 1967

Description: Report, SFO FBI dated 30 Mar 65 re SUBJECT'S father

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/77 dl
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

[redacted]

Classification

336

ICGP-F Form 2-25
(Rev 25 Mar 66)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to:

Report of: SA FRANCIS T. DAVIS
Date: 3/30/65
Office: San Francisco, California

Field Office File #: 100-33836
Bureau File #: 100-365779

Title: IRVING RHODES FROMER

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

254 Sutter St., S.F.

Synopsis:

Subject resides at 881 Clayton St., San Francisco, and is employed as an architectural draftsman through the American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearny St., San Francisco. The Subject attended public meetings sponsored by the San Francisco Free Speech Forum (FSF), "National Guardian" (NG), American-Russian Institute (ARI), DuBois Club, and Committee to End U. S. Intervention in Vietnam. He also attended CP and "People's World" (PW) sponsored social affairs. Subject was arrested during racial demonstration at Sheraton-Palace Hotel, San Francisco, on 3/1/64. He was also observed in a picket line at a meeting of the Citizens Councils of America.

C

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/97 [illegible]
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

A. Residence and Employment

The Subject resides at 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, and is employed as an architectural draftsman through the American Institute of Architects, 47 Kearny Street, San Francisco.

[redacted]

CHARLES TERSHEY, 217 Frederick Street, San Francisco, 3/23/65

[redacted] 337

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

II. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. Communist Activities

The Subject attended a May Day meeting held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, which was sponsored by the San Francisco Free Speech Forum on May 2, 1964.

> The San Francisco Free Speech Forum is a name used by the CP of San Francisco to hold public meetings.

STEVE MURDOCK, editor of the "PW" reviewed the activities of the "PW" for the past year and pointed out that the "PW" offered its readers news from the viewpoint of the working class and Negro people and really had something to offer and this had enabled it to survive.

ROSCOE PROCTOR also spoke on the problems of the Negro people in the capitalistic society and noted that only socialism offered the Negro any chance of solving his problems. PROCTOR said that the President's "War Against Poverty" was simply a political scheme to attract votes.

The featured speaker was ROBERT THOMPSON, a member of the CP Committee, who discussed the split between the Soviet Union and China and said that it would soon be healed over. THOMPSON told the audience that they should support the Democratic Administration while at the same time put pressure on the Democratic Party to end defacto segregation in schools throughout the country. THOMPSON noted that public school systems would have to be integrated in order to survive.

SF T-1, 5/7/64, SF T-2, 5/4/64,
SF T-3, 5/7/64, SF T-5, 5/4/64

> The "PW" is a West Coast communist newspaper published in San Francisco.

ROSCOE PROCTOR attended a meeting of the CP, USA, national and district leaders, held in New York City on June 22 - 24, 1962.

SF T-4, 6/29/62

On June 27, 1964, the Subject attended a social affair sponsored by the Maritime Club, San Francisco CP, at 1027 Brussels Street, San Francisco. Proceeds of this social affair went for the benefit of the "PW".

SF T-5, 7/2/64

On September 25, 1964, the Subject attended a public meeting sponsored by the San Francisco FSF held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco. The purpose of this meeting was to hear HENRY WINSTON, a member of the CP National Committee, speak.

WINSTON identified himself as a communist and told of his imprisonment by the Federal Government. He said that because the government would not treat him for his illness, he became blind. He said the reason for the government's refusal to treat him was because he was a Negro and a communist.

WINSTON pointed out that the Republican Party must be defeated even though he did not completely approve of President JOHNSON and the Democratic Party. WINSTON also discussed the civil rights movement and said that the Negro must get his rights before everything in this country would be all right.

SF T-2, 9/29/64, SF T-5, 10/2/64,
SF T-6, 9/28/64

B. "People's World"(PW)

On April 12, 1964, the Subject attended a dinner held for the benefit of the "PW" at 1581 Masonic Street, San Francisco.

SF T-5, 4/13/64

C. "National Guardian" (NG)

A characterization of the NG is contained in the appendix pages.

On February 8, 1964, the Subject attended a public meeting sponsored by the NG held at 625 Polk Street, San Francisco. The featured speaker at this meeting was MARK LANE, an attorney for the mother of LEE HARVEY OSWALD.

LANE discussed the background of the assassination of President KENNEDY and stressed the fact that Dallas was a very reactionary city and for that reason it is easy to understand why Dallas had been selected as the place for the President to be assassinated. LANE discussed briefly the background of LEE HARVEY OSWALD and noted that he was a drifter without any ties who had spent some time in the Soviet Union. LANE tried to establish a link between OSWALD and the FBI and indicated that OSWALD was the victim of a frameup. He said he had a reputation of being an unstable character and a past association with left-wing groups. LANE said that in spite of this he did not believe that OSWALD was the actual assassin of the President.

SF T-1, 2/12/64

D. W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco

A characterization of the W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco is contained in the appendix.

On August 20, 1964, Subject attended a meeting sponsored by the W.E.B. DuBois Club held at 1007 McAllister Street, San Francisco. The meeting was a panel discussion on the question of world peace. One of the speakers took the viewpoint of the Chinese Marxist and said he believed in revolution because this was the only way of eliminating capitalist enterprises and capitalist economy. He cited such areas as Cuba, Vietnam, the Soviet Union and China. He said that all of these countries are socialist camps of one form or another and all are working for peace.

AL RICHMOND, the editor of the "PW", took the position that peaceful co-existence was a possible way to make some progress for peace without changing the economy of the country.

One of the other panel members spoke in support of peace but not in favor of any kind of violence. He pointed out that the left wingers comprising the CP, the Trotskyite Party, and the Progressive Labor Party looked toward revolution as an alternative for peace; however, he did not think that peace would ever be won by revolution.

SF T-1, 8/31/64, SF T-3, 8/27/64
SF T-6, 8/25/64

On October 16, 1964, the Subject attended a panel discussion sponsored by the DuBois Club held at 625 Polk Street, San Francisco. The three panel members were DOROTHY HEALEY, Chairman of the Southern California CP, VINCENT HALLINAN, a San Francisco attorney, and JOHN BURTON, a California State Assemblyman.

The Subject of the discussion was on the forthcoming election and what part progressive forces should play in the election.

VINCENT HALLINAN took a strong pro-Democratic Party attitude and pointed out that he, himself, had campaigned on a national ticket for a minority party and the result had been disastrous. He said they had wasted their time and money and energy and polled so few votes that he did not receive even one electoral vote. He stressed the fact that the Republican forces represented a step toward fascism and that at all costs, all decent people and all good left-wing people must vote the Democratic slate.

DOROTHY HEALEY generally agreed with HALLINAN but pointed out the Communist Party's specific obligation to the working class to provide good leadership. She said the CP had only one chance of acting as a vanguard of the working class and that was to be right in its support of political candidates. HEALEY also said the people should support the Supreme Court and particularly the Court's recent decision to reapportion state legislature.

JOHN BURTON said this was the first election in which he felt free to accept support from the left openly and he attributed this to a determination on the part of the general public to defeat BARRY GOLDWATER. He praised the DuBois Club for supporting him and he thanked the persons on the left including the Socialist Workers Party, the CP and others for their support.

SF T-1, 10/20/64

VINCENT HALLINAN was candidate for President of the United States on the Independent Progressive Party (IPP) ticket in 1952. The IPP was formed in California in 1948 and ceased to exist in 1954 when it failed to get sufficient votes to remain on the California Ballot.

A characterization of the IPP appears in the Appendix.

E. American-Russian Institute of San Francisco (ARI)

The ARI has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On November 20, 1964, the Subject attended a public meeting sponsored by the ARI held at the Jack Tar Hotel, San Francisco.

HOLLAND ROBERTS, President of the ARI, spoke about the great work being done by the USSR and the Soviet bloc for peace. ROBERTS said he always is inspired when he visits these countries and hears of their achievements to bring about peace and he is always disappointed on returning to the United States to find the war mongers holding the upper hand and keeping the people obsessed with the idea that they have to stay prepared for war against the communists. ROBERTS said the United States was constantly on the side of the landlords and money lenders of small countries throughout the world such as South Vietnam. He said these people only aspire justice for themselves and an opportunity to live in peace and comfort. However, they are ground down ruthlessly by native oppressors with the help of American troops and American support.

CARL BLOICE, a reporter for the "PW", also told of a recent trip he made to Eastern Europe. He said he found the East Germans consecrated to the task of being a socialist nation and cooperating fully with the Soviet Union. BLOICE said that East Germans now claim that America has succeeded to the position once held by fascist Germany of being the most reactionary and most militant country on earth. BLOICE said that communist nations now were in a position to defeat any non-communist countries in the event of military attack but he said this was the poorest way he could think of to bring about communism and he would prefer to see non-communist nations become communist through the means of logic.

SF T-1, 11/30/64

F. Ad Hoc Committee To End U. S. Intervention In Vietnam

A characterization of the Ad Hoc Committee To End U. S. Intervention In Vietnam is contained in the Appendix hereto.

On May 9, 1964, the Subject attended a meeting sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee to End U. S. Intervention In Vietnam held at the Hall of Flowers in Golden Gate Park, San Francisco. The chairman of the meeting who stated he was from Vietnam claimed that the war in Vietnam started with the French Government supporting an attack by South Vietnam against North Vietnam. He said the American military has taken over from the French in supplying arms and ammunition to the South Vietnamese. He urged the United States to pull out of South Vietnam and let the country be unified.

The film was shown entitled, "The War In Vietnam" made by the National Liberation Front of the South Vietnamese. Among other things, the film showed American helicopters being shot down and picket demonstrations in North Vietnam protesting American intervention.

SF T-3, 5/12/64

III. MISCELLANEOUS

On March 1, 1964, the Subject was one of 123 persons arrested picketing the Sheraton-Palace Hotel in San Francisco for alleged discriminatory practices. The 123 pickets who were arrested were charged with contempt of court. These charges were dismissed on April 3, 1964, by Municipal Judge JOSEPH G. KENNEDY because the restraining order which they were accused of violating was faulty.

"San Francisco Chronicle" newspaper, 3/3 and 4/4/64, and San Francisco Police Department Record of Arrest Number 1901586.

On the evening of October 28, 1964, the Citizens Councils of America held a meeting at the Masonic Auditorium in San Francisco which was picketed by numerous individuals on the sidewalk and entrance way to the auditorium. Among those observed in the picket line was the Subject.

Observation by Special Agents of the FBI.

1

"NATIONAL GUARDIAN"

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 193 concerning "National Guardian:"

1. "established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly***. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell, August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

APPENDIX

345

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUB OF SAN FRANCISCO, aka DuBois Youth Group, San Francisco DuBois Club, San Francisco DuBois Youth Group, Student-Labor Alliance

A source advised that on January 31, 1963, the W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco held its first general meeting at California Hall, Polk and Turk Streets, San Francisco, California, at which time the aims of the club were put forth as follows by TERENCE "KAYO" HALLINAN:

(1) Alleviate the Negro problem in the United States.
(2) Promote peaceful co-existence between the United States and Russia.
(3) Promote and encourage Marxist doctrines and to bring about a socialistic government in the United States.

A second source advised in March 1963 that the DuBois Club was both conceived and originated by TERENCE HALLINAN.

A third source has advised that TERENCE HALLINAN attended a Communist Party Youth Commission meeting in San Francisco in October 1963.

Commencing in March 1963, the DuBois Club published a newsletter entitled "San Francisco News and World Report." In its first issue a "Proposed Statement of Principles" was set forth in which the club's aforementioned aims were elaborated upon. In the same issue the lead editorial in part described the San Francisco DuBois Club as "...a group of young people who are convinced that Socialism is the only answer to the many problems of our time and so find philosophical rapport with the life and thought of Dr. DU BOIS, nevertheless, we are weighed with humility in comparing our goals and ambitions with the genius of his life and work. As a source of inspiration, the figure of W.E.B. DU BOIS is unequaled in American history, but as a standard and example, we seem miserably lost in his shadow. We can only resolve that we do his name no dishonor, and whatever we may accomplish should be recognized as a supplement to his life work."

The November 25, 1961, issue of the "People's World," a West Coast communist newspaper published in San Francisco, contains an article on page 12 reflecting

APPENDIX 346

that W.E.B. DU BOIS joined the Communist Party after applying for admission on October 1, 1961.

In May 1963, the first source informed that the "San Francisco News and World Report," although written and edited by members of the club, was run off on a mimeograph machine located in the offices of the "People's World;" however, in March 1964, this source advised that the newsletter was no longer mimeographed by the "People's World" because of the unreliability of the machine and, in addition, the name was changed to "The Insurgent" upon recommendation of one of the club officers who felt the new name sounded more militant.

The first source has also stated that commencing in May 1963, the DuBois Club had no permanent headquarters and used to hold its meetings at 307 Page Street, Apartment 3, San Francisco, California. In March 1964, this source advised that the club is currently active as a membership organization and has its headquarters at 1007 McAllister Street, San Francisco.

1

INDEPENDENT PROGRESSIVE PARTY

The 1955 Report of the California Committee on Un-American Activities, Page 46, stated, "The Independent Progressive Party in California was quickly captured by the communists, and by the time the Wallace for President campaign had swung into high gear was being operated lock, stock, and barrel by the Communist Party of California. Time after time the committee in questioning witnesses throughout the State discovered that the leaders of the Communist Parties in various localities were identical with the leaders of the Independent Progressive Party in the same area. It is true, of course, that in the Independent Progressive Party there were many sincere liberals who, because of dissatisfaction with the two major political organizations registered as Independent Progressives and continued their affiliation until the true control of the I.P.P. became obvious. These people invariably resigned, many of them having given the benefit of their experience to various official agencies interested in the exposure of subversive activities."

APPENDIX

348

1.

COMMITTEE TO END U. S. FOREIGN INTERVENTION, aka
Committee to End U. S. Foreign Aggression,
Committee to End American Intervention in
Viet-Nam (Ad Hoc),
Committee to End United States Intervention
in Viet-Nam (Ad Hoc),
Committee to End United States Imperialism

This Committee was organized as the Committee to End American Intervention in Viet-Nam (Ad Hoc), March 29, 1964, in San Francisco, California, at the instigation of and by members of the W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco, a Marxist youth group, which has promoted the organization's activities among the various groups in the San Francisco area interested in peace and disarmament. Its announced aims have included American withdrawal from Viet-Nam, self-determination for the South Viet-Namese people and adherence of the United States to the 1954 Geneva Convention. Demonstrations along with the distribution of and exhibition of propaganda comprise its program. A flyer advertising a forum of September 15, 1964, in San Francisco on "World Wide Movements--for Freedom" referred to "Cuba - Harlem - Congo - Viet Nam" and listed the Committee to End U. S. Foreign Intervention as sponsor. One of the two sources which provided the information on the Committee's organization has advised that it is the same committee. According to this source, on October 9, 1964, this Committee's proper name is "Committee to End U. S. Foreign Aggression," but it is a loose-knit organization and exactness of title or name is of little concern to the officials and members. The other source advised on June 28, 1964, that an Executive Committee of five members was elected in June, 1964, but no new officers were otherwise elected.

Another source advised on September 17, 1964, that the original officers were JOHN W. THOMAS, Chairman; BEVERLY D. RADCLIFFE, Treasurer, and MARGARET DRIGGS, Secretary. The signature of two of these are still required for checks written.

One source mentioned above currently advises that no headquarters is maintained by the Committee; meetings are infrequent and poorly attended, ranging from eight to twenty members. The last reported membership total was approximately twenty in June, 1964.

APPENDIX

349

[redacted]

2.

[redacted]

JOHN THOMAS attended meetings of the DuBois Club of San Francisco on May 10 and 31, 1964.

When interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI on October 1, 1964, THOMAS indicated he was not a member of the W.E.B. DuBois Club and would not join any group until he found one that really helped the Negro people.

BEVERLY RADCLIFFE in April, 1964, was a member of the DuBois Club of San Francisco.

MARGARET DRIGGS, when interviewed by Special Agents of the FBI on January 25, 1955, said that her activities in the Communist Party (CP) began in the middle 1930s during the depression in Tacoma, Washington. She and her husband moved to Seattle, Washington, and were members there of the CP and the Communist Political Association (CPA). As a result of open criticism of Party functionaries on her part and on the part of her husband, she and her husband were expelled from the CP in 1946 with the proviso that after six months they would reinstate. She said that they did not seek reinstatement.

The CPA has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

[redacted]

[redacted]

APPENDIX

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California
March 30, 1965

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

Title	IRVING RHODES FROMER
Character	SECURITY MATTER - C
Reference	Report of SA FRANCIS T. DAVIS dated and captioned as above.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

FTD/evs
(7)

351

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Exhibit Number: XI

SUBJECT: [illegible], David [illegible]
[illegible]
[illegible] 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois

File Number: [illegible] [illegible]137

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: [illegible] 1967

Description: Report, SFO FBI dated 14 Mar 66 re SUBJECT'S father

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
JFK

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 12/12/97 [illegible]
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

[redacted]

Classification
352

ICGP-F Form 2-25
(Rev 25 Mar 66)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, San Francisco (Class 3) (RM)

Report of: LEO A. SCHON
Date: 3/14/66
Office: San Francisco, California

Field Office File #: 100-33836
Bureau File #: 100-305779

Title: IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/97
✓ RELEASE IN FULL
RELEASE IN PART
TOTAL DENIAL

Synopsis:

Subject still resides 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, and is employed as an architect-draftsman through the American Institute of Architects, 254 Sutter Street, San Francisco. No information has been received reflecting that Subject has been active in the CP during the past year. Subject was present at May Day meeting of the CP held in May, 1965, and he has supported activities of the San Francisco CCPAF and Women For Peace and he has participated in a number of demonstrations sponsored by the VDC and acted as chairman of a meeting of the Haight-Ashbury VDC.

- C

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

DETAILS:

I. BACKGROUND

Residence and Employment

Subject still resides at 881 Clayton Street, San Francisco, and is employed as an architect-draftsman through the American Institute of Architects, 254 Sutter Street, San Francisco.

353

SF T-1, 3/4/66

[redacted]

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

II. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

A. Communist Party

When contacted in March, 1966, confidential informants who are conversant with various phases of activities of the CP in the area of San Francisco in which Subject resides were unable to furnish any information reflecting that Subject has been active in the CP during the past year.

Subject, however, was in attendance at the annual May Day meeting sponsored by the San Francisco Free Speech Forum held at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, on May 1, 1965.

The San Francisco Free Speech Forum is a name used by the San Francisco County CP to sponsor public meetings.

The principal speaker at this meeting was GUS HALL, General Secretary of the CP,USA. HALL accused the administration of President JOHNSON of being dangerous and trigger happy, stating that our foreign policy is a cold-blooded war machine which would turn back history. HALL stated that Marines had been sent to the Dominican Republic on the pretext of protecting American lives. He alluded to the U. S. foreign policy as being imperialistic and said that the President is not receiving full support for his invasion of other countries and the U. S. will never be successful in these undertakings.

SF T-2, 5/4/65
SF T-3, 5/4/65
SF T-4, 5/5/65

B. San Francisco Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (SFCCPAF)

The SFCCPAF is characterized in the appendix hereto.

354

Subject attended a public meeting sponsored by the SFCCPAF which was held at the First Unitarian Church, Franklin and Geary Streets, San Francisco, on May 7, 1965.

SF T-5, 5/13/65

C. Women For Peace

355

WOMEN FOR PEACE, aka Women Strike for Peace

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette," a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Berkeley, California, contained an article in the November 19, 1965, evening edition reflecting that in November, 1961, when concern mounted over radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, a group of women in Washington, D. C. started Women Strike for Peace. The idea spread rapidly throughout the country and now embraces 900 groups, including Women For Peace groups in the San Francisco Bay area.

These groups support programs to achieve goals such as:

(1) Continued disarmament negotiations.

(2) A strong and flexible United Nations.

(3) Planning now at state and national levels for conversion to peace-time economy and positive efforts to ease world tensions.

The women act as individuals and as a group, with specific actions suggested by individuals and groups from all over the world. Decision to participate jointly on any given suggestion is democratly arrived at by members of the Coordinating Committee. Effective cooperation with other peace groups is encouraged. Monthly Coordinating Committee meetings and general meetings, as warranted, are open to all and announced in mailings to members. There are no dues or membership forms nor conditions for membership.

To stir an awareness of the need for peace, Women For Peace encourage public education in peace objectives at local schools and sponsor peace-oriented demonstrations and public meetings, newspaper ads, billboards, and candidates for public office. On the national level the group attempts to influence government officials by letters and conferences.

356

A public meeting sponsored by Women For Peace at which Subject was in attendance was held at California Hall, 625 Polk Street, San Francisco, on August 1, 1965.

SF T-6, 8/4/65

D. Vietnam Day Committee

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE (VDC)

A booklet published by the VDC contained the following policy statement of the VDC adopted by the general membership, June, 1965:

The Vietnam Day Committee is a group of students, faculty and other members of the Bay area community opposed to American intervention in Vietnam, the Dominican Republic and wherever else it may occur. Revolutionary struggles for self-determination are sweeping the world today. American suppression of these movements, we believe, is immoral and a threat to the peace of the world. The Vietnam Day Committee is organizing non-violent direct actions, teach-ins, door-to-door organizing and other educational activities to oppose American intervention. We believe that the struggle for self-determination in other countries is related to the struggle for democracy in America--a democracy in which the people have the facts and the power to make decisions for themselves. The struggles in America against racism, poverty, and bureaucratic conformity are part of the same movement as the struggle against American militarism. We must build a New America and join with those people in Asia, Africa and Latin America building a New World.

Subject was observed participating in a picket line of the VDC engaged in picketing General MAXWELL TAYLOR at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, on August 25, 1965.

Observation by
Special Agents of
FBI on 8/25/65

Subject was in attendance at a rally sponsored by the VDC protesting U. S. intervention in Vietnam which was held at Civic Center Plaza, San Francisco, on October 17, 1965.

Observation by
Special Agent of
FBI on 10/17/65

He was also observed present at another demonstration of the VDC held in protest of U. S. policy in Vietnam at DeFremery Park, Oakland, California, on November 20, 1965.

Observation by
Special Agent of
FBI on 11/20/65

Subject acted as chairman of the Haight-Ashbury Vietnam Committee meeting which was held at 22 Parnassus Street, San Francisco, on December 1, 1965. Subject did most of the talking at this meeting and explained how the war in Vietnam started. He claimed that the U. S. had offered the French the atomic bomb to use against the Vietnamese during the French-Vietnamese War. FROMER stressed that if the war had not ended in six months it would lead to World War III and involvement of China and the U. S. He said that it is up to individuals to bring pressure on the government to stop the war in Vietnam.

SF T-1, 12/2/65

The Haight-Ashbury Vietnam Committee has headquarters at Number 8, Rivoli Street, San Francisco, and is self described as a neighborhood organization with the purpose of opposing U. S. involvement in Vietnam.

On December 3, 1965, Subject took part in another demonstration sponsored by the VDC which was held in protest of U. S. intervention in Vietnam by picketing the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, when Vice President HUMPHREY was registered there on that day as a guest.

Observation by
Special Agent of
FBI on 12/3/65

Subject attended a public meeting held under the sponsorship of the Haight-Ashbury Vietnam Committee at Nourse Hall, Franklin and Hayes Streets, San Francisco, on January 14, 1966.

SF T-5, 1/20/66

IRVING FROMER participated in demonstrations sponsored by the Haight-Ashbury Vietnam Committee protesting the war in Vietnam held in Union Square and in front of the Federal Building, both San Francisco, on February 5, 1966.

Observation by
Special Agent of
FBI on 2/5/66

1

SAN FRANCISCO CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS

A source advised on April 7, 1960, that a San Francisco affiliate of the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms (CCPAF) had been established at a meeting held in San Francisco on April 4, 1960. The source advised that the San Francisco affiliate, to be known as the San Francisco CCPAF, would carry out in Northern California the program of the CCPAF.

A second source advised on April 27, 1965, that the San Francisco CCPAF is active.

[redacted]

1

CITIZENS COMMITTEE TO PRESERVE AMERICAN FREEDOMS

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 43 concerning "Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms":

1. "The (Communist) party's front operations in the Southern California District today are *** confined to four major organizations, "which include the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms.

"The Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms * * * specializes in propaganda aimed at abolishing the Committee on Un-American Activities and discrediting the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Created in Los Angeles in 1952, the front organization is run by Frank Wilkinson, an identified Communist who recently resumed the full-time paid post of executive secretary after approximately a year's leave of absence to assist in similar campaign by another front in New York City, the Emergency Civil Liberties Committee.

"When the Committee on Un-American Activities held hearings in Los Angeles September 2-5, 1958, to inquire into the nature of the party's recent reorganization in California, the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms sponsored a series of public meetings to protest the hearings and the very existence of the committee. Communists subpoenaed as witnesses were guests of honor.

"At this time, leaders of the party's Southern California District were mobilizing Communists in the area for participation in an intensified campaign to abolish this committee of Congress. How the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms served the Party in this effort was revealed by (Communist Party) District Chairman Dorothy Healey in a report to the Party's Southern California District Council on September 21, 1958. Mrs. HEALEY declared that the party preferred public protest meetings to be held by the Citizens Committee to Preserve American Freedoms rather than under party auspices because Communists could attend without danger of being exposed as members of the party. She also noted that Communists scheduled as congressional committee witnesses could not appear beforehand at openly Communist rallies without creating the impression that the party was conspiring with witnesses to withhold information from the committee."

362

(Committee on Un-American Activities,
House Report 259 on the Southern California
District of the Communist Party, April 3,
1959, pp 7 and 8.)

APPENDIX

[redacted]

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

SF 100-33836

San Francisco, California

March 14, 1966

Title **IRVING RHODES FROMER**

Character **SECURITY MATTER - C**

Reference **Report of SA LEO A. SCHON dated and captioned as above at San Francisco, California**

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

SF 100-33836
LAS/sea
(9)

363

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Exhibit Number: XII

SUBJECT: FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant
DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago Illinois

File Number: 7129-6003 564-58-8137

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: 31 May 1967

Description: Report, SFO FBI dated 28 March 67 re SUBJECT'S father

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/97 dc
X RELEASE IN FULL
RELEASE IN PART
TOTAL DENIAL

ALL FBI INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-19-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

[redacted]

Classification

364

ICGP-F Form 2-25
(Rev 25 Mar 66)

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to: 1 - Secret Service, San Francisco
(Class 3)(Registered Mail)

Report of: JOSEPH T. QUIGLEY
Office: San Francisco
Date: 3/28/67

Field Office File #: 100-33836
Bureau File #: 100-365779

Title: IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character: SECURITY MATTER - C

Synopsis:

Subject resides 13 Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, California, and employed as an architect for Hertzka and Knowles, 32 Fremont, San Francisco, California. During 1966, Subject attended two "People's World" functions, one Free Speech Forum and one "National Guardian" function.

- C -

DETAILS:

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/KSR
ON 4-19-96 (JFK)

[redacted]

[redacted]

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/12/97

☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

365

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Residence

In October 1966, Subject reportedly had moved from his residence on Clayton Street in San Francisco to Mill Valley, California.

SF T-1
on 10/13/66

On March 15, 1967, Subject's current residence at 13 Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, California, was verified through the use of a suitable pretext interview with an attendant at a Shell Service Station, Reed and Miller Avenues, Mill Valley, California. This pretext interview was conducted by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

B. Employment

Records of the San Francisco Retail Credit Association reviewed by Special Employee GERALD E. ROSS on March 21, 1966, reflect Subject employed as an architect for Hertzka and Knowles, 32 Fremont, San Francisco, California.

On March 22, 1966, through the use of a suitable pretext telephone call to the office of Hertzka and Knowles, at the above address by a Special Agent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, it was determined that Subject is currently employed here as an architect.

II. EVIDENCE OF SYMPATHY FOR THE COMMUNIST PARTY (CP)

On February 19, 1966, the "People's World" sponsored a 28th anniversary celebration at the Del Webb Townehouse, Eighth and Market Street, San Francisco, California. There were approximately 800 persons present. The main speaker was HERBERT APTHEKER. Subject was among those present.

SF T-2
on 2/24/66

366

SF T-3
on 2/24/66

SF T-4
on 2/19/66

"People's World" is a West Coast Communist weekly newspaper published in San Francisco.

HERBERT APTHEKER is a member of the National Committee CPUSA.

SF T-5
on 1/17/66

On September 25, 1966, there was a reception held for MIKE GOLD, who was leaving his job as a columnist for the "People's World". The reception was held at the "Sun Reporter" Building, 1366 Turk Street, San Francisco, California. Subject was among the approximately 65 persons present.

SF T-3
on 9/29/66

In October 1966, Subject took out a year's subscription to the "People's World". He gave his address at that time as 13 Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, California.

SF T-6
on 10/27/66

On April 30, 1966, a May Day meeting was held at the International Longshoremen's Workers Union, Santa Maria Hall in San Francisco, under the sponsorship of the San Francisco Free Speech Forum. Subject was among approximately 80 persons present at this meeting.

367

The name San Francisco Free Speech Forum is the name utilized by the San Francisco County Communist Party to sponsor its public meetings.

SF T-7
on 10/2/64

Subject was among approximately 200 persons present at a "National Guardian" festival held November 20, 1966, at the Peace Center, 55 Colton Street, San Francisco, California.

SF T-2
on 11/25/66

For characterization of the "National Guardian" see appendix.

1

[redacted]

"NATIONAL GUARDIAN"

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 193 concerning "National Guardian:"

1. "established by the American Labor Party in 1947 as a 'progressive' weekly***. Although it denies having any affiliation with the Communist Party, it has manifested itself from the beginning as a virtual official propaganda arm of Soviet Russia."

(Committee on Un-American Activities, Report, Trial by Treason: The National Committee to Secure Justice for the Rosenbergs and Morton Sobell, August 25, 1956, p. 12.)

[redacted]

APPENDIX

369

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

March 28, 1967

Title IRVING RHODES FROMER

Character SECURITY MATTER - C

Reference Report of SA JOSEPH T. QUIGLEY, dated and captioned as above, at San Francisco.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

370

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 05/04/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10002-10094
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 393

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/09/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/15/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY FBI
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH FBI HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER MEMO DTD 17 OCT 1997.

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

[redacted]

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 564 58 8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
9 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY-SUBJECT) On 7 December 1966, files of the San Francisco Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, were examined regarding SUBJECT by a representative of Source who furnished the following:

SUBJECT has been of continuing interest to the FBI with reports dating from 3 May 1960 to the latest dated 23 November 1966. All the reports are titled: David Reed FROMER, with Bureau File #: 100-433071. A copy of all these reports have been furnished the Department of the Army.

Source requested that all information to include the forms HE completed, DD Form 398 and DD Form 98, be furnished the SFO-FBI.

AGENT'S NOTES: The forms requested by the SFO-FBI were furnished their office on 9 December 1966.

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
DATE 4-14-96 BY 5668 SLD/KSR
(JFK)

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 10/15/97
☑ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Added
Restrictions
1C and 3.
Hope thats
right.

393

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
EUGENE J. POWER, 115th MI Group (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Eugene J. Power

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10002-10187
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 866-961

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 04/08/66
PAGES : 96
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE STRUCTURE

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE ACTIVITIES

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE FINANCES

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA

REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/17/98
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY FBI
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH FBI HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASED WITH RESTRICTIONS, PER MEMO DTD 05 JUNE 98.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

66 125 906 [redacted] 021155

Copy to:
1 - USA, San Francisco
2 - G-2, San Francisco (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - DIO, San Francisco (REGISTERED MAIL)
1 - OSI, Travis AFB (REGISTERED MAIL)

Report of: FRANK S. PERRONE Office: SAN FRANCISCO
Date: 4/8/66

Field Office File #: 100-55462 Bureau File #: 105-141817

Title: VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

Character: INFORMATION CONCERNING
(INTERNAL SECURITY)

Synopsis: Vietnam Day Committee (VDC), Berkeley, California, continues to maintain headquarters at 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley. Comments concerning members of VDC Steering Committee set forth. Protest demonstrations sponsored by VDC during past 6 months include numerous protest rallies at University of California Berkeley (UCB); demonstrations against Vice President HUMPHREY and Secretary of State RUSK in December, 1965; marches and sit-in at offices of U.S. Congressman COHELAN, Oakland, California; march on Oakland Induction Center, 2/23/66, and protest rally and activities against UN Ambassador GOLDBERG in Berkeley on 3/25/66. CP, SWP, PLP and W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America, Berkeley Chapter, have given assistance to VDC during past 6 months. On 1/21/66, VDC checking account had balance of $310.34.

DECLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/JSC
ON 5-16-98 (JFK)

- P* -

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION
IN THIS DOCUMENT K 4-20-98

DETAILS:

I. HEADQUARTERS

SF T-1 related on March 17, 1966, that the headquarters of the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC) continued to be located at 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley, California.

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON ~~1/2/98~~ 5/17/98
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

[redacted]

[redacted] 866

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

I. HEADQUARTER 1

II. STRUCTURE OF THE VDC 2

III. MEMBERS OF THE VDC STEERING COMMITTEE 3 - 25

IV. ACTIVITIES 25-33

Protest Demonstrations

A. Demonstration at Voting Residence of Governor EDMUND G. BROWN, 460 Magellan Avenue, San Francisco, September 26, 1965 33

B. International Days of Protest, October 15-16, 1965 34-38

C. Protest March, November 20, 1965 39-43

D. Demonstration Against Vice-president HUBERT HUMPHREY, Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, December 3, 1965 43-45

E. Demonstrations Against U.S. Secretary of State DEAN RUSK and Vice-president HUMPHREY, San Francisco, December 10, 1965 45-46

F. Demonstration at Offices of U.S. Congressman JEFFERY COHELAN, Oakland, on the following dates:

1. January 31, 1966 46-47
2. February 2, 1966 47-50
3. February 7, 1966 50-52

TABLE OF CONTENTS Continued

Page(s)

G. Three-Day Protest Rally and Planned Strike, UCB, February 7, 8, and 9, 1966 — 52-54

H. Demonstration at Oakland Induction Center, February 23, 1966 — 54-56

I. Demonstration Against UN Ambassador ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, Greek Theater, UCB, March 25, 1966 — 56-57

V. ANTI-DRAFT COMMITTEE OF THE VDC — 57-60

VI. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC — 60

VII. SWP ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC — 60

VIII. PLP ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC — 60-61

IX. W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA) ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC — 61-62

X. FINANCES — 62-64

868

II. STRUCTURE OF THE VDC

SF T-2 on September 20, 1965, furnished a copy of a mimeographed leaflet captioned, "SUGGESTION FOR THE STRUCTURE OF THE V.D.C." The leaflet set forth the following information:

"The Steering Committee of 30 will meet every Sunday night at open meetings, with the following purposes:

"1. to make proposals to the Tuesday night general membership meeting.

"2. to carry out decisions of the membership."

The leaflet informed that all actions by the Steering Committee would be announced at the opening of the Tuesday night meeting of the general membership. According to the leaflet, the general membership is the final authority on all policy decisions.

The leaflet went on to inform that the basic working arrangement of the VDC is that individual committees work autonomously and make their own decisions within the general framework of philosophy and allocation of resources as decided by the Steering Committee and the general membership.

Continuing, the leaflet related that individual committees must bring their actions to the Steering Committee and the membership when their actions are a matter of political or organizational principle and large allocation of resources. Voting in the Tuesday VDC meeting is based exclusively on membership in the VDC, which is defined as possession of a membership card and active work. According to the leaflet, the Steering Committee is also empowered to make and carry out day-to-day decisions of the VDC and to choose a smaller committee or committees to do the same. The leaflet commented that the general membership will set the next date for election of a new Steering Committee.

III. MEMBERS OF THE STEERING COMMITTEE

SF T-1 on September 9, 1965, furnished a copy of a leaflet which set forth the names of the following individuals who were associated with the VDC; SF T-1 described the individuals listed as members of the Steering Committee of the VDC:

Name	Committee
BART ABBOTT	Strategic Research Organization (SRO)
ANYA ALLISTER	Finances, Legal Committee, Staff Member
WALTER BATTAGLIA	Finances, Legal Committee, Staff Member
NEAL BLUMENFELD	Legal Committee, Finances
PETE COHEN	Program Committee, Press
MARGE COLVIN	Magazine, Finances, Program Committee
NANYA CORN	Staff Member
KIPP DAWSON	CBS Committee, Program
MIKE DELACOUR	Community Work
FRED GIBSON	Community Work
ADJA GORBACH	No committee listed
PAUL IVORY	California Campus and Research
HOWARD JETER	No committee listed
LARRY LOUGHLIN	Finances, Staff Member
MARILYN MILLIGAN	Community Work, Staff Member

SF 100-55462
FSP:mfm

Name	Committee
PAUL MONTAUK	Veterans Committee, Program
MIKE O'HANLON ✓	Campus and Coordinating Committee
JOANNE PEYTON	Community Work
SUZANNE POLLARD	Chairman, International Contacts
JANET PUGH	Publicity Chairman
JON READ	Office Manager
JERRY RUBIN	Staff Member
JOHN SELTZ	Office Worker, SRO
STEVE SMALE ✓	Staff Member
WINDRIM SMITH	SRO
LOUISE STAPLETON	Community Work
SID STAPLETON ✓	Speakers Bureau
MARION STEINKELLNER	Community Work
PHIL SUGAR	Newspaper Editor
ARTHUR TURNER	No committee listed
DAVE WARREN	SRO
STEVE WEISSMAN	Chairman, SRO
PHIL WHITE	Correspondence, National Contacts
JOHN WILLIAMS	Office Manager

SF 100-55462
FSP:mfm

Name	Committee
ANNALIESA ZACH	Staff Member, Finances, Receptionist

BART ABBOTT

SF T-3 on February 18, 1954, identified BART ABBOTT as an "active" member of the Workers Party and the Independent Socialist League (ISL) in the San Francisco Bay Area from 1947 - 1951.

The ISL had been listed by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450. The ISL was removed from the list in July, 1958.

Attorney General TOM CLARK, in letters to the Loyalty Review Board, released December 4, 1947, and September 21, 1948, and Attorney General J. HOWARD MC GRATH in a letter to the Loyalty Review Board released September 29, 1949, described the Workers Party (1940 - 1948) as a subversive and communist organization which sought "to alter the form of the United States by un-Constitutional means."
In its official organ, 'Labor Action of 1949', the Workers Party announced that at the 5th National Convention it had voted to relinquish the name of the Workers Party and adopt the name of the Independent Socialist League.

ANYA ALLISTER,
also known as
Ann Allister

The records of the Sheriff's Office, Alameda County, California, set forth the following information for ANYA ALLISTER:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Born	October 24, 1942, New York, New York

872

(Information concerning ANYA ALLISTER
Continued)

Height	5'2"
Weight	115 lbs.
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Hazel
Social Security No.	135-35-5411

Records of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Oakland, California, also disclosed that ANN ALLISTER under #64-11204 was arrested December 3, 1964, in connection with a sit-in demonstration at Sproul Hall, University of California, Berkeley (UCB). She was charged with trespassing, resisting arrest and failure to disperse. In June, 1965, she was found guilty of the trespassing and resisting arrest charges and failure to disperse charge was dismissed.

WALTER BATTAGLIA

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for BATTAGLIA:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	April 14, 1940, Needham, Massachusetts
Residence	1115 G 10th Street Albany, California

NEAL BLUMENFELD,
also known as
Neal Morton

SF T-4 reported on June 10, 1965, that NEAL BLUMENFELD had made a pledge of $5.00 per month to the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on UnAmerican Activities (NCAHCUA) and had "recently" sent in his $5.00 pledge for the month of June, 1965.

A characterization for the NCAHCUA is contained in the Appendix Section.

The following information was set forth under U.S. Passport #28966, issued on May 15, 1951, for BLUMENFELD:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	November 26, 1930, Minneapolis, Minnesota
Height	5'11 1/2"
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Blue
Father	Dr. CHARLES M. BLUMENFELD
Mother	PAULINE BLUMENFELD, nee Ginsberg

PETER COHEN

SF T-5 has reported that on December 7, 1965, PETER COHEN made the following statement in Berkeley:

> "The struggle to build the American revolution is as much a struggle to save the human race from nuclear destruction as it is one for socialism. America is not a healthy society. I defend terrorism. Bank robbery is fine, but it does little to weaken the government; it only puts money into hands of revolutionaries. As for the killing of President KENNEDY, shooting the President is a legitimate, left-wing act of terror."

A review of the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, California school records and from observation revealed the following description for PETER COHEN:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	September 7, 1946, Chicago, Illinois

(Information concerning PETER COHEN Continued)

Height	6'2"
Weight	170 lbs.
Hair	Brown, heavy, bushy and worn long
Eyes	Hazel

MARGE COLVIN

SF T-6 in October, 1965 identified MARGE COLVIN as a member of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP).

A characterization for the San Francisco Branch of the SWP is contained in the Appendix Section.

NANYA J. CORN,
also known as
Nancy J. Corn

A review of the records of the Berkeley Police Department revealed that NANCY J. CORN, also known as Nanya Corn, was arrested by the Berkeley Police Department for failure to have in her possession an automobile driver's permit. She was released on $56.00 bail.

On January 7, 1966, NANYA CORN pled not guilty to the charge; however, she was found guilty and the judgment was suspended.

The following is a description of NANYA CORN as set forth in the records of the Berkeley Police Department:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	January 30, 1943, New York
Height	5'3"

(Information concerning HANYA CORN
Continued)

Weight	140 lbs.
Hair	Bleached blonde
Social Security No.	107-34-5380

KIPP DAWSON

SF T-7 in October, 1965, identified KIPP DAWSON as a member of the San Francisco Branch of the SWP.

MIKE DELACOUR

SF T-1 has described MIKE DELACOUR as follows:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Age	In his mid-20s
Height	6'
Weight	170 lbs.
Hair	Wears Beatle-type haircut

FRED GIBSON

SF T-1 informed on October 25, 1965 that on October 23, 1965, one FRED GIBSON attended a Youth For Jobs (YFJ) meeting at 59th Street and San Pablo Avenue, Oakland.

A characterization for YFJ is contained in the Appendix Section.

ADJA GOLDFINE GORBACH

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for GORBACH:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	September 16, 1940, Chicago, Illinois

(Information concerning ADJA GOLDFINE GORBACH Continued)

Residence	1811 Spruce Street Berkeley, California
Marital status	Single

Attends UCB as a limited undergraduate student

PAUL IVORY

SF T-8 on July 16, 1965, identified PAUL IVORY as Co-Chairman of the VDC who cooperated with members of the Young Socialist League (YSL) who were trying to influence the VDC.

A characterization for the YSL is contained in the Appendix Section.

PAUL IVORY is a UCB Assistant Professor of Economics.

HOWARD P. JETER

SF T-9 has reported that on September 1, 1964, HOWARD P. JETER in discussing a throwaway leaflet distributed at the Democratic National Convention in Atlantic City, New Jersey, identified himself as President of the 7th Congressional District Democratic Club, Berkeley, and remarked his club had been "kicked out" of the California Democratic Club because of the club's "extreme left-wing position".

LAWRENCE ROBERT LOUGHLIN
also known as
LARRY LOUGHLIN

A review of the records of the San Francisco, California Police Department revealed that LAWRENCE ROBERT LOUGHLIN was arrested by the San Francisco Police Department on August 24, 1965, and charged with trespassing and resisting arrest. The charges arose from a demonstration against General MAXWELL TAYLOR at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco.

SF 100-55462
FSP:mfm

General TAYLOR was a former Ambassador to Vietnam.

After LOUGHLIN had pled nolle contendere, he was sentenced on February 16, 1966, to 6 months in the San Francisco County Jail, sentence suspended and placed on 1 year probation.

A review of the records of the San Francisco Police Department revealed the following description for LOUGHLIN:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	October 13, 1932, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Height	5'9"
Weight	160 lbs.
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Social Security No.	019-24-5527
San Francisco Police Department #	202848

MARILYN MILLIGAN

A review of the records of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Oakland, revealed the following description for MARILYN MILLIGAN:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	November 11, 1934, New York, New York
Height	5'6"
Weight	140 lbs.
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Brown
Social Security No.	091-26-9438
California State Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation #	G-725564

The records also revealed that MARILYN MILLIGAN was arrested on December 3, 1964, under S/O #641125 in connection with a sit-in demonstration at Sproul Hall, UCB. She was charged with resisting arrest, failure to disperse and trespassing. On June 28, 1965, she was found guilty of the trespassing and resisting arrest charges and the failure to disperse charge was dismissed. On July 29, 1965, she refused probation and was sentenced to $100.00 or 10 days in jail on the trespassing charge, and $150.00 or 15 days in jail on the resisting arrest charge. She has appealed the convictions.

PAUL MONTAUK

SF T-6 on October 8, 1965, identified PAUL MONTAUK as an alternate member of the SWP National Committee and a member of the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

A characterization of the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP is contained in the Appendix Section.

MICHAEL J. O'HANLON,
true name FRANCIS GEORGE MEDAILLE

On January 5, 1966, Deputy Sheriff JOHN CRISAN, Monterey County, California Sheriff's Office, furnished some membership cards issued to MICHAEL J. O'HANLON, which he had obtained from a forest ranger at the Big Sur Park in December 1965. CRISAN stated he had no further information concerning O'HANLON and assumed the cards had been lost at the park. Among the cards were membership cards signed by O'HANLON for the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and the VDC.

The IWW has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY is an association of young people on the left...; one bringing

"together liberals and radicals, activists and scholars, students and faculty. It feels the urgency to put forth a radical, democratic program counterposed to authoritarian movements both of Communism and the domestic Right.
Preamble, SDS Constitution"

During the 1965 National Convention of the SDS, the Preamble of the Constitution was amended to eliminate "counterposed to authoritarian movements both of Communism and the domestic Right."
SDS Worklist No. 14, 7/28/65

When he was stopped by a Highway Patrol Officer on February 18, 1966 in Ocala, Florida, O'HANLON had a membership card for the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) in his possession.

A characterization for the DCA is contained in the Appendix Section.

The FBI Laboratory informed on February 17, 1966, that from fingerprints, examination revealed that MICHAEL J. O'HANLON was identical with FRANCIS GEORGE MEDAILLE, FBI #874 775C.

In the March 20, 1963 issue of the "San Francisco Examiner", a San Francisco daily newspaper, information was set forth that FRANCIS GEORGE MEDAILLE was arrested in 1958 on a homocide charge in New York for throwing a 6-year old girl from the roof of a building. MEDAILLE was sent to a mental institution until May 5, 1963, when he pled guilty to a manslaughter charge, 1st degree. He received a 5 - 10 year suspended sentence and was placed on 5 years probation. A probation violators warrant is currently outstanding against MEDAILLE issued by the State of New York.

JOANNE PEYTON,
nee Joanne Barker Ward

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for JOANNE PEYTON:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	August 8, 1936, Cleveland, Ohio
Current residence	1416 Grove Street, Apartment 4 Berkeley, California

SUZANNE POLLARD,
also known as
Susan Erica Pollard (true name)

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for POLLARD:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	March 4, 1941, Baltimore, Maryland
Residence	2112 McKinley Avenue Berkeley, California

Graduate student at UCB

JANET MARILYN PUGH

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for JANET MARILYN PUGH:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	December 24, 1939, Red Bluff, California
Permanent residence	200 Cedar Street Red Bluff, California

JON JOSEPH READ

SF T-7 reported on April 18, 1963 that on April 15, 1963, JON JOSEPH READ was elected to the Executive Board of the Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC).

A characterization for the FPCC is contained in the Appendix Section.

JERRY RUBIN

In the August 9, 1965 issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle", San Francisco daily newspaper, information was set forth that JERRY RUBIN in the summer of 1964 traveled to Cuba in defiance of a U.S. Department of State travel ban. According to the article, the trip was sponsored by the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba (SCTC).

A characterization for the SCTC is contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-10 reported on February 19, 1965, that JERRY RUBIN was enrolled for the fall, 1964 semester of the San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS).

A characterization for the SFSSS is contained in the Appendix Section.

JOHN PETER SELTZ

On July 20, 1960, JOHN PETER SELTZ furnished the following background information to Special Agents of the FBI:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	December 6, 1939, Boston, Massachusetts
Height	6'1"
Weight	150 lbs.
Build	Slender
Hair	Blond
Eyes	Blue
Social Security No.	331-34-0574
Military service	Served in the U.S. Marine Corps from 7/1/57 - 12/31/57, honorably discharged, MSN 1658807

JOHN CLIFFORD NORDEEN, 9125 Marmora Avenue, Morton Grove, Illinois, a self-described friend of JOHN PETER SELTZ, has informed that SELTZ served under one ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ, leader of an anti-Somoza Nicaraguan revolutionary group on the Honduras-Nicaragua border during May and June, 1960.

STEPHEN SMALE,
also known as
Steve Smale

SF T-11 in February, 1952 identified STEVE SMALE as a member of the Labor Youth League (LYL) at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The LYL has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The LYL became defunct in February, 1957.

SF T-12 in January, 1961, identified SMALE as Faculty Adviser of the Students Committee FPCC at UCB.

STEPHEN SMALE is a UCB Mathematics Professor.

JOHN WINDRIM SMITH, JR.,
also known as
Windy Smith

SF T-13 reported on November 15, 1963 and March 27, 1964, that JOHN WINDRIM SMITH, JR. was a member of the Southern California District Communist Party (CP).

SF T-14 reported on February 25, 1966, that WINDY SMITH was a transfer to the Marin County, California CP Club; however, he had not attended any meetings of the club.

LOUISE J. STAPLETON

SF T-1 informed on August 17, 1965, that in his opinion, LOUISE STAPLETON was not in sympathy with the VDC but was simply looking for "some excitement and likes to demonstrate." SF T-1 added that LOUISE STAPLETON was an employee of the Child Care Center in Oakland and resided at 419 63rd Street, Oakland.

SYDNEY STAPLETON
also known as
Sid Stapleton

SF T-15 on September 22, 1965, identified SID STAPLETON as a "current" member of the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

MARION J. STEINKELLNER,
also known as
Mrs. Frank Steinkellner,
nee Kuykendall

A review of the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, revealed that a chauffeur's permit was issued to MARION J. STEINKELLNER under #M 268006, issued December 8, 1964. Her birth date was listed as June 7, 1938, brown hair, brown eyes, 5'8", 155 lbs., married. According to the permit, she must wear corrective lenses and her address was shown as 1903 Henry Street, Berkeley.

According to the Certificate of Registry of Marriage maintained by the Department of Public Health, State of California, San Francisco, Steinkellner listed her birth date as March 7, 1938, Michigan.

PHIL SUGAR

SF T-2 on September 28, 1965, furnished a copy of a cardboard poster which stated, "VDC Defendant-- I will commit civil disobedience on 10/15-16 with "the Vietnam Day Committee and am prepared to be arrested in opposition to U.S. intervention in Vietnam. I am joining this committee to organize my political defense." The statement was signed by SUGAR, who listed his address as 1048 Francisco, Berkeley, phone 549-1385.

SF T-1 on September 30, 1965 described PHIL SUGAR as a white male, in his mid-20s, 5'9", 200 - 215 lbs., and a student at Merritt College, Oakland.

ARTHUR TURNER

SF T-16 on April 20, 1965, informed that one ARTHUR LEE TURNER was a delegate to the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) Founding Convention which was held in New York from April 15 - 18, 1965. TURNER was a delegate from San Francisco.

A characterization for the PLP is contained in the Appendix Section.

DAVID A. WARREN,
also known as
Dave Warren

On November 9, 1965, Sergeant JOSEPH P. HALLERAN, UCB Campus Police, furnished a list of student organizations registered with the Dean of Students Office for the fall of 1965, UCB. DAVID WARREN, 1105 F 6th Street, Berkeley, was listed as the representative for the Berkeley Chapter of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA).

A characterization for the YSA is contained in the Appendix Section.

STEPHAN MARK WEISSMAN,
also known as
Steve Weissman

SF T-12 has informed that STEVE WEISSMAN held a BA Degree from the University of Tampa and an

MA Degree from the University of Michigan. He enrolled at UCB as a graduate student for the fall semester, 1964. He was a strategist for the Free Speech Movement (FSM) demonstrations during the latter part of 1964 on the UCB campus. He organized a strike of teaching assistants at UCB in support of the FSM.

The FSM was an organization which evolved at UCB out of a disagreement between students and UCB administration of UCB policy regarding campus organizations.

WEISSMAN, according to his academic file at Tampa University, December 9, 1964, has a history of self-admitted emotional instability for which he had been under psycho-therapy treatment from October, 1958 - January, 1960. His father informed in April, 1965 that his son was not a Marxist; had no communist leanings whatsoever and considered the United States the best country in the world but one which still needed improvement.

Review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for STEPHAN MARK WEISSMAN:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	March 22, 1940, Tampa, Florida
Height	5'10"
Weight	160 lbs.
Eyes	Hazel
Hair	Auburn

PHILIP HUMBERT WHITE,
also known as
Phil White

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for PHILIP HUMBERT WHITE:

(Description of PHILIP HUMBERT WHITE)

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	May 28, 1941, San Diego, California
Height	6'4"
Build	Slender

JOHN GARRETT WILLIAMS

SF T-17 on March 22, 1965, identified JOHN GARRETT WILLIAMS as an active member of the DCA, Berkeley Chapter.

SF T-18 reported on February 23, 1966, that WILLIAMS attended an Executive Board meeting of the DCA Berkeley Chapter which was held at his residence.

ANNELIESE HELGA ZACH,
also known as
Annaliesa Helga Zach (True Name)

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for ZACH:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Date and place of birth	September 8, 1943, Vienna, Austria
Residence	2143 Stewart Street Berkeley, California

In December, 1965, she changed her name from ANNELIESE HELGA ZACH to ANNALIESA HELGA ZACH.

SF T-19 reported in October, 1965, that on September 7, 1965, in addition to the previously mentioned members of the VDC Steering Committee, STEVE CHERKOSS, BARTON STONE and JACK WEINBERG were also members of the Steering Committee.

SF T-20 on October 10, 1965, identified STEVE CHERKOSS as a "current" active member of the Bay Area PLP.

SF T-21 informed on October 9, 1964, that on October 11, 1964, JACK WEINBERG attended a general membership meeting of the DCA, Berkeley Chapter.

WEINBERG was arrested at UCB in connection with a sit-in demonstration at Sproul Hall on December 3, 1964. He was charged with trespassing and resisting arrest; convicted, and on July 30, 1965, he was sentenced to serve 120 days in jail.

A U.S. Department of Justice letter dated August 23, 1965, concerning a suit instituted by the IWW in the District of Columbia against the Department of Justice sought to remove the IWW from listing pursuant to Executive Order 10450 disclosed that BARTON STONE was a member of the General Executive Board of the IWW.

SF T-2 reported on October 4, 1965, that the duties of the Steering Committee are to make recommendations on various projects to the general membership and to carry out the day-to-day functions of the VDC.

Inspector CHARLES O'MEARA, Intelligence Unit, Berkeley Police Department, informed on October 12, 1965, that according to information furnished to him, DAVID FRIEDMAN was a member of the Steering Committee of the VDC.

A protest demonstration was conducted at the Sea Wolf Restaurant, Jack London Square, Oakland, on February 12, 1965. This demonstration was sponsored by the Congress Of Racial Equality. During the demonstration, DAVID FRIEDMAN was one of five individuals arrested by the Oakland Police Department. He was charged with interfering with a police officer. The charge was subsequently dismissed.

The following is a description of FRIEDMAN as contained in the records of the Oakland Police Department:

(Description of DAVID FREIDMAN)

Race	White
Sex	Male
Age	Refused to give birth date-- estimated in mid-20s
Height	5'8"
Weight	180 lbs.
Hair	Black
Eyes	Brown

SF T-2 informed on October 18, 1965, that Professor STEVE SMALE had quit his association with the VDC.

SF T-22 on November 15, 1966, furnished a copy of a printed "Dear Friend" letter issued by the VDC which called for funds from the recipient. The letter identified MORRIS , Professor of Mathematics, UCB, and LARRY LOUGHLIN as members of the Finance Committee, VDC.

The name of MORRIS appeared as a signer of a 1962 petition which urged non-enforcement and repeal of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which petition had been circulated by the Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCL), San Francisco, and had been submitted to the White House.

A characterization for the CCL is contained in the Appendix Section.

The 115th INTC, Presidio, San Francisco, by letter dated December 10, 1965, informed that on December 10, 1965, MICHAEL O'HANLON identified BETTINA APTHEKER as having been a member of the VDC Steering Committee who was allowed to speak for the VDC.

In the November 9, 1965, issue of the "Berkeley Daily Gazette", a Berkeley daily newspaper, there appeared an article captioned, "APTHEKER Says She's a Communist". The article related that on November 9, 1965, BETTINA APTHEKER stated she had been a member of the CP during the "past 3 years".

According to the newspaper article, APTHEKER had informed the student newspaper, "The Daily Californian", a UCB campus newspaper, that she joined the CP in 1962 when she was 17 years of age.

Inspector O'MEARA informed on November 12, 1965, that on November 10, 1965, the VDC Steering Committee held a meeting in Berkeley, California. This meeting pertained to the November 20, 1965 march. In line with the march, a proposal was made that the march would be basically non-violent; however in the event there was trouble, the marchers would defend themselves. Inspector O'MEARA went on to say that according to information furnished to him, the Steering Committee meeting was attended by MICKIE LIMA, Chairman, Northern California District CP. Prior to voting on the proposal, mention was made that only members of the Steering Committee could vote. LIMA voted on the issue. The proposal passed 70 - 58. Inspector O'MEARA commented that his source did not know how LIMA voted on the proposal. Inspector O'MEARA further informed on November 12, 1965, that the VDC held a Steering Committee meeting on November 11, 1965, for the purpose of discussing the parade permit meeting with the Berkeley Police Department. MICKIE LIMA, who attended the meeting, talked with several leaders of the VDC but made no statements or suggestions to the group at the meeting.

SF T-1 on January 27, 1966 identified ROBERT MARK HURWITT as a member of the VDC Steering Committee.

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the folliwng information for ROBERT MARK HURWITT:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Date and place of birth	October 12, 1941, New York, New York
Height	5'11"
Weight	170 lbs.
Hair	Light brown, worn long and shaggy over the ears and down the neck

SF 100-55462
FSP:mfm

(Description of ROBERT MARK HURWITT Continued)

Eyes	Green
Social Security No.	128-32-3305
Employed	Full time by VDC

IV. ACTIVITIES

SF T-2 on September 20, 1965, furnished a copy of a printed leaflet issued by the VDC captioned, "The War in Vietnam is Against our National Interest". The leaflet commented the war in Vietnam was against our national interest because:

"1. The policy of our government is now to send large numbers of American GIs to fight in Vietnam. A hundred thousand of our men died in the Korean War. We don't want this to happen again.

"2. The war in Vietnam is destroying our democracy. The American people rejected Goldwater's policies of war, but President Johnson has defied his mandate for peace and has escalated the war in Vietnam. Even though Congress has not debated American involvement in Vietnam, it has automatically supported all of the government's actions.

"3. It is in our interest to have a strong United Nations. But our country violates the UN Charter and weakens the UN when we intervene in South Vietnam and the Dominican Republic.

"4. Our nation's attention should be on ending poverty, providing jobs for all, fighting Jim Crow, and guaranteeing the right to vote. Our government cannot accomplish this if it devotes its time, energy, and money to interfering in the affairs of other countries."

The leaflet informed that to end the war, President JOHNSON could do any or all of the following things:

"1. Stop bombing North Vietnam.

"2. Call for negotiations with everybody involved in the war, including the Viet Cong.

"3. Ask the United Nations to try to solve the problem.

"4. Call for free elections in South Vietnam and let the people there make up their own minds."

892

SF T-2 on October 11, 1965, furnished a copy of a printed leaflet captioned, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL", issued by the VDC and printed by the Berkeley Free Press.

A Xerox copy of the leaflet follows.

Approved For Posting

ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL

You may soon be sent to Vietnam. You have heard about the war in the news; your officers will give you pep talks about it. But you probably feel as confused and uncertain as most Americans do. Many people will tell you to just follow orders and leave the thinking to others. But you have the right to know as much about this war as anyone. After all, it's you—not your congressman—who might get killed.

WHY ARE WE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM?

We are supposed to be fighting to protect democracy in Vietnam, and yet our own government admits that South Vietnam is run by a dictatorship. General Ky, the latest military dictator, is as bad as they come. In a recent interview he said: "People ask me who my heroes are. I have only one -- Hitler. I admire Hitler because he pulled his country together when it was in a terrible state." (London Sunday Mirror, July 4, 1965).

General Ky doesn't mean much to us; we're not even sure how to pronounce his name, but the South Vietnamese have lived under men like him for years. As far as the Vietnamese are concerned, we are fighting on the side of Hitlerism; and they hope we lose.

WHO IS THE ENEMY?

U.S. military spokesmen have often said that their greatest problem is finding the enemy. The enemy, they say, is everywhere. The old woman feeding her chickens may have a stock of hand grenades in her hut. The little boy who trails after the American soldiers during the day slips out to give information to the guerillas at night. The washerwoman at the American air base brings a bomb to work one day. It is impossible, say the military, to tell which are the Viet Cong and which are the civilians.

And so, because the whole Vietnamese people seem to be the enemy, the military is taking no chances. They use tear gas -- a weapon designed for use against civilians. They order American troops to fire at women and children -- because women and children, after all, are firing at American troops. American fighter planes destroy civilian villages with napalm; American B-52's are flattening whole regions. That is why the war in Vietnam is so often called a "dirty war."

When the South Vietnamese people see you in your foreign uniform, they will think of you as *their* enemy. You are the ones bombing *their* towns. They don't know whether you're a draftee or a volunteer, whether you're for the war or against it; but they're not taking any chances either.

234

FREE ELECTIONS

The Vietnamese would like to *vote* the foreigners out of their country, *but* they have been denied the chance. According to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, there were supposed to be elections throughout Vietnam in 1956. But the U.S. government was certain that our man in Vietnam, Premier Diem, would lose. So we decided not to allow any election until we were sure we could win. Diem set up a political police force and put all political opposition -- Communist and anti-Communist -- in jail. By 1959, it was clear there weren't going to be any elections, and the guerillas known as the Viet Cong began to fight back. By 1963 our government was fed up with Diem, but still wasn't willing to risk elections. Our CIA helped a group of Vietnamese generals to overthrow Diem and kill him. Since then there have been a series of "better" military dictators. General Ky -- the man who admires Hitler -- is the latest one.

FIGHTING FOR DEMOCRACY

Your job as a soldier is supposed to be "to win the people of South Vietnam." Win them to what -- democracy? No, we keep military dictators in power. What then? The American way of life? But why should they care any more about our way of life than we care about theirs? We can't speak their language or even pronounce their names. We don't know anything about their religion or even what it is. We never even heard of Vietnam until Washington decided to run it.

You are supposed to be fighting "to save the Vietnamese people from Communism." Certainly Communist influence is very strong in the National Liberation Front, the rebel government. Yet most of the people support the NLF. Why? Many of the same people who now lead the NLF led the Vietnamese independence movement against the Japanese during World War II, and then went on to fight against French colonial rule. Most Vietnamese think of the NLF leaders as their country's outstanding patriots. In fact, many anti-Communists have joined the guerrilla forces in the belief that the most important thing is to get rid of foreign domination and military dictators. On the other hand, very few Vietnamese support the official government of General Ky. His army has low morale and a high desertion rate.

THE GUERRILLAS

The newspapers and television have told us again and again what a tough fighter the Vietnamese guerrilla is. Short of ammunition and without any air cover, he can beat forces that outnumber him five or ten to one. Why do they have such high morale? They are not draftees; no draftees ever fight like that. They are not high-paid, professional soldiers. Most of them are peasants who work their fields; they can't even spare the ammunition for target practice.

Their secret is that they know why they are fighting. They didn't hear about Vietnam in the newspapers; they've lived there all their lives. While we were in high school, they were living under the Diem regime and hating it. Now American planes are bombing their towns and strafing their fields; American troops have occupied their country; and if they complain out loud, an American-supported dictator sentences them to jail or the firing squad. Is it any wonder that they fight so fiercely?

CRUSHING THE RESISTANCE

The war in Vietnam is not being fought according to the rules. Prisoners are tortured. Our planes drop incendiary bombs on civilian villages. Our soldiers shoot at women and children. Your officers will tell you that it is all necessary, that we couldn't win the war any other way. And they are right. Americans are no more cruel than any other people; American soldiers don't enjoy this kind of war. But if you are going to wage war against an entire people, you have to become cruel.

The ordinary German soldier in occupied Europe wasn't especially cruel, either. But as the resistance movements grew, he became cruel. He shot at women and children because they were shooting at him; he never asked himself why they were shooting at him. When a certain town became a center of resistance activity, he followed his orders and destroyed the whole town. He knew that SS men were torturing captured resistance fighters, but it wasn't his business to interfere.

FOLLOWING ORDERS

As a soldier you have been trained to obey orders, but as a human being you must take responsibility for your own acts. International and American law recognize that an individual soldier, even if acting under orders, must bear final legal and moral responsibility for what he does. This principle became a part of law after World War II, when the Allied nations, meeting in London, decided that German war criminals must be punished even if they committed war crimes under orders. This principle was the basis of the Nuremberg trials. We believe that the entire war in Vietnam is criminal and immoral. We believe that the atrocities which are necessary to wage this war against the people of Vietnam are inexcusable.

OPPOSE THE WAR

We hope that you too find yourself, as a human being, unable to tolerate this nightmare war, and we hope that you will oppose it. We don't know what kind of risks we are taking in giving you this leaflet; you won't know what risk you will be taking in opposing the war. A growing number of GIs have already refused to fight in Vietnam and have been court-martialed. They have shown great courage. We believe that they, together with other courageous men who will join them, will have influence far out of proportion to their numbers.

There may be many other things you can do; since you are in the service, you know better than civilians what sorts of opposition are possible. But whatever you do, keep your eyes open. Draw your own conclusions from the things you see, read and hear. At orientation sessions, don't be afraid to ask questions, and if you're not satisfied with the answers, keep asking. Take every chance you get to talk to your fellow soldiers about the war.

You may feel the war is wrong, and still decide not to face a court-martial. You may then find yourself in Vietnam under orders. You might be forced to do some fighting -- but don't do any more than you have to. Good luck.

Vietnam Day Committee
2407 Fulton Street
Berkeley, California
549-0811

SF T-5 on December 17, 1965, furnished a copy of a "Dear Friend" letter, dated December 14, 1965, issued by the International Committee of the VDC. The letter informed the recipient there was "now" a serious danger that soon the JOHNSON Administration would further escalate the war in Vietnam by extending the bombing to the population centers of North Vietnam, Haiphong and possibly Hanoi.

The letter informed that should escalation of the war effort in Vietnam take place, the peace groups everywhere, as well as all organizations and individuals opposed to the war, should respond immediately by demonstrating their horror at this outrage.

The letter related the committee was urging the demonstrations should take place within hours or days at American embassies, consulates, information centers and military establishments throughout the world.

The letter commented if such a response were made immediately, it would represent a significant acceleration of the movement to stop the war.

CHARLES HARRISON, Intelligence Unit, Berkeley, California Police Department informed on January 12, 1966 that STEVE CHERKOSS had obtained a Berkeley City Permit for a literature table for the VDC. Officer HARRISON informed that at approximately 3:45 PM, January 12, 1966, approximately 100 to 150 junior high students were milling around the literature table where STEVE CHERKOSS, GEORGE EWART, LARRY HAMLIN, MARILYN MILLIGAN and 4 or 5 other representatives from the VDC were situated. Officer HARRISON informed they were distributing VDC literature in the vicinity of the Garfield Junior High School, Berkeley, and were speaking to the youngsters, encouraging them to organize a VDC to oppose the U.S. policy in Vietnam. CHERKOSS and EWART stated the U.S. had violated the Geneva Agreements and told the students that they could be drafted and killed in about five years. At approximately 5:00 PM, the VDC representatives departed from the area.

SF T-5 on November 18, 1965 reported that on November 13, 1965, GEORGE EWART attended a meeting of the Campus Club of the PLP.

SF T-23 informed on January 13, 1966, that JOHN SELTZ,

896

member of the VDC, and others planned to drop propaganda leaflets on Treasure Island Naval Station, San Francisco, during the evening of January 14, 1966.

According to SF T-23, the leaflets portrayed the charred bodies of "mother and child" and contained on their reverse sides a message critical of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

Sergeant DICK CALLAHAN, 115th INTC, San Francisco, informed on January 14, 1966, that the above-described leaflets had been dropped over Oakland at 9:25 PM and over Alameda, California at 9:30 PM. Sergeant CALLAHAN also informed that an unidentified plane had dropped described leaflets on the Alameda Annex near the Naval Supply Depot.

Sergeant CARL DAHL, Intelligence Unit, Oakland Police Department, Oakland, informed on January 14, 1966, that at 11:30 PM, January 14, 1966, four individuals responsible for dropping the described leaflets had been arrested at the San Carlos Airport, San Carlos, California. The four arrested were identified as JAMES HENRY PETRIE, 56, Campbell, California, the pilot; ANTHONY ERNEST BROSKLEY, 28, a heavy equipment operature, Palo Alto, California; RAYMOND P. TIERNAN, JR., 23, a British graduate student at Stanford University, Palo Alto, and GLEN D. FOWLER, San Jose, a student at San Jose State College, San Jose. The airplane used was a Cessna 180, license N1656C, owned by MARGARET H. YOUNG, 2505 Greer Road, Palo Alto.

Sergeant DAHL related on January 16, 1966, that the four persons arrested for dropping the leaflets were released on bond, $1,100 each for PETRIE and TIERNAN, and $550 each for BROSKLEY and FOWLER. Sergeant DAHL added that the Oakland Police Department would confer with the Alameda County District Attorney's Office on possible charges to be filed against the individuals.

Sergeant DAHL later informed that the 4 above-mentioned individuals were charged with conspiring to litter the streets of Alameda County, California. Sergeant DAHL added that the charge against FOWLER and BROSKLEY were dismissed and the cases against PETRIE and TIERNAN are pending.

A review of the Records of the Oakland Police Department, Oakland, revealed the following description for PETRIE, under Oakland Police Department Number 182146:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Born	September 30, 1909, Oklahoma
Height	5'10"
Weight	160 pounds
Hair	Grey
Eyes	Grey
Occupation	Student at San Jose State College
Address	70 East Rosemary Lane, Campbell, California

The following information is set forth for BROSKLEY, under Oakland Police Department Number 182155:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Born	July 27, 1937, West Virginia
Height	5'10"
Weight	150 pounds
Eyes	Blue
Hair	Brown
Characteristics	Wears a mustache
Occupation	Heavy equipment operator
Residence	201 Waverly Street, Palo Alto

The following information was set forth for FOWLER under Oakland Police Department Number 182157:

Sex	Male
Race	White
Born	June 27, 1944

Height	6'
Weight	165
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Blue
Occupation	Student at San Jose State College
Residence	1491 Husted Avenue, San Jose
Social Security Number	565-62-6770
FBI Number	492539

The Hayward, California "Daily Review", a Hayward, California daily newspaper, in its issue of November 5, 1965, contained an article which informed that RAYMOND PATRICK TIERNAN appeared before juniors at Castro Valley High School, Castro Valley, California, during the "previous week" and spoke against U.S. intervention in Vietnam. He was described as a graduate law student, a protester of U.S. policy in Vietnam and a pacifist.

SF T-24, on January 24, 1966, made available to the FBI, Washington, D.C., two letters from the International Committee of the VDC, which had been mailed to the Center University Federation of University Centers, Caracas, Venezuela, South America.

The letters, written in Spanish, urged demonstrations against U.S. embassies, consulates, information centers, cultural services, military missions and military bases throughout the world should the U.S. Government, "declare war or bomb Haiphong and Hanoi".

SF T-25 on February 14, 19[illegible] graphed VDC statement on [illegible]

The statement informed that BILL EPTON, a revolutionary communist and leader of the PLP, was convicted on December 20, 1964, of conspiring to riot and criminal anarchy in the New York State Supreme Court.

The statement related the Harlem rebellion during the summer of 1964 was the result of high rents, police brutality, crowded housing, unemployment and countless other indignities. The statement remarked that the black people of Harlem and other ghettos throughout the U.S. had been subjected to these conditions for many years. According to the statement, BILL EPTON was the scapegoat of the corrupt establishment that created and intensified these brutal conditions of dehumanization.

The statement went on to say that BILL EPTON strongly opposed the war in Vietnam and had urged his brothers not to fight against the people of Vietnam stating that, "the fight for freedom and liberty is right here in this country."

The statement said the VDC was demanding the charges against BILL EPTON be dropped and the conviction be immediately reversed.

PROTEST DEMONSTRATIONS

A. Demonstration at Voting Residence of Governor EDMUND G. BROWN, 460 Magellan Avenue, San Francisco, September 26, 1965

In the September 27, 1965 issue of "The Daily Californian" newspaper there appeared an article captioned, "VDC Members Picket Brown's Residence".

The article informed that 25 members of the VDC had picketed Governor BROWN's voting residence at 460 Magellan Avenue, San Francisco, on September 26, 1965.

The article informed the VDC was protesting Governor BROWN's criticizing of SI CASADY, President of the California Democratic Council. CASADY had been asked by Governor BROWN to resign after making statements praising students who burned their draft cards.

CECIL PHARRIS, Assistant Inspector, Intelligence Unit, San Francisco Police Department, San Francisco, informed on September 26, 1965 there were no arrests or incidents in connection with the above-described demonstration.

900

B. International Days of Protest,
October 15-16, 1965

SF T-2 on September 20, 1965, furnished a copy of a printed leaflet captioned, "Vietnam Day Committee, OCT 15-16, International Days of Protest."

Among other things, the leaflet informed that the VDC had set October 15-16, 1965, as dates of International Days of Protest against military intervention, and had sent a call for support throughout the world. The leaflet added the VDC office at Berkeley would be the international headquarters for the protest. The leaflet went on to inform that a community anti-war meeting would take place on the Berkeley campus on Friday, October 15, 1965, and Saturday morning, October 16, 1965.

According to the leaflet, the meeting would culminate at noon, October 16, 1965, with a "peace march" through Berkeley to the Oakland Army Terminal (OAT), "the country's major send-off port of men and materials to Vietnam."

Sergeant DAHL informed on October 5, 1965, that on October 4, 1965, two representatives of VDC contacted Chief of Police EDWARD TOOTHMAN, Oakland Police Department, for a permit to march on October 15, 1965 from UCB campus to the OAT. The representatives indicated the march would begin at 7:30 PM and last for about 2 to 2-1/2 hours, with a minimum of 2,500 and a maximum of 15,000 individuals participating. The representatives estimated there would be approximately 5,000 individuals in the march and torches would be carried to light the way.

Chief TOOTHMAN informed the representatives the police department did not have the authority to grant a permit and this matter was handled by the City Manager. Chief TOOTHMAN commented that the City Manager relied on the recommendations of the Oakland Police Department and the Oakland Fire Department. When asked what he would recommend, Chief TOOTHMAN replied he would recommend the permit be denied.

Upon hearing this, the representatives stated they would hold a march and use torches whether the permit was granted.

901

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on October 14, 1965 that on October 14, 1965, the VDC held a press conference in San Francisco, at which time MORRIS HIRSCH, who identified himself as a "rank and file" member of the VDC, stated the march through Berkeley and Oakland would be held even though permits to do so were not issued.

The following is a description for HIRSCH as set forth in the records of the Registration Office, UCB:

Sex	Male
Race	White
Born	June 23, 1933, Chicago, Illinois
Height	5'8"
Weight	175
Eyes	Grey-green
Hair	Dark
Employment	Mathematics Professor at UCB

Sergeant DAHL informed on October 14, 1965 that on October 14, 1965, the Acting City Manager of Oakland denied the VDC permit to march through Oakland on October 15, 1965. This refusal was appealed to the Oakland City Council, who also denied the permit.

Inspector O'MEARA informed on October 15, 1965, that he had received information that on October 14, 1965, the VDC held a meeting and discussed detailed plans for the October 15-16, 1965 march. At the meeting, BETTINA APTHEKER, who made her first appearance at a VDC meeting, cautioned those in attendance on how to make arrests more difficult.

Special Agents of the FBI observed that the two-day demonstration began on October 15, 1965 at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB, shortly after 9:00 AM. The classes at the University had already commenced and the crowd which was small and gathered subsequently, was entertained by folk singers during the morning hours.

At approximately 11:30 AM, October 15, 1965, the VDC held a press briefing on the UCB campus, and announced that in spite of the fact that the Oakland City authorities had refused to issue a parade permit, the march from the UCB campus to OAT, 7 miles away, would begin as scheduled at 7:30 PM.

At 12 noon, October 15, 1965, the crowd had grown to approximately 1,000. At 12 noon, the rally began. From 12 noon to 5:00 PM, five speakers were presented and their remarks were directed primarily towards criticizing U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam.

At approximately 5:00 PM, JERRY RUBIN announced that all means to appeal for a permit for the VDC march through the streets of Oakland and the City of Oakland, had been denied to them. JERRY RUBIN was followed by PAUL JACOBS, who was one of three speakers who continued to protest U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam.

> PAUL JACOBS informed Special Agents of the FBI on August 18, 1949 that in 1933 and 1934, he was active in the Young Communist League (YCL), but was a member for less than one year. He stated he was expelled from the YCL for engaging in Trotskyite activities. According to JACOBS, he remained a Trotskyite for about one year.
>
> The YCL has been designated by the Attorney General of the U.S. pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

At approximately 7:45 PM, October 15, 1965, the marchers began leaving UCB campus. Monitor captains preceded and followed the line of marchers. As the marchers approached the Berkeley-Oakland border, they were repulsed by a cordon of Oakland police officers. The marchers, whose ranks were estimated from 4,000 to 12,000, then proceeded to the Civic Center Plaza, Berkeley. At approximately 11:55 PM, October 15, 1965, the crowd began to break up. An unknown person threw a tear gas bomb which disrupted the crowd in the plaza. An 18 year old girl was injured in the eye by the canister-type bomb utilized. During the remainder of the wee hours of the morning and until 4:30 AM

903

October 16, 1965, movies were shown. At 3:15 AM, the crowd had dwindled to approximately 150 persons.

An agreement had been reached with the Berkeley Police Department by the marchers that they would not return to the Civic Center Plaza, Berkeley, because of traffic resulting for a football game at UCB stadium on October 16, 1965.

At approximately 11:45 AM, October 16, 1965, the protest commenced with a rally in the vicinity of the Civic Center Plaza. At the rally, MORT SCHEER was introduced as a representative of PLP.

SCHEER addressed a crowd which now numbered about 350 as "comrades". SCHEER criticized the imperialistic aggression of the U.S. in Vietnam and remarked that in order to win, "we must get rid of the ruling class in the United States." SCHEER added that the working class and the Negroes must be united to achieve this end.

MORT SCHEER has been publicly identified as a Vice President of PLP.

PAUL MONTAUK also spoke at the rally on October 16, 1965. He was also critical of U.S. foreign policy and action in Vietnam.

MIKE MYERSON also spoke at the rally on October 16, 1965. He claimed the U.S. military forces were bombing and murdering thousands of innocent Vietnamese women and children and were on the verge of bombing dikes and dams which would cause starvation to millions of defenseless peasants.

SF T-26 reported on January 13, 1965, that MIKE MYERSON, at a meeting of the National Coordinating Committee of the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America (DCA) in San Francisco, reported to the committee members, he was serving as International Secretary of the DCA. This meeting was held December 31, 1964 to January 2, 1965.

At approximately 2:15 PM, between 1,700 and 3,000 demonstrators moved out of Berkeley and commenced marching south on Grove Street towards Oakland. In the meantime, the Oakland Police Department had formed a double wedge of policemen on the Oakland side of the city limits and were waiting for the arrival of the marchers. At 2:30 PM, 16 black-leather-jacketed motorcyclists, known as the "Hell's Angels" arrived at the Grove-Adeline and 62nd Street intersection. Some of the members began wrapping their hands with leather belts. The members of the "Hell's Angels" began mingling with the spectators, but were forced behind the line of Oakland policemen. At 3:37 PM, the marchers arrived at the above-mentioned intersection. Upon reaching the intersection, a member of the "Hell's Angels" broke through the police lines and grabbed the lead banner of the VDC marchers. Both police departments moved in and broke up the fight. One member of the "Hell's Angels" was injured on the head and a Berkeley police officer suffered a broken leg.

The demonstrators then sat down in the intersection on the Berkeley side of the city boundary. Things remained impasse until the demonstration began breaking up at 5:05 PM.

There were no further incidents although five more members of the "Hell's Angels", which has been publicly described as a notorious outlaw motorcycle group, were arrested and charged with assault with a deadly weapon in connection with the injury to the Berkeley officer. They were later released after questioning.

C. Protest March, November 20, 1965

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on October 18, 1965 that at 12 noon, October 18, 1965, a rally was held at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. The rally was co-sponsored by the VDC and the master of ceremonies and one of the main speakers was BETTINA APTHEKER. During her speech, she condemned U.S. Attorney General KATZENBACH, the Federal Government in general, and damned the Oakland, California Police Department for its part in stopping the VDC marches on October 15-16, 1965.

BETTINA APTHEKER called for a national mobilization to be held in Berkeley of all groups interested in civil rights, individual rights and all peace movements opposed to the war in Vietnam, to unite and form a unit of solidarity for a national march on November 13, 1965 from Berkeley through Oakland.

STEVE WEISSMAN then spoke at the rally and called for a mobilization of all the Negro communities in West Berkeley, West Oakland and East Oakland, to support the November 13, 1965 march. WEISSMAN commented there would be an intensive campaign of leafletting, speeches and rallies to mobilize the Negro community in support of the march and peace rally on November 13, 1965.

WEISSMAN added the planned march for November 6, 1965 was changed to November 13, 1965, because of a civil rights meeting being held somewhere in the South on November 6, 1965, where support would be garnered for the November 13, 1965 rally and march.

The planned march of November 13, 1965 was subsequently changed to November 20, 1965.

At the rally on October 18, 1965, APTHEKER and WEISSMAN emphasized the fact that the Oakland Police Department had denied individual's liberties and rights in stopping the VDC march. They implied that "now" was the time for all of the radical left to organize and crush the Oakland Police Department and the Oakland power structure.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on October 27, 1965, that at a VDC press conference on October 27, 1965, at the Sir Francis Drake Hotel, San Francisco, mention was made that on the "previous night" (October 26, 1965) the general membership of the VDC had radified the following plans for the march on October 20, 1965:

12 noon to 1:00 PM, pre-march rally at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB.

1:00 PM, march will depart from UCB to the OAT.

After picketing at the base, the marchers will return to 7th and Peralta Streets, Oakland, for a rally.

Announcement was also made at the press conference that the purpose of the march was to oppose American intervention in Vietnam, and demand an end to Federal and local suppression of the protest movement. Mention was also made that a team of lawyers would take every possible legal step to force the City of Oakland to permit the march.

Records of the U.S. District Court, San Francisco, revealed that on November 1, 1965, a petition was filed by the VDC which asked for an injunction against the City of Oakland, the Mayor, the Chief of Police and the Acting City Manager. U.S. District Judge WILLIAM T. SWEIGERT filed an order for the defendants to show cause by November 12, 1965, why they should not permit a parade through the City of Oakland on November 20, 1965, by the VDC.

In the November 12, 1965, issue of the "San Francisco Examiner", there appeared an article captioned, "Berkeley OKs VDC March, but Oakland Sticks to Ban."

The article informed that the City of Berkeley had approved a parade permit, however, the City of Oakland was denying the parade permit on the grounds it could cause violence. Oakland City Manager JOHN A. MORIN denied the permit for several reasons.

1. "The proposed 7-1/2 mile march to a point near OAT starting at 1:00 PM would still be going on after dark."

2. The fact he had received 3 parade applications and one amended petition, all signed by different individuals in the VDC. This led him to believe the VDC was a "loosely-knit organization which might not be able to control itself."

3. "It is not reasonable to expect local taxpayers to suffer inconvenience and exposure to possible violence, as well as having to pay the high cost of protection."

On November 17, 1965, U.S. District Judge SWEIGERT issued a preliminary injunction asked by the plaintiff (VDC) with the following restrictions.

The parade must enter Oakland no later than 11:00 AM, November 20, 1965, and must terminate at 7th and Peralta Streets no later than 4:00 PM. If permission from the owners of the property at 7th and Peralta (U.S. Post Office) can not be obtained, alternate points of dispersement will be De Fremery Park or Bushrod Park, Oakland. Both of these alternate locations were offered by the defendant, City of Oakland and Alameda County, as dispersal points.

Permission for the use of the vacant lot at 7th and Peralta was subsequently denied by the owners.

The injunction prevented the plaintiff from sending any persons to the OAT.

The rally following the parade must terminate no later than 5:00 PM.

Law enforcement officers in Oakland and Alameda County were restricted from arresting plaintiff; however, individuals who might commit acts of violence or break possible laws, were subject to arrest. Defendant and their agents must protect the plaintiff and thus sanctioned from attacks by any group, such as the "Hell's Angels". The parade must consist of no more than 1,000 persons in each group and each group must maintain a distance of 60 feet or more from groups, so as not to interfere with east-west traffic. The marchers must march no more than 7 abreast and not occupy more than 1/2 of the street. In addition, the injunction provided that the plaintiff must file by noon, November 18, 1965, the names and addresses of all the monitors of the parade. If reasonable emergency arises, law enforcement agents of the defendant must change the parade route in a reasonable manner consistent with the parade route.

On November 20, 1965, a Special Agent of the FBI was furnished with a printed leaflet captioned, "Why We March .. Against the War in Vietnam."

The leaflet stated that every day young Americans were daily in a war they didn't understand. The leaflet further stated that American soldiers were daily "dying" because they think "we" want them to die. "If we kept silent, we would be disloyal to them. We march against this war because we believe that our loyalty to humanity and to our country is far more important than any loyalty to politics and generals."

The leaflet was issued by the VDC and invited the recipient to join the march from Berkeley to Oakland on November 20, 1965.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on November 19, 1965, that a leaflet captioned, "VDC Bulletin" was being distributed in Berkeley. A copy of the leaflet, which was furnished to the Special Agent, informed that "everything is 'go' for the march", on November 20, 1965. The leaflet explained that the purpose of the march was to "protest American intervention in Vietnam and to affirm our right to peacefully protest, even in Oakland, when we feel our government is wrong."

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on November 20, 1965 that the march on November 20, 1965, was led by the sheriff's van and patroled by police and the California Highway Patrol. The march began at 9:50 AM from the UCB campus. The marchers were divided into groups of approximately 1,000 with some 50 feet between groups. There were 10 groups and the groups wended their way through the cities of Oakland and Berkeley and were joined by people on the sidelines. The 3 lead groups had sound trucks and monitors for the parade and were equipped with 2-way radios. The first group reached its destination, De Fremery Park, 18th and Adeline Streets, Oakland, at approximately 12 noon, and the last marchers reached the park at approximately 1:50 PM.

During the above march, counter-demonstrators were on the scene with signs reading, "Win the War in Vietnam" and "Let's Get the Viet Cong out of California."

A second Special Agent of the FBI observed on November 20, 1965 that the rally at De Fremery Park began at approximately 1:15 PM with some 7,000 people in attendance. Among the speakers was one DANIEL HEALY, who stated that on November 10, 1965, he refused induction into the U.S. Armed Forces. HEALY stated the U.S. Government forced him to choose between being a criminal or losing his self-respect.

Another speaker was DONALD DUNCAN, who was introduced as a veteran of the Vietnam war, who had spent 18 months in combat and had received the Silver Star medal for heroism. DUNCAN was very critical of U.S. policy in Vietnam. JOHN BURTON, California State Assemblyman, also spoke at the rally and said war was an economic burden on the nation, and killings must stop. The rally ended at approximately 4:30 PM.

Sergeant DAHL informed on November 20, 1965, there were no arrests or incidents during the march and rally on November 20, 1965.

D. Demonstration Against Vice-President HUBERT HUMPHREY, Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, December 3, 1965

On December 3, 1965, a Special Agent of the FBI was furnished a copy of a printed leaflet captioned, "Humphrey! What Does your Liberalism mean in Vietnam?". The leaflet which was issued by the VDC was distributed during a demonstration against Vice President HUMPHREY on December 3, 1965, at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco, by the VDC.

Special Agents of the FBI observed on December 3, 1965 that the VDC commenced picketing at the Fairmont Hotel at approximately 5:45 PM on December 3, 1965. This picketing took place across the street from the main entrance to the Fairmont Hotel, Mason Street, San Francisco, where Vice President HUMPHREY was residing and was to be featured guest at a $100-a-plate Democratic Party fund-raising banquet.

Subsequently, some of the demonstrators who were protesting U.S. intervention in Vietnam, proceeded to march on the California Street entrance to the hotel. A maximum number of pickets at one time reached approximately 250 on the Mason Street side and 150 on the California Street side, considerably below the 1500 to 3000 participants the VDC expected in the demonstration.

The demonstrators carried signs reading, "repent" and "Make Love, Not War." They chanted, "Hey, hey, LBJ, how many kids did you kill today?" and "2, 4, 6, 8, when you gonna negotiate?".

At approximately 8:40 PM, as Vice President HUMPHREY was about to enter the Gold Ballroom in the Fairmont Hotel, where he was to deliver his speech, GEORGE ARMSTEAD KAUFFMAN attempted to shout a statement; however, he was quickly removed from the immediate area by members of the San Francisco Police Department. The demonstration outside ended at approximately 9:35 PM and according to Lieutenant BERNARD O'LEARY, San Francisco Police Department, there were no arrests or other incidents during the activities on December 3, 1965.

SF T-27 has informed that during 1948, GEORGE ARMSTEAD KAUFFMAN was a member of the Herman Boettcher Club, Alameda County Communist Party.

In the December 5, 1965 issue of the "San Francisco Examiner", there appeared an article captioned "The Vice President faces VDC." The article related that Vice President HUMPHREY on December 4, 1965 had met with a six-member delegation from the VDC at the Moffett Naval Air Station, California. Among other things, the article stated that ROBERT SCHEER, a spokesman for the delegation, had remarked, "it was worthwhile to get a clear statement from the administration that it was not willing to negotiate with the National Liberation Front."

The article described the National Liberation Front as an underground political group.

In the December 12, 1961 issue of "The Daily Californian", there appeared an article captioned, "Fair Play for Cuba", which was signed by two individuals, one of whom was "BOB SCHEER, Grad. Stu, Econ, member Fair Play Exec. Comm."

In the May 22, 1965 issue of the "San Francisco Examiner" there appeared an article captioned, "The 'camp' meeting at Cal". Among other things, the article identified ROBERT SCHEER as research director for the Fair Play for Cuba Committee and stated that SCHEER had visited Cuba in the summer of 1964, in defiance of a U.S. Department of State travel ban.

911

ROBERT SCHEER is the foreign news editor for "Ramparts" magazine.

"Ramparts" is self-described as the Catholic journal of political opinion.

The February 23, 1966 issue of the "Berkeley Daily Gazette" informed, among other things, that "SCHEER, an outspoken critic of the JOHNSON Administration policies in Vietnam was "presently"touring South Vietnam and Cambodia the latter country at the invitation of Prince SHIANOUK".

E. Demonstrations against U.S. Secretary of State DEAN RUSK and Vice President HUMPHREY, San Francisco, December 10, 1965

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on December 10, 1965, that at approximately 10:30 AM, U.S. Secretary of State DEAN RUSK arrived at the San Francisco International Airport, San Mateo County, California. At the airport, there were approximately 50 individuals, some of whom were there on behalf of the VDC.

During the demonstration, a leaflet issued by the VDC, Berkeley, was distributed.

The leaflet asked Secretary of State RUSK if he would be willing to participate in a nationally televised debate and if he could honestly defend-"U.S. financing of French efforts to retain colonial control of Vietnam between 1948-1954?

"The breaking of the implementation of the Geneva Accords of 1954, with its provision for free election?

"The creation of the republic of South Vietnam under the leadership of DIEM, and subsequent leaders who were even less popular?

"Consistently ignoring the call of the 'enemy' during the past 10 years for a reconvening of the Geneva conference and a return to the essential provisions of the document?"

Special Agents of the FBI on December 10, 1965, observed at approximately 11:30 AM, December 10, 1965, Secretary of State RUSK addressed the 6th Biennial Convention of the AFL-CIO at the San Francisco Civic Auditorium. During Secretary of State RUSK's speech, approximately 30 individuals, who were seated in the balcony, held signs which were critical of the U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. Following Secretary of State RUSK's speech, the demonstrators were escorted from the audience by union members.

The demonstrators then commenced to march in front of the San Francisco Civic Auditorium. After the morning session, the demonstrators proceeded across the street to the San Francisco Civic Center Plaza where an impromtu rally was held.

At approximately 2:30 PM, December 10, 1965, Vice President HUMPHREY spoke before the 6th Biennial AFL-CIO Convention. During Vice President HUMPHREY's speech, 16 demonstrators marched outside the auditorium.

Assistant Inspector CECIL PHARRIS, Intelligence Unit, San Francisco Police Department, informed on December 10, 1965, there were no arrests or other incidents on December 10, 1965, nor were there any demonstrators at the San Francisco International Airport when Secretary of State RUSK departed or when Vice President HUMPHREY arrived or departed.

F. Demonstrations at Offices of U.S. Congressman JEFFERY COHELAN, Oakland, on the following dates:

1. January 31, 1966

ROBERT HULL, UCB Campus Police, informed on January 31, 1966 that on January 31, 1966 a noon-time rally sponsored by the VDC was held at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. At approximately 1:30 PM, some 200 individuals, some of whom carried signs reading, "Impeach JOHNSON" and "Fight JOHNSON Madness," began marching from UCB to Oakland, California, where they intended to picket the offices of U.S. Congressman JEFFERY COHELAN (Democrat), 16th and Telegraph Avenue, Oakland. The demonstrators marched to Latham Square Building, 508 - 16th Street, Oakland, where Congressman COHELAN's offices are located. Approximately 100 of the marchers picketed outside the building while another 100 went upstairs to Congressman COHELAN's offices on the 8th floor

913

to petition his representative, ROY LEMON. The petition urged Congressman COHELAN to initiate legislation for President JOHNSON's impeachment and also urged Congressman COHELAN to return to the bay area to debate with VDC leaders.

Special Agents of the FBI observed on January 31, 1966, that at approximately 5:30 PM, there were some 125 demonstrators in the building and food and blankets were being taken into the building by the marchers; outside, some 25 individuals were marching with signs calling for the impeachment of President JOHNSON, asking him to resign and demanding U.S. get out of Vietnam.

At approximately 7:00 PM, January 31, 1966, the building manager, Latham Square Building, Oakland, read a statement and informed those remaining in the building they would be subject to arrest. The marchers then left the building and departed.

Sergeant DAHL informed there were no arrests or incidents during the rally and march on January 31, 1966.

2. February 2, 1966

Officer HULL informed on February 2, 1966, that the VDC planned to hold a noon-time rally on February 2, 1966, at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. Officer HALL added that UCB rules state an organization can hold only one rally per week at UCB.

Continuing Officer HALL commented that at 11:55 AM, February 2, 1966, BETTINA APTHEKER, JACK WEINBERG and SUSAN STEIN, members of the VDC, began to call for a rally on Sproul Hall Plaza. Since the rally was not authorized, representatives of the VDC placed their own public address system in the plaza in defiance of another UCB rule and regulation. The speakers then commenced to criticize U.S. policy in Vietnam.

In view of the fact that the rally was held without a permit, each speaker was admonished by a representative of the UCB administration and told that he/she was violating UCB rules. Each speaker ridiculed the UC administration and the University rules, and the individuals then proceeded to speak [illegible]

BETTINA APTHEKER, also a member of the UCB Rules Committee, told the crowd that President JOHNSON continued to lie to the American people. She stated that the whole peace venture conducted by President JOHNSON and his colleagues was a fraud against the whole world. She demanded that the U.S. recognize the National Liberation Front in Vietnam and the Viet Cong government and withdraw all U.S. troops from the Vietnam area. BETTINA APTHEKER claimed that taking the Vietnam problems to the United Nations (UN) was an act of hypocrisy.

JERRY RUBIN told the group there would be a rally at noon on Thursday, February 3, 1966, at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. RUBIN went on to say that following the rally there would be a march from Berkeley to the offices of Congressman COHELAN, where there would be a demonstration and sit-in at his offices.

RUBIN related the following demands would be made upon Congressman COHELAN:

1. He initiate impeachment proceedings against President LYNDON JOHNSON for waging undeclared war in violation of U.S. Constitution.

2. He vote against any further appropriations for the war in Vietnam.

3. He return to his district by February 10, 1966 to debate the Vietnam war with a VDC member.

Officer HULL informed that there were no arrests or incidents during the rally on February 2, 1966.

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following background information for SUSAN COLE STEIN, also known as Mrs. BERNARD L. (BUDDY) STEIN, nee SUSAN ELLEN COLE:

Race	White
Sex	Female
Born	June 14, 1942, New York, New York

Height	5'4"
Weight	135 pounds
Complexion	Medium
Social Security Number	097-32-2405
Residence	1945 - Berkeley Way, Berkeley

In the October 20, 1965 issue of "The Daily Californian", there appeared an article which identified SUSAN STEIN as a member of the SDS.

In the March 8, 1966 issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle", there appeared an article captioned, "'Sentence' for Illegal UC Protest". The article informed that BETTINA APTHEKER, an avowed Communist, HAROLD JACOBS, 26, and SUSAN STEIN, 23, were placed on disciplinary probation on March 7, 1966 by Chancellor ROGER W. HEYNS, UCB.

The article informed that the 3 students were accused of violating new free speech violations, for staging an unauthorized anti-Vietnam war rally in early February (February 2, 1966). Continuing, the article informed that under the ruling the 3 students' activities would be curtailed until June 9, 1966.

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following background information concerning JACOBS:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Born	May 12, 1941, Brooklyn, New York
Residence	3014 Fulton Street, Berkeley
Marital Status	Married
Education	Bachelor of Arts Degree, from the University of Chicago; graduate student in sociology

Officer HULL informed on February 3, 1966 that on February 3, 1966, the VDC, utilizing a permit issued to the SDS, attempted to hold a noon-time rally at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. Due to a torrential downpour, the group huddled under the building eaves.

According to Officer HULL, the rally attracted approximately 100 people, which was considered by Officer HALL to be a "fizzle".

Sergeant DAHL informed that at approximately 1:00 PM on February 3, 1966, individuals appeared at the offices of U.S. Congressman COHELAN, Oakland. The demonstrators were informed by the building manager which housed U.S. Congressman COHELAN's offices, that his offices were closed for the day. Despite the announcement, the demonstrators commenced a sit-in on the 8th floor where the offices were located. There was a maximum of some 70 demonstrators in the building, however, at 6:45 PM, there were only 12 remaining demonstrators.

These 12 demonstrators left the building with the remark that they would return at a later date.

Sergeant DAHL informed on February 3, 1966, that on February 3, 1966, there were no arrests or incidents in the building.

3. February 7, 1966

Sergeant DAHL informed on February 8, 1966, that on February 7, 1966, WILLIAM CROSBY MILLER, member of the VDC; MATTHEW WILLIAM ZION, who was arrested in connection with a sit-in at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB, on December 3, 1964 and GEORGE ARMSTEAD KAUFFMAN were arrested outside U.S. Congressman COHELAN's office by PAT KENKE, Executive Secretary of the Morgan Peacock Corporation, owners of the Latham Square Building. Miss KENKE made a citizen's arrest.

Sergeant DAHL explained that the 3 above-mentioned individuals were taken into custody by members of the Oakland Police Department and were charged with trespassing, disturbing the peace and failure to disperse.

917

Sergeant DAHL further explained that at approximately 2:00 PM, February 7, 1966, 12 demonstrators began a sit-in protest in the hall outside U.S. Congressman COHELAN's office. At 5:00 PM, which was the office closing hour, the 3 abovementioned individuals were told to leave. At 7:00 PM, they were again told to leave the building, which they refused to do. They remarked they would not leave until they had a personal confrontation with U.S. Congressman COHELAN. As previously mentioned, they were arrested by Miss KENKE at approximately 7:45 PM.

A review of the records of the Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, reveal a Chauffeur's Permit for WILLIAM CROSBY MILLER, under number H271408. He was described in the permit as follows:

Height	6'6"
Weight	250 pounds
Hair	Blond
Eyes	Blue
Born	June 10, 1941

A review of MILLER's identification record under FBI Number 365 363F, reveals MILLER had been fingerprinted by the Sheriff's Office, Edwardsville, Illinois, on January 2, 1963 on a charge of grand theft. No disposition was set forth.

A review of the records of the Oakland Police Department, under their number 182704, revealed the following description for ZION:

Race	White
Sex	Male
Born	February 18, 1941, Massachusetts
Height	5'11"
Weight	155 pounds
Hair	Brown
Eyes	Blue

Occupation — Writer
Residence — 6109 Hillegass Street, Berkeley

Sergeant DAHL informed on March 31, 1966, that on March 30, 1966, KAUFFMAN, MILLER and ZION were found guilty of the charges against them. Sergeant DAHL added that the 3 individuals had appealed their convictions.

G. Three-day Protest Rally and Planned Strike, UCB, February 7, 8 and 9,1966

On February 4, 1966, a Special Agent of the FBI received a copy of a printed leaflet captioned "Why Strike?", issued by the VDC. The leaflet commented that if the JOHNSON administration escalates the war in Vietnam, so must "we" intensify "our" committment to stop it. The leaflet informed the VDC was planning a work-transfer walk-out for Monday, Tuesday and Wednesday (February 7, 8 and 9, 1966).

The leaflet commented the strike was not aimed directly at the University, but at a political system which influenced it. The leaflet remarked the protest was a political protest and would be successful if a sizeable minority of students and faculty committed themselves to building a peace movement.

"For 3 days we plan to transfer the work we would normally do in class to a discussion of the war and of the development of programs to stop it." The leaflet went on to say, "On Wednesday, a student walk-out is planned. Everybody transfer your work during the demonstration. We urge the entire university community to join together in this action."

Officer HULL, UCB Campus Police, informed on February 7, 1966 that on February 7, 1966, the VDC sponsored a rally at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. Officer HULL related the rally commenced at 12 noon and terminated at 1:00 PM. According to Officer HULL, the speakers included SUSAN STEIN, JAMIE ALLEN, JACK WEINBERG, MORRIS HIRSCH and ROBERT HURWITT, all of whom spoke against U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam. Officer HULL stated the rally was MC'd by HURWITT, who commented there would be a march to Congressman COHELAN's offices later in the day.

SF T-15 on February 8, 1966, identified JAMIE ALLEN as a current member of the BAYSA.

Officer HULL, UCB, informed on February 8, 1966 that the Freshman class at UCB had a permit to hold a rally at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB, on February 8, 1966. Officer HULL further informed that a representative of the Freshman class had the microphone for approximately 5 minutes when JACK WEINBERG, a member of the VDC Steering Committee, jumped on the platform and took the microphone away from the speaker. WEINBERG then announced there would be a VDC rally.

Featured speaker at the rally was BETTINA APTHEKER, who proceeded to attack the U.S. foreign policy and called for a two-hour walk-out at UCB after the noon-time rally on February 9, 1966. APTHEKER remarked that if 1,000 students participated in the walk-out it would be a success. APTHEKER added the rally was not an anti-university rally but an anti-war protest.

JAMIE ALLEN also spoke at the rally and informed those in attendance of the march on the Oakland Induction Center on February 16, 1966. She did not comment at what time the march would take place.

The march on the Oakland Induction Center was subsequently changed to February 23, 1966.

Officer HULL related on February 9, 1966, that the VDC held a noon-time rally on February 9, 1966 at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. The rally started at 12 noon and lasted until approximately 1:10 PM with about 1,200 persons in attendance. To determine who in the crowd was supporting the VDC, those in attendance were told to sit down. This was intended as a show of strength. Only some 200 sat down.

STEVE WEISSMAN, a member of the VDC Steering Committee, upon seeing such a small number seated, commented "we evidentally did not get through to the students." He wondered outloud what could be done.

Officer HULL went on to say that the planned student strike appeared to have failed and did not receive any backing from faculty members. After the rally some 200 persons remained in the area and broke up into "work shops" with the announced intention of studying what action would be taken by the VDC when UN Ambassador to the UN, ARTHUR GOLDBERG appeared at the UCB Campus activities on March 25, 1966, for the Charter Day exercises; what action would be taken in connection with the march on the Oakland Induction Center and a discussion of U.S. foreign policy in Vietnam.

The "Berkeley Gazette" in its issue of February 9, 1966, described the student strike at UCB as a "flop" and a "fiasco".

The article commented that a check of attendance at regular classes at the UCB on February 9, 1966, showed it to have been little affected by the strike.

Officer HULL informed on February 7, 8 and 9, 1966, that there were no arrests on February 7, 8 and 9, 1966.

H. Demonstration at Oakland Induction Center, Oakland, February 23, 1966

On February 23, 1966, a Special Agent of the FBI received a copy of a printed leaflet, "WOMEN: MARCH AGAINST THE WAR - FOR HIM AND FOR ALL OF AMERICA'S YOUNG MEN", issued by the Women's March Committee, VDC. The leaflet was distributed in Berkeley and informed that on February 23, 1966, there would be an all-women's march on the Oakland Induction Center. According to the leaflet those wishing to march would congregate at Constitution Square in Berkeley at 1:15 PM and would arrive at the Oakland Induction Center at approximately 3:15 PM.

In the February 23, 1966 issue of "The Daily Californian", there appeared an article captioned, "A Female March to Oakland."

The article, among other things, quoted JAMIE ALLEN described as organizer of the all-women VDC march as stating:

> "The Government can't accuse us of being draft dodgers, or of lacking the courage to fight

> in the war. That is why we are going to march to Oakland's Induction Center."
>
> The article went on to say that ALLEN, a non-student and member of the VDC, Berkeley, felt it was imperative "at this time" that women should take an active position in the anti-war effort.

CHARLES HARRISON, Intelligence Unit, Berkeley Police Department, Berkeley, informed on February 23, 1966, that at approximately 12 noon, February 23, 1966, a rally sponsored by the "Women's Committee for March", VDC, 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley, was held at Sproul Hall Plaza, UCB. At the rally, JAMIE ALLEN commented, "As women, we aren't worried about our draft status, but we are protesting President JOHNSON's illegal and immoral war." ALLEN went on to say, "We are saying, bring our sons, our husbands and our brothers home now." Officer HARRISON went on to inform that at 1:00 PM, February 23, 1966, BETTINA APTHEKER with a hand bullhorn, assembled the marchers on the UCB Campus and directed the march to the Oakland Induction Center, 1515 Clay Street, Oakland.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on February 23, 1966, that at approximately 4:00 PM, February 23, 1966, some 275 individuals, the majority of whom were females, appeared in the immediate vicinity of the Oakland Induction Center, where an impromptu rally was held. While the rally was in progress, BETTINA APTHEKER and 2 other marchers, attempted to present a petition to the commanding officer, but were told to return the next morning since the Induction Center had closed for the day.

At the rally, SAVANNAH BELLO, who was described as a member of the Richmond Chapter of the Congress of Racial Equality, asked why Negroes had to fight in Vietnam when they had no civil rights in the U.S.

Officer HARRISON informed that the activities terminated at 4:20 PM on February 23, 1966 and there were no arrests or noteworthy incidents during the march and rally.

SF 100-55462
FSP:mb

I. Demonstration Against UN Ambassador ARTHUR J. GOLDBERG, Greek Theater, UCB, March 25, 1966

SF T-1 reported on January 27, 1966, that during a VDC meeting in Berkeley on January 26, 1966, ROBERT HURWITT, a member of the VDC Steering Committee, mentioned the "next drive" would probably occur on Charter Day, March 25, 1966.

Charter Day exercises are held during the latter part of March to celebrate the day the UC received its charter.

The exercises are held in the Greek Theater, UCB, and are featured with the appearance of one of the outstanding speakers in the U.S.

A Special Agent of the FBI observed on March 22, 1966, that a noon-time rally co-sponsored by the VDC was held at Sproul Hall, UCB. At the rally, mention was made that UCB planned to honor UN Ambassador GOLDBERG and "chief international spokesman for the war in Vietnam."

At the rally a leaflet issued by the Peace Rights Organizing Committee (PROC) was distributed. The leaflet carried the message, "When GOLDBERG arrives to accept his degree, we hope that everyone in the audience will rise, picket signs in hand, to voice their opinion."

SF T-18 reported on March 20, 1966, that BETTINA APTHEKER at a meeting of the DCA, Berkeley Chapter, on March 20, 1966, called for a "booing of UN Ambassador GOLDBERG", during the Charter Day exercises on March 25, 1966.

In the March 26, 1966 issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle" there appeared an article captioned, "Charter Day address, GOLDBERG cheered - lively UC protest".

The article informed that waves of boos and catcalls mingled with thunderous applause when UN Ambassador GOLDBERG was introduced. The article informed that 1,000 of the 13,000 spectators began to leave the Greek Theater, UCB, in protest to UN Ambassador GOLDBERG's appearance as a spokesman for U.S.

policy in Vietnam. The article further informed that throughout UN Ambassador GOLDBERG's address, he faced a sea of anti-Vietnam placards and an undercurrent of boos were heard, with the dominant cheers and applause.

In another article in the above-described issue, mention was made that the demonstration was spearheaded by PROC. The article related that MARK STAHL, 2805 Fulton Street, Berkeley, a lab assistant, was arrested on March 25, 1966, during the Charter Day ceremonies and was charged with being a "public nuisance".

> SF T-1 has identified PROC as an off-campus organization whose headquarters are located at 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley, and has as one of its purposes the protesting of U.S. policy in Vietnam.

V. ANTI-DRAFT COMMITTEE OF THE VDC

SF T-23 reported on October 25, 1965 that on October 23, 1965, he attended a meeting of the Anti-draft Committee of the VDC at 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley. SF T-23 related that among those in attendance at the meeting was STEVE CHERKOSS, WINDY SMITH and JOHN SELTZ.

SF T-23 related that goals of the Committee, depending upon approval of the VDC leadership, were:

1. The picketing and leafletting of induction centers.

2. Leafletting high schools and junior college students and coordinating the VDC Anti-draft with other anti-draft committees on a local and national level to make it a vital movement.

3. Undermine the morale of soldiers.

In the October 25, 1965 issue of the "Oakland Tribune", an Oakland, California daily newspaper, there appeared an article captioned, "VDC group pickets city draft center". The article informed that on October 25, 1965, STEVE CHERKOSS, who was described in the article as chairman of the VDC Sub-Committee, with 2 other individuals, had picketed the Armed Forces Induction Center in Oakland by handing out leaflets protesting the Vietnam war to soldiers and civilians and touching off arguments with some of the youths who were reporting for their physical examination. The article informed that the leaflet, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL" was one of the leaflets distributed at the Induction Center.

The article informed there were no incidents at the center, and Army officials had remarked that as along as the demonstrators remained outside the building, no action would be taken against them.

In the November 24, 1965 issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle" there appeared an article captioned, "Anti-draft Action Next, VDC Says". The article informed that the VDC, inspired by the numerical success of "last weekends" protest march, announced on November 23, 1965 that it was embarking on a "serious and intensive campaign against the draft." The article informed that JERRY RUBIN, WINDY SMITH, JR. and BILL MILLER, spokesman for the Committee, evaded press conference questioning about whether they would actually advise young men to avoid the draft. RUBIN remarked, "We will acquaint them with the facts on the war, encourage them to study it and allow them to make up their own minds. Information about the war equals a campaign against the draft." SMITH stated the Committee would take its campaign of "information" into high schools and Armed Service Induction Centers.

SF T-5 on December 2, 1965 furnished a copy of a mimeographed leaflet issued by the Anti-draft Committee, VDC, a Xerox copy of which follows:

A characterization for the M2M is contained in the appendix section.

PROPOSED AN[illegible]DRAFT PROGRAM FROM THE VDC ANT[illegible] DRAFT COMMITTEE

The Anti-Draft Committee of the VDC has been working on ways to end U.S. agression in Vietnam by developing an effective and broadly-based protest against conscription. The draft is basic to carrying on the war. The draft call has been increased to over 45,000 men for December, and it will continue to rise.

PROGRAM

1) Encourage high school and college students and non-students of draft age to apply for Conscientious Objector (SS form 150) status on a political moral basis. Encourage and assist high school students to organize anti-draft and VDC chapters within their schools.
2) Distribute general VDC educational material to potential inductees at induction and draft centers.
3) Give, and urge others to give, all possible support to those who wish to destroy their draft cards, to these who prefer prison to fighting an immoral war, and to other protests of conscience.
4) Begin an immediate and widespread protest against the involvement and cooperation of the Universities with the Draft system.
5) Demand the removal of ROTC programs from college campuses.

WHERE: Work areas should include:
1) High schools
2) College and university campuses
3) Induction and draft centers
4) Coordination with other groups with similar programs, such as SDS and M2M, on a nationwide level.

HOW:
1) Literature
2) Informal counseling (perhaps by retaining legal advice)
3) Rallies, street meetings, demonstrations, where such tactics will have maximum effectiveness.

ARGUMENTS FOR A STRONG ANTI-DRAFT PROGRAM

1) Answers questions of many students as to what they can do about the draft and creates opportunities to inform new people, more people about the war.
2) Creates opportunities for [illegible] marches and demonstrat[illegible]
3) Make[illegible] the Cold War [illegible] Service System.
4) Has an extremely large potential for rapid and sustained growth, at the lowest level through self-interset, at the highest through genuine concern about the war.
5) Is a relatively long range program with immediate and substantial political effect, such as tying up the draft system and creating many problems for Selective Service.
6) Innumerable possibilities for strengthening both the anti-war and anti-draft movements around the country, by creating new opportunities for mutual cooperation and mutual aid with various individuals and organizations.
7) Development of an anti-draft movement on a massive and nationwide scale will hit the Washington militarists right where it hurts—in their cannon fodder.

VI. COMMUNIST PARTY (CP) ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC

SF T-28 reported on October 20, 1965, that on October 14, 1965, a meeting of the Miscellaneous Industrial CP Club, San Francisco County CP, was held in San Francisco. At the meeting, WALTER STACK, a member of the club, announced the VDC was having a mass demonstration in Berkeley on October 15-16, 1965. STACK urged those in attendance to participate in the demonstration.

SF T-29 reported on November 1, 1965 that on October 29, 1965, the CP of San Mateo County, held a meeting in Pacifica, California. At the meeting, those in attendance approved sending $20 immediately to the VDC to help in its work. Decision was also made for the club to send the VDC $20 each month, if the club could raise the amount.

SF T-30 reported on November 15, 1965, that at a meeting of the San Mateo Club of the CP on November 12, 1965, at Pacifica, mention was made that the club was donating $5 to the VDC.

SF T-29 reported on November 24, 1965, that at a meeting of the San Mateo CP Club held in Pacifica, on November 12, 1965, mention was made that all members of the club should go to Berkeley on November 20, 1965, and participate in the protest march.

VII. SWP ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC

SF T-31 reported on October 25, 1965, that on October 6, 1965, a joint meeting of the San Francisco and the Oakland-Berkeley Branches of the SWP was held in San Francisco. At the meeting, PAUL MONTAUK, a member of the SWP, stated that all members should meet on the UCB campus at 7:00 PM, October 15, 1965, for the parade from Berkeley to the OAT.

VIII. PLP ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC

In the September 30, 1965 issue of the "Oakland Tribune", there appeared an article captioned "Progressive Labor Party Aims cited".

The article, among other things, informed that at a press conference on September 30, 1965, at San Francisco, MILT ROSEN, National President of the PLP, informed among other things, that the PLP would participate in the Vietnam demonstrations planned for October 15-16, 1965.

SF T-2 reported on October 12, 1965, that STEVE CHERKOSS speaking for the PLP, remarked on October 9, 1965 that the PLP had approximately 500 persons signed up for the demonstration on October 15, 1965, with the VDC.

SF T-2 commented he believed CHERKOSS was boasting, but had no way of knowing the truthfulness of what he was saying.

SF T-32 reported on January 31, 1966, that he had "recently" learned that the PLP in San Francisco had loaned several hundred dollars to the VDC, and in payment for the loan the PLP would receive free literature from the VDC and would also continue receiving free literature for the next several months.

IX. W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA) ASSISTANCE TO THE VDC

SF T-17 related on August 23, 1965, that at a meeting of the DCA, Berkeley Chapter, on August 22, 1965, decision was made to participate in the demonstration on October 15-16, 1965, and to pass out literature on the war in Vietnam to the soldiers and other interested people.

Inspector O'MEARA informed on October 15, 1965, that according to information furnished to him, a meeting of the VDC was held on October 14, 1965, concerning details for the planned march on October 15-16, 1965. At the meeting, mention was made that CONN HALLINAN with 30 members of the DCA would be in the major intersections and overpasses and would be in radio contact with the marchers.

SF T-33 reported in April 1964 that CONN

"RINGO" HALLINAN was elected to the San Francisco County Committee of the CP at an enlarged committee meeting on April 3, 1964.

X. FINANCES

SF T-19 informed on October 7, 1965 that at a Steering Committee meeting of the VDC on September 23, 1965, mention was made that as of September 23, 1965, the VDC had $860 outstanding in bills with $600 in the treasury.

SF T-2 on October 7, 1965, furnished a copy of an undated printed "Dear Friend" letter by STEPHAN SMALE. In his letter, SMALE referred to the International Days of Protest on October 15-16, 1965.

The letter commented that financial needs for all activities of the VDC were great and money was needed to continue and expand "our" program.

The letter contained a check-off for a $100 contribution, payable to the friends of the VDC. The letter commented that if the special fund-drive did not reach $10,000 by October 31, 1965, the contribution would be returned to the sender.

SF T-1 related on October 25, 1965, that at a VDC meeting on October 19, 1965, in Berkeley, mention was made that the VDC had $4,200 in its treauury. $3,400 was collected from the marches on October 15-16, 1965, and $800 was collected from a party.

SF T-1 reported on October 25, 1965, that on October 21, 1965, a meeting of the VDC was held in Berkeley. At the meeting, mention was made the VDC was $3,000 in debt.

SF T-34 related on October 29, 1965, the following information concerning the checking account balance for the VDC, Berkeley, as maintained at the Bank of California, Berkeley:

Balance September 1 - $739.20

Balance September 30 - $1,214.80

Balance October 29 - $1,315.77

Total Deposits September, 1965 - $2,287.60

Total Deposits October, 1965 - $14,295.44

The above information can only be made public upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

Original documents for which the above information was obtained are no longer in possession of SF T-34.

Mr. FRANK SABETTA, Bank of California, Berkeley, California, is the person to serve with the subpoena if the above information becomes necessary.

Inspector O'MEARA, Berkeley Police Department, Berkeley, related on November 3, 1965 that according to information furnished to him, mention was made at a VDC membership meeting in Berkeley on November 2, 1965, that the Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company had shut off all outgoing phone calls from the VDC headquarters until the VDC paid its phone bill of $1,200.

Inspector O'MEARA also informed on November 26, 1965, that according to information furnished to him, at a meeting of the VDC on November 23, 1965, in Berkeley, announcement was made that the VDC had collected $7,000 from their march on November 20, 1965, and the VDC had $2,000 in its treasury.

SF T-35 reported on February 4, 1966 that the VDC, Berkeley, maintained a checking account at the Bank of America, University Branch, 2347 Telegraph Avenue, Berkeley.

SF T-35 went on to say that the VDC checking account on January 21, 1966, had a balance of $310.34.

The above information can only be made public upon the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum.

Original documents from which the above information was obtained are no longer in SF T-35's possession.

SF 100-55462
FSP:mb

Mr. CLINTON TREMAIN, Manager, Bank of America, University Branch, Berkeley, is the person to serve with the subpoena if the above information becomes necessary.

931

COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (CCL), aka Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties - San Francisco

A source advised on June 19, 1961, that MICKEY LIMA, Chairman, Northern California District, Communist Party (CP), reported on June 15, 1961, that the CP, USA, in response to the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961, relating to the Internal Security Act of 1950, had decided to create a committee known as Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCCL), 22 East 17th Street, New York City, and that a local committee would be organized for Northern California.

This source advised on June 26, 1961, that a meeting was held on June 18, 1961, at the home of ROSCOE PROCTOR, member of the National Committee, CP, USA, for the purpose of formulating plans for the CCCL in Northern California.

A second source advised on September 14, 1961, that the CCCL had opened an office at 942 Market Street, Room 401, San Francisco, California, and that some of the furniture for this office had come from the CP office on the same floor.

A third source advised June 22, 1962, that Dr. HERBERT PHILLIPS announced that he had closed down the headquarters of the CCL at 942 Market Street, San Francisco.

A fourth source in November, 1962, advised that CP officials in Northern California have been active in promoting the CCL.

This same source advised in November, 1962, that the CCL was active in the fight against the Internal Security Act of 1950, under which the CP and its officials were being prosecuted.

A fifth source on May 2, 1963, furnished the names of the officers of the CCL in San Francisco as Dr. HERBERT J. PHILLIPS, Chairman, and WALTER STACK, Treasurer.

Dr. HERBERT PHILLIPS testified in open court in 1953 to CP membership since 1935.

932 APPENDIX

A sixth source advised in April, 1963, that WALTER STACK is a current CP member in San Francisco.

One of these sources advised February 13, 1963, WALTER STACK stated on February 8, 1963, that the officers of the CCL were holding off temporarily on further activity on the advice of MICKIE LIMA, District CP Chairman.

A seventh source advised that Dr. HERBERT PHILLIPS stated in August, 1963, that the CCL is defunct in the San Francisco area.

The fifth source above advised that the CCL bank account at the Bank of America, #1 Powell Street, San Francisco, was closed August 16, 1963, because it was "no longer needed".

APPENDIX

1

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (NEW YORK CITY)

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 42 concerning "Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (New York City)":

> 1. "On the basis of its investigations and hearings to date, the committee concludes that the National Assembly for Democratic Rights and a coordinating and organizing group in support thereof, titled the 'Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties, are communist fronts. Created, dominated and controlled by members and officials of the Communist Party, the National Assembly for Democratic Rights and the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties were organized as propaganda devices for the conduct of 'mass activity' in support of the avowed objectives of 'reversal or nonapplication' of the Supreme Court decisions of June 5, 1961, which upheld the constitutionality of the registration and disclosure provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as applied to the Communist Party, and the Smith Act membership clause making punishable active and purposive membership in the Communist Party."
>
> "*** The long-range objective of the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties is to serve as the vehicle for concealed communist participation in, and direction of, propaganda and agitational activities aimed to nullify the Internal Security and Smith Acts."
>
> "*** Committee investigation disclosed that the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties was formed on or about June 12, 1961 ***."
>
> (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report and Hearings on Manipulation of Public Opinion by Organizations Under Concealed Control of the Communist Party (National Assembly for Democratic Rights and Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties), House Report 1282, Part 1, October 2 and 3, 1961, pp 137, 143 and 144.)

934

APPENDIX

1

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE, BAY AREA CHAPTER, also known as Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (BAFPCC)

The "New York Times" newspaper on November 20, 1960 carried an article captioned "Pro-Castro Body Reports U.S. Gain," which reported that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) had 5,000 paid-up members in the United States. The article declared that the FPCC had headquarters at 799 Broadway, New York City, New York, and had chapters in other cities, including one in San Francisco.

A source advised in March, 1961, that the Bay Area Chapter of the FPCC (BAFPCC) began to be formed in San Francisco in November, 1960, under the direct guidance and leadership of ASHER HARER, who the source identified as a member of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and a member of the National Committee of the SWP.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This source advised in March, 1963, that in the recent election of the BAFPCC the SWP continued its influence by having SWP members elected to the executive committee

This source advised in May, 1963, that the BAFPCC included members in San Francisco and surrounding counties. He advised that the BAFPCC has no headquarters but received mail through Post Office Box 2615, San Francisco 26, California, which is a box maintained by ASHER HARER. He stated that the announced aims and purposes of the BAFPCC are to "spread the truth about Cuba and to prevent U.S. intervention in Cuba."

A second source advised on January 10, 1964, that at a BAFPCC meeting in Berkeley, California, in December, 1963, it was decided to dissolve the BAFPCC.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening in Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that VINCENT "TED" LEE, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that LEE believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. LEE did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se.

APPENDIX

936

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE (cont'd.)

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator THOMAS J. DODD of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator DODD was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC.

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World Telegram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-Castro FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-Castro street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-Castro American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by Castro's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected Presidential assassin LEE H. OSWALD.

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. LEE had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization.

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved.

APPENDIX

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 115, contains the following citation regarding the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC).

"Cited as a 'new organization' set up in the Summer of 1960 to lead and direct the Communist Party's 'Operation Abolition' campaign. Seven of the national leaders of this group have been identified as Communists."

A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC).

A second source advised on June 28, 1965, that as of that date the NCAHUAC continued to function with the headquarters at 555 North Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

APPENDIX

938

1

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source advised on August 1, 1960, that the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed approximately in the early part of 1938 and the Oakland Branch of the SWP was formed in the latter part of 1938.

A second source advised on October 26, 1959, that the name of the Oakland Branch of the SWP was changed to the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

A third source advised on April 2, 1965, that the San Francisco Branch and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP follow the policies and directives of the National SWP with which they are affiliated.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

939

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP)
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT (PLM)

A source advised on April 20, 1965, that the PLP, formerly known as the PLM, held its first national convention April 15-18, 1965, at New York City, to organize the PLM into a PLP. The PLP will have as its ultimate objective the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism.

"The New York Times," City Edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP. The PLP was described as an outgrowth of the PLM. Its officers were identified as MILTON ROSEN, New York, President, and WILLIAM EPTON of New York and MORT SCHEER of San Francisco, Vice Presidents. A 20-member National Committee was elected to direct the party until the next convention.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962 by Mr. ROSEN and Mr. SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

The PLP publishes the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly," a theoretical magazine; "Progressive Labor," a monthly magazine; "Challenge," a New York City newspaper; and "Spark," a west coast newspaper.

The June 1, 1965, issue of "Challenge," page 6, states that, "this paper is dedicated to fight for a new way of life - where the working men and women own and control their homes, factories, the police, courts, and the entire government on every level."

The source advised that the PLP utilizes the address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York, but also utilizes an office in Room 622, 132 Nassau Street, [illegible] where PLP publications are prepared.

APPENDIX

840

1.

SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, aka
San Francisco School of Social Science,
San Francisco Marxist Study Group,
San Francisco School of Marxism-Leninism,
San Francisco School of Marxism

A source advised on February 6, 1962, that the first class of the San Francisco Marxist Study Group (SFMSG) was held on February 5, 1962, at 345 Franklin Street, San Francisco, California, and that the instructor of this class stated that the main purpose of the SFMSG was to train young people for leadership of the people in the event the U. S. wakes up to the advantages of communism.

A second source advised on April 23, 1964, that the San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS), has been known as the "San Francisco School of Social Science," "San Francisco Marxist Study Group," "San Francisco School of Marxism-Leninism," and "San Francisco School of Marxism."

A third source furnished the Spring, 1964, Bulletin of the SFSSS on October 14, 1964, which reflected that TERENCE HALLINAN and J. P. MORRAY were Co-Directors of the SFSSS.

> A fourth source advised on April 9, 1965, that in April, 1965, TERENCE HALLINAN advised that he was not a member of the Communist Party (CP), but considered himself a communist and intended to join the CP as soon as he passed his bar exams.
>
> A fifth source advised March 1, 1963, that HERBERT APTHEKER, a member of the CP, USA, National Committee, advised in February, 1963, that he was to be the East Coast Chairman and JOSEPH P. MORRAY the West Coast Director of a new organization being promoted by the CP, USA, to teach and propagate Marxist theories.

The third source further advised on January 26, 1966, that due to the failure of the SFSSS during its Spring, 1965, term to raise support sufficient to continue all of its scheduled classes, no classes were organized for a Fall, 1965, term. The SFSSS no longer exists.

APPENDIX

941

STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA

"The Columbia Owl," weekly student newspaper of Columbia University, New York City, December 12, 1962, issue, page one, contained an article entitled "Students to Visit Cuba During Holidays." This article stated in part that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was formed October 14, 1962, by a group of students from New York City universities, the University of Wisconsin, Oberlin College and the University of North Carolina, who stated that as students they would like a chance to see and evaluate the situation in Cuba for themselves and had received an offer of transportation and two weeks stay in Cuba from the Federation of University Students in Havana, as guests of the Federation. The Committee accepted the offer and applied to the State Department of the United States for passport validation which was refused; however, over fifty students planned to defy the State Department ban and go to Cuba.

A source advised on December 6, 1962, it was learned the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba had recently been formed by the Progressive Labor Group.

A second source advised on September 13, 1963, that during the Summer of 1963, fifty-nine individuals traveled to Cuba; the leaders of the group were members of the Progressive Labor Movement; and the trip was planned and organized by Progressive Labor Movement members.

A third source advised on October 9, 1963, the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was utilizing Post Office Box 2178, New York, New York, as its mailing address.

On March 12, 1965, Philip Abbott Luce, 504 West 55th Street, New York, New York, a self-admitted member of the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba Executive Committee and the Progressive Labor Movement National Coordinating Committee, advised as follows:

The Student Committee for Travel to Cuba (SCTC) was formerly known as the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba and the Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba.

Luce was a leader and participant of the 1963 trip to Cuba and an organizer of the 1964 trip to Cuba and both trips were sponsored by the SCTC.

By the Spring of 1964 the Executive Committee of the SCTC was considered to be members of the Progressive Labor Movement.

No trip to Cuba or China was being planned by the SCTC for 1965.

APPENDIX

942

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party (CP), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call" to the new youth organization and planning for a founding convention to be held in June, 1964.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are, "It is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-Communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternative."

APPENDIX

943

The constitution further states that this new organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals, or if five or more people so desire, a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles of the parent organization.

As of October, 1965, the headquarters of the DCA was located at 954 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California.

Over the Labor Day weekend, 1965, the DCA held a conference in Chicago, Illinois. According to a third source, a new slate of national officers was elected at this conference, which included Chairman HUGH STERLING FOWLER, II (who, according to the third source, attended a CP cadre encampment held at Camp Midvale, New Jersey, in June, 1965, and following his election as Chairman of the DCA, attended another national CP cadre youth conference held on September 9-12, 1965, on a farm located in Northern Indiana, according to a fourth source); Director of Publicity CARL ELLENGER BLOICE (who was elected to the San Francisco County Committee CP in April, 1964, according to a fifth source); Educational Director MATTHEW "DYNAMITE" HALLINAN (who in June, 1964, was stated to be the Youth Representative on the Northern California CP District Board, according to a sixth source); Organizational Secretary TERENCE "KAYO" HALLINAN (who, according to a seventh source, met in June, 1965, with the District Staff of the Illinois CP to discuss the proposed DCA Midwest Summer Project), and Treasurer SUSAN PHYLLIS BORENSTEIN (who, according to an eighth source, has attended meetings of the Youth Club of the CP of Illinois during 1965 in connection with the DCA Summer Project).

APPENDIX

944

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA - BERKELEY BRANCH;
W.E.B. DuBois Youth Club - Berkeley Chapter;
Berkeley W.E.B. DuBois Club, Berkeley DuBois Club;
East Bay DuBois Club

A source advised on April 12, 1963, that the W.E.B. DuBois Youth Club - Berkeley Chapter, was originated in October 1962, principally through the efforts of MATHEW HALLINAN.

> This same source advised in October 1963, that MATHEW HALLINAN was elected as Chairman and Communist Party (CP) Youth Commission Representative of the Berkeley CP On-Campus Youth Club during September 1963.

A second source advised that a leaflet distributed by the Berkeley DuBois Club in Spetember 1964, reflected the name of that organization to be the "W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America - Berkeley Branch."

This same leaflet, under the heading "The DuBois Clubs of America" reads as follows: "The Berkeley DuBois Club is a part of a nation-wide socialist youth organization founded in June of this year. It attempts to bring together those action-oriented youth who consider socialism to be a visible alternative to the ills of this society."

As of April 23, 1965, the Berkeley W.E.B. DuBois Club was registered with the University of California as an "off-campus" membership organization. As such, it could present lectures on campus with prior University permission and was allowed to set up and maintain a literature table on campus.

945

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (known in the San Francisco Bay area as the Bay Area Young Socialist Alliance, aka the Bay Area Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance, Bay Area Committee for the Young Socialist)

A source advised on May 16, 1960, that the Bay Area Young Socialist Alliance (BAYSA) was formed in February, 1958, as the Bay Area Committee for the Young Socialist (BACYS). At a later stage in its development prior to adoption of the name BAYSA, the organization was known as the Bay Area Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance (BACYSA).

The source advised that as a result of a national convention held April 15-17, 1960, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the BAYSA became a branch of the national organization to be known as the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and will carry out in the Northern California area the policies of the YSA.

The source advised August 19, 1965, that the BAYSA is currently active and is composed of three locals, the San Francisco YSA, the Berkeley YSA, and the San Jose YSA.

The source advised that the BAYSA, although ostensibly an independent organization, is in reality controlled by the San Francisco Branch, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Oakland Branch SWP.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960, issue of the "Young Socialist" ("YS"), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication "YS."

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of YSA. This declaration stated YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the "YS" have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

A source advised on May 7, 1965, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957, in New York City, by youth of various left-socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization.

The source further advised on May 7, 1965, YSA is dominated and controlled on a national basis by the SWP through having SWP members comprise exclusively the National Executive Committee (NEC) and through an official SWP representative at all YSA NEC meetings. The YSA, in reality, is the youth and training section of the SWP and the main source of new SWP members.

The headquarters of the YSA is located in Room 631, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

947 APPENDIX

1. SF 100-5[illegible]2

YOUNG SOCIALIST LEAGUE (YSL)

The March 1, 1954, issue of the "Young Socialist Challenge," published as page three of "Labor Action," an official publication of the Indpendent Socialist League (ISL), contained an article concerning the creation of the YSL, which pointed out that at a unity conference occurring February 12-14, 1954, at Labor Action Hall, New York, New York, a merger occurred between the Young People's Socialist League (YPSL) and the Socialist Youth League (SYL). The new organization was named the YSL.

A source on June 15, 1954, made available the minutes of the YSL's National Action Committee meeting of April 13, 1954, which reflected that one S. SITEMAN, "Chairman of SP (Socialist Party) Youth Committee," had objected to a statement appearing in "Commerce," a New York University journal, which indicated that the YPSL merged with the SYL to form the YSL. He explained that the YPSL did not merge with anyone; that it continued to exist as the youth section of the Socialist Party. He explained that a small group of the YPSL was dropped, expelled, or suspended from that organization and joined the SYL, which he characterized as the youth group of the "Trotskyite ISL." He explained that after these few former members of the YPSL joined the SYL, the SYL then proceeded to change its name for its own purposes.

On April 9, 1956, a source advised as follows: The YSL has frequently worked in close sympathetic cooperation with the ISL toward similar objectives, although each major issue given mutual consideration is decided upon by these organizations individudally. The YSL serves as an apprenticeship for the ISL, but the ISL selection of members from YSL ranks is made on an individual and personal basis. In many instances YSL members are also members of the ISL. The YSL and the ISL utilize the same printing house in New York City and the YSL publication is printed as an insert in "Labor Action." Frequently, lecturers before the YSL are ISL members.

The September 22, 1958, issue of "Young Socialist Challenge," which appeared as page five of "Labor Action," contained an undated statement from the National Committee of the YSL which indicated that the YSL had been dissolved. The statement appeared under the caption "Join the Young Peoples Socialist League."

The YPSL is publicly known as the youth affiliate of the Socialist Party - Social Democratic Federation.

A source advised on June 12, 1958, that the Berkeley, California, unit of the YSL was formed in 1954, following the unity convention held in New York in February 1954, which combined the forces of the SYL and the YPSL. The source stated that the YSL in the San Francisco Bay Area continued to operate under the leadership and guidance of ISL members.

A source advised on October 9, 1958, that the YSL Branch dissolved itself in line with the YSL national organization, and the branch members joined the YPSL.

948

APPENDIX

1

INDEPENDENT SOCIALIST LEAGUE (ISL), FORMERLY WORKERS PARTY (WP)

The May 4, 1942, issue of "Labor Action", then an official publication of the Workers Party (WP), carried an article which reflected that the WP was formed in April 1940, as a result of a split within the leadership of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The article stated that when the Hitler-Stalin Pact was signed and Poland invaded, the minority group within the SWP, in proclaiming the formation of the WP, condemned the pact as being imperialistic in nature and stated it would not support either imperialist camp.

The April 25, 1949, issue of "Labor Action" contained an account of the Fifth National Convention of the WP, held March 24-27, 1949, in New York City, which reflected the change of name of the organization from the WP to the Independent Socialist League (ISL) in order to emphasize the character of the group as a propaganda group for the spreading of socialist ideas and not as a full-fledged political party.

The July 14, 1958, issue of "Labor Action", an official publication of the ISL, contained an article captioned "The ISL Program in Brief." The article indicated: "The ISL stands for socialist democracy and against the two systems of exploitation which now divide the world: capitalism and Stalinism. The ISL, as a Marxist movement, looks to the working class and its ever-present struggle as the basic progressive force in society. The ISL is organized to spread the ideas of socialism in the labor movement and among all other sections of the people. There can be no lasting and genuine democracy without socialism and there can be no socialism without democracy."

The September 22, 1958, issue of "Labor Action" contained an undated statement signed by the Political Committee of the ISL which indicated that the ISL had been dissolved. The statement urged former ISL members to join the Socialist Party - Social Democratic Federation.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

A source advised on May 21, 1958, that the San Francisco Bay Area Branch, Independent Socialist League, was an adjunct of the National Organization. The Branch had representation on the National Committee of the Independent Socialist League; it participated in the campaigns of the Independent Socialist League, and contributed financially to the support of the National Organization.

The source advised on August 11, 1958, that the San Francisco Bay Area Branch, Independent Socialist League, had dissolved itself and the members had joined the Local Branch of the Socialist Party - Social Democratic Federation.

949

1

YOUTH FOR JOBS (YFJ), aka Youth for Jobs Committee

A source advised in July 1963, that several recent graduates and dropouts of high schools in Oakland and Berkeley, California, had on April 17, 1963, attended the organizing meeting of Youth for Jobs (YFJ) in Oakland, California, in response to letters prepared by ROSCOE PROCTOR and DOUGLAS WACHTER. At this meeting, WACHTER gave reports on the unemployment problem among youth and the need for an organization of this type. PROCTOR also spoke at this meeting.

> In May 1963, a second source advised that ROSCOE PROCTOR attended meetings of the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party (CP), USA, during May 1963, in New York City.

> In January 1963, a third source identified DOUGLAS WACHTER as the Chairman of a CP recruiting class held in January 1963, in Berkeley, California.

In May 1963, the first source advised that in May 1963, a 12-page pamphlet entitled "Youth for Jobs-Aims and Purposes" was distributed. This pamphlet described YFJ as an independent organization of young people working together to find solutions to current vocational, social and recreational problems; it specified that YFJ is not affiliated with any other organizations, but would fully support the labor movement and any other organizations striving to combat unemployment and to increase job security for all employees.

In June 1963, the third source advised that at a meeting of the Political Committee of the CP of the East Bay Region (Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, California) held in June 1963, VIRGINIA PROCTOR, member of that Committee, gave a report on a draft document read before the National Committee, CP, USA, by GUS HALL, member of the National Committee, CP, USA. In connection with the portion of the report dealing with youth, PROCTOR said "A report from this area on the activity around Youth for Jobs organized by ROSCOE PROCTOR will be included in the final document, as one of the signs of the Party work in organizing the unemployed."

On May 3, 1965, a fourth source advised that ROSCOE PROCTOR has promoted and guided YFJ since its inception and continues to do so. The source stated that meetings of YFJ are held at the YFJ Club House, 1095 - 59th Street, Oakland, California, and at homes of individual members.

INDEX

ABBOTT, BART 3, 5*
ALLEN 55
ALLEN, JAMIE 52, 53*, 54, 55
ALLISTER, ANN 5*, 6*
ALLISTER, ANYA 3, 5*, 6*
APTHEKER, BETTINA 22*, 23*, 35, 38, 39, 47, 48, 49, 53, 55, 56
BATTAGLIA, WALTER 3, 6*
Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) 14, 15
BELLO, SAVANNAH 55
Berkeley Chapter of the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) 18*
BLUMENFELD 7*
BLUMENFELD, DR. CHARLES M. 7
BLUMENFELD, NEAL 3, 6*
BLUMENFELD, PAULINE 7
BROSKLEY 30, 31*
BROSKLEY, ANTHONY ERNEST 30
BROWN, Gov. EDMUND G. 33
BURTON, JOHN 43
CALLAHAN, Sgt. DICK 30

INDEX (Cont.)

CASADY, SI 33

Cessna 180, Lic. N1656C 30

CHERKOSS, STEVE 20, 21*, 29, 57, 58, 61

COHELAN, Congressman JEFFERY 46, 47

COHELAN, Congressman 48, 50, 51

Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (New York City) 67*

COHEN, PETE 3

COHEN, PETER 7*, 8*

COLE, SUSAN ELLEN 48*, 49*

COLVIN, MARGE 3, 8*

Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCL) 22, 65*, 66*

Congress of Racial Equality 21

CORN, NANYA 3, 9*

CORN, NANCY J. 8*

CORN, NANYA J. 8*

"Daily Review" 32*

DAHL, Sergeant CARL 30

DAWSON, KIPP 3, 9*

DCA, Berkeley Chapter 20, 21

INDEX (Cont.)

DELACOUR, MIKE	3, 9*
CRISAN, Deputy Sheriff JOHN	12
DUNCAN, DONALD	43*
EPTON, BILL	32, 33
EWART, GEORGE	29*
Fair Play for Cuba Committee	69*, 70*
Fair Play for Cuba Committee, Bay Area Chapter, aka Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (BAFPCC)	68*
FOWLER	30, 31*, 32*
FOWLER, GLEN D.	30
FPCC	16
FRIEDMAN, DAVID	21*, 22*
GIBSON, FRED	3, 9*
GOLDBERG, UN Ambassador	57
GORBACH, ADJA	3
GORBACH, ADJA GOLDFINE	9*, 10*
GOLDBERG, ARTHUR	54
GOLDBERG, UN Ambassador ARTHUR	56
HALLINAN, CONN	61
HALLINAN, CONN "RINGO"	62*
HAMLIN, LARRY	29

c

INDEX (Cont.)

HARRISON, CHARLES	29
HEALY, DANIEL	42*
Hell's Angels	38
HEYNS, Chancellor ROGER W.	49
HIRSCH, MORRIS	22*, 35, 52
HULL, ROBERT	46
HUMPHREY, Vice-president	45, 46
HUMPHREY, Vice-president HUBERT	43, 44
HURWITT, ROBERT	52
HURWITT, ROBERT MARK	23*, 24*
Independent Socialist League	5*, 82*
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW)	12*
IWW	21
IVORY, PAUL	3, 10*
JACOBS, HAROLD	49*
JACOBS, PAUL	36*
JETER, HOWARD	3
JETER, HOWARD P.	10*
KAUFFMAN	52
KAUFFMAN, GEORGE ARMSTEAD	44*, 50

INDEX (Cont.)

KUYKENDALL, MARION 17*

Labor Youth League (LYL) 16*

LEMON, ROY 47

LIMA, MICKIE 23*

LOUGHLIN 11*

LOUGHLIN, LARRY 3, 10*, 22

LOUGHLIN, LAURENCE ROBERT 10*

MEDAILLE, FRANCIS GEORGE 12*, 13*

MILLER 52

MILLER, BILL 58

MILLER, WILLIAM CROSBY 50

MILLER, WILLIAM CROSBY 50, 51*, 52*

MILLIGAN, MARILYN 3, 11*, 12, 29

MONTAUK, PAUL 4, 12*, 37, 60

MORIN, Oakland City Mgr. JOHN 40

MORTON, NEAL 6*

MYERSON, MIKE 37*

M2M 58

National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee 6, 71*

National Liberation Front 44*

INDEX (Cont.)

NCAHCUA 6, 7

NORDEEN, JOHN CLIFFORD 16

Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SUP 12

"Oakland Tribune" 57*

O'HANLON 13*

O'HANLON, MICHAEL 22

O'HANLON, MICHAEL J. 12*, 13*

O'HANLON, MIKE 4

O'MEARA, Inspector 23

O'MEARA, Inspector CHARLES 21

Peace Rights Organizing Committee (PROC) 56

PETRIE 30, 31*

PETRIE, JAMES HENRY 30

PHARRIS, Asst. Insp. CECIL 33, 46*

PEYTON, JOANNE 4, 13*, 14*

POLLARD, SUSAN ERICA 14*

POLLARD, SUZANNE 4, 14*

Progressive Labor Party 18

Progressive Labor Party (PLP)
Progressive Labor Movement (PLM) 73*

PROC 57*

f

INDEX (Cont.)

PUGH, JANET 4

PUGH, JANET MARILYN 14*

"Ramparts" 45*

READ, JON JOSEPH 14*

ROSEN, MILT 61*

RUBIN, JERRY 4, 15*, 36, 48, 58

RUSK, U.S. Secty of State DEAN 45

SABETTA, FRANK 63

San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) 8*, 9

San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS) 15, 74*

SCHEER, MORT 37*

SCHEER, ROBERT 44*, 45

SELTZ, JOHN 4, 29, 57

SELTZ, JOHN PETER 15*, 16*

Sgt. JOSEPH P. HALLERAN 18

SMALE, Professor STEVE 22

SMALE, STEPHAN 62

SMALE, STEPHEN 16*

SMALE, STEVE 4, 16*

SMITH, Jr., JOHN WINDRIM 16*

INDEX (Cont.)

SMITH, WINDRIM	4
SMITH, WINDY	16*, 57
SMITH, Jr., WINDY	58
Socialist Workers Party San Francisco Division	72*
STACK, WALTER	60*
STAHL, MARK	57
STEIN, Mrs. BERNARD L. (BUDDY)	48*, 49*
STEIN, SUSAN	47, 49*, 52
STEIN, SUSAN COLE	48*, 49*
STAPLETON, LOUISE	4
STAPLETON, LOUISE J.	17*
STAPLETON, SID	4, 17*
STAPLETON, SYDNEY	17*
STEINKELLNER, MARION	4
STEINKELLNER, MARION J.	17*
STEINKELLNER, Mrs. FRANK	17*
STONE, BARTON	20, 21*
Student Committee for Travel to Cuba (SCTC)	15, 75*
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)	12*, 13*

INDEX (Cont.)

SUGAR, PHIL	4, 17*, 18*
SWEIGERT, U.S.Dist. Judge WILLIAM T.	40
TAYLOR, General	11
"The Daily Californian"	23*
TIERNAN	30
TIERNAN, RAYMOND PATRICK	32*
TIERNAN, Jr., RAYMOND P.	30
TOOTHMAN, Chief of Police EDWARD	34
TREMAIN, CLINTON	64
TURNER, ARTHUR	4, 18*
TURNER, ARTHUR LEE	18*
WARD, JOANNE BARKER	13*, 14*
WARREN, DAVE	4, 18*
WARREN, DAVID A.	18*
W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA)	13, 61, 76*, 77*
W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America - Berkeley Chapter	78*
WEINBERG, JACK	20, 21*, 47, 52, 53
WEISSMAN, STEPHAN MARK	18*, 19*
WEISSMAN, STEVE	4, 18*, 19*, 39, 53
WHITE, PHIL	4, 19*

359

INDEX (Cont.)

WHITE, PHILIP HUMBERT 19*, 20*
WILLIAMS, JOHN 4
WILLIAMS, JOHN GARRETT 20*
Workers Party 5*
Young Communist League (YCL) 36*
YOUNG, MARGARET H. 30
Young Socialist Alliance 79*, 80*
Young Socialist League (YSL) 10, 81*
Youth for Jobs (YFJ) 9, 83*
ZACH, ANNALIESA 5
ZACH, ANNALIESA HELGA 20*
ZACH, ANNELIESE HELGA 20*
ZION 52
ZION, MATTHEW WILLIAM 50

(*) indicates a characterization and/or description for the individual, organization or newspaper.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to File No.

SF 100-55462
BU 100-444608

April 8, 1966

Title	VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE
Character	INTERNAL SECURITY - C
Reference	Report of SA FRANK S. PERRONE, dated and captioned as above, at San Francisco, California

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

961

Date : 08/20/98
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10002-10189
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 963-1008

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 05/24/66
PAGES : 46
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

SEDITION

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY

IVEY, RICHARD CLAYTON

ANTI-WAR LEAFLETS

BAY AREA PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

YOUTH FOR JOBS

REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/02/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY FBI
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH FBI HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER MEMO DTD 5 NOV 97

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59) 86178 2093

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

[redacted]

Copy to:
1 - USA, San Francisco (RM)
2 - G-2, 6th Army, San Francisco (RM)
1 - NISO, San Francisco (RM)
1 - OSI, Travis Air Force Base (RM)

Report of: FRANK S. PERRONE Office: SAN FRANCISCO
Date: 5/24/66

Field Office File #: 14-207 Bureau File #: 14-2943

Title: VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 02 11 55
☒ RELEASE IN FULL
☐ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Character: SEDITION

Synopsis:

Source present at Berkeley Free Press during preparation of "soldier's leaflet". FBI Laboratory has determined that eight (8) additional copies of the "soldier's leaflet" were sent to military servicemen serving overseas by RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY. Witnessed handwriting specimens of IVEY obtained.

- P -

DETAILS:

The Vietnam Day Committee (VDC), 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley, California, distributed a leaflet captioned, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL." The contents of this leaflet are essentially the same as the Xerox copies of the leaflet which follows, and the first paragraph begins, "The following is proposed text for a 4-page 8-1/2 X 11 leaflet." A Xerox copy of the "PROPOSAL" which refers to the leaflet also follows.

The above-mentioned leaflet will also be referred to as the "soldier's leaflet".

In the "PROPOSAL", O.A.T. refers to the Oakland Army Terminal, Oakland, California.

DECLASSIFIED BY: 5668 SLD/GCL
6/12/96 (JFK)

[redacted]

963

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

PROPOSAL:

1. The VDC publish the attached leaflet or one similiar to it specifically aimed at soldiers.
2. The VDC publish a similiar leaflet aimed at prospective draftees which includes a section on ways of getting out of the draft, andC. O. information etc.
3. One of the major themes of the 15-16 demonstration will be a position by the VDC urging soldiers and potential inductees to individually and collectively oppose the war.
4. That the VDC, through its publicity. and through at least one public speaker make it clear that at the O. A. T. we will go beyond merely stating that we urge soldiers and potential inductees to oppose the war, but that we shall lauoch an active campaign of attempting to communicate with soldiers and potential inductees, trying to inform them of the criminal nature of the war and the reasons why we urge them to oppose it.
5. That the VDC publically inform intellectuals, liberals etc. that we are urging soldiers to oppose the war, why we are doing so, and urging them also to oppose the war by refusing to participate in government programs, rejecting government research grants, etc.
6. It is understood that the above program does not rule out stressing other major themes on the 15-16, or of launching other programs on that day.

964

SF 124-207

The following is proposed te... for a 4 page 8½ x 11 leaflet. T... leaflet will also include pictures, and at least 2 informational boxes. One of these will be divided into 2 columns. The left giving definitions of war crimes and the right giving examples ofwar crimes. The other box will give information on the soldiers who have already refused to fight in Vietnam. Other material will be added if space permits. The layout will be large print - 2 columns with frequent subtitles.

You may soon be sent to Vietnam. You have heard about the war in the news; your officers will give you pep talks about it. But you probably feel as confused and uncertain about it as most Americans do. Many people will tell you to just follow orders and leave the thinking to others. But you have the right to know as much about this war as anyone else. After all, it's you---not your congressman---who might get killed.

WHY ARE WE FIGHTING IN VIETNAM ?

We are supposed to be fighting to protect democracy in Vietnam, and yet our own government admits that South Vietnam is a dictatorship. General Ky, the latest military dictator, is as bad as they come. - Insert here quote about Ky admiring Hitler etc. -

----

General Ky doesn't mean much to us; we're not even sure how to pronounce his name. But the South Vietnamese have lived under him and men like him for ten years. As far as they are concerned, we are fighting on the side of Hitlerism; and they hope we lose.

WHO IS THE ENEMY ?

U.S. military spokesmen have often said that their greatest problem is finding the enemy. "The enemy" they say, "is everywhere." The old woman feeding her chickens may have a stock of hand grenades in her hut. The little boy who trails after the America soldiers during the day slips out to give information to the guerillas at night. The washerwoman at the American air base brings a bomb to work one day. "It is impossible says the military, "to tell who is the Viet Cong and who is the people."

And so, because the whole Vietnamese people seems to be the enemy, the military is taking no chances. They use tear gas---a weapon only used against civilian populations never against soldiers. They order American troops to fire at women and children--- because women and children, after all, are firing at American troops. American fighter planes destroy civilian villages with napalm; American B52s are flattening whole regions. That is why the war in Vietnam is so often called a "dirty war."

When the South Vietnamese people see you in your foreign uniform, they will think of you as their enemy. You are the ones bombing their towns. They don't know whether yor're a draftee or a volunteer, whether you're for the war or against it; but they're not taking any chances either.

FREE ELECTIONS

The Vietnamese would dearly like to vote the foreigners out of their country, but they have never had the chance. According to the Geneva Agreement of 1954, there were supposed to be elections throughout Vietnam in 1956, But the U.S. government was afraid that our man in Vietnam, Premier Diem, would lose. In fact, President Eisenhow himself admitted that "Ho Chi Minh....80%" (Eisenhower quote). So we decided not to allown any election there until we were sure we could win. Diem set up a political police

3

965

force and put all political opposition---Communist and anti-Communist---in jail. By 1959 it was clear that there weren't going to be any elections, and the guerillas known as the Viet Cong began to fight back. By 1963 our government was fed up with Diem, but still wasn't willing to risk elections. Our CIA helped a group of Vietnamese generals to overthrow Diem and kill him. Since then there have been a series of "better" military dictators. General Ky---the man who admires Hitler---is the latest one.

FIGHTING FOR DEMOCRACY

Your job as a soldier is supposed to be "to win the people of South Vietnam." Win them to what? Not democracy. We keep democracy for ourselves---they get military dictators. What then? The American way of life ? But why should they care any more about that than we care about the Vietnamese way of life? We can't speak their language or even pronounce their names. We don't know anything about their religion or even what it is. We never even heard of Vietnam until Washington decided to run it.

You are supposed to be fighting to "save the Vietnamese people from Communism." Certainly Communist influence is very strong in the National Liberation Front, the rebel government. Yet most of the people support the NLF. Why? Many of the same people who now lead the NLF led the Vietnamese independence movement against the Japanese during World War II and then went on to fight against French colonial rule. Most Vietnamese think of the NLF leaders as their country's outstanding patriots. In fact, many anti-Communists have joined the guerilla forces in the belief that the most important thing is to get rid of foreign domination and military dictators. On the other hand, very few Vietnamese support the official government of General Ky. His army has low morale and a high desertion rate.

THE TOUGH GUERILLAS

The newspapers and television have told us again and agian what a brave, tough fighter the Vietnamese guerilla is. Short of ammunition and without any air cover, he can beat forces that outnumber him five or ten to one. Why do they have such high morale? They are not draftees; no draftees ever fight like that. They are not high-paid, professional soldiers; most of them are peasants who work their fields. They are not well-trained; they can't even spare the ammunition for target practice.

Their secret is that they know why they are fighting. They didn't hear about Vietnam in the newspapers; they've lived there all their lives. While we were in high school, they were living under the Diem regime and hating it. Now American planes are bombing their towns and strafing their fields; American troops have occupied their country; and if they complain out loud, an American-supported dictator sentences them to jail or the firing squad. Is it any wonder that they fight so fiercely?

CRUSHING THE RESISTANCE

The war in Vietnam is not being fought according to the rules. Civilians are gassed. Prisoners are tortured. Our planes drop incendiary bombs on civilian villages. Our soldiers shoot at women and children. Your officers will tell you that it is all necessary, that we couldn't win the war any other way. And they are right. Americans are no more cruel than any other people; American soldiers don't enjoy this kind of war. But if you are going to wage war against an entire people, you have to become cruel. The ordinary German soldier in occupied Europe wasn't especially cruel, either. But as the resistance movements grew, he became cruel. He shot at women and children because they were shooting at him; he never asked himself why they were shooting at him. When a certain town became a center of resistance activity, he followed his orders and destroyed the

960

whole town. He knew that SS men were torturing captured resistance fighters, but it wasn't his business to interfere.

FOLLOWING ORDERS

As a soldier you have been trained to obey orders, but as a human being you must take responsibility for your own acts. International and American law recognize that an individual soldier, even if acting under orders, must bear final legal and moral responsibility for what he does. This principle became a part of law after World War II, when the Allied nations, meeting in London, decided that German war criminals must be punished even if they committed war crimes under orders. This principle was the basis of the Nuremberg trials. We believe that the entire war in Viet nam is criminal and immoral. We believe that the atrocities which are necessary to wage this war against the people of Vietnam are inexcusable.

OPPOSE THE WAR

We hope that you too find yourself, as a human being, unable to tolerate this nightmare war—we hope that you will oppose it. We don't know what kind of risks we are taking in giving you this leaflet; you won't know what risk you will be taking in opposing the war. Several GIs have already refused to fight in Vietnam and have been court-martialed. They have shown great courage. We believe that they, together with other courageous men who will join them, will have influence far out of proportion to their numbers.

There may be many other things you can do; since you are in the service, you know better than civilians what sorts of opposition are possible. But whatever you do, keep your eyes open. Draw your own conclusions from the things you see, read and hear. At orientations sessions, don't be afraid to ask questions, and if you're not satisfied with the answer, keep asking. Take every chance you get to talk to your fellow soldiers about the war. Demand to hear civilian speakers who oppose the war debate military spokesmen.

You may feel the war is wrong, and still decide not to face a courtmartial. You may then find yourself in Vietnam under orders. You will have to do some fighting—but don't do any more than you have to. Good luck.

67

8

SF T-1 furnished a copy of the "PROPOSAL" and the proposed text for the four page leaflet which would be "specifically aimed at soldiers."

SF T-1 informed on May 3, 1966, that he obtained the "PROPOSAL" and the proposed text for the leaflet from a table during the VDC membership meeting in Room 204, Engineering Hall, University of California, Berkeley, California, (UCB), on October 5, 1965. SF T-1 remarked he did not know who wrote or assisted in the preparation of the proposed text for the leaflet; however, recalled the proposed text for the leaflet was read aloud at the meeting by STEVE CHERKOSS. SF T-1 was unable to recall any comments made by CHERKOSS during his reading of the proposed text.

SF T-1 went on to say there were from 85 to 105 individuals also present at the meeting on October 5, 1965; however, since this was the first meeting of this type that he had attended, he only knew CHERKOSS who was introduced.

> SF T-2 on October 10, 1965, furnished information which identified STEVE CHERKOSS as a current active member of the Bay Area Progressive Labor Party (BAPLP).
>
> A characterization for the BAPLP is contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-3 reported on October 8, 1965, that on October 5, 1965, a VDC meeting was held at UCB, and among topics discussed at the meeting was the distribution of handbills for soldiers. Decision was made at the meeting, that the handbills would be given to soldiers at bus stations, at airports, and also, if possible, at the Oakland Army Terminal.

SF T-3 related on May 6, 1966, that the abovementioned VDC meeting was a VDC general membership meeting; and the meeting place was held in Room 204, Engineering Hall, UCB. SF T-3 informed he did not recall if the proposed text for the leaflet was read by anyone, or who had knowledge of the contents of the proposed text. SF T-3 stated he recalled the following individuals whom he described as members of the VDC were present at the VDC meeting on October 5, 1965.

Carded

STEVE CHERKOSS
DAVID FRIEDMAN
FRED GIBSON
HOWARD HARAWITZ
MORRIS HIRSCH
LARRY LOUGHLIN
MARILYN MILLIGAN
JOANNE PEYTON
JANET PUGH
JERRY RUBIN
VALERIE SILVA
STEPHEN SMALE
WINDY SMITH
LOUISE STAPLETON
SYD STAPLETON
JACK WEINBERG
STEVE WEISSMAN

Continuing, SF T-3 remarked that what he had previously referred to as handbills were identical with the leaflet, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL."

SF T-3 also remarked he could not recall any specific comments made by anyone during the meeting on October 5, 1965.

Inspector CHARLES O'MEARA, Intelligence Unit, Berkeley, Police Department, Berkeley, informed on October 12, 1965, that according to information furnished to him, DAVID FRIEDMAN was a member of the Steering Committee of the VDC. A protest demonstration was conducted at the Sea Wolf Restaurant, Jack London Square, Oakland, on February 12, 1965. This demonstration was sponsored by the Congress of Racial Equality. During the demonstration, DAVID FRIEDMAN was one of five individuals arrested by the Oakland Police Department. He was charged with interfering with a police officer. The charge was subsequently dismissed.

SF T-3 reported on October 25, 1965, that on October 23, 1965, one FRED GIBSON attended a Youth For Jobs (YFJ) meeting at

3
14-207
FSP:jal

59th Street and San Pablo Avenue, Oakland.

A characterization for YFJ is contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified FRED GIBSON as a member of the Community Work Committee of the VDC and also a member of the VDC Steering Committee.

SF T-4 reported in 1963 and 1964 that during 1963 and 1964, HOWARD HARAWITZ was a member of the Communist Party Youth Off-Campus Club, Berkeley.

SF T-5 on November 15, 1965, furnished a copy of a printed "Dear Friend" letter issued by the VDC which called for funds from the recipient. The letter identified MORRIS HIRSCH as a Professor of Mathematics, UCB, and also a member of the Finance Committee of the VDC.

The name of MORRIS HIRSCH appeared as a signer of a 1962 petition which urged non-enforcement and repeal of the Internal Security Act of 1950, which petition had been circulated by the Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCL), San Francisco, and had been submitted to the White House.

A characterization for the CCL is contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified LARRY LOUGHLIN as a member of the Finance Committee and Staff Member of the VDC.

A review of the records of the San Francisco Police Department, San Francisco, revealed that LARRY LOUGHLIN, also known as LAWRENCE ROBERT LOUGHLIN (true name), was arrested by the San Francisco Police Department on August 24, 1965, and charged with trespassing and resisting arrest. The charges arose from a demonstration against General MAXWELL TAYLOR at the Fairmont Hotel, San Francisco.

After LOUGHLIN had pled nolo contendere, he was sentenced on February 16, 1966, to six months in the San Francisco County Jail, Sentence was suspended and he was placed on one year probation.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965 identified MARILYN MILLIGAN as a member of the Community Work Committee and Staff Member of the VDC.

A review of the records of the Alameda County Sheriff's Office, Oakland, revealed that MARILYN MILLIGAN was arrested on December 3, 1964, under Sheriff's Office Number 641125 in connection with a sit-in demonstration at Sproul Hall, UCB. She was charged with resisting arrest, failure to disperse and trespassing. On June 28, 1965, she was found guilty of the trespassing and resisting arrest charges and the failure to disperse charge was dismissed. On July 29, 1965, she refused probation and was sentenced to $100.00 or ten days in jail on the trespassing charge, and $150.00 or fifteen days in jail on the resisting arrest charge. She has appealed the convictions.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified JOANNE PEYTON as a member of the Community Work Committee of the VDC.

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following information for JOANNE PEYTON, nee JOANNE BARKER WARD.

White
Female
Born August 8, 1936, Cleveland, Ohio.

5
14-207
FSP:jal

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified JANET PUGH as Chairman of the Publicity Committee of the VDC.

A review of the records of the Registrar's Office, UCB, revealed the following description for JANET MARILYN PUGH.
White
Female
Born December 24, 1939, Red Bluff, California
Permanent Residence: 200 Cedar Street, Red Bluff

In the August 9, 1965, issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle", a San Francisco, California, daily newspaper, information was set forth that in the summer of 1964, JERRY RUBIN traveled to Cuba in defiance of a United States Department of State travel ban. The trip was sponsored by the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba (SCTC).

A characterization for the SCTC is contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-6 reported on February 19, 1965, that JERRY RUBIN had enrolled for the fall, 1964, semester of the San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS).

A characterization for the SFSSS is contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified JERRY RUBIN as a Staff Member of the VDC and also a member of the Steering Committee of the VDC.

SF T-3 reported on November 1, 1965, that on October 30, 1965, VALERIE SILVA attended a meeting of Youth For Jobs, 59 4th Street and San Pablo Avenue, Oakland.

972

SF T-7 in February, 1952, identified STEPHEN SMALE as a member of the Labor Youth League (LYL) at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Michigan.

The LYL has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The LYL became defunct in February, 1957.

SF T-8 in January, 1961, identified STEPHEN SMALE as the Faculty Advisor of the Students Committee Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC), at UCB.

A characterization for the FPCC is contained in the Appendix Section.

STEPHEN SMALE has been publicly identified as a Mathematics professor at UCB.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965 identified STEVE SMALE as a Staff Member of the VDC and also a member of the Steering Committee of the VDC.

SF T-9 informed on November 15, 1963 and March 27, 1964, that in 1963 and 1964, WINDY SMITH was a member of the Southern California District Communist Party.

SF T-10 reported on February 25, 1966, that WINDY SMITH also known as JOHN WINDRIM SMITH, JR. (TN) was a transfer to the Marin County, California, Communist Party Club; however, had not attended any meetings of the club.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified WINDY SMITH as a member of the Strategic Research Organization Committee of the VDC, and also a member of the Steering Committee.

7
14-207
FSP:jal

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified LOUISE STAPLETON as a member of the Community Work Committee of the VDC.

SF T-3 related on August 17, 1965, that in his opinion, LOUISE STAPLETON was not in sympathy with the VDC but was simply looking for "some excitement and likes to demonstrate." SF T-3 added that LOUISE STAPLETON was an employee of the Child Care Center in Oakland and resided at 419 63rd Street, Oakland.

SF T-11 in October, 1965, identified SYDNEY STAPLETON as a member of the Young Socialist Alliance, Berkeley, and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the Socialist Workers Party.

Characterizations for the Young Socialist Alliance, Berkeley and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the Socialist Workers Party are contained in the Appendix Section.

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified SYDNEY STAPLETON as a member of the Speaker's Bureau of the VDC and also a member of the Steering Committee of the VDC.

SF T-12 reported on October 11, 1964, that on October 11, 1964, JACK WEINBERG attended a general membership meeting of the W.E. B. Du Bois Clubs of America, Berkeley Branch.

A characterization of the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America, Berkeley Branch is contained in the Appendix Section.

WEINBERG was arrested at UCB in connection with a sit-in demonstration at Sproul Hall on December 3, 1964. He was charged with trespassing, and resisting arrest; convicted, and on July 30, 1965, he was sentenced to serve 120 days in jail.

974

8
14-207
FSP:jal

SF T-3 on September 9, 1965, identified STEVE WEISSMAN as Chairman of the Strategic Research Organization Committee of the VDC.

SF T-8 has informed that STEVE WEISSMAN, also known as STEPHEN MARK WEISSMAN (true name), held a Bachelor of Arts Degree from the University of Tampa and a Master of Arts Degree from the University of Michigan. He enrolled at UCB as a graduate student for the fall semester, 1964. He was a strategist for the Free Speech Movement (FSM) demonstrations during the latter part of 1964 on the UCB Campus. He organized a strike of teaching assistants at UCB in support of the FSM.

The FSM was an organization which evolved at UCB out of a disagreement between students and UCB administration of UCB policy regarding campus organizations.

WEISSMAN, according to his academic file at Tampa University, December 9, 1964, had a history of self-admitted emotional instability for which he had been under psycho-therapy treatment fro October, 1958 to January, 1960. His father informed in April, 1965, that his son was not a Marxist; had no Communist leanings whatsoever and considered the United States the best country in the world, but one which still needed improvement.

SF T-13 reported on November 1, 1965, that at a general membership meeting of the VDC on October 26, 1965, in Room 204, Engineering Building, UCB, there was a vote which was subsequently set aside to distribute the leaflet, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL."

A review of all information furnished by SF T-13 failed to reveal any information indicating who conducted the above-described meeting, or when, where or to whom the leaflets would be distributed.

SF T-13 is currently employed in a foreign country, and there is no information indicating whether he will return to the United States in the near future.

SF T-14 reported on May 6, 1966, he was unable to recall who conducted the VDC general membership meeting in Room 204, Engineering Building, UCB, on October 26, 1965, or if mention was made when, where, or to whom the "soldier's leaflet" would be distributed.

SF T-3 informed on May 6, 1966, that the VDC general membership meeting which was held in Room 204, Engineering Building, UCB, was chaired by SYDNEY STAPLETON. SF T-3 recalled that the persons attending the meeting voted on a decision to distribute the "soldier's leaflet"; however, the majority vote postponed action on the leaflets until a later meeting. SF T-3 also recalled that JACK KURZWEIL, BOB KAUFMAN, and (CONN) "RINGO" HALLINAN informed those present that the leaflets should be distributed to civilians rather than to soldiers.

SF T-3 commented he had no knowledge as to when, where, or to whom the leaflets may have been distributed.

SF T-15 reported in October 1965, that as of September 1965, JACK WEINBERG was a member of the Steering Committee of the VDC.

SF T-12 informed on October 9, 1964, that on October 11, 1964, JACK WEINBERG attended a general membership meeting of the W.E.B. Du Bois Club of America, Berkeley Branch.

WEINBERG was arrested at UCB in connection with a sit-in demonstration at Sproul Hall on December 3, 1964. He was charged with trespassing and resisting arrest; convicted, and on July 30, 1965, he was sentenced to serve 120 days in jail.

SF T-16 reported on July 19, 1965, that on July 10, 1965, ROBERT KAUFMAN attended a Northern California District Communist Party meeting in San Francisco.

SF T-17 reported on April 19, 1966, that as of November 1965, CONN "RINGO" HALLINAN was a member of a Communist Party (CP) Club in San Francisco.

Sergeant DAHL informed on January 10, 1966, that he had received a report from his previously described source that at the VDC general membership meeting in Room 204, Engineering Hall, UCB, on October 26, 1965, WINDY SMITH gave the majority report and recommended the VDC approve and distribute the "soldier's leaflet" to anyone, but mainly to U.S. servicemen preparing to go to Vietnam. In addition, SMITH commented at the meeting that 4,000 of the "soldier's leaflets" had been sent to the National Liberation Front, 6,000 had been distributed at Fort Ord, California, 2,000 at a military installation at Point Mugu, California, and many at the Army Intelligence School in Monterey, California.

SF T-14 related on May 6, 1966, that at the VDC general membership meeting in Room 204, Engineering Hall, UCB, on October 26, 1965, WINDY SMITH, who delivered the majority report, recommended that the leaflets be distributed, and MIKE O'HANLON, STEVE WEISSMAN and STEVE SMALE opposed the distribution. SF T-14 could furnish no additional information.

On January 5, 1966, Deputy Sheriff JOHN CRISAN, Monterey County, California Sheriff's Office, furnished some membership cards issued to MICHAEL J. O'HANLON, which he had obtained from a forest ranger at the Big Sur Park in December 1965. CRISAN stated he had no further

-77

information concerning O'HANLON, and assumed the cards were membership cards signed by O'HANLON for the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and the VDC.

The IWW has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY is an association of young people on the left...; one bringing together liberals and radicals, activists and scholars, students and faculty. It feels the urgency to put forth a radical, democratic program counterposed to authoritian movements both of Communism and the domestic Right.

Preamble, SDS Constitution"

During the 1965 National Convention of the SDS, the Preamble of the Constitution was amended to eliminate "counterposed to authoritarian movements both of Communism and the domestic Right."

SDS Worklist No. 14,
7/28/65

When O'HANLON was stopped by a Highway Patrol Officer on February 18, 1966, in Ocala, Florida, O'HANLON had a membership card for the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA).

A characterization for the DCA is contained in the Appendix.

The FBI Laboratory informed on February 17, 1966, that fingerprint examinations revealed MICHAEL J. O'HANLON was identical with FRANCIS GEORGE MEDAILLE, FBI Number 874 775C.

In the March 20, 1966, issue of the "San Francisco Examiner", a San Francisco, California, daily newspaper, information was set forth that FRANCIS GEORGE MEDAILLE was arrested in 1958 on a homicide charge in New York for throwing a six-year old girl from the roof of a building. MEDAILLE was sent to a mental institution until May 5, 1963, when he pled guilty to a manslaughter charge, first degree. He received a five-to-ten year suspended sentence and was placed on five years probation.

RICHARD D. CALLAHAN, Special Agent, Chief of Special Operations Section, 115th INTC, Presidio, California, on January 7, 1966, made available a file pertaining to the appearance of the leaflet in the vicinity of Fort Ord. A review of the file revealed a report concerning an interview with A. C. COULAPIELES, Lieutenant, U. S. Navy 63[illegible], Security Officer, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School (USNPS), Monterey. Lieutenant COULAPIELES informed on October 26, 1965, that during the morning hours of October 23, 1965, members of his cleanup detail at USNPS informed him that a number of VDC leaflets addressed, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL" had been scattered at various points within the USNPS area. The report related a subsequent inspection of the area by the cleanup detail indicated leaflets had been dropped from outside the fence line at various points. The report further informed that the number of leaflets dropped was small.

Mr. CALLAHAN related inasmuch as the investigation revealed the leaflets were dropped from outside the fence on military property, no further investigation was conducted by the military authorities. USNPS is approximately three miles from Fort Ord.

In addition, Mr. CALLAHAN recalled information indicating copies of the leaflet had been reported as appearing on the cement divider on the main highway between Marina and Monterey, California. Mr. CALLAHAN added that part of this highway runs adjacent to Fort Ord.

EDWARD MURPHY, NISO, 11th Naval District, San Diego, informed on February 2, 1966, he had received no information indicating that the "soldier's leaflet" had been distributed at Point Mugu. He added if the leaflet had been distributed at Point Mugu, he was certain his office would have received information concerning the distribution.

SF T-18 informed on May 16, 1966, that he remembered on one occasion during a discussion of the leaflet at VDC headquarters 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley, JOHN SELTZ remarked that he, SELTZ, was one of the passengers in a speeding automobile from which leaflets were thrown at Fort Ord and the Presidio at Monterey. SF T-18 commented he had no knowledge as to whether any of the leaflets were actually picked up by soldiers. SF T-18 believed the discussion took place during the last quarter of 1965.

> JOHN CLIFFORD NORDEEN, 9125 Marmora Avenue, Morton Grove, Illinois, a self-described friend of JOHN PETER SELTZ, had informed that SELTZ served under one ALEJANDRO MARTINEZ, leader of an anti-Somoza Nicaraguan revolutionary group, on the Honduras-Nicaraguan border during May and June 1960.

SF T-3 related on May 6, 1966, he recalled there was a discussion regarding leaflets which were supposedly distributed to soldiers at Fort Ord; however, he could furnish no specifics.

Sergeant CARL DAHL had related on January 10, 1966, that according to his previously described source, at the VDC meeting on October 26, 1965, in Room 204, Engineering Building, UCB, STEVE WEISSMAN made the following remark:

> "Our lawyers have informed us if we stop now distributing this leaflet it is less likely any of us would be prosecuted, but if we continue, we are asking for arrest for sedition."

SF T-14 related on May 6, 1966, that he recalled STEVE WEISSMAN making the above-quoted statement at the VDC meeting on October 26, 1965.

SF T-3 informed on May 6, 1966, that he could not recall

980

STEVE WEISSMAN making the above-quoted statement at the VDC meeting on October 26, 1965.

SF T-18 related on October 25, 1965, that on October 23, 1965, the VDC Anti-Draft Committee held a meeting at VDC headquarters, 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley. SF T-18 related that at the meeting, STEVE CHERKOSS admitted being a "Communist" and stated those active in the organization should face up to the fact and accept that Communists were in the anti-draft movement on a national scale.

SF T-18 related on May 16, 1966, that he recalled WINDY SMITH and JOHN SELTZ were also present at the above-mentioned meeting. SF T-18 went on to say that SMITH left the meeting early. SF T-18 did not recall that anyone at the meeting of October 23, 1965 mentioned the Oakland Induction Center specifically as a distribution point for the "soldier's leaflet." SF T-18 was unable to recall the names of anyone known to him at the meeting of October 23, 1965, who led and/or took part in any discussion concerning the undermining of the morale of U.S. troops or anything said by any individual at the meeting in this regard.

SF T-18 did recall that the "soldier's leaflet" was distributed at the Oakland Induction Center one morning. He believed this occurred in October 1965, but was unable to recall the exact date. SF T-18 recalled STEVE CHERKOSS was present and was distributing the leaflets at the Oakland Induction Center on the morning in question. SF T-18 added he was also present at the Oakland Induction Center on the particular morning; however, he did not distribute any of the leaflets.

A review of the printed leaflet, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL" indicated it was printed by the Berkeley Free Press.

SF T-18 informed on May 16, 1966, that the Berkeley Free Press did, in fact, print the leaflet, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL." SF T-18 went on to say he was present at the Berkeley Free Press, along with two other individuals and a couple of printers from the Berkeley Free Press who were unknown to him when approximately 30,000 copies of the leaflets were printed. SF T-18 added that he helped cut the paper at the Berkeley Free Press for the leaflets.

Sergeant CARL DAHL had related on January 10, 1966, that according to his previously described source in the VDC, the "soldier's leaflet" was primarily the work of MARVIN GARSON and JACK WEINBERG, and had been proofread by ROBERT SCHEER.

SF T-11 reported during April 1963, that MARVIN THOMAS GARSON had been active in the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) in Berkeley, while attending UCB, and had served as an officer of the organization.

SF T-11 further reported that GARSON had become dissatisfied with the YSA over a factionalist dispute and had resigned from the YSA in Berkeley in February, 1963.

The December 12, 1961, issue of "The Daily Californian", UCB Campus Publication, contained an article captioned, "Fair Play For Cuba," which was signed by two individuals, one of whom was "Bob Scheer, Grad Student, Econ., member, Fair Play Exec. Comm."

In the May 22, 1965, issue of the "San Francisco Examiner", a San Francisco, California, daily newspaper, there appeared an article captioned, "The 'Camp' Meeting at Cal." Among other things, the article identified ROBERT SCHEER as Research Director for the FPCC and informed SCHEER had visited Cuba in the summer of 1964 in defiance of a U.S. State Department ban.

ROBERT SCHEER is the Foreign News Editor for "Ramparts" magazine.

"Ramparts" is self-described as the "catholic journal of political opinion."

The February 23, 1966, issue of the "Berkeley Daily Gazette", a Berkeley, California, daily newspaper, informed among other things, that "SCHEER, an outspoken critic of the JOHNSON

Administration policies in Viet Nam" was "presently" touring South Vietnam and Cambodia, the latter country at the invitation of Prince SHIANOUK.

SF T-18 related on May 16, 1966, he could not recall who told him, but he had the distinct impression he was told that MARVIN GARSON was the main author of the "soldier's leaflet." SF T-18 added he had not heard anything linking JACK WEINBERG with the preparation of the leaflet or that ROBERT SCHEER had proofread the leaflet.

SF T-3 reported on May 6, 1966, that he had no knowledge of who actually prepared the "soldier's leaflet"; however, he vaguely recalled that the leaflet was at least in part the work of SIDNEY CHERPITEL. He could furnish no specifics.

SF T-13 reported on November 4, 1965, that SIDNEY WILLIAM CHERPITEL on November 3, 1965, considered himself a Communist, but was not a member of the CP.

SF T-14 reported on May 6, 1966, he possessed no information concerning who prepared or assisted in the preparation of the "soldier's leaflet".

SF T-13 related on October 13, 1965, that on October 11, 1965, at approximately 7:30 PM, MIKE O'HANLON and his girl friend, MIRIAM GOLOMB, described by SF T-13 as very active in the VDC, went to the Greyhound Bus Depot, 7th and Mission Streets, San Francisco. SF T-13 commented their purpose for visiting the Greyhound Bus Depot was to ship three (3) parcels of leaflets to be distributed to soldiers. The leaflets were captioned, "ATTENTION ALL MILITARY PERSONNEL", and were addressed to J. PARISOT, C/O Department of Literature, University of California at San Diego, La Jolla, California.

On May 4, 1966, C. A. TELFER, Greyhound Terminal Manager, San Diego, California, informed that the bus bill for the shipment of leaflets to J. PARISOT on October 11, 1965, if such shipment were made, would be located at the Accounting Department of the Greyhound General Office, Market and Fremont

Streets, San Francisco. Mr. TELFER commented all bus bills were furnished to San Francisco at the end of the month and they would contain the name of the person accepting delivery of the package.

EDWARD J. BASILE, Greyhound Bus Lines, 371 Market Street, San Francisco, furnished the following information to SA JOSEPH T. QUIGLEY on May 6, 1966.

Collect Bus Bill Number 520851, dated October 11, 1965, revealed three (3) boxes weighing sixty-five (65) pounds were sent to J. PARISOT, University of California, Department of Literature, La Jolla, California. The contents of the boxes were described as books and leaflets. The shipper was listed as the VDC, 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley. Express charges were $4.40. No signature was shown on the bus bill to record the name of the recipient.

DISTRIBUTION OF LEAFLET TO MILITARY SERVICEMEN SERVING OVERSEAS

As of April 10, 1966, the FBI Laboratory, Washington, D.C., had determined from handwriting comparisons, twenty-seven (27) leaflets sent to military personnel serving overseas had been sent by RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY.

PATRICK M. AYMAR, EM 3 E Division
USS KITTYHAWK (CVA)
FPO San Francisco

WILLIAM BAGLEY, 9142978
B Division, USS OKLAHOMA CITY (CLG 5)
FPO San Francisco

KEN CRAIGIE
USS PAUL REVERE APA 248
FPO San Francisco

A 3/c WARREN E. HANSEN, AF 19791037
481 TFS (Rote), 33 Tactical Group, Box P
APO San Francisco, 96601

984

STEVE A. LINDQUIST, FA 7782253
M Division, USS DUNCAN 874
FPO San Francisco, 96601

G. L. RAPALEE
MM 2 A Div.
USS KITTYHAWK (CVA-63)
FPO San Francisco, 96601

PAUL J. THOMAS
USS MOUNT MC KINLEY
(A6c-7) COMPHIBGRU-1
FPO San Francisco, 96601

CURTIS R. WESTLAKE, 7782535
USS MONTROSE (APA 212) B.C.
FPO San Francisco, 96601

Sergeant CARL DAHL's highly placed source in the VDC, SF T-14, SF T-3, and SF T-18 on May 4, 6, 6 and 16, 1966, respectively, were shown photographs of IVEY, and they informed they did not know him nor had they seen him at VDC headquarters, Berkeley, nor at any VDC activities. They commented that if an individual desired copies of the leaflet, they were available to anyone at VDC headquarters, 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley.

Inasmuch as investigation to date had revealed that RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY had sent thirty-five (35) of the "soldier's leaflet" to military personnel serving overseas, the following investigation was conducted for the purpose of obtaining witnesses who could testify to IVEY's handwriting.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 5/19/66

MR. ROBERT F. LEVERONI, Chief Clerk, Exchange Bank, Main Office, 4th and Mendecino Avenue, Santa Rosa, California, advised that he personally checked the open and closed accounts of the main Exchange Bank's master indices on the name RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY, and he could not locate this name in the records.

MR. LEVERONI also checked the following branches of the Exchange Bank, for an open or closed account in the name of IVEY, without results:

Montgomery Village Branch, Santa Rosa
Roseland Branch, Santa Rosa
College Avenue Branch, Santa Rosa

MR. LEVERONI advised that when he checked the Rohnert Park Branch, Rohnert Park, California, he was advised by JAMES W. HARRIS, Manager, that he personally opened up a savings account in the name of RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY and DORINDA D. IVEY. The account number is 28-04474. HARRIS further advised that he was personally acquainted with RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY and was the person who witnessed IVEY's signature.

On 5/13/66 at Santa Rosa, California File # SF 14-207

386

by SA MERLE R. ADAMS/pae Date dictated 5/13/66

24

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 5/20/66

JAMES W. HARRIS, Manager, Exchange Bank, Rohnert Park Branch, Post Office Box 1008, Rohnert Park, California, advised he personally opened a savings account, number 28-0447-4, on September 14, 1965, in the name of RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY and DORINDA D. IVEY. He said he personally witnessed the signature card and this card carried Social Security Number 562-50-8925, which number was given to him by RICHARD IVEY and was for the purpose of identifying this individual with his signature card.

MR. HARRIS was exhibited a photograph of RICHARD IVEY, which was taken March 18, 1963. This photograph is an excellent likeness of IVEY as determined by SA ADAMS when IVEY was contacted for interview on March 24, 1966. MR. HARRIS advised that the person in the photograph was RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY and identical with the RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY who had savings account number 28-0447-4. MR. HARRIS said he also had three withdrawal slips from the savings account, and these slips carry the signature of RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY. MR. HARRIS advised that he could testify to IVEY's signature as it appeared on the signature slip and on the three withdrawal slips. MR. HARRIS made available copies of the following items:

1. Signature card number 28-0447-4 in the name of RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY and ~~DORINDA D. IVEY~~.
2. Savings Account withdrawal receipt dated March 1, 1966, in the amount of $25.00, with customer's signature RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY.
3. Savings withdrawal slip dated January 10, 1966, in the amount of $54.66, with customer's signature RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY.
4. Savings withdrawal slip, dated January 3, 1965, in the amount of $150.00, with customer's signature RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY.

On 5/13/66 at Rohnert Park, California File # SF 14-207

by SA MERLE R. ADAMS/pae 387 Date dictated 5/16/66

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

MR. HARRIS further advised that the records of his bank revealed that RICHARD IVEY, 7314 Lynch Road, Sebastopol, California, was issued a bank draft in the amount of $10.00, drawn on the Chase National Bank of New York City. This draft was issued on October 25, 1965.

The above-listed records of the Rohnert Park Branch, Exchange Bank, are confidential and can only be produced through the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, addressed to MR. JAMES W. HARRIS, Manager, Rohnert Park Branch, Exchange Bank, Post Office Box 1008, Rohnert Park, California.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 5/20/66

RICHARD CLAYTON IVEY, 1955 Chestnut Street, Berkeley, California, on March 18, 1963, applied for a California Driver's License at the Berkeley Office of the Department of Motor Vehicles. This individual was described as born April 13, 1941, and he received driver's license number G645401.

MR. MARSHALL TURNER, Manager of the Department of Motor Vehicles, 999 South A Street, Santa Rosa, California, advised that on March 18, 1963, he was the Manager of the Berkeley Office of the Department of Motor Vehicles. He stated that he can testify that it is departmental policy and strictly adhered to by him, that when a person applies for a driver's license background data such as full name and address and date of birth is typed in on Form DL-1, by a clerk. The applicant is then given examination questions. When applicant completes the examination, he takes it to an Examiner. The applicant is then photographed. The Examiner then witnesses the applicant's signature and the identity of the Examiner appears on the reverse side of form DL-1. MR. TURNER stated that the Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, California, could supply a certified, true copy of the driver's application with the name of the Examiner who witnessed the signature.

MR. TURNER advised that the proper person to produce this record in court is MR. THOMAS BRIGHT, Director, Department of Motor Vehicles, Sacramento, California.

On 5/13/66 at Santa Rosa, California File # SF 14-207

389

by SA MERLE R. ADAMS/pae Date dictated 5/16/66

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Date 5/19/66

MRS. ANN BEACH, Deputy Registrar of Voters, Sonoma County Court House, 2555 Mendocino Avenue, Santa Rosa, California, advised that according to the records of her office she registered a RICHARD C. IVEY, 7314 Lynch Road, Sebastopol, California, on November 3, 1965, for voting purposes.

She stated that she can testify that her signature appears on the Affidavit of Registration, No. B75888, and that she personally witnessed the Affiant's signature.

She stated that the usual and accepted practice in registering an individual is as follows:

The registrant comes to the counter in the Office of Registrar of Voters. He asks to be registered. He is questioned about his former registration, which in this case was Alameda County. He is then asked for his height, birth place and birth date. In this case the height was listed as 5'8", birth place as California, and birth date as April 13, 1941. The next question he is asked is, "Can you read the constitution in the English language?" If the Affiant states in the affirmative, he is then asked for his full name, address, occupation, and the name of the party with which he would like to affiliate. He is then asked, "Do you swear that all statements are true to the best of your knowledge?" If the Affiant states in the positive, he then has placed before him the Affidavit of Registration, which he must sign in the Deputy's presence, and in this matter the Affiant signed the name "RICHARD C. IVEY, 7314 Lynch Road, Sebastopol."

MRS. BEACH, after witnessing the signature, in the proper column entitled, "Subscribed and Sworn Before Me," she affixes the date, signs her name in full and enters the precinct number.

MRS. BEACH stated that the proper person to testify to this long and accepted voting procedure in Sonoma County, California, is the Clerk of the County Court.

On 5/13/66 at Santa Rosa, California File # SF 14-207

by SA MERLE R. ADAMS/pae 990 Date dictated 5/13/66

28

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SF 14-207
MRA/pae

In this matter, the person who can so testify and produce the original Affidavit of Registration, is MR. EUGENE D. WILLIAMS, County Clerk, Sonoma County Court House, 2555 Mendocino Avenue, Santa Rosa, California.

BAY AREA PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY, aka
Bay Area Progressive Labor Movement,
Bay Area Progressive Labor,
"Progressive Labor"

The masthead in the February 8, 1965, issue of "Spark" reflects it is published by the Progressive Labor Movement of the Bay Area, P.O. Box 73, Station A, Berkeley.... page 4 of this issue of "Spark" carries an article describing MORT SCHEER as the "West Coast organizer" of the Progressive Labor Movement (PLM).

A source advised on January 7, 1965, that MORTIMER SCHEER, following a press conference in San Francisco, California, on January 7, 1965, related that he was the West Coast Organizer for the PLM and National Vice Chairman. PLM was started about three years ago as a national organization located mainly in the New York and Buffalo areas, and he has been here since last July striving to organize PLM. He stated PLM has several publications, including "Progressive Labor", a monthly, and the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly."

The April 19, 1965, issue of the "San Francisco Chronicle", a daily San Francisco newspaper, carried an article which related that the Progressive Labor Party (PLP) was officially formed April 18, 1965, after a four-day convention in New York. PLP was formerly known as the Progressive Labor Movement and MORT SCHEER was elected as one of the vice-presidents of PLP.

A second source advised on May 6, 1965, that the Bay Area Progressive Labor Party (BAPLP) has no headquarters. MORTIMER SCHEER, organizer for BAPLP operates out of his residence.

APPENDIX

'SF 14-207

1

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP)
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT (PLM)

A source advised on April 20, 1965, that the PLP, formerly known as the PLM, held its first national convention April 15-18, 1965, at New York City, to organize the PLM into a PLP. The PLP will have as its ultimate objective the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism.

"The New York Times," City Edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP. The PLP was described as an outgrowth of the PLM. Its officers were identified as MILTON ROSEN, New York, President, and WILLIAM EPTON of New York and MORT SCHEER of San Francisco, Vice Presidents. A 20-member National Committee was elected to direct the party until the next convention.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962 by Mr. ROSEN and Mr. SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

The PLP publishes the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly," a theoretical magazine; "Progressive Labor," a monthly magazine; "Challenge," a New York City newspaper; and "Spark," a West Coast newspaper.

The June 1, 1965, issue of "Challenge," page 6, states that "This paper is dedicated to fight for a new way of life - where the working men and women own and control their homes, factories, the police, courts, and the entire government on every level."

The source advised that the PLP utilizes the address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York, but also utilizes an office in Room 622, 132 Nassau Street, New York City, where PLP publications are prepared.

APPENDIX

COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (CCL), aka Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties - San Francisco

A source advised on June 19, 1961, that MICKEY LIMA, Chairman, Northern California District, Communist Party (CP), reported on June 15, 1961, that the CP, USA, in response to the Supreme Court decision of June 5, 1961, relating to the Internal Security Act of 1950, had decided to create a committee known as Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (CCCL), 22 East 17th Street, New York City, and that a local committee would be organized for Northern California.

This source advised on June 26, 1961, that a meeting was held on June 18, 1961, at the home of ROSCOE PROCTOR, member of the National Committee, CP, USA, for the purpose of formulating plans for the CCCL in Northern California.

A second source advised on September 14, 1961, that the CCCL had opened an office at 942 Market Street, Room 401, San Francisco, California, and that some of the furniture for this office had come from the CP office on the same floor.

A third source advised June 22, 1962, that Dr. HERBERT PHILLIPS announced that he had closed down the headquarters of the CCL at 942 Market Street, San Francisco.

A fourth source in November, 1962, advised that CP officials in Northern California have been active in promoting the CCL.

This same source advised in November, 1962, that the CCL was active in the fight against the Internal Security Act of 1950, under which the CP and its officials were being prosecuted.

A fifth source on May 2, 1963, furnished the names of the officers of the CCL in San Francisco as Dr. HERBERT J. PHILLIPS, Chairman, and WALTER STACK, Treasurer.

Dr. HERBERT PHILLIPS testified in open court in 1953 to CP membership since 1935.

APPENDIX

2.

A sixth source advised in April, 1963, that WALTER STACK is a current CP member in San Francisco.

One of these sources advised February 13, 1963, WALTER STACK stated on February 8, 1963, that the officers of the CCL were holding off temporarily on further activity on the advice of MICKIE LIMA, District CP Chairman.

A seventh source advised that Dr. HERBERT PHILLIPS stated in August, 1963, that the CCL is defunct in the San Francisco area.

The fifth source above advised that the CCL bank account at the Bank of America, #1 Powell Street, San Francisco, was closed August 16, 1963, because it was "no longer needed".

APPENDIX

CITIZENS COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL LIBERTIES (NEW YORK CITY)

The Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications, revised and published December 1, 1961, prepared and released by the Committee on Un-American Activities, United States House of Representatives, contains the following on Page 42 concerning "Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties (New York City)":

> 1. "On the basis of its investigations and hearings to date, the committee concludes that the National Assembly for Democratic Rights and a coordinating and organizing group in support thereof, titled the 'Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties, are communist fronts. Created, dominated and controlled by members and officials of the Communist Party, the National Assembly for Democratic Rights and the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties were organized as propaganda devices for the conduct of 'mass activity' in support of the avowed objectives of 'reversal or nonapplication' of the Supreme Court decisions of June 5, 1961, which upheld the constitutionality of the registration and disclosure provisions of the Internal Security Act of 1950 as applied to the Communist Party, and the Smith Act membership clause making punishable active and purposive membership in the Communist Party."
>
> "*** The long-range objective of the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties is to serve as the vehicle for concealed communist participation in, and direction of, propaganda and agitational activities aimed to nullify the Internal Security and Smith Acts."
>
> "*** Committee investigation disclosed that the Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties was formed on or about June 12, 1961 ***."
>
> (Committee on Un-American Activities, Report and Hearings on Manipulation of Public Opinion by Organizations Under Concealed Control of the Communist Party (National Assembly for Democratic Rights and Citizens Committee for Constitutional Liberties), House Report 1282, Part 1, October 2 and 3, 1961, pp 137, 143 and 144.)

SF 14-207

1

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE, BAY AREA CHAPTER, also known as Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (BAFPCC)

The "New York Times" newspaper on November 20, 1960 carried an article captioned "Pro-Castro Body Reports U.S. Gain," which reported that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) had 5,000 paid-up members in the United States. The article declared that the FPCC had headquarters at 799 Broadway, New York City, New York, and had chapters in other cities, including one in San Francisco.

A source advised in March, 1961, that the Bay Area Chapter of the FPCC (BAFPCC) began to be formed in San Francisco in November, 1960, under the direct guidance and leadership of ASHER HARER, who the source identified as a member of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and a member of the National Committee of the SWP.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This source advised in March, 1963, that in the recent election of the BAFPCC the SWP continued its influence by having SWP members elected to the executive committee

This source advised in May, 1963, that the BAFPCC included members in San Francisco and surrounding counties. He advised that the BAFPCC has no headquarters but received mail through Post Office Box 2615, San Francisco 26, California, which is a box maintained by ASHER HARER. He stated that the announced aims and purposes of the BAFPCC are to "spread the truth about Cuba and to prevent U.S. intervention in Cuba."

A second source advised on January 10, 1964, that at a BAFPCC meeting in Berkeley, California, in December, 1963, it was decided to dissolve the BAFPCC.

APPENDIX

35

SF 14-207
1

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening in Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that VINCENT "TED" LEE, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that LEE believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. LEE did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se.

APPENDIX

SF 14-207
2

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE (cont'd.)

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator THOMAS J. DODD of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator DODD was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC.

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World Telegram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-Castro FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-Castro street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-Castro American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by Castro's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected Presidential assassin LEE H. OSWALD.

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. LEE had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization.

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved.

APPENDIX

1.

SAN FRANCISCO SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, aka
San Francisco School of Social Science,
San Francisco Marxist Study Group,
San Francisco School of Marxism-Leninism,
San Francisco School of Marxism

A source advised on February 6, 1962, that the first class of the San Francisco Marxist Study Group (SFMSG) was held on February 5, 1962, at 345 Franklin Street, San Francisco, California, and that the instructor of this class stated that the main purpose of the SFMSG was to train young people for leadership of the people in the event the U. S. wakes up to the advantages of communism.

A second source advised on April 23, 1964, that the San Francisco School of Social Sciences (SFSSS), has been known as the "San Francisco School of Social Science," "San Francisco Marxist Study Group," "San Francisco School of Marxism-Leninism," and "San Francisco School of Marxism."

A third source furnished the Spring, 1964, Bulletin of the SFSSS on October 14, 1964, which reflected that TERENCE HALLINAN and J. P. MORRAY were Co-Directors of the SFSSS.

A fourth source advised on April 9, 1965, that in April, 1965, TERENCE HALLINAN advised that he was not a member of the Communist Party (CP), but considered himself a communist and intended to join the CP as soon as he passed his bar exams.

A fifth source advised March 1, 1963, that HERBERT APTHEKER, a member of the CP, USA, National Committee, advised in February, 1963, that he was to be the East Coast Chairman and JOSEPH P. MORRAY the West Coast Director of a new organization being promoted by the CP, USA, to teach and propagate Marxist theories.

The third source further advised on January 26, 1966, that due to the failure of the SFSSS during its Spring, 1965, term to raise support sufficient to continue all of its scheduled classes, no classes were organized for a Fall, 1965, term. The SFSSS no longer exists.

APPENDIX

1000

SF 14-207

1

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source advised on August 1, 1960, that the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed approximately in the early part of 1938 and the Oakland Branch of the SWP was formed in the latter part of 1938.

A second source advised on October 26, 1959, that the name of the Oakland Branch of the SWP was changed to the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

A third source advised on April 2, 1965, that the San Francisco Branch and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP follow the policies and directives of the National SWP with which they are affiliated.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

STUDENT COMMITTEE FOR TRAVEL TO CUBA

"The Columbia Owl," weekly student newspaper of Columbia University, New York City, December 12, 1962, issue, page one, contained an article entitled "Students to Visit Cuba During Holidays." This article stated in part that the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was formed October 14, 1962, by a group of students from New York City universities, the University of Wisconsin, Oberlin College and the University of North Carolina, who stated that as students they would like a chance to see and evaluate the situation in Cuba for themselves and had received an offer of transportation and two weeks stay in Cuba from the Federation of University Students in Havana, as guests of the Federation. The Committee accepted the offer and applied to the State Department of the United States for passport validation which was refused; however, over fifty students planned to defy the State Department ban and go to Cuba.

A source advised on December 6, 1962, it was learned the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba had recently been formed by the Progressive Labor Group.

A second source advised on September 13, 1963, that during the Summer of 1963, fifty-nine individuals traveled to Cuba; the leaders of the group were members of the Progressive Labor Movement; and the trip was planned and organized by Progressive Labor Movement members.

A third source advised on October 9, 1963, the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba was utilizing Post Office Box 2178, New York, New York, as its mailing address.

On March 12, 1965, Philip Abbott Luce, 504 West 55th Street, New York, New York, a self-admitted member of the Student Committee for Travel to Cuba Executive Committee and the Progressive Labor Movement National Coordinating Committee, advised as follows:

The Student Committee for Travel to Cuba (SCTC) was formerly known as the Ad Hoc Student Committee for Travel to Cuba and the Permanent Student Committee for Travel to Cuba.

Luce was a leader and participant of the 1963 trip to Cuba and an organizer of the 1964 trip to Cuba and both trips were sponsored by the SCTC.

By the Spring of 1964 the Executive Committee of the SCTC was considered to be members of the Progressive Labor Movement.

No trip to Cuba or China was being planned by the SCTC for 1965.

1002 APPENDIX

SF14-207

1

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party (CP), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call" to the new youth organization and planning for a founding convention to be held in June, 1964.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisci, California, at which time the name W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution are, "It is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-Communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternative."

APPENDIX

SF 14-207

The constitution further states that this new organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals, or if five or more people so desire, a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles of the parent organization.

As of October, 1965, the headquarters of the DCA was located at 954 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California.

Over the Labor Day weekend, 1965, the DCA held a conference in Chicago, Illinois. According to a third source, a new slate of national officers was elected at this conference, which included Chairman HUGH STERLING FOWLER, II (who, according to the third source, attended a CP cadre encampment held at Camp Midvale, New Jersey, in June, 1965, and following his election as Chairman of the DCA, attended another national CP cadre youth conference held on September 9-12, 1965, on a farm located in Northern Indiana, according to a fourth source); Director of Publicity CARL ELLENGER BLOICE (who was elected to the San Francisco County Committee CP in April, 1964, according to a fifth source); Educational Director MATTHEW "DYNAMITE" HALLINAN (who in June, 1964, was stated to be the Youth Representative on the Northern California CP District Board, according to a sixth source); Organizational Secretary TERENCE "KAYO" HALLINAN (who, according to a seventh source, met in June, 1965, with the District Staff of the Illinois CP to discuss the proposed DCA Midwest Summer Project), and Treasurer SUSAN PHYLLIS BORENSTEIN (who, according to an eighth source, has attended meetings of the Youth Club of the CP of Illinois during 1965 in connection with the DCA Summer Project).

APPENDIX

4

42

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (known in the San Francisco Bay area as the Bay Area Young Socialist Alliance, aka the Bay Area Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance, Bay Area Committee for the Young Socialist)

A source advised on May 16, 1960, that the Bay Area Young Socialist Alliance (BAYSA) was formed in February, 1958, as the Bay Area Committee for the Young Socialist (BACYS). At a later stage in its development prior to adoption of the name BAYSA, the organization was known as the Bay Area Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance (BACYSA).

The source advised that as a result of a national convention held April 15-17, 1960, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the BAYSA became a branch of the national organization to be known as the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and will carry out in the Northern California area the policies of the YSA.

The source advised August 19, 1965, that the BAYSA is currently active and is composed of three locals, the San Francisco YSA, the Berkeley YSA, and the San Jose YSA.

The source advised that the BAYSA, although ostensibly an independent organization, is in reality controlled by the San Francisco Branch, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and Oakland Branch SWP.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

1

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May,1960 issue of the "Young Socialist" ("YS") page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated this organization was formed by the nationwide supporter clubs of the publication "YS".

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of YSA. This declaration stated YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the "YS" have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

A source advised on May 7, 1965, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957 in New York City, by youth of various left-socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization

The source further advised on May 7, 1965, YSA is dominated and controlled on a national basis by the SWP through having SWP members comprise exclusively the National Executive Committee (NEC) and through an official SWP representative at all YSA NEC meetings. The YSA, in reality, is the youth and training section of the SWP and the main source of new SWP members.

The headquarters of the YSA is located in Room 631, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

1006

[redacted]

SF 14-207

1

YOUTH FOR JOBS (YFJ), aka Youth for Jobs Committee

A source advised in July 1963, that several recent graduates and dropouts of high schools in Oakland and Berkeley, California, had on April 17, 1963, attended the organizing meeting of Youth for Jobs (YFJ) in Oakland, California, in response to letters prepared by ROSCOE PROCTOR and DOUGLAS WACHTER. At this meeting, WACHTER gave reports on the unemployment problem among youth and the need for an organization of this type. PROCTOR also spoke at this meeting.

In May 1963, a second source advised that ROSCOE PROCTOR attended meetings of the National Executive Committee of the Communist Party (CP), USA, during May 1963, in New York City.

In January 1963, a third source identified DOUGLAS WACHTER as the Chairman of a CP recruiting class held in January 1963, in Berkeley, California.

In May 1963, the first source advised that in May 1963, a 12-page pamphlet entitled "Youth for Jobs-Aims and Purposes" was distributed. This pamphlet described YFJ as an independent organization of young people working together to find solutions to current vocational, social and recreational problems; it specified that YFJ is not affiliated with any other organizations, but would fully support the labor movement and any other organizations striving to combat unemployment and to increase job security for all employees.

In June 1963, the third source advised that at a meeting of the Political Committee of the CP of the East Bay Region (Alameda and Contra Costa Counties, California) held in June 1963, VIRGINIA PROCTOR, member of that Committee, gave a report on a draft document read before the National Committee, CP, USA, by GUS HALL, member of the National Committee, CP, USA. In connection with the portion of the report dealing with youth, PROCTOR said "A report from this area on the activity around Youth for Jobs organized by ROSCOE PROCTOR will be included in the final document, as one of the signs of the Party work in organizing the unemployed."

On May 3, 1965, a fourth source advised that ROSCOE PROCTOR has promoted and guided YFJ since its inception and continues to do so. The source stated that meetings of YFJ are held at the YFJ Club House, 1095 - 59th Street, Oakland, California, and at homes of individual members.

1007

APPENDIX

45*

[redacted]

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
San Francisco, California

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.
BU 14-2943
SF 14-207

May 24, 1966

Title VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

Character SEDITION

Reference Report of FRANK S. PERRONE,
dated and captioned as above,
at San Francisco, California

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1003

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10002-10203
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 1243-1377

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 04/22/69
PAGES : 135
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

PEACE AND FREEDOM PARTY

REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 3, 4, REFERRED, SECTION 11(a)
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/17/98
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY FBI
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH FBI HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE WITH RESTRICTIONS, PER MEMO DTD 05 JUNE 98.

FD-204 (Rev. 3-3-59)

S E C R E T

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

Copy to: 1 - SECRET SERVICE, SAN FRANCISCO (CLASS 3) (RM)

Report of: WILLIAM E. HUGHES
Office: SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
Date: April 22, 1969

Field Office File #: 100-46832
Bureau File #: 105-106720

Title: ROBERT SCHEER

REVIEWED BY FBI/JFK TASK FORCE
ON 11/3/97 cld
☐ RELEASE IN FULL
☒ RELEASE IN PART
☐ TOTAL DENIAL

Character: SECURITY MATTER - MISCELLANEOUS

Synopsis:

ROBERT SCHEER, white male, date of birth 4/4/36 at New York, New York, resides at 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California, with his wife ANNE and infant son. He is employed as Editor-in-Chief of "Ramparts" magazine, 495 Beach Street, San Francisco, California. SCHEER's affiliation with the following groups set out: Fair Play For Cuba Committee, Progressive Labor Party, W. E. B. Du Bois Clubs of America, Students For a Democratic Society, Young Socialist Alliance, Vietnam Day Committee, Communist Party, Community For New Politics, Peace and Freedom Party and Black Panther Party. Foreign travel, writings, speeches and television appearances of SCHEER set out.

- P -

CLASSIFIED BY 5668 SLD/GCL
DECLASSIFY ON: 25X (1)(6)
(JFK) 11/7/96

DETAILS:

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR, RELEASE OF CIA INFORMATION IN THIS DOCUMENT. KP 5-7-98
only the body of the report was addressed MH 5.6.98

210387

3130895-1

S E C R E T

[redacted]

NO FOREIGN DISSEMINATION

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 1 of 134 Pages

ALL INFORMATION CONTAINED
HEREIN IS UNCLASSIFIED
EXCEPT WHERE SHOWN
OTHERWISE

1243

902d #S-6 / 492

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

I. BACKGROUND

A. Employment

ROBERT SCHEER is employed as Editor-in-Chief of "Ramparts" magazine, 495 Beach Street, San Francisco, California.

May 1969 issue of "Ramparts"

B. Residence

ROBERT SCHEER resides with his wife ANNE and infant son at 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California.

Mrs. GEORGIA GWILLIAM
6480 Benvenue Avenue,
Oakland, California
April 14, 1969

C. Marriage Record

The San Francisco "Examiner" newspaper, issue of October 23, 1965, contained a marriage notice for ROBERT SCHEER, age 29, 2546 Geary Boulevard, San Francisco, and for ANNE WEILLS, age 23, Berkeley, California.

Records of the County Clerk's Office, City Hall of San Francisco, reflect that suit #539250 was filed January 7, 1964 in behalf of ROBERT SCHEER, who was bringing suit for divorce against SERENA SCHEER, to whom he was married September 14, 1957 at Brooklyn, New York. The Plaintiff alleged that he and his wife were separated about December 1, 1961 and that they had no community property. SCHEER charged his wife with extreme cruelty and grievous mental suffering. SERENA SCHEER was served with notice of divorce proceedings February 7, 1964 and failed to appear to answer charges. ROBERT SCHEER was granted an interlocutory judgment of divorce September 14, 1964 and decree

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 2 of 134 Pages

was made final September 23, 1965 by LELAND J. LAZARUS, Judge of the Superior Court for the City and County of San Francisco.

Marriage license records maintained at the Recorder's Office, City Hall, San Francisco, reflect that Book #1433, page 250, shows that ROBERT SCHEER was married to ANNE B. WEILLS on October 22, 1965. In the application, SCHEER stated he was born April 4, 1936 at New York, had been previously married once, which was ended by divorce. His residence was listed as 2546 Geary Boulevard, San Francisco and his occupation as Foreign Editor in the publishing business. His father was listed as FREDERICK SCHEER, born in Germany, and his mother was IDA KURAN, born in Russia. The bride furnished her full name as ANNE BUTTERFIELD WEILLS, born March 14, 1942, in California, and was not previously married. She listed her residence as 108 El Camino Real, Berkeley; occupation - student. Her father was listed as JOHN C. S. WEILLS, III, born in Nebraska, and her mother was AUDREY DAVIS, born in Nevada. Marriage license #5213 was issued October 21, 1965 and the marriage was performed October 22, 1965 by the Honorable LENORE D. UNDERWOOD, Judge, San Francisco Municipal Court.

ANNE WEILLS SCHEER was the recipient of a yearly subscription to the "People's World" (PW) newspaper under her maiden name ANNE WEILLS, 2828 Milvia Street, Berkeley, California. This subscription was due to expire July 31, 1966.

SF T-1
February 10, 1966

The PW is a west coast Communist weekly newspaper published in San Francisco.

IDA KURAN, born April 26, 1900 in Russia, joined the International Workers Order (IWO) in March 1947 and was a member of Lodge 500, IWO, as of late 1953.

SF T-2
June 22, 1954

The IWO has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

FRED SCHEER, who was born May 28, 1898 in Germany, joined the IWO in November 1941 and was a member of Lodge 500, holding Certificate #288936, as late as 1953.

SF T-2
June 22, 1954

The name FRED SCHEER, 653 Britton Street, Bronx, New York, appeared on an original petition to Judge H. R. MEDINA, protesting the trial of members of the National Committee of the Communist Party (CP), USA.

D. Education

Records of the University of California, Berkeley, (UCB) contain information that ROBERT SCHEER was born April 4, 1936 at Bronx, New York. He applied for admission to the graduate division at UCB, Berkeley, California on May 20, 1959, at which time he was residing at 2915 Wheeler Street, Berkeley. He listed his former residence as 205 Ollis Court, Syracuse, New York. He received a BA degree in political science at the City College of New York in June 1960. The Student Directory for the Fall Semester 1960 at UCB, reflected that ROBERT SCHEER, 1916 A Francisco Street, Berkeley, California, was registered for the fall term as a graduate student in economics.

E. "Root And Branch Press"

"Root and Branch Press" was being orgainzed by BOB SCHEER, a student at UCB, where it was planned that SCHEER would head this organization which was to be a magazine published for and by ultra-liberal students at UCB.

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

A leaflet was issued by the "Root and Branch Press" which reflected that it was planning to publish a book by MAURICE ZEITLIN and ROBERT SCHEER entitled "The Cuban Revolution, An American Tragedy."

SF T-3
September 6, 1961

F. Interviews of Subject

Another Government agency that conducts security investigations interviewed ROBERT SCHEER July 11, 1958, August 10, 1961 and August 16, 1961, the last interview being under oath. During the interviews, SCHEER stated that while in college he attended a few meetings which he felt were run by someone who could have been in the Labor Youth League (LYL) and had attended one social event which he felt was definitely sponsored by LYL, but explained that he had gone to this affair to meet a girl. He said he never attended a political meetings of LYL and added that he has never been a member of the CP or any organization cited by the Attorney General. SCHEER admitted having read the "Communist Manifesto" frequently and studied it as an example of ideological development.

SCHEER said under oath that he did not consider the CP, USA to be a threat to the United States and had no reason to believe that a person who joins the CP swears allegiance to a foreign power or advocates the overthrow of the United States Government. He said he believes that the CP is not subversive because it claims to be interested in bringing about its program through democratic process. SCHEER refused to discuss his trip to Cuba in 1960 and refused to discuss his membership, activities or associations with the Student Fair Play for Cuba Committee (SFPCC) under protection of the First and Fifth Amendments.

SCHEER stated under oath that he has never been arrested and that he considers he owes his allegiance to the United States, but does not believe in the philosophy

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 5 of 134 Pages

"My Country Right or Wrong." SCHEER also stated that he was qualified and fit for military service and had never done anything to render himself ineligible for military service.

SF T-4
October 31, 1961

The LYL has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) is characterized in the Appendix.

G. Birth of a Child

Records of the Department of Health, Alameda County Courthouse, Oakland, were checked on April 29, 1968 by IC ROBERT L. GIBSON and a record was found of a birth of a son named CHRISTOPHER WARREN SCHEER, born September 8, 1967 at Berkeley, California to ANNE BUTTERFIELD WEILLS SCHEER and ROBERT SCHEER, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California.

H. Marital Discord

ROBERT SCHEER has been living at his home, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California, since about September 7, 1968. On September 26, 1968, Mrs. ANNE SCHEER told some of the neighbors that she and ROBERT SCHEER were separating because they live different kinds of lives. ANNE SCHEER said she was moving to an apartment somewhere near the Oakland-Berkeley border where she planned to live with a man named TOM, not further identified, whom she expected to marry eventually. Mrs. SCHEER was busy removing her belongings from the residence at 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, on September 26, 1968.

SF T-5
September 26, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER was at his residence, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, on October 19, 1968 and had his infant son with him. He also has a new girl friend who looks like a "hippie" who has been at this residence quite a lot in recent weeks. It is understood that SCHEER's son has been residing with his mother at a different location.

Mrs. JOHN G. GWILLIAM,
6480 Benvenue Avenue,
Oakland, California
October 21, 1968

Mrs. GEORGIA SWILLIAM, 6480 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California, reported October 14, 1968 that ANNE SCHEER had been living with THOMAS HAYDEN while ROBERT SCHEER was away on trips for "Ramparts" magazine and now appears to have taken their child and both are residing with HAYDEN full time at HAYDEN's apartment. The SCHEERs reportedly had reached a mutual agreement to get a divorce.

ROBERT and ANNE SCHEER reside at 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California, and most of the neighbors refuse to associate with them. There has never been any sign of emotion or warmth exhibited between them. When THOMAS HAYDEN arrived in early September 1968, it became very evident that ANNE SCHEER was very strongly attracted to him in a physical way. ANNE is believed to have met HAYDEN in Hanoi, North Vietnam during the summer of 1968. When ROBERT SCHEER made trips away from home, HAYDEN would move into the SCHEER residence. During October 1968, ANNE SCHEER indicated she intended to seek a divorce from ROBERT SCHEER and would move into the apartment of THOMAS HAYDEN. Beginning about Christmas, 1968, ANNE SCHEER returned home with the SCHEER baby and has remained with ROBERT SCHEER for the past month or more. THOMAS HAYDEN has not been observed in the company of ANNE SCHEER or visiting the SCHEER residence in more than one month. There are numerous visitors to the SCHEER residence and it would appear that several men were living at this residence regularly in addition to the SCHEERs. While ANNE SCHEER was in Hanoi, ROBERT SCHEER received a threat to his life that frightened him greatly. He moved out of the house immediately and hired a private investigator who moved into the house "armed to the teeth". It appears that ROBERT SCHEER has been somewhat frightened ever since this threat.

SF T-6
January 16, 1969

THOMAS EMMET HAYDEN was the original organizer of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and, according to the "New York Daily News" of January 10, 1968, was one of a party of three who travelled to North Vietnam in defiance of US Department of State ban on such travel.

A characterization of the SDS is contained in the Appendix.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 8 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

"RAMPARTS" MAGAZINE

"Ramparts" in a letter to subscribers dated May 1, 1968, announced that beginning June 1, 1968, it would be published biweekly at a yearly subscription price of $15. In this letter "Ramparts" described itself as follows: "...the first national publication to consistently reveal the ribbon of lies supporting America's involvement in Vietnam; we stripped the curtain from America's 'invisible government' by exposing CIA's unlicensed intrusion into our domestic lives; we dared to write about the applications of the Catholic Church's political power; we warned, years before the Kerner report, that white racism was the base of America's racial problems; we blasted away at the corroded institutions of Cold War liberalism.

" 'Ramparts' is now the largest left-of-center commercial magazine in the history of the United States..."

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 9 of 134 Pages

I. Burning of Draft Card

The cover of the December 1967 issue of "Ramparts" magazine contains a photograph of four right hands each holding a burning Selective Service card. One of the cards is a duplicate issued December 3, 1958 of the "Selective Service Registration Certificate" for ROBERT SCHEER, 653 Britton Street, New York 67, Bronx.

The San Francisco "Examiner," daily newspaper published in San Francisco, California, in its issue of November 16, 1967, carried an article headlined "Ramparts Editors Burn Draft Cards" which quoted "Publisher MARC STONE" of "Ramparts" as saying the magazine cover is "a very serious editorial statement," adding "there is a very serious political crisis in this country and we want to show that the bureaucracy of the Selective Service System is unfair."

The San Francisco "Examiner" daily newspaper, issue of June 13, 1968, carried a news article "3 Ramparts Officers Before Jury in NY." This article stated that three top officers of "Ramparts" magazine were called to appear before a Federal Grand Jury in New York City, June 13, 1968 to testify at an inquiry described only as "having to do with Selective Service." The article continued by stating that there was speculation that the investigation dealt with the cover photograph of the December 1967 issue of "Ramparts", which pictured the flaming draft cards of 3 top officials. (Should be four officials.)

The August 24, 1968 issue of "Ramparts" magazine carried a column entitled, "Apologia," which carried a reprint of a news article from the "New York Times" newspaper, issue of July 18, 1968. The article stated that WARREN HINCKLE, III, ROBERT SCHEER, DUGALD STERMER, and SOL STEIN, all officials of "Ramparts", appeared before a Grand Jury in New York City on June 17, 1968, as a result of the December 1967 cover of "Ramparts" containing a photograph of four hands holding burning draft cards containing the names of these four men.

J. Threat to Subject's Life

ROBERT SCHEER telephoned the San Francisco FBI Office on July 8, 1968, to state the receptionist at "Ramparts" magazine, San Francisco, received the following telephone message from an anonymous male at 4:45 pm that day:

> "I just want to inform you that we plan to destroy the Managing Editor, BOB SCHEER, tomorrow night at 9:00."

SCHEER stated that the New York City Office of "Ramparts" had received a threat about July 3, 1968 and he felt that this call resulted from a recent article in "Ramparts" regarding Cuban refugees. He said he had no indication that the call was interstate.

The San Francisco "Examiner" newspaper, San Francisco, California, in its issue of July 9, 1968, carried a news article headlined, "Ramparts Threatened By Bombs." The article stated that both the San Francisco and New York City offices of "Ramparts" had been threatened by bombs and "Associate Editor ROBERT SCHEER had received calls threatening his life."

SCHEER advised SA CHARLES E. GALVIN on July 10, 1968, that no one had carried out the threat and that he would immediately contact the FBI if any future threats were made.

Records of the Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation (CII), Sacramento, California, reveal that a .25 calibre Beretta automatic pistol, serial number 415984, was sold to ROBERT SCHEER, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California, on January 27, 1968, and that this gun was purchased in Oakland.

Records of the Oakland Police Department were searched October 17, 1968 by IC ROBERT L. GIBSON and it was determined that ROBERT SCHEER did not possess a permit to carry a gun.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 10 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

Records of the San Francisco Police Department, San Francisco, California, were searched by JOHN VANNUCCI, Intelligence Unit, San Francisco Police Department (SFPD) on October 17, 1968 and no permit has been issued by the SFPD for ROBERT SCHEER to carry a gun.

K. Finances

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 12 of 134 Pages

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 3/21/68

The College Avenue Branch, Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland, California, maintains a commercial checking account for ANNE W. SCHEER or ROBERT SCHEER, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California. This account bears Account Number 5440 03178, and was opened on September 18, 1967.

On March 19, 1968, an examination of bank records pertaining to items deposited in this account during the period September 18, 1967 through March 5, 1968, was made. Among the checks deposited during this period were the following (All these checks were written payable to ROBERT SCHEER.):

Date Deposited	Payee's Account	Amount
9/18/67	"Ramparts" Magazine 301 Broadway, San Francisco, California (Payroll Account)	$507.80
10/2/67	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
10/12/67	Associated Students California Western University	500.00
10/18/67	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
11/1/67	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
11/15/67	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
11/20/67	Stanford University, Student Organization Fund	300.00

On 3/19/68 at Oakland, California File # SF 100-46832

by SA LAWRENCE J. NELSON:cm Date dictated 3/20/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1255 SECRET

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 13 of 134 Pages

Date Deposited	Payee's Account	Amount
11/20/67	University of California Santa Cruz	$350.00
12/6/67	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
12/11/67	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
12/15/67	Brandeis University	300.00
12/18/67	Fordham University	300.00
12/18/67	Agenzia Fugazi, Inc., Travel Agency, San Francisco, California	168.95

The above check was marked "refund".

12/27/67	Associated Students, Los Angeles Valley College	350.00
1/2/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	507.55
1/3/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	130.00
1/16/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	411.05
1/26/68	(largely illegible) but "McGill University" appears on the check	458.75
1/26/68	University of Manitoba	257.25
1/26/68	(largely illegible) but "Manitoba" appears on the check	91.75
2/8/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	473.80

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 14 of 134 Pages

3
SF 100-46832
WEH:cm

Date Deposited	Payee's Account	Amount
2/20/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$473.80
2/20/68	University of Idaho	700.00
3/5/68	Albion College Albion, Michigan	500.00

The above information is confidential and cannot be made public except in the usual procedure following the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, directed to Mr. AARON C. ORTON, Operations Officer, College Avenue Branch, Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland, California.

The original documents listed above are no longer in possession of the bank.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 15 of 134 Pages

FD-302 (Rev. 4-15-64)

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 7/10/68

The College Avenue Branch of Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland, California, maintains a Commercial checking account for ANNE W. SCHEER or ROBERT SCHEER, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland. This account bears account number 5440 03178 and was opened September 18, 1967.

On June 19-21, 1968, an examination of bank records pertaining to items deposited in this account during the period March 6, 1968 to June 21, 1968, were made available. Among the checks deposited during this period were the following checks payable to ROBERT SCHEER:

Date	Maker	Amount
2/29/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$423.80
3/15/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$423.80
3/8/68	Albion College, Albion, Michigan, drawn on City Bank & Trust Co., Albion, Michigan	$277.20
3/29/68	California Intercollegiate Press Association, Hayward, California	$350.00
3/29/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$423.80
4/1/68	Check from IDA SCHEER, 2868 Bronx Park East, New York City, drawn on Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., New York City	$ 15.00
4/10/68	University of California, Irvine, Calif., drawn on United California Bank	$336.00
illegible	Bank of Province, city unknown, Canada, account # 00059-010-00-02003 (check believed issued to "Ramparts" Magazine)	$700.00 (exchangerate $644.00)
4/17/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$350.00
~~4/15/68~~	~~"Ramparts" Magazine~~	~~$423.80~~

On 6/27/68 at Oakland, California File # SF 100-46832

by SA WILLIAM E. HUGHES/mcn Date dictated 7/8/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

1258 SECRET

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 16 of 134 Pages

2
SF 100-46832
WEH:mcn

Date	Maker	Amount
4/16/68	Iowa State University of Science & Technology, Ames, Iowa, drawn on 1st National Bank, Ames, Iowa	$500.00
Unreadable	Iowa State University of Science & Technology	$241.00
4/30/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$473.80
5/15/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$473.80
5/21/68	DAVID KOLODNEY, 6468 Benevue Avenue, Oakland, drawn on Wells Fargo Bank, University Branch, Berkeley, California	$170.00
5/16/68	State University of New York at Buffalo, drawn on Marine Midland Bank, University Office, Buffalo, New York	$196.90
5/24/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$ 79.81
5/24/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$100.00
5/31/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$473.80
6/3/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$170.00
6/11/68	CHRISTOPHER D. WEILLS, 108 El Camino Real, Berkeley, California, drawn on Sumitomo Bank of California, Oakland	$250.00
6/7/68	"Ramparts" Magazine check to Berlitz School of Languages	$261.87
6/7/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$127.45
6/7/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$205.00
6/10/68	"Ramparts" Magazine	$400.00

On June 10, 1968, a Bank of America money order, no. 52423, was purchased by ANNE WEILLS SCHEER made out to Berlitz School of Languages in the amount of $295.00.

6/21/68 - deposited	U.S. Government check from U.S. Marshal, New York City	$482.08

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 17 of 134 Pages

One personal check issued by ROBERT SCHEER to Berlitz School of Languages in the amount of $150.00, was refused by this bank because of insufficient funds in the SCHEER account during June, 1968.

The above information is confidential and cannot be made public except in a usual proceeding following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum, directed to Mr. AARON C. ORTON, Operations Officer, Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland, California.

Each of the "Ramparts" Magazine checks were drawn on the Commonwealth National Bank of San Francisco.

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

ROBERT SCHEER, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California, applied for a loan June 10, 1968, at which time he furnished the following financial information:

He has a savings account at United California Bank, San Francisco, opened July 1966, with a low three figure balance. He maintains a checking account at Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland. He has a salary of "1,000 per month and an additional income from lectures and writings amounting to $8,000 yearly. He owns a 1958 Mercedes 220 sedan with no mortgage against it. He owns a 1967 Saab stationwagon, which is being financed through the First State Bank, San Leandro, California, with a balance of $1,560. His mother is IDA KURAN SCHEER, 2868 Bronx Park West, Bronx, New York. His father-in-law is JOHN WEILLS, 108 El Camino Real, Berkeley, California. His home is mortgaged through American Savings and Loan Association, San Jose, with a balance of $23,000 on which monthly payments are made of $214. Second home mortgage is carried through Central Realty, Telegraph Avenue, Oakland, with a balance of $2,000 and monthly payments of $40. He has Bankamericard 180-763-484 on which there is a balance of $209 owing. He has a Master Charge Card 3017-802-921, on which there is a $300 balance. The loan requested was refused when SCHEER was asked for a copy of his latest income tax return to be furnished, and SCHEER refused to do so. The purpose of the loan was not stated.

SF T-7
June 19, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER had a total income in 1966 of about [redacted] He had a total income in 1967 of about [redacted] including [redacted] salary from his position at "Ramparts" magazine, and approximately $8,800 from his writings and speeches.

IRS [JFK Law 11(a)]

SF T-8
August 29, 1968

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 19 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

Mr. and Mrs ROBERT SCHEER have maintained a joint checking account at the College Avenue Branch, Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland, California. It was learned this account was transferred about September 20, 1968 to a checking account in the name of ANNE W. SCHEER only. Deposits to this account have shown that ROBERT SCHEER received a check for $100 from the University of California at Berkeley dated July 19, 1968, which was deposited to this account.

On August 2, 1968, he deposited three small checks made out to IDA KURAN SCHEER; one dated July 10, 1968 in the amount of $65 from the ILGWU National Retirement Fund, drawn on the Royal National Bank of New York. Another check dated May 20, 1968 in the amount of $30 to IDA SCHEER was issued by the Health and Welfare Fund, Knit Goods Workers Union, drawn on the Chemical Bank of New York. On August 23, 1968, a check for $111.60 from the US Treasury Department to IDA KURAN SCHEER marked Social Security check was deposited.

On August 18, 1968, a deposit was made for a check of $110 from the United States National Student Association, 21st Congress account, drawn on the Union National Bank, Manhattan, Kansas. On August 30, 1968, a payroll check in the amount of $496.35 from "Ramparts" magazine was deposited. On September 17, 1968, the "Ramparts" check issued to Subject in the amount of $254.44 was deposited. On September 16, 1968, a check in the amount of $200 from NBC, drawn on the Morgan Trust Company, New York City, and issued to THOMAS HAYDEN care of Liberation Publications, 5 Beeckman Place, New York, was deposited. On September 12, 1968, a payroll check in the amount of $496.35 was deposited. On September 23, 1968, a check in the amount of $400 issued to ANNE SCHEER, drawn on the Fisherman's Wharf Branch, Bank of America, by ROBERT SCHEER was deposited. On October 18, 1968, a $100 check from "Ramparts" magazine was deposited in the account of ANNE SCHEER.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 20 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

SF T-9
July 29, 1968
August 9, 1968
September 26, 1968
October 14, 1968
October 22, 1968

The above information may not be made public except in a usual proceeding following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Mr. AARON C. ORTON, Operations Manager, Bank of America, 6201 College Avenue, Oakland, California.

ROBERT SCHEER received a check from "Ramparts" magazine, July 31, 1968, in the amount of $200 drawn on the Commonwealth National Bank of San Francisco. He also received a payroll check dated July 31, 1968 in the amount of $517.90 from "Ramparts" magazine. He received a check August 13, 1968 in the amount of $300 from "Ramparts" magazine. Each of these checks was drawn on the Commonwealth National Bank, San Francisco.

SF T-10
August 27, 1968

The above information may not be made public except in a usual proceeding following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Mr. DON FAZACKERELY, Commonwealth National Bank, Montgomery and Sacramento Streets, San Francisco.

SECRET

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

1

Date 10/22/68

Records of Bank of America, Fisherman's Wharf Branch, 330 Bay Street, San Francisco, California, reflect that account number 06780-00074 was opened in the name of ROBERT SCHEER, 495 Beach Street, San Francisco, on September 20, 1968. Deposits to this account are as follows:

September 20, 1968	1 check for $100 dated September 17, 1968, from U. S. National Student Association, Washington, D. C., to ROBERT SCHEER drawn on Riggs National Bank, Washington, D. C.
September 20, 1968	1 check for $446.35 to ROBERT SCHEER from "Ramparts" Magazine drawn on First Western Bank, Main Office, San Francisco, California
September 27, 1968	Deposit of $350.00 composed of check for $750.00 drawn on First Western Bank and Trust Company, University Park Office, Irvine, California, to ROBERT SCHEER, less cash of $400.00. (Recordak film unreadable so maker unknown)
October 3, 1968	Deposit of $275.00 of a cashier's check number 1543672 from Crocker-Citizens National Bank, Golden Gateway - Jackson Square Branch, 625 Battery Street, San Francisco.

On 10/16, 17/68 at San Francisco, California File # SF 100-46832

by SA WILLIAM E. HUGHES/rb Date dictated 10/22/68

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

SECRET

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 22 of 134 Pages

October 9, 1968	Deposit of $555.08 composed of check for $655.08 less $100 cash, drawn on First Western Bank, San Francisco (film has not yet been developed).

The above information may not be made public except in a usual proceeding, following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum addressed to Mr. RICHARD D. FULLER, Bank of America, 330 Bay Street, San Francisco, California.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 23 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

It was leanred that during October 1968, SCHEER wrote a check for $300 and another check for $40, each of which was refused by his bank because of insufficient funds to cover these checks. SCHEER also wrote a check for $45.30 on November 21, 1968, to the Hotel Chelsea, New York City, which was deposited in the National City Bank, 23rd Street and Avenue of the Americas Branch. SCHEER reportedly was having trouble because some of his pay checks from "Ramparts" magazine were not honored when presented for payment. SCHEER also reportedly wrote a check for $25 on December 22, 1968,made out to the Hilton Inn, New York City. SCHEER wrote a check to United Airlines (UAL) for $30, dated December 14, 1968 at New York City. He also issued a check to American Airlines, Houston, Texas for $25 on December 30, 1968. He issued a check to the Continental Hilton, Mexico City, Mexico, in the amount of $35, dated December 30, 1968.

SCHEER made only one deposit of $148 on January 3, 1969, which was a check from "Ramparts" magazine drawn on the Commonwealth National Bank, San Francisco.

SF T-11
October 31, 1968,
November 29, 1968
December 31, 1968
January 28, 1969

None of the above information may be made public except in a usual proceeding following issuance of a subpoena duces tecum directed to RICHARD D. FULLER, Operations Officer, Fisherman's Wharf Branch, Bank of America, 330 Bay Street, San Francisco.

ROBERT SCHEER's checking account at Bank of America, 330 Bay Street, San Francisco, California, showed only three small deposits during April 1969 as follows:

March 4, 1969 - $50.00
March 18, 1969 - $68.00
March 27, 1969 - $180.00

This account has been quite inactive during February and March 1969. There was a deposit of $2500.76 on April 11, 1969 resulting from a telegraphic transfer of funds from the Chase Manhattan Bank, New York City to ROBERT SCHEER from CYRELLY ABEL. As noted above, these bank records are confidential and cannot be made public without a subpoena.

SF T-96
April 17, 1969

L. Passport Information

Files of the Passport Office, US Department of State, Washington, D. C., were reviewed by SA DOUGLAS M. BROWN on January 26, 1968 and reflected the following.

On January 28, 1966, Passport number G 41559 was issued at the San Francisco Passport Agency to ROBERT SCHEER, based on his application, January 27, 1966. SCHEER stated he was born April 4, 1936 at Bronx, New York, was a writer by occupation, residing at 2828 Milvia Street, Berkeley, California.

His last passport, number D 163804, was issued February 5, 1963. It was cancelled and returned to SCHEER when the above application was submitted. His parents were identified as FRED SCHEER, born in Germany, May 5, 1898, and IDA KURAN, born in Russia, April 24, 1900. His father was a United States citizen, but his mother was not a citizen. He was last married in 1965 to ANNE BUTTERFIELD WEILLS, born Eureka, California, March 14, 1942. She was designated as the person to be notified in an emergency at the above address. SCHEER stated in the application that he planned to depart San Francisco via Japan Airlines for a trip of one month to Japan, Cambodia and Hong Kong for journalistic purposes.

On November 29, 1967, SCHEER wrote a letter on the letterhead of "Ramparts" magazine and signed the letter as Managing Editor of that publication, which he sent to the Visa Department, US Department of State, Washington, D. C., stating he had been invited to attend a cultural conference in Havana, Cuba, in January 1968, by the Cuban Commission to the United Nations. He stated he found it necessary in his position to accept this invitation and requested a visa for this purpose.

The Department of State advised SCHEER by letter dated December 18, 1967 that provided he would execute the enclosed affidavit stating that he desired to attend the conference as a professional reporter and would not participate in the conference in any manner, his application would appear to qualify under existing regulations.

On December 20, 1967, SCHEER returned the affidavit which was executed on that date before a notary public in San Francisco. On December 27, 1967, the San Francisco Passport Office was authorized by the State Department to validate SCHEER's passport for one round trip to Cuba. The State Department files reflect that the passport was so validated at San Francisco on December 29, 1967.

Miss MADELINE EBINGER, Clerk, Passport Office, US Department of State, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, advised March 20, 1968 that her office received authorization from the State Department, Washington, D. C. on March 19, 1968 to validate the passport of ROBERT SCHEER, DUGALD STERMER and FREDERICK C. MITCHELL, all of "Ramparts" magazine for one round trip to Cuba, each for journalistic purposes. STERMER is art director of "Ramparts" magazine and MITCHELL a senior editor of "Ramparts". Miss EBINGER expected SCHEER to appear in the immediate future for this validation since she stated he has been telephoning the passport office daily for the past week to determine if the validation of his passport had been authorized.

On April 16, 1968, ROBERT SCHEER was observed by a Special Agent of the FBI to visit the Passport Office of the State Department in San Francisco, where he had his passport validated for one round trip to Cuba. This was confirmed by MADELINE EBINGER the same day.

Mrs. DOROTHY GIBBS, Passport Office, US Department of State (USDS), Washington, D. C., stated on August 29, 1968 to SE ROBERT P. LYNCH that the State Department wired the San Francisco Passport Agency instructing, "You are authorzied to validate passport G 041559, issued to ROBERT SCHEER of 'Ramparts' valid for one round trip to Cuba."

Miss MADELINE EBINGER advised on September 18, 1968 that records of that office reflect that the passport of ROBERT SCHEER was validated for one round trip to Cuba on August 22, 1968. She said she recalled that an unknown man appeared at the Passport Office a few minutes before closing time on August 22, 1968 and insisted that the passport be validated that evening since ROBERT SCHEER intended to depart that evening.

II. AFFILIATION WITH SUBVERSIVE AND OTHER GROUPS

Contact With Cuban Consulate

SERENA and ROBERT SCHEER were among the individuals who had contacted the Cuban Consulate in New York City regarding a trip to Cuba.

SF T-12
August 11, 1960

A. Fair Play For Cuba Committee (FPCC)

A characterization of the FPCC is contained in the Appendix of this report.

"The Daily Californian," a daily newspaper of the Associated Students of the University of California, Berkeley, (UCB), issue of September 22, 1960, identified ROBERT SCHEER as Research Director of the Student Fair Play for Cuba Committee (SFPCC) on the Berkeley Campus.

The National Office of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) maintained a quantity of correspondence dealing with efforts of the SWP to infiltrate and dominate the FPCC. This material included the following notation: BOB SCHEER, originally from N. Y. CCNY, was in SDA. Led fight to expel YSL and told me that they called him a Stalinist. In a political discussion he gave me that impression too, though he can attack Soviet Union before a liberal audience. Either in periphery of CP or thereabouts (influenced, etc.)."

SF T-13
November 18, 1960

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

1270

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 28 of 134 Pages

"The Daily Californian," issue of December 22, 1960, reflected that the SFPCC was formed at a meeting in Berkeley, September 21, 1960. This article stated that amond the officers elected at this meeting was ROBERT SCHEER, who was elected Research Director; RICHARD CURRIER, President; and MAURICE ZEITLIN, Secretary.

The publication "Student Council," Volume 1, Number 1, dated November 4, 1960, declared that this publication constituted the first issue of the "Student Council," FPCC newsletter, and that this publication would be a bi-monthly report concerning Cuba and the activities of the newly organized Student Council chapters. The publication on page one reported that under the leadership of RICHARD CURRIER and ROBERT SCHEER, the Berkeley Chapter had enlisted 90 members and had held several successful meetings.

A source advised November 18, 1960, that an associate of RICHARD CURRIER described CURRIER as new to politics and as being very close to MAURICE ZEITLIN.

SF T-13

The same source reported that an associate of MAURICE ZEITLIN described him as an individual who formerly called himself a Stalinist and who has expressed himself as supporting Russia and Red China.

SF T-13
November 18, 1960

Another source related February 12, 1957, that in September 1956, MAURICE ZEITLIN evidenced interest in joining the Labor Youth League (LYL) in Detroit, Michigan, but did not become active in LYL and, in fact, repulsed LYL efforts to take over a discussion group at Wayne University which ZEITLIN led.

SF T-14
February 12, 1957

1271

The LYL has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

The "Stanford Daily" newspaper, issue of February 9, 1961, contained an article entitled "Bay Area Students Describe Progress of Revolutionary Cuba." This article explained that on February 8, 1961, there were a number of persons who spoke on the campus of Stanford University, Palo Alto, California, favoring "progress" in Cuba since the revolution. One of these speakers was identified as ROBERT SCHEER, from UCB.

An FPCC faction meeting sponsored by the SWP was held March 21, 1961, at 5931 Whitney Street, Oakland, California. ROBERT SCHEER was not present at this meeting, but was described as one of the 14 students on the campus of UCB who had signed a petition for a club of the FPCC to be active on the campus.

SF T-15
March 22, 1961

A meeting of the Bay Area FPCC (BAFPCC) was held at the Unitarian Church, Bancroft and Dana Street, Berkeley, at which ROBERT SCHEER was not present; however, it was announced that a forum on Cuba was taking place on the UCB campus, at the same time as this meeting was taking place and that Mr. SCHEER was one of two people responsible for this Cuba forum. It was stated that SCHEER was also writing a book about Cuba in cooperation with another author.

SF T-15
March 29, 1961

A meeting of BAFPCC was held May 3, 1961, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco. This meeting was not attended by ROBERT SCHEER, but an announcement was made during this meeting that the Student Ad Hoc Committee Against Intervention in Cuba, which is also known as the

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

Bay Area Student Committee to Oppose Intervention in Cuba, was formed on April 17, 1961. This new group was said to have a 7-man executive committee, of whom six are members of the FPCC. ROBERT SCHEER was listed as one of the members of the executive committee. The secretary of the BAFPCC announced that two members of the executive committee of the Student Ad Hoc Committee Against Intervention in Cuba had contacted the executive committee of BAFPCC executive committee, because they wanted to work with and coordinate activities with BAFPCC. It was recommended and voted that the entire 7-man executive committee of the Student Ad Hoc Committee Against Intervention in Cuba be added to the executive committee of BAFPCC.

SF T-15
Observation of Special Agent
of the FBI on May 3, 1961

The name of ROBERT SCHEER, Berkeley, California, was maintained on the mailing list of FPCC, Room 329, 799 Broadway, New York, New York.

SF T-16
September 24 and 25, 1961

"The Daily Californian," issue of December 12, 1961, contained a letter to the editor which upheld FIDEL CASTRO and was signed "BOB SCHEER, Grad., Student Econ., Member Fair Play Exec. Comm. 1960," and by the name of one other person.

B. Progressive Labor Party (PLP)

A characterization of the
PLP is contained in the
Appendix of this report.

A Free University party was held June 26, 1965, at 20 East 14th Street, New York City, attended by a number of people including PLP members. Also in attendance was one BOB SCHEER, who stated he had just returned from Vietnam and had been the only American at the conference held in Indonesia. SCHEER added that he had just written an article for "Ramparts" magazine.

SF T-17
June 28, 1965

C. W. E. B. Du Bois of America (DCA)

A characterization of the
DCA is contained in the
Appendix of this report.

A demonstration calling for an end of the war in Vietnam was sponsored jointly by DCA and Women for Peace and was held April 17, 1965, at the Civic Center, San Francisco. The principal speaker at this affair was ROBERT SCHEER.

SF T-15
April 22, 1965

SF T-18
April 19, 1965

Du Bois Clubs Support

A meeting of the San Francisco W. E. B. Du Bois Club was held at 250 Page Street, San Francisco, on May 22, 1966. This meeting was concerned principally with the ROBERT SCHEER campaign for U. S. Congress. It was agreed that the Du Bois Clubs would support SCHEER and actively campaign in his behalf. SCHEER was not present at the meeting.

SF T-19
May 27, 1966

1274

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

San Francisco W.E.B. Du Bois Club members travelled to East Oakland, California, June 4, 1966, where they canvassed the persons who were registered Democratic in the various precincts and requested them to vote for ROBERT SCHEER for Congress.

SF T-20
June 7, 1966

D. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS)

A characterization of the SDS is contained in the Appendix of this report.

The November 11, 1964 issue of "SPUR" contains on page 10 a news item from Berkeley, California, which reports a panel discussion featuring ROBERT SCHEER, described as "...arthor, correspondent for The Realist and member of the New School. The topic: 'What is to Be Done (After the Elections)' was described as the fourth in a series of such forums co-sponsored by the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs, SDS and the New School.

"SPUR" is a self-described newsletter of the W.E.B. Du Bois Clubs of America.

A characterization of the DCA is contained in the Appendix of this report.

On December 23, 1964, a Special Agent of the FBI obtained a handbill at the UCB announcing that the SDS, the San Francisco New School and the W.E.B. Du Bois Club would present a discussion on November 10, 1964, at Stiles Hall, Berkeley, at 8:00 pm. BOB SCHEER was named as taking part in this discussion.

FRANK MORSMAN, who is employed at the headquarters of SDS, 924 Howard Street, San Francisco, stated January 6, 1966, that SDS holds a weekly class which is a combination lecture-discussion session on the ramifications of the cold war, with special emphasis on the role of Red China as it is politically divergent from the Marxism of the Soviet Union. MORSMAN stated BOB SCHEER is one of those who regularly attends these classes.

SF T-21
January 21, 1966

An undated letter from the Chicago Peace Council advertises a meeting to be held May 11, 1967, as well as a flyer regarding a speech to be made in Chicago May 11, 1967, by ROBERT SCHEER under the sponsorship of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) was received in May 1967. This speech by SCHEER was to be made on the subject of "U. S. - Involvement in Vietnam."

SF T-22
May 18, 1967

A leaflet advertising a "teach In" on the topic of "The Multiversity and the Empire" was scheduled to be held at Mc Millin Auditorium, 116th Street and Broadway, New York City on 11/22/68 under sponsorship of Columbia SDS.

SF T-23
November 30, 1968

E. Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) Meeting, May 24, 1966

The Bay Area YSA and SWP sponsored an open meeting which was held May 24, 1966, at Stiles Hall, Bancroft and Dana Streets, Berkeley, California, to protest against the shooting of LEO BERNARD at the Detroit SWP office. ROBERT SCHEER was one of the speakers at this meeting. During his speech, SCHEER stated that unity of the left is essential to protect its members and to bring an end to the hysteria sweeping the country.

SF T-24
May 27, 1966

SF T-25
June 2, 1966

A characterization of the Bay Area YSA is contained in the Appendix of this report.

F. Vietnam Day Committee (VDC)

A characterization of the VDC is contained in the Appendix of this report.

ROBERT SCHEER participated in meetings, demonstrations, etcetera sponsored by the VDC opposing US participation in the Vietnam war as follows:

Function & Location	Date of Activity	Source	Date Furnished	Activity
Demonstration UCB, Berkeley, California	5/21-22/65	San Francisco "Examiner"	5/22/65	Speaker
Meeting, UCB	8/3/65	SF T-32	8/9/65	Participant
Demonstration Berkeley	8/12/65	SF T-33	8/23/65	Participant
Demonstration Oakland	8/21/65	SF T-33; SA of FBI Observation	8/23/65 8/21/65	Participant
Demonstration San Francisco	8/25/65	SA of FBI Observation	8/25/65	Participant
Meeting, UCB	8/31/65	SF T-34	9/1/65; 10/14/65	Participant

1277

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 35 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

Meeting Berkeley	9/2/65	SF T-35	9/3/65	Speaker
Meeting, UCB	9/21/65	SF T-35	9/27/65	Participant
Meeting San Francisco	9/23/65	SF T-36	9/24/65	Participant
Demonstration San Francisco	9/25/65	SF T-37; SA of FBI	9/24/65; 10/5/65	Speaker
Meeting Berkeley	9/26/65	SF T-35	9/30/65	Participant
Meeting Berkeley	9/26/65	SF T-38	2/15/66	Participant
Social Berkeley	10/2/65	SF T-35	10/6/65	Participant
Meeting Berkeley	10/4/65	SF T-35	2/14/66	Speaker
Demonstration UCB	10/15- 16/65	SA of FBI Observation	10/15- 16/65	Participant
Demonstration San Francisco	10/17/65	SA of FBI Observation	10/17/65	Speaker
Meeting UCB	11/2/65	SF T-35	2/15/66	Participant
Meeting Berkeley	11/11/65	SF T-35	2/15/66	Participant
Teach-In UCLA, Los Angeles	11/12/65	SF T-39	11/29/65	Speaker
Demonstration Oakland	11/20/65	SA of FBI Observation	11/20/65	Speaker

1278

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 36 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

Anti-War Convention, Washington, D. C.	11/25-28/65	SF T-40	12/4/65	Participant
Demonstration NAS, Moffett Field, California	12/5/65	SAsof FBI Observation	12/5/65	Participant
Meeting, UCB	12/14/65	SF T-38	1/27/66	Speaker
Meeting, UCB	1/4/66	SF T-38 SF T-40	2/15/66 1/13/66	Speaker Speaker
Meeting San Francisco	1/14/66	SF T-15	1/20/66	Speaker
Meeting, UCB	1/19/66	SF T-35 SF T-40	1/24/66 1/24/66	Participant
March and Demonstration Oakland	1/31/66	SAsof FBI Observation	1/31/66	Speaker
Demonstration Oakland	2/4/66	SAs of FBI Observation	2/4/66	Participant
Fund Raising Social, Berkeley	2/5/66	SF T-41 SF T-35	2/8/66 2/8/66	Participant
Rally, UCB	5/21/66	SF T-35 SF T-42	5/23/66 5/23/66	Speaker

The VDC held an emergency meeting October 4, 1965 to discuss whether to violate the Mc Carran Act, the Espionage Act of 1917 and other espionage laws, at Room 155 Dwinelle Hall, UCB. There were about 200 persons in attendance, including ROBERT SCHEER. During the meeting, SCHEER read Sections 2387 and 2388 of the Espionage Act of 1917, defining the elements of the violations. SCHEER then stated, "It is time to risk treason. We must totally disassociate ourselves with the US Government."

SF T-38
February 14, 1966

A large cardboard poster was observed at VDC Headquarters, 2407 Fulton Street, Berkeley, California, which bore the notation across its top, "VDC Defendants Committee - I will commit civil disobediance on October 15-16 with the Vietnam Day Committee and I am prepared to be arrested in opposition to United States intervention in Vietnam. I am joining this committee to organize my political defense." There were a large number of names handwritten below this caption including "BOB SCHEER, 2546 Geary Street, San Francisco."

SF T-37
September 28, 1965

A demonstration in opposition to United States participation in the Vietnam war was held October 17, 1965, at the Civic Center Plaza, San Francisco, sponsored by 12 groups and having about 3000 persons participating. The concluding speaker at this program was ROBERT SCHEER, who was introduced as a reporter for "Ramparts" magazine. SCHEER vehemently denounced the United States action in Vietnam and stated that it was a problem for the Vietnamese people to decide. SCHEER stated that the United States rationalized its killing of Vietnamese civilians by saying that the Viet Cong commit horrible atrocities. SCHEER said that although the Viet Cong may kill some civilians, the United States Government's statements on their atrocities are, on the whole, a lie.

Observation by Special Agent
of the FBI

The University Committee on Vietnam of the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA) held a teach-in at the

Grand Ballroom, Student Union Building, UCLA, Los Angeles, on November 12, 1965. ROBERT SCHEER was one of the speakers who talked in opposition to United States foreign policy regarding Vietnam. During his talk, SCHEER stated "The Viet Cong is a party of peace and if I was in Vietnam I would be on the side of the Viet Cong."

SF T-39
November 29, 1965

"The Daily Californian" newspaper, which is published daily by the Associated Students of UCB, in its issue of February 2, 1966, contained a news article which described the march by Vietnam Day Committee on Congressman COHELAN's office on January 31, 1966, in which ROBERT SCHEER participated. This article stated in part, "According to SCHEER, the primary goal of his campaign is not to defeat his opponent but rather to engender support for the anti-Vietnam war movement."

G. Communist Party (CP) Affiliation

SCHEER for Congress issued a press release January 19, 1966, stating that ROBERT SCHEER announced his candidacy for the Democratic Party nomination for Congressman in the 7th Congressional District of California. In his opening speech, SCHEER called for negotiations with the National Liberation Front leading to the withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam. SCHEER said, "The United States should never have gone into Vietnam, should not have stayed in and should now get out." SCHEER added, "The Johnson Administration is waging an increasingly vicious war against the Vietnamese people and this campaign will be aimed at halting it."

The SCHEER for Congress office, 2214 Grove Street, Berkeley, California, issued a letter on the letterhead of this group pointing out that ROBERT SCHEER was running in the Democratic Party primary election in June 1966, for the congressional seat presently held by JEFFREY COHELAN. The letter stated this challenge was being undertaken because

Congressman COHELAN "has been completely unresponsive to the concern of East Bay citizens who are opposed to Administration policy in Vietnam." It added that in addition to the Vietnam issue, SCHEER intended to put forward a "Radical critique of the Great Society." It also requested contributions of time and money to help in this campaign. "Endorsers" of SCHEER for Congress were listed on this letterhead as follows:

CARL BLOICE, Reporter
"People's World"

MARK COMFORT
Oakland Direct
Action Committee

MIRIAM CONNELLY
President
Bettermade Foods

Dr. J. RAYMOND COPE

CASSANDRA DAVIS
East Bay Organizing
Committee

RONNIE DAVIS
Director,
S. F. Mime Troupe

DON DUNCAN
Master Sergeant, Ret.
US Special Forces

LAWRENCE FERLINGHETTI
Poet

BILL FINN
Building Contractor

JOHN GEORGE
Attorney

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 40 of 134 Pages

Dr. CARLTON GOODLETT
Publisher,
Sun Reporter

BARBARA GULLAHORN
Organizer,
Vietnam Day
Committee

ELLY HARAWITZ
Caseworker,
Welfare Rights
Organization

MORRIS HIRSCH
Professor of Mathematics
University of California

PAUL JACOBS
Writer

EPHRAIM KAHN
M. D.

ANN MARTIN,
Secretary,
Welfare Rights
Organization

MARILYN MILLIGAN
Postdoctoral Fellow
University of California

ALAN MYERSON,
Director,
The Committee

ROSCOE PROCTOR
ILWU, Warehousemen's
Union, Local #6

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 41 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

GERALD ROSENFIELD
M. D.

HARRY RUBIN
Professor of Molecular Biology,
University of California

JERRY RUBIN,
Organizer
Vietnam Day Committee

Rev. SAM SMITH,
Chairman,
Welfare Rights Organization

RICHARD STROHMAN
Professor of Zoology
University of California

JESSICA MITFORD TREUHAFT
Writer

STEVE WEISSMAN,
Organizer
Free Speech Movement

TOM WINNETT
Owner
Fybate Lecture Notes

REGINALD ZELNICK
Professor of History
University of California

ROBERT EVANS
Teacher

HOWARD JETER
Teacher

SF T-25
January 28, 1966

CARL BLOICE attended a CP National Youth Cadre Conference which was held September 9-12, 1965, on a farm located in Northern Indiana.

SF T-43
September 15, 1965

He also is a staff writer for the PW newspaper.

Special Agents of the FBI observed MARK COMFORT as he actively participated in nine demonstrations sponsored by the Ad Hoc Committee to End Discrimination (AHCED) at the Oakland Tribune Building, 13th and Franklin Streets, Oakland, California, during the period November 21, 1964 through January 30, 1965.

MARK COMFORT left San Francisco for New York City, April 8, 1965, by automobile with MORT SCHEER, West Coast Organizer of Progressive Labor Movement (PLM), to attend the PLM Convention which was to be held in New York City, April 15-18, 1965, as a guest of the West Coast PLM.

SF T-44
April 9, 1965

Characterizations of the AHCED and Progressive Labor Party (PLP), formerly known as PLM, are contained in the Appendix.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 43 of 134 Pages

CASSANDRA DAVIS and ELLEN HARAWITZ attended a meeting of the Bay Area CP Youth Clubs, which was held January 29, 1966, at 1005 53rd Street, Oakland, California. This meeting was addressed by GUS HALL, National Leader of the CP, USA from New York City.

SF T-45
January 31, 1966

A meeting of the Dewey Davis Branch of the Professional Section, San Francisco County CP (SFCCP), was held January 15, 1947, during which Dr. CARLTON GOODLETT was discussed. The discussion ended with the conclusion that even though Dr. GOODLETT did not attend many meetings of this branch, he would be continued on the rolls of the CP because of the amount of work he did on the outside.

SF T-46
January 24, 1947

San Francisco "Examiner" newspaper issue of June 13, 1963, set forth information that that California State Senate Sub-Committee on Un-American Activities had released a report stating that Dr. CARLTON GOODLETT had visited Moscow, Russia as a guest of the Kremlin and that his support of Communist causes was well known.

FRANCES W. HERRING, Berkeley, California, Women for Peace, was listed as a sponsor of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee.

SF T-47
October 24, 1963

A characterization of the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee is contained in the Appendix.

Records of the Board of Elections, 400 Broome Street, New York City, reflect that EPHRAIM KAHN, 255 West 9th Street, New York City, registered as a communist in 1936, for the 9th Assembly District and the 47th Election District, New York City.

SF T-48 advised on August 16, 1949, that he had been informed by RICHARD NUSSER, leader of the CP at Tucson, Arizona, that EPHRAIM KAHN, 522 East Tucson Boulevard, Tucson, Arizona, was a CP member. NUSSER told the informant that the CP membership of KAHN must be kept secret and not even made known to other party members.

When SIDNEY STEINBERG and ROBERT THOMPSON, fugitive National CP functionaries, were arrested near Twain Harte, California, August 27, 1953, a search of their effects revealed that STEINBERG had the telephone number of Dr. EPHRAIM KAHN in his possession, together with instructions regarding the code name to be used in making contact with this party. When Dr. KAHN was interviewed about this matter, September 3, 1953, by Special Agents of the FBI, he declined to cooperate stating, "Generally speaking I do not approve of FBI investigations."

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper, issue of November 16, 1965, contained a news article headlined "Court Decision Brings Joy to Communists Here." This article stated in part that ROSCOE PROCTOR at a press conference November 15, 1965, admitted that he had been a member of the CP, USA since 1941, and was at this time a member of the CP, USA National Committee.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 95 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

JESSICA TREUHAFT was first reported as a CP member in California in 1948, having an understanding of Marxism and helping shape local CP policy.

SF T-49
April 1, 1953

JESSICA TREUHAFT was identified in 1956, at hearings of the Subversive Activities Control Board, as Financial Director of the California Labor School and as a CP functionary, by witnesses WILLIAM FOARD, DOROTHY JEFFERS, TIMOTHY EVANS and others.

The California Labor School has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

"SCHEER For Congress" issued a leaflet headed "The Following People Were Present at a Press Conference Announcing The Candidacy of Robert Scheer for Congress, 7th Congressional District": Beneath this heading were listed the names of those listed on the Scheer For Congress letterhead, except for ANN MARTIN, ROBERT EVANS and HOWARD JETER. The following additions were noted:

FRANCES HERRING - Member, Women For Peace

ELIJAH TURNER - Congress of Racial Equality

SF T-33 February 4, 1966

A meeting of the Santa Barbara Club, Southern California District CP (SCDCP), was held February 4, 1966, at 1015 North Milpas, Santa Barbara, California. During this meeting a statement was made by WILLIAM TAYLOR, a functionary of the SCDCP, that IRVIN LAUCKS of the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, Santa Barbara, was going to donate $10,000 for a peace candidate and it was expected that this money would be given to the campaign run by SCHEER of Berkeley. TAYLOR felt that some of this money should go to a candidate in Southern California, if possible.

SF T-50
February 8,1966

The PW issue of February 12, 1966, contained an article headlined"A New Campaign Tackles Old Issues," written by CARL BLOICE. This article gives historical background of the City of Oakland, California and the problems faced by the poor people in that city. It then cites how DANIEL SIMON, M. D. had sent hundreds of letters to Berkeley, California during the wekk of June 22, 1965, pointing out that Congressman JEFFREY COHELAN had failed to take a stand in opposition to United States participation in the war in Vietnam, and enclosed cards addressed to Congressman COHELAN appealing to COHELAN to speak out strongly in Congress for a cease fire and international negotiations through the United Nations. The cards also stated that unless COHELAN took such action, he would be opposed for re-election. By August 1965, there had been 750 cards processed and returned to Dr. SIMON. When Congressman COHELAN failed to speak out in Congress opposing US involvement in Vietnam, certain people began searching for a candidate to oppose him. ROBERT SCHEER agreed to oppose COHELAN. Some of his supporters left the organization because SCHEER refused to shave off his beard and others left the organization because SCHEER refused to exclude Communists fro his campaign committee. The article stated ROBERT SCHEER had the endorsement of the VDC as well as a sizeable portion of the community, and was not centered among the college students.

In early 1966, two functionaries of the CP discussed the forthcoming trip by SCHEER to Southeast Asia and his desire to go to North Vietnam. Both functionaries agreed that an effort should be made to assist SCHEER in gaining admission to North Vietnam, or, at least to arrange for him to have an interview at the North Vietnam Embassy while he is in Cambodia.

SF T-51
February 8, 1966

A meeting of the San Francisco CP Community Youth Club was held December 18, 1965, at 2504 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, during which it was announced that in the Bay Area primary election campaign the party will support ROBERT SCHEER for Congressman in Berkeley. It was also announced that CARL BLOICE, a member of this CP club, and ROSCOE PROCTOR were serving on SCHEER's campaign committee. It was stated that BLOICE, PROCTOR and MICKEY LIMA, Chairman of the Northern California District CP, are functioning as a committee to plan strategy for the party's role in this campaign.

SF T-45
December 20, 1965

A meeting of the East Bay CP Industrial Club was held January 10, 1966, at 2716 77th Avenue, Oakland, California. During this meeting, it was announced that a Mr. SHEA, who is going to oppose Congressman JEFFREY COHELAN in the 7th Congressional District, favors peace and not a continuation of the Vietnam war. All members present were asked to support Mr. SHEA.

SF T-52
January 20, 1966

A meeting of the Bay Area CP Youth Clubs was held January 29, 1966, at 1005 53rd Street, Oakland, California. The principal speaker at this meeting was GUS HALL from the National Office of the CP, USA. In his talk, GUS HALL stated that the Party had made a decision in this district that their chief emphasis would be on the BOB SCHEER for Congress campaign, and as many youths as possible from all over the district would be involved in this campaign.

SF T-45
January 31, 1966

A meeting was scheduled to be held February 4, 1966, at 6115 Dover Street, Oakland, California, of the East Bay communists who were to work on BOB SCHEER's election campaign.

SF T-45
January 31, 1966

A source advised that CARL BLOICE had been released from his job on the editorial staff of the PW to work full time, on instructions of the CP leadership, in the campaign of ROBERT SCHEER for the 7th Congressional District.

SF T-53
March 2, 1966

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper, Berkeley, California, issue of June 9, 1966, carried a news article regarding the defeat of ROBERT SCHEER in his campaign as Democratic candidate for U. S. Congressman from the 7th Congressional District of California. This article stated SCHEER received a total of 28,751 votes, while his Democratic opponent, JEFFREY COHELAN, received 35,270 votes. This indicates SCHEER captured 45 per cent of the votes in this primary election. The newspaper quoted SCHEER as stating "From now on I'm the shadow Congressman in this District." He added that he would be a write-in candidate for U. S. Congressman in the November, 1966 election unless Congressman JEFFREY COHELAN stopped supporting the Vietnam war and unless COHELAN faced up to the serious social problems in the U. S. SCHEER added that he and his backers were "building a political movement in this District and this campaign was only the opening wedge."

During the interview, SCHEER said the cost of running his campaign had been $35,000 to $40,000, most of it being donated by "students, housewives, longshoremen and what-have-you," and none of it coming from his own pocket. He said, "When I started this campaign I didn't have a dime."

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 49 of 84 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

The "PW" issue of June 18, 1966, carried a news article headlined, "Scheer Forces to Stay in Business." This article pointed out that in the Democratic primary election held June 7, 1966, ROBERT SCHEER captured 44.9 per cent of the vote against the incumbent Congressman JEFFREY COHELAN in the 7th Congressional District of California. The article quoted SCHEER as stating he and his supporters would continue the community battle on issues and stated they planned to enter candidates in the race for municipal and county offices in 1967.

SHARON GOLD and JUDY DUNLAP were members of the Fillmore Du Bois Club of San Francisco who were working in the ROBERT SCHEER campaign as of February 27, 1966.

SF T-20
March 3, 1966

A social affair to benefit the SCHEER for Congress campaign was held March 19, 1966, at the residence of ROSCOE PROCTOR in Berkeley, California, with ROBERT and ANNE SCHEER in attendance.

SF T-35
March 22, 1966

ROSCOE PROCTOR is a member of the National Committee, CP, USA, and attended a meeting of this body held December 3-7, 1966, in New York City, during which time he was also selected a member of the National Executive Committee, CP, USA.

SF T-54
December 9, 1966

A meeting of the Marin County Communist Party Club was held March 23, 1966, at 315 Rydal Street, Mill Valley, California. At this meeting it was announced that CARL BLOICE had been released from his job at the "PW" since he is acting as publicity man for ROBERT SCHEER in the SCHEER for Congress campaign.

SF T-55
April 7, 1966

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 50 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

A meeting of the San Francisco Du Bois Club was held March 28, 1966, at 1830 Fell Street, San Francisco, during which it was announced that the Club would hold a mobilization April 2, 1966 to work on ROBERT SCHEER's campaign.

SF T-56
March 29, 1966

A CP Youth Commission meeting was held March 29, 1966, at 2504 Sacramento Street, San Francisco, during which there was a discussion of youth work. It was stated that the work of the youths in the ROBERT SCHEER campaign shouldhave been and should now be pointed towards building a Du Bois Club in Oakland.

SF T-45
March 30, 1966

The "PW" issue of May 21, 1966 carried an editorial which stated that in the 7th Congressional District the big issues of the time were "for peace, for freedom, for labor's rights, for a serious war on the grinding poverty that blights the lives of so many people in this District." The editorial then told that ROBERT SCHEER has joined all these issues in his campaign to win the Democratic nomination for Congress. It concludes by urging the readers to vote for ending the war in Vietnam, for seriously beginning the war on poverty, for Negro representation and for labor's rights.

ROBERT KAUFMAN, a member of the East Bay CP Industrial Club, stated August 8, 1966, that he had served as labor relations man for ROBERT SCHEER during SCHEER's campaign for Congress from the 7th Congressional District of California.

SF T-52 August 19, 1966

CARL BLOICE gave a party on Christmas Eve, December 24, 1966, at the residence of ROBERT SCHEER, Milvia and Oregon Streets, Berkeley, California, which was attended by about 60 persons, including ROBERT and ANNE SCHEER.

SF T-57
January 6, 1967

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

A meeting of the East Bay CP Industrial Club was held January 17, 1968, at Oakland, California, which was not attended by ROBERT SCHEER. During this meeting, it was announced that ROBERT SCHEER was going to run for the US Senate on the Peace and Freedom (PFP) ticket in opposition to the incumbent Senator THOMAS KUCHEL. All CP members were urged to support the PFP slate of candidates.

SF T-52
January 24, 1968

A meeting of the Northern California District CP (NCDCP) Committee was held January 20, 1968, in San Francisco, which was not attended by the Subject. During this meeting, there was a discussion of the CP political activities during which it was stated that BOB SCHEER had indicated a willingness to run for the US Senate, but he wanted a definite commitment from the CP and other organizations in the State, such as Black Panther groups and PFP, that they would support him.

SF T-55
January 29, 1968

SF T-58
January 26, 1968

A meeting of the NCDCP Committee was held February 2, 1968 in San Francisco, during which MICKIE LIMA, CP District Chairman, announced that he and ROSCOE PROCTOR, District Negro Organizer, had met with ROBERT SCHEER and both felt that the Party should support ROBERT SCHEER in his candidacy for the US Senate on the PFP ticket.

SF T-55
February 5, 1968

A meeting of the Campus CP Club was held February 4, 1968 at Berkeley, California, during which it was announced that ROBERT SCHEER had decided to run for the Senate and HUEY NEWTON from the Black Panther Party had been drafted to run for Congress. There were indications that the CP would support both candidates.

SF T-35
February 5, 1968

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 52 of 134 Pages

A characterization of the
Black Panther Party (BPP)
is contained in the Appendix
of this report.

On February 21, 1968, there was a discussion led by TERENCE W. GREENE in Oakland, California, regarding a recent meeting of the East Bay CP Regional Committee. At this regional meeting, there was a discussion of whether the CP should support the PFP candidates. It was stated that the youths on the CP Regional Committee favored the CP supporting certain PFP candidates such as ROBERT SCHEER. The matter was not resolved at this meeting.

SF T-52
March 4, 1968

The "PW" issue of March 16, 1968, carried a news article entitled "PFP, New Party to Set Aims." In this article it was stated "Author ROBERT SCHEER announced last week he was withdrawing from contention, although some political observers say he may be courting a possible draft movement" for the US Senate on the PFP ticket. The article told of plans of the PFP to have a state-wide conference, March 16-18, 1968, at Richmond, California, to pass a statement of basic principles and to refine planks for a platform.

The "Berkeley Barb", a weekly underground newspaper that features news of left wing groups, published in Berkeley, California, in its issue of March 15-21, 1968, carried a news article headlined "Differs But Will Fight for Party." This article dealt with the decision of ROBERT SCHEER not to run for the US Senate on the PFP ticket. SCHEER was quoted as saying, "I can be more helpful without being a candidate. I want to work hard for PFP without being accused of doing it for personal advantage.

"I will also be free of the petty in-fighting that goes on too much in PFP. I am talking about PFP in Berkeley. This does not apply to the rest of the state."

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

SCHEER was also quoted as being critical of his critics in the 1966 Congressional campaign as follows:

"Without those 1966 peace campaigns, there would be no PFP today. In this area, my campaign gave rise to CNP (Community for New Politics) and CNP formed the base for PFP here. I made the motion in a CNP meeting to form PFP.

"That Congressional campaign did give rise to organization on the left and its continuity is visibly demonstrated by the fact that we turned our main office at 2214 Grove (Berkeley) into the headquarters of PFP."

H. Community for New Politics also known as Committee for New Politics

"Communique for New Politics, Left-Out News", published bi-weekly by the Community for New Politics, 2214 Grove Street, Berkeley, California, 94703, in volume number one, carried an article captioned, "To All Who Supported Scheer for Congress". This article stated:

> "Our campaign was founded on assumptions which are at odds with mainstream American politics. We are concerned with issues and not personalities.
>
> "We were committed to development of community dialogue and involvement and not merely to electoral victory. The fact that we obtained an unexpectedly large vote does not change this commitment but rather reinforces it. 'The Community for New Politics' was formed to carry out this commitment. We are, in fact, in a very favorable position to implement a 'new politics'. The campaign produced strong community ties and the beginnings of a serious program. If we succeed in new politics it will serve as a much needed model for American political life. If we fail to seriously attempt it we betray not only the larger community but our most significant hopes as well.
>
> "This will be a more difficult period than that which preceded the election--it requires all of our support."
>
> "--ROBERT SCHEER"

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 55 of 134 Pages

Source advised that the "SCHEER For Congress Committee" was an organization formed in early 1966, for the purpose of supporting ROBERT SCHEER as a candidate for a seat in the United States House of Representatives, United States Congress, from the 7th Congressional District of California in the primary election of June 1966.

This committee was a group of diverse people formed for the specific purpose of supporting and working for ROBERT SCHEER in his bid for a seat in the United States Congress.

The primary plank in this committee's platform was opposition to the US involvement in the Vietnam War and with a further and continuing involvement by the US Government in the War on Poverty and civil rights.

SF T-24
July 31, 1967

A closed membership meeting of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was held at 873 Broadway, New York, New York, on June 30, 1966. During this meeting one of the members said he had attended a National Conference for New Politics and this organization has a $100,000 fund. Contributions from this fund were described as having been made to different organizations and individuals, including $1,000. to ROBERT SCHEER for his election campaign.

SF T-59
July 14, 1966

ROBERT SCHEER has particpated in activities sponsored by the Community For New Politics as follows:

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 56 of 134 Pages

Function & Location	Date of Activity	Source	Date Furnished	Activity
Meeting, Berkeley, California	8/26/66	SF T-25	9/6/66	Speaker
Meeting, Berkeley, California	9/21/66	SF T-35	9/23/66	Participant
Meeting, San Francisco	10/8/66	SF T-60	10/11/66	Speaker
Meeting, UCB	10/15/66	SF T-61	10/24/66	Speaker
Meeting, Santa Rosa, California	1/7/67	SF T-55	1/9/67	Speaker
Meeting, Berkeley	2/21/67	SF T-61	2/23/67	Speaker
Meeting, Berkeley	6/23/67	SF T-25	6/26/67	Participant
National Convention, Chicago, Illinois	8/29- 9/4/7	SF T-62 SF T-63	9/11/67 9/11/67	Speaker, 9/1,2/67
Meeting, Berkeley	9/13/67	SF T-35	9/14/67	Speaker
Meeting, Long Beach, California	11/3/67	SF T-64	11/6/67	Speaker
Meeting, Berkeley	4/11/68	"Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper	4/12/68	Speaker

SF 100-46832
WEH:jb

A meeting of the CNP was held February 21, 1967 at Le Conte School, Berkeley, California. During this meeting, ROBERT SCHEER reported he had recently visited Europe where he had talked with BERTRAND RUSSELL and representatives of the National Liberation Front (of North Vietnam). He mentioned that BERTRAND RUSSELL was trying to set up a war crimes tribunal, possibly leading to agreeable solutions to the conflict in Vietnam. SCHEER said, in reference to the representatives of the National Liberation Front, that they were of one mind in their determination to rid themselves of the yoke of colonialism once and for all.

SF T-61
February 23, 1967

A meeting sponsored by the CNP was held at Berkeley Community Theater, Berkeley, California, on June 23, 1967, attended by about 2000 people including ROBERT SCHEER, who was introduced but did not speak. The only speaker was FELIX GREENE. GREENE spoke of his recent trips to Red China and to North Vietnam. GREENE's remarks were favorable to the communists in both China and North Vietnam. He criticized American efforts, belittled United States activities and did all he could to emphasize that the United States should get out of Vietnam. He also showed pictures of North Vietnam, pointing out that the United States was bombing hospitals, churches, women and children.

SF T-25
June 26, 1967

The first issue of "New Politics News", published by the Convention Center, 1517 West Howard Street, Chicago, Illinois, contained a call for a national convention of the National Conference for New Politics (NCNP) entitled, "New Politics Convention on 1968 and Beyond," to be held August 29, 1967, through September 4, 1967, at the Palmer House, Stae and Monroe Streets, Chicago, Illinois. This publication identified the NCNP Convention Steering Committee as consisting of twenty-five individuals including

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 58 of 134 Pages

"ROBERT SCHEER, Berkeley, Committee for New Politics." This publication stated that during the convention, a four-man panel would hold a discussion on "Perspective for 1968". ROBERT SCHEER was scheduled to be one of these panelists and was also scheduled to address the convention on the topic of "Perspective for 1968" on the evening of September 2, 1967.

SF T-65
July 10, 1967

A syndicated article by BRUCE BIOSSAT was carried in the Berkeley Daily Gazette newspaper, Berkeley, California, issue of September 12, 1967 dealing only with the NCNP Convention which was held August 31, 1967 through September 4, 1967 in Chicago. The only person mentioned by name in this article was ROBERT SCHEER. The remarks related to SCHEER are as follows:

> "Perhaps the strangest performance of the whole incredible drama was that of Robert Sheer, managing editor of Ramparts magazine who last year ran a strong, though losing, primary race in California's Berkeley district as a peace candidate against an incumbent Democratic congressman.
>
> "On one convention day, Sheer stood before the assembled delegates and eloquently pleaded with the whites to purge themselves of self-contempt and self-hate. He called on them to find ways to build bridges to other whites whose sympathies must be won if white radicals are ever to bring any real power to a coalition with Negroes. Said Sheer:
>
> "'You're helping the black people and the poor, but you can't talk to your own parents or to the kids you grew up with on your block.'

FD-350 (Rev. 7-16-63)

SECRET

(Mount Clipping in Space Below)

Has CNP Begun to Grow Up?

Robert Scheer has his own differences with fellow members of the New Left, he said here Friday.

In his talk to the City Commons Club, he said the nation for years had operated under a theory which blamed communism as "the devil" responsible for all world turmoil. A listener asked: "Doesn't the New Left have its own devil theory — against liberals and Democrats?"

Scheer replied: "I have my own differences with the New Left because of the fact that I wear suits and have a job."

He wore a suit of muted plaid pattern with a vest, striped, button-down shirt with a long collar and figured tie.

He continued: "Here in Berkeley the Community for New Politics is generally beyond the student stage, over 30. I came to the New Left through traditional politics. When I ran for Congress I received the CDC (California Democratic Council) endorsement, though I didn't recognize many faces at the meeting."

Scheer added: "I got the support from liberal people because they were disillusioned with liberal policies. I don't like stopping troop trains or picketing. But I did not come to the New Left without coming through liberal politics.

"I went to the Democratic Party convention of 1956. I was once on the national board of ADA (Americans for Democratic Action). There is a great danger in symbols. There is a great number of symbols that are attacked and deserve to be attacked."

Scheer continued: "Our form of dress, sexual mores, many aspects of middle class society are boring. We go in for artificial pursuits such as watching television and fixing up our homes. I find every restaurant I eat in in San Francisco boring.

"The hippies force us to re-examine these things — even the New Left can learn from the hippies."

(Indicate page, name of newspaper, city and state.)

5 Berkeley Daily Gazette

Berkeley, Calif.

Date: 9-25-67
Edition: Daily
Author:
Editor: Gerald A. Beatty
Title:

Character:
or
Classification:
Submitting Office: SF
☐ Being Investigated

1302

SECRET

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 60 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

I. Peace and Freddom Party and Black Panther Party

The "San Francisco Examiner," a daily newspaper published at San Francisco, California, in its issue of October 3, 1967, carried a news article headlined "New Peace Party's Aim - Beat LBJ." The article explained that "the newly formed Peace and Freedom Party is out to beat President Johnson in 1968 even at the expense of electing his Republican opponent."

The article continued by saying that the new Peace and Freedom Party was recently formed in an effort to promote peace candidates and had initiated a drive for the 67,000 signatures needed to put a Peace and Freedom Party candidate on the ballot. ROBERT SCHEER was listed as one of the founders of the Peace and Freedom Party.

The "Berkeley Barb," a weekly newspaper of the left, published at Berkeley, California, in its issue of March 15-21, 1968, carried an article headlined, "Differs but Will Fight for Party." This article explained that ROBERT SCHEER's decision to withdraw as a Peace and Freedom Party (PFP) candidate for nomination as U.S. Senator, was based primarily on differences with the PFP leadership over how to conduct the campaign. SCHEER was quoted as saying, "I think it is possible to conduct a radical campaign and at the same time reach out to bring people in. I don't agree that there is a conflict between educating people and running a principled campaign. There are purists in PFP who will be talking only to small meetings of convinced people. Some of the purists seem to want a small, left wing, vegetarian-type party." SCHEER also objected to being asked for loyalty to the PFP program before it had been adopted. SCHEER said he expects to campaign very actively for PFP, but stated his position with "Ramparts" Magazine also creates demands on his time.

The article added that SCHEER said he wanted to work hard for PFP without being accused of doing it for personal advantage. SCHEER also said he wanted to be free of the petty in-fighting that goes on too much in the Berkeley PFP.

SCHEER also claimed that his unsuccessful campaign for nomination as U. S. Congressman from the 7th Congressional District of California gave rise to the Community for New Politics (CNP) and the CNP formed the base for PFP locally.

CP Support for PFP

A meeting of the Campus CP Club was held February 4, 1968, at 3048 Deakin Street, Berkeley, California, during which there was a discussion of political activities. One of the members noted that ROBERT SCHEER had decided to run for the Senate and HUEY NEWTON had been drafted to run for Congress, each on the PFP ticket and he suggested that all Communist Party (CP) group members work for the PFP.

SF T-35
February 5, 1968

A characterization of HUEY NEWTON and the Black Panther Party (BPP) of which he is a leader, are contained in the Appendix of this report.

A meeting of the Southern California District CP Committee was held March 2, 1968, at Hungarian Hall, 1251 South Andrews Place, Los Angeles, California. During this meeting, there was a discussion of political activities and the PFP. The CP's position was that the PFP is an independent party with a radical potential and that CP members in PFP would be fighting for that position. It was stated that there were three PFP candidates running for the U.S. Senate in the primary election and the CP would support ROBERT SCHEER and would urge people to vote for him in the primary election.

SF T-30
March, 1968

Free Huey Newton Fund

A mailing of a letter was sent during May, 1968, requesting moral and financial support for Free Huey Newton Fund. The letter explained that an effort was being made to circularize this letter door-to-door by volunteer Oakland youths to gain community support in the effort to free HUEY NEWTON (from his charge of murder of an Oakland Policeman, and the attempted murder of a second Oakland Police Officer.)

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

The letter stated fifty percent of the funds raised would be used for the legal defense of HUEY NEWTON and fifty percent would be used to mobilize the people of Oakland, in support of the effort to free HUEY NEWTON, and to stop police harassment. This letter was signed by eleven individuals including ROBERT and ANN SCHEER.

SF T-66
May 31, 1968

Oakland Seven Defense Fund

The "People's World" (PW) newspaper in its issue of May 11, 1968, carried a half page article consisting of an interview with BOB MANDEL, who had been arrested twice for his leadership in anti-draft activities. The article stated that funds were being raised to defray legal costs of MANDEL and six others arrested in the anti-draft activities, and that contributions to the Oakland Seven Defense Fund should be sent to 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California (residence of ROBERT and ANNE SCHEER).

Support of HUEY NEWTON

The "Berkeley Barb," an underground newspaper published weekly in Berkeley, California, in its issue of October 25-31, 1968, carried a newspaper article headlined "Scheer supports Newton." This article stated "Bob SCHEER endorsed Huey Newton for Congress last week." It quoted Scheer as saying, "I ran against Cohelan in 1966 because the assumptions that he shared with the democratic establishment and the powerful interests behind it led him to support the war in Vietnam and to ignore the increasingly desperate crisis in our cities, including the miserable conditions right here in Oakland."

The article pointed out that HUEY P. NEWTON was running against JEFFREY COHELAN as the PFP candidate in the California 7th Congressional District, COHELAN being the Democratic Party candidate and the incumbent. The article continued by quoting ROBERT SCHEER as saying, "I have come to know and respect HUEY over the past two years, and I am very pleased to support him for Congress."

Rally October 26, 1968

A rally was held at 30th Street and Oceanview Blvd., San Diego, California, on October 26, 1968, attended by about 3500 persons, including ROBERT SCHEER of "Ramparts" magazine. The principal speaker at this rally was STOKELY CARMICHAEL, who stated that black people should arm themselves and stop worrying about the law of this country, since this country is not interested in black people. CARMICHAEL said that when a black boy reaches 18 years of age, the government would put a gun in his hand and send him off to fight the yellow people who had never called him a nigger or abused him in any way. Other matters discussed related to alleged police brutality against Negroes.

SF T-67
October 28, 1968

STOKELY CARMICHAEL has been publicly identified as Prime Minister of the BPP.

Forum, November 1, 1968

A Forum sponsored by the PFP was scheduled to be held November 1, 1968, at Whittier School, Milvia and Virginia Streets, Berkeley, California. This forum was to feature BOBBY SEALE, Chairman of the BPP, and ROBERT SCHEER, "Editor of Ramparts magazine and 1966 peace candidate in the Democratic primary in Oakland-Berkeley's Seventh Congressional District."

"People's World" (PW) newspaper issue
of October 26, 1968

Valley New Community Movement

A meeting of the Valley New Community Movement was held November 2, 1968, at 13164 Burbank Blvd., Van Nuys District, Los Angeles, California with about 300 to 325 people in attendance. ROBERT SCHEER was one of the speakers at this meeting. SCHEER's statements were summarized as follows:

America must pull out of Vietnam because it is essentially wrong. The dominant political institutions are responsible for the U. S. involvement in Vietnam. We must reject the emotion of racial evil by studying the war in Vietnam. America is fundamentally racist and must come to grips with itself about racism. Relations are unwholesome between white radicals and black panthers. The Panthers are becoming better organized and can reach more people than white people can reach. The Panthers wrote a book to obtain money with which to purchase guns.

At the same meeting, GEORGE MURRAY, Minister of Education of BPP also spoke condemning the institutions in the U.S. as all being racist and working to keep the black people enslaved. MURRAY stated that if the black people wanted anything they had to get it with guns and force.

SF T-68
November 5, 1968

Benefit for ELDRIDGE CLEAVER

A benefit for ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, which was described as "an evening with the Defense Committee" was held November 21, 1968, under sponsorship of the International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver, at California Hall, Polk and Turk Streets, San Francisco, California, with about 400 people present. Admission to the affair was $3 per person and it was held to raise money to help prevent ELDRIDGE CLEAVER from being returned to jail. ROBERT SCHEER was listed on the letterhead of this organization as Director. SCHEER opened the meeting with a few introductory remarks to the effect that CLEAVER was being incarcerated for his political views and activities. The principal speaker at this affair was CHARLES GARRY, Attorney for the BPP, who described the CLEAVER case as political and said every effort must be made to prevent CLEAVER from being returned to jail. He made a strong plea for contributions of money to assist CLEAVER.

SF T-69, November 25, 1968
SF T-70, November 26, 1968
SF T-15, November 22, 1968

Vigil at Cleaver Residence

The International Committee of Defend Eldridge Cleaver issued a press release November 25, 1968, calling on the public to support a vigil at the residence of ELDRIDGE CLEAVER at 2777 Pine Street, San Francisco, 24 hours each day until CLEAVER was returned to jail November 27, 1968. The purpose of the vigil was to allegedly stop the San Francisco Police Department from "murdering" CLEAVER when they came to arrest him to return him to jail. This press release was on the letterhead of the International Committee to Defend Eldridge Cleaver, which listed ROBERT SCHEER as the Director, one of three listed officials. (Rather than return to jail ELDRIDGE CLEAVER went into hiding November 26, 1968, and is presently being sought as a fugitive from justice).

SF T-71
December 2, 1968

Meeting December 6, 1968

The "Berkeley Barb" newspaper, issue of November 29-December 5, 1968, carried an advertisement of a meeting entitled "Perspectives on the Left" to be held December 6, 1968, at Columbus Elementary School, 1541 12th Avenue, San Francisco, California, under sponsorship of the Bay Area PFP. ROBERT SCHEER was listed as one of the five speakers advertised.

ANN SCHEER attempted to contact KATHLEEN CLEAVER at Black Panther Party Headquarters, 3106 Shattuck Avenue, Berkeley, California, on March 4, 1969, in an effort to have KATHLEEN CLEAVER immediately telephone ROBERT SCHEER in New York City. It was not known whether this contact was made.

SF T-72
March 4, 1969

III FOREIGN TRAVEL

Trip to Indonesia, February, 1965

An American by the name of SHEA (phonetic), who claims that he is an ex-professor of a California University, visited Japan about February 11, 1965. He went to visit the office of the National Harbor and Ports Labor Union in Tokyo. The Japan labor union put up SHEA in one of their dormitories and had him live there until three days ago, when he left Japan and went to Indonesia on a ten-day trip. Before he left Japan for Indonesia, he claimed that he strongly desired to go to Communist China. He was complaining to the Japanese labor union officials about the discrimination problem in the U. S. and made derogatory remarks about the U.S. The Japanese labor union official, after listening to his desire to go to Communist China, asked the Chinese Communists now staying in Tokyo about the possibility of SHEA's trip to the Chinese mainland. The Chinese did not give a decisive answer. Although SHEA is expected to return to Japan after his trip from Indonesia, he may go to China directly from Indonesia. It is said that SHEA had to quit his university job due to an article he wrote after he came back from a trip to Cuba. The article contained some derogatory remarks about the U.S. Government.(S)

SF T-73
February 25, 1965

The same source advised March 5, 1965, that the correct name of the individual was SCHEER rather than SHEA.(S)

Contact with North Vietnamese

"Mr. ROBERT SCHERR, 2821 Dwight Way, Berkeley, California," was described as being a correspondent of NGUYEN VAN SAO and CU DINH BA. SAO and BA are representatives in London of the North Vietnamese Communist weekly newspaper "Cuu Quoc," which is published in Hanoi. SAO and BA live and maintain their office at 35 Netherhall Gardens, Hampstead, London N.W. 3.(S)

SF T-74
September 14, 1965

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper, issue of February 23, 1966, carried a news article headlined "Peace Group Slates Scheer." This article states ROBERT SCHEER, candidate for Congressman, 7th Congressional District, would speak under the sponsorhsip of the Berkeley Women for Peace on February 24, 1966, at Friends Meeting House, Berkeley. It added that SCHEER, "an outspoken critic of the Johnson Administration policies in Viet Nam, is presently touring South Viet Nam and Cambodia, the latter country at the invitation of Prince SIHANOUK." It continued by stating, "Foreign Editor of Ramparts, author of 'Cuba - Tragedy in a Hemisphere' and 'How the United States Got Involved in Viet Nam.' SCHEER is also known for his association with the Center for Study of Democratic Institutions at Santa Barbara." The article concluded by stating that Women for Peace would vote on endorsing SCHEER's candidacy at this meeting.

An article appeared in "The Daily Californian," issue of March 1, 1966, which stated that ROBERT SCHEER would give "an eyewitness report from Southeast Asia" at 8:00 p.m. at the Berkeley Community Theatre, Berkeley, California. The article added, "SCHEER is a candidate for Congress in the 7th Congressional District and an authority on U.S. policy in Vietnam."

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper, issue of March 1, 1966, carried a news article advertising the above speech. It also contained information to the effect that SCHEER's travels during February, 1966, took him to Cambodia, Thailand and South Vietnam.

"The Daily Californian," issue of March 4, 1966, carried an article reporting the results of an interview by this newspaper on March 3, 1966, with ROBERT SCHEER, who was scheduled to speak March 4, 1966, on the campus of UC, Berkeley. This article quoted SCHEER as stating that Oakland, California might be the next Watts and explode (into race riots) because of the "miserable conditions which have persisted there for the last 25 years." The article then stated that SCHEER described a recent trip he had taken to Cambodia, which he described as "one of the few neutral governments in the world, very jealous of its prerogatives." SCHEER said he visited Cambodia at the invitation of its government and was sent there by "Ramparts" Magazine, of which he is Foreign Editor. He said he was accompanied by STANLEY SCHEINBAUM, "an adviser to the Diem Government in Vietnam from 1955 to 1961." SCHEER asserted that after exploring the entire frontier between Cambodia and South Vietnam, he concluded that "Cambodia was not being used in any significant way, to support the fighting in South Vietnam." He explained that by any significant way he meant that Cambodia was not a "major staging area for the Viet Cong."

A CP contact class was held February 4, 1966, at 631 Redwood Street, San Francisco, during which it was stated that ROBERT SCHEER had left San Francisco February 4, 1966, for Cambodia and there was a very good possibility that SCHEER would also visit North Vietnam.

SF T-75
February 7, 1966

ROBERT SCHEER was invited to visit Cambodia by its ruler, Prince SIHANOUK, and planned to leave for Cambodia with his wife, ANNE, about February 7, 1966. SCHEER intended to report on this trip for "Ramparts" Magazine upon his return. An unidentified member of the VDC received a cablegram indicating that ROBERT SCHEER was in Cambodia on February 8, 1966.

Officer CHARLES HARRISON
Berkeley Police Department
Berkeley, California
2/11/66

An item in the column of JACK ROSENBAUM appeared in the "San Francisco Examiner and Chronicle" newspaper issue of February 13, 1966, reading: "Federal authorities hear that ROBERT SCHEER, candidate for Congress in the East Bay opposing JEFFREY COHELAN, is in Cambodia, presumably headed for Vietnam. If so, they can't wait to pick up his passport."

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

ZYGMUNT BRONIAREK, the Washington, D.C. correspondent for "Trybuna Ludu," Polish daily newspaper and official organ of the Polish United Workers (Communist) Party (PZPR) met on April 13, 1966, with ROBERT SCHEER, Democratic candidate for Congress from the 7th Congressional District of California.

SF T-76
April 14, 1966

Trip to London and Prague, 1967

ROBERT SCHEER was in London, England, January 26, 1967, and claimed that he was engaged in writing an article about the International Student Conference (ISC) for the magazine "Ramparts" of which he is Editor. The article was intended to be an exposure of the ISC and, in order to obtain material for it, SCHEER was planning a two day visit to the headquarters of the International Union of Students (IUS) in Prague. SCHEER was seeking information on the passing of financial assistance from the ISC to student unions in Africa and Latin America. (S)

While in London, SCHEER met with FERGUS NICHOLSON, National Student Organizer of the Communist Party of great Britain, and with DAVID HOROWITZ, an American postgraduate student at the London School of Economics, who has been closely connected with the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation. (S)

SCHEER planned to leave London for Amsterdam on January 27, 1967, and then to Paris before travelling to Prague January 29, 1967. (S)

SF T-74 , a foreign source abroad
February 1, 1967 (S)

Trip to Prague

The "San Francisco Examiner" newspaper, issue of February 24, 1967, carried a page 1 news article headlined, "Ramparts Editor at Prague Meet" by CARL ROWAN. This article explained that "a few days ago a brief, cryptic report out of Prague, Czechoslovakia, was passed among a handful of top officials

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 70 of 134 Pages

in Washington." The report said that an editor of "Ramparts" magazine had visited Prague and held "a long, secret session" with officers of the Communist controlled International Union of Students (IUS).

The article continued by stating that "Ramparts" is the magazine that exposed the fact that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had been financing the National Student Association (NSA), which in turn had worked for several years to prevent IUS from dominating the youth of the world. The article questioned what relationship there was between "Ramparts" and the IUS.

ROWAN telephoned ROBERT SCHEER, Managing Editor of "Ramparts" in San Francisco and SCHEER admitted that he had met with representatives of the National Liberation Front, political arm of the Communist Viet Cong, in South Vietnam, and also with IUS officers in Prague "several weeks ago" for two days. In response to a question as to who controlled IUS, SCHEER replied, "It is essentially an organ of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union." SCHEER emphasized that he had visited IUS headquarters strictly for journalistic reasons and that he was in Europe writing a story for "Ramparts" on Bertrand Russell, "(94 year old British philosopher who plans a Vietnam 'war crimes trial' of President Johnson)", so he continued on to Prague to check the international implications of the "Ramparts" article on the NSA. SCHEER volunteered, "We don't truck with Communism in Ramparts. We compare the U.S. position in Vietnam with the actions of the Soviet Union in Hungary. Both are intolerable and we make no bones about it. Any attempt to smear us at Ramparts is libelous and we'll sue. I warned the same thing when they were muttering about me being a Communist when I ran for Congress."

ROBERT SCHEER traveled to Prague, Czechoslovakia during the first week of February, 1967, to contact the International Union of Students (IUS) and was an official guest of the Czechoslovakian Government with his lodging being furnished at the best hotel in Prague. SCHEER requested and received massive documentation for his article in "Ramparts" regarding Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) contributions to the National Student Association, a United States affiliate of IUS. SCHEER's trip from West Germany to Czechoslovakia was fiaanced by the Czecosolvakian Government and WLODOMIERZ KONARSKI, Vice President of IUS, was in charge of this visit. (S)

SCHEER had a wide range of interviews with IUS executives and was provided with some internal IUS documents. While in Prague, SCHEER wrote an article based on material which he obtained while in Europe and this article was later published in "Rude Pravo" datelined New York. (S)

SF T-73
August 1, 1967.

The "California Jewish Record" newspaper, an English language weekly newspaper published at Oakland, California, in its issue of September 1, 1967, contained an editorial captioned, "Is BOB SCHEER An Anti-Semite?" This editorial described SCHEER as Managing Editor of "Ramparts" magazine and an unsuccessful candidate in the primary election of 1966.

The editorial stated SCHEER had recently returned from a trip to Cairo and Israel and then spoke at a meeting in Berkeley, California, August 25, 1967, when he told his audience about his trip. In his speech, SCHEER claimed he had been accused of being an anti-Semite and an anti-Arab because of what he said on the matter of Arab-Israel relations. The editorial said that SCHEER referred constantly to the people of Israel and the American Jews as the "Zionists" and uses this term constantly when criticizing action of the Israelis.

The editorial continued by stating that SCHEER accused the Zionists of being imperialistic, of being excessively hard on the poor Arabs they defeated, of provoking the war - in short, of doing everything the Arabs and the Soviets accused them of and SCHEER attributed these lies to Israel's subservience to the United States." In his speech, SCHEER was further accused of using the term, "American Grand Concourse Zionists," the "Anti-Semites favorite euphemism for Jew."

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 72 of 134 Pages

The editorial concluded by stating SCHEER advised Israel and the Arab states to move to the left and to seek to selve their economic and social problems in a joint effort. The editorial adds, "He apparently forgets that the most left of the Arab states is Syria, the country most responsible for the recent war in which the Arabs were defeated."

ROBERT SCHEER, editor of "Ramparts" magazine, San Francisco, California, was issued an invitation to attend the Cultural Congress to be held in Havana, Cuba January 4-12, 1968. The invitation was issued by JOSE VIERA LINARES, First Secretary, Cuban Mission to the United Nations, New York City, during November, 1967. It was not known whether SCHEER would attend this congress.

SF T-77
November 24, 1967

The Cuban Ministry of Foreign Relations instructed the Cuban Mission to the United Nations to extend an invitation to ROBERT SCHEER of "Ramparts" to attend the Havana Cultural Congress as a reporter.

SF T-78
November 16, 1967

A source who maintains contact with numerous Cuban news media and is familiar with Cuban political matters, advised the Cultural Congress of Havana was scheduled for January 4-11, 1968, at Havana, Cuba. It was held at the Havana Libre Hotel, Havana, under the auspices of the National Union of Writers and Artists of Cuba, the Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples' Solidarity Organization and the Cuban Preparatory Committee. The purpose of the congress was to obtain unity of action in the anti-imperialist fight and in the defense of the cultural nucleus of each country.

SF T-79
January, 1968

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 73 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

On January 16, 1968, T-80 reported the passenger Manifest of Cuban Aviation Company flight #465 from Mexico, D.F. to Havana, Cuba, on January 5, 1968, listed ROBERT SCHEER as passenger #35. He was the bearer of U.S. Passport #0041559, and had a Cuban courtesy tourist visa. He was destined to the Hotel Nacional, Havana, Cuba.

On January 16, 1968, T-80 advised the passenger manifest of Cuban Aviation Company flight 464 from Havana, Cuba, to Mexico, D.F. on January 15, 1968, listed ROBERT SCHEER as passenger #57. He was the bearer of U.S. passport #0041559. His destination in Mexico, D.F. was the Hotel Hilton, described as "in transit."

On March 19, 1968, T-81 advised the reoords of the Mexican Department of Immigration reveal ROBERT SCHEER was issued migratory form FM-17, #2839698. He was described as a 31 year old male of North American nationality, married, occupation journalist. He left Mexico, D.F. for Cuba on January 5, 1968 and returned January 15, 1968. His departure-re-entry permit was #35.

ROBERT SCHEER arrived in Mexico City from Cuba January 15, 1968, accompanied by two other persons who had traveled to Cuba to film a documentary on Cuban life for educational television station KQED, San Francisco. SCHEER had traveled from Los Angeles to Cuba on an unspecified date. SCHEER was scheduled to depart Mexico for Los Angeles January 15, 1968 on Western Airlines, Flight 696. ~~(S)~~ u

SF T-73
January 31,1968

ROBERT SCHEER traveled to Mexico City, Mexico, February 5, 1968, via Western Airlines and had accomodations at the Hilton Hotel, Mexico City. (~~S~~U)

SF T-73
February 9, 1968

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 94 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

JOSE VIERA LINARES, First Secretary, Cuban Mission to the United Nations, contacted an un-named secretary to ROBERT SCHEER, editor of "Ramparts" magazine, San Francisco, California, on January 29, 1968. During this contact, it was stated that VIERA had obtained an appointment with FIDEL CASTRO in Cuba for SCHEER and SCHEER was then seeking State Department permission to have his passport validated for journalistic travel to Cuba. Since SCHEER allegedly had been delayed by the State Department and since SCHEER had political appointments running to March, 1968, he was attempting to make an appointment with FIDEL CASTRO for March 15 or 16, 1968. VIERA promised to help expedite this arrangement.

SF T-77
February 29, 1968

Records of Air France, New York, New York, revealed that a man named SCHEER was travelling to Paris, France on Air France Flight No. 042, departing New York City at 11:00 p.m., July 13, 1967, in the company of a man named ANSARE, (probably identical with JAMES MICHAEL ANSARA). The records did not furnish the first names of either SCHEER or ANSARE nor any information about a connecting flight out of Paris for these individuals.

SF T-82
July 14, 1967

On August 13, 1947, MAURICE JOYCE, member of the Professional Staff, Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, provided information that JAMES MICHAEL ANSARA was included among the group of ten persons whose employment had been terminated by the State Department under the provisions of the McCarran Rider to the State Department's appropriation bill which permitted summary dismissals of employees considered to be security risks. However, ANSARA's Department of State personnel file contains a copy of a letter dated December 8, 1947, directed to ANSARA which reads, "Your resignation from the Department of State effective June 23, 1947, hereby accepted."

1317

Copy 2 of 3 Copies
Page 75 of 134 Pages

ROBERT SCHEER has recently traveled as follows:

April 4, 1968, San Francisco to Seattle, Washington, Vancouver and Edmonton, Canada.

April 6, 1968, Edmonton, Canada, via Vancouver to San Francisco, California.

April 17, 1968, San Francisco to Chicago, via Omaha, Nebraska and Des Moines, Iowa.

April 18, 1968, Chicago to Buffalo, via New York City.

April 19, 1968, Buffalo, New York to San Francisco, California.

April 21, 1968, San Francisco to Mexico City.

April 23, 1968, Mexico City to Havana, Cuba.

May 10, 1968, Havana, Cuba to Mexico City to Los Angeles, California.

May 10, 1968, Los Angeles California, to Salt Lake City, Utah.

May 12, 1968, Salt Lake City to San Francisco, California.

SF T-83
April 23, 1968 and
May 27, 1968

SCHEER bought an open round trip ticket to Los Angeles on June 3, 1968.

SF T-83
June 11, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER was observed by a Special Agent of the FBI to arrive at San Francisco International Airport on the late evening of April 6, 1968, and is believed to have arrived on an United Airline flight from Seattle, Washington.

ROBERT SCHEER was reported to have contacted JOSE VIERA LINARES, First Secretary of the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, New York City, April 16, 1968, and arranged to meet with VIERA April 18, 1968. SCHEER then planned to leave New York City by plane, the afternoon of April 18, 1968. SCHEER was expected to fly from Mexico City to Havana, Cuba, April 23, 1968, and expected to remain in Cuba about nine days. SCHEER reportedly requested that Havana be notified so that interviews could be arranged. VIERA reportedly answered that SCHEER should have no problems, and Havana would be notified of SCHEER's travel plans.

SF T- 77
April 16, 1968

The passenger manifest of Cuban Aviation Company Flight 465, from Mexico, DF, Mexico, to Havana, Cuba, on April 23, 1968, listed ROBERT _CHEER as passenger 84. He was the bearer of United States Passport G041559 with a Cuban courtesy visa. He was destined to the Hotel Habana Libre and carried one piece of luggage weighing 30 kilos (66 pounds).

SF T-84
May 3, 1968

The passenger manifest of Cuban Aviation Company Flight 464, from Havana, Cuba to Mexico, DF, Mexico, on May 10, 1968, listed ROBERT SCHEER as passenger 51. He was the bearer of United States Passport G041559 and was shown to be in transit to W.A. (possibly Western Airlines). He carried two pieces of luggage weighing 30 kilos (66 pounds).

SF T-84
May 14, 1968

The records of the Mexican Department of Immigration reveal that ROBERT _CHEER, a United States citizen, was issued departure-re-entry permit 1450 with which he departed Mexico for Cuba on April 23, 1968. His passport number was shown as G041559.

SF T-84
May 28, 1968

On March 30, 1968, HEDWIG URBACH YAMPOLSKY, Calle Rio Tigris 30-B, Mexico, DF, Mexico, remarked that she had heard that ROBERT SCHEER, Editor of "Ramparts" magazine, was visiting Mexico and she hoped he would contact her before he returned to the United States. YAMPOLSKY commented that "Ramparts" was one of the few leftist periodicals she still subscribed to and enjoys reading.

SF T-85
April 1, 1968

HEDWIG URBACH YAMPOLSKY is in contact with associates of the American Communist Group in Mexico (ACGM).

SF T-85
April 1, 1968

According to SF T-86, the ACGM is a loose association of a predominantly social nature, of present and/or past members of the Communist Party, USA, and their friends and associates who share a common sympathy for the international communist movement.

The "San Francisco Chronicle" daily newspaper, San Francisco, California, in its issue of July 10, 1968, carried an item in the gossip column written by HERB CAEN, reading, "'Ramparts' Editor BOB SCHEER, in New York to negotiate for the CHE GUEVARA Diaries (successfully) was surprised to find his wife, ANNE, there too. She was en route to Paris, France, and Hanoi at the invitation of the North Vietnamese to 'observe' the prisoner exchange."

ROBERT SCHEER contacted JOSE VIERA LINARES, First Secretary, Cuban Mission to the United Nations (CMUN), New York City, on August 5, 1968, and told VIERA that SCHEER's wife was then at the Hotel Algonquin in New York City. SCHEER asked VIERA to contact Mrs. SCHEER and VIERA agreed to do so. VIERA also said he had a copy of the original publication of CHE GUEVARA's diary for SCHEER and would give it to Mrs. SCHEER. ROBERT SCHEER said he would be in New York City in about two weeks and would again contact VIERA.

SF T-77
August 5, 1968

1320

ROBERT SCHEER, Editor in Chief of "Ramparts" Magazine, San Francisco, California, contacted JOSE VIERA LINARES August 22, 1968, and stated they had obtained his approval from the State Department (for a round trip to Cuba). VIERA suggested that SCHEER travel to Mexico City to catch the plane on Monday, August 26, 1968, to Havana, Cuba. SCHEER replied he thought it would be taking too big a risk to leave for Mexico without having a visa. SCHEER recontacted VIERA later the same day to state that the only plane to Mexico City was on Sunday, August 25, 1968. He inquired if he would have any trouble getting the Cubana Airlines plane and was told he would have no trouble.

SF T-77
August 22, 1968

On September 7, 1968, ROBERT SCHEER contacted JOSE VIERA LINARES to state he had not received the material VIERA had promised to get him and he wanted to meet with VIERA that evening. SCHEER said he planned to get a plane from New York City that evening en route home. SCHEER added that he hoped to get a Czechoslovak visa with the purpose of eventually visiting Prague. VIERA apologized for not having delivered the promised material and agreed to meet with SCHEER for drinks and dinner that evening.

SF T-77
September 7, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER visited the Passport Office, U. S. Department of State, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, during the week of December 29, 1968, and stated he did not travel to Cuba in August, 1968, as he had planned. He said he had lost the letter he received from the State Department telling him how to make his travel arrangements and how to get his Cuban visa in Mexico City. Another letter was given to SCHEER at this time. SCHEER said he now plans to make the trip to Cuba.

Miss MADELINE EBINGER
Clerk, Passport Office,
U. S. Department of State,
San Francisco, January 2, 1969

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

"The Militant", a weekly newspaper of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP), in its issue of January 24, 1969, carried an article by PAUL MC KNIGHT entitled "Report from Havana, Fidel's Speech on January 2." In this article the author described the celebration of the 10th anniversary of the Cuban revolution which was held in Havana, Cuba January 2, 1969. In describing some of the people who were present, it was stated that ROBERT SCHEER of "Ramparts" was in attendance.

The passenger manifest of Cuban Aviation Company flight 465A from Mexico, D.F., Mexico, to Havana, Cuba, on December 31, 1968, listed Robert Scher as passenger #33. He was the bearer of United States passport _-041550 with a Cuban tourist visa. He was destined to the Hotel Habana Libre and carried one piece of luggage weighing 18 kilograms (39.6 pounds).

SF T-80
January 7, 1969

The passenger manifest of Cuban Aviation Company flight 464 from Havana, Cuba, to Mexico, D.F., Mexico, on January 13, 1969, listed ROBERT SCHEER as passenger #109. He was the bearer of United States Passport 0-041559.

SF T-80
January 15, 1969

ROBERT SCHEER reportedly made a speech at the Hemispheric Conference to End the War in Vietnam held recently in Montreal, Canada.

SF T-87
February 13, 1969

ROBERT SCHEER made appointment to have lunch with JOSE VIERA LINARES at 2:00 p.m., March 12, 1969 at the Delegates Dining Room, United Nations, New York City.

SF T-77
March 12, 1969

ROBERT SCHEER visited the Cuban Mission to the United Nations, New York City, on March 20, 1969 in an effort to meet with JOSE VIERA LINARES. He is not believed to have been successful in meeting with VIERA.

SF T-77
March 20, 1969

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 80 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

IV. WRITINGS OF SUBJECT

ROBERT SCHEER is the author of a pamphlet written for the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, which he later condensed into an article for "Ramparts" magazine entitled, "The Vietnam Lobby." The article purports to show how various Americans worked to misinform the public about Vietnam. The persons whom SCHEER holds responsible for misleading the American people are JOSEPH KENNEDY, Cardinal SPELLMAN, ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR., NORMAN THOMAS, J. BRACKEN LEE, General EDWARD LANSDALE, MARVIN LIEBMAN, and others.

SF T-88 on 3/8/67

A feature article datelined Cairo, July 31, 1967, entitled, "Egypt" which is described as "A Special Report from Managing Editor ROBERT SCHEER in Cairo", was published in the September 1967 issue of "Ramparts" magazine. In this article, SCHEER tried to explain the current situation in Egypt. He laid the blame for the Arabs losing the six-day war to the Israelis on "cowardly or traitorous officers" in the Arab Army.

The article also stated that many in the NASSER Goverment say that most of the blame for starting the Arab-Israel war should be charged to the Syrians for having provided the Israelis with a pretext for attack. The article stated the Egyptian people were not at this time in a warlike mood and NASSER was doing his best to discourage his people from warlike aspirations and to encourage continuance of the Social Revolution in Egypt.

SCHEER concluded that NASSER must break with the rightists in the Arab world and make his primary commitment to the Arab social revolution in order to survive. He concluded also that NASSER's most dangerous enemy is the "Moslem Brotherhood" who could take control of Egypt and become embroiled in another war in as little as one year's time.

1323

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

The November 1967 issue of "Ramparts" magazine contains a 13-page article entitled, "A NASSER Thesis" by ROBERT SCHEER. In this article, SCHEER analyzes the Middle East situation from 1952 to the present, giving his recital of the relationship of the various countries to each other, the rise to power by GAMAL ABDUL NASSER, the Suez war in the middle 1950's, and the six-day Arab-Israel war in June, 1967.

The article lays great stress on NASSER being unsuccessful in some of his ventures because while he nationalized many businesses and industries and distributed the proceeds to the poor, he allowed the Army to remain an elite, privileged class which was not loyal to either NASSER or Egypt. SCHEER also blamed NASSER's failure to develop a political party with its own aims set forth for his lack of success in communicating with his people and obtaining their full support.

SF 100-46832
WEH:ay

The January, 1968 issue of "Ramparts" Magazine contains an article entitled "Oil and the Arabs (The Nasser Thesis:Part 2)" This article states "Researchers for this article and Part I ("Ramparts", November, 1967) include BOB AVAKIAN, JIM HAWLEY, DAVID KOLODNEY and JOHN SPITZER."

The article states the thesis that the Middle East is "of paramount strategic importance to this Country" because the Persian Gulf produces 27% of the world's petroleum and has proved global reserves of 60%. In addition the Mideast is the trade crossroads between Asia and Europe and an important cultural bridge between Africa and Asia and the center of the Islam world.

The article explains that 27% of the oil used throughout the world comes from the Middle East and, since oil is indispensable to industrial and military potential it is no wonder that continued control of this resource is a major focus of the Western powers. It adds that if control of this oil is important to the West it is absolutely critical to the Arabs, since it is the only source of the cash needed to break out of the cycle of underdevelopment and poverty in which their countries are trapped. It pointed out that the profits from the oil go to the "wrong" states, those with the least population (12% of the Arab population) and therefore the least need. The article stated the Arabs could repay the total investment of Western powers of $5 billion in two years with the oil removed from Arab wells except for the fact that Western Countries are in a position to force the Arabs to deal with them or to have no market whatever for this oil. The article cited how Iranian Prime Minister MOSSADEGH nationalized his country's oil production May 1, 1951 and the U. S. proceeded to crush him so totally that the example has served as a chilling model for other would-be nationalists - no major oil producing country in the Mideast has dared to repeat MOSSADEGH's attempt." The Western Powers were said to have accomplished this by imposing a total boycott of Iranian oil.

The article explained that the Baghdad Pact was an integral part of a global containment policy which was put into effect by the U.S. in the early 1950s but NASSER refused to align himself with it. NASSER was said to be a threat to the Western powers by being consciously and arrogantly expansionist, and by holding the position that oil in the underpopulated oil producing countries must be the basis of the development of the entire region. It stated that the U.S. response to NASSER was principally by propping up the economy and military machines of the monarchies while alternately mollifying through grants or the withholding of grants to the more leftist tendencies as they appeared in Egypt and other Arab regimes. The article added "Intensive CIA operations even involved founding the American Friends of the Middle East - a pro-Arab Organization in the U.S. - as well as widespread meddling in internal Arab politics."

The article continued that Soviet support of the Arabs began in 1955, which caused the U. S. to be more careful not to cause an anti-Western Arab union to be formed that might topple America's right-wing Arab allies. NASSER was said to have steered clear of any major direct confrontation with the U.S. and "the U.S. has never attempted to really clamp down on him." Thus the Arab revolutionary impulse, fearful of challenging the West, turned to "challenging Israel as a Western tool" and condemned "Israeli imperialism." This hostility to Israel provided a kind of anti-imperialism that was able to appeal to both progressive leftists and traditional monarchies in the Arab world. In 1956 Israel joined the British and French attempt to reestablish by force Western control over the Suez Canal after NASSER nationalized it, and Israel also supported the French in the Algerian war. To the Arabs it seemed that Israel had aligned herself with the exploiters. This signalled the Russians to begin helping the Arabs to get as many friends as possible among the non-aligned countries even while local communists in Egypt, Algeria and Syria were being jailed.Russia felt that the Arabs were moving to the left to justify Russian support.

The article said the social changesin Algeria and Egypt were significant but also inadequate because "they destroyed the power of the traditional upper class without in any significant sense passing power on to that very broad base of the Arab pyramid." The reforms in Syria and Egypt came about as a result of military coups d'etat which placed men in power who were willing to introduce reforms.

The article continued by stating "The identification of Israel-rather than the oil companies and their monarchies-as the serious extension of imperialism has allowed Arab progressives to play at revolution, through periodic anti-Israel tirades, without taking essential revolutionary action." In reference to the six day Arab-Israel war the article stated "the Soviets were clearly unprepared to assess its implications," in reference to withdrawal of UN troops from Gaza and Aqoba. It added "The Soviets continuously underestimated the emotional depth and political intensity of the Arab-Israeli conflict." It added that Russia began immediately to rearm Eghpt and Syria after the defeat, specifying only that their weapons be better used.

The article stated "The Central Thesis of this essay is that the Great Powers cannot be expected to be concerned, on any consistent basis, with the interests and needs of the Arabs and Jews who live in the Mideast," but are preoccupied with their own prestige and security needs. It added that both the Arabs and the Jews identify their opposition with the nation of imperialism supported by the American oil companies.

The article added that "The Arab denial of legitimate Jewish nationhood as the basis of Israel is the subject of deserved ridicule. But that the mainstream of Zionism has, in like fashion, denied the existence of a legitimate Arab quest for nationhood is not commonly admitted. This factor has been of great significance in the formation and sustaining of Arab hostility towards Israel. The Arabs will never be able to turn their energies from opposing Israel to the development of an Arab nation so long as the Israelis hold the existence of an Arab nation to be a threat." The Israelis viewed the drive toward Arab unity and independence as a threat to them. ABBA EBAN conferred upon Israel the very nationhood that Israel denied to the Arabs. The Arabs find this position most difficult to accept when the Jews deny them the same position. The article stated that "Israelis must come to accept the fact that nationhood is an aspiration which some Arabs hold without being conned into it by NASSER; and that an Arab State - if it became a reality (as a confederation or a nation) - is not necessarily a threat to Israel."

The article concluded that "The Arab Nation and the Jewish Nation are both legitimate concepts which can survive together only if they exist as part of the same social revolution to meet the needs of the people of the Mideast."

SF 100-46832
WEH:mcn

The April - May, 1968, issue of "Ramparts" Magazine, lists ROBERT SCHEER as Editor in Chief and carried a two page article entitled "The 'Peace' Candidates" by ROBERT SCHEER. In this article, SCHEER discussed the Vietnam War and Democratic presidential candidates ROBERT F. KENNEDY (now deceased) and EUGENE McCARTHY. SCHEER was critical of each of these candidates because they were not among the original protestors against U.S. participation in the Vietnam War.

The June 15, 1968, issue of "Ramparts" Magazine stated that this issue marked the beginning of "Ramparts as a fortnightly magazine which will appear in the same format as it has previously appeared. It stated that features planned for the first few editions include (in part) several articles on the problems of today's Cuba including an interview with FIDEL CASTRO by ROBERT SCHEER."

The August 10, 1968, issue of "Ramparts" carried a two-page article entitled, "The Night BOBBY Died," by ROBERT SCHEER. In this article, SCHEER stated he was present at the Ambassador Hotel in Los Angeles, California with ROBERT F. KENNEDY on the evening of Primary Election Day, June 4, 1968, in the Royal Suite, while the KENNEDY campaign workers were waiting for the returns to come in. He wrote that he was also in the Empire Ballroom while ROBERT KENNEDY was giving his victory speech and while KENNEDY was shot about 12:29 A.M.

The September 28, 1968, issue of "Ramparts" carried a feature-length article dealing with the Democratic National Convention in Chicago, which was described as "a Ramparts special report" by staff members and it named 23 persons including ROBERT SCHEER as responsible for this report.

The San Francisco Chronicle daily newspaper published in San Francisco, California, in its issue of March 3, 1969, carried the column of WILLIAM HOGAN entitled, "World of Books: Eldridge Cleaver, Written on the Run." In this article HOGAN discussed a new book "Eldridge Cleaver: Post-Prison Writings and Speeches," which was edited by ROBERT SCHEER published by the book publishing branch of Ramparts magazine. The article continued by stating that SCHEER compiled this book from pieces that appeared previously in Ramparts magazine and from speeches delivered by CLEAVER at various times. The article concluded by stating that a book entitled "Berkeley On 0 Dollars a Day," by ROBERT SCHEER and his Ramparts colleague PETER COLLIER is presently under negotiation with publishers.

V. SPEECHES AND TELEVISION APPEARANCES OF THE SUBJECT

July 17, 1966

A protest rally for persons jailed as a result of Auto Row and Sheraton-Palace Hotel sit-in demonstrations was held at San Francisco City Hall plaza July 17, 1966. The crowd at the rally was estimated at from 400 to 1,000 people. ROBERT SCHEER was one of the speakers and said that if Governor BROWN had not freed these sit-in demonstrators by election day, SCHEER would tell the people to march to the jail housing these demonstrators, rather than going to the polls.

SF T-35 on 7/20/66
Observation by SA of FBI

August 6, 1966

The August 6-9 Committee sponsored the Third International Days of Protest, August 6-9, 1966, at San Francisco Civic Center Plaza, San Francisco. This demonstration numbered about 2,500 people on August 6, 1966. One of the speakers was ROBERT SCHEER, who stated that the demonstrators should not get discouraged, but should continue their picketing and demonstrating.

Observations by SAs of
FBI
SF T-35 on 8/8/66

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

September 7, 1966

The "Stockton Record" newspaper, Stockton, California, issue of September 8, 1966, carried a news article headlined, "Editor Attacks U. S. Policy in Vietnam; Sees National Peril." In this article it was stated that ROBERT SCHEER had delivered a speech at the Raymond College High Table, University of the Pacific, Stockton, California, on September 7, 1966. SCHEER maintained that the concept of an international communist conspiracy was false and the U. S. is mistaken in considering it a unified, ever-growing force that can only be contained by force. He stated that the communist conspiracy is a movement that does not hold together because of nationalistic interests. He cited the Sino-Soviet dispute and the international squabbling between satellite countries and the major communist powers. He said the Vietnam conflict began as an internal dispute and if the U. S. withdrew from the conflict this withdrawal would reaffirm the communists' confidence in the possibility of peaceful co-existence.

He concluded that if anyone is genuinely concerned about American security, he is going to have to work to reverse American foreign policy.

October 18, 1966

"The Guardsman," weekly student newspaper at City College of San Francisco, in its issue of October 19, 1966, carried a news article headlined, "Scheer Lectures on Involvement in Southeast Asia." The article stated ROBERT SCHEER spoke at the College Theater to a capacity audience. He was reported to have reviewed the historical changes in Vietnam, the French role in Vietnam affairs, and the limited policy set by President KENNEDY of only sending 30,000 advisors as "technical aid only for a limited period of time to prevent a colonial posture." The article stated further, "In a summary conclusion SCHEER said that if there is an international communist movement, it should cease to exist, that there are hardly two communist countries that coexist, that communism is in truth a form of nationalism and that practically speaking, 'it does not exist.'"

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

December 2, 1966

Discussion Unlimited, Incorporated (DU), sponsored a meeting December 2, 1966, in the auditorium of Los Angeles Trade College, 700 block, Washington Boulevard, Los Angeles, with from 1,000 to 1,500 people in attendance. The topic of the discussion was "What Will the New Development on the Left Be?" ROBERT SCHEER from "Ramparts" magazine, EUGENE GENOVESE from Rutgers College in New Jersey, and DOROTHY HEALEY from Southern California District CP were the speakers. HEALEY spoke first, stating that the most important things for the groups on the left to do today were to unite on common grounds and to be critical on grounds where they cannot agree, as well as to give allegiance to the other 14 socialist countries in the world. She described these countries as the hope of the future. ROBERT SCHEER attacked her bitterly, his main contention being that he felt he could not even say he was a socialist because of all the crimes that are committed in the name of socialism. He said he could not align himself with other countries in the socialist world because of the barbaric deeds committed by some of these countries.

He led a vicious attack against the Soviet Union, against the STALIN era, against the crimes that were committed in the Soviet Union against Jewish people and Jewish culture, and against other religious people and intellectuals in the Soviet Union. He made reference to the two writers who had been recently jailed in Russia. In a rebuttal and question and answer period the attack went back and forth, mainly between GENOVESE and HEALEY against SCHEER for his anti-Soviet Union position. SCHEER constantly brought up Hungary, stating that the oppression that went on in Hungary is no different than the oppression of the United States in Vietnam. He also said the Soviet Union is a sick society just as the U. S. is a sick society, and he is quite sure that the workers in each society are not much aware of or care about the relative difference of the sickness.

SF T-30, on 12/9/66
SF T-31, on 12/13/66

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

The PW issue of December 10, 1966, and December 24, 1966, also carried news articles on the above-described forum. SCHEER's remarks are reported in the December 10, 1966 issue as follows:

> "Scheer, who ran as a peace candidate in the Democratic primary in the Seventh Congressional District, winning nearly 45% of the vote, spoke of the kind of revolution he would like to see. 'Revolution is better than rebellion,' he said, 'but I am interested in what a revolution will lead to....Soviet society is vicious....I want a revolution that means the right of a man to control his own life.'
>
> "Referring to Marxism, Scheer said, 'The theories don't work. The working class is not getting poorer and poorer.
>
> "'It is true,' he said, 'that the 'New Left' has no ideology, (but because of that) it does not follow that it should accept the old ones...Why is there a New Left?
>
> "'The old Left was tired, cynical, frightened... LSD is more important than (considered by the 'Old Left')...The young people who have looked at the American Dream and said it isn't so great have made a statement more profound than anything the Old Left has ever made'."

A characterization of DU is contained in the appendix.

February 9, 1967

"The Daily Cardinal," student newspaper of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, in its issue of February 10, 1967, carried an article headlined, "Scheer Hits 'Mythology' of U.S. Anti-Communism." This article stated as follows:

SF 100-46832
WEH:kah

"'Anti-Communism is what holds the American people together, not the Judaeo-Christian ethic,' radical author Robert Scheer told 500 people in the Social Science building Thursday.

"He argued that the United States is attempting to impose on the Southeast Asian crisis the 'myth' of a monolithic Communism and the policy of 'containment' that developed out of the post-World War II Eastern European situation 20 years ago.

"He said that America has become 'so imbued with the anti-Communist mythology' that it has become the over-riding criteria for all, and especially foreign policy decision-making.

"He cited the investigations of philosopher Bertrand Russell's Vietnam 'War Crimes Tribunal' which purports to show American use of 'fragmentation bombs' that are not effective militarily, but which demoralize the population. 'And these bombs are designed not so much to kill as to torture.'

"'What is frighteningly horrible about this whole policy,' he said, 'is that it works. It succeeds militarily even where it fails politically.'

"He urged his listeners to 'support the Vietcong, or National Liberation Front...given the fact that they are the only ones standing up to the American 'intrusion' over there.'

"He said that it is not the North Vietnamese who have shown 'bad faith' in efforts to negotiate, 'but us.' They have already offered concessions, he said, 'even though it is we who are bombing them.'

"Russian and Chinese foreign policies, before and after the death of Stalin, he said, 'have been essentially conservative, and not aggressive.' He cited as evidence the Trotsky-Stalin conflict and Mao Tse-tung's early differences with the regular Chinese Communist Party apparatus over this issue."

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

March 16, 1967

A meeting was held at Hospitality House, Balboa Park, California, March 16, 1967, to hear ROBERT SCHEER talk on the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). He was introduced as editor of "Ramparts" magazine. His only comments concerning the CIA were that the CIA was the "whipping boy" for high officials of the U. S. Government. He indicated that if anything went wrong with the policy of the high government officials, they could always blame CIA for their failures.

In discussing the Vietnam war, SCHEER stated the President of the U. S., along with other government officials, were guilty of murder of innocent women and children. SCHEER then spoke of a trip he had taken to France and Belgium. He said he had talked to important officials in these countries and gained the impression that these officials were opposed to the war policy of President JOHNSON, particularly the bombing of North Vietnam. SCHEER alleged that there were more bombs dropped in Vietnam than were dropped during World War II. He claimed that the reason the U. S. was using anti-personnel bombs against the people of North Vietnam was because they did not agree with the U. S. and the use of anti-personnel bomb was of a punitive nature.

SCHEER took the position of an independent criticizing both the "Commie" and "Bircher" elements.

SF T-89, on 3/29/67

April 4, 1967

The "Yale Daily News", student newspaper of Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, issue of April 5, 1967, carried an article relating that ROBERT SCHEER spoke at the Law School Auditorium of Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut, on April 4, 1967, explaining the principles of "New Politics." SCHEER described the "New Politics" as a movement which seeks to bring about a substantial change in American society.

April 15, 1967

ROBERT SCHEER spoke at the rally of the Spring Mobilization Committee Against the War in Vietnam which was held April 15, 1967, at Kezar Stadium, San Francisco, California, with about 55,000 people in attendance. SCHEER remarked that General WESTMORELAND had stated that the Vietnamese people would have to "bleed more" to learn they had met their match in this war. SCHEER commented that despite United States' "intervention" in Vietnam, there would be "other Vietnams" as other rights groups and countries had their own nationalist expressions. SCHEER went on to say that "other people will make revolutions" and, thus, the U. S. would have to go into other countries. "If other people want communist revolutions, so be it" added SCHEER. Other speakers at this rally urged immediate withdrawal of U. S. troops from Vietnam.

SF T-60, on 4/17/67
Observation by SAs of FBI

NATIONAL MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM (NMCEWV)

The Spring Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMCEWV) was an ad hoc organization composed of several anti-Vietnam war and peace groups which organized mass rallies and marches in New York and San Francisco on April 15, 1967, to protest United States involvement in the Vietnam war. The SMCEWV is now known as the National Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMCEWV). The Western Mobilization Committee Against the War is the West Coast counterpart of the NMCEWV.

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

October 7, 1967

The "Daily Utah Chronicle," University of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, in its issue of October 6, 1967, carried a news article entitled, "National Perspective on Vietnam issues," which announced that a program entitled, Spectrum Vietnam, would be held in the main ballroom of the Union Building, Saturday, October 7, 1967, at noon. This would be a panel discussion with CARL OGLESBY of the Students for a Democratic Society and others. The article provided the following background data:

> "Scheer, a Political Science graduate of City College of New York, was appointed Maxwell Fellow in Public Administration at Syracuse University. Two additional years of graduate study as a Teaching Assistant in Economics and as a fellow in the Center for Chinese Studies at the University of California, Berkeley, followed. He then taught American Government at City College of New York.
>
> "Mr. Scheer visited Castro's Cuba in 1960 and co-authored with Professor Maurice Zeitlin, CUBA: TRAGEDY IN OUR HEMISPHERE.
>
> "He was appointed foreign editor of 'Ramparts Magazine' in '65, managing editor in '66, and vice president of the corporation in '67.
>
> "In spring of 1965 and again in 1966 he traveled to Southeast Asia, touring Laos and Vietnam. Findings of his trips were published in the report HOW THE UNITED STATES GOT INVOLVED IN VIETNAM.
>
> "Scheer has been active in the New Politics movement and is a member of the Board of the National Committee for New Politics."

The same paper stated that at 7:00 PM, October 7, 1967, Utah Senator WALLACE F. BENNETT and GALE McGHEE, Senator from Wyoming, would speak on Vietnam.

The "Daily Utah Chronicle," issue of October 18, 1967, carried a news article headlined, "Spectrum Chronicle Debate," which stated that ROBERT SCHEER of "Ramparts Magazine" was looking into the possibility of bringing a libel suit against the "Daily Utah Chronicle" for using slanderous misquotes attributed to him in the coverage in the Spectrum Vietnam, October 7, 1967. This article explained that the night editor of this paper rewrote the story at a time when he could not contact any sources, hence the inaccuracy.

The "Deseret News", Salt Lake City, Utah, newspaper issue of October 9, 1967, carried a news article, "Spectrum Vietnam, Question Unresolved." This article related that ROBERT SCHEER described as Editor of "Ramparts" Magazine, attacked the arrogant American myth that "we are always good guys fighting on the side with angels with a monopoly on democracy, peace and freedom."

The article said "he contended the mood of communism is now nationalism, not world expansion and that the Communists are now more concerned with internal problems than presenting a united front to defeat democracy." The article added "Mr. Scheer and Mr. Oglesby charged that the U.S. is supporting the wrong side in Vietnam because of its economic interest. The real issue in Vietnam and other troubled areas of the world is poverty, according to Scheer and Oglesby."

A symposium on Vietnam was held October 7, 1967 at the University of Utah, Student Union Building Ballroom, Salt Lake City, Utah. The panel of speakers included a senator from Utah, a senator from Wyoming, CARL OGLESBY, former President of Students for a Democratic Society, and ROBERT SCHEER, Editor of Ramparts magazine. There were about 150-200 people present at this meeting including at least seven CP members. This function was called Spectrum - Vietnam.

Following this meeting a social party and discussion was held at the residence of one SUE GOODRICK in Salt Lake City on October 7, 1967.

Both CARL OGLESBY and ROBERT SCHEER were present. The time was spent generally in questioning OGLESBY and SCHEER by youths of the New Left who were attempting to find themselves. There were about 50 persons present at this meeting including at least three CP members.

SF T-90, 10/11/67

Television, October 11, 1967

ROBERT SCHEER was introduced as Editor of Ramparts and as spokesman for the New Left when he appeared as a guest on the LES CRANE Show on television station KTTV, Channel 11, Los Angeles, California, on October 11, 1967. SCHEER stated on this program that due to electoral procedure it would be impossible to place a candidate on the ballot - that the industralist and monied interests controlled the ballot system. SCHEER said "we" had no money and because of time and other factors, it would be impossible to obtain the thousands of names to place an eligible candidate on the ballot. He added "we" would have to take over the polls. He claimed that in order to make necessary changes in the present political structures "we" would have to "take over" the establishment in Washington.

SF T-91, 10/13/67

November 20, 1967

"The Fairfield Republican" newspaper published at Fairfield, California, in its issue of November 21, 1967, carried an article headlined, "Leftist Calls U.S. 'Bought Out Society' in J. C. Talk." This article stated that ROBERT SCHEER, editor of Ramparts magazine, spoke November 20, 1967, at the Solano College Gymnasium and delivered a blistering attack on what he termed the "bought off society." He decried what he termed an "exploitive corrupt war economy fostered by a profiteering business community."

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 96 of 134 Pages

The article said SCHEER stated "We invoke the devil theory of communism to explain the reality of desperate social revolution." SCHEER concluded "Vietnam is only the extension of this unhealthy American characteristic, not an isolated example of mistaken policy. It is an integral part of a policy of corrupt self-seeking deception." After explaining that ROBERT SCHEER visited South Vietnam twice, the article quoted SCHEER as saying, "I think we have to realize that the Vietnamese are indeed fighting for their freedom - but their freedom from us. They are nationalists trying to create a national revolution, and they can't be explained away with a label."

SCHEER alleged that the United States was in the Vietnam war to make a profit. He called for staged withdrawal of U.S. troops over a period of years.

In reference to the domestic scene, SCHEER warned that sterner measures against dissent were coming and that President JOHNSON's talk about peace was a "con job." SCHEER said people were rioting in America because "they have no legitimate avenue of dissent." In summary, SCHEER urged concerned youth not to become complacent but to remain aware of the problems and refuse to conspire with liberal politicians who try to make dissent irrelevant. SCHEER told the group, "Block the halls and block the airports. This may be one of the times when to behave reasonably is to behave irresponsibly."

November 21, 1967

The "University of Washington Daily" newspaper, Seattle, Washington, issue of November 21, 1967, carried an article announcing that ROBERT SCHEER, editor of "Ramparts" Magazine, would speak at the Hub Auditorium, November 21, 1967, under sponsorship of the Political Union. The article said that SCHEER, who is leading proponent of the New Left, served on the Board of Directors of the National Conference for New Politics, which held its convention in Chicago. It stated that SCHEER was currently collaborating with WARREN HINCKLE, also on the "Ramparts" staff, in writing a book about the "Vietnam lobby".

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 97 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

The "Seattle Post Intelligencer" newspaper, Seattle, Washington, in its issue of November 22, 1967, reported that ROBERT SCHEER spoke to an overflow audience at the University of Washington, Hub Auditorium, November 21, 1967. The article stated that SCHEER said it was arrogant for Americans to decide what is best for the Vietnam people. SCHEER said it was an "obscene argument that withdrawal of American forces from Vietnam would result in a blood bath. He claimed the United States was operating on a war economy and suggested that our loss of pre-eminence in world trade as well as in jobs which rely on military contracts accounts for much of our reluctance to pull out of Asia. SCHEER predicted that 1968 may be the "last democratic election" for this nation. He predicted that the far left and the far right would grow as Americans seek alternatives. SCHEER advocated taking the billions spent on the Vietnam war and applying them to domestic problems. He alleged that unless this is done, there would be more violence and more riots in American cities.

December 8, 1967

"The Ram" newspaper of Fordham University, Bronx, New York, in its issue of December 12, 1967, carried a news article reflecting that ROBERT SCHEER gave a speech December 8, 1967 at the Fordham University Campus Center Ballroom before a crowd of 250. The article stated that SCHEER said the United States should withdraw from Vietnam and not worry about the fate of that country. In speaking about the means of demonstration, SCHEER was quoted as saying "Use your bodies imaginatively. Block railway tracks and government buildings. Violence is the only serious alternative." With regard to opposition to the war, SCHEER blamed the rowdy character of recent demonstrations which have been blocked by the economic and political power structure. He said "I support these tactics out of desperation, though I would like to see the growth of a serious left to challenge the people in power."

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

January 26, 1968

"The Daily Californian" newspaper, which is self-identified as being published daily by the Associated Students of UCB, on January 29, 1968, carried a news article entitled "Radical Groups Emphasize Need for Mutual Self-Protection". This article described a rally sponsored by MAPS held at noon on the UCB campus January 26, 1968, in which "members of the PFP, "Ramparts", Black Panthers, the mathematics faculty and political activists addressed the crowd in drizzling rain. The article carries summaries of the speeches of numerous people, including BETTINA APTHEKER KURZWEIL, a self-admitted Communist Party member, and ROBERT SCHEER. The article contained the following regarding SCHEER:

"BOB SCHEER, Managing Editor of Ramparts magazine, also spoke. He began with a comment on the carnival mood of the rally.

Roman Carnival

"'There is something obscene or bizarre about the Roman carnival attitude when seven people are in jail,' he commented, referring to the fact that Martha's Laundry was playing on the lower "plaza and evangelists were singing and preaching on the corner.

"'The United States is now fighting a war of examples,' he said. 'They're saying "there are certain things which we will not tolerate and we will make examples of those who attempt them,"' he continued.

"'And the war of examples in Vietnam has been brought home,' he added.

"He strongly emphasized the fact that the government will permit a type of false liberty so that one feels free--as long as it does not intrude on government policies.

Intruding Struggles

"'Marines won't go to jail and the people who sent them won't go to jail but we will.' Nevertheless, he said, 'We must engage in struggles that intrude.'

"'Most of us were not born to be revolutionary. But one becomes a revolutionary not out of choice but when the situation demands it,' he stated. 'The time calls for it now and we must find solidarity in a spirit of CHE GUEVARA,' he concluded"

A leaflet issued by "Campus Stop the Draft Week Committee" advertised a noon rally to be held Friday, (January 26, 1968) at UCB with six speakers, including ROBERT SCHEER and BETTINA APTHEKER.

**SF T-92, 1/26/68
Observation by SA of FBI**

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper, issue of January 27, 1968, reported on the rally at UCB, which was held January 26, 1968, attended by about 700 persons.

This article quoted ROBERT SCHEER as follows;

"'We must switch to tactics which intrude, which are effective. We must act in the spirit of a CHE GUEVARA because this is the time for the spirit of a CHE GUEVARA.'

"'We must start to plan now for the next Stop the Draft Week,' the editor of Ramparts Magazine urged. 'We must seriously think of filling the jails because Stop the Draft Weeks must go on, and if jail is the price to pay, we must pay it.'

"'Unless protest is effective, it is a charade,' he said."

SECRET

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

Television, February 4, 1968

On February 4, 1968, ROBERT SCHEER appeared as a guest on a nationally televised "Firing Line" television show at 6:30 PM, Pacific Standard Time, where he was involved in a type of debate with WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY, Editor of "National Review". BUCKLEY stated ROBERT SCHEER was invited to appear on this program to explain the un-American attitude of SCHEER and also of "Ramparts" Magazine. SCHEER said he was not previously apprised of the exact topic but in any case could not speak for "Ramparts" since he is only one member of the editorial board. SCHEER then became evasive, claiming he wanted a definition of "un-American" before he could answer BUCKLEY. During this show, SCHEER stated that "National Review" Magazine had maligned SCHEER when it stated he traveled to Cuba in violation of State Department regulations and SCHEER requested a retraction be printed. SCHEER did not state that he had traveled to CUBA illegally in 1960 and legally in 1968, but such is the case. SCHEER was very glib but was very evasive in answering BUCKLEY's questions and statements. SCHEER's statements showed him stongly in opposition to the Vietnam war.

Television, February 7, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER appeared on the Pat Michaels' television show at 10:30 p.m. on KTVU, Channel 2, Oakland on February 7, 1968. During this appearance, SCHEER stated he attended the Cultural Congress held in Havana, Cuba in early January, 1968. He said he traveled in Cuba via Mexico City as an accredited correspondent with the approval of the State Department and that he traveled alone. The interview related to SCHEER's work as managing editor of "Ramparts Magazine."

SECRET

1343

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 101 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH:mcn

Television, February 23, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER was interviewed by BRANT FRAYNE and PAUL SALTZMAN at the Expo '67 in Montreal, Quebec, Canada, in June, 1967, and the results of this interview were shown on Canadian Broadcasting Company television network on February 23, 1968. Some of the points emphasized by SCHEER in this interview are as follows:

"Ramparts" magazine, of which SCHEER is Editor, tries to be exciting and to fill a void in American life. It tries to handle the stories the other magazines do not have the guts to handle and to give some diversity of opinion in the mass media of America. It is an experiment in seeing whether American freedom and democracy really works. Other magazines are locked into the establishment because of the funding required to start a magazine and the income received from advertisers, while "Ramparts" is probably the only large circulation magazine in America that does not depend on advertising.

"Ramparts" made a decision to challenge the big magazines and to turn to a secular monthly magazine two and a half years ago (about January, 1965) and it no longer has any connection with or particular interest in the Catholic Church. It is aimed at challenging the establishment and its readers, who are primarily in the 15 to 40 year age group.

"Ramparts" has been called a muckraker and left-wing. It is on the left of the political spectrum since it opposes the war in Vietnam and is interested in removing the ghettos in American life. "Ramparts" is biased as a left-wing opposition to "Time" magazine but "Time" is biased toward the establishment and toward maintaining the status quo. "Ramparts" has never been sued for libel or had a serious challenge to its factual accuracy. "Ramparts" has a small staff of only 30 and has successfully challenged the other big magazines with extensive advertising revenue and has done a more factual reporting job on the Vietnam War, its casualties, civil rights stories and stories on such topics as the children of suburbia rebelling against suburban community and its values.

"Ramparts" magazine is largely staff produced and has nothing to offer but the guts and freedom of its reporters to report facts as they see them. "Ramparts" does not edit the reporters' articles for opinion or value of concept. These articles are only edited for size and possible emphasis for a particular issue so that there would not be four articles on Vietnam in a single issue, for instance. When "Ramparts" sends a reporter to do a story it prints what the reporter writes even though the Editor does not necessarily agree with that reporter's viewpoint.

SCHEER feels that the United States is more afflicted with an extremely biased press because in the United States we have the illusion of freedom and Americans are raised to believe that we have a free press while in fact the press is controlled through "an interlocking directorate of big business, big military and big government" that effectively manages the news so that it is not troubling or upsetting to their interests.

SCHEER believes that the honest reporting of news by "Ramparts" is doing "an awful lot of good" because a generation is being raised in the United States that knows how to be free for a change and "is not going to buy the nonsense that comes out of Washington". The youths are asking some very searching questions about American society and are not satisfied with the usual glibness so they are willing to go on marches because they do not buy these answers. This is a very large minority of youths.

Most of the American soldiers in Vietnam have been raised to believe that their country always does right and have an implicit racism. They realize that the Vietnamese do not really share United States objectives. For instance "There is a 650,000 man Vietnamese army that never does any fighting". "It is very clear that the Viet Cong has considerable support from the countryside and has done some very fine things in the countryside."

There are some cracks in the brainwashing and some disillusionment with the war in Vietnam even among American troops. More people have refused to fight and more people in the army have taken those critical steps rather than go along with the fighting. It is not a significant number yet, but SCHEER believes it is growing. "We have to figure out whether the United States is Rome on the rise or Rome in decay and hopefully America's empire is on the verge of cracking up."

When asked if he could make a generalization about the American housewife and American married life, SCHEER stated, "The average American is drunk most of the time." SCHEER explained that the average American has a couple of drinks before starting home and several more when he arrives at home. The cocktail hour is all about getting "yourself numb enough that you can take your wife and kids and then you usually fall asleep in front of the television."

SF T-93, 3/6/68

March 1, 1968

The "Albion Pleiad," Albion College weekly newspaper, Albion, Michigan, in its issue of March 1, 1968, carried an article headlined, "SCHEER Rips NORRIS, College." The article stated SCHEER was scheduled to speak on the "relevance of academe in response to cultural needs," but abandoned this topic and instead dissected the speech given by Albion College President LOUIS W. NORRIS to freshmen at this school in the fall of 1967. SCHEER said Dr. NORRIS' speech stressed the importance of vicarious learning and the central role of the "great conversation." SCHEER said the "great conversation is a bore." SCHEER stated that white middle class Americans want to make a revolution without doing anything revolutionary. SCHEER said Dr. NORRIS stated in his speech "hippies" did not belong on Albion's campus. SCHEER replied to this "with these ideas he shouldn't be president of a university, and I wouldn't have to make these statements if he hadn't given such a speech to the freshmen." He said that America can no longer engage in foreign aggression in the guise of extending freedom." SCHEER concluded his speech by stating that to alleviate these crises America should dismantle the defense apparatus, turn to a peace economy and get out of Vietnam.

One of the critics of SCHEER's speech was quoted in this article as saying, "Some of what he said was admirable, but he was so irrational and so boorish and had excruciating bad taste."

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

April 3, 1968

ROBERT SCHEER was one of many persons who was present and spoke at the University of California, Irvine, California (UCI), on April 3, 1968, when an anti-Vietnam program was held. No publicity was afforded this activity in the local metropolitan newspapers and the "Anthill", campus newspaper, published at UCI, did not publish any of the speeches delivered nor any quotes taken out of context, but merely contained an outline of the program.

SF T-94, 10/16/68

April 17, 1968

"Iowa State Daily," which is a student newspaper published at Iowa State University (ISU), Ames, Iowa, carried an article in its issue of April 17, 1968, headlined, "'Ramparts' Editor SCHEER Keynotes 'Dissent' Series." This article stated that ROBERT SCHEER, editor of "Ramparts" Magazine, would speak on "dissent, revolution and the Democratic process" on April 17, 1968, in the Great Hall, Memorial Union, ISU, as part of a series of talks sponsored by the National Affairs Institute (NAI). The article included background information to the effect that ROBERT SCHEER received a B.A. Degree in Economics and Political Science from the City College of New York, and then served as a Maxwell Fellow in Public Administration at Syracuse University.

The "Ames Daily Tribune," Ames, Iowa newspaper, issue of April 18, 1968, carried a news article headlined, "ISU Dissenters Knock System." This article reported that ROBERT SCHEER was the first speaker at ISU's "dissent" series and spoke April 17, 1968. The article reported that SCHEER stated America did not need BOBBY KENNEDY or GENE MC CARTHY, but needed a whole new political ideology. SCHEER stated "if liberals can't come up with some alternative to the prevailing political thought, the right wing is likely to do it instead." SCHEER said "our basic ideologies are going to have to be challenged if we are going to face and solve our problems." He called particularly for critical examination of the philosophies on which the United States foreign policy is based, the attitudes behind its welfare program, and the whole basis of its political system. He stated this nation is ripe for political change and the right wing has frightening ability to come up with ideological alternatives.

Copy 2 of 3 Copies
Page 105 of 184 Pages

1347

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

April 23, 1968

"The Spectrum," weekly newspaper of the State University of New York at Buffalo, New York, in its issue of April 23, 1968, carried an article announcing that a series of talks by new leftists on the central issues of the day, would begin April 23, 1968. ROBERT SCHEER was listed as one of the speakers, noting that he had spoken at the University in 1967, and was very well received.

"The Spectrum" did not carry a follow up news story concerning SCHEER's talk, and there was no reference to SCHEER's plans in the Buffalo, New York, area in the local daily papers.

May 11, 1968

The "Bozeman Daily Chronicle," newspaper, Bozeman, Montana, issue of May 12, 1968, carried an article relating to the speech of ROBERT SCHEER at Montana State University, May 11, 1968. The portion of the article relating to ROBERT SCHEER reads as follows:

> "Robert Scheer, 31-year-old editor of the New Left Ramparts Magazine, who flew here directly from Havana, Cuba, said our simplistic reason for intervention in Vietnam was the 'myth of the international communist conspiracy' also called the 'Devil Theory.' The Devil Theory has disintegrated, whether our state department will admit it or not, he said.
>
> "'This reality plays havoc with the most cherished tenant of our foreign policy,' he said. Scheer cited the squabbling between Russia and Red China, and more recently between Czechoslovakia and Russia, as evidence of the disintegration of the international conspiracy. He said that our foreign policy should be humanistic rather than jingoistic. Americanization of the rest of the world should not be our goal, he added.
>
> "Scheer said the United States should swallow its pride and get out of Vietnam. He said it might be good for the U.S. to lose a little face in Vietnam. Maybe it would be healthy for us to admit we made a mistake, that we can be wrong.

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 106 of 134 Pages

"The Exponent", student newspaper, Montana State University, Bozeman, Montana, issue of May 17, 1968, carried a news article bearing the headline, "Ramparts Editor - War is not U.S. vs Commies." This article stated that a Vietnam symposium was held on Saturday, May 11, 1968, during which ROBERT SCHEER stated "no peace or negotiations are possible unless the United States is willing to admit that the war in Vietnam is not primarily a struggle between communism and democracy." SCHEER reportedly alleged that the state department's monolithic concept of communism is the main reason that we are in that war. SCHEER stated "that the Viet Minh forerunner to the Viet Cong was a serious struggle for independence and fought the French who they considered as foreign aggressors. Both Diem and Ky, South Vietnamese leaders, worked for the French and thus the Viet Cong consider them traitors to their people. Since the U.S. supports Ky and formerly supported Diem, it was natural for the Viet Cong to fight against the U.S." SCHEER said "the U.S. should settle for something along the line of the 1954 Geneva accords to get out of Vietnam." SCHEER added that he thought it would be good for the U.S. to lose face because we have become too arrogant.

Television, June 3, 1968

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette" newspaper issue of June 4, 1968, carried an article by MIKE CULBERT, Executive Editor, which related that KTVU, Channel 2, Oakland, California, taped a television show June 3, 1968, for viewing on that station at 10:30 p.m., June 5, 1968, in which PAT MICHAELS, host, questioned ROBERT SCHEER, "A new left leader and editor of 'Ramparts' magazine" and SCOTT STANLEY, JR., "Editor of 'American Opinion' magazine, major organ of the John Birch Society." The article stated that a surprise questioner from the audience during this show was DAVID GUMAER, a 29 year old Chicagoan who infiltrated the Du Bois Clubs of America for the Chicago Police Intelligence Division and served on the registration committee of the National Convention for New Politics, which was held in Chicago, Illinois, during Labor Day weekend of 1967. The article stated GUMAER also testified before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in Executive Session in December, 1967. GUMAER stated ROBERT SCHEER was "completely surrounded by communists" at the New Politics Convention. SCHEER is reported as replying, "If you're saying I'm a communist, go ahead and say it, and I'll sue." SCHEER called GUMAER a "fink". SCHEER said he is not a communist and the communists he has known are "too conservative" for him.

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

This newspaper account of the PAT MICHAEL's television show on KTVU, Channel 2, was verified by former SA MARVIN BUCHANAN, 2150 Franklin Street, Oakland, California, on June 19, 1968.

August 19, 1968

The agenda for the National Student Association (NSA) Convention which was held at Kansas State University (KSU), Manhattan, Kansas, August 17-26, 1968, stated that there was scheduled a "discussion of the movement for social change in America on both a theoretical and a practical level," conducted by four individuals including ROBERT SCHEER.

An article in the August 21, 1968, issue of the "Kansas City Star" newspaper stated that TOM HAYDEN, former President of Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), and ROBERT SCHEER, editor of "Ramparts" Magazine, had both spoken at the NSA Convention. In this regard, the article stated "despite the militancy of their demands and aggressiveness or their charges of the JOHNSON-HUMPHREY Administration, at no time has HAYDEN or SCHEER called explicitly for violence. The printed material appearing here maintains the same guarded stance."

An article in the "Manhattan Mercury" newspaper, Manhattan, Kansas, issue of August 20, 1968, stated, "In an open forum, ROBERT SCHEER, editor of 'Ramparts' Magazine, said 'If students don't act at the (Democratic National) Convention, they must decide what their reaction is going to be when all their efforts for EUGENE MC CARTHY are swallowed up by a HUMPHREY machine. If the American people are not left with a vote against the war in Vietnam after this Convention, all the work of the students and middle class, all the efforts in the primaries, all the fund-raising will have been in vain and the Democratic process will have failed."

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

On August 23, 1968, NICK DELLERE, Del Mar Rental Company, Municipal Airport, Manhattan, Kansas, advised that on the late afternoon of August 19, 1968, ROBERT SCHEER was picked up by charter aircraft at Municipal Airport, Kansas City, Missouri, and was flown to Manhattan, Kansas. On the morning of August 20, 1968, SCHEER was returned to the airport at Kansas City, Missouri, by charter aircraft which charter flights were arranged for and paid for by a representative of NSA.

September 26, 1968

A meeting billed as "America as a Racist Culture", sponsored by the Associated Students of the UCI, was held on September 26, 1968, with about 2,000 persons in attendance, mainly students. ROBERT SCHEER was one of the main speakers talking on American imperialism, stating it was exhibited through the history of this country and was now being shown in Vietnam. SCHEER criticized the California Board of Regents for having refused ELDRIDGE CLEAVER the opportunity to lecture at a class at the University of California, Berkeley, California (UCB). SCHEER defended HUEY P. NEWTON, Founder of the Black Panther Party (BPP) (characterization to be found in the appendix), and stated that becuase of all of the problems there had evolved a close coalition between the BPP and the Peace and Freedom Party (PFP). SCHEER praised ELDRIDGE CLEAVER as the best choice among the presidential candidates.(running on the PFP ticket). SCHEER said this is a racist society in which we live and the government's efforts to "control" the black man is causing opposition to the government. He said we were forced into the streets in Chicago and society blocked our demands. SCHEER claimed "we must oppose that force."

At the same meeting, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Information of the BPP and PFP presidential candidate, also spoke, condemning the racist pigs, the police, the courts, gun control laws and the racist power structure. CLEAVER recommended that everyone obtain guns and hide them so that they would be available when needed.

SF T-95, 10/14/68

The PFP was legally qualified as a political party on the California ballot through the obtaining of approximately 67,000 signatures of registered voters.

November 14, 1968

"The Dartmouth", Dartmouth College daily newspaper, printed at Hanover, New Hampshire, in its issue of November 15, 1968, carried an article headlined "Scheer provides sharp contrast in symposia focus". This article reported that a senior symposium was held at Dartmouth College on November 14, 1968, with five speakers participating. The article began by quoting ROBERT SCHEER, Editor in Chief of "Ramparts" magazine, as stating "you must use the means at hand, which might mean burning your ROTC building to challenge the institution". The article said "the program climaxed with Scheer's appeal for the students of the college to assert themselves 'by challenging the institution that is manipulating your life'". SCHEER reportedly added, "the spots closest at heart are where you can best challenge the manipulators. I suggest you get busy at task". He added, "even in the woods at Dartmouth, where there aren't any girls, the elements for a confrontation exist. I told a similar group at Columbia this, but they wouldn't believe it. But look what happened". The article stated that the audience applaused loudly at the conclusion of SCHEER's plea.

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

VI. WRITINGS ABOUT SCHEER

"Human Events" publication, Washington, D.C., in its issue of April 8, 1967, carried a story headlined, "The Inside Story of 'Ramparts' Magazine". A portion of this story, "Scheer's Radicalism", reads as follows:

> "Probably the best known nationally of Ramparts' staffers is Managing Editor Robert Scheer, who, at 30, has made a career of New Leftism. A former member of the pro-Castro Fair Play for Cuba Committee, he is the most articulate of the Ramparts crew and contends that he is an anti-Communist.
>
> "Last year Scheer ran for the Democratic nomination for U. S. Congress in Berkeley, hinging his entire campaign on getting out of the war in Viet Nam and getting into the 'War on Poverty.' Several weeks ago, Scheer traveled to Prague, Czechoslovakia, to meet with the Communist-controlled International Union of Students and representatives of the National Liberation Front, the political arm of the Communist Viet Cong in South Viet Nam.
>
> "Not publicized in his race for Congress but revealed later was the fact that Scheer's campaign coordinator was Carl Bloice, a 28-year-old Communist party member. Bloice's CP membership was hardly a secret, for several years he had been a by-lined staff writer for People's World, the Communist weekly on the West Coast, and then he was publications director of the Communist-controlled W.E.B. DuBois Clubs.

SF 100-46832
WEH:kah

"From Berkeley to D.C.

"At last summer's Communist party convention in New York City, Bloice was elected to the CP's National Committee and the requirements for serving on that policy board make it clear Bloice has been a CP member since at least January 1964, although intelligence agencies place it many years earlier.

"Just two months ago the newsletter of the Robert Scheer campaign - he is keeping his organization intact under the name of Community for New Politics (CNP) - carried a social note: 'Carl Bloice, heretofore coordinator for CNP, has left Berkeley for the larger battlefield in Washington, D.C., where he will be a correspondent for People's World and The Worker. At a farewell party December 23 at the home of Mr. and Mrs. Robert Scheer, Carl was presented with several going-away gifts, including a larger than life poster of Mao-Tse Tung....Carl has indicated he will be an occasional correspondent [for the Scheer newsletter].... We all wish him the best of luck in Washington and we feel fully comforted by the fact that we are not losing a coordinator, but gaining a spy.'

"Tax Money Helped

"The portrait of Mao probably brought a gust of laughter when it was unveiled and presented to the Moscow-line Bloice, and the 'gaining a spy' phrase was simply New Left humor. The story makes two important points: 1) Scheer's campaign manager was a Communist, and 2) The Capital correspondent for two Communist newspapers will contribute occasional articles to Scheer's campaign organization.

"Scheer has told Human Events that he hired Bloice 'for his technical competence'; that he likes him as a person, but violently disagrees with his politics.

"Communist Bloice, however, was only one of Scheer's supporters. Another backer was the U. S. Treasury, which channeled funds into Scheer's campaign. It worked this way. During his campaign one of his workers was Mrs. Phyllis Haberman O'Donnell, who has been chairman of the East Bay DuBois Club. Mrs. O'Donnell worked on a work-study program directed by the University of California's Department of Criminology (which is now practically another Sociology Department) and was assigned to a leftist group called Welfare Rights Organization as a case worker. In truth, she worked for the Scheer campaign and reported on it at WRO meetings.

"The work-study program was originally funded through the Office of Economic Opportunity, receives its funds through the National Defense Education Act and is overseen by the Department of Health, Education and Welfare."

An article by IVAN SHARPE appeared in the San Francisco Bay Guardian daily newspaper published at San Francisco, California, in its issue of March 27, 1969, entitled "Ramparts - revolution with limousine service." This article reflects numerous interviews with present and former officials of Ramparts magazine and analyzes factors that led to this magazine's financial difficulties. The article places primary blame for the bankruptcy on WARREN HINCKLE and ROBERT SCHEER for their extragavant spending, such as taking their wives on trips for Ramparts and spending huge sums of money. Most of the blame was placed on WARREN HINCKLE because frequently his expense account would be more than the money he raised on promotional trips. The article gave most of the credit for the sensational stories and exposes to ROBERT SCHEER, who obtained them from his new left contacts. It reported that HINCKLE had destroyed Ramparts and SCHEER was angry about this. SCHEER decided to stay on as Editor-In-Chief of Ramparts and his salary has been reduced from $15,000 to $10,000 per year in an effort to help the magazine out of its financial problems.

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

VII. PHYSICAL DESCRIPTION

The following is a physical description of the Subject:

Name	ROBERT SCHEER
Address	6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland, California
Sex	Male
Race	White
Date of Birth	April 4, 1936
Place of Birth	Bronx, New York
Married	September 15, 1957, to SERENA TUREN SCHEER, date of birth October 16, 1939, at New York. Divorced, September 23, 1965, in San Francisco.
Remarried	October 22, 1965, to ANNE BUTTERFIELD WEILLS SCHEER, date of birth March 14, 1942, at California.
Height	5'10 1/2"
Hair	Light Brown
Eyes	Brown, wears dark rimmed glasses
Occupation	Writer
Peculiarities	Wears Van Dyke beard
Father	FREDERICK JACOB SCHEER, born May 5, 1898, in Germany, U.S. Citizen
Mother	IDA KURAN, born April 24, 1900, in Russia, not a U.S. citizen.
Wife	ANNE BUTTERFIELD WEILLS SCHEER, 6468 Benvenue Avenue, Oakland California.
Employment	Editor in Chief, Ramparts Magazine, San Francisco, California
U.S. Passport Number	D163804, issued February 5, 1963 - turned in and new passport number G041559 issued January 28, 1966
Wife's U.S. Passport #	D167218, issued February 25, 1963 renewed January 28, 1966
Education	City College, New York - BA Degree in Political Science, June, 1958 Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York, MA University of

1356

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 114 of 134 Pages

SF 100-46832
WEH/dp

California, Berkeley,
California, 1960-61

Arrest Record	None

AD HOC COMMITTEE TO END DISCRIMINATION

According to an article in the March 8, 1964, issue of the "San Francisco Examiner," a San Francisco daily morning newspaper, TRACY SIMS stated among other things that following a sit-in demonstration in San Francisco during October 1963 by various civil rights groups, the groups realized that a central, coordinating committee was needed. The formation of AD HOC COMMITTEE TO END DISCRIMINATION (AHCED) was the result and SIMS became its chairman.

A source reported on December 9, 1963, that in December 1963 TRACY SIMS attended a joint meeting of the San Francisco Communist Party Youth Club and the Communist Party Berkeley Off-Campus Youth Club.

A second source, on May 12, 1964, described AHCED as a central body of representatives from militant youth organizations whose purpose was to work for equal civil rights and to put pressure on establishments and employers to hire more people from the minority races, especially Negroes.

A third source reported on March 13, 1964, that at a meeting of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party on March 11, 1964, KIPP DAWSON, a representative of AHCED, related among other things that AHCED was directed and controlled by the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of the Bay Area.

A fourth source reported on January 30, 1964, that on January 29, 1964, KIPP DAWSON attended a San Francisco Branch membership meeting of the Socialist Workers Party.

Second source related on May 12, 1964, that the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of the Bay Area consisted of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of San Francisco, Berkeley, and San Francisco State College. According to source, any member of the W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco who attends San Francisco State College is automatically a member of the club at San Francisco State College.

A fifth source reported on February 3, 1965, that on February 3, 1965, a press conference was held at 1365 Turk Street, San Francisco, California. At this press conference, an official of AHCED announced and passed out press releases that as of February 3, 1965, AHCED was no longer in existence.

SECRET

1

BLACK PANTHER PARTY, aka
Black Panther Party for
Self Defense

A source advised that the Black Panther Party for Self Defense (BPPSD) was formed by HUEY PERCY NEWTON, Minister of Defense, and BOBBY GEORGE SEALE, Chairman, in December, 1966, as a militant black nationalist political organization to combat "police brutality," to unite militant black youth, and to determine the destiny of black communities. The political philosophy was taken from writings of Chairman MAO Tse-tung of Communist China and black militant writers.

In March, 1968, the name of the organization was changed to Black Panther Party (BPP).

The official BPP publication, "The Black Panther Party - Black Community News Service," states that the BPP advocates use of guns and guerrilla tactics in their violent revolutionary program to end oppression of black people.

On February 17, 1968, ELDRIDGE CLEAVER, Minister of Information, announced merger of the BPP and Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) and bestowed title of Minister of Justice, BPP, upon H. RAP BROWN, Chairman of SNCC.

> SNCC is a militant Negro organization which preaches black supremacy.

NEWTON, aforementioned, is incarcerated in the Alameda County Jail, Oakland, California, awaiting trial on charge of murder of an Oakland police officer.

Headquarters of BPP and Huey P. Newton Defense Fund are located at 4421 Grove Street, Oakland, California.

SECRET

APPENDIX

1359

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 112 of 134 Pages

SECRET

1
SF 100-46832

DISCUSSION UNLIMITED, INC.

Records of the Division of Corporations, California State Department of Investments, Los Angeles, California, indicate that Discussion Unlimited filed its Articles of Incorporation as a nonprofit corporation, with the Secretary of State, Sacramento, California, on or about June 4, 1963, noting its principal site of office as Los Angeles County, California. The aims and purposes of the organization, as listed in the Articles of Incorporation, are "...to promote full and open discussion on our society and problems".

A source advised on May 8, 1963, that Discussion Unlimited, Inc. actually was originated in Los Angeles, California, in May, 1962, and was composed largely of a number of present and former Communist Party members who assist in staging panel forums and in promoting such events. Original coordinator of the group was BERNARD LUSHER, who in 1961, was educational director of the Southern California District Communist Party.

This source was recontacted on April 9, 1965, and indicated that the basic concept of Discussion Unlimited, Inc. has not changed. It continues to present "left ideas" to at least partially non-committed audiences. It proposes to develop special activities around various issues on an irregular basis. It is not a membership organization, and does not hold regular meetings as such, but rather is strictly a forum-type organization.

On May 10, 1966, another source reported that Discussion Unlimited, Inc. continues to operate as a forum-type organization.

SECRET

APPENDIX

1360

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 118 of 134 Pages

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA - BERKELEY BRANCH;
W.E.B. DuBois Youth Club - Berkeley Chapter;
Berkeley W.E.B. DuBois Club, Berkeley DuBois Club;
East Bay DuBois Club

A source advised on April 12, 1963, that the W.E.B. DuBois Youth Club - Berkeley Chapter, was originated in October 1962, principally through the efforts of MATHEW HALLINAN.

> This same source advised in October 1963, that MATHEW HALLINAN was elected as Chairman and Communist Party (CP) Youth Commission Representative of the Berkeley CP On-Campus Youth Club during September 1963.

A second source advised that a leaflet distributed by the Berkeley DuBois Club in Spetember 1964, reflected the name of that organization to be the "W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America - Berkeley Branch."

This same leaflet, under the heading "The DuBois Clubs of America" reads as follows: "The Berkeley DuBois Club is a part of a nation-wide socialist youth organization founded in June of this year. It attempts to bring together those action-oriented youth who consider socialism to be a visible alternative to the ills of this society."

As of April 23, 1965, the Berkeley W.E.B. DuBois Club was registered with the University of California as an "off-campus" membership organization. As such, it could present lectures on campus with prior University permission and was allowed to set up and maintain a literature table on campus.

SECRET

1

W.E.B. DU BOIS CLUB OF SAN FRANCISCO,
aka. DuBois Youth Group, San Francisco
DuBois Club, San Francisco DuBois
Youth Group, Student-Labor Alliance

A source advised that on January 31, 1963, the W.E.B. DuBois Club of San Francisco held its first general meeting at California Hall, Polk and Turk Streets, San Francisco, California, at which time the aims of the club were put forth as follows by TERENCE "KAYO" HALLINAN:

(1) Alleviate the Negro problem in the United States.
(2) Promote peaceful co-existence between the United States and Russia.
(3) Promote and encourage Marxist doctrines and to bring about a socialistic government in the United States.

A second source advised in March 1963, that the DuBois Club was both conceived and originated by TERENCE HALLINAN.

A third source advised on April 9, 1965, that in April 1965, TERENCE HALLINAN advised he was not a member of the Communist Party (CP) but considered himself a communist and intended to join the CP as soon as he passed his bar exams.

A fourth source advised on June 29, 1964, that at a general membership meeting held on June 28, 1964, the DuBois Club voted to affiliate with the parent organization, the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA).

The fourth source advised on April 26, 1965, that the DuBois Club is currently active as a membership organization, has its headquarters at 1007 McAllister Street, San Francisco, and continues to follow the line and policy of the DCA.

SECRET

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 120 of 134 Pages

W. E. B. DU BOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA (DCA)

A source has advised that on October 26-27, 1963, a conference of members of the Communist Party (CP), including national functionaries, met in Chicago, Illinois, for the purpose of setting in motion forces for the establishment of a new national Marxist-oriented youth organization which would hunt for the most peaceful transition to socialism. The delegates to this meeting were cautioned against the germ of anti-Soviet and anti-CP ideologies. These delegates were also told that it would be reasonable to assume that the young socialists attracted into this new organization would eventually pass into the CP itself.

A second conference of over 20 persons met in Chicago on December 28-29, 1963, for the purpose of initiating a "call" to the new youth organization and planning for a founding convention to be held in June, 1964.

A second source has advised that the founding convention for the new youth organization was held from June 19-21, 1964, at 150 Golden Gate Avenue, San Francisco, California, at which time the name W. E. B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA) was adopted. Approximately 500 delegates from throughout the United States attended this convention. The aims of this organization, as set forth in the preamble to the constitution, are, "It is our belief that this nation can best solve its problems in an atmosphere of peaceful coexistence, complete disarmament and true freedom for all peoples of the world, and that these solutions will be reached mainly through the united efforts of all democratic elements in our country, composed essentially of the working people allied in the unity of Negroes and other minorities with whites. We further fully recognize that the greatest threat to American democracy comes from the racist and right wing forces in coalition with the most reactionary sections of the economic power structure, using the tool of anti-Communism to divide and destroy the unified struggle of the working people. As young people in the forces struggling for democracy, we shall actively strive to defeat these reactionary and neo-fascist elements and to achieve complete freedom and democracy for all Americans, thus enabling each individual to freely choose and build the society he would wish to live in. Through these struggles we feel the American people will realize the viability of the socialist alternative."

The constitution further states that this new organization shall be a membership organization open to individuals, or if five or more people so desire, a chapter can be formed which shall in turn be guided by the policies and principles of the parent organization.

As of October, 1965, the headquarters of the DCA was located at 954 McAllister Street, San Francisco, California.

Over the Labor Day weekend, 1965, the DCA held a conference in Chicago, Illinois. According to a third source, a new slate of national officers was elected at this conference, which included Chairman HUGH STERLING FOWLER, II (who, according to the third source, attended a CP cadre encampment held at Camp Midvale, New Jersey, in June, 1965, and following his election as Chairman of the DCA, attended another national CP cadre youth conference held on September 9-12, 1965, on a farm located in Northern Indiana, according to a fourth source); Director of Publicity CARL ELLENGER BLOICE (who was elected to the San Francisco County Committee CP in April, 1964, according to a fifth source); Educational Director MATTHEW "DYNAMITE" HALLINAN (who in June, 1964, was stated to be the Youth Representative on the Northern California CP District Board, according to a sixth source); Organizational Secretary TERENCE "KAYO" HALLINAN (who, according to a seventh source, met in June, 1965, with the District Staff of the Illinois CP to discuss the proposed DCA Midwest Summer Project), and Treasurer SUSAN PHYLLIS BORENSTEIN (who, according to an eighth source, has attended meetings of the Youth Club of the CP of Illinois during 1965 in connection with the DCA Summer Project).

[illegible]

1

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE, BAY AREA CHAPTER, also known as Bay Area Fair Play for Cuba Committee (BAFPCC)

The "New York Times" newspaper on November 20, 1960 carried an article captioned "Pro-Castro Body Reports U.S. Gain," which reported that the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC) had 5,000 paid-up members in the United States. The article declared that the FPCC had headquarters at 799 Broadway, New York City, New York, and had chapters in other cities, including one in San Francisco.

A source advised in March, 1961, that the Bay Area Chapter of the FPCC (BAFPCC) began to be formed in San Francisco in November, 1960, under the direct guidance and leadership of ASHER HARER, who the source identified as a member of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and a member of the National Committee of the SWP.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

This source advised in March, 1963, that in the recent election of the BAFPCC the SWP continued its influence by having SWP members elected to the executive committee

This source advised in May, 1963, that the BAFPCC included members in San Francisco and surrounding counties. He advised that the BAFPCC has no headquarters but received mail through Post Office Box 2615, San Francisco 26, California, which is a box maintained by ASHER HARER. He stated that the announced aims and purposes of the BAFPCC are to "spread the truth about Cuba and to prevent U.S. intervention in Cuba."

A second source advised on January 10, 1964, that at a BAFPCC meeting in Berkeley, California, in December, 1963, it was decided to dissolve the BAFPCC.

APPENDIX

1365

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 123 of 134 Pages

1

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE

The April 6, 1960, edition of "The New York Times" newspaper contained a full-page advertisement captioned "What Is Really Happening in Cuba," placed by the Fair Play for Cuba Committee (FPCC). This advertisement announced the formation of the FPCC in New York City and declared the FPCC intended to promulgate "the truth about revolutionary Cuba" to neutralize the distorted American press.

"The New York Times" edition of January 11, 1961, reported that at a hearing conducted before the United States Senate Internal Security Subcommittee on January 10, 1961, Dr. CHARLES A. SANTOS-BUCH identified himself and ROBERT TABER as organizers of the FPCC. He also testified he and TABER obtained funds from the Cuban Government which were applied toward the cost of the aforementioned advertisement.

On May 16, 1963, a source advised that during the first two years of the FPCC's existence there was a struggle between Communist Party (CP) and Socialist Workers Party (SWP) elements to exert their power within the FPCC and thereby influence FPCC policy. This source added that during the past year there had been a successful effort by FPCC leadership to minimize the role of these and other organizations in the FPCC so that their influence as of May, 1963, was negligible.

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

On May 20, 1963, a second source advised that VINCENT "TED" LEE, FPCC National Office Director, was then formulating FPCC policy and had indicated that he had no intention of permitting FPCC policy to be determined by any other organization. This source stated that LEE believed that the FPCC should advocate resumption of diplomatic relations between Cuba and the United States and should support the right of Cubans to manage their revolution without interference from other nations. LEE did not advocate supporting the Cuban revolution per se.

APPENDIX

FAIR PLAY FOR CUBA COMMITTEE (cont'd.)

The November 23, 1963, edition of "The New York Times" reported that Senator THOMAS J. DODD of Connecticut had called FPCC "the chief public relations instrument of the Castro network in the United States." It is to be noted that Senator DODD was a member of the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee which twice conducted hearings on the FPCC.

The December 27, 1963, edition of "The New York World Telegram and Sun" newspaper stated that the pro-Castro FPCC was seeking to go out of business and that its prime activity during its lifetime had been sponsorship of pro-Castro street rallies and mass picket lines, and the direction of an active propaganda mill highlighting illegal travel-to-Cuba campaigns. Its comparatively brief span of life was attributed to mounting anti-Castro American public opinion, the 1962 Congressional hearings which disclosed FPCC financing by Castro's United Nations Delegation, and ultimately, the bad publicity which the FPCC received from disclosure of activities on its behalf by suspected Presidential assassin LEE H. OSWALD.

On February 6, 1964, the previously mentioned second source advised that V. T. LEE had recently remarked that the FPCC was dead and that there were no plans to organize another similar organization.

On April 13, 1964, a third source advised that there had not been any FPCC activity in many months and that the FPCC had been dissolved.

APPENDIX

1
SF 100-46032

INTERNATIONAL UNION OF STUDENTS

1. "The World Federation of Democratic Youth brought into being the International Union of Students, which held a meeting in Prague on August 17-31, 1946. The administration and direction of this project was entrusted to a 17-man executive committee, of whom 12 were known Communists." Also cited as one of the "long-established Soviet-controlled international organizations" which speak identical lines of propaganda and stand together on all phases of Soviet foreign policy and which has "affiliated organizations in the United States, which consequently have also been turned into instruments in the 'peace' campaign."
(Committee on Un-American Activities, House Report 271 on American Youth for Democracy, April 17, 1947, p. 13; and House Report 378 on the Communist "peace" Offensive, April 25, 1951, originally released April 1, 1951, p. 77.)

2. Cited as being among "international Communist fronts * * * functioning at the present time."
(Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, Handbook for Americans, S. Doc. 117, April 23, 1956, p. 93, also p. 59.)

1368

APPENDIX

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 126 of 134 Pages

NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO ABOLISH THE HOUSE UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES COMMITTEE

The "Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications" issued December 1, 1961, by the House Committee on Un-American Activities, page 115, contains the following citation regarding the National Committee to Abolish the Un-American Activities Committee (NCAUAC).

"Cited as a 'new organization' set up in the Summer of 1960 to lead and direct the Communist Party's 'Operation Abolition' campaign. Seven of the national leaders of this group have been identified as Communists."

A source has advised that the NCAUAC changed its name on March 3, 1962, to include the word "House" in its name, thereby becoming known as the National Committee to Abolish the House Un-American Activities Committee (NCAHUAC).

A second source advised on June 28, 1965, that as of that date the NCAHUAC continued to function with the headquarters at 555 North Western Avenue, Los Angeles, California.

1369 APPENDIX

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY (PLP)
PROGRESSIVE LABOR MOVEMENT (PLM)

A source advised on April 20, 1965, that the PLP, formerly known as the PLM, held its first national convention April 15-18, 1965, at New York City, to organize the PLM into a PLP. The PLP will have as its ultimate objective the establishment of a militant working class movement based on Marxism-Leninism.

"The New York Times," City Edition, Tuesday, April 20, 1965, page 27, reported that a new party of "revolutionary socialism" was formally founded on April 18, 1965, under the name of the PLP. The PLP was described as an outgrowth of the PLM. Its officers were identified as MILTON ROSEN, New York, President, and WILLIAM EPTON of New York and MORT SCHEER of San Francisco, Vice Presidents. A 20-member National Committee was elected to direct the party until the next convention.

According to the article, "The Progressive Labor Movement was founded in 1962 by Mr. ROSEN and Mr. SCHEER after they were expelled from the Communist Party of the United States for assertedly following the Chinese Communist line."

The PLP publishes the "Marxist-Leninist Quarterly," a theoretical magazine; "Progressive Labor," a monthly magazine; "Challenge," a New York City newspaper; and "Spark," a west coast newspaper.

The June 1, 1965, issue of "Challenge," page 6, states that, "this paper is dedicated to fight for a new way of life - where the working men and women own and control their homes, factories, the police, courts, and the entire government on every level."

The source advised that the PLP utilizes the address of General Post Office Box 808, Brooklyn 1, New York, but also utilizes an office in Room 622, 132 Nassau Street, New York City, where PLP publications are prepared.

1370

APPENDIX

SF [illegible]

1

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY
SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION

A source advised on August 1, 1960, that the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) was formed approximately in the early part of 1938 and the Oakland Branch of the SWP was formed in the latter part of 1938.

A second source advised on October 26, 1959, that the name of the Oakland Branch of the SWP was changed to the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP.

A third source advised on April 2, 1965, that the San Francisco Branch and the Oakland-Berkeley Branch of the SWP follow the policies and directives of the National SWP with which they are affiliated.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

1371

APPENDIX

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 129 of 134 Pages

1

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), as it is known today, came into being at a founding convention held at Port Huron, Michigan, in June, 1962. The SDS is an association of young people on the left and has a current program of protesting the draft, promoting a campaign for youth to develop a conscientious objector status, denouncing United States intervention in the war in Vietnam and to "radically transform" the university community, and provide for its complete control by students. GUS HALL, General Secretary, Communist Party, USA, when interviewed by a representative of United Press International in San Francisco, California, on May 14, 1965, described the SDS as a part of the "responsible left" which the Party has "going for us." At the June, 1965 SDS National Convention, an anti-communist proviso was removed from the SDS constitution. In the October 7, 1966 issue of "New Left Notes," the official publication of SDS, an SDS spokesman stated that there are some communists in SDS and they are welcome. The National Headquarters of this organization as of April 18,1967, was located in Room 206, 1608 West Madison Street, Chicago, Illinois.

1

SF 100-46832

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE (VDC)

A source advised in May, 1965, that the VDC was founded in May, 1965, to organize the May 21-22, 1965, community "teach-in" on the University of California, Berkeley, California (UCB) campus.

Public literature distributed by the VDC reveals that the purpose of the VDC is to mold public opinion to force withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam, and to utilize dramatic, large-scale demonstrations in increasing public alarm about the Vietnam war.

A second source advised on June 24, 1966, that at a meeting of the San Francisco Branch of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) in San Francisco, California, on June 22, 1966, KIPP DAWSON, whom source identified as a member of the Branch, commented, among other things, that "with our help" the VDC was finally recognized as a political power and was under "our control."

> The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

During the period from August 18, 1966 to October 7, 1966, the VDC was publicly announced as having been expelled from the UCB as a recognized on-campus organization.

A third source advised on September 29, 1966, that PETE CAMEJO was the chief spokesman for the VDC in its attempts for reinstatement as a recognized UCB on-campus organization. Following the reinstatement of the VDC in October, 1966, CAMEJO decided to disband the Campus Chapter of the United Committee Against War (UCAW), which he had organized to replace the VDC on the UCB campus when it was expelled. The UCAW Chapter was disbanded and the VDC subsequently became an "affiliate" of UCAW.

The third source further advised that as of September 29, 1966, the VDC was controlled and dominated by PETE CAMEJO. Source added that the VDC is no longer under the control of the old stalwarts of the original VDC and there is no continuity between the original and current VDC.

> A fourth source on October 27, 1966, identified PETE CAMEJO as a current member of the SWP.
>
> The fourth and a fifth source in September and October, 1966, identified UCAW as an organization in the San Francisco and East Bay areas whose activities were directed toward protesting United States foreign policy in Vietnam, and is controlled and dominated by the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA.

10 - 16832

WOMEN FOR PEACE, aka
Women Strike for Peace

The "Berkeley Daily Gazette," a daily newspaper of general circulation published in Berkeley, California, contained an article in the November 19, 1965, evening edition reflecting that in November, 1961, when concern mounted over radioactive fallout from nuclear testing, a group of women in Washington, D. C. started Women Strike for Peace. The idea spread rapidly throughout the country and now embraces 900 groups, including Women For Peace groups in the San Francisco Bay area.

These groups support programs to achieve goals such as:

(1) Continued disarmament negotiations.

(2) A strong and flexible United Nations.

(3) Planning now at state and national levels for conversion to peace-time economy and positive efforts to ease world tensions.

The women act as individuals and as a group, with specific actions suggested by individuals and groups from all over the world. Decision to participate jointly on any given suggestion is democratly arrived at by members of the Coordinating Committee. Effective cooperation with other peace groups is encouraged. Monthly Coordinating Committee meetings and general meetings, as warranted, are open to all and announced in mailings to members. There are no dues or membership forms nor conditions for membership.

To stir an awareness of the need for peace, Women For Peace encourage public education in peace objectives at local schools and sponsor peace-oriented demonstrations and public meetings, newspaper ads, billboards, and candidates for public office. On the national level the group attempts to influence government officials by letters and conferences.

SECRET

1

SF 100-46632

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE (known in the San Francisco Bay area as the Bay Area Young Socialist Alliance, aka. the Bay Area Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance, Bay Area Committee for the Young Socialist)

A source advised on May 16, 1960, that the Bay Area Young Socialist Alliance (BAYSA) was formed in February 1958, as the Bay Area Committee for the Young Socialist (BACYS). At a later state in its development prior to adoption of the name BAYSA, the organization was known as the Bay Area Committee of the Young Socialist Alliance (BACYSA).

The source advised that as a result of a national convention held April 15-17, 1960, at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, the BAYSA became a branch of the national organization to be known as the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) and will carry out in the Northern California area the policies of the YSA.

A second source advised April 28, 1966, that the BAYSA is currently active and is composed of three locals: The San Francisco YSA, the Berkeley YSA, and the San Jose YSA.

The first source advised on April 28, 1966, that the BAYSA, although ostensibly an independent organization, is in reality controlled by the San Francisco Branch, Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and the Oakland Branch SWP.

The SWP has been designated by the Attorney General of the United States pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

APPENDIX

SECR

1375

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 133 of 134 Pages

1

SECRET

SF 100-4[illegible]

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The May, 1960 issue of the "Young Socialist" (YS), page 1, column 3, disclosed that during April 15-17, 1960, a national organization entitled "The Young Socialist Alliance" (YSA) was established at Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. This issue stated that this organization was formed by the nation-wide supporter clubs of the publication YS.

The above issue, page 6, set forth the Founding Declaration of YSA. This declaration stated that the YSA recognizes the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) as the only existing political leadership on class struggle principles, and that the supporters of the YS have come into basic political solidarity with the SWP on the principles of revolutionary socialism.

A source advised on May 23, 1966, that the original YSA was an organization formed during October, 1957, in New York City by youth of various left socialist tendencies, particularly members and followers of the SWP. The leaders of this group were the guiding forces in the establishment of the national organization.

The source further advised on May 23, 1966, that the YSA is dominated and controlled on a national basis by the SWP through having SWP members comprise exclusively the National Executive Committee (NEC). The YSA, in reality, is the youth and training section of the SWP and the main source of new SWP members.

The headquarters of the YSA are located in Room 535, 41 Union Square West, New York City.

The SWP has been designated pursuant to Executive Order 10450.

SECRET

APPENDIX

1376

134*

Copy 1 of 3 Copies
Page 134 of 134 Pages

SECRE

FD-323 (Rev. 11-29-61)

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

In Reply, Please Refer to
File No.

San Francisco, California

April 22, 1969

Title	ROBERT SCHEER
Character	SECURITY MATTER - MISCELLANEOUS (KEY ACTIVIST)
Reference	Report of SA WILLIAM E. HUGHES dated and captioned as above at San Francisco, California.

All sources (except any listed below) whose identities are concealed in referenced communication have furnished reliable information in the past.

SF T-23 with whom contact has been insufficient to establish his reliability.

SECR

This document contains neither recommendations nor conclusions of the FBI. It is the property of the FBI and is loaned to your agency; it and its contents are not to be distributed outside your agency.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/21/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10002-10216
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 87

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : FBI
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/19/58
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

PRE-INDUCTEE

REPEAT-O-TYPE STENCIL MANUFACTURING COMPANY

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 11/02/97
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY FBI
COMMENTS : COORDINATION WITH FBI HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE WITH RESTRICTIONS, PER LTR DTD 5 NOV 97.

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

19 October 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

H1 016 940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

18 (DEVELOPED EMPLOYMENT) On 15 October 1958, the payroll files of the Repeat-O-Type Stencil Manufacturing Company, 153 Coffey Street, Brooklyn, New York, were examined with the assistance of Harry Hofner, Certified Public Accountant, and revealed the following information in substance:

Name Recorded:	Robert SCHEER
Residence address:	653 Britton Street Bronx 67, New York
Social Security Number:	112-28-1134
Dates of Employment:	Week ending 24 June 1955 to week ending 1 July 1955.

Source stated that no additional employment records were maintained for SUBJECT, that beginning date of employment was about 17 June 1955 and the rate of pay was one dollar ($1.00) per hour. Source was a CPA, not a firm member, and was not acquainted with SUBJECT.

87

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group 085

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Paul F Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10003-10335
RECORDS SERIES : INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 3

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 59TH ORD GP
TO : USA ADVANCED WEAPONS SUPPORT COMD
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/17/71
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : KACZMARCYYK, GEORGE

RESULTS OF NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CONTINUATION SHEET INDEXED SEPARATELY.

N R 10/1 59/84

STAPLE HERE

NACC Use Only 266-1407	A1 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE **NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST**	REQUEST DATE 16 Sep 71
	1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME KACZMARCZYK, Edward NMN E5	2. SEX Male
	3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S) NONE OCT 1 1971	4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER 143 40 1685
5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH Aug 06, 47	6. PLACE OF BIRTH Bomblitz, West Germany GE	7. SERVICE NUMBER RA 1272 4692

62

RETURN RESULTS TO: (Include ZIP Code)

Commanding Officer
US Army Advanced Weapons Support Command
ATTN: Intelligence Branch
APO NY 09189

8.a. SECURITY PROGRAM
☒ MILITARY EM
☐ CIVILIAN
☐ INDUSTRIAL

b. ☒ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST
Commanding Officer
HHC, 59th Ord Gp

A 1 G

ACCT# 6124

9. RELATIVES	10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	11. PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER	12 Nov 12	300 Stone St	

RESULTS OF NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

This request for a NAC was completed by USAINTC on, with results checked below: NOV 17 1971

☐ **FAVORABLE** ☒ **FAVORABLE DETERMINATION** ☐ **SEE ATTACHED SUMMARY**

☐ **SEE ATTACHED COPY OF DOSSIER** ☒ **NO DA FORM 873 IN DOSSIER.**

☐ **DA FORM 873 IN DOSSIER FOR**

GEORGE TOBIAS
MAJ, MI
CHIEF, USAREUR LN TM

Nov 60	Jun 64	Wilson Jr HS #12	Bayonne, NJ

YES	NO	16. ("Yes" answers must be explained in Item 18, below.)	17. REQUEST DATA					
			a. REQUESTER DESIGNATOR				b.	REASON
X		a. Is the subject an alien or naturalized citizen?	X	ARMY		DASA		BASIC TRAINEE
X		b. Has the subject any foreign connections, employment or military service?		NAVY		DCA		PRE-COMMISSION
X		c. Has the subject travelled or resided abroad other than for the U.S. Government?		AIR FORCE		DCAA		NUCLEAR
	X	d. Has the subject had employment requiring a security clearance or investigation?		OSD		DIA		BI.
X		e. Is the subject now or has he ever been in the Federal Civil Service or Armed Forces?		JCS		DSA	X	SECRET CLEARANCE
	X	f. Has the subject qualified DD Form 398, 98, 48-1, or similar security form?		NSA		DISCO	X	
	X	g. Has the subject ever been addicted to drugs?						

Investigative files located no identifiable
Not
pertinent to your inquiry. To check
clearance. must be submitted to
fingerprints
Identification Division.
for positive check

18. REMARKS *(If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)*
ITEM #13. Sep 71 - present, OPR, Pirmasens, Germany

3

ITEM #8a. & 8b.
Josef Kaczmarczyk, DPOE: 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, Alien reg. #A7904415
Dorota Iwanowa Kaczmarczyk, DPOE: 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, Alien reg # A7904416
continued

DD FORM 1 DEC 66 1584 REPLACES DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65, WHICH IS OBSOLETE ☆ GPO: 1967 0 279-094 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10003-10336
RECORDS SERIES : INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 4-5

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 59TH ORD GP
TO : USA ADVANCED WEAPONS SUPPORT COMD
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/17/71
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : KACZMARCYYK, GEORGE

RESULTS OF NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

NR 10/1 59/84

STAPLE HERE

NACC Use Only

266-1407

A1

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST

REQUEST DATE: 16 Sep 71

OCT 1 1971

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME	KACZMARCZYK, Edward NMN E5
2. SEX	Male
3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S)	NONE
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	143 40 1685
5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH	Aug 06, 47
6. PLACE OF BIRTH	Bomblitz, West Germany GE
7. SERVICE NUMBER	RA 1272 4692

62

RETURN RESULTS TO: *(Include ZIP Code)*

Commanding Officer
US Army Advanced Weapons Support Command
ATTN: Intelligence Branch
APO NY 09189

A 1 G

ACCT# 6124

8 a. SECURITY PROGRAM
☒ MILITARY EM
☐ CIVILIAN
☐ INDUSTRIAL

b. ☒ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST
Commanding Officer
HHC, 59th Ord Gp

9. RELATIVES	10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	11. PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER KACZMARCZYK, Josef	12 Nov 12 Frampol, Poland	300 Stone St Dothan, Ala.	Polish
b. MOTHER *(Full Maiden Name)* IWANOWA, Dorota	19 Mar 06 Alexandrovsk, Ukraine	300 Stone St Dothan, Ala.	Polish
c. SPOUSE *(Full Maiden Name)* EASON, Patricia Ann	30 Apr 48 Newport News, Va	6309 Riverdale Rd #715 Riverdale, Md	US

13. RESIDENCES *(List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)*

a. FROM	*b.* TO	*c.* NUMBER AND STREET	*d.* CITY	*e.* STATE
Dec 64	Jun 65	OPR	Ft Dix	NJ
Jul 65	Feb 67	OPR	Evreux-FauvilleAFB	France
Mar 67	Jan 68	OPR	Patrick AFB	Fla.
Jan 68	Mar 69	OPR	Ft Sill	Okla
Apr 69	Mar 70	OPR	Hue	RVN
Aug 70	Aug 71	4313 I Rose Terrace	Ft Knox	Ky

US ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
NOV 17 1971
ENTNAC under provisions of AR 381-130 completed with results as indicated
KENNETH E. THIERER
LTC, MI
Chief, PSI Division

14. EMPLOYMENT *(List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent employment)*

a. FROM	*b.* TO	*c.* EMPLOYER	*d.* PLACE
Mar 70	Jun 70	Unemployed	
Jun 70	Aug 70	Briggs Co	Landover, Md

DN

15. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	*b.* TO	*c.* NAME	*d.* PLACE
Nov 60	Jun 64	Wilson Jr HS #12	Passaic, NJ

Check of FBI investigative files based upon data submitted located no identifiable information pertinent to your inquiry. Not to be considered a clearance. To check arrest records request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

FBI

YES	NO	16. *("Yes" answers must be explained in Item 18, below.)*
X		*a.* Is the subject an alien or naturalized citizen?
X		*b.* Has the subject any foreign connections, employment or military service?
X		*c.* Has the subject travelled or resided abroad other than for the U.S. Government?
	X	*d.* Has the subject had employment requiring a security clearance or investigation?
X		*e.* Is the subject now or has he ever been in the Federal Civil Service or Armed Forces?
	X	*f.* Has the subject qualified DD Form 398, 98, 48-1, or similar security form?
	X	*g.* Has the subject ever been addicted to drugs?

17. REQUEST DATA

a. REQUESTER DESIGNATOR				*b.*	REASON
X	ARMY		DASA		BASIC TRAINEE
	NAVY		DCA		PRE-COMMISSION
	AIR FORCE		DCAA		NUCLEAR
	OSD		DIA		BI.
	JCS		DSA	X	SECRET
	NSA		DISCO	X	CLEARANCE

18. REMARKS *(If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)*

ITEM #13. Sep 71 - present, OPR, Pirmasens, Germany

ITEM #8a. & 8b. 4

Josef Kaczmarczyk, DPOE: 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, Alien reg. #A7904415
Dorota Iwanowa Kaczmarczyk, DPOE: 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, Alien reg # A7904416
continued

DD FORM 1 DEC 66 1584 REPLACES DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65, WHICH IS OBSOLETE ☆ GPO: 1967 0 279-094

DD FORM 1584 - continu[redacted] KACZMARCEYK, Edward NMN, DP[redacted] Aug 06, 47, Bomblitz, West Germany, SSAN: 143 40 1685

ITEM #15a. Subject was naturalized on 24 Oct 69 in US District Court, Honolulu, Hawaii. Naturalization No: 9271178

ITEM 15b.

Uncle,	Stanley Kaczmarczyk,	age 66,	Sluchowo, Poland
Aunt,	Ann Artabolowska ,	age 67,	Charkow, USSR
Aunt,	Kshania Hitriowa ,	age unk,	Charkow, USSR
Stepbrother,	Wladimir Iwanow ,	age unk,	Charkov, USSR

ITEM 15c.
Subject immigrated to United States with parents on 25 Nov 50. From 19 Dec 55 until 2 Nov 60 traveled through USSR and Poland visiting family. Detained in USSR for 9 months before exit was permitted. Subject left Poland with family on 16 Apr 57 to return to United States. Family (including subject) was held over in Hamburg, West Germany, awaiting sponsorship to return to United States.

While in Germany, subject visited Luton, Bedfordshire, England, from 17 Dec 58 until 12 Mar 59.

Subject re-entered the United States on 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, for purpose of legal residence.

Subject also visited Canada from 6 Aug 63 - 12 Aug 63.

ITEM 15e.
Active duty, US Army, E5, Dec 64 - Mar 70, Aug 70 to present.

Check of FBI investigative files based upon data submitted located no identifiable information pertinent to your inquiry. Not to be considered as a clearance. To check arrest records request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

266-140

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10003-10338
RECORDS SERIES : INTELLIGENCE/COUNTERINTELLIGENCE SOURCES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 8-9

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 59TH ORD GP
TO : USA ADVANCED WEAPONS SUPPORT COMD
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/16/71
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : KACZMARCYYK, GEORGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

59

STAPLE HERE

NACC Use Only

266-1407

A

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST

K250

REQUEST DATE
16 Sep 71

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME
KACZMARCZYK, Edward NMN

2. SEX
Male

3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S)
NONE

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
143 40 1685

5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH
Aug 06, 47

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Bomblitz, West Germany GE

7. SERVICE NUMBER
RA 1272 4692

8. a. SECURITY PROGRAM
☒ MILITARY EM
☐ CIVILIAN
☐ INDUSTRIAL

b. ☒ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST
Commanding Officer
HHC, 59th Ord Gp

RETURN RESULTS TO:
(Include ZIP Code)

Commanding Officer
US Army Advanced Weapons Support Command
ATTN: Intelligence Branch
APO NY 09189

A-1 G

ACCT# 6124

9. RELATIVES	10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	11. PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER KACZMARCZYK, Josef	12 Nov 12 Frampol, Poland	300 Stone St Dothan, Ala.	Polish
b. MOTHER (Full Maiden Name) IWANOWA, Dorota	19 Mar 06 Alexandrowsk, Ukraine	300 Stone St Dothan, Ala.	Polish
c. SPOUSE (Full Maiden Name) EASON, Patricia Ann	30 Apr 48 Newport News, Va.	5309 Riverdale Rd #715 Riverdale, Md	US

13. RESIDENCES (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
Dec 64	Jun 65	OFR	Ft Dix	NJ
Jul 65	Feb 67	OFR	Evreux-FauvilleAFB	France
Mar 67	Jan 68	OFR	Patrick AFB	Fla.
Jan 68	Mar 69	OFR	Ft Sill	Okla
Apr 69	Mar 70	OFR	Hue	RVN
Aug 70	Aug 71	4313 I Rose Terrace	Ft Knox	Ky

14. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent employment)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Mar 70	Jun 70	Unemployed	
Jun 70	Aug 70	Briggs Co	Landover, Md

CZIP NOT REQUIRED

DO NOT FORWARD TO FIEL

Central Office - INS

Route to CORAIB - Room 240
Central Office - I&NS

No Record

Alien Reg.# A7-904-417 File at HHQ

Citizenship# C9271178, Issued at 10/24/69 8/22/69

☒	g. Has the subject ever been addicted to drugs?	

INSA ☐ DISCO ☒ CLEARANCE

18. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)
ITEM #13. Sep 71 - present, OFR, Pirmasens, Germany

8

ITEM #8a. & 8b.
Josef Kaczmarczyk, DPOE: 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, Alien reg. #A7904415 OK
Dorota Iwanowa Kaczmarczyk, DPOE: 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, Alien reg # A7904416 OK
continued

DD FORM 1 DEC 66 1584 REPLACES DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65, WHICH IS OBSOLETE ☆ GPO: 1967 0 279-094

DD FORM 1584 - continued. KACZMARCZYK, Edward NMI, DPOB: Aug 06, 47, Bomblitz, West Germany, SSAN: 1[redacted] 40 1685

ITEM #15a. Subject was naturalized on 24 Oct 69 in US District Court, Honolulu, Hawaii. Naturalization No: 9271178

OK

ITEM 15b.

Uncle,	Stanley Kaczmarczyk,	age 66, Gluchow, Poland
Aunt,	Ann Artebolowska ,	age 67, Charkow, USSR
Aunt,	Kshenia Mitriowa ,	age unk, Charkow, USSR
Stepbrother,	Wladimir Iwanow ,	age unk, Charkow, USSR

ITEM 15c.
Subject immigrated to United States with parents on 25 Nov 50. From 19 Dec 55 until 2 Nov 60 traveled through USSR and Poland visiting family. Detained in USSR for 9 months before exit was permitted. Subject left Poland with family on 16 Apr 57 to return to United States. Family (including subject) was held over in Hamburg, West Germany, awaiting sponsorship to return to United States.

While in Germany, subject visited Luton, Bedfordshire, England, from 17 Dec 58 until 12 Mar 59.

Subject re-entered the United States on 2 Nov 60, NYC, NY, for purpose of legal residence.

Subject also visited Canada from 6 Aug 63 - 12 Aug 63.

ITEM 15e.
Active duty, US Army, E5, Dec 64 - Mar 70, Aug 70 to present.

DO NOT FORWARD TO FIEL

Central Office - INS

Route to CORAIB - Room 240
Central Office - I&NS

No Record ______________________

Alien Reg.# ______________________ File at ______________________

Citizenship# ______________________ Issued at ______________________

Date : 01/13/98
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10129
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 2

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 03/28/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

NAC HISTORY CARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

1.

564588137

NAME	SEX	DATE OF BIRTH	POB	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	MIL. SVC. NO.	NI
FROMER DAVID REED	M	072142	14	564-58-8137		S

DATE COMPLETED	
032867	8

DCI	FBI-HQ	FBI-ID	TAG-O	TAG-E	AF-MPRD	BUPERS	USMC	USCG	MPRC	CSC	CIA	I&NS	STATE-S	STATE-P	USAAC	FRC	HCUA	OTHER	OTHER	OTHER

OTHER AGENCIES

1. AIR RESERVE RECORDS CENTER, DENVER, COLO.
2. SECRET SERVICE
3. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE
4. BUREAU OF CUSTOMS
5. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS
6. U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY
7. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK HISTORY CARD

DD FORM 1546 DEC 65

564588137

NAME	SEX	NAME I.D.	DATE OF BIRTH MO	DATE OF BIRTH DAY	DATE OF BIRTH YR	PLACE OF BIRTH	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER	MILITARY SERVICE NUMBER	DATE COMPLETED MO	DATE COMPLETED DAY	DATE COMPLETED YR	DCI	FBI-HQ	FBI-ID	TAG-O	TAG-E	AF-MPRD	BUPERS	USMC	USCG	MPRC	CSC	CIA	I&NS	STATE-S	STATE-P	USAAC	FRC	HCUA	OTHER	OTHER	OTHER	MACH CONTROL
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27	28	29	30 31	32 33	34 35	36 37	38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48	49 50 51 52	53 54	55 56	57 58	59	60	61	62	63	64	65	66	67	68	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80

686360 BSC

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10135
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 14-14A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : USAPSG
TO : DCS-OPS USAINTC
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 05/05/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992
(44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

[redacted]

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
(AR 381–130)

DATE 5 May 1967

TO: *(Control Office)*
DCS-OPS
USAINTC
ATTN: OPS III (Mr. Burwasser)
Fort Holabird, Md.

THRU:

FROM: *(Requesting Agency)*
USAPSG

(Enter name and address of the ACTION AGENCY to which results are to be sent, if known by requester)

U.S. Army Personnel Security Group
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
ATTN: Adjudications Division

CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY

REQUIREMENT	REQUEST NO.
DOSSIER NO.	OPENING DATE
REMARKS	

SECTION I – REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

1. SUBJECT *(Last name in capitals, first and middle names)* FROMER, David Reed	2. ALIAS(ES), MAIDEN NAME None	3. SERVICE/SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 564-58-8137
4. DATE OF BIRTH *(Day, Month, Year)* 21 July 1942	5. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State and country)* Chicago, Illinois	6. GRADE AND POSITION Registrant

7. REQUESTED ACTION ☒ INVESTIGATION ☐ VALIDATION ☐ RECORDS CHECK

8. TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: ☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☒ OTHER *(Explain in Item 15)*

9. a. FOR CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS TO: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
b. ☐ FOR LIMITED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION
c. ☐ INTERIM CLEARANCE DESIRED
d. ☒ OTHER *(Explain in Item 15)*

10. TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR:

11. JUSTIFICATION

12. REVIEW OF FILES REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH ____ AR 604-5, COMPLETED ON ____________ REVEALED:
☐ NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION ☐ UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION DETERMINED NOT TO BE A BAR TO ACTION CONTEMPLATED
☐ INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN ITEM 15

13. LATEST INVESTIGATION/CLEARANCE *(Type, when, by whom)*

14. NO BREAK IN FEDERAL SERVICE EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS SINCE

15. REMARKS *(If unfavorable information entered, transmit in sealed envelope thru intelligence channels.)*

Request that Headquarters and Local FBI (S) file checks be conducted on SUBJECT's parents.

"Request this investigation be expedited as determination under AR 604-10 is being delayed at Department of the Army pending results".

REGRAD[illegible] [illegible]SIFIED
ON 2 Sep94
BY CDR [illegible] F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

INCLS Dossier 564588137 re SUBJECT	TYPED NAME AND TITLE J B FINNEGAN COL AIS	14	SIGNATURE

SECTION II - CONTROL OFFICE TO REQUESTER

DATE

IRR COPY

16. ☐ NEW FINGERPRINT CARD REQUIRED
☐ ITEMS __________ ON SPH (PSQ) REQUIRE CORRECTION AND/OR COMPLETION.
☐ INTERIM REPORT FORWARDED. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND RETURN OF INCLOSURES UPON COMPLETION.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

Regraded Unclassified when separated from classified inclosures

[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 64 2784

[redacted]

SECTION III – REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE	DATE

17. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ INFORMATION NOTED　☐ SUBJECT REASSIGNED TO NON-SENSITIVE DUTIES, INVESTIGATION MAY BE CANCELED.　☐ INFORMATION CONSIDERED NO BAR TO CLEARANCE. REQUEST COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION.

18. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

19. REMARKS *(If returning corrected forms, state here)*

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

SECTION IV – CONTROL OFFICE TO ACTION AGENCY	DATE

20. RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

☐ NO RECORD　☐ FAVORABLE　☐ MINOR UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION RECORDED IN ITEM 21

☐ PRIOR INVESTIGATION INSUFFICIENT FOR ACTION CONTEMPLATED IF NEEDED, INITIATE REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION.　☐ FORWARDED FOR SECURITY DETERMINATION BY CLEARING AUTHORITY

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION ☐ NAC　☐ NACI　☐ BI　☐ OTHER	COMPLETED BY	DATE	DOSSIER NUMBER

21. REMARKS

a. THIS FORM, TOGETHER WITH ANY INCLOSURES, REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND USACRF COPY OF DA FORM 873 *(if appropriate)* WILL BE RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OFFICE WITHIN______ DAYS AFTER RECEIPT.

b. IN THE EVENT SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM YOUR COMMAND, THIS FORM AND INCLOSURES WILL BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY WITH ITEM 23 COMPLETED.

c. ATTENTION IS INVITED TO: PARAGRAPHS________________ *AR 604–5;* PARAGRAPH___ *AR 604–11;* PARAGRAPH____ *AR 640–98;* AND PARAGRAPH_____ *AR 381–130*, AS APPLICABLE.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

SECTION V – ACTION AGENCY TO CONTROL OFFICE	DATE

22. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ FAVORABLE DETERMINATION, USACRF COPY DA FORM 873 ATTACHED　☐ UNFAVORABLE DETERMINATION, RECOMMENDED ACTION IN ITEM 24　☐ REQUEST ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION AS INDICATED IN ITEM 24

23. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

24. REMARKS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep94
BY CDR [illegible] FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

INCLS	TYBED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

142

[redacted]

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10138
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 27-27A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : DIETRICH, DAN H. JR
TO : USA PERSONNEL SECURITY GROUP
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 06/13/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL FBI (S) FILE CHECK

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : INCLOSURES NOT INCLUDED. RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 [44 USC 2107 Note]. Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

[redacted]

SECTION III – REQUE [illegible] R TO CONTROL OFFICE | DAT

17. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ INFORMATION NOTED

☐ SUBJECT REASSIGNED TO NON-SENSITIVE DUTIES, INVESTIGATION MAY BE CANCELED.

☐ INFORMATION CONSIDERED NO BAR TO CLEARANCE. REQUEST COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION.

18. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

19. REMARKS *(If returning corrected forms, state here)*

INCLS.	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

SECTION IV – CONTROL OFFICE TO ACTION AGENCY | DATE 14 JUN 1967

20. RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

☐ NO RECORD ☐ FAVORABLE ☐ MINOR UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION RECORDED IN ITEM 21

☐ PRIOR INVESTIGATION INSUFFICIENT FOR ACTION CONTEMPLATED IF NEEDED, INITIATE REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION.

☒ FORWARDED FOR SECURITY DETERMINATION BY CLEARING AUTHORITY

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION	COMPLETED BY	DATE	DOSSIER NUMBER
☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☒ OTHER	USAINTC	13 Jun 67	5 64 58 81 37

21. REMARKS

a. THIS FORM, TOGETHER WITH ANY INCLOSURES, REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND USACRF COPY OF DA FORM 873 *(if appropriate)* WILL BE RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OFFICE WITHIN ____ DAYS AFTER RECEIPT.

b. IN THE EVENT SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM YOUR COMMAND, THIS FORM AND INCLOSURES WILL BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY WITH ITEM 23 COMPLETED.

c. ATTENTION IS INVITED TO: PARAGRAPHS ________ *AR 604–5;* PARAGRAPH ____ *AR 604–11;* PARAGRAPH ____ *AR 640–98;* AND PARAGRAPH ____ *AR 381–130,* AS APPLICABLE.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
n/c	DAN H. DIETRICH, JR. LTC, AIS, CHIEF, ICOP-III	ICOP III S. B. Butt

SECTION V – ACTION AGENCY TO CONTROL OFFICE | DATE

22. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ FAVORABLE DETERMINATION, USACRF COPY DA FORM 873 ATTACHED

☐ UNFAVORABLE DETERMINATION, RECOMMENDED ACTION IN ITEM 24

RESCINDED PER DA MESSAGE DA 765175, DATED 10 MAY 65

23. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

24. REMARKS

Regraded Unclassified When Separated
From Classified Inclosures
and Marked
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - This Protective
Marking is Excluded From Automatic
Termination"

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep94
BY CDR [illegible] T01/PO
AUTH Para 1-[illegible] DOD 5200.1R

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

27

[redacted]

[redacted]

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
(AR 381-130)

DATE 5 May 1967

TO: (Control Office)
DCS-OPS
USAINTC
ATTN: OPS III (Mr. Burwasser)
Fort Holabird, Md.

THRU:

FROM: (Requesting Agency)
USAPSG

(Enter name and address of the ACTION AGENCY to which results are to be sent, if known by requestor)

U.S. Army Personnel Security Group
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219
ATTN: Adjudications Division

CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY

REQUIREMENT

REQUEST NO.

DOSSIER NO.

OPENING DATE

REMARKS
REC'D 7 1 2 9 ICOP III

SECTION I — REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

1. SUBJECT (Last name in capitals, first and middle names): FROMER, David Reed
2. ALIAS(ES), MAIDEN NAME: None
3. SERVICE/SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 564-58-8137
4. DATE OF BIRTH (Day, Month, Year): 21 July 1942
5. PLACE OF BIRTH (City, State and country): Chicago, Illinois 10
6. GRADE AND POSITION: Registrant
7. REQUESTED ACTION ☒ INVESTIGATION ☐ VALIDATION ☐ RECORDS CHECK
8. TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: ☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☒ OTHER (Explain in Item 15)
9. a. FOR CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS TO: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
b. ☐ FOR LIMITED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION
c. ☐ INTERIM CLEARANCE DESIRED
d. ☒ OTHER (Explain in Item 15)
10. TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR:
11. JUSTIFICATION
12. REVIEW OF FILES REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH ___ AR 604-5, COMPLETED ON ___ REVEALED:
☐ NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION ☐ UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION DETERMINED NOT TO BE A BAR TO ACTION CONTEMPLATED
☐ INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN ITEM 15
13. LATEST INVESTIGATION/CLEARANCE (Type, when, by whom)
14. NO BREAK IN FEDERAL SERVICE EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS SINCE
15. REMARKS (If unfavorable information entered, transmit in sealed envelope thru intelligence channels.)

Request that Headquarters and Local FBI (S) file checks be conducted on SUBJECT's parents.

"Request this investigation be expedited as determination under AR 604-10 is being delayed at Department of the Army pending results".

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

INCLS
Dossier 564588137
re SUBJECT

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
J B FINNEGAN
COL AIS

SIGNATURE

SECTION II - CONTROL OFFICE TO REQUESTER

DATE

16. ☐ NEW FINGERPRINT CARD REQUIRED
☐ ITEMS ___ ON SPH (PSQ) REQUIRE CORRECTION AND/OR COMPLETION.
☐ INTERIM REPORT FORWARDED. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND RETURN OF INCLOSURES UPON COMPLETION.

INCLS

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

272

SIGNATURE

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures

[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 64 2784

eleased under the John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
8613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10139
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 372-373

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : HAYASHIDA, MYRON K.
TO : USA INTELLIGENCE CMD
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/25/66
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R.

INDUCTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94. INCLOSURES NOT INCLUDED.

H

[redacted]

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERS[redacted] ACTION
(AR 381–130)

DATE 25 November 1966

TO: *(Control Office)*
CG, USA Intelligence Cmd
ATTN: ACofS, CONOPS
PO Box 398
Fort Holabird, Md 21219

THRU:
CG, USAREC
ATTN: Security Officer
Hampton, Va 23369

FROM: *(Requesting Agency)*
CO, AFEES
1515 Clay Street
Oakland, California

7 DEC 19

(Enter name and address of the ACTION AGENCY to which results are to be sent, if known by requester)

CHIEF, USAPSG
ATTN: Adjudication Branch
Fort Holabird, Md 21219

CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY

REQUIREMENT	REQUEST NO.
DOSSIER NO.	OPENING DATE
REMARKS	

SECTION I – REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

1. SUBJECT *(Last name in capitals, first and middle names)*: FROMER, David Reed
2. ALIAS(ES), : None
3. ~~SERVICE~~/SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 564-58-8137
4. DATE OF BIRTH *(Day, Month, Year)*: 21 July 1942
5. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State and country)*: Chicago, Illinois
6. GRADE AND POSITION: N/A
7. REQUESTED ACTION ☒ INVESTIGATION ☐ VALIDATION ☐ RECORDS CHECK
8. TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: ☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☐ OTHER *(Explain in Item 15)*
9. a. FOR CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS TO: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL
b. ☐ FOR LIMITED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION
c. ☐ INTERIM CLEARANCE DESIRED
d. ☒ OTHER *(Explain in Item 15)*
10. TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR: INDUCTION
11. JUSTIFICATION: PAR 18, AR 604-10
12. REVIEW OF FILES REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH ____ AR 604-5, COMPLETED ON ____________ REVEALED:
☐ NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION ☐ UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION DETERMINED NOT TO BE A BAR TO ACTION CONTEMPLATED
☐ INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN ITEM 15
13. LATEST INVESTIGATION/CLEARANCE *(Type, when, by whom)*: N/A
14. NO BREAK IN FEDERAL SERVICE EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS SINCE: N/A
15. REMARKS *(If unfavorable information entered, transmit in sealed envelope thru intelligence channels.)*

Request investigation of registrant in view of remarks made by registrant in remarks section of DD Form 98 and DD Form 398. SSN: 4-42-42-204

Regraded ... Enclosure
Fr...
...ective
... automatic
...termination"

Headquarters
US Army Recruiting Command
Hampton, Virginia 23369

INCLS 2	TYPED NAME AND TITLE MYRON K. HAYASHIDA 1/LT, AGC 372	SIGNATURE Myron K Hayashida

SECTION II - CONTROL OFFICE TO REQUESTER

DATE

16. ☐ NEW FINGERPRINT CARD REQUIRED
☐ ITEMS __________ ON SPH (PSQ) REQUIRE CORRECTION AND/OR COMPLETION.
☐ INTERIM REPORT FORWARDED. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND RETURN OF INCLOSURES UPON COMPLETION.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 64 2784

[redacted]

SECTION III – REQUE. ER TO CONTROL OFFICE | DATE

17. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ INFORMATION NOTED

☐ SUBJECT REASSIGNED TO NON-SENSITIVE DUTIES. INVESTIGATION MAY BE CANCELED.

☐ INFORMATION CONSIDERED NO BAR TO CLEARANCE. REQUEST COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

18. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

19. REMARKS *(If returning corrected forms, state here)*

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

SECTION IV – CONTROL OFFICE TO ACTION AGENCY | DATE 30 MAR 1967

20. RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

☐ NO RECORD

☐ FAVORABLE

☐ MINOR UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION RECORDED IN ITEM 21

☐ PRIOR INVESTIGATION INSUFFICIENT FOR ACTION CONTEMPLATED IF NEEDED, INITIATE REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION.

☒ FORWARDED FOR SECURITY DETERMINATION BY CLEARING AUTHORITY

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION	COMPLETED BY	DATE	DOSSIER NUMBER
☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☒ OTHER	USAINTC	29 Mar 1967	AA 81 40 20

21. REMARKS

a. THIS FORM, TOGETHER WITH ANY INCLOSURES, REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND USACRF COPY OF DA FORM 873 *(if appropriate)* WILL BE RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OFFICE WITHIN ______ DAYS AFTER RECEIPT.

b. IN THE EVENT SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM YOUR COMMAND, THIS FORM AND INCLOSURES WILL BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY WITH ITEM 23 COMPLETED.

c. ATTENTION IS INVITED TO: PARAGRAPHS ______ *AR 604–5;* PARAGRAPH ___ *AR 604–11;* PARAGRAPH ___ *AR 640–98;* AND PARAGRAPH ____ *AR 381–130*, AS APPLICABLE.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
SUBJECT'S Dossier and that of HIS father - D8 03 23 86	for DAN H. DIETRICH Lt Col AIS Chief of Operations III	

SECTION V – ACTION AGENCY TO CONTROL OFFICE | DATE

22. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ FAVORABLE DETERMINATION, USACRF COPY DA FORM 873 ATTACHED

☐ UNFAVORABLE DETERMINATION, RECOMMENDED ACTION IN ITEM 24

☐ REQUEST ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION AS INDICATED IN ITEM 24

RESCINDED PER DA MESSAGE DA 765175, DATED 16 MAY 66

23. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

~~Regraded Unclassified When Separated From Classified Enclosures~~

24. REMARKS

373 "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - This Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination"

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10141
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 378-381

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : HAYASHIDA, MYRON K.
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/26/66
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R.

LEGAL ADVICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

STATEMENT O. .ERSONAL HISTORY

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

1. *(Print)* FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—MAIDEN NAME *(If any)*—LAST NAME ☒ MR. ☐ MRS. ☐ MISS DAVID REED FROMER	2. STATUS ☒ CIVILIAN ☐ MILITARY ON ACTIVE DUTY
3. ALIAS(ES), NICKNAME(S), OR CHANGES IN NAME *(Other than by marriage)* None	4. PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS 13 Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, Calif.

5. DATE OF BIRTH *(Day, month, year)* 21 July 1942	PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, County, State, and Country)* Chicago, Cook, Illinois, USA	PLACE CERTIFICATE RECORDED

RACE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES	COLOR OF HAIR	SCARS, PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS
Cauc	67"	170	Brown	Brown	Scar above left eye

6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS NARCOTICS OR BARBITURATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

7. U. S. CITIZEN ☒	NATIVE ☒ YES ☐ NO	IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO.	IF DERIVED, PARENTS' CERTIFICATE NO(S).	DATE, PLACE, AND COURT
ALIEN ☐	REGISTRATION NO	NATIVE COUNTRY	DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY	DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME A U. S. CITIZEN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. MILITARY SERVICE

ARE YOU PRESENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES DRAWING FULL PAY? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION	DATE CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE STARTED

ARE YOU PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF A U. S. RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION

HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOURS OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY, DRAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

COUNTRY	SERVICE	COMPONENT	FROM *(Date)*	TO *(Date)*	TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO.

9. EDUCATION *(Account for all civilian schools and military academies. Do not include service schools)*

MONTH AND YEAR		NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	GRADUATE		DEGREE
FROM—	TO—		YES	NO	
1947	1949	Nettelhorst Elem. School, Chicago, Illinois	~~X~~	X DF	
1949	1950	La Casita Elem. School, Clovis, New Mexico	~~X~~	X DF	
1950	1954	Argonne Elem. School, S.F., Calif.	X		
1954	1957	Presidio Jr. High, S.F., Calif.	X		
1957	1960	Geo. Washington High School, S.F., Calif.	X		

10. **FAMILY** *(List in order given, parents, spouse, guardians, stepparents, foster parents, parents-in-law, former spouse(s) (if divorced give date and place), children, brothers and sisters, even though deceased. Include any others you resided with or with whom a close relationship existed or exists. If the person is not a U. S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate number and place of issuance.)*

RELATION AND NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING	U. S. CITIZEN	
			YES	NO
FATHER IRVING FROMER	12 July 1913 Cincinnati, Ohio	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	X	
MOTHER *(Maiden name)* Katherine Rhodes	31 Dec 1909 Estherville, Iowa	13 Rhoda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	X	
SPOUSE *(Maiden name)* None				
OTHER *(Specify)* Brother Jon Fromer	11 May 1946 Chicago, Illinois	881 Clayton St. San Francisco, Calif.	X	
Sister Ann Spake	15 Aug 1939 San Francisco, Calif.	881 Clayton St. San Francisco, Calif.	X	

378

DD FORM 398 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE. "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" Exception to Standard Form 86 Approved by Bureau of the Budget June 1960

11. **OTHER RELATIVES AND ALIEN FRIENDS LIVING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES** (*List grandparents, first cousins, aunts, uncles, brothers- and sisters-in-law, and other persons with whom a close relationship existed or exists*)

RELATIONSHIP AND NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	ADDRESS	CITIZENSHIP
None				

12. **FOREIGN TRAVEL** (*Other than as a direct result of United States military duties*)

DATES FROM—	DATES TO—	COUNTRY VISITED	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL
		None	

13. **EMPLOYMENT** (*Show every employment you have had and all periods of unemployment*)

MONTH AND YEAR FROM—	MONTH AND YEAR TO—	NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	REASON FOR LEAVING
Dec 59	Dec 59	Paul Elder Bookstore Sutter & Stockton Sts.,S.F.,Cal.	Paul Elder	End of holiday season
Summer 60		San Francisco Council Camp Fire Girls, S.F., Calif.	Unknown	End of summer Camp
1960	1961	Fairmont Hotel San Francisco, Calif.	Unknown	Part-time job
1961	1962	Foster's Restaurant San Francisco, Calif.	Unknown	Part-time job
Summer 1961 &	1962	S. F. Boys' Chorus San Francisco, Calif.	Madi Bacon	End of summer camp
1962 &	1963	Madison Board of Education Rec. Madison, Wisconsin	Unknown	end of school year
Fall 1962		Clark Service Station Atwood Ave.,Madison,Wisconsin	Ed Cutter	Conflict with studies
		Self-employed - musicians in folk trio		
Oct 65	Jun 66	Cooks Cupboard 1718 Wells St.,Chicago,Illinois	Bob George	Return to S.F.

DID ANY OF THE ABOVE EMPLOYMENTS REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE? ☐ YES ☒ NO DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED BOND? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 564-58-8137

14. **CREDIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES** (*Do not include relatives, former employers, or persons living outside the United States or its Territories.*)

	NAME (*List 3 credit and 5 character*)	YEARS KNOWN	STREET AND NUMBER (*Business address preferred*)	CITY	STATE OR TERRITORY
CREDIT	None				
CHARACTER	Melvina Reynolds	10	2027 Parker Street	Berkeley	Calif.
	Stephan Negoesco	10	Sonora Way	Corte Madera	Calif.
	Madi Bacon	4	1120 Keith Avenue	Berkeley	Calif.
	Richard Correll	10	799 Clayton Street	San Francisco	Calif.
	Archie Brown	10	1027 Brussell St.	San Francisco	Calif.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960 O—573450

15.

LIST ALL RESIDENCES FROM 1 JANUARY 1937

MONTH AND YEAR		STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
FROM—	TO—			
1942	1949	2817 Pine Grove Street	Chicago	Illinois
1949	1950	Edwarde Street	Clovis	New Mexico
1950	1960	1932 Cabrillo Street	San Francisco	California
1960	1961	2350 Bzncroft Way	Berkeley	California
1961	1962	881 Clayton Street	San Francisco	California
1962		219 N. Basset	Madison	Wisconsin
1963		215 Lake Lawn Avenue	Medison	Wisconsin
1963	1964	1427 University Avenue	Madison	Wisconsin
1964	1965	881 Clayton Street	San Francisco	California
1965	1966	435 W. North Avenue	Chicago	Illinois
1966		13 Rhonda Way	Mill Valley	California
1966		140 Langdon Street	Madison	Wisconsin

16.

PAST AND/OR PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS

NAME AND ADDRESS	TYPE (*Social, fraternal, professional, etc.*)	OFFICE HELD	MEMBERSHIP	
			FROM—	TO—

17.

YES	NO	
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A.. OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ANYWHERE?
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS AN AGENT, OFFICIAL, OR EMPLOYEE?
		ARE YOU NOW ASSOCIATING WITH, OR HAVE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH ANY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING RELATIVES, WHO YOU KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE, ARE OR HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
		HAVE YOU EVER ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE: CONTRIBUTION(S) TO, ATTENDANCE AT OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY ORGANIZATIONAL, SOCIAL, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SAID ORGANIZATIONS OR OF ANY PROJECTS SPONSORED BY THEM; THE SALE, GIFT, OR DISTRIBUTION OF ANY WRITTEN, PRINTED, OR OTHER MATTER, PREPARED, REPRODUCED, OR PUBLISHED, BY THEM OR ANY OF THEIR AGENTS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES?

IF "YES," DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS FOR A FULL DETAILED STATEMENT. IF ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIFY NATURE AND EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION WITH EACH, INCLUDING OFFICE OR POSITION HELD, ALSO INCLUDE DATES, PLACES, AND CREDENTIALS NOW OR FORMERLY HELD. IF ASSOCIATIONS HAVE BEEN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, THEN LIST THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY WERE OR ARE AFFILIATED.

18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DETAINED, HELD, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (*excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of $25, or less was imposed*)? INCLUDE ALL COURT MARTIALS WHILE IN MILITARY SERVICE. ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," LIST THE DATE, THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR VIOLATION, THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT OR PLACE OF HEARING, AND THE PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF EACH CASE.

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☒ YES ☐ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

Iam a conscientious objector. My case is in the courts at the present time.

20. REMARKS

I have been advised by my lawyers that I cannot sign #16 or #17 without putting myself in jeapardy. Private attorney - Peter Franck
Family attorney - Vincent Hallinan

David Reed Fromer, born 21 July 1942, in Chicago, Illinois, a registrant under the Universl Military Training Act, was this date given an opportunity to execute DD Form 398 and in my presence he refused to do so, in its entirety.

Myron K Hayashida

MYRON K. HAYASHIDA
1/LT, AGC

ITEM #9 EDUCATION (Continued)

		DEGREE
1960 - 1961	University of California, Berkeley, California	No
1961 - 1962	City College of San Francisco, San Francisco, Calif.	Yes
1962 - 1964	University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin	No
1964 - 1965	San Francisco State College, San Francisco, Calif. (Ext.)	No
1965 - 1966	Roosevelt University, Chicago, Illinois	No
1966 - Present	University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin	No

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH *(See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001)*

DATE 21 Nov.1966	SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM David Reed Fromer	
	TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS MYRON K. HAYASHIDA, 1/LT, AGC 1515 Clay St., Oakland, Calif.	SIGNATURE OF WITNESS Myron K Hayashida

21. *THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION*

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (*top secret, secret, etc.*) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS

RECORD OF PRIOR CLEARANCES

DATE OF CLEARANCE	TYPE OF CLEARANCE	AGENCY THAT COMPLETED INVESTIGATION

REMARKS

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960 O—573450

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10142
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 382-383

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : HAYASHIDA, MYRON K.
TO : USA INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 02/21/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R.

LEGAL ADVICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

SPECIAL

5 A FEB 24 1967 / 33

US ARMY REQUES[illegible] O[illegible] NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
(AR 381-130)

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 21 FEB 1967

FBI-S A-BI

2. CONTROL OFFICE:

3. NAME: FROMER, David Reed

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 564-58-8137

5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH: 21 July 1942

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Chicago, Cook, Illinois

7. SERVICE NUMBER:

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Irving Fromer	12 Jul 1913 Cincinnati, Ohio	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	U. S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Katherine Rhodes	31 Dec 1909 Estherville, Iowa	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	U. S.
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) None			

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1950	1960	1932 Cabrillo St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1960	1961	2450 Bencroft Way	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1962	881 Clayton St	San Francisco	Calif.
1962	"	219 N. Basset	Madison	Wisconsin
1963	"	215 Lake Lawn Ave	Madison	Wisconsin
[illegible]	[illegible]	1427 University Ave.	Madison	Wisconsin
[illegible]	[illegible]	[illegible] St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1965	1966	[illegible] North Ave	Chicago	Illinois

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Dec 1959	Dec 1959	Paul Dler Bookstore	San Francisco, Calif.
Summer '60		San Francisco Council Camp Fire Girls	San Francisco, Calif.
1960	1961	Fairmont Hotel	San Francisco, Calif.
1961	1962	Foster's Restaurant	San Francisco, Calif.
Summer 1962 & 1963		Madison Board of Education Rec.	Madison, Wisconsin
Fall 1962		Clark Service Station	Madison, Wisconsin

This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records must be submitted to FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

14. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
1966	Present	University of Wisconsin	Madison, Wisconsin

REQUEST COPY OF INVESTIGATION RESULTS OF ANY CONDUCTED TO DATE

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
	X	c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

SAC

DOD NAC CENTER
Ft Holabird, Md

DOD NAC Center
P.O. BOX 4
Ft Holabird, Md. 21219

16. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

CONDUCT FBI-S WHICH WAS OMITTED FROM ORIGINAL NAC.

NO ADDITIONAL DATA FBI FILES
PERTINENT TO YOUR INQUIRY.

(*) Subsequent 11-23-66.

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

nac completed MAR 09 1967

FOR THE DIRECTOR: E Kll MAR 09 1967

18. FROM:
DCofS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP III
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19. THRU:

382

FEB 24 1967 240

FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED

DA FORM 3027 AUG 65 — REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

6353-6004

0903/51

[redacted] [redacted]

(6353-6004) 18 Jan 67
FROMER, David Reed
DPOB: 21 Jul 42; Chicago, Illinois

Con't - Item 16 (Remarks)

Item 15 - SUBJECT explained in the "Remarks" section as follows: "(I have not done anything that I am not proud of) - I have been advised by my attorneys that I cannot sign this form without placting myself in jeapardy: Peter Franck - personal attorney, Vincent Hallinan - family attorney."

FBI reports, San Francisco, California, titled: David Reed FROMER, with Bureau File #: 100-433071, dating from 3 May 1960 to the latest dated 23 November 1966, are in the possession of this office. Request any additional and/or subsequent information.

MAR 09 1967

2 383

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10143
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 384-385

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : HEADQUARTERS, USAINTC
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 01/18/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R.

LEGAL ADVICE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted] FBI-C "1 CI-I 51

SPLURHO

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

(AR 381-130)

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 18 Jan 67

2. CONTROL OFFICE: DOD NAC Center, PO Box 4, Fort Holabird, Md. 21219

3. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS(ES) - NICKNAMES - CHANGED NAME: FROMER, David Reed 12-2-69

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 564-58-8137

5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH: 21 July 1942

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Chicago, Cook, Illinois 14

7. SERVICE NUMBER:

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Irving Fromer	12 Jul 1913 Cincinnati, Ohio	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	U. S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Katherine Rhodes	31 Dec 1909 Estherville, Iowa	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	U. S.
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) None			

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1950	1960	1932 Cabrillo St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1960	1961	2450 Bencroft Way	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1962	881 Clayton St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1962	-	219 N. Basset	Madison	Wisconsin
1963	-	215 Lake Lawn Ave.	Madison	Wisconsin
1963	1964	1427 University Ave.	Madison	Wisconsin
1964	1965	881 Clayton St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1965	1966	435 W. North Ave.	Chicago	Illinois

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Dec 1959	Dec 1959	Paul Dler Bookstore	San Francisco, Calif.
Summer '60		San Francisco Council Camp Fire Girls	San Francisco, Calif.
1960	1961	Fairmont Hotel	San Francisco, Calif.
1961	1962	Foster's Restaurant	San Francisco, Calif.
Summer 1962 & 1963		Madison Board of Education Rec.	Madison, Wisconsin
Fall 1962		Clark Service Station	Madison, Wisconsin

14. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
1966	Present	University of Wisconsin	Madison, Wisconsin

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
	X	c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

DOD NAC CENTER
Ft Holabird, Md.

233-7727

NAME CHECK ONLY

16. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

Item 12. 1966 to Present 13 Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, California
1966 to Present 140 Langdon Street, Madison, Wisconsin

Item 13. Oct 65 5o June 66 Cooks Cupboard, 1718 Walls St., Chicago, Illinois
Employer: Bob Geroge Reason: Return to S. F.

Item 15. Registrant refused to execute DD Form 98 and explained in the remarks section. Also refused to answer Item 17 and answered affirmatively Item 19 and explained in the remarks section. Refused to be fingerprinted also. (NCO)

0903

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

nac completed

FOR THE DIRECTOR: E Kell FEB 18 1967

(6353-6004)

18. FROM:
HEADQUARTERS, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP-III -31
Fort Holabird, Md. 21219

19. THRU: 384

FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED

0903 JAN 25 1967

DA FORM 3027 1 AUG 65 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. [redacted]

...tive marking is excluded from automatic termination 230

B

[redacted]

(6353-6004) 18 Jan 67
FROMER, David Reed
DPOB: 21 Jul 42; Chicago, Illinois

Con't - Item 16 (Remarks)

Item 15 - SUBJECT explained in the "Remarks" section as follows: "(I have not done anything that I am not proud of) - I have been advised by my attorneys that I cannot sign this form without placting myself in jeapardy: Peter Franck - personal attorney, Vincent Hallinan - family attorney."

FBI reports, San Francisco, California, titled: David Reed FROMER, with Bureau File #: 100-433071, dating from 3 May 1960 to the latest dated 23 November 1966, are in the possession of this office. Request any additional and/or subsequent information.

385

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER :	194-10004-10145
RECORDS SERIES :	DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	PAGE 387

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	USA
FROM :	DCOFS, OPER HQS USAINTC
TO :	
TITLE :	[RESTRICTED]
DATE :	03/15/67
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	FROMER, DAVID R NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	

(OSI - Hq.)

SPECIAL-BI

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
(AR 381-130)

DOD NAC CENTER

CONTROL OFFICE [illegible]

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 15 MAR 1967

3. NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS(ES) - NICKNAME(S) - CHANGES OF NAME: FROMER, David Reed

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 564-58-8137

5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH: 21 Jul 1942

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Chicago, Ill 14

7. SERVICE NUMBER:

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Irving Fromer	12 Jun 1913 Cincinnati, O	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley,	US
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Katherine Rhodes	31 Dec 1909 Estherville, Iowa	As above	US
c. SPOUSE (maiden name)			

A-BI

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
		NAC COMPLETED date MAR 2 8 1967 FOR THE DIRECTOR: Mary E. Bell		

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
	HQ OSI FILE NO DATA ID WITH SUBJECT 21 Mar 67	REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF INVESTIGATION	

14. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
		a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
		b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
		c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
		d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
		e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
		f. ANY DISQUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
		g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

SAC-CTI

16. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

DCII reflects T-F-H-58-33-04/189, T-F-H-58-33-21991/11 and T-F-H-58-33-21991/9 reference SUBJECT'S sister, Ann Spake, NEE: Fromer.

NR

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

6353/6004

18. FROM:
DCofS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP III
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19. THRU:
387
MAR 17 1967 248
0903-51

FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED

DA FORM 3027 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

76-1239

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10147
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 389

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : DCOFS, OPERS HQS USAINTC
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 02/20/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID R

DA FORM 3027

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

ONI No Record

SPECIAL

US ARMY REQUES FO [illegible] (AR 38[illegible]130) ONLY

1. DATE OF REQUEST	20 February 1967
CONTROL OFFICE:	
FROMER, David Reed	564-53-8137
DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH: 21 July 1942	6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Chicago, Cook, Illinois
7. SERVICE NUMBER	

14

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Irving Fromer	12 Jul 1913 Cincinnati, Ohio	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	U. S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Katherine Rhodes	31 Dec 1909 Estherville, Iowa	13 Rhonda Way Mill Valley, Calif.	U. S.
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) None			

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1950	1960	1932 Cabrillo St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1960	1961	2450 Bencroft Way	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1962	881 Clayton St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1962	-	219 N. Basset	Madison	Wisconsin
1963	-	215 Lake Lawn Ave.	Madison	Wisconsin
1964	1964	1427 University Ave.	Madison	Wisconsin
[illegible]	1965	881 Clayton St.	San Francisco	Calif.
1965	1966	435 [illegible]	Chicago	Illinois

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Dec 1959	Dec 1959	Paul Dler Bookstore	San Francisco, Calif.
Summer '60		San Francisco Council Camp Fire Girls	San Francisco, Calif.
1960	1961	Fairmont Hotel	San Francisco, Calif.
1961	1962	Foster's Restaurant	San Francisco, Calif.
Summer 1962 & 1963		Madison Board of Education Rec.	Madison, Wisconsin
Fall 1962		Clark Service Station	Madison, Wisconsin

14. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
1966	Present	University of Wisconsin	Madison, Wisconsin

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
	X	c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

SAC-CTI

DOD NAC CENTER

Ft Holabird, Md

5 2

REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

DCII reflects P-NONI-R054AF061, T-NONI-63-N06790184

SUBJECT'S sister Ann Rhodes Spake, NEE: Fromer; SUBJECT'S Father, Irving Fromer

No RECORD ONI

110 27FEB67

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

2

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

Agency checked per your request.

"For the Director"

MAR 14 1967

18. FROM:

DCofS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP III
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19. THRU: 389

FIN [redacted]

7073 REC'D FEB 23 1967

DA FORM 3027 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

76353-6004 0905

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10148
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 390

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 02/14/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT INDEXED SEPARATELY

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed

DPOB: 21 July 1942; Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
14 February 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
6353-6004 564-58-8137

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 30 January 1967, this office requested a file check from the FBI, Chicago, Illinois, regarding David Reed FROMER. Results received on 10 January 1967 are contained in letter attached as (EXHIBIT 11).

390

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
GORDON R. TYLER, 113th MI GP (I)
for

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
[redacted] Renner

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10149
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 391

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : HQS, 113TH INTELL CORPS GP
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : COVER SHEET ONLY, LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
113TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

EXHIBIT

COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: FROMER, David Reed
DPOB: 21 July 1942; Chicago, Illinois

FILE NUMBER: 6353-6004 564-58-8137

EXHIBIT TO:

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT: Letter, dated 9 February 1967, from Federal Bureau of Investigation regarding SUBJECT.

EXHIBIT II

391

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

HQ5 113TH INTC GP FO [redacted]
12 MAY 1964

ARMY, HQ 5USA, CHICAGO, ILL.

eleased under the John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
8613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10150
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 394

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/09/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17) [redacted]

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 564 58 8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
9 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY-SUBJECT) On 8 December 1966, files of Casual Source I-U-10 were examined regarding SUBJECT and revealed the following:

On 28 December 1959, it was reported that SUBJECT who was residing at 1932 Cabrillo, San Francisco, California, was the SON of Irving Rhodes and Katherine Fromer. It was subsequently reported that SUBJECT was residing at 2452 Bancroft, Berkeley, California.

On 12 April 1961, it was reported that SUBJECT was on the mailing list of SLATE, a student rights organization at the University of California, Berkeley (UCB).

In 1960 and 1962, SUBJECT was a freshman at UCB and resided at 2462 Bancroft, Berkeley.

On 18 June 1963, it was reported that HE attended the Arnautoff Bon Voyage Party which was under the auspicious of the American Russian Institute, San Francisco, on 26 May 1963.

On 26 June 1963, it was reported that SUBJECT attended a meeting under the auspicious of the Continuations Committee of World Congress and General Disarmament & Peace, San Francisco, on 7 May 1963.

In an article in the San Francisco Chronicle, a local newspaper, on 22 September 1966, it was reported that SUBJECT residing at 13 Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, California, had won a federal court stay in HIS battle against the draft board. HE was attending the University of Wisconsin and is a conscientious objector.

(LOCAL AGENCY-SUBJECT) On 8 December 1966, files of Casual Source San Francisco A-14 were examined regarding SUBJECT and revealed no record.

394

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
EUGENE J. POWER, 115th MI Group (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Eugene J Power

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10151
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 395

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/02/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT

[redacted]

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 564-58-8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
2 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 2 December 1966, the records of Casual Source A-14, Oakland, California, were checked concerning SUBJECT and revealed the following information:

One David Fromer, not further identified, who may or may not be identifiable with SUBJECT, appeared on two mailing lists of SLATE, dated November 1966.

395

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
MARVIN P. SCHMIDT, 115th MI Gp (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Marvin P. Schmidt

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10152
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 396

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/02/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 564-58-8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED

2 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 2 December 1966, the records of Casual Source A-16, Oakland, California, were checked concerning SUBJECT and revealed the following information:

An editorial entitled "Some US Children Review a Special Exhibit" contained in the 27 January 1954, edition of the People's World, described how school children in San Francisco, California were shown a film of Russian school children. After the film one student, David Fromer, age 11, not further identified, who may or may not be identifiable with SUBJECT asked the question "Why can't we send our pictures over for them to see?".

396

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

MARVIN P. SCHMIDT, 115th MI Gp (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Marvin P. Schmidt

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10153
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 397

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/01/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

DA FORM 341 (AGENT'S NOTES)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
Selective Svc Registrant, SSN: 564-58-8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
1 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, files of the following agencies were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of SUBJECT's name, and disclosed no record:

1 December 1966	Sheriff's Office, Marin County, San Rafael, California
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
1 December 1966	Police Department, Mill Valley, California
	Police Department,
	Police Department,
	Police Department,
	Police Department,
	Bureau of Police,

AGENT'S NOTES: Mill Valley is in Marin County.

397

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
HOWARD W. CRABTREE, 115th ~~INTC~~ MI Gp (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF—656148

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10154
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 398

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/02/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

FOR [redacted]

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSN: 564-58-8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
2 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, files of the following agencies were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of SUBJECT'S name, and disclosed no record:

__________ Sheriff's Office,

__________ Sheriff's Office,

__________ Sheriff's Office,

__________ Sheriff's Office

__________ Sheriff's Office

__________ Sheriff's Office

2 December 1966, Police Department, San Francisco, California

__________ Police Department,

__________ Police Department,

__________ Police Department

__________ Police Department

__________ Bureau of Police,

AGENT'S NOTES:

115th INTC GP ( )

398

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
DAVID C PETERS, 115TH MI GROUP (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
David C Peters

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED [redacted] OF—656148

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10155
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 399

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/16/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 564 58 8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
16 December 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 15 December 1966, the files of Casual Source A-14, Berkeley, California, were examined concerning FROMER and revealed no record.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ERIC E. McKNIGHT, 115th MI Gp (I)

399

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Eric E. McKnight

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

© U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF—656148

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10156
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 400

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/03/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 564 58 8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
30 November 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, files of the following agencies were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of SUBJECT's name, and disclosed no record:

	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
	Sheriff's Office,
28 November 1966	Sheriff's Office, Alameda County, Oakland, California
28 November 1966	Police Department, Oakland, California
30 November1966	Police Department, Berkeley, California
	Police Department,
	Police Department,
	Police Department,
	Bureau of Police,

AGENT'S NOTES:

400

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
115th INTC Gp ( )
ERIC E. McKNIGHT, 115th MI Gp (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Eric E McKnight

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF—656148

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10158
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 402

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO : FBI, CHICAGO, ILL
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 01/25/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

A- 035355

25 Jan 67

TO: **FBI: Chicago, Ill**
PD: Chicago, Ill

SIR:

Military Intelligence respectfully requests that you note hereon any information your files may reflect on the subject named below, or indicate "NO RECORD." (Use reverse side if necessary.)

Please return results to this office at your earliest convenience, using the enclosed, postpaid, self-addressed envelope.

Very truly yours,
JOSEPH P. CRUEIANI

F-656

SUBJECT: **FROMER, Daniel Reed**						
Place of Birth **Chicago, Ill**		Date of Birth **21 July 1942**			Social Security Number 564 58 8137	
DESCRIPTION OF SUBJECT						
Race:	Sex:	Height:	Weight:	Hair:	Eyes:	Marital Status:

Additional Information:

NEGATIVE (INTELL. FILES)

JAN 30 1967

William J. Duffy
DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE DIV.

CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT
Arrest — name check only
NO RECORD ____
RECORD ATTACHED 9 FEB 1967
DATE ____ CHECKED BY ____

Results of Check:

____
(Date)

Checked by:

____
(Signature)

____
(Title)

113th FL 10
17 Nov 66

402

A77, ALPHA 116 - 1/31/67

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10159
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 403

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

VIOLATION(S)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :



PERSON ARRESTED LAST FIRST MIDDLE NAME

Somer David 1934704

ADDRESS OF ARRESTED PERSON

35 West North 1942

MW21 JUN

PERSON ARRESTED

W3357493

TRF Wnt W3359494

16 FEB 1835

564-58-8137

FINGERPRINTED

YES

WHERE ARRESTED

367

stop sign 10+5

no current license 30

Charge: stop sign violation, no current operator's license
Disposition: $10.00 + $5.00 , $30.00

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10160
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 404

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 02/14/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT I INDEXED SEPARATELY. RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.

[redacted]

L

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT FROMER, David Reed DPOB: 21 July 1942, Chicago, Illinois	2. DATE SUBMITTED 14 February 1967 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 6353-6004 564-58-8137

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 26 January 1967, this office requested a file check from the FBI, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, regarding David Reed FROMER. Results received on 2 February 1967 are contained in letter attached as (EXHIBIT______).

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from
classified inclosures

404

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT E. LITTLE, 113th MI GP (I) for	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 05/21/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10161
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 564588137S-PAGE 405

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : HQS, 113TH INTELL CORPS GRP
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : COVER SHEET ONLY. EXHIBIT INDEXED SEPARATELY. RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94.

[redacted]

HEADQUARTERS
113TH INTELLIGENCE CORPS GROUP
CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

EXHIBIT
COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: FROMER, David Reed
DPOB: 21 July 1942; Chicago, Illinois

FILE NUMBER: 6353-6004 564-58-8137

EXHIBIT TO:

DESCRIPTION OF EXHIBIT: Letter, dated 1 February 1967, from Federal Bureau of Investigation, Milwaukee, Wisconsin

~~REGRA~~[illegible] [illegible]SIFIED
ON 2 Sep94
BY CDR [illegible] [illegible]F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-6[illegible] DOD 5200.1R

EXHIBIT I

Regraded UNCLASSIFIED when separated from classified inclosures

405

HQ5 113TH INTC GP FORM 8
12 MAY 1964

[redacted]

ARMY, HQ 5USA, CHICAGO, ILL.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/20/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10162
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 460

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/29/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : FROMER, DAVID REED

SUBJECT INTERVIEW

SECURITY FORMS

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT [redacted]

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
FROMER, David Reed
SSvc Registrant, SSN 564 58 8137
DOB: 21 July 1942
POB: Chicago, Illinois

2. DATE SUBMITTED
29 November 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(SUBJECT INTERVIEW) On 21 November 1966, David Reed FROMER, Student University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, with residence at 140 Langdon Street, Madison, and with permanent mailing address at Rhonda Way, Mill Valley, California, was contacted at the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Station, 1509 Clay Street, Oakland, California. It was explained to FROMER that it is the policy of the Department of the Army to interview all persons who refuse to fill out their DD Form 98, Personnel Security Questionnaire, and qualify their DD Form 398, Statement of Personal History, at the time they are called upon for processing under the conscription laws of the United States. SUBJECT was informed that the purpose of the interview was to give HIM the opportunity to furnish an explanation concerning HIS reasons for refusing to fill out and qualify the above mentioned forms and to furnish any additional information which might be useful in making a determination of HIS case. FROMER was advised of HIS rights under the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice. HE was further advised of HIS right to legal counsel concerning the interview. FROMER refused to be interviewed under oath or make any statement concerning the above mentioned forms based upon HIS rights under the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States. SUBJECT only stated that HE had formerly made application for conscientious objection, that HIS right of appeal had been denied by the United States District Court on 13 October 1966, and that HIS lawyers had initiated action to have the appeal heard by a higher court. SUBJECT further indicated that HE did not wish to make a statement because HIS personal attorney, Peter Franck, a family attorney, Vincent Hallinan, were not available at this time to speak in HIS behalf.

AGENT'S NOTES: SUBJECT is presently enrolled at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, and will not be available for further contact in this area. FROMER declined to sign a statement in verification of the opportunity given HIM to be interviewed concerning HIS qualification of DD Form 398 and refusal to fill out DD Form 98.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ERIC E. MCKNIGHT, 115th MI Gp (I) 460

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Eric E McKnight

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10353
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 2

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : PHILLIPS, WILLIAM R
TO : ASST COS, G2
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/22/69
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

RECOMMENDATION FOR CASE CLOSURE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]
UNITED STATES ARMY PERSONNEL SECURITY GROUP
FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

SEP 22 1969

USAPSG

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel NMN, US 52 773 870, SSAN: 093 36 4601
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

Assistant Chief of Staff, G2
HQ, U. S. Army, Pacific
ATTN: Scty Div
APO San Francisco 96558

1. Reference your 1st indorsement, file GPIE-SP (8Apr69), dated 2 July 1969, concerning SUBJECT.

2. Department of the Army concurs with your recommendation for favorable closure of SUBJECT's case under the provisions of AR 604-10. This favorable closure has been made a part of SUBJECT's intelligence dossier and forwarded to USAIRR for file.

3. If additional adverse information is disclosed subsequent to this action, this case should be processed as a new action under the provisions of AR 604-10.

4. Closure of SUBJECT's case under the provisions of AR 604-10 does not automatically qualify HIM for a security clearance. In the event HE is considered for a clearance under the provisions of AR 604-5, recommend a review of HIS USAIRR file be conducted prior to taking such action.

FOR THE CHIEF:

WILLIAM R. PHILLIPS
LTC MI
Chief, Mil & Civ Loy Div

2

TO BE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL.
This document will then be marked:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[redacted]

PSG FL 35
17Sep69

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10354
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 3

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : PHILLIPS, WILLIAM R
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/22/69
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CASE CLOSURE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

USAPSG

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD:

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel NMN, US 52 773 870, SSAN: 093 36 4601
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

BACKGROUND: Letter recommends favorable closure UP para 27a, AR 604-10 (rec'd 8 July 69).

BASIS & RATIONALE: The derog info in SUBJECT's case has been adequately summarized in the attached letter of USARV. In view of the info disclosed in the investigation a further review of the dossier should be made prior to the granting of a clearance. Concur with command. Case closed favorably.

COORD: None

AUTH: AR 604-10

David H. Hunton
ACTION OFFICER
DATE: 22 Sept 69

CHIEF, MIL & CIV LOY DIV

3

[redacted]

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10355
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 4

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : SHORTT, C L
TO : CHIEF, USA PERS SEC GRP
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 07/02/69
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

RETENTION IN ARMY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : BASIC LETTER INDEXED SEAPRATELY. INCLOSURE NOT INCLUDED.

[redacted]

[redacted]

GPIN-SP (8 Apr 69) 1st Ind (FOUO)
SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel (NMN), PFC, US 52 773 870
DPOB: 17 May 1946; San Juan, Puerto Rico
SSAN: 093-36-4601

HQ, US Army, Pacific, APO San Francisco 96558 2 JUL 69

TO: Chief, US Army Personnel Security Group, Ft Holabird, Md 21219

1. Reference paragraphs 14b(10) and 27a, AR 604-10.

2. Based on review of the attached investigative file, which is summarized in basic letter, this headquarters concurs in the opinion of Hq, US Army Vietnam that SUBJECT'S retention in the Army is clearly consistent with the interests of national security.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:

C. L. SHORTT
CPT, AGC
Asst AG

1 Incl
nc

Copy furnished:
CGUSARV (AVHGB-C)
APO 96375

4

[redacted]

3

7-114
ac
7/16

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10356
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 5-6

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : LOOS, DONALD A
TO : CDR IN CHIEF, USA, PACIFIC
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 04/08/69
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

RETENTION IN ARMY

BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION

PUERTO RICAN COMMUNIST PARTY

AMERICAN LABOR PARTY

CHARACTER REFERENCES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : INCLOSURE NOT INCLUDED. RECORD WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 20 JUL 94.

[redacted]
DEPARTMENT OF [redacted] ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM
APO SAN FRANCISCO 96375

IN REPLY REFER TO

8 APR 1969

AVHGB-C

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel (NMN), PFC, US 52 773 870
DPOB: 17 May 1946; San Juan, Puerto Rico
SSAN: 093-36-4601 (U)

Commander in Chief
United States Army, Pacific
ATTN: GPIN-SP
APO 96558

1. (U) Reference paragraph 27a, AR 604-10.

2. (U) Based upon a review of the attached file, this headquarters considers that SUBJECT'S retention in the Army is clearly consistent with the interests of national security and, therefore, recommends that this case be closed favorably under paragraph 27a, AR 604-10.

3. (C) Background and reason for investigation. a. (c) SUBJECT'S father was reported to have had the following CP association: 1939 to 1943, active in the Puerto Rican Communist Party (PCP) in Mayaguez, Puerto Rico and President of the Party in that city from 1941 to 1943; 1946, selected as PCP Organizational Secretary; 1948 to 1949, in charge of CP meetings in New York City; 1950, attended PCP meetings with marked regularity; 1951, belonged to the Bronx County, NYC Section of the CP; 1952, registered as a member of the American Labor Party (ALP) and showed preference for the ALP for two years; July 1952, met with the PCP Labor Secretary and other Puerto Rican communists in NYC; 1953, reported to be a CP member; 1956, sympathized with the CP but no evidence of membership in the CP; November 1963 to April 1964, attended CP meetings; 1964, attended meetings and rally sponsored by the Emergency Committee for Disaster Relief to Cuba; February 1967, approved as a member of the new Bronx County CP Committee; and in 1966 and 1967, attended meetings of the Puerto Rican Commission of the CP. SUBJECT'S father was interviewed by the FBI in January 1957 and July 1959 and denied being a member of the PCP, the CPUSA, ever attending meetings of either organization, or ever fostering their causes.

b. (U) A favorable NAC concerning SUBJECT was completed on 23 September 1968. DD Forms 98 and 398 executed by SUBJECT on 12 May and 1 August 1968,

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Jul 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

[redacted]

[redacted]

8 APR 1969

AVHGB-C
SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel (NMN), PFC, US 52 773 870
DPOB: 17 May 1946; San Juan, Puerto Rico
SSAN: 093-36-4601 (U)

respectively, were unqualified. Local agencies disclosed the information in paragraph 3a, above. CONUS and USARV limited investigations from 21 August 1968 to 25 March 1969 disclosed the following:

(1) Local agencies disclosed no record of SUBJECT or HIS sister. A local agency disclosed that in 1962, SUBJECT'S brother was a subscriber to New Horizons for Youth, a CP publication. Three education checks disclosed no derogatory information; an education source recommended HIM favorably. Two employments were checked with favorable results; five employment sources interviewed disclosed no derogatory information and recommended HIM favorably.

(2) Nine character references disclosed no derogatory information concerning SUBJECT and recommended HIM favorably. Five of the sources disclosed that no member of HIS family had ever been known to make statements critical of the US or to voice pro-communist views. One of the sources disclosed that HIS father occasionally brought home a socialist newspaper and agreed with its comments critical of the US. On these occasions, SUBJECT and HIS brother argued in defense of the US and HIS father was not able to influence HIS political thinking and beliefs.

(3) SUBJECT was interviewed under oath on 25 March 1969, and was willing to submit to polygraph examination. HE stated substantially as follows: HE was anti-communist. HE never participated in communist activities or knowingly associated with any CP members. HIS father was a democrat but he did not always agree with party views or their candidates. HIS father's political ideologies had no influence on HIM. HE was loyal to the US and supported its Constitution in its entirely.

4. (U) SUBJECT'S ETS is 20 May 1970 and HIS DEROS is December 1969.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

Donald A. Loos
DONALD A. LOOS
LTC, GS
Actg Asst Adjutant General

1 Incl
Case File

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Jul 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOIPO
Auth Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER :	194-10004-10357
RECORDS SERIES :	DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	PAGE 7

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	USA
FROM :	[RESTRICTED]
TO :	
TITLE :	[RESTRICTED]
DATE :	03/27/69
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	MARTI, MANUEL SUBJECT INTERVIEW
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	EXHIBIT INDEXED SEPARATELY

AGENT REPORT [redacted]
(SR 380-320-10)

1. Name of Subject or Title of Incident
MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PFC, US 52 773 8 70
DPOB: 17 May 1946; San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. Date Submitted
27 March 1969

3. Control Symbol or File Number
093-36-4601

4. Report of Findings

(SUBJECT INTERVIEW) On 25 March 1969, Manuel MARTI, PFC, US52773870, Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, APO 96294, after being advised of HIS rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, and HIS right to Legal Counsel, was interviewed under oath in the Conference Room, Headquarters, 4th Battalion, 60th Artillery, An Khe, Republic of Vietnam. MARTI executed a sworn statement, DA Form 2820 (EXHIBIT____) dated 26 March 1969, which states in substance as follows:

MARTI thought the communists were trying to take over the world and HE didn't go for it. SUBJECT had not participated in any Communist Party activities nor had no knowledge of ever associating with any members of the Communist Party. HE belonged to a stamp collectors' organization.

SUBJECT's father or mother had not been an influence on HIS political ideologies or activities. HE did not object to being in the military, but if HE didn't have to serve, HE wouldn't. HE liked serving in Vietnam better than in the United States. SUBJECT thought that the United States should be in Vietnam to keep communism from spreading.

MARTI owed HIS allegiance to the United States and supported the Constitution of the United States in its entirety.

MARTI was willing to submit to a polygraph examination on the information HE provided.

7

[redacted] [redacted]

5. Typed Name and Organization of Special Agent
DONALD M. MIYOSHI, 55th MI Detachment (Corps)

6. Signature of Special Agent
Donald M. Miyoshi

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 Replaces WD AGO Form 341, 1 Jun 47, Which may be used. 55-277 PPC-Japan

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10359
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 9-10

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 03/26/69
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

COMMUNISM, VIEWS ON

AFFIDAVIT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

STATEMENT BY ACCUSED OR SUSPECT PERSON
(AR 195-10)

PLACE An Khe, Republic of Vietnam	DATE 26 March 69	TIME 1330	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME MARTI, Manuel NMN	SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO. 093-36-4601 US52773870		GRADE E3
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS Headquarters and Headquarters Battery, 4th Bn. 60th Artillery, APO 96294			

PART I - WAIVER CERTIFICATE

I HAVE BEEN INFORMED BY William L. Brooks, Special Agent

OF US Army Intelligence Corps

THAT HE WANTS TO QUESTION ME ABOUT association with possible members of the Communist Party OF WHICH I AM ACCUSED OR SUSPECTED. HE HAS ALSO INFORMED ME OF MY RIGHTS.

I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT AND THAT ANY STATEMENT I MAKE MAY BE USED AS EVIDENCE AGAINST ME IN A CRIMINAL TRIAL.

I UNDERSTAND THAT I HAVE THE RIGHT TO CONSULT WITH COUNSEL AND TO HAVE COUNSEL PRESENT WITH ME DURING QUESTIONING. I MAY RETAIN COUNSEL AT MY OWN EXPENSE OR COUNSEL WILL BE APPOINTED FOR ME AT NO EXPENSE TO ME. IF I AM SUBJECT TO THE UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, APPOINTED COUNSEL MAY BE MILITARY COUNSEL OF MY OWN CHOICE IF HE IS REASONABLY AVAILABLE.

I UNDERSTAND THAT EVEN IF I DECIDE TO ANSWER QUESTIONS NOW WITHOUT HAVING COUNSEL PRESENT, I MAY STOP ANSWERING QUESTION AT ANY TIME. ALSO, I MAY REQUEST COUNSEL AT ANY TIME DURING QUESTIONING.

I (~~DO~~) (DO NOT) WANT COUNSEL.
I (DO) (XXXXXX) WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT AND ANSWER QUESTIONS.

Manuel Marti
(Signature of Person To Be Questioned)

INTERROGATOR: Donald M. Miyoshi
(Signature)

WITNESS: William L. Brooks
(Signature)

DONALD M. MIYOSHI, SPECIAL AGENT
55TH MI DETACHMENT (CORPS)
(Typed Name and Organization)

WILLIAM L. BROOKS, SPECIAL AGENT
55TH MI DETACHMENT (CORPS)
(Typed Name and Organization)

PART II - SWORN STATEMENT

I, Manuel Marti WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

M.M. Question. What are your views on communism as practiced in the world today?

Answer. I think the communists are trying to take over the world. I don't go for it.

✓ Q. Have you ever participated in any communist party activities?

✓ A. None.

Q. Have you ever associated with any members of the communist party?

✓ A. Not to my knowledge.

Q. What organizations or associations do you belong to?

A. I belong to the ~~American Stamp Dealers Association.~~ STAMP COLLECTORS ORGANIZATION. M.M.

Q. Any others?

A. No.

Q. What degree of influence did your parents' political ideologies and activities have on you?

✓ A. My Mother wasn't too interested in politics. My father is a Democrat but he doesn't always agree with the ideas of either party or with the candidates. My father's political ideologies have not been an influence. Sometimes I agree with my father and other times I don't. M.M.

Q. What is your attitude toward military service?

✓ A. Like everyone else, if I didn't have to be here I wouldn't. I don't object to being in the military.

Q. What is your attitude toward service in Vietnam?

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT M.M.	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF __ TAKEN AT __ DATED __ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE __ OF __ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 1 OCT 67 2820 REPLACES DA FORM 19-24, 1 SEP 62, WHICH IS OBSOLETE.

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A. I like serving in Vietnam better than in the States.

Q. What is your attitude toward US Policy in Vietnam?

A. From what I have read and what I know I think we should be here. I think we should be in Vietnam to keep communism from spreading. ✓

Q. Do you support the United States Constitution in its entirety?

✓ A. I do.

Q. Do you owe your allegiance to the United States?

✓ A. I do.

Q. Do you have anything further to add to this statement?

A. No. M.M.

//////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

M.M.

AFFIDAVIT

I, Manuel Marti HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Manuel Marti
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

William L. Brooks
WILLIAM L. BROOKS, SPECIAL AGENT
55TH MI DETACHMENT (CORPS)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of March, 19 69 at An Khe, Republic of Vietnam

Donald M. Miyoshi
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

DONALD M. MIYOSHI, SPECIAL AGENT
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ 136b
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

10

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT M.M.

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PPC-Japan

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10360
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 11-12

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BURKE, J E
TO : ASST COF, G-2
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 08/21/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

SECURITY DETERMINATION

INVESTIGATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : DOCUMENT REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 20 JUL 94

[redacted]

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
(AR 381-130)

DATE 21 Aug 68 0300

TO: *(Control Office, Address and ZIP Code)*
DCS OPNS
USAINTC
PO BOX 398
Ft Holabird, Md., 21219

THRU: *(Include ZIP Code)*

FROM: *(Include ZIP Code) (Include Control Code Number - See AR 381-45.)*
DCSI
Third US Army
Fort McPherson, Ga.

(Enter name and address and ZIP Code of ACTION AGENCY to which results are to be sent.) (Include Control Code Number.)

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2
United States Army, VIETNAM
APO San Francisco 96375

CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY

DATE OPENED	REQUEST NO.
DATE CLOSED	DOSSIER NO.
REMARKS	

SECTION I - REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

1. SUBJECT *(Last name in capitals, first, middle)* MARTI, Manuel (NMN)	2. ALIAS(ES), MAIDEN NAME	3. SERVICE/SOCIAL SECURITY NO. US 52773870 093 36 4601
4. DATE OF BIRTH *(Month, Day, Year)* May 17, 1946	5. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State and Country)* San Juan, PR	6. GRADE AND POSITION PVT

CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX(ES) AND LINE OUT INAPPLICABLE WORDS IN PARENTHESES

7. INVESTIGATIVE ACTION REQUESTED AND REASONS THEREFOR

☐ BACKGROUND INVESTIGATION REQUIRED FOR:

☐ *(Access) (Limited Access)* TO MATERIAL CLASSIFIED *(CONFIDENTIAL) (SECRET) (TOP SECRET).*

☐ ALIEN REQUIREMENT CONTAINED IN AR 600-200.

☐ *(Limited) (Critical)* NUCLEAR WEAPON POSITION PRESCRIBED IN AR 50-3.

☐ OTHER *(Specify).*

☐ *(Special Background Investigation) (Reinvestigation)* REQUIRED FOR *(Ultra-Sensitive Position) (Special Category Position).*

☒ LIMITED INVESTIGATION REQUIRED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 24 AR 381-130 TO RESOLVE ADVERSE INFORMATION ENTERED IN ITEM 11 OR ATTACHED DOCUMENTS.

☐ OTHER INVESTIGATIVE ACTION REQUESTED AND REASONS THEREFOR:

8. AS REQUIRED BY AR 604-5, LOCAL FILES ☐ PERSONNEL, ☒ INTELLIGENCE, ☒ PROVOST MARSHAL, ☒ MEDICAL, WERE CHECKED ON *(Date)* 15 Aug 68 AND REVEALED: ☐ NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION

☐ UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN ITEM 11 BELOW WHICH IS NOT A BAR TO CLEARANCE OR ACTION CONTEMPLATED.

9. LATEST INVESTIGATION AND/OR CLEARANCE *(Indicate type, when made, by whom, and file or dossier number.)*

10. NO BREAK IN FEDERAL SERVICE EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS SINCE:

11. REMARKS *(Use continuation sheets as required.)*

Request Limited Investigation re SUBJECT to determine if action UP AR 604-10 is warranted - LI to include technical FP Check.
SUBJECT currently assigned to USATC, Ft Jackson, S. C.

12

Regraded Unclassified When Separated
From Classified Inclosures
and Marked
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - This Protective
Marking is Excluded From Automatic
Termination"

[redacted]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 20 Feb 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM [illegible]
Auth Para 1-603 [illegible]

INCL
Doss 093364601

TYPED NAME AND TITLE
J. E. BURKE, LTC, GS
Chief, Scty Div

SIGNATURE J E Burke

0903 5239

K

DA FORM 1 DEC 66 2784

REPLACES EDITION OF 1 APR 64 WHICH IS OBSOLETE EFFECTIVE 1 FEB 67 OR WHEN STOCKS BECOME EXHAUSTED, WHICHEVER IS SOONER.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

CHECK APPROPRIATE BOX(ES) AND LINE OUT INAPPLICABLE WORDS IN PARENTHESES

SECTION II - CONTROL OFFICE TO REQUESTER

DATE

☐ NEW FINGERPRINT CARD REQUIRED.

☐ ITEMS RED LINED ON SPH *(PSQ)* REQUIRE CORRECTION AND/OR COMPLETION.

☐ REQUEST CLARIFICATION OF PARA ____________ ABOVE.

INCL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

SECTION III - REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

DATE

☐ ACTION REQUIRED BY SECTION II HAS BEEN COMPLETED.

☐ REQUEST INVESTIGATION BE CANCELED FOR THE FOLLOWING REASON:

☐ CLEARANCE REQUIREMENT IS TERMINATED.

☐ SUBJECT HAS BEEN *(Separated) (Discharged)* AND ORDERS ARE ATTACHED.

☐ OTHER *(Explain)*.

☐ SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED *(Orders attached)*.

INCL

TYPED NAME AND TITLE XX

SIGNATURE XX XX

SECTION IV - CONTROL OFFICE TO ACTION AGENCY

DATE 2 DEC 1968

SUBJECT ASGD TO: USARV TRANS DET, APO S.F. 96375, EDCSA, 13 Dec 68; SO 283, Par 210, Hq, USATC, I, Ft Jackson SC

RESULTS OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATION:

☐ FAVORABLE. ☒ ATTACHED DOCUMENTS FORWARDED FOR SECURITY DETERMINATION.

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION COMPLETED:

☐ BACKGROUND ☐ SPECIAL ☐ REINVESTIGATION ☒ LIMITED ☐ COMPLAINT

CONTROL OFFICE COMPLETING INVESTIGATION: USAINTC

SIGNATURE OF OFFICIAL CLOSING INVESTIGATION: S. B.

DATE COMPLETED: 2 DEC 1968

INCL 1. nc

TYPED NAME AND POSITION
CHAD B. WHITE
LTC, MI, Deputy Chief, ICOP III

SECTION V - ACTION AGENCY TO GAINING COMMAND

DATE

GAINING COMMAND AND ADDRESS *(Include ZIP Code)*

SUBJECT TRANSFERRED TO YOUR COMMAND PER SPECIAL ORDER NO. ____________ *(Copy inclosed)*.

INCL *(Include orders)*

TYPED NAME AND TITLE

SIGNATURE

SECTION VI - RECORD OF FINAL ACTION *(ACTION AGENCY TO USAIRR)*

DATE

☐ FAVORABLE DETERMINATION.

☐ CLEARANCE GRANTED *(TOP SECRET) (SECRET) (CONFIDENTIAL) (CRYPTO) (SPECIAL)*.

☐ CLEARANCE DENIED AND ACTION TAKEN IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARA 24, AR 604-5.

☐ REMARKS:

11

INCL

TYPED NAME, TITLE AND ORGANIZATION

SIGNATURE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY - This Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination"

Regraded Unclassified When Separated From Classified Inclosures and marked

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10361
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 13

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BLOOM, HAROLD
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/22/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

FEDERAL BUREAU INVESTIGATION (FBI)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 22 November 1968
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 26 September 1968, the New York Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, 201 East 69th Street, New York, New York, furnished the following information concerning Manuel MARTI, SUBJECT:

FBI, New York, New York, has no information on file regarding Manuel MARTI, other than what may appear in the FBI reports on MARTI'S father which have been furnished to the 108th Military Intelligence Group.

13

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Group (I-NYFO)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10362
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 14

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 108TH MIL INTELL GRP
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/18/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : COVER SHEET ONLY. RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.

[redacted]

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

EXHIBIT

COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: Manuel MARTI

FILE NUMBER: 8240-6019
093 36 4601

PREPARING UNIT: 108th Military Intelligence Group (I-SIB)

AGENT REPORT DATED: 18 November 1968

DESCRIPTION: Ten FBI Reports, FBI New York, file number 100-100474, subject Adrian Sotomayor; reports dated 30 Jan ary, 12 May, 26 August, and 29 October 1953; 19 November 1956; 11 April 1957; 16 April 1958; 27 April 1961; 2 May 1962 and 20 June 1964.

14

Regraded FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from CLASSIFIED inclosures

IC FORM 171
17 NOV 67

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10363
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 15

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/01/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

MARTI, MANUEL(FATHER)

ALIASES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

ea

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR

2. DATE SUBMITTED
1 October 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093-36-4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY - FATHER) On 30 September 1968, the files of the San Juan Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, were examined concerning Manuel Marti, also known as Adrian Sotomayor; Adrian Marti; Adrian Marti-Aponte; Adrian Martes - Aponte; Adrian Martes; Adrian Sotomayor-Marti; Adrian Sotomayor-Martes; Manuel Sotomayor-Marti and "Soto", SUBJECT'S father, with the assistance of Mrs. Carmen Orraĉa, Records Supervisor, and failed to reveal any additional information subsequent to 21 June 1967.

AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report Birth-Father, dated 25 September 1968, wherein the results of birth records examination reveals that the name of SUBJECT'S father was changed on 5 March 1963.

15

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ROBERT C. PETERSEN, 771st MI Det

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REP[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10364
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 16

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/22/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

MARTI, IVAN

HORIZONS FOR YOUTH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT INDEXED SEPARATELY

[redacted]

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 22 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 26 September 1968, the New York Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI, United States Department of Justice, 201 East 69th Street, New York, New York, furnished the following information concerning Ivan Marti, brother of SUBJECT;

On 29 January 1961 and again on 20 May 1962 a confidential source who has furnished reliable information in the past, advised that Ivan Marti of Apartment 2E, 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York, was a subscriber to New Horizons for Youth. Attached hereto is a characterization of Horizons for Youth, EXHIBIT II.

AGENT'S NOTE: 905 East 167th Street, New York, New York, is shown on SUBJECT'S Personal History Statement (DD Form 398) as HIS address until September 1965. Same DD Form 398 lists HIS brother Ivan's present address as 1201 University Avenue, New York, New York.

16

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Group (I-NYFO)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10365
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 17

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 108TH MIL INTELL GRP
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/22/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

HORIZONS FOR YOUTH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : CHARACTERIZATION INDEXED SEPARATELY

[redacted]

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

EXHIBIT

COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: Manuel MARTI NMN

FILE NUMBER: 8240-6019
093 36 4601

PREPARING UNIT: 108th Military Intelligence Group (I-NYFO)

AGENT REPORT DATED: 22 November 1968

DESCRIPTION: Characterization of HORIZONS for YOUTH.

17 II

[redacted]

[redacted]

IC FORM 171
17 NOV 67

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10367
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 19

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/01/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

MARTI, IVAN

MARTI, BLANCA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

F [redacted] LY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel (NMN) PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR	2. DATE SUBMITTED 1 October 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093-36-4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY - BROTHER) On 30 September 1968, the files of the San Juan Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, were examined concerning Ivan Marti, brother of SUBJECT, with the assistance of Mrs. Carmen Orraca, Records Supervisor, and failed to reveal any record.

(LOCAL AGENCY - SISTER) On 30 September 1968, the files of the San Juan Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, were examined concerning Blanca Marti, sister of SUBJECT, with the assistance of Mrs. Carmen Orraca, Records Supervisor, and failed to reveal any record.

19

[redacted] N

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT C. PETERSEN, 771st MI Det	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Petersen

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPL [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10368
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 20

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BLOOM, HAROLD
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/16/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

MARTI, BLANCA

REPORT OF FINDINGS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted] ONLY
REQ[redacted]ATION

1. Subject Block MARTI, Manuel (NMN) PVT E-1 US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan PR	2. Date Submitted 16 Sept 1968 S.I.B. 3. File Number 8240-6019 / 093-36-4601

4. Further Identifying Data

Name: MARTI, Blanca (Sister) Alias:

Date and Place of Birth: 10 April 1954, San Juan, P.R. Sex:

Present Address: 1201 University Ave., New York, NY

Former Address:

Remarks:

5. Report of Findings: (This check pertains only to Agency circled)

AGENCY	RESULTS and DATE
Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, New York	[redacted] SEP 23 1968
Bureau of Special Services New York City Police Department New York, New York	
Old Records Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York	
Information Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York	20

AGENT REPORT

6. Name of Individual Conducting File Check ____________________

AGENT'S NOTES: The Police Department, City of New York, has jurisdiction over the areas of New York County (Manhattan), Kings County (Brooklyn), Richmond County (Staten Island), Queens and Bronx Counties, New York. Above information was furnished to the undersigned by the agency indicated.

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

7. Name and Organization of Special Agent HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)	8. Signature of Special Agent Harold Bloom

108 FL 62 (Replaces 108 Form 12 dtd 7 Oct 66 which is [redacted]
14 Feb 68

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10369
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 21

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/25/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

BIRTH RECORDS

[RESTRICTED]

SOTOMAYOR-BADILLO, MANUEL ADRIAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT INDEXED SEPARATELY

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

ctr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR

2. DATE SUBMITTED
25 September 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093-36-4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(BIRTH) On 20 September 1968, a check of the birth records concerning Manuel MARTI was conducted at the Bureau of Demographic Registry, Department of Health, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Santurce, Puerto Rico. Mrs. Candita Hernandez de Buxo, Records Supervisor, furnished Certificate 36046, Book 73, for the year 1946, which revealed the following pertinent information:

Name:	Manuel Adrian MARTI-BADILLO
Date of Birth:	17 May 1946
Place of Birth:	San Juan, Puerto Rico
Father's Name:	Manuel Marti
Father's Place of Birth:	Utuado, Puerto Rico
Mother's Name:	Reyes Badillo
Mother's Place of Birth:	Aguadilla, Puerto Rico
Registered By:	Manuel Marti
Date Registered:	27 May 1946
Remarks:	SUBJECT was born, and was originally registered, as Manuel Adrian SOTOMAYOR-BADILLO. HIS father was originally recorded as Adrian Sotomayor. However, on 5 March 1963, SUBJECT'S father changed his name to Manuel Marti under correction number 249, and changed his SON'S surname on the same date.

AGENT'S NOTES: According to Spanish tradition, a person's surname is sometimes compounded by using the father's surname followed by the mother's maiden name in hyphenated form. However, many persons now omit the mother's name in common usage.

Attention is invited to Agent Report, Birth-Father, dated 24 September 1968, reflecting the results of an examination of the Court Order, which effected correction number 249, dated 5 March 1963 (EXHIBIT III).

21

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
PRESCOTT S. WILLIAMS, 771st MI Det

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Prescott S. Williams

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10370
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 22

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/25/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

BIRTH RECORDS

[RESTRICTED]

MARTI, MANUEL SR

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBITS INDEXED SEPARATELY

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

ctr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel (NMN) PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR	2. DATE SUBMITTED 25 September 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093-36-4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(BIRTH-FATHER) On 23 September 1968, a check of the birth records of Manuel Marti, father of Manuel MARTI, was conducted at the Bureau of Demographic Registry, Department of Health, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Santurce, Puerto Rico. Mrs. Candita Hernandez de Buxo, Records Supervisor, furnished a Certificate of Birth Registration, dated 20 March 1963, issued by Tomas Beauchamp, Registrar, Utuado, Puerto Rico, which revealed the following pertinent information:

Name:	Adrian Martir (sic)
Date of Birth:	11 August 1910
Place of Birth:	Utuado, Puerto Rico
Father's Name:	Not Recorded
Father's Place of Birth:	Not Recorded
Mother's Name:	Juana Martir-Aponte (sic)
Mother's Place of Birth:	Utuado, Puerto Rico
Registered By:	Not Recorded
Date Registered:	22 September 1910
Certificate Number:	Certificate 636, Page 257, Book 44, (EXHIBIT III)

AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Court Order in the Spanish language, dated 12 February 1963, by which SUBJECT'S father legally changed his name to Manuel Marti, (EXHIBIT IV), which was subsequently translated into the English language (EXHIBIT V). Attention is further invited to the discrepancy between the spelling of SUBJECT'S father's surname on the Court Order and on the Certificate of Birth Registration. Source advised that the spelling Martir was a typographical error, and that the surname would be changed to read Marti. Attention is further invited to the fact that the term natural child is a term used in Puerto Rico, when a child's birth is registered at the Bureau of Demographic Registry by someone other than the parents of the child. The child takes the name of the mother and the father's name does not appear on the record, inasmuch as the parents are not married to each other.

22

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT PRESCOTT S. WILLIAMS, 771st MI Det	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Prescott S. Williams

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. [redacted]

eleased under the John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
8613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10371
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 23

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 771ST MI DET
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/24/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR

FILE NUMBER: 8240-6019
093-36-4601

REPORTING UNIT: 771st MI Detachment
Fort Brooke, Puerto Rico

AGENT REPORT DATED: 24 September 1968

DESCRIPTION: Birth Certificate of SUBJECT'S father.

EXHIBIT III

[redacted]

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10373
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 25-26

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BARCELO, ANTONIO R
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 02/12/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

COURT ORDER IN THE SPANISH LANGUAGE

NAME CHANGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR

FILE NUMBER: 8240-6019
093-36-4601

REPORTING UNIT: 771st MI Detachment
Fort Brooke, Puerto Rico

AGENT REPORT DATED: 24 September 1968

DESCRIPTION: Court Order in the Spanish Language, dated 12 February 1963, by which SUBJECT'S father legally changed his name to Manuel Marti.

25

EXHIBIT IV

[redacted]

[redacted]

249 63

TRIBUNAL DE PRIMERA INSTANCIA DE PUERTO RICO

TRIBUNAL SUPERIOR

Sala de San Juan

MANUEL MARTI,
Peticionario,) Sobre:
EX-PARTE.) Ad Perpetuam Rei Memoriam
) Civil Num. CS-62-6720
)

Rep . . . .

RESOLUCION

El presente caso se celebró ante el Juez que suscribe el 31 de agosto de 1962, con intervención del Fiscal, habiéndose probado a satisfacción del Tribunal los siguientes extremos: que el peticionario nació en Utuado, Puerto Rico, el 11 de agosto de 1910, hijo natural de Juana Martí; que en su certificado de nacimiento él aparece con el nombre de Adrián, al libro 44 de Utuado, folio 237, acta 636, año 1910; que esta circunstancia constituye un error por cuanto el verdadero y auténtico nombre del peticionario es Manuel, cuyo apelativo ha usado en todo momento desde su nacimiento; que el peticionario tiene dos hijos legítimos llamados Iván y Manuel, quienes aparecen en sus respectivos certificados de nacimiento con el apellido Sotomayor, lo cual constituye un error por la razón de que el apellido legal de dichos menores es Martí; el apellido Sotomayor lo usó el peticionario porque erróneamente creyó estar reconocido por su padre.

En apoyo de las alegaciones de la solicitud presentó el peticionario prueba testifical y documental a entera satisfacción del Tribunal.

El nacimiento de sus referidos hijos Iván y Manuel aparece inscrito en San Juan, P. R. bajo los números 213 y 2765 del Distrito 164, Nums. de Archivo 12969 y 36,046, Años 1945 y 1946, respectivamente.

APR 10 1963

Considerada y analizada la evidencia ofrecida en este caso, el Tribunal, por la presente, declara con lugar la solicitud instada por el peticionario y ordena al Negociado de Registro Demográfico y Estadísticas del Departamento de Salud del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, que proceda a corregir el nombre del peticionario para que aparezca en su certificado de nacimiento con su verdadero nombre de Manuel y para que sus dos hijos menores de edad aludidos precedentemente aparezcan en sus respectivos certificados de nacimiento con el apellido paterno Martí, y asimismo se corrija el nombre del padre de dichos menores para que aparezca Manuel Martí en vez de Adrián Sotomayor; todo ello de acuerdo con lo dispuesto en la Ley Num. 119 aprobada el 26 de abril de 1950.

DADA en San Juan, P. R., hoy día 12 de febrero de 1963.

26

fdo) ANTONIO R. BARCELÓ,
Juez.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10374
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 27-28

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BARCELO, ANTONIO R
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 02/12/63
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

COURT ORDER TRANSLATION

NAME CHANGE

SOTOMAYOR, ADRIAN

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR

FILE NUMBER: 8240-6019
093-36-4601

REPORTING UNIT: 771st MI Detachment
Fort Brooke, Puerto Rico

AGENT REPORT DATED: 24 September 1968

DESCRIPTION: Translation of Court Order, dated 12 February 1963, by which SUBJECT'S father legally changed his name to Manuel Marti.

27

EXHIBIT V

[redacted]

[redacted]

COURT OF HEARING OF PUERTO RICO

SUPERIOR COURT

San Juan Court

MANUEL MARTI,	)	Civil Case Num. CS-62-6720
Petitioner,	)	Concerning:
EX-PARTE.	)	Ad Perpetuam Rei Memoriam
. . . .	)	

RESOLUTION

This case was held before the undersigned Judge on 31 August 1962, with the intervention of the Prosecuting Attorney, having proved to the satisfaction of the Court the following: that the petitioner was born on 11 August 1910, in Utuado, Puerto Rico, the natural son of Juana Marti; that on birth certificate 636, page 237, book 44, for the year 1910, in Utuado, the petitioner appears with the first name Adrian; that this circumstance constitutes an error because the true and authentic first name of the petitioner is Manuel, which first name he has used since his birth; that the petitioner has two legitimate sons named Ivan and Manuel, who appear on their respective birth certificates with the surname Sotomayor, which constitutes an error because the legal surname of the aforementioned minors is Marti; that the petitioner used the surname Sotomayor erroneously because he believed that he had been recognized by his father.

In support of the allegations of the application, the petitioner presented attested and documentary proof to the complete satisfaction of the Court.

The births of the aforementioned children, Ivan and Manuel, are filed in San Juan, Puerto Rico, under numbers 213 and 2765 of District 164, file numbers 12969 and 36046, years 1945 and 1946, respectively.

Considering and analysing the evidence in this case, the Court, by the present, declares the application made by the petitioner to be in order and orders the Bureau of Demographic Registry and Statistics of the Department of Health of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to proceed with the correction of the petitioner's first name in order that it appear on his birth certificate with his true first name of Manuel and in order that his two aforementioned minor sons appear in their respective birth certificate with the paternal surname Marti, and also to correct the name of the father of the said minors so that it appears as Manuel Marti instead of Adrian Sotomayor; all this in accordance with what is set forth in Law 119, approved on 26 April 1950.

Given in San Juan, Puerto Rico, today the 12th day of February 1963.

28

/signed/
Antonio R. Barcelo,
Judge

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10375
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 29-30

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

EDUCATION RECORD

EDUCATION INTERVIEW

EVANDER CHILDS HIGH SCHOOL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]ter a
been entered)

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel NMN
ASN-~~SSN~~: PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DOB/POB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico
POB :

2. DATE SUBMITTED
21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

LISTED EDUCATION RECORD

SCHOOL : Evander Childs High School

ADDRESS: Bronxwood Avenue and East Gun Hill Road, Bronx, New York (N.Y.)

SOURCE : Mrs. Ruth Schwartz POSITION: Student Records Clerk
DATE and Place of Interview: 8 October 1968 at school.

1. **Subject's Name with Aliases:** Manuel MARTI
2. **Address** : 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York
3. **Previous Addresses** : 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, N.Y.
4. **Date and Place of Birth** : 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico
5. **Date of Attendance** : September 1961 to June 1964
6. **Courses and/or Major** : General High School Courses
7. **Instructors** : Mrs. Kerman; Mr. Herbert Tandlich
8. **Graduate (Degree)** : Graduated
9. **Grades** : Average
10. **Record of Transcripts** : Theodore Roosevelt Evening School, Fordham Road; Bronx, N.Y.
11. **Previous Education** : Junior High School 136, Bronx, N.Y.
12. **Employments** : Mutual Insurance Advisory Association, April 7, 1965.
13. **Parents or Guardian** : Father, Manuel; Mother, Reyes
14. **Remarks** : None

AGENT'S NOTE: No information in regard to father's DPOB was available from records.

29

PARA 28 AR 381-130 APPLIES
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY", THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for PAUL P. BAILLARGEN, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 [redacted] (only after data has been entered)

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(EDUCATION INTERVIEW) On 8 October 1968, Herbert Tandlich of 501 Riverdale Avenue, Yonkers, New York, former instructor of Manuel MARTI at Evander Childs High School, Bronxwood Avenue and East Gun Hill Road, Bronx, New York, was interviewed at the school and stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in September of 1963 and had HIM as a student in the "shop course" until June of 1964. SUBJECT was an excellent student to the best of Source's memory and he had daily contact with HIM on an instructor-student basis. Source did not know anything about SUBJECT'S family nor where HE resided. HE was considered to be mentally stable and mature without any memberships in any political organizations. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S association with HIS father and could not comment on the degree of influence exercised by HIS father over HIM.

Source considered SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States form of government and recommends that HE be considered favorably for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States government.

30

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

for PAUL P. BAILLARGEON, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Robert C. Sleeper

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10376
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 31-32

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

EDUCATION RECORD

EDUCATION INTERVIEW

BRONX COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (only after data has been entered)~~

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel NMN
ASN-~~SS~~N: US 52 737 780
DOB/POB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico
POB :

2. DATE SUBMITTED
21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

LISTED **EDUCATION RECORD**

SCHOOL : Bronx Community College (BCC)

ADDRESS: 120 East 184th Street, Bronx, New York (N.Y.)

SOURCE : Mrs. Mildred Kraft, Assistant Registrar

1. **Subject's Name with Aliases:** Manuel MARTI
2. **Address** : 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, N.Y.
3. **Previous Addresses** : None Listed
4. **Date and Place of Birth** : Not Listed
5. **Date of Attendance** : Summer Session 1967
6. **Courses and/or Major** : Not Listed
7. **Instructors** : Not Listed
8. **Graduate (Degree)** : Non-Matriculant
9. **Grades** : Not indicated
10. **Record of Transcripts** : Not Listed
11. **Previous Education** : Not Listed
12. **Employments** : Not Listed
13. **Parents or Guardian** : Not Listed
14. **Remarks** : SUBJECT'S records at BCC are incomplete. SUBJECT did not forward customary papers, such as transcripts of previous education, to BCC.

31

~~PARA 28 AR 381-130 APPLIES~~
~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for HAROLD LEHRER, 108th MI Group (I-NYFO)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. [illegible]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (only after data has been entered)~~

AGENT REPORT [redacted]

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 21 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(EDUCATION INTERVIEW) On 27 September 1968, Mrs. Mildred Kraft, assistant registrar, Bronx Community College (BCC), 120 East 184th Street, Bronx, New York, was interviewed in an attempt to locate former instructors of MARTI, who attended BCC during the Summer session of 1967, with results as follows:

Kraft stated that MARTI'S records were incomplete, and that there was no indication as to who HIS instructors might have been. There was no major course of study. Source could suggest no one who might have knowledge of SUBJECT.

32

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for HAROLD LEHRER, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Skopper

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10377
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 33

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

EDUCATION RECORD

THEODORE ROOSEVELT NIGHT HIGH SCHOOL

BRONX COMMUNITY COLLEGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel NMN
ASN-~~SSN~~: PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DOB/POB : 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico
POB :

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

DEVELOPED EDUCATION RECORD

SCHOOL : Theodore Roosevelt Night High School (TRNHS)

ADDRESS: 500 East Fordham Road, Bronx, New York (NY)

SOURCE : Sylvia Polacsek, School Secretary
DATE AND PLACE OF INTERVIEW: 9 October 1968 at TRNHS

1. **Subject's Name with Aliases:** Manuel MARTI
2. **Address** : 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, N.Y.
3. **Previous Addresses** : 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, N.Y.
4. **Date and Place of Birth** : 17 May 1946; POB not listed
5. **Date of Attendance** : September 1964 to Jan 1965; February 1966 to June 1966.
6. **Courses and/or Major** : Geometry and other evening courses
7. **Instructors** : Mrs. R. Spooner; Honig
8. **Graduate (~~Degree~~)** : Non-graduate
9. **Grades** : Average
10. **Record of Transcripts** : None
11. **Previous Education** : Evander Childs High School
12. **Employments** : None Listed
13. **Parents or Guardian** : None Listed
14. **Remarks** : Developed from records of Evander Childs High School, East Gun Hill Road, Bronx, N.Y. No information in regard to father's DPOB was available from records.

33

PARA 28 AR 381-130 APPLIES
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY", THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

for PAUL P. BAILLARGEON, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Robert C. [illegible]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10378
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 34

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

EMPLOYMENT

POLLY PERRY STORES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED/~~DEVELOPED~~ EMPLOYMENT)

Firm: Polly Perry Stores
Address: 33-37 East 17th Street, New York, New York 10003
Source/Position: Elliot Weiner; Controller
Date/Place of Interview: 14 October 1968, at Source's place of employment

1.	**SUBJECT'S Name with Aliases:**	Manuel MARTI
2.	**Address:**	905 East 167th Street, New York, New York
3.	**Previous Addresses:**	None Recorded
4.	**Date and Place of Birth:**	Not Recorded
5.	**Social Security Number:**	093-36-4601
6.	**Dates of Employment:**	9 September 1964 to 12 February 1965
7.	**Supervisor:**	Bob Wang
8.	**Position:**	Shipping Clerk
9.	**Salary:**	$52.50 for a 35 hour week
10.	**Efficiency:**	Satisfactory
11.	**Reason for Termination:**	Left of own accord
12.	**Eligible for Rehire:**	Eligible
13.	**Previous Employment:**	Not Recorded
14.	**Remarks:**	None

34

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AG [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10379
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 35-37

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/18/68
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE (SUPERVISOR)

CHARACTER REFERENCE (CO-WORKERS)

EMPLOYMENT CO-WORKER(S)

POLLY PERRY STORES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 18 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED EMPLOYMENT SUPERVISOR) On 14 October 1968, Bob Wang, Warehouse Manager, Polly Perry Stores, 33-37 East 17th Street, New York, New York 10003, who resides at 3028 West 29th Street, Brooklyn, New York 11224, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who was SUBJECT'S immediate supervisor from September 1964 to February 1965 stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in September 1964 when MARTI was hired as a shipping clerk by Polly Perry Stores and went to work under Source's Immediate supervision. Source had only business contact with SUBJECT during the period of association, and had not seen MARTI since SUBJECT resigned HIS employment at Polly Perry in February 1965.

Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S personal background, education, residence or home life, except that SUBJECT was believed to be single and was attending school at night, further details unknown. Source was not certain but he seemed to recall SUBJECT once mentioning that HIS father, not further identified, operated a small grocery store. Source believed that SUBJECT'S employment at Polly Perry Stores was HIS first job, and HE left there to seek better employment but Source had no knowledge of where SUBJECT went to work.

MARTI was an excellent employee and HE got along well with HIS co-workers at Polly Perry. HE is highly intelligence and appears to have considerable leadership ability. Source knew nothing adverse concerning SUBJECT'S moral character, integrity, discretion, honesty, maturity, and financial responsibility. HE appeared to be emotionally stable, and manifested no undesirable personal habits whatever. SUBJECT was never heard to express any radical political views, and although Source did not know what HIS specific political views were, Wang had no reason to doubt or question SUBJECT'S loyalty to the United States. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S organizational affiliations, foreign travels, business interest or relatives residing abroad. Source would gladly re-employ SUBJECT if the occasion arose. Source suggested that Allen Lee and Cora McLendon, former co-workers of SUBJECT as persons who would be knowledgeable of HIM.

Wang recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

35

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

18 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED EMPLOYMENT CO-WORKER) On 14 October 1968, Allan Lee, Assistant Buyer, Polly Perry Stores, 33-37 17th Street, New York, New York 10003, who resides at 3 West 123rd Street, New York, New York 10027, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who was a co-worker of SUBJECT from September 1964 to February 1965 stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in September 1964 when MARTI was hired as a chipping clerk by Polly Perry Stores, and he had daily business contact with SUBJECT until MARTI left Polly Perry in February 1965 in order to seek better paying employment. Source's contact with SUBJECT was limited to matters concerning the work at their place of employment, and Source had not seen SUBJECT since February 1965 when HE left Polly Perry.

Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S personal background, parents, siblings, education or residence. MARTI was attending school at night, further details unknown, and usually brought HIS books to the job so that HE could study during spare moments. HE appeared to be of Latin decent but spoke English fluently and without any accent.

SUBJECT was a quiet, well mannered, intelligent and cooperative employee. HE was always punctual in HIS attendance and appeared to get along well with HIS associates at work. HE seemed to be a very ambitious young man, and Source knew nothing adverse concerning SUBJECT'S moral character, integrity, discretion, honesty, or social habits. HE was a very competent employee, and demonstrated no signs of immaturity or emotional instability. SUBJECT was never heard to express any radical political views, and Source presumes that HE is loyal to the United States. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S organizational affiliations, home life, foreign travels, business interests or relatives residing abroad. Source was unable to suggest anyone who may have knowledge of SUBJECT.

Lee recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

36

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 18 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED EMPLOYMENT CO-WORKER) On 14 October 1968, Cora McLendon, Clerk, Polly Perry Stores, 33-37 East 17th Street, New York, New York 10003, who resides at 769 Park Place, Brooklyn, New York 11216, was interviewed at her place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who was associated with SUBJECT at Polly Perry Stores from September 1964 to February 1965 stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in September 1964 when HE was hired as a shipping clerk at Polly Perry Stores and was associated with HIM as a co-worker at that firm until February 1965 when HE left the firm. Source's contact with SUBJECT was limited to an occasional greeting at their place of employment and daily observance of HIM on the job. Source had not seen SUBJECT since HE left Polly Perry in February 1965.

Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S personal background, education, residence, relatives, or other employment.

SUBJECT was a very quiet, respectable looking young man and HIS conduct on the job was above reproach. HE seemed to get along well with HIS co-workers and performed HIS assigned duties in a very satisfactory manner. Source knew nothing adverse concerning SUBJECT'S character, integrity, discretion, political sympathies, or financial responsibility. HE had no known difficulty with law enforcement agencies. SUBJECT was never known to make any radical political statements and Source had no reason to doubt or question HIS loyalty to the United States. Source had no knowledge of HIS organizational affiliations, foreign travels, business interest or relatives residing abroad. Source was unable to suggest anyone who may have knowledge of SUBJECT. McLendon declined to make any recommendation concerning SUBJECT'S suitability for assignment to a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government because of insufficient knowledge.

37

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sleeper

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10380
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 38

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/25/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

EMPLOYMENT

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel
PVT E-1 US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan, PR

2. DATE SUBMITTED
25 September 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093-36-4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED/~~DEVELOPED~~ EMPLOYMENT)

Firm: Mutual Insurance Advisory Association
Address: 733 3rd Avenue, New York, New York 10017
Source/Position: Albert B. Cassidy Jr, Personnel Manager
Date/Place of Interview: 24 September 1968, Source's office

1. **SUBJECT'S Name with Aliases:** Manuel MARTI
2. **Address:** 1201 University Avenue, New York, New York 10452
3. **Previous Addresses:** 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York, Apt 2E
4. **Date and Place of Birth:** 17 May 1946, place not listed
5. **Social Security Number:** 093-36-4601
6. **Dates of Employment:** 5 April 1965 to 20 May 1968
7. **Supervisor:** George Ferraro
8. **Position:** Utility Clerk (start), Tabulating Machine Operator (end)
9. **Salary:** Not listed
10. **Efficiency:** Satisfactory
11. **Reason for Termination:** To enter military service
12. **Eligible for Rehire:** Eligible
13. **Previous Employment:** Polly Perry Stores, 33 East 17th Street, New York, NY
14. **Remarks:** SUBJECT graduated from the Evander Childs High School, Bronx, New York. The records contained no information concerning SUBJECT'S parents.

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (SIB-I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10381
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 39-40

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/19/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE (SUPERVISOR)

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 19 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(EMPLOYMENT SUPERVISOR) On 24 September 1968, George J. Ferraro, Production Manager, Mutual Insurance Advisory Association (MIAA), 733 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10017, who resides at 47-19 216th Street, Bayside, New York 11361, a former supervisor of Manuel MARTI, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning SUBJECT. Ferraro stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT on 5 April 1965 when MARTI started to work under Source's supervision at MIAA, and he had daily business contact with SUBJECT until MARTI left MIAA to enter the United States Army on or about 20 May 1968. Source had no social contact with SUBJECT during the period of association. MARTI was originally employed as a Utility Clerk in Source's department, and because of HIS keen intelligence and willingness to resume responsibility the position of Utility Clerk Supervisor was created for HIM. HE was subsequently trained within the section and promoted to Tabulating Machine Operator, the position which HE held at the time of HIS departure. SUBJECT was well liked and respected by HIS co-workers, and Source considered HIM to be the best employee in his section. Ferraro would be happy to have SUBJECT return to work under his supervision.

SUBJECT is of Puerto Rican decent, and was single and resided with HIS parents in Bronx, New York, exact address unknown. SUBJECT'S mother was ailing for some time after HIS employment at MIAA and she died on or about 9 January 1967. SUBJECT has a younger sister, name unknown, and a brother, name unknown, who is also in the United States military service. While at MIAA SUBJECT was given a deferment by HIS draft board because HIS brother was in the military service and HE was the sole support of HIS parents. SUBJECT is a high school graduate, and is believed to have attended college at night, further details unknown. Source had no knowledge concerning SUBJECT'S employment prior to MIAA.

39

MARTI is a dependable, industrious, cooperative, and aggressive individual who exercises considerable initiative in HIS work. HIS moral character and discretion are above reproach, and HE manifested no undesirable personal habits during the period of association. SUBJECT is honest, trustworthy, mature and emotionally stable, and HE has had no known difficulty with creditors or law enforcement agencies. Source had no knowledge concerning the degree of influence exercised over SUBJECT by HIS father. MARTI firmly believes in the principles of a free democratic society, and Source considers HIM loyal to the United States. SUBJECT had no known organizational affiliations, and Source had no knowledge concerning HIS foreign travels, relatives residing abroad, or business interest in foreign countries. Source suggested Lucien Todman, 1660 Andrews Avenue, Bronx, New York, as a close

Continued

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES W[redacted]

(AR 381-1[redacted]M-30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 19 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

friend of SUBJECT.

Ferraro highly recommends that SUBJECT be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

40

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10382
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 41

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/18/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE (CO-WORKER)

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(EMPLOYMENT CO-WORKER) On 24 September 1968, Anthony Gennarelli, Operations Analyst, Mutual Insurance Advisory Association (MIAA), 733 3rd Avenue, New York, New York 10017, who resides at 50 Barlow Avenue, Staten Island, New York 10038, a former co-worker of Manuel MARTI, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning SUBJECT. Gennarelli, who has known SUBJECT since April 1965, stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in April 1965 when MARTI started to work in the same department as Source at MIAA, and he pursued a daily business association with SUBJECT until HE left MIAA to enter the United States Army in May 1968. Source had no social contact with SUBJECT, and had not seen MARTI since May 1968. SUBJECT worked at MIAA as a Utility Clerk, Utility Clerk Supervisor and finally as a Tabulating Machine Operator. HE was very highly regarded by HIS associates at MIAA and everyone was sorry to see HIM leave.

SUBJECT was single and resided with HIS parents, names unknown, at an unknown address in Bronx, New York. SUBJECT'S mother died on or about 9 January 1967. SUBJECT has a brother and young sister, names unknown, who also resided in HIS household. HE is a high school graduate, and attended college at night, further details unknown. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S employment prior to MIAA. Source believed that SUBJECT and HIS parents were originally from Puerto Rico.

SUBJECT is of excellent moral character and discretion. HE is dependable, mature and emotionally stable. SUBJECT has had no known difficulty with law enforcement agencies, and HE manifested no undesirable personal habits. HE firmly believes in the principles of a free democratic society and is considered loyal to the United States. Source had no knowledge of the degree of influence exercised over SUBJECT by HIS parents. SUBJECT had no known organizational affiliations, and Source had no knowledge concerning HIS foreign travels, relatives residing abroad, or business interest in foreign countries.

Gennarelli recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

41

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10383
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 42

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/19/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE (CO-WORKER)

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 19 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(EMPLOYMENT CO-WORKER) On 24 September 1968, Albert B. Cassidy Jr., Personnel Director, Mutual Insurance Advisory Association, 733 3rd Avenue, New York, New York 10017, who resides at 2939 Route number 2, Browns Mills, New Jersey 08015, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source, who was associated with MARTI as a co-worker at Mutual Insurance Advisory Association from April 1965 to May 1968, stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in April 1965, when he interviewed MARTI for employment at Mutual Insurance Advisory Association, and maintained daily business contact with SUBJECT throughout HIS period of employment with the aforementioned organization. Source had no social contact with SUBJECT, and last saw MARTI in May 1968 when HE departed the organization on military leave.

SUBJECT was employed at Mutual Insurance Advisory Association from 5 April 1965 to 20 May 1968. HE was originally hired as a Utility Clerk. HE was subsequently promoted to Utility Clerk Supervisor and later to Tabulating Machine Operator. MARTI enjoyed an excellent reputation among HIS associates at HIS place of employment and everyone was sorry to see HIM leave. Source would be happy to re-employ SUBJECT upon termination of HIS military service.

SUBJECT was single and resided with HIS parents in Bronx, New York, further details unknown. SUBJECT'S mother, name unknown, died in late 1966 or early 1967. MARTI is a high school graduate, and HE worked for Polly Perry Stores, New York, New York, prior to HIS employment at Mutual Insurance Advisory Association. Source has no further knowledge concerning SUBJECT'S personal background, but believed that SUBJECT was of Puerto Rican decent.

42

SUBJECT is of excellent character, integrity, discretion and morals. HE is financially responsible, and had no known difficulty with law enforcement agencies during the period of association. SUBJECT manifested no undesirable personal habits, nor any sign of immaturity or emotional instability. Source had no knowledge concerning the degree of influence exerted on SUBJECT by HIS parents. MARTI was never heard to express any radical political views, and Source considers HIM to be pro-democratic in HIS political views and loyal to the United States. SUBJECT has no known organizational affiliations, and Source had no knowledge concerning HIS foreign travels, foreign interests or relatives residing abroad.

Cassidy highly recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for ALFHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sheaffer

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10384
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 43-44

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/19/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE(NEIGHBOR)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
19 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
193 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 24 October 1968, Ramona Rodriguez, Housewife, Apartment 4E, 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York, was interviewed in her residence concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT since 1951 stated substantially as follows:

Source met SUBJECT and HIS parents as neighbors in 1951 when Source moved into the apartment across from SUBJECT at 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York. Source became a close friend of SUBJECT'S mother and saw SUBJECT daily until HIS family moved from the building in 1965. Source continued to visit SUBJECT'S mother after 1965 and until her death in early 1967. Source had not seen SUBJECT since the funeral of HIS mother in 1967.

Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT's birthplace since HE was approximately six years of age when they first met. Source knew SUBJECT'S parents as Manuel and Reyes Marti. HE has an older brother, Ivan, and a younger sister, Blanca. SUBJECT was brought up in a very respectable home, and HIS parents exercised very strict control over the children. SUBJECT graduated from high school in Bronx, New York, shortly before HE and HIS parents moved from the neighborhood, further details unknown. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S employment.

SUBJECT is a quiet, friendly, serious-minded young man of excellent character and personal behavior. HE was never known to be adversely involved with law enforcement agencies. HIS parents were very strict and watchful over the upbringing of SUBJECT and HIS brother and they were not allowed to roam the streets or participate in any neighborhood gang activities. Most of SUBJECT'S free time from school was spent at home with HIS studies, and with HIS hobbies of stamp collection, and HIS pet birds and fishes. Source believed that SUBJECT'S father worked in a factory, further details unknown, and was never known to operate HIS own business. HIS parents were never heard to speak badly about the United States and its democratic institutions, and Source was of the opinion that SUBJECT was brought up as a loyal United States citizen. SUBJECT is a mature, emotionally stable young man, and because of HIS home training Source was of the opinion that HE would be financially responsible. SUBJECT was not known to have any organizational affiliations, nor to have traveled outside of the United States. HE is honest, trustworthy and dependable, and has manifested no undesirable social habits. Source suggested Luisa Perez, 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York, as a friend of SUBJECT's family. She was unable to suggest other persons in the neighborhood who would have knowledge of SUBJECT since most of the people presently residing in the apartment building moved there since SUBJECT moved away in 1965. 43

Continued

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 19 November 1968
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Rodriguez recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

AGENT'S NOTES: Source who had a closer relationship with SUBJECT and HIS family than her spouse, Atanacio Rodriguez, was interviewed in lieu of her spouse who was not available. It is believed that SUBJECT erroneously listed Source's husband as Antonio instead of Atanacio.

44

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp,(I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Alphonso E Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10385
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 45

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/20/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

NO CONTACT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 4 November 1968, a check of the Hagstrom's Maps of Manhattan and Bronx, New York City, failed to reveal the location of 201 Roebling Street, New York, New York, the address reflected for listed character reference Hugo Rivera on Manuel MARTI'S SPH, dated 1 August 1968; however, a check of the Brooklyn, New York Telephone Address Directory revealed the existence of a Roebling Street, and a telephone listing 384-0091 for Maria Rivera at 201 Roebling Street, Brooklyn, New York. Repeated telephone calls at different hours and over a period of days failed to elicit any response from the residents at that address.

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 12 November 1968, a physical check was conducted at 201 Roebling Street, Brooklyn, New York, in an attempt to locate Hugo Rivera, listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, with the following results:

Mrs. Kuechler, wife of the apartment building superintendent, was interviewed and stated that the family named Rivera who resided at the above address had moved away approximately one month ago, and she had no knowledge of their present address.

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 13 November 1968, a postal removal check was conducted at the United States Post Office, 271 Cadman Plaza East, Brooklyn, New York, with the assistance of Mr. Urcinola, Postal Inspector, concerning Maria Rivera, 201 Roebling Street, Brooklyn, New York, and revealed the following information:

A postal removal notice had been submitted from that address on 1 October 1968 for Hugo Rivera only, and the new address is 2020 Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York 10453.

45

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10386
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 46-47

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/19/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE(FRIEND)

COL.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 789 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 19 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 14 November 1968, Hugo Rivera, Assistant Manager, American Finance Corporation, 556 7th Avenue, New York, New York, who resides at 2020 Walton Avenue, Bronx, New York 10453, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has been a close friend of SUBJECT for approximately 12 years stated substantially as follows:

Source and SUBJECT first met approximately 12 years ago when they were both attending elementary school at PS 20, Simpson and 167th Street, New Yori. They were classmates from elementary school through Junior High School number 40, Prospect Avenue, Bronx, New York, and through their sophomore year at Evander Childs High School, 800 East Gunhill Road, Bronx, New York, in 1962, when Source dropped out of school and went into the United States Army. Source and SUBJECT visited each other regularly while they were in school together, and because of their mutual interest in coin and stamp collecting. After Source went into the Army he did not see SUBJECT again until HIS discharge in 1964; however, they corresponded with each other regularly. Since 1964 they have had frequent social contact, and Rivera last saw MARTI on 12 November 1968 when HE was home on leave to attend the funeral of HIS uncle who Source knew only as Polo.

Source believed that SUBJECT and HIS brother, Ivan, were born in Puerto Rico but came to New York City when they were very young. When they first met SUBJECT resided at 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York, with HIS parents, Reyes and Manuel Marti; HIS brother, Ivan, and their younger sister, Blanca, who is now approximately 14 years of age. Prior to HIS induction SUBJECT resided with HIS family at 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, New York. HIS mother died in early 1967 from lung cancer. HIS only known employment was with an insurance firm on Third Avenue, New York, New York, where MARTI worked as an IBM operator, further details unknown. SUBJECT'S father was formerly employed with an unknown shipping company, but Source had no knowledge of HIS present employment. HIS uncle, Polo, who died recently, used to operate a small grocery store on 163rd Street, Bronx, New York, exact location not recalled. 46

SUBJECT and HIS brother were brought up in a very respectable home, and their mother exercised rigid control over their activities even after they were fully grown. They were not allowed to participate in any of the games and other activities in which boys usually participate with the other children in the neighborhood, and as a result SUBJECT had had very few close friends. Most of SUBJECT'S spare time was always devoted to reading or to HIS hobby of coin and stamp collection. Although SUBJECT is a perfectly normal male, Source did not recall HIM ever having a

Continued

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

19 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

girlfriend. HE is completely honest, trustworthy, and dependable, and HE has never had a moment of difficulty with law enforcement agencies. When SUBJECT'S brother was drafted into the military service SUBJECT was granted a deferment in order that HE could assist in supporting the family since HIS mother was ill. When HIS turn came to be drafted HE did not utter a single complaint about going into the Army because HE felt that HE had an obligation to go. Source stated that HE would stake his life on SUBJECT'S loyalty to the United States. Although he had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S father's political or organizational affiliations, Source recalled that he occasionally brought home the socialist newspaper, name not recalled, and would side with the comments made in the paper that were critical of the United States and its policies. On these occasions SUBJECT and HIS brother would always argue in defense of the United States, and SUBJECT'S father has never been able to influence HIS political thoughts and belief in any way. SUBJECT never travelled abroad, and is not known to have any relatives residing abroad. HE uses alcoholic beverages moderately, and does not gamble or use habit forming drugs. Source knew of nothing that would reflect adversely on MARTI'S character, discretion, maturity, or emotional stability, and HE has no organizational affiliations, except perhaps some club connected with stamp and coin collection. Source was unable to furnish any information concerning SUBJECT's listed character references Juanita Reyes and Aleanso Ortiz. Carlos Delgado, SW 33rd Street between First and Second Streets, Miami, Florida, is a friend of SUBJECT.

Rivera highly recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO [illegible] 341 [illegible] WHICH [illegible] USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10387
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 48

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/20/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : UNABLE TO LOCATE SOURCE

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 28 October 1968, a physical check was conducted at 1435 Ogden Avenue, Bronx, New York, New York, in an attempt to locate Juanita Reyes, listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, with negative results. A check of the names on the mail boxes in the apartment building located at the above address failed to reveal any listing for Reyes. The wife of the building superintendent, name not furnished, was contacted and she stated that she had never heard of Reyes and there was no one by that name residing in the building.

AGENT'S NOTES: SUBJECT'S SPH, dated 1 August 1968, reflects the above address for Reyes. A courtesy letter addressed to Reyes was returned by the Post Office Department with the statement "Addressee unknown".

48

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FRO [illegible] OMATIC TERMINATION~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group(I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10388
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 49

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

REYES, JUANITA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 1 November 1968, the current New York Telephone Directories for the five boroughs of New York City and the Counties of Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and Putnam, were checked concerning Juanita Reyes, listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, and revealed the following:

The Manhattan, New York directory revealed a listing for a Juanita Reyes, 170 West 89th Street, New York, New York, Telephone number 874-4393.

The Bronx, New York directory revealed a listing for a Juanita Reyes, 940 East 173rd Street, New York, New York, Telephone number DA-8-9935.

AGENT'S NOTES: Previous attempts to locate and interview Reyes at 1435 Ogden Avenue, New York, New York, Reyes' address as reflected on SUBJECT'S Statement of Personal History, dated 1 August 1968, met with negative results.

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 1 November 1968, a telephone call to the residence of Juanita Reyes, 170 West 89th Street, New York, New York, Telephone number 874-4393, possible listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, was answered by the telephone operator who informed that the number had been changed at the request of the customer and that the new number is unlisted.

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 1 November 1968, the unlisted telephone number of Juanita Reyes, 170 West 89th Street, New York, New York, possible listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, was obtained through the New York Telephone Company's Security Office, which informed this agent that Reyes' unlisted telephone number is 874-7986.

49

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10389
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 50

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

REYES, JUANITA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 21 November 1968
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 3 November 1968, Juanita Reyes, 170 West 89th Street, New York, New York, telephone number 874-7986, possible listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, was contacted telephonically at her residence for the purpose of arranging an appointment for interview. In reponse to a query concerning her failure to respond to a courtesy letter which had been left at her residence on 1 November 1968, Reyes stated that she had no recollection of SUBJECT, and was waiting to contact her family in order to determine if any of them were acquainted with MARTI. After receiving a description of SUBJECT from the undersigned Reyes stated categorically that she was not acquainted with MARTI.

50

[redacted]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sleapper

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10390
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 51

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/19/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

REYES, JUANITA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REP

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, MANUEL NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

19 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 4 November 1968, an attempt was made to contact Juanita Reyes, 940 East 173rd Street, Bronx, New York, who might be identifiable with Juanita Reyes, 1435 Ogden Avenue, New York, New York, listed character reference of Manual MARTI, with negative results. There was no one available at Reyes' residence. A courtesy letter was left at the residence with the request that Reyes contact the undersigned for an appointment.

AGENT'S NOTES: An earlier attempt to contact Reyes at the address furnished on SUBJECT'S SPH, dated 1 August 1968, revealed that no one by that name was known at the address.

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 10 November 1968, an attempt was made to contact Juanita Reyes, 940 East 173rd Street, Bronx, New York, who might be identifiable with Juanita Reyes, 1435 Ogden Avenue, New York, New York, listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, and who had failed to respond to a courtesy letter left at her residence on 4 November 1968, with the following results:

Alberto Reyes, a relative of Juanita Reyes, was contacted and stated that he had never heard of SUBJECT, and that Juanita Reyes had returned to Puerto Rico over one year ago. He further stated that she had never resided at 1435 Ogden Avenue, New York, New York.

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10391
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 52

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

ORTIZ, ALEANSO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : UNABLE TO LOCATE AND INTERVIEW REFERENCE

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 21 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 3 November 1968, a physical check was conducted at 810 Hunts Point Avenue, Bronx, New York, in an attempt to locate and interview Aleanso Ortiz, listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, who allegedly resided at the above address. A check of the mail boxes located in the building revealed no listing for Ortiz. The building superintendent, Mrs. Matos, was questioned and stated that she had never heard of MARTI.

52

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Sheaffer

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10392
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 53

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/21/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE

ORTIZ, ALEANSO

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1968, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

21 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 14 November 1968, a postal removal check was conducted at the United States Post Office, 558 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York, with the assistance of Mr. Auteri, Postal Inspector, concerning Aleanso Ortiz, 810 Hunts Point Avenue, Bronx, New York, listed character reference of Manuel MARTI, with the following results:

Source stated that there was no removal on record for Aleanso Ortiz from the aforementioned address; however, there was a removal for an Andre Ortiz from that address to 1749 Grand Concourse, c/o Rivera, Apartment 3J.

(LISTED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 14 November 1968, Angel L. Rivera, Parole Officer, who resides at 1749 Grand Concourse, Bronx, New York, contacted the undersigned telephonically in response to a courtesy letter at his residence. Rivera stated that he was not acquainted with Aleanso Ortiz or Manuel MARTI, and that the postal removal for Andre Ortiz from 810 Hunts Point Avenue, Bronx, New York, to his address was for his mother-in-law, Andre Ortiz, who recently returned to Puerto Rico.

[redacted]

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group(I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Robert C.

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10393
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 54

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/19/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE(NEIGHBOR)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]
AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

19 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(DEVELOPED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 24 October 1968, Luisa Perez, Housewife, Apartment 5E, 905 East 167th Street, New York, New York 10459, was interviewed in her residence concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT since 1956 stated substantially as follows:

Source moved into the building at the above listed address in 1956 and met SUBJECT and HIS family who resided in apartment 2E across from Source. Perez became friendly with SUBJECT'S mother and was a regular visitor to SUBJECT'S home until HE and HIS family moved from the building in 1965. Since 1965 Source had visited SUBJECT'S home on University Avenue, New York, New York, exact address unknown, on various occasions, and she last saw SUBJECT when HE visited her in the hospital approximately four months ago.

Source believed that SUBJECT was born in Puerto Rico and was brought to New York City by HIS parents while HE was still a baby. HE has an older brother, Ivan, and a younger sister, Blanca. HIS parents are Manuel and Reyes Marti. SUBJECT'S mother died in early 1967. SUBJECT attended high school, name unknown, in Bronx, New York, from which HE graduated prior to moving to HIS present address. Source had no knowledge concerning SUBJECT'S or HIS father's employment, and she could not furnish additional information regarding HIS personal background.

SUBJECT was reared in a very respectable home, and HIS parents paid strict attention to the rearing of SUBJECT and HIS brother and sister. HE was never allowed to roam the streets nor to participate in any gang activities in the neighborhood. All of SUBJECT'S sparetime was spent at home with HIS studied and HIS hobbies of stamp collection and the rearing of birds and fishes. Source never heard SUBJECT and HIS parents make any critical remarks concerning the United States or express any sympathy for the Communist philosophy, and MARTI is presumed to be a loyal United States citizen. HIS moral character, integrity, and personal behavior are above reproach, and HE is considered to be honest, trustworthy, dependable, and financially responsible. SUBJECT was never known to be adversely involved with law enforcement agencies, and HE never manifested any undesirable social habits. SUBJECT was not known to have any organizational affiliations, nor to have traveled outside of the United States and its possessions. Source was unable to suggest the names of other individuals who were acquainted with SUBJECT in the neighborhood.

Perez recommended that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AG [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10394
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 55

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/20/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE(CO-WORKER)

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(DEVELOPED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 13 November 1968, Richard H. Franken, Control Supervisor, Data Control Section, Mutual Insurance Advisory Association, 733 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10017, who resides at 1245 University Avenue, Bronx, New York 10452, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT since April 1965 stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in April 1965 when SUBJECT was employed as a utility clerk at MIAA; however, he did not have any close working contact with SUBJECT until approximately one year later when Source was assigned to the Data Control Section where SUBJECT was then working as a Tabulating Machine Operator. Source had daily contact with SUBJECT on the job, and their contact on the outside was limited to a few occasions when both Source and SUBJECT worked late and Source gave SUBJECT a drive to HIS home which was in the same area as Source's. Franken had not seen or heard from SUBJECT since HE left MIAA for active military service in May 1968.

SUBJECT was single and lived with HIS father and brother, names unknown, at 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, New York. HIS mother, name unknown, died during SUBJECT'S employment at MIAA. Source recalled that SUBJECT'S brother was on active military duty and as a result MARTI was given a deferment until HIS brother was released from the military service. SUBJECT was a high school graduate, and had attended college for about eight credit hours at night while employed at MIAA, further details unknown. Source had no further knowledge of HIS personal background.

SUBJECT was an excellent and highly competent and dedicated employee, and HE enjoyed a very good reputation among HIS associates at MIAA. HE is a very intelligent and ambitious young man, and seemed to devote a lot of HIS spare time to studies. HIS main hobby was stamp collecting to which HE also devoted a considerable amount of time. MARTI is honest, trustworthy, mature, emotionally stable, and of high moral character and personal behavior. HE manifested no undesirable personal habits and was not known to be adversely involved with creditors or law enforcement agencies. Source had no knowledge concerning SUBJECT'S organizational affiliations or foreign travels, and he had no reason to doubt or question SUBJECT'S loyalty to the United States since SUBJECT was never heard to voice any criticism whatever of the United States government or of the democratic policies of this country. Source was unable to suggest anyone other than co-workers who would have knowledge of SUBJECT.

55

Franken highly recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10395
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 56-57

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/20/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE(CO-WORKER)

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(DEVELOPED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 13 November 1968, Nick Traficenti, Tabulating Machine Operator, Mutual Insurance Advisory Association (MIAA), 733 Third Avenue, New York, New York 10017, who resides at 565 East 181st Street, Bronx, New York 10457, was interviewed at his place of employment concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT since March 1967 stated substantially as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in March 1967 when he was employed by MIAA and was assigned to the same section as SUBJECT in the Data Control Section. Source was introduced to the personnel within the section and coached in his duties by SUBJECT, and as a result he became quite friendly with MARTI. Source had daily contact with SUBJECT at work, but they never had occasion to associate outside of their working environment. Source last saw SUBJECT in May 1968 when HE left MIAA to enter active military service.

Although SUBJECT is of Puerto Rican decent, Source was not aware of HIS birthplace. HE was single and lived with HIS father, Manuel Marti, in Bronx, New York, further details unknown. HIS mother, name unknown, had died of cancer shortly before HE and Source met. SUBJECT was a graduate of Evander Charles High School, Bronx, New York, and Source believed that HE was attending college at night during HIS employment at MIAA. SUBJECT has a younger sister and an elder brother, names unknown. HIS brother was in the United States military service during SUBJECT'S employment at MIAA, and since SUBJECT was reportedly the main support of HIS family HE was given a deferment from military service until HIS brother was released. Source had no further knowledge of SUBJECT'S personal background.

MARTI is a highly intelligent, conscientious and dependable individual. HE was assigned as a Tabulating Machine Operator at MIAA and seemed to have a keen interest in HIS work and was always seeking ways to improve HIMSELF on the job. Source believed that MIAA was HIS first employment. SUBJECT was very highly regarded by all of HIS associates at MIAA, and HE was greatly missed on the job. HE is friendly, honest, trustworthy, mature, emotionally stable and of good moral character. SUBJECT was not known to have any difficulty with creditors or law enforcement agencies, and HE demonstrated no habits of an anti-social nature during the period of association. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S organizational affiliations or foreign travels. SUBJECT never engaged in political discussions, and HE never made any radical statements concerning the United States government. Source considers MARTI to be a loyal United States citizen who is dedicated to the preservation of our democratic form of government. He knew of no one other than co-workers who are knowledgeable of SUBJECT.

Continued

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group(I-SIB)

56

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341 ... WHICH MAY BE USED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Traficenti recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Alphonso E Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES W[illegible] ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ [illegible] BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10396
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 58-59

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/18/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CHARACTER REFERENCE(ASSOCIATE)

MUTUAL INSURANCE ADVISORY ASSOCIATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(DEVELOPED CHARACTER REFERENCE) On 20 October 1968, Lucien Todman, Computer Operator, Mutual Insurance Advisory Association (MIAA), 733 3rd Avenue, New York, New York, who resides in Apartment 4A, 1660 Andrews Avenue, Bronx, New York 10453, was interviewed at his residence concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT slightly over two years stated substantially as follows:

Source and SUBJECT met in July 1966 when Source went to work at MIAA and was introduced to SUBJECT who gave Source his orientation regarding operations within the data processing at MIAA. Source and SUBJECT became good friends and rode to and from work together since they resided in the same general neighborhood. SUBJECT visited Source's home socially on a few occasions, and they made visits to the United Nations and other cultural sites together. Source had not seen SUBJECT since May 1968 when HE was drafted into the United States Army.

SUBJECT is a native of Puerto Rico, but Source assumed that HE moved to New York City when HE was very young inasmuch as HIS knowledge of HIS native island was very limited, and HE frequently queried Source, a Virgin Islander, concerning conditions in Puerto Rico. Source met SUBJECT'S father, HIS sister, and HIS brother, names unknown, on the occasion of the death of SUBJECT'S mother in early 1967, when Source attended the funeral. SUBJECT appeared to be very much attached to HIS mother and until her death most of HIS time was spent between work and visiting HIS mother at the hospital. SUBJECT never mentioned HIS father, and Source was not aware of his existence until they met briefly at the funeral of SUBJECT'S mother. SUBJECT'S brother was in the military service at the time of HIS mother's death and is believed to have traveled from Germany for the funeral. Source believes that SUBJECT received a deferment from military service because of HIS mother's illness and the fact that HIS other brother was on active military duty. This gave Source the impression that SUBJECT was the family's main support. SUBJECT is an avid reader and has a keen interest in history. HE is a high school graduate and college at night for a short period. Source believed that HE attended New York City College and took courses in history. SUBJECT is not known to have any organizational affiliations. HE and Source have held many discussions concerning local and world politics and MARTI has always staunchly defended the basic democratic philosophy of the United States Government. They have also discussed the subject of Puerto Rico's welfare, independence or statehood and MARTI has expressed the view that Puerto Rico's welfare and that of its people is best served under the island's present commonwealth status. SUBJECT is a very intelligent, friendly, industrious and responsible young man. HE appears to be very mature in HIS thoughts and actions, and has had no known difficulty with creditors or law enforcement agencies. Source

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

Continued

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Group (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM [illegible] WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

58

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 18 November 1968
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

does not know if SUBJECT uses alcoholic beverages at all because on the occasions that HE visited Source's home HE refused to have anything to drink. HE is not known to use habit forming drugs, and has manifested no undesirable personal habits whatever. HIS main hobby is stamp collection. Source does not believe that SUBJECT has traveled abroad since His arrival in New York City, and Source has no knowledge of relatives or business interest HE might have abroad. Source unhesitatingly vouches for SUBJECT'S loyalty to the United States. Source was unable to suggest anyone who may have knowledge of SUBJECT.

Todman highly recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

59

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES W[illegible] FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10397
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 60

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/20/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI,Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 789
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK) On 24 October 1968, the following residents of the apartment building located at 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York 10459, were contacted at their respective apartments in an attempt to locate neighbors knowledgeable of Manuel MARTI, who resided at the above address from 1946 to 1965, with results as indicated:

Bonita Rodriguez, who has resided in apartment 4C since 1966, stated that she had no knowledge of SUBJECT and HIS family, and could not suggest anyone in the neighborhood who might be acquainted with MARTI.

Simona Padron, Apartment 1C, stated that she had only been residing in the apartment building for approximately one year and had no knowledge of SUBJECT. She was unable to suggest the names of other individuals in the neighborhood who might have knowledge of SUBJECT.

Celia Robateau, Apartment 3C, stated that she had resided at that address for the past five years but had no knowledge of SUBJECT and HIS family, and could not suggest the names of other neighbors who might be acquainted with MARTI.

AGENT'S NOTE: Alexander Castillo, whose interview by undersigned agent is recorded in a separate Agent Report, this investigation, was the only competent source regarding SUBJECT who could be located in the neighborhood additional to listed character reference Ramona Rodriguez and the person suggested by Rodriguez as a developed character reference, Luisa Perez.

60

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Alphonso E. Marshall

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10398
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 61-63

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/18/68
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK

CHARACTER REFERENCES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK) On 24 October 1968, Alexander Castillo, Student, Bronx High School of Science, Bronx, New York, who resides in Apartment 5B, 905 East 167th Street, Bronx, New York 10459, was interviewed in his residence concerning Manuel MARTI, Source who has known SUBJECT since approximately 1950 stated substantially as follows:

Source met SUBJECT in 1950 when he and his parents moved into the apartment building at the above address where SUBJECT was then residing with HIS parents. Source's mother was a close friend of MARTI'S mother, and Source became quite friendly with SUBJECT and HIS brother, Ivan, and visited SUBJECT'S apartment on the average of four times weekly until 1965 when the Marti family moved from the neighborhood. Source had seen SUBJECT on a few occasions since He moved from the neighborhood, the last time being about three or four months ago.

SUBJECT grew up in the neiborhood of East 167th Street, Bronx, New York, and came from a very respectable home. In addition to HIS older brother, Ivan, SUBJECT also has a young sister, Blanca. HE was graduated from high school in Bronx, New York, further details unknown, and Source believed that HE was working for an insurance company in New York City, further details unknown. SUBJECT'S mother died in early 1967. Source believes that SUBJECT is still single, and HE resided at an unknown address in upper Manhattan after moving from the neighborhood of East 167th Street.

SUBJECT is a very quiet, mannerly, respectable young man of good moral character and personal behavior. HE was never known to be adversely involved with law enforcement agencies, nor to engage in any activities inimical to the best interest of the United States. SUBJECT'S parents, whom Source knew as Mr. and Mrs. Marti, were very strict and did not allow SUBJECT to associate with any neighborhood gangs. Most of HIS spare time was spent at home with HIS studies and with HIS hobbies of stamp collecting and the rearing of birds and fish. SUBJECT and HIS brother were influential in starting Source in the hobby of stamp collecting. SUBJECT is considered to be an honest, trustworthy, discreet and financially responsible young man. HE is considered to be a loyal United States citizen, and neither HE nor any other member of HIS family was ever heard to make any statements against the United States or to express sympathy for the Communist philosophy. SUBJECT had no known organizational affiliations, and HE was not known to travel outside of the United States. Source was unable to suggest anyone who may have knowledge of SUBJECT.

61

Castillo recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. [illegible]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Emanuel NMN PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico	2. DATE SUBMITTED 18 November 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK) On 24 October 1968, Dominga Ortiz, housewife, who resides at 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, New York 10452, was interviewed at her residence concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT since 1965 stated substantially as follows:

Source who is the spouse of the building superintendent at the above address met SUBJECT and HIS damily in 1965 when they moved into the apratment building, and her contact with SUBJECT has been limited to an occasional greeting whenever they meet in the neighborhood.

Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S education, employment, previous residence, or personal background.

SUBJECT and HIS family appear to be very fine, respectable people and their conduct in the neighborhood had been above reproach. SUBJECT'S mother, name unknown, died in 1967. SUBJECT and HIS family appear to be very quiet people and keep very much to themselves. Source knew of nothing which would reflect adversely on MARTI'S character, integrity, discretion, maturity, emotional stability, financial responsibility or honesty. Neither HE nor other members of HIS family have been observed to engage in any questionable political activity and Source had no reason to doubt HIS loyalty to the United States. SUBJECT was not known to be adversely involved with law enforcement agencies during the period of association, and Source had no knowledge of any organizational affiliation HE might have. Source was unable to suggest anyone who may have knowledge of SUBJECT.

Based on the excellent conduct of SUBJECT in the neighborhood, Ortiz recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of responsibility with the United States Government.

62

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT for ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp, (I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. [illegible]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ WHICH MAY BE USED.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Emanuel NMN
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8250-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(NEIGHBORHOOD CHECK) On 24 October 1968, Hortense Mosko, Housewife, who resides at 1201 University Avenue, Bronx, New York 10452, was interviewed in her residence concerning Manuel MARTI. Source who has known SUBJECT for approximately three years stated substantially as follows:

Source has been casually acquainted with SUBJECT and HIS family as neighbors since 1965 when MARTI and HIS parents moved into apartment 1E adjacent to Source; however, her contact with SUBJECT and HIS family had been limited to a neighborly greeting whenever they met in the hallways of the building. Source saw SUBJECT frequently prior to HIS induction in the United States Army.

SUBJECT and HIS family were described as very quiet, friendly neighbors whose conduct in the neighborhood was above reproach. Source had no knowledge concerning SUBJECT'S educational background, employment or previous residence.

MARTI appears to be of excellent character, and Source knew of nothing whichwould reflect adversely on SUBJECT'S character, integrity, discretion, honesty, or financial responsibility. HE was not known to have any difficulty with law enforcement agencies. SUBJECT'S mother, given name unknown, died almost two years ago. The members of SUBJECT'S family keep very much to themselves and do not associate with any of the other neighbors in the building. Neither SUBJECT or the other members of HIS family were known to engage in any questionable political or other activity in the neighborhood, and Source had no reason to doubt or question SUBJECT'S loyalty to the United States. Source had no knowledge of SUBJECT'S organizational affiliations or foreign travels. Source was unable to suggest anyone who may have knowledge of SUBJECT.

Mosko recommends that MARTI be favorably considered for a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Government.

63

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FR [illegible] MATIC TERMINATION~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for
ALPHONSO E. MARSHALL, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. Sheagger

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10399
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 64

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/03/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

CREDIT AGENCIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (only after data has been entered)

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

nh

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
MARTI, Manuel, NMN
PVT E-1 US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
3 October 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240 6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(CREDIT AGENCY) On 2 October 1968, Pauline DiFiore, Chief Records Clerk, Credit Bureau of Greater New York, 330 West 34th Street, New York, New York, consulted pertinent files in search of records concerning Manuel MARTI, NMN, and furnished the following information:

There was no record concerning SUBJECT or any name similar to that of SUBJECT.

(CREDIT AGENCY) On 2 October 1968, Freda Larsen, Clerk, Daily Litigation Bulletin, a Division of Credit Bureau of Greater New York, 330 West 34th Street, New York, New York, consulted pertinent files in search of records concerning Manuel MARTI, NMN, and furnished the following information:

There was no record concerning SUBJECT or any name similar to that of SUBJECT.

PARA 28 AR 381-130 APPLIES
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY", THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
BASIL C. HACKETT, 108th MI Group (I-NYFO)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Basil C Hackett

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY (only after data has been entered) • U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1962 OF—656148

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10400
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 65

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/01/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

ea

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT MARTI, Manuel (NMN) PVT E-1, US 52 737 780 DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan PR	2. DATE SUBMITTED 1 October 1968
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8240-6019 093-36-4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 30 September 1968, the files of the San Juan Field Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hato Rey, Puerto Rico, were examined concerning Manuel MARTI, also known as Manuel Adrian Sotomayor-Badillo, with the assistance of Mrs. Carmen Orraca, Records Supervisor, and failed to reveal any record.

AGENT'S NOTES: Attention is invited to Agent Report, Birth, dated 25 September 1968, wherein results of birth record examination reveals that SUBJECT'S name was changed on 5 March 1963.

65

~~[illegible] MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT ROBERT C. PETERSEN, 771st MI Det	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Robert C. Petersen

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES [illegible] ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10401
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 66

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/18/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

ALIASES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT I NOT INCLUDED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

amr

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

MARTI, Manuel
PVT E-1, US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 Mat 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico

2. DATE SUBMITTED
18 November 1968

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
8240-6019
093 36 4601

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 26 September 1968, the New York Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Justice, 201 East 69th Street, New York, New York, furnished the following information concerning Manuel Marti, also known as Adrian Martes, Adrian Martes Aponte, Adrian Marti Apontes, Adrian Sotomayor and "Soto", SUBJECT'S father:

Attached hereto, original only, as EXHIBIT I, are the following ten FBI, New York, New York reports, file number 100-100474, subject: Adrian Sotomayor: Reports dated 30 January,12 May, 26 August, and 29 October 1953; 19 November 1956; 11 April 1957; 16 April 1958; 27 April 1961; 2 May 1962 and 10 June 1964.

Note is made of the birth date of SUBJECT'S father, i.e., 2 April 1910, as appears in report dated 11 April 1957, as compared with date of birth listed on current request for information, i.e., 10 August 1910.

Attached reports are additional to those FBI reports on SUBJECT'S father already in possession of Military Intelligence.

AGENT'S NOTE: The request to the FBI for information on SUBJECT'S father indicated that the following FBI reports were in possession of Military Intelligence: San Juan report 13 August 1952; New York reports dated 16 April 1959, 12 April 1960, 23 May 1962, 9 June 1965, 22 June 1966 and 21 June 1967.

~~Regraded FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from CLASSIFIED inclosures~~

66

~~PROTECTIVE MARKING~~ [illegible] ~~TERMINATION~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
for HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Group (I-NYFO)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Robert C. Sleazer

[redacted]

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM [redacted] JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10402
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 67-69

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/16/68
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : THREE COPIES OF FILE CHECK

[redacted]LY

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. Subject Block
MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1 US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan PR

2. Date Submitted
16 Sept 1968 SIB

3. File Number
8240-6019 / 093-36-4601

4. Further Identifying Data

Name: MARTI, Manuel   Alias:

Date and Place of Birth: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico   Sex:

Present Address: 1201 University Ave., New York, NY

Former Address: 905 East 167th St., New York, NY

Remarks:

5. Report of Findings: (This check pertains only to Agency circled)

AGENCY	RESULTS and DATE
Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, New York	
Bureau of Special Services New York City Police Department New York, New York	
[✓ Old Records Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York]	NO RECORD UNDER NAME AND ADDRESS GIVEN
Information Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York	67 AGENT REPORT

6. Name of Individual Conducting File Check ______________________

AGENT'S NOTES: The Police Department, City of New York, has jurisdiction over the areas of New York County (Manhattan), Kings County (Brooklyn), Richmond County (Staten Island), Queens and Bronx Counties, New York. Above information was furnished to the undersigned by the agency indicated.

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

7. Name and Organization of Special Agent
HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)

8. Signature of Special Agent

108 FL 62 (Replaces 108 Form 12 dtd 7 Oct 66 which is obsolete)
24 Feb 68

[redacted]

[redacted]NLY

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. Subject Block
MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1 US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan PR

2. Date Submitted
16 Sept 1968 SIR

3. File Number
8240-6019 / 093-36-4601

4. Further Identifying Data

Name: MARTI, Manuel Alias:

Date and Place of Birth: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico Sex:

Present Address: 1201 University Ave., New York, NY

Former Address: 905 East 167th St., New York, NY

Remarks:

5. Report of Findings: (This check pertains only to Agency circled)

AGENCY	RESULTS and DATE
Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, New York	
[✓ Bureau of Special Services New York City Police Department] ~~New York, New York~~	NOTHING DEROGATORY BASED ON INFORMATION FURNISHED SEP 26 1968 EB BUREAU OF SPECIAL SERVICES
Old Records Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York	
Information Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York	AGENT REPORT

6. Name of Individual Conducting File Check 68

AGENT'S NOTES: The Police Department, City of New York, has jurisdiction over the areas of New York County (Manhattan), Kings County (Brooklyn), Richmond County (Staten Island), Queens and Bronx Counties, New York. Above information was furnished to the undersigned by the agency indicated.

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

7. Name and Organization of Special Agent
HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)

8. Signature of Special Agent

108 FL 62 (Replaces 108 Form 12 dtd 7 Oct 66 which is obsolete)
14 Feb 68

FOR OFFICIA[redacted]

[redacted]

REQUEST FOR INFORMATION

1. Subject Block

MARTI, Manuel (NMN)
PVT E-1 US 52 737 780
DPOB: 17 May 1946, San Juan PR

2. Date Submitted

16 Sept 1968 SIB

3. File Number

8240-6019 / 093-36-4601

4. Further Identifying Data

Name: MARTI, Manuel Alias:

Date ~~and Place of~~ Birth: 17 May 1946, San Juan, Puerto Rico Sex:

Present Address: 1201 University Ave., New York, NY

Former Address: 905 East 167th St., New York, NY

Remarks:

5. Report of Findings: (This check pertains only to Agency circled)

AGENCY	RESULTS and DATE
Federal Bureau of Investigation New York, New York	
Bureau of Special Services New York City Police Department New York, New York	
Old Records Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York	NO RECORD BASED ON INFORMATION GIVEN SEP 18 1968 INFORMATION SECTION
[✓ Information Unit New York City Police Department New York, New York]	69

AGENT REPORT

6. Name of Individual Conducting File Check

AGENT'S NOTES: The Police Department, City of New York, has jurisdiction over the areas of New York County (Manhattan), Kings County (Brooklyn), Richmond County (Staten Island), Queens and Bronx Counties, New York. Above information was furnished to the undersigned by the agency indicated.

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

7. Name and Organization of Special Agent
HAROLD BLOOM, 108th MI Gp (I-NYFO)

8. Signature of Special Agent
Bernard A Hubers

03 FL 62 (Replaces 108 Form 12 dtd 7 Oct 66 which is obsolete)
4 Feb 68

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10403
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 70

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO : DCS, OPERS HQS, USAINTC
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/09/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

RESIDENCES

EMPLOYMENT

SCHOOLING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]E SPECIAL-BI

STAPLE HERE

A1

NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST

9 Sep 1968

254-1448

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME: MARTI MANUEL (NMN)

2. MALE

3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S): NONE

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 093-36-4601

5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH: May 17 1946

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: SAN JUAN, PR. PR

7. SERVICE NUMBER: US52773870

8. a. SECURITY PROGRAM

☒ MILITARY

☐ CIVILIAN

☐ INDUSTRIAL

b. ☒ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST: 0310

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY

INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

OPS III

RETURN RESULTS TO: (Include ZIP Code)

DCS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP-III-
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

SAC-CT 1-21

	DATE ... OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER MANUEL MARTI	10 August 10 UTUADO, P.R.	1201 University Ave.	US
b. MOTHER (Full Maiden Name) REYES BADILLO	6January 15, SAN JUAN PR.	DECEASED	US
c. SPOUSE (Full Maiden Name) N/A			

13. RESIDENCES (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
May 1964	Sept 1965	905 East 167 St.	New York	New York
Sept 1965	May 1968	1201 University Ave.	New York	New York
May 1968	July 1968	D-9-2 (OPR)	Fort Jackson	S. C.
July 1968	Present	D-15-4 (OPR)	Fort Jackson	S. C.

14. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent employment)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Nov. 1964	April 1965	Polly Perry	New York, NY.
April.1965	May 1968	Mutual Ins. Adv. Association)	New York, NY.
July 1968	Present	UNITED STATES ARMY	

15.

a. FROM: July 1966

PLACE: EW YORK, N.Y.

YES	NO	16.
	X	a. Is the
	X	b. Has tl
	X	c. Has tl
	X	d. Has th
X		e. Is the
	X	f. Has th
	X	g. Has th

ent?

on?

Forces?

DOD NAC Center
Agency Checked Per Your Request

FBI-ID

SEP 23 1968

FOR THE DIRECTOR

G. Gibbon

17. REQUEST DATA

a. REQUESTER DESIGNATOR				b. REASON	
	ARMY		DASA		BASIC TRAINEE
	NAVY		DCA	/	PRE-COMMISSION
	AIR FORCE		DCAA		NUCLEAR
	OSD		DIA		BI.
	JCS		DSA		SECRET CLEARANCE
	NSA		DISCO		

18. REMARKS (If a...

REF: Item 14e May 1968 - Present US Army

SINGLE AGENCY CHECK AT FBI - IDENT

70

NAC COMPLETED 8 JULY 68 SHOWS NAME CHECK ONLY NEW FD 258 ATTACHED.

281

0903 826 OPS III

8240-6019

[redacted]

ICOP III

DD FORM 1 DEC 66 1584

[redacted]

☆GPO: 1967 O—247-527

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 01/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10406
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 74

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO : CG, FT JACKSON SC
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 06/05/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

RESIDENCES

EMPLOYMENT

CIVILIAN SCHOOL

FBI INVESTIGATIVE FILES CHECK

RELATIVES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : INCLOSURES NOT INCLUDED. PAGE 74 REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES.

E 272 je Al

RUS JUN 1 [illegible] 9-2

STAPLE HERE →

NACC Use Only

158-2528

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Enthac NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK REQUEST D-9-2

REQUEST DATE 5 JUN 1968

1. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME: MARTI, Manuel [redacted]

2. SEX: Male

3. ALIAS(ES) AND ALL FORMER NAME(S): None

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER: 093-36-4601

5. MONTH, DAY, YEAR OF BIRTH: 17May46

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: San Juan, P.R. PR

7. SERVICE NUMBER: US52773870

RETURN RESULTS TO: (Include ZIP Code)

COMMANDING GENERAL
ATTN: AJJGI
FT. JACKSON, S.C. 29207

FBI-S

8. a. SECURITY PROGRAM
☒ MILITARY
☐ CIVILIAN
☐ INDUSTRIAL

b. ☐ LOCAL FILES CHECKED WITH FAVORABLE RESULTS

c. INITIATOR OF REQUEST: 0310

9. RELATIVES	10. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	11. PRESENT ADDRESS	12. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER MARTI, Manuel	10Aug10 Utaado, P.R.	1201 University Ave. Bronx, NY	US
b. MOTHER (Full Maiden Name) BADILLO, REYES	6Jan15 San Juan, P.R.	Deceased	US
c. SPOUSE (Full Maiden Name) None			

13. RESIDENCES (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent addresses.)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
May64	Sep66	905 E. 167 St.	Bronx	NY
Sep66	May68	1201 University Ave.	Bronx	NY
May68	Pres	On post residence		

In response to your request there are attached 7 reports which appear to relate to the subject of your inquiry. FATHER

14. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 18th birthday or during past 15 years, whichever is shorter. If under 18, list present and most recent employment)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
May64	Apr65	Polly Perry Inc.	Manhattan, NY
Apr65	May68	Mutual Ins. Advisery Assoc.	Manhattan, NY
May68	Pres	US ARMY	

This reply is result of check of FBI ~~investigative files. To check arrest records, request must be submitted to~~ FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

15. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
Jul67	Sep67	Bronx Comm.Clg.	Bronx, NY

YES	NO	16. ("Yes" answers must be explained in Item 18, below.)
	x	a. Is the subject an alien or naturalized citizen?
	x	b. Has the subject any foreign connections, employment or military service?
	x	c. Has the subject travelled or resided abroad other than for the U.S. Government?
	x	d. Has the subject had employment requiring a security clearance or investigation?
x		e. Is the subject now or has he ever been in the Federal Civil Service or Armed Forces?
	x	f. Has the subject qualified DD Form 398, 98, 48-1, or similar security form?
	x	g. Has the subject ever been addicted to drugs?

17. REQUEST DATA

	a. REQUESTER DESIGNATOR				b. REASON
x	ARMY		DASA	x	BASIC TRAINEE
	NAVY		DCA		PRE-COMMISSION
	AIR FORCE		DCAA		NUCLEAR
	OSD		DIA		BL
	JCS		DSA		SECRET CLEARANCE
	NSA		DISCO		

18. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper.)

16e-1st term inductee 74

[redacted] [redacted]

To be regraded UNCLASSIFIED and annotated FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from classified inclosures.

DD FORM 1 DEC 66 1584 REPLACES DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65, WHICH IS OBSOLETE. ☆GPO: 1967 O—247-527

126

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10004-10408
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 79

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : WHITE, CHAD B
TO : CG, THIRD US ARMY
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 07/11/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : MARTI, MANUEL

NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : ENCLOSURE NOT INCLUDED. RECORD REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCOSURES.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE · UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS
U. S. ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND
FORT HOLABIRD, MARYLAND 21219

ICOP-III

11 JUL 1968

SUBJECT: MARTI, Manuel, US 52 773 870, SSN: 093-36-4601
DPOB: 17 May 46, San Juan, P.R.

TO: Commanding General
Third United States Army
ATTN: DCSI, AJAGI-M
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330

1. References:

a. AR 604-10.

b. DD Form 1584, CG, ATTN: AJJGI, Ft Jackson, S.C. ______, subject as above, dated 5 June 68.

2. Forwarded for your information are the results of the National Agency Check (NAC) requested by reference 1b.

3. Information contained in inclosure may be within the purview of reference 1a. If additional investigation is desired, your request should be returned with inclosure and 3 copies of a current DD Form 398 of SUBJECT to this headquarters, ATTN: ICOP-III.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

1 Incl
USAIRR Dossier 093-36-4601

CHAD B. WHITE
MAJ, MI
Acting Assistant Adjutant General

79

~~Regraded Unclassified When Separated From Classified Inclosures and Marked~~

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~ ~~"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -- This Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination"~~

IC FL 97-4 (Rev)
11 Jan 68

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10030
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 2

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

ALIASES

COSUBJECTS

INDEX TRACING RECORD OF ALIASES AND COSUBJECTS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

INDEX TRACING RECORD OF ALIASES AND COSUBJECTS

For use of this form, see AR 381-45; the proponent agency is Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

NOTE: *Alias and cosubject names developed during subsequent or "bring-up" investigations, will be separated from those previously recorded by entry of the date this supplemental action is taken.*

SUBJECT (Last Name - First Name - Middle Name): Scheer, Robert

DOSSIER NUMBER: 112 28 1134

SOCIAL SECURITY OR SERIAL NO.: 112 28 1134

DATE OF BIRTH: 4 Apr 36

PLACE OF BIRTH:

THE FOLLOWING NAMES HAVE BEEN CARDED AS ALIASES OR COSUBJECTS APPEARING IN THIS DOSSIER. THIS FORM WILL BE PLACED AT THE TOP OF THE DOSSIER.

ALIASES - IDENTIFYING DATA AS ABOVE

Sheer, Robert

COSUBJECTS	SOCIAL SECURITY OR SERIAL NO.	DATE OF BIRTH	PLACE OF BIRTH	DOCUMENT DATED*
Hendel, Samuel				
Bishop, Hillman M.				

*Enter the date of the document in which name is recorded.

DA FORM 1 NOV 60 2371

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961 O - 576545

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10042
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 25

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BALDWIN, WILLIAM R.
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 12/05/58
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

INVESTIGATION(S) CONDUCTED

LATEST CLEARANCE(S) ISSUED

AGENCIES CHECKED

SUMMARY OF CONTENT

STANDARDIZED SYNOPSIS FOR REVIEW OF INVESTIGATIVE FILES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 APR 63.

CONFIDENTIAL

STANDARDIZED SYNOPSIS FOR REVIEW OF INVESTIGATIVE FILES
(AR 381-48)

NOTE: Subsequent review - each reviewer adding information will make the entry under item 16 and will sign (including grade and title) immediately under such information.

1. DOSSIER NUMBER
H1 016 940

2. SUBJECT'S LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME
SCHEER, Robert NMN

3. SERVICE NUMBER
N/A

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER
112-28-1134

5. DATE OF BIRTH
4 April 1936

6. PLACE OF BIRTH
Bronx, New York

7. INVESTIGATION(S) CONDUCTED

TYPES	DATE	BY WHOM (command or agency)
NAC		
NACI		
BI		
MISC	28 July 1958	First U.S. Army
CTI	5 Dec 1958	First U.S. Army

8. LATEST CLEARANCE(S) ISSUED

TYPES	DATE	BY WHOM (command or agency)
TS		
SECRET		

9. AGENCIES CHECKED*

FBI CRIM	FBI SUBV	CSC	I&NS	HCUA	PMG	TAG
X	X	X		X		
STATE	**ONI**	**OSI**	**AFAGO**	**USMC**	**BUPERS**	**OTHER**
X						CIA

10. U.S. CITIZEN
☒ YES ☐ NO

11. IF NATURALIZED, GIVE DATE AND PLACE
N/A

12. FOREIGN AFFILIATIONS (*If YES, explain in item 16*)
☐ YES ☒ NO

13. SUBVERSIVE ORGANIZATIONS AFFILIATION (*If YES, explain in item 16*)
☒ YES ☐ NO

14. HAS CLEARANCE EVER BEEN DENIED OR REVOKED (*If YES, explain in item 16*)
☐ YES ☒ NO

15. EVER PROCESSED UNDER AR 380-131, AR 604-10, SR 620-220-1 OR OTHER APPLICABLE REGULATIONS (*If YES, explain in item 16*)
☒ YES ☐ NO

16. SUMMARY OF CONTENT (*Use reverse side if additional space is needed*)

See attached ROI (1).

- -

Case adjudicated favorably by this headquarters and forwarded to D/A on 23 December 1958 with the recommendation that SUBJECT be declared acceptable for induction into the military service.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF, G-2:

Ted E. Gordinier
TED E. GORDINIER
Major GS
Chief, Personnel Security Branch

25

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
AND MARKED
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"
AUTH: AR 381-130
DATE
18 04 '63 70

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

17. DATE OF REVIEW
5 December 58

18. PURPOSE OF REVIEW (*Such as, promotion, clearance, attendance at service school, etc.*)
UP AR 604-10

19. REVIEWED BY (*Command or agency*)
First U.S. Army

TYPED NAME, GRADE, AND TITLE OF INITIAL REVIEWER
WILLIAM R. BALDWIN, 1st Lt, Complaint Section, S2, 108th CIC Group

023

SIGNATURE OF INITIAL REVIEWER
William R. Baldwin

* *Indicate in the applicable block all agencies checked using the following key: NR - no record; ND - non derogatory; NI - not identifiable; Item 16 - which means that related derogatory information is summarized in Item 16.*

DA FORM 1 MAR 58 2073

CONFIDENTIAL

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/19/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10063
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 79-81

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 08/28/58
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

EMPLOYMENT

US POST OFFICE

CITY COLLEGE LIBRARY

DONNEL LIBRARY

LAUFERS HOTEL

REPORT OF FINDINGS

AGENT'S NOTES

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

---

tr

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 August 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

H1-014631

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

13 (EMPLOYMENT) On 27 August 1958, the Personnel File of SUBJECT was examined at the Personnel Section, Room 3218, United States Post Office, 33d Street and 8th Avenue, New York, New York, and the following information was revealed:

Name Recorded:	Robert SCHEER
Date of Birth:	4 April 1936
Place of Birth:	Bronx, New York
Residence Address:	653 Britton Street Bronx, New York
Wife:	Selena Scheer
Dates of Employment:	4 April 1957 to Present
Job Title:	4 April 1957 to 8 August 1958 Temporary Substitute-Clerk Part Time 9 August 1958 to Present Distribution Clerk (Substitute) PFS-4, Step 2
Department or Section:	Outgoing Mails Grand Central Station New York, New York
Salary:	4 April 1957 to 8 August 1958 $2.00 per hour 8 August 1958 to present $2.07 per hour
Employee Number:	789010
Social Security Number:	112-36-2283 (Standard Form 85 carries "SS 331-88-240", in this same Personnel File)
Selective Service Number:	79 50-29-36-186
Loyalty Information:	Employment Application processed through

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group

077

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Paul F. Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 August 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

H1-014631

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

2d Civil Service Region, Investigations Division, 11 September 1957. File stamped "Processed under Executive Order 10450". Post Office Department Form 61 containing Oath of Office Statement, and Subversive Activity and Affiliation Statement signed 9 August 1958. No qualifications listed thereon.

Education:

Christopher Columbus High School
Astor Avenue, Bronx, New York
Graduated 1953

City College
New York, New York
September 1953 to Present

Employments:

April 1957 to Present
New York Post Office, New York, New York

No Dates Recorded
City College Library
133d Street, New York, New York

June 1956 to September 1956
Donnel Library, 1 West 53d Street
New York, New York

June 1955 to September 1955
Laufers Hotel
Sylvan Lake, New York

References:

Serena Turan
1910 Union Street
Bronx, New York

Norman Bernstein
2858 Bronx Park East
Bronx, New York

80

Fred Keen
2858 Bronx Park East
Bronx, New York

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group

078

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Paul F. Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(*SR 380-320-10*)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED
28 August 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
H1-014631

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

AGENT'S NOTES: Neither Social Security Number (SSN) 112-36-2283, nor the notation "SS 331-88-240", agree with the SSN: 112-28-1134 contained on the records of S. Klein Department Stores, another listed employment. SUBJECT did not list employments at City College Library, and Donnel Library on his DD Form 398.

81

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group

079

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/19/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10064
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 82-83

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 08/20/58
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

EMPLOYMENT

S. KLEIN DEPARTMENT STORES

REPORT OF FINDINGS

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

bw 7

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

20 August 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

H1 016 940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

14 (EMPLOYMENT) On 20 August 1958, the employment records of S. Klein Department Stores, 3rd Floor, 6 Union Square, New York, New York, were examined with the assistance of Samuel B. Ward, Personnel Assistant, and the following information was revealed:

Name Recorded:	SCHEER, Robert
Residence Address:	653 Britton Street Bronx 67, New York
Date of Birth:	4 April 1936
Place of Birth:	Bronx, New York
Father:	Fred Scheer 653 Britton Street Bronx, New York
Social Security Number:	112-28-1134
Dates of Employment:	8 June 1954 to 4 October 1954
Position or Title:	Stock Clerk and Cashier
Department or Section:	Shoes, 8 June 1954 Charge Department, 14 June 1954
Salary:	8 June to 13 June 1954 $32.00 per 40 hour week 14 June 1954 advanced to $34.00 per 40 hour week
Reason for Leaving:	Reduction in Force
Eligible for Rehire:	Not recorded
Schools Attended:	PS 96 Bronx 8 years Christopher Columbus High School Bronx, New York 4 years

82

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group

080

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Paul F Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

bw

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED
20 August 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
Hl 016 940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Queens College
Flushing, New York
1 year

References:

Martin Kroop
674 Moheegan Avenue
Bronx, New York

Miss Tillie Horowitz
2750 Barker Avenue
Bronx, New York

Fred Keen
2858 Bronx Park East
New York, New York

Mr. Ward stated that due to the turnover in employees at S. Klein, he could not locate the name of any former supervisor, or co-worker of SUBJECT, who was in contact with SUBJECT in this 1954 employment.

83

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group 081

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Paul F. Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/19/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10066
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 85-86

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/27/58
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

EMPLOYMENT

REPORT OF FINDINGS

HILLTOP LODGE

AGENT REPORT

[RESTRICTED]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : SEE AGENT'S NOTES.

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

rm

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED
27 October 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
H1-016940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

16 (EMPLOYMENT) On 27 October 1958, Paul Wolfson, 424 Marlborough Road, Brooklyn, New York, former co-owner of Hilltop Lodge, a listed employment of SUBJECT, supplied the following information in substance:

Name Recorded:	Robert SHEER
Residence Address:	653 Britton Street, Bronx, New York
Social Security Number:	112-28-1134
Dates of Employment:	July and August 1953
Job Title:	Waiter, summer camp
Rate of Pay:	$60.00 monthly. Total pay $121.50
Reason For Leaving:	End of summer season
Eligible for Rehire:	Yes
Other Pertinent Information:	SUBJECT listed occupation as student, enrolled to attend Queens College, beginning in September 1953.

85

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group

083

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Paul F Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47 WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

rm

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT SCHEER, Robert Pre-Inductee DOB: 4 April 1936 POB: Bronx, New York	2. DATE SUBMITTED 27 October 1958 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER H1-016940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

17 (EMPLOYMENT) On 27 October 1958, Paul Wolfson, accountant, and former co-owner of Hilltop Lodge, Sylvan Lake, New York, with residence at 424 Marlborough Road, Brooklyn, New York, declined to be interviewed at his residence, but furnished substantially the following information spontaneously in telehonic contact:

Source knew SUBJECT as a summer camp waiter employed at Hilltop Lodge, during July and August 1953. Frequency of contact was several times weekly, and the last contact was in August 1953.

SUBJECT performed HIS duties well, got along well with guests at Hilltop Lodge, and left in August 1953, at the end of the 1953, Summer season. Source found SUBJECT an honest, trustworthy and reliable employee. HE used good judgment in the performance of HIS duties, and departed this job eligible for rehire. Source knew nothing further concerning SUBJECT'S background, associates, or loyalty to the United States.

AGENT'S NOTES: Numerous attempts were made to personally interview Source at 424 Marlborough Road, Brooklyn, New York with negative results. Source called the 108th CIC Group, and furnished the above information. The call was in response to a letter left at his residence requesting an appointment for interview.

86

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT PAUL F. ROHDE, 108th CIC Group 084	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Paul F Rohde

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/19/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10105
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 155

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 08/26/58
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

EMPLOYMENT

LAUFER'S RIVER VIEW LODGE

REPORT OF FINDINGS

AGENT REPORT

[RESTRICTED]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
Pre-Inductee
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED
26 August 1958

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
H1 016940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

75 (EMPLOYMENT) On 25 August 1958, Mr. Morris Laufer, Co-owner, Laufer's River View Lodge, summer resort, Loch Sheldrake, New York, furnished a payroll record pertaining to Robert SCHEER which contained the following information:

Name Recorded:	Robert SCHEER
Date of Birth:	Not Recorded
Place of Birth:	Not Recorded
Age:	19½
Address:	653 Britton Street, New York, New York
Social Security Number:	112-28-1134
Student:	Yes
Marital Status:	Not recorded
Number Tax Exemptions:	One
Dates of Employment:	4 July 1955 to 3 September 1955
Position:	Bus Boy (Assistant Waiter)
Salary:	$50.00 per month plus Room, Board and Tips
Efficiency:	Not Recorded
Reason for Leaving:	End of Season
Eligibility for Rehire:	Not Recorded
Previous Employment:	1. S. Klein, 1451 Union Square, New York, New York. 2. Hilltop Lodge, Hopewell Junction, New York

AGENT'S NOTES: No additional pertinent information concerning SUBJECT is available at this source. Note that on his Statement of Personal History, SUBJECT lists employment at this source for the summer of 1956 when it was in 1955. The correct name is Laufer's River View Lodge and not Laufer's Country Club as shown on SUBJECT'S SPH.

155

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
AND MARKED
"FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY"
AUTH: [illegible] AR 381-130
DATE 13 04 '63 70

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
CLEMENT J. PACYNA, 108th CIC Group 153

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Clement J Pacyna

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted] PRINTING OFFICE : 1954—O-284854

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/18/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10005-10140
RECORDS SERIES : DOD AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 1110-1117

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : STATEMENT OF PERSONAL HISTORY
DATE : 10/05/66
PAGES : 8
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

ARMED FORCES SECURITY QUESTIONNAIRE

I.—EXPLANATION

1. The interests of National Security require that all persons being considered for membership or retention in the Armed Forces be reliable, trustworthy, of good character, and of complete and unswerving loyalty to the United States. Accordingly, it is necessary for you to furnish information concerning your security qualifications. The answers which you give will be used in determining whether you are eligible for membership in the Armed Forces, in selection of your duty assignment, and for such other action as may be appropriate.

2. You are advised that in accordance with the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States you cannot be compelled to furnish any statements which you may reasonably believe may lead to your prosecution for a crime. This is the only reason for which you may avail yourself of the privilege afforded by the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer questions under Part IV below. Claiming the Fifth Amendment will not by itself constitute sufficient grounds to exempt you from military service for reasons of security. You are not required to answer any questions in this questionnaire, the answer to which might be incriminating. If you do claim the privilege granted by the Fifth Amendment in refusing to answer any question, you should make a statement to that effect after the question involved.

II.—ORGANIZATIONS OF SECURITY SIGNIFICANCE

1. There is set forth below a list of names of organizations, groups, and movements, reported by the Attorney General of the United States as having significance in connection with the National Security. Please examine the list carefully, and note those organizations, and organizations of similar names, with which you are familiar. Then answer the questions set forth in Part IV below.

2. Your statement concerning membership or other association with one or more of the organizations named may not, of itself, cause you to be ineligible for acceptance or retention in the Armed Forces. Your age at the time of such association, circumstances prompting it, and the extent and frequency of involvement, are all highly pertinent, and will be fully weighed. Set forth all such factors under "Remarks" below, and continue on separate attached sheets of paper if necessary.

3. If there is any doubt in your mind as to whether your name has been linked with one of the organizations named, or as to whether a particular association is "worth mentioning," make a full explanation under "Remarks."

Organizations designated by the Attorney General, pursuant to Executive Order 10450, are listed below:

- Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates.
- Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates, including—
  - Alabama People's Educational Association.
  - Florida Press and Educational League.
  - Oklahoma League for Political Education.
  - People's Educational and Press Association of Texas.
  - Virginia League for People's Education.
- Young Communist League.
- Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
- Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois.
- Action Committee to Free Spain Now.
- American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
- American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions.
- American Christian Nationalist Party.
- American Committee for European Workers' Relief.
- American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born.
- American Committee for the Settlement of Jews in Birobidjan, Inc.
- American Committee for Spanish Freedom.
- American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
- American Committee to Survey Labor Conditions in Europe.
- American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity.
- American Council on Soviet Relations.
- American Croatian Congress.
- American Jewish Labor Council.
- American League Against War and Fascism.
- American League for Peace and Democracy.
- American National Labor Party.
- American National Socialist League.
- American National Socialist Party.
- American Nationalist Party.
- American Patriots, Inc.
- American Peace Crusade.
- American Peace Mobilization.
- American Poles for Peace.
- American Polish Labor Council.
- American Polish League.
- American Rescue Ship Mission *(a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee).*
- American-Russian Fraternal Society.
- American-Russian Institute, New York *(also known as the American Russian-Institute for Cultural Relations with the Soviet Union).*
- American Russian Institute, Philadelphia.
- American Russian Institute of San Francisco.
- American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles.
- American Slav Congress.
- American Women for Peace.
- American Youth Congress.
- American Youth for Democracy.
- Armenian Progressive League of America.
- Associated Klans of America.
- Association of Georgia Klans.
- Association of German Nationals *(Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung).*
- Ausland-Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party.
- Baltimore Forum.
- Benjamin Davis Freedom Committee.
- Black Dragon Society.
- Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts.
- Bridges-Robertson-Schmidt Defense Committee.
- Bulgarian American People's League of the United States of America.
- California Emergency Defense Committee.
- California Labor School, Inc., 321 Divisadero Street, San Francisco, California.
- Carpatho-Russian People's Society.
- Central Council of American Women of Croatian Descent *(also known as Central Council of American Croatian Women, National Council of Croatian Women)*
- Central Japanese Association *(Beikoku Chuo Nipponjin Kai).*
- Central Japanese Association of Southern California.
- Central Organization of the German-American National Alliance *(Deutsche-Amerikanische Einbeitsfront).*
- Cervantes Fraternal Society.
- China Welfare Appeal, Inc.
- Chopin Cultural Center.
- Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder.
- Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges.
- Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side *(New York City).*
- Citizens Emergency Defense Conference.
- Citizens Protective League.
- Civil Liberties Sponsoring Committee of Pittsburgh.
- Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including Civil Rights Congress for Texas.
  - Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York.
- Columbians.
- Comite Coordinador Pro Republica Espanola.
- Comite Pro Derechos Civiles.
- Committee to Abolish Discrimination in Maryland.
- Committee to Aid the Fighting South.
- Committee to Defend the Rights and Freedom of Pittsburgh's Political Prisoners.
- Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy.
- Committee for Constitutional and Political Freedom.
- Committee for the Defense of the Pittsburgh Six.
- Committee for Nationalist Action.
- Committee for the Negro in the Arts.
- Committee for Peace and Brotherhood Festival in Philadelphia.
- Committee for the Protection of the Bill of Rights.
- Committee for World Youth Friendship and Cultural Exchange.
- Committee to Defend Marie Richardson.
- Committee to Uphold the Bill of Rights.
- Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas.
- Congress Against Discrimination.
- Congress of the Unemployed.
- Connecticut Committee to Aid Victims of the Smith Act.
- Connecticut State Youth Conference.
- Congress of American Revolutionary Writers.
- Congress of American Women.
- Council on African Affairs.
- Council of Greek Americans.
- Council for Jobs, Relief, and Housing.
- Council for Pan-American Democracy.
- Croatian Benevolent Fraternity.
- Dai Nippon Butoku Kai *(Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan).*
- Daily Worker Press Club.
- Daniels Defense Committee.
- Dante Alighieri Society *(Between 1935 and 1940).*
- Dennis Defense Committee.
- Detroit Youth Assembly.
- East Bay Peace Committee.
- Elsinore Progressive League.
- Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees *(founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee).*
- Everybody's Committee to Outlaw War.
- Families of the Baltimore Smith Act Victims.
- Families of the Smith Act Victims.
- Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. *(Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione degli Stati Uniti d' America).*
- Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society.
- Florida Press and Educational League.
- Frederick Douglass Educational Center.
- Freedom Stage, Inc.
- Friends of the New Germany *(Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands).*
- Friends of the Soviet Union.
- Garibaldi American Fraternal Society.
- George Washington Carver School, New York City.
- German-American Bund *(Amerikadeutscher Volks-*[illegible]

German American Republican League.
German American Vocational League *(Deutsche Amerikanische Berufsge-meinschaft)*
Guardian Club.

Harlem Trade Union Council.
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee.
Heimuska Kai, also known as Nokubei Heieki, Gimusha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin, Heivaku Gimusha Kai and Zaibei Heimusha Kai *(Japanese Residing in America Military Conscripts Association).*
Hellenic-American Brotherhood.
Hinode Kai *(Imperial Japanese Reservists)*
Hinomaru Kai *(Rising Sun Flag Society—a group of Japanese War Veterans)*
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan *(North American Reserve Officers Association)*
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense.
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy.
Hungarian Brotherhood.

Idaho Pension Union.
Independent Party *(Seattle, Washington).*
Independent People's Party.
Industrial Workers of the World.
International Labor Defense.
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates.

Japanese Association of America.
Japanese Overseas Central Society *(Kaigai Dobo Chuo Kai)*
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940.
Japanese Protective Association *(Recruiting Organization)*
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City.
Jewish Culture Society.
Jewish People's Committee.
Jewish People's Fraternal Order.
Jikyoku Lin Kai *(The Committee for the Crisis).*
Johnson-Forest Group.
Johnsonites.
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee.
Joint Council of Progressive Italian-Americans, Inc.
Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Missouri.

Kibei Seinen Kai *(Association of U. S. citizens of Japanese ancestry who have returned to America after studying in Japan)*
Knights of the White Camelia.
Ku Klux Klan.
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League *(Kyffhaeuser Bund)*, Kyffhaeuser Fellowship *(Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)*
Kyffhaeuser War Relief *(Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk).*

Labor Council for Negro Rights.
Labor Research Association, Inc.
Labor Youth League.
League for Common Sense.
League of American Writers.
Lictor Society *(Italian Black Shirts).*

Macedonian-American People's League.
Mario Morgantini Circle.
Maritime Labor Committee to Defend Al Lannon.
Maryland Congress Against Discrimination.
Massachusetts Committee for the Bill of Rights.
Massachusetts Minute Women for Peace (not connected with the Minute Women of the U. S. A., Inc.).
Maurice Braverman Defense Committee.
Michigan Civil Rights Federation.
Michigan Council for Peace.
Michigan School of Social Science.

Nanka Teikoku Gunyudan *(Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California War Veterans).*
National Association of Mexican Americans *(also known as Asociacion Nacional Mexico-Americana).*
National Blue Star Mothers of America (not to be confused with the Blue Star Mothers of America organized in February 1942).
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners.
National Committee for Freedom of the Press.
National Committee to Win Amnesty for Smith Act Victims.
National Committee to Win the Peace.
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East *(a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy).*
National Council of Americans of Croatian Descent.
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship.
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties.
National Labor Conference for Peace.
National Negro Congress.
National Negro Labor Council.
Nationalist Action League.
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico.
Nature Friends of America *(Since 1935)*
Negro Labor Victory Committee.
New Committee for Publications.
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha *(The Great Fujii Theatre).*
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee.
North Philadelphia Forum.
Northwest Japanese Association.

Ohio School of Social Sciences.
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners.
Oklahoma League for Political Education.
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated.

Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington.
Palo Alto Peace Club.
Partido del Pueblo of Panama *(operating in the Canal Zone).*
Peace Information Center.
Peace Movement of Ethiopia.
People's Drama, Inc.
People's Educational and Press Association of Texas.
People's Educational Association *(Incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.)*, also known as People's Educational Center, People's University, People's School.
People's Institute of Applied Religion.
Peoples Programs *(Seattle, Washington).*
People's Radio Foundation, Inc.
People's Rights Party.
Philadelphia Labor Committee for Negro Rights.
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art.
Photo League *(New York City).*
Pittsburgh Arts Club.
Political Prisoners' Welfare Committee.
Polonia Society of the IWO.
Progressive German-Americans, also known as Progressive German-Americans of Chicago.
Proletarian Party of America.
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Provisional Committee of Citizens for Peace, Southwest Area.
Provisional Committee on Latin American Affairs.
Provisional Committee to Abolish Discrimination in the State of Maryland.
Puerto Rican Comite Pro Libertades Civiles (CLC).
ertorriquenos Unidos *(Puerto Ricans United).*

Quad City Committee for Peace.
Queensbridge Tenants League.

Revolutionary Workers League.
Romanian-American Fraternal Society.
Russian American Society, Inc.

Sakura Kai *(Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association, composed of veterans of Russo-Japanese War).*
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Mass.
Santa Barbara Peace Forum.
Schappes Defense Committee.
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee.
School of Jewish Studies, New York City.
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington.
Serbian-American Fraternal Society.
Serbian Vidovdan Council.
Shinto Temples (Limited to State Shinto abolished in 1945).
Silver Shirt Legion of America.
Slavic Council of Southern California.
Slovak Workers Society..
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers Relief.
Sokoku Kai *(Fatherland Society)*
Southern Negro Youth Congress.
Suiko Sha *(Reserve Officers Association, Los Angeles).*
Syracuse Women for Peace.

Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York.
Trade Union Committee for Peace.
Trade Unionists for Peace.
Tri-State Negro Trade Union Council.

Ukranian-American Fraternal Union.
Union of American Croatians.
Union of New York Veterans.
United American Spanish Aid Committee.
United Committee of Jewish Societies and Landsmanschaft Federations, also known as Coordination Committee of Jewish Landsmanschaften and Fraternal Organizations.
United Committee of South Slavic Americans.
United Defense Council of Southern California.
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization.
United May Day Committee
United Negro and Allied Veterans of America.

Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York.
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade.
Virginia League for People's Education.
Voice of Freedom Committee

Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association.
Washington Committee to Defend the Bill of Rights
Washington Committee for Democratic Action.
Washington Commonwealth Federation.
Washington Pension Union
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation.
Workers Alliance *(since April 1936)*

Yiddisher Kultur Farband.
Yugoslav-American Cooperative Home, Inc.
Yugoslav Seamen's Club, Inc..

III.—INSTRUCTIONS

1. Set forth an explanation for each answer checked "Yes" under question 2 below under "Remarks." Attach as many extra sheets as necessary for a full explanation, signing or initialing each extra sheet.

2. Title 18, U. S. Code, Section 1001, provides, in pertinent part: "Whoever . . . falsifies, conceals or covers up . . . a material fact, or makes any false . . . statements . . . or makes or uses any false writing . . . shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than 5 years, or both." Any false, fraudulent or fictitious response to the questions under Part IV below may give rise to criminal liability under Title 18, U. S. C., Section 1001. You are advised, however, that you will not incur such liability unless you supply inaccurate statements with knowledge of their untruthfulness. You are therefore advised that before you sign this form and turn it in to Selective Service or military authorities, you should be sure that it is truthful; that detailed explanations are given for each "Yes" answer under question 2 of Part IV below, and that details given are as full and complete as you can make them.

3. In stating details, it is permissible, if your memory is hazy on particular points, to use such expressions as, "I think," "in my opinion," "I believe," or "to the best of my recollection."

12

13

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1961 O—607912

For Official Use Only

IV.—QUESTIONS

(For each answer checked "Yes" under question 2, set forth a full explanation under "Remarks" below)

	YES	NO
1. I have read the list of names of organizations, groups, and movements set forth under Part II of this form and the explanation which precedes it.	YES	
2. Concerning the list of organizations, groups and movements set forth under Part II above:		
a. Are you now a member of any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
b. Have you ever been a member of any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
c. Are you now employed by any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
d. Have you ever been employed by any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
e. Have you ever attended any meeting of any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
f. Have you ever attended any social gathering of any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
g. Have you ever attended any gathering of any kind sponsored by any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
h. Have you prepared material for publication by any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
i. Have you ever corresponded with any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed or with any publication thereof?		

	YES	NO
j. Have you ever contributed money to any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
k. Have you ever contributed services to any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
l. Have you ever subscribed to any publication of any of the organizations, groups, or movements listed?		
m. Have you ever been employed by a foreign government or any agency thereof?		
n. Are you now a member of the Communist Party of any foreign country?		
o. Have you ever been a member of the Communist Party of any foreign country?		
p. Have you ever been the subject of a loyalty or security hearing?		
q. Are you now or have you ever been a member of any organization, association, movement, group or combination of persons not on the Attorney General's list which advocates the overthrow of our constitutional form of government, or which has adopted the policy of advocating or approving the commission of acts of force or violence to deny other persons their rights under the Constitution of the United States, or which seeks to alter the form of government of the United States by unconstitutional means?		
r. Have you ever been known by any other last name than that used in signing this questionnaire?		

REMARKS

I refuse to answer these questions because they violate my rights granted to me under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

113

REMARKS *(Continued)*

REMARKS *(Continued)*

[redacted]

Robert Scheer, born 4 April 1936 in Bronx, New York, a registrant under the Universal Military Training Act, was this date given an opportunity to execute DD Form 98 and in my presence he refused to do so.

Myron K Hayashida
MYRON K. HAYASHIDA
1/LT, AGC

[redacted]

CERTIFICATION

In regard to any part of this questionnaire concerning which I have had any question as to the meaning, I have requested and have obtained a complete explanation. I certify that the statements made by me under Part IV above and on any supplemental pages hereto attached, are full, true, and correct.

TYPED FULL NAME OF PERSON MAKING CERTIFICATION	**SERVICE NUMBER** *(If any)*	**SIGNATURE OF PERSON MAKING CERTIFICATION**
TYPED NAME OF WITNESS	**DATE** 113	**SIGNATURE OF WITNESS**

U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE . 1961 O—607912

For Official Use Only

STATEMENT O ONAL HISTORY [redacted]

INSTRUCTIONS: Read the certification at the end of this questionnaire before entering the required data. Print or type all answers. All questions and statements must be completed. If the answer is "None," so state. Do not misstate or omit material fact since the statements made herein are subject to verification. If more space is needed, use the Remarks section, item 20, and attach additional sheets if necessary. The information entered hereon is for official use only and will be maintained in confidence.

1. (*Print*) FIRST NAME—MIDDLE NAME—MAIDEN NAME (*If any*)—LAST NAME ☒ MR. ☐ MRS. ☐ MISS ROBERT (NMN) SCHEER	2. STATUS X CIVILIAN ☐ MILITARY ON ACTIVE DUTY
3. ALIAS(ES), NICKNAME(S), OR CHANGES IN NAME (*Other than by marriage*) None	4. PERMANENT MAILING ADDRESS 2828 Milvia St., Berkeley, California

5. DATE OF BIRTH (*Day, month, year*) 4 April 1936	PLACE OF BIRTH (*City, County, State, and Country*) Bronx, New York, New York, USA	PLACE CERTIFICATE RECORDED Bronx, New York

RACE	HEIGHT	WEIGHT	COLOR OF EYES	COLOR OF HAIR	SCARS, PHYSICAL DEFECTS, DISTINGUISHING MARKS
Cauc	70"	180	Brown	Brown	None

6. DO YOU HAVE A HISTORY OF MENTAL OR NERVOUS DISORDERS? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ADDICTED TO THE USE OF HABIT FORMING DRUGS SUCH AS NARCOTICS OR BARBITURATES? ☐ YES ☒ NO ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A CHRONIC USER TO EXCESS OF ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

7. U. S. CITIZEN ☒	NATIVE X YES ☐ NO	IF NATURALIZED, CERTIFICATE NO.	IF DERIVED, PARENTS' CERTIFICATE NO(S).	DATE, PLACE, AND COURT
ALIEN ☐	REGISTRATION NO.	NATIVE COUNTRY	DATE AND PORT OF ENTRY	DO YOU INTEND TO BECOME A U. S. CITIZEN? ☐ YES ☐ NO

8. MILITARY SERVICE

ARE YOU PRESENTLY ON ACTIVE DUTY IN THE U. S. ARMED FORCES DRAWING FULL PAY? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION	DATE CURRENT ACTIVE SERVICE STARTED

ARE YOU PRESENTLY A MEMBER OF A U. S. RESERVE OR NATIONAL GUARD ORGANIZATION? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

GRADE AND SERVICE NO.	SERVICE AND COMPONENT	ORGANIZATION AND STATION OR UNIT AND LOCATION

HAVE YOU PREVIOUSLY SERVED TOURS OF EXTENDED ACTIVE DUTY, DRAWING FULL PAY, FROM WHICH YOU WERE DISCHARGED OR SEPARATED TO CIVILIAN STATUS? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF "YES," COMPLETE THE FOLLOWING:

COUNTRY	SERVICE	COMPONENT	FROM (*Date*)	TO (*Date*)	TYPE DISCHARGES OR SEPARATIONS—GRADE AND SERVICE NO.

9. EDUCATION (*Account for all civilian schools and military academies. Do not include service schools*)

MONTH AND YEAR FROM—	TO	NAME AND LOCATION OF SCHOOL	GRADUATE YES	GRADUATE NO	DEGREE
Sep 49	Jun 53	Christopher Columbus High School, Bronx, N.Y.	X		Academic
Sep 53	Jun 55	Queens College, Queens, New York		X	
Sep 55	Jun 58	The City College of New York, New York, N.Y.	X		B.A.
Sep 58	Jun 59	Syracuse University, Syracuse, New York		X	
Sep 59	Jun 61	University of Calif., Berkeley, Calif.		X	

10. FAMILY (*List in order given: parents, spouse, guardians, stepparents, foster parents, parents-in-law, former spouse(s) (if divorced give date and place), children, brothers and sisters, even though deceased. Include any others you resided with or with whom a close relationship existed or exists. If the person is not a U. S. citizen by birth, give date and port of entry, alien registration number, naturalization certificate number and place of issuance.*)

RELATION AND NAME	DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	PRESENT ADDRESS, IF LIVING	U. S. CITIZEN YES	U. S. CITIZEN NO
FATHER Fred Scheer	25 May 1898 Germany	Deceased	X	
MOTHER (*Maiden name*) Ida Kuren	24 Apr 1900 Russia	2860 Bronx Park East Bronx, New York		X
SPOUSE (*Maiden name*) Anne Weills	Feb 1942 Eureka, Calif.	2828 Milvia Street Berkeley, Calif.	X	
OTHER (*Specify*) None				
	1114			

DD FORM 398 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE.

For Official Use Only

Exception to Standard Form 86
f the Budget June 1960

brothers- and sisters ENDS LIVING IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES (*List grandparents, first cousins, aun* *uncles,*
aw, and other persons with whom a close relationship existed or exi

RELATIONSHIP AND NAME	AGE	OCCUPATION	ADDRESS	CITIZENSHIP
None				

12. FOREIGN TRAVEL (*Other than as a direct result of United States military duties*)

DATES		COUNTRY VISITED	PURPOSE OF TRAVEL
FROM—	TO—		
Aug 1960	Sep 1960	Cuba	To learn to write
Jan 63	Mar 1963	England, France, Poland, Hungary, Soviert Union & Czechoslavkia	Write
Feb 1965	Mar 1965	Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia Japan, Laos & Thailand	Write

13. EMPLOYMENT (*Show every employment you have had and all periods of unemployment*)

MONTH AND YEAR		NAME AND ADDRESS OF EMPLOYER	NAME OF IMMEDIATE SUPERVISOR	REASON FOR LEAVING
FROM—	TO—			
Soring 1952	Jan 1953	S. Kleins 14th St., New York, New York	Unknown	Christmas over
1956	1957	U. S. Post Office New York City, New York	Unknown	School
Sep 58	Jun 59	Syracuse University Syracuse, New York	Unknown	
Sep 60	Jun 61	University of Calif. Berkeley, Calif.	Unknown	
Sep 61	Dec 63	City Lights Bookstore 261 Columbus, S.F., Calif.	Mr. L. Ferlinghetti	
Jun 65	Present	Rampert's Magazine 301 Broadway, S.F., Calif.	W. Hinckle	

DID ANY OF THE ABOVE EMPLOYMENTS REQUIRE A SECURITY CLEARANCE? ☐ YES ☒ NO DO YOU HAVE ANY FOREIGN PROPERTY OR BUSINESS CONNECTIONS, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN EMPLOYED BY A FOREIGN GOVERNMENT, FIRM, OR AGENCY? ☐ YES ☒ NO HAVE YOU EVER BEEN REFUSED BOND? ☐ YES ☒ NO IF THE ANSWER TO ANY OF THE ABOVE IS "YES," EXPLAIN IN ITEM 20.

SOCIAL SECURITY NO.
112-28-1134

14. CREDIT AND CHARACTER REFERENCES (*Do not include relatives, former employers, or persons living outside the United States or its Territories.*

	NAME (*List 3 credit and 5 character*)	YEARS KNOWN	STREET AND NUMBER (*Business address preferred*)	CITY	STATE OR TERRITORY
CREDIT	None				
CHARACTER	Robert Avakian	2	Unknown	Berkeley	Calif.
	David Welsh	1	301 Broadway	San Francisco	Calif.
	Sol Stern	10	301 Broadway	San Francisco	Calif.
	Robert Truehaft	2	Truehaft & Walker	Oakland	Calif.
	Malcolm Bernstein	2	Truehaft & Walker	Oakland	Calif.

For Official Use Only

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

See Remarks

20. REMARKS

ITEM #12 FOREIGN TRAVEL (Continued)

Feb 1966 to Mar 1966 Vietnam, Combodia, Thailend and Japan - Write

I refuse to answer questions 16, 17, and 19 on the grounds that they violate my constitutional rights under the 1st, 5th & 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution.

Robert Scheer, a registrant under the Military Training and Service Act, refused to complete DD Form 398 in its entirety.

Myron K Hayashida
MYRON K. HAYASHIDA
1/LT, AGC

I CERTIFY THAT THE ENTRIES MADE BY ME ABOVE ARE TRUE, COMPLETE, AND CORRECT TO THE BEST OF MY KNOWLEDGE AND BELIEF AND ARE MADE IN GOOD FAITH. I UNDERSTAND THAT A KNOWING AND WILLFUL FALSE STATEMENT ON THIS FORM CAN BE PUNISHED BY FINE OR IMPRISONMENT OR BOTH *(See U. S. Code, title 18, section 1001)*

DATE
5 Oct 1966

SIGNATURE OF PERSON COMPLETING FORM

TYPED NAME AND ADDRESS OF WITNESS
MYRON K. HAYASHIDA, 1/LT, AGC
1515 Clay St., Oakland, California

SIGNATURE OF WITNESS
Myron K Hayashi

21. *THIS SECTION TO BE COMPLETED BY AUTHORITY REQUESTING INVESTIGATION*

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND DEGREE OF CLASSIFIED MATTER (*top secret, secret, etc.*) TO WHICH APPLICANT WILL REQUIRE ACCESS

RECORD OF PRIOR CLEARANCES

DATE OF CLEARANCE	TYPE OF CLEARANCE	AGENCY THAT COMPLETED INVESTIGATION

REMARKS

117

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1960 O—573450

15. **LIST ALL RESIDENCES FROM 1 JANUARY 1937**

MONTH AND YEAR FROM—	MONTH AND YEAR TO—	STREET AND NUMBER	CITY	STATE OR COUNTRY
1949	1958	653 Britton Street, Bronx	New York	New York
1958	1959	Syracuse N.Y. Married Student Housing	Syracuse	New York
1959	1961	Francisco Street	Berkeley	California
1961	1963	2157 Mason Street	San Francisco	California
1963	1963	444 Columbus Street	San Francisco	California
1964	1965	332 Castro St. & 2870 Geary	San Francisco	California
1965	Present	2828 Milvia Street	Berkeley	California

16. **PAST AND/OR PRESENT MEMBERSHIP IN ORGANIZATIONS**

NAME AND ADDRESS	TYPE (*Social, fraternal, professional, etc.*)	OFFICE HELD	MEMBERSHIP FROM—	MEMBERSHIP TO—
See Remarks				

17.

YES	NO	
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY U. S. A., OR ANY COMMUNIST ORGANIZATIONS ANYWHERE?
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF A FASCIST ORGANIZATION?
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN A MEMBER OF ANY ORGANIZATION, ASSOCIATION, MOVEMENT, GROUP OR COMBINATION OF PERSONS WHICH ADVOCATES THE OVERTHROW OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL FORM OF GOVERNMENT, OR WHICH HAS ADOPTED THE POLICY OF ADVOCATING OR APPROVING THE COMMISSION OF ACTS OF FORCE OR VIOLENCE TO DENY OTHER PERSONS THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, OR WHICH SEEKS TO ALTER THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES BY UNCONSTITUTIONAL MEANS?
		ARE YOU NOW OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN AFFILIATED OR ASSOCIATED WITH ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE AS AN AGENT, OFFICIAL, OR EMPLOYEE?
		ARE YOU NOW ASSOCIATING WITH, OR HAVE YOU ASSOCIATED WITH ANY INDIVIDUALS, INCLUDING RELATIVES, WHO YOU KNOW OR HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE, ARE OR HAVE BEEN MEMBERS OF ANY OF THE ORGANIZATIONS IDENTIFIED ABOVE?
		HAVE YOU EVER ENGAGED IN ANY OF THE FOLLOWING ACTIVITIES OF ANY ORGANIZATION OF THE TYPE DESCRIBED ABOVE: CONTRIBUTION(S) TO, ATTENDANCE AT OR PARTICIPATION IN ANY ORGANIZATIONAL, SOCIAL, OR OTHER ACTIVITIES OF SAID ORGANIZATIONS OR OF ANY PROJECTS SPONSORED BY THEM; THE SALE, GIFT, OR DISTRIBUTION OF ANY WRITTEN, PRINTED, OR OTHER MATTER, PREPARED, REPRODUCED, OR PUBLISHED, BY THEM OR ANY OF THEIR AGENTS OR INSTRUMENTALITIES?

IF "YES," DESCRIBE THE CIRCUMSTANCES. ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS FOR A FULL DETAILED STATEMENT. IF ASSOCIATED WITH ANY OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, SPECIFY NATURE AND EXTENT OF ASSOCIATION WITH EACH, INCLUDING OFFICE OR POSITION HELD, ALSO INCLUDE DATES, PLACES, AND CREDENTIALS NOW OR FORMERLY HELD. IF ASSOCIATIONS HAVE BEEN WITH INDIVIDUALS WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE ABOVE ORGANIZATIONS, THEN LIST THE INDIVIDUALS AND THE ORGANIZATIONS WITH WHICH THEY WERE OR ARE AFFILIATED.

See Remarks

18. HAVE YOU EVER BEEN DETAINED, HELD, ARRESTED, INDICTED OR SUMMONED INTO COURT AS A DEFENDANT IN A CRIMINAL PROCEEDING, OR CONVICTED, FINED, OR IMPRISONED OR PLACED ON PROBATION, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN ORDERED TO DEPOSIT BAIL OR COLLATERAL FOR THE VIOLATION OF ANY LAW, POLICE REGULATION OR ORDINANCE (*excluding minor traffic violations for which a fine or forfeiture of $25, or less was imposed*)? INCLUDE ALL COURT MARTIALS WHILE IN MILITARY SERVICE. ☐ YES ☑ NO IF "YES," LIST THE DATE, THE NATURE OF THE OFFENSE OR VIOLATION, THE NAME AND LOCATION OF THE COURT OR PLACE OF HEARING, AND THE PENALTY IMPOSED OR OTHER DISPOSITION OF EACH CASE.

THER RELATI.

19. ARE THERE ANY INCIDENTS IN YOUR LIFE NOT MENTIONED HEREIN WHICH MAY REFLECT UPON YOUR LOYALTY TO THE UNITED STATES OR UPON YOUR SUITABILITY TO PERFORM THE DUTIES WHICH YOU MAY BE CALLED UPON TO TAKE OR WHICH MIGHT REQUIRE FURTHER EXPLANATION? ☐ YES ☐ NO IF "YES," GIVE DETAILS

See Remarks

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10141
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 476

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 07/14/61
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

REPORT OF FINDINGS

EMPLOYMENT

CITY UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
SSvc, 50-29-186
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

14 July 1961

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

H1 016 940

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

76 (EMPLOYMENT) On 13 July 1961, Mildred Schoenberg, Secretary, Payroll Office, City University of New York, formerly City College of New York, consulted the records concerning Robert SCHEER, and the following information was found to be recorded:

Name:	Robert SCHEER
Date of Birth:	Not listed
Place of Birth:	Not listed
Address:	653 Britton Street, Bronx, New York
Dates of Employment:	20 June 1960 to 12 August 1960
Position:	Lecturer, Summer Session
Salary:	$288 for summer term.
Reason for Leaving:	End of term
Eligibility for rehire:	Not listed
Social Security Number:	112-28-1134
Additional Pertinent Information:	None listed.

Schoenberg does not know SUBJECT, and knows of no one who would have knowledge of SUBJECT.

476

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

EARL F. THOMAS, 108th CIC Group

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Earl F. Thomas

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USE

16—74116-1 U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10178
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 635-636

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : DIETRICH, DAN H JR
TO : CG, USA INTEL CMD
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/05/66
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

REQUESTED ACTION

CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS

LATEST INVESTIGATION/CLEARANCE

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION

RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

REQUEST FOR AND RESULT OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

~~For Official Use Only~~

REQUEST FOR AND RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION
(AR 381-130)

5 October 1966

TO: *(Control Office)*

CG, USA Intelligence Cmd
ATTN: ACofS, CONOPS
PO Box 398
Fort Holabird, Md 21219

THRU:

CG, USAREC
ATTN: Security Officer
Fort Monroe, Va 23351

24 OCT 1966

FROM: *(Requesting Agency)*

CO, AFEES
1515 Clay Street
Oakland, California

(Enter name and address of the ACTION AGENCY to which results are to be sent, if known by requester)

CHIEF, USAPSG
ATTN: Adjudication Branch
Fort Holabird, Md 21219

CONTROL OFFICE USE ONLY

REQUIREMENT	REQUEST NO.
DOSSIER NO.	OPENING DATE
REMARKS	

SECTION I — REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

1. SUBJECT *(Last name in capitals, first and middle names)*: SCHEER, Robert (NMN)

2. ALIAS(ES), ~~MAIDEN NAME~~: None

3. ~~SERVICE/~~SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 112-28-1134

4. DATE OF BIRTH *(Day, Month, Year)*: 4 April 1936

5. PLACE OF BIRTH *(City, State and country)*: Bronx, New York, New York, USA

6. GRADE AND POSITION: N/A

7. REQUESTED ACTION ☒ INVESTIGATION ☐ VALIDATION ☐ RECORDS CHECK

8. TYPE OF INVESTIGATION: ☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☐ OTHER *(Explain in Item 15)*

9. a. FOR CLEARANCE AND/OR ACCESS TO: ☐ TOP SECRET ☐ SECRET ☐ CONFIDENTIAL

b. ☐ FOR LIMITED ACCESS AUTHORIZATION

c. ☐ INTERIM CLEARANCE DESIRED

d. ☒ OTHER *(Explain in Item 15)*

10. TO DETERMINE SUITABILITY FOR: Induction

11. JUSTIFICATION: PAR 18, AR 604-10

12. REVIEW OF FILES REQUIRED BY PARAGRAPH ____ AR 604-5, COMPLETED ON ____ REVEALED:
☐ NO UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION ☐ UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION DETERMINED NOT TO BE A BAR TO ACTION CONTEMPLATED
☐ INFORMATION SUMMARIZED IN ITEM 15

13. LATEST INVESTIGATION/CLEARANCE *(Type, when, by whom)*: N/A

14. NO BREAK IN FEDERAL SERVICE EXCEEDING SIX MONTHS SINCE: N/A

15. REMARKS *(If unfavorable information entered, transmit in sealed envelope thru intelligence channels.)*

Request investigation of registrant in view of remarks made by registrant in remarks section of DD Form 98 and DD Form 398.

Headquarters
US Army Recruiting Command
Hampton, Virginia 23369

INCLS 2	TYPED NAME AND TITLE MYRON K. HAYASHIDA 1 LT, AGC	SIGNATURE Myron K Hayashida
		DATE

SECTION II - CONTROL OFFICE TO REQUESTER

16. ☐ NEW FINGERPRINT CARD REQUIRED

☐ ITEMS ____ ON SPH (PSQ) REQUIRE CORRECTION AND/OR COMPLETION.

☐ INTERIM REPORT FORWARDED. REQUEST REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND RETURN OF INCLOSURES UPON COMPLETION.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

035

DA FORM 1 APR 64 2784

For Official Use Only

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

SECTION III – REQUESTER TO CONTROL OFFICE

DATE

17. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ INFORMATION NOTED

☐ SUBJECT REASSIGNED TO NON-SENSITIVE DUTIES, INVESTIGATION MAY BE CANCELED.

☐ INFORMATION CONSIDERED NO BAR TO CLEARANCE. REQUEST COMPLETION OF INVESTIGATION.

18. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

19. REMARKS *(If returning corrected forms, state here)*

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

SECTION IV – CONTROL OFFICE TO ACTION AGENCY

DATE 23 FEB 1967

20. RESULTS OF PERSONNEL SECURITY ACTION

☐ NO RECORD ☐ FAVORABLE ☐ MINOR UNFAVORABLE INFORMATION RECORDED IN ITEM 21

☐ PRIOR INVESTIGATION INSUFFICIENT FOR ACTION CONTEMPLATED IF NEEDED, INITIATE REQUEST FOR INVESTIGATION.

☒ FORWARDED FOR SECURITY DETERMINATION BY CLEARING AUTHORITY

TYPE OF INVESTIGATION	COMPLETED BY	DATE	DOSSIER NUMBER
☐ NAC ☐ NACI ☐ BI ☒ OTHER	USAINTC	16 Feb 67	H1 01 69 40

21. REMARKS

a. THIS FORM, TOGETHER WITH ANY INCLOSURES, REPORT OF ACTION TAKEN AND USACRF COPY OF DA FORM 873 *(if appropriate)* WILL BE RETURNED TO THE CONTROL OFFICE WITHIN ______ DAYS AFTER RECEIPT.

b. IN THE EVENT SUBJECT HAS BEEN TRANSFERRED FROM YOUR COMMAND, THIS FORM AND INCLOSURES WILL BE RETURNED IMMEDIATELY WITH ITEM 23 COMPLETED.

c. ATTENTION IS INVITED TO: PARAGRAPHS ______________ *AR 604–5;* PARAGRAPH ___ *AR 604–11;* PARAGRAPH ____ *AR 640–98;* AND PARAGRAPH ____ *AR 381–130,* AS APPLICABLE.

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE
Dossier H1 01 69 40	for DAN H. DIETRICH, Jr. LtCol, AIS, Chief, Ops III	Richard J Kindina

SECTION V – ACTION AGENCY TO CONTROL OFFICE

DATE

22. REPORT OF ACTION

☐ FAVORABLE DETERMINATION, USACRF COPY DA FORM 873 ATTACHED

☐ UNFAVORABLE DETERMINATION, RECOMMENDED ACTION IN ITEM 24

☐ REQUEST ADDITIONAL INVESTIGATION AS INDICATED IN ITEM 24

23. SUBJECT WAS TRANSFERRED

TO	HEADQUARTERS	PER	DATED

24. REMARKS

INCLS	TYPED NAME AND TITLE	SIGNATURE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

eleased under the John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
8613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10180
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 639

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : NICHOLS, W H
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 01/09/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

RESIDENCES

EMPLOYMENT

CIVILIAN SCHOOL

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FBI-C

BI

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

(AR 381-130)

SPECIAL

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 6 Jan 66

2. CONTROL OFFICE:

3. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIASES & NICKNAMES & CHANGED NAME: SCHEER, Robert (NMN)

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 112-28-1134

5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH: 4 April 1936

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Bronx, New York, New York

33

7. SERVICE NUMBER:

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Fred Scheer	25 May 1898 Germany	Deceased	U.S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Ida Kuren	24 Apr 1900 Russia	2660 Bronx Park East Bronx, New York	Russian
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) WEILLS Anne Weills	Feb 1942 Eureka, Calif.	2828 Ellvia Street Berkeley, California	U.S.

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1949	1958	653 Britton Street, Bronx	New York	New York
1958	1959	Syracuse N.Y. Married Student Housing	Syracuse	New York
1959	1961	Francisco Street	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1963	2157 Mason Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1963	1963	444 Columbus Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1964	1965	332 Castro St. & 2870 Geary	San Francisco	Calif.

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Sep 60	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California
Sep 61	Dec 63	City Lights Bookstore	San Francisco, Calif.
Jun 65	Present	Rampart's Magazine, S.F.	San Francisco, Calif.

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

14. EDUCATION

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
Sep 59	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

DOD NAC CENTER
Ft Holabird, Md.

CII

SAC

10-3488

NACC: Request check of FBI(C)-Name check only since SUBJECT refused to execute fingerprint card.

Berkeley, California

Hungary, Soviet Union &

Russia, Japan, Laos &

Thailand - To write

Feb 1966 to Mar 1966 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand & Japan - To write

#15 f-Registrant refused to execute DD 398-98 and portions of DD 398.

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

JAN 16 1967 6

ON BASIS OF DATA FURNISHED UNABLE TO LOCATE ARREST RECORD IN FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

C39

18. FROM:
DCSI, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP-III-24
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19. THRU:

6305 6016

Agency checked per your request

JAN 21 1967

E C Sleigh

W. H. NICHOLS
Chief, Closing Division
DOD NAC C

JAN 12 1967

246

FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED

DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65

REPLACES DA FORM 340. 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

1

FBI-C

BI

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

(AR 381-130)

SPECIAL

1. DATE OF REQUEST: 5 Jan 66

2. CONTROL OFFICE:

3. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS(ES) - NICKNAMES - CHANGED NAME: SCHEER, Robert (NMN)

4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.: 112-28-1134

5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH: 4 April 1936

6. PLACE OF BIRTH: Bronx, New York, New York

33

7. SERVICE NUMBER:

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHI
a. FATHER Fred Scheer	25 May 1898 Germany	Deceased	U.S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Ida Kuren	24 Apr 1900 Russia	2660 Bronx Park East Bronx, New York	Russian
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) WEILLS Anne Weills	Feb 1942 Eureka, Calif.	2828 Kilvia Street Berkeley, California	U.S.

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1949	1958	653 Britton Street, Bronx	New York	New York
1958	1959	Syracuse N.Y. Married Student Housing	Syracuse	New York
1959	1961	Francisco Street	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1963	2157 Mason Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1963	1963	444 Columbus Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1964	1965	332 Castro St. & 2070 Geary	San Francisco	Calif.

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Sep 60	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California
Sep 61	Dec 63	City Lights Bookstore	San Francisco, Calif.
Jun 65	Present	Rampart's Magazine, S.F.	San Francisco, Calif.

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
Sep 59	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

DOD NAC CENTER
Ft Holabird, Md.

CTI
SAC

10-3488-0903

16. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

ITEM 12 RESIDENCE - 1965 to Present 2828 Kilvia Street, Berkeley, California

ITEM 15 c. Aug 1960 to Sep 1960 - Cuba - To learn to write
Jun 1963 to Mar 1965 - England, France, Poland, Hungary, Soviet Union & Czechoslovakia - To write
Feb 1965 to Mar 1965 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos & Thailand - To write
Feb 1966 to Mar 1966 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand & Japan - To write

#15 f-Registrant [illegible] DD 398 98 [illegible] DD 398.

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

JAN 16 1967 6

ON BASIS OF DATA FURNISHED UNABLE TO LOCATE ARREST RECORD IN FBI IDENTIFICATION DIVISION

839

18. FROM:
DCSIS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP-III-24
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19 THRU:
6305 6016

Agency checked per your request

JAN 21 1967

W. H. NICHOLS
Chief, Closing Division
DOD NAC C[illegible]

JAN 12 1967

FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED

DA FORM 3027, 1 AUG 65 — REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

246

1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10181
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 640-640A

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : NICHOLS, W H
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 11/04/66
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

RESIDENCES

EMPLOYMENT

CIVILIAN SCHOOL

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED AND ANNOTATED "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY" WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES. INCLOSURES NOT INCLUDED.

F. E 66-a-89 R-23

NOV 22 1966

US ARMY RE NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1. DATE OF REQUEST	4 Nov 1966
2. CONTROL OFFICE:	
3. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS(ES) - NICKNAME	SCHEER, Robert (NMN) IC 1472-66
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	212-28-1134
5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH	4 April 1935
6. PLACE OF BIRTH	Bronx, New York, New York #0121 33
7. SERVICE NUMBER	

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Fred Scheer	25 May 1898 Germany	Deceased	U.S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Ida Kuren	24 Apr 1900 Russia	2860 Bronx Park East Bronx, New York	Russian
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) WELLS Anne Wellis	Feb 1942 Eureka, Calif.	2828 Milvia Street Berkeley, California	U.S.

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1949	1958	655 Britton Street, Bronx	New York	New York
1958	1959	Syracuse N.Y. Married Student Housing	Syracuse	New York
1959	1961	Francisco Street	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1963	2157 Mason Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1963	1963	444 Columbus Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1964	1965	332 Canton St. & 2870 Geary	San Francisco	Calif.

AGENCY TO BE CHECKED: FBI(S) - Records of this office contain FBI reports dated through 1962 when SUBJECT was previously processed as a Selective Service Registrant, and three letterhead memoranda subsequent thereto dated 28 May 65(San Francisco) 23 Aug 65(Washington D C) and 14 Feb 66(San Francisco). Request any additional information re SUBJECT.

st 15 years, whichever is shorter)

d. PLACE
Berkeley, California
San Francisco, Calif.
San Francisco, Calif.

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
Sep 59	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJEC NATURALIZED OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

DOD NAC CENTER
Ft Holabird, Md

CT SAC

16. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

ITEM #12 RESIDENCES - 1965 to Present 2828 Milvia Street, Berkeley, California

ITEM #15 c. Aug 1960 to Sep 1960 - Cuba - To learn to write
Jan 1963 to Mar 1963 - England, France, Poland, Hungary, Soviet Union & Czechoslovakia - To write
Feb 1965 to Mar 1965 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos & Thailand - To write
Feb 1966 to Mar 1966 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand & Japan - To write

#15f-Registrant refused to execute DD 98 and portions of DD 398.

X R

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

~~To be regraded UNCLASSIFIED and annotated~~
To be regraded FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from classified inclosures.

Agency checked per your request.

DEC 2 -1966

OVER

HWLay
for W. H. NICHOLS
Chief, Closing Division
DOD NAC Center

18. FROM 340
DCofS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP-III 24
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19. TO

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INTELLIGENCE ... ATTACHED

NOV 21 1966

201

DA FORM 2-27 1 AUG 65 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS

1

F. E. 66-0-89 R-22 B NOV 22 1966 521

US ARMY RE[illegible] NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

SECRET

1. DATE OF REQUEST	4 Nov 1966
2. CONTROL OFFICE:	
3. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS(ES) - NICKNAME	SCHEER, Robert (NMN)
IC	4472-66
4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO.	~~12-28-1134~~
5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH	4 April 1935
6. PLACE OF BIRTH	Bronx, New York, New York
7. SERVICE NUMBER	

#0121 33

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHIP
a. FATHER Fred Scheer	25 May 1898 Germany	Deceased	U.S.
b. MOTHER (maiden name) Ida Kuren	24 Apr 1900 Russia	2860 Bronx Park East Bronx, New York	Russian
c. SPOUSE (maiden name) WELLS Anne Wallis	Feb 1942 Eureka, Calif.	2828 Milvia Street Berkeley, California	U.S.

12. RESIDENCES (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1949	1958	653 Britton Street, Bronx	New York	New York
1958	1959	Syracuse N.Y. Married Student Housing	Syracuse	New York
1959	1961	Francisco Street	Berkeley	Calif.
1961	1963	2157 Mason Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1963	1963	444 Columbus Street	San Francisco	Calif.
1964	1965	332 Castro St. & 2870 Geary	San Francisco	Calif.

13. EMPLOYMENT (List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
Sep 60	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California
Sep 61	Dec 63	City Lights Bookstore	San Francisco, Calif.
Jun 65	Present	Rampart's Magazine, S.F.	San Francisco, Calif.

14. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
Sep 59	Jun 61	University of California	Berkeley, California

YES	NO	15. ITEM ("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)
	X	a. IS THE SUBJEC[illegible] OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		c. ANY FOREIGN [illegible] ERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
X		f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
	X	g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

REQUEST COPY OF RESULTS OF ANY
INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED TO DATE

DOD NAC CENTER
Ft Holabird, Md

CI SAC 1-12

16. REMARKS (If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)

ITEM #12 RESIDENCES - 1965 to Present 2828 Milvia Street, Berkeley, California
ITEM #15 c. Aug 1960 to Sep 1960 - Cuba - To learn to write
Jan 1963 to Mar 1963 - England,France,Poland,Hungary,Soviet Union & Czechoslovakia - To write
Feb 1965 to Mar 1965 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Japan, Laos & Thailand - To write
Feb 1966 to Mar 1966 - Vietnam, Cambodia, Thailand & Japan - To write
#15f-Registrant refused to execute DD 98 and portions of DD 398.

XR

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

To be regraded UNCLASSIFIED and annotated FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY when separated from classified inclosures.

Agency checked per your request.

DEC 2 2 1966

H W Lay
for W. H. NICHOLS
Chief, Closing Division
DOD NAC Center

18. FROM
340
DCofS, Operations
Headquarters, USAINTC
ATTN: ICOP-III 24
Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219

19. TO

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

OVER

~~SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOV 21 1966

DA FORM 1 AUG 65 89027 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS

201

1

REFER TO DATA RE Subject ("Demonstrations Protesting U.S. Intervention in Vietnam San Francisco")
WHICH WAS SENT ~~YOUR~~ ONI-OSI-G2
~~AGENCY~~ ON 12-6-66
Report dated 11-15-66 at San Francisco pages 18, 22, 56, + 57

In response to your request there are attached 3 reports which appear to relate to the subject of your inquiry.

This reply is result of check of FBI investigative files. To check arrest records, request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division.. Fingerprints are necessary for positive check.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10183
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 642

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/13/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

LOCAL AGENCIES CHECK

POLICE DEPARTMENT, SAN FRANCISCSO, CALIFORNIA

REPORT OF FINDINGS

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT (FM 30-17) **FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY**

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
SSvc Registrant, SSN: 112-28-1134
DOB: 4 Apr 1936
POB: Bronx, N.Y.

2. DATE SUBMITTED
13 October 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
-

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, the agencies indicated below were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of SUBJECT's name, and disclosed no records:

	Sheriff's Office, Marin County, San Rafael, Calif
	Sheriff's Office, Sonoma County, Santa Rosa, Calif
	Police Department, South San Francisco, California
	Police Department, Pacifica, California
	Police Department, Daly City, California
13 October 1966	Police Department, San Francisco, California
	Police Department, Brisbane, California
	Police Department, San Bruno, California
	Police Department, Burlingame, California
	Police Department, Millbrae, California
	Office of the Provost Marshal, Presidio of San Francisco, California

042

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
115th INTC Group (I), LARRY C. VOGT

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10184
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 643

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/07/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

LOCAL AGENCIES CHECK

POLICE DEPARTMENT, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

REPORT OF FINDINGS

POLICE DEPARTMENT, BERKELEY, CALIFORNIA

SHERIFF'S OFFICE, ALAMEDA COUNTY, OAKLAND, CALIFORNIA

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
SSvc Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

7 October 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCIES) On the dates indicated, files of the following agencies were checked concerning SUBJECT, including all variations of SUBJECT's name, and disclosed no record:

______________ Sheriff's Office,

______________ Sheriff's Office,

______________ Sheriff's Office,

______________ Sheriff's Office,

______________ Sheriff's Office,

7 October 1966 Sheriff's Office, Alameda County, Oakland, California

6 October 1966 Police Department, Oakland, California

6 October 1966 Police Department, Berkeley, California

______________ Police Department,

______________ Police Department,

______________ Police Department,

______________ Bureau of Police,

AGENT'S NOTES:

643

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ROBERT A MALONEY, 115th INTC Gp (I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

for K.B. McKinney

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE : 1962 OF—656148

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10185
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 644

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/13/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

CASUAL SOURCE

REPORT OF FINDINGS

RECORD CHECK

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
SSvc Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED
13 October 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(CASUAL SOURCE) On 11 October 1966, a records check in regard to SUBJECT was conducted at Casual Source B-14, Berkeley, California, and revealed the following information:

Name:	Robert SCHEER
Circumstances:	Issued a permit for campaign speaking as a candidate for US Congress in the Spring of 1966.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

844

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
L LEWIS, 115th INTC Gp(I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
L Lewis

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10186
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 645

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/11/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

CASUAL SOURCE

REPORT OF FINDINGS

RECORD CHECK

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
SCHEER, Robert
SSvc Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED
11 October 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(CASUAL SOURCE) On 6 October 1966, a records check conducted at Casual Source A-16, Oakland, California, in regard to SUBJECT revealed the following information:

Name:	Robert SCHEER
Age:	29 Years old in 1965
Occupation:	Student, Teacher, and writer
Residence:	332 B Castro Street, San Francisco, California
Wife:	Anne

Since 1960, HE has been active in demonstrations in the Bay Area of California. Participated in the San Francisco City Hall riots, against the execution of Caryl Chessman, sit-ins, and teach-ins.

1960	Visited Cuba and wrote favorably of Castro
1965	Member of Vietnam Day Committee
1966	Foreign news editor of Rampart Magazine
1966	Visited Cambodia

(CASUAL SOURCE) On 6 October 1966, Casual Source A-14, Oakland, California, informed that Robert SCHEER is a well-known individual in the Bay Area of California who usually supports all liberal political policies. HE has been active in free speech movements in Berkeley, California, has been a candidate for election to the US Congress, and is active in attempting to alter US policy toward Vietnam. There is no evidence that HE has ever attended a meeting of any organization that is considered subversive toward the US Government nor has HE been identified as a member of any such organization. HIS wife, Anne, is active in similar endeavors as SUBJECT.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
L LEWIS, 115th INTC Gp(I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
L Lewis

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10187
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 646

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/11/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

SUBJECT INTERVIEW

REPORT OF FINDINGS

ARMED FORCES EXAMINING AND ENTRANCE STATION

AGENT REPORT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT(S) I,II,III,IV, AND V INDEXED SEPARATELY.

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

SCHEER, Robert
SSvc Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

2. DATE SUBMITTED

11 October 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(SUBJECT INTERVIEW) On 5 October 1966, Robert SCHEER, 2828 Milvia Street, Berkeley, California, was interviewed at the Armed Forces Examining and Entrance Station, 1509 Clay Street, Oakland, California, and HE stated that HE desired counsel present before HE answered any questions in regard to qualification of DD Forms 98 and 398. HE submitted documents in substantiation of HIS views on US policies which are attached as EXHIBITS I, II, III, IV, and V.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

846

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

L LEWIS, 115th INTC Gp(I)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

L Lewis

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

eleased under the John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records Collection Act of
992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
8613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 08/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10188
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 647

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 115TH INTC GROUP (I)
TO :
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 10/11/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

ARTICLE(S) OBTAINED FROM SUBJECT

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBIT(S) I,II,III,IV, AND V INDEXED SEPARATELY.

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

[illegible] Use Only

Exhibit Number: I, II, III, IV, + V

SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert
SSvc Registrant SSN: 112-28-1134
DOB: 4 April 1936
POB: Bronx, New York

File Number:

Preparing Unit: 115th INTC Group (I)

Agent Report Dated: 11 October 1966

Description: Documents obtained from SUBJECT during SUBJECT Interview.

#1. HOW THE UNITED STATES GOT INVOLVED IN VIETNAM BY ROBERT SCHEER

#2. RAMPARTS VIETNAM PRIMER

#3. CAMPAIGN MATERIAL (SCHEER FOR CONGRESS)

#4. CAMPAIGN MATERIAL (SCHEER FOR CONGRESS)

#5. CAMPAIGN MATERIAL (SCHEER FOR CONGRESS)

For Official Use Only

CLASSIFICATION

(para 134 d(10)(e), FM 30-17)
AMINT Form 2-25
(Rev 11 Feb 63)

647

THIS PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10195
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 751

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : FINNEGAN, J B
TO : DIRECTOR, FBI
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 03/08/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

MEMORANDUM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

8 - MAR 1967

USAPSG

MEMORANDUM FOR: DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

ATTENTION: Mr. Patrick D. Putnam

SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert (NMN) - SSN: 112-28-1134
DPOB: 4 April 1936 - Bronx, New York

1. Request any reports concerning Robert SCHEER subsequent to the report of Special Agent William E. Hughes, Field Office File Number 100-46832, Bureau File Number 105-106720 dated 3-14-66. This office has on file two additional memorandums concerning SUBJECT dated April 21, 1966 and June 28, 1966, same file number as above.

2. Please indicate whether the FBI has any objection to further processing of this case as the eventual result may be a field board action involving SUBJECT.

3. Further request that correspondence be forwarded through the Federal Bureau of Investigation Liaison Representative to the Personnel Security Division, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army, Washington, D. C.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE:

Signed
J B FINNEGAN
COL AIS
for DMITRI J. TADICH
Colonel, GS
Chief, Personnel Security
Division

751

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10196
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGES 752-753

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : TADICH, DMITRI J
TO : TJAG
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 05/23/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

RECOMMENDATION

VIETNAM DAY COMMITTEE

COMMUNIST PARTY

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

BERKELEY CHAPTER OF THE W.E.B. DUBOIS CLUBS OF AMERICA

DISPOSITION FORM

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 19 SEP 94

~~SECRET~~

DISPOSITION FORM ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ JAGO SC NO. 16736

(AR 340-15)

REFERENCE OR OFFICE SYMBOL	SUBJECT
USAPSG	SCHEER, Robert - SSN: 112-28-1134 (U) DPOB: 4 April 1936; Bronx, New York

TO TJAG FROM ACSI DATE 2 3 MAY 1967 CMT 1 (C)

M.C. Sneeringer/trt/6139

1. (U) Forwarded under the provisions of paragraph 29a(1), AR 604-10.

2. (U) Inclosed case file has been reviewed, and it is recommended that SUBJECT be rejected for service in any capacity.

3.(U)~~(C)~~ Following credible derogatory information is furnished as a basis for this recommendation:

a. During 1965 and 1966 SUBJECT was an active member and leader of the Vietnam Day Committee (VDC). The VDC was a radical leftist group which was heavily infiltrated by confirmed Communists and Marxists. The VDC solicited and received financial support and/or assistance from the Communist Party (CP), Socialist Workers Party (SWP), Progressive Labor Party (PLP), and the Berkeley Chapter of the W.E.B. DuBois Clubs of America (DCA). The CP and the SWP have been cited by the Attorney General of the United States; the PLP is organized, controlled, and dominated by a factionalist group of dissident Communists who broke away from the CP because they did not believe it was moving fast enough in accomplishing its revolutionary goals; and the DCA is supported, controlled and dominated by the CP. (Tabs B, pp3, 4 and 5; C; D; E; F; G; H; I, ppIV, 32, 41; J and K)

b. In 1966 HE was associated with the United Committee Against the War which is dominated by the SWP and the Young Socialist Alliance, the youth group of the SWP. (Tabs Q; R and S)

c. In 1964 HE was an associate and instructor of the San Francisco New School (SFNS). The SFNS was formulated by a radical group to criticize existing structures and policies and was the forerunner in the west coast area of the Students for a Democratic Society, a militant youth group that has received support from the CP. (Tabs A; C, pp 21 and 22; L; M; N)

d. On 5 October 1966 SUBJECT refused to complete DD Form 98 (Armed Forces Security Questionnaire). (Tab O)

e. On 5 October 1966 SUBJECT refused to complete DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History) in its entirety. (Tab P)

4. (U) FBI check for any reports subsequent to those contained in the file and for any objections to further processing of this case is being made this date. Results thereof will be forwarded for inclusion in case file.

752

USAPSG S 151-7

REGRADED to ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
when separated from classified inclosures. DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

~~SECRET~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP 19 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

DA FORM 1 FEB 62 2496 REPLACES DD FORM 96, EXISTING SUPPLIES OF WHICH WILL BE ISSUED AND USED UNTIL 1 FEB 63 UNLESS SOONER EXHAUSTED. U S GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 1963 O—707-911

~~SECRET~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

USAPSG 23 MAY 1967

SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert

5. (U) Request that file be returned through the Director of Security, OACSI, to the Chief, USAPSG, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219, upon completion of your action.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

1 Incl
Dossier 112 28 11 34 (SECRET
re SUBJ-VOLS 1,2,3 + 4 of 4 VOLS

for John N. Starkey
DMITRI J. TADICH
Colonel, GS
Chief, Personnel Security
Division

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON SEP 1 9 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

753

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
Regraded ______________
when separated from classified
inclosures. __________

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

2

USAPSG S /57-7

~~SECRET~~

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10197
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 755

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : TADICH, DMITRI J
TO : CHIEF, OPO
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 07/28/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

INDUCTION

SECURITY

COMMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL. INCLOSURE NO INCLUDED.

~~SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USAPSG (23 May 67)
SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert, SSN: 112-28-1134
DPOB: 4 April 1936, Bronx, New York

TO: Chief, OPO
ATTN: EPD-EPPA

FROM: ACSI

DATE: 28 JUL 1967 CMT 3
M. C. Sneeringer/jmm/6139

1. Case concerning SUBJECT is forwarded for appropriate action.

2. The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence adheres to his determination, as stated in Comment Number 1, that induction of SUBJECT into military service is inconsistent with the interests of national security. However, the determination of The Judge Advocate General that the proposed allegations should not be drawn for the reason stated in Comment Number 2, precludes rejection of SUBJECT for security reasons under present policy.

3. In the event it is determined that SUBJECT is declared acceptable for induction, recommend that appropriate personnel records be annotated to preclude HIS receiving access to classified information.

4. Request that the file be returned through the Director of Security, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, to the Chief, United States Army Personnel Security Group, Fort Holabird, Maryland 21219, upon completion of your action.

FOR THE ASSISTANT CHIEF OF STAFF FOR INTELLIGENCE

Dmitri J. Tadich

DMITRI J. TADICH
Colonel, GS
Chief, Personnel Security
Division

1 Incl
Dossier 112 28 11 34 (S)
re SUBJECT (4 volumes)

755

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

TO BE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL.
This document will then be marked:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USA PSG S 151-7

~~SECRET~~

Date : 08/24/98
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10198
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : PAGE 756

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : FITZSIMONS, JOHN F
TO : CHIEF, USAPSG
TITLE : [RESTRICTED]
DATE : 09/07/67
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SCHEER, ROBERT

SECURITY CLEARANCE

INDUCTION

COMMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL. INCLOSURE NOT INCLUDED.

~~SECRET~~

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

EPPAW
SUBJECT: SCHEER, Robert - SSN: 112 28 1134 (U)
DPOB: 4 April 1936 - Bronx, New York

18 SEP 1967

THRU: ACSI
~~ATTN: Dir of Security~~

TO: Chief, USAPSG
Ft Holabird, Md 21219

FROM: OPO

DATE: 7 SEP 1967 CMT 4
Major Devany/50371

1. The Commanding General, U. S. Army Recruiting Command has been informed that subject registrant is acceptable for induction with the proviso that he is not eligible for a security clearance. A copy of the implementing instructions has been added to subject's dossier.

2. The Adjutant General's Office, ATTN: AGPO-SEF has been furnished a copy of the instructions mentioned above for necessary action regarding the flagging control.

FOR THE CHIEF OF PERSONNEL OPERATIONS:

JOHN F. FITZSIMONS
Lt Colonel, USA
Chief, Waiver Branch, PAD, EPD

1 Incl
nc

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

~~SECRET~~

TO BE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED CORRESPONDENCE OR MATERIAL
This document will then be marked
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USA PSG S 1517

756

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM
AUTOMATIC TERMINATION (PAR 19, AR 345-15)

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10235
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC678001R-PAGE 437

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : REPORT
DATE : 07/15/69
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : WERBELL, MITCHELL L

REEVES, S F

INTERVIEW

REQUISITION AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT (DD FORM 1149)

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : DD FORM 1149 INDEXED SEPARATELY

11. On 15 July 1969, S. F. REEVES, GS-8, SSAN: 261-50-7220, Shipment Planner, 3201st Transportation Squadron, Eglin AFB, Florida, advised [illegible] Eglin AFB that a review [illegible] his files revealed a copy of a GBL, Nr F-0,648,922, dated 28 March 1969, with an attached DD Form 1149 (REQUISITION AND INVOICE/SHIPPING DOCUMENT), dated 13 March 1969, Requisition Nr FB2823 9073X100XXX, both of which he furnished to the writer. A review of these documents revealed that an outgoing shipment consisting of one box of small arms ammunition weighing 55 pounds and a box of captured enemy weapons, weighing 140 pounds, was shipped from [illegible] (ATEL), Eglin AFB, Florida 32542 (Mr. COOLEY/882-2328) to Sic[illegible], 1655 Peachtree Street N.E., Atlanta, Georgia 30309, Attn: Mr. FRED BROWN. The DD Form 1149 reflects serial numbers for the 11 weapons as follows: 4514, 1300273, 35285, 68[illegible]9, 12099391, 928231, 8414320, 12047120, 411564, 700867 and 930843.

437

6

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10298
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGES 7-9

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CO, 66TH MI GP
TO : DCSI, USAREUR
TITLE : MESSAGE
DATE : 03/20/72
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

CI INTEREST

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94. DUPLICATE OF PAGES 12-14.

PRIORITY

CO NR 1218

GS BE
(SO has 1 other
Oregon DJ)

[redacted]

RECEIVED
21 MAR 1972
O/DCSI
J 09403

NDA 011

FTTCZYUW UUFTD0298 0801431-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY CCCCC ICN ONLY

P 201400Z MAR 72

FM CO 66TH MI GP MUNICH FRG //AEUTMI-OP-CE//

TO DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG FRG//AEAGB-CI (SO)//

ACTION CI

BT

[redacted]

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS RETRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 091100Z FEB 72

FM CO 165TH MI CO FRANKFURT FRG //AEUTMI-F-CI//

TO CO 66TH MI GP MUNICH FRG //AEUTMI-CE//

BT

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

[redacted]

AEUTMI-F-CE

SUBJECT: INCIDENT OF POSSIBLE CI INTEREST

1. AT 1100 HOURS, 1 FEB 72, LT HAYGOOD, HQ, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, SOEST (MC 3813), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG), CONTACTED THE DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE TO REPORT AN INCIDENT OF AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON ATTEMPTING TO ELLICIT OFFICLA INFORMATION FROM A MEMBER OF C TEAM, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, DA ELN ((LC 6424), FRG.

2. LT KULESZA, COMMANDING OFFICER, C TEAM, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, STATED THAT HE WAS INFORMED BY A MEMBER OF HIS UNIT THAT AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL INFORMATION HAD TAKEN PLACE IN DA ELN ON 31 JAN 72. KULESZA WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SAME PERSON IN THE AREA IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.

3. THE FOLOWING LISTED INDIVIDUALS OF C TEAM, 6TH USA ARTILLERY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

DETACHMENT WERE APPROACHED BY THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL :

A. PETER D. HERPS, PFC, 475-54-6972

B. PHILLIP W. MAY, PFC, 544-48-5481, CUSTODIAL AGENT.

C. STEPHEN R. WILSON, SP4, 167-46-2332,, CLERK.

D. ROBERT M. CREED, SP4, 514-54-474,5, GUARD.

4. ALL LISTED MEMBERS OF C TEAM HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED BY SA'S OF DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE.

5. A DESCRIPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLICITING THE INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWD:

A. NAME: "JOHN THE DEE JAY" AKA: JOHN DEE JAY AKA: HOHN

B. OCCUPATION: DISC JOCKEY AT THE LORD NELSON BAR, A EIN

C. HEIGHT: SIX FEET

D. WEIGHT: 190 PUNDS

E. BUILD: SLIGHT

F. HAIR: BLACK WITH LONG SIDEBURNS

G. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS: NONE

6. ATTEMPTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE THROUGH GERMAN CHANNELS TO BOTAIN POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF JOHN DEE JAY.

7. JOHN DEE JAY SPEACKS RUSSIAN GERMAN SPANISH AND ENGLISH. HE HAS EXPRESSED PROTEST SENTIMENTS AND HAS SAID HE HAD BEEN TO

MOSCOW, USSR, WHERE HE LEARNED TO SPEAK ENGLISH. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE A COUSIN OR NEPHEW WHO IS A MAJOR IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR) ARMY. HE ALLEGEDLY TRAVELS REQUENTLYTO THE GDR AND HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN THERE TO LIVE BECAUSE HE HATED THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HE IS EXTREMELY KNOWLEDGABLE ABOUT THINGS PERTAINING TO THE MILITARY. HE KNEW TH EXACT DEPARTURE TIME, LOCATION, INTERMEDIATE STOPS, AND FINAL DESTINATION OF A RECENT CONVOY WHOSE MISSION WAS TO EXCHANGE WARHEADS AT SASCOM UNITS. HOHN DEE JAY ASKED ROBERT M. CREED, IDENTIFIED IN PARA 4 TO BRING HIM SOME WAR AND ARMY BOOKS. ALL HE, JOHN, WANTED WERE SOME WAR STORIES, NOTHING ABOUT NORAD OR SANRAS (SPECIAL AMMUNITIONS RECOGNITION AND AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM).

8. JOHN DEE JAY MENTIONED AN ASSOCIATION (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) WITH SSG (USAF) FNU ALEXANDER, SECTION NCOIC, HOPSTEN (RCA), FRG, WHO WORKS AS A SECURITY SERGEANT AT THE USAF ESR SITE THERE.

9. THE S-2, SASCOM HEADQUARTERS, FRANKFURT GER AND THE OSI WERE BRIEFED ON 8 FEB 72.

10. INVESTIGATIVE ACTION WILL CONTINUE AT THIS COMPANY AND RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT. CP-3

BT

#295

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

NNNN

9

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

[redacted]

Date : 12/10/97
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10300
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGES 12-14

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CO, 66TH MI GP
TO : DCSI, USAREUR
TITLE : MESSAGE
DATE : 03/20/72
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

CI INTEREST

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94. DUPLICATE OF PAGES 7-9.

PRIORITY

CC NR
1248

This took 400 [illegible]
DK

SO

[redacted]

NDA 011

PTTCZYUW UUFTD0298 0801431-CCCC--UUFTB.

ZNY [redacted] ICN ONLY

P 201400Z MAR 72

FM CO 66TH MI GP MUNICH FRG //AEUTMI-OP-CE//

TO DCSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG FRG//AEAGB-CI (SO)//

BT

[redacted]

THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE IS RETRANSMITTED FOR YOUR INFORMATION:

O 091100Z FEB 72

FM CO 165TH MI CO FRANKFURT FRG //AEUTMI-F-CI//

TO CO 66TH MI GP MUNICH FRG //AEUTMI-CE//

BT

[redacted]

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

AEUTMI-F-CE

SUBJECT: INCIDENT OF POSSIBLE CI INTEREST

1. AT 110 HOURS, 1 FEB 72, LT HAYGOOD, HQ, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, SOEST (MC 3813), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG), CONTACTED THE DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE TO REPORT AN INCIDENT OF AN UNIDENTIFIED PERSON ATTEMPTING TO ELLICIT OFFICLA INFORMATION FROM A MEMBER OF C TEAM, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, DATELN ((LC 8424), FRG.

2. LT KULESZA, COMMANDING OFFICER, C TEAM, 66TH USA ARTILLERY DETACHMENT, STATED THAT HE WAS INFORMED BY A MEMBER OF HIS UNIT THAT AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OFFICIAL INFORMATION HAD TAKEN PLACE IN DATELN ON 31 JAN 72. KULESZA WAS ABLE TO DETERMINE THAT THREE OTHER MEMBERS OF HIS UNIT HAD BEEN CONTACTED BY THE SAME PERSON IN THE AREA IN AN ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN INFORMATION.

3. THE FOLOWING LISTED INDIVIDUALS OF C TEAM, 66TH USA ARTILLERY

DETACHMENT WERE APPROACHED BY THE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL :

A. PETER D. HERPS, PFC, 475-54-6972

B. PHILLIP W. MAY, PFC, 544-48-5481, CUSTODIAL AGENT.

C. STEPHEN R. WILSON, SP4, 167-40-2332,, CLERK.

D. ROBERT M. CREED, SP4, 514-54-474,5, GUARD.

4. ALL LISTED MEMBERS OF C TEAM HAVE BEEN INTERVIEWED BY SA'S OF DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE.

5. A DESCRIPTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOLICITING THE INFORMATION IS AS FOLLOWD:

A. NAME: "JOHN THE DEE JAY" AKA: JOHN DEE JAY AKA: HOHN

B. OCCUPATION: DISC JOCKEY AT THE LORD NELSON BAR, DATEIN

C. HEIGHT: SIX FEET

D. WEIGHT: 190 PUNDS

E. BUILD: SLIGHT

F. HAIR: BLACK WITH LONG SIDEBURNS

G. DISTINGUISHING CHARACTERISTICS: NONE

6. ATTEMPTS ARE CURRENTLY BEING MADE THROUGH GERMAN CHANNELS TO BOTAIN POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF JOHN DEE JAY.

7. JOHN DEE JAY SPEACKS RUSSIAN GERMAN SPANISH AND ENGLISH. HE HAS EXPRESSED PROTEST SENTIMENTS AND HAS SAID HE HAD BEEN TO

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

MOSCOW, USSR, WHERE HE LEARNED TO SPEAK ENGLISH. HE CLAIMED TO HAVE A COUSIN OR NEPHEW WHO IS A MAJOR IN THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC (GDR) ARMY. HE ALLEGEDLY TRAVELS FREQUENTLY TO THE GDR AND HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE TO RETURN THERE TO LIVE BECAUSE HE HATED THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HE IS EXTREMELY KNOWLEDGABLE ABOUT THINGS PERTAINING TO THE MILITARY. HE KNEW THE EXACT DEPARTURE TIME, LOCATION, INTERMEDIATE STOPS, AND FINAL DESTINATION OF A RECENT CONVOY WHOSE MISSION WAS TO EXCHANGE WARHEADS AT SASCOM UNITS. JOHN DEE JAY ASKED ROBERT M. CREED, IDENTIFIED IN PARA 4 TO BRING HIM SOME WAR AND ARMY BOOKS. ALL HE, JOHN, WANTED WERE SOME WAR STORIES, NOTHING ABOUT NORAD OR SANRAS (SPECIAL AMMUNITIONS RELEASE ~~RECOGNITION AND~~ AUTHENTICATION SYSTEM).

8. JOHN DEE JAY MENTIONED AN ASSOCIATION (NOT FURTHER IDENTIFIED) WITH SSG (USAF) FNU ALEXANDER, SECTION NCOIC, HOPSTEN (NCA), FRG, WHO WORKS AS A SECURITY SERGEANT AT THE USAF ESR SITE THERE.

9. THE S-2, SASCOM HEADQUARTERS, FRANKFURT GER AND THE OSI WERE BRIEFED ON 8 FEB 72.

10. INVESTIGATIVE ACTION WILL CONTINUE AT THIS COMPANY AND RESULTS WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIPT. GP-3

BT

0298

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

NNNN

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10311
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGES 45-47

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/05/72
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

[RESTRICTED]

JOHN THE DEE JAY

LORD NELSON, WESTERN, KESSIN (BARS IN DATTELN)

MILITARY SUBJECTS

XR-71

STADTSCHAENKE BAR

C-RATIONS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94. EXHIBITS NOT INCLUDED.

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 5 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

~~(C)~~ (U) On 1 February 1972, Robert M. Creed, SP4, 514-54-4745, Security Guard, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), was interviewed at his place of duty regarding an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and stated substantially as follows:

~~(C)~~ (U) Source was approached by a man who identified himself as John the Dee Jay on 31 January 1972, in the Lord Nelson, a bar in Datteln. John the Dee Jay was the Disc Jockey at the Lord Nelson. John sat down with Source and began a normal conversation. The conversation soon turned to military subjects. John asked about CPT FNU Myers and CPT FNU Jackson, who supposedly had been assigned to the unit at one time. John mentioned that he had taken pictures of Myers and his family. John asked Source about radar and other military subjects. John constantly mentioned Security Sergeants, phone numbers and personnel that were formerly at the unit. John stated that he knew the last Security Sergeant of C Team, and was interested in knowing who was now the Security Sergeant. At 2330 hours, Source left the Lord Nelson and proceeded to the Western Bar, Datteln. At the Western, Source met a man, name unknown, who owned the photography shop across the street from the Western, whom Source described as a "drinking buddy". Source and the unidentified man (UIM) left the Western about 0100 hours and proceeded to the Lord Nelson. At the Lord Nelson, Source and UIM were joined at their table by John the Dee Jay. Upon learning that UIM was a Photographer, John asked him if he had ever taken pictures of a military installation. The UIM did not answer the question, but stated that he had taken pictures of a man named Julius (PHONETIC-NFI). Julius supposedly had been an American stationed in Datteln with the US Army. The UIM became nervous because of John's questioning, excused himself, and left the bar. Source did not see UIM anymore that evening. Source and John remained at the Lord Nelson. The conversation between Source and John returned to military subjects. John spoke about military subjects with authority and apparent proficiency. John said many things about military subjects that Source had no knowledge of. Source was unable to recall any of the specifics of the conversation. Source felt dwarfed by John's military knowledge and at one time asked John if he knew about the XR-71. John became very interested and asked Source what was the XR-71. Source replied that he was not allowed to talk about it, and the subject was dropped. John mentioned twice during the evening, that he had been kicked off Haard Kaserne, where C Team was located in Datteln, for being caught wearing a complete set of US fatigues in downtown Datteln. The first time John mentioned the incident he said it occurred two years ago and on the second mentioning he said it

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Heinz E. Ickert

45

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FOR[redacted]

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 5 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

happened in 1966. Source did not mention the discrepancy to John. John stated that he had also veen kicked off two or three kasernes in the South, and that his name was on record. John mentioned being caught and interrogated on a site in Southern FRG. Source was unable to recall the exact identification of the agency John claimed to have been interrogated by, but mentioned that it was something like MA, MD, MI, MAD, MAI. John said he had been released after the interrogation and followed, but that he had managed to lose the people who were following him. John mentioned that he had paced off Haard Kaserne and knew exactly where and how to get on to the kaserne without being detected. Source and John left the Lord Nelson at 0300 hours and went to another bar in Datteln. Source thought the name of the bar was the Kessin (PHONETIC), but was not sure. Upon arriving at the Kessin, John said that he had to pick up his pay check from the owner of the bar and left Source. John and the owner of the bar went into a private office for about five minutes before John returned. The owner of the Kessin also owned the Lord Nelson and Western. Source and John left the Kessin at 430 hours and proceeded by taxi to John's apartment, which was located above the Western. John stated that if Source did not believe everything that he had said, that Source could contact an Air Force Security Sergeant and confirm everything. John gave Source a slip of paper (EXHIBIT____), on which was the name of the Security Sergeant, his job title, station, and telephone numbers. John stated that if Source mentioned or showed the paper to anyone that it would get the Security Sergeant into trouble. John also hinted that bodily harm might result to Source if the paper got into the wrong hands. John gave Source an old US Air Force parka to wear back to the kaserne because it was cold and Source's own jacket was light weight. In the pockets of the parka were four beer coasters, (EXHIBITS____, ____, ____, and ____), and a used streetcar ticket (EXHIBIT____). John arranged another meeting with Source for 1700 hours, 5 February 1972, at the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln. John gave a slip of paper (EXHIBIT____) to Source with the information for the next meeting. John asked Source to obtain any information on Julius mentioned by UIM, that he could. John mentioned that he had known Cristobal Pimentel-Davilla and asked Source to obtain some C-Rations for him. Source then left John and returned to his unit. Source did not believe that he had supplied any official information to John, but felt that it was possible that he might have as he was quite drunk before the evening ended. Source described John as follows: Six to six feet one inch tall, weighing 180-190 pounds, slight build, black hair with long sideburns, and wore a red shirt with a navy blue coat and tie, black shoes, long black overcoat and black fur hat.

REGRA[illegible] [illegible]IFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY~~

Page 2 of 3 Pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 46 HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 5 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) ~~(C)~~ REMARKS: Source explained that the XR-71 that he had mentioned to John did not, to the best of his knowledge, exist.

(U) ~~(C)~~ AGENT'S NOTES: The UIM mentioned was the owner of the Althoff Photo Shop, Hohe Strasse, Datteln.

REGRA[illegible] [illegible]SIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10~~ DOES NOT APPLY

Page 3 of 3 Pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT 47 HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	194-10006-10312
RECORDS SERIES :	DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	AC640653W-PAGE 48

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	USA
FROM :	[RESTRICTED]
TO :	
TITLE :	AGENT REPORT
DATE :	02/04/72
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	KAMINSKI, HANS D POSSIBLE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST AT C TEAM STELPFLUG, JOHN C ARMY DISCHARGE LUKASIK, JOHN P USA AIR DEFENSE SCHOOL, FORT BLISS, TEXAS
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED
4 February 1972

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(u)
(~~C~~) On 1 February 1972, an attempt to interview the following persons regarding an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest at C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09078, met with negative results.

John C. Stelpflug, SP5, 392-48-2033, formerly of C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, had departed the unit on 7 January 1972. Stelpflug had returned to the United States to be discharged from the US Army. Stelpflug left a forwarding address of W164 N9423 Water Street, Menominee Falls, Wisconsin.

John P. Lukasik, SP5, 161-38-4615, formerly of C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, had departed the unit on 23 January 1972 for assignment at the USA Air Defense School, Fort Bliss, Texas.

REG[illegible] [illegible]SIFIED
ON 2 Sep94
BY CDR [illegible] T01/PO
AUTH Para 1-[illegible] DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
48
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 12/10/97
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY :	CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER :	194-10006-10313
RECORDS SERIES :	DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :	AC640653W-PAGE 49

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR :	USA
FROM :	[RESTRICTED]
TO :	
TITLE :	AGENT REPORT
DATE :	02/04/72
PAGES :	1
SUBJECTS :	KAMINSKI, HANS D [RESTRICTED] JOHN THE DEE JAY GENERAL NUISANCE
DOCUMENT TYPE :	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION :	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS :	3
CURRENT STATUS :	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW :	03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :	
COMMENTS :	REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED
4 February 1972

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U)
(~~C~~) On 1 February 1972, Phillip W. May, PFC, 444-48-5481, Custodial Agent, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place of duty concerning an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and stated substantially as follows:

(U)
(~~C~~) About two or three weeks ago, Source was approached by a man that identified himself as John the Dee Jay in the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln. John said that he was the Disc Jockey at the Lord Nelson, another bar in Datteln. With Source at the Stadtschaenke were John Stelpflug, John Lukasik, and Terry Drivis (PHONETIC). John the Dee Jay made a general nuisance of himself. He talked about security at the site and gave verbally a list of telephone numbers he claimed were security information telephone numbers in Heidleberg (MV7773), FRG, and other cities in FRG. Source was unable to recall any of the telephone numbers John the Dee Jay mentioned. John asked Source who the Security Sergeant of the unit was. He also asked about persons who had been formerly assigned to the unit. Source was not familiar with any of the names mentioned as Source has been at the unit only a short time. John talked about how, if he was a spy, he would get information from people. Source felt that John the Dee Jay was trying to make him and the others nervous. John spoke fluent English and German and claimed that he could speak Russian. Source described John as follows:

Height:	Six feet to six feet one inch
Weight:	200-210 pounds
Age:	27-28 years old
Build:	Solid
Dress:	Wore furry coat and shoes, possibly camel hair

Source had not met John the Dee Jay before and had not seen or had contact with him since and gave negative responses to all questions posed by him.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] T01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10~~ DOES NOT APPLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group

49

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10314
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 50

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/05/72
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

REPORT OF FINDINGS

PERSONNEL RECORDS

MYERS, CLYDE E

DRUG USAGE

DORKA, EVA-MARIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED
5 February 1972

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) ~~(C)~~ On 1 February 1972, the personnel records of C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln, (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, were checked with the aid of FNU Kulesza, 1LT, 286-48-0611, Team Commander, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, regarding the following persons and revealed the following information:

(U) ~~(C)~~ Clyde E. Myers, PFC, 266-96-0932, arrived C Team 11 December 1968, departed unit on 8 November 1971 for assignment with 51st Infantry, Cralsheim (NV7843), FRG. Disqualified from nuclear weapons as part of 611-5 program because of use of drugs. Myers was engaged to Eva-Maria Dorka, Gelsinkirchen (LC6909), FRG, Bronner Strasse 22. Reference Agent Report dated 5 February 1972, Subject as above, interview of Robert Creed.

(U) ~~(C)~~ Kulesza was unable to discover anyone by the name of Jackson or Julius, first or last name, that had ever been stationed at C Team. Reference Agent Report dated 5 February 1972, Subject as above, interview of Robert Creed.

REGRA[illegible]SIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-6[illegible] DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group

50

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO F[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10315
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 51

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/04/72
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

REPORT OF FINDINGS

[RESTRICTED]

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

EXCHANGE OF WARHEADS AT C TEAM

REMARKS

AGENT'S NOTES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 4 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

~~(C)~~ (U) On 1 February 1972, Peter D. Herpst, PFC, 475-54-6972, Clerk, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany, APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place of duty concerning an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and stated substantially as follows:

~~(C)~~ (U) About two or three weeks ago, just before a scheduled exchange of warheads at C Team, Source was approached in a Datteln bar, the Stadtschaenke, by a man who identified himself as John Dee Jay. John was the Disc Jockey at another bar in Datteln, the Lord Nelson. Source thought that Dee Jay was only a nickname and not John's real name. John asked Source and other Americans in the bar if they knew where some of the former members of the unit are presently stationed. Source could recall only one name John had asked about, Cristobal Pimentel-Davilla. John told Source "If you see Pimentel, tell him I have the package for him." Source knew that John had called the unit that night asking for Pimentel-Davilla. John at one time asked Source to tell him who the Security Sergeant of the unit was, but Source refused to answer the question. Source descriped John as follows: Height: Six feet to six feet one inch tall; Weight: 200-210 pounds; Age: 22-24 years old; Build: Stocky; Hair: Dark; Dress: Wore furry coat and shoes, possibly camel hair. Source had not met John before and has not seen him since and gave negative responses to all questions posed by him.

~~(C)~~ (U) REMARKS: Source felt that the package John mentioned that he had for Pimentel-Davilla was probably drugs, either hashish or marijuana. Source knew that Pimentel-Davilla used both drugs and may have been selling them to other members of the unit.

~~(C)~~ (U) AGENT'S NOTES: Full identification of Pimentel-Davilla was as follows: Pimentel-Davilla, Cristobal, SP6, 582-58-9662, departed C Team on 20 January 1972 on a permanent change of station to Fort Eustis, Virginia.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group	Heinz E. Ickert

51

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10316
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 52

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/04/72
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

REPORT OF FINDINGS

[RESTRICTED]

COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

THE DORTMUND POLICE

REMARKS

AGENT'S NOTES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED
4 February 1972

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U) ~~(C)~~ On 1 February 1972, Stephen R. Wilson, SP4, 167-40-2332, Clerk, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place of duty concerning an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and stated substantially the following:

(U) ~~(C)~~ About two or three weeks ago, Source was approached by a man who identified himself only as John in the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln. John refused to mention his last name, but Source knew that he had been the Disc Jockey at the Western, a bar in Datteln, and was now the Disc Jockey at the Lord Nelson, another bar in Datteln. Source had only a brief conversation with John, but was asked for the name of the Security Sergeant at the unit. John then told Source to tell Pimentel that he was back in town. Source described John as follows:

Height:	Six feet to Six feet one inch tall
Weight:	180-190 pounds
Hair:	Brown
Dress:	Wore furry coat and boots
Distinguishing marks:	None

Source had not met John before although he had seen him at the Lord Nelson, and has not had contact with John since. Source did not answer questions posed by John that pertained to military affairs.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

(U) ~~(C)~~ REMARKS: Source felt the reason John was interested in Pimentel probably had something to do with drugs. Pimentel was known to smoke hashish and marijuana. The Dortmund Police, Dortmund (LC9308), FRG, were interested in Pimentel as a drug pusher. Dortmund Police had been to the unit two or three times to talk to Pimentel about drugs and had searched his house and car. Pimentel had his car impounded shortly before he left the unit in regards to refusing to pay the one thousand German Marks deductible on an automobile accident he had. The case was still pending. Pimentel was married and had four children, all residing with him in Datteln, but had German girlfriends in the area. Source could provide no further information about Pimentel.

(U) ~~(C)~~ AGENT'S NOTES: Pimentel referred to by Source above was Cristobal Pimentel-Davilla, SP6, 582-58-9662, formerly assigned to C Team. Pimentel-Davilla left the unit on 20 January 1972 for assignment at Fort Eustis, Virginia.

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group

52

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10317
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGES 53-55

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/06/72
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

REPORT OF FINDINGS

[RESTRICTED]

[RESTRICTED]

POSSIBLE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

AGENT'S NOTES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 6 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(U)
(~~C~~) On 4 February 1972, Raymond R. Leal, 1LT, 459-78-6563, Platoon Leader, 164th Military Police Company (MPC), Milsau (NCA), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09059, and Ronald A. Margulies, SP4, 220-48-5408, Senior MP, 164th MPC, were interviewed separately regarding an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and both stated substantially as follows:

(U)
(~~C~~) On 3 February 1972, Sources were in the Lord Nelson Bar, Datteln (LC8424), FRG, with other members of their unit, 1LT Wood and an unidentified Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), when they were approached by the Disc Jockey of the bar, who introduced himself only as John, and asked them if there was a particular song they would like to hear. After playing the record requested, John walked back over to Sources and sat down with them. John began asking them military related questions almost as soon as he sat down. John asked them what unit they were from. He wanted to know where they came from and where they were going. He asked them why they were in Datteln. John stated that he knew who the Security Sergeant at C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln, APO New York 09078, was. When John did not receive the answers to his Questions he stated that he knew what they were doing in Datteln. John stated that Datteln was a dead town, but that things were hoping in Westkirchen (MC3549), FRG. The site that the convoy had just come from. John then listed every site the convoy had just come from. John identified the sites by unit designation, location, APO number, and telephone number of the orderly room. John was completely accurate in every detail. John stated that he knew what they had brought to Datteln and knew how long they were going to stay. John talked about how easy it was to get information out of people by using indirect questions. John said that about four years ago he had a Lieutenant that was supplying him information about the site at Datteln. John then boasted that he could find out anything he wanted to by giving ten beers to almost any German soldier at the site. John stated that he did not have any bugs so Sources and their friends did not have to worry about what they said. John was very interested in the jeeps in the parking lot near the Lord Nelson. John said that the jeeps had poor radios and that he had a transmitter/receiver about one foot long, three to four inches wide, and about six inches high, with a three foot antenna that could reach Brazil. When asked where such a radio could be purchased, John said that it was a special model and could not be bought anywhere. John mentioned how easy it would be to put a fake bomb into the jeeps and asked Sources if they checked the jeeps before starting them or just got in and started them.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

~~EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING~~
~~DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY~~

Page 1 of 3 Pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group	Heinz E. Ickert

53

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO [redacted]

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 6 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

John wanted to know on what frequency the radios operated. John stated that he hated to be a Disc Jockey, that he had more important things to do. John also stated that they had some mighty fine missiles in Soest (MC3813), FRG. John stated that the Russian Army was far superior to anything in Europe. He talked at length about the Russian Army. Sources felt that John was serious about what he was saying and not trying just to make them uneasy. John asked Margulies if he was a CID agent. Margulies replied that he was not. John talked about and named every intelligence agency of the United States. He mentioned MI, OSS, ONI, CIA, CID and the FBI. John said that Israel's intelligence network was far superior to that of any countries' in Europe or that of the United States. John spoke fluent German and English and spoke Spanish and Russian to Sources to prove that he knew how. John said he learned to speak English in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and said "we have to learn many languages." John kept asking about Ramstein Air Force Base and stated that he had been to the NCO Club at Ramstein. John said he hated the FRG and that he wanted to go back to the German Democratic Republic (GDR). John stated that he goes to the GDR often and that he has been to Moscow (NCA), USSR. John expounded on how much better it was to live in the GDR. John claimed to have a cousin or nephew, Sources could not recall which, who was a Major in the army in the GDR. John talked about brainwashing at length and how information could be gotten from people without the threat of physical violence. John said that the American Prisoners of War in North Viet Nam would never be the same even after they were released. John stated that his hobby was just listening and looking around. Sources said that they had to go because tommorrow was a busy day and they had field exercises at 0900 hours. John quipped in "Don't you mean that you and the convoy are leaving at 0600 hours?", and added that tommorrow whould be a busy day from him also. John mentioned that he had stolen something and had sold it. John described the object in great detail, as to size, dimensions, and color, but never said what it was. Sources could only recall that it was about one and a half feet long with fins on the end. Sources thought from the description that John gave, that he was talking about a mortar projectile or some kind of small rocket. When Sources left the bar at 0430 hours, they waited for John outside the bar, but he did not come out. They then proceeded through the parking lot where their jeeps were parked to their hotel across from the Lord Nelson. At 0515 hours, Margulies looked out of his hotel window and saw John leave the Lord Nelson. John proceeded directly to the jeeps in the parking lot

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Page 2 of 3 Pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Heinz E. Ickert

54

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED
6 February 1972

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

and spent five minutes going over them inside and out. Margulies was positive John had checked the radios closely and noted what frequency they were set on. Margulies checked the jeeps in the morning before starting them to see if anything had been done to them, but could find nothing.

~~(C)~~ (U) AGENT'S NOTES: Soest mentioned above is the location of the Headquarters and A Team of the 66th USA Artillery Detachment. Westkirchen mentioned above is the location of D Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment. The convoy mentioned above assembled to prepare to depart Datteln at 0600 hours, 4 February 1972.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] 01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DoD 5200.1R

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC RE-GRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Page 3 of 3 Pages

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
55
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Heinz E Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

[redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10318
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGES 56-57

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/06/72
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

REPORT OF FINDINGS

[RESTRICTED]

POSSIBLE COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE INTEREST

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT	2. DATE SUBMITTED 6 February 1972
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(u)

(~~C~~) On 4 February 1972, Robert M. Creed, Sp4, 514-54-4745, Security Guard, C Team, 66th USA Artillery Detachment, Datteln (LC8424), Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), APO New York 09078, was interviewed at his place of duty regarding an incident of possible Counter-Intelligence interest, and stated substantially as follows:

(u)

(~~C~~) At 1200 hours on 3 February 1972, Creed received a telephone call at the unit from John the Dee Jay. John began the conversation by asking Source his last name, saying that he had a difficult time getting a hold of Source knowing only his first name Bob. Source told John his last name and then was asked to spell it. Source spelled his last name while John repeated it slowly as if he were writing it down. John asked Source if he could meet him at the Lord Nelson Bar, Datteln, that evening. Source replied that he could and asked John if he wanted him to return the Air Force parka he had borrowed from him the previous evening. John said that it was not necessary to return the jacket and that Source could hold on to it for a while if he wished. John said "You didn't have a chance to get to the man at the photo shop yet, have you?" Source said that he had not. John said that it did not matter, it could be done later. John asked Source if he could meet him at the Lord Nelson at 2000 hours, to which Source replied that he could. The conversation ended.

Source met John the Dee Jay at 2000 hours, 3 February 1972, in the Lord Nelson, Datteln. John was very interested in the Military Police that were in Datteln, wanting to know why they were in town. John stated that he knew they had come from Westkirchen (MC3549), FRG, and wanted to know where they were going next. John was extremely interested in the Military Policemen. John was interested in the jeeps that the Military Police had with them, two of which were parked in the parking lot near the Lord Nelson. John wanted to know what the numbers written in chalk on the jeeps meant. Were they call numbers or code numbers as to the point of origin of the jeeps. John mentioned that the radios in the jeeps were nothing, that he knew where he could get a radio that could reach Brazil. John mentioned Julius and said something about Julius having some military photographs. John was not clear on this point and Source was unable to determine exactly what John had meant. John said that he was going to have his photograph taken at the Althoff Photo Shop, Datteln, which was across the street from the Western Bar, where John resided. John asked Source to bring him some war and Army books. John said all he wanted were some war stories, nothing about NORAD or SANRAS (Special Ammunitions Recognition and Authentication System). Source was not positive that John had said SANRAS because John had said it quickly, but Source was fairly sure. John offered to pay for all Source's drinks if Source did not have any money. Source returned the borrowed Air Force parka to John who was very suspicious about it and

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group 56	Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

2. DATE SUBMITTED
6 February 1972

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

wanted to know where it had been the last couple of days. Source told John that it had been in his room at the unit, but John was still quite nervous about the parka. John stated that he did not tell anyone about what Source had said to him the night before. John did not talk to Source about what his was refering to with the statement. John then left Source to talk to some members of the Military Police that had just entered the Lord Nelson. John talked only to members of the convoy from that time on. Although Source remained in the Lord Nelson for two more hours, John did not approach him again. Source was suppose to meet John again at 1700 hours on 5 February 1972, at the Stadtschaenke Bar, Datteln, but told John that he had duty Saturday and would be unable to meet him. John said he would call the unit Saturday to talk to Source and find out if he still had duty that evening and would be unable to meet him.

REGRA[illegible] [illegible]SIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94 [illegible] T01/PO
BY CDR [illegible] DOD 5200.1R
AUTH Para 1-6[illegible]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
HEINZ E. ICKERT, 66th MI Group

57

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Heinz E. Ickert

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 12/10/97
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : CSF/INSCOM
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10006-10329
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AC640653W-PAGE 71

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : CO 165TH MI CO FKFT GER
TO : CO 66TH MI GROUP MUNICH GER
TITLE : MEMO
DATE : 02/10/72
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : KAMINSKI, HANS D

INCIDENT OF POSSIBLE CI INTEREST

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/07/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 2 SEP 94

IMMEDIATE

C/C LOG NR
0466

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR/1163
59

RECEIVED
10 FEB 1972
Gp Msg Ctr

```
OO UUFTD
DE UUFTE1334 040115
ZNY [redacted] ICN ONLY
O 091100Z FEB 72
FM CO 165TH MI CO FRANKFURT GER//AEUTMI-F-CE//
TO CO 66TH MI GROUP MUNICH GER//AEUTMI-OP-CE//
BT
[redacted]
AEUTMI-F-CE
SUBJ: INCI ENT OF POSSIBLE CI INTEREST
1. AT 1100 HOURS, 1 FEB 72, LT HA GOOD, HQ, 66TH USA ARTILLERY
 ETACHMENT, SOEST (MC 3813), FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY (FRG),
CONTACTED THE DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE TO REPORT AN INCIDENT OF
AN UNIDEN IFIED PERSON A  EMP ING  O ILLICI  OFFICIAL INFORMA ION
FROM A MEMBER OF C  EAM, 66 H USA AR ILLERY DE ACHMEN , DA  ELN
(LC 8424), FRG.
2. L  KULESZA, COMMANDING OFFICER, C  EAM, 66 H USA AR ILLERY
DE ACHMEN , S A ED  HA  HE  AS INFORMED BY A MEMBER OF HIS UNI
 HA  AN A  EMP   O OB AIN OFFICIAL INFORMA ION HAD  AKEN PLACE
IN DA  ELN ON 31 JAN 72. KULESZA WAS ABLE  O DE ERMINE  HA
 HREE O H  MEMBERS OF HIS UNI  HAD BEEN CON AC ED BY  HE SAME
PERSON IN  HE AREA IN AN A  EMP   O OB AIN INFORMA ION.
3.  HE FOLLOWING LIS ED INDIVIDUALS OF C  EAM, 66 H USA AR ILLERY


PAGE 2 UUF D1334 [redacted]
DE ACHMEN  WERE APPROACHED BY  HE UNKNOWN INDIVIDUAL:
A. PE ER D. HERPS , PFC, 47 - 4-6972.
B. PHILLIP . MAY, PFC, 44-48- 481, CUS ODIAL AGEN .
C. S EPHEN R.  ILSON, SP4, 167-40-2352, CLERK.
D. ROBER  M. CREED, SP4, 14- 4-474 , GUARD.
4. ALL LIS ED MEMBERS OF C  EAM HAVE BEEN IN ERVIEWED BY SA'S
OF DUESSELDORF FIELD OFFICE.
 . A DESCRIP ION OF  HE INDIVIDUAL SOLICI ING  HE INFORMA ION IS
AS FOLLOWS:
A. NAME: ''JOHN  HE DEE JAY'' AKA: JOHN DEE JAY  AKA: JOHN
B. OCCUPA ION: DISC JOCKEY A   HE LORD NELSON BAR, DA  ELN
C. HEIGH : SIX FEE
D.  EIGH : 190 POUNDS
E. BUILD: SLIGH
F. HAIR: BLACK WI H LONG SIDEBURNS
G. DIS INGUISHING CHARAC ERIS ICS: NONE
6. A  EMP S ARE CURREN LY BEING MADE  HROUGH GERMAN CHANNELS  O
OB AIN POSI IVE IDEN IFICA ION OF JOHN DEE JAY.
7. JOHN DEE JAY SPEAKS RUSSIAN GERMAN SPANISH AND ENGLISH. HE
HAS EXPRESSED PRO EAS  SEN IMEN S AND HAS SAID HE HAD BEEN  O


PAGE 3 UUFTE1334 [redacted]
MOSCOW, USSR, WHERE HE LEARNED  O SPEAK ENGLISH. HE CLAIMED  O
HAVE A COUSIN OR NEPHEW WHO IS A MAJOR IN  HE GERMAN DEMOCRA IC
REPUBLIC (GDR) ARMY. HE ALLEGEDLY  RAVELS FREQUEN LY  O  HE GDR
AND HAS EXPRESSED A DESIRE  O RE URN  HERE  I LIVE BECAUSE HE
HA ED  HE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY. HE IS EX REMELY KNOW-
LEDGABLE ABOU   HINGS PER AINING  O  HE MILI ARY. HE KNE   HE
EXAC  DEPAR URE  IME, LOCA ION, IN ERMEDIA E S OPS, AND FINAL
DES INA ION OF A RECEN  CONVOY  HOSE MISSION  AS  O EXCHANGE
WARHEADS A  SASCOM UNI S. JOHN DEE JAY ASKED ROBER  M. CREED,
IDEN IFIED IN PARA 4  O BRING HIM SOME  AR AND ARMY BOOKS. ALL
HE, JOHN,  A  ED  ERE SOME  AR S ORIES, NO HING ABOU  NORAD OR
SAMRAS (SPECIA  AMMUNI IONS RECOGNI ION AND AU HEN ICA ION
SYS EM).
8. JOHN DEE JAY MEN IONED AN ASSOCIA ION (NO  FUR HER IDEN IFIED)
 I H SSG (USAF) FNU ALEXANDER, SEC ION NCOIC, HOPS EN (NCA), FRG,
 HO WORKS AS A SECURI Y SERGEAN  A   HE USAF ESR SI E  HERE.
9.  HE S-2, SASCOM HEADQUAR ERS, FRANKFUR  GER AND  HE OSI
WERE BRIEFED ON 8 FEB 72.
10. INVES IGA IVE AC ION  ILL CON INUE A   HIS COMPANY ANS
RESUL S WILL BE FORWARDED UPON RECEIP . GP-3
GP-3
B
#1334
```

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 2 Sep 94
BY CDR [illegible] F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

71

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.
DOD DIR 5200.10

NNNN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10031
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X4013287WE2 - PAGE 42

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 03/04/71
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : BEER, HENRY

BEER, HENRY S.

BEER, JOACHIM F.

PEHL, JOACHIM F.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGE 42 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON OCTOBER 17, 1994.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5

AGENT REPORT
(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
BEER, Henry S.

2. DATE SUBMITTED
4 March 1971

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 4 March 1971, the Provost Marshal's Office (PMO), US Army Berlin Brigade, West Berlin, APO New York 09742, were checked regarding SUBJECT'S step-son, Joachim S. Beer aka Joachim F. Pehl, DPOB: 4 December 1942, Berlin-Schoeneberg, and revealed the following derogatory information:

Under Beer, Joachim F., SGT, 412-86-6383, Service Company, US Army Berlin Brigade, APO New York 09742, the PMO had the following remarks: On 19 December 1970 - Report of a fire, and on 22 January 1971 - complainant, disturbing the peace. No additional information given.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 17 Oct 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

42

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
RANDY L. THOMPSON, 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Randy L. Thompson

61

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10262
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X4013287WE2 - PAGES 462-463

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 03/10/71
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : BEER, HENRY

BEER, HENRY S.

BEER, JOACHIM F.

BEER, JOACHIM FRIEDRICH EBERHARD

PEHL, JOACHIM FRIEDRICH EBERHARD

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 462-463 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 OCTOBER 1994.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

BEER, Henry S.

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 March 1971

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(201 FILE CHECK) On 10 March 1971, Military Personnel Records, Military Personnel Branch, AG Division, US Army Berlin Bigade, APO New York 09742, concerning SUBJECT'S step-son, Joachim F. Beer, aka: Pehl, DPOB: 4 December 1942, Berlin-Schoeneberg, West Berlin (WB), were checked and disclosed the following information:

Name:	Joachim Friedrich Eberhard Beer
AKA:	Joachim Friedrich Eberhard Pehl
DPOB:	4 December 1942, Berlin-Schoeneberg, WB
Rank/Grade:	SGT/E5
SSAN:	412-86-6361
Parents:	Father - Major Erich Fritz Pehl Mother - Berta Charlotte Beer nee Thiel div Pehl DPOB: 26 May 1912, Berlin, Germany Residence: Dickensstrasse 11, Hannover 3, FRG Step Father: Henry S. BEER DPOB: 20 January 1920, Vienna, Austria Employment: US Army Element, Hannover, APO New York 09174 Joachim F. Pehl adopted by step-father BEER on 6 May 1965
Marital Data:	Married to Roswitha Beer, nee Ulerth, on 12 Dec 69; present address is Hanaganstr 43, Apartment 3, Berlin 37, WB. Wife's date of birth is 19 February 1950, Berlin-Neukoelln, WB.
Place of duty:	Maintenance Division, US Army Berlin Brigade (USABB), WB, APO 09742.
Unit:	Service Company, Special Troops Battalion, USBB, APO 09742.
DD Form 98:	Completed without qualification on 29 November 1968.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 Oct 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

462

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RANDY L. THOMPSON, 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Randy L. Thompson

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

69

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

BEER, Henry S.

2. DATE SUBMITTED

10 March 1971

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Security Clearance: Confidential, granted by Commanding Officer, Special Troops Battalion, USABB, on 1 May 1970, on the basis of a Background Investigation completed by USAINTC on 24 Jan 67, dossier number AC635107 of para 3-6, AR 600-200 (ALIEN BI).

BASD: 15 December 1965

ETS: 28 November 1972

Date Assigned to USAREUR: 1 May 1969

DEROS: 11 April 1972

Primary MOS: 45B4L29-Small Arms Repairman and German Linguist

Record of Disciplinary Action: None

18 Oct 94

[illegible]

463

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RANDY L. THOMPSON, 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Randy L. Thompson

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

490

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10266
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X4013287WE2 - PAGE 466

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 03/04/71
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : BEER, HENRY

BEER, HENRY S.

BEER, JOACHIM F.

PEHL, JOACHIM F.

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGE 466 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 OCTOBER 1994.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENT REPORT

(SR 380-320-10)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

BEER, Henry S.

2. DATE SUBMITTED

4 March 1971

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 4 March 1971, the Provost Marshal's Office (PMO), US Army Berlin Brigade, West Berlin, APO New York 09742, were checked regarding SUBJECT'S step-son, Joachim S. Beer aka Joachim F. Pehl, DPOB: 4 December 1942, Berlin-Schoeneberg, and revealed the following derogatory information:

Under Beer, Joachim F., SGT, 412-86-6383, Service Company, US Army Berlin Brigade, APO New York 09742, the PMO had the following remarks: On 19 December 1970 - Report of a fire, and on 22 January 1971 - complainant, disturbing the peace. No additional information given.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 Oct 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

466

GROUP 3
DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RANDY L. THOMPSON, 66th MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Randy L. Thompson

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341

73

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 03/04/9
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10267
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X4013287WE2 - PAGE 470

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : BLN STA 66TH MI GP
TO : 66TH MI GP CI DIV
TITLE : CABLE
DATE : 03/10/71
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : BEER, HENRY

BEER, HENRY S.

BEER, JOACHIM F.

PEHL, JOACHIM F.

INVESTIGATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGE 470 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 18 OCTOBER 1994.

ROUTINE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

TOR 10/1330
AX

VZCZCNDA021
RTTCZYUW RUFTTNM0980 0691315-CCCC--RUFTTNB.
ZNY CCCCC ICN ONLY ?
R 101245Z MAR 71
FM OO BLN STA 66TH MI GP BLN GER
TO CO 66TH MI GP CI DIV MUNICH GER
BT
CONFIDENTIAL
AEUTMI-O-G(CE)
FOR: AEUTMI-OP-CE
SUBJ: BEER, HENRY S. (U)

C/C LOG ! 0510

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 18 Oct 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

80

A. LEAD SHEET, DATED 10 FEBRUARY 1971, YOUR OFFICE, CONCERNING SUBJECT.

1. (C) LAC'S AND MAC'S ON SUBJECT'S STEP-SON, JOACHIM S. BEER AKA JOACHIM F. PEHL, DPOB: 4 DECEMBER 1942, BERLIN-SCHOENEBERG, WERE NEGATIVE OR NON-DEROGATORY, W/EXCEPTION OF DISTURBING PEACE IN JAN 71.

2. (C) CKS REVEAL ONE SGT (E-5) JOACHIM F. BEER, DPOB: 4 DEC 42, BERLIN, SSAN: 412-86-6361, MOS: 45B40, WAS FORMERLY A LABOR SERVICE EMPLOYEE, FROM AUG 63 TO MAY 65, AS AN ELECTRONIC APPRENTICE. IN JUN 65, BEER WENT TO HANNOVER,7 !RG TO PROCESS FOR IMMIGRATION TO THE US IN NOV 65. ALLIEN REGISTRATION NO. 14391499, LAST TWO NUMBERS NOT POSITIVE. PRESENTLY SERVING

PAGE 2 RUFTTNM0980 CONFIDENTIAL
IN THE US ARMY W/SERVICE CO., US ARMY BERLIN, APO 09742.
AR'S TO FOLLOW. GP-3
BT
▽0980

	Act	Info
CO		
XO		
DCO		
CI	X	
GCD		
SCD		
S1		
S2		
S3		0
S4		
Compt		
Hq Co		
Sig		
MR		

470

RECEIVED
[illegible] MAR 1971

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

76.

NNNN

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 03/07/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10417
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 487-488

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 04/22/70
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

MILITARY SERVICE

UNDERAGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : EXHIBITS INDEXED SEPARATELY.

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

TRINKALA, Victor L.
DPOB: 28 November 1950, Rochester, Pa.
PVT 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 April 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

9321 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(MILITARY SERVICE) On 22 April 1970, James Hutchinson, Sergeant, United States Army, Personnel Interviewer, Personal Action Branch (PAB), Over-Seas Replacement Station (ORS), United States Army Personnel Center (USAPC), Oakland Army Base (OAB), Oakland, California, was interviewed concerning Victor L. TRINKALA. Hutchinson, who interviewed TRINKALA several times prior to HIS discharge, stated substantially the following:

Hutchinson first met TRINKALA on 8 November 1969, when HE requested to be interviewed by the PAB, ORS, because HE was seventeen years old and HE did not want to go to the Republic of Viet Nam (RVN). A copy of the interview request is attached to the original copy of this agent's report as EXHIBIT___. SUBJECT stated that HE had lied about HIS age to get into the Army, had changed HIS mind about the Army, and did not want to go to RVN. Source was of the impression that SUBJECT had heard from someone that if HE were under 18 years old, HE would not have to go to RVN. SUBJECT was told by Source that even though HE was under 18 years old, HE would be sent to RVN after HIS 18th birthday which was just 20 days away. SUBJECT was questioned by Source as to how HE managed to get into the Army when HE was under 18 years old with out parental consent. SUBJECT stated that the US Army Recruiter was knowledgeable of HIS age but assured SUBJECT that he could "fix it up" so that HE could enlist with out parental consent. SUBJECT was told by Source that HE would have to provide conclusive evidence that HE was under 18 years old, otherwise HE would be shipped to RVN. The interview was terminated at this point and SUBJECT was to return on 10 November 1969, pending verification of HIS age.

On 13 November 1969, Source received a message from Sixth Army Headquarter (EXHIBIT___) through the Message Center (MC), USAPC, OAB, requesting that SUBJECT'S orders to RVN be cancelled pending advisement from the Department of the Army and at the request of one R. C. Nagell, former Captain, Special Agent, Counter Intelligence Corps. This message was sent to Sixth Army Headquarters by way of Western Union Telegraph Company (WUTC) from New York, New York, by R. C. Nagell. Source was not too concerned with this request because SUBJECT was already on "hold status" pending verification of HIS age. This was the first time Source had heard of R. C. Nagell.

On 14 November 1969, Source received a message from the MC, USAPC, that was sent by way of WUTC from Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, from SUBJECT'S mother, Mrs. Dorothy Trinkala, 202 Basco Street, Pittsburgh, a copy of which is attached to this agent's report as EXHIBIT___. The message stated that SUBJECT was not of age and HIS mother did not give her consent for HIM to join the Army. SUBJECT was then called in for another interview and HE was asked to have a registered letter sent to USAPC with HIS birth certificate

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

JACK A. REYNOLDS, 115th MI GP (I AL)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Jack A. Reynolds

DA FORM 341 [illegible]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

TRINKALA, Victor L.
DPOB: 28 November 1950, Rochester, Pa.
PVT 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 April 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

9321 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

or positive evidence of HIS age. SUBJECT stated that HE would comply with this request and the interview was terminated.

On 18 November 1969, Source recieved a telephone call from LTC Parker, Chief of Military Personnel Division, Sixth Army Headquarters, Presidio of San Francisco, California, (EXHIBIT___) stating that one Nagell, former Captain, Special Agent, with Counter Intelligence, urged that SUBJECT'S orders to RVN be cancelled. Parker did not explain why Nagell wanted the orders to be cancelled. Source was instructed to find out who Nagell was by talking to SUBJECT. SUBJECT was consequently called in for another interview by the former Officer In Charge, CWO Walter Girvin, 456-48-8128, 22d Administration Company (Finance), Americal Division, APO San Francisco 96374. Source was not positive if Girvin ever talked to SUBJECT. Source interviewed SUBJECT and asked HIM who Nagell was. SUBJECT replied that Nagell was a relative and a former Army Captain. SUBJECT was apprehensive when talking about Nagell. LEAD

On 24 or 25 November 1969, Source received a registered letter from SUBJECT'S mother. The letter contained a copy of SUBJECT'S birth certificate and a note in long hand, apparently written by HIS mother, stating that she did not want SUBJECT to go to RVN nor remain in the Army. The birth certificate was a copy of the original and Source did not remember seeing a raised seal of any kind on the certificate. The copy of the birth certificate was apparently considered to be official because SUBJECT was transferred to Transient Company to be discharged. Source was confident that the correspondence from Nagell played no part in SUBJECT getting discharged, although it did confuse the matter and brought it to the attention of the personnel working in PAB, ORS, USAPC.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

488

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

JACK A. REYNOLDS, 115th MI GP (I AL)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Jack A. Reynolds

DA FORM 341

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 03/07/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10418
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 489-490

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 115TH MI GROUP
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT
DATE : 04/22/70
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

RECORD OF INTERVIEW

UNDERAGE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

EXHIBIT

COVER SHEET

SUBJECT: TRINKALA, Victor L.

FILE NUMBER: 9321 6006

PREPARING UNIT: Alameda Field Office, Region I, 115th MI Group

AGENT REPORT DATED: 22 April 1970

DESCRIPTION: Copy of Record of Interview form filled out by SUBJECT on 7 November 1969

489

IC FORM 171
17 NOV 67

RECORD OF INTERVIEW

DATE	NUMBER
8 Nov. 69	

Last Name -First Name- Middle Initial	Grade	Social Security Number
TRINKALA Victor L	Pvt 2	186-42-1155

Unit being assigned to:	AUTH:
RVN	

Roster Number (if applicable)	Reporting Date	Have you been seen here before?
7 V 4 L-25	7 Nov. 69	( ) Yes (X) No

I request a interview for the following reason(s):

I am only 17 years old.

EM said he lied to get into Army his real birthday 28 Nov 51, his records indicate 28 Nov 50, EM has no proof of this

AFTER COMPLETING THIS FORM, PLEASE PLACE IN BOX AND HAVE A SEAT. YOU WILL BE CALLED

Information Given or Action Taken:

put EM on hold to rtn 10 Nov 69

Call County Clerk where birth is recorded.

490

Interviewer: Date 8 Nov Time

PC Form 4.9

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10422
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 497-500

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 04/16/70
PAGES : 4
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR

DISCHARGE FROM ARMY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

TRINKALA, Victor L.
DPOB: 28 November 1950; Rochester, Pa.
PVT - 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 April 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

9321 - 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(MISCELLANEOUS) On 14 April 1970, Harfez Muneer, also known as Tony Muneer, Desk Clerk, Hotel Strand, 206 West 43d Street, New York, New York 10036, residing at Room 301, Hotel Woodstock, 127 West 43d Street, New York, New York 10036, was interviewed at his residence in an attempt to identify Richard Nagell's current address, business connections, physical description and to query Muneer as to why Nagell was allegedly instrumental in getting Victor L. TRINKALA separated from the military service and how Nagell was able to do so. Source stated in substance as follows:

Muneer knew Richard Nagell as a former United States Army Officer, Captain Richard C. Nagell and first met him in 1966, while both, Source and Nagel, were serving sentences at the Federal Prison (FP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. From 1966 to 27 November 1968, when Source was released from the FP, Source saw SUBJECT daily on a friendly basis as a fellow inmate. While at the FP, Nagell told Source that he was a former United States Army Captain, and had been an investigator for the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) or the CIC (Counterintelligence Corps), further details unknown. According to Nagell, while he was working for the above mentioned agency, Nagell was directly involved with the investigation of the assassination of former President John F. Kennedy, and while on business in a bank in El Paso, Texas, Nagell was arrested by the civilian authorities and charged with some kind of felony involving traveler checks, further details unknown. As a result of this arrest, Nagell was convicted and confined to the FP at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On 27 November 1968, Source was released from the FP and since then had seen Nagell on approximately four occasions on a friendly and social basis. Source last saw Nagell at the Hotel Strand sometime in December 1969. Muneer was unable to furnish any information concerning Nagell's present business connections or whereabouts. Sometime in 1969, exact date unrecalled, Nagell gave Source the following mailing address: Mr. Richard C. Nagell, P. O. Box 2337, Grand Central Station, New York, New York 10017. Source did not know if Nagell's mailing address is still valid.

Source furnished the following physical description of Nagell:

Name:	Richard C. Nagell
Nationality:	United States citizen
Age:	Approximately 31 or 32 years old
Race:	Caucasian
Height:	6'1" to 6'2"
Weight:	170 to 189 lbs.
Built:	Medium

497

(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

CAPISTRANO PABON-IRIZARRY, 108th MI Gp(I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

mg

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
TRINKALA, Victor L.
DPOB: 28 November 1950; Rochester, Pa.
PVT - 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED
16 April 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
9321 - 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(MISCELLANEOUS-Continued)

Color of Hair:	Brown
Color of Eyes:	Unknown
Physical Defects:	None; however, while at the FP at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Nagell was believed to have had a physical defect which was corrected, further details unknown.
Remarks:	Nagell does not wear glasses or a mustache and he is always clean shaven.

Sometime in 1968, while Source was on duty as a Desk Clerk at the Strand Hotel from 1600 to 2400 hours, SUBJECT came to the hotel desk and requested that Source allow HIM to sleep at the hotel that night since SUBJECT was from out of town and did not have any money to rent a room. Source offered his room at the Woodstock Hotel for that night, which SUBJECT accepted. Since then, Source and SUBJECT have been close friends, and Source shared his room with SUBJECT until approximately three weeks ago when SUBJECT left the hotel with some friends, and Source had not seen HIM since.

SUBJECT told Source that HE was originally from Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, where HE lived with HIS mother, Mrs. Trinkala, prior to coming to New York City. Source had never met Mrs. Trinkala, however, Source had talked with her telephonically on several occasions. To Source's knowledge, SUBJECT'S parents have been either separated or divorced for several years, further details unknown. SUBJECT has several other brothers and sisters, names unknown. During July or August 1969, SUBJECT was inducted into the United States Army and was assigned to Fort Gordon, Georgia, for basic military training. SUBJECT always discussed with Source the fact that HE was a very religious individual and HE considered HIMSELF a Conscientious Objector. During one of Source's telephone conversations with SUBJECT'S mother, Mrs. Trinkala told Source that she was making the necessary arrangements with her Senator in Pittsburg, name unknown, to get SUBJECT out of military service. At this time, Source told SUBJECT'S mother that he felt it would be difficult to get SUBJECT out of military service; however, Source felt that he could help her and SUBJECT in obtaining SUBJECT'S transfer to the United States Army Chaplain School, (USACS), Fort Hamilton, Brooklyn, New York. In December 1969, a couple of days after Source's conversation with SUBJECT'S mother, Source met Nagell at the Strand Hotel. Since Source knew Nagell to be a former United States Army Captain, Source told Nagell about SUBJECT and requested advice from Nagell as to what could be done to have SUBJECT

498

(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
CAPISTRANO PABON-IRIZARRY, 108th MI Gp (I-STB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Capistrano Pabon Irizarry

FORM

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

mg

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT TRINKALA, Victor L. DPOB: 28 November 1950; Rochester, Pa. PVT - 186 42 1155	2. DATE SUBMITTED 16 April 1970 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 9321 - 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(MISCELLANEOUS-Continued)

transferred to USACS. At this time, SUBJECT was at Oakland Army Terminal with PCS orders for Vietnam. Nagell immediately sent a telegram addressed to the Commanding General, Sixth United States Army, requesting SUBJECT'S transfer to USACS since SUBJECT was a Conscientious Objector. Nagell had never met SUBJECT personally; however, the same night that Nagell sent the telegram to Sixth Army in regard to SUBJECT, Source talked to SUBJECT by telephone and at that time Nagell was introduced to SUBJECT telephonically. Source believed that neither Nagell nor Source was instrumental in getting SUBJECT separated from the service, since it is a fact that SUBJECT'S mother mentioned to Source that she was making the necessary arrangements through her Senator in Pittsburg to get SUBJECT separated from the military service. It is Source's opinion, that either Mrs. Trinkala or her Senator was instrumental in getting SUBJECT out of the military. Source knew of no other efforts or attempts made by either Source or Nagell to get SUBJECT separated from the military service. Source could not offer any further information concerning Nagell and had not seen him since that night that Nagell wrote the telegram in behalf of SUBJECT.

In December 1969, SUBJECT was discharged from the United States Army, reason unknown to Source. SUBJECT returned to New York City and continued to share Source's apartment at the Woodstock Hotel. At that time, Source recalled that he was illegally convicted and confined to the FP for the use, possession and selling of narcotics. Since SUBJECT is a young man and there is a narcotics problem in the New York City area, Source started counselling SUBJECT against the use of narcotics or drugs. Source secured a job for SUBJECT at the Clinton Hotel, 19 West 31st Street, New York, New York, where SUBJECT started working during the day shift. Since SUBJECT was working during the day, Source suggested to SUBJECT that HE register at the evening classes offered at the YMCA so that HE could finish HIS high school education. To Source's knowledge, SUBJECT never completed high school and Source was unable to state whether or not SUBJECT ever registered in the evening classes offered at the YMCA. Approximately three weeks ago, SUBJECT was at Source's room at the Woodstock Hotel with some friends, not further identified. SUBJECT left the Woodstock Hotel with HIS friends and Source had not seen HIM since then. To Source's knowledge, SUBJECT had never been approached or been in contact with anyone representing policies inimical to the best interests of the United States and it is Source's opinion that SUBJECT would report to the proper United States authorities if HE were ever approached by such a person. SUBJECT was considered to be loyal to the United States and to favor and support the Constitution of this country. SUBJECT is willing to defend the United States against all enemies;

(Continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT CAPISTRANO PABON-IRIZARRY, 108th MI Gp(I-SIB)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Capistrano Pabon-Irizarry

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

mg

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
TRINKALA, Victor L.
DPOB: 28 November 1950; Rochester, Pa.
PVT - 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED
16 April 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
9321 - 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(MISCELLANEOUS-Continued)

however, since HE is a Conscientious Objector, SUBJECT would hesitate to kill anyone other than in self-defense.

Harfez Muneer recommended that Victor L. TRINKALA be favorably considered for assignment to a position of trust and responsibility with the United States Army.

AGENT'S NOTES: During the course of this interview, it was noted by the undersigned that Source appeared to be genuinely interested in the well being of SUBJECT and on several occasions Source made it clear that he wanted to help HIM. Source appeared to be truthful and always answered the questions asked in a straightforward manner and without hesitation. It was also noted that the hotel room occupied by Source at the Woodstock Hotel contained only one bed, which gave reason to believe that SUBJECT and Source were sleeping in one bed while sharing the room at the hotel. When Source was queried concerning SUBJECT, Source presented for inspection a copy of SUBJECT'S Sworn Statement completed by HIM on 19 February 1970 and signed by HIM on 20 February 1970.

500

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10423
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGE 501

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 04/16/70
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

AGENCY CHECKS

POST OFFICE BOX

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

mg

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

TRINKALA. Victor L.
DPOB: 28 November 1950; Rochester, Pa.
PVT - 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED

16 April 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

9321 - 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY CHECK) On 16 April 1970, Charles H. Smith, Correspondence Clerk, United States Post Office, Grand Central Station, 110 East 45th Street, New York, New York 10017, was contacted at his office in an attempt to obtain the name and address of the person who is presently renting Box 2337 at the above mentioned Post Office. Source stated that Post Office Box Number 2337 is presently registered under the name of Richard G. Nagell, residing at 2292 Edythe Drive, Dundeon, Florida. (LEAD) Source further stated that at the present time there is mail addressed to Nagell in the box; however, Source could not furnish information as to who is presently picking up the mail nor of any instructions to forward the mail to Nagell.

AGENT'S NOTES: Reference is made to Agent Report, dated 16 April 1970, Subject of this investigation, wherein the mailing address of Richard C. Nagell is reported.

— 501

ECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATI

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

CAPISTRANO PABON-IRIZARRY, 108th MI Gp(I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 03/07/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10424
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGE 502

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 02/25/70
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

CHARACTER REFERENCE

SWORN STATEMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : SWORN STATEMENT INDEXED SEPARATELY.

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

mg

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
TRINKALA, Victor Lee
DPOB: 28 November 1950; Rochester, Pa.
PVT - 186 42 1155

2. DATE SUBMITTED
25 February 1970

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER
9321 - 6006

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(SUBJECT INTERVIEW) On 19 February 1970, Victor Lee TRINKALA, Unemployed, address of residence, 127 West 43d Street, Room 301, Manhattan, New York 10036, was interviewed under oath at Region I, 108th Military Intelligence Group, Room 1332, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York 10007, concerning HIS character, suitability, and unswerving loyalty to the United States. TRINKALA, after indicating HIS complete and full understanding of the purpose and necessity of the interview, consented to be interviewed, allowed the interview to be tape recorded, and was duly sworn. TRINKALA furnished a Sworn Statement (DA Form 2823), a copy of which is attached hereto as EXHIBIT _____, containing the information disclosed by HIM during the interview of which HE signed on 24 February 1970 at 206 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York 10036. SUBJECT requested and receipted for a copy of HIS Sworn Statement, copy of Receipt of Statement attached hereto as EXHIBIT _____.

AGENT'S NOTES: SUBJECT was reluctant to answer questions. It is the opinion of the undersigned Agent that TRINKALA was evasive throughout the interview. Special Agent James H. Raymond, Region I, 108th Military Intelligence Group, was present throughout the interview and concurs with the above remarks.

502

[illegible] TERMINATION

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
T. T. MC PHERSON, 108th MI Gp (I-SIB)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 03/07/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10425
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGES 503-507

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : 108TH MI GROUP
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT
DATE : 02/25/70
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

SWORN STATEMENT

TAPE RECORDING OF INTERVIEW

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR

DISCHARGE FROM ARMY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE COMMAND

EXHIBIT

COVER SHEET

SUBJECT:	TRINKALA, Victor Lee PVT - 186 42 1155
FILE NUMBER:	9321 - 6006
PREPARING UNIT:	108th MI Group (I-SIB)
AGENT REPORT DATED:	25 February 1970
DESCRIPTION:	SUBJECT'S Sworn Statement (DA Form 2823), dated 19 February 1970.

503

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION

WITNESS STATEMENT
(AR 195-10 - TB PMG 3)

PLACE 108th MI Group, Region I, Room 1332, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, NY 10007	DATE 19 Feb 70	TIME 1500 Hrs 1600 Hrs	FILE NUMBER 9321 6006
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME TRINKALA, Victor Lee	SOCIAL SECURITY ACCOUNT NO. 186 42 1155		GRADE PVT
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 127 West 43d Street, Room 301, Manhattan, New York 10036			

SWORN STATEMENT

VLT I, Victor Lee Trinkala, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q. Mr. Trinkala, before we proceed, it is my desire to acquaint you with the purpose of this interview. The United States Department of Army must be assured of the character, suitability, and unswerving loyalty to the United States of persons who are in the United States Army and its Reserve component. In this regard, you have been asked to voluntarily undergo an interview under oath concerning your background since you were discharged from active duty and placed in the inactive reserves. This interview will provide a dual opportunity to you and the Department of Army to determine your status up to the present. Do you understand what I have just said to you?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you have any objection to being interviewed under oath?

A. No.

Q. Please stand and raise your right hand. Do you affirm to tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth?

A. Yes, I so affirm.

Q. Do you have any objection to having this interview tape recorded for administrative purposes?

A. No, none whatsoever. VLT

Q. Please state your name, address of residence, occupation, name and address of employer, and Social Security Account Number.

A. My name is Victor Lee Trinkala and I reside at the Hotel Woodstock, Room 301, 127 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York. I am currently unemployed. My Social Security Account Number is 186 42 1155.

Q. What addresses have you resided at since your discharge?

A. I lived at the Hotel Strand, 206 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York for approximately two or three weeks after my discharge from the Army. I then moved to my current address and have resided there ever since.

Q. What employment have you had since your discharge?

A. None. I collect a weekly unemployment check from New York State which pays for my bills.

Q. Did you come directly to New York City after your discharge?

A. Yes.

Q. Mr Trinkala, have you ever had contact with any embassies, legations, consulates, or representatives of any foreign country?

A. No, none that I know of.

504

Q. Have you or any member of your family ever been contacted by a representative of a foreign intelligence service either here or abroad?

A. No, none that I know of.

Q. Have you or any member of your family ever been contacted by anyone with a more than casual interest in your military assignments, career, or duties? VLT

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT VLT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ___ TAKEN AT ___ DATED ___ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

Statement of TRINKALA, Victor Lee, taken at 108th MI Group, Region I, 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1332, New York, New York 10007, dated 19 February 1970, continued:

VLT A. No, no one that I can recall.

Q. If you were contacted by someone with a more than casual interest in your military assignments, career, or duties, what would you do?

A. I would report them to the FBI, CIA, or the CID.

Q. Do you, Mr. Trinkala, still consider yourself to be a Conscientious Objector?

A. ~~No~~ YES. VLT

Q. You do ~~not~~ consider yourself to be a Conscientious Objector?

A. I consider myself to be a Conscientious Objector to a certain point.

Q. Explain, if you will, Mr. Trinkala.

A. I do not believe in killing someone for no reason. I just can not bring myself to kill a man because someone tells me to. V

Q. What are your Conscientious Objector grounds based upon?

A. I have religious and moral objections to killing people.

Q. When were you discharged?

A. I was discharged on 3 December 1969.

Q. What were the reasons given for your discharge?

A. I really cannot recall the reasons for my discharge.

Q. Were you told why you were discharged?

A. There were several reasons involved. A friend of mine helped me to get discharged. VLT VLT

Q. How did he help you obtain a discharge?

A. I do not know how he helped, or if, in fact, he did help me to get discharged. VLT

Q. What is your friend's name?

A. His name is Richard Nagel.

Q. Where does Richard Nagel reside?

A. I do not know where he lives. I have never met him in person and do not know him personally. He is a friend of a friend.

Q. How did you become acquainted with Mr. Nagel.

A. Mr. Nagel is actually the friend of Tony Muneer of whom I have known for three or four years.

Q. Where does Mr. Muneer reside and what is his occupation?

A. Tony Muneer resides at the Hotel Woodstock, 127 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York. He is employed there as a Desk Clerk.

Q. Have you ever resided in the same residence with Mr. Muneer previous to your discharge?

A. Yes, we both lived in the Hotel Strand, 206 West 43d Street, Manhattan, New York.

Q. What was his occupation at that time?

A. He was working as a Desk Clerk and going to school at IBM.

Q. What was your occupation at that time?

A. I was working at the Clinton Hotel, 19 West 31st Street, Manhattan, New York.

Q. So, Mr. Muneer told you he would help you get out of the Army?

A. Yes, he said he would speak to a friend, Richard Nagel, and see what he could do.

Q. Did he ever tell you what he did to help you get out of the Army?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever associated with any dissident, anti-Army, or anti-war groups?

A. No.

Q. Have you ever been contacted by any individual who is a representative of any dissident, anti-Army, or anti-war groups?

A. I do not know.

Q. Has any person ever asked you to attend meetings of such groups?

Statement of TRINKALA, Victor Lee, taken at 108th MI Group, Region I, 26 Federal Plaza, Room 1332, New York, New York 10007, dated 19 February 1970, continued:

VLT Q. Have you ever attended any meetings of any dissident, anti-Army, anti-war groups?

A. No, never. VLT

Q. Where were you stationed while in the Army?

A. I was stationed at Fort Gordon, Georgia for approximately nine weeks during which time I received Basic Training. I then went to Fort Polk, Louisianna, for AIT training in the MOS 11B10. I stayed at Fort Polk for approximately 10 weeks. I was then sent to Oakland Army Terminal with orders for Viet Nam. I was discharged at Oakland Army Terminal on 3 December 1969.

Q. Do you not remember the reasons for your discharge?

A. No, I do not remember the specific reasons.

Q. How much time had you spent in the Army?

A. I had spent five months and 22 days.

Q. Did you not think it rather odd that you should be granted a discharge after only five months and 22 days?

A. Yes, I thought it was odd but I did not know what was happening.

Q. Did you receive any counseling while in the Army from Army personnel?

A. No, but the Personnel Officer at Oakland Army Terminal asked me who Richard Nagel was.

Q. Why did he ask you the identity of Richard Nagel and what was his name and rank?

A. I do not know why he asked me about Richard Nagel. He was a Warrant Officer but I do not remember his name or rank.

Q. What did you tell him about Mr. Nagel?

A. I told him only that he was a personal friend of mine.

Q. Had you requested a discharge at any time prior to arriving at Oakland Army Terminal?

A. I do not recall.

Q. You had never requested a discharge?

A. I was trying to get my combat status changed to non-combat status. I never initiated any formal procedures to obtain a discharge.

Q. Did you ever tell any one that you were a Conscientious Objector?

A. Yes, I told the adjutant at Oakland Army Terminal but he tore up my request and told me to get the hell out.

Q. Have you his name and rank? VLT

A. No, I do not recall his name or rank. VLT

Q. Did Richard Nagel ever mention to you how he got you out of the Army?

A. No, as I mentioned before I have never seen him before or since. He called me VLT long distance from New York City while I was at Oakland Army Terminal and that was the first and last I heard from him.

Q. Has Tony Muneer heard from him or does he know of his whereabouts?

A. No, Tony has not heard from him since December 1969 and does not know of Richard Nagel's whereabouts.

Q. Have you ever been arrested?

A. Yes.

Q. How many times?

A. About three or four times.

Q. Have you ever been arrested since being inducted into the Army?

A. No, and I listed all my arrests on the forms I had to fill out before going into the Army and at Basic Training.

VLT

STATEMENT (Continued)

Q. VLT Do you have friends who are members of dissident, anti-Army, or anti-war groups or organizations? VLT

A. No, but most of my friends do not like the Army. I do not know their reasons.

Q. To what country do you owe your allegiance?

A. The United States.

Q. Do you support the Constitution of the United States and are you willing to defend the United States against any and all of her enemies without exception?

A. VLT I support the Constitution and am willing to fight any enemies who invade the United States but I am not willing to fight in Viet Nam because I believe the war is immoral.

Q. If called upon to fight in Viet Nam would you go?

A. I would try to obtain Conscientious Objector status. If that did not work I do not know what I would do.

Q. Would you be willing to go on Active Duty if called upon?

A. I would not be willing to be called to Active Duty and I do not know if I would go if called.

Q. Why are you opposed to killing?

A. I was brought up to be opposed to killing. They wanted to teach me in four months to kill somebody and you can not teach in four months something which is opposed to what you have been taught for many years. VLT

Q. Are these attitudes due to religious beliefs?

A. Yes, I am Catholic and do not believe in killing.

Q. If you had to kill someone in self-defense what would you do?

A. I would fight back but this is different than being placed in Viet Nam where I would probably have to kill.

Q. If you were in Viet Nam and were under fire would you kill the enemy?

A. Yes, I would. Any human being would fight back. VLT

Q. If a foreign power attacked the United States would you have any objection to killing the aggressor? VLT VLT

A. No, not really.

Q. Do you have anything further to add?

A. NO. ////////////// Nothing Follows ////////////// VLT

VLT

VLT

AFFIDAVIT

I, Victor Lee Trinkala HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

Victor Lee Trinkala

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20th day of February, 1970

at 127 West 43d Street, Manhattan, NY 10036

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

507

TIMOTHY T. MC PHERSON, Special Agent

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 136 (b), UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10007-10426
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : X1332650W - PAGE 508

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 11/14/69
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : NAGELL, RICHARD C.

TRINKALA, VICTOR L.

MILITARY SERVICE

HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE

CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTOR

CANCELLATION OF ORDERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/09/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGE 508 WAS REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 1 JUNE 1994.

~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON JUN 01 1994
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH PARA 1-603 DoD 5200.1-R

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
TRINKALA, Victor L.
DPOB: Unk
Pvt US 527 87 228

2. DATE SUBMITTED
14 November 1969

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(MISCELLANEOUS) During my tour of duty, 0800 hours 12 November 1969 through 0800 hours 13 November 1969, as Duty Agent (DA), 108th Military Intelligence Group, Region I, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, New York (MIGP), the following information was received telephonically from an anonymous male caller, who stated substancially as follows:

At 2105 hours the call was received and the unidentified male stated that an active duty US Army Enlistedman, PVT Victor L. TRINKALA, US 527-87-228, DD Form 2-A, card number, D-323-485, issuing officer, LT James Kraft (Phonetic), Field Artillery, left New York City four or five days prior to 12 November 1969 enroute to Oakland Army Terminal, Oakland, California for shipment to the Republic of Vietnam. TRINKALA completed HIS Basic Combat Training at Fort Jackson, Columbia, South Carolina and HIS Advanced Individual Training at Fort Polk, Louisiana. HE was in New York City on HIS authorized travel time to Oakland Terminal. While in New York City, unknowingly, HE was contacted by a "Soviet Agent" Since the "Soviet Agent" contacted TRINKALA and found HIM to be a Conscientious Objector (CO), enroute to Vietnam, he, the "Soviet Agent", plans to use this as a propaganda pitch against the US, reason being that since TRINKALA is a known CO by the Army, the Army is still sending HIM to Vietnam, and will make HIM serve in a combat zone, against HIS will. The caller stated that he was a former US Army Captian, Special Agent in the Counterintelligence Corp and that his former credential-badge number was 10-837. He stated that this badge number could be verified through the records at Fort Holabird, Maryland. He called in order for this office to send a "twix" to Oakland Army Terminal and cancel TRINKALA'S orders or to detain HIM in Oakland. The caller's reason for calling and explaining the situation was to prevent the US embarrassment. The caller stated that he planned to travel to Washington, DC in the near future to inform the "proper" authorities of the incident concerning TRINKALA and the "Soviet Agent". The caller was released from East Germany approximately one year ago but would not discuss this on the telephone because of security reasons, nor would he discuss any other information concerning TRINKALA telephonically. He refused to release his identity because he was a civilian and did not want to get involved with an Army matter.

AGENT'S NOTES: The caller seemed to be very knowledgeable of the Army and knew many Army terms. He was very relaxed and co-operative when he was asked questions but refused to come to this office to discuss the incident on 12 November1969 nor at a future date. He conversed with the undersigned for approximately thirty minutes and kept putting additional coins in the public pay telephone. He had no outstanding speech characteristics and [illegible] well spoken, [illegible]

508

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
MARIO J. MALTESE 108th MI Gp Rgn I

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Date : 02/09/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY	INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER	194-10012-10030
RECORDS SERIES	DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER	AC643360W - PAGES 15-16

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR	USA
FROM	CIA
TO	
TITLE	CIA INFORMATION REPORT
DATE	01/04/63
PAGES	2
SUBJECTS	PFUNTNER, JORDAN J. UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA
DOCUMENT TYPE	PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION	UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS	1C
CURRENT STATUS	RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW	09/22/97
OPENING CRITERIA	COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA.
COMMENTS	COORDINATION WITH CIA HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND DETERMINED TO BE RELEASABLE, PER LTR DTD 23 SEP 97.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[redacted] / [redacted]
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/532,860

SUBJECT UNDIMINISHED PRESTIGE OF FIDEL CASTRO IN LATIN AMERICA

DATE DISTR. 4 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. DECEMBER 1962

REFERENCES RD-W-2107

IN 44195

PLACE & DATE ACQ. ENGLAND, LONDON (3 JANUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. OEL-34,413

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL BRITISH SERVICE FROM "A REGULAR SOURCE, QUOTING A YUGOSLAV JOURNALIST WHO RECENTLY TOURED LATIN AMERICA."

1. FIDEL CASTRO HAS LOST LITTLE PRESTIGE AMONG HIS SUPPORTERS IN LATIN AMERICA AS RESULT RECENT CRISIS. IN EYES OF HIS DISCIPLES, THE UNITED STATES FAILED TO EXPLOIT AN OPPORTUNITY TO UNSEAT HIM, AND CASTRO REMAINED IN POWER.

2. LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTIES HAVE BECOME INCREASINGLY DIVIDED BETWEEN VIOLENT AND NON-VIOLENT FACTIONS. THIS CONTROVERSY IS LIKELY TO RESULT IN INDIVIDUAL COMMUNIST PARTIES ADOPTING MORE INDEPENDENT AND FELXIBLE POLICIES. THERE IS A GENERAL TREND AGAINST POLICIES "DICTATED FROM OUTSIDE ."

~~CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO~~
VOTING A
DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR
RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT
AS SANITIZED 9.22.97

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

[redacted] / [redacted]

~~GROUP 1 Exclu... ...classification~~

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	INS
STATE/DIR													FBI			EXO	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 4722

15

[redacted]

0000

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

(15-20)

USAOSD/8354

[redacted]

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted]

TDCS -3/532,860

IN 44195

PAGE 2

3. BRITISH COMMENTS.

A. THE IMPRESSION DESCRIBED IN PARA 1 DOES NOT AGREE ENTIRELY WITH INFORMATION FROM OTHER SOURCES BUT IT IS AN INTERESTING POINT OF VIEW. To WHOM?! British

B. SOURCE SAYS THAT CUBAN EXILES IN VENEZUELA ARE "DISILLUSIONED" OVER THE OUTCOME OF THE CUBAN CRISIS BUT THAT THE DIRECTORIO REVOLUCIONARIO ESTUDIANTIL (DRE, REVOLUTIONARY STUDENT DIRECTORATE) AND ALPHA 66 INTEND TO CONTINUE PROMOTING SMALL-SCALE ATTACKS ON CUBA.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 4722

16

CLASSIFICATION—DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted]

[redacted]

0000

eleased under the John F. Kennedy
ssassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
8613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 07/19/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10400
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 785-787

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : DCSI USCOB BERLIN
TO : OPSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG
TITLE : MESSAGE
DATE : 12/02/67
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

POSSIBLE US ARMY DESERTERS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 785-787 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94.

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
NATIONAL MILITARY COMMAND CENTER
MESSAGE CENTER

465341 54525

DA IN

67355

67353

67353 2316

CALL 53337
FOR NMCC/MC
SERVICE

L05 18162

B041N JCS738/5
VZCZCTEA358
PP RUEPJS
DE RUFPBK 031 3390945
ZNY CCCCC
P 050945Z DEC 67
FM USCINCEUR
INFO DIA DIACI WASH DC
P 021230Z DEC 67
FM DCSI USCOB BERLIN GER
TO DPSI USAREUR HEIDELBERG GER
BT

GP 4
[redacted] YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTE[redacted]

[redacted]10-303-67 FROM: DCSI, USCOB
SGD CARPENTER
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE US DESERTERS (U) #2

1. (C) ON 28 NOVEMBER 1967, WEST BERLIN POLICE ADVISED THAT THE FOLLOWING PERSONS, DESERTERS FROM THE AMERICAN ARMY, WERE POSSIBLY IN WEST BERLIN:

PETER SIMONS
BORN 5 MAY 1943 IN GERMANY
ROMAN ARNOLD
BORN 6 JANUARY 1945, PRESUMABLY IN GERMANY

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR U[illegible]SOCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

2. (C) THIS INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM THE DUSSELDORF POLICE, WHO REQUESTED THAT THE INDIVIDUALS BE TAKEN INTO CUSTODY AND TURNED OVER TO THE AMERICAN MILITARY POLICE. DURING A VISIT IN DUESSELDORF IN LATE OCTOBER, THE TWO MENTIONED THAT THEY WANTED TO GO TO BERLIN TO AN UNIDENTIFIED STUDENT ORGANIZATION. THEY FURTHER STATED THAT THEY DID NOT WANT TO GO TO VIETNAM

3. (C) THIS SAME MESSAGE WAS SENT TO THE FRANKFURT/MAIN POLICE, INASMUCH AS SIMONS HAS A GIRL FRIEND THERE, AND HIS FATHER ALSO RESIDES IN THAT CITY. INSTRUCTIONS TO THE FRANKFURT POLICE WERE THE SAME.

4. (C) ON 1 DECEMBER 1967, THE WEST BERLIN POLICE REPORTED THAT THE TWO MEN HAD BEEN REGISTERED IN THE FRENCH SECTOR SINCE 27 SEPTEMBER 1967 AT FALKENTHALER STEIG 140, C/O DECH, BERLIN-HERMSFDORF. POLICE ARE DEFERRING ANY ACTION IN THAT MATTER.

5. (C) CONFIDENTIAL SOURCES HAVE VERIFED THAT THE TWO MEN HAVE BEEN IN WEST BERLIN ON SEVERAL OCCOASIONS IN OCTOBER AND

ACTION: DIA-15

~~INFO~~ CJCS-1 DJS-3 J1-2 SDEF-7 ASD/ISA-9 ASD/MPR-1 ST-1 CIA-4
CSA-1 CNO-2 CSAF-1 CMC-7 FILE-1(55) ETO/RA

[redacted]

785

[redacted]

NOVEMBER, WITH THEIR EXACT WHEREABOUTS UNKNOWN. THEY HAVE RETAINED ATTORNEY HORST MAHLER TO REPRESNT THEIR INTERESTS. IT APPEARS THAT ARNOLD IS TRYING TO OBTAIN YUGOSLAVIAN CITIZENSHIP. THE STUDENT ORGANIZATION HAS BEEN IDENTIFIED AS THE FREE UNIVERSITY ASTA, OR GENERAL STUDENTS COMMITTEE, THE STUDENT BODY ORGANIZATION. FU STUDENTS HAVE BEEN IDENTIFIED AS ACTIVE IN THE AREA OF OFFERING TO ASSIST LOCAL MILITARY PERSONNEL WHO WISH TO AVOID SERVICE IN VIETNAM BY GOING TO A NEUTRAL COUNTRY.

6. (U) INFORMATION ON DD FORM 553 RECEIVED BY TELEPHONE FROM POLICE DUSSELDORF INDICATES FOLLOWING DATA:

ARNOLD, ROMAN, SP4 E4
RA 16 838 103
SSN; 355-36-1583
SPECIAL PROCESSING DET, HQ USAG TROOPS
FT HOOD, TEXAS
DATE AND LOCATION OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE DUTY: 15 OCT 67,
AF EES, CHICAGO, ILL.
ABSENT AS OF : 21 SEP 67, 0515 HRS
CARRIED AS DESERTER AS OF: 10 OCT 67
MOS: 36 C 20
DOB: 6 JAN 45, POB: GERMANY
SIMONS, PETERK., SP4 E4
RA 19 841 799
SSN: 550-66-6254
SAME UNIT
DATE AND LOCATION OF ENTRY INTO ACTIVE DUTY: 28 APR 65,
US ARMY RMS, LOS ANGELES, CA
ABSENT AS OF: 21 SEP 67, 0515 HRS
CARRIED AS DESERTER AS OF : 10 OCT 67
MOS: 31M 20 (RADIO RELAY OPERATOR)
DOB: 5 MAY 43N POB: COTTBUS, GERMANY

7. (C) ATTEMPTS BEING MADE TO ASCERTAIN IF SIMONS AND ARNOLD ARE IN BERLIN AND TO DEVELOP INFORMATION ON THE PERSONS AND ORGANIZATIONS RENDERING ASSISTANCE TO THESE US ARMY DESERTERS. IT IS NOT KNOWN AT THIS TIME WHETHER SUBJECTS ARE US CITIZENS OR

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

[redacted]

GERMAN NATIONALS. WEST BERLIN POLICE RECORDS INDICATE SIMONS IN POSSESSION OF FRG PASSPORT NR 2616712 AND THAT ARNOLD WAS UNABLE TO PRODUCE ANY IDENTITY DOCUMENTS. GP-4

8. (C) ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND STUDENT DEMONSTRATIONS MAY RESULT WHEN SUBJECTS ARE APPREHENDED. THERE ARE NO LEGAL PROBLEMS SEEN EITHER BY THE SJA, USCOB OR BY USBER. MINISTER HAS BEEN BRIEFED AND USBER IS PROVIDING DETAILS TO U. S. EMBASSY, BONN.

9. (C) UNLESS OTHERWISE DIRECTED BY USAREUR OR US EMBASSY BONN THE FOLLOWING ACTIONS WILL BE TAKEN IF SUBJECTS ARE DETERMINED TO BE IN BERLIN.

A. WEST BERLIN POLICE WILL BE ASKED TO APPREHEND SUBJECTS. US MILITARY POLICE WILL ACCOMPANY THE WEST BERLIN POLICE.

B. SUBJECTS WILL BE APPREHENDED AS QUIETLY AS POSSIBLE AND TAKEN TO BERLIN BRIGADE STOCKADE AND PLACED IN SEPARATE ROOMS.

C. SPECIAL ARRANGEMENTS HAVE BEEN COORDINATED FOR C47 AIRCRAFT STATIONED AT EMPLEHOF TO FLY SUBJECTS TO RHEIN MAIN IMMEDIATELY AFTER APPREHENSION DUE TO POSSIBLE ADVERSE PUBLICITY AND STUDENT REACTIONS.

10. (C) DIRECT COORDINATION WITH MILITARY POLICE AT RHEIN MAIN WILL BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PM BERLIN BRIGADE. HOWEVER, RECOMMEND USAREUR COORDINATE ARRANGEMENTS FOR ONWARD MOVEMENT FROM RHEIN MAIN. GP-4

BT

NNNN

ACTION: DIA(ARMY ACSI)
DA IN 465341

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

787

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10408
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 795-796

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 10/05/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

REPORT OF FINDINGS

POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION

ARNOLD, ROMAN D. S.

FIELD 201 FILE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED

5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(FIELD 201 FILE) On 3 October 1967, the 201 file of Roman D. S. Arnold, Specialist Four (E-4), RA 16 838 103, Wireman's Helper, 49th Signal Platoon, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was procured from the Special Processing Detachment, United States Army Garrison Troops, Fort Hood, and from which the following information was extracted:

Name:	Roman Davor Srecko Arnold
Rank:	Specialist Four (E-4)
ASN:	RA 16 838 103
SSAN:	355 36 1583
DOB:	6 January 1945
POB:	Lindau Bodensee, Germany.
Citizenship:	German
BPED:	14 October 1965
ETS:	13 October 1969
Marital Status:	Single
Religious Preference:	Roman Catholic
Father:	Alfons Arnold; date and place of birth not indicated; presently resides in German Federal Republic, address unknown.
Mother:	Zdenka Miketta; born in Yugoslavia, date and exact location unknown; presently resides at Post Office Box #1644, Willmington, North Carolina. Arnold's DA Form 20 (Enlisted Qualification Record), indicates that his mother is an Alien; Alien Registration Number, date and place of entry within United States unknown.
Physical Profile:	111121B, 15 October 1965
Physical Description:	Age, 22; Sex, Male; Height, 72"; Weight, 135 pounds; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or identifying marks, None indicated.
Civilian Employment:	None indicated
Civilian Education:	Arnold's DD Form 4 (Enlistment Record) indicates 12 years education terminated with High School graduation. His DA Form 20 lists Maine-Township High School, Des Plaines, Illinois, as institution attended with schooling being completed in 1965, exact date unknown.
Aptitude Test Scores:	IN, 86; AE, 100; EL, 111; GM, 107; MM, 107; CL, 107; GT, 87

Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)

795

(continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ASHTON K. DURRETT, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES W[redacted]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT: Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED: 5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER:

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (201 File continued)

Military Education:	Rad Rel & Carr Attnd, 31M20, Sig C, 12 weeks during 1966, exact dates not given.
Record of Non-Judicial Punishment:	None indicated
Record of Courts Martial:	None indicated
DD Form 98:	Executed 15 October 1965, without qualification.
DD Form 398:	Arnold's 201 file did not contain a DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History).
DA Form 873:	None
DA Form 2545:	None
Security Clearance:	None
Civilian Foreign Travel:	None indicated other than residence of 48 months in Germany, ending in 1949.
Foreign Service:	19 March 1966 - 27 January 1967, USAREUR (Germany)
Promotions/Reductions:	PVT, E-1(P), 15 October 1965, AR 601-210 PVT, E-2(P), 15 January 1966, Para 7-19a, AR 600-200 PFC, E-3(P), 23 June 1966, UO#59, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn 1966 SP4, E-4(T), 20 August 1967, Para 4, SO#42, Hqs, 198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex 67
Chronology of Military Service:	15 October 1965, USA Rec Sta, Ft Knox, Ky 22 October 1965 - 1 January 1966, E Co, 3d Bn, 1st Bde, USATCI, Ft Benning, Ga 1 January 1966 - 23 March 1966, Stu Co, XUSASESCS, Ft Gordon, Ga 23 March 1966 - 23 May 1966, Btry C, 5th Msl Bn, 6th Arty, USAREUR 23 May 1966 - 6 March 1967, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn, USAREUR 6 March 1967 - 19 May 1967, Co C, 141st Sig Bn, 1st Armd Div, Ft Hood, Tex 19 May 1967 - present, 49th Sig Platoon, 198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex
Remarks:	The absence of a DD Form 398 from Arnold's 201 file limited the quanity of information which could be obtained for each item listed above. His 201 file did not reflect any action taken to conduct a background investigation on this individual.

796

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT: ASHTON K. DURRETT, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT:

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10409
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 797-799

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : **AGENT REPORT**
DATE : 10/05/67
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

REPORT OF FINDINGS

POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION

SIMONS, PETER K.

FIELD 201 FILE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[redacted]ICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED

5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(FIELD 201 FILE) On 5 October 1967, the 201 File of Peter K. Simons, Specialist 4, RA 19 841 799, was examined and revealed substantially the following information:

Name:	Peter Karl Simons
Rank:	Specialist 4 (E4)
Service Number:	RA 19 841 799
SSAN:	550-66-6254
DOB:	5 May 1943
POB:	Cottbus, Germany
Citizenship:	German, Alien Registration Number, A 13 022 527; Date of entry, 8 August 1962; Port of entry, New York, New York.
BPED:	28 April 1965
ETS:	27 April 1968
Marital Status:	Single
Religious Preference:	Roman Catholic
Father:	Karl-Heinz Simons; POB: Saarland, Germany, DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Unknown.
Mother:	Agnes Fries; POB: Essen, Germany, DOB: 17 September 1920; Present Address: Cheruskerstr 49, Duesseldorf, W. Germany.
Step-Father:	Richard Westlake; POB: Unknown; DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Weston-Super-Mare, Somerset, England.
Physical Profile:	PULHES 111 121, Code B, 28 August 1965
Physical Description:	Age, 24; Sex, Male; Height, 73"; Weight, 178#; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or marks, None.
Civilian Education:	55-59, Martin-Buteer; Dierdorf, W. Germany, Graduated; 59-62, Dierdorf Handesischule, Duesseldorf, Germany, Graduated.
Civilian Employment:	Apr 59-Apr 62, Deurogmbh, Berliner Alee 29, Duesseldorf, Germany; Supervisor, Mr Grosskopf, Reason left (RL), immigrate to US; Apr 62-Jul 64, Air-Sea Forwarders Inc, 406 S. Main St., Los Angeles, California, Supervisor, Mr Rautenberg, RL, Better future; Jul-Sep 64, Liberty Engineering Co., Culver City, Calif., Supervisor, Mr. Kilmer, RL, quit; Sep-Oct 64, Sightseeing in New York; Oct 64-Apr 65, Harper-Robinson & Co., 354 S. Spring St., Los Angeles, Supervisor, Mr Caranea, RL, Joined Army; Apr 65 to present, US Army.
Aptitude Test Scores:	IN, 111; AE, 103; EL, 103; GM, 102; MM, 115, CL, 123; GT, 106.

Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)

797

(CONTINUED)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

William F. Mockler

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FO[redacted]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED

5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (FIELD 201 FILE) (Continued)

Military Education:	Rad Rel Carr Attend, MOS 31M20, Signal Corps, 12 weeks, 1965
Record of Non-Judicial Punishment:	None
Record of Courts Martial:	None
DD Form 398:	Executed, unqualified dated 1 October 1965
DD Form 98:	Executed, unqualified dated 28 April 1965
Security Clearance:	None; Background investigation requested by the ACofS, G2, Fort Gordon, Georgia, on 4 October 1965, UP AR 614-280 for retention of Simons in Military Service
Civilian Foreign Travel:	53 to 54, Great Britain, Schooling; Apr 56 to Aug 56, Great Britain, Schooling; Aug 57 to Sep 57, Italy, Vacation; Jul 61 to Sep 61, France, Vacation; Simons has also been in the following countries for sight seeing purposes from 1957 to 1965, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Mexico, Holland, Luxemburg, France, and Spain
Foreign Service:	14 Nov 65 to 27 Nov 66, USAREUR Germany
Promotions/Reductions:	PVT E1 (P) 8 Apr 65 AR 601-210 PVT E2 (P) 28 Aug 65 Par 7-19 AR 600-200 PFC E3 (P) 4 Jan 66 Par 1 UO#4, Co B, 32d Sig Bn APO 757 SP4 E4 (T) UO#32, Co B, 32dSig Bn, APO 09757
Chronology of Military Service:	28 Apr 65 USARECSTA (4075) FT POLK LA 10 May 65 CoE1Bn2TngBDE Ft Polk La 17 Jul 65 StuCoS USASESCS Ft Gordon, GA 16 Nov 65 CoB 32dSigBn APO 09757 25 Nov 65 Enroute to Conus 9 Jan 67 CoC 141stSigBn 1st AD Ft Hood, Tex 8 Jun 67 49thSigPlatoon, 198thInfBde, FtHd, Tex

Remarks Remarks:

1. Simons identification card reported lost to Provost Marshal, 17 August 1967, issued new identification card.

2. Special Order Number 31, Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, dated 19 August 1967, authorized ordinary leave for Simons effective 1 September 1967, for 20 days. Leave address: Oberlindau 89. Frankfurt-Main, Germany. Special Instruction: EM will report to the Army attache at the American Embassy, or to the Commander of the USA Element, as appropriate.

3. Simons enlisted under the Buddy Assignment Plan, with one Michael C. Morgan, RA 19 841 794, for further assignment to USAREUR.

Protective Marking is Excluded From 798 (CONTINUED)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT (Par 13, AR 345-15)

WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501stMI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

William F. Mockler

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 42, WHICH MAY BE USED. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT Possible Sensitive Desertion	2. DATE SUBMITTED 5 October 1967
	3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (FIELD 201 FILE) (Continued)

4. Simons drew advance pay of $360, 16 Aug 67, to be repaid at $60 a month for six months.

Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)

799

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT William F. Mockler

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD [redacted]

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10452
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 894

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 11/28/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

POTENTIAL US ARMY DEFECTOR TO THE USSR

REPORT OF FINDINGS

LOCAL AGENCY CHECK

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

F[redacted] ONLY [redacted]

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

es

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

POTENTIAL US ARMY DEFECTOR TO THE USSR

2. DATE SUBMITTED

28 November 1966

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(LOCAL AGENCY) On 28 November 1966, George Bombel, Captain, 0-5707877, social security number 527-48-5002, Commanding Officer, Company T, US Army Signal Center and School (USASCS), Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, checked the unit's Morning Report and the Personnel Register (DA Form 647) to determine if Virgilio Capino, Private E-1, RA 10124363, Company T, was on leave, pass, or absent from Company T for the period 19 through and including 23 October 1966. The records revealed that Capino was present for duty during this period.

Bombel explained that Company T is a student company and its personnel are considered the transient type; consequently, Bombel had no personal knowledge regarding Capino.

[redacted]

DC[redacted]

894

[redacted]

[redacted]

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ANDREW V. JACOBS, 108th MI GROUP (II)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

/s/ Andrew V. Jacobs

DA FORM 1 APR 52 **341** REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 07/22/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10471
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 913-914

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : DURRETT, MILTON K. [R]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 10/05/67
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

REPORT OF FINDINGS

FIELD 201 FILE CHECK

ARNOLD, ROMAN DAVOR SRECKO

POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 913-914 ARE DUPLICATE COPIES OF PAGES 795-796.

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED

5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(FIELD 201 FILE) On 3 October 1967, the 201 file of Roman D. S. Arnold, Specialist Four (E-4), RA 16 836 103, Wireman's Helper, 49th Signal Platoon, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, Texas, was procured from the Special Processing Detachment, United States Army Garrison Troops, Fort Hood, and from which the following information was extracted:

Name: Roman Davor Srecko Arnold
Rank: Specialist Four (E-4)
ASN: RA 16 838 103
SSAN: 355 36 1583
DOB: 6 January 1945
POB: Lindau Bodensee, Germany
Citizenship: German
BPED: 14 October 1965
ETS: 13 October 1969
Marital Status: Single
Religious Preference: Roman Catholic
Father: Alfons Arnold; date and place of birth not indicated; presently resides in German Federal Republic, address unknown.
Mother: Zdenka Miketta; born in Yugoslavia, date and exact location unknown; presently resides at Post Office Box #1644, Willmington, North Carolina. Arnold's DA Form 20 (Enlisted Qualification Record), indicates that his mother is an Alien; Alien Registration Number, date and place of entry within United States unknown.
Physical Profile: 111121B, 15 October 1965
Physical Description: Age, 22; Sex, Male; Height, 72"; Weight, 135 pounds; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or identifying marks, None indicated.
Civilian Employment: None indicated
Civilian Education: Arnold's DD Form 4 (Enlistment Record) indicates 12 years education terminated with High School graduation. His DA Form 20 lists Maine-Township High School, Des Plaines, Illinois, as institution attended with schooling being completed in 1965, exact date unknown.
Aptitude Test Scores: IN, 86; AE, 100; EL, 111; GM, 107; MM, 107; CL, 107; GT, 87

913

Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)

(continued)

TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

HTON K. DURRETT, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT
(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED

5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (201 File continued)

Military Education:	Rad Rel & Carr Attnd, 31M20, Sig C, 12 weeks during 1966, exact dates not given.
Record of Non-Judicial Punishment:	None indicated
Record of Courts Martial:	None indicated
DD Form 98:	Executed 15 October 1965, without qualification.
DD Form 398:	Arnold's 201 file did not contain a DD Form 398 (Statement of Personal History).
DA Form 873:	None
DA Form 2545:	None
Security Clearance:	None
Civilian Foreign Travel:	None indicated other than residence of 48 months in Germany, ending in 1949.
Foreign Service:	19 March 1966 - 27 January 1967, USAREUR (Germany)
Promotions/Reductions:	PVT, E-1(P), 15 October 1965, AR 601-210 PVT, E-2(P), 15 January 1966, Para 7-19a, AR 600-200 PFC, E-3(P), 23 June 1966, UO#59, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn 1966 SP4, E-4(T), 20 August 1967, Para 4, SO#42, Hqs, 198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex 67
Chronology of Military Service:	15 October 1965, USA Rec Sta, Ft Knox, Ky 22 October 1965 - 1 January 1966, E Co, 3d Bn, 1st Bde, USATCI, Ft Benning, Ga 1 January 1966 - 23 March 1966, Stu Co, XUSASESCS, Ft Gordon, Ga 23 March 1966 - 23 May 1966, Btry C, 5th Msl Bn, 6th Arty, USAREUR 23 May 1966 - 6 March 1967, Co B, 7th USA Sig Spt Bn, USAREUR 6 March 1967 - 19 May 1967, Co C, 141st Sig Bn, 1st Armd Div, Ft Hood, Tex 19 May 1967 - present, 49th Sig Platoon, 198th Inf Bde, Ft Hood, Tex
Remarks:	The absence of a DD Form 398 from Arnold's 201 file limited the quanity of information which could be obtained for each item listed above. His 201 file did not reflect any action taken to conduct a background investigation on this individual.

914

PED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

ON K. DURRETT, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 07/22/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10472
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 915-917

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 10/05/67
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

REPORT OF FINDINGS

FIELD 201 FILE CHECK

POSSIBLE SENSITIVE DESERTION

SIMONS, PETER KARL

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 915-917 ARE DUPLICATE COPIES OF PAGES 797-799.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED

5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

(FIELD 201 FILE) On 5 October 1967, the 201 File of Peter K. Simons, Specialist 4, RA 19 841 799, was examined and revealed substantially the following information:

Name: Peter Karl Simons
Rank: Specialist 4 (E4)
Service Number: RA 19 841 799
SSAN: 550-66-6254
DOB: 5 May 1943
POB: Cottbus, Germany
Citizenship: German, Alien Registration Number, A 13 022 527; Date of entry, 8 August 1962; Port of entry, New York, New York.
BPED: 28 April 1965
ETS: 27 April 1968
Marital Status: Single
Religious Preference: Roman Catholic
Father: Karl-Heinz Simons; POB: Saarland, Germany, DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Unknown.
Mother: Agnes Fries; POB: Essen, Germany, DOB: 17 September 1920; Present Address: Cheruskerstr 49, Duesseldorf, W. Germany.
Step-Father: Richard Westlake; POB: Unknown; DOB: Unknown; Present Address: Weston-Super-Mare, Somerset, England.
Physical Profile: PULHES 111 121, Code B, 28 August 1965
Physical Description: Age, 24; Sex, Male; Height, 73"; Weight, 178#; Hair, Brown; Eyes, Brown; Scars or marks, None.
Civilian Education: 55-59, Martin-Buteer; Dierdorf, W. Germany, Graduated; 59-62, Dierdorf Handesischule, Duesseldorf, Germany, Graduated.
Civilian Employment: Apr 59-Apr 62, Deurogmbh, Berliner Alee 29, Duesseldorf, Germany; Supervisor, Mr Grosskopf, Reason left (RL), immigrate to US; Apr 62-Jul 64, Air-Sea Forwarders Inc, 406 S. Main St., Los Angeles, California, Supervisor, Mr Rautenberg, RL, Better future; Jul-Sep 64, Liberty Engineering Co., Culver City, Calif., Supervisor, Mr. Kilmer, RL, quit; Sep-Oct 64, Sightseeing in New York; Oct 64-Apr 65, Harper-Robinson & Co., 354 S. Spring St., Los Angeles, Supervisor, Mr Caranea, RL, Joined Army; Apr 65 to present, US Army.
Aptitude Test Scores: IN, 111; AE, 103; EL, 103; GM, 102; MM, 115, CL, 123; GT, 106.

915

Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)

(CONTINUED)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

William F. Mockler

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED
5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (FIELD 201 FILE) (Continued)

Military Education:	Rad Rel Carr Attend, MOS 31M20, Signal Corps, 12 weeks, 1965
Record of Non-Judicial Punishment:	None
Record of Courts Martial:	None
DD Form 398:	Executed, unqualified dated 1 October 1965
DD Form 98:	Executed, unqualified dated 28 April 1965
Security Clearance:	None; Background investigation requested by the ACofS, G2, Fort Gordon, Georgia, on 4 October 1965, UP AR 614-280 for retention of Simons in Military Service
Civilian Foreign Travel:	53 to 54, Great Britain, Schooling; Apr 56 to Aug 56, Great Britain, Schooling; Aug 57 to Sep 57, Italy, Vacation; Jul 61 to Sep 61, France, Vacation; Simons has also been in the following countries for sight seeing purposes from 1957 to 1965, Denmark, Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Mexico, Holland, Luxemburg, France, and Spain
Foreign Service:	14 Nov 65 to 27 Nov 66, USAREUR Germany
Promotions/Reductions:	PVT E1 (P) 8 Apr 65 AR 601-210
	PVT E2 (P) 28 Aug 65 Par 7-19 AR 600-200
	PFC E3 (P) 4 Jan 66 Par 1 UO#4, Co B, 32d Sig Bn APO 757
	SP4 E4 (T) UO#32, Co B, 32dSig Bn, APO 09757
Chronology of Military Service:	28 Apr 65 USARECSTA (4075) FT POLK LA
	10 May 65 CoElBn2TngBDE Ft Polk La
	17 Jul 65 StuCoS USASESCS Ft Gordon, GA
	16 Nov 65 CoB 32dSigBn APO 09757
	25 Nov 65 Enroute to Conus
	9 Jan 67 CoC 141stSigBn 1st AD Ft Hood, Tex
	8 Jun 67 49thSigPlatoon, 198thInfBde, FtHd, Tex

Remarks Remarks:

1. Simons identification card reported lost to Provost Marshal, 17 August 1967, issued new identification card.

2. Special Order Number 31, Headquarters, 198th Infantry Brigade, Fort Hood, dated 19 August 1967, authorized ordinary leave for Simons effective 1 September 1967, for 20 days. Leave address: Oberlindau 89. Frankfurt-Main, Germany. Special Instruction: EM will report to the Army attache at the American Embassy, or to the Commander of the USA Element, as appropriate.

3. Simons enlisted under the Buddy Assignment Plan, with one Michael C. Morgan, RA 19 841 794, for further assignment to USAREUR.

Protective Marking is Excluded From (Para 19, AR 345-15)

916

(CONTINUED)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501stMI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
William F. Mockler

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ON

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT
Possible Sensitive Desertion

2. DATE SUBMITTED
5 October 1967

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS (FIELD 201 FILE) (Continued)

4. Simons drew advance pay of $360, 16 Aug 67, to be repaid at $60 a month for six months.

Protective Marking is Excluded From Automatic Termination (Par 19, AR 345-15)

917

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
WILLIAM F. MOCKLER, 501st MI Det (Armd Div)

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
William F. Mockler

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10012-10477
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 935

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK
DATE : 07/00/66
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

FAMILY HISTORY

RESIDENCES

EMPLOYMENT

CIVILIAN SCHOOL

DOWLING, JOHN JOSEPH

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

Ft Holabird Md

US ARMY REQUEST FOR NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK

(AR 381-130)

1. DATE OF REQUEST
28 Jul 66

2. CONTROL OFFICE:

3. LAST NAME - FIRST NAME - MIDDLE NAME - ALIAS(ES) - NICKNAMES - CHANGED NAME DOWLING JOHN JOSEPH		4. SOCIAL SECURITY NO. 560 68 6542
5. DAY, MONTH, YEAR OF BIRTH 25 Oct 48	6. PLACE OF BIRTH Oakland, Calif	7. SERVICE NUMBER RA 18 776 105

05

8. RELATIVE'S NAMES	9. DATE AND PLACE OF BIRTH	10. PRESENT ADDRESS	11. CITIZENSHI
a. FATHER DOWLING JOHN J.	Waterbury, Conn	3016 Murray Ridge Rd San Diego, Calif	U.S.
b. MOTHER *(maiden name)* COLLINS, FRANCES T.	UNK	3016 Murray Ridge Rd San Diego, Calif	U.S.
c. SPOUSE *(maiden name)*			

12. RESIDENCES *(List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)*

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NUMBER AND STREET	d. CITY	e. STATE
1952	1966	3016 Murray Ridge Rd	San Diego	Calif

13. EMPLOYMENT *(List all from 16th birthday or during last 15 years, whichever is shorter)*

a. FROM	b. TO	c. EMPLOYER	d. PLACE
-66	3-66	Bill Burgers Drive-in	Linda Vista
-66	7-66	Car wash	

14. LAST CIVILIAN SCHOOL

a. FROM	b. TO	c. NAME	d. PLACE
9-63	6-66	Kearny	

YES	NO	15. ITEM *("Yes" answers are expanded in Remarks)*
	X	a. IS THE SUBJECT AN ALIEN OR A NATURALIZED CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES?
	X	b. ANY FOREIGN CONNECTIONS, INTERESTS, EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
	X	c. ANY FOREIGN TRAVEL OTHER THAN FOR THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT?
	X	d. EMPLOYMENT BY A FIRM HAVING A CLASSIFIED US GOVERNMENT CONTRACT?
	X	e. FORMER US GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT OR MILITARY SERVICE?
	X	f. ANY QUALIFICATION OF DD FORM 398 OR DD FORM 98?
X		g. ANY ARREST OR COURT RECORD?

16. REMARKS *(If additional space is needed, continue on plain paper)*

Failure to Identify Feb 66 FEAD
Drunk in Public Jun 66 FEAD
Disturbing Peace Dec 65 FEA

A1

Check of FBI investigative files based upon data submitted located no identifiable information pertinent to your inquiry. Not to be considered as a clearance. To check arrest records request must be submitted to FBI Identification Division. Fingerprints are necessary for [illegible] check.

17. CONTROL OFFICE USE

18. FROM:
Ac of S, G2
Ft Ord, Calif

115th

19 THRU:

FINGERPRINT CARD FD 258 MUST BE ATTACHED

DA FORM 1 AUG 65 3027 REPLACES DA FORM 340, 1 DEC 58, WHICH IS OBSOLETE

935

30 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10005
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 959-960

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 01/24/68
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

DEFECTOR

GRIGGS, KENNETH C.

[RESTRICTED]

INTERVIEW

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 959-960 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94.
EXHIBITS I THRU IV INDEXED SEPARATELY.

CONFIDENTIAL

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT GRIGGS, Kenneth C. PFC, RA 19 772 378 (C) DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea	2. DATE SUBMITTED 24 January 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8008-9182 SSAN: 519-46- 94

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 Sep 94 BY CDR USAINSCOM FOI/PO AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

On 23 January 1968, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, retired dairyman, residing at 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, was interviewed at his home concerning letters received in reference to his adopted son, Kenneth C. GRIGGS, and stated substantially as follows:

Source stated that he had received two letters concerning SUBJECT from a Philip LaChapelle Jr, 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois, who claimed to have been the Security and Intelligence clerk with the 191st Ordinance Battalion, Vietnam, but was presently out of the US Army. LaChapelle, in his first letter dated 8 November 1967, indicated to Source that being SUBJECT's closest friend in Vietnam, he felt that he should write to Source giving some history and facts concerning the period prior to SUBJECT's defection. LaChapelle indicated sympathy and concern over SUBJECT's defection. LaChapelle stated that he believed the Army had suppressed information to cover up mistakes. LaChapelle told Source about SUBJECT being beaten and shunned by HIS companions during HIS assignment with the 191st Ordinance Battalion and that he was SUBJECT's only friend. LaChapelle stated that he had also written to SUBJECT, but had received no answer. Copy of letter written by LaChapelle dated 8 November 1967 is attached as EXHIBIT I. On 16 November 1967, Source answered the letter of 8 November 1967 thanking LaChapelle for the communication. Source indicated that he had very little knowledge of SUBJECT's philosophy or plans and requested further information from LaChapelle since he was apparently more knowledgeable concerning these aspects. Source asked four specific questions of LaChapelle. First asking about SUBJECT's view of the world, as known by LaChapelle. Secondly asking LaChapelle's view on why SUBJECT felt that HIS conscience dictated decision was a solution to any problems that HE envisioned. Thirdly was SUBJECT encouraged by a third party to defect and the last question was whether SUBJECT's defection was motivated by resentment about HIS treatment by other Army personnel. Source indicated that LaChapelle's tone in his letter indicated a certain feeling of bitterness about the way the incident was handled by the US Army. Source requested a reply because the information would be of interest to Source. Copy of letter by Source dated 16 November 1967 is attached as EXHIBIT II. LaChapelle again wrote to Source on 20 November 1967, indicating interest in the letter written by Source on 16 November 1967. LaChapelle stated that he was bitter because the Army took no remedial action concerning the mental state of SUBJECT, and indicated to Source that SUBJECT had a medical history of emotional disturbance. LaChapelle stated that he had been the Security and Intelligence Clerk, 191st Ordinance Battalion, Vietnam, and SUBJECT's personnel records had passed over his desk after the defection. LaChapelle indicated that the records had been classified to conceal any embarrassing incidents. LaChapelle commented on the National Security in reference to the classification of SUBJECT's records. LaChapelle indicated that SUBJECT's view of the world was that HE was simply bitter and thought it was going in the wrong direction. LaChapelle

959

(continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT FLOYD R. BEERY, 115th MI Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Floyd R. Beery

GROUP (4)
DOWNGRADED AT
NOT AUTOMATI
DOD

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

AGENT REPORT

(AR 381-130; FM 30-17)

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT GRIGGS, Kenneth C. PFC, RA 19 772 378 DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea	2. DATE SUBMITTED 24 January 1968 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER 8008-9182 SSAN: 519-46-7994

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

stated that SUBJECT favored an absolute state of control as long as HE was one of the ruling class. LaChapelle stated that SUBJECT's defection was the truest decision HE could make thus making the only solution HIS conscience dictated. LaChapelle stated that SUBJECT was not encouraged by a third party to defect except maybe the world around HIM. LaChapelle stated that only three people other than himself who were in any way friendly were Chaplain Camp, presently in Germany, Hal Nelson, and John Klink. They would not encourage a defection. SUBJECT would not let HIMSELF be influenced by others. LaChapelle went on saying that SUBJECT's defection was motivated by HIS resentment of HIS treatment by other personnel, indicating that HE had been beaten and required stitches in HIS head on one occasion and that HE was considered different by HIS section leaders. SUBJECT had mentioned defection to LaChapelle, but LaChapelle had talked HIM out of it. At that point in their relationship, the friendship between LaChapelle and SUBJECT seemed to decline. LaChapelle blames the Army and society for forcing SUBJECT to defect. LaChapelle requested any information or photographs of SUBJECT because LaChapelle intends to be a writer and wants to write about SUBJECT and HIS problems. A copy of letter dated 20 November 1967, written by LaChapelle is attached as EXHIBIT III. On 24 November 1967, Source answered the letter of 20 November 1967, stating that at first he was apprehensive and wondered how much LaChapelle was involved with SUBJECT. Source commented that he could offer very little concerning SUBJECT for LaChapelle to use in his writing. Source stated that SUBJECT's mental problems started before HIS entry into the US Army and that LaChapelle should take a more kindly view of the people who comprise society. Source gave LaChapelle a short history of SUBJECT from the time HE came to the United States in 1956 to the time HE was placed in the Childrens Home, Boise. During this period, SUBJECT would not stay with any one thing for very long, such as scouts, sports, and physical activities. HE became angry very easily. SUBJECT was intelligent in school. From the time HE was placed in the Childrens Home until HE entered the US Army, SUBJECT had a history of running away and was never satisfied being in the same place for very long. SUBJECT finished high school and entered the military service. Source stated his desire to again hear from LaChapelle. A copy of letter dated 24 November 1967, written by Source is attached as EXHIBIT IV.

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Source stated that he had not received any other correspondence concerning SUBJECT. Neither Source nor his family have heard from SUBJECT or any official of the Cuban Embassy in Japan. Source further stated that he had no information concerning SUBJECT's present whereabouts or HIS future plans. Source stated that he would advise this office in the event he received other letters or information pertaining to SUBJECT.

AGENT'S NOTES: Source was very cooperative. He had original letters written by LaChapelle and carbon copies of his replies, which Source allowed this office to copy

960

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT FLOYD R. BEERY, 115th MI Group (DV)	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Floyd R Beery

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10006
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 961

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
DATE : 01/24/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY PHILIP LACHAPELLE JR.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C.
PFC, RA 19 772 378
DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea

File Number: 8008-9182
519-46-7994

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)

Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968

Description: Copy of letter dated 8 November 1967 written by Philip LaChapelle Jr., 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois, to SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho.

EXHIBIT I

961

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10009
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 965

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
DATE : 01/24/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CECIL L. GRIGGS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C.
PFC, RA 19 772 378
DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea

File Number: 8008-9182
519-46-7994

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)

Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968

Description: Copy of letter dated 16 November 1967 written by SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, to Philip LaChapelle, 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois.

EXHIBIT II

Date : 07/23/96
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10011
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W PAGE 968

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
DATE : 01/24/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY PHILIP LACHAPELLE JR.

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C.
PFC, RA 19 772 378
DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea

File Number: 8008-9182
519-46-7994

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)

Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968

Description: Copy of letter dated 20 November 1967 written by Philip LaChapelle Jr, 1724 Linder, Chicago, Illinois, to SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho.

EXHIBIT 71

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 07/22/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10013
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W PAGE 973

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : EXHIBIT COVER SHEET
DATE : 01/24/68
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

COPY OF LETTER WRITTEN BY CECIL L. GRIGGS

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : LETTER INDEXED SEPARATELY.

EXHIBIT COVER SHEET

Subject: GRIGGS, Kenneth C.
PFC, RA 19 772 378
DPOB: 25 December 1946, Korea

File Number: 8008-9182
519-46-7994

Preparing Unit: 115th MI Group (IV)

Agent Report Dated: 24 January 1968

Description: Copy of letter dated 24 November 1967 written by SUBJECT's adopted father, Mr. Cecil L. Griggs, 2615 North 30th Street, Boise, Idaho, to Philip LaChapelle Jr, 1724 North Linder, Chicago, Illinois.

EXHIBIT IV

973

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

Date : 07/25/96
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10139
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGE 1179

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 10/04/82
PAGES : 1
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY

GLAISTER, HENRY D.

SWORN STATEMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : SWORN STATEMENT INDEXED SEPARATELY.

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT WHITE, Joseph Timothy PFC, 492-60-2196 DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO	2. DATE SUBMITTED 4 October 1982 3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED TO SUBJECT

On 3 October 1982, Henry D. Glaister, CPT, Field Artillery, 547-76-1040, United States Army, was re-contacted at his home at 812 Maplewood Drive, Columbia, Missouri 65201, for the purpose of obtaining his written permission for release of Agent Report (AR), DA Form 341, dated 22 September 1982, concerning Joseph T. WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196. CPT Glaister reviewed AR prepared from his personal interview on 16 September 1982, (EXHIBIT________) and executed a Sworn Statement, DA Form 2823, dated 3 October 1982, (EXHIBIT________) giving his written permission to release the AR, in full, to Norval (NMN) White Jr., father of Joseph Timothy WHITE.

1179

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group	6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10140
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 1180-1182 AND 1185-1187

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : [RESTRICTED]
TO :
TITLE : AGENT REPORT
DATE : 09/22/82
PAGES : 6
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY

[RESTRICTED]

INTERVIEW

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

WHITE, Joseph Timothy
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 September 1982

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED TO SUBJECT

On 16 September 1982, Henry D. Glaister, Captain, 547-76-1040, United States Army, was interviewed in his home at 812 Maplewood Drive, Columbia, Missouri 65201, concerning Joseph T. WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196. Source, SUBJECT'S former Military Science instructor from August 1980 to May 1981, at Kemper Military School and College (KMSC), Boonville, Missouri 65233, stated in substance as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in August 1980, when SUBJECT enrolled at KMSC. From August 1980 to May 1981, Source had contact with SUBJECT three times weekly for a one hour class, and twice monthly for weekend leadership classes. Also during this period, Source counseled SUBJECT on three occasions concerning SUBJECT'S academic performance. From June 1981 to July 1981, Source, acting as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advance Summer Camp (ASC) Liaison Officer for KMSC at Fort Riley, Kansas, had contact with SUBJECT on three separate occasions about SUBJECT'S performance in ASC. Source last met SUBJECT in September 1981, when SUBJECT enrolled for 1981/82 school year at KMSC. Source has had no contact with SUBJECT since September 1981 when HE departed KMSC.

SUBJECT was born in St Louis, Missouri, where HIS family still maintains their residence. SUBJECT'S father worked for an automobile company in Saint Louis, Missouri, (NFI). Source could provide no further information regarding SUBJECT'S family background, past employments, prior residences or education. SUBJECT had no close associates.

SUBJECT was a member of Source's Military Science class from August 1980 to May 1981. SUBJECT was a good student and did well on the course tests. Source had no disciplinary problems with SUBJECT but Source counseled SUBJECT on three occasions to improve HIS leadership skills. During a counseling session in approximately November 1980, SUBJECT told Source that HE was having financial difficulty in meeting HIS school expenses. SUBJECT further stated that HE was concerned with the financial assistance being provided by HIS parents as being a financial burden to the family. In approximately January 1981, Source assisted SUBJECT in entering the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) to assist HIM financially. In the SMP, SUBJECT was required to train with the Missouri National Guard (MNG), Marshall, Missouri, once a month and received $88 for HIS duty time. From June 1981 to July 1981, SUBJECT attended

PROTECTIVE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTOMATIC TERMINATION
(Para 13, AR 340-16)

(continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

1180

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

INCL (1)

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

WHITE, Joseph Timothy
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 September 1982

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

ROTC ASC at Fort Riley, Kansas. In July 1981, while Source was assigned as an Individual Tactical Training (ITT) instructor at Fort Riley, Kansas, he received performance evaluations from SUBJECT'S peers and cadre personnel describing SUBJECT as immature and unable to interact with HIS peers. As a result of these reports, SUBJECT was required to appear before an administrative review board. The review board was to decide if SUBJECT was to be given credit for completing ASC. Source, acting as defense representative for SUBJECT, submitted testimony to the board that SUBJECT should be granted credit for ASC. Source could not recall any specific statements other than saying SUBJECT was immature but should be given the benefit of the doubt and be granted credit for completing ASC. The board ruled that SUBJECT would be given credit for ASC. Upon completion of ASC, SUBJECT was to report for Annual Training (AT) with C Battery, 128th Field Artillery Battalion, MNG, Marshall, Missouri. When SUBJECT returned to KMSC approximately 15 September 1981, HE told Source that HE had failed to attend HIS AT, (NFI). SUBJECT further stated HE had attended airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, from August 1981 to September 1981, (NFI). In September 1981, SUBJECT'S financial trouble led to HIS disenrollment from KMSC, which subsequently led to SUBJECT being disenrolled from the ROTC program, (NFI).

In approximately February 1981, Source was informed by Thomas McCarthy, Professor, KMSC, that SUBJECT and McCarthy debated the benefits of National Socialism (Nazism) during McCarthy's American Government class. SUBJECT'S support for Nazism enraged the other students and further widened the gap with SUBJECT'S peers, (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States, but, because of HIS beliefs on Nazism and Communism, HE was branded "Anti-US" by HIS peers. Source, personally could not recall any occasions in which SUBJECT specifically denounced the United States Government. In approximately May 1981, Booker T. Washington, SUBJECT'S former Cadet Commanding Officer, A Company, KMSC, told Source that he was having trouble with SUBJECT. Washington related that because of SUBJECT'S beliefs in Nazism, and HIS "superior" attitude over HIS peers, HE was alienating HIS peers against HIM. Washington related further that SUBJECT had gone AWOL overnight in approximately April 1981 to attend a debate between the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and a representative of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The debate was held in Columbia, Missouri. Washington also advised Source that SUBJECT had National Socialist reading material in HIS barracks room, (NFI). Source did not know Washington's present address, only that Washington may be in the Berkley or Oakland, California area, (NFI).

Source believed SUBJECT was mentally stable, but emotionally immature.

(continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

1181

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C): AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

WHITE, Joseph Timothy
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 September 1982

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Source believed SUBJECT felt HIS peers were against HIM because of HIS "rightist" views and therefore, HE would not interact with them. SUBJECT also believed in the "Nietzsche Philosophy" of superior beings and that HE was one of the "Chosen Few", (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States because SUBJECT never made any disloyal statements in his presence. Source provided no information regarding SUBJECT'S use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or adverse involvements with law enforcement agencies. SUBJECT was of high moral character and integrity.

Source was willing to provide a sworn statement and appear before any court or administrative hearing which may arise concerning SUBJECT.

AGENT'S NOTES: Source was shown a copy of message, DTG 082200Z, SEP 82, SUBJECT: WHITE, Joseph Timothy, PFC, 492-60-2196, DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO (U), and was asked to review the message and to comment about what areas could be attributed to SUBJECT. Source replied that the message did contain areas attributable to SUBJECT. The following statements were identified by Source:

A. "...My deep conviction."

B. "...U.S. troops were being sent to South Korea to 'protect' South Korea from 'aggression' from the North."

C. "...People like me have no hope in the United States after being discharged from the Army."

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

1182

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

WHITE, Joseph Timothy
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 September 1982

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO HIS IDENTITY BEING RELEASED TO SUBJECT

On 16 September 1982, Henry D. Glaister, Captain, 547-76-1040, United States Army, was interviewed in his home at 812 Maplewood Drive, Columbia, Missouri 65201, concerning Joseph T. WHITE, PFC, 492-60-2196. Source, SUBJECT'S former Military Science instructor from August 1980 to May 1981, at Kemper Military School and College (KMSC), Boonville, Missouri 65233, stated in substance as follows:

Source first met SUBJECT in August 1980, when SUBJECT enrolled at KMSC. From August 1980 to May 1981, Source had contact with SUBJECT three times weekly for a one hour class,and twice monthly for weekend leadership classes. Also during this period, Source counseled SUBJECT on three occasions concerning SUBJECT'S academic performance. From June 1981 to July 1981, Source, acting as the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) Advance Summer Camp (ASC) Liaison Officer for KMSC at Fort Riley, Kansas, had contact with SUBJECT on three separate occasions about SUBJECT'S performance in ASC. Source last met SUBJECT in September 1981, when SUBJECT enrolled for 1981/82 school year at KMSC. Source has had no contact with SUBJECT since September 1981 when HE departed KMSC.

SUBJECT was born in St Louis, Missouri, where HIS family still maintains their residence. SUBJECT'S father worked for an automobile company in Saint Louis, Missouri, (NFI). Source could provide no further information regarding SUBJECT'S family background, past employments, prior residences or education. SUBJECT had no close associates.

SUBJECT was a member of Source's Military Science class from August 1980 to May 1981. SUBJECT was a good student and did well on the course tests. Source had no disciplinary problems with SUBJECT but Source counseled SUBJECT on three occasions to improve HIS leadership skills. During a counseling session in approximately November 1980, SUBJECT told Source that HE was having financial difficulty in meeting HIS school expenses. SUBJECT further stated that HE was concerned with the financial assistance being provided by HIS parents as being a financial burden to the family. In approximately January 1981, Source assisted SUBJECT in entering the Simultaneous Membership Program (SMP) to assist HIM financially. In the SMP, SUBJECT was required to train with the Missouri National Guard (MNG), Marshall, Missouri, once a month and received $88 for HIS duty time. From June 1981 to July 1981, SUBJECT attended

PRO[redacted]VE MARKING IS EXCLUDED
FROM AUTO[redacted]TERMINATION
(Para 13, AR 340[redacted]

(continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

1185

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

☆ GPO: 1970 380-907/248

INCL (2)

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

WHITE, Joseph Timothy
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO

2. DATE SUBMITTED

22 September 1982

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

ROTC ASC at Fort Riley, Kansas. In July 1981, while Source was assigned as an Individual Tactical Training (ITT) instructor at Fort Riley, Kansas, he received performance evaluations from SUBJECT'S peers and cadre personnel describing SUBJECT as immature and unable to interact with HIS peers. As a result of these reports, SUBJECT was required to appear before an administrative review board. The review board was to decide if SUBJECT was to be given credit for completing ASC. Source, acting as defense representative for SUBJECT, submitted testimony to the board that SUBJECT should be granted credit for ASC. Source could not recall any specific statements other than saying SUBJECT was immature but should be given the benefit of the doubt and be granted credit for completing ASC. The board ruled that SUBJECT would be given credit for ASC. Upon completion of ASC, SUBJECT was to report for Annual Training (AT) with C Battery, 128th Field Artillery Battalion, MNG, Marshall, Missouri. When SUBJECT returned to KMSC approximately 15 September 1981, HE told Source that HE had failed to attend HIS AT, (NFI). SUBJECT further stated HE had attended airborne training at Fort Benning, Georgia, from August 1981 to September 1981, (NFI). In September 1981, SUBJECT'S financial trouble led to HIS disenrollment from KMSC, which subsequently led to SUBJECT being disenrolled from the ROTC program, (NFI).

In approximately February 1981, Source was informed by Thomas McCarthy, Professor, KMSC, that SUBJECT and McCarthy debated the benefits of National Socialism (Nazism) during McCarthy's American Government class. SUBJECT'S support for Nazism enraged the other students and further widened the gap with SUBJECT'S peers, (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States, but, because of HIS beliefs on Nazism and Communism, HE was branded "Anti-US" by HIS peers. Source, personally could not recall any occasions in which SUBJECT specifically denounced the United States Government. In approximately May 1981, Booker T. Washington, SUBJECT'S former Cadet Commanding Officer, A Company, KMSC, told Source that he was having trouble with SUBJECT. Washington related that because of SUBJECT'S beliefs in Nazism, and HIS "superior" attitude over HIS peers, HE was alienating HIS peers against HIM. Washington related further that SUBJECT had gone AWOL overnight in approximately April 1981 to attend a debate between the Grand Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan (KKK) and a representative of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). The debate was held in Columbia, Missouri. Washington also advised Source that SUBJECT had National Socialist reading material in HIS barracks room, (NFI). Source did not know Washington's present address, only that Washington may be in the Berkley or Oakland, California area, (NFI).

Source believed SUBJECT was mentally stable, but emotionally immature.

(continued)

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT

RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

1186

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT

Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47, WHICH MAY BE USED.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

AGENT REPORT

For use of this form, see FM 30-17(C); AR 381-130; the proponent agency is the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence.

1. NAME OF SUBJECT OR TITLE OF INCIDENT

WHITE, Joseph Timothy
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO

2. DATE SUBMITTED
22 September 1982

3. CONTROL SYMBOL OR FILE NUMBER

4. REPORT OF FINDINGS

Source believed SUBJECT felt HIS peers were against HIM because of HIS "rightist" views and therefore, HE would not interact with them. SUBJECT also believed in the "Nietzsche Philosophy" of superior beings and that HE was one of the "Chosen Few", (NFI). Source believed SUBJECT to be loyal to the United States because SUBJECT never made any disloyal statements in his presence. Source provided no information regarding SUBJECT'S use of alcohol, illegal drugs, or adverse involvements with law enforcement agencies. SUBJECT was of high moral character and integrity.

Source was willing to provide a sworn statement and appear before any court or administrative hearing which may arise concerning SUBJECT.

AGENT'S NOTES: Source was shown a copy of message, DTG 082200Z, SEP 82, SUBJECT: WHITE, Joseph Timothy, PFC, 492-60-2196, DPOB: 5 Nov 61, St Louis, MO (U), and was asked to review the message and to comment about what areas could be attributed to SUBJECT. Source replied that the message did contain areas attributable to SUBJECT. The following statements were identified by Source:

A. "...My deep conviction."

B. "...U.S. troops were being sent to South Korea to 'protect' South Korea from 'aggression' from the North."

C. "...People like me have no hope in the United States after being discharged from the Army."

1187

5. TYPED NAME AND ORGANIZATION OF SPECIAL AGENT
RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

6. SIGNATURE OF SPECIAL AGENT
Raul J. Lozano

DA FORM 1 APR 52 341 REPLACES WD AGO FORM 341, 1 JUN 47 WHICH MAY BE USED. ☆ GPO: 1970 390-907/248

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10141
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 1183-1184

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : SWORN STATEMENT
DATE : 10/03/82
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY

[RESTRICTED]

AFFIDAVIT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.

LOCATION COLUMBIA MISSOURI	DATE 3 OCT 82	TIME 1136	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME GLAISTER, HENRY DANIEL	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER. 547-76-1040		GRADE/STATUS CPT

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
812 MAPLEWOOD DR COLUMBIA MO 65201

I, HENRY DANIEL GLAISTER, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I HENRY D. GLAISTER, 547-76-1040, CPT, FA, RESIDING AT 812 MAPLEWOOD DR, COLUMBIA, MISSOURI AUTHORIZE RELEASE OF AGENT REPORT, DA FORM 341, DATED 22 SEPTEMBER 1982, SUBMITTED BY MR RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI GROUP CONCERNING JOSEPH TIMOTHY WHITE, TO MR NORVAL (NMN) WHITE JR. (FATHER OF JOSEPH TIMOTHY WHITE) ///////// END OF STATEMENT ////////////

1183

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ___ TAKEN AT ___ DATED ___ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE ___ OF ___ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

DA FORM 1 JUL 72 2823 SUPERSEDES DA FORM 2823, 1 JAN 65, WHICH WILL BE USED.

STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, HENRY DANIEL GLAISTER HAVE READ ~~OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME~~ THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of OCTOBER, 1982

at COLUMBIA MISSOURI

Raul J. Lozano

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

RAUL J. LOZANO, 902d MI Group

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136(b), UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

1184

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

U.S. G.P.O. 1980-665141/1344

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10144
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 1190-1191

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : SICRRO CI/SIGSEC SPT BN
TO : HQDA
TITLE : MESSAGE
DATE : 09/11/82
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY

[RESTRICTED]

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 1190-1191 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94.

PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER

OTTCZOVW RUEAUSA4920 2541633
IMMEDIATE/PRIORITY
O P 111630Z SEP 82

FM SICRRO CI/SIGSEC SPT BN (FGGM) CDR FT DEVENS MA //IAGPA-A-DE//

TO HQDA WASH DC //DAMI-CI//

INFO CDR USAINSCOM FT MEADE MD //IAOPS-OP//
CDR902D MI GP FT MEADE MD //IAGPA-OP-I//
CDRCI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MEADE MD //IAGPA-A-OPI//
CDRMID CI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MONMOUTH NJ //IAGPA-A-MO//
BT

[redacted]

QQQQ
SECTION 01 OF 02
ACTION ADDRESSEE: NITE ACTION REQUIRED
INFO ADDRESSEES: DELIVER DURING FIRST DUTY HOUR
QQQQ
SUBJECT: WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY, PFC, 492-60-2196, DPOB: 5 NOV 61, ST LOUIS, MO (U)
A. MSG, IAGPA-OP-I, 091240Z SEP 82, SAB.

1. (U) SOURCE HAD NO OBJECTION TO THE RELEASE OF HIS IDENTITY TO SUBJECT.

2. (U) ON 10 SEP 82, JOSEPH C. MERLINO, 027-54-4638, 2LT, USAR, DPOB: 26 APR 62, BOSTON, MA, COMPANY A, 2D BATTALION, 104TH INFANTRY MASSACHUSETTS ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, WAS INTERVIEWED AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS CAMPUS, AMHERST, MA, CONCERNING SUBJECT. SOURCE PROVIDED SUBSTANTIALLY THE FOLLOWING INFORMATION: (MSG PARA 3 THRU 12

3. (U) MERLINO FIRST MET WHITE ON 28 AUG 80, WHEN BOTH ARRIVED AT KEMPER MILITARY SCHOOL & COLLEGE (KMSC), BOONVILLE, MISSOURI, AS FRESHMEN (PLEBES), ASSIGNED TO DIFFERENT COMPANIES. MERLINO'S LAST CONTACT WITH WHITE WAS ON ABOUT 26 SEP 81, TWO DAYS BEFORE WHITE DROPPED OUT OF KMSC. THROUGHOUT ACADEMIC YEAR 80-81 AND DURING SEP 81, MERLINO SAW WHITE DAILY, USUALLY AT FORMATIONS, OCCASIONALLY IN CLASS, BUT MADE PERSONAL CONTACT ONLY ON ABOUT FIFTEEN OCCASIONS. THEY ALSO MET BRIEFLY AT THE AIRBORNE SCHOOL, FT BENNING, GEORGIA, IN JULY 1981. THEY WERE WELL ACQUAINTED, BUT WERE NOT CLOSE PERSONAL FRIENDS.

4. (C) MERLINO DID NOT KNOW OF WHITE'S FAMILY BACKGROUND OR FINANCIAL SITUATION, ALTHOUGH WHITE DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY FINANCIAL PROBLEMS. NOR DID MERLINO KNOW IF WHITE USED NARCOTICS OR ABUSED ALCOHOL. WHITE WAS PHYSICALLY HEALTHY AND FIT, BUT NOT ATHLETIC. HE DID NOT APPEAR TO HAVE ANY DEVIANT SEXUAL TENDENCIES OR HANG-UPS, TO INCLUDE HOMOSEXUALITY. WHITE WAS REPUTED TO BE A MORALLY STRAIGHT INDIVIDUAL WHO VALUED HIS OWN HONESTY AND INTEGRITY. HE WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BRIGHT, AND CONSISTENTLY EARNED HIGH GRADES IN ACADEMIC SUBJECTS AND MILITARY SCIENCE.

5. (C) WHITE WAS ALSO A VERY SERIOUS, EXTREMELY INTENSE, AND HIGHLY IDEALISTIC PERSON. HE WAS USUALLY MILD-MANNERED, BUT WOULD GET QUITE AGITATED DURING SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS. IN PAPERS HE WROTE AND DURING DISCUSSIONS IN HISTORY CLASS, HE EARNESTLY DEFENDED THE MARXIST PHILOSOPHY OF EQUALITY. IN OTHER DISCUSSIONS HE REVEALED AN ADMIRATION FOR HOW ADOLF HITLER HARNESSED THE ENERGIES AND NATIONALISM OF THE GERMAN PEOPLE. HOWEVER, WHITE DID NOT APPEAR TO BE PRO-NAZI OR ANTI-SEMITIC. IN FACT, HE SEEMED TO BE SYMPATHETIC TO MINORITY GROUPS IN THE U.S., AND THEIR BID FOR EQUALITY.

6. (C) WHITE NEVER SHOWED ANY DISLOYALTY TO THE U.S., ALTHOUGH DURING CONVERSATIONS HE WOULD CONSTRUCTIVELY CRITICIZE AND CRITIQUE BOTH AMERICAN SOCIETY AND THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT. HE TALKED SERIOUSLY AS THOUGH HE HAD HIS OWN PROGRAMS FOR IMPROVING THE LOT OF OTHER PEOPLE. WHITE NORMALLY RESPECTED SUPERIORS AND THEIR AUTHORITY, AS LONG AS THEY MADE SENSE TO HIM. BUT, HE WOULD BALK AT OBEYING SOMEONE FOR WHOM HE HAD LOST RESPECT. THIS TENDENCY LED TO AN INCIDENT AT ROTC ADVANCED CAMP AT FORT RILEY, KANSAS, IN THE SUMMER OF 81, WHEN WHITE REFUSED TO OBEY A CADET'S ORDER (NO FURTHER INFORMATION), AND WAS ALMOST BOARDED OUT OF THE CAMP.

7. (C) WHITE'S SERIOUSNESS, INTELLIGENCE, AND INTENSITY SEEMED THREATENING TO SOME CADETS AT KMSC. HE TENDED TO REMAIN ALOOF FROM HIS PEERS. ON TOP OF THIS, HIS POOR SKIN COMPLEXION, NERVOUS MANNERISMS, AND ERRATIC DRESS (ONE DAY - NEAT, THE NEXT DAY - SHABBY) MADE WHITE THE BUTT OF DERISION AND PRANKS AT KMSC. HE WAS OSTRACIZED AND UNIVERSALLY DISLIKED. HIS PEER RATING AT ROTC ADVANCED CAMP WAS REPORTED TO BE LOW.

8. (C) WHITE TRIED HARD TO SUCCEED IN EVERYTHING HE DID. HOWEVER, HIS SELF-ESTEEM WAS CONSTANTLY BATTERED BY THE ATTITUDES OF HIS PEERS AND A STRING OF DISAPPOINTMENTS. DURING HIS FIRST YEAR AT KMSC HE GOT INTO SEVERAL FIGHTS WITH OTHER CADETS. ALSO, HIS GIRLFRIEND (NFI) BROKE-OFF THEIR RELATIONSHIP, ALLEGEDLY UNDER PRESSURE FROM HER PARENTS. (WHITE PAPERED A MYRIAD OF PICTURES OF HER ON HIS DORMITORY WALL.) WHITE DATED SELDOM, IF AT ALL. ONE OF HIS INSTRUCTORS, A CAPTAIN DAVID, REPORTEDLY GAVE WHITE A ZERO FOR TURNING IN A PAPER LATE, BUT DID NOT PENALIZE OTHERS WHO HAD DONE SO, AS SEVERELY. CPT DAVID WAS THE TYPE OF PERSON WHO EITHER LIKED OR HATED OTHERS, AND IT SEEMED THAT HE DISLIKED WHITE INTENSELY FOR UNKNOWN REASONS.
BT

OPI CI
FIW FIE
FIS ISH
ZX FI IS
ZC FII ISI
ZCL FIR ISP
JA FIT ISS
[illegible] FIQ LNP
AD FRT CI
FL AM

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

Cy handcarried to LTC Hawthorne, SAPA-PP at 1230 hrs
13 Sep

ACTION DAMI(4) (M)
INFO AOC-DAMI WATCH(1) SCB REVIEW(1)
SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 6

1190

OTTCZOVW RUEAUSA4921 2541633
IMMEDIATE
O P 111630Z SEP 82

FM SAICRO CI/SIGSEC SPT BN (FGGM) CDR FT DEVENS MA //IAGPA-A-DE//

TO HQDA WASH DC //DAMI-CI//

INFO CDR USAINSCOM FT MEADE MD //IAOPS-OP//
CDR902D MI GP FT MEADE MD //IAGPA-OP-I//
CDRCI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MEADE MD //IAGPA-A-OPI//
CDRMID CI/SIGSEC SPT BN FT MONMOUTH NJ //IAGPA-A-MO//
BT

[redacted]

QQQQ
FINAL SECTION OF 02

9. (C) AFTER WHITE'S NEAR FAILURE AT ROTC ADVANCED CAMP, HE WAS RECYCLED AT AIRBORNE SCHOOL FOR FAILING THE PT TEST. HOWEVER, HE RECOVERED AND COMPLETED THE COURSE. WHEN HE RETURNED TO KMSC IN SEP 81, HE WAS DEEPLY UPSET UPON LEARNING THAT HE WAS ONLY A CADET SERGEANT FIRST CLASS AND NOT AN OFFICER. WHITE WAS IN SOURCE'S COMPANY (SOURCE WAS A CADET MAJOR). ON ONE OCCASION, DURING LEADERSHIP LAB, SOURCE CORRECTED WHITE WHO WAS IMPROPERLY EXECUTING THE HIGH AND LOW CRAWLS. WHITE REACTED INDIGNANTLY AT FIRST, BUT AFTER SOURCE EXPLAINED WHAT HE DID WRONG, WHITE ADJUSTED AND CONTINUED TO PERFORM. ALSO IN SEP 81, ANOTHER CADET (NFI) TOOK ONE OF WHITE'S BOOKS FROM HIS ROOM . VIOLENTLY ANGRY, WHITE DRAPED TOILET PAPER ON THE CADET'S DORMITORY DOOR AND SET IT ON FIRE. SOURCE CAUGHT WHITE IN THE ACT OF SETTING THE BLAZE AND LAUGHING ABOUT IT. MERLINO VERBALLY CENSURED WHITE AND THREATENED TO GET HIM DISMISSED FROM KMSC. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, WHITE ADVISED THAT HE WANTED TO LEAVE SCHOOL. HE WAS COUNSELED BY COLONEL JOHNNY PARKER, SCHOOL COMMANDANT. PARKER ASKED SOURCE FOR HIS RECOMMENDATION. SOURCE SYMPATHIZED WITH WHITE BUT COULD NOT RECOMMEND HIM FOR A COMMISSION IN THE US ARMY BECAUSE OF HIS APPARENT IMMATURITY.

10. (C) AROUND 26 SEP 81, BEFORE WHITE LEFT KMSC, HE TOLD SOURCE HE WAS LEAVING THE SCHOOL. WHITE SAID HE DID NOT WANT TO BE AN OFFICER, BECAUSE HE WAS "FED UP WITH THE BULLSHIT AND THE ASS-KISSING". HE ADDED THAT HE WAS GOING TO ENLIST IN THE ARMY AND BECOME "THE BEST DAMN NCO HE COULD BE". BY HIS COMMENTS AND HIS TONE OF VOICE DURING THIS AND OTHER CONVERSATIONS, WHITE INDICATED THAT HE WASN'T GETTING WHAT HE DESERVED FROM SOCIETY. SOURCE WISHED HIM LUCK AND NEVER SAW OR HEARD FROM HIM AGAIN.

11. (C) SOURCE WAS NOT TOTALLY SURPRISED WHEN HE READ OF WHITE'S DEFECTION TO NORTH KOREA. IT SEEMED TO FIT IN WITH HIS PERSONALITY. SOURCE GUESSED THAT WHITE'S ACTION RESULTED FROM THE CULMINATION OF HIS DISAPPOINTMENTS. WHITE PROBABLY BECAME DISILLUSIONED WITH THE ARMY OR HIS UNIT AND HAD PROBABLY ENTERTAINED THOUGHTS ABOUT DEFECTING FOR SOME TIME. HOWEVER, IT WAS MOST LIKELY ONE PARTICULAR INCIDENT THAT PROMPTED HIM TO TAKE ACTION. WHERE ONCE WHITE WAS A FAILURE IN U.S. SOCIETY, HE GAINED NOTORIETY AND AN INTERNATIONAL AUDIENCE THROUGH HIS DEFECTION. SOURCE BELIVED THAT THE TEXT OF THE REMARKS ATTRIBUTED TO WHITE BY THE GOVERNMENT OF NORTH KOREA SOUNDED LIKE WHITE'S WORDS AND MANNER OF SPEECH, AND COULD VERY WELL HAVE BEEN AUTHORED BY WHITE. AT LEAST THEY PARALLELED WHITE'S IDEALISTIC BUT NAIVE SOCIO-POLITICAL VIEWS.

12. (U) OTHER SOURCES FROM KMSC WHO KNEW WHITE BETTER OR WHO COULD CONTRIBUTE ADDITIONAL INFORMATION INCLUDED: COL JOHNNY PARKER, (TEL: 816-882-5623), RICHARD J. HATCH, 2LT USAR, A NATIVE OF PENNSYLVANIA, WHO KNEW WHITE BETTER THAN ANYONE, CAPTAIN MICHAEL R. BASISTA, SGM JAMES MCKANE, AND MSG STEPHEN G. HINK.

13. (U) POC FOR THIS REPORT IS S/A ALFRED M. MEMOLE, FORT DEVENS RESIDENT OFFICE, AV 256-2001, (ON LEAVE 13 THRU 17 SEP 82).

14. (U) DELAY IN REPORTING AROSE FROM DIFFICULTIES IN IDENTIFYING AND LOCATING SOURCE.
CLAS BY INSCOM PAM 380-6
REVIEW ON 11 SEP 92.
BT

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR U[illegible]SCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

ACTION ARMY SECTIONAL(1) (M)
SECTIONAL(1)

TOTAL COPIES REQUIRED 1

1191

Date : 07/25/96
Page : 1

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10152
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 1203-1204

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : SSO
TO : SSO DA
TITLE : MESSAGE
DATE : 09/08/82
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

WHITE, JOSEPH T.

VIDEO TAPE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

ZCZCRP0324 PAGE 1
DAN: 296-043001
INPUT CDSN = DKA925
TOR: 081034Z SEP 82 TOT: 081034Z SEP 82

⑤

cc from DASACR, 27 Sep
B

OTTMZYUW YAIHRA 8192 2510930-MNSH--YEKDQO.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 080900Z SEP 82
FM SSO KOREA//CS//
TO SSO DA
ZEM
UNCLAS E F T O
EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//EYES ONLY//
SSO DA FOR MG E. C. O'CONNOR, DAMO-ODO; SSO KOREA FROM MG HUDACHEK, CS, USFK/EUSA
SUBJECT: VIDEO TAPE - PFC WHITE

1. ENROUTE TO YOUR LOCATION IS A VIDEO TAPE COPY OF THE TELEVISED NORTH KOREAN PRESS CONFERENCE PFC WHITE HELD IN PYONGYANG.

2. THE TAPE IS BEING HANDCARRIED BY LTC ROBERT TURPIN, 074-26-2297, USA. LTC TURPIN IS SCHEDULED TO ARRIVE WASHINGTON NATIONAL AIRPORT AT 2155 LOCAL, 8 SEPTEMBER, ON TWA FLIGHT 240.

3. REQUEST AN OFFICER FROM YOUR OFFICE MEET HIM UPON HIS ARRIVAL. HE IS DRESSED IN SHORT SLEEVE CLASS A UNIFORM.

4. LTC TURPIN HAS RESERVATIONS AT THE HOLIDAY INN, NEXT TO MILPERCEN HQ IN ALEXANDRIA, SHOULD HE BE MISSED AT THE AIRPORT.

5. TAPE MUST BE CONSIDERED CLOSE HOLD NOW, BUT, DO NOT OBJECT TO PERMITTING PARENTS TO VIEW IT UNDER DA CONTROL WITHOUT PRESS INVOLVEMENT. NEWS MEDIA MAY HAVE TAPED INTERVIEW AND SEEMS BEST TO GIVE PARENTS AN OPPORTUNITY TO VIEW FROM OUR SOURCE FIRST RATHER THAN THEM SEEING IT ON EVENINGS NEWS. PARENTS SHOULD BE REQUESTED TO NOT DISCUSS THE TAPE OR ITS CONTENTS WITH NEWS MEDIA, AS SUCH ACTION MIGHT JEOPARDIZE OUR 13 SEPTEMBER EFFORTS TO TRY AND ARRANGE A FACE TO FACE INTERVIEW WITH WHITE.

6. USE OF THE TAPE IN CONNECTION WITH NEWS MEDIA MUST BE CAREFULLY CONSIDERED. WE BELIEVE THAT UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES SHOULD DA ALLOW THE PRESS TO VIEW THE TAPE WITHOUT EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE PARENTS. TO DO OTHERWISE VIOLATES COMMON COURTESY. MOREOVER, THE TAPE WAS NOT PRODUCED BY DOD FOR RELEASE BUT HAS SIMPLY FALLEN INTO OUR POSSESION AND THUS PRESS HAS NO UP FRONT RIGHT TO IT. THE INTERVIEW WILL NOT

EYES ONLY

BE SHOWN ON SOUTH KOREAN TV AND IT IS IN THE BEST INTEREST OF THE US NOT TO AID NORTH KOREA IN SPREADING THEIR COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA. OFFERING TO PROVIDE A SCREENING OR COPIES OF THE TAPE WILL PROVIDE THE NORTH KOREANS WITH A MUCH LARGER AUDIENCE THAN THEY MAY OTHERWISE ACHIEVE. COMMON SENSE DICTATES THAT WHATEVER WE CAN DO TO DOWNPLAY THE INCIDENT AND LIMIT THE PUBLICITY WILL FRUSTRATE COMMUNISTS EFFORTS TO SPREAD THEIR MESSAGE. IF FEELING AT DA IS THAT TAPE SHOULD BE TURNED OVER TO PRESS, URGE TJAG AND/OR GENERAL COUNCIL BECOME INVOLVED TO RULE ON THE NECESSITY TO DO SO.

7. PLEASE RESPOND WHEN THE TAPE IS IN YOUR POSSESSION.

8. WARM REGARDS.

SSO NOTE: DELIVER IMMEDIATELY

#8192

NNNN

1204

EYES ONLY

Released under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW 88613 Date: 03-18-2025

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10013-10155
RECORDS SERIES : DOD-AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : ZF000003W - PAGES 1208-1209

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM : SSO
TO : SSO MEADE
TITLE : MESSAGE
DATE : 09/07/82
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : SLOVODA, VLADIMIR

WHITE, JOSEPH T.

MILITARY PERSONNEL FILES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 3
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 03/20/95
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : PAGES 1208-1209 WERE REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED ON 22 SEP 94.

****

[redacted]

****

ZCZCRPQ530 PAGE 1
DAN: 296-010206
INPUT CDSN = KDA807
TOR: 071935Z SEP 82 TOT: 071935Z SEP 82

Press — has seen
Bjorkman
SAPA-AP

OTTMZYUW YWQALD 0025 2501931-MNSH--YEKDQQ.
ZNY MMNSH
ZKZK OO SOA DE
O 071210Z SEP 82 ZYH
FM SSO LVNWORTH
TO SSO MEADE
INFO SSO INSCOM
SSO SAM
SSO DA//DAMI-CIC//
ZEM
[redacted]
QQQQ
HANDLING INSTRUCTIONS: SSO MEADE PASS TO CDR, 902D MIGP//IAGPA-OP//
SSO INSCOM PASS INFO TO CDR, USAINSCOM//IAOPS-P//. SSO SAM PASS TO
S3, CI/SIGSEC SPT BN, 902D MIGP//IAGPA-B-OP//.
SUBJECT: WHITE, JOSEPH TIMOTHY
PFC, 492-60-2196
DPOB: 5 NOV 61, ST LOUIS, MO

1. ON 1 SEP 82, THE RESERVE OFFICERS TRAINING CORPS (ROTC) MILITARY PERSONNEL FILE OF JOSEPH TIMOTHY WHITE, PFC 492-60-2196, LOCATED AT THE KEMPER MILITARY COLLEGE, BOONVILLE, MO 65233 WAS FURNISHED BY JOHN E. PARKER, LTC, INF, PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE AND DISCLOSED THE FOLLOWING.

A. WHITE ENROLLED IN THE KEMPER MILITARY COLLEGE (KMC) ON 9 JUNE 1980 WITH THE ROTC PROGRAM.

B. WHITE ATTENDED BASIC CAMP FROM 9 JUN 80 TO 14 JUL 80 AT FTNOX, KY 40121. ON 16 JUN 80, WHITE WAS APPREHENDED BY THE FT KNOX MILITARY POLICE (MP) AND CHARGED WITH A UNIFORM VIOLATION AND DISOBEYING A LAWFUL GENERAL ORDER. (MP REPORT WITH HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT BY WHITE FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER). WHITE WAS HELD AT MP STATION FOR APPROXIMATELY 2 HOURS, AT WHICH TIME HE WAS RELEASED TO HIS UNIT, COMPANY B, 4TH BRIGADE, 15TH BATTALION, FT KNOX, KY.

C. ON 12 FEB 81, WHITE ENLISTED IN THE US ARMY NATIONAL GUARD, FOR A PERIOD OF SIX (6) YEARS. WHITE WAS ASSIGNED TO BATTERY C, 1ST BATTALION, 128TH FIELD ARTILLERY, MARSHALL, MO 65340.

****

[redacted]

****

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

1208

****

[redacted]

****

D. WHITE BEGAN STUDIES AT KMC IN SEPTEMBER 1981. SUBJECT'S SCHOLASTIC RECORD (DA FORM 131, FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER) INDICATED "B" AVERAGE FOR THE SCHOOL YEAR 80-81.
E. WHITE ATTENDED ADVANCED CAMP FROM 5 JUN 81 TO 15 JUL 81 AT FT RILEY, KS. ON 13 JUL 81 A BOARD OF OFFICERS WAS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF AR 15-6, AR 145-1 AND TRADOC REG 145-1 IN ORDER TO DETERMINE IF SUBJECT SHOULD BE DISMISSED FROM THE CAMP DUE TO HIS POOR PERFORMANCE. A COPY OF THE BOARD PROCEEDINGS WITH SWORN STATEMENTS FORWARDED UNDER SEPARATE COVER.
F. WHITE WAS GRANTED A SECRET CLEARANCE, ON 10 SEP 81, BASED UPON A NATIONAL AGENCY CHECK.
G. ON 15 SEP 81, SUBJECT WAS DISENROLLED FROM THE ROTC PROGRAM AT KMC FOR FAILURE TO ATTEND CLASSES.
H. WHITE WAS DISCHARGED FROM THE US ARMY RESERVE ON 21 OCT 81, IN ORDER TO ENTER ON ACTIVE DUTY ON 22 OCT 81. WHITE WAS ASSIGNED, FOR BASIC TRAINING AT FORT JACKSON, SC.
2. ON 1 SEP 82, JOHN EDWARD PARKER, LTC, 466-62-1137, INFANTRY, PROFESSOR OF MILITARY SCIENCE (MPS), KEMPER MILITARY COLLEGE (KMC), BOONVILLE, MO 65233 WITH RESIDENCE AT RURAL ROUTE 3, BOONVILLE, MO 65233, WAS INTERVIEWED IN HIS OFFICE AT KMC. PARKER ASSUMED THE DUTIES AS PMS IN AUG 81 AND HAD ONLY ONE CONTACT WITH SUBJECT, WHICH WAS ON 15 SEP 82, WHEN WHITE WAS DISENROLLED FROM ROTC. PARKER STATED THERE WAS NO ONE AT KMC PRESENTLY, WHO WAS ASSIGNED THERE DURING WHITE'S ATTENDANCE. PARKER DID STATE THAT CPT CARL J. DAVID, SUBJECT'S FORMER INSTRUCTOR, WAS ATTENDING THE COMBINED ARMS AND SERVICES STAFF SCHOOL (CAS3), FT LEAVENWORTH, KS 66027 (NFI), AND THE PREVIOUS PMS, EUGENE C. MURKINSON, LTC (RETIRED), WAS RESIDING AT 619 KROHN, BOONVILLE, MO 65233.
3. ON 2 SEP 82, EUGENE C. MURKINSON, WAS CONTACTED TELEPHONICALLY REFERENCE SUBJECT. MURKINSON STATED HE WOULD BE WILLING TO BE INTERVIEWED BUT HE HAD HAD NO CONTACT WITH SUBJECT.
4. ON 3 SEP 82, AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT BG (RETIRED) LOYD P. RHIDDLEHOOVER MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. RHIDDLEHOOVER IS PRESENTLY TDY AND WILL NOT BE AVAILABLE UNTIL 9 SEP 82.
5. ON 3 SEP 82, AN ATTEMPT TO CONTACT CPT CARL J. DAVID AT CAS3, FT LEAVENWORTH, KS, MET WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. CPT DAVID DEPARTED FT LEAVENWORTH, KS ON 3 SEP 82 ENROUTE TO HQS, 3 BN, 61ST ADA, 3D ARMORED DIVISION, APO NY, NY 09076.
6. RECOMMEND THAT MURKINSON ANDRHIDDLEHOOVER NOT BE CONTACTED AS THEY WOULD NOT HAVE HAD ANY CONTACT WITH WHITE. ANY INFO THEY MIGHT FURNISH WOULD BE HEARSAY.
7. ACTION OFFICER, S/A JOHN HARDY, AV 552-2490/5202.
REVIEW: 7 SEP 92
#0025

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED
ON 22 Sep 94
BY CDR USAINSCOM F01/PO
AUTH Para 1-603 DOD 5200.1R

****

[redacted]

****

1209

****

Date : 09/02/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : INSCOM/CSF
RECORD NUMBER : 194-10014-10116
RECORDS SERIES : DOD AFFILIATED PERSONNEL AND INCIDENT INVESTIGATIONS
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : AA851401WJ - PAGES 20-21

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : USA
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : INFORMATION REPORT
DATE : 00/00/00
PAGES : 2
SUBJECTS : CHARLES, CLEMARD J

UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : REFERRED
CURRENT STATUS : POSTPONED IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/15/98
OPENING CRITERIA : COMPLETION OF REVIEW BY CIA FOR RELEASABILITY
COMMENTS : DOCUMENTS DECLARED "NOT BELIEVED RELEVANT" BY THE CIA AND AGREED TO BY THE ARRB, PER MEMO DTD 14 AUG 98.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONTROLLED DISSEM

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

NO DISSEM ABROAD

COUNTRY Haiti

REPORT NO. OO-~~[illegible]~~/14068-68 A(S)322

SUBJECT Clemard Joseph-Charles Must Raise US $605 Thousand Before He Can Resume His Banking And Other Activities/Outline Of Charles's Plans/President Duvalier Reportedly Hopes To Improve His Image And To Attract Foreign Capital And Business Activity/ Rumors Continue Concerning Possible Reorganization Of Haitian Government

DATE DISTR.

NO. PAGES 2

(1453)

REFERENCES DCS Case ~~[illegible]~~ 47,540
Supplement to: OO-B-321/12106-68

DATE OF INFO. May 68

PLACE & DATE ACQ Port-au-Prince, Haiti, May 68

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE Naturalized US citizen of Haitian birth. Source maintains close contacts with Haitians in the US and with prominent business and political figures in Haiti and travels at irregular intervals to the Caribbean countries.

1. Clemard Joseph-Charles was released from prison during the evening of 25 Apr 68 in return for a "ransom" of US $605 thousand.

2. Charles has been given until 24 May 68 to produce the US $605 thousand. This sum must be in an irrevocable letter of credit on an American bank in favor of the National Bank of the Republic of Haiti. It has been intimated that the 24 May 68 deadline can be extended, should Charles be experiencing any really unusual difficulties in producing the required money.

3. In order to obtain his release from prison, Charles had to sign a memorandum of understanding that he would produce the US $605 thousand plus some unidentified real property. These terms were agreed to by both Charles and his wife prior to the release. At the same time, Charles wrote a personal letter to President Duvalier asking for release and promising to hand over the money and property in question.

4. Charles is now under house arrest in Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

5. Charles's immediate resources consist of about US $100 thousand in cash in two US banks (no additional data available), various homes, businesses (essential oils, an automobile dealership and others (no additional data available)), buildings, land and about US $400 thousand worth of Haitian government bonds. He did have another US $300 thousand in personal funds in Haiti. He can no longer count on this money to help raise the US $605 thousand, however, because prior to his release from prison the Haitian authorities (no additional data available) confiscated it.

6. Charles has agreed to raise the US $605 thousand on condition that it be used to pay off legitimate claims of depositors in his Banque Commerciale d'Haiti. He has stated that he will permit the money to be paid out only to those depositors who are able to produce documentary proof that they had deposited funds in his bank.

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

020

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

U NO

CONFIDENTIAL/CIA INTERNAL USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S NO

The dissemination of this document is limited to civilian employees and active duty military personnel within the intelligence components of the USIB member agencies, and to those senior officials of the member agencies who must act upon the information. However, unless specifically controlled in accordance with paragraph 8 of DCID 1/7, it may be released to those components of the departments and agencies of the U. S. Government directly participating in the production of National Intelligence. IT SHALL NOT BE DISSEMINATED TO CONTRACTORS. It shall not be disseminated to organizations or personnel, including consultants, under a contractual relationship to the U. S. Government without the written permission of the originator.

7. Charles and several associates now propose to reorganize the Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, formerly his private preserve, into a corporate entity and to incorporate it in the US. The associates plan to raise US $500 thousand for this new corporation. This sum will be separate from the US $305 thousand and will serve to put the new banking corporation into business. Secretarial help and at least some of the six directors of the corporation will be US citizens. Two of the directors will be Charles himself and Louis [illegible].

8. President Duvalier is reportedly most interested in the new venture and is anxious to see it succeed. He has finally realized that the economic situation in Haiti has deteriorated so badly during the past 18 months that he must do something before total bankruptcy occurs. Accordingly, President Duvalier wants to improve his "image" in the eyes of the outside world, particularly in the US, and by doing so hopes to attract investments and business activities from outside Haiti. He apparently hopes that the new, incorporated, Banque Commerciale d'Haiti, will help attract such activity to Haiti and is therefore permitting Charles to proceed.

9. /Collector's Note: 00-B-321/12106-68 described a possible reorganization in the Haitian government. This reorganization, sponsored by Duvalier, would place Duvalier on the elevated plane of spiritual advisor and father of the people and would, on the surface, at least, turn over to a president the day-to-day management of Haitian government affairs. Various names have been mentioned for the position of president under the possible new system./ The name of Luc-Albert Foucard has recently been mentioned frequently in Haiti as the possible new president under the rumored reorganization of the government. Foucard is a son-in-law of Duvalier and lives in Haiti. He is in charge of tourism. Some say that Duvalier listens to Foucard and is, to a degree, influenced by him. I doubt this very strongly.

- end -

021

EXCLUDED FROM GENERAL
DECLASSIFICATION SCHEDULE

Date : 05/20/97
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : USA
RECORD NUMBER : 197-10002-10190
RECORDS SERIES : HEADQUARTERS FILES, PENTAGON TELECOMMUNICATIONS CENTER
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : CIA TDCS-3/566,305
DATE : 00/00/63
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : WEST GERMANY: SOVIET MILITARY ALERT FOLLOWING KENNEDY ASSASSINATION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : / /
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

ELEGRAM **INFORMATION REPORT** TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

[illegible]

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY USSR/EAST GERMANY/EASTERN EUROPE

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/566,303

SUBJECT HIGHLIGHTS OF MILITARY WEEKLY SUMMARY NO. 48

DATE DISTR.

PRECEDENCE

REFERENCES

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

Jm 5/14/97

DATE OF INFO. 20-26 NOVEMBER 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. GERMANY, MUNICH /29 NOVEMBER 1963/ IN TEXT.

APPRAISAL 3, EXCEPT WHERE OTHERWISE INDICATED/

FIELD REPORT NO. EGK-27396

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE OFFICIAL WEST GERMAN SERVICE FROM INFORMANTS OF VARYING RELIABILITY.

FOLLOWING ARE HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE GERMAN SERVICE MILITARY WEEKLY SUMMARY NO 48/63, COVERING THE PERIOD OF 20-26 NOVEMBER 63.

1. DURING THE WEEK UNDER REVIEW, THERE WERE NO INDICATIONS OF PREPARATION FOR ATTACK BY SOVIET BLOC FORCES.

2 PART A. GENERAL.

LAST WEEK'S EXERCISE AND TRAINING ACTIVITIES IN THE SOVIET BLOC ARMED FORCES WERE NORMAL AND WERE THUS IN KEEPING WITH THE GENERAL PACE OF TRAINING AT THIS TIME OF YEAR.

SOVIET AND SATELLITE FORCES REACTED TO THE ASSASSINATION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, NOV 22ND, WITH PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES OF A GENERAL NATURE WHICH MAY BE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S E C R E T NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SECDEF | NSA | NIC | XXXXXXX | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | XXXXXXX | DDX

STATE/DID

TELEGRAM **INFORMATION REPORT** TELEGRAM

DA IN 157472

SECRET

INTERPRETED AS A REACTION TO CORRESPONDING STAND-BY MEASURES OF THE U.S. FORCES.

IT IS EXPECTED THAT IN THE PRESENT SITUATION SOVIET TACTICS IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY POLICY WILL BE MARKED BY CAUTION.

3. PART B. ARMED FORCES.

A. USSR/EAST GERMAN.

1/ ON THE NIGHT OF 22/23 NOVEMBER, SPECIAL ALERT MEASURES WERE ORDERED IN THE ORANIENBURG GARRISON FOR NVA UNITS AND POSSIBLY ALSO FOR SOVIET ARMY UNITS /SEVERAL B/F-3/. GERMAN COMMENT- THE MEASURE WAS PRESUMABLY TAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THE ASSASSINATION OF PRESIDENT KENNEDY. IT APPARENTLY WAS CONFINED TO THE BERLIN AREA.

B. EAST GERMAN.

1/ SINCE MID-OCTOBER 1963, CONTROL POSTS /SO-CALLED HINTERLANDPOSTEN/ HAVE BEEN STAGGERED IN DEPTHS OF UP TO 1 KILOMETER FROM THE INTERZONAL BORDER DURING WEEKEND NIGHTS. /SEVERAL F-3/.

4. PART C. GROUND FORCES.

A. SOVIET.

1/ SUMMARY GERMAN COMMENT ON TRAINING /OBPC/. TRAINING AT LOCAL TRAINING GROUNDS AND NUMEROUS DRIVING SCHOOLS IS INDICATIVE OF RECRUIT TRAINING. FROM 16 TO 18 NOVEMBER ELEMENTS OF THE FIRST GUARDS TANK ARMY CONDUCTED

EXERCISES, PRESUMABLY AT REGIMENTAL LEVEL, AT THE LETZLINGER HEIDE AND ALTENGRABOW TROOP TRAINING GROUNDS.

SINCE 26 NOVEMBER, THERE HAVE BEEN TENTATIVE INDICATIONS OF ACTIVITY OUTSIDE GARRISONS OF ELEMENTS OF THE 34TH ARTILLERY DIV. NO OBSERVATIONS HAVE BEEN MADE AS YET INDICATIVE OF EXERCISES WITH FULL UNITS PARTICIPATING.

5. PART D. AIR FORCES. NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.

6. PART E. NAVY.

A. SOVIET.

1/ ON 25 NOVEMBER 1963, ONE F-CLASS SUBMARINE, WITHOUT PT-NUMBER, PASSED NORTHWARD THROUGH THE GREAT BELT. /B-2/

7. PART F. LOGISTICS, AND PART G. PSYCHOLOGICAL - NO HIGHLIGHTS PROVIDED.

FIELD DISTRIBUTION: ARMY, AIR, NAVY, USEUCOM

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO: DCSOP
DA IN 157472

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10076

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/1963
PAGES : 123

SUBJECTS :
EXAMINATION OF PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF POLICY AND CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON CUBA
NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE CUBAN BRIGADE

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/24/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 6. Indexed collection of CIA, DOD, DOS, and NSC reports.

JFK Assassination Records

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 12/8/2015 By

NO.	SUBJECT	DATE
1	CIA Report No. CS DB-3/652, 924 (SECRET-NOFORN)	17 Jan 63
2	Memo fr McGeorge Bundy to NSC Exec Comm(C) w/6 Incls: 1(S); 2(TS);3(S); 4(S); 5(S) and 6(S)	22 Jan 63
3	Drft Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba(TOP SECRET) (in dupe)	23 Jan 63
4	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
5	Memo for NSC Exec Comm, subj as above, from DoD Rep on ICCC (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	23 Jan 63
6	DepSecDef ltr to Mr Vance, subj: US Policy Towards Cuba, Cy 2 of 6, Control #559 (TOP SECRET) w/1 Incl, Coord of Cuban Affairs Memo for NSC Exec Comm, Subj: US Policy Toward Cuba(TOP SECRET)	23 Jan 63
7	Dept of State Memo for Mr Bundy, subj: Papers for NSC Exec Comm Mtg, 25 Jan 63 (TOP SECRET)	24 Jan 63
8	National Security Actions on Cuba (Pending and Closed) (TOP SECRET)	Undtd
9	Memo to Mr Cottrell from Mr. Ford, subj: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba (TOP SECRET-SENSITIVE)	4 Feb 63

3

February 4, 1963

TO : ARA - Mr. Cottrell

FROM : S/P - John W. Ford

Subject: Examination of Principal Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning on Cuba

In accordance with your instructions, over the week-end I have reviewed the main sources of policy on Cuba. The problem as I define it as follows:

The Problem:

Prior to the establishment of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs, much work had been done on Cuba, both in the policy and contingency fields. The purpose of the current exercise is to review and identify the main sources of such policy and contingency planning in an effort to determine if any of the work previously done will be of value to the officers of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the newly stated Cuban policy and objectives.

Sources of Policy and Contingency Planning:

The principal sources of policy and contingency planning which may or may not be of value to the work of your committee are as follows:

1. The National Security Action Memoranda emanating from the White House.
2. The Actions of the National Security Council.
3. The Basic National Security Policy of the U.S. (now awaiting final stages of formal clearance before presentation to National Security Council).

4. The Records

4. The Records of Action of the Executive Committee of the National Security Council as they pertain to Cuba.

5. The Reports of the Sub-Committees of EXCOM - during the Cuban Crisis.

6. The Resolutions of the Organization of American States and the Punta del Este Conference.

7. Public Statements of Government Officials, in Particular Press Conference of President Kennedy of September 13, 1962.

8. Meeting of Secretary Rusk with Foreign Ministers of Latin America during Cuban Crisis.

9. Recently Approved New Policy Statement and Objectives as Drawn Up by the Interdepartmental Committee of Cuban Affairs.

10. Cuban Guidelines Paper.
    (A guidelines paper as such does not exist on Cuba as is the case in a majority of other countries.)

CONCLUSIONS:

There are well over eight volumes of material concerned with Cuba, particularly that generated during the recent October crisis. This review is nearing completion, and I am segregating particular reports which may be of value to the members of your committee as we go forward with implementation of the new policy and objectives. In the attached documentation, I have segregated those National Security Council decisions and National Security Action Memoranda which are carried as pending or closed in the files of the Department of State. Where action on a particular NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to EXCOM, action responsibility on these decisions would appear now to be within the purview of your Coordinating Committee. From my review

to date,

to date, it appears that all of these decisions call for actions which have already been considered by your Committee. You will note that in some instances action responsibility on an NSC decision or NASAM has been transferred to the Special Group (Mr. Alexis Johnson).

Attachment:
List of Pending and Closed
NSC and NASAM decisions
concerning Cuba.

8

[redacted] SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTIONS ON CUBA
(PENDING AND CLOSED)

[redacted] SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422a 5/5/61	Agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at the downfall of Castro regime.	(Pending) According to files, out of this NSC directive grew a policy paper, to be handled differently from regular guidelines papers on each country. As of 9/4/62, White House was informed that action on this NSC directive would be reported in compliance with NSAM 181 which transferred certain NSC & NASAM actions to special group (Alexis Johnson).
483 NSC 2422d 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to obtaining adequate intelligence on Cuban military capabilities.	(Pending) Action to be reported in compliance with NASAM 181 (Johnson channel)
483 NSC 2422e 5/5/61	Importance President attaches to publication in free world press of terrorist actions of Castro regime, etc. and to possible political action to end current terror.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422g 5/5/61	Relations with Cuban Revolutionary Council should be improved.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422i 5/5/61	Cuban refugees to be given refugee status; refugees in Miami to be relocated; refugees to be eligible to apply for travel privileges.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM
483 NSC 2422k 5/5/61	Initiation of negotiations to enlarge willingness of other American states to join in action against Castro.	(Pending) Action transferred to EXCOM

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422m 5/5/61	USIA will expand L.A. program, but not initiate electronic warfare against Castro; means of propaganda should be madeavailable to non-US groups.	(Pending) Action transferred to Johnson channel Per NASAM #181.
483 NSC 2422n 5/5/61	US military officers under general guidance to be prepared by Dept of State, would discuss Castro threat to all L.A. with L.A. officers.	(Closed) completed action as of 11/28/61.
483 NSC 2422o 5/5/61	Dept of State should prepare a report on a possible new juridical basis for effective anti-communist action.	(Closed) S/P paper "possible new Basis for Anti-Communist Action" 7/24/61
483 NSC 2422p 5/5/61	Robert Woodward's assumption of responsibility of Task Force on Cuba on announcement of appointment.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422b 5/5/61	No US military intervention now. Do nothing which would foreclose possibility military intervention in future.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422e 5/5/61	No naval blockade or airwar against Cuba.	Closed.
483 NSC 2422f 5/5/61	Detailed study to be made by CIA with other Departments of possible weaknesses and vulnerabilities in elements which control Cuba.	Closed. Bissell memo to Achilles 11/21/61 re: "Situation and Prospects in Cuba"by Sherman Kent 11/3/61.

[redacted] SECRET

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
483 NSC 2422h 5/5/61	No separate Cuban military forces should be organized in U.S. Cuban nationals would be encouraged enlist in US Armed Forces.	Closed. DEF recommended to Pres.draft program be terminated 6/30/62 due to modest results.
483 NSC 2422j 5/5/61	No immediate trade embargo on Cuba.	Closed, with President's action of 2/3/62 declaring total embargo on trade with Cuba with exception medicine and food on humanitarian grounds.
483 NSC 2422l 5/5/61	Alliance for Progress to be strengthened.	Closed. Weekly report now from AID to White House.
NASAM 194 10/2/62	Policy Toward non-bloc ships in Cuban trade (Action US Government proposes to take with regard to shipping to Cuba.)	Pending. Action transferred to EXCOM.
NASAM 100 10/5/61	Contingency Planning for Cuba.	Pending Action transferred to Johnson channel.
CUBA NASAM #31 3/11/61	US Government must have ready a White Paper on Cuba and be ready to give assistance to Cuban Patriots in similar effort.	Closed. Paper prepared and translated: "The Castro Regime in Cuba" 9/61
CUBA NASAM #181 8/24/62	Eyes only - Limited Distribution. Reporting to be through another channel and handled personally by Deputy USecy Johnson (understand this authorized response on certain pending NSC Actions, 2 NASAMs thru Johnson channel)	Closed.

NSC Action No.	Substance	Status
CUBA NASAM 196 10/22/62	Establishment of NSC Executive Committee	Closed.
CUBA NASAM 208 12/6/62 EYES ONLY	Cuba Overflights. (This Presidential directive approved an attached Guidelines for the Planning of Cuban Overflights, and requested CIA to come up with an estimate of the adequacy of such a system of intelligence collection to meet the criteria set forth, on assumption it is supplemented by energetic collection of information by all other available means.)	Report Submitted.
CUBA NASAM 213 1/8/63	Interdepartmental Organization of Cuban Affairs - with responsibility vested in a Coordinator of Cuban affairs in Department of State.	Closed.

7

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

34

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 24, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Papers for NSC Executive Committee Meeting, January 25 at 4:00 p.m.

Attached are two revised papers "Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations" and "United States Policy Toward Cuba" which are being transmitted to members of the NSC Executive Committee for consideration at the meeting of the Committee on Friday, January 25 at 4:00 p.m. Also attached is a new page 8 for the paper entitled "United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade." The other two papers transmitted on January 22 remain unchanged and will also be considered at the Friday meeting. They are "United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States" and "Current Problems Concerning Cuba."

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretariat

Attachments:

As stated.
Copy No.____.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENTS

[redacted] SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

[redacted] SECRET

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

    a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

    b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

    c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

6

TOP SECRET

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

January 23, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. VANCE

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Attached is a revision of paper #2 submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs for the meeting of the NSC Executive Committee on the above subject, that has now been rescheduled for Friday at 4:00 p.m. The revision consists essentially of what is now denominated as "ALTERNATIVE I" in the proposed statement of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba, supplemented by the insertion of the paragraphs marked in red at the top of page 3 and on page 7 of the revision. This supplemental material is derived from portions of the text of "ALTERNATIVE II" in the original paper.

At luncheon today with Alexis Johnson, I handed him the attached revision and told him Mr. McNamara's and my reasons for suggesting the expansion of State's paper to include the supplemental material referred to above. He, in turn, will discuss the revision with Mr. Cottrell who will thereafter be in touch with you. If possible, will you let me know by noon tomorrow where you and he stand with regard to the revised paper.

Enclosure

SIGNED
ROSWELL L. GILPATRIC

cc: Mr. McNamara
General Taylor
Mr. Yarmolinsky

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY

SecDef Control No. 559

0ASD 0031

[redacted] SECRET COPY 2 OF 6 COPIES.

DOD

DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

DoD supporting addition

[illegible]

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

   b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

5

TOP SECRET

SENSITIVE

23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Department of Defense Representative on the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee on Cuba

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

Policy

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U. S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U. S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

~~SENSITIVE~~

[redacted] SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as material, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U. S.

Invasion of Cuba by U. S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U. S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U. S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of and participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

Coordinator's Recommendation

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. The objectives stated in the Coordinator's paper do not sufficiently commit the U. S. to the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. The Coordinator's paper depends too much upon events outside the control of the U. S. Government and does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of the Castro/Communist regime. The specific actions recommended in the Coordinator's paper are consistent with the policy recommended in this paper and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy.

Recommendation

I recommend that the policy stated above be adopted as the United States policy toward Cuba.

DRAFT/23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose;

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will be prepared to apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

   a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

   b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AB ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

([illegible])

In addition to these immediate actions, we should make preparations now so that we are able to seize opportunities for more positive action towards our ultimate objective of the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime. These opportunities may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world, as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile acts) by the Castro/Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba. We should prepare contingency plans to deal with these situations.

Our contingency planning should include preparations for large-scale use of Cubans inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U.S. military forces.

We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba is the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the U.S. and, where possible, sharing the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; negate its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through the exercise of all feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

Soviet

Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/ Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent feasible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in [redacted] support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

4

23 JAN 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

There are submitted for your consideration two alternative statements of policy and related courses of action with respect to Cuba. Alternative I was prepared by the Department of State. The Alternative II was prepared by the Department of Defense. The Coordinator's Recommendation that Alternative I be approved, and the Department of Defense non-concurrence, appear at the end of this paper.

ALTERNATIVE I

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere'.
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and

and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U. S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes or replacing the Government with a regime which would accomplish this purpose.

6. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

7. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS;

8. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

9. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

The following actions should be initiated in the sequence set forth below:

1. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiation with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Prior aggressive U. S. action could jeopardize their release.

2. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following time-table:

3. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;
   b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

   c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who wo own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

4. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference in El Salvador on January 28-30 Assistant Secretary Martin will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

5. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington

and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

6. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

7. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

8. ←In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

9. In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, radio broadcasts, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) activities, and infiltration of propaganda materials, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

   a. Intensify to maximum degree possible intelligence and counterintelligence coverage of Cuba;

   b. Su

   b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause

a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and, 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

ALTERNATIVE II

United States Policy

1. Our ultimate objective with respect to Cuba remains the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime and its replacement by one compatible with the objectives of the United States and consonant with the aims of the Free World. To achieve this objective, the U.S. Government will apply increasing degrees of political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created, until the Castro/Communist regime is overthrown.

2. Our immediate objectives are to isolate the Castro/Communist regime from the Free World and from the Bloc; weaken it economically; promote internal dissension, erode its domestic political support; frustrate its subversive activities; reduce its influence in the hemisphere; increase the cost to the Bloc of sustaining the regime; and obtain the withdrawal of Russian troops from Cuba.

3. Isolating, undermining and discrediting the Castro/Communist regime through [illegible] feasible diplomatic, economic, psychological and covert actions may achieve the immediate objectives and could create propitious conditions in Cuba for further advance toward our ultimate objective.

4. We should be in a position to respond with open military support (to include such items as materiel, advisors, training, and Special Forces support and, if necessary, up to the full range of military forces), to a request for assistance from any anti-Castro/Communist group or groups in Cuba which demonstrate an ability to survive, which threaten the present regime, and whose aims are compatible with those of the U.S.

5. Invasion of Cuba by U.S. military forces, as distinguished from military support upon request of indigenous forces, should not be undertaken in the absence of aggression or other Castro/Communist and/or

Soviet

Soviet actions that threaten the peace or security of the hemisphere. This does not preclude appropriate U.S. retaliation for isolated hostile acts by the Castro/Communist or Soviet forces.

6. To the extent possible, U.S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U.S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U.S. effort.

7. Intensive, comprehensive and continuing intelligence gathering in depth on Cuba should be identified as a primary objective of the national intelligence effort.

8. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon theTTreaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

Overt and covert annexes of specific actions in support of this policy will be prepared.

Discussion

The active pursuit of our ultimate objective involves a phased and controlled series of political, economic, psychological and military actions. Such actions might include leaflet dropping; propaganda urging sabotage, strikes, and opposition to the regime; psychological operations urging defections; large scale training of Cubans in the U.S. and the use of such Cubans inside Cuba; extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the

effect

[illegible] t[illegible] keeping the Castro forces on the[illegible] retaliatory [illegible], as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; [illegible]; severance of communications [illegible] Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military forces.

In addition, this course of action would involve a broad gamut of carefully timed political, economic, psychological and covert actions, such as OAS sanctions, Caribbean security arrangements, intensified surveillance of and publicity concerning Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America, application of Four Point shipping restrictions and other economic sanctions, and a series of actions designed to obtain, to the greatest extent possible, multilateral approval of an participation in the campaign to unseat the Castro/Communist regime.

This course of action has the advantage of attaining the objective more rapidly and under more controlled conditions than the alternative stated by the Coordinator. Indeed, this may be the only course of action that will accomplish the ultimate objective. It involves greater risks; and, in the short run, a greater expenditure of money and material and far greater numbers of personnel.

From the standpoint of international politics, the U. S. will probably be subjected to criticism for aggression from the uncommitted nations. It is difficult to predict the reaction of the Latin American governments. They may attack the U. S. for "intervening" or they may react favorably (as they did during the missile crisis). To a large extent, the reaction of the nations throughout the world, and particularly the Latin American nations, will depend upon how adroitly these actions are handled. For example, there may even be advantages to the fact that our active policy and the courses of action under it may eventually become impossible to conceal. If properly handled, the overt aspects of this policy may serve not only to mitigate any unfavorable reactions from other countries, but also to gain, particularly in Latin America, increasing appreciation of the threat of Castro/ Communist Cuba.

The active pursuit of our objective will make it clear that the U. S. will not permit the maintenance of a communist base in the hemisphere. From the standpoint of military posture, the more active approach may be subjected to counteractions from the Sino-Soviet Bloc elsewhere. As we increase the pressures on Castro/Communist Cuba and the extent of our commitment to overthrow the regime, U. S. prestige becomes more deeply involved. The further we progress along this route, the more significant will be the loss of U. S. prestige if we alter or abandon it.

The successful execution of this policy will require careful timing and coordination of our actions and the development of detailed plans. While such plans would be designed to bring about the overthrow of the Castro regime within a given time frame for planning purposes, they would have to be sufficiently flexible to accommodate changes to the international situation.

In any case, at crucial points along the way, it will be necessary for the highest levels of our Government to review the actions already taken and those contemplated and to assess the advantages of continued and escalated activity against the disadvantages and dangers of such activity.

Commitment to this course of action does not exclude the possibility of actively pursuing the isolation of the Castro regime from the Bloc.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

I recommend approval of Alternative I.

STATEMENT OF DOD REPRESENTATIVE

I do not concur in the policy recommended by the Coordinator. Alternative I does not make the overthrow of the Castro/Communist regime an objective of the U. S. In addition, Alternative I does not sufficiently contemplate the creation of opportunities to effect the downfall of that regime. The specific actions recommended in Alternative I are consistent with the policy recommended in Alternative II and, in many cases, would be among the initial steps that would be taken in executing that policy. I recommend adoption of Alternative II.

3

[redacted] SECRET Draft 23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday , January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other ~~OAS~~ Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8.

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

[illegible]

opportunities

until the
regime ~~be~~ is
overthrown

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

   a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

   b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

a

a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. WITH RESPECT TO THE ACTIONS LISTED BELOW, THE ~~Await~~ results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners SHOULD FIRST BE ASCERTAINED. ~~Any of the actions listed below~~, If these actions are taken before the conclusion of the negotiations, they could jeopardize the~~ir~~ release of the Americans

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

   a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. ...

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of ~~All~~ ships of OAS member states from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and

4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

[redacted] SECRET Draft 23 Jan 63

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL"S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE
(Prepared for the meeting of [illegible], January 25, 1963, 4 p.m).

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of U.S. policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other ~~OAS~~ Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;
7. Maximizing the cost ~~to~~ the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8.

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U.S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere.

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U.S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and;

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U.S. Government will be prepared to increase the political, economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate

opportunities

opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:
    a) continue to intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;
    b) Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create

a

a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. Await results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners. Any of the actions listed below, if taken before the conclusion of the negotiations could jeopardize their release.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

a. close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

b. close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

c. prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department or agency of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference January 20-30, or at a later date, dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining Hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items); 2) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and

4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items is prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek

to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contingency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are no~~t~~w inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations in Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

2

(WITH REVISIONS)

38

CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

January 22, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable McGeorge Bundy

COPIES TO : All Members of the NSC Executive Committee

SUBJECT : CUBA - Back-up Papers and a Summary of Recommendations of the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

The enclosed papers are submitted by the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

1. Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations.
2. United States Policy Toward Cuba.
3. United States Policy in Cuba in the Organization of American States.
4. United States Policy Toward the Cuban Brigade.
5. Current Problems Concerning Cuba.

It is understood that the recommendations will be considered by EXCOM at their meeting at 10 a.m. on Thursday, January 24.

William H. Brubeck
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

As stated.

CONFIDENTIAL
(WITH TOP SECRET ENCLOSURES)

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 10 a.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Summary of Coordinator's Recommendations

1. U. S. Policy Objectives

The following are the objectives of the U. S. with respect to Cuba:

a. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;

b. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;

c. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;

d. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other OAS states;

e. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;

f. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

g. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

h. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other Free World states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

i. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

j. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

2. Supporting Actions

Actions in support of these objectives and their time sequence are set forth in the attached paper entitled "U. S. Policy Toward Cuba." They include the four point shipping regulations, OAS sanctions, NATO action to include Cuba on the COCOM list, and approaches to Free World industrial nations to eliminate sale and shipment of critical items from their Cuban trade. Existing programs will be reviewed and further recommendations made as necessary. Planning for the variety of contingencies related to Cuba will be undertaken at once.

In addition to current covert programs such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council (CRC) and other exile activities, infiltration of propaganda materials, and radio broadcasts, the following are recommended for approval and immediate initiation:

a. intensified covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

b. support of Cuban exiles who are seeking to return the 26 of July Movement to its original aims.

NOTE: It should be noted that approval of the foregoing actions may impair our ability to accomplish objective b. (Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba) because taking these actions could provide the U.S.S.R. with rationale for maintaining its forces in Cuba. Nevertheless, approval of the foregoing actions is recommended.

3. Cuban Brigade

Brigade leaders should be induced to accept a specially tailored civilian and military program for Brigade members.

The Brigade should be disbanded as a military unit and individual members urged to accept civilian training or to enlist in the existing U. S. military program for Cubans and join a Brigade reserve unit thereafter. Our moral obligation would be discharged to the Brigade members and creation of a privileged class in the exile community would be avoided.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Friday, January 25, 1963, 4 p.m.)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: United States Policy Toward Cuba

United States Policy

On November 20, the President set forth the broad guidelines of United States policy with respect to Cuba in the following words:

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons systems are removed from Cuba and kept out of the hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, 'we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.'
>
> "We will not, of course, abandon the political, economic and other efforts of this hemisphere to halt subversion from Cuba, nor our purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be truly free. But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Objectives

Accordingly, the objectives of United States policy with respect to Cuba are:

1. Protecting the security of the United States and the other states of the Organization of American States (OAS) by assuring that offensive weapons are not reintroduced into Cuba;
2. Removal of remaining Soviet forces from Cuba;
3. Preventing Cuba from taking any aggressive military action against other Caribbean states;
4. Reducing the capabilities of the Castro regime to direct and support subversion and insurrection within the other Hemisphere states;
5. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of divorcing the Cuban Government from its support of Sino-Soviet Communist purposes;
6. Encouraging and supporting any developments within Cuba that offer the possibility of replacing the Cuban Government with a regime that would break with the Sino-Soviet Bloc, it being understood that our ultimate objective is replacement of the regime by one fully compatible with the goals of the United States;

7. Maximizing the cost to the Soviet Union of supporting the Castro regime;

8. Maximizing the political isolation of the Castro regime from other free world states, and especially from states of the OAS. Whenever possible, U. S. actions against Cuba should be multilateral, preferably based upon the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) or on resolutions adopted by the Organization of American States. The newly-won hemispheric solidarity on the Cuban issue should not be jeopardized by seeking OAS actions of marginal value and which might split the hemisphere;

9. Being prepared to meet, with the employment of appropriate U. S. combat elements and/or logistical support, the wide variety of military contingencies that may arise from pursuit of the foregoing objectives; and

10. Producing comprehensive intelligence related to the above objectives.

Supporting Actions

A. To achieve the foregoing objectives, the U. S. Government will be prepared to increase the political economic, psychological and military pressures, as appropriate opportunities present themselves or can be created. The actions listed below are those requiring immediate approval and would be initiated in the sequence set forth below. Recommendations for further actions based upon the re-examination of existing programs and upon the development of new programs related to the foregoing objectives will be forthcoming.

1. In addition to current covert program, such as intelligence collection, recruitment of Cuban officials as agents, radio broadcasts, support of the Cuban Revolutionary Council(CRC) and other exile group activities and infiltration of propaganda materials:

    a. Intensify covert collection of intelligence within Cuba, especially within the regime;

    b. Support the efforts of certain Cuban exiles, who are associated with the original aims of the 26 of July Movement and who believe that the Castro regime can be overthrown from within in order that they may: 1) cause a split in the leadership of the regime at the national or provincial levels; and 2) create a political base of popular opposition to the regime; and, 3) secure intelligence;

    c. Assist Cuban exiles in developing a capability to launch balloons carrying leaflets and other propaganda materials from international waters into Cuba. Launch propaganda balloons after an operational capability has been established.

2. With respect to the actions listed below, the results of Mr. Donovan's imminent negotiations with Fidel Castro for freeing the 20-odd American prisoners should first be ascertained. If these actions were taken before the conclusion of the negotiations they could jeopardize the release of the Americans.

3. If these negotiations fail, or when the prisoners are recovered, proceed on the following timetable:

4. Inform NATO and OAS twelve hours in advance of the proclamation of the four point shipping orders. (The proclamation calls for the orders to go into effect in five days). These orders:

    a. Close United States ports to all vessels of a country whose vessels engage in carrying arms to Cuba;

    b. Close United States ports to any ship which has carried goods in the Bloc-Cuba trade within 120 days of the time it seeks to enter a United States port;

    c. Prohibit all United States flag ships and all ships owned by United States nationals or residents from entering any ports of Cuba and from carrying any goods bound to or from Cuba; and

d. Prohibit any cargo sponsored by any department of the United States from being shipped on vessels owned or controlled by persons who own or control vessels engaged in the trade between Cuba and the Soviet Bloc.

5. At the termination of the U. S. Chiefs of Mission Conference - January 20-30, or at a later date dependent on the Donovan mission, Assistant Secretary Martin, or another representative of the President will visit the Presidents of Chile, Mexico and Brazil to convey to them the importance President Kennedy attaches to maintaining hemispheric solidarity by their supporting the following resolutions:

a. An OAS resolution condemning Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deploring refusal to allow inspection, condemning the presence of Soviet troops, recommending continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and terminating the invocation of the Rio Treaty on the missile crisis, together with

b. An OAS resolution which would recommend 1) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

2) prohibition of ships of OAS member states from transportating embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade; 3) denial of Soviet over-flights and transit rights for flights to Cuba; and 4) a call on other states to take similar action.

6. After obtaining the maximum possible support of the key countries of Mexico, Chile and Brazil, the other OAS members will be approached in Washington and in their respective capitals, simultaneously. It should be possible for this consultation and OAS action on the resolutions to be completed within ten days. Prior to formal COAS approval of the resolutions, we will inform our NATO allies of the impending OAS action.

7. At the first NATO meeting after formal OAS action on the resolutions, we will request that NATO include Cuba on the list of countries to which shipment of COCOM list (strategic) items prohibited.

8. After NATO decision on our COCOM request, we will seek to get agreement from Free World industrial nations to prevent shipping of critical spare parts and equipment to Cuba, not on the COCOM list.

9. In addition to the four point shipping resolutions, and action under Section 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, continue to press Free World nations to keep their shipping out of Bloc-Cuba trade.

B. Contigency Planning

New opportunities for accomplishing our objectives may arise either as a result of Bloc action in other parts of the world; as a result of aggressive moves (or isolated hostile actions) by the Castro-Communist regime itself; or as a result of uprisings or internal conflict within Cuba.

Our contingency planning, which will be undertaken immediately, should include preparations for increased multilateral and/or bilateral political and economic measures, large scale use of Cubans who are now inside Cuba; more extensive air activity including both high and low level flights primarily directed toward surveillance and collection of intelligence, and which may also have the effect of embarrassing the Castro government and keeping the Castro forces on continual alert; retaliatory measures, as appropriate, including the imposition of a POL blockade; harrassment of Cuban officials in other countries; severance of communications to Cuba; major acts of sabotage on shipping destined for Cuba and on key installations to Cuba; intensive naval patrols; and, ultimately, the use of U. S. military force. To the extent feasible, U. S. military forces employed against Cuba should be accompanied by U. S. militarily-trained free Cubans and by the armed forces of those Latin American nations desirous of participating in the U. S. effort.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m.)

FROM : Sterling J. Cottrell, Coordinator of Cuban Affairs.

SUBJECT: United States Policy re Cuba in the Organization of American States.

PROBLEM

To determine the future course of action which the U.S. should seek in the OAS with respect to Cuba.

Discussion

The Meeting of Foreign Ministers at Punta del Este in January 1962 put the problem of Cuba clearly in the hemispheric context. At that meeting the Foreign Ministers excluded Cuba from participation in the Inter-American system, declared an arms embargo, and directed vigilance against Cuban subversive activities in the hemisphere.

The U.S. invoked the Rio Treaty on October 22, 1962. Pursuant thereto, the Council of the OAS (COAS) continues to act provisionally as the Organ of Consultation under that Treaty. (OC)

Acting in this capacity, the COAS/OC on October 23 unanimously passed a resolution calling for the withdrawal of all offensive weapons from Cuba, recommending that member states take such action, including the use of armed force, as might be necessary to prevent continued receipt of military supplies from the USSR and to prevent the missiles in Cuba from threatening the peace of the hemisphere. In accordance with the resolution of the COAS/OC, the U.S. instituted its quarantine. Argentina, Venezuela and the Dominican Republic cooperated with us in the quarantine and 9 others offered their assistance and facilities.

With the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet talks in New York, the Cuban problem reverts to the OAS context. With the Organ of Consultation still in being and committees of the Council continuing to concern themselves with subversion and possible extension of economic sanctions, the other American Republics are waiting for some lead from the U.S. as to what further steps could be taken.

COURSES

SECRET

COURSES OF ACTION

(1) Continue the COAS/OC in being under the Rio Treaty but take no further action at present.

Considerations:

The Rio Treaty was invoked and the COAS/OC brought into being for the specific purpose of considering the October missile crisis. If the purpose is considered fulfilled, the COAS/OC should either be terminated or its authorization enlarged to deal with changed circumstances.

(2) Under the Rio Treaty seek a resolution in COAS/OC which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities.

Considerations:

This would promote U.S. objectives vis-a-vis Cuba and would represent one feasible, approprite, immediate step following the conclusion of the U.S.-Soviet New York talks.

Although the language would have to be negotiated, it is believed that unanimity or near-unanimity could be obtained.

Recent statements by Cuban leaders calling for armed insurrection in Latin America would be exploited in this connection.

It could be criticized for not constituting sufficiently vigorous action on the problem of Soviet troops, but it would put the OAS on record against their continued presence in the hemisphere and dramatize Castro's continued military subservience to the Soviet Union.

(3) Terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este (Which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and a Special Committee to study the further suspension of trade.)

Considerations:

This step could be considered logical, since the COAS/OC was called into being to deal only with the October missile crisis.

Taken

Taken by itself, this course of action might raise doubts concerning the inter-American legal basis under which we are continuing our surveillance.

Psychologically, if this were the only action taken, it would appear as though the OAS considered the crisis over, the presence of Soviet troops unimportant, and its principle of verification surrendered (on-site inspection and re-introduction of offensive weapons)

(4) Combine (2) and (3).

Considerations:

This combination of actions is feasible and is likely to obtain unanimity or near-unanimity.

The termination of the COAS/OC makes strong language in the resolution more acceptable to the "soft" minority.

Termination of the OOAS/OC, even accompanied by the proposed resolution, is open to some of the criticism indicated under (3). Much of this could be mitigated if, however, the action is accompanied by the action suggested in (9), which imposes economic sanctions.

(5) Seek to enlarge the basis on which the Rio Treaty was invoked to encompass the presence of Soviet troops and seek a resolution in COAS/OC calling for their withdrawal.

Considerations:

With adequate consultation and preparation, we should be able to obtain a substantial majority.

Such action would give a better basis for urging such additional steps as (6) and (7) and (8).

It would seem undesirable to take this course by itself unless we seriously contemplate taking some additional strong enforcement action.

(6) In addition to (5), seek authorization under the Rio Treaty for collective action, including the use of armed force, to bring about the withdrawal of soviet troops in Cuba if the OAS call is not heeded.

Considerations:

Considerations:

This action should be seriously considered only if we are determined to use all possible means to obtain removal of Soviet troops.

While it should be possible with adequate consultation and preparation to obtain a substantial majority for further political and economic sanctions to help bring about the withdrawal of Soviet troops, it would be difficult to obtain the necessary 2/3 majority for authorization of the use of armed force.

(7) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OCto sever all diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

This would be consistent with general U.S. policy to increase the isolation of Cuba, but contrary to some present policies encouraging the maintenance of certain diplomatic missions in Cuba.

Although we could probably obtain the necessary 2/3 vote for such action (particularly if couched as a recommendation) it would be stoutly resisted by Mexico and Brazil and opposed by Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay, whose contrary arguments would have some appeal.

Probably no more than maximum of 15 votes could be obtained for this.

(8) Seek a resolution in the COAS/OC to sever all economic and commercial relations and all communications with Cuba (probably possible only in conjunction with (5) or (11).

Considerations:

The severance of all economic and commercial relations would go beyond our current embargo on trade with Cuba which provides for the exception on humanitarian grounds of the export from the U.S. to Cuba of certain foods, medicines, and medical supplies. Such action would expose us to charges of inhumanity and would probably nullify our public statements that we have no quarrel with the Cuban people.

A number of telecommunications between Latin America and Europe are routed through Cuba. Prohibition of these services would interrupt communications vital to many of our Latin American friends. Further, U.S. communications with Cuba should be maintained to facilitate the transmission of messages in the national interest and those for humanitarian reasons.

These

These considerations would make it extremely difficult to obtain a 2/3 majority in the COAS/OC.

(9) Seek resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fall back position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of over-flights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on bloc-Cuba runs. (Points (b) and (c) could also be added to No. (8).)

Considerations:

This is feasible and consistent with our objectives, and could be taken independently of other steps.

With adequate consultation and preparation, near-unanimity should be possible. Brazil would probably not go along. The actual effect of extending the embargo so far as Latin America is concerned is more psychological than practical because Latin American countries ship little except food to Cuba. But it would show forward movement and would provide a useful argument with our allies if it included an appeal to other Free World nations to take similar steps.

It would offer a helpful (though not necessary) basis for U.S. unilateral steps in controlling shipping, implementing 107 of the Foreign Assistance Act, and for urging other states to control Soviet flights to Cuba.

(10) Intensify through COAS and SCCS programs of recommended controls over subversive activities. Seek COAS resolution warning Castro that continued subversive activity may result in action under Rio Treaty.

Considerations:

The course described in the first sentence of (10) is being presently pursued under the decision taken at Punta del Este and should be continued. However, it would be difficult to get unanimous or near unanimous support for the warning resolution because of the reference to the Rio Treaty.

(11)

(11) Invoke Rio Treaty on basis of Castro's continued subversive activities.

Considerations:

If we desire to institute more vigorous collective sanctions vs. the Castro regime for its subversive activities, it would be necessary to invoke the Rio Treaty since the present functions given the COAS and Special Consultative Committee on Security (SCCS) under Resolution II of Punta del Este provide authority only for surveillance and recommendations to governments for control measures.

The primary threat of Castro is his subversive activities in the hemisphere. Should the level of Castro-directed subversive activities in the Hemisphere increase appreciably, this would become a more feasible and desirable course. This becomes an increasing possibility in view of Castro's recent speech inciting insurrection in Latin America.

The basis of any such action should consist of the production of hard evidence of the direct involvement of the Cuban regime in subversive activities in the hemisphere. There is, however, insufficient hard evidence available at this time to obtain COAS action. (A U.S. project to collate all available evidence is under way.)

(12) Assign the functions and operations of the Advisory Defense Committee (ADC) to the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB). This could be done:

(a) by amending the OAS Charter to assign ADC functions to the IADB;

(b) by the COAS seeking the advice of the IADB; or

(c) having the OAS member governments designate their representatives on the IADB to serve also on the ADC.

Considerations:

As to (a), the proposed amendment would have to be referred to the Quito Conference (whose date has not been set). Moreover, amendment of the Charter is a difficult and tortuous process and requires ratification by 2/3 of the member governments.

As to (b), this is a feasible course of action which the COAS/OC could take without specific authority. It might be difficult, however, depending on the circumstances, to persuade the Council of the desirability of such action.

As

As to (c), member governments could take this course on an individual basis, but it would be necessary to convince them that "exceptional circumstances" prevailed which would justify this action under the OAS Charter.

COORDINATOR'S RECOMMENDATION

In selecting the optimum combination of actions to take with respect to the OAS, the political feasibility and international complications were key factors which I have carefully considered.

Courses of action (2) (3) (4) (9) (10) and (12) would advance us toward our objective, would be politically feasible, and would involve minimum adverse international effects. We could probably obtain a near-unanimous vote in the OAS for these courses except (10) and (12).

Courses (2) (5) (6) (9) (10) (11) and (12) would advance us considerably further toward our objective, but (6) and (11) particularly could create a split in hemispheric unity, and would involve adverse international effects, including a probable acute confrontation with the USSR.

I believe courses (1) (7) and (8) will not serve our best interests at this time.

I recommend that we take immediately courses (4) and (9).

Course (4) calls for (a) a COAS/OC resolution under the Rio Treaty which condemns Cuba for its actions which continue to endanger the peace, deplores refusal to allow inspection, condemns the presence of Soviet troops and recommends continued surveillance and continued vigilance against subversive activities, and (b) terminate the COAS/OC on the missile crisis. This would still leave COAS with its responsibilities under Resolutions II and VIII of Punta del Este which provided for a Special Consultative Committee on Security and for the COAS to study the further suspension of trade.

Course (9) calls for a resolution in COAS under Resolution VIII of Punta del Este which would recommend:

(a) extension of arms embargo to all items of trade except food and medicine (Fallback position: extension of arms embargo to all strategic items);

(b)

(b) prohibition of AR ships from transporting embargoed items and deny use of ports to ships in Bloc-Cuba trade;

(c) denial of overflights and transit rights to Soviet aircraft on Bloc-Cuba runs.

(d) a call upon other Free World nations to take similar actions.

Rationale

The steps I recommend would start movement forward towards our objective, carrying the OAS with us, without committing us to any further action.

After these initial measures are in effect, we should assess the situation and determine the feasibility of moving forward with any of the remaining courses of action, or any new courses which may be opened to us by events.

I believe we should develop our pressures steadily and gradually, bringing the OAS along with us, and keeping the situation under constant review for the optimum opportunity to initiate additional measures.

I do not believe we should take a track now which will break hemispheric unity. We may need unity later in an emergency.

Neither do I believe we should push the OAS into probable acute confrontation with the USSR at this time.

Both of these prices the U. S. may find it necessary to pay for action at a later date but not now, in my opinion.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 24, 1963, at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Cuban Brigade

PROBLEM

To determine the future of the Cuban Brigade (participants in the Bay of Pigs invasion recently released from Cuban prisons), and other Cubans who participated in or trained for the invasion. To determine the future of existing Cuban training programs.

DISCUSSION

Approximately 1500 Cubans participated in the Bay of Pigs invasion (known as Brigade 2506), the great majority of whom were captured. In December 1962 over 1100 were released.

A decision on the future of the Cuban Brigade and other Cubans trained militarily by the U. S. must logically proceed from whatever over all policy the U. S. adopts toward Cuba.

A trained Cuban Brigade would be of relatively marginal military value because of its quantitative limitations and restricted military capability, but its politico-psychological value as a symbol of Cuban resistance to Castro/Communism may more than compensate for its limited military utility.

Any moral responsibility to the Brigade must be weighed.

COURSES OF ACTION

Three courses of action appear feasible with respect to the Brigade's future.

(1) Induce the Brigade to disband as a military unit, with no further U. S. special assistance.

If this policy were adopted, Brigade members and their families would be eligible for the benefits now accorded to all needy Cuban refugees in the Miami area (approximately 105,000). These benefits are equivalent to those received by American citizens in Dade County, Florida who are in need. The principal ones include: financial grants of up to $100 per month for a family and up to $60 a month for an individual; hospitalization and out-patient facilities at county and private hospitals for acute illnesses; distribution of surplus food commodities; employment counseling; resettlement, including transportation and a transition grant; foster care for unaccompanied children; special English and refresher courses for doctors and lawyers at University of Miami; a student loan program for Cubans attending U. S. universities provides up to $1,000 a year; supplemental assistance to Dade County, Florida, is provided by HEW to cover 50 percent of cost of educating Cuban refugee children in primary and secondary schools; payment for a substantial part of special language courses and vocational training; and physical examinations and inoculations at time of entry into the U. S.

DOD has a program providing for enlistment in the U. S. Army of those Cuban nationals between the ages of 18 and 30 who pass entrance requirements. (A similar program for the Navy covers ages 18-26). The program provides 20-22 weeks of training at the conclusion of which they are transferred as individuals to U. S. Reserve status. They are not required to know English. A two week period for resettlement is also provided at the termination of the training.

Another DOD program enables former officers of the Cuban Army, Navy and Air Force to volunteer on a highly selective basis for programs in the U. S. Armed Forces. Training periods are from 20 to 36 weeks. English is necessary. The officers are in civilian status. They receive a salary from the Cuban Revolutionary Council and a per diem through DOD from AID funds which are no longer available.

Considerations:

This course of action would provide the simplest and most economical way of disposing of the problem, provide equal treatment for all eligible Cuban refugees; equivalent to benefits offered to American citizens.

Individual Cubans could continue to be accepted for service in the U. S. Armed Forces and their language, skill and country knowledge could be distributed through various U. S. units which might be used in an invasion.

The unsatisfactory aspects of this course are that it would appear to run counter to expectations of the Brigade as a result of Administration statements and actions; it would result in substantial loss of whatever "mystique" the Brigade possesses, which might be useful in unifying Cuban refugees; and a phasing out of this kind would probably engender some adverse political reaction domestically as well as from the Brigade and its sympathizers. Also it might have an undesirable effect on opinion in Latin America and other parts of the Free World concerning the determination of the United States to unseat the Castro regime, and would lend weight to arguments that the U. S. may be leaning toward coexistence with the Castro regime.

(2) Train the Brigade and Cubans in training as a unit. Maintain and support them as a military reserve component of the U. S. Armed Forces.

Considerations:

Under this course of action whater "mystique" the Brigade possesses in the anti-Castro community could perhaps be exploited in the struggle for Cuban liberation, and used to bring about greater unity in the Cuban anti-Castro exile community.

It would constitute an immediate political and psychological advantage by demonstrating to the Cubans within Cuba, to the Cuban exile community, and to Latin Americans, the U. S. determination to establish a striking force symbolic of U. S. intent to overthrow the present Cuban regime.

It would satisfy one of the principal desires expressed by top Brigade leaders and would promote prestige and esprit among its members. It would appear to be in consonance with the statements and actions of the Administration in connection with the future of the Brigade.

But it would inevitably become a focal point for Cuban exile political activities in the Miami area, and morale, discipline and esprit would be difficult to maintain over the long term without early employment to retake Cuba. It could generate domestic political and military criticism by incorporating organized alien groups in the U. S. armed forces reserve component. There is a risk that an impulsive, irrational act by Brigade members, as members of the U. S. reserve forces, could be a source of serious embarrassment to the U. S .

(3) Tailor a special civilian and military program for Brigade members. Encourage the Brigade to continue as a "fraternal" unit similar to the "Flying Tigers". Encourage those Brigade members who enter the current military training program for Cubans to establish a Brigade military reserve component which other U. S. militarily-trained Cubans could join.

Under existing authority, HEW could provide the following additional benefits for Brigade members in need, over and above those now offered: special employment counseling and placement service; extended student loans to provide for all institutional costs such as tuition, books, etc., even if this exceeds $1,000 per year (living costs to be provided by another agency); expanded vocational training in the Miami area; increased financial assistance to needy persons while in training; increased distribution of surplus food (with approval of the Department of Agriculture).

The following additional programs could be undertaken by HEW upon Presidential determination that such action would contribute to the defense and security of the United States or advance its foreign policy interests: scholarship grants for students; loans for vocational training anywhere in the United States; an expanded training program similar to a G. I. Bill of Rights, in the United States and/or abroad. The cost of these additional programs, assuming an expenditure of $2,500 per person per year would be about $2.5 million.

Establishment of additional programs, after a Presidential determination, would increase costs even more, and be subject to wider criticism as "unnecessary" privileges for Brigade members.

COORDINATORS'S RECOMMENDATION

1. I recommend course (3), a specially tailored program for Brigade members.

2. I recommend against a Presidential determination providing broader privileges for Brigade members.

3. I recommend no change in existing U. S. military training programs for Cubans, except that a Brigade reserve unit should be authorized and other Cuban reservists should be permitted to join.

4. I recommend that the Brigade be induced rather than forced to accept this proposal, and intend to arrange consultation with them immediately if this course of action is approved.

Rationale

Lacking an immediate military use for the Brigade we should disband the Brigade as such. Since we may in the future desire the presence in the U. S. Armed Forces of militarily-trained Cubans, we should encourage Brigade members to enlist in the existing military training program for Cubans and to enter a U. S. Reserve Unit thereafter.

Our programs should be designed to encourage the Brigade members to melt back into the exile community and engage in constructive pursuits pending the liberation of Cuba. We should offer them some special assistance but not to the extent that they become a perpetual privileged class within the community. Presidential action on their behalf would single them out unnecessarily.

SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL'S EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Prepared for the Meeting of Thursday, January 23, 1963 at 10 a.m)

FROM : Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

SUBJECT: Current Problems Concerning Cuba

1. Verification of withdrawal of missiles.
2. Removal of Soviet troops from Cuba.
3. Release of all Americans in Cuban prisons plus Mr. Robert Geddes, British subject married to a U. S. citizen.
4. Cuban subversive activities in the Western Hemisphere.
5. Future activities of Mr. Donovan. -Prior to mtg
6. Policy on low-level aerial surveillance as a political weapon against the Castro regime.
7. Policy re such Cuban groups as Alpha 66, Cuban Revolutionary Council and exile groups.
8. Preparation of a Psychological Annex to the basic paper on U. S. Policy Toward Cuba.
9. Policy on extent of attributability acceptable in intensified intelligence collection; Policy on illegal infiltration and exfiltration.
10. Policy on resumption of KLM, Mexicana and Iberia flights to Cuba.

SECRET

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

This document consists of 4 pages
No. 1 of 10 Copies, Series B

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY	Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS DB-3/652,924
SUBJECT	Analysis of the Cuban Situation by the Italian Embassy in Habana	DATE DISTR.	17 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	4
		REFERENCES	RD-W-2088 RD-W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	6 December 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Italy, Rome (21 December 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: A qualified, astute observer (B) who has contacts in the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Appraisal of Content: 2, that the document is genuine.

The following is a translation of a report dated 6 December 1962 sent by the Italian Embassy in Habana to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In my dispatch of 9 November I reported on some of the considerations regarding the consequences which the recent crisis could have on the international position of Cuba. I will now add some comments on the conjecture which has been reported by some members of our representations.

1) The possibility that there will soon be a loosening of the political and economic ties with the USSR appears to me to be nil at this time. The fact that the talks with Mikoyan were long and difficult and that Castro expressed in private his opinion on Khrushchev (wishing that Stalin were still alive) does not mean that he can and will renounce that Soviet assistance which is vital to him. This assistance cannot be replaced by the Chinese.

Certainly the Chinese Ambassador to Habana will have done everything possible to convince Castro to resist (and in fact the latter held firm on the question of inspection). Certainly the activity of the Chinese representation here is intense. But the Peiping Government cannot replace the USSR in economic assistance. It does not seem probable to me that /China/ can furnish more than it has furnished to date, which consists of second quality foodstuffs, rather shoddy

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/CONTROLLED DISSEM/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI 2
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #												I&NS	X	

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

wool and silk material, and many trifles of which the stores in Habana are full. As for machinery and spare parts, /China/ is not in a position to compete with that merchandise supplied by the USSR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland.

In substance Castro, even if he cannot exactly be defined as pro-Khrushchev, is tied to the USSR in such a way that he cannot for any reason release himself. I recall in this regard that on 2 November, after the visit of U Thant during the most acute moment of the crisis in Cuban-Soviet relations, he declared, "We are above all Marxist-Leninists and friends of the USSR. There will be no breaches in our relations."

Given this, I feel that the statements of the vice director of TASS as reported by the Embassy in Helsinki are a good resume of the situation, i.e., a) Soviet leaders have for some time felt perplexed with regard to Castro's character and person because he is reluctant to be "guided" docilely by Moscow. b) The USSR will continue to give all its economic support to Cuba because otherwise its prestige would suffer a grave blow particularly in Latin America.

2) Also excluded, it appears to me, is the possibility that the revolutionary regime of Castro can be changed into a "Titoist" regime. It is comprehensible that, as Ambassador Zoppi reported, some "non-aligned" countries and even some Latin American countries desire such a change and are doing everything possible to provoke it. It is also possible that some Cubans share these sentiments. But, in my opinion, it is impossible that such a change can take place while Castro is in power. As I pointed out in my previous report, it is not in Castro's temperament to become "non-aligned", to imitate anyone, and even less to take Tito as a model. Therefore Castro would have to be eliminated, and this possibility seems very remote.

3) As I noted in my 9 November report it is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so.

It would certainly be highly desirable if a serious pressure action on Cuba could be exercised within a purely Latin American framework as pointed out by our Embassy in

Buenos Aires. But it is an extremely remote possibility. The countries which could do it do not have the necessary material means. A partial solution would worsen the situation and a definitive solution could be directed only by Washington. I think therefore that only pressure which is accompanied by material strength can obtain results in Cuba.

In conclusion, in judging the Cuban situation it is necessary first to keep in mind the personality and temperament of Fidel Castro, the influence which he has on a part of the population, and finally his deep-rooted hate of the United States. It is useless to say that the Cuban revolutionary regime, purged of some fanaticism, could be a good example for other Latin American countries. This would not take into account the mentality of the Cuban leaders and particularly their chief, who accepts council from no one and intends to imitate no one. Furthermore it is too late to select another path. As Guevara said the other day in an interview for the Daily Worker, "this is a battle to the death with the United States in which the most possible damage must be done to the adversary."

Undoubtedly, after the events of October and November, Fidel Castro is in a descending parabola. But how long this descent will last no one can say today. The only certain thing is that the economic situation is getting worse every day and therefore the revolutionary regime needs the assistance of the whole Communist world. Only last night a commercial mission headed by Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, who heads the most important institution of the country - the Institute for Agrarian Reform - left. The mission will go first to Moscow and then to Peiping. It is evident that new agreements must be negotiated, as well as new credits, to permit the Cubans to last through 1963, which will certainly be the most difficult year.

But economic assistance can permit this country to survive, not resolve its problems. For a definitive solution it would be necessary in the first place for the Cubans to learn to work seriously and to use intelligently the machines which they have. Agricultural production, principally sugar cane, as has been recognized even by the fanatics of industrialization, constitutes the basis of the Cuban economy. But how can they hope for a good harvest if, for example, the tractors furnished by Hungary which should last ten years are unusable after two years?

It is not possible to forecast the fall of the regime solely on the basis of economic factors. The people suffer from an insufficiency of food and clothing. But for another year they will find a way to get by.

Summed up, the decisive and at the same time prudent policy followed by the United States in the recent months is the best and perhaps the only policy. After the danger of strategic weapons has been eliminated, the wisest measure is to let the situation mature. Certainly Fidel Castro will present some more "headaches" to the United States; but the atmosphere is changed and -even without counting on the hypothetical coup d'etat of Castro which would force the solution of the problem - one can hope for a perhaps not too distant day when all will get tired of him. So long as the Cubans insist on the known five points and the United States refuses any guarantees, so long as the USSR is obliged to feed Castro to permit his survival, the less uncomfortable position appears to me to be that of the Government in Washington.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10004-10207

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO : MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS

TITLE : INTERDEPARTMENTAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE OF CUBAN AFFAIRS: REPORT ON THE STATUS OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION

DATE : 01/10/1964
PAGES : 62

SUBJECTS :
COUNTERINSURGENCY
CUBAN SUBVERSION
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 10. Army memo from Joseph Califano to Mr. Crimmins on status of actions to counter Cuban subversion in Latin America with other related documents.

JFK Assassination Records Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 8/12/2015 By Kent E. Slover, ADA

SECRET

Lt Col Haig/78029/8 Jan 64/md

10 JAN 1964

OSA 353-CUBA 1/10/64

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 December 1963-1 January 1964. The format of this report adheres to the topic outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion, September 13, 1963.

FW 1/30/63

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 3151-D

FILE

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

SECRET

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 DEC 63 - 1 JAN 64

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. General A. P. O'Meara, USA, Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, met with Vice Admiral Ray C. Needham, USN, Chief of Staff to Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic and members of their respective staffs during the period 11 to 15 December 1963. Discussions encompassed methods of improving the existing surveillance/ intercept system throughout the Caribbean. Existing US plans were reviewed, continuance of the ship visit program instituted in November 1963 was agreed upon, and combined exercises to test country capabilities to intercept simulated intruding ships were planned for early execution. Discussions by General O'Meara were continued with the Secretary of the Army and with representatives of the State Department, CIA and the Joint Staff, Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Commander Mine Division 44 with minesweepers USS STURDY and USS SWERVE completed visits to Central American ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Deficiencies in the capabilities of all three countries to counter subversive infiltration were reported. Additional visits, designed to assist in correcting deficiencies, are planned. USCINCSO also plans, through Commanders of US Military Groups, to assist in developing existing capabilities.

c. Based upon information from CAS Panama representative on 8 November, USCINCSO directed US operations to find a small boat which reportedly left the Colon Free Zone with a cargo of arms destined for the vicinity of the Colombian-Venezuelan border. Daylight visual aerial surveillance flights were instituted immediately, with radar-equipped aircraft taking over surveillance during hours of darkness. Colombian and Venezuelan authorities were notified through US diplomatic channels, but no direct communications between US surveillance aircraft and Colombian forces in the vicinity of the probable landing area were established before termination on 14 November. This effort, though not successful, has evoked considerable effort by US State Department, Defense Department and CIA activities to improve capabilities and procedures.

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

d. Action was commenced in the Colon area to provide means to keep track of ships and boats entering or leaving the Colon Free Zone in order to monitor the movements of those suspected of carrying contraband. Assistance to USCINCSO was provided from the continental United States in carrying out surveys as to equipment required on as secretive a basis as possible, and special optical equipment to include probable night television was approved by the Secretary of the Army for expedited delivery to USCINCSO.

e. A joint survey and mobile training team from USCINCSO continued assistance to Venezuelan authorities in improving indigenous capabilities for surveillance and interception of intruders.

f. A US Southern Command Operations Plan 50-63 was developed to provide for three levels of operational assistance to Venezuela in surveillance and intercept operations. Representatives of the US Strike Command and the Air Defense Command visited USCINCSO to assist in developing detailed supporting plans.

g. Information was obtained by USCINCSO concerning in-country communications capabilities of Colombia and Venezuela to receive and disseminate surveillance information provided by US forces.

5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. US Army training included the following: 13 students from 6 countries completed CI operations course in the Canal Zone; 8 students from 5 countries completed CI orientation course in the Canal Zone; 24 students from 8 countries completed Military Intelligence course in the Canal Zone; 11 Chilean students completed special Military Intelligence orientation course; three Canal Zone-based CI Mobile Training Teams (MTT) carried out training programs in Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela; and one Canal Zone-based CI MTT commenced a training program of Panamanian National Guardsmen.

b. US Navy training included the following:

(1) The Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) completed training the third class of Central American nationals, bringing to 63 the total number of students trained since May 1963.

(2) The semiannual maintenance check of two Panamanian 40 foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) was commenced on 16 December by an on-the-job training (OJT) program. Work should be completed by 10 January 1964.

(3) Work was temporarily suspended on two 40 foot CGUBs in Costa Rica due to the lack of critical spare parts. It is anticipated work will be completed by 15 January 1964.

c. Increases in the stock levels of the Canal Zone stockpile of riot control equipment were directed on 20 December 1963. Increases will enable USCINCSO to respond to urgent requests from Latin American governments. Buildup concerned primarily tear gas grenades, gas masks, carbines and shotgun ammunition.

d. Final arrangements were made with the Bertram Boat Company of Miami for delivery of 10 outboard-inboard fiber glass boats to Cabamis, Venezuela for use in the Lake Maracaibo area. Boats, spares and an MTT will be delivered to destination by 14 January 1964.

e. Action has been taken to expedite the shipment of radio-electronic gear to Jamaica for use in the joint surveillance program designed to combat Castro-inspired insurgency in the Caribbean area. Equipment should arrive in Jamaica within the next few weeks.

f. A US Air Force Air Commando MTT demonstrated in Asuncion, Paraguay.

8. Other Special Actions.

a. Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Ecuador and Nicaragua and the Ground-to-Air facilities in Ecuador have been completed.

b. Authority to proceed with the LAMCS in Honduras was received from the US State Department on 17 December 1963. This facility should be completed within 120 days.

c. Emergency power units to improve reliability of US Army and Air Force Mission radio stations in Colombia and Venezuela, shipped from the United States, arrived in Bogota and Caracas respectively.

A S G O S A 353 CUBA SECRET	091.411	020 Staff	031.2 JCS	201 Reynolds, John

1-2-63

From: John Reynolds, KCS
To: C/Staff
Subj: Interdepartmental Coordinating Comte of Cuban Affairs: Rpt on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

rw Incl: None
Dis: Col. Haig 1-3-64
FW 1-30-63

OSA 3004

OSA 353 Cuba 1-2-63 FW 1-30-63

OSA FORM 3
31 MAY 49

THIS PAPER BELONGS TO:
Administrative Support Group Division, Office of the Secretary of the Army

★ U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1963—683865

CONFIDENTIAL

SAOGC/LtColHaig/lc/59856/18Dec63

OSA 353 CUBA

December 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL WADE ROBERT
Office of the Secretary of Defense
(International Security Affairs)

12-18-63

SUBJECT: State Paper Entitled "Terrorism in the Latin American Countries on the Critical Insurgency List"

Enclosed herewith is a paper prepared by a member of the Cuban Coordinating Committee at the Department of State (Mr. William Bowdler, 182-3736) for use by the Department of State representative at the Special Group (Counterinsurgency) meeting on December 19, 1963. The paper was provided to this office by State on December 18 with the request that Department of Defense comments, particularly on the basic memorandum, be obtained. Although this office is very much concerned with the aspects of the paper which deal with the problem of Castro-inspired subversion, the broader implications of the paper pertain to the Latin American area and the military assistance programs related thereto. These are, of course, matters of primary concern to your office. Therefore, the attached paper is forwarded to you for appropriate action with the request that your comments, if any, be coordinated with this office so that they can be correlated to actions currently under the purview of this office.

FW 1-30-63

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA

for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

OSA, OSG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SAOGC/LtColHaig/1c/59856/18Dec63

December 18, 1963

OSA 353 CUBA

12-18-63

FW 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR DIRECTOR, DDR&E
Office of the Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT: Anti-Sabotage Operations in Latin America

The Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs (ICCOCA) has recently considered a CIA proposal to provide guidance to US firms in Latin America confronted with Castro-communist inspired sabotage of their facilities and assets. CIA has contracted for the preparation of a report which will consolidate the experiences of several US firms in Latin America in combatting sabotage. After consideration by the ICCOCA this report will be furnished through our country teams in Latin America to local US firms to assist them in instituting appropriate anti-sabotage programs.

I would be most grateful if you would prepare a brief report designed to supplement the CIA project which would include enumeration of general guidelines which might be adopted by US firms in the Latin American area in combatting sabotage. In particular, an enumeration of known appropriate anti-sabotage devices available on the commercial market together with the manufacturer's names would be most helpful.

A member of my staff has discussed this project with Mr. Phelps of your staff, who has indicated that DDR&E might be of assistance in this matter based on a recent field trip to Venezuela where problems peculiar to that area were studied at the request of the US Ambassador. It is also possible that commercial devices developed for South Vietnam would have applicability in Latin America. Because this project is designed for distribution to several Latin American countries, it is requested that where possible guidelines be developed which might have general application throughout Latin America, but with emphasis on key subversive target areas. Present plans anticipate finalization of this project by December 23, 1963.

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

OSA, ASG
Mr Califano
LtCol Haig

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

17 DEC 1963

OSA 353 CUBA 12-17-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion

Enclosed herewith is the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion for the period 1 November-1 December 1963. The format of this report adheres to the topic outline disseminated at the meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion, September 13, 1963.

It is requested that this office be provided with 12 copies of the final report. It is assumed that each of the representatives will have an opportunity to consider the final report before it is forwarded.

FW ~~1-3-63~~ 1-30-63

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OFFICE

DEC 18 9 24 AM '63

COORDINATION OFFICE

FILE

SECRET

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

OSA, ASG Control No. 2915-E

STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO COUNTER SUBVERSION FOR THE PERIOD 1 NOV - 1 DEC 1963

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms.

a. On 9 November 1963 the Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command (USCINCSO) advised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) of reports concerning suspected subversive arms smuggling into Venezuela or Colombia from the Colon Free Zone, Panama. USCINCSO initiated surveillance at first light on 9 November 1963 to detect and track surface vessels which might be engaged in the subversive traffic. The JCS directed the Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT) to commence surveillance with radar equipped aircraft and to keep USCINCSO advised of all information. Suspected craft were not positively identified or intercepted; however, there were indications that an unidentified surface vessel off the Rio Hacha area of Colombia and in Colombian waters was probably in contact with small boats operating from the Colombian coastline at night.

b. As directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USCINCSO developed a plan under which the United States could provide assistance to Venezuelan forces, on three levels of participation, designed to prevent the surreptitious movement of Castro-Communist arms and personnel into Venezuela. To be fully effective, the plan calls for US elements operating from Venezuelan territory which is not considered a likely subject for approval by the Government of Venezuela at the present time.

c. A joint survey and mobile training team of eleven men was provided by USCINCSO to Venezuela on 22 November 1963, upon approval of the concept by the Government of Venezuela. The purpose of the team is to train Venezuelan military personnel in organizing and operating a joint operations center; in improving capabilities in the plotting and coordination of intelligence data, and aerial photography; and in coordinating all Venezuelan military and paramilitary organizations involved in surveillance and intercept operations.

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS
DOD DIR 5200.10

5. Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities.

a. Two minesweepers from the US Atlantic Command, USS STURDY and USS SWERVE with Commander Mine Division 44 embarked, commenced a schedule of visits to Caribbean ports in Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Guatemala. Visits are intended to assist each country in improving its coastal and off-shore surveillance effort, to improve intercept capabilities with respect to the prevention of infiltration of arms and subversive personnel through the countries' territorial waters, and to establish procedures which would provide for US assistance in final interception when requested. Visits in November, under the supervision of USCINCSO, covered Puerto Limon, Costa Rica; Bluefields and Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua; and Puerto Barrios, Guatemala.

b. Seventy-eight Latin American officers, previously enrolled, were in attendance during November at courses stressing counterinsurgency conducted by the US Army Canal Zone school. Two officers graduated from the US Army Counterinsurgency Course at Fort Bragg, North Carolina on 12 November 1963 and two additional officers are now in attendance.

c. Seven US Army Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams based in the Canal Zone, consisting of twenty officers and thirty-five enlisted men, provided training in seven Latin American countries during November.

d. Nine enlisted men from Chile were in attendance at Marine Corps schools at Camp Pendleton, California in November.

e. US Coast Guard training in small boat operations was provided in the Canal Zone for fifteen students from five Caribbean countries in the operation and maintenance of forty-foot Coast Guard utility boats. A Coast Guard mobile training team of one officer and two enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training in Costa Rica for the reconditioning of Coast Guard utility boats. Five members of the Costa Rican Guardia Civil are receiving on-the-job training in connection with reconditioning of the boats.

f. A US Air Force counterinsurgency team of five officers and eight enlisted men, based in the Canal Zone, provided training for Ecuadorian Air Force personnel in Ecuador.

g. At the request of USCINSO, and with the enthusiastic support of the Venezuelan Government, a small boat program has been initiated to provide security for the Lake Maracaibo region. Arrangements have been made through the US Navy under Military Credit Sales agreement for the manufacture of six (6) 25-foot and four (4) 31-foot inboard-outboard, fiberglass hull boats by Bertram Boat Company, Miami, for delivery in December 1963 or early January 1964. A SEAL-trained Mobile Training Team (MTT) of one officer and five enlisted men will be provided by the Navy and will report to the equipment supplier in time to become fully acquainted with the boats by 15 December. The MTT will accompany the boats to Venezuela and will remain up to two months in country to provide necessary familiarization training.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Surveillance.

a. Upon receipt of intelligence pertaining to suspected arms smuggling from the Canal Free Zone, Panama into Colombia or Venezuela, the USCINCSO relayed this information to Colombia and Venezuela by the Military Alerting System. The US Ambassador to Colombia conveyed the information to the Government of Colombia. Colombian Navy and Air Force elements were assigned increased surveillance missions in the Caribbean coastal area of Colombia by Colombian military authorities and results of their surveillance activities were provided to USCINCSO by the US Military Group Commander in Colombia. The results of US air surveillance of the expected route and landing area, undertaken by US Air Force and Naval air elements were transmitted to the US Military Group Commander in Colombia for passage to the Colombian military authorities.

b. The motor vessel BLUE STAR, of Panamanian registry, was apprehended by Ecuadorian authorities in November 1963 as it was attempting the clandestine introduction of contraband articles into Ecuador. Ship movement information had been provided to the US Naval Attache Bogota by the District Intelligence Officer of the Fifteenth Naval District. There was no apparent involvement of Cuban arms or Cuban trained personnel in this instance.

7. Other Special Actions.

a. Construction is now in progress on the Latin American Military Communications System (LAMCS) in Quito, Ecuador; the terminal station is expected to be completed in December 1963. The station in Nicaragua is expected to be completed in early December 1963.

b. In response to a request by USCINCSO, action was taken on 15 November 1963 to expedite delivery of communications equipment required to implement a Jamaican integrated coastal surveillance system. The system was originally approved as part of the $500 thousand one-time grant of Military Assistance material directed by the President in April 1963, but world-wide shortages of specific items threatened to delay shipment in some cases until FY 1965. In view of the urgency of this requirement, priorities were adjusted to provide delivery by 1 January 1964. The items include:

12	AN/CRC radios and installation kits
3	AN/ARC 3 radios
1	AN/PSM 6
1	Wattmeter

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of Public Safety, State-AID, are studying the possibility of increasing the stock level of certain items of Riot Control Equipment in the Canal Zone, in order to meet rapidly and effectively multiple contingencies that may occur in Latin America. In the past, the size of some requests have necessitated shipment of certain items directly from the United States, with resultant increase in cost and time. USCINCSO has been asked for his recommendations on stock levels.

CONFIDENTIAL

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

2 DEC 1963

In reply refer to:
I-28596/63

OSA 353 Cuba 12-2-63 f/w 1-30-63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR., THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions to Counter Subversion (U)

The enclosure to your Memorandum No. 81, subject as above, dated 26 November 1963, has been received. The report appears to be complete and appropriate for submission to the President.

SIGNED

Frank K. Sloan
Deputy Assistant Secretary

Orig - Mr Califano

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OFFICE
DEC 4 11 36 AM '63

OFFICE
COORDINATION & RECORD
DISPATCHED

ASG

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC

OSA 353 Cuba 11-26-63 f/w 1-30-63

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: DA Memo #64, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG

FILE

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

OSA, ASG Control No. 27071

DRAFT
11/13/63

SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

on CUBAN SUBVERSION

ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA ASG Control No. 2207 F

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and

From

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued Inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several month.

g.

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and

innoculations

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

Measures to counteract

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three CH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.

V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the UnitedSStates

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.

e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three H-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Guatemala Guantanamo City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.

b.

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The

The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospectfor effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

No special actions to report.

VII.

VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.

b.

B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analysés on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries and interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of
A America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in the

the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to allits Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brazilassisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athelete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.

Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of

stronger

stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguayan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector will/be brought to light.

OSA 353 CUBA

29 October 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE GENERAL COUNSEL

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

1. (U) The following information is submitted in response to Memorandum No. 64, General Counsel, dated 19 September 1963.

10-29-63

2. (S) Reference Topic 5 (Strengthening of Counterinsurgency Capabilities):

a. Canal Zone -

(1) Fifteen students from six Latin American countries are attendees in the ten weeks Counterinsurgency Operations Course of the U. S. Army School of the Americas which began 30 September 1963.

FW 1-30-63

(2) There are 24 students from eight Latin American countries attending the 16 weeks Military Intelligence Course which began 23 August 1963.

b. CONUS -

(1) Three students from three Latin American countries are attending the Special Warfare Course at Fort Bragg, N. C.

(2) One Peruvian student is attending the Civil Affairs Course at Fort Gordon, Georgia.

c. In the month of October 1963, eight Counterinsurgency Mobile Training Teams (MTT) (14 Off-48 EM) were deployed in six countries to conduct counterinsurgency training.

d. A U. S. Army officer is attending the Command and General Staff School of the Uruguayan Army and upon completion of this course in December 1963, will be assigned to the OUSARMA, Uruguay. He will perform intelligence advisory functions as an additional duty.

e. An additional officer has been assigned as assistant USARMA in Guatemala, increasing the capability for intelligence assistance in that country.

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2505A FILE file (m)

A56

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS:
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

2314854

KB2

OPS SW OP
SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

3. (S) Reference Topic 6 (Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion):

a. The number of intelligence exchange agreements between the U. S. Army and local military services in Latin America has been increased to 13.

b. The additional officer assigned as Assistant USARMA, Guatemala, raises the collection potential in that nation and may develop information which can be exchanged with Latin American countries.

J. D. ALGER
Major General, GS
Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff
for Military Operations
for Special Operations

G. S. BLANCHARD
Colonel, GS
Director of Special Warfare
ODCSOPS

SECRET

Lt Col Haig/78029/29Oct63/md

October 29, 1963

OSA 353-CUBA 10/29/63

FW 1/30/63

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Revision of the Paper Entitled "Training of Latin Americans in the United States"

At a meeting of the Subcommittee on Subversion on October 10, 1963, the Department of Defense (DOD) Representative was requested to review and up-date the DOD portions of pages 4, 5 and 6 of subject report. Enclosed herewith is a line in line out revision of the report. A revision has also been made to page 7, which is designed to make the DOD portions of the report current.

Signed:
A. M. Haig
Lt Colonel, USA
for Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

sent Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2494C

fil (m)
FILE

COORDINATION & RECORD
OFFICE
DISPATCHED
30 11 56 AM '63
...CE ...E ARMY

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT

SECRET

SECRET

DOD Revision to Paper Entitled "Training of Latin Americans in the United States"

3. Military Assistance Programs

At the ~~present time~~ end of FY 63, ~~2,277~~ 1791 Latin American military students ~~are~~ were receiving, or ~~are programmed to receive~~ have received training in the United States under the Military Assistance Program. Courses vary in length from two-week orientation tours to 83-week flying training courses. However, the majority of instruction is for periods of less than six months, and is distributed in fields as follows:

Flying Instruction (8-83 weeks)	~~172~~	154
Command, Staff and Operational (direction and control of armed forces, 4-23 weeks)	~~748~~	638
Communications/Electronics (6-29 weeks)	~~66~~	36
Equipment Maintenance and Repair (5-28 weeks)	~~336~~	232
Logistics (2-14 weeks)	~~46~~	33
Administration (4-40 weeks)	~~8~~	7
Professional Specialized (Engineering, Medical, Legal etc., 4-20 weeks)	~~306~~	193
Orientation (2-3 weeks)	~~596~~	498

OSA. ASG. CONTROL NO. 2494 C

SECRET

7. Difficulties Encountered in Filling Available Military Quotas in the United States

The failure of Latin American countries to take full advantage of military quotas offered has been a persistent problem. In 1962, for example, 15 per cent of the quotas offered were unfilled. This unfavorable situation derives from many causes. ~~During the current fiscal year 18 per cent of unfilled Army quotas have been due to inability to meet course pre-requisites; 22 per cent because of lack of sufficient funds; and 33 per cent because of political upheavals.~~ The armed forces of the average Latin American country are small, and the availability of qualified candidates who can be spared for extended periods of obligated service and the lack of a professional non-commissioned officer corps also tends to discourage the training of enlisted men in United States schools, since large sums from limited budgets to train enlisted men who will remain in service only a brief time. Another significant deterrent is the per diem rates required by law to be paid by some countries to service personnel sent outside their homeland. In Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay the legal rates for personnel serving abroad are too high to be supportable by defense budgets; while in other countries, such as Bolivia and Paraguay, the standard rates are too late to provide a reasonable living for students.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 74 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL WILLIAM K. JONES, USMC

sent

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report of Meeting of Subcommittee on Subversion

Circulated herewith for information is a report of the October 10, 1963 meeting of subject subcommittee.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD) - sent

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

retained in Gen Counsel

OSA 353 CUBA 10-19-63 F.W. 1-30-63

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

October 14, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Meeting of Subcommittee on Subversion, October 10, 1963

Outlined below is a summary of deliberations of subject subcommittee during the meeting of October 10 at 1430 hours in Room 6273, New State. Agenda is at Tab A.

Agenda Item 1

The Final Subcommittee Report for the months of July and August was circulated. The report has been circulated to points of contact by separate correspondence.

Agenda Item 2

The Subcommittee discussed the SCCS letter which referred to the recent trip of US students to Cuba. (Attached to enclosure 1) It was apparent to all that criticism of the US could be implied from this letter. The Chairman stated he would provide the SCCS with the substance of State's telegram 647, which outlines actions undertaken by the US Government against the students.

Agenda Item 3

a. CIA, in coordination with the Esso Corporation's Chief of Industrial Security, will prepare guidance data for distribution to Latin America which could be utilized by US commercial firms for the protection of their facilities against sabotage. The DOD representative was requested to ascertain whether ARPA had available some commercial protection devices which might be applicable for use in Latin America against sabotage attacks. The CIA representative stated he believed ARPA had developed some devices for this purpose.

CONFIDENTIAL

b. State will prepare a circular telegram to all Latin American Ambassadors requesting that an immediate review of Country Team Emergency and Evacuation Plans be conducted to insure that plans were adequate to meet a stepped-up campaign of Castro-inspired sabotage.

Agenda Item 4

In lieu of a written report on the Honduran guerrilla problem, the DOD representative proposed a firsthand report to the Subcommittee. Colonel Walter Hutchins, who has recently returned from assignment as US Military Attache to Honduras, presented a review of the subversion situation in that country and then answered questions from the Subcommittee. The general thrust of Colonel Hutchins' remarks confirmed that there has been considerable Castro subversive activity in Honduras. The most serious inroads are achieved through communist radio and press and communist educators. Colonel Hutchins commented that recent guerrilla activity along the Nicaraguan border was probably limited to groups totaling between 100 and 200 men. He emphasized that Cuban-trained Honduran guerrillas are successfully transiting by air through Grand Cayman Island and British Honduras with some transiting Havana to Jamaica via Belgrade. In response to a query from a State representative, Colonel Hutchins pointed out that he believed that both Honduran military and commercial interests were genuinely concerned with Castro subversion and that some of their leaders were perfectly capable of discerning the true nature of the communist threat to Honduras.

Agenda Item 5

The Chairman stated that the paper for training Latin Americans in the United States (included in the "Krulak Report"*) was too broad in scope for implementation by the Subcommittee and proposed that it be rewritten under narrower parameters. In this regard, the Defense representative was requested to review pages 4, 5 and 6 of the paper on training contained in the report with the view toward bringing the Defense portion up-to-date.

Miscellaneous

The Chairman stated that preparatory actions on the Isthmian meeting at San Salvador tentatively scheduled for the second half of November would be held in abeyance pending further developments in the Honduran situation.

A. M. Haig, Lt Colonel, GS

---

*Report prepared by the Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion containing a series of action programs designed to impede the Castro-Communist subversive effort in Latin America.

CONFIDENTIAL

October 9, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion.

SUBJECT: Meeting of October 10.

You are invited to a meeting of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion of the Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs to be held on Thursday, October 10, at 2:30 P.M. in Room 6263, State Department (ARA Conference Room).

AGENDA

1. Consideration of draft of monthly report for September.
2. Discussion of letter (copy attached) from SCCS of Pan American Union.
3. Status of papers on contingency planning.
4. Report by DOD on Honduran guerrilla problem.
5. Consideration of the paper on training of Latin Americans in the United States.

CONFIDENTIAL

SPECIAL CONSULTATIVE COMMITTEE ON SECURITY
COMISIÓN ESPECIAL DE CONSULTA SOBRE SEGURIDAD
COMISSÃO CONSULTIVA ESPECIAL DE SEGURANÇA
COMMISSION SPÉCIALE DE CONSULTATION SUR LA SÉCURITÉ

PAN AMERICAN UNION
Washington 6, D.C., U.S.A.
Cable address: PAU WASH DC

October 1st., 1963

Sir:

As you know, the Special Consultative Committee on Security is presently holding the first of its regular meetings, in accordance with the statutes approved by the Council of the Organization on April 23 of this year.

For the better fulfillment of its work, and in accordance with Article 13 of these statutes, the Committee intends to request of the governments of the member states of the Organization any information that they may have regarding specific activities of international communism in this hemisphere.

Among the important activities of this kind are the trips that many individuals make to Cuba for well-know ulterior purposes. In this connection, I should greatly appreciate it if you would furnish the Committee with whatever information your government may deem it advisable to present regarding the trip that a large group of U.S. citizens recently made to Cuba at the invitation of that country's government, about which the Committee has learned through newspaper reports that have recently appeared in this country and in Latin America. This information would be treated with the confidence that your government deemed appropiate.

Thank you in advance for your valuable assistance in this matter.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my highest consideration.

Julio Cesar Doig Sanchez
Chairman
Special Consultative Committee
on Security

Mr. Ward P. Allen
Alternate Representative of the United States
Council of the Organization of American States
Washington, D.C.

SECRET

OSA 353-CUBA

14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC

10/14/63

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

FW 1/30/63

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
cc: DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

fil. (M)

OSA, ASG Control No. 2386 H FILE

SECRET REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

SECRET This document consists of 18 pages
No 14 of 44 Copies, Series A

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

OSA, ASG Control No. 2386 H

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy, the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay greater attention to the information and act on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The report has not been confirmed.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

There have been a number of unconfirmed reports alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, (reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

ANNEX B

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - JULY 1963

NATIONALITY	JULY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	6	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	14	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL	25	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	0	0	
CHILE	20	1	26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA	29	1	26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA	12	0	26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	37	0	26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR	2	0	26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR	4	1	26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA	6	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	33	1	30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO	65	28	26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	5	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA	15	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	3	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PERU	4	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	17	15	26th of July Celebrations. Most attending will remain to work.
VENEZUELA	22	0	26th of July Celebrations.
TOTALS	319	47	

Annex C

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - AUGUST 1963

NATIONALITY	AUGUST TO	AUGUST FROM	PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
ARGENTINA	4	0	26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	5	3	
BRAZIL	0	24	22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	7	10	Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE	22	47	8-Physical Ed. Seminar - 1-Seeking funds - 10-Returning from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA	6	14	
COSTA RICA	0	8	26th July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	1	8	
ECUADOR	0	2	
EL SALVADOR	1	0	
GUATEMALA	3	0	1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	8	
JAMAICA	0	2	
MEXICO	34	63	26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	0	0	
PANAMA	6	0	26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	2	9	9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	10	16	26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA	3	0	26th July Celebrations.
TOTALS	104	214	

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10005-10017

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

DATE : 04/10/1962
PAGES : 6

SUBJECTS :
ANTI-CASTRO CUBANS
MRR GROUP

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 3, Folder 2. Draft copy of Cuba Project Progress Report, 4-11 April 1962, regarding clandestine resistance groups in Cuba.

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority______________________
☐ Refer To______________________
Review Date 12AUG15 By

DRAFT

SECRET

10 APR 1962

CUBA PROJECT PROGRESS REPORT

4 - 11 April 1962

OPERATIONAL

1. An internal leader of the Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR) who was infiltrated into Cuba on 29 December 1961, and exfiltrated on 29 March 1962, said at a debriefing on 7 April that he considers only five clandestine resistance [redacted] organizations in Cuba of national importance: The Directorio Revolucionario Estudantil (DRE), Movimiento Democrat~~a~~ica Cristiano (MDC), Movimiento Revolucionario del Pueblo (MRP), Movimiento Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR), and the 30th of November [redacted] unit. Only these groups have the necessary motivation and discipline to [redacted] establish coordination among themselves. There are a large number of other underground revolutionary [redacted] units which claim to be of national importance but which ~~have~~ consist of no more than two or three dozen men at most and can be found only in the area where they were established. Most of the small [redacted] organizations, appear to have been established by self-named leaders for personal reasons, financial gain through the sale of "bonds," or for future political opportunity [redacted] when Fidel Castro is overthrown. Although the small groups are relatively inactive, their claims to importance have attracted numerous dissidents who could be more useful if they were members of the few larger and more effective organizations. Because

of the boundless personal ambitions of the respective leaders and the geographic dispersion of the units, however, these small groups could never be effectively merged into a centrally directed larger ~~unit~~ organization. To use them effectively we would have to try to siphon off the membership ~~to~~ into controlled groups. If this is not possible, they may serve a useful purpose by providing unwitting diversionary harrassment while the larger groups work toward the major goals.

2. A unilaterally recruited senior officer of the diplomatic service of a neutralist African country has been briefed and given training in secret writing and communications to assist him in reporting on our objectives in Cuba. He is now in Havana from where he plans to travel to other in Cuba areas of interest to us.

3. The Chief of the Danish Intelligence Service has agreed to cooperate with us on Cuban intelligence operations. He has identified several sources aboard ships transitting Cuban ports and has arranged for their periodic briefing and debriefing.

4. The Norwegian Intelligence Service has also agreed to cooperate with us in establishing case officer "centers" in Norway and Kiel, Germany, to handle Norwegian Merchant Marine sources who call at Cuban ports.

5. The Madrid Station Cuban refugee debriefing center is now in operation and results of the first interrogations are ~~now~~ being reviewed

for dissemination. The most interesting and informative refugee thus far is the brother of Amando Hart, the Cuban Minister of Education and member of the twenty-five man ORI Central Committee. The center is also collecting travel and personal documents which may be used for agent operations.

6. We received valuable data on Cuban trade from the debriefing of a former official of the Ministry of Commerce who defected in Canada at the end of March. We were informed in ~~had been advised during~~ February by CIA sources that this official was disaffected and wished to work against Castro. We contacted him and attempted unsuccessfully to induce him to return to Cuba as our agent. We have since expedited his travel to Miami where he is being interrogated.

7. We are in contact with Eva Matos, the sister of Huber Matos, former associate of Fidel Castro, who broke with Fidel and has been in jail on the Isle of Pines since 1960. Although there is no practical method of effecting the escape or release of Huber at present, we will continue contact with his sister, who maintains correspondence with Huber through his father and his wife who are in Cuba.

A.S. [illegible] on these per Bill H

CAC INFORMATION REPORTS

Following are highlights from selected interrogations of Cuban refugees processed through the Caribbean Admission Center (CAC) at

Opa-locka, Florida. This information is secured entirely from untrained observers and is presented partly as original unconfirmed data and partly as a supplement to intelligence already received from controlled reliable sources. All CAC information is screened for use in the daily and weekly Cuban summaries. During the past week [redacted] 1309 Cuban refugees were processed through Miami, ~~prepared~~ 263 preliminary interrogation reports were prepared and disseminated 135 information reports were

8. Numerous reports confirm that all towns have been partitioned into "blocks" infiltrated by communist informants under the direction of block chiefs of the "Comite de Defensa." Th~~e~~ is informant system also [redacted] utilizes [redacted] data procured from the telephone monitoring switchboards established in the telephone centrals of every town. One refugee from the Cuban Telephone Company described a switchboard panel in the "Principe plant" in Havana which was monitoring "20 or 30 positions." These informants, their chiefs, members of the militia, G-2, "chivatos" (provocation agents), and other Castro supporters are now generally labeled by the populace as communists rather than Castroists.

9. While the network of informants protects the home front, officials of the National Directorate of the Integrated Revolutionary Organization (ORI) are increasingly occupied with the export of Castroist-communism to the Western Hemisphere. Flight manifests of Cubana Airlines show that "hundreds of Latin Americans are being brought to

Cuba for training and indoctrination." In addition to regular commercial transportation, charter flights to service these persons are being run thrice monthly throughout South America. In order to avoid Cuban visas and entry-exit stamps in their passports, these persons are given visas on a separate sheet of paper. In Cuba all arrangements are made for them by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP).

10. Soviet military equipment has been reported in increasingly larger quantities and wider disbursement. One refugee said that he saw "20 or 25 wheel-mounted Soviet 100 mm field guns M-55 (identified from photographs) at a militia camp at Miranda near Camaguey.

11. Shortages of certain essential food items have resulted in widespread protests and, in a few instances, to open action by those directly affected. A group of "13 to 15 women" reportedly waylaid a milk truck, overpowered the driver, and each carried off two liters of milk.

12. Refugees described the existence of three resistance organizations, allegedly widespread in membership but limited in action. One, the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario Militar (MRRM) is a group which has broken away from the Movimiento de Recuperacion Revolucionario (MRR). Reportedly, its objective is to apprehend key Castro leaders "when the time is appropriate." MRRM is organized in all provinces except Matanzas and Camaguey where the movement has

now begun to develop a following. The second organisation, the Movimiento Democratico Cristiano (MDC), is described as oriented along traditional Christian democratic lines. It is said to have a "national coordinator, a national executive, provincial, military and political coordinators, and resistance chiefs." They claim that military and counter-revolutionary activities have been limited because of lack of equipment. A third organization, the Unidad Revolucionario (UR), is reported to be carrying out the sabotage of sugar fields by burning, using a small incendiary device made of gelatin, match heads, potassium permanganate tablets, and glycerine.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10005-10018

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : MULTIPLE
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 123

SUBJECTS :
ARMS SMUGGLING, CUBA
LATIN AMERICA SECURITY
CUBAN SPONSORED SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/1997

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 6, Folder 30. Assorted documents related to Cuban material support of Communist subversives in Latin America.

JFK Records Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 3/12/2015 By

ARMS SHIPMENTS - TO
AND FROM CUBA

SECRET

ARMS SHIPMENT

General: Arms smuggling is one of the "facts of life" in Latin America and has been engaged in by dissident elements for many years. Reports of Castro involvement in these activities have been frequent since shortly after his seizure of power early in 1959. None of these reports has ever been proven. With the arrival of large quantities of Soviet Bloc arms in 1961, Cuba recovered all U.S. arms in the hands of the populace and made it a crime punishable by death to have possession of weapons of U.S. manufacture. The U.S. arms furnished under the MAP to former Cuban governments together with those collected by Castro provide the Castro government with large stocks which could be shipped to subversive groups in other countries. Identification of these arms with Cuba would be extremely difficult.

TAB

1 Reports of Method of Operation

This Tab contains five items: (1) Two reports alledging arms smuggling by fishermen and by means of food products shipped to Latin America; (2) A report which indicates that a Cuban arms cache discovered in Brazil is not of Cuban origin; and (3) Two reports concerning a Cuban arsenal purportedly being used to supply arms for an invasion of some Caribbean country or an invasion of South America.

2 Reports of Arms Smuggling

This Tab contains a number of items reporting arms smuggling to Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, Venezuela, British Guiana and Brazil. Note particularly the top item in which the British indicate the numerous reports on arms smuggling to British

SECRET

Guiana are without foundation and the second item which refutes the report contained in the Life Magazine article of 8 February.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Exporting Revolution

COUNTRY CUBA/LATIN AMERICA

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,152

SUBJECT POSSIBLE CONCEALMENT OF WEAPONS FOR SHIPMENT TO LATIN AMERICA

DATE DISTR. 6 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. LATE 1962

REFERENCES IN 62553
35871

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (4 FEBRUARY 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO.

APPRAISAL 6

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE U.S. OWNER (C) OF A MARINA, FROM A FORMER CUBAN AIR FORCE OFFICER, FROM THE BROTHER OF AN EMPLOYEE OF A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL.

1. IN LATE 1962 A DAY-SHIFT EMPLOYEE AT A CANNERY IN SAN CRISTOBAL, PINAR DEL RIO PROVINCE, FOUND A HAND GRENADE WRAPPED IN NYLON AND BEDDED IN SHREDDED COCONUT IN A CAN WHICH HAD FELT UNUSUALLY HEAVY. (FIELD COMMENT: IT IS NOT CLEAR WHETHER THE CAN HAD GONE THROUGH THE CANNING PROCESS AND HAD BEEN SEALED.) AS A RESULT OF HIS DISCOVERY THE WORKER WAS ALMOST FIRED. ONE OF THE MILITIA GUARDS AT THE CANNERY SAID THAT AMMUNITION AND OTHER EQUIPMENT IS REGULARLY CANNED AND SHIPPED TO LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES. A SPECIAL NIGHT SHIFT WORKS AT THE PLANT.

2. (FIELD COMMENT: AN UNTESTED SOURCE REPORTED IN EARLY OCTOBER 1962 THAT IN JULY 1962 A STORY WAS CIRCULATING IN SAN

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	D/A	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	XXX	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR													REPCINCLANT		INS		EXO

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

ANDRES, AN ISLAND POSSESSION OF COLOMBIA, THAT A PISTOL HAD BEEN FOUND EARLIER CONCEALED INSIDE A FROZEN CHICKEN WHICH HAD BEEN PART OF A SHIPMENT RECEIVED FROM CUBA.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

An arms cache of weapons and ammunition recently discovered at the Ligas Camponesas guerrilla training center in the interior of the Brazilian state of Goias is believed by US Embassy and CAS officers to be of Brazilian rather than Cuban arms, despite a Brazilian newspaper suggestion that they were Cuban. There were also discovered about 125 copies of Communist publications including Che Guevara's well-known treatise on "Guerrilla Warfare". The training center was described as organized according to that book. A confidential report on the discoveries added that "members of the center want to be the Brazilian equivalent of those who fought in the Sierra Maestra and so bring the hard Chinese-Cuban type revolution to Brazil." Some 90 to 95 persons in the locality are reported members of or sympathetic to the Ligas Camponesas activities, but only 2 of the 24 for whom warrents were issued have yet been taken into custody. (Am Emb, Rio de Janeiro 1122, 10 December, CONFIDENTIAL, and CIA, Brasilia, IN 33026, 11 December, SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY Export of Rev.

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

w/ it PKW

COUNTRY	Cuba/USSR/Latin America	REPORT NO.	CS-3/530,898
SUBJECT	1. Use of Soviet Fishing Boats to Transport Arms to Latin America 2. Belgian Arms Dealer in Habana	DATE DISTR.	11 December 1962
		NO. PAGES	1
DATE OF INFO.	Paras. 1 & 2: October 1962; Para. 3: August 1962	REFERENCES	RD -W-2107 RD-ACQ-01258
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paras. 1, 2: France, Paris; Para. 3: Spain, Madrid Paras. 1, 2: 23 November 1962; Para. 3: 12 October 1962	FIELD REPORT NO.	38957

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paras. 1 & 2: An official French service; Para. 3: CC-1197, Cuban refugee (F), a former employee of the Cuban diplomatic service, who visited Santiago de Cuba in August 1962, Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. Soviet fishing boats, under cover of fishing Atlantic waters, are transporting contraband arms to Latin American countries. The boats are met outside the territorial waters of those countries, and arms are transferred in small quantities. On board the Soviet boats are only Soviets and a very few Cubans or other Latin Americans who talk with those who pick up the arms. The arms being delivered are of American manufacture, including those obtained during the Batista regime and those taken during the Playa Giron invasion. The Soviet fishing boats also carry propaganda and pamphlets containing military instructions, the same type of material being sent by diplomatic pouch from Mexico.

2. A Belgian in Habana who says he represents a Belgian firm, has offered the Cuban Government any type and nationality of arms for payment in dollars. The Belgian has made a similar offer of sale of arms to a representative of an anti-Castro group in Habana.

3. In August 1962 a fisherman in Santiago de Cuba said that on several occasions he had been forced by the Government to use his boat for transporting small groups of men, in civilian clothes, and supplies of arms. He also knew of other fishermen who had been forced to do the same. The men and arms were carried to small islands or transferred to other boats at sea. Such trips sometimes lasted as long as four or five days. The fisherman did not know the purpose or final destination of the men and arms.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #		COAST GUARD	X									I&NS	X		

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Cy plant g Rev.

CIA INFORMATION REPORT CS-3/532,138

COUNTRY: CUBA

26 December 1962

SUBJECT: IDENTIFICATION OF CUBAN VESSELS ALLEGEDLY PREPARED TO INVADE A CARIBBEAN COUNTRY

DATE OF INFO: 28 NOVEMBER 1962

SOURCE: TRAVELING SALESMAN (F)

APPRAISAL OF CONTENT: 3

HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: ACCORDING TO TDCS-3/530,589, DATED 6 DECEMBER 1962, AS OF MID-NOVEMBER TWO CUBAN SHIPS LOADED WITH PERSONNEL AND EQUIPMENT WERE XXXX SAID TO BE PREPARED FOR AN INVASION OF HAITI. SOURCE SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE NAMES OF THE SHIPS AND THEIR DEPARTURE DATE.

THE FRUCUBA AND THE FUNDADOR, CUBAN-FLAG VESSELS, WERE DOCKED AT THE ARSENAL DOCKS IN CASABLANCA (HABANA) IN LATE NOVEMBER. THESE XXXX VESSELS WERE SCHEDULED TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INVASION OF SOME CARIBBEAN COUNTRY.

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

ARMS SHIPMENTS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Stockpile of War Materiel for Latin America (C)

Early January 1962

Habana, c/a 7 January 62
C-5
DUJ 316/36-6-62

19 January 1962

1 of 1

None

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-43-62

1. Source reports an arsenal or stockpiling of war materiel at Casablanca, a Habana District, northeast shore of Habana Bay, Habana Province.

2. Source has heard this materiel is targeted for an invasion of South America.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS
INTERVALS NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPNS BRANCH

Venezuela Uncovers Communist Arms Cache

The Venezuelan Government -- in a raid on a small village near Caracas on 5 January -- uncovered a large cache of arms and equipment which it claims belonged to the pro-Castro Armed Forces of National Liberation, reputed to be emerging as a para-military arm of the Venezuelan Communist Party. Several tons of explosives and large quantities of hand bombs, arms, and ammunition were seized as well as a nearby clandestine Communist radio transmitter. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SOURCE: TDCS 533,071 (S/NFD); FBIS (OUO); PRESS

ARMS SHIPMENTS

12 Feb 63 "All the information available to Her Majesty's Government and to the British authorities in British Guiana indicates that there is no truth whatever in the continuing reports that arms are being shipped to the colony from Cuba. Similar stories have appeared from time to time in the past, but upon examination all have been found to be without foundation."

(British Embassy in US to Reuters, AP and UPI).

SECRET

12 February 1963

SUBJECT: (U) Reported Arms Shipment from Cuba on 14 Jan 63

1. The 8 February 1963 edition of LIFE contains a story on Cuba with the following caption under the photo of a Russian freighter:

> "But refugees aboard the SHIRLEY LYKES said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana."

2. A debrief report of a Cuban national who arrived at Port Everglades on 25 January 1963 contained the following statement:

> "I was told by an assistant ship inspector for the Port of Havana that on 14 January 1963 two launches captained by a man with what appeared to be an Italian accent had departed from the La Coubre wharf (Havana). Manifest on ship indicated the destination was British Guiana. However, the ship inspector had been told by the stevedores at the wharf that two launches were loaded with arms and the true destination was Venezuela."

TD/00-K-3249336 DTG 281805Z

3. The following information may refer to this arms shipment. An untested CIA source, a member of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali, has stated that during a conversation on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zapata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P.I. Plata, a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker - Student - Peasant Movement (MOEC), in Colombia and Venezuela. Plata said that the MOEC is not a local movement but rather a part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOEC groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963. (Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, Colombia, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.)

CIA Report CS-3/5[illegible], dated 10 Jan 63 Ref RD-N-2107

5. Another report may also refer to this arms shipment. According to information dated 1 February 1963 from a CIA source and appraised by the CIA preparing office as possible true, Pedro MATOS, who together with the three-member regional command committee of the Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) in the state of Zulia is responsible for PCV arms matters in that state, said recently that the party is awaiting a shipment of arms from Cuba and Panama but that the exact date of arrival is still unknown.

CIA Report TDCS-3/536,942, dtd 9 Feb 63 Ref IN 64876

6. Replies to DIA SICR's on this subject from NSA and CNO do not indicate any vessels departing Havana on or after 14 January bound for British Guiana, nor do State Department queries to Georgetown, British Guiana indicate the arrival of any arms. No reports have been received from service attaches in Venezuela or from sources in Panama concerning this particular matter.

Project Officer:
CDR Barton

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CONFIDENTIAL

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Cuba

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CONFIDENTIAL (When Filled In) | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS | NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA / HONDURAS / COSTA RICA / CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/534,035

SUBJECT PLANS TO LAND ARMS FROM CUBA IN HONDURAS

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

Export J Rev

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 9 JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 50511

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (15 JANUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. HNM-729

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A NICARAGUAN JOURNALIST (C) FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL (F) IN SAN JOSE; FROM CESAR AUGOSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS

ACTION COPY
OPERATIONS AREA

1. ON 9 JANUARY 1963 CESAR AUGUSTO VILLAREAL CABEZAS, A NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY LIVING IN SAN JOSE, SAID THAT HE WAS AWAITING INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES, HONDURAS TO RECEIVE A SHIPMENT OF ARMS WHICH WILL COME FROM CUBA ON THE "CORK_C", A MERCHANT VESSEL OF UNKNOWN REGISTRY. HE SAID THAT THE INSTRUCTIONS TO GO TO PUERTO CORTES WILL COME FROM CUBA THROUGH DR. EMILIO ORTEGA TAPIA.

2. THE "CORK_C" WILL UNLOAD THE ARMS AT CAYO COCHINO WHERE THEY WILL BE RECEIVED BY GRIFFIN (FNU), WHO LIVES IN PUERTO CORTES. GRIFFIN WILL DELIVER THE ARMS TO VILLAREAL AT PUERTO CORTES.

3. THE ARMS WILL BE TAKEN FROM PUERTO CORTES TO PUEBLO NUEVO,

CONFIDENTIAL | CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS | NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 8112

FORM 5-62 1Kq OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

0000

NICARAGUA BY VILLAREAL, JULIO VELASQUEZ VELEZ, AND DR. HERNAN SILVA ARGUELLO WHERE THEY WILL BE TURNED OVER TO DR. EMILIO FLORES OBREGON.

4. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE DATE OF ARRIVAL OF THE "CORK C" IS UNKNOWN. CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST GUERRILLA LEADER IN HONDURAS, HAS RECEIVED ARMS FROM CUBA BY THE SAME SYSTEM.)

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 8112

END OF MESSAGE

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET 1963 FEB 9 11 41
(When Filled In)

COUNTRY VENEZUELA

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/536,942

DIAAP-3

SUBJECT POSSIBLE SHIPMENT OF ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA TO WESTERN VENEZUELA

DATE DISTR. 9 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 1 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 64876

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, MARACAIBO (1 FEBRUARY 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC-2651

APPRAISAL 3

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A MEMBER (C) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA IN MARACAIBO.

1. PEDRO MATOS, WHO TOGETHER WITH THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND
COMMITTEE OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY
OF VENEZUELA) IN THE STATE OF ZULIA IS RESPONSIBLE FOR PCV ARMS MATTERS
IN THAT STATE, SAID RECENTLY THAT THE PARTY IS AWAITING A SHIPMENT OF
ARMS FROM CUBA AND PANAMA BUT THAT THE EXACT DATE OF ARRIVAL IS STILL
UNKNOWN OURCE COMMENT: ALTHOUGH THE LOCATIONS OF ARMS ARE KNOWN
ONLY TO MATOS AND THE REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE
AREA AROUND LA CONCEPCION AND LA PAZ, TOWNS APPROXIMATELY SOUTHWEST
AND WEST, RESPECTIVELY, OF MARACAIBO CITY IN THE DISTRICT OF MARACAIBO,
ARE SITES). (FIELD COMMENT: ACCORDING TO SOURCE, THE REGIONAL

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

GROUP
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

AAP-3

FORM 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

WORKING COPY

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS-3/536,942

IN 64876

PAGE 2

WORKING COPY

COMMITTEE OF THE PCV IN THE STATE OF ZULIA HAD BEEN DISSOLVED AS OF EARLY 3 '63 AND A THREE MEMBER REGIONAL COMMAND COMMITTEE ESTABLISHED).

2. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

AAP-3

CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
STAFF MESSAGE DIVISION
INCOMING MESSAGE

RETRANSMITTED TO: SAC, TAC, CONAD, AFSC, MATS (per req Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

AF IN: 50955 (24 Feb 62) K/eld

ACTION: CIN-17 (18)

A/D: ARMY-2, NAVY-2, CMC-7, JCS-45, OSD-15 OSD/SDLU-1, STATE-15, CIA-11, NSA-7 XPD-3, ISI-2, IDS-2 (112) (Rlsd by Mr Kerp-CIN-25Feb62)

RC 41/24 FEB 62
RQ/RQ/RQ
PRIORITY
231841Z
FM USAIRA MEXICO CITY
TO CSAF WASH DC
1127 USAF FAG FT BELVOIR VA //PROTECTED//
INFO CIARC ALBROOK AFB CZ
USAIRAS GUATEMALA BRAZIL VENEZUELA
BT

CONFIDENTIAL XX CITE CHARLIE DASH NINE SGD HARRIS PARA MILITARY REP OF EURHPEAN WESTERN NATION ACCREDITED MEXICO REPORTED TWO TWO FEB HAVING RECD INFO FROM TWO DIFFERENT SOURCES THAT CUBAN SHIPLOAD OF ARMS HAD DEPARTED EITHER SANTIAGO DE CUBA OR BAHIA DE NIPE TWO XERO DEGREE FOUR FIVE MINUTES NORTH SEVEN FIVE DEGREES FOUR XERO MINUTES WEST DURING WEEK OF ONE ONE TO ONE SEVEN FEB PD SHIP REPORTEDLY HEADED FOR BRITISH GUIANA OR NORTHEAST BRAZIL PD LOCAL EMB INTEL AGENCIES UNABLE CONFIRM PARA SCP DASH THREE

BT

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS; NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED. DOD DIR. 5200.10

ACTION: AF, (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, ORD
DA IN 205836

AFHQ FORM NOV 59 0-309a
PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS FORM MAY BE USED.

CONFIDENTIAL

The British consul in Santiago de Cuba has informed Washington and the Governor of British Guiana that two alleged US citizens, John Allram Johnson, aged 53, and his wife Margaret Frances Johnson, were leaving Cuba on 31 December on the Cuban vessel BAHIA DE TANAMA destined for Georgetown, British Guiana. On board with them were 17 cases in their name, including two large wood crates understood to be "very similar to those recently unloaded from a Soviet Union ship in Santiago de Cuba." The British consul notes the unlikelihood of US citizens' leaving Cuba in this manner, and the resulting doubt as to their real identities and intentions. (British Foreign Office to Washington, No. 9759, 31 December, 1962 (SECRET))

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Cuba/British Guiana	REPORT NO.	00-K-3,210,102
SUBJECT	Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana	DATE DISTR.	21 Feb 62
		NO. PAGES	One
		REFERENCES	CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5 Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX
DATE OF INFO.	Dec 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	--; Dec 1962		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962. Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State 02147

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

FEB 6 10 16 AM '63

36

Origin
EUR

Info:
SS
G
SAL
ARA
P
USIA
SCA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
RMR

ACTION: Amembassy GEORGETOWN 286

UNCLASSIFIED MESSAGE REFERRING
TO THIS MESSAGE BY CITE NUMBER
WILL BE DESIGNATED EFTO

The Feb 8 edition of LIFE contains story on Cuba with following caption under photo of Russian freighter:

QUOTE

But refugees aboard the Shirley Lykes said two ships put out from Mariel (Cuba) only last week with holds loaded with weapons sent by Castro to British Guiana. UNQUOTE

Would appreciate any available comment.

END

1963 P-3 21 25

RUSK

ACTION: STATE (ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS
DA IN 827722

Drafted by:
EUR:BNA:RTepper:cjk 2/5/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by:
~~BNA - Mr. Knox~~

Clearances:

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

000

FORM 8-61 DS-322

INCOMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

54
Action
EUR

Info
SS
G
SAL
ARA
P
USIA
SCA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
MR

CONFIDENTIAL

8 1013
1963 13

Control: 4682
Rec'd: February 7, 1963
12:57 PM

FROM: Georgetown

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 245, February 7, NOON

Reference: Department's 286 February 6.

Neither harbor master nor shipping companies have any knowledge Cuban ships en route Georgetown. Guiana Import-Export agents for sales rice Cuba, states it is always notified as soon as rice ships leave Cuba so that necessary arrangements at RMB wharf can be made. It denies having received any notice recently. Governor also reports negative results his inquiries.

CONGEN has had numerous inquiries AP story mentioned TOUSI 18. Appreciate any clarification (not for release to press) Department can give.

MELBY

TEK/18

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

FBIS 84 OFFICIAL USE ONLY

PARIS AFP IN ENGLISH TO THE FAR EAST 1905 7 FEB 63 E

(EXCERPT) GEORGETOWN--BRITISH GUIANA IN A STATE OF NEAR PANIC TODAY AFTER NEWSPAPERS AND RADIO STATIONS PUT OUT A WASHINGTON NEWSPAPER REPORT THAT CUBA WAS SENDING TWO SHIPS FULL OF SOVIET ARMS TO THIS COUNTRY. PREMIER CHEDDI JAGAN CALLED THE REPORT FROM THE WASHINGTON EVENING STAR FANTASTIC AND UNFOUNDED. A SPOKESMAN IN THE HOME AFFAIRS MINISTRY SAID THE GOVERNMENT EXPECTED NO ARMS FROM THE SOVIET UNION OR CUBA.

7 FEB 749P FG/OP

OUTGOING TELEGRAM Department of State

04289

Cuba

INDICATE: ☐ COLLECT
☐ CHARGE TO

CONFIDENTIAL

FEB 9 11 17 AM '63

1963 FEB 11 14 04

DIA-3

RECEIVED

59

Origin
EUR

Info:
SS
SR
G
SP
SAL
ARA
E
STR
P
USIA
SCA
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

RMR

ACTION: AmConGen GEORGETOWN 293

UrTel 245

Washington ~~investigation~~ intelligence agencies have no information to confirm alleged munitions shipments from Cuba to Georgetown.

~~Sox~~ Story originated with caption current edition Life Magazine to effect two Russian ships carrying munitions from Mariel, Cuba to BG. O'Leary of Washington Evening Star apparently seized on Life story as basis Evening Star article. Unlikely any responsible US official confirm story as O'Leary alleged in article.

If repeat if Department is asked by press, we plan say we have no information but are making inquiries.

END

RUSK

Drafted by:
EUR:BNA:RJTepper:ldd 2/8/63

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: EUR/BNA - M. Gordon Knox

Clearances:
INR - Mr. Packman
EUR/P - Mr. McGowan
INR/CS - Mr. Simmons
~~ARA - Mr. [illegible]~~
CCA - Mr. Follestad

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

FORM 8-61 DS-322

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	British Guiana/Cuba	REPORT NO.	00-B-3,247,344
SUBJECT	Jagan's Political-Economic Viewpoints/Expropriation of Foreign Properties Linked to Foreign Aid/Futility of Jagan's 5-Year Plan/Peoples Progressive Party Infiltration of United Front/Arms Smuggling from Cuba/Filariasis Disease Common in Guiana Back Country.	DATE DISTR.	11 Jan 63
		NO. PAGES	
		REFERENCES	
DATE OF INFO.	Thru Oct 62		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	British Guiana/Thru Oct 62		

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: US national, executive in a US aluminum company.

Source has frequently traveled to and within British Guiana in connection with geological surveys for his company. He has known Jagan for about nine years, and on his latest trip had several conversations with Jagan.

1. On the basis of many conversations with Cheddi Jagan (mostly concerning possible investments by my company in British Guiana), I am convinced that he is not a Communist. In fact, Jagan does not know what he is. He is simply looking for anything new that will help to pull up his people quickly. In this context he sees Soviet and Chinese Communism as the two principal Twentieth Century economic experiments -- and as economic experiments he is willing to try them.

2. In talking with me, Jagan has made clear that he is not a "Castro Type." He wants help from anybody. The one thing that might in the future seriously hinder his getting economic aid from the USSR is that he demands that aid be without strings.

3. Both Jagan and his Trade Minister, Frank Hubbard, have told me that Jagan would hesitate to do anything (such as confiscating foreign properties in an attempt to increase revenues) which would offend the US or the UN for fear of ruining any future chances of obtaining US or UN aid. Jagan is of course quite conscious that he is still under the UK and that it is therefore unconstitutional for him to expropriate anything. After British Guiana achieves independence, I am confident Jagan would not expropriate anything if he is getting aid from the US or the UN -- that is, until the money is spent. If at any point (after independence) Jagan is receiving no such aid and has no prospects of receiving such aid, then anything could happen. I would, however, temper this somewhat depressing estimate of Jagan by commenting that in 1953 when he entered office, he was something of a wild-eyed fanatic without direction. Since then he has matured considerably.

W Hemes

4. The PPP capability for increasing the industrial wealth of British Guiana is hopeless. Jagan indiscriminately wants all kinds of factories. His "Five Year Plan" is no plan at all. In his eagerness to do something for British Guiana, Jagan thinks he ought to build any kind of factory that the country does not have. Whenever he thinks of something, he just tells a subordinate to add it to the Plan. But there is no one in the Jagan government who has done or can do the marketing research, etc., which is necessary for any such investment.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

STATE		ARMY		NAVY		AIR		FBI		AEC					

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CONTROLLED NO DISSEM ABROAD NO FOREIGN DISSEM

5. In the last elections Jagan ordered some of his (Indian) Peoples Progressive Party (PPP) supporters to join the United Front Party (UFP) in order to impress the world in general and the US in particular that democracy in British Guiana was working. By virtue of the fact that the UFP membership was "growing," it was "obvious" that Jagan was not a dictator. I was told this by two Indian Guianese who were working for Jagan.

6. I was in British Guiana for about 12 months on my latest trip. Since much of this time was devoted to geological surveying in the hinterland, I was accompanied by an Indian Guianese doctor. A well-educated man of the upper-middle class, he told me that arms were being smuggled into the country from Cuba. He did not go into any detail on the subject, but he did mention that his sons, who were members of the Progressive Youth Organization (PYO) frequently brought arms into their home, kept them for a while, and then disposed of them. The doctor was so much concerned -- and pessimistic -- about the situation that he emigrated from the country shortly after I departed.

7. Malaria is not a factor now. Even well into the interior there is less than 1 percent incidence. But anywhere away from the coast filariasis presents a problem. At first I did not believe it when my Indian Guianese doctor said that mosquito bites incurred in the day-time were harmless but mosquito bites at night would infect with filariasis. After several months in the back country I believed him. The disease seems to affect women more than men, causing women's legs to swell. But the disease's affect on men's sexual organs was not exactly encouraging. I never did understand why, but my doctor said that to be effective in detecting the disease a blood test must be made at night (preferably between 11 p.m. and 1 a.m.), and analyzed quickly. If filariasis is treated promptly, a man's sexual prowess can be saved. We found that the disease is very common throughout the country.

- end -

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Cuba/British Guiana

SUBJECT Shipment of Weapons to British Guiana

REPORT NO. 00- K-3,210,102

DATE DISTR. 21 Feb 62

NO. PAGES One

REFERENCES
CD/00 Case 36159 H2/05676/G5
Case 35662 78/IWW/DOM-81/CX

DATE OF INFO. Dec 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. --; Dec 1962

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION

SOURCE: Cuban national, A 12 884 576, who arrived in the US on 3 Feb 1962.

Source is an electrical engineer and advisor to underground groups in Cuba.

[This report was developed by an Army representative assigned to the office of preparation.]

I was advised by a Cuban merchant marine officer that the Cuban freighter, "Bahia de Nipe" left Cuba for British Guiana on 22 Dec 1961 with a cargo shipment of weapons. The boxes containing this equipment were stored in the bottom of the ship's hold and covered with mattresses and canvas. A cargo of sugar bags was placed on top of the weapons.

-end-

COMMUNICATIONS

COMMUNICATIONS

There is little information available on the Castro/Communist communication network with Latin America. Over the past years there are numerous reports indicating that communications are carried by visitors to and from Cuba, that Cuban Embassies serve as communication points for Castro/Communist subversive groups in various countries, and that directions to subversive groups are transmitted by clandestine radio transmitters in Cuba. Preceding items on radio propaganda and propaganda shipments, arms shipments, and the training of personnel in Cuba are closely related to communications. Information on Communist organizations and the Communist apparatus also are related to the question of communication.

There have been some references to instructions from Cuba; however, such evidence is not available and copies of those documents made available in the past would not withstand scrutiny.

TAB

1 Electronic Communications

This Tab contains three items: (1) A general comment on electrical communications; (2) An item indicating the use of amateur radio stations for communications; and (3) A report of a clandestine receiving station in the Dominican Republic.

2 Documents

This Tab contains an item referring to documents obtained from the plane crash in Peru. Initially, the Peruvian press and Peruvian officials indicated these documents proved Castro/Communist sponsorship of a revolution in Brazil; however, the Brazilian Government has not taken public note of the document.

3 Couriers

This Tab contains illustrative reports of travellers to and from Cuba who may act as couriers. This item is closely related to information on individuals and groups travelling to Cuba for training or propaganda.

1

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

There are numerous reports of a highly classified nature concerning electronics communications between Cuba and the Bloc, within Cuba, and between Cuba and Latin America. Some reports infer that Prensa Latina facilities may be used for other than news purposes and there are frequent reports of clandestine radio instructions to Latin America from Cuba and between clandestine stations in Latin America.

ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS

CONFIDENTIAL

Export

CONFIDENTIAL

CUBA

Central "Nom" Radio Transmitting Station,
Rancho Boyeros Airport, Habana Province (C)

30 January 1962

1 of 1

None

19-20 January 1962

Rancho Boyeros, Jan 62
C-3
DUJ 316/37-1-62

DUJ
DUJ
DUJ-39-62

1. Sub-Source reports that the Government of Cuba had planned to inaugurate a in amateur radio transmitting station at the Rancho Boyeros Airport, south of Habana City, on the 19th or 20th of January 1962.

2. The purpose of the station was to be communication between Cuba and Tegucigalpa, Honduras, on the 9077 frequency.

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEARS
INTERVALS NOT AUTO-
MATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

OPNS BRANCH

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Dominican Republic/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/535,788

SUBJECT Clandestine Radio Receiving Station in Santo Domingo

DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. 22 January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Dominican Republic, Santo Domingo 22 January 1963

FIELD REPORT NO. HDC-553

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Foreign businessman (B) with good contacts in Dominican political circles. Appraisal of Content: 3.

One of the under-cover receiving stations for radio messages from Habana is believed to be in a house at Calle Espaillat 56. The house is occupied by Johnson (fnu), who has an electrician's repair shop there.

Headquarters Comment. Johnson (fnu) is probably identifiable with the Johnson (fnu) reported by another source as a Communist member of the Agrupacion Politica Catorce de Junio (APCJ - 14th of June Political Group). See CS-3/511,814, of 24 May 1962. Also see CS-3/528,287, of 14 November 1962, from an official British service, which reports on a clandestine group of pro-Castro Dominicans who are in radio contact with Habana from a repair shop in Santo Domingo..

2

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The CIA station in Rio de Janeiro has reported that some efforts may be made to put pressure on President Goulart to publicly take some note of the Cuban intervention in Brazil's internal affairs, allegedly shown by some 16 pages of Spanish-language documents found in the Varig plane crash which carried a Cuban delegation to their deaths in November. The documents are considered by a Brazilian source who made them available to the CIA station to be "explosive, since they prove the Cubans are sponsoring revolution in Brazil." Paraphrases of these documents have appeared in the Lima press; but it is unlikely that President Goulart will give any support to publicizing them. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 43586, 2 January, SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

41173

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Paraguay/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/536,454
SUBJECT	Paraguayan Travelers to and From Cuba	DATE DISTR.	7 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	December 1962 - 20 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Paraguay, Asuncion (24 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HYA-833

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paraguayan security officer (B) from a member of the Paraguayan Communist Party (C). Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. On about 20 January 1963 Cantero, a leader of the Partido Comunista Paraguayo (PCP - Paraguayan Communist Party) in Paraguay,[1] met with five rural leaders of the PCP from the areas of Villarrica, Concepcion, Piribebuy, Tebycuarymi, and Guarambare. These leaders received political instructions from the PCP for their trip to Cuba, where they will receive military and political training in rural organization. Lopez (fnu)[2] is the leader from Piribebuy, and Ignacio Acosta[3] is the leader from Tebycuarymi.

2. Federico Tatter, a retired ensign in the Paraguayan Navy, entered Paraguay from Cuba in the first half of December to assume military direction of the Frente Unido de Liberacion Nacional (FULNA - United Front for National Liberation).

3. Anibal Garcete[4] has returned to Paraguay from Cuba to organize the sugar-cane workers. Garcete is a PCP member masquerading as a member of the Colorado Party.

[1] Field Comment. Cantero is the PCP pseudonym of a person whose true name is unknown.

Source Comments

[2] Lopez was born about 1937.

[3] Acosta is a cousin of Wigberto Acosta, a long-time member of the PCP.

5
4

[illegible] Comment. Wigberto Acosta was reported in June 1960 to have been a PCP member active in the labor dispute in the Tabyouarymi area involving the sugar cane worker's demand for higher salaries.

4. Source Comment. [illegible] was mentioned in confidential PCP correspondence at which time he was an officer in the Federation of Sugar Cane Workers.

On 4 December Brazilian President Goulart telephoned General Alves, commander of the First Army with headquarters in Rio de Janeiro and the highest ranking extreme leftist in the Brazilian armed forces. He told Alves to choose four or five junior officers of his absolute confidence to escort certain people who were arriving from Cuba via Bolivia. Goulart said the people were coming with "much material." (CIA, Sao Paulo, IN 30353, 6 December, SECRET NOFORN)

Eight Dominican pro-Castro leaders were aboard the Czech airlines flight to Cuba which transited Shannon Airport on 14 December, according to an official Irish service. The Dominicans included Maximo Lopez Molina, Tomas Parmenio Erickson, and Gustavo Ricart, leaders of the outlawed Dominican Popular Movement (MPD), one of the most active pro-Communist groups in the Dominican Republic. The eight Dominicans were among the ten who were deported from the Dominican Republic to France earlier this year. Another source reported last November that the Cuban ambassador in Paris had a meeting with the ten Dominican deportees to discuss helping them travel to Cuba without passports. (CIA Dublin, TDCS-3/531,991, 21 December, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Premier Castro is to deliver the closing speech at the Congress of Women of the Americas on 15 January in Havana. Havana Radio announced that the congress, scheduled to begin 11 January, will be attended by more than 200 delegates from Latin America, the U. S., and Canada, as well as by guests from many other non-American countries. Delegations from Communist China, Albania, Czechoslovakia, North Korea, and North Vietnam arrived in Havana on 9 January. (FBIS 03 and 51, 10 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

SABOTAGE

SABOTAGE

A number of acts of sabotage have been committed in various Latin American states. There is no conclusive evidence available to link these acts of sabotage with the Castro/Communist apparatus.

Portions on training indicate that sabotage is being taught to trainees in Cuba.

TAB

1 **Reports of Sabotage**

This Tab contains four items: (1) A report that Cuba is training personnel for sabotage missions in the U.S.; (2) A report that Dominicans are leaving Cuba to sabotage cane fields in the Dominican Republic; (3) A report on the controversial sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields in Venezuela. (Not substantiated by evidence available to the U.S.); and (4) Report of an unsuccessful attempt to sabotage a bridge in Venezuela.

2 **Terrorist Activities**

This Tab contains an item reporting Castro/Communist inspired terrorist activities in Venezuela linked to the Maracaibo sabotage.

1

An expert Cuban electrical technician in the Borjita sugar mill has told a former close associate who is now a regular clandestine source that Cuba is training personnel in the techniques of using explosives prior to sending them to the United States on sabotage missions. It is intended that such persons will go in the guise of anti-Communist refugees, and the sabotage will be so arranged that in some cases it will be taken to be merely accidents. The electrical technician added that there is a large Communist espionage ring operating with a ring in the United States across the border, with several plans already under way. (CIA DDP IN 29517, 4 December, SECRET NOFORN)

A Dominican exile in Cuba reportedly told a source who was there about mid-December that Dominican Communists are leaving Cuba for the Dominican Republic to sabotage the cane fields there. (CIA, Panama City, IN 48599, 11 January, SECRET NOFORN)

COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

42-41 [illegible] 45 CONFIDENTIAL

Control: 1171
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 3, 1962
11:29 P.M.

Action

[illegible]-3

ARA

FROM: CARACAS

Info

TO: Secretary of State

SS
G
SP
SAL
IO
PR
P
IOP
INR

RMR

NO: 548, NOVEMBER 3, 9 P.M.

NIACT

DEPARTMENT PASS CINCARIB, CINCLANT

FOREIGN MINISTER FALCON BRICENO INFORMS ME HE WILL ARRIVE WASHINGTON SUNDAY NIGHT TO MAKE SPECIAL SPEECH IN OAS/OC MONDAY RE CUBAN SITUATION UNDERSCORING CUBAN INSPIRED SUBVERSION AND SABOTAGE AGAINST VENEZUELA.

HE WILL PRESENT INTERCEPTED CABLE TO VENEZUELAN STUDENTS AND OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH HE HOPES OBTAIN FROM INTERIOR MINISTRY. HE ASKS IF DEPARTMENT CAN PROVIDE HIM SUNDAY AT VENEZUELAN EMBASSY WITH TRANSCRIPT RAUL CASTRO'S STATEMENT AFTER MARACAIBO SABOTAGE IN WHICH PRESS CLAIMS RAUL TOOK CUBAN CREDIT FOR INCIDENT.

SUGGEST DEPARTMENT MAKE THIS AND ALL OTHER USEFUL FBIS INTERCEPTS AS WELL OTHER EVIDENCE AVAILABLE TO HIM.

FALCON'S ARRIVAL NEW YORK AND WASHINGTON WILL BE AVAILABLE VENEZUELAN EMBASSY THERE. PLEASE EXTEND COURTESIES. HE PLANS STAY US ABOUT EIGHT DAYS.

STEWART

SMD

NOTE: PASSED TO CINCARIB, CINCLANT 11/4/62.
MESSRS. MOSKOWITZ, BOWDLER AND ALLEN (ARA) NOTIFIED
12:10 A.M., 11/4/62 TEM.

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

TELEGRAM SECRET INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

ASD
DASD
EXEC
D/RA ✓
EUR
NESA
WE
FE
SSB
FEA
D/AC
DIS
D/PL
COMP
WPS
C/L
OPR

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY	VENEZUELA	REPORT NO.	TDCS -3/537,176
SUBJECT	CONTINUATION OF COMMUNIST TERRORIST ACTIVITIES	DATE DISTR.	13 FEBRUARY 1963
		PRECEDENCE	PRIORITY
DATE OF INFO.	8 AND 12 FEBRUARY 1963	REFERENCES	IN 67419
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	VENEZUELA, CARACAS (13 FEBRUARY 1963)		
APPRAISAL	2	FIELD REPORT NO.	HVC 2655

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: FORMER POLICE OFFICIAL (C) WITH CONTACTS IN THE HEADQUARTERS OF THE NATIONAL GUARD; PARA 2: U.S. BUSINESSMAN (B) WITH EXCELLENT CONTACTS IN THE VENEZUELAN MILITARY.

1. ON THE EVENING OF 8 FEB 63 NATIONAL GUARD SOLDIERS WHO WERE PROTECTING THE CARACAS-LA GUAIRA TURNPIKE SURPRISED A GROUP OF MEN AT THE ENTRANCE TO TUNNEL NUMBER 1 WHO WERE ATTEMPTING TO DESTROY TURNPIKE BRIDGE NUMBER 1. FIRE WAS EXCHANGED FOR ABOUT THIRTY MINUTES BETWEEN THE SOLDIERS AND THE MEN IN THE TUNNEL AND LATER A BOX CONTAINING ABOUT 100 POUNDS OF DYNAMITE WAS FOUND BELOW THE BRIDGE.

2. TWO CAR LOADS OF GUERILLAS ATTACKED THE NATIONAL GUARD HEADQUARTERS AT DABAJURO, A PIPE LINE OUTPOST BETWEEN AMUAY, IN THE PARAGUANA PENINSULA AND LAKE MARACAIBO, STATE OF ZULIA, IN WESTERN VENEZUELA, ON 12 FEB. ABOUT 100 SHOTS WERE EXCHANGED BUT ALL THE GUERILLAS ESCAPED.

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

DA IN 16985

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

000

FORM 1-63 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS -3/537,176

IN 67419

PAGE 2

3. (FIELD COMMENT: TERRORIST ACTIVITIES HAVE BEEN INCREASING IN VENEZUELA. SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE FUERZAS ARMADAS DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FALN, ARMED FORCES OF NATIONAL LIBERATION) TOOK TEMPORARY POSSESION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PREFECT IN THE TOWN OF SAN DIEGO DE LOS ALTOS, ABOUT 20 MILES FROM CARACAS, ON 4 FEB. THEY TIED UP THE POLICEMEN ON GUARD, STOLE A FEW RIFLES, AND PAINTED THE WALLS WITH ANTI-GOVERNMENT SLOGANS. ON 5 FEB AN ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE HOME OF COLONEL JOSE ANTONIO GONZALEZ, COMMANDER OF THE MILITARY TRIBUNAL, LOCATED IN A WELL-TO-DO RESIDENTIAL AREA OF CARACAS. THIS WAS FOLLOWED BY ANOTHER ATTACK ON 12 FEB WHICH RESULTED IN THE GOVERNMENT ESTABLISHING ROAD BLOCKS AND SENDING TROOPS AND POLICE INTO THE AREA. ON THE MORNING OF 9 FEB AN ARMED ATTACK WAS MADE ON THE AMERICAN (PORTION GARBLED WILL FWD)* WHERE OFFICES WERE SET ON FIRE AND EQUIPMENT DESTROYED, AND ON THE NIGHT OF 9 FEB SEARS WAREHOUSE IN ANTIMANO WAS COMPLETELY DESTROYED BY MEMBERS OF THE FALN. THREE BRIDGES ON THE PAN AMERICAN HIGHWAY, BARQUISIMETO AREA, STATE OF LARA, WERE DAMAGED BY BOMBS ON 12 FEB AND AN ATTEMPT WAS MADE ON THAT DAY TO BLOW UP A CREOLE OIL LINE IN CATIA LA MAG, FEDERAL DISTRICT, BUT ONLY ONE SMALL BOMB EXPLODED CAUSING MINOR DAMAGES).

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

* 5. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: MISSING PORTION WILL BE DISSEMINATED ONLY IF IT MATERIALLY AFFECTS THE SENSE OF THIS REPORT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOPS
DA IN 16985

000

2

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcon area of northwestern Venezuela.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION
FOR LATIN AMERICA

COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Information on the Communist apparatus for Latin America and its relationship with Cuba and the Sino Soviet Bloc is largely derived from highly classified intelligence which is provided separately. From the reports contained in this section, it may be concluded that the organizational links vary from country to country depending upon, among other factors, the legal status of the Communist party, whether diplomatic representation is located in a country, the relative strength of Communist alliances with other leftist or opposition parties, and the character of current government leadership in these countries. Next attached is an unclassified report prepared in October for release as a White Paper. Although this paper was not released due to the missile crisis, it represents an agreed summary (State, DOD, CIA and USIA) of the Communist apparatus in Latin America. The report contains briefs on Communist activities in each of the Latin American countries.

The reports vary with respect to the country priority for Castro/Communist action in Latin America. Brazil, Venezuela, and British Guiana are mentioned most frequently as the likely priority targets. There are also conflicting reports on the relative independence of Castro from the Soviet Union and indications that the publicized Sino Soviet disagreements are reflected in local Communist organizations throughout Latin America.

TAB 1 Cuban Relationships and Policies Toward Latin America

This tab contains relevant excerpts from the draft NIE now under preparation. (USIB is meeting on this item and the most current agreed positions will be made available to you in the event there is any significant change.) Also included at this tab are a number of significant reports indicating the probable orientation of Castro/Communist actions directed toward Latin America. The last item at this tab summarizes the unsuccessful armed incursions of 1959 (Panama, Nicaragua, and Dominican Republic).

TAB 2 Soviet Activities and Conflicts

This tab contains a number of items indicating possible Cuban-Soviet conflicts as reflected in Latin America. The last two items reflect the concern attached to the possible establishment of a Soviet fishing port in Cuba.

TAB 3 Situation in Latin America

This tab contains a number of current situation and pertinent background reports on various Latin American countries in the following order: Central America, Panama and Mexico; Bolivia; Brazil (4); Colombia; Costa Rica; Ecuador; Haiti; Mexico; Panama; Peru (4); and Venezuela (3).

4 October 1962

MEMORANDUM: Cuban Subversion in Other Latin American Countries

I. General Summary

1. The Castro regime denies that material support is being given any anti-regime group outside Cuba. Castro claims that such assistance is unnecessary since the people of these countries, thanks to Cuba's example, are becoming aware of their revolutionary potential. The publicly stated position of the Cuban leaders is that their country, "the first socialist state in America," has become the example, the "beacon". In fact, however, Cuba's moral and material support to Communist and Communist-influenced groups has been felt in varying degrees in every one of the 19 other Latin American republics. The Castro regime has become an effective instrument of the Sino-Soviet effort to weaken and eventually destroy democratic political institutions in Latin America.

2. Cuban subversion has become more subtle since 1959, when a Cuban-mounted expeditionary force was launched against the Dominican Republic and smaller "invasion forces" left Cuba for abortive attacks on the governments of Panama, Nicaragua, and Haiti. Now Cuban subversive efforts generally fall in three categories:

a. The indoctrination and training of hundreds of Latin Americans in Cuba;

b. The intensive propaganda beamed at Latin America by Cuban radio stations and circulated through printed material and the Cuban-subsidized international "news" agency, and;

c. The covert material support given subversive groups in other countries.

II. Cuban Subversive Programs

A. Training of Latin Americans in Cuba:

3. Fidel Castro announced on 9 June 1961 that his government would grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American countries for the next school term and 100 scholarships to students from other countries of the world. Hundreds of young Latin Americans have been subjected to Communist indoctrination. In addition to whatever formal training they receive in Cuba, many of them receive training in guerrilla warfare and other techniques of revolution.

4. Cuban refugees who have arrived recently in the United States have provided detailed information on the training programs offered to some of these young Latin Americans.

a. One refugee, a deserter from Castro's army, reported from personal knowledge that in late 1961 there were a number of students from Chile, Ecuador, Argentina, Guatemala, and Brazil living in a Havana suburb who regularly attended classes in Marxism-Leninism, propaganda techniques, and other subjects to prepare them for active revolutionary roles in their homelands. He reported that those male students who were between 16 and 20 years of age were sent as part of their training to the Minas del Frio training center in Oriente province. During this phase of their training they received familiarization in the use of small arms and hiked to the top of Cuba's highest mountain, Pico Turquino, in the Sierra Maestra, the locale of Castro's guerrilla warfare against the Batista dictatorship.

b. Another refugee, who lived in Oriente province, learned from conversations with militia-men in the area and from Latin Americans training there that continuous training of students from other Latin American countries is going on at Las Arenas, Oriente. The trainees receive instruction in military tactics, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, propaganda, and Communist ideology. The refugee did not know how many Latin Americans were involved, but believed the duration of each course was about eight weeks, after which another group replaced the one that had been training.

5. Much of the travel of Latin American students to Cuba for training and indoctrination is handled by the Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP - Cuban Institute for Friendship with Peoples).

6. Cuba is also a major takeoff point for Latin Americans traveling to and from the Sino-Soviet bloc. Over 400 Latin Americans returned from last July's Communist-sponsored Youth Festival in Helsinki aboard a Soviet passenger vessel with the 400-man Cuban delegation. They disembarked in Havana and stayed in Cuba some weeks before some of them began returning to their home countries. Others may well be remaining in Cuba for some time.

B. Cuban Propaganda:

7. International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all of Latin America. The general theme of all these broadcasts is that "the Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them.

8. There are regular programs beamed by Havana radio to Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Peru, and Honduras. They are all subversive in content and frequently incite to rebellion. These programs to specific countries are apparently directed and produced with the guidance of exiles from the countries concerned resident in Cuba.

9. The program to the Dominican Republic, for instance, is announced as the program of the Dominican Liberation Movement (MLD), and the program is entitled Patria Libre. At present, Radio Havana beams the 20 minute Patria Libre program to the Dominican Republic on Thursdays and Saturdays. Just prior to the program, the Radio Havana announcer explains that the station is making its facilities available to the MLD for its program. There are some areas in the Dominican Republic where, due to the absence of local radio stations, the Cuban broadcasts are the only ones heard. Last July, the subversive content of these broadcasts to the Dominican Republic led the Dominican government to protest to the Organization of American States.

10. The content of such broadcasts is exemplified in the stated goals of the "Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua," the program which is regularly beamed by Radio Havana to Nicaragua. On 31 August this program celebrated its first anniversary by repeating its original statement of its purposes:

> "The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua has set itself the goal of contributing to pointing out the real way to Nicaragua's liberation from the dominion of Yankee imperialism and the Somoza tyranny. Elections (scheduled for next February to choose President Somoza's successor) with the Somozas in power, and under the State Department's economic and political control of Nicaragua, will be a farce. Without. . a prior revolutionary overthrow of the Somoza tyranny there can be no free elections in Nicaragua nor can a popular government be established. This program will be at the service of the revolutionaries and against the electioneers...The Voice of Revolutionary Nicaragua will defend the Cuban revolution because it is an important part of the Latin American people's liberating revolution."

11. Cuban propaganda is also disseminated through the offices of Presna Latina, the Cuban-subsidized international "news agency" which has close working relations with TASS, the New China News Agency, and other propaganda media for the Sino-Soviet bloc.

12. Cuban printed material is circulated throughout the hemisphere; Che Guevara's book on guerrilla warfare has received wide distribution. Periodically, the Mexican government, most recently last August, has been obliged to confiscate large quantities of propanganda materials from Latin Americans passing through that country enroute from Cuba to their homelands.

C. Cuban covert support for subversive groups:

13. Cuban covert support for Communist or pro-Communist groups in other Latin American countries is provided in a number of ways. In the five Latin American countries where Cuban diplomatic missions are still resident (Mexico, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile, and Bolivia), these missions have often been the channel. The Cuban embassy in Mexico is known to have provided

frequent assistance to exiles from Guatemala, Nicaragua, and other Central American countries living in Mexico. In other instances, assistance is provided through travelers coming from Cuba and through Prensa Latina representatives.

14. The assistance is usually financial. The Cubans appear to have been careful since 1959 to avoid being caught in a blatant act of subversion that could be used to justify concerted inter-American action. Financial assistance is often just as useful and much less risky than actual weapons deliveries. In a number of American countries, small arms and other weapons are available for a price. Unscrupulous or careless arms dealers in the US have also contributed to the arms traffic from which pro-Castro groups have benefitted, directly or indirectly.

15. As the following country-by-country rundown indicates, Cuban support for subversive activity has affected in varying degrees every one of the 19 other Latin American countries.

a. Argentina: Ernesto "Che" Guevara, an Argentine by birth, has retained his deep interest in Argentina's political affairs. On 25 May, the Argentine national holiday, he addressed the group of Argentine citizens resident in Cuba and told them that he hoped that next year they would be celebrating in Argentina under "the flag of socialism." At another point in this address he said: "Our revolution is one which needs to expand its ideas...and other people are helping us. Let the other peoples of the hemisphere get angry and take up arms or seize power and aid us in this task which is the task of the entire hemisphere and of humanity."

The Argentine community in Cuba last April organized the "Cuban-Argentine Friendship Institute" with headquarters in Havana. One of the leaders is John William Cooke, who was for a time chief of former Argentine dictator Peron's political machine in Argentina. Cooke continues active in that faction of the Peronista party which seeks concerted action with the Argentine Communists. Cooke maintains regular contact with sympathizers inside and outside Argentina through travelers and through his wife, Alicia Eguren de Cooke, a resident of Montevideo, Uruguay, who apparently has regular means of communication with individuals in Argentina. Argentine citizens have been recruited through this channel to go to Cuba for training. There are also strong indications that terrorist activities by Argentine Peronists and Communists have been encouraged and perhaps assisted through this channel.

Prior to the diplomatic break between Argentina and Cuba last February, the Cuban embassy in Buenos Aires provided financial assistance to anti-government groups there. An Argentine journalist who has contacts in the Communist party there reported last December, for instance, that the Argentine Communist party had received the sum of 50,000 pesos from the Cuban embassy as a contribution to the railway workers who were then on strike in the province of Cordoba.

Though the Cuban embassy is no longer in Buenos Aires, Cuban clandestine assistance to Argentine Peronist-Communist groups continues. On 19 July of this year the federal police in Buenos Aires reported the unearthing of a center of Communist and Peronist activities in the capital. Two Buenos Aires policemen were shot and killed at a surburban warehouse in June. Investigations revealed that a quantity of explosives and propaganda were stored in the warehouse. The trail led to the arrest of one Jose Maria Aponte, a journalist and known Peronist activist, and one Mario Massi, owner of the firm which owned the warehouse. It was revealed that Massi had been maintaining contact with Cuban Communists, with John William Cooke, and with an unidentified woman associated with the Cuban embassy in Uruguay who was probably Alicia Eguren de Cooke referred to above. According to the Argentine police investigation, some 150 Argentine citizens had been sent from Argentina to Cuba (through Uruguay and Mexico) for training in guerrilla warfare. On their return to Argentina, these men were to be used in planned activities in the provinces of Formosa, Tucuman, Salta, and the wooded areas of eastern Argentina. A number of other individuals were apprehended by the Argentine police in connection with the subversive activity revealed in these investigations.

b. Bolivia: Bolivia has been the recipient of special Cuban attentions. The number of Bolivians receiving "scholarships" in Cuba this year--between 130 and 150-- appears disproportionately high. The Bolivian government felt obliged to request the departure of Cuban Ambassador Tabares in 1960 and of Cuban Charge Garcia Trians in 1961 for blatant intervention in internal Bolivian affairs, including support for Bolivian Communists and attempts to incite extreme leftist members of the governing MNR party to leave the party. In June 1961, the Bolivian government published a series of documents linking the Cuban embassy with a Communist conspiracy to seize control of the government. One of these documents, a statement by an arrested Bolivian agitator who had been in close contact with the Cuban embassy, gave the names of a number of Bolivians who had received financial support from the Cuban embassy. This evidence was used to justify the request for the Cuban charge's recall.

The present Cuban charge in Bolivia, Ramon Aja, has also been active though perhaps a bit more discreet than his predecessors. He has been particularly energetic in cultivating relations with Bolivian campesinos. The peasant union in the Cliza Valley of Bolivia has been reported to be the recipient of Cuban financial assistance.

c. Brazil: During the past two years the Castro regime has developed increasingly close ties with Francisco Juliao, self-proclaimed Marxist and leader of the Peasant Leagues in the troubled northeast region of Brazil. Juliao, whose wife and children are resident in Cuba, has traveled there on several occasions, and a number of his associates and rank-and-file members of the Leagues have gone to Cuba for agricultural training which is undoubtedly heavily larded with ideological indoctrination. Transportation direct from northeast Brazil to Cuba has been provided by Cubana airlines on at least one occasion. Circumstantial evidence strongly suggests that Juliao has received financial assistance for his movement from the Cuban government. Brazilian Communist leaders have privately stated, in fact, that Juliao's Peasant Leagues have received not only money but also shipments of small arms from Cuba. These Brazilian Communist leaders also said that the reason Juliao sent his family to Cuba was his fear that they might be endangered in the civil war he expects to erupt shortly in Brazil.

The Cuban government has also during the past year cultivated particularly close relations with leaders of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB). One of the CPB leaders who had visited Cuba last May told a friend of a long conversation he had had with Fidel Castro in late May. Castro expressed identity of feeling with the dissident Brazilian Communists and criticized the regular Communist party for its failure "to take a strong revolutionary line" in accordance with the decision of the 22nd party congress of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Castro approved the insurrectionary policy of the CPB and urged the leaders to organize guerrilla activities and start the revolutionary movement in Brazil "as soon as possible." Castro advised them that government reprisals against revolutionary action in Brazil would serve only to increase popular discontent in Brazil and swell the ranks of the revolutionaries. He advised CPB leaders to give special emphasis to securing as wide a base as possible among agricultural workers and the inhabitants of rural areas.

The Cuban embassy in Rio de Janeiro, like Cuban embassies elsewhere in Latin America, has been a source of assistance to Communist and pro-Communist elements. Last May leaks to the Brazilian press reported discussions in the Brazilian cabinet on the subversive activities being directed by Cuban ambassador Joaquin Hernandez Armas. The Navy and Army Ministers are reported to have expressed particular concern over Hernandez' activities.

d. Chile: Senator Salvador Allende, leader of Chile's Communist-dominated popular front and a leading presidential aspirant, has made at least two trips to Cuba.

The Cuban embassy in Santiago is the source of propaganda support for pro-Communist groups, mostly those associated with Allende, who are intent on coming to power in Chile through elections or revolution. Orlando Prendes, cultural attache of the Cuban embassy, is known to be supervising the printing of Cuban propaganda on a clandestine printing press in the home of Julio Bocanegra, who also prints propaganda for the Chilean Communist party. This activity has been going on for some time. As long ago as August, 1961, Chilean officials investigating political agitation and resulting unrest in the Salamanca area learned that after a visit to the area by a Cuban diplomat the previous month, pro-Cuban propaganda was being distributed in the area, and Communists and pro-Communists there were saying "The mountains of Salamanca are going to be the Chilean Sierra Maestra."

Last March, when Cuban Minister of Education Armando Hart went to Chile for an international conference he took with him several sacks of propaganda.

e. Colombia: The United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), organized early this year by Colombian extremists, is believed to have received financial assistance from Cuba to promote its objective of creating a guerrilla movement aimed at the overthrow of the government. A Colombian citizen who has contacts among FUAR members reported last June that Fidel Castro had just given the group $15,000 and promised further financial aid semi-annually. Gloria Gaitan de Valencia, the wife of a FUAR leader and the daughter of the Colombian leader Gaitan whose assassination in 1948 sparked the disastrous Bogota rioting, is a long-time personal friend of Fidel Castro. He has visited Cuba frequently and probably returns to Colombia with specific advice and assistance from the Cuban government. The FUAR has succeeded in drawing members from the extremist wing of the regular Colombian Communist party who are dissatisfied with that party's reluctance to engage in ipen revolutionary action.

f. Costa Rica: The small Costa Rican Communist party, the Popular Vanguard party (PVP), is charged by the Cuban government with the selection of young men to be trained in Cuba. Riboberto Carmona and Jose Murillo, PVP members, left Costa Rica last June for training under this program, and PVP leaders had plans for organizing guerrilla training programs in Costa Rica under the direction of the Costa Ricans who had received training in Cuba.

g. The Dominican Republic: The provisional Council of State, which is preparing the country for its first free elections this December in more than 30 years, has been a major target for Cuban subversion. A cadre of Dominican Communists is headquartered in Cuba, and clandestine contact is probably maintained with sympathizers inside the Doninican Republic. Broadcasts to the Dominican Republic from Cuba have helped incite the frequent riots in Santo Domingo. The fact that broadcasts from Cuba have on occasion referred to very recent events in the Dominican Republic strongly suggests the presence of clandestine radio contacts between the two countries.

h. Ecuador: The Communist party of Ecuador has formed the nucleus of a small guerrilla organization. This group was drawn largely from the pro-Castro Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE), which was involved in a two-day battle with government forces last April. The leader of the April affair, as well as several other Ecuadoreans involved in subversive activities, has received guerrilla training in Cuba. A URJE leader told a friend last June that this organization has so far in 1962 received $22,000 in financial aid from the Cuban government.

Manuel Araujo Hidalgo, pro-Communist former Ecuadorean Minister of Interior who has visited Cuba and who recently traveled in Communist China, appears to be working with the URJE. He is reported to have received a considerable amount of money from the Cuban government for his efforts, according to a private statement by the URJE leader.

i. El Salvador: On 1 March 1961, the Salvadoran government broke relations with the Castro regime after it had received evidence of conversation between the Cuban charge, Roberto Lassalle, and leading Salvadoran Communists in which Lassale urged increased revolutionary activity.

j. Guatemala: On 5 March 1962, a Cuban arrived in Mexico with a message for a leader then in Mexico of the Guatemalan Communist-influenced

13 November group, which had recently engaged in guerrilla activity in Guatemala. The Cuban gave him $4,000 which he said was the first installment of a total of $10,000 to be used to establish a new guerrilla front in Guatemala. On 8 March, Castro's emissary gave the Guatemalans the balance of the $10,000 and told one of the 13 November leaders that the decision to provide them with the money was taken by Fidel Castro personally. Castro, he said, had sent instructions that the group did not have to account for how the money was spent, that no strings were attached, and that he hopes they are successful so he can provide them with additional assistance.. Later the Cuban emissary met with leaders in Mexico of the orthodox Guatemalan Communist party. These Guatemalan Communists had apparently complained that the Cuban money was not going to them. They were told that Castro wanted the money to go to the 13 November group because this group had demonstrated its capacity to fight the Guatemalan government, a capacity which the Guatemalan Communists had not shown. The Cuban said: "It is not a matter of standing around with Arab fatalism waiting for events to take place--- We should act efficiently so as to precipitate the death of imperialism. Because of this we are ready to help anyone who may decide to struggle against imperialism anywhere."

Cuban propaganda media have sought through publicizing the activities of the 13 November group to increase its prestige and chances for success. A Prensa Latina reporter published an alleged interview with 13 November leader Yon Sosa.

k. Haiti: A cadre of Haitian Communists led by Rene Depestre is resident in Cuba, and many thousands of Haitian citizens living in eastern Cuba are now being subjected to Communist regimentation and indoctrination.

l. Honduras: Prior to the break in Cuban-Honduran diplomatic relations in April 1961, Cuban personnel under the cover of consular and diplomatic offices engaged in proselyting in the north coast region of Honduras. Honduras now is the target of a particularly vicious regular radio program beamed especially to Honduras by Radio Havana. Many Hondurans are in Cuba under the "Scholarship" program.

m. Mexico: The Cuban embassy in Mexico City, the consulate in Merida, and the "Cuban-Mexican Cultural Center" in Merida have all engaged in propaganda activities designed to encourage the pro-communist cause in Mexico, particularly the Communist-influenced National Liberation Movement (MLN). Former Cuban ambassador in Mexico Portuondo is reported by people in close contact with MLN leaders to have concluded an agreement whereby some of the money sent by Havana to cover the expense of the embassy is earmarked as a contribution to the MLN. Mexican officials were disturbed at the participation of Cuban embassy officials in inciting the anti-US demonstrations by Mexican students in July and August 1960. Mexican authorities have periodically impounded quantities of Cuban propaganda being sent through Mexico to other Latin American countries. The most important aspect of Mexico in Cuban propaganda and subversive operations in Latin America is its use by the Cubans as a way station or jumping off place between Cuba itself and the rest of Latin America.

n. Nicaragua: A cadre of Nicaraguan Communists is based in Cuba. Contact between them and pro-Castro Nicaraguans in Nicaragua and in exile in other countries of the Caribbean area is maintained at least on a sporadic basis. A number of Nicaraguans periodically have traveled to Cuba and some have received training there in guerrilla tactics. Reliable reports indicate that some of these Cuba-trained Nicaraguans have been among the small guerrilla bands that have infiltrated Nicaragua across the largely unguarded Hondruan border. The Nicaraguan government is the target of a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program to Nicaragua which is announced as the program of "free Nicaraguans."

o. Panama: Cuban financial assistance is believed to be channeled to the pro-Communist National Action Vanguard (VAN) in Panama. One of the VAN leaders, Deputy Thelma King, is a frequent traveler to Cuba and claims to be a personal friend of Fidel Castro.

p. Paraguay: Paraguayan exiles in Uruguay and Brazil have received Cuban financial assistance. Four members of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA), a Communist Paraguayan exile group in Uruguay, receive the equivalent of $230 monthly each from the Cuban embassy in Uruguay to finance clandestine pro-Castro activities in Uruguay, according to a Paraguayan exile in Uruguay who is in close touch with FULNA.

q. Peru: At least eight Peruvians traveled to Cuba by way of Mexico last June to receive training and indoctrination in that country. Other Peruvian Communists or pro-Communists have long been in Cuba and a regularly broadcast Radio Havana program is beamed to Peru.

r. Uruguay: The Cuban embassy in Montevideo has been engaged in promoting pro-Castro propaganda. In January 1961 the Uruguayan government was obliged to declare the Cuban ambassador persona non grata for intervening in internal Uruguayan affairs.

s. Venezuela: The Castro regime has been extremely vitriolic in its propaganda blasts against the Betancourt administration in Venezuela. Cuban assistance has been channeled to members of the militant opposition Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), which is attempting to develop a guerrilla movement in Venezuela with the aid of its ally, the regular Venezuelan Communist party. While there is little evidence to indicate direct Cuban involvement in this Communist effort, a significant number of the leading figures involved, including Fabricio Ojeda, are known to have traveled to Cuba, where they probably received financial and other assistance in addition to official encouragement and propaganda support for their activities.

1

SECRET

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

Policies Toward Latin America

42. Here Castro has more capability for independent action than in any other field except the internal politics of Cuba. Castro is deeply committed to a policy of armed insurrection throughout Latin America. Because of his own experience he has a deep-seated belief that only through insurrection can revolution be promoted in Latin America. Further, he apparently believes that a successful revolution in another Latin American country would give great impetus to the revolutionary movement and would also consolidate his own regime in Cuba. In trying to foment insurrections, he apparently does not believe it crucial that he cannot now give direct military assistance to them, nor does he seem to consider it important whether he has or has not Soviet support. For the Soviets, however, such an inflexible approach smacks of the Chinese position and causes great problems in dealing with other Latin American Communists. Most important, however, it is probable that the Soviets believe such a posture will damage Soviet prospects for penetration of Latin America and inevitably bring about a confrontation with the US.

SECRET

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

18. Cuban overseas military capabilities remain severely limited by lack of the requisite air or sea lift. The Cubans could probably not undertake an overseas operation on a scale larger than one battalion. For political as well as military reasons, the Castro regime is most unlikely to undertake military operations of this nature. It would prefer to concentrate on rendering clandestine support to local insurgents.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

31. The decline of his prestige has at least for the moment reduced Castro's capability for subverting popular groups and moving them into action against their own governments and against US interests. Local *fidelistas* have encountered greater difficulty in mobilizing mass support for anti-government strikes and demonstrations on other than local issues.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

32. Nonetheless, Castro continues his appeal for revolution in Latin America on the Cuban model. Those Latin Americans who are committed to violent revolution continue to look to Castro for help, particularly from his training program in Cuba and his large-scale dissemination of printed and broadcast propaganda. Communist agitators are concentrating their efforts increasingly in rural areas, as they have done in Peru recently. In addition, there has been an increase in sabotage and other violence perpetrated by extremists, of the sort not requiring the participation of large popular groups, yet designed to provoke drastic countermeasures by governments and to increase popular anti-government sentiment. These widespread activities have demonstrated that the ability of local Communists to engage in terrorist and subversive activities and their willingness to accept Cuban and Soviet support do not dpend upon Castro-s prestige or upon their opinion of his doctrines and policies.

Che Guevara's mother, who lives in Argentina, told a clandestine source in mid-December that during her recent visit to Cuba her son told her that Cuban leaders now feel they will have to rely more and more on their own efforts to promote Communist penetration in South America. Guerrillas will be used on a large scale after they have received training in Cuba, Guevara said. He explained to his mother that this is necessary since both he and Castro feel Khrushchev "let them down" and has no further interest in spreading Communism in South America. Guevara added that he and Castro believe they and the Chinese are better Communists than Khrushchev. (CIA DD/P Buenos Aires, 19 December, SECRET)

Comment: This report is consistent with recent public speeches by Guevara which have emphasized the important role of Cuba with respect to the "anti-imperialist revolution" in Latin America. (SECRET)

CIA Report 21 Dec 62 Rome

Translation of report dated 6 Dec 62 from Italian Embassy Havana to Foreign Ministry in Rome. "As I noted in my 9 November report is is difficult for Castro to remain calm. Therefore the revolutionary regime will continue with all means at its disposition to disseminate subversive propaganda in the whole continent, as demonstrated by the fact that all the states of Latin America (including Mexico) are taking strong measures against the dissemination of this propaganda. But it is doubtful that today Castro can do much more and that/he constitutes a real menace to the security of other countries, if only because he lacks the necessary funds. I tend to share the opinion of the Ambassador to Brazil that the Cuban leaders are trying to concentrate all their subversive efforts in one country, and that they have selected Venezuela for various reasons, including the old ill feeling between Castro and Betancourt. I note in passing that, according to what was told me by the aforementioned Ambassador, during the recent meeting of the OAS the Venezuelan representative accused the Cubans of promoting the recent attempts in his country but, when asked to furnish proof, he was unable to do so."

SECRET (NOFORN) (CONTROLLED DISSEMINATION)

A relative of a leading Communist in Cuba (who has previously given reliable advance information of important developments) expressed the opinion on 30 November that there will be revolts in Caribbean countries which will masquerade as "national revolutions" so as to negate the accusation of Cuban complicity. In fact, however, these revolutions will be directed from Cuba through revolutionaries from various countries who are now being trained in Cuba. (CIA DD/P IN 48717, 12 January, SECRET)

Comment: This points up what is probably the most effective means of Cuban subversion in Latin America - the training of hundreds and perhaps thousands of Latin Americans in Cuba. (SECRET)

The recent spate of public addresses by leading Cuban officials on the subject of insurrection in other Latin American countries reflects a more aggressive stance than prior to the "missile crisis" and suggests that a decision to step up Cuban support for subversive groups in other Latin American countries may be under discussion within the inner circle of Cuban leaders.

Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart have been in the forefront since late November in publicly expressing the view that the only road to the "liberation" of the Latin American peoples is the road of insurrection. Fidel Castro's earlier public line had been to deny the necessity for Cuba to "export" its revolution; Cuba's"example" was sufficient. This line is given only perfunctory attention in the recent Guevara and Hart speeches. The line emerging in these speeches appears even stronger than that espoused in the "Second Declaration of Havana" promulgated last February which suggested that in certain circumstances Communist-dominated coalitions could come to power by peaceful means. The whole tenor of the recent speeches suggests that Cuba intends to provide every assistance within its means to Latin American insurgents. The attention given in the Cuban press to developments in Venezuela in recent weeks strongly suggests a more than academic interest in developments there.

Canadian Ambassador Kidd, speculating on the "Trotsky-like dedication to permanent revolution" apparent in a 21 November speech by Armando Hart, commented that Cuban leaders may be attempting to counter "the humiliation of the withdrawal of the Russian missiles" by making renewed efforts to "light revolutionary fires in neighboring countries." (Comment on: Canadian Embassy, Havana, 23 November, CONFIDENTIAL) (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

SUPPLEMENT

THE CASTRO THREAT TO LATIN AMERICA

Despite diminished prestige, especially among government leaders, Castro retains great influence over politically unsophisticated Latin Americans. He is also supported by Western Hemisphere Communist parties and the vast majority of extreme leftists. Castro's main appeal lies in his claim to be the leader of a successful revolution against "Yankee imperialism" and in the support he is ready to provide subversive activities throughout Latin America.

The degree to which Cuba is involved in current hemisphere unrest is not clear. Antigovernment nationals and Communists of various Latin American countries, however, have made frequent visits to Cuba to receive pro-Castro indoctrination and propaganda. During 1962, 1,000 to 1,500 are believed to have received intensive education and training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare. Significant representation has been noted from Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Nicaragua. There is no definite proof that Cuba is now exporting arms to any dissident groups, but propaganda materials, explosives, and financial support are reliably reported to have been furnished.

Cuban leaders have also called with increasing frequency for open rebellion as the "only road" to liberation for the Americas; they have been especially vociferous since the first of the year. Leading officials, such as Castro, Blas Roca, Che Guevara, Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, and Juan Marinello are among those calling for revolutionary violence. The "Betancourt tyranny" in Venezuela has been designated a primary target, but Peru and Chile apparently also have high priority. The use of the Prensa Latina organization and the agent network already in existence makes it virtually sure that Havana will intensify its clandestine activities.

Latin American governments are generally now more alert to Castro's threat. Inadequate security forces and widespread poverty throughout the area, however, make it almost certain that Cuban-supported insurgency will have an effect out of proportion to the number of people involved.
(SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

Cuban Developments

Following Fidel Castro's call for revolution in Latin America in his 2 January speech, other Cuban speakers are emphasizing the same theme. Che Guevara told a group of Central American delegates in Havana recently that they must prepare for simultaneous revolutions in all Central American countries and pointed to Venezuela and Chile as major targets for revolution. Long-time Communist leader Blas Roca, on 23 January, praised Venezuelan Communists for their recent acts of sabotage and pledged continued Cuban support for the struggle of the people against the Betancourt "tyranny." Venezuela has long been a major Castro-Communist target, and Blas Roca's remarks imply Cuban support for the present upsurge of Communist activity there.

(EXCERPT FROM UNCLASSIFIED DEPARTMENT OF STATE WHITE PAPER ON CUBA ISSUED AUG 1960)

1. Armed Incursions.

No sooner had the Revolutionary Government of Cuba taken power than it launched a program for exporting its revolution to other countries in the Hemisphere, particularly in the Caribbean area. The memories of the invasions and attempted invasions of Panama, of Nicaragua, and of the Dominican Republic, following closely upon one another in the spring and summer of 1959 are still fresh. Support of Cuban officials for military expeditions against the Governments of these countries, although vehemently denied, has been established beyond reasonable doubt. With the invasion of the Dominican Republic came the realization among the American Republics that international tensions in the Caribbean area, to which Cuba had significantly contributed, had risen to the extent that a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American States was necessary.

The Investigating Committee appointed by the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation under the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in the Panama case in June, 1959 concluded "that the Republic of Panama was the victim of an invasion, organized abroad, that sailed from a Cuban port and was composed almost entirely of foreigners". The Committee report stated that the Chairman of the Committee was able to confirm that 82 of 84 imprisoned invaders were Cubans. Further, the Government of Panama, prior to the departure of the invasion group from Cuba informed the Cuban Government of reports about this impending event, invoking the 1928 Habana Convention on the Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The Cuban Foreign Minister in turn assured Panama that the Cuban Government would take the necessary preventive measures.

In connection with several of the invasions or attempted invasions of Nicaragua from Costa Rica and Honduras in June, 1959, and the individuals organizing them, documentary and other types of evidence which came to light demonstrated Cuban officials support in the form of arms and financial contributions.

Official Cuban complicity in the invasion of the Dominican Republic in the same month was clear. The expedition was organized, trained, and equipped in Cuba with the undoubted assistance of Cuban officials. An officer on active duty with the Cuban Rebel Army was one of the expedition's leaders. The Cuban Navy escorted the three landing craft used by the invading force on their voyage to the Dominican Republic.

Even during the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in Santiago, Chile, a report was received of the invasion of Haiti on August 13, 1959 by a group of armed men coming from Cuba. The Haitian Government after the Santiago meeting expressed its fears of further invasion attempts. It charged that the August 13 invasion from Cuba was a violation of the 1928 Habana Convention on Duties and Rights of States in the Event of Civil Strife. The assistance of Cuban officials, including the Cuban

Ambassador to Haiti and his five military attaches, in the attempt to overthrow the Haitian Government was denounced by that Government. The Cuban Government, though admitting that the invasion was launched in Cuba and all but one of the participants were Cubans, conveniently disavowed the acts of the Cuban citizens involved.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

33. There have been indications of disapproval of Castro-s policies on the part of those Latin American Communist parties which are committed to a more gradual and less violent approach to revolution. Castro has shown himself willing to collaborate with any group, Communist or not, willing to resort to violence and in so doing to circumvent some of the regular Communist parties. Some of the latter resent such tactics and have appealed to the Soviets against Castro. It seems likely that the question of relations with other Latin American Communist parties, as well as the question of tactics, is likely to hamper Communist revolutionary efforts in Latin America and cause strains in Soviet-Cuban relations.

EXCERPT FROM DRAFT NIE 85-63, 4 FEBRUARY 1963

29. ... Among much of the revolutionary left, discussion has tended to shift to the need for indigenous, nationalist revolutions, and away from internationalism and alliance with Moscow-oriented Communists and *fidelistas.*

Panamanian Communist Party (PDP) leader Ruperto Thomas' recent trip to Cuba was evidently an effort to persuade Castro to support the PDP rather than the more activist Panamanian pro-Communist VAN group. When he returned to Panama on 14 December, Thomas reportedly said that Jorge Turner, who also went to Havana in September and has not returned, and other VAN leaders are still campaigning against the PDP in Cuba. However, the Cubans claim to have told VAN leaders they must cooperate with the PDP to get Castro support.

The Castro government seems consistently to favor the VAN with funds and international trips. The Cubans may distrust the PDP's poor organization and believe VAN charges that the PDP is infiltrated. However, the VAN is a rather unstable group and the Cubans are probably trying to keep on good terms with both. Thomas said he received no military training but was taught a few things like how to dismantle a machine gun.

Thomas commented that no particular group seemed to be in command in Cuba, resulting in such disorder that it was a wonder the revolution had survived. He believes the ORI is merely a mechanism.

Mexico would not issue Thomas a visa, so he returned to Panama via Prague where he talked with Czech Communist officials and may have pleaded the PDP case against VAN with them. (CIA Panama City TDCS-3/531,754, 20 Dec, SECRET)

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET
(When Filled In)

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

EXLO
D/BA
FE
SR
P/PL
OFR

COUNTRY VENEZUELA EAST GERMANY

REPORT NO. TDCS-3/537,107

SUBJECT VENEZUELAN ATTENDANCE AT THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 65920

PLACE & DATE ACQ. VENEZUELA, CARACAS (1 & 7 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HVC 2652

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE PARA 1: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM A FELLOW CELL MEMBER WHO WORKS IN THE NATIONAL PARTY OFFICES.
PARA 2: A MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA, FROM POMPEYO MARQUEZ.

1. JESUS FARIA, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PARTIDO COMUNISTA DE VENEZUELA (PCV, COMMUNIST PARTY OF VENEZUELA), AND OLGA LUZARDO FINOL, SECRETARY OF WOMEN'S AFFAIRS OF THE PCV, WERE TWO OF THE DELEGATES OF THE PCV TO THE EAST GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS HELD DURING JAN '63. THEY RETURNED TO VENEZUELA WITH A LENGTHY DOCUMENT WHICH CLEARLY DISCUSSES THE IDEOLOGICAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF CHINA AND THE USSR. THIS DOCUMENT IS BEING CIRCULATED AMONG SOME MEMBERS OF THE PCV.

2. POMPEYO MARQUEZ, MEMBER OF THE NATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF THE PCV, ON 1 FEB SAID THAT THE VENEZUELAN AND CUBAN DELEGATIONS AT THE EAST

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 16376

SECRET

000

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS (15-20)

GERMAN COMMUNIST PARTY CONGRESS TOOK A NEUTRAL POSITION REGARDING THE DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CHINA AND THE USSR WHEREAS THE OTHER LATIN AMERICAN COMMUNIST PARTY REPRESENTATIVES STRONGLY SUPPORTED THE POSITION OF THE USSR. REPRESENTATIVES OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNIST PARTIES AT THE CONGRESS CAUTIONED THAT EXTREME CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN BY THE PCV IN USING GUERRILLA FORCES.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCLANT CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP, DIA
DA IN 16376

END OF MESSAGE

Cuban Anniversary Celebrations (See pictures following)

The Cuban Armed Forces parade in Havana yesterday included infantry, naval, artillery, armor, and air formations. The most significant display was that of SA-2 missiles and possible cruise missiles.

Ground units included 15 companies of the 2d Western Army, units of the National Militia, and other infantry units in a "new parade step" resembling the goose step. The artillery unit had antitank guns, heavy artillery, multiple rocket launchers and AA artillery. Three battalions of medium tanks, heavy tanks and assault guns, along with the surface-to-air and possible cruise missiles made up the final unit of the parade.

The air formations included helicopters, propeller-type training planes, and MIG-15's, 19's and 21's.

Soviet participation in the parade has not been established, although Soviets and Czechs may have piloted some of the aircraft.

Premier Castro's speech following the parade brought no surprises aside from its unusual brevity. He made an effort to indicate Cuban control of the air defense system, including the SA-2's, and, in a probable reference to US reconnaissance flights, said there could be an incident "at any time". end here

Castro reiterated the five demands he first made after the announcement that the Soviets would withdraw offensive missiles from Cuba. He included his usual anti-US statements and slurs at President Kennedy and made a low-keyed appeal for "unity" within the Communist Bloc. He called for revolution in Latin America, with special emphasis on Venezuela, and cited Cuba's "historic task . . . of serving as an example" for that revolution.

In the USSR, Cuban and Soviet spokesmen lauded Cuban-Russian friendship and unity, and the Soviet spokesman, Suslov, pledged that his country would "never leave Revolutionary Cuba alone in distress." (CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: VARIOUS

reportedly continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief Lemus has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections, and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado, President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders, has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading candidates would probably follow the present government's policies, including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists, while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.

El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat about two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional government, still has widespread support and military backing. The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes. Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of subversion and intrigue.

Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America but there are reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested but peaceful election, represents the liberal left, although it includes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal but well organized and effectively led. It recently instigated disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat, has long-range potential should economic conditions worsen.

(REVERSE BLANK)

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public emotion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the landless peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

(REVERSE BLANK)

Construction of the fishing port in the Bay of Havana, whose announcement as a Soviet undertaking caused so much concern last fall, will be directed by a team of Soviet technicians and Cuban engineers and will start in February - according to a Havana radio announcement. The port is to be completed by the end of 1963 and is to cost 12 million pesos, which will be met by a loan from the Soviet Union, to be amortized over 10 years. The port is expected to serve 130 vessels of the Soviet fishing fleet and from 24 to 30 of the Cuban fleet. It will have installations such as freezer plants for 10,000 tons of fish, factories for processing sea products, machinery for making no less than 80 tons of ice a day, a floating dock to repair ships of up to 2,500 tons, and well-equipped repair shops. The announcement emphasized that the port is to be operated by and will be the "absolute property of the Cuban state."

It has also been announced that Poland has now formulated plans for building the shipyard envisaged in the port of Mariel. The installation will be managed by Cuban technicians who are presently receiving training in Polish shipyards on the Baltic. Ship construction will reportedly reach a level of 70,000 tons per year. (FBIS 58, 17 January, and Daily Report, 16 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

CONFIDENTIAL

48
Action
ARA
Info
SS
SR
G
SP
SAL
EUR
IO
UFW
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR
COM
INT
RMR

WORKING COPY

CONFIDENTIAL

PASSED TO
GEN. CARROLL ☐
GEN. QUINN ☐
GEN. HALL ☐
COL. GILLIS ☐

Control: 7384
Rec'd: February 11, 1963
9:11 p.m.

FROM: Kingston

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 567, February 11, 6 p.m.

PARAPHRASE NOT REQUIRED
Ref by msg number in
unclassified reply prohibited.

Exporting Revolution

Permanent Secretary External Affairs Ministry told Embassy today that GOJ concerned over reports it had received that USSR furnishing Cubans not only fishing vessels, but also torpedo boats and submarine chasers. He foresaw Soviet-supplied ships as having potential adverse effect on Jamaican fishing industry as well as presenting possible security problem. He asked whether US could provide more detailed information on these ships which would operate from Soviet-built "fishing base" in Cuba.

In view of reports, he planned to urge Cabinet to take early action on deciding and publicizing limits of Jamaican territorial waters in order to avoid incidents with Soviets and Cubans. He is considering recommending to Cabinet that Jamaica claim territorial waters of six-and-six miles. Jamaica now apparently claims three-mile limit.

Although GOJ obviously counting on receipt US military equipment, seems unlikely that this expression GOJ concern motivated primarily by desire to speed up delivery. Embassy inclined to view Jamaican approach as healthsome indication GOJ at technical level beginning to appreciate ramifications of Cuban problem.

ACTION: STATE(ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, OSA, JCS, USDEL IADB
DA IN 16465

DOHERTY

SMD:CT

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

AAP-3

CONFIDENTIAL

000

3

SUPPLEMENT

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA, PANAMA, AND MEXICO

Central America is relatively stable. Preparations are under way for President Kennedy's scheduled meeting with the Chiefs of State of these countries at San Jose, Costa Rica, on 18 and 19 March. Tensions are rising, however, in those countries having elections scheduled this year; Mexico's political stability is threatened; and the Cuban subversive potential remains a problem throughout the area.

During the forthcoming meeting, an attempt will be made to center discussions on areas of common interest. Economic integration of the Central American region -- one of the major objectives of the Alliance for Progress Program -- will undoubtedly be emphasized. Central America, which has been moving toward greater political unity, has begun to take steps toward economic integration, and presently envisages the creation of a Common Market by 1965. The Cuban subversive threat is also likely to be given top priority. All of the Central American countries regard this as one of the major problems and are seeking ways to meet it.

On 3 February, Nicaraguans are scheduled to cast ballots for the first time in nearly 30 years for a Presidential candidate who is not a member of the Somoza family. Rene Schick -- the government's Liberal Party (PLN) candidate and hand-picked by the Somozas -- is expected to win easily, however. Effective opposition to Schick collapsed when the major opposition party -- Traditionalist Conservative (PCT)-- boycotted the elections because the government refused to permit OAS supervision. The only opponent is Diego Manuel Chamorro Bolanos, a last-minute candidate of the splinter Nicaraguan Conservative Party (PCN), whose entry into the race seems to have been engineered by the government to provide a semblance of opposition. Castro-Communist elements, militant conservatives and others may attempt to create disorders before or during the elections, but the Nicaraguan National Guard is believed capable of controlling any troubles short of a general uprising or well-coordinated rebel invasion -- neither of which seems likely.

Anti-Somoza Nicaraguans have alleged fraudulent registrations and may attempt to challenge the elections. Although Schick may not turn out to be a Somoza puppet, opposition suspicions will be reinforced with the likely retention of General Anastasio Somoza as Director of the National Guard.

Repercussions in Guatemala from the recent abortive Air Force revolt have not been too serious. Although plotting

(REVERSE BLANK)

[illegible] continues, the threat of retaliatory action from forces rallying around deposed Air Force Chief [illegible] has apparently diminished, and the majority of the armed forces still supports President Ydigoras. The President's intention with regard to leftist ex-President Arevalo, who plans to return and seek the presidency in next December's elections, is an unsettling factor. The armed forces universally oppose Arevalo. Some factions want to replace Ydigoras with a civilian-military junta and call new elections before Arevalo becomes eligible to run in March. Should Arevalo return, the military will probably move to prevent his candidacy and the coming months may be critical.

Honduran President Villeda Morales, although not a strong leader, is expected to complete his term. The ruling Liberal Party will probably retain the Presidency in the October elections, and maneuvering for the nomination has begun. Rodas Alvarado, President of the Congress and one of the three leading contenders, has used his position to build up strength, but the armed forces regard him as the least desirable and a developing anti-Rodas coalition may prevent his nomination. Either of the three leading candidates would probably follow the present government's policies, including its relatively soft Communist stand. The Communists, while not yet a direct threat, are steadily increasing their influence in the labor field and are exploiting the country's discouraging political, economic, and social conditions.

El Salvador, faced with a serious Communist threat two years ago, continues to show political and economic progress, but there are clouds on the horizon. President Rivera, who assumed control last summer in a full return to constitutional government, still has widespread support and military backing. The government is moving ahead with its reform program, but there is some resistance to the proposed new income taxes. Communist activities have been curbed, but the Communists still retain a subversive capability particularly among labor and student groups. There is concern over the likely election of a pro-Communist as rector of the university, a center of subversion and intrigue.

Costa Rica continues to be one of the most democratic and politically stable countries in Latin America but there are some reverberations of unrest stemming from the deteriorating economic situation. The ruling National Liberation Party, which was returned to power in last year's election in a bitterly contested but peaceful election, represents the liberal left, although it includes a number of moderates such as President Orlich and some members of his cabinet. The Communist Party is small and illegal but well organized and effectively led. It recently instigated disorders in the banana zone and, while not an immediate threat, has long-range potential should economic conditions worsen.

(REVERSE BLANK)

Panama is relatively quiet. Although Panama has failed to receive any commitment for a long-sought renegotiation of the Canal Zone treaty, continuing talks on areas of disagreement and some concessions have eased tensions and softened violent anti-US propaganda. Public opinion may again be aroused, however, by the recent petition, filed by a Communist lawyer, requesting the Supreme Court to declare the treaty unconstitutional. President Chiari has also indicated he expects to press for increased compensation during the forthcoming talks. On the internal scene, President Chiari has failed to provide a strong administration. Corruption continues; the cabinet is divided by conflicting loyalties and ambitions; badly needed reforms have not yet been adopted; and the chronically depressed economy remains stagnant.

The stability which has marked the 30-year dominance of Mexico's Party of Revolutionary Institutions (PRI) is gradually being eroded. Extreme right and left factions of the PRI are vying for domination. In attempting to placate both, President Lopez Mateos has adopted inconsistent and vacillating policies, pleasing neither group. Forces outside the PRI also pose an increasing threat -- particularly the recently formed Independent Peasant Central (CCI) with which leftist ex-President Cardenas is associated. The CCI, organized to exploit unrest among the landless peasants, may also attempt to challenge the PRI politically. To undercut the CCI, the government plans to complete the land distribution program by the end of Lopez Mateos' term late next year. Although this may alleviate discontent in the agrarian sector, rising population and mounting unemployment will continue to be major problems.
(SECRET)

(Reverse Blank)

Campesino Strike Scheduled in Bolivia

A planned Campesino (peasant) strike in Bolivia today could lead to violence if it occurs. The Government reportedly plans to block all entrances into La Paz, and campesinos loyal to the government are assembling and arming to counter the strikers who are led by pro-Communist Torribio Salas. A government spokesman claims that the Cuban and Czechoslovak Embassies are financing the strike and that the Cubans are training campesino militia in other areas as well.

President Paz has reportedly said he will do everything to prevent the strike but will call on loyal campesinos for aid if he fails. If armed conflict develops between the two groups of campesinos, the Armed Forces would probably be forced to step in. President Paz might also have to take action against trouble makers like Salas, something he has tried to avoid.
(CONFIDENTIAL)

SOURCE: ARMA LA PAZ CX-11 (C)

SECRET [redacted] DISSEM

Three top Brazilian Communist Party officials, including Luis Carlos Prestes, are reported leaving for Cuba via Prague prior to 15 January to discuss certain political problems with the Cuban Communists responsible for pro-Cuban activities in the different Latin American countries. Before leaving they planned to be briefed by a Brazilian Communist Party member who has just returned from a visit to party leaders in Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia to get their opinions about holding the "Latin American Congress in Support of Cuba," now rescheduled for March, in Rio or Sao Paulo. (CIA, Rio de Janeiro, IN 42868, 31 December, SECRET NOFORN)

SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM

The National Executive Commission of Brazil's orthodox Communist Party (PCB) reportedly planned to meet on 7 January to discuss the party position in relation to Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant-League leader who has been closer to Brazil's dissident hard-line Communist Party than to its orthodox group (CPB). The PCB leaders planned to consider the possibility of sending a high-level party delegation to Cuba to confer with Fidel Castro, not only to improve relations but to protest a report that Castrol is supporting Juliao. (CIA Sao Paulo, TDCS-3533404, 9 January, SECRET)

Comment: Cuba has for some time had a divisive influence on Brazilian Communist affairs. The dissident Communist Party formed in late 1961 has - like Juliao - favored a more revolutionary line and has apparently received considerably more support from Cuba than has the orthodox party. Another indication of the divisive influence of Cuba is the report that Francisco Leivas Otero, PCB leader responsible for matters pertaining to Cuba, attacked party subservience to the CPSU at a national PCB conference on 29 November. Leivas maintained that the PCB should discuss the Sino-Soviet dispute with complete independence, rather than maintain silence on it as it had been doing. (SECRET)

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY MEXICO/BRAZIL

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,187

SUBJECT CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO AND PRESIDENT MATEOS; REASONS FOR LOMBARDO'S TRIP TO BRAZIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67594

PLACE & DATE ACQ. MEXICO, MEXICO CITY (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HMM 7016

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A PERSON (B) IN CLOSE PERSONAL CONTACT WITH LOMBARDO.

1. ON 12 FEBRUARY VICENTE LOMBARDO TOLEDANO, SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE PARTIDO POPULAR SOCIALISTA (PPS - POPULAR SOCIALIST PARTY) CONFERRED WITH HUMBERTO ROMERO PEREZ, PRIVATE SECRETARY OF ADOLFO LOPEZ MATEOS, PRESIDENT OF MEXICO. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WANTED THE PRESIDENT TO KNOW ABOUT HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL AND WHY HE WAS GOING. HE ASKED ROMERO TO TELL LOPEZ MATEOS THAT HE WOULD LEAVE MEXICO CITY FOR RIO DE JANEIRO ON 13 FEBRUARY, AND EXPECTED TO BE BACK IN MEXICO CITY ON 23 FEBRUARY. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO HE WOULD CONTACT HIM ON HIS RETURN FROM BRAZIL IN ORDER TO ARRANGE A PRIVATE MEETING WITH THE PRESIDENT. LOMBARDO SAID HE HAD SEVERAL THINGS

DA IN 17084

ASD
DASD
EXEC
D/RA
EUR
NESA
WH ✗
FE
SSP
FMRA
FEA
D/AD
DIS
~~D/FL~~
C/ST
P/FL
COMA
MAPL
PROG
COMP
M&T
V/PS
G/L
OPR

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

0000

FORM 1-63 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

TO DISCUSS WITH LOPEZ MATEOS.

2. LOMBARDO GAVE ROMERO THE FOLLOWING REASONS FOR HIS TRIP TO BRAZIL. HE SAID THAT A GROUP OF BRAZILIAN PERSONALITIES AND INTELLECTUALS HAD CONVOKED A CONGRESS WHICH IS SCHEDULED TO BE HELD IN RIO DE JANEIRO IN MARCH 1963. HE SAID THE TWO PRINCIPAL AIMS OF THE CONGRESS ARE:

A. TO CREATE AN ORGANIZATION IN DEFENSE OF CUBA.

B. TO EXAMINE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONDITIONS EXISTING IN LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES IN ORDER TO PROMOTE THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF LATIN AMERICA.

3. LOMBARDO SAID THAT SOMETHING WENT WRONG IN BRAZIL BECAUSE, APART FROM THE COMMITTEE WHICH CONVOKED THE CONGRESS, A SECOND SEPARATE COMMITTEE HAD SPRUNG UP WHOSE AIMS ARE THE SAME, AND THAT A SORT OF RIVALRY HAS DEVELOPED BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS. LOMBARDO SAID THE RESULT WAS "THAT MY COMRADES IN EUROPE HAVE ASKED ME TO GO TO BRAZIL TO INTERVENE IN THE MATTER, TO TRY TO ORGANIZE A SINGLE UNITED COMMITTEE, AND MAKE DEFINITE PREPARATIONS FOR THE HOLDING OF THE CONGRESS IN ORDER TO ENSURE ITS SUCCESS." LOMBARDO SAID "THE COMRADES IN EUROPE" SHOULD HAVE SENT AN ARGENTINE, A CHILEAN, A URUGUAYAN, OR SOMEONE NEARER BRAZIL, BUT THEY INSISTED ON SENDING HIM BECAUSE HE HAS EXPERIENCE, AND THEY ARE CONVINCED THAT HE CAN STRAIGHTEN THINGS OUT SATISFACTORILY.

4. LOMBARDO TOLD ROMERO THAT IF THE CONGRESS IS HELD IN MARCH AS

SCHEDULED, HE WILL NOT ATTEND IT. HE SAID "THE PRIMA DONNAS" AND ORNAMENTAL FIGURES WILL TAKE OVER THEN, AND I AM NOT ONE OF THOSE." ROMERO REMARKED THAT LOMBARDO IS A MAN OF WORK. LOMBARDO SAID,"I GO TO ORGANIZE SO THE CONGRESS WILL NOT FAIL, THAT IS MY MISSION, NOTHING MORE, AFTER THAT ANY ONE FROM MEXICO CAN ATTEND."

5. (FIELD COMMENT. LOMBARDO'S PLAN TO LEAVE MEXICO ON 13 FEBRUARY FOR PANAMA AND RIO DE JANEIRO HAS ALREADY BEEN REPORTED.)

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR FBI I&NS CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 17084

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION ARA-4		
RM/R 1	REP	AF
A	EUR	FE
NEA	CU	INR 5
E 4	P	IO
L	FBO	AID
S/AL 1	U/IB 1	
AGR	COM	FRB
INT	LAB 6	TAR
TR	XMB	AIR 4
ARMY 5	CIA 10	NAVY 5
OSD 12	USIA 8	NSA 3

(25)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

AIRGRAM

CSM 9-6 BRAZ

FOR RM USE ONLY

A-234
NO.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Mr. [illegible]
HANDLING INDICATOR

TO : DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INFO : RIO DE JANEIRO

FROM : Amcongen, SAO PAULO

DATE: February 6, 1963

SUBJECT : Sample survey of worker sentiment shows receptivity toward communism; São Paulo business leaders reported by one observer as generally unconcerned over Communist danger.

REF :

Two straws in the wind that have come recently to my attention indicate the existence of an unhealthy attitude toward communism on the part of at least some segments of São Paulo's working and managerial classes. Further indications in support of or in refutation of these signs will be submitted as they are noted.

On January 31, I was visited by the two top American executives of a Brazilian subsidiary of a large American corporation.§ They said that their firm, following a practice instituted some years ago of periodically sampling worker sentiment in their plants, had just finished a small survey conducted very informally by trusted Brazilian employees among 55 or 60 of their semi-skilled workers to discover how the latter would feel about the establishment in Brazil of a communist system of government. The result of this survey was so shockingly different from that of earlier pulse-taking that these executives thought the Consulate General should know about it. Eighty percent of the workers approached had indicated that while they did not pretend to know much about communism, they thought they would be better off under a communist regime than they are at present. Among the reasons most commonly given were that things were so bad in Brazil that any change would be for the ~~best~~ better and that communism would put an end to the rascality (malandragem) which is so prevalent. The other twenty percent thought that communism would be bad for the country.

§ Names withheld at their request.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FORM 4-62 DS-323

FOR DEPT. USE ONLY
☒ In ☐ Out

Drafted by: DMBraddock:tmn 2-6-63

Contents and Classification Approved by:

Clearances:

Sao Paulo
A-234

The company executives attributed the pro-communist sentiment as revealed, mainly to the economic difficulties experienced by low-income families as a result of the rampant inflation. They said their labor relations were good, that while their pay scales were not as high as those in some other industries, some popular fringe benefits were provided, and that to the best of their knowledge there had been no communist agitators at work among their employees.

Not long before this visit I was lunching one day at the Jockey Club with Sr. Paulo Ayres Filho, a Brazilian banker and pharmaceutical manufacturer who is the spark-plug of IPES (Instituto de Pesquisas Economicas e Sociais), the principal democratic action group in the local business world. Looking around him at the other tables, occupied by a good many well-known figures of São Paulo's conservative upper classes, Sr. Ayres said to me, "Apart from the two of us, there isn't a man in this dining room who is seriously concerned over the communist danger in Brazil."

No conclusions, obviously, should be drawn from such slender indications. It has been my observation, however, that most Brazilians either believe that a communist take-over would be impossible in Brazil, or believe that even if it occurred, it would take a relatively mild form with which they could live. The Brazilian's boasted calm, which is genuine and in most circumstances a virtue, could in the present state of affairs be the cause of his undoing.

Daniel M. Braddock
Minister Consul General

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Colombia/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/536,069

SUBJECT Cuban Support of Guerrillas in Colombia

DATE DISTR. 4 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Germany, Munich (14 December 1962)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An official German service, from "a fairly reliable source with contacts in Buenos Aires." Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. Maximo Gruber, a major in the Cuban Army and one of the leaders of the G-2 section, has been appointed technical leader of the Communist guerrillas in Sumapaz, Colombia.[1] Gruber, a Polish Jew, was formerly a commissar in Spain. His wife is European. His son Maximo is a graduate of the Lenin Institute in Moscow. On his frequent trips to Bolivia, Uruguay, and Cuba he carries a Bolivian diplomatic passport identifying him as "traveling inspector of the Bolivian Foreign Ministry."

2. Gruber is being assisted in his tasks in Colombia by Jaime Guerra, also known as Captain Veneno. One of his liaison officers to the Communist Party of Colombia is Blanca Diaz y Collazo, a lawyer and former member of the Cuban Embassy in Bogota, who was trained in Prague in 1952.

[1] Headquarters Comment. An official British service reported in April 1961 that Maximo Grobart, nationality unknown, was training guerrillas in the Sumapaz area; Grobart, who claimed to be of Hungarian origin, had a Cuban passport in the name of Jose Blanco and might have had other passports of different nationalities.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/534,724

SUBJECT Departure of Costa Rican Communist to Live in Cuba

DATE DISTR. 22 January 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. November 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Costa Rica, San José (23 November 62)

FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3006

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Costa Rican Communist Party circles. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Carlos Guillen Fernandez, Costa Rican Communist who was formerly very active in the Sociedad de Amigos de la Revolucion Cubana (Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution), left Costa Rica on 14 November, on his way to Cuba, where he planned to remain indefinitely and to work.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY Ecuador/Cuba/Latin America

REPORT NO. CS-3/535,791

SUBJECT Request by Cuban Diplomat in Chile to Member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth for Information on Leftist Activity in Ecuador

DATE DISTR. 1 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD-W-2107

DATE OF INFO. Mid-January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Ecuador, Guayaquil (22 January 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HEG-2108

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Alfredo Vera Arrata, a member of the National Executive Council of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) until his expulsion from URJE during its National Convention held in early January 1963, has received a letter from Pedro Martinez Pirez, First Secretary of the Cuban Embassy in Santiago, Chile, in which he asks Vera to send a person to Chile to inform him on current leftist activity in Ecuador. Vera plans to send Jaime Galarza Zavala, also expelled from URJE, if funds can be raised for the trip.

Field Comment. Martinez is in charge of Cuban subversive activities in Chile, Peru, and Ecuador.

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM

Mr. Rowen has seen

COUNTRY CUBA/HAITI

REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,274

SUBJECT PLANNED MILITARY COUP TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT DUVALIER OF HAITI

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 8 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67457

PLACE & DATE ACQ. UNITED STATES (28 JANUARY, 8 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICER (B) OF NEWS DISTRIBUTING MEDIA; FROM A COLLEAGUE OF EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL.

ASD
DASD
EXEC
D/RA
EUR
NESA
WHEM
FE
SSR
FMRA
FEA
D/AC
DIS
D/PL
[illegible]
P/PL
ODMA
MAPL
PROG
COMP
MGT
WPS
C/L
BPR

1. PAUL E. MAGLOIRE, FORMER HAITIAN PRESIDENT, IS PLANNING TO OVERTHROW PRESIDENT FRANCOIS DUVALIER OF HAITI IN A MILITARY COUP. MAGLOIRE CLAIMS TO HAVE THE BACKING OF THE HAITIAN ARMY. THE DATE OF THE COUP IS EXPECTED TO BE SET AT A SECRET MEETING WHICH WILL BE HELD IN NEW YORK ON 20 FEBRUARY.

2. MAGLOIRE EXPECTS TO RECEIVE FINANCIAL SUPPORT AND MANPOWER FROM CERTAIN CUBANS IN EXILE. ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ Y ECHAZABAL, FORMER CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO HAITI, IS LINING UP CUBAN EXILE SUPPORT. RODRIGUEZ HOPES THAT IF THE CUBANS PLAY A PROMINENT ROLE, THEY

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
CONTROLLED DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR							TREASURY				FBI		I&NS		REPCINCLANT		

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DA IN 17056 SECRET

000

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

MIGHT BE GIVEN A BASE FROM WHICH TO OPERATE ACTIVELY AGAINST CASTRO IN THE FUTURE. (SOURCE COMMENT: RODRIGUEZ HAD BEEN A DELEGATE OF THE 26 JULY MOVEMENT IN PUERTO PRINCIPE UNTIL JANUARY 1959 WHEN HE WAS NAMED AMBASSADOR TO HAITI BY FIDEL CASTRO RUZ.

IN LATE 1959 RODRIGUEZ MANAGED TO ESCAPE ASSASSINATION).

3. EUSEBIO MUJAL BARNIOL OF THE CONFEDERACION DE TRABAJADORES DE CUBA EN EXILIO (CTCE-CONFEDERATION OF CUBAN WORKERS IN EXILE) IS ASSISTING RODRIGUEZ, A RELATIVE.

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 17056

END OF MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

S E C R E T

CLASSIFICATION [illegible]

[illegible] CUBA

SUBJECT [illegible] ACTIVITIES, DEMONSTRATIONS AGAINST [illegible]

REPORT NO. [illegible]

DATE [illegible]

REFERENCES

DATE OF INFO. [illegible] FEBRUARY 196[illegible]

FIELD REPORT NO. [illegible]

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

[illegible] WITH GOOD CONNECTIONS [illegible] STUDENTS [illegible]

[illegible] ACTIVITIES. ALL MEMBERS OF THE VANGUARDIA [illegible]

[illegible] (VANGUARD) OF THE [illegible]

[illegible] POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE) INCLUDING [illegible]

[illegible] ALEJANDRO [illegible]

[illegible] BELONGING TO THE [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH AND [illegible]

[illegible] YOUTH) AND [illegible]

[illegible] MEXICO [illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible]

[illegible] CONTROLS

S E C R E T

INFORMATION REPORT

MEXICO. THEY DECLARE HIM UNWELCOME BECAUSE OF HIS OPPOSITION TO THE REGIME OF FIDEL CASTRO RUZ, COMMUNIST PRIME MINISTER OF CUBA.

2. LEONEL PADILLA GUTIERREZ, A LEADING MEMBER OF THE UCV, IS ALSO TRYING TO ORGANIZE AND INCITE THE MEXICAN WORKERS AND FARMERS TO DEMONSTRATE AGAINST BETANCOURT'S VISIT.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE FBI CINCARIB.

[illegible] OCI ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
[illegible] 1 [illegible]
[illegible] IN 17445

END OF MESSAGE

SECRET

SECRET

LA

INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PANAMA/CUBA A. IN : 9477 (13 Feb 63) R/bi 1963

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/537,022

SUBJECT CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO TO ASSIST IN ESTABLISHMENT OF CUBAN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA

DATE DISTR. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 17 DECEMBER 1962

REFERENCES IN 38943

17 OT

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PANAMA, PANAMA CITY (21 DEC 62)

APPRAISAL 2 - THAT THOMAS IS ACCURATELY QUOTED

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE REGIONAL OFFICER (B) OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO, FROM THOMAS WHO IS A PERSONAL FRIEND.

ACTION:
IN-9

INFO:
IA-30
IA-CTIC-2
(41)

1. ON 17 DECEMBER 1962, RUPERTO LUTHER THOMAS, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF PROPAGANDA OF THE PARTIDO DEL PUEBLO (PDP - PEOPLE'S PARTY - COMMUNIST), SAID THAT WHILE HE WAS IN CUBA HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT A PROPOSAL MADE BY THE CUBANS, WHO PROPOSE TO ESTABLISH AN ESPIONAGE NET IN PANAMA, TARGETED AGAINST UNITED STATES MILITARY INSTALLATIONS IN THE CANAL ZONE, TO BE FUNDED THROUGH THE PDP. THOMAS SAID THE CUBANS ARE EXTREMELY INTERESTED IN THE MOVEMENTS OF MILITARY SHIPS THROUGH THE PANAMA CANAL, AND THAT THEY TOLD HIM THAT THE NET WOULD REQUIRE TWO MEN, ONE A RADIO TECHNICIAN, THE OTHER A CODE EXPERT. THOMAS WISHED TO KNOW WHETHER A RADIO TRANSMITTER COULD BE BOUGHT IN PANAMA.

2. THOMAS SAID THAT HE HAD REPORTED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL TO THE NATIONAL EXECUTIVE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

SECRET

ATE/INR | DIA | ARMY/ACSI | NAVY | AIR | JCS | SEC | NSA | AID | USIA | OCI | ONE | OCR | ORR | OCI | OO

ATE/DIR

/EXO/ REPCINCLANT

INFORMATION REPORT

SECRET N 16496

SECRET

COMMITTEE (CEN) OF THE PDP ON 16 DECEMBER BUT THAT HE HAD NOT TOLD THE CEN THAT HE HAD COMMITTED THE PDP TO ACCEPT THE PROPOSAL. THOMAS WAS WORRIED ABOUT THE MATTER BECAUSE AT THE 16 DECEMBER MEETING MIGUEL PORCELL, NATIONAL SECRETARY OF ORGANIZATION OF THE PDP, HAD OPPOSED THE IDEA. HE DID NOT BELIEVE THAT THE PDP SHOULD ENGAGE IN SUCH ACTIVITY AND SAID THAT IF THE CUBANS WANTED THIS KIND OF INFORMATION THEY SHOULD GET IT THEMSELVES. RUBEN SOUZA, NATIONAL SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PDP, DISAGREED WITH PORCELL, SAYING THAT SO LONG AS THE PDP COULD USE THE INFORMATION DEVELOPED BY SUCH AN OPERATION HE BELIEVED THE CUBAN PROPOSAL SHOULD BE ACCEPTED. THE SUBJECT WAS TO BE DISCUSSED FULLY AT THE CEN MEETING SCHEDULED TO BE HELD 18 DECEMBER 1962. (FIELD COMMENT: THOMAS WENT TO CUBA 14 SEPTEMBER AND RETURNED TO PANAMA, VIA ZURICH, 14 DECEMBER. TDCS 3/531,754 GIVES FURTHER DETAILS OF THOMAS' EUROPEAN TRAVEL.)

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, NAVY, AIR, CINCLANT, CINCARIB.

END OF MESSAGE

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD
INFO : DCSOP
DA IN 16496

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

ASD
DASD
EXEC
D/RA
EUR
NESA
FE
SSI
FEA
D/AC
DIS
C/SI
P/PL
COMP
WPS
C/L
OPR

SECRET (When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY PERU

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,185

SUBJECT 1. DECISION OF GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO RELEASE COMMUNISTS
2. COMMUNIST LEGAL ADVISER IN GUARDIA CIVIL

DATE DISTR. 14 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

REFERENCES IN 67560

DATE OF INFO. 12 FEBRUARY 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. PERU, LIMA (12 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2

FIELD REPORT NO. HPL 2756

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE COMPETENT AMERICAN OBSERVER (B).

1. MAJOR GUILLERMO HINOSTROZA, WHO WAS NAMED AS THE GUARDIA CIVIL JUDGE TO TAKE THE STATEMENTS OF THE COMMUNISTS ACCUSED OF PLOTTING SUBVERSION, DECIDED ON 12 FEBRUARY 63 THAT HE COULD NOT ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY FOR BRINGING THE COMMUNISTS TO TRIAL. HE INTENDS TO RELEASE THEM ON 15 FEBRUARY IN THE ABSENCE OF A DECISION BY THE GOVERNING JUNTA (FIELD COMMENT: THE PRESS REPORTED HINOSTROZA'S APPOINTMENT AS AD HOC JUDGE OR MAGISTRATE FOR THE SECOND POLICE JUDICIAL ZONE IN THE ARRAIGNMENT PROCESS. IT ALSO REPORTED THAT COLONEL ENRIQUE DIEZ CANSECO WAS THE GUARDIA CIVIL LEGAL ADVISOR IN THE CASE. ACCORDING TO A USUALLY RELIABLE SOURCE WITH GOOD

SECRET
DA IN 17081

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO
STATE/DIR																

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

0000

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

CONTACTS AMONG COMMUNIST PARTY LEADERS, THE PARTY IS PLEASED THAT DIEZ CANSECO IN THE CASE BECAUSE HE WAS A COMMUNIST SYMPATHIZER WHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE PARTY IN THE NINETEEN FORTIES. PARTY RECORDS FURNISHED BY THE POLICE IN 1950 SHOW ACTUALLY THAT HE WAS A PARTY MEMBER).

2. NAVY CAPTAIN ENRIQUE CARBONNEL, CHIEF OF THE SERVIÇIO DE INTELLIGENCIA NACIONAL, PLANNED TO DISCUSS THE SITUATION WITH THE PRESIDENT OF THE JUNTA AND URGE HIM TO PREVENT THE RELEASE OF THE COMMUNISTS. JAVIER CAMPOS MONTOYA, CHIEF OF THE STATE SECURITY DIVISION OF THE POLICIA DE INVESTIGACIONES DEL PERU, INSISTS THAT THE GOVERNMENT HAS AMPLE EVIDENCE, INCLUDING SOME CONFESSIONS, ON WHICH TO CONVICT THE COMMUNISTS. CAMPOS EXPRESSED DISAPPOINTMENT AT THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE JUDGE, WHOM HE DESCRIBES AS WEAK, BUT HE HAS SOME HOPE THAT THE JUNTA WILL OVERRIDE THE DECISION.

3. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB.

ACTION: ACSI, NAVY, AF, JCS, OSD

INFO : DCSOP

DA IN 17081

END OF MESSAGE

Three Cuban nationals have been identified, according to a usually reliable and competent source, among the leaders of the 17 December strike violence at the US-owned Cerro de Pasco mine in La Oroya, Peru. One of the three Cubans has also been active in promoting the seizure of ranchland in the Peruvian highlands by Andean Indians. Communist-led Indians were said to have planned to synchronize a major new seizure campaign with the violence against Cerro de Pasco. No such incidents have been reported yet. (SECRET)

Peruvian Communist Elements Coordinating Their Activities

Orthodox Communists in Peru are apparently putting aside their differences and moving toward closer co-operation with the extremist Trotskyist faction, believed to be leading the recent outbreak of disorders. The groups are reportedly co-ordinating previously random plans to carry out extensive destruction of industrial and agricultural installations and to provoke uprisings. Cubans and other Latin American nationals as well as Havana and Moscow-trained Peruvians are said to be instrumental in this latest development.

Members of the Peruvian junta have expressed serious concern over the internal situation and hinted that they favor strong action. Although constitutional guarantees have been suspended in a fourth department, and several Army units have been moved into the areas of disorders, the junta has taken no further action. It has requested riot control equipment from the US and says it is ready to embark on an anti-Communist program upon assurance that the equipment is forthcoming. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 612 and 613 (S); AIRA LIMA C-1 (C)

Peruvian Junta Makes Firm Anti-Communist Move

Continued Communist-incited disorders and an alleged Havana-Moscow plan to take over the government prompted the military junta to suspend constitutional guarantees in Peru and institute a nationwide state of siege early on 5 January. Military commanders assumed political control in their respective zones, and a reported 800 Communist Party leaders and pro-Communist subversives have been arrested. The Lima headquarters of several Communist and Communist-front organizations, as well as their publications, have been closed.

According to the Communist plan, subversive activity was to have been intensified between 15 and 20 January in all parts of Peru, with assaults on banking and commercial institutions, military garrisons, vital communications facilities, and universities. A clandestine radio station operating on the Bolivian border allegedly was to direct and co-ordinate this activity.

The junta has regarded members of the leftist but non-Communist American Popular Revolutionary Alliance (APRA) a greater danger than the Communists and originally tended to blame them for the disorders. There is no proof that APRA has been involved in anything but legititmate strike activity. Suspension of constitutional guarantees would enable the junta to strike at APRA to discredit and weaken it before the scheduled elections next June. (SECRET)

SOURCE: EMB LIMA 622 (S), 623 (LOU) and 624 (U)

SUPPLEMENT

THE VENEZUELAN SITUATION

A number of high-ranking Cuban leaders since the first of the year have publicly called for revolution in other Latin American countries, with Venezuela singled out as a country with top priority.

Coinciding with these appeals have been reports that the Venezuelan Communist Party (PCV) planned to step up terrorist activity to discredit President Betancourt before his US visit. The recent incidence of terrorism, which has included attacks on the US Chamber of Commerce office building and the burning of Sears, Roebuck warehouses, is apparently part of this campaign.

Involved in the current terrorism is the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The FALN, although purporting to represent all of the opposition, includes some prominent Communists and is emerging as a paramilitary force of the PCV with its main strength in the Caracas area.

Guerrilla bands also operate in western Venezuela, but there is no firm evidence that their activity is coordinated with that in the Caracas area. Venezuelan army units, with air support, have been used in a recent campaign against these guerrillas.

The armed forces are generally capable of maintaining internal security and of defending the nation's borders against neighboring countries. The vast majority supports constitutionality and is loyal to the Betancourt government. The armed forces would not hesitate, however, to take over the government in order to maintain order or to forestall a Communist uprising. The armed forces were earlier greatly frustrated over the government's inaction against Communist-instigated disorders. Betancourt's recent willingness to take more vigorous action, however, coupled with the strong support given the US during the Cuban crisis, has overcome much of this dissatisfaction, and armed forces' support of the government is greater now than it was six months ago.

The officer corps is generally free of Communist penetration, although there has been some infiltration in the Marine corps, two or three battalions having been involved in leftist-led revolts during the spring of 1962. (SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Extremist And Police Activities In Venezuela

Venezuela has been afflicted over the past several months with a rash of Castro-Communist terrorist actions. Many incidents, involving shootings and robberies, are connected with the Movement of the Revolutionary Left, the Venezuelan Communist Party, and the Armed Forces of National Liberation -- the Castro-Communist group credited with the destruction at the Maracaibo oil fields during the Cuban crisis. These activities are probably designed to discredit and weaken the Betancourt Government.

The police have demonstrated considerable proficiency in preventing major outbreaks and in acting rapidly to arrest terrorists. They have rounded up extremists responsible for the holdup and looting of a printing supply warehouse and the burning of the Dupont paint warehouse and have captured the Communist leader of guerrilla bands operating in the Falcón area of northwestern Venezuela. (CONFIDENTIAL)
SOURCE: VARIOUS

SECRET

SECRET—NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Venezuelan Communists Plan to Increase Violence

As part of its terrorist campaign, the Venezuelan Communist Party reportedly plans to mark the fourth anniversary of Betancourt's presidency on 13 February by guerrilla bombings in the Caracas area. Other Communists are to see to it that the capital is flooded with propaganda that day. According to unconfirmed reports, Venezuelan authorities have charged the Castro government with ordering the recent terrorism in both Venezuela and Colombia under an extensive plan to create collective panic and insecurity in both countries. Colombian military authorities have reportedly drawn up a plan to prevent terrorism in Colombia's cities.
(SECRET)

SOURCE: TDCS 3/537,117 (S); FBIS (U)

14 Feb 63

IX.B.2

Leites/Mandelstam/DRAFT/14 Mar 63/frc

SUBJECT: Alternative US Public Posture on Subversion in Latin America

1. Although our public posture on subversion in Latin America may be too firmly established for instant and radical revision, the following analysis is offered on the assumption that some change in emphasis is both possible and desirable, now or at some time in the future.

2. Given the existence of a Communist state, of either major persuasion, what is the likelihood that it will engage in subversion toward neighboring states?

a. Total. All experience of the past forty years demonstrates that a Communist state emanates subversion as the sun emanates heat.

b. But let us be clear that two kinds of subversion are involved:

(1) Hardware-centered - that is, funds, guns, tools of sabotage.

(2) Egalitarian and libertarian ideals.

3. How much does this fact of inevitable subversion raise the probability of Communism spreading to target countries?

a. Subversion is never a sufficient condition - and frequently not a necessary one.

b. If subversion is really dangerous to a target state, there is per se something seriously wrong in that state. (France's "Nasser Fallacy" of 1956; France embarked on the Suez adventure on the assumption that if Nasser were disposed of, the trouble in Algeria would magically disappear. Although the game was not played out, few would dispute the conclusion that France's assumption was wrong; or, for that matter, that France would have been in an even deeper morass if her military forces had managed with the British to occupy Cairo.)

4. How feasible is it to control subversion at the source without destroying the Communist State?

Usually it is infeasible to do so or the costs are prohibitive. For instance, the costs of a protracted tight quarantine which could prevent the export both of hardware-oriented and idea subversion, would be very high, even if the activity were accepted by Cuba and the Soviet Union. This would mean inspecting every vessel, searching every traveler, forcing planes down for inspection, etc. We submit (a) that ideas would still be exported and (b) that by so doing we would magnify the importance of Cuba beyond imagination. It would become a kind of forbidden fruit. The analogy with prohibition in this country comes to mind. This course involves an increment of prestige and lure to Cuba which would be likely to outweigh the doubtless desirable diminution in the export of trained subversives and associated hardware. Furthermore, given the success of such an effort, the obvious Soviet counter would be to use other channels which we could not surveil without major East-West confrontation. The Cuban subversion export organization might well move to Moscow, Prague and/or even Peiping. Therefore, to take a public stance opposed to Cuban subversion without having resolved on invasion is to be committed to a policy bound to demonstrate US impotence.

5. If we want to control subversion at the source by destroying the Communist State, Cuba, how useful is it for us publicly to emphasize hardware-centered subversion as the reason?

a. For many people outside of the US, even the export of subversion by force and sabotage also involves ideas and dedication, as well as funds, arms, and other equipment. (We, for example, are not ashamed of the Bay of Pigs expedition except that it failed.)

b. Usually attitudes toward violent subversion depend on attitudes toward thetarget. (Example: acts against Jiminez, Trujillo did not offend US/ most of Latin America/ most of the world; the parallel today: Somoza, Ydigoras, Stroesser). We run the danger of falling into the USSR projection of the US as the "world gendarme." Subversion directed against the Dutch government would outrage not only all Americans, but also all non-Communist Europeans; its legitimacy is total. But the same can not be said for most LA governments. The difference is decisive and perhaps sometimes neglected.

c. Most people generally recognize that when violent subversion is powerful, it is because it taps fundamental sources of discontent.

d. We in the US tend to look at subversion in Latin America from the point-of-view of hardware. But a great deal of the subversion in Latin America is or at least appears as idea-centered, not hardware-centered. The export of "armed aggression" by dedicated revolutionaries is only a part of the process. Another part, which is at least as important, and probably more so, is the export of propaganda. This, however, to much of the world, including Latin America outside of the oligarchies, will appear as an export of ideas and ideals (perhaps wrong, but nevertheless ideas). Our approach, then, tends to pass rather than meet the

Latino viewpoints. We are very close to putting ourselves into the position of the Tsarist gendarmes who tried to use brute force against the power of ideas. The trap is that we may seem thereby to be acknowledging the decline and imminent fall of our own ideas.

e. One consequence of this line of reasoning would be that, if we ever find it necessary to invade Cuba, we should do so "to stop the firing squads," "to guarantee free elections," -- but not to save Somoza.

6. How feasible is it for us to control both kinds of subversion at the target rather than at the source?

a. It is often feasible. This is how we have in fact successfully controlled subversion except in the dubious case of S. Vietnam. Even in the difficult case of Greece, we succeeded by a combination of military and economic measures.

b. The point is not that this is always a feasible way of handling the problem; rather it is often practicable and also often the most desirable way.

7. Suppose that we decided to invade Cuba to control subversion with the result (three cases):

a. That we restored the status quo ante Castro.

b. That for reasons of expediency we try to maintain Castro's "reforms" -- i.e., what many Latinoes would regard as "socialism."

c. That we gave the Cuban people an obvious free choice, no matter what ensued.

How would the prospects for Communism in the Western Hemisphere be affected?

Case A: Boomerang - we would almost certainly enhance the prospects for Communism.

Case B: There would be strong popular Latin American support, some governmental outrage, but the prospects for Communism would be diminished.

Case C: Paradoxically, the result would depend on what ensued, because most Latin Americans do not trust the US (and particularly would be skeptical of "free elections" if US soldiers were present).

CONCLUSIONS

1. Conditions in most parts of Latin America are such that subversion (Cuban or Bloc or both) is really dangerous.

2. Since this is so, the US public posture should not recognize this; and we should abstain from public pronouncements that subversion is conceivably a casus belli.

3. The point-of-view set forth in this paper, insofar as it can be made operative, may tend to bring a fundamental alignment between the US public posture and LA opinion.

4. The US course of action towards any LA country has to weigh the advantages and disadvantages, in any given case at any given time, of subversion control (a) at source or (b) at point of impact.

5. The same principles would apply if another Communist-oriented government were to come to power in any part of Latin America.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10002

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO : GENERAL KRULAK

TITLE : CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION

Released under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of
1992 (44 USC 2107 Note). Case#:NW
88608 Date: 03-18-2025

DATE : 02/14/1963
PAGES : 139

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1C; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 02/10/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1. Transmittal of report entitled "Cuba as a Base for Subversion" from Califano to Krulak.

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________________
☐ Refer To________________
Review Date 12AUG15 By________

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
BY______ DATE 01/14/16

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

14 February 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR GENERAL KRULAK:

This book will have to be held by you on an EYES ONLY basis.

The 1700 meeting with Mr. Yarmolinsky will be held in Mr. Vance's office.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment

Room
3E733

75855

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CUBA AS A BASE FOR SUBVERSION

GENERAL

SNIE 85-4 62 (9 Nov 62) Next Attached

1 PROPAGANDA

TAB

Prensa Latina and Printed Material 1
Havana's International Broadcasting 2
Personal Contact 3
U.S. Counter Effort 4

2 FUNDS

Sole Report of Evidence 1
Reports of Cuban Funds for Subversion 2

3 TRAINING

Summary Report of Training in Cuba 1
Program 2
Travel for Training 3
Activities Upon Return from Cuba 4
Miscellaneous 5

4 ARMS SHIPMENTS - FROM CUBA

Methods of Operation 1
Reports of Arms Smuggling 2

5 COMMUNICATIONS

Electronic Communications 1
Documents 2
Couriers 3

6 SABOTAGE

Reports of Sabotage 1
Terrorist Activities 2

7 COMMUNIST ORGANIZATION FOR LATIN AMERICA

Cuban Relationships and Policies 1
Soviet Activities and Conflicts 2
Situation Reports 3

SUBVERSION -- Actions, which may or may not be inimical to U.S. interests, designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a constituted government.

9 NOV 1962
SNIE 85-4-62

CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE CAPABILITIES IN LATIN AMERICA

THE PROBLEM

To describe and evaluate Castro's capabilities, with Soviet help, for carrying out subversion and sabotage in Latin America after satisfaction of all US conditions relative to the withdrawal of strategic weapons systems from Cuba and a consequent US commitment not to invade.

NOTE: In this estimate we have considered Castro's raw capabilities, taking note of, but not working out in detail, US and Latin American capabilities for counteraction.

SUMMARY

A. The dangerously unstable situation that prevails throughout much of Latin America is the product of fundamental inequities and historic circumstances; it is not the creation of Castro and the Soviets. Castro's efforts, with Soviet help, to exploit this situation by means of subversion and sabotage have not produced significant results. Propaganda exploitation of Castro and Cuba as symbols of revolution has probably been more effective to date than other subversive activities. Castro's influence in Latin America had waned by the time of the missile base crisis and was further reduced by the revelation that he had accepted Soviet strategic missile bases on Cuban soil and by the manner of the Soviet decision to withdraw them.

B. Implementation of an agreement between the US and the USSR whereby the strategic weapons systems would be withdrawn and the US committed not to intervene in Cuba with force will leave Castro with a new immunity and a greater freedom for subversive actions throughout Latin America. The extent to which this potential is realized will depend upon the situation in Cuba, Soviet policy toward Cuba, and the policies and performance of the other Latin American governments and of the US with respect to the Castro threat. There are many targets in the hemisphere vulnerable to Castro-Communist subversion and sabotage, and the Soviets are likely to assist Castro in reaching them by contributing both to his security at home and to his capability for action overseas. As in the period before the missile base crisis, the effect of Castro's subversive activities will depend not only upon his capabilities but upon the attractiveness of the Cuban example and the willingness of the American governments to take determined counteraction. This willingness will probably be weakened by fulfillment of the US commitment not to invade Cuba.

C. We have examined how Castro's subversive potential would be affected by alternative courses of Soviet policy regarding Cuba: (1) virtual withdrawal of support; (2) continuation of economic and military support ranging from present up to substantially increased levels. We believe that course (1) would considerably reduce Castro's subversive potential, and that the Soviets are unlikely to elect it. We conclude that Soviet course (2) would maintain Castro's potential for subversive action at least at present levels or actually raise it to the point where he could undertake amphibious and/or airborne subversive operations against close-in targets.

THE ESTIMATE

I. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES BEFORE THE MISSILE BASE CRISIS [1]

Aims

1. From the time of his accession to power Fidel Castro has sought to gain acceptance of the Cuban revolution as a model for others and of himself as the leader of revolutionary forces throughout Latin America. He has constantly sought to foment revolutions in other Latin American States. Moreover, Castro has generally had the support of the Sino-Soviet Bloc in the pursuit of these aims.

Means

2. Castro began his career of sponsorship for revolutions in Latin America in 1959 with landings of small rebel forces in Nicaragua, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. None of these were successful and he turned to other means.

3. From the beginning, propaganda has been one of the principal instruments on which Castro has relied. In addition to the main transmissions of Radio Havana for external listeners, which have had a great deal of revolutionary content, he has beamed special programs devised to stimulate revolutionary action to each of half a dozen selected countries.[2] A major effort has been made through *Prensa Latina,* the Cuban news service, to disseminate Castro-Communist propaganda. Printed propaganda has also been sent from Cuba into most other Latin American States, and Cuban diplomatic missions and personnel have actively disseminated it. Students returning from indoctrination in Cuba have helped establish Cuban Institutes for Friendship among Peoples which have functioned as propaganda outlets.

4. Thousands of Latin Americans have been brought to Cuba; about 1,200 foreign trainees are believed to be there now. Many hundreds have been trained in revolutionary techniques and guerrilla warfare. Cuba has been made a main transit point for travel between Latin America and the Bloc.

5. Financial support has been provided by Cuba to revolutionary groups in a number of countries, although the cases on which we have reports involved relatively small sums of money. Arms shipments have

---

[1] See Annex A.

[2] Peru, Ecuador, Colombia, Venezuela, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic.

also been reported, but the evidence is unclear as to quantities shipped and the extent of Cuba's role in these transactions. We believe that there is an extensive agent net in Latin America directed from Havana.

6. Castro has associated himself with revolutionary activist groups throughout Latin America. In most cases these have been Communist, but where the regular Communist Party favored a legal or parliamentary line he has not hesitated to support dissident Communist groups, e.g., in Brazil, and non-Communist revolutionaries, e.g., in Guatemala and El Salvador. In some cases he has sponsored new revolutionary organizations, e.g., in Panama, Colombia, and Peru. In Chile he has endorsed a popular front coalition made up of Communist and moderate leftists.

Evaluation

7. Instances of financial and material support sent by Cuba to revolutionaries in other countries which have come to our attention are probably only a part of the total effort. Even so, the effort seems to have been relatively small and ineffective. Yet along with the political and psychological stimulus which Castro's influence has provided, Cuban subversive activities have perceptibly strengthened activist revolutionary groups. Dangerous situations subject to exploitation by Castro and the Communists exist in a number of Latin American countries—notably Venezuela, Brazil, British Guiana, the Dominican Republic, and Bolivia. These dangers arise from political and social tensions which existed long before Castro came to power. They might lie dormant for some time; but with Castro as a potential detonator, they are more likely to blow up. The detonative compound will exist as long as Castroism survives, whatever may happen to Castro personally.

8. The most dangerous aspect of Castroism has been its broad appeal as a symbol of revolutionary change and nationalist assertiveness in Latin America. Propaganda from Cuba has taken advantage of this fact and has almost certainly been a more important influence in the Latin American situation than Castro's other subversive activities. During 1960 and 1961 Castroism became a force to be reckoned with politically in a number of Latin American countries. Certain governments felt obliged to move in the direction of neutralist and leftist positions. This influence waned, however, after Castro identified himself with the Bloc in late 1961. Nevertheless, the appeal to Castro's movement continued to be a source of major concern to almost all governments and seriously restricted their willingness to associate themselves, at least publicly, with the US.

II. CASTRO'S SUBVERSIVE POTENTIAL IN THE AFTERMATH OF AN AGREEMENT UNDER WHICH THE SOVIETS WOULD WITHDRAW THEIR STRATEGIC MISSILES AND THE US GIVE ASSURANCES THAT IT WOULD NOT INVADE CUBA

9. Castro's subversive capabilities—and his disposition to use them—will be enhanced by the sense of security provided by such sophisticated weapons as are retained in Cuba after the withdrawal of Soviet strategic missiles. The IL-28 bombers, if retained, and other modern equipment noted in Annex B, would be important in this regard. A US commitment not to invade Cuba will further strengthen his sense of immunity from reprisal and almost certainly encourage him to intensify subversive activities in other Latin American countries.

Response of Castro Supporters to Missile Base Crisis

10. Castro's supporters throughout Latin America, with few though important exceptions (e.g., sabotage of oil facilities in Venezuela), failed to respond to the missile base crisis with effective acts of sabotage or with impressive public demonstrations. Two important limiting factors should be taken into account in judging this response, however. US action to alert Latin American governments led them to make extensive advance preparation, including deployment of security forces and the roundup of suspects, a condition of readiness which is unlikely to be maintained indefinitely. There also may have been some uncertainty among the activist followers of Castro whether they should make their big effort in response to the announcement of the US blockade, or wait for the anticipated US invasion. Moscow's apparent failure to provide guidance may have contributed to the confusion. It is our judgment, however, that the response to Castro's appeal for attacks on the US and its friends indicates that his power to command revolutionary action, at least in the circumstances of the missile base crisis, is limited.

Support Which Castro Can Expect in the Future

11. The range of Castro's support has been, we believe, considerably narrowed by events since Castro declared himself a Communist. Revelation of the fact that he had allowed the Soviets to establish offensive bases under exclusive Soviet control has alienated many non-Communist nationalists, genuine neutralists, and even revolutionaries seeking social and economic betterment. San Tiago Dantas, formerly Foreign Minister under President Goulart and an author of Brazil's nonalignment policy, and leading Mexican officials have publicly expressed their disenchantment.

12. The activist revolutionaries are probably the only important force on which Castro can now count, but even their support has apparently been rendered less effective by differences on the question of Soviet relations with Castro and with Latin American Communist parties.

Castro's Resources for Continued Subversive Activity

13. *Arms.* (See Annex B.) Castro has substantial stocks of arms. In addition to Soviet Bloc materiel there are stores of arms inherited from the Batista regime not being used by Castro forces and available for distribution outside Cuba. In the past he has apparently been hampered in his efforts to use arms for subversive purposes by problems of transport and delivery. He has at his disposal, however, 11 IL–14 transports belonging to Cubana airlines which could be used to deliver arms under certain circumstances. The IL–28's now in Cuba are inappropriate for subversive purposes. However, they could be used for air drops. Cuba has many small craft suitable for infiltration of men and arms. The 6 Khronshtadt subchasers, 16 P–6 motor torpedo boats, and 12 Komar missile boats obtained from the Bloc could also be used for arms deliveries. If the projected trawler base is built up, trawlers—both Cuban and Soviet—could be used for arms deliveries. If Soviet submarines call at the trawler base or at other Cuban ports, they, too, could be used in support of subversive activities. We see no evidence that Cuba has or is developing a sophisticated amphibious warfare capability, and all the means of delivery of arms by sea noted above would be vulnerable to precautionary measures by Latin American military and naval forces.

14. *Propaganda apparatus.* Castro's propaganda machine remains intact. For the time being, however, his diplomatic missions are likely to find it harder to disseminate propaganda than in the past, both because of new precautions by local governments and because of a reduction in the numbers of cooperative volunteers outside the organized Communist groups.

15. *Money and equipment.* Despite differences between Castro and the USSR concerning dismantling of the missile bases, we believe that the Soviets will continue to supply Castro with money, supplies, and equipment for subversive activity. The Soviets have certainly supplied Castro with sophisticated instruments of intelligence collection, sabotage, and clandestine communications.

16. *Organization.* The organization of Castro's subversive assets throughout Latin America was shown by the recent crisis to be loose and otherwise faulty. We estimate that Castro will make a strong effort to strengthen and improve it, and that he will continue to receive support in this effort from the Soviet apparatus, both in Cuba itself, where the Soviet Ambassador is a veteran officer of the KGB, and in other important centers of Soviet activity such as Mexico City and Montevideo.

Other Factors on Which Castro's Subversive Capability Will Depend

17. If the US and USSR reach and implement the agreement stated in the problem Castro will gain an immunity which he lacked before the missile base crisis. He will, furthermore, still have most of the arms and equipment which were delivered in the post-July buildup, as well as enhanced capabilities provided by accelerated training. Presumably his enemies will have about the same, or less, freedom to engage in propaganda, sabotage, support for resistance activities, and other actions designed to overthrow Castro than they had before the crisis—almost certainly not more. Unless Castro is gravely endangered by internal political and economic problems, there is no reason to believe that anti-Castro activities are any more likely to jeopardize his position than they did before the crisis.

18. *Situation in Cuba.* Castro's ability to engage in subversive activities will be influenced significantly by the strength and stability of his position at home. Heightened political and economic difficulties in Cuba would restrict Castro's subversive effort, while the more secure he is at home, the more freedom and strength he is likely to have for subverting other governments and re-establishing his prestige and influence. Castro's position in Cuba will depend in part on his own policies, but is likely to depend even more upon those of the Soviets.

19. *Alternative Soviet policies.* There are several courses of action with respect to Cuba which the Soviets are likely to consider. Some leaders may argue that the whole policy of economic and military support for Castro should be abandoned along with the plan for the deployment of strategic missiles in Cuba. We believe, however, that the Soviet stake in Cuba as an ally and as a Soviet center in Latin America is still too high to abandon. The stake in Castro as a person, however, is questionable. If the Soviets did make a decision to withdraw support either from Castro or from Cuba, we believe that Cuban capability for subversion in Latin America would be greatly reduced, at least for a time. This capability would be reduced more in the case of the Soviets' withdrawing support from Cuba than in the case of their abandonment of Castro alone.

20. An alternative course would be for the Soviets to continue to extend economic and military assistance. Such assistance could range all the way from the amounts necessary to maintain Cuba in its present condition, including support of the expanded military establishment, to substantial increases. Such a policy would probably reduce considerably Castro's internal problems and thus give him additional freedom to engage in external subversion and sabotage. Additions to Castro's stocks of small arms would not in themselves change his capability for subversive activity, as he already has supplies of surplus arms. However, if the Soviets were to provide substantial additional air and

sealift capability, the Cubans would be able to mount large-scale subversive interventions in neighboring countries. Furthermore, whatever degree of success is achieved in improving Cuba's position and in expanding its physical resources, Cuba's net capability for subversion and sabotage will in the last analysis largely be determined by the overall situation in Latin America.

21. We do not believe that Castro or the Soviets can yet foresee what the effects of the recent crisis will be over the long term on their relationship. The crisis has probably created difficulties of a political and psychological nature that neither of them can readily solve, however determined they may be to do so. Castro may have been moved by the treatment he has received at the hands of the Soviets to consider modifying his relationship with them and seeking to improve his relations with the OAS and possibly even the US. We believe, however, that he is unlikely to find feasible ways of reducing his dependence upon the USSR. The Soviets certainly must consider that they have effective means of exercising control over Castro. Furthermore, his repeated assertions of continued loyalty to Marxism-Leninism make it unlikely that he is seriously contemplating a restoration of relations with the OAS, or that he could succeed if he tried.

22. *Policy of other American nations.* Castro's subversive capabilities will be greatly influenced by the policies and actions of other Latin American nations, as by those of the US. We believe that the high state of security alert that has prevailed since 22 October and the show of unity that marked the recent crisis are unlikely to last. There is sure to be a revival of nationalist sentiments. On balance, however, we believe that the prospects for countersubversive action by Latin American States, on their own and in conjunction with the US, are improved. Many responsible Latin Americans will have interpreted recent events to mean that firm and united action can be effective against the Soviet threat from Cuba. However, Latin American governments will probably be less willing to take coordinated action against Communist inroads if the US commits itself not to invade Cuba.

Likely Future Targets for Cuban Sabotage

23. The extent of Castro's capabilities for sabotage and other clandestine activity in Latin America will depend upon the complicated factors noted above. Whatever his capabilities are, he will not be at a loss for targets against which to use them. Some of the more obvious targets are:

a. *US missions and personnel.* US missions and personnel all over Latin America were designated as targets for attack in the various calls for action which went out during the recent crisis. Action against such targets has a primarily political and propaganda value to Castro in that it tends to show public opposition to US policy. It is also relatively easy for Castro to promote attacks against official US installations in a crisis situation and to get help from all the various elements which are opposed to American influence in the area. Future attacks may be anticipated in situations in which Castro feels that the public resentment of US policy exists or can be stirred up.

b. *Physical targets vulnerable to a limited sabotage effort.* Prime targets for sabotage will be mining, industrial, and business installations in which there is a large proportion of US capital, which are otherwise associated with the US, or which are so important to the local economy that damage to them would create difficulties for governments which are anti-Castro and cooperating with the US. Oil facilities in Venezuela, including the oil and water pipelines to the refineries on the Paraguana Peninsula, and similar facilities are likely to be chosen as targets for Cuban sabotage. Installations for the handling of Venezuelan iron ore are also likely objectives. US installations in Panama might be attacked.

c. Port and communications facilities are generally vulnerable to sabotage and are appealing targets to Cubans and other Latin American Communists particularly in countries which are cooperating with the US and whose communications media are taking an anti-Castro line. Telephone, telegraph, radio and television facilities, and most public utilities, particularly electric power and transformer stations, are potential targets. Selection of targets for sabotage will depend on the importance of particular facilities but even more on the varying access of Castroites and Communists to them.

d. *Political targets susceptible to exploitation.* Political instability throughout Latin America, in almost every case characterized by pressures from below upon relatively conservative and generally anti-Communist governments, provide Castro with opportunities for subversive political activity. Particularly unstable situations include the following:

(1) *Venezuela*, where Communist-inspired disorders have been kept in check by the government, but where continued Communist and leftist violence may lead the military to take control. In a country such as Venezuela, where the stability of an anti-Castro and anti-Communist government depends heavily upon one man, assassination is another danger.

(2) *Nicaragua*, where Communist-led groups, in anticipation of coming elections, may seek to incite or exploit violence against the Somoza regime.

(3) *Guatemala*, where President Ydigoras' position is weak and uncertain.

(4) *The Dominican Republic*, where the problems of political reconstruction after a generation of dictatorship have proved almost more than the caretaker government can handle, and where some political groupings amenable to Castro's influence are seeking to gain a footing.

(5) *Bolivia*, where the struggle for dominance within the ruling MNR Party between the moderates and those on the far left is ready-made for exploitation by Castro.

(6) *Brazil*, where Communists have penetrated the government and military to some limited extent, the tide of nationalist and anti-US feeling is strong, and depressed socio-economic conditions and inefficient government administration provide Castro many opportunities, especially in the northeast.

PROPAGANDA

PROPAGANDA

General: Since 1 January 1959, the Castro/Communist Regime has placed great emphasis on its propaganda efforts throughout Latin America, as reflected in the quantities of personnel and obvious amounts of funds devoted to this enterprise. One of the first efforts was to establish PRENSA LATINA, a Cuban news agency with exchange agreements with TASS and the NEW CHINA NEWS AGENCY, as the principal Castro/Communist overt outlet. Shipments of printed pamphlets, books, magazines and leaflets have been discovered in Cuban diplomatic pouches in Mexico, Panama, Chile and Argentina. The baggage of most travellers departing Cuba contains printed propaganda. Cuban government personalities such as Dr. Armando Hart, Minister of Education, are known to have transported quantities of this printed material. Personal representation plays a great part in the Castro/Communist propaganda program. Travellers to Cuba for economic, political and cultural meetings are indoctrinated and are provided material for further distribution upon return to their home countries. Student, labor, youth, women, and professional organizations serve as a medium for propaganda dissemination. Diplomatic and economic representatives have cultivated local communists, influential leftists, and anti-government dissidents through personal contact. Radio plays an extremely important part in the Castro/Communist propaganda effort within Cuba and externally.

TAB 1 - PRENSA LATINA and Printed Material

This tab contains a detailed summary of Cuban efforts to organize propaganda and press control and an item illustrating Cuban efforts to mail printed material through Mexico.

TAB 2 - HAVANA'S International Broadcasting

This tab contains a recent summary of Havana's broadcasting program with examples of Cuban propaganda inciting revolt in Latin America. Additionally this tab contains four separate items indicating in greater detail the types of broadcast information currently being disseminated.

TAB 3 - PERSONAL CONTACT

This tab contains 4 items as follows: (1) An example of attempted diplomatic influence in Bolivia; (2) A tabulation of representatives attending a recent Congress in Cuba (by profession, country, and organizations represented); (3) An item on propaganda through the Cuban sponsored labor organization (CTCR); and (4) An example of propaganda through a cultural organization with inferred connections to an international organization strongly influenced by Communists.

TAB 4 - U. S. COUNTER EFFORTS

This tab contains a recent summary of USIA programs on Cuba and a more detailed item on USIA radio broadcasting to Latin America.

The following description of the Cuban Government's measures this past year to organize propaganda and press control is based upon the 25 September report of an official German service supplemented by August 1962 information from a fairly reliable independent source.

In early 1962 the ORI decided to establish a Comite de Orientacion Revolucionaria (COR) to be responsible for all propaganda activities of the Cuban Government and for censorship of the press. Cesar Escalante, an old-time Communist, a member of the ORI National Directorate and brother of Anibal Escalante who was later "purged" by Castro, was appointed head of the COR and thus given control over the entire Cuban press, radio, and television. By August, Cesar Escalante was reported to have a personal staff of 15 workers, most of whom were Communist Party members, and to be holding weekly briefing sessions with editors of the four large Havana newspapers, entrusting censorship to these editors.

In late June 1962, the ORI set up a committee to be in charge of coordination of Cuban propaganda throughout Latin America. This committee was subordinate to the COR, and consisted of representatives from the Ministry of Foreign Relations, the Prensa Latina news agency and the COR. The director of Prensa Latina was the news agency's representative on this committee. The representative of the COR, however, along with the representative of the Foreign Ministry, believed to be Ramon Penate y Molina, were said to have actually determined the policy of Prensa Latina.

The reorganization of Prensa Latina is described as Escalante's most important accomplishment. Since mid-July 1962 the news agency has been increasingly employed as an instrument of the Cuban Foreign Ministry and is serving as its propaganda medium in these countries with which Cuba no longer maintains diplomatic relations. Cesar Escalante now controls Prensa Latina's activities both in Cuba and abroad. He is assisted by Ramon Calcines Gordillo, also a veteran Communist and member of the ORI National Directorate, who acts as liaison official with the Communist parties of Latin America. Calcines has been reported as being also a director of the Cuban Institute of Friendship with Peoples (ICAP) with which Prensa Latina maintains close relations.

The staff of the Prensa Latina center in Havana is to be enlarged from 150 employees to almost 1,000 by January 1963. The center also employs about 250 salaried personnel in Latin America in addition to numerous free-lance correspondents. The Latin American section of the Prensa Latina center enjoys a favored position with special privileges given to "sub-agencies" working in countries which have broken diplomatic relations with Cuba. The sub-agencies in several Latin American capitals are to be enlarged as operational centers for certain areas - for example, Bogota will be a coordinating center for Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Costa Rica, and Nicaragua; and Mexico City for Mexico, Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala.

The 100-Kilowatt VHF transmitter of Radio Havana is of special importance for increasing Cuban propaganda activities in Latin America; at the end of propaganda broadcasts the station reportedly also transmits specific directives to Cuban agents abroad. The manager of the radio station is Baldomero Alvarez Rios, president of the Cuban-Chinese Friendship Committee, who maintains close contact with Shen Chien, Communist Chinese ambassador to Cuba. Communist China is said to have considerable influence on Cuba propaganda activities.

A biweekly periodical, Panorama Economico Latinoamericano, which is distributed throughout Latin America, is to be given wider circulation and published additionally in an English-language edition. Fernando Colino, editor of the periodical, is said to be planning a campaign on "the economic tragedy of the Latin American peoples." (CIA CS-3/530, 108, 5 December, SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

2/8/63

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY	Mexico/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/536,706
SUBJECT	Return of Cuban Propaganda To the Cuban Embassy by the Mexican Post Office	DATE DISTR.	8 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	21 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (21 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HMM-6958

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (F) with good contacts in the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Recently Mexican postal authorities returned a large amount of Cuban propaganda to the Cuban Embassy with the stamp "no such address." Herberto Jorrin Munoz, an employee of the Cuban Embassy, commented that with such tactics the Mexican Post Office "is sabotaging the Cuban Revolution."

Field Comment. TDCS-3/526,575 reported that on 26 October 1962 Mexican authorities had refused to accept a considerable volume of airmail from Cuba which was destined for countries other than Mexico and ordered the mail returned to Cuba.

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION DIVISION
OFFICE OF OPERATIONS

SPECIAL MEMORANDUM

HAVANA'S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

31 JANUARY 1963

I. HOURS ON THE AIR

II. SAMPLES OF RADIO PROPAGANDA INCITING TO REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA

Prepared for:
Information Copy for:

00/F3ID
31 January 1963

HAVANA'S INTERNATIONAL BROADCASTING

I. HOURS ON THE AIR

The Cuban Government uses three vehicles for its radio propaganda to audiences in other countries: "Radio Free Dixie," "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," and "Radio Habana Cuba."

"Radio Free Dixie" is a one-hour weekly transmission in English to Negroes in the United States, broadcast over the facilities of Havana's 50-kilowatt transmitter "Radio Progreso" and its network of eight relay stations situated throughout Cuba. Robert F. Williams, the North Carolina Negro who fled to Cuba to avoid prosecution for alleged kidnapping, is the director and chief commentator of this program, which is heard every Friday night at 10 p.m. EST. Using "Jazz" terminology and frequently crude language, Williams tells his "oppressed North American brothers" that they are going to have to "fill a lot of jails and a lot of graves, and not just with black boys, either," in order to achieve "freedom and social justice." Assisting Williams are newscaster Carlos Moore and "musical hostess" (disc jockey and commentator) Jo Salas. "Radio Free Dixie" is heard very well in southern Florida and can probably be heard in many areas of the southern United States without elaborate technical facilities.

"The Friendly Voice of Cuba," formerly a popular Havana radio station known as "Radio Mambi," began broadcasting in May 1962. Although this powerful station does not so announce, its transmissions are apparently intended for listeners in the United States. "The Friendly Voice of Cuba" broadcasts from 6:00 in the morning to 1:00 a.m. EST. All of its programs, except for four seven-minute Spanish news shows, are in English. Its approach is a shade more subtle than that of "Radio Free Dixie." It is heard best in southern Florida, but can also be heard in many parts of the southern United States.

The official international service called "Radio Habana Cuba" is considered to be the chief external radio propaganda outlet of the Cuban Government. More commonly known as "Radio Havana," this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, Spanish, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere. "Radio Havana" is under the supervision of Marcos Behemaras, deputy director (for international broadcasting) of the Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusion. In addition to the normal information and entertainment, it transmits special programs--"sponsored" by so-called exile groups--the evident intent of which is to encourage subversion of the incumbent governments of Peru, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. Programs with similarly subversive intent were formerly beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras; these were discontinued in September 1962.

Although first observed by FBIS monitors on 14 March 1961, the Cuban international service was not officially inaugurated until May Day of that year, when it began presenting a relatively modest schedule of programs in English, French, and Spanish for Europe and the Americas for a total of 42 hours a week. Since then, "Radio Havana" has grown by leaps and bounds, finally emerging as Latin America's number one international broadcaster. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hours 15 minutes
Haitian Creole to Haiti - 7 hours
English to Europe - 9 hours 20 minutes
English to the Americas - 17 hours 30 minutes
French to Europe - 9 hours 20 minutes
French to Canada - 3 hours 30 minutes
French to the Mediterranean - 3 hours 30 minutes
Portuguese to Brazil - 7 hours
Spanish to Europe & the Mediterranean - 16 hours 55 minutes
Spanish to the Americas - 108 hours 30 minutes

The technical facilities of "Radio Havana" are at a transmitter site about 23 miles southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling "Radio Havana" to be heard all over the world. Programs are sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, these transmitters have been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of particular political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station called "Radio Revolucion del Movimiento Catorce de Junio" demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off the air after about a week, but not before direction finder (DF) bearings and other technical clues indicated that the Bauta transmitter site was the point of origin.

"Radio Havana" announces that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American nations so that they can beam programs back to their homelands. These programs are now broadcast as follows:

The Peruvian Anti-Imperialist Struggle Movement (Movimiento Peruano de la Lucha Anti-Imperialista) broadcasts the "La Voz del Peru Revolucionaria" program to Peru on Sundays at 7 to 7:15 p.m, EST;

The Guatemalan Information Committee (Comité Guatemalteco de Information) transmits the "Mensaje a Guatemala" program to Guatemala on Tuesdays and Saturdays at 9 to 9:15 p.m. EST;

The Dominican Liberation Movement (Movimiento de Liberacion Dominicana) broadcasts the "Patria Libre" program to the Dominican Republic on Wednesdays and Fridays at 9 to 9:15 p.m. EST.

Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras, but were dropped in September 1962 in favor of a "Radio Havana" program called "Trinchera Americana," now heard nightly from 9:30 to 9:40 p.m. EST. This program is more flexible in that it attacks the regimes of any Latin American nation, changing its target from night to night according to the exigencies of any given prevailing political situation.

II. SAMPLES OF PROPAGANDA INCITING TO REVOLT IN LATIN AMERICA

Reproduced below is a selection of some of the more inflammatory statements that have appeared in Havana broadcasts to Latin America as a whole (Section A) and in special programs tailored for listeners in Peru, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic (Section B). The quotations are arranged in reverse chronological order. Most of the statements are taken from programs broadcast within the past two months, with a sampling from the spring of 1962 included for purposes of comparison. Passages not included in quotation marks are paraphrases.

A. Broadcasts for Latin America in General (Radio Havana in Spanish to the Americas)

23 January 1963:

> The People's animosity against Betancourt "has been growing with each passing day. Already there has been an elaboration of revolutionary tactics, the application of which is causing the very foundations of the spurious government to tremble. The National Liberation Front is turning out to be the most effective executor of the will of the Venezuelan people at this time. The slogan of the people is 'A Complete Change of Government!'"

12 January 1963:

> "The situation in El Salvador is disastrous in every respect; the people are on the verge of a complete collapse or a violent reaction. The more the Salvadorans are oppressed, the more they strike back for their liberation, particularly since the Cuban revolution.... The masses are acquiring a great awareness of their strength and the possibility of its effective use, thanks to measures like the United Revolutionary Action Front, which declares itself to be the organization created by the people to carry out the revolution the peoples need."

9 January 1963:

> "The Paraguayan people are now determined to get rid of the government, which has ignored the most elementary rights, which has turned the country over to the insatiable voracity of the monopolies, and which is preparing an electoral farce in order to remain in power against the people's wishes. However, the people of Paraguay have decided to acquire their freedoms at all costs, and the crimes committed by Stroessner to dissuade them will be useless."

25 December 1962, quoting a statement attributed to Ecuadoran communists:

> "'The domestic political crisis is worsening. Administrative ineptness of the dominating classes is becoming more glaring. Contradictions among the dominating class are increasing. And servility to Yankee imperialism is spreading. The real solution to this crisis is: To strengthen the people of all sectors in their struggle for their rights; to create a solid front with the masses; to overthrow the imperialists and oligarchs from power; and to set up a people's authority able to carry out a program of radical reforms.'"

23 December 1962, from a speech by Education Minister Armando Hart:

> "We want every American nation and every man in Latin America to fight for his country, fight for his nation, fight for his national independence. This is what we want and what we desire, and this is what imperialism does not want. It does not want it because it knows that sooner or later this struggle will lead to liberation from imperialism, and it was the liberation from imperialism which guided Cuba to socialism, because liberation from imperialism naturally leads to socialism. What we want is for the people of Latin America to fight for their country and for the men of Latin America to fight for their country."

24 November 1962:

> "Venezuelan events in recent days have lost none of their intensity. Given the vigor of the clashes between the Venezuelan patriots--perfectly organized for action in the fields and in the cities--and Romulo Betancourt's traitorous forces, decisive episodes should be expected within a few days. Venezuela is the weakest trench in the imperialist front in the Americas. Let it not be forgotten that the traitorous regime in Caracas, despite all appearances, is under fire from a great popular offensive."

The following quotations are taken from broadcasts in the spring of 1962:

1 May 1962, speech by Ernesto Guevara:

"Sometimes some comrade in Latin America asks us what we think of this or that place, how shall the problem be faced in this or that place. We always answer that there is no set way to seize power and that the working class, helped and strengthened by the peasant class, must never seek the most bloody battle, because it will cost thousands and thousands and millions of lives of their sons. But the seizure of power by the working class is a historic necessity, and no one can oppose history.... The years ahead, comrades, will be the scene in all of America of constant, fratridical struggles."

8 April 1962, commentary on Ecuador:

"As of today, Arosemena, the people are rising up in arms against you, your infamous coalition government, the reactionary elements of the army, the bosses, the powerful, the exploiters, and above all, imperialism, in order to fulfill the slogans that you proclaimed and betrayed: land reform, tax reform, and national dignity. The people, Arosemena, never forget their word."

4 April 1962:

"The present government of Ydigoras Fuentes must be forced to abandon office, and the Congress, composed mainly of deputies who hold office as a result of fraud and imposition, must be dissolved."

22 March 1962:

"Cuba has said, and has repeated a thousand times, that it is not necessary to export revolution, because each of the oligarchical, tyrannical, and despotic governments under which America suffers is itself preparing the conditions necessary for the people to rise up against it. And the people who suffer those proimperialist, bloody governments do not need to have parachutists drop into their mountains. They themselves seek solutions for their problems. The only thing of which Cuba can be accused is of having opened the way, of having won its freedom fighting in guerrilla warfare against a cruel dictatorship."

B. Special Broadcasts

1. To Peru

21 January 1963:

"Our standard must be a national liberation, a transforming liberation, a transforming revolution.... The people of Peru know only too well that elections will not solve their problems, because Peru needs a complete change, a radical transformation of its economic, political, and social structures..... Therefore we must continue to fight, not for small or partial victories but for a transformation of Peruvian society, for the destruction of capitalism."

7 January 1963:

"The military government junta may rest completely assured that there will be revolution in Peru and the people will take over.... We wonder if among the members of the armed forces there is not a group of truly honorable and patriotic men who love the people of Peru and are ready to place their weapons at the service of the people.... This is a year which will mark the beginning of a new era in Peru. Now is the time to resist with greater force and vigor. Strike against abuse; strike against violations.... The strike is the most powerful weapon. The strike can do more than can rifles and bullets."

2 April 1962:

"The Peruvian people know perfectly well that the Cuban revolution represents a hope for us and for all the nations of America. It is not enough to call oneself a revolutionary or support the revolution; it is necessary to adopt a revolutionary attitude."

2. To the Dominican Republic:

19 January 1963:

"The Dominican Liberation Movement calls on the entire nation to demonstrate its repudiation of the alleged visitors (two U.S. warships), which are coming to outrage the country and to be, suspiciously, present precisely when the people are filling the streets in their struggle against the imperialist U.S. Government. Everyone, forward to the fight for freedom, for national independence, and social progress!"

5 January 1963:

> "The people must come again into the streets and demand that the emergency law be revoked immediately.... Citizens, all to the fight to end the repressive and antidemocratic measures!"

31 December 1962:

> "The experience of this year makes obvious to all the need to carry out the national antifeudal, anti-imperialist revolution. To carry out this revolution means to destroy the reactionary, antinational, and despotic power of the large landowners and the great bourgeoisie in league with foreign imperialism."

26 December 1962:

> "The situation can be changed only by the grassroots mobilization of the popular masses, which will bring about the proper conditions to carry out an anti-imperialist, antifeudal revolution of emancipation."

3 April 1962:

> "The time will come--and it is sooner than you think--when the popular masses of our country, the massacred, tortured, starving, and irridentist masses, will know how to settle accounts with every one of their oppressors. ... To the streets! To arms! Down with the illegal Trujillista Council of State!"

21 March 1962:

> "The Trujillista Council of State is not competent to resolve the serious national problems in the interest of the country. That is why it must be overthrown and replaced by a government of the people whose hand will not tremble in liberating the country from feudal extortion and Yankee imperialist domination."

3. To Guatemala:

5 January 1963:

> "The workers and employees, by means of strikes, and the peasants, by starting a big resistance movement everywhere, must make their strength felt so as to accentuate the popular nature of the struggle and pave the way to revolution. The Guatemalan people repudiate Ydigoras and his clique."

An even larger number of direct Havana radio incitements to revolt have been noted in transmissions to Latin American countries recently, apparently reflecting the increased references to the need for other Latin American countries to follow Cuba's example which have been noted in recent speeches of regime leaders.

Thus a 1 January Cuban broadcast quoted a Guatemalan writer as saying that "after Cuba the American revolution will cleanse the other countries of this dirty blemish of ignorance, maintained purposely by interested groups. Now America has only one way to go - the way of revolution that began in Cuba." A late December broadcast about Peru claimed that "a powerful guerrilla movement is growing: it already forms the nucleus for a future national liberation army." A 3 January report on the meeting of the Uruguayan Communist Party quotes its first secretary as saying: "The next phase will be one of hard battles. A sharpened class war may break out at any time and unleash the revolutionary storm ... There is no other way but to forge the social forces of the revolution step by step, shaping the unity of the anti-imperialist forces whose nucleus is the left-wing liberation front." A specially beamed "Dominican bulletin" to the Dominican Republic on 31 December quoted a communique of the "Dominican Liberation Movement" as saying: "The experience of this year makes obvious to all the need to carry out the national, anti-feudal, anti-imperialist revolution." On 3 January, Havana radio attacked President-elect Bosch of the Dominican Republic for preparing to sell his country to the "American monopolists." The radio also repeated instructions from a Cuba-based Dominican exile group urging Dominicans to mobilize in support of striking workers. Ten leading Dominican pro-Castro exiles recently were transported to Cuba from Europe aboard a Czech plane. (FBIS Special weekly report to the Daily Summary, 4 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY; last sentence above SECRET NOFORN)

Havana broadcasts to Latin America continue to take the line that Cuba "is not exporting revolution," but to stress the necessity and inevitability of internal armed left-wing revolution in individual Latin American countries - calling for a "solid front" of the masses in support of such revolutions throughout the hemisphere, and indeed throughout the world.

The Dominican Republic and Venezuela continue to receive special emphasis in these Havana broadcasts. Broadcasts of 23 and 26 December called the Dominican elections a "farce", and made the point that such elections are no substitute for armed revolutions - such as "the heroic Venezuelan revolution which has stirred the whole continent." A 27 December broadcast on the Venezuelan situation as such said: "The workers, students, intellectuals, and men and women of Venezuela fight bravely. Members of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left and of the Democratic Republican Union, Communists, and other patriots, civilian and military, have fought and still do fight against the traitorous and fascist regime of Betancourt." The commentator said that patriots have risen in arms in the mountains and cities of Venezuela; and that the guerrilla movement remained active in various regions of Venezuela. (FBIS Special Report to the Daily Summary, 28 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

Radio Havana's regularly scheduled program to Peru on 7 January was particularly strong in its appeals to the "Peruvian people" to continue their revolutionary struggle.

The program, like others directed to several other Latin American countries, purports to be directed by a group of exiles living in Cuba. The 7 January broadcast to Peru urged continuation of the struggle "since we already have a good part of the road behind us." The revolution may be lengthy, the broadcast states, but "it is too late now to contain the uncontainable...the more brutal the repression, the greater will be the force of the people in their struggle..." Young army officers were urged to side with the people and, at the right moment, to "know where to direct your rifles."

Broadcasts of this type have been directed in recent months to a number of countries, including the Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Late last month, Radio Havana began broadcasting daily programs to Haiti in the Creole language. (FBIS Daily Report, 9 January; and FBIS Operational Developments 371, 4 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

A Havana radiobroadcast 10 January quoted the Central Committee of the Venezuelan Communist Party as calling President Betancourt's government the "principal enemy of the Venezuelan people today." It called on the people and Communist Party of Venezuela to "master and use all forms of combat needed to achieve liberation and national sovereignty."

A 7 January broadcast beamed from Havana to Peru said that "the military-government junta may rest completely assured that there will be revolution in Peru and the people will take over power," and it concluded - "Now is the time to resist with greater force and vigor; strike against abuse, strike against violations...the strike is the most powerful weapon. The strike can do more than rifles and bullets." (FBIS, Special Report to Daily Summary, 11 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

CONFIDENTIAL

071543Z DEC 62

FM USARMA LA PAZ BOLIVIA

TO RUEPDA/DA WASHDC

INFO RULPC/CINCARIB

RUEAHF/CAIRC

RULPAK/USARCARIB

RUEPDA/DIA WASHDC "DLVD"

Export Rev

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.10

P.Rw. P. 18

CONFIDENTIAL//TDTG 071535Z FM USARMA LA PAZ SGD WIMERT. CITE CX-50. DA FOR ACSI. USARCARIB FOR G-2.

RELIABLE SOURCE REPORTS THAT OF CARABINERO GUARDS RECENTLY PLACED AT SEVERAL AMBASSADORS RESIDENCES. THOSE REPORTING TO CUBAN RESIDENCE ARE PERSONALLY MET BY AMBASSADOR, WINED AND DINED INSIDE RESIDENCE, GIVEN SHORT LECTURES ON ADVANTAGES OF CUBAN REVOLUTION AND OBSERVED LEAVING CARRYING ARMS FULL OF PROPAGANDA.

COMMENT: ARMA CHECKED AND FOUND THIS TO BE TRUE. CAS ALSO VERIFIED. AT THIS RATE, CUBAN EMBASSY WILL BE ABLE TO TALK PERSONALLY WITH EACH CARABINERO OF LA PAZ REGIMENT WITHIN THREE MONTHS. SCP-3

BT

ACTION: ACSI

INFO: DCSOP,OSD,JCS,AF,NAVY,CMC,DIA,DIA(AQ)

DA IN 297251

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE NR 0000

SCO FORM 35-2
8 JUN 56

CONFIDENTIAL

REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

APPENDIX A

"ALL AMERICA WOMEN'S CONGRESS", held Havana, Cuba, January 11, 12, 13, 1963.

Attendance:

Number of Countries Participating	19
Number of Guest Countries Represented	15
Number of Delegates	425
Number of Guests	95
Total number of Women Attending	520
Cuban Women Attending	177
Net Total Foreign Women Attending	343

Breakdown of Delegates, by Occupations:

Workers: factory workers, peasants and employees	110
Professionals	49
Housewives	127
Teaching profession	95
Students	20
Writers	4
Journalists	8
Congresswomen	2
City councillors	2
Businesswomen	2
	425

Number of Delegates, by Countries:

1.	Argentina	19
2.	Bolivia	1
3.	Brazil	8
4.	Canada	17
5.	Colombia	13
6.	Costa Rica	8
7.	Cuba	177
8.	Chile	31
9.	Ecuador	4
10.	El Salvador	3
11.	Guatemala	10
12.	Honduras	3
13.	Mexico	93
14.	Nicaragua	2
15.	Panama	2
16.	Paraguay	3
17.	United States of America	14
18.	Uruguay	15
19.	Venezuela	2
		425
	From Cuba	177
	Net Total Women Attending From the Rest of the Continent	248

(Based on figures given in "Hoy" January 13, and "Revolución" January 14, 1963)

Presidents of Delegations:

1. Argentina - Fany Edelman
2. Bolivia - Marta Vallejo
3. Brazil - Bertina Blum
4. Canada - Gilda Murray
5. Chile - Julieta Bampuzano
6. Colombia - Lidia de Hurtado
7. Costa Rica - Luisa Gonzáles

8. Cuba - Vilma Espín
9. Ecuador - Marta Feijóo
10. El Salvador - Leticia del Valle
11. Guatemala - Floremmila Castro
12. Honduras - Clementina Batalla de Bassols
13. Mexico - Concepción Palacio
14. Nicaragua - Lidia Eneida de Gil
15. Panama - Presentación Lezcano
16. Paraguay
17. United States of America - Name of president omitted
18. Uruguay - Julia Arévalo
19. Venezuela - Argelia Laya.

Organizations Represented, by Countries:

Argentina
Women's Inter-Partisan Commission; Argentina Vanguard Socialist Party, Women's Chapter; Co-ordinating Committee of the Peronist Movement, Women's Chapter; Women's Commission of the Communist Party; Argentine Women's Union; Labour Unions' Group; the 62 Organizations; Labour Unions' Unity and Co-ordination Movement; Sponsoring Committees for the Congress.

Bolivia
Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Brazil
Womens' Federation of Sao Paolo; Women's Interchange and Friendship Commission; Women's League of Guanabara State; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Canada
Congress of Canadian Women; La Ligue de Femmes Canadiennes; Fair Deal for Cuba Committee; Workers' Benevolent Association; United Jewish Peoples Order; Ladies' Auxiliary Committee (represented by the Chairman); Russian-Canadian Women's Federation; United Ukrainian-Canadian Women's Association; Peace Council Organization.

Colombia
Democratic Women's Union; Political Party of the Left; Barristers' Society of Colombia; Liberal Revolutionary Movement; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Costa Rica
Costa Rican Women's Alliance.

Cuba
Workers' Central Organization of Revolutionary Cuba; Union of the Communist Youth; High School Students' Union; University Students' Federation; Committees for the Defence of the Revolution; Movement for the Peace and Sovereignty of the Peoples; Cuban Women's Federation.

Chile
Workers' Single Central Organization; Women's Union of Chile; Women Workers' Union of the Cuban-Chilean Institute of Culture; Israeli Culture Center; Teachers' Labour Union; Telephone Company; National Society of Professors; Bookstores' Professors' Union; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress; National Labour Union; Committee of Young Chilean Women.

Ecuador
Women's Union of Guayaquil; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress; University Women's Association.

El Salvador
Salvadorean Women's Fraternity.

Guatemala
"Dolores Bedoya" Women's Organization; Labour's Patriotic Youth.

Honduras
Hondurean Women's Union; White Cross Mothers' Societies.

Mexico
Mexican Women's Democratic Union; Teachers' Revolutionary Movement; National Liberation Movement's Women's Action Group; University Women's Association; Group of Friends of Rumania; United Front of Mazatlán-Sinaloa Colonies; Civic Committee of Guerrero; University and High School Teachers; Women's Co-ordinating Committee; Economists' Committee; National Workers' Union of the Teaching Profession; Revolutionary Labour Federation; General Union of Mexico's Workers and Peasants; Pro-Independence Women's Group of Michoacán; The Mexican Women's Vanguard; Mexican Women Workers' Union; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Nicaragua
Political Party "Revolutionary Mobilization".

Panama
Vanguard for Nation Action; Women's Vanguard.

Paraguay
February Revolutionary Party, Women's Chapter; Women's Union; Women's Movement; FULNA.

United States of America
North-American Association of Friends of Cuba.

Uruguay
Liberation Front of the Left; Eastern Revolutionary Movement; Women's Union; Committee to Help Spanish and Portuguese Political Prisoners; Workers' Central Organization of Uruguay; Sponsoring Committee for the Congress.

Venezuela
National Women's Union of Venezuela; Assistance Federation of Venezuela.

—

Guest Countries Represented:

Albania
Algeria
Bulgaria
China
Korea
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
East Germany
Great Britain
Hungary
Indonesia
Rumania
Spain
U.S.S.R.
Viet Nam

Officials of Cuba's organization for regimenting workers, the CTCR, are stressing to the Cuban people their responsibility for "liberating" other Latin American peoples. Havana radio has reported a talk to a group of volunteer harvesters of tubers and weeders of garlic and arum in a town of southern Havana Province, some of whom were locally recruited and some of whom were delegates from Latin America and Canada to the recent revolutionary commemoration ceremonies. The CTCR official responsible for this volunteer work said that Cuba was offering "its example to the 200 million exploited Indians, peasants and workers of Latin America; and that in the same manner that we receive help from the socialist countries, we have the duty to help other peoples to obtain their liberation." He added that the Cubans would fulfill that duty. (FBIS Daily Report, 15 January, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

2/8/63

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Brazil/Cuba/Latin America	REPORT NO.	CS -3/536,690
SUBJECT	Activities of the Society of Friends of Cuba in Preparation For the Continental Congress in Support of Cuba	DATE DISTR.	8 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	15, 21 January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Brazil, Rio de Janeiro 23 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HBR-3301

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Brazilian (F) with good contacts in the Society of Friends of Cuba. Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. The World Peace Council (WPC) was expected to pay for the expenses of the Continental Congress in Support of Cuba, which is to be held in Rio de Janeiro from 28 to 30 March 1963, according to comments made by General Luiz Gonzaga Leite, president of the Society of Friends of Cuba (SAC), at a meeting of the SAC on 21 January 1963.

2. As of 21 January the SAC had not received any replies from the invitations sent to the African nations to participate in the congress. It was announced at the meeting that Valerio Konder, acting president of the Brazilian Pro-Peace Movement and a member of the SAC, was planning to go to Tanganyika to attend the Third Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Conference in early February and would take a copy of the convocation for the congress with him.

3. Plans were made for painting slogans concerning the congress all over the city and for placing large signboards along some of the main parkways. The possibility was discussed of persuading a well-known painter, such as Emiliano di Cavalcanti, to paint a picture for the congress, which would be raffled off for the benefit of the congress.

4. At a meeting of the SAC on 15 January a series of pro-Cuba meetings, which would be held before the congress, was planned. The possibility of inviting certain Brazilian artists to perform at the meetings in order to attract a large crowd was discussed. The SAC was also trying to obtain the signature of Dias Gomes, the theatrical producer, on the convocation of the congress. Gomes planned to go on 19 January to Cuba, where he was to direct a play.

5
4

4

February 6, 1963

CURRENT USIA PROGRAMS ON CUBA

1. Special Multi-Media Project to tell Cuban story in perspective from its early promises through the missile crisis. Initiated December 14 with target date for completion February 15. Theme: "This is what happens to a country which lets itself be embraced by communism."

Products in preparation under this project are:

a) a two-reel film for theatrical and mobile unit showing;
b) a television film with interviews from around the world expressing disillusionment that the Cuban revolution became a pawn in the international communist game;
c) a photo booklet;
d) a radio dramatization for both shortwave broadcast and local placement;
e) a photo exhibit.

2. Regular Program

Radio (see attachment on VOA broadcasts to Cuba)

- Nine hours Spanish daily to Latin America, three especially directed to Cuba (latter also relayed by medium wave)

- Package programs for local placement. Over 4500 hours per week on some 1500 Latin American stations (counting all programs, of which those relating to Cuba represent a large proportion).

- USIA-Miami Office (1 Foreign Service Officer, 11 Cuban employees) producing daily half-hour package of interviews, excerpts from letters, refutations latest Cuban propaganda.

- Themes (see attached memorandum)

Press and Publications

- Wireless file: 10,000 words news and commentary daily via teletype to all Latin American posts for placement in local press. Average 15 articles weekly relating Cuban situation.

- Packet materials - Articles and photos of more timeless interest mailed to posts.

- Miami Office provides articles on latest Cuban developments derived from interviews with refugees and study of Cuban press and radio.

- Publications - Six anti-Castro cartoon books distributed in eight million copies. New series in progress, including one on food shortages in communist world and Cuba, and three cartoon books on Alliance for Progress theme.

- Mexico Reproduction Center and USIS posts in Latin America originate a number of pamphlets on Cuba.

Book Development

Support of low-cost Spanish editions of anti-Castro books, which have included "Las Cadenas Vienen de Lejos," by Alberto Baeza Flores; "Cuba, First Satellite in the Americas," by Daniel James; "El Infidel Castro" by Yves Gilbert; and now in production, "The Sensual Revolution" by Victor Franco. Portuguese edition in Brazil of Theodore Draper's "Castro's Cuba: Myths and Realities."

Television

"Panorama Panamericano" - weekly 15-minute videotaped show televised regularly in 42 cities of 18 Latin American countries with estimated 10 million viewers.

Special productions. Examples: Film on Cuban children, "Tactics of Communism" series (one on Castro land reform), missile crisis specials, etc.

Acquisitions. Examples: "Anatomy of Betrayal - Dateline Cuba" (from Armstrong Circle Theater; "The Tunnel" (Berlin wall documentary from NBC).

Films

"Horizons" - monthly news film magazine for commercial theater showings in Latin America, featuring occasional items on Cuba.

Specials - "The Unfinished Struggle"; "The Promised Land" (animation on land reform); "The Revolution Betrayed," etc.

3. USIS Field Operations in Latin America

USIS maintains offices in 45 major cities of Latin America. Total American field personnel in Latin America is 215, including 29 Student Affairs Officers and 9 Labor Information Officers. Locally-employed nationals total 782. USIS assists 119 Binational Centers in the area.

Major posts are equipped to carry out extensive press, film, radio, exhibit, book, cultural, and personal contact programs. Most posts originate their own materials designed to fit the local situation.

USIA:IAL:WNWagley:mjb

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

(Attachment to February 6, 1963 paper: "Current USIA Programs on Cuba")

Current Voice of America Programming on Cuba

The Voice of America broadcasts 8 3/4 hours in Spanish daily to Latin America, of which 2 3/4 hours is tailored especially for the Cuban audience. The transmission times of the Cuban hours are 6:00 to 7:00 a.m., and 10:00 to 11:45 p.m.

The "Appointment with Cuba" hour (10:00 to 11:00 p.m.) consists of 15 minutes of news, followed by a five-minute commentary on some development in the Cuban situation, a 30-minute Miami-produced package (interviews with refugees, commentaries refuting the latest Cuban propaganda claims, excerpts of letters received from listeners inside Cuba), and a ten-minute sports feature emphasizing the activities of Cuban athletes in the U.S.

The 11:00 to 11:45 p.m. broadcast opens with 15 minutes of news and is followed either by a half-hour dramatization or a 15-minute news documentary and 15 minutes of features. A 150-installment series of a soap-opera type adventure, featuring three brothers combatting a Castro-like regime, was run at this time until recently. A new series of this dramatization is now being produced under contract in Miami with Cuban writers and actors and will soon be broadcast to Cuba in the same time spot.

The 7:00 to 8:00 a.m. broadcast to Cuba also opens with 15 minutes of world news and repeats the Miami package and features of the previous night.

In the six hours of daily broadcasts to the general Latin American audience, which can also be heard in Cuba, the total material relating to the Cuban situation averages approximately one hour. This consists of commentaries, interviews with refugees, and news documentaries.

In addition to the short-wave broadcasts (relayed also to Cuba on medium wave by two mobile transmitters), the main features on Cuba are sent out as tapes to all USIS posts in Latin America for placement with some 1500 local radio stations. The number of listeners reached by this means is many times greater than the shortwave audience.

The main themes emphasized in the Voice's Cuban programming are: 1) Castro's betrayal of a legitimate national revolution; 2) the subservience of the Cuban regime to international communism; 3) the economic failures of the regime, relating these to the pattern of communist failures in the rest of the world; 4) the isolation of Cuba in the face of continental solidarity opposing Cuba's alliance with the communist bloc; and 5) the U.S. position that Cuba will one day be free.

OFFICIAL USE ONLY

USIA RADIO BROADCASTING TO LATIN AMERICA

1. Direct Shortwave

   a. Spanish - 8 hours/45 minutes per day.

   (3 hours are programmed for Cuba)*

   b. Portugese - 3 hours per day.

2. Packaged Programs

Spanish and Portugese language tapes are air-mailed to USIA stations in Latin America - some 4,000 hours per week are broadcast over 1,500 local stations. The program material consists of dramatizations, news documentaries about the Alliance for Progress, economics, political commentaries, etc.

3. Miscellaneous

About 150 LA local stations rebroadcast (either simultaneously or from tapes) portions of the Spanish and Portugese programs listed in "Direct Shortwave" above. These rebroadcasts are in medium wave bands to local audiences. USIA has no estimate of the total hours involved per day or week.

*This time is simultaneously broadcast over medium wave transmitters to Cuba and the Caribbean.

(Data supplied by:
Mr. William Wagley of USIA
Code 182/2340)

13 February 1963

FUNDS

FUNDS

GENERAL: Despite continuing reports of Castro/Communist offers of financial assistance to individuals and groups in Latin America, there is no proof that the delivery of funds was actually made. Cash transactions other than those made with Cuban pesos outside of Cuba would be virtually impossible to trace. There is some fairly firm evidence that in March 1962 an mount of $10,000 was provided to the Guatemalan "13 November Movement" based in Mexico City for use in actions against the Government of Guatemala.

Individuals travelling to Cuba on various occasions are known to have received both transportation and financial assistance, but the amounts have not been established. A number of reports indicate representatives in Latin America have channelled funds to sympathetic individuals or groups.

TAB

1. EVIDENCE OF FUNDS

This Tab contains a summary of the sole report considered as evidence of fund transfers by DIA. CIA representatives have informed DIA that the original raw report is not immediately available.

2. REPORTS OF CUBAN FUNDS FOR SUBVERSION

This Tab contains a large number of reports alleging fund transfers in Brazil, Guatemala, Columbia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Honduras. Most of the reports indicate the funds are to be used in activities against the local government. (Amounts vary from small sums for travel up to thousands of dollars).

1

Guatemala: A new attempt to oust the Ydigoras regime may be made shortly by the Cuban-supported "13 November" group of ex-Guatemalan army men. The Guatemalan military attache in Mexico told his U.S. counterpart there that "13 November" leaders in Mexico appear well-financed and are buying arms and supplies for an operation to begin late this month or early next.

The group, which led a guerrilla outbreak earlier this year, is reported by a usually reliable source to have received at least $10,000 in Cuban financial assistance since last March. Meanwhile, sporadic bomb explosions in Guatemala City may mark the beginning of a new anti-government campaign, though the U.S. Embassy there reports that at the moment there are no vital issues stirring up popular feeling against the regime.

2

Monthly financial aid from the Cuban Embassy in Rio de Janeiro to Julião's left-wing peasant leagues in northeastern Brazil has reportedly been cut off by orders from Havana. A key leader of the dissident Communist Party of Brazil may have been responsible for the cutoff by recently revealing the serious internal friction within Julião's organization to a Cuban Embassy official. (CIP DDP Recife TDCS-3,530,312, 5 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

LARIC FILE

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Guatemala/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/536,093
SUBJECT	Planned Return of Manuel Galich as Presidential Candidate, with Possible Support from Fidel Castro	DATE DISTR.	5 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Guatemala, Guatemala City 22 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HGG-2907

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former Guatemalan police official (B); from a member (B) of the Communist Party of Guatemala. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Upon his return from Habana, Cuba, from the anniversary celebrations, Humberto Barillas, member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), said that, in addition to a meeting with Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, he had also talked with Manuel Galich, Fidel Castro, and Jose Manuel Fortuny. He said that Galich had told him that he would return to Guatemala to begin his presidential campaign toward the end of February and that Castro had offered to lend Barillas money to be used in Galich's campaign.

1. Field Comment. See TDCS-3/535,004.

Headquarters Comments

Barillas' first name was reported as Gilberto in CS-3/532,931 and CS-3/535,649.

2. Galich, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Arbenz, is now head of the Communist Cultural Center in Habana.

Fortuny is a former secretary-general of the Communist Party of Guatemala.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

EXPORT REVOLUTION

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Colombia/Venezuela /Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/535,595
SUBJECT	Cuban Subversive Activities in Colombia and Venezuela	DATE DISTR.	30 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	RD -W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	1962 - January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Colombia, Cali (7 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HLB-3158

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (F) of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali. Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. During a discussion on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zapata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P. I. Plata, whom Zapata describes as a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC) in Colombia and Venezuela, both criticized the PCC for its soft policy and fear of taking a more active role in the guerrilla activities in Colombia.[1] They indicated there is a split between the followers of Gilberto Vieira White, Political Secretary of the PCC, and those who advocate the Castro-Communist concept of active participation in the guerrilla bands. Both agreed the only hope for the PCC is to follow the Castro policy, as have the Communist Parties of Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Plata said it is possible there will soon be a change in the position of the PCC leaders in Bogota.

2. Plata said the MOEC is not a local movement but rather part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the bands of the MOEC groups. Plata said he has also been helping to recruit Venezuelan youth, largely from schools and universities, to fight with the MOEC bands in Colombia.

3. Plata said he lived for many years in Caracas and that his apartment there is still a meeting place of Cuban guerrilla leaders operating in Venezuela. Two Castro agents, who represent themselves as being anti-Castro, live in his apartment now. He added that the apartment is a center that maintains contact with Colombia through associates in Bucaramanga, Cucuta, and Bogota, and that several Cubans and Cuban-trained Colombians are working with the MOEC in Colombia. He said that Pedro Emilio Castro, Fidel's older brother, lived for a long time at his apartment in Caracas, but has now returned to Cuba, where he is not involved in politics. Plata added he has visited Cuba several times, the last visit in February 1961, when he was introduced to Fidel

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

STATE #	X	ARMY #	X	NAVY #	X	AIR #	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #														I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "x"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

Castro and had two conferences with him. The Castro organization in Caracas is in direct contact with Castro agents in Miami, who consider Caracas their most important center in Latin America. The Miami group, which is made up of persons in the anti-Castro organization there who ostensibly escaped from Cuba, maintains contacts with all of the Latin American groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963.[2] It is to be used in the MOEC plans to increase their activities in the Department of Santander. Plata mentioned Santander several times in the discussion as an area where the MOEC will play a more important role in violence in the future. He said there are several MOEC training areas in Colombia and Venezuela. Plata said he ostensibly is a salesman of refrigeration equipment for Comerciales Unidas Ltda., Carrera 5a No. 15-75, Cali.[3] He said most of the MOEC representatives in Colombia pose as traveling salesmen. He asserted MOEC is looking for new people who are not known to the Colombian authorities to help them transport arms and equipment around the country.

5. Plata said he was born in the municipality of Malaga,[4] in the Department of Santander; that he is married to Maruja de Plata, who has one arm missing; and that they have two daughters, one of whom is married to a Venezuelan doctor.

6. On 6 January 1963 Zapata and Plata went to "Los Panchos," a restaurant near the country club of Cali. The owner of the restaurant, a Gomez (fnu), is a member of the MOEC. They inspected a new tent that was acquired for a MOEC guerrilla leader known as "Mariposo,"[5] who is active in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Plata expressed a desire to obtain more of the tents for MOEC operations in other areas. He said he was expecting money from Venezuela by the first of February. Francisco Calero,[6] formerly thought to be the MOEC leader in Cali, attended the meeting briefly and was ordered around as a subordinate of Plata.

7. During the conversation at the restaurant it was asserted that Fidel Castro had given US 50,000 dollars to Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR). The money had been given to Valencia to build up an organization to participate more actively in sabotage and guerrilla activities. It was said that Valencia used the money for his private use and as a result the FUAR has collapsed and might not be assisted any more by Castro. Since the failure of FUAR there is increased importance on the MOEC organization.[7]

Source Comment. Plata, who appears to be approximately 60 years old, is well acquainted with the MOEC contacts in Ibague. He also has a very close relationship with Zapata, who was in complete agreement with the criticism of the "soft line" of the PCC as represented by Vieira. It also appears there is a much closer understanding and co-operation between MOEC and PCC at this level than appears on lower levels.

Field Comments

1. Members of the Regional Committee of the Department of Valle have expressed differences in the recent past with the action of the Central Committee of the PCC over the lack of action during the Cuban blockade. They also have spoken of their plans to participate in sabotage in the Cali area. Apparently the aggressive faction, headed by Zapata, has been overruled by Jose Cardona Hoyos, secretary-general of the local regional committee.

2. Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.

3. There is no record of Comerciales Unidas in the Cali telephone directory. Plata did present his business card, which lists the address and name of the company as reported above.

4. Malaga is in the east central part of the Department of Santander, about 80 miles from the Venezuelan border.

5. "Mariposo" is the alias of a MOEC guerrilla leader who controls a band in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Cf. CS-3/533,975.

in the anti-Castro organization there who ostensibly escaped from Cuba, maintains contacts with all of the Latin American groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963.[2] It is to be used in the MOEC plans to increase their activities in the Department of Santander. Plata mentioned Santander several times in the discussion as an area where the MOEC will play a more important role in violence in the future. He said there are several MOEC training areas in Colombia and Venezuela. Plata said he ostensibly is a salesman of refrigeration equipment for Comerciales Unidas Ltda., Carrera 5a No. 15-75, Cali.[3] He said most of the MOEC representatives in Colombia pose as traveling salesmen. He asserted MOEC is looking for new people who are not known to the Colombian authorities to help them transport arms and equipment around the country.

5. Plata said he was born in the municipality of Malaga,[4] in the Department of Santander; that he is married to Maruja de Plata, who has one arm missing; and that they have two daughters, one of whom is married to a Venezuelan doctor.

6. On 6 January 1963 Zapata and Plata went to "Los Panchos," a restaurant near the country club of Cali. The owner of the restaurant, a Gomez (fnu), is a member of the MOEC. They inspected a new tent that was acquired for a MOEC guerrilla leader known as "Mariposo,"[5] who is active in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Plata expressed a desire to obtain more of the tents for MOEC operations in other areas. He said he was expecting money from Venezuela by the first of February. Francisco Calero,[6] formerly thought to be the MOEC leader in Cali, attended the meeting briefly and was ordered around as a subordinate of Plata.

7. During the conversation at the restaurant it was asserted that Fidel Castro had given US 50,000 dollars to Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR). The money had been given to Valencia to build up an organization to participate more actively in sabotage and guerrilla activities. It was said that Valencia used the money for his private use and as a result the FUAR has collapsed and might not be assisted any more by Castro. Since the failure of FUAR there is increased importance on the MOEC organization.[7]

Source Comment. Plata, who appears to be approximately 60 years old, is well acquainted with the MOEC contacts in Ibague. He also has a very close relationship with Zapata, who was in complete agreement with the criticism of the "soft line" of the PCC as represented by Vieira. It also appears there is a much closer understanding and co-operation between MOEC and PCC at this level than appears on lower levels.

Field Comments

1. Members of the Regional Committee of the Department of Valle have expressed differences in the recent past with the action of the Central Committee of the PCC over the lack of action during the Cuban blockade. They also have spoken of their plans to participate in sabotage in the Cali area. Apparently the aggressive faction, headed by Zapata, has been overruled by Jose Cardona Hoyos, secretary-general of the local regional committee.

2. Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.

3. There is no record of Comerciales Unidas in the Cali telephone directory. Plata did present his business card, which lists the address and name of the company as reported above.

4. Malaga is in the east central part of the Department of Santander, about 80 miles from the Venezuelan border.

5. "Mariposo" is the alias of a MOEC guerrilla leader who controls a band in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Cf. CS-3/533,975.

6. Calero appeared to be the MOEC leader in Cali by virtue of the fact that he represented it in meetings with the PCC and FUAR during the Cuban blockade. It now appears he is a local agent

who devotes part time to MOEC, being directed by Plata, who is probably a full-time agent of the Castro government in charge of recruiting and controlling Cuban assistance to the organization in the Cali area.

7. The FUAR seems to have been in a recess during recent months in the Cali area. In early November Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the FUAR, was asked directly if there was any truth to the story circulating in Cali that Castro had given him 50,000 dollars to help FUAR. He laughed and asserted the amount mentioned in Bogota is only 30,000. He said his only assistance from Cuba was a 1,000-dollar first prize in a literary contest in 1959 or 1960 and two paid trips thereafter to judge other literary contests. It is difficult to determine the truth of Valencia's denial or the charges mentioned herein. The story has been circulating in Cali for approximately six months and could be hearsay on the part of either Plata or Zapata. It is noteworthy that Valencia has refused to espouse common ideology with the PCC, except for Castro, which Valencia insists he will not accept if it is a tool of international Communism.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA/MEXICO/CUBA/USSR

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/534,229

SUBJECT FUNDS SUPPLIED BY SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO PROMOTE CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF NICARAGUA

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

DATE OF INFO. 13 JAN 1963

REFERENCES IN 50894

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA, 15 JAN 63)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C).

(FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED.)

1. OCTAVIO FLORES, NICARAGUAN CITIZEN CONNECTED WITH A BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES, VISITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY ON 13 JANUARY 1963, WHERE HE WAS GIVEN $20,000, WHICH HE TOOK TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, THAT SAME DAY. THE MONEY IS TO BE USED TO PROMOTE A CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF NICARAGUA.

2. ON 15 JANUARY REYNALDO VIQUEZ RUIZ, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST LEADER, FLEW FROM MANAGUA TO SAN JOSE, WHERE HE PLANNED TO MEET FLORES.

3. FLORES HAS 75 SUBMACHINE-GUNS AT LAS BRISAS, WHICH IS ON THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BORDER.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR														EXO		DD/I	I&NS

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

FUNDS

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA / HONDURAS / CUBA DIAAP-3

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/535,840

SUBJECT 1. PLANS OF THE FLN TO MAKE AN ARMED ATTEMPT AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT OF NICARAGUA
2. CUBAN SUPPORT OF THE MOVEMENT

DATE DISTR. 30 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 12-25 JANUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 59179

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA (28-29 JANUARY 1963).

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO. HNM-740

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C); FROM A NICARAGUAN OFFICIAL IN HONDURAS (F); FROM A MEMBER (F) OF THE FLN.

cuban acty in L.A.

1. LEADERS OF THE FRENTE DE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FLN - NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONT), A CUBAN-SUPPORTED ANTI-SOMOZA REVOLUTIONARY GROUP, PLAN TO SEND FOUR GROUPS OF GUERRILLAS FROM HONDURAS INTO NICARAGUA WHEN SUFFICIENT ARMS AND MEN HAVE BEEN COLLECTED. (SOURCE COMMENT: THE FLN WILL NOT BE READY TO BEGIN GUERRILLA ACTIVITIES UNTIL SOMETIME AFTER THE NICARAGUAN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS WHICH WILL BE HELD ON 3 FEBRUARY 63.) THREE OF THE GROUPS FROM HONDURAS PLAN TO ATTACK NICARAGUAN MILITARY POSTS AT OCOTAL, SOMOTO, AND JINOTEGA. THE FOURTH GROUP WILL OPERATE IN THE CAPE GRACIAS A DIOS AREA AND WILL BE SUPPLIED BY SMALL BOATS. THE FLN PLANS TO SUPPLY THE OTHER GROUPS

SECRET

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	EXO
STATE/DIR															FBI	I&NS	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

BY AIR AND A LANDING STRIP IS BEING PREPARED ON THE PLAINS NEAR CERRO AGUILA. THE ATTACKS BY THE GROUPS FROM HONDURAS WILL BE COORDINATED WITH SIMILAR ATTACKS WHICH WILL BE MADE BY FLN GROUPS WHICH HAVE BEEN ORGANIZED WITHIN NICARAGUA.

2. THE FLN IS BEING DIRECTED FROM CUBA AND IS ORGANIZED IN HONDURAS AND NICARAGUA. GUILLERMO URBINA VASQUEZ AND DR. NOEL JARQUIN TOLEDO, NICARAGUAN COMMUNISTS OR PRO-COMMUNISTS WHO LIVE IN HONDURAS, WILL BE IN CHARGE OF ALL FLN ACTIVITIES OUTSIDE CUBA. (SOURCE COMMENT: THEY WILL REPLACE CARLOS FONSECA AMADOR, FORMER CHIEF OF THE FLN IN HONDURAS, ON DIRECT ORDERS FROM CUBA. FONSECA WILL BE IN CHARGE OF THE GUERILLA GROUP THAT WILL OPERATE NEAR CAPE GRACIAS A DIOS.) DR. ORLANDO QUANT QUINTANA AND GERMAN GAITAN MORA, NICARAGUAN LEFTISTS AND REVOLUTIONARIES, ARE THE LEADERS OF THE FLN GROUP IN NICARAGUA.

3. THE FLN NOW HAS 53 MEN IN THE MOUNTAINS ALONG THE HONDURAN-NICARAGUAN BORDER UNDER THE COMMAND OF CAPTAIN JOSE DUBAS HERRERA, AN OFFICER OF THE CUBAN MILITIA. THEY WILL BE JOINED BY 18 MEN WHO ARRIVED IN HONDURAS FROM CUBA BETWEEN 15 AND 25 JANUARY. (SOURCE COMMENT: SOME OF THE 18 TRAVELED TO HONDURAS BY AEROLINEAS PERUANAS (APSA) AND OTHERS CAME BY LAND THROUGH GUATEMALA AND EL SALVADOR.)

4. THE MEN LED BY DUBAS ARE WELL ARMED, BUT ADDITIONAL MEN ARE EXPECTED AND MORE ARMS MUST BE OBTAINED BEFORE THE GUERRILLA OPERATIONS CAN BEGIN. ON 17 JANUARY IN TEGUCIGALPA, IVAN OCTAVIO SANCHEZ

ARGUELLO, A LEADER OF THE FLN, SAID THAT HE HAD JUST RECEIVED TEN THOUSAND DOLLARS (U.S.) TO BE USED TO BUY ARMS FOR THE FLN. HE SAID THE MONEY HAD BEEN SENT FROM CUBA BY NOEL GUERRERO SANTIAGO, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST AND A LEADER OF THE FLN. (SOURCE COMMENT: AN ADDITIONAL FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS WAS PROVIDED BY GENERAL CARLOS PASOS LEIVA, A NICARAGUAN REVOLUTIONARY IN COSTA RICA.) SANCHEZ SAID THAT THE ARMS WILL BE BOUGHT FROM OFFICERS OF THE HONDURAN CIVIL GUARD AND SAID THAT MOST OF THE ARMS THAT THE FLN NOW HAS WERE BOUGHT FROM THE CIVIL GUARD.

5. THE GOVERNMENT OF HONDURAS IS AIDING THE FLN AND HAS ASSIGNED FIVE HONDURAN ARMY OFFICERS AS INSTRUCTORS. HONDURAN OFFICIALS WHO ARE COOPERATING WITH THE FLN INCLUDE: MODESTO RODAS ALVARADO, PRESIDENT OF THE HONDURAN CONGRESS, OSCAR MORALES, A DEPUTY, DAVEY HUNTER, DEPUTY CHIEF OF THE HONDURAN SECURITY SERVICE, JORGE E. REINA, AND COLONEL MARCELINO PONCE.

6. THE FLN IS TRYING TO RECRUIT LIEUTENANTS AGUSTIN RAUDES AND ALFREDO QUESADA, OFFICERS OF THE NICARAGUAN AIR FORCE. ON 18 JANUARY EITEL BOLANOS ORTEGA, A MEMBER OF THE FLN IN HONDURAS, SAID THAT THE FLN HAD SENT LETTERS TO RAUDES AND QUESADA ASKING FOR THEIR COOPERATION. THE LETTERS WERE DELIVERED BY FANNY MANFUT DE ULLOA.

FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY CINCARIB CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

OUNTRY Cuba/Brazil

REPORT NO. CS -3/530,889

SUBJECT Cuban Aid to Brazilian Revolutionaries

DATE DISTR. 11 December 1962

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES RD. -W-2107

DATE OF INFO. February 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Spain, Madrid (9 March 1962)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE An official Spanish service. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. In early February 1962 there was a meeting of the directorate of the Communist Party of Cuba and the Brazilian leaders Francisco Juliao and Basilio Rodriguez da Silva. The meeting was also attended by Fidel Castro, Raul Castro, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Ramiro Valdes, and the Soviet Ambassador. It was agreed: (a) to send $500,000 (dollars) in cash for propaganda campaigns in Brazil, (b) to eliminate physically Governor Carlos Lacerda, (c) to send to Brazil 1,000,000 copies of the Second Declaration of Habana. Miguel Ruberas, Director of Press of the Ministry of Foreign Relations,[1] was called in connection with the sending of the 1,000,000 copies; his attention was called to the fact that the sending of propaganda through the diplomatic pouch to Brazil had been very unsatisfactory in recent months.

2. At the meeting the Soviet Ambassador took a strong stand that an all-out effort should be made to produce an uprising in Brazil. He also said that Brazil would have to follow Soviet practice in that certain politicians and men of the right would have to be eliminated.

3. Juliao, Rodriguez da Silva and other Brazilians received four days' training at El Caribe Military School in the use of arms and preliminary instructions in guerrilla warfare. The instructor was General Alberto Bayo.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2
RECCINCLANT CINCARIB #												I&NS	X		

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

1. Headquarters Comment. Ruberas is probably identical with Miguel Brugueras del Valle, who was described as Director of the Press Department on the official list of delegates to the Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Uruguay in January 1962. Brugueras is now assigned to the Cuban Embassy in Brazil as Cultural Attache.

The Lima paper La Tribuna on 3 December published a document which it was claimed had been found in the crashed Brazilian plane in which ten Cuban officials died. Without referring specifically to Cuba, the paper discusses a "national and another international congress of solidarity" to be held in Brazil from 16 to 20 January, 1963; and it requests $10,000 additional to help finance these congresses. The Lima article about the document suggested that the request was intended for Fidel Castro and that its discovery was another indication that Cuba is financing Latin American Communism. (FBIS Daily Report, 5 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Guatemala/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/536,093
SUBJECT	Planned Return of Manuel Galich as Presidential Candidate, with Possible Support from Fidel Castro	DATE DISTR.	5 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Guatemala, Guatemala City 22 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HGG-2907

Expository Revolution

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Former Guatemalan police official (B); from a member (B) of the Communist Party of Guatemala. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Upon his return from Habana, Cuba, from the anniversary celebrations, Humberto Barillas, member of the Partido Guatemalteco del Trabajo (PGT), said that, in addition to a meeting with Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, he had also talked with Manuel Galich, Fidel Castro, and Jose Manuel Fortuny. He said that Galich had told him that he would return to Guatemala to begin his presidential campaign toward the end of February and that Castro had offered to lend Barillas money to be used in Galich's campaign.

1. Field Comment. See TDCS-3/535,004.

Headquarters Comments

Barillas' first name was reported as Gilberto in CS-3/532,931 and CS-3/535,649.

2. Galich, who was Minister of Foreign Affairs under Arbenz, is now head of the Communist Cultural Center in Habana.

   Fortuny is a former secretary-general of the Communist Party of Guatemala.

GROUP 1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
DOWNGRADING AND
DECLASSIFICATION

3
2
1

S-E-C-R-E-T

STATE #	X	ARMY #	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	AID	
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #												FBI		USIA	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Ecuador/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/535,793
SUBJECT	Refusal of Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano to Account to the Cuban Government for Funds Received for Revolutionary Purposes	DATE DISTR.	1 February 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	Mid-January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Ecuador, Quito 17 January 1963	FIELD REPORT NO.	HEQ-3102

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (B) of the Communist Youth. Appraisal of Content: 2 (that Arellano was quoted correctly); 3 (truth of Arellano's statements).

On 16 January 1963 Jorge Arellano Gallegos, a leader of the Communist Party of Ecuador (Partido Comunista de Ecuador, PCE) in Quito, said that Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirano, leader of the abortive guerrilla movement at Santo Domingo de los Colorados in April 1962, had been called to Cuba to explain the expenditure of funds given him by the Cuban Government for revolutionary purposes. Arellano added that Rivadeneyra had refused to go to Cuba. According to Arellano, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, who was also involved in the guerrilla movement, had returned to the Cuban Government 50,000 sucres (about US$2,273) which had been entrusted to him.

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

S-E-C-R-E-T

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY NICARAGUA/COSTA RICA/MEXICO/CUBA/USSR

REPORT NO. TDCS 3/534,229.

SUBJECT FUNDS SUPPLIED BY SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY TO PROMOTE CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF NICARAGUA

DATE DISTR. 16 JANUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE PRIORITY

REFERENCES IN 50894

DATE OF INFO. 13 JAN 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. NICARAGUA, MANAGUA, (15 JAN 63)

APPRAISAL 3

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE NICARAGUAN GOVERNMENT OFFICIAL (C).

(FIELD COMMENT: SOURCE SAID THAT HIS INFORMATION HAD BEEN CONFIRMED.)

1. OCTAVIO FLORES, NICARAGUAN CITIZEN CONNECTED WITH A BUSINESS IN THE UNITED STATES, VISITED THE SOVIET EMBASSY IN MEXICO CITY ON 13 JANUARY 1963, WHERE HE WAS GIVEN $20,000, WHICH HE TOOK TO SAN JOSE, COSTA RICA, THAT SAME DAY. THE MONEY IS TO BE USED TO PROMOTE A CASTRO-SPONSORED INVASION OF NICARAGUA.

2. ON 15 JANUARY REYNALDO VIQUEZ RUIZ, NICARAGUAN COMMUNIST LEADER, FLEW FROM MANAGUA TO SAN JOSE, WHERE HE PLANNED TO MEET FLORES.

3. FLORES HAS 75 SUBMACHINE-GUNS AT LAS BRISAS, WHICH IS ON THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BORDER.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR														EXO		DD/I	I&NS

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

TRAINING

COPY

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT - CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NO FOREIGN DISSEM/CONTROLLED DISSEM/NO DISSEM ABROAD/BACKGROUND USE ONLY

COUNTRY ECUADOR/CUBA/LATIN AMERICA
REPORT NO. TDCS DB-3/653,193

OBJECT FINANCIAL SUPPORT BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT TO ECUADORAN COMMUNISTS
DATE DISTR: 11 FEBRUARY 1963
PRECEDENCE: ROUTINE

Date of Info: 2-4 February 1963
Place: Ecuador, Quito
REFERENCES: IN 63940
RD-M-2107

Date ACQ (7 February 1963)

Appraisal 2 (THAT THE REMAKRS MADE WERE CORRECTLY
MEMBER (B) OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF ECUADOR.

1. ON 2 FEBRUARY 1963 A PERSON CLOSE TO PEDRO SAAD, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE COMMUNIST PART OF ECUADOR (PCE), SAID THAT FIDEL CASTRO HAD PROMISED THAT ALL OF THE MONEY RECEIVED FROM THE UNITED STATES IN THE PRISONER EXCHANGES WOULD GO FOR THE "LIBERATION" OF LATIN AMERICA AND THAT $100,000 HAD BEEN ALLOTTED TO THE PCE, OF WHICH $50,000 HAD ALREADY BEEN DELIVERED TO THE PCE THROUGH SAAD, SECRETARY-GENERAL, PCE. PERSON SAID THAT THE MONEY WAS GIVEN UNDER THE CONDITION THAT IT BE USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR THE PREPARATION OF THE "LIBERATION," INCLUDING THE LOCAL PURCHASES OF ARMS AND SUPPLIES, BUT NOT FOR SALARIES OR TRIPS, AND THAT SAAD HAD ALREADY SPENT A LARGE PART OF THE MONEY ON "BUREAUCRATIC EXPENSES."

2. ON 4 FEBRUARY 1963 RAFAEL ECHEVERRIA FLORES, SECRETARY-GENERAL OF THE PINCHINCHA PROVINCIAL COMMITTEE OF THE PCE SAID THAT CERTAIN REQUESTS MADE BY ANTONIO FLORES BENITEZ, LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY WHO IS WORKING WITH ECHEVERRIA, IN OCTOBER 1962 HAD BEEN GRANTED BY THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT, AND THAT HE (ECHEVERRIA) EXPECTED TO RECEIVE MONEY FROM CUBA SOON BY WAY OF PEDRO MARTINEZ PIREZ, CUBAN DIPLOMAT IN SANTIAGO, CHILE. ECHEVERRIA SAID THAT THE MONEY WAS TO BE WITHOUT THE

KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCE, AS CASTRO WAS FOLLOWING THE CHINESE RATHER THAN THE SOVIET LINE AND WAS HELPING PEOPLE LIKE ECHEVERRIA WHO WERE ALSO FOLLOWING THE CHINESE LINE. FOR THIS REASON THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCE, WHO FOLLOW THE SOVIET LINE, COULD NOT BE MADE AWARE OF THE HELP.

3. (FIELD COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION BETWEEN THE REPORT THAT CUBA IS SUPPLYING FUNDS TO THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCE AND ECEVERRIA'S REMARK THAT CUBA HAS APPROVED FUNDS FOR HIS GROUP WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE NATIONAL LEADER's OF THE PCE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT CUBA IS FURNISHING ASSISTANCE TO BOTH GROUPS INDEPENDENTLY AND WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE OTHER GROUP WITH THE AIM OF CONTINUING ASSISTANCE TO THE GROUP WHICH FIRST SUCCEEDS IN ESTABLISHING GUERRILA OPERATIONS. THE CUBANS PROBABLY KNOW THAT BOTH GROUPS ARE COMPETING IN THIS. IT IS ALSO POSSIBLE THAT ECHEVERRIA'S COMMENTS ABOUT CUBA'S ACTION IN RELATION TO THE SINO-SOVIET DIFFERENCES WERE EITHER GIVEN TO HIM BY THE CUBANS AS A REASON TO KEEP THE AID SECRET FROM THE NATIONAL LEADERS OF THE PCE OR WERE INVENTED BY HIM TO IMPRESS HIS LISTENER WITH THE NEED FOR SECRECY.)

4. FIELD DISSEM: STATE, ARMY, AIR, CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

TRAINING

General: Immediately after Castro siezed Cuba, Latin Americans began to visit Cuba at the invitation of the new Cuban Regime. Shortly thereafter reports of training activities conducted by veterans of the Sierra Maestra for these visitors begun to come in. Initially, the training was badly handled, poorly organized, and consisted primarily of indoctrination in the techniques employed by the 26th of July Movement in its struggle against Batista. Few graduates of these courses were greatly impressed by what they had been taught. As Soviet advisors arrived and made their influence felt, training improved and training facilities were expanded.

The Cuban government established a school in the Sierra Maestra capable of handling about 600 students where techniques of guerrilla warfare could be imparted to visiting Latin Americans. Students sent to this school were mostly teen-age and young adult males selected from Communist youth and leftist organizations. Some young females were also included. The course of instruction consisted of physical conditioning, weapons familiarization, tactics, demolitions, methods of conducting demonstrations, leadership, organization of subversive groups, political indoctrination, etc. Upon completion of the course, graduates were sent home to organize and lead local groups and prepare for "the inevitable revolution." Travel and maintenance expenses generally were borne by the Cuban government. In 1962, from 1,000 to 1,500 Latin Americans received this training in Cuba. There is no estimate of the number of trainees currently in Cuba. (See Report at Tab I which was read by the President and referred to the Cottrell Committee.)

Stennis Committee

Note: On page 92 of Mr. McCone's testimony he states -- "I think I said that we knew of some 1,000 to 1,500 that were in training there at the present time." The duration of the training courses ranges from 4 to 40 weeks. CIA has indicated informally that the bulk of the 1,000 to 1,500 reported above are still in Cuba.

U.S. intelligence agencies are largely dependent upon third country sources for information concerning those who received training in Cuba. Systems of documenting these visitors and their travel to and from Cuba are in the process of being undertaken by many Latin American nations. Among the problems which confront Latin American security forces are the fact that Cuban visitors employ many devious means in travelling to and from Cuba; some states desire not to infringe on the freedom of movement of its citizens; the use of false documents or aliases by travellers; and the difficulty of obtaining a useful exchange of intelligence among Latin States. There is also some problem of separating Cuban-inspired plotters from the leftists, oppositionists, and political plotters who travel in neighboring states.

TAB

1 CIA Report on Training of Latin Americans in Cuba

This Tab contains the best overall summary of the training of Latin Americans in Cuba.

2 Program of Training

This Tab contains 4 items; (1) Recent detailed reports from an Argentine Communist who trained in Cuba; (2) Questionaire which Peruvians training in Cuba were required to fill out; and (3) Two Reports of student who had access to notes of Salvadorans returning from Cuba.

3 Travel of Individuals to Cuba for Training

This Tab contains a number of reports indicating the travel of individuals and groups of up to 30 individuals to Cuba for training. These reports indicate training of individuals from Ecuador, El Salvador, Paraguary, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia and the Dominican Republic. Two of the reports indicate that some of the individuals have received or are scheduled to receive training in the Soviet Union.

4 Activities Upon Return from Cuba

This Tab contains items reporting activities of individuals upon return to their home country (Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Peru, British Guiana, Ecuador, Brazil and the Dominican Republic). These reports vary in description of activities in which Cuban trained individuals will participate (from small scale guerrilla activity up to invasion). Numbers referred to in these reports vary from one to 400. The top two reports connect individuals returning from Cuba with terrorist type activities.

5 Miscellaneous Training Reports

This Tab contains five items as follows: (1) Interesting report by student recently returned (see conclusions last page); (2) Two reports on the use of International Games as a cover for training; (3) An item reporting links between Guatemalan exile group in Cuba and training; and (4) Interesting excerpts on training from Canadian Ambassador to Cuba.

SC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

SECRET January 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Sterling Cottrell
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

The President has read the attached copy of a CIA report on the training of Latin Americans in Cuba. He has also read the note from Ray Cline, which is attached.

The President desires that you and your group take on this problem and report to him in the usual way.

Bromley
Bromley Smith

SECRET

C
O
P
Y

SECRET

To White House (Attn: General Clifton), From Ray S. Cline

Your note concerning the President's query about subversive training of Latin Americans in Cuba was mainly answered in our current intelligence memorandum of 19 January. We did not cover, however, the operational question of how to do something about the flow.

Our general view on this point is as follows. The main thing the United States can do to restrict the flow of Latin American youth to Cuba for training in subversion is to frustrate the aims and tarnish the image of the Castro regime. Beyond this, we should try through overt and covert political pressure and educative efforts to induce Latin American governments and security services at the main transit points to monitor and impede the traffic of trainees to and from Cuba. Ways and means of doing this might well be examined by the Cottrell task force.

SECRET

OCI No. 0474/63

S

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Current Intelligence
19 January 1963

CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: The Training of Latin Americans in Cuba

1. It is estimated that at least 1,000 and perhaps as many as 1,500 *individuals from other Latin American countries were in Cuba for varying periods of time during 1962 to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training. Many of them are still there. In addition, during 1962 there were 60 to 70 trainees from British Guiana and an undetermined number, perhaps 100, from various African countries, including Angolans, Kenyans, Zanzibaris, and Negro nationalists from the Republic of South Africa. Most of the trainees are young--in their teens, twenties, and early thirties. A sizable proportion had attended universities or secondary schools in home countries.

2. In a public address on 9 June 1961, Fidel Castro announced that his government intended to grant 1,000 scholarships to "poor students" from other Latin American countries for the next school term, and 100 scholarships to students from other countries of the world. By this means, Castro has explained, the students will be equipped to participate in the "construction of socialism" in their home countries after the "inevitable anti-imperialist revolutions" occur there.

3. A portion of the students from other Latin American countries come to Cuba with the idea that

---

*The estimates of total numbers of trainees in Cuba excludes those whose visits have been tied to a particular event in Cuba such as the 2 January anniversary celebrations and who have not remained more than a week or two. Also excluded are those who have merely passed through Cuba on route to the Sino-Soviet bloc, as well as the many Communist or pro-Castro party functionaries who visit Cuba frequently.

they are to take standard courses at Cuban universities or other institutions in such subjects as agronomy, irrigation techniques, industrial management, etc. Even if their courses in Cuba are as represented to them before their arrival, they are undoubtedly given heavy ideological indoctrination and, like Cuban students, expected to "volunteer" for various emergency tasks such as picking coffee and harvesting sugar. Many of these probably also receive training in guerrilla tactics and other techniques of subversion.

4. Other students are frankly told before they leave their home countries for Cuba that their training in Cuba will be in guerrilla warfare tactics, that it will be a rigorous program, and that they will be required to maintain strict standards of conduct and security.

5. There have been a number of reports--from clandestine sources in Cuba, from sources in contact with the trainees after they have returned from Cuba, from Cuban refugees, and from a few of the trainees themselves--concerning the types of training which the young non-Cubans undergo in Cuba. The guerrilla training programs for Latin Americans in 1961 and 1962 do not appear to have been particularly well organized. In some instances, the trainees were moved to protest the fact that there were long periods when they were doing little or nothing; in other instances they were disgruntled over what they felt was harsh treatment, or when they thought too much was expected of them. The majority of the trainees, however, probably took the experience in stride.

6. Included in the guerrilla training programs have been long marches through the forests and mountains, especially in the Sierra Maestra mountains where Castro carried on his guerrilla campaign against Batista. Students often are required to hike to the top of Pico Turquino, Cuba's highest mountain (6,230 feet). During the hikes, they engage in simulated guerrilla defensive and offensive exercises, are taught how to fend for themselves in the wilderness, how to find directions with compasses and maps, and how to assure the security of their encampments. Back in their camps, they are taught such subjects as means of communications among guerrilla bands, strategy and tactics of the guerrilla fighter, marksmanship, and weapons familiarization. One trainee

reported that they were given instruction only in US weapons. The instructor explained to them that as guerrillas they must capture and use the arms of the enemy and in Latin America the authorities use US weapons. They are also given instruction in demolition of bridges and other structures, in the manufacture of explosives and the construction of Molotov cocktails.

7. Scattered throughout the entire course are periods of ideological indoctrination, sometimes given in the training camps and sometimes for large groups in Havana. They are also given instruction in the general strategy of the "anti-imperialist struggle" and often specific advice on how best to carry out the struggle in their individual countries. A group of students from El Salvador, for instance, visiting Cuba last October, were told that they should give more emphasis to the penetration and control of groups at the National University and to the control of the labor movement. It was explained to them that they should initially seek as wide support as possible from all political factions and that when the initial stages of the revolution had been accomplished the non-Communists could be eliminated.

8. The instructors are mostly Cubans, but there have been some Spaniards and a few Algerians reported among the instructors. General Enrique Lister, Spanish Communist veteran of the Spanish civil war who subsequently received military training in the USSR, is in Cuba. He reportedly assists in the guerrilla training program. None of the reports on the subject give credible evidence of Soviet or other bloc instructors for these trainees. However, a small portion of those trained in Cuba subsequently go on to the Sino-Soviet bloc where they may be subjected to further training. One report states that the experiences of guerrilla fighters in Algeria and in Southeast Asia have been used to expand on the Cuban experience to permit a broader study of the "art" of guerrilla warfare in Cuba.

9. Fidel Castro and Che Guevara evidently take a personal interest in the guerrilla training of other Latin Americans. A number of the trainees in Cuba have been treated to personal pep talks from these, as well as other, Cuban leaders.

10. An Argentine trainee who arrived in Cuba early last July and left in late December has described in some detail his experiences in Cuba during this period. He was first approached by an Argentine pro-Castro leader last June as to whether he would be interested in taking courses in Cuba on guerrilla warfare and "city fighting." After several days he agreed. With three other Argentines, none of them orthodox Communists but all of them radicals, he left Buenos Aires on about 1 July. He traveled by way of Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, and Trinidad to Cuba. In Chile, the Cuban embassy supplied him with travel money and "complimentary visas" to enter Cuba. He arrived in Havana on 5 July. During most of July he had little to do as a group of about fifty gradually collected at a camp near Havana. They eventually protested this lack of action and were visited by Fidel Castro, who apparently came to assure them that their program would shortly get underway. On 30 July they began a series of marches into the woods somewhere in the Organos mountains in Pinar del Rio province under the command of two Cuban officers. Most of his activity between August and October seems to have been concerned with guerrilla training. Training with him were 34 others, most if not all of them apparently Argentines. There were political disputes among them, particularly concerning the pro-Communist Argentine Peronist leader John William Cooke, a political exile in Cuba who apparently had some degree of authority over the Argentine trainees but who was resented by them.

11. During the October crisis the entire group "volunteered" to join the militia in defense of the Cuban revolution "threatened by Yankee invasion." After the crisis eased, they began classes in "political economy" taught by a Spaniard named "Guillen." These classes were held daily for eight days until 5 November, when the group was again sent into the field for guerrilla training. They engaged in firing practice with various types of weapons, including rifles and bazookas. On 14 November they were moved to a new area for a new course in "guerrilla tactics." This included practice in hanging hammocks, digging trenches, making wire entanglements, as well as exercises in the mountains. During this period, some members of the group rebelled against taking another long march in the rain. The Cuban officers tried to discipline

them by taking away their food, but then all the members of the group went on a hunger strike in protest. Discipline then appears generally to have broken down, the trainees got their way but were no longer motivated to study. The source and most other members of his group left Cuba and arrived in Prague on 23 December. At his first opportunity, he left Czechoslovakia and reported his experiences to officials in a West European country.

12. This source's total period of training in Cuba was approximately six months. Other trainees have gone for periods of three months or less. An unknown number have probably remained a year or more and, in some instances, remain in Cuba indefinietly. The latter sometimes join one of the numerous groups of nationals from particular Latin American countries which, in effect, form cadres being groomed for eventual return to their countries, perhaps "after the revolution."

13. Information from all available sources indicates that nationals of all nineteen other Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Uruguay, have been among those receiving guerrilla training in Cuba during the course of 1962. Venezuelans seem most numerous; some 200 of them are estimated to have received training in Cuba during the past year. Relatively large numbers have also come from Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia.

14. Prior to the October crisis, the trainees going to Cuba usually traveled by regular commercial airlines or, on some occasions, by specially chartered Cuban commercial planes. Those coming from South America generally went via Uruguay, Chile, or Brazil to Trinidad or Curacao and from there by regularly scheduled Cubana or KLM planes to Havana. Those coming from Middle America generally traveled through Mexico and then by Mexicana or Cubana commercial planes to Havana. With the cessation of service to Cuba by KLM, Mexicana, Iberia and other Western airlines after 23 October, the regular Cubana service between Mexico City and Havana remains the only direct and regular air connection between Cuba and the rest of Latin America. There has been a sharp increase in recent weeks of travelers to Mexico from South America en route to Cuba. Many of these were invited for the 2 January anniversary celebrations

in Cuba, but others may have remained for training.

15. Trainee transit through Mexico usually involves special procedures by the Cuban embassy there. The trainees, who travel as tourists, report first to the Cuban embassy. There they are given special Cuban entry papers; no entry is made in their passports. They are given pseudonyms for travel out of and back into Mexico--apparently a relatively recent innovation.

16. Some of the British Guianese trainees in Cuba have arrived aboard the Cuban merchant ships bringing Guianese rice to Cuba.

17. Some of the Latin American trainees arrive in Cuba via Czech or Cuban planes from Prague. It is not clear whether this route to Cuba is dictated by difficulties of getting there by way of Mexico or whether the students involved were already in Europe.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

EXPORTING REVOLUTION

COUNTRY Argentina/Cuba

SUBJECT Training of Argentine Guerrillas in Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/535,176

DATE DISTR. 26 January 1963

NO. PAGES 6

REFERENCES RD

Cuban act'y in L.A.

DATE OF INFO. July - December 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Spain, Madrid (7 January 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An official Spanish service, from an Argentine who took part in the course. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. A group of Argentines, varying in number between 34 and 50, and including Peronists, Trotskyites, and Vanguard Socialists, attended a six-month course in guerrilla warfare in Cuba from July to December 1962. Part of the group traveled from Buenos Aires to Cuba by way of Chile where they received courtesy visas for Cuba and financial assistance from the Cuban Embassy. They had been told by Reinaldo Frigerio, leftist Peronist, that they would be met by John William Cooke, leftist Peronist residing in Cuba,[1] but instead were met in Habana by a member of Cuban G-2 and taken to the Hotel Riviera, where they later met Cooke. Cooke told them that it was necessary to train expert guerrillas who could carry out the revolution in Argentina. He insisted that General Juan Peron knew about the training.

2. From the hotel the trainees were transferred to the Tabare finca, behind the Buen Pastor Seminary.[2] After several weeks of inactivity they were visited on 20 July by Fidel Castro who promised that they would soon begin their training. They were transferred the next day to Rio Cistal and on 24 July they were visited by Comandante Escalona (fnu), who was responsible for the zone of Pinar del Rio,[3] where they were to spend some time marching and camping out.

3. On 30 July the 34 men who were to take the course marched from the town of Artemisa into the woods; they were under the command of two Cuban lieutenants. Seven more trainees joined the group on its march to points within Pinar del

5
4
3
2
1

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2	
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #												I&NS	X			

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

Rio; the march lasted about one month. On 26 August the 41 men returned to Tabare.

4. On 3 September the trainees were moved to a house called "San Antonio," at kilometer no. 18, Arroyo Arenas, Habana Province. The house had belonged to Celia Rosa Toucezt Masfera. From 28 August to 10 September, when classes began, training consisted mainly of Communist films which they were taken to see several times. From 10 September to 14 November classes were held in the following subjects: weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, strategy, tactics, marksmanship, sanitation, and closed and open drill. Manolo (lnu), a Cuban, gave classes in explosives; Guillen (fnu) taught economics; Angel Martinez taught the class in guerrilla tactics and strategy; an unidentified mulatto instructed the class in communications; a 17-year old youth named Jose (lnu) taught marksmanship; and a man known as "Cara de Goma" (Rubber Face), a Cuban, served as political commissar. Weapon practices were made with 22-calibre Mauser rifles, Garand rifles, Thompson submachine guns, Browning and Husine rifles, bazookas, and 81-mm mortars. They also practiced with a 57-mm recoilless cannon.

5. Alicia Eguren de Cooke, John William Cooke's wife, visited the school at San Antonio; on one occasion she told the students in a speech that they had to forget Peron and Peronism since they had to organize a guerrilla army, an Army of Liberation.

6. On 14 November the trainees were moved to "Las Mil Lomas de Echeverria," five kilometers from the town of Pan de Guajaibon (N 22-48, W 82-21), Pinar del Rio Province. They dug trenches and individual foxholes and studied mines and fuses, illumination with infrared rays, and Bengal lights, and the construction of electrified and simple wire entanglements. On 17 November, under the direction of a Cuban lieutenant known as Manolo Nunez, they carried out two sighting exercises. Later that day they carried out two more sighting exercises and made a march with topographic maps of the area; the march did not turn out well because of errors of calculation on the map. Daily training from 18 November through 25 November was as follows:

18 November - Rested and studied.

19 November - Made observations from a hillock, studied, and made a scouting-type march.

20 November - Practiced defense exercises and fighting from individual foxholes; explored and located elements of a simulated barracks in the hills, taking notes with regard to an attack.

21 November - Studied plan of attack on the encampment.

22 November - Studied plan of attack on the encampment; marched in the rain, camping in the woods.

23 November - Practiced hanging and taking down hammocks; studied tactical manual.

24 November - Practiced security and emergency plan of the encampment.

25 November - Studied tactical manual.

7. On 26 November, during an exercise to practice security on the march, the advance and rear guard groups got lost in the woods. As a result there was criticism of poor leadership, and the instructor ordered them to repeat the operation. Several men refused, and the instructor ordered that they not be given anything to eat. Because of the order, the rest of the men refused to eat but through argument and an appeal to the Revolution they were eventually persuaded to do so.

8. While they were studying on 27 November, Lt. Manolo Nunez arrived from Habana with news that the course would be intensified because some of the group had a fixed date for their departure from Cuba for Argentina. During the day a conversation was overheard in which a Trotskyite said that the Cuban Government ought not to allow those who wanted to leave to do so since they might be dangerous when they got to Argentina. The conversation was repeated to members of the Peronist group, one of whom loaded a rifle, intending to shoot the Trotskyite. The shooting was prevented but the atmosphere was so tense that the two groups were ready to fight. At that moment the lieutenant instructor appeared and took away the rifles and ammunition; he immediately went to Habana to report the incident. By night the five Trotskyites were separated from their group.

9. On 29 November Cooke arrived and urged the immediate withdrawal of the Peronists and the Vanguard Socialists so that they could return to Argentina. That evening the trainees left for Habana, where they were housed in a residential building on Calle Septima. On 30 November the trainees, because of their semi-abducted situation, became very concerned and put on civilian clothes instead of their military uniforms. On 1 December some of the men left the house without permission, intending to take a walk; they were told by Ulises (lnu), a Negro member of G-2, that they could not go out without the permission of the Cuban Government. They said that they wished to deal directly with the Cuban Government concerning their return home since they did not wish to have anything to do with Cooke, who they thought was deceiving them. Ulises immediately asked them for a written, personal report, including 1) their regard for and opinion of John William Cooke; 2) the type of work which they desired to do when they arrived in Argentina; 3) their political affiliations; and 4) the impressions produced

by the Cuban Revolution.

10. Even after the reports were submitted the rule against leaving the building continued in effect, so they then talked with the political commissar who went to see about the matter. When he returned he said that he had not been able to put the case before higher authorities.

11. On 6 December one Guidi (lnu),[4] someone Cooke's wife had met in Montevideo, took several of the trainees to have their photos taken for the visa required for leaving Cuba. The Vanguard Socialists refused to go because of the man's connection with Cooke; they wished to deal with the Cuban representatives. When one of the trainees who was taken to see Cook explained his position, stating that he no longer would obey orders from anyone but General Peron, Cooke replied that he should be careful what he said, especially since the Cuban Revolution had taken a turn toward the Chinese policy in view of the behavior of the Soviet Union.

12. Guillen, the Spanish instructor, said that he had spent an entire afternoon in the Albanian Embassy trying to obtain aid for the Argentine guerrilla army.

13. During the period when the events described above took place,[5] Hector Villalon, an emissary from General Peron, arrived with instructions to demand the immediate departure from Cuba of all those who were studying in the schools; in this he was supported by the Vanguard Socialists.

14. The first group of trainees left Habana for their return home via Prague on 11 December. The men, in some cases, were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean. In Prague they were interviewed by Vila (fnu), who is in charge of Cubana Airlines flights in Prague. His assumed name is Velasquez.

15. The last assignment given the students in Habana was to send a telegram after their arrival in Argentina to Yolando Perez, Instituto Cubano de Amistad con los Pueblos (ICAP, Cuban Institute for Friendship with the People) with the message "I could not accept the invitation," which would indicate safe arrival. Instructions were also given to return the passports to Miguel Angel, No. 844-50 Calle Maldonado, Apartment 503, or to Calle Reconquista 354/56, apartment 205, in Montevideo, Uruguay.

16. During the training and political instruction in Cuba the men were organized in squads which were composed as follows:[6]

Squad No. 1 - Alberto Alvarez, Ricardo Arenas, Frederico Krause (sought by the Argentine police under the name of Elias Seman),[7] Roberto Garcia, Pedro Ibanez, Jose M. Villar, Romulo Aganagay, and Campos (fnu).

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

Squad No. 2 - Jorge Monti, Mariano Penaroza, Julio Peralta, Alberto Albi, Ernesto Moranzo, Jorge Soteli, Ismael Fierro y Rodriguez.

Squad No. 3 - Cesar Vallejo, Ricardo Valdes, Enrique Viamonte, Ismael Valle, Alejando Camposanto, Ramon Ravero, Fredoy Rivera, Hugo Decuco, and Angel Rameriz, director of the Trotskyite periodical Palabra Obrera, published in Argentina.[8]

Squad No. 4 - Manuel Ordonez, Antonio Velasquez, Roberto Franco, Carlo Rivero, Juan J. Montenegro, Luis Bermudez, Jose Sanchez (Spaniard), and Santiago D'Alessio, Vanguard Socialist.

Squad No. 5 - Juan Jimenez, Jose Falcon, Rodrigo Beltran, Sergio Martinez, Alberto Ruiz, Jaime Adri, Jorge del la Fuente, Ricardo Canteca, Ireneo Ribas, a Catholic from La Plata and a Peronist.

In addition, there was a group which made up the general staff in which the acquaintances of one "Lucero" from Cordoba, Argentina, figured; he belongs to the Tres Banderas Party, of neo-Peronist ideology. Persons known as "Marelli," "Mellin," and "Belaz," followers of Cooke, were also associated with the general staff.

Headquarters Comments

1. TDCS-3/523,106, dated 21 September 1962, reported that Cooke had left Madrid on 20 September 1962, apparently without seeing Peron who had made it known that he would not receive Cooke.

2. The 1958 edition of the Habana telephone directory listed a Buen Pastor Conv. at Avenida 49 No. 8007, Marianao, Habana.

3. Major Dermidio Escalona has previously been identified as military chief of Pinar del Rio Province.

4. According to a usually reliable source in Montevideo, Luis Guide, an Argentine Peronist, went to Cuba in October 1962.

5. The time referred to is apparently about 6 December.

6. It is presumed that the names below are aliases rather than true names.

7. In September 1962 a usually reliable source listed Dr. Elias Seman, Socialist, among Argentine organizers for the Second Latin American Youth Congress, then scheduled to be held in Santiago, Chile, in January 1963. The date for the congress has since been changed to February.

8. In February 1960 Palabra Obrera listed its editor as Abel Bengochea. In a report furnished by an official Argentine service in April 1962, Angel Bengochea was listed among seven leaders of the Palabra Obrera (Trotskyist) Party who had gone to Cuba for guerrilla training. The others were Ernesto Gonzalez, Hugo

Bressano, Daniel Pereyra, Juan Pundiz, Orellano (fnu), and Anibal Tesoro. Cf. CS-3/509,420.

3

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Cuba/Latin America

REPORT NO. CS -3/535,576

SUBJECT
1. Guerrilla Training for Latin Americans in Cuba
2. Plans for Revolutionary Activity in Latin America

Transporting Revolution

DATE DISTR. 30 January 1963

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES RD -W-2107
CS-3/535,575
CS-3/535,577

DATE OF INFO. August - Mid-November 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Argentina, Buenos Aires (15 December 1962)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: An official Argentine service, from an Argentine Communist who visited Cuba. Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. Intensive training is being given in Cuba to large groups of Latin Americans, especially from Central America, Brazil, Peru, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Panama; there are also some groups from Argentina and Uruguay. Instruction includes courses in guerrilla leadership and the manufacture of explosives and their use in acts of sabotage.

2. In this connection contact between Cuba and other countries is maintained through the members of the Committees for Solidarity with the Cuban Revolution and the Communist Parties of the respective countries, and the corresponding organizations in Cuba.

3. The following people are responsible in their respective countries for arranging travel to Cuba for training: in Peru, Guillermo Carnero Hoke; in Nicaragua, Dr. Mario Flores Ortiz, who is in Cuba at present and is head of the military organizations of freedom, and Francisco Bravo; in Ecuador, Osvaldo Yuyasamin; in Venezuela, Mario Fonseca; in Chile, Luis Enrique Munoz; in Paraguay, Orlando Rojas; in Argentina, Ernesto Sabattini and Jesus Mira; in Uruguay, Victorio Casardelo; in Brazil, Dante Dacosta Fonseca; and in El Salvador, Luis Contreras Vargas, who is in Cuba at present and is a leading member of the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR), which maintains the clandestine guerrilla organization in the mountains of El Salvador through means provided by Cuba.

5
4
3
2
1

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE	X	ARMY	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	NSA	X	OCR	X	DIA	X	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #												I&NS	X		

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

4. Josef Hokes, former Czech Ambassador to Mexico, plays an important role in Cuba's revolutionary activity in Latin America.[1] He is allegedly connected in Peru with Hugo Blanco, a revolutionary leader who lives in the mountains of Cuzco, to whom he has sent economic assistance and armaments. He is said to have carried out similar actions for Allio de Fleitas, a priest and guerrilla leader of Brazil.[2]

5. Invasions are not contemplated as a part of the revolutionary program in Latin America unless there are first internal uprisings. These could possibly be carried out, because equipment for such uprisings is already stored in strategic places.

6. Hokes was present at a reception which the Czech Embassy in Habana gave for Fidel Castro and other Cuban officials.[3] Among those invited were Manuel Galich, of Guatemala, and Aleksandr Ishkov, Minister of Fisheries of the USSR.

7. Latin American leaders who wished to speak with Hokes in order to obtain assistance were presented in Mexico by Natividad Rosales and Luis Suarez.[4]

8. Chinese leaders are demanding that Cuba invade Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and Puerto Rico, and bombard Panama. They are also demanding that Cuba issue orders that the Communist and liberal soldiers in Venezuela overthrow the government and take power, and that the guerrilla organizations in Chile, Colombia, and Peru prepare for the declaration of a general revolutionary strike. As for Mexico, there they will only await an occasion when the military supporters of General Lazaro Cardenas and other active groups will take over power by means of a passive insurrection.

9. Cardenas and his supporters would rely upon receiving decisive assistance from the internal and external revolutionary organizations resulting from the coalition of Communist and revolutionary parties of Central America and Mexico which was carried out in Mexico in August 1962 and in which the Mexican leaders exercised control and supervision through Arnoldo Martinez Verdugo, a member of the central committee and the political commission of the Partido Comunista Mexicano (PCM, Mexican Communist Party). The coalition is made up of the PCM, the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajadores (PGT, Guatemalan Communist Party), the Partido Socialista de Nicaragua (PSN, Nicaraguan Communist Party), the Vanguardia de Accion Nacional (VAN, pro-Cuban revolutionary group), the Partido Comunista Salvadoreno (PSC, Salvadoran Communist Party), Partido Comunista de Honduras (PCH, Communist Party of Honduras), Partido de los Trabajadores de Honduras (PTH, Honduran Workers Party), and other leftist groups. The administrative secretary of the organization works in the building of the Mexican-Czech Institute of Culture, at Calles Insurgentes and Reforma and in its Political Bureau at Calle Londres 252. The coordinator is the international Communist Max Aub Mohrenwitz, a resident of Mexico who works for the National University of Mexico. Also, Emilio Portes Gil,[5] former president of Mexico, is involved in this

coalition and relies upon the support of soldiers on active duty and on the National Front of Liberation.

10. The coalition has arms which were disembarked at Vera Cruz, Mexico, from the Soviet vessel TARKA (phonetic spelling) during late September or early October 1962. Arms have also allegedly been unloaded, in accordance with the plans referred to, somewhere along the coasts of Peru and Chile, and possibly in Brazil, in spite of the fact that the coalition did not include Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia and Brazil.

11. In addition to General Cardenas and the PCM, Mexican organizations associated with the coalition include the Partido Obrero-Campesino Mexicano (POCM, Mexican Worker-Peasant Party), the Federacion Obrera Revolucionaria (FOR, Revolutionary Workers Federation), and the Movimiento Revolucionario del Magisterio (MRM, Revolutionary Teachers Movement); they have allegedly been organized into a permanent association at Calle Salvador No. 30-301, profiting by the passive attitude of the official intelligence organizations, a portion of whose personnel also belong to this Communist conspiracy.

Headquarters Comments

1. Hokes left Mexico on 4 October 1962.
2. Fleitas is probably identical with Alipio de Freitas, who has made many speeches favoring revolution along Cuban lines.
3. Source did not provide the date of the reception; presumably it was in October 1962.
4. Suarez is probably identical with Luis Suarez Lopez, naturalized Mexican of Spanish origin, who is a Communist newspaperman.
5. Recently Portes Gil publicly denounced Cardenas and charged that he is working for a foreign power.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Peru/Cuba

SUBJECT Questionnaire Filled Out by Peruvians Being Trained in Cuba

REPORT NO. CS -3/534,909

DATE DISTR. 25 January 1963

NO. PAGES 3

REFERENCES RD
CS-3/534,910
CS-3/534,911
C-RR2-60251

DATE OF INFO. Late 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Peru, Lima (7 January 1963)

FIELD REPORT NO. HPL-2719

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Investigator (F) employed by a large American company, from a Peruvian (F) recently returned from guerrilla training in Cuba. Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. The following is a questionnaire which Peruvians taking guerrilla training in Cuba were required to fill out during their stay:

    1. True name
    2. Pseudonym
    3. Where worked; at what; how long?
    4. Profession; marital status; date and place of birth.
    5. Addresses in Peru
    6. Reason for leaving; other type of work performed
    7. Parents, brothers and sisters, uncles and aunts, grandparents, whether alive or dead; closest living relatives, etc.
    8. Friends of intimate political trust; names and addresses
    9. Friends of different political ideology; names and addresses
    10. Grade of education
    11. Past and present membership in political parties
    12. Length of membership and reason for leaving past political parties
    13. Have you held any Government post? What type? Why did you leave; or continue? How long did you serve?
    14. Have you held any post in a mass organization, union, sports, social, or cultural club? What position, how long?
    15. Political leaning of the organization; who assist in

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	#	X	ARMY	#	X	NAVY	#	X	AIR	#	X	NSA		X	OCR		X	DIA	X	FBI	2
REPCINCLANT	CINCARIB	#																USIA	X	I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "x"; Field distribution by "#".)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

carrying out duties; their (political) tendencies and names?
16. Revolutionary organizations of your base. Who are the leaders? Names, and political affiliation.
17. Experience in clandestine struggles
18. Have you ever been deported? Why? How long? When?
19. Have you ever been arrested? How many times? How long? Reason? How were you released?
20. Give run-down on political situation in Peru; predominant parties, and the people.
21. Boundaries of your country
22. Political divisions
23. Military regions
24. Religious sects
25. Organization of police and investigative agencies of repression
26. Chiefs of repression, hated by the people--names, ranks, etc.
27. Personnel of repression in your base. Chiefs.
28. What means of mobility do they have available?
29. What means of communication; possible reinforcements?
30. What kind of informer organizations exist? Formation and chiefs
31. Possibility of guerrilla warfare in your region
32. Morale of the people for the struggle; organizations
33. What is the situation on the frontiers of your country--population and official control methods?
34. Give names and methods of persons engaged in smuggling.
35. How do we get in touch with them?
36. Give names of those whom we can trust.
37. Morale of the Army--its state of preparedness for anti-guerrilla warfare.
38. Do you have friends in official circles--if so, what do they think of anti-guerrilla warfare?
39. Morale of the police; working conditions, and salary
40. What would be the attitude of the police rank and file toward a revolution?
41. Requirements for entry into the country
42. Once inside the country, can one obtain personal documentation for cash? How?
43. Can a foreigner buy a house?
44. Is it possible to establish a commercial firm?
45. How can one obtain credentials for an accredited institution?
46. Where do officials meet?
47. Where do the governing classes meet?
48. Form of entry; requirements. (It is possible that this refers to entry to social meetings.)
49. Can one gain entry to these places of reunion by a cash payment?
50. Can one obtain a credential from someone to buy admission to such meetings?
51. How many people know that you are in Cuba?
52. When and how were they made witting?
53. Have you done military service? How long? Where? Rank?
54. Grade in military instruction
55. Aircraft in the country; location; number of planes
56. Army posts in the country; location; number of soldiers
57. Naval and river bases
58. Locations of military bases, and their potential.

2. Luis Perez had brought with him from Lima a map of Peru. On this map each member of the group marked the military installations with which he was familiar, as well as bridges, rivers, and anything else which was of importance in military strategy.

All these questions (the 58) had three principal motives: to know the future guerrilla fighter better; and, above all, his needs and limitations for the struggle; and, generally, his personal problems and those of morale. Time given for answering each question was unlimited. One of the possibilities is that of introducing arms by smuggling, as, for example, in the case or relatives who work on the borders, such as comrades from Cuzco; also, in the case of Comrade Betancurt (pseudonym) who is from the town of Ayabaca, Piura, and who has facilities for smuggling arms, since his community borders on Ecuador, where large-scale smuggling of arms has developed. Also, the experiences of soldiers, such as Vallejos, who have served in such localities, show considerable practice in effecting such contraband.[1]

[1] Source Comment. In the question regarding possibilities of guerrilla warfare, the Cubans asked about possibilities of supply by air--suitable drop-zones, etc. It is possible that this questionnaire has been filled out by at least 100 Peruvians who have gone to Cuba. Among those who have enlarged on these topics, the range is from lawyers down to those who can barely write their names. Likewise, from the interest they are showing in Peru, it is presumed that many Cubans can introduce themselves into the country, passing as Mexicans or Panamanians, and set up profitable businesses and commercial firms. One of those who presented the questions had been in Brazil. The Cubans took two photos of those in training, front and profile, in militia uniform, but without cap.

NO FOREIGN DISSEM

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY El Salvador/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/529,533

SUBJECT Visit of Salvadoran Delegation to Headquarters of Cuban Troop Battalion

DATE DISTR. 27 November 1962

NO. PAGES 2

REFERENCES RD CS-3/529,536 CS-3/529,537 CS-3/529,538 CS-3/525,511

DATE OF INFO. 7 October 1962

PLACE & DATE ACQ. El Salvador, San Salvador 23 October 1962

FIELD REPORT NO. HSS-1285

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Salvadoran student (C) who had access to the notes of one of the returning delegates. Appraisal of Content: 3.

1. On 7 October 1962 the officer in command of Batallion 192 of the Vedado zone of Habana invited the Salvadoran delegation to the First Latin American University Games to meet with the troops of this battalion. The officer informed his troops that the Salvadoran delegation had gone to Cuba to see the Cuban revolutionary movement in action and that the Salvadorans would be given a variety of information concerning guerrilla warfare. Raul San Roman Gonzalez, a lieutenant in the Cuban militia, who acted as a guide for the Salvadoran delegation, said that the Salvadoran delegates would have a special program because all were members of the Frente Unido de Accion Revolucionaria (FUAR - United Front for Revolutionary Action), a Communist front, and because the Union of Cuban Communist Youth had recomended that this delegation receive training in revolutionary tactics.

2. The officer in command of Batallion 192 explained to the Salvadorans that all revolutionary groups must be reinforced in their early stages of organization by the recruitment of persons of different political views, and that when the revolution is on its way to success anyone who does not accept Communist leadership can be expelled from the group. He said further that this tactic can be used in El Salvador. The officer also recommended that the Salvadorans draw up plans which indicate points of strategic interest in El Salvador, including important intersections (plazas), bridges which could be sabotaged, terrain suitable for guerrilla activity, and airfields. He also said that they should acquire information as to the type of weapons used by the Salvadoran armed forces and as to normal troop movements. The officer pointed out, however, that in organizing an effective guerrilla movement particular attention must be paid to the ideological indoctrination of members of the movement so that each member is convinced that he is fighting for a just cause. If he believes this there will be no morale problem.

GROUP 1
Excluded from auto
downgrading an
declassification

3. The officer then showed the delegates a large map of Central and South America. This map contained the location of military forces of the Central and South American countries, the distance between major cities, and key highways and bridges. It also showed the centers of guerrilla activity in Guatemala, Colombia, and Venezuela. In addition, the map contained

SECRET
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

STATE	#	X	ARMY	#	X	NAVY	X	AIR	X	FBI	2	AEC		NSA	X	OCR	X
REPCINCLANT CINCARIB #														DIA	X	I&NS	X

(Note: Washington distribution indicated by "X"; Field distribution by "#".)

information as to the numerical strength of the armies, air forces, navies, and rural police forces of many countries. They also had information as to the types of weapons in use in the Central American countries, most of them surplus weapons from the Second World War. The Panama Canal was shown on a large map which had marked all access routes to the canal from both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, as well as the normal shipping and air routes. There were also large photographs which showed the locks of the canal and also a special diagram showing the types of ships which can pass through the canal.

4. Some members of the Salvadoran delegation received training in the use of Belgian (FAL) rifles during their visit with troops of Batallion 192.

Field Comment. Salvadoran delegates to the First Latin American University Games included Jose Luis Enriquez, Carlos Rafael Baires, Armando Rafael Morales, Danilo Armando Castro, Ricardo Ayala Kroufts, Jose Alfredo Hernandez, Rafael Mario (aka Rafael Onofre, aka Rafael Salvador) Cuenca, Eliseo Antonio Sosa Montiel, Carlos Antonio Madriz, and Felix Rodolfo Villatoro. (Cf. CS-3/529,506).

3

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Ecuador /Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS-3/534,979
SUBJECT	Return of First Member of Revolutionary Youth to Receive Guerrilla Training in Cuba	DATE DISTR.	24 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	Late December 1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Ecuador, Guayaquil (6 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HEG-2101

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (C) of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Victor Leon, a member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) from Esmeraldas, returned to Ecuador from Cuba on 22 December 1962. He is the first member of URJE to return from Cuba after receiving guerrilla training in that country. He went via Mexico to Cali, Colombia, by air and then overland to Guayaquil. After his arrival in Guayaquil Leon said that he was the only URJE member in the group with which he was trained and therefore he did not know when the other URJE members undergoing training would return to Ecuador.

Source Comment. Evidently Leon did not bring any money back from Cuba because he asked for a loan so that he could go to his home in Esmeraldas. Leon is not particularly intelligent and therefore was not trained as an organizer. However, he is eager to start guerrilla activities in Ecuador.

MESSAGE SECRET DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
STAFF COMMUNICATIONS OFFICE

SECRET

DIAAP-3

16 23

NNNNEUB005REE251

-P RUEPDA

DE RUEIVC

P 152200Z JAN 63

FM USARMA SAN SALVADOR

TO ACSI DEPTAR WASHDC

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR. 5200.10

C1 SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM REUR DA 923579 SINCE CASTRO REGIM SEITED POWER ESTIMATED 300-350 SALVADORAN STUDENTS HAVE VISITED CUBA. CURRENTLY 8-12 THERE AND ESTIMATED 6 REPORTEDLY BEHIND IRON CURTAIN. VISITS MADE GENERALLY BY WAY OF MEXICO. SOME STUDENTS REPORTEDLY HAVE RECEIVED MILITARY TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION IN CUBA TO BE APPLIED ON RETURN TO EL SALVADOR. NO FACTUAL INFORMATION AVAILABLE ON WHICH STUDENTS HAVE RECEIVED TRAINING AND INDOCTRINATION. ESTIMATED 5 OR 6 STUDENTS EACH ARE CURRENTLY WORKING AT COFFEE FINCAS NEAR AHUACHAPAN, SONSONATE, AND BERLIN FOR PURPOSE OF SUBVERTING COFFEE PICKERS. NO EVIDENCE OF DIRECT SUBVERSION EFFORTS AGAINST ARMEDD FORCES. SCP-3.

LT

200 Ecuadoreans are / or have been in Cuba for guerrilla training (US AirA Rpt 182 8000 363 = 15 Jan 63

ACTION: ACSI

ADDED DIST: , DIA; DIA(AQ)

DA IN 791

2/7/63

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T
NO FOREIGN DISSEM

COUNTRY Paraguay/Argentina/Cuba

REPORT NO. CS-3/536,455

SUBJECT Return of Paraguayan Leftist to Argentina from Cuba

DATE DISTR. 7 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

DATE OF INFO. 9 January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Paraguay, Asuncion 24 January 1963

FIELD REPORT NO. HYA-834

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Paraguayan security officer (B) from a Paraguayan Government official in Formosa, Argentina. Appraisal of Content: 2.

Retired Captain Guerrero Padin (fnu),[1] a member of the left-wing group of the Paraguayan Febrerista Party, was seen in Formosa, Argentina, on about 9 January 1963. Since October 1962 Guerrero Padin had been in Habana, Cuba, where he received guerrilla training. Guerrero, who is separated from his family,[2] spends as much time in Buenos Aires as he does in Formosa.

1. Field Comment. Guerrero Padin is probably identical with Rafael Guerrero Padin.

Headquarters Comment. In September 1962 a usually reliable source with good contacts in exile groups, reported that Guerrero Padin (fnu), a former captain in the Paraguayan Army, was an instructor in guerrilla warfare at a training camp near Habana. The source received this information from a member of the United Front for National Liberation (FULNA) who had recently returned.

2. Field Comment. According to a usually reliable source, Guerrero Padin is legally separated from his wife, Benefrida, who lives on Calle Caballero, between Tte. Farina and Manuel Dominguez, Asuncion, Paraguay.

SECRET

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

SECRET
(When Filled In)
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

Mr. Roven has seen

COUNTRY ARGENTINA / URUGUAY / CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/537,168

SUBJECT ACTIVITIES OF ARGENTINE PERONIST TERRORISTS

DATE DISTR. 13 FEBRUARY 1963

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 10 FEBRUARY 1963

REFERENCES IN 67101

PLACE & DATE ACQ. URUGUAY, MONTEVIDEO (11 FEBRUARY 1963)

APPRAISAL 2 (THAT THE SUBSOURCE MADE THE REPORTED STATEMENTS)

FIELD REPORT NO. HUM-2202

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE A PERSON IN CONTACT WITH PERONISTS IN URUGUAY (B) FROM A CONTACT (F) IN PERONIST CIRCLES.

ASD
BASD
~~EXEC~~
D/SA
EUR
[illegible]
[illegible]
FE
SSH
FMRA
FEA
D/AS
DIS
D/PL
S/ST
P/PL
CDMA
MAPL
PROG
COMP
M&T
WPS
C/L
OPR

1. NORMA KENNEDY AND FIVE OTHER ARGENTINE TERRORISTS ARE CURRENTLY IN MONTEVIDEO HAVING RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM CUBA WHERE THEY UNDERWENT GUERRILLA WARFARE TRAINING. THEY PLAN TO GO TO ARGENTINA IN THE NEAR FUTURE WHERE THEY WILL ORGANIZE GUERRILLA WARFARE OPERATIONS. (FIELD COMMENT: KENNEDY AND HER GROUP WERE REPORTED UPON BY THE SAME SOURCE IN AUGUST 1962 WHEN THEY ARRIVED IN URUGUAY CLANDESTINELY FROM ARGENTINA ENROUTE TO CUBA.) (SOURCE COMMENT: KENNEDY AND HER GROUP MAY BE HIDING ON A RANCH NEAR FRAY BENTOS, URUGUAY, OWNED BY JULIO GALLEGO SOTO, ARGENTINE

SECRET
CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

DA IN 16839

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	
STATE/DIR																	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

SECRET

000

FORM 5-62 1K OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

PERONIST AND CASTRO SYMPATHIZER.) (FIELD COMMENT: GALLEGO MAY BE THE INTERMEDIARY BETWEEN THE CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO AND THE PERONIST GROUP HEADED BY JOSE LUIS ALBAMONTE, A/KA (ALSO KNOWN AS) AMERICO BARRIOS. DURING THE FALL OF 1962 GALLEGO WAS RELIABLY REPORTED TO BE IN TOUCH WITH CUBAN EMBASSY IN MONTEVIDEO AND TO HAVE TRAVELLED TO BUENOS AIRES ON AN UNSPECIFIED MISSION FOR THAT EMBASSY.)

2. ALICIA EGUREN DE COOKE, ARGENTINE TERRORIST AND GUERRILLA RECRUITER AND WIFE OF TERRORIST JOHN WILLIAM COOKE, IS CURRENTLY IN MONTEVIDEO. SHE PLANS TO REJOIN HER HUSBAND IN CUBA, POSSIBLY IN LATE FEBRUARY 1963.

3. DR. (FNU) GUIDE, ARGENTINE PERONIST, IS CURRENTLY IN MONTEVIDEO HAVING RECENTLY ARRIVED FROM CUBA. (FIELD COMMENT: GUIDE MAY POSSIBLY BE IDENTICAL WITH ALFREDO OMAR GUIDI, MILITANT PERONIST.)

4. AN UNIDENTIFIED PERONIST WHO ESCAPED FROM AN ARGENTINE PRISON IN LATE 1962 WHERE HE HAD BEEN IMPRISONED FOR SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES SPENT SEVERAL DAYS IN MONTEVIDEO BEFORE BEING SMUGGLED BACK INTO ARGENTINA BY ALBAMONTE IN LATE JANUARY OR EARLY FEBRUARY 1963.

5. THE PERONIST GROUP OF JOSE LUIS ALBAMONTE HAS COMMITTED ITSELF TO AIDING FUTURE GUERRILLA ACTIVITY IN ARGENTINA AND THEREFORE "MUST" ACCEPT CUBAN AID. THE KENNEDY GROUP, ALICIA DE

DA IN 16839

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS
[redacted]

SECRET
(When Filled In)

TDCS -3/537,168

IN 6710

PAGE 3

COOKE, AND GUIDE ARE ALL IN CONTACT WITH ALBAMONTE.

6. FIELD DISSEM: STATE ARMY NAVY AIR CINCARIB CINCLANT

ACTION: ACSI,NAVY,AF,JCS,OSD

INFO: DCSOP

DA IN 16839

END OF MESSAGE

[redacted] [redacted]

According to a usually reliable Communist Party source in Brazil, two Brazilians, Carlos Danielli and Angelo Arroyo, have recently returned from Cuba where they received training in guerrilla warfare. Both have been relieved of all party activities to allow them to concentrate exclusively on guerrilla activities in Brazil. The National Executive Commission of the Dissident Communist Party of Brazil (CPB) planned to meet in Rio de Janeiro on 16 and 17 January to discuss a report to be submitted by Danielli and Arroyo regarding their training. (CIA, TDCS 3/534,418, 17 January, SECRET)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

OUNTRY Ecuador/USSR/Cuba

SUBJECT Communist Travel to and from Ecuador

REPORT NO. CS -3/534,946

DATE DISTR. 24 January 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

ATE OF NFO. December 1962 - January 1963

LACE & ATE ACQ. Ecuador, Guayaquil (December 1962 - Janu

FIELD REPORT NO. HEG-2104

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Ecuadorean official (B) with access to travel information. Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. During late December 1962 Ketty Romo Leroux Giron, a member of the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE), returned to Guayaquil from the Soviet Union.

2. During early January 1963 Antonio Ruiz Flores, a member of the PCE who had been in the Soviet Union for six months, returned to Milagro.

3. On 11 January 1963 Cesar Muñoz Vicuña, a member of the PCE, was to travel to Moscow to undertake studies in civil engineering.

4. On 12 or 15 January 1963 Ecuador Padilla and Alfredo Almeida Vargas, members of the PCE from Milagro, were scheduled to travel to Cuba. //

5. Julio Olmedo Muñoz Gonzalez, Antonio Mosquera Anchundia, Jose Luis Cardenas Pinto, and Carlos Baste Castillo, members of the PCE, were selected by the PCE to travel to Cuba during the last half of January 1963. //

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

NFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

C-O-N-F-I-D-E-N-T-I-A-L

COUNTRY	Colombia/Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/534,133
SUBJECT	Travel of Colombians to Cuba	DATE DISTR.	16 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	2
		REFERENCES	RD
DATE OF INFO.	31 December 1962		BY CABLE
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Mexico, Mexico City (31 December 1962)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Person (B) with good access to travel information. Appraisal of Content: 2.

1. The following Colombians left Mexico City by air en route to Habana, Cuba, on 31 December 1962:

Luis Enrique Gomez Restrepo[1]	Passport No. 33145
Eduvino Mateus Porras	Passport No. 588669
Jorge Albornoz	Passport No. 55834
Fanny Puentes de Cruz	Passport No. 359708
Cecilia Porras de Child	Passport No. 692256
Manuel Tiberio Rozo Duque[2]	Passport No. 59845
Prieto Guevara	Passport No. 064694
Maria Dalila Sierra Robon de Arcila	Passport No. 61694
Libia Colombia de Benavides	Passport No. 69206
Clotilde Guerrero de Dorado[3]	Passport No. 59816
Camilo Dominguez	Passport No. 8864
Carlos Vicente Nunez Obondano	Passport No. 48938
Santiago Londono Londono[4]	Passport No. TQ 39586
Alvaro Echandial	Passport No. 71069
Silvio Agredo Yepez	Passport No. 55712
Justo Castellanos [1]	Passport No. 38610
Jesus Antonio Villegas[5]	Passport No. 50833
Jaime Rafael Altamar Pios	Passport No. 70758
Valentina Colombiana Arocha	Passport No. 30437
Jorge Child Velez[1]	Passport No. 59607
Antonio Becerra Becerra	Passport No. 88613
Hernan Lozano Mahecha[1]	Passport No. 88687
Eduardo Kronfly	Passport No. 59880
Sara de Bejarano[6]	Passport No. 59751
Helena Garavito de Garavito	Passport No. 59440
Maria L. Villaseca	Passport No. - not given
Jorge Vargas	Passport No. 59848
Ana Victoria Fajardo de Silva[7]	Passport No. 59618
Cristina Zambrano	Passport No. 59522
Maria Irene Avila Barrera	Passport No. 56014

All had courtesy visas

GROUP 1

Field Comment. These people probably attended the celebration in observance of the fourth anniversary of the Castro regime. It is possible that some of them may remain in Cuba for the Latin American Women's Congress.

Headquarters Comments

1. Members of the extremist segment of the Liberal Revolutionary Movement.

2. Rozo was arrested by the Colombian authorities in May 1963 during a raid on a Communist meeting. At that time he was a student at Universidad Libre.

3. In March 1959 Guerrero was reported as a member of a preparatory committee to organize a Communist-front women's organization in Colombia.

4. Londono has a long record of Communist and Communist-front activities. A cancer specialist, he attended a cancer conference in the Soviet Union in February 1962. He visited Habana in late December 1961.

5. Villegas is labor secretary of the central executive committee of the Communist Party of Colombia.

6. Bejarano was reported in August 1962 as a member of the Union of Democratic Women, a Communist-front organization.

7. De Silva has a long record of Communist activities.

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

WORKING COPY

COUNTRY DOMINICAN REPUBLIC/CUBA

REPORT NO. TDCS -3/531,991

SUBJECT TRAVEL OF DOMINICAN COMMUNIST DEPORTEES TO CUBA

DATE DISTR. 21 DECEMBER 1962

PRECEDENCE ROUTINE

DATE OF INFO. 14 DECEMBER 1962

REFERENCES IN 36480 36618

PLACE & DATE ACQ. IRELAND, DUBLIN (17 & 20 DECEMBER 1962)

APPRAISAL 2 (THAT THE DOMINICANS WERE ACTUALLY ABOARD)

FIELD REPORT NO.

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE AN OFFICIAL IRISH SERVICE.

DIAAP-3 RECEIVED 1962 DEC 21 23

1. ON 14 DECEMBER 1962 A CZECH AIRLINES (CSA) PLANE TRANSITED SHANNON AIRPORT, IRELAND, EN ROUTE TO HABANA, CUBA, FROM PRAGUE, CZECHOSLOVAKIA. AMONG THE PASSENGERS WERE THE FOLLOWING EIGHT DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS:

A. MAXIMO LOPEZ MOLINA

B. ISLANDER SELIG DELMONTE

C. TOMAS PARMENIO ERICKSON ALVAREZ

D. JOSE ESTRELLA JACOBO ARMAGH - (ALSO REPORTED AS JOSE [illegible] [illegible])

E. JUAN JOSE [illegible] RIVERA

F. RAMON AGUSTIN PINEDO MEJIA

G. HUGO FRANCISCO CABRERA GARCIA

H. GUSTAVO FEDERICO RICART RICART

CLASSIFICATION — DISSEMINATION CONTROLS

S-E-C-R-E-T/NO FOREIGN DISSEM

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic downgrading and declassification

STATE/INR	DIA	ARMY/ACSI	NAVY	AIR	JCS	SECDEF	NSA	NIC	AID	USIA	OCI	ONE	OCR	ORR	OBI	OO	FBI
STATE/DIR													DD/I		INS	[illegible]	

TELEGRAM INFORMATION REPORT TELEGRAM

DIAAP-3

FORM 5-62 1Kb OBSOLETE PREVIOUS EDITIONS. (15-20)

WORKING COPY

2. OTHER PASSENGERS WERE 21 CZECHS, THREE EAST GERMANS, TWO SPANIARDS, TWO BANIANS, ONE FINN, AND ONE ALGERIAN. THE CARGO INCLUDED AIRCRAFT SPARES AND DIPLOMATIC AIL.

3. HEADQUARTERS COMMENT: THE ABOVE DOMINICAN COMMUNISTS ARE EIGHT OF THE TEN WHO RE DEPORTED FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC TO FRANCE ON ABOUT 1 NOVEMBER 1962. MAXIMO LOPEZ MOLINA IS SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE MOVIMIENTO POPULAR DOMINICANO (MPD - DOMINICAN POPULAR MOVEMENT), A LEFTIST PARTY DOMINATED BY COMMUNISTS: ISLANDER SELIG DELMONTE AND MAS PARMENIO ERICKSON ALVAREZ ARE MPD LEADERS; JOSE ESTRELLA JACOBO ARMACH IS THE RO-COMMUNIST LEADER OF FENEPIA, THE DOMINICAN GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES UNION; GUSTAVO EDERICO RICART RICART IS A MEMBER OF THE MPD; ANOTHER SOURCE HAS REPORTED THAT JUAN JOSE ATOS RIVERA IS A SUSPECTED COMMUNIST AND AN ACTIVE MEMBER OF THE AGRUPACION POLITICA CATORCE DE JUNIO (APCJ - 14TH OF JUNE POLITICAL GROUP), A PRO-CASTRO GROUP. SEE TDCS-3/528,582 OF 17 NOVEMBER 1962, FROM ANOTHER SOURCE, WHICH REPORTED A MEETING IN PARIS BETWEEN THE CUBAN AMBASSADOR TO FRANCE AND ABOUT TEN DOMINICANS TO DISCUSS THE POS-SIBILITY OF HELPING THEM TO GO TO CUBA WITHOUT PASSPORTS.

4. FIELD DISSEM: CINCARIB, CINCLANT.

END OF MESSAGE

IAAP-3

CONFIDENTIAL

An Ecuadorean youth who returned from Cuba on 18 November 1962 has spent most of his time since then training guerrilla candidates in Ecuador, according to a fairly reliable source who is a member of the Revolutionary Union of Ecuadorean Youth (URJE). The youth involved, Mario Vera Arrata, was one of four Ecuadoreans who on 22 November threw three sticks of dynamite at the USAID mission office building in Guayaquil, according to the source. The camp where Mario Vera is training guerrillas is said to be located near a small beach resort some 70 miles from Guayaquil. Training consists of learning how to march, rifle practice, the use of camouflage, and hand-to-hand combat. Mario Vera is the URJE's intelligence officer, according to the source, and is the principal courier for instructions coming directly from Cuba. (CIA Guayaquil CS-3/531,884, 31 December, CONFIDENTIAL)

CONFIDENTIAL

Lima reports that three young Peruvian extremists shot and killed a civil guard from a car in Callao on 11 January. One of them was Miguel Tauro de Mala, a young Communist leader who attended the Latin American Youth Congress in Havana in 1960. He is said to be boasting after his arrest two days later that he pulled the trigger, and to be threatening other attacks on the authorities. A second one of the trio, Jorge Bejar, who is still being sought, attended the People's Conference in Havana early last year. No tie to Cuba has yet been reported for the third killer, Fernando Samaniego Perdiz, who has been arrested in Lima. (CIA, Lima IN 49651, 14 January, SECRET NOFORN)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY Costa Rica/Cuba

SUBJECT Inclusion of Militia Training in Communist Party Program

DATE OF INFO. Mid-January 1963

PLACE & DATE ACQ. Costa Rica, San José (17 January 63)

REPORT NO. CS -3/535,911

DATE DISTR. 4 February 1963

NO. PAGES 1

REFERENCES RD

FIELD REPORT NO. HRS-3009

SOURCE EVALUATIONS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Costa Rican (B) with good contacts in Communist Party circles, who talked with Lopez's mother. Appraisal of Content: 3.

Militia training will be included in new courses of instruction soon to be started by the Partido Vanguardia Popular (PVP--Costa Rican Communist Party). Alvaro Lopez Vargas, a PVP member who was formerly an employee of Public Works, was sent to Cuba in June 1962 to be trained in militia organization. Upon his return to Costa Rica, Lopez will help conduct similar courses in Costa Rica.

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Cuba/Nicaragua	REPORT NO.	CS -3/534,165
SUBJECT	Cuban Training of Guerrillas for Landing in Nicaragua	DATE DISTR.	16 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	1
		REFERENCES	RD -W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	Mid-1962		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Belgium, Antwerp (7 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Cuban naval officer (F) who left Cuba in January 1963, from a Cuban G-2 officer who disappeared from Habana, reportedly deserting, in November 1962. Appraisal of Content: 3.

About July 1962 four hundred men, including Mexicans, Nicaraguans, and Cubans, were being trained in Cuba as a guerrilla unit which was to be landed in Mosquito, Nicaragua.

Field Comment. The Cuban naval officer did not know when the landing in Mosquito was to take place.

(An estimated 1,000 to 1,500 Latin Americans have gone to Cuba for indoctrination + guerrilla training). (Date of info: early 63)

Two top Peruvian Communists (PCP officials) said on 18 December that Fidelista activities in Peru are being carried on largely through the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), according to a usually reliable clandestine source. The MIR was reported to have been given the task of helping guerrillas enter Peru clandestinely from Chile. Between two and three hundred Peruvians had gone to Cuba about a year ago, traveling in groups of twelve to fifteen, to study guerrilla tactics. The PCP had not directly participated in this MIR activity, which was under an expelled PCP member, which had so upset Communist Party leaders that they recently sent an emissary to discuss the matter with Fidel Castro. Members of the Communist Youth Group (JCP) has also met secretly with Castro agents without prior knowledge of PCP leaders, to prepare distribution of Cuban revolutionary propaganda and material on the formation of the Peruvian "army of liberation" being trained in Cuba. Nor had the PCP been consulted by Havana with respect to the Latin American Congress in Defense of Cuba, originally scheduled to be held in Rio de Janeiro this coming January but since postponed - about which they had first learned through the local press. They agreed with the Brazilian, Argentine, and Chilean Communists that the congress should be postponed. They reportedly decided to call for a conference of Latin American Communist parties to discuss Cuba's attitude toward these parties. The Political Commission of the Peruvian PSP has resolved that the methods employed by the Cubans can only hurt the "liberation" movement in South America, and they termed these methods "erroneous, precipitate, and very dangerous." (CIA, Lima, TDCS-3/531,899, 20 December, SECRET NOFORN)

A regular CIA clandestine asset in Peru with close contacts in Peruvian left-wing circles reports that Cuba has given, and is still giving, training in Peruvians in Cuba - including demolition instructions, manufacture of explosives, and other aspects of guerrilla warfare. A 50-point questionnaire issued by the Cuban Government is said to "clearly pinpoint" Cuban interest in information which could be used for sabotage operations in Peru, subversion of the Peruvian police, and for illegal entry and travel in Peru. Some 150 Peruvians are reported receiving such training in Cuba. (CIA, Lima, IN 46954, 9 January, SECRET NOFORN)

There is a group of Negroes and Hindus from British Guiana studying "agronomy and military tactics" in Cuba, according to a letter dated 4 November recently received in Uruguay from an Uruguayan Communist employed in Cuba. The writer claimed that the British Guianese are "supervised" by an American couple who are Communists and who travel frequently between Cuba and British Guiana. The writer commented that British Guiana is soon to become the second Communist state in the western hemisphere. (CIA Montevideo IN 30671, 6 December, SECRET)

SECRET

A number of Ecuadoreans are currently receiving training in guerrilla warfare in Cuba, according to a usually reliable source who is a member of the Communist Party of Ecuador. The source was told by Rafael Echeverria, a Communist leader in Ecuador, that the Ecuadoreans being trained in Cuba would return to Ecuador to train and command guerrilla units there. Echeverria added that the top Ecuadorean Communist leader, Pedro Saad, had told him that the techniques of guerrilla warfare used by Castro against Batista were now antiquated and that current training in Cuba now emphasizes methods used by guerrillas in Burma, Vietnam, and Algeria. According to the source, Saad and other high party leaders in Ecuador are now coming around to the view previously urged on them by a minority faction of the party that the Communists should open guerrilla warfare in Ecuador as soon as possible. (CIA Quito CS-3/530,540 7 December, SECRET)

SECRET

The police in Rio de Janeiro report they have uncovered a pro-Castro plot to organize a revolution in Brazil. The police charge that Cubans who had undergone training in the Soviet Union and Communist China, have slipped into Brazil to train guerrilla bands in the northwest. Brazilian news reports predict a vigorous anti-Communist campaign there as a result of the affair. (CIA FBIS 07, Rio de Janeiro, 14 December, OFFICIAL USE ONLY)

INFORMATION REPORT INFORMATION REPORT

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

This material contains information affecting the National Defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage Laws, Title 18, U.S.C. Secs. 793 and 794, the transmission or revelation of which in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

S-E-C-R-E-T

COUNTRY	Colombia/Venezuela / Cuba	REPORT NO.	CS -3/535,595
SUBJECT	Cuban Subversive Activities in Colombia and Venezuela	DATE DISTR.	30 January 1963
		NO. PAGES	3
		REFERENCES	RD -W-2107
DATE OF INFO.	1962 - January 1963		
PLACE & DATE ACQ.	Colombia, Cali (7 January 1963)	FIELD REPORT NO.	HLB-3158

THIS IS UNEVALUATED INFORMATION. SOURCE GRADINGS ARE DEFINITIVE. APPRAISAL OF CONTENT IS TENTATIVE.

SOURCE: Member (F) of the Communist Party of Colombia in Cali. Appraisal of Content: 6.

1. During a discussion on 5 January 1963 between Amado de Jesus Zapata, member of the Department of Valle Regional Committee of the Communist Party of Colombia (PCC), and P. I. Plata, whom Zapata describes as a Cuban deep-cover agent working with the Seventh of January Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC) in Colombia and Venezuela, both criticized the PCC for its soft policy and fear of taking a more active role in the guerrilla activities in Colombia.[1] They indicated there is a split between the followers of Gilberto Vieira White, Political Secretary of the PCC, and those who advocate the Castro-Communist concept of active participation in the guerrilla bands. Both agreed the only hope for the PCC is to follow the Castro policy, as have the Communist Parties of Peru, Venezuela, and Bolivia. Plata said it is possible there will soon be a change in the position of the PCC leaders in Bogota.

2. Plata said the MOEC is not a local movement but rather part of a Latin American concept which is being assisted by Castro and the Cuban Government. He said he has been in Cali for one year on a special assignment from the top leaders in Cuba to see that arms, propaganda, and instructions from Venezuela, originating in Cuba, get into the hands of the MOEC groups. Plata said he has also been helping to recruit Venezuelan youth, largely from schools and universities, to fight with the MOEC bands in Colombia.

3. Plata said he lived for many years in Caracas and that his apartment there is still a meeting place of Cuban guerrilla leaders operating in Venezuela. Two Castro agents, who represent themselves as being anti-Castro, live in his apartment now. He added that the apartment is a center that maintains contact with Colombia through associates in Bucaramanga, Cucuta, and Bogota, and that several Cubans and Cuban-trained Colombians are working with the MOEC in Colombia. He said that Pedro Emilio Castro, Fidel's older brother, lived for a long time at his apartment in Caracas, but has now returned to Cuba, where he is not involved in politics. Plata added he has visited Cuba several times, the last visit in February 1961, when he was introduced to Fidel

GROUP 1

Castro and had two conferences with him. The Castro organization in Caracas is in direct contact with Castro agents in Miami, who consider Caracas their most important center in Latin America. The Miami group, which is made up of persons in the anti-Castro organization there who ostensibly escaped from Cuba, maintains contacts with all of the Latin American groups.

4. Plata said an important shipment for MOEC is due to arrive from Venezuela via Cucuta in February 1963.[2] It is to be used in the MOEC plans to increase their activities in the Department of Santander. Plata mentioned Santander several times in the discussion as an area where the MOEC will play a more important role in violence in the future. He said there are several MOEC training areas in Colombia and Venezuela. Plata said he ostensibly is a salesman of refrigeration equipment for Comerciales Unidas Ltda., Carrera 5a No. 15-75, Cali.[3] He said most of the MOEC representatives in Colombia pose as traveling salesmen. He asserted MOEC is looking for new people who are not known to the Colombian authorities to help them transport arms and equipment around the country.

5. Plata said he was born in the municipality of Malaga,[4] in the Department of Santander; that he is married to Maruja de Plata, who has one arm missing; and that they have two daughters, one of whom is married to a Venezuelan doctor.

6. On 6 January 1963 Zapata and Plata went to "Los Panchos," a restaurant near the country club of Cali. The owner of the restaurant, a Gomez (fnu), is a member of the MOEC. They inspected a new tent that was acquired for a MOEC guerrilla leader known as "Mariposo,"[5] who is active in the northern part of the Department of Tolima. Plata expressed a desire to obtain more of the tents for MOEC operations in other areas. He said he was expecting money from Venezuela by the first of February. Francisco Calero,[6] formerly thought to be the MOEC leader in Cali, attended the meeting briefly and was ordered around as a subordinate of Plata.

7. During the conversation at the restaurant it was asserted that Fidel Castro had given US 50,000 dollars to Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the United Front for Revolutionary Action (FUAR). The money had been given to Valencia to build up an organization to participate more actively in sabotage and guerrilla activities. It was said that Valencia used the money for his private use and as a result the FUAR has collapsed and might not be assisted any more by Castro. Since the failure of FUAR there is increased importance on the MOEC organization.[7]

Source Comment. Plata, who appears to be approximately 60 years old, is well acquainted with the MOEC contacts in Ibague. He also has a very close relationship with Zapata, who was in complete agreement with the criticism of the "soft line" of the PCC as represented by Vieira. It also appears there is a much closer understanding and co-operation between MOEC and PCC at this level than appears on lower levels.

Field Comments

1. Members of the Regional Committee of the Department of Valle have expressed differences in the recent past with the action of the Central Committee of the PCC over the lack of action during the Cuban blockade. They also have spoken of their plans to participate in sabotage in the Cali area. Apparently the aggressive faction, headed by Zapata, has been overruled by Jose Cardona Hoyos, secretary-general of the local regional committee.

2. Cucuta, capital of the Department of Norte de Santander, is on the Venezuelan border and is a traditional center of smuggling between the two countries.

who devotes part time to MOEC, being directed by Plata, who is probably a full-time agent of the Castro government in charge of recruiting and controlling Cuban assistance to the organization in the Cali area.

7. The FUAR seems to have been in a recess during recent months in the Cali area. In early November Luis Emiro Valencia, one of the leaders of the FUAR, was asked directly if there was any truth to the story circulating in Cali that Castro had given him 50,000 dollars to help FUAR. He laughed and asserted the amount mentioned in Bogota is only 30,000. He said his only assistance from Cuba was a 1,000-dollar first prize in a literary contest in 1959 or 1960 and two paid trips thereafter to judge other literary contests. It is difficult to determine the truth of Valencia's denial or the charges mentioned herein. The story has been circulating in Cali for approximately six months and could be hearsay on the part of either Plata or Zapata. It is noteworthy that Valencia has refused to espouse common ideology with the PCC, except for Castro, which Valencia insists he will not accept if it is a tool of international Communism.

FROM : AMEMBASSY, GUATEMALA   DATE:

SUBJECT: Interview with Cuban [illegible]

Attached is a Memorandum of Conversation [illegible] Embassy officers and [illegible] Cuban [illegible] [illegible] of the Cuban Government, [illegible] anti-[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] interesting.

For the Ambassador:

Attachment:

Memorandum of Conversation

the people "complained" but remarked that whatever "Fidel" wanted was all right with them. Several people stated that "if communism meant the homes they had been given, the better jobs and salaries they had and the schools that had been provided for their children, then they were communists."

Castellanos remarked that the anti-Castroites often seemed [illegible] and without [illegible] people [illegible] that they were attempting to sneak in and destroy the Revolution. The only really [illegible] group of anti-Castroists Castellanos says he encountered were the taxi drivers who, he claimed, were all ex-military men, even officers.

In answer to a suggestion that perhaps his tour had been closely planned so as to permit him to see only what the GOC wanted him to see, he claimed that he felt he had been permitted to see almost everything he wanted to and had had ample opportunity to talk to different types of people in many sections of the Island (he mentioned, in addition to Havana, Santiago, Camaguey and Pinar del Rio) without any supervision.

Although admitting shortages in Cuba, Castellanos said he did not want to give the impression that everything was perfect and dream world. He said that he knew there had been abuses and barbarities in the revolutionary process and that to his surprise and disappointment he [illegible] "Neither prostitution nor [illegible] he had been [illegible]." Furthermore, he said, although people felt free to talk [illegible] Castro, many people who were not with the Revolution [illegible] good jobs.

2. [illegible]

Castellanos [illegible] that most of the people had [illegible] Castro [illegible] His appearance on [illegible] When the question of elections [illegible] laughed, saying, "Why do we need elections [illegible] we have Fidel?" [illegible] admiration [illegible] Cuba [illegible]

3. Soviet Influence.

Castellanos observed [illegible] expressed resentment about Khrushchev's actions during [illegible] felt that the Soviets should not have [illegible] they generally ended by saying, "If Fidel wanted [illegible] it was all right."

CONFIDENTIAL

A-4[illegible]

Page No. [illegible] Enclosure No. ___ Of Airgram No. _____ From Guatemala

[illegible] The Delegations

[illegible] said that there were delegations from all over the world, Asians, Latin Americans, Europeans, and even a substantial representation from Guatemala. There were about 10 Americans, who, he said, claimed that other American youth wanted to come but were not permitted to by the US Government. Those that did come travelled via [illegible]. The Guatemalan delegation consisted of about 40 people.

Remarks:

[illegible], as is obvious from his remarks reported above, was greatly [illegible] impressed by what he saw in Cuba. He said that he feels that "revolution" is necessary in each of the Latin American countries if the necessary rapid social and economic changes are to be accomplished, although he feels that a revolution as brusque as the Cuban revolution cannot and should not be accomplished in other countries.

In regard to the United States attitude towards Cuba, he said that he personally feels that we should leave the Cubans in peace to work out the consolidation of their own revolution. However, he said, if he were Kennedy (looking at it from our point of view) he would immediately take steps to eliminate Castro and put an end to the Cuban [illegible]. This for two reasons: 1) the danger to US security of the Soviet presence, 2) the ideological danger of the example of Cuba to [illegible]. He, however, [illegible] with the fact that the Cubans are intent upon defending their revolution. He remarked that he himself had been disturbed by the Soviet presence in Cuba, saying that he did not like to see Cuba "falling from the hands of American imperialism into the hands of Soviet imperialism".

[illegible] is young and impressionable, and saw Cuba through the eyes of [illegible] and had a previous disposition to sympathize with the Cuban Revolution. A well-planned trip to the United States might do him some good.

JTGr[illegible]

CONFIDENTIAL

INTERNATIONAL GAMES USED AS TRAINING COVER

(S) (GP-1) The Latin American University games held in Havana from 7 to 21 October 1962, at which thirteen countries were represented, allegedly were used by the Cuban Government as an opportunity to indoctrinate and train a number of Latin American students. Several Salvadorean athletes reportedly took no part in the games but spent their time in training classes for "Socialist revolution" conducted by Cuban instructors. A number of athletes from other unspecified countries followed the same schedule.

HQ OSI COMMENT: (C) (Gp-1) Such events as this competition supplements the vast training program conducted in Cuba. Many of the participants in the 1960 conference of the Communist front World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY) in Havana stayed behind to take part in a "work camp" sponsored by the WFDY in the Cierra Miestras. Attendance at such events may also serve as cover for Party travel and other personnel previously selected for specialized training. The events also served to promote the image of Cuba as a major regional Communist stronghold. (SCIB, Vol XI, #24, 28 November 1962)

OSI COMMENT: (S) (Gp-1) As was noted in the Panama section of this report, one of the Panamanians returning to Panama from the games carried with him a book entitled "Firing Manual" concerned with the care and handling of small arms. (OSI District 30; 30 Nov 62)

A Salvadoran student source has provided detailed information on Cuban instructions and encouragement to pro-Communist Salvadoran students who visited Cuba in October to participate in the First Latin American University Games in Havana. The source, who talked at length with one of the students who had visited Cuba, reported that the Salvadoran group to the games was given special instructions in "revolutionary tactics" on the recommendation of the leaders of the Cuban Union of Young Communists (UJC).

A Cuban military officer lectured the Salvadoran group on various aspects of the revolutionary struggle. He emphasized that in the initial stages all revolutionary groups must be reinforced by the recruitment of persons of "various political views," but that "as the revolution nears victory, all who do not accept Communist leadership can be expelled." He also gave the Salvadoran students advice on preparing for guerrilla warfare in El Salvador. He showed them a large map of Central and South America which pointed out the locations of military forces, key highways and bridges, and also showed the centers of guerrilla activity in several countries. There was another map showing the Panama Canal and large photographs of the locks. Some of the Salvadoran students received special instruction in the use of the Belgian Fal rifles.

The Cuban students had recommended that the Salvadorans give more emphasis to infiltration of the university and of the labor movement in El Salvador. (CIA San Salvador CS-3/529,533 and -536, 27 and 30 November, SECRET/NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

INCOMING TELEGRAM **Department of State**

47

UNCLASSIFIED

Control: 14268
Rec'd: DECEMBER 28, 1962
4:14 AM

DIAAP-3

Action
ARA

Info
SS
SR
G
SP
L
H
CAP
P
USIA
NSC
INR
CIA
NSA
OSD
ARMY
NAVY
AIR

RMR

FROM: GUATEMALA CITY

TO: Secretary of State

NO: 398, DECEMBER 27

FOLLOWING HIGHLIGHTS LENGTHY GOG PRESS RELEASE ANNOUNCING EXPULSION FOUR CUBAN EXILES HONDURAS (WHICH REPORTED SEPARATELY). RECOUNTED HISTORY BEGINNING WITH CUBAN ARMED EXPEDITION PANAMA 1959, AND INCLUDING CASTRO SUPPORTED SUBVERSION, ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES OF CUBAN EMBASSY HERE BEFORE RUPTURE RELATIONS AND TRAINING OF ANTI-GOG GUATEMALANS IN CUBA, WHICH LED TO YDIGORAS GOVERNMENT BEING "FIRST TO REALIZE TREMENDOUS DANGER THAT CASTRO REPRESENTED FOR ALL THE AMERICAS". STATED US AND MANY LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES FIRST MISJUDGED CASTRO AS "LEFTIST DEMOCRACY". DANGER REPRESENTED BY CASTRO FORCED GUATEMALA GO ON OFFENSIVE IN ORDER DEFEND ITSELF BETTER AND LED TO ILL-FATED (NO FAULT OF GUATEMALA'S BUT OF THOSE WHO FAILED GIVE AIR SUPPORT, ETC.) BAY OF PIGS VENTURE WITH US GOVERNMENT. FROM THAT TIME ON CASTRO'S "DEFACTO" GOVERNMENT UNDERTOOK MANY SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES AGAINST GUATEMALA, INCLUDING MARCH-APRIL 1962 DISTURBANCES WHICH COMMUNIQUE CHARACTERIZES AS LED BY UNSCRUPULOUS GUATEMALANS, COMMUNIST-LINERS AND DUPES. AMONG LATTER GROUP THOSE WHO DO NOT WISH PAY INCOME TAX.

CASTRO SPONSORS MANY EXILED GUATEMALANS TOTALING AROUND 27 PERSONS LED BY FORMER PRESIDENT ABENZ. THESE GUATEMALANS FORM GROUP WHICH CALLS ITSELF "GOVERNMENT OF GUATEMALA IN EXILE". COMMUNIQUE THEN RELATES SUBVERSIVE AND PROPAGANDA ATTEMPTS ABENZ AND COMPANY TO CAUSE REVOLUTION HERE AND STATES ARMS AND RADIO BROADCASTS, FORMER COMING TO GUATEMALA FROM BELIZE AND MEXICO. IN ADDITION MANY STUDENTS AND LABORERS BEING TRAINED IN CUBA AND SELECTED ONES SENT TO IRON CURTAIN COUNTRIES. ESTIMATED 600-700 PERSONS TRAINED IN CUBA NOW PREPARING SUBVERSIVE MOVEMENT FOR THE FIRST FEW MONTHS OF 1963. GOG THROUGH SWISS WHO REPRESENT GUATEMALA IN CUBA TOLD CASTRO GOG WOULD RECOGNIZE GOVERNMENT IN EXILE IF CUBANS DID NOT GET RID OF GUATEMALAN EXILES. AS IT ALMOST CERTAIN DEFACTO

DA IN 815779

UNCLASSIFIED

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED".

-2-- 398, DECEMBER 27, FROM GUATEMALA CITY

DEFACTO GOVERNMENT CUBA WILL REJECT GUATEMALAN NOTE AND GIVE INSTEAD GREATER SUPPORT TO GUATEMALAN EXILES, GOG, TAKING A STEP FORWARD TO DEMONSTRATE GOOD WILL, INVITING CONSEJO REVOLUCIONARIO CUBANO MEMBERS TO LEAVE COUNTRY. LATTER GROUP MAINTAINS ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES AND MENACES CUBAN GOVERNMENT WITH IMAGINARY INVASIONS AND MAINTAINS GUATEMALAN PUBLIC IN STATE CONFUSION.

GUATEMALA NEEDS PEACE AND TRANQUILITY. IT HAS ALREADY DONE ITS PART AGAINST CASTRO. NECESSARY THAT OTHER COUNTRIES IN LATIN AMERICA NOW DO THEIR PART. ALSO GOG INFORMED US GOVERNMENT OF MISSILES AND OTHER ARMAMENT IN CUBA EIGHT DAYS BEFORE PRESIDENT KENNEDY MADE OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT.

GOG DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO GIVE THE PEOPLE PEACE AND CALM IN 1963 AND HOPES MEN OF GOOD WILL ON BOTH SIDES NOTE THE TRANSCENDENTAL STEP GUATEMALA TAKING IN GETTING RID CUBANS WHO IN ONE FORM OR ANOTHER ARE CARRYING OUT ACTIVITIES AGAINST THE "DEFACTO" GOVERNMENT OF CUBA. GUATEMALA EXPECTS IN RECIPROCITY PEACE AND TRANQUILITY IN ORDER DEVELOP AND TO ELECT EFFICIENTLY ITS NEW PRESIDENT.

BELL

FB

ACTION: STATE(ARMY ACSI)
INFO : DCSOP, JCS, OSA, USDEL IADB
DA IN 815779

In a report dated 15 November, Canadian Ambassador Kidd in Havana submitted the following analysis of the "Foreign Legion" in Cuba.

"Press publicity abroad about the formation of a Foreign Legion to fight for Castro may have given a somewhat misleading impression of what seems to be involved. At any given time, there are a large number of Communist or fellow-traveling Latin Americans and persons from other parts of the world in Cuba as guests of the government, usually under the auspices of the ICAP (Institute of Friendship for Peoples). Many of these people wished, or were pushed into volunteering, to defend Cuba when the mobilization took place. They were formed into scratch militia squads of no military value, but of some political use.

"We do not know whether their choice was free. We learned that some eighteen Guinean students studying here were mobilized without any opportunity to decline the honour. They seemed somewhat unhappy about the military duties which the scholarships they came to Cuba on had entailed, particularly as they are not Communists but firm supporters of President Sekou Toure.

"A large number of the foreigners who have taken up residence in Cuba since the revolution are true believers of the most fervent kind, and would be pleased with the idea of fighting for the cause (though this is no indication of how they might react to actual combat). Some of the English-speaking friends of Cuba donated blood for the blood bank being formed to succor the wounded; a sacrifice made to the accompaniment of the usual publicity. A number of foreign residents are, of course, enrolled in regular reserve militia units. The Chilean Secretary told us of his rage when a Chilean woman strolled into the embassy with full militia regalia, including a pistol, to claim her mail.

"One would assume that to the extent the Cubans are providing training in guerrilla warfare to Latin American extremists, these trainees would be thrown into any fighting which might develop, but that no publicity would be given to their presence at this time. Persistent, but unreliable sounding, rumours would have it that there are a large number of Africans (usually described as having rings in their noses and ears) being trained somewhere in the island (the province of Matanzas is sometimes mentioned); they have been variously described as Ghanaian, Guinean, and Congolese. I would imagine that the Cubans would be delighted to provide military training to left-wing Congolese dissidents or Angolans, but I have not a particle of evidence that any such people are here.

"The international brigades in the Spanish Civil War occupy an important place in left-wing mythology. It would be quite natural for the Cubans to dream of being able to secure similar support if fighting took place on the island. It seems highly unlikely, however, that foreigners would be brought to Cuba for this purpose in advance and the present rather limited effort seems to involve foreigners who for other reasons happened to be on the island when the crisis broke out." (CONFIDENTIAL)

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10013

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR :
FROM :
TO :

TITLE : CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA

DATE : 00/00/0000
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERRILLAS AND ARMS
EXCHANGE OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/09/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 4, Folder 6. Draft report concerning control of access to and surveillance of Cuba.

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority____
☐ Refer To____
Review Date 12AUG15 By____

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
BY____ DATE 01/14/16

DRAFT SECRET 2 of 9 copies

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

SECRET

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ BrazilAN GOVERNMENT over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew [illegible] scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

f. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Goverment/during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligence Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

S. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports [illegible] on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

198-10007-10021

2025 RELEASE UNDER THE PRESIDENT JOHN F. KENNEDY ASSASSINATION RECORDS ACT OF 1992

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10021

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ICCCA
FROM : CHMN, SUBCMMT ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
TO : MEMBER OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE

TITLE : REPORT FOR JULY-AUGUST ON ACTIONS TAKEN TO COMBAT CASTRO-COMMUNIST SUBVERSION

DATE : 09/30/1963
PAGES : 23

SUBJECTS :
ENHANCEMENT OF INTELLIGENCE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
STRENGTHENING OF COUNTER-INSURGENCY CAPABILITIES
CONTROL OF TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
CONTROL OF TRANSFER OF FUNDS
SURVEILLANCE OF CUBAN DIPLOMATIC, COMMERCIAL AND CULTURAL MISSIONS
CONTROL OF CLANDESTINE MOVEMENT OF GUERILLAS AND ARMS
CONTROL OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN PROPAGANDA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion to the members of the Committee re: Report for July-August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority____________
☐ Refer To____________
Review Date 8/12/2015 By____

#6
File

SECRET

September 30, 1963

TO: Members of Subcommittee on Castro-Communist Subversion.

FROM: Chairman, Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion

SUBJECT: Report for July - August on Actions Taken to Combat Castro-Communist Subversion.

Attached is a draft of the Subcommittee's report for July and August on actions taken to counteract Castro-communist subversion in the hemisphere. The draft has been prepared on the basis of the material which you furnished with certain modification. The CIA member will note that I have extracted from his submission the items of action taken and placed these in the body of the report. The intelligence information contained in the submission I have made into an annex. I think it is very useful to have the intelligence data form part of the report, and request that in the future the CIA member prepare his submission in two parts.

May I have your comments on the draft by close of business October 1, 1963.

Copies to: CIA - Mr. Wheeler (2)
DOD - Col. Haig (2) — #6, #7
USIA - Mr. Wagley (1)
RAR - Mr. Hart (1)
Justice - Mr. Geogheghan (1)

2 Oct 63
M/R Called
Bob Follstad advised OK - Staffed w/
J-3 - Air Staff & Army — Haig

ARA:WGBowdler:jg
9/30/63

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

DRAFT SECRET 6 of 9 copies

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on these flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished by him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba on other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

SECRET

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of theCongress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica ~~has~~ presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Mosco$\overset{w}{a}$ route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least

until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the ~~government of~~ Brazil IAN GOVERNMENT over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubans as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be

returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Havana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed U.S. Missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew sk scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor

indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban government in its efforts to find a short route for return, of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago

urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegates to a preparatory meeting planning for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their citizens to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29-October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba, on a commercial basis, that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the month of July at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which

was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Havana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who particiate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organisations and agencies.

Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 days per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily.

Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and countersubversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

f. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the foreign office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay attention to the information and take action on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident

brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commerical and Cultural Missions.

Central Intelligency Agency

(To be filled in by Mr. Wheeler)

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement of Cuban mission in internal politics of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Reassured President Schick of Nicaragua in the most emphatic terms that the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty did not mean that our attitude toward Castro has altered in the slightest, and stressed our interest in seeing steady progress by all the Isthmian countries in implementing the recommendations of the Managua Security Conference to block Cuban subversive efforts.

d. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in addition to the regular reporting of developments in the hourly newscasts.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIS posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the statement by State Department Press Officer Richard Phillips that "potential subversive agents" from Cuba to the Caribbean area were passing through Gran Cayman, the expulsion of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained terrorists in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of America roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on

three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

GROUP I
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

SECRET

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered Cubana Airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered Cubana plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected

SECRET

to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, are apparently receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina.

Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Juliao to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

In mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. The purchase of arms and supplies and the recruitment of Nicaraguans for a movement against Nicaragua are also reportedly underway in Costa Rica.

Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator, left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, was assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July. He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10022

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO : ICCCA

TITLE : ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION

DATE : 07/18/1963
PAGES : 17

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/08/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 26. Memo from Califano to ICCCA re: the Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion. Also appears in Califano Box 6, Folder 11.

JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority__________
☐ Refer To__________
Review Date 8/12/2015 By Kes

SECRET

July 18, 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 53 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL H. M. ELWOOD, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

References:
a. SecArmy memo, subj: ICCCA: Movement of Subversives and Subversive Trainees, dated 15 Mar 63.
b. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on the Status of Implementation of Actions Approved by The President, dated 20 Mar 63.
c. Spec Asst to Sec Army memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on the Status of Actions Approved by the President, dated 29 Apr 63.
d. Spec Asst to SecArmy memo, subj: ICCOCA: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion, 27 Jun 63.

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During the April-June Period in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 22 July 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions furnished in response to reference d.

OSA, ASG Control No. 1673 Q

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

Future Subcommittee Progress Reports will be prepared on a monthly basis for the previous month's activities and will follow the format utilized in the attached draft. It is requested that appropriate points of contact provide this office (Room 2E-614) by 1600 hours on 1 August 1963 and each month thereafter, a report, in duplicate, on the status of those actions approved by the President and assigned to their respective organizations. Additionally, this report should include any other actions taken to counter Castro subversion.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

SECRET

REPORT OF SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
ON PROGRESS MADE DURING APRIL-JUNE PERIOD
IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

USA, ASG Control No. 1673G

1. The Department of State:

A. Participated in the preparations for and the holding of the Managua meeting on subversion, which was held April 3-4.

B. Headed an inter-departmental team which visited the Isthmian countries to encourage implementation of the recommendations for curbing subversion which were agreed on at the Managua meeting.

C. Prepared a report on the inter-departmental team's suvery of the Central American countries, containing recommendations for further action in this field, and advised affected U. S. agencies and foreign service posts of the guidelines for operation of the military alerting system.

D. Worked in the OAS in drafting a report containing practical recommendations to counteract Castro/communist subversion in the fields of the movement of travel, propaganda and funds, and prepared the ground for a COAS decision to transmit the report to member Governments urging them to implement the recommendations contained therein.

E. Drew official and public attention in Latin American countries to the capture of Peruvians who were returning from Habana by an overland route through Bolivia, and urged the Peruvian Government to make details of this case known to the OAS.

F. Helped publicize the capture of an Ecuadoran subversive who was returning to Ecuador from Cuba by way of Prague with $25,000 in cash on his person, and requested the Ecuadoran Government to make an official report of this matter to the OAS.

G. Sent a U.S. Consul to Gran Cayman to investigate Cuban flights to that island, and secured the cooperation of the Costa Rican Government in preventing the use of LACSA aircraft to transport subversives to San Jose off-landed in Gran Cayman.

H. Approached the British Government various times to seek its cooperation in preventing the use of Gran

Cayman and its other Caribbean possessions as traffic refueling or transit stops for planes flying to and from Cuba.

I. Continued pressure on the Dutch Government and KLM airline officials not to resume KLM flights to Cuba, thus limiting the access to Cuba by Free World airlines.

J. Obtained the cooperation of CMA airline (Mexico) to keep its mail and cargo flights to Cuba on an unscheduled basis and to avoid carrying passengers on the Habana-Mexico City leg of its service.

K. Continued efforts with the Canadian and Mexican Governments to secure their cooperation in preventing Cubans from introducing Russian IL-18's on flights between Habana and their countries.

L. Urged the Brazilian Government not to grant landing rights for Soviet Bloc or Cuban planes servicing Cuba, and continued efforts to keep Brazil from signing a civil air agreement with Cuba.

M. Sought cooperation of various African Governments in preventing the use of African airports as transit points for regular USSR-Cuba air service with TU-114's or as refueling stops for ferrying IL-18's to Cuba.

N. Initiated action to request US-owned and controlled oil companies in the Caribbean and Latin America to refuse bunkers voluntarily to vessels and aircraft in the Cuba trade.

O. Requested the Spanish Government to limit or eliminate service to Cuba by Iberia airlines and Spanish shipping companies.

P. Blocked initiation of an ocean ferry service between Habana and Florida by employing various delaying and obstructing tactics.

Q. Ordered, as of April 1, that all U.S. passports be marked not valid for travel to Cuba to insure that ban on travel to Cuba would be more effectively enforced.

R. Informed the Mexican Government that Americans were not permitted to travel to Cuba without authorization and requested their assistance in preventing U.S. citizens from transiting Mexico en route to Cuba.

S. Instructed posts in Latin America to encourage host governments to take appropriate measures to discourage participation of their nationals in Cuba's May Day celebrations, and to prevent charter flights from their country to Cuba for the celebration.

T. Informed affected governments of the names of their nationals who had returned from Cuba on the Cuban plane which flew the new Cuban Ambassador and his party to Brazil, and suggested that they take this matter up with Brazil. Also called this Cuban action to the attention of the Brazilian Government.

U. Worked through Chilean Government and university circles to block the holding of the Communist-inspired II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for Santiago, Chile in August 1963.

V. Encouraged the President of Honduras to have his immigration officials request clearance from our Embassy in Tegucigalpa before granting visas to Cubans wishing to enter Honduras from Cuba.

W. Encouraged the Benelux and Italian Governments to maintain visa requirements for Cubans travelling to their countries despite Cuba's having done away with visa requirements for their nationals who visit Cuba.

2. The Department of Defense:

A. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba at the same rate and with the same emphasis as existed prior to that date. Between 25 April and 23 May 1963 additional sea surveillance was realized between Cuba and Haiti, due to the stationing of the Caribbean Ready Amphibious Squadron at the entrance of the Gulf of Gonaives occasioned by the deterioration of internal conditions in Haiti.

B. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Due to noncommunication difficulties, the multi-channel radio station scheduled for installation at Managua, Nicaragua by 1 July 1963 will be completed on or about 27 July 1963. Entry negotiations have been completed with Honduras, with the military radio facilities installation scheduled for completion on or about 10 October 1963. Negotiations are continuing in Colombia and Ecuador for the installation of military radio facilities.

C. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U. S. forces, reporting as before, to U. S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of subversive movement, obtained by U.S. surveillance have been made available for immediate transmittal through U. S. military alerting system.

D. Reached agreement with CIA on steps to be taken to prevent duplication of effort in operating a U.S. military alerting system and furnished guidance on this matter to USCINCSO and CINCLANT. After clarification of the role of the U. S. Military Groups by USCINCSO the military alerting system was again placed in operation effective 15 June 1963.

E. Maintained U. S. forces, for the most part from within the Atlantic Command, available to respond to assist in the final interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, upon the request of the country concerned. Currently, forces are assigned by the United Commander involved to meet the singular problem encountered. In somewhat similar circumstances, U. S. forces of Atlantic Command have responded to this requirement in the cases of the Venezuelan ship ANZOATEGUI and the Italian ship CANNA REGIA.

F. Had the U. S. Coast Guard Mobile Training Team (MTT) report for duty in the Canal Zone on 15 May 1963 to perform as a Small

Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT). Members of the SCIATT accompanied by a representative from the staff of Commander U. S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) have completed an in-country evaluation of 40-foot Coast Guard Utility Boats (CGUBs) in five Central American countries and a detailed program through mid-November has been prepared for improving the material readiness and handling of the CGUBs provided by MAP. Action is underway to expedite delivery of spare parts required for maintenance of the boats.

COMUSNAVSO has now initiated a request to establish SCIATT billets with permanent personnel for an initial period of three years in order to fully develop the Central American CGUB program. The success of this program would be a major contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System. U. S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command (USCINCSO) has recommended approval of COMUSNAVSO's request to CNO and action is being coordinated with OSD/ISA, JCS and USCG to obtain approval and appropriate funding for permanent billets.

The 40-foot CGUB permanently assigned to the U. S. Naval Station, Rodman, Canal Zone, for use by the SCIATT has been delivered and is in the process of being activated.

G. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

H. Continued, through its intelligence agencies, work on studies concerning Castro/Communist subversion directed against Latin America.

I. Increased to 12 the number of Latin American countries in which there are intelligence exchange arrangements between U. S. and local military services.

3. The Central Intelligence Agency:

A. Completed efforts to improve U.S. government communications in Latin America by the installation of the remaining two commercial leased circuits into Guatemala City and Managua, and the stationing on a permanent basis of 35 CIA radio operators in Latin America in replacement of temporary duty personnel. In November 1962, CIA's active radio facilities in 20 Latin American capitals were augmented with on-line cryptographic facilities and temporary personnel to handle the bulk of all U.S. government communications in the area. These facilities, known as Joint Communications Centers, are now being operated by CIA on a 24-hour basis, as a service to all U.S. government agencies. Latin American traffic handled by the CIA base radio station near Washington has increased from 3,000,000 groups handled in October 1962 to 15,000,000 groups handled in March 1963.

B. Increased its efforts designed to control the movement of persons, arms and propaganda materials to and from Cuba. A summary of actions by country follows:

1. Argentina - Station, in conjunction with the Embassy, has continued to press the Argentine government to enact effective travel control legislation and to adopt measures recommended by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the OAS. Information on Argentines travelling to Cuba is being furnished to the Argentine government by the station. Several potential travellers to Cuba have been spotted and are being assessed by the station. Information from three recent returnees from Cuba is being obtained through debriefings. Station reports that because of increased Mexican controls, all truly clandestine travel to Cuba from Argentina is now via Prague. The Argentine Security Service has informed the station that mail censorship and customs controls at the docks and airports are 95% effective in preventing the entrance of Cuban propaganda through these channels. Local dissemination of propaganda is regulated by an Argentine inter-agency committee, which reviews any new propaganda items and takes action to stop dissemination of any item judged to be pro-Cuban or pro-Communist. During May the Argentine government issued a new decree which restricts Communist activities within Argentina. The station has continued to press the Security Service to urge regulation of travel to Cuba, but the adoption of such measures has been delayed pending government receipt on an official basis of the OAS recommendations. Through several assets the station is working on leads which it is hoped will reveal the basic sources of illegal arms sales in Argentina.

2. Bolivia - Station has been urging Bolivian government to adopt stricter travel controls, without apparent results so far. Names of travellers known to have returned from Cuba are being furnished to the Bolivian government. Thus far, no action is known to have been taken by the Bolivian government on the strength of such information. Station comments that problem with Bolivia is not in lack of information available to government on Cuban subversion, but in getting Bolivia to do something about it. The station has also furnished considerable information, including some surreptitiously acquired documents, to the Ambassador for his use in urging Bolivian government action against Cuba. Considerable information is also being obtained through the interrogation of Peruvian guerrillas captured attempting to cross into Peru early in June.

3. Brazil - Information on Brazilians who have received subversive training in Cuba has been made available to the National Security Council through CIA liaison with the NSC's Security Service. While the Brazilians have stated that the information is "of interest," there is no firm indication to date that they have the capability or desire to really follow up on the information furnished.

An asset of the CIA station in Rio is in a position to harass and delay Cuba-bound travellers in those instances where the station is able to tip him off regarding their destination. He can also harass returnees when informed in advance. The station is taking steps to get appropriate information to him promptly. The station has indicated that in spite of its increased efforts, there are no indications of any basic change in the Brazilian attitude toward Cuba, and it is unlikely that the Brazilian government will take adequate steps to combat Cuban subversion.

4. Chile - Chilean internal security authorities, at urging of station, are trying to impede and harass travellers to and from Cuba. Government is now requiring passport applicants to state destination, and passports must be turned in after travel. The Foreign Minister has stated much progress is being made, with cooperation of the Mexican government, and that travel of Chileans to Cuba has been dramatically reduced in recent weeks. Station and Embassy are continuing pressure on Cuban government in this regard. Names of travellers to Cuba are being passed to the Ambassador, who furnishes them to President Alessandri (who has asked that this collaboration be kept secret). Information from CIA unilateral operations

against Cuban Embassy is being used by a newly created Chilean surveillance team in checking out purpose of travel projected and in following up on returnees from Cuba. The station has an agent in daily contact with leaders of the extreme militant left and is exploring the possibilities of sending three station assets to Cuba for training and intelligence missions. A Cuban First Secretary was declared persona non grata during April for using false identity documents, and the Cuban charge d'affaires was subsequently recalled by his own government. Two new sources have recently been recruited by the station who are in a position to furnish valuable information concerning not only certain aspects of the situation within Cuba, but details concerning travel to and from Cuba by both legal and illegal means. The station is now in the process of debriefing an asset who recently returned to Santiago after spending one month in Cuba as a trainee. Efforts are being made to have other station assets included in future training programs.

5. Colombia - Chief of Customs has indicated to station his willingness to institute an improved travel control system. Station believes it has identified a courier operating between Colombia and Cuba and has mounted an operation to uncover his Colombian contacts. One station asset is now in Cuba attending guerrilla warfare training, another is being debriefed after his recent return from Cuba, and a third expects to depart soon for two months training in Cuba. The station is continuing to develop leads provided by one recent returnee, and thus far this investigation has involved members of both the Colombian Congress and the Bogota municipal government. A Colombian Civic Action Group, composed of influential local businessmen, which is subsidized and directed by the station, has established an anti-Castro propaganda unit. This group is actively collecting evidence of Cuban subversion in Colombia to support its propaganda campaign.

6. Costa Rica - Local authorities appear to be inclined to cooperate in a program of harassing travellers to Cuba. A station asset in the Costa Rican Security Service has been confiscating the passports of persons returning from Cuba and has cooperated in other ways. One station asset is expected to travel to Cuba soon for training. The "Kennedy Groups," which were organized at the time of the President's visit to Costa Rica, are being encouraged to collect information of all sorts concerning Cuban subversive activities, and to participate in propaganda activities aimed at Cuban subversion. Other station propaganda assets have kept up a

steady campaign against Cuban activities, and the Costa Rican Security Service, at the urging of the CIA station, has destroyed tons of propaganda brought into the country from Cuba.

7. Dominican Republic - Efforts to get Juan Bosch to take active steps against Communists and travellers to and from Cuba have been fruitless to date, as have been efforts to establish a new and effective internal security organization in the Dominican Republic. Bosch appears to have lost his previously stated enthusiasm for such a service, but efforts to persuade him to approve a proposed budget for the service are continuing.

8. Ecuador - Station reports that, largely as a result of both overt and covert propaganda activities of U.S. agencies in Ecuador, the public awareness of Cuban subversion has changed from apathy to genuine concern. The government, however, is no more inclined to take action than before. The National Director of Immigration has stated that he personally would like to do whatever he can to stop travel to Cuba, which he realizes is for subversive purposes, but present laws do not permit him to impede travel via third countries. He is exploring possibilities of reprisals against citizens who return from Cuba. He has checked a list of names and passport numbers obtained by CIA from airline manifests in Mexico, and reports that not one name or passport number corresponds with official Ecuadoran records, indicating the possibility of fabrication of passports by Cuba.

A recent Ecuadoran returnee from Cuba, recruited by the station, lost his hand in testing a homemade bomb made in accordance with instructions received in Cuba. He made a public statement and wide publicity was arranged by the station and USIS. Plans are to keep this incident alive as proof of revolutionary training given in Cuba for terrorist activity in Ecuador.

The station chief has accompanied the American Ambassador on visits to the Ecuadoran Ministers of Defense and Government to stress the threat of Cuban backed subversion.

Approximately 7,000 pounds of Communist propaganda are being destroyed monthly as a result of a unilateral operation of the CIA Base in Guayaquil.

There have been at least two recent cases of Ecuadoran returnees from Cuba being arrested upon their arrival, one of them having been found in possession of a large sum of U.S. dollars, and another allegedly having a plan of revolutionary action found on his person. In both cases the Ecuadoran authorities had been informed of the pending arrivals of these individuals by the CIA station.

9. El Salvador - The station has called to the attention of the Chief of the Salvadoran Security Service the fact that the stamping of passports "not valid for travel to Cuba" is not being done on a regular basis, and received assurance that the Foreign Office and Immigration Police would be reminded of their obligation to do this. The station is embarking on an expanded program of assistance to Department 2 of the Ministry of Defense, which is in fact the Salvadoran Clandestine Internal Security Service. That service has indicated a willingness and desire to combat Cuban subversion, but so far it has lacked both know-how and equipment to do so.

10. Guatemala - The CIA station in Guatemala City has found its efforts in this field hampered considerably by the apathy and disorganization of the Guatemalan government. Early this year the only effective Internal Security Service in Guatemala was disbanded by President Ydigoras, and no adequate organization has been established since the Peralta government came into power. Through unilateral assets the station has been able to keep itself reasonably well informed concerning guerrilla activities and travel to and from Cuba. However, it has been unable to bring about any effective counter Cuban activity on the part of the Guatemalan government.

11. Jamaica - New and more stringent regulations concerning travel to Cuba were adopted by the Jamaican government during May, partially as a result of the urging of the CIA station. The Jamaican Internal Security authorities have shown a willingness to do everything they can to control such travel, and have indicated a high degree of cooperation with the CIA station.

12. Haiti - Because of the continued political crisis in Haiti, the CIA station activities there with regard to Cuban activities have been severely limited and have consisted primarily of checks made by unilateral station

assets who have reported from Cape Haitien, Port de Paix and La Gonave and La Tortue Islands that they were unable to uncover any evidence of travel to or from Cuba. No cooperation between the station and Haitian authorities can be expected under the present political circumstances.

13. Honduras - The CIA station in Tegucigalpa has persistently prodded security elements of the Honduran government in an effort to persuade that government to undertake the actions agreed to at Managua. The government has now begun stamping most new passports "invalid for travel to Cuba." However, revalidated passports are not being so stamped. Station assets have succeeded in publicizing some Cuban subversive activities, including the return of eight leftist labor leaders from a trip to Cuba and the sabotage of a fishing vessel which was being used by anti-Castro Cuban exiles to surveil the northern coast of Honduras. Several alleged Cuban agents are now being held in jail pending legal proceedings against them.

14. Mexico - A CIA source states the Cuban Embassy has continued to issue visas on pieces of paper separate from the passport, but the government's practice of stamping all passports to show travel to or from Cuba has largely nullified this effort by travellers to avoid the stigma of travel to Cuba. All Cubans arriving in Mexico, whether in transit or otherwise must have Mexican visas. This is not true of other nationalities, who need no visa if in transit. The government continues to confiscate propaganda material from Cuba sporadically at the airport. The government recently refused visas to five Cuban doctors who wished to attend a Urology Congress in Mexico. Several station assets have recently travelled to Cuba for intelligence purposes. Through unilateral penetrations of the Cuban Embassy in Mexico City, the CIA station continues to acquire information on types of Cuban visas granted to travellers, as well as some advance travel data.

15. Panama - At the urging of station, the Guardia Nacional has been ordered to increase its vigilance concerning returnees from Cuba and to prevent them from establishing an effective organization. Several recent returnees from Cuba are being debriefed regarding their training and contacts, and several CIA assets are

expecting to leave for Cuba in the near future for training. CIA has increased its personnel assigned to travel control functions at the Panama City airport, now permitting a three-man detail for each eight-hour shift. Station is continuing its pressure on Panamanian officials to tighten travel controls.

16. Nicaragua - The Nicaraguan Security Services with whom the CIA station is in liaison have been cooperative in their efforts to take suitable action based on the Managua resolutions. Cuban activity in Nicaragua appears to be at a minimum, and the government has the will and ability to control it.

17. Peru - Through the cooperation of a Peruvian intelligence organization, CIA officers have been able to participate in the interrogation of several Cuba-trained guerrillas who were recently captured when they attempted to enter Peru near Puerto Maldonado. The interrogation should provide additional data on guerrilla training, Soviet activities in Cuba, and particularly on Cuban support to guerrilla activities in Peru. Further information has been obtained through a unilateral asset of the station who is active in guerrilla activities of the MIR. An investigation of small arms manufacture in a machine shop in Lima is underway at the urging of the station. The station has furnished additional technical equipment to the Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service to increase its capability to intercept clandestine radio communications from Cuba, and partly as a result of CIA station urging, that organization has been able to obtain 12 investigators assigned by another Peruvian internal security service to assist in the investigation of subversive activities in the port areas of Peru. A Communist penetration agent, who is being run jointly by the Peruvian Internal Security Service and the CIA station, has been offered an opportunity to go to Cuba for training. Considerable information concerning the Peruvian MIR plans for financing the acquisition of arms, communications equipment and other information concerning MIR guerrilla activities has been acquired through a unilateral asset of the station.

18. Uruguay - Station has made arrangements with local service to pigeonhole or "lose" applications for good conduct certificates - which are needed to secure passports, and must be renewed every six months - in cases where information from the CIA station or from the Uruguayans'

own sources indicated intention of travelling to Cuba. Pertinent information from CIA unilateral operations is being passed regularly to cooperating Uruguayan officials. Station has a further check in that the Mexican Ambassador to Uruguay is now checking all applicants for Mexican visas with the station. On the basis of information furnished to him, he held up visa applications of Uruguayan Communist Labor delegates who planned to attend May Day celebrations in Havana. Creation of this bottleneck may force some travellers to abandon the Mexican route to Cuba and turn to the longer and far more expensive route via Prague. Information on past travel to Cuba by Uruguayans, furnished by the station, was included in a study of Cuban subversion prepared by Uruguayan Military Intelligence Service for the National Council of Government.

19. Venezuela - Travel information from the Caracas Airport is now being received on a daily basis by the CIA station. Venezuelan internal security officials have indicated a strong disposition to take all possible steps to repress Cuban subversive activities. The station has been passing pertinent information from unilateral sources to appropriate Venezuelan officials and, in some instances, action has been taken in accordance with the stations's request. Four Venezuelan officials have been trained in covert mail intercept techniques by a CIA technician and one additional Venezuelan security official is now undergoing training in the United States in the field of police administration, clandestine operations and audio surveillance. Venezuelan student teams, operating under the control of the CIA station, are intensifying their efforts to spot and recruit members of extremist youth groups who are likely to be sent to Cuba for training purposes.

4. The U.S. Information Agency:

A. Issued a detailed information policy guidance to all its Washington media divisions on March 28 setting forth the basic themes to be followed and types of materials to be developed in exposing Castro-Communist subversive activities in the hemisphere. This was followed on April 3 by a circular instruction (USIA CA-2819) to all USIS field posts in Latin America urging each to stimulate local press and radio attention to evidence of Cuban-based subversion and to report promptly local developments, official comment, and editorials, for cross-play to other countries.

B. Broadcast over Voice of America a total of 26 features and commentaries on the subject of Cuban-based subversion in its Spanish-language transmissions to Latin America during the three month period. This was in addition to regular reporting of developments on the subject in the Voice's hourly newscasts. Prominent attention was given to the Managua Ministers Meeting, the OAS reports of the Special Consultative Committee on Security and the Lavalle Committee, the capture in Bolivia and Peru of Cuban-trained guerrillas, the discovery of a subversive plot in Ecuador, and terrorism and counter-measures in Venezuela. Special features included editorial round-ups from the Latin American press on subversion, a dramatization of an incident in Ecuador, a chronology of subversive acts involving Cuban diplomats, and a history of subversion. In the usual Voice of America practice, these features and commentaries were sent to USIS field posts in tape recordings after short-wave broadcast for placement on the hundreds of local medium-wave stations in the area.

C. Transmitted by teletype through its press service a total of 33 articles on Cuban-based subversion during the three-month period to USIS posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local press. These included news stories, commentaries, and backgrounders on essentially the same developments which were treated by the Voice of America. The Agency's Information Officers in each country were provided with copies of the OAS reports for use in their personal contacts with press and radio personnel. A pamphlet based on the letters from the Guatemalan ex-communist leader Carlos Manuel Pellecer to Castro and Khrushchev in which he revealed communist subversive tactics was developed by the Agency's publications center in Mexico for reproduction and distribution throughout the area. Work was completed also on a cartoon book, The Despoilers, the story of two young Cubans who tour the communist bloc encountering oppression and food shortages and return home to find the same conditions developing in their own country. The cartoon book is being distributed in over a million copies throughout Latin America.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10007-10029

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : CIA
FROM : C. TRACY BARNES
TO :

TITLE : REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

DATE : 06/25/1953
PAGES : 15

SUBJECTS :
RADIO BROADCASTING - CIA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 04/03/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 2. Memo from Barnes re: Report on the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☑ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority__________
☐ Refer To__________
Review Date 12AUG15 By

6

S E C R E T
Security Information

25 June 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: (See distribution below)

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

1. We have made a complete survey of the use of radio broadcasting in the cold war mission of CIA. The essential parts of the report and recommendations are contained in the attached memorandum dated 15 May 1953 and entitled "Report On the Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA". (Operational information and other sensitive matter contained in the original, but deleted from the attached, will be separately supplied where appropriate to the interested area divisions.)

2. The policy outlined in the attached memorandum has been approved by the Deputy Director for Plans, who has directed the following actions:

a. Undertake, in collaboration with each area division, a country by country analysis of all indigenous broadcasting and television systems for the purpose of devising plans for their penetration, where feasible, or an explanation where it appears not to be feasible.

b. Develop and submit, in collaboration with the appropriate personnel and training offices, a plan for the recruitment and training of officers qualified for covert broadcasting operations.

c. Explore with the State Department the possibilities of a joint undertaking to exploit fully, in the interest of efficiency and economy, material derived from escapee interrogations and other intelligence sources, covert as well as overt, to support all U.S. propaganda efforts.

d. Develop and recommend, in collaboration with area divisions, an improved method for the issuance and dissemination of policy guidance to the field.

e. Prepare and submit, in collaboration with General McClelland, a project to produce broadcasting devices capable of electronic intrusion into Communist broadcasts; to develop special techniques for their use; and to continue research and development of other unconventional methods of broadcasting suitable to our mission.

3. Chief of Operations,

S E C R E T

3. Chief of Operations, DD/P, has authorized the circulation of the attached material with the request that you cooperate in the carrying out of the DD/P's directive. Particular attention is called to item 2. a. above.

4. Mr. C. Lloyd Egner, assisted by Mr. Stanley P. Richardson, have been assigned the responsibility for staff coordination of these matters on behalf of CPP and will be available to you for assistance in planning and supporting broadcasting operations.

/s/ C. Tracy Barnes

C. TRACY BARNES
Chief
Political and Psychological
Warfare

Attachment
As stated above

Distribution
DD/P - 1
ADCO - 1
Chiefs, All Areas - 1 ea.
Chiefs, Senior Staffs - 1 ea.
C/TC - 1
PP/C/OPS - 1
PP/CPY - 1
PP/C/PAD - 1
PP/Mr. Egner - 2
RI - 1

15 May 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: CHIEF, POLITICAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

SUBJECT : Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting by CIA

Attached hereto is our report on CIA radio broadcasting as a cold war weapon. It is grouped into the following sections:

1. Section 1, Page 1, deals with RADIO AS A MEDIUM IN THE COLD WAR. It shows in the main that the countries having the most to fear from Communism are doing the least to counter its radio propaganda.

2. Section 2, Page 2, deals with CAPABILITIES. It embraces a discussion of the techniques available to CIA.

3. Section 3, Page 3, discusses broad TARGETS and appraises our current and planned activities against them.

4. Section 4, Page 4, deals with the principal PROBLEMS peculiar to covertly directed broadcasting, and their solution.

5. Section 5, Page 10, contains RECOMMENDATIONS for a body of principles to govern over-all CIA policy in its present and future activities in this field.

(For a detailed statement of present CIA radio broadcasting assets, reference is made to CPY to CPP memorandum of 25 February 1953, entitled "Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting Media", TS 86889.)

(The original "Report On The Cold War Use of Radio Broadcasting By CIA," from which this document is excerpted, was dated 15 May 1953, TS 88465.)

(The data on broadcasting hours by countries was obtained from FBID and VOA, that on available receivers from OSI/ORR and VOA, and that on Soviet jamming transmitters from ONE.)

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

Attachment, as stated.

PP/CLE:ha

15 May 1953

REPORT ON THE COLD WAR USE OF RADIO BROADCASTING BY CIA

1. Radio As a Medium in the Cold War

a. The USSR and its satellites, including China, broadcast to countries outside the Orbit 1,395 hours per week of aggressive psychological warfare.

b. The free world responds with 1,015 hours per week.

c. This gives the enemy a numerical advantage of approximately seven to five. In reality, the Communist advantage is much greater because of their successful interference with free world broadcasts to the Orbit through jamming and the penalties they impose on their own peoples for listening to foreign broadcasts. It is estimated that these measures reduce the effectiveness of free world broadcasts to the Orbit by as much, if not more than, 50 percent. An illustration is that the Communists devote an estimated 900 transmitters to the jamming of free world broadcasts. There is no jamming of Orbit broadcasts to the Western world, nor any restrictions on listening to them.

d. Only the English speaking world holds its own numerically in the over-all radio war with the Orbit. VOA, BBC and Canada together broadcast 238 hours per week against the Orbit; whereas the Orbit countries combined direct 222 hours per week to English language audiences in North America, the United Kingdom, and the Pacific area.

e. In the rest of the world, the balance is drastically in favor of the Communists. They broadcast 1, 173 jam-free hours to all other countries around the world in multiple languages, compared with a mere 264 hours broadcast to all Orbit countries by non-English speaking nations of the free world.

f. Of the total of 1,015 broadcast hours beamed by all the free world to the Orbit, CIA, through TPTCNIC and other quasi-clandestine stations, broadcasts 513 hours, or more than half, in the name of exiles from Communist dominated areas.

g. The greatest disparity in effort is most noticeable in Western Europe. France, which receives 89 hours of broadcasts per week from the Orbit as a whole, responds with only 35 to the Orbit. Italy receives 97 hours from the Orbit but broadcasts only 44 to it, Spain 94 to 12, Greece 89 to 9, Turkey 34 to 7. Even relatively aggressive Yugoslavia receives 194 broadcast hours from the Orbit against its output to the Orbit of only 89 hours.

h. The one-sided

h. The one-sided contest is even more marked in a comparison of the broadcast output of the USSR alone, without the satellites, against Europe. It subjects Spain, Greece and Italy together, for instance, to 140 hours of broadcasts per week. The combined broadcasts of these three countries to the USSR, however, number only 19 hours per week. France and Turkey who, together, receive 64 hours per week from the USSR, make no broadcasts at all to the USSR.

i. Appendix I gives a compilation by country or area of the international broadcasts to and from USSR and the satellites. It shows that the Communists are outslugging the free world, and that Western Europe, in particular, is doing far less than it should in the radio propaganda battle with the Orbit.

2. Capabilities

Several techniques are available to CIA for the use of radio broadcasting in its covert psychological warfare mission.

a. Overt international broadcasting on fixed frequencies under cover of covertly controlled emigre groups. This technique normally would be calculated to reach wide audiences by means of high power and the use of multiple frequencies; but it invites heavy jamming, is costly and presents security, control and political problems in the acquisition and maintenance of suitable bases and frequency allocations.

* * * * * * *

b. Quasi-clandestine broadcasts in the name of notional or "captive" resistance movements using relatively low power and employing a frequency switching technique to evade jamming. This technique presents more manageable security and control problems, delivers a signal in spite of jamming and costs less than high power, but it places a burden on listeners and presents special problems in avoiding interference with broadcasts of friendly countries.

* * * * * * *

c. Subsidization of overt nonpolitical, but anti-Communist, religious broadcasts. * * *

d. Through covert penetration and/or support, the manipulation of free world domestic broadcasting systems for the purpose (1) strengthening their anti-Communist broadcasts to the Orbit and/or (2) influencing them to more aggressive anti-Communist, pro-Western attitudes in their domestic services.

This technique lends itself naturally to clandestine operations. It requires a minimum of U.S. personnel, presents no

problems concerning

problems concerning bases and management, and requires relatively small investments and expense. It would be advantageous beyond the immediate PP field. In such a post an agent could observe communist infiltration, spot forthcoming political changes by observing changes in government propaganda directives, recruit agents with reliable cover for other covert undertakings and cooperate in planning for denial of the facilities to an enemy in the event of hostilities.

We believe it should be the agency's established policy to carry out such penetrations wherever opportunities offer or can be created. A glance at the world map is sufficient to indicate the immensity of this field of potentialities, both as concerns the countries on the peripheries of the USSR and Communist China in Europe, the Near East and Far East; and in Latin America as well. We propose that an immediate start be made, in cooperation with Area Divisions, on a country-by-country survey of possibilities in this area and that action be taken to achieve penetration wherever this study indicates it may be feasible.

* * * * * * * * * * *

e. Use of purchased or free time through covert channels on existing radio systems in friendly countries. * * *

f. Electronic penetration of enemy broadcasts. /Example--the "Ghost" Voice operations of World War II./ This technique is discussed in para 5.c.(6) below.

g. To exploit the amateur /"ham"/ broadcasters, large numbers of whom exist in Russia. * * * A project is being drafted to explore the possibilities of this technique.

h. Broadcasting from airplanes. This has been carried out experimentally in two areas with disappointing results due primarily to operational and equipment limitations which make for limited audience coverage at best. It is, moreover, very costly and also presents special security problems. It is not recommended, except for possible hit-and-run operations. Airborne transmitters might be used on occasion to simulate messages from agents inside the USSR or satellites. This is a deception technique rather than broadcasting but should, we believe, be explored.

3. Targets in order of importance, with estimate of Adequacy of present Projects

a. USSR.--Radio is the only consistent medium for piercing the Soviet iron curtain. It is estimated that there are approximately 4,000,000 receiving sets in the USSR, of which 75 to 80 per cent are believed to be equipped with frequency bands capable of receiving foreign shortwave broadcasts. Virtually all of them readily receive long and medium wave signals. Not all of these receivers are

in the hands of

in the hands of private individuals, however; and the number of those having access to shortwave receivers is estimated to be constantly decreasing due to Soviet efforts to increase group listening by means of wired networks. Nevertheless, it would appear that there will be a sizeable potential audience for foreign broadcasts in all three wave bands for some time to come. One indication of this is the fact that at present the USSR is broadcasting approximately 900 hours per day over 160 transmitters in 26 or more languages to its own people. Many of these transmissions are to areas and over frequencies which lie within our transmitting capabilities.

Our assets for exploiting this potential audience, including projects still in the planning stage, are far from adequate.

b. Communist China.--Like the USSR, the Communist government of China relies heavily on radio broadcasting for communication with the people. It utilizes more than 50 national and regional stations for this purpose, operating chiefly on medium and long wave but to some extent, also, on shortwave. * * *

* * * * * * * * * * *

c. European Satellites.--The preponderance of CIA broadcasting efforts are centered on this area. * * *

d. The Free World.--Many countries afford opportunities for relatively inexpensive exploitation by covert penetration of indigenous broadcasting systems and use of free or purchased time. * * * (See Para. 2.d.)

4. Problems of Covert Broadcasting

a. Cover

(1) a radio transmitter that can be heard cannot be hidden. Put another way, there are no known methods for concealing from technical monitors the geographical source of broadcasts, although the non-technical listening public can be and often is deceived. Cover for broadcasting operations, therefore, presents a formidable problem. Autonomous emigre organizations, which offer the most credible cover, generate factionalism as well as control, security and management problems. /These difficulties could, however, be minimized by positive agency control through a compartmentalization which separates the cover organization from program and transmitting operations and lays down strict requirements on security, budget control, and high professional standards./ See Chart, Annex II.

(2) Religious broadcasting presents few cover headaches, but is of doubtful propaganda value.

(3) The best cover

(3) The best cover is afforded by covert penetration of friendly systems, (a Western European nation talking back to USSR, etc., as discussed in 2.d. above).

(4) Commercial broadcasting cover presents some possibilities in the free world but none for broadcasting to the Soviet Orbit.

b. Bases

(1) Because governments object to providing bases for aggressive psychological warfare which they do not influence or control, it is difficult to find bases in areas suitable for broadcasting to the Orbit. Furthermore, adequate broadcasting facilities take time to plan, build, and staff and long tenure is therefore important. However, the political climate of a country can change abruptly, with resulting uncertainty as to length of tenure. Munich, for instance, which once furnished an excellent base for a variety of broadcasts targeted to the Orbit, appears to be becoming less and less satisfactory.

Cover and control problems are closely related to this. A base for a secure and competently managed operation should be less difficult to obtain than for a loosely organized one.

(2) Seaborne transmitters offer much in mobility but, antenna limitations restrict their effective power. As in the case of the VOA COURIER, stationary antennas on land are required for maximum effectiveness. Thus, the political problem becomes the same as for land transmitter bases, and costs in investment and maintennance are considerably higher than land based operations. Moreover, the difficulties of providing credible cover for a covert seaborne operation are manifest. While this office will continue to study VOA experience in this field, it sees no prospect of any agency use for it.

(3) The VOA presently controls numerous broadcasting bases and are developing additional bases, in areas of the world suitable for our purposes. The necessary agreements with host countries have already been negotiated; power, housing, transportation and other logistics have been provided. The present management of VOA are sympathetic to sharing these bases with CIA. In addition to the saving in cost, this would furnish us secure areas for transmitters with the minimum of housekeeping problems. If the difficult but not insurmountable problem of cover can be resolved, such locations would be ideal for our purposes.

c. Information Support

(1) To supplement available normal news sources, broadcasting to Orbit countries is dependent for program material

upon intelligence

upon intelligence reports, interrogation of defectors, escapees and exiles, indigenous newspapers and a regular flow of intercepts from enemy broadcasts. These are indispensable to credible, interesting, and timely broadcasts. Despite our vast potential resources and large U.S. expenditures in these fields, the effective "take" is far from adequate, rarely timely, and unnecessarily costly. FBID, VOA, and several others monitor the same foreign broadcasts to extract the same or similar information. Several U.S. agencies interrogate the same exiles for PW information, whereas a single interrogator, trained in PW needs, could supply most, if not all, the requirements not only for all radio but all other PW activities better and faster. A cleared consultant, on behalf of one of our more successful operations, produced on abundance of excellent support information and evaluation data. The same data, properly sterilized and speedily disseminated, could equally serve the VOA and any other covert or overt PW effort targeted to the same area.

This complex problem needs a high level decision by State and CIA and the appointment of a small team of officers experienced in both PW and interrogation work with power to devise an effective and efficient program to exploit our rich resources.

d. To Deliver a Signal That Can Be Heard

(1) Soviet jamming of propaganda broadcasts raises serious questions concerning our ability to deliver a signal that can be heard above the jamming. To be sure, some of our broadcasts get through because they are unable simultaneously to jam broadcasts in all areas nor do they in practice jam a given broadcast transmission at all hours.

For future planning purposes, however, these factors seem clear:

(a) Soviet capabilities for jamming are large and on the increase.

(b) The degree of their jamming seems to be related to their estimate of the harmful effect of the broadcasts on their interests. Hence, the more effective parts of our propaganda are likely to be jammed even though other parts get through.

(c) We have no present capabilities to monitor their jamming if they use--as they probably do in congested areas--low-powered local jammers.

(2) Prudent planning would, therefore, require that any substantial future investments by CIA in radio broadcasting transmitters include provision for all possible techniques to ensure our broadcasts being heard to the maximum in spite of jamming.

(3) What techniques

(3) What techniques are available to meet this requirement?

(a) To deliver a signal of such power as to be heard above the jamming. Here we are at a disadvantage in that a low-powered and inexpensive local jammer is capable of rendering unintelligible a signal of substantially higher power from a distant point. The greater the power of our transmitter the more complicated the installation and the more expensive the investment. And the more difficult becomes the cover and security problems as well as the political considerations involved in base negotiations. Since the enemy is not required to equal our power with his jammers, we would therefore be fighting a losing battle if we attempted to "slug it out" on a power basis only.

(b) Jamming evasion through the device of varying the frequency has so far proven to be an effective means of laying down a signal that can be heard clearly despite jamming. This method requires constant dial changing by the listener and must assume therefore a desire on his part to hear the program sufficient to overcome the annoyance of dial twisting. When used in combination with appropriate programming techniques and the use of two or more frequencies simultaneously this has so far proven to be the most effective means of jamming avoidance.

Such frequency shiftings cannot be accomplished within the legal rules laid down for international broadcasting. These must, therefore, be "black" broadcasts in the sense that they can be credibly denied by our Government as well as the government of the host country. The movement at will through various frequencies produces an annoying interference for the listeners to broadcasters to whom those frequencies are legally assigned. This interference, while fully justified in the case of USSR and satellite assigned frequencies, must be avoided in the case of frequencies assigned to our friends.

Our broadcasts using this technique have so far avoided annoyance to friendly countries by the use of very low power. This limits us to a small part of the total Soviet Orbit target and that only on the periphery. The same techniques can be used with higher power and at greater distances from the target. To avoid interference with friendly nations' broadcasts the base must be located in an area which, with the proper antenna adjustments, permits our signal to "skip" over the territory of friendly countries in its path. An example would be that, given a transmitting base in Saudi Arabia for broadcasts to the USSR, the facility would have to be engineered so that its signal would not interfere with local broadcast reception in Turkey and other friendly countries in between.

(c) The development of unconventional broadcasting

techniques for

techniques for the penetration of enemy domestic radio broadcasting services might well enable us to overcome the handicaps imposed by the jamming of our conventional broadcasts to the Soviet orbit and seize the cold war initiative in the radio sphere. It is a field which has been neglected thus far.

Some possibilities in this area are described in the "Project Troy" report of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (Vol. IV, Annex 26) of 1 February, 1951.

Among them is the "intrusion," or "side-band injection," technique which was used successfully by the Russians against Germany during World War II. It would enable us to intrude our own propaganda messages into radio programs being broadcast on enemy home channels. It would enable us in effect to talk to the Soviet, satellite and neutral radio audiences over enemy facilities or compel the enemy to disrupt his own broadcast service in an effort to prevent it. It could also be used in turning Soviet propaganda broadcasts to Western Europe to the advantage of our friends. The Troy report observes as to the technique itself:

"This would be an effective and annoying technique which would be extremely difficult to counter."

Utilization of this technique appears to be within our capabilities at the moment. It has been field tested and is ready for use as soon as the necessary technical adaptations can be made to conventional transmitters. The time and cost involved in mounting a facility for utilizing this technique is now being explored by ADCO at the suggestion of this office.

Another unconventional technique being developed by an agency consultant and now almost ready for field testing is the so-called "cuddling" device. This operates on the theory that we can transmit an interfering signal into an orbit domestic radio service which will cause the listening audience to shift to our nearby program in endeavoring to tune out the interference on his own home program.

Other unconventional means of carrying the cold war to the Orbit by means of clandestine radio might be capable of invention and development, and the scientific and practical potentialities in this field should be explored to the utmost.

This office is convinced that emphasis must be placed more and more on unconventional radio broadcasting techniques if the cold war of the air waves is not to become more one-sided than it already is in favor of the Communists. Properly developed and utilized, those techniques already perfected or in the process of perfection and those which might be invented might even be

the means of

the means of shifting the whole radio propaganda war balance in our favor. They would be indispensable in the event of hot war. We, therefore, are impressed with the necessity of developing our capacities in this direction to the utmost and proceeding immediately with the covert procurement of bases and equipment needed for the task.

To recapitulate, it would seem desirable for CIA to limit its present and future conventional radio broadcasting acitvities to the absolute minimum and that any new undertakings should provide:

1 A maximum transmitter power of 100,000 watts capable of accommodating:

2 Built in jamming evasion capabilities; and

3 Built in unconventional broadcasting capabilities.

4 Bases in secure and protected areas which permit the use of the jamming evasion technique without interference with friendly countries. A study of base possibilities is now being made by this office.

e. Lead Time

(1) (a) Radio broadcasting facilities cannot be created over night. From the time that plans are finally approved, it takes 12 to 18 months to design, construct and install a transmitter. Prior to such approval time is required for the planning cycle, negotiation for bases, the staffing problem, etc.

(b) Deep cover penetration of existing radio stations or systems likewise require time for development .

(2) All in all, it would be prudent to estimate that upwards of two years are required from the conception of a project for broadcasting and its implementation. Hence, the planning must be long-range. It is not possible to improvise broadcasting capabilities for targets of opportunity, such as Stalin's death.

f. Control and Management

(1) Control by CIA of the substance of broadcast and the management of broadcasting operations should be absolute and through officers directly responsible to agency control.

(2) The doctrine of compartmentalization should be strictly enforced. No one, excepting the handful of technicians required

to operate

to operate a transmitter, should be allowed near the transmitter site. The delivery of tapes, etc., should be through a cutout. Likewise, the studio and programming activity should be separated from the operation of the transmitter as well as from any other activities of the cover organization. If two or more language groups use the same facilities they should be compartmented from each other.* * * *

(See Para. 4.a.(1))

g. Evaluation

(1) In the Preliminary Survey of Radio Broadcasting (25 February 1953--TS 86889) attention was called to the need for a continuing evaluation of all radio broadcasting operations with particular reference to coverage and impact, and sources for the essential information were outlined.

(2) PP/OPS, in collaboration with this office, has initiated this much-needed undertaking.

h. Personnel

(1) There is a shortage of professional and technical personnel qualified for covert radio broadcasting. A program of selective recruitment should be undertaken in coordination with any plans for new radio projects.

(2) A training program in covert broadcasting techniques should also be initiated. This training should be undertaken in safe houses by detail of qualified instructors from covert training for basic indoctrination; to be supplemented by area instruction by the area desks and specialized radio training by Commo. and this office.

5. Recommendations

Pending clarification of CIA's future responsibility in the cold war we have made certain assumptions as to the criteria which should govern agency activities in radio broadcasting.

Our thesis is that CIA should use radio broadcasting in covert Psychological Warfare only under the following conditions:

a. That the task cannot be performed by VOA or other overt media.

b. That any contemplated operation follow strict concepts for clandestine operations, including

(1) Positive and direct agency control of both management and policy.

(2) Strict security requirements including compartmentation of all elements of broadcasting operations.

(3) Maintenance of

(3) Maintenance of sufficient cover to permit credible denial of official connection by U.S. or host country government.

c. That no direct broadcast operation be undertaken by CIA until every possibility has been exhausted to have the task undertaken by another country (or countries) through penetration, manipulation and/or control of, or covert purchase of time on, indigenous radio facilities.

Our foremost objective should be to exploit the broadcasting systems of friendly and neutral countries. This generally is possible in two ways:

(1) To stimulate our friends to greater aggressive effort in their international broadcasts to the Soviet orbit; and

(2) To influence the output of the domestic services of friendly and neutral states in the interests of the Western cause.

Within this frame of reference we made the following recommendations:

(1) Proceed to exploit the many possibilities to use indigenous radio systems in friendly and neutral nations with the objectives of (a) increasing the amount and effectiveness of their propaganda efforts against USSR and the satellites, (b) exposing and inhibiting Communist fifth column activities and (c) the maintenance of pro-U.S. and pro-Western attitudes.

These missions should be undertaken in closest collaboration with the USIS missions to the end that all that can be accomplished overtly.

(2) Undertake a recruitment and training program to make available highly qualified and thoroughly indoctrinated officers preferably with natural cover to undertake and to support such missions.

(3) In cooperation with State, develop a positive program for information support of all propaganda activities through maximum use of intelligence and defector sources.

(4) Strengthen and streamline the machinery for policy guidance, with Washington headquarters responsible for broad policy only and the field missions to be given the widest possible latitude in the application of those policies to local requirements and the exploitation of targets of opportunity. A mature staff officer experienced in P.W. should be available in the mission to (a) feed propaganda lines, (b) expedite P.W. support (c) coordinate with USIS

and (d) generally

and (d) generally backstop the operation.

(5) Establish machinery for evaluating the substance, coverage, impact and management of radio operations.

(6) Proceed with the development of capabilities to electronically intrude upon and otherwise exploit the Communist radio broadcasting to their own and foreign audiences. It is important to have these facilities reacy at the earliest possible date for possible use in the cold war--Not to have them available at the outbreak of hot war would be a tragic mistake.

* * * * * * * * * * *

/Note: Recommendations with respect to specific targets have been transmitted to the appropriate divisions./

(10) A small staff element should be created to supervise CIA planning and operations in covert radio broadcasting. This staff should be instructed to expedite the implementation of the above recommendations and provide a continuing review of CIA Policy and Program for the use of this Media.

/s/ C. Lloyd Egner

C. LLOYD EGNER

15 May 1953

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10008-10119

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO : CAPT. ZUMWALT ET AL

TITLE : ICCCA: ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION

DATE : 10/14/1963
PAGES : 20

SUBJECTS :
COUNTERSUBVERSION PROGRAM
TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO CUBA
CUBAN SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1A; 4
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 06/01/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo No. 71 from Joseph Califano with attached report of Subcommittee on Subversion.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 15AUG15 By________

NO STATE OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
BY____ DATE 01/15/16

SECRET

14 OCT 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 71 FOR CAPTAIN E. R. ZUMWALT, JR., USN (OSD)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL W. K. JONES, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America

Attached is the final report of the Subcommittee on Subversion on Actions Taken During July-August 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Attachment
As Stated

Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)
cc: DIA (Col Nigra)
Mr. Califano
Lt Col Haig
ASG

[illegible] 2386G

SECRET

REGRADED UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED
FROM CLASSIFIED INCLOSURES

File

SECRET This document consists of 18 pages
No 13 of 44 Copies, Series A

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION:

ACTIONS TAKEN DURING JULY-AUGUST 1963

IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA, ASG Control No. 23866

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

1. Control of Travel to and from Cuba

Central Intelligence Agency

a. Developed highly useful information on frequency of Cuban "chartered" flights to Brazil, names and nationalities of passengers and crew, and lax measures of control followed by Brazilian authorities. Transmitted this information to station chiefs in the Latin American countries of the non-Brazilians travelling on those flights.

b. Maintained close watch over travel to and from Cuba. See Annex B for table of known travel of Latin Americans during July and August.

c. As a result of information furnished to him by the CIA Station in Buenos Aires and with the Station's urging, the Argentine Minister of Interior indicated that he would make every effort to prevent Argentine delegates from attending the International Union of Architects Congress in Havana.

d. At the urging of the CIA Station and the Embassy, the Bolivian Minister of Interior issued in mid-July an order prohibiting the granting of travel permits to Cuba or other bloc countries to Bolivian nationals.

e. Partly as a result of the efforts of the CIA station in Santiago, the Government of Chile prohibited the entry into Chile of organizers of the Cuban-sponsored Second Latin American Youth Congress, which had been scheduled to take place in Santiago in August. This was one of the factors which led to postponement of the Congress.

f. After considerable prodding by the CIA Station and the Embassy the Minister of Public Security of Costa Rica presented legislative proposals to the Costa Rican Assembly which will require all persons intending to travel to Communist countries to have their travel approved by a newly created Costa Rican security agency.

g. CIA Station in Mexico City developed information concerning the clandestine arrival of passengers in Vera Cruz on Cuban merchant ships. Efforts are being made to obtain more information and to encourage stricter controls by the Mexican authorities.

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Conakry to try to persuade Guinean authorities to deny use of airport facilities by flights on Habana-Moscow route. These efforts achieved a temporary withholding of permission for future regular flights, at least until such time as the Soviets develop their own refueling facilities at Conakry.

b. Instructed Embassy Rio to approach Brazilian authorities to express our deep concern at the growing frequency of Cuban non-scheduled flights to Brazil and request their cooperation in curbing them. Also instructed our Embassies in several Latin American countries to work with CIA station chiefs in furnishing the names of nationals of those countries travelling on these flights to local authorities and urging them: (1) to institute tighter controls on their own citizens travelling to Cuba, and (2) to express their concern to the Brazilian Government over Cuban use of Brazil as a way station for transporting subversives.

c. As a result of representations made to the British Government about Cuban flights to the Cayman Islands carrying Latin American subversives, the British developed an administrative scheme which will effectively prohibit the use of British Caribbean dependencies by Cubana as transit points for passengers. The British intend to require transit visas of passengers passing through their areas, and to reject applications for such visas except in certain special cases. Persons not possessing visas would be prevented from leaving their aircraft, or would be returned to their point of origin.

d. Instructed Embassy Mexico City on August 29 to inform the Mexican airline CMA that the United States is opposed to a proposal that CMA operate charter flights to carry refugees from Habana to Central America. CMA, as a result, stated that they had no intention of proceeding further with this project.

e. Instructed our missions in Curacao and the Hague to investigate a report that KLM was planning to renew scheduled Curacao-Habana flights and to reiterate US opposition to resumption of air service to Cuba. KLM assured our Embassy that there is no plan to initiate service, scheduled or non-scheduled, to Habana.

f. Instructed Embassy Ottawa to express our strong objections to a proposal that a Cubana charter flight pick up a second group of U.S. students in Montreal to fly them to Cuba. The flight was not authorized.

g. Instructed Consulate Georgetown to investigate Cubana approaches to secure flight facilities. Mission reported on August 1 that the Governor had no knowledge of any talks between the B.G. Ministry of Communications and the Cuban Government regarding landing rights for Cubana planes. The Governor indicated his intention to inquire further and to keep us advised. London reported that neither the Cuban nor the British Guiana Governments had raised the issue of landing rights with H.M.G.

h. Urged the governments of Mexico, Canada, Jamaica and the Netherlands to refuse to assist the Cuban Government in its efforts to find a short route for return of the 58 American students who illegally travelled to Cuba. Also informed Pan American Airways that we were opposed to a Cuban request for a PAA charter flight to fly the students from Habana to New York.

i. Instructed our missions at Port of Spain and Barbados on several occasions to approach these governments to express the concern of the U.S. at indications of Cuban interest in the use of their aviation facilities.

Embassy Port of Spain discussed with the Foreign Secretary of Trinidad various legal moves available that would enable

GOTT to control movements of aircraft within their territory, citing examples of such controls instituted by Mexico, Canada and Ireland. He indicated receptiveness to the proposal that the list of suggestions be made available to the aviation officials concerned.

j. During a previous reporting period Embassy Santiago urged the government of Chile to refuse visas to Cuban delegated to a preparatory meeting for the II Latin American Youth Congress scheduled for August in the Chilean capital. Inability of Cuban delegates to obtain Chilean visas for this meeting is one of the contributing factors to the Cuban sponsors announcing during August that the meeting had been postponed.

k. Sent general instructions to our missions in countries which participate in the International Union of Architects asking them to urge the cooperation of governmental authorities in preventing or discouraging the attendance of their nationals to the VII UIA Congress in Habana, September 29 - October 4, 1963. Followed this up with instructions to individual posts to try where feasible to dissuade architects from free world countries from serving on the jury for the selection of a Bay of Pigs monument.

l. Urged Canadian Government to block a plan to commence food parcel shipments to Cuba on a commercial basis that would have required the establishment of scheduled weekly charter flights by Canadian planes.

2. Control of Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Central Intelligence Agency

Responding to the urging of the CIA Station, police of the State of Guanabara seized large quantities of propaganda brought into Brazil by passengers on the special Cubana flights. For example, some 50 pounds of printed propaganda was taken from the various passengers who arrived on the 16 August Cubana flight.

3. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Department of Defense

a. Continued surveillance of the area surrounding Cuba during the months of July and August at the same rate and with the same emphasis as prior to 1 July 1963.

b. Continued to maintain U.S. Forces, primarily from within the Atlantic Command, available to assist other Caribbean governments in the interception of suspicious craft in territorial waters, as might be requested. No such requests were received from any other government during the period covered by this report. However, U.S. Forces did keep track of the location of the Soviet merchant freighter MITCHURINSK, which was suspected of carrying subversives and arms from Cuba to British Guiana in mid-July. MITCHURINSK was under U.S. surveillance from its departure from Habana until United Kingdom forces assumed the task of keeping this ship under surveillance upon its approach to Georgetown, British Guiana. Subsequently, British police search of MITCHURINSK in British Guiana waters revealed nothing of a suspicious nature.

Central Intelligence Agency

At the repeated urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the Peruvian Government late in August published a new anti-terrorists law providing a penalty of no less than five years imprisonment for persons who participate in guerrilla activities or in the illegal manufacture of weapons or explosives.

The Peruvian National Intelligence Service is working on a lead furnished by the CIA Station in Lima concerning a 200 ton vessel reportedly involved in arms traffic.

Department of State

Instructed our Consulate General in Georgetown to investigate reports that commercial cargoes (which could conceal illicit arms traffic out of Cuba) had developed between British Guiana and Cuba. Investigations to date have been negative.

4. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

Cooperated with the Foreign Assets Control Office of the Treasury Department in developing blocking controls with respect to Cuba which went into effect on July 9, 1963.

5. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Continued the installation of military communications facilities in Latin America. Operational dates for the multi-channel radio stations to be installed in Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras have been delayed to 15 October 1963 and 15 December 1963, respectively because of new engineering and contractual requirements. Negotiations are continuing with Colombia and Ecuador for installation of U.S. military radio facilities. Completion of a new commercial trans-isthmian cable in the Panama Canal Zone within the coming month is expected to improve military communications within the United States and the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command.

b. Continued the surveillance of Cuba by U.S. Forces, reporting as before to U.S. commanders, organizations and agencies. Reports of surveillance have been disseminated to all who have a requirement to know.

c. Established a 24 hour per day, 7 day per week duty watch at the U.S. Military Groups in the Caribbean countries in conjunction with implementation of the military alerting system. Continued efforts to staff the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center with properly cleared, trained personnel (this center is the military focal point for relaying information concerning the movement of subversives). Filled, partially, the authorized billets in the U.S. Southern Command Intelligence Center and took under consideration the problem of an increase in the billet structure in the Center. The Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command together with his intelligence officer visited Honduras and Nicaragua and determined that no significant problems existed which would interfere with effective operations in those countries.

d. Action previously initiated by the Commander, U.S. Naval Forces, Southern Command (COMUSNAVSO) to establish a Small Craft Inspection and Training Team (SCIATT) as a contribution to the Caribbean Surveillance System is progressing satisfactorily. Permanent assignment of U.S. Coast Guard personnel to SCIATT in the Canal Zone has been approved and the U.S. Coast Guard has taken appropriate implementing actions.

e. During the period of this report, the SCIATT conducted an on-the-job training course at Puntarenas, Costa Rica. Training was given to 13 members of the Guardia Civil of Costa Rica who were either newly assigned to the 40 foot Coast Guard utility boats (CGUBs) or were to be assigned as replacement crew members.

f. A quarterly inspection and evaluation of the CGUBs provided other Central American countries was conducted during the period 17 to 31 August by a mobile training team (MTT) made up of SCIATT personnel.

g. Continued efforts to improve the internal security of Latin American armies through the provision of Intelligence Advisors. Presently there are such advisors assigned to 14 Latin countries, emphasizing counterintelligence and counter-subversion.

h. During the reporting period MTTs conducted training in counterinsurgency for the armed forces of Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and El Salvador.

i. Civic Action MTTs were sent to Guatemala, Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Jamaica and Ecuador.

6. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations throughout Latin America continued in a great majority of countries to furnish to the local internal security organizations with whom they are in liaison information concerning travelers to and from Cuba, as well as such information as came to CIA's attention concerning the movement of funds, arms and propaganda material. In many instances, the furnishing of information to the internal security service by the CIA Station was paralleled by the furnishing of similar information to the Foreign Office by the Ambassador or his representative. The response to this information has varied greatly. The Central American countries, in general, began to pay greater attention to the information and act on it. At the other extreme, the Brazilian Government during the reporting period showed little inclination to follow up on the information.

Department of State

a. Reiterated to the Foreign Minister of Peru our interest in having the facts of the Puerto Maldonado incident brought to the attention of the OAS, and urged that this action be taken as soon as possible.

b. Urged the Government of Guatemala to submit evidence of communist activity to the OAS.

7. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

Department of State

Instructed Embassy La Paz to follow up closely on charges of involvement by the Cuban mission in internal policies of Bolivia, and, at the Embassy's discretion, to point out to Bolivian officials the opportunity for a possible break in relations with Cuba. Embassy La Paz was not able to press for a break when the evidence of Cuban intervention did not prove to be as conclusive as originally reported.

8. Other Special Actions

Department of State

a. Obtained action by the COAS on July 3 on the Lavalle Committee Report transmitting the document to the governments and urging them to implement the specific and general recommendations contained therein as soon as possible.

b. Through Embassy Managua informed the Nicaraguan Government of the matters which we wanted to have considered during the informal meeting of the Ministers of Security and Interior of the Isthmian countries held in Managua, August 26-28 in preparation for the second formal meeting of the Managua Security Conference countries later this year.

c. Explained in detail the nature of the Cuban threat and the related policy objectives of the U.S., during conversation in London and in Washington with Mr. Adam Watson, newly appointed British Ambassador to Cuba.

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service during the reporting period transmitted 12 articles, commentaries, and backgrounders on its wireless file service to USIA posts throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers and the Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America carried a total of 28 commentaries and features on the subject of Cuban-based subversion. These stories were designed to alert people in Latin America to the dangers of this subversion.

b. In response to standing Agency instructions to give special attention to developments related to Cuba-based subversion, USIA posts in Latin America were prompt in reporting incidents and in providing editorial comments from the Latin American press, all of which was used in the Agency's radio and press output.

The main developments treated in the Agency's radio and press coverage included Castro's July 26 speech urging revolutions in Latin America, the discovery of terrorist weapons factories in Guayaquil, the Ecuadorean Vice President's accusation of Cuban responsibility for terrorism, the Cuban use of Grand Cayman as a way station for subversive elements from Cuba, the expulsion from the University of a Bolivian youth leader for receiving funds from Cuba, Castro-trained guerrillas in Honduras, and Bolivian protests against meddling by the Cuban Embassy in the miner's strike. A Voice of American roving reporter in Latin America provided several reports on the subversion picture in countries he visited.

c. In support of the Agency's effort on Cuban-based subversion, the publications center in Mexico began work on three pamphlets during the period based on Castro's report of his visit to the Soviet Union (showing that he contradicted himself in some of his extravagant claims of Soviet progress), the losses suffered by Cuban labor under Castro, and the fate of political prisoners in Cuba. When completed, these pamphlets will be reproduced and distributed in quantity throughout the area.

ANNEX A

CIA Intelligence Annex

1. Travel to and from Cuba

Brazil

Chartered *Cubana* airlines flights between Cuba and Brazil have become a major means of transporting non-Cuban Latin Americans to and from Cuba. The five such flights since late July have carried nearly 400 non-Cubans.

The first of the recent series -- on 25 July -- brought 71 Latin American passengers to Havana for the 26 July celebrations. The other four flights -- on 15, 22, 28 and 29 August -- transported over 200 Latin Americans to Brazil from Havana. Some of the aircraft involved returned to Cuba with smaller numbers of passengers. Many of the 200 Latin American passengers had been delegates to the 26 July ceremonies, but others had apparently been in Cuba for longer periods and some had probably received training there. Of the passengers on these four flights to Brazil, 75 were natives of Caribbean area countries. Their circuitous travel through Brazil was evidently designed to help conceal the fact that they had been in Cuba.

Costa Rica

Two Costa Ricans were among the passengers on a chartered *Cubana* plane which was turned back to Havana at Grand Cayman on 11 July 1963. One was Luz Marina Hernandez Salazar, the only Costa Rican woman known to have been sent to Cuba for training as a guerrilla warfare instructor. She had been in Cuba since September 1962. The other Costa Rican passenger was Carlos Guillen, former head of the Costa Rican Society of Friends of the Cuban Revolution, who had been in Cuba since November 1962.

Ecuador

The CIA Station in Quito reports that the military junta, which assumed power in Ecuador on 11 July, can be expected to follow the guidance of the Embassy and the Station in controlling travel to and from Cuba and the Soviet bloc. The activities of Cuban subversives in Ecuador, at least for the present, have been greatly inhibited by the mass arrests of Communists and pro-Cubans and by the outlawing of the Communist Party by the junta.

Honduras

It is reported that the Honduran Communist Party has issued orders to its members not to attempt to travel to Cuba at the present time. This action is apparently the result of the increasing vigilance of the Honduran government and the greater implementation of stricter travel controls.

2. Movement of Cuban Propaganda

Guatemala

According to an unconfirmed report received in July, a Bureau of Information of the Communist Party of Guatemala is being formed in collaboration with Prensa Latina and is to be managed clandestinely. It expects to receive news by shortwave radio from Cuba and print bulletins for distribution by radio stations. This may indicate a pattern by which Prensa Latina will attempt to distribute on a more clandestine basis in other areas in Latin America.

Honduras

It was reliably reported that in mid-July 1963, a small coastal freighter landed 14 large boxes of Communist propaganda on the northern coast of Honduras, the boxes having been transferred at sea from a larger vessel. The report has not been confirmed.

3. Movement of Guerrillas and Arms

Argentina

Extremist members of the Peronist Party, apparently under the leadership of such figures as Hector Villalon and John William Cooke, were reported to be receiving encouragement and promises of large sums of money from Cuba in support of their efforts to train and organize subversive groups in Argentina. Villalon has stated that his plan calls for expanding and accellerating subversive activities in Argentina culminating in a complete take over within two years. There is no indication that Peron himself has agreed to this plan. It has been reported that leaders of the Communist Party of Argentina have been greatly annoyed by the tendency of the Castro regime to support the revolutionary Peronists without having consulted the Communist Party of Argentina.

It is reported that the so-called Army of National Liberation (ANL) of Argentina, which is a relatively small Castroist organization directed from Cuba by John William Cooke, has in recent weeks been negotiating for the purchase of arms and has been offered submachine guns, bazookas and other weapons by two or three private suppliers. It was reported, however, that the ANL was having difficulty getting enough dollars from Cuba to make significant purchases possible.

Bolivia

The Bolivian Ministry of Foreign Relations on 23 August protested formally to the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires in La Paz against the Cuban Embassy support to the miners during the recent crisis. Subsequently, however, Foreign Minister Fellman informed the Cuban Chargé that he need not fear that the Government of Bolivia would break diplomatic relations with Cuba. There has, in fact, been no hard information linking the Cuban Embassy with the present mining crisis in spite of some unconfirmed reports of Cuban support.

Brazil

Cuban Ambassador to Brazil, Raul Roa Kouri, is reported to have attempted to encourage peasant league leader Francisco Julio to revitalize the leagues in northern Brazil. According to some reports efforts are being made to unify the leadership and bring dissident elements under the general direction of Juliao. Other reports indicate that, although the Cuban Embassy is providing guidance and possibly financial support to the movement, it had not yet resolved the internal dissension in the leagues.

Colombia

From Colombia reports have been received of increasing Cuban assistance, primarily in the form of training courses by instructors who have been trained in Cuba, to the Worker-Student-Peasant Movement (MOEC). A small guerrilla band encountered by the Colombian army in July 1963 was broken up when five members of the band were killed and two others captured. A small quantity of arms and a considerable amount of books and pamphlets on revolutionary warfare, photographs of Fidel Castro, Camilo Cienfuegos and Mao Tse-tung, and bulletins of the MOEC were found at the camp site. Recent reports have indicated an increase in the terrorist efforts of the MOEC and increased promises of assistance from Che Guevara with regard to the training of additional MOEC members.

Costa Rica

There have been a number of unconfirmed reports alleging small-scale training of revolutionaries on Costa Rican territory for guerrilla activity in Nicaragua. For example, in mid-July an increased number of guerrillas were reportedly being trained in Costa Rica by Adolfo Garcia Barberena, well-known Nicaraguan revolutionary leader and member of the FLN (National Liberation Front -- a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaragua revolutionary group). In early August, Alberto Serrato, leader of the FLN in Costa Rica, (reportedly left with a group of Nicaraguans for the Costa Rican-Nicaraguan border. Another report indicated that Hector Bogantes Zamora, Costa Rican agitator was supposed to have left San Jose in mid-August for the Nicaraguan border to supervise the passage of Nicaraguan guerrillas from Costa Rica into Nicaragua. Bogantes, who recently returned from attending the May Day celebrations in Cuba, is said to have been assigned this responsibility by the Costa Rican Communist Party.

So far as we know, the GON, which is normally well-informed and highly sensitive to such activities on its borders, has not made any complaints or otherwise signified concern or awareness of these reported activities.

Honduras

The Honduran armed forces began to move against a group of pro-Castro guerrillas operating against the Nicaraguan Government and active in the vicinity of the Nicaraguan-Honduran border. The Nicaraguan National Guard has been conducting operations on its side of the border against the insurgents since July. The dense jungle and difficult terrain, however, will impede the efforts of both forces to eliminate the guerrillas.

Information on the guerrilla force is scanty and conflicting. It is apparently composed of members of the National Liberation Front (FLN), a Communist-dominated and Cuban-supported revolutionary organization active primarily in Honduras and Nicaragua since the fall of 1962. The strength of the force is not known.

Nicaragua

A captured guerrilla of the FLN (National Liberation Front - a Communist-dominated, Cuban-supported, anti-Nicaraguan group) confessed that he was a member of a group of 46 who entered Nicaragua from Honduras on 22 July.

He said that their mission was to establish a base camp in the Isabella mountains, Department of Jinotega, in order to indoctrinate the peasants and to train them in guerrilla tactics. He admitted that he had received six months' guerrilla warfare training in Cuba and that other FLN leaders had received similar training. He also said that the FLN training camp in Honduras was near El Lagarto, on the Patuca River.

4. Transfer of Funds

British Guiana

In British Guiana, Guiana Import-Export Corporation (Gimpex) received a one million dollar advance payment deposited by the Cuban Alimpex Corporation for goods to be delivered to Cuba in the future. Gimpex has, in turn, loaned this money to the Government of British Guiana. Cheddi Jagan's People's Progressive Party is the major stockholder in Gimpex. Mohammed Kassim, Manager of Gimpex, has indicated that Gimpex will be able to secure additional loans from Cuba in amounts sufficient to tide the Jagan government over any foreseeable crisis. It was also reported that Gimpex plans to buy aircraft, spare parts and other machinery in the United States for reshipment to Cuba.

General

Reports continue to be received from many places indicating that the suitcase full of currency is still one of the most common methods used by the Cubans for transmitting funds for use in supporting subversive activities throughout the hemisphere. Instances where such funds have been confiscated by the police have occurred recently in El Salvador, Panama and Ecuador.

ANNEX B

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM C U B A - JULY 1963

NATIONALITY	JULY		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	6	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	14	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BRAZIL	25	0	26th of July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	0	0	
CHILE	20	1	26th of July Celebrations. A returning Chilean Diplomat
COLOMBIA	29	1	26th of July Celebrations.
COSTA RICA	12	0	26th of July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	37	0	26th of July Celebrations.
ECUADOR	2	0	26th of July Celebrations.
EL SALVADOR	4	1	26th of July Celebrations.
GUATEMALA	6	0	
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	0	
JAMAICA	33	1	30-Football team. 3-to 26th of July Celebrations.
MEXICO	65	28	26th of July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	5	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PANAMA	15	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	3	0	26th of July Celebrations.
PERU	4	0	
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	17	15	26th of July Celebrations. Most attending will remain to work.
VENEZUELA	22	0	26th of July Celebrations.
TOTALS	319	47	

SECRET

Annex C

SECRET

KNOWN TRAVEL OF LATIN AMERICANS TO AND FROM CUBA - AUGUST 1963

NATIONALITY	AUGUST		PURPOSE OF TRIP TO CUBA
	TO	FROM	
ARGENTINA	4	0	26th July Celebrations.
BOLIVIA	5	3	
BRAZIL	0	24	22-Returning from 26th July Celebrations.
BR. GUIANA	7	10	Herder Institute in Leipzig.
CHILE	22	47	8-Physical Ed. Seminar - 1-Seeking funds - 10-Returning from 26 July Celebrations.
COLOMBIA	6	14	
COSTA RICA	0	8	26th July Celebrations.
DOM. REP.	1	8	
ECUADOR	0	2	
EL SALVADOR	1	0	
GUATEMALA	3	0	1-Study at University of Sofia.
HAITI	0	0	
HONDURAS	0	8	
JAMAICA	0	2	
MEXICO	34	63	26th July Celebrations.
NICARAGUA	0	0	
PANAMA	6	0	26th July Celebrations.
PARAGUAY	0	0	
PERU	2	9	9-Returning were members of (MIR) who received guerrilla training.
TRINIDAD	0	0	
URUGUAY	10	16	26th July Celebrations.
VENEZUELA	3	0	26th July Celebrations.
TOTALS	104	214	

SECRET

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form
Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10009-10098

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : ARMY
FROM : JOSEPH A. CALIFANO, JR.
TO : MULTIPLE

TITLE : ICCCA: REPORT ON STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF ACTIONS DESIGNED TO COUNTER SUBVERSION

DATE : 11/26/1963
PAGES : 19

SUBJECTS :
ICCCA - SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION
CUBAN SUBVERSION
RESTRICTIONS ON TRAVEL TO AND FROM CUBA
SUBCOMMITTEE ON CUBAN SUBVERSION

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 2, Folder 25. Memo from Califano to Wheeler, Sloan, Alger, Wendt, Carpenter, Quilter re: attached paper concerning status of implementation of actions designed to counter Cuban subversion.

JFK Review
Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority________
☐ Refer To________
Review Date 8/19/2015 By

SECRET

26 NOV 1963

MEMORANDUM NO. 81 FOR GENERAL EARLE G. WHEELER (JCS)
MR. FRANK K. SLOAN, Dep Asst Sec/Def ISA (Regional Affairs)
MAJOR GENERAL J. D. ALGER, USA
REAR ADMIRAL W. F. A. WENDT, USN
MAJOR GENERAL J. W. CARPENTER, III, USAF
BRIGADIER GENERAL C. J. QUILTER, USMC

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Report on Status of Implementation of Actions Designed to Counter Subversion (U)

Reference: DA Memo #64, subject as above, dated September 19, 1963

Attached herewith is a final draft of the Report to the President of the Subcommittee on Cuban Subversion on Progress Made During September 1963 in Curbing Cuban Subversion in Latin America.

It is requested that comments, if any, be provided this office by 1200 hours, 2 December 1963. The Department of Defense portion of subject report is based on submissions provided in response to referenced memorandum.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
General Counsel

Enclosure
As Stated

cc: Mr. Yarmolinsky (OSD)

Lt Col Haig
Mr. Califano
ASG

OSA, ASG Control No. 2707H

SECRET

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

DRAFT
11/13/63

SECRET

REPORT OF THE SUB-COMMITTEE

on CUBAN SUBVERSION

ACTION TAKEN DURING SEPTEMBER 1963 IN CURBING CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

SECRET

OSA, ASG Control No. 2207H

DRAFT
11/13/63

I. Control of Travel to and From Cuba

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Tunis to call to the attention of the Foreign Ministry our concern at increased evidence of Aeroflot attempts to establish North Africa routes to Cuba, especially through Algeria, and our conviction that Tunisia has a valid case in thwarting any Bloc civil air penetration of Africa.

b. Instructed Embassy Conakry to contact Guinean Government officials, reminding them of their past assurances that no Aeroflot flights to Cuba would be permitted to use Conakry facilities, and to express our concern at recent indications that Aeroflot was preparing to establish service to Cuba via Conakry.

c. Instructed Consulate Fort au France to investigate and report on alleged landing and refuelling of Cubana aircraft at Guadeloupe. Also double-checked directly with the Shell Company, the supplier of the fuel. Instructed Embassy Paris to query the French Government about alleged Cubana use of the Guadeloupe facility, and to express our concern at this evidence of Cuba's attempt to use French Caribbean dependencies for flights to and

From

from Latin America.

d. Instructed Embassy Rio to make a new approach to the Brazilian Foreign Ministry to express our concern at Cuba's continuing use of "charter" flights to Brazil and the laxity of Brazilian officials in the control of passengers. During the course of the month the Brazilian Government began tightening controls against Cubana flights. Specifically, all requests for landing permission were henceforth to be processed by the Foreign Office, with appropriate delays. Also tighter passenger, crew and cargo controls were to be instituted when a Cubana flight is permitted to use Brazilian facilities.

e. Determined that the U.K. had specifically warned Cubana that no aviation fuel was available in Barbados and that H.M.G. would, in the future, respect Shell Company's decision to deny fueling to Cubana planes.

f. Continued inter-Departmental efforts to prevent resumption of ferry service between Cuba and the U.S. which a British citizen, Harold Derber, has been attempting to establish during the past several month.

g.

g. Instructed Consul Georgetown to investigate and report on evidence the Department received which indicates that Cuba is planning to sell merchant vessels to British Guiana in order to facilitate the establishment of regular service for passengers and cargo.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. In connection with the Seventh Congress of the International Union (UIA) held in Habana September 29 - October 3, 1963 the Buenos Aires Station:

(1) encouraged the Argentine National Federation of Architects to oppose Argentine attendance at the Habana meeting, with the result that 25 of the 39 practicing architects who had planned to attend cancelled their participation;

(2) arranged to prevent the attendance of any officially authorized Argentine delegation at the Habana meeting, but encouraged the attendance of an official Argentine delegation of anti-Communist coloration at an international architects meeting to be held in Mexico in October;

(3)

(3) delivered a memorandum to the Minister of Interior concerning Cuban charter flights to Brazil which supported the Ambassador's request that the Argentine government express concern over such flights.

b. Rio de Janeiro Station continued to furnish the Embassy with data on Cubana flights to Brazil used in representations to the Brazilian Foreign Office. Also induced Rio airport officials to impose stringent passport control and baggage efforts. These efforts contributed to the Brazilian Government's failing to issue landing permits for Cubana flights on September 21, 24 and 25, 1963 forcing their cancellation. When Cubana, because of harassment at Rio, began using the landing facilities in Sao Paulo where controls were non existent, CIA initiated and obtained a local liaison agreement for similar harassment in the event of future Cubana flights to Sao Paulo.

c. Mexico City station inspired a press campaign of hoof and mouth and smallpox epidemics in Cuba, prior to the Architects Congress to discourage participation in the Habana meeting. The resulting quarantines and

innoculations

innoculations were a factor in discouraging 52 of the 60 Mexican professional architects who were expected to go to Habana from attending the Congress.

II. Control of Movement of Propaganda

Measures to counter act

III. Control of Clandestine Movement of Guerrillas and arms

Department of State

Made the necessary arrangements through Embassy Tegucigalpa with the Government of Honduras for the dispatch of three U.S. helicopters to give logistical assistance to the Honduran Army in its effort to locate and eliminate the band of guerrillas allegedly operating in the Patuca River area along the Honduran-Nicaraguan border.

Department of Defense

Three OH-13 helicopters from USSOUTHCOM supported Honduran armed forces conducting counter-insurgency operations in the Patuca River area. A total of 27 sorties were flown resulting in delivery of 3928 pounds of supplies, evacuation of 12 sick Honduran soldiers, airlift of 19 passengers to points in the operational area, and recovery of 400 pounds of supplies from the operational area.

IV.

IV. Control of Transfer of Funds

Department of State

a. Instructed Embassy Mexico City to inform the Mexican airline SAESA that their proposal to purchase surplus Cuban aircraft would in fact result in the accrual to Cuba of a significant amount of hard currency, and the U.S. would have to oppose the transaction. Further, if dollars were involved in the purchase, it would be a violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

b. Informed Department of Treasury, Foreign Assets Control Office, of the activities of Somondelp Enterprises, a Miami firm engaged in sending remittances to persons in Cuba in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.

c. Instructed Consulate, Belize to inform Mr. Richard Joyce, an American national, that his commercial transactions with Cuba were in violation of the Cuban Assets Control Regulations and that he is prohibited from engaging in such trade.

V.

V. Strengthening of Counter-Insurgency Capabilities

Department of Defense

a. Thirteen Latin American officers graduated from the counter-insurgency Operations Course of the U.S. Army School for Latin America in the Panama Canal Zone on 20 September. During the month, a total of 91 Latin American officers enrolled in courses stressing counter-insurgency at the Army Canal Zone school.

b. Eight U.S. Army counter-insurgency mobile training teams were providing training to the Armed Forces of five Latin American countries during the period. U.S. Air Force counter-insurgency training teams were in two countries.

c. In the Canal Zone, 15 students from five countries were under instruction in the operation of coast guard utility patrol craft used for coastal surveillance. Six students from two countries were undergoing similar training in the UnitedSStates

d. A U.S. Navy counter-insurgency training team is in Venezuela to assist in improving the security of oil installations in Lake Maracaibo.

e.

e. Costa Rica and Honduras were provided one Cessna 185 aircraft each for medical civic action and internal security purposes.

f. On May 25, 1963, three H-43B KAMAN helicopters were provided to the government of Colombia on a 90-day loan. The Colombian Government requested an extension of the loan and a 90-day extension has been approved.

Central Intelligence Agency

Guatemala

a. Guatemala City Station has recruited, on a trial basis, a former member of the 13 November guerrilla group and debriefings are in process. Negotiations continue with the Government of Guatemala for the formation of a new internal security service.

b. Lima Station has agreed to furnish the Peruvian Investigations Police (PIP) with an outboard motor to increase their patrol capability on rivers crossing the Bolivian frontier. Our information is that the rivers crossing this frontier have provided the primary avenues for recent attempts to gain clandestine entry of personnel and weapons into Peru.

VI.

VI. Exchange of Intelligence on Cuban Subversion

Department of Defense

Engineering installation work continued on radio stations for Managua, Nicaragua and Tegucigalpa, Honduras. No further progress has been made in reaching agreements with Colombia and Ecuador for rights to establish radio stations in those countries. Installation of the new trans-isthmian commercial cable in Panama is nearing completion.

Central Intelligence Agency

CIA Stations continued their exchange of intelligence information with local intelligence Agencies. The following actions are of special significance:

a. The CIA Station in Buenos Aires furnished the Argentine State Intelligence Service (SIDE) with information on the travel of Argentines to Cuba, and requested that SIDE provide name traces and debrief these travellers on their return whenever feasible. SIDE provided the traces, but did not conduct any debriefings. The Station has not felt it feasible to try to remedy this omission in view of the personnel changes expected within SIDE after the new government is installed on 12 October.

b.

b. As a result of information passed by the Bogota Station to the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) concerning Colombian travellers to Cuba, a number of passport violations have been discovered in which travellers to Cuba are using passports issued to other persons. There is a reluctance, however, on the part of the Colombian Government to prosecute this type of violation.

c. At the urging of the CIA Station in Lima, the National Intelligence Service (SIN) instructed one of its penetrations of leftist groups to campaign for a trip to Cuba in order to receive guerrilla warfare training. This asset has been offered, and has accepted, an opportunity to make the trip by the Leftist Revolutionary Movement (MIR), primary vehicle of Cuban subversive activities in Peru. Briefing and debriefing of the asset will be done by the SIN.

The Peruvian Naval Intelligence Service (PNIS) has, in response to the efforts of the Station in Lima, sent one of its agents to Chile where he will sign aboard a Chilean freighter calling at Habana. The asset has been given specific intelligence requirements to fulfill.

The

The Prime Minister and Minister of Government and Police has requested from the CIA representative in Lima any information that he might supply on subversive elements posing a threat to the Government of Peru. This request has opened an additional channel to the highest level of the Government with a concomitant prospectfor effective action when needed.

d. Through regular liaison channels, the Venezuelan General Directorate of Police (DIGEPOL) has been provided by CIA with the names of all Venezuelans known to have travelled to Cuba from February through August 1963. This activity will be carried out on a continuing basis; the names are now being integrated into the regular watch list kept at international airports in Venezuela. Thus far, at least three returnees have been arrested on the basis of the information supplied to DIGEPOL. DIGEPOL has indicated its appreciation of the data being supplied and desires that the arrangement be continued.

VII. Surveillance of Cuban Diplomatic, Commercial and Cultural Missions

No special actions to report.

VII.

VIII. Other Special Actions

United States Information Agency

a. The Agency's press service transmitted seven articles relating to Cuban subversion on its wireless file service to USIS offices throughout Latin America for placement in the local newspapers. Developments reported in these articles included demands by the Bolivian Senate for the ouster of the Cuban Chargé d'Affaires, terrorism and government counteraction in Venezuela, the seizure in Ecuador of an arms and explosives cache reportedly received from Cuba, several articles on the International Union of Architects Congress in Habana (emphasizing the intent of the Castro regime to use the Congress as a forum for its propaganda claims), and Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech in which he pointed out the regime's affinity for Chinese communist doctrine and its continued emphasis on violent revolution and subversion. In all, the press service transmitted 27 articles and commentaries during September on the subject of Cuba, the other articles dealing for the most part with economic and political conditions inside the country as evidenced by the regime's own admissions and the reports of refugees.

b.

B. The Voice of America Spanish broadcasts to Latin America during September carried a total of 20 news analyses, commentaries, press round-ups, and interviews related to the subject of Cuban subversion. Some of the developments treated included the following:

A commentary on communist embassies as channels for subversion; a news analysis on the U.S. students who visited Cuba; Assistant Secretary Martin's Los Angeles speech; a news analyses on Cuban subversion as an obstacle in the normalization of U.S.-Soviet relations; a three-part series on university autonomy in Latin America; a feature on the letter of a Colombian student who went to Cuba on a scholarship and was disillusioned by the communist indoctrination; a commentary on Che Guevara's recent article on revolutionary strategy; and a commentary on guerrilla training in Cuba. Many of these items were repeated several times in the broadcasts. The "Rendezvous with Cuba" hour carried four or five commentaries ~~from Cuba~~ and interviews nightly on economic and political developments inside Cuba. Of special note, the Cuban radio and Castro himself reacted angrily to Voice of
A America broadcasts about Che Guevara's article and to commentaries that Cuba had accepted an agricultural role in

the

the communist bloc and had postponed its plans to industrialize.

c. On September 27, the Agency issued a circular instruction to allits Latin American posts urging greater attention to opportunities for publicizing Cuban-stimulated subversion, suggesting the various types of information activities to support this effort, and requesting monthly reports of field actions taken to implement the instruction. This was done as a follow-up to the original instruction on Cuban subversion which was issued April 3, 1963.

Central Intelligence Agency

a. CIA in Brasileassisted in the defection and exploitation of a Cuban athelete Roberto Perez Ondarse in Porto Alegre on 4 September 1963. Perez was a member of the Cuban basket-ball team which participated in the World University Games (FISU) held in Porto Alegre Brazil in early September 1963.

b. Assistance was given to the Government of Guatemala in the interrogation of some of those who were arrested in connection with the Communist Party documents that were confiscated in late May 1963.

Only

Only one of those interrogated admitted to any involvement with the captured documents, the Communist Party, guerrillas, or anything else that could be construed as incriminating. The one who did admit knowledge denied that he was involved in any way. The Government of Guatemala wants to interrogate this person again at a later date.

c. CIA Station in Montevideo arranged for an interview between an Uruguayan military intelligence officer and a recent defector from the Montevideo Cuban Embassy during which extensive information regarding Cuban subversive activities was revealed. The Uruguayan officer prepared a report containing this data and presented it to the National Council of Government which has been slow to indicate concern over communist subversive activity in Uruguay. As a result of this report, the NCG has directed the Minister of Interior to appoint a special commission to study the problem of Communist subversion and to make recommendations as to what course of action should be taken by the Uruguayan Government. Should the Government wish to press for passage of

stronger

stronger anti-subversive legislation the Station has taken steps to prepare Uruguyan public opinion by planning simultaneous local press releases of the salient features of the defector report with similar press reporting in the United States where the defector willbe brought to light.

JFK Assassination System
Identification Form

Date: 6/24/201

Agency Information

AGENCY : ARMY
RECORD NUMBER : 198-10009-10099

RECORD SERIES : CALIFANO PAPERS

AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

Document Information

ORIGINATOR : MULTIPLE
FROM :
TO :

TITLE :

DATE : 02/00/1963
PAGES : 153

SUBJECTS :
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS
SITUATION IN LATIN AMERICA
PRESIDENT'S REPORT - SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA - 1962
CUBAN SUBVERSION
SOVIET MILITARY FORCES IN CUBA

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : Secret
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : Redact
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/15/1998

OPENING CRITERIA :

COMMENTS : Califano Papers, Box 1, Folder 9. Multiple papers re: classified/secret Congressional testimony concerning Cuban subversion in Latin America, Cuban military buildup, Soviet military weapons in Cuba, etc.

JFK Review

Department of the Army EO 13526
☒ Declassify ☐ Exclude ☐ Exempt
Authority__________
☐ Refer To__________
Review Date 6/19/2015 By

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II

NO.	SUBJECT:	DATE:
1.	Statement by LtGen Joseph F. Carroll, DirDIA before the Cmte on Foreign Affairs, HR, WashDC	Undated
2.	Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis	7 Jan 63
3.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	11 Feb 63
4.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	12 Feb 63
5.	SecDef testimony before House Appropriations Cmte	13 Feb 63
6.	SecNav testimony before HASC	18 Feb 63
7.	Ltr to SecArmy from Mr. Martin, AsstSecState with attached statement by Mr. Martin before the Latin American Subcomte of HFAC on subject of communist subversion of the hemisphere	19 Feb 63
8.	SecDef testimony before SASC (Vol. I -A. M.)	19 Feb 63
9.	SecNav testimony before HASC	19 Feb 63
10.	Statement of SecDef accompanied by General Maxwell D. Taylor, ChJCS	20 Feb 63
11.	Excerpts of Navy testimony before HASC	20 Feb 63
12.	SecDef testimony before SASC	21 Feb 63
13.	Excerpt of SecAirForce testimony before HASC	21 Feb 63
14.	SecDef testimony before SASC (Cuba)	22 Feb 63
15.	Statement by the DirCIA for use of the staff of the Preparedness Investigating Subcmte of Senator Stennis (Cuban Subversion in LA)	26 Feb 63 (Transmittal Slip)
16.	Statement by Secretary of Defense to the Permanent Subcmte on Investigations of the Committee on Government Operations - U.S. Senate	13 March 63

CLASSIFIED TESTIMONY - PART II (Cont'd)

NO.	SUBJECT:	DATE:
17.	Memo for Mr. Bromley Smith from Mr. McGiffert Subj: Cuba -- with Items 3, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 included as attachments	8 Mar 63
18.	Study on Cuba as a Base for --------prepared by Bob Mandelstam and LtCol Patchell for use by Sec McNamara at Stennis Comm hearings, in the form of Memo to Sec/Def	Undated
19.	Memo for Mr. Robt A. Hurwitch, Subj: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Rept to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1963, fr Mr. Califano w/draft of President's message atchd	29 Mar 63
20.	Sub Interim Report by Preparedness Inves/Comm of the Comm on Armed Services US Senate, on the Cuban Military Buildup, OATSD(LA) Control # 5812(8)	Undtd

RANSMITTAL SLIP	**DATE** 26 Feb 6

TO:
Mr. Califano for Secy. Vance

ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**
3E985	Pentagon

REMARKS:

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
OFFICE
10 00 AM '63

FROM:
CIA - William A. Tidwell

ROOM NO.	**BUILDING**	**EXTENSION**
	Code143	6614

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55
REPLACES FORM 36-8 WHICH MAY BE USED.
GPO : 1957—O-439445
(47)

35

286

STATEMENT BY THE DIRECTOR FOR USE OF THE STAFF OF THE PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE OF SENATOR STENNIS

OSA, ASG Control No. 519

25 February 1963

CUBAN SUBVERSION IN LATIN AMERICA

I. Introduction

The public pronouncements of Cuban leaders, the daily record of events in Latin America, and reports from our intelligence sources within Communist and other left-extremist elements throughout this hemisphere all agree on one salient conclusion: that Fidel Castro is spurring and supporting the efforts of Communists and other revolutionary elements to overthrow and seize control of the governments in Latin America.

Even before the October missile crisis--and with increasing rancor since then--Cuban leaders have been exhorting revolutionary movements to violence and terrorism, and supporting their activities. Cuban support takes many different forms, but its main thrust is in the supply of the inspiration, the guidance, the training, and the communications and technical assistance that revolutionary groups in Latin America require.

In essence, Castro tells revolutionaries from other Latin American countries: "Come to Cuba; we will pay your way, we will train you in underground organization techniques, in guerrilla warfare, in sabotage and in terrorism. We will see to it that you get back to your homeland. Once you are there, we will keep in touch with you, give you propaganda support, send you propaganda materials for your movement, training aids to expand your guerrilla forces, secret communications methods, and perhaps funds and specialized demolition equipment." Castro is not, as far as we know, promising these other Latin Americans any Cuban weapons or Cuban personnel--either leaders, advisers, or cadres. But he probably does tell them: "If you succeed in establishing something effective by way of a revolutionary movement in your homeland, if your guerrillas come down out of the hills and confront regular armed forces, then we may consider more concrete forms of assistance."

So far, it should be noted, none of the movements in South America has reached this final stage--and in fact even Castro's Sierra Maestra guerrillas never had to fight a pitched battle with regular military formations which might have required more advanced weapons than small arms, grenades, mines, and machineguns. In many ways, Cuba under Castro is the Latin version of the old Comintern, inciting, abetting, and sustaining revolution wherever it flourishes.

We have occasional evidence of more concrete Cuban support. Cuban nationals, for example, took part in the La Oroya disorders in Peru in December. We know that some funds move, generally in cash by courier, from Cuba to the revolutionaries in other countries. We know that Cuba furnishes money to buy weapons, and that some guerrilla forces in Peru, for instance, are equipped with Czech weapons which most probably came from Cuba.

Venezuela is apparently number one on Cuba's priority list for revolution. Fidel Castro said so to the recent meeting of Communist front organizations for Latin American women. Che Guevara and Blas Roca both emphasized the outlook for revolution in Venezuela in speeches in January. One of our established sources of proven reliability, high in the ranks of the Venezuelan Communist Party says the Central Committee agreed in January that a "peaceful solution to the present situation in Venezuela is out of the question."

This same source reported that Communist guerrilla and terrorist operations in Venezuela were placed under a unified command in late 1962, which coordinates activities with the other militant extremist groups in Venezuela. The result has been the creation of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). This organization is currently trying to publicize its existence by such acts as the hijacking of the freighter ANZOATEGUI, and by acts of sabotage and indiscriminate shootings. These were also designed to dissuade President Betancourt from his trip to Washington. In this, of course, they failed.

The violence in Venezuela should not be minimized. The sabotage is the work of experts, and is being done with advanced types of explosives. The shooting has reached the point in Caracas where it is not safe to go out at night in some sections of the capital. But it is the opinion both of our people and the embassy that this level of activity is not the sort of thing that will bring down the government unless the president or other high officials are assassinated. The FALN has not reached a point where it stands up to the armed forces, or seizes and holds government buildings.

We believe that Cuba has given guerrilla training to more nationals from Venezuela than from any other country. Our estimate is that more than 200 Venezuelans received such training in 1962. Many of these are engaged in terrorism in the cities, and others were rounded up and given long prison sentences when they committed themselves prematurely last spring in a countryside where the rural population strongly supports the Betancourt administration. One of our best penetrations of the Communist Party in Venezuela tells us that at present the unified command has less than 150 guerrillas in the field, in widely separated groups of 15 to 25 men each.

II. The Cuban Plan

For the past year Cuban spokesmen have been pushing the line that Cuba provides the example for Latin American revolution, with the implication that nothing more than guidance needs to be exported. Castro actually sounded the keynotes for Cuban subversion on July 26, 1960, when he said, "We promise to continue making Cuba the example that can convert the Cordillera of the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the American continent." In his speech on 15 January 1963 Castro said that if "Socialism" in Cuba had waited to overturn Batista by peaceful means, Castro would still be in the Sierra Maestra. For the past three months, Che Guevara and Education Minister Armando Hart, both in public speeches and in remarks to visiting Communists which have been repeated to us, have been insisting that what they call "Socialism" can achieve power in Latin America only by force.

The Cuban effort at present is far more serious than the hastily organized and ill-conceived raids that the bearded veterans of the Sierra Maestra led into such Central American countries as Panama, Haiti, Nicaragua and the Dominican Republic during the first eight or nine months Castro was in power. Today the Cuban effort is far more sophisticated, more covert, and more deadly. In its professional tradecraft, it shows guidance and training by experienced Communist advisers from the Soviet bloc, including veteran Spanish Communists.

The ideas move fairly openly in a massive propaganda effort. The inflammatory broadcasts from Havana and the work of Prensa Latina are matters of public record. It may be worth noting that the postal and customs authorities in Panama are destroying on the average of 12 tons a month of Cuban propaganda coming into their land. Another 10 tons a month comes into Costa Rica; most of it is spotted either at the airport or in the post office and destroyed.

The know-how is not only imparted to the guerrilla trainees who come to Cuba, but is exported in the form of booklets. There are thousands of copies of the texts on guerrilla warfare by Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara scattered over all of Latin America. Our agents have brought us, for example, a little pocket booklet, about two and a half by four inches, called "150 questions on guerrilla warfare," written by a Spanish Civil War veteran, Alberto Bayo. This was printed in Cuba, and turned up first in Peru. Another version, with 100 questions and answers, based on Guevara's and Bayo's books, has been written especially for Peruvian use and mimeographed in Peru. This is about 5 x 8, and includes drawings on how to place demolition charges as well as charts for calculating the force of various explosives. There is a Portuguese text of Guevara's book in Brazil, and a mimeographed abridgement of Bayo's 150 questions has been prepared by a terrorist-guerrilla organization in Colombia.

All of these textbooks stress that the guerrilla must be self-sustaining. They not only tell him how to make Molotov cocktails, explosives, and incendiary preparations from materials that he can obtain easily and sometimes even openly at home. They stress that his weapons, his equipment, and supplies should come from "the enemy"--that is, from the security forces in his homeland.

III. Training

We estimate that at least 1,000, and perhaps as many as 1,500 persons came to Cuba during 1962, from all the other Latin American countries with the possible exception of Uruguay, to receive ideological indoctrination or guerrilla warfare training or both. More have gone in 1963 despite the limited facilities for reaching Cuba at present.

The largest contingents have come from Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. Some of the courses are as short as four weeks, designed to let it appear that the trainees had merely attended some conference or celebration and done a little sightseeing. Other courses last as long as a year, and may include intensive training in such things as sabotage, espionage, and psychological warfare.

We have devoted a great deal of effort to monitoring Latin American travel to Cuba at the main jump-off points such as Mexico and Curacao. (Curacao has not been used since October, but KLM may soon resume flights.) The Cubans go to great lengths to conceal the fact that some of these trainees have ever been to Cuba, and how long they stayed. However, we know a great deal about this travel from our penetrations of the Communist parties, from controlled agents we have been able to maneuver into the training courses in Cuba, and from cooperative travel control authorities in Latin American countries. The Cuban Embassy in Mexico City gives the trainee a visa on a separate piece of paper, so that his passport, when he goes home, will only show that he has been in Mexico. We have a record, however, of those who fly on to Cuba. In other cases, particularly in the case of travel through Montevideo before the quarantine, the Cubans furnished passports under other names for travel by way of Curacao.

We derive some of our figures from travel control points, and another set from the information we receive from penetration agents of established reliability in the Communist parties. Some of the

Latin American governments are also able to maintain fairly accurate lists of their nationals known to have been in Cuba. We get a certain amount of cross-checking from lists of names furnished us by several of our agents who have undergone training, and in confessions of captured guerrillas who had been in Cuba. Thus in the case of Peru, for instance, we come up with a list of 235 names of individuals known to have made extended stays in Cuba in 1961 and 1962. We have to make allowance for some who did not receive guerrilla training, and allowance in the opposite direction for those whose names have escaped our surveillance. But we are guided in these adjustments by the cross-checking information mentioned above.

Some of the trainees arrive, and many go home, by way of the Iron Curtain and Western Europe, using Soviet, Czech, or Cuban aircraft--and probably ships as well--for the trip between Cuba and the Bloc. This is another attempt to conceal their movements, and in some cases permits further indoctrination and training in Bloc countries.

Under the circumstances we consider that our estimate of 1,000 to 1,500 guerrilla warfare trainees in 1962 is reasonably accurate. We also believe that the scope and volume of this training is being stepped up, just as we know that it incresed in 1962 over 1961.

The basic training covers cross-country movement of guerrillas, firing, care of weapons, and general guerrilla tactics. One of our Brazilian agents took such a four-week course more than a year ago, under cover of going to Cuba for a convention. He returned to his Havana hotel every few days during the course to spread the word that he had been sightseeing. An Argentine trainee who took a longer course and then was sent home by way of Europe has given us a great deal of detail on the type of training. He reports that some of the trainees remain indefinitely. The Cubans sometimes refer to these men as their International Brigade. Sometimes they are formed into national units from a particular country, in effect forming a packaged cadre which can be returned to the homeland to lead a "Liberation Army."

A trainee who recently returned to Peru after several months of training in Cuba, said that all his fellow trainees were asked to mark bridges and other similar demolition targets on detailed maps of Peru. They were also required to fill out lengthy questionnaires on sabotage targets, possibilities for subversion of police, methods for illegal entry and travel, suitable drop zones for air supply, possible points of attack against police and military posts, and similar information necessary for directing subversion and insurrection.

Numerous reports come to us indicating that in such countries as Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru, where there are indigenous guerrilla forces either in action or in being in the hills, there are Cubans among the bands acting as leaders, instructors or advisors for these forces. These reports are invariably second-hand, and we have not been able to confirm any of them. In some cases, it has turned out that a reference to "a Cuban" with the guerrillas referred to someone who has been trained in Cuba and was training others, rather than a Cuban national. However, we know positively that three Cuban nationals were involved in the strike violence at La Oroya, Peru, last December, which culminated in several million dollars worth of damage to the smelter of the American-owned Cerro de Pasco mining company. One of these Cubans has also been directing the armed invasions of big ranches in the Andean highlands by land-hungry Indians. Information of this nature contributed to the decision of the Peruvian junta to crack down on Communists in January. In Brazil, the complaint of guerrillas in training camps was that they had been recruited by a promise of Cuban instructors, but found there were none. This came to light when the report of a Cuban intelligence agent, relaying their complaints to Havana, turned up in the wreckage of the Varig airliner which crashed in Peru in November.

IV. Weapons

In general, the Cubans appear to be following the textbook for guerrillas in regard to provision of arms. We have strong evidence, from numerous sources, that they are telling the guerrilla warfare students and their leaders to obtain their own weapons at home.

One of our agents who was in the original group of Brazilian trainees said he was trained exclusively in the use and maintenance of the Garand M-1 rifle and M-3, Browning and Hotchkiss machineguns. His group was told that these were the weapons Brazilian guerrillas would be able to buy, steal, or capture from the security forces at home. Similarly, an Argentine trainee, an agent, said their instructors told them Cuba would not be sending weapons because there was a plentiful source of supply for any determined guerrilla movement in its own homeland. Leaders of militant groups in Venezuela, Brazil, and Peru who have gone to Cuba seeking assistance have been told by the Cuban leaders that Cuba is willing to furnish funds, training, and technical assistance. Reference to weapons is pointedly omitted. This is reported to us by our agents in these same groups.

We have recently again checked with all of our stations in Latin America to review what evidence we have of military shipments from Cuba. In Peru, radio transmitters were admittedly brought in from Cuba. (In Venezuela so much radio equipment was stolen last fall that this was unnecessary.) In 1962, Cuba furnished cash to buy weapons in Mexico to be smuggled into Guatemala. In Peru, the guerrilla trainees who were rounded up in the Huampani-Satipo incident last March had been issued kits containing a Czech rifle with a pistol grip, apparently of bloc origin. Otherwise, however, in case after case guerrilla hardware turned out to have been bought or stolen locally, or smuggled in from the adjoining country. We do not have a single case where we are certain of the Cuban origin of captured arms.

This is not to say that we are positive weapons have not been sent from Cuba. Latin America has a long tradition of smuggling, a long coastline, innumerable isolated landing fields and drop zones, and inadequate security forces to control all such channels. A Venezuelan Communist leader has been telling guerrilla leaders that Cuba will soon send them mortars. It is always possible, of course, that he is fabricating to build up the morale of his units, but we must also conclude that if he is indeed making this up, he risks inevitable disillusionment.

In summary, we have evidence that in principle Cuba is not sending identifiable quantities of weapons to Latin American insurgents at present. But we have no reason to believe that they will not or cannot do so, when so doing serves their stated purpose of creating uprisings in Latin American Countries. Needless to say, this is a matter that we consider of most serious concern and we intensively trace every rumor that comes to us of the importation of arms from Cuba to Latin American countries.

V. Funding

Cuban financing of subversive operations in Latin America is easy to ascertain and hard to document. Our evidence shows that it is generally effected by couriers carrying cash. The following are a few examples of these operations.

A Venezuelan politician, Fabricio Ojeda, returned from Cuba in March of 1962, and was seen by several witnesses to have large quantities of US currency stuffed in a false-bottomed compartment of his suitcase. There is no law against bringing currency into Venezuela, so that authorities could not even determine how much he had brought in. Ojeda later was captured, tried, and sentenced for guerrilla activity.

A Nicaraguan exile, Julio Cesar Mayorga Portocarrera, was flying from Mexico to Honduras in September, 1961, when weather forced the plane to overfly Honduras and land in Nicaragua. He was found to be carrying $3,600 in cash, which he admitted he was bringing from Cuba for Nicaraguan rebels in Honduras.

Last March Ecuadorean troops raided a guerrilla training camp in the mountains west of Quito and arrested some 48 members of the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth. The leaders of the group admitted having received guerrilla training in Cuba, together with funds to support their activities. One item of $44,000 was publicized in the press.

A highly placed Guatemalan Communist who defected last November has given us a specific account of procedures by which Cuba sent cash to Mexico to buy weapons which were then smuggled into Guatemala. We also have considerable evidence of involved bank transfers by which Cuban money eventually reached Latin American front groups to pay for political and propaganda activity. In some countries where the Cubans still have diplomatic missions, we have obtained photostats showing that Cuban diplomats paid for printing of front-group propaganda.

In January 1963 one of the first Brazilians to receive guerrilla warfare training in 1961 was picked up with a suitcase full of ammunition he was carrying to some of those same guerrilla training camps exposed when the Varig plane crashed in Peru. The man admitted that a woman attorney in Rio had given him the money to buy a large hacienda as a new guerrilla camp. We know that this woman is a cut-out in the communications between the pro-Communist Peasant Leagues, which have run the camps, and the Cuban embassy.

The principle that guerrillas must be self-sustaining has obviously been applied to finances as well. Communist guerrillas have staged numerous bank robberies in Peru, Venezuela, and Argentina. The most spectacular hold-up was that of a bank in a Lima suburb last year which netted almost $100,000. From the participants, who have been caught, we know that the hold-up was carried out by a combination of guerrillas and ordinary criminals, who divided the loot fifty-fifty. Some of the share of the common criminals has been recovered, but the Communist half is believed to have reached the sizeable guerrilla forces of Hugo Blanco in the Cuzco Valley. In February 1963 a bank in an outlying Venezuelan town was robbed of $25,000 by men wearing FALN armbands.

VI. Cuban Propaganda Broadcasts

International broadcasts by Cuban radio stations maintain a relatively constant propaganda level at all times, with regularly scheduled and special broadcasts to specific countries as well as general transmissions to all Latin America. The general theme of these broadcasts is that the "Cuban example" is awakening the "people" of Latin America to the opportunity for revolutionary action against the "corrupt" regimes in power and against "Yankee imperialism" which allegedly supports them. Within the last two months there has been an increase in the aggressiveness with which the broadcasts incite revolt.

The official Cuban international service called Radio Havana Cuba is the chief radio propaganda outlet. More commonly known as Radio Havana, this station broadcasts weekly a total of 187 hours and 50 minutes of propaganda in languages which include Spanish, English, French, Arabic, Portuguese, and Haitian Creole, to listeners in Europe, the Mediterranean area, and the Western Hemisphere.

Radio Havana's international service was inaugurated on May Day in 1961. It has grown rapidly since that time and is now Latin America's first international broadcaster in terms of program hours. Its time on the air is as follows, in hours per week:

Haitian Creole to Haiti - 7 hr

Arabic to the Mediterranean area - 5 hr 15 min

English to Europe - 9 hr 20 min

English to the Western Hemisphere - 17 hr 30 min

French to Europe - 9 hr 20 min

French to Canada - 3 hr 20 min

French to Mediterranean - 3 hr 30 min

Portuguese to Brazil - 7 hr

Spanish to Europe - 16 hr 55 min

Spanish to the Americas - 108 hr 30 min

In addition to the regularly scheduled international service, Radio Havana has been known to broadcast special programs in order to take advantage of unique political situations. When serious disorders broke out in the Dominican Republic in late 1961, for example, broadcasts emanating from a self-styled "clandestine" station which said it was located inside the Dominican Republic demanded the overthrow of the Dominican government. The station went off after about a week, but not before direction finder bearings and other technical clues indicated that it had been transmitting from Radio Havana's transmitting facilities in Cuba.

Radio Havana states that it makes its facilities available to political groups from other Latin American countries so they can beam programs to their homelands. These programs, which have the evident intent of encouraging subversion and inciting revolt, are presently beamed on regular weekly or twice a week schedule to Guatemala, Peru, and the Dominican Republic. Similar programs were beamed to Nicaragua and Honduras until last September when they were replaced by a single program with wider targets now programmed nightly. These special programs are exemplified by the programs transmitted to the Dominican Republic on 28 January. One was a "manifesto" by Dominican Communists (who are based in Cuba) on the recent election of the "demagogic imperialist agent" Juan Bosch as President of the Dominican Republic. Another was allegedly by a pro-Communist group of Dominicans in Cuba called the "National Liberation Movement." It appealed to Dominican university students to demonstrate against the Constituent Assembly meeting in Santo Domingo.

There are also two special programs beamed to the United States. "Radio Free Dixie" is a one hour a week transmission in English aimed at US Negroes. The other program, "The Friendly Voice of Cuba," is somewhat more subtle and aimed at a wider audience. Both programs can be heard well in Florida and also in many parts of southern United States.

The technical facilities of Radio Havana are at a transmitter site at Bauta, some 23 miles southwest of Havana. At present, no more than four shortwave transmitters are being used, but in the past as many as five have been observed on the air at the same time. These transmitters range in power from 10 to 100 kilowatts, enabling Radio Havana to be heard all over the world. Programs are being sent from studios to the transmitter site by means of microwave relays.

VII. Rival Forces in Latin American Subversion

Since the October crisis, Fidel Castro has obviously been trying to straddle the rift between Moscow and Peiping over global Communist strategy. It has been aptly put that Castro's heart is in Peiping but his stomach is in Moscow. This same split between all-out militancy and a more cautious policy--call it coexistence or "two steps forward, one step back"--is reflected on the extreme left in many Latin American countries. Thus Cuba at present not only seeks to serve two masters, but to choose among rival servants in its Latin American subversion.

Castro's views on what is good for socialism and revolution in Latin America are more in line with those of the Chinese Communists than the Soviets. Only the Cuban and Venezuelan Communist parties are totally committed to terror and revolution. In spite of differences over tactics and timing between various Communist groups, all intend eventually to deliver the Latin American countries into the Communists-socialist bloc. The so-called Soviet "conservative" view, as it is now espoused, is more intent on trying to achieve power by legal means if possible and by subversion rather than by force.

Direct Soviet interest in Latin America is clearly increasing. An excellent example of this was the setting up early in 1962 of a Latin American Institute in the Academy of Sciences of the USSR. The avowed purpose of this institute is to raise the study of the problems of Latin America, which in their own statements the Soviets claim they have neglected, to the highest possible level. Teaching of Spanish and Portuguese languages is to be stressed in the institute and throughout the school system. A list of subjects on which this institute intends to publish shows that it is to be used to attack the Alliance for Progress; it has already attacked the Alliance program in Colombia--a showpiece of the Alliance. We have been reliably informed that posters have been placed in some Colombian universities referring to the problems of the "national liberation and workers' movements in Latin American countries" as topics which will be studied by the institute. Results of these studies will be published in the near future in a magazine called America Latina, intended especially for distribution in Latin America. A pamphlet, apparently to be distributed by the institute, and entitled Alianza para el Progreso, will in the words of its heralds, "unmask the economic expansion of the USA" in Latin America. The institute also expects to enter into close contact with leading Latin American scientists and academicians during 1963.

One of the most important Communist assets in Latin America is a large number of Bloc diplomatic and Cuban missions. These missions are used to further Communist subversive activities even in countries where there are no Bloc diplomatic missions. The USSR, and in some cases some Satellites as well, have diplomatic missions in Mexico, Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay. The USSR maintains relations with Bolivia, but has no resident mission there. Cuba maintains embassies in Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia, Uruguay, and Chile. The Chinese Communists have no diplomatic ties in Latin America except with Cuba. That fact alone would make Cuban missions important to the Chinese. Only seven Latin American countries--Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Paraguay, and Peru--have no official ties whatever with any bloc country.

Uruguay offers a good example of how the Communists misuse diplomatic missions and the importance the Communists attach to them. We have found that Communist subversive activities in Uruguay are not now aimed at promoting revolutionary activity against the government. In this case even the Cubans appear to be much more interested in retaining the good will of the government so that they can continue to use the country as a base of operations against Argentina, Paraguay, etc. Communist diplomatic missions, however, are active in supporting local Communists and other pro-Castro groups to retain enough leverage within the country so as to prevent the anti-Castro groups from forcing a break in relations. The badly split Uruguayan government itself is anti-Communist, but is highly tolerant of the activities of these missions and of the Uruguayan party itself. The USSR, most of the Satellites, and Cuba all have diplomatic missions in Montevideo--some 70 or so bloc personnel. In addition, couriers and travellers can go back and forth between this city and the bloc countries and Cuba at any time.

ANNEX A - ARGENTINA

A participant has given us a detailed account of a six-month guerrilla warfare training course given to 50 Argentine extremists in Cuba from July to December 1962. Instruction included such subjects as weapons and explosives, ballistics, communications, construction of defenses, guerrilla strategy and tactics, map reading, and closed and open order drill. The trainees practiced with Mauser and Garand rifles, Thompson submachineguns, Brownings, bazookas, 81-millimeter mortars, and a 57-millimeter recoilless cannon. Part of the group reached Cuba by way of Chile. Some of the men were given two passports, one Cuban and one Ecuadorean, and returned to Argentina by way of Prague.

Buenos Aires police in July 1962 announced that they had raided a warehouse which had served as headquarters for terrorists working with both the Peronists and Communists. According to the police, the gang was engaged in smuggling Cuban propaganda into Argentina and distributing it; facilitating travel of Argentines to Cuba for guerrilla training; and had carried out about 30 robberies to obtain funds, weapons, and explosives.

A special Cuban office in Montevideo, Uruguay, provides false documentation for Argentines and Paraguayans traveling to Cuba for guerrilla training.

Morais, had a flat tire on 14 December. When a police patrol stopped to investigate, they found he was carrying a number of rifles in his car.

In the last week of January, another of the original batch of trainees in Cuba, Jeronimo Rodrigues Lima, was arrested by national security police at an airport. He was carrying a suitcase full of ammunition for some of the camps which apparently are still operating. Jeronimo Rodrigues at first refused to talk, but in less than 24 hours, disgusted, announced he would tell his whole story. So far, according to the press, he has revealed that a woman attorney in Rio de Janeiro had furnished money with which he had bought another farm to continue the Peasant League guerrilla operation. We know this woman works for the Cuban Embassy. Rodrigues says the farm is in his name, and that if he gets out of jail, he intends to forget the Peasant League, move his family to the farm, and work it.

ANNEX B - BRAZIL

Documents found in a wrecked airliner in Peru now have made public an obvious case of Cuban involvement in subversion directed against Brazil. These are the so-called VARIG documents recovered by Peruvian authorities when an airliner carrying a Cuban commercial delegation crashed near Lima en route from Rio de Janeiro on 27 November.

The documents, a letter and attachments from "Gerardo" to "Petronio," comprised a report from a Cuban diplomat in Rio de Janeiro, writing under a cover name, to his superior in Havana. The letter made it plain that Cuba had financed and supervised efforts by Francisco Juliao, Brazilian Peasant League leader, to set up guerrilla warfare training camps within the framework of his pro-Communist peasant organization. The report, which relays complaints of some of the guerrillas recruited for these camps, makes it clear that the Peasant League guerrilla operation was plagued by confusion and corruption, but leaves no doubt of Cuban involvement, and names many Brazilians involved.

Purely fortuitously, a Brazilian customs police official checking on possible clandestine landing fields in the interior, ran across evidence of the training camps and arranged to have some of them raided even before the Varig aircraft crashed. The raids turned up no evidence pointing directly to Cuba, but the camps happened to be precisely those described in the Gerardo-Petronio correspondence. The Varig document provided the evidence against Cuba, the two independent sources matched their details perfectly, and it has become impossible for the Communists and the Peasant League to obtain serious consideration for any claim that the documents might be forgeries. We in turn are sure of their authenticity.

The Peasant League operation, which was staffed by some of the first Brazilian Communists to take guerrilla training in Cuba in June of 1961, continues to provide evidence against Cuba. Although the Cubans apparently have done their best to avoid all contact with the guerrilla organization since the exposê, Brazilian police continue to turn up further ramifications of the operation. The second-in-command of the Peasant League and head of the guerrilla organization, Clodomir

ANNEX C - CHILE

On 28 October 1962, at the height of the missile crisis, a homemade bomb exploded during assembly in a downtown Santiago apartment house. The Chilean police who searched the apartment found four members of the extremist Social Progressive Group (SPG), 6 cases of Cuban propaganda, 30 sticks of dynamite, 38 fuses, and one small bomb already assembled.

One of those arrested, an SPG leader, who had his hand blown off, had earlier been photographed with three Cuban diplomats. At least two of these, Orlando Prendes Gutierrez and Raul Zayas Linares, have been reliably reported as Cuban intelligence officers. The Chilean police told the press that the group had planned bomb attacks on the US Embassy and residence, US firms, and local public utilities. This incident occurred two days after a clandestine Havana broadcast urging Latin American Communists to attack US property and installations wherever possible in Latin America.

ANNEX D - ECUADOR

Well-placed and reliable agents have reported that the last Cuban chargé in Quito, Ecuador, had given more than $40,000 to the Union of Revolutionary Ecuadorean Youth (URJE) for guerrilla warfare training.

More than 45 young Ecuadoreans, including three girls, were rounded up by Ecuadorean paratroopers last spring at a guerrilla training camp at Santo Domingo de los Colorados, about 50 miles west of Quito. Many of the trainees had been to Cuba. The leaders of the group, Santiago Perez Romoleroux, Jorge Rivadeneyra Altamirono, and Efrain Alvarez Fiallos, had recently returned from extensive guerrilla warfare training in Cuba.

When the Ecuadorean Communist Party last January arranged for the expulsion of several URJE leaders involved with the guerrilla operation in order to restore full Communist control, newspapers reported that the expelled leaders had been accused by the Communists of wasting Cuban funds.

Guillermo Layedra, Communist leader from Rio Bamba, arrested on his return from Cuba in March 1962, was reported to have photographs showing him undergoing guerrilla training in Cuba. Communist Miguel Lechon, the only Indian on the party Central Committee and president of the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians, was arrested in 1962 for shooting a peasant. He showed a Soviet pistol which he said had been given him by Fidel Castro during a visit to Cuba, and has also shown a key which he boasts is the ignition key for a Cadillac Castro has promised to send him as soon as he recruits 300 Indians for the Communist Party.

Reliable sources in Ecuador report that at least 80 Ecuadoreans were in Cuba as of January for guerrilla training. We have 30 of these trainees listed by name.

ANNEX E - PERU

The ruling military junta in Peru started in February 1963 mass trials of more than 200 extremists, including 63 Communist leaders. In a 68-page indictment, the government charges that the extremists have attacked police stations and banks, raised guerrilla forces, incited peasant violence, and caused riots in San Marcos University. The evidence to be submitted in the Lima trial alone runs to almost 700 single-spaced pages. The security forces have given us no evidence of a Moscow-Havana master plan, but there is ample evidence of Cuban involvement.

The trials center on the activities of the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), a roof-organization for extremist militants founded by De La Puente Uceda in 1961. De La Puente had just returned from Cuba and said he brought instructions to "organize the revolution in Peru with economic and technical help from Fidel Castro." This phrase from the indictment conforms with reports our agents received at the time from close associates of De La Puente. He is one of the top extremists who escaped the roundup launched by the junta early in January. We believe he is in Cuba. We have a photograph, taken some time ago, which shows De La Puente and two of his top Peruvian associates with Fidel Castro in Havana.

Although the government did not move against the Communists and other extremist groups with any great vigor, proof of Cuban involvement in subversion goes back at least as far as March 1962. Peruvian police fooled a Cuban-trained agent in the mountains into directing them to a guerrilla camp accessible only by foot, near Satipo, and almost simultaneously raided a house in the Lima suburb of Huampani from which trainees were being sent to the camp. As a result, they found complete guerrilla kits including Czech-made rifles with a pistol grip, instructions for dispatching and equipping the guerrilla candidates, and two radio transmitters brought in from Cuba. The custodian admitted he had used the radios to contact a sister in Havana. Most of the men arrested in this incident were released, but have been picked up again in the January roundup and are to be included in the mass trials.

An agent who took guerrilla training in Cuba last fall has provided a detailed account of his training, lists of other trainees he could identify, and in particular, a list of questions the Cubans apparently gave to all the Peruvians. Possibly it is a standard questionnaire for all guerrilla warfare trainees. The Peruvians were asked to pinpoint possible sabotage targets such as bridges on a large map. The Cuban instructors also wanted information on all kinds of targets for sabotage, chances to subvert the police, possibilities for illegal entry into and travel in Peru, the problems of setting up business firms to cover espionage and agent operations, and information on location of and access to police and military installations.

Three major guerrilla groups, according to good reports from our agents and from Peruvian police, appear to have reached agreement on a plan for coordinated action. This may be one factor that persuaded the junta to move against the extremists.

The main guerrilla strength at present is a force which local police in the Cuzco area estimate to be as large as 2,000 men. This is the guerrilla force led by Hugo Blanco, who is reported by Peruvian authorities to have received his guerrilla training in Argentina. If in fact he has 2,000 men, this figure includes landless peasants and Indians, largely untrained and unarmed; we have no reason to believe that more than a small proportion are trained and equipped guerrillas. The Indians, however, are almost as deadly with rock slings as guerrillas are with rifles. The junta has moved in some troops because the local police detachments have been unable to withstand Blanco's raids. Interrogations and agent reports have established that the guerrillas are buying weapons stolen from or sold by the Bolivian military and smuggled across the frontier into Peru. Some of the money is apparently the Communist share of the $100,000 Miraflores bank robbery.

As one example of the activities of the coordinated extremist forces, a lieutenant of the Guardia Republicana, assisted by half a dozen guerrillas dressed in Guardia uniforms, attacked the village Guardia post in Jauja, 110 miles east of Lima, and overwhelmed it. Arming another score of guerrillas with the captured weapons, the gang then robbed three local banks and retreated to the hills.

ANNEX F - VENEZUELA

Venezuela is the top priority target for Cuban subversion. A campaign of terror is in full swing. Castro, Che Guevarra, Blas Roca and other high-ranking Cuban officials have, as recently as January 1963, told various visiting Latin American Communists that Venezuela is the first goal of Castroism in Latin America. Venezuela is receiving priority attention from Castro, who has claimed that the Betancourt regime will be toppled by guerrilla warfare methods.

It would appear from the meager evidence available in Venezuela, that the Venezuelan Communists have been thoroughly briefed to hide or deny any Cuban involvement in the present guerrilla-terroristic campaign which is being waged in the country. The wave of terror which has existed for months in Venezuela has physically exhausted the handful of competent men in the Venezuelan police system, which has little or no time left over to track down evidence of Cuban involvement.

Support from Havana can be inferred, however, if only from the expert character of the sabotage carried out. In mid-February, for instance, it was discovered that the Communists have begun to use shaped charges to sabotage vulnerable oil pipe lines. Earlier attempts had involved more conventional explosives.

The paramilitary apparat of the Venezuelan Communist Party, which is directly charged with the mission for continuing terrorism in the urban areas, has been actively engaged in carrying out other major acts of sabotage, such as burning down warehouses with advanced combustibles and dynamiting major bridges, pipelines and pumping stations. All of these acts have been well planned and professionally executed. There is circumstantial evidence that the Communist sabotage of the Maracaibo oil fields last October and November was in reply to an appeal from Radio Havana to attack all American installations in Venezuela as a reprisal for the quarantine of Cuba.

Last November a Venezuelan military court tried 139 guerrillas captured in the course of the Puerto

Cabello revolt, and handed out heavy jail sentences. Some of the defendants had previously been in Cuba. One of them, Fabricio Ojeda, who had at one time been photographed in Cuban uniform during Cuban army maneuvers, was known to have brought back a large sum of US currency from Cuba, and had made several trips there. He was also the recipient of large quantities of Cuban Communist propaganda.

Venezuelan police early in January raided a house registered in the name of a Venezuelan Communist known to have made at least one trip to Cuba, and discovered a radio transmitter capable of reaching Cuba. Two Communists were subsequently arrested attempting to enter the house. The armed forces have also heard a voice radio, which appears to be located on the grounds of the Central University in Caracas, communicating with another station which they believe to be in Cuba.

Late last fall a raid on the home of a leader in Caracas of the pro-Communist Movement of the Revolutionary Left turned up a sheet of instructions for procedures in radio communication with Cuba. When the man himself was arrested, police found a radio transmitter being carried in the trunk of his car.

We have received reports from a reliable source that Rafael Martinez, head of the Communist paramilitary apparat (PCV) in Venezuela, asked Castro last September for assistance. Castro reportedly had promised to give the PCV mortars and other weapons. However, Castro is reported to have given Martinez $50,000 instead, and offered to train some of Martinez' men in Cuba. Castro had explained that he was unable to offer arms at that time because the USSR would not permit him to do so. Last month (January 1963), it was further reported that the wife of Martinez, Argelia Laya de Martinez, received an additional sum of $6,000 to finance sabotage operations against North American business installations in Venezuela. Mrs. Martinez was visiting in Cuba at the time that she received these funds.

SECRET

B-9

Mr ~~Califano~~

Rubbell

INVESTIGATION OF
THE PREPAREDNESS PROGRAM

INTERIM REPORT BY
PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING
SUBCOMMITTEE

Of The

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

Under The Authority Of

S. Res. 75

(88th Cong., 1st Sess.)

On

THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

5812 (8)

OATSD(LA) CONTROL NUMBER

SECRET

SECRET

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

Richard B. Russell, Georgia, Chairman

John Stennis, Mississippi
Harry Flood Byrd, Virginia
Stuart Symington, Missouri
Henry M. Jackson, Washington
Sam J. Ervin, Jr., North Carolina
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina
Clair Engle, California
Howard W. Cannon, Nevada
Robert C. Byrd, West Virginia
Stephen M. Young, Ohio
Daniel K. Inouye, Hawaii

Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusett
Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
J. Glenn Beall, Maryland
Barry Goldwater, Arizona
Clifford P. Case, New Jersey

Harry L. Wingate, Jr. Chief Clerk

PREPAREDNESS INVESTIGATING SUBCOMMITTEE

John Stennis, Mississippi, Chairman

Stuart Symington, Missouri
Henry M. Jackson, Washington
Strom Thurmond, South Carolina

Leverett Saltonstall, Massachusett
Margaret Chase Smith, Maine
Barry Goldwater, Arizona

James T. Kendall, Chief Counsel

SECRET

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

U. S. Senate,
Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee,
Committee on Armed Services,
May , 1963.

Honorable Richard B. Russell,
Chairman, Committee on Armed Services
U. S. Senate

My Dear Mr. Chairman:

There is transmitted herewith an interim report by the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee, appointed under Senate Resolution 75 of the 88th Congress, on the Cuban Military Buildup.

In its inquiry to this time the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive session from the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air Force intelligence sections. The interim report transmitted herewith is addressed primarily to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the present insofar as the facts have been developed and are now known to the Subcommittee.

The Subcommittee intends to pursue further its inquiry into the Cuban situation and it is anticipated that one or more subsequent reports on this subject will be issued in the future.

It is necessary that this interim report to the full Committee on Armed Services be classified "Secret." However, the Subcommittee is submitting the report for review for security purposes and will have the report printed and released to the public when it has been so reviewed and the necessary security matters have been deleted.

Respectfully,

JOHN STENNIS,
Chairman, Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee.

CONTENTS

INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

Page

I. Introductory Statement 1
II. Summary of Major Findings 3
III. Situation Prior to Mid-July, 1962 7
  (A) Cuban Forces 7
  (B) Intelligence Activities and Operations 8
IV. Situation From Mid-July to October 22, 1962 10
  (A) Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment 10
  (B) Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment 11
    (1) SA-2 Sites 11
    (2) Cruise Missiles 11
    (3) MIG-21 Fighters 12
    (4) IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers 12
    (5) Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles 12
  (C) Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Combat Units 13
  (D) Alleged Photographic Gap 15
  (E) Transfer of U-2 Flights From CIA to SAC 16
  (F) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally 17
V. Situation From October 22, 1962, to Time of Removal of IL-28 Bombers 21
  (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally 21
  (B) Identification of Organized Soviet Combat Units 21
  (C) Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers 21
VI. Current Military Situation in Cuba 22
  (A) Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally 22
  (B) Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba 23
    (1) Types and Numbers of Weapons 23
    (2) Strength and Capabilities of Forces 26
    (3) Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba 29
    (4) Withdrawal of Soviet Personnal 30
  (C) Summary of Threat Arising From Soviet Presence in Cuba 31
  (D) Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion 32
VII. Concluding Statement 34

INTERIM REPORT ON CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP

I. INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT

The dramatic events which occurred last October with respect to Cuba are now history. Following photographic confirmation of the fact that strategic and offensive weapons had, in fact, been introduced into Cuba and President Kennedy's confrontation with Premier Khrushchev, such strategic and offensive weapons were ostensibly withdrawn.

However, the public concern and debate about the Cuban situation has not subsided. There have been and are insistent reports that the Soviets still maintain strategic missiles in Cuba which are concealed in caves and other underground facilities and that Soviet troops are based in the island in numbers far in excess of those accepted by our intelligence community. Reports also abound with respect to the use of Cuba as a base for subversive, agitational and revolutionary activities directed at other Latin American countries.

The prevalence of these reports and allegations prompted the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to launch an investigation into the entire subject matter in an effort to determine the facts. Although the investigation still continues, the Subcommittee deems it appropriate to issue an interim report at this time. This report will be limited to a review of military developments and intelligence activities and operations in connection with Cuba from early 1962 to the current time insofar as the facts are now known to us. A discussion of the use of Cuba as a base for subversive activities will be included in a subsequent report.

Broadly speaking, the term "intelligence community" includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of State, the National Security Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission, and the

Federal Bureau of Investigation. It is used in this report, however, in a somewhat more limited sense. Where the term appears in this report it primarily refers to and includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the intelligence sections of the Army, Navy and Air Force. Other agencies are, of course, impliedly included in our use of the term to the extent that they participated in or contributed to any of the activities or operations discussed.

Up to this time, the Subcommittee has received testimony in executive hearings from Mr. John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence; Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Army; Rear Admiral Vernon L. Lowrance, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Major General Robert A. Breitweiser, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U. S. Air Force.

The Subcommittee has also received and has on file a number of written reports from the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, the Department of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We have also considered reports issued by the Special Consultative Committee on Security of the Council of the Organization of American States and the Cuban Revolutionary Council.

In addition, the Subcommittee staff has made an extensive investigation and has thus far interviewed more than 70 witnesses who do not hold official positions, including many Cuban refugees and exiles. Staff investigators spent approximately 45 man days in the Miami area alone.

Information has also been received from individual Senators and Members of the House of Representatives.

This interim report is based primarily on the testimony received from the intelligence chiefs who appeared before the Subcommittee. It does, however, include some information from other sources.

Since our inquiry is not yet completed, this report does not contain any overall or comprehensive conclusions and recommendations. Major findings, based on the testimony and evidence thus far received, relative to intelligence activities during the military buildup have been incorporated. Our general recommendation at this time is that an alert vigilance be maintained over all activities taking place in Cuba.

II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR FINDINGS

1. While hindsight shows that the performance of the Central Intelligence Agency and the military intelligence agencies can be criticized in some areas, in other areas they performed creditably. Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

2. Although photographic reconnaissance has limitations, it was this capability which ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

3. While a reasonably competent job was done in acquiring and collecting intelligence information and data, in retrospect it appears that several substantial errors were made by the intelligence agencies in the evaluation of the information and data which was accumulated.

4. Faulty evaluation and the predisposition of the intelligence community to the philosophical conviction that it would be incompatible with Soviet policy to introduct strategic missiles into Cuba resulted in intelligence judgments and evaluations which later proved to be erroneous. Among these were:

(a) It was not until after a confirming picture was obtained on October 25th, 1962, that it was established by the intelligence community that organized Soviet ground combat units were present in Cuba. At this time our plans for a possible landing in Cuba were substantially complete and were necessarily based upon the information that our forces would face only indigenous Cuban defense forces.

(b) The number of Soviet troops in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the crisis. On October 22nd, our intelligence people estimated that there were 8000 to 10,000 Soviets in Cuba. They now say that, at the height of the buildup, there were at least 22,000 Soviet personnel on the island.

(c) It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14th that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14th negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community. A contributing factor to this was the tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade the reports of Cuban refugees and exiles.

5. The Subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography "gap" having existed from September 5th to

October 14th. The evidence before the Subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

6. The news reports of an alleged conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency and Strategic Air Command with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14th were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit. No evidence was presented to support the charge that the operation of the U-2 flights were transferred from the Central Intelligence Agency to Strategic Air Command because of a deadlock or friction between the agencies.

7. To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba. However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise. They also admitted that absolute assurance on this question can come only from penetrating and continuing on-site inspection by reliable observers and that, based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about the matter.

8. There are literally thousands of caves and underground caverns in the Island of Cuba and many of these are suitable for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. Refugee and exile reports continue to insist that they are being so utilized. Military-connected activities have been noted with reference to a number of them but it is the view of the intelligence analysts that the military usage of the caves is for the storage of those weapons which we know are now in Cuba and not for the storage of offensive weapon systems. Admittedly, however, this view is based to a substantial degree on the negative proposition that there is no hard evidence

confirming the presence of strategic missiles in Cuba at this time.

9. Even though the intelligence community believes that all have been withdrawn, it is of the greatest urgency to determine whether or not strategic missiles are now concealed in Cuba. The criticality of this is illustrated by the fact that, assuming maximum readiness at pre-selected sites, with all equipment pre-located, the Soviet mobile medium range (1100 miles) missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours.

10. The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation, leaving, according to intelligence sources, about 17,500 Soviets in Cuba. A net of 4000 to 5000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say. However, because of what is described by intelligence as "technical reasons," the 17,500 intelligence estimate of those remaining is unchanged at the writing of this report. At the least, this indicates to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some doubt in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. All of the intelligence people agree that there is no evidence that any of the combat ground troops associated with the four mobile armored groups have been withdrawn.

11. Some other sources --primarily refugee and exile groups-- estimate that as many as 40,000 Soviets are now in Cuba. Bearing in mind the lack of hard evidence on the question and the substantial underestimation of last Fall, we conclude that no one in official United States circles can tell, with any real degree of confidence, how many Russians are now in Cuba and we are of the opinion that the official 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

12. In any event, it is conceded that the combined Soviet and Cuban forces now in the island are quite powerful defensively and could offer severe opposition to any attack. They are admittedly capable of suppressing any

internal rebellion or revolt mounted without external support, and it is clear that an invasion from without, to have a fair chance of success, would require large forces, extensive sea-borne landing efforts, and adequate air cover.

13. Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapons have been removed, the intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of the lack of conclusive evidence.

14. The evidence is overwhelming that Castro is supporting, spurring, aiding and abetting Communist revolutionary and subversive movements throughout the Western Hemisphere and that such activities present a grave and ominous threat to the peace and security of the Americas.

III. SITUATION PRIOR TO MID-JULY, 1962

A. Cuban Forces

It was estimated by intelligence sources that at the beginning of 1962, the Cuban ground forces consisted of a standing army of 75,000, a ready reserve of 100,000, and a home guard of 100,000. Although the ground combat capability of the Cuban forces had increased since the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion, it was thought that, although the Cuban forces were of varying states of training, they had the capability for effective ground operations at the battalion combat team level. They were not thought to be organized for operations with units larger than reinforced battalions and it was believed that they were maintained primarily for the purpose of internal security operations and to repel any attempted invasion. The intelligence community thought that approximately 500

Soviet bloc advisory personnel were then in Cuba.

By the beginning of 1962, the Cuban Air Force had benefitted by the acquisition of MIG aircraft and the return of a number of people trained in bloc countries. It had some 40 MIG 15's, 17's and 19's as well as about 40 propeller-driven aircraft of training, transport and utility types.

The Cuban Navy was small and of an essentially coastal patrol type. Several of these craft in the sub-chaser and motor torpedo boat types had been received from the Soviets. The crews on a number of these craft were mixed Cuban and Soviet, indicating that the Cubans were still under training.

It was agreed by intelligence sources, however, that even prior to July, 1962, vast amounts of Soviet military equipment had been introduced into Cuba for the use of the Cuban forces. As a result, it was believed that even then the Cuban Army was one of the best equipped in all Latin America. The arms and equipment furnished the Cubans at this time consisted of a mixture of World War II equipment and more modern weapons. There is a question as to whether the amount of heavy and more complicated weapons introduced into Cuba at this time was not more than ample to supply the needs of the Cuban forces as then constituted.

B. Intelligence Activities and Operations

The intelligence activities with respect to Cuba prior to July, 1962, consisted of reconnaissance overflights by U-2 aircraft, peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters and the collection of reports from refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

For sometime prior to 1962, U-2 aircraft operated by the Central Intelligence Agency flew one mission a month at high altitudes over the Island of Cuba itself for reconnaissance purposes. Commencing in early 1962, two flights were flown each month, weather permitting, until September, 1962, when the number of flights was increased.

Also, even before 1962, regular electronic reconnaissance and photographic flights were flown by the military on a regular basis over international waters but not over the Island of Cuba itself.

In addition, during the same period, thousands of human source reports were collected and assessed. Included in these reports were many which contained allegations of missile-related activities and of the presence of Soviet ground combat units in Cuba. However, although the reports were checked to the greatest extent possible, the intelligence community obtained no confirmation of such activities.

In recognition of the increasing importance of the Cuban problem, the intelligence community in early 1962 intensified their intelligence activities and stated a greater urgency in their collection requirements with respect to Cuba. The routine one-a-month flight over Cuba was increased to two a month. The intelligence community was alert to the implications of the communization of Cuba. However, on the basis of the information collected and the assessment of this information, the intelligence conclusion at this time was that the activities were primarily defensively oriented. No Soviet combat units or strategic weapons were discovered.

The intelligence community, although agreeing that the activities in Cuba were then primarily directed towards defense, did conclude in early 1962 that it might probably be expected that the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber would be supplied to Cuba by the Soviets in the future.

IV. SITUATION FROM MID-JULY TO OCTOBER 22, 1962

A. Buildup in Soviet Forces and Equipment

In late July and early August, our intelligence noted a significant change in the situation in Cuba. A sudden rise in military aid from the Soviet Union became clearly evident. Ship arrivals, both dry cargo and passenger, increased drastically. For example, for the first half of 1962, an average of 15 Soviet dry cargo ships per month arrived in Cuba. The number jumped to 37 in August. Only one Soviet passenger ship had arrived in Cuba during the first five months of 1962. Four arrived in July and six in August.

While our intelligence people were aware from this and other information that a major Soviet effort in Cuba was under way, its exact nature and impact was not clear to the intelligence community.

During the July-August period, refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity, there was no confirmation of them.

At the same time, there were human source reports that some of the ships were unloaded at night under rigid security with all non-Soviet personnel being excluded from the dock areas. The practice of unloading at night in small easily guarded ports, remote from large population centers, was known to the intelligence community, although the alleged security conditions ashore could not be confirmed.

Human source reports also alleged that the nature and character of the arriving Soviet personnel had changed significantly. It was reported that some of the arriving personnel during this period were primarily young, trim, physically fit, sun-tanned and disciplined, and that they formed in ranks of fours on the docks and moved out in truck convoys. Refugee, exile, and other human source reports suggested that, in contrast to the earlier arrivals, the new arrivals were Soviet combat troops. However, the intelligence community adhered to the view that they were military instructors, advisors, and trainers, plus a number of civilian technicians and advisors associated with improving the Cuban economy. The view was that they did not include significant numbers of Soviet military personnel and that they were not organized into combat units. As late as October 29, in an unclassified information brochure published by the Defense Department entitled "Cuba," the Soviet "personnel" in the island were estimated at 5,000.

B. Identification of Specific Weapons and Equipment

1. SA-2 Sites - About August 15, as a result of suspicions generated by human source reports, the Department of Defense focused special attention on suspected areas and requested that they be covered by the "next" high altitude flight. As a result, the next such flight, flown on August 29, established positive identification of SA-2 surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites at two of the suspect locations and at six others in Western Cuba. Flights from August 29 through October 7 discovered additional SA-2 sites. The SA-2 system can engage targets at altitudes from about 3,000 to 80,000 feet and has a slant range of about 25 miles.

2. Cruise Missiles - A coastal defense cruise missile installation was identified shortly after the flight of August 29. Three additional cruise missile sites were discovered by October 7. These are anti-shipping missiles estimated to have a maximum range of about 40 miles. On August 29th KOMAR class patrol boats with 2 missile launchers each were identified in Cuba.

3. MIG-21 Fighters - Although the Soviets had supplied the Cuban Air Force with MIG-15, 17, and 19 aircraft prior to the Spring of 1962, the presence of the modern supersonic MIG-21 fighter was first confirmed by a picture obtained on September 5, 1962.

4. IL-28 (Beagle) Bombers - As early as the Spring of 1962, the intelligence community was of the view that the Soviets might send the IL-28 (Beagle) light bomber into Cuba. This apprehension was confirmed by a picture taken on September 28 which was later evaluated as showing crates containing IL-28's aboard a Cuba-bound ship. This evaluation was not made until October 9 and was disseminated to the intelligence community on October 10.

5. Medium Range and Intermediate Range Missiles - As has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962. It is evident that many of these reports in fact referred to the SA-2 missile, which, although nowhere near the size of the strategic missiles later identified, still appears large to the untrained observer.

However, after mid-September some reports of missiles being introduced into Cuba were suggestive enough of strategic or offensive weapons to arouse the suspicions of intelligence analysts. This resulted in the conclusion--apparently reached near the end of September, 1962--that there was a suspect medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) site in Pinar del Rio Province. As a result, photographic coverage of the suspect area was proposed and on October 14 a Strategic Air Command U-2 reconnaissance aircraft overflew the area and emerged with hard photographic evidence of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile complex.

Photographic reconnaissance was unable to detect precisely how many ballistic missiles were introduced into Cuba. Prior to the Soviet announcement that 42 missiles would be withdrawn, our photographs had revealed evidence of only 33. It could not be established, therefore, how many ballistic missiles were, in fact, introduced into Cuba or how many the Soviets planned to introduce.

Additional medium-range ballistic missile sites and intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) sites were located by high altitude reconniassance missions flown after October 14. Six MRBM sites were located, all of which had achieved a full operational capacity on October 28 when the dismantling of the sites commenced. Three IRBM sites were located and it was anticipated that a fourth would be established. None of the IRBM sites became operational before being dismantled, it being the estimate that they would have become operational by December 15.

The medium-range missile is estimated to have a range of about 1100 miles and the intermediate range missile is credited with a range of 2200 miles

C. Failure to Identify Soviet Organized Ground Combat Units

As has already been noted, notwithstanding some reports that many of the Soviets arriving in Cuba after mid-July were military units, and notwithstanding the evidence of a drastically increased buildup in modern and sophisticated ground weapons, the intelligence community did not identify the presence of Russian organized ground combat forces in Cuba until October 25 when new pictures obtained by low-level photography, coupled with a reanalysis of previous photography, led to the conclusion that there were, in fact, four organized, mobile, and powerful armored Soviet units in Cuba.

The aggregate strength of these units is now estimated by intelligence people to be about 5,000 men.

In addition, it is agreed that the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba was substantially underestimated by our intelligence. For example, on October 22, 1962, the date that the President addressed the nation, the intelligence community estimated the Soviet personnel in Cuba to be 8 to 10 thousand. The current intelligence evaluation is that at the height of the Soviet build-up, there were in Cuba an aggregate of at least 22,000 Soviet troops. This is, of course, a retroactive or reconstructed intelligence estimate. One factor in the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel in Cuba in October was the assumption that the arriving passenger ships were normally loaded. It is obvious now that these ships were, in fact, troop loaded and that the actual aggregate troop-carrying capacity of the arriving passenger ships was in excess of 20,000. In addition, it is believed that additional Soviet military personnel arrived in cargo ships. There is some reason to doubt that even the 22,000 figure would account fully for all of the great quantities of weapons and equipment introduced into Cuba since June, 1962.

The failure to identify the presence of organized Russian combat units in Cuba and the underestimation of the number of Soviet personnel present there merits special comment. At that time, that is, on October 22, our plans for a possible landing of forces in Cuba, which were already substantially complete, were necessarily based upon the information that our invading forces would be opposed only by indigenous Cuban troops. The fact of the matter is that the native Cuban forces would have been reinforced by highly trained, powerful, and mobile Soviet armored units possessed of tremendous striking power. These facts were not transmitted to the responsible United States commanders until several days subsequent to October 25.

In other words, the true order of battle of the enemy had not been ascertained at the time of the completion of plans for possible landings of our forces in Cuba. This omission could have resulted in our paying a much higher price in casualties in the occupation of Cuba than had been anticipated.

Equally important, since on October 22nd the President did not know of the presence in Cuba of a substantial number of Soviet soldiers in heavily armed organized ground combat units, he could not include this factor in his actions vis-a-vis the Soviets and demand at that time their withdrawal from the Western Hemisphere along with the strategic missiles.

D. Alleged Photographic Gap

There has been considerable public discussion about an alleged gap in our photographic reconnaissance over Cuba during the period from September 5 to ~~September~~ October 14. We have examined this question as thoroughly as possible and have found the allegations with respect to it to be unfounded. The record of the flights which were scheduled between August 29 and October 14 should be sufficient to clear up the situation and these will be summarized here.

The flight of August 29, which has already been discussed, resulted in the discovery of surface-to-air missile and cruise missile sites.

On September 5, a mission was flown which covered the central and eastern portion of the island. Good coverage was obtained of the central portion but weather conditions prevented any photographic returns with reference to the eastern end of the island.

A flight was planned for September 10th but this was not flown.

On September 17, a mission was flown but, because of weather conditions, it was not wholly successful.

Adverse weather precluded further flights until September 26th. Flights were flown on September 26, September 29, October 5 and October 7. These flights completed the coverage of those areas of Cuba which had been spotlighte as requiring early attention.

Weather prevented any additional flights until October 14. On October 12, the Strategic Air Command was given responsibility for operating the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance missions over Cuba, and on October 14, it flew the flight which gave the first hard evidence of the existence of strategic missiles in Cuba.

E. Transfer of U-2 Flights from CIA to SAC

There have been numerous news reports alleging the existence of a conflict between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Strategic Air Command (SAC) with reference to the operation of the U-2 high altitude flights. These reports have contained allegations that a deadlock existed between CIA and SAC and that this was resolved at the policy level by transferring the function of flying the U-2 missions from CIA to SAC. It has also been alleged that this is one of the reasons for the delay in locating the MRBM sites in Cuba.

These allegations have also been closely inquired into and have been found to be without merit. There is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that any conflict between CIA and SAC existed or that there was any delay in photographi coverage of the island because of the fact that the U-2 program was being operated by CIA prior to October 14.

Likewise, there is no evidence whatsoever of any deadlock between the two agencies or any conflict or dispute with respect to the question of by whom the flights should be flown.

The Subcommittee inquired thoroughly into the reason for the transfer of the U-2 operation from CIA to SAC. It is to be remembered that the SA-2 sites in the San Cristobal area had been located on August 29th. The U-2 flight which was flown on October 14th was programed to over-fly this area. In view of the possibility that the flight might provoke hostile reactions from the SA-2's, it was concluded that it would be more appropriate for the operation to be conducted by the military rather than by civilians. This decision was entirely reasonable and proper.

It is a fact, of course, that the first U-2 flight flown by SAC was the one which resulted in obtaining a photograph of the MRBM site. This, without explanation, originally gave the Subcommittee some concern. However, after inquiring closely into the situation we are convinced that there is no significance to it and that it was just a matter of timing and coincidence.

F. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

As has been indicated, the U-2 high altitude reconnaissance flights over Cuba continued at the rate of two a month, weather permitting, until September. The stepped-up schedule for September and early October has already been outlined. All of the U-2 flights prior to October 14th were flown by the CIA.

After the mission which verified the existence of MRBMs in Cuba, there was a concentrated effort to determine the precise nature of the missile buildup and the exact location, number, configuration and state of readiness of the missile systems. Between October 14 and October 22, the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 17 high altitude sorties. Low altitude overflights were not initiate until October 23, the day following the President's message.

During the same period, the peripheral reconnaissance flights over international waters continued, as did the intensified collection efforts using refugees, exiles, and other human sources.

In reviewing the intelligence activities with respect to Cuba, the Subcommittee found areas in which criticism is justly due. In other areas, however, our intelligence did quite well. The MRBMs were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers were discovered while they were still in their crates. The MIG-21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container. All these weapon systems were identified, and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out before they became operational in a very compressed and limited period of time despite adverse weather conditions and the fact that we were penetrating an almost completely closed society.

The SA-2 sites were discovered commencing August 29th, and were credited by the intelligence community with becoming operational on a site-by-site basis commencing in mid-September. It is certain that these air defense missiles had attained an operational capability by October 27th. On that date a U-2 plane piloted by Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF, was shot down by an SA-2 and Major Anderson was killed.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisors and United States diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the Organization of American States and world acceptance of the correctness of our position.

Photographic reconnaissance, however, does have limitations. It is only a part of the total intelligence collection means, although a most important one It did not reveal the presence of ballistic missiles in Cuba during the period of at least a month between their introduction into the Island and their deployment on sites. The absence of photographic confirmation of human source and other reports, therefore, does not of itself disprove the accuracy of the other sources.

The responsible agencies of the intelligence community appear to have done a creditable job in gathering and collecting quantities of data and information. The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

In addition, the intelligence people apparently invariably adopted the most optimistic estimate possible with respect to the information available. This is in sharp contrast to the customary military practice of emphasizing the worst situation which might be established by the accumulation of evidence.

There also appeared to be a tendency on the part of the intelligence people to discredit and downgrade refugee and exile reports. This was based on the general lack of experience and training of the refugees and exiles as military observers, their frequent inclusion of items not reasonably credible among those things which were within their power of observation as to time, place and comprehension, and on the consideration of the obvious self-interest of the Cuban sources.

Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that suc a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them. The error inherent in this estimate was clearly demonstrated by subsequent events. The danger that such pre-conceptions will control the weighing of the facts as events unfold is evident.

The influence of these and other factors resulted in several intelligenc judgments and estimates which, in the retrospect, proved to be erroneous. A few of these will be mentioned.

The fact that the intelligence community did not accept the fact that organized Soviet ground combat units were being introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation of this fact was obtained on October 25, and the related fact that the number of Soviets in Cuba was substantially underestimated throughout the entire crisis have already been discussed.

It has also been noted that the intelligence community did not estimate that strategic missiles would be introduced into Cuba until photographic confirmation was obtained on October 14th. It appears that, on this point, the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight. Among other things the discovery of the surface-to-air missile complex in the San Cristobal area on August 29th could logically have led to the assumption that they were being constructed to protect a strategic missile installation since it was clear that these SA-2's were not being emplaced for the purpose of protecting any existing or known military installation.

V. SITUATION FROM OCTOBER 22, 1962, TO TIME OF REMOVAL OF IL-28 BOMBERS

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

On the day following the President's statement, that is, on October 23, 1962, low altitude flights over Cuba were commenced and there was a concerted effort to obtain detailed information both about the entire island and selected targets.

During the period from October 22 to December 6 the Strategic Air Command flew a total of 82 high altitude sorties, and from October 23 through November 15, when the low level flights over the island were discontinued, the Air Force and Navy flew a total of 162 low altitude sorties.

B. Identification of Organized Soviet Ground Combat Units

As has already been mentioned, photographs obtained on October 25th provided the first confirmation of the presence of Soviet highly mobile armored task groups in Cuba. The information obtained as a result was first distribute to the operational military commands on October 30th. Up to that time, it was thought that the Soviet ground equipment arriving in Cuba was to be utilized by the Cuban forces.

C. Removal of Missiles and IL-28 Bombers

To a man the intelligence chiefs believe that, following the October crisis and quarantine, the Soviets removed from Cuba 42 medium range ballistic missiles and related equipment, intermediate range ballistic missile equipment, and 42 IL-28 jet light bombers.

A comprehensive and concentrated aerial reconnaissance and fleet observation program endeavored to cover every aspect of the exodus of this equipment. This program involved high and low altitude flights over Cuba, accompanied by intensive sea and aerial surveillance of the departing ships over Cuba and Caribbean waters and continued surveillance across the Atlantic.

The effort was directed at covering the dismantling and abandonment of the missile sites, at covering the roads and highways leading from the sites to the ports, and at covering the port areas to observe the material as it arrived, was assembled on the docks and loaded aboard ships.

As stated, the intelligence community believes that all strategic missiles and bombers which were in Cuba at the time of the quarantine were removed by the USSR. However, they acknowledge the existence of continuing reports to the contrary and freely concede that, in terms of absolutes, it is possible tha despite our surveillance program, we were misled and deceived.

VI. CURRENT MILITARY SITUATION IN CUBA

A. Intelligence Activities and Operations Generally

Since the withdrawal of the strategic missiles and the IL-28 bombers the intelligence community has turned its primary attention to surveillance of the situation as it now exists. High level U-2 photographic flights continue on a regular basis. Since the U-2 was shot down on October 27 there has been no further attempt to interfere with our aerial reconnaissance. The reason for this one incident amidst a pattern of acquiescence in the overflights remains a matter for speculation.

The collection efforts using the technical and the various human sources available, such as refugees, exiles, and returned prisoners of the ill-fated Bay of Pigs operations, and others is a continuing process. The close surveillance of merchant shipping arriving and departing Cuba, by naval air and surface ships continues, as does the peripheral surveillance by electronic reconnaissance and photographic aircraft. There is additional surveillance of the aircraft activity over and near Cuba, from bases and ships to the extent that radar range permits.

A particular focus of attention has been the prospect that Cuba might become a base for Soviet submarine operations. There have been repeated rumors and speculations that such is already the case. Much of this is related to the Soviet assistance to Cuba in improving and expanding certain commercial fishing facilities. The intelligence community, however, does not believe that in fact Cuba is now, or has been, a base for Soviet submarines.

Admittedly, however, no spectacular operation is necessary to provide temporary advance base type support to submarines, sufficient to greatly extend their time on station away from bloc nation ports, and to facilitate their operations generally. Reasonably sheltered anchorages or ports with sufficient depth, ready supplies of diesel fuel, fresh water, food supplies, and relaxation facilities ashore for the crews greatly extend the time away from home for any submarine. The presence of a few skilled technicians and a supply of the high usage repair parts would additionally extend operational periods considerably. The use of shore-based long range communication systems and information from surface and shore-based radio and radar nets would greatly facilitate Soviet submarine operations in the Caribbean as well as assist in attempts to evade detection.

B. Nature and Capabilities of Forces and Equipment Now in Cuba

1. Types and Numbers of Weapons - As previously mentioned, it was testified that the native Cuban forces are organized only at reinforced battalion level with the effective modern weapons for such units, including rifles, machine guns, light and heavy mortars and considerable field artillery. For an organization of that type they have a rather large amount of mechanized equipment, tanks, self-propelled artillery and armored personnel carriers.

They also have available a considerable amount of anti-tank guns and light antiaircraft guns suitable for use against low flying aircraft. How much of the large numbers of additional crew-operated weapons of the types mentioned above are now in Cuban hands is apparently not known or estimated.

The Soviet organization has a powerful modern array of weapons in plentiful numbers. There are 24 SA-2 sites of 6 launchers each, in a tight knit perimeter air defense of the entire Island of Cuba. These weapons are similar to our NIKE-HERCULES and are very good indeed. Their fire control system is also estimated as of a high order of effectiveness. They have brought in a large amount of ammunition for these units. The SA-2 system which is quite complex is manned by Soviet troops. It would take over a year of intensive training, including quite technical schooling, for the native Cuban troops to replace the Soviets in the SA-2 system. Probably associated with the SA-2 sites for low level air defense, as well as in local defense of other important sites, are some of the large additional numbers of light antiaircraft guns brought in by the Soviet Expeditionary Force. Whether any or all of these weapons are manned by Soviets is apparently not known.

There are four cruise missile sites, with missiles of a range of about 30 to 40 miles from their ground launchers. The missiles are placed as part of the coastal defense system of Cuba, which is the normal Soviet employment of these weapons. They are manned by Soviet naval crews. As an added feature of these missiles, there are at least one hundred fifty (150) of them in Cuba, far more than could be logically associated with the known missile launching sites. It may be speculated that the launchers for these missiles may have been in some of the bloc shipping turned back by the October Quarantine and thus failed to reach Cuba.

The Soviet naval contingent in Cuba also operates 12 KOMAR-type high-speed patrol craft as part of the Cuban coastal defenses. These boats are each equipped with a pair of cruise-type missiles. The missiles are estimated to have a range of 10 to 15 miles. These boats are under Soviet control, but Cubans are believed to have been observed aboard them. The KOMARS are apparently the only Soviet naval craft introduced into Cuba as part of their expedition.

The Soviet Army element of the Soviet expedition in Cuba is armed with almost all of the weapons found in large Soviet troop formations. Many of these weapons, of the type characteristic of elements of mechanized and motorized divisions, reinforced by artillery and other units, are known to be in surprisingly large numbers. As mentioned before, the amounts, if any, handed to the Cubans from the many hundreds of heavy weapons brought in by the ships of the Soviet expedition, are not fully known. These weapons include heavy tanks and medium tanks, to a total in Cuba, both in Soviet and Cuban hands, of almost 400. There are several score self-propelled assault guns; over 200 57mm anti-tank guns; over 500 light, medium and heavy mortars; over 600 field artillery pieces; around 400 antiaircraft guns, both 300 mm and 57 mm; almost 100 armored personnel carriers, a number of the truck-mounted multiple launchers for the 130 mm rocket, all brought in over and above the numbers already in Cuban hands. In addition, of course, quantities of various types of motor vehicles, radio equipment and engineer equipment were also brought in.

To the above must be added two very modern Soviet Army tactical missiles The first is the SNAPPER, a wire guided anti-tank missile similar to our SS-10 and SS-11. The second is the FROG, a rocket with a range of about 25 miles, which can be equipped with a nuclear warhead. It is similar to our HONEST JOHN.

According to our intelligence, the Soviet Air Force in Cuba has approximately 42 MIG-21's, one of their most modern high performance supersonic jet fighters. They are equipped with infra-red seeking, homing missiles similar to our SIDEWINDER. Associated with them is a net of radars and radios necessary for their control and the integration of the entire air defense system, SA-2 and fighter.

2. Strength and Capabilities of Forces

The estimate of the strength of the Cuban army remains at the same level as before the crisis, that is, 75,000 in the regular Army, 100,00 in the Militia and 100,000 in the form of a home guard.

The native Cuban Army capabilities are believed generally limited by their organization. They are probably able, as before the crisis, to suppress an insurrection, depending upon the degree of support the insurgents obtain from the people of Cuba, and the amount of effective outside help given. It also has a limited degree of static defense ability against modern highly organized and heavily supported forces such as those employed in United States amphibious and air-borne landing operations. The lack of an organization which would permit coordinated operations by units larger than reinforced battalions indicates a low probability that any such combat would be of long duration.

The Cuban Navy is estimated to number some 4000 to 5000 men and to consist of 6 KRONSTADT patrol craft and a relatively small number of other coastal patrol craft. Although its previously slight capabilities have been somewhat enhanced by the provision of Soviet equipment and by training, it is not believed to be very effective and is generally limited to coastal patrol activities.

The Cuban Air Force consists of a Cuban manned jet fighter force of about 70 MIG-15's, 17's, and 19's, about 14 World War II propeller fighters, about 18 propeller-driven tactical bombers, a considerable quantity of antiaircraft equipment, plus a limited number of trainers, transports, and helicopters. The modern MIG-21 jet fighters which are in Cuba are not believed to have been turned over to the Cubans.

The effectiveness of the Cuban Air Force is not readily apparent. The assortment of fighters for air defense have varying performance characteristics. The effectiveness of its bomber force would probably be limited to action against insurgents in or invaders of Cuba who were not possessed of any real air cover or air defense capability.

The Soviet Expeditionary Force is still currently credited by the intelligence community with a total strength of about 17,500. Of these, about 2000 are believed to be Soviet Navy, with about 1000 manning the cruise missile sites, and the remainder in the KOMAR missile-bearing patrol boats, supporting Cuban ships and headquarters, security and other miscellaneous assignments. About 7800 Soviets are believed in the Air Force and Air Defense system, which includes the personnel manning the SA-2 system. This leaves an estimated 7700 soldiers to man all the weapons and equipment of the Soviet Army contingent in Cuba.

At this point it must be said that there is no really hard evidence of the number of Soviets who are now in Cuba. While 17,500 is still the official estimate of our intelligence people, despite the reported withdrawal of some

4000 to 5000 since the first of the year, the level of confidence in its accuracy varies even within the intelligence community. Other sources present considerably higher estimates --some ranging up to 40,000 and more. Bearing in mind the substantial underestimation of last October, we can only conclude that no one-- outside of Soviet and Cuban official circles --knows how many Russian troops are now there. The 17,500 estimate is perhaps a minimum figure.

In any event, it is believed that the Soviet expedition, combined with the Cuban forces, as an entity, is quite powerful in a defensive sense. The air defense system is believed to be of a high order of effectiveness. The coastal defense cruise missiles do not form a tight perimeter defense of the Cuban shoreline, evidently because the quarantine turned back the necessary launchers to complete an interlocking net similar to the SA-2 system. This gap in the island defense may be partially covered by the KOMAR missile craft. The Soviet Army units, trained in mobile aggressive armored warfare, if well coordinated with the static defense ability of the Cuban native forces, could offer severe opposition to any attack. This opposition would be sufficient to make it necessary to mount a large sea-borne landing effort along with any desired air-borne effort in order to be sure of success. The public evidence of the forces assembled during the October crisis indicate that the combination of Soviet and Cuban forces would require the bulk of the ready forces in the United States and the Atlantic Ocean.

Based upon their judgment that all strategic missiles and offensive weapon systems have been removed, the intelligence community does not believe that Cuba now presents any major direct military threat to the United States or Latin America in an offensive or aggressive sense. Strategic weapons may or may not be now in Cuba. We can reach no conclusion on this because of lack of conclusive evidence.

It is clear, however, that as a source of weapons and small bands of provocateurs, saboteurs, agents of revolution and chaos it is a distinct and present threat to all of the Latin American nations with shores on the Atlanti Ocean and Caribbean Sea. It might be relatively difficult to engage in the smuggling of tanks, self-propelled guns, and heavy truck-towed artillery. Light mortars, machine guns, rifles, and the ammunition for these weapons, grenades, explosives, radios and bribe money are an entirely different matter. Gun running is an ancient art in Central and South America, well-practiced and well-understood in many quarters. Modern facilities make Cuba, as a centrally located base for such Communist operations, a present and grave menace to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere. The use of Cuba as a base for subversion will be discussed in more detail in a later report.

3. Reports of Concealed Strategic Weapons in Cuba

Reports from refugee, exile and other human sources insist that the strategic missiles and bombers were not removed from Cuba but are concealed in caves and otherwise. The intelligence community, although aware of these reports, have been unable to confirm them and adhere to the position that all strategic weapons are withdrawn.

It is fair to say, however, that this is a matter of great concern to the intelligence community. Based on skepticism, if nothing else, there is grave apprehension on this score. It is agreed that iron-clad assurance of the complete absence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba can come only as a result of thorough, penetrating on-site inspection by reliable observers. The current intelligence estimate that they are not present is based largely on the negative evidence that there is no affirmative proof to the contrary. This of course, was precisely the status of the matter prior to last October 14.

There is no doubt that there are literally thousands of caves and caverns in Cuba and that it is feasible to use many of these for the storage and concealment of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons. It is also true that military activity has been observed in connection with these caves. Our intelligence people are of the opinion that some of the caves are in fact utilized for the storage of military items and equipment other than strategic missiles, such as ammunition, explosives, etc.

The importance of making every effort to ascertain the truth with respect to this matter cannot be over-emphasized. The criticality of it can best be illustrated by the fact that the testimony established that, upon the assumption that all missiles and associated equipment and the necessary personnel were readily available near pre-selected sites in a state of complete readiness, mobile medium range missiles could be made operational in a matter of hours. Thus, if these missiles and their associated equipment remain in Cuba, the danger is clear and obvious.

The possible installation of advance submarine bases in Cuba has already been discussed.

4. Withdrawal of Soviet Personnel

Even though the intelligence community believes that a net 4000 to 5000 Soviet military personnel have been withdrawn from Cuba since the first of the year, because of what intelligence describes as "technical reasons" the previous intelligence estimate of approximately 17,500 Soviets in Cuba remains unchanged. At the very least this suggests to the Subcommittee that there is a low level of confidence in the original estimate. There is also some question in our minds as to the adequacy of the information as to the number of Soviets newly arriving. Admittedly, there could have been undetected arrivals at smaller ports, where it is known that cargo ships have repeated their prior practice of unloading at night under conditions of strict Soviet-imposed security. Since night photographic methods were not employed, we have little knowledge of what happened in these cases. In any event, as the matter stands at the writing of this report, the intelligence community does not believe it yet has sufficient concrete evidence to estimate any reduction in overall Soviet military capability on the Island. There is no evidence that any of the combat troops associated with the four armored groups have been withdrawn.

C. Summary of Threat Arising from Soviet Presence in Cuba

Our summary of the threat and potential threat which the Soviet presence in Cuba [redacted] presents to the Americas is as follows:

1. Cuba is an advanced Soviet base for subversive, revolutionary and agitational activities in the Western Hemisphere and affords the opportunity to export agents, funds, arms, ammunition and propaganda throughout Latin America.

2. Assuming without deciding that all strategic weapons have been withdrawn, there is the ever-present possibility of the stealthy re-introduction of strategic missiles and other offensive weapons, using the Soviet forces still in Cuba as camouflage and security for the activity.

3. Cuba serves as an advance intelligence base for the USSR.

4. The potential exists to establish electronic warfare capabilities based on Cuba.

5. The vital Panama Canal could be the target for sneak raids originating from Cuba.

6. Potentially, Cuba is a base from which the Soviets could interdict our vital air and sea lanes. It can now be used for the air, sea, and electronic surveillance of our military activities in the Southeast United States and the Caribbean.

7. Cuba's airfields could serve as recovery air bases for planes launched against the United States from the Soviet Union.

8. Advanced Soviet submarine bases could be established in Cuban ports with very little effort.

9. The continued presence of the Soviets in Cuba could require a further reorientation of the U.S. air defenses.

10. Cuba provides a base for the training of agents from other Latin American countries in subversive, revolutionary, agitational and sabotage techniques.

11. The very presence of the Soviets in Cuba affects adversely our nation's image and prestige. Our friends abroad will understandably doubt our ability to meet and defeat the forces of communism thousands of miles across the ocean if we prove unable to cope with the communist threat at our very doorstep.

A consideration of all these matters serves to emphasize the gravity of the threat to our national security which Cuba now represents.

D. Prospect of Internal Revolt or Invasion

The continued presence of the Soviet expedition in Cuba can now be seen to be a most effective shield against either internal revolt by native insurgents, or invasion by external forces from any source. The ringing of the

Island by the Soviet air defense and missile system, and the island-wide evidence of impressive, powerful, armored Russian troop units, all apparently immune from attack, has been and will be an increasing psychological damper to the fires of revolt. We can only expect, under present circumstances, that whatever capacity and will to resist communism may exist among the people in Cuba, will wither and shrink. The communization of the younger element creates simultaneously an increasingly militant communist nation.

The withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Cuba would remove a primary psychological prop of Castroism, and remove what is presently being used as a physical shield against any overt effort to keep alive the fires of freedom in Cuba. As mentioned before, the ability of Castro's native Cuban forces standing alone, to withstand any insurrection, depends upon the support the Cuban people give to the insurgents, and the effective outside help given to insurgent forces.

VII. CONCLUDING STATEMENT

Barring some development which is unforeseen at this time, the public debate will probably continue as to whether missiles and other strategic weapons are now based in Cuba and as to the number of Soviet troops being maintained there. These things are certainly of undeniable importance. The matter of basic and fundamental importance, however, and the source of the real threat, is that international communism now has a firm foothold in this hemisphere and that, if we permit it to do so, it is here to stay.

The Soviets are in Cuba primarily for the purpose of increasing and spreading communism's influence and power in Latin America and we can be sure that they will exploit their foothold to the greatest extent possible. The paramount danger at this time is that the nations of this hemisphere may be subverted one by one and be exploited, in turn, for subversive and revolutionary activities. By this process of erosion our neighbors to the South may fall nation by nation until the entire hemisphere is lost and the Communist goal of isolating the United States has been attained.

Communism, of course, operates on a world-wide scale and its methods and techniques are always adapted to the environment in which it operates. With this in mind, the value to the USSR of the occupation of Cuba is apparent. The techniques of communist subversion may vary from simple infiltration to violent intervention. Whatever its form, however, in Cuba as elsewhere it is conceived, developed and perfected by the leaders of world communism for the purpose of furthering their concept of world domination. Its aim and goal is to destroy existing political, economic and social orders and to replace them with new and dictatorial regimes which presuppose the complete physical and moral control of subjugated peoples.

This aim and goal has already been ahcieved in Cuba. It will be abhieved elsewhere in Latin America unless positive steps are taken to prevent it. We must be prepared to take appropriate and positive action in our own national self-interest and in the interest of the collective security of the Western Hemisphere.

The Communist domination and occupation of Cuba, and the resulting menace to our security, requires and demands that the United States be ever alert and vigilant to all of its sinister implications. We must exercise the greatest surveillance and watchfulness possible, and use all available resources, for the purpose of ascertaining the true military situation in that unhappy island and to insure that we will not again be deceived and surprised. The entire Cuban problem, both military and political, should be accorded the highest possible priority by our governmental officials to the end that the evil threat which the Soviet occupation of Cuba represents will be eliminated at an early date.

Mr. Califano
Col Patchell ?

March 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT A. HURWITCH, Department of State

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

Pursuant to our telephone conversation, the attached draft has been reviewed and the Department of Defense has no objection to it, subject to the following changes:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy.

3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November," "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4. Page 37, Lines 13-15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

TO: General Counsel
Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy.

3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November", "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4. Page 37, Lines 13 - 15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

Joseph F Carroll

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

28 March 1963

U17,171/P-2

SUBJECT: Missile Crisis Section of the President's Draft Report to Congress on US Participation in the UN During 1962

TO: General Counsel
Department of Defense

Intelligence content of subject draft has been reviewed and the following comments are submitted:

1. Page 3, Line 8: Change number "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy, based on official Department of the Navy records.

2. Page 3, Line 10: Change "12" to "16" and "25" to "24." Reason: Accuracy.

3. Page 34, Lines 14 and 15: Insert "10" before word "November", "and observed" before "42," and "ballistic" before "missiles." Reason: Clarity and more accurate detail.

4. Page 37, Lines 13 - 15: Insert "by December 6" before "its promise" and "42" before "IL-28." Eliminate the sentence "and, by December 6, the US was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left," and substitute "their removal being confirmed by aerial reconnaissance and by along-side observation at sea on the decks of the Soviet ships carrying them back to the USSR." Reason: Provide additional positive detail, particularly with reference to the IL-28 removal being based upon confirmed observation and not merely upon information provided by the USSR.

5. Page 42, Line 9: Insert "more vigilant and" before "stronger." Reason: Strengthen prime point that increased awareness of Communist duplicity and potential threats resulted from crisis, particularly in the OAS.

JOSEPH F. CARROLL
Lieutenant General, USAF
Director

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

March 27, 1963

10:40 am
3/28/63
phoned Col. "Tiny"
Moore & he'll
have DIA
look at it
& report to me

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)

GC 2490

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
5010-104
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr Califano

TO : CCA - Mr. Hurwitch

DATE: March 27, 1963

FROM : RPA - William G. Bowdler WGB

SUBJECT: Defense Clearance of Missile Crisis Section of President's Report To Congress on US Participation in UN During 1962.

UNP, with RPA's cooperation, has prepared the attached draft chapter on the missile crisis for the President's annual report to Congress on US participation in the UN.

Mr. Monsma is handling clearance of the chapter within ARA. I have been asked to obtain Defense clearance. When I spoke to Mr. Knaur about this last week, he touched base with Mr. Yarmolinsky and came back with the reply that the most expeditious way to get DOD clearance is through CCA channels. Could you please arrange for this to be done as quickly as possible as the report is now overdue?

ARA/RPA:WGBowdler:jjv

Mr. Califano

March 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Attached is a draft of the missile crisis section of the President's Report to Congress on United States Participation in the United Nations during 1962.

The Department of State has drafted this report and sent it to me for Department of Defense clearance. I should appreciate it if you would read the report and return it to me with any comments by 1200 hours on March 29, 1963.

Signed
Joseph A. Califano, Jr.

Joseph A. Califano, Jr.
Special Assistant to the
Secretary of the Army

Attachment
As Stated

cc:
Mr. Yarmolinsky
Mr. McGiffert
General Carroll (DIA)

DRAFT PRESIDENT'S REPORT 1962

SOVIET OFFENSIVE WEAPONS IN CUBA

Soviet Buildup

On October 22, President Kennedy announced to the nation and to the world the "secret, swift and extraordinary buildup" by the Soviet Union of offensive missiles in Cuba and the initial steps that the United States was taking to cope with this threat. Information on the buildup had been given to the President the previous Tuesday morning (October 16) and, during the week that followed, surveillance was stepped up, confirming evidence evaluated, a course of action decided upon, friendly governments notified and consulted, the members and machinery of the Organization of American States (O.A.S.) brought into the picture, and American defenses in the Caribbean strengthened and put on the alert.

The President revealed that a serious threat against the peace and security of the Americas was being secretly mounted by the Soviet Union on the "imprisoned island" of Cuba. Sites for medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) capable of carrying a nuclear warhead 1,000 nautical miles had been rapidly and secretly installed and additional sites not yet completed were designed for intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) capable of travelling twice as far and thus posing a nuclear threat to most of the major cities of the Western Hemisphere. This urgent transformation of Cuba into a strategic base with nuclear striking capacity constituted an explicit threat to the peace and security of the Americas in defiance of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Pact) of 1947, "the traditions of this nation and hemisphere," and the Charter of the United Nations. This Soviet action contradicted the repeated assurances of Soviet spokesmen, both

/publicly and

publicly and privately delivered, that the arms buildup in Cuba would retain its original defensive character. Neither the United States nor the world community, the President emphasized, could tolerate the deliberate deception and offensive threat represented by the clandestine deployment of strategic nuclear weapons.

To meet this threat the United States was taking immediately the following steps: 1) to halt the buildup, a strict quarantine of all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba was being initiated and, should offensive military preparations continue, "further action will be justified;" 2) the United States declared that it would regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against the Western Hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet Union; 3) Guantanamo was being reinforced; 4) the Council of the Organization of American States was being convened to apply the Rio Treaty in support of hemispheric security; and 5) under the Charter of the United Nations, the United States was requesting an emergency meeting of the Security Council. Finally, the President called on Chairman Khrushchev "to halt and eliminate this clandestine, reckless, and provocative threat to world peace and to stable relations between our two nations."

U.S. Objective

This was a difficult and dangerous effort on which the United States had set out, the President concluded, "but the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing." On the military side, steps were taken to strengthen defenses in the Caribbean and to put United States forces in a posture to apply the quarantine. The Department of Defense had ordered all tours of duty of Navy and Marine personnel extended until further notice; the

/Guantanamo naval

Guantanamo naval base defenses were strengthened; air power was built up in the Southeastern portion of the United States; and military deployment put 5,000 marines and 40 naval vessels in the Caribbean, initially as part of a training exercise. Following the resolution adopted by the Organ of Consultation of the Council of the Organization of American States (described below) the President issued a proclamation establishing the quarantine of Cuba as of 10 A.M. on October 24. The Department of Defense ordered the interdiction of 25 Soviet merchant vessels known to be headed for Cuba. At 8 A.M. on October 25 the first interception of a Soviet ship, the oil tanker Bucharest, took place, and the ship was allowed to proceed. 12 of the 25 Soviet vessels heading for Cuba turned around and no encounter with a contraband-carrying vessel occurred during the Cuba affair.

From the beginning it was clear that in the political and diplomatic realm U.S. policy had two immediate tasks. The first and most proximate task of U.S. diplomacy was to show that the Soviets had in fact used guile and deception to emplace in Cuba offensive nuclear weapons, and that our evidence was conclusive. The second was to halt further shipments and bring about rapidly and effectively the removal of the offensive weapons, under U.N. supervision, before the quarantine could be lifted. The United States was prepared to negotiate on modalities and to consider various formulae but not to abandon this goal.

From the start, both the Organization of American States and the United Nations were involved. Resources and institutions of this hemisphere were used to underline its solidarity and determination, and to convince the Soviet Union that elimination of the offensive weapons was a purpose to which the hemisphere was solidly commited. From the start, too, it was clear that

/the United Nations

the United Nations would have a crucial role. It was the forum in which the evidence of Soviet guilt could be most convincingly exposed to a world-wide audience, world opinion mobilized, and the world verdict pronounced. It was, also, a ready and efficient mechanism for diplomatic communications. The United Nations served as a site where U.S. and Soviet negotiators could easily meet. The Secretary-General himself supplied an important link between the parties particularly during the first days when tension was highest. Thirdly, although Cuba prevented their employment, the United Nations proved itself willing and able to devise acceptable mechanisms for inspection and verification of dismantling and removal of the offensive weapons and for safeguards against their reintroduction. The United Nations was also prepared to carry out the necessary operational responsibilities. Simultaneously with the President's speech, therefore, the United States took diplomatic steps to set in motion the political machinery of the O.A.S. and the U.N.

O.A.S. Action

In Washington the U.S. Representative on the Council of the Organization of American States (C.O.A.S.) sent a note to the Acting Chairman requesting the immediate convocation of the Council as a Provisional Organ of Consultation under Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (Rio Treaty). This article provides for immediate consultation on measures to be taken for the common defense and for the maintenance of peace and security of the Continent when "the inviolability of the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American States should be affected by an aggression which is not an armed attack or by an extra-continental conflict, or by any other fact or situation that might endanger the peace of America."

/The O.A.S.

The O.A.S. Council met on the morning of October 23. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sitting as the U.S. Representative described the nature of the threat to this hemisphere and the counter-measures which the United States considered it essential for the inter-American system to take. He stated that "the Soviet intervention in this hemisphere with major offensive weapons challenges as never before the determination of the American Governments to carry out hemispheric commitments solemnly assumed in inter-American treaties and resolutions for the defense of the peace and security of the nations of the hemisphere against extra-continental aggression or intervention." He proposed that under the Rio Treaty the Council, serving as Organ of Consultation, without delay "call for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons of offensive capability and ... recommend ... that the member states of the Organization of American States take the necessary measures to ensure that Cuba does not continue to receive additional offensive weapons ... and if necessary to prevent the offensive capacity already acquired by the Castro regime from being used to destroy the peace and security of the hemisphere."

The Secretary noted that the United States was simultaneously asking the U.N. Security Council to act in the matter. He observed: "The threat is to our hemisphere and we have primary responsibility and duty to act as we are now doing, as a hemisphere. But the threat originates from outside the hemisphere and it is appropriate that the extra-continental power which challenges our inter-American commitments ... be dealt with in the forum in which that power participates. It is therefore fitting in this case that the Security Council of the United Nations be requested to call upon this member

/to refrain

to refrain from his aggressive actions against us and seek to enforce upon him its decisions. Meanwhile, without awaiting the outcome of the United Nations approach, we must ensure that our hemisphere is effectively quarantined against any further addition to Soviet offensive nuclear military power in our midst."

Following a general discussion of the danger confronting the hemisphere the Council voted 19 to 0 (Bolivia abstained for lack of instructions) to constitute itself provisionally as the Organ of Consultation (C.O.A.S./O.C.). Then, at the suggestion of the U.S. Representative, the Organ of Consultation adjourned for several hours to permit a number of delegations to consult their governments and receive instructions on the draft resolution presented by the United States to deal with the threat confronting the hemisphere.

The Organ of Consultation reconvened that same afternoon. Debate centered on the draft resolution. As each representative spoke, it became evident that the American republics were solidly united in their determination to resist this most dangerous threat tothe peace and security of the hemisphere. A few delegations were not in a position to vote affirmatively on certain provisions of the resolution, attributable for the most part to domestic constitutional considerations, but when the resolution as a whole was put to a vote, the support was unanimous. In one of the historic decisions of the inter-American system the Organ of Consultation: (1) called for "the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with any offensive capability," and (2) recommended that "the member states, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively including the use of armed force,

/which they

which they may deem necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent." The resolution also expressed "the hope that the Security Council will, in accordance with the Resolution introduced by the United States, dispatch United Nations observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Following the meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States/Organ of Consultation and pursuant to the recommendations contained in the second paragraph of the resolution adopted, President Kennedy issued the Presidential Proclamation interdicting the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, to commence at 10:00 A.M. Eastern Standard Time on October 24. The proclamation stated that the Secretary of Defense "shall take appropriate measures to prevent the delivery of prohibited material to Cuba, employing the land, sea and air forces of the United States in cooperation with any forces that may be made available by other American states." The Secretary of Defense was authorized to designate prohibited or restricted zones and prescribed routes and declared that "any vessel or craft which may be proceeding toward Cuba may be intercepted and may be directed to identify itself, its cargo, equipment and stores and its ports of call, to stop, to lie to, to submit to visit and search, or to proceed as directed." Any vessel that refused to comply with directions might be taken into custody. In carrying out the order force was not to be used except in case of failure or refusal to comply with directions or

/regulations

regulations after reasonable efforts had been made to communicate with the vessel or craft, or in self-defense.

In the days immediately following, twelve other American republics offered assistance in support of the quarantine operation: Argentina, Dominican Republic, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, and Nicaragua. Several of these offers included naval units, posing the problem of coordination of forces. Consequently, on November 5, the C.O.A.S./O.C. recommended that the contributing member states take among themselves the technical measures necessary to establish an efficient and coordinated action. Pursuant to this recommendation, the governments of Argentina, the Dominican Republic and the United States on November 9 notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. of the establishment of an Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force into which they were integrating their respective naval units and placing officers of the participating navies on the staff of the Commander of the Combined Quarantine Force.

Security Council Consideration

Simultaneously with the call for a meeting of the O.A.S. Council, Ambassador Adlai Stevenson in New York requested the President of the Security Council -- that month the Soviet Representative -- to call an urgent meeting of the Council "to deal with the dangerous threat to the peace and security of the world caused by the secret establishment in Cuba by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of launching bases and the installation of long-range ballistic missiles capable of carrying thermonuclear warheads to most of North and South America." "The United States," he wrote, "now has incontrovertible evidence that the U.S.S.R. has been installing in Cuba a whole series of facilities for launching offensive nuclear missiles and other offensive weapons and installing the weapons themselves."

/The establishment

The establishment of these bases, Ambassador Stevenson declared, "constitutes a grave threat to the peace and security of this hemisphere and of the whole world." It should be the purpose of Security Council action, he concluded, "to bring about the immediate dismantling and withdrawal of the Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons in Cuba, under the supervision of United Nations observers, to make it possible to lift the quarantine which is being put into effect." He also expressed the willingness of the United States to confer with the Soviet Union "on measures to remove the existing threat to the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world."

Ambassador Stevenson transmitted a draft resolution which called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other offensive weapons, and which authorized the sending to Cuba of a U.N. observer corps to assure and report on compliance with the resolution. The resolution called for an end to the U.S. quarantine of military shipments to Cuba when the above terms were complied with and recommended that the United States and the U.S.S.R. "confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat."

The Security Council held four meetings on October 23, 24, and 25. By the time the first meeting opened on the afternoon of October 23, the Soviet Union and Cuba had introduced two parallel letters to the President of the Security Council making similar requests for an urgent meeting of the Council in an attempt to change the focus of the question. They contended that U.S. countermeasures and "aggressive action" against Cuba constituted the real threat to peace in the Caribbean. Under Rule 37 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure, the Cuban Representative was invited to participate in the discussion of the matter before the Security Council.

/Ambassador

Ambassador Stevenson's opening speech put the issue in the perspective of Soviet post-war aggressive expansionism. He traced the "vast plan of piecemeal aggression" and "the basic drive to abolish the world of the Charter" which had characterized Soviet policy in the post-war years and which had not been altered by the present Soviet Government. Contrasting the history of Soviet expansionism and rejection of the principles of the Charter with the United States record of loyal support for the Organization and "the world of the Charter," Ambassador Stevenson regretted that some members "seemed to believe that the cold war is a private war between two great super powers." "It is not a private struggle," he insisted, "it is a world civil war -- a contest between the pluralistic world and the monolithic world -- a contest between the world of the Charter and the world of Communist conformity." "The Castro regime," he pointed out, "has aided and abetted an invasion of this hemisphere" and "has given the Soviet Union a staging area in this hemisphere" by inviting "an extra-continental, anti-democratic and expansionist power into the bosom of the American family" and by making itself "an accomplice in the communist enterprise of world domination." The Soviet Union, he continued, had secretly transformed Cuba into a formidable missile and strategic airbase, armed with the deadliest, most far-reaching modern nuclear weapons, in an attempt to put all the Americas under a "nuclear gun" and to intensify the "Soviet diplomacy of blackmail." The day of forbearance is past, he concluded. "If the United States and the other nations of the Western Hemisphere should accept this new phase of aggression, we would be delinquent in our obligations to world peace." He could not believe that the Soviet leadership had deluded itself into supposing the United States lacked the nerve and will to use its power, and he voiced the hope that the Soviets would call an end "to this new

/phase of

phase of aggression." He urged the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons from Cuba.

Ambassador Stevenson then informed the Security Council, in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter, that the Council of the O.A.S. had adopted a resolution by 19 affirmative votes (as noted above) calling for the dismantling and withdrawal of the offensive weapons, recommending that member states of the O.A.S. take all measures to ensure that the threat was removed from the continent, and expressing the hope that the Security Council will "dispatch U.N. observers to Cuba at the earliest moment."

Ambassador Stevenson thus made three points before the Security Council which defined the themes for the debate during the rest of the week:

(1) The Soviet action in sending thousands of military technicians to its puppet in the Western Hemisphere, supplying jet bombers capable of delivering nuclear weapons, installing missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads and preparing sites for additional missiles with a range of 2,200 miles, and doing these things through deceit and under the cloak of secrecy, were in defiance of the security commitments of the Organization of American States and in violation of the Charter of the United Nations, and contained a manifest threat to this hemisphere and to the whole world.

(2) The action and policy of the United States in this matter were in consonance with the U.N. Charter and had the unanimous backing of the Organization of American States.

(3) The Security Council should remove the threat by calling, as the resolution proposed, for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and all offensive weapons; authorizing and requesting the Secretary-General to dispatch to Cuba a U.N. observer corps to assure and

/report in

report in compliance with this resolution; calling for termination of the quarantine upon U.N. certification of such compliance; and urgently recommending that the United States and the Soviet Union confer promptly on measures to remove the existing threat to the security and the peace of the world and report thereon to the Security Council.

Following Ambassador Stevenson's presentation, the Cuban and Soviet Representatives made their initial statements. The Cuban Representative, Mr. Garcia-Inchaustegui, denounced the naval "blockade" as an "act of war" and declared that the Cuban people had answered the "armed attack" with general mobilization. He asked the Council to call for the immediate withdrawal of all troops, ships and planes deployed on the approaches to Cuban shores, and for the cessation of all "interventionist" measures. The Cuban Representative also contended that the United States had no right to ask for dismantling and disarmament and that "logically, U.N. observers should be sent to the U.S. bases from which invaders and pirates emerge to punish and harass a small state." He insisted that Cuba "will not accept any kind of observers in matters which fall within our domestic jurisdiction."

The Soviet Representative, Ambassador Zorin, declared that the United States charges were "a clumsy attempt to cover up aggressive actions" in Cuba. He described the U.S. quarantine as a "new and extremely dangerous act of aggression" and as "undisguised piracy." During this first encounter, while avoiding direct reference to the presence of Soviet missiles or bombers in Cuba, Ambassador Zorin declared that accusations that the Soviet Union had "set up offensive armaments in Cuba" were false, and officially confirmed the statement already made by the Soviet Union in this connection, "that the Soviet Government has not directed and is not directing to Cuba any offensive armaments." He also recalled the statement of Soviet Minister for Foreign Affairs

/Andrei Gromyko

Andrei Gromyko in the General Assembly just a month previously (September 21, 1962) that "any sober-minded man knows that Cuba is not ... building up her forces to such a degree that she can pose a threat to the United States ... or else a threat to any state of the Western Hemisphere."

Ambassador Zorin submitted to the Security Council a statement published by the Soviet Government that day which addressed a "serious warning to the United States Government, to advise it that, in carrying out the measures announced by President Kennedy, it is taking on itself a heavy responsibility for the fate of the world;" declared that the Soviet Government will do "everything in its power to frustrate the aggressive designs of U.S. imperialistic circles;" and appealed to all governments and peoples to raise their voices in protest against the "aggressive acts" of the United States and strongly to condemn such acts. He introduced a draft resolution condemning the "actions of the Government of the United States designed to violate the Charter of the United Nations and to intensify the threat of war." The Soviet resolution insisted that the United States "repeal its decision on the control of ships of other states going towards the shores of Cuba," and called upon the United States, Cuba, and U.S.S.R. "to establish contacts and enter into negotiations for the purpose of normalizing the situation and thereby removing the threat of war."

At the request of the Representative of Ghana the meeting was adjourned to the following morning so that representatives might consult with other delegations outside the Council.

The Next Morning: October 24

The next morning, the Security Council heard the Representative of Venezuela, Mr. Sosa-Rodriguez, associate the Latin American nations with the action taken by the United States pursuant to the O.A.S. resolution. He noted

/that "it has

that "it has been proved that the Soviet Union has set up in Cuba rocket bases that might deliver nuclear missiles to about 1,000 miles distance, and that, apparently, it is at present setting up others for rockets with a range of up to 2,200 miles." This had created an atmosphere of insecurity and concern in the countries of the American hemisphere which felt themselves directly threatened by such weapons. The weapons in Cuba, the Venezuelan Representative emphasized, were no longer defensive but offensive, and "they are of a magnitude that might be sufficient to wipe out any of the American republics and drag the world into the holocaust of nuclear war." He described the apprehension felt throughout the continent at Cuban subversive activities, including the introduction of agents, propaganda, and weapons to equip guerrilla forces in American republics. Ambassador Sosa-Rodriguez recalled the resolution adopted by the Organization of American States and declared that he was speaking for the entire continent in asking the Security Council to take measures to stop nuclear weapons from arriving in Cuba and to have the presently existing bases of nuclear rockets in Cuba dismantled.

Sir Patrick Dean, Representative of the United Kingdom, noted that by no stretch even of the Soviet imagination could a nuclear missile with a range of 2,200 miles in Cuba be called defensive, and recalled assurances on this point by Foreign Minister Gromyko and President Dorticos of Cuba at the General Assembly the previous month. "While the Soviet Government were acting their lie," he stated, "the orders were being given, plans laid and preparations being made for the supply of missiles to Cuba. Who can possibly believe in the honesty of the Soviet Government's intentions in these circumstances?" The United Kingdom, he concluded, considered that the United States acted properly by coming to the Security Council at the first possible moment. Now the Security Council must take immediate and urgent steps to restore confidence

/in the Western

in the Western Hemisphere by having these offensive missiles dismantled and withdrawn. The United Kingdom fully supported the U.S. resolution before the Council.

The Representative of Rumania, Mr. Malitza, supported the Soviet position. The Irish Foreign Minister, Mr. Aiken, underlined world concern with the growth of Soviet intervention in Cuba. He appreciated Cuban concern with its national security, "but it is a far cry from that to a military buildup of the kind which the Cuban Government now appears to have embarked upon with the massive assistance of the Soviet Union." He could not understand "why the Soviet Union should have chosen this moment to establish new missile and bomber bases on the island of Cuba?" The Foreign Minister believed he perceived some common ground in the U.S. statement to the Security Council of October 22 which declared U.S. willingness "to confer with the Soviet Union on measures to remove the existing threat to security of the Western Hemisphere," and in the Soviet draft resolution which proposed that the United States, U.S.S.R. and Cuba establish contacts and enter into negotiations.

The Security Council reconvened that evening, some forty-eight hours after President Kennedy's historic speech. The naval quarantine had gone into effect at 10:00 A.M. that morning. Members knew that if a Soviet ship attempted to run the quarantine the result would be serious. They also knew that the President had indicated that the quarantine was an "immediate step" which would be followed by "further action" if the Soviet missiles were not removed.

At this meeting the Council heard statements by those members who had not yet spoken: France, China, Chile, United Arab Republic, and Ghana. In addition to expressions of support for the U.S. resolution by France and China, the highlights of the meeting were the statement of Chile, the United Arab

/Republic-Ghana

Republic-Ghana "restraint resolution," and the first formal intervention of the Secretary-General. Ambassador Seydoux, the Representative of France, noted that "the appearance of foreign nuclear missiles on Cuban soil...cannot be considered as other than a serious initiative aimed at creating a new war front in a region which up to now has been free from such threats." He stated that the U.S. had demonstrated clearly that it is seeking a peaceful solution in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and that the solution proposed by the U.S. was desirable in the interest of the countries concerned and "in order to banish once and for all the dangers with which world peace is threatened by the recent developments in Cuba." Ambassador Liu, for the Republic of China, noted that it was particularly disturbing to see Cuba transformed, as a result of Sino-Soviet intervention, into an armed base for communist penetration of the Americas. He declared that the measures initiated by the United States designed to call an immediate halt to the shipment of military material to Cuba were justified and supported the U.S. draft resolution as a reasonable and peaceful solution.

Speaking for Chile, Ambassador Schweitzer endorsed the security measures of the regional system and expressed support for the U.S. draft resolution. He welcomed the authorization that the U.S. draft resolution gave to the Secretary-General to dispatch an observer corps to Cuba. "Unfortunately," he said, "the Representative of Cuba yesterday rejected this idea. At such a decisive moment as this, we believe Cuba should trust the methods of the United Nations for putting out the flames of conflict and for ensuring peace. One such method could be to ensure the United Nations presence in a zone of conflict .... We make a fervent and heartfelt appeal to Cuba to accept such a procedure."

/The United Arab

The United Arab Republic Representative, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, declared that his country "cannot condone the unilateral decision of the United States of America to exercise the quarantine" which he characterized as contrary to international law and likely to increase world tension. He recalled that Dr. Dorticos had told the General Assembly that the weapons Cuba had acquired were "defensive in nature" and called for "normalization" of relations between Cuba and the United States. At the same time he reaffirmed U.A.R. policies against the spread of nuclear weapons. He urged all parties to refrain from tension-aggravating action and called for negotiations. The Ghanian Representative, Mr. Quaison-Sackey, took a similar position, stating that he had no "incontrovertible proof...as to the offensive character of military developments in Cuba" and therefore could not condone the quarantine. He also called for negotiations to resolve the crisis on the basis of "mutual respect for sovereign rights." The U.A.R.-Ghana joint draft resolution requested the Secretary-General "to promptly confer with the parties directly concerned on immediate steps to be taken to remove the existing threat to world peace, and to normalize the situation in the Caribbean;" and called on the parties concerned to comply forthwith with the resolution, to provide every assistance to the Secretary-General, and "to refrain meanwhile from any action which may directly or indirectly further aggravate the situation." The formula proposed was thus limited to a general appeal for mediation by the Secretary-General, but provided neither for the suspension of the Soviet offensive buildup nor for U.N. involvement in inspection and verification.

U Thant Proposal of October 24

At the close of the meeting, the Secretary-General revealed that he had

/just addressed

just addressed an urgent appeal to President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev which proposed "the voluntary suspension of all arms shipments to Cuba, and also the voluntary suspension of the quarantine measures involving the searching of ships bound for Cuba." Thant believed that such voluntary suspension for a period of two to three weeks would greatly ease the situation and give time to the parties to "meet and discuss." He offered to "make myself available to all parties for whatever services I may be able to perform."

In addition to this appeal to President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, the Secretary-General took the occasion of the Security Council meeting to address an urgent appeal to the President and Premier of Cuba, declaring that "it would also contribute greatly to the same end if the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba would be suspended during the period of negotiations." He then appealed to "the parties concerned" to enter into negotiations immediately, "even this night," irrespective of other procedures, with the first subject to be discussed being the "modalities" to achieve his suggestions. Significant in U Thant's intervention were his offer to make himself available to U.S. and Soviet negotiators "for whatever services" he might perform and the concrete suggestion for "suspension" of Soviet arms shipments and of the construction and development of major military installations in exchange for the suspension of the quarantine.

The next day, President Kennedy's reply reminded the Secretary-General that the threat "was created by the secret introduction of offensive weapons into Cuba, and the answer lies in the removal of such weapons." The President noted that the Secretary-General had "made certain suggestions and...invited preliminary talks to determine whether satisfactory arrangements can be assured" and indicated that "Ambassador Stevenson is ready to discuss promptly

/these

these arrangements with you." Premier Khrushchev's reply welcomed U Thant's initiative and characterized the situation "as highly dangerous and calling for the immediate intervention by the United Nations."

When the Security Council reconvened Thursday afternoon for what proved to be the last formal meeting on the Cuban crisis, Ambassador Stevenson welcomed both the course adopted by the Soviet Union the previous day to avoid direct confrontations in the zone of quarantine and the report that Mr. Khrushchev had agreed to the proposals advanced by the Secretary-General. Nevertheless, the situation remained serious and Ambassador Stevenson set the theme in his opening remark by inviting the Council to address itself to "the realities of the situation posed by the buildup of nuclear striking power in Cuba."

Ambassador Stevenson cautioned the Council not to forget that "we are here today...for one single reason: because the Soviet Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the world that nothing was further from its thoughts." Already the Communists had attempted to distort the record by arguing that it was not the Soviet Union which created this threat to peace by secretly installing these weapons in Cuba, "but that it was the United States which created this crisis by discovering and reporting these installations. This is the first time, I confess," the U.S. Representative continued, "that I have ever heard it said that the crime is not the burglary but the discovery of the burglary." He noted that some representatives in the Council say that they do not know whether the Soviet Union has in fact built in Cuba installations capable of firing nuclear missiles over ranges from 1,000 - 2,000 miles. If further doubt remained on this score the United States would

/gladly

gladly exhibit photographic evidence to prove the truth of the charges.

One by one Ambassador Stevenson demolished the arguments that Ambassador Zorin had presented at the first Security Council meeting. As for the "thirty-five bases in foreign countries" which the Soviet Representative had mentioned, the fact was that there were such missiles with the forces of only three of our allies -- the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey -- and that these were established by the decision of Heads of Government in December 1957 "which was compelled to authorize such arrangements by virtue of a prior Soviet decision to introduce its own missiles capable of destroying the countries of Western Europe." Why was it necessary for the Western Hemisphere nations to act with such speed? The "speed and stealth" of the Soviet offensive buildup in Cuba demonstrated the premeditated attempt by the Soviet Union "to confront this hemisphere with a fait accompli." If the United States had not acted promptly and had delayed its counteraction, "the nuclearization of Cuba would have been quickly completed." He stressed that the United States had acted promptly to put into process "the political machinery which we pray will achieve a solution to this grave crisis." The one action in the last few days which had strengthened the peace was the determination to stop this further spread of weapons in this hemisphere. The United States was now in the Security Council, Ambassador Stevenson noted, because it wished the machinery of the United Nations "to take over to reduce these tensions and to interpose itself to eliminate this aggressive threat to peace and to ensure the removal from this hemisphere of offensive nuclear weapons and the corresponding lifting of the quarantine."

When Zorin again attempted to delude the Council about the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup, a dramatic encounter occurred between

/Stevenson and

Stevenson and Zorin, which exposed the truth beyond doubt.

STEVENSON: Well, let me say something to you, Mr. Ambassador: We do have the evidence. We have it, and it is clear and incontrovertible. And let me say something else: Those weapons must be taken out of Cuba.

Next, let me say to you that, if I understood you, you said -- with a trespass on credulity that excels your best -- that our position had changed since I spoke here the other day because of the pressures of world opinion and a majority of the United Nations. Well, let me say to you, sir: You are wrong again. We have had no pressure from anyone whatsoever. We came here today to indicate our willingness to discuss U Thant's proposals -- and that is the only change that has taken place.

But let me also say to you, sir, that there has been a change. You, the Soviet Union, have sent these weapons to Cuba. You, the Soviet Union, have upset the balance of power in the world. You, the Soviet Union, have created this new danger -- not the United States....

Finally, Mr. Zorin, I remind you that the other day you did not deny the existence of these weapons. Instead, we heard that they had suddenly become defensive weapons. But today -- again, if I heard you correctly -- you say that they do not exist, or that we have not proved they exist -- and you say this with another fine flood of rhetorical scorn. All right, sir, let me ask you one simple question: Do you, Ambassador Zorin, deny that the U.S.S.R. has placed and is placing medium and intermediate-range missiles and sites in Cuba? Yes or no? Do not wait for the interpretation. Yes or no?

ZORIN: I am not in an American courtroom, sir, and therefore I do not wish to answer a question that is put to me in the fashion in which a prosecutor puts questions. In due course, sir, you will have your reply.

/STEVENSON:

STEVENSON: You are in the courtroom of world opinion right now, and you can answer "yes" or "no". You have denied that they exist -- and I want to know whether I have understood you correctly.

ZORIN: Will you please continue your statement, sir? You will have your answer in due course.

Inasmuch as Zorin delayed his response, Stevenson proceeded to present conclusive evidence of the existence of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. This consisted of a display of enlarged aerial photographs and maps pinpointing the details and location in Cuba of Soviet bomber aircraft and of Soviet missile bases, complete with launching sites and supporting equipment, "in short, all of the requirements to maintain, load, and fire these terrible weapons." When Zorin's reply again evaded the question of whether the Soviet Union had installed offensive missiles in Cuba, Stevenson challenged the Soviet Union to ask the Cubans to permit a UN team to visit the sites he had identified in order to authenticate the evidence.

The proposal made by the United Arab Republic, and supported by Ghana, to postpone further work of the Council and to adjourn the meeting was adopted without objection, in the light of the willingness of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. to consult with the Secretary-General on his suggestions of the previous day. The Security Council thus adjourned but remained "seized" of the problem while the parties negotiated. The scene then shifted from the formal chamber of the Security Council to the informal chambers of the Secretary-General.

/Weekend Negotiations:

Weekend Negotiations: The Kennedy-Khrushchev Letters

That weekend (October 26-28) there was an exchange of letters between Moscow and Washington which transformed the nature of the Cuba crisis. On October 26, Khrushchev sent a letter to President Kennedy making certain proposals on the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba. On October 27, another letter from Khrushchev, which was broadcast before delivery, also expressed willingness to withdraw the weapons but proposed to link the question of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba to the unrelated issue of strategic weapons in Turkey. The USSR would "agree to remove from Cuba those means which you regard as offensive means; we agree to carry this out and made a pledge in the United Nations. Your representative will made a declaration to the effect that the United States of America, on its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its similar means from Turkey...After that persons entrusted by the United Nations Security Council may check on the spot the fulfillment of the pledge made by either side." Of course. he added, "the authorisation of the Governments of Cuba and of Turkey would be necessary for the entry into those countries of these agents." In addition, Khrushchev proposed that the United States and the USSR give pledges against invasion of Cuba and Turkey respectively and solemn promises to respect the sovereignty and the inviolability of the frontiers of these countries.

This tie-in of Turkey with Cuba was immediately rejected by the United States. A statement issued by the White House that day noted that several inconsistent and conflicting proposals had been made by the USSR in the past twenty-four hours, including the one just broadcast.

/The proposal

The proposal involved the security of nations outside the Western Hemisphere and it was the Western Hemisphere nations alone that were the subject of the threat which produced the crisis. The position of the United States, the statement read, was that "as an urgent preliminary to consideration of any proposals work on the Cuban bases must stop; offensive weapons must be rendered inoperable; and further shipment of offensive weapons to Cuba must cease -- all under effective international verification." As to proposals concerning the security of nations outside this hemisphere, the statement concluded, the United States and its allies had long taken the lead in seeking properly inspected arms limitation, on both sides. These efforts could continue as soon as the present Soviet-created threat was ended.

President Kennedy's letter to Chairman Khrushchev of the same day (October 27) replied to Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

"As I read your letter," the President wrote, "the key elements of your proposals which seem generally acceptable as I understand them are as follows:

"1. You would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate U. N. observation and supervision; and undertake, with suitable safeguards, to halt the further introduction of such weapons systems into Cuba.

"2. We, on our part, would agree -- upon establishment of adequate arrangements through the United Nations to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments -- (a) to remove promptly the quarantine measures now in effect, and (b) to give assurance against an invasion of Cuba, and I am confident that other nations of the Western Hemisphere would be prepared to do likewise."

Assuming work ceased on offensive missile bases in Cuba and all weapons systems in Cuba capable of offensive use were rendered inoperable, under effective UN arrangements, the President was prepared to have representatives in New York work out an arrangement in cooperation with the Secretary-General for a permanent solution along the lines suggested in Chairman Khrushchev's letter of October 26.

On Sunday, October 28 -- Chairman Khrushchev broadcast the text of his reply. In addition to earlier instructions to discontinue further work on weapons construction sites, he said, the Soviet Government "has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union." The letter stated:

"I regard with respect and trust the statement you made in your message of October 27, 1962, that there would be no attack, no invasion of Cuba, and not only on the part of the United States, but also on the part of other nations of the Western Hemisphere, as you said in your same message. Then the motives which induced us to render assistance of such a kind to Cuba disappear.

"It is for this reason that we instructed our officers -- these means as I had already informed you earlier are in the hands of the Soviet officers -- to take appropriate measures to discontinue construction of the aforementioned facilities, to dismantle them, and to return them to the Soviet Union. As I had informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.

"Thus in view of the assurances you have given and our instructions on dismantling, there is every condition for eliminating the present conflict."

/Chairman

Chairman Khrushchev sent a copy of this message to U Thant "to enable you to familiarize yourself with our position, which we regard as exhaustive and which will help you to discharge your noble functions." At the same time, he informed the United States and the United Nations, that in connection with the negotiations U Thant was conducting with representatives of the USSR, the United States, and Cuba, the Soviet Government was sending First Deputy Foreign Minister V. V. Kuznetsov to New York to help U Thant in his "noble efforts aimed at eliminating the present dangerous situation."

President Kennedy replied at once to the broadcast message of October 28 even before the official text reached him, and welcomed it as "an important contribution to peace." The operative paragraph read:

> "The distinguished efforts of Acting Secretary-General U Thant have greatly facilitated both our tasks. I consider my letter to you of October 27 and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be promptly carried out. I hope that the necessary measures can at once be taken through the United Nations as your message says, so that the United States in turn can remove the quarantine measures now in effect. I have already made arrangements to report all these matters to the Organization of American States, whose members share a deep interest in a genuine peace in the Caribbean area."
>
> "I agree with you," the President concluded, "that we must devote urgent attention to the problem of disarmament...I think we should give priority to questions relating to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, on earth and in outer space, and to the great effort for a

/nuclear test ban.

nuclear test ban. But we should also work hard to see if wider measures of disarmament can be agreed and put into operation at an early date. The United States Government will be prepared to discuss these questions urgently, and in a constructive spirit, at Geneva or elsewhere."

A. U.S. statement issued the same day welcomed the Khrushchev response and stated: "We shall be in touch with the Secretary-General of the United Nations with respect to reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean area."

Weekend Negotiations in New York

Meanwhile steps continued in New York to reach agreement on practical means of avoiding conflict at sea and on arrangements to carry out the Secretary-General's suggestion for stopping work on the offensive bases and screening further shipments as conditions of suspending the quarantine.

The initial aim of the Secretary-General was to avoid an incident at sea. What concerned him most, he had written on October 25 to Chairman Khrushchev, was that a confrontation at sea between Soviet ships and United States vessels "would destroy any possibility of the discussions I have suggested as a prelude to negotiations on a peaceful settlement." He therefore asked that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba be instructed to stay away from the interception area for a limited time in order "to permit discussions of the modalities of a possible agreement." The next day (October 26), the Secretary-General addressed a parallel letter to President Kennedy, informing him of his approach to Chairman Khrushchev and requesting that "instructions may be issued the United States vessels in the Caribbean to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with

/Soviet ships

Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of an outward incident." He expressed the further hope that such cooperation could be the prelude to a quick agreement in principle on the basis of which the quarantine measures could be called off as soon as possible.

Premier Khrushchev accepted the proposal and "ordered the masters of Soviet vessels bound for Cuba...to stay out of the interception area, as you recommend." President Kennedy welcomed U Thant's efforts for a satisfactory solution and stated that if the Soviet Government accepts and abides by his request that Soviet ships already on their way to Cuba stay out of the interception area during the period of preliminary discussions "you may be assured that this Government will accept and abide by your request that our vessels in the Caribbean do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation with Soviet ships in the next few days in order to minimize the risk of any untoward incident!" At the same time the President underlined that this was a matter of great urgency in view of the fact that certain Soviet ships were still proceeding toward Cuba and the interception area.

Screening Shipments

As the White House statement on October 27 made clear, the urgent preliminary to the consideration of any proposals for a solution was that work on the Cuban bases stop, the offensive weapons be rendered inoperable, and further shipment of weapons to Cuba must cease--all under effective international verification. After that means must be found to get the missiles and other offensive weapons removed and their removal verified and to institute adequate safeguards against their reintroduction.

/The immediate

The immediate concern of the negotiators in New York, during the initial phase, was to work out a system for incoming shipments to ensure that no further offensive weapons were being introduced. The UN asked the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to serve as its agent in inspecting incoming vessels to make sure that no more Soviet weapons were coming in to Cuba. The operation would be expected to continue for about one month and would be entrusted to some thirty inspectors which the ICRC would undertake to recruit. Mr. Paul Ruegger, former president of the ICRC, arrived in New York early in November to discuss with the UN whether and under what circumstances the ICRC could undertake this task. In releases issued in Geneva on November 5 and November 13, the ICRC pointed out that the organization could participate in the plan only with the formal agreement of "the three parties concerned." The statement issued by the ICRC on November 13 explained that "eventual action by the ICRC would be based on previous consent being given by the three states concerned" and the methods of control would have to be clarified in future discussions. Premier Castro refused to give his consent to the proposed scheme. Before final arrangements could be made it was, in any event, realized that the system envisaged would no longer be required and that the United States and other countries of the Western Hemisphere could rely on other means, including air surveillance, to guard against new shipments of offensive weapons.

Havana Talks

The main obstacle to progress on establishing the conditions for a settlement was the attitude of the Cuban government. On October 26 U Thant

/wrote Prime Minister

wrote Prime Minister Castro renewing his appeal that he (Castro) direct that "the construction and development of major military facilities and installations in Cuba, and especially installations designed to launch medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles, be suspended during the period of negotiations which are now underway."

Dr. Castro's reply came the next day and proved to be a hedged acceptance. He rejected "the presumption of the United States to determine what action we are entitled to take within our country, what kind of arms we consider appropriate for our defense." Cuba was prepared to accept "the compromises that you request as efforts in favor of peace, provided that at the same time, while negotiations are in progress, the United States Government desists from threats and aggressive actions against Cuba, including naval blockade of the country." Read literally, Dr. Castro was saying that he would consider the suspension only at the price of ending the quarantine. At the same time, his letter contained another note: "...Should you consider it useful to the cause of peace, our government would be glad to receive you in our country as Secretary-General of the United Nations, with a view to direct discussions on the present crisis."

U Thant replied the next day noting that Castro was prepared to accept the suggestion he had made provided the United States Government "desists from threats...against Cuba including the naval blockade" while negotiations were in progress. He accepted the invitation to visit Cuba early in the coming week -- and to "bring a few aides with me to leave some of them behind to continue our common effort towards a peaceful solution of the problem." To facilitate his task the United States had agreed to suspend its naval quarantine and aerial surveillance during the Secretary-General's visit to

/Havana.

Havana. At this point, the United Nations was working on the assumption that the visit to Cuba would be concerned with working out modalities of U.N. observation and inspection and "reciprocal measures to assure the peace in the Caribbean."

The issue was further clouded by Castro's "statement of conditions" issued in Havana on October 28. "The guarantees of which President Kennedy speaks against the invasion of Cuba will not exist without the elimination also of the naval blockade," he declared, "and adoption, among others, of the following measures:"

1. End of the economic blockade and "all measures of commercial and economic pressure" exercised by the United States against Cuba;
2. End of "all subversive activities" and the organization or support of invasions;
3. End of "pirate attacks" from bases in the United States and Puerto Rico;
4. End of "violations of air and naval space" by the United States;
5. United States withdrawal from the naval base at Guantanamo and its "return to Cuba."

This statement of conditions was clearly unacceptable and adumbrated its intransigent position that the Cuban authorities would take during the Havana talks. U Thant and a party of nineteen, including Brigadier General Rikhye and a small military staff, flew to Havana on October 30 and held talks with Cuban leaders that day and the next to arrange for U.N. supervision of removal of the offensive weapons and to discuss the other modalities for carrying out the Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement of October 27-28.

/Although general

Although general agreement was reached that the United Nations should participate in settlement of the Cuban crisis and the talks were characterized as "fruitful," the Cuban authorities balked at all proposals for U.N. inspection of weapons removal and safeguards against their reintroduction. Premier Castro reiterated the five demands he had made in his October 28 statement. These demands were obviously beyond the scope of the Secretary-General's purpose in negotiating with the Cubans, and no agreement was reached.

The Secretary-General and his party returned to New York the next day, where, it was understood, talks between the Secretary-General and Cuban representatives would continue. Premier Castro, however, did state that he would not interfere with the Soviet removal of the missiles. The missiles are "not ours", he said in a radio speech on November 1 in which he reported on his talks with U Thant, but he rejected any form of international inspection on the withdrawal of Soviet weapons. He specifically turned down a proposal that the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) carry out the inspection task. He also rejected other forms of UN inspection. On Friday, November 2, Soviet First Deputy Premier Anastal I. Mikoyan arrived in New York on his way to Havana and issued a statement supporting Premier Castro's demands and warmly endorsing the Cuban regime.

Surveillance and Dismantling Continued

When U Thant left Havana without a mutually satisfactory formula, President Kennedy ordered resumption of the quarantine on shipping to Cuba and authorized resumption of close aerial surveillance of the island to determine whether dismantling of Soviet missile bases was proceeding as reported by Soviet officials. On the evening of November 2, the

/President reported

President reported in a short television and radio broadcast that the "Soviet missile bases are being dismantled, the missiles are being crated and the fixed installations at the sites are being destroyed." The President said the information was based on aerial photographs and added that the United States intended to follow closely the completion of this work through various means, including aerial surveillance, until "an equally satisfactory international means of verification is effected." He also said that while the quarantine remained in effect, he was hopeful that adequate procedures could be developed for international inspection of Cuba-bound cargoes. The International Committee of the Red Cross could be "an appropriate agent" for carrying out this inspection.

New York Negotiations: Verification and IL-28s

Meanwhile, talks proceeded in New York between Ambassador Stevenson and Mr. John J. McCloy for the United States and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov, for the Soviet Union. Apart from working out the details of the scheme for ICRC inspection of incoming shipments (described above), the negotiators spent the next three weeks in considering two main issues. Until November 12 the central concern of the negotiators was to make sure that the offensive missile system had left Cuba and to work out a satisfactory system for verification that dismantling and removal had in fact taken place. Associated with this was the problem of longer-term safeguards against the reintroduction of offensive weapons. From November 12 to November 20 the focus of negotiation shifted to the problem of removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers from Cuba.

On verification, it was clear that what the President had termed "an equally satisfactory international means of verification" required an adequate UN system of inspection to make sure that the offensive weapons

/had in fact

had in fact been removed, to guard against hiding, and to prevent reintroduction of such weapons. Various schemes were considered and the USSR made clear its willingness to have UN verification take place. Castro adamantly refused to accept any form of verification in Cuba by the UN or under its auspices for removal of the weapons. US negotiators continued to make it clear to the Soviet negotiators that US aerial surveillance would continue so long as there was no adequate UN system of inspection. When it became clear that Castro would not give his consent to UN inspection or verification of shipments from his ports, the negotiators turned to devising a system for US inspection at sea of outgoing ships carrying the dismantled missiles. The US naval vessels would come "alongside" departing Soviet vessels which would be loaded in such a way as to enable the US vessels to see and count the missiles and associated equipment. Rapid progress was made in dismantling and loading the missiles and by November the US had counted 42 departing missiles by this procedure. Failing UN verification and safeguards, the US continued its own system of surveillance under the existing OAS resolution to make sure that offensive weapons were not reintroduced.

On November 12, with the missiles removed, the US negotiators took up again the question of the removal of IL-28s and made it clear that the United States could not consider lifting the quarantine until the bombers were withdrawn. The Soviets claimed they had fulfilled their part of the bargain by dismantling and removing the missiles and were pressing for lifting of the quarantine and a U.S. non-invasion pledge.

The US position was that the bombers were defined as offensive weapons in the Presidential Proclamation of October 23 and that they

/were included as

were included as such in the Kennedy-Khrushchev exchange of October 27-28. The United States made it clear that it could not consider lifting the quarantine until the Soviets agreed to remove the IL-28s within a short time.

Partial Settlement: November 20

On November 20, Dr. Castro informed U Thant that if the Soviets wished to remove the bombers he would not object. That day an agreement was reached between Kennedy and Khrushchev under which the IL-28s would be withdrawn. U Thant was notified the same day by Ambassador Stevenson and Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov. Soviet agreement to remove the bombers payed the way for the lifting of the quarantine. The partial settlement had taken just four weeks to accomplish.

At his press conference that evening, President Kennedy announced that he had that day been informed by Chairman Khrushchev that all of the IL-28 bombers in Cuba would be withdrawn in thirty days, and that these planes could be observed and counted as they departed. "Inasmuch as this goes a long way towards reducing the danger which faced this hemisphere four weeks ago," the President announced, "I have this afternoon instructed the Secretary of Defense to lift our naval quarantine." The President then recalled the agreement he had reached with Chairman Khrushchev October 27-28, including the stipulation that once the Soviet leader had complied with all his pledges, "we would remove our naval quarantine and give assurance against invasion of Cuba." Evidence to date indicated that all known offensive missile sites had been dismantled, he stated, and sea inspection by the navy had confirmed that the missiles had been withdrawn. But, he warned, "important parts" of the agreement "remain to be carried out. The Cuban Government has not yet permitted the United Nations to

/verify whether all

verify whether all offensive weapons have been removed, and no lasting safeguards have yet been established against the future introduction of offensive weapons back into Cuba." The United States, therefore, had no choice but to pursue its own means of checking on military activities in Cuba. The United States, he said, will continue its efforts to achieve "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification of Cuba." Later, in reply to a question, he defined adequate safeguards as "an inspection which would provide us with assurances that there are not in the island weapons capable of offensive action against United States or neighboring countries and that they will not be reintroduced."

Regarding guarantees against invasion, the President stated that these were contingent on adequate verification and safeguards for the future.

> "As for our part, if all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and kept out of the Hemisphere in the future, under adequate verification and safeguards, and if Cuba is not used for the export of aggressive Communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, "We shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere."

The United States, he stressed, would not abandon the political, economic, and other efforts to hald subversion from Cuba nor its purpose and hope that the Cuban people shall some day be fully free. "But these policies are very different from any intent to launch a military invasion of the island."

Inter-American Quarantine Force Terminates Operations

Following the lifting of the quarantine, the three governments whose

/naval units had

naval units had participated in the inter-American combined quarantine force -- i.e., Argentina, Dominican Republic, and the United States -- notified the C.O.A.S./O.C. on November 30 that the operations of the quarantine force had been terminated. During this period, it had not been necessary to take up the offers of airport and seaport facilities and other types of assistance made by other hemispheric determination and solidarity.

As the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union in New York progressed, the United States kept the C.O.A.S./O.C. fully informed of developments. The C.O.A.S./O.C. in the meantime withheld taking any further action with regard to the crisis until these talks were completed.

Continued Negotiations

The Soviet Government carried out its promise to withdraw the IL-28 bombers, and, by December 6, the United States was informed that all bombers (42 in number) had left. No progress, however, was made during the rest of the month in achieving the "adequate international arrangements for the task of inspection and verification in Cuba" that the President had mentioned on November 20, and which were part of the original understanding. Deputy Premier Mikoyan's three-hour conversations with the President on November 29 and with the Secretary of State on November 30, did not advance the final solution. The question was turned over again to the delegations in New York.

By mid-December several important loose ends still remained. No

/adequate,

adequate, U.N.-supervised arrangements for verification of removal of offensive weapons and safeguards against their reintroduction had been achieved. The U. S. assurance against invasion or supporting an invasion of Cuba was dependent on adequate safeguards that offensive weapons were not present or reintroduced into Cuba and that Cuba refrained from aggressive acts against the Western Hemisphere.

Soviet Troops

The withdrawal of Soviet personnel from Cuba was also a matter of deep concern to the United States. As the President stated at his press conference of November 20, the U.S. had been informed that Soviet combat units and other Soviet units were associated with the protection of offensive weapons systems and would also be withdrawn in due course. The U.S. position was that removal of the offensive weapons systems made the presence of Soviet troops to defend such weapons no longer necessary. Efforts to secure their removal continued into 1963.

Security Council Consideration Concluded

The formula for terminating Security Council consideration of the Cuban crisis was finally agreed between the governments of the United States and the Soviet Union on January 7, 1963. It represented a standstill rather than a final settlement. The two governments agreed to send a joint letter to the Secretary-General which he, in turn, transmitted to the Security Council for information of its members. The text of the letter read:

> "On behalf of the Governments of the United States and the Soviet Union, we desire to express to you our appreciation for your efforts in assisting our governments to avert the serious threat to the peace which recently arose in the Caribbean area.
>
> "While it has not been possible for our governments to

/resolve all the

> resolve all the problems that have arisen in connection with this affair, they believe that, in view of the degree of understanding reached between them on the settlement of the crisis and the extent of progress in the implementation of this understanding, it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.
>
> "The Governments of the United States of America and of the Soviet Union express the hope that the actions taken to avert the threat of war in connection with this crisis will lead toward the adjustment of other differences between them and the general easing of tensions that could cause a further threat of war."

The same day (January 7, 1963), the Permanent Representative of Cuba, Carlos M. Lechuga, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General, which he requested be transmitted to United Nations members, expressing a dissenting view on the conclusion of the affair. Cuba, the letter declared, "does not consider as effective any agreement other than one which would include consideration of five points or measures, which as minimum guarantees to peace in the Caribbean, our Prime Minister Fidel Castro stresses in his declaration of 28 October, 1962...."

As the Security Council concluded its consideration of the Cuban item, the situation remained as follows:

1. The Soviet Union had withdrawn its offensive missiles, its bombers, and some of its military personnel. The United States and participating American Republics had lifted the quarantine.

2. The Cubans had refused to accept on site inspection and post-removal verification or to agree on a system of continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons under United Nations auspices.

3. In the absence of adequate inspection and safeguards, the United States continued other methods of surveillance of military

/activities in

activities in Cuba in the interests of hemispheric security.

4. The continued presence of Soviet military personnel in Cuba constituted an unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the Western Hemisphere. Efforts continued with the USSR to obtain their removal as agreed.

5. The United States continued to be seriously concerned about Cuban subversive efforts directed against other American Republics.

6. The United States position with regard to assurance against invasion remained that stated by the President on November 20, as outlined above.

7. With the conclusion of the New York talks and the joint US-USSR letter terminating Security Council consideration of the matter, responsibility of further action remained with the OAS Organ of Consultation in its hemispheric context.

Conclusion: Complementary Roles of Bilateral, Regionals, and UN Diplomacy

The Cuban affair demonstrated the utility and possibilities for interaction of the various diplomatic and military instruments available to the United States in a crisis. Orchestration of bilaterial diplomacy, regional arrangements, and the United Nations system marked the handling of the crisis throughout. In particular, the Cuba affair represented a unique demonstration of coordination between a regional system and the world organization, with diplomatic action being taken in the O.A.S. and the United Nations, depending on the task to be performed and the governments directly involved. The O.A.S. system successfully met the test of

/workability by

workability by demonstrating conclusively the solidarity and determination of the American Republics when their security is endangered. The rapid, decisive action taken by the American Republics under the Rio Treaty strengthened the hand of the United States in making its case before world opinion, in dealing in the Security Council with the crisis, and in negotiating with the Soviets.

The United Nations played a three-fold role: as a forum for exposing Soviet duplicity and for enlisting diplomatic support of the United States position; as an instrument for international consultation and as a site for negotiation; and, as an institution willing and able, on short notice, to provide inspection and verification services.

(1) The United States provided an unparalleled forum for presenting the facts of the Soviet offensive buildup directly to representatives of 109 nations and through communications media directly to world public opinion. Ambassador Stevenson's speeches of October 23 and 25 in the Security Council, together with the photographs and explanations to delegations both inside and outside the chamber, presented incontrovertible evidence in a dramatic and effective manner and thus helped in convincing the world of the facts. In addition, the United Nations provided a forum in which the American Republics could impress on the world and on the Secretary-General their solidarity on this issue.

(2) The Secretary-General provided an effective point of contact, notably in the tense days at the outset of the crisis and valuable suggestions for avoiding direct confrontation. The Secretary-General's intervention on the second day of Security Council debate, in which he called for suspension of arms shipments and of construction and development of military installations in exchange for suspension of

/the quarantine

the quarantine led to the formula under which Soviet ships stayed away from the interception area and on that condition the United States agreed to do everything possible to avoid direct confrontation. Khrushchev gave unprecedented agreement to the idea of U.N. inspection and verification of arms removal on the spot. And, the United Nations proved that it was ready and capable of organizing a corps of observers and a system of inspection in rapid order.

Both the United Nations and the Organization of American States proved their utility and vigor -- and emerged stronger from the ordeal.

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

March 8, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BROMLEY SMITH

SUBJECT: Cuba

As a follow-up to my memorandum to you on February 15, 1963, I am attaching excerpts containing references to Cuba in testimony given by the Department of Defense to congressional committees. They continue from the latest date of each committee excerpt you now have, and include excerpts from the Senate Armed Services Committee transcripts.

Not all testimony has been screened for Cuba references inasmuch as all transcripts are not available. Thus the House Armed Services Committee has been covered up to February 21, the DOD Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee to February 13, and the Senate Armed Services Committee to February 22. The DOD Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee has not yet begun its hearings.

As transcripts become available, I will send the requested items to you.

SIGNED

David E. McGiffert
Assistant to the Secretary
(Legislative Affairs)

11 Attachments
- 4 HASC Transcript excerpts
- 3 DoD SC, HAppns Transcripts excerpts
- 4 SASC Transcript excerpts

5644 (2)

SECRET WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

cc:(S/Attachments included) -
Mr. McNaughton, GC
Mr. Yarmolinsky, Spec Asst.
Mr. McGiffert, ATSD(LA)
Mr. Lennartson, PA
Mr. Califano, OSA

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
ROBERT S. McNAMARA TO THE PERMANENT
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE
COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
U. S. SENATE

13 March 1963

Mr. Chairman, I am grateful to this Committee for having granted my request of 9 March that I be afforded the opportunity to present my views on the development of the TFX concept and on the selection of General Dynamics Corporation as prime contractor for this versatile new addition to our Defense arsenal.

My decision in November 1962 to select General Dynamics over the Boeing Company, as the better of two qualified competitors, was based on the judgment that the General Dynamics design would result in an airplane less expensive to produce, maintain, and operate, and more dependable both in training missions and in actual combat.

The General Dynamics-Grumman team was successful because, in my judgment, and in the judgment of the Secretaries of the Navy and the Air Force, their proposal gave the most valid promise of obtaining a single airplane that can meet Navy and Air Force requirements with:

- The least expensive, time-consuming research and development effort before production.
- The least reliance upon unknown process and materials.
- The earliest delivery to our fighting forces.
- The highest level of experience in building fighter-type aircraft.

- The greatest use of proven design techniques and methods.
- The most understanding of the requirements and difficulties in developing, testing, tooling, and producing a fighter-type aircraft.

When the General Dynamics and Boeing proposals were first identified in the early stages of the competition in December-January 1961 -- 1962 as the two significantly better proposals among those submitted by six competing companies, neither proposal was found to be acceptable without substantial changes. Differing opinions were expressed as to whether a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at the outset, or whether the competition between General Dynamics and Boeing should be continued in order to meet the military requirements.

Competition was continued over the period from January to the Fall of 1962. In November 1962, the Fourth Evaluation Report, prepared by the evaluation officers of the Navy and the Air Force, concluded:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Report itself did not express a preference for either proposal, and indicated there was little to choose between the proposals. Both proposals were certified by General LeMay and Admiral Anderson to meet military requirements. My examination of the facts, in consultation with my advisers, convinced me that, as compared with the Boeing proposal, the General Dynamics proposal was substantially closer to a single design, requiring only relatively minor modifications to adapt it to the differing requirements of the Navy and the Air Force, and that it embodied a more realistic approach to the cost problem. Accordingly, I decided to select General Dynamics as the development contractor, since I concluded that it was best qualified to design the most effective airplane that could be produced at the least cost, in the least time, to meet our military requirements. It should be unnecessary to add that no other considerations entered into my judgment, but I wish to make that statement a part of the record.

When I took office in January 1961, President Kennedy instructed me to:

1. Develop the force structure necessary to our military requirements without regard to arbitrary budget ceilings.

2. Procure and operate this force at the lowest possible cost.

Following this guidance, we have made substantial increases in both our nuclear and non-nuclear forces. The additions to our nuclear forces have been designed both to strengthen our strategic retaliatory forces and to increase their flexibility by shifting the emphasis to those weapon systems which have the best chance of riding out any kind of nuclear surprise attack.

At the same time, we have substantially expanded our non-nuclear forces -- ground, sea, and air -- so that we can cope with the many and varied threats confronting us around the world. To insure that our non-nuclear forces are properly equipped and supplied, procurement of weapons, equipment, and ammunition has been vastly increased.

Concurrently with these increases in our fighting strength we have attacked the problem of costs on a wide variety of fronts. Because of the great technical complexity of modern-day weapons, their lengthy period of development, their tremendous combat power and their enormous cost, sound choices of a limited number of major weapon systems in relation to military tasks and missions have become the key decisions around which much else of the Defense program revolves.

In the past, the actual costs of major weapon systems have commonly increased from 300 to 500 percent over the costs estimated when the program started, and in some instances more. Some of the reasons for such overruns have been:

1. We have insisted that weapon systems meet performance standards that go far beyond essential military requirements.

2. We have accepted unrealistically optimistic cost estimates at the beginning of a program, only to find costs multiplied many times during the program.

3. We have not sufficiently defined at the outset what it is we are asking our contractors to develop. Here we have discovered that it is frequently helpful to work with more than one contractor in what we call a "program definition phase" before a development contract is awarded.

4. We have too often employed inadequate and unsatisfactory procedures to select major contractors, putting insufficient weight on seasoned experience in the design and production of similar weapons.

5. We have relied too much on cost-plus-contracts and other contracting procedures which do not provide incentives to reduce cost.

Within the Department of Defense, we have taken a number of steps to attack these problems. A formal five-year cost reduction program has been launched, which should produce savings of at least $3 billion per year by the end of fiscal year 1965. It has already produced savings that should amount to $1.4 billion per year. We are shifting from cost-plus-fixed-fee to fixed price and incentive contracts. We are studying ways to improve program definition and cost estimates, using the resources of such non-profit organizations as the Logistics Management Institute as well as in-house resources.

At my request the problem of how we select contractors has been under study for several months by a subcommittee of the recently established Defense Industry Advisory Council, which represents a cross-section of America's business and industrial leaders. Both the Council and we are convinced that our current source selection procedures can be improved.

One way to reduce costs (and to increase reliability) is to insist that weapon systems be developed that can be used by more than one Service, where this can be accomplished without degradation of essential military requirements. The advantages of one weapon system over two are obvious. They result in substantial savings not only in the development, test and production stages, but throughout the life of the system in terms of logistic support, maintenance, training programs, and operations.

The disadvantages of operating many different weapons systems can be observed in the Navy and in the Air Force today. The Navy currently has a rate of aircraft out of operation for lack of parts which is altogether too high. The Air Force is maintaining a better operational rate but at a cost of excessive spare parts inventories. With the present rapid rate of technological change, the Air Force has acquired a $2.2 billion inventory of spare parts that are already obsolete and practically worthless.

When I became Secretary of Defense, I learned that the Air Force was developing plans for a tactical fighter that would ultimately replace the F-105. At the time, the Navy was designing a second tactical fighter to replace the F4H in its fleet air defense role. These two planes would have many common missions and require many similar operational capabilities. After consultation with my military and civilian advisors, and independent study, I became convinced that one tactical fighter could be developed that would meet both the Navy and Air Force requirements. Accordingly, I directed that the Air Force reorient its program, with Navy participation, to achieve the goal of a common tactical fighter.

The concept of a major multi-Service weapon system is new. I would be less than candid with you if I did not admit that the majority of experts in the Navy and Air Force said it couldn't be done. As late as the 22nd of August 1961, after the Navy and the Air Force had been working together for almost 8 months, it was reported to me by both Services that development of a single TFX aircraft to fulfill stated requirements of both Services was not technically feasible.

While this attitude, based on years of going separate ways, was understandable, I did not consider it was a realistic approach, considering the versatility and capabilities that could be built into a modern aircraft because of advances in technology. I was also convinced that, if we could achieve a single tactical fighter, we would save at least one billion dollars, in development, production, maintenance and operating costs. In short, after study and review, I believed that the development of a single aircraft of genuine tactical utility to both Services in the projected time frame was technically feasible and economically desirable. I directed that we continue to work toward this objective. Because this decision was peculiarly my own, I kept myself fully advised of the development of the TFX as it progressed over the succeeding 14 months.

Since I consider it essential to a thorough understanding of the matter before you, I would like at this point to recount for you in some detail the sequence of events which led up to the decision. On 1 September 1961, I directed the Air Force to seek to develop a single aircraft for both the Air Force tactical mission and the Navy fleet air defense mission. From the outset, the emphasis was on development of a weapons system that provided minimum divergence between the Navy and Air Force versions. My specific guideline in this regard was: "Changes to the Air Force tactical version of the basic aircraft to achieve the Navy mission shall be held to a minimum." This is a recurring theme throughout the procurement actions which followed.

Requests for proposals from aircraft manufacturers were issued in October, 1961, and proposals were submitted by six firms two months thereafter.

A Source Selection Board was organized with members appointed by the Navy and the Air Force, and they were instructed to work jointly in evaluating the proposals, under the non-voting chairmanship of the Commander of the Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division.

To assist the Source Selection Board, an Evaluation Group was established, consisting of approximately 235 Navy and Air Force officers, advisors and consultants, divided into teams to make the detailed analyses and to evaluate each of the proposals in the areas of technical design, operational effectiveness, logistics, management strength, production efficiency, and suitability for use on aircraft carriers.

The findings of the Evaluation Group were submitted to the Source Selection Board. The Board's recommendations were reviewed by appropriate commands within the Navy and the Air Force, as well as by the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations, and finally, by the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force who made their recommendations to me.

Of the six proposals considered in December and January, those of Boeing Company and General Dynamics Corporation were determined by the Evaluation Group to be significantly better. But it was recognized that each of these designs would require substantial changes before it would be acceptable. Although the Boeing design was given the higher rating in operational capability, and General Dynamics was given the higher rating in the technical area, the Evaluation Group recommended that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics, in order to modify their designs to meet the military requirements. For example, Boeing's proposal had offered the General

Electric engine which was found to be unacceptable. The senior Navy member of the Evaluation Group stated that none of the designs was acceptable without very substantial change.

A different view was expressed by the Source Selection Board which recommended that further work to achieve a satisfactory design be conducted exclusively with Boeing. It recognized that substantial changes had to be made to the Boeing design: a different engine was required, the means of stowing missiles was unsatisfactory, the radar equipment required revision, and feasibility of substituting capsules for ejection seats had to be explored. The Source Selection Board proposed that a letter contract be issued to Boeing for the limited purpose of refining a design specification which would be acceptable to the Navy and the Air Force. The Board's recommendation was concurred in by the Tactical Air Command, the Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy Bureau of Weapons. The Air Force Systems Command, however, which would have the over-all responsibility for development of the aircraft, recommended against the selection of Boeing, and proposed the award of study contracts to both Boeing and General Dynamics, as suggested by the Evaluation Group.

The Air Force Council, chaired by the Deputy Chief of Air Staff for Operations, in the absence of the Vice Chief of Staff, with the concurrence of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air, also supported the Evaluation Group, and recommended that study contracts be issued to both companies for continued competition for another 60 to 90 days. The Council recognized that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics proposal, as submitted, would meet the established military requirements. The Council felt that by extending the competition for an additional period "time and dollars are thereby more apt to be saved than lost in the long run." It considered that competition should produce realistic cost estimates, further assurance of the validity of the eventual choice, and, in all probability, an earlier final design.

Agreeing with the Air Council's proposal, the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force recommended to me that study contracts be awarded to both Boeing and General Dynamics. They pointed out that:

a. The proposals of these two companies were markedly superior to the others and offered the best chance of being brought up to stated Service requirements.

b. The Services were unanimous in rejecting the General Electric engine (on which the Boeing design had been based) because of the low probability of its development in the time required, since not even a prototype existed at the time.

c. The extension would permit the fuller use of the two designs and provide the incentive for sharper competition from business and design standpoints.

I approved the recommendations of the Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force, raising particular questions about the realism of the Boeing cost estimates.

The two companies submitted new proposals on April 2, 1962, and the second evaluation was conducted in April and May. The Evaluation Group concluded that both contractors had done an excellent job in correcting identified deficiencies, but neither design was acceptable to the Navy from the standpoint of suitability for use on aircraft carriers and ability to remain on station for adequate periods of time.

The difference of opinion between the Navy and the Air Force emerged more fully in the deliberations of the Source Selection Board, and overshadowed consideration of the relative merits of the two companies, since the Navy member of the Board took the position that neither the Boeing nor the General Dynamics design was acceptable to the Navy, and the endorsements transmitted to the Chief of Naval Operations, and by him to the Secretary of the Navy, recommended in effect abandonment of the effort to achieve a joint fighter. It is clear also that the Air Force members of the Source Selection Board preferred the Boeing submission. The qualified concurrence of the Navy member must be viewed in the light of the over-all Navy recommendation. As a matter of fact, Admiral Anderson stated in writing that he had "no indication that Navy requirements can indeed be met." Therefore, he was of the opinion that "it was premature to state a firm recommendation at that time that Boeing be unequivocally selected."

The Secretaries of the Navy and Air Force advised me that, in view of the joint nature of the program and the continued nonacceptance by the Navy of either design (principally because of high gross weight and wing loadings), the Source Selection Board had been directed to examine courses of action which would correct deficiencies as specified by the Navy. Minimum design changes were to be analyzed and the resulting divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the aircraft, resulting from the elimination of those deficiencies, were to be determined. Three weeks were suggested to accomplish the task. I concurred, emphasizing that acceptable Navy and Air Force versions were not to be created by reducing the degree of commonality so far as to lose the savings inherent in a joint program.

At the end of the three-week period, both companies submitted proposals which contained very substantial changes from previous designs. The Navy member of the Source Selection Board remained unconvinced that either of the new proposals met the Navy's requirements. The Board also noted that the degree of divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions that would be necessary to meet Navy specifications had not been determined in the time available. Nevertheless, the Board recommended, and the Air Council, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, and the Chief of Naval Operations proposed that a single contractor, Boeing, should be selected at that point to undertake a continuing "design definition" phase. The expressed need for the continuation of the definition process pointed up the fact that the purposes for which the third evaluation were held had not been satisfied.

Following the second and third evaluations of the TFX, it appeared to me not only that neither contractor was meeting Navy requirements, but also that my primary goal was not accepted or not fully understood by the contractors or the Source Selection Board. That goal was to develop, if at all possible, one plane to meet the needs of both the Navy and the Air Force.

Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Air Force directed that work be continued to establish detailed designs, from which they could better assess the probability of developing the respective versions into an effective weapon system acceptable to both the Navy and the Air Force. They also directed that the obvious disparity between the contractors' cost proposals and the Air Force standards be reconciled. Lastly, they restated my intent to reduce cost by maximizing similarities in the Navy and Air Force versions, and by use of common equipments and structures.

To avoid any doubt as to the objective, I asked Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric to write to Boeing and General Dynamics explaining fully my position, and asking both of them to rework their proposals in accordance with our requirements. That letter of July 13, 1962, explicitly established three conditions that had to be met before any contract would be awarded. These were:

"1. Satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that a significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities is represented by the winning design.

"2. Minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate missions of the Air Force and Navy to protect the inherent savings of a joint program.

"3. Demonstrably credible understanding of costs both for development and procurement of the complete TFX weapon system, which costs must be acceptable in view of the capability added to our military strength by the weapon system."

These three conditions are vital. They are the yardsticks I used in judging and weighing the two proposals -- Boeing and General Dynamics. They were constantly in my mind as I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report. Rather than ignoring its advice, I relied heavily on its comments and conclusions.

The two companies submitted their new proposals in September 1962. These proposals were reviewed by the Evaluation Group and the Source Selection Board, which made its report on November 2.

At the risk of repetition, I want to read to you again the general conclusions of the Evaluation Group which were restated verbatim by the Air Council, with the concurrence of Admiral Anderson, Chief of Naval Operations, and General LeMay, Chief of Staff of the Air Force:

"(1) Both contractors have the capability to successfully design and produce this weapon system.

"(2) Both designs are acceptable as initial development design configurations to the using Agencies involved -- TAC and the Navy.

"(3) Both designs will require further design refinement, and changes can be expected during the development period.

"(4) When fully developed, the operational tactical aircraft will markedly improve the capability of the Tactical Air Command in carrying out its assigned missions, especially in limited war.

"(5) Similarly, the Navy version, when fully developed, and when configured with the new long range air-to-air missile, will markedly improve existing fleet air defense capability."

The Fourth Evaluation Report did not choose as between the contractors. When I reviewed the report, I could see why. The question was a very close one.

In the technical area, the Report evaluated the General Dynamics design as having "a better structural design, a simpler fuel system, a slight edge in the flight control area and better proposed programs in the Personnel

Subsystem and Aerospace Ground Equipment areas. The General Dynamics design had an edge in supersonic dash capability and supersonic maneuverability at altitude. It has a low radar cross section and an integrated penetration aids system. For deceleration, it uses dive brakes in the air and brakes on the ground, providing a conventional but limited deceleration capability. The Boeing design has the edge in ferry capability, conventional weapon carriage, loiter capability, and in landing performance. It has the advantage in low-altitude maneuvering capability. For deceleration it uses a thrust reverser which offers an excellent deceleration capability, but will require additional development effort."

In the operational area, the Boeing proposal received the higher score, but the Report stressed that either design was considered acceptable from the users' viewpoint.

In the "Production, Management and Cost" area, General Dynamics was rated higher than Boeing. In "Scheduling," General Dynamics presented the better program. It was somewhat more detailed and better time phased.

In the "Logistics" area, which includes the functional elements of maintenance, supply, transportation and procurement, the Boeing proposal received a slightly higher rating over-all.

It was clear that both designs met the first condition prescribed in Mr. Gilpatric's letter of July 13, i.e., satisfaction of both Navy and Air Force that the designs represented significant improvement to their tactical air capabilities. With this state of the record, the degree to which the two designs met the other two cardinal conditions became crucial. You will recall that those two conditions were: (1) minimum divergence from a common design; and (2) demonstrably credible understanding of costs. It should be emphasized that these two conditions would understandably loom less important in the eyes of the Source Selection Board than operational capability. These are conditions more properly the concern of those charged by law with the over-all direction of our defense effort. They are equally a part of my determination of what is in the national interest.

When I reviewed the Fourth Evaluation Report from the standpoint of minimum divergence from a common design, I was immediately struck by the difference in approach adopted by the two contractors. The Report found that General Dynamics proposed an airframe design that has a very high degree of identical structure for the Navy and Air Force versions. On the other hand, the Report estimated that in the two Boeing versions less than half of the structural components of the wing, fuselage and tail were the same. In fact the Evaluation Group concluded that Boeing is, in effect, proposing two different airplanes from a structures point of view. The same differences in approach were apparent in the larger number of identical parts in the General Dynamics design -- a particularly crucial point, since there are strong incentives in the course of the development process to retain identity of parts, while, on the other hand, small divergences in the early stages tend to grow as development proceeds.

In short, Boeing simply did not meet the fundamental requirement of minimum divergence from a common design. No amount of peripheral technical argument should be permitted to obscure this central and crucial fact.

It has been suggested by several of your committee staff in their role as witnesses before the committee that much ado about nothing has been made about the so-called issue of commonality. It has been suggested to you that the only reason for common structures or common parts is so that money could be saved by use of common tooling. Such a conclusion overlooks the basic purpose of attempting to get one airplane instead of two. Two airplanes increase costs at every stage beginning with development itself.

As the Fourth Evaluation Report stated, the design approach adopted by Boeing would "require separate documentation, (drawings; loads, stress, flutter, and fatigue analyses; etc.); separate static, dynamic and fatigue test programs; and more extensive developmental flight testing for the USAF and Navy versions."

Separate production lines or unique production operations would be required earlier in the production process. Supply and logistics problems become complicated. It is evident that the less the divergence, the greater the savings in the logistics area.

These future savings are not susceptible of precise measurement, involving as they do such factors as training, supply processes, future usage rates, common technical manuals, and the like.

If I had approved what was essentially two different airplanes, the prospects of saving one billion dollars would have evaporated. The issue of minimum divergence is fundamental. The effort to attain the highest possible degree of commonality lies at the heart of the entire TFX endeavor. My instructions on this point were clear and consistent.

Another aspect of the Fourth Evaluation Report struck me as I reviewed the report and consulted with my technical advisors, including Dr. Charyk, who was then Under Secretary of the Air Force, and Dr. Brown, the Director of Defense Research and Engineering. On the basis of my studies, discussions with my advisers, and my experience over the years in judging development and production programs, it became clear to me that the General Dynamics proposal was generally more straightforward in approach than that of Boeing, although the General Dynamics design was fully acceptable. There were aspects of the Boeing proposal which, on their face, complicated the development of the aircraft. Three problems in particular stood out in my mind.

The first problem was Boeing's proposed use of engine thrust reversers for in-flight deceleration, as well as for reducing ground roll after landing touch down. To date, engine thrust reversers have never been used in flight on operational fighter aircraft, nor have they ever been employed on supersonic aircraft. The only operational experience has been on subsonic commercial jet transports and cargo-type aircraft in which the engines are mounted on outboard pylons underneath the wings. The Air Force does have one fighter aircraft in which a research and development type installation has been made. This is a single engine aircraft with the exhaust on the airplane centerline and aft of the tail surfaces. The Boeing design uses two engines nestled in the fuselage with their nozzles exhausting hot gases directly alongside the horizontal and vertical control surfaces. The full effect of this hot gas efflux is unknown. Assurance that longitudinal and directional stability was not impaired could not be obtained without extensive flight tests, in addition to considerable developmental wind tunnel testing. Since flight testing cannot occur until late in the development phase, the Boeing design would impose an added degree of risk in terms of meeting an early operational date for the TFX.

In addition, the Boeing thrust reverser feature, as the Fourth Evaluation Report observed, adds considerably to the complexity and to the development task associated with the engine. The full impact of this problem could not be completely assessed because Boeing did not collaborate in detail with the engine contractor, Pratt and Whitney, on its proposed thrust reverser design and development.

Speed brakes, as proposed by General Dynamics, are historically proven and offer a more straight forward approach to meeting the stated military requirement. Since speed brakes will, in themselves, exceed the military requirement, the greater development risk of thrust reversers must be weighed against their possible advantages. I want to point out that in selecting the General Dynamics proposal we retain the option to apply thrust reversers to the aircraft design, but we have the flexibility to undertake this development on an exploratory basis concurrent with the overall program, and terminable at will if costs should exceed anticipated benefits.

The second area in which Boeing's approach seemed likely to produce more complicated development problems was its proposed power plant installation with top-mounted inlets. The Fourth Evaluation Report commented that Boeing's location of the inlets on top of the fuselage, in combination with the Boeing subsonic diffuser design, results in significant distortion of the air flow at the engine face under most conditions, and prohibitive distortion during high angle of attack operation. The Report noted that the effect of this distortion on engine operation is virtually impossible to predict accurately, and it can only be determined by actual testing of the engine in flight under the distortion conditions delivered by the induction system.

In contrast, General Dynamics chose a conventional "straight through" installation and inlet design which the Evaluation Group considered to be a good selection for the TFX aircraft -- one which should give the best trade-off in terms of performance, complexity and operational problems. The top-mounted inlet does minimize the problem of foreign object damage during ground operations, but there is no reason to believe that the more conventional General Dynamics solution for this problem will not be effective, and it avoids all of the other uncertainties of the Boeing approach.

The third area in which the Boeing approach involved greater development risks was its extensive use of titanium in its wing carry-through structure. We have had some experience in the use of titanium in other Department of Defense weapon systems but mainly in heat-resistant applications and where high stress levels in thick plates are not involved. The Fourth Evaluation Report observed that data concerning the fatigue design properties of titanium, in the thickness Boeing proposed to use in the wing carry-through structure, is very limited, and that this raises the question of the advisability of using such thickness. The Report further commented that the effect of temperature on structural details, especially in the aluminum-to-titanium splice, can be expected to be quite pronounced in producing metal fatigue, and the Report concluded the Boeing fatigue test program showed lack of realism. In fact, Colonel Gayle, the TFX System Project Officer, sent a letter to the competing companies pointing out that, in the judgment of the Aeronautical Systems Division, it was not advisable to use titanium in fittings which are subject to heavy load, nor in heavy section areas because of a lack of data relating to such use. If Boeing's proposed use of titanium did not work out and heavier steel had to be used to replace the lighter metal, I realized that not only would the operational capabilities of the Boeing plane suffer, but additional costs would be incurred.

In contrast, the General Dynamics design solved the problem of wing loading by the ingenious but simple expedient of providing a bolt-on extra wing extension for the Navy version of the aircraft, instead of employing relatively unusual applications of an exotic metal.

These three examples point up for me a basic difference between the overall philosophies underlying the two proposals. I should emphasize that this difference in philosophy was not peculiar to the fourth phase of the competition. Boeing had from the very beginning consistently chosen more technically risky trade-offs in an effort to achieve operational features which exceeded the required performance characteristics. This approach was first exemplified in Boeing's choice of the undeveloped General Electric engine for its initial submission.

Mr. Chairman, I do not mean to say that the Boeing approach posed insuperable obstacles. On the contrary, I assumed that the problems associated with the use of titanium, the use of thrust reversers in supersonic flight, and the high inlet ducts in the propulsion system are all susceptible of solution. But my judgment, reinforced by the Fourth Evaluation Report, clearly indicated that these proposals would, in fact, complicate the development problems, and would require a significantly greater development effort to be expanded by Boeing in their solution.

But, significantly, Boeing proposed a development effort less than that proposed by General Dynamics, and this in spite of the greater complexity of the Boeing aircraft design, the greater divergence between the Navy and the Air Force versions of the Boeing aircraft, and the lesser experience which they possess in building high-density supersonic fighter aircraft. This anomaly caused me to examine other cost aspects of the Boeing proposal.

I discovered additional evidence of unrealistic cost estimates in the Boeing proposal. In the judgment of the Evaluation Group, Boeing was overly optimistic in its estimate of production tooling and was dangerously low in estimating the manufacturing hours for both the development and production phases. It appeared to me that Boeing simply did not appreciate the complexities of developing the TFX. This is understandable because Boeing's past experience in aircraft development and production has been with bombers and transport aircraft -- experience which is largely inapplicable to TFX estimating.

I therefore concluded that as to the third cardinal condition -- demonstrably credible understanding of costs -- Boeing's proposal was deficient.

The Evaluation Team cost estimators recognized this fact. They attempted to correct for it by raising Boeing's costs to a level which in their judgment was more accurate. They also made adjustments for the General Dynamics cost estimates, which were considered deficient, but not nearly so much so as Boeing's.

The Air Force estimators applied experience and other statistical factors to the two proposals in an effort to arrive at ultimate costs. The application of such factors is well suited to correction of an intentionally low proposal. Where, however, the low proposal is the result of a lack of appreciation of the complexity of a problem, the adjusted figures are subject to substantial errors.

Expressed another way, the cost estimators of the Evaluation Group could only assume an equal understanding of the problem by both Boeing and General Dynamics, and then correct the two cost proposals more or less mechanically. But the predictable result of the lack of appreciation of the scope of a problem is delay and increased costs, the extent of which is essentially unpredictable, and therefore not susceptible to analysis by the application of statistical factors.

The question has been raised as to why costs are important when both contractors were proposing fixed-price incentive contracts. There are several reasons.

In a development contract for a complex new weapon system like the TFX, there inevitably will be engineering change orders. The cost of change orders is borne by the government. Consequently, when two proposals both meet military requirements as did Boeing's and General Dynamics', the proposal which seems likely to involve less change, with consequent delays and increased costs, is to be preferred.

Aside from the matter of cost over-runs induced by multiplicity of change orders, there are other reasons why credibility of costs must be carefully evaluated in a fixed-price incentive contract.

It is true that any costs over the contract ceiling are at the expense of the contractor and not the government. Nonetheless, if after several years of effort it appeared that a contractor's costs were going to be far in excess of the ceiling, say, by several hundred million dollars, the contractor would be in very serious financial difficulty. He would then be motivated to take every possible cost saving alternative. These alternatives could have a serious adverse impact on the continuity and quality of the development.

In short, while incentive contracts are generally important to force efficient management and obtain good estimating, where the dollar expenditure is exceedingly large, as in the case of the TFX, it is imperative that we make our own judgment of cost estimates. This is the only way we can insure that a contractor, through optimism or misunderstanding, has not imposed a ceiling on himself that could lead to serious degradation of the development. This result would hurt the Department of Defense as well as the contractor.

Further, the proposed contract covered only the research and development phase of the TFX program. A multi-billion dollar production program is to follow. There is no future price commitment for this production program. In the event of very large over-runs on the research and development contracts, the price of the production program, which for all practical purposes would be committed to the development contractor, would probably be affected.

When we talk about the TFX program, we are talking National Defense. This aircraft is to be an important element in our military force; it must be operational in proper quantities in the time span scheduled. The more straightforward design of General Dynamics, an airframe contractor well versed in the design, development, and production of supersonic fighters, and assisted by Grumman, an outstanding designer, developer, and producer of Navy carrier-based aircraft, offered a more dependable answer to our needs.

I have detailed at some length the reasons underlying my judgment that the General Dynamics proposal offered the better possibility of obtaining a satisfactory aircraft on the desired time schedule and within the dollars programmed.

Having studied the TFX question over many months, I met with Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, Secretary Korth, and Secretary Zuckert early in

November 1962, I found that their own views, arrived at independently, coincided with mine. After several discussions we concluded:

First, that all the evidence showed that the TFX concept was a valid concept that would markedly improve existing military capabilities of the Navy and Air Force. We therefore decided to move ahead with the development of the TFX aircraft.

Second, our best judgment of the many factors involved let us to the tentative conclusion that General Dynamics should receive the award. Although I considered our judgment to be soundly supported on the broad bases I have outlined, I agreed that Mr. Zuckert was to review the facts again before we arrived at a final decision.

Having verified to our satisfaction our judgments, we decided to award the TFX development contract to General Dynamics.

There remains one more important aspect of this case which I believe should be thoroughly understood. Fundamentally, we are dealing with a question of judgment. Granted there are specific technical facts and calculations involved; in the final analysis, judgment is what is at issue.

In this case we are faced with a situation in which judgments are pyramided upon judgments. First, we have the judgments of the competing contractors that an aircraft of particular design can be built at a given cost within a specific time-frame. Next, we have the judgments of the Evaluation Group regarding feasibility, and the degree to which the designs would or would not satisfy the stated requirements. Then the Source Selection Board, using factors weighted by judgment, made a recommendation which appeared to place greater emphasis on potential bonus factors in certain operational areas, rather than on dependability of development and predictability of costs. This recommendation, understandably, was seconded by the Navy and Air Staffs, since these officers are most vitally interested in obtaining the ultimate in performance in individual weapons systems. On occasion, this desire leads to the establishment of characteristics for weapons systems which cannot be met within the time or funds available, and it has frequently resulted in lowering operational effectiveness.

There is only one way I know to minimize the compounding of error that can occur through this pyramiding of judgment, and that way is to apply the judgment of the decision-maker not only to the final recommendation, but also to the underlying recommendations and facts. This I did to the best of my ability. In doing so, I found it necessary to balance the promises held out by competing contractors, against the hopes and aspirations of military officers, and the limiting realities of economics and technology.

That I attach great importance to the principle of free competition is, I believe, demonstrated by my insistence that competition continue through the program definition phase of the TFX project. That I attach great importance to the fulfillment of established military requirements is, I believe, demonstrated by my refusal to terminate the program definition phase until I was satisfied that the military requirements of both the Navy and Air Force had been met. That I attach great importance to the recognition of economic and technological limiting conditions is, I believe, demonstrated by my selection of General Dynamics as the contractor that most clearly recognized the effects of these limitations on the task to be achieved.

I do not feel that this is a case which presents a civilian--military conflict but rather one of placing emphasis where it must be placed. In the final analysis, judgments differed. In reaching my decision, I considered the recommendations of my various military and civilian advisors as well as other available evidence, but I had the final responsibility. The basic judgments on my part which determined my decision were:

- Both the General Dynamics and the Boeing designs met stated military requirements and would provide significant improvements in combat capabilities of the Navy and the Air Force.
- The General Dynamics proposal resulted in minimum divergence from a common design compatible with the separate mission of the Navy and Air Force, thus insuring the substantial savings

and increased dependability inherent in a joint program.

- The General Dynamics proposal reflected a more realistic understanding of costs.

As Secretary of Defense my responsibilities were clear; the decision was mine.

Date : 08/28/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10187
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 188

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF THE SPECIAL GROUP ON MONGOOSE 6 SEP 62
DATE : 09/06/62
PAGES : 5
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Reviewed by JCS, OSD, CIA and State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIA
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

h. General Carter urged that, in connection with number 22 (submarine broadcasts), General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban counter-measures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail. 1

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.

PERTINENT BACKGROUND

4. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 (agricultural sabotage). General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of producing crop

State decision
6(1)(C)

(1)(B)(C)

State equities in blue 6(1)(C)

failures [by the introduction of biological agents which would appear to be] of natural origin. Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of a natural disaster, but that we must avoid external activities such as release of chemicals, etc., unless they could be completely covered up.

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinat to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

1,2,4,5

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looke into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program

f. General Carter pointed out that reference to support of all Cuban exile groups (number 48) is impractical. The word was changed to selected.

g. Mr. Martin cautioned that results of number 50 (actions to be undertaken by other Hemisphere governments) would not be expected overnight.

h. General Carter urged that, in connection with [redacted] 1 General Lansdale should be given more latitude in working up other deception possibilities. Mr. Bundy felt, on the other hand, that particularly because of the possible Cuban countermeasures which had been outlined by Mr. Murrow, the Group should look at other possibilities in some detail.

i. General Carter felt that a determination should be made as to how far the U.S. is prepared to go in economic harrassing actions. He emphasized that sabotage operations such as those under number 27 will not in themselves be especially effective in wrecking the Cuban economy.

PERTINENT BACKGROUND

4. The Group then turned to a discussion of number 32 [redacted] General Carter emphasized the extreme sensitivity of any such operation and the disastrous results that would flow from something going wrong, particularly if there were obvious attribution to the U.S. He went on to say, however, that it would be possible to accomplish this purpose by methods more subtle than those indicated in the paper. He mentioned specifically the possibility of [redacted]

State specifics 6(1)(C)

(1)(B)(C)

State equities in blue 6(1)(C)

[redacted] Mr. Bundy said that he had no worries about any such sabotage which could clearly be made to appear as the result of local Cuban disaffection or of [redacted] but that we must avoid external activities such as [redacted]

5. A suggestion was made that small explosives or incendiaries which could be distributed to Cubans should be infiltrated. General Carter explained that the problem is not one of such supplies, since they can be easily improvised, but rather that the people have shown no inclinatio to use such materials despite many exile claims to the contrary.

1,2,4,5

6. It was suggested that the matter of attacking and harrassing of Soviet personnel within Cuba should be considered.

7. The Attorney General and Mr. Bundy said that no reprisals against exiles who undertake active operations on their own are contemplated.

8. It was suggested that the possibilities of counterfeiting be looked into further.

9. General Carter urged again that a decision be reached as to how much latitude would be allowed the operating elements of the government, within broad policy lines. The Chairman indicated that it would not be a simple matter to delegate responsibilities of this kind to any great degree.

10. Mr. Bundy then raised the basic question of the entire spectrum of other contingencies beyond those envisaged in the MONGOOSE program

Date : 08/04/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10203
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 204

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : THE CUBA PROJECT
DATE : 01/24/62
PAGES : 6
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA and State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIA
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

No object = ✓

(248)

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYES ONLY

TAB 'A'

SUBJECT: Tasks Assigned to CIA in General Lansdale's Program Review

A. TASKS

Part V, pp. 5-8, of General Lansdale's program review of the Cuba Project, dated 18 January 1962, assigns 32 specific tasks to elements of the U.S. Government. Of these, 16 are assigned to CIA solely or jointly. The tasks have been reviewed by this Agency, and it has been determined that substantially all reporting and planning deadlines can be met. Work on all tasks, with and without assigned dates for completion, is in progress. The following detailed observations are keyed to General Lansdale's paper.

1. Task 1, p. 5. The intelligence community is hard at work on NIE 85-62 and is attempting to meet the deadline of 7 February. As was agreed in a conversation of 23 January 1962 with General Lansdale, a short extension may be necessary.

2. Task 2, p. 5. The Opa-Locka Interrogation Center in Florida will be in operation on 15 February -- the deadline date.

3. Task 3, p. 5 The survey is in progress and will be completed on the stipulated date. On the basis of the information

The Department of State releases this document in part and postpones release of portion(s) of it under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL 102-526)

Reviewed on 6/30/98 mpr

Portion(s) Postponed Under 6.1 (c and b)
Supp. 2, 5, 6, 8

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED
Jm 6/23/98
6(1)(B)

OSD: NO OBJECTION
25 JUN 98

DOC # 204, 8PP
87 ~~MDR~~ 155

(6.3)

(R1)

S-E-C-R-E-T
EYES ONLY

DISA(DFOISR) 87 TS 104

obtained the possibility of establishing additional interrogation points will be determined.

4. Task 4, p.5. An operational assessment of the stay-behind net in Cuba will be completed and reported by the deadline of 15 February. Because communication with singleton agents is by SW, not W/T, it is unlikely that assessment can be completed by the date stipulated; an extension to 28 February may be necessary, although every effort is being made to complete the work before that date. An intensive program aimed at the acquisition of third country assets through the cooperation of liaison services is also under way, particularly in Spain, Belgium, France, Uruguay, and Costa Rica. A progress report on the status of this program will be made by 15 February, although this Agency cannot be sure that the cooperation of all intended participants will have been obtained by that date. CIA has also taken the following additional steps in respect to Task 4.

State
Excisions
6.1(c)

CIA

a. A cable has been sent to field stations to give added impetus to the search for assets and the development of both unilateral and joint operations. Progress reports have been required by 1 March.

b. A survey of the Cuban Chinese community and of operational access to it is under way. Target date: end of February.

c. An assessment of more than one hundred persons to determine their suitability for return to Cuba as agents in the guise of students is also being conducted. Target date: end of February.

5. Task 5, p.5. The 1 February deadline will be met, and by that date we shall also have begun the search for suitable intermediaries. Analysis to date has not uncovered a top-level official of the Cuban regime whose personal characteristics indicate he would accept recruitment or agree to defection now. Although some targets of opportunity will appear outside Cuba, most planning will necessarily be based upon an appeal made inside the island by intermediaries selected from the ranks of journalists, foreign officials, international businessmen, foreign lawyers, crime syndicates, international detectives and foreign police officials. Additionally, plans for the defection of lower-level Cuban officials abroad have been completed, and the search for targets and access abroad is under way.

6. Task 6, p.5. By the assigned date we shall complete and submit a coordinated plan. We shall also have begun action on

cover and deception operations by that date.

7. Task 7, p. 5. By 1 February CIA will submit an operational schedule for the initiation of an organized resistance movement inside Cuba. The schedule will include the localities selected and the assessment of some candidates. A full assessment will be completed in accordance with the schedule listed in para. 4, above, in conformance with Task 4. It should be noted, however, that this operational schedule (like the schedules called for in Tasks 10, 26, and 30) will necessarily be tentative and subject to later revision as the number of assets inside Cuba increases and as the flow of intelligence is augmented. Moreover, the development of a resistance movement will not remain controllable, so that operational timetables produced during the next four weeks can serve only as guides for a proposed sequence of actions.

8. Task 10, p. 5. CIA has on hand both propaganda and political action assets in the Caribbean area and elsewhere in Latin America. It is planned to use those assets both to support the Project inside Cuba and to generate and mobilize public and official opinion against Castro outside Cuba. The operational schedule will be submitted on the stated date.

9. Task 18, p. 6. Discussions with the appropriate AFL-CIO

officials have been donducted and a report of developments will be submitted by 15 February.

10. Task 21, p. 7. / Plans for inducing the failure of crops will be submitted by 15 February. These plans will envisage both the use of controlled assets who can be infiltrated and exfiltrated and the provision of encouragement and guidance to the resistance, so that it will undertake acts of sabotage, some of which are to be directed against crops, particularly rice.

C[illegible]

1, 2, 4, 5

11. Task 24, p. 7. This deadline will also be met. Primary methods of disrupting the supply of Cuban nickel to the USSR could, if approved, include (1) the sinking of Cuban or Bloc ships by open attack; (2) the use of "frogman" or UDT tactics in harbors for the same purpose; (3) the employment of torpedos and mines toward this end; and (4) the sabotaging of primary or secondary sources of Cuban nickel, such as the Nicaro and Moa plants. CIA now has no proven internal assets capable of carrying out any of these actions. The Agency does have external assets capable of undertaking actions (2) and (3). It also has an external group capable of undertaking (4) upon the completion of specialized training. All studies, including a plan for using overt or covert means to prevent re-institution of the Canadian supply to the USSR, will be submitted by 15 February. It is suggested that consideration be given to

State concurs

CIA

CIA
13 March

assigning to the economic action group, chaired by the Department of State, responsibility for overt action designed to deny Canadian nickel to the USSR.

CIA

12. Task 26, p. 7. Together with Tasks 27 and 28, Task 26 constitutes an outline of a plan for a psychological warfare operation. These tasks are so closely interrelated that CIA proposes to submit by 15 February a single plan dealing with all three tasks.

13. Task 27, p. 7. See preceding paragraph.

14 Task 28, p. 7. See paragraph 12.

15. Task 30, p. 7. By 15 February CIA will submit an operational schedule dealing with the sabotage of (1) shipping in Cuban waters and harbors, (2) Cuban transport facilities, (3) communications facilities, (4) equipment for the refining of petroleum, (5) facilities for producing and distributing power, (6) industry, (7) food supplies, (8) key military and police installations and materiel. The schedule will also include the disruption of military and police communications and harassment of military and police training and personnel.

1, 2, 4

16 Task 31, p. 8. This deadline will be met.

B. ADDITIONAL UNDERTAKINGS

The following comments are keyed to Sections D through K, Part IV (pp. 3 and 4) of the program review.

17. Section D, p. 3. Six men, to form the initial nucleus, have been assessed in depth. Further assessment of candidates inside and outside Cuba is in progress, and it is expected that ten of these will be recruited by 15 February.

18. Section E, p. 3. To date fifteen locations have been selected as suitable centers of resistance because of (1) the presence there of groups among which there is patent or incipient unrest, (2) the presence of strategic and tactical targets for use or deactivation, and (3) proximity to potential unconventional warfare areas. In order of priority, the fifteen centers are Havana, Camaguey, Santa Clara, Cienfuegos, Matanzas, Cardenas, Sancti Spiritus, the Escambray Mountains, Holguin, Siantago de Cuba, Ciego de Avila, Baracoa, Pinar del Rio, Manzanillo, and Colon

1,2,4,

19. Section F. p. 3. In support of State's efforts CIA has conducted propaganda operations, including a number of mass demonstrations, in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Panama, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

1,2,4

20. Section H, p. 4. One TV intrusion operation has been conducted, on 16 January. Plans for an intrusion during the scheduled parade and demonstration in Havana are being formulated

1,2,4

21. Section K, p. 4[illegible] Groups with which CIA has exploitable access or entree include women, labor, students, teachers, jurists, and other professional classes. International contacts with labor organizations and members of the Catholic Church will also be utilized.

State quesn
6.1 (B)

Date : 08/04/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10001-10219
RECORDS SERIES : FOIA SERIES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : DOC 220

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : OPERATION MONGOOSE PROGRESS
DATE : 05/31/62
PAGES : 3
SUBJECTS : MONGOOSE

DOCUMENT TYPE : MEMORANDUM
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 07/30/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : Reviewed by OSD, CIA, State.

NO JOINT STAFF OBJECTION
TO DECLASSIFICATION
REQUIRES CONCURRENCE OF
CIA
DATE: MAR 2016

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

SPECIAL HANDLING 2

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

~~20~~ 133

31 May 1962

SENSITIVE

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)

From: Brig. Gen. Lansdale Ed

Subject: Operation Mongoose Progress

[Intelligence build-up by CIA includes efforts to recruit a Cuban diplomat in-place and an official in an airlines office in Havana.] The CIA team placed in Pinar del Rio Province last March was successfully re-supplied by maritime means on 24 May. The Navy and CIA have worked out a cooperative effort to strengthen the U.S. security and intelligence program at Guantanamo.

The CAC continues to provide word from inside Cuba covering local security moves and popular unrest (unrest reportedly increasing). A substantial reduction in oil refining and manufacture of tires and tubes is reported from CAC sources.

Economic pressure upon the Communist regime may be increased by a Department of Commerce move denying bunkering facilities at U.S. ports to vessels under Sino-Soviet bloc charter carrying cargo to Cuba. State Department reports having solicited views of our Ambassador to Japan regarding possible approaches to the Japanese asking them to cease sugar purchases from Cuba.

Propaganda efforts of USIA and CIA continue to apply pressure upon the Cuban regime by focusing upon abuses of power and failure of key programs such as medical and food. The VOA use of refugees in interviews especially underlined this theme. I am looking into a USIA proposal that we counter Communist Cuba moves to impress Latin America by participation in the athletic North Central American and Caribbean Games set for August 11-25 in Kingston, Jamaica: a "free Cuba" team might be effective, with good publicity support.

(11)

The Department of State has no objection to the release or declassification of this document in full under the provisions of the JFK Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992 (PL102-526)
Reviewed on 7/30/98

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED 23 June 98
6(1)(B)

EXCLUDED FROM GDS

OSD: RELEASE AS REDACTED 23 JUNE 98

EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY

TOP SECRET - SPECIAL HANDLING

#220

(R1)

This document contains 3 pages.
Copy No. 6 of 7 copies, Series A

308

Incident at Guantanamo occurred 26 May when a light Cuban aircraft landed there. Three Cubans had forced the pilot, at pistol point, to land them at our Naval Base. With State's concurrence, Defense acted: the Cuban pilot flew home, the 3 Cuban escapees stayed on the Base.

Fracturing the Regime has been given priority attention by CIA. A senior case officer has been assigned full-time to this specific action, and has preferential use of CIA assets. Of 24 desirable defection targets, CIA has found several who seem vulnerable (including the Minister of National Economy, Leon Boti).

Priority Operations Schedule of 21 May, seeking some positive actions in behalf of our project during the next several weeks, has brought a very healthy response from CIA and USIA. The CIA determination to meet the challenge has surfaced four policy-type questions which I note for you on behalf of CIA:

(4)

1). Task 7, "Voice of Free Cuba," is almost immediately feasible, if the Group will approve CIA arranging with Navy for use of a submarine. CIA has firm plans for worrying the Communist regime through broadcasts which would appear to come from local dissident groups actively planning to harass the regime.

[illegible] INFORMED

R1,2,

2). Task 19, CIA is prepared to disseminate leaflets on Castro's failure to the Cuban population via balloon with a view of increasing instability of the Communist machine. The technique is tested and CIA has plans to operate from a surface ship in international waters. The Group is asked to approve the idea, including Navy support. This could be operating in time to exploit the 26 July anniversary of Castro's attack upon government forces at Santiago de Cuba in 1953, for "the revolution" he has now betrayed.

3). Task 19, CIA believes it can recruit some 20-man teams for possible use in beefing up resistance groups within Cuba. Group approval is asked for Defense support in training, holding, logistics. The 'noise level' hazard is noted, but this special project could be almost unnoticed if tied with proposed U.S. military enlistment of Cubans.

[illegible] 2

4) Task 23, Counterfeit Currency to increase Cuban economic problems is considered feasible within 30-60 days upon a limited basis and in considerable scale within six months. CIA asks the Group approval before proceeding with this action.

Other Tasks.

I note here that CIA does not feel it has the operational means to undertake Task No. 22, black-market activities, at this time. Further that Task No. 11, Time magazine dissemination, would require operational facilities not now available. I accept indefinite deferral of Task No. 22 and scrubbing of Task No. 11 on this basis.

The Department of State reaction, to my effort to get the U.S. into priority actions towards our project's goals, has been disappointing to me thus far. Apparently, my schedule of targets for special efforts is accepted only as it may fit into long-range, existing programs already under way. If this is the theory of our project, I believe that the project then becomes only a special reporting device and not a special U.S. effort to win the goal of helping the Cubans recapture their country from a gang of Communists.

"Eyes Only" copies to:

1. General Taylor
2. Mr. Johnson
3. Mr. Gilpatric
4. Mr. McCone
5. Mr. Kennedy
6. General Lemnitzer ←
7. Chief of Operations

[illegible] 3

Date : 09/14/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10124
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : OSD
FROM : CYRUS R. VANCE
TO : MULTIPLE RECIPIENTS
TITLE : CUBAN AFFAIRS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
DATE : 06/26/65
PAGES : 27
SUBJECTS : ICCCA, ADMINISTRATION

PSYCHOLOGICAL PROGRAMS - CUBA

SECOND LATIN AMERICAN YOUTH CONGRESS

POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY CUBAN GOVERNMENT

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : CONFIDENTIAL
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 05/15/98
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central File, Box 3, 4 of 15. Memo from Vance to SecArm, SecNav, SecAir, CJCS, and ASD(ISA) re: Cuban Affairs in the Dept. of Defense. ICCCA report on Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government.

EXEMPT PER E.O. 13526
SEC 3.3(b) 50X5 / 8
DATE EXEMPTED: MAR 2016

JS RE-REVIEW DATE: 31 DEC 2038
OKAY TO RELEASE AS REDACTED w/CIA CONCURRENCE

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

31 December 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [Holloway]; from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned. 6(1)(A) 6(1)(C)

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [Brazil] which suggest postponement of the meeting. 6(1)(C

MAR 2016

OSA, ASG Control No. 3 001

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

29

CONFIDENTIAL

for Wheeler c/s

Partially
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION
BY JOINT STAFF
EXEMPTION: 6(1)(c)
DATE: MAY 15 1998

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

MAR 2016
6(1)(c)

COMMENT: [A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT.] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

9123/3100 (8 JAN 63) w/JCS 2304/204-1

OSA, ASD Control No. T/S 0228

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 17 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

Copy No. ___ of ___ Copies

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

OCOFSA 7 2 1/6 8

purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U. S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U. S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to U. S. Governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the interchange of information between the U. S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

6(1)(c)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

MAR 2016

COMMENT A minimum of approximately 20 days supply of water is maintained in reserve storage at the naval base. Provision is made for the emergency resupply of water by tanker, which would require a maximum of eighteen days and which would be implemented on order of CINCLANTFLT. Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy. ✓

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

6(1)(C)

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of a tailored Naval Construction Battalion unit containing necessary skills, the requisite labor force, and the possible stationing of a repair ship at Guantanamo Bay aboard which are personnel with appropriate skills. Critical personnel would be transported by air, to arrive within 48 hours, when ordered by CINCLANTFLT. ✓

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action through such measures as the use of fire hoses and lacrymating agents may be ordered by the Commander, U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. ✓

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure

circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, through increased defense conditions, placing personnel in positions protected from fire, and return of fire if appropriate and required as determined by the Commander Naval Base, Guantanamo. The precise nature of the U.S. response cannot be determined in advance. A single shot from an unseen sniper resulting in injury or death to a sentry is one thing, a continued sniping fusillade from a number of persons is another.

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane.

MAR 2016

6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

CONFIDENTIAL

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. Commanders are not authorized to organize deliberately a pursuing force, however ships or aircraft ordered to the area of the attack may take immediate protective measures including pursuit to, but not into, Cuban air space or territorial waters. U.S. pilots are not authorized to attack unless either they or the ship or aircraft they are defending is endangered by Cuban attack. In the event Cuban aircraft limit their action to harassment, U.S. pilots are limited to making their presence known by flying close aboard the Cuban plane. Overflight of Cuba by fighter aircraft is authorized only in those instances where it has been established that Cuban attack is being made on a U.S. ship or aircraft and then only for the purpose of substantially reducing the time required for the U.S. fighter aircraft to reach the scene. Such overflights may be authorized only by specifically designated commanders.

6(1)(C)

MAR 2016

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT With regard to Castro attacks on areas in Latin America, plans exist for the U.S. military to respond to requests for assistance by Latin American governments subject to US governmental approval. There is also an arrangement for the

6(1)(C)

~~TOP SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

interchange of information between the U.S. Coast Guard and British naval forces with regard to possible staging areas which may be used by exiles in the Bahamas.

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

[redacted]

31 December 1963

CIA HAS NO OBJECTION TO DECLASSIFICATION AND/OR RELEASE OF THIS DOCUMENT AS SANITIZED

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL HAIG
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, DA

Subject: Psychological Programs Subcommittee - Cuba

1. An informal meeting of the Interdepartmental Subcommittee (Psychological Programs) on Cuban Affairs was convened in Room 7519, New State at 1430 hours, 30 December 1963. The agenda for the meeting was not pre-announced. Present from State were Chairman Bowdler, Sylvester, and Montenegro; from CIA, Tilton and [redacted] from USIA, Murphy; and the undersigned. 6(1)(A) 6(1)(B)

2. The following topics were discussed:

a. CUTAL (Unified Labor Federation for Latin America) meeting scheduled for Rio de Janeiro, 24 - 28 January 1964. Mr. Montenegro, State labor advisor for Latin America, described the anticipated meeting as a "founding" assemblage of left-wing labor leaders, socialists, and communists who will attempt to resolve their differences. State believes that there will be a concerted effort by the communists to wrest the leadership of the fledgling federation from Mexican socialist elements. Following actions were discussed:

(1) State to cable US Ambassador to Brazil to ascertain the degree to which local (not national) governmental elements will support disruptive and harassing actions before and during the meeting.

(2) State to circularize Latin American posts with the suggestion that local influences be brought to bear in order to discourage country delegates from attending the meeting.

(3) USIA to consider VOA broadcasts to Latin America in order to exploit exposes of Cuban, East German, and Chinese Communist labor conditions.

(4) CIA to continue black propaganda operations in [redacted] which suggest postponement of the meeting. 6(1)(C)

OSA, ASG Control No. 3 001

DOWNGRADED AT 3 YEAR INTERVALS;
DECLASSIFIED AFTER 12 YEARS.
DOD DIR 5200.10

[redacted]

29

CONFIDENTIAL

Partially
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION
BY JOINT STAFF
EXEMPTION: 6(1)(c)
DATE: MAY 15 1998

Jr Wheeler c/s

September 21, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. JOHN H. CRIMMINS
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs
Department of State

SUBJECT: Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee of Cuban Affairs: Possible Retaliatory Actions by the Castro Government (U)

Reference: Memorandum from the Coordinator of Cuban Affairs Dept of State, subject as above, 13 Sep 63

In response to reference memorandum, outlined below is the status of existing contingency plans for those priority situations agreed upon at our meeting of September 12, 1963. The numbering of the paragraphs below corresponds to the format utilized in the attachment to reference memorandum and includes those actions for which Department of Defense specific or related military contingency plans exist.

"A. Actions Against U. S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT: [redacted] In addition, evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less can be accomplished if directed.

6(1)(c)

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

9/23/3100 (8 JAN 63) w/JCS 2304/204-1

OSA, ASG Control No. T/S 0228

SYSTEMATICALLY REVIEWED
BY JCS ON 17 OCT 1989
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED

Copy No. ___ of ___ Copies

CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED
DOD DIR 5200.10

OCOFSA 721/63

COMMENT: Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT: Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT: Measures may be taken appropriate to the circumstances and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT: Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U. S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U. S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U. S. Shipping using Ucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT: The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters.

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters."

COMMENT: It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U. S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate," "raider," "mother ship" or "exile raider," even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U. S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. [redacted]

6(1)(c)

[redacted]

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean"

COMMENT: [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT: The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT: There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

The summaries of actions set forth above are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, of course, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

It was generally agreed at the September 13, 1963 meeting of the Committee that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime. It appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin

~~SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

REPORT CONCERNING POSSIBLE RETALIATORY ACTIONS BY THE CASTRO GOVERNMENT

1. The numbering of the subparagraphs below corresponds to the numbering of those actions for which specific or related military contingency plans exist. A brief summary of the action contemplated by those plans is also provided.

"A. Actions Against U.S. Targets in Cuba

"4. Harassment of Guantanamo

"(a) Cutting off of the water supply"

COMMENT [redacted] Evacuation of non-essential personnel in 24 hours or less if directed and consistent with national policy.

"(b) Closing access to the base by Cuban workers who commute"

6(1)(c)

COMMENT Provision is made for the introduction of [redacted]

"(c) Staging demonstration and riots at the gates"

COMMENT Execution of measures appropriate to the degree, kind, and exact location of the disturbance, ranging from no action [redacted]

"(d) Sniping at base sentries resulting in injury or death"

COMMENT Measures may be taken appropriate to the

~~TOP SECRET~~ CONFIDENTIAL

DOWNGRADED AT 12 YEAR INTERVALS;
NOT AUTOMATICALLY DECLASSIFIED.

Enclosure

circumstance and situation ranging from no action, through action taken in self defense by a wounded sentry or those assisting him, [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"(e) Sabotaging of base facilities"

COMMENT Extensive security measures are taken to prevent such sabotage by the Commander U.S. Naval Base, Guantanamo. The nature of the action taken would depend upon the nature of the sabotage and be designed to assure the continued functioning of the Base.

"B. Actions Against U.S. Aircraft and Shipping

"1. Harassment of U.S. Shipping using Yucatan Channel, Florida Straits, Windward Passage"

COMMENT The rules of engagement, which have been approved by the highest national authority provide that ships or aircraft ordered to the area may take immediate protective measures [redacted]

6(1)(c)

"C. Actions Against Cuban Exiles

"1. Shooting down of pirate planes, possibly of US registry.

"2. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding planes over the high seas or another country's territory.

"3. Hot pursuit of or attack on raiding boats on the high seas or another country's territorial waters

"4. Attack on mother ship or exile raiders on the high seas or in another country's territorial waters

COMMENT It is noted that it is contrary to national policy to permit raids on Cuba originating from U.S. territory, however, at the time a ship or aircraft is discovered to be under Cuban attack it may be difficult to identify it as a "pirate", "raider", "mother ship" or "exile raider", even though this, in fact, may be the case. All the situations, set forth above, are covered, at least in part, by the rules of engagement which have been approved by the highest national authority. However, the action summarized below is authorized only in the case of U.S. ships and aircraft and those not clearly identified as being of foreign registry. [redacted]

6(1)(C)

"5. Attack on staging areas employed by exiles in the Caribbean

COMMENT [redacted]

6(1)(C)

CONFIDENTIAL
~~TOP SECRET~~

[redacted]

"E. Actions Against Targets in the US

"1. Sabotage or terroristic bombings"

COMMENT The level of intensity of such actions contemplated within the context of the paper is not considered to exceed the capabilities of law enforcement agencies to control. There are military contingency plans to protect against this type of activity at a much higher level of intensity.

"2. Jamming of US radio stations"

COMMENT There are standing operating procedures to overcome interference and jamming methods employed against military communications.

2. "Any additional pertinent information on existing or related plans" and "recommendations, if any, on other likely actions which might be taken by the Castro government in retaliation for Cuban exile raids" was also requested. The furnished list of possible retaliatory actions by the Castro government were of "the level of intensity which the committee agreed to be in the most likely category." It is inferred that what the committee had in mind by the most likely "level of intensity" was that level which would not provoke the United States into taking extensive countermeasures which might seriously endanger the Castro regime. The summaries of actions, set forth above, which might be taken under existing military contingency plans are essentially defensive reactions to Cuban initiatives. There are, however, existing and related military plans, retaliatory in nature, which range up to and include a full scale military invasion of Cuba.

3. If it is assumed that the most likely actions of the Cuban government are those which would not provoke United States retaliation seriously and immediately endangering the Castro regime, it appears more likely that Castro might intensify his support of subversive forces in Latin America

than risk direct confrontation with the United States. In the long run, such action is more dangerous and difficult to combat, and in the short run is less likely to provoke immediate and effective United States retaliation. Such actions would be in keeping with Castro's repeated declarations that Cuba is the main source of guidance inspiration for the "inevitable" Latin American revolution. Whereas an inflamed American public opinion over the killing of even a few sentries might require strong countermeasures, the training of a greater number of Latin American guerrillas than the 1500 or more trained in fiscal year 1962, probably would not. Nor is it likely that the return of those trainees to Latin American countries, their establishment of guerrilla training bases, recruitment of additional personnel, and engagement in insurgency actions would be as immediately provocative as interference with the water supply at Guantanamo. Similarly, closing access to the naval base Cuban workers who commute would deprive Castro of a source of foreign exchange. While such items as, "the harassment of air traffic into and out of Guantanamo," or "the harassment of US aircraft operating in the vicinity of or overflying Cuba," might be added to the list, it is considered that specific provocative actions are less likely and less dangerous than the intensification of support to subversive forces in Latin America. Such action not only is in keeping with the declared communist intention to support "national liberation movements of oppressed peoples" but may be done by means which avoid an invitation to overt US military countermeasures which would endanger the Castro regime. Thus, they are considered as of that level of intensity which places them in the most likely category as well as being in the category of most dangerous to the long range interests of the United States.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10000
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964
DATE : 10/01/64
PAGES : 21
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING

SUMMARY OF OCTOBER 1 AND 2, 1964 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1A, 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/14/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING

OF

OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964

206-10001-10000

Mr. C[illegible] ~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENDA FOR OCTOBER 1 and 2, 1964

October 1, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 9:45	Chairman's Time
2.	9:45 - 10:15	Major Board Recommendations - Status Report Mr. Ash
3.	10:15 - 11:15	Audiosurveillance Collection and Countermeasures:
a.	10:15 - 10:30 10:45	Final USIB Assessment of Audio Penetrations of U. S. Embassy, Moscow Mr. Howard Osborn Director of Security, CIA, and Chairman of USIB's Security Committee Mr. ~~Marvin Gentile~~ Kevin C. Brown Director of Security, Department of State
b.	10:45 - 11:45 ~~10:30~~ - ~~11:15~~	USIB Conclusions and Recommendations on Organization, Management and Coordination of the Effort Mr. Richard Helms and Tom Karamessines Deputy Director/Plans, CIA Mr. Howard Osborn
~~4.~~	~~11:15 - 11:30~~	~~Executive Session~~
5.	11:45 ~~11:30~~ - 12:15	Highlights of Soviet COSMOS (Photographic Reconnaissance Satellite) Efforts Targeted Against the United States Dr. Albert Wheelon + Mr. Sayre Stevens Deputy Director for Science and Technology, CIA
6.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - White House Mess
7.	1:00 - 1:30	Recent Tonkin Gulf Incident:
a.	1:00 - ~~1:15~~ 1:40	General Highlights Mr. Coyne
b.	1:40 ~~1:15~~ - ~~1:30~~ 2:10	White House Intelligence Requirements in Developing Crisis Situations Mr. Bromley Smith Office of the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Handle via DYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 1, 1964 Agenda (Continued):

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
8.	1:30 - 4:30	Alert Warning and Response Capabilities of the U. S. Intelligence Community in Developing Crisis Situations (Organization and procedures for analysis of current intelligence; identification of Early Warning indicators; timely appraisal and reporting to top Government levels):
a.	~~1:30~~ 2:10 - ~~1:50~~ 3:20	National Security Agency Mr. Louis Grant + Mr. Jack Sharretts
b.	~~1:50~~ 2:10 - ~~2:10~~ 3:20	Department of Defense Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll + Col. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
c.	2:10 - 2:30	Executive Session [illegible]
d.	~~2:30~~ 3:20 - ~~2:50~~ 3:45	Department of State Mr. Thomas L. Hughes Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
e.	~~2:50~~ 3:45 - 3:10 4:05	Central Intelligence Agency Mr. R. J. Smith Assistant Director, Current/Intelligence Staff
f.	3:10 - 3:30	Executive Session [illegible]
g.	~~3:30~~ 4:15 - ~~4:30~~ 5:00	Organization, Procedures and Communications Support of the USIB Watch Committee and National Indications Center Mr. Huntington Sheldon Chairman, USIB Watch Committee
9.	4:30 - 5:00	Executive Session [illegible]
10.	5:00 - 5:10	Application of Executive Pay Bill to Key Positions in the National Signals Intelligence Community Dr. William O. Baker Chairman of the Board's Communications Panel
11.	5:10 - End of Day	Resume Consideration of Item 2.
12.	7:30	Dinner at the Residence of Mr. Gordon Gray (Address: 1224 - 30th Street, Northwest)

[illegible] Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 2, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
13.	9:00 - 9:45	Chairman's Time
14.	9:45 - ~~10:45~~ 11:00	Current Intelligence Briefing on Situations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, Malaysia-Indonesia, Cyprus, Congo, Cuba Mr. Ray Cline + Mr. Clinton B. Conger Deputy Director for Intelligence, CIA (or Mr. R. J. Smith)
15.	10:45 - 11:00	Executive Session not held
16.	11:00 - ~~12:00~~ 12:15	The National Reconnaissance Program Dr. Brockway McMillan + Brig. Gen. Jas. T. Stewart Director, National Reconnaissance Office
17.	12:00 - 12:15	Executive Session not held
18.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - White House Mess
19.	~~1:00~~ 1:10 - ~~1:45~~ 1:50	Briefing on Highlights of Recent U. S. National Photographic Intelligence Activities Dr. Arthur Lundahl Director, National Photographic Intelligence Center
20.	1:45 - 3:00	Discussions of Future Board Business
21.	3:00 - 4:30	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John A. McCone + Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
22.	4:30 - End of Day (5:00)	Executive Session

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

~~April~~ 5, 1965

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting, October 1-2, 1964

October 1, 1964

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened at 9:00 AM on October 1, 1964 at the Board's offices in the Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford; Board members Langer, Pace, Gray, Land and Baker (Mr. Murphy was in Brazil); and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

In opening the meeting the Chairman pointed out that ample time had been allotted during this two-day meeting for Board members to discuss agenda items of special interest. He then turned to some matters which he wished to bring to the Board's attention before proceeding with the regular agenda.

Chairman Clifford informed Board members that since the last Board meeting he had met with the President a number of times for discussions of various subjects, and on these occasions had taken the opportunity to progressively acquaint the President with the work of the Board. Mr. Clifford pointed out to the Board that, unlike President Kennedy who had reconstituted the Board in 1961 and was thoroughly familiar with its functioning, President Johnson has not been as intimately associated with the Board, primarily for the reason that no intelligence-related incidents have thus far arisen in President Johnson's term to evidence his special need for the Board's assistance. However, during the past few months the President is beginning to get a better idea of the Board's accomplishments as a result of Mr. Clifford's comments from time to time. Chairman Clifford observed that otherwise it was unlikely that the President would learn much about the work done by the Board, and certainly not from the intelligence community itself and probably not from Mr. McGeorge Bundy whose many duties of a non-intelligence nature are most demanding.

HANDLE VIA
BYEMAN-COMINT
CONTROL SYSTEMS JOINTLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

With a view to keeping the Board fully informed of the President's indicated reactions to Board's work, Mr. Clifford said that for the time being the President prefers a quiet, unostentatious operation of the Board. It is the President's desire to try to avoid any explosions in the intelligence field, and any resignations in heat by any members of the intelligence community. After coming into office under most difficult circumstances, the President has found people are eager to help, and he relies heavily on Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and on others such as the members of this Board.

Concerning contacts with the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Clifford said that he has talked with him from time to time. Recently, Mr. McCone had called to say that he was going to be out of the country on a mission, and he asked that General Carter of CIA be furnished the usual list of topics which Board members wished the DCI to cover during this meeting of the Board.

At this point the Chairman asked that the Board take up a matter in closed session, with Messrs. Ash and Coyne leaving the conference room and rejoining the meeting at the end of the closed session. Chairman Clifford informed Mr. Coyne that the Board had discussed a report and recommendation which Mr. Pace had prepared for the Board's consideration, and the Board had unanimously agreed to propose to the President that the position of Executive Secretary to the Board be placed in Level IV of the Executive Salary Schedule recently established by the Salary Reform Act. Mr. Clifford said that as a part of this proposal it would be suggested to the President that meanwhile the salary of the Executive Secretary be raised to a level commensurate with the compensation of positions classified in GS-18, pending Presidential action to place the position in Executive Level IV. Mr. Coyne expressed to the Board his appreciation for this action not only as it applied to him as incumbent of the position, but also as an action in keeping with the work and level of effectiveness required of the position in performing on behalf of the President and the Board the responsibilities involved.

The Board then recessed for a minute to greet former Board member General Doolittle who had visited the Board's offices to pay his respects to the members. (At the time of the visit, through arrangements made by Mr. Coyne, General Doolittle was debriefed by Mr. Henry Thomas of CIA in connection with the suspension of various special clearances held by General Doolittle at the time of his recent resignation from the Board.)

Resuming in executive session, the Chairman called attention to the next item on the regular agenda dealing with the audio-surveillance and countermeasures problem generally, and with the intelligence community's assessment of damage to the national security resulting from the 12-year penetration of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow through the Soviet microphone system which had recently been uncovered there. In this connection, Mr. Pace observed that the September 24, 1964 report which the Board had received from General Carter of CIA (concerning the status of actions taken in response to Board Recommendation No. 35 of June 1962) was not responsive to the Board's recommendation calling for the organization of a major research and development effort in the audiosurveillance field.

At 10:40 AM the Board meeting was joined by Messrs. Richard Helms, Karamessines and Harold Osborne of CIA, and Mr. Brown who represented the Director of Security of the State Department.

Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Osborne of CIA (Chairman of the USIB Security Committee) to speak to the intelligence community's damage assessment of the Soviet microphone penetration of the U. S. Embassy at Moscow.

Mr. Osborne read from a draft report on the damage assessment, which was scheduled to be considered by the USIB Security Committee on the following Tuesday preparatory to submission to the USIB. He noted that the 52-microphone system had been installed during the Soviet-controlled construction and renovation of the Embassy building prior to its occupation by the U. S. It was tentatively concluded that the penetration did serious damage to the U. S. which is not possible of precise proof. The penetration provided the Soviets at least with the knowledge of Embassy operations, especially those of the U. S. military attaches; knowledge of the Attaches' travel plans and intelligence targets in the USSR; and information on the habits, problems and weaknesses of Embassy personnel as a basis for possible exploitation by Soviet Intelligence Services. Mr. Osborne said that Ambassador Thompson has expressed the intention to give the Security Committee a damage assessment which is understood to reflect the judgment that the damage to U. S. political interests was not serious and could only have given the Soviets a short-run advantage.

Mr. Osborne said that the damage assessment has pointed up certain deficiencies which have long been recognized by U. S. security officers, namely: the fact that Soviet bloc control of U. S. embassies during construction periods prevents security inspections which would identify installations being made of clandestine listening systems; the U. S. does not have an effective technical capability to detect buried microphones; and there is a need for a stronger interagency mechanism to develop necessary countermeasures. He added that State now has a program to demolish at least one room in each U. S. Embassy located behind the Iron Curtain, and other U. S. agencies have been invited to join State in the conduct of "sweep" procedures.

One action resulting from the Moscow incident has been the alerting of appropriate U. S. agencies to the type of installation uncovered in Moscow. The USIB will be asked to urge the agencies involved to seek adequate funds and personnel to perform necessary security inspections of facilities overseas. The agencies will be asked to monitor the U. S. personnel who were subject to compromise by Soviet technical penetrations, to ensure that Soviet exploitation attempts are not successfully made against them. It will be proposed that a new interagency mechanism for countermeasures coordination be established within the USIB, with a view to achieving such goals as U. S. observation of the construction of our overseas facilities; the employment of U. S. personnel rather than local maintenance personnel in the Embassys; the assignment of more U. S. technicians to security inspections of U. S. posts overseas; the assignment of resident U. S. security technicians at sensitive posts abroad; intensified security indoctrination and briefings of U. S. personnel scheduled for assignment abroad; and expanded research and development in the audiosurveillance countermeasures field.

Chairman Clifford asked whether the USIB Security Committee's assessment had produced actual showings that the Soviets had intercepted Embassy messages. (Mr. Clifford recalling the incident last year when Khrushchev boasted to Ambassadors Harriman and Kohler that he knew the contents of a message that Kohler had sent to Washington recommending against U. S. approval of a sale of West German pipe to the USSR.) Mr. Osborne could shed no light on this. Mr. Coyne stated that he had followed up with State Department several times regarding this incident but the Department never had come up with a meaningful report. Mr. Osborne said that Ambassador Thompson's forthcoming annex to the Security Committee's assessment was expected to go into the matter of whether the Soviets were known to have acted on any information which was obtained through the microphone penetration.

At Chairman Clifford's request, Mr. Helms spoke to the subject. He observed that CIA has over 300 telephone taps and many other listening devices operated world-wide. These operations not only are for intelligence collection, but they also provide CIA with an idea of the kind of countermeasures used by the opposition as, for example, in the case of the Chinese Communists' discovery of CIA's audiosurveillance operation directed against the Chinese in Geneva. Mr. Helms said that without audio coverage the CIA would not have known that Lee Harvey Oswald sought a visa at the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City in 1963. In Burundi, when a Chicom attache defected to the U.S. and asked for asylum, the Chicom Legation pressured the Burundi Government to attempt to seize the defector and return him to the Chicoms -- but CIA learned of this plan through audiosurveillance coverage and was able to thwart the Chicoms and spirit the defector out of Burundi to the U. S.

In answer to Mr. Clifford's inquiry, Mr. Helms said that one major lesson learned from the Moscow penetration incident is simply that such penetrations are just being invited when the host country controls construction of the premises and supplies the maintenance employees.

Dr. Baker asked what was being done to protect the U. S. Embassy in Moscow and whether there are plans to use plastering and paint to cover walls such as those in which pin-hole apertures were found to lead to the concealed microphones. Mr. Brown of State said that he understood that research and development planning is being done on this. Dr. Baker observed that this is not an R and D problem and that such materials are available now for use in placing protective coatings on walls in our sensitive facilities abroad. Dr. Baker recalled that the code room is jeopardized in the U. S. Embassy in Paris where the Embassy is joined to a contiguous building not under our control, and Dr. Baker wanted to know what is being done about that situation. Mr. Brown of State was unable to say but he pointed out that current countermeasures plans are directed to the protection of U. S. posts in the Iron Curtain countries, not France.

Dr. Land said that there appeared to be some protective steps which could be done right away, such as "painting and plastering", but it seemed that there is a bureaucratic problem which prevents such action, and Dr. Land wondered what was considered necessary to get the job done -- was it necessary to obtain a Presidential Executive Order to do these things? Mr. Helms commented that one of the USIB Security Committee's recommendations will call for putting the responsibility in the USIB and the agencies will look to the DCI for guidance in such matters. Dr. Baker said that all this seemed confusing because the individual agencies have responsibility in this field, and he wondered whether a mere change in organizational labels would provide the necessary coordination and action. Mr. Helms thought that one task is to get the agency heads to realize the importance of the problem of audiosurveillance countermeasures. Dr. Baker observed that there are already in existence NSC directives which emphasize the seriousness of the threat. Mr. Gray pointed out in this connection that the preliminary USIB damage assessment of the Moscow penetration reflects that in some quarters in the State Department there is the view that maybe it was a good thing if the Soviets did get our information on the theory that the Soviets were thereby convinced of the firm intentions back of U. S. policy pronouncements.

Chairman Clifford asked whether anyone in our Government had ever considered the idea of telling the USSR in direct terms that we want to build an Embassy in Moscow ourselves, so that we can be certain that there are no audiosurveillance systems installed in it. Mr. Helms said that this is one answer and should be tried, but right now there is a hassle about which agency should chair the proposed new USIB Committee to coordinate such matters. Mr. Brown of State said that consideration had been given in the past to the possible use of U. S. employees instead of local maintenance people. Granting this, Mr. Clifford repeated his inquiry as to whether the intelligence community had ever proposed that the U. S. adopt the policy of bluntly telling the Soviets that we want the right to build a microphone-free Embassy in Moscow. Mr. Helms knew of no such proposal having been made by the intelligence community, but he thought that this was a matter which the President's Board could deal with in a recommendation to the President. Mr. Coyne at this point read to the Board the text of Recommendation No. 16 which the Board had made in the Dunlap Case (adoption of a U. S. policy that the USSR not be permitted to build a new Embassy in Washington unless the U. S. is given comparable permission in Moscow), and the State Department's reply to the effect that the U. S. was committed to the USSR in writing to help the Soviets get a new Embassy in Washington, in return for the Soviet action a few years ago in refurbishing and making available the North Wing of the U. S. Embassy in Moscow (Mr. Coyne poined out that it was in this same North Wing that a number of concealed microphone cable connections and antennae were found in the course of digging out the recently-discovered microphone system in the Embassy).

Chairman Clifford asked Mr. Helms to provide the Board at an early date with a list of protective actions which could be taken right now to increase defenses against audio penetrations of our posts abroad. Mr. Helms agreed to do so.

Messrs. Helms, Osborne, Brown, et al, departed the Board meeting at the conclusion of this agenda item.

Dr. Albert Wheelon, Deputy Director of CIA for Science and Technology, joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Mr. Stevens of CIA, to report to the Board on Soviet satellite reconnaissance operations directed against the U. S. Describing this as the Soviet COSMOS program, Dr. Wheelon said that of the total number of Soviet satellite shots (46 in all) 17 have been launched from Kapustin Yar. During the last three years 22 launchings have been made from Tyura Tam, and these were pretty clearly reconnaissance satellites. These carried 10,000-pound payloads in a photographic general search system like our CORONA. The camera weighs 2000 pounds. Four of the shots, however, were of the 15,000-pound payload variety, and are spotting systems like our GAMBIT. The repetition rate over U. S. targets is increasing. We are getting data on each mission, being supplied through Burundi and Brazzaville. The Congo situation could become dangerous to the U.S. position in African public opinion. Chinese Communist influence is persuasive, and several African countries will recognize Communist China and vote for its admission into the U.N. The Chicoms offered a Central African Republic $4 million for diplomatic recognition, and got it.

With regard to the Cyprus situation, Mr. Cline noted that although fighting has stopped neither side is backing down. The Cypriot leader will not agree to the Turks' proposal to rotate 1/3 of their troops on Cyprus unless the Turk Cypriots withdraw from positions along the coast. The USSR wants an independent Cyprus with a Communist-influenced government. Nasser wants an independent Cyprus subject to Egyptian influence. In reply to a question from Mr. Coyne, Mr. Cline stated that the Navy SIGINT installation has been scaled down so as to be ready for quick evacuation. This cut-down in U.S. SIGINT coverage has been replaced somewhat by installations in some Middle East capital cities.

Concerning South Vietnam, Mr. Cline said that the past 60 days have witnessed increased weakening of the political fabric of the government of that country. Khanh's inability to meet challenges is apparent, and his authority has steadily eroded. Khanh is trying to build support from the young officers and Bhuddists. (Mr. William Sullivan has just returned to the U.S. and says that the SVN people generally feel that the U.S. will pull out after the November elections). There is no change in the military situation, Mr. Cline said, but there is a creeping paralysis in the SVN army. The Viet Cong is shifting from terrorism and fighting to all-out political activity. In the USIB yesterday CIA expressed the view that there will be further political decay in SVN, increased friction with the U.S., and a petering out of the war effort.

In Cuba, there are signs that either the Soviets or Cubans will begin shooting at our U-2's after the November elections, and the "303 Committee" is studying courses of action which might be taken by the U.S. in such an event. One objective of the DCI's recent European trip was to emphasize to NATO commanders that U.S. U-2 missions over Cuba are not mere whimsy, but are necessary for intelligence coverage which cannot be provided by satellite overflights.

2

At 11:00 a.m., Mr. Cline left the Board meeting which was then joined by Under Secretary of the Air Force Brockway McMillan (Director of the NRO) accompanied by General Stewart the new Staff Director at the NRO (previously attached to the Air Force Systems Command and the Air Staff).

At 3:00 p.m., the Board meeting was joined by the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, and Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA, in order that the DCI might cover the items in which Board members had indicated an interest in discussing with Mr. McCone.

Mr. McCone first took up the September Tonkin Gulf incident, pointing out that he was out of the country when it occurred. Mr. McCone said that previously in a meeting with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the President, Mr. McCone had expressed the view that if the proposed De Soto patrol remained outside the 12-mile limit it would not be attacked by the North Vietnamese or Chicoms. The DCI said that the night before he left for Europe he repeated this belief to the Secretary of Defense, pointing out to him the absence of military attack preparations and the lack of other indications of hostile intent. The DCI felt that there was no real intelligence requirement for the De Soto patrol which had in fact been proposed for the purpose of emphasizing freedom of the seas and our right to enter the Tonkin Gulf with U.S. vessels. At the time of the incident the DCI was in conference with a NATO officer in Europe; and he immediately put in a call to McGeorge Bundy on the KY-9 and offered to return to Washington, but was told not to do so because of the uncertainties as to the need for it. Mr. McCone pointed out to the Board that CIA's assessment in the Central Intelligence Bulletin on Saturday morning reflected that there was no evidence that Hanoi had ordered an attack on U.S. vessels but that North Vietnam naval units had been alerted to avoid acts of provocation and were concerned with defensive action only if fired upon.

Mr. McCone noted the Board's expression of interest in discussing a mechanism to improve current intelligence assessment and reporting of such incidents as the Tonkin Gulf episode. He said that he had found room for improvement in one area: certain NSA intercept messages had been passed back to the field stations for processing, and had been sent to the National Indications Center, but were not passed immediately and directly to the CIA for analysis. Mr. McCone said that he had since corrected this reporting procedure. In any case, when the NSA messages reached the NIC they were sent on to CIA without serious delay. However, Mr. McCone said, there developed a dangerous situation which the Board should look at, namely, the fact that top policy officials grabbed onto fragments of raw intelligence and made decisions before the information had been evaluated in the light of the total information available and relevant to the situation. Policy officials should make use of the evaluating machinery which is at hand.

Dr. Langer said he understood that there had been no interagency evaluation of the SIGINT messages in the Tonkin Gulf incident. Mr. McCone said that by the time the Central Intelligence Bulletin was ready for publication on Saturday morning there was no opportunity for complete interagency coordination of the evaluation which CIA had made of the situation. Dr. Langer wondered whether there was sufficient DIA and State Department representation at the CIA center where the Central Intelligence Bulletin was prepared. Dr. Langer added that the White House staff followed the wrong procedure; that instead of querying CIA, Mr. Bromley Smith had called Mr. Coyne for help in getting a coordinated evaluation of the situation. Mr. Coyne corrected this by pointing out that in fact Mr. Smith had talked to State and others in the intelligence community; and thereafter called Mr. Coyne to obtain help in getting an up-to-date comprehensive summary of the SIGINT messages from NSA, and Mr. Coyne thereupon spent two days at NSA observing the work of NSA officials in reviewing and summarizing the messages which had come in from NSA field collection points, and the operational U.S. Navy messages to the extent that they had been made available to NSA.

Mr. Pace thought it strange that the availability of a channel to CIA had not been known to Mr. Bromley Smith, and Mr. McCone said that he too was surprised and intended to discuss this with McGeorge Bundy.

Turning to the subject of Cuba, Mr. McCone said that he had little to report in addition to that which he had reported to the Board at its meeting before last. CIA has 100 agents reporting on Cuba; they report comprehensively but under difficult circumstances requiring resort to clandestine radio equipment and secret writing reports through the mails. CIA has a reasonable number of sources (14) in the Cuban diplomatic corps, but Castro apparently doesn't have confidants among the Cuban diplomatic corps abroad. CIA has relations with friendly foreign diplomatic personnel inside Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he is not satisfied with the information being obtained from Cuba; the task is difficult; it is a matter of ~~providing~~ a negative. CIA has had to rely mainly on U-2 coverage results to check on the 45 reports received this year that there are Soviet missiles in Cuba. The SA-2 sites have probably been turned over to the Cubans by the Soviets, and a defector from an SA-2 crew has told CIA about Cuban operations. Castro has expressed intention to bring to the UN the matter of U.S. U-2's over Cuba, and has told Danish and Norwegian officials that after the U.S. elections in November, U.S. U-2's over Cuba will be shot down; Castro claiming that U.S. can rely on satellite photography of Cuba and must cease U-2 operations over the island. Mr. McCone said that by November 1, 1964, OXCART will be ready for missions over Cuba at a speed of Mach 2.8 and 80,000 foot altitude.

[redacted]

[redacted]

[redacted]

As for South Vietnam, the DCI said that it is most difficult to get intelligence on the Viet Cong. He has discussed with Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, and the CIA Station Chief in Saigon, how to improve this intelligence coverage. SVN intelligence organizations get very little information concerning the Viet Cong

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 24, 1964

SUMMARY

Recommendations Previously made by the Board for Strengthening Capabilities of the U. S. Intelligence Community in the Timely Analysis and Reporting of Current Intelligence on Developing Crisis Situations

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY ~~TOP SECRET~~

Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #4: That the U. S. Intelligence Board create the means for assessing and reporting early warning indications of developing "cold war" crisis situations in any part of the world (such early warning to be handled separately from "hot war" indications dealt with in the National Indications Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee).

Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #1(7): That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing the preparation of national intelligence estimates by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the President and other White House officials as required.

Board Report of January 11, 1962

Rec. #26: (Based on a review of the Berlin Wall and Syrian coup incidents): That (1) a sense of urgency be imparted at field and headquarters levels of U. S. intelligence agencies, with a view to ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are of potential significance to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States; (2) without imposing undue delay on the transmission of raw intelligence to Washington, State Department officials at overseas posts prepare periodic appraisals of developing crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consideration at Washington in the preparation of intelligence analyses and estimates; (3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board, and its subsidiaries such as the Watch Committee, ensure that intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of view which may develop in the intelligence estimative process; and (4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested to review arrangements and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA's intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are furnished to the DCI for information and for use in preparing intelligence estimates.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #32: That the Director of Central Intelligence, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, review the functions of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee and National Indications Center, to determine their effectiveness in carrying out their mission of providing early warning.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #49(11) (Based on the review of intelligence coverage, assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba in 1962): That concerted efforts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism for the integrated assessment (and cumulative periodic appraisals) of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making and command officials; and (2) conduct intensified research concerning automatic data processing techniques, to facilitate the review and assessment of the great volume of material dealt with in the United States intelligence community.

Related Board Recommendations Regarding Improved Communications Capability for the Quick Transmittal of Vital Intelligence Data

Board Report of October 17, 1961

In lieu of a recommendation, this was a report to the President on progress achieved by the Defense Department in performing its share of the responsibility for the efficiency of the Critical Communications (CRITICOM) Network for the quick transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data from overseas posts to headquarters in Washington.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #27(11) (Based on review of U. S. intelligence activities in seven Middle Eastern countries): That the Defense Department equip field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network with capability for rapid communication of critical messages among major and subordinate military commands in the field.

Board Report of October 5, 1962

Rec. #40 (Based on review of U. S. foreign intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East): that the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Special Security Offices (SSO) Communications System for transmitting sensitive information with a view to: (1) consolidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific military commands and Washington civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Commands in the field and command (as distinguished from Service) elements in Washington.

Rec'd
10-1-64
87 8773
PB#23328

Note: Distributed to members at meeting
by Mr. Sheldon

INDICATIONS INTELLIGENCE/INFORMATION



CIA
OCI INDICO
- CLANDESTINE SERVICES
- FOREIGN INTELL LIAISON

INFORMATION
National Estimates ONE
Economic ORR
Scientific OSI
US Overt Sources OO
Foreign Broadcasts FBIS
Foreign Documents FDD

STATE
RSB
- FOREIGN SERVICE POSTS

INFORMATION
Political
Foreign Policy (US)

DIA
ISIC Watch Alert
- UNIFIED & SPECIFIED COMMANDS
- ATTACHES
- WARNING CENTERS

INFORMATION
Joint Military Estimates
Military Operations
Military Capabilities

WATCH COMMITTEE

NSA
SIGINT COMMAND CENTER
- COMINT
- ELINT

FBI
Liaison Division
- COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

AEC
Intell Division
- ATOMIC
- SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGES

~~SECRET~~

SPECIAL USIB COMMITTEES

ATOMIC
JAEIC

MISSILES
GMAIC CCPC

TRADE
EIC

SPEC. BERLIN COMMITTEE

OTHERS

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

February 27, 1963

NATIONAL SECURITY ACTION MEMORANDUM NO. 226

TO:
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director, Office of Emergency Planning
The Director, Bureau of the Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
The Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

SUBJECT: Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

I hereby approve the attached directive relating to the transmittal of information by appropriate departments and agencies of the Government to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board.

PB #2328

Attachment
Above-referenced directive

Note: Distributed to members at meeting by Mr. Sheldon

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

Directive Relating to Transmittal of Information to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board

1. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 102(e) of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and for the purpose of providing necessary support to the Watch Committee of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB) in the accomplishment of its mission, all appropriate departments and agencies of the Government are authorized and directed by the President:

a. To make fully available to the Watch Committee of the USIB all information and intelligence of reasonable credibility pertinent to its mission and functions (as defined in DCID 1/5 (new series), attached hereto), without restriction because of source, policy or operational sensitivity.

b. To keep the Watch Committee of the USIB informed concerning significant diplomatic, political, military, or other courses of action by the U. S., approved for immediate implementation or in process of execution, which might bring about military reaction or early hostile action by the USSR, or its allies, thus endangering the security of the U. S. This information is for the explicit and express use of the Watch Committee and those members of the National Indications Center who need to know of it in order to perform their functions.

2. When, in the opinion of a department or agency, overriding considerations affecting the national security exist which justify an exception to a. or b. above, the decision as to withholding or delaying the transmission of the information to the Watch Committee shall be taken up with the Director of Central Intelligence and, if there is disagreement, referred to the President. In the case of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the matter shall be taken up by the Director thereof with the Attorney General who shall consult with the Director of Central Intelligence, and if there is disagreement the matter shall be referred to the President.

3. Under normal circumstances such data should be sent to the Director of the National Indications Center, Pentagon Building. When an item is considered of exceptional sensitivity, it should be addressed

~~SECRET~~

to the Chairman of the Watch Committee, in care of the Director, National Indications Center.

Attachment   Copy of Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) No. 1/5 (New Series).

Copy furnished: Each member of the United States Intelligence Board.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10001
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON SEPTEMBER 12-13, 1963
DATE : 09/12/63
PAGES : 33
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF SEPTEMBER 12 AND 13, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

SEPT
12-13
1963

MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD on SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

206-10001-10001

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF SEPTEMBER 12 - 13, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		September 12, 1963
1.	9:00 - 11:00	The Chairman's Time a. Administrative Announcements b. Counterintelligence and Counterespionage: (1) Dunlap espionage case at NSA (2) Defection to USSR of former NSA employee Hamilton (3) Damage to U.S. classified information and intelligence techniques resulting from recent Soviet espionage operations in West Germany, Sweden and the U.K. (4) COMSEC developments involving USSR c. Alsop article on CIA and Defense d. Intelligence capabilities for detecting violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty e. Photo reconnaissance satellite developments * f. Highlights of intelligence community reports to White House in response to earlier Board recommendations g. Report of Clifford Panel
2.	11:00 - 12:00	Intelligence Community Capabilities for Detecting Violations of the Limited Test Ban Treaty Dr. Doyle Northrup, Technical Director, Air Force Technical Application Center
3.	12:00 - 12:15	Executive Session
4.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
5.	1:00 - 1:45	Discussions with Director, National Security Agency Lt. General Gordon Blake, USAF
✓6.	1:45 - 2:45	Counterintelligence Programs of CIA ~~Mr. James Angelton, CIA~~ Mr. Raymond Rocca, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA
7.	2:45 - 3:15	Executive Session
8.	3:15 - 4:15	Status Report on the Organization and Programs of the National Reconnaissance Office Dr. Brockway MacMillan, Director, NRO
9.	4:15 - 4:45	Review of SIGINT and Related Intelligence Activities in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and the U.K. Dr. Baker

~~TOP SECRET~~

Murphy will be late

* Not taken up at Board Mtg.

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
10.	4:45 - 5:45	Consideration of Revised SIGINT Report of Board's Communications Panel Dr. Baker
11.	5:45 - 6:00	Status Report on Covert Action Operations Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel
12.	6:00 - 6:15	Status Report on State Department Intelligence Activities Murphy Panel
		September 13, 1963
13.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
14.	9:30 - 10:15	Covert Action and Intelligence Operations Relating to Cuba Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA
15.	10:15 - 12:15	Discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John McCone
16.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch - The White House Mess
17.	1:00 - 1:30	Discussion with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs Mr. McGeorge Bundy
18.	1:30 - 2:00	Executive Session
* 19.	2:00 - 6:00	Preparation of Draft Report to be Submitted to the President at a Later Date, Following Appropriate Review and Coordination with the Board Members.

* not taken up at
Board Mtg.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 19, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board September 12 - 13, 1963.

At 9:00 a.m., September 12, 1963, the Board began a two-day meeting in the Board's offices, Executive Office Building. Present were Board members Clifford, Pace, Doolittle, Baker, Langer, Murphy and Gray; and also present were Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford recalled that at the last meeting the Board discussed ways and means of increasing its effectiveness, and it had been agreed that ample time would be allotted for the discussion of subjects covered throughout Board meetings. At this morning's session two hours had been set aside, the Chairman announced, for discussion of the various subject matters referred to in the first item on the agenda.

Turning to some administrative matters, Mr. Clifford made reference to Mr. Coyne's August 5 memorandum regarding a request made to the Special Counsel to the President for guidance to Board members in complying with newly-revised Federal legislation governing conflicts of interest, and revised regulations calling for the submission of statements of financial interest (Board members having already submitted the latter some time ago in compliance with the previous law and Presidential instructions). The Chairman asked Mr. Ash to summarize the memorandum just received by Mr. Coyne from Assistant Special Counsel White under date of September 10, 1963, suggesting the procedure which should now be followed under the new law.

The Board meeting was joined at this point by Raymond G. Rocca (substituting for Mr. James Angleton of CIA) for a briefing of Board members on CIA's counterintelligence program.

Mr. Rocca began his briefing with the statement that CIA does not have the entire world-wide responsibility for counterintelligence (CI). To illustrate this point, he exhibited a chart dated September 1962 entitled "U. S. Organization for Counterintelligence" showing the various elements of the numerous U. S. departments and agencies whose functions and responsibilities bear some relationship to counterintelligence. Within CIA itself the CI function is compartmented under the Deputy DCI for Plans. The headquarters staff consists of 85 officers and 66 clerical personnel (although there is a large number of CIA headquarters personnel assigned to other intelligence activities which are related to CIA's CI programs). At CIA stations overseas, CI functions are performed by various CIA personnel in such areas as Penetration, Provocation, Double Agents, Technical Surveillances, Protective CI Services, Interrogations, and Deception.

Mr. Rocca stated that studies and recommendations made by General Doolittle some 10 years ago had a great deal to do with the fact that there is a separation in CIA of the handling of CI activities and positive espionage operations.

It was emphasized by Mr. Rocca that the CI program of CIA is directed against the Soviet bloc espionage apparatus which is operating against the United States, and the primary objective of the CI effort is to obtain intelligence concerning Soviet bloc attempts to effect espionage penetrations of the United States. Mr. Rocca also explained to the Board that within CIA the responsibility for personnel security and physical security rests with the CIA Office of Security which is located in the area of the Deputy DCI for Support, whereas the CI program is located in the area of the Deputy DCI for Plans.

It became apparent in the discussion with Mr. Rocca that Board members were primarily interested in the nature and effectiveness of CIA personnel security programs (in comparison to the NSA system which did not result in an identification of Sergeant Dunlap during the three years which he acted as a Soviet agent while employed in a sensitive area at NSA headquarters). Accordingly, Mr. Rocca received a number of questions from Board members which involved responsibilities of the CIA Security Office and which Mr. Rocca could not answer on the basis of first-hand knowledge. Within this limitation, however, Mr. Rocca endeavored to be of assistance to the Board in response to various members' questions which he answered to the effect that (1) efforts to uncover a "Dunlap" in CIA would involve the personnel security and physical security protective measures administered by CIA's Office of Security whose programs include thorough background investigations and the use of polygraph interviews, (2) the identification of a "Dunlap" in CIA might also result from the CIA's CI program carried on outside the United States in an effort to cover foreign intelligence efforts to penetrate the United States, (3) re-investigations of CIA personnel are conducted at 5-year intervals -- Mr. Rocca said that he would have to refer to the CIA Security Office questions as to whether all CIA personnel are polygraphed and whether they are periodically re-polygraphed, (4) the best hope of successful CI coverage of Soviet bloc penetration efforts is the inducement and wise exploitation of defectors, (5) the objective of Soviet bloc espionage penetration efforts is to "go for the jugglar vein," that is, to find and use people who are in a position to produce valuable information "in the clear" thereby overcoming the problem of obtaining such information from communications channels which are increasingly safeguarded by encryption and other protective measures, (6) although the United States has made some efforts to use blackmail against Soviet bloc personnel for CI and intelligence purposes, with some success, these efforts have failed insofar as Soviet personnel are concerned, and (7) the key to improving the effectiveness of CIA's CI effort is not a larget budget, but the obtaining of CI people having the specialized knack required -- and there is also a need for common training of all U. S. Government personnel overseas in order that they may have adequate awareness of the nature of the Soviet penetration threat.

In answer to Mr. Coyne's question, Mr. Rocca said that although there is no evidence of over-all penetration of U. S. Government agencies, we must assume that such penetrations are being effected, and we should recognize that the size and complexity of our Governmental organization and the members numbers of departments and agencies which are targets for Soviet bloc penetration efforts make us "a sitting duck."

Upon Mr. Rocca's departure at 3:30 P.M., the Board resumed in executive session.

Referring to Mr. Rocca's appearance before the Board, Chairman Clifford said it was apparent that the Board had been hearing from a representative of the wrong CIA area, as indicated by the fact that Mr. Rocca had found it necessary to say that most of the Board members' questions fell in the area of competence and knowledge of the CIA Security Office headed by Mr. Bannerman. Mr. Gray agreed that Mr. Rocca had been unable to respond to the questions in which the Board was particularly interested.

Chairman Clifford referred to General Blake's appearance before the Board earlier in the day, and Mr. Clifford pointed out that the NSA Director had emphasized his confidence in the thousands of good and reliable people who are employed at NSA.

Mr. Pace said that he was concerned about the heavy investment of time and money on security without a program to make it clear what the threat is. The absence of public awareness of the threat has in Mr. Pace's opinion resulted in a popular notion that the word "traitor" is no longer an opprobrious term in peace time, and the peace time impact of treason is less than in war time. (General Doolittle observed that the impact of treason is punishment by death, which is a pretty firm impact.)

Next, the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of the CIA headquarters group concentrating on Cuba) and his assistant, Mr. Bruce Clark, who were present to brief the Board on covert actions being directed against the Castro government. Chairman Clifford asked the CIA representative to confine the discussion to 25 minutes in view of changes which had been required in the Board's schedule.

Mr. Clark informed the Board that CIA has kept a close watch on the situation in order to reach an estimate on the number of Soviet forces in Cuba. Recently, he said, the Intelligence community arrived at its estimate, and at the last Presidential Press Conference the President had answered questions on the subject without getting into numbers, an approach which Mr. Clark favored. He said that CIA estimates there are from 6,000 to 10,000 Soviet personnel in Cuba, and the range of this estimate is indicative of the difficulty of estimating the number of Soviet ground forces. The Soviets control and operate the SAM system and related communications. There are no longer any Soviet ground units as such because they were removed along with the missiles and IL-28's in February. Cubans now control and operate all the MIG aircraft although the Cubans continue to receive training from Soviet pilots. Also the Cubans control the helicopters and use them effectively in counterinsurgency activity. Cruise missile sites and the KOMAR boats are operated by Cubans.

In air defense there are some 2,300 to 3,000 Soviet military technicians, but these personnel are not likely to be the kind to bear arms against an insurrection in Cuba, Mr. Clark stated. It was on July 12 that Cubans began to receive Soviet training in SAM site operations, and the training will extend over 10 months. Therefore in April 1964, Cubans will be prepared to take over the SAM sites and related communications. Some 300 Soviet personnel are estimated to be engaged in training Cubans in the operation of 12 patrol boats. Some 800 Soviets are assigned to cruise missile activities. And Soviet groundforces number between 2,000 and 4,000, Mr. Clark stated.

As for communications, Mr. Clark said that all Soviet naval links are down, but a Moscow-Havana link remains. The traffic on this scrambler circuit cannot be read by us, although useful information is obtained through traffic analysis procedures, and we do intercept Cuban VHF voice traffic.

In answer to a question from Mr. Clifford, Mr. Clark said that there have been no substantial new arrivals of Soviet personnel in Cuba. However, CIA does not get enough information on loadings and unloadings from vessels because of Cuban port security measures.

Mr. Clark said that from 3,000 to 4,000 Soviets would be expected to conduct MAAG-type operations in Cuba. In answer to Dr. Langer's question, he said that CIA has no knowledge of the number of Soviet agricultural advisers in Cuba.

Mr. Fitzgerald began his presentation with the remark that this was a good day to be talking to the Board because yesterday CIA was in a position to disseminate the best intelligence report received to date on the situation in Cuba. He showed Board members a copy of the agent report which he said had come from a "high level Commandante" in the Cuban army who is a reliable source. Mr. Fitzgerald also read from another CIA agent report which quoted a source as saying that not even Fidel Castro can enter Soviet military installations in Cuba, anyone who reports knowledge of the level of Soviet forces in Cuba is lying.

Mr. Fitzgerald said that the level of CIA resources directed against Cuba includes 467 CIA personnel at headquarters and in Miami, and 45 CIA personnel at CIA stations overseas. There are also 595 foreign sources, mostly Cubans.

At the present time, Mr. Fitzgerald said, CIA has a number of integrated covert operations which were approved by the Standing Group and by the President. The six-part program is a long-range one geared to a period of 18 months, and it is within the framework of U. S. policy toward Cuba. The elements of the integrated program are:

(1) Intelligence collection, both strategic and operational.

(2) Propaganda actions to stimulate resistance efforts and sabotage within Cuba.

(3) Action to stimulate disaffection in the Cuban military which CIA considers is the strongest group which can be expected to successfully seek the overthrow of Castro.

(4) A program of economic denial on an increasing basis. The Cuban economy is already suffering. Ninety per cent of Cuban industry uses U. S. machinery and replacement parts cannot be obtained from the United States. (Mr. Fitzgerald agreed with Mr. Murphy that Cuba can look to Canada for needed materials.)

Mr. Clifford asked Mr. Fitzgerald who is responsible for the raids reportedly launched against Cuba in recent times. The answer was that CIA is responsible for only a relatively few of the raids that have been publicized. On two occasions, August 17 and 19, CIA put ship-borne teams into Cuba, but CIA isn't responsible for the bombing raids with planes which have been staged by Cuban exiles from the Bahamas. (CIA thinks these raids are ineffective and would prefer that they be stopped.)

Best available image

~~TOP SECRET~~

A smallish raid is planned by CIA in Oriente Province in September, and there will be probings of coastal defenses all month long.

In answer to Mr. Clifford's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that if the teams are captured they will no doubt indicate to the Castro government that they were CIA-trained.

Mr. Murphy asked whether CIA has a long-range plan which it thinks will be effective in following through on a successful overthrow of Castro within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald's answer was that the remarkable thing about the Cuban people is their volatility and their tendency to be heartened by [illegible] acts against Castro. The long range plan, Mr. Fitzgerald said, is to stimulate Cuban resistance to Castro. In answer to Dr. Land's query, Mr. Fitzgerald said that if an insurrection was about to succeed the Soviet forces in Cuba would not be powerful enough to put it down. He noted that Cuban military forces number [illegible], plus [illegible] militia.

Mr. Murphy asked if CIA had anyone in mind as a replacement for Castro, and Mr. Fitzgerald replied that there is none in mind, but there are some exile groups being considered. He added that CIA is now working with State Department on a possible replacement, [illegible] be considered.

Messrs. Fitzgerald and [illegible] withdrew and departed at [illegible] P.M.

it thinks will be effective in following through on a success-ful overthrow of Castro within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald's answer was that the remarkable thing about the Cuban people is their volatility and their tendency to be heartened by sabotage acts against Castro. The long range plan, Mr. Fitzgerald said, is to stimulate Cuban resistance to Castro. In answer to Dr. Land's query, Mr. Fitzgerald said that if an intervention (?) was about to succeed the Soviet forces in Cuba would not be powerful enough to put it down. He noted that Cuban military forces number 150,000 plus 75,000 militia.

Mr. Murphy asked if CIA had anyone in mind as a replacement for Castro and Mr. Fitzgerald replied that there is none in mind but there are three exile groups being considered. (?) He added that CIA is not working with State Department on a possible replacement, and CIA prefers that no leader in exile be considered.

Messrs. Fitzgerald and Clark ? concluded and departed at 10:10 A.M.

Best available image

Copy of p.57 with text written above.

The DCI then referred to the problem of CIA's limited access to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. He said that there are sources in the USSR who would be willing to work with the CIA if the Agency had personnel on the scene to operate these sources. Mr. McCone noted that there are only four CIA people in the Embassy, along with some 17 U.S. military personnel. In contrast, Mr. McCone noted, in the U.S. there are 185 Soviet and 93 Soviet satellite intelligence officials operating against the U.S. in the Washington D. C. and New York (UN) areas. The DCI stated that on the question of placing additional CIA personnel under official cover in the Embassy at Moscow, the Ambassador has steadfastly held that the risk of damage from exposure of such personnel is so severe that it is not worth the gamble. Therefore, Mr. McCone said, CIA has only four men in the Moscow Embassy and they would all have to work on any one case. Recalling that several CIA operatives had to be taken out of Moscow when the Penkovskiy case blew up, the DCI emphasized that CIA needs to augment its personnel there. In answer to Mr. Clifford's inquiry as to what steps were being taken by the DCI to obtain authorization for the assignment of additional CIA personnel to the Embassy in Moscow, Mr. McCone said that he has had conversations with the head of the State Department. However, housing for U.S. personnel is limited in Moscow and the net result of increasing CIA personnel there would probably necessitate the removal of a State Department political officer or some other State Department representative.

Mr. McCone referred to the Vietnam situation as being very bad, with a disintegration of relations between the Diem regime and the Vietnamese and the U. S. The situation is so bad we may have to get out of the war. The U. S. could live with Diem's antagonism but he has lost popular support and winning the war would be a hollow victory. The U. S. has had no success in getting Diem to mend his policy. The shooting into a crowd of Buddhists and the deaths of 8 of them began an impossible situation, and the August raids on the pagodas were the last straw. If the Diem regime were to be disposed of, there's no one to replace him, and even though a military coup were pulled off; CIA does not believe it could stay in power. CIA is maintaining contact with the military to keep watch on them (but there is no CIA support as has been publicly alleged).

The DCI said that there have been received disturbing reports that Nhu is making a deal with the North Vietnamese (who would pay any price to get the U. S. out of the war.) The French Ambassador left Saigon for Paris last night. Mr. McCone added that our President and the Executive Committee of the NSC have been meeting regularly on the problem. There are differences of opinion in our Government and in the U. S. Embassy at Saigon as to the best solution. Some think if we can get Diem to do reforms we can win the war and get out. Others think Diem should be overthrown.

In answer to Mr. Clifford, the DCI said that State Department and CIA collaboration is close on the Vietnam situation. He added however that there was no coordination of the hastily composed August 24 cablegram from the State Department telling the Embassy to begin thinking about "unloading the Nhus" and that a change of the regime was in the offing.

Mr. Clifford invited the DCI to take up any other matters he wished to cover. Mr. McCone said there were a few that time didn't permit him to cover, but he would furnish the Board memoranda on "Deep Cover" and "Soviet Trawlers".

As to scheduled CORONA launchings care should be taken as to their frequency having in mind that CORONA shots cost $9 million each and GAMBIT $12 million, Mr. McCone observed.

Mr. Gray mentioned to the DCI a recent remark made by Alexis Johnson to some of the Board members to the effect that although the U. S. can put a man on the moon for a billion dollars, we can't place an agent in Castro's office. Mr. Gray said that he would like to hear Mr. McCone's comments to the Board some time as to the prospect of CIA penetrating the USSR and Cuban Governments if unlimited millions or billions of dollars were available. Mr. Clifford agreed that the Board should hear from the DCI on this at the next Board meeting. Mr. McCone's visit completed, he departed the Board meeting at 12:15.

Following lunch, the Board resumed in executive session. Mr. Coyne reported some information just received in the Dunlap case. Dunlap's wife produced another Government document which her husband had apparently removed from NSA. She said she found it in a strong box to which her husband was not supposed to have had a key. NSA Director Blake had informed Mr. Coyne that the document was from NSA to overseas stations on steps to be taken in tests of procedures with respect to intercepts of Soviet scrambler traffic. Dr. Baker noted that this is serious, because our only hope for exploiting Soviet scrambler communications is to take advantage of operator and encryption mistakes, so any reminder to the Soviets that NSA personnel are looking for "busts" will be very bad.

Dr. Baker said that the DCI's remark about Dunlap being at the crossroads of NSA information is untrue, because in fact Dunlap had access only to the crossroads of NSA activity against Soviet SIGINT. Also Dr. Baker said that the DCI's comments on CIA's WALNUT data system were exaggerated, for in fact the project has proved to be a useless disaster to say the least, and it is certainly not a "leading edge" to automation as the DCI had claimed. Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne had recently received word on the inadequacy of the WALNUT system from Mr. Griffith of IBM, privately.

Chairman Clifford agreed with Mr. Coyne's suggestion that at the next Board meeting the DCI be asked to report on the status of coordinated effort in the intelligence community with a view to achieving a data processing capability in the intelligence field.

Mr. McGeorge Bundy joined the Board meeting at 1:30 and addressed himself to the items which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's memorandum to Mr. Bundy dated September 11, 1963 (attached as a part of these minutes).

First Mr. Bundy expressed the view that there have been significant improvements in intelligence community support to the White House. This is particularly true with respect to current intelligence topics specially covered by CIA's OCI. These submissions are useful to the President and White House staff members because they are more timely than NIE's and supply the need for information without having to wait for the results of the necessarily slower process of turning out finished estimates.

Also, Mr. Bundy said the White House is getting good ad hoc reporting from Department of State intelligence (INR). Some of it goes to the President and it is of value to staff members in discussions with the President. Also, DIA's material forwarded to General Clifton is a useful supplement to more formally prepared estimates.

CIA's Deputy DCI/Intelligence reports at Mr. Bundy's morning staff meetings and if a particular intelligence memorandum is needed it is asked for,

81

but largely the initiative is with State, Defense, and CIA in making these current intelligence submissions.

In short, Mr. Bundy said that the means of access to intelligence are good, for policy purposes.

As to the second item on the Board's list, Mr. Bundy said he would have to throw back to the Board the question as to any modifications considered desirable in providing intelligence community support to the White House (in the light of the Board's Cuba report). Mr. Bundy thought that he would not be as good a witness ~~on~~ to the Board on this.

Dr. Land remarked that this morning the Board heard optimistically-worded reports by CIA on the responsiveness of Cubans to small sabotage efforts, but when the CIA representatives were asked about a long range plan for use in case of a coup in Cuba, they indicated that they had none. Dr. Land also wondered whether we would have advance intelligence on a coup in time for our Government to act on it. Mr. Bundy said that we do have an intelligence input on the question of whether a coup would result in unacceptable Soviet reaction, and the tentative judgment that there would not be.

Mr. Clifford recalled remarks by the CIA representatives to the effect that if agent teams now being sent into Cuba are caught, CIA will get the blame as it does in the case of non-CIA covert actions detected by the Castro regime. Mr. Bundy agreed that this is not a very good defense when agent teams are caught and their activities are attributed to CIA by Castro. Mr. Bundy said that the Standing Group file on Cuba is large and Mr. Coyne might well look through it.

Mr. Murphy wondered whether the intelligence effort is adequately tied in to the policy process, and he cited the August 24 State Department message to Saigon representatives indicating a policy change. Mr. Bundy said that the State Department message was not very well coordinated in its preparation, but there was no failure of intelligence involved.

Next, as to the adequacy of intelligence community production of timely, cumulative assessments of current intelligence and indicator-type data, for example in the South Vietnam situation, Mr. Bundy said that the intelligence record on problems developing there since last May is pretty good. The difficulty is that when you get into a matter involving daily operational-type policy decisions, it is not easy to keep track of the very latest developments. From now on, Mr. Bundy said that steps will be taken to make sure that the Standing Group and Executive Committee of the NSC have the same daily "new news" as their various intelligence officers do. The principal question regarding Vietnam is what does Diem actually think he is doing. Raw intelligence material is not lacking, Mr. Bundy said, but assessment is the problem.

As to the fourth question listed by the Board, Mr. Bundy said that it would cause a problem if the Board were to be made recipients of the daily CIA Presidential Check List, because the Board would then be getting something to which the rest of the White House family does not have access. Mr. Bundy said that he analyzes the Check List on a daily basis and this has resulted in the President getting sharper information. However, Mr. Bundy said that it would be a good thing if Mr. Coyne would look over past Check Lists for periods of perhaps a month, with a view to analyzing the submissions.

As to the fifth and last item in Mr. Clifford's list (inviting suggestions for increasing the Board's access to covert action matters and Special Group activities) Mr. Bundy said that he frankly did not know the Board's present method of covering NSC 5412/2 matters. Dr. Langer said that the Board Panel on the subject gets briefings from time to time on covert action operations. Mr. Bundy stated that he himself looks to CIA for reports asked for concerning the status of particular programs, but he did not want to have in his office a compilation of all of such sensitive activities. But if the Board appoints a Panel to do a review of all covert actions to date, or of selected programs, he stands ready to meet the Board's needs.

Mr. Clifford said that he or Mr. Coyne would be in touch with Mr. Bundy regarding the desired review of NSC 5412/2 activities.

Chairman Clifford then turned to the subject of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, noting that the Board had looked at U. S. intelligence capability to detect violations. He said that it appeared thus far that the U. S. capability is largely based on the acquisition and enlargement of detection systems in the future. Mr. Buncy said that he is concerned about the U. S. capability to apply intelligence safeguards against the treaty violations, but is unwilling to sign a blank check for detection programs. So the Board should keep aware of the question as to the worth of adopting certain additional detection systems, and in Mr. Bundy's view we need more than we now have. Dr. Baker observed that only two or three systems are well established, and all of the 13 or so under consideration are probably not necessary. He added that thus far only about 30 percent of previous Soviet tests have been learned of in advance through SIGINT, although some 60 to 90 per cent alerting could be achieved through better SIGINT take and better use of the take.

[illegible]

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel on Covert Action Operations (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Langer) was formed for the purpose of keeping the Board fully advised on the status of the planning and execution of covert action operations.

On previous occasions, the Panel's activities have included a review of minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group (with respect to Cuba only), and briefings by the Secretary to the Special Group and by CIA officials. Most recently, on September 6, 1963, the Panel again consulted with CIA officials and was briefed on a variety of developments in the covert action field. The Panel Chairman, Mr. Murphy, will make an oral report to the Board on the foregoing.

J. Patrick Coyne

~~SECRET~~

minutes

~~TOP SECRET~~

September 10, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Panel on Covert Action Operations

The Board Panel met in the Board's offices on September 6, 1963. Panel members present were Mr. Robert Murphy, Chairman; Mr. Gordon Gray; and Dr. William Langer. Messrs. Coyne and Ash also attended the meeting.

During the course of its meeting the Panel was briefed by Mr. Richard Helms (Deputy DCI/Plans, CIA) and his assistants, Mr. Cord Meyer and Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald (head of CIA's headquarters staff dealing with Cuba). Highlights of the briefings were as follows:

MESSRS. HELMS and MEYER

British Guiana

For a 79-day period ending in July, the anti-Jagan Trades Union Congress maintained a general strike which was directed against the Jagan regime, and had wide support among agrarian and industrial workers in protest against an oppressive Labor Bill proposed by Communist-oriented Jagan. CIA worked out with George Meany a program of CIA financial support ($435,000) to the strike under the cover of "AFL-CIO contributions." A CIA cover representative ran the strike program. The activity was tricky because the United States and the British desired to avoid violence; and the situation was complicated by the fact that the British Governor-General opposed the strike. CIA assesses the operation as a success because even though Jagan was not unseated, the oppressive Labor Bill was withdrawn and the TUC survived.

The strike activity took place against a background of agreement between President Kennedy and MacMillan that the British will not pull out of Guiana for an indefinite future period, in the hope that a Communist government will not fill the vacuum when the British do withdraw.

Cuban influence in the strike was in the form of a $1 million advance from Cuba to the Guiana Import-Export Corporation (an arm of Jagan's East Indian Peoples Progressive Party) which in turn was borrowed by the Jagan regime. Soviet help was indicated by a rumored transfer of over $100,000 to Jagan's Party through banks.

~~TOP SECRET~~

CIA at present is providing $5,000 to the PNC Party made up of anti-Jagan Africans in Guiana, and CIA is sending a Negro cover representative from New York to aid the African Party.

(CIA considers that Mrs. Jagan, a known Communist from Chicago, is the brains and guts of the Jagan operation.)

Haiti

CIA has surveyed the intentions and capabilities of various Haitian exile groups and has supplied them with token amounts of money to test them out. Efforts of the groups to form a united front have failed, and in the Dominican Republic Juan Bosch has reversed his intention to help unseat Devalier for the present. Ten days ago CIA dropped 100 rifles and ammunition to one Haitian exile group which has been given sanctuary by a Dominican Republic commander stationed on the border.

Dominican Republic

In this country there is a lack of democratic institutions, political party structure, labor unions, or cooperatives of an effective nature. Juan Bosch spends more time debating charges by political opponents than in performing the administrative job of running the country.

Bosch is an extreme conservative, economically, and refuses to spend moneys in excess of assured revenues. A twenty per cent unemployment figure is a major problem. Bosch has strengthened his Cabinet at the urging of the U. S. Ambassador, and has made peace with church elements (with CIA's help).

Opposition to Bosch is from the right and from parts of the Army. He has met individual Communist moves as they arise (e.g., an attempted infiltration of the Planning Commission), but he is not pursuing an over-all anti-Communist program or crusade. Although Bosch is considered by CIA to be anti-Castro and anti-Soviet, he has not clamped down on returning trainees from Cuba.

The twenty per cent unemployment situation provides the basis for a coup in the months ahead. Meanwhile the Army strong-man Embert (one of Trujillo's assassins) waits in the wings.

Vietnam

CIA's role in Vietnam during the past two years has been two-fold:

(1) Total support of the war against the Viet Cong, including the training of some 43,000 irregulars (now turned over to U. S. Special Forces); support to the mountain people in operations against the Viet Cong; and CIA training of U. S. Special Forces in South Vietnam.

(2) CIA support of infiltration operations in North Vietnam. (Not a great success. High losses of teams.)

In response to a question based on recent U. S. press allegations that CIA is attempting to overthrow the Diem government: "CIA has never engaged in any such operations whatsoever -- no instigation of the Buddhists -- nothing." CIA considers that anti-CIA expressions of this kind originate with Madame Nhu. The Viet Cong has been working on the Buddhists, but the Buddhist leader who took sanctuary in the U. S. Embassy has indicated that the Buddhist activity is motivated by a desire to unify what is a loosely-joined, individual-Pagoda-type religious movement.

August 20 saw the temple raids, martial law, and then the arrests of students. One U. S. reaction was an August 24 cablegram from the State Department (presumably hastily prepared) which, in nice diplomatic language to State Department representatives in Saigon, gave the word to "unload the Nhus" -- i.e., indicate to the anti-Diem plotters among the Generals that they should get moving. However, the Generals proved to be lacking in any intention to pursue their previously-professed anti-Diem sentiments. CIA considers that the August 24 State Department cablegram was the result of a miscalculation of the General's true capabilities and intentions. CIA understands that subsequently the Executive Committee of the NSC has met frequently on the subject, and more recent State Department cables have reflected a revision of the earlier "unload the Nhus" message.

As yet the political situation in South Vietnam has not had an adverse effect on the military effort, nor any increased Viet Cong moves to capitalize on the situation. (Mr. Helms departed at this point.)

Italy

With approval by the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the Christian Democratic Party was supported by CIA to the tune of $1 million in the campaign leading to the June elections (plus $600,000 to other political elements in Italy). CIA's rationale for the loss of CDP strength in the elections is that (1) there was a loss of votes among the workers from the south who were given the Communist treatment when they moved to the northern cities;

(2) Fanfani, and (3) the Papal audience given to Khrushchev's son-in-law had an effect on anti-Communist religious Italians, including wives of the workers who had previously been able to persuade their husbands to vote against the Communist candidates. Meanwhile the Special Group has authorized CIA to spend $125,000 to support the CDP in current developments looking toward the establishment of a center-left government coalition.

Bolivia

The Special Group has authorized a unique effort by CIA in support of Paz Estancero's program to "rationalize" the tin mines -- i.e., a project calling for the firing of surplus tin miners and resettling them in new jobs. This will take some time, but may result in breaking the leftist influence among the Bolivian miners.

Brazil

Goulart is engaged in coordinated efforts to (1) discredit the legislature, (2) obtain backing of the Army, and (3) make a demagogic appeal to the Brazilian people as the only leader who can serve their interests.

CIA is carrying out covert action in the labor movement and CIA believes that Communist control can be weakened. In student groups, a number of CIA operations are going and assets are in place (e.g., in the top executive committee of the Students' Federation). However, there is no large-scale CIA political operation in Brazil now.

MR. FITZGERALD
(On the subject of Cuba)

In June the NSC Special Group approved a CIA proposal for a package of covert actions against Cuba. The covert program assumes that means short of military action are to be attempted on the premise that at the present rate of progress, the Castro regime will be even more firmly entrenched because the passage of time runs in Castro's favor.

Mr. Fitzgerald turned to a listing of the approved CIA covert actions, remarking that if they seemed familiar proposals which were previously under consideration, it should be kept in mind that they have now been approved as "interdependent" actions. The actions call for (1) covert collection of intelligence, (2) propaganda action to stimulate "low-key sabotage", (3) stimulate disaffection among the Cuban military, (4) an economic denial program aimed at precluding acquisition of spare parts for industrial machinery, and other products needed by Cuba, (5) a sabotage program of a general nature, and (6) support of anti-Castro autonomous groups, by giving them money and the means to act, but under an arrangement which insures against attribution to the United States, and which precludes operations from U. S. or British soil. (The CIA philosophy is to back only the potentially powerful and effective anti-Castro groups, and the military is felt to be the best bet.)

The CIA effort represents a shift from external raids to internal sabotage actions. CIA mounts about 10 "black" operations a month, and Castro security forces have taken their toll among the CIA teams. Three operations were conducted on August 17 and 18, and among other things the objective is to give encouragement to dissident Cuban elements such as military officers who see no professional future under Castro who is unloading military elements which aided him in his initial seizure of the government. (The Special Group, Mr. Bundy and other White House staff note the successful mounting of CIA's sabotage operations and have asked for more to be conducted. CIA has found it necessary to resist any such pressures for these operations to be increased beyond the present effective capacity which CIA has at this time.)

Again, referring to the Cuban economy, it is hurting badly. The United States has a monopoly on the spare parts for industrial machinery needed by Cuba, and the USSR cannot supply them. The Cuban electrical industry is particularly hard hit in this respect. Castro's re-emphasis on an agricultural step-up means increased efforts to produce sugar, a crop which presents a good sabotage target. Finally, the Soviet aid at a rate of $1 million a day (military and economic) is not enough to keep the Cuban economy going. Cubans are not starving but they do not eat "comfortably" even in the larger cities. CIA finds that a major problem for their "black" teams is food re-supply in areas where the Cubans are hard put to feed themselves.

CIA assets being used against Cuba:

Staff: 384 (Washington and Miami)
U. S. contractor personnel: 83
Foreign nationals: 525 (mostly Cubans)
Personnel at overseas posts: 45
DD/I staff: 12
NPIC: a big effort on U-2 photography of Cuba.

CIA considers that of all nationalities, the Cubans are the most unreliable (prone to exaggerate). The best information comes from non-Cuban agents.

There are 108 agents in Cuba, including friendly diplomatic personnel. There are two illegal teams working, one of which has 200 sub-agents. There are 44 legal travelers working; 60 agents in Cuban shipping; and there are 31 penetrations of Cuban installations abroad.

As to Soviet shipping into Cuba, CIA has an agent in every port, but observers cannot say what is in the crates they see being off-loaded.

Since January CIA has disseminated 150 photographs taken by agents on-the-ground in Cuba. Also CIA has furnished its agents in Cuba more and better radio equipment.

CIA's estimate of bloc personnel in Cuba: 12,000 Soviet troops; 150 Chinese (mostly diplomatic personnel); an unknown number of Soviet civilian technicians; and "a lot" of Czech and other bloc technicians working with the Cuban military forces.

CIA considers that in the past 9 months progress has been made in (1) intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, and (2) effectiveness of the economic denial program. CIA feels that the "X" factor is the volatility of the Cuban people whose resignation to their lot under Castro would change overnight if they see evidence of successful sabotage operations against the Cuban government.

CIA penetration of the Cuban military got under way in April. An agent brought out a Cuban Army major and he is being sent back into Cuba next week. The major says that there is a medium level acceptance among the military of the idea of overthrowing Castro, but although this view is held by individual members of the military they are fearful of communicating it to others within Cuba. The wife of the chief of training of the Cuban Army is a CIA source. Defectors are naming military personnel to be contacted. There is, however, a fear of the Castro security system.

The subject of specific kinds and amounts of Soviet military equipment in Cuba is an area of the worst exaggeration and reporting by nonprofessional observers. However, there is no evidence of offensive missiles. There are 47 MIG-21's operated by Cuban pilots. Cubans are at the SA-2 sites and are being trained to operate them. We don't know what is in the caves, exactly. Neither CIA agents nor Cubans (nor even Castro) has access to the Soviet armored camps.

A. R. Ash

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Covert Action and Intelligence Operations Against Cuba

Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, who heads up a Cuba task force within the DD/P area at CIA, has been asked to join the Board meeting for one hour for the purpose of reporting on covert action and intelligence operations relating to Cuba.

When Mr. Fitzgerald last appeared before the Board on April 23, 1963, to brief members on this subject, his presentation included reference, among other things, to (1) the numbers of agents, teams, reports, etc., involved in the CIA clandestine agent effort against Cuba, with less detail on the substantive intelligence collection results being obtained thereby; (2) the fact that CIA had no policy guidance for "positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature," and that the policy guidance available to CIA in this area was concerned with creating "low key" resistance and "subtle sabotage" (e.g., leaflet drops and shorting out electric power lines); and (3) the fact that a decision regarding such policy guidance was to be obtained later in April 1963.

In the course of Mr. Fitzgerald's appearance before the Board, members may wish to raise questions about the following:

(1) The extent to which policy guidance has been provided to CIA, and by whom, pertaining to the execution of positive, major covert action programs against Cuba.

(2) The results of efforts to mount clandestine agent operations designed to (a) obtain on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, and (b) attempt intercept of emanations from Soviet encryption machines (as recommended by the Board to the President).

(3) A description of covert actions against Cuba which (a) have been approved and are under way or are scheduled for future execution, and (b) have been proposed by CIA but for which approval has not been obtained.

J. Patrick Coyne

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

September 6, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Discussions With The Director of Central Intelligence

The Chairman has invited Mr. McCone to meet with the Board and has requested that he be prepared at the meeting to discuss the following subjects:

1. Coordination of U. S. foreign intelligence activities. (Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies encountered by the DCI in the implementation of the President's memorandum of January 16, 1962, concerning coordination and guidance of the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; and remedial actions taken or contemplated.)

2. National intelligence estimating process. (Status and results of survey looking to possible improvements in organization, procedures and product.)

3. Current intelligence assessments and spot reporting on crisis situations. (The DCI's comments on the adequacy of present arrangements for providing the President and members of his staff with such assessments and reports.)

4. Counterintelligence posture of U. S. foreign intelligence agencies. (DCI's appraisal of current effectiveness. DCI's views on methods for strengthening posture, in light of damage to U. S. classified information, intelligence and sources resulting from recent Soviet espionage operations in several NATO countries.)

5. National Reconnaissance Office. (DCI's views on adequacy of current organization; operations and funding; status of OXCART and TAGBOARD programs; status of efforts to eliminate Agena-related failures.)

6. Cuba. (DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. S. clandestine intelligence collection activities and U. S. covert operations currently directed against Cuba and his appraisal of the current status of Soviet-bloc personnel in Cuba.)

7. Deep Cover. (DCI's suggestions on measures to facilitate intelligence community efforts to improve deep cover intelligence assets overseas.)

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

8. Intelligence collection activities of Soviet trawlers operating off U. S. coasts.

9. Renewed efforts in the Congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

10. Such other topics as the DCI may wish to raise.

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

BEY 0038/63

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjects Suggested By Board Members For Discussion
By the Director of Central Intelligence When He
Meets With The Board On September 13, 1963

1. Coordination of U. S. foreign intelligence activities. (Identification of major problems, gaps and deficiencies encountered by the DCI in the implementation of the President's memorandum of January 16, 1962, concerning coordination and guidance of the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort; and remedial actions taken or contemplated.)

2. National intelligence estimating process. (Status and results of survey looking to possible improvements in organization, procedures and product.)

3. Current intelligence assessments and spot reporting on crisis situations. (The DCI's comments on the adequacy of present arrangements for providing the President and members of his staff with such assessments and reports.)

4. Counterintelligence posture of U. S. foreign intelligence agencies. (DCI's appraisal of current effectiveness. DCI's views on methods for strengthening posture, in light of damage to U. S. classified information, intelligence and sources resulting from recent Soviet espionage operations in several NATO countries.)

5. National Reconnaissance Office. (DCI's views on adequacy of current organization; operations and funding; status of OXCART and TAGBOARD programs; status of efforts to eliminate Agena-related failures.)

6. Cuba. (DCI's appraisal of the adequacy of U. S. clandestine intelligence collection activities and U. S. covert operations currently directed against Cuba and his appraisal of the current status of Soviet-bloc personnel in Cuba.)

7. Deep cover. (DCI's suggestions on measures to facilitate intelligence community efforts to improve deep cover intelligence assets overseas.)

8. Intelligence collection activities of Soviet trawlers operating off U. S. coasts.

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

~~TOP SECRET~~

9. Renewed efforts in the Congress to establish a Joint Watch Dog Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

10. Such other topics as the DCI may wish to raise.

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN
CONTROL SYSTEM

Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10002
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964
DATE : 01/30/64
PAGES : 67
SUBJECTS : SUMMARY OF JANUARY 30, 1964 MEETING

AGENDA FOR JANUARY 30, 1964 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

JAN 30 1964

MINUTES
OF
MEETING
OF
JANUARY 30, 1964

206-10001-10002

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 30, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 10:00	Chairman's Time
2.	10:00 - 11:00	Acting Director of Central Intelligence Lt. General Marshall Carter
3.	11:00 - 11:30	Executive Session
4.	11:30 - 12:30	Director, National Reconnaissance Office Under Secretary Brockway McMillan, USAF
5.	12:30 - 1:45	Executive Session
6.	1:45 - 2:30	Lunch--White House Mess
7.	2:30 - 4:00	Consideration of Report to the President
8.	4:00 - 5:00	Meeting with the President
9.	5:00 - End of Day	Executive Session and Discussion of Future Board Business.

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 28, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WALTER JENKINS

Following up on the recent conversation which you had with Mr. Clark Clifford, Chairman of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, there are listed below the names of the personnel of the Board who are scheduled to meet with the President on January 30 at 4:00 PM.

Mr. Clark Clifford	-	Washington, D. C.
Dr. William O. Baker	-	Murray Hill, N. J.
Lt. Gen. James Doolittle	-	Redondo Beach, Calif.
Mr. Gordon Gray	-	Washington, D. C.
Dr. Edwin H. Land	-	Cambridge, Mass.
Dr. William L. Langer	-	Cambridge, Mass.
Mr. Robert D. Murphy	-	New York, N. Y.
Mr. Frank Pace, Jr.	-	New York, N. Y.
Mr. J. Patrick Coyne	-	Washington, D. C.

Copies of this memorandum are being provided to Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell and Mr. Pierre Salinger for their information.

J. Patrick Coyne
Executive Secretary

cc: Mr. Kenneth O'Donnell
Mr. Pierre Salinger

Attached memoranda (Tabs A through H) were used by the Chairman as the basis for an oral briefing on the Origin of the Board at the PFIAB meeting with President Johnson on January 30, 1964.

This document consists of 4 pages
No. [illegible] of 16 Copies, Series ______
~~TOP SECRET~~ SC 11412/63
(3)

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 1, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Origin of the Board: From 1946 to 1954 a variety of ad hoc groups were constituted at the Presidential level to review selected aspects of the total U.S. foreign intelligence effort.

In 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government recommended a permanent bi-partisan "Watch Dog Committee" (to be composed of members of both Houses of Congress and of public-spirited citizens) to make periodic surveys of the organization, functions, policies and effectiveness of the foreign intelligence activities of the several Government agencies concerned, reporting thereon both to the Congress and the President. President Eisenhower rejected this proposal.

In February 1956, as a tactic to forestall creation of a Watch Dog Committee, President Eisenhower issued an Executive Order (Tab A) establishing his own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities, to maintain a continuing, independent review of all U.S. foreign intelligence activities. President Eisenhower's Board functioned continuously from February 1956 to January 1961. (The membership of the Eisenhower Board is listed under Tab B.)

In January 1961, President Kennedy decided that there was a continuing need for a Presidential advisory board on foreign intelligence, but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members. In the interim he requested that the Executive Secretary of the prior Board remain in office and that he continue to review and report to the President on the conduct of our foreign intelligence effort.

Mission of the Board: On May 4, 1961 following the disaster suffered by the U.S. at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President, by Executive Order No. 10938 (Tab C), established the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. This Order directs the Board (a) to conduct a continuing, independent review and assessment of all functions of the departments and agencies having responsibilities in "the foreign intelligence and related fields" and (b) to advise the President with respect to the objectives and conduct of these activities, which are required in the interest of foreign policy, national defense and security. The phrase "related fields" pertains to highly sensitive covert operations relating to political action, propaganda, economic warfare, sabotage, escape and evasion, subversion against hostile states or groups and support of indigenous and anti-communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. These covert operations are to be conducted in such manner that, if uncovered, the U. S. Government can plausibly disclaim responsibility for them.

Membership of the Board: President Kennedy's Executive Order provides that "members of the Board shall be appointed from among qualified persons outside the Government..." All appointments to

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY ~~TOP SECRET~~ Handle via BYEMAN Control System the Board have been made on that basis. (The Board's membership is listed under Tab D.) The Board was chaired initially by Dr. James Killian, Jr. In April 1963 when Dr. Killian resigned, President Kennedy appointed Mr. Clark Clifford as Chairman. In appointing Mr. Clifford, the President directed that the Board "continue to perform the highly important function of maintaining an independent review and assessment of the objectives and conduct of the foreign intelligence and related activities of the departments and agencies having responsibilities in this field." (Tab E)

Coincident with Mr. Clifford's appointment, the President made a public announcement emphasizing that he would "continue to look to the Board for non-partisan, objective appraisals of the activities of our intelligence agencies in order to assure their efficient management and maximum effectiveness." (Tab F)

Review Procedures of the Board: The Board maintains its continuing, independent review and assessment of U.S. foreign intelligence activities and covert action operations through the following means:

(1) Panels (composed of designated Board Members and the Executive Secretary) which are responsible for keeping the full Board informed with respect to significant actions, problems, gaps, overlaps, and deficiencies in specified areas of the overall foreign intelligence effort.

(2) On-the-scene reviews, both in the U.S. and abroad, of intelligence-related activities. These reviews (made by designated Members and/or the Executive Secretary) encompass pertinent activities of the CIA, the Departments of State and Defense, the Unified and Specified Commands, the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the National Security Agency and the Service Cryptologic Agencies. Such reviews have been made at the Seat of Government, elsewhere in the Continental U.S., in Latin America, Scandanavia, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and the Far East.

(3) Review of periodic progress reports and special reports, submitted to the Board by the military and civilian intelligence agencies.

(4) Review of major intelligence publications, produced on a daily, weekly, monthly, or "spot" basis by the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and by the U.S. intelligence community collectively. These publications include current intelligence reports and appraisals of significant day-to-day developments, National Intelligence Estimates, Special Intelligence Estimates, and the intelligence results of satellite and aircraft reconnaissance missions.

(5) Briefings on selected intelligence topics from agency heads and other officials associated with the several U.S. intelligence agencies.

(6) Discussions, as appropriate, with the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman, JCS, the President's Special

Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Heads of the several intelligence agencies.

(7) Frequent meetings of the full Board.

Meetings of the Board: From May 1961 through November 1963, President Kennedy's Board held 25 separate meetings covering a total of 39 days. These meetings included sessions with the President, which provided opportunities for discussion of topics of major significance. (President Eisenhower's Board held 18 meetings covering a total of 39 days during its five-year tenure.)

Recommendations of the Board: During the past 2½ years the Board submitted to the President a total of 170 recommendations, summarized under Tab G. (During its five year tenure the Eisenhower Board made 42 recommendations; these are summarized under Tab H.) A large percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's Board involved activities internal to the Department of Defense; a lesser proportion involved activities internal to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of them related to activities of joint interest to two or more member agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170 recommendations, the President approved 125, disapproved 2, and temporarily deferred final action on the remainder. Of the 125 approved recommendations, implementing actions on 85 have been substantially completed. The remaining Presidentially-approved recommendations deal with substantive intelligence matters warranting continued Board attention and, possibly, the submission of further Board recommendations to the President.

Intelligence Areas of Major Concern: These include:

(1) The ever-increasing cost, size and complexity of the overall intelligence effort. This fiscal year the effort will cost $3.7 billion. Its personnel strength is in excess of 149,000. (Of this number, over 131,000 are in the Department of Defense and 17,000 in CIA.) The effort is diffused throughout a number of Government agencies including the Departments of State, Defense, Army, Navy, Air Force; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the Service Cryptologic Agencies; the Unified, Specified and Component Commands; and the Central Intelligence Agency.

(2) The acquisition on a priority basis of crucially-needed intelligence on the long-range missile capability of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

(3) The National Reconnaissance Program for the collection of photographic and signals intelligence through surveillance satellites, manned aircraft and drones (e.g. CORONA, LANYARD, GAMBIT, ARGON, U-2, OXCART, TAGBOARD).

(4) The Signals Intelligence Program for the interception and analysis of the governmental and military communications of foreign governments, and of electronics emanations associated with their missile and space vehicle activities.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

(5) The handling and analysis of intelligence information (received in massive amounts) as the basis for (a) the preparation of appraisals of current intelligence indicators and early warning data for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) the formulation of longer-range national intelligence estimates for use in the policy-making process.

(6) The U. S. clandestine espionage effort for the collection of vitally-needed intelligence concerning the plans, actions and capabilities of the Sino-Soviet bloc in areas significantly affecting our national defense and security.

(7) The safeguarding of sensitive U.S. information (including intelligence and intelligence sources and techniques) by means of (a) positive counterespionage penetration of Soviet bloc intelligence operations targeted against our Government on a world-wide basis, (b) the security screening and security supervision of personnel engaged in sensitive U.S. Government activities, and (c) physical security measures for the protection of sensitive U.S. material, installations and operations.

(8) The covert operations conducted by the CIA in political action, propaganda and related fields with the objective of influencing the complexion and orientation of selected foreign governments.

(9) The budgeting and management, particularly in the Department of Defense, of the complex programs which make up our total foreign intelligence effort. (Over 85% of our foreign intelligence dollar expenditures falls within the management and control responsibility of the Secretary of Defense.)

(10) The coordination and guidance of all significant aspects of our entire foreign intelligence effort as a means of achieving maximum effectiveness in meeting critical intelligence needs of our Government.

No. 2 16, [illegible] 28 2

~~TOP SECRET~~ S.C. 11412|63

(1)

December 1, 1963

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT BY THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
May 1961 - - - - - November 22, 1963

Board Reports of July 2, July 18, October 4, and October 17, 1961.

Rec. #1: The Board made a series of 17 recommendations calling for (1) a redefinition of the role of the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), and (2) a reorganization and redirection of the activities of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). These recommendations were submitted on the basis of a Board study requested by the President in anticipation of the appointment of a new DCI which subsequently took place on November 29, 1961. The Board recommended as follows:

(1) That the President designate the DCI as the Government's chief intelligence officer having primary responsibility for lending coordination and guidance to the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort.

(2) That the DCI consider establishing a small staff to assist him in providing coordination and guidance to the intelligence effort.

(3) That the DCI, although retaining over-all responsibility for the CIA, be directed by the President to assign to the Deputy DCI the day-to-day operational direction of the CIA.

(4) That the DCI be housed in the Executive Office of the President, in order to emphasize his role as chief intelligence officer of the United States.

(5) That the DCI consider taking with him to the Executive Office those CIA personnel engaged in the preparation of national intelligence estimates and evaluations.

~~TOP SECRET~~

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle via [illegible]
Control System

(6) That the DCI participate with the Bureau of the Budget in its review of the intelligence budgets of the various U. S. intelligence agencies.

(7) That the DCI be responsible for (1) overseeing the preparation of national intelligence estimates by the intelligence community, (2) assuring the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, and (3) providing intelligence briefings to the President and other White House officials as required.

(8) That the DCI serve as Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and represent the President on intelligence policy matters at the national level.

(9) That CIA (1) place increasing emphasis on the acquisition of "hard" intelligence, and (2) decrease the excessive emphasis being placed upon covert action programs.

(10) That CIA devise means for identifying and eliminating covert action programs of low potential.

(11) That CIA consider the feasibility of transferring clandestine operations and covert operations from CIA to some other agency.

(12) That, if feasible, the headquarters administration of all or portions of clandestine activities be relocated to points outside of Washington (e.g., to New York City, and other appropriate points).

(13) That deeper cover be achieved for all clandestine activities and covert actions.

(14) That efforts be made to reduce the visibility of our foreign intelligence activities through (1) action by the DCI to reduce to a minimum the appearances of CIA officials before Congressional Committees, and (2) action by officials of all intelligence agencies to refrain from public statements concerning substantive intelligence matters.

(15) That improvements be achieved in the quality of CIA personnel.

(16) That consideration be given to a possible change in the name of the CIA.

(17) That there be realignments in the organization and staffing of the CIA, with a view to increasing its effectiveness.

Rec. #2: That positive action on the new leadership of CIA be taken as soon as possible.

Board Report of July 2, 1961

Rec. #3: That the Department of State and the CIA conduct a study of the number of CIA representatives serving overseas under official State Department cover, with a view to an orderly reduction of such cover positions in appropriate instances.

Rec. #4: That the U. S. Intelligence Board create the means for assessing and reporting early warning indications of developing "cold war" crisis situations in any part of the world (such early warning to be handled separately from "hot war" indications dealt with in the National Indications Center of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee).

Rec. #5: That there be a strengthening of the capabilities of the National Security Agency (NSA) in the acquiring and processing of Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence, through the following means: (1) new legislation authorizing the Department of Defense to summarily deny or revoke the employment at NSA of any person unless such employment is found to be consistent with national security interests; (2) new legislation exempting the NSA from statutes and regulations governing employment in the U. S. civil service, as required to enable NSA to accomplish its sensitive and vital mission; (3) a requirement for full management and budgetary control of NSA by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; (4) central supervision by NSA of all collection and processing of Electronics Intelligence (ELINT) done by military intelligence elements within the Department of Defense; (5) a realistic re-examination of the system followed by the U. S. Intelligence Board in levying intelligence collection requirements upon the NSA; and (6) support by the Defense Department to meet such vital needs of NSA as ship-borne intercept stations, and equipment for intercept coverage of submarines and critical land areas, in order to meet national as distinct from purely military requirements.

Rec. #6: That the President support the Secretary of Defense in a reorganization of Defense Department intelligence activities through the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Agency.

Rec. #7: (This recommendation, on the subject of possibly changing the name of the CIA, is dealt with in the summary of Rec. #1 (16), above).

Rec. #8: That the President oppose: (1) the establishment of a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence; and (2) Congressional investigations of the CIA.

Rec. #9: That every effort be made to protect the President against public identification with specific U. S. projects and programs involving (1) clandestine espionage activities, and (2) covert political, propaganda, psychological, paramilitary and related activities.

Rec. #10: That the President lend his influence in persuading Congress to reduce its demands for testimony by officials of the CIA.

Rec. #11: That the Departments of State and Defense, and the CIA, be requested to report semiannually on the status of their respective actions to implement the 43 recommendations made on December 15, 1961, by the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities.

Rec. #12: That the President lend his prestige (in the period of transition involving the selection of a new DCI, and related matters) to support and enhance the morale of the intelligence community, and to restore public confidence in the CIA, by: (1) a Presidential statement commending the work of those serving in our intelligence agencies; and (2) an indication by the President of appreciation for the long, distinguished and pioneering work of Allen Dulles in the foreign intelligence field.

Board Report of July 18, 1961

Rec. #13: That CIA review its plans for occupancy of the newly-completed CIA Headquarters Building at Langley, and consider the feasibility of housing at some other place the administration of CIA's clandestine activities.

Rec. #14: That the mechanism of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group be employed in such a manner as to ensure: (1) political control of all covert actions (including paramilitary operations whether or not assigned to the Department of Defense), with an opportunity for the Department of State to bring suggestions and judgments to bear on covert action operations in the planning and execution stages; (2) the submission for resolution by the President of matters involving disagreement by any member of the Special Group with respect to a proposed covert action operation; and (3) a current review and evaluation by the Special Group of all covert action authorizations then in effect, in order that the Department of State might be fully informed of all such authorizations.

Board Report of October 4, 1961

Rec. #15: That the U. S. Intelligence Board make a thorough assessment with a view to improving the collection, coordination and analysis of intelligence concerning scientific and technical capabilities of the Soviet bloc.

Rec. #16: That, because the need for intelligence on Soviet nuclear and missile capabilities is more urgent than the current need for geodetic and mapping information, urgent action be taken as follows: (1) the scheduling of as many additional CORONA shots as possible in the coming months, with postponement of ARGON shots, if necessary; (2) the THOR-CORONA system to be relied upon as the photographic reconnaissance "work horse" while other systems are in the developmental stage; (3) a sufficient number of CORONA systems be made available to meet basic needs, either by ordering long lead-time items beyond the present CORONA system, or by ordering additional CORONA systems until advanced systems are improved; and (4) steps be taken to ensure launch pad availability to permit future CORONA flights for quasi-tactical objectives.

(Subsequently, based on information obtained in the course of its continuing review of the National Reconnaissance Program, the Board submitted to the Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs a report dated July 5, 1963, in which the Board: (1) noted a sugnificant series of failures which had occurred in photographic reconnaissance satellite missions, because of malfunctions of booster and other systems; and (2) suggested that the President's office appropriately re-emphasize the urgent need for achieving and maintaining a dependable and continuing photographic reconnaissance satellite capability -- lest our Government be denied vitally-needed intelligence essential to our intelligence-estimating and policy-formulating processes relative to the Sino-Soviet bloc.)

Rec. #17: That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group re-evaluate and make recommendations to the President on the desirability and feasibility of conducting (under special security safeguards) U-2 photographic reconnaissance missions over selected areas of the China mainland.

Rec. #18: That the DCI, as Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board, explore the feasibility of expediting the operational readiness date (April 1963) of the new National Photographic Interpretation Center at the Naval Weapons Plant.

Rec. #19: That (1) the Defense Department report on the feasibility and status of two technical projects initiated by the U. S. Air Force to eliminate delays in the transmission of critical Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence data to Strategic Air Command Headquarters; and (2) the Department of Defense comment on the adequacy of interim remedial measures which the Board had proposed as a tentative means of reducing delays in the transmission of such intelligence data to SAC headquarters.

Rec. #20: That preparatory to a Board review of the security of U. S. classified intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods, the DCI submit a detailed report on the implementation of the following: (1) Section 102-d-3 of the National Security Act of 1947 which provides that the DCI shall be responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure; and (2) Section 3 of National Security Council Directive No. 1 which prescribes methods by which the DCI, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, shall ensure the development of policies and procedures for the protection of intelligence, and intelligence sources and methods, from unauthorized disclosure.

Rec. #21: That at the earliest possible date action be taken on the Board's previous recommendations for a redefinition of the role of the DCI and for an improved organization of CIA activities. (See Rec. #1, above.)

Board Report of October 17, 1961

Rec. #22: The Board re-emphasized to the President its conviction as to the importance of outlining to the newly-chosen DCI the objectives of previous Board recommendations concerning the coordinating role of the DCI. (See Rec. #1.)

Rec. #23-a: With respect to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), the Board proposed that it review, with the Defense Department and the CIA, the contemplated organizational structure of the NRO for purposes of clarifying its responsibilities and increasing its effectiveness in the coordinated management and operation of all satellite and overhead reconnaissance projects.

Board Report of June 26, 1962

Rec. #23-b: With further reference to the National Reconnaissance Office, the Board noted that the NRO agreement between the Secretary of Defense and the DCI was not adequate to support an efficient NRO organization; and the Board recommended further study to achieve a better documentary basis for the NRO with particular reference to National Security Council directives possibly in conflict with the NRO plan then existing.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #23-c: With further reference to the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) the Board recommended that a recently-completed draft of a new NRO agreement be adopted by the Secretary of Defense and the DCI, and that in the implementation of the NRO plan there be: (1) a clear channel of guidance and authorization from the policy decisions of the President to the Secretary of Defense and to the DCI; (2) a clear and effective connection between the advance technology and planning of the National Reconnaissance Program and the development of plans for reconnaissance capabilities for the Department of Defense and the military services; (3) plans for improved continuity of management of the NRO, particularly with respect to the availability of career specialists heavily engaged in meeting schedules for new satellites, aircraft and other reconnaissance instruments; (4) action to ensure that Department of Defense directives which guide the National Reconnaissance Program are consistent with pertinent directives from higher authority, such as National Security Council Intelligence Directives; and (5) within the Defense Department a clarification of present and planned relationships as between the NRO, the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.

Board Report of October 17, 1961

Rec. #24: That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review the paramilitary operations being carried out by the CIA in Laos (and elsewhere) to determine whether those operations, given their present scale, are properly assigned to the CIA.

Rec. #25: (Not a recommendation -- this was a report to the President on the progress achieved by the Defense Department in performance of its share of the responsibility for the efficiency of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network for the quick transmittal of vital early warning and other intelligence data from overseas posts to headquarters in Washington.)

Board Report of January 11, 1962

Rec. #26: Based on a review of advance intelligence concerning the Berlin Wall and Syrian Coup incidents, the Board recommended that: (1) a sense of urgency be imparted at field and headquarters levels of U. S. intelligence agencies, with a view to ensuring timely reporting, dissemination and assessment of intelligence indicating the imminence of crisis situations which are of potential significance to the foreign policy and national security interests of the United States; (2) without imposing undue delay on the transmission of raw intelligence to Washington, State Department officials at overseas posts prepare periodic appraisals of developing crisis situations, for use at the field level and for consideration at Washington in the preparation of intelligence analyses and estimates; (3) procedures of the U. S. Intelligence Board, and its subsidiaries such as the Watch Committee, ensure that intelligence appraisals reflect significant differences of view which may develop in the intelligence estimative process; and (4) in keeping with the DCI's responsibility for the timely flow of intelligence to the White House, the DCI be requested to review arrangements and procedures to ensure that (a) CIA's intelligence assessments and spot reports on developing crisis situations are made available for timely consideration by the President and other officials, and (b) copies of assessments and spot reports to the White House from other agencies are furnished to the DCI for information and for use in preparing intelligence estimates.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #27: Based on an on-the-scene review (made by representatives of the Board) of U. S. intelligence activities in Egypt, Lebanon, Iran, Turkey, Cyprus, Greece and Israel, the Board recommended as follows:

(1) That U. S. Ambassadors be given an opportunity to comment on the drafts of proposed National Intelligence Estimates prepared in Washington with respect to foreign countries to which the Ambassadors are assigned.

5 (2) That Political Sections and Ambassadors at U. S. Embassies be given an opportunity to comment on all political intelligence at the time it is being sent to headquarters, except when this would unduly delay the reporting process.

5 (3) That U. S. Ambassadors be made aware of the capability and security of emergency clandestine radio stations installed in selected U. S. Embassies.

(4) That U. S. intelligence personnel be assigned to overseas posts where best use can be made of their language abilities.

(5) That when intelligence information is reported that later proves erroneous, appropriate corrective notification be given to recipients of the erroneous reports.

(6) That the DCI and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, ensure the validity of intelligence collection requirements levied upon the CIA for support of the military in wartime.

(7) That the Defense Department review the Attache Systems of the three Military Services to determine the advisability of establishing a single Military Attache System.

(8) That the Defense Department ensure adequate foreign language training of Military Attaches prior to their assignment to overseas posts.

(9) That the Defense Department staff Military Attache posts on the basis of specific intelligence needs and on the basis of linguistic and other specialized talents.

(10) That the Defense Department, for intelligence-related purposes, ensure efficient allocation of aircraft to Military Attaches at overseas posts.

(11) That the Defense Department equip field elements of the Critical Communications (CRITICOMM) Network with capability for rapid communication of critical messages among major and subordinate military commands in the field.

(12) That the DCI review NSC 5412/2 and related National Security Council Intelligence Directives, and recommend any necessary revisions to ensure adequate guidance to U. S. Ambassadors and CIA Station Chiefs overseas, with regard to (1) covert actions directed at targets within foreign countries, and (2) covert actions directed against third country targets.

(13) That the Signals Intelligence Panel of the President's Board, in the course of its review of National Security Agency operations, determine whether significant intelligence gathered by NSA intercept stations in the field is being furnished to U. S. intelligence agency consumers (and to field consumers) in timely fashion.

(14) That the U. S. Intelligence Board review (1) the adequacy of criteria used for the selection of a particular Military Cryptologic Service or the CIA for Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence intercept operations in a given country; and (2) the grounds for selecting targets for such operations in a given foreign country.

(15) That improvements be made in the communications of the U. S. Embassy in Cairo, particularly under emergency circumstances which would not permit use of commercial communications channels.

(16) That the Defense Department consider changing the Army Attache station in Lebanon from a "hardship" to a "regular" post, to permit longer tours of duty and continuity of experience.

(17) That the DCI and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Army, improve the coordination of clandestine espionage activities conducted by the Army and the CIA in Iran (as called for in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5).

(18) That the National Security Agency make an on-the-scene technical review of CIA's covert Communications/Electronics Intelligence collection effort in Behshahr, Iran, to ensure maximum technical use of this strategically-positioned activity against Soviet missile and satellite operations.

(19) That the National Security Agency take steps in Iran to ensure that: (1) the U. S. Embassy is furnished significant intelligence developed by the U. S. Army Security Agency intercept detachment which is housed on the Embassy grounds, and (2) the National Security Agency provides to the Teheran CIA Station Chief any data developed by the Army Security Agency detachment concerning (a) communications of the Iranian security and intelligence forces, and (b) illicit Soviet agent communications networks targeted against Iran from Odessa.

(20) That the State Department and CIA review the situation in Iran with a view to: (1) improving the coordination of U. S. intelligence activities in that country; (2) agreeing on procedures for the handling by the U. S. Embassy of political intelligence developed by the CIA in Iran; and (3) maintaining an appropriate proportion between the numbers of Foreign Service Officers and CIA representatives assigned to the Political Section of the Embassy in Iran.

(21) That the DCI ensure that: (1) in Cyprus increasing emphasis is placed on covert operations, particularly in the trade union and newspaper fields; and (2) the CIA Stations in Greece and Turkey provide support to the covert action operations of the CIA Station in Cyprus.

(22) That the DCI ensure that the CIA Station Chief in Cyprus keeps the U. S. Ambassador informed of the nature of a clandestine intelligence program in which the CIA Station Chief is engaged with the Cypriot Minister of the Interior.

(23) That the DCI ensure that the U. S. Ambassador in Athens is adequately informed about the substantive nature of the special relationship between the CIA Station Chief and the ruling and policy-making officials of the Greek Government.

(24) That the DCI reassign CIA personnel who are in excess of the requirements of the CIA Station in Athens.

(25) That the DCI consider furnishing the U. S. Ambassador in Tel Aviv with details of CIA-Israeli intelligence undertakings involving Africa.

(26) That the DCI consider the proposal (made to Board representatives by the Israeli Intelligence and Security Service) calling for (1) extended CIA-Israeli coordination of intelligence activities in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere; and (2) a cooperative mechanism for the review, discussion and assessment of intelligence problems relating to the Middle East and peripheral countries.

(27) That the Air Force consider the assignment to Tel Aviv of an Air Force Attache having jet fighter experience, because of the intelligence significance of jet aircraft operating in this area of the Middle East.

(28) That officials making up the Special NSC 5412/2 Group: (1) examine the Turkish government's request for access to operational and early warning data of the NSA-Service Cryptologic intercept sites in Turkey; (2) consider assigning to the U. S. Ambassador in Turkey the responsibility for negotiating the Turkish request; and (3) assure co-ordination of the efforts of the many U. S. elements in and out of Turkey which are working on various aspects of the strategically-placed U. S. Signals Intelligence activity in Turkey.

(29) That the National Security Agency take steps to ensure that: (1) the U. S. Army Security Agency Detachments at Ankara pass significant intelligence to the U. S. Ambassador, the Embassy Political Section, the CIA Station Chief, and to CIA headquarters in Washington; and (2) improvement is made in the communications capabilities of selected intercept sites in Turkey, including the Tropospheric Scatter System.

(30) That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group review the desirability and feasibility of C-130 aircraft reconnaissance flights over Iran from Turkish bases, with a view to covering Soviet missile tests and related activities.

Rec. #28: That highest priority be placed on the acquisition of crucially-needed intelligence on the Soviet ICBM capability, with special and intensive efforts to advance the photographic reconnaissance capabilities of the OXCART and GAMBIT projects even earlier than now programmed.

Rec. #29: That, with regard to CORONA, OXCART and other advanced intelligence collection projects: (1) prompt and stringent measures be taken, within the intelligence community and with outside contractors, to keep to the absolute, practicable minimum the number of persons cleared for access to information concerning such sensitive projects, and (2) there be periodic security indoctrinations of all persons cleared for access to such information, including knowledge of the special photographic capabilities involved.

Rec. #30-a: That there be brought to the urgent attention of the Secretary of State the intelligence aspects of the U. S. space satellite program, for consideration in connection with a United Nations requirement for the registration by member nations of all satellite launchings.

Board Report of May 16, 1962

Rec. #30-b: Subsequently, in a May 16, 1962 letter to the President, the Board: (1) pointed out the intelligence implications to the United States of international discussions of agreements to provide information on U. S. satellite launchings to the United Nations and its Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space; (2) urged that U. S. control of the development of space capabilities for national defense and intelligence purposes not be foreclosed, diminished or compromised; and (3) noted that the United States, unlike the USSR, would lose a crucially-needed intelligence capability if international agreements prohibiting military uses of outer space should preclude continued use of our Government's highly effective reconnaissance satellite intelligence activities. Accordingly, the Board recommended that: (1) the United States formulate a clear position on the relationship of our reconnaissance satellite intelligence programs to international discussion of peaceful uses of outer space; (2) the President review and approve the position to be taken by the United States on this subject; (3) U. S. representatives involved in UN, Geneva and other discussions be appropriately briefed on the sensitive U. S. intelligence collection program involved; and (4) differing points of view among U. S. Government officials on this subject be resolved as soon as possible.

Board Report of January 20, 1962

Rec. #31: That there be a re-examination of the status of the DCI, to determine whether his relative position and salary are in keeping with the newly-defined role and responsibility of the DCI for coordinating and guiding the U. S. foreign intelligence effort, as provided in the President's January 16, 1962 memorandum to the DCI.

Rec. #32: That the DCI, in consultation with the U. S. Intelligence Board, review the functions of the U. S. Intelligence Board's Watch Committee and National Indications Center, to determine their effectiveness in carrying out their mission of providing early warning.

Board Report of June 26, 1962

Rec. #33: That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group ensure that: (1) adequate cover stories are approved and ready for release by responsible parties, if required, with respect to the U-2, OXCART and satellite reconnaissance programs; (2) adequate procedures are in readiness for making such releases; and (3) that U-2 and OXCART pilots are instructed as to appropriate action to be taken in case of mission failures.

Rec. #34: Based on further continued studies of ways and means to strengthen the national Communications Intelligence and Electronics Intelligence effort, under authoritative control and management of the National Security Agency, the Board recommended: (1) strong control and management by NSA over these intelligence activities; (2) concentration by NSA on intelligence objectives of greatest national importance, in response to U. S. Intelligence Board guidance which must be refined; (3) NSA supervision of all Signals Intelligence collection and processing, so that national needs will be met without undue cost and effort; (4) the completion of long-pending plans for improved collection and processing of Electronics Intelligence; (5) increased Department of Defense leadership now that responsibility for NSA activities has been assigned to an Assistant Secretary of Defense; and (6) within NSA itself, the exercise of strong leadership competent to meet national intelligence needs rising beyond specific military intelligence interests.

Rec. #35: That the Defense Intelligence Agency and the CIA jointly: (1) make an operational analysis of present and potential use of audiosurveillance as an intelligence collection technique; (2) work up a plan for developing audiosurveillance devices to meet operational clandestine intelligence requirements; (3) estimate the costs and results of a major research and development effort to produce practicable audio systems for use in clandestine collection and counterintelligence activities; and (4) on the counter-audio side, install secure rooms (electronically and acoustically shielded) in sensitive U. S. posts overseas.

Rec. #36: That the U. S. Intelligence Board evaluate the intelligence potential of the "Big Dish" moon-reflector project, and that thereafter the Secretary of Defense reach an early decision as to the future of this project.

Board Report of August 1, 1962

Rec. 37: Based on a review of intelligence disclosures in a New York Times article by Hanson Baldwin, the Board recommended that: (1) the President emphasize to Government officials his concern about such disclosures and his intention in this case to identify and take action against the source of Government leaks to the newspaper writer; (2) the President take drastic action against the offender if identified by the FBI, or against the heads of offices from which the leak emanated; (3) the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA require their personnel to make memoranda of record on talks with the press, and to clear such contacts in advance with departmental Public Relations Officers; (4) those responsible for protecting intelligence data and techniques identify selected areas of sensitive data requiring special handling; (5) ways be sought to reduce the number of persons involved in preparing highly sensitive intelligence estimates; (6) the DCI and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency be provided with the investigative capability to run down leaks of sensitive intelligence data; (7) a confidential policy be established within the Executive Branch as to the degree of disclosure of intelligence data to be made to Congressional Committees; (8) a re-study be made of possible proposals for legislation to protect official secrets; and (9) a review be made of Government policy and procedures with a view to declassifying non-sensitive information and thereby strengthening programs for the safeguarding of sensitive data.

Board Report of October 5, 1962
(Based on an on-the-scene review by Board
representatives of U. S. foreign intelligence
and related activities in Southeast Asia
and the Far East)

Rec. #38: That the Defense Department, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency strengthen the intelligence elements of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Unified Commands (drawing on resources of the military intelligence services in the process.)

Rec. #39: That the flow of intelligence guidance from the Defense Intelligence Agency to Unified/Specified and component commands be oriented toward a controlled, integrated effort on the part of the numerous U. S. military intelligence organizations overseas (e.g., in South Vietnam, Thailand and Japan), in order to make the most effective use of their substantial resources.

Rec. #40: That the Defense Intelligence Agency take action regarding the military Special Security Offices (SSO) Communications System for transmitting sensitive information with a view to: (1) consolidating parallel SSO networks running between Pacific military commands and Washington civilian officials, and (2) reorienting the SSO system to make it a primary service and support to Commands in the field and command (as distinguished from Service) elements in Washington.

Rec. #41: That the National Security Agency accelerate spectrum searches in Thailand in order that the U. S. Intelligence Board may give guidance to the U. S. Ambassador in negotiating a permanent U. S. intercept site in Thailand (which is a most favorable location for U. S. Signals Intelligence operations against targets in the Soviet bloc, North Vietnam, Laos, Burma, Tibet and Communist China.)

Rec. #42: That the Special NSC 5412/2 Group consider authorizing selective, airborne defoliation operations against the Viet Cong in South Vietnam.

Board Report of October 19, 1962

Rec. #43: Based on an on-the-scene review of U. S. intelligence activities in Southeast Asia and the Far East, the Board made the following subsidiary recommendations:

(1) That the National Security Agency review the Office of the NSA Pacific Representative with a view to clarifying its mission, and its relationship to the Pacific Command structure and to other NSA personnel deployed in the Pacific area.

(2) That the Defense Department consider staggering the rotation schedules of U. S. Army Intelligence Advisers to the South Vietnam Government, and that such advisers be given more extensive training in the French and Vietnamese languages.

(3) That the DCI and Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency emphasize efforts of U. S. civilian and military intelligence elements in South Vietnam to improve the capabilities of South Vietnamese intelligence and security services.

(4) That the DCI and the Defense Intelligence Agency in their respective areas of responsibility ensure adequate and timely lateral exchange of intelligence reporting of the various U. S. intelligence units in South Vietnam (particularly the intelligence elements of the Military Assistance Command in South Vietnam, the U. S. Military Attaches in Saigon and the CIA Station, Saigon).

(5) That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting with the three U. S. Military Intelligence Services, consider the advisability of (1) extending from two to three years the tours of Service Attaches in Thailand; and (2) provide Thai language training for Military Attaches selected for future assignment to Thailand.

(6) That the Defense Intelligence Agency arrange for U. S. Air Force photo interpretation personnel on Taiwan and at Yokota, Japan, to receive all reports produced by the Chinat Air Force Photo Interpretation Center concerning U-2 and other reconnaissance flights over the China Mainland.

(7) That the Defense Intelligence Agency in consultation with Army Intelligence: (1) assess the organization, management and effectiveness of clandestine espionage operations conducted in the Pacific area by Army's 500th Intelligence Corps Group; and (2) assure early coordination with appropriate CIA Station Chiefs of the few Army Intelligence clandestine operations not yet coordinated.

(8) That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting with U. S. military intelligence agencies, assure that (under guidance by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Unified Commands) maximum use is made of the substantial intelligence potential of U. S. Military Assistance Groups deployed in foreign countries.

(9) That the Defense Intelligence Agency make maximum intelligence use of Service Attaches in foreign countries, particularly where intelligence is also being produced by U. S. Military Assistance Groups and other U. S. military organizations.

(10) That the Defense Intelligence Agency, consulting with the National Security Agency and U. S. military intelligence agencies, reduce the time required for security clearances of personnel assigned to sensitive U. S. installations overseas.

Rec. #44: The Board also made the following additional recommendations based on its Southeast Asia and Far East review:

(1) That the State Department explore with the U. S. Intelligence Board the practicability of a mechanism to furnish U. S. Ambassadors in Southeast Asia with current, regional intelligence evaluations (of a political, economic and military nature) concerning the Southeast Asia area -- as proposed by the U. S. Ambassador to Thailand.

(2) That the State Department review the manning table of the Political Section of the U. S. Embassy at Bangkok, to determine whether an additional officer should be assigned (as recommended by the Chief of the Political Section of the Embassy).

(3) That the CIA renew efforts to convince the Thai Government of the need for an effective central intelligence organization in the Government of Thailand (the State Department to decide whether the U. S. Ambassador should make specific overtures to Marshal Sarit in this regard).

Rec. #45: That the CIA explore the feasibility of intensifying covert actions against the sizeable and effective influence of Communists among Japanese intellectuals, educators and students.

Board Report of December 28, 1962

Rec. #46: Based on its review of intelligence coverage, assessment and reporting by U. S. agencies with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the months preceding October 22, 1962, the Board submitted to the President an interim report containing the following recommendations:

(1) That the U. S. Government: (1) maintain an aggressive intelligence effort to equip our policy makers with timely and adequate intelligence information to meet the possibility of continuing Soviet confrontations in Cuba; and (2) resist any tendency toward a let-down in intelligence coverage of Cuba in the wake of U. S. intelligence successes through U. S. military aircraft reconnaissance of Cuba.

(2) That the United States make intensified, hard-hitting efforts to obtain significant intelligence on Cuba through clandestine espionage operations, including efforts by U. S. intelligence agencies to lay the groundwork for "deep cover" espionage operations in Latin American and other foreign countries (without dependence on official State Department cover which would not be available in the event of a break in diplomatic relations).

(3) That (1) high-level and low-level reconnaissance of Cuba be continued as a means of acquiring photographic and Signals Intelligence concerning Soviet military installations, forces, weapons,

and highly-sophisticated communications equipment in Cuba; (2) planning be made for substitute intelligence techniques in the event that our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba is denied us by Soviet air defense systems on the island; and (3) that the United States launch a clandestine agent program to provide on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an adjunct to our aerial reconnaissance photographic coverage of Cuba.

(4) That, as an adjunct to Signals Intelligence coverage of Cuba: (1) a major clandestine agent effort be directed toward obtaining vitally-needed Signals Intelligence from Soviet encoding machines through the use of clandestine intercept equipment carried by on-the-ground U. S. espionage agents in Cuba; and (2) plans be readied for commando-type or covert actions to pre-empt Soviet communications equipments in the event of internal revolt or invasion of Cuba.

(5) That in instances where exceptional intelligence collection techniques are suggested to meet priority U. S. intelligence objectives, but are opposed because of political or other risks involved, the issues be submitted for resolution at the Presidential level.

Rec. #47: That, in view of Soviet camouflage of missile installations in Cuba, the Director of the National Reconnaissance Office assign high priority to experiments to determine the effectiveness of short and long-range photography of concealed ground targets, including the use of new sensing and illuminating methods.

Board Report of January 19, 1963

Rec. #48: That, with regard to the Secretary of Defense/DCI plan for surfacing military versions of OXCART, intelligence considerations require that: (1) no statements or programs should be undertaken which would result in public (and Soviet) knowledge of OXCART or military versions thereof; (2) although leaks concerning OXCART will eventually occur, such leaks should be avoided as long as possible in order to postpone Soviet development of countermeasures against OXCART; and (3) instead of an OXCART cover story to the effect that a new U. S. interceptor aircraft is being produced, the cover story should be that a variety of U. S. military aircraft are being developed. (In making these recommendations the Board confined itself to the intelligence-related aspects of the subject, noting the Board's awareness that the problem involved military and Congressional considerations (the B-70 issue, for example) apart from intelligence concerns.)

Board Report of February 4, 1963

As a follow-up to the Board's interim Cuba report and recommendations of December 28, 1962, the Board forwarded to the President on February 4, 1963, the results of the Board's assessment of the performance of the U. S. intelligence community in its coverage and reporting of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during 1962.

Board Report of March 8, 1963

Rec. #49: On March 8, 1963, the Board submitted to the President its final report on Cuba (taking into account views and comments which had been received from the Director of Central Intelligence concerning intelligence aspects of the Cuba experience). The Board made a number of specific recommendations for strengthening U. S. intelligence coverage of Cuba, and for increasing the capabilities of the total foreign intelligence program of our Government, as follows:

(1) That U. S. intelligence planning include attention to possible Soviet intention to create and maintain in Cuba a Soviet base for communications surveillance and military command-and-control in the Western Hemisphere (with unprecedented opportunity to use electronic and other means to obtain intelligence on U. S. military and space capabilities).

(2) That U. S. intelligence agencies make it a major goal to discover the terms of Soviet/Cuban agreements and the programs to carry out such agreements.

(3) That intensified efforts be made for substantial improvement in U. S. clandestine espionage coverage of Cuba -- because human-resource espionage operations continue to be important in spite of noteworthy results obtained by the United States in using scientific and technical intelligence techniques against Cuba.

(4) That (1) there be a resumption of efforts to develop a long-focal-length camera for use in U-2 coverage of Cuba, using color and stereo photographic methods; (2) that there be a re-appraisal of the decision to suspend low-level photographic reconnaissance aircraft missions over Cuba; and (3) that a vigorous clandestine agent program be instituted with a view to obtaining on-the-ground photography of intelligence targets in Cuba, as an essential supplement to aerial photographic reconnaissance of the island.

(5) That the current, intensive aerial surveillance of Cuba be accompanied by priority planning for adequate substitutes in the event that our aerial reconnaissance program is cut off by the advanced Soviet air defenses being installed in Cuba.

(6) That, as recommended earlier, a major clandestine agent effort be mounted against Cuba, with a view to intercepting emanations from sophisticated Soviet code machines through the use of intercept equipment capable of concealment on an agent's person.

(7) That, as previously proposed, the President be asked to resolve the issue when exceptional intelligence techniques are opposed at lesser levels because of the element of risk.

(8) That (1) U. S. intelligence officials be less reluctant to propose to higher authority the use of extraordinary means (such as the U-2) to acquire vital intelligence not otherwise obtainable; and (2) that there be a mechanism whereby policy officials will be informed of operational delays or other factors which call for top-level authorization of new or revised intelligence missions.

(9) That, in order to meet intelligence needs in simultaneous emergencies, pre-arranged plans be made for: (1) the rapid reassignment of personnel, equipment and other intelligence resources; (2) the designation of various processing centers for the handling of photographic intelligence; (3) the processing and communication of vital intelligence to major users in Government; and (4) planning for such related intelligence activities to meet the extra burden if two or more crises should occur concurrently.

(10) That, in the event that emergency situations should arise requiring restrictions on the normal publication and distribution of intelligence data, the U. S. intelligence community should monitor the application of such restrictions to ensure that (1) they are carried through, and (2) they are not applied in such a way as to deny critical intelligence to policy-making and command officials who need such intelligence data.

(11) That concerted efforts be made to (1) devise an effective mechanism for the integrated assessment (and cumulative periodic appraisals) of early-warning and indicator-type intelligence and prompt reporting thereof to policy-making and command officials; and (2) conduct intensified research concerning automatic data processing techniques to facilitate the review and assessment of the great volume of material dealt with in the United States intelligence community.

(12) That there be a re-examination of present methods of arriving at national intelligence estimates, with a view to ensuring that (1) all indicators

and other available intelligence information are considered; (2) the views of intelligence community members are fully taken into account; (3) recognition is given to the possibility of widely-varying interpretations of a given body of evidence; (4) consideration is given to the advisability of preparing two or more estimates when evidence is susceptible of more than one interpretation -- even though under current practice dissents are noted in footnotes to estimates; and (5) that every precaution be taken to avoid adherence to isolated opinions or preconceived notions.

(13) That the effectiveness of the National Reconnaissance Office be strengthened through specific measures separately summarized in Rec. #23.

Rec. #50: That there be a reorganization and reorientation of the CIA's scientific and technological activities in the intelligence field. Specifically the Board recommended: (1) a research and development effort located outside the intelligence community but coupled with development and engineering conducted within CIA and other intelligence agencies; (2) an administrative arrangement in CIA to bring science and technology into contact with major intelligence programs and projects of the CIA; (3) the vesting of scientific and technological intelligence responsibilities in a top-level official of the CIA; (4) the formation in CIA of special research and development groups concerned with natural sciences and behavioral research in studies of such matters as camouflage and concealment; and (5) actions within the Defense Department to emphasize research on advanced sensing, photographic and other systems, and advanced research in the Signals Intelligence field over the next ten years.

Board Proposal of July 11, 1963

Rec. #51: That the Chairman of the U. S. Intelligence Board give continued attention to and report periodically on measures taken by the U. S. intelligence agencies to strengthen our Government's counterintelligence posture. (Here the Board reiterated its previous endorsement of a recommendation that: "The Director of Central Intelligence should focus community attention on the important area of counterintelligence and the security of overseas personnel, and assign responsibility for periodic reports thereon to the United States Intelligence Board.")

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

No. 1 3 26 a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: January 30, 1964, Meeting of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in regular meeting at 9:00 a.m. on January 30, 1964, at the Board's offices, Room 297 Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford and Board members Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Pace, and Land (Dr. Baker was unavoidably detained in New Jersey and joined the meeting later in the morning); and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

In executive session, Chairman Clifford gave Board members a fill-in on the brief talk he had with President Johnson a few days after the President took office on November 22. Chairman Clifford had taken the occasion to relate to the President some of the highlights of the function performed by the Board for President Kennedy, and the composition of the Board. Although President Johnson gave no indication that he had previously known of the work of the Board, he expressed appreciation for the effort which the Board had made on behalf of President Kennedy. The President said that he was comforted to know that this group of outstanding citizens is giving attention to the important subject of intelligence, and he asked Mr. Clifford to inform the Board members that he wished them to continue with this important task.

Chairman Clifford referred to the one-hour meeting which the Board would have with the President later in the day. Mr. Clifford spoke of the heavy work schedule which the President has undertaken and the many demanding matters to which the

CORONA/OXCART/TAGBOARD/GAMBIT

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

President is giving personal attention. Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion that prior to succeeding to office President Johnson has probably had few occasions on which to obtain more than brief glimpses of intelligence problems. With that assumption in mind, Mr. Clifford thought that the Board's major purpose at today's meeting with the President should be one of education with respect to the foreign intelligence effort and the Board's role in it. Mr. Clifford proposed that he begin with a background statement to the President concerning the circumstances under which President Kennedy established the Board (the Bay of Pigs incident), and its responsibilities and method of performing its assigned functions. Then, in order that the President might become better acquainted with the Board membership and some of the more significant intelligence areas reviewed by the Board, Mr. Clifford said he would like to call on various members to speak briefly about those areas. Particularly, the Chairman asked that Dr. Land be prepared to inform the President about the National Reconnaissance Program; that General Doolittle be ready to discuss the U-2 OXCART, and TAGBOARD programs; Dr. Baker the Signals Intelligence Program; and Mr. Gray the Dunlap espionage case. (The Board agreed with Mr. Coyne's proposal that in the Board's reporting on the Dunlap case there be only an oral statement to the President, but nothing in writing, with respect to the closely-held and highly sensitive source about which the Board has been informed. In this connection, the Chairman said that in the course of a recent conversation with former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, the latter seemed unaware of the sensitive source.)

Dr. Land suggested that during the Board meeting with the President the point be made that the Board's principal function is to determine what the foreign intelligence program should be and to recommend how to achieve it.

Mr. Pace thought that it would also be well to indicate to the President the value of the role played by McGeorge Bundy in the staffing of Board subject matters for the President, and mention should also be made of the Board's use of Panels in its review of intelligence matters. Dr. Langer thought that brief remarks from selected Board members concerning intelligence subjects, coming within their special Panel assignments, would be more appropriate and helpful to the President than for all Board members to be called upon. Mr. Clifford thanked the members for these suggestions and said that he would be guided accordingly in making his presentation to the President.

Chairman Clifford then made reference to the recently-discovered Soviet espionage case involving Army Sergeant Howell, a case which Mr. Clifford thought might prove to be more damaging than the Dunlap case, and one which dramatizes the recommendations which the Board has formulated in its report to the President on the basis of the Dunlap matter. Mr. Clifford recalled that when he recently discussed the Dunlap case with former Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric, the latter said that if any progress is made by the Government in the area of counterintelligence, the impetus will have to come from the Board, and remedial action cannot be left up to the Defense Department. The Chairman asked Mr. Coyne to be prepared to brief the Board on the Howell case later on in the meeting.

Next, Chairman Clifford directed attention of the members to the list of topics which he had asked the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, to cover at today's meeting -- Mr. Clifford noting that because the DCI is out of the country he had designated his Deputy, General Carter, to cover these matters with the Board.

Chairman Clifford then turned to the January 1[illegible], 1964, letter which he had received from the DCI, volunteering information concerning the events which had led to the recent CIA release of information on the estimate of the Soviet economy, with resulting critical editorial reaction in the United States press. Mr. Clifford asked that Board members study the DCI's letter as the basis for later discussion. Mr. Clifford said that he had found the letter to be curiously defensive, and he expressed concern over the danger inherent in what appeared to be an almost obsessive interest on the part of the DCI in regard to the CIA's "image". The Chairman also observed that according to newspaper accounts the DCI was at that moment in Europe visiting several heads of state, presumably on intelligence and other matters. Mr. Murphy recalled that previously the Board had urged closer relations between the President and the DCI on intelligence matters and he wondered if the DCI's current trip abroad is an indication that this close relationship exists between the DCI and President Johnson. Mr. Clifford said that it could only be speculated that sometimes a new President is susceptible to suggestions offered by experienced Presidential advisers, and in this instance the President may possibly have received a suggestion from the DCI that the European trip be made and perhaps the President acquiesced in reliance upon the DCI's judgment.

Mr. Clifford left the Board meeting to take a telephone call from Secretary of Defense McNamara. Upon his return to the meeting Mr. Clifford said that the Secretary of Defense had called to emphasize the importance which he placed on the NRO problem which would be related to the Board later in the day by NRO Director McMillan; and Secretary McNamara had indicated that he personally was disturbed about the competition and back-knifing which had become evident in the NRO program. Mr. Clifford noted that General Carter of CIA was about to join the Board meeting, and that it would be well for the Board to defer bringing up the NRO subject at this time. In this connection, Mr. Clifford stated that he had recently been visited by NRO Director McMillan who had expressed his views as to the NRO problem and would repeat them to the Board when he joined the meeting later in the day.

At 10:20 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by the Deputy DCI, General Carter (substituting for Mr. McCone). General Carter was accompanied by Mr. Knocke (who was introduced as substituting for Mr. Kirkpatrick who was in the Far East), and by Mr. Fitzgerald (referred to by General Carter as the CIA's expert on Cuba).

Mr. Clifford thanked the CIA officials for their attendance. He pointed out that today the Board was having its first meeting with President Johnson, therefore the Board would appreciate being brought up to date; would like to hear from General Carter on the topics which had been listed in Mr. Clifford's note to Mr. McCone; and would be glad to hear from General Carter on any matters which he might also wish to cover.

General Carter said that Mr. McCone's absence from the country prevented his meeting with the Board, but that he would endeavor to cover for Mr. McCone the various matters in which the Board had expressed an interest as set forth in Mr. Clifford's note to Mr. McCone dated January 16, 1964.

Turning first to the subject of Cuba, General Carter said that all sabotage efforts have been stood down; that the President and Secretaries Rusk and McNamara have some serious doubts about our policy toward Cuba; and that the question had been raised as to whether it is not hypocritical for the United States Government to talk peace while at the same time "waging war" against Cuba. General Carter added that when Mr. Bundy gets back from leave and when Mr. McCone returns from abroad the following Saturday, there will be a meeting to discuss a new policy toward Cuba.

In answer to an inquiry from Dr. Land, General Carter said that Mr. Bundy has no deputy to act in his absence; that the DCI briefs the President on intelligence matters and Mr. Bundy briefs him on foreign policy matters; and that the White House staff has not seemed to have settled into any new mechanism since November 22. General Carter said that the President gets the CIA daily intelligence check list which is handed to the President by one or another member of the White House staff, not necessarily the same one each time. Also, CIA has added a weekly check list review, and it is understood that the President reads them. Mr. McCone sees the President at least twice a week and attends all policy meetings except on occasions when the DCI has to be absent, in which case General Carter attends in his stead.

General Doolittle asked whether there has also been a stand-down in clandestine intelligence collection efforts with respect to Cuba, and General Carter answered in the negative. Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the volativity of the Cuban people is a factor, and over the long run the capability of CIA to infiltrate intelligence agents into Cuba is affected by the morale of the Cuban people which in turn is affected by the success of sabotage acts directed against Cuba.

In answer to a question from Chairman Clifford, Mr. Fitzgerald said that no hard facts had been obtained concerning the purpose and subject matter of Castro's recent talks with Khrushchev in Moscow, although the Panama and Cuban economic situations may have been discussed -- Mr. Fitzgerald agreeing with Murphy that this is all speculation on CIA's part.

General Carter said that our Government's economic denial program against Cuba is also falling by the wayside, as reflected by the actions of Britain and Spain in trading with Cuba. There is a view, General Carter

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

added, that it is difficult for our Government to equate its policy of wheat sales to Russia with a policy of economic denial against Cuba; however the President has said that he wants to push the economic denial program. Mr. Fitzgerald remarked in this connection that the volatility of the Cuban people transmits itself to Washington.

Mr. Murphy then asked if someone could say what is going on in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that the most important development is the series of "victories" which Castro has enjoyed: Castro found at year's end that there was an unanticipated hard currency balance of $100 million from the sugar crop, thus giving Castro a basis for obtaining extensions of credits for such transactions as the purchase of British buses; the French are about to extend Castro credits over a 5-year period; in Panama, although Castro didn't provoke the anti-U. S. incidents he gets credit for it; and Castro also gets credit for the Zanzibar coup even though he did not instigate that incident, either. So, Mr. Fitzgerald noted, "Castro is stronger and his arm is longer".

Dr. Langer asked if CIA is getting intelligence agents into Cuba, and information out. Mr. Fitzgerald exhibited a chart depicting the deployment of agents in Cuba, pointing out that there was a concentration of agents in the Havana area. He said, however, that the figures were off because CIA had sloughed off the poor agents, and because two agent nets had been lost in the Havana area (although a key agent from each net had been successfully pulled out). Mr. Fitzgerald said that CIA has 64 singleton agents; 83 agents legally resident in Cuba; and 55"black subagents" in one net.

In reply to Dr. Langer's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that about 1200 Latin American and African nationals a year are receiving training in Cuba and are returning to their respective countries.

Mr. Pace asked what are the priority intelligence objectives which are assigned for coverage by CIA agents sent into Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that the agents are targeted against the strategic military situation. In answer to a query about the question of the use of Cuban caves, Mr. Fitzgerald said that this question had been pretty well resolved but CIA is keeping at it.

General Carter stated that CIA presently estimates there are from 4,000 to 7,000 Soviet military personnel in Cuba who are operating the SAM sites and providing military training to Cubans, plus about 4,000 non-military Soviet personnel. He added that by April the Cubans will probably be ready to take over the air defense systems if the Soviets choose to turn them over to the Cubans. Mr. Fitzgerald added that a flash had been received this morning of the first evidence of a Chinese pilot taking part in air operations in Cuba (this from a COMINT source).

Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether CIA had succeeded in planting agents in Castro's immediate entourage. Mr. Fitzgerald said that this is another priority intelligence objective being pursued by CIA, including the objective of obtaining intelligence on the inter-relationship of factions within the Castro regime; on the extent of Cuban counter-insurgency programs (in which Cuba has a good capability); and on the Soviet bloc training of Cubans in counterintelligence activities (Cuba has a fairly wide intelligence system with "plenty in the United States").

Mr. Fitzgerald departed the meeting at this point, upon conclusion of the discussion of the subject of Cuba.

General Carter next turned to the Panama situation. He noted that CIA has regularly reported on the subject of Communist activities in Panama since 1956. General Carter stated that there is no evidence that Communists instigated the recent incidents in Panama, although the Communists were quick to exploit the situation once it arose. CIA succeeded in photographing 13 Castro-ites who were engaged in fomenting the incident after it started. Of a total of 45 Communist Castro-ites involved, 13 had been trained in Cuba, and they distributed leaflets and disseminated propaganda over the radio. CIA also learned that one Thelma King personally led a mob of Panamanians in the streets. Dr. Langer wondered if Panamanians and the world at large are aware that radio stations in Panama were in the hands of the Communists. General Carter replied that one could not say that precisely, but it can be said that 30 minutes after the incident began there were inflamatory broadcasts on the air. As for the sniper activity, General Carter said that one sniper had been identified as a known Communist.

With regard to Vietnam, General Carter said that the bloodless coup which began yesterday afternoon was accomplished by a group of young generals who are pro-American and anti-neutralist. General Khanh is the leader. General Khin, 3rd Corps Commander, will be chief of staff. The coup group had been plugging for more counter-insurgency effort against the Viet Cong, and the new leaders will take stronger action. General Khanh has said that he will look to U. S. Ambassador Lodge for guidance on political matters in the immediate Saigon area.

General Carter said that CIA had received advance information from General Khanh that he was worried about French moves with respect to Vietnam. (In answer to Mr. Coyne's question as to whether CIA had been back of yesterday's coup, General Carter replied that it is well known that the CIA does not instigate coups.) Mr. Murphy, noting the conspiratorial aspects involving France in the Vietnam situation, asked whether CIA had received advance intelligence from French sources concerning involvement of the French Government in Vietnam. General Carter said that none had been received, despite good CIA penetrations in Paris. Mr. Murphy found it difficult to understand why there had been no hard intelligence on this matter, particularly when there had been public statements by the French concerning France's neutralist objectives in Southeast Asia. General Carter said that there had been no evidence of a covert French effort against the Vietnam regime.

Chairman Clifford asked whether there had been an improvement in the Vietnam situation following the previous coup which overthrew the Diem regime. General Carter said that social reforms have been made but their timing and acceleration have been disappointing. He thought it too early to say whether the new regime will have the will and ability to intensify the fight against the Viet Cong. General Khanh has indicated to Ambassador Lodge a desire to retain General Minh in the new government. General Khanh also said that he saw no malfeasance on the part of the generals in the Minh regime although they were known to have cooperated with French intelligence in the past.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, General Carter said there was no evidence that the murders of Diem and Nhu in the previous coup were motivating factors in the recent coup. General Carter answered Dr. Langer's question by saying that there is no hard evidence of an increased flow of supplies, arms and men into North Vietnam (from Communist China).

Turning to the next item which had been indicated as of interest to the Board, General Carter referred to the question as to the desirability to separate the coordinating function of the DCI from the post of head of the CIA. Chairman Clifford interposed the comment that from its inception this Board had been concerned with achieving greater coordination and control over the total U. S. foreign intelligence effort, the Board still urges it, cases whether involving U. S. military personnel or civilians; and another recommendation dealing with the criteria for selection of the heads of sensitive agencies such as the NSA. The Chairman stated that these proposed recommendations would be taken up at the next Board meeting. / follow

Chairman Clifford directed Board members' attention to the report and recommendations which had been completed by the Board Panel on Signals Intelligence. There was agreement with Mr. Clifford's suggestion that the report and its recommendations be forwarded to Mr. Bundy for consideration and action with the agencies involved, rather than presenting this complex subject to the President today.

Mr. Clifford mentioned to the Board the recently copyrighted newspaper article by former President Truman who took the CIA to task for engaging in activities which were not within the function of CIA as originally created. Mr. Clifford reminded the Board that while Mr. Truman was President the CIA was authorized and directed to engage in covert actions (e.g. in Italy) which had much to do with stemming the Communist tide in post-World War II in Europe.

Chairman Clifford brought up another matter, which he felt could become more serious, namely, the aggressive campaign being waged by CIA to improve its "public image". Mr. Clifford asked that the Board members think about this subject, which would be placed on the agenda of the next Board meeting. At that time the Board should hear from the DCI regarding this matter, and consider it in the light of previous Board recommendations that the DCI and other CIA officials refrain from making public speeches, with a view to reducing the visibility of intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford said that he had learned that one of the subjects which the DCI is now

/NB

/NB

discussing in the course of his visit with heads of state overseas is the advisability of their countries engaging in economic reprisals against Cuba. Dr. Baker confirmed this, stating that today he had learned that CIA is taking specific covert steps to influence cessations of trade with Cuba, particularly in the case of Spain. Mr. Clifford could only speculate that the DCI had suggested that the fostering of economic reprisals is properly a task for the CIA, and the President may have agreed in the absence of any other advice or consultation. Mr. Clifford thought that the DCI's meetings with heads of state is the course least likely to succeed in CIA's efforts to contradict its growing image as becoming a policy-making organization in the Government. Mr. Clifford repeated that the Board should hear from the DCI on this at its next meeting and consider making a recommendation to the President.

At 4:00 p.m., until 5:30 p.m., the Board met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House (a pertinent memorandum on the meeting is filed elsewhere in the Board's records).

When the Board members returned to the Board's offices, Chairman Clifford remained at the White House at the President's request to confer on other matters of a non-intelligence nature.

April 2 and 3, 1964, were selected as the dates of the next meeting of the Board, a two-day session.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

A. R. Ash

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~TOP SECRET~~

February 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting with the President, January 30, 1964

At 4:00 p.m. on January 30, 1964, the Board members and the writer met with the President in the Cabinet Room of the White House. The meeting terminated at 5:30 p.m. The highlights of this meeting follow.

At the outset, Mr. Clifford made reference to his meeting with the President in early December reporting that immediately following the meeting he conveyed to the Board personnel the President's desires that the Board continue to perform its mission and that each Board member continue to serve with this advisory body. Mr. Clifford then went on to state that he considered the Board to be an extraordinary group composed of individuals whose diverse backgrounds and experience were of inestimable value in carrying out the mission of the Board. By way of example he cited tremendous contributions made in the fields of communication, signals intelligence and missiles systems by Dr. William O. Baker, the Head of Research at Bell Laboratories. He next mentioned the outstanding military career of Jimmy Doolittle, noting that he has served three Presidents in reviewing various aspects of intelligence and noting also the ramified contributions which he has made to the overhead intelligence reconnaissance program. He next mentioned Mr. Gordon Gray noting that he had earlier served as Secretary of

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY ~~TOP SECRET~~

the Army, Assistant Secretary of Defense, Director of Defense Mobilization and Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs. He noted, too, that with Coyne on behalf of the Board, Mr. Gray has made on-the-scene reviews of intelligence activities in practically every country in the Near East, Middle East, Southeast Asia and the Far East. The Chairman next mentioned Dr. Land, his Presidency of Polaroid and his outstanding contributions to photographic reconnaissance techniques having special application to intelligence. He next mentioned Dr. William Langer, his distinguished academic career and his long association with the intelligence estimating process. He next mentioned Mr. Robert Murphy and his decades of service as a career diplomat, roving ambassador and Under Secretary of State. He next mentioned Mr. Frank Pace, noting that his experience as Director of the Budget Bureau and as Secretary of the Army, as well as his experience as President of General Dynamics, expecially equips him to keep abreast of management and organization problems in the intelligence community and of the intelligence budgeting process. Finally Mr. Clifford mentioned Mr. Coyne, the Executive Secretary of the Board, as a Presidential appointee and member of the White House staff who has had some 24 years of experience in the intelligence field, first as Assistant Director of the FBI and in more recent years with the staff of the National Security Council and of the President. He observed that prior to President Johnson's assuming office, Coyne had served Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Kennedy in various intelligence capacities.

Mr. Clifford then went into some detail with respect to the history of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and predecessor organizations of the Board. He pointed out that following the close of World War II, a variety of ad hoc groups were formed at the Presidential level to review selected aspects of the Government's foreign intelligence effort. Studies were made from time to time, recommendations were submitted, and then in most cases the particular study group disbanded, with little or no follow-up action on its recommendations. Mr. Clifford noted that in 1955 the Hoover Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch recommended the creation of a permanent, bipartisan "Watch Dog Committee" (to be made up of House and Senate members and private citizens) to make periodic surveys of the foreign intelligence activities of our Government agencies, and to report to the Congress and to the President. President Eisenhower opposed the idea of a Congressional Watch Dog Committee on Intelligence (as did President Kennedy after he took office). Mr. Clifford went on to state that in February 1956, President Eisenhower formed his own Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence, made up of private citizens, responsible for reviewing on his behalf all foreign intelligence activities of the United States; that President Eisenhower looked on the Consultants group not only as a means of obtaining independent appraisals and advice concerning our foreign intelligence effort, but also as a tactic to forestall the creation of a "Watch Dog Committee" in the Congress. The Board of Consultants served for some five years until the members submitted their resignations at the close of President Eisenhower's term of office.

Mr. Clifford then pointed out that in January 1961 President Kennedy decided that there was a continuing need for a Presidential Advisory Board on foreign intelligence, but deferred temporarily the appointment of new members; that on May 4, 1961, following the disaster experienced by the Central Intelligence Agency at Cuba's Bay of Pigs, the President issued an Executive Order establishing this Board. (Mr. Clifford noted that at that time and on several subsequent occasions, President Kennedy remarked to him that he could not stand another intelligence failure like the Bay of Pigs fiasco; that as President he must have the assurance of adequate intelligence on which to make important decisions; and that he would depend heavily on this Board to continually monitor the activities of all of the intelligence agencies, providing him with independent, objective assessments and recommendations concerning those activities.) Mr. Clifford stated that President Kennedy had informed him that CIA had provided him with "bad" information on Cuba and that this had resulted in "bad" decisions. Based on this experience President Kennedy had emphasized to Mr. Clifford that he was activating the Board to perform a continuing mission for the President; that the Board was to have three functions (1) investigation (2) recommendation and (3) follow-up.

Mr. Clifford noted that Dr. Killian served as Chairman of the Board until April 1963; that he resigned at that time because of reverses in his health; and thereupon Mr. Clifford was moved up from member to Chairman.

Mr. Clifford then proceeded to describe in some detail the work, meetings, review procedures, reporting procedures and general modus operandi of the Board. He noted that from May 1961 until the time of President Kennedy's death, the Board held 25 separate meetings covering a total of 40 days. He emphasized that the intelligence community is made up of a great many departments and agencies and that efforts to coordinate and control them have thus far barely gotten off the ground. Some progress has been made but much more remains to be accomplished.

Mr. Clifford then went on to discuss in some detail the Panels and Task Forces of the Board citing a few examples.

The Chairman next went into some detail with respect to the recommendations which the Board made to President Kennedy noting that during the past 2½ years the Board submitted to the President a total of 170 recommendations. A large percentage of the recommendations made by President Kennedy's Board involved activities internal to the Department of Defense; a lesser proportion involved activities internal to the Central Intelligence Agency and the Department of State; a number of them related to activities of joint interest to two or more member agencies of the Intelligence Community. Of the 170 recommendations, the President approved 125, disapproved 2, and temporarily deferred final action on the remainder. Of the 125 approved recommendations, implementing actions on 85 have been substantially completed. The remaining Presidentially-approved recommendations deal with substantive intelligence matters warranting continued Board attention and, possibly, the submission of further Board recommendations to the President.

Next Mr. Clifford cited several examples of intelligence areas of major and continuing concern to the Board. These included the following:

1. The vast size and cost of the over-all intelligence effort which involves some 149,000 individuals, 131,000 of whom are in Defense and 17,000 of whom are in CIA. Mr. Clifford reported that the effort this year will cost slightly less than four billion dollars.

2. The National Reconnaissance Program (at this point Mr. Clifford asked Dr. Land to brief the President for three or four minutes, which he did, on the highlights of the satellite reconnaissance programs.) In the course of the briefing Dr. Land exhibited to the President examples of the recent Gambit photography taken over Montana.

3. The U-2, Oxcart, Tagboard programs. At this point, pursuant to Mr. Clifford's request, General Doolittle briefed the President for several minutes on the highlights of these three programs.

4. The Signals Intelligence Program. Here, Dr. Baker, at the request of Mr. Clifford, briefed the President on the highlights of the Signals Intelligence effort and on the major contribution which is made to the over-all intelligence effort by elements of the COMINT-ELINT community.

5. The Counterintelligence Program. At this point Mr. Clifford advised the President that, following a serious espionage penetration at the National Security Agency, President Kennedy requested the Board to make a thorough examination of the entire situation. Happily Mr. Gray was able to free himself in order to devote full time, along with Mr. Coyne, to such a study. Mr. Clifford requested Mr. Gray to brief the President on the highlights of the Dunlap case which he did. Thereafter Mr. Gray mentioned briefly the highlights of the Howell penetration. Following the Gray briefing Mr. Clifford presented to the President the report on the Dunlap case which had been prepared by the Board, noting that it was dated as of November 22, 1963. (The President retained the report and later sent it to Mr. Bundy's office for appropriate staffing and it is now in the process of being staffed by us.)

In the course of the Board's discussion with the President, the following major points were made:

With respect to the recent developments in Panama, the President was not happy with the way in which CIA acquitted itself. The President indicated that after the fact "they told us they had been reporting disturbing developments in Panama for months on end and that perhaps this was so" but from the President's vantage point there was no specific information pinpointing developments until after difficulties had occurred.

In the case of the coup which had occurred in South Vietnam on the night preceeding our meeting with the President, he said that he "received no intelligence at all on that development." In fact it appeared to the President that General Khanh had advised our intelligence people of a suspected coup which would be attempted by someone else in Saigon for the purpose of "pulling us off the track."

Next the President inquired as to the Board's view on a request that he had recently received from the Pentagon. Reading from a communication which he had before him, it appeared that the President was being informed by the Pentagon that a proposal had been made to reduce the military membership on the U. S. Intelligence Board by dropping from the USIB the Directors of G-2, A-2 and ONI, retaining on USIB the DCI, the Deputy Director of CIA, DIA, NSA, State, AEC and FBI. Mr. Clifford observed that in our bureaucracy no one having representation on a committee likes to be removed therefrom but that it was his personal view that USIB would probably function as well if not better with reduced membership. The President indicated that the Chiefs of Staff did not agree. They were, in fact, asking the President to permit their respective G-2's to continue as regular members of USIB. Mr. Clifford advised that he and the other Board members did not agree that this was necessary, particularly now

~~TOP SECRET~~

that military intelligence activities are being centralized in the Defense Intelligence Agency along the lines earlier recommended to the President by the Board. President Johnson expressed appreciation for the Board's views on this matter indicating that it would be helpful to him in responding to the request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Turning to another matter, the President asked whether the Board believes that Congress is being provided with enough information on our intelligence activities. Mr. Clifford responded in the affirmative then brought up the fact that there are increasing pressures for the establishment of a Congressional Watch Dog Committee on intelligence. Mr. Clifford emphasized to the President the view of the Board that the creation of such a Watch Dog Committee would be dilatorius to the national security and national interests because it would be most difficult to keep our secrets secret under such a committee.

The meeting with the President terminated with an expression on the President's part of deep appreciation to the Board for the continuing patriotic and substantive contribution which it is making to the national security in important areas involving foreign intelligence.

(At the suggestion of the President the discussion of Board business was momentarily suspended in order to let the Press take pictures of the President in session with his Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.)

J. Patrick Coyne

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

~~TOP SECRET~~

P. [illegible]

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 16, 1964

Dear John:

The next meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board is scheduled to be held on January 30, 1964, and in line with established practice it would be very much appreciated if you would meet with us on the morning of that day. preferably from 10:00 to 11:00 a.m.

At the time of your meeting with us, it would be helpful if you would be prepared to discuss the subjects outlined in the attachment.

Sincerely,

Clark M. Clifford
Chairman

General Carter will attend meeting in Mr. McCone's absence from the country.

Attachment

Mr. John A. McCone
Director of Central Intelligence
Langley, Virginia

JPC:MMC

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

Subjects Suggested by Board Members for Discussion by the Director of Central Intelligence at the Board Meeting of January 30, 1964

1. Cuba

   (Status and effectiveness of clandestine collection and covert action programs; numbers and missions of Soviet personnel in Cuba; Castro's involvement in counter-insurgency and subversive programs in Latin America and other countries.)

2. South Vietnam

   (Prospects for permanency of present regime; adequacy of coordination and effectiveness of indigenous intelligence organizations.)

3. Panama

   (Availability of pre-crisis intelligence indicators and timeliness of current reporting thereon; extent of Castro influence.)

4. Separation of the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency

   (Views as to desirability and feasibility.)

5. U. S. Counterintelligence Posture

   (Assessment of damage to U. S. intelligence sources and operations resulting from Dunlap and Howell cases. Status of CIA studies on protection of intelligence, ✓ intelligence sources and methods.)

6. Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence

   (The DCI's appraisal of effect such a Committee arrangement would have on the effectiveness and security of foreign intelligence and related activities.)

7. CIA Estimate on Economy of USSR

   (The DCI's comments on substance of the estimate and significance of its public release by CIA.)

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

16 January 1964

Dear Clark:

As you probably know, I am leaving for Europe on Saturday and hence will miss an opportunity to visit with you in the immediate future. However I wish you to know the background of the press incident which unfortunately has been "blown up" and hence the theme of a great number of editorials.

Therefore I am attaching a memorandum prepared for my file to review the series of events which lead up to the release of information on the Soviet economy with CIA attribution. Also attached is a copy of a letter from Senator Stennis and my reply. Finally, there is a copy of the directive which I am issuing today in order to prevent an inadvertent recurrence of the situation.

Frankly I am surprised at the publicity and furthermore I cannot be overly critical of the attribution because of the long history of CIA's releases on Soviet economy. We have for 10 years been issuing volumes on this subject in unclassified form carrying the Central Intelligence Agency name and these are in universities, libraries, and in the hands of virtually all economists and newspapermen interested in the subject. Furthermore, Allen Dulles has testified in open hearing and on the record on this subject. It was a favorite topic for speeches by Allen, General Cabell and Bob Amory in the days when CIA officials were making speeches. Hence the denial of the privilege of attribution would have, in my opinion, not been respected by anyone in the press.

Two additional points which might have something to do with this -- first, we recently lost Col. Grogan, who has handled press relations for CIA for years, because of retirement after a heart attack. His replacement, a capable officer in the field of public relations was in the process of getting acquainted with the press and hence was not as sensitive to the tricky problem of press relationship as a more experienced press officer might have been. Secondly,

Rec'd.
1-20-64
P 20aB
P.B.# 1695

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

I have known for some time, as I told you, that there are people in this Government, most particularly in the State Department, who enjoy harassing CIA in the press. I think, although I cannot prove it, that they have not been inclined to pass up this opportunity.

Sincerely,

John

John A. McCone
Director

Attachments as stated

The Honorable Clark Clifford
Chairman, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board
Washington, D. C.

~~SECRET~~

UNITED STATES SENATE

COPY

January 13, 1964

Honorable John A. McCone
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Washington 25, D. C.

Dear Mr. McCone:

Recently I read an article stating that the CIA had held a press conference during which the Soviet economy was discussed.

My impression is that the holding of press conferences is a distinct departure from CIA's past practice. I would appreciate it if you would advise me of the significance of this occurrence and whether it represents a change of policy which will be a precedent for the future.

Sincerely,

/S/

John Stennis
United States Senator

COPY

P.B. #1695

xfc

THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

14 January 1964

The Honorable John Stennis
The United States Senate
Washington, D. C.

Dear Senator Stennis:

This is in reply to your letter of January 13th. As I told you when I saw you at my meeting with your Committee on Friday afternoon, the press report of a "CIA press conference" was something of an over-statement of fact, although circumstances were such that I can understand the reason for the statement.

What happened was that several reporters received unclassified information on the Soviet economy from us and one of them featured the CIA attribution. This brought an avalanche of requests from other reporters who felt that one had been favored with some "inside information." Therefore our people prepared a brief memorandum of just what had been told and invited the inquirers to come out and pick it up. All who inquired were asked to come at a particular hour. The fact that they were met and talked to by a CIA officer during the course of distribution of the memorandum gave rise to the report that it had been a "CIA press conference," which, I think, overstates what happened.

I have been concerned over the fact that the CIA attribution has been given such wide-spread publicity and frankly don't understand why because in this area, namely Soviet economics, CIA has been a recognized authority and has for the past 10 years issued volumes of unclassified reports of one sort or another which have been distributed to libraries and universities. Moreover, the subject was a favorite subject of my predecessor who looked upon it as one area which he could treat freely and publicly in open forum. You may recall there was an open hearing by the Joint Economic Committee on 13 November 1959 at which the Director of Central Intelligence testified.

P.B. #1695

In view of all this, I cannot criticize the authorized attribution.

The above background of CIA interest in, and continued study of, the Soviet economy is so well known to the press that a request for non-attribution would most certainly not have been respected. Nevertheless I have restated our rules so that no such circumstance will again occur without my consent and approval; and this, I assure you, would be given only after consultation with all interested parties.

I have tried to answer your questions by the above explanations but I assure you that there is no change of policy which will be a precedent for the future.

Sincerely,

/S/

John A. McCone
Director

C
O
P
Y

13 January 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Recent CIA Publicity

Two recent developments within CIA should be noted:

a. Following the briefings of the NSC and Congressional leadership, I proposed that CIA findings on Soviet economy be released to the public in the United States and Europe in order to (1) influence curtailment of long-range credits and (2) influence a number of uncommitted leaders of nations in Africa, Southeast Asia and Latin America. This plan was discussed and agreed with the President, Secretaries Rusk, Harriman, Alexis Johnson and others. My proposed plan per Memoranda and Notes of Conversation was to handle the subject through cut-outs, on an unattributable basis, and largely through the foreign press on a carefully timed schedule to avoid the impact of "sudden propaganda". DDP organized to implement this program. Additionally, information was to be furnished (presumably on an unattributable basis) to Stewart Alsop (SATURDAY EVENING POST) and Charles Murphy (FORTUNE) who were said to be studying the subject.

b. I have felt, and expressed myself to the late President Kennedy, to President Johnson, to Secretary Rusk and others, that the DCI and CIA image must be changed. Its basic and primary responsibilities by law are to assemble all intelligence, analyze, evaluate, estimate and report such intelligence for the benefit of policy makers. This function has been submerged and CIA has been consistently referred to as a "cloak and dagger" outfit whose activities involve (almost exclusively) operations designed to overthrow governments, assassinate Heads of State, involve itself in political affairs of foreign states, and none of these activities are either controlled or coordinated with the White House or the State Department. This is

FO #1695

C
O
P
Y

~~SECRET~~

entirely wrong, both with respect to the activity and the coordination and control, and I wish to attempt to change this image. (NOTE: Hundreds of editorials, and dozens of speeches on the Hill have dealt with this thesis in one form or another, and there has been no rebuttal at any time to my knowledge).

No authorization was given by me for the briefing of press or other columnists (other than Alsop and Murphy) or for attribution or for statements or references to CIA's unique capabilities in Soviet economy or the purpose of the releases.

What has happened is that the two stated purposes "merged" and journalists, including TIME, NEWSWEEK, HERALD TRIBUNE, Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale of the NEW YORK TIMES were briefed during late December and early January.

In the case of Charles Bartlett and Mr. Dale, permission was given to attribute the information to CIA by DD/I and PR and apparently additional information on the depth of CIA's work in studying Soviet economy was discussed.

As a result the CIA role, the attribution and the fact that it had finally "spoken out" was of far greater significance than the facts. When the NEW YORK TIMES featured this side of the story in a front-page article, there was a clamour for like information for others and, as a result, CIA invited inquiring press men to come down and receive identical information which was then prepared in a written memorandum. The memorandum was discussed with them and this was interpreted to be a "formal press conference" which is only partially true.

In defense of DDI and PR's activities, it is to be noted that CIA has for 10 years issued unclassified publications on the Soviet economy and the method used in analyzing it. Mr. Allen Dulles used this subject as a favorite topic for his speeches, which were numerous - in fact, Mr. Elder, my assistant, states he has written at least 12 speeches on this subject for Mr. Dulles. However the timing and manner of release has given special notice by the press in this instance.

Attribution to President Johnson for authority to do all of the above is completely wrong, except to the extent that President Johnson knew of, and agreed to, a. and b. above which were entirely separate courses. It was not anticipated that they "merge" as they have.

The consequences are as follows:

1. The White House, and more particularly the State Department, are rightfully disturbed because they do not know the effect this publicity might have on their responsibilities.

2. CIA's methodology and findings have been questioned because a vast amount of information upon which our conclusions are based was not disclosed (and much of it cannot be disclosed), and hence the legitimacy of our conclusions is doubted by some experts and in the public mind.

3. Congressional leaders (Senators Russell, Saltonstall, Stennis, Chairmen Vinson and Cannon) are rightfully disturbed and have so expressed themselves.

4. All of this will be used to emphasize the need for a "Watchdog Committee" and legislation on this is more probable now than at any time in the past.

5. A carefully planned DDP operation for covert release of information, and developed at my direction, has been destroyed. The purpose of DCI's trip to brief Heads of State in Britain, France, West Germany and Italy has been impaired if not destroyed.

6. Activities have been contrary to my specific written and oral orders and warnings of DDCI at staff meetings when the subject was discussed.

As a result it is my intention to issue instructions for the conduct of all public relations activities in the future, their careful coordination at the level of the White House and the State Department, and until these orders are issued I wish absolutely no contact whatsoever, no comments, no discussions with the press except with my personal authorization.

~~SECRET~~

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10003
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 21-22, 1963
DATE : 11/21/63
PAGES : 22
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR NOVEMBER 21 AND 22, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 21 AND 22, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10003

B. J. [illegible]
11-21/22/63

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 21 -- 22, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		November 21, 1963
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:30	Board Panel's Review of the Dunlap Espionage Case and its Ramifications Messrs. Clifford, Gray, Doolittle
3.	10:30 - 11:30	Actions Taken and Contemplated by NSA Based on its Study of the Dunlap Case Lt. General Gordon A. Blake, USAF, Director of NSA
4.	11:30 - 12:00	Executive Session
5.	12:00 - 1:00	Results of U. S. Army's Study of Dunlap Case and of Counterintelligence and Personnel Security Screening Processes Applied to Army Personnel Major General Alva R. Fitch, Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army
6.	1:00 - 1:30	Executive Session
7.	1:30 - 2:15	Lunch - White House Mess
8.	2:15 - 3:00	Executive Session
9.	3:30 - 4:30	Assessment of the Adequacy of the Several Defense Department Reviews as an Outgrowth of the Dunlap and Related Espionage Penetrations. Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA
10.	4:30 - 6:30	Discussion and Drafting of Material to be Included in Report to the President.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		November 22, 1963
11.	9:00 - 9:15	Chairman's Time
12.	9:15 - 10:00	Resume with Item 10
13.	10:00 - 12:00	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John A. McCone
14.	12:00 - 12:30	South Vietnam: Activities of CIA Preceding and Following the Overthrow of Diem. Mr. William Colby, DD/P Staff, CIA
15.	12:30 - 1:30	Resume with Item 10
16.	1:30 - 2:15	Lunch - White House Mess
17.	2:15 - 6:00	Completion of final draft of Report to the President.

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~This document consists of 56 pages~~
~~No. 1 of 3 Copies, Series 2~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: November 21-22, 1963, Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

November 21, 1963

The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board convened in Executive Session at 9:00 a.m. November 21, 1963, on the first day of a scheduled two-day meeting, at the Board's offices, Room 297 Executive Office Building. Present were Chairman Clifford; members Land, Gray, Langer and Doolittle; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R. Ash.

Chairman Clifford informed Board members that in this two-day meeting consideration would be given to the Soviet espionage case involving the late U. S. Army Sergeant Jack E. Dunlap, previously assigned to the National Security Agency by the Army Security Agency. Mr. Clifford said that the Board was in a position to do a unique service in this situation, and was the only Government entity engaged in a detailed, full-time review of the counterintelligence and national security ramifications of the case. Chairman Clifford advised Board members that some of the facts involved are extremely sensitive and must be given extreme security. (Here Mr. Clifford outlined to the Board the substance of highly sensitive information which had been given orally to Mr. Coyne by FBI Director Hoover for the information of the Board and the President with respect to a uniquely valuable intelligence source which supplied information concerning the espionage activities of Dunlap.)

HANDLE VIA **COMINT CHANNELS ONLY**

CORONA/OXCART/TAGBOARD/GAMBIT

Handle via [illegible]
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

November 22, 1963

The Board re-convened at 8:45 a.m. in executive session. Chairman Clifford announced that General Carroll had called to emphasize that during his remarks yesterday he did not intend to be critical of corrective measures taken by General Blake (Director of NSA) after the Dunlap case, rather, his criticisms were directed at the situation existing prior thereto.

Board members directed their attention to a further review of materials relating to the Dunlap case, and to further work on the draft of the Board's report to President Kennedy.

(Messrs. Pace and Murphy joined the meeting.)

At 10:00 a.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. McCone, DCI, who was accompanied by CIA officials Kirkpatrick and Helms.

Mr. Clifford informed the DCI that the Board would appreciate his comments on the subject matters which had previously been indicated as of interest to the Board, and in any comments on other subjects which the DCI or his associates might wish to make.

Mr. McCone said that he was prepared to discuss all of the items listed by the Chairman, plus 3 additional subjects: (1) the Soviet Space Analytical Center (2) organizational changes in regard to CIA's scientific and technical activities, and (3) Vietnam. He said that at noon he would have available to the Board Mr. William Colby, CIA headquarters official assigned to Far East matters, who had just returned from a several weeks' visit to Vietnam at President Kennedy's request. Mr. McCone said that he himself would have to leave the meeting at 12:20 in order to keep an appointment with McGeorge Bundy.

First Mr. McCone said he wanted to refer most emphatically to the damage being done to CIA through adverse publicity appearing in the press, radio and TV in a campaign which, if not arrested, could well destroy the CIA. If the campaign continues, it will prevent CIA recruitment of good men, and will discourage present CIA personnel at all levels in the organization. Mr. McCone said that there is little he can do to dissuade the press from pursuing this line for ideological reasons or otherwise. There are those in the Defense Department who have opposed CIA ever since it was established, and there are Foreign Service Officers in the State Department who are highly critical of the CIA.

Mr. McCone urged most emphatically that the Board bring this matter to President Kennedy's attencion and to urge the President to take not one but several occasions to try to correct the CIA's public image. For example, CIA has been accused of being a "Third Government in South Vietnam", and various people have been led to the erroneous conclusion that the anti-Diem coup was engineered by CIA. One result of irresponsible charges may be that Cambodia will swing over to the Communist camp.

Mr. Clifford asked whether these criticisms are traceable back to the Bay of Pigs as a turning point. Mr. McCone said yes, and back to CIA's involvement in Guatemala. The criticisms of CIA make interesting copy for writers who know there will be no denial or defense. For some reason or other, extreme liberals in and out of Government feel that a secret intelligence service is contrary to the democratic principles of our Government. The N. Y. Times is particularly critical and Times staffer James Reston would destroy CIA if he had his way; and the Washington Post from top to bottom is opposed to CIA.

Mr. Gray asked if Mr. McCone was suggesting that the President should talk to the Secretaries of State and Defense about criticisms of CIA made by persons in those Departments. Mr. McCone said, no, what must be done is for the President to make the matter the subject of a major speech and several press conferences. General Doolittle inquired whether Mr. McCone had discussed this with the President, and Mr. McCone replied that he had and this was the reason for remarks which the President made 30 days ago during a press conference. Mr. Murphy observed that public statements of the kind urged by Mr. McCone often have a way of proving to be a liability, because they may generate a whole flock of further press and radio commentaries; and for this reason Mr. McCone might consider the prospect of having to ride out this storm.

Dr. Land asked what is the CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said its role was not to overthrow governments, and there are many other reasons why CIA is in Vietnam. Dr. Land asked what, however, should the President publicly say about CIA's role in Vietnam. Mr. McCone said that he could supply the President with that.

Chairman Clifford stated that the matter raised by Mr. McCone is an area in which he would hope that the Board might be of assistance. However, Mr. Clifford did not know how much the President could do in the way of public statements to the press. Perhaps a lot could be done within Government to stop damaging leaks of information from the various departments and agencies. Mr. Clifford said that the Board would address itself to the problem. Mr. McCone agreed that leaks are a part of the problem, and he recalled that the editor of News Week told him that he obtained information from State Department, but the editor would not name the source.

Turning to the subject of Counterintelligence which was included on the Board's list of items of interest, Mr. McCone asked Mr. Helms to speak to this matter.

Mr. Helms said that in looking at the subject of our counterintelligence posture he preferred to refer to it as "counter-espionage". He said that it is the most dreary and least attractive job that CIA has. When CIA goes out for positive collection of intelligence in an espionage operation, the objective is clear -- e.g., the obtaining of information about a Soviet missile site. But counterespionage is like Blind Man's Buff where you know someone is in the room but you aren't certain who it is. There is a passive side of the effort, involving security checks, safes, fences, guards, etc.; but if the counter effort is only passive, it continues to be a game of Blind Man's Buff. Therefore, a counterespionage activity is needed for the purpose of identifying hostile espionage agents. In this latter activity CIA has about 5 years to go before getting to the level that is desired.

Mr. Helms pointed out that the USSR not only has an aggressive cold war policy but it uses the instruments of the GRU and the KGB operating in parallel -- with coordination taking place under Khrushchev in Moscow where decisions are reached as to dividing up the slots and espionage missions between the GRU and the KGB.

Next Mr. Helms exhibited a chart reflecting a number of espionage cases which have been uncovered as a result of CIA's counterintelligence efforts: the Able case (an illegal KGB agent who was located by the FBI in New York after Able's subordinate defected to the CIA in Paris); Blake (of Britain's MI-6 who worked for the Soviets for 6 years until uncovered as a result of a Polish defection to the CIA); Philby (the old school tie MI-6 official whose Soviet espionage recruitment dates back to 1934 and who recently fled to the

USSR from the Middle East); Clemens and Felfe (who served 9 years in the West German counterespionage service, and were uncovered through a Polish defector's tip to CIA); Cox (a U. S. citizen who took $500 from the Soviets, returned the money, suffered a heart attack, and the case dropped by U. S. authorities); Ethel and Harry Houghton (uncovered through a tip from a Polish defector); the Krugers (a U. S. couple whose real names were Cohen and who disappeared in 1950); the Lansdale case in England; Vassalls (a homosexual clerk in the British Admiralty); and Wennerstrom (CIA didn't give the Swede's a direct lead to this Soviet agent, but CIA laid out to officials of Sweden the manner in which the Soviets would effect a penetration, and when the Swede's surveyed their situation they found that Wennerstrom fit the prototype, with the result that Wennerstrom confessed when confronted.) Mr. Helms also presented another chart dealing with cases of espionage penetrations by other Soviet bloc intelligence services including Czechs, East Germans, Poles and Yugoslavs.

Mr. Murphy asked whether CIA had concurred in the U. S. release of the Soviet espionage agent, Able, in exchange for U-2 pilot Powers. Mr. Helms said that considerations of national interest prevailed in that decision, although CIA's counterintelligence officers objected to the action.

As a result of information gained through CIA's counterespionage efforts, CIA has informed French and Israeli governments that the KGB is obtaining information from them. The worst situation is in the French government which has recently arrested the Soviet agent Pacques, and this action by the French government may be an indication that they are moving against Soviet espionage infiltrations. CIA believes in the accuracy of information it has received from a Soviet defector that there are 10 or 12 high placed French officials serving as Soviet agents.

Mr. Clifford asked whether this situation should cause the U. S. to furnish less information to the foreign governments involved. Mr. Helms said that CIA is recommending to the USIB that there be less distribution of sensitive papers placed in the hands of foreign recipients, but that these foreign governments be provided more counterintelligence information to protect themselves against Soviet espionage penetrations (for example, West Germany is crawling with hundreds of East German agents).

In answer to General Doolittle's question as to motivations in these cases, Mr. Helms said that in the Western world the primary motivations have been desire for money, blackmail pressures, ideology, and vanity (the agent Blake enjoyed confessing how well he had fooled his British superiors). In blackmail situations, the Soviets develop leads as to personality defects and then exploit them persistently.

Mr. Clifford asked whether CIA's counterintelligence program has uncovered U. S. citizens serving as Soviet agents. Mr. Helms replied that one such instance was the case of Sergeant Rhodes. (Mr. McCone interjected that if there had not been a mix-up in signals, Dunlap would have been turned up as an agent. Mr. Clifford said that the Board knew about that.)

Dr. Langer asked whether the FBI is more active now in its counterespionage coverage in the United States. Mr. Helms said that FBI is at a maximum of activity. He added that the Able case had proved something that CIA and FBI had doubted, i.e., that the USSR was operating "illegals" in the U. S. after World War II.

In answer to a question as to whether new policy guidance is needed with respect to counterespionage activities, Mr. Helms stated that CIA does not feel that NSCID No. 5 needs revision -- the problems that exist are encountered in the implementation of the directive. There is a view in the

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

intelligence community (supported by Army and Navy, although CIA and FBI are not keen on it) that there is a need for a Counterintelligence Committee. The objection to this is grounded on the nature of counterintelligence work which involves highly sensitive operations aimed at penetration of foreign government's intelligence services, and the security of these sensitive operations would be weakened if several agencies shared in them. Under present arrangements there is no duplication of counterintelligence actions on the part of the agencies involved because of the day-to-day liaison that is maintained among them; and, also, the CIA maintains a central counterintelligence index file for use by interested agencies. In addition, the USIB provides a place for the resolution of policy questions. Therefore, Mr. Helms said, the CIA feels that the present bureaucratic apparatus is sufficient for its purposes. He added that one improvement that is needed is for U. S. military agencies to make good memoranda for the record concerning contacts made by U. S. military attaches with foreign officers (in the Wennerstrom case it has been found that no such records were maintained about the many contacts with Wennerstrom during the period in which it is now known that he was serving as a Soviet agent).

Mr. McCone next addressed himself to the subject of Cuba, in which the Board had expressed an interest. He said that from 15,000 to 18,000 military personnel have been withdrawn since the missile crisis. A few hundred have arrived during the past month, and since October there appears to have been a rotation replacement of Soviet personnel in Cuba. It is believed that the USSR is ma[illegible]ing a large "MAAG-type" contingent in Cuba, including military advisers, [illegible]nicians, and personnel training the Cubans in the operation of SAM sites and KOMAR vessels. All missiles have been removed from Cuba by the Soviets except cruise missiles, FROG missiles and

SAM's. The Soviet decision to train Cubans and to relocate SAM sites indicates an intention to turn them over to Cuban control eventually. Further Soviet withdrawals will probably take place when Cubans become proficient in the weapons systems. So, in Cuba there is a transition from Soviet military forces to a MAAG-type operation, with the Soviets retaining control of only the most sophisticated weapons systems. Equipment withdrawals have been limited to the missiles and launchers, and the replacement of advanced SAM radars with older types of the kind supplied by the USSR to Egypt and Indonesia.

In answer to Mr. Clifford's query about news accounts of CIA agent operations in Cuba, Mr. McCone said that CIA has had a very active operation against Cuba and the Board has been briefed on it from time to time. Although there have been some disappointments and roll-ups of agents, CIA has vastly improved its agent nets and internal agent sources among legal travelers and friendly foreign government missions in Cuba. Of the 17 agents reportedly executed in Cuba, 7 were CIA's. One unfortunate experience was the identification of the S.S. Rex as a CIA support ship. (Mr. Helms said that the story first came to public attention on October 21 when Cuban planes strafed a bauxite ore vessel, thinking it was the mother ship which CIA was using to return an agent team from a desolate area in Western Cuba. The CIA agent team had been in 6 weeks, had recruited additional agents, and was scheduled to come out on October 21. The S. S. Rex was lying off shore and personnel were sent ashore in small boats to meet the agent team. The infra-red blinker signals from shore were correctly given, although the lights were placed closer together than they should have been. A hailing signal was given from a rubber boat and was acknowledged, but then machine gun fire opened up on the small boats.) Mr. McCone stated that the cover story for the S. S. Rex was a good one -- a hydrographic oil exploration vessel -- and when the agent team was rolled up it was decided to bring the Rex back to a Florida port as called for in the cover plan, rather than taking it to some foreign port and thereby ruin the cover story.

Referring to the Dunlap case, Mr. Clifford said that the Board was shocked to learn of the lack of coordination between NSA and ASA, and he invited the DCI's comments on this in view of the Board's responsibility to the President in this matter.

Mr. McCone replied that his recommendation to the Secretary of Defense is to overhaul the security system and to ensure that military personnel assigned to NSA be subjected to the same kind of security screening as that which NSA applies to its civilian personnel, i.e., a background investigation and polygraph examination. The DCI noted that NSA rejects 20 per cent of the military personnel who have been working as military assignees to NSA, when they apply for civilian employment at NSA. Critics of Mr. McCone's proposal say that any such new procedure would have to be applied among agencies generally and that would present problems, but Mr. McCone feels that the more stringent security clearance procedure should start at NSA which is the heart of the problem, and then widen the circle to other agencies gradually.

The DCI said that he is also looking into the need-to-know by NSA with respect to the large number of sensitive CIA documents which are used by NSA. Some 135,000 such documents were at NSA during Dunlap's employment there. The DCI stated that CIA has not completed its damage assessment yet, and a few weeks more would be required.

Mr. Gray asked whether the CIA investigates a military man assigned to CIA in the event that derogatory information is developed concerning him. Mr. McCone replied that before a military assignee comes to CIA, the CIA

ELINT. For example in connection with aSoviet missile shot on Kamchatka there was a suspicion that the test would include a Soviet anti-ICBM shot, but our Alaskan radar site was not alerted, the radars were not up, and we missed coverage of any anti-ICBM test. Mr. McCone agreed with Dr. Baker's observation that there is a relationship between the activities of the new Center and the responsibilities to be assigned under the Defense ELINT Plan, and the DCI added that there may well be resistance from some elements of the military.

Next Mr. McCone reported to the Board on the recent U-2 crash in the Gulf of Mexico. The whole plane has been found in 9 fathoms of water 40 miles NW of Key West. The ejector canopy is off and the seat is out. An empty life raft and parachute were found. There was no attack made on the aircraft. The pilot reported a successful mission over Cuba, he flew over the Key West station on the return trip and 10 minutes later he was down. When the wreckage is raised it should be possible to determine the cause.

Mr. McCone said that this exhausted the list of things he had in mind to discuss at this meeting.

Mr. Clifford asked if there were any intelligence facets of the arrest of U. S. professor Barghorn in the USSR. The DCI said that an analysis of the professor's debriefing had not yet been completed. He had no intelligence mission even indirectly, but was once a CIA consultant and the KGB knew that. No doubt this Soviet move was made because they had run out of pawns to use in obtaining an exchange for the Soviet spy Egeroff arrested in the U. S. As a matter of fact CIA had forecast that the Soviets would do something like this when they ran out of people to use in exchanges, Mr. McCone said.

At 12:15 Mr. McCone brought in Mr. Colby who was in charge of the CIA Station at Saigon for 5 years and more recently has been in charge of the

Far East desk at CIA headquarters. At an NSC meeting following the anti-Diem coup in South Vietnam the President decided to send Mr. Colby to Saigon to survey the situation as a representative of the President and of the Secretaries of State and Defense. The Vietnam coup is the 8th that has taken place around the world during the past year. Mr. McCone said that he has looked back over CIA reporting on these events and found that without exception there had been a forecast of what was to come and of the people involved.

Mr. McCone said that reports of possible coups in Vietnam had been received for years. Up to early August it was CIA's practice to inform the Diem government about reported coup plotting. Then when Diem began to resist efforts to get him to change some of his policies, CIA decided not to report to him on coup talk which was noted in August, but CIA would watch the situation -- which CIA did in detail through August and September. CIA knew quite a lot about the General's coup plotting but not their precise plan. General Dhin told CIA that the coup was ready. CIA maintained a radio telephone link between the Joint General Staff and the CIA Station in Saigon, so that the CIA contact could report developments. CIA did not have/information on and does not know about the assassinations of Diem and Nhu. CIA had no part in organizing the coup, Mr. McCone informed the Board, although some have accused CIA of this. Mr. McCone said he would now ask Mr. Colby to brief the Board, noting that Mr. Colby attended the Honolulu meeting (as did Mr. McCone) and is knowledgeable of the decisions made there. (At 12:25 Mr. McCone left the Board meeting to keep his appointment with Mr. Bundy.)

Mr. Colby began by informing the Board that CIA has for some time been watching signs of instability in the Vietnam government, in order to

CORONA/OXCART/TAGBOARD/GAMBIT

determine reasons for discontent and to learn of any plans to overthrow the government. (Two earlier coups had been attempted. In November 1960 junior paratrooper officers took part. In 1962 two Air Force pilots bombed the palace in the hope of killing members of the royal family.) In the summer of 1963 CIA's policy was tied to clear and present danger to U. S. interests. If CIA saw threats to the Diem regime, CIA would give warnings to Diem so as not to spoil CIA's contacts with the regime. In the summer, the intense feelings over the Bhuddist issue were graver than any that CIA had seen in Vietnam. There were major popular grievances against the regime. The regime insisted it had the answers to all questions and that any opposition was either venal or stupid. All was decided from the Palace, and the Generals did not have much to do. The regime had a total lack of appreciation of public relations both at home and internationally. While the Bhuddist suicides by burning were taking place there were 6 or 8 potential coup groups being formed, some of them being alliances between civilians and the military. The situation was crystallized with the Government raids on pagodas, resulting in public outcry. Diem convinced his Generals that these repressive actions were necessary to maintain the war effort, when in fact Diem was making a political move against a Bhuddist political operation. (Mr. Colby said there was no tie between the Bhuddists and the Vieg Cong, although there had been some Communist penetration of the Bhuddist priests dating back before 1954.) The anti-Diem Bhuddist movement actually began as a concept to protect Bhuddism against Catholic supremacy. When the Government raided the pagodas, this almost set off a coup attempt at that time but the coup planners had not yet obtained support of sufficient troops. Meanwhile, CIA was watching developments carefully, Mr. Colby said. In answer to a question from Mr. Coyne, he stated CIA funds and activities were not directly or indirectly involved in support of Diem forces which raided the pagodas.

Continuing, Mr. Colby reported to the Board that in September and October CIA had identified (1) a General's coup group, and (2) a coup group headed by junior officers and civilians, which was all set to move on October 24 but could not do so for lack of needed trucks. Mr. Colby then went on to describe the Generals' coup action which resulted in the overthrow of the Diem government, along the lines publicly reported.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Colby informed the Board that there were 10 executions of members of the Diem regime during the coup action.

Looking ahead, Mr. Colby stated that as soon as the Generals have finished removing pro-Diem officials from the Government they will proceed to institute popular programs in an effort to solidify the support of the people in the prosecution of the war effort (the strategic hamlet program will probably be continued). The Generals will have to change the compartmentation of the Vietnam military forces which Diem had established as a means of preventing the Generals from knowledge of the overall situation. Accordingly, the new ruling Generals' group sees the need for thorough reorganization of the military chain of command, and are attempting to form an organizational pattern which will be better suited to fighting the war against the Viet Cong. The basic war concept is to clean out Cong forces in the southern delta area and then expand military activities in the northern area.

General Doolittle asked whether there is any organized Communist movement within South Vietnam. Mr. Colby replied that the Viet Cong guerilla effort has penetrated into the South Vietnamese society. Viet Cong military units are guided by Cong Political Committees which are set up in each Province. There is, Mr. Colby stated, a Communist Party in South Vietnam whose main efforts are directed at "shooting at us" and propagandizing the South Vietnamese into the belief that their real enemies are the U. S. and the present Government of the country.

In answer to Mr. Pace's question as to whether realistic looks have been taken of the potentials for winning the war in Vietnam, Mr. Colby said that a hard nose look is necessary. It is not yet clear whether the new Government regime can claim the support of the people in the countryside. The situation is in fair shape in the northern two-thirds of the country, but is bad in the southern one third.

Mr. Coyne inquired about U. S. coordination of its some fifteen intelligence elements in South Vietnam. Mr. Colby said that the J-2 is coordinating military intelligence activities, CIA coordinates political intelligence efforts, and paramilitary matters are being turned over to U. S. Special Forces. He said that there are 200 personnel engaged in the CIA effort in South Vietnam.

Dr. Langer asked about the recall of the CIA Station Chief in Saigon (Richardson) Mr. Colby said that Richardson had become publicly identified as a close contact of the Diem regime at a time when the U. S. Government became critical of policies of the Diem regime.

As for French Government attitudes toward the South Vietnam situation, Mr. Colby observed that the French have considerable commercial holdings in the country and a history of cultural affinity, and the French are piqued at their loss of a "protective image".

Mr. Colby concluded his discussion with the Board and left the meeting at 1:00 p.m.

In executive session, the Board had a further discussion of its report to be made to President Kennedy on the Dunlap case. Chairman Clifford brought Messrs. Murphy and Pace up to date on the principal matters covered at the preceding day's session of the Board meeting with regard to the extensive review and materials which had been completed thus far by Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne in the Dunlap case. Mr. Clifford summed up the Board's reaction of being aghast at the shocking looseness of security attitude at the NSA. He referred to the many questions which had been put to the Director of NSA at yesterday's session. Mr. Clifford observed that General Fitch had made a very intelligent presentation, and that an exceedingly valuable session had been had with General Carroll of DIA. Mr. Clifford said that after lunch the Board would complete its consideration of the Dunlap report and recommendations which the Board Panel had drafted. Arrangements had not been made for a meeting of Board members with President Kennedy in conjunction with this particular Board meeting because Mr. Clifford had felt that the Board would require all the time of this 2-day meeting to complete action on its report on a complex subject.

Chairman Clifford said that Board members should plan to convene for half a day at the next Board meeting and then meet with the President for an hour on the Dunlap case report. In view of the serious nature of the counterintelligence problems involved, Mr. Clifford expressed the opinion that the Board's report and recommendations may well constitute one of the most important contributions which the Board has made.

Mr. Clifford then informed Board members Murphy and Pace of the Board's discussion yesterday assessing the degree of damage resulting from Dunlap's espionage activities. Recognizing the difficulty of arriving at an assessment at this time, Mr. Clifford observed that the damage must have been serious, and he noted that the CIA is still evaluating its practice of sending its sensitive documents to the NSA. Mr. Clifford stated that despite differences of opinion which may exist as to the damage done to U. S. interests by Dunlap's espionage service for the Russians, the Board has information which bears on the subject but which cannot be made generally known and which the Board can pass on only to the President. (Mr. Clifford then related to the Board the most sensitive item, consisting of information which had been given to Mr. Coyne by appropriate authority, for reporting to the Board and to the President. It was agreed by Board members that the Board must take particular pains to protect this information, and would do so.)

At 1:35 the Board adjourned for lunch at the White House Staff Mess.

Having heard the report of the assassination of President Kennedy which had just occurred at 2:00 p.m. EST in Dallas, Chairman Clifford reconvened the Board in executive session. Mr. Clifford expressed the keen sense of personal loss which he felt upon the President's death. He joined Board members in their individual expressions of profound sorrow occasioned by the tragic circumstances of the President's death, and their deep sympathy and concern for the President's family.

Chairman Clifford announced that at this point the Board's meeting of the past two days was at a close, and that completion of the Board's report which was in preparation for submission to President Kennedy would be suspended pending further developments.

~~TOP SECRET~~

It was Chairman Clifford's feeling that it would be inappropriate and premature, during the transition period following President Kennedy's death, for the Board to present to President Johnson the Board's recommendations calling for substantial changes in the U. S. intelligence effort. Mr. Clifford expressed his intention, and Board members agreed, to indicate to President Johnson as soon as possible the Board's willingness to serve in any way possible. Meanwhile, pending a resolution by President Johnson as to whether the Board would continue as an institution, and as to the President's wishes concerning continued services of the present Chairman and members, Chairman Clifford asked that the Board members be prepared to meet on a quick notice should intelligence developments require it. Mr. Clifford said that he would inform the DCI of the course of action which the Board was taking at this time.

The Board meeting was adjourned at 3:20 p.m., subject to call of the Chairman as determined by developments.

A. R. Ash

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

CORONA/OXCART/TAGBOARD/GAMBIT

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 20, 1963

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS

SUBJECT: South Vietnam

The Director of Central Intelligence has suggested to the Chairman that the Board might wish to be brought up to date on recent intelligence and related activities involved in South Vietnam, including the activities of CIA preceding and following the overthrow of Diem. The Chairman concurred in this suggestion.

Accordingly, arrangements have been made for the Board to be provided an oral briefing on the subject by Mr. William Colby, Chief of the Far East Division, of the DD/P Staff, CIA.

/s/

J. Patrick Coyne

~~SECRET~~

Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10004
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD ON JUNE 25-26, 1963
DATE : 06/25/63
PAGES : 8
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR JUNE 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF JUNE 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10004

Ju
25
19

MEETING OF THE
PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
ON
June 25 - 26, 1963

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10004

[illegible]

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JUNE 25 - 26, 1963

June 25, 1963 (all were present)

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 10:00	The Chairman's Time Mr. Clifford
2.	10:00 - 10:15	Report on OXCART Incident General Doolittle
3.	10:15 - 11:00	Status Report on Organization and Operations of CIA in non-Covert Action Areas Doolittle Panel
4.	11:00 - 11:30	Briefing on Organization, Management and Operation of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), Department of State Mr. George C. Denney, Jr. Deputy Director, INR, State Mr. Allan Evans, INR Staff No supporting papers prepared for Bd. Books.
5.	11:30 - 12:00	Status Report on State Department Intelligence Activities Murphy Panel
6.	12:00 - 12:30	Status Report on Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Activities Baker Panel
7.	12:40 - 2:00	Lunch - Metropolitan Club (Anderson Room - Second Floor)
8.	2:00 - 2:30	a. 2:00 - 2:15 -- Budget Bureau Views on Management and Budgetary Control of Intelligence Mr. Gary Pettibone, Budget Bureau Staff Mr. Irving Lewis, Budget Bureau Staff b. 2:15 - 2:30 -- Over-all Budgeting for Intelligence Pace Panel
9.	2:30 - 3:00	Executive Session Discussion of DCI's Comments on Report and Recommendations Growing Out of the Board's Cuba Review
10.	3:00 - 3:30	Discussion with the Director, National Reconnaissance Office (NRO) Mr. Brockway McMillan, Under Secretary, Department of the Air Force

Budget discussion 15 min. OK

For material on Panel assignments see ① Bk of Panel [illegible] ② Bks of [illegible] and Coyne

~~TOP SECRET~~

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	~~3:30 - 5:00~~ misunderstanding re: time.	~~Discussion with the Director of Central Intelligence~~ ~~Mr. McCone~~
12.	7:00	Dinner at Mr. Clifford's Residence 9421 Rockville Pike, Bethesda, Maryland

June 26, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
13.	9:00 - 9:30	Executive Session
14.	9:30 - 10:30	Status Report on Defense Intelligence Activities (other than SIGINT and NRO) Gray Panel
NOT TAKEN UP 15.	10:30 - 11:00	Status Report on Covert Action Activities Murphy-Gray-Langer Panel
16.	11:00 - 11:30	Status Report on NRO Activities Land-Doolittle Panel
17.	11:30 - 12:00	Status Report on DCI's Coordination Role and on Intelligence Community Relationships with and Support of the White House Clifford Panel
18.	12:00 - 12:30	Executive Session
19.	12:30 - 1:30	Lunch -- The White House Mess
20.	1:30 - End of Day 300 McCone	a. Consideration of Chairman's Draft Communications Concerning Future Status Reports of DCI, CIA, State and Defense b. Discussion of Board's SIGINT Panel Report c. Discussion of the question of recommending a ninth Board member d. Discussion of frequency of future Board meetings e. Discussion of future business of the Board and the Board's Panels f. Determination of next Board meeting date

See Revised 6/26 agenda

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 85 pages
No. 1 of 2 Copies, Series A

June 28, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board - June 25-26, 1963

The Board convened in its offices at 297 Executive Office Building, 9:00 A.M., June 25, 1963, on the first day of its two-day meeting. Those present were Board Chairman Clark Clifford and Members Gray, Langer, Murphy, Doolittle, Land, Langer, and Pace; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Chairman Clifford began the meeting with the observation that the Board has been in existence for two years, and has been very active during that time. Mr. Clifford thought that it was exceedingly appropriate at this time to look back on the two years' work of the Board, to evaluate the work, and to arrive at conclusions concerning areas where the Board can expand its usefulness to the President. Accordingly, Mr. Clifford said, he has purposely kept to a minimum the appearances of briefers from outside during this meeting, and Board business would be confined mostly to consideration of reports by the various Board Panels. On the following day the Chairman indicated that he would set aside time for a discussion of the usefulness of Panel reports with a view to seeing whether there might not be increased use made of Panels in pursuing the Board's functions. If this procedure proved useful, the Chairman thought that perhaps there would be fewer formal meetings of the whole Board and that the Panels could prepare proposed reports to the President to be considered at formal meetings of the Board, thereby avoiding a last-minute rush in the preparation of reports to the President.

The Chairman then turned to a number of items which he had drawn up for discussion with the Board, with the assistance of Mr. Coyne.

First, the Chairman read to Board members the letter which had been written to Mr. Clifford on June 5 by Dr. Killian, thanking the Board for the gift which he had received on the occasion of his resignation as Chairman of the Board.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

This document contains information referring to IDEALIST, CORONA, OXCART, TAGBOARD

Property of:
The President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Turning to the Board-suggested item regarding the status of current efforts to mount clandestine collection and covert operations against Cuba, the DCI referred to the close attention being given to these matters. He told the Board that since March of this year Mr. Fitzgerald of CIA has been heading up the Agency's headquarters element directly concerned with clandestine activities against Cuba. Agents have been placed in Cuba for CIA by Argentina, France, Spain, Holland, Denmark, Norway and Britain. A total of 104 new agents of all types are in operation, 41 of them in Cuba where three "black", illegal teams are working. As yet there have been no penetrations of the Castro regime or military installations. CIA gets reports from these agents and liaison observers but the Agency has "no agents sitting on the Cuban General Staff".

Mr. McCone said that we do not know how many Soviets are in Cuba, although it can be estimated that there are 12,000 to 13,000 still there and possibly more, all scattered over the island. He informed the Board that pursuant to approvals by the Special Group, the NSC and the President there are active programs for intensified intelligence collection on Cuba, as well as efforts to promote disaffection in the Cuban military; hampering the Cuban economy; and sabotage.

Mr. Clifford asked for background on the recent news stories about Cuban exiles claiming that invasion teams had been sent into Cuba. Mr. McCone stated that these claims were national stories by Cuban exiles in Miami with a view to obtaining U. S. military intervention. The DCI added that CIA assessed the development accurately the night that word was first received about it. He went on to say that an approved U. S. program calls for a long term effort over two years aimed at disaffecting the Cuban military from Castro, and it is expected that this effort will result in press releases, and Soviet protests at the UN and elsewhere. However, Mr. McCone expressed the belief that there is already some disaffection within Cuban military circles, and if the CIA effort succeeds the result will be an overthrow of Castro but it will also mean a military dictatorship in Cuba for a time.

Mr. McCone suggested that it might be profitable for the Board to receive a briefing on Cuban matters from Mr. Fitzgerald of CIA, at the next Board meeting. Mr. Clifford agreed that this would be desirable.

Mr. Gray observed that newspaper accounts and items in the Central Intelligence Bulletin have been in disagreement on the Soviet turnover of the armored camps to the Cubans. Mr. McCone thought that CIA's assessment is the correct one.

Mr. Pace inquired about the quality of U-2 photography being obtained from missions over Cuba. Mr. McCone replied that in the present season of summer storms there is more cloud cover and shadows which means fewer sightings of the 30 critical target points of top interest to the CIA, and he noted that there was a 15-day period of such bad weather recently. At present U-2 missions are flown daily and sometimes twice daily, all of them direct overflights. The objective, he said, is to get a mosaic of the whole island every 7 days.

In answer to General Doolittle's question, Mr. McCone said that special authorization is still required for the sending of low-level missions over Cuba. Answering a question by Dr. Langer, the DCI said that no evidence of camouflage had been seen. He added that each day CIA issues an analysis of "exotic" reports received from refugee, agent and other sources, and there are innumerable such reports of all kinds which cannot be checked out. For example, a refugee from Cuba arrived in Miami with the story that he had seen an enormous submarine

~~TOP SECRET~~

base at a location near Banes. But an examination of photography of the village in question shows only some fishing shacks and the presence of a shoal which would prevent the entry of any vessels other than shallow draft fishing boats.

Mr. Pace asked whether useful information had been obtained from CIA's own recovered agents. Mr. McCone said yes, definitely.

Turning to the subject of OXCART, the DCI said that ten are on order, seven have been delivered and six have been flown. The remaining three will be delivered one at a time in July, August, and September. Plans call for subsequent development of Air Force interceptor and reconnaissance versions of OXCART.

As for the crash of the OXCART last month, the DCI reported the facts substantially as previously given to the Board by General Doolittle. Mr. McCone indicated that no security breach had occurred; when picked up by the persons who came up in a jeep the pilot succeeded in steering them away from the crash scene; the State Police secured the area; all pieces of the plane were removed within 30 hours; the only news photos made were retrieved before the film was processed or published; and only an innocuous news story appeared in the press. Mr. McCone said that the Board of Inquiry found that false instrument readings were caused by frozen pitot tubes. It appeared that there was some pilot error; corrective recommendations have been made; and meanwhile OXCART will be flown under conditions of clear visibility.

In answer to Mr. Pace's question, the DCI said that the overall cost of project OXCART is $750 million (of which $300 million is engine cost), and that project TAGBOARD will require an additional expenditure of $85 million.

~~TOP SECRET~~

(Dr. Baker departed the Board meeting at this point.)

Taking up the sixth item suggested by the Board for discussion, the DCI said that he felt that there were no security implications in the Profumo case in Britain. Mr. McCone said it was thought that it would be contrary to Soviet procedure for Ivanov to attempt to use Keeler for espionage purposes, although there might have been a Soviet attempt at political action against the MacMillan government. In answer to Mr. Coyne's question, Mr. McCone said that the British had cooperated fully with CIA in regard to the Profumo case with respect to any U. S. people involved, but that the British have rightfully withheld information on the implication of other Britishers. Mr. McCone informed the Board that within a couple of days the Labor Party in England will break the case involving Philby who turns out to be the "third man" in the Burgess-MacLean case, and who in the late 1940's was in liaison with the CIA and FBI. The DCI added that MacMillan has been sitting on this case for a long time and CIA has tried in the past to get the British to surface it.

Turning to the next item listed as of interest to the Board, Mr. McCone said that the Penkovskiy espionage case in the USSR had no implications for British or U. S. Intelligence security. The DCI noted that we suffered a serious loss of valuable source with the execution of this individual who provided over 8,000 pages of very important documents during the period 1960-1962. Mr. McCone related that the Soviet Colonel had been recruited by CIA but the British were brought in when it developed that contacts could best be made when the Soviet officer was in London escorting visiting military and trade missions. Therefore, Mr. McCone went on to say, CIA got MI-6 to share in the reporting aspects and means were set up whereby information could be delivered by

Penkovskiy (for example, dropping a roll of tinfoil wrapped microfilm into a baby carriage pushed by the wife of a Britisher in a London park). The DCI said that apparently the Soviet officer's cooperation was motivated by an emotional resentment of the fact that he had been passed over in promotions. According to Mr. McCone, the officer was probably uncovered as a result of Soviet penetration of British intelligence, and it is known that he had no access to CIA or FBI. Mr. Coyne asked whether CIA or Penkovskiy had initiated the contact with CIA, and whether he could have been planted. Mr. McCone replied that CIA was of course worried about the possibility of a plant but decided that such was not the case.

Taking up the next item on the status of Board recommendations growing out of the Hanson Baldwin article of July 1962, the DCI informed the Board that the FBI completed its investigation but did not positively identify the source of the leak and therefore dropped the matter. As to the proposal for controls on press contacts as a means of protecting intelligence matters, the DCI said that State and Defense put in a system of control procedures which set off the furor over "management of the news" which is still raging. State finally dropped its system; the Defense Department retained its procedures; and CIA already was following a control system and still does. With regard to the Board's proposal of a special investigative group to investigate unauthorized disclosures, Mr. McCone said that he suggested this to State and Defense but the "managed news" furor was at its height so nothing was heard from those departments about the proposal. Meanwhile unknown to anyone outside CIA, the Agency's Office of Security is developing a mechanism to cover any serious leaks occuring in the security field should the President request action.

Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10005
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FOR MEETING OF APRIL 23, 1963
DATE : 04/23/63
PAGES : 16
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR APRIL 23, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF APRIL 23, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF APRIL 23, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 9:15	The Chairman's Time
✓ ~~2.~~	~~9:15 - 10:15~~	~~Status Report on Prior Board Recommendations~~ ~~Mr. Russell Ash~~ *
✓ 3.	10:~~15~~ 25 - ~~10:45~~ 11:13	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John McCone Mr. Lyman Kirkpatrick
✓ 4.	11:13 - 12:00 ~~10:45 - 11:15~~	Current Intelligence and Covert Operational Activity Relating to Cuba Mr. Sterling J. Cottrell, State Department Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald, CIA Mr. Bruce Clark, CIA
✓ 5.	12:00 - 12:55 ~~11:15 - 12:15~~	Status Report on Developments Pertaining to the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency Gen. Wm Quinn, Col. Chas. Gillie, Sgt. John Rite (all DIA)
6.	~~12:15 - 12:40~~	~~Executive Session~~ (Time overlap)
7.	12:~~45~~ 55 - 2:~~20~~ 35	Luncheon at the Metropolitan Club in Honor of Dr. Killian -- Host: Mr. Clark Clifford (Bd. Mbrs., Coyne, Ash, McCone & Bundy at luncheon.)
✓ 8.	2:~~30~~ 40 - 3:~~00~~ 10	Status Report - National Reconnaissance Office Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, NRO
✓ 9.	3:~~00~~ 10 - 4:~~00~~ 30	Developments Relating to the National Security Agency Mr. John H. Rubel, Deputy Director, Research and Engineering, Department of Defense Lt. General Gordon A. Blake, Director, National Security Agency + Bob Rich + Edwin Bartush; Dr. (2:00)
✓ 10.	4:~~00~~ 30 - 5:~~00~~ 08	Intelligence Coverage of Foreign Diplomatic and International Organization Establishments and Personnel in the United States Mr. Alan H. Belmont, Assistant Director, FBI Mr. Millen
11.	~~5:00 - 5:10~~	~~Executive Session~~ (Time overlap)

*This item was not considered at the 4/23/63 meeting of the Board. In lieu thereof the Board discussed the DCI's report on Cuba dated 4/15/63, following a briefing thereon by Mr. Coyne.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

All Board Members Present.

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10005

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AGENDA (Continued)

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
12.	5:15 - ~~5:25~~ 5:45	Meeting with the President - Presentation of Commission to Mr. Clifford as new Board Chairman
13.	~~5:25~~ 5:45 - End of Day 6:	Executive Session with the new Board Chairman

Addendum: Subsequent to the preparation of this agenda, the DCI submitted his comments on the recommendations (on Cuba and other subjects) which the Board made to the President at its last meeting. The DCI's comments are filed under Tab 14.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 54 pages
No. 1 of 4 Copies, Series A

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, April 23, 1963

The Board met at 9:00 a.m., April 23, 1963, in the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building, at the call of the Chairman, Dr. Killian. Present were Board members Doolittle, Murphy, Clifford, Gray, Baker, Pace, Langer and Land, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian opened the meeting with the observation that when the DCI joined the Board meeting later in the day, Board members should be prepared to discuss with Mr. McCone the latter's April 15, 1963, submission to the President of comments in response to the 14 recommendations made in the Board's March 8 report on Cuba.

The Chairman asked Mr. Coyne to give the Board a brief oral summary of the DCI's April 15 submission to the President. Mr. Coyne did so by repeating for the information of the Board members the comments which he had provided to Mr. Bundy in a memorandum dated April 22, 1963, in response to Mr. Bundy's request that he be furnished Mr. Coyne's own reaction (not that of the Board) to the DCI's communication to the President.

Having heard Mr. Coyne's resume of his comments to Mr. Bundy on the DCI's report, Dr. Killian thought that the comments were sound and well presented, although Dr. Killian was of the view that

Briefly referring to his visit to the NPIC quarters at the Naval Gun Factory, General Doolittle noted that the facility has considerable room for expansion and the activity is being carried on there under greatly improved conditions. The Department of Defense personnel contingent which is housed at the facility operates as a self-contained unit. Mr. Lundahl, Director of the NPIC, reports that although the facility does not possess usfficient manpower to handle a double load which might be imposed should two emergency situations occur simultaneously, he nevertheless feels that the space and equipment expansion now under way at the new quarters would accommodate the additional personnel who would be required in such a situation.

At the Chairman's request, Mr. Murphy briefly informed the Board concerning the meeting which he and Mr. Gray and Mr. Coyne had recently with Mr. Cord Meyer of CIA on the subject of covert action programs. Mr. Murphy pointed out that Mr. Meyer's briefing covered operations in Latin American countries, but the subject of Cuba was excluded inasmuch as that subject was to be covered at today's Board meeting. Mr. Murphy said the briefing consisted primarily of light touches including information on the China frontier situation. Nothing new was brought up with respect to Europe or the Middle East, Mr. Murphy said. The CIA briefing reflected the existence of positive evidence that the entourage of the Brazilian President Goulart is communist-penetrated. Mr. Murphy observed that this briefing had been presented by CIA at the request of Mr. Murphy and Mr. Gray, and it was Mr. Murphy's impression that the briefing was rather routine in nature, and therefore seemed to downgrade the importance which the Board attaches to the subject of covert action operations and requirements.

Dr. Land observed that from his experience, every time that secrecy is used as a cloak for an assumed efficient but sensitive operation, one may well later find on removal of the cloak that there was nothing there. Dr. Land thought that it is up to the Board to ascertain specifically whether the President desires that the Board go into covert action programs deeply, and if that is the President's wish then the Board should take steps to insure that it receives full and significant briefings from the agencies concerned. In this connection Mr. Clifford asked whether there was any limitation at all on the Board's right to know about these matters. Dr. Killian replied that there were no limitations and that this is well established.

Mr. Coyne informed the Board at this point about the telephone call which had been received from the Office of the DCI the preceding day, Mr. Kirkpatrick of CIA had conveyed the DCI's wish that the scheduled CIA briefing of the Board today on certain clandestine operations be conducted in the absence of Mr. Cottrell, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, who Mr. McCone understood was to join the Board meeting at the same time the CIA briefing was to be given. The basis for the DCI's request was the fact that certain aspects of the CIA briefing to be given on clandestine operations with respect to Cuba involve covert action operations which Mr. Cottrell is not privy to. Mr. Coyne noted that the Board's agenda had been revised to accommodate the DCI's request, although Mr. Coyne found the request to be somewhat surprising in view of the responsibilities which have been assigned to Mr. Cottrell by the White House for coordination for all matters relating to Cuba.

Mr. Gray observed that if at today's meeting the Board in fact received a full story concerning clandestine and covert actions being planned and executed under CIA auspices, this would certainly constitute a milestone in the Board's efforts along this line. Dr. Land thought the Board should take the position that unless the CIA briefing presents a full story, the briefers should be asked to continue until the Board has received a full picture. Mr. Clifford thought that the better procedure to follow would be for the Board to listen to the CIA briefing and to ask any questions which it may have during the course of the briefing, and if the Board still has unanswered questions at the conclusion of the briefing they should be compiled by the Board staff for discussion at the next meeting of the Board and pursued further with the DCI. The Board agreed with Mr. Clifford's suggestion. Mr. Murphy added that the Board should endeavor to ascertain the context of any over-all plan which the government has with respect to Cuba and under which the intelligence community is operating. Dr. Killian emphasized the desirability that on the occasion of the CIA briefing today, pertinent questions regarding Cuba should be pressed with the briefers. Mr. Clifford observed that if the Board does not receive sufficient information from CIA in these matters, it might be well to consider the alternative of the Board preparing itself for the conduct of a searching examination of appropriate CIA representatives who are knowledgeable in this area, and have a stenographic record prepared of the proceedings.

✓

At 10:15 a.m., the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone, joined the Board meeting, accompanied by Messrs. Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald and Clark. Referring to events of the past twenty-four hours, the DCI expressed satisfaction that the U.S./Cuba prisoner exchange had included the return to the U.S. of the 3 senior CIA personnel who had been imprisoned in Cuba early in the Castro regime when they were caught in the act of bugging the Chinese Communist mission in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that the exchange which the attorney Donovan had worked out with Castro called for the release of 22 Americans in exchange for the return to Cuba of Molina (Castro body-guard) who was in the custody of New York authorities following the slaying of an Argentine girl in a night club, and the 3 Cubans who were under Federal indictment in New York on sabotage charges. The DCI said that he personally negotiated with Governor Rockefeller the release of Molina, and that the Attorney General handled the release of the other three Cubans.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy, the DCI stated that the terms of the exchange agreement were not of a nature to affect the conduct of present or future U.S. intelligence and covert action operations with respect to Cuba. Mr. McCone added that Castro did not seek any conditions other than the release of the 4 Cubans being held in the U.S. Mr. McCone thought it interesting that Castro had pressed for no conditions involving U.S. policy toward Cuba, and had sought no assurances regarding U.S. aerial surveillance, espionage operations, military policy, or anything else. Vallejo, Castro's assistant, told attorney Donovan to tell President Kennedy and Mr. McCone that Castro realizes that he must gain a rapprochment with the U.S., and Mr. McCone expressed the belief that in agreeing to the recent prisoner exchange Castro is seeking to retain a thread of contact with the U.S. as insurance in the event of a double-cross by the USSR. The DCI had no idea why he had been included in the message to be delivered by Donovan.

Mr. McCone pointed out that the attorney Donovan has become our only direct channel to Castro. However, Donovan has announced that his mission is ended and that with the completion of the recent exchange he had gone into Cuba for the last time (for one thing Donovan had to make the announcement to head off continued appeals by Cuban exiles in the U.S. to help obtain the release of numerous relatives still remaining in Cuban prisons). Therefore, Mr. McCone noted, if any future use is to be made of Donovan's entree to Castro, it would undoubtedly have to be on some basis other than prisoner releases.

Messrs. Kirkpatrick and Fitzgerald noted that apparently the Castro regime had not succeeded in connecting the 3 CIA personnel to employment with CIA.

Next, Mr. McCone turned to several matters which he wished to mention to the Board.

In the coordination field, the DCI informed the Board that the new NRO agreement is now in effect and working well. Plans and arrangements for the DIA's use of the NPIC are progressing. In the

Mr. Desmond Fitzgerald of CIA (DD/P Area) exhibited a chart reflecting the following information concerning clandestine agents in Cuba as of April 1, 1963, and the intelligence reports which they had produced during the 12-month period ending April 1, 1963:

82 resident agents - 665 reports.

2 illegal teams - 77 reports.

29 legal travelers - 67 reports.

46 shipboard agents - 39 reports.

26 penetrations of Cuban installations - 192 reports.

In answer to questions raised by Board members, Mr. Fitzgerald elaborated upon the statistics displayed on the chart which he exhibited to the Board.

The "resident agents" are not third-country diplomats but are Cubans. As of March 1, 1962, there were 90 such agents in Cuba. Thereafter, 480 individuals were considered for possible use in this category. Of the number which were recruited, 34 resident agents in Cuba have been lost (one is known to have been executed, 27 are unaccounted for, 4 escaped after arrest). As of April 1, 1963 the total number of resident agents in Cuba is 82 as indicated previously by Mr. Fitzgerald.

With reference to the "illegal teams" of which there are 2 in Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the teams consist of 2 men each, but that as many as 100 sub-agents have been developed by the teams. The recruitment and operation of the 2 teams are in the "black"; the teams were introduced by sea and their mission is primarily intelligence gathering. A principal intelligence mission is the obtaining of information concerning military aspects of the Soviet presence in Cuba. Also, Mr. Fitzgerald stated, the illegal teams are designed to create resistance networks among the Cuban population if possible, but the policy is not to pursue large-scale, dangerous activity of this sort. For the most part reports are received from members of the illegal teams in the form of secret writing messages dispatched in the regular mail by way of Mexico, and Mr. Fitzgerald stated in this connection that efforts are being made to equip the team members with additional radios (they have 4 agent-type radios now); and it is hoped that the team members will soon be equipped with radio units which are small in size (the transmitter and receiver together about the size of 2 cigarette cartons) and capable of medium speed transmissions for spans of only 60 seconds. Mr. Fitzgerald further informed the Board that there were 4 illegal agents in Cuba as of March 1, 1962, and in the 12-month period ending April 1, 1963, 45 agents were infiltrated, 32 were ex-filtrated, and 13 were lost, and as of April 1, 1963 there are in Cuba 4 agents comprising the 2 illegal agent teams.

With reference to the shipboard agents, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these agents are on board Cuban ships, of which there are only 19 operating outside of Cuban waters. With regard to penetrations of Cuban installations previously referred to, Mr. Fitzgerald stated that these involve Cuban diplomats and Cuban diplomatic installations abroad. He added that some 14 Cuban diplomats are providing information and 2 of these have furnished reports which are considered to be good. In answer to Mr. Murphy's question, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the only penetration of Castro's immediate entourage has been through Castro's younger sister. He added that the penetrations referred to included 12 of an audio surveillance nature. Referring again to the 665 intelligence reports which have been obtained from resident agents in Cuba, Mr. Fitzgerald said that these reports are heavily devoted to military subjects and a few of them have proved really worth while, as for example, during the October crisis when these reports served to pin-point MRBM locations. On the economic side, it is reported that curtailed exports of special lubricating oil components gives the Cubans a serious problem in the operation of industrial machinery.

At this point, Mr. Cottrell of the Department of State joined the Board meeting.

In answer to a question by Mr. Murphy, Mr. Fitzgerald said that the intelligence teams mostly confined their activities to intelligence gathering rather than covert action, although the teams do have the mission of creating "low-key" resistance and "subtle sabotage". Mr. Fitzgerald said that although CIA has no policy guidance for positive covert action programs of a specific sabotage nature, there is policy guidance for leaflet drops and radio propaganda, and an example of "subtle sabotage" would be the shorting out of a high tension power line by throwing a copper wire over it.

Mr. Fitzgerald stated that the Special Group approved the monthly plans of the CIA for infiltrations of illegal agents into Cuba, and thereafter the success of infiltrations is determined by such matters as weather conditions and the requirement for carrying out infiltrations in the dark of the moon. Mr. Coyne asked whether CIA was kept informed about U. S. Army infiltrations into Cuba, and Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while CIA received notice of such activity, none had occurred to his knowledge for the past 6 months.

Mr. Murphy asked whether there is available any evidence of organized resistance against the Castro regime within Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that while there is scattered resistance it is not organized. He recalled that in 1962 resistance organizations composed of students and other groups had been infiltrated by the Castro Security Service and after a time Castro rolled up the resistance groups and smashed them completely. The only resistance which is now active in Cuba is in the form of small bands.

Referring back to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier comment that the CIA has no policy guidance with respect to the conduct of covert action programs in Cuba, Mr. Coyne inquired as to the function of Mr. Cottrell's Interdepartmental Coordinating Committee with respect to Cuba. In response to this question, Mr. Cottrell described his coordinating function, beginning with the point that the President had requested last January that coordination be supplied to the activities of the 6 or 7 U. S. agencies which were dealing with the 4 or 5 Cuban exile groups. The President directed that there be established a focal point for coordination of policy recommendations and execution of approved policies assigned for implementation by various U. S. agencies following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC with respect to Cuba. Having been given this coordinating responsibility, Mr. Cottrell named Secretary of the Army Vance and Mr. Helms of CIA to serve on the committee, with provision for drawing upon representatives of other agencies as might be required from time to time. Mr. Cottrell said that his committee is charged with coordinating policy with respect to Cuba, the objectives being to prevent Cuba from becoming a base of Soviet aggression, to prevent the overt export of military equipment from Cuba to other Latin American countries for communist purposes, to prevent the export of subversive activities to other Latin American countries from Cuba and to seek the removal of the Soviet presence in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell went on to say that when CIA proposes covert actions with respect to Cuba, the Cottrell Committee considers the proposals and comments on them to the Special Group, and if a policy issue is involved in a given proposal the matter is referred to the Executive Committee of the NSC for decision.

Mr. Murphy asked Mr. Cottrell if he would state for the Board Mr. Cottrell's concept of what U. S. policy toward Cuba is today, for instance whether the policy is of a defensive or an offensive character. Mr. Cottrell answered by saying that in his opinion that the U. S. policy toward Cuba is not defensive, and as an indication of this he referred to the visit which he and Deputy Attorney General Katzenbach made to Nicaraugua where a conference was held with officials of Central American countries concerning visa and other travel controls which might be improved or instituted for the purpose of restricting the travel of Castro's representatives in Latin American countries. In further describing the U. S. policy, Mr. Cottrell said that in his own view our government does not intend to invade Cuba except as a last resort, and our policy holds that the liberation of Cuba is the responsibility of the Cuban people themselves. However, Mr. Cottrell added, it is felt by a number of people that the time has long past when we might expect a successful popular uprising in Cuba against the Castro regime.

Mr. Gray asked whether the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Cuba would alter the point of view just mentioned by Mr. Cottrell to the effect that we cannot hope for a successful popular uprising in Cuba. Mr. Cottrell preferred that this question be answered by Mr. Fitzgerald who expressed the opinion that withdrawal of Soviet forces would not significantly affect the situation because of the strong internal security measures which are maintained by the Castro regime in Cuba.

Referring again to Mr. Fitzgerald's earlier statement that CIA is lacking in policy guidance on covert actions, Mr. Coyne inquired as to whether requests for such guidance had been made. Mr. Fitzgerald replied that a decision in this area is being sought this week. Mr. Cottrell observed that previously the government's prime objective had been to obtain the release of the 22 Americans imprisoned in Cuba, and now that this has been accomplished, Mr. Cottrell predicted that future operations would include low-level reconnaissance missions, increased sabotage operations, and intensified efforts to obtain OAS action. He added that inasmuch as the "noise level" is down it is hoped that aggressive programs may now be pursued. Mr. Cottrell also said that he believes the time has come to begin creating tensions in the Cuban area, and he noted that critics of the Administration have been charging that our government has fallen into a co-existence policy with respect to Cuba. In Mr. Cottrell's opinion Castro must feel that his recent release of the American prisoners will aid rapprochment efforts with respect to the U. S., and Castro probably hopes that he may now quietly go on building up his communist strength.

Next Mr. Bruce Clark of CIA (the DD/I Area) briefed the Board with respect to certain aspects of intelligence coverage of Cuba.

Mr. Clark stated that during the period February 15 to April 20, 1963 the Soviets have removed approximately 4,700 personnel from Cuba. CIA believes that most of the 4,700 Soviet personnel were military people because of their age and appearance and because there is little likelihood that the Soviets would be removing economic personnel from Cuba. CIA estimates that only 500 or 600 Soviets have arrived during this period, and CIA reasons that the 4,700 Soviets who have been withdrawn are military personnel who have completed tours of duty, including some entire logistic units. CIA estimates that this leaves in Cuba Soviet personnel totaling on the order of "12,000 plus". Mr. Clark said that the validity of the latter figure depends on the validity of the original estimated total of 17,500 Soviet personnel in Cuba, a figure which was arrived at on a strict table of organization basis, taking into account the estimated number of persons logically required to operate the equipment which has been observed in Cuba. In the opinion of Mr. Clark, the estimated figure of 4,700 Soviet withdrawals is far sounder than the previous estimate of 17,500 total personnel in Cuba.

Dr. Killian asked whether there is evidence of re-introduction of Soviet military personnel into Cuba and their deployment and concealment by means of camouflage. Mr. Clark said that in view of the redundancy of the high altitude coverage and the fact that nothing has been seen in photography since November 1962, evidence is to the contrary.

In answer to Mr. Murphy's question as to what Soviet personnel are presently doing in Cuba, Mr. Clark estimated that 7,500 are connected with SAM installations and activity, another 7,500 are in the category of military engineers, and 2,000 are engaged in naval operations. Mr. Clark indicated that Soviet personnel are scattered out over the island of Cuba and the greatest concentrations are the 2,500 to 4,000 Soviet personnel in the 4 major Soviet armored camps. In answer to Dr. Langer's question as to what the 2,500 to 4,000 personnel are doing, Mr. Clark stated that their main mission was probably the furnishing of training to Cuban military forces. Mr. Clark said that COMINT obtained this week confirms reports that Cuban pilots are receiving training in MIG-21's.

Noting that Mr. Fitzgerald had stated that CIA had 4 agents in Cuba in 1962 and now has 4 agents in Cuba in 1963, Mr. Clifford wondered whether efforts are being made through other Latin American countries to infiltrate clandestine agents in Cuba. Mr. Fitzgerald said that efforts are being made to develop agents from other Latin American countries to operate in Cuba. He added that while Mr. Clifford's recollection was correct concerning the constant figure of "illegal" agents in Cuba as of a year ago and at the present time, nevertheless there are approximately 87 "resident" agents in Cuba who are engaged in clandestine intelligence collection.

Messrs. Cottrell, Kirkpatrick, Fitzgerald and Clark departed the Board meeting at this point.

At 12:00 noon, the Board meeting was joined by General Carroll, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and by General Quinn and Colonel Gillis, members of General Carroll's staff.

General Carroll recalled that at a Board meeting last year he had discussed the status of the organization of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the responsibilities which had been assigned to DIA or were being considered for assignment to DIA. General Carroll said that at this time he would like to point out the present status of organization of the DIA and the responsibilities which have been recently assigned to it.

General Carroll pointed out that DIA has the responsibility for handling military intelligence requirements for the Department of Defense as a central figure for NSA was given as 20,000 in comparison with the UK total of 6,600 personnel engaged in this type of activity.

With respect to SIGINT collection on Cuba, General Blake informed the Board that in March 1961 there were 10 NSA intercept positions and 5 processing staff personnel working on Cuba, which was increased by February 1963 to 100 positions and 1,660 people. Mr. Clifford inquired as to whether any SIGINT which was obtained on Cuba entered into U. S. policy decisions during the October 1962 Cuba crisis. General Blake said that the policy makers were supplied with SIGINT on Soviet shipping to Cuba as early as the spring and early summer of 1962. Dr. Tordella added that also in the early summer of 1962 NSA was able to report on the SIGINT buildup of the Soviets in Cuba, and was able to provide information on defense communications networks as well as the plain text of communications sent by the Soviet Ambassador to his superiors in Moscow.

Mr. Murphy inquired as to whether NSA now has an ability to penetrate Soviet communications in to Cuba. Dr. Tordella stated that in spite of the short distance which separates Cuba from the U. S. the security precautions followed by the Soviets would not permit a hit-and-run commando type effort to pre-empt the communications equipment involved. General Blake had no suggestions to offer in response to Mr. Coyne's inquiry as to whether the NSA would like to extend its operations with respect to Cuba beyond those which are now programmed. General Blake did refer to efforts which are being made, through direction finding methods, to pin-point the location of the Soviet communications equipment in question, hopefully within the range of 1 mile. General Blake pointed out that the Russian SCRAMBLER system which is employed on 2 links running from Moscow to Havana, and which operates at the rate of 66 words a minute, may be approaching a solution on the part of NSA -- meanwhile, some traffic analysis is being obtained from it.

Dr. Tordella mentioned that NSA is getting good results from its attack on SILVER, the Soviet government communications channel within Russia which handles approximately 40,000 messages a quarter. The exploitation of this break-through will be increased when NSA obtains 15 million dollars in additional equipment during the remainder of this year and next. Dr. Tordella said that NSA is on the verge of solving the Soviet COPPER system which is used by the Soviet Navy and feeds into the SILVER network. It is expected that NSA will solve the COPPER machine within a year.

Dr. Tordella said that the Soviet ALUMINUM SCRAMBLER system is approaching a 50% probable solution by NSA. This system has the greatest number of Soviet users, including those in Cuba and is of greatest interest to NSA. Dr. Tordella said that the Russian ALBATROSS system, utilizing a manual machine and which is also in use in Cuba, has been the subject of NSA attack since 1945 and during the last 7 months has shown promise of possible solution. He added that the Russian diplomatic cipher system involves the use of hand systems (one time pads) which were inaugurated in 1948, and which if properly used are purely random systems, and NSA has no hope whatsoever of reading this traffic.

Mr. Murphy asked whether the Russians are exploiting U. S. diplomatic traffic. Dr. Tordella said that he became confident that the Soviets were exploiting our diplomatic traffic in Moscow on the basis of compromising radiations emanating from the printer unit associated with U. S. encryption machines. Accordingly, Dr. Tordella succeeded in getting a ruling to prevent the use of such U. S. machines behind the Iron Curtain until this problem is resolved.

Dr. Killian asked for General Blake's estimate of the FOCUS project at Princeton University. General Blake said that he supports this effort because it brings outside scientific thinking into a security-closed effort, and this can

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10006
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF APRIL 2 AND 3, 1964
DATE : 04/02/64
PAGES : 8
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR APRIL 2 AND 3, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF APRIL 2 AND 3, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

MINUTES
OF
BOARD
MEETING
OF
APRIL 2 and 3,
1964

206-10001-10006

Bd. Transition

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF APRIL 2 and 3, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		April 2, 1964
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 1:00	Reports on Recent Study Made by Board's Panel (Chairman Baker, Doolittle and Land) on NRO Activities, including highlights of:

a. Baker/Coyne Discussions with Mr. McCone
Dr. Baker

b. Baker/Coyne Discussions with Dr. McMillan
Dr. Baker

c. Doolittle/Baker/Coyne Discussions with General Greer, Los Angeles
General Doolittle

d. Baker/Doolittle/Coyne Discussions with Representatives of Lockheed and Itek
Dr. Baker

e. Doolittle/Coyne Discussions with Kelly Johnson and Visit to Ox Site
General Doolittle

f. Doolittle/Coyne Visits to Satellite Launching (Vandenberg) and On-Orbital Control (Synnyvale) Facilities
General Doolittle

g. Panel meeting with:

(1) Secretary McMillan, Director, NRO
(2) General Martin, Chief of Staff, NRO
(3) Mr. Eugene Keifer, Deputy Director, NRO
(4) Dr. Eugene Fubini, Assistant Secretary of Defense
(5) Messrs. Carter, Wheelon, Bross and Ledford of CIA

Mr. Coyne

h. Assessment of Degree to which NRO Agreement is Presently Being Implemented
Dr. Baker

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 2 Agenda (Continued):

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		1. Proposals for Revisions in NRO Agreement, Organization, and Operations (1) Proposals of Dr. McMillan (2) Proposals of Mr. McCone (3) Proposals of Board Panel Dr. Baker
3.	1:00 - 2:00	Lunch - White House Mess
4.	2:00 - 2:45	NRO Satellite Reconnaissance Activities as Related to the Air Force Systems Command General Bernard A. Schriever, USAF no prepared
5.	2:45 - 3:30	CIA Monitorship of the NRO Dr. Albert D. Wheelon no prepared Deputy Director for Science and Technology, CIA
6.	3:30 - 4:15	Defense Department Monitorship of the NRO Dr. Eugene G. Fubini no prepared Assistant Secretary of Defense
7.	4:15 - 4:30	Executive Session
8.	4:30 - 6:00	Discussions of the National Reconnaissance Office, Agreement and Programs Mr. John A. McCone no prepared Director of Central Intelligence

April 3, 1964

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
9.	9:00 - 9:15	Chairman's Time
10.	9:15 - 9:30	Oral Report on Recent Developments Relating to the National Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) Program Dr. Baker and Mr. Coyne
11.	9:30 - 10:30	The National Signals Intelligence Program Dr. Eugene Fubini no prepared Assistant Secretary of Defense
12.	10:30 - 11:00	Executive Session
13.	11:00 - 12:00	Discussions of the NRO Agreement, Management, and Programs Mr. Cyrus Vance no prepared Deputy Secretary of Defense

~~TOP SECRET~~

April 3 Agenda (Continued):

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
14.	12:00 - 1:00	Briefing on the World Situation [illegible] Mr. Ray Cline Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA
15.	1:00 - 2:00	Lunch - White House Mess
16.	2:00 - 2:15	Status Report on Implementation of Board's Recommendations Growing Out of the Dunlap Case Mr. Coyne [illegible]
17.	2:15 - 2:30	Status Report on Implementation of Other Recent Major Recommendations Made by the Board Mr. Ash [illegible]
18.	2:30 - End of Day	Preparation by the Board of a Report on NRO *

---

* The Chairman will outline his views as to the handling of this report (a) initially with Secretary McNamara and Mr. Bundy and (b) ultimately with the President.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 10, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Meeting of April 2-3, 1964

A regularly scheduled two-day meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board was convened by Chairman Clifford at 9:00 a.m., April 2, 1964, in the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building. Present were Board members Doolittle, Gray, Baker, Langer, Pace and Murphy; J. Patrick Coyne, Executive Secretary; and A. R. Ash. (Dr. Land was unavoidably detained at the Boston airport, and joined the Board meeting later in the day.)

Chairman Clifford opened the meeting with some general remarks, first congratulating Mr. Murphy on the excellence of his recently published and well-received book "Diplomat Among Warriors". Other Board members joined in the sentiments expressed by the Chairman.

Next Mr. Clifford expressed the Board's gratitude to the Board Panel on NRO matters for the long and difficult task involved in the Panel's extensive study of the NRO management and organization structure and attendant problems. He noted that Dr. Baker and General Doolittle had been devoting the majority of their time to the study, with inestimable assistance from Mr. Coyne. The Chairman thought that in the NRO matter the Board had probably made the most exhaustive analysis of any intelligence-related problem up to this time.

Chairman Clifford announced that in a few minutes the meeting would be joined briefly by Mr. Henry Thomas of CIA for the purpose of indoctrinating Board members concerning two new security clearance categories (DORIAN and QUILL) covering two extremely sensitive areas of intelligence activity.

Mr. Clifford recalled that when the Board met with the President on January 30, the President had sought the Board's views on a proposed reduction in the Military Services' representation on the U. S. Intelligence Board -- the Board expressing its long-held view that such reduction should be made at an appropriate time. Mr. Clifford went on to inform the Board that on February 5, 1964, Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy had issued a memorandum to the intelligence community, announcing the President's decision to reconstitute the USIB membership by designating the Director of DIA as the Defense Department

Mr. Clifford pointed out that the DCI feels that because the NRO is presently set up as a "line" organization in the Air Force, a great deal goes on that the DCI does not know about, e.g., after USIB sets out intelligence requirements for NRO to execute, the DCI does not have an opportunity to examine the effectiveness of the program. Mr. Vance agreed that the DCI should be kept fully informed, but if weather conditions, for example, require that a 5-day mission be called down on the third day, this is the kind of operational decision that should not have to involve the DCI.

Dr. Baker referred to concerns which have been expressed regarding the tendency toward a fragmentation of effort in the reconnaissance field within the Defense Department, as for example in the case of the MOL. Noting that Defense is the greatest resource for national reconnaissance, Dr. Baker asked whether consideration had been given to relating the JRC to the NRO, with a view to avoiding unnecessary duplication of peripheral reconnaissance missions, the reduction of costs, and the placing of emphasis on meeting national requirements. Mr. Vance replied that tying the JRC into the NRO suggests some command channel problems, but he thought the suggestion very worth while, and he expressed the intention to consider it further.

Dr. Langer referred to the system of monitors of the NRP in Defense and in the CIA, and he asked whether the Director of NRO in fact reports to Dr. Fubini in Defense. Mr. Vance replied that, to the contrary, the Director reports directly to Mr. Vance and to Secretary McNamara. He added that as an internal matter Dr. Fubini monitors NRO matters for the office of the Secretary of Defense and Mr. Vance would continue this internal Defense arrangement but would clearly spell out the role of the PFIAB, et al, to accomplish external monitoring.

Secretary Vance completed his discussion with Board members and left the Board meeting at 11:50 a.m.

In executive session, Board members further discussed the question of appropriate assignment to CIA of a role in the NRP -- with the object of preserving the valuable research and development potential of the CIA. Mr. Coyne noted that the Board Panel had heard testimony that CIA is heavily involved in reconnaissance research and development, but that this was not yet supported by the evidence thus far assembled. Mr. Coyne added that under the Vance proposal to leave aircraft projects in CIA, this would include 9 OXCART aircraft, 2 U-2's at Taiwan, 3 U-2's at Lockheed undergoing configuration for carrier operations, and aircraft engaged in the STPOLLY project. Mr. Coyne also noted that of the 694 personnel providing support for CIA's aircraft reconnaissance activities, 350 are AF personnel assigned to the CIA.

At 12:10 p.m. the Board meeting was joined by Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director for Intelligence, and Mr. Bruce Clark, of CIA. Mr. Clifford indicated to Mr. Cline the Board's interest in receiving a current intelligence briefing on aspects of the world situation.

Mr. Cline informed the Board that his job at CIA is the correlation and evaluation of intelligence relating to the national security. With reference to the state of the art in the field of intelligence analysis, Mr. Cline pointed and storable high energy propellant fuel.

As for Soviet MRBM's and IRBM's, Mr. Cline said that there are over 700 launchers, mostly in the Western USSR; deployment is almost complete; and there is evidence of some hardening (four silos have been discovered).

Mr. Cline said that it is not certain as to how much the USSR intends to invest in the development of an anti-missile missile. Satellite photography is the key. A March 1964 photo of Leningrad shows 5 distinctive bays at launch sites, but it is indicated that the USSR probably suspended construction in 1963.

In further emphasis on the importance of special search satellite photography, Mr. Cline said that a GAMBIT mission has not yet been run over a huge mystery structure recently revealed in photography of Moscow.

Mr. Cline reported that yesterday the Soviets had launched a space probe to Venus, the time of arrival estimated as July 22.

Concerning the recent release of the CIA estimate on the Soviet economy, Mr. Cline said that despite the welter of denials and counterattacks by the USSR, the CIA has indications that its estimate was correct. The first "Pravda" blast contained statistics confirming the CIA's estimate of a 3 per cent gain in the Soviet GNP. The next issue of Pravda omitted these statistics.

As for the Sino-Soviet conflict, Mr. Cline stated that this deep and bitter struggle reflects opposing national interests and policy views, and is a contest for dominance which is nearing the breaking point. The anti-Soviet vituperation coming out of Communist China is unprecedented. CIA's clandestine reporting indicates that the Chicoms are attempting to subvert Soviet leadership around the world, and to discredit Khrushchev in the USSR. Exchanges of secret Party letters indicate that a Sino-Soviet break must come. The basis of the dispute seems to be the failure of the USSR to provide the economic and military support which China needed in order to enlarge its industrial capacity. Public exchanges of insults, and intelligence from various sources, shows that the breach began in 1960 from differences of policy with regard to degree of risk of war which should be acceptable to Communism in its actions affecting the West. Also there is a lot of prejudice against China in the Soviet military. Mr. Cline does not think that Sino-Soviet differences can be resolved so long as Mao and Khrushchev are in positions of leadership.

With regard to Indian border action by the Chinese Communists, Mr. Cline thought that this move was for the purpose of getting control of a part of the route for a transcontinental railroad.

In Vietnam, Mr. Cline said, the U. S. mission has given General Khanh a breathing spell to get a grip on the political and military machine. There is a little more confidence within the South Vietnam government. The Viet Cong has not launched attacks on the larger scale expected when Khanh took over, but guerrilla activities have increased and 3 province chiefs have been killed or kidnapped in the last few weeks. In North Vietnam, recent intelligence indicates, there is civil defense activity including the digging of shelters and trenches. Last night the Interagency Task Force on Vietnam discussed the problem and concluded that things are on dead center as far as the South Vietnam war effort is concerned, and more U. S. support may be necessary before the rainy season sets in in September. The Viet Cong are getting Chicom help, mostly psychological; captured weapons indicate that 10 per cent are of Chinese origin; many of their weapons are of U. S. and French origin; and some are hand made.

Mr. Cline concluded his briefing and departed the Board meeting at 1:10 p.m. at which time the Board adjourned for lunch.

At 2:00 p.m. the Board resumed in executive session. Chairman Clifford remarked that the session with Mr. Cline of CIA had been valuable and that there would be similar briefings arranged for future Board meetings. Mr. Clifford asked that Board members let Mr. Coyne know ahead of time the subject matters which they wish to have covered in current intelligence briefings.

Next, Mr. Coyne gave the Board an oral summary of implementing actions reportedly under way in response to the Board's recommendations in the Dunlap case. It was noted that in answer to Mr. Bundy's referral of the Board's recommendations to the DCI for agencies' consideration and the preparation of a coordinated report by the DCI, the latter had failed to coordinate with other agencies with respect to 9 of the 21 recommendations. Mr. Coyne had discussed this with Mr. Bundy who agreed that the DCI should have furnished a coordinated report of agencies' views and comments, and Mr. Bundy had asked Mr. Coyne to prepare an appropriate further communication for Mr. Bundy's signature. In answer to a question by Dr. Langer, the Chairman thought it best to see whether the DCI complies with the request for a coordinated report, before suggesting that Mr. Bundy go directly to the agencies.

During the Board's discussion of action reported on its Dunlap case recommendation relating to the Soviet Union's attempt to obtain new Embassy quarters in Washington, General Doolittle expressed the hope that steps would be taken by U. S. intelligence agencies to ensure technical coverage of any new Embassy that might be constructed for the USSR.

Mr. Ash summarized for the Board recent reports received on the implementation of Recommendation 3 (CIA-State report); Recommendation 35 (DCI report); and Old Board Recommendation 3 on the status of JCS-CIA intelligence planning for wartime emergencies. With regard to the latter, the Chairman asked that there be put on the agenda of the next Board meeting the matter of the JCS-CIA suggestion that annual status reports be discontinued.

Chairman Clifford asked that Board members next proceed to discuss the type of report that the Board would make to the President concerning the NRO. The Chairman asked Dr. Baker, as head of the Board's NRO Panel, to discuss the reasons for changes in the NRO as recommended in the draft report which the Panel had placed before the Board.

Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10007
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : MINUTES OF BOARD MEETING OF AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1964
DATE : 08/06/64
PAGES : 11
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF AUGUST 6 AND 7, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : ~~RELEASED WITH DELETIONS~~ OPEN IN FULL
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10007

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Aug. 6+7

MINUTES OF

BOARD MEETING

OF

AUGUST 6 and 7, 1964

+ + + +

206-10001-10007

Aug
6+7

MINUTES OF

BOARD MEETING

OF

AUGUST 6 and 7, 1964

+ + + +

206-10001-10007

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA

August 5, 1964

All members + JPC were in Omaha except Baker and Murphy

1.	8:30 P.M.	Depart Andrews AFB via Special Mission aircraft (Constellation)
2.	11:00 P.M., CST (approx.)	Arrive Offutt AFB Remain overnight at Offutt Inn

August 6, 1964

All members except as above

No papers

Item	Time	Subject
1.	8:00 - 9:30	Meeting with General Thomas Power, CINCSAC, and SAC Command Post Status Briefing
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Intelligence Warning
3.	10:30 - 11:00	Intelligence War Planning
4.	11:00 - 12:15	Soviet Bloc Threat a. Information Deficiencies b. Coverage Deficiencies c. Impact on the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP)
5.	12:15 - 1:00	Lunch
6.	1:00 - 2:00	Continue with Item 4
7.	2:00 - 2:30	Intelligence Data Handling System (IDHS)
8.	2:30 - 3:00	SAC-NSA Special Project
9.	3:10	Depart Offutt AFB
10.	9:10 (approx.)	Arrive Andrews AFB

August 7, 1964

All members here

1.	9:00 - 9:30	Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - ~~10:15~~ 10:20	Current Intelligence Briefing on the Situations in South Vietnam, North Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Communist China, Cyprus, Congo, Cuba Mr. Ray Cline Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA with Mr. Hargraves

GAMBIT/FULCRUM

Handle Via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

Item	Time	Subject
3.	10:15 - ~~11:15~~ 11:45	The National Reconnaissance Program: a. Resume of Operations - CY 1964 b. Concepts for Advanced Satellite Reconnaissance Systems (GAMBIT 3, FULCRUM, others) c. Budget Outlook Dr. Brockway McMillan, Director, NRO with Col. John Strand
4.	~~11:15~~ - 12:00 11:45	Foreign Intelligence Budgeting and Management: a. Budget Patterns for this Fiscal Year b. Budget Outlook as to Principal Trends and Problems Over the Next Five Years Mr. ~~Kermit Gordon~~ not here Director, Bureau of the Budget ~~Mr. Elmer Staats~~ not here ~~Deputy Director~~, Bureau of the Budget Mr. Robert Amory Assistant Director, Bureau of the Budget
5.	12:00 - 12:45	Lunch - The White House Mess Jack Sharpetts Dr. Torkelly Col. Delmar Lang
[illegible] 6.	12:45 - ~~1:00~~ 2:15 1:50 - 2:35	~~Executive Session~~ Ray Cline with Mr. [illegible]
ostponed 7.	~~1:00~~ - 2:00	Audio Surveillance Collection and Countermeasures Efforts of the Intelligence Community: a. USIB conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management of the effort Mr. Tom Karamessines, CIA Mr. Robert Bannerman, CIA b. Final USIB assessment of audio penetrations of U. S. Embassy, Moscow Mr. Howard Osborn, CIA Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Department of State
8.	2:00 - 2:15	Executive Session
9.	~~2:15~~ - 3:15 2:40 - 3:30	Status Report on Developments Pertaining to the Defense Intelligence Agency Lt. General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF Director, Defense Intelligence Agency with Col. Wynn, Col. Gillis & Mr. Huffine

GAMBIT/FULCRUM

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Agenda For August 7: (Continued)

Item	Time	Subject
10.	3:15 - 4:00	Status Report on the Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations Mr. Ash not covered
11.	3:30 5:15 ~~4:00~~ - ~~5:30~~	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Mr. John A. McCone with Mr. Kirkpatrick
12.	5:30 - End of Day	Executive Session

Mr. Clifford: Mr. McCone will join the Board at 3:15 PM.

13. Added later - See p.4 of Memo to Chairman

14 Added later - See p.8 of Memo to Chairman.

This document consists of 12 pages
No. 1 of 3 Copies, Series A

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: August 6-7, 1964, Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

August 6, 1964

The first day of this scheduled 2-day meeting of the Board was devoted to an all-day visit at SAC Headquarters, Offutt AFB, Omaha, Nebraska, on August 6. In attendance were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Langer, Pace, Gray, Land, and Coyne. Board members Murphy and Baker were unable to join the meeting at SAC.

August 7, 1964

On the second day of its meeting the Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on August 7 at the Board's offices in the Executive Office Building, Washington, D. C. Present were Messrs. Clifford, Doolittle, Murphy, Langer, Pace, Baker and Gray; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash. (Board member Land joined the meeting a little later on.)

Chairman Clifford commented on the valuable experience gained by the Board in the course of its visit to SAC headquarters the previous day, during which the Board had an opportunity to examine some fundamental intelligence problems confronting the U. S. and the USAF. Mr. Clifford mentioned the usefulness of the Board getting out of the atmosphere of "theory" in Washington, in order to view intelligence activities and problems on the scene. He thought that the Board's visit to SAC might well lead to action on the part of the Board with respect to some of the matters examined and discussed at Omaha.

Mr. Clifford pointed out that events of the last few days in the Gulf of Tonkin had necessitated some last minute changes in the agenda of the Board's meeting, and that particular attention would today be devoted to intelligence aspects of the Vietnam situation.

The Chairman informed Board members that Presidential action on the Board's May 2 report and recommendations concerning the National Reconnaissance Program awaits the outcome of pending considerations and discussions between Mr. McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. McCone. Mr. Bundy, who has been following the McNamara-McCone discussions in the hope of seeing those officials reach agreement on the organization and management of NRP activities, recently asked Chairman Clifford if the Board could take part in these discussions with a view to facilitating agreement on the part of the Secretary of Defense and the DCI. Mr. Clifford, speaking for the Board, told Mr. Bundy that the Board felt that

ARGON/CORONA/FULCRUM/GAMBIT/OXCART

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

increase is expected over the next 5 - 6 years (except for new reconnaissance systems for which CIA might become responsible).

Mr. Gray asked for the DCI's views on the capability of the intelligence estimating mechanism to avoid being influenced by the wishful thinking of responsible officials, as in the case of the erroneous estimate on Cuba prior to the Soviet missile crisis in 1962. Mr. McCone said that a better example than Cuba was the estimate on Brazil which was bitterly resisted by people in Government who nevertheless later saw the accuracy of the estimate proved by developments.

Chairman Clifford observed that at SAC headquarters the day before, SAC representatives suggested that they should have representation on COMOR in USIB. The DCI said that the AF already has a representative on COMOR, and if SAC were specifically added then a similar request would be made by other commands such as NORAD and CINCEUR. Mr. Coyne observed that the representation desired by SAC was on behalf of the SAC Commander in his role on the Joint Strategic Planning Group.

In response to Mr. Murphy's query about Cuba, the DCI said that an estimated 5,000 Soviets had departed since May 1, leaving 2,000 on the island. The Cubans now have control of air defense and coastal defense but the question is whether they have unlimited control of the SAM sites.

Chairman Clifford turned to another subject, asking for any new views the DCI might have on the desirability of creating the position of "Chief U. S. Intelligence Officer" who would be divorced from direction of the CIA. Mr. McCone said he had thought a lot about it but does not believe that such an official could be effective if not linked to the CIA which by law has the responsibility for coordinating all intelligence from all sources.

Mr. Pace expressed the opinion that it is not possible for the head of CIA to render abstract opinions in the capacity of DCI. Mr. Clifford urged the DCI to help the Board explore the possibilities of new organizational approaches to this problem, now that 17 years have passed since the CIA was established under the National Security Act. Mr. McCone said that he sees the problem as having arisen because CIA has become a member agency of the intelligence community as well as being charged by law to serve as coordinator of all intelligence; and perhaps we are not managing properly the arrangement that presently exists.

Mr. McCone agreed to have a study made of the matter raised by the Chairman, as soon as possible.

Mr. McCone and Mr. Kirkpatrick departed the meeting at 5:10 p.m.

At 5:20 p.m. the Board adjourned, closing its 2-day meeting.

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

a
A. R. Ash

THE WHITE HOUSE ~~SECRET~~

WASHINGTON

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

August 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Audiosurveillance Collection and Countermeasures
Efforts of the Intelligence Community

In Executive Session Mr. Ash will brief the Board on significant developments relating to the subject which members may wish to keep in mind when USIB representatives discuss the matter with the Board.

Following Mr. Ash's briefing, Mr. Tom Karamessines, Assistant to CIA's Deputy Director for Plans, and Mr. Robert Bannerman of CIA's Deputy Directorate for Support, will brief the Board on the U. S. Intelligence Board's conclusions and recommendations on the organization and management of the audiosurveillance effort. (On June 26, 1964 following the Board's recommendations to the President, Mr. Bundy requested the Director of Central Intelligence, as Chairman of the USIB, to present coordinated proposals for the most effective possible organization, management, and coordination of the intelligence community's resources and capabilities for research and development, and the operational application, of techniques for audiosurveillance collection and audiosurveillance countermeasures. The organization and management aspects of this problem are indicated by the fact that under present arrangements: (1) research and development of audiosurveillance collection and countermeasure devices and techniques are pursued separately by State, Defense and CIA; (2) the coordination of audiosurveillance collection operations is the responsibility of the FBI in the U. S., and is the responsibility of the DCI overseas; and (3) the coordination of audiosurveillance countermeasures activities is the responsibility of an NSC Interagency committee chaired by the Department of State.)

Next Mr. Howard Osborne, Director of CIA's Office of Security, and Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of Security at the Department of State, will bring the Board up to date on the USIB's final assessment of the audio and electromagnetic penetrations of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow which were discovered in April.

(At the last meeting the Board was provided with results of USIB's preliminary assessment of damage caused by these

Not taken up at August Meeting ~~SECRET~~

penetrations. Subsequent to the last meeting the President requested the Chairman, USIB, to provide a final assessment of damage in time for consideration by the Board at its August 6-7 meeting.)

J. P. Coyne
J. P. Coyne

Addendum: Enclosed for the information of the Board is a memorandum entitled "Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow" which was submitted to the Chairman by Dr. Jerome Wiesner, following his oral presentation to the Board subsequent to his on-the-scene examination of developments at the Embassy in Moscow.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

June 24, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Clark M. Clifford
Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

SUBJECT: Bugging of the U. S. Embassy, Moscow

During my recent trip to Moscow I visited the American Embassy and had a number of conversations with Mr. Musser who has the responsibility for assuring that the building is secure against listening devices. I also examined a number of key offices in the Embassy building, including several in which microphones had been found, and examined the special secure rooms that have recently been installed. I formed the following judgments regarding the present situation.

1. There is no convincing basis for concluding that additional listening systems do not exist in the building.

2. The soundproof rooms and the special room containing the teletype equipment appear to be secure, though the former are not electrically shielded. The lack of shielding is probably not serious because the rooms are in the interior of the building and under guard at all times so that the use of microphones or of electromagnetic listening devices in them would be extremely difficult.

3. The physical security of the building seemed a bit less than adequate. For example, it was possible for us to go in and out of the room housing the telephone switchboard with no one but the telephone operator--who I believe was a Russian girl--seeing us. I understand that at night no one is in the room. Physical security is complicated somewhat by the fact that the building is also the residence for Embassy employees and by the fact that the local guard staff is very small; none the less this is a problem that should receive attention.

4. Mr. Musser is extremely competent but the task at the Embassy is more than any one person could handle at this time.

I would recommend the following measures:

1. Provide Musser with some assistance. He has had some help from the American forces in Germany from time to

~~SECRET~~

time but when I was there he was working by himself. Because of the housing shortage the Embassy is reluctant to add to the staff. The fact is, as I have already said, in spite of Musser's outstanding ability he cannot do the job that now must be done without substantial continuing assistance. He also needs additional equipment.

2. A very complete physical examination must be made of any room that is to be used for confidential conversations. This should include x-ray or neutron examination of the walls, floors and ceilings if possible. Possibly other techniques can be found which would also help locate hidden equipment.

3. If x-ray examination is not feasible, physical examination of the outside of the building should be considered.

4. In critical areas new wall surfaces should be provided. Expert advice is needed to determine whether plastering or paneling would provide the best protection.

5. Dr. Land's proposal for inducing masking sounds into the walls should be pursued. It should be possible to introduce such sounds directly into the walls without creating objectionable sound levels in the rooms. This should be investigated before a decision is made regarding new wall covering.

6. Screening should be provided against electromagnetic-reflection listening devices.

7. The possibility of providing continuous monitors for signals from such devices should be investigated.

8. More effort should be made to understand the purpose of the microwave signal directed at the Embassy, or failing in this, to stop it. It is hard to understand why we have been so unconcerned about it.

9. An effort should be made to insure that the telephone system cannot be used as a distribution system for listening devices.

10. I understand that head sets and microphones exist that permit secure conversations. Though they may be awkward they should be used for confidential discussions held outside of the secure rooms until greater confidence can be established in the security of the building.

11. I believe that there is a desperate need for a

professional group in the government to develop protective techniques for our embassies. Such a group should work with or at least have full access to a group whose task is to develop sophisticated penetration devices so that its work is effectively directed against all of the real threats that can be imagined.

JBWiesner

Dr. Jerome B. Wiesner

Date : 09/24/98
Page : 1

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10008
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27-28, 1962
DATE : 12/27/62
PAGES : 9
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1962 MEETING

SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 27 AND 28, 1962 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10008

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

Dec,
27·28
1962

206-10001-10008

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 27 - 28, 1962

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		December 27th
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
2.	9:30 - 10:00	Review of Board's Draft Interim Report to the President
3.	10:00 - 12:45	Review of Draft Report on Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup (Received from DCI on December 26, 1962)
4.	12:45	Depart for Lunch
5.	1:00 - 2:30	Lunch - The Hay-Adams Hotel (Guests of Dr. Langer)
6.	2:30 - 3:30	Review of the World Situation ~~Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy Director/Intelligence, CIA~~ [illegible] (LANIER)
7.	3:30 - End of Day	Resume Review of Report on Cuban Arms Buildup
8.	7:30 p.m.	Dinner at Residence of Mr. John McCone (3025 Whitehaven Street, Northwest, D. C.) (attended by all Bd. Members except Land, Baker, [illegible])
		December 28th
9.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time
10.	9:30 - 1:00	Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup with the Following Key Intelligence Community Officials: a. 9:30-10:30 ✓ Mr. John McCone b. 10:30-11:00 ✓ Lt. General M. Carter, Deputy Director, CIA c. 11:15 12:00 ~~11:00-11:30~~ ✓ Lt. General G. Blake, Director, NSA d. 12:00 12:35 ~~11:30-12:00~~ ✓ Mr. Thomas Hughes, Deputy Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of Stat e. 12:35-1:30 ~~12:00-1:00~~ ✓ Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director, DIA

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

(December 28th - Continued)

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	1:00 - 2:30 2:30 — (3:45)	Lunch - Room 21, Executive Office Building McGeorge Bundy + Tom Parrott
12.	2:30 - 3:30	~~Status of Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations~~ ~~Mr. Russell Ash~~
13.	3:30 - END	Resume Discussion of Report on the Cuban Arms Buildup and Complete Preparation of Report to the President.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

This document contains information relating to IDEALIST, CORONA OXCART

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of December 27 - 28, 1962

The Board convened at 9:00 a.m. on December 27.* Those present were Dr. Killian, Chairman, Board members Langer, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Pace and Clifford and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian suggested that Board members read the draft report which had been furnished to the Board on the preceding day by Mr. McCone, the Director of Central Intelligence, setting forth the results of the all-source review which the Board had requested concerning U. S. intelligence community activities with respect to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba during the 6-months preceding October 22, 1962. The Chairman asked that Board members make note of any comments and questions they might wish to raise for discussion during this two-day meeting. Dr. Killian said that he was not sure the DCI's report had the approval of the intelligence community at this point, for he understood that Mr. McCone was at that moment reviewing the draft report in Seattle, and it was possible that some of the conclusions and factual details might not have yet received final approval by the agencies which contributed to the preparation of the report (CIA, DIA, State and NSA). Accordingly, the Chairman noted the importance of the discussions which the Board would have on the following day with heads of the intelligence agencies. The Chairman also thought that the Board should aim for the preparation of a Board report to the President at the close of this 2-day meeting.

Dr. Killian said that he had very recently talked to Mr. McGeorge Bundy who hopes that the Board will take the time it needs to produce a solid report on the handling given by U. S. intelligence agencies to the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. Mr. Bundy assured that the President will understand that the Board is going into the subject deeply and objectively. About 10 days ago, the Chairman related, he had received a telephone call from Mr. Bundy who said that he had seen an early draft of the DCI's report (from a confidential source) and was concerned because the report did not get to the basic issues, and Mr. Bundy expressed an intention to talk to Mr. McCone about this. Dr. Killian stated that he had an appointment to see Mr. Bundy later in the morning at which time he would ask Mr. Bundy to meet with the Board during the course of this meeting.

---

* Board members Baker and Land were unable to attend.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Handle Via COMINT-TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels Only

Handle via BYEMAN Control System

24-day stay in Cuba, and our Government is equally in the dark about Soviet and Cuban plans for further activities involving other countries in this Hemisphere. Also we are lacking intelligence on Cuba/Communist China discussions. Mr. Murphy reiterated his concern that our lack of information on such matters as these indicates the absence of an adequate intelligence capability to keep our Government informed about developments in Cuba at the present time and in the future.

Dr. Killian at this point reported to the Board on the conversation which he had just had with Mr. Bundy. According to Mr. Bundy, the President is fully aware that the Board is conducting its review of the Cuba situation. The President wants an objective report from a group of citizens who have no axe to grind, and he is placing great store on this effort of the Board. The Chairman said that Mr. Bundy was obviously concerned about the prospect that the Congress will make inquiries into the Cuba matter. However, Mr. Bundy feels there is a bare possibility that Congressional investigators will be more hesitant to raise hypothetical questions if they learn of the existence of a study having been made by a group such as the Board. It is Mr. Bundy's hope that the Board will carefully consider the preparation of a sanitized version of the report, but if the Board and the President feel that this cannot be done then the Board should try to prepare a report which could be used in executive session of a Committee of the Congress.

Dr. Killian went on to report other matters which had been covered in his discussion with Mr. Bundy. He said that Mr. Bundy had expressed concern over the failure of the DCI to accept the suggestion that there be submitted a more adequate report than the one which the DCI forwarded to the Board on December 26. Mr. Bundy noted in this connection that the DCI's report assigns to policy makers prime responsibility for any failures with respect to intelligence handling.

On the question of availability of Special Group records for purposes of the Board's study, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that certainly the Board should examine such records and that they could be obtained from Mr. Parrott (Mr. Bundy commented that✓ the Board is the only group which can have this kind of access).

Handle Via COMINT-TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels O...

Handle via DYEMAN Control System

As to the Board's study, Mr. Bundy told Dr. Killian that the Board should include in its review discussions with the Secretaries of State and Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff -- Mr. Bundy indicating that the Secretary of Defense has particular reservations about the DCI's report.

Another matter mentioned by Mr. Bundy was his belief that the morale of the intelligence community as a whole stands to suffer in the absence of a carefully done review and report which is being expected from the Board.

With regard to the interim report which the Board has under way, Mr. Bundy informed the Chairman that the report could be delivered to him or it could be presented to the President directly, and Mr. Bundy thought it important that the Board present it to the President in person. One other matter discussed was the Board's concern about any intelligence let-down in the wake of the Cuba crisis, it being Mr. Bundy's belief that no such let-down is in prospect if present directives and discussions on the subject have any effect in Government.

(At the conclusion of the Chairman's account of his discussion with Mr. Bundy, the Board recessed for lunch.)

At 2:30 p.m., the Board was briefed on the world situation by Mr. Thomas Lawlor, senior intelligence officer in CIA's Office of Current Intelligence (Mr. Ray Cline, Deputy DCI/Intelligence was on vacation leave and not available to be present at this Board meeting). Mr. Lawlor explained that his own responsibilities included the handling of current intelligence matters, the selection and write-up of current intelligence items (e.g., in the CIB and in memoranda for the White House), and the preparation of internal intelligence notes for use at the CIA working level. Mr. Lawlor pointed out that his duties were in the areas of analysis and production, not the collection, of intelligence. His briefing of the Board included the following subject matters:

USSR/Chicom relations: Recriminations between the USSR and Communist China are the greatest in the history of their dispute, and an open break in party relations is most likely near.

USSR/Cuba: The USSR is presently reappraising its foreign policy positions in the light of the Cuba crisis aftermath.

USSR/Berlin: The USSR is at a diplomatic standstill in Berlin, and this is traceable to the USSR/Chicom rift.

The Chairman asked the DCI whether the MONGOOSE activity presented any particular intelligence problem in the Cuba situation. Mr. McCone said that it had not. He said that in the MONGOOSE activity the Special Group and the Attorney General had given a great deal of consideration to the need for intelligence collection with respect to Cuba, but the intelligence needed was primarily for covert action rather than other purposes. Nevertheless, the MONGOOSE activity contributed to the over-all intelligence collection effort on Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that there was a hiatus in the collection of intelligence on Cuba after the Bay of Pigs invasion, and when he took office in November 1961 Mr. McCone was surprised to learn that no interrogation of Cuban refugees was taking place. Thereafter, following discussions with the President and the Attorney General they got the refugee interrogations under way.

Mr. Murphy wondered why there had been a let-down in intelligence gathering after the Bay of Pigs incident. Mr. McCone said that this took place before his time, but he assumed that the reasons had to do with discouragement and other psychological factors. In response to Dr. Killian's question as to whether another intelligence let-down was in store in the wake of the Cuba crisis, Mr. McCone said that there was in fact a great danger of such a development following what some officials consider was an "intelligence victory" for the United States. Mr. McCone, noting that the Soviet SA-2's remain in Cuba, said he had brought this up forcefully a week ago at an NSC Executive Committee meeting, and the President had agreed to get word to the USSR that any interference with our aerial reconnaissance of Cuba would be considered as being most grave -- and Messrs. McCloy and Stevenson have passed this word to Kuznetsov. Mr. McCone added that while low-level reconnaissance flights have been suspended, should any ominous development occur it will be necessary to obtain Presidential approval of the resumption of low-level flights.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether there were any prohibitions on the conduct of intelligence operations with regard to Cuba. Mr. McCone said yes; it is desired to follow a more aggressive pattern of agent infiltration into Cuba. He would like to see a 3 or 4 month effort directed toward the obtaining of straight intelligence on Cuba (in lieu of political warfare, for example) to determine the trend of Soviet plans in Cuba. The DCI noted that the Soviets may quietly get out of Cuba, or they may in fact take one step back and two steps forward, and hold on to the Cuba real estate as a propaganda and insurgency base, as a means of keeping Castro under control, or in order to retain a capability for quick restoration of a Soviet offensive capability. The kind of concerted intelligence action which the DCI had in mind would include (1) penetration of the Castro government regime, (2) the placement of additional agent teams in Cuba, (3) the continuation of efforts to obtain the assistance of British, French and German representatives in Cuba, (4) the possible obtaining of useful intelligence from the attorney, Donovan, who is negotiating prisoner releases, and (5) possibly the obtaining of useful information from the captain of the "African Pilot" who had a 3-hour talk with Castro and who yesterday asked to see a U. S. intelligence officer.

Mr. Pace asked whether Mr. McCone would favor the use of Guantanamo Naval Base as a base for launching intelligence and related operations against Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he would not be in favor of this because if we were caught using Guantanamo for intelligence operations Castro would obtain UN and other support for Cuba's demands for U. S. evacuation of the Naval Base.

Answering General Doolittle's question, the DCI stated that U-2 overflights of Cuba were going at the rate of two a day, resulting in coverage of all targets once a week and in coverage of some important targets (e.g., harbors) more often. Mr. McCone said that COMOR and USIB list the targets and that he then establishes flight schedules. [redacted]

Going back to the subject of Guantanamo, Mr. Pace asked whether the DCI had made a study of the expected intelligence return that would be obtained if intelligence operations were conducted from the Base -- Mr. Pace adding that he thought such a study should be made before a final policy decision was reached. Mr. McCone said that he had not made such a study. He added that in August the "operators" in CIA had proposed to the MONGOOSE Group that Guantanamo Base be so used, but this was opposed at the policy level. Mr. McCone said that he would not be opposed to a restudy of the proposal at this time. In answer to Dr. Killian's inquiry, Mr. McCone confirmed that we are conducting SIGINT operations at Guantanamo, and Mr. Kirkpatrick noted that NSA had only recently added two more positions there.

Mr. Murphy asked the DCI to state the meaning of "MONGOOSE B PLUS". Mr. McCone explained that in the MONGOOSE Group it was originally conceived that Phase I would be one of gathering intelligence on the possibilities for the organization and supply of resistance groups within Cuba, but this effort was "only fairly successful" because Castro has some 100,000 informers in place in Cuba and exercises internal security controls through a system of ration cards, and therefore, CIA did not get as many teams into Cuba as had been hoped. On August 10, Phase II was reached with MONGOOSE planning for (a) violent actions (b) a relatively high level of actions, or "B PLUS", and lesser actions, or "B MINUS". Mr. McCone said that he had not been prepared to endorse proposed "B PLUS" actions in the absence of plans for military backing, because of his own speculation that the U.S. would be faced with MRBMs in Cuba. In any case, the MONGOOSE effort became diverted by considerations of Soviet activities in Cuba, Mr. McCone stated.

In answer to a question from Mr. Murphy as to who chairs the MONGOOSE Group at this time, Mr. McCone said that he did not know whether Mr. Bundy or the Attorney General was now serving as Chairman.

With reference to the absence of photographic evidence of Soviet offensive missile deployment prior to October 14 photography, Mr. McCone said that if one looks at photography of Cuba obtained on September 5 it is possible to spot evidence of activity at the San Cristobal MRBM site, but this activity could have been that of agricultural workers and the evidence did not then point to missile activity. Dr. Killian noted the Board's concern that Soviet camouflage operations may be deceiving us. Mr. McCone expressed his own great concern that the Soviets are deceiving us by camouflage methods. Acknowledging that our intelligence estimates leave a certain margin for error, Mr. McCone noted that it is nevertheless impossible for us to say that we know all that is going on in the USSR with respect to missile activity. In response to Dr. Killian's comment that public discussions seem to indicate that U. S. missile capabilities are superior to those of the USSR, the DCI considered that any such conclusion is erroneous and dangerous and could lead to a complacency which might well result in curtailment of the U. S. missile program by an economy-minded Congress. Mr. McCone added that in his presentations to select Committees of the Congress he always expresses reservations concerning U. S. missile superiority.

Dr. Killian wondered whether the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Congress understand the danger of conclusions that "nothing is there because it can't be seen". Mr. McCone said that undoubtedly there is a tendency toward heavy dependence upon photographic intelligence.

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10009
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF DECEMBER 6, 1962 OF THE BOARD'S CUBAN PANEL
DATE : 12/06/62
PAGES : 10
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR DECEMBER 6, 1962 MEETING

SUMMARY OF DECEMBER 6, 1962 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

206-10001-10009

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

3/7/6

206-10001-10009

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF DECEMBER 6, 1962

OF THE BOARD'S CUBAN PANEL

Item	Time	Subject
1.	10:00 - 12:10	Cuba - Review of Data Assembled by Board Staff
2.	12:10	Depart for CIA Headquarters
3. *	12:30	Discussions with DCI's Cuban Review Committee (Consisting of Messrs. McCone and Hilsman, and Generals Carroll, Blake, and Carter) (Lunch will be served in the course of this meeting.)
4.	4:00	At approximately 4:00 P.M. - or whenever the Board Panel terminates its discussions with the DCI's Committee, the Panel will return to the Executive Office Building to continue its review of the material referred to in Item 1.
	6:00	Discussions of the full Board with Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering

---

* Dr. Killian ~~will~~ joined this meeting at about ~~1:45~~ 5:30 P.M.

Murphy
Gray
Doolittle
Baker } 10 am

Clifford - 6 PM
Pace - 6:30pm

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR MEETING OF DECEMBER 7, 1962

Item	Time	Subject
1.	9:00 - 9:30	~~Status of Implementation of Prior Board Recommendations Mr. Ash~~ Not taken up
2.	9:30 - 10:30	Oral Report by Board's Cuban Panel
3.	10:30 - 1:00	Discussions with DCI's Cuban Task Force (Messrs. McCone, Carroll, ~~Blake, Hileman and Carter~~) + Kirkpatrick + Helms
4.	1:00 - 2:00	Lunch
5.	2:00 - 2:30	Executive Session
6.	2:~~30~~ 45 - 3:~~00~~ 15	Discussion with Dr. Charyk (Capt Sullivan)
7.	3:~~00~~ 15 - 4:~~00~~ 15 35	Status Report on the Organization, Programs and Plans of NRO (Messrs. Charyk, Scoville and Carroll - ~~possibly~~ joined by the DCI) + Kirkpatrick
8.	4:00 - 5:30	Discussion of Board's Preliminary Conclusions and Recommendations on the Cuba Problem.
9.	5:30 - End	Discussion of Future Board Business

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board December 6 and 7, 1962.

The Board convened on December 6, 1962, at the call of the Chairman, Dr. Killian, for a two-day meeting at the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building.

Beginning at 10:00 a.m., Board members Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, and Baker reviewed materials and summary memoranda which had been assembled as the result of a study conducted by the Board staff of information then available concerning intelligence aspects of the Soviet military buildup in Cuba.

At 12:30 p.m. the Board Panel on Cuba (Messrs. Murphy, Gray and Doolittle), and Messrs. Coyne and Ash, proceeded to CIA Headquarters at Langley, Virginia. Purpose of the visit was to discuss with DCI and the members of the DCI's ad hoc committee that committee's interim findings which had been reached thus far in its study and preparation of a report on the actions taken by the U. S. intelligence community relating to the Soviet buildup in Cuba prior to October 14, 1962. (Details of the Board Panel's discussion with the DCI, et al., are set forth in a separate memorandum in the Board's files.)

At 6:00 p.m. Dr. Harold Brown, Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, joined the Board meeting for a discussion of some aspects of advanced intelligence collection capabilities. Those present were Messrs. Killian, Murphy, Gray, Doolittle, Baker, Clifford, and Pace, and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Dr. Killian informed Dr. Brown that the Board had in mind discussing Project OXCART with the President, and the Board anticipated that the President would have

Handle via COMINT-TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels Only

PROJECTS:
IDEALIST-ARGON-CORONA- OXCART

Handle via BYEMAN Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

to maintaining coverage of activities in Cuba.

Dr. Killian next informed the Board that he was somewhat troubled by the position of the Board with respect to the following: (1) Mr. Bundy once told Dr. Killian that inasmuch as a special Cuban operation had been laid on with the Attorney General involved, the MONGOOSE group would have particular jurisdiction with respect to Cuba (2) during the height of the Cuba crisis the Board had not been included in the designated recipients of intelligence regarding strategic missiles in Cuba, and (3) it would appear essential that the Board have an opportunity to examine the records of the Special Group.

Mr. Gray pointed to an additional matter of concern to the Board, namely, the view expressed by Dr. Charyk that different interpretations had resulted from the analysis of satellite and U-2 photography of the same areas. Dr. Killian agreed that this presents a most serious problem, because our Government could be induced to adopt an unwarranted attitude of disbelief regarding Soviet military capabilities in the same way that an attitude of disbelief was engendered with respect to the likelihood of the Soviet introduction of an offensive missile capability into Cuba.

Mr. Gray, referring again to comments made to him by Dr. Charyk, thought that Dr. Charyk had identified two additional problems which would seem to be of concern to the Board, namely (1) the near shortage of photographic film which prevailed during the week of October 15, and (2) the fact that when U. S. intelligence operations detected the presence of C-Band radar in Cuba, the U. S. was surprised by this and had no C-Band jammers available except a laboratory model in the possession of a Government contractor, despite the fact that we had discovered as early as 1961 that the Soviets possessed this radar capability. With respect to the latter point, Dr. Baker affirmed the seriousness of the problem, noting that our ELINT coverage had revealed that this radar capability was deployed in the USSR against our SAC forces but nevertheless our B-52-s still have not been equipped with a capability to jam this Soviet radar.

Mr. Clifford expressed the view that the Board has a peculiar and particular responsibility to the President in assessing intelligence aspects of the Cuba experience, particularly in the light of the earlier debacle at the Bay of Pigs at which time the President stated privately that he could not make correct decisions without correct intelligence, and that he could not endure "another Cuba". Therefore, Mr. Clifford recalled, the President had established this Board and one of the reasons for doing so was to bring professionalism into the field of U. S. foreign intelligence. Now the possibility arises that valid refugee reports on Soviet use of Cuban caves may be disregarded. Mr. Clifford also feared that the Administration may now have adopted the view that everything is all right again now that the missiles and the bombers are out of Cuba. Mr. Clifford acknowledged that no policy advisory officials like to have a check made on the advice they give to the President, and this is understandable, but on the other hand the President looks to the Board to assess the intelligence aspects of the policy advisory function. Mr. Clifford believed that CIA had made errors in not conducting sufficient overflights, and top level Presidential advisers erred in not proposing sufficient overflights of Cuba. And now that the Cuba crisis was successfully met by the President, the feeling in responsible parts of Government seems to be that things turned out all right so why bother the President. Mr. Clifford said that he of course could not say what the President thinks about the U. S. intelligence job that was done regarding Cuba, but the President did say to the recent meeting of the Business Advisory Council that the DCI had been the only one who had called the shots on what was going on in Cuba. This prompted

Mr. Clifford to observe that if the President thinks a good intelligence operation took place, this could have dangerous implications, and therefore the Board should push on with its thorough review of the subject no matter what attitudes of resistance are encountered among the Government agencies involved. Dr. Killian expressed complete agreement with these observations of Mr. Clifford.

General Doolittle questioned whether the Board was certain that the President was not informed of the views expressed by the DCI in the cables which he dispatched to CIA from France. Dr. Killian said he did not know the answer to this, but he was disturbed at the manner in which the DCI was making this case for himself. Mr. Murphy advised the Board that he had been told by the DCI that General Carter had not informed the President about the cables received from the DCI. Dr. Killian thought that this question of whether the DCI had communicated with the President should be pursued with the DCI when he joined the Board meeting today. General Doolittle added that it would be appropriate to ask whether General Carter had been instructed by the DCI to make the DCI's views known to the President. Mr. Clifford surmised that General Carter could have thought that the DCI would have returned if he considered his views urgent.

Mr. Gray was of the opinion that it was in the area of CIA's Deputy DCI/Intelligence where the DCI's messages were ignored, and therefore it would be well for the Board to talk to that Deputy.

Mr. Pace felt that the intelligence weaknesses apparent in the Cuba situation indicate the presence of broader weaknesses. He thought that in highlighting the weaknesses observed in the Cuba matter, the Board would be in a position to make recommendations for broader improvements in the foreign intelligence effort. Dr. Langer cautioned the Board to consider, however, that out of the thousands of refugee reports coming in there were bound to be reports containing false and misleading information. Mr. Pace observed that if that line of thinking were pursued to its conclusion the question would arise as to why we should have a refugee interrogation program. Mr. Pace was of the opinion, however, that the interrogation program offered an unprecedented opportunity to obtain information and CIA should have made the most of it. Mr. Pace recalled that the Board had received articulate briefings on Cuba from Mr. Cline of CIA, who also reportedly briefed Prime Minister MacMillan, the President and others, but Mr. Pace wondered on what firm intelligence basis these briefings had been conducted. Mr. Murphy noted that Mr. Coyne's study reflected that on August 14 Mr. Cline had issued an order not to publish any information on missile bases unless it had been checked out with NPIC. Dr. Killian then suggested, and Board members agreed, that an effort should be made to have a discussion with Mr. Cline during this meeting of the Board.

Secretary of Defense. (Dr. Killian expressed the view that the DCI, as coordinator of the overall U. S. intelligence effort, should certainly have the right to look at the budget of any element of the intelligence community, and Mr. McCone said he thought that he could work this out.) The DCI went on to say that the total Department of Defense Budget is $3 billion whereas the CIA budget is around $400 million and the Defense budget is up over the previous $2½ billion figure because the Secretary of Defense has added the cost of the reconnaissance program. The result is, Mr. McCone said, that the USIB is unable to look at this large budget and therefore Mr. McCone is endeavoring to discuss it with Secretary McNamara. As for the CIA budget, Mr. McCone had thought that it could be kept at last year's level through reorganization steps and cutting down on wasteful expenditures, and at the same time an effort has been made to absorb salary increases within the existing budget. The DCI said that despite hard work on the CIA budget by all CIA elements, then there had to be added on the cost of the Cuba operations, so the former budget of CIA is up to $425 million, exclusive of $146 million involved in OXCART and NRO. The Bureau of the Budget cut this down to $381 million by charging the Cuba budget to the CIA's Contingency Reserve over the opposition of the DCI who feels that the Reserve should be held intact for use in unforeseeable emergencies. Mr. McCone said he was not sure how all this would finally be resolved with the Bureau of the Budget.

Turning to another subject, Mr. McCone explained the MONGOOSE project in answer to an inquiry from Mr. Clifford. The DCI said that this project developed out of a discussion last Fall between himself, the President and the Attorney General. The objective is to create dissensions in Cuba which will lead to revolt against the Castro regime and to the unseating of Castro, leaving the Cubans to form a government of their own choosing. Some $26 million of the CIA budget is allotted to activities authorized by the MONGOOSE Committee (Composed of the Special Group, plus the Attorney General and 2 or 3 other officials). MONGOOSE plans are developed under the coordination of General Lansdale who works with State, Defense, CIA and USIA elements for this purpose. Mr. McCone said that the first phase of the project was an intelligence gathering effort. The second phase was to involve sabotage, insurgency and other actions which were tentatively agreed upon at the MONGOOSE meeting of August 10 but which then fell into limbo during the Cuban crisis until two days ago when the Executive Committee of the NSC tentatively renewed consideration of the project. Mr. McCone said that he personally does not favor sabotage or guerilla activity for a few months until the dust settles. The DCI said he was disturbed over the possibility of a new confrontation by the Soviets who could take the stand that there had been compliance with U. S. demands for removal of offensive weapons and therefore any continuance of U. S. aerial surveillance of Cuba will be countered by shoot-downs of our surveillance aircraft by SA-2's. Dr. Langer suggested that the SA-2 defenses might be for the purpose of meeting an anticipated invasion of Cuba by the U. S., but Mr. McCone thought not, pointing out that the SA-2's would be easy to knock out if an invasion should take place.

Turning to the NRO, Mr. McCone said that the Defense Department/CIA agreement had not worked out too well because the Director of NRO feels he should have fiscal control over Department of Defense as well as CIA resources, through a review of programs and the allocation of funds on a monthly basis. This approach, Mr. McCone stated, puts accounting and fiscal responsibility into NRO, i.e., into the Air Force, in effect. Mr. McCone said that he favors more CIA control because it is necessary for CIA moneys spent for NRO purposes have to be defended before special Congressional Committees in a special way, and since $150 million of this CIA money is tied up in NRO (OXCART) the DCI feels he will have a hard time explaining how this money got

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10010
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD MEETING OF THE BOARD NOVEMBER 9, 1962
DATE : 11/09/62
PAGES : 10
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING

SUMMARY OF NOVEMBER 9, 1962 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/06/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

MEETING OF THE BOARD

NOVEMBER 9, 1962

206-10001-10010

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETING OF NOVEMBER 9, 1962

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 9:30	The Chairman's Time - Executive Session
? 2.	9:30 - 10:15	Preliminary Review by Board Staff of Recent Cuban Developments Mr. Patrick Coyne
? 3.	10:15 - 10:30	Recent Discussions of Cuban Developments with the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Reconnaissance Office Mr. Gordon Gray
4.	10:30 - 11:00	Recent Photographic Intelligence Acquisitions Mr. Arthur Lundahl, NPIC
5.	~~11:00 - 12:00~~ 1:30 - 3: 45	Defense Intelligence Agency Activities Including DIA's Role in the Cuban Situation Lt. Gen. Joseph Carroll, USAF, Director, DIA
6.	~~12:00 - 12:30~~ ~~4:30~~ 5:15 - 5:55	State Department Views on Recent Intelligence Developments Relating to Cuba Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director, Intelligence and Research, Department of State
7.	~~12:30~~ 1:05 - 1:30	Lunch - Room No. 21, Executive Office Building
? 8.	1:30 - 1:45	Status Report on CIA's Covert Operations Mr. Robert Murphy
9.	~~1:45 - 2:15~~ ~~3:00~~ NOT TAKEN UP	~~Review of the Recent Series of Soviet Nuclear Tests~~ ~~Dr. Albert Wheelon~~ ~~Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA~~ ~~Dr. Donald Chamberlain~~ ~~Office of Scientific Intelligence, CIA~~
? 10.	2:15 - 2:30	Executive Session

~~TOP SECRET~~

DCI = 11:00
DIA = 1:30

No Board book for this meeting.

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
11.	~~2:30 - 4:00~~ 11:00 - 12:55	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence Including Review of U. S. Intelligence Activities Relating to the Cuban and Berlin Situations Mr. John McCone
12.	4:00 - 4:15 4:30 - 5:15	Discussions with the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs ~~Mr. McGeorge Bundy~~
13.	4:15 - 4:30	Board Review of U.S. Intelligence Activities in Italy, Spain and the United Kingdom Mr. Coyne
14.	4:30 - 5:00	Status Report on Implementation of Board Recommendations Mr. Ash
15.	5:00 - END	Discussion of Board Panel Assignments and Future Board Business Board Personnel Only

Due to absence from the country, Board members Langer and Pace will be unable to attend this meeting.

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

This document consists of 42 pages
No. 1 of 3 Copies, Series a

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of November 9, 1962 file

The Board convened in meeting at 9:00 a.m., on November 9, 1962, at the offices of the Board in the Executive Office Building. Dr. Baker presided as Acting Chairman in the absence of Dr. Killian. Board members Gray, Doolittle, Murphy and Clifford were present as were Mr. Coyne and the writer. (Messrs. Pace and Langer were out of the country at the time of this meeting. Illness prevented Dr. Land's attendance.)

Dr. Baker informed the Board that Messrs. Coyne and Ash had done a unique assembly of material for the Board's use in considering the intelligence aspects of the Soviet missiles buildup in Cuba. Dr. Baker expressed the view that the materials which had been assembled are far too complicated for the Board to consider in the course of only one day, and therefore the Board would look to Mr. Coyne and Mr. Gray for selective reporting to the Board concerning the highlights of the coverage which had been accomplished thus far in the Board's review of the Cuba situation.

Dr. Baker observed that the conflict involving Cuba is an intelligence conflict. The government does not know for sure the positions of anti-aircraft artillery units which are protecting the SA-2 sites in Cuba. Furthermore, intelligence is lacking on such elementary things as the support facilities which serve the SA-2 installations. Based on the intelligence which has been obtained, it appears that except for Moscow and Leningrad the island of Cuba is now equipped with the best air defense system in the world. It is possible that Cuba is now on the verge of insuring against invasion by reason of its possession of an assembly of the most dangerous armaments which have heretofore been collected in an area of that size. In the UN the United States is discussing inspection and surveillance proposals and positions which in Dr. Baker's view are a century out of date. Dr. Baker said that he does not know how much the President is aware of these things, but there is a serious proposal being discussed which would contemplate one or two inspections a month, whereas we well know that within 72 hours there can be made operational a most dangerous offensive capability.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Murphy wondered what specifically had caused the decision to be made to transfer from CIA to SAC the responsibility for reconnaissance of Cuba. Mr. Murphy thought that an understanding of the reasons for this shift of responsibility is important because the Board itself seemed to have been oblivious to developments which were of such a nature as to warrant the stepped-up coverage by SAC. Mr. Gray's comment on this was to the effect that he had noted an uncertainty in the past with regard to whether the problem of Cuba had been removed from the Board's area of responsibility. Mr. Gray recalled remarks by the Chairman at a Board meeting last summer indicating that the Cuba situation was being looked at elsewhere in Government. Therefore, Mr. Gray thought that if in fact the Board's responsibility extends to Cuba this should be made clear for the benefit of the Board. In Mr. Gray's opinion if the Board in fact had such a responsibility, then the Board should have been addressing itself to the implications of public statements such as those being made by Senator Keating and others, and particularly the statement by Senator Keating on October 10, 1962, that ballistic missile installations were being constructed in Cuba.

Acting Chairman Baker informed the Board that he had confirmed with the Chairman that the Chairman's remarks at the last summer's Board meeting were intended to convey that it was only in the NSC 5412/2 area that Cuba matters where being handled outside the purview of the Board.

Continuing, Mr. Gray said that it was a matter of personal regret to him that the public statements by Senators Keating, Humphry and others had not served to flag the situation.

Mr. Coyne said that following that line of reasoning he himself could be said to have been at fault. Mr. Coyne went on to point out in this connection that Senator Keating and others were speaking from the benefit of Executive Branch briefings which they had received, including General Carter's briefing of the Republican Policy Committee. In any case, the Senators had only information which was in the possession of the Executive Branch. Insofar as this information was based on foreign intelligence acquisitions, Mr. Coyne pointed out that all of the U.S. foreign intelligence agencies are under instruction and have an obligation to furnish the Board with all significant information derived from the foreign intelligence effort, and if such instructions and understandings were not in effect the Board would be in the position of having to dig out the intelligence information which the agencies are obligated to provide to the Board on a systematic basis. In the case of the developing Cuban situation, however, Mr. Coyne pointed out that a top level decision was made to give limited distribution of intelligence information on Cuba and the Board was excluded from those elements of the government which were designated to receive it.

HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY
Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE Channels

Handle via BYEMAN
Control System

a periodic regional intelligence bulletin on Southeast Asia, and that consideration is being given to issuing similar regional intelligence bulletins for consumers in other areas. He described this particular recommendation as being a "good suggestion."

At this point Mr. Clifford, reverting to the discussion on the Hanson Baldwin matter, asked whether a separate investigative unit is being established as recommended by the Board, in lieu of the referral of leaks for investigation by the FBI. Mr. McCone responded that this matter is still under consideration; that in his own office he is prepared to set up such a unit; that he and the President feel this action must be taken; but that there is growing concern in some quarters that the creation of such a unit might ultimately lead to the establishment of some kind of internal Gestapo.

Mr. McCone next turned to the subject of Cuba. He said that in late July there was first witnessed an increased tempo of Soviet bloc shipments to Cuba, and by August the rate of shipments had more than doubled. On August 10, 1962 there was held a meeting of Principals (the President not participating) to discuss Cuban operations which had taken place during the preceding months of 1962. Up to that time there had been an exploratory intelligence effort primarily aimed at providing a basis for deciding what covert actions could be taken against the Castro regime. The results of this intelligence effort had been reflected in reports appearing in the Central Intelligence Bulletin and in items which were set forth in the Presidential Check List. At that time, Mr. McCone said, he analyzed the developments in Cuba as indicating (1) the establishment of a sophisticated SIGINT operation to be directed against our space activities at Camp Canaveral, (2) the establishment of a comprehensive air defense system, or (3) the introduction of a MRBM capability, or possibly all three. However, no one shared Mr. McCone's feeling that the Soviet activities in Cuba were directed toward the establishment of a ballistic missile capability. On the contrary, the Department of State and the Office of National Estimates within the CIA considered that such action by the Russians would be a departure from established Soviet policy.

Mr. McCone said that throughout August a careful watch was maintained with respect to developments in Cuba, and in late August the construction of SAM sites was detected. By August 23, when Mr. McCone left the country (on his honeymoon), there had been obtained photographic evidence of the construction of seven SAM sites together with evidence of extreme security measures being taken with respect to the unloading of ships at Cuban ports. These developments, Mr. McCone related, gave rise to considerable worry on his part, and prior to his departure from the country, on August 23, he took the occasion on August 21, 22, and 23 to express his worry to the President and to the Secretary of Defense. Mr. McCone acknowledged that he had no positive evidence to support his concern, but he reasoned that the extensive air defense buildup which was underway in Cuba had as its immediate purpose the denial of the surveillance by the United States of the Soviet missile buildup in Cuba. The U-2 photography which was being obtained reflected that 26 SA-2 sites would be installed in Cuba. Mr. McCone observed that while the photography obtained at the time did not provide evidence of missile sites, a current review of that photography indicates the presence of tents and some construction equipment. Mr. McCone said that when he left the country on August 23, he instructed that a daily CIA bulletin be initiated at once with respect to Cuban developments, and he initiated issuance of this reporting after consultation with the USIB. When in September an incident was created by the U-2 which "wandered" over Soviet territory, and also when the U-2 was shot down over Communist China on September 8, these incidents caused Mr. McCone to be concerned. Nevertheless, overflights were ordered. It developed, however, that from September 17 to September 20, weather conditions would not permit the overflights of Cuba.

At about that time the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, as well as the CIA, became convinced that some risk was involved in the conduct of U-2 operations over Cuba. For that reason, Mr. McCone said, the flights which were scheduled were of a peripheral nature. Four flights were authorized and flown in late September and in early October, but because of their peripheral or semi-peripheral character they did not cover the western area of Cuba. Mr. McCone recalled that in early October there had been seen refugee reports concerning mysterious shipments being transported over Cuban roads, and there were other things of this nature reported by refugees.

As reflected in the SNIE dated September 19, 1962, Mr. McCone said that the USIB dismissed the possibility that MRBMs were being introduced into Cuba, and this view was based on the belief that such introduction would confront the USSR with so many difficulties that the action would not be undertaken. Mr. McCone said that he was in France when he received a summary of the SNIE, and he disagreed with its conclusions because he could not see why the Soviets were establishing such a comprehensive air defense system in Cuba unless this was being done to shield the island against U. S. surveillance and to protect the conduct of some clandestine operation.

became greater. But even if this flight had been conducted, in Mr. McCone's opinion there would not at that time have been obtained information of a more convincing nature than was later obtained as a result of the October 14 mission. Mr. McCone said that on September 7 he made a recommendation that more frequent flights be conducted, and it continues to be Mr. McCone's view that there should have been more intense U-2 coverage during September.

Mr. Clifford asked why and from where was there concern over a possible U-2 incident involving Cuba. Mr. McCone said that this view was held within the NSC 5412 Group and in CIA as well. Mr. McCone said that he held a different view but he was away at the time. He cited as a current example of concern attaching to the possibility of U-2 incidents the fact that today the Special Group considered a U-2 flight over the China-India border, and great concern was expressed in the Group because the mission would have to include an overflight of Burma, and the prospect of the Burma overflight creating another U-2 incident was a matter of considerable sensitivity within the Group.

Mr. Clifford observed that while this concern might well be understandable in the case of Burma, he was nevertheless unable to understand why there should be a similar concern about reaction to a U-2 incident which might arise with respect to Cuba. Mr. McCone said that such concern with respect to Cuba does not exist today and, as a matter of fact, on that very day there were being conducted ten low-level and 3 U-2 missions against Cuba.

Mr. Clifford made the comment that he feared that the Board might possibly be subjected to criticism in the light of the fact that there was no photographic reconnaissance over Cuba between September 5 and October 14, despite the DCI's own suspicions and the content of refugee reports with respect to a Soviet missile buildup in Cuba.

Mr. Murphy inquired of Mr. McCone as to whether clandestine agents are being successfully operated in Cuba. Mr. McCone answered by saying that there have been three rather ineffective teams operating in Cuba with the principal objective of organizing dissidence against the Castro regime rather than obtaining intelligence. He said that there are approximately 40 third-country agents planted in various foreign embassies in Cuba, but we obtained no hard intelligence from them regarding the military buildup.

could be reintroduced into Cuba as below-deck cargoes. Mr. Clifford thought that it would be a good idea to continue our surveillance in order to ascertain the destination of these ships and the disposition made of the missiles, and Mr. McCone said that we can probably track the ships into the Black Sea and the Baltic, but that we would not be able to cover the unloading and transshipment of missiles into Soviet ports.

Mr. Murphy wondered what had been the inspiration for the commitment not to invade Cuba. Mr. McCone supposed that this resulted from a Russian offer to do certain things in return for things which they asked for.

Mr. Clifford asked whether it is possible for the United States to develop intelligence sources in Cuba which would relieve our dependence upon photographic intelligence. Mr. McCone said that this is difficult to do primarily because Castro had instituted a police state in Cuba and, as an example of this, Mr. McCone cited the practice of the Castro regime in following a procedure whereby in effect the ration cards of the Cuban people serve as identification cards. Mr. McCone said that previously eight or nine teams of trained agents had been introduced into Cuba since April. Three of these teams remain in Cuba; the rest have been either killed or came back from their mission. Mr. McCone said that we have not been able to obtain much intelligence from these three teams because their principal activity has been to maintain their survival.

Mr. Clifford said that he found it hard to understand why the United States has not been able to develop intelligence sources within Cuba, a country situated only 90 miles away from the United States, and one with which we have enjoyed the friendliest relations for 60 years. Mr. McCone said that approximately 2000 Cubans are coming out of Cuba every week and at that rate practically all of the responsible Cubans have left the island. Mr. McCone said after the Bay of Pigs invasion an intelligence "paralysis" set in for a time. Then, in December 1961, the President and the Attorney General and Mr. McCone had discussions leading to the instigation of some operations in Cuba. Mr. McCone said that he was aghast to learn at that time there were no refugee interrogations being conducted, and so the interrogation center was established at Opalaka. He said that within CIA a 500-man task force was set up to work on the Cuba problem and disappointing results have been obtained. Mr. McCone said that he is now concerned and he has had under review the question as to whether too much dependence is being placed on refugees as sources of information, and consideration is being given as to whether it may be necessary to send U. S. citizens into Cuba as intelligence agents. He said that we are not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means. Mr. Murphy observed that this is a salient point of interest to the Board. Mr. McCone repeated his concern which he had earlier expressed that even with the Soviet missiles removed, the Castro regime will continue to be a center of insurgency for Latin America, as indicated by the fact that during the recent days of the Cuban crisis orders were issued from within Cuba for the initiation of insurgency action in other Latin American countries.

At this point Mr. McCone's visit with the Board terminated and the Board recessed for lunch.

At 1:45 p.m., General Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, joined the Board meeting. General Carroll said that in an attempt to anticipate the specific matters in which the Board might be interested, he had prepared some materials regarding the Cuban situation over the period from last summer up to October 14 and thereafter. He said that the extreme pressures which had prevailed, and the requirement for daily presentations to top level officials concerning the progress of the Cuban situation, had made it impossible for him to complete a detailed survey up to this time, but that such a survey was in process within the DIA.

General Carroll began by describing briefly the role of the DIA's CIIC which was responsible for the coordination of intelligence regarding the Cuban situation. In July 1962, the CIIC reported on the increased Soviet shipping into Cuba. In August, reports were disseminated with regard to increasing introduction of Soviet materials. On September 8, the CIIC reported that the scope of the Soviet bloc assistance to Cuba suggested motives going beyond the lending of support and encouragement to the Castro regime. On August 15, in an effort to supply guidance and requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked that the NPIC conduct a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been obtained with respect to three areas in Cuba. On August 17, photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was located in two of the three areas, although there was no evidence of deployment as yet. The next photographic mission flown on August 29 disclosed the presence of two SA-2 sites and the presence of a third site at Banes. Moreover, a study of the photographic evidence concerning the SA-2 sites,

JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM

AGENCY INFORMATION

AGENCY : PFIAB
RECORD NUMBER : 206-10001-10011
RECORDS SERIES : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD
AGENCY FILE NUMBER :

DOCUMENT INFORMATION

ORIGINATOR : PFIAB
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 25-26, 1963
DATE : 01/25/63
PAGES : 88
SUBJECTS : AGENDA FOR JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING

SUMMARY OF JANUARY 25 AND 26, 1963 MEETING

DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
RESTRICTIONS : 1B, 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : ~~08/14/98~~ 08/01/2024
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS :

2025 Release under the
President John F. Kennedy
Assassination Records Collection
Act of 1992

[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

AGENDA FOR MEETINGS OF JANUARY 25 - 26, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
		January 25th
1.	10:00 - 10:15	Executive Session *
2.	10:15 - 11:30	Consideration of Draft Report to the President on Board's Review of Cuba Situation
3.	11:30 - 12:30	Discussions with the Director of Central Intelligence
4.	12:30	Lunch
5.	2:20	Depart Executive Office Building for New State Department Building
6.	2:30 - 3:00 (Approx.)	Meeting with the Secretary of State
7.	3:00	Return to Board's Offices
8.	3:10 - 3:40	Report on Special Board Meeting with the President on January 21, 1963 Dr. Killian
9.	3:40 to End of Day	Resume Consideration of Item 2
		January 26th
10.	9:00 - 9:30	Executive Session
11.	9:30	Depart Executive Office Building for Pentagon
12.	9:45 - 10:55	Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 C 468 (Members will be met at the Mall Entrance)
13.	10:55	Depart 2 C 468
14.	11:00 - 11:30	Meeting with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 E 873
15.	11:30 - 12:00	Meeting with the Secretary of Defense Room 3 E 880
16.	12:00	Return to Washington - Lunch
17.	2:00 to End of Day	Completion of Final Report to the President on Board's Cuba Review and Discussion of Future Board Business

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

---

*Dr. Killian will be unable to join the meeting until after lunch; at his request Mr. Gray has agreed to serve as Acting Chairman.

2025 Release under the John F. Kennedy Assassination Records Collection Act of 1992

206-10001-10011 PART 1

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

REVISED AGENDA FOR MEETING OF JANUARY 26, 1963

ITEM	TIME	SUBJECT
1.	9:00 - 9:30	Executive Session
2.	10:45	Depart Executive Office Building for Pentagon
3.	11:00	Review of Results Obtained from Reconnaissance Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba Lt. General Joseph Carroll, Director Defense Intelligence Agency, Room 2 C 468 (Members will be met at the Mall Entrance)
4.	12:25	Depart 2 C 468
5.	12:30	Meeting with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Room 2 E 873
6.	1:00	Meeting with the Secretary of Defense Room 3 E 880
7.	1:30	Return to Washington - Lunch
8.	2:45 to End of Day	Completion of Final Report to the President on Board's Cuba Review and Discussion of Future Board Business

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, January 25-26, 1963 / filed w/ material on this meeting

The Board convened in executive session at 10:15 a.m. on January 25, 1963, on the first day of a two-day meeting in the Board's offices, Room 297, Executive Office Building. Present were Board members Gray, Baker, Land, Clifford, Pace, Doolittle, Murphy, and Langer; and Messrs. Coyne and Ash.

Mr. Gray presided as acting Chairman in place of Dr. Killian whose arrival was delayed by bad flying weather. Mr. Gray noted that the DCI, Mr. McCone, had been called to testify before a Congressional Committee and would therefore be unable to meet with the Board at 11:30 as scheduled. The acting Chairman then called for a general discussion of the Board's pending review and draft report on the intelligence aspects of the circumstances leading to the Cuba crisis.

Dr. Land expressed the view that although tidying up is an obligation, and although looking back is a useful technique, the Board's responsibilities go beyond the conduct of post mortems for the purpose of identifying past mistakes in the foreign intelligence field. Without detracting from the importance of the Board's after-the-fact review of the Cuba situation, Dr. Land thought it equally important that the Board become fully informed on current developments as well.

Mr. Coyne called Dr. Land's attention to the fact that previously, in Dr. Land's absence, the Board had submitted a December 28, 1962, report to the President which was interim in nature, and which contained recommendations looking ahead to the strengthening of U. S. foreign intelligence capabilities in matters not necessarily confined to the Cuba situation. Taking note of this, Dr. Land nevertheless thought that the Board should make sure that it knows what is going on in Cuba today and what are the intelligence and related actions which are being taken by the U. S. intelligence community with respect to the Soviet presence in Cuba.

Dr. Baker, referring to theBoard's December 28 interim report on Cuba, felt that this is one of the most searching and far sighted that the Board has produced, and he noted that the DCI's written response to this report was devestatingly empty and inadequate. Dr. Baker saw no excuse for the fact that the DIA had been afforded only two days notice to comment on the Board's report prior to the submission of views by the DCI. (Dr. Langer thought it incredible that the DCI had given DIA only two days to comment on the Board's December 28 interim report.) It was Dr. Baker's thought that such a procedure was contrary to the general agreement which had been previously reached with Mr. Bundy (in a discussion between Messrs. Bundy, Baker and Coyne) that White House action memoranda flowing from Board recommendations would go directly to the agencies primarily concerned. With regard to the latter point, Mr. Coyne observed that Mr. Bundy had in this instance acquiesced with the DCI's request that the DCI obtain and report the coordinated views of the various U. S. intelligence agencies concerned with the matters covered in the Board's report.

Dr. Langer pointed out to Dr. Land that at the Board's last meeting (which Dr. Land had been unable to attend) the Board had been briefed on current aspects of the Cuba situation. Dr. Land, pursuing the point which he had raised, hoped that the Board would be able to avoid the submission of a "boiler plate" report on the errors made in the intelligence handling of the Soviet build-up in Cuba. Dr. Land said he thought that the draft of the final Board report now before the Board was a good effort, but he hoped that it would not draw from the agencies involved a book covering past errors. It was Dr. Land's view that in the intelligence system there should be someone who knows the whole story and can inform the Board fully about it. Dr. Land's concern was that the intelligence elements involved may have been inept and that a year from now they would be repeating the errors spotted in the Board's report, unless the Board can get the agency heads to accept the Board's help in profiting from lessons learned so that mistakes can be avoided in the future.

Mr. Clifford observed that there is a question of timing involved in the Board's present Cuba review, because the Board was under a special assignment from the President to prepare a report. Mr. Clifford thought that the Board would do a better service if it made a hard-hitting report and recommendations, and then after an appropriate interval the Board should ascertain whether the recommendations were being put into effect and urge action on those which the Board might find were not being implemented.

Dr. Land suggested that the Board should complete its work on the present draft of its Cuba report and then take steps to get to the heart of things with respect to intelligence plans and programs regarding Cuba. He added that the Board's responsibilities go to the effectiveness of the institution and framework within which the U. S. intelligence community operates, the meeting of day-to-day concerns which arise, and a determination as to whether re-creation or reorganization is needed based on the "massive approach" represented by the draft report which the Board had before it.

Mr. Murphy expressed agreement with points made by Dr. Land. It was Mr. Murphy's view that the intelligence community apparently does not know enough about what is presently happening in Cuba. He thought that photographic coverage was not enough and what was needed was deep cover clandestine agent coverage of Cuba. Dr. Land added that it was not enough for the Board to make recommendations but there should also be a "violent surveillance" of their implementation.

Noting the agenda for the day, Mr. Murphy wondered what the Chairman had in mind as to the nature and purpose of the Board's scheduled visit to the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray recalled that when Mr. Bundy had met with the Board previously he had suggested that in the course of the Board's Cuba review it might well be useful to discuss with the Secretary's of State and Defense, and the Chairman of the JCS, their views regarding the U. S. intelligence coverage given to the Soviet buildup in Cuba. Mr. Gray added that it was his impression that Mr. Bundy's suggestion had been based not only on the obtaining of facts pertinent to the Board's review for intelligence purposes, but also in anticipation of a Congressional investigation which might be made of the Cuba experience.

Mr. Murphy thought it important that the Board organize its interview to be had with the Secretary of State. Mr. Gray suggested that without going into a re-hash of the chronological summary of the intelligence aspects, the Board's questions to Secretary Rusk should include those which would determine the Secretary's views on what would have been done differently, from the vantage point of hindsight, with respect to intelligence handling of the Cuba development; whether there was a proper weighing of the risks and the intelligence advantages involved in overflights of Cuba; whether the intelligence analysis and reporting processes were hindered by preconceived views of U. S. "Sovietologists"; and whether raw intelligence reports were adequately communicated to the White House (Mr. Gray recalling that Mr. Bundy had expressed to him the belief that the President should have been informed of the contents of some of these reports regarding the sightings of offensive missiles in Cuba prior to the photography of October 14).

Coyne to sign

✓ Bd meeting

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Cuba

In the course of the Board meeting of January 25, 1963, the Board members and Mr. Coyne met at the State Department with the Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary Alexis Johnson and Mr. Roger Hilsman, Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State.

Utilizing the memorandum (copy attached) which contained a series of questions which had been drafted earlier in the day by the Board, the Board members elicited Secretary Rusk's views on a variety of intelligence subjects pertaining to the pre-buildup and post-buildup period in Cuba.

At the outset Secretary Rusk stated that the two Administrations must share the responsibility for Cuba and that each in turn has taken full responsibility for what was done or what was not done during their respective Administrations. He noted that Cuba is a national problem; that because of it "we came up to the edge of incineration in the Western Hemisphere"; and that he personally has a deep anxiety over the question as to where we go from here. He observed that in the case of a Communist take-over in Cuba or anywhere else, it is easier to prevent the occurrence than it is to correct it once it has taken place.

The Secretary was queried as to whether he agreed with the Board's present finding that from October 14 onward there was an effective performance by the intelligence community in supplying support in the policy decision process with respect to the Cuba situation. The Secretary agreed stating the intelligence community performance from October 14 onward was superb. He stated that this performance enabled the panels of the NSC Executive Committee to recommend the establishment of positions on which the Government as a whole could and did act.

Secretary Rusk was next queried as to whether he agreed with the Board's present findings that, prior to October 14 the intelligence performance was clearly deficient and that perhaps this deficiency was not fully known to the Department of State at the time. The Secretary observed that this was a complex question and a difficult one to answer. He felt it was terribly important that,

~~TOP SECRET~~

as an outgrowth of the review of how the intelligence community acquitted itself, we not paralyze the community "as was done by the Robert's Commission on Pearl Harbor day". He observed that from the point of view of high policy we have got to depend on people who see a great inflow of information and we must depend on them to give us balanced judgments, particularly in such a large area of operation as the Department of State where over one thousand cables are received and dispatched daily.

The Secretary stated that it was his impression that in mid September 1962 the intelligence community did not expect the Soviet Union to put MRBMs or IRBMs in Cuba; that this was the impression at higher policy-advisory levels; and that because of this overall judgment it is possible that intelligence analysts were diverted from the main point, namely, that offensive missiles were going in. He thought this diversion might also have been based upon the September 19 estimate of the intelligence community and that that estimate might have had the effect of the analysts feeling that they should pursue a "hands off attitude" as far as anything that came up which concerned the USSR's introduction of offensive missiles. He said the lesson to be learned from this is that some means must be found to assure that we do not take anything for granted in these areas. Also a means must be found for stimulating the expression of reservations at policy levels, noting that it is not easy to make these reservations operational.

The Secretary stated that if one looks at the problem of intelligence in terms of the time factors involved he thought one would find that even before October 14 our intelligence was "pretty good". He observed that except for two of the long-range sites, overflights ten days earlier than October 14 would have seen nothing.

Mr. Murphy noted that the last observation of the Secretary seemed to suggest exclusive dependence on photographs. To this the Secretary observed that in its interim report the Board had called attention to the need for re-enforcing classical intelligence means. The Secretary said that he agreed with the Board's point and that he considered it extremely important. He said the Department is prepared to provide cover to the CIA, but that other means must be developed as soon as possible; otherwise if there is undue dependence on diplomatic cover embarrasments would become greatly increased. He noted that already the United States Government has had "many problem cases" involving CIA cover. He noted also that a good rule is now being followed in this area, a rule which precludes a CIA agent to target in his country of assignment. The Secretary emphasized the view that our government has "under-played old fashioned espionage". He observed that it is easy to fly U-2s but that such flights inevitably bring up international problems since they violate sovereignty; and therefore the Department of State welcomes the idea of beefing up traditional espionage activities which are not dependent upon diplomatic cover.

The Board next inquired as to whether the Secretary believed that the interests and requirements of the intelligence community were aggressively spoken for at the policy level during the pre-October 14 period. He responded that the United States would have been better off with more intensive air (U-2 plane) coverage during the period beginning October 1, but at that time reports were sketchy, there was the problem of the stand-down of the U-2 because of the Chinat loss, weather conditions were not optimum, etc. Reverting to the principal question asked of him the Secretary expressed the view that the Special NSC 5412/2 Group operated adequately and is now operating adequately. He said that he is in touch with the Group from time to time on its plans and he noted that on the matter of intelligence collection flights we have run 2500 peripheral flights around the Soviet Union and every one of them is to some degree dangerous. He said that the President and he personally examine the particularly sensitive flights that are proposed. He noted that in the State Department intelligence requirements of the community are accepted in this area and that the Department goes along with the overwhelming number of flights proposed. He said that in the case of Cuban overflights he personally made two suggestions during the period in question. The first involved the step-up of peripheral flights around Cuba as a cover for putting flights over the island when we wanted to and he said that he had told the OAS representatives about this, noting that the "risks of strays" of such peripheral flights was "very high". His second suggestion involved breaking up one or two proposed flights into segments of four flights (the Board members were fully cognizant of this). Mr. Gray made reference to the delays which necessarily resulted from breaking the proposed mission into a four-segmented one. He inquired of the Secretary as to whether he had been advised of the fact that delays would necessarily result from his suggested amendment of the mission. The Secretary replied in the negative.

At this point Dr. Land observed that there is not enough personified pressure from intelligence; that a concentrated statement of intelligence requirements and purposes should be constantly served up to the policy level from suspicious intelligence personalities and that these, of course, should be subject to ultimate decision by the Secretary of State and others of high authority. The Secretary took issue with a portion of Dr. Land's statement on the grounds that it assumed that there is no one in the intelligence community who has any policy responsibility. The Secretary said that he thought this was incorrect because the Director of Central Intelligence frequently acted as one having policy responsibilities.

The Secretary observed that while the intelligence needs are great there are other requirements which the United States must take into account and that these must all be balanced out. He emphasized again at this point that overflying another country in peacetime is a difficult thing.

The Secretary then reverted to the question of traditional espionage and expressed the view that "we have gotten a little lazy on espionage". He noted that during World War II excellent espionage results were obtained by virtue of a "most fabulous combination of blue bloods and thugs". The Secretary favored resumption now of this World War II practice.

At this point Dr. Killian inquired of the Secretary as to whether he was satisfied that Mr. McCone's report on Cuba dated December 26th reflects a fair statement of the State Departments views. The Secretary said he had been unable to examine the report fully; that he had complete confidence in the relationships which his Department has with Mr. McCone, but that he would take exception to "the juxta-position of things on the four-flight matter". Mr. Hilsman joined the Secretary in this view. The Secretary urged that the Board members be as analytical as possible in examining the Cuba situation. He encouraged them to remember the "atmosphere of the times". He hoped the Board would be "as precise as possible" in examining the overflight matter stating that "if you think the U-2 is not serious, you are on the wrong track".

Mr. Gray indicated that it was the Board's understanding that the President approved all overflights recommended, and he then suggested that apparently there were some flights that were not rejected, but neither were they made. To this the Secretary stated that what ought to be looked at were the flights that were laid on from September 20 to October 5 or 6. He noted that during this period, following the September 19 estimate of the intelligence community on Cuba, there was some delay in distributing reports from refugee and agent sources on the sightings of long-range missiles in Cuba. He again noted that just prior to this period there was a loss of a Chinat operated U-2 over the

China mainland on September 9. On the latter point Dr. Langer inquired whether the Secretary felt that flights over Cuba were in the same category as flights over the Soviet Union or over China. The Secretary responded in the negative noting that "we felt much greater freedom of action in the case of Cuba". Mr. Hillsman added on this point that the USIB felt that two U-2 flights a month over Cuba were adequate.

The Secretary recalled that early in October he was requested to authorize overflights based on indications of two specific sites and he said he immediately approved.

Mr. Gray observed that there appeared to be some confusion as to whether we had a policy of not overflying SA-2 sites, and Secretary Johnson responded that the matter of overflying SA-2's invariably came up in the Special Group but that he could not recall any prohibition on overflying such sites. Secretary Johnson added that in the Special Group he could not recall any kind of operation ever being recommended where the atmosphere was as relaxed as it was in the case of recommendations pertaining to the Cuba problem.

Mr. Hilsman stated that at the operational level there was concern about losing a pilot over Cuba. Consequently a CORONA Mission was programmed for Cuba from September 21 to September 24. Mr. Hilsman thought this concern over the loss of a man may have been a factor which contributed to the low number of U-2 flights flown.

The Secretary was asked whether he was satisfied with the national estimating process and whether he considered that State Department participation therein was provided for adequately. The Secretary thought that State Department participation in the preparation of national intelligence estimates was adequately provided for. He said that from the point of view of the policy officer it is essential that he know what the intelligence people think; that on the other hand the policy officer wants to avoid taking the intelligence view as "the Bible", and he wishes to find a way for the intelligence community to "throw in contrary indicators in their estimates in order that they might be flagged for the policy maker."

The Secretary was then asked if he felt that the intelligence community analytical, estimative and reporting functions in the Cuba situation were hindered by international political considerations or by preconceived views of "Sovietologists" regarding Soviet intentions with respect to Cuba. The Secretary responded that he did not believe that the "Sovietologists" did what has been claimed. He did not believe that they had much influence on estimates. He thought, however, he detected an insufficient alertness on their part to the possibility that the estimates of the intelligence community were wrong. He expressed the observation on this point that the direct indicators came in after the September 19 estimate was prepared.

The Secretary was next queried as to whether we are currently informed in an adequate manner about Soviet objectives and activities in Cuba today. The Secretary responded that the principal gap is our inability to prove the negative because of the absence of on-site inspections. He said we are running overflights regularly; that we have improved our cooperation with allied governments in Cuba; but that we do not know for certain what the Soviet objectives are insofar as Cuba is concerned.

When queried as to U. S. Government knowledge as to the purpose of Mikoyan's stay in Cuba and as to what Mikoyan accomplished, the Secretary stated that he thought we know a great deal about the Mikoyan mission. He noted that for ten days Castro would not talk to Mikoyan. He said that we are getting much better information regarding Castro and particularly Castro's efforts in inspiring other Latin American countries. The Secretary expressed the thought that the Soviet Union may be deciding that Cuba is not the proper base from which to launch their Latin American operations. He said rewarding gains have been made in attempting to obstruct travel between Cuba and the Free World. He conceded, however, that we do not have the Cuba-Russian plan, adding that we have not penetrated the Cuban regime as well as he hopes we might be able to later.

The Secretary was asked with reference to the Monroe Doctrine, whether the Department of State has urged an aggressive intelligence collection effort to define any new violation of the Doctrine. The Secretary thought it would not be too profitable to concentrate on this point and it would be more profitable to concentrate on the Rio Pact. He agreed, however, that the Doctrine is violated by the presence of the Marxist-Leninist system in the Western Hemisphere for he said there is no question whatever about the Soviet presence in Cuba.

In conclusion the Secretary stated that he thought "our intelligence on Cuba today is not complete but it is not deficient."

J. Patrick Coyne

J. Patrick Coyne

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 26, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: Cuba

In the course of the Board meeting of January 26, the Board members and the writer met at the Pentagon with General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at which time the members discussed with General Taylor the series of questions set forth in the attachment to this memorandum. The highlights of the discussion follow.

General Taylor felt that the performance of DIA during the Cuba period was "on the whole good - in fact indispensable."

General Taylor noted that from August 31 to September 21, he, Gilpatrick and McCone were all absent from the Washington area but he quickly added that things probably would not have been different had they been here.

General Taylor disparaged the value of the refugee reports emanating from Cuban exiles in Florida during the months preceding the crisis. He said most of their information was unreliable although on reflection he concluded that some reports were in fact reliable. When General Taylor was asked by a Board member whether the intelligence community's estimating and reporting functions could have been hindered by pre-conceived views of Sovietologists regarding Soviet indications with respect to Cuba, General Taylor stated that either Khrushchev was stupid or we were. He said, "In the minds of most of us we just didn't think that the Soviets would put nuclear weapons on the island." He added that the dirth of U-2 flights over Cuba prior to SAC's discovery was occasioned by the shoot-down of a U-2 over the Chinese communist mainland (causing us to go slow on authorizing U-2 anywhere), and the highly unsatisfactory weather conditions which prevailed in the Caribbean during the period preceding the discovery on October 14.

Dr. Killian asked whether DIA had been as effective as it might have been and General Taylor responded that particularly after October 14 it had done such an excellent job that he could not suggest any way of improving on it. He said that in the pre-October 14 period the intelligence community "wasn't going at full steam." He added that all efforts in the Mongoose Committee to achieve a better intelligence base produced very little and that in the Mongoose Committee "we never received any urgent information of value on Cuba."

~~TOP SECRET~~

Mr. Pace inquired as to why Guantanamo had not been used more extensively as a base for the acquisition of intelligence. General Taylor responded that "We may have viewed it as a Sacred Cow." He had a feeling that the Navy might consider enlarged intelligence activities at Guantanamo as prejudicing the U. S. Naval base there.

Mr. Pace inquired as to whether the intelligence community had been sufficiently agressive in placing its requirements on the Special Group and on the Mongoose Committee. General Taylor responded to the effect that he knew of no intelligence requests emanating from the community that were not supported from higher levels. (In an aside General Taylor mentioned that when the missiles were discovered in Cuba "I was a hawk", meaning that he favored the launching of the U. S. military strike against the missile bases in Cuba.) General Doolittle asked whether at the present time General Taylor feels he is getting sufficient intelligence on Cuba. General Taylor responded "obviously not" adding that "photographic intelligence is practically all we are getting today." General Taylor stated that "Most of us are well aware of the frailty of our intelligence system - we can beat the DCI over the head but he just can't produce the intelligence we need."

Dr. Killian elicited General Taylor's recommendations on the Special NSC 5412/2 Group asking whether the General had any constructive suggestions to make in light of his having chaired the Special Group prior to his appointment as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. General Taylor had no specific suggestions to make. He noted that as Chairman of the Special Group he always had the feeling that representatives of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board were closely examining covert action programs and were constantly going around the world to see what the intelligence community was doing both in the intelligence and covert action field. He said that this activity on the part of the Board gave him a good feeling - a feeling of insurance - in his capacity as Chairman of the Special Group. General Taylor added that "If your Board didn't exist we would have to invent you."

Mr. Clifford stated that he had the impression that relations between defense and CIA were not too close and General Taylor expressed the hope that that was not in fact the case. General Taylor recognized, however, that there was a feeling of considerable rivalry between CIA and Defense, particularly SAC, when responsibility for U-2 reconnaissance over Cuba was transferred from CIA to SAC. General Taylor said he favored the transfer of the flights, that CIA was really Cassandra-like on this issue and that is where the animosity arose." (Mr. McCone later denied to the Board that CIA opposed the transfer but the Board's files clearly reflect that CIA was in violent opposition; that it protested the flights to the White House both orally and in writing; and that the animosity became so severe that Deputy Director Scoville of CIA did not even speak to the Director NRO for a period of days, after SAC's first flight brought back the first photographic evidence of intermediate range nuclear missiles in Cuba.)

General Taylor volunteered the view that the creation of the DIA will improve rather than aggravate the relations between Defense and CIA although he acknowledged that there will always be some rivalry between civilian intelligence collectors in CIA and military intelligence collectors in DIA and the Services. To this Mr. Pace observed that some rivalry is good and healthy.

Finally, when queried about the posture of service attaches, General Taylor noted that he had recently returned from a lengthy trip in the course of which he visited with a number of the attaches and he had found that they had "improved enormously" over prior times.

J. Patrick Coyne

Enclosure.

SPECIAL LIMITED DIS[illegible]BUTION ~~TOP SECRET~~
OXCART

PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD

January 25, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE BOARD

SUBJECT: Board Meeting of January 25 - 26, 1963

For the information of the Board members the following documents are enclosed:

Tab 1: Memorandum for the President from the Board dated January 19, 1963, concerning the handling of OXCART and of projects in the Department of Defense associated with OXCART.

Tab 2: Board's Interim Report to the President dated December 28, 1962, and the DCI's 1/22/63 response thereto.

Tab 3: Draft of final report to the President on the Board's comprehensive study of intelligence activities relating to the military buildup in Cuba.

Tab 4: Memorandum for the Chairman from Mr. McGeorge Bundy dated January 9, 1963, concerning Presidential instructions relative to control of intelligence information on offensive weapons in Cuba.

Tab 5: Memorandum on Mr. Ash's review of Special Group records pertaining to developments in Cuba.

Tab 6: CIA memorandum concerning cable correspondence between CIA headquarters and Mr. McCone while in Europe (August 30 - September 21, 1962)

Tab 7: General Chronology of Events in Cuba, 1957 - 1962, prepared by the Board's staff.*

Tab 8: General Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba, prepared by the Board's staff.*

---

* Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board

HANDLE VIA BYEMAN CHANNELS ONLY HANDLE VIA TALENT-KEYHOLE CHANNELS ~~TOP SECRET~~
HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY

Tab 9:	Memorandum concerning CIA Field Station Reports (received by NSC or White House staff elements) dealing with the military buildup prior to October 14, 1962.*
Tab 10:	CIA Memorandum concerning the Caribbean Admissions Center, Opa locka, Florida.*
Tab 11:	Memorandum for Mr. Bundy from Mr. Ray Cline, CIA, entitled "The Effect of Weather on Overflights of Cuba, 29 August - 14 October 1962".
Tab 12:	Report by the Director of Central Intelligence to the Board on "Intelligence Community Activities Relating to the Cuban Arms Buildup".*
Tab 13:	Letter to the Chairman from Mr. Murphy dated Dec. 8, 1962.

J. Patrick Coyne

---

* Reviewed at earlier meetings of the Board

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 11, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILE

SUBJECT: CUBA (Review on 1/10/63 of Records of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group)

On 1-10-63 the writer reviewed in the offices of Mr. Tom Parrott, Executive Secretary, Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the records of the Special Group which Mr. Parrott identified as relating to considerations given by the Special Group to reconnaissance and covert action operations with regard to Cuba. (Attached hereto is a copy, supplied by Mr. Parrott from his records, of a "Memorandum for the Record" dated 10/21/62 on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba" which Mr. Parrott had prepared for another purpose.)

There follows a detailed summary of the results of a review made by the writer of the Cuba items referred to in Mr. Parrott's summary memorandum, and of other items which the writer reviewed in the Special Group records pertaining to Cuba.

Minutes of Meetings of the Special Group (Augmented) - "MONGOOSE"

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, Mr. McCone, General Carter, General Lemnitzer, General Lansdale, and Dr. Cline (for part of the meeting).

The Group noted a paper presented by the State Department member concerning "Guideline for a post-Castro Political Program."

General Lansdale briefed the Group on the number of agents now in Cuba, including legal residents, plus infiltrated teams. It was decided that a CIA proposal, for resupply of agent teams and possibly of resistance groups, should be deferred pending a broader review of the entire situation. General Taylor specified, however, that if an urgent need arose for air supply at any time, the proposal could be made to the Special Group (Augmented).

Mr. McCone and General Lansdale stated that a sizable number of intelligence reports were coming out of Cuba, largely on political and economic matters. Mr. McCone emphasized that no high-level penetration of the Cuban Government had been achieved. In answer to a question from the Attorney General, General Lansdale said that intelligence indicated that although there was widespread dissatisfaction with Castro, there was no rallying point for active opposition.

The Attorney General and Mr. Johnson emphasized the need for an effort to obtain hard intelligence on subversive activities by the Castro regime in the Hemisphere, Mr. McCone noting that such efforts to date had been fruitless.

Dr. Cline showed the Group the extent of reconnaissance coverage of Cuba. Mr. McCone emphasized that this program has developed complete information on deployments and facilities for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and he particularly noted that these missions have verified that there is sufficient logistic support for a 75,000-man military force. "No missile sites have been found."

The Group agreed on a complete review of MONGOOSE toward the end of July, with participation by the Secretaries of State and Defense. General Taylor emphasized that in the preparation for such review, there would be a need for summaries of results obtained to date, of intelligence developed, and of future alternatives opened to the United States (including possible activities in other parts of Latin America).

Mr. Johnson said that the State Department is investigating the possibilities for subsidizing Japanese purchases of Dominican sugar to divert purchases from Cuba and thereby deprive Cuba of a source of dollars, and Mr. Johnson asked that MONGOOSE operational representatives look into this further. Mr. McCone said that the CIA could use unvouchered funds for this purpose, but it would be illegal to use covert funds as a means of evading the intent of Congress.

Minutes of the October 4, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)

Those present for this meeting with regard to Operation MONGOOSE were the Attorney General, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lansdale, Mr. McCone, General Carter, and Mr. Wilson.

The Attorney General informed the Group that higher authority was concerned about progress on the MONGOOSE program and felt that more priority should be given to trying to mount sabotage operations. The Attorney General wondered if a new look were not required in view of the meager results obtained, especially in the sabotage field, and he urged "massive activity" within the entire MONGOOSE framework.

General Lansdale thought that another attempt should be made against the major target which had been the subject of three unsuccessful missions and he said that six new missions were in the planning stage.

Mr. Johnson said that the "massive activity" would have to come from within, and he hoped to be able to present soon to the Group a plan for giving Cuban exiles more of a free hand, fully realizing that this will give additional visibility to their activities. Mr. McCone reserved judgment on the feasibility and desirability of such a program, and Mr. Johnson agreed that he had reservations as well.

Mr. McCone said that he had received the impression that although high levels of our Government wanted increased activity, they still want to keep it at a low noise level, but Mr. McCone did not believe this would be possible and he felt that any sabotage would be blamed on the United States. Mr. McCone cited the enormous number of telephone calls directed at CIA at the time the skin divers landed in east Cuba, and the time that the Cuban exile students shot up the apartment house. Mr. McCone therefore urged that responsible officials be prepared to accept a higher noise level if they want to get on with operations.

The Attorney General, in partial rebuttal, said that the reasons people had such concern were (a) the fact that the skin divers were Americans, and (b) the fact that the student activity was irresponsible and foolish -- and if either of these had in fact been engineered by the United States it would have been a great mistake. The Attorney General also related the possibility of attributability to the importance of the particular undertaking, and he questioned whether we are going down the right road or whether more "direct action" were not indicated. He urged that alternative and imaginative plans be developed.

Mr. McCone said that internal restrictions are so rigid that internal uprisings would surely be brutally suppressed. (It was agreed that the current guidelines did not call for inciting such an uprising.)

Mr. McCone and General Carter explained the tremendous efforts necessary to insure that operations such as the sabotage operation previously authorized cannot be pinned directly on the United States. (After discussion, the Group agreed that it was not necessary to go to such extreme lengths to insure nonattribution, and that short cuts were desirable.)

Mr. Gilpatric informed the Group that the Defense Department was hard at work on establishing a Cuban brigade. Recruits would be trained from four to five months and then placed on call for any future action.

General Taylor reported that the Joint Staff is refining various contingency military plans based on a variety of possible situations, including Soviet action against Berlin; "the presence of bloc offensive weapons in Cuba"; an attack against Guantanamo; a popular uprising; armed Cuban subversion in the Hemisphere; and "the establishment of a direct threat to the United States."

Dr. Scoville and Colonel Steakley were present at this Group meeting for an item regarding reconnaissance of Cuba. It was pointed out that the CIA is "restricted to using its high-performance vehicle in the southeast quadrant of Cuba, because of SAM sites." It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at that time, particularly when SAMs were almost certainly not operational. *

Colonel Steakley and Dr. Scoville described a spectrum of reconnaissance activities which could be undertaken, ranging from low-level, Navy fighters through drones, up to the Agency's capabilities, particularly equipped with new radar countermeasures. As a result of the discussion there was agreement that the Department of Defense and the CIA should get together on recommendations for targets within Cuba that require coverage, and on recommendations as to how to achieve this coverage. A meeting was set for the following Tuesday when Defense and CIA were to be prepared to discuss all possibilities, including requirements, capabilities, vulnerabilities, etc.

There was some discussion of the desirability of mining Cuban waters, using nonattributable mines appearing to be homemade and laid by small aircraft operated by Cubans.

It was agreed that the Attorney General would act as Chairman of the Special Group (Augmented) for the time being.

It was agreed that four major points which had emerged from this meeting were: (1) we ought to go all-out for increased intelligence; (2) there should be considerably more sabotage; (3) restrictions on attributability can be relaxed so that training and preparations can be subject to short cuts; and (4) all efforts should be made to develop new and imaginative approaches to the possibility of getting rid of the Castro regime.

In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject

(Continuation of footnote from previous page)

"Reconnaissance of Cuba" it is stated: "The DCI pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant of Cuba, because of SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational." Beside this item in the summary memorandum, there appears the penciled notation "Also agreed should go all out for intel."

Minutes of the October 9, 1962 Meeting
of the Special Group (Augmented)

Present for this meeting were the Attorney General, Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Wilson, Dr. Charyk, Dr. Scoville, Colonel Steakley, and Colonel Ledford, CIA.

The Group discussed various possibilities of accomplishing reconnaissance of Cuba, ranging from low-level coverage by tactical aircraft to high-performance aircraft and drones. Overflights and peripheral flights were discussed. It was agreed that the first priority is one high-performance mission in the western part of the island, to be accomplished by all-out ELINT support, and depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties might be mounted. (The first mission was later approved by higher authority, with the decision on the second proposition left open. The entire package was to be discussed at the USIB and by the Chiefs on Wednesday, October 10.)

Along with the minutes of this October 9 Meeting there was in file a memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, dated October 11, 1962. It was reflected in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric had called at 2:15 P.M. to say he and Mr. McCone had finally agreed that the one high-performance flight would be flown as a military flight with a SAC pilot. CIA had wanted to stick to the existing system for the first flight, simply to avoid any delay. The SAC pilot would require some additional training because the equipment in the improved vehicle was new to him, but Mr. Gilpatric and Mr. McCone apparently felt that this was an acceptable delay and it was hoped to get the flight off over the weekend. It was further stated in Mr. Parrott's memorandum that it seemed agreed that within the terms of the authorization given by higher authority it would be necessary to go back for approval of the next phase contemplating two or three more high-performance missions, and Mr. Gilpatric seemed to feel that the discussion which had taken place with higher authority was explicit enough to get an emergency authority by telephone. Mr. Parrott further informed Mr. Bundy that the Cover Committee (Messrs. Charyk, Hilsman, Scoville, Parrott, "et al") had met that morning and had agreed on a new cover story for a military pilot and a revised cover story for civilian pilots, and with the necessary changes it was thought that the cover story would be ready that afternoon. Mr. Parrott pointed out to Mr. Bundy that, on the military side, the flight is characterized as military reconnaissance of the periphery of the target area, with particular reference to the Secretary of State's recent comments to the OAS Ministers to the effect that we are increasing surveillance activities. (A penciled note on the file copy of this memorandum read: "Later was delayed due to disagreement on account of training required."

There was also an October 12, 1962 addendum to the abovementioned October 11 memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Mr. Bundy, stating: "Later." The memorandum related that, according to Mr. Knocke, Mr. McCone had decided the day before (October 11) that these flights must be either entirely overt or entirely covert, and he didn't particularly care which so long as they were accomplished as soon as possible. In Mr. McCone's absence, General Carter had come to an agreement with General McKee, Vice Chief of Staff of the Air Force, along those lines on October 11; later, however, Mr. Gilpatric said that this was not his understanding of the terms of authorization from higher authority. Mr. Gilpatric felt that the idea was that a uniformed pilot should operate the Agency's vehicle.

On October 12 at 12:45, General Carter had a meeting with Mr. Bundy and at that time General Carter stated that the Agency operation was ready to go except for weather, and that this would hold it up until at least Sunday, and meantime the SAC pilot would have received the necessary training. It was agreed that if the pilot was sufficiently trained by the earliest time the mission could be mounted, the flight would go, with all other arrangements within the Agency framework. If the pilot were not ready by the time the vehicle was ready, the mission would be mounted as a completely Agency operation, i.e., with a civilian pilot. According to Mr. Lay, the USIB had taken the following actions at its October 10, 1962 meeting with respect to the targets listed in the COMOR paper of October 6: (1) The Group I targets were not discussed by USIB, the implication being that there was no problem from the point of view of USIB's jurisdiction. (2) Groups II and III should be covered as rapidly as possible initially, and after that the frequency of coverage would be further examined. (3) COMOR was to re-do the section of the October 6 paper dealing with Group IV, with targets to be broken out in categories of priorty, and USIB would consider this new paper on October 17. USIB did not consider any operational aspects, but confined themselves to the importance of the targets and the frequency of coverage.

Minutes of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group

The following summarizes the minutes of the Special Group Meetings which were identified by Mr. Parrott as including consideration of the subject of Cuba.

Minutes of February 1, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and Mr. Helms.

On the subject of Cuba, the Chairman read his memorandum to higher authority dated January 26, summarizing progress up to that time. The memorandum from General Lansdale suggesting a different approach to the content of the minutes of the meeting of the preceding week on Cuba was discussed, and it was agreed that the minutes would stand as prepared. General Lansdale's report of February 1 on popular support for the OAS meeting was distributed. Mr. Parrott's summary states that the Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month to two per month.

Minutes of June 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

This meeting was attended by General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Carter.

On the subject of "Request for Special Cuban Missions," it was stated that the COMOR proposal dated June 13, 1962 was approved. (A handwritten notation on the file copy of these minutes stated that "higher authority informed June 15 about possibility of uprising," and there was also a notation that the June 13 memorandum regarding the COMOR request had been "rewritten for book.")

Minutes of the July 12, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

The Group agreed to recommend approval of various requests for authorizations. In the case of Cuba, the minutes reflect agreement to continue with the presently authorized schedule of two flights per month. General Taylor asked that for the purpose of discussing this matter with higher authority, CIA should prepare a paper on Cuba, setting forth a summary of information which had been obtained to date, the number of missions mounted, what is proposed to be looked at in the future, and the frequency of further coverage desired.

Memorandum for the President from the Special Group, July 20, 1962

The Special Group records contain a memorandum for the President from General Taylor dated July 20, 1962, bearing a handwritten notation by General Taylor, "Approved by H. A. (presumably 'higher authority') 20 July 1962." In essence, the memorandum to the President was as follows:

> In the Special Group we are aware that we have been proceeding on a day-by-day basis in requesting authority for overflight reconnaissance. At our meeting yesterday, we took a long look ahead at the estimated requirements for the next few months and agreed that the following program is the minimum which meets military requirements . . . . Cuba: Two flights monthly . . . . all U-2 flights with CIA civilian pilots . . . . We would like to get your approval in principle of the foregoing program with the understanding that on the first of each month you will be presented with the specific flights recommended for that month.

Minutes of August 9, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. McCone, Mr. Hilsman, and Mr. William Bundy.

On the subject of "Cuba Reconnaissance" it was stated that the Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the immediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies it. It was noted that this would use up existing authority for August, and if a third mission should become necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.

Minutes of August 30, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer and Mr. Bundy.

The minutes reflect that in connection with the Agency's monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba. (In the "Memorandum for the Record," October 21, 1962, on the subject "Reconnaissance of Cuba," attached hereto, there appears beside the item dealing with this meeting the penciled notation "primarily low-level.")

Minutes of September 10, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present at this meeting, which took place in Mr. Bundy's office, were the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting Director of Central Intelligence, "and others."

The Secretary of State expressed concern at the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba, involving extensive peripheral coverage as well as two legs directly over Cuban air space, all in one flight. He said he had no objection to the peripheral parts and, in fact, thought it useful to continue to establish our right to fly over international waters. On the other hand, he recognized the necessity of obtaining vertical coverage of the Isle of Pines and the eastern portion of Cuba at this time. He felt, however, that it was unwise to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. He pointed out that the long peripheral flights would draw undue attention to the mission and, further, should the aircraft fall into enemy hands after an overflight had occurred, this would put the United States in a very poor position for standing on its rights to overfly international waters.

Taking these views into account, the Agency's plans to break this proposed coverage into four parts: the Isle of Pines; the area roughly east of longitude 77 west; and two legs along the coast, one north and one south.

Within this framework, higher authority gave approval this morning for two additional missions to be added to the one for which authority is currently outstanding. Priority will be given to the two overflights. (A notation on the file copy of these Special Group minutes states that as of this morning it appears that weather will not permit a flight until at least Friday, and longer range weather prospects are not very good, consequently it will be some little time before these three authorizations are used up.)

In connection with the minutes of this meeting, the Special Group records contain a note for the file dated October 25, 1962, stating that COMOR later recommended that the Bay of Pigs area should be looked at since it had not been seen since June . . . . Time over mainland would be 12½ minutes for a total of 75 miles . . . . depth of penetration, 13 miles . . . . nearest known SAM site, 35 miles away. The file note further stated that after considerable negotiation with the Department of State it was agreed that this additional coverage would be accomplished.

(In quoting the minutes of this September 10 meeting in a memorandum from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962, there was an addendum which stated: "N.B. Mr. Bundy said on 13 September 1962 that he thought the intent of higher authority's approval was such that the entire number of four missions would be considered as being approved. This thus extends the outstanding authorizations from three to four.")

Minutes of September 14, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were Mr. Bundy, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Nitze, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

The minutes of this meeting reflect that a JCS representative (Colonel Steakley) outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present. Colonel Steakley distributed charts for the monthly book, on supplementing ELINT coverage of Cuba which was begun today. The Group had no objection to these missions. It was agreed that the Joint Reconnaissance Center should keep an eye on all military reconnaissance or surveillance flights in the Cuban area. (The Special Group record of these minutes is contained in a memorandum dated November 30, 1962, from Mr. Tom Parrott to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric.)

Minutes of September 27, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

Those present were General Taylor, Mr. Johnson, Mr. Gilpatric, General Lemnitzer, and General Carter.

CIA's October forecast of reconnaissance activities was noted. The special mission request for Cuba was approved. This brings the number of authorizations for this area back to four, i.e., four had been previously authorized and one has been successfully completed, leaving authority for three outstanding.

Minutes of October 15, 1962 Meeting of the Special Group

A memorandum prepared for the Special Group records by Mr. Parrott reflected that at a special meeting on this date two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved, and that these were concurred in by higher authority. It is reflected that after the 15th of October additional coverage was agreed on at other meetings, but the Special Group was not convened for this purpose.

Memorandum from Mr. Parrott to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric, November 30, 1962

The Special Group records contain a copy of a memorandum (previously referred to) from Mr. Thomas A. Parrott to Deputy

Secretary of Defense Gilpatric dated November 30, 1962. The memorandum began with the statement that it had been prepared in answer to Deputy Secretary Gilpatric's request on the preceding day for minutes of the special meetings of the Special Group which bore on Cuban reconnaissance, in order that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor might be informed. It was stated in the memorandum that Mr. Gilpatric and General Taylor had been present on August 30 and had then returned to the Group on September 27. It was further stated that at the meetings of the 6th and 20th of September the subject of Cuba reconnaissance did not arise. The memorandum then pointed out that the meeting of September 10 was not a regular meeting of the Special Group but had nevertheless resulted in particularly significant decisions. The memorandum then went on to set forth the minutes of the meetings of September 10, 14 and 27.

A. Russell Ash

Attachment

COPY

~~TOP SECRET~~

21 October 1962

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Reconnaissance of Cuba

Following is a chronological resume of considerations by the Special Group (5412) and the Special Group (Augmented) of U-2 reconnaissance activities over Cuba. This summary begins as of 1 May 1961 (i.e., after the Bay of Pigs).

11 May 1961. It was agreed that policy approval for U-2 flights over Cuba is still in effect.

1 February 1962. The Cuba missions were stepped up from one per month to two.

14 June 1962. A COMOR recommendation that two additional flights be authorized for June was approved by the Group.

12 July 1962. (Augmented Group) Mr. McCone emphasized that reconnaissance of Cuba has developed complete information on deployment and facilities for the Army, Navy and Air Force, and that it has verified the fact that there is sufficient logistic support for a 75,000 man military force. No missile sites have been found.

12 July 1962. The Group agreed to continue with the presently-authorized schedule of two flights per month.

19 July 1962. Cuba was considered as part of a set of proposals covering reconnaissance world-wide. The two flights per month pattern was reiterated. (This was later approved by higher authority.)

9 August 1962. The Group agreed that the second mission authorized for August should be flown whenever the DCI decides that the immediate situation with respect to Soviet materiel justifies it. It was noted that this would use up existing authorizations for August and if a third mission should become necessary later in the month, it should be considered on its merits at that time.

NOTE: Coordinated with Reber, then shown to General Carter who put a covering memo on it. The Carter memo, this one and a compilation from the COMOR point of view, done by Mr. Reber, were given to Mr. McCone at the White House just before the 2:30 meeting today.

THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS INFORMATION REFERRING TO IDEALIST

BYEMAN
BYE 3746-62

~~TOP SECRET~~

30 August 1962. In connection with the Agency's monthly forecast, General Carter mentioned that there might be an additional requirement for flights over Cuba.

10 September 1962. At a special meeting attended by the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Acting DCI and others, the Secretary expressed concern over the Agency's planned coverage of Cuba. He objected particularly to the proposal to combine extensive overflying of international waters with actual overflights. As a result of this discussion, it was agreed that the Agency's proposed coverage would have to be broken into four parts - one over the Isle of Pines, one over the eastern end of Cuba, and two legs along the coast - one north and one south. Within this framework, higher authority later gave approval for three flights in addition to those already authorized, with priority to the overflights. (NOTE: The Agency later secured agreement to continue the Isle of Pines leg over the Bay of Pigs area, after considerable negotiation with State.)

14 September 1962. A JCS representative outlined the capabilities for low-level coverage of certain targets in Cuba. It was noted that the Secretary of Defense did not wish this operation considered further until the results of Agency reconnaissance in the same area became available. General Carter said that special efforts will be required to identify certain installations, the nature of which is not clear at present.

27 September 1962. An additional mission for Cuba was approved.

4 October 1962 (Augmented Group). The DCI pointed out that the Agency is now restricted to using the U-2 in the southeastern quadrant of Cuba, because of the SAM sites. It was questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time, particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational.

9 October 1962 (Augmented Group). The Group discussed the spectrum of possible reconnaissance activities. It was agreed that first priority should be given to one U-2 in the western part of the island. Depending on the results of this, a number of similar sorties might be mounted. (Higher authority later approved the one mission, leaving the second proposition open.)

15 October 1962. At a special meeting, two U-2 missions, designed to cover all of Cuba, were approved. These were concurred in by higher authority.

After the 15th of October, additional coverage was agreed on at other meetings. The Special Group was not convened for this purpose.

Thomas A. Parrott

~~TOP SECRET~~

II. Chronology of Specific Events Relating to the Military Buildup in Cuba

Presented below is a summary of information on the subject which has been assembled by the staff in a chronological arrangement of selected excerpts of data received from intelligence community sources and from public sources. The chronology is somewhat incomplete because it does not include: (a) the all source, all community review which the DCI is making at the request (11/14/62) of the Board, (b) significant information in the files of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group on intelligence and covert actions relating to Cuba, and (c) all of the information believed to have been submitted to the White House during the period of the military buildup in Cuba.

1. 1/2/59 - Castro proclaims provisional Government headed by Urrutia as President.

2. 1/7/59 - U.S. recognizes the Castro Government . . . expresses the sincere good will of the Government and people of the U.S.

3. 12/31/59 - Cuba and Communist China sign trade agreement under which Cuba is to sell Peiping 50,000 tons of sugar.

4. 2/4/60 - Mikoyan arrives to open a Soviet exhibition. On 2/13/60, Fidel Castro and Mikoyan sign a joint Soviet-Cuban communique describing their conversations as "carried out in an atmosphere of frank cordiality."

5. 2/13/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign trade and economic aid agreement.

6. 2/20/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with East Germany.

7. 3/31/60 - Cuba signs trade and payments agreement with Poland; with Czechoslovakia on 6/10/60; with Communist China on 7/23/60; with Hungary on 9/15/60; with Bulgaria on 10/7/60; and with Rumania on 10/26/60. During this period Cuba established diplomatic relations with these countries and with North Korea, North Vietnam, Albania and Outer Mongolia.

8. 7/9/60 - Khrushchev stated that the USSR is "raising its voice and extending a helpful hand to the people of Cuba . . . Speaking figuratively, in case of necessity, Soviet artillerymen can support the Cuban people with rocket fire."

9. 7/10/60 - Guevara stated that Cuba is defended by the Soviet Union, "the greatest military power in history."

10. 7/21/60 - The Cuban press reported Raul Castro's statement in Moscow that Cuba is grateful for political and moral support from the USSR.

11. 8/24/60 - Castro charged the U.S. with supporting counter-revolutionaries, and stated that Cuba would be friends with the Soviets and Chinese Peoples Republic.

12. 11/18/60 - U.S. stated that at least 12 Soviet ships have delivered arms and ammunition to Cuba since July 1960, and that Soviet bloc arms provided to Cuba amount to at least 28,000 tons.

13. 12/19/60 - Cuba and the USSR sign joint communique through which Cuba openly allies itself with the domestic and foreign policies of the Soviet Union and indicates its solidarity with the Sino-Soviet bloc.

14. 1/2/61 - Cuba holds military parade displaying bloc arms, including tanks, assault guns and field guns. Castro said this represents only a "small part" of the arms which Cuba had received from the bloc.

15. 1/3/61 - The United States severed diplomatic relations with Cuba.

16. 2/23/61 - Armed Forces Minister Raul Castro declared that the Chinese People's Republic has sent Cuba hundreds of machine guns.

17. 3/24/61 - In a letter to the New York Times, Mr. Juan Bosch of New York City (former Minister of Finance of Cuba prior to the Batista Administration) stated that: "Just recently I have received confidential information that in the western part of the island of Cuba, specifically in the vicinity of the town of Soroa, Province of Pinar del Rio, an installation is being finished that has required hundreds of tons of portland cement, and has led observers to conclude that a rocket-launching pad is being prepared for use by the Soviet Union. Many reports of other secret military installations are being received continuously in my office. Do the American people not realize that these installations may be used to pinpoint atomic destruction to any part of the United States, and that a military base in Cuba would be invaluable to the Soviet Union, not only because of its military value as a base at the very back door of the U.S., but also because of the prestige that this would give the Russians?"

18. 4/3/61 - The U.S. Department of State stated that since mid-1960 over 30,000 tons of arms valued at $50 million had arrived in Cuba from the bloc; the Cuban armed forces are dependent on the Soviet bloc for their armed power; Soviet and Czech military advisers and technicians had accompanied the flow of arms; Cubans had gone to Czechslovakia and the USSR for training as jet pilots, ground maintenance crews, and artillerymen; and that, except for the U.S., Cuba had the largest ground forces in the hemisphere -- at least 10 times as large as those maintained by Batista's and other previous Cuban Governments.

19. 4/17-19/61 - The CIA-directed effort against Castro met with disaster at the Bay of Pigs.

20. 4/20/61 - President Kennedy stated that any unilateral American intervention would have been contrary to our traditions and to our international obligations, but that we do not intend to abandon Cuba.

21. 4/20-12/1/61 - CIA relaxed its intelligence collection and covert action efforts against Cuba, according to the oral report made to the Board on 6/26/62 by CIA Deputy Director Helms.

22. 6/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-15s and MIG-17s in Cuba.

23. 7/15/61 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-19s in Cuba.

24. 12/2/61 - Castro declares himself a bona fide Communist. "I believe absolutely in Marxism . . . I am a Marxist-Leninist and will be a Marxist-Leninist until the last day of my life." He admits that he hid his true political ideology during his revolutionary struggle because he felt that "if we, when we began to have strength, had been known as people of very radical ideas, unquestionably all the social classes that are making war on us would have been doing so from that time on."

25. 1/31/62 - The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics, meeting at Punta del Este, declared that because of its public alignment with international communism, the present Marxist-Leninist government of Cuba is excluded from participating in the Inter-American system.

26. 2/3/62 - In a Proclamation by the President an embargo was placed on trade with Cuba.

27. 3/7/62 - Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/3, entitled "Priority National Intelligence Objectives," provided guidance to the intelligence community on its intelligence collection effort. This guidance included the following:

> "First Category: Objectives of such vital importance as to require a maximum intelligence effort . . . B. Present and prospective Soviet and Chinese Communist capabilities for nuclear attack on the U. S. . . ."
>
> "Second Category: Objectives of such critical importance as to require an intensive intelligence effort . . . F. Present and prospective Soviet, Chinese Communist, Satellite, and Cuban capabilities and intentions to initiate, conduct, and support

(27. 3/7/62 Continued)

"internal warfare in countries on the periphery of the Sino Soviet Bloc, and in Africa and Latin America."

"Third Category: Objectives of such great importance as to warrant a major intelligence effort . . . Z. The stability, internal policy, and international relations of the Castro regime in Cuba; the locus of power within the regime; the progress of its reorganization of the economy, the political structure, and the military establishment; its capabilities to control the population and to defend itself against internal and external attack; the extent and nature of popular disaffection and of organized internal resistance; the regime's economic, political, and military relations with the Soviet Bloc and with Communist China; its subversive capabilities and activities in Latin America."

28. 3/15/62 - According to a CIA memorandum of 11/16/62, the intelligence community established on 3/15/62 an interagency refugee interrogation center (Caribbean Admission Center) at Opa-Locka, Florida, manned by 40 personnel representing CIA, Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, USIA and VOA. Cuban refugees were arriving at Miami at the rate of 1400 per week. On arrival, male refugees were screened at the Center for intelligence and counter-intelligence potential. From 3/15 to 10/23/62 (the date on which civil air travel was suspended), 10,000 refugees were interviewed at the Center, and 5608 intelligence reports were disseminated to the community.

According to the 11/14/62 CIA Chronology: "On 15 February, 1962 an interagency interrogation center was established by CIA at Opa Locka, near Miami, to handle Cuban refugees and improve the quality of intelligence collected from them . . . . . The establishment of Opa Locka coincided with a sharp drop in reports of missile activity received in Washington. When the defensive phase of the Soviet buildup began, the volume of Opa Locka reporting rose very rapidly, and provided good information on the types of equipment coming in, on the use of Soviet personnel and on the security precautions imposed by the Soviets on this operation -- such reports were the basis for the Checklist item cited . . . " (See Items Nos. 54 and 59, infra).

(NOTE: As reflected in Item No. 134, infra, a somewhat different CIA assessment of the reports appears elsewhere in the CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 wherein it is stated that CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before January 1, 1962, all of which were either totally false or misrepresentations by the observer of other kinds of activity. The CIA Chronology adds that CIA analysts had come to view such reports with suspicion.)

29. 3/21/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-62 on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba". It stated that Cuban military capabilities are "essentially defensive" and that "we believe it unlikely that the Bloc will provide Cuba with strategic weapon systems or with air and naval capabilities suitable for major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the Bloc will station in Cuba combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate (the next two years). This attitude would

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 5)

(29. 3/21/62 Continued)

"not preclude the liberal provision of Bloc advisers, instructors, and service personnel, the provision of such defensive weapons and equipment as surface-to-air missiles and radars, and such improvement of Cuban naval and air facilities as would enable them to service Soviet units." A foreword to the above estimate states that "Our information on internal developments is not as complete or as reliable as we could wish. On some matters, it is seriously inadequate . . . In general, the information available is sufficient to support the estimate."

30. 3/27/62 - The U.S. stated that the Sino-Soviet bloc has furnished $100 million worth of military equipment and technical services to Cuba, and that several hundred Cuban military personnel have received training, including pilot training, in the bloc. "Arms include 5 to 75 MIG jet fighters; 150 to 250 tanks; 50 to 100 assault guns; 500 to 1000 field artillery; 500 to 1000 antiaircraft artillery; 500 mortars; 200,000 small arms, and some patrol vessels and torpedo boats. No evidence of missiles, missile bases or bombers." (Source: Chronology prepared by the State Department at the request of Senator Morse.)

31. 4/11/62 - DIA initiated meetings with JCS and CIA personnel to discuss refugee interrogation guides for use at the Opa-locka center and to review intelligence requirements on Cuba. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

32. Spring of 1962 - "The USSR's decision to develop Cuba as a military base must have been made by the spring of 1962 and preparations within the USSR must have been under way from that time on. There also must have been planning activities in Cuba, in particular, reconnaissance and survey work. The only indication of these operations which can be found is a single intercepted personal message (4/11/62) addressed to a Russian in Cuba who had previously been at the Kapustin Yar missile test range. This fragment was not judged important enough to warrant inclusion in current intelligence publications". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

33. May 1962 - A Cuban "Indications Center" was established at CINCLANT on the recommendations of DIA and NORAD. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

34. 5/31/62 - On this date the NPIC began publishing a series of formal reports dealing with NPIC's evaluation, from a photographic standpoint, of refugee and agent reports on Cuba. Between 5/31 and 10/5, NPIC examined 138 refugee and agent reports. The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 stated that only three of these reports cited missile activity which could not be linked to the SAM and cruise missile deployments, and "NPIC's evidence negated those three." Elsewhere in the CIA Chronology it is stated "CIA current intelligence was ordered on 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of

(34. 5/31/62 Continued)

"missile bases in Cuba until they had been checked out with NPIC." Between 14 August and mid-October one CIA office sent NPIC 13 memoranda "asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding."

35. 6/1/62 - DIA issued intelligence requirements regarding the missile buildup in Cuba including missiles of intermediate range. These requirements were described by General Carroll as detailed and comprehensive and as including suggested clandestine intelligence requirements for CIA.
(Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

36. 6/26/62 - At the PFIAB Meeting on this date, Mr. Richard Helms, Deputy Director of Plans, CIA, reported that CIA relaxed its intelligence and covert action efforts against Cuba following the abortive invasion in April, 1961; that since December 1961 CIA has mounted a major intelligence effort against Cuba; that there have been weekly U-2 overflights of Cuba; that an interrogation center has been set up at Opa-locka, with Defense participation, where 1600 Cuban refugees a week are interrogated with 250 weekly intelligence reports resulting therefrom; that such intelligence reports are coordinated with U-2 photography as the basis for disseminating intelligence data on the status of the military situation in Cuba; that CIA is operating intelligence agents in Cuba; that some intelligence is also received from British, French, Maxican and other governments still maintaining diplomatic relations with Cuba; that the Cubans are credited with being stronger militarily than any other Latin American country, but that the Cuban ground forces do not represent an offensive capability; that they have no guided missiles; and that no nuclear weapons are known to have been supplied to Cuba by the USSR.

37. July 1962 - According to the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62, "intelligence officers dealing with Cuba were focusing during July on the direction Soviet-Cuban relations would take following Soviet acquiescence in Castros' assertion of his leadership of Cuban Communism in the Escalante affair."

38. 7/4/62 - The President's Intelligence Checklist, prepared by CIA, referring to Raul Castro's visit to Moscow, noted that Raul was probably seeking more Soviet military aid such as MIG-21s and surface-to-air missiles which the USSR was already providing to Indonesia, Egypt and Iraq.

39. 7/19/62 - CIA's President's Checklist noted that the fact that Raul left Moscow without publicity indicated that this was a "pretty good sign that the visit was unproductive". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

40. 7/19/62 - The NSC Special 5412/2 Group (and later the President) approved a proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba "be continued at their current level of two a month". This recommendation was based on a memo from the DD/I to the DCI following a request made of the DCI on 7/10 by General Taylor who had asked for a comprehensive review of all aerial photography activities. The justification advanced for the DCI's proposal that U-2 flights over Cuba be "continued at their current level" was (1) that earlier missions over Cuba had provided "conclusive evidence that recurring reports of submarines and missile bases in Cuba have been false", and (2) that "our most important need is for any evidence of the deployment of SA-2 missiles and/or MIG-21s in Cuba". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

41. 7/26-29/62 - Soviet ships carrying equipment and personnel for the Soviet buildup in Cuba first began arriving at Cuban ports. ". . . evidence gradually accumulated that the behavior pattern of these ships was similar to that of Soviet ships carrying arms to other countries, that even greater security measures than usual were in effect, that a number of the ships were coming from the Baltic rather than Black Sea ports, that some of these were passenger ships, and finally that there was a general movement of Bloc shipping toward Cuba on an unprecedented scale. Apparently, the first recognition of unusual activity in any intelligence publication was a note in a daily review of economic intelligence for CIA internal use . . . this paper stated on August 1, that 'at least some if not all of the ships involved probably are carrying additional military equipment to Cuba'. This statement was in direct contradiction to NSA's comment on the same information, i.e., that it tended to corroborate a report by the Brazilian Ambassador in Havana (earlier intercepted by NSA) that Raul Castro had asked the USSR to take back excess war materiel. . ." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

42. August 1962 - ". . . It should be noted for the record that CIA was in disagreement with DIA over interpretation of intelligence on the movement of shipping to Cuba throughout the month of August. The resulting difficulties in coordination of items for the Central Intelligence Bulletin (CIB), held up publication from 3 August to 9 August of the first item on this subject in that publication. As late as 29 August, DIA in its own daily Intelligence Summary said that 'The high volume of shipping probably reflects planned increases in trade between the USSR and Cuba . . .' There were further difficulties resulting from CIA-DIA differences in the interpretation of photography of aircraft crates deck-loaded on Soviet ships; the record shows that CIA was right. Finally, it should be noted that there is a long history of CIA efforts to obtain better photography on deck cargoes and faster service in returning these pictures to Washington." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

43. 8/1/62 - The DCI circulated NIE 85-2-62 on "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", which stated that the capabilities of the Cuban armed forces "have been and are being greatly enhanced by the Soviet Bloc's provision of military equipment and instruction. Cuban military capabilities however are essentially defensive. We believe it unlikely that the bloc will provide Cuba with the capability to undertake major independent military operations overseas. We also believe it unlikely that the bloc will station in Cuba bloc combat units of any description, at least for the period of this estimate." (The estimate was "over the next year or so".) With respect to this estimate CIA reported that "The Intelligence Community view of the Cuban problem in this period was crystallized in NIE 85-2-62 . . . as the intelligence foundation for MONGOOSE". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

44. 8/4/62 - CIA's President's Checklist ("not being under a requirement for USIB coordination was able to report the accumulating information fully to the President") stated that "Eleven Soviet ships are on their way to Havana and we strongly suspect they are carrying arms. Such a delivery would not be far short of the total amount of arms delivered in the first half of 1962". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

45. 8/5/62 - "The first of the two Cuban U-2 missions authorized for August was flown on August 5, probably just too soon to detect significant reflections of the Soviet equipment entering the island at that time." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

46. 8/8/62 - "Observations (in reports later reviewed) at the port of Mariel suggest that preparations for construction of the Guanajay MRBM sites were being made in early August. Prefabricated concrete slabs up to 12x4x2 feet in size and more than thirty dark colored cylindrical tanks about 30 feet long and 10 feet in diameter were off-loaded about 8 August. Tubular and semicircular shaped concrete forms arrived in Mariel during the same period. Similar items have been photographed at the IRBM sites in the Guanajay-Bauta area. One source reported that this material was designed for use in building missile bases, and that some of the cargo was delivered to the Bauta area. . ."

"Concrete forms similar to those observed at Mariel were off-loaded at the port of La Isabela (in the Remedios IRBM site area) during August . . ." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

47. 8/8/62 - "The DCI briefed the Republican Policy Committee, emphasizing the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

48. 8/9/62 - CIA's President's Checklist for this date said "Soviet ships have been arriving on an unprecedented scale since mid-July. Some 32 vessels are involved; at least half of these we believe to be carrying arms. Five passenger ships with a total capacity of about 3,000 persons have already arrived. Some of the personnel are said to be Soviet technicians, and we have no reason to doubt this. We do not believe that there are any combat troops among them." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

49. 8/10/62 - At a MONGOOSE meeting, the DCI stressed the importance of intelligence received on the arrival of Soviet military equipment and technicians in Cuba. The DCI "raised questions as to what purpose was behind the sudden movement of men and materiel, and said that the United States must face the possibility of the USSR locating MRBMs in Cuba as a step that it could justify because of U. S. missile bases in places like Italy and Turkey." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

50. 8/14/62 - There arrived in Havana the first shipment of KOMAR class patrol craft in Cuba -- each carrying two homing missiles with a range of 10 or 15 nm and carrying 2000 pound HE warheads. The KOMARS were transported to Cuba as deck cargo on Soviet ships, two and four per shipload. By 10/20 there were a total of 12 KOMAR craft in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

51. 8/14/62 - "CIA current intelligence was ordered orally by the DD/I's office on about 14 August not to publish any information on the construction of missile bases until they had been checked out with NPIC -- this instruction was in the field of intelligence technique rather than of policy; it had no relation to later restrictions (see Item No. 152, infra) . . . . Between 14 August and mid-October this office sent NPIC 13 memoranda asking for a check on 25 separate reports containing information which was thought to raise the possibility of Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba. A great many more such reports were checked with NPIC informally by telephone. In all cases, NPIC either lacked the necessary coverage or made a negative finding." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

52. 8/15/62 - On this date, in an effort to supply guidance and requirements for photographic reconnaissance, the DIA asked NPIC to conduct a study and review of photographic intelligence which had previously been obtained with respect to three particularly suspect areas in Cuba. On 8/17 photographic evidence indicated that SA-2 equipment was located in two of these three suspect areas, although there was no evidence of their deployment. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, on 11/9/62)

53. 8/15/62 - "Construction material for the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites began to arrive at Mariel about mid-August . . . . minor activity of an indefinite type was noted there in the 29 August photography, and major construction had probably begun by 15 September. (The fact that shipments to Guanajay started before those to San Cristobal reflects the longer lead-time required for construction

(53. 8/15/62 Continued)

"of a fixed site.) It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

54. 8/18/62 - CIA's President's Checklist reported that "There are grounds for thinking that the large influx of Soviet military equipment and technicians into Cuba lately could be connected with the beginning of construction of surface-to-air missile sites. What we know so far is that the shipments have included quantities of electronic, transportation and construction equipment, some of it similar to Soviet equipment which showed up in Indonesia for the building of SAM installations, and that many of the arriving Soviets are construction personnel . . ." (The CIA Chronology at this point states that "Soviet operations in August involved primarily the establishment of surface-to-air missile and coast defense missile positions. By the middle of August CIA was receiving a large volume of agent and refugee reporting which, while understandably garbled and fragmentary, enabled its (CIA's) analysts to pinpoint areas of construction and identify some of the equipment coming in.") (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

55. 8/20/62 - "The COMOR Targeting Working Group (chaired and staffed largely by CIA) set up the first comprehensive card file system for Cuban targets." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

56. 8/21/62 - At a meeting in Secretary Rusk's office (attended also by Secretary McNamara, Under Secretary Johnson, the Attorney General, General Taylor, General Lemnitzer and Mr. McGeorge Bundy) the DCI said that "information available since 10 August indicated the extent of Soviet aid was much greater than previously thought, and that this probably included highly-sophisticated electronic installations or missile sites, probably ground-to- air." "The possibility of Soviet MRBMs in Cuba was again raised by the DCI, which developed a discussion of possible U.S. courses of action . . . It was agreed that the DCI would fully brief the President the next day (which he did) and that Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and the DCI would discuss the situation with the President on 23 August." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

57. 8/23/62 - A meeting was held with the President with Messrs. Rusk, McNamara, Gilpatric, Taylor, Bundy and McCone in attendance. This meeting resulted in the issuance of NSAM (National Security Action Memorandum) #181 dated 8/23/62, reflecting that "The President has directed that the following actions and studies be undertaken in the light of evidence of new bloc activity in Cuba . . .

> "2. What information should be made available in the United States and abroad with respect to these new bloc activities in Cuba?"

(57. 8/23/62 Continued_

"4. The line of activity projected for operation MONGOOSE PLAN B PLUS should be developed with all possible speed."

"5. An analysis should be prepared of the probable military, political and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the United States."

"6. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of making a statement that the United States would not tolerate the establishment of military forces (missile or air, or both?) which might launch a nuclear attack from Cuba against the United States."

"7. A study should be made of the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching a nuclear attack on the United States. What would be the pros and cons, for example, of pinpoint attack, general counterforce attack, and outright invasion?"

"8. A study should be made of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action beyond the MONGOOSE B PLUS, in the context of an aggravated Berlin Crisis."

NSAM No. 181 indicated there would be a further meeting with the President about 9/1 to review progress on the above items and that in the event of important new information an earlier meeting would be called. The NSAM concluded with the statement "The President emphasizes again the sensitive character of these instructions."

58. 8/23/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 referring to the meeting with the President, which resulted in the issuance of NSAM #181, states: " . . . Thus, by 23 August CIA had alerted the highest levels of the government to a rapidly unfolding Soviet military development in Cuba, including the probable establishment of surface-to-air missile sites, and the danger of surface-to-surface missiles. Furthermore, the President had taken action on the intelligence received. There was at this time no evidence of any sort that surface-to-surface weapons were being installed -- in fact, the MRBM units had scarcely started en route from the USSR -- but the possibility had been discussed by the President and his advisers."

59. 8/23/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Most of our information from within Cuba on the influx of Soviet equipment and technicians has come from Cuban sources. We now have several reports from the British Embassy whose people have been out looking."

(59. 8/23/62 Continued)

"They have spotted at least one camp southwest of Havana, where the number of vehicles suggested the presence of 'many' more than the 200 presumed young Russians they did see, and where a radio antenna field had already been erected. This they think could be connected with radio monitoring."

"Their information on the equipment coming in--some hard, some not--leads them to suggest that an expert might consider the possibility of antiaircraft rockets and radar."

(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

60. 8/24/62 - On the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62 Senator Engle stated that "On August 24 the Department of State gave a background press and radio news briefing" on the subject of Soviet activities in Cuba. The Senator then quoted a number of articles from various U.S. newspapers dated from 8/24 to 8/26/62, which Senator Engle summarized as follows: "All these stories contain the same set of facts. All of them mention 3000 to 5000 Soviet technicians. All of them mention the strengthening of coastal and air defenses . . . All of these articles relate that the information came from U.S. officials." (Source: Congressional Record)

61. 8/27/62 - In a memorandum of this date, General Carter reported to Mr. Bundy on actions taken in response to NSAM 181: (a) Task Force "W" would look into the possibility of removing the restrictions on the mounting of clandestine operations out of Guantanamo, (b) the Board of National Estimates would "establish a procedure to ensure continuing analysis" of the numbers and types of Communist Bloc personnel and equipment entering Cuba and its probable use, and of all construction, particularly missile sites, (c) the Board of National Estimates would assess the physical and psychological dangers to the U.S. and Latin America of missile installations in Cuba, (d) a daily CIA "Cuban Highlights" memorandum would be published for distribution to the President and others, (e) CIA would arrange intelligence collection overflights "as frequently as the situation demands," and (f) Task Force "W" would prepare a plan of operations for "MONGOOSE B PLUS." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

62. 8/27/62 - On this date, pursuant to NSAM 181, OCI of CIA began publishing a daily paper, "Cuban Highlights," using a "philosophy and format similar to the (President's) Checklist." It was to include current intelligence estimative assessments and press coverage -- for distribution to the President, Bundy, McNamara, Gilpatric, Lemnitzer, Rusk, Taylor, and the Attorney General. (A few officials were later added to the distribution.) "It was discontinued on 19 September, because General Carter and the DD/I concluded that sufficient emphasis was by then being given to Cuban reporting in regular intelligence publications." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

63. 8/27/62 - "Based on refugee reporting the COMOR Targeting Working Group pinpointed four farms in (the Sagua La Grande) area as suspect missile sites." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

64. 8/29/62 - The State Department briefed a bipartisan group in the House of Representatives, according to Senator Engle's statement on the floor of the Senate on 9/5/62. He said that the statement which had been supplied to the House of Representatives by the Department of State on 8/29 read as follows: "Soviet Military Aid to Cuba. After a lull since early 1962 the Soviet Union resumed large-scale military deliveries to Cuba in the last week in July. Since then, Soviet ship movements to Cuba have totaled at least 25, including at least 5 passenger ships. This is in addition to normal tanker and cargo movements. The shipments contained both military and economic goods and personnel. Although full details are not yet available on the contents of the ships, nor of the breakdown between military and nonmilitary, information to date indicates the following:

"Cargo: Military cargo, perhaps as much as half of the total, included large quantities of transportation, electronic, and construction equipment, such as communications vans, radar vans, trucks, and mobile generator units. Much of the equipment is likely to go into the improvement of coastal and air defenses. The size and shape of some of the boxes delivered suggests that it is possible they could contain ground-to-air missiles for antiaircraft use, but we have no information on that as yet. These missiles are not adaptable for nuclear use.

"Nonmilitary cargo, roughly half of the total, consists of deliveries, already behind schedule, of industrial and agricultural equipment under aid and trade agreements.

"Personnel: A large number of additional Soviet specialists arrived in Cuba in the same period. With the recent arrivals, the total number in Cuba or on the way, both military and nonmilitary may be as high as 5000. The breakdown between military and technical personnel is not known, but the additional numbers of military specialists are not incompatible with the training and setting up of the complex military equipment which has arrived. There is no evidence of the arrival of Soviet combat troops from other Soviet bloc countries.

"The shipments consist of both economic goods and defensive military goods. They appear designed to enhance the Cuban regime's defense capabilities against an internal threat, and to increase the effectiveness of the Cuban military establishment for possible internal use. Information to date indicates that the shipments will not improve significantly the very limited offensive capabilities of the Cuban armed forces.

"The recent shipments indicate a significant increase in Soviet involvement in Cuba. The increased amount of military assistance accompanies stepped-up Soviet economic aid to try to relieve Cuban shortages. The shipments must have been planned several months ago to have arrived when they did. The Cuban regime, facing economic deterioration and rising popular discontent, probably hopes to strengthen its internal position through new demonstrations of Soviet support." (Source: Congressional Record)

202-10001-10011 PART 2

65. 8/29/62 - SAM sites in Cuba were "first observed" as the result of the U-2 photographic mission flown on this date. On this date 8 SA-2 sites were identified. (Three more were observed on 9/5 -- one on 9/26 -- one on 9/29 -- 1 on 10/5 -- 6 on 10/7 -- 2 on 10/14 -- 1 on 10/15 -- 1 on 10/17 -- Total 24 sites). (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62, Table 3)

66. 8/29/62 - Referring to results of the 8/29 U-2 mission, the CIA Chronology states "Read out of the 29 August coverage showed an SA-2 site near Sagua La Grande which apparently was the basis for the reported activity there" (i.e., the pinpointing of four farms in the Sagua La Grande area as "suspect missile sites," referred to in Item No. 63 above) . . . "the target card was changed to show a confirmed SA-2 site. It should be noted that knowledge that this site was in the area could have lead analysts to misinterpret any subsequent reports of MRBM activity as part of the SAM development, but in fact no such reports were received." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

67. 8/29/62 - A DIA study of the 8/29 U-2 photography and a study of refugee reports, suggested some sort of clandestine activity in progress in the San Cristobal area. This prompted the DIA to request additional photographic coverage of this area, but such coverage was not accomplished until 10/14 for a variety of reasons including poor weather and the requirement that the U-2 not overfly SA-2 installations. (Source: Oral report to Board by Director, DIA, 11/9/62)

68. 8/29/62 - The minutes of the USIB meeting on this date show that Mr. Hilsman requested an SNIE on the military buildup in Cuba. The paper requested by Mr. Hilsman and the Board of National Estimates memorandum already requested by the DD/I (on 8/24) were combined.

" . . . . Successive drafts of such a paper, prepared by the ONE staff, were quickly overtaken by the photography which became available after 29 August. At the USIB meeting of 7 September, further attempts to write such a paper were deferred until 19 September, by which date the new information could be digested. This estimate, SNIE 85-3-62, was in fact passed by USIB on 19 September . . . . ."

At the USIB meeting on this date, two other subjects were discussed: (1) the question raised by General Carter and Mr. Cline of more rapid delivery from Turkey and Denmark of Navy photography of outbound Soviet ships, and (2) the action which General Carter had taken on 8/27/62 in asking General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using F-101 or F8U aircraft -- to which General Lemnitzer had replied that "something could be dug up." (This action by General Carter in calling General Lemnitzer was the result of an instruction telephoned from out of town by the DCI who had left Washington on August 23 for the West Coast, then left the country on August 30 for the Riviera, and returned on September 23. The DCI "was concerned over the long delay of the 29 August mission by weather."). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

HANDLE VIA COMINT/TALENT/KEYHOLE CHANNELS ONLY

SPECIAL LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

69. 8/29/62 - CIA's President's Checklist contained the report that:

"There is no sign of a let-up in the movement of Soviet equipment and personnel into Cuba.

"By latest count, there have during the past six weeks been some 80 voyages to Cuban ports by Bloc vessels and 20-35 by ships under Communist charter.

"We note that deliveries of industrial equipment, foodstuffs, and other nonmilitary items are being made largely on chartered Western ships, probably because so many Soviet ships are involved in hauling military gear." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

70. 8/30/62 - At a meeting of the Special Group, General Lemnitzer told the Group of his discussion with General Carter who had on 8/27 asked General Lemnitzer about the possibility of low-level photography using F-101 or F8U aircraft. The Special Group agreed to take cognizance of the matter and "reopen it when specific targets and information needs could be identified."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

71. 8/30/62 - A draft prepared by the JCS on 8/30 in response to NSAM 181 of 8/23/62 presented to the White House "a study of the advantages and disadvantages of action to liberate Cuba by blockade or invasion or other action in the context of aggravated Berlin crisis". The following are selected highlights from the draft:

In NSAM 109 of 10/23/61, the President described the four phases into which he expected progressive U.S. and Allied military action to fall, in meeting and countering Soviet/GDR measures to force the Western powers out of Berlin.

"The JCS are of the opinion that positive action of oppose communist agression in any geographical area will be evidence of the determination of the United States and will influence the Berlin decision. However, they consider that actions outside of Germany should be complementary to, and not substituted for, actions to be taken in Central Europe to maintain our rights in Berlin and prevent denial of access."

"The Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated repeatedly that the United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence of a communist government in Cuba and that the requirement to remove the communist government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly increasing capabilities."

"Conclusions": (a) a blockade would be an act of war (b) the undertaking of the liberation of Cuba by invasion during a period of aggravated crisis in Berlin is militarily sound -- contingent upon the call-of of substantial additional forces to active duty and a firm preparedness to execute full mobilization if necessary, and

(71. 8/30/62 Continued)

(c) other actions (such as covert measures to eliminate Cuban nuclear launch installations) would be less effective than full scale military intervention and would produce only partial or temporary results.

Military Alternatives

The JCS draft also included a section ("Item 7") in response to the provision of Par. 7 of NSAM 181 which called for a Department of Defense study of "the various military alternatives which might be adopted in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U. S. . . . (for example, (a) pinpoint attack (b) general counter-force attack, (c) outright invasion).

In a preface to this study the JCS pointed out that (1) although the current evaluation of reported SAM sites in Cuba is that they are for defensive purposes and designed for air defense, if these sites are effectively used to derogate U.S. aerial reconnaissance the Cubans will have an opportunity to develop such offensive capabilities as missile launch sites and submarine bases (2) a Cuban offensive capability would fill gaps in the Russian missile coverage of the U.S. and also provide the Cuban Communist government with a means of countering future U.S. actions against Cuba through blackmail, and (3) continued development of Cuban capabilities would increase U.S. defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet the threat.

The JCS analysis of alternative U.S. military actions was then set forth in essence as follows:

a. Pinpoint attack (i.e., a localized attack against a specific facility followed by planned withdrawal . . . This might be done by pinpoint air attack, or by covert commando-type raids (not recommended) on targets adjacent to coastal areas). Advantages: economical in force applied . . . minimizes U.S. and Cuban casualties, and pre-attack publicity. Disadvantages: eliminates nuclear launch capability only on a temporary basis . . . no less belligerent than any other act of war . . . even if covert will brand U.S. as aggressor . . . affords Cuba with outcry before international organizations and a legal justification for retaliatory attacks on the U.S. . . . gives USSR precedent for retaliation against U.S. installations on periphery of Bloc . . . little or no effect on Cuban Communist regime or other Cuban militaryforces.

b. General counter-force attack (i.e., an attack designed to destroy or neutralize Cuban nuclear capability installations or areas, through air attacks, naval gunfire, or possible overt airborne or amphibious assaults with or without immediate subsequent withdrawal). Advantages: moderately economical in use of U.S. forces if adequate air and naval support . . . fewer U.S. and Cuban casualties than if a full scale invasion. Disadvantages: same as disadvantages of "Pinpoint attack", above, and also . . . could lead to invasion to extricate U.S. forces . . . gives USSR precendent for reprisal against U.S.

(71. 8/30/62 Continued)

installations on periphery of Bloc, Formosa, etc. . . . affords USSR with opportunity for stepped-up military material and technical buildup.

c. Outright invasion (i.e., would be accomplished through execution of existing U.S. military contingency plans with full preparation for positive and effective overt U.S. intervention). Advantages: permanent elimination of Cuban facilities having present or potential capability to launch nuclear attack on the U.S. . . . would eliminate Communist government in Cuba and expel direct Soviet influence . . . is equally effective against coastal or inland target areas, whether missile sites, airfields or potential submarine bases . . . would clearly establish that the Monroe Doctrine is effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy . . . would reassert U.S. determination to maintain integrity of Western Hemisphere and reaffirm principle of government by self-determination . . . would restore U.S. prestige, world-wide. Disadvantages: would reduce in some degree U.S. capability to react in other contingency areas during the operation.

JCS conclusion: ". . . the advantages of a decisive execution of an outright invasion, together with the many disadvantages of any lesser alternative, conclusively indicate that this is the only course of action which should be adopted in order effectively and permanently to accomplish the mission.

"Accordingly, it is recommended that in executing a decision to eliminate any installations in Cuba capable of launching nuclear attack on the U.S., only overt full-scale military action should be considered. Further, noting the increasing complexities attending the delay of U.S. intervention in Cuba, a previous recommendation is reiterated, that a national policy of early military intervention be adopted by the United States."

72. 8/30/62 - The following excerpt from the President's press conference of 8/30/62 was reported in the Congressional Record on 9/5/62:

The President: "We have no evidence of troops . . . In response to your specific question, we have no information that troops have come into Cuba . . . the main thrust of course is assistance because of the mismanagement of the Cuban economy . . . However, we are continuing to watch what happens in Cuba with the closest attention and will respond to -- will be glad to announce any new information if it should come immediately."

Question: "Mr. President, I wonder if a distinction could be made with respect to the troops in Cuba. Some of us were told at the State Department the other day that there is Russian military personnel in Cuba, that these are military technicians, and that they are people who are going to operate missiles, similar to the Nike missiles --"

(72. 8/30/62 Continued)

The President: "I don't know who told you that at the State Department, that they are going to operate Nike missiles, because that information we do not have at this time. There certainly are technicians there and they may be military technicians. We don't have complete information about what's going on in Cuba, but since the word 'troops' has been generally used they had a military advisory commission there for a long period of time, so there may be additional military advisory personnel or technicians. But on the question of troops, as it is generally understood, we do not have evidence that there are Russian troops there. There is an expanded advisory and technical mission. That is correct."

Question: "Are there no antiaircraft missiles shipped to Cuba?"

The President: "We have no information as yet . . . that does not mean that there have not been, but all I am saying is that we have no such information as yet."

73. 8/31/62 - CIA's President's Checklist stated that:

"Preliminary information from the 30 (sic) August U-2 mission shows at least seven SA-2 sites on the western half of the island. Manning of this many sites would require some 1500-2000 Bloc troops. We are able to report on the basis of what is known so far that construction of the sites appears to be fairly advanced and that there are canvas-covered missiles in the vicinity of some sites. The existence of additional sites can probably be assumed.

"The same source reveals seven or eight Soviet missile-equipped torpedo boats and an undetermined number of Soviet tanks. The Cubans have had Soviet tanks for some time, but this is our first indication that they now have boats of this type. They appear to be KOMAR-class converted PT-boats, mounting two surface-to-surface missiles with an estimated range of 35 nautical miles." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7)

74. 8/31/62 - Par 5 of NSAM 181 called for an analysis (by the White House, consulting with State, Defense and CIA) of "the probable military, political, and psychological impact of the establishment in Cuba of either surface-to-air missiles or surface-to-surface missiles which could reach the U.S." Accordingly, such an analysis was made and set forth in a memorandum (labelled "Top Secret and Sensitive") signed by Mr. McGeorge Bundy under date of August 31, 1962. There follows a summary of selected highlights from that memorandum, under the topic headings set forth therein:

"1. Soviet missile possibilities in Cuba"

"The most probable present Soviet missile activity would be the introduction of SA-2 missiles." Preliminary photo

(74. 8/31/62 Continued)

interpretation shows 7 SA-2 sites in early stages of construction . . . a modern first-line AA missile with an engagement range of 30 miles and high reliability from 2500 to 60,000 feet, and limited effectiveness up to 80,000 feet . . . probably capable of use with a nuclear warhead, but there is no evidence that the Soviet Government has ever provided nuclear warheads to another state, and it seems unlikely that such a move is currently planned -- although there is little reason to suppose that the Soviets would refuse to introduce such weapons if the move could be controlled in the Soviet interest.

Other missiles which could be introduced now or later are surface-to-surface missiles with ranges from 150 miles to 2000 miles (the Soviet MRBM), which would be of little value without nuclear war heads. Longer range surface-to-surface missiles would require relatively substantial installations -- shorter range missiles of this sort could be introduced very quickly and mounted without elaborate construction . . . As missile capabilities increase in the remainder of the 1960's, it will be progressively easier for the Soviet Union to install in Cuba lightweight mobile missiles with increasing range and destructive power against aircraft and against targets in the U.S.

"2. Military impact of the introduction of Soviet missiles in Cuba:"

"A. Surface-to-air missiles"

Extensive deployment of SA-2s would make reconnaissance overflight and other clandestine air operations difficult and dangerous, and would substantially increase the problem of neutralizing air defense in event of open conflict . . .

"B. Surface-to-surface missiles"

SSMs with nuclear warheads would be a very significant military threat to the U.S. . . . It appears probable that on military grounds alone the establishment of such a capability would be unacceptable.

It may well be that the introduction of nuclear warheads into Cuba is a more significant dividing line than introduction of any given class of missiles as such -- but the covert introduction of nuclear warheads would be very hard to detect.

Attention should also be given to the possibility that the Soviets may attempt to set up a submarine missile base in Cuba.

(74. 8/31/62 Continued)

"3. Political and psychological impact of a Soviet missile establishment in Cuba"

In supplying Cuba with missiles of any sort, the Soviet Union is obviously staking a claim to a large-scale military foothold in the Western hemisphere . . . the delivery of MIGs a year ago did not greatly disturb American or hemisphere opinion, but missiles are something else again . . . and we cannot expect that the public mind will serenely distinguish between aircraft missiles and a direct threat of missile attack on the U. S.

Any missile deployment in Cuba will strengthen critics of the Administration's "softness" on Cuba. This effect can be somewhat mitigated by words and actions being considered in other responses to NSAM 181, but it cannot be prevented while the missiles remain in place.

". . . There will be a distinct difference in impact between missiles for defensive use against aircraft and missiles capable of use against the United States . . . international acceptance of action against defensive installations would be lower than in the case of action against missiles posing a direct nuclear threat to the U. S. . . ."

In Latin America the psychological and political effect of missile installations in Cuba (no matter what kind) will be substantial . . . the missile sites would be seen as proof of strong Soviet support for Cuba . . . in the absence of prompt and effective U. S. counteraction, it would be judged that Castro is here to stay . . . in the Caribbean this would lead to heavy pressure for more U. S. support against Castro's subversion . . . other Latin American states would be more than ever inclined to accommodate to Cuba . . . and all this would accentuate inter-American strains.

"SUMMARY: In sum, the expectation is that any missiles will have a substantial political and psychological impact, while surface-to-surface missiles would create a condition of great alarm, even in the absence of proof that nuclear warheads were arriving with them."

75. 8/31/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating included the following in his remarks on the floor of the U. S. Senate:

". . . I am reliably informed--when I say 'reliably informed,' I mean that has been checked out from five different sources, and I am certain I can state it as a fact--that between the dates of 8/4 and 8/15, 10 or 12 Soviet vessels anchored at the Marante dock area at Mariel. The dock area previously had been surrounded by the construction of a high cinder-block wall. The Soviet ships unloaded 1200

(75. 8/31/62 Continued)

"troops. Troops is what I mean, and not technicians. They were wearing Soviet fatigue uniforms.

"On August 13 five Soviet torpedo boats unloaded from Soviet ships, and are now moored at La Base. There is every indication that the naval complement to handle these boats disembarked at the same time.

"Again let me emphasize that these could not reasonably be called technicians.

"On August 13, 1,000 non-Cuban personnel in fatigue uniforms were seen working in the area near Finca La Guatana, in all probability on or near a missile base located in that area.

"On August 3 a large convoy of military vehicles manned by Soviet personnel was observed on the highway in Las Villas Province. The convoy moved in military order and contained the first amphibious vehicles observed in Cuba; also jeeps, 6x6 trucks, and tracked trucks.

"On August 5 there was a movement seen of a 64-vehicle convoy heading west on Carretera Central. The convoy was moving in military order. It included tanks, cannonlike trailers, and flatbed trailers.

"On August 8 there was observed a night movement of a convoy on Carretera Central. Flatbed trucks were observed transporting concave metal structures supported by tubing. The convoy included a number of closed vans. The convoy appeared to be moving toward an installation 4 to 5 kilometers from Canimar in a closely restricted area believed to contain a rocket installation.

"There have been other observations of activities there, which have been confirmed.

". . . Since July the Soviet Union has greatly stepped up shipments of men and equipment. More than 20 cargo ships have arrived from Communist ports in the last few weeks. Many have been unloaded under maximum security. Between three and five thousand so-called 'technicians' have arrived in the course of the past year. Soviet statistics reveal that by the end of the year the Soviets will have shipped nearly $1 billion of goods and equipment to Castro. Cuban trade with non-Communist countries will be down to about 30 percent next year and Cuba will be virtually isolated from the free world--a Communist enclave within the free world where the Soviets can operate unchecked and to a large extent unobserved.

". . . More ominous reports suggest that the Soviets are constructing missile bases and sending over technicians and experts to man them. In this way the Soviets could expect to discourage determined refugees of other nations of this hemisphere from any kind of concerted attack on the Cuban dictatorship. They could also strengthen Castro to resist increasing internal dissatisfaction against his "regime. That supposition, which our Government has never openly admitted or discussed, is a source of serious concern to the people of all the Americas. It should be fully aired. The dangers inherent in the situation should be known and appreciated by all the people of this hemisphere, and particularly by those nations which so far have actively blocked measures to combat the menace of Castroism.

"Another very real possibility and, in my judgment, a probability that should be a source of even greater concern to the U.S. and which has so far not been openly discussed at all in this country is that the Soviets are deliberately taking advantage of the proximity between Cuba and Cape Canaveral to conduct other activities. There is no question at all of the possibility of interference with American space flights by sensitive equipment mounted in Cuba and operated by Communist experts. . ." (Source: Congressional Record)

76. 8/31/62 - In retrospect "a thorough review of refugee reports concerning the general areas now containing IRBM and MRBM sites has produced some probable indicators of scheduling. This collateral information indicates that plans to deploy ballistic missiles in Cuba were being implemented by the end of August. Site locations apparently had been selected and the surveys for the initial IRBM installations were probably completed by that time. IRBM site construction was apparently under way in September and preceded the MRBM sites. This sequence is also indicated by the photography."

"Reported activities indicate that probably all of the San Cristobal sites were selected by MRBM deployment in August since an area which includes some of the sites was made a restricted zone during late August-early September."

"Refugees had also reported "about August 22 the owner of a farm, now the location of San Cristobal MRBM Site 3, was evicted and the secondary road to the farm was improved by 24 August . . . (A Soviet survey team was reported in the vicinity of San Diego de los Banos, a village about 4 miles west of Site 1, on 5 September)".
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62, Supp. 4)

77. 8/31/62 - CIA distributed a raw intelligence report which was based on information acquired in the U.S. on 8/23/62 (presumably from refugee sources) and which stated in part "A platoon of Soviets who are specialists in rocketry and atomic arms is assigned to the Ministry of the Cuban Armed Forces".

78. 8/31/62 - Information received by an American correspondent in Mexico from a prominent Cuban exile and reported to the U.S. Embassy in Mexico City: ". . . Soviet military presence in Cuba was a fact . . . among the thousands of Soviet technicians who recently arrived on the island, many appeared to be between 18 and 20 years of age, too young to acquire any technical experience to impart to the Cubans . . . these young Russians dress in sports clothes but give the appearance of having only recently completed their military training . . . two sites with antennae, presumably used for monitoring activity at Cape Canaveral, will be converted into missile bases . . ." (Source: State Department Airgram from Mexico City No. 737.00/8-3162, dated 8/31/62)

79. 8/31/62 - A column by Henry J. Taylor (date and newspaper not identified) was inserted into the Congressional Record of 8/31/62 page A6559, by Congressman William C. Cramer:

". . . we help Cuba mightily by having no policy at all. Admittedly, enemy rocket sites are available there from which to reach Miami, Cape Canaveral, and even Washington (only 1,139 miles), New York (1,317), Boston (1,801), Chicago (1,333), Kansas City (1,497), Denver (1,819), Los Angeles-San Diego (2,299), and easily as far as Seattle (2,843) on a pinpoint basis. Why does the administration consistently pooh-pooh and soften the indications these rocket sites are being built? It you were Khrushchev wouldn't you build them? Disliking the inevitable does not make it less inevitable . . ."

80. 9/1/62 - In response to NSAM 181 the Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, submitted to the Secretary of State and the White House a paper analyzing the meaning of increased Soviet aid to Cuba including an analysis of Soviet and Cuban motives behind the recent Soviet economic and military shipments to Cuba. This analysis stated in part: "In addition to training and arming Castro's forces, the Soviets may be establishing some kind of overt military presence with Soviet-manned installations in Cuba. But we believe at present such activities are likely to be limited to the setting up of unacknowledged intelligence collection and defensive facilities . . . More risky, and politically less justifiable, would be demonstrably offensive installations, such as bomber bases or pads for missiles capable of reaching adjacent countries. We believe that the Soviets would rule out this type of military presence for the foreseeable future. In sum, we think there is some possibility that intelligence and defensive installations may be set up at least temporarily under purely Soviet control, while offensive installations would not be likely, certainly for a considerable time." The State Department analysis stated at this point "It should be noted in this connection that presently available information makes it extremely difficult to assess Soviet intentions in this field and that a harder estimate must await more clear cut evidence."

81. 9/4/62 - The White House issued the following Presidential Statement: "All Americans, as well as all of our friends in this hemisphere have been concerned over the recent moves of the Soviet Union to bolster the military power of the Castro regime in Cuba. Information has reached the Government in the last 4 days from a variety of sources which establishes without doubt that the Soviets have provided the Cuban Government with a number of antiaircraft missiles with a short range of 25 miles which are similar to early models of our Nike. Along with these missiles, the Soviets are apparently providing the extensive radar and other electronic equipment which is required for their operation. We can also confirm the presence of several Soviet-made motor torpedo boats carrying ship-to-ship guided missiles having a range of 15 miles. The number of Soviet military technicians now known to be in Cuba or enroute -- approximately 3,500 -- is consistent with assistance in setting up and learning to use this equipment. As I stated last week, we shall continue to make

(81. 9/4/62 Continued)

"information available as fast as it is obtained and properly verified. There is no evidence of any organized combat force in Cuba, from any Soviet bloc country, of military bases provided to (sic) Russia, of a violation of the 1934 treaty relating to Guantanamo, of the presence of ground-to-ground missiles, or of other significant offensive capability either in Cuban hands or under Soviet direction and guidance. Were it otherwise, the greatest issues would arise. The Cuban question must be considered as a part of the worldwide challenge posed by Communist threats to peace . . . . It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere . . . "

82. 9/4-5/62 - "General Carter briefed a number of Congressional leaders, including the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees". (CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

83. 9/5/62 - This was the first U-2 mission for September (of the two which had been authorized "as a routine matter" by the Special Group on July 19 -- based on the DCI's recommendation that "U-2 flights over Cuba be continued at their current level of two a month"). This flight (and the August 29 flight) covered areas which in retrospect are known to have been the sites of MRBM and IRBM installations -- but the September 5 photography "gave no recognizable evidence that any construction was then under way, although re-examination showed a few vehicles and some construction material at Guanajay Site 1 on August 29. In fact there was probably no ballistic missile equipment in Cuba at that time." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

84. 9/5/62 - On this date photography of the Remedios IRBM site was negative, but road improvements began shortly thereafter, and a flow of construction from the port of Isabela, on the north coast . . . . "the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable. The estimated date for the beginning of major construction is about 1 October". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

85. 9/5/62 - A CIA U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of MIG-21s in Cuba. (Source: NPIC)

86. 9/5/62 - Senator Keating, speaking on the floor of the Senate in response to Senator Engle's earlier remarks that day (see Items 60 and 64, above):

" . . . . I have said that the whole story has not been told the American people. That is still the case . . . . even after the latest White House announcement yesterday.

" . . . . I apologize for the embarrassment I am about to cause the Senator from California. On the 14th day of August, in an effort to get some official information, I wrote to the Department of State to ask them about Cuba and the buildup there. Sixteen days later on

(86. 9/5/62 Continued)

August 30th, the Department wrote a letter to me which arrived at my office just today (9/5/62) . . . This letter -- an incredible letter in the light of what has happened since August 30, and indeed what had happened before that -- reads in part as follows:

'Several Soviet passenger and cargo ships arrived in Cuba during late July and early August carrying large quantities of technicians of various kinds.

'The Department has established that personnel landed from approximately five of the ships. We have no specific information about the number of persons.

'We have no information that any Soviet-bloc troops have landed in Cuba. Although the full significance of these developments is not clear, there is no evidence that supplies and technicians have arrived in Cuba in such numbers as to provide support for external aggression from Cuba against other countries.'" (Source: Congressional Record)

87. 9/6/62 - "After further analysis" (of the August 29 flight) there appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin of 6 September the information which had previously been included by the CIA in the President's Checklist of August 31, 1962, regarding photography of the August 29 flight which disclosed SA-2 sites in Western Cuba, plus KOMAR-class PT-boats and tanks. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

88. 9/6/62 - By this time "more detailed readout of the 29 August mission had . . . led CIA analysts to suspect the presence of another kind of missile site -- possibly surface-to-surface -- at Banes, on the northeast coast. General Carter so informed the President on September 6. (For this reason the information was never included in the Checklist)" -

Programs were then set in motion to determine the characteristics and range of the missiles at Banes: On 9/9/62 at the request of the Secretary of State, COMOR reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes. On 9/10 General Carter sent a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense requesting necessary actions, including Special Group approval, to provide for "tactical-type reconnaissance" of the Banes area, when directed by higher authority. On 9/14 a Special Group meeting was briefed by JCS on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain targets" in Cuba -- but the Secretary of Defense did not want the operation considered further until there were available the results of further U-2 reconnaissance which had been decided upon at a White House meeting of 9/10.

(On September 18 the CIB reported the results of a further CIA study of the 9/5 U-2 photography, namely, the conclusion that the Banes site was intended for a short-range coastal defense missile.)

"One additional item was picked up by the 5 September mission, the presence of an assembled MIG-21 at Santa Clara airfield along

(88. 9/6/62 Continued

"with several others still in crates. This was not reported by CIA in the Checklist but was reported in the CIB of 8 September. Actually, these MIG-21 crates (readily identifiable from photographs) had arrived in Cuba about 1 September aboard a Soviet ship which had been photographed en route, but the photographs were not received in Washington for several weeks. Upon the arrival of these and photographs of other ships carrying MIG-21 crates, an item was published in the CIB of 27 September -- with DIA withholding concurrence -- that between 22 and 30 MIG-21s had been delivered to Cuba. This information was also reported in the Checklist of 27 September." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

89. 9/6/62 - "Mexico City, September 4. -- A detailed report on distribution of nearly 20,000 Russian, Chinese, Algerian and African military men, naval and air bases and guided missile launching pads was released here today by a Cuban student exile office . . . One missile station is being installed near the port of Bahia Honda and another near Varadero Beach in Matanzas Province . . . More than 3000 Russians were landed at Bahia Honda for work on a launching pad. . . the statement said." (Source: Congressional Record)

90. 9/7/62 - On this date the DCI (who was on the Riviera and was being kept informed by CIA cable) sent a cable to General Carter urging frequent repeat reconnaissance missions and stating that "my hunch is we might face prospect of Soviet short-range surface-to-surface missiles of portable types in Cuba which could command important targets in Southeast U.S. and possibly Caribbean areas." (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

91. 9/7 (or 8)/62 - "The first large pieces of equipment for the MRBM sites near San Cristobal were probably shipped from the USSR on the ship "Omsk" which arrived at Mariel on 7 or 8 September." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

92. 9/8/62 - The CIB on this date included a report on results of the 9/5 photography which disclosed the presence of one assembled and several crated MIG-21s at Santa Clara airfield. Apparently information on the presence of MIG-21s in Cuba was not reported in the President's Checklist until 9/27/62. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

93. 9/8/62 - DIA reported that the scope of Soviet Bloc assistance to Cuba suggests motives going beyond the lending of support and encouragement of the Castro regime. (Source: DIA report to Board on 11/9/62)

94. 9/9/62 - COMOR, at the request of the Secretary of State, reviewed the vehicles available for reconnaissance of Banes (as the result of U-2 photography of 9/5 indicating the possible presence of an SSM site at Banes). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

95. 9/10/62 - Senator Thomas J. Dodd stated in the Senate:

"I have reason to believe, on the basis of information from reliable sources, that the situation in Cuba is even more grave than has yet been indicated to the American public . . .

"The fantastic buildup of Soviet planes and tanks and missiles and advisory personnel that has gone on in Cuba over the past year cannot be dismissed as purely defensive." (Source: Washington Evening Star - 10/24/62)

96. 9/10/62 - Upon instruction of the President, General Carter briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban situation". (The DCI briefed General Eisenhower again on 10/3.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

97. 9/10/62 - On this date the DCI sent a second cable to General Carter from the Riviera stating: "Difficult for me to rationalize extensive costly defenses being established in Cuba . . . appears to me quite possible measures now being taken are for purpose of ensuring secrecy of some offensive capability such as MRBMs to be installed by Soviets after present phase completed and country secured from overflights. Suggest Board of National Estimates study motives . . ." (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

98. 9/10/62 - In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, General Carter requested "necessary actions (including Special Group approval) to provide for the employment, when directed by higher authority, of tactical-type reconnaissance" against the cruise missile site at Banes. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

99. 9/10/62 - CIA reports that on this date a meeting took place at the White House attended by Secretary Rusk, Messrs. Robert Kennedy and McGeorge Bundy, and Generals Carter and Lansdale. The purpose of this meeting was to make "a full review of the overflight program for Cuba," and it was prompted by "the results of the 29 August and the 5 September missions, in particular the confirmation of SA-2 sites."

CIA reports that the factors involved and the decision reached at this White House meeting were as follows:

(1) Because of the Soviet protest of the August 30 U-2 overflight of Sakhalin Island, and because of the September 8 shootdown of a U-2 over Communist China, the participants at the meeting "were naturally reluctant to authorize any flights over areas where SA-2s might be operational."

(2) The hard intelligence thus far received on the presence of SA-2s and other advanced defensive systems had been foreseen in NIE 85-2-62 of August 1 and had subsequently been fully reported. Therefore, the hard intelligence "was not such as to "produce a sense

(99. 9/10/62 Continued)

"of alarm or a feeling that urgent action was required . . . . confirmation came not as a shock but as a problem to be dealt with deliberately . . . . it may have even served to relax the sense of urgency generated by the President's decision of 23 August, the known usually being less alarming than the unknown . . . . . The participants therefore felt that the next step was to provide systematic coverage of the areas covered by the two previous missions (of August 29 and September 5)."

(3) "Finally, the participants (at the meeting) were operating in the atmosphere of the time . . . . . The Soviet diplomatic and propaganda apparatus was attempting to focus attention on Berlin . . . . . throwing up a diplomatic smokescreen . . . . . Furthermore, they (the participants at the White House meeting) must all have been acutely aware that Cuba was potentially the campaign issue that could most seriously damage the Administration in the election campaign then beginning."

(4) The CIA proposed two extended overflights covering the remainder of the island not covered in the August 29 and September 5 missions. "The Secretary of State objected" and insisted that "coverage of the rest of Cuba should be designed so that peripheral flights over international waters would not be combined with overflights of Cuban territory."

(5) "To meet (the Secretary of State's) wishes, the program was divided into four flights, two overflights and two peripheral". The overflights were to be: (a) over the Isle of Pines, and (b) over the east of Cuba to cover Guantanamo and Banes. The peripheral flights were to be: (a) over the North coast of eastern Cuba, and (b) the south coast. All four flights were to be designed for maximum safety, and the overflights were to be quick "in-and-out" operations. In obtaining approval for the tracks it was necessary to provide assurance that there would not be flights over known SA-2 sites.

"The President approved this program" for four flights in September. "Thus the record shows that the President authorized everything the Special Group requested." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

100. 9/11/62 - Senator Tower, speaking in the U. S. Senate: "Russian tanks, rockets, military planes and high velocity artillery have been brought into Cuba. They threaten the entire U. S. east of the Mississippi. Pads for light rockets have already been built in Cuba by Russians and Chinese. . . . . I am reliably informed that launching pads for medium rockets with a 1500-mile-plus range can be built in under 4 days . . . . ."

(Source: Congressional Record)

101. 9/11/62 - Senator Humphrey, speaking on the floor of the Senate said: ". . . I think it is ridiculous and insulting to the American people for grown men to wring their hands publicly about Cuba's being a military threat to the United States . . . I do not underestimate the fact that there are missiles, intermediate and short range. But I do know . . . that we have it within our capacity without even so much as violently flexing a muscle, to destroy every single military installation in one day. So I do not want the people of my state to lose a single night's sleep worrying about the might of Cuba . . ." (Source: Congressional Record)

102. 9/12/62 - General Carter briefed the House Armed Services and Foreign Affairs Committees "on the Cuban situation". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

103. 9/12/62 - A Cuban National being processed at the Refugee Center at Opa-locka, Florida, reported that on this date he observed 20 Soviet-driven trucks pulling 4-wheel double axle trailers from 65 to 70 feet in length; that these trucks were observed driving from Havana to Camp Libertad; that the beds of the trucks were loaded with black crates; that the trailers were loaded with what the source believed to be large canvas-covered missiles; that there were 4 fins at the trailing edge of each missile. The source of the information drew sketches of the missiles and these missiles resembled surface-to-surface MRBMs.

CIA disseminated this information to the intelligence community on 9/21/62.

104. 9/13/62 - "On 13 September a source was informed by a resident of the general area that a rocket base was being constructed by the Soviets at a location now identified from photography as Remedios (IRBM) Site 1. A second base was also reported, but a missile site has not yet been found in photography although new road construction exists in that area." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

105. 9/13/62 - On this date the DCI sent a third cable to General Carter from the Riviera "repeating these premonitions" which he had set forth in cables to CIA on 9/1 and 9/10 regarding the possibility of Soviet introduction of MRBMs into Cuba. (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

106. 9/14/62 - At the Special Group meeting, a JCS representative briefed on capabilities for low-level coverage of "certain targets" in Cuba. However, "the Secretary of Defense was recorded as not wanting to have the operation considered further until results of further U-2 reconnaissance of these targets were available, i.e., General Carter's proposal had been overtaken by the decision on U-2 coverage taken on 10 September (at the White House meeting on that date)." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

107. 9/14/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "The number of confirmed SAM sites remains at 12, but the likelihood that others are under construction grows, with the latest evidence pointing to the Isle of Pines as one of the additional locations". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

108. 9/15/62 - Major construction at the Guanajay fixed IRBM sites "had probably begun by 15 September" (the construction equipment and material having arrived at Mariel beginning "about mid-August").

"It is not possible to say how soon after 15 September the activity might have been recognizable from the air as an IRBM site." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

109. 9/15/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "A message intercepted yesterday on a net serving Soviet forces in Germany called for 'volunteers for the protection of Cuba'. We are not sure of the weight to be placed on this and another intercept referring to the isolation of 'volunteers'. If valid, they would suggest that the influx of Soviet military personnel to Cuba is not finished. We are investigating further." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

110. Mid-September, 1962 - At this time there was first noted a high frequency circuit in operation between Moscow and Havana relayed through Bomako, Mali. The fact that manual operations and one-time codes are used argue against a command and control function for this link. It is believed that this link was established to meet a requirement for additional back-up communications. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

111. 9/16/62 - On this date, the DCI sent a fourth cable to General Carter regarding the possibility of a ballistic missile buildup in Cuba, stating: "Do not wish to be overly alarming this matter, but believe CIA and community must keep Government informed of danger of a surprise and also that detection of preparatory steps possibly beyond our capability once Cuba defense system operative." (These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

112. 9/17/62 - The second shipment of equipment for the MRBM sites at San Cristobal arrived at Mariel on 9/17/62 on the ship "Poltava" (the first shipment had arrived on September 7 or 8). "This equipment was moved to San Cristobal by truck at night with the first convoys probably arriving at the sites about 17 September. That is, 17 September is the earliest date at which photography might have detected the first MRBM equipment at San Cristobal". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

113. 9/18/62 - There appeared in the Central Intelligence Bulletin on September 18 a report on the September 5 photography which reflected the presence of a surface-to-surface, short-range, coastal defense missile site. (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

114. 9/18/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that "We have spotted two more Soviet passenger vessels en route to Cuba. Their arrival will raise our estimate of technicians on the scene to about 4,200. We are beginning to see some tenuous evidence foreshadowing the appearance of SAM sites in Camaguey Province." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

115. 9/19/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"The interception on 15 September of a signal from a missile-associated radar, probably coming from the surface-to-air missile site at Mariel, suggests that the site is or soon will be operational."

"The message asking for volunteers for service in Cuba, which we reported Saturday, has now cropped up on enough Soviet military radio nets to reveal that a fairly general recruiting campaign is going on. There is no indication yet of the numbers involved." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

116. 9/19/62 - (USIB Meeting) - "As a result of the DCI's pressure (presumably his cables to General Carter from the Riviera from 9/7 to 9/20/62) there was a renewed examination of other methods of reconnaissance of Cuba. (It should be noted here that this discussion was in terms of what might be necessary after the establishment of a complete SA-2 defense had made use of the U-2 impossible, with the implicit thought that only at this point would the Soviets risk the introduction of such weapons as MRBMs). On September 19 at USIB, General Carter stated his desire to see RF-101's over Cuba. He also said he thought use of the FIREFLY drone over Cuba could be justified to the Special Group, adding that 'we cannot put a stop to collection in Cuba; otherwise the President would never know when the point of decision was reached.'" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

117. 9/19/62 - USIB issued SNIE 85-3-62 on "The Military Buildup in Cuba". Among the key findings of the SNIE were the following: (1) "We believe that . . . the main purpose of the military buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and Soviets conceive to be a danger that the U.S. may attempt by one means or another to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabilities and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke U.S. military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose; (2) (the Soviets) are well aware that the question of offensive as opposed to defensive weapons in Cuba has become a major political issue; (3) the establishment on Cuban soil of Soviet nuclear striking forces which would be used against the U.S. would be incompatible with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has displayed thus far . . . however, Soviet military planners have almost certainly considered the contribution which Cuban bases might make to the Soviet strategic posture, and, in that connection, the feasibility and utility of displaying nuclear delivery systems to Cuba. Therefore, this contingency

(117. 9/19/62 Continued)

"must be examined carefully, even though it would run counter to current Soviet policy; (4) Soviet planners might see some utility in deploying MRBMs and IRBMs to Cuba in order to supplement the limited number of ICBMs now believed to be operational in the USSR and to reach targets beyond the range of submarine-launched missiles; (5) the establishment on Cuban soil of a significant strike capability with such weapons would represent a sharp departure from Soviet practice, since such weapons have so far not been installed even in Satellite territory . . . the Soviets might think (it) would be worth a good deal if they could get away with it, however, they would almost certainly estimate that this could not be done without provoking a dangerous U. S. reaction; and (6) although the Soviets may see some military advantages in Cuba, as a strategic strike base, the risks would be great and the political implications would run counter to the kind of policy they are actually pursuing in Latin America. They do not propose to win the region for communism by military conquest. They count instead on a process of political action . . ."

* * * * * * * * * * * *

CIA's retrospective comments on SNIE 85-3-62: (1) the judgment on the degree of risk which the USSR was willing to accept was gravely in error and the community was virtually unanimous in support of this judgment (2) the deployment of ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons outside the USSR was unprecedented (3) while the first ballistic missiles had probably arrived in Cuba between 9/7-15/62, the first reports by ground observers who had seen them had not arrived in Washington by 9/19/62, and there was no evidence that MRBMs were on the way (4) the estimate failed to give adequate weight to the pace at which Soviet operations were moving and to the great probability that the new installations were manned by Soviet personnel (5) the community was still thinking in terms of rather deliberately-paced Soviet military aid programs for the UAR, Iraq and Indonesia, and for Cuba in the 1960-1962 period, but there was already good evidence that the Cuban program had departed from this pattern (6) also the Indonesian situation had broken the Soviet pattern only a month before when the USSR showed itself willing to accept a substantially increased degree of risk "for the sake of a political gain something less than vital to Soviet interests" (7) the USSR had shown in the Indonesian affair that it was "willing to take some risk of military engagement with an ally of the United States, albeit the degree of risk involved was far less than in the Cuban venture, and (8) ". . . . For the record, there is no evidence that the existence of SNIE 85-3 had any inhibiting influence on later decisions. It was not, for instance, cited to support an argument against continuing overflights. Nor did it affect current intelligence reporting; this is conducted independently of the estimative process and provides a check on the continuing validity of standing estimates". (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

118. 9/20/62 - CIA disseminated an agent report quoting Castro's personal pilot, Claudio Morinas, who said on 9/9/62: "We have 40-mile range guided missiles, both surface-to-surface and surface-to-air. . . . There are also many mobile ramps for intermediate range rockets . . . . ." This report was considered "too general to be used in the process" (in which CIA analysts made up target cards). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

119. 9/20/62 - Intercepted messages (COMI[illegible]) indicated the presence in Cuba on this date of Lieutenant General Pavel B. Dankevich. Dankevich is believed to have held a command in Vinnista probably as late as November, 1961. Vinnista is the location of a probable Soviet MRBM command and the headquarters of a Long Range Air Army. It is not known how long Dankevich may have been in Cuba prior to September 20, 1962. The intelligence publications available to the Board fail to reflect that any particular significance was attached to Dankevich's presence in Cuba until after the President made his public address relative to MRBMs and IRBMs in Cuba. On October 27 CIA distributed a memorandum stating that Dankevich's presence in Cuba "indicates the high priority assigned by Moscow to the missile bases in Cuba." (Source: CIA memorandum of 10/27/62; DIA Intelligence Summary 10/27/62; Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)

120. 9/20/62 - On this date the DCI sent a final cable to CIA from the Riviera, commenting to General Carter on the conclusions of SNIE 85-3 of 9/19 which had been cabled to the DCI. The DCI's cable expressed reservations on the SNIE conclusions and stated "As an alternative I can see that an offensive Soviet base in Cuba will provide Soviets with most important and effective trading position in connection with all other critical areas and hence they might take unexpected risks in order to establish such a position." These views were provided to the DD/I and the Board of National Estimates. (We have no evidence that the intelligence community was informed of the views expressed by the DCI in his several cables from the Riviera The State and DIA members of USIB advised the Board on 11/9/62 that they had not been informed of the DCI's views.) (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

121. 9/20/62 - The Defense Intelligence Agency on this date attempted to obtain broad area coverage of Cuba through CORONA. On that date the DIA member of COMOR addressed a memorandum to the Chairman of COMOR with the request that COMOR recommend the programming of an engineering pass of the CORONA vehicle over Cuba "where the western end of the island is, temporarily at least, off limits and where we need to know if any other SA-2 sites have been constructed . . ."

122. 9/21/62 - An article in the Washington News by Virginia Prewett under date of 10/31/62 entitled "Why Didn't JFK Act Earlier?" stated that a report made by Miami's Cuban Student Directorate on 9/21/62, stated that: "One of the European Ambassadors in Havana recently reported to his respective country 'that if the countries of this hemisphere do not take military action against Castro immediately, or at least before the next six months, Cuba will possess Russian missile bases armed with atomic and nuclear weapons capable of destroying in a few minutes the most strategic zones in the United States. Besides, it is known that the construction will be carried out secretly, with this end in view--that while the work continues, the American government will go on believing that the military installations are purely defensive measures.'"

123. 9/21/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that: "Evidence is still coming in on Moscow's canvass of its military forces for volunteers to serve in Cuba. This activity is puzzling; we have never seen anything like it before. The move may be purely administrative: to replace personnel who had been suddenly ordered there with others prepared to stay for some time. On the other hand, it could mean another sizable increment to Soviet personnel in Cuba or a belief in Moscow that its people are likely to be engaged in combat. We are trying to get a better answer." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

124. 9/22/62 - "The most likely ship to have carried the large items (of equipment for the Sagua La Grande MRBM sites) is the Kimovsk which docked (at Casilda, on the south coast) on 22 September. This equipment must have moved to the site during the last week of September, and was probably detectable from photography after 1 October." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

125. 9/27/62 - The CIA reported in the President's Checklist that:

"Photography snapped earlier this month show at least two Soviet ships delivering 22, perhaps more, MIG-21s. We now estimate there are 25-30 aircraft of this type in Cuba." (This paragraph was quoted in the CIA Chronology of 11/7/62 but not in the revised Chronology of 11/14/62.)

"Our running account of the number of Soviet dry-cargo vessels making the voyage to Cuba since mid-July is now over 100. About 85 of these probably were carrying military hardware."

"The Cuban Foreign Office on Tuesday ordered Western correspondents to put in for new credentials by today, telling them that all of Cuba beyond Havana's city limits is out of bounds except by special permission." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

126. 9/27/62 - On this date CIA received a report of an observation made on 9/17/62 of a convoy moving toward San Cristobal. This report dovetailed with the earlier report of the 9/12/62 sighting of MRBMs near Havana (Item 103, above). ""The arrival of the second report led CIA analysts to a tentative conclusion that the two observers had in fact seen the same convoy, and that there was a possibility of the SS-4 identification being genuine. A day or so earlier, a target card on San Cristobal had been prepared on the basis of a vague report of "Russians building a rocket base." Now this card was removed and, with the two reports cited above and other less specific information on activity in this area which was beginning to trickle in, a new card was prepared between 1 and 3 October which was in effect a priority requirement for photographic coverage. This card was used in the targeting of the 14 October flight. It read as follows: 'Collateral reports indicate the existence of a restricted area in Pinar del Rio Province which is suspected of including an SSM site under construction, particularly SS-4 Shyster. The area is bounded by a line connecting the following four town: Consolacion del Norte (8332N/2244W); San Diego del Los Banos (8325N/2235W); San Cristobal (8301N/2243W); and Las Pozos (8317N/2250W). Requirement: Search the area delineated for possible surface missile construction, with particular attention to SS-4 Shyster.'" (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

127. 9/27/62 - " . . . . . At some point, probably just after 27 September, an item on the subject of possible strategic weapons in Cuba might have been written for CIA current intelligence publications. It could not be written because there was an injunction not to do so (see Item No. 51, above). . . . . It should also be noted that the order not to publish anything on missile sites without NPIC corroboration had never been rescinded. The effect this would have had on reporting in late September and October if the other ban had not been in effect (i.e., the USIB restriction -- see Item 152, infra) is difficult to determine. These restrictions did not apply to the Checklist, but the Checklist writers drew . . . largely on the Cuban Daily Summary . . . . published by CIA. Since the Summary was affected by the restrictions, this practice, imposed by the sheer volume of raw material coming in on Cuba, had the effect of cutting the Checklist off from information on offensive weapons. Moreover, neither the Checklist group, nor any other current intelligence officers, knew that the possibility that a Soviet strategic missile base might be established in Cuba had been raised by the DCI and seriously discussed by the President and his advisors more than a month earlier (see Item No. 57, above). In other words, the thrust of NSAM 181 had been so watered down by time and bureaucratic processes that it reached the working level only in the form of SNIE 85-3 which held that establishment of such a base was most improbable (see Item No. 117, above).

"It is difficult to say whether information from ground sources would have been published had there not been a blanket injunction against it. The analysts too were sensitive to the political impact of the reports they were receiving . . . . . . In addition, rigid compartmentation was maintained between the COMOR -- Special Group organization for collection and the intelligence components responsible for analysis. Few, if any, CIA analysts working on the Cuban problem even had IDEALIST clearances. As a result, they did not know that no overflights of Pinar del Rio and Las Villas were included in the September program, or that this program was seriously delayed. They had no way of knowing that the photographic verification they had requested would not soon be forthcoming, and they might well have delayed publication from day to day in hopes of receiving it.

"Nevertheless, it can be established that if the injunction against publication had not existed there would have been some reflection of the refugee reports in the Cuban Daily Summary, which is not highly selective. In retrospect, it seems quite possible -- but by no means certain -- that they would have been picked up in the Checklist, but it is extremely doubtful if they would have survived the coordination process for the Central Intelligence Bulletin. Thus, at the most the President might have learned that there was suspicious activity around San Cristobal slightly more than a week before he apparently did.

"In sum, the CIA analysts believed they had done their duty by targeting the San Cristobal area for photographic coverage, but no word of their concern over activity in this area had appeared in an intelligence publication. It appears highly probable that the Special Group first heard of this concern at its meeting on 9 October (see Item No. 143, infra) when it ordered a U-2 mission which covered the area.

"The gap of 7-10 days between the key analytic correlation of reports and the Special Group Meeting can probably be attributed to the cumbersome processes of the administrative structure supporting the Special Group. This machinery was designed to provide elaborate justifications and back-up paper work before each decision was made, procedures reaching back into the early history of the U-2 operations over the USSR. They were intended for the control of deliberate strategic reconnaissance of the USSR, and not for a fast-moving situation such as that in Cuba, which was rapidly becoming tactical. In fact, after readout of the 14 October mission they were jettisoned." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

128. 9/28/62 - At the Board's 9/28/62 meeting the DCI indicated he did not believe that offensive, strategic missiles had been installed in Cuba, but he considered this a possibility at some future time, but only after Cuba's defensive capability was such as to deny Cuban airspace to U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. The DCI reported that "our intelligence collection on Cuba has improved since the first of the year" and that "CIA now has 45 third-country agents (meaning diplomats) reporting throughout Cuba."

129. September 1962 - "Offensive missiles identified: Western Cuba: Two launch sites consisting of 8 field-type launchers and 16 1020-nm MRBMs (SS-4) . . . these missiles are probably those reported moving into this area during September."
(Source: Joint Evaluation Report of 10/18/62, prepared by GMAIC/JAEIC/NPIC)

130. 9/29-10/2/62 - Pursuant to the 9/20/62 request of DIA, a pass over Cuba was made by the Corona vehicle launched on 9/29/62. The resulting photography was good by Corona standards but not of sufficient quality to reflect significant photographic intelligence on MRBM or IRBM developments on the island. When this CORONA photography was checked against the photography obtained from the SAC-operated U-2s it was possible to relate some of the earth scratchings appearing in the CORONA photography to the construction at some of the long range missile sites which were detected beginning October 14. Without the U-2 photography however, these scratchings could not possibly be identified as being associated in any way with MRBM or IRBM construction. The photographic interpreters at the Strategic Air Command believe that if all nine sites had been completed at the time of the CORONA pass, the CORONA photography might have resulted in the identification of the IRBM sites but not of the MRBM sites.

Dr. Charyk, in commenting on this subject to Board Member Gray, noted that this experience makes it obvious that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence; and that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite photography seeking evidence of missile installations in the USSR.

131. 10/1/62 - A memorandum prepared on this date in DIA by a DIA analyst, on the subject "Analysis of SAM Sites," dealt with the 15 confirmed SA-2 sites in Cuba and the discernible pattern whcih was developing from their location:

(1) In Oriente Province, the 3 SA-2 sites form a triangular pattern around the new military airfield at Holguin which will probably soon be operational . . . no MIGs there now but the MIGs believed to be stationed at Camaguay airfield will probably be moved to Holguin when Holguin becomes operational. (No SA-2 sites identified at Camaguay.)

(2) 4 SA-2 sites form a rectangular pattern around the military airfield near Santa Clara in the Central Army area -- where MIGs have been for several months, and also the field on which the first MIG-21 was identified.

(131. 10/1/62 Continued)

(3) In the Western Army area, the 3 (possibly 4) SA-2 sites form a linear pattern for the defense of the military airfield at San Antonio de los Banos and the Havana-Mariel complex (San Antonio is headquarters for the Cuban Revolutionary Air Force and the assembly point for all MIGs except MIG-21s).

(4) Further west, in Pinar del Rio Province, a triangular pattern of SA-2 sites cannot be connected with any significant military installation. There are 2 underground facilities within this triangle whose use and purpose are unknown. One of these 3 SA-2 sites is located very near to the San Julian military air base, but this is a most unlikely spot to place SA-2s for the defense of this air base. "Therefore, curiosity is immediately aroused as to the purpose of this triangular pattern on the far western tip of Cuba."

(5) In the north central portion of Pinar del Rio Province is a trapazoid-shaped restricted area (15-20 miles on a side) controlled by Soviet military personnel recently introduced into Cuba . . . no known military installations in this rough and sparsely populated area . . . Cuban refugees arriving in Miami say all Cubans have been evacuated from the area. Purpose of this restricted area is unknown.

(6) Information on the deployment of Soviet military personnel and "technicians" in Cuba is derived from unevaluated refugee sources. A plotting of all reported locations indicates that there is a definite correlation between the location of Soviet personnel and missiles or missile activity. Significantly, the greatest concentration of Soviet personnel, activity and camps is in the western end of Cuba indicating a greater interest by the Soviets in Pinar del Rio than in other Provinces.

(7) The source of an unevaluated report says that on September 12 he saw some 20 SS-4 (or possibly SS-3) missiles in the vicinity of Campo Libertad (a small airfield on the western edge of Havana). This report is unconfirmed and there are no other reports of such missiles. However, it is significant to note that by taking the approximate center of the trapozoid-shaped restricted area previously referred to, as the point of origin for a radius of 1100 nm (range of an SS-4 missile) the arc includes Philadelphia, St. Louis, Oklahoma City, San Antonio, Mexico City, all Central American capitals, the Panama Canal, and Venezuelan oil fields. "The presence of operational SS-4 missiles in this location would give the Soviets a great military asset."

Based on the foregoing, DIA on 10/2/62 proposed to the COMOR Working Group that the Pinar del Rio search area be included in COMOR's reconnaissance objectives for Cuba. (This was done at the October 4 COMOR meeting and the objective was incorporated in the reconnaissance objectives list.) (Source: Letter to Coyne from Director, DIA, 11/13/62)

132. 10/1/62 - According to reports subsequently reviewed, "On October 1 explosions were reportedly occurring at a highly secure construction project at a location now identified from photography as Site 1 (Sagua La Grande area). Material delivered to the project included lumber and prefabricated concrete forms. This suggests that site construction was underway at that time." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

133. 10/1/62 - This is the estimated date for the beginning of major construction on the Remedios IRBM site. ". . . . the date at which the site acquired a recognizable photographic signature is not determinable." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

134. 10/1-3/62 - CIA reports that during this period CIA prepared a new target card which was in effect a requirement for photographic coverage of the San Cristobal area (see Item No. 126, above), and that in spite of time lags involved in receiving reports of refugees and CIA agents, ... "Nevertheless, by about 1 October, the San Cristobal area had been pinpointed as a suspect MRBM site and photographic confirmation had been requested. This represents a considerable technical achievement. . . . . the Intelligence Community had been flooded with reports of Soviet weapons shipments and missile installations in Cuba . . . . . CIA's files contain 211 intelligence reports . . . . on missile and missile-associated activity in Cuba before 1 January 1962. All of these were either totally false or misinterpretations by the observer of other kinds of activity. CIA analysts had naturally come to view all such reports with a high degree of suspicion . . . . By September, the volume of agent and refugee reporting had become very large indeed. During the month 882 reports on internal activities in Cuba were disseminated, exclusive of telegraphic dissemination. (The CIA clandestine collectors report that their output represented only a small publishable fraction of the raw material collected.) A substantial proportion of these dealt with the deployment of defensive missiles and related activities. Knowledge on the part of the analysts that such a deployment was in fact going on, plus the normal difficulties encountered by untrained observers in telling an offensive missile from a defensive one, tended to throw a sort of smoke-screen around the Soviet offensive deployment when it finally began. The CIA analytic apparatus, however, recognized and correlated the first authentic reports of MRBM equipment ever to be received in Washington, and took action upon them. It targeted the San Cristobal area, not as another location where alleged missile activity should be negated by photography, but as a suspect SS-4 site. This process took about three weeks, from the date when the first observation was made on the ground in Cuba to the preparation of the target card . . . . ." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/14/62)

(NOTE: The fact that CIA considered San Cristobal as a suspect MRBM site was not included in any of CIA's current intelligence publications until after photographic confirmation was obtained in mid-October.)

135. 10/2/62 - CIA distributed to the White House and other recipients a raw intelligence report, based on information acquired in Cuba on 10/1/62 which stated in part that on 9/19/62 large intercontinental rockets more than 67 feet long were unloaded in Mariel, Pinar del Rio Province and that the rockets were on long trailers when unloaded from the ship. In distributing this report CIA Headquarters appended the comment "It is more likely that source observed SA-2 missiles being off-loaded".

136. 10/2-3/62 - The Final Communique of the Informal Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics held in Washington, 10/2-3/62 stated in part that "The Soviet Union's intervention in Cuba threatens the unity of the Americas and its democratic institutions" and it called for "the adoption of special measures, both individual and collective". The communique observed that "it is desirable

(CONTINUED ON PAGE 39)

(136. 10/2-3/62 Continued)

"to intensify surveillance of the delivery of arms and implements of war and all other items of strategic importance to the communist regime of Cuba, in order to prevent the secret accumulation in the island of arms that can be used for offensive purposes against the Hemisphere."

137. 10/3/62 - The President signed Senate Joint Resolution 230 which had been adopted in the Senate and House of Representatives during September. The Joint Resolution expressed the determination of the United States to (1) prevent by necessary means, including use of force, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending by force or threat of force its aggressive or subversive activities in this Hemisphere; (2) prevent in Cuba the creation or use of externally supported military capability endangering U.S. security; and (3) work with the OAS and with freedom-loving Cubans to support the aspirations of the Cuban people for self-determination.

138. 10/3/62 - The DCI briefed General Eisenhower "on the Cuban situation" (the General had previously been briefed by CIA on 9/10). (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

139. 10/3/62 - On this date the DIA member of COMOR submitted to the Chairman of COMOR a memorandum which (1) noted the concerns of the Sec/Def and JCS about the (insufficient) amount of intelligence on Cuba that was being made available to responsible decision makers in Government; (2) noted that certain portions of the island, notably the western end, had not been seen since August 29; (3) expressed the view of DIA and J-2 that the best way of collecting intelligence on Cuba under the present circumstances was by resuming frequent and regular U-2 overflights and that coverage on the order of once a week was essential; and (4) proposed that COMOR send to the USIB a draft "intelligence justification" which had been prepared by the DIA as the basis for authorizing frequent and regular U-2 flights over Cuba.

The DIA "intelligence justification" pointed to the buildup of SAM sites, and "SSM" sites which had been observed in eastern and western Cuba, and on the Isle of Pines. The DIA proposal called for U-2 coverage to meet requirements for up-to-date intelligence on (a) the location of SA-2 sites; (b) confirmation or negation of reports from reliable sources concerning the sightings of SS-4 missiles in Cuba; (c) the number of KOMAR class PGMGs in service; and (d) the number of MIG-21s in Cuba.

The intelligence justification drafted by DIA gave recognition to the increased risk to U-2 aircraft in the light of SA-2 and MIG-21s present in Cuba. Nevertheless, this recognition of risk was followed by the statement: "But it must be stated that the current need is extremely urgent, and the risk involved should be very thoroughly weighed before this coverage is denied."

The DIA memorandum to COMOR also included a proposed list of target objectives in Cuba to meet the intelligence requirements which DIA had outlined.

(139. 10/3/62 Continued)

With few changes or omissions, the DIA's 10/3 draft of the intelligence justification for revised overflights of Cuba was forwarded by COMOR on 10/5 to the USIB for consideration and approval. Similarly, on 10/6 COMOR sent to the Director of NRO, at his verbal request, the intelligence justification and statement of target requirements for overhead reconnaissance of Cuba (with copies also being sent by COMOR to the USIB for information and any comments prior to the Special Group meeting on 10/9/62.)

In summary, the intelligence justification, and the listing of requirements and specific objectives, which went forward to NRO from COMOR on 10/6 included the following:

(1) A statement of the pressing need for photographic coverage of the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, particularly with regard to (a) SA-2 sites, (b) possible MRBMs, (c) MIG-21 aircraft, and (d) tanks, artillery, and other conventional weapons and equipment "which are arriving in large quantities."

(2) SIGINT coverage to obtain up-to-date intelligence on the Soviet-furnished air defense buildup in Cuba which is known to include (a) radar -- EW, GCI, HF, MC, AQ and FC; (b) missile systems consisting of 3 confirmed and 1 probable cruise-type coastal defense short range missile sites, 15 SA-2 sites, and missile storage and support facilities; (c) MIGs -- 60 MIG-15/17/19 and 36 MIG-21s estimated; and (d) a general dispersal throughout Cuba of 30mm, 37mm and 57mm AAA to defend airfields, ports and military installations. (". . . a two-fold collection program is necessary: first, a continued coverage of the early warning (EW), ground control intercept (GCI), and communications networks which is now adequately covered by peripheral air, shipborne and ground efforts; second, overflight missions by a vehicle capable of stimulating this defense system into an offensive reaction. From this reaction, the readiness and effectiveness of weapons can be determined.")

(3) Conclusions: "Some of these requirements are currently being met by peripheral means. However, only overflights will permit the accomplishment of all objectives. COMOR will provide a continual review and up-dating of requirements."

(4) Recommendation: "It is recommended that reconnaissance programs be initiated to satisfy these requirements." (Source: DIA letter to Coyne, 11/13/62)

140. 10/4/62 - The Director, DIA, established a Cuba "Situation Room" operated on a 24-hour basis.

141. 10/4/62 - On this date at a meeting of the Special NSC 5412/2 Group, the DCI noted that U-2 flights were now restricted by the presence of SAM sites to the southeastern quadrant of Cuba. The DCI questioned whether this was a reasonable restriction at this time particularly since the SAMs were almost certainly not operational. The

(141. 10/4/62 Continued)

Special Group then directed the NRO to prepare an over-all program for reconnaissance of Cuba for presentation at the Special Group meeting of 10/9/62.

142. 10/9/62 - NSA units in Puerto Rico, Key West, Florida, and on the USS Oxford detected for the first time the Cuban air defense net. On October 27, 1962, this net shifted from an experimental to an operational status. The Cuban air defense net is now a Russian network in almost every respect, utilizing Russian call signs, the Russian grid system and Russian operators.

The Russians are employing the Albatross machine in Cuba. (The first time it has ever been detected outside of the Bloc except on Soviet ships in certain instances.) NSA has reason to believe that the Russians are possibly employing two Aluminum Scrambler links running between Havana and Moscow. (Aluminum is considered by the Russians to be their most secure Scrambler system. Up to now it has never been employed outside the USSR except on a Soviet cruiser and then only when Khrushchev was aboard.)
(Source: Deputy Director, NSA, 11/7/62)

143. 10/9/62 - NRO (Dr. Charyk) made a presentation to the Special Group of an over-all program for reconnaissance of Cuba. This presentation was based on the DIA-recommended, COMOR-proposed submission of a paper on "Intelligence Justification and Requirements for Overflights of Cuba."

"At the Special Group meeting on 9 October, NRO's first recommendation was 'A U-2 probe over the suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits.' This referred to the area targeted by COMOR near San Cristobal . . . The operation, which was to be supported by ELINT collection aircraft off the coast, also was designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites which was thought to be most nearly operational. Thus the secondary objective was to determine the status of SA-2 defenses in order to measure the risk involved in getting complete U-2 coverage of Cuba as rapidly as possible. NRO's second recommendation was therefore conditional: 'If there is no SA-2 reaction to the initial U-2 sortie, maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously, as soon as weather permits.' (There were also certain other recommendations for low level, oblique, and FIREFLY missions.)

"The Group gave first priority to the San Cristobal mission and recommended to the President that he approve it. The President gave his approval -- presumably learning of the San Cristobal reports at this time -- and the mission was immediately mounted. It was delayed by weather, however, from 10 through 12 October. On that date operational control was transferred to SAC by direction of the President in a meeting with the Deputy SecDef and the DCI. There is no reason to believe that the transfer in any way delayed launching the mission, which SAC flew on 14 October. The pilot did not fly the prescribed track, but took a course at an angle to it. Fortunately the planned and actual paths crossed over San Cristobal, and the primary mission was accomplished." (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)
NOTE: This is in error. See Item 143-a, next page.

143-a. (See Item 143, above.) On 12/7/62 SAC representatives exhibited to a Panel of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board the plan for and actual flight track of the 10/14/62 U-2 mission over Cuba, as laid out by SAC. The material shown to the Board Panel reflects that the pilot flew the mission precisely as prescribed.

(143. 10/9/62 Continued).

Prior to this decision, CIA had operated 21 U-2 missions over or peripheral to Cuba during 1962. The dates of these 21 missions are listed below:

1/19/62
2/2/62
2/21/62
3/15/62
4/1/62

5/2/62
5/22/62
6/6/62
6/15/62
6/18/62

6/29/62
7/8/62
7/12/62
8/5/62
8/29/62

9/5/62
9/17/62
9/26/62
9/29/62
10/5/62
10/7/62

(Source: NPIC)

144. 10/9/62 - The DCI briefed Congressman Cannon "on the Cuban situation." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

145. 10/9/62 - Senator Kenneth B. Keating, speaking on the floor of the U.S. Senate:

"Mr. President, the President of Cuba, like a two-bit Khrushchev, has disgraced the name of the United Nations . . .

"Cuba represents a new and menacing shift in the world balance of power . . . I trust that all of us, regardless of party, are united in the hope that this Nation, through its chosen leaders and in cooperation with its allies, will progress resolutely toward the stern decisions which may be necessary to deal with the Soviet cloud now darkening our national horizon . . .

"Late in August I called attention to the Russian arsenal in Cuba . . .

"My first suggestion, made August 31, called upon the Administration to tell the American people all of the facts about the island buildup. Reliable information had reached me concerning the number of ships, types of armament, and Soviet troops arriving in Cuba . . .

"On August 29, just 2 days earlier, the President told a reporter that he had no information that Russians were sending Nike-type missiles to Cuba, after the reporter cited a State Department source to that effect. Following my revelations on the Senate floor, on August 31, the Administration first declared, through a Senator on the other side of the aisle, that Senator Keating was 'misinformed'. Nevertheless, there followed from other quarters an effort to make it appear that the information I had reported had been released earlier by the State Department.

"On September 4, however, the President conceded that Nike-type missiles had been delivered to Castro and confirmed in almost every detail the facts I had stated 4 days earlier. The President characterized the buildup as 'defensive'. This in my view was a tremendous error and a serious concession to the Soviets. That was their line. It should not be ours.

(145. 10/9/62 Continued)

". . . Under Secretary of State Ball now admits that 85 ships have delivered troops and war goods to the island. He admits that 15 missile sites have been established, and it is estimated that the total will eventually reach 25. This knowledge has been possessed for a long time by many of us. Under Secretary Ball said . . . that four missile sites of different types have been identified. He said that these sites are similar to known Soviet defense missiles sites which are believed to contain anti-shipping missiles having a range of 20 to 25 miles. The significant sentence, rather buried away, is that several more such sites will be installed.

"Many other facts have been stated which have been known to some of us but which have not been publicly stated before. The statement was made that 4,500 troops are stationed in Cuba. It will be remembered that the first figure given was 3000. I stated that there were at least 5000. The first figure given by the President was 3000. That was advanced to 4200. It has now been advanced to 4500. I stand on my statement that more than 5000 troops are stationed in Cuba. Five thousand is a modest figure. But I commend the Under Secretary of State for revealing these additional facts . . ."
(Source: Congressional Record)

146. 10/10/62 - USIB discussed the COMOR submission on "Intelligence Justifications and Requirements for Overflight of Cuba", in response to the Special Group's request of 10/9 for USIB opinion regarding the COMOR-approved paper, especially as regards frequency of coverage for the various groups of objectives and targets proposed by COMOR. After discussion USIB agreed that the DCI should express to the Special Group USIB's view that (a) the targets in Groups II and III should be surveyed as promptly as possible and that the results of such initial surveillance should determine the subsequent frequency of coverage to be recommended, (b) COMOR submit for USIB consideration at its 10/17 meeting a specific list of those priority targets in Group IV which should be covered.

Group II and Group III listed "those targets for which surveillance is desired primarily to provide order of battle and operational status information. Ground resolution of 2-5 feet or better will suffice for this purpose. Group II includes targets for monthly coverage; Group III includes targets for weekly coverage."

Because the records of the NSC Special 5412/2 Group have been unavailable thus far to the Board's staff we are not clear as to what action was taken by the DCI on the basis of the USIB discussion of 10/10/62. (It may be that by this time or shortly thereafter, action on the USIB decision was overtaken by decisions at higher levels in Government including the decision of the President to transfer from CIA to SAC responsibility for operation of U-2 missions over Cuba.)

147. 10/10/62 - On this date CIA received Navy photographs taken of the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba, showing clearly identifiable IL-28 crates which later showed up in U-2 photography of 10/17 at San Julian airfield -- "along with a number of others which must have come in on unphotographed ships."
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

148. 10/10/62 - The DCI briefed the CIA Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee "on the buildup, including the IL-28s. He also commented on MRBMs essentially along the lines of his cables from Nice, adding that there were many experts who did not believe the Soviets would make such a move, but that he differed with them. He told the Subcommittee that he had authority for an overflight in the next day or so." (Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

149. 10/10/62 - On the floor of the U.S. Senate, Senator Keating declared that:

"Construction has begun on at least a half dozen launching sites for intermediate range tactical missiles. Intelligence authorities must have advised the President and top Government officials of this fact, and they must now have been told that ground-to-ground missiles can be operational from the island of Cuba within 6 months.

"My own sources on the Cuban situation, which have been 100 percent reliable, have substantiated this report completely.

"The fact of the matter is, according to my reliable sources, that six launching sites are under construction - pads which will have the power to hurl rockets into the American heartland and as far as the Panama Canal Zone."

(Source: Congressional Record)

150. 10/11/62 - On this date CIA reported in the President's Checklist the information from Navy photography of 10/10 showing IL-28 crates on the Soviet ship Kasimov off Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

151. 10/11/62 - On this date General Carter said to Senator Saltonstall "much the same thing" that the DCI had said on the preceding day to the CIA Appropriations Subcommittee of the House, i.e., that he differed with experts who were of the view that the Soviets would not place MRBMs in Cuba.
(Source: CIA Chronology, 11/7/62)

152. 10/11/62 - The CIA Chronology of 11/14/62 indicates that the "USIB principals . . . aware that they were dealing with an explosive political issue and aware also that 'leakage' of intelligence on offensive weapons, true or false, would seriously limit the President's freedom of action in dealing with what might become a major international crisis, they had evolved a system for limiting dissemination of such information. Analysis would continue and senior policy

(152. 10/11/62 Continued)

"officials would be briefed, but no material would appear in formal intelligence publications without the approval of the USIB principals. These instructions were first issued orally, (CIA does not say when) and later on October 11, 1962 formalized by USIB in the 'PSALM' system. The key passages in USIB's order were 'such information or intelligence will be disseminated outside each USIB intelligence component only to specific individuals on an EYES ONLY basis who by virtue of their responsibilities as advisers to the President have a need to know', and 'there is no intent, hereby, however, to inhibit the essential analytic process.' "

(Despite the advisory role to the President which is supposed to be performed by the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the latter Board was not included as one of the approved recipients for PSALM reports. Accordingly, the Board received its first official notification of offensive missiles in Cuba when the President made his address on 10/22. The Board thereafter requested the restricted "PSALM" intelligence reports which were made available to the Board by CIA on 10/29/62.)

153. 10/13/62 - General Carter of CIA addressed a letter to Mr. McGeorge Bundy requesting reconsideration of the Presidential decision to transfer from CIA to SAC operational responsibility for U-2 missions over Cuba. Mr. Bundy acknowledged General Carter's letter, stating in essence that the decision had been made and that it would stand. During the period immediately preceding and following the Presidential decision, CIA personnel expressed considerable concern relative to the transfer on the ground that SAC did not have capability or experience to effectively operate such U-2 photographic missions.

(The following resume of SAC U-2 operations is pertinent to the question raised by CIA as to SAC's competence to conduct overflights of Cuba: SAC established the 4080th Wing in May 1956, and U-2 aircraft began to arrive in June 1957. Thereafter, the 4080th operated from a variety of locations in Puerto Rico, Alaska, Panama, Australia, Guam, Okinawa, Korea, the United Kingdom and the United States. The 4080th flew peripheral photographic reconnaissance against the Kamchatka Peninsula, the Russian land mass in the East Siberian Sea, and the Laptev Sea area of Russia, obtaining thereby the first photographs of these areas available to Air Force planners. The 4080th has flown under every conceivable weather condition including snow, ice, fog and desert. In addition to photographic missions, it has flown U-2 ELINT missions during 1961 and 1962 in the Far North and Far East areas. Further, it has flown about 3500 sampling sorties since 1957 in support of the national effort. The 4080th's crews average 3500 hours, of which 600 hours is in U-2 aircraft. The 4080th has flown about 1500 overseas sorties. Since its establishment six years ago, eight crews have been lost by accidents (one RAF, seven USAF). During the period from October 14 through November 5, 1962, the 4080th had flown 36 U-2 sorties over Cuba, with the loss of one aircraft which was shot down on October 27, 1962.)
(Source: SAC, as provided to Coyne by Generals Power and Smith)

154. 10/14/62 - SAC flew its first U-2 mission over Cuba. This mission produced the first photographic identification of MRBM launch sites at San Cristobal No. 1. (This area had last been covered by a CIA U-2 flight on August 29.)

From 10/14/62 through 11/8/62 SAC flew 43 U-2 missions over Cuba:

October 14 - 1
October 15 - 2
October 17 - 6
October 18 - 2
October 19 - 3
October 20 - 3
October 22 - 3
October 23 - 3
October 25 - 1
October 27 - 1*
November 3 - 1
November 4 - 5
November 5 - 5
November 6 - 3#
November 7 - 2
November 8 - 2

TOTAL: 43

During the period October 23 through November 8, the Navy flew 54 F8U low-level (Blue Moon) photo flights over Cuba. In the same period the Air Force flew 52 low-level photo missions over Cuba.

---

*this mission was lost

#aborted.

155. 10/14-17/62 - During this period SAC U-2 missions identified 9 MRBM and IRBM sites in Cuba. The dates of identification and the dates of the last previous CIA U-2 coverage of these sites follow:

	Site Identified	Last Coverage Prior to Site Location
San Cristobal #1	14 Oct	29 Aug
San Cristobal #2	"	"
San Cristobal #3	"	"
San Cristobal #4	"	"
Sagua La Grande #1	17 Oct	05 Sep
Sagua La Grande #2	"	"
Guanajay #1	15 Oct	29 Aug
Guanajay #2	"	"
Remedios	17 Oct	05 Sep

156. 10/15/62 - In the early evening the read-out of SAC's initial U-2 mission over Cuba first became available. It reflected identification of an MRBM site in the San Cristobal area. The Director, DIA, notified a number of key civilian and military officials of the Department of Defense of this fact on the night of October 15, 1962. Similarly, the Deputy Director of Intelligence, CIA, notified Mr. McGeorge Bundy and Mr. Hilsman (who notified the Secretary of State). The following morning the President was notified.

157. 10/15/62 - Following SAC's flight the previous day, a meeting was held at the White House attended by Messrs. Bundy, Gilpatric, Johnson, McCone, Scoville, Charyk and General Taylor, and by General Kompton - SAC's Director of Operations, and General Smith - SAC's Director of Intelligence. Messrs. McCone and Scoville were

critical of SAC's ability to fly U-2 missions. At the meeting, Mr. Bundy reaffirmed the decision made on 10/12 and indicated that SAC should continue to fly these missions. Mr. Scoville was critical of SAC's flight plans for upcoming missions, and he complained that his office had not received the ELINT take from the first SAC mission of 10/14. Subsequent inquiry reflected that the ELINT take had been delivered to CIA immediately following its receipt, but that it had become bogged down in CIA's message center resulting in delay in its delivery to Mr. Scoville.

158. 10/15/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of crated IL-28s at San Julian.

158-a. 10/15/62 - General Carter briefed Senator Stennis ("before the photography of the previous day was available") along the same lines of his answer to Senator Saltonstall's question, four days earlier, about Senator Keating's charges of known MRBM sites in Cuba -- i.e., "General Carter said that there were refugee reports but no hard evidence". (Source: CIA Chronology 11/14/62)

159. 10/17/62 - A U-2 mission developed photographic evidence of uncrated IL-28s at San Julian.

160. 10/18/62 - Gromyko talked to President Kennedy at the White House, saying that he was instructed by the Soviet Government to state that Soviet assistance to Cuba "pursued solely the purpose of contributing to the defense capabilities of Cuba".

161. 10/18/62 - There was initiated the daily issuance of Joint Evaluation ("PSALM") Reports on the Soviet Missile Threat in Cuba -- prepared jointly by GMAIC, JAEIC, and NPIC, based on photographic, ELINT, COMINT, and other sources. These reports were cumulative beginning 10/18. (See Item 152, above)

162. 10/19/62 - The USSR is making a major military investment in Cuba with some of their most effective guided missile systems. The planning for this operation must have started at least one year ago and the operation itself begun last spring. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

163. 10/19/62 - On this date the first FRUITSET radar signal from Cuba was intercepted, possibly emitted from a SAM site at Senado. This was a C-Band signal, indicating that the USSR has committed its most recent version of the SA-2 system in Cuba. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

164. 10/19/62 - "There are several refugee reports indicating the presence of tactical (FROG) missiles in Cuba, although there is no photographic confirmation thus far". (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/19/62)

"Photography (Mission 5012 of 10/25) confirmed the presence of a FROG missile launcher in a vehicle park near Remedios . . . a tactical unguided rocket of 40,000 to 50,000 yard range, similar to the U. S. Honest John". (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/27/62)

165. 10/21/62 - This was the arrival date in Cuba of a TU 114 CLEAT transport. The unusual circumstance of KRUG flight tracking, normally reserved for especially important flights, suggests that high ranking Soviet command personnel may be among the 140 passengers aboard. (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/20/62)

166. 10/22/62 - By this date seven Soviet ships identified as possible ballistic missile carriers (having cargo hatch openings of at least 75 by 15 feet) had made a total of 13 trips to Cuba since "late July." These ships were the KASIMOV, KIMOVSK, KRASNOGRAD, OKHOTSK, OMSK, ORENBURG and POLTAVA.

As of 10/22 the KIMOVSK, OKHOTSK and POLTAVA were en route to Cuba. Two of these, the KIMOVSK (en route from the Baltic) and the OKHOTSK (from the Black Sea) "are among seven ships which were contacted by individual cipher messages from Moscow six hours after the President's public statement." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

167. 10/22/62 - The President made his radio-TV address to the Nation, reporting unmistakable evidence of a series of offensive missile sites in Cuba and noting that "the first preliminary hard information of this nature" was received by him at 9:00 A.M., on 10/16/62.

168. 10/23/62 - The President issued a Proclamation asserting that (1) world peace and U.S. security had been endangered by the establishment by the Sino-Soviet powers of an offensive military capability in Cuba, including bases for ballistic missiles (2) in a Joint Resolution passed by the Congress and approved on 10/3/62, it was declared that the U.S. was determined to prevent by whatever means necessary, including the use of arms, the Marxist-Leninist regime in Cuba from extending its agressive or subversive activities to any part of this hemisphere, and to prevent in Cuba the creation or use of an externally supported military capability endangering U.S. security, and (3) that the Organ of Consultation of the American Republics meeting in Washington on 10/23/62 had recommended that the Member States, in accordance with Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, take all measures, individually and collectively, including armed force, deemed necessary to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military material and related supplies threatening the peace and security of the Continent, and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent.

Therefore, the President proclaimed that the forces under his command were ordered, beginning at 2:00 P.M., on 10/24/62 to interdict the delivery of offensive weapons and associated material to Cuba, specifically: surface-to-surface missiles; bomber aircraft; bombs; air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles; warheads for any of the above weapons; mechanical or electronic equipment to support

(168. 10/23/62 Continued)

or operate the above items; and any other classes of material hereafter designated by the Secretary of Defense for purposes of effectuating this Proclamation.

The President authorized the Secretary of Defense to employ the land, sea and air forces of the U.S. (in cooperation with any forces made available by other American States) to carry out this Proclamation.

Further, the President authorized the interception of vessels or craft proceeding toward Cuba and the taking into custody of any vessel or craft failing to comply with directions to identify itself and submit to visit and search -- with force to be used only to the extent necessary.

169. 10/23/62 - A message passed within Cuba from Las Villas to Placetas suggested an intent to conceal "equipment" and "fuel station" in a railroad tunnel in an area south of the Remedios IRBM site. The message read: "Today situate equipment in the railroad tunnel of Placetas. Also situate the fuel station in this place." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/24/62)

170. 10/23/62 - The Director, DIA, initiated the issuance of daily shipping reports and of a summary of Soviet ship movements.

171. 10/24/62 - On this date Khrushchev "categorically stated" to American businessman W. E. Knox, in a conversation held in the Kremlin, that "the weapons which the Soviet Union had furnished to Cuba included antiaircraft missiles and ballistic missiles with both conventional and thermonuclear warheads." Khrushchev added that "even the Americans would not trust their NATO allies by turning over thermonuclear devices to them." (Source: N.Y. Times Magazine, 11/18/62)

172. 10/25/62 - The DIA initiated the issuance of a Special Intelligence Summary on Cuba.

173. 10/26/62 - James Reston, writing in the New York Times, stated: "Privately, there are several misgivings. First, many people find it hard to believe that the offensive Soviet missile sites in Cuba suddenly mushroomed over the weekend. Accordingly, there is considerable suspicion either that the official's intelligence was not as good as maintained, or the Administration withheld the facts."

174. 10/28/62 - SCRAMBLER communications were established between the USSR and Cuba. "We consider these links as the best candidates identified to date for Soviet command and control of the missile forces in Cuba." (Source: Joint Evaluation Report, 10/28/62)

175. 10/28/62 - Until immediately prior to the President's statement of this date welcoming Khrushchev's decision to stop building bases in Cuba, dismantling offensive weapons and returning them to the Soviet Union, it appears that in Cuba the Soviets continued at feverish pace with the construction and camouflaging of their MRBM and IRBM bases in Cuba.

176. 10/29/62 - By this date, accumulated evidence showed that the Russians had put first-line modern equipment in Cuba, including such items as FRUITSET radar with C-Band, armored personnel carriers, etc.

177. 10/30/62 - Senator Scott of Pennsylvania, appearing on the CBS radio program "The Leading Question" on the night of 10/30/62, said that he and other Republicans had "very hard information early in September that the Russians were building missile bases in Cuba." Senator Scott said, "We knew it began early in September and any information we had we knew was available to the administration and to the President." Referring to President Kennedy's radio-television broadcast of 10/22 in which the President said that he received the first preliminary hard information of the offensive missile buildup on Tuesday, 10/16, Senator Scott declared, "You don't build a missile site in a week. Those missile bases were there a long, long time before the President spoke." Senator Scott further stated, "On September 13 Secretary of State Dean Rusk in testimony before the Armed Services Committee admitted that a Soviet arms build-up was going on in Cuba." He added, "I think the only conclusion can be that the President himself may not have received the information -- there may have been a failure of intelligence. On the other hand, there may have been a cautious reluctance to move which is understandable but was not shared by the Republican Party or the American people." (Source: Washington Evening Star, 10/31/62)

178. 10/31/62 - Writing in the New York Times under the heading "An Intelligence Gap" Hanson Baldwin stated "The effectiveness of the country's intelligence organization is again in question as a result of the Cuban Crisis."

"Considerable mystery, in the opinion of some members of Congress and military men, still surrounds the Administration's sudden decision to impose a blockade of Cuba after a missile buildup that must have started weeks or months ago. The questions being asked are primarily these: Was the nation's factual information about the Communist military buildup in Cuba adequate in quantity and quality, and was there a long delay after the missiles actually arrived?"

"Were the interpretation and evaluation of this information influenced by policy considerations; in other words, were the estimates tailored to fit top policy beliefs? Or did Administration officials, until action was finally taken, reject the intelligence estimates as erroneous?"

"Has the marked centralization of intelligence activities in the two years of the Kennedy Administration improved or hampered the production of objective, nonpartisan intelligence analyses?"

179. 11/5/62 - Dr. Charyk, Under Secretary of the Air Force, expressed to Board Member Gordon Gray the opinion that the following lessons were learned from the Cuba situation:

(1) There is a need for a group at the policy level, having access to all pertinent intelligence, which can perform the task of rapidly identifying intelligence requirements and objectives. (Dr. Charyk believed that in this instance USIB did not perform the function he had in mind.)

(2) There is need for a focal point to ensure the availability of intelligence-related resources for use in contingency situations (e.g., film for photographic reconnaissance purposes).

(3) Comparisons of CORONA and U-2 photography of Cuba reveal significant instances where U-2 photography was positive, whereas CORONA photography of the same targets had been interpreted as negative. Dr. Charyk felt that based on this experience it is obvious that satellite photography cannot be wholly relied upon when it provides negative evidence. He observed that this gives one pause when we consider the reliance which has been placed on satellite photography for evidence of missile installations in the USSR. (Dr. Charyk added that recent satellite photography shows a new missile site at Tyura Tam which is not served by rail facilities heretofore noted as an identifying characteristic of this type of missile installation -- suggesting the possibility that our readings of satellite photography have failed to locate other missile sites because of the absence of rail or other characteristics we have assumed for them.)

180. 11/6/62 - The Washington Star of this date records the report of Fernando Garcia Chacon, a Havana lawyer and an agent of the Students Revolutionary Directorate, that Soviet missiles have been placed in seven caves and other underground installations in Cuba. (At Hershey, Victoria, Fenon, Sierra de Cubitas, Las Villas Province, Oriente Province and Pinar del Rio Province.) Garcia reported that the underground sites are strongly guarded by Russians and that no Cubans have been allowed to approach them since the sites were completed. Garcia's student group issued a statement in Miami claiming that "The free world is on the verge of being a victim of a new swindle of the Soviet Union. We have in our hands sufficient information that there exist on Cuban territory bases of missiles like the ones that have caused the present crisis and some of even greater range in subterranean installations that cannot be photographed by reconnaissance aircraft.

"The photo planes have localized on Cuban territory nearly 30 launching pads while our information assures us that there are many more missiles in Cuba. The Soviet Union can take out of Cuba and permit the inspection of more than 50 missiles, but there are on Cuban territory sufficient missiles to destroy half the continent."

181. 11/6/62 - (IL-28s) As of this date photographic evidence reflected the following regarding IL-28 medium jet bombers in Cuba:

9 already assembled or in the process of assembly at St. Julian
20 packaged in crates at St. Julian
9 packaged in crates at Holguin
4 packaged in crates at a point near Holguin
TOTAL: 42 IL-28s in Cuba

182. 11/9/62 - When the DCI met with the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board on this date, he reported that from France he had protested, without success, the conclusions reached by USIB in the SNIE on the Soviet buildup in Cuba, and in commenting upon the lessons to be learned from the recent developments pertaining to Cuba, the DCI (1) expressed the belief that "we were too timid with respect to the conduct of surveillance operations over Cuba in September;" (2) expressed concern because of the lack of weight given to refugee reports by the intelligence analysts; (3) expressed the view that a state of mind had developed in the intelligence community to the effect that the Soviets just simply would not undertake an offensive ballistic missile buildup in Cuba; (4) reported that CIA has been operating three rather ineffective intelligence teams in Cuba but that they have not produced hard intelligence on the subject because they have been occupying themselves mainly with staying alive; (5) advised that there were approximately 40 third-country agents (meaning diplomats) reporting from foreign embassies in Cuba but that CIA "obtained no hard intelligence from them regarding the military buildup;" (6) advised that from the standpoint of reasonable and proper UN verification we do not have satisfactory coverage of Cuba, and that "we have little unofficial on-site information;" and (7) stated that currently CIA "is not getting intelligence on Cuba through conventional means."

183. 11/9/62 - When the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, met with the Board on this date, he expressed the view that there was danger in placing undue reliance on photography in seeking answers to questions that plague us from the standpoint of intelligence. He noted that DIA received no significant information from agent sources concerning the Soviet missile buildup. He suggested that the Army should play an increasing role in terms of clandestine intelligence penetration of Cuba. He also noted that an additional important lesson to be learned was that there must be provided to the Washington area a first class photo processing facility if we are to be prepared adequately for similar Cuban situations in the future.

184. 11/9/62 - When Mr. Thomas Hughes, Acting Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, met with the Board on this date, he identified the following areas as warranting further examination: (1) The need for establishing an improved capability for the evaluation of indicators as distinguished from the process of preparing intelligence estimates; (2) The need for getting across to top level officials the full brunt of such indicators. (Hughes noting that this did not happen in State, and in fact that State received some of the refugee indicator reports as much as two months after they had

(184. 11/9/62 Continued)

been prepared.); (3) The need for clandestine intelligence collection. (Hughes noting that we do not have espionage agents on the ground in Cuba providing significant data.); (4) The need for a better warning mechanism; (5) The need for registering with USIB views such as those expressed by the DCI from the Riviera. (Hughes noting, as did the Director, DIA, that the DCI's dissent was registered internally within CIA, but was not communicated to USIB until after the Cuban crisis broke.)

185. 11/14/62 - The President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, following its preliminary review of the subject on 11/9/62 requested the DCI for "a review on an all-source, all-agency basis of the actions taken and results obtained within the intelligence community in providing intelligence coverage, reporting and estimates on the developing buildup." The Board requested that the report setting forth the results of the intelligence community's review include: (a) an identification of the requirements levied on intelligence collection elements of the Government, (b) a resume of the intelligence information obtained from such sources as foreign diplomatic personnel, Cuban refugee interrogations, in-place agent reports, COMINT, and ELINT, (c) the scope of distribution given such information to higher authority and laterally within the intelligence community, and (d) the extent to which such information was reflected in reports and assessments provided to policy level officials.

186. 11/21/62 - The Minutes of the USIB Meeting of this date reflect the following entry: "Noted a view expressed by General Carter in related discussion of the Cuban situation that, for intelligence planning for the future, Cuba should be considered as a satellite of the USSR."

187. 11/23/62 - The DIA Summary of this date contains a detailed analysis of Soviet military forces in Cuba as of 11/23. In summary the analysis states "Soviet military forces in Cuba are now believed to number about 16,000, including some 4,000 ground combat troops, 3,000 IRBM and MRBM personnel, 7,800 in air defense and air force elements, and 1,200 naval personnel."

188. 11/24/62 - Broadcasting from Havana on this date Allen Oxley stated (heard on CBS in New York) that "there is now no doubt that not all the Russian missiles have been withdrawn from Cuba. While the Russians have removed 42 missiles it is known that others remain and one type - a rocket with a range of about 25 miles - is believed to be controlled by the Cubans . . . . Information received from Mariel and Bayia Onde, the two main seaports of the Province of Pina Del Rio reveals that at least 88 medium and long range missiles were unloaded there from Russian ships; 36 in the month of September and 52 in October. In addition a large number of short range rockets arrived . . . There are unconfirmed reports of missiles remaining in Cuba

(188. 11/24/62 Continued)

"which have been hidden underground in concrete shelters where American reconnaissance planes cannot detect them. The island is alive with rumors, and it is difficult to sift the facts out of the stories of the big Russian military buildup still going on. Some of these stories tell of big concrete constructions in the wooded countryside and underground rocket bases still being built by the Russians in the mountains. . ."

189. 11/26/62 - At Homestead Air Force Base, Florida, the President commended the Strategic Air Command and the Tactical Air Command for the photographs which they had taken "which first gave us conclusive proof of the build-up of offensive weapons in Cuba." The President noted that "the work of these two units has contributed as much to the security of the United States as any unit in our history, and any group of men in our history."

On the same date at Key West, the President commended the Navy stating: "We express particular thanks to you for your work of the last five weeks. The reconnaissance flights which enabled us to determine with precision the offensive build-up in Cuba contributed directly to the security of the United States in the most important and significant way."

190. 12/4/62 - In a briefing provided to Messrs. Gray and Coyne, the Director, DIA, advised that photographic intelligence identified 33 MRBMs in Cuba; that it subsequently identified 42 MRBMs on board ship departing Cuba; that the Soviets removed either partially or totally the canvass covers on 36 of the 42 outgoing MRBMs (the Soviets refused to exhibit 6 of them) and in all instances the skins of the missiles were in no way removed; that no IRBMs were detected entering, in, or exiting Cuba; that the intelligence community estimates that the IRBMs had not yet been introduced into Cuba but may have been on some of the ships which turned back at the time the quarantine was declared; that the 9 known MRBM-IRBM bases in Cuba have been dismantled; that no evidence has been developed reflecting the existence of nuclear warheads in Cuba; that it would be relatively simple to introduce such warheads with little likelihood of detection; that "black boxes" were employed with negative results in an endeavor to detect nuclear emanations from the ships exiting Cuba with the MRBM.

The Director, DIA, also reported that photographic evidence reflected that at least 42 IL-28s had been introduced into Cuba; that as of this date three of the IL-28s have been put aboard a Soviet vessel which has exited Cuba; that assembly of other IL-28s has apparently ceased; and there are indications that the remaining IL-28s may be in the process of being readied for shipment out of Cuba.